Title: Com. v. Myrtetus

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

397 Pa. Superior Ct. 299 (1990) 580 A.2d 42 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Charles G. MYRTETUS, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted July 23, 1990. Decided August 22, 1990. *300 David G. Ennis, Norristown, for appellant. Alan M. Rubenstein, Dist. Atty., Doylestown, for Com., appellee. Before CAVANAUGH, TAMILIA and HESTER, JJ. *301 TAMILIA, Judge: Appellant Charles Myrtetus appeals judgment of sentence entered January 12, 1990, following a jury trial in which appellant was found guilty of driving under the influence,[1] pursuant to being stopped at a formalized roadblock program instituted by the Upper Southampton Township Police Department. Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than 12 months. On appeal, appellant first challenges the constitutionality of drunk driving roadblocks under both the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions as unreasonable searches and seizures. In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, 535 A.2d 1035 (1987), our Supreme Court stated as dicta that a drunken driver roadblock conducted substantially in compliance with suggested guidelines would not be violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Court, however, found that the provisions of section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code did not authorize the police to conduct such roadblocks. The Court described appropriate guidelines as follows: Following the arrests in Tarbert, the legislature amended section 6308(b) to provide: 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). In Commonwealth v. Fioretti, 371 Pa.Super. 535, 538 A.2d 570 (1988), this Court was presented with the opportunity to decide a case with the benefit of both the Tarbert guidelines and amended section 6308(b), and found roadblocks established in compliance therewith would be constitutional. Appellant concedes the roadblock involved instantly was lawful under existing Pennsylvania law, yet still contends the roadblock amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure. We therefore analyze appellant's claim in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Michigan Dept. of State Police, et al. v. Sitz, et al., 496 U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. *303 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412.[2] Sitz presents a nearly identical situation to the case at bar, in that guidelines were created setting forth procedures governing roadblock operations, site selection and publicity. Id. at ___, 110 S. Ct. at 2484. In deciding Sitz, the Court utilized a balancing analysis set forth in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 (1976), in approving highway checkpoints for detecting illegal aliens. The Martinez-Fuerte balancing test weighed the intrusion of a particular law enforcement practice on the individual's fourth amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. As to the government interest in preventing drunken driving, the Court stated, "No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it." Sitz, supra 496 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct. at 2485. Id. The Court also reiterated its finding in Martinez-Fuerte that the subjective intrusion the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop because "the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion." Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. at 558, 96 S. Ct. at 3083. In Sitz, "checkpoints are selected pursuant to the guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop every approaching vehicle. The intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuerte." Sitz, supra 496 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct. at 2487. Although appellant argues sobriety checkpoints are an ineffective means of combatting drunken driving, as evidenced by appellant's being the only person arrested on April 29, 1989, and this ineffectiveness heightens the intrusiveness of the stop, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument in Sitz. The Court defined effectiveness as "the degree to which the seizure advances the public *305 interest." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979). Sitz, supra 496 U.S. at ___, 110 S. Ct. at 2487. Applying the above state and federal guidelines to the case at bar, we cite with approval a portion of the trial court Opinion dealing with the procedures implemented, leading up to appellant's arrest. (Slip Op., Kelton, J., 12/14/89, pp. 4-6.) From our examination of the record, we agree with the trial court that the roadblock program carried out by the Upper Southampton Township Police Department met the constitutional requirements imposed under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, and therefore appellant's argument is without merit. Appellant next argues the trial court erred in not admitting into evidence the results of a preliminary breath test where such results are exculpatory and where appellant and not the Commonwealth seeks to offer or elicit the results of the test. Appellant presented expert testimony from a toxicologist that at the time appellant was stopped by the police, his blood alcohol level was below .10 per cent. The toxicologist's opinion was that alcohol was being rapidly absorbed into appellant's blood stream, accounting for the increase in the second of two intoximeter tests from .140 per cent to .146 per cent in a period of two minutes. To corroborate appellant's theory his blood alcohol level was increasing and at the time he was driving it had not yet reached the legal limit of .10 per cent, appellant attempted to introduce the result of the preliminary breath test reading of .11 per cent, obtained seven minutes after appellant was stopped. The trial court based its decision on a section of the Vehicle Code dealing with chemical testing to determine the alcoholic content of blood. The statute provides in pertinent part: 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(k) (emphasis added). While appellant concedes the intent of section 1547(k) is to preclude the Commonwealth from using the results from a preliminary breath test to obtain a conviction, but only to determine probable cause to arrest, appellant also argues the statute should not preclude appellant from electing to introduce the test results. However, we find another subsection of section 1547 instructive on this issue. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c) (emphasis added). In attempting to ascertain the meaning of a statute, we are required to consider the intent of the legislature and are permitted to examine the practical consequences of a particular interpretation. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 375 Pa.Super. 585, 544 A.2d 1384 (1988). We are to presume the legislature did not intend a result that is unreasonable. Commonwealth v. Martorano, 387 Pa.Super. 151, 563 A.2d 1229 (1989). We agree with the Commonwealth that while the preliminary breath test device in question is an approved device, it is not one which is calibrated and tested for accuracy. The preliminary blood test serves only as an aid to police in determining probable cause for arrest. Appellant or the Commonwealth may introduce into evidence later the results of chemical tests of breath or blood taken after arrest. This evidence is admitted because of its presumptive validity and reliability. No such presumption can be made from the preliminary breath test, nor do we find the legislature intended to create such a presumption. We therefore find no error by the trial court in excluding evidence of the preliminary breath test, and this claim is without merit. Judgment of sentence affirmed. [1] 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(4). [2] Michigan Dept. of State Police, et al. v. Sitz, et al., 496 U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990), had not yet been decided by the Supreme Court at the time this case was submitted on appeal. Appellant, therefore, did not have the benefit of the Court's Opinion and in his brief relied on the Michigan Court of Appeals decision which found roadblocks unconstitutional.