Title: In re Adoption of Walters

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Adoption of Walters, 112 Ohio St.3d 315, 2007-Ohio-7.] 
 
 
 
IN RE ADOPTION OF WALTERS. 
[Cite as In re Adoption of Walters, 112 Ohio St.3d 315, 2007-Ohio-7.] 
Adoption — R.C. 3107.11(A) does not require the notice of a hearing on an 
adoption petition to include language that both the consent and best-
interests requirements will be addressed at the hearing — One hearing to 
address both requirements is sufficient, provided notice of the adoption 
hearing pursuant to R.C. 3107.11(A) is afforded the biological parent — 
When, at the discretion of the court, separate hearings take place to 
address the consent requirement and the best-interests requirement of 
R.C. 3107.14(C), notice of each shall be given to the biological parent. 
(Nos. 2006-0613 and 2006-0614 — Submitted September 19, 2006 — Decided 
January 17, 2007.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Fairfield County, 
Nos. 2005-CA-65 and 2005-CA-66, 2006-Ohio-631. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
R.C. 3107.11(A) does not require the notice of a hearing on an adoption 
petition to include language that both the consent and best-interests 
requirements will be addressed at the hearing. 
2. 
One hearing to address both requirements is sufficient, provided notice of 
the adoption hearing pursuant to R.C. 3107.11(A) is afforded the 
biological parent. 
3. 
When, at the discretion of the court, separate hearings take place to 
address the consent requirement and the best-interests requirement of R.C. 
3107.14(C), notice of each shall be given to the biological parent. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} Today this court is called upon to determine whether the required 
notice of a hearing on an adoption proceeding under R.C. 3107.11 must include 
specific reference to both the consent and best-interests portions of that hearing to 
be sufficient under the Due Process Clause of the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions.  We hold that neither the statute nor a biological parent’s 
fundamental interest in the custody and care of his or her child requires notice of 
the two separate purposes of the adoption hearing in order for the adoption to be 
valid, and for that reason, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} In 1999, following the 1997 divorce of appellee, Atheena Walters, 
and appellant William Wright, Atheena moved to Ohio with their two minor 
children.  Wright remained in Alabama and neither supported nor maintained 
contact with the children.  In 2001, Atheena married appellant Robert Walters.  
Shortly after the marriage, Robert filed separate petitions to adopt the children, 
and because Atheena could not locate Wright, he was notified of the adoption 
petitions via publication in Lancaster, Ohio.  The publications specifically 
identified the date and time of the joint hearing on the petitions for adoption and 
further alleged that Wright’s consent was unnecessary because he had failed to 
communicate with or support the children for one year.1 See R.C. 3107.03(A).  
                                          
 
1.  The published notice in each case read: “You are hereby notified that on 7/16/01 Petitioner(s) 
Robert Lee Walters, filed in this Court a Petition to Adopt [the Wright children]. * * *  A hearing 
on said Petition will be held before Judge Steven O. Williams at the Fairfield County Probate 
Court, Hall of Justice, Third Floor, 224 East Main Street, Lancaster, Ohio 43130, on 10/22/01 at 
9:30 AM.  It is alleged in the Petition, pursuant to  R.C. 3107.07, that the consent of William 
David Wright is not required because: That person is a parent who has failed without justifiable 
cause to communicate with the minor for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the 
filing of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in the home of the petitioner.  That 
person is a parent who has failed without justifiable cause to provide for the maintenance and 
support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year 
immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in the 
home of the petitioner.” 
January Term, 2007 
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The notice did not specifically declare that a best-interests hearing would be held.  
Wright did not appear at the hearing. 
{¶ 3} The trial court found that the law had been complied with and 
entered an interlocutory order of adoption in October 2001.  The final order 
followed in January 2002 after the court held that an entry finding that consent of 
the biological father was not necessary.  On December 18, 2005, however, 
pursuant to a divorce petition, Robert filed a motion to vacate the adoptions, 
claiming that the publication notice served on the biological father, Wright, was 
defective because Atheena had falsely claimed during the time of the filing of the 
adoption petition that Wright’s whereabouts were unknown.  Robert located 
Wright in Alabama, and Wright eventually joined in the motion to set aside the 
adoptions based upon the allegedly defective notification to Wright. 
{¶ 4} The trial court refused to set aside the adoptions, finding that 
Atheena had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate Wright in 
order to serve him with notice and that the notice required by R.C. 3107.11(A) 
need not include express provisions concerning both the consent and best-interests 
portions of the adoption hearing.  The Fifth District affirmed, but certified its 
decision as in conflict with In re Adoption of Kuhlmann (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 
44, 649 N.E.2d 1279; In re Adoption of Fenimore (Jan. 28, 2000), 2d Dist. No. 
17902, 2000 WL 204389; In re Adoption of Jorgensen (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 
207, 515 N.E.2d 622; In re Adoption of Jordan (1991), 72 Ohio App.3d 638, 595 
N.E.2d 963; and In re C.M.W., 12th Dist. No. CA2004-09-031, 2004-Ohio-6935.  
This court accepted jurisdiction over the notice issue and certified the following 
conflict:  “Whether R.C. 3107.11 requires the parties listed in the statute to be 
given notice of both the consent hearing and the best interest hearing.” 2 
                                          
 
2.  Although the parties also included argument in their briefs as to whether Atheena truly 
exercised diligence in locating Wright, her ex-husband, in order to notify him of the adoption 
proceeding, we declined jurisdiction over that issue and refrain from addressing it in this case.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF R.C. 3107.11 
{¶ 5} R.C. 3107.11 states that “the court shall fix a time and place for 
hearing the [adoption] petition” and that notice of the hearing must be given both 
to any person whose consent to the adoption is necessary and to any person whose 
consent is not necessary under R.C. 3107.07(A) and certain other provisions.  
R.C. 3107.07(A) renders unnecessary the consent of a biological parent “when it 
is alleged in the adoption petition and the court finds after proper service of notice 
and hearing, that the parent has failed without justifiable cause to communicate 
with the minor or to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as 
required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year immediately 
preceding either the filing of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor 
in the home of the petitioner.”  Before granting an adoption, the trial court must 
hear evidence as to whether first, “the required consents have been obtained or 
excused” and second, whether “the adoption is in the best interest of the person 
sought to be adopted.”  R.C. 3107.14(C).  See, also, In re Adoption of Fenimore, 
2d Dist. No. 17902, 2000 WL 204389, *1. 
{¶ 6} The trial court determined that all the necessary consents had been 
entered or excused and that the adoption of the minor children was in their best 
interests.  The only question remaining, then, is whether the published notice that 
specifically referred only to the consent portion of the adoption hearing was 
sufficient under R.C. 3107.11 and due process concerns to notify Wright of both 
portions of the adoption hearing. 
{¶ 7} In considering this argument, we must first consider the actual text 
of R.C. 3107.11(A): 
                                                                                                                   
The trial court found that Wright, the biological father, had failed to communicate and provide 
support to the minor children for at least one year preceding the filing of the adoption petition and 
that Atheena exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate Wright before serving notice 
via publication.  See In re Adoption of Knipper (1986), 30 Ohio App.3d 214, 30 OBR 371, 507 
N.E.2d 436.   
January Term, 2007 
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{¶ 8} “After the filing of a petition to adopt an adult or a minor, the court 
shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition. The hearing may take place at 
any time more than thirty days after the date on which the minor is placed in the 
home of the petitioner. At least twenty days before the date of hearing, notice of 
the filing of the petition and of the time and place of hearing shall be given by the 
court * * *.” 
{¶ 9} When construing a statute, this court must determine the intent of 
the legislature by looking to the language of the statute.  Rice v. CertainTeed 
Corp. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 417, 419, 704 N.E.2d 1217.  We must also afford 
words their usual, normal, and customary meaning and “ ‘give effect to the words 
used [while refraining from] insert[ing] words not used.’ ”  Id., quoting State ex 
rel Richard v. Bd. of Trustees of Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 409, 412, 632 N.E.2d 1292. 
{¶ 10} The language of R.C. 3107.11(A) does not require the notice of a 
hearing on an adoption petition to include language that both the consent and 
best-interests requirements will be addressed at the hearing.  Instead, it merely 
requires “notice of the filing of the [adoption] petition and of the time and place 
of hearing” on that petition.  R.C. 3107.11(A).  In fact, there is nothing in any of 
the relevant statutes suggesting that the notice must include the best-interests 
portions of the hearing on the adoption petition.  We thus refrain from adding 
language to the statute and thereby requiring more than the legislature intended. 
CERTIFIED-CONFLICT CASES 
{¶ 11} Appellants ignore the plain language of the statute and instead cite 
the five certified-conflict cases to support their proposition that the notice is 
defective unless both the consent and best-interests portions of the hearing are 
included.  A close review of those cases, however, reveals that the supporting 
language in most is either irrelevant to the issue before us based on 
distinguishable facts or is dicta. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 12} First, In re Adoption of Jordan, 72 Ohio App.3d at 645, 595 
N.E.2d 963, specifically addressed whether a trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to take evidence as to the best interests of the children involved.  The court 
held that notice of that additional determination on the best interests must be 
made even when a parent’s consent is unnecessary under R.C. 3107.07(A).  In 
other words, the appellate court ordered the trial court to hold a second hearing on 
the adoption petition because it had never addressed a statutory requirement under 
R.C. 3107.14(C).  Logically, R.C. 3107.11(A) requires notice of that additional 
hearing.  The plain language of R.C. 3107.11(A) does not distinguish between 
different hearings.  It simply requires notice of any hearing on the adoption 
petition. 
{¶ 13} Similarly, in In re Fenimore, 2d Dist. No. 17902, 2000 WL 
204389, the biological parent whose consent was unnecessary failed to receive 
any notice of a second hearing on the adoption petition.  The court properly 
recognized that R.C. 3107.11(A) requires notice of all hearings on the adoption 
hearing. 
{¶ 14} By contrast, In re Kuhlmann, 99 Ohio App.3d 44, 649 N.E.2d 
1279, is entirely distinguishable on the facts, but echoes the rationale of Jordan 
and Fenimore.  In Kuhlmann, the trial court found that the biological mother’s 
ignorance of the law requiring her to provide support for her minor children 
justified her failure to pay child support.  The appellate court held this finding to 
be against the manifest weight of the evidence.  The court noted in dicta that the 
finding that the biological mother need not consent did not end the proceedings 
below.  “Even if the probate court makes a determination that a parent’s consent 
is not required, the court must still go on to make a determination that adoption is 
in the best interest of the child. * * * A parent whose consent to the adoption has 
been determined not to be required still must be given notice of this best-interest 
hearing.”  Id. at 51, 649 N.E.2d 1279.  Again, the court recognized that R.C. 
January Term, 2007 
7 
3107.11(A) requires service of notice of all hearings on the petition for adoption 
on a parent whose consent is unnecessary.  It did not require the notice to 
specifically state that the child’s best interests would be discussed at the new 
hearing. 
{¶ 15} Even In re Adoption of Jorgensen, 33 Ohio App.3d 207, 515 
N.E.2d 622, is not applicable to the issue here.  In Jorgensen, the trial court held 
two separate hearings, the first on the consent issue and the second on the best 
interests of the child.  The biological father received notice of both hearings, but 
notice of the best-interests hearing specifically stated that “ ‘neither the natural 
father nor his counsel will be permitted to appear and participate in said final 
hearing.’ ”  Id. at 208, 515 N.E.2d 622.  The court, therefore, was faced only with 
the issue of whether the biological father had a right to attend and participate in 
the best-interests portion of the final hearing.  The court held that “consistent with 
the requirement of R.C. 3107.11 that notice of the time and place of the best-
interest hearing shall be given to a person whose consent is dispensed with,” a 
biological parent may attend and present evidence at the best-interests hearing.  
Id. at 209-210, 515 N.E.2d 622.  “It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where a 
natural parent, even though he or she could not bar the adoption by withholding 
consent, could offer evidence of probative value that the adoption proposed would 
not be in his or her child’s best interest.”  Id.  Jorgensen simply does not support 
the proposition that the original notice to a biological parent whose consent is 
alleged to be unnecessary must include express language encompassing both the 
consent and best-interests portions of the adoption-petition proceeding. 
{¶ 16} Only the final case, In re C.M.W., provides some direct support for 
the proposition of law urged by appellants.  The appellate court in that case stated, 
“[A]s long as the notice of the hearing on an adoption petition clearly notifies the 
parties that the hearing will address both the issues of consent and the best interest 
of the child, thereby clearly giving parties the opportunity to fully and fairly 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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litigate both issues at the hearing, there need not be a separate hearing on the best 
interest of the child.”  Id. at ¶ 8.  Because the notice in that case did not clearly 
announce that both the consent and best-interests portions of the hearing would be 
held, however, the appellate court ordered a new hearing on only the best-interests 
issue and required service of notice of that hearing on the biological parent.  
C.M.W. is inconsistent with our holding today. 
{¶ 17} Four of the conflict cases merely recognize that a court must 
actually take evidence as to both issues and notify a parent whose consent is 
unnecessary under R.C. 3107.07(A) of any hearing held on the adoption petition, 
regardless of its purpose.  See R.C. 3107.11(A).  In other words, when, at the 
discretion of the court, separate hearings take place to address the consent 
requirement and the best-interests requirement of R.C. 3107.14(C), notice of each 
shall be given to the biological parent.  To the extent that the fifth case, C.M.W., 
contradicts this holding, we overrule it. 
DUE PROCESS CLAIMS 
{¶ 18} Wright also claims that we should construe the statute in favor of 
more explicit notice by including notification of both portions of the adoption 
proceeding based upon his fundamental liberty interest in the custody and care of 
his children.  This court has called the right to raise a child an “essential” and 
“basic” civil right, In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680, and 
the United States Supreme Court has further established that the right of a parent 
to the custody of his or her child is a fundamental liberty interest.  Troxel v. 
Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49.  See, also, 
In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169. 
{¶ 19} Even a parent who fails to accept the responsibilities of 
parenthood, for example by failing to support or communicate with his children 
for a year preceding an adoption petition, is entitled to notice of the adoption.  
R.C. 3107.11(A)(2).  See, also, Armstrong v. Manzo (1965), 380 U.S. 545, 550, 
January Term, 2007 
9 
85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62; In re Adoption of Greer (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 293, 
298, 638 N.E.2d 999.  In cases in which a party proves by clear and convincing 
evidence at the adoption hearing that the parent’s consent is unnecessary by 
statute, the due process rights of the parent have been protected once that parent 
has been given notice of the hearing.  Manzo, 380 U.S. at 550, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 
L.Ed.2d 62.  Because the parent has received notice that the court will be taking 
evidence as to whether that parent’s parental rights should be terminated, there is 
no need for any additional requirement that the court give notice that it will 
consider both consent and the best interests of the child at the hearing.  Id. 
{¶ 20} The language of the statute does not require that notice of an 
adoption include explicit language as to both phases of the proceeding.  The 
parties here have not presented a sufficient reason to require that the notice 
include any information in addition to that provided in this case.  The notice need 
not expressly include any direction that the hearing will encompass a 
determination of the best interest of the child.  It need only notify a biological 
parent of the time and place of any hearing on a petition for adoption of his or her 
natural child. 
HOW MANY HEARINGS MUST BE HELD 
{¶ 21} This court must also address a tangential issue that was raised 
during oral argument: whether a court must hold separate hearings for the consent 
and best-interests portions of the adoption petition.  After considering the plain 
language of the statutes, we can find nothing to suggest that the legislature 
intended to require two hearings on each adoption petition.  In fact, R.C. 
3107.11(A) discusses notification requirements for “the hearing” on the adoption 
petition, and R.C. 3107.14(C) discusses factual findings a court must make at “the 
hearing,” implying that only one hearing is necessary.  Again, in interpreting the 
intent of the legislature as to statutory language, we must accord that language its 
“usual, normal, or customary meaning,” without adding any additional language.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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CertainTeed Corp., 84 Ohio St.3d at 419, 704 N.E.2d 1217.  There is nothing in 
the statute that either requires or prevents a separate hearing for the consent and 
best-interests portions of an adoption proceeding.  Accordingly, although a court 
may choose to hold separate hearings on consent and the best interests of the 
child, there is no requirement to do so.  One hearing to address both requirements 
is sufficient, provided notice of the adoption hearing pursuant to R.C. 3107.11(A) 
is afforded the biological parent. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 22} We hold that the original notice of the filing of an adoption petition 
need not include any language specifying the dual issues that are to be presented 
at the hearing and that the court need not hold a separate hearing as to the best 
interests of the child.  If the court opts to hold more than one hearing on an 
adoption petition, however, R.C. 3107.11(A) requires service of notification of 
the date and time of all hearings on a biological parent whose consent is 
unnecessary under R.C. 3107.07(A).  Accordingly, we hold that the notice given 
to Wright in this case was sufficient to satisfy R.C. 3107.11(A), and we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals, refusing to overturn the adoption. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., TRAVIS, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
ALAN C. TRAVIS, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, was assigned to sit for 
RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
 
CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
__________________ 
 
Dagger, Johnston, Miller, Ogilvie & Hampson, L.L.P., and Randy L. 
Happeney, for appellant Robert L. Walters. 
 
Steve Zigan, for appellant William Wright. 
January Term, 2007 
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L. Jackson Henniger & Associates and L. Jackson Henniger, for appellee. 
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