Title: Perez v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Policarpio Espinoza Perez and Adan Canela v. State of Maryland, No. 94, September
Term, 2010, Opinion by Greene, J.
HEADNOTE:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURY COMMUNICATIONS
When Md. Rule 4-326(d) is not adhered to and error is established, the State must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the failure to disclose jury communications to counsel prior
to any response by the court did not prejudice the defendant.  As stated in Dorsey, a reviewing
court must be satisfied that “there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained
of . . . may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict.”  In this case, the State could
not meet its burden of proving that five substantive jury notes did not influence the verdict and
therefore the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 94
September Term, 2010
POLICARPIO ESPINOZA PEREZ & ADAN
CANELA
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Harrell, Murphy and Adkins, JJ., Dissent.
Filed:   June 17, 2011
Petitioners, Policarpio Espinoza Perez (“Perez”) and Adam Espinoza Canela
(“Canela”), were convicted of murder and related offenses in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City.  Before this Court, Petitioners challenge the non-disclosure of multiple jury notes
submitted to the judge during the course of the trial.  Specifically, the Petitioners presented
one question for our review:
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in applying a weakened
harmless error test to the admittedly erroneous non-disclosure to
counsel of six substantive jury notes in this case?
We shall answer the question in the affirmative.  In the present case, jury members sent
more than thirty notes to the court during the course of the trial, seeking clarification of
testimony and asking questions relating to the case.  Of those notes, six were not disclosed to
counsel for the defense or the State, or to the Petitioners.  Petitioners challenge the failure of
the trial judge to disclose jury notes in accordance with Maryland Rule 4-326(d), which states:
Communications with jury. The court shall notify the defendant
and the State’s Attorney of the receipt of any communication
from the jury pertaining to the action as promptly as practicable
and in any event before responding to the communications.  All
such communications between the court and the jury shall be on
the record in open court or shall be in writing and filed in the
action.  The clerk or court shall note on a written communication
the date and time it was received from the jury.
The State concedes that the trial judge erred in not disclosing the notes; the issue before this
Court is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On May 27, 2004, three children were killed while alone in an apartment in Northwest
Baltimore.  The children, who were members of the same extended family as Petitioners,1
were discovered by their parents when the parents returned home from work.  A neighbor
called the police, who arrived on the scene and began their investigation.  As family members
began arriving at the apartment complex, they were taken to the rental office, where they were
interviewed by a detective, with another officer serving as an interpreter.  About fifteen
relatives voluntarily went into the conference room of the rental office, and were asked
questions regarding their identity, their relation to the victims, and when they had last seen
the children alive. 
When Petitioners arrived a few hours later, they were interviewed by the police. 
Petitioners appeared to have showered recently and gave inconsistent statements as to their
prior whereabouts.  A neighbor told police that two days prior to the discovery of the victims,
she had seen Petitioners coming out of the bushes near the victims’ apartment and acting
suspiciously.  After questioning, the Petitioners were taken to the homicide unit and placed
in adjacent holding cells.  Both Petitioners were questioned separately, and based on Perez’s
statement, both Petitioners were arrested and a search warrant was issued for their shared
home and Perez’s car.  In Petitioners’ home, police found a pair of blue jeans with apparent
 Ricardo Espinoza Perez and Noemi Quezada Morales were the parents of two of the
1
children, Ricardo and Lucero.  Maria Andrea Espejo-Quezada is Noemi’s niece, and the
mother of the third victim, Alexiz.  All members of this family lived together in the
apartment.  Petitioner Perez is Ricardo Sr.’s youngest brother.  Petitioner Canela is the son
of Perez and Ricardo Sr.’s oldest brother, Victor.  Thus, Petitioner Perez is the uncle of
Petitioner Canela, but they are separated in age by only five years, and lived together on
Bedford Road in Baltimore.
2
blood stains and a knife impression.  In Perez’s car, police recovered two gloves and another
pair of jeans with apparent blood stains.  DNA analysis on the items subsequently linked
Petitioners to the victims.  The gloves were analyzed using a device invented by Salvatore
Bianca, an expert in the field of trace analysis.  Using Bianca’s micro-vacuum technique,
samples were collected from the interior surface of the gloves and the jeans.   The Petitioners
2
were arrested and later tried by a jury.  The first trial resulted in a hung jury in 2005.  The
second trial took place throughout June, July and August of 2006, and resulted in guilty
verdicts for both Petitioners.  Petitioners each received: two consecutive terms of life in prison
without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, a consecutive thirty-year sentence
for second-degree murder, and a concurrent life sentence for three counts of conspiracy to
commit murder.
Petitioners appealed their convictions to the Court of Special Appeals.  Relevant to this
case, Petitioners contested multiple jury notes which were not disclosed to counsel at trial, and
were only discovered when counsel reviewed the record for appeal.  The Court of Special
Appeals remanded the matter to the Circuit Court for fact-finding on the issue, as provided
for by Md. Rule 8-413(a).   Retired Judge Dennis M. Sweeney was specially assigned to
3
 The reliability of the micro-vacuum method was the subject of a Frye/Reed hearing
2
during the trial.  The result of the Frye/Reed hearing was adverse to Petitioners and the
evidence garnered through the technique was admitted via Bianca’s testimony.
 Rule 8-413 is entitled “Record – Contents and form.”  Rule 8-413(a) states in
3
pertinent part:
(continued...)
3
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether certain jury notes had been disclosed. 
The hearing judge determined that the jury wrote twenty-eight notes, which were submitted
to the judge during the trial, posing questions concerning the evidence presented.  Judge
Sweeney found that notes 6, 7, 14, 21, 23, and 26 were not disclosed to either counsel or
Petitioners.  Based on the opinion issued by Judge Sweeney, both parties filed supplemental
briefs in the Court of Special Appeals.  After the supplemental briefing and oral argument,
that court affirmed the judgments of conviction.  Canela v. State, 193 Md. App. 259, 997 A.2d
793 (2010).  Subsequently, we granted Petitioners’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari.  Perez v.
State, 416 Md. 272 (2010).
DISCUSSION
Md. Rule 4-326(d) provides explicit guidance to a trial court in dealing with
communications from the jury.  In interpreting the Maryland Rules, we have stated, “we use
the same well-established canons of construction that we use when interpreting statutes.” 
Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 738, 4 A.3d 976, 982 (2010).  Specifically:
“As we have so often stated, the chief objective of statutory
construction is to discover and effectuate the actual intent of the
legislature in enacting the statute.”  Deville v. State, 383 Md.
(...continued)
3
The lower court, by order, shall resolve any dispute whether the
record accurately discloses what occurred in the lower court, and
shall cause the record to conform to its decision. When the
Court of Appeals reviews an action pending in or decided by the
Court of Special Appeals, the record shall also include the
record of any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals.
4
217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004).  When interpreting
legislative intent, “we look first to the plain language of the
statute [or Rule], ‘as the words of the statute, given their
ordinary and popularly understood meaning, are the primary
source of legislative intent.’”  Melgar v. State, 355 Md. 339,
347, 734 A.2d 712, 716 (1999) (quoting Gargliano v. State, 334
Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994)).  As this Court and the
intermediate appellate court have reiterated on numerous
occasions, the word “shall” indicates the intent that a provision
is mandatory.  E.g., State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 82, 785 A.2d
1275, 1287 (2001) (“When the Legislature commands that
something be done, using words such as ‘shall’ or ‘must’ rather
than ‘may’ or ‘should,’ the obligation to comply with the statute
or rule is mandatory.”).
Dove, 415 Md. at 738, 4 A.3d at 982.  In the context of Md. Rule 4-326(d), we have stated,
“[t]he rules governing communications between the judge and the jury are basic and relatively
simple to adhere to in practice. . . . These rules are not abstract guides. They are mandatory
and must be strictly followed.”  Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 322, 765 A.2d 97, 122-123
(2001) (citations omitted); see also Porter v. State, 289 Md. 349, 352-353, 424 A.2d 371, 374
(1981) (noting that “the right is deemed ‘absolute,’ and a judgment of conviction ordinarily
cannot be upheld if the record discloses a violation of the right.”). 
Maryland Rule 4-326 originates from the 
right of a criminal defendant to be present at every stage of his
trial [which] is, as we have said many times, a common law right
preserved by Art. 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  The
right, in some measure at least, is also protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Finally, the right is guaranteed by Maryland Rule [4-231,
requiring the presence of the defendant at all stages of the trial]. 
Bunch v. State, 281 Md. 680, 683-684, 381 A.2d 1142, 1143-44 (1978) (internal citations
5
omitted).  Further, “communications between the trial judge and the jury relating to the jury’s
verdict are generally considered stages of the trial when the defendant has a right to be
present.”  Bunch, 281 Md. at 685, 381 A.2d at 1144.  In Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 139
A.2d 209 (1958), we thoroughly discussed the right to be present, stating:
In this State there is no doubt that an accused in a criminal
prosecution for a felony has the absolute right to be present at
every stage of his trial from the time the jury is impaneled until
it reaches a verdict or is discharged, and there can be no valid
trial or judgment unless he has been afforded that right. The
constitutional guarantee includes the right of the accused to be
present . . . (iii) when the court communicates with the jury in
answer to questions propounded by the jury, or (iv) when there
shall be any communication whatsoever between the court and
the jury; unless the record affirmatively shows that such
communications were not prejudicial or had no tendency to
influence the verdict of the jury.
Midgett, 216 Md. at 36-37, 139 A.2d at 214.  Additionally, “[w]hile the rule expressly requires
notice to the parties of any communication from the jury, its very spirit is to provide an
opportunity for input in designing an appropriate response to each question in order to assure
fairness and avoid error.”  Smith v. State, 66 Md. App. 603, 624, 505 A.2d 564, 574 (1986)
cert. denied, 306 Md. 371, 509 A.2d 134 (1986). 
Current Md. Rule 4-326(d) is derived from former Rule 758(d).  Interestingly, prior
to being recodified as Md. Rule 4-326, former Rule 758 was altered on July 1, 1977.  In
changing Rule 758, we dropped the language “[a]fter the jury has retired to deliberate, all
communications between it and the court shall be made on the record in open court or shall
be in writing and filed in the case,” and replaced it with language pertinent to timing and
6
notification of jury communications.  After the amendment, the rule stated “[t]he court shall
notify the defendant and the State’s Attorney of the receipt of any communication from the
jury pertaining to the case.  All communications between the court and the jury shall be made
on the record in open court, or shall be in writing and filed in the case.”  Thus, the Court
expanded the requirement of disclosure of jury communications by the trial court from solely
during deliberation to include any point during the case.  When Rule 758(d) was recodified
as Md. Rule 4-326(c),  effective in 1985, the new rule specifically required that the trial judge
4
shall notify the parties “before responding to the communications.”  This Court approved
subsequent changes to Md. Rule 4-326(d) in 2003, adding the phrase “as promptly as
practicable,” and in 2005, formalizing the requirements for notification by requiring that the
court or clerk record a date and time on any written communication received from the jury.
As seen above, Md. Rule 4-326 protects an important right, and therefore we employ
the harmless error analysis when reviewing violations of the rule.  Noble v. State, 293 Md.
549, 568, 446 A.2d 844, 854 (1982) (“the harmless error principle is fully applicable to a
defendant's right to be present during a stage of the trial.”).  We discussed this standard at
length in Dove:  
This Court announced the standard for evaluating harmless error
in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976):
[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes
 Current Md. Rule 4-326(d) was previously 4-326(c).  Md. Rule 4-326 was amended
4
effective in 2003 to include a new section (a), and was redesignated accordingly.
7
error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own
independent review of the record, is able to declare
a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error
in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot
be deemed ‘harmless’ and a reversal is mandated.
Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that
there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of – whether erroneously admitted or
excluded – may have contributed to the rendition
of the guilty verdict.
Maryland appellate courts continue to follow the standard 
established in Dorsey.  The harmless error standard is highly
favorable to the defendant, Bellamy [v. State, 403 Md. 308, 333,
941 A.2d 1107, 1121 (2008)], and “the burden is on the State to
show that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”
and did not influence the outcome of the case. Denicolis v. State,
378 Md. 646, 658-59, 837 A.2d 944, 952 (2003).  
Dove, 415 Md. at 743, 4 A.3d at 985 (citations omitted).  Prior to Dove, we clarified this
standard as applied to Md. Rule 4-326(d) in Denicolis, stating that, “[o]nce error is
established, the burden is on the State  to show that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. The record must affirmatively show that the communication (or response or lack of
response) was not prejudicial.”  Denicolis, 378 Md. at 658-59, 837 A.2d at 952 (relying on
Noble and cases cited therein). 
One of the first cases to interpret Md. Rule 4-326(d) is Allen v. State, 77 Md. App. 537,
551 A.2d 156 (1989), cert denied, State v. Allen, 315 Md. 692, 556 A.2d 674 (1989).  The
Court of Special Appeals held that “Rule 4-326[d] requires full communication of the contents
of a jury communication so that both parties can have input into the response.”  Allen, 77 Md.
App. at 545, 551 A.2d at 160.  Drawing from cases interpreting Md. Rule 2-521, Md. Rule
8
4-326’s civil analog, the intermediate appellate court stated that “the general rule is that a
judge shall not answer questions without first informing counsel and then giving counsel a
chance to address the court’s proposed answer” and further that “[b]efore responding to an
oral or written communication, the court must notify the parties of the receipt and substance
of the communication and advise them of the court’s intended response, permitting counsel
the opportunity to object or to request inclusion of some other response.”  Allen, 77 Md. App.
at 545-546, 551 A.2d at 160 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
We have previously cited Allen in emphasizing the requirement that counsel be allowed
to provide input prior to the court’s response to a jury communication.  See Miles v. State, 365
Md. 488, 543-544, 781 A.2d 787, 819 (2001) (noting that “filing of the written
communication with the action allows the parties to inspect the communication for themselves
if they so desire[;]” but cautioning that a “failure to provide an opportunity for inspection in
order to develop an appropriate response may provide the basis for an error.”); see also
Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 415, 601 A.2d 131, 139 (1992) (agreeing with Allen that “the
spirit of the Rule is to provide relevant information to those most vitally concerned with the
trial.”).  In Stewart v. State, 334 Md. 213, 638 A.2d 754 (1994), we relied on Allen in holding
that Stewart’s absence during a communication between the judge and a juror was not
harmless error when the judge went to the jury room during deliberations to talk with a
distressed juror.  In Stewart, the defendant was precluded “from having ‘input’ in the judge’s
response to the juror’s conduct. Stewart may have had other suggestions as to how the
9
situation could be handled” and therefore “the mere opportunity for improper influence in
Stewart’s absence prejudiced him” despite any innocent motive of the trial judge.  Stewart,
334 Md. at 229, 638 A.2d at 761.
In Denicolis, we emphasized that Md. Rule 4-326(d) implements “the Constitutional
and common law right of a criminal defendant to be present at every critical stage of trial” and
emphasized the “fundamental principle” that the right is “absolute.”  Denicolis, 378 Md. at
656, 837 A.2d at 950.  In Denicolis, four notes were received from the jury during
deliberations.  Denicolis, 378 Md. at 653, 837 A.2d at 948.  The note at issue sought
clarification on the definition of solicitation.  Denicolis, 378 Md. at 653, 837 A.2d at 949. 
The note was in the record but was not time-stamped, responded to, or even mentioned on the
record, and counsel was apparently unaware of the note until after the verdict and sentence
had been imposed.  Id.  The intermediate appellate court in Denicolis held that since the
record was silent as to the note, prejudice could not be proven.  Denicolis, 378 Md. at 657,
837 A.2d at 951.  We reversed that holding, stating that the record was “sufficient to establish
non-harmless error” because neither Denicolis nor his attorney were informed of the
communication, which pertained to a non-collateral issue, and the State could not prove that
the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Denicolis, 378 Md. at 658-59, 837 A.2d
at 951-52.  We held that the “record must affirmatively show that the communication (or
response or lack of response) was not prejudicial” and that a silent record could not do so. 
10
Denicolis, 378 Md. at 659, 837 A.2d at 952.   In Denicolis, we also explained what errors may
5
be deemed non-prejudicial and thus harmless in the context of jury communications, including
“those [communications] that clearly do not pertain to the action or to a juror’s qualification
to continue serving and that are of a purely personal nature.”  Denicolis, 378 Md. at 657, 837
A.2d at 950 (relying on Midgett, 216 Md. at 36-37, 1139 A.2d at 214, and Graham, 325 Md.
398, 415, 601 A.2d 131, 139).  
Turning to the case at hand, there are six notes which were not disclosed to counsel
during the course of the trial.  On remand to the Circuit Court, Judge Sweeney found that “the
contents of juror notes 6, 7, 14, 21, 23, and 26 were not disclosed to counsel by the court.” 
Testimony by the trial judge at the evidentiary hearing before Judge Sweeney revealed that
 We find it important to clarify the burden placed on the State for proving harmless
5
error.  Some cases refer to the need for the record to “affirmatively show” that the error did
not cause prejudice.  See Denicolis, 378 Md. at 656, 837 A.2d at 950; Noble, 293 Md. at 563,
446 A.2d at 851; Midgett, 216 Md. at 36-37, 139 A.2d at 214.  That phrasing, however, does
not alter the underlying meaning of the test, which requires the State to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that “the error in no way influenced the verdict” and thus did not cause
prejudice.  Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678.  We point to two cases which help
clarify the State’s burden of proving that the error had no influence on the verdict, effectively
requiring the State to prove the absence of prejudice.  See Noble, 293 Md. at 573, 446 A.2d
at 855 and La Guardia v. State, 190 Md. 450, 458-59, 58 A.2d 913, 917 (1948).  In those
cases, the error in question either benefitted the defendant, as in Noble, or had no affect at
all on the proceedings because the error pertained to a defendant who did not appeal the case,
as in La Guardia.  Therefore, we held in both Noble and La Guardia that the record
“affirmatively showed” a lack of prejudice, or rather, proved that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt, because there was no possibility that the defendant was harmed
by the error.  Noble, 293 Md. at 571-73, 446 A. 2d at 856; La Guardia, 190 Md. at 459-60,
58 A.2d at 917.  Thus, to require the record to “affirmatively show” lack of prejudice is
simply to reiterate the State’s burden of proving that the error did not influence the verdict.
11
the trial judge believed there to be three categories of jury communications.  First, those notes
dealing with juror comfort or personal problems, which the trial judge reviewed and acted
upon without informing counsel.  Second, those notes which were given to counsel to review
in order to determine whether to conduct an inquiry.  Third, those notes the judge considered
to be “obvious” and solely for “clarification,” which the judge believed did not have to be
given to counsel and thus were responded to by the court without input.  The jury notes at
issue in this case fall under this third category.
Although the State concedes that the trial judge committed error in not disclosing the
notes, the State contends that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The State
argues that the Court of Special Appeals concluded correctly, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the errors at issue “had no impact whatever on the jury’s verdicts.”  In contrast, the Petitioners
argue that the “errors in the present case were hardly harmless.  Five of the six notes reflected
precise and important substantive concerns the jury had with evidence in the trial.  Counsel
were entitled under the rule to know that the jury had asked these questions so that counsel
could use this information about the jury’s concerns to adjust their trial strategy or . . . [to
undertake] follow-up questioning of the witness.”  We agree with the Petitioners that the trial
judge’s failure to disclose to counsel the origin of the five substantive questions, four of which
the judge posed to the witnesses at trial, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We first turn, however, to juror note 14, which reflected the concern on the part of
several jurors with the efficacy of another juror.  The note stated:
12
We the juror[s] feel that juror #6 should be removed, because of
lack of concentration and constantly nodding during this trial. 
Two men[’s] lives are at stake and we believe they deserve a fair
trial.
The note was received prior to the start of testimony on July 13.  The trial judge did not advise
counsel that the court received the note.  Rather, because juror #6 had not yet arrived, the
judge discussed with both counsel what should be done about the absent juror.  This
discussion occurred outside the presence of the jury.  The jury was called into open court only
briefly in order for the judge to inform them that there would be a delay in the proceedings
while the court waited for the absent juror to arrive. When the jury next returned to the
courtroom, the court directed an alternate to take the seat of juror #6 without offering further
explanation to the jury.
Relying on Dorsey, the Petitioners argue that the State cannot declare beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error “in no way influenced the verdict.”  Petitioners argue that the
trial judge’s failure to disclose the jury note is not harmless because “it is not really so hard
to imagine well-intentioned jurors of the sort who wrote Note 14 wearing down over the
course of a long trial and losing their initial willingness to extend the benefit of the doubt to
the defendants.”  The Petitioners conclude that the delay would have prejudiced the defendant
by “needlessly trying the jury’s patience” and “diminish[ing] the jury’s good will to the
Petitioners’ detriment and thus could have contributed to the guilty verdict.” 
The State disagrees with Petitioners’ characterization that the jurors would have
charged the delay to the Petitioners because “all of the discussions between the court and
13
counsel about the tardy juror occurred while the jury was out of the courtroom” and therefore
there “was patently no reason for the jurors to blame defense counsel for the delay on this
record.”  Further, the State argues that “[t]he very contents of the note demonstrate[d] that the
juror’s were indeed . . . sympathetic to the defendants’ right to a fair trial.”  
We hold that the failure to disclose juror note 14 was a moot issue, and therefore we
need not engage in the harmless error analysis.  In this case, Judge Sweeney found that “Juror
Number 6’s continued participation in the trial had become a moot issue” because, following
the note, “the juror was subsequently removed for not showing up, making it unnecessary for
the court to deal with the jury’s note.”  Thus, there was an independent ground for excusing
the juror (tardiness), and there was an alternate available to sit on the venire.  Had the
Petitioners not been informed of the note and the juror was allowed to remain on the venire,
the case would be quite different.  Instead, any possibility for prejudice resulting from the
failure to disclose the jury note is moot because the juror was dismissed on an independent
ground having nothing to do with the failure to disclose the jury note.  Thus, we agree with
Judge Sweeney’s observation that the continued participation of juror number 6 was a “moot
issue,” and of no consequence to our harmless error analysis.
The remainder of the undisclosed jury notes dealt with substantive issues and cannot
be deemed moot or harmless.  Jury notes 6 and 7 asked for clarification of the testimony of
Ricardo Espinoza Perez, the father of two of the victims, regarding his actions on the
afternoon of the murders.  There was apparently confusion among the jurors regarding where
14
the witness and other family members stopped on their way home as well as when and what
items were purchased.  Jury note 6 asked: “When were these things purchased? When
everybody got out of the car to carry stuff to the house?”  Jury note 7 stated: “Please I need
to know when these things were purchased.  If they only made two stops. 1. Bank 2. The
babysitters house 3. Home.”  The notes were received by the court on July 7, within two hours
of each other.  Judge Sweeney found that “[n]otes 6 and 7 were not disclosed to defense
counsel as proposed questions coming from the jury.”  Instead, the trial judge asked the
witness the questions posed on the notes and asked counsel if there was any follow up
questioning. 
The next note, jury note 21, was submitted to the court during the testimony of Bruce
Levine, an engineer for Sprint Corporation.  The State presented evidence regarding numerous
cell phone calls between the Petitioners and other family members shortly before and after the
murders.  Mr. Levine testified as an expert regarding the location of the cell phones when
various calls were made or received.  During Mr. Levine’s testimony, the jury submitted note
21, which asked: “When you say call ‘received’ does that mean the call went through and was
answered at the other end?”  The trial judge then asked the witness to define the term
“received.”  Mr. Levine explained the term referred to the start of a phone call, but did not
indicate whether the call was answered.  Judge Sweeney found that the trial judge “did not
disclose that it was a jury note that prompted the inquiry.” 
Jury notes 23 and 26 both concerned the DNA evidence.  Jury note 23 was received
15
while Salvatore Bianca was testifying about his micro-vacuum technique.  The note asked,
“is it possible to vaccum [sic] those types of gloves?  If possible did you vaccum [sic] them
one and two.”   The hearing judge determined that defense counsel was not notified of this
6
note and the trial judge, who did not remember receiving the note, did not pose the question
contained in the note to the witness.  Jury note 26 was received during the testimony of the
State’s DNA expert, Francis Chiafari.  The note asked: “Is it possible for another DNA expert
to look at the same reports and have a different opinion?”  Following the cross-examination
by Canela’s attorney, the trial judge asked Mr. Chiafari, “[i]s it possible for another DNA
expert to look at the reports that you generated and reach a different conclusion than what you
have reached?”  Mr. Chiafari responded, “I don’t believe that if another DNA expert is
provided with the data . . . that they would reach a different conclusion.”  The trial judge then
asked counsel if they had any questions, and counsel for both Petitioners asked a series of
follow up questions.
Petitioners argue that each jury note should have been disclosed and that the failure of
the court to do so resulted in prejudicial error.  Petitioners contend that the reasoning of the
Court of Special Appeals
[c]ompletely dismisses Petitioners’ interest in knowing that the
question [in each note] was one that was on the minds of one or
more jurors, and thus that the issue was of concern to them.  It
 The gloves found in Perez’s car, which were vacuumed by members of the police
6
trace evidence unit, were labeled number 1 and number 2.  DNA was extracted from the
blood stains on one glove. 
16
should be obvious that knowing a particular evidentiary matter or
issue is of concern to jurors, as opposed to just being of concern
to the trial judge, would be very important to a lawyer trying a
case. 
The Petitioners argue that the Court of Special Appeals’s repeated statements that it “fail[ed]
to see how appellants were prejudiced,” and that it was “impossible” for the court to envision
a different result, resulted from an improper harmless error analysis. 
Regarding notes 6 and 7, Petitioners contend that the trial judge’s “questioning did not
clear up the matter satisfactorily.”  They assert that if “Petitioners or their counsel had known
the questions came from a juror, rather than just from the trial judge, they may well have
pressed the matter further. . . . [D]efense counsel could have pursued the matter until it was in
fact cleared up.”  Notes 6 and 7 pertained directly to the credibility of the witness, and revealed
the jury’s concern regarding the testimony.  Again with note 20, Petitioners argue that the
failure to disclose a note asking for clarification of a witness’s testimony is not harmless
because defense counsel may have responded differently to the issue had they known it was
a concern of the jury rather than the judge.  With regard to notes 23 and 26, which expressed
questions concerning the DNA evidence, Petitioners proffered at the evidentiary hearing before
Judge Sweeney that had they known the notes came from the jury, counsel would have been
more likely to call a defense DNA expert to counter the State’s experts.  Petitioners further
point out that the Court of Special Appeals did not properly apply the harmless error test from
Dorsey for any note, and argue that the court’s analysis “totally dismisses the importance to
trial counsel of having information about what the jury is thinking.  It substitutes the appellate
17
court’s after-the-fact inability to conceive of what might have been done for trial counsel’s
opportunity to make on-the-spot intuitive decisions about trial strategy.” 
In response to these concerns, the State argues repeatedly that “Petitioners contention[s]
ignore[] the fact that the questions posed in the notes were asked of the witness” and that “[i]f
defense counsel thought the matter had some additional significance, they were free to pursue
the matter further.”  The State posits that knowing that a note came from a juror would do
“nothing to change the defense strategy.”  The Court of Special Appeals largely agreed with
the State’s arguments, holding that the failure to disclose the jury notes was harmless error. 
The court stated, “[w]e fail to see how appellants were prejudiced by the failure to reveal the
contents” of the jury notes, and that it is “impossible for us to envision how defense counsel’s
trial strategy may have differed if they had known the source of the question was a note from
the jury.”  Canela, 193 Md. App. at 283, 286, 997 A.2d at 806, 808.  
Petitioners finally argue that adopting the intermediate court’s burden-shifting analysis
would essentially change Md. Rule 4-326(d) to no longer require a trial judge to show counsel
jury notes raising questions about evidence, so long as the trial judge asks the question posed
in the note.  Petitioners rely on Taylor v. State, 352 Md. 338, 340-41, 722 A.2d 65 (1998), in
which we held that it was not harmless error when the trial judge answered the jury’s questions
without notice to, and in the absence of, counsel.  In Taylor, we stated that although the trial
judge’s responses were substantively correct, “neither the petitioner nor his counsel had any
input, or even any opportunity to have input, in the answers the jury received. . . . The
18
petitioner might well have asked the court to make the response clearer, or objected to the form
of the response.”  Taylor, 352 Md. at 354, 722 A.2d at 73. 
Petitioners analogize the present case to Taylor, arguing that allowing a trial judge to
simply ask the witness a question posed by the jury without notifying counsel, is “almost the
same as saying that the failure to share a note with counsel is excusable so long as the judge’s
reply to the note is correct, a proposition this Court has rightly and soundly rejected [in
Taylor].”  The State, however, disagrees with Petitioners’ reliance on Taylor, arguing that the
present case is distinguishable because the “trial court did not answer the jury’s questions
[itself],” as the question was posed to the witnesses and Petitioners had the opportunity to
follow up.  Thus, the State contends that there was no effect on the jury’s verdict because the
jury’s questions were answered by the witnesses. 
We agree with Petitioners that “despite stating correct principles of law, the
intermediate appellate court then shifted the burden to Petitioners to show precisely how they
were prejudiced by the non-disclosure of the jury notes by delineating what defense counsel
would have done differently had the notes been disclosed.”  The Court of Special Appeals
stated several times that it could not find prejudice, and faulted the Petitioners for not
affirmatively showing prejudice.  Canela, 193 Md. App. at 278, 279, 281, 283, 286, 997 A.2d
at 803, 804, 805, 806, 808.  Despite appearing to apply the Dorsey harmless error standard, 
Canela, 193 Md. App. at 274, 997 A.2d at 801, the court did not hold the State to its burden
of proving the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Simply stating that the court
19
failed to see how the outcome would be different is not the same as the court determining that
the error did not influence the verdict.  Moreover, it is not the province of an appellate court
to speculate as to how the defense would have reacted to the disclosure of the note in order to
ascertain prejudice.  
We also agree with Petitioners that expanding the harmless error standard to allow a
trial judge to read a jury note, not inform counsel, and ask the question directly to the witness
without allowing for counsel’s input in advance, would fundamentally alter the rule.  As seen
in the trial judge’s testimony, at the evidentiary hearing, the trial judge believed there to be a
category of jury notes, not outlined by the rule or prior cases, which would allow a judge to use
his or her discretion in dealing with what the trial judge characterized as “obvious” or
“clarifying” questions, rather than follow the dictates of the rule and require input from counsel
prior to responding.  We have previously cautioned against expanding the harmless error
standard, stating that the rule “should be carefully circumscribed” because “[c]ontinued
expansion of the harmless error rule will merely encourage prosecutors to attempt to get such
[improper evidence] in, since they know that, if they have a strong case, such testimony will
not be considered to be reversible error [under the harmless error prejudice requirement].” 
Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 248, 322 A.2d 211, 219 (1974) (quoting People v. Jablonski, 38
Mich. App. 33, 38-39, 195 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1972)).  Instead of protecting an “absolute” and
“fundamental” right which is “simple to adhere to in practice,” such a change would greatly
expand the discretion of the trial judge and allow him or her to determine when the defendant
20
may exercise his or her right to be present for all communications between the court and the
jury.  To be sure, to create such an exception to the rule of disclosure would invite mischief
and thereby undermine the public’s trust and confidence in the jury system.
 Applying Dorsey and its progeny, we must determine, based on the record, whether the
error possibly influenced the verdict in this case.  Petitioners are not required to prove what
they would have done differently; the burden is on the State to persuade us beyond a
reasonable doubt that violations of Rule 4-326 did not influence the verdict to the Petitioners’
prejudice.  In this case, although most of the notes in question were asked to the witnesses by
the judge,  this did not relieve the court of its obligation to inform both parties that the
7
communications originated with the jurors and the substance thereof, pertaining to non-
collateral issues, prior to any response by the court.  The trial judge’s failure to disclose the
receipt of the jury notes to counsel deprived counsel of the opportunity to have input into the
form and substance of the court’s response.  We are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt
that the failure of the trial judge to inform counsel of the receipt and content of the jury notes,
 Unlike the other notes, jury note 23, concerning DNA evidence, was not addressed
7
by the trial judge.  The trial judge testified at the evidentiary hearing before Judge Sweeney
that he did not remember receiving the note and did not pose the question contained in the
note to the witness.  The Court of Special Appeals held that note 23 was answered by the
witness during direct examination, despite not being asked by the court.  Canela, 193 Md.
App. at 283, 997 A.2d at 806.  Even if the question contained in note 23 had been asked of
the witness, as the other notes apparently were, this would not correct or ameliorate the
prejudice caused by failing to disclose the note to counsel.  Therefore, note 23 should be
evaluated in accordance with the balance of the notes, which, although addressed by the
court, were not disclosed to counsel in advance of the court’s response.
21
numbers 6, 7, 20, 23, and 26, prior to the court’s response to the jury’s inquiry, did not
influence the jury’s verdict.  Consequently, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals and direct the intermediate appellate court to reverse the judgment of the
Circuit Court, and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
O F  
S P E C I A L  
A P P E A L S
REVERSED AND REMANDED
TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS WITH  DIRECTIONS 
T O  
R E V E R S E  
T H E
JUDGMENTS 
ENTERED 
BY
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
B A L T IM O R E  
C IT Y  
A N D
REMAND THE CASE TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR A NEW
TRIAL. COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
BALTIMORE CITY.
22
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 94
September Term, 2010
                                                                                 
POLICARPIO ESPINOZA PEREZ 
& ADAN CANELA
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                                 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera, 
JJ.
                                                                                 
Dissenting Opinion by Murphy, J., 
 which Harrell and Adkins, JJ., join.
                                                                                 
Filed:   June 17, 2011
There are two reasons why I dissent from the holding that Petitioners are entitled
to a new trial.  First, assuming that it is appropriate to reach the “merits,” I would adopt
the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals and affirm the judgment of that Court.  More
importantly, however, this Court should refuse to address the merits of Petitioners’ Rule
4-326(d) argument on the ground that the inaction of Petitioners’ trial counsel - - who
actually witnessed the alleged violations - - utterly failed to preserve this argument for
appellate review.  
Judge Sweeney’s opinion includes the following factual findings:
Counsel did not expressly agree to any process for
handling jury notes or communications. Counsel did observe at
various times that notes were coming from the jury
foreperson and being given to the judge for consideration.
Counsel did not observe all jury notes being handed to the clerk
since they were busy with other tasks such as examining or
cross-examining witnesses, taking notes, or, in the case of the
parties with more than one attorney, counsel may have been
absent from the courtroom preparing an upcoming witness or
handling other matters needing attention outside of the
courtroom. At no time did counsel object to the process by
which Judge Mitchell was handling jury notes throughout
the course of the trial or prior to the verdict being reached.
The clerk was keeping the jury notes as part of the
record in the case. At any time, counsel in the case could
have reviewed any or all of the jury notes that the judge had
returned to the clerk. There is no evidence that any of the
counsel asked to review the notes in the possession of the
clerk.
* * *
Jury Note 12, which clearly was fully disclosed on the record, is
not at issue as not being disclosed. However, Appellants have
placed emphasis on this note with the suggestion that it was
being “hidden” by Judge Mitchell and only revealed when one
of the attorneys, Mr. Panteleakis, noticed it at the bench while
they were discussing Jury Note 11 and asked Judge Mitchell
about it. Mr. Panteleakis stated he received “a stern look” from
Judge Mitchell upon making the inquiry.
Judge Mitchell testified that he was not trying to hide any
notes, and this is credible to the Court. He was instead going to
get to the note when he chose to do so – not on counsel’s
schedule. 
He 
was 
preempted 
by 
counsel’s 
arguably
presumptuous inquiry and then fully disclosed Note 12 to
counsel. This incident does show that all defense counsel
were aware at that juncture that at least some jury notes
were being handled in a fashion that did not totally suit
them.
(Emphasis supplied). 
As Judge Sweeney noted, at the point in time when Jury Notes 11 and 12 were
discussed at a bench conference, Petitioners’ trial counsel were on actual notice of how
Judge Mitchell had been handling jury notes that were being (1) written in the jury box,
and (2) passed to him in open court.  At this point in the trial, Petitioners’ trial counsel
had a full and fair opportunity to make whatever objections they wished to make.  It is
clear, however, that Petitioners’ trial counsel neither made any objection nor requested (1)
to review any of the notes that had already come out of the jury box, or (2) the
opportunity to review, from that point forward, any note that would come out of the jury
box during the remainder of the trial.  Under these circumstances, this Court should hold
that Petitioners’ right to review notes coming out of the jury box was waived.  
In Glickman v. State, 190 Md. 516, 60 A.2d 216 (1948), this Court stated:
2
This Court has recently held in Conley v. Warden of the
Maryland House of Correction, 190 Md. 750, 59 A.2d 684
[(1948)], as follows: “ . . .  ‘Where in a State criminal trial
the defendant is represented by competent and experienced
counsel, even constitutional rights known or presumed to be
known to counsel to exist must be held to have been waived
if not made at all or * * * inadequately presented.' United
States ex rel. Jackson v. Brady, 47 F. Supp. 362, 367, aff. 4
Cir., 133 F. 2d 476, cert. den. 319 U.S. 746, 63 S. Ct. 1029, 87
L. Ed. 1702, rehearing denied 319 U.S. 784, 63 S. Ct. 1315,
87 L. Ed. 1727." Had the objection been seasonably made
in the case at bar, the omission could have been readily
corrected.
Id. at 526-27, 60 A.2d at 220-21.  (Emphasis supplied).  Those statements are fully
applicable  to the case at bar.  This Court should not reverse Petitioners’ convictions on
the ground that the trial judge - - in open court - -  employed a procedure that “could have
been readily corrected” at the request of Petitioners’ counsel.  
Judges Harrell and Adkins have authorized me to state that they join this dissenting
opinion.  
3