Title: In re Spradling

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 124,083 
 
In the Matter of JACQUELINE J. SPRADLING, 
Respondent. 
 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed May 20, 2022. Disbarment. 
 
Matthew J. Vogelsberg, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Krystal L. Vokins, 
Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, was on the brief for the petitioner. 
 
LJ Leatherman, of Palmer Law Group, LLP, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the briefs 
for respondent.  
 
PER CURIAM:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office 
of the Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent Jacqueline J. Spradling, an 
attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1992. After a December 2020 
hearing before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys, the panel issued a 
final hearing report on June 3, 2021. The hearing panel determined that respondent 
violated KRPC 1.1 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 321) (competence), KRPC 3.1 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. 
R. 384) (meritorious claims and contentions), KRPC 3.3(a)(1) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 385) 
(candor toward the tribunal), KRPC 3.4(c) and (e) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 389) (fairness to 
opposing party and counsel), KRPC 8.1 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 424) (bar admission and 
disciplinary matters), and KRPC 8.4(c) and (d) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 427) (misconduct) 
involving respondent's conduct during the prosecutions of Dana Chandler and Jacob 
Ewing, Chandler's direct appeal, and respondent's disciplinary proceeding.  
 
 
2 
 
After the hearing and arguments, the hearing panel made the following findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
"31. The hearing panel bases the following findings of fact on the evidence 
presented during the disciplinary hearing, including the exhibits admitted into evidence 
and the testimony of the witnesses. The hearing panel finds the following facts by clear 
and convincing evidence.  
 
"32. The hearing panel is cognizant that the criminal cases which gave rise to 
this case remain pending in district court. The hearing panel's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law do not reflect what the State may or may not be able to prove during 
any retrial of the cases. Rather, the findings of fact and conclusions of law relate only to 
the respondent's conduct during the previous trials and appeals held in the cases as well 
as the respondent's conduct during the disciplinary investigation.  
 
"Prosecution of Dana Chandler 
 
"33. M.S. and Dana Chandler were married in 1982. Two children were born of 
the marriage. On March 3, 1997, M.S. filed a petition for divorce in the District Court of 
Douglas County, case number 97D0163. That same day, M.S. filed an amended motion 
for interlocutory relief. In the motion, M.S. included standard language seeking an order 
mutually restraining Chandler and M.S. from bothering the other. On March 5, 1997, the 
district court granted M.S.'s motion and ordered that, 'Petitioner and respondent are 
mutually restrained and enjoined from contacting, bothering, harassing or molesting each 
other in any manner whatsoever, wheresoever each may be, pending the final hearing of 
this matter.' 
 
"34. On March 5, 1998, the district court entered a journal entry of divorce. The 
district court awarded custody of the minor children to M.S. and visitation to Chandler. 
Based on the language contained in the ex parte order referenced above, the standard 
restraining order terminated on March 5, 1998.  
 
3 
 
 
"35. M.S. developed a romantic relationship with K.H. K.H. resided in Topeka, 
Kansas.  
 
"36. On October 13, 1998, following the expiration of the standard ex parte 
restraining order, M.S. filed a motion for an immediate restraining order in the divorce 
action. In the motion for an immediate restraining order, M.S. asserted that Chandler was: 
 
(a) intentionally, maliciously and repeatedly following and 
harassing the petitioner, [M.S.]; 
 
(b) destroying personal property of petitioner's acquaintances, 
including on two different occasions slashing automobile 
tires and ripping the convertible top of an automobile; 
 
(c) harassing petitioner on the telephone under the pretense of 
talking to the parties' children; 
 
(d) verbally abusing petitioner in the presence of the children 
and parents at sporting activities; and 
 
(e) verbally abusing petitioner in the presence of friends and 
neighbors. 
 
There are no entries in the Record of Action in the Douglas County District Court case 
that establish that Chandler filed a response to M.S.'s motion, that the motion was set for 
hearing, or that the district court ruled on the motion.  
 
"37. In approximately 2000, M.S. and the children moved to Topeka, Kansas. 
Neither M.S. nor K.H. sought or obtained a protection from abuse order restraining 
Chandler in either Douglas County, Kansas or Shawnee County, Kansas.  
 
"38. During the afternoon hours of July 7, 2002, M.S. and K.H. were found 
dead in K.H.'s Topeka home, from gun shot wounds. There was no evidence of a 
 
4 
 
burglary—there was no evidence that anything was missing from the home; K.H. was 
wearing jewelry, M.S.'s wallet containing more than $950 in cash was in his shorts, and 
K.H.'s purse containing more than $350 in cash was on the kitchen counter. A sliding 
glass door leading into the house from the back was ajar. The gun was never recovered 
and no fingerprints were found on the empty shell casings or elsewhere at the scene of the 
crime.  
 
"39. At the time of the murders, Chandler lived in Denver, Colorado. Later, 
Chandler moved to Oklahoma.  
 
"40. In July 2011, Chandler was charged with two counts of premeditated first-
degree murder. See K.S.A. 21-3401(a).  
 
"41. The trial was held in March, 2012. The respondent was the lead prosecutor 
in Chandler's murder trial. There were 10 days of testimony during which the State called 
over 80 witnesses and introduced nearly 900 exhibits into evidence. The jury convicted 
Chandler of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder and the district court 
sentenced Chandler to two consecutive life sentences, each carrying a mandatory 
minimum 50-year prison term.  
 
"42. Chandler took a direct appeal of the convictions to the Kansas Supreme 
Court. Chandler challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and asserted that the 
respondent engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. On April 6, 2018, the Supreme Court 
reversed Chandler's convictions based on prosecutorial misconduct committed by the 
respondent. [State v.] Chandler, 307 Kan. 657, 414 P.3d 713 (2018).  
 
"Protection from Abuse Order 
 
"43. On January 23, 2012, more than a month before Chandler's jury trial 
commenced, the respondent filed a motion to admit K.S.A. 60-455 evidence. In the 
motion, the respondent sought permission to offer evidence that M.S. filed a motion for 
an immediate restraining order on October 15, 1998, indicating that Chandler 
intentionally, maliciously, and repeatedly followed and harassed him, that she destroyed 
the personal property of his acquaintances, and that she engaged in telephone harassment. 
 
5 
 
The respondent also sought permission to offer evidence of a protection from abuse order 
filed by M.S. and Chandler's daughter in 2009.  
 
"44. The district court granted the motion and permitted the respondent 'to 
present evidence regarding 1) the following and harassing of [M.S.] including the 
October 15, 1998 PFA Order, 2) the entering of [M.S.]'s home, 3) arguing with victims 
[M.S.] and [K.H.], 4) peeking inside [M.S.]'s home, and 5) frequently phoning both 
victims at various times during the day and night.' 
 
"45. The district court affirmed its prior ruling that M.S. and K.H.'s statements  
that they feared being murdered by Chandler were inadmissible hearsay. The court, 
however, ordered that 'a witness could relate incidents (pursuant to K.S.A. 60-460[d][3]) 
if those incidents were recently perceived by the victim(s)' and were otherwise admissible 
based on the district court's rulings. Finally, the District Court ordered that a witness 
'could testify about his or her personal observation of the victim's demeanor while 
relating the incident.' 
 
"46. In the respondent's opening statement, she stated that M.S. 'responded to 
[Chandler's request to set aside all the orders in the divorce case] with motions for an 
immediate restraining order against the defendant which is a court ordering the defendant 
to stay from him.' M.S. filed only one motion—rather than multiple motions—seeking an 
immediate restraining order. Later, in her opening statement, the respondent stated that 
M.S. 'asked for the immediate restraining order . . . on October 15th, 1998. And in his 
request, . . . said that the defendant continued to follow and harass him . . .' 
 
"47. During her opening statement, the respondent also displayed a slide show. 
The slide show included a slide which stated, '[M.S.] responded with Motions for 
Immediate Restraining Order against the defendant . . .' 
 
"48. Gordon Rock represented M.S. in the divorce action filed in Douglas 
County, Kansas. The respondent called Mr. Rock to testify as a witness in Chandler's 
trial. The respondent did not question Mr. Rock regarding the existence of any type of 
restraining order in effect at the time of the murders.  
 
 
6 
 
"49. Sergeant Volle was the lead detective who investigated the murders of 
M.S. and K.H. The respondent called Sergeant Volle to testify as a witness in the case 
against Chandler. On direct examination, the respondent did not ask Sergeant Volle any 
questions regarding the existence of a restraining order.  
 
"50. During redirect-examination, the respondent questioned Sergeant Volle 
regarding a protection from abuse order as follows:  
 
'Q. Will you tell the jury what a production [sic] from abuse or PFA is. 
 
'A. It's a document signed by the Court that says you are not able to have 
contact with another person, you're not supposed to call them, write them, 
contact them in any manner. 
 
'Q. A court order precluding one person from contacting another? 
 
'A. Yes. 
 
'Q. Did [M.S.] get a protection from abuse? 
 
'A. Yes, he did. 
 
'Q. Against who? 
 
'A. Against the defendant. 
 
'Q. In 1998? 
 
'A. That's correct.' 
 
"51. On recross-examination, the following exchange occurred between 
Sergeant Volle and defense counsel:  
 
 
7 
 
'Q. Detective Volle, you testified that [M.S.] had obtained a protection from 
abuse order; is that correct?  
 
'A. Yes. 
 
'Q. Do you have that? 
 
'A. It's in the divorce file. I don't have a copy of it. 
 
'Q. Was it actually signed by a judge and filed or was it a motion or a request 
for one that wasn't— 
 
'A. I don't recall.' 
 
 
"52. During the respondent's closing statement to the jury, she argued: 
 
'How else do we know the defendant is guilty? [M.S.] got a protection from 
abuse, a court order. He applied and said, hey, Judge, please order this woman to 
stay away from me and the Judge agreed. And in 1998, meaning one year after he 
filed for the divorce, he was continuing to have problems with the defendant not 
leaving him alone. So he got a court order saying she has to stay away. The 
protection from abuse order did not stop the defendant, though.' 
 
Again, the respondent displayed a slide show. The slide show included slides that stated, 
'How Else Do We Know the Defendant is Guilty [M.S.] GOT A PROTECTION FROM 
ABUSE COURT ORDER KEEPING DEFENDANT AWAY FROM HIM IN 1998' and 
'How Else Do We Know the Defendant is Guilty THE PFA DID NOT STOP 
DEFENDANT . . .'  
 
"53. 
Chandler filed a direct appeal of her convictions to the Supreme Court. 
The parties filed initial briefs and the Supreme Court conducted oral arguments. The 
respondent was one of the attorneys who wrote the initial brief and she argued the case.  
 
 
8 
 
"54. 
The respondent drafted the statement of facts included in the State's 
initial appellate brief. Additionally, the respondent signed the State's initial brief.  
 
"55. 
In the State's initial brief, the respondent stated that '[w]hile Defendant 
proclaims that there was no protection from abuse order, the record shows otherwise.' 
The respondent also stated that M.S. 'was granted a protection from abuse order in 1998.' 
 
"56. 
The respondent delivered the oral argument on behalf of the State. 
During the argument, the respondent conceded that M.S. did not obtain a protection from 
abuse order from the Douglas County District Court. The respondent, however, continued 
to argue that a restraining or protective order followed M.S.'s October 1998 motion for an 
immediate protective order.  
 
"57. 
Upon additional questioning by members of the Supreme Court, 
however, the respondent ultimately conceded that there was no document evidencing a 
restraining or protective order in evidence. After multiple questions by the Supreme 
Court regarding the statements in her closing argument relating to the existence of a 
restraining or protective order, the respondent finally clarified: 
 
'I don't want to mislead this Court. There is no document that I found in State's 
Exhibit 969 which was the divorce file. There's no document in that file that is 
either a protection from abuse or a protective order. So, if I indicated that there 
was a document, I don't want to mislead you. I do know, speaking with the 
victim's family members, that the order existed. 'Um, and that that was 
discovered by Detective Volle as the lead detective in this case.'  
 
"58. Then, the parties were permitted to present additional supplemental briefs 
and the case was argued for a second time. At the time the supplemental briefs were filed 
and the case was argued for a second time, the respondent was no longer employed by the 
Shawnee County District Attorney's office and she did not participate in those portions of 
the appellate case.  
 
 
9 
 
"59. On July 27, 2016, Keen Umbehr filed a complaint against the respondent. 
The respondent provided a written response to the disciplinary complaint to the 
disciplinary administrator's office on October 4, 2016. In her response to the disciplinary 
complaint, the respondent again relied on Sergeant Volle's testimony. Specifically, the 
respondent stated, 'Here, the lead detective testified under oath that [M.S.] had received a 
protection from abuse order against the defendant in October of 1998.' The respondent 
did not acknowledge that Sergeant Volle recanted his testimony on recross-examination.  
 
"60. After the initial complaint and response were received by the disciplinary 
administrator's office, the disciplinary investigation was placed on hold pending the 
Supreme Court's decision in Chandler's direct appeal. On April 6, 2018, the Supreme 
Court reversed Chandler's convictions and the disciplinary investigation resumed.  
 
"61. As part of the disciplinary investigation, on July 24, 2018, the respondent 
submitted to a sworn statement. During the sworn statement, the respondent testified 
under oath that M.S. had a protection from abuse order in place at the time of the 
murders.  
 
'A. . . . So, in preparing the case for trial, I spent enough time with Detective 
Volle to try and familiarize myself with a case that he had spent years, 
really, investigating, and during that trial preparation there are many things 
that Volle passed on to me, and one of them was there was a pending PFA at 
the time that [M.S.] and [K.H.] were murdered. And so we— 
 
'Q. Can I interrupt you? 
 
'A. Yes. 
 
'Q. A pending PFA, you mean a pending PFA that has been asked for [but] not 
signed by a judge? 
 
'A. No, signed, but— 
 
'Q. What does pending mean then? 
 
10 
 
 
'A. Pending meaning— 
 
'Q. Outstanding? 
 
'A. —signed, current, controlling, in place. 
 
'Q. In effect? 
 
'A. In effect, yep. . . .' 
 
The respondent also testified that she did not recall that Sergeant Volle recanted his 
redirect testimony on recross-examination.  
 
"62. At the disciplinary hearing, the respondent called K.R., M.S.'s co-worker, 
to testify. K.R. testified that he recalled reading over a restraining order with M.S. 
However, on examination by a hearing panel member, K.R. testified he believed that the 
divorce was not yet finalized when he read over the restraining order with M.S.  
 
"63. The respondent also presented an affidavit from K.R. K.R.'s affidavit 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
'8. 
[M.S.] told me he was getting a restraining order to keep [Chandler] 
away from him. 
 
'9. 
I know [M.S.] had a restraining order prohibiting Chandler from 
contacting him. 
 
'10. 
I believe [M.S.] brought the restraining order to work and show[ed] it to 
me, saying, "Finally".' 
 
Thus, at best, K.R. confirmed only that M.S. received the standard restraining order 
issued at the outset of the divorce action, restraining both parties from bothering the 
other.  
 
11 
 
 
"64. Moreover, the hearing panel finds that K.R.'s testimony lacks credibility as 
it conflicted with other statements made by K.R. (The respondent made a note that K.R. 
stated, 'M wanted a restraining order.'); (K.R. testified at Chandler's preliminary hearing 
that M.S. wanted a restraining order.); and (K.R.'s testimony at Chandler's jury trial was 
struck by the district court after K.R. testified that M.S. had a restraining order, called the 
police, and 'just point blank [told] them what do I got to do, die before you're going to 
help me.') 
 
"65. Sergeant Volle testified at the respondent's disciplinary hearing. He 
testified that he does not have a specific memory of a specific family member of a victim 
informing him of the existence of a restraining order. Rather, he recalled reviewing Mr. 
Rock's client file, observing the motion for an immediate restraining order, and noting 
that Mr. Rock's file did not include a restraining order issued in response to the motion. 
Sergeant Volle recalled contacting the Douglas County District Court, requesting a copy 
of any order issued in response to the motion, but not receiving an order. He testified that 
he would have noted the existence of a restraining order in the police reports only if he 
was able to document the order's existence. The hearing panel finds that Sergeant Volle 
did not include a reference to a restraining order in the police reports because he was 
unable to verify an order's existence. Sergeant Volle testified that he assisted in preparing 
the probable cause affidavit and that the probable cause affidavit did not include any 
references to a restraining order in effect at the time of the murders.  
 
"66. Finally, Sergeant Volle testified: 
 
'Again, it's—I—I can't deal in hearsay. I get the hearsay coming into the report. I 
had recollection that there was an application, but Douglas County could not 
provide me a copy of the actual order, the final order. So it's—it's a matter of I 
can believe it's there, I can't prove it's there, so it's not going to go in my 
affidavit. But the fact that they couldn't provide it doesn't mean that it doesn't 
exist. It's just a matter I can't prove it. So I'm not going to put it in my affidavit if 
I can't prove it, . . .' 
 
 
12 
 
"67. 
The respondent testified on her own behalf at the disciplinary hearing. 
For the first time, the respondent acknowledged that she introduced no evidence that a 
restraining order was in effect at the time of the murders. She testified, 'And I can't tell 
you as I sit here today that the restraining order exists. Since—the—the—since you filed 
the complaint against me, I went looking, and I can't find it.' 
 
"68. 
She admitted that she was wrong when she stated in the sworn statement 
that a protection from abuse order was in effect.  
 
'Q. . . . And when they asked you about the PFA you made the claim that there 
was a PFA still in existence at the time of the murders? 
 
'A. Yes, I did. I misspoke. 
 
'Q. And you actually said that there was two PFAs, one in '97 and one in '98— 
 
'A. Yes. 
 
'Q. —that were both active at the time of the murders? 
 
'A. I don't believe—I don't remember saying they were both active at the time 
of the murders. However, I did say that at least one, I think I said that the 
one was active or in place at the time of the murder, and I was wrong. 
 
'Q. I don't believe you said that you were wrong in your sworn statement. 
 
'A. Yeah. 
 
'Q. You were pretty—you were pretty adamant it was in effect? 
 
'A. Yeah, you're right, I really was. And, you know, when I gave my sworn 
statement my mistake was not asking to look at the file. I hadn't seen it, 'um, 
since, oh—I don't know if I looked at the facts before I gave oral arguments 
in 2016 or not. Assuming that I did, that would have been the last time I 
 
13 
 
saw, so it—it had been a couple years, two to six—two to six years, I think 
that is, since I had seen the file. And so, what I should have done, and I 
failed to do, was ask to look at the discovery before I gave my statement. 
 
'Q. And if you went and looked at the discovery, what would it have told you? 
 
'A. What it told me as I prepared for this hearing, that there is no document 
that's a restraining order.' 
 
"69. The respondent testified that she did not plan to ask Sergeant Volle 
questions about a restraining order. But, during redirect-examination, the respondent 
asked Sergeant Volle about the existence of a protection from abuse order to differentiate 
Chandler from other suspects.  
 
"70. The respondent testified that she did not recall that Sergeant Volle changed 
his testimony on recross-examination. 
 
"71. The disciplinary administrator's office questioned the respondent about any 
attempts she made to verify whether the Douglas County District Court granted M.S.'s 
motion for an immediate restraining order. Initially, the respondent did not squarely 
answer the question. Rather, the respondent explained that it was not her practice to offer 
restraining orders into evidence and it was Chandler's conduct that was relevant not 
whether an order was issued restraining her from contacting M.S. Eventually, the 
respondent testified that she could not recall whether she looked for an order in the 
divorce file during the criminal investigation and prosecution. Likewise, she could not 
recall whether she directed someone else to look for an order in the divorce file. But see 
(The respondent testified that she did not 'try to verify whether or not an order had 
resulted from this motion filed in October of '98.')  
 
"72. During the disciplinary hearing, the respondent testified that prosecutors 
use the term, 'protection from abuse orders' or 'PFA' interchangeably with other types of 
orders including restraining orders, protective orders, no contact bond conditions, no 
contact probation conditions, and no contact provisions in divorce cases. Additionally, 
the respondent called other witnesses who testified similarly.  
 
14 
 
 
"Five Minute Phone Call 
 
"73. On July 5, 2002, two days prior to the murders, Chandler called M.S. seven 
times. One of the phone calls lasted five minutes.  
 
"74. During opening statement of Chandler's jury trial, the respondent alleged 
that during the five-minute phone call M.S. told Chandler that he was engaged to marry 
K.H. The respondent implied that news of the engagement prompted Chandler to travel to 
Kansas and murder M.S. and K.H. two days later.  
 
"75. S.R., Chandler's sister, testified at Chandler's jury trial that Chandler was 
aware that M.S. was going to marry K.H. and that Chandler most likely learned the news 
during a conversation with M.S. S.R. did not testify about when Chandler learned that 
M.S. was going to marry K.H. The respondent did not question S.R. about the five-
minute phone call.  
 
"76. During Chandler's jury trial, Agent Malick testified about his interview of 
S.R. Agent Malick confirmed S.R.'s trial testimony. Again, the testimony did not include 
any information about when Chandler learned that M.S. planned to marry K.H. Further, 
the respondent did not question Agent Malick whether S.R. reported that Chandler 
learned that M.S. planned to marry K.H. during the five-minute phone call.  
 
"77. At trial, T.S., M.S.'s brother, testified that M.S. relayed a conversation to 
him that M.S. had with Chandler in the 'breezeway' of M.S.'s home. Specifically, T.S. 
testified that sometime in late May or early June 2002—more than a month prior to the 
murders—M.S. found Chandler in the 'breezeway' of his home. T.S. testified that, during 
that conversation, Chandler suggested to M.S. that they reconcile and that she move into 
his home so that they could again live together as a family. T.S. testified that, in response, 
M.S. told Chandler that he was marrying K.H. The respondent did not question T.S. 
about his knowledge of the five-minute phone call.  
 
 
15 
 
"78. During closing argument, the respondent, again, asserted that two days 
prior to the murders, during the five-minute phone call, M.S. told Chandler that he was 
engaged to marry K.H.  
 
"79. On appeal, Chandler asserted that the respondent's statements about the 
content of the five-minute phone call constituted error.  
 
"80. During the oral argument, the Supreme Court questioned the respondent 
about her argument to the jury that M.S. informed Chandler of his engagement to K.H. 
during the five-minute phone call. In response to a question by Justice Johnson, the 
respondent asserted, 'We know exactly what happened during that phone call because 
[M.S.] told his brother, [T.S.]. . . . I'm going to get married to [K.H.] and I'm afraid of 
what that news will do when I tell [Chandler] because I'm afraid of what she will do . . . .' 
Further, in response to a question by Justice Beier, the respondent confirmed her position 
that T.S. testified about the substance of the discussion between M.S. and Chandler 
during the five-minute phone call.  
 
"81. Upon further questioning by the Supreme Court, the respondent abandoned 
her argument that T.S.'s testimony established that Chandler learned of the engagement in 
the five-minute phone call. See also (At the disciplinary hearing, the respondent agreed 
that T.S.'s testimony did not establish the substance of the five-minute phone call.) 
 
"Escape Route Through Nebraska 
 
"82. During her opening statement, the respondent stated that the State's 
evidence would show: 
 
'. . . The defendant's actual route included that she went from Denver to Topeka, 
[M.S.] and [K.H.]'s house, and after killing both [M.S.] and [K.H.] in an interest 
to get out of the state as quickly as she could, she drove directly up to Nebraska. 
After she gets to Nebraska, she turns around and goes home heading towards 
Denver. This route matches the defendant's gas purchases and the defendant's gas 
consumption by her credit card receipts. It is the only route that matches that  
 
16 
 
she's attributed to. Meaning, what we know she bought in gas is not consistent 
with what she told Detective Volle she did. It is not consistent with what she told 
[J.B.] she did the weekend of the murder.' 
 
"83. Before the jury, the respondent asked Sergeant Volle whether there was 'a 
route other than going east that would have taken a person out of Topeka into another 
state that's the quickest route to get out of Kansas.' Defense counsel objected and 
requested a sidebar. The attorneys approached the bench and defense counsel argued that 
the question called for speculation. The respondent responded, 'Your honor, what I'm 
trying to explain is that if a person heads north, they can get out of [the] state into 
Nebraska, and it may be that I asked it inartfully, but I will not be asking for a route, only 
that heading north out of Topeka you get out of the state.' The district court sustained the 
objection.  
 
"84. During the balance of the trial, the respondent put on no evidence to 
establish that Chandler drove through Nebraska to return to Colorado. 
 
"85. Later, during the respondent's rebuttal closing argument, the respondent 
made an additional reference to the Nebraska exit theory, 'What these two gas cans [do] 
match up with is it gives her enough fuel to get from Denver to Topeka to do the killing 
and get out of the state. That's the significance of the gas cans. Otherwise her 27-mile-
per-gallon can't be done.' 
 
"Internet Searches 
 
"86. During the investigation into the murders, computers associated with 
Chandler were seized and turned over to the Kansas Bureau of Investigation for 
examination. Kansas Bureau of Investigation Agent John Kite examined the computers 
and prepared reports regarding his findings. In addition, an additional investigator, Mark 
Johnson, examined the computers associated with Chandler. 
 
"87. In her opening statement, the respondent told the jury that Agent Kite 
would testify that Chandler 'accessed articles on CJ Online that dealt with how to defend 
against murder charges and articles that dealt with sentencing in murder charges.' 
 
17 
 
 
"88. During her direct-examination of Agent Kite during Chandler's jury trial, 
the respondent asked Agent Kite several questions about Internet searches conducted on 
the computers associated with Chandler. During the examination, the following exchange 
occurred: 
 
'Q. Did you find anything related to viewing articles on CJ Online or the 
Topeka Capital-journal [sic]? 
 
'A. Yes. I found HTML fragments that produced search results for CJ Online 
that had related articles about the homicide and the investigations into them.  
 
'Q. And then at the one-year anniversary, did you also find a search regarding 
these homicides and the investigation into them? 
 
'MR. BENNETT:  Just for clarification, anniversary of what? 
 
'MS. SPRADLING:  [M.S.] and [K.H.]'s murder. 
 
. . . . 
 
'Q. Did you find the anniversary of the double homicides that there had been 
another search regarding or looking into CJ Online about the homicides? 
 
'A. The HTML fragments I found that related to that produced a story which 
was the one-year anniversary story by Tim Hrenchir.' 
 
The respondent did not question Agent Kite whether Chandler searched the Internet for 
articles about how to defend against murder charges or articles about sentencing in 
murder charges. Further, during cross-examination, Agent Kite indicated that in his 
examination of Chandler's computers, he did not find anything 'that was significant to 
[him] that occurred prior to July 7, 2002.' The respondent did not call Mark Johnson to 
testify regarding his examination of Chandler's computers. The respondent put on no  
 
18 
 
other evidence regarding Chandler's Internet searches or Chandler's access to online 
articles regarding how to defend against murder charges or about sentencing in murder 
cases.  
 
"89. During the disciplinary investigation, the respondent made a sworn 
statement. During that sworn statement, the respondent testified that Chandler conducted 
the Internet searches that the respondent referenced in her opening statement and closing 
argument. She testified during the disciplinary hearing that Agent Kite told her during 
trial preparation that Chandler made those searches. She indicated that she did not recall 
the questions that she asked Agent Kite during the jury trial but she testified that she 
intended to ask him about Internet searches and articles accessed relating to murder 
charges. 
 
"90. On September 19, 2019, as part of the disciplinary investigation, Agent 
Kite gave a deposition. During the deposition, Agent Kite specifically denied ever finding 
evidence that Chandler accessed articles regarding how to get away with murder, how to 
defend against murder charges, or sentencing in murder cases. Furthermore, Agent Kite 
denied ever conveying such information to the respondent during a pretrial meeting. At 
the disciplinary hearing, Agent Kite again testified that he did not find evidence that 
Chandler conducted Internet searches about how to defend against murder charges or 
sentencing in murder cases.  
 
"91. Because of the conflict in testimony, the hearing panel must weigh the 
credibility of the witnesses in light of all the evidence presented. The respondent did not 
pose any questions to Agent Kite designed to elicit testimony to establish that Chandler 
conducted Internet searches on how to defend against murder charges or on sentencing in 
murder cases. Further, Agent Kite's reports do not contain any conclusions that Chandler 
conducted Internet searches on how to defend against murder charges or sentencing in 
murder cases. Because other evidence corroborates Agent Kite's testimony, because 
Agent Kite has no reason to fabricate, because the respondent did not ask Agent Kite any 
questions designed to elicit the information, because the respondent has expressed that 
she does not recall a number of facts in this case, because the respondent has now  
 
19 
 
admitted that other statements she made previously were incorrect, and because the 
respondent misstated evidence, the hearing panel accepts Agent Kite's testimony and 
rejects the respondent's testimony in this regard.  
 
"Chandler Thinks She is Smarter 
 
"92. During the murder trial, the respondent called Chandler's former employer, 
J.M. to testify. During his testimony, J.M. testified that Chandler's intelligence was 
'probably above average.' The respondent did not present any additional evidence 
regarding Chandler's intelligence. Chandler, 307 Kan. at 688. 
 
"93. During closing argument, the respondent said, 'she's smart, she's got high 
intelligence and she thought she was smarter than the police department and she thought 
she was smarter than the jurors and it's not true, . . . And we have you. She's not smarter 
than the cops, [and] she's not smarter than you.' 
 
"Reference to S.R. in Gallery 
 
"94. Shortly before the parties made closing arguments in Chandler's jury trial, 
the district court admonished the parties to refrain from asking members of the gallery to 
stand up during the closing arguments. The admonition was aimed at the respondent 
based on an experience in a previous case. The district court also stated, 'Do not do that in 
this case. I don't want references to folks here at all.' 
 
"95. Despite the district court's clear order, during her closing argument in the 
Chandler jury trial, the respondent referred to S.R. and pointed out that S.R. was giving 
the respondent 'a look.' Specifically, the respondent stated, '[t]hat's the defendant and her 
close friend [S.R.] that I'm getting a look from talking about what a great day it was 
because [P.W.] was dead and can't put the defendant in Kansas.' 
 
"96. At the oral argument, the following exchange occurred between the 
respondent and Justice Rosen: 
 
 
20 
 
'JUSTICE ROSEN:  Well, I'll jump in with what I think is misconduct, and that's 
right off the bat you were warned not to refer or to have anybody in the gallery 
stand up, . . . 
 
'MS. SPRADLING:  Yes, sir. 
 
'JUSTICE ROSEN:  And then there was "I don't want you to do that in this case. 
I don't want references to folks here at all." And then during your closing 
argument you do exactly what the trial Court emphatically told you not to do. . . .  
 
. . . . 
 
'MS. SPRADLING:  And, actually, let me disagree with you, please. . . . There 
was no one who stood up in the Chandler case. I didn't request anyone to stand 
up in the Chandler [case]. 
 
'JUSTICE ROSEN:  Any reference to, you said "I'm getting a look." . . . and 
you're referring to the defendant's sister, I believe. 
 
. . . . 
 
'JUSTICE ROSEN:  You're referring to someone in the gallery, and the Court 
told you not to do that. 
 
'MS. SPRADLING:  Let me disagree with the analogy, if I could, please. I do not 
think that saying that the defendant's sister who was mean mugging the State is 
akin to asking half of the gallery to stand up during closing argument. So I 
respectfully disagree that I did the same thing that the Court asked me not to.' 
 
"97. At the disciplinary hearing, the respondent generally acknowledged that 
she violated the district court's order by pointing out S.R. in the gallery when she testified 
as follows:  
 
 
21 
 
'I admit today it was wrong. I didn't at the time believe that I was violating the 
Court's order. My understanding of the Court's motion in limine, or pretrial order, 
was that I was to not have anybody stand. I still had that belief at oral argument. 
But I shouldn't have commented on it. You just take those looks and go on would 
have been the better approach.' 
 
"Robbing the Children of Their Father 
 
"98. In the rebuttal portion of her closing argument, the respondent argued, 
'[n]ow the State, just like the defense, would also like to implore you not to convict an 
innocent person. That would be horrible. Don't convict an innocent person. Instead, 
convict her because she killed [M.S.], she killed [K.H.], and she robbed her own children 
of their father and his fiancé [sic]. . . .['] 
 
"99. During the respondent's sworn statement, the respondent disagreed with the 
Supreme Court and testified that her statement was factual—by killing M.S. and K.H., 
Chandler robbed her children of their father.  
 
"100. At the disciplinary hearing, the respondent simply stated that the statement 
was made in the 'heat of the moment.' 
 
"Prosecution of Jacob Ewing 
 
"101. In 2016, the Jackson County Attorney filed six criminal cases against Jacob 
Ewing, charging him with committing numerous sex crimes against several individuals. 
The county retained the respondent as a special prosecutor to handle the prosecution of 
the criminal cases against Ewing. 
 
"102. On February 14, 2017, the respondent filed a motion to consolidate two of 
the six cases for trial, cases numbered 2016-CR-195 and 2016-CR-203. Those cases 
involved J.M. and M.W. The district court granted the respondent's motion and scheduled 
a jury trial.  
 
 
22 
 
"103. On June 26, 2017, a five-day jury trial commenced. The jury found Ewing 
guilty of two counts of rape, four counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, two counts of 
battery, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of hosting minors 
consuming alcohol, and one count of furnishing cereal malt beverages to a minor. 
 
"104. Ewing appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, arguing, among 
other issues, that the respondent committed prosecutorial error during her closing 
argument.  
 
"Touch DNA 
 
"105. During her closing argument, the respondent stated:  
 
'Now, [J.M.] told everyone, and there's no contradiction to this, that when she 
went to bed in the defendant's bed she was fully clothed. Why is that important? 
It's important because of the defendant's DNA around the waistband of [J.M.'s] 
panties. You cannot get the defendant's DNA there unless [J.M.] was unclothed. 
She went to bed in panties and sweats. Unless the sweats are taken off, she would 
not have the defendant's DNA there. And the only reason that [J.M.'s] panties 
were exposed was because the defendant took her pants off.' 
 
The respondent informed the jury that Ewing's DNA could not—as a certainty—be on 
J.M.'s underwear waistband unless her sweat pants had been removed by Ewing. The 
respondent's argument is not supported by the evidence at trial. First, J.M. testified that 
she did not remember whether she had changed clothes in Ewing's bathroom or his 
bedroom and she did not remember whether she laid the sweat pants on Ewing's bed 
before changing into them. Further, Rachel White, a forensic scientist with the Kansas 
Bureau of Investigation, testified that touch DNA occurs when 'an individual has simply 
touched an item and left behind some of their skin cells just in the process of touching 
that item.' Further, White testified that touch DNA could transfer from bed sheets to 
underwear by simply laying down on bed sheets.  
 
 
23 
 
"Low-Functioning Young Woman 
 
"106. The respondent asserted that a witness was low functioning and also 
asserted that Ewing liked to 'watch autism abuse pornography.' 
 
"107. At the disciplinary hearing, the respondent testified that the jury observed 
the witness' testimony and it was clear from how she presented that the witness was low-
functioning. 
 
"108. Additionally, Shawna Miller, the Jackson County Attorney testified at the 
respondent's disciplinary hearing regarding whether the witness was low functioning. 
Specifically, Ms. Miller testified regarding her experience with the witness during 
Ewing's preliminary hearing, as follows: 
 
'A. One thing[]that sticks out to me is I conducted the preliminary hearing and I 
questioned her on the stand, and, 'um, one thing in particular is right when I 
got to kind of the very, very difficult part of her testimony where we had to 
start talking about penetration, she kind of froze and seemed to just not 
respond for—it was probably only a few seconds, but it seemed like a long 
time. 
 
'And at some point later there was discussion that—I think it was on her 
cross-examination by defense she explained that she had disassociated. That 
was kind of her way of coping with trauma and she had done that because 
she was being asked to remember something that was extremely traumatic 
for her. So that was one of the reasons that they brought that up. 
 
'Another thing that I would just note in dealing with her is that, 'um, I almost 
had to examine her like I would examine a young child. Had to use very 
simple terms. She was very easily confused by the questions. We had to ask 
very simple questions. It's kind of hard to articulate other than to say that I 
had to ask her questions like I would a very young child on the stand, not 
somebody who was in her early twenties, late teens. 
 
 
24 
 
'Q. And does she have a fidgeting issue? 
 
'A. She does, yeah, 'um . . . 
 
'Q. Is it—is it one of those that—the Supreme Court Justice Hand, [sic] 
"pornography, you know it when you see it," but is it one of those that when 
you see it you realize there's some mental issues going on there? Just— 
 
'A. Yeah. 
 
'Q. Yeah. And— 
 
'A. It's pretty evident. 
 
'Q. And can you just describe it a little bit, because one of the issues we have is 
not making the record— 
 
'A. Right. 
 
'Q. —so I apologize, and I hope JM isn't—doesn't need to be embarrassed about 
any of this, but we—we've got to put it in this record so we've got it, so . . . 
 
'A. It would just go back to, you know, she was very childlike, and just having 
to ask her questions as you would a young child. Very simple words. Simple 
questions. Breakdown your questions into very simple, small answers. You 
could tell that she—you could tell that she was very traumatized obviously 
with the disassociation that I described. She acted as a young child would on 
the stand. You mentioned fidgeting, just kind of keeping her attention, 
keeping her focused was a little bit of a challenge, too.' 
 
Miller's testimony, however, was not evidence that was presented to the jury in the 
underlying jury trial. 
 
 
25 
 
"Victimized on Social Media and Looking for Attention 
 
"109. In her closing argument, the respondent argued: 
 
'. . . [t]he delay in the reporting is in part because of what we saw in this 
courtroom, because women who have been sexually assaulted do not want to be 
cross-examined on it. They do not want to tell well-intending but still strange 
people to them about a sexual experience. They do not want to be victimized on 
social media by the defendant's friends or family. They do not want to have the 
embarrassment, the humiliation that these young women have had to know.' 
 
"110. The respondent also argued: 
 
'. . . Are these gals looking for attention? The only attention they've got in this 
case is negative attention. [They] both were described as passive, shy. They're 
not looking for attention. There's pictures of [J.M.'s] vagina put into evidence. 
Anybody want that attention? Dr. Allison talked to you about women do not 
report because they don't want the attention. This is a scarlet letter, is what this 
case is about, and the scarlet letter is simply this, that these three women have 
been branded. In the public and social media they've been branded, and nobody 
seeks out that type of attention. The ugliness that has been directed towards these 
women can be taken into consideration for you when you decide whether or not 
you believe their testimony.' 
 
"111. There was no evidence presented at trial that M.W. or J.M. were victimized 
on social media by Ewing's friends or family. Further, during the testimony of the Chief 
Detective of the Jackson County Sheriff's Office, the district court sustained an objection 
to the respondent's question about contact between M.W. and Ewing's family. The district 
court ruled that Ewing's family's behavior toward M.W. was irrelevant to the material 
issues at trial. 
 
 
26 
 
"If There was Sex It was Nonconsensual 
 
"112. During closing argument, the respondent also stated that 'in [M.W.'s] case 
the defendant acknowledges that they had sex. It's different from [J.M.'s], but in [M.W.'s] 
case the defendant is saying it was consensual. So with [J.M.] you have to decide whether 
they had sex or not. If they did, it could not have been consensual.' 
 
"113. The respondent's statement boils down to if the jury concluded that Ewing 
and J.M. had sexual contact, then the sexual contact was nonconsensual. While Ewing 
did not assert consent as a defense, he maintained that he could not recall the events of 
the night in question. 
 
"Watching Pornography on Mobile Phone and Autism Abuse 
 
"114. During the final moments of the respondent's initial closing argument, the 
respondent reminded the jury that Ewing's mobile phone had been seized and examined. 
The respondent then stated, '[n]ow, folks, while the defense is telling you that the 
defendant did not watch those videos[,] know this, the evidence shows differently.' 
 
"115. Agent Malick testified before the jury that he could not say with any 
certainty 'what section of the video was watch[ed] or was not watched.' Also, Agent 
Malick testified that the data from the mobile phone suggested that only portions of the 
videos were watched and the data from the mobile phone did not support a conclusion 
that Ewing watched the videos in their entirety in one sitting. 
 
"116. During the rebuttal portion of her closing argument, the respondent stated, 
'now, the defense says this is all smoke. It's not smoke, it's evidence of an attitude of 
what—of how you treat women. . . . Autism abuse, yes, he does.' 
 
"117. In August 2018, after Ewing filed his brief, but while his appeal was still 
pending, Ewing's mother, W.E., filed a disciplinary complaint against the respondent. 
 
 
27 
 
"118. The Court of Appeals reversed Ewing's convictions. The Court of Appeals 
based the reversal on cumulative error. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district 
court's erred in admitting State's Exhibit 66 (a DVD containing a compilation of 
pornographic videos) into evidence. In addition, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
respondent engaged in prosecutorial error (not misconduct), that the respondent failed to 
show that the cumulative error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that Ewing 
was denied a fair trial. The Court of Appeals remanded the cases for a new trial. The 
Supreme Court denied the State's petition for review.  
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
"119. Based on the above findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a 
matter of law that the respondent violated Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 
(competence), 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions), 3.3 (candor to the tribunal), 3.4 
(fairness to opposing party and counsel), 8.1 (disciplinary matters), and 8.4 (professional 
misconduct), as detailed below. 
 
"Prosecution of Dana Chandler 
 
"Protection from Abuse Order 
 
"120. In the K.S.A. 60-455 motion filed pretrial, the respondent sought 
permission to offer evidence of the motion for immediate restraining order filed in 
October, 1998. In the K.S.A. 60-455 motion, the respondent did not seek permission to 
admit evidence of an order restraining Chandler from contacting M.S.  
 
"121. Because the respondent accurately described the evidence in the K.S.A. 60-
455 motion, because in that motion the respondent did not seek to introduce evidence of 
an order restraining Chandler, and because the respondent never saw the order, the 
hearing panel concludes that, when the respondent filed the motion to admit K.S.A. 60-
455 evidence, the respondent knew that she had no evidence to establish that the district 
court granted M.S.'s motion for an immediate restraining order. 
 
 
28 
 
"122. Again, in her opening statement, the respondent accurately acknowledged 
that M.S. filed a motion for an immediate restraining order in October, 1998. Because the 
respondent accurately described the evidence regarding M.S.'s 1998 motion for an 
immediate restraining order in her opening statement, the hearing panel concludes that 
the respondent knew, at the outset of the trial, just as she knew when she filed the K.S.A. 
60-455 motion, she had no evidence that the district court granted M.S.'s motion for an 
immediate restraining order. 
 
"123. Despite that knowledge, during her redirect-examination of Sergeant Volle 
during Chandler's jury trial, the respondent asked him whether M.S. had a protection 
from abuse order in place against Chandler. While Sergeant Volle testified that M.S. did 
have a protection from abuse order protecting him from Chandler on redirect-
examination, he later recanted that testimony and indicated that he could not recall 
whether it was a request for an order or an actual order.  
 
"124. At the conclusion of Sergeant Volle's trial testimony, there was no 
evidence presented on which the respondent could rely to argue that M.S. obtained any 
type of order restraining Chandler and that Chandler violated such an order. Further, 
during the balance of the jury trial, the respondent presented no other evidence regarding 
the existence of any type of restraining order.  
 
"125. Relying on Sergeant Volle's redirect trial testimony—in separate 
proceedings including (a) her closing argument before the jury, (b) in the State's initial 
appellate brief, (c) during oral argument before the Supreme Court, (d) in her written 
response to the disciplinary complaint, and (e) in her sworn statement made during the 
disciplinary investigation—the respondent falsely asserted that M.S. had a protection 
from abuse order in place at the time M.S. and K.H. were murdered. 
 
"126. The Supreme Court concluded that the respondent's false statement in 
closing argument that M.S. had a protection from abuse order in place at the time of the 
murders was prosecutorial misconduct. Determining whether a prosecutor committed 
error or misconduct involves a different analysis than determining whether a prosecutor 
violated the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. However, a review of the law in this 
area is helpful. 
 
29 
 
 
"127. In State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88 (2016), the Supreme Court modified the 
analysis employed when considering prosecutorial error and prosecutorial misconduct. 
The Supreme Court articulated a two-step analysis when evaluating claims of reversible 
prosecutorial error. 
 
'Appellate courts will continue to employ a two-step process to evaluate claims of 
prosecutorial error. These two steps can and should be simply described as error 
and prejudice. To determine whether prosecutorial error has occurred, the 
appellate court must decide whether the prosecutorial acts complained of fall 
outside the wide latitude afforded prosecutors to conduct the State's case and 
attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner that does not offend the defendant's 
constitutional right to a fair trial. If error is found, the appellate court must next 
determine whether the error prejudiced the defendant's due process rights to a fair 
trial.' Id. at 109.  
 
If there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the guilty verdict, then 
the error is harmless. The Supreme Court defined prosecutorial misconduct as 
prosecutorial error done with a level of culpability exceeding mere negligence. Id. at 114. 
 
"128. The distinction between prosecutorial error and prosecutorial misconduct 
as well as the impact of the conduct on the verdict are crucial when deciding whether a 
criminal case will be upheld or reversed. Those considerations are, likewise, relevant 
when considering whether the same conduct amounts to professional misconduct under 
the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. When a prosecutor commits error or engages 
in misconduct, whether the prosecutor acted negligently, with knowledge, or intentionally 
is an important consideration.  
 
"129. Generally, the respondent defended this allegation by asserting that she 
made a mistake. To that end, the respondent put forth a number of arguments in an 
attempt to establish that her false statements were not made knowingly or intentionally.  
 
"130. First, the respondent asserted that she did not recall Sergeant Volle's 
testimony on recross-examination. Competent representation of the State required the 
 
30 
 
respondent to be familiar with all the evidence presented to the jury, including the 
evidence elicited during the examination by opposing counsel.  
 
"131. Second, the respondent argued that she knew an order existed because 
unnamed family members of the victims told her and Sergeant Volle so. The respondent's 
position appeared to be that because she believed that the order existed, she had a 
reasonable basis for arguing that a restraining order was in effect to the jury. The 
respondent's belief, even a sincere belief, is not a replacement for evidence in any case 
and that is particularly true in a murder trial. The hearing panel is troubled by the 
respondent's failure to understand that her belief was an insufficient basis for her 
argument that a restraining order was in place at the time of the murders and that 
Chandler violated the order. 
 
"132. Third, at oral argument in Chandler's appeal and to some extent during the 
disciplinary hearing, the respondent argued that while there was no protection from abuse 
order in place at the time of the murders, there was a restraining order in place and the 
terms protection from abuse order, restraining order, protective order, etc., are 
interchangeable. 
 
"133. Protection from abuse orders, protection from stalking orders, restraining 
orders, protective orders, bond provisions, probation provisions, and temporary orders in 
divorce cases are all governed by separate statutory provisions, are obtained in different 
ways, and are available in different circumstances. Finally, each type of restrictive order 
carries with it a different implication. For example, in divorce cases, it is standard to 
obtain an initial ex parte order restricting each party from bothering the other. That type 
of order was issued in M.S. and Chandler's divorce case and continued in effect until the 
divorce was granted on March 5, 1998. On the other hand, a protection from abuse order 
can be issued only if a district court determines that a petitioning party has satisfied the 
statutory requirements of K.S.A. 60-3101, et seq. 
 
"134. In support of her argument, the respondent elicited testimony from other 
witnesses who agreed that the terms are interchangeable. The respondent's argument in 
this regard is fallacious—just because others also believe it is proper to use 'PFA' to 
describe a variety of different types of restrictive orders does not make it proper to do so. 
 
31 
 
 
"135. The hearing panel concludes that regardless of whether prosecutors 
generally use the term 'PFA' interchangeably with other terms, the respondent's 
statements in her closing argument of Chandler's jury trial, during the oral argument, and 
in the disciplinary investigation that a protection from abuse order was in place at the 
time of the murders and that Chandler violated the order was improper. The respondent 
should not have argued that there was any type of order in place without seeing or 
presenting the order.  
 
"136. Next, the respondent testified that it was not her practice to introduce 
restraining orders into evidence. The respondent's testimony is, at best, disingenuous. 
 
a. 
In the K.S.A. 60-455 motion, the respondent specifically sought permission 
to admit evidence that M.S. and Chandler's daughter obtained a protection from 
abuse order against Chandler. 
 
b. 
And, in her questioning of Sergeant Volle at trial, the respondent 
specifically asked, on redirect examination, whether M.S. obtained a protection 
from abuse order against Chandler.  
 
c. 
Likewise, during closing argument, the respondent did not argue only 
Chandler's conduct which served as the basis for M.S.'s motion for an immediate 
restraining order, the respondent also argued that M.S. obtained a protection from 
abuse order and the order did not stop Chandler.  
 
It is because the respondent offered evidence and argument about a protection from abuse 
order that this discussion is necessary. 
 
"137. In addition to the false statement made to the jury and to the Supreme 
Court, during the respondent's sworn statement made during the disciplinary 
investigation, she also made false statements.  
 
 
32 
 
"138. During the disciplinary hearing, the respondent admitted that her sworn 
statement included misstatements. The hearing panel appreciates the respondent's 
admission on cross-examination that her sworn statement includes misstatements. 
However, the respondent's testimony that during the sworn statement she 'misspoke,' that 
she 'was wrong,' and that her 'mistake was not asking to look at the file' ring hollow when 
considering that the statement was made under oath, during a disciplinary investigation, 
and only two months after the Supreme Court overturned Chandler's two premeditated 
murder convictions based on the respondent's misconduct.  
 
"139. Further, the record is void of any evidence that the respondent took steps to 
correct the respondent's untrue statements made during the sworn statement. Importantly, 
after the sworn statement was reduced to writing, the respondent reviewed the sworn 
statement and offered an errata sheet of corrections.  
 
"140. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent took an oath to tell the 
truth when she gave the sworn statement and she failed to do so and that occurred in a 
disciplinary investigation. 
 
"KRPC 1.1 
 
"141. Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. KRPC 1.1. 
'Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' Id. The hearing panel recognizes 
the respondent's extensive preparation for the murder trial. The respondent, however, 
admitted before the Supreme Court during oral argument and at the disciplinary hearing 
that she did not recall Sergeant Volle's testimony on recross-examination. The hearing 
panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.1 by not noting that Sergeant Volle 
changed his testimony. The respondent's failure to thoroughly note the change in 
testimony led to the respondent improperly relying on Sergeant Volle's redirect-
examination in closing argument. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated KRPC 1.1.  
 
 
33 
 
"KRPC 3.3(a)(1) 
 
"142. 'A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the 
tribunal by the lawyer.' KRPC 3.3(a)(1). In Kansas, '[a] matter is material if it is one to 
which a reasonable man would attach importance in determining his choice of action in 
the transaction in question.' Griffith v. Byers Construction Co., 212 Kan. 65, 73, 510 P.2d 
198 (1973).  
 
"143. The respondent violated this rule in three separate ways.  
 
a. 
First, the respondent intentionally made a false statement of material fact to 
the district court when she argued to the jury during closing arguments that M.S. 
sought and obtained a protection from abuse order and that Chandler violated the 
protection from abuse order. The respondent exacerbated the misconduct by 
intentionally including false information in the slides that she displayed during 
closing argument. Specifically, the respondent's slide falsely stated:  'How Else 
Do We Know the Defendant is Guilty [M.S.] GOT A PROTECTION FROM 
ABUSE COURT ORDER KEEPING DEFENDANT AWAY FROM HIM IN 
1998' and 'How Else Do We Know the Defendant is Guilty THE PFA DID NOT 
STOP DEFENDANT . . .'  
 
b. 
Second, on appeal, the respondent likewise made a false statement of 
material fact to the Supreme Court when she made similar statements in the 
State's initial brief.  
 
 
c. 
Finally, the respondent made a false statement to the Supreme Court during 
oral argument when she falsely argued that evidence was introduced at trial to 
support her claim that a restraining order was in effect at the time of the murders.  
 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent intentionally made the false statements 
of material fact to the district court and Supreme Court, in violation of KRPC 3.3(a)(1). 
 
 
34 
 
"KRPC 3.4(e) 
 
"144. 'A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter . . . that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.' KRPC 3.4(e). In her oral closing statement and the 
slide show that accompanied it, the respondent argued that M.S. obtained a protection 
from abuse order and Chandler violated that order. The only evidence that the respondent 
sought permission to introduce regarding this came in the form of Sergeant Volle's 
testimony. On recross-examination, Sergeant Volle effectively recanted his statement that 
an order had been issued when he stated in response to a question by defense counsel that 
he could not recall whether an order was issued or whether only an application for an 
order was made. Because the respondent's argument that a restraining order existed at the 
time of the murders and that Chandler violated the restraining order was not based on any 
evidence admitted before the jury, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
violated KRPC 3.4(e). 
 
"KRPC 8.1 
 
"145. Lawyers must cooperate in disciplinary investigations. KRPC 8.1(a) 
provides that 'a lawyer in connection with a . . . disciplinary matter, shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of material fact.' The respondent violated KRPC 8.1 in two ways.  
 
"146. First, in the respondent's written response to the initial complaint, the 
respondent stated that Sergeant Volle 'testified under oath that [M.S.] had received a 
protection from abuse order against the defendant in October of 1998.' However, 
Sergeant Volle backtracked on his statement elicited during redirect-examination when 
opposing counsel asked him, on recross-examination, specifically whether an order had 
been issued or just that a motion had been filed and Sergeant Volle testified that he could 
not recall. Further, it is undisputed that M.S. never petitioned for nor obtained a 
protection from abuse order restricting Chandler.  
 
"147. In the respondent's sworn statement, she made similar statements about the 
existence of a protection from abuse order and that the order remained in effect at the 
time of the murders. The respondent's violation of this rule is particularly egregious in 
light of the timing of the sworn statement. Just months prior to the sworn statement, the 
 
35 
 
Supreme Court concluded that the respondent engaged in prosecutorial misconduct and 
reversed Chandler's two convictions of premeditated murder based on that misconduct.  
 
"148. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent intentionally made false 
statements of material fact in the disciplinary investigation in violation of KRPC 8.1(a).  
 
"KRPC 8.4(c) 
 
"149. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' KRPC 8.4(c). The respondent 
engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when she argued before the jury that M.S. 
sought and obtained a protection from abuse order and that Chandler violated the 
protection from abuse order. The respondent repeated that dishonest conduct when she 
included similar statements in the State's initial appellate brief, during oral argument, in 
her written response to the initial complaint in the disciplinary investigation, and during 
the sworn statement. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
KRPC 8.4(c).  
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"150. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The Supreme Court concluded 
that the respondent's statement in closing argument that M.S. obtained a protection from 
abuse order and that Chandler violated the protection from abuse order was prosecutorial 
misconduct in that it was error 'done with a level of culpability exceeding mere 
negligence.' Further, in reversing Chandler's murder convictions, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the respondent's misconduct prejudiced Chandler's right to a fair trial 
because there was a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the guilty verdict. 
Because the respondent's misconduct prejudiced Chandler's right to a fair trial, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d).  
 
 
36 
 
"Five Minute Phone Call 
 
"151. Only M.S. and Chandler—and anyone they told—would know what was 
said during the five-minute phone call. M.S. is not available to testify, Chandler opted not 
to testify, which was her Constitutional right, and there appears to be no evidence that 
either M.S. or Chandler told anyone else what was discussed during that telephone call. 
As a result, during the jury trial, the respondent did not and could not present any 
evidence as to the substance of the conversation.  
 
"152. Even though the respondent did not have any evidence as to what was 
discussed during the five-minute phone call, in her opening statement the respondent 
asserted that during that call M.S. told Chandler that he was engaged to K.H. and implied 
that because the call occurred two days before the murders and because M.S. feared 
Chandler's reaction to his engagement, the call was the motivation for the murders. 
 
"153. The evidence that the respondent introduced at trial directly contradicted 
that statement. The respondent introduced evidence, through T.S., that M.S. told 
Chandler four to six weeks before the murders that he was going to marry K.H. during 
the 'breezeway' conversation. 
 
"154. Again, in closing argument, without any evidence to support the argument, 
the respondent asserted that during the five-minute phone call, M.S. told Chandler that he 
was engaged to marry K.H. and the respondent implied that news of the engagement 
prompted Chandler to travel to Kansas and murder M.S. and K.H. two days later.  
 
"155. During oral argument, the respondent told the Supreme Court that 'We 
know exactly what happened during that phone call.' The respondent went on to explain 
that the testimony of T.S. establishes that M.S. told Chandler during the five-minute 
phone call that he was engaged [to] marry K.H. The respondent's arguments to the 
Supreme Court misstate the evidence presented to the jury. T.S.'s testimony centered 
around the 'breezeway' conversation which occurred four to six weeks prior to the 
murders. 
 
 
37 
 
"156. The hearing panel finds, as the Supreme Court concluded, that there was no 
evidence presented at Chandler's jury trial regarding the substance of the conversation 
that occurred during the five-minute phone call between M.S. and Chandler on July 5, 
2002. Likewise, the hearing panel concludes that it was improper for the respondent to 
argue that Chandler learned of the engagement in the five-minute phone call and then 
imply that the news of the engagement prompted Chandler to travel to Kansas and 
murder M.S. and K.H. two days later. 
 
"KRPC 3.1 
 
"157. 'A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an 
issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.' KRPC 3.1. The 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.1 before the district court 
and the Supreme Court. First, the respondent's assertions in her opening statement and in 
her closing argument that Chandler learned of M.S.'s plans to marry K.H. during the five-
minute phone call and the respondent's implication that that knowledge prompted 
Chandler to travel to Topeka and kill M.S. and K.H., are not based on any evidence and 
are therefore frivolous. Also, the respondent also violated KRPC 3.1 during the oral 
argument before the Supreme Court. There, the respondent stated, '[w]e know exactly 
what happened during that phone call.' There is no basis for the respondent's statement to 
the Supreme Court. The respondent's belief in a theory of the case is not evidence. 
Because the respondent knew that she did not have a basis for making the assertions, the 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent intentionally violated KRPC 3.1 during the 
opening statement and closing argument of the jury trial and during the oral argument 
before the Supreme Court.  
 
"KRPC 3.4(e) 
 
"158. 'A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter . . . that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.['] KRPC 3.4(e). The respondent's assertion that 
Chandler learned of M.S. and K.H.'s plans to marry during the five-minute phone call and 
the implication that that knowledge prompted Chandler to travel to Topeka and kill M.S. 
and K.H. in the respondent's opening statement and closing argument, were not supported 
by admissible evidence. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
 
38 
 
violated KRPC 3.4(e) when she made assertions in her opening statement and closing 
argument that were not supported by admissible evidence. 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"159. KRPC 8.4(d) provides that '[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
. . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' The respondent 
engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when she asserted 
during her opening statement and closing argument, without any evidence, that Chandler 
learned that M.S. and K.H. planned to marry during the five-minute phone call. She then 
implied that that knowledge prompted Chandler to travel to Topeka and kill M.S. and 
K.H. two days later without any evidence. The respondent's unsupported statements made 
it appear to the jury that this part of the prosecution's theory of the case was supported by 
evidence when it was not. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
violated KRPC 8.4(d).  
 
"Escape Route Through Nebraska 
 
"160. The respondent's assertion in her opening statement that Chandler's actual 
route after the murders took her through Nebraska was not based on any evidence. 
Rather, the respondent's statement was based on a theory of the case that the respondent 
discussed with Sergeant Volle pretrial. While the respondent believed Sergeant Volle's 
theory on this issue to be true, the respondent lacked any evidence to prove the theory. 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's statement during her opening statement 
was improper because she had no evidence, only a theory, that Chandler 'drove directly 
up to Nebraska. . . .' 
 
"161. Likewise, the hearing panel finds that the respondent's assertion in her 
closing argument during Chandler's jury trial that Chandler sought to 'get out of the state' 
after the murders lacked evidentiary support. The statement was improper and violated 
the district court's ruling sustaining defense counsel's previous objection.  
 
"162. The hearing panel concludes that at the time of the trial, the respondent 
knew she did not have any admissible evidence of the Nebraska exit theory. 
 
39 
 
 
"KRPC 3.4(e) 
 
"163. 'A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter . . . that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.['] KRPC 3.4(e). The respondent's statements in 
opening and arguments in closing regarding the Nebraska exit theory were not supported 
by evidence admitted at trial. Because the respondent made statements not supported by 
admissible evidence, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent, again, intentionally 
violated KRPC 3.4(e). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"164. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when she made statements 
during her opening statement and her closing argument that Chandler traveled through 
Nebraska after killing M.S. and K.H. without evidence of such. The respondent's 
unsupported statements made it appear to the jury that this 'theory' was supported by 
evidence when it was not. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
violated KRPC 8.4(d).  
 
"Internet Searches 
 
"165. When the respondent stated during opening statements that Agent Kite 
would testify that Chandler 'accessed articles on CJ Online that dealt with how to defend 
against murder charges and articles that dealt with sentencing in murder charges,' the 
respondent knew that she had no evidence to support the statement. 
 
"166. Agent Kite's reports contained no references to Internet searches about how 
to defend against murder charges or sentencing in murder cases. Agent Kite did not tell 
the respondent that Chandler conducted such searches.  
 
"167. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent did not have a good faith 
basis to state during opening statements that Chandler accessed articles and searched the 
 
40 
 
Internet looking for articles about defending against murder charges and sentencing in 
murder cases.  
 
"168. The hearing panel is particularly troubled by this statement in light of the 
fact that the respondent did not ask Agent Kite any questions during his trial testimony 
about Chandler accessing articles and conducting Internet searches about how to defend 
against murder charges and articles addressing sentencing in murder cases. 
 
"KRPC 3.4(e) 
 
"169. 'A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter . . . that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.['] KRPC 3.4(e). The respondent's statements in her 
opening statement, that Agent Kite would testify that Chandler searched the Internet on 
how to defend against murder charges and on sentencing in murder charges, was not 
supported by admissible evidence. Because the respondent's statement in her opening 
statement were not supported by admissible evidence, the hearing panel concludes that 
the respondent, again, violated KRPC 3.4(e). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"170. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when she stated, in her 
opening statement, that Agent Kite would testify that Chandler conducted Internet 
searches on how to defend against murder charges and sentencing in murder charges was 
not supported by any evidence before the jury. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes 
that the respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in 
violation of KRPC 8.4(d).  
 
"Chandler Thinks She is Smarter 
 
"171. Chandler's former employer's testimony that Chandler had 'probably above 
average' intelligence provided insufficient evidence to support the respondent's argument 
that Chandler thought that she was smarter than the police and smarter than the jury. The 
 
41 
 
respondent had no evidence to support the statements that Chandler thought that she was 
smarter than the police and smarter than the jury. Further, the comments were designed to 
inflame the jury. Through those comments, the respondent suggested that the jury should 
be personally affronted by the 'thoughts' the respondent attributed to Chandler.  
 
"172. The hearing panel finds that the respondent's comments that Chandler 
thought that she was smarter than the police and smarter than the jury were not based on 
the evidence. Moreover, the hearing panel concludes that the statements were improper 
and constitute violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
"KRPC 3.4(e) 
 
"173. 'A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter . . . that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.['] KRPC 3.4(e). In closing, the respondent's argument 
that Chandler had 'high intelligence,' that Chandler thought that she was smarter than the 
police, and that Chandler thought that she was smarter than the jury was not based on 
sufficient evidence admitted before the jury. Because the respondent's statement in her 
closing argument was not supported by sufficient admissible evidence, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent, again, violated KRPC 3.4(e). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"174. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when she argued that 
Chandler thought that she was smarter than the police and smarter than the jury. The 
respondent's purpose in making this statement was to inflame the jury—to cause the jury 
members to be personally affronted by Chandler's thoughts. The hearing panel concludes 
that the respondent's closing commentary about Chandler's thoughts was prejudicial to 
the administration of justice, in violation of KRPC 8.4(d).  
 
 
42 
 
"Reference to S.R. in Gallery 
 
"175. The respondent violated the district court's clear order prohibiting 
references to members of the gallery during closing argument.  
 
"176. The respondent's violation of the district court's order was compounded at 
oral argument when the respondent argued that because she did not ask anyone in the 
gallery to stand up, she did not violate the order. The respondent failed to recognize that 
the district court's order was not limited to asking individuals in the gallery to stand up, as 
the district court also ordered, 'Do not do that in this case. I don't want references to folks 
here at all.'  
 
"177. While the respondent generally acknowledged that she violated the district 
court's order during her testimony at the disciplinary hearing, the respondent's admission 
was tempered, 'I admit today it was wrong. I didn't at the time believe that I was violating 
the Court's order. My understanding of the Court's motion in limine, or pretrial order, was 
that I was to not have anybody stand. I still had that belief at oral argument. But I 
shouldn't have commented on it. You just take those looks and go on would have been 
the better approach.' 
 
"178. The respondent's reference to her understanding of the district court's 
pretrial order is curious. The meaning of the district court's order is plain. The district 
court ordered the parties to not refer to anyone in the gallery and the respondent referred 
to a person in the gallery. 
 
"KRPC 3.4(c) 
 
"179. KRPC 3.4(c) provides that '[a] lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an 
obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion 
that no valid obligation exists.' The respondent knowingly disobeyed an order of the 
district court when she stated during closing argument that she was 'getting a look from' 
S.R. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.4(c).  
 
 
43 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"180. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in 
conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice when she pointed out S.R. in 
the gallery, in violation of the district court's order, during closing arguments. By 
pointing out S.R. and stating that S.R. was giving the respondent a look, the respondent 
attempted to apply additional weight to the recorded conversation between Chandler and 
her sister. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's conduct in her closing 
argument was prejudicial to the administration of justice. As such, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d).  
 
"Robbing the Children of Their Father 
 
"181. The respondent's statement that Chandler 'robbed her own children of their 
father and his fiancé [sic]' is improper. It is well-settled law that it is improper for a 
prosecutor in closing argument to comment on the impact the crime had on the victim's 
family. Such comments are not relevant to prove the case, the comments divert the jury's 
attention from deciding the case on the evidence, and the comments appeal to the jury's 
sympathy for the victim's family. See State v. Holt, 300 Kan. 985, 992, 336 P.3d 312 
(2014) (improper for a prosecutor to comment during a murder trial that there is a 9-year-
old and a newborn without a father) and State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 640-41, 44 P.3d 
466 (2002) (improper for a prosecutor to urge the jury to think about how the murder 
victim's mother must have felt on Mother's Day).  
 
"182. The hearing panel is likewise troubled by the respondent's testimony at the 
sworn statement given during the disciplinary investigation. There, the respondent 
testified that because her statement that Chandler 'robbed her children of their father' was 
factual, it was appropriate for closing argument. As an experienced prosecutor, the 
respondent should be well aware of the law on this point. 
 
 
44 
 
"183. Finally, the respondent's testimony before the hearing panel also does not 
establish that the respondent understands why this comment is misconduct. At the 
disciplinary hearing, without acknowledging the wrongful nature of the statement, the 
respondent implied that it was unplanned and resulted from the 'heat of the moment.' 
 
"184. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's statement that Chandler 
robbed her own children of their father and his fiancé [sic], was not relevant to prove that 
Chandler killed M.S. and K.H., was designed to divert the jury's attention from deciding 
the case on the evidence, and appealed to the jury's sympathy for the victim's family. 
 
"KRPC 1.1 
 
"185. Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. KRPC 1.1. 
'Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' Id. It is well settled that 
prosecutors may not comment on the impact of a crime on the crime victim or the crime 
victim's family. The respondent's statement during closing argument that Chandler 
robbed her children of their father and his fiancé [sic] was improper and evidenced a lack 
of competence. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
KRPC 1.1.  
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"186. KRPC 8.4(d) provides that '[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
. . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice 
when she argued to the jury the impact the crime had on the victim's family. The hearing 
panel concludes that the respondent's statement in this regard was an attempt to elicit the 
sympathy of the jury and divert the attention of the jury and was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, in violation of KRPC 8.4(d).  
 
 
45 
 
"Prosecution of Jacob Ewing 
 
"Touch DNA 
 
187. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's argument to the jury, in 
her closing argument, that the only way Ewing's DNA could be found on the waistband 
of J.M.'s panties was if Ewing took off J.M.'s panties was contrary to the evidence. 
Specifically, the respondent's argument was contrary to the evidence provided by the 
respondent's expert, Rachel White. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's 
statement was improper. 
 
"KRPC 3.4(e) 
 
"188. 'A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter . . . that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.['] KRPC 3.4(e). In the respondent's closing argument 
in Ewing's jury trial, the respondent made several statements that were not supported by 
the evidence. The respondent's statement that the only way Ewing's DNA could be found 
on the waistband of J.M.'s panties was if Ewing took off J.M.'s panties was not supported 
by the evidence. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) 
when she argued that the only way Ewing's DNA could be found on the waistband of 
J.M.'s panties was if Ewing took off J.M.'s panties. 
 
"Low-Functioning Young Woman 
 
"189. There was no evidence introduced at trial that the witness was low-
functioning or autistic. The respondent has a duty to refrain from making improper, 
leading, inflammatory, or irrelevant statements to the jury and must guard against 
appealing to jurors' sympathies or prejudices. State v. Holt, 300 Kan. 985, 992, 336 P.3d 
312 (2014).  
 
"190. The respondent argued that it was clear from the witness' appearance that 
she was low functioning. However, in order for the respondent to argue that the witness  
 
46 
 
was low-functioning, the respondent was required to present evidence that the witness 
was low-functioning. The respondent's beliefs, assumptions, and conclusions are not 
evidence.  
 
"191. The respondent's argument that the witness was low-functioning combined 
with the respondent's argument that Ewing liked to watch autism pornography were 
improperly designed to inflame the passions of the jury. 
 
"KRPC 3.4(e) 
 
"192. 'A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter . . . that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.['] KRPC 3.4(e). In the respondent's closing argument 
in Ewing's jury trial, the respondent made several statements that were not supported by 
the evidence. There was no evidence introduced at trial that the witness was low-
functioning or autistic. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 
3.4(e) when she argued that the witness was low-functioning without first introducing 
evidence to support the argument. 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"193. KRPC 8.4(d) provides that '[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
. . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice 
when she made statements in her closing argument that were designed to inflame the 
jury's passions and prejudices and contributed to the cumulative error resulting in the 
reversal of Ewing's convictions. The respondent's purpose in arguing that a witness was 
low functioning and that Ewing liked to watch autism pornography was to inflame the 
jury. The hearing panel concludes that the respondent's statement that the witness was 
low-functioning was designed to inflame the jury and generate sympathy for the victims, 
in violation of KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
 
47 
 
"Victimized on Social Media and Looking for Attention 
 
"194. While the respondent argued that J.M. and M.W. were attacked on social 
media by Ewing's friends and family, the respondent presented no evidence to the jury to 
support those arguments. On appeal, the respondent admitted there was no evidence to 
support her comments made during closing argument that the women were branded with 
the scarlet letter and that there was ugliness directed to the women. The hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent's statements in this regard were designed solely to inflame 
the jury's passions and prejudices.  
 
"KRPC 3.4(e) 
 
"195. 'A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter . . . that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.['] KRPC 3.4(e). In the respondent's closing argument 
in Ewing's jury trial, the respondent made several statements that were not supported by 
the evidence. The respondent's statement that J.M. and M.W. were attacked on social 
media by Ewing's friends and family was not supported by the evidence. Because the 
respondent's statement that J.M. and M.W. were attacked on social media by Ewing's 
friend[s] and family was not supported by evidence, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"196. KRPC 8.4(d) provides that '[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
. . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice 
when she made statements in her closing argument that were designed to inflame the 
jury's passions and prejudices and contributed to the cumulative error resulting in the 
reversal of Ewing's convictions. Likewise, when the respondent argued that J.M. and 
M.W. were attacked by Ewing's friends and family, the respondent sought to produce 
sympathy for the victims and to inflame the jury's passions and prejudices. The 
respondent's statement that J.M. and M.W. were attacked by Ewing's friends and family 
was designed to inflame the jury and generate sympathy for the victims, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
48 
 
 
"If There was Sex It was Nonconsensual 
 
"197. The respondent's argument during closing that if Ewing had sex with J.M. 
then it could not have been consensual misstated the evidence. The evidence presented 
was contradictory and the conclusion that the respondent made regarding the conflicting 
evidence was improper.  
 
"KRPC 3.4(e) 
 
"198. 'A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter . . . that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.['] KRPC 3.4(e). In the respondent's closing argument 
in Ewing's jury trial, the respondent made several statements that were not supported by 
the evidence. The respondent's argument during closing that if Ewing had sex with J.M. it 
was [non]consensual misstated conflicting evidence and was improper. Because the 
respondent's statement lacked evidentiary support, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e). 
 
"Watching Pornography on Mobile Phone and Autism Abuse 
 
"199. The respondent's statement, during the final moments of her initial closing 
argument, that Ewing's mobile phone had been seized and examined and that 'while the 
defense is telling you that the defendant did not watch those videos[,] know this, the 
evidence shows differently,' misstates the evidence presented to the jury.  
 
"200. During the rebuttal portion of her closing argument, the respondent again 
misstated the evidence when she said 'now, the defense says this is all smoke. It's not 
smoke, it's evidence of an attitude of what—of how you treat women. . . . Autism abuse, 
yes, he does.' Because the respondent did not present evidence to the jury that Ewing 
abused anyone with autism, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent's statement 
was improper. 
 
 
49 
 
"KRPC 3.4(e) 
 
"201. 'A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter . . . that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.['] KRPC 3.4(e). In the respondent's closing argument 
in Ewing's jury trial, the respondent made several statements that were not supported by 
the evidence. The respondent's statement that [Ewing] abused a person with autism was 
not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) in this regard. 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
"202. KRPC 8.4(d) provides that '[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
. . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). 
The respondent engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice 
when she made statements in her closing argument that were designed to inflame the 
jury's passions and prejudices and contributed to the cumulative error resulting in the 
reversal of Ewing's convictions. In the rebuttal portion of her closing argument, the 
respondent's statement that Ewing engaged in the abuse of a person with autism served 
no purpose other than to inflame the jury and generate sympathy for the victims. As such, 
the hearing panel concludes that the respondent's statement was designed to inflame the 
jury and generate sympathy for the victims, in violation of KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
"203. In making a recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel considered 
the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors to be 
considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury 
caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.  
 
 
50 
 
"204. Duty Violated. The respondent violated her duty to the public to maintain 
her personal integrity. The respondent also violated her duty to the public, to the legal 
profession, and the legal system to refrain from conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.  
 
"205. Mental State. The respondent's level of intent is a key factor for the hearing 
panel to consider in making its recommendation for discipline in this case. The 
respondent engaged in misconduct during the trial and appeal of Chandler's criminal case 
and Ewing's case. Additionally, the respondent engaged in misconduct during the 
disciplinary investigation. 
 
"206. When the Supreme Court reversed Chandler's two premeditated murder 
convictions, it concluded that the respondent's culpability exceeded negligence.  
 
"207. In the disciplinary context, '"knowingly," "known," or "knows" denotes 
actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from 
circumstances.' KRPC 1.0(g).  
 
"208. In the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the ABA defines intent 
and knowledge as follows: 
 
'"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. 
 
'"Knowledge" is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant 
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to 
accomplish a particular result.'  
 
Based on all the evidence in the record, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
acted knowingly and intentionally.  
 
"209. Injury. The respondent's misconduct caused serious actual injury. Two 
premeditated murder convictions were reversed as a result of the respondent's 
misconduct. Additionally, two counts of rape, four counts of aggravated criminal 
sodomy, two counts of battery, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count 
 
51 
 
of hosting minors consuming alcohol, and one count of furnishing cereal malt beverages 
to a minor were reversed, in part, because of the respondent's misconduct. The injury 
significantly impacts J.M., M.W., the families of M.S., K.H., J.M., and M.W., the 
defendants, the families of both the defendants, the public, the legal profession, and the 
legal system. The hearing panel concludes that the injury caused in this case is extreme 
and the effects will be long-lasting. 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
"210. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present. 
 
"211. Prior Disciplinary Offenses. In 2015, the disciplinary administrator's office 
informally admonished the respondent for violating KRPC 4.2 (communication with 
person represented by counsel).  
 
"212. A Pattern of Misconduct. The respondent engaged in multiple patterns of 
misconduct.  
 
a. 
In both the Chandler case and the Ewing case, the respondent included 
many statements in her closing arguments that were not supported by any 
evidence introduced at trial.  
 
b. 
In the Chandler case, the respondent perpetuated the misconduct by 
repeating the same statements in the appellate brief, during oral arguments, in her 
written response to the initial complaint, and during the sworn statement.  
 
c. 
The respondent engaged in similar misconduct in both the Chandler 
prosecution and the Ewing prosecution. For example, in the Chandler 
prosecution, the respondent argued that M.S. told Chandler that he planned to 
marry K.H. during the five-minute phone call. The respondent then inferred that 
Chandler's motivation to murder M.S. and K.H. was because M.S. told Chandler 
 
52 
 
that he planned to marry K.H. during the five-minute phone call. However, the 
respondent had no evidence that M.S. told Chandler that he planned to marry 
K.H. during that call. In fact, the respondent had no evidence whatsoever as to 
what was discussed during that telephone call. Likewise, in the prosecution of the 
Ewing case, the respondent argued that Ewing watched pornography on his 
phone and then inferred that because he watched pornography on his phone, he 
committed the sexual assaults. The evidence introduced at trial establishes that 
pornography was downloaded to Ewing's phone. However, the respondent did 
not present evidence that Ewing watched the pornography. 
 
The hearing panel concludes that the respondent engaged in deliberative patterns of 
serious misconduct. 
 
"213. Multiple Offenses. The respondent violated six separate rules in many 
ways. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent committed multiple 
offenses. 
 
"214. Submission of False Evidence, False Statements, or Other Deceptive 
Practices During the Disciplinary Process. At the disciplinary hearing, the respondent 
admitted that statements made in her sworn statement were inaccurate. The respondent's 
sworn statement came just a few months after the Supreme Court issued its opinion 
reversing Chandler's conviction. Further, at that time, the disciplinary complaints had 
already been pending for some time. The respondent was on notice that her statements 
were being carefully scrutinized. Finally, the record is clear that the respondent reviewed 
her sworn statement, because she specifically requested that corrections be made to the 
sworn statement. The hearing panel concludes that providing false information in the 
sworn statement amounts to engaging in a deceptive practice during the disciplinary 
process.  
 
"215. Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct. While the 
respondent admitted that she made mistakes, the respondent denied that her conduct 
violated the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent refused to fully acknowledge the wrongful nature of her 
conduct.  
 
53 
 
 
"216. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Supreme Court 
admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1992. At the time of the 
misconduct, the respondent had been practicing law for approximately 20 years.  
 
"217. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify 
a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for 
discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following mitigating circumstances 
present. 
 
"218. The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by Her 
Cooperation During the Hearing and Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 
Transgressions. The respondent generally cooperated in the disciplinary investigation and 
prosecution. The respondent provided written responses to the complaints, she submitted 
to a sworn statement, and she filed an answer to the formal complaint and an answer to 
the amended formal complaint. This mitigating factor is offset significantly because the 
respondent did not acknowledge that her transgressions violate the rules and she provided 
false information during the sworn statement. 
 
"219. Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including Any 
Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and General 
Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an experienced and well-respected 
prosecutor. The respondent enjoys the respect of her peers and generally possesses a good 
character and reputation as evidenced by a letter received by the hearing panel and by the 
testimony of Judge Parrish, Carl Cornwell, Jerry Hathaway, Kim Parker, Joel Meinecke, 
and Ron Paschal.  
 
"220. Remorse. While the respondent did not admit that she violated any rules 
and while the respondent argued that she should not be disciplined, the respondent also 
expressed remorse. The respondent testified as follows:  'My responsibility as a 
prosecutor is to protect people, and I failed in these cases.' 
 
"221. Remoteness of Prior Offense. The misconduct which gave rise to the 
informal admonition in 2015 is remote in character to the misconduct in this case. 
 
54 
 
 
"222. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards:  
 
'6.11 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the 
intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a 
false document, or improperly withholds material information, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or 
causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on 
the legal proceeding.  
 
'6.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that 
false statements or documents are being submitted to the court or 
that material information is improperly being withheld, and takes 
no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a 
party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially 
adverse effect on the legal proceeding.  
 
'6.21 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit 
for the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially 
serious injury to a party, or causes serious or potentially serious 
interference with a legal proceeding.  
 
'6.22 
Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a 
court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a 
client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a 
legal proceeding.'  
 
"Discussion 
 
"223. The hearing panel recognizes that these two criminal cases were very 
difficult and complicated cases to prosecute. In the Chandler case, the prosecution was 
based on circumstantial evidence and involved a well-publicized double homicide that 
 
55 
 
was tried 10 years after the crimes were committed. The Ewing case had other 
complicating factors—it occurred in a small community and turned on the jury's 
conclusions of the credibility of witnesses.  
 
"224. The respondent presented credible evidence that she is known to be a 
skilled, experienced prosecutor. In fact, the respondent's reputation as a skilled, 
experienced prosecutor appears to be precisely why she was assigned and appointed to 
prosecute these complex cases.  
 
"225. The respondent's reputation evidence, however, is at odds with the 
evidence in the disciplinary case. The respondent repeatedly made arguments without 
evidentiary support for the arguments. The respondent made false statements to the 
Supreme Court. The respondent ignored the order of a district court. The respondent 
either failed to pay attention to the recross-examination of a key witness in the Chandler 
case or she intentionally disregarded the fact that the witness recanted his testimony 
regarding a key issue. The respondent improperly argued the impact of the crime on 
surviving members of the crime victims—contrary to well-established law.  
 
"226. From all the evidence presented, it appears that the respondent concluded 
that Chandler and Ewing were guilty of the crimes charged and she adopted a 'win at all 
costs' approach.  
 
"227. This case does not involve the respondent making an error in judgment or 
engaging in an isolated incident of misconduct. As stated above, the respondent's 
misconduct was knowingly and intentionally committed. The respondent engaged in a 
deliberative pattern of serious misconduct which resulted in serious injury.  
 
"228. The injury caused by the respondent's misconduct is extreme. As a result of 
the respondent's misconduct, the family members of M.S. and K.H. as well as the women 
injured by Ewing will have to endure a second trial. Both criminal cases are complicated 
and will require the dedication of significant community resources to retry. Further, the 
respondent's misconduct undermines the confidence in the judicial system and caused 
serious injury to the administration of justice.  
 
 
56 
 
"229. 'A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply 
that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the 
defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of 
sufficient evidence.' Comment 1 to KRPC 3.8. The respondent failed in her obligation to 
see that Chandler and Ewing were accorded procedural justice.  
 
"230. Justice Biles summed up the respondent's misconduct succinctly:  'Taken 
as a whole, this prosecution unfortunately illustrates how a desire to win can eclipse the 
State's responsibility to safeguard the fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial owed 
to any defendant facing criminal prosecution in a Kansas courtroom.' Chandler, 307 Kan. 
at 695.  
 
"Recommendations of the Parties 
 
"231. The disciplinary administrator's office recommended that the respondent's 
license to practice law be indefinitely suspended.  
 
"232. The respondent recommended that she receive no discipline. 
 
"Recommendation of the Hearing Panel 
 
"233. Based on the deliberative pattern of serious misconduct and the serious 
injury that followed, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the respondent be 
disbarred. 
 
"234. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator."  
 
Respondent filed exceptions to the panel's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommended discipline. 
 
 
57 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
We first briefly address respondent's argument that the hearing panel should 
have granted her motion to admit the results of a polygraph examination that was 
administered to her before the hearing. The Internal Operating Rules of the Kansas 
Board for Discipline of Attorneys, D.1, requires the panel to "rule on the prehearing 
motions presented" by the parties. (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 308). Disciplinary hearings are 
governed by the Rules of Evidence. Supreme Court Rule 222(e)(1) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
272); see also In re Crandall, 308 Kan. 1526, 1543, 430 P.3d 902 (2018) (considering 
arguments in an attorney discipline case "in light of the Rules of Evidence"). We review 
the panel's ruling for abuse of discretion. The panel abuses its discretion if its decision is 
(1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or (3) based on an 
error of fact. In re Harrington, 305 Kan. 643, 656, 385 P.3d 905 (2016).  
 
In a prehearing ruling, the panel exercised its discretion by declining to admit the 
polygraph results, appropriately applying the rationale from State v. Wakefield, 267 
Kan. 116, 136, 977 P.2d 941 (1999), where we held that polygraph examinations are 
inadmissible absent a stipulation by the parties. We therefore find that the panel did not 
abuse its discretion in declining to admit the results of respondent's polygraph 
examination.  
 
I. 
Rule Violations 
 
"In a disciplinary proceeding, this court generally considers the evidence, the 
disciplinary panel's findings, and the parties' arguments to determine whether KRPC 
violations exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence." In re Swischer, 314 Kan. 439, 
445, 499 P.3d 1130 (2021); see Supreme Court Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 
 
58 
 
276). Evidence is clear and convincing when it "'causes the factfinder to believe that "the 
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Rumsey, 301 Kan. 438, 447, 343 
P.3d 93 (2015) (quoting In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 [2009]). "'In 
making this determination, the court does not weigh conflicting evidence, assess witness 
credibility, or redetermine questions of fact. If a disputed finding is supported by clear 
and convincing evidence, it will not be disturbed.'" In re Ayesh, 313 Kan. 441, 464, 485 
P.3d 1155 (2021) (quoting In re Hodge, 307 Kan. 170, 209-10, 407 P.3d 613 [2017]). 
However, we are not bound by the Disciplinary Administrator's or the hearing panel's 
recommendations. In re Kupka, 311 Kan. 193, 204, 458 P.3d 242 (2020). 
 
A. The panel misapplied KRPC 1.1 because an isolated incident of mere 
negligence, standing alone, is insufficient to support a KRPC 1.1 violation.  
 
KRPC 1.1 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 321) states:  "A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." The panel 
found that respondent violated KRPC 1.1 in two ways. First, she failed to note that 
Sergeant Volle "changed his testimony" on re-cross examination, in violation of KRPC 
1.1's "thoroughness" requirement. The inquiry into a lawyer's thoroughness includes 
considering "the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter." KRPC 1.1 
cmt. 1. The panel "recognize[d] the respondent's extensive preparation for the murder 
trial," yet it found that despite this extensive preparation, respondent's failure to note the 
change in testimony constituted incompetence.  
 
Second, the panel found that respondent's comment that Chandler "robbed her 
children of their father and his fiancé [sic]" during closing arguments evidenced a lack of 
competence because "[i]t is well settled that prosecutors may not comment on the impact 
of a crime on the crime victim or the crime victim's family." Respondent admits that she 
 
59 
 
should "not have commented on the victim's children losing their father," but asserts that 
she made the comment "in the heat of the moment."  
 
The panel's conclusions seem to rely on a strict-liability-esque interpretation of 
KRPC 1.1. Indeed, the Disciplinary Administrator even argues that the rule "requires no 
proof of a particular mental state." We disagree. As we stated in State v. Sherman, 305 
Kan. 88, 90-92, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016), not all improper or erroneous acts of a prosecutor 
constitute "misconduct." "Prosecutorial acts properly categorized as 'prosecutorial 
misconduct' are erroneous acts done with a level of culpability that exceeds mere 
negligence." (Emphasis added.) 305 Kan. at 114.  
 
"We prefer to examine the particular circumstances of each disciplinary case." 
In re Ketter, 268 Kan. 146, 153, 992 P.2d 205 (1999). Given this, we hesitate to dictate 
any bright line rule for defining when an attorney has violated KRPC 1.1, and instead 
employ a case-by-case approach more akin to Justice Potter Stewart's famous "I know it 
when I see it" standard. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S. Ct 1676, 12 
L. Ed. 2d 793 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). But despite the difficulty in creating a 
hard and fast rule for defining "incompetence," we have no trouble holding that an 
isolated incidence of "mere negligence" cannot rise to the level of "incompetence" 
contemplated by KRPC 1.1.  
 
The "'enforcement of competent standards has been generally limited to relatively 
exotic, blatant, or repeated cases of lawyer bungling.' C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 
§ 5.1 (1986)." In re Discipline of Laprath, 670 N.W.2d 41, 64 (S.D. 2003). And while 
KRPC 1.1 certainly requires a lawyer to provide "legal knowledge" reasonably necessary 
for the representation, the panel's finding that respondent's one-off victim impact 
statement translated to a lack of legal knowledge necessary to competently prosecute the 
case is illogical. Moreover, respondent's failure to notice the shift in Sergeant Richard 
 
60 
 
Volle's testimony on recross-examination was also an isolated act at the trial that did not 
exceed "mere negligence" or reflect negatively on respondent's "preparation and study." 
KRPC 1.1 cmt. 1; see also In re Disciplinary Action Against Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672, 
684 (N.D. 2016) ("[A]n isolated act of negligence will not necessarily satisfy the broad, 
generic concepts of incompetence or lack of diligence."); In re Askew, 225 A.3d 388, 
394-95 (D.C. 2020) (ethics rules are designed to address "failures that constitute a 
'serious deficiency' in an attorney's" conduct, and "[m]ere careless errors do not rise to the 
level of incompetence"). The panel's findings that respondent violated KRPC 1.1 are not 
based on any repeated patterns of conduct that exceed mere negligence and therefore do 
not satisfy the broad, generic concept of incompetence.  
 
Because we hold that mere negligence, standing alone, is insufficient to support a 
KRPC 1.1 violation, we find the panel's conclusion that respondent violated KRPC 1.1 is 
not supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
 
B. The panel's finding that respondent violated KRPC 3.1 is supported by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
 
KRPC 3.1 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 384) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not bring or 
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for 
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law." The panel determined that respondent violated 
this rule because no evidence supported her claim that Chandler learned of M.S.'s 
engagement during the five-minute phone call. The panel concluded respondent also 
violated KRPC 3.1 in Chandler's direct appeal when she stated before our court during 
oral arguments that "[w]e know exactly what happened during that phone call." 
 
Respondent focuses on the theory of the call being the "trigger" call, pointing out 
that Sergeant Volle testified at the hearing that "many other law enforcement officers" 
 
61 
 
reached a "consensus" that the call "triggered" the murders, and that KBI investigator 
Mark Malick similarly testified that he "strongly believed" that "that phone call was the 
trigger." But just because the call itself was widely believed to be the trigger does not 
prove what was actually said during the call. There is no evidence that would support 
respondent's statement before this court that "[w]e know exactly what happened during 
that phone call" or for her to make similar claims at trial. 
 
Respondent argues that "to be sanctioned" she "must have known there was no 
evidence nor reasonable inferences from the facts to show . . . the content of the five-
minute phone call." We are unpersuaded by this argument, because respondent has 
offered no reason why she supposedly did not know about the lack of evidence. All the 
evidence was readily available when she made her statement. Moreover, because of her 
word choice, she was not making a "reasonable inference." Rather, "we know exactly" 
presented it as a conclusive statement of fact.  
 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the panel's finding that respondent violated KRPC 3.1 
is supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
C. The panel's finding that respondent violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1) is supported by 
clear and convincing evidence.  
 
KRPC 3.3(a)(1) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 385) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not 
knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false 
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer[.]" The 
rule requires a "knowing" state of mind, which "denotes actual knowledge of the fact in 
question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." KRPC 1.0(g) 
(2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 318).  
 
 
62 
 
The panel found that respondent intentionally violated this rule in three ways:  
(1) by arguing to the jury during closing arguments (including in her PowerPoint slide) 
that M.S. sought and obtained a PFA and that Chandler violated it; (2) by making similar 
statements in the State's initial appellate brief; and (3) during oral arguments before this 
court when she argued that evidence introduced at trial supported her claim that a 
restraining order was in effect at the time of the murders. 
 
Before the Chandler trial, respondent filed a K.S.A. 60-455 motion requesting to 
admit evidence of stalking type behavior to establish Chandler had motive to kill both 
victims. In it, she stated:  "[M.S.] requested an immediate restraining order on October 
15, 1998, indicating that this defendant intentionally, maliciously, and repeatedly 
followed and harassed him, destroyed personal property of his acquaintances and had 
engaged in telephone harassment." (Emphasis added.) Notably, the K.S.A. 60-455 motion 
did not state that M.S.'s motion had ever resulted in a granted order. This fact supports 
the panel's finding that respondent intentionally violated KRPC 3.3(a)(1), as the language 
of respondent's pretrial motion seems to acknowledge that M.S. had only requested a 
motion for a restraining order, yet had not been granted one. This is especially true 
considering that in the very same motion, respondent also described a PFA order that had 
actually been granted against Chandler by her daughter several years after the murders, 
indicating that respondent was well aware that no such order had been entered in 1998.  
 
Moreover, Sergeant Volle testified at the hearing that he unsuccessfully tried to 
locate a signed order. He also testified that he did not have any specific memory of a 
family member telling him that M.S. obtained a PFA against Chandler. And during 
respondent's oral argument before our court in Chandler's direct appeal, she made clear 
that she knew no order was entered, or at least, that the order was not physically in the 
State's evidence—but we only obtained this admission from respondent after asking her 
dozens of questions: 
 
63 
 
 
"JUSTICE BILES:  And in the—I was reading the closing arguments again last 
night, and when that comes up it seems like you hit it hard and fast. Number one, you 
said something that wasn't true, that there was a protection from abuse order. Number 
two, you said that that means that the judge agreed that the defendant was a danger 
because you'd have—that would be the foundation for entering an order for protection 
from abuse. And number three, you said that the defendant ignored the order. 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  Yes, sir. 
 
"JUSTICE BILES:  And none of that is true? 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  It is true. 
 
"JUSTICE BILES:  How's it true if there was no protection from abuse order? 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  Because what I should have said Your Honor, was that 
there was a protective order. A protective order, as this Court knows is an umbrella. 
 
"JUSTICE BILES:  Entered at the beginning of the divorce proceeding against 
both parties and concerning, I think in her case, the residence. That's a whole lot different 
then a protection from abuse order, isn't it? 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  Yes, but there are two orders in this case, Your Honor. 
 
"JUSTICE BILES:  Okay. Well, what do I need to look at? 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  There was a protective order in October of 1998. That is 
different from the protective order that was originally given in 1997, which fits the 
definition that you described. However, after the divorce was over in September of 1998, 
the defendant had still not signed the divorce journal entry and she had filed, the day after 
the last hearing multiple motions to reopen the entire case. It was after this in October of 
1998 that Mike Sisco requested a protective order and a case manager. 
 
 
64 
 
"JUSTICE BILES:  And the Court didn't—but the district court didn't give that 
protective order that was requested in 1998? 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  I can tell you, if I'm limited to the record on appeal, I 
can't—I cannot point to it. 
 
"JUSTICE BILES:  You entered into evidence the entire divorce file. 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  No, sir, I did not. 
 
"JUSTICE [BILES]:  Or a ton of it anyway? 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  Yes. 
 
"JUSTICE [BILES]:  We have a huge exhibit— 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  Yes, sir. 
 
"JUSTICE [BILES]:  —that—that's—that's the divorce file and there's no order 
in it. 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  There is no order in it, you're exactly right. There's no— 
 
"JUSTICE [BILES]:  I mean, you can't say there was an order entered because 
there's nowhere in evidence that an order was entered. 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  I believe that testimony that an order was entered is also 
direct evidence that allows— 
 
"JUSTICE [BILES]:  That would be the detective's statement? 
 
"MS. SPRADLING: Yes, sir. 
 
 
65 
 
"JUSTICE [BILES]:  But the detective took it back in cross-examination and 
said, oh, I really don't recall if there was an order, you'll have to look at the file in 
evidence. 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  Yes, Your Honor. 
 
"JUSTICE [BILES]:  There's no order in evidence. How do you stand up in front 
of a Jury and tell them that a protective—protection from abuse order was entered and 
then say that that means that the judge validated the claim and that the defendant ignored 
it? 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  Because a protective order, protection from abuse and also 
protective order is signed off by a judge who must agree— 
 
"JUSTICE [BILES]:  But there was no protective—I mean, all I can do is go by 
what you said. 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  Sure. 
 
"JUSTICE [BILES]:  So what you said was there was a protection from abuse 
order, and that's not true? 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  That is not true. It is protective order, not a protection from 
abuse. And the difference is the protective order was issued in the divorce proceeding. A 
protection from abuse order is an order that a person applies for and is granted outside of 
the divorce proceeding. However, they are both protective of one person against the 
other. They both require, by judicial order, one person to stay away from the other. And 
having been involved in pretrial meetings and preparation in this case, I can tell you that 
there was a protective order. I said protective—protection from abuse and I should have 
said protective. 
 
"JUSTICE JOHNSON:  And this is your—   
 
 
66 
 
"[JUSTICE BILES]:  [J]ust—is it your claim that in that statement you are within 
the wide latitude given to prosecutor's, that's really our step? 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  Yes, sir. I can tell you without certain there's no ill will in 
saying protection from abuse rather than protective order. 
 
"JUSTICE BILES:  But that's—I'm sorry, go ahead. 
 
"JUSTICE JOHNSON:  Now are we talking about the October '98 request? 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  Yes, sir. 
 
"JUSTICE JOHNSON:  Well, I'm confused. A month before trial the State filed a 
60-455 motion asking to—to enter this—this evidence, 'um, and it only referred to a 
request for an immediate restraining order in October '98. I'm curious why the State 
wouldn't have asked that the Court consider the order if there was one, in fact, in place.  
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  I don't want to mislead this Court. There is no document 
that I found in State's Exhibit 969 which was the divorce file. There's no document in that 
file that is either a protection from abuse or a protective order. So, if I indicated that 
there was a document, I don't want to mislead you. I do know, speaking with the victim's 
family members, that the order existed. 'Um, and that that was discovered by Detective 
Volle as the lead detective in this case." (Emphases added.)  
 
And lastly, respondent testified at the hearing that before the Chandler trial she 
only found the motion for immediate restraining order in the divorce file, which led her to 
refer only to the "motion for immediate restraining order" in her opening statement. This, 
taken together with the above exchange during oral arguments and the language in 
respondent's 60-455 motion, supports the hearing panel's finding that respondent violated 
KRPC 3.3(a)(1).  
 
 
67 
 
D. The panel's finding that respondent violated KRPC 3.4(c) is supported by 
clear and convincing evidence.  
 
KRCP 3.4(c) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 389) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not . . . 
knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal 
based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists[.]" The panel found that respondent 
violated this rule when she referenced the gallery in her closing argument in direct 
contradiction of Judge Parrish's order. KRPC 3.4(c) requires a "knowing" violation, 
which can be shown through "actual knowledge of the fact in question" or "inferred from 
circumstances." KRPC 1.0(g).  
 
 
Judge Parrish's ruling was as follows: 
 
"THE COURT:  . . . One thing I do want to say, I know we've had a lot of folks 
that have been here observing the trial and I suspect there are very, very strong feelings 
on both sides of this case. I do not want any of the folks that are in the gallery to be asked 
to stand up at any time during the closings. 
 
. . . . 
 
"I will [be] jumping on you big time, if you do that. Do not do that in this case. I 
don't want references to folks here at all. 
 
"MS. SPRADLING:  I understand your parameters, your Honor. 
 
"THE COURT:  That goes for both sides. We're not injecting any sympathy for 
victims or for the defendant into these proceedings. And it's appropriate that we not inject 
that into the proceedings." (Emphasis added.)  
 
 
However, respondent referred to a friend of Chandler's that was present in the 
gallery shortly after this ruling was made. After playing an audio recording of a jail call, 
 
68 
 
respondent stated:  "That's the defendant and her close friend Shirley Riegel that I'm 
getting a look from talking about what a great day it was because Patti Williams was dead 
and can't put the defendant in Kansas." (Emphasis added.) Given that Judge Parrish 
explicitly stated that "I don't want references to folks here at all," and respondent replied 
that she "underst[oo]d [the] parameters," the panel's finding that respondent knowingly 
violated the order is supported by clear and convincing evidence because the order's plain 
language gave respondent "actual knowledge" of her "obligation under the rules of the 
tribunal." KRPC 1.0(g); 3.4(c).  
 
E. The panel's finding that respondent's conduct during the Chandler 
prosecution violated KRPC 3.4(e) is supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.  
 
 
KRPC 3.4(e) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 389) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not . . . in 
trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that 
will not be supported by admissible evidence . . . ." KRPC 3.4(e) requires that the 
attorney have a "reasonable belief," which "denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in 
question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable." KRPC 1.0(j).  
 
The panel found five instances in the Chandler trial where respondent violated this 
rule:  (1) arguing the existence of the PFA; (2) five-minute phone call; (3) Nebraska exit 
theory; (4) internet searches; and (5) "Chandler thinks she is smarter" comment. We 
consider each finding in turn. 
 
First, the panel found that respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) because her 
"argument that a restraining order existed at the time of the murders and that Chandler 
violated the restraining order was not based on any evidence admitted before the jury." 
Respondent points to Sergeant Volle's testimony on redirect examination as the basis for 
having made the statements to the jury: 
 
69 
 
 
"Q. Will you tell the jury what a production [sic] from abuse or PFA is. 
 
"A. It's a document signed by the Court that says you are not able to have contact with 
another person, you're not supposed to call them, write them, contact them in any 
manner. 
 
"Q. A court order precluding one person from contacting another? 
 
"A. Yes. 
 
"Q. Did [M.S.] get a protection from abuse? 
 
"A. Yes, he did. 
 
"Q. Against who? 
 
"A. Against the defendant. 
 
"Q. In 1998? 
 
"A. That's correct. 
 
"Q. Did [M.S.] get a PFA or protection from abuse against anybody other than the 
defendant? 
 
"A. No one else."  
 
Chandler's defense counsel asked the following of Volle on recross:  
 
"Q. Detective Volle, you testified that [M.S.] had obtained a protection from abuse order; 
is that correct? 
 
 
70 
 
"A. Yes. 
 
"Q. Do you have that? 
 
"A. It's in the divorce file. I don't have a copy of it. 
 
"Q. Was it actually signed by a judge and filed or was it a motion or a request for one that 
wasn't— 
 
"A. I don't recall."  
 
In State v. Chandler, 307 Kan. 657, 678, 414 P.3d 713 (2018), we described this 
exchange as Sergeant Volle "admit[ting] he could not say any such order existed, which 
put the prosecutor on notice that the detective's testimony could not establish this as fact." 
Despite this notice, respondent stated in closing arguments: 
 
"How else do we know the defendant is guilty? [M.S.] got a protection from 
abuse, a court order. He applied and said, hey, Judge, please order this woman to stay 
away from me and the Judge agreed. And in 1998, meaning one year after he filed for the 
divorce, he was continuing to have problems with the defendant not leaving him alone. 
So he got a court order saying she has to stay away. The protection from abuse order did 
not stop the defendant, though."  
 
Respondent also displayed a slide to the jury that stated:  "HOW ELSE DO WE 
KNOW THE DEFENDANT IS GUILTY? [M.S.] GOT A PROTECTION FROM 
ABUSE COURT ORDER KEEPING DEFENDANT AWAY FROM HIM IN 1998." 
 
Respondent called Ron Paschal, Chairman of the Kansas Prosecutor's Grievance 
and Ethics Committee, at the hearing to testify that he did not view the exchange on 
recross "as a recantation," but rather "as a fairly effective cross-examination," and that he  
 
71 
 
viewed the issue as being "more about the quality of the evidence." Yet even if we were 
to adopt that view of the exchange, still another problem remains when considering the 
language that respondent used when referring to the PFA. 
 
Respondent told the jury that M.S. "got a court order saying she has to stay away. 
The protection from abuse order did not stop the defendant, though." (Emphasis added.) 
This statement indicated to the jury that an active order was in place at the time of the 
murders. But K.S.A. 60-3107(e) provides that "a protective order . . . shall remain in 
effect until modified or dismissed by the court and shall be for a fixed period of time not 
to exceed one year[.]" The only identified application in the Chandler case was from 
1998. So even if that order had been granted, it would have expired years before the 
murders without an affirmative renewal. Therefore, even if we gave full credit to 
Sergeant Volle's testimony about the 1998 PFA, it was still too far of a jump for 
respondent to declare that the order remained in place four years later in 2002 when the 
murders occurred.  
 
We accordingly find the panel's conclusion is supported by clear and convincing 
evidence because Sergeant Volle's testimony did not give the respondent an evidentiary 
basis for asserting that M.S. had obtained a PFA order or that Chandler violated it when 
she allegedly committed the murders.  
 
Next, the panel found that respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) when she declared 
that Chandler learned of M.S.'s engagement during the five-minute phone call and 
implied that this knowledge prompted Chandler to travel to Topeka and kill the victims 
because it was not supported by admissible evidence.  
 
 
 
72 
 
As we described above, no evidence was admitted at trial about the content of the 
phone call. While it was apparently widely agreed among investigators that this call was 
the "trigger," this does not confirm what was said during the call. KRPC 3.4(e) prohibits 
alluding to any matter that will not be supported by admissible evidence. And respondent 
presented no evidence supporting the theory. Accordingly, the panel's finding that 
respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) by discussing the substance of the five-minute phone 
call during opening and closing but not admitting or attempting to admit any evidence as 
to its contents is supported by clear and convincing evidence.   
 
Third, the panel found that respondent intentionally violated KRPC 3.4(e) during 
her "opening and arguments in closing regarding the Nebraska exit theory" because they 
"were not supported by evidence admitted at trial."  
 
Respondent's opening statement claimed: 
 
"The defendant's actual route, you'll be provided in this case, is that she went through I-
70 east to Topeka from Denver passing through WaKeeney on July 6th, 2002, as 
Margaret Linden will indicate. Somewhere along that route, probably around Salina, the 
defendant would have had to have used the ten gallons of gas that were in the two five-
gallon gas cans she purchased at Autozone before she committed the murders. The 
defendant's actual route included that she went from Denver, to Topeka, Mike and 
Karen's house, and after killing both Mike and Karen in an interest to get out of the state 
as quickly as she could, she drove directly up to Nebraska. After she gets to Nebraska, 
she turns around and goes home heading towards Denver. This route matches the 
defendant's gas purchases and the defendant's gas consumption by her credit card 
receipts." (Emphases added.)  
 
Additionally, respondent displayed slides to the jury that depicted a map of Kansas 
and the eastern half of Colorado, with notes made along the map that stated "Defendant's 
actual route." (Emphasis added.) 
 
73 
 
 
The jury certainly heard evidence that challenged the legitimacy of Chandler's 
alleged route and her whereabouts the weekend of the murders. However, it is one thing 
for respondent to highlight the inconsistencies in Chandler's story—and it is quite another 
for her to make repeated claims that Nebraska was Chandler's "actual route." We thus 
find that the panel's conclusion that respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) is supported by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
 
Fourth, during respondent's opening statement, she claimed:  "John Kite will also 
tell you that the defendant accessed articles on CJ Online that dealt with how to defend 
against murder charges and articles that dealt with sentencing in murder charges." The 
panel found that this violated KRPC 3.4(e) because this claim was not supported by 
admissible evidence. 
 
At trial, respondent asked Agent John Kite only a few questions about any CJ 
Online articles covering the homicides that Chandler may have searched: 
 
"Q. Did you find anything related to viewing articles on CJ Online or the Topeka Capital-
journal. 
 
"A. Yes. I found HTML fragments that produced search results for CJ Online that had 
related articles about the homicide and the investigations into them. 
 
. . . . 
 
"Q. Did you find the anniversary of the double homicides that there had been another 
search regarding or looking into CJ Online about the homicides? 
 
"A. The HTML fragments I found that related to that produced a story which was the 
one-year anniversary story by Tim Hrenchir." 
 
74 
 
 
 
However, this quick exchange about the anniversary articles in no way relates to a 
search about how to defend against murder. Clearly the testimony elicited from Agent 
Kite did not match up with respondent's opening statement. 
 
The panel also pointed to testimony from Agent Kite at the hearing. The panel 
found that Agent Kite "denied ever finding evidence that Chandler accessed articles 
regarding how to get away with murder, how to defend against murder charges, or 
sentencing in murder cases. Furthermore, Agent Kite denied ever conveying such 
information to the respondent during a pretrial meeting." And though Agent Kite's 
testimony conflicted with respondent's version of events, the panel weighed the 
witnesses' credibility and found: 
 
"Because other evidence corroborates Agent Kite's testimony, because Agent 
Kite has no reason to fabricate, because the respondent did not ask Agent Kite any 
questions designed to elicit the information, because the respondent has expressed that 
she does not recall a number of facts in this case, because the respondent has now 
admitted that other statements she made previously were incorrect, and because the 
respondent misstated evidence, the hearing panel accepts Agent Kite's testimony and 
rejects the respondent's testimony in this regard." 
 
We generally respect the panel's findings when it concludes that one person's 
testimony was more credible than another's because, as the trier of fact, the panel had the 
chance to observe the witnesses and assess their demeanor. As such, we will not reweigh 
evidence or evaluate the witnesses' credibility. In re Saville, 311 Kan. 221, 235, 458 P.3d 
976 (2020); In re Murphy, 312 Kan. 203, 224, 473 P.3d 886 (2020). The panel made such 
a credibility determination here, and evidence presented at the hearing supports this 
finding. We will not disturb it. 
 
 
75 
 
The fifth and final instance of respondent's conduct in the Chandler trial that the 
panel found violated KRPC 3.4(e) came from closing arguments, where respondent 
stated: 
 
"She planned it in advance. You know why, you heard the evidence, she's smart, she's got 
high intelligence and she thought she was smarter than the police department and she 
thought she was smarter than the jurors and it's not true, because we are lucky enough to 
have law enforcement officers who didn't torture her. She's still playing the victim. They 
wanted justice. And we have you. She's not smarter than the cops, she's not smarter than 
you." 
 
The panel found that this argument was "not based on sufficient evidence admitted 
before the jury" and therefore violated KRPC 3.4(e).  
 
At respondent's hearing, detectives testified about their theory that Chandler 
considered herself smarter than law enforcement, in part based on Chandler's tactic of 
"going dark" during the time the murders took place (meaning that she took steps to 
ensure her credit cards and phone could not be tracked). The FBI completed a profile on 
Chandler, and "one of the key things" that the profile described about her is that she is the 
type of person who "feel[s] like they're the smartest person in the room."  
 
Despite these reports and seemingly widespread consensus among the 
investigative team that Chandler thought she was smarter than everyone else, the jury 
did not hear any of this evidence. The only information presented to the jury about 
Chandler's intelligence came from her boss at Buell & Company in Denver. He testified 
that Chandler was his bookkeeper, and when respondent asked him how smart he 
believed Chandler was, he answered:  "Intelligence wise, probably above average." This 
one sentence of testimony about Chandler's intelligence does not support an inference 
that Chandler believed she was smarter than police and the jurors, and since respondent 
 
76 
 
made this statement in closing arguments, she knew that she had not entered evidence 
that would support such a statement. We conclude that the panel's finding that this 
statement violated KRPC 3.4(e) is supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
F. The panel's finding that respondent's conduct during the Ewing prosecution 
violated KRPC 3.4(e) is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
 
While the panel's findings with respect to KRPC 3.4(e) violations resulting from 
the Chandler trial are supported by clear and convincing evidence, we cannot say the 
same of the panel's findings about the Ewing trial. The panel found five additional KRPC 
3.4(e) violations resulting from the Ewing trial:  (1) DNA evidence; (2) "low functioning" 
comment; (3) reference to social media attacks; (4) if there was sex it could not be 
consensual comment; and (5) watching pornography and autism abuse comments. 
 
Before we turn to those findings, we first pause to note that the Disciplinary 
Administrator presented no witnesses at the hearing who testified about the Ewing case. 
At oral arguments the Disciplinary Administrator explained that he relied on the 
admission of the Ewing trial record and the Court of Appeals State v. Ewing, No. 
118,343, 2019 WL 1413962 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion), opinion into 
evidence before the hearing panel, which he alleges were sufficient to support a finding 
that respondent committed the alleged rule violations. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals 
declined to use the heightened "misconduct" label and instead categorized respondent's 
conduct as prosecutorial error. 2019 WL 1413962, at *32. What is more, both the panel's 
final hearing report and the Disciplinary Administrator curiously ignored the vast amount 
of hearing testimony respondent presented that provided much more color to the 
otherwise cold Ewing record, which leads us to find that respondent's conduct in that trial 
did not amount to misconduct that violates the KRPC.  
 
 
77 
 
First, the panel found that respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) when she stated: 
 
"[J.M.] told everyone, and there's no contradiction to this, that when she went to 
bed in the defendant's bed she was fully clothed. Why is that important? It's important 
because of the defendant's DNA around the waistband of [J.M.]'s panties. You cannot get 
the defendant's DNA there unless she was unclothed. She went to bed in panties and 
sweats. Unless the sweats are taken off, she would not have the defendant's DNA there. 
And the only reason that [J.M.]'s panties were exposed was because the defendant took 
her pants off. [J.M.] told you that the panties were ripped, and the panties that are in 
evidence are ripped. Rachel White told you that she swabbed around the waistline. Those 
waistbands, pretty thin, not much there. Not much surface to swab, yet Rachel White was 
able to find the defendant's DNA there."  
 
The panel concluded this statement was made in violation of KRPC 3.4(e) because 
it was not supported by the evidence.  
 
KRPC 3.4(e) prohibits a lawyer from alluding to any matter the "lawyer does not 
reasonably believe" is supported by admissible evidence. Reasonable belief is shown 
when the lawyer "believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that 
the belief is reasonable." KRPC 1.0(j). While the Court of Appeals took issue with this 
statement, it was not because it was unsupported by the evidence. Rather, it was because 
of respondent's phrasing. "[H]ad the prosecutor asserted that the DNA evidence 
supported the conclusion that J.M.'s sweatpants were removed, that would not be error," 
but the way respondent phrased the argument "misrepresented the evidence that had been 
admitted for the jury's consideration and, as such, was error." 2019 WL 1413962, at *35.   
 
Shawna Miller, Jackson County Attorney, who initially reached out to respondent 
for help with the Ewing prosecution, testified that she "would see absolutely zero 
problem with saying that the logical conclusion is given the placement of the DNA, . . . 
that was supportive of what the victim said happened, that he physically ripped those 
 
78 
 
panties off of her." Like the Court of Appeals found, Miller stated that the problem here 
was "just kind of a phrasing issue." She highlighted how "the touch DNA was on the 
inside of her underwear waistband and she had sweatpants over there. The allegations 
were that he ripped off the sweatpants and literally ripped off her underwear. . . . And so, 
given the placement of the DNA it was a logical conclusion that that's how it got there."  
 
Given that the trial testimony did support this inference, but respondent erred 
because of a phrasing issue, we find that respondent did not violate KRPC 3.4(e) when 
she made this statement. 
 
Second, the panel found that respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) because there "was 
no evidence introduced at trial that the witness was low-functioning or autistic," and that 
she should not have made that statement "without first introducing evidence to support 
the argument."  
 
We agree that it would have been better for respondent to have sought admission 
of evidence about J.M.'s functioning before commenting on it. However, we find that it 
does not warrant a misconduct label given the extensive hearing testimony about J.M.'s 
very visible difficulties. As the Indiana Supreme Court has recognized, disciplinary 
proceedings afford an "opportunity for evidentiary development beyond the cold record 
available to the Court of Appeals . . . . [A] written trial transcript 'presents only a small 
part of the whole picture,' and in a disciplinary proceeding the parties may be able to 
offer additional evidence that paints a more complete picture." In re Smith, 60 N.E.3d 
1034, 1036 (Ind. 2016). 
 
At trial, one of the only pieces of evidence from the cold record revealing J.M.'s 
level of functioning came when she was asked to put the date on a picture, and asked, 
 
79 
 
"What number is June?" However, at the hearing, there was significant testimony about 
J.M.'s functioning that paints a more complete picture. First, respondent stated: 
 
"The victim/witness assistant held JM's hand up to the bar when she went to testify, and 
that was there obviously in front of the jury. I believe that there was sufficient evidence 
by her demeanor, her inability to—well, her struggling while she was testifying. She 
wore slippers to court, Mr. Vogelsberg, and I believe that the record was sufficient for 
that argument." 
 
Agent Mark Malick testified: 
 
"I spent of a lot of time with JM . . . . I was privy to how she conducted herself on the 
witness stand, and I did see her throughout the trial, the initial trial. And I—I—I hesitated 
when I use the word—just a quick background, I was involved with Special Olympics 
Kansas as a volunteer, being on the board of directors for 29 years, and I hate to use the 
word intellectual disabilities, but I—she comes awful close to fitting that term, if you 
will. 
 
"Her attention span was very short. 'Um, it took her a long time to answer 
questions. And I will tell you that I never go into an interview setting a time limit because 
you never know, depending on who you're talking to and what it involves, but I didn't 
have the plan on spending as much time as we did. And I don't have that interview 
directly in front of me to—to know how long it was, but it was several hours. And that 
was just the first interview. And part of that was because between answering questions 
she'd ask for a piece of paper so she could actually draw and doodle. And I—that helped 
her to a degree, but she—she is a person that doesn't express herself very well. She does 
come across as slow, if you will, or low functioning.  
 
"'Um, I did see, partially, and hear of an episode in court where she, more or less, 
zoned out or blacked out on the stand. And I don't mean physically collapsed, but she was 
unresponsive to any questions or direction from the Court. She talked about medication 
she's on to control some of her behaviors. She discussed some of the problems she had in 
school. 'Um, so, yes, I—I did have—she was—she was difficult to work with, to say the 
 
80 
 
least. And—and I didn't believe that that was because, A, nobody likes to cooperate in 
something like this, but I didn't take that as being the root cause of the difficulty in 
interviewing her."  
 
Later in his testimony Agent Malick reaffirmed that he would call J.M. 
"somewhere in the low range" of functioning, stating, "there's no[] other way to put it, 
she did not function that high."  
 
Lisa Hyten, a victim services coordinator with the Jackson County Sheriff's 
Office, reiterated many of the same impressions. Hyten stated: 
 
"I notice when she communicated with other people she struggled often to find 
words, sometimes would become short of breath. She would fidget and sometimes need 
to draw in order to stay focused. It appeared as if she had a pretty serious issue with 
social anxiety.  
 
"She particularly struggles when she's given—given tasks with multiple steps 
that need to be broken down.  
 
. . . . 
 
"[T]here are a number of ways the jury would have observed the same 
observations that I'm mentioning here today. First, when she was giving direct testimony 
and answering questions by both the attorneys she . . . got very confused very frequently. 
Often the attorneys would have to stop, and . . . if they had asked multidimensional 
questions they'd have to break them down to one concept at a time to get her through. She 
several times told both the attorneys on different occasions she was confused by what 
was being asked and said. 
 
. . . .  
 
 
81 
 
"The jury would also have observed JM's vocabulary, for instance, when she was 
describing her . . . neurological treatment she talked about having brain-ish therapy or 
needing to do brain exercises. And another point in time when the defense was 
questioning her she was asked to put a date on a picture and she asked the Court what 
number is June. Those would have been some of, in her direct testimony, issues that were 
maybe apparent to the jurors.  
 
"She also in her direct testimony told the jury that she had ongoing long-term 
neurological problems and mental health concerns. The jury would have had access to the 
SANE-SART medical report and examination which listed a history of PTSD and 
seizures. The jury would have heard Jennifer Johnson, who actually was a defense 
witness, testify that the SANE-SART nurse that examined JM reported that she was very 
immature."  
 
Shawna Miller testified about J.M. as well. She pointed out that Ewing's counsel 
filed a pretrial Gregg motion, which she described as a request "for the court to order 
essentially a psychological evaluation of a witness. Usually it's asked for if there's mental 
health issues, . . . limitations, maybe educational, functioning type limitations." This 
motion was filed by the defense after the preliminary hearing, and Miller testified that 
Ewing's defense counsel was "not one just to file a Gregg motion in every case," but she 
rather would have wanted "to feel she could support that motion with a straight face 
argument with the court. . . . [T]here are some defense attorneys that will just file them, 
but she's not one of them. She's only going to file a motion if she thinks it's appropriate 
and she's going to win it, honestly."  
 
Miller recalled her impression of J.M. while questioning her on the stand: 
 
"A. One . . . thing in particular is right when I got to kind of the very, very 
difficult part of her testimony where we had to start talking about penetration, she kind of 
froze and seemed to just not respond for—it was probably only a few seconds, but it 
seemed like a long time.  
 
82 
 
 
. . . . 
 
"Another thing that I would just note in dealing with her is that, 'um, I almost had 
to examine her like I would examine a young child. Had to use very simple terms. She 
was very easily confused by the questions. We had to ask very simple questions. It's kind 
of hard to articulate other than to say that I had to ask her questions like I would a very 
young child on the stand, not somebody who was in her early twenties, late teens.  
 
 . . . . 
 
"Q. Is it—is it one of those that—the Supreme Court Justice Hand, [sic] 
'pornography, you know it when you see it,' but is it one of those that when you see it you 
realize there's some mental issues going on there? Just— 
 
"A. Yeah. . . . It's pretty evident. 
 
. . . . 
 
"A. It would just go back to, you know, she was very childlike, and just having to 
ask her questions as you would a young child. Very simple words. Simple questions. 
Breakdown your questions into very simple, small answers. You could tell that she—you 
could tell that she was very traumatized obviously with the disassociation that I 
described.  
 
"She acted as a young child would on the stand. You mentioned fidgeting, just 
kind of keeping her attention, keeping her focused was a little bit of a challenge, too." 
 
When asked if the better route would have been to have an expert testify about the 
low functioning of J.M. to better establish the record, Miller said maybe, but they also 
wanted to avoid "heaping . . . on" embarrassment for J.M., and that they did not find it 
necessary because "it was really pretty evident for the jury to see."  
 
 
83 
 
J.M.'s difficulties were so apparent, that even defense counsel had no problems 
referencing it during her closing argument: 
 
"So let's talk about why we know this could not have happened to [J.M.].  
 
. . . .  
 
"Her story on the stand was confusing and it didn't make such sense. She seemed 
very confused. She has seizure issues, we know that. She testified to that. We know they 
happened before May 6th of 2016 and we know she's still receiving treatment for them. 
She wants to tell you that she's going to some type of physical therapy for her brain to 
make her brain work better . . . ."  
 
What is more, defense counsel explicitly called J.M. intellectually slow, and then 
even went so far as to contrast J.M.'s apparent reduced mental capacity with the other 
victim, M.W., who she called "a really bright girl": 
 
"[J.M.], she may be—she may be, intellectually, a little bit slower, but you saw 
her. She's a tall girl, she's a broad-shouldered girl. She can take care of herself. But even 
if she couldn't, where is the beating? Where is [M.W.]'s weakness? [M.W.] seems like a 
really bright girl." (Emphasis added.)  
 
As Hyten stated, the fact that the defense explicitly called J.M. intellectually slow 
is perhaps "a lot more offensive" considering that "autism is a spectrum and not 
necessarily a diagnosis." But in any event, the fact that defense counsel felt comfortable 
enough with the visible nature of J.M.'s difficulties to make these statements to the jury 
suggests that it was not a violation of our rules of professional conduct for respondent to 
have done the same.  
 
 
84 
 
In sum, we find that respondent did not violate KRPC 3.4(a)'s prohibition on 
alluding to a matter that she did not reasonably believe was supported. Once again, 
"reasonable belief" is present where "the lawyer believes the matter in question and that 
the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable." KRPC 1.0(j). Here, based on the 
testimony before the hearing panel, we find that the circumstances were such that 
respondent's belief was reasonable.  
 
Third, the panel found that respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) when she claimed 
"J.M. and M.W. were attacked on social media by Ewing's friends and family" because 
this statement "was not supported by the evidence." Respondent specifically stated: 
 
"[W]omen who have been sexually assaulted do not want to be cross-examined on it. 
They do not want to tell well-intending but still strange people to them about a sexual 
experience. They do not want to be victimized on social media by the defendant's friends 
or family. They do not want to have the embarrassment, the humiliation that these young 
women have had to know."  
 
As the Court of Appeals noted, there was no evidence presented at trial that the 
victims were victimized on social media by Ewing's friends or family. The victims were 
not asked specifics about any social media or messages they received; Miller testified that 
"they may have said, you know, my whole life has blown up," but that would be the 
extent of it.  
 
 
However, respondent presented extensive evidence before the hearing panel about 
Ewing's family's activity on social media and in the community surrounding the trial 
which was well known to all participants—including, to some extent, the jury. Miller 
testified that the Ewing family targeted the victims online and "community wide." This 
issue came up during voir dire because Ewing's counsel "added a question to the jury 
questionnaire regarding social media" because of a recognition "that the family was 
 
85 
 
attempting to use this medium to influence the jurors and the community," and that it was 
"constant" and "very inflammatory." Miller was concerned that the jury pool was tainted, 
because the town of Holton had "probably around 2,000" citizens and "[e]verybody 
knows everything in Holton, so if it's on Facebook, probably everybody is going to hear 
about it."  
 
 
Specifically, Miller recalled the victims being called "liars," "things much worse 
than liars," and that "they were just doing it to get attention." She also recalled a meme 
that was made that showed the victim's faces—and included their first and last names—
chained up in orange jumpsuits and which said something to the effect that "women who 
false report should be in prison as well." These posts came from Ewing's mother and 
grandmother.  
 
Hyten also talked about "ongoing problems" with the victims receiving hateful 
messages. She described how a Ewing family member took "a post off JM's Facebook 
and edited to make it look as if it was sort of a crude sexual comment, and then had 
reposted it and said something about what this pathetic whore was doing."  
 
Miller recalled signs being put up "all over Jackson County" that said, "Justice for 
Jacob," and that the family also had t-shirts with similar messaging that they all wore to 
court during the trial. Miller agreed that it was necessary to address this environment with 
the jury because they "obviously" were seeing it, as there was "no way to avoid it" when 
going to the courthouse. She said that the courthouse "security had to be pretty tight" 
because the Ewing family would harass those present in support of the victims, that they 
"would make cow noises, pig noises at the victims as they walked by," and that they 
would also make faces at the victims while testifying.  
 
 
86 
 
Ewing's grandmother was eventually barred from the courtroom after a handful of 
instances when she "physically came after" a reporter, Miller, and Hyten. Hyten testified 
that the accommodations that had to be made for the trial were unlike any she had seen 
before in her 13 years of working with victims, and those accommodations were put in 
place "because of the intense social media and in-person harassment that was being 
reported." She recalled a time when she was walking J.M. out of the courthouse, and 
members of Ewing's family called out "'here comes the hog train.'"  
 
Miller agreed that "even if there wasn't direct testimony on it, the jurors were 
addressed in voir dire about the social media problem" and said that everything 
respondent said on the topic during trial was "appropriate and . . . true as far as 
information that was known in court proceedings." Hyten testified that respondent even 
"requested that there be a statement of perjury included on the jury's questionnaire, 
because . . . [of] concerns of people falsifying information on their jury questionnaires in 
order to get on the jury or denying knowing the family at all." Hyten also recalled a lot of 
dialogue about the victimization on social media during jury selection. She stated that 
"the context and importance and impact of social media started in jury selection . . . and 
was relevant, and clear, throughout the whole trial." Even Ewing's defense counsel 
acknowledged the intense media situation in her closing argument when she referred to 
the "media storm."  
 
We find that the more complete picture developed by the hearing testimony 
revealed the intensity of the circumstances surrounding the trial and highlighted the 
common understanding that would have existed among those present. Respondent's 
comment did not violate KRPC 3.4(e) because her statement was made with a reasonable 
belief that the comment was appropriate in light of the circumstances. KRPC 1.0(j). 
 
 
87 
 
Next, the panel found respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) by misstating conflicting 
evidence when she asserted:  "With [J.M.] you have to decide whether they had sex or 
not. If they did, it could not have been consensual."  
 
The Court of Appeals found that this statement was error, because the  
 
"wording of her assertion . . . impl[ied] a certain and foregone conclusion:  if the jury 
concluded that Ewing and J.M. had sex, then it 'could not' have been consensual. 
Although Ewing did not assert consent as a defense—he maintained that he could not 
remember the events of the night in question—it was a misstatement for the prosecutor to 
inform the jury that if any sexual acts occurred that night, they were as a matter of fact 
nonconsensual." 2019 WL 1413962, at *36.  
 
At the hearing, however, Miller testified that she thought this statement was a 
reasonable inference because J.M. said that the sex was not consensual, and Ewing 
affirmatively maintained that they did not have sex at all—or, if they did, he could not 
remember it. In any of the possible scenarios presented to the jury, then, consent would 
be impossible. K.S.A 2020 Supp. 21-5503(a)(2) defines "rape" as "[k]nowingly engaging 
in sexual intercourse . . . when the victim is incapable of giving consent because of . . . 
the effect of any alcoholic liquor . . . ." Considering the facts of the case and the language 
of the rape statute, respondent's statement was a correct statement of the law.  
 
The panel determined that "respondent's statement lacked evidentiary support." 
But respondent's statement did not actually "lack[] evidentiary support," rather, again the 
issue came with the way that respondent characterized the evidence. We find respondent's 
statement did not violate KRPC 3.4(e). 
 
 
88 
 
Finally, the panel found that respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) by stating that 
Ewing "abused a person with autism" as it "was not supported by the evidence." We first 
note that many of the identified problems in the Ewing trial only arose because of the 
district court's admission of the pornography. Several of respondent's statements that the 
panel found inflammatory are statements she made about the admitted pornography. But 
because the evidence was admitted by the district court, respondent was free to comment 
on it. In her closing, respondent specifically mentions the titles of the various 
pornographic films admitted by the district court. Those titles were clearly visible to the 
jury while each clip was played. This context is important for understanding the 
respondent's statements that otherwise would seem utterly shocking and inflammatory. In 
other words, "Fist-Fucked and Double-Donged for Days," "Too Drunk to Fuck," and 
"Autism Abuse," among others, are all references to the titles of the admitted 
pornographic films that Ewing allegedly viewed.  
 
Respondent's full statement was as follows: 
 
"Now, Malick told you that he found, 'Pimp works over one of his hoes and she 
takes a rough and mean pounding.' That's not something that people watch unless they 
enjoy violence against women. Now, Malick told you that on the Christie Wett story the 
defendant watched that, he stopped what he was watching, he researched Christie Wett, 
she is a porn star, and then found something he liked, because he went back to the, 
"Christie Wett, Prison Story," and watched some more. 'Fist-fucked and double-donged 
for days,' now, the defense says this is all smoke. It's not smoke, it's evidence of an 
attitude of what—of how you treat women. 'I love rough porn,' yes, he does. Too drunk to 
fuck, yes, he does. Autism abuse, yes, he does. Drunken sex gone wrong, he sure does. 
 
"Now, Malick found this that he picked out, he chose to watch, and it's, "Crave 
the other side of sexuality." Dominating, humiliating or forcing submissive behavior with 
violence, it's what these ladies have told you happened to them. Advertises the most  
 
89 
 
extreme brutal porn online, his pastime; advertises 'Your one-stop shop for all your abuse 
needs,' his pastime. Unconscious women being raped and sodomized is what you see and 
what he chose to do with his spare time. Sound familiar? 
 
"These porn sites where rape scenes are being reenacted, women are being 
slapped, strangled, overpowered, having their hair pulled, their hands held behind their 
back and a dildo used on them, sound familiar? He chose this violent porn. The path he 
chose on his phone—while we might go to Neiman Marcus, while we might go to Wal-
Mart, while we might go to Bing and see the daily picture, he chose paths to violent porn. 
Now, he did that because he watched what he did and he did what he watched. If you 
watch violent porn, that does not mean you rape, but if you watch violent porn and every 
other piece of evidence in this case is considered, then that's strong evidence of the 
rapes."  
 
At another point in closing, respondent also stated: 
 
"Only thing that makes sense from the evidence is that the defendant is guilty. [J.M.], 
when she testified, was asked to put the date on a picture and [J.M.] asked, 'What number 
is June?' [J.M.] is a low-functioning young woman, and the defendant likes to watch 
autism abuse pornography."  
 
The Court of Appeals stated that there "was no evidence that J.M. was 'a low-
functioning young woman,' whatever that means. This statement was prosecutorial error. 
It also appears likely that this statement—immediately followed by a reference to 'autism 
abuse'—was made to inflame the passions of the jury, which is also error." 2019 WL 
1413962, at *35. The Court of Appeals seems to make clear that its main problem was 
with the admission of the "Autism Abuse" film in the first place, noting that "this 
particular disturbing video had no probative value to prove the charges against Ewing"; 
"[e]vidence that purports to show the sexual abuse of an autistic woman is irrelevant to 
any material fact at issue, and it merely serves to inflame the jury by implying that Ewing 
was sexually aroused by the abuse of a vulnerable individual"; and describing the video 
 
90 
 
as a "glaring problem[]" because "there was no evidence that the victims in this case were 
autistic." 2019 WL 1413962, at *24. The Court of Appeals found that respondent 
"compounded" this error by making improper statements to inflame the jury by 
"[i]mplying—with no evidentiary basis—that J.M.'s assault was related to Ewing's 
enjoyment of watching pornographic 'autism abuse' . . . ." 2019 WL 1413962, at *38-39.  
 
But the district court's order expressly permitted admission of video clips that 
"showed acts Ewing was accused of doing to his victim." (Emphasis added.) 2019 WL 
1413962, at *19. And there was abundant testimony at the hearing about J.M.'s cognitive 
difficulties that were very visible to the jury. Again, even defense counsel freely 
commented on those difficulties by calling J.M. "intellectually slow." Given these facts, 
we find that the panel's conclusion that respondent violated KRPC 3.4(e) is not supported 
by clear and convincing evidence.  
 
G. The panel's finding that respondent violated KRPC 8.1 based on statements 
she made during the disciplinary investigation is supported by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
 
KRPC 8.1 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 424) provides that "a lawyer in connection with 
. . . a disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly make a false statement of material fact; 
or fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to 
have arisen in the matter . . . ." The hearing panel found that respondent intentionally 
made false statements of material fact during the disciplinary investigation, based on her 
written response to the initial complaint and in her sworn statement.  
 
Respondent's argument that "actual" knowledge is required to support a KRPC 8.1 
violation falls flat given that we have stated "[a]lthough an attorney's motives and  
 
91 
 
intentions might be relevant as aggravating or mitigating factors when considering 
appropriate discipline, proof of intent or motive is not necessary to establish a violation 
of KRPC 8.1." In re Lober, 276 Kan. 633, 640, 78 P.3d 442 (2003). 
 
We conclude that the finding that respondent violated KRPC 8.1 is supported by 
clear and convincing evidence, because at the hearing, respondent when asked "when was 
the first clue" she had that she "might be wrong" on the PFA issue answered that it was 
"[a]t oral arguments." But respondent made a sworn statement—on July 24, 2018, after 
we released the Chandler opinion on April 6, 2018—where she testified:   
 
"Q. So, let me make sure I'm comprehending your position correctly, you—you're saying 
that you had a reasonable belief based on your conversations with Detective Volle, and 
with others, especially associated with the decedent's family, that a PFA existed? 
 
"A. Well absolutely. I believe as I sit here in front of you today it exists.  
 
"Q. Okay. And so the Supreme Court calls this a misstatement, and, 'um, says that that's 
not true. Is—is there anything else that you wanted to sort of add to that answer to 
directly address what the Supreme Court holds? 
 
"A. Yeah. The Supreme Court meant well, but they got it wrong, 'um, there is a PFA." 
(Emphases added.)  
 
She further testified:  
 
"Q. Okay. And the—I want to close this chapter by giving you the opportunity to respond 
to, I guess, two lines of the Supreme Court decision. On page 25 is where I am. 'In its 
initial briefing, the state brazenly wrote, "While defendant proclaims there was no 
protection from abuse order, the record shows otherwise."' 
  
"A. Yeah.  
 
92 
 
 
"Q. 'Um, 'The state further represented in its brief [M.S.] was granted a protection from 
abuse order in 1998. These statements were not true.'  
 
"A. They are true.  
 
"Q. 'Um, the—so to me there's two separate, 'um, representations being made in the first 
two sentences. 'Um, the second sentence that begins, 'The state further represented in that 
brief, "[M.S.] was granted a protection from abuse order in 1998."' 'Um, and you believe 
that to be true?  
 
"A. Still do." (Emphases added.) 
 
 
The panel's finding that respondent violated KRPC 8.1 by making a false 
statement during her disciplinary investigation is supported by clear and convincing 
evidence given the stark contrast between her sworn statement and her testimony before 
the hearing panel.    
 
H. The panel's finding that respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c) is supported by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
 
KRPC 8.4(c) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 427) provides that "[i]t is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation[.]" The panel found that respondent engaged in conduct that involved 
dishonesty when she argued the existence of the PFA order before the jury, and that she 
"repeated that dishonest conduct when she included similar statements in the State's 
initial appellate brief, during oral argument, in her written response to the initial 
complaint in the disciplinary investigation, and during the sworn statement."   
 
 
93 
 
Respondent displayed dishonest conduct when she misrepresented to this court 
that M.S. had obtained a PFA order, even though she ultimately—after persistent 
questioning by our court—admitted that no such document existed. Moreover, as we 
stated above, clear and convincing evidence supports a finding that respondent made 
dishonest statements during the investigation into her conduct based on the timing of her 
statements and her contradictory testimony. Namely, during her sworn statement made a 
few months after we released the Chandler opinion, she brazenly stated that this court 
"got it wrong" and emphasized that a PFA did exist. This, of course, does not square with 
her admission to the hearing panel that she started doubting the existence of the PFA 
during oral arguments.  
 
We therefore conclude the panel's finding that respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c) is 
supported by clear and convincing evidence.  
 
I. 
The panel's finding that respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d) is supported by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
 
KRPC 8.4(d) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 427) provides that "[i]t is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration 
of Justice[.]" KRPC 8.4(d) includes any conduct that injures, harms, or disadvantages the 
justice system. In re Kline, 298 Kan. 96, 121, 311 P.3d 321 (2013); see In re Hawver, 300 
Kan. 1023, 1035, 339 P.3d 573 (2014) (respondent significantly prejudiced the 
administration of justice by incompetently representing a capital defendant which led to a 
reversed capital murder conviction).  
 
The panel found that respondent violated this rule based on many instances of 
conduct across the Chandler and Ewing trials as explained above. From the Chandler 
trial, the panel cited:  the PFA, the five-minute phone call, Nebraska exit theory, internet 
searches, Chandler thinks she is smarter comment, reference to the gallery, and the 
 
94 
 
robbing children of their father comment. In the Ewing trial, the panel cited the "low 
functioning" and branding comments, the reference to autism abuse pornography, the 
social media attacks, and the comment that Ewing abused a person with autism. 
 
We disagree that the robbing children of their father comment constituted a KRPC 
8.4(d) violation. As we described above, not all improper or erroneous acts of a 
prosecutor constitute misconduct, and an isolated incidence of mere negligence cannot 
support a finding that an attorney is incompetent. Accordingly, this comment did not 
constitute a KRPC 8.4(d) violation.  
 
The remaining instances of misconduct in the Chandler trial—i.e., the references 
to the PFA, the five-minute phone call, the Nebraska exit route, the defending against 
murder searches, the Chandler thinks she is smarter comment, and the reference to the 
gallery—reveal a repeated pattern of misconduct resulting in significant prejudice. 
Viewing the respondent's conduct as a whole, we find clear and convincing evidence 
supports the panel's finding that respondent's conduct violated KRPC 8.4(d).  
 
We base this conclusion only on respondent's conduct in the Chandler trial. We 
disagree with the panel that respondent's conduct in the Ewing trial violated KRPC 
8.4(d). The fuller picture of the circumstances surrounding the Ewing trial, as presented 
by several witnesses before the hearing panel, convinces us that the panel's findings 
regarding respondent's conduct in that trial are not supported by clear and convincing 
evidence. While we will not rehash each individual instance that the panel found 
constituted a KRPC 8.4(d) violation, as those instances have already been discussed at 
length above, we will briefly evaluate the one final additional finding from the Ewing 
trial that we have not yet discussed. 
 
 
95 
 
 
The panel found that respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d) based on her comment that 
the victims had "been branded" as it was "designed solely to inflame the jury's passions 
and prejudices." However, a fuller picture of both parties' closing arguments clarifies why 
respondent would have made those comments, for reasons that stretch beyond an intent to 
inflame the jury.  
 
 
Before respondent made the comments at issue in her rebuttal, defense counsel 
first repeatedly suggested that the victims were lying and made quite inflammatory 
remarks that—dare we say—sound a whole lot like an attempt to brand the victims. For 
example, she stated that J.M.'s account of the rape was fabricated, because if her story 
was true then "her face would have showed it." She also declared that "[i]t is not difficult 
to get up here and repeat a story about terrible things happening to you when there's no 
one to contradict you." She also speculated that perhaps M.W. made up the rape story 
because "she was looking for new meds" or "maybe she was looking for more attention." 
Defense counsel also called J.M. "intellectually, a little bit slower," and was quick to 
remind the jury of J.M.'s physical stature—"[s]he's a tall girl, she's a broad-shouldered 
girl. She can take care of herself." She also said that J.M.'s allegation was "unfounded" 
because she did not have "the face of a beaten woman." And lastly, defense counsel 
stated:  
 
"[J.M.] claims that she was anally raped and then that penis was immediately put in her 
mouth, and the State points out how awful that is. And when I was asking her about what 
she had done prior to going to the hospital, 'Did you shower? Did you eat? Did you 
change clothes'—I asked her if she brushed her teeth and she looked at me like that was a 
really stupid question and said, 'I don't know.' Well, I submit to you that if you were in 
that situation and someone had anally raped you and then forced you immediately to 
perform oral sex, one of things you darn tootin' would know is whether or not you 
cleaned your mouth, because I'm reckoning that's one of the first things that you would 
want to do. That would be of your utmost concern." (Emphasis added.)  
 
 
96 
 
Based on this slew of comments made by the defense, Hyten testified that in her 
view, it was "relatively clear that the primary objective of the defense, or at least one of 
them, was to brand these victims." And expert witness Dr. Julie Allison had testified at 
trial that victims are often reluctant "to report sexual assault because of the fear of being 
blamed, the fear of reprisal, and the stereotypes of what causes rape." 2019 WL 1413962, 
at *11. Importantly, it was only after these comments by the defense that respondent 
stated in rebuttal:  
 
"Are these gals looking for attention? The only attention they've got in this case is 
negative attention. [The victims] were described as passive, shy. They're not looking for 
attention. There's pictures of [J.M.]'s vagina put into evidence. Anybody want that 
attention? Dr. Allison talked to you about women do not report because they don't want 
the attention. This is a scarlet letter, is what this case is about, and the scarlet letter is 
simply this, that these three women have been branded. In the public and social media 
they've been branded, and nobody seeks out that type of attention. The ugliness that has 
been directed towards these women can be taken into consideration for you when you 
decide whether or not you believe their testimony."  
 
This statement, when viewed in context—i.e., immediately after the defense 
labeled the victims as attention seekers whose body types are not the type that can 
physically be raped, and that in any event, J.M.'s story must be fabricated because there is 
no way someone could have been brutally raped and sodomized if they could not 
remember when they brushed their teeth—seems to be an attempt on respondent's part to 
rebut the labels defense counsel placed on the victims. The defense's comments surely 
provide an obvious example of the type of attention and "branding" that rape victims do 
not want. 
 
 
97 
 
Despite our finding that respondent's conduct did not violate KRPC 8.4(d) in the 
Ewing trial, we still conclude that respondent's repeated patterns of misconduct in the 
Chandler trial clearly and convincingly support the panel's finding that respondent 
violated KRPC 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
 
II. Respondent's patterns of serious misconduct and dishonesty warrant disbarment. 
 
The final issue before us is determining the appropriate discipline to impose based 
on respondent's misconduct. The Disciplinary Administrator recommended to the 
panel—and maintains in his brief—that respondent should face indefinite suspension. 
The panel recommends that respondent be disbarred. Respondent recommends that she 
should receive no discipline. 
 
"We base our disciplinary decision on the facts and circumstances of the 
violations and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present. In re Johanning, 
292 Kan. 477, 490, 254 P.3d 545 (2011). And although not mandated by our rules, this 
court and disciplinary panels '[h]istorically' turn to the American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to guide the discipline discussion. . . .  
 
"Under that framework, we consider four factors in assessing punishment:  (1) 
the ethical duty violated by the lawyer; (2) the lawyer's mental state; (3) the actual or 
potential injury resulting from the misconduct; and (4) the existence of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances. ABA Standard 3.0. [Citations omitted.]" Kline, 298 Kan. at 
213. 
 
ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions sections 9.22 and 9.32 list 
aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered. Of these, the panel found that the 
following aggravating factors existed:  (1) prior disciplinary offenses; (2) pattern of 
misconduct; (3) multiple offenses; (4) submission of false evidence; (5) false statements 
or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (6) refusal to acknowledge 
 
98 
 
wrongful nature of conduct; and (7) substantial experience in the practice of law. The 
panel also identified the following mitigating factors:  (1) present and past attitude of 
the attorney as shown by her cooperation during the hearing and her full and free 
acknowledgment of the transgressions; (2) previous good character and reputation in the 
community including any letters from clients, friends, and lawyers in support of the 
character and general reputation of the attorney; (3) remorse; and (4) remoteness of prior 
offense. 
 
The evidence in this case demonstrates a serious pattern of grossly unethical 
misconduct. "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply 
that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the 
defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of 
sufficient evidence." KRPC 3.8 cmt. 1 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 395). Respondent failed in 
her obligation to act as a minister of justice in her prosecution of Dana Chandler. She 
ignored the order of a district court, repeatedly made arguments to the jury that lacked 
any evidentiary support, intentionally lied to this court in her briefs and in oral 
arguments, and made false statements during the disciplinary investigation.  
 
After carefully considering the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and the 
ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, we find that respondent's intolerable 
acts of deception warrant the severe sanction of disbarment. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Jacqueline J. Spradling is disbarred from the 
practice of law in the state of Kansas, effective on the filing of this opinion, in accordance 
with Supreme Court Rule 225(a)(1) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 275) for violations of KRPC 
3.1, 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), 3.4(e), 8.1, 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). 
 
99 
 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Judicial Administration strike the name 
of Jacqueline J. Spradling from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in Kansas. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 231 (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 286). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
 
 
* * * 
 
WILSON, J., dissenting:  Jacqueline Spradling is one of the most skilled, 
successful, and expert trial attorneys in this state. Today, we accept the panel's 
recommendation to take away her profession by disbarment, our most serious 
punishment, for ethical violations. Notably, we accept that recommendation even 
after we have discarded for lack of sufficient evidence many of the panel's most serious 
findings. Even considering all of the panel's findings, including those we now do not 
consider, the Disciplinary Administrator only recommended the lesser punishment of 
indefinite suspension. 
 
Oh, Spradling did make mistakes, and those mistakes were serious and costly. 
They caused reversals of convictions for murder and rape. But we also know some of 
Spradling's mistakes were based in part on mistakes made by other professionals who 
were honest and highly skilled.  
 
100 
Let's examine the nature of Spradling's mistakes. As summarized by the majority, 
she "ignored the order of a district court, repeatedly made arguments to the jury that 
lacked any evidentiary support, intentionally lied to this court in her briefs and in oral 
arguments, and made false statements during the disciplinary investigation." In re 
Spradling, 315 Kan. ___, ___, ___ P.3d 
___ (2022), slip op. at 98. Defiance of a district 
court order might deserve admonition, and arguments lacking evidentiary support may 
lead to a reversal of conviction, but disbarment? Doubtful, especially when, as here, there 
appears to be some basis for Spradling's arguments to the jury, though not found in the 
record. 
The most serious of the panel's findings relate to Spradling's acts of intentional 
falsehood. Acts of intentional falsehood are always serious. It is worth recognizing, 
however, those acts found by the panel, and those acts for which we find clear evidence, 
relate to Spradling's refusal to concede that she had ever intentionally lied—not to the 
jury, not to the panel, and not to this court. So she lied by insisting she hadn't. 
Spradling does concede she is guilty of stubborn pride. But the sins of pride and 
stubbornness are not mentioned in the disciplinary code. As her counsel describes, she 
has been hoisted on her own petard because of those sins. Clearly, Spradling's stubborn 
pride made her too confident and too comfortable with the risks she was taking. They 
undid her hard work. And more. 
We lawyers and judges police our ranks, and for that we should be proud. This 
court has the responsibility to examine and judge the wrongs done by those in our 
profession. And if those wrongs violate our demanding codes of ethics the violators 
should be punished. There is evidence sufficient to support findings that Spradling 
committed ethical violations. 
 
101 
 
I believe we have inadequately appreciated the reasons Spradling's mistakes 
happened, and I am convinced we have punished too harshly. 
 
I respectfully dissent from the majority's choice of discipline.