Title: Maisonave v. The Newark Bears Professional Baseball Club, Inc.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff Louis Maisonave suffered a facial injury when a foul ball struck him in the eye as he stood in the mezzanine at Riverfront Stadium, home of minor league baseball team The Newark Bears. The mezzanine is an open walking area exposed on one side to the baseball field. Vendors sell food and beverages on that level and restrooms are located there. At the time of the incident, vending carts dotted the mezzanine along both the first and third base lines on the field-side of the mezzanine. Although netting protected the seating area behind home plate and extended for some distance down both base lines, the beverage cart that Maisonave was patronizing was beyond the protection of the net. As he was talking with other people in the vending line, Maisonave was struck with a batted ball in the right eye, causing numerous fractures and other injuries. Alleging negligence, Maisonave sued The Newark Bears Professional Baseball Club, Inc. and Gourmet Dining Services, which provides food and beverage services to the stadium (hereinafter, the Bears). The Bears moved for summary judgment. The trial judge granted the motion, finding that the Bears had not breached their duty of care. In reaching that conclusion, the trial judge relied on Schneider v. American Hockey & Ice Skating Center, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 527, 533-34 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 387 (2001), which set forth a two-pronged duty of care for stadium owners and operators. Under Schneider, the operator must provide 1) protected seats sufficient for those spectators who may be reasonably anticipated to desire them, and 2) protection for the most dangerous sections of the stands a limited duty that ordinarily may be satisfied by screened seats behind home plate in baseball and behind the goals in hockey. Here, the trial court reasoned that the provision of at least two vending carts close to home plate and behind the screening, which Maisonave could have utilized, established that the Bears had not breached their limited duty to him, therefore they were not liable as a matter of law. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded. 371 N.J. Super. 129, 134 (2004). The panel found that the second component of Schneider, describing dangerous locations as home plate in baseball and the goals in hockey, was not intended to be exhaustive nor immutable. Instead, the panel determined that the measure of the duty is due care under all circumstances. HELD : An owner or operator of a stadium must provide protected seating to those who would seek it on an ordinary basis and provide screening in the most dangerous sections of the stands. The stands include the stairs providing access to the seats as well as the areas immediately adjacent to the stands dedicated solely to viewing the game. In respect of all other areas of a stadium, the proper standard of care is the business invitee rule, under which the owner or operator owes a duty of reasonable care to guard against any dangerous conditions on the property that he or she either knows about or should have discovered. 1. A landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to guard against any dangerous condition on his or her property that the owner knows about or should have discovered. The operator of a commercial recreational facility, like the operator of any other business, has a general duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its patrons. The limited duty rule, discussed by the Appellate Division in Schneider, is an exception to general negligence principles and to the business invitee standard of care in the commercial context. The rule establishes a fact-specific standard of care for injuries caused by errant balls at baseball stadiums by accounting for the open and obvious nature of the risk that batted balls pose to fans. (Pp. 7 9). 2. After considering the law in other states and recognizing that the limited duty rule fairly balances the practical and economic interest of owners and operators with the safety and entertainment interests of the fans, the Court adopts the Appellate Division's opinion in Schneider, to the extent that it holds that owners and operators must offer sufficient protected seating to those who would seek it on an ordinary basis and provide screening in the most dangerous sections of the stands. The Court recognizes that owners and operators would face undue hardship if forced to guarantee protection for all fans in the stands from every fly ball and that most spectators willingly expose themselves to the risks posed by flying balls and even actively engage in the game by trying to catch foul balls. It would be unfair to hold owners and operators liable for injuries to spectators in the stands when the potential danger of fly balls is an inherent, expected, and even desired part of the baseball fan's experience. (Pp. 9 14). 3. In the interest of clarity, the Court explains that the term "stands" includes the stairs that fans ascend and descend to access their seats in the stands. Similarly, areas immediately adjacent to the stands designated as "standing room only" and dedicated solely to viewing the game, fall within the purview of the limited duty rule. In contrast, multi-purpose areas, such as concourses and playground areas, are outside the scope of the rule. The measure of the operator's duty is due care under all the circumstances. Owners and operators must identify the areas of the stadium that are the most dangerous and take preventive steps to ensure fan safety to a reasonable extent. (Pp.14 15). 3. In respect of areas other than the stands, the Court recognizes that a different standard of care is appropriate, in part because of transformations in the game of baseball that have enabled players to hit baseballs harder and farther. Additionally, fans foreseeably and understandably let down their guard when they are in other areas of the stadium. In the areas outside of the stands, including concourses and mezzanines such as the one in this appeal, a commercial sports facility is no different than any other commercial establishment and courts do not hesitate to apply general negligence principles in virtually all other tort situations and the specialized business invitee rule to commercial enterprises. To apply the limited duty rule to the entire stadium would convert reasonable protection for owners to immunity by virtually eliminating their liability for foreseeable, preventable injuries to their patrons even when the fans are no longer engaged with the game. The Court does not impose strict liability for owners in areas outside of the stands, however. It simply applies traditional tort principles and concludes that the proper standard of care for all other areas of the stadium is the business invitee rule, which provides that a landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to guard against any dangerous conditions on his or her property that the owner either knows about or should have discovered. (Pp. 15 20). 4. In summation, the limited duty rule will apply to injuries occurring in the stands. Liability for injuries that occur in all other areas of the stadium will be governed by traditional rules of negligence, specifically the business invitee rule. (Pp. 20 22). The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as modified, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE WALLACE, CONCURRING in the majority's result, would reject the limited duty rule and apply traditional tort principles, including the business invitee rule, throughout the entire baseball stadium. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, CONCURRING in part and DISSENTING in part, joined by JUSTICE LaVECCHIA, agrees with the majority's decision to adopt the limited duty rule of Schneider as the duty of care an owner/operator of a sports facility must meet for the distinct peril of objects leaving the playing field. He would apply, however, the same duty of care for the same peril irrespective of the plaintiff's location when injured and adopt without modification the Appellate Division's analysis in Schneider. He is of the belief that there should be one duty and that the majority's creation of shifting duties of care for the same peril is fraught with uncertainty and inconsistency. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. JUSTICE WALLACE filed a separate concurring opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA joins. Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. THE NEWARK BEARS PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUB, INC. and GOURMET DINING SERVICES, Defendants-Appellants, and ABC CORP. (name being fictitious) and JOHN DOE (name being fictitious), Defendants. Argued February 14, 2005 Decided September 13, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 371 N.J. Super. 129 (2004). James J. Horan argued the cause for appellant Gourmet Dining Services (Mautone & Horan, attorneys). Timothy J. Schipske argued the cause for appellant The Newark Bears Professional Baseball Club, Inc. (Rawle & Henderson, attorneys). Frank DiGiovanni argued the cause for respondents (Kessler, DiGiovanni & Jesuele, attorneys). JUSTICE ZAZZALI delivered the opinion of the Court. The first recorded baseball game took place at the Elysian Fields in Hoboken on June 19, 1846. Leonard Koppett, Koppett s Concise History of Major League Baseball 7 (2004). Since then, the game has become an integral part of our American identity and has emerged as an ever-expanding business. George F. Will, Bunts 28 (1999) ( The business of America is business, and so, of course, is the national pastime. ); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282, 92 S. Ct. 2099, 2112, 32 L. Ed. 2d 728, 743 (1972) ( Professional baseball is a business and is engaged in interstate commerce. ). Between 1994 and 2001, eight minor league stadiums opened in New Jersey alone. As an increasing number of citizens flock to competitive baseball games, we confront difficult questions of tort liability. Here, a foul ball struck plaintiff in the face as he purchased a beverage from a mobile vending cart on the concourse of a minor league stadium. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court s grant of summary judgment in favor of the stadium owners and operators, holding that the trial court erred in finding that defendants had not violated their duty of care as a matter of law. In this appeal, we survey the law that has evolved concerning owner and operator liability and examine the boundaries of the limited duty rule. In doing so, we must accommodate the interests of both fans and owners. We hold that the limited duty rule, which restricts the tort liability of owners, applies in situations where an injury occurs in the stands. However, public policy and fairness require application of traditional negligence principles in all other areas of the stadium, including, but not limited to, concourses and mezzanine areas. [(Emphasis added.)] At his deposition, plaintiff described the incident: Q. What were you doing during that five or ten minutes? Were you trying to watch the game? A. No, I was talking with some people on line. A. No. Q. Did you see the ball leave the bat? A. Nothing, nothing. [(Emphasis added.)] The batted ball struck plaintiff in the right eye, causing numerous fractures and persistent numbness in the area of the eye, drooping of the eye, problems with his sinuses, and scarring. Alleging negligence, plaintiff sued The Newark Bears Professional Baseball Club, Inc., which leases Riverfront Stadium from the Essex County Improvement Authority, and defendant Gourmet Dining Services, which provides food and beverage services to Riverfront Stadium. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that they had not breached their duty of care. In reaching that conclusion, the trial court relied on Schneider v. American Hockey & Ice Skating Center, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 527, 533-34 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 387 (2001), which set forth a two-pronged duty of care for stadium owners and operators: [F]irst, the operator must provide protected seating sufficient for those spectators who may be reasonably anticipated to desire protected seats on an ordinary occasion, and second, the operator must provide protection for spectators in the most dangerous section of the stands. The second component of this limited duty ordinarily may be satisfied by the operator providing screened seats behind home plate in baseball and behind the goals in hockey. [(Citations omitted.)] The trial court reasoned that the provision of at least two vending carts close to home plate and behind the screening, which plaintiff could have utilized, established that defendants had not breached their limited duty to plaintiff and, therefore, were not liable to plaintiff as a matter of law. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded. Maisonave v. Newark Bears Prof l Baseball Club, Inc., 371 N.J. Super. 129, 134 (2004). Citing Schneider, the panel agreed that the operators of a commercial sports facility owe a limited duty to spectators. Id. at 133 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, focusing on the second part of the Schneider limited duty rule, the Appellate Division stated: When we said that the second component [of Schneider] may be satisfied by the operator providing screened seats behind home plate in baseball and behind the goals in hockey[,] our identification of those locations was not intended to be exhaustive nor immutable. Rather, the measure of that duty is due care under all the circumstances. [Ibid. (citations omitted).] We granted certification on the separate applications of defendants. 182 N.J. 142 (2004). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm and modify the decision of the Appellate Division. In our analysis, we consider general principles of tort liability, including the business invitee rule and its application to commercial establishments. Next, we examine the limited duty rule as an exception to the business invitee rule, its origins, its application in New Jersey and other jurisdictions, and concerns about the rule. We then determine whether we should adopt the limited duty rule, and if so, to what extent it should apply to the stands and to other areas of the stadium. . . . . This rule of law denies recovery to injured spectators as effectively as the old doctrines of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence ever did, and uses a fundamentally similar rationale to do so. [Akins, supra, 424 N.E.2d at 535, 537 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).] In 2002, when an errant puck struck and killed a thirteen-year-old girl attending a National Hockey League game in Ohio, the media intensified its focus on safety issues in both hockey arenas and baseball stadiums. See Phil Taylor, Death of a Fan, Sports Illustrated, Apr. 1, 2002, at 59; Steve Politi, Spotlight on Safety After Fan Death, Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 21, 2002, at 33. Since that time, some critics have described the limited duty rule as hopelessly anachronistic, David Horton, Note, Rethinking Assumption of the Risk and Sports Spectators, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 339, 365 (2003), and have noted that stadium owners are so insulated from legal responsibility that they are under little pressure to add more protection for fans, id. at 344-45 (quoting Politi, supra). [Gil Fried, Baseball Spectators Assumption of Risk: Is It Fair or Foul ?, 13 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 39, 58 (2002) (internal citation omitted).] Thus, owners and operators must reassess whether there is a sufficient amount of protected seating available in the most dangerous locations for those that might reasonably expect to obtain such seats. Ibid. [Maisonave, supra, 371 N.J. Super. at 134 (emphasis added).] We agree with that analysis and conclude that times of heightened vulnerability include all situations in which a patron is no longer in the stands. Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. THE NEWARK BEARS PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUB, INC. and GOURMET DINING SERVICES, Defendants-Appellants, and ABC CORP. (name being fictitious) and JOHN DOE (name being fictitious), Defendants. JUSTICE WALLACE, JR., concurring. I concur with the result in the majority opinion that traditional negligence principles apply to plaintiff s injury in the concourse of a baseball stadium. However, because I agree with the comment that the limited duty rule is hopelessly anachronistic, David Horton, Comment, Rethinking Assumption of Risk and Sports Spectators, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 339, 365 (2003), I write separately. Whether it is called the limited duty rule or the baseball rule, and I use those terms interchangeably, this appeal presents this Court with the opportunity to evaluate the public policy underlying stadium owner and operator liability. I would reject the limited duty rule and apply traditional tort principles throughout the entire baseball stadium. Such seats are particularly dangerous for parents with infants (babies should not even be allowed there), children (how many elementary school kids are riveted to each pitch for a three-hour game?) and the elderly (slowed reaction time makes them vulnerable). Children and seniors are an important part of minor league and spring training games, typically held in small ballparks in which even the premium seats are affordable. The risk, however, is enormous for even the most athletic onlookers. In 1992 California Angels pitcher Matt Keough was hit in the right temple and nearly killed by a line drive while seated in the dugout of Scottsdale Stadium in Arizona. A fence was installed in front of the dugout for the safety of the players and staff. [Tom Verducci, Safety Squeeze, Sports Illustrated, Apr. 1, 2002, at 64.] Whether the defendant reasonably believes that the plaintiff is aware of a risk and voluntarily undertakes it may be relevant to whether the defendant acted reasonably. The defendant might reasonably have relied on the plaintiff to avoid the known risk, or other policy considerations may dictate that the defendant has no duty or a limited duty to the plaintiff. See 2, Comment j; Restatement Second, Torts 282. Whether the plaintiff is aware of a risk and voluntarily assumes it may also be relevant to whether the plaintiff s conduct is a superseding cause. See Restatement Second, Torts 442. Comparative responsibility may affect what constitutes a superseding cause, but that issue is beyond the scope of this Restatement. [Restatement (Third) of Torts; Apportionment of Liab. 3 cmt. c (2000).] Illustration number six of section three of the Restatement specifically addresses the sports stadium scenario and provides that: A attends a baseball game at B s ballpark. A sits in a portion of the stands beyond the point where the screen prevents balls from entering the seats. A is aware that balls occasionally are hit into the stands. The fact that A knew balls are occasionally hit into the stands does not constitute assumption of risk. The fact that A knew balls occasionally are hit into the stands is relevant in evaluating whether A acted reasonably by engaging in particular types of conduct while sitting in the stands (sitting in the stands would not itself constitute unreasonable conduct). If the factfinder concludes that A did not act reasonably under the circumstances, A s knowledge of the risk is relevant to the percentage of responsibility the factfinder assigns to A. See 8. If B could reasonably assume that A and other fans are aware that balls are occasionally hit into the stands, this fact is also relevant to whether B acted reasonably in relying on A to watch out for balls instead of constructing a screen or providing warnings. [Id. at cmt. c, illus. 6.] Accordingly, I would follow the Restatement and apply the business invitee rule and comparative negligence principles to assess liability for injuries caused at a baseball stadium. A trier of fact should consider all of the circumstances to determine whether the owner and operator have breached their duty of care to the plaintiff. That view does not impose a requirement on owners and operators to guarantee protection for all fans[.] Ante at ___ (slip op. at 13). Instead, the application of traditional tort principles, such as comparative negligence, will adequately even out the playing field for both sides. See Restatement, supra. Simply stated, if the elements of the business invitee rule are present, then the injured fan should have the opportunity to seek redress and a jury should decide whether the owner and operator of the stadium should bear any responsibility for that injury. Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. THE NEWARK BEARS PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUB, INC. and GOURMET DINING SERVICES, Defendants-Appellants, and ABC CORP. (name being fictitious) and JOHN DOE (name being fictitious), Defendants. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, concurring in part and dissenting in part. This appeal requires that we address what duty, if any, a baseball stadium operator or its concessionaires owe patrons with respect to a peril unique to sports facilities: objects leaving the playing field that strike and injure patrons. On summary judgment, the trial court held that the limited duty rule set forth in Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice Skating Ctr., Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 387 (2001), barred the causes of action pressed here. Accepting the trial court s articulation of the limited duty rule, the Appellate Division nonetheless created an exception to the limited duty rule for those patrons who have left their seats and are in the process of placing orders or reaching for money or accepting the purchases or striking up conversations with others [in] line . . . . Maisonave v. Newark Bears Prof l Baseball Club, Inc., 371 N.J. Super. 129, 134 (App. Div. 2004). Focusing on whether a patron is a spectator and distinguishing those instances when the patron/spectator is no longer paying attention to the sporting contest and is otherwise engaged in one of the sports arena s commercial venture[s] which by its nature induces spectators to let down their guard, the panel held that the baseball stadium operator and its concessionaires have a concomitant duty to exercise reasonable care to protect [the inattentive spectators] during such times of heightened vulnerability. Ibid. Sustaining, but modifying, the Appellate Division s reasoning, a majority of this Court now adopt[s] the Appellate Division s opinion in Schneider, to the extent that it holds that owners and operators must offer sufficient protected seating to those who would seek it on an ordinary basis and to provide screening in the most dangerous sections of the stands. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 13-14). The majority then defines the area where the limited duty rule applies -- the stands -- to include[] the stairs that fans ascend and descend to access their seats in the stands. Similarly, areas immediately adjacent to the stands designated as standing room only, and dedicated solely to viewing the game, fall within the purview of the limited duty rule. In contrast, multi-purpose areas, such as concourses and playground areas, are outside the scope of the rule, . . . . [Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 14).] Relying on Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 503 (1994) for the proposition that [r]ecognition of a duty of care, ultimately, rests on considerations of public policy and on notions of fairness, ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 12, 15), the majority distinguishes between the areas within a sports facility where the duty of care of the owner/operator is defined by the limited duty rule and those areas of the stadium outside of the stands, ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 16), where the duty of care of the owner/operator is the business invitee rule, which provides that a landowner owe[s] a duty of reasonable care to guard against any dangerous condition on his or her property that the owner either knows about or should have discovered. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 20) (citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 434 (1993)). Insofar as the majority adopts the limited duty rule of Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice Skating Ctr., Inc. as the duty of care an owner/operator of a sports facility must meet for the distinct peril of objects leaving the playing field, I concur with the majority s conclusion. However, to the extent the majority creates a hybrid duty of care for exactly the peril addressed by the limited duty rule -- a hybrid duty of care that hinges solely on where a plaintiff s volitional acts take him or her and is independent of any act by the party ultimately held liable -- I respectfully dissent. I would apply the same duty of care (the limited duty rule) for the same peril (objects leaving the playing field) irrespective of the plaintiff s location when injured. Although the operator of a commercial recreational facility, like the operator of any other business, has a general duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its patrons, the measure of that duty is due care under all the circumstances. The critical circumstance that determines the scope of the duty of an operator of a baseball field or hockey rink is that most spectators prefer to sit where they can have an unobstructed view of the game and are willing to expose themselves to the risks posed by flying balls or pucks to obtain that view. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to accommodate this preference, so long as the sports facility operator provides sufficient screened seats for those spectators who may be reasonably expected to request protected seats and also screens any seats that pose an unduly high risk of injury from flying balls or pucks. [Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544 (1984) (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied) (holding limited by N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.7).] It is beyond question that [a] cause of action founded upon negligence involves a breach of a duty of care that causes injury. Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 484 (1987) (citations omitted). We analyze what duty of care is owed through the dual prism of the peril we seek to protect against and the party that owes the duty in the first instance. Ibid. ( What precautions are reasonable depends upon the risk of harm involved and the practicality of preventing it. We ordinarily evaluate a defendant s conduct on the basis of what a prudent man would have done in defendant s circumstances. ). In determining the duty of care to be imposed, our focus is on the defendant s acts or omissions, not those of the plaintiff. To be logically consistent, a duty of care imposed on a defendant in respect of an identified peril cannot be altered solely at the whim of the plaintiff because [t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed; it is the risk reasonably within the range of apprehension, of injury to another person, that is taken into account in determining the existence of the duty to exercise care. Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139, 144 (1977) (quoting 57 Am.Jur 2d Negligence 58 (1970)); see also Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 503 (1997); Kuehn v. Pub Zone, 364 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App. Div. 2003). To that extent, the position advanced by Justice Wallace in his concurrence in the result is the logical analog to what I express in dissent: there should be one, and only one, duty of care in respect of an identified peril, and the creation of shifting duties of care for the same peril is fraught with uncertainty and inconsistency. Thus, although Justice Wallace and I differ in our conclusions -- Justice Wallace would jettison the limited duty rule in its entirety in favor of a common law negligence duty of care, ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005), while I would apply the limited duty rule uniformly across all circumstances affected by the peril we seek to control -- we agree on the core principle: one and only one standard of care should apply in respect of the peril of objects leaving the playing field. Finally, the majority understates the burden that its holding places on stadium owner/operators. As the majority recognizes, in a seven year period, eight minor league baseball stadiums opened in New Jersey alone. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 2). Each such stadium was designed and constructed under what was then the law in New Jersey: Schneider s limited duty rule. Based on diffuse notions of fairness that are not tethered to either law or proper public policy, See footnote 5 each such stadium now is presented with a Hobson s choice: either incur the expenses for substantial retrofitting, or, unless relief is provided through the Legislature, serve as little more than a hothouse for budding tort litigation. To date, the Legislature has seen fit to live with the balancing of interests that the limited duty rule represents. If the Legislature perceives that balancing to be preferable to the hybrid rule the majority embraces, then it may opt to speak to this subject directly. See footnote 6 Simply said, the trial court had it right. Because I cannot subscribe to the majority s reasoning as set forth in Parts IV and V of the majority s opinion, ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 15-21), I respectfully dissent. Justice LaVecchia joins in this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-59/60 SEPTEMBER TERM 2004 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court LOUIS MAISONAVE and MYRNA MAISONAVE, his wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. THE NEWARK BEARS PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUB, INC., and GOURMET DINING SERVICES, Defendants-Appellants, and ABC CORP. (name being Fictitious) and JOHN DOE (name being fictitious), Defendants. DECIDED September 13, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY Justice Rivera-Soto CONCURRING OPINION BY Justice Wallace