Title: State ex rel. Edwards Land Co., Ltd. v. Delaware County Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Edwards Land Co., Ltd. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2011-
Ohio-4397.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4397 
THE STATE EX REL. EDWARDS LAND CO., LTD., ET AL. v. 
DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Edwards Land Co., Ltd. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4397.] 
Prohibition — R.C. 519.12(H) — Board of Elections abused its discretion in 
denying relators’ protest — Referendum petition was not timely filed — 
Writ granted. 
(No. 2011-1266 — Submitted August 23, 2011 — Decided August 31, 2011.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of prohibition to prevent 
respondent, the Delaware County Board of Elections, from certifying a 
referendum petition and submitting a Liberty Township zoning amendment to the 
township electorate at the November 8, 2011 general election.  Because relators, 
who applied for the zoning amendment and protested the referendum petition, 
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have established their entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief, we grant 
the writ. 
Statutory Backdrop 
{¶ 2} This case arises out of the amendment of a township zoning 
resolution and the subsequent attempt by certain township citizens to force a 
referendum vote on the amendment.  R.C. 519.12 sets out the process for 
amending township zoning resolutions and for overturning those amendments.  
Pursuant to R.C. 519.12(A)(1), an owner of property within the area proposed for 
a zoning change may initiate an amendment to a township zoning resolution by 
filing an application with the township zoning commission.  R.C. 519.12(A)(2) 
requires a public hearing before the zoning commission on the proposed 
amendment.  Under R.C. 519.12(E), the zoning commission must solicit a 
recommendation on the amendment from county or regional planning authorities.  
That recommendation is considered at the zoning commission’s public hearing.  
After the public hearing, the zoning commission recommends the approval or 
denial of the proposed amendment, or the approval of some modification of it, 
and submits that recommendation, the recommendation of the county or regional 
planning commission, and the text and map pertaining to the proposed 
amendment to the board of township trustees.  R.C. 519.12(E). 
{¶ 3} The board of township trustees, in turn, must hold a public hearing 
on the proposed amendment.  R.C. 519.12(E).  Pursuant to R.C. 519.12(H), within 
20 days of its hearing, the board of trustees must “either adopt or deny the 
recommendations of the township zoning commission or adopt some modification 
of them.”  If the board denies or modifies the commission’s recommendations, a 
majority vote of the board is required.  If the board adopts the proposed zoning 
amendment, with or without modification, the zoning amendment automatically 
becomes effective 30 days after the board of trustees’ action, unless a referendum 
petition is filed within those 30 days. R.C. 519.12(H). 
January Term, 2011 
3 
 
{¶ 4} The focus of this case is on R.C. 519.12(H), and specifically on 
whether the petitioners filed their referendum petition within 30 days of the board 
of trustees’ adoption of the zoning amendment at issue.  On what date the board 
of trustees adopted the zoning amendment is the bone of contention. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 5} In January 2009, relator Valerie Knowlton submitted a zoning-
amendment application to Liberty Township—Rezoning Proposal LTZ 09-01—
that would amend the township zoning resolution to rezone 216.3 acres on three 
parcels of township land from Farm Residence District (FR-1) to Planned 
Residence District (PR).  Knowlton owned the property at that time.  Relator 
Edwards Land Co., Ltd. (“Edwards Land”) is a limited-liability company that will 
be the developer of the property that is subject to rezoning, and relator Charles P. 
Driscoll Jr. is the company’s president. 
{¶ 6} In November 2010, Knowlton transferred the property to relator 
MRLD Farm, Ltd. (“MRLD”), a limited-liability company of which she is a 
member, and in January 2011, Knowlton amended her rezoning application to 
reflect that MRLD was the owner of the property.  On January 26, 2011, the 
Liberty Township Zoning Commission voted to recommend approval of the 
rezoning proposal. 
{¶ 7} The proposed amendment then moved to the Liberty Township 
Board of Trustees for review.  Pursuant to R.C. 519.12(H), it then became the 
board of trustees’ duty to “either adopt or deny the recommendations of the 
township zoning commission or adopt some modification of them.”  Beginning on 
March 15, 2011, and continuing on April 4, 2011, the board of trustees conducted 
its final public hearing on Rezoning Proposal LTZ 09-01.  At the conclusion of 
the April 4, 2011 hearing, the board of trustees verbally amended the rezoning 
proposal as follows:  (1) “Pillion Way be stubbed and not be connected and, if for 
any reason it is required to be connected by another authority at a later date, that 
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the connection be restricted to emergency vehicle access only with gates or like 
devices which will be subject to approval by this Board of Trustees and our 
Liberty Township Fire Department” and (2) “Red Emerald Way be restricted to 
emergency vehicle access only, and that it be gated or has such other device as to 
only allow emergency vehicle access, with such device being subject to approval 
by the Board of Trustees and the Liberty Township Fire Department.”  The board 
of trustees then unanimously approved the application for rezoning as amended, 
rezoning 216.3 acres on three parcels of township land from Farm Residence 
District to Planned Residence District. 
{¶ 8} At the board of trustees’ April 18, 2011 meeting, the board noted 
that minutes for its March 15 and April 4 meetings would be approved at the 
board’s May 4, 2011 meeting.  At the board of trustees’ May 4 meeting, the board 
approved its minutes for the April 4, 2011 meeting; those minutes included the 
board’s approval of the application as amended by the board.  May 4 was thus the 
first date upon which there was an approved, written recordation of the board’s 
April 4 modification and approval of the zoning amendment. 
{¶ 9} On June 3, 2011, a group of petitioners filed a referendum petition 
seeking to submit the board’s action approving the rezoning of the property to the 
electors of Liberty Township.  Their filing date fell 60 days after the board of 
township trustees’ April 4 voice-vote adoption of the amended version of 
MRLD’s Rezoning Proposal LTZ 09-01 and 30 days after the board’s May 4 
approval of the minutes for the April 4 hearing.  The petitioners specified that 
they sought a referendum “on the proposal to amend the Zoning Map of the 
unincorporated area of Liberty Township, Delaware County, Ohio,” that was 
“[a]dopted on the 4th day of May, 2011 by the Liberty Township Board of 
Trustees, Rezoning Proposal LTZ-09-01 [and that] would permit the rezoning of 
216+ acres at the intersection of Home Road and Olentangy River Road from 
Farm Residence District (FR-1) to Planned Residence District (PR).” 
January Term, 2011 
5 
 
{¶ 10} With their petition, the petitioners submitted a black-and-white 
copy of the official zoning map for all of Liberty Township.  The map was not 
highlighted or otherwise marked to delineate the 216.3-acre property subject to 
the zoning amendment being challenged. 
{¶ 11} On June 23, 2011, relators, Edwards Land, Driscoll, MRLD, and 
Knowlton, submitted a protest to the Delaware County Board of Elections against 
the referendum petition.  In their protest, relators specified eight separate grounds, 
including the two grounds argued here—that the referendum petition was not 
timely filed and that the petitioners did not submit an appropriate map of the area 
affected by the zoning proposal.  On June 28, the board of elections certified the 
referendum petition and placed the rezoning issue on the November 8, 2011 
general-election ballot. 
{¶ 12} On July 18, 2011, the board of elections held a hearing on relators’ 
protest.  Relators and the petitioners were represented by counsel at the hearing, 
and sworn testimony was submitted.  Kathy Melvin, the clerk of the Liberty 
Township Board of Trustees, testified that the board of trustees addresses zoning 
amendments by motion at a public hearing rather than by written resolution 
because the board considers zoning amendments to require only an 
“administrative review.”  The board  of elections voted two to one to deny the 
relators’ protest and to affirm its prior certification of the referendum to the 
November 8 election ballot.  The board also issued a document entitled “Findings 
of Fact and Conclusion and Decision” in which it gave reasons for rejecting each 
of relators’ protest grounds. 
{¶ 13} Eight days later, on July 26, 2011, relators filed this action for a 
writ of prohibition to prevent the board of elections from certifying to the 
November 8 election ballot a referendum on Liberty Township Rezoning Proposal 
LTZ 09-01 and a writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections to sustain 
relators’ protest against the referendum petition.  Relators also filed a motion to 
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expedite.  The board of elections filed an answer and a response to the motion to 
expedite. 
{¶ 14} On August 11, this court granted an expedited alternative writ on 
relators’ prohibition claim and issued an accelerated schedule for the submission 
of briefs and evidence.  __ Ohio St.3d __, 2011-Ohio-3948, 951 N.E.2d 440.  We 
also dismissed relators’ mandamus claim.  Id.; see, e.g., State ex rel. Phillips v. 
Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 537, 757 N.E.2d 319, 
quoting State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 
N.E.2d 704 (“ ‘In general, if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a 
prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in 
mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction’ ”). 
{¶ 15} Although none of the referendum petitioners intervened as parties 
in this case, referendum-petition-circulator Robert Cohen filed an amicus curiae 
brief in support of the board of elections. 
{¶ 16} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
Law and Analysis 
Prohibition 
{¶ 17} To be entitled to the writ of prohibition they seek, relators must 
establish that (1) the board of elections is about to exercise or has exercised quasi-
judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) 
denying the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in 
the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Eshleman v. Fornshell, 125 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2010-Ohio-1175, 925 N.E.2d 609, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 18} Relators have satisfied the first requirement for the writ because the 
board of elections exercised quasi-judicial authority by denying their protest after 
January Term, 2011 
7 
 
a hearing that included sworn testimony.  State ex rel. Knowlton v. Noble Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 126 Ohio St.3d 483, 2010-Ohio-4450, 935 N.E.2d 395, ¶ 33. 
{¶ 19} Relators have also established the third requirement for the writ 
because of the proximity of the election.  Id.  The board of elections erroneously 
asserts that because S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.9, which governs procedure for expedited 
election cases, applies only to actions filed within 90 days of an election, the rule 
implies that when an election is more than 90 days away, relators have other legal 
remedies available to them.  We have never so held, and we have recognized the 
propriety of writ actions challenging elections-board decisions in cases that were 
not governed by S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.9.  See State ex rel. Allen v. Warren Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 186, 2007-Ohio-4752, 874 N.E.2d 507 (mandamus case 
filed on July 17, 2007 to challenge July 3, 2007 board decision regarding the 
November 6, 2007 election). 
{¶ 20} For the remaining requirement, “[i]n extraordinary actions 
challenging the decisions of * * * boards of elections, the standard is whether they 
engaged in fraud, corruption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of 
applicable legal provisions.”  Whitman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 216, 2002-Ohio-5923, 778 N.E.2d 32, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 21} Relators claim that the board of elections abused its discretion and 
clearly disregarded R.C. 519.12(H) in denying their protest. 
R.C. 519.12(H)’s 30-Day Filing Requirement 
{¶ 22} R.C. 519.12(H) specifies that a township zoning amendment 
becomes effective 30 days after it is adopted by the board of township trustees 
unless a referendum petition is filed within the 30 days after it is adopted: 
{¶ 23} “The proposed amendment, if adopted by the board, shall become 
effective in thirty days after the date of its adoption, unless, within thirty days 
after the adoption, there is presented to the board of township trustees a petition, 
signed by a number of registered electors residing in the unincorporated area of 
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the township or part of that unincorporated area included in the zoning plan equal 
to not less than eight per cent of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor 
in that area at the most recent general election at which a governor was elected, 
requesting the board of township trustees to submit the amendment to the electors 
of that area for approval or rejection at a special election to be held on the day of 
the next primary or general election that occurs at least ninety days after the 
petition is filed.  Each part of this petition shall contain the number and the full 
and correct title, if any, of the zoning amendment resolution, motion, or 
application, furnishing the name by which the amendment is known and a brief 
summary of its contents.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 24} R.C. 519.12(H) required the referendum petitioners to present their 
petition to the board of township trustees within 30 days after the “adoption” by 
the board of Rezoning Proposal LTZ 09-01 as amended.  The parties disagree 
over the meaning of the word “adoption.”  Relators argue that the proposal was 
adopted when the board of township trustees voted to approve the rezoning on 
April 4; the board of elections asserts that the adoption occurred on May 4, when 
the board of township trustees approved the minutes recording its prior vote. 
{¶ 25} In construing R.C. 519.12(H), our paramount concern is the 
legislative intent in its enactment, and we determine this intent by reading 
undefined statutory language according to the rules of grammar and common 
usage.  State ex rel. Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 120 Ohio St.3d 
198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 N.E.2d 641, ¶ 29.  The word “adoption” is not defined 
in the statute.  In its pertinent common definition, the word “adopt” means “to 
vote to accept.” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/adopt (accessed Aug. 29, 
2011); see also the Oxford English Dictionary (2d Ed.1989) 171, defining “adopt” 
as “[t]o approve, to confirm.”  According to the uncontroverted testimony of 
Kathy Melvin, the clerk of the Liberty Township Board of Trustees, the board 
addresses zoning amendments by motion at a public hearing rather than by written 
January Term, 2011 
9 
 
resolution because the board considers zoning amendments to require only an 
“administrative review.”  Indeed, under R.C. 519.12(H), the board of trustees is 
reviewing a recommendation of the zoning commission. 
{¶ 26} The board thus accepted the recommendation of the zoning 
commission with modifications at its April 4, 2011 hearing by unanimously 
granting a motion to approve the application for rezoning, as amended.  The 
minutes describe the action thusly:  
{¶ 27} “Mr. Mann moved to approve the Application as amended.  The 
motion was seconded by Mr. Sybert and the roll call vote: Ms. Carducci-yes, Mr. 
Sybert-yes, and Mr. Mann-yes. The motion passed with a 3-yes and 0-no vote.” 
{¶ 28} The application was approved upon the vote.  There was a motion 
to approve the amendment, and the motion passed.  Thus, April 4 was the date 
that the board approved the application for rezoning by vote, adopting a modified 
version of the zoning commission’s recommendation.  The common meaning of 
“adoption” does not require the further step of recordation of the approval. 
{¶ 29} It might be preferable for the board of township trustees to adopt 
contemporaneous written resolutions in approving zoning amendments, but in the 
absence of any statutory or other legal requirement, the board had no duty to do 
so.  “We will not add a requirement that does not exist in the statute.”  State ex 
rel. Columbia Reserve Ltd. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 111 Ohio St.3d 167, 
2006-Ohio-5019, 855 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 32. 
{¶ 30} In contrast, R.C. 519.12(E) sets the time period for the board of 
township trustees to have a public hearing on a zoning amendment after the 
zoning commission has made its recommendation, and it does require the 
recordation of the zoning commission’s recommendation.  The zoning 
commission must “submit” its recommendation to the board of trustees, and the 
board of trustees must hold a public hearing “not * * * more than thirty days from 
the date of the receipt of [the zoning commission’s] recommendation.”  Thus, 
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R.C. 519.12 calls for the submission and receipt of a recommendation, which 
implies that the zoning commission’s recommendation must be written.  The 30-
day clock starts after the board of trustees receives the zoning commission’s 
submission.  R.C. 519.12(H) references no submission or receipt of the board of 
trustees’ decision in order to start the 30-day referendum clock.  It starts once the 
decision is made. 
{¶ 31} R.C. 121.22(C), which is cited by the board of elections and amicus 
curiae, is not relevant in this case.  R.C. 519.12(H) need not be read in pari 
materia with R.C. 121.22(C), because they are not logically related in this case.  
R.C. 121.22(C) is Ohio’s open-meetings statute.  It provides: 
{¶ 32} “(C) All meetings of any public body are declared to be public 
meetings open to the public at all times. A member of a public body shall be 
present in person at a meeting open to the public to be considered present or to 
vote at the meeting and for purposes of determining whether a quorum is present 
at the meeting. 
{¶ 33} “The minutes of a regular or special meeting of any public body 
shall be promptly prepared, filed, and maintained and shall be open to public 
inspection.” 
{¶ 34} No one claims that the board of trustees’ hearing was not public.  
No one has complained that the township failed to produce minutes.  Nothing in 
the record suggests that the petitioners sought and were denied minutes from the 
April 4 hearing.  If they had been denied such minutes, mandamus would lie to 
force their preparation pursuant to R.C. 121.22(C). State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. 
Cincinnati (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 540, 545, 668 N.E.2d 903.  But there is no 
language in R.C. 121.22(C) that says that a legislative enactment does not become 
official until minutes are approved.  “Minutes serve as records of actions, not as 
actions themselves.”  Davidson v. Hanging Rock (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 723, 
733, 647 N.E.2d 527.  In Davidson, the court rejected the proposition that under 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
R.C. 121.22, a failure to approve meeting minutes renders all actions taken during 
the meeting void. 
{¶ 35} The board of elections and amicus curiae assert that allowing the 
board of township trustees to adopt a zoning amendment by voice vote and 
modify that amendment in the process, without requiring the board of township 
trustees to incorporate its action contemporaneously in written form to start the 
30-day period to file a referendum petition, unduly restricts the right of 
referendum under R.C. 519.12(H).  As an abstract principle, that assertion may 
well have merit.  But R.C. 519.12(H) does not require a board of township 
trustees to create a writing noting that it adopted the recommendation of the 
zoning commission, even when the board makes modifications. 
{¶ 36} And in this case, there is no evidence that the referendum 
petitioners either lacked notice of the board of township trustees’ April 4 adoption 
of the zoning amendment or were unfairly prejudiced in their ability to submit a 
referendum petition because of the lack of a written record on the date that the 
board of township trustees adopted the amendment.  To the contrary, there is 
evidence that the referendum petitioners’ representative at the protest hearing 
before the board of elections—a petition circulator named Tony Gioffre—was 
present and spoke at the board of township trustees’ April 4 hearing.  Similarly, 
amicus curiae Robert Cohen, a second petition circulator, was also present at two 
board of township trustees’ meetings. 
{¶ 37} In addition, interested citizens could have asked to see the 
unofficial meeting minutes of the board of township trustees, which were 
completed within a week or a week and a half after the April 4 hearing.  Or they 
could have requested to listen to the audio record of that hearing.  The 
introduction to the April 4, 2011 minutes even states: “The audio recording, 
resolutions passed, and any attachments constitutes an accurate record of the 
Liberty Township Trustee Proceedings at the above dated meeting as determined 
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by the Fiscal Officer.  The following summary is provided as an overview of the 
meeting and a road map to the audio recording.” 
{¶ 38} And although the board of township trustees did, in fact, amend the 
proposed zoning amendment, these amendments were not material to the 
referendum petitioners’ challenge, because the petition itself did not even mention 
these amendments.  The language ultimately used by the petitioners in their 
petition could have been taken from MRLD’s amended zoning application.  The 
application and maps related to it must be available for viewing by the public ten 
days before the zoning-commission hearing and ten days before the board of 
township trustees’ hearing. R.C. 519.12(C)(5) and (F)(5).  Thus, the petitioners 
here did not—as the board of elections claims—“lack the details necessary to 
prepare a valid referendum petition” because of the absence of written minutes or 
a resolution. 
{¶ 39} Finally, a contrary ruling would engender unreasonable results.  
Leaving the citizens of Liberty Township unable to vote on an important 
community issue is unfortunate, but the board of elections’ advocated 
construction of R.C. 519.12(H)—that the zoning amendment in this case was not 
adopted until written minutes of its adoption were adopted—is untenable.  This 
new definition of the word “adoption” would elevate hearing minutes to the status 
of legislation and invite confusion in any number of future cases, suggesting to 
Ohioans that no governing body—county commissioners, city council, or school 
board—or any other public board, local or state, performs any official act until a 
written record of the act is prepared and approved.  Every legislative act at every 
level of government would be held in abeyance until the preparation and approval 
of minutes.  Government cannot work that way. 
{¶ 40} Therefore, based on the plain language of R.C. 519.12(H) as well 
as the uncontroverted evidence adduced at the protest hearing, the referendum 
petition, which was filed 60 days after the board of township trustees’ adoption of 
January Term, 2011 
13 
 
the amendment, was 30 days too late to prevent the amendment from taking 
effect.  The board of elections should have thus sustained relators’ protest on this 
ground. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} Based on the foregoing, the board of elections abused its discretion 
and clearly disregarded R.C. 519.12(H) by denying relators’ protest, certifying the 
referendum petition, and submitting the zoning amendment to the Liberty 
Township electorate at the November 8, 2011 election ballot.  The 30-day filing 
period to submit a timely referendum petition demands strict compliance; “the 
settled rule is that election laws are mandatory and require strict compliance and 
that substantial compliance is acceptable only when an election provision 
expressly states that it is.” State ex rel. Ditmars v. McSweeney (2002), 94 Ohio 
St.3d 472, 476, 764 N.E.2d 971 (plurality opinion).  And “[a]lthough we liberally 
construe R.C. 519.12(H) in favor of the right of referendum, that statute’s 
requirements were not followed here.”  State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, 881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 47.  Because 
the applicable provisions of R.C. 519.12(H) are unambiguous, we must apply 
them rather than construe them. 
{¶ 42} Therefore, because relators have established their entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary relief, we grant the writ of prohibition.  By so holding, we 
need not address relators’ remaining contention that the board of elections abused 
its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law by not sustaining their protest 
against the referendum petition based on the appropriate-map requirement of R.C. 
519.12(H). 
Writ granted. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
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CUPP, J., concurring. 
{¶ 43} I concur in the foregoing opinion, but with reservations. 
{¶ 44} It concerns me that an official action of a board of township 
trustees as significant as approving a change in the township zoning resolution 
relating to a specific parcel of real estate does not have to be in writing in either 
the form of a resolution or a written motion acting as a substitute for a formal 
resolution. 
{¶ 45} Written documents are often required to make governmental 
actions official: a court “speaks” only through its written journal entries, a 
legislature “speaks” only through its written statutes and resolutions, and a city 
“speaks” only through its written ordinances.  Analogously, if a board of township 
trustees can speak only through its written resolutions, this board has not “said” 
anything official even yet. 
{¶ 46} However, as the opinion notes, there is no statutory requirement 
that a board of township trustees take its action in writing.  Moreover, these 
foregoing concerns were not directly raised or argued by the parties and, 
therefore, are not presently before this court.  Consequently, I must concur. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 47} This case involves the interplay between the people’s paramount 
right of referendum, the limited 30-day period in R.C. 519.12(H) to exercise that 
preeminent right to challenge a township zoning amendment, and the duty of the 
board of township trustees to promptly prepare, file, and maintain minutes of its 
meetings in the seemingly unique circumstance in which the board chooses not to 
issue written resolutions or ordinances for these zoning amendments.  Because the 
majority misunderstands the interaction between the people’s right and the 
township’s duty, grants the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition, and 
January Term, 2011 
15 
 
thereby unreasonably divests the township citizens of their important right of 
referendum, I respectfully dissent. 
Right of Referendum 
{¶ 48} The people’s right of referendum to challenge legislation “is a 
means for direct political participation, allowing the people the final decision, 
amounting to a veto power, over enactments of representative bodies.”  Eastlake 
v. Forest City Ents., Inc. (1976), 426 U.S. 668, 673, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 49 L.Ed.2d 
132.  It is “ ‘one of the most essential safeguards to representative government.’ ”  
State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 
916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 20, quoting State ex rel. Nolan v. ClenDening (1915), 93 Ohio 
St. 264, 277, 112 N.E. 1029.  Although Section 1f, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution “does not confer any constitutional right of referendum on township 
electors challenging township resolutions,” R.C. 519.12(H) provides a statutory 
right of referendum for township zoning amendments.  State ex rel. McCord v. 
Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 106 Ohio St.3d 346, 2005-Ohio-4758, 835 
N.E.2d 336, ¶ 33, 37. 
{¶ 49} We have held that “R.C. 519.12(H) should be liberally construed to 
permit the exercise of the power of referendum by township electors even without 
a constitutional provision applicable to townships comparable to that applicable to 
municipalities in Section 1f, Article II, Ohio Constitution.”  Id. at ¶ 37; see also 
State ex rel. Miller Diversified Holdings, L.L.C. v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
123 Ohio St.3d 260, 2009-Ohio-4980, 915 N.E.2d 1187, ¶ 36.  Yet with little 
consideration of the vital right of referendum, the majority readily discounts our 
duty to liberally construe R.C. 519.12(H). 
R.C. 519.12(H)’s 30-Day Filing Requirement 
{¶ 50} As the majority acknowledges, R.C. 519.12(H) specifies that to 
prevent a township zoning amendment from becoming effective 30 days after the 
date it was adopted, a referendum petition must be filed within that 30 days.  I am 
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mindful that the ordinary definition of the word “adoption” does not generally 
require the further step of recordation of the approval by vote on a motion, as the 
majority observes.  As a general precept, in the vast majority of circumstances, 
this is appropriate. 
{¶ 51} However, R.C. 519.12(H) cannot be construed in a vacuum.  And I 
disagree with the majority’s dismissal of R.C. 121.22(C) as irrelevant.  R.C. 
121.22(C) provides that “[t]he minutes of a regular or special meeting of any 
public body shall be promptly prepared, filed, and maintained and shall be open 
to public inspection.”  (Emphasis added.)  See State ex rel. Colvin v. Brunner, 120 
Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 46 (“statutes that relate to 
the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia so as to give full effect 
to the provisions”).  The minutes compelled by R.C. 121.22(C) are a necessary 
component that facilitates a citizen’s right of referendum, especially where the 
township does not adopt written resolutions for its zoning amendments.  Because 
of the unquestioned importance of the right of referendum as well as the fact that 
the Liberty Township Board of Trustees does not adopt written resolutions for its 
zoning amendments, the majority should have liberally construed R.C. 519.12(H) 
in pari materia with R.C. 121.22(C). 
{¶ 52} Allowing the board of township trustees to adopt a zoning 
amendment by voice vote and to modify that amendment in the process with 
detailed oral amendments to the proposal, without requiring the board to 
incorporate its action contemporaneously in written form to start the critical 30-
day period to file a referendum petition, unduly restricts the township electors’ 
right of referendum under R.C. 519.12(H).  “One of the strengths of American 
government is the right of the public to know and understand the actions of their 
elected representatives.  This includes not merely the right to know a government 
body’s final decision on a matter, but the ways and means by which those 
January Term, 2011 
17 
 
decisions were reached.”  White v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1996), 76 Ohio 
St.3d 416, 419, 667 N.E.2d 1223. 
{¶ 53} The Liberty Township Board of Trustees does not enact written 
resolutions memorializing their zoning amendments, because they consider 
zoning-amendment proposals to require only an “administrative review.”  But the 
zoning amendment here is manifestly a legislative act subject to referendum.  See 
State ex rel. Zonders v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 5, 
11, 630 N.E.2d 313 (“Generally, the adoption of a zoning amendment, like the 
enactment of the original zoning ordinance, is a legislative act which is subject to 
referendum”); Tuber v. Perkins (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 155, 157, 35 O.O.2d 255, 
216 N.E.2d 877 (“the action of a Board of Township Trustees in adopting or 
amending a zoning regulation is a legislative action”). 
{¶ 54} Without a written record of the zoning amendment’s approval by 
the board of township trustees, citizens are hampered in exercising their time-
sensitive right to referendum.  See Bd. of Twp. Trustees v. Spring Creek Gravel 
Co., Inc. (1975), 45 Ohio App.2d 288, 289-290, 74 O.O.2d 409, 344 N.E.2d 156 
(“[t]he failure to record the adoption of  [a township zoning] amendment 
substantially affects the right to request a referendum)”; see also Crates v. 
Garlock Bros. Constr., Hancock App. No. 5-91-8, 1991 WL 229216, *3 (rezoning 
by township trustees is legislative in nature, and in the absence of a record, a 
rezoning cannot be presumed). 
{¶ 55} By way of example, citizens challenging a zoning amendment need 
a written record of the amendment to accurately summarize it for purposes of 
properly invoking their statutory right of referendum.  See R.C. 519.12(H); State 
ex rel. Gemienhardt v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 109 Ohio St.3d 212, 2006-
Ohio-1666, 846 N.E.2d 1223, ¶ 57 (referendum petitioners must strictly comply 
with R.C. 519.12(H)’s brief-summary requirement).  As noted by the board of 
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elections, “[w]here strict compliance is required, it is unreasonable to require a 
referendum petition to be prepared from memory or mere notes.” 
{¶ 56} Without any evidentiary support, the majority admonishes that 
“interested citizens” could have requested to listen to audio recordings of the 
meeting.  Majority opinion at ¶ 37.  However, the majority overlooks the lack of 
any sworn testimony concerning whether the recordings or the meeting minutes 
were actually available to citizens before the board’s approval of the minutes.  
Relators, as the protestors against the referendum petition, manifestly had the 
burden of establishing that the referendum petition violated the R.C. 519.12(H) 
30-day requirement, but much of the so-called evidence they—and the majority—
rely on here was not properly submitted as sworn evidence at the board’s protest 
hearing.  Instead, it is little more than mere supposition and baseless speculation.  
“[A] claim that the board of elections abused its discretion * * * [can]not be based 
on evidence that was never presented to it.”  State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, 881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 40. 
{¶ 57} Therefore, after construing R.C. 519.12(H) in pari materia with 
R.C. 121.22(C) and abiding by the court’s duty to liberally construe the statutory 
right of referendum in favor of its exercise, I would hold that the word “adoption” 
for purposes of the critical 30-day deadline to submit a referendum petition refers 
to the written recordation of the zoning amendment, either by resolution or by 
detailed minutes.  This result is particularly justified under the circumstances 
present in this case, which include the absence of a written resolution and the 30-
day delay in recording the verbal approval of the board, including its verbal 
amendments to relators’ zoning proposal. 
{¶ 58} The majority’s strict construction of the pertinent provisions will 
unduly restrict—and in some cases, unfairly eliminate— citizens’ paramount right 
of referendum, particularly the rights of those citizens who may not have the 
ability to attend the board of township trustees’ meetings.  See White, 76 Ohio 
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19 
 
St.3d at 420, 667 N.E.2d 1223 (“keeping full minutes [of board of county 
commissioners’ meetings] allows members of the public who are unable to attend 
the meetings in person to obtain complete and accurate information about the 
decision-making process of our government.  * * * Most people’s day-to-day 
schedule leaves them with far too little time to attend government meetings”). 
{¶ 59} Moreover, the majority’s decision will allow a board of township 
trustees to thwart the township citizens’ right of referendum by intentionally 
delaying the preparation of a written record of the approval of a zoning 
amendment.  By strictly construing R.C. 519.12(H) without deference to the right 
of referendum, the majority has engendered this unreasonable result.  Colvin, 120 
Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 58 (courts have duty to 
construe constitutional and legislative provisions to avoid unreasonable or absurd 
results). 
{¶ 60} Insofar as the majority opinion cites a veritable parade of horribles 
to suggest that its holding, which usurps the township electors’ critical right to 
approve or reject a zoning amendment that directly affects them, is somehow 
warranted, suffice it to say that none of those particular circumstances is before 
the court in this case.  That is, the court could deny relators’ request for 
extraordinary relief in prohibition without “suggesting to Ohioans that no 
governing body—county commissioners, city council, or school board—or any 
other public board, local or state, performs any official act until a written record 
of the act is prepared and approved” or holding that “[e]very legislative act at 
every level of government would be held in abeyance until the preparation and 
approval of minutes.”  See majority opinion at ¶ 39.  Not every legislative act 
involves the unique circumstances of this case, i.e., the important right of 
referendum, an abbreviated statutory time period in which citizens can assert that 
right, and the practice of a board of township trustees to not adopt zoning 
amendments by a contemporaneous written resolution.  Therefore, upholding the 
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board of elections’ denial of relators’ protest and recognizing the township 
citizens’ right to referendum here would not have drastic consequences in other 
unrelated contexts as the majority portends. 
{¶ 61} I would therefore hold that the board of elections did not act in an 
arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable manner in determining that the 
referendum petition was timely filed.  In my view, the board of elections properly 
rejected relators’ protest on this ground. 
R.C. 519.12(H)’s Appropriate-Map Requirement 
{¶ 62} I would further hold that the board of elections did not abuse its 
discretion or clearly disregard R.C. 519.12(H) by determining that the map 
submitted by the referendum petitioners was appropriate.1 
{¶ 63} R.C. 519.12(H) requires that the referendum petition “be 
accompanied by an appropriate map of the area affected by the zoning proposal.”  
A “map accompanying a referendum petition [is] appropriate * * * for purposes 
of R.C. 519.12(H) if it does not mislead the average person about the area 
affected by the zoning resolution.”  McCord, 106 Ohio St.3d 346, 2005-Ohio-
4758, 835 N.E.2d 336, ¶ 63.  An objective rather than a subjective test is used to 
determine whether a referendum-petition map is appropriate.  State ex rel. 
Columbia Reserve Ltd. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 111 Ohio St.3d 167, 2006-
Ohio-5019, 855 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 34. 
{¶ 64} The board of elections determined that “[t]he map is appropriate 
under the facts and circumstances of this case.” 
{¶ 65} Relators assert that the board abused its discretion and clearly 
disregarded applicable law in so holding based on our decision in Columbia 
Reserve, 111 Ohio St.3d 167, 2006-Ohio-5019, 855 N.E.2d 815.  In that case, this 
court held that the map filed by the referendum petitioners was not appropriate, 
                                          
 
1. Because the majority found relators’ first argument persuasive, it did not address this remaining 
claim. 
January Term, 2011 
21 
 
because it was a drawing that had been previously submitted with a different 
township zoning resolution than the one that was the subject of the referendum, it 
did not include all the area affected by the resolution and did not highlight the 
area, and the referendum petitioners could have easily avoided any defect by 
filing the map that had been previously approved by the board of township 
trustees and that was attached to the resolution that was the subject of the 
referendum.  Id. at ¶ 35, 37. 
{¶ 66} Columbia Reserve, however, is distinguishable in significant 
particulars from this case.  First, the referendum petitioners here did not submit a 
map relating to a different zoning resolution.  Second, the Liberty Township 
Board of Trustees did not approve a map that it determined accurately reflected 
the rezoning.  Third, the referendum petitioners submitted a map that included all 
of the area affected by the zoning amendment.  Although it is true that the map 
included the entire township and the petitioners did not highlight the smaller area 
subject to the rezoning, the text of the petition together with the map would not 
have misled the average person about the area affected by the amendment.  The 
text of the petition specified the area and location of the property—“216+ acres at 
the intersection of Home Road and Olentangy River Road”—as well as the 
specific parcels involved.  Fourth, the referendum petitioners here could not have 
easily avoided any perceived defect by filing one of the alternate maps submitted 
by relators in the zoning process.  None of the maps submitted by relators in the 
zoning process included the board of township trustees’ amendments regarding 
road restrictions and the maps appear to either contain property outside the 
affected area or depict less than the entire affected area.  That is, if the referendum 
petitioners had done as relators now claim they should have—submitted one of 
relators’ zoning maps with the referendum petition—it is likely that relators 
would claim that that map was likewise defective. 
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22 
 
{¶ 67} Consequently, Columbia Reserve does not require a finding that the 
referendum petitioners violated the appropriate-map requirement of R.C. 
519.12(H).  The board of elections did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard 
R.C. 519.12(H) by determining that the map submitted by the referendum 
petitioners was appropriate. 
{¶ 68} Therefore, I would hold that the board of elections properly 
rejected relators’ protest on this ground as well. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 69} The board of elections neither abused its discretion nor clearly 
disregarded R.C. 519.12(H) by denying relators’ protest, certifying the 
referendum petition, and submitting the zoning amendment to the Liberty 
Township electorate at the November 8, 2011 election ballot.  The referendum 
petitioners complied with the requirements of R.C. 519.12(H).  Therefore, relators 
have not established their entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief and this 
court should deny the writ of prohibition.  Because the majority fails to correctly 
apply the applicable law and thereby cripples the township electors’ critical right 
of referendum, I respectfully, but vigorously, dissent. 
LANZINGER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
McTigue & McGinnis, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, Mark A. McGinnis, 
and J. Corey Colombo; and Crabbe, Brown, & James, L.L.P., Larry H. James, 
Andy Douglas, and Laura M. Comek, for relators. 
 
Carol Hamilton O’Brien, Delaware County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Christopher D. Betts, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
 
Robert G. Cohen, pro se, urging denial of the writ as amicus curiae. 
______________________