Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Jeffrey D. Knickmeier

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 115 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2438-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jeffrey D. Knickmeier, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey D. Knickmeier,  
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KNICKMEIER 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 21, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 1, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs.   
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Jeffrey 
D. Knickmeier, McFarland, and oral argument by Jeffrey D. 
Knickmeier. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Frank 
M. Tuerkheimer, Jeffrey Schneider and LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, 
Madison, and oral argument by Frank M. Tuerkheimer. 
 
 
2004 WI 115 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2438-D  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jeffrey D. Knickmeier, Attorney  
at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey D. Knickmeier,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 21, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
revoked.    
 
¶1 
PER 
CURIAM.   Attorney 
Jeffrey 
D. 
Knickmeier 
(hereafter Knickmeier or respondent) has appealed from the 
referee's report including findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which was filed in this court on September 30, 2003.  After 
a public hearing, the referee determined that of the 23 counts 
of misconduct alleged by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) 
in 
its 
complaint 
filed 
against 
Knickmeier, 
the 
evidence 
established, or Knickmeier admitted, that he had committed 21 of 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
2 
 
those separate counts.  Specifically, Knickmeier admitted the 
violations alleged in 8 of the counts, and the referee, the 
Honorable Dennis Flynn, concluded that the OLR had established 
by clear and convincing evidence Knickmeier's violations of the 
remaining counts except for two.  Based on the 21 counts of 
misconduct 
by 
Knickmeier, 
the 
referee 
recommended 
that 
Knickmeier's license to practice law in this state be revoked.  
¶2 
On this appeal, Knickmeier does not specifically 
challenge the referee's findings nor does he assert that the 
evidence was insufficient to support these findings.  Rather, 
Knickmeier's focus on appeal is on the procedures followed by 
the OLR in pursuing this disciplinary matter, especially what 
Knickmeier 
perceives 
to 
have 
been 
the 
improper 
and 
unconstitutional temporary suspension of his license to practice 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
3 
 
law pursuant to SCR 22.21 as ordered by this court on June 14, 
2001.1   
¶3 
In addition to challenging the temporary suspension, 
on 
this 
appeal, 
Knickmeier 
also 
disputes 
the 
referee's 
revocation 
recommendation. 
 
According 
to 
Knickmeier, 
his 
                                                 
1 On February 19, 2001, the OLR, by its director, filed a 
motion requesting this court to temporarily suspend Knickmeier's 
license pursuant to SCR 22.21(1).  Under that rule, this court, 
after giving the attorney an opportunity to show cause and 
respond to the OLR's motion, may temporarily suspend an 
attorney's license " . . . where it appears that the attorney's 
continued practice of law poses a threat to the interest of the 
public and the administration of justice."  After OLR's motion 
was filed, this court ordered Knickmeier to show cause and 
respond which he did on March 13, 2001.  In that response, 
Knickmeier conceded that he had violated certain supreme court 
rules as the OLR's motion had alleged.  Specifically, he 
admitted his failure to maintain all of the required internal 
accounting ledgers under SCR 20:1.15; he also admitted "some 
commingling of funds"; and he admitted a failure to produce a 
complete comprehensive accounting to his client on demand.  In 
this response, however, Knickmeier asserted that these were mere 
accounting violations.  Knickmeier suggested that rather than 
temporarily suspending his license under SCR 22.21(1), this 
court should impose certain monitoring conditions on his license 
pending completion of the then-pending OLR investigation of the 
grievance filed against Knickmeier by a former client on 
September 21, 2000.   
Rejecting 
Knickmeier's 
suggestion 
that 
conditions 
be 
imposed on his license pending the OLR's investigation, this 
court 
instead 
on 
June 
14, 
2001, 
temporarily 
suspended 
Knickmeier's license pursuant to SCR 20:21(1).  His license 
remains suspended under this rule.   
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
4 
 
violations of the Rules of Attorneys Professional Responsibility2 
would warrant, at most, a six-month to one-year suspension of 
his license to practice law.   
¶4 
We determine that the referee's findings of facts are 
not clearly erroneous.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 (1997).  
Those findings were supported by the clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence presented at the public hearing held in this 
disciplinary matter.  After our de novo review of the referee's 
conclusions of law, see In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718, we 
agree with the referee that the extensive pattern of misconduct 
Knickmeier acknowledges, as well as the misconduct as found by 
the 
referee, 
reflects 
serious, 
wide-spread, 
and 
repeated 
violations of the Rules of Attorneys Professional Responsibility 
warranting the revocation of Knickmeier's license to practice 
law in this state.  Accordingly, we adopt the referee's findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and we revoke Knickmeier's 
license to practice law in this state.  We further agree with 
                                                 
2 Effective 
October 
1, 
2000, 
Wisconsin's 
attorney 
disciplinary process was substantially restructured.  The name 
of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases 
involving attorney misconduct was changed from the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation and the supreme court rules applicable to the 
lawyer regulation were also revised in part.  Some of the 
conduct underlying this case arose prior to October 1, 2000.  
However, the complainant in this case will be referred to as the 
OLR.  All references to supreme court rules will be to the 
current version of the supreme court rules unless otherwise 
noted. 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
5 
 
the referee that Knickmeier should be required to pay to the OLR 
all the costs connected with this disciplinary proceeding now 
totaling $27,085.04.  
¶5 
Jeffrey D. Knickmeier was admitted to practice law in 
this state on September 15, 1978, and since then has engaged in 
the general practice of law in the McFarland-Madison area.  He 
has twice previously been privately reprimanded for professional 
misconduct. 
¶6 
The genesis of the instant disciplinary proceeding 
against Knickmeier occurred when J.R., an individual Knickmeier 
had represented since 1997, complained in September 2000 that 
Knickmeier had borrowed several thousand dollars from J.R. to 
purchase an airplane and later a motorcycle and that Knickmeier 
had not repaid the money.  J.R. also complained to OLR that 
Knickmeier 
had 
spent 
more 
than 
$45,000 
of 
J.R.'s 
money 
Knickmeier had been holding in his trust account while J.R. was 
incarcerated.  Further, according to J.R., despite written 
agreements and assurances, Knickmeier had never provided the 
promised accountings for the expenditures of the monies and had 
little or no documentation to substantiate or corroborate his 
explanations for the expenditures.  
¶7 
In response to the OLR's request, Knickmeier submitted 
several explanations and post hoc attempts to document the 
expenditures of J.R.'s monies from his trust account.  The OLR, 
however, found Knickmeier's responses and explanations to be 
inadequate; consequently, on February 19, 2001, OLR filed a 
motion in this court requesting the temporary suspension of 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
6 
 
Knickmeier's license pursuant to SCR 22.21(1).  On June 14, 
2001, this court (Bradley, J., dissenting), granted the motion 
and temporarily suspended Knickmeier's license to practice law 
in this state; his license remains suspended.3 
¶8 
On September 13, 2002, the OLR filed in this court its 
complaint (amended on October 11, 2002) alleging that Knickmeier 
had committed 23 counts of misconduct.  Knickmeier subsequently 
filed his answer admitting some of the allegations but denying 
others.  In that answer, and during the hearing before the 
referee, Knickmeier admitted violating 8 of the 23 counts.  As 
                                                 
3 On August 26, 2003, Knickmeier commenced an action in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Wisconsin challenging this temporary suspension and seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief.  He named the OLR, its 
director, the state, the attorney general and this court as 
defendants.  He also sought monetary damages from the OLR 
director.  Knickmeier challenged his temporary suspension on due 
process and equal protection grounds.  He also alleged that the 
supreme court rules prohibiting an attorney whose license has 
been suspended from engaging in the practice of law in this 
state, see SCR 22.26(2) and SCR 22.27(3), are unconstitutionally 
overbroad insofar as they purport to regulate practice before 
federal courts or federal agencies.   
On October 7, 2003, the federal district court, relying on 
the abstention doctrine, denied Knickmeier's motion for a 
preliminary injunction and dismissed his complaint without 
prejudice.  See Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State 
Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423 (1982).  Knickmeier appealed that 
dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit and that court on May 3, 2004, affirmed the Federal 
District 
Court's 
judgment 
dismissing 
Knickmeier's 
federal 
lawsuit; however, relying on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, See 
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), 
the Seventh Circuit modified that dismissal to reflect a 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
7 
 
noted, after the public hearing, the referee concluded that the 
OLR had proven by clear and convincing evidence all of the 
remaining counts except for two.  Then, based on Knickmeier's 21 
counts of misconduct, the referee recommended that Knickmeier's 
license to practice law in this state be revoked.   
¶9 
On this appeal Knickmeier reiterates that a six-month 
to one-year suspension should be the appropriate sanction for 
his misconduct because, according to Knickmeier, his actions 
were motivated by altruism rather than avarice.  Knickmeier's 
basic argument in his altruism defense is that his actions were 
actually compelled in order to save his client, J.R., from 
financial ruin and also to protect the community from J.R.'s 
ongoing drug and alcohol consumption.  Knickmeier observes that 
under SCR 20:1.2,4 he could not assist his client in conduct that 
was criminal.  Knickmeier maintains on this appeal that J.R.'s 
drug habit and spendthrift pattern of behavior necessitated 
Knickmeier's actions in order to protect J.R. from his own 
vices.  Moreover, according to Knickmeier, in the year preceding 
the filing of this grievance, J.R. had squandered $60,000 to 
$70,000, mostly on alcohol and drugs and on one day, had spent 
more than $4500 on cocaine.  Knickmeier claims that his duty and 
desire was to protect J.R. and his assets, and thus, all of 
Knickmeier's actions, misguided as some turned out to be, were 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:1.2 provides, in pertinent part: "(d) A lawyer 
shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in 
conduct 
that 
the 
lawyer 
knows 
is 
criminal 
or 
fraudulent, . . . ."  
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
8 
 
for J.R.'s benefit.  On this appeal Knickmeier faults the OLR 
for refusing to recognize the altruistic basis for his actions.  
¶10 Knickmeier also argues on appeal that several of the 
misconduct counts should have been dismissed because the OLR 
investigator had failed to include exculpatory information in 
her report to the OLR director and then to the Preliminary 
Review Committee (PRC) as the rules require.  According to 
Knickmeier, although he borrowed money from J.R. to purchase an 
airplane, the PRC should have been informed that J.R. had 
retained a security interest in the airplane (which had an 
agreed value of $17,250) which secured the loan balance.  
Knickmeier asserts that the OLR's investigative report submitted 
to the PRC should have pointed out that in light of the value of 
the collateral and J.R.'s secured interest in it, J.R.'s funds 
were never really at risk in this loan transaction.   
¶11 In 
addition, 
Knickmeier 
contends 
that 
the 
OLR 
investigative report submitted to the PRC should have included 
information about J.R.'s spendthrift habits, including his 
spending on drugs and alcohol.  Because that report failed to 
note these two important pieces of exculpatory information, 
Knickmeier asserts this disciplinary proceeding should have been 
dismissed at least with respect to these counts which were in 
dispute before the referee.   
¶12 Knickmeier also contends that he should not be 
required, as the referee recommended, to pay the full costs of 
this disciplinary proceeding.  
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
9 
 
¶13 Knickmeier's specific arguments will be discussed in 
more detail in the following portions of this opinion which 
outline the specific counts of misconduct Knickmeier has been 
found to have committed.  
COUNTS 1 AND 2——AIRPLANE LOAN 
¶14 Count 1 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.8(a).5  In 
general, this rule prohibits a lawyer from entering into a 
business transaction with a client unless the terms are fair and 
reasonable to the client; in addition, the terms must be fully 
disclosed and transmitted to the client in the manner which can 
be reasonably understood by the client.  The client then must be 
given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent 
counsel and consent in writing to the transaction.   
                                                 
5 SCR 20:1.8(a) provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business 
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an 
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary 
interest adverse to a client unless:  
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the 
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing to the client in a manner which can be 
reasonably understood by the client;  
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity 
to seek the advice of independent counsel in the 
transaction; and  
(3) the client consents in writing thereto. 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
10 
 
¶15 Count 2 alleged a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).6  This 
rule, among other things, states that it is professional 
misconduct 
for 
a 
lawyer 
to 
engage 
in 
conduct 
involving 
"dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."   
¶16 The testimony at the hearing before the referee 
established that Knickmeier borrowed $12,000 from J.R. on 
September 3, 1998, in order to purchase an airplane for himself.  
J.R. did not have a pilot's license.  At the time of this 
transaction, 
Knickmeier 
executed 
a 
promissory 
note 
which 
required the repayment of the loan within 12 months with monthly 
payments of $200 at an interest rate of 15 percent per year.   
¶17 The referee determined that although that agreement 
was in writing as required by SCR 20:1.8, the loan nevertheless 
violated that rule because J.R.'s written agreement to this 
transaction had not been obtained until approximately 12 days 
after Knickmeier had obtained the $12,000 from him.  In 
addition, the referee found that: The airplane had been 
purchased solely for Knickmeier's benefit; the loan had not been 
repaid within the time specified; and the terms of the contract 
had not been complied with.  According to the referee, the fact 
that the airplane was adequate collateral for the loan was 
irrelevant because J.R. was unable to use his economic resources 
as freely as he desired since the loan had not been repaid 
within the agreed upon timeframe.  Furthermore, the referee 
                                                 
6 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to: (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
11 
 
noted that Knickmeier had acknowledged that he was aware that he 
was required to obtain the signed consent of his client before 
taking the loan from him.   
¶18 The referee was not persuaded by Knickmeier's altruism 
defense or his argument that he was merely acting to protect 
J.R. from wasting his assets on alcohol and drug addictions.  
The referee observed that statutory procedures set out for 
guardianships in Wis. Stat. ch. 880 (2001-02),7 were available 
for dealing with a spendthrift client.  See Wis. Stat. § 880.03.  
According to the referee, Knickmeier's claim that he took J.R.'s 
money to protect it from being wasted "rings hollow" in light of 
the fact that the airplane only benefited Knickmeier and most of 
the loan payments were made only after J.R. had filed his 
grievance and the OLR had filed the misconduct complaint against 
Knickmeier.  The referee concluded that the OLR had established 
by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Knickmeier 
had 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.8(a) 
by 
knowingly 
engaging 
in 
an 
impermissible business transaction with his client.  
¶19 Similarly, with respect to Count 2, based on the 
evidence and testimony at the hearing, the referee concluded 
that Knickmeier had failed to disclose to J.R. at the time of 
the $12,000 airplane loan that Knickmeier himself had a 
checkered 
financial 
history——to 
wit, 
Knickmeier 
had 
made 
multiple Chapter 13 filings in federal bankruptcy court and at 
                                                 
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
12 
 
the time of this loan, Knickmeier's debts totaled more than 
$100,000.  According to the referee, information regarding the 
lawyer's creditworthiness, or lack thereof, would be important 
information for a client to have in order to make an informed 
decision about whether to consent or reject the lawyer's request 
for a loan.   
¶20 Likewise, 
the 
referee 
was 
not 
persuaded 
by 
Knickmeier's argument that he had acted out of altruism in 
trying to protect J.R. from himself; instead, the referee found 
that Knickmeier had intentionally acted to conceal his own poor 
credit status with intent to mislead J.R. into lending him the 
$12,000.  Thus, the referee concluded that the OLR had 
established by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that 
Knickmeier had violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by engaging in intentional 
fraud, dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining the 
airplane loan.  
COUNTS 3, 4, 5, AND 6——DEPLETION OF TRUST ACCOUNT 
¶21 Count 3 alleged the second of the six counts in the 
OLR complaint charging Knickmeier with violating SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶22 Count 4 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.15(d)8 which in 
general, requires a lawyer who is in possession of property in 
                                                 
8 SCR 20:1.15(d) provides: 
(d) When, in the representation, a lawyer is in 
possession of property in which both the lawyer and 
another person claim interests, the property shall be 
treated by the lawyer as trust property until there is 
an accounting and severance of their interests. If a 
dispute arises concerning their respective interests, 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
13 
 
which the lawyer and another person claim an interest, to keep 
that property as trust property until there is an accounting and 
severance of the disputed interest.  Knickmeier admitted this 
count of misconduct. 
¶23 Count 5 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.15(b).9  
Knickmeier also admitted his violation of this rule which 
requires a lawyer, upon the request of a client, to render a 
full accounting regarding property held in trust.   
¶24 Count 6 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.15(e).10  
Knickmeier also admitted his misconduct with respect to this 
                                                                                                                                                             
the portion in dispute shall continue to be treated as 
trust property until the dispute is resolved.  
9 SCR 20:1.15(b) provides: 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in 
which a client or third person has an interest, a 
lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third 
person in writing. Except as stated in this rule or 
otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client 
or third person any funds or other property that the 
client or third person is entitled to receive and, 
upon request by the client or third person, shall 
render a full accounting regarding such property. 
10 SCR 20:1.15(e) provides: 
(e) Complete records of trust account funds and 
other trust property shall be kept by the lawyer and 
shall be preserved for a period of at least six years 
after termination of the representation. Complete 
records shall include: (i) a cash receipts journal, 
listing the sources and date of each receipt, (ii) a 
disbursements journal, listing the date and payee of 
each disbursement, with all disbursements being paid 
by check, (iii) a subsidiary ledger containing a 
separate page for each person or company for whom 
funds have been received in trust, showing the date 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
14 
 
rule which in general, requires the lawyer to keep complete 
records of trust account funds and other trust property 
including a disbursement journal listing the date and payee of 
each disbursement with all disbursements being paid by check. 
¶25 In this grouping of counts relating to the depletion 
of J.R.'s monies held by Knickmeier in his trust account, only 
Count 3 which alleged fraud, misrepresentation, deceit or 
dishonesty, was at issue at the hearing before the referee 
because as noted, Knickmeier had acknowledged his misconduct as 
alleged in Counts 4, 5, and 6.   
¶26 The evidence the referee heard established that in 
early 1999 while Knickmeier was representing J.R. in connection 
with J.R.'s mother's estate, certain property was sold resulting 
in a $45,785 payment to J.R.  That money was deposited by 
Knickmeier in his trust account because J.R. was, at that time, 
incarcerated.  On March 1, 1999, Knickmeier traveled to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
and amount of each receipt, the date and amount of 
each disbursement, and any unexpended balance, (iv) a 
monthly schedule of the subsidiary ledger, indicating 
the balance of each client's account at the end of 
each month, (v) a determination of the cash balance 
(checkbook balance) at the end of each month, taken 
from the cash receipts and cash disbursement journals 
and a reconciliation of the cash balance (checkbook 
balance) with the balance indicated in the bank 
statement, and (vi) monthly statements, including 
canceled 
checks, 
vouchers 
or 
share 
drafts, 
and 
duplicate deposit slips. A record of all property 
other than cash which is held in trust for clients or 
third persons, as required by paragraph (a) hereof, 
shall also be maintained. All trust account records 
shall be deemed to have public aspects as related to 
the lawyer's fitness to practice. 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
15 
 
prison where J.R. was incarcerated and obtained J.R.'s signature 
on an agreement which set forth guidelines for Knickmeier's 
supervision of the trust account monies.  That agreement, which 
Knickmeier also signed, provided, among other things, that 
Knickmeier would not disburse any funds from the account unless 
previously authorized by J.R. either orally or in writing.   
¶27 In his testimony 
before 
the referee, 
Knickmeier 
asserted that it was his intent when he signed that agreement to 
protect these funds from being wasted by J.R. on alcohol, drugs, 
and criminal activities.  The referee, however, also heard 
testimony that only three months after the agreement was signed, 
the trust account funds were totally depleted by Knickmeier.  By 
June 5, 1999, J.R.'s money in the account had been expended and 
the guidelines in the agreement between Knickmeier and J.R. had 
not been followed from the very first day.  The referee found 
that on March 1, 1999, Knickmeier withdrew more than $500 from 
the account in order to pay his phone bill, and the following 
day he withdrew an additional $838.83.  Thus, according to the 
referee, by March 2, 1999, Knickmeier had already disbursed more 
to himself from J.R.'s trust monies than he was entitled to 
receive under his agreement with J.R.   
¶28 In addition, the referee determined that Knickmeier 
had extended loans to himself from the trust account funds 
without any documentation.  Specifically, on two separate 
occasions, Knickmeier had withdrawn $1100 for himself which he 
later described as a "principal advance."  That first $1100 
"principal advance" occurred on May 10, 1999, as part of a $3000 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
16 
 
withdrawal from the trust account made that day by Knickmeier; 
the second $1100 "principal advance" was made on May 20, 1999, 
as part of another $3200 withdrawal made by Knickmeier from the 
trust account on that day.  Knickmeier acknowledged at the 
hearing before the referee that he had not obtained J.R.'s prior 
consent for those two "principal advances."  According to 
Knickmeier he thought that was unnecessary because he considered 
these advances to be part of an earlier loan.   
¶29 Although Knickmeier had not prepared a contemporaneous 
document reflecting these disbursements, after J.R.'s grievance 
was filed, and in response to the OLR's request for information 
and 
documentation, 
Knickmeier 
drafted 
a 
document 
then 
identifying these two $1100 withdrawals as "principal advances."   
¶30 The referee also noted that Knickmeier had taken a 
loan from J.R.'s trust account monies in order to finance the 
purchase of one-half interest in a motorcycle; Knickmeier had 
also paid his office phone bill and had purchased athletic event 
tickets using money from the trust account.  The referee 
determined that all of those transactions had occurred without 
Knickmeier having first obtained J.R.'s authorization in writing 
as the March 1, 1999, agreement required.  Based on the 
evidence, 
including 
OLR's 
analysis 
of 
Knickmeier's 
later-
constructed trust account records, the referee found that 
Knickmeier had repeatedly used the trust account funds for his 
own, not J.R.'s purposes.  The referee wrote: 
 
Respondent's position of acting to protect these 
funds for [J.R.] is not supported by the credible 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
17 
 
evidence.  These funds were not protected in any way 
and Respondent used this money often for his own 
benefit.  He also failed to provide any meaningful 
accounting as was repeatedly requested by [J.R.].  
When the accounting was provided, it was after 
misconduct claims had been filed.  The withdrawal of 
funds by Respondent from this $45,785 deposit occurred 
without the consent of [J.R.].  The testimony of 
[J.R.] is credible on this point as it is corroborated 
by communications to or about Respondent . . . . 
¶31 According to the referee, Knickmeier had violated SCR 
20:8.4(c) as alleged in Count 3 by withdrawing funds from J.R.'s 
trust account for personal purposes without any notice to or 
consent from J.R., and by not keeping current records of trust 
account 
withdrawals. 
 
The 
referee 
determined 
that 
this 
constituted dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.  
Furthermore, 
characterizing 
the 
March 
1, 
1999, 
guideline 
agreement as "fraudulent" from the time it was signed, the 
referee found that Knickmeier had, from the very first day of 
the agreement, used it to obtain personal access to J.R.'s 
funds.  The referee reasoned that Knickmeier's actions in 
concealing what had happened to the money after the account had 
been 
depleted, 
supported 
the 
conclusion 
that 
Knickmeier 
" . . . had intentionally and without consent used much of the 
trust money for his own purposes and not those of his client."  
Specifically, Knickmeier had used the funds to pay his law 
office phone bills, to purchase athletic event tickets, and the 
one-half interest in a motorcycle.  
¶32 As noted, 
Knickmeier 
admitted his 
misconduct as 
alleged in Counts 4, 5, and 6 of the OLR's complaint.  He 
acknowledged that he had made disbursements from the trust 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
18 
 
account before an accounting and severance of interest had 
occurred, and that he had paid himself funds that he should have 
held in trust until he provided J.R. with an accounting, 
something he also failed to do.  Knickmeier also admitted that, 
as alleged in Count 5, he had failed to timely respond to J.R.'s 
request for an accounting and, as alleged in Count 6, he had 
failed to keep the records required for trust account funds 
including a disbursements journal listing the date and payment 
of each disbursement and a listing of the trust account checks 
he had written to himself.  Although Knickmeier acknowledged 
this misconduct with respects to Counts 4, 5, and 6, he claimed 
these violations were "technical" and "de minimus" violations 
which did not harm his client.   
COUNT 7——FOOTBALL TICKETS 
¶33 Count 7 alleged another violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶34 The 
facts 
supporting 
this 
count 
alleging 
that 
Knickmeier had engaged in fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty 
or deceit, included Knickmeier's use of $653 of the trust 
account funds to purchase tickets to Green Bay Packer and 
University of Wisconsin Badger football games.  The evidence 
revealed that J.R. had used some of the Badger tickets and one 
of the Packer tickets for a total of $202; the remaining 
tickets, worth $451, however, were used personally by Knickmeier 
or sold by him.11 
                                                 
11 At the hearing before the referee, Knickmeier and the OLR 
entered into a stipulation with respect to certain facts.  This 
stipulation asserted that J.R. had used tickets totaling $202 
and Knickmeier had used tickets totaling $451. 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
19 
 
¶35 Based on the testimony regarding this count, the 
referee determined that Knickmeier had violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by 
buying athletic event tickets for his own use and enjoyment 
which he paid for from funds belonging to his client which were 
kept in the trust account.  The referee determined that this 
conduct was "intentional" and that Knickmeier's dishonesty was 
further demonstrated by his failure to keep a current account 
journal of disbursements for the trust account.   
COUNTS 8 AND 9——MOTORCYCLE LOAN 
¶36 Count 8 alleged another violation of SCR 20:1.8(a).   
¶37 Count 9 alleged another violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶38 The testimony before the referee established that on 
April 20, 1999, Knickmeier withdrew $10,800 from J.R.'s trust 
account and then used that money to purchase a motorcycle which 
Knickmeier and J.R. were to jointly own even though J.R. did not 
have a license to operate a motorcycle.  Knickmeier's share in 
the motorcycle purchase was financed by a $5400 loan (half of 
the $10,800 he had withdrawn) from the trust account funds.  The 
remaining $5400 from that withdrawal paid for J.R.'s one-half 
ownership of the motorcycle.  At the hearing before the referee, 
Knickmeier acknowledged that he had not discussed his own 
financial background with J.R. prior to making this loan to 
himself from J.R.'s monies in the trust account; Knickmeier also 
                                                                                                                                                             
The check register which Knickmeier constructed after 
J.R.'s grievance had been filed, listed the $653 as "fees."  
Later, Knickmeier acknowledged that that entry was in error and 
that the money had actually been spent on the athletic tickets, 
not fees.   
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
20 
 
acknowledged that he knew at the time that J.R. did not have a 
valid license to operate the motorcycle.   
¶39 The referee also heard testimony that in August of 
1999 Knickmeier sold the motorcycle and received $8000 for it.  
Knickmeier then split that $8000 equally between himself and 
J.R. but Knickmeier did not pay off any of his prior $5400 
indebtedness from his $4000 share of the proceeds from the 
motorcycle sale.  
¶40 Based on the evidence and the testimony he had heard, 
the referee determined that although the promissory note 
executed by Knickmeier with respect to the motorcycle loan was 
fair and reasonable in its terms, and even though J.R. had 
apparently consented to the transaction in a contemporaneous 
writing, the problem was that J.R.  
 . . . was not able to make an informed or considered 
decision as to whether his economic resources should 
or should not be deployed in this loan.  [J.R.] 
testified that he was often intoxicated (Respondent 
corroborated) and had a poor memory as to this 
transaction.  Respondent did not keep contemporaneous 
account records in his Trust Account regarding the 
loan to himself of $5,400.  He also did not repay the 
loan in accord with the contract.  This result was 
predictable.  Respondent acted intentionally to use 
[J.R.'s] money to get a motorcycle for himself.  He 
had an obligation as a lawyer seeking a loan from a 
client to make full disclosure of his financial 
status.   
¶41 The referee concluded that by intentionally failing to 
disclose "very relevant" facts——i.e., Knickmeier's multiple and 
recent bankruptcy filings and his then outstanding indebtedness 
of over $100,000——Knickmeier had prevented his client from 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
21 
 
making an informed decision on whether or not to extend the 
$5400 loan and J.R. had not been given a fair opportunity to 
make an independent decision regarding the loan.   
¶42 Thus, the referee concluded that with respect to Count 
8, Knickmeier had engaged in misconduct as proscribed by SCR 
20:1.8(a) by improperly entering into a business transaction 
with his client without disclosing important, negative financial 
information about himself to the client.  The result, according 
to the referee, was that J.R. was "intentionally misled" into 
participating in the business transaction.  The referee asserted 
that his conclusion concerning Knickmeier's intent was bolstered 
by the fact that Knickmeier had defaulted on the loan, had not 
provided J.R. with the requested accounting, and then, when the 
motorcycle was sold, did not use any of his share of the 
proceeds to pay off the loan.   
¶43 Similarly, with respect to Count 9, the referee 
concluded that when Knickmeier subsequently sold the motorcycle 
and did not use any of his share of the sale proceeds to pay 
down his outstanding loan balance, he violated the rule which 
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in fraud, misrepresentation, 
dishonesty or deceit.  The referee reasoned that even if 
Knickmeier had properly obtained the loan for the motorcycle 
(which the referee determined he had not) Knickmeier still had 
no right to use the sale proceeds for any other purposes other 
than paying down the outstanding loan balance without his 
client's consent.  According to the referee, the evidence 
clearly established Knickmeier's fraud and his intent not to 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
22 
 
repay the loan.  The referee concluded that Knickmeier's sole 
goal was to get money from his client in any way he could for 
his own ends.  
COUNTS 10, 11, AND 12——BAIL AND EVIDENCE MONEY 
¶44 Count 10 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.15(a).12  That 
rule requires a lawyer to hold in trust, separate from a 
                                                 
12 SCR 20:1.15(a) provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from 
the lawyer's own property, that property of clients 
and third persons that is in the lawyer's possession 
in connection with a representation or when acting in 
a fiduciary capacity. Funds held in connection with a 
representation or in a fiduciary capacity include 
funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal 
representative of an estate, or otherwise. All funds 
of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable 
trust accounts as provided in paragraph (c). The trust 
account shall be maintained in a bank, savings bank, 
trust 
company, 
credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association or other investment institution authorized 
to do business and located in Wisconsin. The trust 
account shall be clearly designated as "Client's 
Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar 
import. No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm, 
except funds reasonably sufficient to pay or avoid 
imposition 
of 
account 
service 
charges, 
may 
be 
deposited in such an account. Unless the client 
otherwise directs in writing, securities in bearer 
form shall be kept by the attorney in a safe deposit 
box in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association 
or 
other 
investment institution authorized to do business and 
located in Wisconsin. The safe deposit box shall be 
clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust 
Account" or words of similar import. Other property of 
a client or third person shall be identified as such 
and 
appropriately 
safeguarded. If 
a lawyer 
also 
licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or 
property 
in 
connection 
with 
an 
out-of-state 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
23 
 
lawyer's own property, the property of a client that is in the 
lawyer's 
possession. 
 
Knickmeier 
admitted 
this 
count 
of 
misconduct. 
¶45 Count 11 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.15(b).  
Knickmeier also admitted his violation of this rule which 
requires a lawyer to deliver promptly to a client any funds a 
client is entitled to receive and to render a full accounting 
regarding such property.  
¶46 Count 12 alleged another violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) 
which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.  
¶47 At the hearing before the referee Knickmeier admitted 
and pled no contest to the misconduct as alleged in Counts 10 
and 11 of the OLR complaint.  The referee resolved Count 12 
against Knickmeier based on the evidence at the hearing.  These 
three counts related to bail money and cash seized from J.R. 
(apparently at the time of his arrest).  There is no dispute 
that J.R. was entitled later to the return of the bail money and 
the seized cash which totaled $2200.  Knickmeier retrieved those 
funds after J.R. went to prison; however, of that $2200, 
Knickmeier disbursed approximately only $700 on J.R.'s behalf.  
Of the remaining amount totaling $1471, Knickmeier admitted that 
he had deposited some of that money into his own personal 
savings account and used a portion of it for other personal 
                                                                                                                                                             
representation, this provision shall not supersede the 
trust account rules of the other state. 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
24 
 
matters.  In addition, Knickmeier acknowledged at the hearing 
that he had not contemporaneously maintained trust account 
records with respect to this money; in fact, he had not 
developed the trust account records until after J.R.'s grievance 
was filed and he was required to provide documentation to the 
OLR.  
¶48 After hearing the testimony and seeing the evidence on 
this cluster of misconduct counts, the referee described these 
actions "stealing" and found it to be an act of dishonesty for 
Knickmeier to take the $2200 belonging to J.R. and to use any 
portion of that money for his own purposes without giving the 
funds to J.R. or depositing them into his trust account.  
According 
to 
the 
referee, 
the 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing evidence, established that Knickmeier had violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c) by taking money belonging to his client and by not 
depositing it into his trust account or giving it directly to 
his client.  The referee determined that Knickmeier's actions in 
this 
respect 
constituted 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).   
COUNTS 13, 14, 15, 16, AND 17——EAST JOHNSON STREET PROPERTY 
¶49 Count 13 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.7(b).13 
                                                 
13 SCR 20:1.7(b) provides: 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation 
of 
that 
client may 
be 
materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another 
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless:  
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
25 
 
¶50 This rule, in general, prohibits a lawyer from acting 
in the face of a conflict of interest with his client.  The rule 
provides that a lawyer shall not represent a client if that 
representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibility to another client or to a third person or by the 
lawyer's 
own 
interest 
unless 
certain 
conditions 
are 
met 
including the client's consent in writing, to the lawyer's 
continued representation. 
¶51 Count 14 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.3.14  This 
rule requires a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.  
¶52 Count 15 alleged another violation of SCR 20:1.15(a).   
¶53 This rule requires a lawyer to hold in trust, separate  
from the lawyer's own property, property of a client that is in 
the lawyer's possession.   
¶54 Count 16 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.15(b).  
However, the referee determined that the evidence presented at 
the hearing was insufficient to establish that Knickmeier had 
violated this rule which requires the lawyer to promptly notify 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) the 
lawyer 
reasonably 
believes 
the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and  
(2) the 
client 
consents 
in 
writing 
after 
consultation. When representation of multiple clients 
in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation 
shall include explanation of the implications of the 
common representation and the advantages and risks 
involved. 
14 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "Diligence. A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
26 
 
the client of the receipt of funds; accordingly, the referee 
dismissed this count.  
¶55 Count 17 alleged another violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).   
¶56 This was the fifth count in the OLR's complaint 
alleging 
that 
Knickmeier 
engaged 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation.  
¶57 This 
cluster 
of 
misconduct 
counts 
involved 
Knickmeier's conflict of interest regarding his handling of 
J.R.'s house on East Johnson Street in Madison, while J.R. was 
incarcerated.  At the same time Knickmeier was representing J.R. 
and seeking tenants for the house, Knickmeier also represented 
D.S.  Knickmeier rented J.R.'s house to D.S. without revealing 
to either J.R. or D.S. that the other person was his client too.  
Knickmeier rented J.R.'s house to D.S. after he had just 
recently represented D.S. in an eviction action brought against 
her for nonpayment of rent; at that time he was also 
representing D.S. in a small claims action brought against her.  
Knickmeier did not tell J.R. of that fact nor of D.S.'s past 
rental history. 
¶58 The evidence established that at the time J.R. was 
incarcerated in the fall of 1999, he and Knickmeier agreed that 
Knickmeier would take care of J.R.'s Johnson Street residence; 
J.R. asked Knickmeier, among other things, to pay the property 
taxes on the residence as they became due in 2000.  
¶59 In the summer of 2000, Knickmeier arranged for another 
one of his clients, D.S., to rent J.R.'s property.  Knickmeier, 
had represented D.S. in March 2000 in an eviction action brought 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
27 
 
against her in connection with her tenancy at a different 
location.  Knickmeier was at that time also representing D.S. in 
a small claims action brought against her for nonpayment of 
medical fees.  At the time he rented J.R.'s house to D.S., she 
remained his client.  
¶60 The testimony presented at the hearing before the 
referee 
revealed 
that 
although 
Knickmeier 
had 
negative 
information regarding D.S. as a tenant, he did not disclose that 
information to J.R.  Knickmeier explained at the hearing that he 
did not disclose this negative information because he believed 
it was privileged information based on his lawyer/client 
relationship with D.S.  
¶61 Testimony before the referee also established that at 
the time Knickmeier negotiated the lease agreement between his 
clients, J.R. and D.S., Knickmeier was indebted to both:  he had 
owed $2000 to D.S. and he had previously borrowed money from 
J.R. for the purchase of an airplane and a motorcycle.  As was 
true with respect to the loans Knickmeier had obtained from 
J.R., Knickmeier had not informed D.S. prior to obtaining the 
$2000 loan from her, that Knickmeier's own financial history 
included numerous bankruptcy petitions; nor had he disclosed to 
her his current indebtedness or the fact that at that time, he 
was in default on his loans from J.R. 
¶62 Knickmeier had borrowed $2000 from D.S. in April of 
2000; Knickmeier acknowledged at the hearing before the referee 
that he had not provided D.S. with a full disclosure of his 
financial history nor had he told her about the default status 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
28 
 
of the airplane and motorcycle loans from J.R.  Again, according 
to Knickmeier, he had not disclosed that information because he 
thought it was confidential and privileged; he also thought he 
did not have to do so.  Those failures on his part to disclose 
this information formed the basis for the misconduct alleged in 
Count 17 of OLR's complaint.   
¶63 The testimony before the referee also established that 
when D.S. moved into the Johnson Street premises, she paid $600 
in rent to Knickmeier.  Knickmeier then used $300 of that 
payment to reduce his indebtedness on the outstanding $2000 loan 
he had previously obtained from her.  Knickmeier made no trust 
account entries at that time indicating his use of the $300 
rental payment that belonged to his client J.R.  Those facts 
were the basis for the misconduct alleged in Count 15. 
¶64 Count 16 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.15(b).  It 
was alleged that Knickmeier had not notified J.R. of the receipt 
of rent money and security deposit from D.S.  The referee 
determined, however, that the credible evidence established that 
Knickmeier in fact notified J.R. of the receipt of the security 
deposit and rental payment from D.S.  Therefore, the referee 
dismissed Count 16.   
¶65 The referee made several other specific findings.  For 
example, with respect to Count 14, the referee determined that 
although Knickmeier had paid the insurance premiums on the 
residence, Knickmeier had failed to pay the property taxes that 
were due on the property.  The evidence before the referee 
indicated that the Dane County Treasurer had sent J.R. a notice 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
29 
 
of real estate taxes due in the amount of $2695.95.  Knickmeier 
replied to that tax notice on behalf of J.R. acknowledging 
receipt of the tax due form but asserting that even though J.R. 
had substantial assets, " . . . we are having a liquidity 
problem at the moment."   
¶66 The 
referee 
further 
determined 
that 
it 
was 
Knickmeier's responsibility, under his agreement with J.R., to 
manage J.R.'s residence and to pay the property taxes while J.R. 
was incarcerated.  According to the referee, the cash shortage 
J.R. was experiencing was the result of Knickmeier's actions in 
depleting J.R.'s funds and defaulting on his loans from J.R. 
which totaled $17,000.  Knickmeier's failure to pay the property 
taxes put J.R.'s property at risk.  This, according to the 
referee, amounted to Knickmeier's violation of SCR 20:1.3 
because he failed to act with diligence and promptness in paying 
the property taxes and failed to protect his client's property.  
This referee believed that these failures were compounded by 
Knickmeier's failure to provide current and complete accountings 
and by his telling his incarcerated client that the tax matter 
was of no consequence.  
¶67 Similarly, with respect to Count 15, the referee 
concluded that the evidence established that Knickmeier had 
violated SCR 20:1.15(a) because he failed to keep J.R.'s 
property (i.e., the rental payments made by D.S.) separate from 
Knickmeier's own property.  The testimony established that 
Knickmeier had received money from D.S. for the rent and a 
security deposit but then he had used those funds for himself 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
30 
 
without first depositing them into the trust account for 
disbursal to J.R. 
¶68 With respect to Count 17, the referee determined that 
Knickmeier had violated SCR 20:8.4(c) because he had failed to 
disclose to D.S. his own negative financial history before he 
borrowed money from her.  According to the referee, this 
amounted to obtaining money from the client by deceit and 
dishonesty; furthermore, the referee found that Knickmeier's 
repeated acts of obtaining client funds and then not repaying 
the debt, established that his deceitful and dishonest conduct 
was intentional.  The referee wrote that Knickmeier's actions 
constituted "an intentional fraud upon [D.S.]." 
¶69 The 
referee 
was 
not 
persuaded 
by 
Knickmeier's 
arguments that disclosure was not required because D.S. was 
receiving a fair interest rate on the loan, because the loan was 
secured by two motorcycles, and that in any event, the $2000 
loan was subsequently repaid.  According to the referee, that 
argument missed the point because " . . . It was unreasonable 
and a fraud for the lawyer to obtain this loan without advising 
the client of material, negative information which was essential 
to the decision of the client on whether or not to grant the 
loan." 
COUNT 18——J.R.'S MOTHER'S ESTATE 
¶70 Count 18 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.3 but the 
referee dismissed this count concluding that the evidence did 
not establish that Knickmeier had not acted with reasonable 
diligence and promptness as OLR had alleged.  
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
31 
 
COUNT 19——KEEPING CLIENT INFORMED AND CURRENT 
¶71 Count 19 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.4(a).15  This 
rule requires that a lawyer keep the client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information.   
¶72 The referee's findings with respect to this count were 
based on evidence concerning Knickmeier's failure, despite 
repeated requests from J.R., to inform J.R. about the status of 
his accounts and to provide J.R. with an accounting of the funds 
Knickmeier had disbursed from the trust account.  The referee 
observed that approximately two years had elapsed from the time 
J.R. first made his repeated requests for accountings until 
Knickmeier finally submitted a statement to J.R.  The referee 
determined that the billing records Knickmeier finally sent to 
J.R. were substantially late; furthermore, Knickmeier's failure 
to provide the information J.R. requested was intentional and 
this, according to the referee, was compounded by the fact that 
Knickmeier had not maintained regular and current account books.   
COUNT 20——FAILURE TO COOPERATE 
¶73 Count 20 alleged a violation of SCR 22.03(2).16  This 
rule, in general, requires a lawyer to fully and fairly disclose 
                                                 
15 SCR 20:1.4(a) provides: "(a) A lawyer shall keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly 
comply with reasonable requests for information."  
16 SCR 22.03(2) provides: 
(2) Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
32 
 
all facts to the OLR regarding the alleged misconduct being 
investigated.   
¶74 Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the 
referee determined that after J.R.'s grievance was filed, OLR 
sent 
Knickmeier 
a 
letter 
asking 
him 
to 
provide 
certain 
information 
and 
data 
on 
or 
before 
October 
20, 
2000.  
Knickmeier's response, however, was found to be incomplete, and 
when notified of that, Knickmeier asked for an extension of 
time.  That extension was granted and OLR was specific about 
what remaining data Knickmeier needed to provide.  Knickmeier 
thereafter submitted some additional data as requested on 
several subsequent occasions including a report he submitted to 
OLR on November 20, 2000.  The referee determined, however, that 
the information Knickmeier provided was insufficient and did not 
comply with the OLR's specific request for data regarding his 
representation of J.R., particularly the financial and account 
records.  Knickmeier finally provided that information to the 
OLR on November 24, 2000.  
                                                                                                                                                             
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise. The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response. The 
director 
may 
allow 
additional 
time 
to 
respond. 
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
33 
 
¶75 The referee, based on the evidence and testimony he 
heard, determined that Knickmeier had violated SCR 22.03(2) by 
not responding timely to reasonable requests for data during an 
inquiry involving a grievance investigation.   Moreover, the 
referee determined that Knickmeier had not established good 
cause for his delay in submitting the relevant data to the OLR 
during the investigation.   
COUNTS 21, 22, AND 23——TRUST FUND VIOLATIONS 
¶76 Count 21 alleged another violation of SCR 20:1.15(a).  
At the hearing Knickmeier admitted violating this rule and 
entered a no contest plea to this count.   
¶77 Count 22 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.15(e).  
Knickmeier also admitted his violation of this rule and pled no 
contest to this count before the referee. 
¶78 Count 23 alleged a violation of SCR 20:1.15(a).  
Again, 
Knickmeier, 
at 
the 
hearing 
before 
the 
referee, 
acknowledged his violation of this rule and pled no contest to 
this count.   
¶79 With 
respect 
to 
Counts 
21 
and 
22, 
Knickmeier 
acknowledged that he had repeatedly drawn trust account checks 
to pay for matters that were Knickmeier's personal expenses.  
For example, he paid for secretarial services, application fees 
for his daughter's college entrance examination, and similar 
matters 
from 
the 
trust 
account 
funds. 
 
Knickmeier 
also 
acknowledged that he had not kept complete records of his trust 
account and trust fund property including a cash receipts 
journal 
and disbursement 
journal. 
 
Knickmeier 
maintained, 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
34 
 
however, that this was merely a "technical" and "de minimus" 
violation which caused no harm to his client. 
¶80 With respect to Count 23, Knickmeier acknowledged that 
he had commingled funds that had belonged to another one of his 
clients, G.M. 
¶81 After 
finding that 
Knickmeier had 
committed the 
misconduct as alleged in 21 of the 23 counts in the OLR's 
complaint, the referee addressed what discipline should be 
imposed for Knickmeier's numerous acts of misconduct.  The 
referee rejected Knickmeier's asserted altruism defense and in 
18 separate paragraphs in his report, the referee discussed and 
rejected Knickmeier's various arguments.  According to the 
referee Knickmeier failed to understand that his actions 
amounted to "opportunistic or predatory behavior toward his 
client's 
economic 
resources." 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
referee 
described Knickmeier being unrepentant as demonstrated by his 
claim that he was the "victim" and that he had "suffered 
enough."17   
                                                 
17 Knickmeier had submitted a written closing argument and 
memorandum to the referee. In that document Knickmeier described 
himself as "honest, credible and forthright."  He also argued 
that his "temporary" suspension from June 2001, had been 
devastating to his livelihood and to his solo practice.  
According 
to 
Knickmeier, 
his 
actions 
were 
motivated 
and 
compelled by what he viewed as the requirement that a lawyer 
must protect his client and not engage in any illegal activities 
on behalf of his client.  Knickmeier repeated his assertion that 
his actions were motivated by his obligation to keep his client, 
J.R. 
from 
dissipating 
his 
inheritance, 
and 
that 
without 
Knickmeier's intervention, J.R. would have spent his money on 
drugs and alcohol.  In his written argument Knickmeier asserted: 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
35 
 
¶82 The referee recommended that Knickmeier's license be 
revoked.  He explained that his recommendation for revocation 
was based on the need to protect the public; further, according 
to the referee, in a case like this where the violations of the 
rules were multiple and serious, where prior discipline had been 
imposed, and where remorse apparently did not exist, the severe 
sanction of revocation was necessary and appropriate.  The 
referee wrote: "This is a case where, sadly, revocation is 
needed to provide protection from a lawyer who most assuredly 
would continue his misconduct in the future.  He views his 
                                                                                                                                                             
The reality is that Respondent acted in a 
fashion——however unorthodox——that kept [J.R.] alive 
and protected him.  He was saved from overdose, 
robbery, police bullets, and who knows what else.  
Putting more money in [J.R.'s] hands would be like 
giving someone a loaded gun to commit suicide.   
The reality is that the ultimate goals of the 
rules——the 
protection 
of 
the 
public 
and 
the 
preservation of the client——were largely achieved by 
Respondent.  [J.R.], and every man, woman and child 
who walk the streets of the East side of Madison are 
greatly indebted to the Respondent.  Respondent didn't 
walk away or wash his hands——to this day.  He has made 
a noble sacrifice, and we cannot lose sight of what is 
important.  The individual rules are servants of a 
greater, 
more 
cosmic 
good——the 
avoidance 
of 
criminality and protection of the public.  
Knickmeier 
also 
wrote 
that 
no 
matter 
how 
" . . . wonderful . . . [he] has been for the community, for 
God, country and the client . . . " it could not be overlooked 
that 
he 
had 
acknowledged 
and 
admitted 
to 
numerous 
rule 
violations.  Knickmeier suggested that as a sanction for his 
"gross failures" with respect to record keeping and delay in 
billings and accountings, a six-month suspension of his license 
might be appropriate under the circumstances. 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
36 
 
clients and their assets as a source of funds to be obtained for 
his own benefit through fraud and deceit." 
KNICKMEIER'S APPELLATE ARGUMENTS 
¶83 On appeal, Knickmeier's primary focus is on the 
referee's recommendation for revocation of his license to 
practice law.  Knickmeier does not identify and challenge 
specific findings by the referee as not being supported by 
credible 
evidence. 
 Instead, Knickmeier mounts 
procedural 
attacks on the OLR's complaint and the referee's findings.  He 
also vigorously contends that because of the "temporary" 
suspension he has endured since this court's June 14, 2001, 
order, which he insists amounted to a clear violation of his 
constitutional rights, that the only appropriate remedy for this 
deprivation of his rights would be the dismissal of this 
disciplinary proceeding.   
¶84 More specifically, Knickmeier first contends that this 
disciplinary proceeding should be dismissed because the OLR 
failed to plead compliance——and to actually comply——with the 
requirements of SCR 22.03(3)18 and SCR 22.06(1).19  Knickmeier 
maintains that under SCR 22.03(3) the OLR staff is required to 
                                                 
18 SCR 
22.03(3) 
provides: "(3) Staff 
involved 
in 
the 
investigation process shall include in reports to the director 
all relevant exculpatory and inculpatory information obtained." 
19 SCR 22.06(1) provides: "(1) The director shall submit 
investigative reports, including all relevant exculpatory and 
inculpatory information obtained and appendices and exhibits, if 
any, pursuant to SCR 22.05(1)(d) to the chairperson of the 
preliminary review committee. The chairperson shall assign each 
matter to a panel for consideration." 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
37 
 
include in the investigative report submitted to the OLR 
director 
" . . . all 
relevant 
exculpatory 
and 
inculpatory 
information obtained . . . ."  (Emphasis added.) Likewise, he 
maintains that under SCR 22.06(1) the OLR director is then 
required to submit the investigative reports to the PRC and such 
reports must 
include " . . . all 
relevant 
exculpatory and 
inculpatory information obtained . . . ."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶85 According to Knickmeier, the material submitted by the 
OLR investigative staff to the director, and in turn, the 
material submitted by the director to the PRC, did not include 
exculpatory information because there was nothing about J.R.'s 
security interest in the airplane which secured the loan balance 
Knickmeier owed to J.R., nor did the reports note that the 
airplane was valued at $17,250 which was more than the loan 
balance.  Knickmeier complains that the reports actually 
suggested that that loan was unsecured.  
¶86 Knickmeier further complains that the reports failed 
to include additional exculpatory information concerning J.R.'s 
spendthrift 
habits 
and 
his 
drug 
and 
alcohol 
problems.  
Knickmeier believes that this information is exculpatory because 
it went to establish Knickmeier's altruism defense——i.e., that 
he was acting in the best interest of J.R. and with intent to 
protect J.R. from financial ruin as well as his client's 
continuing 
drug 
and 
alcohol 
addictions. 
 
According 
to 
Knickmeier, because this information justified and explained his 
actions, it should have been presented as exculpatory material 
to both the OLR director and then to the PRC so that informed 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
38 
 
decisions about whether to proceed with this disciplinary matter 
could be made.  
¶87 Furthermore, 
Knickmeier 
asserts 
that 
the 
OLR's 
investigator's admission that she did not "sift or winnow" any 
of the information but rather simply presented everything she 
had obtained, including what Knickmeier insists was exculpatory 
information, was insufficient.  According to Knickmeier, simply 
turning over every piece of information to the director and then 
to the 
PRC, 
does 
not provide the 
decision 
makers 
with 
appropriate and complete staff analysis and recommendations, and 
does not highlight any exculpatory information.  
¶88 Knickmeier's arguments are not persuasive.  We agree 
with the referee that the OLR director, as well as the PRC, had 
all of the investigative information before it including 
Knickmeier's claimed exculpatory information.  The investigator 
submitted every report and every piece of information she had 
obtained in her investigation.  Included in that submission was 
all the information Knickmeier now insists was exculpatory.  
¶89 Moreover, we find nothing in the rules to support 
Knickmeier's jurisdictional 
challenge. 
 
He 
maintains 
that 
compliance with the provision that exculpatory information must 
be submitted and that OLR must plead such compliance, is a 
jurisdictional requirement that has to be established before the 
disciplinary case can proceed.  We believe, as the referee 
noted, that because the OLR investigator had turned over 
everything she had to the director and then to the PRC, all the 
alleged 
"exculpatory" 
information 
was 
in 
fact 
presented; 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
39 
 
therefore, the rules were complied with.  And, as noted, we find 
nothing in the rules to suggest that these requirements are 
jurisdictional and compliance has to be specifically pled.  
¶90 In addition, it is not clear that the information 
Knickmeier has identified as exculpatory is actually exculpatory 
in nature.  This information does not go to prove Knickmeier's 
innocence on the misconduct counts nor does it tend to support 
any affirmative defense.  At best, it simply provides his 
explanation for his actions.  While this information might be 
relevant to the issue of the appropriate sanction to be imposed, 
we 
do 
not 
agree 
that 
submission 
of 
this 
"exculpatory" 
information was a jurisdictional prerequisite for the OLR's 
decision to file and pursue these misconduct charges against 
Knickmeier. 
¶91 On this appeal, Knickmeier also contends that his 
motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment with 
respect to Counts 2, 3, 7, 9, 12, and 17, should have been 
granted by the referee.  The rule underlying all those counts is 
SCR 20:8.4(c) which, as noted, precludes a lawyer from engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation.  Knickmeier argues that these six counts in 
the OLR complaint alleging violations of this rule were based on 
alleged omissions by him——i.e., his failure to advise his client 
about various matters.  Knickmeier maintains that none of those 
six counts alleged any actual intent to deceive or misrepresent 
by him.  According to Knickmeier, all prior disciplinary cases 
involving this rule have included an allegation that the lawyer 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
40 
 
had the intent to deceive and/or misrepresent.  Because the OLR 
complaint in this case did not allege that he had acted with 
intent to deceive or misrepresent, Knickmeier insists that these 
six counts should have been dismissed. 
¶92 Furthermore, Knickmeier complains that the referee 
improperly found that Knickmeier had engaged in fraud or 
intentional misrepresentation.  Again, Knickmeier insists that 
the referee could not make such findings because this case was 
brought solely on the theory of Knickmeier's omissions, not on 
any theory that he acted with fraudulent intent or intent to 
misrepresent.  Thus, Knickmeier argues that no matter what the 
referee might have thought the evidence established, the referee 
should have been constrained by the omission theory as pled by 
the OLR in its complaint.  Therefore, it follows, according to 
Knickmeier, that Counts 2, 3, 7, 9, 12, and 17 should have been 
dismissed.  
¶93 We reject this argument because as the OLR notes, SCR 
20:8.4(c) does not simply prohibit "intentional, fraudulent" 
conduct; rather, that rule is stated in the disjunctive and 
prohibits conduct which involves any one of the four acts 
described——i.e., 
"dishonesty, 
deceit, 
fraud 
or 
misrepresentation."  Furthermore, we agree with the OLR that 
deceitful omissions of relevant information constitute dishonest 
conduct within the scope of SCR 20:8.4(c).  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Urban, 2002 WI 63, 253 Wis. 2d 
194, 645 N.W.2d 612.   
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
41 
 
¶94 We also reject Knickmeier's underlying argument——which 
he never fully articulates——that the referee was constrained to 
find the facts only as pled in the OLR complaint.  This 
suggested limitation ignores the wide latitude and authority 
given to the referee under SCR 22.16.20  Among other things, that 
                                                 
20 SCR 22.16 provides: Proceedings before a referee. 
(1) The referee has the powers of a judge trying 
a civil action and shall conduct the hearing as the 
trial of a civil action to the court. The rules of 
civil procedure and evidence shall be followed. The 
referee shall obtain the services of a court reporter 
to make a verbatim record of the proceedings, as 
provided in SCR 71.01 to 71.03. 
(2) The hearing shall be held in the county of 
the respondent's principal office or, in the case of a 
non-resident attorney, in the county designated by the 
director. The referee, for cause, may designate a 
different location. 
(3) Unless otherwise provided by law or in this 
chapter, the hearing before a referee and any paper 
filed in the proceeding is public. 
(4)(a) If in the course of the proceeding the 
respondent claims to have a medical incapacity that 
makes the defense of the proceeding impossible, the 
referee shall conduct a hearing and make findings 
concerning whether a medical incapacity makes defense 
of the proceeding impossible. The referee may order 
the examination of the respondent by qualified medical 
or psychological experts.  
(b) All 
papers, 
files, 
transcripts, 
communications, and 
proceedings on 
the 
issue of 
medical incapacity shall be confidential and shall 
remain confidential until the supreme court has issued 
an order suspending the attorney's license to practice 
law, or has otherwise authorized disclosure. 
(c) If the referee finds no medical incapacity 
that 
would 
make 
the 
defense 
of 
the 
proceeding 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
42 
 
rule provides that the referee has powers of a judge trying a 
civil action; also the referee's request to conduct the 
disciplinary hearing as a bench trial in a civil action at which 
the rules of civil procedure "shall be followed."  One pertinent 
rule of civil procedure to be followed at a disciplinary hearing 
before a referee would be Wis. Stat. § 802.09(2).  This statute 
permits the amendment of pleadings to conform to the proof.  
This statute also directs the judge (or referee) to freely allow 
the pleadings to be amended where the presentation of the merits 
                                                                                                                                                             
impossible, 
the 
referee 
shall 
proceed 
with 
the 
misconduct action. 
(d) If 
the 
referee 
finds 
that 
a 
medical 
incapacity 
makes 
the 
defense 
of 
the 
proceeding 
impossible, the referee shall file a report promptly 
with the supreme court. If the court disapproves the 
referee's finding, the court shall direct the referee 
to proceed with the misconduct action. If the court 
approves the referee's finding, the court shall abate 
the misconduct proceeding and suspend the respondent's 
license to practice law for medical incapacity until 
the court orders reinstatement of the attorney's 
license under SCR 22.36. Upon reinstatement, the court 
shall 
direct 
the 
referee 
to 
proceed 
with 
the 
misconduct action.  
(5) The office of lawyer regulation has the 
burden of demonstrating by clear, satisfactory and 
convincing evidence that the respondent has engaged in 
misconduct. 
(6) Within 30 days after the conclusion of the 
hearing or the filing of the hearing transcript, 
whichever is later, the referee shall file with the 
supreme court a report setting forth findings of fact, 
conclusions 
of 
law 
regarding 
the 
respondent's 
misconduct, if any, and a recommendation for dismissal 
of the proceeding or the imposition of specific 
discipline. 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
43 
 
would be subserved and where there would be no prejudice to the 
objecting party.  In this case, the referee's ruling rejecting 
Knickmeier's motion to dismiss these six counts, can be viewed 
as the referee's decision to "freely allow" an amendment of 
these pleadings and the referee's recognition that permitting 
proof and making findings on any of the four actions——
dishonesty, deceit, fraud or misrepresentation——would not and 
could not, prejudice Knickmeier because the rule is stated in 
the disjunctive.  
¶95 Knickmeier 
also 
challenges, 
as 
excessive, 
the 
discipline 
recommended 
by 
the 
referee——revocation 
of 
Knickmeier's license.  According to Knickmeier, the referee 
ignored at least 15 specific positive and mitigating points 
Knickmeier had identified in order to demonstrate that at most, 
a six-month to one-year suspension of his license would be 
appropriate as a sanction for his misconduct.  Those specific 
points included: (1) Knickmeier's claimed cooperation with the 
OLR investigation; (2) his cooperative attitude and demeanor; 
(3) his expressed concern for his clients' welfare; (4) the fact 
that his client actually profited from the transactions; (5) the 
fact that Knickmeier "saved" his client's life; (6) the fact 
that Knickmeier charged reasonable fees for his services; and 
(7) the fact that Knickmeier has "suffered enough" because his 
license has already been suspended and he has done no legal work 
since June of 2001.   
¶96 According to Knickmeier, in other disciplinary cases 
involving much more egregious behavior by the lawyer, this court 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
44 
 
has not revoked the lawyer's license.  See, e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gilbert, 227 Wis. 2d 444, 595 
N.W.2d 715 (1999).  Furthermore, Knickmeier complains that here 
the referee wrongly criticized him for not being repentant and 
for showing no remorse.  He should not be so faulted, Knickmeier 
believes, because he has simply exercised his right to have a 
hearing in this matter and to put OLR to its proof regarding the 
claims against him.  Knickmeier insists that this should not be 
viewed as a demonstration of no remorse or an unrepentant 
attitude on his part.  
¶97 Again, we are not persuaded by Knickmeier's arguments.  
Under the circumstances of this case, we do not think the 
referee's recommendation for revocation of Knickmeier's license 
to practice law is excessive.  We believe, as did the referee, 
that Knickmeier's actions (even if we were only to consider the 
eight counts of misconduct which Knickmeier admitted) fully 
warrant the revocation of his license to practice law in this 
state.  Although this court is guided by prior cases when 
determining the appropriate level of discipline to be imposed 
for a lawyer's misconduct, prior cases are neither controlling 
nor limiting on this court's discretion.  In any event, we note 
that 
the 
Gilbert 
case 
which 
Knickmeier 
has 
cited, 
is 
distinguishable from this situation because the respondent in 
Gilbert had no prior disciplinary contacts. Here, Knickmeier has 
twice been privately reprimanded for professional misconduct.   
¶98 Moreover, we note there are several prior cases where 
this court has revoked the license of the lawyer to practice law 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
45 
 
based on acts similar to Knickmeier's misconduct.  In several 
instances, revocation has resulted where the lawyer committed 
many fewer acts of misconduct than Knickmeier has committed 
here.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Martinez, 225 Wis. 2d 433, 591 N.W.2d 866 (1999); In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sheehan, 224 Wis. 2d 44, 588 
N.W.2d 624 (1999); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Warmington, 212 Wis. 2d 657, 568 N.W.2d 641 (1997); and In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cassidy, 172 Wis. 2d 600, 493 
N.W.2d 362 (1992).   
¶99 Although we agree with the referee that given the 
seriousness and widespread pattern of misconduct committed by 
Knickmeier, revocation of his license to practice law in this 
state is fully justified, we note that Knickmeier has not, by 
his own assertion, practiced law since June 14, 2001, the date 
of this court's order temporarily suspending his license under 
SCR 22.21.  Under these circumstances, we believe it is 
appropriate, as we have done in the past, to order this 
revocation to be retroactive to the June 14, 2001, date when 
this court temporarily suspended Knickmeier's license.  We have 
imposed such retroactive discipline in prior cases. See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Meagher, 2003 WI 132, 266 
Wis. 2d 18, 669 N.W.2d 733; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Calhoun, 196 Wis. 2d 665, 538 N.W.2d 797 (1995); In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mittelsteadt, 113 Wis. 2d 718, 
335 N.W.2d 880 (1983); and In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Glasschroeder, 113 Wis. 2d 672, 335 N.W.2d 621 (1983).  
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
46 
 
This retroactive revocation of Knickmeier's license as of June 
14, 2001, means that he will be able to petition for 
reinstatement of his license, should he seek to do so, at any 
time commencing five years after that date.  See SCR 22.29(2).21   
                                                 
21 Retroactive revocation of his license commencing as of 
the date of his temporary suspension makes it unnecessary for 
this court to now address Knickmeier's arguments that the 
temporary suspension deprived him of due process and equal 
protection. 
 
Those 
issues 
and 
arguments 
were 
raised 
in 
Knickmeier's federal action and we consider these issues to be 
moot for the purposes of this disciplinary proceeding.  A 
decision by this court on these constitutional challenges to 
this court's authority under SCR 22.21 to order the temporary 
suspension of a lawyer's license to practice law, would have no 
practical legal effect upon the existing controversy in the 
instant 
case 
in 
light 
of 
the 
retroactive 
revocation 
of 
Knickmeier's license.  See State ex rel. LaCrosse Tribune v. 
Circuit Court, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983), and 
cases cited therein.  We acknowledge that there are exceptions 
to the mootness doctrine including the situation where the 
constitutionality of a statute is involved, see Doering v. 
Swoboda, 214 Wis. 481, 253 N.W. 657 (1934); however, we decline 
to now address Knickmeier's challenges to this court's rule and 
authority in the context of this current disciplinary proceeding 
against Knickmeier.  There is no dispute that this court has the 
authority 
to 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline——including 
revocation——for a lawyer's misconduct.  See SCR 21.16.   
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
47 
 
¶100 On 
this 
appeal, 
Knickmeier 
also 
challenges 
the 
referee's recommendation that the costs of these proceedings be 
assessed against him.  First, because he believes the entire 
proceeding should be dismissed for various reasons, he asserts 
that no costs at all should be assessed against him.  We have 
already rejected Knickmeier's claim that the matter should be 
dismissed in its entirety, thus, this argument needs no 
discussion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
This court has held that a lawyer's constitutional right to 
due process in a disciplinary proceeding involves only the right 
to prior notice of the charges, the right to prepare and defend 
against the charges, and the right to a full hearing on the 
charges.  State v. Hersh, 73 Wis. 2d 390, 243 N.W.2d 178 (1976); 
see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 117 
Wis. 2d 332, 344 N.W.2d 169 (1984); and In re Complaint Against 
Seraphim, 97 Wis. 2d 485, 495, 294 N.W.2d 485 (1980).  Before 
Knickmeier's license was temporarily suspended, he was given 
notice of the pending charges and was given an opportunity to 
respond and show cause to the OLR's motion for his temporary 
suspension, and he did so.  He also subsequently had a full 
evidentiary hearing before a referee after the OLR's complaint 
was filed.  In both his responses to OLR's motion for temporary 
suspension and in his hearing before the referee, Knickmeier 
admitted various acts of misconduct (ultimately, he acknowledged 
his misconduct as alleged in 8 of the 23 counts in OLR's 
complaint).  Consequently, the dispute in this case has always 
focused primarily on the appropriate discipline to be imposed as 
a sanction for Knickmeier's misconduct.   
Ordering the revocation of Knickmeier's license to run from 
the date of his temporary suspension moots the constitutional 
issues Knickmeier attempts to present on this appeal because, in 
effect, he will have suffered no prejudice from this court's 
alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights when it 
temporarily suspended his license.  He will be able to petition 
for reinstatement in less than two years.  We therefore deem 
these issues and arguments to be moot and decline to address 
them.   
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
48 
 
¶101 Knickmeier also asserts that because 2 of the 23 
counts alleged in the OLR's complaint were dismissed by the 
referee, the total costs should be reduced to reflect those 
dismissals.  And he maintains that in light of the OLR's 
intransigence throughout this proceeding and its refusal to 
negotiate with him concerning an appropriate sanction for his 
misconduct, this court should deny the OLR's request for costs 
in its entirety.   
¶102 We reject Knickmeier's arguments in all respects.  
First, we note that in many prior cases, full costs have been 
imposed 
against 
the 
lawyer-respondent 
in 
a 
disciplinary 
proceeding even though several of the misconduct claims were 
dismissed by the referee or by this court. For example, in 
Gilbert, this court awarded full costs to the OLR even though 
only 8 of the 12 claims of misconduct brought in that case were 
sustained.   
¶103 Moreover, 
this court 
has 
repeatedly 
declined to 
apportion costs based on the number of misconduct counts 
sustained.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Pangman, 
216 Wis. 2d 440, 460-61, 574 N.W.2d 232 (1998) and In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 
N.W.2d 867 (1988). 
¶104 We find, in light of Knickmeier's egregious pattern of 
misconduct, that it is entirely appropriate for this court to 
require him to pay the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding now totaling $27,085.04.  Pursuant to SCR 22.24 this 
court may assess all of the costs against a respondent in a 
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
49 
 
disciplinary proceeding in which misconduct has been found.  The 
fees and expenses incurred by the OLR as itemized in its 
statement of costs submitted to this court are reasonable and 
fully documented.  Knickmeier, as a repeat violator of this 
court's rules, should pay all of these costs.  
¶105 IT 
IS 
ORDERED 
that 
the 
license 
of 
Jeffrey 
D. 
Knickmeier to practice law in this state is revoked effective as 
of this court's order temporarily suspending his license to 
practice law in this state dated June 14, 2001.  
¶106 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Jeffrey D. Knickmeier shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this disciplinary proceeding 
provided that if the costs are not paid within the time 
specified, and absent a showing to this court of his inability 
to pay the costs within that time, the license of Jeffrey D. 
Knickmeier to practice law in Wisconsin shall remain revoked 
until further order of this court. 
¶107 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jeffrey D. Knickmeier 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
revoked.  
¶108 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate.  
¶109 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., concurs. 
¶110 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., dissents.   
No. 
02-2438-D   
 
 
 
1