Title: City of Orange Beach v. Boles.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: June 16, 2023 
Corr: August 3, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
1210055 
_________________________ 
 
City of Orange Beach 
 
v. 
 
Ian Boles 
 
 
 
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court 
(CV-16-900955) 
 
_________________________ 
 
1210056 
_________________________ 
 
1210055; 1210056 
2 
 
City of Orange Beach 
 
v. 
 
Ian Boles 
 
 
 
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court 
(CV-17-900361) 
 
 
SHAW, Justice. 
 
In these consolidated appeals, the City of Orange Beach ("the City") 
appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in two consolidated 
actions below in favor of Ian Boles in regard to a dispute over the City's 
inspection of Boles's property.  We reverse and remand.   
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Between 2013 and 2015 Boles constructed, without any apparent 
issues, two eight-bedroom duplexes on property he owned that is located 
within the City limits ("the beachfront property").  In September 2015, 
Boles filed with the City a building-permit application seeking a permit 
to construct two additional multiple-level duplexes on the beachfront 
property.  Additionally, in October 2015, Boles filed with the City a 
separate building-permit application for the construction of a single-
1210055; 1210056 
3 
 
family dwelling on another parcel of property that Boles owned within 
the City limits ("the Burkhart Drive property").  At the time of each 
permit request, Boles completed a "Home Builders Affidavit" attesting 
that he was the owner of the property; that he would be acting as his own 
contractor on the proposed project, which would not be offered for sale; 
and that he was, thus, exempt from the requirement that he be licensed 
under Alabama's Home Builders Licensure Law.  See, generally, § 34-
14A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.    
As to each of Boles's requests, both the building-permit application 
itself and an accompanying stormwater-permit application specifically 
provided that the applicant agreed, among other things, that the 
proposed construction would comply with the provisions of the 2012 
International Residential Code, which the City had adopted, as well as 
with the City's ordinances.  See, generally, § 11-45-8, Ala. Code 1975.  
The City approved both building-permit applications.  In accordance with 
the City's standard operating procedure at the time, the building-permit 
packages issued to Boles provided that a "subcontractor list must be 
submitted to [the] City … finance department prior to [an electrical 
and/or gas] meter[-]release inspection."  (Capitalization and emphasis 
1210055; 1210056 
4 
 
omitted.)1  Elsewhere, the building-permit packages provided to Boles 
explained that a certificate of occupancy for the proposed structure would 
not be issued until, among other things, "a subcontractor list has been 
submitted to the [City's] Finance Department."  Boles also received with 
each package a blank subcontractor list ("the subcontractor form") for 
identifying all subcontractors for the proposed project, which specified 
that it was due within 10 days of the issuance of the building permits.   
As explained by the City, the subcontractor form was used by its 
 
1Section 34-14A-13, Ala. Code 1975, provides: 
 
"It is the duty of the building official, or other authority 
charged with the duty, of issuing building or similar permits, 
of any incorporated municipality or subdivision of the 
municipality or county, to refuse to issue a permit for any 
undertaking which would require a license hereunder unless 
the applicant has furnished evidence that he or she is either 
licensed as required by this chapter or is exempt from the 
requirements of this chapter [i.e., § 34-14A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 
1975].   … The builder shall submit to the issuing municipality 
if requested a list of the subcontractors with correct physical 
address and phone numbers involved in the construction 
project within 15 days of the issuance of the building permit.  
Should the builder add any other subcontractor to the project, 
the builder will submit the subcontractor's name, address, 
and phone number to the municipality within three working 
days of hiring.  An updated list of subcontractors shall be 
furnished by the builder before the issuance of a certificate of 
occupancy by the municipality." 
 
1210055; 1210056 
5 
 
Finance Department to verify that contractors or subcontractors were 
properly licensed.  The subcontractor form included, as to each 
subcontractor performing work on a project, a space for recording the 
subcontractor's license number, the type of work performed, the 
subcontractor's contact information, and the amount the subcontractor 
received for performance of the specified work.  The record suggests that 
the verification process included not only verifying that a particular 
contractor had "applied for a City license, but also [to] check if there was 
any other State licenses that might be applicable" or concurrently 
required.  See, e.g., § 34-14A-2(12), Ala. Code 1975 (defining a 
"residential home builder" as including those who assist undertaking 
construction "to be used by another as a residence when the cost of the 
undertaking exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000)"); § 34-14A-5, Ala. 
Code 1975 (requiring "residential home builders" to be licensed). 
Landon Smith, the City's "chief building official" at all pertinent 
times, described the required subcontractor form as serving the following 
purposes: 
"First, it is meant to ensure that all subcontractors working 
within the City are properly licensed.  Second, the form 
provides assurance that the City is abiding by regulations 
pertaining to certain state-regulated trades, including 
1210055; 1210056 
6 
 
homebuilding, general contracting, roofing, gas, plumbing, 
mechanical and electrical.  The form is also used to obtain 
contact information for subcontractors.  From time to time the 
City may need to contact subcontractors to have them answer 
questions about work being performed or to secure or remove 
equipment in certain circumstances such as potential storm 
events." 
 
Evidence in the record also indicated that the City was aware that all 
potential subcontractors might not be known in the early stages of a 
project and that, as construction on permitted projects proceeded, the 
City would, even in the absence of a completed subcontractor form, 
conduct any and all inspections up to the meter-release inspection, but 
that a completed subcontractor form was a prerequisite for a meter-
release inspection because, by that point in construction, the information 
necessary to complete the subcontractor form should be readily available.   
Following issuance of both permits, Boles apparently proceeded as 
planned with construction at the beachfront property and at the 
Burkhart Drive property, including subcontracting out certain work and 
undergoing various periodic inspections by the City as construction 
progressed.  It is undisputed that, after obtaining those permits and 
undertaking construction, Boles did not complete and timely return to 
the City a completed subcontractor form for either project.   
1210055; 1210056 
7 
 
In June 2016, as construction at the beachfront property was 
nearing completion, Boles's electrical subcontractor apparently contacted 
the City to request an electrical meter-release inspection upon 
completion of the electrical portion of that project, i.e., the subcontractor 
sought the required City approval before permanent electrical power 
service could be supplied to the beachfront property.  Citing Boles's 
failure to complete and return the required subcontractor form, the City, 
through Smith, refused to conduct the meter-release inspection.   
In response, Boles offered to provide "the names and information of 
the major subcontractors, but not the amount in which those 
subcontractors were paid" -- as he had allegedly done with prior projects 
within the City limits.  Also according to Boles, based upon the City's 
issuance, at various stages of construction, of other construction-related 
permits to his subcontractors, the City "already [was] in possession of the 
information it [was] withholding the inspection for."  Referencing "the 
governing rules stating that a building inspector shall inspect … property 
for safety," Boles further contended that the City and Smith either lacked 
the authority to and/or were exceeding their authority in refusing to 
inspect the beachfront property until the City received information to 
1210055; 1210056 
8 
 
which, according to Boles, it was not entitled.   
After an unsuccessful appeal of the City's refusal to conduct the 
meter-release inspection at the beachfront property to the City's 
Construction Board of Adjustment and Appeals, Boles sued the City and 
Smith (case no. CV-16-900955) in the Baldwin Circuit Court, asserting 
claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as claims seeking 
monetary damages.  In particular, as stated in Boles's fourth amended 
complaint, he sought a judgment declaring "that [t]he City and Smith 
have no authority to require Boles to provide financial information in 
regards to his subcontractors," a preliminary injunction directing that 
the City immediately conduct a meter-release inspection at the 
beachfront property as requested, a permanent injunction, compensatory 
damages, and "such other, further or different relief as may be just and 
proper."  In their ensuing answers, the City and Smith pleaded, among 
other things, both "substantive immunity" and "the benefit of all statutes 
and common law conferring immunity on municipalities."   
Following a hearing, the trial court awarded Boles, as to the 
beachfront property, a preliminary injunction "to the extent that the 
[City] is to conduct the electrical inspection and meter[-]release … 
1210055; 1210056 
9 
 
inspection which would allow [Boles] to continue construction on the 
building subject to the litigation."  Pursuant to the trial court's order, the 
City performed the requested meter-release inspection at the beachfront 
property.  All issues identified during that inspection were subsequently 
corrected, and the meter was released for service.   
Subsequently, when construction at the Burkhart Drive property 
neared completion, the City emailed Boles, noting that, although his 
electrical subcontractor had requested a meter-release inspection, the 
City had yet to receive a completed subcontractor form from Boles for 
that project.  The City's email correspondence further provided 
instructions for Boles's submission of the completed subcontractor form 
and indicated that, "[u]pon receipt and review, [the City would] schedule 
the electrical meter[-]release inspection."  Boles, however, through legal 
counsel, declined to furnish the completed subcontractor form but, 
nonetheless, demanded that the City perform the requested meter-
release inspection. 
 
Thereafter, the City commenced in the Baldwin Circuit Court its 
own declaratory-judgment action against Boles (case no. CV-17-900361) 
with regard to the project at the Burkhart Drive property.  Specifically, 
1210055; 1210056 
10 
 
among other relief, the City sought a judgment declaring that Smith was 
authorized to require a building-permit holder to provide a completed 
subcontractor form for a permitted project; that applicants like Boles, 
who have applied for and accepted a building permit, are required to 
provide the completed subcontractor form as a condition of inspection; 
and that the City was authorized to withhold scheduling meter-release 
inspections and/or a certificate of occupancy until the completed 
subcontractor form is provided.   
 
Boles filed an answer denying the City's allegations and an 
accompanying counterclaim.  In his counterclaim, Boles stated that he 
had offered to provide information regarding his subcontractors but was 
merely unwilling to disclose the amounts those subcontractors were paid, 
that he believed that the City already possessed the pertinent 
information, and that the City was exceeding its authority by refusing to 
inspect the project at the Burkhart Drive property.  Thus, Boles again 
requested injunctive relief mandating an immediate inspection, a 
judgment declaring "that the City has no authority to require Boles to 
provide financial information in regards to his subcontractors," and 
damages.  On the motion of Boles, case no. CV-16-900955 and case no. 
1210055; 1210056 
11 
 
CV-17-900361 were, over the City's objection, consolidated, and Boles 
was permitted to demand a jury trial on his counterclaims.  In answer to 
Boles's counterclaims, the City acknowledged that it had not performed 
the meter-release inspection at the Burkhart Drive property based on 
Boles's continued refusal to complete the subcontractor form required by 
the City and, among other things, again asserted the applicability of "all 
statutes and common law conferring immunity on municipalities" and, 
more specifically, the doctrine of "substantive immunity."   
The parties later obtained the trial court's ratification of an 
agreement aimed at resolving "preliminary inspection issues" with 
regard to the Burkhart Drive property.  Pursuant to that agreement, 
Boles agreed to identify and to provide contact information for all 
subcontractors on that project who performed work in certain identified 
disciplines and who were paid in excess of $10,000 for their work on the 
project.  In exchange, the City agreed to "perform all Inspections 
concerning the structure's compliance with the relevant building codes, 
to specifically include the electrical meter[-]release and certificate of 
occupancy inspections."  Thus, as with the beachfront property, the 
meter-release inspection at the Burkhart Drive property ultimately 
1210055; 1210056 
12 
 
occurred during the pendency of the underlying litigation; the meter was 
released for service as a result; and a certificate of occupancy issued for 
the Burkhart Drive property.   
After the settlement of Boles's claims against Smith and Boles's 
withdrawal of any claims for punitive damages, the matter ultimately 
proceeded to a jury trial on Boles's claims for damages allegedly resulting 
from the City's actions.  At the conclusion of Boles's evidence, the City 
requested the entry of a judgment as a matter of law in its favor.  Among 
other grounds, the City, relying on Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385 
(Ala. 1982), reasserted its claim of substantive immunity, which the City 
maintained "precludes the assessment of liability in this case."  
Specifically, according to the City, "the duty to inspect is a public duty, 
not a private duty," and "the benefit doesn't inure to the private property 
owner[,] it inures to the public as a whole."  The trial court denied that 
motion. 
At the close of all the evidence, the City renewed its motion for a 
judgment as a matter of law in its favor.  Again, based on substantially 
similar findings, the trial court denied that request. 
The trial court subsequently instructed the jury, among other 
1210055; 1210056 
13 
 
things, that, to return a verdict for Boles, it must find that Boles had 
successfully demonstrated that the City was negligent in failing to 
inspect his properties.  The jury ultimately rendered a verdict in favor of 
Boles and awarded corresponding damages.  Thereafter, in accordance 
with the verdict, the trial court entered a judgment and awarded 
damages to Boles "in the amount of $792,247.00 for lost rental income, 
$343,917.00 for lost holding costs, $2,375,955.00 for lost future profits on 
possible duplex construction, and $267,881.00 for consolidation loan 
costs, plus the costs of Court."  The City subsequently filed a 
postjudgment motion seeking, alternatively, a judgment as a matter of 
law in its favor, a new trial, or a remittitur of the damages awards.  In 
that motion, the City again maintained that it was entitled to substantive 
immunity and lodged various challenges to the damages awards.  
Following the denial by operation of law of its postjudgment motion, see 
Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., the City appealed.2 
Standard of Review 
"This Court's standard for reviewing a ruling on a 
 
2The City's appeal from the judgment as it pertains to case no. CV-
16-900955 was assigned appeal no. 1210055; its appeal from the 
judgment as it pertains to case no. CV-17-900361 was assigned appeal 
no. 1210056.  This Court consolidated the appeals.   
1210055; 1210056 
14 
 
motion for a [judgment as a matter of law ('JML')] is well-
settled. 
 
"'When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a 
JML, this Court uses the same standard the trial 
court used initially in granting or denying the 
motion.  Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 
689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997). Regarding questions of 
fact, the ultimate issue is whether the nonmovant 
has presented sufficient evidence to allow the case 
or issue to be submitted to the jury for a factual 
resolution.  Carter v. Henderson, 598 So. 2d 1350 
(Ala. 1992). In an action filed after June 11, 1987, 
the nonmovant must present substantial evidence 
to withstand a motion for a JML.  See § 12-21-12, 
Ala. Code 1975; West v. Founders Life Assurance 
Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).  A 
reviewing court must determine whether the party 
who bears the burden of proof has produced 
substantial evidence creating a factual dispute 
requiring resolution by the jury.  Carter, 598 So. 
2d at 1353.  In reviewing a ruling on a motion for 
a JML, this Court views the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmovant and entertains 
such reasonable inferences as the jury would have 
been free to draw.  Id.  If the question is one of law, 
this Court indulges no presumption of correctness 
as to the trial court's ruling. Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. 
Pappas & Co., 599 So. 2d 1126 (Ala. 1992).' 
 
"Ex parte Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 1237, 1240 (Ala. 
1999)." 
 
Thompson Props. 119 AA 370, Ltd. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow Co., 
897 So. 2d 248, 260-61 (Ala. 2004). 
Discussion 
1210055; 1210056 
15 
 
 
Boles's claims for damages hinged on there being a duty on the part 
of the City to inspect Boles's projects at the beachfront property and at 
the Burkhart Drive property and demonstrating that the City was 
negligent in failing to conduct those inspections.  Among its several 
arguments on appeal, the City contends, as it did below, that, with regard 
to conduct involving building inspections, it is protected from liability by 
the doctrine of substantive immunity.  We agree and find this argument 
determinative.   
 
The doctrine of substantive immunity was adopted by this Court in 
Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1982).  In that case, the 
plaintiffs' residence was connected to and served by the sewer and water 
systems of the City of Mobile.  Because an overflow trap had not been 
installed in the sewer line leading to the residence, the sewer line backed-
up and overflowed into the plaintiffs' home.  The plaintiffs sued, alleging 
that the city was negligent in failing to inspect or in inspecting the sewer 
lines and connection to the plaintiffs' residence.  410 So. 2d at 385.  This 
Court held that the doctrine of substantive immunity prevented the city 
from being held liable: 
"There is, indeed, a sense in which the duty of the City's 
employees, as inspectors, is a duty flowing to the individual 
1210055; 1210056 
16 
 
homeowners.  But to stop here and impose liability is to 
overlook what we perceive as overriding public policy reasons 
to hold to the contrary.   
 
"These policy considerations may be expressed in terms 
of the broader requirement of the City to provide for the public 
health, safety, and general welfare of its citizenry.  While, as 
here, the individual homeowner is affected by the discharge of 
the City sewer inspector's duty, the City's larger obligation to 
the whole of its resident population is paramount; and the 
imposition of liability upon the City, particularly where the 
Plaintiffs' reliance upon the public inspection is secondary 
and inferential to their reliance upon the building contractor, 
necessarily threatens the benefits of such services to the 
public-at-large. 
 
"…We believe these public policy considerations, 
however, override the general rule and prevent the imposition 
of a legal duty, the breach of which imposes liability, in those 
narrow areas of governmental activities essential to the well-
being of the governed, where the imposition of liability can be 
reasonably calculated to materially thwart the City's 
legitimate efforts to provide such public services." 
 
410 So. 2d at 386-87.   
Decisions following Rich further applied the doctrine of substantive 
immunity to other claims regarding a municipality's alleged negligent 
failure to perform inspections.  In Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So. 
2d 889, 889-90 (Ala. 1991), the plaintiff contended that the City of 
Huntsville had negligently inspected the wiring in an apartment 
1210055; 1210056 
17 
 
complex, which later burned, resulting in the death of the plaintiff's wife 
and two children.  In upholding the trial court's judgment in favor of the 
city, this Court stated:  
 
"Clearly, the same policy considerations that prevailed 
in Rich are equally compelling in this case. Although 
inspections performed by the city's electrical inspectors are 
designed to protect the public by making sure that municipal 
standards are met, and although they are essential to the 
well-being of the governed, the electrical code, fire code, 
building code, and other ordinances and regulations to which 
[the plaintiff] refers are not meant to be an insurance policy 
or a guarantee that each building in the city is in compliance. 
While [the plaintiff] calls to our attention the inherent danger 
of electricity, it is precisely because of the dangerous nature 
of that element that immunity should be granted to a 
municipality that, although not required by law to do so, 
chooses to provide for the public health, safety, and general 
welfare of its citizenry through the regulation of this 
inherently dangerous element." 
 
585 So. 2d at 892. 
 
A similar holding was reached in Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 295 So. 
3d 625 (Ala. 2019) (plurality opinion).  In that case, the City of Tuskegee's 
building code required rental properties to have smoke detectors and to 
be inspected before utilities could be turned on at the property.  295 So. 
3d at 627.  The plaintiff contended that the city had failed to properly 
inspect her mother's residence to ensure that it was equipped with proper 
1210055; 1210056 
18 
 
fire-detection and fire-alarm systems, which, the plaintiff alleged, led to 
her mother's death in a fire.  295 So. 3d at 637.  The opinion stated:  "As 
was the case in Hilliard, although individual residents of the City derive 
a benefit from the inspections, the inspections are designed to protect the 
public by ensuring that municipal standards are met," and, thus, the 
Court determined that the city was entitled to substantive immunity.  
295 So. 3d at 641.   
 
The doctrine of substantive immunity has also been held to apply 
when a municipality refuses to act.  In Bill Salter Advertising, Inc. v. City 
of Atmore, 79 So. 3d 646 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), a billboard-advertising 
company and its owner sued the City of Atmore and its building official 
who, based on an interpretation of the city's sign ordinance, refused to 
allow the advertising company to rebuild certain signs damaged by a 
hurricane.  The plaintiffs asserted claims seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief, as well as a claim for damages based on the theory that 
the defendants had allegedly intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs' 
business relationships. 79 So. 3d at 647. 
 
The city's board of adjustment ultimately determined that the signs 
could be rebuilt under certain conditions.  79 So. 3d at 648.  The trial 
1210055; 1210056 
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court subsequently entered a summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants on the intentional-interference claim, and the plaintiffs 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals.  79 So. 3d at 649. 
 
The Court of Civil Appeals described the doctrine of substantive 
immunity in part as follows: "[T]he lack of anything other than an 
incidental duty to a particular individual prevents the municipality from 
being liable for damages, because a breach of a duty owed to the general 
public will not form the basis for a negligence claim by an individual 
citizen."  79 So. 3d at 652 (citing Hilliard, 585 So. 2d at 891).  The court 
held:   
"In the present case, the city chose to enact a sign ordinance, 
and the city and [its building official], acting in his official 
capacity, decided that, under their interpretation of the 
ordinance, [the plaintiffs] could not rebuild [their] hurricane-
damaged signs. The sign ordinance was not enacted to provide 
a benefit to the … plaintiffs. Instead, the ordinance was 
enacted to benefit the municipality as a whole. Thus, … we 
conclude that the … plaintiffs failed to establish a duty owed 
to them by the city …. Therefore, based on the doctrine of 
substantive immunity, the summary judgment in favor of the 
city and [its building official] … on the … plaintiffs' claim for 
damages arising out of the city defendants' interpretation and 
enforcement of the city's sign ordinance is affirmed." 
 
79 So. 3d at 652-53. 
1210055; 1210056 
20 
 
 
In the instant cases, the City required inspections of residences 
before permitting them to be connected to electrical power.  As part of 
that process, the City requested certain information, such as the 
information requested on the subcontractor form.  Boles contends that 
the City had a duty to perform the meter-release inspections despite his 
failure to provide the completed subcontractor forms and that the City 
was negligent in failing to conduct those inspections.  The City's 
performance of meter-release inspections, like the performance of the 
inspections at issue in Rich, Hilliard, and Tuskegee, was to "protect the 
public by making sure that municipal standards are met" and were 
"essential to the well-being of the governed."  Hilliard, 585 So. 2d at 892.  
The City's performance of the meter-release inspections thus did not 
establish a legal duty to Boles.  To hold that the City's building 
permitting process in fact imposed a legal duty to Boles to perform the 
meter-release inspections, even if he was not in compliance with that 
process, and that the breach of that duty imposes liability would 
"materially thwart the City's legitimate efforts to provide such public 
services."  Rich, 410 So. 2d at 387.  Finding liability on the part of the 
City in these cases would make the City disinclined to inspect property 
1210055; 1210056 
21 
 
in the first place, to the detriment of the public as a whole, which benefits 
from such inspections.  This is especially true when the alleged breach of 
such a duty arose from nothing more than the City's requirement that a 
builder file a simple form intended to substantiate the builder's 
compliance with the City's policies. 
 
Boles disputes that principles of substantive immunity apply to his 
damages claims.  Specifically, he contends that Rich, Hilliard, and 
Tuskegee, involved claims alleging property damage or personal injury 
resulting from negligently performed inspections, did not involve a 
refusal 
to 
perform 
inspections, 
and, 
therefore, 
are 
factually 
distinguishable. 
 
However, 
such 
distinctions 
are 
immaterial.  
Substantive immunity, when it applies, prevents in the first place the 
imposition of a duty, the breach of which a municipality may be liable for, 
thereby preventing liability regardless of whether the purported duty 
was never performed or was performed negligently.  Rich involved 
allegations of a "failure to inspect or negligent inspection," 410 So. 2d at 
385, and Bill Salter involved a refusal to act based on an allegedly 
incorrect interpretation of a municipal ordinance.  Further, the nature of 
the damages that result from the breach of a duty are immaterial to 
1210055; 1210056 
22 
 
whether the duty exists in the first place.  See Bill Salter, 79 So. 3d at 
653 (holding, in a case that did not involve a claim for property damage 
or personal injury, that substantive immunity prevented the creation of 
a duty for purposes of an intentional-interference-with-business-
relationships claim).  
 
Boles further contends that these cases are, instead, controlled by 
Lee v. Houser, 148 So. 3d 406 (Ala. 2013) (plurality opinion), in which a 
plurality of this Court rejected the application of substantive-immunity 
principles based on a determination that, although a municipality may 
be immune for certain zoning-related activity, "municipal immunity 
cannot extend to protect a municipality for the actions of its agents who 
sought extraterritorial jurisdiction over the private property of a citizen 
so that the municipality could prevent development of that property."  
148 So. 3d at 419.  Contrary to the facts in Houser, however, it appears 
undisputed that the purpose of the meter-release inspections at issue in 
these cases were indisputably aimed at promoting public safety, rather 
than merely "to prevent a private citizen from developing [his] private 
property for [his] economic benefit."  148 So. 3d at 419.  
 
Finally, according to Boles, the circumstances of these cases are 
1210055; 1210056 
23 
 
distinct from the circumstances in cases "in which city employees 
undertook to perform their jobs but did so in an unsatisfactory manner" 
-- and in which substantive immunity was found to apply -- and are more 
akin to the circumstances in "cases involving city employees failure or 
refusal to do what their job required," including Williams v. City of 
Tuscumbia, 426 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1983), Ziegler v. City of Millbrook, 514 
So. 2d 1275 (Ala. 1987), and City of Birmingham v. Benson, 631 So. 2d 
902 (Ala. 1993), in which substantive immunity was rejected.   
As Boles acknowledges, however, the main opinion in Williams 
includes no finding as to the applicability of substantive-immunity 
principles.  Further, although, as Boles also notes, the Court in Ziegler, 
which did not involve municipal inspections, relied on Williams to reject 
holding that substantive immunity applied, it did so on a rationale that 
is not applicable to these cases.  Specifically, "this Court held in Ziegler 
… and in Williams that the City of Millbrook and the City of Tuscumbia, 
respectively, by creating professional fire departments, had thereby 
undertaken a duty to provide skillful fire protection" and "further held 
that, if the unskillfulness of the firefighters employed by the City of 
Millbrook and the City of Tuscumbia, respectively, caused a breach of 
1210055; 1210056 
24 
 
that duty, the respective cities would be directly liable for the breach."  
Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So. 2d 135, 141 (Ala. 2004).  Finally, 
Benson declined to extend the doctrine of substantive immunity 
recognized in Rich to include "a police context" based on the conclusion 
that the "[p]olicy considerations supporting immunity do not come into 
play when a policeman is … on the scene and in a position to control an 
aggressor" and prevent a criminal assault but declines to do so.  631 So. 
2d at 905.  Thus, Ziegler, Williams, and Benson, which involved police 
and fire protection, and not building inspections, as did Rich, Hilliard, 
and Tuskegee, are clearly distinguishable and do not support a rejection 
of substantive immunity in these cases.  Compare Rich, 410 So. 2d at 385 
(holding substantive immunity applicable and affirming judgment for the 
city on claims of "negligent failure to inspect or negligent inspection").  
See also Hilliard and Tuskegee, supra (demonstrating that inspection 
cases are the type of cases in which this Court has previously applied the 
doctrine of substantive immunity).  
Here, it appears undisputed that the City's inspections of buildings 
before an electrical meter would be "released" for service and utilities 
turned on in preparation for the building's occupation clearly constituted, 
1210055; 1210056 
25 
 
as conceded by Boles in his own declaratory-judgment claims and by his 
counsel at trial, "safety inspection[s]."  See also Rich, 410 So. 2d at 386.   
Accordingly, any resultant duty to perform the inspections was owed to 
the public at large rather than to any individual property owner -- 
including Boles.  Thus, the City has demonstrated that it is entitled to 
substantive immunity on Boles's damages claims arising from actions 
taken by Smith in his role as the City's building inspector.  Boles has not 
refuted that principles of substantive immunity apply. 
Because the City was entitled to substantive immunity, Boles was 
not entitled to damages.3  Accordingly, the trial court erred both in 
submitting Boles's damages claims to a jury and in denying the City's 
motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law.  Accordingly, the trial 
court's judgment is reversed, and these matters are remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
1210055 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.  
  
1210056 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
3The parties had resolved Boles's claims for injunctive relief before 
trial, and the judgment addressed only the damages claims that were 
presented to the jury.  Accordingly, we pretermit discussion as to whether 
either party was entitled to a declaratory judgment.  
1210055; 1210056 
26 
 
 
Stewart, J., concurs. 
 
Shaw, J., concurs specially, with opinion, which Mendheim, J., 
joins. 
 
Parker, C.J., concurs in the result, with opinion.  
 
Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Wise and Bryan, JJ., join. 
 
Mitchell and Cook, JJ., recuse themselves. 
 
 
1210055; 1210056 
27 
 
SHAW, Justice (concurring specially). 
 
I am the author of the main opinion.  I write specially to note the 
following.     
In these cases, the City of Orange Beach ("the City") refused to 
perform meter-release inspections because certain paperwork was not 
completed; it is alleged that its agent was thus negligent in failing to 
perform the inspections and that the City was vicariously liable for such 
negligence.  
There is no dispute that the purpose of the meter-release 
inspections was to provide for public health, safety, and welfare.  
Generally stated, numerous prior decisions directly hold that the doctrine 
of substantive immunity prevents the imposition of liability for a 
municipality's failure to properly conduct inspections related to public 
health, safety, and welfare.  For example, in Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 
So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1982), the case that adopted the doctrine of substantive 
immunity, this Court held that claims related to a "failure to inspect" or 
a "negligent inspection" of sewer lines were barred.  Id. at 385.  In Hilliard 
v. City of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889 (Ala. 1991), substantive immunity 
barred claims related to the death of three persons allegedly caused by a 
1210055; 1210056 
28 
 
municipality's negligent inspection of wiring.  Similarly, in Ex parte City 
of Tuskegee, 295 So. 3d 625 (Ala. 2019) (plurality opinion), it was alleged 
that a city's failure to inspect a fire system, purportedly in violation of its 
own ordinances, resulted in the death of an elderly woman.  In those 
cases, the municipalities undertook to provide inspections.  The failure 
to inspect, or the negligent performance of the inspections, even in 
violation of the municipalities' own polices, constituted no breach 
imposing liability because there was no duty created in the first place: 
substantive immunity "prevent[s] the imposition of a legal duty."  Rich, 
410 So. 2d at 387.  See also Hilliard, 585 So. 2d at 891 ("[I]n Rich, the 
Court ... refused to hold that the duty imposed upon city plumbing 
inspectors was owed to individual homeowners. Consequently, the breach 
of such a duty, the Court held, would not support an action for 
damages.").  If there is no duty, the manner of a purported breach, 
whether negligent performance or the negligent failure to perform, is of 
no consequence.  
In this case, the City desired certain information before it would 
conduct the inspections.  It had a form for builders to complete: the 
subcontractor form.  If the plaintiff, Ian Boles, had provided the 
1210055; 1210056 
29 
 
completed form and the inspections then occurred in a negligent fashion, 
or if the City had released the properties for power-meter hookups 
without conducting inspections at all, and occupants of the structures 
died as a result, our directly-on-point caselaw would hold that no duty 
existed, and no liability would attach.    
 
But here, Boles inexplicably refused to provide the completed forms, 
and the City thus refused to inspect.  In light of our caselaw, the City's 
policy of providing inspections did not create a duty owed to Boles to 
perform the meter-release inspections or to perform them competently.  
The difference between the facts of these cases and the facts of the 
previously discussed substantive-immunity cases is that, in these cases, 
the City would provide the inspections only after the submission of 
certain paperwork.  The existence of this restriction -- completing the 
subcontractor form -- whether related to "safety" or not, would not alter 
whether a duty to inspect was created.  But if we were to hold that a 
refusal to inspect because of noncompliance with such an undemanding 
requirement is a different form of negligence that can create liability 
when other, clearly more dangerous forms of negligent inspection do not, 
we would no less "thwart the City's legitimate efforts" to provide public 
1210055; 1210056 
30 
 
services.  Rich, 410 So. 2d at 387.  These cases are not legally 
distinguishable from prior caselaw on this issue.  Whether those past 
decisions are correct is not before us.    
Any motivation for the requirement to file the completed 
subcontractor form appears to be a red herring when there is no duty to 
individuals on the part of the City to perform the inspection in a 
competent manner or to perform it in the first place.  The subcontractor-
form requirement was part of the City's overall building-inspections 
process in these cases.  Although there may have been no written policy 
or ordinance requiring the submission of the completed subcontractor 
form, the City's building-permit packages nevertheless contained it from 
the beginning.  There was no per se refusal by the City to perform the 
inspections in these cases; instead, it just wanted the forms completed.  
Boles had the requested information, could have provided it, and thus 
could have had the inspections.  Although the City may have had the 
ability to independently search its records and find some of the 
information it desired, it could not possess all of it, and it was clearly 
much easier to simply require it from builders.  As stated in the main 
1210055; 1210056 
31 
 
opinion, to impose liability on the City for the mere existence of this 
requirement in the building-inspection process  
"would make the City disinclined to inspect property in the 
first place, to the detriment of the public as a whole, which 
benefits from such inspections.  This is especially true when 
the alleged breach of such a duty arose from nothing more 
than the City's requirement that a builder file a simple form 
intended to substantiate the builder's compliance with the 
City's policies."   
 
___ So. 3d at ___.  Municipalities must know if they will be held liable for 
faults in their inspection process; to reject the application of substantive 
immunity in this case and create new avenues of liability could lead to 
uncertainty with respect to whether municipalities should provide 
building inspections at all if some portion of the inspection process might 
later be deemed by the courts to have an insufficient connection to public 
health, safety, and welfare.   
 
Because the doctrine of substantive immunity, which is the law of 
this State, prevents the imposition of a duty on the City, it was entitled 
to a judgment in its favor in these cases.  Further, that holding pretermits 
the need to discuss the City's substantial challenges to the propriety of 
the amount of damages awarded in this case. 
 
Mendheim, J., concurs.   
 
1210055; 1210056 
32 
 
PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in the result). 
 
I agree that reversal of the judgment is required by this Court's 
precedent regarding the substantive-immunity exception to municipal 
liability. In particular, I cannot find any sound jurisprudential 
distinction between this case and our prior cases holding that 
municipalities were immune for negligently failing to properly conduct 
inspections, Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1982), and 
Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889 (Ala. 1991). Importantly, 
Ian Boles's damages claims must be viewed solely through the lens of 
negligence because the City of Orange Beach has statutory immunity 
from liability for its agents' intentional torts, see § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 
1975; Neighbors v. City of Birmingham, 384 So. 2d 113 (Ala. 1980); 
Wheeler v. George, 39 So. 3d 1061, 1085 (Ala. 2009). Thus, the City's 
agents' intent and motives in failing to inspect Boles's properties were 
not directly relevant. Moreover, our precedent seems to suggest that the 
relevant question -- whether substantive immunity applies to a 
particular activity of a municipality -- must be decided at a relatively 
high level of generality, not based on the specific factual idiosyncrasies of 
the case or on the particular kind of private harm involved. See Rich, 410 
1210055; 1210056 
33 
 
So. 2d at 387-88 ("[T]hese public policy considerations ... override the 
general rule and prevent the imposition of a legal duty ... in those narrow 
areas of governmental activities essential to the well-being of the 
governed, where the imposition of liability can be reasonably calculated 
to materially thwart the City's legitimate efforts to provide such public 
services. [¶] ... [T]he substantive immunity rule ... must be given 
operative effect only in the context of those public service activities of 
governmental entities ... so laden with the public interest as to outweigh 
the incidental duty to individual citizens." (emphasis added)); Hilliard, 
585 So. 2d at 892 ("[I]t is precisely because of the dangerous nature of 
[electricity] that immunity should be granted to a municipality that ... 
chooses to provide for the public health, safety, and general welfare of its 
citizenry through the regulation of this inherently dangerous element."). 
Thus, although I do not concur in most of the reasoning in the main 
opinion, I concur in the result. 
 
The real problem -- one that Boles has not briefed in this case but 
that this Court should take up in a future case -- is that substantive 
immunity has been mistaken from its beginning. This Court created it 
out of thin air in Rich. 
1210055; 1210056 
34 
 
A little history is helpful here, because Rich was not the first time 
this Court protected municipalities from liability without any 
constitutional or statutory basis. In the 19th century, the Court declared 
cities immune when they engaged in governmental functions, as opposed 
to ministerial (or "corporate") functions. See Smoot v. City of Wetumpka, 
24 Ala. 112, 120-21 (1854); City Council of Montgomery v. Gilmer, 33 Ala. 
116, 130-32 (1858); Campbell's Adm'x v. City Council of Montgomery, 53 
Ala. 527, 530-31 (1875). But in 1907, the Legislature enacted a statute 
providing that municipalities were liable for the negligence of their 
agents:  
"No city or town shall be liable for damages for injury done to 
or wrong suffered by any person or corporation, unless said 
injury or wrong was done or suffered through the neglect, 
carelessness or unskillfulness of some agent, officer or 
employee of the municipality engaged in work therefor and 
while acting in the line of his duty ...." 
 
Ala. Acts 1907, Act No. 797, § 95. (That language is now in § 11-47-190, 
Ala. Code 1975, in substantially identical form.) The statute contained 
no exceptions to this liability. Thus, the statute did not incorporate this 
Court's earlier distinction between governmental and ministerial 
functions but instead provided a categorical rule of negligence liability.  
1210055; 1210056 
35 
 
The Court, undaunted, ignored this result of the statute's language 
and continued finding immunity for governmental functions. See City of 
Tuscaloosa v. Fitts, 209 Ala. 635, 96 So. 771 (1923); Hillman v. City of 
Anniston, 214 Ala. 522, 108 So. 539 (1926); City of Bay Minette v. 
Quinley, 263 Ala. 188, 82 So. 2d 192 (1955). 
In 1975, the Court course-corrected, returning to the language of 
the statute and rejecting our prior extratextual immunity doctrine. See 
Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So. 2d 68 (1975). We 
thoroughly explained that the municipal-liability statute contained no 
exception for governmental functions. 294 Ala. at 596, 320 So. 2d at 71. 
Rather, the statute was a categorical determination by the Legislature 
that municipalities would be liable for the negligent acts of their agents. 
See 294 Ala. at 596-98, 320 So. 2d at 71-73. Further, we detailed our 
precedent since the statute's enactment, to show that "[t]he rule of 
municipal immunity cannot be rationally defended." 294 Ala. at 596-98, 
320 So. 2d at 71-73. In particular, the distinction between governmental 
and ministerial/corporate functions "ha[d] resulted in some curious 
categories. Garbage collecting ha[d] been held governmental, but sewer 
disposal [was] corporate. Repair and maintenance of streets [was] 
1210055; 1210056 
36 
 
proprietary or corporate, but operating a street sweeper to keep the 
streets clean [was] governmental." 294 Ala. at 597, 320 So. 2d at 72 
(citations omitted). Amidst such disparate results, "the only clue to 
whether a particular function [was] governmental or corporate [had to] 
be found in cases expressly declaring that particular function to fall 
within one or the other category." Id. In other words, whether an activity 
was subject to liability could not be decided in a principled fashion, but 
varied from case to case. In contrast to this confusion,  
"[t]his judicial sleight of hand could have been avoided 
entirely by giving to the 1907 legislative enactment its clear 
meaning. Yet, as case after case [came] to this court urging it 
to correct this judicially created barrier to the courthouses of 
this state, the answer always given in denying that relief 
[was] that the relief sought, if to be obtained, must come from 
the legislature. In making that statement, this court [did] not 
recognize[] that in Alabama, it was this court which closed the 
courthouse doors in litigation of this kind as early as 1858; 
and when the legislature opened them in 19[07], we closed 
[them] again and, in so doing, thwarted the will of the 
legislature."  
 
Id.  
Thus, in Jackson, we recognized that the municipal-liability statute 
contained no exceptions; our obligation was to apply the statute as the 
Legislature wrote it.  
1210055; 1210056 
37 
 
"The legislature had the power in 1907 to abolish municipal 
immunity for tort, there being no constitutional barrier to its 
action. This court should have bowed to that legislative 
prerogative rather than take the course it did, which was to 
treat the thoughtful legislation as no more than a restatement 
of the law as it then existed by judicial decision."  
 
294 Ala. at 597-98, 320 So. 2d at 73. Therefore, in Jackson, we entirely 
abolished the judicially created doctrine of municipal immunity, "to let 
the will of the legislature, so long ignored, prevail." 294 Ala. at 599, 320 
So. 2d at 74. 
This Court's vigor to stick to the statute's text was regrettably 
short-lived. A mere seven years later, we took a step backward in Rich. 
Once again confronted by a municipal-liability case, we acknowledged 
that § 11-47-190 makes municipalities liable for negligence, and we 
nodded to Jackson and claimed to retain it as good precedent. 410 So. 2d 
at 387. But we then walked back Jackson's interpretation of the statute 
as a categorical rule of liability, recasting it as merely a "general" rule. 
Id. We then said that "public policy considerations ... override the general 
rule ... in those narrow areas of governmental activities essential to the 
well-being of the governed, where the imposition of liability can be 
reasonably calculated to materially thwart the City's legitimate efforts to 
provide such public services." Id.  
1210055; 1210056 
38 
 
With those words, we exhumed municipal immunity's corpse. And 
in doing so, we did not bother to quote or even address the language of 
the municipal-liability statute. Instead, we merely motioned at a bevy of 
"overriding public policy reasons": "the broader requirement of the City 
to provide for the public health, safety, and general welfare," "the City's 
larger obligation to the whole of its resident population," and an assertion 
that "the imposition of liability upon the City ... necessarily threatens the 
benefits of such services to the public-at-large." Id. at 386-87. It is hard 
to see those "reasons" as anything other than a fig leaf for the Court's 
distaste for the results of the unqualified municipal liability imposed by 
the statute. Perhaps recognizing the untethered nature of the doctrine, 
we tried to chain the beast:  
"We emphasize ... that only the narrowest of 
constructions of our instant holding will avoid violence to § 
11-47-190 and its Jackson interpretation; and that the 
substantive immunity rule of this case must be given 
operative effect only in the context of those public service 
activities of governmental entities ... so laden with the public 
interest as to outweigh the incidental duty to individual 
citizens." 
 
Id. at 387-88. But as often happens with judicially invented restraints on 
judicially invented exceptions to statutes, that attempt was unduly 
optimistic. As illustrated by today's cases, once we depart from the text 
1210055; 1210056 
39 
 
in favor of an amorphous balancing test, the test has a way of eclipsing 
the text; the exception, of swallowing the rule.  
One reason why Rich's exception is difficult to contain is that it has 
no real limits. Rich conceptualized the question of municipal immunity 
as a balancing of interests -- an individual citizen's interest in being made 
whole from a municipality's wrongdoing, against the public's interest in 
funding of public services. We said:  
"While ... the individual homeowner is affected by the 
discharge of the [City's] duty, the City's larger obligation to 
the whole of its resident population is paramount; and the 
imposition of liability upon the City ... necessarily threatens 
the benefits of such services to the public-at-large. 
 
"... We believe these public policy considerations ... 
prevent the imposition of a legal duty, the breach of which 
imposes liability, in those narrow areas of governmental 
activities essential to the well-being of the governed, where 
the imposition of liability can be reasonably calculated to 
materially thwart the City's legitimate efforts to provide such 
public services. 
 
".... 
 
"We emphasize, however, ... that the substantive 
immunity rule of this case must be given operative effect only 
in the context of those public service activities of 
governmental entities ... so laden with the public interest as 
to outweigh the incidental duty to individual citizens." 
 
1210055; 1210056 
40 
 
Id. at 387-88 (emphasis added). Translation: When municipal liability to 
individuals would materially decrease the money available for public 
services or would incentivize a municipality to decrease public services, 
that liability cannot be allowed. But that rationale applies far beyond the 
context of public-safety inspections. In reality, any liability of a 
municipality for any conduct that causes significant injury to an 
individual could materially diminish the public coffers and disincentivize 
public services, depending on the municipality's budget. Thus, if applied 
consistently, Rich's rationale could result in municipal immunity for all 
but the most minor injuries.4 
 
As might be expected for a judicially created, amorphous exception, 
however, Rich has not been applied consistently or coherently. Instead, 
 
4There is another problem with the rationale that liability would 
decrease the money available for public services (i.e., that immunity 
prevents diversion of public funds). That justification for immunity has 
been thoroughly discredited as lacking any sound moral or logical basis. 
See Annotation, Municipal Immunity from Liability for Torts, 120 A.L.R. 
1376, 1377-78 (1939); Leon Green, Freedom of Litigation (III): Municipal 
Liability for Torts, 38 Ill. L. Rev. 355, 378-79 (1943-44); Molitor v. 
Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 20, 22-24, 163 N.E.2d 
89, 93-95 (1959); Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 228-
29 (Mo. 1977); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895C cmts. c-d (Am. L. 
Inst. 1979); Note, Municipal Tort Immunity in Virginia, 68 Va. L. Rev. 
639, 645-47 (1982); Linda M. Annoye, Revising Wisconsin's Government 
Immunity Doctrine, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 971, 977-79 (2005). 
1210055; 1210056 
41 
 
it has produced the same kind of head-scratching anomalies that existed 
before Jackson cleared the field. Under Rich, for failing to provide police 
protection, a municipality is sometimes immune, see Calogrides v. City 
of Mobile, 475 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1985); Garrett v. City of Mobile, 481 So. 
2d 376 (Ala. 1985); Nichols v. Town of Mount Vernon, 504 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 
1987), and sometimes not immune, see City of Birmingham v. Benson, 
631 So. 2d 902, 903-05 (Ala. 1993). The same is true for failing to provide 
fire protection: sometimes immune, see Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So. 
2d 135, 141 (Ala. 2004), sometimes not immune, see Williams v. City of 
Tuscumbia, 426 So. 2d 824 (Ala. 1983); Ziegler v. City of Millbrook, 514 
So. 2d 1275 (Ala. 1987). And flood protection: sometimes immune, see Ex 
parte City of Muscle Shoals, [Ms. SC-2022-0524, Mar. 31, 2023] ___ So. 
3d ___ (Ala. 2023), sometimes not, see City of Mobile v. Jackson, 474 So. 
2d 644, 645-46, 649 (Ala. 1985). And for zoning/land-use-related conduct: 
immune, see Payne v. Shelby Cnty. Comm'n, 12 So. 3d 71, 73-81 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2008); Bill Salter Advertising, Inc. v. City of Atmore, 79 So. 3d 
646, 647-48, 651-53 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), or not, see Lee v. Houser, 148 
So. 3d 406, 418-20 (Ala. 2013) (plurality opinion); City of Mobile v. 
Sullivan, 667 So. 2d 122 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995). This inconsistency is not 
1210055; 1210056 
42 
 
surprising. Because of Rich's untethered and ill-defined balancing test, 
our municipal-liability jurisprudence quite naturally devolved into a 
game of "we know it when we see it," cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 
Further, Rich distinguished between a municipality's duties to the 
public and its duties to individuals, a distinction that Rich admitted was 
illogical. We noted that a Wisconsin court had said, "'Any duty owed to 
the public generally is a duty owed to individual members of the public.'" 
410 So. 2d at 386 (quoting Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 
540, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (1976)). And we acknowledged: "From the 
standpoint of pure logic, we concede that the reasoning of the Wisconsin 
Court is difficult to refute. There is, indeed, a sense in which the duty of 
the City's employees, as inspectors, is a duty flowing to the individual 
homeowners." Id. But then this Court pivoted away from logic, saying 
that "public policy reasons" required us "to hold to the contrary." Id. The 
Court should have stuck with logic. People who owe duties to the public 
are ordinarily liable to individuals who are harmed by breach of those 
duties. For example, someone excavating near a public road "owes to the 
public a nondelegable duty to protect travellers from an unreasonable 
1210055; 1210056 
43 
 
risk of harm caused by the excavations." Sims v. Star-Mindingall Water 
Sys., 619 So. 2d 1368, 1369 (Ala. 1993) (emphasis omitted). If the 
excavator breaches that duty and thereby causes harm to an individual 
traveler, the excavator is liable to that individual. The duty to the 
individual is simply a particularization of the duty to the public. 
 
Ultimately, however, the problem with Rich's substantive-
immunity exception is that it was raw public policy, not statutory 
interpretation. The opinion itself made clear that it was based on "public 
policy considerations," Rich, 410 So. 2d at 387, not the text. As this Court 
often emphasizes these days, it is not our prerogative to create law out of 
thin air, including inventing exceptions to statutes when we dislike their 
results. "'This Court's role is not to displace the legislature by amending 
statutes to make them express what we think the legislature should have 
done. Nor is it this Court's role to assume the legislative prerogative to 
correct defective legislation or amend statutes.'" Grimes v. Alfa Mut. Ins. 
Co., 227 So. 3d 475, 488-89 (Ala. 2017) (citation omitted). This limit is 
fundamentally embedded in the nature of our judicial power: 
"Fidelity to ... separation[]of[]powers ... requires us to 
determine and adhere to the meaning of the statute's text, 
even if doing so leads to an inefficient or undesirable result. 
Therefore, 'our inquiry begins with the language of the 
1210055; 1210056 
44 
 
statute, and if the meaning of the statutory language is plain, 
our analysis ends there.' We must 'interpret that language to 
mean exactly what it says.'" 
 
Lang v. Cabela's Wholesale, LLC, [Ms. 1200851, June 24, 2022] ___ So. 
3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022) (citations omitted). This means that we must apply 
a statute as it is written and leave for the Legislature to decide whether 
and how it will be rewritten to adapt to any undesirable results. In 
particular, if the Legislature decides that some kind of municipal 
immunity is appropriate, it knows how to create it. The Legislature has 
previously carved out immunity from municipal liability via other 
statutes. See §§ 4-4-4 (municipal-airport construction and management), 
6-5-338 (discretionary functions of peace officers). In the absence of that 
kind of legislation, this Court has no business creating exceptions to § 11-
47-190 based on nothing more than policy judgments. 
When this Court first abolished municipal immunity in Jackson, we 
recognized "the authority of the legislature to enter the entire field, and 
further recognize[d] its superior position to provide with proper 
legislation any limitations or protections it deems necessary." 294 Ala. at 
600, 320 So. 2d at 75. But then in Rich, we created a substantive-
immunity exception out of whole cloth. Although the invalidity of this 
1210055; 1210056 
45 
 
exception was not briefed in this case, I encourage future parties and 
amici to fully ventilate this issue. And I urge this Court to overrule Rich 
and its progeny at the next opportunity. 
 
 
 
1210055; 1210056 
46 
 
SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).  
Recognizing that there are areas "where the imposition of liability 
can be reasonably calculated to materially thwart the City's legitimate 
efforts to provide … public services," this Court has crafted an exception 
to cities' liability: substantive immunity. Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So. 
2d 385, 387 (Ala. 1982). This "narrow exception" applies "when a 
municipality's responsibility to provide for the public safety, health, or 
general welfare outweighs the reasons for imposing liability on the 
municipality." Lee v. Houser, 148 So. 3d 406, 419 (Ala. 2013) (plurality 
opinion).  The main opinion holds that substantive immunity applies in 
these cases because the undisputed purpose of the meter-release 
inspections at issue was to promote public safety. Although I agree with 
the main opinion's characterization of the inspections themselves, Ian 
Boles's claims are based on the City of Orange Beach's withholding of 
those inspections to compel an action unrelated to promoting public 
safety -- namely, completing a subcontractor disclosure form. In my view, 
the financial information requested on that form has nothing to do with 
public safety, rendering any claim of substantive immunity based on the 
1210055; 1210056 
47 
 
pretext of filing that completed form before an inspection can be 
scheduled inapplicable. 
 
Although the city now has an ordinance conditioning the 
inspections on the submission of the completed subcontractor form, that 
ordinance was not enacted until 2018, after the events made the basis of 
these actions. The city has not pointed to any written policy in effect 
before the ordinance's enactment that would provide a basis to postpone 
an inspection, thereby delaying the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. 
The subcontractor form required Boles to provide each subcontractor's 
license number and contact information, to describe the type of work 
performed, and to list the amount paid for the performed work. According 
to Boles, the city already had the requested information, except for the 
amount the subcontractors were paid. Further, Boles offered to submit 
the forms to the city, albeit without listing the amounts he had paid his 
subcontractors. Apparently, that compromise was unappealing to the 
city.  
Between the information that the city possessed, Boles's 
willingness to provide forms containing the same information, and the 
lack of a written policy requiring submission of the forms, the city's 
1210055; 1210056 
48 
 
mandate for the completed forms can be attributed only to its desire to 
know the amount Boles paid his subcontractors. Nothing about any 
amount paid to a subcontractor is related to health, much less safety or 
the general welfare of the city’s residents. Since the city withheld the 
inspections based on Boles's failure to submit the completed form, its 
motivation for doing so seems wholly unconnected to public safety. 
Instead, the city's purpose in withholding the inspections appears to have 
been chiefly aimed at "prevent[ing] a private citizen from developing [his] 
private property for [his] economic benefit," Lee, 148 So. 3d at 419, unless 
he complied with its demands. That purpose implicates none of the policy 
concerns underlying substantive immunity. The city's actions here 
appear to be using a regulatory scheme that on the surface seems 
appropriate, but becomes a punishment to prevent a property owner from 
developing property to its highest and best use. Rather than regulating 
public health and safety, the imposition of these regulations became a 
cudgel to force compliance and an excuse to postpone inspections until 
the financial penalty of not having a certificate of occupancy became too 
great and the property owner had no recourse but to submit. Cities are 
entitled to substantive immunity when health and safety concerns 
1210055; 1210056 
49 
 
provide a legal rationale for regulatory actions that would otherwise 
create liability. But, when a city uses its regulations to punish 
landowners under the guise of protecting public health and safety by 
regulating matters that are only tangentially related to that objective, 
there should be no substantive immunity. In such a case, a city may be 
liable for any damage occasioned by its withholding of a vital city service 
to enforce regulations with little, if any, basis in protecting public health 
and safety. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision 
to reverse the trial court's judgment.   
 
Wise and Bryan, JJ., concur.