Title: State v. Paul E. Magnuson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 19 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Paul E. Magnuson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
224 Wis. 2d 937, 592 N.W.2d 319 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999 – Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 29, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 7, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Sarah B. O’Brien 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner the cause 
was argued by Lara M. Herman, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the Defendant-Appellant, there was a brief 
and oral argument by Keith A. Findley, Madison. 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1105-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul E. Magnuson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, the State of 
Wisconsin, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals that reversed a circuit court order denying the 
defendant’s request for sentence credit.1  The State contends 
that the defendant is not entitled to sentence credit since he 
was not in custody while released on bond to home detention with 
electronic monitoring.  We determine that an offender’s status 
constitutes custody for sentence credit purposes when the 
offender is subject to an escape charge for leaving that status. 
Because we conclude that the defendant here was not in custody, 
we reverse the court of appeals.  
                     
1  State v. Magnuson, No. 98-1105-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1999) (reversing order of circuit court for 
Dane County, Sarah B. O’Brien, Judge). 
FILED 
 
FEB 29, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Acting Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
2 
¶2 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  The defendant, 
Paul E. Magnuson, was charged with eight counts of securities 
fraud on January 17, 1996.  Bail was set at $12,000 per count, 
for a total of $96,000.  Unable to post bail, Magnuson remained 
in jail.   
¶3 
Trial 
preparation 
in 
this 
securities 
fraud 
case 
required Magnuson’s examination of thousands of pages of 
documents and computer records.  However, institutional rules 
that prohibited access to more than two to four inches of 
documents per visit rendered such preparation difficult.  As a 
result, Magnuson’s attorney filed a motion requesting bail 
modification and reduction.  
¶4 
The circuit court modified bail to a $10,000 signature 
bond on each count and required that others co-sign the bond.  
As part of the bond, the court ordered Magnuson to reside with 
either his Pastor, John Clark, or his other co-signers.  He 
chose to reside with Pastor Clark. 
¶5 
The court imposed additional conditions of release on 
bond.  Magnuson was subject to a nightly curfew that confined 
him to the Clark residence between the hours of 7:00 p.m. to 
7:00 a.m.  A subsequent modification extended the hours to 9:30 
p.m. on Tuesdays to allow him to participate in substance abuse 
counseling and to 11:00 p.m. on other days, provided that he was 
attending church activities.  This home detention as a condition 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
3 
of bond was not pursuant to an order from the sheriff or the 
Department of Corrections under Wis. Stat. § 302.425 (1997-98).2  
¶6 
Magnuson was formally supervised by a bail monitoring 
program and was required to wear an electronic monitoring 
bracelet to ensure his presence within the Clark home during his 
curfew 
hours. 
 
The 
electronic 
bracelet 
sent 
signals 
to 
monitoring officials every 16 seconds and allowed Magnuson a 
roaming range of 75 feet from the monitor installed in the home. 
 Officials from the Division of Intensive Sanctions (DIS) were 
responsible for detecting any violations of the monitoring, 
although Magnuson was not formally placed within the DIS 
program. 
¶7 
As a participant in the bail monitoring program, 
Magnuson was obligated to contact bail monitoring authorities 
every morning and submit to urinalysis as directed.  The 
authorities also required face-to-face contact at least once a 
week. 
 
Other 
conditions 
of 
bond 
required 
Magnuson 
to:           
1) participate in drug and alcohol treatment; 2) surrender his 
passport; 3) remain in Dane County during non-curfew hours; 4)  
avoid contact with named victims; 5) refrain from possessing or 
consuming any alcohol or drugs; 6) make all scheduled court 
appearances; and 7) refrain from involvement in further criminal 
activity. 
                     
2 Unless otherwise noted, all further references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes will be to the 1997-98 volumes. 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
4 
¶8 
The circuit court released Magnuson on bond to the 
care of Pastor Clark on June 12, 1996.  He subsequently pled no 
contest to three of the original eight counts of securities 
fraud.  Magnuson remained under Clark’s care until December 11, 
1996, when the pastor notified bail monitoring authorities that 
he disapproved of Magnuson’s behavior.  However, Pastor Clark 
reported no violations of the signature bond.  Magnuson was 
ordered back into custody the following day and cash bail was 
set at $25,000 on each of the three counts.  Unable to post 
bail, he remained in jail. 
¶9 
The circuit court later sentenced Magnuson to an 
aggregate term of eight years imprisonment, followed by seven 
years probation, and granted 229 days of sentence credit for the 
time he spent in jail.  Magnuson subsequently filed a post-
conviction motion seeking sentence modification and credit for 
the six months he resided with Pastor Clark as a condition of 
his bond.  The court denied the motion, concluding that this 
home detention with electronic monitoring as a condition of bond 
did not constitute custody for sentence credit purposes.  
¶10 Magnuson appealed the denial of additional sentence 
credit, and the court of appeals reversed.  In an unpublished 
opinion, the court repeatedly expressed disfavor with State v. 
Collett, 207 Wis. 2d 319, 558 N.W.2d 642 (Ct. App. 1996), which 
adopted a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a defendant 
is in custody for purposes of sentence credit.  State v. 
Magnuson, No. 98-1105-CR, unpublished slip op., 5-7 (Ct. App. 
Feb. 18, 1999).  Noting that it was nevertheless constrained to 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
5 
follow precedent and to apply the Collett test, the court of 
appeals concluded that the bond conditions to which Magnuson was 
subject were restrictive enough to constitute the “functional 
equivalent of confinement.”  Id. at 6.   
¶11 This case presents two issues.  The first issue 
addresses the definition of custody for purposes of sentence 
credit under Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  The second issue requires an 
analysis of whether Magnuson’s bond conditions satisfied the 
definition of custody, thereby entitling him to sentence credit. 
 Statutory interpretation and the application of a statute to 
particular facts present questions of law that we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. 
Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 81, 88, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999); Meyer v. 
School Dist. of Colby, 226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 
(1999).    
¶12 We begin our analysis of the first issue with an 
examination of Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  This statute governs 
sentence credit and states in relevant part: 
 
(1)(a) A convicted offender shall be given credit 
toward the service of his or her sentence for all days 
spent in custody in connection with the course of 
conduct for which sentence was imposed.  As used in 
this 
subsection, “actual 
days spent 
in 
custody” 
includes, 
without 
limitation 
by 
enumeration, 
confinement related to an offense for which the 
offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other 
sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, 
which occurs: 
 
1. 
While the offender is awaiting trial; 
 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
6 
2. 
While the offender is being tried; and 
 
3. 
While the offender is awaiting imposition of 
sentence after trial. 
¶13 Our initial step in statutory interpretation focuses 
on the plain language of the statute to discern the legislative 
intent.  Beard v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 225 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 591 
N.W.2d 156 (1999).  Here, the plain language of Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 973.155(1)(a) does not explicitly define custody.  However, 
numerous cases have interpreted the sentence credit statute and 
concluded that the plain meaning of custody under the statute 
corresponds to the definition of custody contained in the escape 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 946.42.    
¶14 In State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 378-79, 340 
N.W.2d 511 (1983), this court first encountered the issue of 
determining 
what 
constituted 
custody 
for 
sentence 
credit 
purposes and defined custody by reference to the escape statute. 
 Section 946.42(1)(a)3 defines custody to include: 
 
[W]ithout limitation actual custody of an institution, 
including a secured correctional facility, as defined 
in s. 938.02(15m) . . . a secure detention facility, 
as defined in s. 938.02(16) . . . or of a peace 
officer or institution guard and constructive custody 
of prisoners . . . temporarily outside the institution 
 whether for the purpose of work, school, medical 
care, a leave granted under s. 303.068, a temporary 
leave or furlough granted to a juvenile or otherwise. 
                     
3  At the time of Gilbert, the pertinent subsection of the 
escape statute was numbered 5(b), which defined custody. That 
subsection has subsequently been amended and renumbered to 1(a). 
 This change does not affect our analysis.    
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
7 
¶15 The Gilbert court also referenced the dictionary 
definition of custody, but courts thereafter have settled on the 
statutory definition, consistently referring to the escape 
statute for guidance.  See e.g., State v. Cobb, 135 Wis. 2d 181, 
184-85, 400 N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Pettis, 149 Wis. 
2d 207, 209-11, 441 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Sevelin, 204 Wis. 2d 127, 135, 554 N.W.2d 521 (Ct. App. 1996).  
The statute aptly incorporates the dictionary definition and is 
not inconsistent with it.  Pettis, 149 Wis. 2d at 210.  
¶16 Although Gilbert intended to provide clear guidelines 
for determining custody in the context of sentence credit, the 
court in State v. Collett nevertheless employed the same 
statutory 
definition 
of 
custody 
found 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.42(1)(a) to set forth the requirement of a case-by-case 
analysis.  207 Wis. 2d 319, 324-25, 558 N.W.2d 642 (Ct. App. 
1996).  Looking to the statute, the court determined that the 
enumerated examples of custody were “not exhaustive but only 
illustrative.”  Id. at 324.   
¶17 At issue in Collett were the restrictions placed on a 
Department of Intensive Sanctions (DIS) participant and whether 
those restrictions constituted custody, thereby entitling the 
participant to sentence credit for time spent in the DIS 
program.   Characterizing the Gilbert rule as “impractical,” the 
Collett court embarked upon uncharted waters and established a 
new test to determine custody for purposes of sentence credit.  
¶18 This test requires circuit courts to evaluate the 
specific restrictions on an offender’s freedom and to examine 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
8 
whether 
they 
represent 
“the 
functional 
equivalent 
of 
confinement” and are “so substantial as to amount to being 
locked in at night or its equivalent.”  Id. at 325.  Since the 
Collett court did not have a fully developed record of the 
particular DIS restrictions in the case, it remanded to the 
circuit court for a determination pursuant to its new rule of 
whether the defendant was in custody for sentence credit 
purposes.  Id. at 325-26.    
¶19 In this case, the State maintains that for sentence 
credit 
purposes, 
courts 
should 
continue 
to 
utilize 
the 
definition of custody found in the escape statute.  The State 
contends that by dispensing with the established approach to 
defining custody, the Collett court has replaced a bright-line 
rule with case-by-case analysis that is “burdensome, unworkable 
and confusing.”   
¶20 Magnuson concedes the utility of adopting a bright-
line rule yet disagrees as to the precise rule this court should 
pronounce.  He maintains that the preferred bright-line rule is 
one that supplements the established approach of referring to 
the escape statute with the additional requirement that custody 
include all home detention with electronic monitoring.   
¶21 Magnuson argues that the escape statute should be read 
in pari materia with other statutes that provide for escape 
charges, 
including 
provisions 
governing 
home 
detention, 
community residential confinement, and intensive sanctions.  
According to Magnuson, all of the relevant statutes taken in 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
9 
conjunction 
reflect 
the 
legislative 
intent 
to 
view 
home 
confinement under electronic monitoring as custody.   
¶22 We agree with both parties that a bright-line rule is 
the better approach for determining custody in the context of 
sentence credit.  The Collett rationale for determining custody, 
which requires sentencing courts to engage in detailed inquiries 
as to the specific restrictions presented in each case, imposes 
an unnecessary burden upon those courts and hinders consistency. 
 Yet we do not adopt wholesale either party’s articulation of a 
bright-line rule. 
¶23 The State advances a rule that fails to acknowledge 
the “without limitation” language of Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a), 
language that precludes the escape statute from being as bright 
a line as the State maintains.   Moreover, the State’s rule is 
stagnant and falls short of recognizing the evolving methods of 
custody in our criminal justice system.   
¶24 Although Magnuson is cognizant of the developing 
methods of confinement, he focuses solely on one aspect, home 
detention with electronic monitoring.  His rule fails to account 
for other custodial situations in which the legislature has 
specifically 
indicated 
that 
an 
escape 
charge 
will 
lie.  
Additionally, Magnuson’s bright-line rule fails to offer clear 
contours as to exactly what degree of electronic monitoring it 
envisions. 
¶25 Our rule encompasses both precedent as well as the 
developing methods of custody and is intended to promote 
uniformity.  We determine that for sentence credit purposes an 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
10
offender’s status constitutes custody whenever the offender is 
subject to an escape charge for leaving that status.  
¶26 In 
establishing 
this 
definition, 
we 
modify 
the 
approach set forth in Gilbert in that we do not limit the 
inquiry to the definition of custody contained only in Wis. 
Stat. § 946.42(1)(a).  Instead, we acknowledge the importance of 
reading statutes in pari materia, as Magnuson suggests, and 
include for reference other statutory provisions in which the 
legislature has classified certain situations as restrictive and 
custodial by attaching escape charges for an unauthorized 
departure from those situations. 
¶27 Subsequent to Gilbert, the legislature has enacted  
several statutes consistent with the Gilbert assessment of 
custody dependent upon an offender’s exposure to charges of 
criminal 
escape. 
 
This 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
“without 
limitation” language of Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a) because it 
recognizes modern methods of confinement.   
¶28 For example, Wis. Stat. § 301.046(1) addresses the 
community 
residential 
confinement 
program, 
describing 
this 
program as a “correctional institution” and the residents as 
“prisoners.”   Under this provision, an offender placed in  
community residential confinement may be monitored by electronic 
surveillance.  Wis. Stat. § 301.46(5).  An escape charge lies 
upon 
unauthorized 
flight 
from 
the 
program. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.46(6). 
¶29 Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 301.048 provides that the 
Department of Corrections (DOC) shall administer an intensive 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
11
sanctions 
program 
that 
imposes 
various 
sanctions 
upon 
participants.4  Sanctions may include electronic monitoring, 
intensive supervision, mandatory substance abuse treatment, or a 
combination of restrictions.  Wis. Stat. § 301.048(3)(a).  In 
addition, the failure to comply with the imposed conditions of 
this program subjects the offender to a charge of escape under  
 § 946.42(3)(a).  Wis. Stat. § 301.048(5).5 
¶30 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.425 governs home detention and 
also provides for electronic monitoring of persons in detention. 
 This 
provision 
requires 
placement 
by 
the 
sheriff, 
the 
superintendent of a correctional institution, or the DOC and 
classifies persons placed in detention as “prisoners.”  Wis. 
Stat. § 302.425(3).  Furthermore, “[a]ny intentional failure of 
a prisoner to remain within the limits of his or her detention 
or to return to his or her place of detention” qualifies as an 
escape.  Wis. Stat. § 302.425(6).  Thus, the aforementioned 
statutes provide additional reference points for circuit courts 
                     
4 A circuit court may no longer sentence an offender 
convicted of a felony occurring on or after December 31, 1999 to 
intensive sanctions.  See 1997 Wis. Act 283, § 428.  However, 
the intensive sanctions program remains otherwise in effect and 
is relevant for the purposes of this case. 
5 By recognizing DIS placement as custody, we disagree with 
 Collett’s 
conclusion 
that 
DIS 
participation 
does 
not 
automatically constitute custody but rather must be determined 
based on the specific restrictions involved.  207 Wis. 2d at 
325.   
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
12
in determining whether a defendant is in custody for sentence 
credit purposes.6 
¶31 Today we adopt a definition of custody that remains 
true to precedent, yet also captures other custodial and 
restrictive situations not enumerated explicitly within Wis. 
Stat. § 946.42(1)(a).7  In sum, we determine that for purposes of 
sentence 
credit 
an 
offender’s 
status 
constitutes 
custody 
whenever the offender is subject to an escape charge for leaving 
that status. 
¶32 Having 
determined 
the 
appropriate 
definition 
of 
custody for purposes of sentence credit, we next address the 
second issue of whether Magnuson’s bond conditions rendered him 
in custody according to our definition.  Magnuson asserts that 
the various conditions imposed upon his release on bond, 
particularly 
home 
confinement 
with 
electronic 
monitoring, 
transformed his release into custody.  Because the release 
                     
6 Other situations to which escape charges and penalties 
apply include Wis. Stat. § 303.10 (county work camp), Wis. Stat. 
§ 303.065 (work release plan for prison inmates), and Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.538 (serious juvenile offender program).  However, these 
statutes are not directly at issue in this case.  
7 To the extent that prior cases have refused to grant 
sentence credit for situations in which an offender would be 
subject to escape charges under the aforementioned statutes, 
they are limited by our holding today.  See State v. Swadley, 
190 Wis. 2d 139, 526 N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1994)(refusing to 
grant sentence credit for time spent in home detention with 
electronic monitoring under Wis. Stat. § 302.425).  See also 
State v. Olson, 226 Wis. 2d 457, 595 N.W.2d 460 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that the specific DIS restrictions at issue do not 
constitute custody by employing Collett analysis).  
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
13
conditions of his bond did not subject Magnuson to an escape 
charge under any of the pertinent statutes and are not covered 
by the escape statute, we disagree with his assertion. 
¶33 Magnuson was not placed in a community residential 
confinement program under Wis. Stat. § 301.046. Unlike the 
defendant in State v. Holliman, 180 Wis. 2d 348, 509 N.W.2d 73 
(Ct. App. 1993), who was both paroled to DIS and placed in a 
community residential program pursuant to a specific agreement, 
Magnuson was not placed in such confinement pursuant to any 
agreement or directive of the DOC or the sheriff. 
¶34 Likewise, Magnuson was not a participant in the 
intensive 
sanctions 
program 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.048.  
Although he may have been monitored by DIS officials within a 
bail monitoring program, Magnuson was not actually sentenced and 
placed in the DIS program.  In addition, he was neither directed 
by the DOC to participate in intensive sanctions nor paroled to 
the program.   
¶35 Simply because his bond included conditions similar to 
those in intensive sanctions does not render Magnuson a 
participant in the program, subject to an escape charge for 
failure to comply with those conditions.  If we were to 
determine that conditions analogous to DIS sanctions constitute 
custody, we would essentially find ourselves back to square one, 
with a rule for determining custody as amorphous as the Collett 
test, rather than the rule we have adopted today.     
¶36 Furthermore, Magnuson’s nightly confinement in Pastor 
Clark’s residence was not the equivalent of placement in home 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
14
detention pursuant to an order from the sheriff or the DOC under 
Wis. Stat. § 302.425.  Rather, his situation closely resembles 
that presented in State v. Pettis, 149 Wis. 2d 207, 441 N.W.2d 
247 (Ct. App. 1989).   
¶37 In Pettis, the defendant requested sentence credit for 
the time he spent in home confinement as a condition of bail.  
Rejecting his request for credit, the court reasoned that 
although “Pettis could suffer certain legal consequences for 
violating his home detention,” exposure to such negative 
consequences as a charge of bail jumping did not necessarily 
transform his situation into one of custody.  Id. at 212.    
¶38 Although Pettis was decided prior to the enactment of 
Wis. Stat. § 302.425, its holding nevertheless remains valid 
when a defendant has not been placed in home detention by a 
sheriff, a superintendent, or the DOC as Wis. Stat. § 302.425 
requires.    Like the defendant in Pettis, Magnuson would face 
charges 
of 
bail 
jumping 
or 
possible 
alterations 
of 
the 
conditions of his release for violating his bond conditions.  An 
escape charge would not lie upon his departure from home 
detention or his violation of the electric monitoring as a 
condition of bond.  Thus, Magnuson was not in custody under any 
of the statutes presented. 
¶39 Magnuson maintains that the failure to satisfy the 
requirements of those specific statutes does not preclude his 
entitlement to sentence credit.  He asserts that we must then 
revert to an examination of the escape statute, under which he 
is entitled to sentence credit.  We are not persuaded, however, 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
15
that Magnuson’s conditions of release on bond fall under the 
ambit of the escape statute. 
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.42(1)(a) requires that a person 
be in actual or constructive custody under one of the listed 
situations.  Actual custody includes custody of an institution, 
a secured correctional facility, a secure detention facility, a 
peace officer, or an institutional guard.  Id.  Magnuson’s 
conditions of release do not correspond to any of those 
situations, and thus do not constitute actual custody. 
¶41 Magnuson’s bond conditions also do not constitute 
constructive custody under the escape statute.  Constructive 
custody includes temporary leave for the purpose of work, 
school, medical care, or otherwise.  Id.  In releasing Magnuson 
on bond, the circuit court considered several factors and later 
explained that the most significant factor was Magnuson’s need 
to assist counsel with trial preparation.  However, release on 
bond for trial preparation is not a temporary release for any of 
the specified purposes.  
¶42 Magnuson’s situation is distinguishable from that of 
the defendant in State v. Sevelin, 204 Wis. 2d 127, 554 N.W.2d 
521 (Ct. App. 1996).  In Sevelin, the court specifically granted 
the defendant a “furlough” to attend inpatient alcohol treatment 
as part of bail modification.  Id. at 130.  The court noted that 
  the defendant’s release was undoubtedly temporary and that he 
would be required to return to jail upon leaving or completing 
his treatment.  Id. at 133.   
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
16
¶43 In this case, the court did not impose a similar 
requirement upon Magnuson.  He was not required to return to 
jail once he completed assisting counsel in trial preparation.  
Furthermore, although Magnuson was also obligated to attend 
substance abuse counseling as a condition of his bond, the court 
did not grant him a furlough or leave to specifically attend 
treatment, as did the court in Sevelin.  Magnuson’s release on 
bond therefore does not correspond to the type of release set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a) as constructive custody. 
¶44 Magnuson next contends that the escape statute is, in 
and of itself, broad, vague, and expansive.  He seizes upon the 
“without limitation” language of Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a) and 
argues that the expansive nature of the statute covers his 
situation, even if not specifically enumerated as custody.  He 
maintains that the statute may be read to include situations in 
which there is no actual physical restraint or control. 
¶45 For support, Magnuson refers to cases that also 
address the purported broadness of the statutory language.  See 
State v. Hoffman, 163 Wis. 2d 752, 760, 472 N.W.2d 558 (Ct. App. 
1991) (noting that under plain meaning of escape statute, actual 
custody does not define the entire scope of the term custody for 
purposes of arrest).  See also State v. Scott, 191 Wis. 2d 146, 
528 N.W.2d 46 (Ct. App. 1995) (custody upon lawful conviction of 
crime); State v. Adams, 152 Wis. 2d 68, 447 N.W.2d 90 (Ct. App. 
1989) (custody relating to arrest).  These cases are of limited 
usefulness, however, for they do not address custody as it 
relates to sentence credit. 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
17
¶46 Here we are confronted with a situation in which 
Magnuson was subject to a charge of felony bail jumping for a 
violation of the conditions of his bond.  He was not in danger 
of being charged with escape under any applicable statute.  
Although Magnuson could suffer negative legal consequences for 
leaving his home detention with electronic monitoring or for 
violating his other release conditions, we do not believe that 
these consequences transformed his situation into custody for 
entitlement to sentence credit.  Pettis, 149 Wis. 2d at 212.   
¶47 In summary, we conclude that an offender’s status 
constitutes custody for sentence credit purposes when the 
offender is subject to an escape charge for leaving that status. 
 We reject the burdensome case-by-case analysis established in 
Collett and replace it with a rule intended to provide clear 
guidelines for sentencing courts in their determination of 
sentence credit. 
¶48 Applying our rule to Magnuson, we conclude that his 
conditions of release on bond, including home detention with 
electronic monitoring, did not subject him to an escape charge 
for any violation of bond conditions and therefore did not 
render him in custody.  Since Magnuson was not in custody, he is 
not entitled to sentence credit under Wis. Stat. § 973.155.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
  
 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
18
 
No. 
98-1105-CR 
 
 
1