Title: Commonwealth v. Billingslea

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12715 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ESSIE BILLINGSLEA. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 1, 2019. - April 30, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Habitual Offender.  Appeals Court, Concurrent 
jurisdiction.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Waiver of 
trial by jury, Voir dire, Instructions to jury, Jury and 
jurors. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 15, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Thomas P. Billings, J. 
 
 
 
Alan D. Campbell for the defendant. 
 
Jessica Langsam, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  We are asked to determine whether a third 
conviction of one of the crimes enumerated in G. L. c. 279, § 25 
(b), may be reviewed by the Appeals Court.  The defendant was 
indicted for various serious felonies arising from a brutal 
2 
 
 
attack and rape.1  Each indictment, in addition to charging the 
specific felony, also alleged that the sentence for that felony 
should be enhanced pursuant to the habitual criminal provision 
                     
 
1 The jury found the defendant guilty of armed assault in a 
dwelling with a knife, G. L. c. 265, § 18A; home invasion, G. L. 
c. 265, § 18C; three counts of aggravated rape, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 22 (a); assault by means of a dangerous weapon (knife), G. L. 
c. 265, § 15B (b); kidnapping, G. L. c. 265, § 26; breaking and 
entering a building in the daytime with intent to commit a 
felony, G. L. c. 266, § 18; and assault with intent to rape, 
G. L. c. 265, § 24.  The defendant was found not guilty of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (knife), 
G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); and assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon (firearm), G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b). 
 
3 
 
 
of G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a),2 or the habitual offender provision of 
§ 25(b), or both.3,4 
                     
 
2 The habitual criminal portions of the indictments alleged, 
and the Commonwealth presented evidence that the defendant 
previously had been convicted of and sentenced to, (1) rape of a 
child by force, G. L. c. 265, § 22A, with a sentence of five 
years; (2) rape and abuse of a child second or subsequent, G. L. 
c. 265, § 23, with a sentence of from six to ten years; (3) 
indecent assault and battery on a child, G. L. c. 265, § 13B, 
with a sentence of from four to five years; (4) assault with a 
deadly weapon (shotgun), G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b), with a 
sentence of from four to five years; (5) assault with a deadly 
weapon (handgun), G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b), with a sentence of 
from four to five years; and (6) armed assault to rob (knife), 
G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), with a sentence of from four to five 
years. 
 
 
3 The habitual offender portions of the indictments alleged 
that the defendant had been convicted and imprisoned on two of 
the crimes enumerated in note 2, supra:  (1) rape of a child by 
force, G. L. c. 265, § 22A, serving a sentence of more than 
three years; and (2) indecent assault and battery on a child, 
G. L. c. 265, § 13B, serving a sentence of more than three 
years. 
 
 
4 A habitual criminal under G. L. c. 279, § 25(a), is 
defined as someone who is "convicted of a felony and has been 
previously twice convicted and sentenced to state prison or 
state correctional facility or a federal corrections facility 
for a term not less than [three] years by the commonwealth, 
another state or the United States."  If the Commonwealth can 
establish that the person has not been pardoned for either of 
the prior two crimes on the grounds that he or she was innocent, 
the habitual criminal is sentenced to the "maximum term provided 
by law." 
 
 
A habitual offender under G. L. c. 279, § 25(b), must have 
been convicted twice previously of one of the enumerated 
offenses in the statute or 
 
"of a like violation of the laws of another state, the 
United States or a military, territorial or Indian tribal 
authority, arising out of charges separately brought and 
tried, and arising out of separate and distinct incidents 
4 
 
 
After being convicted, the defendant moved in the Appeals 
Court to vacate the entry of his appeal in that court and to 
have the case entered directly in this court.  He argued that 
because his case is defined as a "capital case" by G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, as amended by St. 2012, c. 192, §§ 143-144, he was 
entitled to have it entered directly in, and decided by, this 
court in the first instance.5  The Appeals Court denied his 
                     
that occurred at different times, where the second offense 
occurred subsequent to the first conviction . . ." 
 
 
A habitual offender must have been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of at least three years for each of the prior two 
convictions with no pardon for innocence on either conviction, 
and he or she similarly receives the maximum sentence provided 
by law.  Under § 25(b), however, "[n]o sentence imposed . . . 
shall be reduced or suspended nor shall such person so sentenced 
be eligible for probation, parole, work release or furlough or 
receive any deduction from such person's sentence for good 
conduct." 
 
5 General Laws, c. 278, § 33E, provides: 
 
"In a capital case as hereinafter defined the entry in the 
supreme judicial court shall transfer to that court the 
whole case for its consideration of the law and evidence.  
Upon such consideration the court may, if satisfied that 
the verdict was against the law or the weight of the 
evidence, or because of newly discovered evidence, or for 
any other reason that justice may require (a) order a new 
trial or (b) direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser 
degree of guilt, and remand the case to the superior court 
for the imposition of sentence.  For the purpose of such 
review a capital case shall mean:  (i) a case in which the 
defendant was tried on an indictment for murder in the 
first degree and was convicted of murder in the first 
degree; or (ii) the third conviction of a habitual offender 
under subsection (b) of [§] 25 of c[.] 279.  After the 
entry of the appeal in a capital case and until the filing 
of the rescript by the supreme judicial court motions for a 
5 
 
 
motion without prejudice to renewal in this court.  We ordered 
that the defendant's appeal be transferred to this court.  For 
the reasons that follow, we hold that a direct appeal from the 
third conviction of a habitual offender pursuant to G. L. 
c. 279, § 25 (b), may be entered in the Appeals Court, that this 
direct appeal is entitled to the unique review prescribed by 
§ 33E, and that the Appeals Court may conduct such § 33E review.  
We also address the other issues raised by the defendant. 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We recite the facts as the jury 
could have found them, reserving certain details for later 
discussion. 
 
At around 6:30 P.M. on June 1, 2014, the victim was in her 
second-floor apartment.  She heard a noise from the back porch 
and went to investigate.  In a "split second," she saw the 
silhouette of a large African-American man (the defendant) who 
punched her "extremely hard" in the face, causing her to bleed 
profusely. 
                     
new trial shall be presented to that court and shall be 
dealt with by the full court, which may itself hear and 
determine such motions or remit the same to the trial judge 
for hearing and determination.  If any motion is filed in 
the superior court after rescript, no appeal shall lie from 
the decision of that court upon such motion unless the 
appeal is allowed by a single justice of the supreme 
judicial court on the ground that it presents a new and 
substantial question which ought to be determined by the 
full court." 
6 
 
 
 
The defendant pushed the victim into her bedroom and 
demanded that she take off her clothes.  Over the next hour, he 
brutally sexually assaulted her.  At some point, he yelled at 
the victim and ordered her to make a blindfold; she complied. 
 
At around 7:30 P.M., the victim's boyfriend telephoned her 
to inform her that he was on his way to her residence.  The 
defendant instructed the victim to answer the telephone, and 
shortly thereafter told the victim to call the boyfriend back 
and tell him not to come to the apartment.  Because of the 
victim's monotone voice and one word replies to his questions 
during both calls, the boyfriend called 911 and requested that 
the police go to the victim's apartment to conduct a well-being 
check. 
 
A short time later, the defendant was sitting next to the 
victim on the living room couch when they both heard a noise 
from a car door.  The defendant went to the window and "said 
something like, 'Oh, shit, the cops.'" 
 
When her boyfriend arrived at the victim's home, two police 
officers were already at the front door.  A light in the 
apartment briefly turned on and off, but no one opened the door.  
The boyfriend led police to the side of the house, where a door 
was unlocked, and into the basement.  He and one of the officers 
saw what appeared to be two people coming down the stairs, one 
of whom was naked from at least the top of the thighs down. 
7 
 
 
 
The victim testified that shortly after she heard the car 
door, she could hear the doorbell and people calling her name, 
but she was in "utter . . . shock" and "catatonic."  The 
defendant walked "snug up" behind her and ushered her, still 
completely naked and blindfolded, through the kitchen and down 
the back stairwell.  When they reached the halfway point of the 
lower set of stairs, an officer identified himself and began 
walking toward the victim.  The defendant pulled away from her 
and managed to flee the residence. 
 
The victim told her boyfriend, "I got raped.  I thought I 
was going to die." 
 
Meanwhile, one of the officers in pursuit of the defendant 
made eye contact with him.  The defendant said, "Come and get 
me," before running.  When the officer approached the defendant, 
the defendant lunged at him twice.  After a struggle, the 
defendant was handcuffed and continued to kick, roll around, and 
yell.  A large steak knife, a box cutter, and a cellular 
telephone (cell phone) were recovered from the defendant.6 
 
At trial, the defendant testified that he and the victim 
had been in a sexual relationship and that their encounter was 
consensual.  He testified that he was homeless and could not 
                     
6 Investigators also found a walkie-talkie radio and duct 
tape in the clothing the defendant left in the victim's 
apartment. 
8 
 
 
leave anything at the shelter, which implied that this was the 
reason that he had a knife, box cutter, duct tape, and other 
items with him at the victim's home.  He testified that he 
struck the victim in the face after they had an argument about 
their respective significant others.  He stated that when the 
victim's boyfriend arrived, she told the defendant to "just go 
out the back," and he was confused by his encounter with the 
officers who "slammed [him] to the concrete," put him "in a 
choke hold," and handcuffed him. 
 
2.  The sentencing enhancement provisions of the 
indictments.  After the jury convicted the defendant, he 
executed a written waiver, and a bench trial was held on the 
habitual offender portion of the indictments.  The defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss the habitual offender portion of the 
indictments on the ground that they did not allege that he 
previously had committed the same offenses.  The judge denied 
the motion.  The Commonwealth then filed a nolle prosequi as to 
the habitual criminal enhancements and moved for sentencing on 
the habitual offender enhancements.  The judge sentenced the 
defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole on 
the charge of armed assault in a dwelling with a knife, G. L. 
c. 265, § 18A.  The defendant also was sentenced on the 
remaining charges of home invasion; three counts of aggravated 
rape; assault by means of a dangerous weapon -- knife; 
9 
 
 
kidnapping; breaking and entering a building in the daytime with 
intent to commit a felony; and assault with intent to rape.  The 
defendant filed a notice of appeal in the Appeals Court. 
Discussion.  1.  Appellate jurisdiction of the third 
conviction of a habitual offender under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, the 
history of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and the transformation of § 33E 
powers.  General Laws c. 278, § 33E, guarantees a defendant's 
right to appeal a conviction after trial of murder in the first 
degree directly to the Supreme Judicial Court and grants a more 
searching and comprehensive standard of review than ordinary 
appellate procedure.7  Section 33E originally provided, in part:  
"The clerk shall . . . transmit . . . the record on appeal, to 
. . . the supreme judicial court for the commonwealth . . . .  
The entry thereof shall not transfer the case but on the 
questions to be determined.  The supreme judicial court shall 
consider the questions of law fairly raised."  See St. 1926, 
c. 329, § 4; G.L. 1932 (Ter. Ed). 
An amendment in 1939 added a second paragraph to § 33E, 
which now comprises, in essence, the entire section.  See St. 
                     
 
7 After the direct appeal, however, as we discuss, a 
defendant in a capital case must contend with the gatekeeper 
provision of § 33E, see discussion infra, where a defendant in a 
noncapital case may file any number of appeals from motions for 
postconviction relief without obtaining permission from a 
gatekeeper.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (8), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001). 
 
10 
 
 
1939, c. 341.  "The [1939] amendment was enacted in part to 
remedy the defects in such procedures which had been especially 
evident in the celebrated cases of" Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo 
Vanzetti.  Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 167 (1978), 
citing Commonwealth v. Sacco, 259 Mass. 128 (1927), and 
Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369 (1926). 
These "defects" were emphasized by the Judicial Council,8 
which published in 1927, shortly after the executions of Sacco 
and Vanzetti, the entire docket of the trial in order to 
"illustrate[] in a striking way some serious defects in our 
methods of administering justice."  Third Report of the Judicial 
Council, Pub. Document No. 144, at 37 (Nov. 1927), reprinted in 
13 Mass. L.Q. 1 (1927).  Although the council recommended 
granting the court the power to consider the whole case and 
order a new trial if justice requires, the impetus for the 
recommendation appears to be, in part, the six-year delay 
between the verdict and the execution, rather than the errors at 
                     
 
8 The Judicial Council was created in 1924 when a 
legislative commission suggested it be implemented to "make a 
continuous study of the courts, report annually to the Governor 
on the work of the judicial branch and suggest rules of practice 
and procedure to the courts."  Johnedis, "Creation of the 
Appeals Court and its Impact on the Supreme Judicial Court," The 
History of the Law in Massachusetts:  the Supreme Judicial Court 
1692-1992, at 451 (1992).  It was comprised of judges from 
various courts and lawyers, and eventually played a significant 
role in the founding of the Appeals Court.  Id. 
 
11 
 
 
the trial .  Id at 37-38, 42, 78 (Appendix A).  Allen, Section 
33E Survives the Death Penalty:  Why Extraordinary Review of 
First-Degree Murder in Massachusetts Serves No Compelling 
Purpose, 45 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 979, 988-989 (2012) ("But the 
focus was neither predominantly on the trial's injustice nor on 
abolishing the death penalty; rather the Judicial Council 
reserved its particular criticism for the extraordinary, six-
year delay between the verdict and execution").9 
In 1937 and 1938, the Judicial Council again recommended 
that the Supreme Judicial Court "be given power to review the 
evidence in capital cases and make such orders as justice may 
seem to require."10  Thirteenth Report of the Judicial Council, 
                     
 
9 Justice Felix Frankfurter detailed the many egregious 
errors in the Sacco and Vanzetti case.  Frankfurter, The Case of 
Sacco and Vanzetti, The Atlantic, 409 (Mar. 1927).  He described 
the prosecutor's willingness to put forth unreliable witnesses 
with contradictory testimony and the judge's inability or 
unwillingness to appropriately instruct the jury (among other 
serious issues).  Id. at 411-416, 421-424.  Written while he was 
a professor at Harvard Law School, Justice Frankfurter's 
meticulous analysis highlighted the need for an appellate court 
to conduct plenary review to remedy such injustice.  See id. at 
427 ("Th[e] court could not inquire whether the facts as set 
forth in the printed record justified the verdict. . . . What is 
reviewed in effect is the conduct of the trial judge; only so 
called questions of law are open"). 
 
10 Both in 1937 and a decade earlier, the Judicial Council 
looked to other States' treatment of first-degree murder 
appeals.  Thirteenth Report of the Judicial Council, supra at 
29; Third Report of the Judicial Council, supra at 42-43.  In 
1927, the Council noted that a recent statute had vested the 
same broad power in the New York Court of Appeals.  Third Report 
of the Judicial Council, supra at 42.  In 1937, when considering 
12 
 
 
Pub. Document No. 144, at 28-30 (Nov. 1937), reprinted in 23 
Mass. L. Q. 1(1938); Fourteenth Report of the Judicial Council, 
Pub. Document No. 144, at 14-16 (Nov. 1938).  The amendment to 
§ 33E proposed by the Judicial Council guaranteed that the entry 
of an appeal in a capital case transferred to the Supreme 
Judicial Court the whole case for consideration of the facts as 
well as the law.  See Thirteenth Report of the Judicial Council, 
supra at 30; Fourteenth Report of the Judicial Council, supra at 
16.  See also Third Report of the Judicial Council, supra at 78 
(Appendix A).  It also served to reduce frivolous appeals by 
imposing the requirement that after one plenary review, to file 
a motion for a new trial, a defendant must pass the scrutiny of 
a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court acting as a 
gatekeeper.  See St. 1939, c. 341. 
In 1962, § 33E was amended to broaden this court's powers 
in the review of capital cases.  St. 1962, c. 453.  For the 
first time, the court had a duty to consider the degree of guilt 
and was given the power to direct the entry of a verdict of a 
lesser degree of guilt.  Id.  In the first case to apply the 
1962 amendment, the court explained its new power: 
                     
whether the recommended change would place any undue burden on 
the Supreme Judicial Court, the report noted that "[s]uch a 
power exists in appellate courts in England and Scotland" and it 
cited a survey done by two professors that reported that 
appellate courts in twenty-two States exercised similar powers.  
Thirteenth Report of the Judicial Council, supra at 29. 
13 
 
 
"If upon our examination of the facts, we should, in our 
discretion, be of opinion that there was a miscarriage of 
justice in convicting the defendant of murder in the first 
degree, and that a verdict of guilty of murder in the 
second degree or of manslaughter would have been more 
consonant with justice, it is now our power and duty so to 
declare.  This is a power which the trial court does not 
have." 
 
Commonwealth v. Baker, 346 Mass. 107, 109 (1963). 
Before the 1962 amendment, a murder case did not remain a 
"capital case" under §33E after a verdict of guilty of murder in 
the first degree unless there was a recommendation that the 
death penalty be imposed.  Baker, 346 Mass. at 109 n.1.  After 
the 1962 amendment until 1979, a capital case under § 33E was 
one in which a defendant was tried on an indictment for murder 
in the first degree and convicted of murder in either the first 
or second degree. 
In 1979, § 33E was amended to eliminate special review by 
this court of convictions of murder in the second degree based 
on indictments charging murder in the first degree.  St. 1979, 
c. 346, § 2.  The special rules for murder in the first degree 
in § 33E are rooted in the fact that the crime is the most 
heinous cognizable under law and the sentence of death (now life 
in prison without the possibility of parole) was the most severe 
punishment imposed.  Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 
744 (1986) ("Th[e] uniquely thorough review of first degree 
murder convictions is warranted by the infamy of the crime and 
14 
 
 
the severity of its consequences").11  During the seven-year 
period between the creation of the Appeals Court in 1972, see 
G. L. c. 211A, § 1, and the removal of convictions of murder in 
the second degree from the definition of "capital case," the 
respective roles of the two courts were being clarified.  See 
G. L. c. 211A, § 10 (granting Appeals Court concurrent appellate 
jurisdiction with Supreme Judicial Court unless otherwise 
limited).  This court, in an abundance of caution about whether 
the Appeals Court had power of special review under § 33E, 
"regularly used [its] sua sponte power of transfer with respect 
to such appeals after they were entered in the Appeals Court."  
Commonwealth v. Davis, 380 Mass. 1, 13 (1980).  There is no 
longer be any doubt that the Appeals Court is capable of 
providing plenary review of "capital cases."  Based on the plain 
language of the statute and this court's reasoning that not 
every statutory reference to "the supreme judicial court" is a 
literal reference to this court, see Commonwealth v. Friend, 393 
                     
 
11 In Commonwealth v. Davis, 380 Mass. 1, 13-14 (1980), the 
court considered the possible reasoning for removing murder in 
the second degree from the statute, "The amendment of § 33E, 
eliminating the special review of the category of second degree 
convictions based on first degree indictments, may have been a 
response to the fact that such a conviction results in a 
sentence (life imprisonment with a possibility of parole after 
fifteen years) no more severe than sentences on convictions of 
various other crimes for which the special review has not been 
provided." 
15 
 
 
Mass. 310, 312 (1984), we conclude that the Appeals Court also 
has the power and authority to conduct plenary review.12 
In 2012, the Legislature again amended § 33E to include 
"the third conviction of a habitual offender under" G. L. 
c. 279, § 25 (b).  G. L. c. 278, § 33E, as amended by St. 2012, 
c. 192, § 44.  This act "relative to sentencing and improving 
law enforcement tools" has the explicit purpose of 
"strengthening . . . the laws relative to habitual offenders," 
and "provid[ing] additional law enforcement tools."  St. 2012, 
c. 192.  We next consider this statutory amendment in light of 
the history and development of the Appeals Court as well as the 
purpose of G. L. c. 211A, § 10. 
 
2.  Creation of the Appeals Court and jurisdiction under 
G. L. c. 211A, § 10.  In 1972, the Legislature created the 
Appeals Court as the Commonwealth's intermediate appellate 
court.  G. L. c. 211A, inserted by St. 1972, c. 740.  The 
Appeals Court "substantially reduced" the "intolerable caseload" 
of the Supreme Judicial Court and allowed this court "to 
concentrate on those appeals involving novel or serious legal 
issues of general application and broad impact".13  Tauro, The 
                     
 
12 See discussion, infra. 
13 The creation of the Appeals Court came on the heels of 
over a century of increased recognition of the high volume of 
this court's caseload.  See Report of the Commission to 
Investigate the Causes of Delay in the Administration of Justice 
in Civil Actions 13-14, 1910 House Doc. No. 1050.  See generally 
16 
 
 
State of the Judiciary, 57 Mass. L.Q. 209, 213 (1972).  See 
Johnedis, The Founding of the Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1 
Sup. Jud. Ct. Hist. Soc'y J. 44, 60 (1995). 
The Legislature provided the Appeals Court with "concurrent 
appellate jurisdiction with the supreme judicial court, to the 
extent review is otherwise allowable . . . except in review of 
convictions for first degree murder" (emphasis added).  G. L. 
c. 211A, § 10.  See Johnedis, Massachusetts' Two-Court Appellate 
System:  A Decade of Development, 67 Mass. L. Rev. 103, 103-105 
(Fall 1982) (Two-Court Appellate System) (discussing scope of 
jurisdiction and power of Appeals Court). 
In determining whether § 10 allows for appeals by habitual 
offenders to be entered in the Appeals Court in the first 
instance, we examine § 33E in conjunction with G. L. c. 211A, 
                     
Johnedis, The Founding of the Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1 
Sup. Jud. Ct. Hist. Soc'y J. 44 (1995).  In 1927, the Judicial 
Council noted in its report to the Governor that this court's 
appellate case load was "far in excess of what should be 
expected, or required, of them."  See Third Report of the 
Judicial Council, supra at 43.  However, the Judicial Council 
rejected a proposal to create an intermediate appellate court at 
that time.  Id. at 45-46.  "[A]ppeals continued to pour into the 
Supreme Judicial Court in great numbers, presenting issues of 
increasing difficulty," and in 1967, the Judicial Council began 
taking steps to create an intermediate appellate court.  See 
Johnedis, supra at 47, 49.  See id. at 44, 47 & n.25, 49-53 
(discussing reasons for increased appellate caseload leading to 
Appeals Court's creation).  Once the idea of creating an 
intermediate appellate court gained momentum, enacting 
legislation was drafted, and Governor Francis W. Sargent and 
Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice G. Joseph Tauro advocated 
for the legislation's enactment.  See id. at 57-59. 
17 
 
 
§ 10 "in the context of the entire statutory scheme and the 
historical background of the relevant provisions."  Friend, 393 
Mass. at 312.  Because this court's existence predated the 
establishment of the Appeals Court by almost three centuries, 
"[m]ost statutes authorizing appeals from decisions in the lower 
courts were originally drafted prior to the formation of the 
Appeals Court in 1972."14  Id. at 312.  See Johnedis, Two-Court 
Appellate System, supra at 104.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Ortiz, 425 Mass. 1011, 1012 (1997) (Commonwealth's appeal 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 28E, from Superior Court order 
dismissing indictment was properly entered in Appeals Court in 
first instance and should not have been entered in this court). 
                     
 
14 General Laws c. 211A, § 5, provided the Appeals Court 
with the power and authority necessary to fulfill its 
obligations, and early on the Appeals Court addressed the 
application of statutes that by their terms or through 
interpretation had applied to the Supreme Judicial Court.  See 
G. L. c. 211A, § 5 ("The appeals court shall be vested with all 
powers and authority necessary to carry into execution its 
judgments, decrees, determinations and orders in matters within 
its jurisdiction according to the rules and principles of common 
law and the Constitution and laws of the commonwealth, and 
subject to the appellate jurisdiction, supervision and 
superintendence of the supreme judicial court"); Rooney v. 
Sletterink, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 126 (1976) ("Ordinarily, 
statutes which were in effect prior to the establishment of [the 
Appeals Court, see G. L. c. 211A, inserted by St. 1972, c. 740,] 
and which are related to proceedings on appeal to the Supreme 
Judicial Court, are applicable to [the Appeals Court]"); 
Paananen v. Rhodes, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 12, 15 n.4 (1972) (statute 
applicable by its terms to Supreme Judicial Court made 
applicable to Appeals Court by G. L. c. 211A, § 5). 
 
18 
 
 
Requiring habitual offender appeals to be entered in and 
decided by this court in the first instance, rather than direct 
entry in the Appeals Court, would ignore both the purpose for 
the creation of the Appeals Court and the plain language of 
single exception to concurrent jurisdiction for first-degree 
murder appeals in G. L. c. 211A, § 10.15  See Davis, 380 Mass. at 
13; Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the 
Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 124 
(2006) ("Statutory language should be given effect consistent 
with its plain meaning. Where, as here, that language is clear 
and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to the intent of the 
Legislature"). 
                     
 
15 The defendant argues that it is "incongruous" to make 
§ 25 (b) appeals subject to plenary review by the Appeals Court 
because when § 10 was written the only capital cases were first-
degree murders.  His assertion is only partially accurate.  As 
discussed supra, at the time G. L. c. 211A, § 10, was enacted, 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, defined a "capital case" as one in which 
the defendant was "tried on an indictment for murder in the 
first degree and was convicted of murder either in the first or 
second degree."  See, e.g., G. L. c. 278, § 33E, as amended 
through St. 1962, c.453.  Following the passage of G. L. 
c. 211A, § 10, in 1972, although second-degree murder cases 
still qualified as "capital cases" under § 33E, they were 
nevertheless entered in the Appeals Court because G. L. c. 211A, 
§ 10, provided for the Appeals Court's concurrent jurisdiction 
in all appeals other than first-degree murder appeals.  See 
Davis, 380 Mass. at 12-13; Johnedis, Massachusetts' Two-Court 
Appellate System:  A Decade of Development, 67 Mass. L. Rev. 
103, 105 (Fall 1982). 
 
19 
 
 
3.  Guidance to the Appeals Court when performing § 33E 
review.  To assist the Appeals Court in exercising § 33E review, 
we summarize the provisions of § 33E review as applied to first-
degree murder convictions, determine which convictions under 
G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), are entitled to § 33E review, and 
prescribe which provisions of § 33E review are applicable to 
those convictions.16 
a.  Defining § 33E review of first-degree murder 
convictions.17  Defendants in first-degree murder cases have a 
direct appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court as of right under 
§ 33E, Trigones v. Attorney Gen., 420 Mass. 859, 863 (1995), and 
these cases are excluded from Appeals Court jurisdiction under 
G. L. c. 211A, § 10.  Section 33E review grants this court the 
power to (i) conduct plenary review of a defendant's case on 
direct appeal; (ii) reduce a defendant's conviction to a lesser 
                     
 
16 Additionally, our decision -- that appeals from the third 
conviction of a habitual offender are to be entered first in the 
Appeals Court -- does not preclude this court from considering 
those cases with novel issues or issues of public concern, 
before they are heard and decided by the Appeals Court, via 
direct review (either on application for direct appellate review 
of a party or by exercising our power to transfer cases on our 
own initiative), nor does it preclude us from entertaining a 
case on further appellate review after it has been heard and 
decided by the Appeals Court. 
 
 
17 For a detailed description of the scope of this court's 
powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, see J.M. Greaney and J.F. 
Comerford, The Law of Homicide in Massachusetts, at 255-259 (2d 
ed. 2016). 
20 
 
 
degree of guilt or mandate a new trial; and (iii) require a 
finding by a judicial gatekeeper that the appeal from an order 
on a motion for a new trial presents new and substantial issues 
before it may be considered by the full court.  Defendants whose 
direct appeals are subject to § 33E also are afforded, by court 
rules, certain liberties regarding the time allowed for filing a 
brief and for oral argument. 
i.  Plenary review.  Plenary review means that in direct 
appeals that are subject to § 33E, the court is required to 
review the entire case on the law and the facts, which includes 
a reading of the entire trial record.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Healy, 393 Mass. 367, 385-386 (1984), S.C., 438 Mass. 672 
(2003) (reviewed 3,500 trial transcript pages).  Moreover, the 
court must review the entire record in every capital case 
regardless of whether the defendant has specifically requested 
such review.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Goudreau, 422 Mass. 
731, 735 (1996); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 422 Mass. 420, 429-430 
(1996).  See also Commonwealth v. Wade, 428 Mass. 147, 148 
(1998), S.C., 467 Mass. 496 (2014) and 475 Mass. 54 (2016).  We 
may ask the parties to brief an issue that neither party raised 
on appeal.  See Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 260-261 
(1998), S.C., 456 Mass. 1017 (2010), and 459 Mass. 480, cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011).  Thus, the court has the authority 
to grant relief because of an error that the defendant did not 
21 
 
 
raise at trial or on appeal.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Anderson, 425 Mass. 685, 691 (1997); Goudreau, supra at 735. 
Regarding unpreserved or unargued errors, we first 
determine whether an error occurred and, if so, examine the 
record to determine whether the error created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice by having "likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  Commonwealth v. Goitia, 480 
Mass. 763, 768 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 
678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  Such an error 
would mandate that we exercise our authority under § 33E either 
to reduce the sentence or order a new trial.  We note, however, 
that this power is not without limitation. 
"Neither the conventional type of appellate review 
permitted in a criminal case, nor the special type 
prescribed by G. L. c. 278, § 33E, for a 'capital case,' is 
intended to afford an opportunity, from the vantage point 
of hindsight, to comb the trial record for interesting 
questions which could have been, but in fact were not, 
raised at the trial, or to attempt to convert the 
consequences of unsuccessful trial tactics and strategy 
into alleged errors by the judge." 
 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 374 Mass. 453, 465 (1978), S.C., 409 
Mass. 405 (1991). See Commonwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 406 
(1944) ("Th[e] statute opens the facts as well as the law for 
our consideration.  It does not, however, convert this court 
into a second jury, which must be convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the guilt of the defendant by reading the reported 
22 
 
 
evidence, without the advantage of seeing and hearing the 
witnesses"). 
ii.  Reduction of verdict.  This court may overturn a 
conviction and remand the case to the Superior Court for a new 
trial or reduce a conviction of murder in the first degree to a 
conviction on a lesser charge, for any reason that justice may 
require.  See G. L. c. 278, § 33E, as amended by St. 1962, 
c. 453. (allowing Supreme Judicial Court to enter verdict of 
lesser degree of guilt).  However, despite errors in a trial, 
this court may decline to reduce a defendant's conviction if the 
evidence against the defendant is overwhelming and no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice exists.  See 
Commonwealth v. Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 108 (1997). 
Significantly, this court grants relief under § 33E 
extremely rarely and only in the most extraordinary 
circumstances. 
"From 2001-2010, a total of 282 first-degree murder cases 
entered into the Supreme Judicial Court.  Of these, the 
court reversed or reduced only twenty-three, a reversal 
rate of 8.2%.  But ten of these reversals, almost half, 
came in 2009 and 2010.  Without these exceptional years, 
the reversal rate (from 2001-2008) was actually only 
5.94%." 
 
Allen, supra, at 993.18 
                     
18 "During the 2000s, the Appeals Court reversed eleven of 
the sixty-three second-degree murder cases it reviewed, 17.5%.  
The [Supreme Judicial Court (SJC)] . . . reversed an additional 
four cases.  All these appeals, whether disposed in the Appeals 
Court, directly in the SJC, or reviewed by the SJC after an 
23 
 
 
 
 
We have conducted a comprehensive but nonexhaustive search 
of cases on appeal between 2011 and 2019 where a defendant was 
convicted of murder in the first degree.  Of approximately 296 
cases, we reversed convictions thirty-seven times.  However, we 
discovered only four cases in which we exercised our power under 
§ 33E to reverse the conviction, i.e., only 1.35 percent of the 
total number of appeals.  In each of the four cases, we then 
reduced the verdict.19  See Commonwealth v. Dowds, 483 Mass. 498, 
                     
initial appeal of right to the Appeals Court, were heard under 
ordinary criminal procedure, including the rule that issues not 
raised at trial are waived upon appeal.  Overall, the reversal 
rate (out of the total seventy appeals) was 21.4%.  This survey 
strongly suggests that ordinary criminal procedure offers 
greater hope for defendants seeking appellate relief pursuant to 
section 33E." 
 
Allen, supra at 993-994. 
 
See Brandt & DeJuneas, Special Considerations in Criminal 
Briefs, in N. Quenzer & F. Spina, Appellate Practice in 
Massachusetts, 15.3.4 (4th ed. Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2016) 
("It must be acknowledged, however, that in recent years the 
Supreme Judicial Court appears to be more reluctant to reduce 
the degree of guilt than it was in the past . . . Between 1980 
and 1992, the court ordered a verdict reduction ten times in a 
total of 312 direct appeals from murder convictions.  In 
contrast, between 1998 and 2008 the court decided 280 first-
degree murder appeals and did not use its [§] 33E powers to 
reduce the verdict in a single one"). 
 
 
19 In three other cases we examined, although the 
defendants' convictions were upheld, their sentences were 
reduced pursuant to this court's decision in Diatchenko v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 658, 674 
(2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) (sentencing of juveniles 
convicted of murder in first degree to life without meaningful 
opportunity for parole violates Massachusetts Constitution).  
24 
 
 
499 (2019) (verdict reduced to murder in second degree where 
defendant had brain injuries that affected cognition and 
behavior); Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 120 (2018) 
(verdict reduced to murder in second degree where evidence of 
deliberate premeditation was "far from compelling," intoxication 
defense was presented "incompletely," and prosecutor  made 
"inappropriate" statement about intoxication); Commonwealth v. 
Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 366-367 (2016) (verdict reduced to 
voluntary manslaughter in context of senseless brawl); 
Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 773-774 (2014) (verdict 
reduced to murder in second degree where defendant had history 
of mental illness and brain tumor that affected behavior). 
 
This court's authority to reduce a conviction of murder in 
the first degree in the interest of justice "should be used 
sparingly and with restraint."20  Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 
                     
See Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 480 Mass. 334, 347-348 (2018); 
Commonwealth v. Ray, 467 Mass. 115, 139-140 (2014); Commonwealth 
v. Keo, 467 Mass. 25, 46-47 (2014). 
 
 
20 Some authors have argued that the benefit defendants 
receive pursuant to § 33E review is outweighed by the burden it 
puts on the court and the limitation it creates on future 
appeals in first-degree murder cases.  See Allen, supra at 979 
(§ 33E review "serves no justifiable purpose; rather, it 
routinely dumps meritless, automatic appeals onto the docket of 
the high court").  See also Hartung, The Limits of 
"Extraordinary Power":  A Survey of First-Degree Murder Appeals 
under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 278, Section 33E, 16 
Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 1, 29 (2011); id. at 7-8 ("Given 
the expansive protections available to the defendant under 
Section 33E, the potential exists for a significant number of 
25 
 
 
Mass. 805, 824 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2017) 
(reducing conviction to murder in second degree where defendant 
was involved only in "remote outer fringes" of joint venture).  
Accordingly, we have reduced convictions only in the most 
compelling circumstances.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dowds, 483 
Mass. 498, 512-513 (2019) (reducing conviction to murder in 
second degree where "uncommon facts" of defendant's two severe 
brain injuries were not presented to jury); Commonwealth v. 
King, 374 Mass. 501, 506-508 (1978) (reducing verdict where 
there was little evidence of deliberate premeditation and judge 
omitted critical instruction regarding voluntary intoxication). 
 
iii.  Gatekeeper.  "Given the broad plenary review which 
capital defendants receive on direct appeal, there is a 
'rational basis' for restricting their ability to appeal 
                     
first-degree murder convictions to be reduced or reversed.  
However, the results of [our survey] indicate the opposite 
conclusion"); Note, Populism and the Rule of Law:  Rule 25 (b) 
(2) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure and the 
Historical Relationship Between Juries and Judges in the 
Commonwealth's Trial Courts, 34 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 125, 136 
(2000) ("The SJC, indicating a respect for the deeply-rooted 
tradition of the right to trial by jury in Massachusetts, has 
rarely unleashed the extraordinary equitable power entrusted to 
it.  The SJC, in an attempt to reassert its deference towards 
jury verdicts, instructed trial courts to use this same measure 
of restraint in the exercise of their verdict reformation 
authority"); Note, What Justice Requires:  Equal Protection 
Clause Issues with the Massachusetts Supreme Court's 33E Powers, 
52 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 319, 331 (2019) ("Despite having the power 
to reduce verdicts when it determines justice so requires, the 
SJC actually uses its verdict-reduction power quite rarely"). 
26 
 
 
subsequent postconviction motions."  Dickerson, 396 Mass. at 
744.  This restriction comes in the form of the "gatekeeper" 
provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, which requires that defendants 
convicted of murder in the first degree obtain leave from a 
single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court to appeal a 
postconviction motion after their direct appeal has been 
decided.21  Commonwealth v. Gunter, 459 Mass. 480, 487, cert. 
denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011).  In order to obtain this additional 
review, a defendant must show that there is a "new and 
substantial" issue that this court could not have considered in 
the course of its plenary review in the direct appeal. Id., 
quoting G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  As detailed in Gunter, supra: 
"The bar for establishing that an issue is 'substantial' in 
the context of the gatekeeper provision of § 33E is not 
high. It must only be a meritorious issue in the sense of 
being worthy of consideration by an appellate court. . . .  
At the same time, an issue must also be 'new' to pass the 
gatekeeper's inspection.  This presents a more significant 
hurdle.  An issue is not 'new' within the meaning of G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, where either it has already been addressed, 
or where it could have been addressed had the defendant 
properly raised it at trial or on direct review.  The 
statute requires that the defendant present all his claims 
of error at the earliest possible time, and failure to do 
so precludes relief on all grounds generally known and 
available at the time of trial or appeal" (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 
                     
21 The statute also designates that any motions for a new 
trial filed while the direct appeal is pending must be filed in 
this court.  G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
27 
 
 
The ruling of a single justice, acting as a gatekeeper, that the 
application does not present a new and substantial question is 
final and unreviewable by the full court.  Leaster v. 
Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 547, 548-549 (1982).  A single justice 
of the Supreme Judicial Court is in the best position to conduct 
this review "[d]ue to [this court's] familiarity with the case."  
Dickerson, supra at 744. 
 
iv.  Special considerations.  Finally, a defendant on 
direct appeal from a first-degree murder conviction is afforded 
other special considerations with regard to the filing of 
briefs, issue selection,22 and time allotted for oral argument.  
Although an appellant's brief in a noncapital case is due forty 
days after the case is entered on the appellate court's docket, 
Mass. R. A. P. 19 (a) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1642 
(2019), an appellant in a first-degree murder appeal is allotted 
120 days, Mass. R. A. P. 19 (c) (1).  Additionally, Mass. R. A. 
P. 22 (b), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1651 (2019), affords each 
                     
22 "While the usual task of an appellate lawyer is to weed 
out the weak claims and brief only the stronger claims . . . 
this rule does not appear to apply in a first-degree murder 
appeal.  All colorable claims should be raised and briefed, 
keeping in mind the broad canvas of plenary review.  This does 
not, of course, mean giving equal attention to the strong and 
the weak.  It means that even a small issue, covering one page 
and tucked at the end of a section or on its own at the back of 
the brief, will receive the court's consideration and, given the 
stakes, should not be omitted."   Brandt & DeJuneas, supra at 
15.3.2. 
28 
 
 
party an additional five minutes of oral argument (for a total 
of twenty minutes per side). 
 
b.  The powers and provisions of § 33E review as applied to 
third convictions of habitual offenders under G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25 (b).  In order to construct the bounds of § 33E review in 
the context of G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), we must first determine 
whether every third conviction of a habitual offender is 
entitled to this unique review, or whether, as suggested by the 
history and evolution of § 33E, the Legislature intended to 
limit this review to only those convictions resulting in a 
mandatory life sentence -- i.e., those with the same punishment 
as a first-degree murder conviction.  We conclude it is the 
former. 
 
"It is a well-established canon of construction that, where 
the statutory language is clear, the courts must impart to the 
language its plain and ordinary meaning" (emphasis added).  
Commonwealth v. One 1987 Mercury Cougar Auto., 413 Mass. 534, 
537 (1992). "The words of a statute are the main source from 
which we ascertain legislative purpose . . . ."  Foss v. 
Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 584, 586 (2002).  "The language of a 
statute is not to be enlarged or limited by construction unless 
its object and plain meaning require it."  Rambert v. 
Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 771, 773 (1983).   When the Legislature 
amended G. L. c. 278, § 33E, in 2012 to expand the definition of 
29 
 
 
"a capital case," it inserted the words "or (ii) the third 
conviction of a habitual offender under [G. L. c. 279, § 25 
(b)]." We conclude that it is apparent from the plain meaning of 
this language that the Legislature intended for all of the 
enumerated offenses under G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), to be included 
in this definition. 
 
Although the habitual offender designation stems from a 
wide range of crimes as delineated in G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), 
the statute provides that for any third conviction, a defendant 
must "be imprisoned . . . for the maximum term provided by law 
for the offense" of which the defendant has been presently 
convicted, and similar to the sentence for a first-degree murder 
conviction, is not eligible for parole.23  The legislative 
history reveals that the struggle to present a "balanced bill" 
to the Governor resulted in attempts to "narrowly target[] a 
small class of violent habitual offenders[s]," and that in order 
to alleviate concerns about wrongful convictions, § 33E was 
amended as a "safety valve."  State House News Service, House 
Session, July 30, 2012 (Statement of Rep. David P. Linsky). 
                     
 
23 For example, the mandatory sentence for a defendant with 
two prior qualifying offenses who then commits attempted murder 
in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 16, is twenty years in State 
prison.  But a defendant whose third conviction is for an 
assault and battery causing bodily injury in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 13A (b) (i), must be sentenced to a mandatory five 
years in State prison. 
30 
 
 
 
Therefore, because the plain meaning of and the legislative 
intent behind § 33E require it, all third convictions of 
habitual offenders under G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), will be subject 
to the court's broad powers of plenary review.  Accordingly, the 
Appeals Court will 
"consider the whole case, both the law and the evidence, to 
determine whether there has been any miscarriage of justice 
[and it will] consider questions raised by the defendant 
for the first time on appeal, or even . . . address issues 
not raised by the parties, but discovered as a result of 
[its] own independent review of the entire record" 
(citations omitted). 
 
Dickerson, 396 Mass. at 744. 
 
This court's extensive history and case law describing the 
various standards of review pursuant to § 33E may serve as a 
guide. 
With regard to the gatekeeper provision of § 33E, the 
statute mandates that the single justice review any application 
for leave to pursue a postconviction appeal to determine whether 
it presents a new and substantial question.  G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  Considering the extensive plenary review that the 
Appeals Court will conduct, the interest of judicial economy 
will be best served by maintaining a gatekeeping function.  See 
Dickerson, 396 Mass. at 744.  However, as the Appeals Court will 
be the court that is most familiar with the entire record, we 
again interpret the reference to a single justice of the 
"supreme judicial court" in § 33E, in conjunction with G. L. 
31 
 
 
c. 211A, § 10, to allow for these applications to be screened by 
a single justice of the Appeals Court. 
The Appeals Court's ability to reduce the verdict of a 
third conviction of a habitual offender under § 33E presents a 
slightly more complicated question.  The statutory language 
provides that the court may "order a new trial" or "direct the 
entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt" and remand for 
resentencing if the court is (1) "satisfied that the verdict was 
against the law or the weight of the evidence," or (2) based on 
"newly discovered evidence," or (3) "for any other reason that 
justice may require."  G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Given the varying 
nature of the crimes enumerated in G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), we 
conclude that declaring a verdict of a "lesser degree of guilt" 
can mean two things in this context:  the Appeals Court may 
uphold the verdict as it stands, but direct the Superior Court 
to impose another sentence less than the maximum term as 
otherwise required by § 25 (b); or the Appeals Court may reduce 
the verdict to a lesser included offense and direct the Superior 
Court to impose a new sentence consistent with the new verdict.24  
                     
 
24 In this context, we also interpret "lesser degree of 
guilt" to allow the Appeals Court to vacate a sentence under 
G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), and impose a sentence under § 25 (a).  
Although G. L. c. 279, § 25, is a sentencing enhancement 
statute, and therefore § 25 (a) cannot be a lesser included 
offense of § 25 (b), we recognize that there is a lower burden 
of proof for the Commonwealth under § 25 (a).  Section 25 (a) 
encompasses a wider range of crimes (i.e., all felonies), and 
32 
 
 
Additionally, if the Appeals Court concludes that there was no 
injustice to be remedied on the present conviction, but there 
was a failure of proof on the habitual offender enhancement, it 
may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the trial court 
for resentencing. 
In sum, a defendant's direct appeal from a third conviction 
under the habitual offender statute, G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), is 
to be entered directly in the Appeals Court, which will be 
required to complete § 33E review as described supra.  In 
addition to having the power to order a new trial, the Appeals 
Court will have the authority to remand the case for 
resentencing.  A single justice of the Appeals Court will act as 
a gatekeeper on postconviction motions after rescript. 
 
However, in the interests of efficient administration of 
justice, "[w]e retain jurisdiction in the instant case and reach 
                     
under § 25 (a), "predicate convictions arising from separate 
qualifying criminal indictments or episodes need not [have been] 
separately prosecuted in order for a person to be considered a 
habitual criminal."  Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 480 Mass. 683, 690 
(2018).  See id. at 688-689 (comparing with § 25 [a] with 
§ 25 [b], which requires that prior charges have been separately 
brought and tried). 
 
 
The Appeals Court may find that a mandatory maximum is 
still warranted, but that justice requires the availability of 
probation, parole, work release, or good conduct deductions, 
which are only available under § 25 (a).  Therefore, the Appeals 
Court may, in certain circumstances, appropriately reduce a 
defendant's sentence by directing the trial court to resentence 
under G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a). 
33 
 
 
the defendant's claims."  Commonwealth v. Balliro, 437 Mass. 
163, 165 (2002). 
 
4.  Claims concerning the defendant's trial.  a.  
Impermissible waiver of jury trial.  The defendant argues that 
he was impermissibly allowed to waive his right to a jury trial 
on the sentencing enhancement provisions of the indictments.25  
He argues that this was in violation of G. L. c. 263, § 6, which 
expressly states that a defendant may not waive his right to a 
jury trial in a capital case.  Since this court has already 
stated that "the §33E definition of 'capital case' governs the 
meaning of that phrase in c. 263, § 6," Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 
371 Mass. 605, 606-607 (1976), he asserts that he was precluded 
from opting for a bench trial.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
"third conviction" language contained in G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
refers to the "underlying case on the third strike" and not the 
subsequent trial on the enhancement.  According to the 
Commonwealth, the defendant was not precluded from waiving his 
right to a jury and being tried by a judge for the sentencing 
portion.  We agree. 
 
Although it is true that the definition of "capital case" 
in G. L. c. 278, § 33E, governs the meaning of "capital case" as 
                     
 
25 The defendant was tried and convicted by a jury on the 
underlying crimes, but chose to waive his right to a jury during 
the subsequent sentencing enhancement trial. 
34 
 
 
it appears in G. L. c. 263, § 6, based on our holding in 
O'Brien, 371 Mass. at 606-607, § 33E defines a "capital case" to 
include "the third conviction of a habitual offender under 
[G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b)]."  This "third conviction" is 
referenced in the statute as a prerequisite to receiving an 
enhanced sentence as a habitual offender under G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25 (b).  In other words, in order for a defendant to be 
sentenced as a habitual offender, there must be a conviction of 
one of the offenses enumerated by clause (i) of  G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25 (b).  The Commonwealth must then prove that the defendant 
had been convicted twice previously of one of the offenses 
enumerated by clause (i), that the defendant was sentenced to 
incarceration at a State prison or State or Federal correctional 
facility for at least three years on each of the two prior 
convictions, and that the defendant had not been pardoned for 
either offense on the grounds that he or she was innocent.  
G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b).  This sentencing phase of a defendant's 
trial is separate and distinct from the trial for his or her 
third conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 
248, 252 (2014) ("Statutes providing for enhanced sentencing 
based on a defendant's prior convictions do not create 
35 
 
 
independent crimes, but enhance the sentence for the underlying 
crime"[quotation and citations omitted]).26 
 
As the Commonwealth argues, this is consistent with the 
rationale articulated in Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 
135-136 (2007), S.C., 477 Mass. 582 (2017), in which the 
justification for the Legislature's desire to treat defendants 
facing a charge of murder in the first degree differently from 
other criminal defendants was explained.  "The Legislature has 
determined that, when a defendant chooses to go to trial in such 
a case, the facts must be found by a jury rather than by 'one 
[person]'" (citation omitted).  Id. at 136. 
 
Therefore, where a defendant has been subject to an 
enhanced sentence as a habitual offender, he or she would not be 
entitled to waive his or her right to a jury trial on the 
indictment charging a crime that could lead to a third 
conviction pursuant to G. L. c. 263, § 6.  However, a defendant 
                     
 
26 The defendant argues that the Commonwealth invaded the 
province of the judiciary by filing a nolle prosequi on the 
habitual criminal portion of the indictments and seeking 
sentencing on the habitual offender portions.  We have already 
detailed the procedure to be followed when a defendant is 
charged with multiple sentencing enhancement provisions 
applicable to a single underlying offense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 254-255 (2014).  Additionally, the 
principle of the separation of powers requires that it be 
exclusively within the power of the executive branch to 
determine who and what crimes to prosecute.  Because the 
Commonwealth appropriately filed a nolle prosequi prior to 
sentencing, we find no error. 
36 
 
 
is entitled to waive his or her right to a jury trial during the 
sentencing phase, especially given its technical nature, as long 
as the judge conducts a colloquy, advises the defendant of his 
or her constitutional right to a jury trial, and is satisfied 
that any waiver by the defendant, which must be memorialized in 
writing, is made voluntarily and intelligently.  See Ciummei v. 
Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 509-510 (1979). 
 
Here, after the verdict was announced, the judge asked 
defense counsel if the defendant had decided whether to proceed 
with a jury or a jury-waived trial for the sentencing 
enhancement portion.  Defense counsel requested time to discuss 
the issue with the defendant, after which the defendant appeared 
with counsel and informed the judge that it was his intention to 
waive a trial by jury.  The judge then conducted a colloquy with 
the defendant, reviewed the written waiver form with the 
defendant, which the defendant signed, and accepted the waiver 
as "made voluntarily, intelligently, and with knowledge of its 
consequences."  The waiver was valid.27 
                     
 
27 The defendant also argues that in order to be sentenced 
as a habitual offender, he must have been previously convicted 
twice of the same offense for which he was just convicted.  This 
argument defies logic and the plain language of the statute.  We 
construe G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), to mean that a person with 
three convictions of any combination of the enumerated offenses 
may be sentenced as a habitual offender, provided the other 
requirements of § 25 (b) are met. 
37 
 
 
 
b.  Individual voir dire on interracial rape.  The 
defendant, an African-American, filed a pretrial motion for 
individual voir dire on the grounds that this case involved 
allegations of interracial rape.  At the motion hearing, the 
judge acknowledged that the charge of interracial rape required 
individual questioning at sidebar, but he was uncertain as to 
"what question or questions are supposed to be asked."  The 
judge then suggested posing questions on a one-page 
questionnaire that would "supplement" what he asked.  In 
response, defense counsel stated that he used a questionnaire at 
another trial and "it actually worked pretty well, so I am not 
opposed to doing it"; he went on to say that it even "may be 
beneficial" as long as the jurors were brought into the court 
room individually.  The juror questionnaire included both 
general questions about racial prejudice and more specific 
questions, such as, "Would you tend to believe the testimony of 
a white person over that of a black person, or the testimony of 
a black person over that of a white person, based on the 
witnesses' race?" and 
"In this case, the defendant and the alleged victim are of 
different races:  the defendant is African-American, and 
the alleged victim is Caucasian.  Knowing that, would this 
fact interfere in any way with your ability to render a 
true and just verdict based solely on the evidence and the 
law?" 
 
38 
 
 
Defense counsel subsequently submitted his input on the 
questionnaire to the court and never raised the issue again 
during the three days of jury selection that included attorney-
conducted individual voir dire. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that a new trial is 
warranted because the judge failed to conduct an individual voir 
dire of the prospective jurors on the issue whether they could 
be impartial where the defendant is African-American and the 
victim is Caucasian.  The Commonwealth acknowledges that a judge 
is required, on request, to question potential jurors 
individually in a case involving interracial rape, but asserts 
that the defendant's request here was waived when he agreed to 
pose certain questions by questionnaire.  The Commonwealth 
further argues that even if the defendant's request was not 
waived, the defendant cannot show prejudice because the jurors 
were subject to individual voir dire and the evidence against 
the defendant was overwhelming. 
 
In cases involving interracial rape, because of the 
"substantial risk that extraneous issues will influence the 
jury," individual questioning with respect to racial prejudice, 
on request, is mandatory.  See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 383 
Mass. 637, 640-641 (1981), overruled in part on another ground 
in Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 407 Mass. 553 (1980).  The court in 
Sanders, supra, further explained: 
39 
 
 
"Although . . . interrogation of jurors as to racial 
prejudice is not constitutionally mandated . . . , we think 
it should be held in cases tried hereafter that as a matter 
of law interracial rape cases present a substantial risk 
that extraneous issues will influence the jury and hence 
are within [G. L. c. 234, § 28].[28]  Under the 1975 
amendment, this means that prospective jurors are to be 
interrogated individually in accordance with the statute 
rather than as a group. . . .  The judge has broad 
discretion as to the questions to be asked, and need not 
put the specific questions proposed by the defendant.  
Commonwealth v. Walker, 379 Mass. 297, 300 (1979), and 
cases cited." 
 
 
Here, defense counsel agreed to the judge's request to use 
a questionnaire as long as the jurors were brought individually 
into the court room, which they were.  Defense counsel had an 
opportunity to offer feedback on the questionnaire, which the 
judge incorporated.  He also was provided the opportunity to 
question the potential jurors himself, and he often declined to 
ask any questions at all.  Defense counsel therefore waived his 
request for the judge to individually question the jurors. 
 
Further, the Commonwealth presented extensive evidence 
supporting a finding of the defendant's guilt, and the jurors 
fairly weighed the evidence against the defendant as reflected 
in their acquittal on two counts.  Therefore, "there appears no 
                     
 
28 The statute is now G. L. c. 234A, § 67A, inserted by St. 
2016, c.36, § 4, and provides that to determine "if it appears 
that, as a result of the impact of considerations which may 
cause a decision to be made in whole or in part upon issues 
extraneous to the case, . . . the juror may not stand 
indifferent, the court shall, or the parties or their attorneys 
may, . . . examine the juror specifically." 
40 
 
 
reason to believe that the jury improperly considered race in 
arriving at their findings."  Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 411 Mass. 
218, 229 (1991). 
 
c.  Jury instructions.  i.  Consciousness of guilt.  The 
defendant argues that the judge erred by allowing the 
Commonwealth to argue consciousness of guilt in its closing 
argument without providing the jurors with a consciousness of 
guilt instruction.  He claims that the instruction was mandatory 
and should have been given sua sponte.  The Commonwealth argues 
that the defendant was not entitled to a sua sponte instruction; 
the Commonwealth requested the instruction -- not the defendant 
-- and the defendant did not object to the judge's denial of 
this request.29  
 
In Commonwealth v. Cruz, 416 Mass. 27, 30 (1993), this 
court held that when evidence is presented at a criminal trial 
tending to show the defendant's consciousness of guilt, the 
judge, on his or her own initiative, is required to instruct the 
                     
 
29 The Commonwealth also claims it "ended up not arguing 
consciousness of guilt" in its closing, but the transcripts show 
otherwise: 
 
"And when the police arrived and the defendant realized it, 
he led [the victim], still naked, bleeding and blindfolded 
[toward the basement].  And when the police made themselves 
known in the basement, he fled out the back door, through 
the back yard, and into the neighborhood behind.  And he 
fought with the police when they caught up to him because 
he knew he was guilty." 
41 
 
 
jury in accordance with the instructions in Commonwealth v. 
Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 585 (1982).  However, in Commonwealth v. 
Simmons, 419 Mass. 426, 435 (1995), we recognized that "[a] 
defense attorney . . . , as a matter of trial tactics, might not 
want to request a consciousness of guilt charge [because] it 
would not assist the defendant's case to have the judge focus 
the jury's attention on such matters."  Therefore, we held that 
the decision to instruct on consciousness of guilt is "left to 
the sound discretion of the judge, and it will not be error if 
he or she chooses not to instruct on the subject in the absence 
of a request."  Id. at 436. 
 
Here, the defendant did not request a consciousness of 
guilt instruction in his written request for instructions, and 
he acknowledges that he did not object to the judge's denial of 
the Commonwealth's request.  At this point in the trial, the 
defendant already had testified that he fled from the victim's 
boyfriend -- not the police, which was the Commonwealth's theory 
-- and the judge noted his desire to "remain neutral on that."30  
The judge's concern, that providing such an instruction could 
indicate that he agreed with the Commonwealth, is valid.  
Because the defendant did not request a consciousness of guilt 
                     
 
30 During closing, defense counsel repeatedly emphasized 
that the defendant fled from the house to avoid a confrontation 
with the victim's boyfriend and then he coincidentally 
encountered the police. 
42 
 
 
instruction, and the judge properly exercised sound discretion, 
we find no error. 
 
ii.  Aggravated rape.  The defendant argues that the 
aggravated rape instruction precluded the jury from determining 
whether an adequate nexus existed between the rape and the 
aggravating offenses because the judge instructed the jury that 
the aggravating offenses did not have to take place at the same 
exact time as the rape.  Instead, the judge instructed the jury 
that the aggravating offenses and rape only had to take place 
during the "same criminal episode."  Specifically, the defendant 
takes issue with a portion of the judge's instruction that 
"summarize[] this element": 
"So, if you find the defendant guilty of rape and also 
guilty on any one or more of the indictments that charge 
these offenses, that is, assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, 
kidnapping and/or breaking and entering in the daytime to 
commit a felony, then those findings together would 
constitute aggravated rape." 
 
The defendant did not object to this instruction. 
 
The statutory definition of aggravated rape requires, among 
other elements, forced sexual intercourse "during the commission 
or attempted commission of" one of the enumerated offenses.  
G. L. c. 265, § 22 (a).  The judge's instructions given at the 
start of trial closely mirrored the statutory definition of 
43 
 
 
aggravated rape.31  During the jury charge, the judge clarified 
and elaborated upon that instruction by explaining, 
"The word 'during' is a little bit misleading.  The statute 
says rape committed during certain offenses.  But the rape 
and the aggravated offense or offenses need not have 
occurred at exactly the same time.  The critical point is 
not whether the aggravating acts served to compel the 
complainant's submission, but whether she was subjected to 
other felonious conduct during the same criminal episode.  
So long as the rape and the other offense or offenses 
constituted one continuous episode in course of conduct and 
so long as the aggravated offense or offenses are on the 
list that I'm about to give you, they transform a rape into 
an aggravated rape, even if they didn't occur exactly 
simultaneously with the rape itself." 
 
The judge then gave the now objected-to instruction followed by, 
 
"If the Commonwealth has proved the first element, sexual 
intercourse, and the second element, that is, by force and 
against her will, it has proved rape.  If it has proved the 
aggravating factor, that is -- if the Commonwealth has also 
proved the aggravating factor; that is, that the rape was 
committed during the same criminal episode as one of the 
enumerated crimes that qualify as aggravation, then it has 
proved aggravated rape." 
 
We find no error in the judge's instruction.  In Commonwealth v. 
McCourt, 438 Mass. 486, 496 (2003), we found that the jury were 
"entitled to consider the entire sequence of events in making 
their determination whether the aggravating acts occurred in the 
                     
 
31 The judge instructed, 
 
"Aggravated rape is a more serious offense than rape, and 
it requires that the Commonwealth prove one additional 
element beyond a reasonable doubt.  In order to prove 
somebody guilty of aggravated rape, the Commonwealth needs 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the rape . . . was 
committed during the commission or attempted commission of 
certain offenses." 
44 
 
 
course of the rape" or whether they should be viewed as separate 
offenses.  Here, the judge's instructions did just that.  First, 
he explained to the jury how they could determine whether the 
aggravating offenses occurred "during" the rape, then he 
reiterated what the aggravating offenses were, and he concluded 
by reminding the jury that it was the Commonwealth's burden to 
prove that the rape was committed "during" the same criminal 
episode. 
 
d.  Dismissal of juror without extraneous influence 
inquiry.  Before closing arguments, a juror sent a note to the 
judge that read, "I wanted you to know yesterday [the 
defendant's] sister was on the bus with me and she said a few 
thing[s]."  The judge conducted a voir dire of the juror, and 
the juror explained that the previous day she had unknowingly 
spoken with the defendant's sister while waiting for the bus.  
Once on the bus, the two sat next to each other and the 
defendant's sister discussed various aspects of the case, 
including that she had not provided the defendant with the 
victim's telephone number32 and that the defendant was mistreated 
by the police and hospitalized for three days after the 
                     
 
32 This is significant because the defendant claimed that 
the victim had given him her telephone number as part of their 
consensual sexual relationship, while the Commonwealth suggested 
that the defendant had obtained her telephone number from his 
sister. 
 
45 
 
 
encounter.  When the judge inquired whether this juror had 
discussed this conversation with any other jurors, she 
confidently stated that she had not.33  The judge excused the 
juror.  In denying defense counsel's motion for a mistrial, the 
judge stated that the juror "came across as very candid, and she 
was quite emphatic" that she had not spoken with other jurors. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge erred in failing to 
determine the extent of an extraneous influence on the jury when 
this juror was discharged, especially because the defendant's 
sister and the juror spoke "at length" about the case.  The 
Commonwealth argues that there was no abuse of discretion where 
the lone juror credibly reported that she had not discussed the 
matter with anyone else on the jury and where she was 
subsequently excused. 
 
We have recently described the bounds of judicial 
discretion as it pertains to the impartiality of remaining 
jurors: 
"A trial judge 'has discretion in addressing issues of 
extraneous influence on jurors discovered during 
trial.' . . . Because the determination of a juror's 
impartiality is essentially one of credibility, and 
therefore largely one of demeanor, [a reviewing court] 
. . . 'will not disturb a judge's findings of 
impartiality,' or a judge's finding that a juror is 
unbiased, 'absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion 
                     
 
33 The judge inquired a second time, "You're sure about 
that?"  To which she replied, "Of course I am.  One hundred 
percent." 
46 
 
 
or that the finding was clearly erroneous'" (citations 
omitted). 
 
Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162, 168 (2019). 
 
In Commonwealth v. Amran, 471 Mass. 354, 362-363 (2015), a 
juror accidentally was exposed to extraneous material.  The 
defendant argued that the judge erred by failing to conduct a 
voir dire of the remaining jurors after one had been exposed.  
Id. at 363.  In concluding that the judge had not abused his 
discretion, the court noted that the judge was entitled to rely 
on the answers of the foreperson and the juror interviewed.  Id. 
at 364.  No additional voir dire was required.  Id.  Because 
this case is dispositive on the issue, we find no abuse of 
discretion. 
 
5.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having 
carefully reviewed the entire record, we discern no reason to 
exercise our power under § 33E to set aside the verdict or 
remand this case for resentencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.