Title: Turner v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LEE TURNER, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 700, 2013 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Case Number 1206022694A 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  May 28, 2014 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  May 29, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 29th day of May 2014, it appears to the Court that: 
1) 
The defendant-appellant, Lee Turner (“Turner”), appeals his 
sentence following a guilty plea in the Superior Court to Manslaughter and 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  The judge 
sentenced Turner to ten years at Level V supervision.   
2) 
Turner raises one claim on appeal.  He contends that his due 
process rights were violated when the prosecutor made remarks at 
sentencing that were factually inaccurate.  The record does not support 
Turner’s argument.  Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be 
affirmed.  
2 
 
 
3) 
In June 2012, Wilmington Police received a report of gun shots 
around Fly 365, a clothing store on West Fourth Street.  Officers found two 
victims in the back alley, one shot in the chest and one shot in the stomach.  
The victim shot in the chest later died at Christiana Hospital from his 
injuries.   
4) 
Officers later learned that Turner was the co-owner of Fly 365 
and that his store had been broken into earlier that day.  After being alerted 
to the earlier break-in, Turner drove to Fly 365.  While Turner was cleaning 
up the store, a number of youths snuck back into the store.  Turner shot at 
the intruders and left the scene. 
5) 
Police located Turner three days later and obtained a search 
warrant for his residence.  Police interviewed Turner, during which time 
Turner complained about officers harassing him and his family and 
contended that he had nothing to hide.  Because he was not under arrest at 
the time, police were only able to conduct a short interview and allowed 
Turner to leave.  
6) 
Turner was later indicted on one count of Murder in the First 
Degree, Attempted Murder in the First Degree, two counts of Possession of 
a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, (“PFDCF”), and one count of 
Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited.  Turner entered into a plea 
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agreement with the State in which he pleaded guilty to Manslaughter and 
PFCDF in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and a 
favorable sentence recommendation (seven years).  The Superior Court 
accepted Turner’s guilty plea and sentenced him to ten years at Level V, 
suspended after five years, for the Manslaughter charge and five years at 
Level V for the PFCDF charge.  In imposing sentencing, the Superior Court 
stated: 
 
Mr. Turner, . . . this is a hard case, because you are 
someone who . . . at one point in time [we] would hope to hold 
up as an example of a kid who did it all wrong . . . and, then, 
turned it all around and had it all going for him:  Family, 
business, successful, doing it the right way.  And in a split 
second, you kind of turned it all back . . . . 
 
 
And I can understand the frustration that you probably 
were feeling that day.  You had been robbed and the store was 
in shambles and you were cleaning it up and what appeared to 
be the same people were coming back to do it again. The 
unfortunate thing is how you reacted to that.  And as a result, 
you took someone’s life.  You shouldn’t have had the gun in the 
first place, which led to the firearm charge which I have to 
impose the five-year sentence on. 
 
 
So, that brings me to the manslaughter charge and, in 
essence, the reckless killing of someone else. 
 
 
It’s a hard, hard sentence for me because those types of 
offenses are normally ones that I would sentence longer for.  
But I have to give you the recognition of what you’ve done and 
how you turned your life around . . . .  I don’t know why this 
young man had decided to come in your store the way it 
happened.  He certainly didn’t come in the front door, and he 
certainly is coming in having – what appeared to have been 
4 
 
ransacked your place before.  It still, however, doesn’t justify 
shooting him.  There’s other ways to handle this.  And you, I’m 
sure, recognize that and – but the event of that day kind of lives 
with you and will live with you forever.   
 
 
So I’ve tried to craft a sentence to justify in my mind 
what you did that day, but at the same time punish you for, in 
essence, taking someone else’s life. 
 
 
7) 
In this appeal, Turner contends that his due process rights were 
violated by factually inaccurate statements made by the prosecutor at 
sentencing.  At no point during the sentencing hearing did Turner or his 
counsel object to the State’s comments, otherwise dispute the accuracy of 
the State’s comments, or claim that the court imposed a sentence based on 
false information. 
8) 
Because Turner failed to object to the prosecutor’s statements at 
the sentencing hearing, our review is plain error.1  Under the plain error 
standard of review “the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to 
substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial 
process.”2  Plain error review is also limited to “material defects which are 
apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental 
                                          
 
1 Turner v. State, 957 A.2d 565, 574 (Del. 2008) (citing Supr. Ct. R. 8; Czech v. State, 
945 A.2d 1088, 1097 (Del. 2008)). 
2 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citing Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 
127, 146 (Del. 1982)). 
5 
 
in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial 
right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”3   
9) 
Appellate review generally ends upon determination that the 
sentence is within the statutory limits prescribed by the legislature.4  
However, a sentencing court abuses its discretion if it sentences on the basis 
of inaccurate or unreliable information.5  The due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits a criminal defendant from being sentenced on the 
basis of information which is either false or which lacks minimal indicia of 
reliability.6   
10) 
Material false assumptions as to any facts relevant to sentencing 
render the entire sentencing procedure invalid as a matter of due process.7  In 
Townsend v. Burke, the United States Supreme Court found a due process 
violation where the defendant was sentenced without counsel after a guilty 
plea, because the judge relied on “assumptions concerning his criminal 
                                          
 
3 Id. (citing Bromwell v. State, 427 A.2d 884, 893 n. 12 (Del. 1981)). 
4 Ward v. State, 567 A.2d 1296 (Del. 1989). 
5 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839 (Del. 1992). 
6 See, e.g., Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 843 (Del. 1992) (explaining that “the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits a criminal defendant from being 
sentenced on the basis of information which is either false or which lacks minimal indicia 
of reliability”); see also State v. Leroy, 1993 WL 19629, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 
1993) (“Procedural due process under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
forbids a sentence from being determined on the basis of ‘information which is materially 
untrue or, if not shown to be false, to be so lacking in indicia of reliability as to be of little 
value.’” (quoting Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d at 844)).  
7 United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775, 779 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Townsend v. Burke, 
334 U.S. 736 (1948)); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).   
6 
 
record which were materially untrue.”8  This Court has held that the 
sentencing judge errs when she sentences a defendant based on false or 
inaccurate information.9   
11) 
In this case, Turner entered guilty pleas to Manslaughter and 
Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited.  The State agreed to cap the 
recommendation to seven years of incarceration at Level V.  When 
addressing the judge at sentencing, the prosecutor stated that Turner “lied to 
the police about where he was and what he did.”  Furthermore, the 
prosecutor went on to state that the defendant “never showed an ounce of 
remorse” when saying in open court:   
The State stands by its recommendation at the time, to seven 
years, but the defendant should get no less than those seven 
years. It would be injustice if we ignored the fact that the 
defendant was a person prohibited from having firearms when 
he armed himself that day and went into his store. It would be 
injustice to ignore the fact that the defendant fired that weapon, 
the weapon he wasn’t supposed to have, at least three times at 
those kids. It would be injustice to ignore the fact that the 
defendant walked out of his store, walked by [the victim], who 
was laying in that alleyway bleeding from his wounds, got in 
his car and fled the scene. And we shouldn’t ignore the fact that 
the defendant, when finally the police caught up to him, lied to 
the police about where he was and what he did. And during that 
interview, he never showed an ounce of remorse. The State 
does stand by its recommendation, but the defendant should not 
get any less than the seven years that we have recommended 
before. 
                                          
 
8 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948). 
9 Hamilton v. State, 1987 WL 4687, at *1 (Del. Nov. 12, 1987) (ORDER). 
7 
 
 
 
12) 
According to Turner, these two italicized sentences are false.  
Turner explains that during allocution that he sincerely apologized to the 
victim’s family and that the police never asked him about his location prior 
to the shooting.   
 
13) 
The State’s response to Turner’s characterizations of the 
contested sentences is that the statements were neither false nor incendiary.  
The State points to the transcript of Turner’s police interview as evidence to 
support the prosecutor’s statements.  For example, the statement that Turner 
lied to police is based on Turner’s statements including, “I don’t know why 
I’m here,” “I have nothing to hide,” and “I don’t know anything about 
[anything].”  The State argues that Turner’s claims that he had nothing to 
hide and that he did not know about the shooting were not truthful.   
 
14) 
As to the second statement, that Turner did not show remorse, 
the State contends that this is also based on Turner’s behavior during his 
interview.  At the time, Turner never exhibited any regret or guilt for the 
children that he shot.  Instead, he continually complained that police were 
unfairly investigating him and harassing his family.  Turner further 
exclaimed, “if this is something, which I know it’s nothing, because I have 
nothing to hide, then I mean, it’s nothing.”  Based on these statements, the 
8 
 
State submits that the logical inference was that Turner did not exhibit any 
remorse or compunction.   
 
15) 
It is well-settled law that “prosecutors may not misrepresent the 
evidence.”10  In this case, the prosecutor’s statements at issue are legitimate 
inferences from the statements Turner made during his police interview.  As 
a result, Turner’s due process claim is without merit.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgments 
of the Superior Court are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice  
 
 
 
                                          
 
10 Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 540 (Del. 2006) (citing Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 
730, 735 (Del. 2002)).