Title: Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

                     Amy Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc. (A-86-18) (082509)

Argued February 3, 2020 -- Decided August 18, 2020

PATTERSON, J., writing for the Court.

      In this appeal, the Court reviews the trial court’s decision dismissing plaintiff Amy
Skuse’s complaint against her former employer, Pfizer, Inc., and ordering arbitration of
her employment discrimination claims.

      Pfizer’s Human Resources Department sent an e-mail to Pfizer employees at their
corporate e-mail addresses announcing Pfizer’s five-page Mutual Arbitration and Class
Waiver Agreement (Agreement) and included a link to that document. The following
language appeared in bold font on the final page of the Agreement:

              You understand that your acknowledgement of this Agreement
              is not required for the Agreement to be enforced. If you begin
              or continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after
              receipt of this Agreement, even without acknowledging this
              Agreement, this Agreement will be effective, and you will be
              deemed to have consented to, ratified and accepted this
              Agreement through your acceptance of and/or continued
              employment with the Company.

The e-mail also included a included a link to a document that listed “Frequently Asked
Questions,” including “Do I have to agree to this?” to which the response indicated, “The
Arbitration Agreement is a condition of continued employment with the Company. If
you begin or continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after receipt of this
Agreement, it will be a contractual agreement that binds both you and the Company.”
The “FAQs” document also encouraged any employee who had “legal questions” about
the Agreement “to speak to [his or her] own attorney.”

       Additional e-mails assigned the “Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement
and Acknowledgment” as part of Pfizer’s module-based training program, noting that
agreement to individual arbitration was a condition of employment, and included a link to
launch that module, which consisted of four slides. The first slide noted that agreement
to individual arbitration was a condition of employment; the second contained
                                            1
instructions for opening the Agreement; the third slide contained language similar to the
final page of the Agreement (reproduced above); a box with an arrow pointing upward to
that language instructed the employee to “CLICK HERE to acknowledge.” The fourth
slide thanked the employee for reviewing the Agreement, provided an e-mail address for
questions, and included a means to exit the “course.”

       Pfizer terminated Skuse’s employment in August 2017, and Skuse filed a
complaint alleging that Pfizer and the individual defendants violated the Law Against
Discrimination by terminating her employment because of her religious objection to
being vaccinated for yellow fever. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and to
compel arbitration. Skuse opposed the motion, contending that she was not bound by
Pfizer’s Agreement, arguing that she was asked only to acknowledge the Agreement, not
to assent to it, and that she never agreed to arbitrate her claims.

        The trial court dismissed Skuse’s complaint and directed her to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the Agreement. The Appellate Division reversed,
identifying three aspects of Pfizer’s communications to Skuse as grounds for its decision:
Pfizer’s use of e-mails to disseminate the Agreement to employees already inundated
with e-mails; its use of a “training module” or a training “activity” to explain the
Agreement; and its instruction that Skuse click her computer screen to “acknowledge”
her obligation to assent to the Agreement in the event that she remained employed for
sixty days, not to “agree” to the Agreement.  457 N.J. Super. 539, 555-61 (App. Div.
2019). The Court granted certification.  238 N.J. 374 (2019).

HELD: Pfizer’s Agreement and related communications informed Skuse that if she
remained a Pfizer employee more than sixty days from her receipt of that Agreement, she
was deemed to assent to it. Those communications clearly and unmistakably explained
the rights that Skuse would waive by agreeing to arbitration, thus complying with waiver-
of-rights case law, and Pfizer’s delivery of the Agreement by e-mail did not warrant its
invalidation. Pfizer’s use of the word “acknowledge” was appropriate in the
circumstances of this case, given the terms of Pfizer’s arbitration policy and other
expressions of assent that immediately preceded that request. Pfizer should not have
labeled its communication explaining its arbitration agreement a “training module” or
training “activity,” but that is not a basis to invalidate the Agreement. The Agreement
was valid and binding, and the Court concurs with the trial court’s decision to enforce it.

1. Federal law specifically permits states to regulate contracts, including contracts
containing arbitration agreements, under general contract principles. For any waiver-of-
rights provision to be effective, the party who gives up rights must have full knowledge
of his legal rights and intent to surrender those rights. New Jersey case law requires that
a waiver-of-rights provision be written clearly and unambiguously. In an employment
setting, employees must at least know that they have agreed to arbitrate all statutory
claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination. (pp. 18-23)
                                             2
2. Applying those principles, Pfizer’s Agreement and its related communications clearly
informed Skuse that by continuing to be employed for sixty days, she would waive her
right to pursue employment discrimination claims against Pfizer in court. New Jersey
contract law recognizes that in certain circumstances, conduct can constitute contractual
assent. Pfizer informed employees, with the clarity that New Jersey’s waiver-of-rights
law requires, that continued employment after the policy’s effective date would constitute
acceptance of the Agreement’s terms. Further, as required by case law, Pfizer clearly
explained to Skuse the rights that she would relinquish if she remained employed after
the policy’s effective date and thereby assented to the Agreement’s terms. The
Agreement’s language complied with the Court’s mandate in Atalese v. U.S. Legal
Services Group, L.P.,  219 N.J. 430, 446 (2014), that a waiver-of-rights provision clearly
and unambiguously state that the plaintiff is “waiving her right to sue or go to court to
secure relief.” Pfizer’s communications also explained in general terms what arbitration,
the agreed-upon method of dispute resolution, would entail, with no confusing references
to mediation as in Kernahan v. Home Warranty Administrator of Florida, Inc.,  236 N.J. 301, 323-26 (2019). Finally, Skuse’s LAD claim was indisputably included in the
Agreement’s broad language describing the employment-related claims subject to
arbitration, and it does not fall within the exceptions to that policy enumerated in the
Agreement. (pp. 23-28)

3. The Court next considers the method by which Pfizer chose to deliver its Agreement
and accompanying communications to Skuse. Even if Skuse were to contend that she did
not review Pfizer’s e-mails and their attachments because of the volume of e-mails
addressed to her -- which she does not -- her failure to review Pfizer’s communications
would not invalidate the Agreement. Under case law, any contention by Skuse that she
completed Pfizer’s e-mailed module without reading its contents or the documents linked
to it would have no impact on the analysis. Moreover, no principle of New Jersey
contract law bars enforcement of a contract because that contract is communicated by e-
mail, rather than by the transfer of a hard-copy document. And here, nothing in the e-
mailed communications in this case concealed the Agreement or understated its
importance. The Court does not share the Appellate Division’s view that Pfizer’s
decision to communicate the Agreement and related materials to its employees by e-mail
warrants invalidation of the Agreement. (pp. 28-33)

4. The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that Pfizer’s characterization of its
slides summarizing the Agreement as “training” was a misnomer. When it disseminates
an arbitration agreement, an employer may choose to use tools developed for its training
program. The employer should not, however, label those communications as “training.”
Although a reference to “training” in an employer’s communication of an arbitration
policy might be regarded as misleading an employee in a different setting, however,
Pfizer’s use of the term does not invalidate the Agreement in the circumstances here.
(pp. 33-34)

                                            3
5. This case is distinguishable from Leodori v. CIGNA Corp.,  175 N.J. 293, 305-07
(2003). Here, what Skuse was asked to “acknowledge” -- what she did “acknowledge” --
was her understanding that she “must agree” to the Agreement, and that whether or not
she clicked the “acknowledge” button, she would be deemed to have “consented to,
ratified and accepted” the Agreement through her continued employment at Pfizer.
Although the word “acknowledge” could be vague or misleading in a different setting, it
was an appropriate term as used here. (pp. 35-40)

       The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the trial court’s
order is REINSTATED.

        JUSTICE ALBIN, concurring, is persuaded by the totality of the evidence that
plaintiff clearly and unmistakably understood that she was agreeing to submit any
disputed employment issue to an arbitrator rather than a court and notes that plaintiff has
not raised the argument that the arbitration provision constituted an illicit, industry-wide
contract of adhesion. Justice Albin cautions, however, that when every employment and
consumer contract contains such a clause across an entire profession or industry, when
employees and consumers have no choice but to waive their right to resolve their disputes
in a judicial forum in order to get a job or buy a good, the Court will have to address a
more profound question: Are such contracts of adhesion contrary to New Jersey’s most
fundamental public policy -- the constitutional right to a civil jury trial -- and therefore
unconscionable and unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act and its state
counterpart? That is the great issue that will confront the Court, in Justice Albin’s view.
In his concurrence, Justice Albin sets the stage for what is at stake.

        CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER, dissenting, notes that the Appellate Division
decision carefully parses the online “training module” defendant Pfizer used and explains
why the module lacks clear and unmistakable proof that Pfizer’s employees agreed to
waive the right to have their day in court. Chief Justice Rabner fears that today’s opinion
not only sanctions what took place but also ushers in a new day for arbitration
agreements. Going forward, Chief Justice Rabner asks, what employer will ask an
employee to agree to settle a dispute through arbitration and waive the right to proceed in
court if it is enough simply to ask the employee to acknowledge she received a statement
of company policy and deem consent from her continuing to show up for work? More is
required to show clear and unmistakable assent in any context, Chief Justice Rabner
explains, and more should be required before employees are asked to give up their
constitutional and statutory rights to have their day in court.

JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE
PATTERSON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a concurrence. CHIEF JUSTICE
RABNER filed a dissent. JUSTICE TIMPONE did not participate.

                                             4
       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-
86 September Term 2018
                       082509

                      Amy Skuse,

                Plaintiff-Respondent,

                          v.

             Pfizer, Inc., John D. Witzig,
         Paul Mangeot, and Connie Corbett,
        individually, jointly, severally and/or
                  in the alternative,

                Defendant-Appellants.

       On certification to the Superior Court,
   Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
        457 N.J. Super. 539 (App. Div. 2019).

       Argued                      Decided
   February 3, 2020             August 18, 2020

Thomas A. Linthorst argued the cause for appellants
(Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and Jackson Lewis, attorneys;
Thomas A. Linthorst, Sam S. Shaulson, John M. Nolan,
Carla D. Macaluso, and Timothy M. McCarthy, on the
briefs).

Alan H. Schorr argued the cause for respondent (Schorr
& Associates, attorneys; Alan H. Schorr, on the briefs).

David R. Kott argued the cause for amici curiae New
Jersey Business & Industry Association, Commerce and
Industry Association of New Jersey, and New Jersey
Chamber of Commerce (McCarter & English, attorneys;

                           1
            David R. Kott and Edward J. Fanning, Jr., of counsel and
            on the brief, and Steven H. Del Mauro, on the brief).

            Andrée P. Laney argued the cause for amicus curiae
            Employers Association of New Jersey (Ford & Harrison
            and Employers Association of New Jersey, attorneys;
            Mark A. Saloman, of counsel and on the brief, and
            Jeffrey A. Shooman, on the brief).

            William D. Wright argued the cause for amicus curiae
            New Jersey Association for Justice (The Wright Law
            Firm, attorneys; William D. Wright and David T. Wright,
            on the brief).

            Richard M. Schall argued the cause for amicus curiae
            National Employment Lawyers Association of New
            Jersey (Schall & Barasch, attorneys; Richard M. Schall,
            on the brief).

            Leah S. Robinson submitted a brief on behalf of amicus
            curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
            America (Mayer Brown, attorneys; Leah S. Robinson,
            Archis A. Parasharami, of the District of Columbia bar,
            admitted pro hac vice, and Daniel E. Jones, of the District
            of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).

            Gavin J. Rooney submitted a brief on behalf of amicus
            curiae New Jersey Civil Justice Institute (Lowenstein
            Sandler, attorneys; Gavin J. Rooney and Justin Corbalis,
            on the brief).

         JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

      In this appeal, we review the trial court’s decision dismissing plaintiff

Amy Skuse’s complaint against her former employer, Pfizer, Inc., and ordering

arbitration of her employment discrimination claims.

                                        2
      In 2016, four years after it hired Skuse, Pfizer notified her of a new

arbitration policy that would become a condition of her employment. Under

that policy, if an employee continued to work for Pfizer for sixty days after

receiving a copy of Pfizer’s Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement

(Agreement), that employee would be deemed to have assented to the

Agreement, waived the right to litigate in court several categories of

employment-related claims, and agreed to arbitrate those claims. Skuse

opened e-mails that linked to the Agreement, completed a “training module”

regarding the arbitration policy, and clicked a box on her computer screen that

asked her to “acknowledge” her obligation to assent to the Agreement as a

condition of her continued employment after sixty days.

      Skuse continued to work for Pfizer for another thirteen months.

Following a dispute between Pfizer management and Skuse as to whether she

should be required to receive a particular vaccine, Pfizer terminated her

employment.

      Skuse filed this action against Pfizer and three of its employees,

asserting claims based on the Law Against Discrimination,  N.J.S.A. 10:5-1

to -49 (LAD). Pfizer moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration.

The trial court enforced Pfizer’s Agreement, dismissed the complaint, and

ordered the parties to arbitrate Skuse’s claims.

                                        3
      The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s determination. It held

that Pfizer’s communications to Skuse regarding the Agreement were

inadequate to ensure that she knowingly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate

her claims and waive her right of access to the courts. Skuse v. Pfizer Inc.,

 457 N.J. Super. 539, 561 (App. Div. 2019). The Appellate Division identified

three aspects of Pfizer’s communications to Skuse as grounds for its decision:

Pfizer’s use of e-mails to disseminate the Agreement to employees already

inundated with e-mails; its use of a “training module” or a training “activity”

to explain the Agreement; and its instruction that Skuse click her computer

screen to “acknowledge” her obligation to assent to the Agreement in the event

that she remained employed for sixty days, not to “agree” to the Agreement.

Id. at 555-61.

      We conclude that Pfizer’s Agreement and related communications

informed Skuse that if she remained a Pfizer employee more than sixty days

from her receipt of that Agreement, she was deemed to assent to it. We hold

that those communications clearly and unmistakably explained the rights that

Skuse would waive by agreeing to arbitration, thus complying with our waiver-

of-rights case law. We further determine that Pfizer’s delivery of the

Agreement by e-mail did not warrant its invalidation. We view Pfizer’s use of

the word “acknowledge” -- in its request that Skuse click to “acknowledge”

                                        4
her obligation to arbitrate disputes with her employer if she remained a Pfizer

employee sixty days later -- to be appropriate in the circumstances of this case,

given the terms of Pfizer’s arbitration policy and other expressions of assent

that immediately preceded that request. We concur with the Appellate

Division that Pfizer should not have labeled its communication explaining its

arbitration agreement a “training module” or training “activity,” but we do not

view that as a basis to invalidate the Agreement.

      Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Division’s determination and

reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and ordering

arbitration.

                                       I.

                                       A.

      On May 5, 2016, Pfizer’s Human Resources Department sent an e-mail

to Pfizer employees at their corporate e-mail addresses.1 The e-mail

announced Pfizer’s five-page Agreement and included a link to that document.

      The first section of the Agreement, entitled “Mutual Arbitration

Agreement,” provided:

1
  We derive our summary of the facts from the allegations of the complaint
and the record presented to the trial court in connection with Pfizer’s motion to
dismiss and to compel arbitration.

                                        5
Except as expressly set forth in section 3, titled,
“Claims Not Covered by this Agreement,” all disputes,
claims, complaints, or controversies (“Claims”) that
you have now or at any time in the future may have
against Pfizer and/or any of its parents, subsidiaries,
affiliates, predecessors, successors, assigns, current
and former officers, directors, employees, and/or those
acting as an agent of the Company (which make up the
definition of “Company”), or that the Company has
now or at any time in the future may have against you,
including claims relating to breach of contract, tort
claims, wrongful discharge, discrimination and/or
harassment claims, retaliation claims, claims for
overtime, wages, leaves, paid time off, sick days,
compensation, penalties or restitution, including but
not limited to claims under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (“ADEA”), the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (“WARN”), the Equal Pay Act
(“EPA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”), and any other claim under any federal,
state, or local statute, constitution, regulation, rule,
ordinance, or common law, arising out of and/or
directly or indirectly related to your application for
employment with the Company, and/or your
employment with the Company, and/or termination of
your employment with the Company (collectively
“Covered Claims”), are subject to arbitration pursuant
to the terms of this Agreement and will be resolved by
arbitration and NOT by a court or jury. THE PARTIES
HEREBY FOREVER WAIVE AND GIVE UP THE
RIGHT TO HAVE A JUDGE OR JURY DECIDE ANY
COVERED CLAIMS. Either party to this Agreement
may make application to a court for temporary or
preliminary injunctive relief in aid of arbitration or for
                            6
             the maintenance of the status quo pending arbitration,
             if the award to which the party may be entitled may be
             rendered ineffectual without such relief.

      The following language appeared in bold font on the final page of the

Agreement:

             You understand that your acknowledgement of this
             Agreement is not required for the Agreement to be
             enforced. If you begin or continue working for the
             Company sixty (60) days after receipt of this
             Agreement, even without acknowledging this
             Agreement, this Agreement will be effective, and you
             will be deemed to have consented to, ratified and
             accepted this Agreement through your acceptance of
             and/or continued employment with the Company.

      The May 5, 2016 e-mail stated that under the Agreement, “both

colleagues and Pfizer agree that arbitration will replace state and federal courts

as the place where certain employment disputes are ultimately decided,” and

that “arbitrators will resolve the disputes, rather than judges or juries.” It also

included a link to a document entitled “Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver

Agreement FAQs,” which listed “Frequently Asked Questions,” including:

             4. Do I have to agree to this?

             The Arbitration Agreement is a condition of continued
             employment with the Company. If you begin or
             continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after
             receipt of this Agreement, it will be a contractual
             agreement that binds both you and the Company.

                                         7
             5. Can I change any parts of the agreement that I do not
             like?

             No, you cannot change any of the terms of the
             Arbitration Agreement.

             6. Do I give up any rights under the Arbitration
             Agreement?

             Please review the Arbitration Agreement carefully to
             fully understand its terms and conditions. By agreeing
             to the Arbitration Agreement through continuing your
             employment with Pfizer, you are giving up the right to
             bring employment-related claims covered by the
             Agreement against Pfizer in a court of law. Instead,
             you are agreeing to arbitrate those claims before a
             neutral arbitrator. You are also agreeing to bring those
             claims on an individual basis and not on a class action,
             collective action, or representative action basis. Pfizer
             is also giving up the right to bring employment-related
             claims covered by the Agreement against you in court
             and is agreeing to bring any such claims on an
             individual basis in arbitration.

      The “FAQs” document informed employees that Pfizer “cannot provide

you with legal advice about the legal impact” of the Agreement. It stated that

Pfizer encouraged any employee who had “legal questions” about the

Agreement “to speak to [his or her] own attorney.” The “FAQs” document

also explained the details of the arbitration proceedings contemplated by the

Agreement.

                                        8
      On May 5 and 6, 2016, as part of Pfizer’s “Power2Learn” module-based

training program, Pfizer sent a second e-mail to approximately 28,540 Pfizer

employees at their Pfizer e-mail addresses. In that e-mail, Pfizer advised each

employee that he or she had been “assigned the activity, Mutual Arbitration

and Class Waiver Agreement and Acknowledgment.” The e-mail stated that

the employee had been assigned the training “activity” because “[a]s a

condition of your employment with Pfizer, you and Pfizer agree to individual

arbitration as the exclusive means of resolving certain disputes relating to your

employment.” The e-mail added “[t]his agreement is contained in the Mutual

Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement. It is important that you are aware of

the terms of this Agreement.”

      In its second e-mail, Pfizer informed the employees that the due date for

completing the “activity” was July 4, 2016, the date on which the Agreement

would become effective.

      The e-mail included a link by which the employee would launch the

“Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement” module, choose to proceed

in English or Spanish, and review the module.

      The module consisted of four slides. The first slide stated:

            As a condition of your employment with Pfizer, you
            and Pfizer agree to individual arbitration as the
            exclusive means of resolving certain disputes relating
            to your employment. This agreement is contained in
                                      9
            the Mutual Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement. It
            is important that you are aware of the terms of this
            Agreement.

            The next page contains the Mutual Arbitration and
            Class Waiver Agreement. You will be able to review
            and print the Agreement. You will then be asked to
            acknowledge your receipt of the Agreement.

      The second slide instructed the employee to “[c]lick the 'Resources’ tab

in the upper-right corner to review the Agreement” and identified that tab with

an arrow. The slide instructed that after opening the “Resources” tab, the

employee “may print the Agreement and retain for your records.” It instructed

that after reviewing the Agreement, the employee should “close the window to

return to this page.”

      The third slide stated:
            I understand that I must agree to the Mutual Arbitration
            and Class Waiver Agreement as a condition of my
            employment. Even if I do not click here, if I begin or
            continue working for the Company sixty (60) days after
            receipt of this Agreement, even without acknowledging
            this Agreement, this Agreement will be effective, and I
            will be deemed to have consented to, ratified and
            accepted this Agreement through my acceptance of
            and/or continued employment with the Company.

      Just below the language set forth above, a box with an arrow pointing

upward to that language instructed the employee to “CLICK HERE to

acknowledge.”

                                      10
        The fourth slide thanked the employee “for reviewing the Mutual

Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement.” It provided an e-mail address for

the employee to use if he or she had questions about the Agreement and

instructed the employee to “[c]lick 'Exit’ to exit this course.”

                                         B.

        In 2012, Pfizer hired Skuse to work as a flight attendant in its corporate

aviation operations, based at its aviation facility in West Trenton.

        Skuse was an active Pfizer employee on May 5 and 6, 2016, when Pfizer

sent its two e-mails to employees announcing its arbitration Agreement.

Pfizer’s records indicate that Skuse received both e-mails. On June 9, 2016,

Pfizer sent Skuse an e-mail confirming that she had completed the Mutual

Arbitration and Class Waiver Agreement training module at 7:33 p.m. on that

date.

        The dispute that gave rise to this action concerned Pfizer’s policy

requiring its corporate aviation flight attendants to be vaccinated for yellow

fever. Skuse, a practicing Buddhist who has adhered to a vegan diet all her

adult life, refused the yellow fever vaccine on the ground that it contained

animal products. She states that during the first five years of her employment

at Pfizer, she was never asked or pressured to be vaccinated for yellow fever.

                                         11
      According to Skuse, in April 2017, the two managers to whom she

reported gave her “an ultimatum to receive the yellow fever vaccination”

within thirty days “or be terminated.” She asserts that her managers ignored a

letter from her doctor and her requests for exemptions from the vaccination

requirement on religious and medical grounds, and that they persistently

pressured her to be vaccinated or be terminated, prompting her to have a

“breakdown from all of the threats.”

      Skuse contends that she was granted medical leave but was not permitted

to return to work at the conclusion of that leave, and that Pfizer refused to

reasonably accommodate her request to be exempted from the vaccination

requirement.

      On August 11, 2017, Pfizer terminated Skuse’s employment.

                                        II.

                                        A.

      Skuse filed a complaint against Pfizer, the two managers to whom she

reported and a Pfizer human resources executive. Skuse alleged that Pfizer

and the individual defendants violated the LAD by terminating her

employment because of her religious objection to being vaccinated for yellow

fever. She demanded compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and

other relief.

                                        12
      Invoking the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 16, and the

New Jersey Arbitration Act (NJAA),  N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -36, Pfizer and the

individual defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and to compel

arbitration.

      Skuse opposed the motion, contending that she was not bound by

Pfizer’s Agreement. She asked the court to assume for purposes of the motion

that she “got the email and that she saw the screen that said, I acknowledge

receipt of this policy.” Skuse argued, however, that in Pfizer’s

communications on May 5 and 6, 2016, she was asked only to acknowledge

the Agreement, not to assent to it, and that she never agreed to arbitrate her

claims.

      Citing the FAA and the NJAA, the trial court granted the motion filed by

Pfizer and the individual defendants. The court noted that it was undisputed

that the Agreement covered Skuse’s LAD claims and that, if the Agreement

were held to be binding, the claims would be subject to arbitration. The trial

court concluded that Skuse assented to the Mutual Arbitration and Class

Waiver Agreement module by clicking the “acknowledge” box that appeared

on the module’s third slide. Citing Jaworski v. Ernst & Young U.S. LLP,  441 N.J. Super. 464 (App. Div. 2015), the court found that Skuse’s continued

employment after the effective date of Pfizer’s arbitration policy constituted

                                       13
assent to arbitration in accordance with Pfizer’s Agreement. Accordingly, the

trial court dismissed Skuse’s complaint and directed her to proceed to

arbitration in accordance with the Agreement.

                                        B.

      Skuse appealed the trial court’s judgment. The Appellate Division

granted amicus curiae status to the National Employment Lawyers Association

of New Jersey, the Employers Association of New Jersey, and the New Jersey

Civil Justice Institute. Skuse,  457 N.J. Super. at 551.

      The Appellate Division observed that under United States Supreme

Court jurisprudence applying the FAA, state-law contract principles govern

contract formation in a dispute over the arbitrability of a claim. Id. at 552

(citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,