Title: Vaile v. Porsboll

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

om

 

CISILIE A. PORSBOLL, F/K/A CISILIE

428 Nev., Advance Opinion 3
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ROBERT SCOTLUND VAILE, No. 53687,

‘Appellant,

we FILED
Is 7 ‘SBOLL, F/K/A CISILIE _

se Os sn 28202

Respondent.

  
 

A. VAILE,

Appellant,

ROBERT SCOTLUND VAILE,
Respondent.

 

Consolidated appeals from a district court post-divoree decree
order imposing statutory penalties on child support arrearages under NRS
125B.095. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark
County; Cheryl B. Moss, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Robert Scotlund Vaile, Kenwood, California,
in Proper Person.

Willick Law Group and Marshall S. Willick, Las Vegas,
for Cisilie A. Porsboll,

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Donald W. Wine, Jr.,
Deputy Attorney General, Carson City,

for Amicus Curiae State of Nevada, Division of Welfare and Supportive
Services, Child Support Enforcement Program.

 

BEFORE SAITTA, C.J., HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

ya-0alsl

 

 
OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

In these appeals, we address the district court's authority to
enforce or modify a child support order that a Nevada district court
initially entered, when neither the parties nor the children reside in
Nevada. We conclude that, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support
‘Act, because no other jurisdiction has entered an order concerning child
support, the Nevada order controls and the district court retains subject
matter jurisdiction to enforce the Nevada order, but since the parties and
children do not reside in Nevada and the parties have not consented to the
district court's exercise of jurisdiction, the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to modify the support order. On this latter point, we
take this opportunity to explain the distinction between a family court
order that modifies a prior order and one that merely clarifies the prior
order. Because we conclude that the district court in the present case
impermissibly modified the child support obligation set forth in the

divorce decree, we reverse the district court's order and remand this

 

matter to the district court for further proceeding

BACKGROUND
In 1998, Robert Scotlund Vaile and Cisilie A. Porsboll were

granted a divorce in a Nevada district court proceeding. The divorce

 

decree adopted and incorporated the terms of the parties’ separation
agreement with regard to, among other things, the payment of child
support. Under the agreement, Vaile was obligated to pay Porsboll
monthly child support according to a specific formula that was calculated
based on the parties’ annual exchange of tax return information or income

statements to determine their combined income. Although the parties’

 

 
0 8

 

compliance with the provision is not entirely clear from the documents
before us, the district court found that the parties never exchanged tax
returns or otherwise complied with the requirements of this agreement,
but that Vaile nonetheless paid $1,300 a month in child support from
August 1998 to April 2000. The district court further found that,
thereafter, Vaile ceased voluntarily paying child support.

In November 2007, Porsboll, through counsel, filed in the
district court a motion seeking “to establish a sum certain due each month
in child support” and to “reduce arrears in child support to judgment.”
|ked the district court to establish a fixed monthly child

 

Porsboll’s motion

 

support obligation for Vaile based on Nevada's child support statute
without regard to the parties’ agreed-upon formula adopted in the decree,
to calculate arrears, and to reduce those arrears to judgment. In
particular, the motion sought to have the support set at the $1,300
amount that Vaile had previously paid. The district court granted
Porsboll’s motion, set Vaile’s monthly child support obligation at $1,300
and used that figure to calculate his support arrearages, which it then
reduced to judgment, The district court subsequently imposed penalties
on the arrearages amount under NRS 125B.095. When Porsboll filed her
motion, neither the parties nor the children resided in Nevada. Both
Vaile and Porsboll filed separate appeals challenging the district court's
rulings, and the parties’ appeals were consolidated for the purpose of this
court's appellate review.

In the appeal pending in Docket No. 53687, Vaile, proceeding

in proper person, raises various challenges to the district court’s child

 

"Based on the parties’ filings in this court, Vaile currently resides in
California, and Porsboll and the children live in Norway.

 
support and penalty determinations, including an assertion that the
district court impermissibly modified the support award contained in the
divorce decree, as it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do ¢0.2 In Docket
No. 53798, Porsboll challenges the methodology used by the district court
to determine the statutory penalty amount imposed on Vaile under NRS
125B.095 and the ensuing penalties,
DISCUSSION

‘The primary issue presented in these appeals is whether the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce or modify its child
support order when the parties and their children do not reside in Nevada,
‘Nevada's version of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA),
NRS Chapter 130, controls our resolution of thi

 

sue. After concluding
that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the
Nevada child support order, we then consider whether the district court's
determination that Vaile owes $1,300 per month in child support
constitutes a modification or a clarification of the initial support
obligation.
nr jurisdic

Enacted in all 50 states, the UIFSA creates a single-order
system for child support orders, which is designed so that only one state's
support order is effective at any given time. Unif. Interstate Family
Support Act prefatory note (2001), 9/IB U.L.A. 163 (2005); see also
Lunceford_v. Lunceford, 204 S.W.3d 699, 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). To

'We reject Vaile's attempt to resurrect challenges to Nevada's
personal jurisdiction over the parties, which were previously determined
in Vaile v. District Court, 118 Nev. 262, 268-77, 44 P.3d 506, 511-16
(2002). Moreover, the Nevada district court retains continuing personal
jurisdiction over the parties under NRS 130.202.

 
facilitate this single-order system, UIFSA provides a procedure for
identifying the sole viable order, referred to as the controlling order,
required for UIFSA to function. See NRS 190.207 (addressing the
recognition and determination of the controlling child support order); Unif.
Interstate Family Support Act § 207 emt, (2001), 9B U.L.A. 198.99
(2005). Under UIFSA’s statutory scheme, a court with personal
iblish a child support
order and to retain jurisdiction to enforce or modify the order until certain

jurisdiction over the obligor has the authority to

 

conditions occur that end the issuing state's jurisdiction and confer
jurisdiction on another state.* Jurado v, Brashear, 782 So. 2d 575, 579
(La. 2001); see_alse Upson_v. Wallace, 3 A.3d 1148, 1156 (D.C. 2010)
(Although the UIFSA never speaks explicitly of ‘subject matter
jurisdiction,’ the terms that it does use—jurisdiction’ and ‘continuing
exclusive jurisdiction’—are simply alternative ways of referring to subject
matter jurisdiction ..

 

One such condition that calls the issuing state's jurisdiction
into question occurs when the parties and the children for whose benefit
the support order has been entered do not reside in the issuing state when
‘a motion concerning child support is filed. See NRS 130.205(1)(a). Under
these circumstances, the fact that the parties and the children do not
reside in the issuing state does not divest the issuing state of jurisdiction
to enforce its support order when that order is the controlling order and
has not been modified by another state in accordance with UIFSA. See
NRS 130.206 (discussing continuing jurisdiction to enforce a child support

INRS 130.10139 defines “issuing state” as a “state in which a
tribunal issues a support order .

 

 

 
order); Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 610-11 (RI. 2011); Nordstrom v,
Nordstrom, 649 S.B.2d 200, 204 (Va. Ct. App. 2007); Unif. Interstate
Family Support Act § 206 cmt. (2001), 9 U.L.A. 196 (2005) (noting that
“the validity and enforceability of the controlling order continues unabated
until it is fully complied with, unless it is replaced by a modified order
issued in accordance with [UIFSA], and that “even if the individual

parties and the child no longer reside in the issuing State, the controlling

   

order remains in effect and may be enforced by the issuing State or any

 

responding State ...."), But even when the issuing state’s order has not
been modified by another state and the order remains controlling, if the
parties and the children do not reside in the issuing state, the issuing
state lacks authority to modify the support order. See NRS 130.205(1)(a);
Dept. of Economic Sec, v, Tazioli, 246 P.3d 944, 946 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011);
Brown_v. Hines-Williams, 2 A.3d 1077, 1081 (D.C. 2010); McLean_v..
Kohnle, 940 So. 2d 975, 978-79 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006); Lilly v. Lilly, 250
P.3d 994, 998-1003 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); Nordstrom, 649 S.B.24 at 202-
05; but see NRS 130,205(1)(b) (providing that the parties may consent to
the issuing state exercising subject matter jurisdiction to modify a child
support order).

Here, there is only one child support order, the order issued by
the Nevada district court as part of the divorce decree. Thus, the Nevada

“Although the parties’ appellate filings and various parts of the
appellate record allude to a possible child support order entered by a
Norway court, no such order is contained in the appellate record, nor does
it appear that the district court was provided with any such order.
Consequently, on remand, the district court must determine whether such
an order exists and assess its bearing, if any, on the district court’s
enforcement of the Nevada support order.

 

 
order controls. NRS 130.207(1) (providing that, “[iJf' a proceeding is
brought under this chapter and only one tribunal has issued a child-
support order, the order of that tribunal controls and must be so
recognized”), Moreover, it is undisputed that neither the parties nor their
children resided in Nevada when Porsboll filed her child support motion,
and no party asserts that he or she consented to the Nevada court's
continued exercise of jurisdiction. As a result, the Nevada district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the support obligation
NRS 130.205(1). Thus, we must
determine whether the district court impermissibly modified the child

 

contained in the divorce decre

support obligation under UIFSA when it imposed a sum certain payment

 

of $1,300 per month as Vaile’s child support obligation, or if that
determination was a clarification of the child support order for the purpose
of enforcement.
Modification versus clarification

On appeal, Vaile contends that setting his support payments
at the sum certain of $1,300 per month constitutes a modification of the
support obligation contained in the divorce decree. Porsboll disagrees,
asserting that the district court merely clarified, rather than modified, the
support obligation. The district court's order shows that the court initially
concluded, without explanation, that setting the $1,300 support payment

was a clarification. In a subsequent order, however, the distriet court
stated that “the convoluted portions of the [divorce decree had been]
vacated and modified... to reflect $1,300.00 per month as a ‘sum

 

 
certain.” In that same order, the district court later returned to
describing its setting of the $1,300 payment as having “clarified the child
support order.” This court has not addressed the distinction between a
modification and a clarification of a prior district court order in the family
law context.

Other courts that have addressed the issue look to whether
the challenged order changes the parties’ rights under the earlier order or
merely defines the parties’ existing rights. In Collins v, Billow, 592 S.E.24
843, 844-45 (Ga, 2004), the Georgia Supreme Court addressed whether the
establishment of a sum certain payment amount of $140 per week
constituted a modification of a divorce decree provision that required the
wife to pay the husband child support in the amount of 23 percent of her
annual income or $115 per week. The court concluded that the
establishment of the $140 per week payment constituted a modification
because, if the sum certain amount had been based on a calculation of 23
percent of the wife's current income in accordance with the decree, that
would have resulted in a weekly payment of $158.° Id, at 845; see also In

®The phrase “sum certain’ in this context comes from NRS
125B.070(1)(b) (defining “obligation for support” as “the sum certain dollar
amount determined according to” a schedule provided in that statute).

"But see Paschal v. Paschal, 117 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Ark. Ct. App.
2003) (concluding, in a case where a sum certain payment amount was
required by administrative order but the divorce decree did not provide
such a figure, that a subsequent order establishing sum certain child
support payments using Arkansas's child support charts was a
clarification rather than a modification because an order that “fails to
recite the amount of support... has no sum certain... capable of
modification,” but nonetheless noting that the decree was “unambiguous
in that the parties intended to set child support in accordance with the
child-support chart”).

 
Re Marriage of Jarvis, 792 P.2d 1259, 1261-62 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)
(addressing whether a trial court had modified or clarified a provision
providing for child support while one of the children was enrolled as a full-
time student in college and applying the rule that a divorce decree is
modified when parties’ rights are extended or reduced beyond those set
forth in the decree, while a clarification involves the definition of rights
previously awarded), Also useful to our consideration is a North Dakota
Supreme Court case, Stoelting v, Stoelting, 412 N.W.2d 861, 862-63 (N.D.
1987), that addressed the propriety of a trial court's

 

Iteration of a divorce

 

decree, which changed the nature of cortain payments made by one party
from payments for the purpose of property settlement to alimony and
separate maintenance payments. In rejecting an argument that this
action was not a modification, but instead constituted a mere clarification
of the decree, the Stoelting court noted that the distinction between a
modification and a clarification is that a clarification provides definition to
the parties’ obligations, but leaves the parties’ substantive rights
unchanged. Id, at 863; see also Boucher v, Boucher, 191 N.W.2d 85, 89
(Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (noting that the distinction between a modification
and a clarification in the context of a divorce decree turns on whether
changes are made to the parties’ substantive rights); Ulrich v, Ulrich, 400
N.W.2¢ 213, 218 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that, in the property-
division context, a trial court has the authority to clarify and construe a
divorce decree so long as the parties’ substantive rights are not altered).
We find these decisions instructive, and therefore conclude that in the
family law context a modification occurs when the district court’s order
alters the parties’ substantive rights, while a clarification involves the
district court defining the rights that have already been awarded to the

 
1

 

parties. Compare NRS 125.116 (providing in the child-custody-
jurisdiction-and-enforcement context that “modification” “means a child
custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes or is otherwise
,

Applying this approach to the district court's order in this case

 

made after a previous determination concerning the same child . .

 

establishing the $1,300 per month sum certain support obligation, we
conclude that this determination constituted a modification of the support
obligation. Pursuant to the parties’ separation agreement, which was
adopted and incorporated into the divorce decree, the monthly support
payment was to be redetermined each year and the parties were required

to exchange tax return information or a certified statement of their

 

income, which would then be used to determine the monthly child support
obligation using the agreed-upon formula.’ Thus, under the decree's
terms it was possible for Vaile’s monthly support obligation to change from
year to year. By setting Vaile's monthly support payment at the fixed
amount of $1,300 per month, the district court substantively altered the
parties’ rights, such that the district court modified, rather than clarified,

"Because the parties’ agreement was merged into the divorce decree,
to the extent that the district court purported to apply contract principles,
specifically, rescission, reformation, and partial performance based on
Vaile's initial payments of $1,300 and Porsboll’s acceptance of these
payments to support its decision to set the payments at $1,300, any
application of contract principles to resolve the issue of Vaile’s support
payments was improper. See Day v. Day, 80 Nev. 386, 389.90, 395 P.2d
321, 322-23 (1964) (concluding that when a support agreement is merged
into a divorce decree, the agreement loses its character as an independent
agreement, unless both the agreement and the decree direct the
agreement's survival).

10

 
oe

  
    
   
  
  
  
  
  
   
   
   
    
  
   
  

he support obligation contained in the divorce decree and thereby
-xceeded its jurisdiction in violation of NRS 130.205(1).$

Because we conclude that the district court's establishment of
$1,300 per month sum certain for Vaile’s child support obligation
mnstituted an impermissible modification of the original support
Dbligation, we reverse the district court's order setting Vaile’s support
yment at $1,300, and we further reverse the arrearages calculated using
1e $1,300 support obligation and the penalties imposed on those
wrearages. We remand the matter to the district court for further
sroceedings consistent with this opinion.®

thaw 5

Hardesty

Cu.
Parraguirre

Given that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
lmodify the support obligation, the assertion that the district court's
sstablishment of a “sum certain” figure for Vaile’s support payments was
ade to comply with the 2001 amendment to NRS 125B.070(1)(b) is
funavailing.

*With regard to Vaile’s remaining challenges to the district court's
lecision, to the extent they are not explicitly addressed herein, we have
mnsidered Vaile’s arguments and conclude that they lack merit.
\dditionally, in light of our resolution of this matter, we do not reach
orsboll’s challenge, in Docket No. 53798, to the methodology employed by
district court to calculate Vaile’s statutory penalties and the ensuing
nalties,

ul