Title: Pinther v. Pinther

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Pinther v. Pinther1995 WY 4888 P.2d 1250Case Number: 93-258Decided: 01/13/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

 

Ronald Elliot PINTHER, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

 Marcia 
Elaine PINTHER, Appellee (Plaintiff).

                                  

 

Appeal from District Court, Laramie County, Keith G. 
Kautz, J.

   

 

     Karen A. Byrne, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

      Rocklon L. Edmonds, 
Cheyenne, for appellee.

 

     Before GOLDEN, 
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

     MACY, 
Justice. 

  [¶1]      Appellant Ronald Elliot Pinther (the 
father) appeals from the district court's order which denied his petition to 
modify the custody provision in the parties' divorce decree and left custody of 
the parties' minor daughter with Appellee Marcia Elaine Pinther (the mother), 
modified his visitation rights, and increased the amount of his child support payments 
and from the district court's order which denied his motion for 
reconsideration.

 

     [¶2] We affirm.

 

                                
ISSUES

 

    [¶3]  The father states three 
issues:

 

       1. Whether the 
district court abused its discretion in determining that [the mother] should 
have custody of the minor 
child?

 

       2. Whether 
the district court committed reversible error by allowing [the father's] present 
wife to testify against him in 
violation of the spousal privilege?

 

       3. Whether 
the district court abused its discretion in determining that a substantial 
change of circumstances justified 
raising the support obligation?

 

             
                    FACTS

 

  [¶4]       The parties divorced in November 
1987. The divorce decree granted custody of the parties' daughter to the mother, 
subject to specified visitation rights in the father. The divorce decree also 
ordered the father to pay child support in the amount of $220 per month, which 
amount was to increase automatically in October 1992 to $245 per 
month.

 

   [¶5]     On October 9, 1992, the father filed a 
motion to modify the divorce decree in which he prayed for full custody of his 
daughter and for an order which would require the mother to pay child support on 
the basis of the child support guidelines. On October 21, 1992, the mother filed 
a petition to modify the divorce decree in which she requested that the amount 
of the father's child support payments be increased. After holding a hearing on 
the parties' motions, the district court issued an order which allowed the 
mother to retain custody of the parties' daughter, modified the father's visitation rights, 
and increased the amount of the father's child support payments to the presumed 
amount pursuant to the child support guidelines.

 

  [¶6]       The father filed a motion for 
reconsideration in which he claimed, in part, that the district court had 
violated Wyoming law by failing to consider his other children when it made its 
child support calculation. The district court denied the father's motion for 
reconsideration, and the father appealed to this Court.

 

                                
CUSTODY

 

  [¶7]       The father contends that the 
district court abused its discretion by refusing to award custody of the 
parties' daughter to him.

 

     In reviewing a 
district court's decision regarding child custody, we defer to the discretion of 
the district court

             "`unless there is a 
procedural error or unless there is shown to be a clear abuse of discretion. 
A court does not abuse its 
discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances, as 
is said to mean an error of law committed by the court under 
the circumstances.' Deen v. Deen, 
774 P.2d 621, 622 (Wyo. 1989)."

 

     Uhls v. Uhls, 794 P.2d 894, 896 (Wyo. 1990).

 

            The best interests of 
the children is the primary consideration when parental custody matters are 
being determined. Fanning v. 
Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 352 (Wyo. 1986). "[T]he `goal to be achieved is 
a reasonable balance of the rights 
and affections of each of the parents, with paramount 
consideration            being given 
to the welfare and needs of the children.'" Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1287 
(Wyo. 1993) (quoting Leitner v. 
Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 720 (Wyo. 1965)).

 

   Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 
(Wyo. 1993).

 

   [¶8]     After the divorce, the father married 
Carol Wolfe (the current wife). The mother and her daughter later moved from 
Cheyenne to live near Burns with the mother's boyfriend, and the daughter began 
attending elementary school in Cheyenne.

 

  [¶9]       The parties presented extensive 
evidence to the district court.1 Notably, the father attributed his 
daughter's reading abilities and, in part, her success in school to her mother's 
encouragement. The father also testified that he suffered from "posttraumatic 
stress syndrome" which had caused him to have outbursts of anger, that he and 
his current wife had pushed and shoved each other in the past, and that he used 
moderate amounts of alcohol. The father's seventeen-year-old son also testified 
that the father had been violent with him and that the father and his current 
wife had disagreements which involved yelling at, hitting, and slapping each 
other in the presence of the daughter.

 

   [¶10]            
  The district court's 
decision letter stated:

 

            I find that there have 
been no material changes in circumstances which justify a change in custody. 
Each party has [exercised], and 
likely will continue[] to exercise[,] poor judgment, especially in regard 
to relationships. Considering the 
many stormy, occasionally violent relationships of [the father], 
I cannot say it would be in the 
best interest of [the parties' daughter] to change custody. Custody 
shall  remain with [the mother].

 

The district court did not 
exceed the bounds of reason under the circumstances of this case; therefore, we 
conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion.

 

                              
VISITATION

 

  [¶11] 
   The father asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion by modifying his visitation rights 
and by refusing to enforce the parties' informal visitation 
arrangement.

 

            The 
definition of rights of visitation is an aspect of the determination of custody, 
and it has been our consistent 
principle that in custody matters the welfare and needs of the children are to 
be given paramount consideration. 
The decision of the trial court with respect to such matters will not 
be disturbed by this court unless 
we can identify a clear abuse of discretion.

    
Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 1990) (citations 
omitted).

   

  [¶12] 
   The original divorce 
decree granted the father visitation rights during the first weekend of each 
month, the third week of each month, and part of the summer; on some holidays; 
and, until his daughter started attending school, for two weeks between 
September 1 and December 15 and an additional two weeks between January 5 and 
June 1. After the divorce, however, the parties informally agreed that each 
parent would keep the daughter every other week. The parties' informal 
visitation arrangement was not binding upon the district court. "[T]he parties 
to a divorce may not modify a divorce decree without submitting those 
modifications to the district court for 
its consideration and approval." Richardson v. Richardson, 868 P.2d 259, 262 
(Wyo. 1994).

 

   [¶13]  The daughter's elementary school was 
located near the father's house in Cheyenne and was located approximately twelve 
miles from the mother's home. The mother testified that she wanted to send 
her daughter to the school in Burns so 
that her daughter would be attending school closer to the mother's home. The 
mother requested that the father be granted visitation rights for every other 
weekend and during the summer.

 

   [¶14]            
  The district court's 
decision letter stated:

 

            I . . . find that there 
has been a change in circumstances which warrants a modification 
of visitation. [The parties' 
daughter] is now in school (she was not at the time of the divorce) and has 
moved with her mother to Burns, Wyoming. 
The practice of changing the child's residence during the third week of each 
month conflicts with stability and continuity in the child's educational 
development,             and is not 
logistically practical now that the child is in school and lives in another 
town. Visitation is modified to 
coincide with the standard visitation schedule I have 
attached.

 

   The standard visitation schedule 
granted the father visitation rights for alternate holidays, alternate weekends, 
and two months during the summer, and it eliminated the father's visitation 
rights for the third week of each month and for the two additional weeks at both 
the end of the year and the beginning of the year.

 

  [¶15] 
   The district court's 
modified visitation schedule was designed to serve the best interests of the 
parties' daughter by ensuring her educational development. The district court 
did not abuse its discretion by modifying the father's visitation 
rights.

 

                             
CHILD SUPPORT

 

  [¶16] 
   The father claims 
that the district court abused its discretion by determining that a substantial 
change of circumstances had occurred which justified raising the amount of his 
child support payments pursuant to the child support 
guidelines.

 

   [¶17]  The district court retains continuing 
jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree concerning matters of "care, custody, 
visitation and maintenance of the children as the circumstances of the parents 
and the benefit of the children require[]." WYO. STAT. § 20-2-113(a) (Supp. 
1992).2 See also Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 
756 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Wyo. 1988). Any party may petition for a review of any 
child support order by alleging that the application of the child support guidelines would 
result in a twenty percent or more change in the monthly support amount or that 
any other substantial change of circumstances had occurred.  WYO. STAT. § 20-6-306(a) (Supp. 1992).3 See also Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 348 (Wyo. 1994).

 

 [¶18]      "The district court has 
broad discretion in determining the proper amount of a child support award. We 
will disturb the district court's ruling only upon a showing that the district 
court has abused its discretion." Smith v. Smith, 863 P.2d 624, 625 (Wyo. 1993) 
(citation omitted). Abuse of discretion is defined as 
follows:

 

            "`A court does not 
abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances. In 
determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the 
ultimate issue is whether or not 
the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has 
been            said to mean an error 
of law committed by the court under the circumstances.'"

      Roberts v. Roberts, 
816 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(Wyo. 1980)).

    
Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819, 821 (Wyo. 1993).

 

   [¶19]  The father contends that, because the 
mother filed an incomplete and inaccurate financial affidavit, she did not meet 
her burden of proving that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred 
which would warrant the increase in his child support obligation. The record 
reveals that the mother filed a financial affidavit as was contemplated by § 
20-6-306(a). The district court ruled, however, that the mother's financial 
affidavit was incomplete, and, instead 
of using it, the district court used the father's financial affidavit and the 
mother's testimony to compute the parties' net income and to determine whether 
the father's child support obligation should be increased. The district court 
had adequate evidence before it to make its calculations and did not abuse its 
discretion when it used the father's affidavit and the mother's testimony to 
determine whether a substantial change in circumstances had 
occurred.

 

   [¶20]  The father also contends that the 
district court "erred by not considering the father's support obligations to his 
other two children" in determining the amount of his child support payments. The 
district court did consider the father's other two children when it was 
calculating the father's child support obligation. As it stated in its decision 
letter, the district court relied upon the mother's testimony and the father's 
financial affidavit. In his financial affidavit, the father listed two children 
he was legally responsible for supporting who lived with him in addition to 
listing the parties' daughter as being a child he was responsible for 
supporting. The district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it did not deviate from the child support guidelines 
by including the other two children in the formula in determining the proper 
child support amount. A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a 
manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Dowdy, 864 P.2d  at 440.

 

                           
SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE

 

 [¶21]      The father alleges that the 
district court committed reversible error when it permitted his current wife to 
testify against him because allowing the testimony to be admitted violated the 
spousal privilege.4 The mother argues that, since the 
father and his current wife were separated at the time the hearing was held, the 
district court did not err when it permitted the current wife to testify or 
that, in the alternative, any error was harmless.

 

            WYO. STAT. 
§ 1-12-104 (1988) states:

 

No husband or wife shall be a witness against the 
other except in criminal proceedings 
for a crime committed by one against the other, or in a civil action or 
proceeding by one against the other. They may in all civil and criminal 
cases be witnesses for each other the same as though the marital relation did 
not exist.

 

   (Emphasis added.) See also WYO. 
STAT. § 1-12-101 (Supp. 1994).5

 

  [¶22] 
   In construing a 
statute, we must determine whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. "[A] 
statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able 
to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability." Allied-Signal, 
Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo. 1991). "[A] statute is ambiguous only if it is 
found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations." 813 P.2d  
at 219-20. "[W]hether an ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law to be 
determined by the court." 813 P.2d  at 220. If the language of a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we apply the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction. Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish 
Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 1993). See also Padilla v. Lovern's, Inc., 
883 P.2d 351, 353-54 (Wyo. 1994).

 

  [¶23] 
   We hold that the 
language of § 1-12-104 is unambiguous and that, pursuant to § 1-12-104, one 
spouse may not testify against the other spouse even when they are separated or 
estranged at the time the testimony is offered.

 

  [¶24] 
   Prior to the hearing, 
the mother subpoenaed the current wife to testify. The father filed a motion to 
quash the subpoena in which he asserted the spousal privilege and asked the 
district court to exclude the current wife's testimony. At the time of the 
hearing, the father and the current wife were separated, and they were engaged 
in divorce proceedings. The district court denied the father's motion and ruled 
that the privilege did not apply because the father and the current wife were 
estranged.

 

  [¶25] 
   This case involved a 
civil proceeding by the mother and the father against each other. Since the 
current wife was not a party, she should not have been permitted to testify. The 
district court's ruling, consequently, was erroneous. Cf. Pike v. State, 495 P.2d 1188 (Wyo. 1972) (criminal proceedings). We conclude, however, that the admission of the current 
wife's testimony was harmless. See id. at 1189. "The general principle is that 
where there is sufficient competent evidence to sustain a finding in a case 
tried by the court without a jury, admission or exclusion of incompetent 
evidence is not a ground for reversal."  
Herman v. Speed King Manufacturing Company, 675 P.2d 1271, 1279 (Wyo. 
1984).

 

 [¶26]     The current wife testified 
essentially that the father was sometimes not tolerant of children, that he 
sometimes yelled and got physical with the children, that he got physical with 
her, and that his gruffness frightened his daughter. The current wife's 
testimony merely corroborated the testimony of other witnesses, including the 
father and his son, and the admission of the testimony was, therefore, harmless. 
Sufficient competent evidence existed to sustain the district court's 
decision.

 

                              
CONCLUSION

 

  [¶27] 
   We hold that the 
district court properly modified the parties' divorce decree and that it did not 
abuse its discretion when it denied the father's motion for 
reconsideration.

 

  [¶28] 
   
Affirmed.

 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1 In 
addition to presenting testimony from the mother, the father, and the father's 
seventeen-year-old son, the parties

   presented testimony from the 
mother's boyfriend, the mother's former neighbor, the man who was convicted in 
1989 of sexually

   assaulting the mother, the police 
officer who investigated the sexual assault against the mother, two of the 
father's

   acquaintances, and the father's 
current wife.

 2 Amended 
by 1993 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 159, § 1 and ch. 218, § 1 effective July 1, 
1993.

 3 Amended 
by 1993 WYO. SESS. LAWS ch. 184, § 1 effective March 5, 
1993.

 4 The 
father does not contend that his current wife revealed any confidential marital 
communications.

 5 Section 
1-12-101(a)(iii) provides:

 

     (a) The following 
persons shall not testify in certain respects:

               
.      
.      
.      
.      
.

        
(iii) Husband or wife, except as provided 
in W.S. 1-12-104[.]