Title: P. v. Britt

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 4/19/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S115377 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C033771 
MICHAEL FREDERICK BRITT, 
) 
 
) 
El Dorado County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. WS98F205 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In California, certain sex offenders are required by statute to register with 
law enforcement authorities where they are residing.  When they change residence 
within California, they must notify the local authorities in both their former and 
new residences.  (Pen. Code, § 290, subds. (a)(1)(A) and (f)(1).)1  We must decide 
whether a person subject to these requirements who moves once from one county 
to another within California without notifying the authorities in either county, and 
hence who violates both subdivisions (a) and (f) of section 290, may be prosecuted 
and punished separately for each crime—once in the county of the former 
residence and once in the county of the new residence. 
We conclude that the person may not be separately punished for the two 
failures to notify.  Moreover, although he may be charged with both offenses in 
either county, when, as here, the prosecution knows or should know of both 
offenses, he may be prosecuted for them only once. 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
 
2
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant Michael Frederick Britt has prior convictions for sexual crimes 
that require him to register with the appropriate law enforcement agency where he 
lives, to notify that agency when he moves, and to register in his new home.  
(§ 290.)  When he moved from Sacramento County to El Dorado County, he failed 
to notify law enforcement authorities in either county.  A warrant for his arrest 
issued in Sacramento County.  He was arrested in El Dorado County on April 8, 
1998, and was booked both for the Sacramento County arrest warrant and for 
failing to register in El Dorado County.  On May 8, 1998, an amended complaint 
was filed in Sacramento County charging defendant with not notifying the 
authorities in that county of his new address, a felony.  Defendant pleaded no 
contest to the charge on January 15, 1999, and the court placed him on probation 
on terms including that he serve 180 days in the county jail. 
On June 29, 1998, while the charges in Sacramento County were pending, a 
complaint was filed in El Dorado County charging defendant with not registering 
in that county, also a felony.  The preliminary hearing in this matter was held on 
March 5, 1999, after the Sacramento County prosecution had ended.  Comments 
by the parties and court at that hearing indicate that the El Dorado County 
prosecutor had known about the Sacramento County prosecution and had agreed 
to let the Sacramento County case proceed first.  The information in the El Dorado 
County prosecution was filed on March 12, 1999.  It charged defendant with not 
registering in that county and alleged that he had two prior serious felony 
convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law.  (See generally People v. 
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504-506.) 
Defendant moved to set aside the El Dorado County information on the 
ground that he had been convicted previously in Sacramento County for an offense 
arising out of the same course of conduct and, therefore, that section 654 barred 
 
 
3
the second prosecution in El Dorado County.  The court denied the motion.  
Defendant then waived his right to a jury trial.  The court found him guilty of not 
registering in El Dorado County and found true that he had two prior serious 
felony convictions.  It struck the prior convictions for purposes of sentencing (see 
People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th 497) and granted probation 
on terms including that he serve 365 days in the county jail. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.  The majority concluded that 
“both prosecutions are permissible because a person necessarily has two separate 
intents and objectives in violating both subdivisions (a) and (f) of section 290, and 
each crime is a separate continuing act that is not so interrelated with the other act 
as to come within provisions of section 654.”  Justice Sims dissented.  He argued 
that “prosecution of the El Dorado County offense was barred by Penal Code 
section 654 because defendant had been convicted and sentenced on the 
Sacramento County offense and he could not properly be punished for both the 
Sacramento County offense and the El Dorado County offense.” 
We granted defendant’s petition for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Background 
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides:  “An act or omission that is 
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under 
the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in 
no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.  An 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same 
act or omission under any other.”  “Section 654’s preclusion of multiple 
prosecution is separate and distinct from its preclusion of multiple punishment.  
The rule against multiple prosecutions is a procedural safeguard against 
 
 
4
harassment and is not necessarily related to the punishment to be imposed . . . .”  
(Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 21.)  We must decide how 
section 654 operates regarding two sex offender registration requirements. 
Section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A), requires certain sex offenders in 
California, including defendant, to register with the appropriate law enforcement 
authorities where they reside.2  Section 290, subdivision (f)(1), also requires those 
offenders, when they move, to inform the law enforcement agency where they last 
registered of their new address or location.3  These are separate, albeit closely 
related, requirements.  Sex offenders registered in one county who move to 
another county within California without notifying any law enforcement agency 
violate both requirements:  section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A), by not registering in 
the new county; and section 290, subdivision (f)(1), by not informing authorities in 
the old county of the new address.  When, as here, the person must register 
because of a felony conviction, violating these requirements is itself a felony.  
                                             
 
2 
Specifically, section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A), requires defendant “to 
register with the chief of police of the city in which he or she is residing, or if he 
or she has no residence, is located, or the sheriff of the county if he or she is 
residing, or if he or she has no residence, is located, in an unincorporated area or 
city that has no police department . . . within five working days of coming into, or 
changing his or her residence or location within, any city, county, or city and 
county . . . .” 
3  
Specifically, section 290, subdivision (f)(1), provides:  “If any person who 
is required to register pursuant to this section changes his or her residence address 
or location, whether within the jurisdiction in which he or she is currently 
registered or to a new jurisdiction inside or outside the state, the person shall 
inform, in writing within five working days, the law enforcement agency or 
agencies with which he or she last registered of the new address or location.  The 
law enforcement agency or agencies shall, within three days after receipt of this 
information, forward a copy of the change of address or location information to 
the Department of Justice.  The Department of Justice shall forward appropriate 
registration data to the law enforcement agency or agencies having local 
jurisdiction of the new place of residence or location.” 
 
 
5
(§ 290, subd. (g)(2); see Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 523-
524.) 
A defendant may clearly be convicted of violating both parts of section 290.  
Section 654 limits multiple punishment and prosecution, not conviction.  (See 
People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 762-763.)  The question here is 
whether defendant may be prosecuted and punished separately for the two 
violations.4  We first consider the multiple punishment question. 
B.  Multiple Punishment 
The test for determining whether section 654 prohibits multiple punishment 
has long been established:  “Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and 
therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 
depends on the intent and objective of the actor.  If all of the offenses were 
incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such 
offenses but not for more than one.”  (Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 
at p. 19.)  A decade ago, we criticized this test but also reaffirmed it as the 
established law of this state.  (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1209-
1216.)  We noted, however, that cases have sometimes found separate objectives 
when the objectives were either (1) consecutive even if similar or (2) different 
even if simultaneous.  In those cases, multiple punishment was permitted.  (Id. at 
pp. 1211-1212.)  Thus, we must decide whether defendant had the same objective 
when he violated both subdivisions (a) and (f) of section 290. 
Section 654 turns on the defendant’s objective in violating both provisions, 
not the Legislature’s purpose in enacting them, but examining the overall purpose 
behind the notification requirements helps illuminate the defendant’s objective in 
                                             
 
4  
This case involves a single move directly from one jurisdiction to another.  
We express no opinion on how section 654 would apply to other facts, such as 
multiple moves or the maintenance of multiple residences. 
 
 
6
violating them.  “The purpose of section 290 is to assure that persons convicted of 
the crimes enumerated therein shall be readily available for police surveillance at 
all times because the Legislature deemed them likely to commit similar offenses in 
the future.”  (Barrows v. Municipal Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 821, 825-826; accord, 
Wright v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 527.)  Defendant’s objective in 
violating this section was the opposite of the government’s—to avoid police 
surveillance.  To fulfill this objective, he committed two crimes of omission, but 
each crime furthered the same objective.  The failure to notify the former 
jurisdiction (§ 290, subd. (f)(1)) and the failure to register in the new jurisdiction 
(§ 290, subd. (a)(1)(A)) were means of achieving the same objective—to prevent 
any law enforcement authority from learning of his current residence. 
Section 290, subdivision (f)(1), requires the agency of the former residence 
to notify the Department of Justice of a change of address and the Department of 
Justice to forward that information to the agency of the new residence.  (See fn. 3, 
ante.)  Thus, if a person informs only the former agency but not the new one, the 
objective of avoiding police surveillance would be defeated, as the new agency 
would learn of the change of address.  The statute provides no converse 
requirement; if the person informs the new agency of the new address, that agency 
is not required to forward that information to the former agency.  But the only way 
a person can prevent the new agency from learning of the new residency, and thus 
be sure of avoiding police surveillance, is to notify neither agency, that is, to 
violate both of section 290’s reporting requirements.  Defendant’s commission of 
each crime was essential to the successful commission of the other, and he had the 
same objective when he committed both crimes. 
The majority below held that defendant had two separate objectives:  “(1) 
to mislead law enforcement and the residents of one community to believe that the 
sex offender remains there; and (2) to conceal from law enforcement and the 
 
 
7
residents of another community the fact that the sex offender is now residing in 
that community.”  It relied heavily on People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545 
(Perez).  In Perez, we held that the defendant could be separately punished for 
separate sex offenses against the same victim.  “[F]ocus[ing] on the question 
whether defendant should be deemed to have entertained single or multiple 
criminal objectives” (id. at p. 552), we rejected the defendant’s argument that he 
had but a single objective in committing each sex offense—to obtain sexual 
gratification.  “Such an intent and objective is much too broad and amorphous to 
determine the applicability of section 654. . . .  To accept such a broad, overriding 
intent and objective to preclude punishment for otherwise clearly separate offenses 
would violate the statute’s purpose to insure that a defendant’s punishment will be 
commensurate with his culpability.”  (Ibid.) 
 This rationale does not apply here.  If the single objective of sexual 
gratification in separate sex offenses is too amorphous, finding separate objectives 
here—to mislead or conceal information from the law enforcement agency in each 
county—parses the objectives too finely.  In Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d 545, the 
objective—sexual gratification—was achieved each time the defendant committed 
a sex offense.  Each sex offense provided a new, and separate, sexual gratification; 
hence, the objectives were consecutive even if similar.  (See People v. Latimer, 
supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 1211-1212.)  Here the objective—avoiding police 
surveillance—was achieved just once, but only by the combination of both 
reporting violations. 
The Attorney General relies on In re Hayes (1969) 70 Cal.2d 604, where 
we upheld multiple punishment for the single act of driving while intoxicated and 
with knowledge of a suspended license.  That case, however, is distinguishable.  
As we later explained, “neither of the Hayes violations, although simultaneously 
committed, was a means toward the objective of the commission of the other.  The 
 
 
8
objectives, insofar as the criminal conduct was concerned, were deemed by the 
[Hayes] majority to be to drive while intoxicated and to drive with a suspended 
license.”  (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639, quoted in People v. Perez, 
supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 552.)  Here, however, each failure to report was “a means 
toward the objective of the commission of the other.”  (Beamon, supra, at p. 639.)  
Defendant’s violation of both reporting provisions constituted the means of 
achieving the common end of avoiding police surveillance. 
Accordingly, we conclude that a person subject to section 290’s reporting 
requirements who changes residence a single time within California without 
reporting to any law enforcement agency, and who thus violates both subdivisions 
(a) and (f) of section 290, may be punished for one of those crimes, but not both.  
We note, however, that nothing in section 654 prohibits the court from considering 
the overall circumstances, including the fact that the defendant violated both 
provisions, in determining what punishment to impose for one of those offenses. 
C.  Multiple Prosecution 
The leading case involving multiple prosecution under section 654 is 
Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822 (Kellett).  In Kellett, the defendant 
was standing on a sidewalk holding a pistol.  He was charged with, and pleaded 
guilty to, exhibiting a firearm in a threatening manner.  We held that this 
conviction prohibited a later prosecution for possessing a concealable weapon by a 
felon arising out of the same facts.  “When, as here, the prosecution is or should be 
aware of more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a 
significant part, all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single proceeding unless 
joinder is prohibited or severance permitted for good cause.  Failure to unite all 
such offenses will result in a bar to subsequent prosecution of any offense omitted 
 
 
9
if the initial proceedings culminate in either acquittal or conviction and sentence.”  
(Id. at p. 827.)5 
Here, as we discussed in finding that multiple punishment is prohibited, the 
same act or course of conduct—a single unreported move within California—
played a significant part in both omissions.  This conclusion does not entirely 
decide the question of multiple prosecution, however, for the bar against multiple 
prosecution contains two limitations. 
First, the bar does not apply if “joinder is prohibited or severance permitted 
for good cause.”  (Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 827.)  It would be absurd to hold 
that crimes must be tried together if they may not be tried together.  We conclude 
that California statutes permit these offenses to be joined together in a single 
proceeding in either county.  Defendant failed to report to law enforcement 
agencies in two different counties, but that does not mean that each omission must 
be tried in the county where the agency is located.  “When a public offense is 
committed in part in one jurisdictional territory and in part in another, or the acts 
or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense 
occur in two or more jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction of such offense is in 
any competent court within either jurisdictional territory.”  (§ 781.)  Although this 
statute speaks in terms of jurisdiction, it is actually a venue statute.  (People v. 
Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1095-1096.)  It “must be given a liberal 
                                             
 
5  
We recognized possible exceptions to this rule when the original 
prosecution was for a less serious crime than the later prosecution.  (Kellett, supra, 
63 Cal.2d at pp. 827-828.)  We also stated that “if an act or course of criminal 
conduct can be punished only once under section 654, either an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under one penal statute will preclude subsequent 
prosecution in a separate proceeding under any other penal statute.”  (Id. at p. 
828.)  This seemingly all-encompassing statement is qualified by Kellett’s earlier 
limitation of the prohibition against multiple prosecution to cases in which the 
prosecution knew or should have known of the two offenses.  (See In re Dennis B. 
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 687, discussed below.) 
 
 
10
interpretation to permit trial in a county where only preparatory acts have 
occurred . . . .”  (Id. at p. 1109.)  The notification requirements of both 
subdivisions (a) and (f) of section 290 were triggered by defendant’s moving from 
Sacramento County to El Dorado County.  This single move necessarily involved 
preparatory acts in both counties.  Thus, either county would be a proper venue in 
which to try both crimes.  Moreover, the two crimes are connected together in 
their commission and are of the same class of crimes; accordingly, they may be 
joined in the same accusatory pleading.  (§ 954.) 
Second, the bar applies only when “the prosecution is or should be aware of 
more than one offense . . . .”  (Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 827.)  In In re Dennis 
B., supra, 18 Cal.3d 687, a juvenile made an unsafe lane change and collided with 
a motorcycle, killing the cyclist.  The juvenile was first charged with, and found 
guilty of, making the unsafe lane change, an infraction.  Later, it was alleged that 
he committed vehicular manslaughter.  We permitted the second action to proceed 
even though both charges arose out of the same prohibited act.  “The issue is, 
under the Kellett standard, whether on the record herein the prosecution was or 
should have been ‘aware of more than one offense.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 692-693.)  “The 
reference in Kellett to situations in which ‘the prosecution is . . . aware of more 
than one offense’ applies, however, only to intentional harassment, i.e., to cases in 
which a particular prosecutor has timely knowledge of two offenses but allows the 
multiple prosecution to proceed.”  (Id. at p. 693.)  Noting that “the fact that the 
prosecution could have known of the multiple offenses does not necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that it did know or should have known” (ibid.), we concluded that 
the prosecution in that case neither knew nor should have known of both offenses. 
This knowledge requirement is especially critical in a case, as here, 
involving multiple prosecuting agencies.  We do not suggest, for example, that if a 
prosecuting agency charges a person with leaving a county without reporting, that 
 
 
11
agency must investigate where that person went, or decide whether additional 
charges in the new location are appropriate.  Whether the rule of Kellett, supra, 63 
Cal.2d 822, applies must be determined on a case-by-case basis.  We need not 
explore these questions in detail here, however, because this record makes clear 
that the El Dorado County prosecutor was fully aware of the simultaneous 
Sacramento County prosecution.  “[A] particular prosecutor actually knew of both 
offenses in time to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings.”  (In re Dennis B., supra, 
18 Cal.3d at p. 693.)  Accordingly, prosecuting the El Dorado County action after 
defendant had been convicted of the Sacramento County charges violated section 
654’s prohibition against multiple prosecution. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BAXTER, J. 
 
I agree that in this case, where “the El Dorado County prosecutor was fully 
aware of the simultaneous Sacramento County prosecution,” prosecution of the El 
Dorado County action was barred by Penal Code section 654’s prohibition of 
multiple prosecutions.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  I therefore join fully in the 
judgment reversing defendant’s El Dorado County conviction.  I write separately 
only to highlight two aspects of the majority opinion:   
1.  The majority opinion’s discussion of the multiple-punishment issue is 
unnecessary.  Today, we reverse the judgment of conviction in the El Dorado 
County action as violative of the bar on multiple prosecutions set forth in Penal 
Code section 654.  Neither El Dorado County nor Sacramento County will be able 
to retry defendant for violating Penal Code section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A).  
Accordingly, any additional claim of error arising from the El Dorado County 
action that presumes retrial is possible—i.e., any claim that defendant’s waiver of 
jury trial was defective, that certain evidence was erroneously admitted or 
excluded, or that defendant could not be separately punished for that offense—is 
now moot.  (E.g., People v. Killebrew (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 644, 661 [reversal 
for insufficient evidence renders remaining contentions “moot”]; Weston v. 
Kernan (9th Cir. 1995) 50 F.3d 633, 639 [reversal for double jeopardy violation 
renders remaining contentions “moot”].)  Part B. of the majority opinion falls into 
that category and is thus dictum.                
 
2 
2.  The bar on multiple prosecutions does not apply “if  . . . ‘severance [is] 
permitted for good cause.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 9.)  This case involves a 
second prosecution under Penal Code section 290 brought by a contiguous county 
that was fully aware of the simultaneous prosecution in Sacramento.  Future cases 
may involve counties that are geographically remote from each other or are 
otherwise without the resources to shuttle witnesses from one place to the other.  
Our decision today does not prevent a court from finding that good cause exists to 
sever the charges in such circumstances.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
I CONCUR: 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
I agree with the majority’s reasoning and result.  I also agree with the 
second point of Justice Baxter’s concurring opinion.  (See conc. opn. of Baxter, J., 
ante, p. 2.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Britt 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 107 Cal.App.4th 8 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S115377 
Date Filed: April 19, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: El Dorado 
Judge: Thomas A. Smith 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
William J. Arzbaecher III, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Veronica A. Bonetti, under 
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, David P. Druliner and 
Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, J. Robert 
Jibson, Anthony L. Dicce, Janet E. Neeley and Raymond L. Brosterhous, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
William J. Arzbaecher III 
Central California Appellate Program 
2407 J Street, Suite 301 
Sacramento, CA  95816 
(916) 441-3792 
 
Raymond L. Brosterhous 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-7851