Title: State v. Matalonis

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2016 WI 7 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP108-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Charles V. Matalonis, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 359 Wis. 2d 675, 859 N.W.2d 628) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 10, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 18, 2015 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Wilber W. Warren, III 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents. (Opinion Filed) 
PROSSER, ABRAHAMSON, A.W. BRADLEY, J.J.J., 
dissent. (Opinion Filed) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, 
the 
case 
was 
argued by Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Mark D. 
Richards, Brian P. Dimmer and Mark D. Richards, S.C., Racine, 
and oral arguments by Mark D. Richards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 7
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP108-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF81) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles V. Matalonis, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 10, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished 
decision 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
State 
v. 
Matalonis, No. 2014AP108-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 23, 2014), which reversed the Kenosha County circuit 
court's1 judgment of conviction and order denying defendant 
Charles V. Matalonis's ("Matalonis") motion to suppress evidence 
of marijuana production in Matalonis's home.  Police obtained 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Wilbur W. Warren III presided. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
2 
 
this evidence while investigating the source of injuries 
sustained by Matalonis's brother, Antony. 
¶2 
We are asked to determine whether a warrantless search 
by police of Matalonis's home, including, importantly, of a room 
secured by a locked, blood-spattered door, was reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  The State argues 
that the police officers in this case acted reasonably on the 
night 
in 
question 
because 
(1) 
the 
police 
officers 
were 
reasonably exercising a bona fide "community caretaker" function 
in ensuring the absence of injured persons in the home; and (2) 
the police officers reasonably believed that a protective sweep 
of the home was necessary to guarantee their own safety.  
¶3 
We conclude that the officers in this case reasonably 
exercised a bona fide community caretaker function when they 
searched Matalonis's home.  The officers therefore were not 
required to obtain a warrant prior to conducting the search in 
question, and the evidence of marijuana production they obtained 
should not be suppressed.  Because the search was lawful under 
the community caretaker doctrine, we need not determine whether 
the search was also justified as a protective sweep. We reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the case to the 
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.   
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On January 15, 2012, at about 2:45 a.m., Officers 
Brian Ruha ("Officer Ruha") and David Yandel ("Officer Yandel") 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
3 
 
of the Kenosha Police Department were dispatched for a medical 
call to the upper unit of an address on 45th Street in Kenosha.2  
When Officer Ruha arrived at the address, he observed "what 
appeared to be blood all over the door." He knocked on the door, 
entered, and there met Antony Matalonis ("Antony").  Antony 
looked as though "he may have been battered[;] . . . his whole 
right side of his body was covered in blood." Additionally, 
Antony seemed "highly intoxicated."  Antony initially told 
Officer Ruha that he had been beaten up by four different groups 
of people outside of a bar, but some time later said that he was 
beaten up by four people outside of a bar.  The resident at the 
address told Officer Ruha that Antony lived down the street with 
his brother. Antony was loaded into an ambulance and taken to a 
hospital. 
                                                 
2 The facts in this section are taken from testimony 
provided by Officer Ruha, Officer Yandel, and Matalonis at the 
April 4, 2013 suppression hearing, as well as from portions of 
the officers' police reports that were read at the suppression 
hearing.  The circuit court stated at the conclusion of the 
hearing:  
I don't think the material facts are in dispute at 
all.  The only fact that might be in dispute is 
whether initial consent was given to enter the home or 
not.  But if that issue is of concern, the [c]ourt 
certainly would find that the officer[s] did have 
consent to enter the home.   
On appeal before this court, Matalonis concedes that he 
"consented to the [officers'] entering his home to discuss 
Antony's injuries."  Certain disputed facts not material to the 
outcome of this case will be noted as they arise.  
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
Officer Yandel arrived at the address as Antony was 
being placed in the ambulance.  Officer Yandel "could tell that 
[Antony] had a bloody face. [Antony] had blood on his shirt.  He 
seemed pretty beat up."  Officer Yandel went to the back door 
leading to the upper unit of the residence, and "noticed a large 
amount of blood that led up the stairwell to that apartment." 
¶6 
After the ambulance departed, Officer Ruha and Officer 
Yandel "checked the surrounding area to determine where [the] 
blood had originated from" in order to "find out where [Antony] 
came from . . . and if anyone else was even involved," because 
the resident of the upper apartment had explained that Antony 
had arrived at the residence already injured.  There was snow on 
the ground, and the officers found a single "blood trail" in the 
snow, which they followed.  
¶7 
The blood led to the side door of a residence on Fifth 
Avenue.  "There was blood on a screen door and then on the 
inside of the screen door.  And there was another wooden door, 
and there was blood on that door as well."  The officers heard 
two loud bangs coming from inside the residence that sounded to 
Officer Yandel like "[t]hings being shuffled around in the 
house."3  
¶8 
The officers then called for backup because, according 
to Officer Ruha, "we had no idea what was going on inside the 
                                                 
3 During the suppression hearing, Officer Yandel admitted 
that information regarding the noises did not appear in his 
police report. Officer Ruha's police report mentions the noises. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
5 
 
residence," and according to Officer Yandel, because "[i]t's 
protocol in case we had to enter that residence to check the 
welfare of anybody if we couldn't make contact.  It was a pretty 
significant amount of blood, and we were concerned that maybe 
somebody was injured inside." 
¶9 
The officers went to the front door of the residence 
and knocked on the door.  Matalonis "answered the door without a 
shirt on.  He didn't appear to be injured at all, but he 
appeared to be out of breath."  He was not intoxicated but 
"seemed pretty upset about something."  Officer Yandel "noticed 
there was blood in the foyer on the floor" as well as "blood to 
the right which led up to a stairwell."  Matalonis testified 
that he had been cleaning up blood when the officers arrived. 
¶10 The 
officers 
asked 
Matalonis 
who 
lived 
at 
the 
residence and Matalonis responded that he lived alone.  The 
officers told Matalonis about the injured individual they had 
met and the blood trail leading to the side door of Matalonis's 
house.  Matalonis explained that he had been in a fight with his 
brother Antony, but that his brother had left.  According to 
Officer Yandel's police report, Matalonis stated, "Yeah, my 
brother left already.  It was just me and my brother fighting.  
I just had to do what I had to do to defend myself but he's gone 
now."  The officers told Matalonis "that because there was blood 
in the house, [they] just wanted to make sure that no one else 
was injured."  Matalonis let the officers into the house.4  
                                                 
4 See supra note 2. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
6 
 
¶11 Once the officers were inside the house, they directed 
Matalonis to sit on the couch in his living room.5  The officers 
did not place Matalonis in handcuffs or tell him that he was 
under arrest.  Officer Yandel did not frisk Matalonis.6  Officer 
Ruha then conducted a search of the residence "to make sure that 
no one else was inside the house or even injured in the house 
that needed medical attention" while Officer Yandel stayed 
behind with Matalonis.  At no time did Officer Yandel point a 
weapon at Matalonis. 
¶12 Officer Ruha began his search on the lower level of 
the house, where the officers and Matalonis were located.  He 
                                                 
5 Matalonis testified that the officers "told" him to sit on 
the couch.  Officer Yandel initially testified that he "asked" 
Matalonis to sit on the couch, but on cross-examination agreed 
that he had "directed" Matalonis to sit on the couch and that 
the direction was "a direct order."  Officer Ruha testified 
simply that Matalonis sat on the couch and that he "may have 
been" directed to sit on the couch.  
6 Officer Ruha could not recall whether he had frisked 
Matalonis.  Officer Yandel did not see Officer Ruha frisk 
Matalonis, and Matalonis did not provide testimony regarding 
whether Officer Ruha had frisked him.  Counsel for Matalonis 
asked 
Officer 
Yandel 
about 
the 
fact 
that 
Matalonis 
was 
apparently not frisked: 
Q: 
So you're not worried for officer safety 
enough to even frisk Mr. Matalonis, correct? 
A: 
We did have officer safety concerns, yes.  
Q: 
But you didn't think enough to even frisk 
Mr. Matalonis, correct? 
A: 
Correct. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
7 
 
found "a couple drops of blood" in the living room,7 and then 
moved into the kitchen where he found "another couple drops of 
blood."  A bucket of water and a mop were in the kitchen. 
Officer Ruha went to the basement area but "didn't locate any 
blood down there."8  Officer Ruha returned to the lower level and 
proceeded up the stairs to the second floor.  On the stairs to 
the second floor "there [were] what appeared to be droplets of 
blood on the carpet and blood smeared all along the wall leading 
upstairs." 
¶13 Upstairs, "[t]here appeared to be blood all over the 
handrail.  There was a mirror that was down that was broken.  
There [were] shards laying all over the floor."  Officer Ruha 
moved into a "little living area" to his left, but "didn’t 
locate anyone in there."  He did, however, observe "various 
pipes and other smoking utensils used for smoking marijuana."  
                                                 
7 Matalonis testified, "There was no blood in the main 
living room that I know of." 
8 It is unclear from the record whether Officer Ruha in fact 
entered the basement.  On direct examination Officer Ruha 
stated, "I actually went down to the basement."  On cross-
examination Officer Ruha was asked, "[Y]ou don't go into the 
basement because there's no blood going down there, correct?"  
Officer Ruha responded, "Correct."  When rendering judgment the 
circuit court stated, "The officers only searched where there 
was blood.  They didn't go in the basement."  
At some point a tenant who lived in the basement came out 
of his room——according to Officer Yandel, "came upstairs"——and 
spoke with the officers, but the record is not entirely clear 
regarding at what point during the search of the house this 
happened. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
8 
 
This included "a small silver grinder that lay opened on the 
coffee table containing a green leafy substance that [Officer 
Ruha] identified as marijuana through [his] training and 
experience."  Then he continued right, and "saw that there was a 
door with a deadbolt that had blood splatters on the door 
itself."9  Officer Ruha tried unsuccessfully to open the door, 
which was locked.  He then moved past the door and into a 
bathroom.  There were no individuals in the bathroom, but 
Officer Ruha saw a "ceramic water bong used for smoking 
marijuana."  Officer Ruha went back to the locked door, where he 
"could not hear anyone inside, but . . . did smell a strong odor 
of marijuana coming through [the] door and . . . heard a fan 
running."  Officer Ruha testified that at that point he was 
                                                 
9 On cross-examination counsel for Matalonis, using a 
photograph of the door, questioned Officer Ruha about the extent 
of blood on the door. 
Q: 
And the blood you're speaking about are 
these two little drops here? 
A: 
Drops here, drops all the way down here. 
Q: 
And that is like the least amount of blood 
anywhere in that house, is that a fair statement, 
compared to, let's say, the stairway? 
A: 
That would be fair to say. 
In his brief before this court, Matalonis characterizes the 
blood on the locked door as "two little drops of blood."  The 
State argues that photographs of the door "show a number of 
spatter marks running across the bottom of the door and on the 
adjacent wall," and "three red drops forming a triangle between 
the lock and door handle as well as additional red marks on the 
adjacent door jamb."  
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
9 
 
"interested in knowing that there's no one injured behind that 
door."10  Since he "realized that [the locked room] was the only 
place [he] could not get into to check," Officer Ruha went back 
downstairs to ask Matalonis for the key to the room in order "to 
ensure that no one is injured behind that door." 
¶14 While Officer Ruha was searching the house, Officer 
Yandel asked Matalonis about the fight he had had with his 
brother Antony.  Matalonis described what had happened.  He also 
mentioned that somebody lived in the basement of the house.  At 
some point in their conversation, Matalonis asked Officer Yandel 
"if, while they were doing their sweep [of the house], [he] 
could continue cleaning up the blood from the fight."  According 
to Matalonis, Officer Yandel did not allow him to do so, but 
instead told Matalonis that he "had to stay right where [he was] 
and to not get up."11 
                                                 
10 Officer Ruha was asked by counsel for Matalonis: 
Q: 
Can you tell me what, objectively, would 
lead you to believe someone was behind that door? 
A: 
There's droplets of blood around the door 
handle and it's locked from the inside. 
Q: 
Well, it's not locked from the inside. It's 
locked from the deadbolt. 
A: 
It's deadbolted. Either you lock it with a 
key or you lock it from the inside. 
11 Officer Yandel did not remember Matalonis asking him if 
he could continue cleaning the house, but agreed that he did not 
allow Matalonis to get up from the couch. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
10 
 
¶15 Officer Ruha returned to the living room.  According 
to Matalonis, Officer Ruha's search took "10 to 15 minutes."  
Testimony regarding the conversation that followed differed 
slightly when recounted by Matalonis, Officer Ruha, and Officer 
Yandel.  According to Matalonis, Officer Ruha asked Matalonis 
what was in the locked room.  Matalonis responded that the room 
was "a security room where I keep my valuables."12  Officer Ruha 
then "said he needed to get in the room, and he was going to 
kick the door down unless [Matalonis] told him where the key 
was."  At some point during the conversation, according to 
Matalonis, Officer Ruha asked whether there was anyone else in 
the room or made clear that "[h]e wanted to go and look for 
bodies in that room." 
¶16 According to Officer Yandel, Officer Ruha "asked what 
was in that room, said that he noticed that there was blood on 
that door and said that he would have to check that room to make 
sure no one was injured in there."  Officer Yandel then "noticed 
[Matalonis's] breathing started becoming faster.  He looked 
nervous to me.  Officer Ruha told him he was going to kick the 
door in unless he had a key."  At some unspecified point in the 
conversation Matalonis told the officers the room "was a 
security room and he had some security equipment in there," that 
he kept the room locked, and that no one was in the room.  
Additionally, at some point in the conversation Officer Ruha 
                                                 
12 Matalonis admitted at the suppression hearing that this 
statement was "obviously" not true. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
11 
 
informed Officer Yandel that he had found drug paraphernalia and 
marijuana upstairs.13 
¶17 According to Officer Ruha, upon his return to the 
living room, "I asked [Matalonis] where the key to the door was.  
I gave him the options of [sic] I needed to ensure that no one 
was injured inside [the locked] room.  There's blood on the 
door.  Either I need to know where the key's at or I'm going to 
kick the door in."14  Matalonis said he would not consent to the 
officers' entry into the room, and "said it was a security room 
for his security cameras." 
¶18  Matalonis testified that approximately 20 minutes had 
elapsed between the officers' initial entry into Matalonis's 
home and the moment that Officer Ruha asked Matalonis for the 
key to the locked room.  The officers obtained the key to the 
                                                 
13 When asked on cross-examination whether Officer Ruha also 
told Officer Yandel at that time about the smell of marijuana 
and sound of a fan coming from the inside of the locked room, 
Officer Yandel stated, "I don't remember that conversation." 
14 Both officers were asked by counsel for Matalonis why 
they declined to kick down the door immediately without asking 
Matalonis for a key, given their testimony that they were 
concerned about possible injured persons inside the room.  Both 
responded to the effect that allowing Matalonis to produce the 
key would avoid damage to the home.  
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
12 
 
room15 after waiting for a certain amount of time.16  Officer Ruha 
testified that the key was located next to an aquarium on the 
second floor, and that there was a bag of marijuana next to the 
key.  Matalonis testified that the key was not hidden and was 
kept in a red cup on top of the aquarium, "probably five to six 
feet" away from the locked door.17  
                                                 
15 The question of the circumstances under which the 
officers obtained the key was sharply disputed by the parties at 
the suppression hearing.  Officers Ruha and Yandel testified 
that Matalonis assisted them in locating the key and told the 
officers that he had marijuana plants growing in the locked 
room.  Matalonis testified that he provided no assistance in 
finding the key to the room, that he never consented to their 
entry into the room, and that he intended to let the officers 
kick down the door to the room.  Matalonis maintained that 
Officer Ruha went upstairs and found the key to the room on his 
own.  Matalonis also denied making the statement about the 
presence of marijuana in the locked room.  The circuit court 
concluded, "If I had to resolve that question of fact, I would 
resolve it in the direction of there was assistance in obtaining 
the key, especially in light of the fact that, unequivocally, 
the officers had told [Matalonis] that they were going to kick 
the door down." 
16 Officer Ruha contended that Matalonis sat for "a matter 
of seconds" before telling the officers the location of the key.  
Officer Yandel wrote in his police report that Matalonis paused 
"for several minutes" when he was asked for the key, but stated 
at the suppression hearing, "[f]rom my recollection, it was a 
pause for several seconds."  Officer Yandel testified that 
Matalonis then told Officer Ruha where the key was.  Matalonis 
testified that he "sat there for probably about five minutes" 
before Officer Ruha left to look for the key. 
17 At the suppression hearing Officer Ruha was presented 
with a picture of the red cup but could not remember "exactly" 
if the key had been located in the cup, though he stated "[i]t 
may have been." 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
13 
 
¶19 According to Officer Ruha, Officer Ruha went back 
upstairs,18 unlocked the locked room, announced "Kenosha Police," 
and entered the room.  "A large marijuana plant was being grown 
as soon as you opened the door.  It was a pretty sophisticated 
system."  No one was present in the room. 
¶20 Officer Ruha returned downstairs.  Matalonis was still 
sitting in the living room on the couch.  Officer Ruha asked 
Matalonis about the marijuana.  Matalonis "said the plants were 
his and he didn't wish to talk any further about the plants."  
Officer Ruha then spoke with him about the fight between him and 
his brother.  Matalonis eventually asked to speak with a lawyer 
and was arrested later that night.  At some point "[a]fter the 
residence was secured and [the officers] found no one else 
injured or hurt inside [the] house," the officers attempted to 
obtain a search warrant but were denied the warrant.  Officer 
Ruha testified that "[w]hatever [evidence] we found in plain 
view, we took," and that after the search warrant was denied he 
"didn't open any drawers or go any further into the house and 
look for anything else."  
II. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶21 On January 17, 2012, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Matalonis, charging him with possession of 
drug paraphernalia, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.573(1) (2011-
                                                 
18 Officer Ruha testified that he was accompanied by his 
sergeant, who, according to Officer Ruha and Officer Yandel, had 
arrived during the conversation with Matalonis and had been 
briefed on the situation.  
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
14 
 
12),19 possession of tetrahydrocannabinols ("THC"), contrary to 
§ 961.41(3g)(e), and manufacture or delivery of THC in an amount 
not 
more 
than 
200 
grams 
or 
four 
plants, 
contrary 
to 
§ 961.41(1)(h).  On November 28, 2012, Matalonis filed a motion 
to suppress the evidence seized in the search of his residence 
as unconstitutionally conducted without a warrant and without 
consent.  On April 4, 2013, a hearing on Matalonis's suppression 
motion was held in Kenosha County circuit court.  The circuit 
court denied Matalonis's motion.  The court concluded in part: 
The search there once inside the house was not 
directed at finding evidence but for protective search 
and 
for 
injured 
parties. . . .  
[The 
officers] 
searched only in areas where there was blood found and 
they didn't search drawers or places where obviously 
people could not hide but only rooms and larger areas 
where bodies might be found.  
. . .   
[T]here was blood on the door. . . .  So it was 
reasonable for them to extend their search for injured 
parties to that area.  Again, with someone who is 
bleeding, someone who is taken away by ambulance, to 
have a locked door in a house with blood on that door 
and not search behind that door and to later find that 
there's a dead body or a bleeding body or a person in 
need of medical assistance behind that door I think 
                                                 
19 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
15 
 
would not only be improper, it would be a sign of poor 
police work.[20] 
¶22 On May 15, 2013, Matalonis pleaded no contest to the 
charge of manufacture or delivery of THC in an amount not more 
than 200 grams or four plants; the two other charges were 
dismissed and read in for purposes of sentencing.  On June 28, 
2013, the court withheld sentence and placed Matalonis on 
probation for 18 months.  On January 14, 2014, Matalonis filed a 
notice of appeal.  
¶23 On December 23, 2014, the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court's judgment of conviction and order denying 
Matalonis's motion to suppress, and remanded the case to the 
circuit court to suppress the evidence resulting from the 
warrantless search.  See State v. Matalonis, No. 2014AP108-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶37 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014).  The 
court of appeals concluded that the officers were not exercising 
a bona fide community caretaker function.  See id., ¶¶25, 31.  
¶24 The court of appeals stated that the police were 
required to possess, under the totality of the circumstances, 
"an 'objectively reasonable basis' to believe there [was] 'a 
member of the public who [was] in need of assistance.'"  Id., 
¶15 (quoting State v. Ultsch, 2011 WI App 17, ¶15, 331 
                                                 
20 The 
court 
based 
its 
ruling 
on 
multiple 
grounds, 
including, apparently, the hot pursuit and emergency aid 
doctrines.  Both before the court of appeals and in its petition 
for review to this court, the State argued the search at issue 
should be upheld under the community caretaker and protective 
sweep doctrines. We do not address any other grounds for 
upholding the search. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
16 
 
Wis. 2d 242, 793 N.W.2d 505).  The court analyzed two cases in 
which officers were found to be exercising a bona fide community 
caretaker 
function, 
State 
v. 
Gracia, 
2013 
WI 
15, 
345 
Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87, and State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 
327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592.  It also examined two cases in 
which officers were found not to be exercising a bona fide 
community caretaker function, State v. Maddix, 2013 WI App 64, 
348 Wis. 2d 179, 831 N.W.2d 778, and State v. Ultsch, 2011 WI 
App 17, 331 Wis. 2d 242, 793 N.W.2d 505.  The court concluded:  
In Pinkard and Gracia, the officers had specific 
concerns about the welfare of people known to be 
present in the homes when the officers entered the 
homes.  However, the present case is more similar to 
Maddix in that the officers in this case did not have 
before them any evidence pointing "concretely to the 
possibility that a member of the public was in need of 
assistance" inside Matalonis's home. 
Matalonis, unpublished slip op., ¶24 (quoting State v. Maddix, 
2013 WI App 64, ¶27, 348 Wis. 2d 179,831 N.W.2d 778).  The court 
of appeals recognized that there were "conflicting versions of 
how Matalonis's brother sustained his injuries" but added that 
"in no version is there reference to any other person being 
injured."  Id.  Ultimately, the court decided, "A mere 
possibility that another person may be injured without any other 
evidence that concretely points to the possibility that a member 
of the public required assistance does not meet the more 
demanding objective reasonable basis standard."  Id., ¶25 
(citing Ultsch, 331 Wis. 2d 242, ¶15). 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
17 
 
¶25 The court further held that, assuming the officers 
were acting as community caretakers, id., ¶31, their exercise of 
that function was not reasonable because "the public's interest 
in the intrusion was minimal and . . . did not outweigh the 
substantial intrusion upon Matalonis's privacy interest in his 
home."  Id., ¶36.  In particular, any exigency that existed 
"diminished significantly once the officers were informed by 
Matalonis that he had been involved in a fight with his brother 
and that his brother had left," and "by the time the officers 
reached the locked door, which at best revealed only very minor 
streaks of blood on the door's surface and on the doorknob, a 
reasonable officer would have suspected that Matalonis was the 
only person in the residence."  Id., ¶32.  Additionally, "the 
degree of authority and force displayed by the officers in this 
case was considerable."  Id., ¶33.  
¶26 Finally, the court determined that the officers' 
search did not constitute a lawful protective sweep because "the 
evidence before the officers did not provide an objectively 
reasonable basis for the officers to believe their safety was at 
risk."  Id., ¶¶29-30.21 
¶27 On January 22, 2015, the State filed a petition for 
review in this court.  On April 17, 2015, we granted the 
petition.   
                                                 
21 Judge Blanchard dissented and would have upheld the 
search on community caretaker grounds.  See State v. Matalonis, 
No. 2014AP108-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶38 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 23, 2014) (Blanchard, P.J., dissenting). 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
18 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶28 When we review an order granting or denying a motion 
to suppress evidence, we are presented with a question of 
constitutional 
fact 
requiring 
application 
of 
a 
two-step 
analysis.  State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 
786 N.W.2d 463 (citations omitted).  "First, we review the 
circuit court's findings of historical fact under a deferential 
standard, upholding them unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Second, we independently apply constitutional principles to 
those facts."  Id. (citations omitted). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
¶29 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibit 
"unreasonable searches and seizures."  U.S. Const. amend. IV; 
Wis. Const. art. 1, § 11. "[W]arrantless searches of homes are 
presumptively unreasonable."  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶24 
(citation omitted).  As we have noted, however, "the nature of a 
police officer's work is multifaceted."  State v. Kramer, 2009 
WI 14, ¶32, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598.  Put differently, 
Police 
officers 
wear 
many 
hats: 
criminal 
investigator, 
first 
aid 
provider, 
social 
worker, 
crisis intervener, family counselor, youth mentor and 
peacemaker, to name a few.  They are charged with the 
duty to protect people, not just from criminals, but 
also from accidents, natural perils and even self-
inflicted injuries.  We ask them to protect our 
property 
from 
all 
types 
of 
losses——even 
those 
occasioned by our own negligence.  They counsel our 
youth.  They quell disputes between husband and wife, 
parent and child, landlord and tenant, merchant and 
patron and quarreling neighbors.  Although they search 
for clues to solve crime, they also search for missing 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
19 
 
children, parents, dementia patients, and occasionally 
even an escaped zoo animal.  They are society's 
problem solvers when no other solution is apparent or 
available.  
Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 607 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2009) (Torpy, J., concurring and concurring specially).  
¶30 We have acknowledged that "a police officer serving as 
a community caretaker to protect persons and property may be 
constitutionally permitted to perform warrantless searches and 
seizures."  State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶14, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 
785 N.W.2d 592.  An officer's community caretaker function is 
"totally 
divorced 
from 
the 
detection, 
investigation, 
or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute." Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶¶19, 23 (quoting Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).22 That is, an officer's 
community caretaker function is distinct from the officer's law 
enforcement function.  See Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶¶18, 31 
(citation omitted).  In sum, we need not invalidate a 
warrantless search of a residence if the search was conducted 
pursuant to a police officer's reasonable exercise of a bona 
fide community caretaker function.  See id., ¶¶28-29.  
¶31 Our community caretaker analysis is the same under 
both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  State v. 
Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶14, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 
                                                 
22 As we will explain shortly, however, see infra ¶32, an 
officer engaged in a bona fide community caretaker function 
might also possess subjective law enforcement concerns.  State 
v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶31, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592.   
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
20 
 
(citation omitted).  As always, "[t]he ultimate standard set 
forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."  Pinkard, 327 
Wis. 2d 346, ¶13 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 439).  However, we 
analyze the reasonableness of a residential search alleged to be 
justified under the community caretaker doctrine using a three-
step test: 
(1) whether a search or seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment has occurred; (2) if so, whether 
the police were exercising a bona fide community 
caretaker function; and (3) if so, whether the public 
interest outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of 
the individual such that the community caretaker 
function was reasonably exercised within the context 
of a home. 
Id., ¶29 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).  The State bears 
the burden of proving that these factors have been met.  Id. 
(citation omitted).  
¶32 With regard to the second step, 
When evaluating whether a community caretaker 
function is bona fide, we examine the totality of the 
circumstances as they existed at the time of the 
police conduct.  In so doing . . . the "totally 
divorced" language from Cady does not mean that if the 
police officer has any subjective law enforcement 
concerns, he cannot be engaging in a valid community 
caretaker function.  Rather, . . . in a community 
caretaker context, when under the totality of the 
circumstances an objectively reasonable basis for the 
community 
caretaker 
function 
is 
shown, 
that 
determination 
is 
not 
negated 
by 
the 
officer's 
subjective law enforcement concerns. 
Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶30 (citations omitted). 
¶33 The third step requires us to "balance the public 
interest or need that is furthered by the officers' conduct 
against the degree and nature of the intrusion on the citizen's 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
21 
 
constitutional 
interest." 
 
Pinkard, 
327 
Wis. 2d 346, 
¶41 
(citation omitted).  Four considerations are of immediate 
relevance to this question:  
(1) [T]he degree of the public interest and the 
exigency 
of 
the 
situation; 
(2) 
the 
attendant 
circumstances surrounding the search, including time, 
location, the degree of overt authority and force 
displayed; (3) whether an automobile is involved; and 
(4) the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of 
alternatives 
to 
the 
type 
of 
intrusion 
actually 
accomplished. 
Gracia, 345 Wis. 2d 488, ¶15 (citation omitted).  
¶34 The State does not contest that the officers conducted 
a search of Matalonis's residence, including of the locked room 
containing the marijuana plants.  Therefore, we need only decide 
whether the officers were exercising a bona fide community 
caretaker function and doing so in a constitutionally reasonable 
manner.  Because we conclude that the officers in this case 
reasonably exercised a bona fide community caretaker function 
when they searched Matalonis's home, we need not determine 
whether the search was justified as a protective sweep. 
 
A.  Whether the Officers Were Exercising a  
Bona Fide Community Caretaker Function 
¶35 It is obvious to all, in hindsight, that Matalonis's 
home did not in fact contain a "member of the public . . . in 
need of assistance."  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶32.  But that is 
not the question before us today.  Instead, we must decide 
whether, "under the circumstances as they existed at the time of 
the police conduct, [the officers were] engaged in a bona fide 
community caretaker function."  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶31 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
22 
 
(emphasis 
added) 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
Therefore, 
we 
are 
concerned with the extent of the officers' knowledge at the time 
they conducted the search, not after. 
¶36 We have no difficulty concluding that the officers in 
this case were engaged in a bona fide community caretaker 
function at the time they searched the house and the locked 
room.  The events that unfolded before the officers——when viewed 
without the benefit of hindsight——are alarming, to say the 
least. 
¶37 The officers, responding to a medical call at almost 
three in the morning, are confronted with a beaten, bloody, and 
"highly intoxicated" man, injured to an extent sufficient to 
justify an ambulance ride to the hospital.  The man provides the 
officers with inconsistent accounts of how many people had 
injured him, but both accounts feature multiple potential 
assailants.  The officers find blood on a door and a stairway 
and a "trail" of blood in the snow.  At the end of the trail the 
officers find a residence bearing more blood-stained doors, and 
hear loud bangs inside the residence.  The officers, noting the 
"pretty significant amount of blood" and fearing potential 
injured persons inside the residence, call for backup and 
proceed to knock on the front door of the home.  
¶38 Answering the front door is a breathless, shirtless, 
and "pretty upset" man, Matalonis, who informs the officers that 
he lives alone and that he had fought with his brother Antony, 
who has since left.  This statement was contrary to information 
the officers already possessed in three respects.  First, Antony 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
23 
 
had told the officers that he was beaten up by multiple people.  
Second, Antony had told the officers he sustained his injuries 
outside of a bar. Third, the officers had been told at the 
previous residence that Antony lived with his brother.  Officer 
Yandel notices blood on the floor and the stairs.  
¶39 At this point, according to the court of appeals, "the 
exigent 
nature 
of 
the 
situation," 
if 
any, 
"diminished 
significantly."  Matalonis, unpublished slip op., ¶32.  We do 
not agree with this contention.  Instead, the officers now had 
to make a decision after observing: (1) lots of blood, including 
some blood in the house before them; (2) an injured person; and 
(3) inconsistent stories regarding the number of participants in 
the fight, whether Matalonis lived alone, and exactly what had 
transpired.  The officers requested and obtained entry into 
Matalonis's house.  The officers maintained "that because there 
was blood in the house, [they] just wanted to make sure that no 
one else was injured."   
1. The Inception of the Search 
¶40 After the officers' entry into the home, the search in 
question began.  We ignore, for the time being, the officers' 
conduct toward Matalonis; this will become relevant at the next 
step of our analysis.  Instead, we ask whether, based on the 
circumstances at the time, the officers were engaged in a bona 
fide community caretaker function at the inception of the 
search.  
¶41 We conclude that they were.  As the circuit court 
found——and 
the 
circuit 
court's 
finding 
was 
not 
clearly 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
24 
 
erroneous——the officers were not searching for evidence, but for 
injured parties.  See State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶20, 317 
Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569 (under clearly erroneous standard, 
"we are bound not to upset the trial court's findings of 
historical or evidentiary fact unless they are contrary to the 
great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence" (citation 
omitted)).  This is the quintessence of the community caretaker 
function.  See, e.g., Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶¶14, 34.   
¶42 The State has shown "an objectively reasonable basis 
for the community caretaker function."  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 
¶30. Although the court of appeals stated that "[a] mere 
possibility that another person may be injured without any other 
evidence that concretely points to the possibility that a member 
of the public required assistance does not meet the more 
demanding 
objective 
reasonable 
basis 
standard," 
Matalonis, 
unpublished slip op., ¶25 (citation omitted), there was "other 
evidence" in this case:  blood inside the house, the loud bangs 
heard by the officers while they were outside, Antony's 
statement that multiple other individuals were involved, and 
Matalonis's assertions to the contrary, which were therefore 
suspect (as was Antony's account).23  The officers did not know 
who to believe or what had happened.  At Matalonis's door, the 
officers were basically told, "Yes, I just beat a drunken man 
                                                 
23 Matalonis's 
statements 
were 
also 
suspect 
because, 
although the resident at the original address had told the 
officers that Antony lived with Matalonis, Matalonis told the 
officers that he lived alone. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
25 
 
senseless, but there's nothing to see here; all this blood is 
his."  The officers need not have had their concerns assuaged by 
Matalonis's explanation.24  
¶43 The court of appeals apparently relied to some extent 
on the fact that, in some of our other cases upholding searches 
under the community caretaker doctrine, namely Pinkard and 
Gracia, "officers had specific concerns about the welfare of 
people known to be present in the homes when the officers 
entered the homes."  Matalonis, unpublished slip op., ¶24 
(emphasis added).  Here, it is true, the officers did not know 
that there was an injured individual in any of the home's rooms.  
But the Fourth Amendment does not inflexibly require that 
officers be concerned about specific, "known" individuals in 
order to be acting as community caretakers.  
¶44 For 
instance, 
the 
case 
in 
which 
the 
community 
caretaker doctrine "has its origins," Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 
U.S. 433 (1973), involved Wisconsin police taking actions 
directed toward the welfare of unknown individuals.  Pinkard, 
327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶15.  In Cady a Wisconsin police officer 
searched the trunk of a vacant car that had been towed to a 
                                                 
24 We recognize that it is possible, and even likely, that 
the officers in this case were also motivated by the desire to 
investigate a potential battery.  However, "when under the 
totality of the circumstances an objectively reasonable basis 
for 
the 
community 
caretaker 
function 
is 
shown, 
that 
determination is not negated by the officer's subjective law 
enforcement concerns."  State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶19, 345 
Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87.  
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
26 
 
privately-owned garage.  Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 436-
37 (1973).  The car belonged to a man who had become drunk, 
crashed the car, and later identified himself to police as a 
Chicago police officer.  Id. at 435-37.  The Wisconsin police 
officer searched the car "to protect the public from the 
possibility that [the Chicago police officer's service] revolver 
would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands."  Id. at 
437, 443.  The police did not find a revolver in the car.  Id. 
at 436.  The Supreme Court upheld the search.  See id. at 446.  
Cady thus involved (1) a search based on the potential existence 
of a dangerous object, (2) to protect against the potential that 
some unknown person might be harmed by the object.  See id. at 
447. 
¶45 In Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 251 N.W.2d 461 
(1977), which constituted "our very first discussion of the 
community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement," 
Pinkard, 
327 
Wis. 2d 346, 
¶21, 
an 
officer 
responded 
to 
information 
provided 
by 
an 
anonymous 
telephone 
caller——
information 
"therefore . . . not 
possessed 
of 
even 
minimal 
'indicia of reliability,'"——that "someone" was "making noise 
shortly after midnight" in an unspecified garage in an alley.  
Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 461, 470, 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977).  
We stated,  
Checking noise complaints bears little in common with 
investigation of crime.  As a general matter it is 
probably more a part of the "community caretaker" 
function of the police. . . .  The officer was clearly 
justified in proceeding to the alley in question and 
conducting a general surveillance of the area to 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
27 
 
determine whether some noise or other disturbance was 
present. 
Id. at 471.  Bies thus involved an investigation that was only 
marginally directed at the welfare of an identifiable person, 
the anonymous caller.  
¶46 In a more recent case, Kramer, there was no dispute 
between the parties that, but for the possibility of certain 
subjective concerns, an officer was acting in a community 
caretaker capacity when he activated his police cruiser's 
emergency overhead lights while pulling up behind a vehicle 
which was legally parked on the side of the road and which had 
activated its hazard lights.  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶¶4-5, 
22, 24, 37.  The officer in that case "testified that his reason 
for stopping was to 'check to see if there actually was a 
driver, [and to] offer any assistance.'"  Id., ¶5 (emphasis 
added).  We later acknowledged that the officer did not know 
"what was going on inside the vehicle, or whether there was a 
driver present," id., ¶38 (emphasis added), and did so again 
when we explained that "it was [the officer's] community 
caretaker function of offering assistance to what could have 
been a motorist stranded in a stalled vehicle after dark that 
led to the officer's contact with Kramer."  Id., ¶39 (emphasis 
added).  
¶47 Although the parties in that case were litigating the 
constitutional implications of the officer's subjective concerns 
rather than whether the officer's actions constituted community 
caretaking in the first place, see id., ¶24, the case is 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
28 
 
illustrative for our purposes.  Requiring an officer such as the 
one in Kramer to have concern for specific, "known" individuals 
in order to be acting as a community caretaker might well mean 
that an officer would have to have some kind of evidence 
pointing to the presence of specific individuals in a stalled, 
abandoned, or overturned vehicle on the side of the road before 
he or she could investigate the vehicle as a community 
caretaker.  
¶48 Kramer suggests, like Cady and Bies, that whether the 
police are acting in their capacity as community caretakers does 
not depend upon whether the police are acting to protect persons 
that have been specifically identified.  The reverse is also 
true: just because the police are acting to protect a person 
that has been specifically identified does not mean that the 
police are acting in their capacity as community caretakers.  
See, e.g., Ultsch, 331 Wis. 2d 242, ¶¶1, 3-4 (police not engaged 
in community caretaker function when they entered home to locate 
driver of damaged vehicle after driver's boyfriend informed the 
officers the driver was "up at the house 'possibly in bed or 
asleep'").  We cannot lose sight of the fact that the question 
of the lawfulness of the officers' conduct is ultimately one of 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
29 
 
reasonableness. 
 
Pinkard, 
327 
Wis. 2d 346, 
¶13 
(citation 
omitted).25  
¶49 The blood in this case——on the stairwell of the first 
apartment, in the snow, on the side doors of Matalonis's house, 
on the floor of the foyer of Matalonis's house, and leading up 
to the stairwell in Matalonis's house——came from somewhere, 
obviously, and Antony indicated that multiple individuals were 
involved in the fight that led to his injuries.  Antony 
initially told Officer Ruha that he had been beaten up by four 
different groups of people outside of a bar, but later said that 
he was beaten up by four people outside of a bar.  Matalonis, in 
contrast, told the officers that he and Antony alone had fought. 
Additionally, the resident at the address to which the officers 
had first responded told the officers that Antony lived with his 
                                                 
25 The court of appeals below relied upon a formulation of 
the "objectively reasonable basis" test it had earlier set forth 
in its Ultsch opinion, namely that "there must have been 'an 
"objectively reasonable basis" to believe there [was] "a member 
of the public who [was] in need of assistance."'"  Matalonis, 
unpublished slip op., ¶15 (quoting State v. Ultsch, 2011 WI App 
17, ¶15, 331 Wis. 2d 242, 793 N.W.2d 505).  This slightly 
misleading phrasing was created by splicing together two 
distinct quotations from Kramer.  See Ultsch, 331 Wis. 2d 242, 
¶15 (quoting State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶¶30, 32, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598).  Our original formulation of that 
test was that there must be "an objectively reasonable basis for 
the community caretaker function."  Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶30 
(emphasis added).  We also stated in Kramer that an officer 
"serves as a necessary community caretaker when the officer 
discovers a member of the public who is in need of assistance."  
Id., ¶32.  This statement should not be read to require 
certainty as to whether a dangerous situation involves the 
presence of individuals.  As we have explained, Kramer itself 
arguably implied that that kind of certainty is not required.  
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
30 
 
brother, but Matalonis told the officers that he lived alone.  
Officers Ruha and Yandel were apparently concerned that perhaps 
Matalonis was not telling the truth.  They had also heard loud 
noises coming from inside Matalonis's residence.  The evidence 
in this case sufficiently provides an objectively reasonable 
basis for the police to believe an injured individual needed 
their help.  We conclude that the officers in this case were 
engaged in the exercise of a bona fide community caretaker 
function when they searched Matalonis's home.26 
                                                 
26 The court of appeals thought that this case was similar 
to State v. Maddix "in that the officers in this case did not 
have before them any evidence pointing 'concretely to the 
possibility that a member of the public was in need of 
assistance' 
inside 
Matalonis's 
home," 
but 
that 
case 
is 
distinguishable.  See Matalonis, unpublished slip op., ¶24.  In 
Maddix evidence pointing to an individual in need of protection 
included: (1) a call reporting a domestic disturbance, and (2) 
hearing screams from inside the residence upon the officers' 
arrival.  State v. Maddix, 2013 WI App 64, ¶26, 348 Wis. 2d 179, 
831 N.W.2d 778.  Once inside the residence, the officers met and 
separately interviewed two individuals.  Id.  One of the 
individuals explained that she had screamed because "she was 
scared but she didn't know what she was scared of."  Id.  The 
Maddix court determined that a subsequent search of the 
residence did not fall within the scope of the community 
caretaker function.  Id., ¶25. 
The Maddix court noted that the "female's failure to 
identify the source of the fear that caused her to scream" had 
been the "primary basis" for the officers' subsequent search of 
the apartment.  Id., ¶26.  Both individuals "gave the same basic 
account" of what had happened.  Id., ¶29.  The court explained 
that "no evidence directly corroborated the officers' theory 
that another person was present in the apartment" and that there 
was no "corroboration that someone was in need of assistance."  
Id., ¶¶26-28.  During the 25 to 30 minutes that the officers 
were in the apartment prior to the inception of the search, the 
officers were presented with "virtually no" relevant evidence 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
31 
 
2. The Search of the House and of the Locked Room 
¶50 Given our conclusion that the officers' search of 
Matalonis's home was an exercise of the community caretaker 
function, we examine whether the officers were presented with 
evidence during their search that rendered that function no 
longer necessary or otherwise negated it.  If the officer in 
Bies had discovered a person loudly playing music in the alley 
in question, for example, the officer might not have been 
justified in continuing his search after asking that the music 
be turned off.  See Maddix, 348 Wis. 2d 179, ¶¶29-30 (officers 
who entered apartment and interviewed occupants "properly 
exercised their community caretaker function and achieved the 
purpose for which they were dispatched" and were not justified 
in also searching the apartment).  As we have made clear, 
                                                                                                                                                             
"such as noises, nervous behavior by Maddix or the female, or 
statements by either of them that implied the presence of 
another person."  Id., ¶28.   
In this case, in contrast, the blood trail and significant 
amounts of blood that the officers discovered supported the 
officers' theory that an individual in Matalonis's residence was 
in need of assistance.  This theory was "corroborated" by 
Antony's statement that multiple individuals were involved.  In 
contrast to Maddix, moreover, the parties involved in this case 
did not "[give] the same basic account."  Id., ¶29  Finally, the 
officers perceived suspicious noises coming from within the 
residence 
and 
were 
confronted 
by 
Matalonis's 
suspicious 
behavior: he answered the door breathless and "pretty upset" and 
offered a version of events that did not match the information 
the officers had gained earlier.  While the Maddix court found 
"no . . . facts," id., ¶30 (emphasis added), suggesting someone 
else was present, here there was sufficient evidence supporting 
the officers' concern that someone was in need of their 
assistance. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
32 
 
Matalonis's explanation was not sufficient for this purpose 
because, among other things, the officers already possessed 
contrary information.  
¶51 The officers' community caretaking logically would 
have been fulfilled only after they had checked the areas of the 
home where persons might be located.  The circuit court found 
that "[the officers] searched only in areas where there was 
blood found and they didn't search drawers or places where 
obviously people could not hide but only rooms and larger areas 
where bodies might be found."  This conclusion is not clearly 
erroneous.   
¶52 During his search, Officer Ruha located numerous signs 
of drug use.  This does not invalidate the search.  "[W]hen 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
an 
objectively 
reasonable basis for the community caretaker function is shown, 
that determination is not negated by the officer's subjective 
law enforcement concerns."  Gracia, 345 Wis. 2d 488, ¶19.  
Police officers do not operate in a vacuum and may be confronted 
with evidence of criminal activity as they seek to execute tasks 
that are not related to law enforcement.  See Pinkard, 327 
Wis. 2d 346, ¶¶18, 40.  The fact that there was evidence of drug 
use in the house was not Officer Ruha's fault, and we find no 
reason to disturb the circuit court's conclusion that the reason 
for the search was to check the house for injured parties.  
¶53 Similarly, we are convinced that Officer Ruha had the 
welfare of potentially injured parties in mind when he obtained 
access to the locked room in question.  Upstairs, Officer Ruha 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
33 
 
had found "blood all over the handrail.  There was a mirror that 
was down that was broken.  There [were] shards laying all over 
the floor."  These were further signs of an altercation.  
Officer Ruha then observed (1) a locked door, (2) with blood on 
it.  If Matalonis had been lying about the presence of injured 
parties, 
the 
room 
was 
obviously 
a 
likely 
candidate 
for 
concealment of those parties.  When Matalonis was questioned 
about the door, Officer Yandel "noticed [Matalonis's] breathing 
started becoming faster.  [Matalonis] looked nervous to" Officer 
Yandel.  At that time the officers clearly had not yet completed 
their legitimate community caretaking function.  The circuit 
court put it well:  
[W]ith someone who is bleeding, someone who is taken 
away by ambulance, to have a locked door in a house 
with blood on that door and not search behind that 
door and to later find that there's a dead body or a 
bleeding 
body 
or 
a 
person 
in 
need 
of 
medical 
assistance behind that door I think would not only be 
improper, it would be a sign of poor police work. 
¶54 Again, we recognize that the officers may have had 
other subjective, enforcement-related interests at this time.  
In particular, Officer Ruha testified that he heard a running 
fan behind the locked door and smelled marijuana.  If these two 
facts were the only relevant ones before Officer Ruha, a 
warrantless entry might not have been justified.  But in light 
of all the facts that Officer Ruha had to consider——the blood 
(outside the house, inside the house, and on the door itself), 
the fact that the door was locked, the conflicting stories, and 
the noises the officers had heard——Officer Ruha's testimony that 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
34 
 
he heard a fan inside the locked room and smelled marijuana does 
not 
negate 
the 
officers' 
bona 
fide 
community 
caretaking 
function.  See Gracia, 345 Wis. 2d 488, ¶19.  The potential for 
the presence of marijuana in the locked room did not render it 
impossible that there were also injured parties in that room.27  
¶55 It is easy, after the fact, to say that there was not 
an injured person behind the locked door.  But the police 
officers in this case had to rely solely on the facts they 
possessed at the time.  Had there been a bludgeoned, bleeding 
person suffering inside that locked room and had law enforcement 
not investigated, we would be wondering why not, considering the 
facts before them.  Simply stated, we expect law enforcement to 
respond to exigent situations, and that is just what they did in 
this case. 
                                                 
27 Counsel for Matalonis found significant the fact that 
Officer Ruha asked Matalonis "what" was in the locked room, as 
opposed to "who" was in the locked room.  We do not ascribe the 
same significance to Officer Ruha's choice of words.  First, we 
do not think it prudent to imbue a single word with so much 
consequence, especially given that events on the night in 
question unfolded rapidly.  Second, had there actually been 
injured persons in the locked room, Matalonis would have been 
actively concealing those persons from the police, and would 
therefore not necessarily be expected to freely admit to doing 
so in response to a question about the contents of the room.  
For all we know, Officer Ruha framed the question the way he did 
in order to gauge Matalonis's reaction, or to appear less 
concerned than he actually was so as to keep Matalonis's guard 
down.  There is not enough evidence in the record to ascertain 
the reason for Officer Ruha's particular phrasing of the 
question. 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
35 
 
¶56 We conclude that the officers were exercising a bona 
fide community caretaker function when they searched Matalonis's 
home for injured parties.  This function continued for the 
duration of Officer Ruha's search of the home, including of the 
locked room. 
 
B. Whether the Officers Exercised their  
Community Caretaker Function Reasonably 
¶57 All that has been determined thus far, from a 
constitutional perspective, is that a search of Matalonis's 
house occurred, and that the officers conducted that search in 
good faith as community caretakers in order to locate injured 
parties. 
¶58 The State still retains the burden, however, of 
showing that the officers exercised their community caretaker 
function reasonably.  We must "balance the public interest or 
need that is furthered by the officers' conduct against the 
degree 
and 
nature 
of 
the 
intrusion 
on 
the 
citizen's 
constitutional 
interest," 
Pinkard, 
327 
Wis. 2d 346, 
¶41 
(citation omitted), and consider: 
(1) [T]he degree of the public interest and the 
exigency 
of 
the 
situation; 
(2) 
the 
attendant 
circumstances surrounding the search, including time, 
location, the degree of overt authority and force 
displayed; (3) whether an automobile is involved; and 
(4) the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of 
alternatives 
to 
the 
type 
of 
intrusion 
actually 
accomplished. 
Gracia, 345 Wis. 2d 488, ¶15 (citation omitted).  We conclude 
that the officers in this case exercised their community 
caretaker function reasonably.  Although the nature of the 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
36 
 
officers' intrusion was substantial, the public interest to be 
served by the intrusion was also substantial, and the nature of 
the intrusion was strictly limited to the requirements of the 
situation.  
¶59 The public has a significant interest in ensuring the 
safety of a home's occupants when officers cannot ascertain the 
occupants' physical condition and reasonably conclude that 
assistance is needed.  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶¶45-48 (citing 
State v. Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249, ¶29, 287 Wis. 2d 831, 707 
N.W.2d 565).  Here, Officer Ruha and Officer Yandel reasonably 
concluded 
based 
on 
the 
evidence 
before 
them 
that 
their 
assistance was needed to verify that the blood in Matalonis's 
house did not belong to an injured person other than Antony.  
The situation was exigent in nature.  The officers were not 
responding to a mere noise complaint, such as occurred in Bies, 
but instead investigating the possibility that a person lay 
injured, perhaps critically, in Matalonis's home.  If the blood 
in the house belonged to someone besides Antony who "had been 
seriously injured[,] . . . quick medical assistance would have 
been necessary."  Gracia, 345 Wis. 2d 488, ¶25 (applying first 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
37 
 
factor of balancing test to situation involving individual who 
potentially had been injured in a car accident).28 
¶60 The attendant circumstances surrounding the search 
demonstrate 
the 
reasonableness 
of 
the 
search, 
given 
the 
circumstances.  Before we analyze this factor, we emphasize the 
fact that we are not here presented with a police officer's 
warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a home.  Instead, we 
examine whether the officers in this case, while already 
lawfully in Matalonis's home, acted reasonably in searching the 
rooms of the home without consent.  Nevertheless, the police 
undeniably intruded on Matalonis's significant constitutional 
right "to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion."  Silverman v. United 
                                                 
28 Matalonis argues that if the police had actually believed 
the situation was urgent, they would have immediately kicked 
down the door to the locked room without going to the trouble of 
obtaining the key from Matalonis.  We are not convinced by this 
argument.  The decisive issue before us is whether the conduct 
of the police while at Matalonis's residence was reasonable, 
see Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶13, and the police must similarly 
ensure that they are acting reasonably as situations before them 
progress.  If the police had immediately broken down the door 
without asking for a key, Matalonis would likely be arguing that 
"the degree of overt authority and force displayed" was 
unreasonable.  Gracia, 345 Wis. 2d 488, ¶15 (citation omitted).  
Because our analysis of whether the officers exercised the 
community caretaking function reasonably is a balancing test, we 
are concerned with the officers' conduct as a whole.  A quick 
detour to attempt to obtain a key to the locked room (as well as 
to ask Matalonis about the room) in order to avoid having to 
kick down a door in Matalonis's house does not prove that the 
situation was something less than exigent.  
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
38 
 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citation omitted); see Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87, 589-90 (1980).  
¶61 The officers did not choose the time or location of 
the search because they were initially responding to a medical 
call and reacting to evidence discovered upon their arrival.  
See Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶49 (officers did not control time 
of day or location because they were responding to an anonymous 
tip).  As for the search itself, as we have noted, the circuit 
court found "[the officers] searched only in areas where there 
was blood found and they didn't search drawers or places where 
obviously people could not hide but only rooms and larger areas 
where bodies might be found. "  
¶62 We agree with the court of appeals that the degree of 
authority and force the officers displayed was "considerable": 
"Officer Ruha conducted a warrantless search of Matalonis's 
residence without Matalonis's consent, . . .  Matalonis was 
detained in his living room with Officer Yandel, and Officer 
Ruha threatened to break down the locked door on the second 
floor if a key to the door was not provided."  Matalonis, 
unpublished slip op., ¶33.  However, the authority and force 
displayed 
was 
appropriate 
for 
the 
legitimate 
community 
caretaking objective the officers were pursuing.  In order to 
ensure that there were no injured parties in Matalonis's house, 
Officer Ruha needed to check the rooms of the house, and 
quickly.  Obtaining a warrant was not practicable given the 
exigency of the situation.  Further, and for the same reason, 
the officers needed to obtain immediate access to the locked 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
39 
 
room.  In asking Matalonis for a key to the room rather than 
abruptly breaking it down, Officer Ruha was attempting to use 
less authority and force than might have been justified under 
the circumstances.  See Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶¶50-51 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Horngren, 
2000 
WI 
App 
177, 
¶17, 
238 
Wis. 2d 347, 617 N.W.2d 508) (exigency of situation rendered 
officers' actions reasonable).  Matalonis was detained on the 
living room couch in his own home while Officer Ruha checked the 
rooms of the home.  However, Matalonis was not handcuffed.  He 
was not placed under arrest.  There is no evidence in the record 
that Matalonis was frisked.  There is no evidence in the record 
that a weapon was ever pointed at Matalonis.  All in all, the 
force 
and 
authority 
displayed 
in 
this 
situation 
was 
"considerable" but appropriately tailored to the needs of the 
situation.  See id., ¶55 ("The officers' search was limited to 
minimize the intrusion into Pinkard's home."). 
¶63 No automobile was involved in this case.  "This is not 
a relevant factor here except to recognize that one has a 
heightened privacy interest in preventing intrusions into one's 
home."  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶56. 
¶64 Finally, we consider the "availability, feasibility 
and effectiveness of alternatives to the type of intrusion 
actually accomplished."  Gracia, 345 Wis. 2d 488, ¶15 (citation 
omitted).  As we have said, a warrant was not a feasible 
alternative.  The court of appeals below thought the officers 
could have "ask[ed] Matalonis whether there was anyone injured 
(or uninjured) in his home."  Matalonis, unpublished slip op., 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
40 
 
¶35.  We note that the officers asked Matalonis who lived at his 
residence and Matalonis told the officers that he lived alone.29  
Officer Ruha also asked Matalonis about the contents of the 
locked room (and was lied to).  Given their time constraints, 
and the fact that the officers "would not have been required to 
accept at face value" Matalonis's responses, id. (citation 
omitted), further questioning was not clearly an effective 
alternative to the route actually taken by the officers.  It is 
difficult to second-guess credibility determinations invariably 
made by the officers on the night in question. 
¶65 The one additional step not taken by Officer Ruha that 
he could have taken was to knock on the locked door and call out 
to potential parties on the other side of the door.  However, 
had there been no answer, the officers would have had the same 
cause for concern.  An injured party on the other side of the 
door could be unconscious, incapacitated, or dead.  Though 
available and feasible, the alternative would not, ultimately, 
have been effective; Officer Ruha's failure to knock on the 
locked door only marginally reduces the reasonableness of his 
actions, if at all.30 
                                                 
29 As has been explained, this statement by Matalonis was 
inconsistent with information the officers had received at the 
first address to which they had responded. 
30 Counsel for Matalonis found Officer Ruha's failure to 
knock on the door to the locked room probative.  But Officer 
Ruha's failure to knock on the door is not enough, standing 
alone, to disturb the circuit court's finding that the officers 
were in fact searching for injured parties.  We do not possess 
sufficient information regarding Officer Ruha's thought process 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
41 
 
¶66 Taken together, our balancing test shows: (1) a 
significant public interest and an exigent situation; (2) a 
significant intrusion on Matalonis's constitutional rights, but 
one tailored to the needs of the situation; and (3) few or no 
available, feasible, and effective alternatives.  We conclude 
that, on balance, the officers' exercise of the community 
caretaker function was reasonable "because the public interest 
in the search outweighed [Matalonis's] privacy interests." 
Gracia, 345 Wis. 2d 488, ¶30. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶67 We conclude that the officers in this case reasonably 
exercised a bona fide community caretaker function when they 
searched Matalonis's home.  The officers therefore were not 
required to obtain a warrant prior to conducting the search in 
question, and the evidence of marijuana production they obtained 
should not be suppressed.31  Because the search was lawful under 
                                                                                                                                                             
in the face of a developing situation to decide that asking 
Matalonis for access to the locked room rather than pounding on 
the door demonstrates that Officer Ruha was unconcerned about 
injured parties.  And on the other side of the ledger, although 
Officer Ruha did not knock on the door to the locked room, he 
testified that he announced "Kenosha Police" as he entered the 
locked room.  This would tend to show that Officer Ruha believed 
there might have been individuals in the room. 
31 The State contends, and we agree, that if the officers' 
search was justified as a reasonable exercise of a bona fide 
community caretaker function, the officers "acted within the 
scope of the plain view doctrine when they seized contraband 
from the residence, including the locked room."  See Pinkard, 
327 
Wis. 2d 346, 
¶62; 
Gracia, 
345 
Wis. 2d 488, 
¶29 
n.14 
(explaining plain view exception to the warrant requirement).  
No. 
2014AP108-CR   
 
42 
 
the community caretaker doctrine, we need not determine whether 
the search was also justified as a protective sweep.  We reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the case to the 
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.   
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2014AP108-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶68 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with Justice David T. Prosser that the community caretaker 
exception is important but cannot be interpreted so broadly as 
to swallow the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., State v. Gracia, 
2013 WI 15, ¶¶42-46, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., dissenting, joined by Ann Walsh Bradley, J. & Prosser, 
J.); Gracia, 345 Wis. 2d 488, ¶¶47-90 (Prosser, J., dissenting, 
joined by Abrahamson, C.J. & Ann Walsh Bradley, J.); State v. 
Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶64-101, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 
(Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting, joined by Abrahamson, C.J. & 
Prosser, J.).  Accordingly, I join Justice Prosser's dissent. 
¶69 I write separately not only to reaffirm my assessment 
that this court has taken too broad a view of the community 
caretaker exception, but also to memorialize once again the 
approach being taken in the instant case and in other cases 
argued and tentatively decided before a new justice's (here 
Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's) appointment to the court, and to 
compare the practice at this time with past practice in this 
court and in the United States Supreme Court.       
¶70 As I have written previously, these cases "pose[] the 
question of how a case should be treated by the court when the 
case was heard and decided before a new justice became a member 
of the court and the new member joins the court before an 
opinion is released."  New Richmond News v. City of New 
Richmond, 2015 WI 106, ¶7, 365 Wis. 2d 610, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring).   
No.  2014AP108-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶71 Let me briefly set forth the facts and circumstances 
of the change in membership of the court, the status of cases 
heard in September and October, and the issues raised by a new 
justice's joining the court at this time.1   
¶72 Justice N. Patrick Crooks passed away on September 21, 
2015.  Justice Rebecca G. Bradley joined the court on October 9, 
2015.   
¶73 Prior to September 21, 2015, the court heard oral 
argument in the instant case and eight other cases.  Justice N. 
Patrick Crooks participated in these nine cases.  No opinion was 
released in these nine cases prior to Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley's joining the court.  These nine cases are set forth in 
the attached oral argument schedule (Attachment A) released by 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
¶74 In addition, after Justice N. Patrick Crooks passed 
away on September 21, 2015, and prior to Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley's appointment, the court heard oral argument in seven 
cases on September 22, October 5, and October 6, 2015.  No 
opinion was released in these seven cases prior to Justice 
Rebecca G. Bradley's appointment to the court.  These seven 
cases are set forth in the attached oral argument schedules 
                                                 
1 I am not writing about the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
lawyer discipline cases and petitions for review or bypass and 
certifications by the court of appeals.  These matters are too 
numerous and involve a large variety of factual patterns.  They 
do, however, present issues similar to those presented by the 
oral argument cases. 
No.  2014AP108-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
(Attachments A and B) released by the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court.   
¶75 Opinions have been released in five cases heard and 
decided before Justice Rebecca G. Bradley joined the court.  
Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate in these five 
cases:  State v. Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, ¶52, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___; Winnebago Cnty. v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶58, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; Wis. DOJ v. Wis. DWD, 2015 WI 
114, ¶60, 365 Wis. 2d 694, ___ N.W.2d ___; New Richmond News, 
2015 WI 106, ¶4, 365 Wis. 2d 610, ___ N.W.2d ___; State v. 
Iverson, 2015 WI 101, ¶62, 365 Wis. 2d 302, 871 N.W.2d 661. 
¶76 The per curiam opinion in New Richmond News explained 
Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's non-participation thusly:  "Justice 
Rebecca G. Bradley was appointed to the court after the court's 
decision, and therefore did not participate."2  No other opinion 
has explained Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's non-participation.     
¶77 The same situation as described in New Richmond News 
appears to exist in the instant case.  Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley was appointed to the court after the court heard oral 
argument and tentatively decided the instant case on September 
18, 2015.  Yet unlike New Richmond News and the four other cases 
from September and October in which opinions have been issued 
(in which Justice Rebecca G. Bradley did not participate), 
Justice Rebecca G. Bradley participates in the instant case.   
                                                 
2 New Richmond News, 365 Wis. 2d 610, ¶1. 
No.  2014AP108-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶78 Although the majority opinion looks regular in its 
form, the opinion differs from other opinions released in 
September and October cases.  The vote in the instant case is 4-
3, with Justice Rebecca G. Bradley as part of the majority of 
four.  Without Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's vote, this case 
would result in a tie vote.  The decision of the court of 
appeals would be affirmed.  With Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's 
vote, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed.      
¶79 In sum, Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's participation in 
the instant case appears inconsistent with her non-participation 
in New Richmond News and other cases argued in September and 
October.   
¶80 Although this court has not had much experience with a 
new justice joining the court after a case has been heard but 
before an opinion is released, we have had some.  In my 
concurring opinion in New Richmond News, I wrote at length, 
reviewing this court's past experiences and the past experiences 
and practice of the United States Supreme Court.3  
¶81 I concluded that the process when a new justice joins 
the court after a case has been heard but before an opinion is 
released 
is 
as 
follows: 
 
The 
justices 
who 
originally 
participated in the case, without the new justice's input, 
decide whether to reargue the case.  The new justice may 
                                                 
3 See 
New 
Richmond 
News, 
365 
Wis. 2d 610, 
¶¶17-25 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring).   
No.  2014AP108-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
participate in reargument and subsequent proceedings.4  No 
precedent appears to exist in the United States Supreme Court or 
in this court for a new justice who did not participate in oral 
argument to participate in the case without reargument. 
¶82 In the instant case, which predates Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley's appointment to the court, Justice Rebecca G. Bradley 
participates without a reargument.  Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's 
participation in some (but not all) cases predating her 
appointment to the court, and participation in those cases 
without a reargument appear to be internally inconsistent and 
inconsistent with the court's prior practice and the practices 
in the United States Supreme Court. 
¶83 As I stated previously, to aid the court in the 
future, I write once again to memorialize the approach being 
taken by the court in the instant case and to compare the 
present practice with this court's past practice and the 
practices of the United States Supreme Court.  
¶84 For the reasons set forth, I join Justice David T. 
Prosser's dissent and write separately. 
 
                                                 
4 Thus, "under past precedent of this court and the United 
States Supreme Court, it appears that if a new justice is 
available to break a tie vote, then the court, without the new 
justice's input, decides whether to reargue the case.  In 
reargument, the new justice participates."  See New Richmond 
News, 365 Wis. 2d 610, ¶¶21-26 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) 
(citing Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); 
Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice, ch. 15.6 at 
838-39 (10th ed. 2013)).   
No.  2014AP108-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
ATTACHMENT A 
 
No.  2014AP108-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
 
ATTACHMENT B 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
 
¶85 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J.   (dissenting).  The 
Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
¶86 There are exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement, but these exceptions are "few in number and 
carefully delineated."  United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 
U.S. 297, 318 (1972).  In cases in which the police have seized 
evidence that a defendant seeks to suppress, a court must 
determine whether the police conducted a search and, if so, 
whether they were required to obtain a judicial warrant before 
the search.  No warrant is required when the police are acting 
pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. 
¶87 Whether an exception to the warrant requirement exists 
in a particular case is often a close question.  When a court 
consistently 
resolves 
these 
close 
questions 
against 
the 
necessity for a warrant, the court tends to expand the 
exceptions and reduce the protections of the Fourth Amendment.  
Because I believe the scope of the community caretaker exception 
is being substantially expanded in this case, without any 
compelling justification, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶88 The facts in this case are carefully set out by the 
majority opinion.  See majority op., ¶¶4-20.  Summarizing 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
briefly, Kenosha police were called to assist a man who was 
bleeding profusely.  The man, Antony Matalonis (Antony), told 
inconsistent stories about how he was beaten before he was taken 
to a hospital.  Advised that Antony lived with his brother 
nearby, the police were able to follow a trail of blood to the 
home of the brother, Charles Matalonis (Charles), a relatively 
short distance away. 
¶89 There was blood on the door of Charles's house.  After 
calling for backup, the police knocked on his door and were 
quickly admitted.  There were splotches of blood throughout the 
first and second floors.  Charles admitted he had been in a 
fight with his brother.  He admitted he had been cleaning up 
blood.  He permitted officers to go through the house to assure 
their own safety and explore the possibility of other injured 
persons in the house.  They found no injured persons. 
¶90 On the second floor, in plain view, a police officer 
did see marijuana and a variety of drug paraphernalia——pipes and 
other smoking utensils, a small silver grinder, and a ceramic 
water bong.  The officer also encountered a locked door with a 
few droplets of blood scattered on the door.  The officer 
smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming through the door and 
heard a fan running behind the door. 
¶91 The date was January 15; the time was after 3:00 a.m.  
A reasonable person could infer that a fan is not normally 
operating at such a date and time merely for purposes of 
comfortable climate control. 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶92 In my view, the officer's observations on the second 
floor, followed by Charles's refusal to give consent to open the 
locked door, provided ample probable cause for a search warrant 
for the locked room to search for drugs.  Conversely, the 
officers would have been hard pressed to make a case for a 
search warrant to find a body in some condition behind the door.  
Officers had already accounted for other known occupants of the 
house, including a basement tenant. 
II 
¶93 If one acknowledges that there was no probable cause 
to search for a person——living or dead——behind the door, the 
government had to have an exception to the warrant requirement 
that did not require probable cause. 
¶94 Consent to search is an exception to the warrant 
requirement, but everyone understands that threats and duress 
are inconsistent with voluntary consent.  There is no claim in 
this case that Charles Matalonis freely consented to the search 
of the locked room. 
¶95 The 
exigent 
circumstances 
exception 
also 
is 
inappropriate 
because 
the 
exigent 
circumstances 
exception 
requires probable cause. 
¶96 Thus, the State and the majority rely upon the 
community caretaker exception.  This exception does not require 
probable cause because investigation of a crime is not the 
predominant motivation for police action. 
¶97 In State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 
N.W.2d 87, I traced the history and evolution of the community 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
caretaker exception in Wisconsin.  My dissent did not discuss 
the court of appeals' decision in State v. Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 
249, 287 Wis. 2d 831, 707 N.W.2d 565, which is a very persuasive 
analysis of the community caretaker exception. 
¶98 There is no need here to restate the analysis in all 
past cases.  It is enough to note that community caretaking has 
moved beyond fact situations involving automobiles to fact 
situations inside people's houses and even situations involving 
locked rooms inside people's homes.  Moreover, community 
caretaking has moved from fact situations in which the actions 
of 
police 
are 
"totally 
divorced 
from 
the 
detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the 
violation of a criminal statute," State v. Anderson, 142 
Wis. 2d 162, 166, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Cady 
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)), rev'd on other 
grounds, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990), and, more than 
three decades later, fact situations in which a police officer's 
subjective 
law 
enforcement 
concerns 
do 
not 
negate 
an 
"objectively reasonable basis" for the officer's community 
caretaker function, State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶¶29-32, 315 
Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598, to situations in which a community 
caretaking theory supported by corroborating facts does not 
require a warrant even where traditional law enforcement 
concerns predominate. 
III 
¶99 As the majority properly states, majority op., ¶31, 
this court uses a three-part test when evaluating whether a law 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
enforcement officer's performance of a community caretaker 
function provides an exception to the warrant requirement: 
When a community caretaker function is asserted as the 
basis for a home entry, the circuit court must 
determine: (1) whether a search or seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred; (2) if 
so, whether the police were exercising a bona fide 
community caretaker function; and (3) if so, whether 
the public interest outweighs the intrusion upon the 
privacy of the individual such that the community 
caretaker function was reasonably exercised within the 
context of a home. 
State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶29, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 
N.W.2d 592 (citing Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶21). 
¶100 This dissent focuses on the second and third prongs 
stated above. 
A 
¶101 The 
majority 
concludes 
that 
Officer 
Brian 
Ruha 
exercised a bona fide community caretaker function because he 
had an objectively reasonable basis to enter the locked room 
based on his observations.  Majority op., ¶42.  However, the 
majority opinion is unclear on what degree of certainty an 
officer must possess to initiate the community caretaker 
function and then to maintain it as circumstances change. 
¶102 In State v. Ferguson, 2001 WI App 102, ¶22, 244 
Wis. 2d 17, 629 N.W.2d 788, Judge Curley, joined by Judge Fine, 
used a felicitous phrase: "Unlike the facts in [State v.] Dull[, 
211 Wis. 2d 652, 565 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1997)], the police 
here never stepped out of their caretaking role."  (Emphasis 
added.)  How do we determine when a police officer steps out of 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
his "caretaking role" to focus on the investigation of criminal 
activity?  
¶103 Cady v. Dombrowski and Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 
251 N.W.2d 461 (1977), were cases in which officers were not 
seeking evidence of specific crimes.  They were pursuing the 
non-criminal facet of police work and were surprised at the 
evidence of criminal activity that they encountered.  Both cases 
are distinguishable from Matalonis's situation. 
¶104 From the outset in this case, after seeing Antony, the 
police thought that a crime might have been committed.  If a 
crime had been committed, there might have been other victims.  
However, this "theory" was pursued to extreme lengths when an 
officer postulated that a deceased or injured person might be 
found behind a locked door, knowing that marijuana would almost 
certainly be found beyond the locked door. 
¶105 The majority declares: "In this case, . . . the blood 
trail and significant amounts of blood that the officers 
discovered supported the officers' theory that an individual in 
Matalonis's residence was in need of assistance. . . .  [H]ere 
there was sufficient evidence supporting the officers' concern 
that someone was in need of their assistance."  Majority op., 
¶49 n.26. 
¶106 This expansive conception of community caretaking 
transforms community caretaking from a narrow exception into a 
powerful investigatory tool.  No longer limited to the purpose 
of allowing the State to rely upon evidence obtained by law 
enforcement officers incidental to their provision of valuable 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
services to the public, community caretaking becomes an end in 
itself.  Officers can now easily conduct a warrantless search in 
the name of "community caretaking"; they must merely articulate 
a hypothetical community need——here, checking to see whether an 
injured person was trapped in the closet——based on circumstances 
that they observe.  Conveniently, they may then retain any 
evidence of criminal activity that comes into their plain view 
as they conduct their community caretaking search. 
B 
¶107 A broad statement of a bona fide community caretaker 
function becomes more concerning when considered in conjunction 
with the public interest that the majority articulates in this 
case: "The public has a significant interest in ensuring the 
safety of a home's occupants when officers cannot ascertain the 
occupants' physical condition and reasonably conclude that 
assistance is needed."  Majority op., ¶59. 
¶108 For this proposition, the majority cites Pinkard and 
Ziedonis.  The Pinkard court characterized Ziedonis as involving 
"a significant public interest in ensuring the safety of the 
occupants because the officers could not ascertain their 
physical condition and 'reasonably concluded' that assistance 
was needed."  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶45 (quoting Ziedonis, 
287 Wis. 2d 831, ¶29).  Like Pinkard, Ziedonis involved police 
officers entering a residence for the purpose of checking the 
welfare of a resident.  Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶4; Ziedonis, 
287 Wis. 2d 831, ¶5.  In both cases, officers received 
information indicating that a person was present in the 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
residence, found a door ajar allowing access to the interior of 
the 
residence, 
announced 
themselves 
before 
searching 
the 
residence, and ultimately encountered the resident inside.  
Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶¶2-5; Ziedonis, 287 Wis. 2d 831, ¶¶2-
8. 
¶109 Unlike 
the 
residents 
in 
Pinkard 
and 
Ziedonis, 
Matalonis responded immediately when law enforcement officers 
knocked on his door.  Matalonis told the officers that he lived 
alone, and they confirmed the safety of Matalonis's tenant 
without 
accessing 
the 
locked 
room.1 
 
Consequently, 
with 
Matalonis, his brother, and his tenant accounted for, Officer 
Ruha searched the house not for a particular person suspected of 
needing care but to determine whether any other person was 
present.   
¶110 An open-ended search for occupants illustrates the 
danger that results when the majority's description of the 
community caretaker function combines with its statement of the 
public interest present in this case.  As occurred here, 
officers 
could 
point 
to 
facts 
and——without 
demonstrating 
                                                 
1 The record is unclear as to the exact timing of the 
officers' interaction with the tenant living in Matalonis's 
basement.  At the beginning of his testimony at the suppression 
hearing, Officer Ruha indicated that he did not go into the 
basement during his search because no blood led into the 
basement.  Rather than enter the tenant's room, the officers 
"waited till he came out to talk" to them.  Later in his 
testimony, Officer Ruha indicated that he spoke with the tenant 
at approximately the same time he decided not to search the 
basement, saying, "I believe I talked to him right then and 
there in the basement." 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
probable cause or even reasonable suspicion——use those facts to 
set forth a theory that a person in a building requires 
immediate police assistance.  Given that the public would then 
have an interest in the officers assisting the theoretical 
person inside the building, officers could enter the building 
and search it to determine whether there is in fact a person in 
need of assistance.  Once officers enter the building, the plain 
view doctrine allows them to seize evidence of unrelated 
criminal activity that they encounter——even if the search 
ultimately reveals that the person to whom they attempted to 
provide care remains purely theoretical.  Furthermore, officers 
may conduct their search for the theoretical person who might 
need care regardless of whether other law enforcement objectives 
affect their desire to enter the building2——such as probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion that they will encounter evidence 
of unrelated criminal activity inside——so long as a factual 
basis supports their community caretaking theory. 
IV 
¶111 The 
community 
caretaker 
exception 
recognizes 
the 
crucial role that law enforcement officers play in our society.  
The exception allows the State to rely on evidence that officers 
                                                 
2 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) 
("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 
Fourth Amendment analysis."); State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶29, 
315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598 ("The reasoning of Whren is not 
inconsistent with the analysis in a community caretaker context, 
since police conduct is not based on probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion when a community caretaker function is 
ongoing."). 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
obtain when providing valuable services to the community.  
Officers frequently engage fellow citizens with no intention of 
investigating criminal activity, but sometimes they encounter 
evidence of criminal conduct during the course of those 
interactions.  An officer engaged in a genuine community 
caretaking function will not and should not hesitate to assist 
members of the public when time is of the essence.  Cf. Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) ("[P]olice may enter a 
home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable 
basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or 
imminently threatened with such injury."). 
¶112 But the majority's embrace of a broad, ever-expanding 
version of the exception risks transforming a shield for 
evidence encountered incidental to community caretaking into an 
investigatory sword.  Wisconsin already applies a generous 
interpretation of the exception.  See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 6.6 n.4, at 595 (5th ed. 2012) ("Because 
[Cady] stressed 'the distinction between motor vehicles and 
dwelling places,' it is commonly responded that the Cady 
doctrine is limited to vehicles.").  Allowing law enforcement 
officers to conduct warrantless searches based on a mere theory 
of community need——and without making a showing of probable 
cause or even reasonable suspicion——completely undermines the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.   
¶113 Because I believe the majority opinion unnecessarily 
expands this valuable exception, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶114 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2014AP108-CR.dtp 
 
 
 
1