Title: HENDRICKS v ANACONDA CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13320 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 CAMDEN J. HENDRICKS, Deceased, Claimant and Respondent, -vs- THE ANACONDA COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Joseph J. Picarelli argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent : Jack M. Scanlon argued, Anaconda, Montana Submitted: May 11, 1977 Decided : J U N 2 2 1977 Filed: J U N 2 2 1 m Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. In October 1971 claimant Camden Hendricks was injured in an industrial accident while employed in a mine of defendant The Anaconda Company (Anaconda). He submitted a claim for compensation. Anaconda accepted it and began paying temporary total disability benefits, and continued until claimant's death in November 1973. The parties here stipulated the cause of death was unrelated to the industrial injury. Claimant's widow requested a lump sum disability payment that was denied by Anaconda and subsequently, on appeal, by the Worker's Compensation Division. Claimant's widow appealed the decision to the district court, Silver Bow County. That court reversed the Division and awarded claimant's widow a lump sum of $6,000. Prior to his demise claimant had seen two physicians and each made an estimate of the percentage of disability. The first physician estimated disability at 20%, the second, some months later, set the figure at 30%. The district court's award repre- sents an amount based on the 30% figure. Neither physician's report stated the period of healing had ended. The only additional testimony taken by the district court was that of Albert Pillen, an administrator of the Division's State Campensation Fund. No transcript of his testimony was filed as a part of this appeal record, but the briefs indicate the testimony explained how the state fund handles such claims. The question here is whether the widow has a right to a lump sum payment. I n 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, $58.40, there i s a general discussion, pertinent as background for our discussion of the issue involved here, it states: "558.40 Heritability and assignability of benefits, "In the opening portion of the book it was pointed out that one of the features distinguishing a compensa- tion award from a t o r t recovery is the absence of any property right i n an award which can survive i n favor of heirs. The problem most frequently arises i n connec- tion with schedule or other permanent p a r t i a l awards, when an employee who has been awarded, say, 312 weeks' bene- f i t s for loss of an arm dies a t the end of 1 2 weeks. The question i s whether h i s heirs have a claim upon the unaccrued 300 weeks' payments. "Accrued but unpaid installments are, of course, an asset of the estate, like any other debt. This is equally true of the widow's death benefits, accrued but unpaid installments of which go on her death to her heirs. When the award takes the form of a lump sum, the amount due as accrued payments i s the entire amount of the lump sum. "When, however, the award, although for a fixed number of weeks, i s paid weekly or.periodically, most jurisdictions i n the absence of a special statute t o the contrary have held that the heirs have no claim upon the unaccrued payments, since the award i s a personal one, based upon the employee's need for a substitute for h i s l o s t wages and earning capacity. There is, however, some contra authority. "This rule has been modified by statute i n some states, but it i s significant that the modification often takes the form, not of giving the unaccrued balance t o heirs indiscriminately, but of giving it i n fixed proportions t o dependent heirs, * * *I1 The statute pertinent here i s section 92-608, R.C.M. 1947: "(1) I f an injured employee dies and the injury was the proximate cause of such death, then the bene- ficiary of the deceased, a s the case may be, shall receive the same compensation as though the death occurred immediately following the injury, but the period during which the death benefit shall be paid s h a l l be reduced by the period during or for which compensation was paid for the injury. "(2) I f the employee shall die from some cause , other than the injury, there shall be no l i a b i l i t y for compensation a f t e r h i s death. "(3) The question as t o who constitutes a beneficiary shall be determined a s of the date of the happening of the accident t o the employee, whether death shall immediately result therefrom or not .I1 Subsection 2 of section 92-608 was discussed i n Breen v. Ind. Ace. Board, 150 Mont. 463, 475, 436 P.2d 701, where the Court said : "As we construe t h i s provision it simply means that i f an employee is receiving compen- sation a s the result of an i n d i s t r i a l injury and subsequently dies from causes other than t h i s injury, l i a b i l i t y for further compensation by way of death benefits or continuing disability benefits i s cut off. But w e do not construe t h i s statute a s terminating l i a b i l i t y for compensation accrued prior t o death but unpaid a t the time of death.'' 150 Mont. 475. Claimant's widow argues claimant had an accrued right t o a lump sum idemnity payment and that such right accrued when the physicians made their estimates of the percentage dfi impair- ment. The major difficulty with t h i s argument i s that a lump sum indemnity payment was not the only option available t o claimant a t the time of h i s death. A s noted i n McAlear v. McKee & Co., Mont . , 558 P.2d 1134,1136,1137, 33 St.Rep. 'I* * * there a r e two distinct types of p a r t i a l disability benefits which a claimant may seek 9~ * *. A claimant may elect a disability benefit under section 92-703.1, R,C.M. 1947, or an indemnity benefit under section 92-709, R.C.M. 1947. "The distinction between these two benefits is that section 92-703.1 bases the benefit upon actual loss of earning capacity resulting from the injury, whereas section 92-709 awards compensation regardless of earnings t o compensate for possible loss of earning capacity i n the future. Jones v. Glac. General Assurance Co., 145 Mont, 326, 400 P.2d 888." 33 St.Rep. 1341; 558 P.2d 1137. Here claimant made no election prior t o h i s death. I f claimant had elected to receive disability benefits Breen s t a t e s these would have ceased a t death. To say claimant had accrued rights i n a lump sum indemnity benefit requires that options which the deceased claimant could have exercised be made for him and given retroactive effect. 1A second difficulty is that prior t o claimant's death there was never a determination made that the healing period had ended. McAlear points out: "* * * The statutes which govern are section 92- 701.1, R.C.M. 1947, which states: " I * * * Total temporary disability benefits s h a l l be paid for the duration of the worker's temporary disability. ' and section 92-439, R.C.M. 1947, which defines temporary t o t a l disability as: I"* * * a condition resulting from an injury as defined i n t h i s act that results i n t o t a l loss of wages and exists u n t i l the injured workman i s a s f a r restored as the permanent character of the injuries w i l l permit. I (Emphasis added.) Therefore, temporary t o t a l disability ceases when the workman's physical condition i s as f a r restored a s the permanent character of the injuries w i l l permit. When the claimant has reached t h i s stage i n h i s healing process temporary t o t a l disability ceases, and p a r t i a l disability begins i f there is permanent p a r t i a l impair- ment." 33 St. Rep. 1340; 558 P.2d 1136. N o indemnity payment may accrue u n t i l the healing period is completed. Blessed with hindsight, it is easy t o see the benefit t o claimant's estate that would result from having claimant fully healed and having made an election to go under the indemnity provisions. The legislature could grant death benefits t o depen- dents of claimants who die from causes unrelated t o their indus- t r i a l injury, as yet it has not done so. Instead it has prohibited payment of compensation a f t e r death from unrelated causes. Although it i s unfortunate claimant had no accrued lump sum indemnity pay- ment due him prior t o h i s death, the fact remains he did not. Since no compensation accrued to the claimant remains unpaid, the district court erred in granting a lump sum award to claimant's widow. The cause is reversed with direction to dismiss. We Concur: /-----7