Title: State ex rel. Schlegel v. Stykemain Pontiac Buick GMC, Ltd.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Schlegel v. Stykemain Pontiac Buick GMC, Ltd., 120 Ohio St.3d 43, 2008-
Ohio-5303.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SCHLEGEL, APPELLANT, v. STYKEMAIN PONTIAC BUICK 
GMC, LTD., ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Schlegel v. Stykemain Pontiac Buick GMC, Ltd., 
 120 Ohio St.3d 43, 2008-Ohio-5303.] 
Workers’ compensation — Temporary total disability compensation — Untimely 
submission of evidence. 
(No. 2007-1757 – Submitted August 26, 2008 – Decided October 21, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 06AP-1203, 2007-Ohio-4810. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} At issue once again is the temporary total disability compensation 
eligibility of a claimant who was discharged from his position of employment.  
Ultimately, however, we decide this case on procedural, not substantive, grounds 
and affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Brian P. Schlegel, was hired by appellee Stykemain 
Pontiac Buick GMC, Ltd., on December 15, 2005.  Stykemain’s attendance policy 
provided: 
{¶ 3} “Regular attendance by all employees is mandatory.  You, as an 
employee, must notify your supervisor immediately if you are unable to report to 
work as assigned.  You are to give notice as far in advance as possible for your 
absence to be an excused absence.  If you will be absent because of illness you 
must notify your supervisor, within two hours [of] starting time, on the day that 
you will be absent.  You are to report your status and estimated date of return to 
your supervisor.  Frequent absence or tardiness may result in disciplinary action 
or termination of employment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 4} “*  *  * 
{¶ 5} “* * * An absence for two (2) days without reporting to your 
supervisor will be considered a voluntary quit.” 
{¶ 6} Schlegel does not dispute that within the first six months of his 
employment, he violated this policy six times, prompting two verbal warnings. 
{¶ 7} Schlegel was injured at work on January 25, 2006, and missed 
work intermittently thereafter for reasons that are not always clear from the 
record.  The absence at the heart of this dispute occurred in May 2006.  A May 1, 
2006 note from Schlegel’s chiropractor certified that Schlegel was unable to work 
from May 1, 2006, through May 7, 2006.  Schlegel worked on May 10, but never 
returned after that day and, according to Stykemain, never called in or submitted 
evidence of continuing disability.  Consequently, he was fired for violating the 
company’s attendance policy. 
{¶ 8} Schlegel later moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for 
temporary total disability compensation.  Before the staff hearing officer, Schlegel 
argued that he had contacted Stykemain and hence did not violate any work rule.  
He also indicated that he had other relevant evidence that he had not brought to 
the hearing. 
{¶ 9} The staff hearing officer found that Schlegel’s claim that he had 
contacted Stykemain was not credible.  The hearing officer concluded that 
Schlegel had voluntarily abandoned his position of employment and could not 
receive temporary total disability compensation.  Schlegel never argued to either 
the district or staff hearing officer that he was disabled at the time that he had 
been fired. 
{¶ 10} Nevertheless, Schlegel appealed to the commission, seeking to 
submit the aforementioned evidence that he, for the first time, claimed established 
his disability from May 11 through the date of firing.  That appeal, however, was 
refused. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
{¶ 11} Schlegel filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
finding that he had voluntarily abandoned his job and in denying him temporary 
total disability compensation.  The magistrate recommended that the writ be 
denied, making three relevant findings: (1) the commission’s determination of 
voluntary abandonment was supported by the evidence, (2) there was no abuse of 
discretion in the commission’s refusal to accept Schlegel’s appeal and to consider 
evidence that had been previously withheld, and (3) Schlegel’s “contemporaneous 
disability” argument under State ex rel. Pretty Prods., Inc. v. Indus. Comm. 
(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 5, 670 N.E.2d 466, need not be considered, because 
Schlegel had not raised it at the administrative level. 
{¶ 12} The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s report in full, 
prompting Schlegel’s appeal as of right to this court. 
{¶ 13} Schlegel admits that he (1) violated the “no call – no show” rule 
six times in six months, resulting in two verbal warnings, (2) did not present 
evidence of disability, which he possessed, to either the district hearing officer or 
the staff hearing officer, and (3) did not raise a Pretty Prods. argument at the 
administrative level.  The magistrate’s analysis is, therefore, sound, and the 
judgment of the court of appeals, which is based on that analysis, is hereby 
affirmed. 
{¶ 14} The first point of the magistrate’s analysis is relevant because it 
establishes a pattern of behavior on the part of Schlegel that amply supports the 
staff hearing officer’s refusal to believe that Schlegel had contacted Stykemain 
during the period in question.  This result left Schlegel unable to establish 
attendance-policy compliance and left him with only two alternatives for 
potentially preserving temporary total disability compensation eligibility:  (1) to 
establish that Stykemain nevertheless knew the reason for his absence or (2) to 
establish that he actually had been disabled when he was discharged. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 15} As the magistrate points out, both arguments rely on evidence that 
was not considered during the administrative proceedings because of Schlegel’s 
untimely submission.  Schlegel acknowledges that he had this evidence at the 
time of both his district- and staff-level hearings.  Inexplicably, he waited until 
after those two hearings to submit that evidence. 
{¶ 16} Hearings before district and staff hearing officers are effectively as 
of right.  A hearing before the commission is not.  It is discretionary.  R.C. 
4123.511(E).  So, too, is consideration of evidence submitted after a hearing.  
State ex rel. Cordray v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 99, 561 N.E.2d 917; 
State ex rel. Domjancic v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 693, 696-697, 635 
N.E.2d 372.  The magistrate reasoned that because the staff hearing officer was 
not required to review belatedly submitted evidence, the commission could not be 
compelled to grant Schlegel’s appeal in order to consider it.  The resultant 
absence of this evidence from the administrative record bars its consideration 
here. 
{¶ 17} Because the record lacks this evidence, neither of Schlegel’s 
arguments can succeed.  As the magistrate also correctly observed, one of 
Schlegel’s arguments is barred from judicial consideration irrespective of 
evidentiary problems.  Pretty Prods. and State ex rel. OmniSource Corp. v. Indus. 
Comm., 113 Ohio St.3d 303, 2007-Ohio-1951, 865 N.E.2d 41, indicate that a 
claimant who is temporarily and totally disabled when he is fired does not forfeit 
temporary total disability compensation eligibility.  That argument, however, was 
not presented to the district hearing officer or staff hearing officer, and under 
State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 679 N.E.2d 
706, a party’s failure to raise an issue at the administrative level precludes the 
party from raising it before a reviewing court.  Schlegel argues that Quarto 
Mining’s holding should apply only to employers that failed to raise issues at the 
January Term, 2008 
5 
administrative level, not claimants.  He argues that R.C. 4123.95’s liberal-
construction provision compels this result.  But he is wrong. 
{¶ 18} R.C. 4123.95 instructs that R.C. Chapter 4123 shall be interpreted 
liberally in favor of employees.  The principle of issue waiver, however, does not 
derive from R.C. Chapter 4123.  The principle instead derives from notions of 
fundamental fairness that have existed for decades. 
{¶ 19} Ironically, the employer in Quarto Mining sought to relax this 
tenet as well, prompting us to respond that “there is nothing about the purpose of 
workers’ compensation legislation or the character of the proceedings before the 
commission that would justify such action.”  Id., 79 Ohio St.3d at 81, 679 N.E.2d 
706.  Quoting Professor Larson’s seminal treatise, we continued: 
 
{¶ 20} “ ‘[E]videntiary and procedural rules usually have an irreducible, 
hard core of necessary function that cannot be dispensed with in any orderly 
investigation of the merits of a case.’  2B Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law 
(1996) 15-4, Section 77A.10.  Thus, ‘when the rule whose relaxation is in 
question is more than a merely formal requirement and touches substantial rights 
of fair play, the relaxation is no more justified on a compensation appeal than on 
any other.  Such a rule is that forbidding the raising on appeal of an issue that has 
not been raised below * * *.’ (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 15-101, 15-103, Section 
77A.83.”  Quarto Mining at 82, 679 N.E.2d 706. 
{¶ 21} There is no justification for holding employers to this rule while 
exempting claimants.  Schlegel did not raise the Pretty Prods. argument during 
the administrative proceedings and is barred from doing so now. 
{¶ 22} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
___________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Williams & Reynolds and Brian R. Williams, for appellant. 
Eastman & Smith, Ltd., Mark A. Shaw, and Richard L. Johnson, for 
appellee Stykemain Pontiac Buick GMC, Ltd. 
Nancy Hardin Rogers, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Alatis, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
______________________