Title: Lampkins v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ACAY LAMPKINS,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 162, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0606021907 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                      Submitted: September 24, 2010 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: November 22, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 22nd day of November 2010, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
In March 2007, the defendant-appellant, Acay Lampkins, pleaded 
guilty to Assault in the Second Degree.  He was sentenced as a habitual offender to 
8 years of Level V incarceration, to be followed by 6 months of Level II probation.  
Soon after pleading guilty, Lampkins filed a motion for postconviction relief, 
which was denied by the Superior Court.  On appeal, we remanded the matter to 
the Superior Court for consideration of additional claims made by Lampkins.1   
                                                 
1 Lampkins v. State, Del. Supr., No. 369, 2007, Steele, C.J. (Dec. 29, 2008). 
 
2
 
(2) 
On remand, the Superior Court again denied the motion and, again, 
Lampkins appealed.  On appeal, we affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment of 
conviction.2  However, we also agreed with the State’s position that its original 
motion to have Lampkins declared a habitual offender was defective3 and, 
therefore, vacated Lampkins’s sentence and again remanded the matter to the 
Superior Court, this time for resentencing.  On remand, the State filed a corrected 
motion to have Lampkins declared a habitual offender.  The Superior Court 
granted the motion, resulting in the instant appeal. 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Lampkins claims that a) the State improperly exceeded 
this Court’s order of remand by correcting its original motion to have him declared 
a habitual offender; b) the Superior Court erred by declaring him a habitual 
offender on the basis of the State’s corrected motion; and c) the State was 
prevented from filing a corrected motion after acknowledging that the original one 
was defective. 
 
(4) 
The transcript of the hearing that took place in the Superior Court 
following this Court’s September 18, 2009 remand reflects the following.   
Lampkins’s attorney represented that, while Lampkins was “concerned” that the 
State had filed a corrected motion, he knew of no authority preventing the State 
                                                 
2 Lampkins v. State, Del. Supr., No. 369, 2007, Steele, C.J. (Sept. 18, 2009). 
3 The motion failed to set forth 3 prior felony offenses as required by Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§4214(a).  
 
3
from filing such a motion.  As a result, Lampkins’s counsel declined to object to 
the State’s corrected motion.  When asked for further comment, Lampkins 
declined, stating that his counsel had “said it all.”   
 
(5) 
We have reviewed our Order dated September 18, 2009.  The Order 
stated that, “[h]aving reviewed the parties’ contentions, we conclude that it is 
necessary to vacate the Superior Court’s sentencing order and remand this matter 
for a new sentencing hearing.”  We find nothing in the Order preventing the State 
from presenting a corrected motion to have Lampkins declared a habitual offender.  
Moreover, the transcript of the new sentencing hearing reflects that Lampkins, 
through counsel, waived his right to object to the State’s corrected motion.4  We, 
therefore, conclude that Lampkins’s claims are without merit. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
  
 
                                                 
4 MacDonald v. State, 816 A.2d 750, 756 (Del. 2003).  
5 We note that Lampkins raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time in 
his reply brief.  We decline to address arguments that were not raised in his opening brief.  Supr. 
Ct. R. 14(c).