Title: Grover v. Owens

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Reversed June 22, 1960.
Asa L. Lewelling argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Lewelling & Gies, Salem.
*497 Orval N. Thompson argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Weatherford & Thompson, Albany.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, WARNER, GOODWIN and HOLMAN, Justices.
REVERSED.
HOLMAN, J. (Pro Tempore)
This is an action for damages for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff Grover when she fell on the 8th day of March, 1956, while a patron at wrestling matches at the National Guard Armory in Albany, promoted by the defendant Owens. The matches were held on the drill floor, which was the subject of a written lease from the National Guard to defendant. While the lease by its terms covered only the drill floor, which was the main floor of the building, the evidence shows without contradiction that defendant also had the use of the seating in the balcony, the dressing rooms, which were on the same floor as the balcony, and the shower rooms and lavatories, which were in the basement. A sign upon the drill floor informed the patrons of the location of the lavatories. The public, on wrestling nights, had to pay to gain admission to the building.
At the conclusion of the matches on the night in question, plaintiff found it necessary to go to the lavatory and descended the stairs to the basement where there was a waiting or anteroom leading to the lavatory. In the waiting room the entire floor was wet, but the water was deeper in a part of the room which had to be crossed by plaintiff to reach the lavatory on the far side. This condition was known to defendant's employee whose duty it was to take care *498 of the lavatories. Plaintiff had to wait 10 or 15 minutes for other patrons who were ahead of her. When her turn came, she crossed to the lavatory and, after using it, was returning across the anteroom to the stairway leading to the drill floor when she fell and suffered the injuries for which this action is brought.
Defendant filed a general denial to plaintiff's complaint and an affirmative defense of assumption of risk. There was no plea of contributory negligence. Upon completion of the case, defendant moved for a directed verdict on three grounds: (1) defendant had no control of the lavatory and, therefore, no responsibility for its condition; (2) that there was no evidence defendant was guilty of negligence, as he had breached no duty owed to plaintiff; and (3) plaintiff assumed the risk of any danger encountered. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $7,825.70. Defendant appeals, assigning as error the court's failure to grant the motion for a directed verdict.
1. Because of the view we take of defendant's contention that plaintiff assumed the risk of the danger involved, it will be unnecessary to consider the other claimed grounds of error.
The plaintiff was an invitee or business visitor on the premises of defendant. Plaintiff was on the premises at the invitation of defendant in connection with defendant's business. She still had this status at the time she used the lavatory.
Testimony of plaintiff relative to her knowledge *499 of the conditions in the lavatory and the cause of her slipping is as follows:
*501 2. One who enters upon the premises of another, even as a business visitor, assumes the danger of all known or obvious conditions which he finds there. The consent to the assumption of the risk is found in going ahead with full knowledge of it. See Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed) 308, § 55. The Restatement of the Law of Torts 491, § 893, states the rule as follows:
In its comment on the above rule the Restatement says as follows:
*502 Illustration 3 referred to in the comment above is as follows:
3. It is apparent from plaintiff's testimony that she had full knowledge of the wet condition of the lavatory from many prior experiences, and the dangers involved in its use had previously been amply demonstrated to her. Plaintiff contends, however, there was evidence of a deposit on the floor in addition to the water, which deposit caused her to slip, and about which she had no knowledge and was not warned and, therefore, she did not assume this risk. Prosser states the proposition on which she relies as follows:
The evidence upon which plaintiff has to depend for the application of this rule comes from her own testimony that the floor was slick and from defendant's *503 employee who had charge of the lavatory, whose testimony was as follows:
4. From this we can only draw the conclusion that the water deposited a stain on the floor. People do not slip on stains. We believe there is no evidence that anything caused her to fall other than the water. Even if there was something other than water which caused her to fall, she knew of the danger because she had seen others slip and fall more than once. Therefore, there could be no trap insofar as she was concerned, *504 as was the situation in Lyons v. Lich, 145 Or 606, 28 P2d 872.
The doctrine of assumption of risk has been recognized by this court for years and has been applied to situations other than master and servant. See Hunt v. Portland Baseball Club, 207 Or 337, 296 P2d 495.
It is the opinion of this court that plaintiff's own testimony demonstrates as a matter of law that she had assumed the risk involved, and defendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.