Title: State v. Michael S., Jr.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 82 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2934 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Interest of Michael S., a Person  
Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael S., Jr.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  273 Wis. 2d 787, 680 N.W.2d 833 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 10, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Christopher R. Foley   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and PROSSER, J.J., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Susan E. Alesia, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2005 WI 82 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2934  
(L.C. No. 
01 JV 1666) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of Michael S., a Person  
Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael S., Jr.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming an order 
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Christopher R. Foley, 
Judge.1   
¶2 
The issue presented in this case is whether a circuit 
court may, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6),2 extend a 
                                                 
1 In re Michael S., No. 2003AP2934, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2004). 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
2 
 
juvenile's one-year dispositional order temporarily for 30 days 
if the 30-day extension order is entered after the one-year 
dispositional order has expired.   
¶3 
We hold that after a juvenile's one-year dispositional 
order expires, a circuit court may not grant a 30-day temporary 
extension of the order under Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6).  Further, 
consistent 
with 
caselaw, 
the 
expiration 
of 
the 
one-year 
dispositional order cannot be waived.  Because no 30-day 
temporary extension or new dispositional order was granted prior 
to the expiration of the one-year dispositional order, the 
circuit court could not act with respect to Michael S. once the 
one-year dispositional order expired. 
I 
¶4 
We must first address the issue of mootness.  On April 
11, 2005, Michael S. turned 18 and is no longer subject to the 
juvenile code.  
¶5 
A determination of the issue presented in the instant 
case will have no practical effect on Michael S.  With regard to 
Michael S., the issue raised on review is therefore moot. 
¶6 
Reviewing courts generally decline to decide moot 
issues but may do so under certain circumstances.3  A court may 
decide a moot issue when the issue is of great public 
importance; occurs frequently and a definitive decision is 
necessary to guide the circuit courts; is likely to arise again 
                                                 
3 State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, ¶7, 268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 
N.W.2d 349.   
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
3 
 
and a decision of the court would alleviate uncertainty; or will 
likely be repeated, but evades appellate review because the 
appellate review process cannot be completed or even undertaken 
in time to have a practical effect on the parties.  
¶7 
The question presented in this case seems to satisfy 
all these exceptions to the mootness rule.  Deciding a circuit 
court's retention of authority over a juvenile after the 
expiration of a dispositional order is a matter of great 
importance to the sound operation of the judicial system and the 
rights and interests of juveniles.   
¶8 
We will therefore address the issue presented in the 
instant case. 
II 
¶9 
We now turn to the relevant facts relating to the 
expiration and extension of Michael S.'s dispositional order. 
¶10 The district attorney's office for Milwaukee County 
petitioned the circuit court for Milwaukee County on August 22, 
2001, seeking to adjudicate Michael S. delinquent.  Michael S. 
waived his right to a trial, and on November 8, 2001, the 
circuit court entered a dispositional order placing Michael S. 
on supervision until October 23, 2002.  The November 8 order 
contained a number of conditions of supervision with which 
Michael S. was required to comply. 
¶11 On September 10, 2002, the State petitioned the 
circuit  court for a change in the original dispositional order.  
This requested change was based on post-November 8 conduct 
violating Michael S.'s conditions of supervision.  Specifically, 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
4 
 
the State sought to place Michael S. in a secure group home 
(change of placement) and sought a one-year extension of the 
original one-year dispositional order set to expire on October 
23, 2002.   
¶12 At a hearing before Judge Christopher Foley on October 
2, 2002, Michael S.'s attorney, the Assistant District Attorney, 
and Michael S.'s probation officer discussed the status of the 
State's petition and set a date for a contested hearing on the 
petition.  Michael S. did not oppose an extension of supervision 
but did oppose a change of placement, and this objection would 
be the subject of the contested hearing. 
¶13 During the discussion about setting the date for the 
contested hearing, the following exchange took place, indicating 
that the hearing could not be held before October 24: 
[PROBATION OFFICER]: I have a quick comment, Judge.  
I'm on vacation starting this Friday until the 15th.  
If that's going to be a problem, if we want a quick 
hearing—— 
THE COURT: We have problems with quick hearings all 
over the place.  As some of you may be aware, we 
finished a 7 day jury trial on a TPR [termination of 
parental rights] last night at 8 o'clock.  We're 
starting another one that's projected to last at least 
five days on Monday.  We are institutionally trying to 
figure out how we can possibly handle the requirements 
for preliminary hearings on 13 or more kids that we 
anticipate are going to be charged with homicides in a 
10-day period.  I don't know how we're going to do 
that.  And I'm going to the judicial conference.  So, 
a quick hearing is a foreign concept here. 
. . . . 
THE COURT:  . . . Let's get a date, please. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
5 
 
THE CLERK:  What is this being set for?  A contest 
hearing? 
THE COURT:  Yes. 
THE CLERK:  October 24th at 1:30?  
[MICHAEL S.'S ATTORNEY]: I can't do it on the 24th.  I 
can do it on the 25th any time. 
[ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:  Do you have anything 
the following week? 
[MICHAEL S.'S ATTORNEY]:  The following week I'm out 
of town, the week of the 28th.  The 24th is good in 
the morning.  I don't know what——I just can't do it in 
the afternoon. 
 
¶14 The parties agreed that the contested hearing would be 
held at 10:30 A.M. on October 24, 2002.  Michael S.'s attorney 
also discussed at the October 2 hearing the possibility of 
getting 
another 
psychological 
evaluation 
for 
Michael 
S.; 
apparently this evaluation was never done. 
 
¶15 On October 24, 2002, the parties met before Judge 
Michael Malmstadt; Judge Foley was occupied with a jury trial.  
At the October 24 hearing were Michael S., his attorney, his 
mother and grandmother, the assistant district attorney assigned 
to the case, the probation officer, and three individuals 
involved in various juvenile delinquency programs. 
 
¶16 To familiarize himself with the status of Michael S.'s 
case, Judge Malmstadt questioned Michael S. and the attorneys.  
The parties discussed at length the possible placement options 
and whether Michael S. was going to change his behavior. 
 
¶17 Without either attorney raising the issue, Judge 
Malmstadt noticed that Michael S.'s dispositional order had 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
6 
 
expired on October 23, 2002, the prior day.  The import of the 
expiration date of the dispositional order was not lost on Judge 
Malmstadt.  The following relevant exchange relating to the 
dispositional order ensued: 
JUDGE MALMSTADT:  Okay.  I'm being told his Probation 
ended yesterday? 
[PROBATION OFFICER]:  I believe so.  Unless——I don't 
know if Judge Foley extended it verbally or not last 
time.  I didn't hear. 
. . . . 
[ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:  Placed on Probation 
October 23, 2001. 
JUDGE MALMSTADT:  Okay. 
[MICHAEL S.'S ATTORNEY]:  Only was a one-year Order.  
I have the Original Dispositional Order.  That should 
be in the file. 
[ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: What does the Judgment 
roll say? 
JUDGE MALMSTADT:  . . . I don't see anything in it 
that shows there was ever an Extension. 
[ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]:  My notes are silent to 
that as well. 
[MICHAEL S.'S ATTORNEY]:  Original Order says "Ends 
10/23/02."  Signed by [Judge] Wasielewski.  My notes 
reflect we set this for Contest, argued placement, got 
a copy of the Psych.  I don't have anything about 
extending it. 
JUDGE MALMSTADT:  Do you know what that all means, 
Michael? 
[MICHAEL S.]:  (Nods head negatively.) 
JUDGE MALMSTADT:  Well, I will tell you, in a nut 
shell, what it means.  It means you have two choices 
right now.  Okay? 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
7 
 
Choice Number One--  And I'm going to go through this 
damn thing with a fine tooth comb, to make sure it's 
true. 
But, 
Choice 
Number 
One, 
tells 
me 
you 
are 
off 
Probation, that we have no more authority over you, 
and it's "Good Bye, Michael." 
. . . . 
Well, that's one option. 
The other option is for you to say: "You know what?  I 
think I want this Judge to extend my Probation so I 
can work with the people from Running Rebels."  I can 
only do that if you say, "Judge, I want to you to do 
that."  I can't make you do that.  That's up to you. 
Those are your two options. 
[MICHAEL S.]:  The first. 
JUDGE MALMSTADT:  Fine.  Back to Detention.  I'm going 
to show this to Judge Foley.  Judge Foley and I will 
talk about it.  And if Judge Foley and I come to the 
same conclusion, I think this case is over with. 
 
¶18 Judge Malmstadt understood the expiration of Michael 
S.'s one-year dispositional order to mean that the circuit 
court's authority over Michael S. may have ceased on October 23, 
saying: "Well, if he is off supervision, what authority do I 
have to keep him?" 
 
¶19 Prior to concluding the hearing, Judge Malmstadt 
checked to determine whether any files showed a temporary 
extension of the one-year dispositional order.  They did not.  
Judge Malmstadt also stated that he would check further with 
court reporters to determine whether the one-year dispositional 
order had been temporarily extended at the October 2, 2002, 
hearing. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
8 
 
 
¶20 That afternoon the parties appeared before Judge 
Foley.  Michael S.'s attorney was not present.  Judge Foley 
stated that at none of the previous three hearings (September 
24, September 26, and October 2) was there any indication "that 
a 938.365(6) extension was granted.  And Judge Malmstadt was 
concerned that this Court may have lost authority to act in this 
matter." 
 
¶21 Judge Foley further stated that, after speaking with 
the court reporters for the previous three hearings, he was 
satisfied that no judge had orally temporarily extended Michael 
S.'s one-year dispositional order. 
 
¶22 Judge Foley concluded, however, that the failure to 
extend the order was not significant, because Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.365(6) had been modified to mean that if a juvenile does 
not object to the scheduling of a hearing beyond the expiration 
of the one-year dispositional order, "it operates as a waiver."  
Judge Foley asserted that his reading of § 938.365(6) was 
supported by the text of § 938.315(3), providing that "failure 
to comply with any time limit specified in this chapter does not 
deprive the court of personal or subject matter jurisdiction or 
of competency to exercise that jurisdiction."4 
 
¶23 Judge Foley went on to conclude that "I continue to 
have authority in this matter, that I have the right to, in 
effect, retroactively grant the thirty days' extension, which I 
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 938.315(3). 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
9 
 
am doing."  Michael S.'s attorney was not present and was not on 
the phone with the court during this brief hearing. 
 
¶24 At a hearing later that same day, Michael S.'s 
attorney was present by phone.  Judge Foley explained to Michael 
S.'s attorney that he had granted the temporary extension 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6) and § 938.315(3).  A 
subsequent hearing date was set for November 8, 2002, and just 
before the close of the hearing Michael S.'s attorney asked for 
the statute numbers Judge Foley had mentioned earlier in the 
hearing (§§ 938.365(6) and 938.315(3)).  According to Michael 
S.'s attorney, this phone appearance on October 24, 2002 took 
only a couple of minutes. 
 
¶25 At the November 8, 2002 hearing, a third judge, Judge 
Joseph R. Wall, presided.  Michael S.'s attorney objected to 
Judge Foley's temporary extension of Michael S.'s one-year 
dispositional 
order, 
contending 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
authority expired on October 23, 2002.  Judge Wall concluded 
that 
unless 
the 
transcript 
from 
the 
October 
2 
hearing 
demonstrated 
that 
Judge 
Foley 
had 
extended 
the 
one-year 
dispositional order, the court lost authority over Michael S. on 
October 23, 2002.  Concerned about this issue, Judge Wall 
ordered Michael S. placed in detention until Judge Foley could 
review, on November 26, 2002, the issue of the expiration of the 
one-year dispositional order. 
¶26 At the November 26 hearing before Judge Foley, the 
parties discussed the implications of the circuit court's 
failure to extend the one-year dispositional order temporarily 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
10 
 
for 30 days on October 2, 2002, and the circuit court's 
authority under Wis. Stat. §§ 938.315(3) and 938.365(6).  In 
affirming his earlier assertion that the circuit court retained 
authority over Michael S., Judge Foley acknowledged that he 
never said the "magic words" ordering an extension.  The judge 
reasoned that because there was good cause for scheduling the 
hearing on October 24 as opposed to October 23, the circuit 
court did not have to state explicitly on October 2 that Michael 
S.'s one-year dispositional order was being extended temporarily 
for 30 days. 
¶27 Judge 
Foley 
asserted 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
inferentially granted the 30-day temporary extension when the 
matter was set on the court's calendar for October 24, 2002.  
Judge 
Foley's 
ruling 
that 
the 
temporary 
extension 
was 
"inferentially" granted is 
somewhat 
inconsistent 
with his 
earlier position that the circuit court "retroactively" granted 
the extension. 
 
¶28 The circuit court scheduled a contested hearing on the 
merits of the petition for the extension of the one-year 
dispositional order for December 3, 2002.  The circuit court 
granted the State's motion after the December 3 hearing to 
extend Michael S.'s dispositional order for one year (until 
October 23, 2003) and changed his placement to Ethan Allen 
School. 
¶29 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
holding that the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6) had 
been fulfilled, because (1) a request was made for an extension 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
11 
 
of the one-year dispositional order before the expiration of the 
order; and (2) a hearing could not be held before the expiration 
of the one-year dispositional order.  The court of appeals held 
that Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6) does not require that a 30-day 
extension must be granted prior to the dispositional order's 
expiration, as long as the two conditions set forth above were 
met.  Similarly, the court of appeals held that the circuit 
court is not required, under § 938.365(6), to explicitly inform 
the parties that it granted a temporary 30-day extension.  
Michael S. seeks review in this court.  We reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
III 
¶30 The 
parties dispute 
whether 
the 
circuit court's 
failure to grant a temporary 30-day extension of Michael S.'s 
one-year dispositional order prior to October 23, 2002, the date 
of the expiration of the order, has any effect on the validity 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
extending 
Michael 
S.'s 
dispositional order for an additional year and changing his 
placement to Ethan Allen School.   
¶31 We turn to the relevant statutes and their application 
to the facts in the case at bar.  Interpretation and application 
of statutes ordinarily present questions of law that this court 
decides independently of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals, benefiting from their analyses.5 
                                                 
5 In re Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, ¶11, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 
N.W.2d 1. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
12 
 
¶32 The statutes at issue in the present case are Wis. 
Stat. §§ 938.34, 938.365(6), and 938.315(3).   
¶33 Section 938.34 provides that when a juvenile is judged 
delinquent, a circuit court must enter an "order deciding one or 
more of the dispositions of the case as provided in this section 
under a care and treatment plan."6  Dispositions under § 938.34 
include 
counseling, 
supervision 
(intensive 
or 
otherwise), 
placement in a particular home, electronic monitoring, transfer 
of legal custody, institutional or correctional placement, 
aftercare supervision, restitution (in the form of money or 
services), work programs or community service, and various job, 
educational, drug or alcohol counseling programs.7  Pursuant to 
§ 938.355(4)(a), the original dispositional order in the instant 
case provided that it would expire on October 23, 2002. 
¶34 A circuit court may extend a dispositional order and 
change placement.  Wisconsin Stat. § 938.365(6) allows a circuit 
court to extend a dispositional order for 30 days for the 
circuit court to hear a request to extend the dispositional 
order.  Section 938.365(6) reads as follows: 
If a request to extend a dispositional order is made 
prior to the termination of the order, but the court 
is unable to conduct a hearing on the request prior to 
the termination date [of the dispositional order], the 
court may extend the [dispositional] order for a 
period of not more than 30 days, not including any 
period 
of 
delay 
resulting 
from 
any 
of 
the 
circumstances specified in s. 938.315(1).  The court 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 938.34. 
7 Wis. Stat. § 938.34(1)-(16). 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
13 
 
shall grant appropriate relief as provided in s. 
938.315(3) with respect to any request to extend a 
dispositional order on which a hearing is not held 
within the time limit specified in this subsection.  
Failure to object if a hearing is not held within the 
time limit specified in this subsection waives that 
time limit. 
¶35 According to the text of Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6), if 
there is a request to extend a dispositional order prior to the 
termination of the order, but the circuit court is unable to 
conduct a hearing on the request before the termination date of 
the dispositional order, the circuit court may extend the 
dispositional order for not more than 30 days.  In the instant 
case, the State did request an extension of the dispositional 
order prior to the termination of the order.  The circuit court 
was unable to conduct a hearing on the State's request before 
the termination date of the dispositional order.  The circuit 
court did not, however, extend the disposition order for 30 
days, probably because no request for a temporary extension 
under Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6) was made.  The statute does not 
explicitly explain the consequences of a circuit court's failure 
to order a 30-day temporary extension of the dispositional 
order.  The statute does provide that if a hearing is not held 
within the 30 days set forth in the temporary extension, failure 
to object waives that time limit. 
¶36 The third relevant statute is Wis. Stat. § 938.315(3).  
This statute governs the failure to comply with any time limit 
specified in the Juvenile Justice Code (chapter 938).  Section 
938.315(3) provides that failure to comply with any time limit 
in chapter 938 does not deprive the court of personal or subject 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
14 
 
matter 
jurisdiction 
or 
of 
competency 
to 
exercise 
that 
jurisdiction and that failure to object to a delay or a 
continuance 
waives 
the 
time 
limit. 
Specifically, 
section 
938.315(3) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Failure to comply with any time limit specified in 
this chapter does not deprive the court of personal or 
subject matter jurisdiction or of 
competency to 
exercise that jurisdiction.  Failure to object to a 
period of delay or a continuance waives the time limit 
that is the subject of the period of delay or 
continuance.8   
                                                 
8 The other subsections of Wis. Stat. § 938.315 are as 
follows: 
(1) The following time periods shall be excluded in 
computing time requirements within this chapter: 
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other legal 
actions 
concerning 
the 
juvenile, 
including 
an 
examination under s. 938.295 or a hearing related to 
the juvenile's mental condition, prehearing motions, 
waiver motions and hearings on other matters. 
(b) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance 
granted at the request of or with the consent of the 
juvenile and counsel. 
(c) Any 
period 
of 
delay 
caused 
by 
the 
disqualification or substitution of a judge or by any 
other transfer of the case or intake inquiry to a 
different judge, intake worker or county. 
(d) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance 
granted at the request of the representative of the 
public under s. 938.09 if the continuance is granted 
because of the unavailability of evidence material to 
the case when he or she has exercised due diligence to 
obtain the evidence and there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the evidence will be available at the 
later date, or to allow him or her additional time to 
prepare the case and additional time is justified 
because of the exceptional circumstances of the case. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(dm) Any 
period 
of 
delay 
resulting 
from 
court 
congestion or scheduling. 
(e) Any period of delay resulting from the imposition 
of a consent decree. 
(f) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or 
unavailability of the juvenile. 
(fm) Any period of delay resulting from the inability 
of the court to provide the juvenile with notice of an 
extension hearing under s. 938.365 due to the juvenile 
having run away or otherwise having made himself or 
herself unavailable to receive that notice. 
(g) A reasonable period of delay when the juvenile is 
joined in a hearing with another juvenile as to whom 
the time for a hearing has not expired under this 
section if there is good cause for not hearing the 
cases separately. 
(h) Any period of delay resulting from the need to 
appoint a qualified interpreter. 
(2) A continuance may be granted by the court only 
upon a showing of good cause in open court or during a 
telephone conference under s. 807.13 on the record and 
only for so long as is necessary, taking into account 
the request or consent of the representative of the 
public under s. 938.09 or the parties, the interests 
of the victims and the interest of the public in the 
prompt disposition of cases. 
(2m) No continuance or extension of a time limit 
specified in this chapter may be granted and no period 
of delay specified in sub. (1) may be excluded in 
computing a time requirement under this chapter if the 
continuance, extension, or exclusion would result in 
any of the following: 
(a) The 
court 
making 
an 
initial 
finding 
under 
[several statutory subsections not relevant here] that 
reasonable efforts have been made to prevent the 
removal of the juvenile from the home, while assuring 
that 
the 
juvenile's 
health 
and 
safety 
are 
the 
paramount 
concerns, or 
an initial 
finding 
under 
[several statutory subsections not relevant here] that 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
16 
 
¶37 A request to extend the dispositional order and change 
placement, as we stated previously, was made in the present case 
in September 2002.  The circuit court did not act upon the 
request prior to the expiration of the one-year dispositional 
order.  No request was made for a temporary 30-day extension of 
the one-year dispositional order under § 938.365(6) before the 
expiration of the one-year dispositional order.   
¶38 The dispositional order expired on October 23, 2002; 
the hearing on extending the order for another year was held on 
October 24, 2002. 
¶39 The State argues that the circuit court inferentially 
granted the temporary 30-day extension on October 2, 2002, when 
it scheduled the hearing for October 24, and that no magic words 
are required for a circuit court to invoke a temporary 30-day 
extension 
of 
the 
dispositional 
order 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.365(6).  The State asserts that the criteria for granting 
the temporary extension were met in the instant case: A request 
                                                                                                                                                             
those efforts were not required to be made because a 
circumstance specified in s. 938.355(2d)(b)1. to 4. 
applies, more than 60 days after the date on which the 
juvenile was removed from the home. 
(b) The court making an initial finding under s. 
938.38(5m) that the agency primarily responsible for 
providing services to the juvenile has made reasonable 
efforts to achieve the goals of the juvenile's 
permanency plan more than 12 months after the date on 
which the juvenile was removed from the home or making 
any subsequent findings under s. 938.38(5m) as to 
those reasonable efforts more than 12 months after the 
date of a previous finding as to those reasonable 
efforts. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
17 
 
for an extension of a dispositional order was timely made, and 
the circuit court had difficulty scheduling the hearing earlier. 
¶40 The State argues that the circuit court can extend a 
dispositional order by implication or inference or nunc pro 
tunc.  We disagree with the State.  A circuit court must follow 
the statutory procedure for extending an order.9  The statute 
does not allow for an extension by implication, by inference, or 
after the fact.   
¶41 Particularly in juvenile proceedings, the juvenile and 
his or her relatives must be aware of the dispositional status 
of a juvenile; inferential orders do not comport with that 
notion, the statutes, or due process.  The juvenile's liberty 
interests are at stake.  To allow an extension by inference 
undermines all the certainty the legislature has attempted to 
build into chapter 938.  As a one-year dispositional order nears 
its end, all the parties are aware that unless the state 
initiates additional action before the expiration date of the 
order, the circuit court's authority over the juvenile ceases.   
¶42 In the present case, if a 30-day temporary extension 
were granted by inference, no one would have been able to 
determine Michael S.'s status on October 23, 2003.  It was only 
on October 24 that Judge Foley mentioned he was going to enter a 
temporary extension.  Even then, the parties continued to 
dispute the court's authority to grant the order over at least 
three more hearings before two different judges.  The goals of 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § 938.365(1m). 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
18 
 
certainty and finality would not be achieved by inferential 
orders.  
 
¶43 Section 938.365(6) allows a circuit court to "grant" 
an extension if certain conditions are present.  Granting an 
extension is an affirmative act that advises all parties 
involved, as well as all the circuit court judges who act on the 
file.   
¶44 While the circuit court is not required to utter 
"magic words" to extend a dispositional order temporarily for 30 
days, it must enter a written or oral order of extension prior 
to the expiration of the underlying dispositional order.  No 
order was entered in the instant case.  The record does not 
reflect that the circuit court or the parties were aware that 
the contested hearing was set beyond the expiration of the one-
year dispositional order.  Had the circuit court entered on 
October 2 either a written or oral order granting a 30-day 
extension under Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6), this case would not be 
here.   
¶45 Having rejected the State's position that the circuit 
court 
extended 
the 
dispositional 
order 
inferentially, 
by 
implication, or after the fact, prior to its expiration, we 
address now the parties' other arguments.  
¶46 Relying 
on 
In 
re 
B.J.N., 
162 
Wis. 2d 635, 
469 
N.W.2d 845 
(1991), 
in 
which 
the 
court 
stated 
that 
"[a] 
dispositional order has no validity once the time period has 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
19 
 
elapsed,"10  Michael S. asserts that the circuit court lost both 
personal jurisdiction and competency over Michael S. once the 
one-year dispositional order expired on October 23.  Michael S. 
contends that the circuit court was without authority to issue a 
temporary extension after the expiration date, and without the 
statutory 30-day temporary extension, argues Michael S., the 
circuit court was without authority to enter the subsequent one-
year dispositional order.   
¶47 In contrast, relying on Village of Trempealeau v. 
Mikrut11 and the statutes, the State argues that because Michael 
S. did not object to scheduling the hearing on October 24, he 
waived any challenge to the circuit court's ability to hear the 
State's request for an additional one-year dispositional order.   
¶48 We now turn to Michael S.'s position.  B.J.N., upon 
which Michael S. relies, arose under chapter 48 of the Statutes 
(1987-88), the Children's Code, enacted in 1977.  At the time 
B.J.N. was decided, chapter 48 set forth the requirements for 
dispositional orders for both juvenile delinquency and children 
in need of protection or services (CHIPS) cases. 
¶49 Prior to the adoption of the Children's Code, the 
juvenile justice system allowed a dispositional order to last 
until the juvenile's eighteenth birthday.  There was no 
statutorily required expiration date of a dispositional order 
                                                 
10 In re B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 658, 469 N.W.2d 845 
(1991). 
11 Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, 273 
Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
20 
 
before the juvenile attained the age of 18.12  This lack of an 
expiration date for a dispositional order "often resulted in an 
abuse of detention."13   
¶50 As revised in 1979, the Children's Code empowered 
circuit courts to issue juvenile dispositional orders for a one-
year period and, if the order was to be extended, required 
circuit courts to hold formal hearings on whether to extend a 
dispositional order.14  The Children's Code thus afforded a 
juvenile an annual review15 and did not allow a "gap" between the 
expiration date of the dispositional order and the date on which 
a new order was entered.16 
¶51 The primary function of the expiration date of a 
dispositional order was to ensure the protection of a juvenile's 
due process rights.17  Indeed, "some of the more important 
revisions of ch. 48 [were] made in the 1970's in order to 
                                                 
12 For a discussion of the 1977 Children's Code, see B.J.N., 
162 Wis. 2d at 646—47; In re S.D.R., 109 Wis. 2d 567, 574-77, 
326 N.W.2d 762 (1982). 
13 B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 646 (citing Wisconsin Council on 
Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice Standards and Goals 81 (Dec. 
1975)).  See also S.D.R., 109 Wis. 2d at 574.  
14 B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 646.  See also S.D.R., 109 
Wis. 2d at 574. 
15 S.D.R., 109 Wis. 2d at 576. 
16 B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 647 n.9. 
17 B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 646; S.D.R., 109 Wis. 2d at 577.  
See In re R.H., 147 Wis. 2d 22, 433 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1988), 
aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 150 Wis. 2d 432, 
441 N.W.2d 233 (1989). 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
21 
 
implement major United State Supreme Court decisions and assure 
the constitutional rights of children . . . ."18  The Children's 
Code recognized that a juvenile has a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest and should be subject to a dispositional order 
only if one is needed.19  The Children's Code's new temporal 
limitations 
were 
designed 
to 
protect 
the 
juvenile's 
constitutional liberty interest.  A juvenile has a due process 
                                                 
18 B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 645. 
19 S.D.R., 109 Wis. 2d at 576.  In discussing the temporal 
limitations of a dispositional order and the role of the 30-day 
temporary extension, this court noted: 
The temporary extension provision is an integral part 
of the revised Code which provides for yearly review 
of juvenile dispositions.  In changing from the system 
under 
the 
old 
Code, 
which 
allowed 
continued 
confinement until after eighteen without any review, 
the legislature deemed it necessary to allow a short 
additional period to accommodate situations when the 
court was "unable" to hold the extension hearing prior 
to the expiration of the dispositional order.  Such a 
temporary extension is in the best interests of all 
parties involved in the juvenile process. . . . The 
legislature 
in 
providing 
for 
the 
30-day 
period 
balanced the interests of the juvenile in having a 
hearing before the expiration of the dispositional 
order 
and 
having 
the 
benefit 
of 
the 
entire 
dispositional period to examine his or her progress.  
Further, the legislature recognized the problems of 
scheduling the plenary extension hearing into busy 
court calendars prior to the expiration of the order.  
Thus, through sec. 48.356(6), Stats., the legislature 
attempted to effectively and practically implement the 
annual review requirement of the revised Code.   
Id. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
22 
 
right to have his or her disposition re-determined by a fixed 
date.20  
¶52 With this background about the Children's Code, we 
turn to B.J.N.  In B.J.N., unlike in the present case, the 
circuit court granted a temporary 30-day extension of a one-year 
dispositional order before the order expired.  No hearing was 
held, however, during the 30-day period.  The question was 
whether under Wis. Stat. § 48.365(6) (1987-88),21 the predecessor 
to Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6), the one-year dispositional order 
could be extended beyond 30 days and whether Wis. Stat. § 48.315 
(1987-88),22 a predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 938.315, could be used 
                                                 
20 B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 648-49. 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.365(1), (6) (1987-88) read: 
48.365 
Extension of orders.  (1) The parent, child, 
guardian, legal custodian, any person or agency bound 
by the dispositional order, the district attorney or 
corporation counsel in the county in which the 
dispositional order was entered or the court on its 
own motion, may request an extension of an order under 
s. 48.355.  The request shall be submitted to the 
court which entered the order.  No order under s. 
48.355 may be extended except as provided in this 
section. 
. . . . 
(6) If a request to extend a dispositional order is 
made prior to the termination of the order, but the 
court is unable to conduct a hearing on the request 
prior to the termination date, the court may extend 
the order for a period of not more than 30 days. 
22 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.315 (1987-88) read: 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
48.315  Delays, continuances and extensions. (1) The 
following time periods shall be excluded in computing 
time requirements within this chapter: 
 
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other 
legal actions concerning the child, including an 
examination under s. 48.295 or a hearing related to 
the child's mental condition, prehearing motions, 
waiver motions and hearings on other matters. 
 
(b) Any 
period 
of 
delay 
resulting 
from 
a 
continuance granted at the request of or with the 
consent of the child and counsel. 
 
(c) Any 
period 
of 
delay 
caused 
by 
the 
disqualification of a judge. 
 
(d) Any 
period 
of 
delay 
resulting 
from 
a 
continuance 
granted 
at 
the 
request 
of 
the 
representative of the public under s. 48.09 if the 
continuance is granted because of the unavailability 
of evidence material to the case when he or she has 
exercised due diligence to obtain the evidence and 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
evidence will be available at the later date, or to 
allow him or her additional time to prepare the case 
and additional time is justified because of the 
exceptional circumstances of the case. 
 
(e) Any period of delay resulting from the 
imposition of a consent decree. 
 
(f) Any period of delay resulting from the 
absence or unavailability of the child. 
 
(g) A reasonable period of delay when the child 
is joined in a hearing with another child as to whom 
the time for a hearing has not expired under this 
section if there is good cause for not hearing the 
cases separately. 
 
(2) A continuance shall be granted by the court 
only upon a showing of good cause in open court or 
during a telephone conference under s. 807.13 on the 
record and only for so long as is necessary, taking 
into account the request or consent of the district 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
24 
 
to expand the duration of a 30-day extension of a dispositional 
order.23   
¶53 The B.J.N. court held that the circuit court lost its 
competence to exercise jurisdiction when the hearing was not 
held within the 30-day time period under Wis. Stat. § 48.365(6) 
(1987-88); that § 48.315 (1987-88) could not be used to enlarge 
the 30-day time period of the dispositional order; and that the 
parties could not waive the circuit court's loss of competency 
after the 30-day extension terminated.   
¶54 Resting its decision on the text of the statutory 
provisions and the objectives of the drafters of the Children's 
Code, the B.J.N. court concluded that "[a] dispositional order 
has no validity once the time period has elapsed"24 unless a 
temporary extension was granted before the expiration of the 
one-year dispositional order.     
¶55 The B.J.N. court concluded that a juvenile cannot 
waive the right to challenge the scheduling of a post-
dispositional proceeding after the expiration of the 30-day 
extension.25  The B.J.N. court highlighted that the court has 
"consistently ruled that a court's loss of power due to the 
failure 
to 
act 
within 
statutory 
time 
periods 
cannot 
be 
                                                                                                                                                             
attorney or the parties and the interest of the public 
in the prompt disposition of cases. 
23 B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 639, 641. 
24 Id. at 658. 
25 Id. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
25 
 
stipulated to nor waived."26  "An objecting party's failure to 
expressly raise the loss of competence at the earliest available 
moment cannot revive an order which has expired and no longer 
carries any force of law."27  
¶56 With regard to the application of Wis. Stat. § 48.315 
(1987-88), the B.J.N. court held that § 48.315 (1987-88) did not 
apply to extensions of dispositional orders.  Section 48.315(1) 
(1987-88) provided that certain enumerated periods of delay or 
continuance "shall be excluded in computing time requirements 
within this chapter."  The B.J.N. court concluded that "the 
length 
of 
time 
a 
dispositional 
order 
can 
remain 
in 
effect . . . is not really a 'requirement' or 'deadline' by 
which time something must be done to proceed to the next step."28  
The 30-day extension under § 48.365(6) (1987-88) represents the 
length of time an order stays in effect, according to the B.J.N. 
court.  Thus the court ruled in B.J.N. that § 48.315 (1987-88) 
did not allow the dispositional order to remain in effect beyond 
its stated expiration date.   
¶57 To determine the applicability of B.J.N. to the 
present case, we have to compare the Children's Code to the 
Juvenile Justice Code, which governs the present case.  In 1995, 
the legislature created chapter 938, the Juvenile Justice Code, 
which governs delinquent juveniles; CHIPS cases remain in 
                                                 
26 Id. at 657 (citations omitted). 
27 Id. at 657-58. 
28 Id. at 651. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
26 
 
chapter 48.29  The 1995 Juvenile Justice Code revised sections of 
the 
Children's 
Code 
applicable 
to 
delinquent 
juveniles.  
Relevant to this case are changes from Wis. Stat. §§ 48.365(6) 
and 48.315 (1987-88) in §§ 938.365(6) and 938.315.   
¶58 The text of Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6) regarding the 
request for a 30-day temporary extension of the dispositional 
order is essentially unchanged from the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.365(6) (1987-88) interpreted in B.J.N., except for the 
addition of the sentence stating that "[f]ailure to object if a 
hearing is not held within the time limit specified in this 
subsection waives that time limit."  
¶59 This final sentence of Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6) does 
not apply in the present case because this sentence is obviously 
tied to the preceding sentences, which relate to a request made 
prior to expiration of the order to extend a dispositional order 
for 30 days in order to hold a hearing.  That is, the "time 
limit" referred to is holding the hearing within 30 days.  In 
the present case no request for a 30-day extension of the 
dispositional order was made and none was granted before the 
expiration of the order.  Accordingly, the waiver provision of 
§ 938.365(6) is inapplicable here, and under B.J.N., the one-
year dispositional order in the present case had no validity 
once its expiration date, October 23, was reached.     
¶60 We turn now to a new provision in the Juvenile Justice 
Code, Wis. Stat. § 938.315(3), upon which the State relies for 
                                                 
29 1995 Wis. Act 77. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
27 
 
the proposition that failure to comply with the 30-day provision 
in Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6) does not deprive the circuit court of 
personal or subject matter jurisdiction or competency and that 
Michael S.'s failure to object to the delay waived the time 
limit.  Section 938.315(3) reads in relevant part as follows: 
Failure to comply with any time limit specified in 
this chapter does not deprive the court of personal or 
subject matter jurisdiction or of 
competency to 
exercise that jurisdiction.  Failure to object to a 
period of delay or a continuance waives the time limit 
that is the subject of the period of delay or 
continuance. 
¶61 The State's argument is not persuasive.  It is 
answered by the B.J.N. decision.  The expiration date of a 
dispositional order is not a "time limit" contemplated in Wis. 
Stat. § 938.315(3).  The B.J.N. court explained this conclusion, 
stating, "The length of time a dispositional order can remain in 
effect, however, is not really a 'requirement' or 'deadline' by 
which something must be done to proceed to the next step."30  
Accordingly, we conclude that § 938.315(3) does not apply in the 
present case to extend the one-year dispositional order.  
¶62 When the legislature wanted to use the term "time 
limits" in chapter 938 with reference to specifically enumerated 
periods, it did so.31  The fundamental difference between a "time 
                                                 
30 B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 651. 
31 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 938.24(5), governing the intake 
of a delinquent juvenile, which reads in relevant part: 
(5) The intake worker shall request that a petition 
be filed, enter into a deferred prosecution agreement 
or close the case within 40 days or sooner of receipt 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
28 
 
limit" 
as 
described 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.315(3) 
and 
the 
expiration of the one-year dispositional order is as follows:  
"Time limits" are those constraints that require action within a 
set period of time.  In contrast, when a one-year dispositional 
order expires, it simply ceases to be in effect.  Unless an 
order is entered extending the one-year dispositional order 
before the dispositional order expires, nothing in §§ 938.315(3) 
or 938.365(6) extends the validity of the one-year dispositional 
order.  
¶63 The 
difference 
between 
"time 
limits" 
and 
the 
durational period of dispositional orders was retained by the 
court of appeals in In re Sarah R.P., a recent court of appeals 
decision relating to Wis. Stat. § 938.32, which governs consent 
decrees.32   
¶64 In Sarah R.P., a circuit court attempted to vacate a 
consent decree entered under chapter 938.  The consent decree in 
the delinquency action included a curfew and a condition that 
Sarah R.P. not engage in further law violations.  The consent 
                                                                                                                                                             
of 
referral 
information. . . . Notwithstanding 
the 
requirements of this section, the district attorney 
may initiate a delinquency petition under s. 938.25 
within 20 days after notice that the case has been 
closed or that a deferred prosecution agreement has 
been entered into.  The judge shall grant appropriate 
relief as provided in s. 938.315(3) with respect to 
any such petition which is not referred or filed 
within 
the 
time 
limits 
specified 
within 
this 
subsection. . . . (emphasis added). 
32 See In re Sarah R.P., 2001 WI App 49, 241 Wis. 2d 530, 
624 N.W.2d 872. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
29 
 
decree at issue was to remain in effect until December 8.  The 
State filed a petition to vacate the decree on December 1, 
alleging that Sarah R.P. violated the curfew and stole two pens 
from school.  The hearing on the State's petition was not held 
until December 21, 13 days after the consent decree expired.  No 
temporary extension of the consent decree was requested or 
entered.   
¶65 The circuit court accepted the State's contention that 
the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 938.315 allowed for an extension 
of the consent decree after the expiration date of the decree 
and entered a dispositional order.  Sarah R.P. challenged the 
order in the court of appeals.   
¶66 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, 
concluding that the durational period of a consent decree is not 
a time limit within Wis. Stat. § 938.315 but rather provided for 
a "period of supervision" that terminated at the conclusion of 
the period set forth in the decree.33  According to Sarah R.P., 
once "the decree has expired, it cannot be resurrected."34   
¶67 The court of appeals also rejected the State's 
argument that Sarah R.P. waived the right to challenge the 
expiration of the decree by not raising it at or before the 
December 21 hearing.35  
                                                 
33 Id., ¶12. 
34 Id., ¶14. 
35 Id., ¶15. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
30 
 
¶68 Applying the principles derived from B.J.N. and Sarah 
R.P., we would have to conclude that the circuit court had no 
authority over the Michael S. matter after the one-year 
dispositional order expired on October 23. 
¶69 We now turn to the State's position to determine 
whether the Mikrut case undermines our reliance on B.J.N. and 
Sarah R.P. for the proposition that when no order is in effect 
extending the dispositional order, the circuit court has no 
authority over the juvenile.   
¶70 The State relies on Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 
2004 WI 79, ¶¶27-30, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190, to assert 
that Michael S. waived his right to challenge on appeal the 
circuit court's loss of competency when he failed to challenge 
the scheduling of the contested hearing for October 24, 2002, at 
the October 2 hearing.  The State relies on Mikrut for the 
proposition that a challenge to a circuit court's competency is 
waived if not raised in the circuit court.   
¶71 Mikrut was issued 21 citations for violations of local 
ordinances.36  He was found guilty, appealed, and lost, and this 
court denied his petition for review.37  Mikrut then moved, 17 
months after the guilty verdict, to vacate the judgment.38  
Mikrut claimed the citations were illegal because the village 
failed to comply with statutory mandates in issuing the 
                                                 
36 Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶4. 
37 Id., ¶5. 
38 Id., ¶6. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
31 
 
citations.39  The Mikrut court held that competency does not 
equate to subject matter jurisdiction and that a challenge to 
the circuit court's competency is waived if not raised in the 
circuit court.40  The Mikrut court, however, backed off from 
adopting a categorical rule that all competency objections must 
be made at the circuit court or be waived.41  For example, the 
court held open the question whether statutory time periods can 
be waived.42  
 
¶72 The State agrees that Mikrut left open the question 
whether a challenge to competency based on noncompliance with a 
statutory time period can be waived.  The court explained in 
Mikrut, for example, that in B.J.N., "the failure to timely hold 
a hearing on a request for an extension of a CHIPS order under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.365(2) resulted in a loss of the circuit court's 
competency to proceed, because without the statutorily-required 
hearing on the extension, the original order expired."43  Mikrut 
summarized B.J.N. as acknowledging that "'we have consistently 
ruled that a court's loss of power due to the failure to act 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Id., ¶3. 
41 Id., ¶30. 
42 Id. 
43 Id., ¶12. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
32 
 
within statutory time periods cannot be stipulated to nor 
waived.'"44 
¶73 Thus the waiver rule of Mikrut does not, according to 
Mikrut, control the outcome of this case.  The present case 
involves a statutory time period that Mikrut left undisturbed.  
¶74 The State provides no persuasive reason to extend 
Mikrut and overrule B.J.N.'s holding that "[a] dispositional 
order has no validity once the time period has elapsed."45  We 
therefore abide by Mikrut and B.J.N.46  
* * * * 
 
¶75 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that after a 
juvenile's one-year dispositional order expires, a circuit court 
may not grant a 30-day temporary extension of the order under 
Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6).  Further, consistent with caselaw, 
expiration of the one-year juvenile dispositional order cannot 
be waived.  Because no 30-day temporary extension was granted 
                                                 
44 Id., 
¶25 
(quoting 
B.J.N., 
162 
Wis. 2d at 
656-57) 
(emphasis added in Mikrut). 
45 B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d at 658. 
46 An additional reason why Mikrut's broad waiver rule does 
not operate in this case is that Michael S. challenged the loss 
of competency at the earliest possible time.  The loss of 
competency in this case arose on October 24, 2002.  The State 
could have petitioned for a temporary extension any time before 
October 23, 2002.  Therefore, until the one-year dispositional 
order expired on October 23 without the juvenile court granting 
a temporary extension, there was no loss of competency for 
Michael S. to challenge.  At the very first hearing after the 
loss of competency, before Judge Malmstadt, Michael S. expressed 
his desire to be released from control by the State. 
No. 
2003AP2934   
 
33 
 
prior to the expiration of the one-year dispositional order, the 
circuit court could not act with respect to Michael S. once the 
one-year dispositional order expired. 
¶76 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶77 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   The 
majority opinion concludes that because the hearing on the 
State's petition to extend the supervision of Michael S. and to 
change placement was held one day after the date on which the 
majority 
opinion 
determined 
that 
the 
dispositional 
order 
expired, the court lost the authority to issue further orders in 
regard to Michael.  Majority op., ¶3.  I disagree with the 
majority's conclusion because the dispositional order had not 
expired prior to the extension of Michael's supervision on 
December 3, 2002.  Accordingly, I conclude the order extending 
supervision and changing Michael's placement was a valid order.  
Therefore, I would affirm the court of appeals, although on 
different grounds, and I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶78 The record shows that Michael was placed under court 
supervision by an order signed November 6, 2001.47  That order 
was entered by the clerk on November 8, 2001.  The original 
supervision order stated as follows:  "The juvenile [is] placed 
under the supervision of the Milwaukee County Department of 
Human 
Services 
for 
a 
period 
of 
one 
(1) 
year 
expiring 
October 23rd, 2002."   
¶79 On September 10, 2002, the county moved to extend the 
dispositional order for a year and to change placement.  The 
                                                 
47 Michael was found delinquent for a weapons violation 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 948.60(2)(a) 
(2001-02). 
 
All 
further 
statutory references are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise 
noted. 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
2 
 
county filed an amended permanency plan and a hearing on the 
county's motion was held September 26, 2002.  Michael, his 
lawyer, an assistant district attorney and others were present, 
and discussed the petition.48  When asked his position on the 
petition, Michael's lawyer said, "My client's position is he 
doesn't have a problem with extending probation, but he does not 
want to stay here in detention." 
¶80 At the September 26 hearing, there was a request for a 
psychological exam for Michael, as he seemed unable to adapt to 
any 
of 
the 
previous 
placements——his 
aunt's 
home, 
his 
grandmother's home and his mother's home.  The parties agreed 
the assessment should be done and the court so ordered.  They 
then continued the hearing on the county's petition until 
October 2 to determine how best to proceed in light of the 
psychological exam.   
¶81 The examination results were filed on September 30 and 
reviewed during the continued hearing on October 2.  Because of 
the 
psychological 
report, 
the 
county 
made 
a 
primary 
recommendation of placement in "corrections" and a secondary 
recommendation of placement in a group home.  The court then 
asked, "[W]hat are we setting this on for?  Contest or what?"  
To which Michael's attorney responded, "I'm going to contest it 
at this point.  . . .  I'd probably like to get another psych[] 
exam."  The court, in consultation on the record with the 
attorneys, set October 24 as the date to continue the hearing.  
                                                 
48 Michael was then being held in detention because he was 
"AWOL" from his last court placement. 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
3 
 
This was the first date the court had available on which all 
parties and their attorneys could attend.   
¶82 At the hearing on October 24, 2002, all parties 
discussed possible placement options.  No new psychological 
information was provided by Michael.  However, the judge then 
presiding 
raised 
questions 
about 
the 
court's 
continuing 
jurisdiction.  The matter was adjourned and rescheduled for a 
hearing on November 8, based on the court's calendar and the 
attorneys' availability.  Again, questions of the court's 
authority were raised and the matter was rescheduled and 
adjourned, with the consent of all present, to November 26.  On 
November 26, the circuit court made a definite decision on its 
authority to continue to make orders in regard to Michael and 
set an evidentiary hearing for December 3.  At the conclusion of 
the December 3 hearing, the court extended supervision to 
October 23, 2003, and changed Michael's placement to the Ethan 
Allen School.  An order to that effect was entered December 4, 
2002. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶83 This 
case 
turns 
on 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation to which we apply a de novo standard of review, 
but benefit from the analyses of both the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 
167, 663 N.W.2d 700.   
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
4 
 
B. 
Statutory Interpretation 
¶84 The 
majority 
opinion 
mainly 
relies 
on 
its 
interpretation of the term "time limit," found in Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.315(3), 
as 
compared 
with 
this 
court's 
earlier 
interpretation of "time limit" in In re B.J.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 
658, 469 N.W.2d 845 (1991), majority op., ¶¶52-62.  In so doing, 
it assumed that the original dispositional order terminated 
October 23, 2002.  I conclude that assumption is incorrect as a 
matter of law.  In my view, the majority opinion failed to 
analyze the relevant statutes for determining when the order of 
supervision actually terminated; and therefore, it came to an 
incorrect conclusion about the validity of the order extending 
supervision and changing placement.  Section 938.315(1) governs 
the date the original dispositional order terminated, as I 
explain below.49   
¶85 In interpreting Wis. Stat. § 938.315(1), because we 
are examining a dispositional order, I begin with Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.355(4)(a), which sets the statutory parameters for the 
termination of a dispositional order.  For my interpretation of 
these 
statutes, 
I 
rely 
on 
our 
criteria 
of 
statutory 
interpretation set out in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
                                                 
49 The applicability of Wis. Stat. § 938.315(1) was briefed 
by Michael.  Additionally, I am aware that the State chose not 
to analyze the statute.  However, we are not bound by 
concessions on legal issues that a party makes.  See Fletcher v. 
Eagle River Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 156 Wis. 2d 165, 178-80, 456 
N.W.2d 788 (1990).  
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
5 
 
In Kalal, we explained that our focus was to determine 
"statutory meaning."  Id., ¶44.  We explained that: 
[j]udicial deference to the policy choices enacted 
into law by the legislature requires that statutory 
interpretation focus primarily on the language of the 
statute.  We assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed 
in 
the 
statutory language. 
 
Extrinsic 
evidence of legislative intent may become relevant to 
statutory interpretation in some circumstances, but is 
not the primary focus of inquiry.  It is the enacted 
law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the 
public. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
purpose 
of 
statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means 
so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended 
effect. 
Id.  As we have said many times, we begin with the language used 
in the statute and if that language is plain and clearly 
understood, 
we 
ordinarily 
stop 
our 
inquiry. 
 
Seider 
v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶¶44-53, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  
Context is also important when determining the plain meaning of 
a statute, as is the purpose of the statute and its scope, if 
those qualities can be ascertained from the language of the 
statute itself.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46-48.  These are all 
intrinsic sources for statutory interpretation. Id.  
¶86 However, if the meaning of the statute is not plain 
and the statute "is capable of being understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons in two or more senses," then the statute 
is ambiguous.  Id., ¶47.  When a statute is ambiguous, we often 
consult extrinsic, "interpretive resources outside the statutory 
text," such as legislative history.  Id., ¶50. 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
6 
 
1. Wisconsin Stat. § 938.355(4)(a) 
¶87 The original dispositional order that was entered 
November 8, 2001, placed Michael in the home of his aunt.  The 
time requirement in regard to the order's duration is set out in 
Wis. Stat. § 938.355(4)(a): 
an order under this section . . . that places or 
continues the placement of the juvenile in . . . the 
home of a relative other than a parent shall terminate 
when the juvenile reaches 18 years of age, at the end 
of one year after its entry, . . . whichever is later, 
unless the court specifies a shorter period of time or 
the court terminates the order sooner. 
As shown by the quote above, part of § 938.355(4)(a) that 
applies to a child placed outside of his or her home envisions 
dispositional orders that do not end until the child is 18 years 
of age because the statute directs that the order terminates at 
the later of when the child is 18 or one year has passed.  The 
statute also provides that a court may specify a different time 
period or may terminate the disposition at a date earlier than 
that specified in the order.   
¶88 The order imposing supervision on Michael does not 
fall within the phrase in Wis. Stat. § 938.355(4) that would 
permit it to run until Michael turned 18 because the circuit 
court took advantage of an alternate choice.  Instead, the order 
gave more specific directions in regard to its duration, as the 
statute permits.  However, if we look only to the face of the 
order, 
its 
directives 
are 
ambiguous 
in 
regard 
to 
when 
supervision terminates.  For example, the order states it is 
"for a period of one (1) year," which would cause it to expire 
on November 7, 2002, because the order has a stamp on it showing 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
7 
 
it was "entered" on November 8, 2001.  However, the order also 
states 
that 
placement 
under 
supervision 
is, 
"expiring 
October 23rd, 2002," which arguably sets October 23, 2002 as the 
termination of supervision.  This ambiguity does not require 
resolution, however, because the directives in the order do not 
answer the question of when the original supervision ended.  And 
as I explain below, no matter which date one chooses, the order 
extending supervision and changing placement was timely.  I look 
first to the effect of relevant tolling provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.315 (1) on the duration of the dispositional order.   
 
2.  Wisconsin Stat. § 938.315(1) 
¶89 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.315(1) states in relevant part: 
The following time periods shall be excluded in 
computing time requirements within this chapter: 
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other 
legal actions concerning the juvenile, including an 
examination under s. 938.295 . . . 
(b) 
Any 
period 
of 
delay 
resulting 
from 
a 
continuance granted at the request of or with the 
consent of the juvenile and counsel. 
. . .  
(dm) Any period of delay resulting from court 
congestion or scheduling.   
Section 938.315(1) excludes "time periods" that would otherwise 
apply when computing any "time requirement" found within ch. 
938.  Therefore, it is a tolling provision relating to ch. 938.  
As an initial matter, whether § 938.315(1) applies depends upon 
the meaning of "time periods" and "time requirements."  These 
are not defined in ch. 938, nor are they technical terms.  
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
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Accordingly, 
it 
is 
appropriate 
to 
consult 
dictionary 
definitions.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶53, 54.   
¶90 Black's Law Dictionary defines "time" as, "A measure 
of duration."  Black's Law Dictionary 1520 (8th ed. 2004).  
Black's does not define "period" or "requirement."  A dictionary 
of common usage defines "time" as, "the measured or measurable 
period during which an action, process, or condition exists or 
continues."  Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 1222 (1974 
ed.).  It lists "duration" as a synonym.  Id.  Webster's defines 
"period" as an "interval," id. at 852, and "requirement" as 
"something . . . needed," id. at 983.  
¶91 I conclude that the plain meaning of "time periods" in 
Wis. Stat. § 938.315(1) is an interval or measure of duration 
set out in paragraphs (a) through (i) of subsection (1) because 
the statute directs that it is the "following time periods" to 
which the statute's tolling provision refers.    Michael argues 
that the tolling effect of § 938.315(1) applies only to a 
temporary extension of a dispositional order.  However, the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
the 
statute 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
his 
interpretation.  This is so because the time periods described 
in paragraphs (a) to (i) concern many occurrences that would not 
be ordered or concluded within a 30-day extension.   
¶92 Additionally, the plain meaning of "time requirements" 
is more broad than the plain meaning of "time periods" because 
the "time requirements" of Wis. Stat. § 938.315(1) encompass all 
measures of duration that are required by any part of ch. 938.  
Here, the measure of duration of a dispositional order is set by 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
9 
 
the combination of Wis. Stat. § 938.355(4)(a) and the circuit 
court's dispositional order entered in compliance with that 
statute.  Therefore, although I do not disagree with Michael's 
conclusion that § 938.315(1) permits the tolling of a 30-day 
extension of a dispositional order as set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.365(6), there is nothing in the words chosen by the 
legislature that so limits 
its use. 
 To 
the 
contrary, 
§ 938.315(1) applies whenever the circuit court or a statute has 
set any time requirement within ch. 938.  
¶93 In my review of the "time periods" listed in Wis. 
Stat. § 938.315(1), I have concluded that the facts presented in 
the record implicate the tolling provisions of paragraphs (a), 
(b) and (dm).  Paragraph (a) speaks to "periods of delay" for an 
examination 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.295, 
which 
includes 
psychological examinations.  Paragraph (b) speaks to "periods of 
delay" that result from continuances granted either at the 
request of the juvenile and his counsel or with their consent, 
and paragraph (dm) addresses "periods of delay" resulting from 
court congestion or scheduling.    
¶94 In 
order 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.315(1) "period of delay" occurred, I examine the record 
subsequent to September 10, 2002, when the county filed its 
petition to extend Michael's supervision and to change his 
placement.  First, a hearing was held on the county's petition 
on September 26, 2002, well within the date the majority opinion 
chose for the expiration of the dispositional order.  At that 
hearing Michael's counsel explained that he did not object to 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
10 
 
the extension of supervision.  However, all agreed that a 
psychological exam of Michael was necessary in order to assess 
an appropriate placement.  The court ordered the examination and 
October 2 was selected, before the hearing was adjourned, as the 
date to determine whether placement would be contested.  The 
adjournment and the date to reconvene were agreed to by Michael 
and his attorney.  Accordingly, I conclude that the "period of 
delay" in deciding the petition, from September 26 to October 2, 
was the result of a continuance granted with the consent of 
Michael and his counsel.  Therefore, § 938.315(1)(b) applies, 
and the dispositional order is tolled from September 26 until 
October 2, a period of 6 days.50  If nothing further had 
occurred, the order for supervision could not have terminated 
earlier than October 29, 2002.51     
¶95 When the hearing was reconvened on October 2, based on 
the results of the report of psychological examination, the 
county requested placement at Ethan Allen School.  Because 
Michael did not want to be placed at Ethan Allen School, his 
                                                 
50 The time period from the September 26 hearing to the 
filing of the psychological exam report on September 30 is also 
tolled under Wis. Stat. § 938.315(1)(a); however, that provision 
is not necessary to my decision because § 938.315(1)(b) applies 
and covers a longer period of time.  
51 I realize that Wis. Stat. § 938.315(2) requires a showing 
of good cause in open court or during a telephone conference in 
order for a continuance to be granted.  The circuit court later 
spoke to good cause, but even if the court had not done so, the 
record is sufficient to find good cause for the adjournment as a 
matter of law.  See Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., Dist. 
13 v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 230, 240, 251 N.W.2d 41 (1977) 
(concluding that when there is only one reasonable inference to 
be drawn that inference becomes a question of law). 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
11 
 
counsel contested placement.  The court then worked with counsel 
and the court's calendar and scheduled October 24 as the date to 
reconvene the hearing on the county's petition.  The October 24 
time and date were agreed to by Michael and his counsel.  It was 
also the first date the court's calendar permitted sufficient 
time for a contested hearing on which the attorneys could 
attend.  Wisconsin Stat. § 938.315(1)(dm) tolls the order of 
supervision for "Any period of delay resulting from court 
congestion or scheduling."  It is uncontested that court 
congestion and scheduling were the reasons for the choice of 
October 24 as the adjourned date for the pending petition.52  
Accordingly, the dispositional order was tolled for 22 more 
days.  
If nothing further 
had occurred, 
the 
order for 
supervision could not have terminated earlier than November 20, 
2002. 
¶96 When the hearing was reconvened on October 24, the 
judge who presided at that hearing questioned whether the court 
had the power to order an extension of supervision and a change 
in placement, as the majority opinion notes.  Majority op., ¶17.  
Accordingly, no testimony was presented on the pending petition.  
However, later on October 24, the original presiding judge 
reviewed the record and concluded the court had jurisdiction.  
The court then immediately set a hearing date for November 8, to 
                                                 
52 When 
re-examining 
what 
occurred 
on 
October 2 
on 
November 26, the court said, "we just said next available date 
is October 24th and October 24th turned out one——to be one day 
beyond the expiration of the order.  . . .  So clearly one of 
the good causes in .315(1), kicks in." 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
12 
 
which Michael and his attorney agreed.  Accordingly, the 
dispositional order was tolled for 15 more days.  If nothing 
further had occurred, the order for supervision could not have 
terminated earlier than December 5, 2002. 
¶97 However, 
when 
the 
hearing 
was 
reconvened 
on 
November 8, the original presiding judge was not able to be 
present so a second substitute judge presided.  That judge also 
questioned whether the court had the power to make further 
orders.  He determined he could not decide that question without 
a transcript.  After considerable discussion with Michael, his 
counsel and the calendar clerk for the original presiding judge, 
the then-presiding judge had the matter rescheduled with the 
original presiding judge for November 26.  In regard to choosing 
this date, the then presiding judge stated, "We'll try to get a 
date real quick in front of Judge Foley."  The clerk suggested, 
"November 25th at 10?"  However, Michael's attorney was not 
available on November 25 so the November 26 date was chosen as 
the first date all would be available to reconvene the hearing 
on the county's petition.  Accordingly, the dispositional order 
was tolled for 18 more days.  If nothing further had occurred, 
the order for supervision could not have terminated earlier than 
December 23, 2002.  
¶98 When the hearing reconvened on November 26, the court 
first made a conclusive determination that it had the power to 
continue to make orders in regard to Michael's supervision.  It 
relied on its interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 938.365(6) and 
Wis. Stat. § 938.315(1).  The circuit court explained, "I think 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
13 
 
as of October 24th, each and every delay has been governed by 
938.315(1), 938.315 probably (1) and (2)."  The court then 
scheduled December 3 to reconvene for an evidentiary hearing.  
All 
parties 
again 
agreed 
to 
the 
date 
on 
the 
record.  
Accordingly, the dispositional order was tolled for 7 more days.  
If nothing further had occurred, the order for supervision could 
not have terminated earlier than December 30, 2002.  
¶99 When the hearing reconvened on December 3, evidence 
regarding an appropriate disposition was presented.  There was 
no evidence presented that Michael should not be continued in 
supervision.  Instead, in closing argument Michael's attorney 
said, "there is no doubt that he needs additional help, 
guidance, counseling, therapy, whatever.  I think we all agree 
with that.  The whole point is where?"  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the court ordered supervision extended to October 23, 
2003 and changed Michael's placement to the Ethan Allen School.  
The court's order was reduced to writing and entered on 
December 4, 
2002, 
well 
before 
the 
dispositional 
order's 
termination date of December 30, 2002. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶100   While I do not disagree with the majority opinion's 
statement that the "expiration date of a dispositional order was 
to ensure the protection of a juvenile's due process rights," 
majority op., ¶51, it begs the question for a juvenile who is in 
serious need of assistance from the juvenile court and the 
county is actively attempting to obtain what it has determined 
he needs.  Here, the circuit court, the county and all attorneys 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
14 
 
were diligent in trying to determine what services would best 
help Michael.  However, that determination could not be made in 
one hearing.  The legislature recognized that there would be 
times when flexibility in scheduling would be required, as the 
plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 938.315(1) shows.  Because I 
conclude that the order extending supervision and changing 
placement was timely made, it is a valid order.   
¶101 Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion that simply assumes the original order of supervision 
had expired before the order extending supervision and changing 
placement was made.  
¶102 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2003AP2934.pdr 
 
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