Title: AUDIT SERVICES INC v KRAUS CONS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 79-80 IN T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1980 AUDIT SERVICES, I N C . , a Montana Corp., P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, K R A U S CONSTRUCTION, I N C . , a corp., and JAMES KRAUS, SR., d/b/a K R A U S CONSTRUCTION Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Cascade, The Honorable J o e l G. Roth, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Barry T. Olson, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : Cure and Borer, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : May 27, 1980 Decided: J u l y 22, 1980 F i l e d : JUL 2 3 1980 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Appellants Kraus Construction, Inc., and James Kraus, S r . , appeal from an e n t r y of a d e f a u l t judgment and an order refusing t o vacate the judgment. The order of d e f a u l t w a s entered by t h e t r i a l c o u r t due t o appellants' f a i l u r e t o comply with e a r l i e r discovery orders. The s o l e i s s u e before t h i s Court i s whether the t r i a l c o u r t erred i n f a i l i n g t o set a s i d e the d e f a u l t judgment entered a g a i n s t appellants f o r f a i l u r e t o answer t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s under the circum- stances set f o r t h below. Respondent Audit Services, Inc., i s a c o l l e c t i o n agency f o r a union t r u s t fund. A s such, it brought t h i s a c t i o n t o enforce appellants' alleged obligation t o make contributions t o the t r u s t fund under a c o l l e c t i v e bargaining compliance agreement. Although the judgment here was entered on March 5, 1979, t h i s lawsuit was i n i t i a t e d over t h r e e and one-half years e a r l i e r i n October 1975. The f a c t s reveal t h a t t h i s appeal i s not concerned with the t y p i c a l "first appearance" d e f a u l t judgment i n which a defendant i s served with summons and a complaint b u t f a i l s t o appear within twenty days a s allowed by law. Rather, here the record i n i t i a l l y presents a p i c t u r e of a vigorously contested lawsuit. The record i n d i c a t e s t h a t appellants w e r e represented by t h r e e con- secutive law firms. It f u r t h e r r e v e a l s t h a t appellants subsequently abandoned t h e i r defenses, and only a f t e r several unsuccessful attempts by the D i s t r i c t Court t o have appellants reinvolve themselves did t h e c o u r t f i n a l l y e n t e r a d e f a u l t . Now, following the e n t r y of t h e d e f a u l t by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, appellants a t t a c k the d e f a u l t judgment e s s e n t i a l l y on procedural, r a t h e r than substantive, grounds. I n i t s o r i g i n a l complaint f i l e d October 6, 1975, respon- d e n t sought t o c o l l e c t $5,095.03 i n delinquent contributions owed by appellant Kraus Construction, Inc., t o respondent's assignors, t r u s t e e s of a c e r t a i n Montana construction in- dustry employee b e n e f i t t r u s t fund, together with reasonable attorney fees. Having been served with process, appellants f a i l e d t o appear within twenty days of the service. A " f i r s t appearance" d e f a u l t judgment was entered. Execution issued and a judgment was collected by the Cascade County s h e r i f f . The execution by t h e s h e r i f f on funds of Kraus Construction, Inc., prompted appellants t o take action. Appellants moved t o set a s i d e the d e f a u l t judgment, and following a hearing on December 11, 1975, the D i s t r i c t Court granted t h e motion. On December 16, 1975, appellants f i l e d t h e i r answer and added a counterclaim f o r a refund of $477.09 f o r alleged overpayments t o respondent's assignors. I n January 1976 a p p e l l a n t moved f o r a r e t u r n of the funds c o l l e c t e d under t h e s h e r i f f ' s levy. On February 4 , 1976, t h e D i s t r i c t Court ordered t h e r e t u r n of a portion of those funds with t h e balance being deposited with the c l e r k of the court. O n April 29, 1976, an a f f i d a v i t of disquali- f i c a t i o n was f i l e d by P a t Kraus. P a t Kraus i s t h e wife of James Kraus, S r . , b u t the a f f i d a v i t f a i l e d t o a l l e g e any r e l a t i o n t o t h e then s o l e defendant, Kraus ~ o n s t r u c t i o n , Inc. Pursuant t o t h e a f f i d a v i t , the d i s t r i c t judge disquali- f i e d himself and the Honorable R. J. Nelson assumed j u r i s - d i c t i o n . Discovery was i n i t i a t e d on June 25, 1976, with appel- l a n t s ' f i r s t i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and requests f o r admissions. The balance of 1976 and t h e f i r s t t e n months of 1977 were consumed by repeated appearances before t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court over the sufficiency of respondent's answers t o those re- quests and i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and by amending and supplement- ing versions of t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s profounded by appellants and respondent's subsequent responses t o them. During t h i s t i m e , Judge Nelson r e t i r e d from the bench and was succeeded by the Honorable H. William Coder i n January 1977. Because Judge Coder's former law firm was representing appellants, he d i s q u a l i f i e d himself, c a l l i n g i n f i r s t t h e Honorable W. W. Lessley and subsequently, the Honorable J o e l G. Roth. I t w a s not u n t i l November 1, 1977, t h a t appellants had f i l e d and Audit Services had answered four sets of i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . I n t h e interim, t h e r e had been two hearings c a l l e d by appel- l a n t s t o question t h e sufficiency of those responses. Respondent's discovery began with t h e deposition of James Kraus, Sr., taken November 17, 1977. H e was t h e p r i n c i p a l i n Kraus Construction, Inc., and an o r i g i n a l l y - named defendant. (It should be noted t h a t t h e Kraus Con- s t r u c t i o n , Inc., w a s not organized a s a corporation u n t i l February 1976, some f i v e months a f t e r t h e lawsuit began.) Also i n November 1977, a representative of respondent con- ducted a new a u d i t of appellants' records covering t h e period of May 1, 1975 t o June 30, 1977. Following the deposition of James Kraus, Sr., respon- d e n t moved t o amend i t s complaint t o combine the amounts claimed i n t h e o r i g i n a l complaint with t h e delinquencies revealed by t h e a u d i t conducted i n November 1977. The amended complaint a l s o sought t o hold James Kraus, S r . , personally l i a b l e f o r t h e debts of Kraus Construction, Inc. A hearing on t h e request t o amend t h e complaint was set f o r December 21, 1977. However, one day before t h a t hear- ing, appellants' attorneys moved ex p a r t e t o withdraw. The motion i n d i c a t e d t h a t a copy had been served on a p p e l l a n t s . O n t h e same day, t h e c o u r t ordered t h a t t h e a t t o r n e y s could withdraw. The c o u r t ' s order s t a t e d t h a t a copy was t o be served by t h e s h e r i f f on James Kraus, Sr., and t h a t appel- l a n t s were t o appear through new counsel w i t h i n twenty days. Respondent, i n turn, vacated its December 21, 1977, hearing. Appellants f a i l e d t o comply with t h e c o u r t ' s order and d i d nothing. On January 30, 1978, respondent renoticed i t s hearing on t h e motion f o r leave t o amend t h e complaint. Hearing on t h e motion was set f o r February 15, 1978. Since a p p e l l a n t s had f a i l e d t o r e t a i n new counsel, a copy of t h e n o t i c e was served upon t h e i r former a t t o r n e y s and upon James Kraus, S r . , personally. O n February 15, 1978, a p p e l l a n t s r e t a i n e d new counsel and appeared a t t h e hearing on t h e motion f o r leave t o amend t h e complaint. O n February 23, 1978, t h e c o u r t granted respondent Services leave t o f i l e a p o r t i o n of its amended complaint. Appellants f i l e d t h e i r answer on March 1 4 , 1978. O n A p r i l 27, 1978, respondent f i l e d its f i r s t r e q u e s t s f o r admissions. These requests s e t f o r t h respondent's theory of i t s case, asking Kraus Construction, Inc., t o admit t h a t it was a p a r t y t o various c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreements and t r u s t agreements underlying respondent's claim. Appellants w e r e f u r t h e r asked t o admit t h e accuracy of t h e a u d i t s underlying t h e d o l l a r amount of t h e amended complaint. Copies of these a u d i t s w e r e attached t o t h e e x h i b i t s f o r t h e r e q u e s t s f o r admission. Appellants f i l e d a timely response t o t h e requests. They denied the accuracy of t h e a u d i t s , s p e c i f i c a l l y denying f i r s t t h a t a l l of t h e persons l i s t e d i n t h e a u d i t were employees and second, t h a t t h e persons l i s t e d t h e r e i n performed work coming under t h e scope of r e l e v a n t c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreements. Based on those d e n i a l s , respondent f i l e d its f i r s t i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s on June 2, 1978. Those i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s sought s p e c i f i c information underlying appellants' denial-- asking which of t h e persons l i s t e d i n t h e a u d i t s of appel- l a n t s ' payroll records were not i n f a c t i t s employees, and which of them d i d n o t perform work coming within t h e scope of t h e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreements. Appellants f a i l e d t o answer those i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s o r t o tender any objections t o them. Having received no answers t o t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , on October 3, 1978, respondent moved f o r an order compelling appellants under Rule 37, M.R.Civ.P. A hearing on t h i s motion was s e t f o r October 25, 1978. One day before t h e hearing, on October 24, 1978, appellants' attorneys made an ex p a r t e application t o t h e District Court t o withdraw as counsel. This application was granted, and another of respondent's motions t o bring t h i s lawsuit t o f r u i t a t i o n had t o be p u t o f f . A s with t h e withdrawal of appellants' f i r s t counsel, t h e District Court ordered a copy of the order allowing t h e withdrawal of appellants' second counsel and requiring new counsel t o appear within twenty days t o be served upon James Kraus, Sr. Once again, appellants f a i l e d t o obey t h e c o u r t ' s order. O n Jandary,3, 1979, respondent, a f t e r waiting approxi- mately two months f o r appellants t o do something, renoticed i t s request f o r a hearing on t h e long-pending motion t o compel answers t o t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s submitted some seven months e a r l i e r . Hearing w a s set f o r January 1 7 , 1979. Once again, a copy w a s s e n t t o James Rraus, S r . , and t o h i s former attorneys. The D i s t r i c t Court on its own i n i t i a t i v e reset t h e hearing from January 17, 1979 t o January 25, 1979, because of a c o n f l i c t i n i t s calendar. An order f o r t h e change of t h i s d a t e was served on James Kraus, Sr., and t h e r e i s no d e n i a l t h a t he received it. Pursuant t o t h e c o u r t ' s order, a hearing on respondent's motion t o compel answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s was f i n a l l y held on January 25, 1979. N o appearance w a s made by o r on behalf of appellants. However, t h e r e l i e f awarded by the District Court w a s s t r i c t l y i n accord with t h a t provided by Rule 37, M.R.Civ.P. Appellants were given an a d d i t i o n a l twenty days t o answer t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , o r i n l i e u thereof, t h e i r answer was deemed s t r i c k e n such t h a t t h e i r d e f a u l t could be entered. A copy of t h i s order dated January 29, 1979, was served on James Kraus, S r . , and he does n o t deny receiving it. Appellants f a i l e d t o obey t h e f i n a l order of t h e c o u r t by answering t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and no new counsel appeared f o r them regarding t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . O n February 26, 1979, respondent f i l e d a n o t i c e of i t s i n t e n t i o n t o apply f o r a judgment of d e f a u l t on March 5, 1979, a t t h e Cascade County Courthouse. Kraus w a s served with a copy of t h i s n o t i c e a l s o , and he does n o t deny re- ceiving it. The hearing on respondent's a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e f a u l t judgment was held on March 5, 1979. N o one appeared on behalf of a p p e l l a n t s . Respondent's a t t o r n e y s were sworn and t e s t i f i e d concerning a t t o r n e y fees. A judgment i n con- formance with t h e d e f a u l t was entered on arch 7, 1979. Notice of i t s e n t r y was mailed by t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t t o James Kraus, S r . , and he does n o t deny receiving it. Following e n t r y of the d e f a u l t , a p p e l l a n t s d i d nothing. O n March 8, 1979, on a p p l i c a t i o n of respondent, t h e D i s t r i c t Court signed an order releasing the funds which had been held by t h e c l e r k of the c o u r t since t h e i r o r i g i n a l d e p o s i t i n 1975 when t h e f i r s t d e f a u l t judgment was s e t aside. A copy of t h a t order was f i l e d on James Kraus, S r . , and he does not deny receiving it. O n March 1 4 , 1979, a w r i t of execution was issued, and levy w a s made by t h e Cascade County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e on March 19, 1979, which r e s u l t e d i n securing $2,100 on deposit i n a bank account of one of appellants. This execution apparently brought appellants around t o doing something, and on t h e same day James Kraus, Sr., delivered f i l e s t o a new attorney. Immediately a f t e r and e a r l y i n April 1979 a number of pleadings were f i l e d by appellants' new counsel. A n o t i c e of appeal was f i l e d and l a t e r withdrawn. Then a motion f o r a new t r i a l was f i l e d , even though t h e r e had never been a t r i a l . Thereafter, appellants f i l e d a motion t o set a s i d e t h e withdrawal of t h e i r second counsel along with a motion t o s e t aside the d e f a u l t judgment supported by an a f f i d a v i t of James Kraus, Sr. Appellants then ex p a r t e sought and obtained a s t a y of execution. The motion concerning the withdrawal of appellants' second attorneys w a s heard on April 20, 1978. Based on t h e a f f i d a v i t of James Kraus, S r . , and on t h e f a c t t h a t the motion of t h e law firm d i d not i n d i c a t e t h a t appellants had assented t o o r acknowledged the withdrawal of the firm, t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court determined t h a t t h e order permitting the withdrawal of counsel was improper and set t h e same aside. The D i s t r i c t Court deferred a hearing on appellants' post- judgment motions pending t h e i r decision as t o who was going t o represent them t h e r e a f t e r . A proper s u b s t i t u t i o n of counsel was signed on May 17, 1979, and served on a l l concerned on May 2 3 , 1979. Despite t h e time l i m i t s s e t i n Rule 60, M.R.Civ.P., f o r t h e determination of motions t o vacate d e f a u l t judgments, a p p e l l a n t s d i d nothing regarding t h e i r pending post-judgment motions u n t i l J u l y 11, 1979, when they noticed them f o r hearing on August 9, 1979. A t t h a t t i m e a hearing w a s held i n c o u r t chambers. N o testimony was taken; t h e hearing consisted s o l e l y of a p p e l l a n t s ' arguments. After hearing t h e arguments, t h e D i s t r i c t Court refused t o g r a n t any of a p p e l l a n t s ' motions, and t h e d e f a u l t judgment was allowed t o stand. Appellants t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d t h i s appeal from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s order of August 9, 1979. The s o l e i s s u e f o r review i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o s e t a s i d e the d e f a u l t judgment and d e f a u l t entered a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t s f o r f a i l u r e t o answer in- t e r r o g a t o r i e s under t h e circumstances of t h i s case. Appellants make two arguments f o r s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment. The f i r s t i s t h a t t h e District Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n imposing such a harsh sanction. Second, a p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t t h e withdrawal of t h e i r second counsel r e t r o a c t i v e l y s e t a s i d e a s improper, " t a i n t e d " a l l subsequent proceedings and, therefore, t h e d e f a u l t judgment must be set a s i d e . W e f i n d n e i t h e r argument t o have merit. Appellants r e l y s t r o n g l y on t h e general r u l e t h a t d e f a u l t judgments a r e n o t favored and no g r e a t abuse of d i s c r e t i o n need be found by t h i s Court t o set a s i d e such a judgment. Appellants r e l y p r i n c i p a l l y on t h e following cases: Kootenai Corp. v. Dayton (1979), Mont. I 601 P.2d 47, 36 St.Rep. 1785, 1790-1791; L i t t l e Horn S t a t e Bank v. R e a l Bird (1979), - Mont. - , 598 P.2d 1109, 36 St.Rep. 1495; Shields v. P i r k l e Refrigerated F r e i g h t l i n e s , Inc. (1979), - Mont. - , 591 P.2d 1120, 1125, 36 St.Rep. 472. W e have reviewed these a u t h o r i t i e s and f i n d them n o t i n p o i n t with t h i s case. Each of them d e a l with " f i r s t appearance" d e f a u l t judgments. Another case c i t e d and r e l i e d upon by a p p e l l a n t s , Simpkins v. Simpkins (1894), 1 4 Mont. 386, 36 P. 759, d e a l s with a d e f a u l t o t h e r than t h e " f i r s t appearance" d e f a u l t . However, Simpkins can e a s i l y be distinguished. There t h e l i t i g a t i o n was s t i l l i n its pre- liminary s t a g e s and t h e d e f a u l t entered was s o l e l y due t o t h e negligence of an out-of-state attorney. Such i s n o t t h e case here. W e can, however, f i n d cases from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s analogous t o t h e circumstances of t h i s case, p a r t i c u l a r l y where t h e a p p e l l a n t d e l i b e r a t e l y refused t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n discovery o r t o comply with an order of t h e c o u r t issued pursuant t o Rule 37 of t h e Rules of C i v i l Procedure and whose a t t o r n e y withdraws during t h e course of t h i s noncom- pliance. Most analogous i s Gallegos v. Franklin (1976), 89 N.M. 118, 547 P.2d 1160, c e r t . den. 549 P.2d 284. There the a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c a r e f u l l y reviewed t h e record which indicated t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t s had f a i l e d t o answer i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s o r otherwise cooperate with p r e t r i a l discovery. I n t h a t c a s e a p p e l l a n t s t a t t o r n e y s withdrew during t h e proceedings. Thereafter t h e p l a i n t i f f s served upon t h e a p p e l l a n t s a n o t i c e of a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a d e f a u l t judgment. The d e f a u l t was based on t h e a p p e l l a n t s t noncompliance with t h e r u l e s of discovery and t h e e x p l i c i t a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r e n t r y of such a d e f a u l t under Rule 37. I n Gallegos t h e d e f a u l t judgment was allowed t o stand, with t h e c o u r t s t a t i n g a s a u t h o r i t y lan- guage f r o m H. F. Livermore Corp. v. ~ k t i e n g e s e l l s c h a f t Gebruder Loepfe (D.C. C i r . 1970), 432 F.2d 689, where t h e c o u r t held: "Given t h i s approach, t h e d e f a u l t judgment must normally be viewed a s a v a i l a b l e only when the adversary process has been h a l t e d because of an e s s e n t i a l l y unresponsive party. I n t h a t i n s t a n c e , t h e d i l i g e n t p a r t y must be protected lest he be faced with interminable delay and continued uncertainty as t o h i s r i g h t s . The d e f a u l t judgment remedy serves a s such a pro- t e c t i o n . Furthermore, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a d e f a u l t is a d e t e r r e n t t o those p a r t i e s who choose delay a s p a r t of t h e i r l i t i g a t i v e s t r a t e - gy* " 432 F.2d a t 691. A f t e r quoting Livermore, t h e c o u r t i n Gallegos went on t o say: "From January 29, 1974, t o November 18, 1974, a period of t e n months, t h e defendants f a i l e d t o comply with t h e Rules of C i v i l Procedure. A d e f a u l t judgment may be entered. See Rules 55(a) and 37(d) of t h e Rules of C i v i l Procedure. "In a d d i t i o n , defendants f i l e d a consent t o t h e withdrawal of a t t o r n e y s a f t e r t h e d e f a u l t judg- ment was entered. Defendants, having n o t i c e of t h e motion f o r withdrawal, f a i l e d t o o b t a i n o t h e r a t t o r n e y s , f a i l e d t o appear a t t h e hear- i n g on t h e motion f o r d e f a u l t judgment, and f a i l e d t o show any cause, o r a l o r w r i t t e n , why t h e d e f a u l t judgment should n o t be entered. "To g r a n t t h e defendants a r e v e r s a l now means t h a t w e would give credence t o e s s e n t i a l l y unresponsive p a r t i e s , and consent t h a t they may h a l t t h e adversary process and endlessly delay t h e r i g h t s of p l a i n t i f f . The philosophy of t h e l a w of c i v i l procedure m i l i t a t e s a g a i n s t t h i s p r o t r a c t e d wearisome conduct." Gallegos, 547 P.2d a t 1164-1165. The same reasoning can be applied t o a p p e l l a n t s here. See a l s o Johnson v. Matelich (1971), 165 Mont. 329, 517 P.2d A s t o t h e second p a r t of a p p e l l a n t s ' argument, i n t h e a f f i d a v i t f i l e d with t h e motion t o set a s i d e the d e f a u l t judgment, James Kraus, S r . , s t a t e d t h a t he thought t h a t h i s second counsel was s t i l l representing a p p e l l a n t s u n t i l January 29, 1979, even though t h e District Court had per- mitted t h e i r withdrawal on October 2 4 , 1978. Appellants make much of t h e argument t h a t t h e r e w e r e no c o u n t e r a f f i - d a v i t s and s o Kraus's a f f i d a v i t was t h e only evidence upon which t h e D i s t r i c t Court should have based i t s decision. W e f i n d t h i s argument without m e r i t . A s t o t h e f i r s t p o i n t , t h e af f i d a v i t has t o be accepted f o r what it a c t u a l l y is--a self-serving document drawn by a p p e l l a n t s 1 attorney. The general r u l e i s t h a t a f f i d a v i t s " a r e commonly regarded a s weak evidence, t o be received with caution," and t h a t "they a r e not conclusive of the f a c t s s t a t e d t h e r e i n even though n o t contradicted by counter- a f f i d a v i t s . " 32A C.J.S. Evidence 81032 a t 706. See a l s o Lohman v. Lohman (1946), 29 Cal.2d 1 4 4 , 173 P.2d 657, 660. Here t h e record before t h e t r i a l c o u r t b e l i e d t h e testimony of Krausls a f f i d a v i t , even though t h e t r i a l c o u r t l a t e r n u l l i f i e d t h e withdrawal order. There i s no question t h a t a copy of t h e ' o r d e r allowing t h e withdrawal of t h e f i r m was served on James Kraus, Sr. A r e c e i p t was attached t o t h e order of withdrawal i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e Cascade County s h e r i f f served Kraus with a copy of t h e order permitting withdrawal on October 28, 1978. While a p p e l l a n t s claim t h a t they had no "notice" of t h e October 24 o r d e r , they d i d n o t counter t h e f a c t t h a t it was served upon Kraus and t h a t he was personally served with a l l t h e motions, n o t i c e s and o r d e r s subsequently f i l e d . There i s no question t h a t Kraus, an experienced, capable businessman, had s u f f i c i e n t n o t i c e t o know what was going on and y e t chose t o ignore it a t considerable r i s k t o himself and h i s corporation. I n Johnson v. Matelich, supra, i n r e f u s i n g t o set a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment a g a i n s t another d e l i b e r a t e l y unresponsive l i t i g a n t , t h i s Court noted: "Defendant has made no showing of why he f a i l e d t o f i l e an answer within t h e time granted by t h e d i s t r i c t court. Defendant now asserts t h a t he w i l l be prejudiced because he has a good de- fense t o t h e claims and now w i l l be unable t o assert the defense. If defendant is in any way prejudiced, the record clearly shows that it is by his own failure and disregard to as- sert his rights when available to him." 163 Mont. at 335, 517 P.2d at 734. We note particularly the trial court's order of January 29, 1979. Noncompliance with it formed the basis of the default judgment under Rule 37. That order required appel- lants to answer interrogatories served eight months earlier on June 2, 1978. As of the date of respondent's brief before us, some twenty-two months af ter the interrogatories were filed, appellants made no attempt to answer the inter- rogatories or conform in the slightest with the trial court's order. On this record we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the refusal of the trial court to set aside the default judgment. Appellants did not offer proper answers to the interrogatories at any time or explain or justify their refusal to comply. Such matters, in our opinion, would be a prerequisite to establishing an abuse of discretion. Given the length of time involved, appellants' default coupled with their ongoing refusal to rectify it, we are convinced that appellants failed to meet a showing required under Rule 60(d), M.R.Civ.P., and the District Court was correct in refusing to set aside its default judgment. The next issue raised was whether the withdrawal of appellants' second set of attorneys voided all subsequent proceedings. Appellants rely upon McPartlin v. Fransen (1978) - Mont. , 582 P.2d 1255, 35 St.Rep. 1191. In McPartlin this Court ruled under section 93-2104, R.C.M. 1947, now section 37-61-405, MCA, that when an attorney withdraws without consent of his client, the opposing party must "notify" the unrepresented party to have counsel appear before the former may proceed with the action. Appellants now claim t h a t respondent d i d n o t m e e t t h a t requirement. W e disagree. I n McPartlin we noted t h a t t h e r e was no hard-and-fast r u l e on how the s t a t u t o r y "notice" must be given t o t h e unrepresented p a r t y and s t a t e d : "We do n o t b e l i e v e a c t u a l n o t i c e must be per- s o n a l l y served on t h e unrepresented p a r t y op- ponent. But w e do hold t h e represented p a r t y must make a p o s i t i v e showing he has attempted t o communicate adequate n o t i c e t o t h e unrepre- sented party. I f t h e represented p a r t y can show he made a good-faith e f f o r t t o n o t i f y t h e unrepresented p a r t y and advise him he should s u b s t i t u t e counsel o r appear i n person, and t h e n o t i c e a l s o sets f o r t h t h e d a t e of t h e next hearing o r a c t i o n i n t h e matter pending, then t h e represented p a r t y w i l l be deemed t o have s a t i s f i e d t h e r e q u i s i t e s of s e c t i o n 93- 2104, R.C.M. 1947." 582 P.2d a t 1259. Here, a p p e l l a n t s w e r e served with an order of t h e c o u r t r e q u i r i n g them t o do what t h e "notice" asks them t o do. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e October 25, 1978 order was personally served on a p p e l l a n t s , even though i n McPartlin t h i s Court deemed such a s e r v i c e n o t required by t h e s t a t u t e . The order of t h e c o u r t exceeds i n impact t h e "notice" from opposing counsel where both t h e n o t i c e and t h e order convey t h e same information. I n t h i s case, f u r t h e r n o t i c e of counsel would have been redundant and serve no u s e f u l purpose. I n arguing t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s order of October 25, 1978, was improperly served s o as t o r e t r o a c t i v e l y make void a l l intervening proceedings, t h e a f f i d a v i t of James Kraus, Sr., f i l e d on January 25, 1979, i n d i c a t e s t h a t he knew he was n o t represented by counsel. H e r e , a p p e l l a n t s had f u l l knowledge on January 25, 1979. I n a d d i t i o n , they had f u l l n o t i c e of t h e c o u r t ' s order of t h a t d a t e giving them twenty days t o f i l e answers t o t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . They chose t o do nothing. Indeed, they d i d n o t even move t h e c o u r t f o r reconsideration of t h a t order during t h e twenty days between t h e s e r v i c e of t h e order upon them and t h e s e r v i c e of respon- d e n t ' s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a d e f a u l t judgment. They chose n o t t o appear a t the t i m e set f o r hearing t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e f a u l t judgment, even though respondent's n o t i c e was served upon them seven days before the hearing r a t h e r than merely t h e t h r e e days required by Rule 55, M.R.Civ.P. Following t h a t , they d i d nothing f o r over t h i r t y days a f t e r r e c e i p t from t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t of a n o t i c e of e n t r y of judg- ment, a procedural courtesy n o t provided i n t h e case of " f i r s t appearance" d e f a u l t . They d i d nothing following t h e i r r e c e i p t of t h e c o u r t order allowing t h e c l e r k t o r e l e a s e t h e i r monies t o respondent. Under these circum- stances, we can s e e no reason t o a f f o r d them t h e r e l i e f requested. The D i s t r i c t Court awarded respondent $3,150 f o r a t t o r - ney f e e s where t h e amended complaint only asked f o r $3,000. This was n o t objected t o a t t h e District Court l e v e l . N o w on appeal, a p p e l l a n t s o b j e c t t o t h e a d d i t i o n a l $150. A t t h e hearing on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a d e f a u l t dated March 1, 1979, respondent's a t t o r n e y o f f e r e d testimony t o i n d i c a t e t h a t a reasonable a t t o r n e y f e e would be $3,150. I n view of t h i s f a c t w e f i n d no reason t o reduce t h e amount awarded a s being excessive. The judgment of t h e District Court is affirmed with t h e a d d i t u r of $150 f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r defending t h e same. We concur: Chief Justice P J ~ & Justices