Title: Myer v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Robert Lee Myer v. State of Maryland
No. 15, September Term 2007
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - TENDER YEARS STATUTE - CROSS-
EXAMINATION: Under the facts and circumstances of the case,
the trial court abused its discretion when it did not permit
the defendant to cross-examine a child-witness after a video-
tape containing an out of court statement was admitted into
evidence.
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. K04-4726
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 15
September Term, 2007
ROBERT LEE MYER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M.
(Retired, specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R.
(Retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
Harrell and Battaglia, JJ., Concur
Filed:    March 10, 2008
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In this criminal case involving sexual abuse to a minor, we must decide if the trial
court abused its discretion when it did not allow the defendant to recall the child-witness for
additional cross-examination after the court admitted into evidence a videotaped interview
between a social worker and the child-witness after the child-witness had testified.  We shall
hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioner the opportunity to
cross-examine the child-witness after the video-tape had been admitted into evidence.
I.
Robert Lee Myer, petitioner, was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
for sexual abuse of a minor and various other sexual offenses.  He waived his right to a jury
and proceeded to trial before the court.  He was convicted of the offenses of sexual abuse of
a minor, third degree sexual offense, fourth degree sexual offense and second degree assault.
Petitioner’s convictions stem from events that occurred on or about November 19 and
20th, 2004.  H.C., then three years old, was staying with petitioner and his wife, Ethel Myer,
at their house overnight on November 19th.  When H.C.’s mother, Kelly C., picked her up
the next morning, H.C. told her that Petitioner had been “bad” and indicated that he had
touched her vagina.  Kelly C., along with her husband David C., took H.C. to the police
station in Cockeysville.  Two days later, a licensed social worker at the Child Advocacy
Center, Nelwyn Henry, interviewed H.C..  The interview was videotaped. Petitioner was
indicted by the Grand Jury for Baltimore County, and proceeded to trial in the Circuit Court.
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Petitioner filed an “omnibus motion,” raising, inter alia, the competency of the child.
At the hearing on the motion, he argued that H.C., a child of four years and nine months of
age, was not a competent witness.  He raised concerns as to her ability to recollect, her ability
to differentiate between the truth and a lie, and impermissible coaching.  As to the
admissibility of a videotape made during the social worker’s interview of the young child,
counsel explained as follows:
“We also believe that as part of the competency proceeding, it
is important for the Court to weigh what the child says today as
opposed to what she was saying a year ago in that tape and how
she was saying it.  And, so, we’ve asked the Court to review the
tape for that limited ground, but we reserve the right to object to
it if the State tries to bring [it] in as substantive evidence.”
The Court found H.C. competent to testify.
From the outset, petitioner objected strenuously to the admissibility of the videotape.
Before the trial commenced, petitioner told the court that he objected to the tape.  He stated
as follows:
“Your Honor, there is the argument regarding the tape.  But [I’d]
like to reserve on that.  I want to see what the State’s going to
do.  For all I know, they may or may not admit it, so I — we’ll
just wait.  I’d be pleased to wait for that to get things going.” 
Petitioner moved in limine to exclude the testimony of the social worker as well as the
videotape of the social worker’s interview of H.C..  His objection was twofold: that it was
unreliable, and that it violated his constitutional right of confrontation.  He maintained that
the interview and the tape were hearsay, that the evidence was testimonial in nature, and it
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was therefore inadmissible based upon Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct.
1354, 158 L. Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Lawson v. State, 389 Md. 570, 886 A.2d 876 (2005).
The State’s position was that the social worker would be called only to lay the
evidentiary foundation for the tape’s admission, that the tape was not testimonial evidence
and therefore it was admissible evidence.  The trial court reserved ruling as to the
admissibility.
H.C. testified as the State’s first witness.  She testified that she was on the bed with
Myer while her Aunt Ethel was taking a shower.  She testified that Myer touched his fingers
to his lips and then to her vaginal area, on the inside of her underwear.  After the State
concluded its direct examination, defense counsel declined to cross-examine H.C.
The court heard testimony from several other witnesses, including H.C.’s parents,
Ethel Myer, expert witnesses interpreting forensic evidence recovered from H.C.’s
underwear, and Ms. Henry, the social worker.  Defense counsel maintained that the social
worker should not be permitted to testify at all, and objected.  Ms. Henry testified about the
interview she conducted with H.C., explaining to the court the protocol she uses when she
conducts a “forensic interview” with a child to determine whether abuse has occurred.
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited the facts as to how the police became
involved in the case and their involvement in the interview with H.C..  The interview room
contained a camera to videotape the interview and the police could watch the interview from
an adjoining room.  There was a phone in the room and Ms. Henry structured the interview
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so there would be an opportunity at the end of the interview for a police observer to call with
any questions he would like to ask the victim.
The State waited until the end of its case-in-chief to formally offer the video-tape into
evidence.  Defense counsel objected again to the tape’s admissibility on constitutional
grounds and lack of reliability and particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  The
following colloquy occurred:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . Also, if the Court decides it
wanted to admit the tape for those substantive reasons, I would
like to reserve the right to at least — I’m going to consider
cross-examining [H.C.] on portion of the tape, if it comes in.
“THE COURT: Well, it would have been better, even if it were
beyond the scope of the State’s direct, to question the child
about whatever matters needed to be addressed while she was
here.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, you know, Your Honor, I made
a tactical decision, along with my client, based on what [H.C.]
had to say and what I felt was best for this case for him not to
cross-examine based on her testimony.
“THE COURT: Hmm.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, introducing some other
testimony, or at least you’re being requested to put in some other
testimony of [H.C.], and, and I think I have the right to
cross-examine her on that.  However, it may very well be that
the State and I can stipulate to what are really, I think, only two
to three points in that tape that I would ask [H.C.] about.  I, I am
not and I do not want to inconvenience that child or have her get
on the stand again, if I can help it . . . .”
The court reserved ruling on the matter.
1 The State and the defense stipulated that Dr. Spodak was an expert in the field of
forensic psychiatry.
2 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent statutory references herein will be to the
Criminal Procedure Article of Md. Code (2001, 2006 Cum. Supp.).  As pointed out by the
State, § 11-304 provides for the admissibility of ex-parte out-of-court statements made by
alleged child victims.  Assuming proper notice is given to the defense, the statute allows the
trial court in a criminal case to admit into evidence, to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
an out-of-court statement of a child under the age of twelve who is the alleged victim of child
abuse or certain sexual offenses, regardless of whether the child testifies at trial or not.  The
(continued...)
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The next day, petitioner called Michael Spodak, M.D.1 as an expert in the field of
forensic psychiatry to testify that, in his opinion, because the methods used in conducting the
interview were suggestive, the interview was unreliable.  Defense counsel again objected to
the admissibility of the tape, based on lack of genuineness and trustworthiness, and Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354.  Without conceding the tape’s admissibility,
counsel reiterated to the court that if the tape was received into evidence, counsel wanted to
cross-examine the child.  Counsel argued to the court as follows:
“By the way, I think from my argument yesterday, I think the
Court already understands that I disagree with the State when
they said in their argument, I’ve already had my chance to
cross-examine [H.C.].  I certainly had my chance to cross-
examine [H.C.] based on her testimony.  I’ve never had a change
to cross-examine [H.C.] with the information that’s on this tape
that has not been in evidence and is only now decided by the
court, whether or not to admit.”
The State argued that the tape possessed particularized guarantee of trustworthiness and that
it was admissible pursuant to § 11-304 of the Criminal Procedure Article, Md. Code (2001,
2006 Cum. Supp.).2 
2(...continued)
statement must have been made to statutorily identified persons acting lawfully in the course
of their profession when the statement was made, and the court must find that the statement
possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  If the child victim does not testify,
the child’s out-of-court statement must be corroborated.  In addition, the statement cannot
be admissible under any other hearsay exception.
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The court ruled that the videotape had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
pursuant to § 11-304(e) and was admissible, concluding as follows: 
“I’ve considered all of the factors under Criminal Procedure
Section 11-304; I’ve considered the testimony, also, of Dr.
Spodak and the arguments of respective Counsel, and I’m
satisfied that the statement given by [H.C.] to Miss Henry does
have the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  It was
given to Miss Henry as she was acting in the course of her
profession as a licensed clinical social worker, interviewing the
child and, therefore, I do find that the tape should be admitted
into evidence.”
Following a stipulation by the parties as to the testimony of an unavailable police officer, the
State rested.
Petitioner renewed his request to recall H.C. for cross-examination.  The following
discussion took place:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, there’s still the question
about, with respect to the tape, the cross-examination of [H.C.].”
“THE COURT: [H.C.] was here, and there was an opportunity
to cross-examine her on competency and then as to the merits of
the case.  That would have been the time to question her
regarding the tape.  I don’t know what questions you would have
asked her with respect to the tape.  The interview took place
back in November of 2004.
3 The parties had an extended discussion and disagreement about whether the notice
provided by the State to the defense indicated that the State might offer the videotape in
addition to Ms. Henry’s testimony or that the State would only offer Ms. Henry’s testimony.
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“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, Your Honor, I can certainly
make a proffer to you.  But I, I’ve already made the argument
yesterday.  I’ll make - excuse me - Friday, I’ll make it again.”
“At the time the client pros- to cross-examine [H.C.] was based
on the testimony that she had given.  The tape was not into
evidence at that time.  Tape is in evidence now.  And I believe
the confrontation clause argument gives me the right to
cross-examine her on the contents of the tape which, in some
cases, is different than what she testified to on the stand.  It’s not
identical.  And I’ve already made the Court aware of some of
the areas, you know, with respect to Aunt Ethel being in the bed
which is, I would suggest to the Court, a huge difference in,
with respect to what she’s testified to.  And it goes to her
credibility.  Not whether she’s lying or not, but whether she has
memory of the incident and how she’s reporting it.
“And, so, there, there are things that are said on the tape that
aren’t said during testimony before you, and those are the things
that I would ask her about.  And, so, I ask for permission to do
that.
“THE COURT: Well, you have trial strategy, and it may be a
decision to ask the witness about a prior inconsistent statement,
or it may be a decision to simply point out the differences
between testimony here at trial and statement given at the time
that she spoke with Miss Henry back in November of 2004.  But
there 
was 
certainly 
an 
opportunity 
to 
conduct
cross-examination.”
The State opposed recalling H.C. for further cross-examination, arguing that the State had
given the defense notice of intent to use the statement pursuant to § 11-304(d)(3).3  Defense
counsel pointed out that “things that are said in that tape, once again, that aren’t said in
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[H.C.’s] direct.  If there weren’t those differences, I think that the State would have a good
point.”  The court did not permit H.C. to be recalled for cross-examination, stating: “I don’t
see the reason for that in light of the opportunity for cross-examination that’s already been
given.”  The court found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to a term of incarceration.
Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Before that court,
petitioner argued that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation,
based on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354.  He further argued that his
rights to cross-examination and due process were violated when he was not allowed to recall
H.C. for cross-examination after the tape was admitted.  The Court of Special Appeals agreed
with Myers that the recorded statement was “testimonial” in nature as that term has been used
by the Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington but found that the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment was not offended.  In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special
Appeals held that even though the statements made on the videotape were testimonial in
nature, the Confrontation Clause was not offended because Myer had the opportunity to
cross-examine H.C. before the tape was admitted.  The intermediate appellate court reasoned
as follows: 
“In the case at bar, because the State complied with its
obligation to disclose the existence of the victim’s recorded
statement, it is of no consequence that appellants’s trial counsel
made a strategic decision to forego cross-examination of the
victim.  Because the victim actually testified during the State’s
case-in-chief, she was ‘subject to cross-examination concerning
the [recorded] statement.’  The Confrontation Clause, which
provides criminal defendants with the opportunity to
4 We granted the State’s conditional cross-petition to answer the following questions:
“Did the Court of Special Appeals properly hold that the trial
court’s ruling allowing admission of videotaped evidence did
not violate the Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed.2d 177
(2004)?
“Did the Court of Special Appeals properly recognize that Myer
did not have a due process right to re-call the child victim for the
purposes of cross-examination where the child victim had
testified previously in the case and Myer opted not to
cross-examine her?”
The State presented two arguments to support the cross-petition.  The State argues that
petitioner did not preserve the Crawford argument for appellate review.  Second, the State
argues that the videotape was not testimonial under Crawford because the interview with the
social worker had the primary purpose of determining whether abuse had occurred and
whether any action was needed to protect H.C.’s health and safety.
We do not find it necessary to determine whether the admission of the video-tape was
error under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution because we decide this case based on non-constitutional Maryland law.
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cross-examine prosecution witnesses, does not require that a
witness be ‘recalled’ as an essential condition precedent to the
introduction of that witness’s otherwise admissible prior
statement.”
We granted certiorari to answer the following question:4
“Did the trial court violate Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights
under Crawford v. Washington and his fundamental right to
cross-examine witnesses against him when it allowed the State
to introduce taped testimonial hearsay at the close of its case and
refused to permit defense counsel to cross-examine the
declarant-victim on the additional testimony?” 
Myer v. State, 399 Md. 33, 922 A.2d 573 (2007).
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II.
Before this Court, petitioner argues that the statements on the tape are testimonial
hearsay under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, and its progeny.
Petitioner argues that the interview and tapes are testimonial evidence because during the
interview, a police officer was watching through a two-way mirror and the officer asked a
question, by telephone, at the end of the interview.  Petitioner asserts that he was never given
a prior opportunity to cross-examine H.C. about the videotape because the tape was not yet
in evidence when the State called H.C. as a witness and he was not allowed to recall H.C.
after the tape was admitted into evidence.  Finally, petitioner argues that the trial court
committed prejudicial error under Maryland evidence law when it denied petitioner the
opportunity to recall H.C. for cross-examination.
The State argues that petitioner declined to cross-examine H.C. when given the
opportunity, and that Crawford was not offended because H.C. was available for
cross-examination before the tape was admitted.  The State characterizes the refusal of the
trial court to recall H.C. for further cross-examination as a permissible exercise of the court’s
discretion.
III.
We turn to petitioner’s contention that the trial court committed prejudicial error when
it denied his request to recall the witness for cross-examination.  This Court generally follows
the principle that we will not reach a constitutional issue when a case can properly be
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disposed of on a non-constitutional ground.  See Smith v. State, 399 Md. 565, 570 n.4, 924
A.2d 1175, 1178 n.4 (2007); Dept. of Corrections v. Henderson, 351 Md. 438, 451, 718 A.2d
1150, 1156 (1998); Professional Nurses v. Dimensions, 346 Md. 132, 138, 695 A.2d 158,
161 (1997); State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 404 n.13, 631 A.2d 453, 463 n.13 (1993).
A court’s interest in properly disposing of a case on non-constitutional grounds is so
strong as to constitute one of the few exceptions to the general rule that an issue must be
raised in the petition for certiorari, cross-petition or Order of the Court. See McCarter v.
State, 363 Md. 705, 713, 770 A.2d 195, 199 (2001); Professional Nurses v. Dimensions, 346
Md. at 138-139, 695 A.2d at 161 (1997) (stating “[t]he appellate policy of avoiding
unnecessary decision of constitutional issues gives rise to one of ‘a very limited number of
circumstances [that] have been treated as ‘extraordinary’ and thus within the exceptions to
the requirement that an issue be raised in a certiorari petition, cross-petition, or order by the
Court.’”) (internal citations omitted); State v. Raithel, 285 Md. 478, 484, 404 A.2d 264, 267
(1979).
In the instant case, the issue presented can be decided on Maryland evidentiary,
non-constitutional grounds.  We hold that the trial court’s denial of Myer’s request to recall
the witness after the tape was admitted to be a violation of Maryland evidence law separate
and apart from any rights Myer may have under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476, 77 L.
Ed.2d 1201 (1983).  Because we find that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in restricting
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petitioner’s right of cross-examination, and the error was not harmless, we do not consider
petitioner’s constitutional argument as to the admissibility of the tape.
The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to recall the witness for purposes
of cross-examination.  The trial court has discretion both in controlling the mode and order
of interrogating witnesses and in controlling the scope of cross-examination.  The trial court
also abused its discretion because its refusal to recall the child-witness, under the unusual
facts of this case, impermissibly limited petitioner’s right of cross-examination.
Trial courts are granted broad discretion under Md. Rule 5-611 (a) to control the mode
and order of the interrogation of witnesses and the parties’ presentation of evidence.  Subject
to constitutional considerations, the same is true as to the scope and timing of
cross-examination.  The Rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(a) Control by court.  The Court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2)
avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses
from harassment or undue embarrassment.
“(b) Scope of cross-examination. (1) Except as provided in
subsection (b) (2), cross-examination should be limited to the
subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting
the credibility of the witness.  Except for the cross-examination
of an accused who testifies on a preliminary matter, the court
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional
matters as if on direct examination. . . .”
We review an exercise of this authority for abuse of discretion.  See Ware v. State, 360 Md.
650, 684, 759 A.2d 764, 782 (2000) (noting that “trial judges have broad discretion in
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determining the order of presentation of evidence.”).  An abuse of discretion can occur when
the trial judge’s action “impair[s] the ability of the defendant to answer and otherwise receive
a fair trial.” State v. Hepple, 279 Md. 265, 270, 368 A.2d 445, 449 (1977).
Cross-examination is a right guaranteed by the common law.  See, e.g., Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 (holding that where testimonial evidence is
at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and
a prior opportunity for cross examination); U.S. v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326, 333 (6th Cir.
1991) (describing “the ancient faith of the common law, incorporated by the founders in the
Bill of Rights, that live confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses in the courtroom
is the key to finding the truth in a criminal trial”); State v. Bumper, 170 S.E.2d 457, 460
(N.C. 1969).  The United States Supreme Court has recognized cross-examination as “the
‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’”  California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 158, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1935, 26 L. Ed.2d 489 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
Cross-examination has many purposes.  The questioner may intend to impeach a
witness with a prior inconsistent statement, to show bias or interest of a witness, or to even
bring out helpful information not included in the direct testimony.  We have described the
role of cross-examination as follows:
“The real object of cross-examination is ‘to elicit all the facts of
any observation or transaction which has not been fully
explained.’  That a witness may be cross-examined on such
matters and facts as are likely to affect his credibility, test his
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memory or knowledge or the like, is a fundamental concept in
our system of jurisprudence.  And cross-examination to
impeach, diminish, or impair the credit of a witness is not
confined to matters brought out on direct examination; it may
include collateral matters not embraced in the direct examination
to test credibility and veracity, it being proper to allow any
question which reasonably tends to explain, contradict, or
discredit any testimony given by the witness in chief, or which
tends to test his accuracy, memory, veracity, character or
credibility.  Of course, the right to cross-examine effectively
necessarily includes the right to place the testimony of a witness
in its proper setting to fairly enable the jury to judge its
credibility.”
Cox v. State, 298 Md. 173, 183-84, 468 A.2d 319, 324 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
Cross-examination is permissible to elicit facts “tending to discredit the witness by
showing his testimony in chief was untrue or biased.”  Alford v. U.S., 282 U.S. 687, 692, 51
S. Ct. 218, 219, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931).  The partiality of a witness is “always relevant as
discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.” 3A J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 940, p. 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).  A cross-examiner may also seek to draw
out disparities in a witness’ testimony.  Such pursuit may yield an instance where “the
witness who has told one story aforetime and another today has opened the gates to all the
vistas of truth which the common law practice of cross-examination and re-examination was
invented to explore.”  EDWARD W. CLEARY, ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 251 at 603
(2d ed. 1972).  If a witness is not so easily led to contradiction, the “[c]ommon law
traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact
in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted.”  Jenkins v.
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Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2129, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (citing 3A J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042, at 1056 (Chadbourn rev.1970)).
In the instant case, the trial court improperly precluded petitioner’s counsel from the
opportunity to pursue these traditional avenues of cross-examination with respect to the
video-taped testimony, which the State introduced into evidence after H.C., the child-victim
had testified.  When the trial court denied petitioner the opportunity to recall H.C. for cross-
examination, the court said as follows:
“Well, you have trial strategy, and it may be a decision to ask
the witness about a prior inconsistent statement, or it may be a
decision to simply point out the differences between testimony
here at trial and statement given at the time that she spoke with
Miss Henry back in November of 2004.  But there was certainly
an opportunity to conduct cross-examination.”
In this case, the denial of the opportunity to cross-examine after the tape had been admitted
“inhibited the ability of the defendant to receive a fair trial.”  Martin v. State, 364 Md. 692,
698, 775 A.2d 385, 388 (2001).
The general rule is that ex parte statements are excluded from evidence as hearsay
unless otherwise permitted by rule or statute.  Many states, including Maryland, have enacted
statutes, sometimes known as the tender years exception, designed to protect the emotional
and psychological health of young children alleged to be victims of sexual abuse and to
provide for the admissibility of ex parte statements and video-tapes taken under particular
circumstances.  See, e.g., State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005);
Commonwealth v. Kriner, 915 A.2d 653, 657 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth
5 Section 11-304 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(b) Subject to subsections (c), (d), and (e) of this section, the
court may admit into evidence in a juvenile court proceeding or
in a criminal proceeding an out of court statement to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the statement made by a child
victim who:
“(1) is under the age of 12 years; and
“(2) is the alleged victim or the child alleged to need assistance
in the case before the court concerning:
(i) child abuse under § 3-601 or § 3-602 of the
Criminal Law Article;
(ii) rape or sexual offense under §§ 3-303 through
3-307 of the Criminal Law Article;
(iii) attempted rape or attempted sexual offense in
the first degree or in the second degree under §§
3-309 through 3-312 of the Criminal Law Article;
or
(iv) in a juvenile court proceeding, abuse or
neglect as defined in § 5-701 of the Family Law
(continued...)
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v. Fink, 791 A.2d 1235, 1248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that “[t]he tender years exception
allows for the admission of a child’s out-of-court statement due to the fragile nature of young
victims of sexual abuse”)).  See also Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause
and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U.
ILL. L. REV. 691 (1993).
H.C.’s video-taped interview with the social worker was admitted into evidence
pursuant to § 11-304, a carefully crafted exception by the Legislature to the hearsay rule for
certain out-of-court statements of child sexual assault victims under the age of twelve and
other specified offenses.5  See § 11-304(b).  The statute sets out the requirements for
5(...continued)
Article.
“(c) An out of court statement may be admissible under this
section only if the statement was made to and is offered by a
person acting lawfully in the course of the person’s profession
when the statement was made who is:
“(1) a physician;
“(2) a psychologist;
“(3) a nurse;
“(4) a social worker; or
“(5) a principal, vice principal, teacher, or school counselor at
a public or private preschool, elementary school, or secondary
school.
“(d)(1) Under this section, an out of court statement by a child
victim may come into evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement:
(i) if the statement is not admissible under any
other hearsay exception; and
(ii) regardless of whether the child victim
testifies. . . .
“(3) To provide the defendant, child respondent, or alleged
offender with an opportunity to prepare a response to the
statement, the prosecuting attorney shall serve on the defendant,
child respondent, or alleged offender and the attorney for the
defendant, child respondent, or alleged offender within a
reasonable time before the juvenile court proceeding and at least
20 days before the criminal proceeding in which the statement
is to be offered into evidence, notice of:
(i) the State’s intention to introduce the statement;
and
(ii) the content of the statement. 
“(4)(i) The defendant, child respondent, or alleged offender may
depose a witness who will testify under this section.
(ii) Unless the State and the defendant, child respondent, or
alleged offender agree or the court orders otherwise, the
defendant, child respondent, or alleged offender shall file a
notice of deposition:
(continued...)
-18-
5(...continued)
1. in a criminal proceeding, at least 5 days before
the date of the deposition; or
2. in a juvenile court proceeding, within a
reasonable time before the date of the deposition.
(iii) Except where inconsistent with this paragraph, Maryland
Rule 4-261 applies to a deposition taken under this paragraph.
“(e)(1) A child victim’s out of court statement is admissible
under this section only if the statement has particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.
“(2) To determine whether the statement has particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness under this section, the court shall
consider, but is not limited to, the following factors:
(i) the child victim’s personal knowledge of the
event;
(ii) the certainty that the statement was made;
(iii) any apparent motive to fabricate or exhibit
partiality by the child victim, including interest,
bias, corruption, or coercion;
(iv) whether the statement was spontaneous or
directly responsive to questions;
(v) the timing of the statement;
(vi) whether the child victim’s young age makes
it unlikely that the child victim fabricated the
statement that represents a graphic, detailed
account beyond the child victim’s expected
knowledge and experience;
(vii) the appropriateness of the terminology of the
statement to the child victim’s age;
(viii) the nature and duration of the abuse or
neglect;
(ix) the inner consistency and coherence of the
statement;
(x) whether the child victim was suffering pain or
distress when making the statement;
(xi) whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the
defendant or child respondent had an opportunity
(continued...)
-19-
5(...continued)
to commit the act complained of in the child
victim’s statement;
(xii) whether the statement was suggested by the
use of leading questions; and
(xiii) the credibility of the person testifying about
the statement.
“(f) In a hearing outside of the presence of the jury or before the
juvenile court proceeding, the court shall:
“(1) make a finding on the record as to the specific guarantees
of trustworthiness that are in the statement; and
“(2) determine the admissibility of the statement.
“(g)(1) In making a determination under subsection (f) of this
section, the court shall examine the child victim in a proceeding
in the judge’s chambers, the courtroom, or another suitable
location that the public may not attend unless the child victim:
(i) is deceased; or
(ii) is absent from the jurisdiction for good cause
shown or the State has been unable to procure the
child victim’s presence by subpoena or other
reasonable means.
“(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, any
defendant or child respondent, attorney for a defendant or child
respondent, and the prosecuting attorney may be present when
the court hears testimony on whether to admit into evidence the
out of court statement of a child victim under this section.
“(3) When the court examines the child victim as paragraph (1)
of this subsection requires:
(i) one attorney for each defendant or child
respondent, one attorney for the child victim, and
one prosecuting attorney may be present at the
examination; and
(ii) the court may not allow a defendant or child
respondent to be present at the examination.
“(h)(1) This section does not limit the admissibility of a
statement under any other applicable hearsay exception or rule
of evidence.
(continued...)
-20-
5(...continued)
“(2) This section does not prohibit the court in a juvenile court
proceeding from hearing testimony in the judge’s chambers.”
6 We do not address the question of whether this statute violates Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354.
-21-
admissibility, regardless of whether the child victim testifies at the trial; it also provides an
opportunity for the defendant to depose a child witness who will testify under the statute.6
In providing for the opportunity to depose a child witness before trial, the statute expresses
a clear legislative intent that the defendant have a right to cross-examine the witness, and in
our view, the right must be a meaningful one.
Typically, attorneys make the tactical decision as to whether or not to cross-examine
a witness.  Ordinarily, the court’s denial of a request by counsel to recall a witness for
cross-examination is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  Upon review, if the
decision not to cross-examine was a pure tactical and strategic decision, a reviewing court
will ordinarily find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.  See, e.g., Deibert v.
State, 150 Md. 687, 693, 133 A. 847, 850 (1926) (stating that when an appellant did not
inquire about an issue on cross-examination “[h]is failure did not give him the right to call
the witness to the stand again for what was, in effect, a belated cross-examination.”).
It is correct that the court gave petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine H.C. after
the child completed her direct examination, and petitioner declined to do so.  And, the court
did nothing to prevent the defense from questioning the witness, to confront H.C., to ask her
relevant questions, and to bring out any inconsistencies in her testimony.  But the opportunity
-22-
to cross-examine H.C. was not a meaningful one when it preceded the receipt of the video-
tape into evidence.  Ordinarily, failure to exercise the opportunity to cross-examine would
be considered a waiver of the right.  But, the introduction of an ex parte statement of a child
witness pursuant to § 11-304, well after the child has testified, is no ordinary case.  Petitioner
did not elect to cross-examine H.C. immediately after her direct testimony because he
objected to the admissibility of the videotape.  In a case such as this, it is an abuse of
discretion to deny petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine on issues arising from the
introduction of that evidence.
H.C. testified before the State offered the tape into evidence, and the State waited until
the conclusion of its case-in-chief before it offered the tape into evidence.  Counsel indicated
to the trial court that there were statements on the videotape that were inconsistent with
H.C.’s testimony and he wished to confront her with those statements.  For example, when
H.C. testified in court, she said that Ethel was in the shower when the purported touching
occurred; in the video, she said that Ethel was on the bed with her and the defendant.  There
were some other inconsistencies as well.
Defense counsel was placed “on the horns of a dilemma.”  He had objected
consistently to the admissibility of the testimony of the social worker and to the admissibility
of the videotape.  His theory that the videotape and the social worker’s testimony was
inadmissible on Crawford grounds was neither baseless nor frivolous.  If counsel had
cross-examined H.C. on inconsistencies in her testimony and the videotape, he might well
7 Because the defendant had not objected at trial on the grounds that the witness was
not available to be cross-examined, the court reviewed the issue on appeal for plain error.
(continued...)
-23-
have opened the door for the State to put the entire videotape into evidence.  See, e.g. Brown
v. State, 373 Md. 234, 238-39, 817 A.2d 241, 243-44 (2003) (stating that a party who
introduces evidence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted).
He was placed in a position of forgoing cross-examination, or himself introducing evidence
of the video-tape.  He was faced also with waiving his objection to the introduction of the
video-tape or asking H.C. about statements contained on the video-tape before the tape was
introduced.  He cannot be faulted for not cross-examining H.C. when she testified in the
State’s case in chief.  Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in not
permitting counsel to recall H.C. for purposes of cross-examination.
An analogous situation arose in Delaware regarding an out-of-court statement of an
adult rape victim and the timing of cross-examination.  See Smith v. State, 669 A.2d 1 (Del.
1995).  Even though Smith pre-dated the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements on the
confrontation clause, see Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed.2d
224 (2006) and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, the Court’s reasoning
regarding the opportunity for cross-examination is instructive.  Pursuant to Delaware statute,
Del. Code Ann., tit. 11, § 3507 (1994), the State offered the alleged victim’s statement into
evidence well after the victim had completed her direct, cross-examination and redirect
testimony.7  The court stated as follows:
7(...continued)
Although the court found the introduction of the out-of-court statement to be error, the court
affirmed on the ground that the error was harmless.
-24-
“Although Anderson was called as a witness and examined by
he State, her statement was not offered into evidence when the
State concluded its direct examination.  As a result, Smith was
left with two equally unsatisfactory alternatives.  If he cross-
examined Anderson about the statement before it had been
offered as evidence, Smith would be calling the jury’s attention
to a damning statement made by a witness who testified in his
favor on direct examination.  Alternatively, Smith could ignore
the statement and hope that the State had decided not to put it
into evidence.  By choosing the latter course, Smith lost the
opportunity to cross-examine Anderson about the statement.”
Smith, 669 A.2d at 7-8.  The court held that the Delaware statute requires not only the
opportunity to cross-examine a declarant, but also requires the opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant about the out-of-court statement, and that introduction of the statement cannot
be timed so as to place a strategic burden on the non-offering party.  Id. at 8.  The court
created a rule for the admissibility of such statements: “the statement must be offered into
evidence no later than the conclusion of the direct examination of the declarant.”  Id.  What
is clearly the importance of Smith is that the introduction of an out-of-court statement should
not be timed to strategically disadvantage a defendant or to limit the opportunity for quality
cross-examination of the declarant.
The issue of timing of cross-examination of a child sexual assault victim arose in
Vaska v. State, 135 P.3d 1011 (Alaska 2006).  The out-of-court statement at issue was
admitted by the court as a prior inconsistent statement.  Noting that the practical question at
-25-
issue in the case was whether the particular manner in which the State chose to present its
case at trial could have influenced the defendant’s tactical decision as to whether to cross-
examine or not, the court stated as follows:
“As the state itself recognizes, Vaska’s decision to waive
cross-examination at trial reflects a tactical choice. Yet despite
this recognition, the state ignores the most likely tactical
explanation for Vaska’s choice: the state’s own strategic
decision to cut short T.E.’s testimony, have her declared
unavailable, and ask that her earlier statements be admitted on
grounds wholly unrelated to her ability to appear as a witness at
trial or to be meaningfully cross-examined.  Theoretically, of
course, Vaska remained free to cross-examine T.E; but as a
practical matter, the state’s tactical choice gave Vaska no
immediate reason to conduct cross-examination, and it
suggested no foreseeable reason.  Indeed, it appears that the
state’s most likely purpose in deciding to seek admission at trial
under the catchall exception, instead of on alternative grounds
that would have required T.E.’s presence, was to spare T.E.
from having to face the emotional trauma of cross-examination.
From the state’s perspective at trial, T.E. had no meaningful
testimony to offer, so there was no point in initiating an ongoing
dispute over her present ability to testify and be meaningfully
cross-examined—a dispute that the state was bound to invite
unless it relied on the catchall provision.”
Id. at 1021.
This case does not require any broad ruling.  We are holding that, on the facts before
us, the court abused its discretion by not allowing the defense to cross-examine the child
once the statement was admitted.  Whether a court has abused its discretion usually depends
on the particular facts of the case—on the context in which the discretion was exercised –
and that is what we address here.  The critical facts were as follows:
-26-
(1) The defense was aware of the statement, had a copy of it, and knew that, on the
whole, it was highly inculpatory but that it also revealed an important inconsistency, which
could be used to impeach the witness;
(2) The defense believed that the statement was inadmissible in evidence, both under
Crawford and because it was unreliable; on balance, the defense concluded that it was more
prejudicial than helpful;
(3) The defense moved, in limine, that the court exclude the statement and made clear
that it would formally object if and when the statement was offered;
(4) The State played coy with whether it really intended to offer the statement, to the
end that, when the child testified, it was not clear whether the statement would be offered;
(5) If the statement was not to be admitted, the defense was content not to cross-
examine the child; and
(6) If the defense, immediately following direct examination, had cross-examined the
child about the content of the statement — the part that was inconsistent with her testimony
— it ran a serious risk that, by questioning the child about the inconsistency, most likely the
State would be able to introduce the inculpatory parts under the doctrine of verbal
completeness, even if the statement would otherwise have been inadmissible.
As we have indicated, the State’s deliberate strategy created in this case a real
Hobson’s Choice for the defense, i.e., to forego cross-examination regarding a glaring
inconsistency between the child’s out-of-court statement and her testimony on a highly
-27-
relevant fact, or to waive the efficacy of what may well have been a valid objection to a
highly prejudicial piece of evidence.  That dilemma, created entirely by the State’s trial
strategy, could be avoided only by allowing the defense to cross-examine the child after the
statement was admitted.  The court’s refusal to do so constituted an abuse of discretion.
The concurring opinion, though agreeing with that conclusion, would go further and
establish a per se rule regarding the scope of the cross-examination—that, as a matter of law,
cross-examination would be restricted to specific contradictions between the out-of-court
statement and the child’s testimony.  That is too rigid.  It is also unnecessary and could be
hurtful to the child-witness.
The trial court could have controlled the scope of the cross-examination; that, too, is
largely discretionary, especially with respect to a child-witness, and there is no need for us
to opine as to what a trial court may, in its discretion, allow.  A court, in this situation, may
be willing to allow, and ordinarily should allow, a broader cross-examination if the
alternative, mandated by the concurring opinion, would require that the cross-examination
be bifurcated, thereby subjecting the child to being cross-examined, and thus having to relive
the incident, twice.  There certainly would have been no error and no abuse of discretion had
the trial court here chosen to allow a greater range of cross-examination than would be
permitted by the concurring opinion. 
-28-
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
REVERSED.
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENTS OF
CONVICTION, AND TO REMAND
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE COUNTY FOR A NEW
TRIAL.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY
BALTIMORE COUNTY.
 
In the Circuit C ourt for Ba ltimore Co unty
Case No. K04-4726
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 15
September Term, 2007
ROBERT LEE MYER
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M.
(Retired, specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R.
(Retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
Concurring Opinion by Harrell, J.,
which Battaglia, J., Joins.
Filed:   March 10, 2008
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but only on a narrower ground than stated in
the Court’s opinion.  The holding framed by the opinion is that “the court abused its
discretion by not allowing the defense to cross-examine the child once the statement was
admitted.”  Slip op. at 24.  Although claiming that this does not constitute a “broad ruling”
(id.), the Court’s reasoning strips away that cloak of denial.   The holding is overly broad.
Myer was given an opportunity to cross-examine the victim, called by the State,
following the child’s live, in-court testimony.  He declined.  The surmise of the Court’s
opinion seems a valid one in that his decision to forego cross-examination at that point in the
trial in order to discredit or impeach the victim at that time, using what he believed to be
conflicting or additional factual assertions found only in her videotaped interview, risked
opening the door to wholesale admission of the hitherto unadmitted videotape.  Nonetheless,
as long as Myer steered clear in cross-examination at that time of factual predicates traceable
only to the videotape, he risked nothing. His election not to cross-examine the victim at that
juncture cannot be without any consequence.
The unfairness to Myer on this record crept in when, after the videotape was admitted,
which assertedly contained statements of fact contradictory to or supplemental to what the
victim said on the witness stand, cross-examination as to the “new” information was not
allowed.  Had the Court’s  opinion held that cross-examination aimed solely at exploring or
developing the contradictory or supplemental statements by the victim in the videotape was
what was wrongly denied, I would be at peace with the opinion; however, the  opinion seems
to encourage the trial judge in this case (and others in future analogous cases) to  allow Myer
-2-
an overly broad cross-examination right, including matters which were cumulative and
consistent in both the in-court and videotaped statements, which he waived by not cross-
examining the victim following the in-court testimony.  That is, in my view, unnecessarily
generous based on this record.
Judge Battaglia has authorized me to state that she joins in this concurring opinion.