Title: Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan's Cove, LLC

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 34 
Docket: 
BCD-15-30 
Argued: 
December 9, 2015 
 
Decided: 
February 23, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
OCEANIC INN, INC., et al. 
 
v. 
 
SLOAN’S COVE, LLC 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
[¶1]  Oceanic Inn, Inc., and Armand A. Vachon (collectively, “Oceanic”) 
appeal from a comprehensive judgment entered in the Business and Consumer 
Docket (Horton, J.) on their complaint against Sloan’s Cove, LLC, and on Sloan’s 
Cove’s counterclaim.  Oceanic filed suit after Sloan’s Cove executed a power of 
sale foreclosure on Vachon’s real property in Old Orchard Beach, claiming that 
Sloan’s Cove conducted the sale improperly.  On appeal, Oceanic challenges the 
dismissals of its claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, and argues that the court also erred in entering summary 
judgments in Sloan’s Cove’s favor on Oceanic’s claims for breach of contract and 
accounting and on Sloan’s Cove’s counterclaim for a declaratory judgment.  After 
amending the judgment to correct a clerical error, we affirm. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In September of 2013, Oceanic filed its eleven-count complaint against 
Sloan’s Cove in the Superior Court (York County), alleging various tort and 
contract claims based on Sloan’s Cove’s conduct in connection with the 
foreclosure by sale of Vachon’s property.  Among other causes of action, Oceanic 
claimed breach of fiduciary duty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach 
of contract, and an “action for accounting.”1 
[¶3]  With its answer, Sloan’s Cove filed a counterclaim seeking a 
declaration that its foreclosure by sale of the Oceanic Inn property was legal and 
effective.  Soon thereafter, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Sloan’s Cove filed a 
motion to dismiss all of Oceanic’s claims except the action for accounting.  After 
the case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket, the court 
(Horton, J.) granted Sloan’s Cove’s motion as to nine of Oceanic’s claims, 
including breach of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
and denied the motion only as to Oceanic’s breach of contract claim. 
[¶4]  Sloan’s Cove then sought summary judgments on its counterclaim and 
on Oceanic’s breach of contract claim, and included with its motion for summary 
                                         
1  Oceanic also alleged breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage, slander of title, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent transfer, 
and violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S. §§ 205-A to 214 (2015).  Oceanic does not 
challenge the trial court’s dispositions of these claims. 
 
3 
judgment a supporting statement of eighteen material facts, each with a reference 
to supporting evidence.  See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(1).  In opposing the motion, 
Oceanic responded to Sloan’s Cove’s statements of fact and included a statement 
of additional facts containing 145 statements with record citations.2  See M.R. 
Civ. P. 56(h)(2).  Sloan’s Cove replied to Oceanic’s opposition, see M.R. 
Civ. P. 56(h)(3), objecting to most of Oceanic’s additional facts as both irrelevant 
and unsupported by the record.  After reviewing the parties’ submissions and 
holding a hearing, the court granted Sloan’s Cove’s motion, leaving only the action 
for accounting to be adjudicated. 
[¶5]  A single set of facts provided the basis for the court’s decisions as to 
both (1) Sloan’s Cove’s motion to dismiss and (2) Sloan’s Cove’s motion for 
summary judgments on Oceanic’s breach of contract claim and Sloan’s Cove’s 
counterclaim.  Although we apply different standards of review to Oceanic’s 
separate challenges to the court’s decisions at each of these two stages, in both 
instances, we view, respectively, the allegations in Oceanic’s complaint, and the 
facts established by the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to 
                                         
2  Contrary to M.R. Civ. P. 56’s directives, see M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(2), many of the entries contained 
multiple assertions of fact and many consisted solely of legal argument.  Oceanic’s 145-paragraph 
response to the eighteen-paragraph statement of material facts was nonresponsive, excessive, 
unnecessary, and unhelpful.  The court would have been justified in disregarding it.  See First Tracks 
Invs., LLC v. Murray, Plumb & Murray, 2015 ME 104, ¶¶ 2-3, 121 A.3d 1279 (per curiam); Stanley v. 
Hancock Cty. Comm’rs, 2004 ME 157, ¶¶ 27-29, 864 A.2d 169. 
 
4 
Oceanic.  See, e.g., Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶ 3, 116 A.3d 466 
(viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the 
nonprevailing party); Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co., 2012 ME 113, ¶ 6, 54 A.3d 710 
(viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in an appeal from 
a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).  Viewed in the light most favorable to Oceanic, 
therefore, the record establishes the following set of facts. 
[¶6]  In 2006, a real estate investment company operated by Georgette and 
Gerard Proulx, Vachon’s mother and stepfather, executed a promissory note in 
favor of TD Banknorth in the amount of $578,000.  The note provided that it 
would be “governed by, and interpreted and construed in accordance with, the laws 
of the State of Maine.”  As the officers of Oceanic Inn, Inc., the Proulxes also 
executed a guaranty of the note and a mortgage on the Oceanic Inn property that 
secured the note and the guaranty in favor of TD Banknorth.  The mortgage gave 
the bank and its assigns a statutory power of sale upon default.  
See 14 M.R.S. § 6203-A (2012); 33 M.R.S. § 501-A (2012).3 
[¶7]  In 2007, Vachon became the owner of the Oceanic Inn property.  
Two years later, Sloan’s Cove, LLC, which is solely owned by Pauline Beale, 
                                         
3  The 2012 publication of the Maine Revised Statutes contained the statutes in effect when Sloan’s 
Cove conducted the auction at issue and when Oceanic filed its complaint.  The power of sale statutes 
have since been amended.  P.L. 2015, ch. 147, § 1 (effective Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 14 M.R.S. 
§ 6203-A (2015)); P.L. 2015, ch. 147, § 7 (effective Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 33 M.R.S. § 501-A 
(2015)). 
 
5 
Vachon’s sister, paid off Oceanic’s debt.  As part of that transaction, Vachon and 
Sloan’s Cove entered into an “allonge and modification agreement,” pursuant to 
which Vachon became the sole obligor under the note and agreed to make 
interest-only monthly payments for two years before paying all the remaining 
principal and interest in a single balloon payment of $284,500, and TD Banknorth 
assigned the mortgage securing the note to Sloan’s Cove.  Although he apparently 
made the monthly payments for the next two years, Vachon did not make the 
balloon payment when it became due in November of 2012. 
[¶8]  In December of 2012, after it defaulted, Oceanic Inn, Inc., filed a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in an attempt to forestall foreclosure by Sloan’s 
Cove.  Using funds from her and Vachon’s mother’s estate, Beale, acting through 
Sloan’s Cove, purchased the claim held by the largest general unsecured creditor of 
Oceanic Inn, Inc., and was thereby able to block the reorganization plan.4  The 
bankruptcy petition was dismissed on August 7, 2013.  
[¶9]  Sloan’s Cove decided to proceed to foreclosure by sale, and its 
attorney, Daniel Cummings, prepared a sale notice, which he sent to Vachon via 
registered mail.  The sale notice listed the address of the Oceanic Inn property and 
                                         
4  For several years, Vachon and Beale have been engaged in contentious probate litigation regarding 
their mother’s estate.  Beale is the estate’s personal representative, and is not named as a beneficiary.  
Vachon and his stepfather, Gerard Proulx, are the named beneficiaries. 
 
 
6 
the book and page number of the mortgage, and stated that the auction was to 
occur at 9:30 a.m. on September 13, 2013.  It was recorded in the York County 
Registry of Deeds and was published in the Portland Press Herald on August 19, 
August 26, and September 2, 2013. 
[¶10]  Hoping to stop the sale, Oceanic Inn, Inc., filed a second Chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition during the morning on the day the auction was to occur.  
Several potential bidders attended the auction later that morning, and three people 
registered to bid; each paid a $25,000 deposit.  Cummings told the potential buyers 
that Oceanic Inn, Inc., had filed a bankruptcy petition, but that he believed he 
could nonetheless proceed with the auction.  Although he did not share the 
information with either the bidders or with Vachon, Cummings had earlier 
determined that Vachon, and not Oceanic Inn, Inc., was the true owner of the 
property.  Thus, a bankruptcy filing by Oceanic Inn, Inc., would not prevent the 
sale from proceeding. 
[¶11]  Cummings, who is a licensed Maine attorney but not a licensed 
auctioneer, went forward with the auction that day.  Sloan’s Cove opened the 
bidding at $345,000, and two of the registered bidders bid actively on the property 
 
7 
up to the winning bid of $455,000.  The winning bidder signed a purchase and sale 
agreement.5 
[¶12]  After the court granted Sloan’s Cove’s motion for summary judgment, 
the sole remaining claim to be adjudicated was Oceanic’s “action for accounting.” 
Sloan’s Cove moved for summary judgment on that claim as well, asserting that it 
was owed interest and attorney fees based on provisions in the original note and 
the allonge.   
[¶13]  The summary judgment record concerning the accounting claim 
establishes the following facts, which we view in the light most favorable to 
Oceanic.  See Remmes, 2015 ME 63, ¶ 3, 116 A.3d 466.  The original note called 
for a 7.47% annual interest rate as well as a 6% annual “default interest rate” over 
and above “the rate of interest otherwise payable.”  The allonge provided for an 
interest rate of “the Wall Street Journal Prime Rate plus three percent[], adjusted 
monthly,” and did not refer to any “default” rate.  Sloan’s Cove asserted that the 
allonge left the original note’s “default” interest rate intact while changing the 
regular interest rate from 7.47% to the prime rate plus 3%; Oceanic asserted that 
                                         
5  According to Vachon, a recent town assessment valued the Oceanic Inn property at $642,300, and 
the actual value is approximately $900,000.  Vachon also claimed that the property contained personal 
property and furnishings worth approximately $200,000, and argued both that (1) Sloan’s Cove could not 
legally sell this personalty at auction along with the real estate, and (2) selling the personalty at auction 
along with the real estate would have resulted in a more lucrative sale. 
 
8 
the interest provision in the allonge replaced both interest provisions in the original 
note. 
[¶14]  With regard to attorney fees, Sloan’s Cove claimed that provisions in 
the note and guaranty made Oceanic responsible for paying about $65,000 in legal 
fees that Sloan’s Cove incurred in carrying out the foreclosure and defending 
against the ensuing litigation.  Sloan’s Cove supported these assertions with an 
affidavit of its attorney, to which was attached a bill of costs.  Oceanic argued that 
Sloan’s Cove’s bill of costs was not adequately detailed and that the fees and costs 
claimed were unreasonable. 
[¶15]  The court agreed with Oceanic that Sloan’s Cove was entitled to only 
the “prime plus three percent” interest rate expressed in the allonge, and awarded 
Sloan’s Cove $59,000 in attorney fees plus the costs that Sloan’s Cove had 
identified.  The court then entered a final comprehensive judgment on all claims, 
which incorporated its previous judgments.  This appeal followed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Dismissals 
[¶16]  Oceanic argues that the court erred by dismissing its claims for breach 
of fiduciary duty and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Because the court 
dismissed the claims pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we review the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint de novo, viewing the complaint “in the light most 
 
9 
favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of 
action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some 
legal theory.”  Ramsey, 2012 ME 113, ¶ 6, 54 A.3d 710 (quotation marks omitted).  
1. 
Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
[¶17]  Oceanic claimed that the various aspects of the relationship between 
Vachon and Beale created a fiduciary relationship between Sloan’s Cove and either 
Oceanic Inn, Inc., or Vachon, or both, and that Sloan’s Cove breached that duty by 
“failing to keep the Plaintiff fully informed as to its intent to sell the Oceanic Inn, 
failing to act diligently to protect Plaintiff’s interests, [and] concealing or failing to 
disclose material facts.” 
[¶18]  To survive Sloan’s Cove’s motion to dismiss, Oceanic must have 
alleged sufficient facts to show that a fiduciary relationship existed between 
Sloan’s Cove and either Oceanic Inn, Inc., or Vachon.  “The elements of a 
fiduciary relationship are (1) the actual placing of trust and confidence in fact by 
one party in another, and (2) a great disparity of position and influence between the 
parties at issue.”  Id. ¶ 7 (quotation marks omitted).  “To establish the element of 
disparity of position and influence, [the plaintiff] must demonstrate diminished 
emotional or physical capacity or . . . the letting down of all guards and bars.”  
Id. ¶ 9 (quotation marks omitted).  “Although a fiduciary duty may be based on 
moral, social, domestic, or merely personal duties, it does not arise merely because 
 
10 
of the existence of kinship, friendship, business relationships, or organizational 
relationships.”  Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 1999 ME 144, ¶ 20, 
738 A.2d 839 (alteration omitted) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶19]  First, Oceanic argues that a fiduciary relationship automatically arises 
between a mortgagor and a mortgagee who forecloses pursuant to a power of sale 
provision.  See Pearson v. United States, 831 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519-20 
(D. Mass. 2011) (deciding that, although a lender generally does not owe a 
fiduciary duty to a borrower, “one such instance in which a fiduciary duty arises 
between a lender and a borrower is in the context of a foreclosure sale . . . to 
refrain from committing fraud, bad faith or failing to use reasonable diligence in 
the sales process”); Murphy v. Fin. Dev. Corp., 126 N.H. 536, 540-41, 
495 A.2d 1245 (N.H. 1985) (citing “the often-repeated rule that a mortgagee 
executing a power of sale is bound both by the statutory procedural requirements 
and by a duty to protect the interests of the mortgagor through the exercise of good 
faith and due diligence,” and holding that “the mortgagee’s duty of good faith and 
due diligence is essentially that of a fiduciary”).  We decline to adopt such a per se 
rule.  In the absence of specific facts sufficient to support the elements of a 
 
11 
fiduciary relationship, a mortgagee foreclosing by power of sale does not owe a 
fiduciary duty to the mortgagor.6 
[¶20]  Alternatively, Oceanic asserted that a fiduciary relationship existed 
because Vachon’s sister, Pauline Beale, is the personal representative of their 
mother’s estate; Vachon is a beneficiary of that estate; and Beale, as sole owner of 
Sloan’s Cove, used estate funds improperly to block the bankruptcy reorganization 
plan proposed by Oceanic Inn, Inc.  Oceanic claimed that the relationship between 
Vachon and Beale caused Sloan’s Cove to owe some sort of a duty to Vachon to 
inform him that he was the actual owner of the Oceanic Inn property.7 
[¶21]  These allegations, however, which we assume are true, are also 
insufficient to support the elements of a fiduciary relationship.  Oceanic’s 
argument is undermined by two facts: first, Pauline Beale is not even a party in 
Oceanic’s action, and second, Oceanic has not alleged and could not argue that 
Oceanic Inn, Inc., or Vachon placed trust and confidence either in Beale or in the 
actual defendant in this case—Sloan’s Cove.  In fact, the allegations in the 
                                         
6  In the judicial foreclosure context, we have held unequivocally that “a relationship of a 
mortgagee-mortgagor alone . . . is not sufficient to create . . . a fiduciary duty.”  Camden Nat’l Bank v. 
Crest Constr., Inc., 2008 ME 113, ¶ 15, 952 A.2d 213. 
7  Oceanic argues that if Sloan’s Cove had informed Vachon that he was the true owner of the Oceanic 
Inn property, Vachon would have filed a personal Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition to forestall foreclosure 
on the property, instead of filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Oceanic Inn, Inc., which 
did not forestall foreclosure.  The fact that Vachon was the true owner should have been known to him 
and/or his counsel, and certainly was a matter of public record.  See Thurlough v. Dresser, 98 Me. 161, 
163-64, 56 A. 654 (1903) (“The mere record of a valid mortgage gives constructive notice to all.  All are 
presumed to know its contents, for any one interested can obtain knowledge by examining the record.”). 
 
12 
complaint clearly demonstrate just the opposite.  The relationship between the 
parties is characterized by significant distrust and conflict.  Given this record, the 
court correctly determined that Oceanic failed to allege sufficient facts to show that 
a fiduciary relationship existed between Sloan’s Cove and either Oceanic Inn, Inc., 
or Vachon.  
2. 
Claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
[¶22]  Oceanic’s argument that the court erred by dismissing its claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress fails for similar reasons.  Oceanic claimed 
that “Defendant breached her [sic] duties of care owed to the Plaintiff and 
Defendant foresaw or reasonably should have foreseen that Plaintiff would suffer 
severe emotional distress as a result of the tortious conduct committed by the 
Defendant.” 
[¶23]  To survive Sloan’s Cove’s motion to dismiss on this claim, Oceanic 
must have alleged sufficient facts that, taken as true, could establish that Sloan’s 
Cove owed a duty to Oceanic Inn, Inc., or Vachon; that Sloan’s Cove breached its 
duty; that Oceanic Inn, Inc., or Vachon suffered severe emotional distress; and that 
Sloan’s Cove’s conduct caused the harm.  See Steadman v. Pagels, 2015 ME 122, 
¶ 26, 125 A.3d 713; Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶¶ 18, 20, 784 A.2d 18.  
“[W]e have recognized a duty to act reasonably to avoid emotional harm to others 
in very limited circumstances: first, in claims commonly referred to as bystander 
 
13 
liability actions; and second, in circumstances in which a special relationship exists 
between the actor and the person emotionally harmed.”  Curtis, 2001 ME 158, 
¶ 19, 784 A.2d 18 (footnote omitted). 
[¶24]  Oceanic argues that the complaint sufficiently alleges a “special 
relationship,” in the form of “the various fiduciary roles held by the 100% 
shareholder of Sloan’s Cove as well as directly by Sloan’s Cove due to its taking 
on the fiduciary duty of selling Vachon’s property.”  The relevant allegations in its 
complaint revolve around Beale’s roles as the personal representative of their 
mother’s estate and sole owner of Sloan’s Cove, and Sloan’s Cove’s status as a 
mortgagee foreclosing pursuant to the mortgage’s power of sale provision.  As we 
have discussed, Oceanic Inn’s argument that these circumstances could give rise to 
a fiduciary or “special” relationship is unpersuasive.  The court therefore did not 
err in dismissing Oceanic’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. 
B. 
Summary Judgments 
 
[¶25]  We review a trial court’s grant of a summary judgment de novo, 
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonprevailing party.  
Angell v. Hallee, 2014 ME 72, ¶ 16, 92 A.3d 1154.  “Summary judgment is 
properly granted if the record reflects that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Doe v. Reg’l Sch. 
Unit 26, 2014 ME 11, ¶ 13, 86 A.3d 600 (quotation marks omitted); see M.R. 
 
14 
Civ. P. 56(c).  “A fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the 
suit, and a genuine issue of material fact exists when a fact-finder must choose 
between competing versions of the truth, even if one party’s version appears more 
credible or persuasive.”  Angell, 2014 ME 72, ¶ 17, 92 A.3d 1154 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
[¶26]  A defendant who is the moving party has “the initial burden to 
establish that there is no genuine dispute of fact and that the undisputed facts 
would entitle [the defendant] to judgment as a matter of law” at trial.  Jennings v. 
MacLean, 2015 ME 42, ¶ 5, 114 A.3d 667 (quotation marks omitted).  The 
nonmoving plaintiff must then demonstrate that material facts are disputed and 
must make out a prima facie case for its claim.  Id.; see also Budge v. Town of 
Millinocket, 2012 ME 122, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 484.  When the material facts are not in 
dispute, this Court reviews de novo the trial court’s application of the law.  
Remmes, 2015 ME 63, ¶ 19, 116 A.3d 466. 
 
1. 
Oceanic’s Claim for Breach of Contract 
 
[¶27]  Oceanic argues that Sloan’s Cove’s power of sale foreclosure auction 
should be invalidated because the sale did not comply with Maine law, and that 
Sloan’s Cove therefore violated the parties’ contract.  Although the parties agree 
that the law requires compliance with the statutory power of sale requirements, and 
 
15 
there is no real dispute about Sloan’s Cove’s compliance with the statute,8 Oceanic 
argues that, beyond statutory compliance, a mortgagee who forecloses pursuant to 
a power of sale provision owes fiduciary or “quasi-fiduciary” duties to a mortgagor 
or, alternatively, that such a sale must meet a standard of “commercial 
reasonableness.”  
[¶28]  Having already explained why we reject Oceanic’s assertion that the 
mortgage held by Sloan’s Cove created some sort of fiduciary relationship between 
the parties, we turn to Oceanic Inn’s argument that a standard of commercial 
reasonableness governs power of sale foreclosures and that Sloan’s Cove’s conduct 
in connection with the foreclosure auction made the sale commercially 
unreasonable. 
[¶29]  We note, at the outset, that no part of the parties’ contract states that 
the mortgagee, upon initiating a foreclosure by power of sale, would be required to 
conduct the sale in accordance with any standard beyond that which is required by 
statute.  Nor do the power of sale statutes themselves, to which the contract does 
refer, contain any requirement that a power of sale foreclosure sale be 
“commercially reasonable.”  See 14 M.R.S. § 6203-A; 33 M.R.S. § 501-A.  In this 
breach of contract dispute, we address Oceanic’s argument regarding “commercial 
                                         
8  We are not persuaded by Oceanic’s assertion, on appeal, that the sale notice was not sent by 
registered mail.  Oceanic failed to deny—and therefore admitted—this fact in its opposition to Sloan’s 
Cove’s motion for summary judgment.  See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4). 
 
16 
reasonableness” in accordance with the note’s provision that the note would be 
“governed by, and interpreted and construed in accordance with, the laws of the 
State of Maine.” 
[¶30]  “Commercially reasonable” means “conducted in good faith and in 
accordance with commonly accepted commercial practice.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 305 (9th ed. 2009).  Although the phrase derives from Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, which governs security interests in personal property, 
see 11 M.R.S. §§ 9-1109, 9-1610(2) (2015), some courts have nonetheless applied 
the standard to power of sale mortgage foreclosures, e.g., Wansley v. First Nat’l 
Bank of Vicksburg, 566 So.2d 1218, 1224-25 (Miss. 1990).9  In Bar Harbor Bank 
& Trust v. The Woods at Moody, LLC, addressing a mortgagee’s action for a 
deficiency judgment, we analyzed a mortgagor’s challenge to the power of sale 
foreclosure auction according to a standard of commercial reasonableness.  
2009 ME 62, ¶¶ 17-20, 974 A.2d 934.  Although the mortgagor in Moody argued 
that the sale price was inadequate, we affirmed the trial court’s grant of a summary 
judgment to the foreclosing mortgagee, holding that “price inadequacy is generally 
                                         
9  Courts in other jurisdictions have decided differently.  See, e.g., Pentad Joint Venture v. First Nat’l 
Bank of La Grange, 797 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding that, in contrast to foreclosure of a 
mortgage secured by personal property, “foreclosure of real property under a deed of trust need not be at 
a ‘commercially reasonable’ sale, and the failure to conduct a commercially reasonable foreclosure sale of 
real property is not actionable”); see also Pemstein v. Stimpson, 630 N.E.2d 608, 613-14 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1994) (espousing, instead of commercial reasonableness, a “reasonable diligence” standard, which 
“inquires whether the sale has been advertised at least as required by statute, whether the proceedings 
have been open, and whether notice of foreclosure sale has been given to obviously interested parties”). 
 
17 
an insufficient basis on which to challenge the reasonableness of a sale unless other 
factors exist, such as fraud, unfairness or other irregularity.”  Id. ¶ 20 (citing 
1 Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law § 7.21 at 853-54 
(5th ed. 2007)).    
[¶31]  In support of its claim of commercial unreasonableness, Oceanic 
relies on Sloan’s Cove’s decisions not to hire a licensed auctioneer to conduct the 
auction and not to advertise the sale beyond what was required by statute, and 
contends that Cummings chilled bidding by confusing potential bidders when he 
informed them that Oceanic Inn, Inc., had filed a bankruptcy petition on the 
morning of the auction.10  We are not persuaded. 
[¶32]  In addition to complying with each of the statutory requirements, the 
record shows that Sloan’s Cove also complied with the terms of the parties’ 
agreement.  This was a breach of contract action, and neither the note, nor the 
mortgage, nor the allonge contains language requiring the mortgagee to employ a 
particular form or extent of advertising leading up to the sale upon default.  
Moreover, despite the claimed lack of advertisements and the complication of a 
                                         
10  In arguing that the foreclosure auction was commercially unreasonable, Oceanic again relies on 
Sloan’s Cove’s decision not to inform Vachon that he was the true owner of the Oceanic Inn property.  
As we have already discussed, neither Sloan’s Cove nor its attorney owed any duty to provide 
information to an opposing party.  Cummings owed a duty to Sloan’s Cove to represent its interests, 
which included pursuing the foreclosure.  That he did not assist Vachon in blocking the foreclosure did 
not make the sale commercially unreasonable. 
 
18 
last minute bankruptcy filing, this foreclosure sale achieved the unusual result of 
generating a surplus.  When Vachon defaulted on the mortgage, he owed $284,500.  
Several potential buyers attended the auction, and two bid actively.  The property 
was sold for $455,000.  Given these circumstances, and assuming, solely for the 
purpose of this argument, that Maine law requires that a power of sale foreclosure 
auction meet the standard of commercial reasonableness, we cannot agree with 
Oceanic’s argument that a fact-finder could rationally conclude that the sale was 
commercially unreasonable. 
[¶33]  Finally, Sloan’s Cove’s decision not to hire a licensed auctioneer does 
not render the sale unreasonable or require invalidation of the sale.  Oceanic points 
to the auctioneering licensing statute, 32 M.R.S. § 285 (2015), which requires a 
person “who engages in the business of auctioneering, professes or advertises to be 
an auctioneer or advertises the sale of real, personal or mixed property by auction” 
to hold a valid auctioneer’s license.  The power of sale statute, however, 
specifically authorizes “the mortgagee or . . . his or their agent or attorney [to] sell 
the mortgaged premises . . . by a public sale.”  33 M.R.S. § 501-A. 
[¶34]  Even accepting Oceanic’s argument that Cummings violated the plain 
language of the auctioneering licensing statute by conducting the auction, there is 
no support for the remedy Oceanic seeks—the licensing statutes provide for civil 
and criminal penalties for a violation of the statute, but do not provide for a private 
 
19 
cause of action to invalidate a sale conducted by an unlicensed auctioneer.  
10 M.R.S. § 8003-C(3)-(5) (2015).  As the trial court noted, courts in other 
jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion.  See Assocs. Discount Corp. v. 
Lunsford, 128 S.E.2d 924, 924-25 (Va. 1963) (holding that an auction sale by a 
creditor’s employee, who was unlicensed as an auctioneer, did not bar a deficiency 
judgment, and noting that “[w]here a person sells at action without a license the 
question is one between the State and the auctioneer”); Gorman v. Berg, 
141 A. 179, 179-80 (R.I. 1928) (per curiam) (holding that an auction sale by an 
unlicensed auctioneer did not invalidate the sale); Williston v. Morse, 51 Mass. 17, 
23 (1845) (holding that an auction sale by an unlicensed auctioneer “will not affect 
the conveyance to an innocent purchaser”). 
[¶35]  Oceanic has not demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to Sloan’s Cove’s compliance with the power of sale statute or as to the 
reasonableness of the sale.  It therefore cannot make out a prima facie case for its 
breach of contract claim, and the trial court concluded correctly that Sloan’s Cove 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that claim. 
 
2. 
Sloan’s Cove’s Counterclaim 
[¶36]  Sloan’s Cove was the plaintiff and moving party on its counterclaim, 
in which it sought a declaratory judgment validating the foreclosure sale.  
It therefore “ha[d] the burden to demonstrate that each element of its claim [wa]s 
 
20 
established without dispute as to material fact within the summary judgment 
record.”  North Star Capital Acquisition, LLC v. Victor, 2009 ME 129, ¶ 8, 
984 A.2d 1278.  Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Sloan’s Cove has met 
this burden, and that the court correctly granted a summary judgment in Sloan’s 
Cove’s favor on its counterclaim for a declaratory judgment.   
 
3. 
Oceanic’s Action for Accounting 
[¶37]  Oceanic contends that the court erred by awarding Sloan’s Cove a 
substantial portion of the attorney fees it requested in response to Oceanic’s action 
for accounting, arguing that Sloan’s Cove incurred greater attorney fees than 
necessary and that the bill of costs was not sufficiently detailed.  We are not 
persuaded by this argument.   
 
[¶38]  An accounting for profits, “[o]ften shortened to accounting,” is 
[a]n action for equitable relief against a person in a fiduciary 
relationship to recover profits taken in breach of the relationship. . . . 
“[I]t is a restitutionary remedy based upon avoiding unjust 
enrichment . . . [that] reaches monies owed by a fiduciary or other 
wrongdoer, including profits produced by property which in equity 
and good conscience belonged to the plaintiff.” 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary 22 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting Dan B. Dobbs, Law of 
Remedies § 4.3(5), at 408 (2d ed. 1993)). 
 
[¶39]  Because we conclude as a matter of law that Oceanic cannot prove the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship between Sloan’s Cove and either Oceanic Inn, 
 
21 
Inc., or Vachon, neither Vachon nor Oceanic Inn was entitled to any sort of an 
accounting.  Despite Oceanic’s labeling of its claim as an “action for accounting,” 
however, the court and the parties treated the action as a request that the court 
decide what amounts, if any, Oceanic Inn owes to Sloan’s Cove after the 
foreclosure sale, based on provisions in the note specifying interest and 
“reasonable attorney fees and expenses” to be paid upon default.11  Oceanic’s 
claim is therefore more accurately characterized as a preemptive strike challenging 
the amount of damages to which Sloan’s Cove would be entitled based on 
Oceanic’s breach of contract. 
[¶40]  Oceanic does not dispute that the legal work claimed was actually 
completed, and failed to demonstrate any defect in the manner in which Sloan’s 
Cove’s counsel recorded the time he spent to provide legal services.  See Hebert v. 
Hebert, 475 A.2d 422, 426-27 (Me. 1984).  The trial court, which was intimately 
familiar with this complex action, did not err in concluding that Sloan’s Cove was 
entitled to $59,000 in attorney fees.  See Poussard v. Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. 
of Lewiston, 479 A.2d 881, 884-86 (Me. 1984). 
                                         
11  The language of section 6203-A(5) in effect at the time said: 
If the real estate is sold for an amount in excess of the outstanding balance of the 
mortgage together with all interest and costs, said excess must be used to satisfy any 
other encumbrances on said property and after all said encumbrances are satisfied 
together with all interest and costs, any excess then remaining must be paid to the 
mortgagor. 
14 M.R.S. § 6203-A(5) (2012). 
 
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[¶41]  Finally, as Oceanic correctly points out, the court concluded, in its 
order on Sloan’s Cove’s motion for a summary judgment on the action for 
accounting, that the parties’ contract contemplated only the allonge’s “prime plus 
three percent” interest rate rather than the original note’s “default” interest rate.  
In its efforts to address all of the blind alleys presented by Oceanic’s litigation 
tactics, the court apparently erred by including in its comprehensive judgment an 
interest figure calculated by applying both interest rates.  We therefore amend the 
judgment to correct this clerical error, and affirm the judgment as amended.  
See State v. Thornton, 2015 ME 15, ¶ 14, 111 A.3d 31.  Part 3(a) of the court’s 
comprehensive judgment is amended to read as follows: “(a) As of the date of the 
foreclosure sale, September 13, 2013, Plaintiff Armand Vachon owed Defendant 
Sloan’s Cove, LLC $284,500, plus accrued regular interest of $16,743.21, plus 
attorney fees of $22,500, plus costs of $1,780.26, all of which amounts remain 
unpaid, due and owing.”  We do not otherwise alter the judgment. 
The entry is: 
The judgment is amended to reflect that, as of the 
date of the foreclosure sale, Vachon owed Sloan’s 
Cove accrued regular interest of $16,743.21. 
 
The judgment is affirmed as amended. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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On the briefs and at oral argument: 
 
John S. Campbell, Esq., Campbell & Associates, P.A., Portland, for 
appellants Oceanic Inn, Inc. and Armand Vachon 
 
Daniel L. Cummings, Esq., Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC, Portland, for 
appellee Sloan’s Cove, LLC 
 
 
 
Business and Consumer Docket docket number RE-2014-1 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY