Title: RICHARD L. WAGNER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD L. WAGNER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 51182 P.3d 506Case Number: S-07-0104Decided: 05/02/2008Modified: 05/05/2008
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
RICHARD 
L. WAGNER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofGoshenCounty

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, Faculty 
Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; Brian Hunter, Student Director; 
Clarissa Collier, Student Intern.  
Argument by Ms. Collier.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After being 
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (fourth offense), Richard L. 
Wagner (hereafter "Wagner") filed a motion to suppress claiming that the 
arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory 
stop.  The district court denied 
that motion.  We will affirm the 
district court.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Wagner presents 
one issue for our review:

 
 

1.     
Did the 
Trial Court Err by Failing to Suppress Any Evidence Obtained After the Arrest of 
[Wagner] When That Arrest Was Not Supported By Reasonable 
Suspicion?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      On June 26, 2006, 
Officer Lacey Hague, of the Torrington Police Department, was dispatched to 
Patrick Reifschneider's residence.  
Reifschneider had called the Torrington Police Department twice, 
reporting first that Wagner was at his residence and "was not to be there," and 
then that Wagner was "driving, and  intoxicated."  Officer Hague was familiar with Wagner, 
and prior to responding, knew that he previously had been arrested for driving 
while under the influence, and that his driver's license was suspended.  Officer Hague was also aware that the 
two men had a previous altercation, and that maybe Reifschneider "had it out" 
for Wagner.

 
 
[¶4]      After she was 
twice unable to locate Wagner at Reifschneider's residence, Officer Hague drove 
around looking for Wagner.  She 
eventually parked her vehicle near Reifschneider's residence and spotted Wagner 
driving his truck.  Wagner noticed 
Officer Hague and put his truck in reverse to move behind a building and into a 
parking lot.  Officer Hague pulled 
into the same lot, directly in front of Wagner's vehicle.  By the time the officer had positioned 
her vehicle, Wagner was walking toward Reifschneider's residence.  Officer Hague observed Wagner stumble 
repeatedly and hold onto a gate to maintain balance.  Officer Hague noted that Wagner was 
"very, very unsteady on his feet."

 
 
[¶5]      The officer got 
out of her vehicle and shouted toward Wagner, "Stop, I need to talk with you," 
but Wagner did not stop.  She 
repeated herself, this time directing the comment only at Wagner: "Richard, 
stop.  I need to talk with 
you."  This time, he stopped and 
began making his way back to the officer, who again noticed he was "very 
unsteady."  Officer Hague advised 
Wagner that he was not to be at Reifschneider's residence and, upon smelling an 
odor of alcohol, asked Wagner if he had been drinking.  He responded in the negative, but by 
this time, Officer Hague noticed his speech was slurred to the point that she 
could not understand some of his comments.

 
 
[¶6]      Wagner eventually 
walked away from Officer Hague, who followed him into the residence and asked 
him to perform field sobriety maneuvers.  
Wagner refused to perform any test.  
Wagner was arrested for drunk driving and taken into custody.  He was transported to the detention 
center and refused both breath and blood alcohol tests.

 
 
[¶7]      Wagner filed a Motion to Suppress which was denied by 
the district court.  In its denial, 
the court found that it was "abundantly clear" that the contact made by the 
officer was reasonable and in direct response to a valid complaint.  Furthermore, the "reasonableness" was 
"enhanced, not diminished" by what the officer knew of a prior altercation 
between the complainant and Wagner.  
There also was "ample evidence," according to the court, that Wagner was 
drunk, and that the officer observed him driving minutes before their 
confrontation.  And finally, the 
court found that the arrest was "well supported by probable 
cause."

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      Our standard of 
review is well settled in this matter, and as we have very recently 
stated:

 
 
In 
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the trial court's 
findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. We view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial 
court has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of 
the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, 
deductions, and conclusions. The constitutionality of a 
particular search is a question of law that we review de novo. Fenton 
v. State, 2007 WY 51, ¶ 5, 154 P.3d 974, 976 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting 
Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 25, 98 P.3d 857, 869 Wyo. 2004)).

 
 

Sam v. 
State, 2008 WY 
25, ¶ 9, 177 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Wagner's sole 
issue on appeal is that because Officer Hague lacked reasonable suspicion to 
justify the investigatory stop, any evidence obtained after that point should 
have been suppressed by the district court.  The State disagrees and insists that 
because the officer possessed both personal knowledge of Wagner prior to the 
incident and information from an 
identified citizen's tip, along with her own observations from the scene, 
reasonable suspicion was present and justified.  We side with the 
State.

 
 
[¶10]   Encounters between law enforcement 
and private citizens can be classified into three categories.  McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 
(Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
[1]  The 
most intrusive encounter, an arrest, requires justification by probable cause to 
believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime. [2] The 
investigatory stop represents a seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment 
safeguards, but, by its less intrusive character, requires only the presence of 
specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime. 
[3] The least intrusive police-citizen contact, a consensual encounter, involves 
no restraint of liberty and elicits the citizen's voluntary cooperation with 
non-coercive questioning.

 
 

McChesney, 988 P.2d  at 1074 (quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo. 1994)); see also Innis v. State, 2003 
WY 66, ¶ 16, 69 P.3d 413, 419 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶11]   For purposes of this appeal, we 
focus our attention on the investigatory stop, which, like an arrest, is a 
seizure that triggers Fourth Amendment safeguards.  McChesney, 988 P.2d  at 1074.  
Due to its less intrusive nature than an actual arrest, however, an 
investigatory stop requires only the presence of "specific and articulable facts 
and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person 
has committed or may be committing a crime." Id.  
Two inquiries must be madewhen Wagner was "seized" for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment, and upon being seized, whether or not the officer has 
reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed.

 
 
[¶12]   We first turn to whether or not, 
and when, Wagner was seized under Fourth Amendment standards.  The encounter between Officer Hague and 
Wagner began when the officer positioned her vehicle in front of Wagner's truck 
after Wagner was walking away from the vehicle.  At this point, the encounter was 
consensual because a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was 
free to leave, as Wagner did even after the officer beckoned him to stop.  Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-691 
(Wyo. 
1993).  Having resisted submitting 
to a show of authority, Wagner remained unseized.  California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 
111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991).  
Not to be deterred, however, Officer Hague called out after Wagner a 
second time: "Richard, stop. I need to talk with you."  This time, Wagner responded by turning 
and walking back toward the officer, signaling his submission to Officer Hague's 
detention.

 
 
[¶13]   With Wagner being seized for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the investigatory stop began and, thus, we 
turn to the second portion of our inquirywhether or not the officer had 
reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was in the process of being 
committed.  This Court uses a dual 
inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory stop: first, were 
the officer's actions justified at the inception of the investigatory stop, and 
second, whether or not the stop was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance.  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 
64 P.3d 700, 704-05 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶14]   After reviewing the record in full, 
it is apparent that the investigatory stop was justified at its inception.  Officer Hague testified to a number of 
"specific and articulable" facts which, taken together, warranted the 
intrusion.  First, the officer had 
more than reasonable suspicion that Wagner was driving on a suspended license 
because she was familiar with Wagner, knew that he had been arrested several 
times for driving under the influence, and knew that his license was suspended 
as a result of those arrests.  After 
observing Wagner driving his vehicle, she had reasonable suspicion to believe 
that Wagner was committing a crime.  
Officer Hague's knowledge of Wagner's past offenses, together with her 
observation of him driving, gave rise to the conclusion by the officer that 
Wagner had committed or was committing a crime.

 
 
[¶15]   Wagner encourages this Court to 
ignore the officer's knowledge of his suspended license because this fact was 
not articulated by the officer as the basis for the initial contact or for the 
seizure.  However, we decline to do 
so.  The United States Supreme Court 
has recognized that an officer's subjective reasoning for making an arrest does 
not matter if the objective facts known to the officer were sufficient to create 
probable cause.  Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 126 S. Ct. 699, 163 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2005).  In Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 27, 
146 P.3d 492, 501 (Wyo. 2006), this Court noted that under our state's 
constitution, "an officer's subjective intent does not vitiate the probable 
cause that would otherwise justify the [Terry] stop."  Furthermore, other courts have 
recognized that the Devenpeck 
reasoning applies equally to investigatory stops.  See People v. Cherry, 119 P.3d 1081, 1083 
(Colo. 2005) 
("the officer's subjective intent is not relevant to a determination that he 
has reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory 
stop.").

 
 
[¶16]   Regardless of whether or not 
Officer Hague articulated that she had knowledge of Wagner's suspended license, 
it is undisputed that Wagner's license was indeed suspended.  What is more, however, is that Officer 
Hague had reasonable suspicion to believe that Wagner was driving his vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol.  
Several things amount to her suspicions being 
formed.

 
 
[¶17]   First, she spoke with Mr. 
Reifschneider, an identified citizen-informant.1  Reifschneider indicated both on the 
phone and in person to Officer Hague that Wagner was driving and was "very 
intoxicated."  Next, Officer Hague 
noted a "surprised" look on Wagner's face when he noticed her patrol vehicle 
parked, and then made an attempt to elude her.  And finally, even prior to the 
initiation of the investigatory stop, Officer Hague saw Wagner stumble, hold 
onto a gate in order to maintain his balance, and observed that he was "very, 
very unsteady on his feet."  When 
taken together, the information 
provided by Reifschneider and Wagner's conduct, which alone could appear to be 
wholly lawful and seemingly innocent, helped to form the basis for a reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.  State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601, 604 
(Wyo. 
1994).

 
 
[¶18]   The totality of the circumstances 
in this instance established that Officer Hague had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that Wagner was not only driving under the influence, but also driving 
on a suspended license.  The 
investigatory stop was justified, and we affirm the district court's order 
denying the motion to suppress and Wagner's conviction.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Identified 
citizen-informant tips are considered 
more reliable than that of anonymous informant tips because an identified informant exposes himself to possible criminal and 
civil prosecution if the report is false.  
McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1076 ( Wyo. 1999).