Title: AllEnergy Corp. v. Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP491 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
AllEnergy Corporation and AllEnergy Silica, 
Arcadia, LLC, 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 370 Wis. 2d 261, 881 N.W.2d 358 
(2016 - Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 31, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Trempealeau 
 
JUDGE: 
Elliott M. Levine 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs, joined by ROGGENSACK, C.J. 
(opinion filed) 
 
DISSENTED: 
KELLY, J. dissents, joined by GABLEMAN, J. and 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
petitioners-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Gary A. Van Cleve and Larkin, Hoffman, Daly and 
Lindgren Ltd., Minneapolis, and oral argument by Gary A. Van 
Cleve. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Ronald S. Stadler, Aaron J. Graf and Mallery & Zimmerman, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Ronald Stadler. 
 
An amici curiae brief was filed on behalf of CSI Sands 
(Wisconsin) LTD., D/B/A Canadian Silica Industries, Superior 
 
 
2 
Silica Sands LLC, Mississippi Sand LLC, and High Country Sand 
LLC by Anders B. Helquist and Weld Riley, S.C., Eau Claire. 
 
An amici curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Counties Association and Wisconsin Towns Association by Richard 
Manthe, Shawano. 
 
An amici curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Realtors Association and Wisconsin Builders Association by 
Thomas D. Larson, Madison. 
 
 
 
2017 WI 52
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP491 
(L.C. No. 
2013CV245) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
AllEnergy Corporation and AllEnergy Silica, 
Arcadia, LLC, 
 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 31, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.1   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming an order 
                                                 
1 Although four justices agree with the mandate of this 
opinion that the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed, 
only Justice Ann Walsh Bradley joins this opinion (which makes 
it the opinion of two justices).  Justice Annette K. Ziegler 
(joined by Chief Justice Patience D. Roggensack) joins the 
mandate and writes separately in concurrence.  Justice Daniel 
Kelly (joined by Justice Michael J. Gableman and Justice Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley) dissents.  This opinion is a lead opinion 
because four justices do not agree with or join its reasoning.   
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
2 
 
of the circuit court for Trempealeau County, La Crosse County 
Circuit Court Judge Elliott M. Levine, presiding.2  The order of 
the circuit court affirmed the Trempealeau County Environment & 
Land Use Committee's denial of the conditional use permit 
application 
for 
non-metallic 
mineral 
mining 
submitted 
by 
AllEnergy 
Corporation 
and 
AllEnergy 
Silica, 
Arcadia, 
LLC 
(collectively AllEnergy).  The non-metallic mineral mining in 
the instant case is mining, processing and transporting silica 
sand used in hydraulic fracturing (fracking).   
¶2 
Naming the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee as respondent, AllEnergy sought certiorari review in 
the circuit court of the denial of its application for a 
conditional use permit; appealed the order of the circuit court 
                                                                                                                                                             
As Justice Ann Walsh Bradley recently explained in State v. 
Weber, 2016 WI 96, ¶83 n.1, 372 Wis. 2d 202, 887 N.W.2d 554 (Ann 
Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting), although "the term 'lead' 
opinion . . . is undefined in our Internal Operating Procedures, 
its use here is consistent with past description.  We have said 
'that a lead opinion is one that states (and agrees with) the 
mandate of a majority of the justices, but represents the 
reasoning 
of 
less 
than 
a 
majority 
of 
the 
participating 
justices.'" (quoting State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶143, 371 
Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson & Ann Walsh Bradley, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Hoffer 
Props., 
LLC 
v. 
DOT, 
2016 
WI 
5, 
366 
Wis. 2d 372, 
874 
N.W.2d 533)).   
2 AllEnergy Corp. v. Trempealeau County Env't & Land Use 
Comm., No. 2015AP491, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 
10, 2016).   
No. 
2015AP491   
 
3 
 
to the court of appeals; and then sought review of the decision 
of the court of appeals in this court.3      
¶3 
The 
issues 
presented 
in 
AllEnergy's 
brief 
and 
addressed by the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee's brief are the following: 
I. 
Did the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee, an appointed body without the power to 
legislate, exceed its jurisdiction by denying a 
conditional use permit based on broad legislative 
concerns over the public health, safety, and 
welfare?  
II. Did substantial evidence in the administrative 
record support the denial of a conditional use 
permit for non-metallic mining?   
III. Should the court adopt a new doctrine that a 
conditional use permit applicant is entitled to 
the permit where (A) all ordinance conditions and 
standards are met and (B) additional conditions 
can be adopted that address potentially-adverse 
impacts from the use?4  
                                                 
3 Briefs were submitted in this court by amici curiae as 
follows: Joint brief of CSI Sands (Wisconsin) LTD., D/B/A 
Canadian 
Silica 
Industries, 
Superior 
Silica 
Sands 
LLC, 
Mississippi Sand LLC, and High Country Sand LLC; Wisconsin 
Realtors Association and Wisconsin Builders Association; and 
Wisconsin Counties Association and Wisconsin Towns Association. 
4 Brief of Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners (AllEnergy) at 
vi (emphasis added).   
AllEnergy's petition for review stated the issues somewhat 
differently as follows (emphasis added): 
I. 
Does a conditional use permit ("CUP") applicant 
have a property right of entitlement to issuance 
of a CUP when a county zoning committee adopts 37 
specific conditions of approval for a CUP, but 
then denies it based on generalized quasi-
legislative concerns? 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
4 
 
¶4 
AllEnergy's statement of the third issue is premised 
on AllEnergy's argument that AllEnergy satisfied, as a matter of 
law, all the specific conditions in the ordinance and that the 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee cannot 
require 
AllEnergy 
to 
satisfy 
"subjective," 
"generalized" 
conditions and standards in the ordinance. 
¶5 
Before we address each issue in turn, we briefly state 
the certiorari standard of review to provide context for the 
issues and our decision.   
                                                                                                                                                             
II. Do 
unsubstantiated 
public 
comments 
on 
the 
possible negative impacts of a non-metallic mine 
constitute substantial evidence upon which to 
base a CUP denial? 
III. Should the court adopt a new doctrine that where 
a CUP applicant has shown that all conditions and 
standards, both by ordinance and as devised by 
the zoning committee, have been or will be met, 
the applicant is entitled to the issuance of the 
permit? 
IV. Did [the Environment & Land Use Committee] exceed 
its jurisdiction by denying a CUP based upon 
generalized concerns, reflecting the exercise of 
policy-based, quasi-legislative authority by a 
committee 
whose 
members 
are 
appointed, 
not 
elected? 
V. 
In addition to violating the judicial notice 
statute, did it violate the due process and equal 
protection rights of the CUP applicant for the 
courts below to refuse to take mandatory judicial 
notice of certain governmental documents? 
This court's order granting AllEnergy's petition for review 
limited review to issues II, III, and IV, above.     
No. 
2015AP491   
 
5 
 
¶6 
The first two issues stated above relate to certiorari 
review of the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee's decision denying AllEnergy a conditional use permit.5  
A person aggrieved by the denial of a conditional use permit may 
commence an action seeking the remedy available by certiorari. 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10) (2013-14).6   
¶7 
In the instant certiorari review, the decision of the 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee is accorded 
a presumption of correctness and validity.7  Certiorari review is 
                                                 
5 See State ex rel. Skelly Oil Co. v. Common Council, City 
of Delafield, 58 Wis. 2d 695, 700-701, 207 N.W.2d 585 (1973) 
(footnote omitted): 
Conditional uses or as they are sometimes referred to, 
special exceptions uses, enjoy acceptance as a valid 
and successful tool of municipal planning . . . .[A]s 
flexibility devices, which are designed to cope with 
situations where a particular use, although not 
inherently inconsistent with the use classification of 
a particular zone, [conditional uses] may well create 
special problems and hazards if allowed to develop and 
locate as a matter of right in [a] particular zone. 
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
"Certiorari is used to test the validity of decisions made 
by administrative or quasi-judicial bodies."  Acevedo v. City of 
Kenosha, 2011 WI App 10, ¶8, 331 Wis. 2d 218, 793 N.W.2d 500. 
7 See, e.g., Lamar Cent. Outdoor, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning 
Appeals of City of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 117, ¶16, 284 Wis. 2d 1, 
700 N.W.2d 87; Edward Kraemer & Sons, Inc. v. Sauk Cty. Bd. of 
Adjustment, 183 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 515 N.W.2d 256 (1994); Sills v. 
Walworth Cty. Land Mgt. Comm., 2002 WI App 111, ¶6, 254 
Wis. 2d 538, 648 N.W.2d 878. 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
6 
 
limited to whether the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee:  
1. 
Kept within its jurisdiction; 
2. 
Proceeded on a correct theory of law; 
3. 
Acted in an arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable 
manner that represented its will and not its judgment; 
and 
4. 
Might reasonably make the order or determination in 
question based on evidence.8   
¶8 
AllEnergy's focus——and therefore our focus and that of 
the circuit court and court of appeals——is on the first and 
fourth inquiries on certiorari review.  Nevertheless, we 
recognize that AllEnergy sometimes seems to fuse its arguments 
on the first and fourth inquiries in a certiorari review with 
the third inquiry, namely whether the Trempealeau County 
Environment & Land Use Committee acted in an arbitrary, 
oppressive, or unreasonable manner that represented its will, 
not its judgment.  Our discussion of the first and fourth 
inquiries demonstrates that the determination of the Committee 
was not arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable:  The Committee 
                                                 
8 Oneida Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay, 2015 
WI 50, ¶41, 362 Wis. 2d 290, 865 N.W.2d 162 (citing Ottman v. 
Town 
of 
Primrose, 
201 
WI 
18, 
¶35, 
332 
Wis. 2d 3, 
796 
N.W.2d 411).  
In challenging whether the evidence was such that the 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee might 
reasonably make the determination in question, courts apply the 
substantial evidence test.  See Part III, infra.   
No. 
2015AP491   
 
7 
 
addressed AllEnergy's arguments; the Committee addressed the 
provisions of the county's ordinance and its decision was the 
result of deliberation and judgment exercised within the range 
of discretion accorded it in the ordinance; and the Committee's 
determination was reasonable, had a rational basis, and was 
supported by substantial evidence.9    
¶9 
On certiorari, this court reviews the record of the 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee, rather than 
the judgment or findings of the circuit court or the decision of 
the court of appeals.10  We have undertaken an independent review 
of the Committee's record but have benefitted from the court of 
appeals' comprehensive review.    
                                                 
9 A determination of a local governmental entity represents 
its will and not its judgment when its action is "arbitrary, 
oppressive, or unreasonable."  Snyder v. Waukesha Cty. Zoning 
Bd. of Adj., 74 Wis. 2d 468, 475-76, 247 N.W.2d 98 (1976) (An 
action is "arbitrary o[r] capricious if it is unreasonable or 
without a rational basis."); see also Olson v. Rothwell, 28 
Wis. 2d 233, 239, 137 N.W.2d 86 (1965) ("Arbitrary or capricious 
action on the part of an administrative agency occurs when it 
can be said that such action is unreasonable or does not have a 
rational basis. . . . and [is] not the result of the 'winnowing 
and sifting' process.") (internal citations omitted); State ex 
rel. Harris v. Annuity & Pension Bd., Emp. Ret. Sys. of City of 
Milwaukee, 87 Wis. 2d 646, 651–52, 275 N.W.2d 668, 671 (1979) 
(the fourth certiorari criterion, whether the evidence was such 
that the governmental entity might reasonably make the order 
based on evidence, controls the third criterion); see also 
Williams v. Housing Auth. of City of Milwaukee, 2010 WI App 14, 
¶10, 323 Wis. 2d 179, 779 N.W.2d 185 (a challenge under criteria 
three and four of a certiorari review requires a court to 
determine whether the decision is founded on insufficient 
evidence). 
10 Oneida Seven Generations Corp., 362 Wis. 2d 290, ¶42. 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
8 
 
¶10 For the reasons set forth, we conclude as follows: 
I. 
The 
Trempealeau 
County 
Environment 
& 
Land 
Use 
Committee applied the factors and considerations set 
forth in the applicable ordinance and thus kept within 
its jurisdiction in denying a conditional use permit 
to AllEnergy.  
II. There is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the 
Trempealeau 
County 
Environment 
& 
Land 
Use 
Committee's decision denying AllEnergy's application 
for a conditional use permit.   
III. The court will not overturn settled law governing 
review of a grant or denial of a conditional use 
permit.  The court does not adopt the new legal 
doctrine urged by AllEnergy, namely that an applicant 
for a conditional use permit is entitled to the permit 
for a conditional use when it meets the specific 
conditions 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
ordinance 
and 
any 
additional conditions set forth, and that an applicant 
cannot be required to meet other conditions and 
standards in the ordinance.  
¶11 Part I describes the proposed project for which 
AllEnergy sought a conditional use permit.  In Parts II, III, 
and IV, we address each issue stated above.  Issues I and II 
require a fact-intensive analysis to determine whether the 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee kept within 
its jurisdiction and whether substantial evidence exists to 
support the Committee's denial of AllEnergy's application for a 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
9 
 
conditional use permit; the facts are set forth in Parts II and 
III.   
I 
¶12 Trempealeau County is home to several frac sand mines.  
Trempealeau County's rolling and bucolic hills hide vast 
reserves of silica sand.  Silica sand is often called "frac 
sand," in reference to the material's use as a proppant in 
hydraulic fracturing, that is, in "fracking."  Fracking is a 
process used to extract previously inaccessible buried reserves 
of oil and natural gas.  The process involves drilling an oil or 
natural gas well and using explosives to create cracks or 
fissures in the rock or subsurface material.  A mixture of 
water, chemicals, and frac sand is injected to expand and hold 
open the cracks or fissures created by the explosives.  The oil 
or natural gas reserves leach out of the cracks and fissures and 
into the wells.11   
¶13 In May 2013, AllEnergy located a site in the Town of 
Arcadia in Trempealeau County for a frac sand mine.  The site is 
located in an Exclusive Agriculture 2 (EA-2) zoning district, 
which has the stated purpose to "preserve[] class I, II and III 
soils 
and 
additional 
irrigated 
farmland 
from 
scattered 
residential developments that would threaten the future of 
                                                 
11 For a more in-depth discussion of fracking and frac sand, 
see Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Industrial Sand 
Mining 
in 
Wisconsin, 
June 
2016, 
http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/EIA/documents/ISMSA/ISMSA.pdf 
(last 
visited May 22, 2017). 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
10 
 
agriculture . . ." and "to preserve woodlands, wetlands, natural 
areas and the rural atmosphere of the County."12  
¶14 Because non-metallic mineral mining, including frac 
sand mining, requires a conditional use permit in Trempealeau 
County, AllEnergy filed an application for such a permit and a 
non-metallic mineral mining reclamation plan with the County on 
August 2, 2013.  The application describes a 550-acre project, 
which includes a 265-acre mine site, a processing plant, a 
conveyor system (to move sand and other materials around the 
facility), storm water retention ponds, and a rail spur 
connecting the facility to a Canadian Northern rail line.   
¶15 AllEnergy's application also explains that it had 
received "favorable determinations" from various state and 
federal agencies regarding wetland-fill, storm water discharge, 
and highway-related permits.   
¶16 Trempealeau County's Department of Land Management 
initially received the application and referred it to an 
engineering firm for third-party review.  In response to the 
engineering firm's concerns, AllEnergy made changes to its plan.  
                                                 
12 See Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance § 2.03(2). 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
11 
 
On August 27, 2013, the Department of Land Management deemed the 
plan "complete."13  
¶17 Tasked with deciding whether a sand mine should be 
permitted in the EA-2 zoning district, the Trempealeau County 
Environment & Land Use Committee held a public hearing on 
AllEnergy's application on October 9, 2013.  During the hearing, 
AllEnergy's representatives and its experts gave presentations 
on the project.  
¶18 After 
AllEnergy's 
presentations, 
the 
hearing 
was 
opened to public testimony.  Thirteen people testified against 
permitting the proposed non-metallic mine and two supported the 
mine.  In addition, letters and e-mails were read into the 
record.  According to the circuit court, "[a]pproximately 368 
people went on record as being in favor of granting the 
conditional use permit, with the vast majority registering their 
support via form letter with little or no comment, including 
approximately 51 people who are residents of another state.  
Approximately 38 people went on record as being opposed to 
granting the conditional use permit, the majority of whom 
provided a reason for their position."   
                                                 
13 The Department of Land Management deemed the application 
complete days before the County adopted a one-year moratorium on 
permitting new frac sand mines on August 30 (effective September 
1, 2013).  The County adopted the moratorium in order to study 
the health and environmental effects of the recent boom in frac 
sand mining.  Because AllEnergy submitted a complete application 
before September 1, the moratorium did not apply to AllEnergy. 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
12 
 
¶19 Generally, those favoring granting the conditional use 
permit 
cited 
increased 
employment. 
 
Those 
opposed 
cited 
environmental, health, and cultural concerns.   
¶20 A 
lengthy 
discussion 
ensued 
between 
AllEnergy's 
representatives and the members of the Trempealeau County 
Environment 
& 
Land 
Use 
Committee 
regarding 
the 
concerns 
expressed by the public about the project. 
¶21 During the public hearing, the Trempealeau County 
Environment & Land Use Committee reviewed the provisions of the 
County ordinance concerning conditional use 
permits, non-
metallic 
mineral 
mining 
permits, 
and 
non-metallic 
mine 
reclamation.  See Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance chs. 10, 
13, 20.  The substance of these ordinance provisions will be 
discussed below.  For now, it suffices to say that the Committee 
discussed many of the factors in the ordinance and that 
AllEnergy was involved in this discussion.  
¶22 After reviewing the ordinance provisions governing its 
decision, 
the 
Trempealeau 
County 
Environment 
& 
Land 
Use 
Committee discussed what conditions would have to be imposed on 
AllEnergy's conditional use permit before it would vote to grant 
the permit.  After extensive discussion, the Committee voted 7-1 
in favor of imposing numerous conditions on the conditional use 
permit. 
¶23 After 
deciding 
on 
the 
approved 
conditions, 
the 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee voted 5-3 to 
deny AllEnergy's application for a conditional use permit even 
with those conditions in place.  The five members of the 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
13 
 
Committee who voted to deny the application stated their reasons 
for doing so on the record.  The Committee also prepared a 
written summary of its decision pursuant to Trempealeau County 
Zoning Ordinance § 13.03(4).14   
II 
¶24 AllEnergy's first challenge is that the Trempealeau 
County Environment & Land Use Committee did not keep within its 
jurisdiction when denying a conditional use permit to AllEnergy 
when it based its denial on "legislative concerns implicating 
public health, safety, and welfare."   
¶25 To support this challenge, AllEnergy makes three 
arguments. 
¶26 AllEnergy argues that the Trempealeau County Board of 
Supervisors decided, as a legislative matter in enacting the 
ordinance, that the public health, safety, and welfare may be 
served by allowing non-metallic mineral mining in an Exclusive 
Agriculture 2 (EA-2) zoning district.  AllEnergy reasons that 
the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee did not 
keep within its jurisdiction in denying AllEnergy a conditional 
use permit because the designation of a use in a zoning code as 
                                                 
14 Under our cases, no requirement exists that a written 
decision be prepared, but, for meaningful review, a reviewing 
court must be able to discern from the record or the transcript 
of the proceedings before the board the reasons for the denial 
of the application for a conditional use permit.  See Lamar 
Cent. Outdoor, 284 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶31-35. 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
14 
 
a conditional use by the Board of Supervisors conclusively 
establishes that the use is in the public interest.   
¶27 AllEnergy also argues that because the Trempealeau 
County Board of Supervisors included non-metallic mineral mining 
as a conditional use within an EA-2 zoning district, such a use 
is 
presumptively 
valid 
and 
the 
proper 
inquiry 
for 
the 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee is whether 
the conditional use at the particular location carries impacts 
greater than the adverse impacts ordinarily associated with that 
use.  AllEnergy asserts further that it is entitled to a 
conditional use permit as of right because no evidence in the 
record demonstrates that the proposed non-metallic mineral 
mining site at the particular location carries impacts greater 
than the adverse impacts ordinarily associated with that use.15 
¶28 AllEnergy further bolsters its position that the 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee did not keep 
within its jurisdiction by arguing that the guideline of "public 
health, safety or general welfare" is too general to supply the 
necessary guidance for action by the Committee.  In making this 
argument AllEnergy does not refer to the constitution in its 
briefs, but its argument is a constitutional one attacking the 
ordinance as an invalid delegation of power to the Committee.   
                                                 
15 AllEnergy 
relies 
on 
Maryland 
cases 
adopting 
this 
standard.  See, e.g., Mossburg v. Montgomery Cty., 666 A.2d 1253 
(Md. Ct. App. 1995).  
No. 
2015AP491   
 
15 
 
¶29 At oral argument, Justice Ziegler asked whether 
AllEnergy 
was 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
ordinance.  Counsel for AllEnergy replied that the court stopped 
him from making such an argument.   
¶30 The dialogue at oral argument proceeded as follows: 
Justice Ziegler:  I'm curious, it doesn't seem that 
you have specifically made constitutional arguments 
that 
this 
is 
an 
unconstitutional 
delegation 
of 
authority or that this ordinance is unconstitutional 
either 
facially 
or 
as 
applied, 
or 
any 
other 
constitutional claims.  I'm curious why not.   
AllEnergy's counsel:  Because this court told me I 
couldn't make them.  That was one of the issues that 
we raised in our petition for review and the court 
granted review on the three issues that are stated in 
its order granting the petition.  We did raise a 
constitutional issue, but it is not before this court. 
¶31 Justice Ziegler and counsel, however, spoke past each 
other.  AllEnergy's response to Justice Ziegler should have been 
that it did not raise an unconstitutional delegation of 
authority claim or make any facial or as-applied constitutional 
claim in its petition for review.  See ¶3 n.3, supra (describing 
AllEnergy's statement of issues in its petition for review). 
¶32 AllEnergy's 
petition 
for 
review 
did 
raise 
a 
constitutional issue that the court did not address in granting 
review.  AllEnergy's petition for review raised a violation of 
due process and equal protection relating to judicial notice of 
certain documents.  See ¶3 n.3, supra.  This was not the 
constitutional argument to which Justice Ziegler was referring.  
¶33 Undeniably, 
AllEnergy's 
brief 
attacks 
the 
constitutionality of the Trempealeau County ordinance, relying 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
16 
 
throughout its brief (in pages too numerous to cite in its Table 
of Authorities) on State ex rel. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. 
Wahner, 25 Wis. 2d 1, 130 N.W.2d 304 (1964), a case successfully 
challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance on the grounds 
of invalid standards in the ordinance.  
¶34 Trempealeau 
County's 
brief 
correctly 
objects 
to 
AllEnergy's diverging into a constitutional argument in its 
discussion of whether the Trempealeau County Environment & Land 
Use Committee exceeded its jurisdiction.     
¶35 We disagree with the positions that AllEnergy urges.  
We conclude: 
(A) 
By adhering to the Trempealeau County ordinance, the 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee 
kept within its jurisdiction in denying AllEnergy's 
application for a conditional use permit in the 
instant case.   
¶36 AllEnergy supports its challenge to the Committee's 
jurisdiction by three arguments.  As to these three arguments, 
we conclude:  
(B) 
Designation of 
non-metallic mineral mining as a 
conditional 
use 
in 
the 
zoning 
code 
does 
not 
conclusively establish that the use is in the public 
interest.  
(C) 
The proper inquiry is not whether the proposed 
conditional use carries impacts greater than the 
adverse impacts ordinarily associated with that use, 
and  
No. 
2015AP491   
 
17 
 
(D) 
The guidelines in the Trempealeau County ordinance, 
including the requirement that the Committee consider 
"public health, safety or general welfare," are 
constitutional. 
A 
¶37 To 
determine 
whether 
the 
Trempealeau 
County 
Environment & Land Use Committee kept within its jurisdiction, 
we compare the terms of the ordinance to the Committee's action.  
The "kept within its jurisdiction" inquiry on certiorari review 
considers 
whether 
the 
applicable 
ordinance 
grants 
the 
Trempealeau 
County 
Environment 
& 
Land 
Use 
Committee 
the 
authority to take the action it took.  The Trempealeau County 
Environment & Land Use Committee, as an agency created by the 
County's legislative body, has those powers that are expressly 
conferred or that are necessarily implied by the ordinances 
under which it operates.16   
¶38 The Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance enacted by the 
Trempealeau County Board of Supervisors lists various criteria 
the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee is to 
                                                 
16 Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 110 
Wis. 2d 455, 461–62, 329 
N.W.2d 143 (1983) (citing 
Elroy-
Kendall-Wilton Schs. v. Coop. Educ. Serv., 102 Wis. 2d 274, 278, 
306 N.W.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1981)).  See also Wis. Citizens 
Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶14, 270 
Wis. 2d 318, 334–35, 677 N.W.2d 612 ("It is axiomatic that 
because the legislature creates administrative agencies as part 
of the executive branch, such agencies have only those powers 
which are expressly conferred or which are necessarily implied 
by the statutes under which it operates.") (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
No. 
2015AP491   
 
18 
 
consider in deciding whether to grant or deny an application for 
a conditional use permit. 
¶39 The 
ordinance 
requires 
the 
Trempealeau 
County 
Environment & Land Use Committee to "review each conditional use 
permit 
application 
for 
compliance 
with 
all 
requirements 
applicable to that specific use and to all other relevant 
provisions of this Ordinance."  The ordinance specifically 
directs the Committee to approve a conditional use permit only 
if it determines that "the proposed use at the proposed location 
will not be contrary to the public interest and will not be 
detrimental or injurious to the public health, public safety, or 
character of the surrounding area."  Trempealeau County Zoning 
Ordinance § 10.04(5)(a). 
¶40 The Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance provides 16 
other factors to guide the Trempealeau County Environment & Land 
Use 
Committee's 
inquiry 
in 
its 
decision-making 
function 
regarding a conditional use permit, including:  
1. Whether the proposed project will adversely affect 
property in the area.  
2. Whether the proposed use is similar to other uses 
in the area.  
3. Whether the proposed project is consistent with 
adopted Trempealeau County plans or any officially 
adopted town plan.  
. . . . 
7. Whether the proposed use creates noise, odor, or 
dust.  
. . . . 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
19 
 
11. Provision for proper surface water drainage.  
. . . . 
13. Whether the proposed project creates excessive 
exterior lighting glare or spillover onto neighboring 
properties.  
14. Whether the proposed project leads to a change in 
the natural character of the area through the removal 
of natural vegetation or altering of the topography.  
15. Whether the proposed project would adversely 
affect the natural beauty of the area.  
16. Whether the proposed project would adversely 
affect any historic or archeological sites.  
Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance § 10.04(5)(b).  
¶41 Moreover, the Trempealeau County Environment & Land 
Use Committee is not limited to considering the factors 
specified in the ordinance.  It may consider "additional factors 
as are deemed by it to be relevant to its decision making 
process . . . ." 
 
Trempealeau 
County 
Zoning 
Ordinance 
§ 10.04(5)(b).  The Committee did not rely on this latter 
provision. 
¶42 In addition to the criteria governing the granting of 
conditional use permits stated above, additional considerations 
for authorizing non-metallic mineral mining are set forth in 
chapter 13 of the Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance.  The 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee is required 
to analyze proposals for non-metallic mineral mining "in light 
of the County's interest in providing for the wise use of the 
natural resources of the county, aesthetic implications of the 
siting of such a mine at a given location and the impacts of 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
20 
 
such a mining operation on the general health, safety and 
welfare of the public."  Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance 
§ 13.01.   
¶43 The zoning ordinance governing non-metallic mineral 
mining sets forth another eight factors the Trempealeau County 
Environment & Land Use Committee shall consider, "among other 
factors," when considering an application for a non-metallic 
mineral mine permit:  
(a) When considering an application for a non-metallic 
mineral mine permit, the County shall consider, among 
other factors, the following: the effect or impact of 
the 
proposed 
operation 
upon; 
(1) 
public 
infrastructure, including but not limited to streets 
and highways, schools and other public facilities; (2) 
present and proposed uses of land in the vicinity of 
the proposed operation; (3) surface water drainage, 
water quality and supply; (4) soil erosion; (5) 
aesthetics, including but not limited to scenic beauty 
and 
the 
conservation 
of 
natural 
resources 
of 
outstanding quality or uniqueness; (6) the market 
value of lands in the vicinity of the proposed 
operation; 
(7) 
the 
physical 
practicality 
of 
reclamation of the site after the operation has been 
concluded; and (8) the public interest from the 
standpoints of smoke, dust, noxious or toxic gases and 
odors, noise, vibration, blasting and the operation of 
heavy machinery and equipment.  
Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance § 13.03(3)(a). 
¶44 The ordinance also requires the Committee to determine 
whether the proposed non-metallic mining operation is an 
appropriate land use at the site in question, including the 
ability of the operator to avoid harm to the legitimate 
interests of properties in the vicinity of the proposed 
operation, as follows: 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
21 
 
(b) In order to grant a conditional use permit for 
non-metallic mineral mining, the County shall find 
that the proposed operation is an appropriate land use 
at the site in question, based upon consideration of 
such factors as: existence of non-metallic mineral 
deposits; 
proximity 
of 
site 
to 
transportation 
facilities and to markets; and the ability of the 
operator to avoid harm to the public health, safety 
and welfare and to the legitimate interests of 
properties in the vicinity of the proposed operation.  
Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance § 13.03(3)(b).  
¶45 The 
ordinance 
acknowledges, 
however, 
despite 
the 
extensive criteria outlined above, that it is "impossible to 
prescribe the criteria upon which such a permit may be granted 
in each and every case."  Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance 
§ 13.01.     
¶46 In 
determining 
whether 
to 
grant 
AllEnergy 
a 
conditional use permit, the Trempealeau County Environment & 
Land Use Committee considered and applied the criteria set forth 
in the ordinance. 
¶47 Each member of the Trempealeau County Environment & 
Land Use Committee who voted against granting AllEnergy's 
application stated his or her reasons as follows:   
Committee member Vold:  The reason I thought it was an 
attempt to [negate] the moratorium was that——I wasn't 
here for the moratorium but I read it.  I thought that 
the booklet was quite incomplete, there was too many 
unanswered questions in the application process and I 
felt there was more questions than there were answers. 
Committee member Zeglin:  I too agree that the plan 
seemed to be rushed; it was revised after the third 
party review.  Things should have completed before 
that and it leads one to wonder how many times it may 
be revised again.  The lack of a reclamation plan 
provided in the initial plan.  That should have been 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
22 
 
done 
initially. 
 
I 
have 
numerous 
environmental 
concerns about the significant wetlands in the area, 
the river at this point historically was and is 
constantly changing it is very hard to plan anything 
on a long range basis.  I'm very concerned with the 
water table in the area——it is very high.  I haven't 
been convinced that it will not be disturbed.  Virg 
you can add the river constantly floods, changes 
course. 
Committee member Brandt:  My reasons were wetland 
location is too close to sensitive water and wildlife 
resources and the inability of the applicant to 
mitigate those concerns to my satisfaction.  Um, the 
possibility of possible significant danger to ground 
water, by processes involved in mining and processing, 
and the high capacity well.  Number 3 is the 
significant change to the landscape and to the local 
cultural . . . and social conditions.  Um, and the 
other issues that had been brought up by staff and the 
public included the reclamation plan.   
Committee member Patzner:  Well, I represent the Farm 
Service Agency and I'm for agriculture.  Agriculture 
has a history of bringing stability and jobs to our 
local economy, where sand mines have a history of boom 
or bust on the local economy, therefore destroying 
good productive agricultural land is not a wise 
decision.  We don't want to destroy our outdoor 
recreation potential, like hunting, biking and other 
activities that attract visitors, retirees and people 
that love scenic beauty who are close to work and live 
here.  There are health concerns with mining so we 
need to protect our residents. 
Committee member Bawek:  Based on information given as 
referenced and my own findings, along with public 
concerns given at this meeting, this siting does not 
seem to be in the best interest of our citizens nor in 
the best use of our natural resources of Trempealeau 
County.  Soil around and in the site bring into 
question the potential for water problems.  Trout Run 
Creek and the close proximity to the Trempealeau River 
deem this site as poor.  The potential loss of some 
unique 
resources 
for 
both 
ourselves 
and 
future 
generations comes into question.  That's it.  
No. 
2015AP491   
 
23 
 
¶48 It is evident that the Trempealeau County Environment 
& Land Use Committee exercised the powers conferred by the 
ordinance.  It considered factors set forth in the ordinance for 
granting a conditional use permit.  These factors included the 
impact of AllEnergy's mine on the general health, safety, and 
welfare of the public; the wise use of the county's material 
resources; the aesthetic implications of the siting of the mine; 
and the adverse effects of the mine on the environment 
(including water quality, ground water, and wetlands), scenic 
beauty, 
wildlife, 
and 
recreational 
opportunities. 
 
After 
considering 
these 
factors, 
the 
Committee 
determined 
that 
AllEnergy's application for a conditional use permit should be 
denied.   
¶49 Because the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee considered the factors the Trempealeau County Board of 
Supervisors directed the Committee to consider, we conclude that 
the Committee kept within its jurisdiction.    
B 
¶50 Our case law has not accepted what AllEnergy advocates 
as a new doctrine in Wisconsin, namely that a legislative 
listing 
of 
a 
conditional 
use 
equates 
to 
a 
legislative 
determination that the use is in the public interest.  AllEnergy 
urges the court to apply this doctrine and hold that the 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee did not keep 
within its jurisdiction when it denied a conditional use permit 
for non-metallic mineral mining, a conditional use listed in the 
ordinance. 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
24 
 
¶51 In Edward Kraemer & Sons, Inc. v. Sauk County Board of 
Adjustment, 183 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 16-17, 515 N.W.2d 256 (1994), the 
court declared that the court of appeals erred in believing 
"that the mineral extraction permit had to be granted and if 
conditions 
were 
necessary 
to 
ensure 
compliance 
with 
the 
ordinance, the Board was obligated to fashion them."    
¶52 Indeed, the Kraemer court concluded that conditional 
uses may be authorized pursuant to the ordinance, but they are 
not uses as of right.  They are allowed only if approved by the 
appropriate local governmental authority.17 
¶53 In Delta Biological Resources, Inc. v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals of the City of Milwaukee, 160 Wis. 2d 905, 912, 467 
N.W.2d 164 (Wis. App. 1991), the court of appeals emphasized: 
"[T]he presumption that the conditional use serves the public 
interest[ ] does not exist in Wisconsin. . . . The zoning 
ordinance allows certain uses, provided certain conditions are 
met.  These conditions are not presumed to be met either by 
judicial fiat or by the terms of the ordinance . . . ."18 
                                                 
17 See also Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, ¶¶55-57, 
311 Wis. 2d 1, 751 N.W.2d 780 (quoting Primeco Pers. Commc'ns, 
L.P. v. City of Mequon, 242 F. Supp. 2d 567, 576 (E.D. Wis. 
2003)).  
18 Delta Biological's argument, which the court of appeals 
dismissed, was that "a presumption arises that [a conditional] 
use serves the public interest from the fact that the 
legislature permits it, and the special use itself, therefore, 
presumes a legislative determination that a public need for the 
use exists."  Delta Biological Res., Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning 
Appeals of the City of Milwaukee, 160 Wis. 2d 905, 911-12, 467 
N.W.2d 164 (Wis. App. 1991).   
No. 
2015AP491   
 
25 
 
¶54 In Wisconsin, and in many states, a conditional use is 
one that has been legislatively determined to be compatible in a 
particular area, not a use that is always compatible at a 
specific site within that area.  In these states, the decision 
whether to grant a conditional use permit is discretionary.  The 
relevant entity determines whether a particular site will 
accommodate a proposed particular use.  In other states, 
decision 
makers 
have 
less 
discretion 
on 
requests 
for 
a 
conditional use permit.19   
¶55 Thus, our precedent dictates that no presumption 
exists that a conditional use is ipso facto consistent with the 
public interest or that a conditional use is a use as of right 
at a particular site within an area zoned to permit that 
conditional use.20  No compelling reason has been given to 
justify deviating from Wisconsin precedent and eliminating site-
specific flexibility in local zoning matters. 
C 
                                                 
19 See Daniel R. Mandelker & Allan Wolk, Land Use Law § 6.53 
(6th ed. 2016); 2 Patricia E. Salkin, American Law of Zoning 
§§ 14:1, 14:6 (6th ed. 2016); Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and 
Planning §§ 60:5, 60:9, 60:10, 61:5-:8, 61:34-:38 (2016). 
20 "The principle of stare decisis applies to published 
decisions of the court of appeals, and stare decisis requires us 
to follow court of appeals precedent unless a compelling reason 
exists to overrule it."  Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶21, 
274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 (citations omitted).  See also 
State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶114, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 
N.W.2d 238; 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 752.41(2) 
("Officially 
published 
opinions 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
shall 
have 
statewide 
precedential effect.").   
No. 
2015AP491   
 
26 
 
¶56 No Wisconsin case has concluded that the proper 
inquiry for a local government entity in considering an 
application for a conditional use permit is whether the 
conditional use carries adverse impacts greater than the adverse 
impacts ordinarily associated with that use.  This approach does 
not comport with precedent, and no compelling reason has been 
given to justify deviating from precedent.  
D 
¶57 AllEnergy bolsters its argument that the Trempealeau 
County Environment & Land Use Committee did not keep within its 
jurisdiction 
in 
denying 
AllEnergy's 
application 
for 
a 
conditional use permit with the contention that the provisions 
of the Trempealeau County ordinance impermissibly require the 
Committee to look at "legislative considerations of public 
health, safety and welfare."  According to AllEnergy, the 
Committee can consider only objective factors, not public 
interest factors.   
¶58 It appears that AllEnergy is trying to shoehorn a 
constitutional challenge into the "exceeds jurisdiction" aspect 
of certiorari review without explicitly saying so.  See ¶¶29-33, 
supra.   
¶59 We 
understand 
AllEnergy 
to 
be 
challenging 
the 
Trempealeau County Ordinance on the ground that its standards 
are unconstitutionally vague and do not guide the Trempealeau 
County Environment & Land Use Committee's decision-making 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
27 
 
process.21  We are not persuaded by AllEnergy's implied 
constitutional argument.   
¶60 To begin, we emphasize our role in determining the 
constitutionality of an ordinance.  An ordinance is presumed 
valid.  It must be liberally construed in favor of the decision 
rendered by the local governmental entity.22  A party challenging 
the constitutionality of an ordinance bears a heavy burden to 
show that the ordinance is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt: 
The role of courts in zoning matters is limited 
because 
zoning 
is 
a 
legislative 
function. 
 
An 
ordinance is presumed valid and must be liberally 
construed in favor of the municipality. The party 
challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance 
bears a heavy burden.  In Wisconsin, "an ordinance 
will be held constitutional unless the contrary is 
shown beyond a reasonable doubt, and the ordinance is 
entitled 
to 
every 
presumption 
in 
favor 
of 
its 
validity."   
Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, ¶26, 311 Wis. 2d 1, 751 
N.W.2d 78 (citations omitted).  
¶61 Edward Kraemer & Sons, Inc. v. Sauk County Board of 
Adjustment, 183 Wis. 2d 1, 515 N.W.2d 256 (1994), illustrates an 
ordinance permissibly requiring a zoning entity to consider 
public interest factors in issuing a conditional use permit.   
                                                 
21 "When 
an 
ordinance 
vests 
discretionary 
power 
in 
administrative officials it must prescribe standards to guide 
their action." State ex rel. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. 
Wahner, 25 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 130 N.W.2d 304 (1964). 
22 Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶26 (citing State ex rel. Am. Oil 
Co. v. Bessent, 27 Wis. 2d 537, 546, 135 N.W.2d 317 (1965)).   
No. 
2015AP491   
 
28 
 
¶62 In Kraemer, the Sauk County Board of Adjustment denied 
an application for a conditional use permit to extract minerals 
because of concern that the project would harm the Baraboo 
Bluffs, 
"an 
important 
natural 
resource." 
 
Kraemer, 
183 
Wis. 2d at 11.  The court explained that, under the ordinance 
governing the granting of a special exception permit for mineral 
extraction,23 the Board must consider "the ability of the 
operation . . . to avoid harm to the public health, safety and 
welfare and to the legitimate interests of nearby properties."  
Kraemer, 183 Wis. 2d at 6. 
¶63 The petitioner, Edward Kraemer & Sons, argued that the 
standards in the ordinance are not sufficiently specific to 
withstand attack on the grounds that they constitute an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.  Kraemer, 
183 Wis. 2d at 13. 
¶64 The Kraemer court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Sauk County ordinance's standard of public health, safety, and 
welfare as permissible criteria for the Board to consider in 
determining whether to grant a conditional use permit, stating: 
[T]he "public health, safety and welfare" standard[ ] 
is a general standard that provides the Board with 
flexibility and discretion to consider how a proposed 
special exception could affect the public welfare.  
The standard allows the Board to consider potential 
harm to individuals living near the proposed mineral 
                                                 
23 The phrase "special exception permit" has been used 
interchangeably with "conditional use permit."  State ex rel. 
Skelly Oil Co. v. City of Delafield, 58 Wis. 2d 695, 700, 207 
N.W.2d 585 (1973).   
No. 
2015AP491   
 
29 
 
extraction site, including exposure to health hazards 
from the dust and threats to safety posed by blasting. 
The public health, safety and welfare standard is also 
broad enough to enable the Board to consider the 
generalized 
effects 
on 
the 
public 
welfare 
that 
concerned the Board in this case——harm to the public 
that would result from partial destruction of a 
natural area that both permit supporters and opponents 
agree is of great geological importance.  
Kraemer, 183 Wis. 2d at 11. 
¶65 The Kraemer court, 183 Wis. 2d 1, 14, citing 3 Edward 
H. Ziegler, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 41.11 at 
41-49 (4th ed. 1993), further declared that these "generalized 
standards are acceptable in most jurisdictions."  The mere fact 
that the "standards are general in nature does not impair the 
validity of these portions of the ordinance."  Kraemer, 183 
Wis. 2d 1, 
14-15. 
 
According 
to 
the 
Kraemer 
court, 
183 
Wis. 2d 1, 14 (quoting Rathkopf's § 41.11 at 41-49), the 
ordinance's general standards served a beneficial purpose:   
The purpose of the special exception-conditional use 
technique is to confer a degree of flexibility in the 
land use regulations. This would be lost if overly 
detailed standards covering each specific situation in 
which the use is to be granted or, conversely, each 
situation in which it is to be denied, were required 
to be placed in the ordinance. 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
30 
 
¶66 The Kraemer court ultimately ruled that the standards 
in the Sauk County ordinance were specific enough to guide the 
action of the Board.  Kraemer, 183 Wis. 2d at 11-12.24 
¶67 AllEnergy calls on the court to overrule Kraemer and 
to be guided instead by State ex rel. Humble Oil & Refining Co. 
v. Wahner, 25 Wis. 2d 1, 130 N.W.2d 304 (1964).  The reference 
to Humble Oil is unavailing.   
¶68 In Humble Oil, a town's zoning ordinance classified 
gas stations as conditional uses.  Gas stations were permitted 
as a conditional use in a commercial zone only if approved by 
the zoning board of appeals.  The only "guideline" in the 
ordinance provided that "in interpreting and applying the 
provisions of this ordinance they shall be held to be the 
minimum requirements for the promotion of the public health, 
safety, convenience, prosperity or general welfare . . . ."  
Humble Oil, 25 Wis. 2d at 7.   
¶69 The Humble Oil court concluded that this "guideline" 
does not prescribe adequate standards to govern the board in its 
disposition of a request to build a filling station.  The court 
characterized the "guideline" as a listing of factors that 
                                                 
24Criteria to be considered such as the following appear in 
the statutes governing the granting of applications for various 
permits:  ""enjoyment of natural scenic beauty and environmental 
quality," 
"will 
not 
endanger 
life, 
health 
or 
property," 
"reasonable needs of the public," "public interest," "not have 
undue adverse impact on other environmental values such as, but 
not 
limited 
to, 
ecological 
balance, 
public 
health 
and 
welfare, . . . the aesthetics of land and water and recreational 
use"  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 31.06(3), 31.08, 196.491(3)(d). 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
31 
 
justify the zoning ordinance; the factors are too general and 
too remotely related to what the board is required to do to 
supply the necessary guidelines for the board or Humble Oil.  
The court stated that the ordinance did not "inform Humble and 
any other parties hoping to build filling stations of what was 
required of them and what factors were to be considered by the 
board in disposing of each application . . . and this was bound 
to create a situation in which the board could do just as it 
pleased."  Humble Oil, 25 Wis. 2d at 11.   
¶70 The court was careful in Humble Oil, however, to 
preserve the board's exercise of discretion and judgment in 
issuing conditional use permits.  The Humble Oil court reviewed 
several cases that addressed the validity of the standards set 
forth in zoning ordinances.  Humble Oil, 25 Wis. 2d at 8-9.  For 
instance, in discussing prior cases ruling on whether an 
ordinance was too broad, the court referred approvingly to 
ordinances that "contained guidelines that pinpointed some of 
the 
considerations 
that 
were 
to 
govern 
the 
exercise 
of 
discretionary power either by the common council or the zoning 
board."  Humble Oil, 25 Wis. 2d at 9.  In contrast, the 
ordinance in the Humble Oil case did not pinpoint any such 
considerations.   
¶71 Applying Kraemer and Humble Oil, we conclude that the 
Trempealeau County ordinance at issue in the instant case is 
more similar to the Kraemer ordinance and to the ordinance the 
court upheld in Smith v. City of Brookfield, 272 Wis. 1, 7-10, 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
32 
 
74 N.W.2d 770 (1956),25 than to the ordinance the court declared 
unconstitutionally vague in Humble Oil.   
¶72 After comparing Humble Oil and Smith, the court of 
appeals in Guse v. City of New Berlin, 2012 WI App 24, ¶¶10-12, 
339 Wis. 2d 399, 810 N.W.2d 838, concluded that "ordinances may 
vest boards with some (and even significant) discretion without 
being unconstitutionally vague."  Like the ordinances in 
Kraemer, Smith, and Guse, Trempealeau County's zoning ordinance 
does not "blanket the [Committee] with unfettered discretion."  
Guse, 339 Wis. 2d 399, ¶11.26 
¶73 In sum, the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee kept within its jurisdiction.  It exercised its 
discretion in deciding whether to grant AllEnergy's application 
                                                 
25 In Smith v. City of Brookfield, 272 Wis. 1, 7-10, 74 
N.W.2d 770 (1956), the court held that a general statement of 
purpose contained in the preamble to the town's comprehensive 
zoning ordinance provided sufficient guidance.  The stated 
purpose was "to provide adequate light, pure air, and safety 
from fire and other dangers, to conserve the taxable value of 
land and buildings throughout the township, to avoid congestion 
in the public streets and highways and to promote the public 
health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare, all in accordance 
with 
a 
comprehensive 
zoning 
plan . . . ." 
 
(Emphasis 
in 
original.)  
26 See also Town of Grand Chute v. U.S. Paper Converters, 
Inc., 229 Wis. 2d 674, 686, 600 N.W.2d 33 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(concluding that "a town, regulating development within its 
boundaries, must create an ordinance [with enough specificity] 
to give developers reasonable notice of the areas of inquiry 
that the town will examine in approving or disapproving proposed 
sites.").   
No. 
2015AP491   
 
33 
 
for a conditional use permit, adhering to the criteria set forth 
in the ordinance.   
III 
¶74 We turn now to the second issue AllEnergy presents:  
Whether the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee 
"might reasonably make the order or determination in question 
based on evidence."  This issue raises the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Committee's decision.  
The sufficiency of the evidence is determined under the 
substantial evidence test.27  
¶75 Substantial evidence is evidence of such convincing 
power that reasonable persons could reach the same decision as 
the 
local 
governmental 
entity,28 
even 
if 
there 
is 
also 
substantial 
evidence 
to 
support 
the 
opposite 
decision.29  
                                                 
27 Gehin v. Wis. Group Ins. Bd., 2005 WI 16, ¶6 nn.5-6, 278 
Wis. 2d 111, 692 N.W.2d 572 (citing State ex rel. Harris & 
Annuity Pension Bd., 87 Wis. 2d 646, 652, 275 N.W.2d 668 
(1979)).   
28 Oneida Seven Generations Corp., 362 Wis. 2d 290, ¶43. 
See also Gehin, 278 Wis. 2d 111, ¶48 ("Substantial evidence 
has been defined in the case law as 'that quantity and quality 
of evidence which a reasonable [person] could accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion.") (footnotes and citations omitted).  
29 Sills v. Walworth Cty. Land Mgt., 2002 WI App 111, ¶¶10-
11, 254 Wis. 2d 538, 648 N.W.2d 878 ("We must uphold the 
Committee's decision so long as it is supported by substantial 
evidence, even if there is also substantial evidence to support 
the opposite conclusion."). 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
34 
 
Reasonable inferences may be drawn from credible evidence.30  If 
"credible, relevant and probative evidence upon which reasonable 
persons could rely to reach a decision" supports the decision of 
the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee, the 
court will uphold the decision.31    
¶76 Quantitatively, substantial evidence is less than a 
preponderance of the evidence, Smith v. City of Milwaukee, 2014 
WI App 95, ¶22, 356 Wis. 2d 779, 854 N.W.2d 857, but  "more than 
'a mere scintilla' of evidence and more than 'conjecture and 
speculation.'"  Gehin v. Wis. Group Ins. Bd., 2005 WI 16, ¶48, 
278 Wis. 2d 111, 692 N.W.2d 572 (quoted sources omitted).  
¶77 AllEnergy contends that 
there is no substantial 
evidence in the record upon which the Trempealeau County 
Environment 
& 
Land 
Use 
Committee 
could 
deny 
AllEnergy's 
application because the Committee could not rely on the 
"uncorroborated hearsay" in the record or the lay opinions by 
persons lacking appropriate special expertise.   
¶78 AllEnergy errs in trying to apply the Wisconsin Rules 
of Evidence to the instant case.  The Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence 
govern 
court 
proceedings, 
not 
administrative 
proceedings.  Wisconsin Stat. § 901.01 states that Chapters 
901.01 to 901.11, the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, "govern 
                                                 
30 Delta Biological Res., Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of 
City of Milwaukee, 160 Wis. 2d 905, 910-915, 467 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
31 See Sills, 254 Wis. 2d 538, ¶11. 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
35 
 
proceedings in the courts of the state of Wisconsin . . . ."  
The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, by their very terms, do not 
govern the proceedings of the Trempealeau County Environment & 
Land Use Committee, administrative proceedings.    
¶79 More recently, this court stated: "[A]n agency or 
hearing examiner is not ordinarily bound by common law or 
statutory rules of evidence."  Gehin, 278 Wis. 2d 111, ¶¶6, 49-
50.32  
¶80 AllEnergy cites Folding Furniture Works v. Wisconsin 
Labor Relations Board, 232 Wis. 170, 285 N.W. 851 (1939), as 
support for its restrictive view of what constitutes substantial 
evidence.  But Folding Furniture does not support AllEnergy. 
¶81 In Folding Furniture, 232 Wis. at 188, the court 
stated that an administrative decision cannot be based on 
                                                 
32 On certiorari review, the substantial evidence test is 
the same substantial evidence test used for the review of 
administrative determinations under Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  Gehin, 
278 Wis. 2d 111, ¶6. 
The statute governing the admission of evidence before 
administrative 
agencies 
in 
contested 
cases, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.45(1), states that an agency is not bound by common law or 
statutory rules of evidence and adopts a "reasonable probative 
value test" for admission of testimony: 
[A]n agency or hearing examiner shall not be bound by 
common law or statutory rules of evidence.  The agency 
or hearing examiner shall admit all testimony having 
reasonable 
probative 
value, 
but 
shall 
exclude 
immaterial, 
irrelevant 
or 
unduly 
repetitious 
testimony . . . . 
Basic 
principles 
of 
relevancy, 
materiality and probative force shall govern the proof 
of all questions of fact. 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
36 
 
uncorroborated hearsay alone; uncorroborated hearsay alone does 
not constitute substantial evidence.  But Folding Furniture made 
clear that an administrative decision is based on substantial 
evidence if it is based on evidence having rational probative 
force.   
¶82 Folding Furniture, 232 Wis. at 189, quotes with favor 
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1938), in which the United States 
Supreme Court stated:  Mere uncorroborated evidence does not 
constitute substantial evidence.  Substantial evidence means 
evidence having rational probative force, that is, relevant 
evidence accepted by a reasonable mind as adequate to support a 
conclusion.  The Consolidated Edison Court stated as follows:   
The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions 
[freeing 
an 
administrative 
agency 
of 
rules 
of 
evidence] is to free administrative boards from the 
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere 
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent 
in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the 
administrative order. . . . But this assurance of a 
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does 
not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in 
evidence having 
rational probative force.  
Mere 
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute 
substantial evidence.  
. . . . 
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.  
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
(Emphasis added and citations omitted).   
¶83 As this court discussed in Gehin, a subsequent United 
States Supreme Court case, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
37 
 
407-08 (1971), explained the Consolidated Edison language that 
"mere uncorroborated hearsay" is not substantial evidence by 
emphasizing 
the 
language 
"rational 
probative 
effect" 
and 
explaining that hearsay can have such an effect: 
Although the [medical] reports are hearsay in the 
technical sense, because their content is not produced 
live before the hearing examiner, we feel that the 
claimant and the Court of Appeals read too much into 
the single sentence from Consolidated Edison.  The 
contrast the Chief Justice was drawing, at the very 
page cited, was not with material that would be deemed 
formally inadmissible in judicial proceedings but with 
material 'without a basis in evidence having rational 
probative force.'  This was not a blanket rejection by 
the Court of administrative reliance on hearsay 
irrespective of reliability and probative value. The 
opposite was the case. 
¶84 In Gehin v. Wisconsin Group Insurance Board, 2005 WI 
16, ¶54, 278 Wis. 2d 111, 692 N.W.2d 572, the court reinforced 
Folding Furniture (and Consolidated Edison), stating that 
Folding Furniture allows flexibility in the admission of hearsay 
evidence but that "this flexibility does not go so far as to 
justify administrative findings that are not based on evidence 
having a rational probative force." 
¶85 Folding Furniture (adopting the Consolidated Edison 
language) has been followed in Wisconsin since 1939.  Gehin, 278 
Wis. 2d 111, ¶56.  We adhere to Folding Furniture in the instant 
case.  
¶86 In any event, the Trempealeau County Environment & 
Land Use Committee did not base its denial of AllEnergy's 
application 
for 
a 
conditional 
use 
permit 
solely 
on 
uncorroborated hearsay.  Indeed, as we illustrate below, the 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
38 
 
record is replete with specific and substantial representations 
of people describing their first-hand experiences with frac sand 
mines and their opinions.   
¶87 The Committee and the courts would be remiss to ignore 
the words of concerned persons familiar with frac sand mining 
and the environs.  Zoning is a matter of local concern, and many 
of the people commenting at the hearing on AllEnergy's proposal 
have either lived near a frac sand mine or will be living, 
working, and recreating alongside the proposed mine.  The 
language of the Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance clearly 
anticipates 
and 
invites 
public 
opinion. 
 
Thus, 
public 
expressions of support or opposition establish a valid basis——
that is, substantial evidence——for a decision on AllEnergy's 
application for a conditional use permit.33  
¶88 The substantial evidence test is a significant hurdle 
for AllEnergy to overcome because, in applying the test, this 
                                                 
33 Substantial evidence, defined similarly to the Wisconsin 
definition, is used in case law of other jurisdictions.  See, 
e.g., Ocean View Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Montecito Water 
Dist., 
116 
Cal. App. 4th 396, 
402 
(2004) 
(opinions 
and 
observations 
about 
aesthetics 
can 
constitute 
substantial 
evidence); State of Missouri ex rel. Karch v. Camden Co., 302 
S.W.2d 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (lay witnesses' testimony that 
increased boat traffic endangered public health or safety and 
would destroy nature of area constituted substantial evidence); 
City of Las Vegas v. Laughlin, 893 P.2d 383, 385 (Nev. 1995) 
(public concerns over increased traffic where children walk to 
school 
and 
preserving 
residential 
nature 
of 
neighborhood 
constituted substantial evidence); Bellsouth Mobility v. Miami-
Dade Cty., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (decision 
on proposed cellular facility based on residents' aesthetic 
concerns was based on substantial evidence). 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
39 
 
court is deferential to the decision of the Trempealeau County 
Environment & Land Use Committee.34  Certiorari review accords 
the decision of the local governmental entity a presumption of 
"correctness and validity."35 
¶89 Finally, in applying the substantial evidence test on 
certiorari review, a court does not reweigh the evidence.  
Roberts v. Manitowoc Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2006 WI App 169, 
¶32, 295 Wis. 2d 522, 721 N.W.2d 499.  Rather, we consider only 
whether the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee 
made a reasonable decision based on the evidence before it.36  In 
making this determination, we may look to the whole record.  
"[A] reviewing court should consider the context of the evidence 
when determining whether it supports a municipality's action."  
Oneida Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay, 2015 WI 50, 
¶45, 362 Wis. 2d 290, 865 N.W.2d 162.  
                                                 
34 See Clark v. Waupaca Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 186 
Wis. 2d 300, 305, 519 N.W.2d 782 (1993) (citing Van Ermen v. 
DHSS, 
84 
Wis. 2d 57, 
64, 
267 
N.W.2d 17 
(1978) 
("As 
the 
substantial evidence test is highly deferential to the board's 
findings, we may not substitute our view of the evidence for 
that of the board when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 
on certiorari.")).   
35 Kapischke v. Cty. of Walworth, 226 Wis. 2d 320, 328, 595 
N.W.2d 42 (Ct. App. 1999).    
36 Roberts v. Manitowoc Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2006 WI App 
169, ¶28, 295 Wis. 2d 522, 721 N.W.2d 499 ("[I]t is not 
'substantial concerns' that will overcome the Board's decision, 
but rather the absence of substantial supporting evidence."). 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
40 
 
¶90 The context in which we consider the evidence in the 
instant case is the location and nature of the proposed non-
metallic 
mineral 
mine, 
the 
applicable 
provisions 
of 
the 
Trempealeau County ordinance, and the record of the hearing 
before the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee.   
¶91 The proposed mine area was to be located in an 
Exclusive Agriculture (EA-2) district.  Non-metallic mineral 
mining, including industrial frac sand mining, is a conditional 
use in EA-2 districts.  Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance 
§ 13.01.  "Conditional uses are for those particular uses that a 
community recognizes as desirable or necessary but which the 
community will sanction only in a controlled manner."  Town of 
Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, 
¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 1, 751 
N.W.2d 780.  The Trempealeau County Board of Supervisors 
concluded that non-metallic mineral mines may be desirable in 
EA-2 districts, but only if the applicant for a conditional use 
permit demonstrates that it will meet the standards contained in 
the County's ordinance.  See ¶¶39-45, supra.     
¶92 Under 
the 
provision 
in 
the 
ordinance 
governing 
conditional uses, the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee has to determine that AllEnergy's proposed mine "will 
not be contrary to the public interest and will not be 
detrimental to or injurious to the public health, public safety, 
or character of the surrounding area."  Trempealeau County 
Zoning Ordinance § 10.04(5)(a).  The Trempealeau County Board of 
Supervisors set forth several factors to guide the Committee's 
inquiry into the public health, public safety, and character of 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
41 
 
the surrounding area.  Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance 
§ 10.06(6).  See ¶39, supra. 
¶93 Because AllEnergy applied for a conditional use permit 
to open and operate a non-metallic mineral mine, it also had to 
satisfy 
the 
standards 
the 
Trempealeau 
County 
Board 
of 
Supervisors 
established 
for 
non-metallic 
mineral 
mining, 
including the wise use of natural resources, aesthetics, the 
market value of land, and the legitimate interests of properties 
in the vicinity.  See Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance 
Chapter 13 (Non-metallic Mining); ¶¶43-45, supra.   
¶94 Having set forth the substantial evidence test and the 
provisions of the county ordinance governing the standards and 
factors that the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee must consider, we examine the record to determine 
whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the 
Committee's denial of AllEnergy's application for a conditional 
use permit.     
¶95 AllEnergy has the burden of proof (persuasion) to 
demonstrate satisfaction of the criteria for a conditional use 
permit.  Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance § 10.04(5)(c).  The 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee is directed 
to deny an application for a conditional use permit if the 
application does not meet any of the conditional use or non-
metallic mineral mining standards.  Trempealeau County Zoning 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
42 
 
Ordinance § 10.04(5)(c).37  If substantial evidence supports any 
of the Committee's reasons for denying AllEnergy's application 
pursuant to the criteria in the ordinance, the court will affirm 
the Committee's decision.38  We conclude that substantial 
evidence supports the reasons expressed by the members of the 
Committee for denying AllEnergy's application for a conditional 
use permit.   
¶96 The court of appeals aptly synthesized the Trempealeau 
County Environment & Land Use Committee's reasons for denying 
AllEnergy's application for a conditional use permit.  The 
Committee denied AllEnergy's application for four primary 
reasons:  
(1) AllEnergy's plan was "rushed," "incomplete," and 
had been modified between the time of the plan's 
preliminary review and presentation at the public 
hearing;   
(2) The proposed mine raises environmental concerns;  
(3) The proposed mine would change the landscape and 
would 
have 
adverse 
effects 
on 
wildlife 
and 
recreational opportunities available to residents and 
tourists; and  
                                                 
37 "At all times the burden of proof to demonstrate 
satisfaction of these criteria remains with the applicant."  See 
also Delta Biological, 160 Wis. 2d at 910-12 ("The burden of 
proof at all times remains with the applicant."). 
38 Clark v. Waupaca Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 186 Wis. 2d 300, 
304, 519 N.W.2d 782 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[I]f we conclude that any 
one of the board's reasons for denying the variances at issue 
passes certiorari review, we affirm without commenting on the 
board's other reasons."); see also Trempealeau County Zoning 
Ordinance § 10.04(5) (the Committee may deny the application if 
it does not satisfy any of the ordinance's criteria).       
No. 
2015AP491   
 
43 
 
(4) The proposed mine raised health concerns and would 
result in changes in local culture and conditions.   
¶97 The court of appeals reviewed whether substantial 
evidence supports the first reason for denying the permit.  We 
do not.  We look to the other primary reasons, summarized above, 
beginning with whether substantial evidence supports denying the 
application on the ground that the project raised environmental 
concerns, including the condition of Trout Run Creek, water 
quality, flooding, and wetlands.   
¶98 Marlys Kolstad opined that the proposed mine on the 
banks of Trout Run Creek would endanger this Class II trout 
stream and tributary of the Trempealeau River.  She explained 
that a 2014 report39 noted that the stream was on the verge of no 
longer being able to sustain healthy populations of trout.  The 
Creek's impairment was caused by "run-off from uplands and 
barnyards, [which] continue[s] to degrade habitat conditions," 
and with the "external draining associated with frac sand 
mining, sediment can be carried into the creek causing further 
damage to the health of this trout stream."   
¶99 Building the proposed mine on wetlands next to Trout 
Run Creek worried Noah Slaby, an Arcadia resident with two young 
children and two properties bordering the proposed site of the 
mine: 
Of all the possible negative effects of this project, 
the location of the rail spur and processing facility 
                                                 
39 The reference is to a publicly available publication of 
the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
44 
 
is the most disturbing with its close proximity to a 
registered trout stream, river, and wetland.  This 
river bottom is also very prone to flooding and with 
my own experience with farming and pasturing cattle in 
this low lying area, less than a mile away[,] I can't 
imagine trying to control piles of sand, overburden 
and containment ponds when such common flooding 
occurs. . . . [W]ater 
quality 
is 
dependent 
upon 
wetlands to purify the water we drink and to filter 
out impurities that exist in our water from field run-
off and other human pollutants.  
¶100 Concern 
about 
the 
proposed 
mine's 
potential 
to 
aggravate flooding in a flood-prone area was repeated time and 
time again to the Committee.  For instance, Henry Schultz 
opposed allowing a mine "whose process and loading facilities 
are to be located within a flood prone area.  [Because] [h]igh 
water won't be an unusual occurrence; it will be a recurrent 
problem."  
¶101 Indeed, Pat and Mary Slaby, who own a farm a mile 
downstream from the site of the proposed mine, reiterated the 
flooding concern in an e-mail that was read into the record:  
"This past year alone the river bridge crossing had been closed 
on at least three different occasions . . . . We have been 
battling high water in our fields, roads, and basements and each 
year it seems to get worse."  According to the Slabys, filling 
in these upstream wetlands would be akin to "giving up our 
greatest asset on battling flood water."   
¶102 Kathy Lockington explained that a neighboring mine's 
development has caused numerous water quality problems.  For 
example, since the sand mine was built, she has spent $550 on 
water 
quality 
testing 
that 
looks 
for 
both 
dust 
and 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
45 
 
polyacrylamides (one of the chemicals used in frac sand mining).  
She explained:  "Our water softener has sand.  The guy came and 
said you have sand in your filter.  I have drawn out water and 
if you set it in a white bucket, the sand is in there."  
¶103 Clearly, the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee had substantial evidence on which to conclude that the 
proposed mine raises environmental concerns and would have an 
adverse impact upon "surface water drainage, water quality and 
supply," factors the Trempealeau Zoning Ordinance required the 
Committee to consider.   
¶104 Turning to the effect of the mine on the landscape, 
wildlife, and recreational opportunities, Abby Johnson's e-mail 
read into the record stated that wetlands are "very important 
ecosystems that need protection from developments."  The 
wetlands were described as seasonal home to "[v]arious species 
of waterfowl . . . as their breeding ground."  "A rail spur 
would decrease the livability and functionality of these unique 
ecosystems 
that 
are 
important 
for 
maintaining 
a 
diverse 
population of waterfowl and plant species."  
¶105 The record also demonstrates that placing a sprawling, 
550-acre frac sand mine among Trempealeau County's rolling hills 
would change the landscape.  The Trempealeau County Environment 
and Land Use Committee had sufficient evidence to conclude that 
the 
project 
would 
be 
"detrimental 
to 
or 
injurious 
to 
the . . . character of the surrounding area," and would have an 
adverse effect on "aesthetics, including but not limited to 
scenic beauty and the conservation of natural resources of 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
46 
 
outstanding quality or uniqueness."  Trempealeau County Zoning 
Ordinance §§ 10.04(5)(a), 13.03(3)(a)(5).   
¶106 Aesthetic concerns, that is, changes to the landscape, 
were raised repeatedly by members of the public.40  Duane and 
Theresa Matelski reported that they "marvel everyday at the 
breathless beauty in the ridges and valleys that make up our 
County.  It saddens us greatly that this unique beauty is so 
quickly disappearing, and the eyesore of yet another mine dots 
what was once a beautiful vista here in Trempealeau County."  
¶107 Henry Schultz noted the aesthetic degradation inherent 
to the project:  AllEnergy's plan called for "extract[ing] sand 
from several sites over time that are not connected except by a 
network of conveyors that greatly expands the footprint of the 
whole operation . . . sprawling over the landscape."   
¶108 Noah Slaby stated:  "This driftless area has brought 
people here to visit and live.  What incentive do young families 
have to stay in this area when the very values and landscape 
that they love continue to be compromised?"  He noted that 
AllEnergy's representative even "commented on what a beautiful 
                                                 
40 See VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cty., 342 
F.3d 818, 831 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Indeed, every circuit to 
consider the issue [of telecommunications siting] has determined 
that aesthetics may constitute a valid basis for denial of a 
wireless permit if substantial evidence of the visual impact of 
the tower was before the board.").  See also Village of 
Menomonee Falls v. DNR, 140 Wis. 2d 579, 607, 412 N.W.2d 505 
(Ct. App. 1987). 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
47 
 
area this is, but yet he is here to change the topography of the 
land."    
¶109 To some residents, the proposed mine would result in 
changes in local culture and conditions.  The mine would 
eliminate their pastoral lifestyles.  For example, Diane 
Waniorek's letter read into the record expressed her concern 
that she "will no longer be able to maintain the farm that has 
been in [her] family for over 100 years."  She explained that 
"[h]aving a sand mine so close to my home will decrease the 
property value and quality of life . . . [and] may force my 
family to abandon land on which [it] has lived for over a 
century."   
¶110 Clearly, the Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use 
Committee had substantial evidence in the record to support its 
conclusion that the proposed mine would result in changes in 
local culture and aesthetics.   
¶111 Finally, many people who lived near existing frac sand 
mines testified about health problems caused by sand and dust. 
¶112 Bobbi and Richard Halvorsen's e-mail read into the 
record described problems that their family faced from the dust 
caused by a frac sand mine.  They eventually had to move away 
from the mine because their daughter had "asthma which grew 
progressively worse," Bobbi Halvorsen "lived with a constant 
headache," and their "five year old [had] continuing problems 
with allergies. . . ."  All of these health problems disappeared 
once the family moved away from the mine.   
No. 
2015AP491   
 
48 
 
¶113 Lois Taylor, a registered nurse, reiterated these 
health concerns in an e-mail that was read into the record at 
the hearing.  She stated that she believes "there needs to be a 
land use impact study focusing on health risks related to air 
and water quality . . . ."  Sherie Sacia, a health worker, 
expressed concern in an e-mail read into the record that the 
health impacts of frac sand mining are unknown and that it is 
"[b]etter to slow the process down until we are sure of any 
health impacts.  All of our famil[ies'] health depends on you."   
¶114 Once again, health concerns——ranging from anecdotal to 
professionally based——were substantial evidence on which the 
Trempealeau County Environment & Land Use Committee could base 
its denial of AllEnergy's application.  The Committee is 
required by the ordinance to analyze a proposal for non-metallic 
mineral mining in light of the "impacts . . . on the general 
health, safety and welfare of the public."  Trempealeau County 
Zoning Ordinance § 13.01.  
¶115 The 
Trempealeau 
County 
Environment 
& 
Land 
Use 
Committee's decision must be upheld if any reason set forth in 
the ordinance for denying the permit is supported by substantial 
evidence.  Surely, a reasonable person could conclude that the 
public 
comments 
at 
the 
hearing 
were 
relevant, 
probative 
evidence, providing substantial evidence in the record to 
support the Committee's decision to deny AllEnergy's application 
because the proposed mine raises environmental concerns, changes 
the landscape, would have adverse effects on wildlife and 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
49 
 
recreational opportunities, would result in changes in local 
culture and aesthetics, and raises public health concerns.       
¶116 AllEnergy contends, however, that its experts had an 
adequate response to each and every one of the concerns 
expressed by the members of the Trempealeau County Environment & 
Land Use Committee who voted against the application.   
¶117 AllEnergy's arguments amount to asking this court to 
reweigh the evidence.  Reweighing the evidence is not part of 
the substantial evidence test or the role of this court.41  The 
Committee need not have accepted an expert's testimony.  It had 
the discretion to weigh the expert's testimony against other 
evidence in the record.  Expert testimony, for example, cannot 
allay aesthetic concerns raised by a large open mine site in a 
beautiful part of the state.    
¶118 On review of the record, we conclude that substantial 
evidence exists to support the Trempealeau County Environment & 
Land Use Committee's decision to deny AllEnergy's application 
for a conditional use permit.   
IV 
                                                 
41 For example, AllEnergy argues that its expert testimony 
rebutted 
public 
comments 
regarding 
runoff 
concerns.  
"AllEnergy's ecologist testified that the project would minimize 
and improve 'the current conditions by controlling runoff and 
storm water through construction of storm water retention 
basin[s] 
and 
infiltration 
basins 
as 
well." 
 
Brief 
of 
Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners 
(AllEnergy) 
at 
38. 
 
The 
Trempealeau County Environment and Land Use Committee apparently 
was not persuaded by AllEnergy's expert.  The Committee, 
instead, opted to give more weight to the reports of members of 
the public who lived near the proposed mine site.    
No. 
2015AP491   
 
50 
 
¶119 Finally, we address AllEnergy's request that the court 
"adopt a new doctrine that where a conditional use permit 
applicant has shown that all conditions and standards, both by 
ordinance and as devised by the zoning committee, have been or 
will be met, the applicant is entitled to the issuance of the 
permit."  As we explained previously, this request is based on 
AllEnergy's assertion that AllEnergy satisfied all the specific 
conditions in the ordinance as a matter of law and cannot be 
required to satisfy subjective, generalized conditions and 
standards in the ordinance.     
¶120 Quoting Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning, 
AllEnergy proposes the following rule: "If the administrative 
body finds compliance with the standards or requisites set forth 
in the ordinance, the right to the exception exists, subject to 
such specific safeguarding conditions which the agency may 
impose by reason of the nature, location, and incidents of the 
particular use."42   
¶121 AllEnergy argues that other states follow this rule, 
but provides very little justification for our discarding 
precedent 
beyond 
the 
following 
cursory 
statement: 
 
"The 
rationale for recognition of the right has been that a decision 
to deny a CUP [conditional use permit] is arbitrary where the 
applicant has met the ordinance standards and where conditions 
                                                 
42 Brief of Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners (AllEnergy) 
at 45 (quoting Rathkopf § 61:37 at 61-99) (emphasis added). 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
51 
 
can 
be 
adopted 
to 
address 
additional 
potentially-adverse 
impacts."43 
¶122 We 
discussed 
AllEnergy's 
"entitlement" 
argument 
previously in our discussion of whether the Trempealeau County 
Environment & Land Use Committee kept within its jurisdiction in 
denying AllEnergy's application for a conditional use permit.  
We declined to adopt AllEnergy's argument.  See Part II, ¶¶50-
54, supra.   
¶123 Less than a decade ago, the court in Town of Rhine v. 
Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, 311 Wis. 2d 1, 751 N.W.2d 780, rejected——on 
the merits——a nearly identical rule as the one AllEnergy urges 
in the instant case.  In Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶56, the court 
concluded that the entitlement argument was "without merit."   
¶124 In elucidating the difference between permitted uses 
and conditional uses, the Bizzell court explained that "[e]ven 
though conditional uses may be authorized pursuant to the 
ordinance, that does not render them uses as of right."  
Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶56 (citing Gail Easley, Conditional 
Uses: Using Discretion, Hoping for Certainty, American Planning 
Association Zoning Practice, May 2006, at 8).44  Rather, the 
                                                 
43 Brief of Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners (AllEnergy) 
at 48.   
44 See also Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶59: 
[W]hile 
discussing 
rules 
that 
generally 
govern 
conditional uses, Anderson's American Law of Zoning 
states, '[t]he designation of a use in a zoning 
district as a conditional use does not constitute an 
authorization or assurance that such use will be 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP491   
 
52 
 
Bizzell court further explicated that "[c]onditional uses are 
for those particular uses that a community recognizes as 
desirable or necessary but which the community will sanction 
only in a controlled manner."  Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20 
(citing State ex rel. Skelly Oil Co. v. Common Council, City of 
Deerfield, 58 Wis. 2d 695, 701, 207 N.W.2d 585 (1973)).  "[U]ses 
subject to a conditional use permit are necessary to the 
community, but because they often represent uses that may be 
problematic, their development is best governed more closely 
rather than as of right."  Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24.  Whether 
a conditional use can be sanctioned depends on whether the use 
meets the criteria set forth in the governing ordinance.     
¶125 Looking to the language of the Town of Rhine ordinance 
governing 
conditional 
uses 
in 
Bizzell, 
the 
Bizzell 
court 
concluded that the Town of Rhine ordinance's language in and of 
itself foreclosed an entitlement argument.  The standards for 
"obtaining 
a 
conditional 
use 
permit 
[were] 
subject 
to 
significant interpretation."  Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶58. 
¶126 For example, the ordinance at issue in Bizzell 
directed the zoning board to consider whether a conditional use 
permit would "preserve natural growth and cover and promote the 
natural beauty of the township."  Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶58.  
This standard, and others like it, were "simply not specific 
                                                                                                                                                             
approved.' 5 Alan C. Weinsten, Anderson's American Law 
of Zoning, § 34.23, at 573 (4th ed. 1997).  While 
perhaps not dispositive, this assertion casts doubt on 
the Town of Rhine's entitlement argument.   
No. 
2015AP491   
 
53 
 
enough that one can reasonably say that any use as of right 
exists . . . ."  Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶58. 
¶127 Additionally, nothing in the Bizzell ordinance stated 
that "[i]f all requirements are met, the conditional use permit 
shall be granted."  Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶59.   
¶128 AllEnergy faces the same roadblock in the instant 
case.  The Trempealeau County ordinance uses language similar to 
that in Bizzell to set forth factors for the Trempealeau County 
Environment & Land Use Committee to consider.  See, e.g., 
Trempealeau County Zoning Ordinance § 10.04(5)(b)15. ("adversely 
affect[s] the natural beauty"), § 13.01 ("wise use of natural 
resources").  No language in the Trempealeau County Zoning 
Ordinance guarantees that a conditional use permit shall be 
granted if all requirements are met.  
¶129 AllEnergy has failed to provide a compelling reason 
for this court to depart from long-standing precedent.  We shall 
therefore adhere to stare decisis and reaffirm Bizzell's 
rejection of AllEnergy's "entitlement" approach to conditional 
use permits.        
V 
¶130 In conclusion, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  On certiorari review, we accord the decision of the 
Trempealeau 
County 
Environment 
& 
Land 
Use 
Committee 
a 
presumption of validity and correctness.  AllEnergy has not 
successfully rebutted that presumption.  The Trempealeau County 
Environment & Land Use Committee kept within its jurisdiction in 
denying AllEnergy's application for a conditional use permit.  
No. 
2015AP491   
 
54 
 
It relied on standards that the Trempealeau County Board of 
Supervisors adopted and explicitly directed the Committee to 
consider.  The Committee's denial of AllEnergy's application was 
based on substantial evidence in the record.   
¶131 Finally, we reject AllEnergy's entitlement approach to 
conditional use permits.  This approach has no basis in our 
precedent or the language of the Trempealeau County ordinance; 
it has been rejected previously by the court.  Without a 
compelling reason, and none has been given, the court will not 
overturn settled law. 
¶132 For the reasons set forth, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
No.  2015AP491.akz 
 
1 
 
¶133 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
respectfully concur in the mandate.  In my view, the lead 
opinion and the dissent have made this case much more 
complicated and potentially more far-reaching in effect than it 
should be.  This case can and should be decided narrowly: ours 
is a certiorari review.   
¶134 Our review in this case is limited.  On certiorari 
review we examine:  
(1) whether the [Trempealeau County Environment & Land 
Use Committee ("the Committee")] kept within its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on a correct 
theory of law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, 
oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will 
and not its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was 
such that it might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question. 
Oneida Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay, 2015 WI 50, 
¶41, 362 Wis. 2d 290, 865 N.W.2d 162 (quoting Ottman v. Town of 
Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶35, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411).   
¶135 Moreover, our review in this case must be deferential.  
The decision of the Committee "is entitled to a presumption of 
correctness and validity."  Sills v. Walworth Cty. Land Mgmt. 
Comm., 2002 WI App 111, ¶6, 254 Wis. 2d 538, 648 N.W.2d 878.  
¶136 I cannot conclude, given these controlling legal 
standards, that the Committee's decision is invalid.  See 
Ottman, 332 Wis. 2d 3, ¶34 ("Certiorari is a mechanism by which 
a court may test the validity of a decision rendered by a 
municipality, 
an 
administrative 
agency, 
or 
an 
inferior 
tribunal.").  I agree with the lead opinion that the Committee's 
decision survives the specific challenges made by AllEnergy 
No.  2015AP491.akz 
 
2 
 
Corporation and AllEnergy Silica, Arcadia, LLC ("AllEnergy") 
under this framework.  That is, I agree that the Committee kept 
within its jurisdiction and that the evidence was such that it 
might reasonably have made the determination in question.  
Although AllEnergy was able to complete its application shortly 
before a moratorium on such projects went into effect, as the 
court of appeals explained and as the lead opinion reiterates, 
legitimate environmental and health concerns, among others, 
supported the Committee's decision to nevertheless deny the 
permit.  The disposition of this case is appropriate when one 
recognizes that decisions of the type made by the Committee 
involve "local concerns" best handled at the local level.  See 
id., ¶51.1 
¶137 Unfortunately, the lead opinion examines a number of 
matters not necessary to this case and is not written narrowly 
                                                 
1 The dissent suggests it is improper to state that the 
disposition of this case is in some way tied to the fact that 
this appeal involves local decision-making.  The dissent fails 
to recognize that the correct disposition of this case depends 
largely on the limited and deferential nature of our certiorari 
review——a standard of review applied in part because we pass 
upon the decision of a local governmental entity.  It is 
recognized, for example, that "[a] certiorari court may not 
substitute 
its 
view 
of 
the 
evidence 
for 
that 
of 
the 
municipality."  Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶53, 332 
Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411.  I of course agree that the 
Committee, like any other governmental unit, must conduct itself 
according to the law.  But no one disputes, for instance, that 
the Committee "proceeded on a correct theory of law"; that prong 
of certiorari review was not invoked on this appeal.  To say 
that the local nature of the issues in this case bears upon the 
outcome is consistent with our precedent and thus upholds the 
rule of law rather than thwarts it. 
No.  2015AP491.akz 
 
3 
 
enough for me to join it.  For example, the lead opinion engages 
in 
a 
discussion 
of 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
certain 
of 
Trempealeau County's ordinances, in disregard of the basic 
judicial 
principle 
that 
courts 
do 
not 
adjudge 
the 
constitutionality of legislation unless it is necessary to do 
so.  See, e.g., Cty. of Milwaukee v. Williams, 2007 WI 69, ¶63, 
301 Wis. 2d 134, 732 N.W.2d 770 ("[I]t is fundamental that a 
court should not reach a constitutional question unless it is 
essential to the determination of the case before it.").  It is 
most certainly not necessary to reach a constitutional question 
on this certiorari review. 
¶138 Indeed, one would think that if the lead opinion's 
constitutional detour were necessary to our decision, the word 
"constitution" might appear somewhere in AllEnergy's briefing.  
It does not.  That word does appear, however, in the Committee's 
briefing, where it explains that "of course, AllEnergy has made 
no argument in this case that the Zoning Ordinance is 
unconstitutional."  And even if AllEnergy were attempting to 
sneak a constitutional argument in through the back door, I fail 
to see why its gambit should be rewarded.  See, e.g., Cemetery 
Servs., Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Regulation & Licensing, 221 
Wis. 2d 817, 831, 586 N.W.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1998) ("For us to 
address undeveloped constitutional claims, we would have to 
analyze them, develop them, and then decide them.  We cannot 
serve as both advocate and court.  For this reason, we generally 
choose not to decide issues that are not adequately developed by 
the parties in their briefs.").  Little more need be said to 
No.  2015AP491.akz 
 
4 
 
illustrate the gratuitousness of the lead opinion's discussion 
in this regard. 
¶139 I also part ways with the lead opinion's consideration 
of AllEnergy's request that this court "adopt a new doctrine" 
that a conditional use permit applicant has a "right to the 
permit if the applicant shows that ordinance conditions have 
been, or will be met and if concerns of potentially-adverse 
impacts can be addressed by imposing additional conditions."  
This issue, at least, is properly before the court.  The 
request, however, comprising the last few pages of AllEnergy's 
brief, turns out to be moot.  The Committee responded to 
AllEnergy's argument in part by stating that the law already 
required that "[i]f an applicant is able to unilaterally satisfy 
all requirements and considerations of the ordinance, and no 
substantial evidence is offered in opposition, for all practical 
purposes the body would be required to grant the permit," but 
added that AllEnergy had not established that it had met this 
standard.  Consequently, the question boiled down to whether 
AllEnergy's permit application was properly denied.  And, as 
discussed, the Committee's decision that AllEnergy's application 
should be denied under local law is valid.  Consequently, the 
court need not and should not weigh in on the necessity or 
propriety of adoption of AllEnergy's proposed rule in this case. 
¶140 In sum, our review in this case is limited and 
deferential, and I agree that the decision of the court of 
appeals should be affirmed.  Of course, the appropriate 
legislative body is always free to amend these ordinances.  
No.  2015AP491.akz 
 
5 
 
However, in the case now before us, the presumption of 
correctness and validity of the Committee's decision has not 
been overcome.  That is where our analysis should end. 
¶141 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
the mandate. 
¶142 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins in this concurrence. 
 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
1 
 
¶143 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (dissenting).  We are "a government 
of laws, and not of men."1  Unless one is trying to obtain a 
conditional use permit from a municipality's land-use committee, 
in which case the opposite is true.  A government of laws 
requires us to conform our actions to pre-existing standards 
with discernible content.  A government of men requires us to 
conform our actions to a governing authority's ad hoc wishes.  
Because our decision today condones the latter, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶144 AllEnergy Corporation and AllEnergy Silica, Arcadia, 
LLC (collectively, "AllEnergy") have an interest in a parcel of 
property in an area zoned to allow non-ferrous mining as a 
conditional use (I will refer to this property as the AllEnergy 
Property2).  AllEnergy wishes to mine sand on that property, and 
so (along with the title owners) filed a conditional use permit 
application with the Committee.  The Committee denied the 
application, citing the various concerns discussed in the 
court's opinion. 
¶145 Our obligation, in reviewing this case, was to 
determine whether the Committee properly denied the application.  
A municipal entity commits reversible error if it exceeds its 
jurisdiction, incorrectly applies controlling legal principles, 
                                                 
1 J. Adams, 4 Life and Works of Johns Adams 99, 106 (1851) 
(Novanglus Letter No. VII) (referring to the definition of a 
"republic" as understood by Aristotle, Livy, and Harrington). 
2 AllEnergy's application for a conditional use permit 
identifies Gary 
Haines, 
Cortland 
Farm 
LLC, 
and 
Francis 
Pronschinske as the title owners of the property. 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
2 
 
acts arbitrarily by exercising its judgment instead of its will, 
or bases its decision on insufficient evidence.  Oneida Seven 
Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay, 2015 WI 50, ¶41, 362 
Wis. 2d 290, 865 N.W.2d 162.   
¶146 The Committee exceeded its jurisdiction when it took 
upon itself the task of determining whether a sand mine, as a 
general proposition, is an appropriate use of the AllEnergy 
Property.  This is a determination already answered by the 
Trempealeau County Board, and the Committee had no authority to 
second-guess the wisdom of its decision.  The Committee also 
acted arbitrarily by failing to apply appropriate pre-existing 
standards to the specific proposal contained in AllEnergy's 
application.3 
I 
¶147 The Committee exceeded its jurisdiction for the same 
reason our opinion is in error today.  That is, we both failed 
to account for what a County Board accomplishes when it includes 
certain conditional uses in a zoning district.  Both the 
Committee and our opinion treat the conditional use as a piece 
of unfinished zoning business, which the Committee may complete 
when an owner applies for a permit.  But a conditional use is 
not a loose end.  It is a determination that the identified use 
                                                 
3 This is not to say, however, that I believe the record is 
sufficiently developed to conclude that the Committee should 
have issued the conditional use permit.  Because the Committee 
did not complete its assigned task, as I discuss below, the 
proper course would be to remand the matter to the Committee for 
further proceedings. 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
3 
 
is compatible with the zoning district, and is subject only to 
appropriate conditions to control for the potentially hazardous 
aspects of the specific proposal under consideration.   
¶148 Our error caused us to review the wrong question.  We 
(and the Committee) inquired into the general advisability of 
operating a sand mine on the AllEnergy Property.  Our duty was 
to accept the County Board's determination that sand mining, 
with all the incidents that necessarily accompany such a use, is 
appropriate on that property.  If we had done this, our 
attention would have been focused where it belongs, to wit, on 
whether AllEnergy's specific proposal created such hazards that 
they could not be controlled even with the imposition of 
appropriate conditions.4  
A 
¶149 By 
juxtaposing 
"conditional 
uses" 
and 
"permitted 
uses," we can gain some useful insight into the essential nature 
of the former.  That insight will, in turn, illuminate how the 
                                                 
4 The concurring opinion says the "disposition of this case 
is appropriate when one recognizes that decisions of the type 
made by the Committee involve 'local concerns' best handled at 
the local level."  Concurrence, ¶136.  This is a category error.  
The "localness" of the governmental body making the decisions 
has absolutely nothing to say about whether it made them 
correctly.  The rule of law does not lose its grip as the scope 
of the governmental body scales down.  The smallest unit of 
government owes the same duty as the greatest:  To conduct 
itself according to law.  We defer to a local government's 
policy decisions because they are outside the remit of the 
judiciary, but the legality of its decisions never is.  So to 
suggest the disposition of this case has anything to do with the 
level of government making the decision is to miscategorize the 
nature of our inquiry. 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
4 
 
Committee improperly took to itself authority to address a 
question already answered by the County Board.   
¶150 The chief characteristic of a permitted use is that it 
is one to which an owner may put his property as a matter of 
right.  Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 76, ¶19, 311 
Wis. 2d 1, 751 N.W.2d 780 ("In general, zoning ordinances 
provide landowners with permitted uses, which allow a landowner 
to use his or her land, in said manner, as of right.").  Thus, 
for example, a person desiring to build a residence in a 
residential zoning district need only comply with whatever 
parameters may exist in that district (such as density, building 
size, setbacks, height, etc.).  So long as that zoning pertains, 
and the proposed development does not exceed the district's 
explicit limitations, the municipality may not deny a building 
permit.5 
¶151 This is not the case with "conditional uses."  As we 
have said before, a conditional use classification "allows a 
property owner 'to put his property to a use which the ordinance 
expressly permits when certain conditions [or standards] have 
been met.'"  Id., ¶21 (brackets in original; emphasis added) 
(quoting State ex rel. Skelly Oil Co. v. Common Council, City of 
Delafield, 58 Wis. 2d 695, 701, 207 N.W.2d 585 (1973)).  Such a 
                                                 
5 "Permissible uses are by-right uses, i.e., the uses are 
named in the zoning ordinance and a property owner has the right 
to establish the use so long as it conforms to the standards and 
criteria of the zoning ordinance."  Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 
2008 WI 76, ¶50, 311 Wis. 2d 1, 751 N.W.2d 780 (internal marks 
omitted). 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
5 
 
classification allows a municipality "to cope with situations 
where a particular use, although not inherently inconsistent 
with the use classification of a particular zone, may well 
create special problems and hazards if allowed to develop and 
locate as a matter of right in [a] particular zone."  Skelly Oil 
Co., 58 Wis. 2d at 701.  The purpose of conditional use 
classifications, therefore, is to provide for "those particular 
uses that a community recognizes as desirable or necessary but 
which the community will sanction only in a controlled manner."  
Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20; see also 3 Edward H. Ziegler, 
Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 61.1 at 61-3 (4th 
ed. 
1993) 
(stating 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
conditional 
use 
classification is to provide "same-site-specific discretionary 
review of proposed uses that are generally deemed to be 
presumptively compatible or desirable in a particular area or 
zoning district.").  They are "necessary to the community, but 
because they often represent uses that may be problematic, their 
development is best governed more closely rather than as of 
right."  Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24.6 
¶152 From this we may distill that a conditional use is one 
a municipality has determined is "desirable" or "necessary to 
the community" and is not "inherently inconsistent with the use 
classification of a particular zone . . . ."  Id., ¶¶23-24.  But 
                                                 
6 "Current zoning journals also support the conclusion that 
the common, accepted zoning practice is to provide permitted 
uses as of right and then, in addition to permitted uses, the 
ordinance may provide for conditional uses."  Bizzell, 311 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶50. 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
6 
 
it is also one that "may well create special problems and 
hazards if allowed to develop and locate as a matter of 
right . . . ."  Id., ¶23.   So a "conditional use" listing is a 
declaration that "the community will sanction [it] only in a 
controlled manner."  Id., ¶20.  The manner in which the 
community exercises its control is by allowing development to 
proceed only "'when certain conditions [or standards] have been 
met.'"  Id., ¶21 (quoting Skelly Oil Co., 58 Wis. 2d at 701) 
(brackets in Bizzell). 
¶153 This means, of course, that a property owner is not 
entitled to a conditional use permit as a matter of right.  If 
the use is dependent on satisfaction of "certain conditions or 
standards," it necessarily follows that property owners have no 
guarantee a permit will issue.  We have previously said as much:  
"'[T]he designation of a use in a zoning district as a 
conditional 
use 
does 
not 
constitute 
an 
authorization 
or 
assurance that such use will be approved.'"  Bizzell, 311 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶59 (quoting 5 Alan C. Weinstein, Anderson's American 
Law of Zoning § 34.23, at 573 (4th ed. 1997)). 
¶154 However, 
just 
because 
a 
property 
owner 
has 
no 
guarantee a permit will issue does not mean a municipal 
committee has free rein to deny an application.  One of these 
propositions is not the negation of the other, and we have been 
very careful not to say so.  For example, in Bizzell we 
considered whether a municipality could create a zoning district 
in which there were no permitted uses, only conditional uses.  
Mr. Bizzell asserted that there must be some use to which a 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
7 
 
person may put his property as a matter of right.  See id., 311 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶14.  The Town of Rhine responded that "conditional 
uses are permitted uses because once the standards have been 
satisfied a landowner is 'entitled' to the conditional use."  
Id., ¶55.  We rejected that argument as lacking any merit.  See 
id., ¶¶55-56.  But we did so on the basis that "[p]ermitted uses 
and conditional uses are different" in large part because there 
is no absolute right to the latter.  Id., ¶¶55-56 (citing S. 
Kemble Fischer Realty Trust v. Bd. of Appeals of Concord, 402 
N.E.2d 100, 103 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (stating that "[n]o one, 
of course, has an absolute right to a special permit")).  We did 
not say a municipality could deny the application because it 
does not believe the conditional use is appropriate for the 
applicant's property.  We just affirmed the proposition that 
there is never an absolute (that is, unconditional) right to a 
permit.   
¶155 And in Edward Kraemer & Sons, Inc. v. Sauk County 
Board of Adjustment, 183 Wis. 2d 1, 515 N.W.2d 256 (1994), we 
said the court of appeals was mistaken in believing that a 
"mineral extraction permit had to be granted and if conditions 
were necessary to ensure compliance with the ordinance, the 
Board was obligated to fashion them."  Id. at 7.  But that was 
in the context of determining who bears the burden of 
establishing 
compliance 
with 
the 
municipality's 
identified 
standards.  See id. at 16-17.  We did not say the municipality 
could deny an application because the proposed use comprised the 
essential attributes of a mining operation. 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
8 
 
¶156 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
has 
not 
been 
similarly 
circumscribed.  In Delta Biological Resources, Inc. v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals of Milwaukee, 160 Wis. 2d 905, 467 N.W.2d 164 
(Ct. App. 1991), the appellant asserted that "a presumption 
arises that the use serves the public interest from the fact 
that the legislature permits it, and the special use[7] itself, 
therefore, presumes a legislative determination that a public 
need for the use exists."  Id. at 911 (footnote added).  From 
this Delta Biological argued that "because the legislature's 
provision for a special use exception is a determination that 
such use does not materially affect the area adversely, denial 
is proper only upon proof that adverse impact upon public 
interest is greater than that which might be normally expected."  
Id. at 912.   
¶157 The court of appeals disagreed, stating "[w]e reject 
Delta's argument because its linchpin, the presumption that the 
conditional use serves the public interest, does not exist in 
Wisconsin."  Id.  The court of appeals accurately identified 
that argument as the linchpin in determining whether there are 
circumstances in which a municipality must grant a conditional 
use permit.  See id. at 911-12.  What it did not identify is any 
authority for its surprising assertion that there is no 
presumption that a conditional use serves the public interest.  
                                                 
7 "Special use" is synonymous with "conditional use."  See, 
e.g., Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20 ("ordinances may also provide 
for conditional uses by virtue of a special use or conditional 
use permit."). 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
9 
 
Nor did it identify any rationale that would make it an accurate 
description of the state of the law.   
¶158 Our opinion today recognizes that AllEnergy and Delta 
Biological's arguments share the same linchpin.  After quoting 
Delta Biological's authority-free statement of the law, it 
concludes that "our precedent dictates that no presumption 
exists that a conditional use is ipso facto consistent with the 
public interest or that a conditional use is a use as of 
right . . . ."  Lead op., ¶55.  The latter part of the quote is 
not material to the analysis because no one equates conditional 
uses and uses as of right.  But whether a "conditional use is 
ipso facto consistent with the public interest" is a question of 
the greatest moment here.  Indeed, AllEnergy's case succeeds or 
fails based on whether Delta Biological answered that question 
correctly.   
¶159 Delta Biological's answer is not correct.  Bizzell——a 
supreme court decision considerably more recent than Delta 
Biological——teaches that a conditional use is one a municipality 
has determined is "desirable" or "necessary to the community," 
and is not "inherently inconsistent with the use classification 
of a particular zone . . . ."   See Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶¶23-24.  It also tells us that when a community identifies a 
"conditional use" with a property, it is sanctioning that use so 
long as it is done "in a controlled manner."  See id., ¶20.  
This description of conditional uses is entirely inconsistent 
with the court of appeals' statement that "the presumption that 
the conditional use serves the public interest[] does not exist 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
10 
 
in Wisconsin."  See Delta Biological, 160 Wis. 2d at 912.  We 
should not assume that a municipality would "sanction" a use 
that is contrary to the public interest.  And the principle of 
non-contradiction should prevent us from concluding that a use 
that is "desirable" or "necessary to the community" can somehow 
simultaneously not serve the public interest. 
¶160 This places substantial limitations on the reasons a 
municipality can give for denying a conditional use permit.  
Because the types of uses identified as conditional uses are 
"sanctioned," and either "desirable" or "necessary to the 
community," an application for such a use may not be denied 
because the owner proposes to engage in that type of use.  That 
is to say, if an ice-cream shop is a conditional use, a land-use 
committee may not deny a permit because the committee's members 
object to the owner selling ice-cream on his property.  Such 
objections are in order when the municipality adopts (or amends) 
its zoning ordinance and considers which conditional uses (if 
any) to include in each of its zoning districts.  Upon adding a 
conditional use to a zoning district, the municipality rejects, 
by that very act, the argument that the listed use is 
incompatible with the district.  See, e.g., People's Counsel v. 
Mangione, 584 A.2d 1318, 1322-23 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) 
(explaining that a zoning ordinance providing for a special 
exception is a legislative predetermination that such special 
exception, 
subject 
to 
certain 
guides 
and 
standards, 
is 
compatible with other uses identified for that zone); State ex 
rel. Straatmann Enters., Inc. v. Cty. Of Franklin, 4 S.W.3d 641, 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
11 
 
650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that a conditional use is 
one authorized by a local legislative body that, in the absence 
of having met certain conditions, may otherwise be incompatible 
with the location). 
¶161 An application for a conditional use permit is not an 
invitation to re-open that debate.  A permit application is, 
instead, an opportunity to determine whether the specific 
instantiation of the conditional use can be accomplished within 
the standards identified by the zoning ordinance.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Cove Pizza v. Hirshon, 61 A.D.2d 210, 212-13 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (where a special use ordinance allows for 
certain types of restaurants, board cannot deny application 
because it objects to the allowed special use).  A land-use 
committee, therefore, must focus on the owner's specific 
proposal and determine whether that proposal can be made 
compatible with the zoning ordinance's standards.  See, e.g., 
id.; see also DeMaria v. Enfield Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 271 
A.2d 105, 106-108 (where zoning ordinance provides for special 
use and identifies requirements for obtaining such permit, board 
cannot deny application because it does not like the esthetic 
effect of the proposed apartment complex or because the board 
does not believe the proposal presents a satisfactory image of 
what apartments in the town should look like). 
B 
¶162 Our decision today would look considerably different 
if we had taken our guidance from Bizzell instead of Delta 
Biological.  The logic behind Bizzell teaches us that (as 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
12 
 
relevant here) testimony related to a proposed use of property 
has two distinct functional purposes depending on the stage of 
the zoning process in which it is offered.  One stage relates to 
a municipality's adoption or amendment of a zoning ordinance.  
The other relates to the consideration of an owner's application 
for a use permit. 
¶163 When the Trempealeau County Board writes its zoning 
code, or considers amendments, the testimony it needs, and is 
appropriate to consider, is whether a type of use is compatible 
with a designated zoning district.  This is the stage at which 
the County has the greatest discretion in determining what may, 
and may not, be allowed on various tracts of property.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 59.69(13) ("The powers granted in this section shall be 
liberally 
construed 
in 
favor 
of 
the 
county 
exercising 
them . . . ."); see also Cohen v. Dane Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 
74 Wis. 2d 87, 90, 246 N.W.2d 112 (1976).  It is also the stage 
at which it is necessary to draw most deeply on the wisdom, 
experience, 
and 
discretion 
of 
the 
community 
and 
its 
representatives.  The community's testimony plays a key role in 
answering these land-use questions wisely. 
¶164 Once the County adopts its zoning code, however, 
testimony about a proposed use has a narrower function.  Its 
purpose is to help the Committee determine whether the proposal 
satisfies the parameters already adopted by the Trempealeau 
County Board.  And when the testimony relates to a "conditional 
use," its function is to provide the information necessary to 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
13 
 
determine what conditions to impose on the use.8  In making this 
determination, the Committee must interpret and apply the zoning 
code with a bias towards the free use of property.  See, e.g., 
Cohen, 74 Wis. 2d at 91 (zoning ordinances are to be construed 
"in favor of the free use of private property."). 
1 
¶165 Consequently, the zoning ordinance's terms inform the 
Committee of both the scope of its discretion, as well as the 
type of testimony on which it may rely in considering an 
application for a conditional use permit.  The AllEnergy 
Property bears the EA-2 zoning designation, which Trempealeau 
County describes as follows: 
This district preserves class I, II and III soils and 
additional 
irrigated 
farmland 
from 
scattered 
residential 
developments 
that 
would 
threaten 
the 
future of agriculture in Trempealeau County.  The 
district is also established to preserve woodlands, 
wetlands, natural areas and the rural atmosphere of 
the County. . . .  
Trempealeau County, Wis., Zoning Ordinance § 2.03(2).  Chapter 
13 of Trempealeau County's zoning ordinance makes non-ferrous 
mineral mining a conditional use in the EA-2 district: 
Non-metallic mining is a conditional use of land in 
the EA, EA-2, PA and TA districts.  In addition to 
taking 
into 
consideration 
the 
general 
criteria 
governing the granting of conditional use permits 
under Sec. 10.04, the County shall specifically 
                                                 
8 It is conceivable that there could be no set of conditions 
sufficient to control the potential adverse impacts of a 
specific instantiation of a conditional use.  However, the 
Committee did not suggest that was the case, so this proposition 
needs no further consideration here. 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
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analyze non-metallic mineral mining proposals in light 
of the County's interest in providing for the wise use 
of the natural resources of the county, aesthetic 
implications of the siting of such a mine at a given 
location and the impacts of such a mining operation on 
the general health, safety and welfare of the public.  
Each application shall be judge on its own merits.  
Subject only to the standards set forth in this 
section and in the zoning ordinance as a whole, it is 
impossible to prescribe the criteria upon which such a 
permit may be granted in each and every case. 
Trempealeau County, Wis., Zoning Ordinance § 13.01.9 
 
¶166 Bizzell says these zoning provisions establish that 
the Trempealeau County Board has legislatively determined that 
sand mining is not inherently inconsistent with the EA-2 zoning 
district.  See id., 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23.  Bizzell also says we 
must conclude from these provisions that sand mining is a type 
of use sanctioned by the County Board and deemed desirable, or 
necessary to the community, in this district.  See id., ¶24. 
 
¶167 Presumably, when the members of the Trempealeau County 
Board authorized non-ferrous mineral mining as a conditional use 
of the AllEnergy Property, it knew at least the basics about the 
type of activity it was designating as sanctioned and either 
necessary or desirable.  I trust the members would not be 
surprised to learn that sand mining will change the topography 
of the property, alter the course of surface waters, create 
dust, make the property unavailable for agricultural uses (at 
                                                 
9 I cite to Trempealeau County, Wis., Zoning Ordinance 
§ 13.01 as it existed at the time AllEnergy filed its 
conditional use application.  That zoning ordinance, however, 
has since been amended.  All references to § 13.01 in this 
dissent are to the version existing at the time AllEnergy filed 
its application.    
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
15 
 
least 
until 
remediation 
and 
maybe 
thereafter), 
and 
not 
contribute to scenic beauty.  
 
¶168  These are expected and necessary consequences of sand 
mining, and are baked into the County Board's decision that sand 
mining should nonetheless be allowed on the AllEnergy Property, 
subject only to appropriate conditions.  Just as a municipality 
may not deny a conditional-use application for an ice-cream 
parlor because the owner intends to have ice-cream on the 
premises, the Committee may not deny AllEnergy's application 
because 
his 
proposed 
use 
will 
comprise 
the 
essential 
characteristics of a sand mine.   
¶169  The 
people 
of 
Trempealeau 
County 
should 
be 
congratulated on their interest in, and concern for, their 
community.  The testimony they offered was, for the most part, 
relevant, instructive, and trenchant.  Some of it, however, 
related to the wisdom of the Trempealeau County Board's 
determination that sand mining is a sanctioned and desirable or 
necessary use in AllEnergy's zoning district.   
 
¶170 Thus, for instance, various community members objected 
to AllEnergy's proposal because it would affect the landscape, 
detract from scenic beauty, impact the conservation of natural 
resources, or eliminate their pastoral lifestyle.  Members of 
the Committee raised similar concerns.  Committee member George 
Brandt rejected AllEnergy's application, in part, because of 
"the significant change to the landscape and to the local 
cultural and social conditions."  Committee member Ed Patzner 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
16 
 
frankly stated a sand mine is not compatible with this zoning 
district: 
Well, I represent the Farm Service Agency and I'm for 
agriculture. Agriculture has a history of bringing 
stability and jobs to our local economy, where sand 
mines have a history of boom or bust on the local 
economy, 
therefore 
destroying 
good 
productive 
agricultural land is not a wise decision. We don't 
want to destroy our outdoor recreation potential, like 
hunting, biking and other activities that attract 
visitors, retirees and people that love scenic beauty 
who are close to work and live here. 
Committee member Jeff Bawek was no less blunt in his conclusion 
that a sand mine simply does not belong on the AllEnergy 
Property:   
Based on information given as referenced and my own 
findings, along with public concerns given at this 
meeting, this siting does not seem to be in the best 
interest of our citizens nor in the best use of our 
natural resources of Trempealeau County . . . .  Trout 
Run Creek and the close proximity to the Trempealeau 
River deem this site as poor. 
¶171 All of this testimony, and the concerns raised by the 
Committee members, appear to be well-founded and offered in good 
faith.  But it is also all directed at a question they had no 
authority to address.  Trempealeau County has legislatively 
disagreed with Mr. Bawek on whether a sand mine on the AllEnergy 
Property is in the best interest of the community, or is a 
"poor" site.  Also, we should presume the County was aware of 
the relative economic benefits of mines and farms (as described 
by Mr. Patzner).  But the County legislatively disagreed with 
him as well.  So, too, with Mr. Brandt's concern about the 
cultural and social implications of developing a mine on the 
AllEnergy Property.  And the County surely knew, when it decided 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
17 
 
that a mine would be a necessary or desirable use of the 
AllEnergy Property, that it would change the landscape, be less 
attractive, and affect natural resources and recreational 
activities. 
 
¶172 The County knows a sand mine will do and be all these 
things, but nonetheless declared them unobjectionable on the 
AllEnergy Property.  So although the testimony and concerns 
described above are valid, they should have been raised when the 
County was developing its zoning ordinance in the first place.  
When, as here, the task is to apply the zoning decisions already 
made to a conditional use permit application, the Committee 
lacks authority to second-guess the County Board's legislative 
decisions.   
2 
¶173 Whether 
the 
specific 
attributes 
of 
AllEnergy's 
proposed mining operation would comply with all the necessary 
criteria upon which a permit may be conditioned is a question of 
an altogether different nature.  Here, the Committee's specific 
task was to decide whether the imposition of an appropriate set 
of conditions could sufficiently control for the "special 
problems and hazards" this type of use presents.  See Bizzell, 
311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23; see also Halfway House v. City of Waukegan, 
641 
N.E.2d 1005 
(Ill. App. Ct. 
1994) 
(city 
could 
impose 
reasonable conditions such as limiting halfway house to 32 
residents); Council Rock Sch. Dist. v. Wrightstown Twp. Zoning 
Hearing Bd., 709 A.2d 453 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (special 
exception uses may require imposition of "reasonable conditions 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
18 
 
for the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the 
community which the applicant must meet").  The community's 
concerns about AllEnergy's specific implementation of that use 
are not only relevant, they are critical to the Committee's 
deliberations over the permit application. 
¶174 Although the community offered a wealth of information 
relevant to this task, the Committee used it for the wrong 
purpose. It should have used the testimony to determine what 
specific standards AllEnergy would be required to satisfy before 
obtaining a sand mining permit.  Instead, the Committee used the 
testimony to address a question already answered by the 
Trempealeau County Board, to wit, whether it would be advisable 
to operate a sand mine on the AllEnergy Property.  That is a 
legislative determination already settled by § 13.01 of the 
zoning code, and the County Board settled it in AllEnergy's 
favor. 
¶175 The mismatch between the community's testimony and the 
question the Committee answered becomes incandescent upon review 
of 
the 
Committee's 
justification 
for 
denying 
AllEnergy's 
application.  Community members offered heartfelt and reasoned 
input on the proposed mine's impact on nearby Trout Run Creek 
and associated wetlands, surface water drainage, the health 
effects of wind-borne dust, the potential consequence of 
flooding in the vicinity, water quality, and the continued 
viability of various ecosystems.  As the court's opinion 
demonstrates, each of these topics relates to standards the 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
19 
 
zoning code requires the Committee to consider in ruling on 
AllEnergy's application. 
¶176 But the Committee did not use the testimony to 
determine what conditions it might be necessary to impose on 
AllEnergy's planned use.  It instead acted as though it was 
determining, in the first instance, whether sand mining was 
compatible with the AllEnergy Property.  Committee member Kathy 
Zeglin, for instance, said she had 
numerous environmental concerns about the significant 
wetlands in the area, the river at this point 
historically was and is constantly changing it is very 
hard to plan anything on a long range basis. I'm very 
concerned with the water table in the area——it is very 
high.  I haven't been convinced that it will not be 
disturbed.  
Committee member George Brandt expressed similar concerns: 
[T]he possibility of possible significant danger to 
ground water, by processes involved in mining and 
processing, 
and 
the 
high 
capacity 
well . . . .  
[W]etland location is too close to sensitive water and 
wildlife resources and number 2 is the possibility of 
significant 
damage 
to 
groundwater 
by 
processes 
involved in mining and high capacity well.  
Committee member Ed Patzner noted "[t]here are health concerns 
with mining so we need to protect our residents."  And finally, 
Committee member Jeff Bawek observed that "[s]oil around and in 
the site bring into question the potential for water problems." 
¶177 Each of these concerns is entirely legitimate.  And if 
the Committee had the authority to determine whether sand mining 
should be listed as a conditional use in the zoning district 
encompassing the AllEnergy Property, perhaps this would have led 
them to say "no."  But that was not its duty, and in acting as 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
20 
 
though it was, it exceeded its jurisdiction and usurped the 
Trempealeau County Board's authority to answer that question. 
II 
¶178 There is some disagreement about how specific an 
ordinance governing issuance of conditional use permits must be 
to prevent arbitrary decision-making.  We have recognized that 
they at least "must be sufficiently specific . . . to allow for 
judicial review."  Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21 n.9 (citing 3 
Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 21.09, at 
709 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing the specificity of standards)).  
An ordinance does not satisfy this requirement if it "'fails to 
provide suitable standards where it confers on a board [ ] 
"unlimited discretion to condition the issuance of the permit on 
the basis of such norms or standards as it may from time to time 
arbitrarily determine."'" 
Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21 n.9 
(citing 3 Young at 711).  Some courts strike ordinances as 
insufficiently specific when they simply require that the 
conditional use be in the "public interest," promote the 
"general welfare," or are "'consistent with the purpose or 
intent of the zoning ordinance.'"  Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21 
n.9 (quoting Daniel R. Mandelker & Michael Allan Wolf, Land Use 
Law § 6.03, at 6-6 (5th ed. 2003) (one set of quotations 
omitted); see, e.g., Clark v. Bd. of Appeals, 204 N.E.2d 434 
(Mass. 
1965) 
(rejecting 
zoning 
ordinance 
as 
too 
broad); 
Fitanides v. Crowley, 467 A.2d 168 (Me. 1983) (finding portion 
of zoning ordinance unconstitutional because it did not provide 
the board with "specific guidelines that allow the board to 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
21 
 
determine what special characteristics of a proposed use render 
it detrimental to the public health, safety or general welfare 
of the neighborhood.").  Others uphold similar ordinances, 
citing the need for flexibility in the administration of 
conditional use permits.  Bizzell, 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21 n.9; see, 
e.g., Burrell v. Lake Cty. Plan Comm'n, 624 N.E.2d 526 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1993)(concluding that that the complained of "health, 
safety, and general welfare standard" was not improper); Schultz 
v. Bd. of Adjustment, 139 N.W.2d 448 (Iowa 1966) (concluding 
that a general zoning ordinance was "constitutionally adequate 
and [gave] reasonably sufficient guidelines governing the grant 
or denial of a conditional use permit for operation of a 
sanitary landfill.").  
¶179 The court's opinion today identifies a lengthy list of 
standards AllEnergy must navigate en route to issuance of a 
conditional use permit.  Some are relatively specific.10  Others 
                                                 
10 For 
example, 
Trempealeau 
County 
Zoning 
Ordinance 
§ 10.04(5)(b) requires the Committee to consider, amongst other 
criteria: 
 
1. 
Whether the proposed project will adversely affect 
property in the area. 
 
2. 
Whether the proposed use is similar to other uses 
in the area. 
 
3. 
Whether the proposed project is consistent with 
adopted Trempealeau County plans or any 
officially adopted town plan. 
 . . . . 
 
7. 
Whether the proposed use creates noise, 
odor, or dust. 
 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
22 
 
are as broad as those struck down in other jurisdictions.11  
There may be legitimate debate about where to place each of 
these standards on the continuum between "sufficiently specific" 
and "unbridled discretion."  But there should be no debate that 
an explicit refusal to identify all of the applicable standards 
rings the "unbridled discretion" bell, and smartly. 
¶180 Whatever success Trempealeau County may have in 
convincing us its standards are sufficiently specific, it 
forfeits by giving itself an escape hatch so generous it makes 
the standards superfluous.  As our decision today acknowledges, 
                                                                                                                                                             
 . . . . 
 
11.   
Provision for proper surface water drainage. 
 
 . . . . 
 
13.  
Whether 
the 
proposed 
project 
creates 
excessive 
exterior 
lighting 
glare 
or 
spillover onto neighboring properties. 
 
 . . . . 
 
16.  
Whether the proposed project would adversely 
affect any historic or archeological sites. 
11 The Committee must assess an application for a sand 
mining permit "in light of the County's interest in providing 
for the wise use of the natural resources of the county, 
aesthetic implications of the siting of such a mine at a given 
location and the impacts of such a mining operation on the 
general health, safety and welfare of the public." Trempealeau 
County, Wis., Zoning Ordinance § 13.01.  Nor may the Committee 
issue a conditional use permit unless it first determines "the 
proposed use at the proposed location will not be contrary to 
the public interest and will not be detrimental or injurious to 
the 
public 
health, 
public 
safety, 
or 
character 
of 
the 
surrounding area." Trempealeau County, Wis., Zoning Ordinance 
§ 10.04(5)(a). 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
23 
 
the Committee "is not limited to considering the factors 
specified in the ordinance."  Lead op., ¶41.  Instead, it may 
look to "additional factors as are deemed by it to be relevant 
to its decision making process."  Trempealeau County, Wis., 
Zoning Ordinance § 10.04(5)(b).  This is not an isolated 
sentiment——the County is committed to not letting the listed 
standards cabin its discretion:  "Subject only to the standards 
set forth in this section and in the zoning ordinance as a 
whole, it is impossible to prescribe the criteria upon which 
such a permit may be granted in each and every case." 
Trempealeau County, Wis., Zoning Ordinance § 13.01. 
¶181 So the County reserves to itself the right to make up 
the standards as it goes along.  But the whole point of 
requiring a set of knowable standards is to limit the bases on 
which the County may deny a permit.  As we noted in Bizzell, a 
zoning ordinance may not confer on the County "unlimited 
discretion to condition the issuance of the permit on the basis 
of such norms or standards as it may from time to time 
arbitrarily determine."  Id., 311 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21 n.9 (quoting 3 
Young, § 21.09 at 711) (internal marks omitted).  This unbridled 
discretion soundly defeats any attempt at judicial review.  If 
the Committee may announce a standard at the same time it rules 
the applicant failed to satisfy it, what are we to review?  How 
closely the post hoc standard conforms to the evidence it was 
designed to match?  That's a rhetorical inquiry, not judicial 
review. 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
24 
 
¶182 Ultimately, creating standards at will gives rise to 
the same problem as the vague "wisdom" and "public interest"-
type standards.  It forces permit applicants to play the "guess 
what's in my head" game with the Committee.  AllEnergy consulted 
the ordinances in an attempt to discern what standards its 
application must satisfy to get a conditional use permit from 
the Committee.  At the hearing, it listened as the Committee 
members touched the ordinance talismans before voting against 
the application.  It learned the Committee members had concerns 
about a sand mine's effect on wetlands, trout streams, soil, 
beauty, recreation, topography, culture, and farming (to name a 
few).  What it did not learn was anything about why the 
Committee members thought AllEnergy's specific proposal would 
immanentize their concerns.  Just as it had to guess at what 
might cause the Committee to deny the application while drafting 
it, AllEnergy must now retrospectively guess at what could be 
done to allay the members' inchoate fears. 
¶183 Not coincidentally, that is also what we must do.  The 
thing we are supposed to review is still secreted away in the 
Committee members' minds.  The generalized concerns they 
expressed certainly track the ordinance's language, but our job 
is not to evaluate whether they can repeat that language while 
denying an application.  It is to determine whether the 
Committee 
properly 
measured 
AllEnergy's 
specific 
proposal 
against knowable and certain standards, and then determined 
whether the imposition of appropriate conditions would allow 
implementation of the proposal while simultaneously protecting 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
25 
 
the public's legitimate interests.  Only the Committee members 
can know whether they did this, because no evidence of it made 
its way into the record. 
¶184  A proper record, and proper exercise of discretion, 
would demonstrate the Committee actually engaged with the 
specifics of AllEnergy's proposal, and then determined whether 
appropriate conditions would protect against the hazards of this 
type of conditional use.  So for example, after identifying that 
sand mines in general might threaten Trout Run Creek and 
surrounding 
wetlands, 
the 
Committee 
should 
have 
informed 
AllEnergy of the nature of the threat it feared and given it an 
opportunity to develop an alleviating condition.  Flooding is 
apparently a recurrent event in this area, so the Committee 
could have, and should have, required AllEnergy to develop a 
condition that would control for such an eventuality.  Blowing 
dust consequent upon sand mining potentially has adverse health 
effects, so the Committee should have required AllEnergy to 
quantify the problem and propose a condition to address it.  And 
so on with each of the specific issues raised by the community 
or Committee members.  This is the Committee's core function, 
and it was left undone. 
¶185 Because the Committee did not complete its assigned 
task, its decision to reject AllEnergy's application reflects an 
exercise of will, not judgment.  "Judgment" would have been the 
result of applying the standards already adopted by the 
Trempealeau County Board to the facts presented by AllEnergy's 
application, including the determination that sand mining at 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
26 
 
this location is sanctioned and either necessary or desirable.  
But the Committee jettisoned those standards.  And with respect 
to 
the 
exceedingly 
vague 
"public 
interest" 
and 
"wisdom" 
standards, it required AllEnergy to guess at what specific 
aspects of a sand mine would cause concern for its members.  And 
then it required AllEnergy to guess at what might be necessary 
to allay those concerns.  Wherever the arbitrary and capricious 
line might lie, "Guess what's in my head" certainly falls on the 
wrong side of it. 
¶186  Because of this, we (along with AllEnergy) must guess 
at whether the imposition of conditions on AllEnergy's proposed 
sand mine would be capable of properly controlling the hazards 
incident to such a use.  So our decision today does not actually 
review whether the Committee properly considered an application 
for a conditional use permit.  It reviews whether the Committee 
expressed sufficient misgivings about mining for sand on the 
AllEnergy Property.  Because the Committee addressed itself to a 
question outside its jurisdiction, and because its failure to 
complete its task made its decision arbitrary and capricious, we 
should have reversed the decision and remanded for further 
proceedings.  Because we did not, I respectfully dissent. 
¶187 I am authorized to state that Justices MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent. 
No.  2015AP491.dk 
 
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