Title: Virginia Tech. and State University v. Quesenberry

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and  
Goodwyn, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
 
VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE 
AND STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
v.   Record No. 080976 
 
 
       OPINION BY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
                     April 17, 2009 
MAYNARD QUESENBERRY 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this case involving an appeal under Code § 2.2-3006(B) 
from a grievance determination, we consider whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court’s judgment that a 
hearing officer’s decision upholding the termination of a state 
employee was “contradictory to law.”  We also consider whether 
the Court of Appeals erred in rendering judgment based on the 
elements of “sexual harassment” discussed in court decisions 
applying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e et seq. (Title VII). 
 
Maynard Quesenberry was employed as a business manager in 
the Communications Network Services department at Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University (the University) for 
29 years.  While employed by the University, Quesenberry 
received favorable job performance evaluations.  However, in 
April 2005, Quesenberry received a “Group II” written 
disciplinary notice suspending him from work for four days for 
misusing a university-owned computer and for gaining access to 
computer websites containing pornographic content.∗ 
 
In 2006, the University terminated Quesenberry’s employment 
after issuing him a “Group III” written disciplinary notice, 
which was based on a discussion Quesenberry had with a female 
student in violation of University Policy No. 1025 (the policy).  
After receiving this notice of termination, Quesenberry 
exhausted his internal administrative remedies and ultimately 
requested a hearing before an administrative hearing officer 
appointed by the Department of Dispute Resolution pursuant to 
Code §§ 2.2-3003 through -3005. 
 
At a hearing held in September 2006, the hearing officer 
made the following factual findings.  The hearing officer found 
that Quesenberry participated as a volunteer coach and a board 
member of a boxing club for “disadvantaged” youth (the club), 
which was a non-profit program that was not affiliated with the 
University. 
 
The club held various fundraising events to support its 
activities, and club members discussed a project that would 
include development of a “boxing calendar,” which would feature 
photographs of young, attractive women posing in the context of 
                     
∗ The Department of Human Resource Management Policies and 
Procedures Manual, in Policy 1.60, sets forth certain “standards 
of conduct” and describes levels of offenses ranging from the 
lowest level, “Group I,” to the highest level, “Group III.” 
 
2
boxing activities.  The club members agreed that any such 
calendar must be produced in “good taste.” 
 
Quesenberry discussed the calendar with another male 
University employee who worked as a mail supervisor under 
Quesenberry’s direction.  The mail supervisor, acting on his own 
initiative, asked several female students whether they would be 
interested in posing for the calendar.  Quesenberry later 
learned about this conduct and directed the mail supervisor to 
stop initiating such conversations. 
 
The mail supervisor, contrary to Quesenberry’s directive, 
initiated a discussion about the calendar with a 20-year-old 
female student who worked for a student-run organization.  The 
mail supervisor informed Quesenberry that he should meet this 
student because “she might be interested in [the boxing 
calendar] fundraiser.” 
 
The two men visited the student in her office located on 
the University campus.  Quesenberry explained to the student 
that he was in search of models to pose for pictures in the 
calendar, that these pictures would be “tastefully done,” and 
that the women would be photographed wearing “short shorts” or a 
bathing suit.  The student reported that during this 
conversation, which lasted less than 15 minutes, she was 
“uncomfortable” and thought that the men were “objectifying” 
her. 
 
3
 
As a result of her conversation with Quesenberry and the 
mail supervisor, the student began closing and locking her 
office door.  The student also took a less direct route to her 
office to avoid the possibility of encountering the two men. 
 
Based on these factual findings, the hearing officer 
rendered a decision under the policy, which was entitled “Anti-
Discrimination and Harassment Prevention Policy.”  The portion 
of the policy on which the hearing officer relied, section 2.1, 
is labeled “Prohibited Acts.”  The hearing officer cited the 
second paragraph of that section, which states in relevant part: 
Discrimination/Harassment includes the following behaviors: 
 
. . . . 
 
 
Conduct of any type . . . based upon a person’s . . . 
gender . . . and which unreasonably interferes with the 
person’s work or academic performance or participation in 
University activities, or creates a working or learning 
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile, 
threatening or intimidating. 
 
The hearing officer concluded that Quesenberry failed to comply 
with this portion of the policy. 
 
The hearing officer found that Quesenberry “focused on the 
[s]tudent because she was a young attractive female.”  Also, the 
hearing officer concluded that the student’s work performance 
and participation in University activities had diminished as a 
result of her encounter with Quesenberry, and that the student 
had become “introverted” in a manner that materially affected 
 
4
her and other people with whom she worked.  Thus, the hearing 
officer concluded that Quesenberry’s actions unreasonably 
interfered with the student’s work and participation in 
University activities. 
 
The hearing officer stated that while the student 
overreacted to her encounter with the two men, if the hearing 
officer disregarded that overreaction, the remaining facts 
supported the University’s position concerning the student’s 
response.  The hearing officer further noted that Quesenberry’s 
conduct did not constitute “sexual harassment” in the “legal 
sense” because the conduct was not severe or pervasive. 
 
The hearing officer reduced Quesenberry’s disciplinary 
action from a “Group III” offense to a “Group II” offense 
because, in the hearing officer’s opinion, Quesenberry did not 
intentionally engage in inappropriate behavior.  However, the 
hearing officer upheld Quesenberry’s termination from employment 
based on Quesenberry’s accumulation of two “Group II” offenses 
within three years. 
 
As permitted by Code § 2.2-3006(B), Quesenberry appealed 
from the hearing officer’s decision to the Circuit Court of 
Montgomery County and asked that the circuit court reverse the 
hearing officer’s decision as being “contradictory to law.”  
Quesenberry further requested that the circuit court reinstate 
his employment and award him accrued compensation, benefits, and 
 
5
attorney’s fees.  After conducting a hearing, the circuit court 
determined that the hearing officer’s decision was “contrary to 
law” and ordered that Quesenberry be reinstated in his 
employment and be compensated for wages accrued since the date 
of his termination. 
 
In its final judgment order, the circuit court listed 
several reasons in support of its decision: (1) Quesenberry’s 
conduct was not “sexual harassment;” (2) the student was not 
offended by her “brief encounter” with Quesenberry; (3) there 
was no evidence that the student’s work or participation in 
school activities were “in any way impacted” by the encounter; 
(4) “[n]o reasonable person” could describe the environment in 
which the encounter occurred as a hostile or intimidating 
environment; (5) Quesenberry did not engage in unwelcome sexual 
advances or verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (6) 
Quesenberry was not the student’s supervisor; (7) the hearing 
officer found that the student had overreacted to the encounter; 
and (8) there was no evidence of severe or pervasive conduct 
“giving rise to sexual harassment.” 
 
The University preserved its objection to the circuit 
court’s final judgment order, noting that neither Quesenberry 
nor the circuit court had identified a statute, regulation, or 
rule of law that was contradicted by the hearing officer’s 
 
6
decision.  The University appealed from the circuit court’s 
judgment to the Court of Appeals. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s judgment 
in Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University v. 
Quesenberry, 51 Va. App. 553, 659 S.E.2d 546 (2008).  Although 
the hearing officer specifically had found that Quesenberry’s 
conduct did not constitute “sexual harassment,” the Court of 
Appeals nevertheless analyzed his appeal under that particular 
section of the policy.  Id. at 562, 659 S.E.2d at 551. 
 
According to the Court of Appeals, that particular section 
of the policy prohibiting “sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, [or other verbal] or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature” was “taken directly from 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(a), the 
federal regulation defining sexual harassment as it pertains to 
Title VII.”  Id. at 560, 659 S.E.2d at 550.  The Court of 
Appeals applied reasoning contained in some federal court 
decisions interpreting that definition of “sexual harassment” 
and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the 
hearing officer’s decision was contradictory to law.  Id. at 
565, 659 S.E.2d at 552. 
 
The Court of Appeals concluded that because Quesenberry had 
not engaged in sexual advances or other conduct that could be 
deemed sexual in nature, his conduct “did not fall within the 
ambit of [the policy].”  Id. at 564, 659 S.E.2d at 552.  We 
 
7
awarded the University this appeal because the case involves a 
matter of significant precedential value.  See Code § 17.1-
410(B). 
 
The University argues that the hearing officer’s decision 
should be upheld because the decision was not “contradictory to 
law” under the standard of review set forth in Code § 2.2-
3006(B).  According to the University, the General Assembly 
specified this narrow standard of review in recognition of a 
state agency’s “exclusive right” to manage its affairs and 
operations as provided by Code § 2.2-3004(B).  The University 
contends that the circuit court erred in employing a broader 
standard of review than permissible by making its own factual 
findings and by basing its decision on those factual findings.  
The University further asserts that the circuit court and the 
Court of Appeals should have approved the hearing officer’s 
decision because Quesenberry failed to demonstrate that the 
hearing officer’s decision was contradictory to law. 
 
The University also argues that the Court of Appeals erred 
in applying an analysis grounded on “sexual harassment” claims 
brought under Title VII.  The University contends that although 
certain language in the policy mirrors language in federal 
regulations defining “sexual harassment” for purposes of Title 
VII, this similarity does not prevent state agencies in Virginia 
 
8
from formulating additional, more stringent regulations and 
policies than those contained in Title VII. 
 
In response, Quesenberry asserts that the Court of Appeals 
correctly affirmed the circuit court’s judgment because the 
hearing officer’s decision was contradictory to law.  He argues 
that the Court of Appeals properly applied an analysis based on 
sexual harassment claims brought under Title VII, because a 
portion of the policy mirrors language applicable to such Title 
VII claims.  Quesenberry argues that the Court of Appeals 
correctly concluded that his conduct was not severe and 
pervasive, and that there was no objective evidence that he 
created a hostile or abusive work environment.  Quesenberry 
further maintains that because the hearing officer determined 
that his conduct did not constitute sexual harassment, he should 
not have been disciplined for failure to comply with the policy. 
 
In addition, Quesenberry argues that the hearing officer’s 
decision was contradictory to his own factual findings because 
the officer determined that the student had overreacted to 
Quesenberry’s inquiries.  Thus, Quesenberry concludes that the 
hearing officer’s own factual findings required that the hearing 
officer resolve the grievance in favor of Quesenberry.  We 
disagree with Quesenberry’s arguments. 
 
In a plainly stated statutory framework, the Code of 
Virginia provides grievance procedures applicable to state 
 
9
agency employees, granting an employee a right to a hearing 
before a designated hearing officer when that employee has been 
formally disciplined.  See Code §§ 2.2-3001 and 2.2-3004(A)(i).  
This grievance procedure applies to all non-probationary state 
employees, including non-probationary employees of the 
University.  See Code § 2.2-3001(A) and 8 VAC § 105. 
 
As provided by statute, a hearing officer appointed by the 
Department of Employment Dispute Resolution has certain powers 
and duties with regard to a grievance hearing, including the 
consideration of evidence and the determination of appropriate 
remedies.  Code §§ 2.2-3005 and 2.2-3005.1.  The hearing 
officer’s decision, which must be in writing, shall contain 
findings of fact and the hearing officer’s basis for making 
those factual findings.  Code § 2.2-3005.1(C)(i) and (ii).  The 
hearing officer’s decision is final and binding “if consistent 
with law and policy.”  Code § 2.2-3005.1(C)(iii). 
 
If a grievant contends that the hearing officer’s decision 
is contrary to the “policy” of the state agency employing the 
grievant, the grievant may request that the decision be reviewed 
by the Director of the Department of Human Resources Management, 
who shall determine whether the hearing officer’s decision “is 
consistent with [agency] policy.”  Code § 2.2-3006(A).  In the 
present case, Quesenberry did not request such a “policy” 
review. 
 
10
 
Instead, as permitted by Code § 2.2-3006(B), Quesenberry 
appealed to the circuit court from the hearing officer’s 
decision on the ground that the hearing officer’s decision was 
“contradictory to law.”  Under that statutory provision, if an 
unsuccessful grievant establishes that the hearing officer’s 
decision is “contradictory to law,” the circuit court may 
reverse or modify the hearing officer’s decision.  See Code 
§ 2.2-3006(B). 
 
The Court of Appeals previously has held that a party 
appealing from a hearing officer’s decision to a circuit court 
is required to “specify how that decision [was] ‘contradictory’ 
to law and what ‘law’ [was] thereby being contradicted.”  Tatum 
v. Virginia Dept. of Agric., 41 Va. App. 110, 122, 582 S.E.2d 
452, 458 (2003) (quoting Virginia Dept. of State Police v. 
Barton, 39 Va. App. 439, 445-46, 573 S.E.2d 319, 322 (2002)).  
The appealing party must “identify [a] constitutional provision, 
statute, regulation or judicial decision which the [hearing 
officer’s] decision contradicted.”  Tatum, 39 Va. App. at 122, 
582 S.E.2d at 458 (quoting Barton, 39 Va. App. at 446, 573 
S.E.2d at 323). 
 
We agree with this analysis of the burden of a litigant who 
appeals a hearing officer’s decision to a circuit court.  The 
General Assembly has articulated a very narrow standard of 
review to be applied by the circuit court in such appeals.  
 
11
Because this standard focuses solely on the question whether the 
hearing officer’s decision is contradictory to any applicable 
law, the party appealing the hearing officer’s decision properly 
bears the burden of identifying the law thereby contradicted. 
 
In the present case, Quesenberry failed to identify to the 
circuit court any applicable constitutional provision, statute, 
regulation, or court precedent of this Commonwealth that the 
hearing officer contradicted, and appeared to rely solely on 
federal decisions interpreting Title VII.  This reliance was 
misplaced, because Quesenberry’s grievance did not involve a 
Title VII claim but was an administrative proceeding conducted 
under the Virginia state grievance procedures provided in Code 
§§ 2.2-3000 through -3008. 
 
In addition, because the hearing officer specifically 
concluded that Quesenberry had not engaged in “sexual 
harassment,” there was no issue of “sexual harassment” before 
the circuit court in Quesenberry’s appeal.  The hearing 
officer’s decision was based on Quesenberry’s violation of the 
second paragraph of section 2.1 of the policy, which prohibits 
any conduct based on a person’s gender that unreasonably 
interferes with the person’s work or participation in University 
activities.  Thus, the federal decisions addressing “sexual 
harassment” were not germane in any respect to the issue before 
the circuit court. 
 
12
 
The Court of Appeals engaged in the same erroneous analysis 
of “sexual harassment” as did the circuit court.  Instead of 
addressing the portion of the policy that formed the basis of 
the hearing officer’s decision to determine whether that 
decision was “contradictory to law,” the Court of Appeals 
examined a different provision in the policy prohibiting sexual 
harassment.  The Court further considered as persuasive 
authority federal court decisions interpreting “sexual 
harassment” under Title VII, when the hearing officer had 
explicitly rejected “sexual harassment” as a basis for his 
decision. 
 
This appeal, therefore, is presented to us in an unusual 
posture, in which the circuit court failed to conduct the 
required review to determine whether the hearing officer’s 
decision was “contradictory” to applicable law.  See Code § 2.2-
3006(B).  Instead, the circuit court, in the absence of any 
statutory authority, made its own factual findings and 
determined that Quesenberry did not engage in “sexual 
harassment.” 
 
The Court of Appeals explained the proper review process 
several years ago in Barton: 
These statutes clearly provide [that] the hearing officer 
is to act as fact finder and the Director of the Department 
of Human Resource Management is to determine whether the 
hearing officer’s decision is consistent with policy.  In 
the grievance process, neither of these determinations is 
 
13
subject to judicial review, but only that part of the 
grievance determination “contradictory to law.” 
 
39 Va. App. at 445, 573 S.E.2d at 322; accord Tatum, 41 Va. App. 
at 121-24, 582 S.E.2d at 458-59.  Here, because Quesenberry 
failed to identify any applicable law that was contradicted by 
the hearing officer’s decision, Quesenberry’s appeal to the 
circuit court failed from its inception.  See Tatum, 41 Va. App. 
at 122, 582 S.E.2d at 458; Barton, 39 Va. App. at 445-46, 573 
S.E.2d at 322-23. 
 
Nevertheless, Quesenberry asks us to consider the issue 
whether the hearing officer’s decision was contrary to the 
hearing officer’s own factual findings.  We do not consider this 
issue, or the preliminary question whether a factual review of 
this very limited nature is permitted under the applicable 
statutory review process, because the record fails to show that 
Quesenberry made this argument either in the circuit court or in 
the Court of Appeals.  See Prince Seating Corp. v. Rabideau, 275 
Va. 468, 469, 659 S.E.2d 305, 306-07 (2008); Manassas Autocars, 
Inc. v. Couch, 274 Va. 82, 89, 645 S.E.2d 443, 447 (2007); 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 436 n.1, 587 S.E.2d 532, 
542 n.1 (2003).  In addition, Quesenberry has failed to assign 
cross-error to the Court of Appeals’ judgment on this basis.  
See Rule 5:18(b).  Having failed to do so, Quesenberry is 
precluded from asking us to affirm the Court of Appeals’ 
 
14
judgment on that basis.  See id.; Hicks v. Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 
221 n.2, 657 S.E.2d 142, 146 n.2 (2008); Jackson, 266 Va. at 436 
n.1, 587 S.E.2d at 542 n.1; Board of Supervisors of Fairfax 
County v. Lake Services, Inc., 247 Va. 293, 298 n.*, 440 S.E.2d 
600, 603 n.* (1994). 
 
We hold that because Quesenberry failed to identify any 
applicable law that the hearing officer’s decision contradicted, 
both the Court of Appeals and the circuit court lacked any basis 
for reviewing the hearing officer’s decision.  See Code § 2.2-
3006(B); Tatum, 41 Va. App. at 122-24, 582 S.E.2d at 458-59; 
Barton, 39 Va. App. at 445-47, 573 S.E.2d at 322-24.  
Accordingly, we further hold that the Court of Appeals erred in 
affirming the circuit court’s judgment reinstating Quesenberry 
to his previous position of employment and awarding him 
compensation for accrued wages. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment, and will enter final judgment reinstating the hearing 
officer’s decision. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
15