Title: STATE v BRETZ

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12906 I N T H E S U P R E M E COURT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, L. R. B R E T Z and GLORIA E U S E K CARDEN, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Truman G. Bradford, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Asst. Richard Dzivi, s p e c i a 1 / ~ t t o r n e y Genera 1, Helena, Montana Dona ld Ens tman, specia l l A ~ 6 r n e ~ General and John P . Atkins argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Sandall, Moses and Cavan, Billings, Montana Charles F. Moses argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: April 10, 1975 Fi led : APbi t 6 19[S M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by the s t a t e from an order granting respondent's motion f o r a change of venue from Cascade County t o Lewis and Clark County. I O n September 16, 1974, respondent Bretz, defendant i n d i s t r i c t court, was charged i n Cascade County with f i f t y - e i g h t felony counts. Ten days l a t e r he f i l e d a motion f o r change of venue i n two parts: (1) That Lewis and Clark County i s the proper place f o r t r i a l r a t h e r than Cascade County, and (2) t h a t he could not receive a f a i r t r i a l i n Cascade County by reason of adverse publi- c i t y i n the community. Oral argument on t h e motion was held October 15, 1974. Bretz did not present any evidence i n support o f , and i n f a c t abandoned, p a r t (2) of h i s motion. He r e l i e d on p a r t ( I ) , arguing t h a t Lewis and Clark County was the proper place f o r t r i a l . I n granting the motion f o r change of venue, the d i s t r i c t judge observed t h a t he hoped an appeal t o t h i s Court would s e t t l e the venue i s s u e p r i o r t o a long t r i a l . The s t a t e raised s i x issues on appeal, however, we find it necessary t o discuss but two. F i r s t : Was Cascade County a county of proper venue? Chapter 4, T i t l e 95, Montana Code of Criminal Procedure, pro- vides the answer i n simple d i r e c t terms. Section 95-401, R.C.M. 1947, s t a t e s the t r i a l s h a l l be i n the county where the offense was committed. Section 95-402, R.C.M. 1947, provides t h a t where two o r more a c t s a r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e commission of an offense, t r i a l may be i n any county i n which any of such a c t s occur. Section 95-408, R.C.M. 1947, provides "Where a person obtains property by larceny, robbery, f a l s e pretenses o r embezzlement, he may be t r i e d i n any county i n which he exerted control over such property." Respondent was charged with fifty-two offenses involving e i t h e r grand larceny, larceny by bailee o r obtaining money by f a l s e pre- tenses. He was a l s o charged with four counts of forgery and two counts of preparing f a l s e evidence. With respect t o the larceny and f a l s e pretenses charges, i t was alleged t h a t respondent exercised control over the property i n Cascade County. With respect t o the forgery and preparing f a l s e evidence charges, it was alleged t h a t a t lease some of the a c t s r e q u i s i t e t o the offenses charged occurred i n Cascade County. Clearly Cascade County was a proper county f o r the case t o be t r i e d . Some of the elements of the offenses charged may have occurred i n whole o r i n part i n other counties. However, t h a t does not a f f e c t the problem of whether cascade County was a proper county f o r t r i a l . Venue was proper i n Cascade County. Second: Was i t e r r o r f o r the d i s t r i c t court t o order the t r i a l moved t o Lewis and Clark County, a county i n which venue was allegedly a l s o proper a s t o some of t h e counts? W e hold it was e r r o r and reverse t h e order of the d i s t r i c t court. I n Shields v. Shields, 115 Mont. 146, 139 P.2d 528, a c i v i l case, t h i s Court under s i m i l a r circumstances held t h a t i f t h e county i n which t h e action i s brought and t h e one t o which it i s sought t o have i t transferred a r e both counties of proper venue, the action must s t a y where the complaint was f i l e d . That same principle applies i n a criminal case. I f no prejudice o r other l e g a l reason i s shown and the complaint o r information i s f i l e d i n a county of proper venue, t h a t i s where t h e t r i a l i s t o be held. The d i s t r i c t court was i n e r r o r i n ordering the t r i a l moved t o Lewis and Clark County. O n o r a l argument respondent advanced, f o r the f i r s t time, the t h e contention t h a t sections 95-402 and 95-408, R.C.M. 1947, vio- l a t e the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 11, Sec. 24, of the 1972 Montana Constitution. The latter I t guarantees a right to trial in the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed." His argument is 1 t that an offense can only be committed, i , e . consummated", at the one point in time at which all the elements of the crime have occurred and, thus, there can be only one county of proper venue. We do not agree and would not so define the word "committed", Cases have long recognized that statutes such as sections 95-402 and 95-408, R.C.M. 1947, do not violate constitutional guarantees. Brown v . Elliott, 225 U . S . 392, 400, 32 S . C t . 812, 56 L.Ed. 1136; Travis v . United States, 364 U . S . 631, 636, 81 S,Ct. 358, 5 L ed 2d 340; American Tobacco Co. v . United States, 147 F.2d 93,120, affd. - 328 U.S. 781, 66 S . C t . 1125, 90 L.Ed. 1575; State v . Coon, 242 La.1019, 141 S.2d 350; State v . Harrington, 128 Vt. 242, 260 A.2d 692; State v. Moore, 189 Wash.680, 66 P.2d 836; 18 U . S . C . 53237. The order of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconststent with this Opinion, Justice \ We Concur: