Title: Eickhoff Corporation v. Warrior Met Coal, LLC

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: May 4, 2018
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2017-2018
____________________
1161099
____________________
Eickhoff Corporation
v.
Warrior Met Coal, LLC
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court
(CV-17-900361)
STUART, Chief Justice.
Warrior Met Coal, LLC ("Warrior Coal"), sued Eickhoff
Corporation in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court asserting that
certain pieces of heavy mining equipment Eickhoff had
manufactured and sold to Warrior Coal were defective. 
1161099
Eickhoff subsequently moved the trial court to compel Warrior
Coal to arbitrate its claims pursuant to an arbitration
provision in contracts executed after the sale of the
equipment, 
not 
the 
original 
purchase-order 
contracts
associated with the allegedly defective equipment.  The trial
court denied the motion to compel arbitration and Eickhoff
appeals.  We reverse and remand.
I.
In January 2014, Warrior Coal's predecessor in interest,
Jim Walter Resources, Inc. ("JWR"), contracted to 
purchase two
Eickhoff SL 750 longwall shearers –– heavy equipment used in
underground coal mining to separate slabs of coal from the
coal seam or "longwall panel" –– direct from Eickhoff at a
price of $3.2 million each.  The terms and conditions of the
purchase-order contract provided JWR with certain warranty
protection; the contract contained no arbitration provision,
providing only that "venue for any legal proceeding will be in
Birmingham, Alabama."  
In November 2014, before either of the two ordered
longwall shearers were delivered, JWR and Eickhoff executed
another contract, referred to as "the SL750 shearer rebuild
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and life cycle service agreement," or, more simply, "the
master service agreement,"1 which provided that, after the
mining of a longwall panel was finished, JWR would deliver the
used longwall shearer back to Eickhoff, and Eickhoff would
rebuild it at an approximate cost to JWR of $880,000. 
Pursuant to the master service agreement, Eickhoff also agreed
to provide JWR with an Eickhoff employee who would serve as a
"life cycle manager" and work on-site at the JWR mines at
least 40 hours a week and assist with the longwall shearers
and otherwise generally "support longwall operations" by
providing training on maintenance and repairs and responding
to 
all 
requests 
"for 
advice, 
instruction and 
troubleshooting." 
The master service agreement further provided that it
constituted 
"the entire agreement between the parties in respect
of its subject matter and supersedes all prior
agreements, quotation requests, understandings,
1Throughout this litigation, Warrior Coal has objected to
calling this contract "the master service agreement," instead
referring to it by its full title, "the SL750 shearer rebuild
and life cycle service agreement," or as simply the "rebuild
agreement."  However, we note that the contract by its own
terms refers to itself as the "master service agreement" or,
more simply, as "the agreement."  For convenience and to
differentiate it from the various other contracts and
agreements executed by the parties in this case, we likewise
refer to it as "the master service agreement."
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representations, warranties, promises, statements,
negotiations, letters and documents in respect of
its subject matter (if any) made or given prior to
the commencement of the term."
Finally, 
the 
master 
service 
agreement 
contained 
an 
arbitration
provision requiring the parties to submit "any dispute,
controversy or claim arising out of or in connection with the
agreement" 
to 
the 
American 
Arbitration Association ("the 
AAA")
for binding arbitration conducted in accordance with the AAA's
commercial arbitration rules if 
the parties were not otherwise
able to resolve the dispute using all reasonable efforts.
The first of the longwall shearers ordered by JWR was put
into service in May 2015.  At approximately the same time, JWR
and Eickhoff executed yet another contract, the consignment-
parts agreement, pursuant to which Eickhoff agreed to provide
a supply of spare parts for the longwall shearers, which JWR
would store on-site and then pay for on a weekly basis as the
parts were needed.  The consignment-parts agreement did not
contain an arbitration provision; rather, like the purchase-
order contract, it provided only that venue for any legal
proceeding would be in Birmingham.  It also provided that it
"constitute[d] the entire agreement between the parties,
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supersedes any previous agreements and may be amended or
modified only by a writing signed by each of the parties."
The second longwall shearer was put into service by JWR
in October 2015.  That same month, JWR agreed to purchase yet
a third SL 750 longwall shearer from Eickhoff for $3,295,000. 
The purchase-order contract for this transaction explicitly
incorporated the terms and conditions of the January 2014
purchase-order 
contract; 
accordingly, 
there 
was 
no 
arbitration
provision, and Birmingham was designated as the appropriate
venue for any legal proceedings.  The October 2015 purchase-
order contract also had the same integration provision as did
the January 2014 purchase-order contract, providing that "the
[purchase order] comprises the entire agreement between
[Eickhoff] and [JWR] and supersedes all other previous
statements, 
representations, 
or 
agreements, 
whether 
written 
or
oral."
During this period, JWR's parent company, Walter Energy,
Inc., was involved in bankruptcy proceedings, and, in 
November
2015, Warrior Coal agreed to acquire substantially all of
Walter Energy's and JWR's Alabama assets.  Warrior Coal also
ultimately agreed to assume various JWR contracts, including
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the November 2014 master service agreement.  As a result of
market conditions and the bankruptcy proceedings, mine no. 4
–- the mine where the two longwall shearers ordered from
Eickhoff in January 2014 had been put into operation –– was
shut down from approximately January 2016 to August 2016. 
During this shutdown, the longwall shearers were idle.
In March 2016, Warrior Coal completed its purchase of
Walter Energy's and JWR's assets.  In May 2016, Eickhoff
delivered the third longwall shearer to Warrior Coal, and, in
June 2016, Warrior Coal's subsidiary executed another master
service agreement with Eickhoff for this piece of equipment. 
This master service agreement was substantially similar to 
the
November 2014 master service agreement and contained an
identical arbitration provision.  This third longwall shearer
was placed into operation in Warrior Coal's mine no. 7 in
October 2016.
On February 17, 2017, Warrior Coal notified Eickhoff that
it was revoking its acceptance of all three longwall shearers,
asserting that it had experienced continual problems with the
equipment and that Eickhoff had been unable to satisfactorily
remedy those problems.  On March 9, 2017, Eickhoff formally
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notified Warrior Coal that it disputed the claim that the
three longwall shearers were defective, set forth the
remaining sums owed by Warrior Coal in connection with the
purchase of the longwall shearers, and requested a meeting
with Warrior Coal's designated dispute representative so that
they could attempt to resolve the dispute.  This final request
was presumably made in accordance with the arbitration
provision in the master service agreements, which required
that such a step be taken before arbitration could be
initiated.
On March 24, 2017, Warrior Coal sued Eickhoff, asserting
breach-of-warranty, 
breach-of-contract, 
and 
products-liability
claims.  Warrior Coal specifically alleged that both the first
and third longwall shearers delivered by Eickhoff had failed
multiple times, that Eickhoff had been unable to repair them,
that the failure of the two longwall shearers had impaired
Warrior Coal's ability to produce and sell coal, leaving
Warrior Coal no option but to remove the Eickhoff longwall
shearers from its mines and to purchase replacement equipment
from other sources.  In total, Warrior Coal claimed damages in
excess of $10 million.  On April 2, 2017, Eickhoff filed a
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demand for arbitration with the AAA pursuant to the
arbitration provision in the master service agreements,
arguing that the longwall shearers delivered to Warrior Coal
had performed in an exemplary fashion and that any problems
Warrior Coal now claimed to have experienced with them were
the result of insufficient maintenance, exacerbated by the
time the machines were idle, as well as unique geological
conditions at the Warrior Coal mines.  Eickhoff also claimed
that its own damages were in excess of $1,032,328.  On May 2,
2017, Eickhoff followed up its demand for arbitration by
moving the trial court to stay all proceedings related to the
lawsuit filed by Warrior Coal and to compel arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration provision in the master service
agreements.
Warrior Coal thereafter opposed Eickhoff's motion to
compel arbitration, arguing that the claims it had asserted
against Eickhoff were based on the purchase of the three
longwall shearers and were subject to the terms and conditions
of the purchase-order contracts, which did not contain an
arbitration provision and, in fact, provided that venue for
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any "legal proceedings" should be in Birmingham.2  Both
parties thereafter filed additional materials concerning the
question of whether their dispute fell within the scope of the
arbitration provision in the master service agreements, with
Eickhoff 
additionally 
arguing 
that, 
regardless 
of 
the 
ultimate
answer, that question should be decided by the arbitrator,
inasmuch 
as 
the 
identified 
arbitration 
provision 
dictated 
that
the 
AAA's 
commercial 
arbitration 
rules 
would 
govern
arbitration proceedings and those rules provide that the
arbitrator is empowered to decide the threshold issue of
arbitrability.  See Federal Ins. Co. v. Reedstrom, 197 So. 3d
971, 976 (Ala. 2015) ("[T]he arbitration provision in this
case provides that any arbitration proceedings will be
conducted 
'pursuant 
to 
the 
then-prevailing 
commercial
arbitration rules of the [AAA].'  The relevant commercial
arbitration rule, Rule 7(a), expressly provides, in its
current form, that '[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to
2Eickhoff notes for this Court that Warrior Coal's action
was filed in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court as opposed to the
Jefferson Circuit Court, which operates in Birmingham.  We
further note that Eickhoff, although arguing that the term
"legal 
proceeding" 
includes 
arbitration 
proceedings, 
requested
in its demand for arbitration that the arbitration hearing be
held in Atlanta.
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1161099
rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections
with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the
arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or
counterclaim.'").  On September 1, 2007, the trial court
denied 
Eickhoff's 
motion 
to 
compel 
arbitration without 
stating
its rationale.  Pursuant to Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. P.,
Eickhoff appeals that order.
II.
Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to
compel arbitration is well settled:
"'This Court reviews de novo the denial of a
motion to compel arbitration.  Parkway Dodge, Inc.
v. Yarbrough, 779 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. 2000).  A motion
to compel arbitration is analogous to a motion for
a summary judgment.  TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell,
739 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (Ala. 1999).  The party
seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of
proving the existence of a contract calling for
arbitration and proving that the contract evidences
a transaction affecting interstate commerce.  Id. 
"[A]fter a motion to compel arbitration has been
made and supported, the burden is on the non-movant
to present evidence that the supposed arbitration
agreement is not valid or does not apply to the
dispute in question."  Jim Burke Automotive, Inc. v.
Beavers, 674 So. 2d 1260, 1265 n. 1 (Ala. 1995)
(opinion on application for rehearing).'"
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Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Gantt, 882 So. 2d 313, 315 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d
277, 280 (Ala. 2000)).
III.
It is undisputed that in this case a contract calling for
arbitration exists; both master service agreements contain an
arbitration provision requiring the parties to arbitrate "any
dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or in connection
with [those contracts]."  Moreover, there is no dispute but
that the master service agreements evidence transactions
affecting interstate commerce inasmuch as they are between a
Pennsylvania corporation and Alabama companies.  Accordingly,
the burden of proof is upon Warrior Coal to establish either
that the arbitration provision in the master service
agreements is invalid or that it does not apply to the instant
dispute.  On appeal, Warrior Coal pursues this second avenue,
arguing that the master service agreements, and the
arbitration provision therein, are irrelevant to its instant
dispute with Eickhoff inasmuch as the gravamen of this dispute
is whether Eickhoff actually delivered the ordered products ––
functional longwall shearers –– and that issue, Warrior Coal
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argues, is governed by the purchase-order contracts, which
contain no arbitration provision, not the master service
agreements, which are primarily concerned with rebuilding the
longwall shearers after the initial mining of a longwall panel
is completed and which, by their own language, limit the
operation of the arbitration provision to disputes "arising
out of or in connection with [the master service agreements]."
Eickhoff disputes Warrior Coal's characterization of the
master service agreements and argues that the instant dispute
falls squarely within the reach of the arbitration provision
in those contracts.  Eickhoff also argues, however, that, to
the extent the trial court even considered Warrior Coal's
argument, it erred because the issue of arbitrability should
have been decided by the arbitrator, not the trial court.  We
first address who is to decide the issue of arbitrability. 3
3Warrior Coal argues to this Court that Eickhoff waived
its argument that the 
arbitrator must decide the arbitrability
issue in this case because Eickhoff did not make that argument
in its initial motion to compel arbitration.  Eickhoff argues,
however, that a party moving to compel arbitration cannot
anticipate that the opposing party will seek to avoid an
arbitration agreement, much less respond to every potential
argument the party might make in that regard.  We agree;
Eickhoff promptly responded to Warrior Coal's objection, and
the arbitrability issue was thoroughly briefed and argued by
both sides before the trial court entered its ruling.  See
Locklear Auto. Grp., Inc. v. Hubbard, [Ms. 1160335, September
12
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The 
arbitration 
provision 
in 
the 
master 
service
agreements provides that "any dispute, controversy or claim
arising out of or in connection with the [master service]
agreement" that cannot otherwise be resolved by the parties
must be submitted to the AAA for binding arbitration conducted
in accordance with the AAA commercial arbitration rules. 
Those rules vest the arbitrator with the power "'to rule on
his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with
respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration
agreement 
or 
to 
the 
arbitrability 
of 
any 
claim 
or
counterclaim.'"  Reedstrom, 197 So. 3d at 976 (quoting AAA
Commercial Arbitration Rule 7(a)).  In CitiFinancial Corp.,
L.L.C. v. Peoples, 973 So. 2d 332 (Ala. 2007), this Court
first considered the effect of an arbitration provision
specifically incorporating the AAA commercial arbitration
29, 2017] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2017) (holding that the
appellants "clearly and explicitly argued to the trial court
[at the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration] that
there was an arbitrability clause in the 
arbitration agreement
and that the import of the clause was that the issue whether
[the appellee's] claims were covered by the arbitration
agreement was for the arbitrator to decide, not the trial
court.  Therefore, the effect of the arbitrability clause is
properly before us in this appeal.").
13
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rules in a dispute regarding which party –- a trial court or
an arbitrator –– should decide arbitrability issues:
"In Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So. 2d 375, 379
(Ala. 2006), we stated:
"'A threshold issue is which forum
should decide the question of the scope of
the arbitration agreement.  In First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985
(1995), the United States Supreme Court
stated:
"'"Just as the arbitrability of
the merits of a dispute depends
upon whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate that dispute, see,
e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., [514 U.S.
52, 57 (1995)]; Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985),
so the question 'who has the
primary 
power 
to 
decide
arbitrability' turns upon what
the parties agreed about that
matter."
"'514 U.S. at 943, 115 S.Ct. 1920. 
However, 
the 
Court 
warned, 
"[c]ourts 
should
not assume that the parties agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability unless there is
'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence that
they did so."  514 U.S. at 944, 115 S.Ct.
1920 
(quoting 
AT&T 
Techs. 
v. 
Communications
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415,
89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986)).  This Court has
similarly required that trial courts order
arbitration of the issue of arbitrability
when the plain language of the agreement
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unquestionably shows that the parties
agreed 
to 
arbitrate 
the 
issue 
of
arbitrability.  Polaris Sales, Inc. v.
Heritage Imports, Inc., 879 So. 2d 1129,
1133–34 (Ala. 2003); and Ex parte Perry,
744 So. 2d 859, 866–67 (Ala.1999).'
"The question presented by this case is whether
the arbitration provision clearly and unmistakably
provides 
that 
the 
arbitrator 
shall 
decide
arbitrability.  The lenders argue that incorporation
into the arbitration provision of the Commercial
Rules of the American Arbitration Association,
conferring authority to decide such issues on the
arbitrator, evidences such an intent.  This Court
has not decided whether the incorporation of such
rules is sufficient to show the parties' intent to
delegate 
the 
issue 
of 
arbitrability 
to 
an
arbitrator, but federal courts have so held.  In
Terminix International Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd.
Partnership, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit stated:
"'[T]he parties have agreed that the
arbitrator will [decide the issue of
arbitrability] by providing (in all three
of the arbitration clauses at issue) that
"arbitration 
shall 
be 
conducted 
in
accordance with the Commercial Arbitration
Rules then in force of the American
Arbitration Association" (AAA).  [The
relevant AAA rule], in turn, provides that
"[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to
rule on his or her own jurisdiction,
including any objections with respect to
the existence, scope or validity of the
arbitration 
agreement." 
 
... 
 
By
incorporating the AAA Rules ... into their
agreement, 
the 
parties 
clearly 
and
unmistakably agreed that the arbitrator
should decide whether the arbitration
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clause is valid.  See, e.g., Contec Corp.
v. Remote Solution, Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208
(2d 
Cir. 
2005) 
("when 
... 
parties
explicitly incorporate rules that empower
an 
arbitrator 
to 
decide 
issues 
of
arbitrability, the incorporation serves as
clear and unmistakable evidence of the
parties' intent to delegate such issues to
an arbitrator"); Apollo Computer, Inc. v.
Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989)
("By contracting to have all disputes
resolved according to the Rules of the ICC
..., Apollo agreed to be bound by Articles
8.3 and 8.4.  These provisions clearly and
unmistakably 
allow 
the 
arbitrator 
to
determine her own jurisdiction when, as
here, there exists a prima facie agreement
to arbitrate whose continued existence and
validity is being questioned.")....'
"We find the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit
and other Circuit Courts of Appeal that have
addressed this issue persuasive and hold that an
arbitration provision that incorporates rules that
provide for the arbitrator to decide issues of
arbitrability clearly and unmistakably evidences the
parties' intent to arbitrate the scope of the
arbitration provision."
973 So. 2d at 339-40 (footnotes omitted).  This Court has
since consistently reiterated the holding that questions of
arbitrability must be decided by an arbitrator when the
parties have executed a contract containing an arbitration
provision incorporating the AAA commercial arbitration rules. 
See, e.g., Slamen v. Slamen, [Ms. 1160758, December 22, 2017]
___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2017); Locklear Auto. Grp., Inc. v.
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Hubbard, [Ms. 1160335, September 29, 2017] ___ So. 3d ___
(Ala. 2017); Managed Health Care Admin., Inc. v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Alabama, [Ms. 1151099, September 1, 2017] ___
So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2017); Bugs "R" Us, LLC v. McCants, 223 So.
3d 913 (Ala. 2016); Reedstrom;  Anderton v. Practice-
Monroeville, P.C., 164 So. 3d 1094, 1102 (Ala. 2014); and Auto
Owners Ins., Inc. v. Blackmon Ins. Agency, Inc., 99 So. 3d
1193 (Ala. 2012).  Warrior Coal states in its brief to this
Court that it "does not in any way challenge that precedent,"
Warrior Coal's brief, p. 38, but instead argues that the
instant case is distinguishable because of the multiple
contracts defining the relationship of the parties and the
specific language used in those contracts.  We disagree.  
Regardless of any facts that might be unique to this
case, at its simplest, this appeal still essentially amounts
to one party asking us to examine multiple contracts between
it and another party to hold that certain claims asserted by
one of the parties arise under one of those contracts that
does not contain an arbitration provision, as opposed to
another one of those contracts that does contain an
arbitration provision.  In Blackmon, it was an insurance agent 
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asking this Court to hold that an insurance company's claims
were premised upon a 2005 document that did not contain an
arbitration provision as opposed to a 1995 agreement that
contained an arbitration provision that, much like the
provision in the instant case, was limited to disputes
"arising out of" the contract containing it.  99 So. 3d at
1194.  This Court declined to reach that issue, however,
explaining that it was for an arbitrator to decide:
"We do not decide whether the 2005 document is
encompassed by the arbitration provision in the 1995
agreement, however, because the AAA Commercial
Arbitration Rules, which the parties in the 1995
agreement agreed to be bound by, require the
arbitrator to decide that question, and 'doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration.'  Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. [v. Mercury Constr. Corp.], 460 U.S.
[1,] 24–25 [(1983)].  We merely note that the
various documents at issue in this case underscore
that it cannot be said with 'positive assurance,' Ex
parte Colquitt, 808 So. 2d [1018,] 1024 [(Ala.
2001)], that the arbitration provision in the 1995
agreement is not susceptible of an interpretation
that would include disputes arising from the 2005
document, nor can it be said at this juncture that
the dispute does not arise from the relationship
described in the arbitration provision of the 1995
agreement."
99 So. 3d at 1198.  
Similarly, in Bugs "R" Us, the plaintiff urged this Court
to hold that her negligence claim against a pest-control
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company arose from an apparently erroneous inspection report
upon which the plaintiff relied when deciding to purchase real
property –– which did not contain an arbitration provision –– 
as opposed to a termite-service agreement entered into with
the same pest-control company at the time she closed upon the
property approximately seven weeks later.  223 So. 3d at 914-
15.  We declined to address that issue, however, noting
instead that "[w]hatever merits [the plaintiff's] arguments
may or may not have, under the arbitration provision in the
termite contract it is not this Court's responsibility to make
determinations on those issues."  223 So. 3d at 918.  Rather,
the Court held, it was the responsibility of the arbitrator to
make that decision. 
Finally, 
Managed 
Health 
Care 
"involve[d] 
several
contracts between various parties."  ___ So. 3d at ___.  The
plaintiffs, a parent company and its subsidiary, had a long
contractual 
relationship 
with 
the 
defendant 
insurance 
company,
as evidenced by contracts executed in 1986, 1991, 1995, and
2006; however, in 2015, the plaintiffs sued the defendant
asserting multiple contract and fraud claims.  However,
notwithstanding the fact that they initiated the 
lawsuit, they
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eventually moved the trial court to compel the arbitration of
their claims, as well as counterclaims filed by the defendant,
based upon an arbitration provision in a 2006 contract one of
the plaintiffs had executed with the defendant, as well as an
arbitration provision in a 2013 contract that the same
plaintiff had executed with a third-party contractor alleged
to represent the defendant.4  ___ So. 3d at ___.  The
defendant opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing
that the 2006 contract had been terminated and, to the extent
the plaintiffs' claims were based upon the 2013 contract, it
was not a party to that contract and was not bound by any
arbitration provision contained in it.  ___ So. 3d at ___. 
The trial court ultimately agreed with the defendant and
denied the motion to compel arbitration, after which the
plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred by
holding both that the 2006 contract had been terminated and
that the plaintiffs' claims did not arise out of or relate to
4Much like the arbitration provision in the instant case
limited itself to any dispute "arising out of or in connection
with the [master service] agreement[s]," both of the
arbitration provisions identified in Managed Health Care were
limited to disputes arising out of or relating to the
contracts in which the arbitration provisions were found.  ___
So. 3d at ___.
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the 2006 contract. ___ So. 3d at ___.  This Court subsequently
reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that
"whether the arbitration provision in the 2006 contract ha[d]
been terminated ... [was an] issue[] for the arbitrator, not
the circuit court," and that "it [was] for the arbitrator, not
the courts, to determine whether the claims asserted by the
parties [were] within the scope of the 2006 contract." ___ So.
3d at ___.
Thus, over the course of these cases, this Court has made
it clear that, once it is established (1) that two parties to
a dispute are bound by a valid contract containing an
arbitration provision, (2) that that same contract contains a
clear indication that the parties have agreed to arbitrate the
issue of arbitrability, and (3) that the subject dispute is at
least arguably within the scope of that contract, this Court
will not entertain arguments that the dispute actually falls
within the scope of some other contract binding the parties
that does not contain an arbitration provision.  Rather, those
arguments should be directed to the arbitrator.  See, e.g.,
Blackmon, 99 So. 3d at 1198 ("Because that is an arguable
question, it is the arbitrator's task to decide whether the
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dispute in this case is, or is not, subject to mandatory
arbitration under the 1995 agreement.").  Numerous parties on
appeal –– as well as even dissenting Justices on this Court ––
have urged this Court to abandon this standard and, instead,
to make the arbitrability determination in such cases itself;
however, we have continually declined to do so.  See, e.g.,
Anderton, 164 So. 3d at 1105 (Murdock, J., dissenting) ("It is
the court that of necessity must answer the threshold question
of whether the dispute falls within the universe of cases as
to which the arbitrator is to decide the question of
arbitrability because, until the court does so, and does so in
the affirmative, it has no basis to send the case to the
arbitrator for any purpose.").  For this Court to change its
analysis of these types of cases now would require us to
overrule the line of authority discussed supra, and, as noted,
not only has Warrior Coal not asked us to do so, but it has
affirmatively stated that it does not in any way challenge
that precedent.  As we have previously explained, "[e]ven if
we would be amenable to such a request [to overrule existing
caselaw], we are not inclined to abandon precedent without a
specific invitation to do so.  'Stare decisis commands, at a
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minimum, a degree of respect from this Court that makes it
disinclined to overrule controlling precedent when it is not
invited to do so.'  Moore [v. Prudential Residential Servs.],
849 So. 2d [914,] 926 [(Ala. 2002)]."  Clay Kilgore Constr.,
Inc. v. Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C., 949 So. 2d 893, 898 (Ala.
2006).  Warrior Coal has not distinguished its case from
Managed Health Care, Blackmon, and the other cases cited
herein, and the trial court accordingly erred by not granting
Eickhoff's motion to compel arbitration.
IV.
Warrior Coal sued Eickhoff alleging that the longwall
shearers Eickhoff manufactured and sold it were defective. 
Eickhoff thereafter moved the trial court to compel Warrior
Coal to arbitrate its claims pursuant to an arbitration
provision in the master service agreements –– contracts
between 
the 
parties 
outlining Eickhoff's obligation 
to 
rebuild
the longwall shearers after their initial term of use and
providing for an Eickhoff employee to be on-site with the
longwall shearers to provide support for their operation.  The
breach-of-warranty, 
breach-of-contract, 
and 
products-liability
claims asserted by Warrior Coal in its action against Eickhoff
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are at least arguably connected to the master service
agreements inasmuch as those contracts addressed Eickhoff's
obligation to provide an employee to assist with the
maintenance 
and 
operation 
of 
the 
longwall 
shearers.
Accordingly, because the parties also agreed in the master
service agreements that the AAA commercial arbitration rules
would govern any arbitration, and because those rules empower
the arbitrator to decide questions of arbitrability, the 
trial
court erred when it instead at least implicitly resolved the
arbitrability issue in favor of Warrior Coal in its order
denying Eickhoff's motion to compel.  That order is
accordingly reversed and the cause remanded for the trial
court to enter an order granting Eickhoff's motion to compel
arbitration and staying proceedings in the trial court during
the pendency of the arbitration proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Bolin, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Sellers, JJ., concur.
Bryan and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.
Parker, J., dissents.
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1161099
PARKER, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent for the reasons set forth in Justice Murdock's
dissent in Federal Insurance Co. v. Reedstrom, 197 So. 3d 971,
979-81 (Ala. 2015)(Murdock, J., dissenting), which I joined. 
The main opinion concludes that the arbitration provision
dictates that the question of arbitrability is to be decided
by the arbitrator because the arbitration provision generally
states that the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration
Association 
("the 
AAA") 
would 
govern 
any 
arbitration
proceedings in this case.  However, such a general reference
to the AAA's rules is not an indication that the parties have
"clearly and unmistakably" agreed to deviate from the general
rule -- that questions of arbitrability be decided by the
court -- and instead to have the arbitrator decide issues of
arbitrability.  See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938, 944, 945 (1995)(reiterating that "[t]his Court
... has ... added an important qualification, applicable when
courts decide whether a party has agreed that arbitrators
should decide arbitrability: Courts should not assume that the
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is
'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence that they did so"; and
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1161099
recognizing "the principle that a party can be forced to
arbitrate only those issues it specifically has agreed to
submit to arbitration").
26