Title: Commonwealth v. Gorham

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-10587 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KYRON A. GORHAM. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     March 6, 2015. - July 8, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Intent.  Intoxication.  Evidence, Intent, 
Intoxication.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, New trial, 
Postconviction relief, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 2, 2007. 
 
 
The case was tried before Gary A. Nickerson, J.; motions 
for a new trial and for funds, filed on June 25, 2010, were 
considered by him, and a motion for reconsideration, filed on 
June 14, 2012, was also considered by him. 
 
 
 
John H. Cunha, Jr. (Charles Allan Hope with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Owen J. Murphy, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  The defendant appeals from his conviction of 
deliberately premeditated murder.  At trial, the defendant 
claimed he intended only to scare the victim, but his rifle 
discharged accidentally when the victim grabbed the barrel in an 
2 
 
attempt to disarm the defendant.  Represented by new counsel on 
appeal, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial in which he 
claimed (1) ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial 
counsel's failure to investigate a defense of "diminished 
capacity" caused by the voluntary consumption of alcohol, and 
(2) newly discovered evidence of the defendant's intoxication at 
the time of the killing.  He also filed a motion for funds for 
an investigator.  The motions were denied without a hearing by 
the trial judge, who also denied without a hearing the 
defendant's motion for reconsideration.  On appeal the defendant 
argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, 
and that the denials of his postconviction motions were an abuse 
of discretion.  We affirm the convictions and the denial of the 
defendant's postconviction motions.  We also decline to exercise 
our powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts.  We reserve other details for discussion of particular 
issues.  The defendant was one of ten to fifteen people who 
attended a party hosted by Kayla Aguiar at her home in Fall 
River on January 16, 2007.  People were drinking alcohol, and it 
is not clear whether drugs also were used.  The defendant did 
not appear intoxicated.  The defendant left the party to get 
more beer.  While he was gone, Kayla Joseph and Jasmine Dugan 
started arguing, and then fighting physically, over a young man 
3 
 
named Shakeem Davis, who was not at the party.  After some 
partygoers broke up the fight, Joseph telephoned Davis for a 
ride home.  Davis and some friends arrived.  Joseph got into 
their vehicle.  At that time, there had been no communication 
between anyone at the party, other than Joseph, and anyone in 
the vehicle.  They drove to an apartment on Amity Street.  When 
the defendant returned to the party, the festive atmosphere had 
been dampened by the altercation between Joseph and Dugan.  
Disappointed and annoyed, the defendant telephoned Davis, and 
they argued.  Angered by Davis's insults, the defendant went to 
a friend's apartment to get a rifle that the defendant kept 
there. 
 
The defendant and a friend arrived at the Amity Street 
apartment where Davis and Joseph had gone.  Davis and the 
defendant cursed each other.  The defendant fired his rifle once 
at Davis, who was sitting on a couch.  He fired several more 
times as Davis ran for cover.  Davis sustained a graze wound to 
his right hand.  Bullets penetrated his anterior right and left 
thighs, his lower left and lower right back, and the left side 
of his lower torso.  The defendant ran from the apartment.  He 
hid the rifle in some bushes.  Davis died as a result of 
multiple gunshot wounds. 
 
After being told that the police were looking for him, the 
defendant left town.  He was arrested in Syracuse, New York, on 
4 
 
February 13, 2007, after first giving a false name to police.  
He gave a video-recorded statement to Syracuse police, which was 
played for the jury.  In his statement the defendant admitted 
shooting Davis.  He said he only wanted to scare Davis for being 
disrespectful.  When he pointed the rifle at Davis, Davis 
grabbed the barrel of the rifle and a tug-of-war ensued.  The 
defendant said he pulled the trigger a few times.  Davis 
released his grasp on the barrel after being shot in the chest 
and stomach.1  The defendant fled, and he discarded the rifle in 
some nearby bushes. 
 
Trial counsel had indicated in his opening statement that 
absence of intent, including intoxication, would be a theory of 
the defense.  Trial counsel requested a voluntary intoxication 
instruction based on a statement in the defendant's confession 
to the effect that he had been drinking at the party.  The judge 
declined to give the instruction because there had been no 
evidence as to the defendant's level of impairment.  
Specifically, there was no evidence that the defendant's 
condition rose to the level of "debilitating intoxication" that 
would support a reasonable doubt that the defendant was capable 
of forming the requisite criminal intent.  See Commonwealth v. 
James, 424 Mass. 770, 789 (1997). 
                     
 
1 A fingerprint was found on the barrel of the rifle, but it 
could not be attributed to any specific individual. 
5 
 
 
The defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging newly 
discovered evidence and the failure of trial counsel to 
investigate a defense of voluntary intoxication.  The defendant 
offered the affidavits of Alberta Smith and trial counsel in 
support of his motion for a new trial.  Smith said she saw the 
defendant at the party drinking brandy and beer and taking 
Colotopin pills.  She indicated he was "seriously intoxicated."  
Smith stated that the defendant slurred his speech, and his eyes 
were "red and bugged out."  She said that the defendant and 
Davis exchanged words outside the house after the defendant 
returned (in contradiction of the testimony at trial).  She had 
not testified at the trial, but she said that she had been 
interviewed by police and never provided them with this 
information.  She said she was never contacted by trial counsel. 
 
Trial counsel indicated in his affidavit that he "directed 
[his] investigator to look into evidence of the defendant's 
intoxication on the night in question."  He said he pursued an 
intoxication defense at trial "based on the defendant's 
statement to the police," but the judge declined to give an 
instruction on voluntary intoxication.  The defendant did not 
offer his own affidavit or that of trial counsel's investigator 
in support of his motion. 
 
The judge rejected the defendant's claim of newly 
discovered evidence.  He reasoned that, absent a full account of 
6 
 
the investigator's efforts, "[w]e do not know whether [the] 
investigator spoke with Smith or whether he or she secured 
similar or dissimilar evidence from the other guests at the 
party."  The judge also rejected the defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  He reasoned that, without 
knowing what the investigator discovered after having been 
directed by trial counsel to investigate the question of the 
defendant's intoxication, the defendant failed to meet his 
burden of establishing ineffective assistance.  Finally, the 
judge denied the defendant's motion for funds ($5,000) for an 
investigator.  He said that "[n]o reasonable defendant or 
counsel would spend $5,000.00 searching for and interviewing the 
guests at the party without first getting a full account from 
the investigator as to his or her findings.  Presently there is 
an insufficient basis . . . to conclude that post trial 
discovery is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might 
warrant granting a new trial." 
 
The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
denial of his motion for a new trial and his motion for funds.  
He offered his own affidavit in support, together with those of 
appellate counsel, the investigator, and Kendra Andrews.2  The 
defendant stated in his affidavit that while at the party he 
                     
 
2 "Kendra Andrews" is a pseudonym for a woman whose 
affidavit was filed under seal. 
7 
 
consumed five shots of brandy and three bottles of beer during 
the first hour.  He continued drinking brandy and beer, but he 
could not recall how many he consumed.  He said he also had 
taken two or three Colotopin pills and had smoked marijuana 
earlier in the evening. 
 
Andrews said the defendant reeked of brandy, slurred his 
speech, walked into walls, and knocked over a table.  She also 
said that the defendant and Davis exchanged words outside after 
the defendant returned to the party and Davis had arrived to 
pick up Joseph (in contradiction of the testimony at trial).  
Andrews acknowledged that she personally did not see Davis that 
night.  She said she spoke to the defendant the day after the 
party, and that he told her that he did not remember fighting 
with Davis or why he should be avoiding the police.  She said 
she had to tell him about the party because he had no 
recollection.  Andrews stated she had been interviewed by police 
but not by trial counsel or anyone who worked for him.  Andrews 
had not testified at the trial. 
 
Appellate counsel's affidavit indicates that the police 
reports noted the presence of ten to fifteen people at the 
party, several of whom reported that partygoers were drinking 
alcoholic beverages.  He said he needed the services of an 
investigator to locate and interview them.  Appellate counsel 
included the police reports with his affidavit.  The 
8 
 
investigator filed an affidavit stating that he "was unable to 
develop any useable witnesses up to the time of . . . trial."  
He further stated that he and trial counsel met with the 
defendant on April 8, 2008, at the Bristol County house of 
correction to discuss a possible plea to murder in the second 
degree, and that this was the only time he had ever spoken to 
the defendant or had contact with him in regard to this case.3 
 
The defendant also filed the "Declaration of John 
Nardizzi," dated January 22, 2013.  Nardizzi, a private 
investigator engaged by appellate counsel, located two witnesses 
who had been at the party.  They said they had never been 
interviewed by the defense, either by a lawyer or by a private 
investigator, prior to the trial in 2008. 
 
The judge denied the motion for reconsideration.  He wrote 
that the filings added nothing new, and that the "absence of a 
full accounting of the investigator's efforts is fatal to the 
present claim."  The judge also noted that Nardizzi failed to 
state in his "declaration" whether the two witnesses he located 
had given any details as to the defendant's level of 
intoxication. 
                     
 
3 The defendant filed a motion to expand the record to 
include the investigator's billing records.  Those records 
indicate the investigator met with trial counsel and the 
defendant a second time, on May 30, 2008. 
 
9 
 
 
2.  Motions for new trial and for reconsideration.4  The 
defendant argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by 
denying his motion for a new trial and his motion for 
reconsideration.  We address first the question of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and then the question of newly discovered 
evidence. 
                     
 
4 The defendant raises essentially the same claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence 
in his direct appeal as he does in his appeal from the denial of 
his postconviction motions.  They are based on the same facts 
and on the same theories.  Because these claims in the direct 
appeal depend on evidence that is not in the trial record, they 
necessarily fail.  Our review of issues raised in the direct 
appeal is limited to what is contained in the trial record.  See 
Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 Mass. 71, 81 n.22 (2007); 
Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 807 (1996).  Relief on a 
claim of ineffective assistance based on the trial record is the 
weakest form of such a claim because it is "bereft of any 
explanation by trial counsel for his actions and suggestive of 
strategy contrived by a defendant viewing the case with 
hindsight."  Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 437 Mass. 204, 210 n.5 
(2002).  Relief may be afforded on such a claim "when the 
factual basis of the claim appears indisputably on the trial 
record."  Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 811 (2006), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Adamides, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 344 
(1994).  The factual basis for the defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance in his direct appeal does not appear 
indisputably from the record.  To the extent that the 
defendant's direct appeal suggests that trial counsel was 
ineffective for suggesting in his opening statement that 
voluntary intoxication would be a defense without having the 
evidence to support such a theory, that argument fails as well.  
The trial record is silent as to what evidence of intoxication 
trial counsel had or did not have.  In any event, trial counsel 
may well have thought that even if the evidence did not require 
any instruction on voluntary intoxication, the trial judge was 
not precluded from giving such an instruction.  Such a strategy, 
particularly where the case against the defendant was strong, 
would not have been "manifestly unreasonable."  See Commonwealth 
v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 728-730 (1978). 
10 
 
 
a.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
conduct an adequate investigation into the level of his 
intoxication for purposes of presenting a defense of voluntary 
intoxication.  He relies on various police reports in which 
several people who attended or were aware of the party reported 
that partygoers were drinking alcoholic beverages and smoking 
marijuana.  He also relies on his own postarrest statement to 
Syracuse police in which he commented that "we were all just 
drinking some alcohol."  He argues that trial counsel failed to 
investigate properly and develop the facts necessary to support 
the voluntary intoxication defense he laid out in his opening 
statement to the jury.  The defendant further asserts that he 
has begun to demonstrate what a competent investigation would 
have produced, citing the affidavits of Alberta Smith and Kendra 
Andrews, and that he needs $5,000 to pursue the investigation he 
has only begun. 
 
"The decision to allow a motion for a new trial lies within 
the sound discretion of the judge and will not be reversed 
unless it is manifestly unjust or unless the trial was infected 
with prejudicial constitutional error."  Commonwealth v. Nieves, 
429 Mass. 763, 770 (1999).  Here, because the defendant was 
convicted of murder in the first degree, our review is under the 
statutory standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, which is more 
11 
 
favorable than the constitutional standard for reviewing claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.  We need not focus on the 
adequacy of counsel's performance, but on whether there was any 
error in the course of the trial, and, if there was, whether 
that error likely influenced the jury's conclusion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  A strategic decision by an attorney 
constitutes error only if it was manifestly unreasonable when 
made.  See Commonwealth v. Smith, 456 Mass. 476, 482 (2010).  
The burden is on the defendant to show that counsel was 
ineffective.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 745, 754 
(1999). 
 
The judge rejected the defendant's claim of ineffectiveness 
because trial counsel in fact hired an investigator and directed 
the investigator to investigate the question of the defendant's 
intoxication on the night in question.  The record is silent as 
to the results of that investigation, other than that the 
investigator's affidavit indicated that he "was unable to 
develop any useable witnesses up to the time of . . . trial."  
As the judge noted, we have no way of knowing whether the 
investigator interviewed Smith or Andrews, or what, if anything, 
they may have reported as to the defendant's state of sobriety.  
Without that information, it is impossible to assess whether or 
how trial counsel's use of, or response to, the investigation 
12 
 
was such that it amounted to error that was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion.  See Wright, 411 Mass. at 682.  
See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Mass. 645, 655 (2008).  
This is not a case where trial counsel did no investigation. 
 
In addition, the judge was not required to credit the 
affidavit of the defendant, Smith, or Andrews.  See Commonwealth 
v. Diaz, 453 Mass. 266, 283 (2009).  There is substantial basis 
in the police reports on which to reject the affidavits of the 
defendant, Smith, and Andrews, and to deny the motions for a new 
trial and for reconsideration, wholly apart from the absence of 
information regarding the investigation.  The defendant never 
mentioned to Syracuse police that he was intoxicated, but only 
that he and others at the party "were all just drinking some 
alcohol."  He never mentioned drugs.  Andrews, who was 
interviewed by police four times, and Smith never mentioned the 
defendant's state of sobriety to police.  Moreover, Andrews 
initially told police that the defendant did not attend the 
party, and she was persistent on the point.  Smith told police 
she did not know the defendant, and she was "sure that he was 
never in that apartment" at the time of the party.  The judge 
acted well within his discretion when he concluded that the 
defendant failed to meet his burden of proof and when he denied 
the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as 
13 
 
contained in his motion for a new trial and motion for 
reconsideration.  See id. 
 
b.  Newly discovered evidence.  The judge rejected the 
defendant's claim of newly discovered evidence, especially the 
information contained in the Smith and Andrews affidavits, 
because, without a full accounting of the investigator's 
efforts, there is no way of knowing if the information is newly 
discovered.  The judge's reasoning and his decision are entirely 
sensible.  His conclusion that the claim of newly discovered 
evidence cannot be ascertained is neither erroneous nor an abuse 
of discretion. 
 
As mentioned in the preceding discussion on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and entirely apart from the absence of 
information about the investigator's efforts, the judge simply 
could have rejected the affidavits on the strength of other 
information in the record.  Neither the defendant, Smith, nor 
Andrews ever told police that the defendant was intoxicated; and 
both Smith and Andrews had told police that the defendant, 
without question, did not attend the party.  There was no error 
or abuse of discretion in the denial of the defendant's motions 
for a new trial and for reconsideration.  For the reasons stated 
by the judge, there was no error in the denial of the 
defendant's motion for funds. 
14 
 
 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the 
entire record and the briefs on appeal and we see no reason to 
reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Orders denying motion for a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial, motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  funds, and motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  reconsideration affirmed.