Title: Ellis v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Koontz, S.J.∗ 
 
CORDERO BERNARD ELLIS 
OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v. Record No. 100506 
March 4, 2011 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, the principal issue we consider is 
whether, in order to prove a violation of Code § 18.2-279, 
which makes it a criminal offense to discharge a firearm at or 
against any occupied building, the Commonwealth must establish 
that the defendant had a specific intent to shoot at a 
particular building. 
BACKGROUND 
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.  Consistent with 
well-established principles of appellate review, we consider 
those facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
the prevailing party in the circuit court.  Hamilton v. 
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 94, 103, 688 S.E.2d 168, 173 (2010). 
On November 10, 2008, Cordero Bernard Ellis was indicted 
by the grand jury in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport 
News for the offense of maliciously discharging a firearm at 
                     
∗ Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing 
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011. 
or against an occupied building in violation of Code § 18.2-
279, a Class 4 felony.1  A bench trial on this indictment was 
held in the circuit court on January 9, 2009.  The court 
ultimately convicted Ellis of the lesser included offense of 
unlawfully discharging a firearm at or against an occupied 
building, a Class 6 felony. 
The evidence adduced at Ellis’ trial established that at 
approximately 6 p.m. on the afternoon of August 16, 2008, Evan 
D. Claude and his child nephew exited a convenience store 
located in the 4700 block of Marshall Avenue in the City of 
Newport News, where Claude had gone to purchase cigarettes.  
They crossed Marshall Avenue and proceeded through an open 
space between two buildings directly opposite the convenience 
store.  An individual, who Claude recognized as “D.A.,” walked 
past them toward Marshall Avenue. 
                                                                
 
 
1 Ellis was also indicted for attempted malicious wounding 
of Evan D. Claude, Code § 18.2-51, and use of a firearm in the 
commission of that offense, Code § 18.2-53.1.  The malicious 
wounding charge apparently was premised on a theory of 
transferred intent since the victim named in the indictment 
was a bystander, not the intended victim, whose exact identity 
was not known.  The circuit court, applying Crawley v. 
Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 768, 773, 492 S.E.2d 503, 505 
(1997), ruled that the doctrine of transferred intent was 
inapplicable to the crime of attempted malicious wounding, and 
dismissed the indictment for that offense and the use of a 
firearm offense. 
 
 
2
Approximately 10 to 20 feet further away, Claude saw 
Ellis, known to Claude as “Moosey,” draw a pistol and call out 
to “D.A.”  Ellis then began firing the pistol at “D.A.”  
Claude and the child were “in the path of the fire.”  Claude 
estimated that the total distance separating Ellis and “D.A.” 
was “about 30 or 40 feet.” 
During Claude’s testimony, the Commonwealth introduced an 
aerial photograph showing the convenience store and the 
surrounding area.  On the photograph, Claude marked the 
approximate locations of where he, “D.A.,” and Ellis were 
standing when the shooting occurred. 
Aja Lani, the assistant manager of the convenience store, 
testified that at the time of the shooting there were three 
employees and at least three customers in the store.  Lani 
testified that as soon as he and the others heard gunfire they 
“laid down on the floor” of the store.  Lani further testified 
that one bullet entered the store through a glass door. 
Officer Luley2 of the Newport News Police Department 
testified that in investigating the August 16, 2008 shooting, 
he recovered two bullets, one from where it had impacted the 
wall of the convenience store and another from inside the 
store.  In the open area across Marshall Avenue from the 
                     
2 The record does not disclose Officer Luley’s full name. 
 
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store, Officer Luley recovered eight shell casings.  Although 
Officer Luley was able to identify the approximate location 
where he recovered the casings, he could not state the exact 
distance from the store to that location.  
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, Ellis made 
a motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence and dismiss the 
charge relating to a violation of Code § 18.2-279, asserting 
that the evidence failed to show that Ellis intended to shoot 
“at or against” the convenience store.  The circuit court took 
Ellis’ motion to strike under advisement, directing the 
parties to be prepared to address whether the gravamen of the 
offense defined by Code § 18.2-279 required the Commonwealth 
to prove that Ellis had the specific intent to shoot at the 
building in which the store was located.  Ellis did not 
present any evidence. 
On March 3, 2009, the circuit court conducted a hearing 
to receive additional argument on Ellis’ motion.  Relying on 
Fleming v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 349, 412 S.E.2d 180 
(1991), Ellis’ counsel maintained that the Commonwealth was 
required to prove that Ellis had the specific intent to fire 
“at or against” the store in order to sustain a charge under 
Code § 18.2-279, because that language was included in the 
indictment.  The court stated that it did not agree with 
counsel’s interpretation of Fleming, finding instead that the 
 
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case stood for the proposition that Code § 18.2-279 was a 
general intent crime.  Counsel responded that she agreed that 
Fleming stood for the proposition that unlawfully shooting at 
an occupied building required only a showing of general 
intent.3  She contended, however, that because the indictment 
in this case charged the precise offense of maliciously 
shooting “at or against” an occupied building, the 
Commonwealth was required to prove a specific intent to shoot 
at or against the convenience store with the malicious intent 
of injuring one of the occupants.  Asserting that the evidence 
did not prove either of these elements, counsel contended that 
Ellis was at most guilty of unlawfully discharging a firearm.4  
                     
3 The Commonwealth contends that when Ellis’ counsel 
acknowledged her agreement with the circuit court’s 
interpretation of Fleming, she conceded that Ellis could be 
convicted of unlawfully shooting at an occupied building as a 
general intent crime and that any argument to the contrary on 
appeal is an improper attempt to “approbate and reprobate.”  
See, e.g., Rowe v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 495, 502, 675 S.E.2d 
161, 164 (2009).  In the context of the colloquy between the 
court and counsel on this point, however, it is clear that 
counsel was only acknowledging the court’s reading of Fleming 
and did not intend to concede that Ellis could be convicted of 
unlawfully shooting into an occupied building under the 
indictment and evidence in this case, as was made clear by her 
subsequent argument. 
 
4 Presumably counsel was referring to Code § 18.2-280, 
which prohibits the “willful” discharge of a firearm “in any 
street in a city or town, or in any place of public business 
or place of public gathering,” a Class 1 misdemeanor unless 
the incident occurs in or within a specified distance of a 
school, which raises the offense to a Class 4 felony. 
 
5
In effect, Ellis’ counsel contended that by indicting Ellis 
for the greater offense defined by Code § 18.2-279, which she 
contended required proof of specific intent to shoot at the 
building with malicious intent to wound a person inside, the 
Commonwealth was bound by the indictment to prove that Ellis 
had specific intent with respect to every aspect of the crime.  
Thus, according to counsel, the Commonwealth could not assert 
that Ellis was guilty of the lesser offense based on a theory 
of general intent. 
The circuit court, while agreeing with Ellis’ counsel 
that the element of malice was not proven by the evidence, 
disagreed that the “at or against” language of the indictment, 
which tracked the statute, required proof of a specific intent 
to shoot “at or against” the convenience store in order to 
obtain a conviction.  Accordingly, the court convicted Ellis 
of the lesser included offense of unlawfully shooting at an 
occupied building.  Following the preparation of a pre-
sentence report, the court sentenced Ellis to five years 
imprisonment, suspending two years of that sentence. 
Ellis noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which 
refused his petition for appeal in an unpublished order.  
Ellis v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1281-09-1 (December 9, 
2009).  The Court found, in accord with Fleming, that the 
evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference by 
 
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the circuit court as fact finder that Ellis “ ‘knew or should 
have known that the [convenience store] was in the line of 
fire, even if [Ellis] did not specifically intend to shoot at 
or into the [store].’ ”  Id., slip op. at 1 (quoting Fleming, 
13 Va. App. at 354, 412 S.E.2d at 183).  We awarded Ellis this 
appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Ellis contends that the circuit court erred in failing to 
find that the language of the indictment required the 
Commonwealth to prove that Ellis had a specific intent to fire 
“at or against” the convenience store.  Ellis asserts that, 
regardless of the level of the offense under Code § 18.2-279 
for which he was convicted, the Commonwealth could not rely 
upon Ellis’ apparent intent to fire at “D.A.” to establish 
that Ellis also intended to shoot at the store because “D.A.” 
was “not in the store and located an unknown distance away 
from the store.”  Ellis further contends that even if the 
Commonwealth was not required to prove that Ellis had the 
specific intent to shoot at the store, the Court of Appeals 
nonetheless erred in holding that the evidence was sufficient 
to support the circuit court’s finding that Ellis knew or 
should have known that the store was in his direct line of 
fire.  For the reasons that follow, we disagree with Ellis on 
both points. 
 
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Code § 18.2-279 provides in relevant part: 
If any person maliciously discharges a firearm . . . 
at or against any . . . building when occupied by 
one or more persons, whereby the life or lives of 
any such person or persons may be put in peril, the 
person so offending is guilty of a Class 4 
felony. . . . 
 
If any such act be done unlawfully, but not 
maliciously, the person so offending is guilty of a 
Class 6 felony. 
 
This Court first addressed the application of Code 
§ 18.2-279 in Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 114, 255 S.E.2d 
506 (1979).  In Dowdy, we held that the statute was “a 
legislative declaration that human lives may be endangered 
when a deadly weapon is maliciously discharged at or against a 
building occupied by people and that such conduct is 
felonious.”  Id. at 117, 255 S.E.2d at 508. 
Since Dowdy was decided, the Court of Appeals has 
reviewed numerous convictions under Code § 18.2-279, beginning 
with Fleming.  In that case, the defendant was convicted as a 
principal in the second degree for unlawfully shooting at an 
occupied building.  Id. at 350, 412 S.E.2d at 181.  While not 
disputing that his actions were sufficient to prove that he 
was present and gave assistance to the first degree principal, 
Fleming contended that the Commonwealth had not proven that 
the first degree principal had the requisite intent to shoot 
at the building.  The Court of Appeals rejected Fleming’s 
 
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argument, holding “that the offense as defined by the statute 
is not a specific intent crime; rather, it is a general intent 
offense.”  Id. at 354, 412 S.E.2d at 183.  The Court went on 
to explain that 
[a] violation of the statute may be established upon 
proof that a person unlawfully discharged a firearm 
at or in the direction of an occupied [building] if 
the person knew or should have known that the 
[building] was in the line of fire, even if the 
person did not specifically intend to shoot at or 
into the [building].  The fact finder may infer that 
the perpetrator had an unlawful intent from the 
commission of an unlawful act. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  Since deciding Fleming, the Court of 
Appeals has consistently interpreted Code § 18.2-279 in accord 
with this holding.  See, e.g., Armstead v. Commonwealth, 55 
Va. App. 354, 361, 685 S.E.2d 876, 879 (2009) (applying 
rationale of Fleming to Code § 18.2-154, which prohibits 
maliciously or unlawfully shooting into a vehicle); King v. 
Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 193, 199, 578 S.E.2d 803, 806 
(2003). 
The rationale of Fleming is consistent with the view 
expressed in Dowdy that the legislative purpose of the statute 
is meant to prohibit unlawful conduct, whether malicious or 
merely criminally reckless, which has the potential to 
endanger the lives of persons inside occupied buildings, 
without regard to the shooter’s actual motive or intent in 
unlawfully discharging a firearm.  Accordingly, applying that 
 
9
rationale here, we hold that to sustain a conviction under 
Code § 18.2-279, the Commonwealth need not prove that the 
defendant had the specific intent to shoot at or against a 
particular building.  Rather, the evidence need only show that 
a defendant who unlawfully discharges a firearm knew or should 
have known that an occupied building or buildings were in his 
line of fire. 
Ellis contends, however, that even under this general 
intent standard the evidence was not sufficient for the 
circuit court to find that he knew or should have known that 
the convenience store was within his line of fire.  This is 
so, Ellis contends, because the evidence showed only that he 
and “D.A.” were walking toward Marshall Avenue at an 
undetermined distance from the store when he fired his weapon 
at “D.A.”  Thus, Ellis asserts that there was “[n]o evidence 
. . . presented to even suggest that [he] even knew where the 
building was located or that it was occupied.” 
During oral argument of this appeal, the Commonwealth 
conceded that Code § 18.2-279 is not a strict liability crime, 
and that factors such as visibility, time of day, the 
character of the neighborhood, and, most especially, the 
distance between the shooter and the building struck could 
impact the fact finder’s determination of whether the 
defendant reasonably should have known that he was shooting at 
 
10
an occupied building.  The Commonwealth further acknowledged 
that the nexus between the shooter and the building struck 
could become so attenuated as to be legally insufficient to 
support a conviction under Code § 18.2-279.  The Commonwealth 
contends, however, that the evidence in this case was 
sufficient to permit the circuit court to find that the 
Commonwealth’s evidence was legally sufficient, and, as the 
trier of fact, to make the further determination that Ellis 
knew that the convenience store was in his line of fire or 
should have realized that the natural, probable consequences 
of his actions was that stray shots were likely to strike 
occupied buildings.  We agree. 
It is permissible for the fact finder to infer that every 
person intends the natural, probable consequences of his or 
her actions.  See, e.g., Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 
145, 547 S.E.2d 186, 198-99 (2001).  In Fleming, the shots 
were fired “at a truck located directly in front of an 
occupied residence from a distance of sixty feet.”  13 Va. 
App. at 355, 412 S.E.2d at 184.  The Court of Appeals 
determined that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that 
the shooter in that case, despite his statement that his 
intent was to fire at the truck, had the general intent to 
shoot at the dwelling that was also in his direct line of 
fire, because this was a natural, probable result of his 
 
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discharging a firearm rapidly and indiscriminately in the 
vicinity of the dwelling.  Id. 
 
Examining the aerial photograph that was admitted into 
evidence in this case, it is apparent that Ellis was only a 
short distance from the convenience store when he fired at 
“D.A.”  Moreover, the photo clearly shows that there were 
other buildings immediately behind and to Ellis’ right and 
left on either side of the open area where the shooting 
occurred.  Claude’s testimony established that the character 
of the neighborhood was of mixed residential and commercial 
use.  Since Claude knew both Ellis and “D.A.” by sight, the 
circuit court could reasonably have inferred that Ellis was 
familiar with the neighborhood.  It was also reasonable for 
the circuit court to infer that Ellis would have known that 
the convenience store would have been open for business and 
therefore occupied by employees, if not employees and 
customers. 
The evidence also showed that the shooting occurred at a 
time of day in the summer when it would still be full 
daylight.  Although no evidence was adduced as to the exact 
character of the weather on the day of the incident, there was 
no assertion that it was inclement such that visibility would 
have been in any way obscured. 
 
12
 
Given these facts, we hold that the Commonwealth’s case 
was legally sufficient to survive Ellis’ motion to strike and 
that the circuit court, as the fact finder, could reasonably 
infer from the character of the neighborhood, the presence of 
others in the vicinity, and the density of the surrounding 
development, that Ellis knew or should of known that an 
occupied building would be in his line of fire when he 
unlawfully discharged his weapon toward “D.A.”  In this 
instance, it was not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove 
by direct evidence that Ellis was actually aware that the 
convenience store was within his line of fire or that it was 
occupied at the time, because it was reasonable for the fact 
finder to infer from the evidence that these elements of the 
offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not 
err in finding that the Commonwealth was not required to prove 
that Ellis had the specific intent to fire at or against the 
convenience store and that the Court of Appeals did not err in 
finding that the evidence was sufficient to support Ellis’ 
conviction.  Accordingly, we will affirm Ellis’ conviction 
under Code § 18.2-279 for unlawfully shooting at or against an 
occupied building. 
Affirmed. 
 
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