Title: State v. Heiner

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Heiner1984 WY 48683 P.2d 629Case Number: 83-83Decided: 05/15/1984THE STATE OF WYOMING, PETITIONER,

v.

DEON F. HEINER, RESPONDENT.

Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
PETITIONER,

v.

DEON F. HEINER, 
RESPONDENT.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Allen C. Johnson, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Michael L. Hubbard, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Roy D. Adcock, Lincoln 
County Atty., for 
petitioner.

Ted C. Frome and 
Gerald L. Goulding of Frome & Goulding, Afton, for 
respondent.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     In this instance this 
court is urged to address the question of its authority to review, pursuant to a 
writ of certiorari, a ruling of a trial court granting a motion to suppress 
evidence in a criminal case. If the authority is present we then are asked by 
the State of Wyoming to determine whether an inventory of 
personal property claimed to have been destroyed in a fire should be suppressed 
in a case involving charges of arson and arson with intent to injure and defraud 
an insurance company. We also must address a pretrial ruling by the district 
court which would impose upon the State the burden of demonstrating the 
reasonableness under constitutional standards of the seizure of evidence 
obtained at the scene of the fire by investigators employed by the fire 
insurance company. The district court granted the motion to suppress the 
evidence in the form of an unsworn inventory of personal property furnished to a 
fire insurance adjuster, and informed the prosecuting attorney of his 
responsibility to demonstrate the reasonableness of the seizure of evidence. The 
State of Wyoming sought review of these pretrial 
rulings pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari. It is our conclusion that 
this court does have the authority and responsibility to review such pretrial 
rulings by trial judges in the exercise of its discretion. The facts and the law 
disclose that the rulings of the trial court were erroneous, and we therefore 
will reverse those rulings.

[¶2.]     On December 22, 1982, a 
criminal complaint was filed in the justice of the peace court in Lincoln 
County, charging Deon Heiner with arson in violation of § 6-7-101, W.S. 1977,1 and with arson with intent to 
defraud his insurer in violation of § 6-7-105, W.S. 1977.2 Deon Heiner then was arrested 
pursuant to a warrant issued upon the criminal complaint, and on January 11, 13 
and 14, 1983, a full-blown preliminary examination was held before the justice 
of the peace. At the conclusion of that preliminary examination the justice of 
the peace found that there was probable cause to believe that the crimes alleged 
in the complaint had been committed and that the defendant had committed those 
crimes.

[¶3.]     On February 15, 1983, 
the transcript of the justice of the peace proceedings was filed in the district 
court, and on February 22, 1983, an Information was filed in the district court 
which was substantially identical to the criminal complaint earlier filed. The 
case then was set for arraignment on February 28, 1983, and on February 22, 
1983, an order was entered pursuant to which the matter was reset for March 21, 
1983, at the request of defense counsel. On March 22, 1983, the court set the 
case for pretrial conference to be held on May 2, 1983, and on that same date 
the defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence and Limit Comment Thereon, 
stating:

"Comes now the Defendant 
herein and moves the court to suppress all evidence gathered by the agents and 
employees of Farmers Insurance Company, and by officers and employees of the 
State of Wyoming after the time that the State received a tip on their hot line 
that the fire at the home of Defendant was caused by arson until Defendant was 
read his `Meranda' [sic] Rights for 
the reason that from that moment on, the Defendant was a suspect for that 
crime.

"In the alternative, 
should the court deny the above motion, then Defendant moves the court to strike 
all evidence gained as a result of a taped interview with Cheryl Heiner, the 
wife of the Defendant, taken on December 30, 1982, by Deputy Fire Marshall, Tim 
Reikofski, and for an order limiting any comment in that interview at the trial 
of this matter; and, "The Defendant moves the court for an order suppressing as 
evidence a list of personal property given by Defendant to Gerald Hansen, an 
insurance adjuster employed by Farmers Insurance Co.; and an order limiting any 
comment on that list at the trial of this case."

[¶4.]     On April 4, 1983, a 
hearing was held by the court to deal with the Motion to Suppress Evidence and 
Limit Comment Thereon, and because of the unavailability of witnesses due to the 
weather that hearing was continued to May 11, 1983. On May 16, 1983, the court 
entered its Order Suppressing Evidence which provided in pertinent part as 
follows:

"It is hereby ORDERED and 
DECREED that:

"1. Defendant's motion to 
suppress the list of household items and other items given by Deon Heiner to 
Gerald Hansen is granted and the list shall not be received and admitted into 
evidence and no testimony or comment shall be received respecting the same, and 
the list is hereby suppressed, said list being identified in Plaintiff's 
Pretrial Memorandum as Exhibits 76 through 87.

"2. Before being admitted 
into evidence, any other exhibit that makes reference to Plaintiff's Exhibits 76 
through 87 shall have the material that makes reference to Plaintiff's Exhibits 
76 through 87 blocked out from the Exhibit so as to not be visible to the 
jury.

"3. Defendant's motion to 
suppress all other evidence is denied without prejudice."

[¶5.]     In the meantime the 
State had filed a Motion in Limine which sought an order

"directing the 
defense counsel not to examine the following State's witnesses as to whether or 
not said witnesses gave the defendant Miranda warnings prior to their 
interviews of the defendant:

"Jerald Hansen 

Greg Cline 

Brent Halladay 

Lynn Borg

"Plaintiff states that 
inquiry in the matters sought to be excluded would be both immaterial and 
irrelevant to the case in that the witnesses were not police officials and were 
acting on behalf of Farmers Insurance Group, and such inquiry by defense counsel 
would tend to confuse the jury. Moreover, the interviews were 
non-custodial."

This motion was 
denied by the court.

[¶6.]     On May 17, 1983, the 
case was reset for trial on June 13, 1983, and on May 20, 1983, a Petition for 
Writ of Review, or Writ of Prohibition, or Writ of Certiorari, or Writ of 
Mandamus was filed in this court by the State of Wyoming. On May 25, 1983, an Order Granting 
Writ of Certiorari was entered in this court and the Writ of Certiorari issued 
to the trial court. Pursuant to the Order Granting Writ of Certiorari further 
proceedings in the district court were stayed until the disposition of the case 
on certiorari. 

[¶7.]     In its brief to this 
court the State of Wyoming presents its statement of the issues 
as follows:

"I. DID THE TRIAL COURT 
ERR IN SUPPRESSING THE INVENTORY SHEETS VOLUNTARILY GIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT TO 
THE INSURANCE ADJUSTOR THREE DAYS AFTER THE FIRE, ON THE BASIS OF ENTRAPMENT OR 
FAILURE TO PROVIDE MIRANDA 
WARNINGS?

"II. DID THE TRIAL COURT 
ERR IN IMPLICITLY HOLDING THAT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WAS APPLICABLE TO THE SEARCH 
AND SEIZURES ACCOMPLISHED BY PRIVATE INSURANCE INVESTIGATORS, AND THEREBY 
REQUIRING THE STATE TO SHOW THE REASONABLENESS OF THE SEIZURES AS A FOUNDATIONAL 
PREREQUISITE TO ADMISSIBILITY?"

The defendant 
articulates the issues to be dealt with in this way in his brief:

"1. Does the Supreme 
Court have jurisdiction to hear this appeal?

"2. If it does, should it 
decline to hear such cases on general policy grounds?

"3. Should the Supreme 
Court overturn the Trial Court's Order on suppression of evidence?

"4. Should the 
investigative employees of Farmers Insurance Exchange be treated like police 
officers and should their conduct in gathering information be held to the same 
standards as that required of police officers of the State of Wyoming?"

[¶8.]     The threshold question 
of the authority of this court to review these evidentiary rulings by the trial 
court pursuant to a writ of certiorari is settled in principle by the decision 
of this court in City of Laramie v. 
Mengel, Wyo., 671 P.2d 340 (1983). In the instant case the rulings of the 
district court suppressed a list of personal property claimed to have been 
destroyed or damaged in the fire which was furnished by the defendant to an 
adjuster employed by the fire insurance company and required the State to 
justify under constitutional standards the reasonableness of the seizure of 
evidence such as photographs, burned wire, and a sample of a chemical substance 
from the scene of the fire by investigators employed by the fire insurance 
company. In this regard we note that the essence of the ruling by the municipal 
judges in City of Laramie v. Mengel, 
supra, was that evidence of a refusal by an accused person to submit to a 
chemical test to determine blood alcohol content was not admissible at the trial 
of the case. We did note in City of 
Laramie v. Mengel, supra, that review pursuant to the statutes providing for 
a bill of exceptions was not available to the city. In that opinion we quoted 
language from Call v. Town of Afton, 
73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954), in which the court observed in substance that 
the writ of certiorari subserves a good purpose in instances in which an appeal 
(or a bill of exceptions) is not plain, speedy and adequate. With respect to 
rulings which suppress important evidence to be offered by the State in a 
criminal prosecution the inadequacy of the bill of exceptions after an acquittal 
is patent. We then would simply add to the authorities cited in City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, 
references to State v. Johnson, 
Tenn., 569 S.W.2d 808 (1978); State v. 
McCormick, Tenn.Cr.App., 584 S.W.2d 821 (1979); State v. Bradfield, 29 Wn. App. 679, 630 P.2d 494 (1981); and State v. 
Chatmon, 9 Wn. App. 741, 515 P.2d 530 (1973). In these several cases the 
respective courts recognized the propriety of a writ of certiorari to review 
pretrial rulings relating to the suppression of evidence.

[¶9.]     In this case, like City of Laramie v. Mengel, the rulings 
of the district court were premised upon constitutional grounds, which results 
in the presentation to this court of issues of constitutional magnitude. Whether 
constitutional protections with respect to inculpatory statements of an accused 
and evidence obtained from the person or property of the accused are to be 
extended to private individuals is a significant question of first impression in 
the State of Wyoming. Consequently, we conclude that 
because of the importance of the evidence suppressed or the use of which is 
potentially denied to the State of Wyoming; the constitutional magnitude of the 
issues raised; and the importance of determining the rule with respect to such 
matters in the State of Wyoming, the court appropriately exercised its 
discretion in granting the writ of certiorari in this case.

[¶10.]  We turn then to a consideration of the 
ruling of the district court suppressing as evidence the list of personal 
property purportedly damaged or destroyed in the fire which was furnished by 
Deon Heiner to the adjuster employed by the fire insurance company. A brief 
background resume with respect to this document is helpful. The record discloses 
that on December 8, 1982, the day after the fire, the adjuster met with Deon 
Heiner, who was concerned about how soon he might be reimbursed for the loss he 
sustained in the fire. The adjuster informed him that one item that would be 
necessary for his claim would be an inventory of personal property which had 
been damaged or destroyed in the fire. The insurance adjuster informed the 
defendant that he had commitments for the following Monday and Tuesday and could 
not return to Star Valley, 
Wyoming, on those days. Heiner 
inquired if he could return on December 10, 1982, if the inventory could be 
prepared by that time, and the insurance adjuster agreed to do so. The articles 
included in the list of personal property furnished by Heiner on December 10, 
1982, were numerous and the inventory indicated an aggregate value of some 
$65,000. At that time it was the conclusion of the adjuster that some of the 
items shown on the list had not been in the home at the time of the fire. After 
the criminal charges had been filed against Deon Heiner a verified proof of loss 
was filed with the fire insurance company in which a claim was made for only 
$9,983 for personal property lost or destroyed in the fire. The theory of the 
State of Wyoming is that the furnishing of the initial inventory is relevant 
with respect to the second count charging the commission of arson with intent to 
injure or defraud an insurance company, and that this is an extremely important 
item of evidence with respect to the question of specific intent. The State also 
urges that this evidence is relevant because it discloses motive which would be 
helpful in reaching a conclusion as to the identity of the person who set the 
fire.

[¶11.]  The basis for the ruling of the district 
court suppressing the inventory of personal property as evidence is elusive. In 
his Motion to Suppress Evidence and Limit Comment Thereon the defendant simply 
requested the suppression of the inventory. In his Brief in Support of Motion to 
Suppress, the defendant urged that a demand for a formal proof of loss signed 
and sworn to by the defendant and his furnishing of the same pursuant to the 
fire insurance policy rendered the prior list (the inventory in question) 
inadmissible because it would not have been relied upon by the insurance company 
in adjusting the loss. During the course of dialogue between counsel and the 
court the court paraphrased the position of the defendant to the effect that 
constitutional guarantees would be a foundational matter for the admissibility 
of any testimony if the insurance company investigators were in fact peace 
officers.

[¶12.]  Later in the dialogue the court indicated 
an understanding of § 6-7-105, W.S. 1977, to the effect that the inventory would 
not be relevant to the fraud count if it were not to be relied upon by the 
insurance company. The district judge emphasized this at another point in the 
dialogue when he indicated that he was inclined to grant the suppression of the 
inventory "on the basis that in order to have a foundation of relevance, on an 
issue of fraud, then you must use that document which was the basis of the 
alleged fraudulent claim, not something that wasn't used for the alleged 
fraudulent claim, but the actual thing that was used for the alleged fraudulent 
claim." Subsequently in considering the statute the court indicated that 
admissibility was not a question of relevancy but that the question of 
admissibility was based upon the Fourth and Fifth Amendment guarantees and Sixth 
Amendment guarantees. Essentially he stated that the question of admissibility 
must be based upon whether or not there were unreasonable searches and 
seizures.

[¶13.]  Having said all this, the court then 
ruled with respect to the list of personal property which Deon Heiner gave to 
the insurance adjuster that the problem with that exhibit was on the foundation, 
and he granted the motion to suppress the exhibit. Finally, after this court had 
granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, the district court inserted in 
the record a Memorandum of the Court, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Appendix A. The thrust of that memorandum is to inject, for the first time, into 
the proceedings the proposition that the basis of the court's ruling was a 
conclusion that pursuant to Rule 403, W.R.E.,3 the court had exercised its 
discretion in concluding that the probative value was substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice.

[¶14.]  This last proclamation by the district 
court disposes of the question of relevance of the inventory in this case. A 
conclusion that the evidence is relevant is correct, because the gravamen of the 
offense found in § 6-7-105, W.S. 1977, is not the fraud, but instead it is the 
setting fire or burning or attempting to do so of any building, structure, etc., 
"with intent to injure or defraud the insurer." Johns v. State, 144 Fla. 256, 197 So. 791 
(1940); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 264 
Mass. 368, 162 N.E. 729 (1928); State v. Greer, 243 
Mo. 599, 147 S.W. 968, 28 Ann.Cas. 1913C 1163 (1912). See also Parb v. State, 143 Wis. 561, 128 N.W. 65 
(1910). In an instance in which the State is charged with proof of a specific 
intent beyond a reasonable doubt, the relevance of a potential false claim of 
loss to the issue of the specific intent is obvious to all. The advice by the 
district court that it had premised its ruling upon an exercise of its 
discretionary authority under Rule 403, W.R.E., renounces any earlier comments 
it may have made with respect to relevance. If this was the court's intention it 
is eminently correct.

[¶15.]  With respect to the exercise of the 
court's discretion under Rule 403, W.R.E., we read the Memorandum of the Court 
to the end that it concluded that unfairness in obtaining evidence became a 
factor to be weighed against the probative value of the proffered evidence in 
the exercise of its discretion. We must say to the district court that however 
reasonable that construction appeared to the court it is erroneous. The manner 
in which relevant evidence is obtained may lead to a conclusion that it is not 
admissible in evidence. See Rule 402, W.R.E. If the evidence is not admissible 
there is no occasion for the court to exercise its discretion under Rule 403, 
W.R.E. 22 Wright and Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 5213, pp. 258-259 
(1978). The district judge must have concluded that the exhibit was admissible 
as not having been unlawfully obtained when he invoked Rule 403, W.R.E. The only 
question then to be resolved, under Rule 403, W.R.E., is whether the prejudicial 
impact of the evidence at trial is "unfair" and if so whether it substantially 
outweighs the probative value. See 2 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 
126 (1978); and 22 Wright and Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 5215 
(1978). The district court then is ruling, in effect, that it is unfair for the 
State of Wyoming to attempt to prove that Mr. Heiner 
set fire to his home with the intention of defrauding his insurance company by 
injecting into evidence an inflated inventory of personal property allegedly 
damaged or destroyed in the fire. This is tantamount to ruling that even though 
the State has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt it is unfair for it 
to introduce any evidence that might incriminate the defendant. We are unable to 
discern from the record or any authorities which have been called to our 
attention the manner in which unfair prejudice attaching to this exhibit in the 
context of the trial of the case substantially outweighs the probative value of 
the exhibit.

[¶16.]  Finally we consider whether in fact the 
district judge ruled that the inventory should not be admitted into evidence 
because the insurance investigator was an agent of law enforcement charged with 
the duty of warning Mr. Heiner that any statements he made would be admissible 
in evidence and could be used against him, and informing him of his right to 
counsel prior to taking any such statements. We are reminded that this 
essentially was Mr. Heiner's position in connection with his motion to 
suppress.

[¶17.]  This theory in part depends upon the 
facts. In this regard the following colloquy appears in the closing part of the 
record of the suppression hearing:

"THE COURT: If it makes 
any help to you, Mr. Frome, the Court concludes that these private insurance 
investigators were gathering evidence for purposes of prosecution.

"MR. FROME: I'll then 
move on to the next statement.

"Since the court has 
determined they were agents of the State, or an alter-ego of law enforcement 
-

"THE COURT: I didn't say 
that. I concluded that these agents were gathering evidence for purposes of 
prosecution.

* * * * * *

"THE COURT: The Court 
didn't find that they were agents of the State. The Court finds that these 
insurance people were gathering evidence for purposes of 
prosecution.

"MR. ADCOCK: As well as 
perhaps for their insurance company.

"THE COURT: There were 
two things, -

"MR. ADCOCK: 
Yes.

"THE COURT: - Mr. Adcock, 
and there is absolutely no question about that.

* * * * * *

"THE COURT: All right. 
The Court has already indicated that it concludes that from the evidence which 
the Court believes is uncontradicted, that the agents, servants and employees of 
the insurance company were gathering evidence for two specific purposes: For the 
purpose of determining insurance company claims, payment and civil activities; 
and they were gathering evidence for purposes of criminal 
proceedings."

[¶18.]  The district court concluded that the 
insurance investigators were not agents of the State, but also concluded that 
because they were gathering evidence for the purpose of criminal prosecution 
their activities would be subject to the same rules that apply to law 
enforcement officers with respect to criminal investigations. It well may be 
that it was on this basis that the court concluded that there was no foundation 
for the admissibility of the list of personal property because it is conceded 
that the insurance adjuster did not present to Deon Heiner any advice with 
respect to his constitutional rights prior to obtaining the inventory from him. 
It is our conclusion, however, that if that is the basis for the district 
court's ruling it was erroneous.

[¶19.]  It is appropriate to deal with this last 
possible basis for the ruling by the district court in the broader context of 
the second issue argued by the State of Wyoming. This involves the propriety of the 
district court's requirement that the State must show the reasonableness of 
seizures of evidence by the fire insurance company's investigators which 
implicitly extends the protections of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States of 
America to the obtaining of evidence by private 
individuals. Conceptually there is no good reason to distinguish between the 
Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States of 
America in discussing this principle. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933, reh. denied 368 U.S. 871, 82 S. Ct. 23, 7 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1961); and Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 
(1886). 

[¶20.]  The overwhelming weight of authority in 
this country is to the effect that Fourth Amendment protections are not invoked 
when evidence is obtained by a private individual. This view still is justified 
by Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048 
(1921). The cases which specifically involve evidence by investigators for fire 
insurance companies are People v. 
Mangiefico, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1041, 102 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1972); Lester v. State, 145 Ga. App. 847, 244 S.E.2d 880 (1978); People v. Vlcek, 114 Ill.App.2d 74, 252 N.E.2d 377 (1969), cert. denied 400 U.S. 822, 91 S. Ct. 42, 27 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1970); 
Stone v. Commonwealth, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 646 (1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 1010, 88 S. Ct. 1259, 20 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1968). Cf., Romano v. Home Insurance 
Company, 490 F. Supp. 191 (N.D.Ga. 1980). A much more lengthy list of cases 
involving many other factual situations is encompassed in Annotation 36 A.L.R.3d 
553 (1971). It does appear that in some jurisdictions an exception is recognized 
relating to private security personnel, e.g., People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575, 594 P.2d 1000 (1979); Commonwealth v. Leone, 386 Mass. 329, 435 N.E.2d 1036 (1982). Of course if the private individual is in fact an agent of law 
enforcement officers then the exclusionary rule may pertain. Since the district 
court in this instance specifically found that the fire insurance company 
investigators were not agents of the law enforcement officers we have no need to 
consider the application of that exception in this instance.

[¶21.]  The sole jurisdiction which we have been 
able to identify in which a different rule prevails is in our sister state of 
Montana. The 
rule in Montana appears to be that the same 
constitutional protections pertain whether a search and seizure involves private 
individuals or law enforcement officers. State v. Hyem, Mont., 
630 P.2d 202 (1981). The most charitable rationalization of that ruling is that 
it depends upon a peculiar provision of the Constitution of the State of Montana 
which is not found in the constitution of this state. Even so, the dissenter to 
the court's opinion in State v. Hyem, supra, points out that other 
states having the same style of constitutional provision have adhered to the 
usual rule distinguishing private individuals from law enforcement officers. On 
the other hand one well could conclude, having perused the somewhat tortured 
history of that rule in the State of Montana, that the rule is chimerical. 
Unfortunately in this instance Deon Heiner persuaded the district judge to 
follow that rule in essence.

[¶22.]  We have considered the cases cited to us 
by Deon Heiner to attempt to discover any basis for espousing in this state a 
rule other than the majority rule. We can find none. In Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 447 P.2d 967 (1969), the court 
invoked the exclusionary rule because of a joint operation by the private 
investigators and police officers. In dealing with the issue that court stated 
in passing:

"* * * The Fourth 
Amendment does not apply, however, to searches by private individuals. * * *" 73 Cal. Rptr.  at 576-577, 447 P.2d  at 968-969.

In State v. Furuyama, 64 Haw. 109, 637 P.2d 1095 (1981), and State v. Sheppard, 
Iowa App., 325 N.W.2d 911 (1982), the existence of an agency relationship 
between the private individual and the law enforcement officers specifically was 
found. In People v. Zelinski, supra, 
and Commonwealth v. Leone, supra, the 
exclusionary rule was applied or suggested with respect to private security 
officers. This exception to the majority rule is alluded to above. Even so, the 
Massachusetts court in Commonwealth v. 
Leone, supra, remanded the case for the purpose of determining the propriety 
of the guard's action in light of identified reasons for special treatment of a 
privately employed special police officer acting upon his employer's behalf, 
with the tenor of the opinion being that if the requirements articulated were 
met the evidence would be admissible. People v. Grevious, 119 Mich. App. 403, 
327 N.W.2d 72 (1982), involved an interrogation of a prisoner in a penal 
institution by custodial personnel without furnishing any warning as to his 
constitutional rights identified in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), reh. denied California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890, 87 S. Ct. 11, 17 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1966). The court concluded that state action under the 
circumstances was obvious.

[¶23.]  As indicated, the same considerations 
apply with respect to any Fifth Amendment implications involved in questioning 
or in obtaining the inventory from Deon Heiner. People v. Vlcek, supra, specifically 
involved failure to provide the warnings articulated in Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra. 
Other cases make clear the proposition that the requirement to give those 
warnings depends upon the existence of custodial interrogation by law 
enforcement officers and is not invoked by questioning by a private citizen. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 
96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976); United States v. Warinner, 607 F.2d 210 
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 927, 100 S. Ct. 1313, 63 L. Ed. 2d 760 
(1980); United States v. Parr-Pla, 
549 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 431 U.S. 927, 97 S. Ct. 2935, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1069 (1977); United States v. 
Maddox, 492 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 851, 95 S. Ct. 92, 42 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1974); United States 
v. Casteel, 476 F.2d 152 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Antonelli, 434 F.2d 335 
(2nd Cir. 1970); Yates v. United 
States, 384 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967); Scoggins v. State, 258 Ark. 749, 528 S.W.2d 641 (1975); People v. Vlcek, 
supra; People v. Raitano, 81 Ill. 
App.3d 373, 36 Ill.Dec. 597, 401 N.E.2d 278 (1980); Luckett v. State, 158 Ind. App. 571, 303 N.E.2d 670 (1973); Trinkle v. State, 
259 Ind. 114, 284 N.E.2d 816 (1972); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 
335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 959, 96 S. Ct. 1740, 48 L. Ed. 2d 204 
(1976); State v. Brydon, Mo. App., 
626 S.W.2d 443 (1981); State v. 
Colton, Mo. App., 529 S.W.2d 919 (1975); State v. Kelly, Mo., 439 S.W.2d 487 
(1969); and State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio 
St.2d 15, 56 Ohio Op.2d 8, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971).

[¶24.]  In discussing the matters before it at 
the suppression hearing the district court also suggested an implication of 
Sixth Amendment rights with respect to deprivation of the right to counsel. It 
is clear that in this jurisdiction a Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches 
only when adversarial criminal proceedings have been commenced against an 
accused. Brown v. State, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1024 (1983). It follows that in this instance the materials, whether 
inculpatory statements or evidence obtained at the scene of the fire, which were 
obtained prior to the filing of the criminal complaint, were not obtained in 
violation of Deon Heiner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

[¶25.]  We hold that the district court erred in 
suppressing the list of items purportedly damaged or destroyed in the fire which 
was furnished to the insurance company adjuster on December 10, 1982, and that 
the district court espoused an erroneous rule of law in suggesting that it would 
be the burden of the State to demonstrate the reasonableness of the seizure of 
evidence from the scene of the fire by the insurance company investigators. 
These holdings makes it unnecessary in this instance for the court to consider 
other bases for admissibility which have been argued, such as non-custodial 
interrogation; consent to search and seizure; or any other justifications that 
might be significant if the evidence had been obtained by law officers rather 
than private individuals. We reverse the rulings of the district court, dissolve 
the stay of proceedings in the district court, and remand the case for further 
proceedings in accordance with the rulings articulated in this opinion. 

  
 
 


STATE OF 
      WYOMING

COUNTY OF 
      LINCOLN

 

IN THE 
      DISTRICT COURT

THIRD 
      JUDICIAL DISTRICT

 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE 
      OF WYOMING

 
 
 
 
Plaintiff

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VS

 
 
CRIMINAL NO. 
    1677

 
 
 
 
 
 
DEON 
      HEINER

 
 
 
 
Defendant

 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________

MEMORANDUM OF THE 
COURT

[¶26.]  In consideration of the action taken by 
the Supreme Court in response to Plaintiff's Petition for Review, it is 
appropriate that the Supreme Court should be advised of the basis of the Trial 
Court's ruling.

[¶27.]  Pursuant to Rule 403, Wyoming Rules of 
Evidence, the Court in its discretion ruled on the admissibility of the 
inventory prepared by Defendant. Rule 403 provides:

Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

[¶28.]  The Court declared the inventory 
inadmissable. Some of the facts considered by the Court were:

[¶29.]  1. The fire department put out the fire 
in the Heiner home and left. The scene of the alleged crime was not seized and 
no law enforcement agencies started an investigation.

[¶30.]  2. Shortly after the fire an independent 
insurance adjustor, hired by the Defendant's insurance company, arrived, 
inspected the home and talked with the Defendant. The adjustor quickly suspected 
that the fire was arson and the Defendant was the perpetrator.

[¶31.]  3. However, while the adjustor 
interviewed a member of the fire department, who was also a police officer in a 
nearby municipality, the adjustor did not report his suspicions to the Lincoln 
County Sheriff or to the State Fire Marshall. He did not demand an 
investigation.

[¶32.]  4. Instead, four private investigators 
were hired by the insurance company, two of whom secured re-entry to the alleged 
crime scene without the burden of a warrant.

[¶33.]  5. The Adjustor asserted that this 
private investigation was being done for insurance purposes. However, the 
adjustor also admitted that evidence was being gathered in contemplation of the 
same being used in criminal proceedings.

[¶34.]  6. The Adjustor interviewed the 
Defendant. He advised the Defendant

a. That the Defendant 
should prepare a detailed 
inventory.

b. That after the 
inventory was prepared, the two of them would go over it in an effort to reach 
an agreement.

c. When they had reached 
an agreement, he would help the Defendant prepare and submit a claim to the 
insurance company; and that the quicker the inventory was prepared, the quicker 
Defendant would be paid.

d. That Defendant had an 
inventory prepared by December 10, 1982, approximately three days after the 
fire.

e. That upon seeing the 
inventory the Adjustor knew there were items listed which were not in the 
home.

f. However, the adjustor 
said nothing to the Defendant. He did not adjust the inventory. He did not 
question the inventory. He did not reject the inventory. He did not help the 
Defendant reduce the inventory to a proper form of claim under the 
policy.

g. After the private 
investigators concluded their examination of the scene, and more than a week 
after the fire, the private investigators for the first time contacted the State 
Fire Marshall. There was no evidence the insurance company ever contacted the 
Sheriff.

h. After the Defendant 
had been charged with arson, the insurance company demanded that he submit a 
sworn proof of loss as required by the policy as a condition for payment of a 
claim.

i. Defendant complied, 
resulting in two inventories of widely differing value, the first of which 
should not be admitted at trial.

DATED AND SIGNED THIS 
27th DAY OF MAY, 1983.

/s/ 
John D. Troughton

JOHN 
D. TROUGHTON

DISTRICT 
JUDGE

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 6-7-101, W.S. 
1977, provides as follows:

"Any person who willfully 
and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, 
counsels or procures the burning of any dwelling house, whether occupied, 
unoccupied or vacant, or any kitchen, shop, stable or other outhouse that is 
parcel thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto or any standing timber on 
public or privately owned land, whether the property of himself or of another, 
shall be guilty of arson in the first degree, and upon conviction thereof, be 
sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than two (2) nor more than twenty 
(20) years."

2 Section 6-7-105, W.S. 
1977, provides as follows:

"Any person who willfully 
and with intent to injure or defraud the insurer sets fire to or burns or 
attempts to do so or who causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures 
the burning of any building, structure or personal property, of whatsoever class 
or character, whether the property of himself or of another, which shall at the 
time be insured by any person, company or corporation against loss or damage by 
fire, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to 
the penitentiary for not less than one (1) nor more than five (5) 
years."

3 Rule 403, W.R.E., reads 
as follows:

"Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
concurring, with whom THOMAS, 
Justice, joins.

[¶35.]  I concur with all of that said in the 
majority opinion but find it appropriate to indicate a few of the fallacies 
contained in the dissenting opinion.

FALLACY NO. 1: 
JUSTICE

[¶36.]  The dissenting opinion begins with 
reference to there being a subversion of justice in allowing certiorari in a 
criminal case or in accepting an appeal by the state from a final order 
terminating the proceeding before jeopardy attaches in a criminal case. The 
dissenting opinion contends that a bill of exceptions taken pursuant to §§ 
7-12-101 through 7-12-105, W.S. 1977, is the only means available to the people 
of the state by which an error in a criminal case can be reviewed by 
us.

[¶37.]  Since the bill of exceptions can be used 
only to settle the question concerning an error at the trial level without 
affecting the result of the action taken against the defendant1, the dissent would hold that the 
defendant is allowed to take advantage of any error without regard as to whether or not such 
error resulted in a perversion of justice. As an example, the introduction 
into evidence of a statement by a defendant admitting guilt and the introduction 
of physical evidence of sexual assault could be attacked by the defendant as 
improper through a motion in limine made before jeopardy attaches. Granting of 
the motion would sabotage the people's case. The prosecution could not succeed, 
and the case would have to be dismissed. Under the dissent, such would leave the 
defendant his freedom without any determination of his guilt or innocence. 
Conversely, if the order were subject to appeal, directly or by certiorari, and 
the trial court were found to have erred, the case could be remanded and the 
trial could proceed with, perhaps, a dangerous rapist being removed from a 
position of hurting others.

[¶38.]  But it can work the other way. If the 
trial court denied the motion in limine, the dissent's position would leave the 
defendant with no alternative but to face the time and rigors of a long trial in 
which the evidence would be used. Thereafter, on his appeal the trial court 
could be found to have erred in admitting the evidence, allowing the defendant 
his freedom only after he suffered through an expensive and lengthy trial with 
accompanying mental anguish and pretrial and preappeal incarceration. If 
defendant had the right to an earlier appeal of the order denying his motion in 
limine, directly or by certiorari, he would have been spared the difficulties of 
trial and lengthy incarceration.

[¶39.]  Either way, justice would be better 
obtained by use of the certiorari or interlocutory appeal, or through the direct 
appeal of the ruling on the motion in limine as advocated by Justice Raper in State v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368 
(1983) (Raper, Justice, specially concurring), a case with which Justice Rose 
disagrees in his dissent.

[¶40.]  In his specially concurring opinion in Faltynowicz, in which I joined, Justice 
Raper ably and fully exposited the availability of an appeal from certain orders 
issued prior to judgment in a criminal case. His research as therein set forth 
established the fact that the people of the state have means to bring error to 
this court in a criminal case other than through the statutory bill of 
exceptions procedure. It would be redundant for me to repeat that said by 
Justice Raper in Faltynowicz which 
would also have application to the writ of certiorari here under consideration, 
but that said by Justice Raper also exposes the fallacies in the dissenting 
opinion.

[¶41.]  It should also be constantly kept in mind 
that justice is a two-way street. A defendant in a criminal case is absolutely 
entitled to justice. So also are the people of the state entitled to justice in 
connection with that case.

[¶42.]  In recognition of the need for justice in 
such instances and also in certain situations in civil matters, this court began 
the process of establishing a rule to allow interlocutory appeals in such 
pertinent instances or situations. The rule has not yet progressed through the 
rules committee. This court recognized the potential set forth by Justice Raper 
in State v. Faltynowicz, supra, 
whereby the application of Rules 1.04 and 1.05, W.R.A.P.,2 would provide the vehicle for 
rendering justice in some instances. However, it was felt that the review should 
be discretionary and not a matter of right so that the cleavage between that 
subject to such review and that not so qualifying would not be significant. Both 
certiorari and the interlocutory appeal are discretionary and accomplish that 
end. Pending enactment of the interlocutory appeal rule, this court opted to use 
the power of certiorari, as granted by the constitution and as existed at common 
law, in those instances wherein justice could best be served through final 
settlement of a material issue of the case prior to trial in a civil matter and 
prior to jeopardy in a criminal matter.

[¶43.]  In the case now before us, the trial 
court erred in suppression of evidence vital to the presentation by the people 
of the state. Justice requires an ultimate fair determination of defendant's 
guilt or innocence of the charge of arson. Certiorari furthers justice in this 
case by providing, prior to the time of jeopardy, the means to correct the error 
of the trial court with reference to admissibility of evidence upon which the 
determination of guilt or innocence should be made.

[¶44.]  Use of the writ of certiorari is a means 
of furthering justice and not the contrary.

FALLACY NO. 2: DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY

[¶45.]  It must be emphasized that once the defendant is 
put in jeopardy, neither the author of the majority opinion and those concurring 
with him nor anyone else contends that the people of the state can secure 
interlocutory review by certiorari or otherwise. A defendant cannot twice be put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. Art. 1, § 11, Wyoming Constitution. After 
jeopardy attaches, the people of the state may request review of a ruling on a 
legal issue only through the bill of exceptions, but, as reflected in § 
7-12-105, supra (see fn. 1), such review, if granted, will not affect the 
judgment in favor of the defendant. Of note is the fact that the section 
concerns only the "judgment." Section 7-12-103, W.S. 1977, requires the 
prosecution to give reasonable notice to the judge "who presided at the trial." 
Thus, the procedure for use of a bill of exceptions as set forth in § 7-12-101 
et seq., W.S. 1977, is available only after the trial. It does not purport to 
apply to orders prior to the judgment let alone prior to jeopardy.

[¶46.]  Cases cited in the dissenting opinion 
concern instances in which the defendant was put in jeopardy. In most cases, the 
judgment had been rendered. The courts were there refusing "appeals" after the 
defendant was put in jeopardy. Those cases are not proper precedent for the 
question before us. 

FALLACY NO. 3: 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

[¶47.]  The dissent attempts to change the plain 
meaning of Art. 5, § 3, of the Wyoming Constitution by suggesting that it is 
conditioned on Art. 5, § 2. Art. 5, § 2, grants appellate powers to the court. 
Art. 5, § 3, defines the original jurisdiction of the court.3

[¶48.]  Art. 5, § 3, is plain and unambiguous in 
providing that:

"* * * The supreme court 
shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas 
corpus, certiorari, and other writs 
necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory 
jurisdiction. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

The phrase 
"necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory 
jurisdiction" modifies only "other writs" inasmuch as many of the enumerated 
writs have nothing to do with appellate or revisory jurisdiction. The power 
granted is to issue a writ of certiorari without any strings attached 
thereto.

[¶49.]  The common-law writ of certiorari is of 
ancient origin. St. George v. Larson, 
125 Vt. 352, 215 A.2d 511, 512 (1965); McKenna v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 
19 N.J. 270, 116 A.2d 29, 31 (1955). It is a writ requiring the certification of 
the record and proceedings from a court of record or other tribunal or officer 
exercising a judicial function for revision and correction in matters of law. Lenz v. Cobo, 338 Mich. 383, 61 N.W.2d 587, 592 (1953); Toulouse v. Board of 
Zoning Adjustment, 147 Me. 387, 87 A.2d 670, 673 (1952). Certiorari differs 
from a writ of error in that the latter is a writ of right while the former is 
discretionary. Levy v. Gerhard, 74 
R.I. 288, 60 A.2d 494, 495, 4 A.L.R.2d 345 (1948); Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 25 S. Ct. 760, 765, 50 L. Ed. 90 (1905). It is a remedial, revisory, supervisory and 
prerogative writ. Reagan v. Rhodes, 
264 Ala. 39, 84 So. 2d 647, 653 (1956); Wattenbarger v. Tullock, 197 Tenn. 279, 
271 S.W.2d 628, 631 (1954); Waltman v. 
Ortman, 233 Ala. 170, 170 So. 545, 547 (1936). Inasmuch as certiorari is 
more than an appellate power, Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18, of the Wyoming Constitution 
have no pertinency to it. As already stated, Art. 5, § 3, supra, has to do with 
original jurisdiction of the supreme court, whereas Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18, concern 
appellate jurisdiction of the court. That provided in Art. 5, § 3, does not 
depend on "rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law."

[¶50.]  The argument in the dissenting opinion on 
this point is not only flawed in this respect, but the authorities cited therein 
do not pertain to the circumstances here involved. The quotation in the 
dissenting opinion from Mau v. 
Stoner, 14 Wyo. 183, 83 P. 218, 219 (1905), begins:

"* * * It is well settled 
that, in the absence of a direct 
constitutional requirement, the right of appeal does not exist unless 
expressly conferred by statute. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

There is a 
"direct constitutional" power granting to the supreme court the right to issue a 
writ of certiorari. Cases and authorities referred to in the dissenting opinion 
which depend on statutory authority for appeal and review are not pertinent to 
the situation in which there is direct constitutional power providing for 
certiorari.

[¶51.]  An attempt was once made to abolish by 
statute the use of the writ of certiorari in civil cases. Ch. 60, § 801, Laws of 
Wyoming 1886, last codified as § 3-5323, W.C.S. 1945:

"Writs of error and 
certiorari to reverse, vacate or modify judgments or final orders in civil cases 
are abolished; but court shall have the same power to compel transcripts of the 
proceedings containing the judgment or final order sought to be reversed, to be 
furnished, completed or perfected as they heretofore had under writs of error 
and certiorari."

Of interest to 
failure of the dissenting opinion in this case are: (1) the legislature only 
abolished the writs in civil cases, by implication not doing so in criminal 
cases, and (2) the constitution (adopted in 1890) retained certiorari in face of 
the prior legislative action abolishing it. In any event, we held in State v. Dahlem, 37 Wyo. 498, 263 P. 708, 709 (1928), that the right to certiorari existed notwithstanding attempted 
abolition by statute. See G-W Development 
Corporation v. Village of North Palm Beach Zoning Board of Adjustment, 
Fla.App., 317 So. 2d 828 (1975); State ex 
rel. Pearson v. Hansen, Wyo., 409 P.2d 769 (1966); Call v. Town of Afton, 73 
Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954); Batty v. 
Arizona State Dental Board, 57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870 (1941).

[¶52.]  A more pertinent consideration, not 
mentioned in the dissenting opinion, arises from Rule 1.06, W.R.A.P. It 
reads:

"Proceedings in error are 
hereby abolished and any judgment or final order reviewable by the district 
court or Supreme Court may be reviewed only by appeal in accordance with the 
rules herein provided, and the words `proceeding in error' where used in the 
laws of this state shall be held to mean `appeal.' Writs of error are 
abolished."

[¶53.]  Of course, the court can no more vary the 
constitution by rule than can the legislature by statute. In any event, there is 
a definite distinction between "certiorari" and "proceeding in error" or "writs 
of error." The quotation from the statute purporting to abolish certiorari, 
supra, recognizes the distinction by referring to "writs of error and 
certiorari" (emphasis added). As noted, supra, Art. 5, §§ 3 and 18, of the 
Wyoming Constitution recognize the distinction. Certiorari is discretionary. A 
writ of error is a writ of right.

[¶54.]  The constitution makes certiorari 
available for use by the supreme court, but the court will use it sparingly and 
only in the interest of justice.

FALLACY NO. 4: APPEAL vs. 
CERTIORARI

[¶55.]  The dissenting opinion treats appeal and 
certiorari as identical. I have already noted the distinction made between them 
historically, including the language in Ch. 60, § 801, Laws of Wyoming 1886, and 
last codified § 3-5323, W.C.S. 1945, supra, and as reflected in the Wyoming 
Constitution. The two A.L.R. annotations referred to and quoted from in the 
majority opinion, i.e., 109 A.L.R. 794 and 91 A.L.R.2d 1096, make the definite 
distinction between appeals and writs of error on the one hand and certiorari on 
the other hand.

[¶56.]  Most of the dissenting opinion is 
predicated on law as it pertains to an appeal. The attempt to apply it to 
certiorari fails in view of the historical and practical distinction between the 
two. Specific instances of this failure are set forth in Fallacy No. 6, 
infra.

[¶57.]  Mentioned in connection with this fallacy 
is the dissenting opinion's failure to distinguish between common-law certiorari 
and statutory or constitutional certiorari which modifies common-law certiorari. 
The constitutions of some states do not mention certiorari - wherefore statutory 
change controls. See Fallacy No. 3, supra, and Fallacy No. 6, infra, for 
supporting authority.

[¶58.]  One of the primary conditions for 
issuance of a writ of certiorari is that it will not lie when another remedy is 
available. State ex rel. Pearson v. 
Hansen, supra; Call v. Town of 
Afton, supra; City of Sheridan v. 
Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892 (1916). This factor alone reflects the 
distinction between "appeal" and "certiorari."

[¶59.]  The people of the state have no right to 
appeal a criminal case. A statutory bill of exceptions does not provide a remedy 
for the people of the state. The fact that the statutory bill of exceptions is 
not an appeal of a case is discussed in Fallacy No. 5, infra.

FALLACY NO. 5: BILL OF 
EXCEPTIONS vs. APPEAL

[¶60.]  The dissent equates the procedure set 
forth in §§ 7-12-101 through 7-12-105, supra, with an appeal. Inasmuch as such 
procedure provides that the judgment "shall not be reversed nor in any manner 
affected," (§ 7-12-105), it does not comport with that to be accomplished by an 
"appeal. " Rule 1.04, W.R.A.P., supra, provides that this court, on review, can 
reverse in whole or in part, vacate, or modify any judgment or final order. The 
bill of exceptions procedure is inconsistent with this purpose of an appeal, 
and, thus, it is also something other than an appeal.

[¶61.]  The statutory bill of exceptions, by its 
terms, is not an appeal of the case. 
At most, it is an appeal of an issue presented and decided in the case. The 
resulting opinion has no effect on the case itself. It is not an 
appeal.

FALLACY NO. 6: IRRELEVANT 
CITATIONS

[¶62.]  Cases and authorities cited and quoted 
from in the dissenting opinion are not in point and do not support the position 
taken in such opinion.

[¶63.]  In Mau v. Stoner, supra, heavily relied 
upon by Justice Rose in his dissent, the court entered a decree in a water right 
case under a statute providing that "the decision of the court, judge or 
commissioner shall be final." 83 P.  at 219. Not only is this a civil case, 
wherein the availability of certiorari is historically different than in 
criminal cases (discussed infra), but the court, after quoting from cases pro 
and con on the issues as was then commonly done, concluded at of 83 
P.:

"It is not necessary * * 
* for us to express an opinion as to whether there is a constitutional right of 
appeal or review in cases which proceed according to the course of the common 
law. The statute under consideration provides for a special or summary 
proceeding unknown to the common law, created by the Legislature for the purpose 
of affording temporary relief only, and to meet immediate emergencies that may 
arise under it. * * *"

Not only is the 
case a civil one, but it concerns a specific statute providing for temporary 
relief and directing that the decision be final with regards to the temporary 
relief. It involves an appeal, not certiorari.

[¶64.]  State v. Heberling, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1043 
(1976); State v. Ginther, 53 Wyo. 17, 
77 P.2d 803 (1938); State v. 
Weathers, 13 Okla. Cr. 92, 162 P. 239 (1917); State v. Arnold, 144 Ind. 651, 42 N.E. 1095 (1896); and In re Boulter, 5 
Wyo. 263, 39 P. 875 (1895), all relied upon in the dissenting opinion, are cases 
in which the defendant was put in jeopardy and trial was had. The language from 
those cases directing review to be by a bill of exceptions under such condition 
rather than by an appeal after jeopardy attached cannot properly be quoted to 
pertain to certiorari. In State v. 
Heberling and in the Indiana case, the proceedings were pursuant to a bill of exceptions. 
In re Boulter came to the court on a 
petition for habeas corpus. None of these cases concern certiorari. They concern 
an attempted appeal. References to these cases in the dissenting opinion are 
misleading.

[¶65.]  State v. Benales, Wyo., 365 P.2d 811 
(1961), relied upon in the dissenting opinion, was not before the supreme court 
on certiorari. The issue involved a dismissal of an information for failure to 
prosecute, i.e., to grant a speedy trial. The supreme court noted that "the 
state undertook an appeal to this court, proceeding as in a civil case under the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure" (emphasis added). Id. at 812.

[¶66.]  State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 14 
Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 (1906), also relied upon in the dissenting opinion, came to 
us on a bill of exceptions and on a 
petition for a writ of error, not on certiorari. The court held that the bill of 
exceptions rather than the writ of error was the proper procedure.

[¶67.]  United States v. Rosenwasser, 145 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1944), concerned an action to suppress evidence by a stranger to 
criminal action. The quotation from this case in the dissenting opinion has to 
do with "appeals," not certiorari; and the court's discussion had to do with the 
propriety of an appeal under 28 U.S.C.A. § 227, and not with certiorari under a 
constitutionally granted power. Moreover, in a footnote, the court said at page 
1018:

"[3] Appellee has 
suggested that appeals by the government in criminal cases are strictly confined 
to a few instances listed in § 682 of 18 U.S.C.A. and therefore that even if the 
district court's order herein be considered a final decision, the within appeal 
would not lie. We have considered the point but indicate no opinion 
thereon."

The court, thus, 
did not rule out even an "appeal" under proper circumstances.

[¶68.]  The dissenting opinion quotes from a 
summary of a holding in State v. 
B'Gos, 175 Ga. 627, 165 S.E. 566 (1932), as such summary is contained in 
Annotation: Right of state to writ of certiorari in criminal cases, 109 A.L.R. 
793. The dissenting opinion does not mention the other numerous case citations 
in the annotation which resulted in the annotation conclusion at :

"That a remedy by writ of 
certiorari lies under proper circumstances on behalf of the state in a criminal 
case finds support in various decisions."

[¶69.]  The dissenting opinion refers to 24 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1659 and to 4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 268 to support 
the proposition that there is "no right to a writ of error, to an appeal, or to 
an exception in a criminal case unless it is expressly conferred by * * * 
statute * * *." Of course, the references do not concern certiorari.

[¶70.]  Finally, the dissenting opinion 
says:

"* * * The rule is 
reported in Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1095, 1096, `Right of prosecution to writ of 
certiorari in criminal case,' where it is said:

"`As a general rule the 
prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of 
the defendant in a criminal case, in the 
absence of a statute clearly conferring that right.' (Emphasis 
added.)"

The dissenting 
opinion fails to continue the quotation in context. The annotation reads further 
at :

"It is against this 
background of the prosecution's limited right of appeal in criminal cases that 
courts deal with the problem of the state's status to obtain by certiorari 
review of a lower court decision, favorable to the defendant, in a criminal 
proceeding; and the problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant 
contends, in effect, that the prosecution is attempting to accomplish by the 
writ what it could not do by appeal, and that his constitutional rights are 
being thus encroached upon."

In summarizing 
cases listed "§ 3. Under modern constitutions and statutes," the annotation 
explains:

"Among the cases 
discussed in this section are many instances in which the prosecution's standing 
to maintain the writ was upheld and many in which it was denied. The results 
reached depend on the particular statutory or constitutional language before the 
court, and the specific facts of the individual cases. * * *" (Footnote 
omitted.)

As reflected 
under Fallacy No. 3, supra, the Wyoming Constitution empowers the supreme court 
to issue certiorari as part of its original jurisdiction.

[¶71.]  A few of the more recent cases holding 
the state to be entitled to a writ of certiorari in criminal cases are: State v. McCormick, Tenn.Cr.App., 584 S.W.2d 821 (1979) (cited in the majority opinion), under common law to review 
order suppressing evidence; State v. 
Ward, 46 N.C. App. 200, 264 S.E.2d 737 (1980), state held to be required to 
petition for prerogative writ of certiorari to secure review of dismissal for 
failure to supply speedy trial since it had no right to appeal; People v. Gonter, 125 Cal. App. 3d 333, 
178 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1981), review of jurisdiction to impose deferred incarceration 
program on defendant; People v. Dee, 
Colo., 638 P.2d 749 (1981), review of holding that defendant's rights were 
violated in administration of breath test in driving under the influence of 
intoxicants case. Directly in point with this case, the court held in State v. Cullison, Iowa, 215 N.W.2d 309 
(1974), that its review in this original certiorari action of a ruling by the 
trial court sustaining a motion to suppress evidence was proper.

[¶72.]  Some mention should be made of the 
criticism by the dissenting opinion of the decision in City of Laramie v. Mengel, Wyo., 671 P.2d 340 (1983). Such criticism is founded on the same fallacies herein set out 
- failure to understand that the people of the state are entitled to justice 
just as is the defendant; that there is constitutional authority for the writ of 
certiorari; that certiorari is a concept entirely separate from "appeal"; that 
the statutory bill of exceptions is not an appeal of the case; and that 
certiorari is a well recognized and proper proceeding to use in the situation 
presented in City of Laramie v. 
Mengel, just as it is in this case.

FALLACY NO. 7: NUMBER OF 
PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI

[¶73.]  The dissent recites that "we find the 
State's petitions for writs of certiorari from pretrial and final orders in 
criminal prosecutions to be raining down about our heads in torrents." We have 
had but a handful of such petitions. And, of course, if most of them had not 
come to us on certiorari, they would finally come along on appeals or on bills 
of exceptions.

CONCLUSION

[¶74.]  The majority opinion properly serves the 
cause of justice and is founded on sound legal reasoning and 
precedent.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 7-12-105, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"The judgment of the 
court in the case in which the bill was taken shall not be reversed nor in any 
manner affected, but the decision of the supreme court shall determine the law 
to govern in any similar case which may be pending at the time the decision is 
rendered, or which may afterwards arise in the state."

2 Rule 1.04, W.R.A.P., 
provides:

"A judgment rendered or 
final order made by a district court may be reversed in whole or in part, 
vacated or modified by the Supreme Court for errors appearing on the 
record."

Rule 1.05, 
W.R.A.P., provides in part:

"A final order is: (1) an 
order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect 
determines the action and prevents a judgment * * *."

3 See Fallacy No. 4 
(infra) re certiorari being other than an "appeal."

CARDINE, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶75.]  I was not a member of the court when this 
writ of certiorari was issued in the first instance. Had I been, I would have 
opposed it being granted. We are asked here to overturn a preliminary ruling by 
a trial court on an evidentiary question. That is an exercise in futility. It is 
a waste of this court's time and limited resources.

[¶76.]  Should we reverse the court's ruling and 
this case go to trial, I do not know what would prevent the court, after hearing 
additional testimony and receiving evidence, from, in the exercise of its 
discretion, excluding this evidence because its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, or excluding this evidence for any 
of a myriad of other reasons.

[¶77.]  The complaint in this case was filed 
December 22, 1982. There followed a preliminary hearing, motions, Order for 
Pretrial Conference, and Order Suppressing Evidence. The case was set for trial 
June 13, 1983. The granting of writ of certiorari and appeal from the Order 
Suppressing Evidence prevented the trial. The result is delay, inefficiency in 
disposition of the case and further crowding of the court's docket. In the 
future, trial courts, for the sake of efficiency, may simply take these motions 
under advisement and rule upon them after the commencement of trial. For these 
reasons, I believe we should avoid, whenever possible, involvement in 
evidentiary rulings and preliminary matters at the trial level.

[¶78.]  With respect to Justice Thomas' opinion 
in this case, I agree with his analysis of the law and the result. However, were 
I considering this writ in the first instance, I would not have favored it being 
granted.

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶79.]  Had I been given the opportunity, I would 
have voted to deny the petition for an order granting certiorari. Since I was 
away from the court on the day the issue was considered by the other justices 
and therefore not given the opportunity to express my thoughts, I take this 
occasion to say that it is my judgment that the writ was improvidently 
granted.

The Writ-of-Certiorari 
Crisis

Introduction

"* * * Not being weary in 
search of substantial justice, he sues out a writ of error, and brings his case 
to this court, where substantial justice 
is known to be administered in all its purity."1 (Emphasis added.) Garbanati v. Beckwith, 2 Wyo. 213 
(1880).

[¶80.]  First addressing Chief Justice Rooney's 
concurring opinion, in which he criticizes my dissenting position in this matter 
as he undertakes to show that a bill of exceptions is not the exclusive means by which the 
State may seek to review in this court an adverse ruling made during the trial 
and that certiorari is appropriate for this purpose, I am blessed by not having 
to do a great deal of responsive research since he and Chief Justice Raper (now 
retired) have done it for me in State v. 
Selig, Wyo., 635 P.2d 786 (1981) and State v. Heberling, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1043 
(1976). In State v. Selig, supra, 635 P.2d  at 788, where the State sought review of an adverse ruling made during a 
criminal trial, Chief Justice Rooney, writing for the court, holds as 
follows:

"A bill of exceptions is 
the exclusive means for the prosecution to seek review of an adverse ruling made 
during the trial. State v. Heberling, 
Wyo., 553 P.2d 1043 (1976); State v. 
Benales, Wyo., 365 P.2d 811 (1961); State v. Ginther, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803 (1938); State ex rel. Gibson v. 
Cornwell, 14 Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 (1906). It is now a statutory proceeding, 
and the statutory requirements must be met. State v. Ginther, supra, and State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 
supra."

In State v. Heberling, supra, 553 P.2d  at 
1043, Chief Justice Raper (now retired), writing for the court, 
said:

"A bill of exceptions is 
the only way by which the State may challenge and have reviewed any adverse 
ruling of the district court in criminal prosecutions. State v. Benales, Wyo. 1961, 365 P.2d 811; State v. Ginther, 1938, 53 Wyo. 
17, 77 P.2d 803. Even then, as provided in § 7-291, W.S. 1957:

"`The judgment of the 
court in the case in which the bill was taken shall not be reversed nor in any 
manner affected, but the decision of the supreme court shall determine the law 
to govern in any similar case which may be pending at the time the decision is 
rendered, or which may afterwards arise in the state.'"

[¶81.]  As the author of the majority opinion in 
the case at bar writes, the threshold question here is this court's authority to 
review a district court's order suppressing evidence in a pretrial criminal 
proceeding. The majority find, by authority of City of Laramie v. Mengel, Wyo., 671 P.2d 340 (1983), that certiorari could and should be used for this purpose. In 
my judgment, it is in utter disregard of the law for this court to hold that City of Laramie v. Mengel furnishes 
authority for us to grant certiorari in the case at bar or that we are possessed 
of any jurisdiction whatever which would permit our utilization of certiorari 
for these purposes. Before I explain my objection to the majority opinion in 
this and other relevant respects, I pause to notice the prophetic observations 
of former Chief Justice Raper (now retired), as he authored his concurrence in 
State v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368 (1983). Faltynowicz was properly 
here on a bill of exceptions taken by the State from a County Court ruling 
dismissing a criminal complaint. We sustained the bill of exceptions, but Chief 
Justice Raper saw the case as a

"* * * catalyst to point 
up some misleading and poor Wyoming jurisprudence." 660 P.2d  at 372.

He 
said:

"It is my concern that in 
this case an appeal through the 
district court, rather than through the bill of exceptions procedure, by the 
State of Wyoming would have been the proper means of bringing the issue to the 
supreme court." (Emphasis added.) 660 P.2d  at 372.

[¶82.]  Justice Raper thought it bad law - the 
historic rule of this court which holds that a bill of exceptions is the only 
way by which the State can bring an adverse ruling in a criminal case to this 
court's attention for decision.2 He then concluded that his concern 
extended to

"* * * instances where a 
trial judge may have, in a pretrial proceeding, suppressed evidence necessary to 
the State in proceeding with the prosecution * *."

[¶83.]  I disagree with Chief Justice Raper's 
belief that the State of Wyoming has, under its Constitution, statutes, case law 
or court rules, an interlocutory-appeal right from a trial court's adverse 
decision in a criminal case - a right which would even authorize the appeal of a 
pretrial evidentiary ruling - but I must say that his concurring opinion 
certainly started something. Since Faltynowicz, we find the State's 
petitions for writs of certiorari from pretrial and final orders in criminal 
prosecutions to be raining down about our heads in torrents. In entertaining 
these petitions - where the State is the petitioner in a criminal proceeding as 
exemplified in the case at bar - we are, without jurisdiction,3 inviting a myriad of appellate and 
trial-court problems.

[¶84.]  The majority opinion in this appeal 
represents the first time in the history of Wyoming jurisprudence that this 
court has granted the State of Wyoming appellate review of an adverse ruling in 
the criminal-trial process.

[¶85.]  It is fundamental to the consideration of 
the issues and their ramifications that the granting of certiorari has raised in 
this appeal, that the applicable Wyoming constitutional provisions be identified 
and considered.

[¶86.]  The Constitution of the State of Wyoming, 
Art. 5, § 3, provides - with respect to writs of certiorari - as 
follows:

"The supreme court shall 
have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus as to all state 
officers, and in habeas corpus. The supreme court shall also have power to issue 
writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, and other writs necessary 
and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction." 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶87.]  There are no "rules and regulations" 
pertaining to certiorari under Art. 5, § 2, which section provides:

"Supreme court generally; 
appellate jurisdiction.

"The supreme court shall 
have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the state, in both civil 
and criminal causes, and shall have a general superintending control over all 
inferior courts, under such rules and 
regulations as may be prescribed by law" (emphasis added),

nor have 
regulations been adopted under Art. 5, § 18, which provides:

"Appeals from district 
courts to supreme court.

"Writs of error and 
appeals may be allowed from the decisions of the district courts to the supreme 
court under such regulations as may be 
prescribed by law." (Emphasis added.)

[¶88.]  This leaves the applicable constitutional 
provisions in a position in this state whereby the supreme court has the "power" 
to issue writs of certiorari "in the exercise of its appellate * * * 
jurisdiction" but the "power" is present in circumstances in which there is no 
constitutional requirement for the issuance of such writs and no implementing 
"rules" and/or "regulations" have been adopted.

[¶89.]  The Wyoming Supreme Court has 
historically - and with good reason - refused to even consider the merits of the 
State's appeals in a criminal case on the oft-repeated ground that, there being 
no common-law right of appeal (State v. 
Benales, Wyo., 365 P.2d 811 (1961); State v. Ginther, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803 (1938); Mau v. Stoner, 14 Wyo. 
183, 83 P. 218 (1905)), and since the statutory bill-of-exceptions procedure (§§ 
7-12-101 through 7-12-105, W.S. 1977) is an exception to the common law, the 
bill of exceptions provides the only source of this court's jurisdiction to 
review the State of Wyoming's adverse criminal trial-court rulings (State v. Heberling, supra; State v. Benales, supra; State v. Ginther, supra; State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 14 
Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 (1906)).

[¶90.]  As early as 1905, this court said in Mau v. Stoner, supra, 83 P.  at 219, 
that, unless the Constitution guarantees an appeal as a matter "of right,"4 it is the legislature that has the 
implementing authority as contemplated by Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18 of the Wyoming 
Constitution. We said:

"* * * It is well settled 
that, in the absence of a direct constitutional requirement, the right of appeal 
does not exist unless expressly conferred by statute. The right to have a 
judgment of an inferior tribunal reviewed by writ of error or appeal is not a 
natural or inherent right. It pertains merely to the mode of judicial procedure 
or the remedy. Unless it is guaranteed as a matter of right in the Constitution, 
the Legislature has power to pass laws not only regulating the mode of 
proceeding, but limiting the cases in which the right may be exercised. The 
remedy by appeal was unknown to the English common law, hence it may be said 
that in both England and the United States the whole matter of appellate review 
is regulated almost entirely by statute law."

[¶91.]  It was the court's task in Mau v. Stoner to decide whether a right 
of appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court was denied by a statute which provided 
that a trial court's decision would be "final." It was contended, without 
success, that the Constitution of the state guaranteed appellant access to this 
court. We said:

"Since the Legislature 
has declared that the judgment of the district court shall be final * * *, it 
becomes important to determine whether, under the Constitution of this state, 
the right of appeal is guaranteed in all cases." 83 P.  at 218.

[¶92.]  The author of the Mau opinion wrote that Art. 5, § 2 of 
our Constitution, supra, defines the appellate jurisdiction of this 
court

"* * * without attempting 
to define the manner of appeal or the class of cases in which appeals may be 
taken," 83 P.  at 219,

and the court 
then held that the supreme court's jurisdiction is limited by the following Art. 
5, § 2 language:

"* * * under such rules 
and regulations as may be prescribed by law."

[¶93.]  The court said:

"* * * We think the 
expression `under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law' refers 
to and limits all the powers conferred by the section, in other words, 
prescribes how the exercise of these powers may be regulated and limited." 83 P. 
at 219.

[¶94.]  It was one of the court's conclusions in 
Mau that it was the intention of the 
framers of our Constitution that the subject of appeals to this court would be 
left to the legislature, the court saying:

"`* * * It is quite clear 
from the provisions of Sections 18 and 20 that the framers of the fundamental 
law intended to leave the power over the subject of appeals to the Legislature, 
to be exercised in such manner as public policy and the best interests of the 
people might require.'" Quoting from McClain v. Williams, 10 S.D. 332, 73 N.W. 72, 43 L.R.A. 287 (1897).

[¶95.]  In emphasizing that the right of appeal 
even though authorized must nevertheless be "prescribed by law" (i.e., by the 
legislature), the Mau court referred 
to this court's earlier decision in In re 
Boulter, 5 Wyo. 263, 39 P. 875 (1895), where we said:

"* * * [W]e have no 
direct constitutional provision allowing appeals as a matter of right in 
criminal cases, except that this court is clothed with appellate jurisdiction in 
criminal as well as in civil causes, and is vested with a general 
superintendence and control over all inferior courts, under such rules and 
regulations as are prescribed by law (Const. Wyo., art. 5, § 2) * * *." 39 P.  at 
878.

[¶96.]  It was the court's conclusion in Mau that, since there had been no rules 
or regulations promulgated under Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18, the respondent had no 
right of appeal. 

[¶97.]  The requirement that there be express 
statutory authority where the State seeks adverse ruling review through the 
utilization of certiorari was discussed in Annot., 109 A.L.R. 793, 794-795, 
"Right of state to writ of certiorari in criminal case":

"But against the State's 
contention that authority to entertain a petition by the State for certiorari in 
a criminal case, in which a conviction had been reversed by the Court of Appeals 
(an intermediate court), was conferred by a constitutional amendment providing 
that it should be competent for the Supreme Court `to require by certiorari or 
otherwise any case to be certified . . . for review and determination with the 
same power and authority as if the case had been carried by writ of error,' the 
Supreme Court held that it did not have such authority in State v. B'Gos (1932) 175 Ga. 627, 165 S.E. 566, and relied, in part, upon the general statement in 8 R.C.L. p. 168, 
that `the state has no right to sue out a writ of error on a judgment in favor 
of the defendant in a criminal case, except under and in accordance with express 
statutes, whether that judgment was rendered on a verdict of acquittal or on the 
determination by the court on a question of law,' in connection with decisions 
to the effect that the State was not entitled to appeal criminal cases; and 
observed that the amendment relied upon had reference only to the nature of the 
cases to be reviewed, and not to the right of any particular party or litigant 
to appeal."

Bill of Exceptions or 
Writ of Certiorari What Is the Difference?

[¶98.]  The difference between our granting 
certiorari for the purpose of deciding a question in a criminal case, on the one 
hand, and agreeing to decide an issue framed by a bill of exceptions, on the 
other hand, is far-reaching and fundamental. Even though the substantive issues 
are addressed in both procedures, in the first instance, the particular 
defendant whose criminal prosecution gives rise to the controverted opinion or 
decision of the district court is affected and bound by our decision, while in 
the second this is not so. In the latter case, this court's opinion is binding 
upon the courts of Wyoming in future "similar" cases but will not affect the 
judgment of the court "in the case in which the bill was taken."5 I therefore concede here that the 
bill-of-exceptions proceeding which is authorized by Wyoming statutes, will not 
provide the relief that the State seeks as it petitions in certiorari since the 
defendant Heiner in whose pretrial proceeding the suppression issue is raised 
will not be affected. Even though this is so, the overriding response to this 
objection is that the State has no inherent or common-law right to appeal 
adverse trial-court rulings in a criminal prosecution (State v. Benales, supra, and State v. Ginther, supra), and it only 
has authority to exercise its constitutional appellate prerogatives "under such 
rules and regulations as are prescribed by law," Mau v. Stoner, supra. There being no 
rules or regulations for the exercise of interlocutory appellate authority 
through certiorari, and it being noted that the legislature has in fact 
furnished a review process through the bill-of-exceptions statutes, the right of 
appeal claimed in these proceedings cannot, therefore, be found to 
exist.

[¶99.]  The bill-of-exceptions procedure is the 
only method by which this court may 
take jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding questions raised by trial-court 
rulings in a criminal prosecution which are alleged by the State to be adverse 
to its interests. State v. Ginther, 
supra; State ex rel. Gibson v. 
Cornwell, supra. Since the bill of exceptions is itself an exception to and 
in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed and applied.6 

The Common Law and the 
Statutory Exception

[¶100.]            
The argument is made, however, that the bill-of-exceptions statute 
furnishes the State with no right of appellate review as respects the particular 
defendant in whose prosecution the controversial issue arises in the trial court 
and, since certiorari is authorized by the Constitution (Art. 5, § 3), and since 
one of the offices of certiorari is to furnish litigants appellate relief where 
no other avenue of appeal is available (City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra), it 
must be that certiorari was intended to serve as a vehicle for the State to 
appeal adverse criminal trial-court rulings which, if the appeal is successful, 
will be binding upon the defendant in whose prosecution the question is raised. 
The silent predicate to which this contention is anchored is that the State 
possesses a right to have its adverse rulings in criminal prosecutions reviewed 
as on appeal. This is just not so. State 
v. Benales, supra; State v. 
Ginther, supra.

[¶101.]            
The Common-Law Rule

[¶102.]            
This court has noted long ago that the common-law rule is that the State 
has no right to appeal adverse 
criminal rulings unless the right is expressly given.

[¶103.]            
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1659 submits the common-law rule to 
be:

"Under the common law as 
generally understood and administered in the United States, the state or federal 
government has no right to a writ of 
error, to an appeal, or to exceptions in a criminal case unless it is expressly 
conferred by * * * statute * * *" 
(emphasis added),

citing Wyoming's 
State v. Benales and State v. Ginther for the proposition 
that Wyoming is one of the states that holds to this rule of the common law. The 
rule is reported in Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1095, 1096, "Right of prosecution to 
writ of certiorari in criminal case," where it is said:

"As a general rule the 
prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of 
the defendant in a criminal case in the 
absence of a statute clearly conferring that right." (Emphasis 
added.)

To the same 
effect see 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error § 268, pp. 762-763.

[¶104.]            
In any case, without specific statutory permission, neither the State nor 
the defendant can appeal an adverse ruling of the court in a pending criminal 
action since it will be held to be interlocutory in nature and thus not 
appealable. In United States v. 
Rosenwasser, 145 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1944), the court 
said:

"* * * However, if a 
party to a pending criminal action seeks the suppression of evidence together 
with the return of the seized papers and if the principal purpose of the motion 
is to suppress evidence at the criminal trial, the proceeding is incidental to 
the criminal action, and the resulting order is held to be interlocutory and not 
appealable. Cogen v. United States, 
1929, 278 U.S. 221, 49 S. Ct. 118, 73 L. Ed. 275; Jacobs v. United States, 1926, 9 Cir., 8 F.2d 981; United States v. Marquette, 
1921, 9 Cir., 270 F. 214. Compare Cobbledick v. United States, 1940, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S. Ct. 540, 84 L. Ed. 783; Alexander v. United States, 1906, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S. Ct. 356, 50 L. Ed. 686."

[¶105.]            
In commenting upon the common law pertaining to interlocutory orders in a 
criminal prosecution, the court said in the Rosenwasser case:

"* * * [A]ppeals from 
interlocutory orders are exceptional in character and are wholly dependent upon 
statute * * *." 145 F.2d  at 1018.

Bill of Exceptions Is an 
Exception to the Common-Law Rule

[¶106.]            
In State v. Ginther, supra, 
the defendant was charged with the theft of a cow - with receiving the animal 
knowing it to have been stolen - but no value of the property was alleged. Trial 
was had and the defendant found guilty, whereupon a motion in arrest of judgment 
was made and sustained. The State appealed and we held that this court had no 
jurisdiction since there was no statutory provision for the appeal. In 
dismissing the appeal, we said: 

"It seems generally held 
under the common law as administered in this country that the State may not 
bring a writ of error or take an appeal or have exceptions in a criminal case, 
unless the right thereto has been expressly granted by statute * * *" 
(emphasis added), 77 P.2d  at 803,

and while noting 
that the courts of some states permit such review in limited circumstances - 
either by case rule or statute - we held that we would adhere to the common law 
in Wyoming.

[¶107.]            
We noted in Ginther that 
Wyoming has a statutory exception to this common-law rule which appears as our 
bill-of-exceptions statutes according to which the State's attorney may take 
"any opinion or decision of the court" to this court for review. We then went on 
to hold and cite with approval cases which hold that, where an appellate right 
is granted and is based upon specific statutes, such statutes are to be strictly 
construed and not to be enlarged by construction. It is said in 24 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law, § 1659, supra, wherein the states' right of appeal in criminal 
cases is discussed, that the common-law rule is as this court identified it in 
Ginther, supra. The encyclopedia then 
goes on to say that

"* * * it is generally 
held that, being in derogation of the common law, they [statutes granting 
appellate rights] should be strictly construed, and that the authority conferred 
thereby should not be enlarged by construction. [Citations.]"7

[¶108.]            
In State v. Weathers, 13 Okla. 
Cr. 92, 162 P. 239 (1917), cited in Ginther for the proposition that 
appellate criminal appeals statutes which are in derogation of the common law 
must be strictly construed, the Oklahoma statute expressly allowed the State to 
appeal in a criminal case from an order arresting judgment, quashing an 
information or indictment, and questions reserved by the State. It was held that 
the prosecution had no right to appeal from a trial-court order granting a 
person convicted of a crime a new trial. The court said:

"* * * In many 
jurisdictions the state has no right of appeal at all, and its right to appeal, 
where the right is granted, is based upon specific statutes, which statutes are 
not to be enlarged by construction." 162 P.  at 240.

See also State v. Arnold, 144 Ind. 651, 42 N.E. 1095 (1895), cited in Ginther, where, 
in referring to a statute similar to that considered in State v. Weathers, supra, it was 
said:

"These statutes, it is 
urged, deny the right of the State to appeal in other instances than those 
enumerated, and this we have no doubt is correct, as shown by the cases cited to 
that proposition. State v. Bartlett, 
9 Ind. 569; State v. Hamilton, 62 
Ind. 409; State v. Hallowell, 91 Ind. 
376; State v. Evansville, etc., R.R. 
Co., 107 Ind. 581 [8 N.E. 619]."

[¶109.]            
This court then held in State v. 
Ginther:

"Our view of the law accordingly is that the 
prosecution in a criminal case in this state is given by statute no method of 
review of adverse rulings except through the medium indicated in the four above 
cited sections [the bill-of-exception proceeding], with the limitations there 
imposed." (Emphasis added.) 77 P.2d  at 807.

[¶110.]            
In State v. Benales, supra, 
the court granted the defendant's motion for dismissal based upon the 
constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under the Wyoming Constitution, Art. 
1, § 10, and § 7-11-208, W.S. 1977. The State undertook an appeal to this court, 
proceeding as in a civil case under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, and, 
in a per-curiam opinion, we dismissed the appeal as we observed that the State 
had not complied with the bill-of-exceptions statute, anchoring our holding upon 
the State v. Ginther rule quoted 
above.

[¶111.]            
In State v. Heberling, supra, 
553 P.2d  at 1043, on September 3, 1976, we revisited and reaffirmed these prior 
holdings and thus this court has historically been committed to the common-law 
rule which holds that, unless there is a statutory exception, the State may not 
appeal an adverse ruling of the district court in a criminal case. Where there 
is a statutory exception to this rule, the statutes which provide the 
exceptions, as with our bill-of-exception statutes, §§ 7-12-101 through 
7-12-105, supra, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly adhered 
to. State v. Ginther, supra; State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwall, 
supra.

Bill of 
Exceptions

The Exclusive Source of 
This Court's Jurisdiction

[¶112.]            
Since it is not possessed of a common-law right of appeal, the State has 
no right to appeal a district court's adverse ruling or judgment in a criminal 
prosecution without strictly adhering to the bill of exceptions provisions of 
the statute (§§ 7-12-101 through 7-12-105, supra). This being so, this court, 
except by bills of exceptions, has no jurisdiction to review any such rulings or 
judgments. State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra. In Gibson, Chief Justice 
Potter, writing for the court, said:

"* * * It is only upon a compliance with the 
provisions of the statute in question [bill of exceptions] that this court 
obtains jurisdiction to review any ruling of the district court adverse to the 
state in criminal prosecutions." (Emphasis added.) 85 P.  at 979.

[¶113.]            
In Gibson, the Attorney 
General argued that an exception to the ruling of the court should be sufficient 
to preserve the issue for this court's consideration. This court rejected the 
contention, saying:

"* * * But it is obvious, 
we think, that the bill in a case like this not only serves to preserve in the 
record matters which otherwise would not be in the record, but it is the basis of the jurisdiction of 
this court. It is not perceived that we would have authority to decide any 
question arising upon exceptions of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal case, 
without a bill of exceptions containing the same, taken and filed as prescribed 
by the statute." (Emphasis added.) 85 P.  at 979.

[¶114.]            
Having said this, the court struck the bill since it was not sealed as 
provided by what is now our § 7-12-102, W.S. 1977, 1983 Cum.Supp.

Reference to the Majority 
Opinion and City of Laramie v. Mengel, Supra, and Certiorari

[¶115.]            
Without even giving the bill-of-exceptions statutes (§§ 7-12-101 through 
7-12-105) or the case law which holds that this court has no jurisdiction to 
"review any ruling of the district court adverse to the state in criminal 
prosecutions" except by way of bill of exceptions (State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra) 
a sideways glance - that is to say, without even mentioning these statutory and 
historical case authorities which identify and define the very jurisdiction 
of this court to act in the premises, the majority in the case at bar 
say:

"The State of Wyoming 
sought review of these pretrial rulings pursuant to a petition for writ of 
certiorari. It is our conclusion that this court does have the authority and 
responsibility to review such pretrial rulings by trial judges in the exercise 
of its discretion." 683 P.2d  at 630.

[¶116.]            
I cannot fathom the "discretion" to which the majority have reference. We 
do not even have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. I repeat, for emphasis, the 
words of Chief Justice Potter as he wrote for this court in State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 
supra:

"* * * It is only upon a compliance with the 
provisions of the statute in question [bill of exceptions] that this court 
obtains jurisdiction to review any ruling of the district court adverse to the 
state in criminal prosecutions," (emphasis added), 85 P.  at 979,

and where the 
Chief Justice also said:

"* * * But it is obvious, 
we think, that the bill in a case like this * * * is the basis of the jurisdiction of this 
court. It It is not perceived that we would have authority to decide any 
question arising upon exceptions of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal case, 
without a bill of exceptions containing the same, taken and filed as prescribed 
by the statute." (Emphasis added.) 85 P.  at 979.

[¶117.]            
I agree that we need not be slavishly bound by old opinions, but if we 
are to overrule them we should say so and at the same time be possessed of 
adequate and substantial authority upon which to base our overruling decision. 
In this case, however, the majority do not have or even mention case authority 
which would authorize the overruling of State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell. In 
fact, State ex rel. Gibson v. 
Cornwell is not even noticed by the majority. The reason the majority cite 
no authority for their position here has to be because there are no legislative 
rules and regulations which permit this court to implement our powers of 
certiorari for interlocutory appellate purposes in a criminal case.8 This is because the State does not 
possess a common-law right to an appeal, and, where there is an exception to the 
common-law rule as Wyoming has in its bill-of-exceptions statutes, the 
exception, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly followed and 
may not be enlarged by construction. State v. Ginther, supra.

[¶118.]            
The most shocking feature of this court's majority opinion in the case at 
bar is its reliance upon our recent decision in City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, as 
authority for holding that the trial court's evidentiary ruling may be brought 
to our attention through a petition for a writ of certiorari.

[¶119.]            
The majority say, in this respect:

"The threshold question 
of the authority of this court to review these evidentiary rulings by the trial 
court pursuant to a writ of certiorari is settled in principle by the decision 
of this court in City of Laramie v. 
Mengel, Wyo., 671 P.2d 340 (1983)." 683 P.2d  at 632.

[¶120.]            
The thing that makes the majority's reliance upon City of Laramie v. Mengel so 
unbelievable is the fact that the City of Laramie case did not evolve from a 
petition by the State as is the case here, and the petitioner City was not - for 
this reason at least - jurisdictionally limited by the bill-of-exceptions 
provisions of our statutes from seeking certiorari.

[¶121.]            
In City of Laramie v. Mengel, 
supra, the substantive issue was the constitutionality of § 31-6-105(f), W.S. 
1977, as adopted by the Laramie Municipal Code, which statute and code provision 
hold that evidence of a driver's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test could 
be used against him in court where the citizen stands accused of operating a 
motor vehicle upon the highways of the state while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor.

[¶122.]            
The municipal judges in City of 
Laramie v. Mengel had held, in response to motions to suppress and in 
limine, that the refusal to submit to the blood-alcohol test was testimonial in 
nature, and that the ordinance was therefore violative of the protection against 
self-incrimination found in the United States and State constitutions. The order 
granting the motions of respondents Mengel and Johnson further prohibited the 
City of Laramie from permitting any of its witnesses to comment upon the refusal 
of either respondent to take a blood-alcohol chemical test, or to comment 
directly or indirectly in any manner concerning such refusal.

[¶123.]            
In an effort to obtain a definitive decision on the issue, the City of 
Laramie (not the State) filed a document in this court entitled "Petition for 
Permission to File Bill of Exceptions." Instead of granting or denying this 
petition, we granted a writ of certiorari, noting that 

"* * * § 7-12-102 through 
§ 7-12-105, W.S. 1977, pertaining to bills of exceptions were not applicable in 
an instance in which the accused is not charged with an offense against the laws 
of the State of Wyoming and this statutory proceeding [bill of exceptions] was 
not available with respect to a prosecution in a municipal court for violation 
of an ordinance. City of Sheridan v. 
Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892 (1916)." 671 P.2d  at 343.

[¶124.]            
In its further defense, the ruling in City of Laramie v. Mengel had 
prospective effect only and it was in this respect consistent with the theory of 
bills of exceptions. Most importantly, that appeal was not proscribed by the 
rule that says where an appellate proceeding is legislatively in place it must 
be followed, State v. Ginther, supra. 
We therefore treated the City of Laramie's petition for a bill of exceptions as 
though it were a petition for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of settling 
questions of constitutional magnitude for which review was otherwise 
unavailable. This is, of course, in the proper circumstances, one of the offices 
of certiorari. City of Laramie v. 
Mengel, supra.

[¶125.]            
In City of Laramie v. Mengel 
we assumed, in reliance upon language contained in City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 
157 P. 892 (1916), that this court possessed jurisdiction to review the 
questions raised by the City of Laramie. We said in City of Sheridan v. Cadle:

"This not being a civil 
case, there seems to be no provision giving the city a right of appeal to this 
court. We think, therefore, that the writ might be issued to determine the 
question of the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain the appeal in 
which the order complained of was made." 157 P.  at 895-896

[¶126.]            
Parenthetically, I am now forced to the admission that, having studied 
this subject in greater depth, and especially since revisiting this court's 
earlier opinion in Mau v. Stoner, 
supra - which holds unequivocally that, even where constitutional appellate 
authority exists, the exercise of rights of appeal must nevertheless be 
authorized by the legislature through the promulgation of statutory rules and 
regulations - and given the absence of any such implementing legislation in the 
area of certiorari, I now question the propriety of that language in City of Sheridan v. Cadle, upon which we 
relied in City of Laramie v. Mengel. 
According to Mau v. Stoner and the 
overwhelming weight of the general law, this court is without jurisdiction to 
employ its constitutional grant of appellate certiorari authority to review any questions - civil or criminal - 
unless and until the requisite legislation is promulgated.

[¶127.]            
However, I only give tangential reference by way of dicta to the City of Laramie v. Mengel utilization of 
certiorari because, regardless of whether this court was correct in granting 
certiorari in City of Laramie v. Mengel, 
that case provides no authority for the issuance of the writ in the case at 
bar. This is so because the legislature has expressly limited this court's 
jurisdiction to review questions raised by the State in a criminal case. The 
bill of exceptions is the only mode of review, and this court, therefore, has no 
jurisdiction to hear, under the label of "certiorari," interlocutory appeals or 
appeals from final orders brought by the State.

[¶128.]            
It is with the assumption of jurisdiction that I take issue with the 
majority opinion in the appeal at bar - not whether, assuming jurisdiction, the 
writ was otherwise lawfully employed, and it is in the jurisdictional context of 
our difference that I charge the majority with taking unwarranted liberty with 
our holding in City of Laramie v. 
Mengel when the majority opinion says:

"The threshold question 
of the authority of this court to review these evidentiary rulings by the trial 
court pursuant to a writ of certiorari is settled * * * in City of Laramie v. Mengel * * *." 683 P.2d  at 632.

This is just not 
so. In City of Laramie we assumed we had jurisdiction to employ certiorari under 
City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra, 
and, in any event, we were not 
involved with a State of Wyoming criminal appeal and the consequential 
proscriptions of the bill-of-exceptions statutes. In the case at bar, we simply 
do not have jurisdiction - the State having no inherent right of appeal and the 
bill of exceptions not having been utilized, State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 
supra.

[¶129.]            
The majority in the appeal at bar call attention to the observations that 
this court made in City of Laramie v. 
Mengel having to do with what we said about the utilization of the writ of 
certiorari in Call v. Town of Afton, 
73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954). The majority say:

"* * * We did note in City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, that 
review pursuant to the statutes providing for a bill of exceptions was not 
available to the city. In that opinion we quoted language from Call v. Town of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954), in which the court observed in substance that the writ of 
certiorari subserves a good purpose in instances in which an appeal (or a bill 
of exceptions) is not plain, speedy and adequate. With respect to rulings which 
suppress important evidence to be offered by the State in a criminal prosecution 
the inadequacy of the bill of exceptions after an acquittal is patent." 683 P.2d  
at 632.

[¶130.]            
By this statement the majority are saying in effect that in City of Laramie v. Mengel we relied on 
Call v. Town of Afton (where the 
State was not a petitioner for certiorari) for the proposition that certiorari 
serves a good purpose in instances in which "an appeal (or a bill of exceptions) 
is not plain, speedy and adequate." From this observation about a circumstance 
in which certiorari may be utilized, the majority reason:

Even though the State has 
no common-law right of appeal and even though the bill of exceptions is 
available and is the only statutory remedy the State has - and even though this 
court has held that the bill of exceptions is the jurisdiction-furnishing 
vehicle in these circumstances - we find that a bill of 
exceptions would be inadequate after acquittal and we will therefore simply 
disregard the bill-of-exceptions jurisdictional requirement as previously 
announced by this court and, without statutory implementing sanction, employ 
certiorari in its stead.

[¶131.]            
When the majority observe:

"With respect to rulings 
which suppress important evidence to be offered by the State in a criminal 
prosecution, the inadequacy of the bill 
of exceptions after an acquittal is patent" (emphasis added), 683 P.2d  at 
632,

it is 
constructing its own fantacized "inadequacy" out of an assumption that the law 
provides the State with the right to appeal adverse criminal rulings in addition to the remedy provided by the 
bill of exceptions. This is just not the case. In fact, it amounts to 
judicial sophistry. The State has no right of appeal except that which is given 
by statute and, if so provided as it is in Wyoming's criminal code, the statute 
must be followed with particularity, State v. Ginther, supra. Thus, the 
majority make a fatally unwarranted and unauthorized assumption in order to 
reach its fatally faulty conclusion with respect to the utilization of the writ 
of certiorari in the case at hand.

CONCLUSION

[¶132.]            
In summary, I call attention to these following propositions:

[¶133.]            
The Constitution of the State of Wyoming gives this court the power to 
issue writs of certiorari in the exercise of its appellate power (Art. 5, § 3), 
but this authority is restricted by such rules and regulations as "may be 
prescribed by law" (Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18). It is the legislature that has the 
authority to limit and define the appellate process (Mau v. Stoner, supra). The writ of 
certiorari being in aid of this court's appellate jurisdiction (Art. 5, § 3), 
statutory authority must exist to invoke the court's certiorari authority (109 
A.L.R. at 795, supra) since the State has no common-law right of appeal from 
adverse trial court decisions in a criminal prosecution (State v. Benales, supra; State v. Ginther, supra; Annot., 91 
A.L.R.2d 1096, supra; 4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 268, pp. 762-763; 24 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law § 1659, supra). In absence of statute, the State has no common-law 
right to an interlocutory appeal from an adverse ruling in a criminal 
prosecution (United States v. 
Rosenwasser, supra).

[¶134.]            
In Wyoming, the legislature has made an exception to the common-law rule 
of nonappealability of the State's adverse criminal rulings through the 
bill-of-exceptions statutes (State v. 
Ginther, supra). Since the bill-of-exceptions statute is in derogation of 
the common law, it must be strictly construed and its authority cannot be 
enlarged by construction.9

[¶135.]            
This court has held that, based upon these above propositions, the 
prosecution in Wyoming has "no method of review of adverse rulings except 
through [the bill-of-exceptions procedure]" (State v. Ginther, supra), and, finally, 
we have said that it is only upon compliance with the bill-of-exceptions 
provisions that this court has "jurisdiction to review any ruling of the 
district court adverse to the state in criminal prosecutions" (State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 
supra).

[¶136.]            
I take issue with the majority's utilization of City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, as an 
excuse to ignore and circumvent these jurisdictional prohibitions against the 
issuing of a writ of certiorari in the case at bar. I say this, because in City of Laramie v. Mengel we granted the 
writ upon the authority of City of 
Sheridan v. Cadle, noting that, since the State was not the petitioner, the 
bill-of-exceptions statutes were not available to bring the issues here. We said 
that the bill-of-exceptions statutes

"* * * were not 
applicable in an instance in which the accused is not charged with an offense 
against the laws of the State of Wyoming and that this statutory proceeding 
[bill of exceptions] was not available with respect to a prosecution in a 
municipal court for violation of an ordinance," citing City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 
supra,

and went on - no 
matter how carelessly - to exercise our certiorari appellate authority. But at 
least it can be said that our procedure was authorized by Wyoming Supreme Court 
precedent and pursued the same underlying philosophy as that contained in the 
bill-of-exceptions statutes.

[¶137.]            
For the reasons given, I would hold that the majority commit grievous 
error in granting the writ of certiorari in this appeal because this court has, 
by this method, no jurisdiction to review a suppression ruling of the district 
court adverse to the State of Wyoming.

[¶138.]            
I would hold that the petition for a writ of certiorari was improvidently 
granted.

FOOTNOTES

1 Ah . . . . for the good, 
old days!

2 State v. Heberling, supra; State v. Benales, Wyo., 365 P.2d 811 
(1961); State v. Ginther, 53 Wyo. 17, 
77 P.2d 803 (1938); State ex rel. Gibson 
v. Cornwell, 14 Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 (1906).

3 State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra 
n. 2, discussed infra.

4 City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, 671 P.2d  at 345, holds that the grant or denial of certiorari is discretionary with 
this court.

5 Section 7-12-105, W.S. 
1977, provides:

"The judgment of the 
court in the case in which the bill was taken shall not be reversed nor in any 
manner affected, but the decision of the supreme court shall determine the law 
to govern in any similar case which may be pending at the time the decision is 
rendered, or which may afterwards arise in the state."

6 SeeState v. Stovall, Wyo., 
648 P.2d 543, 547-548 (1982), for a reiteration of the general 
rules.

7 We recently expressed 
the derogation-of-common-law rule for Wyoming when we said in State v. Stovall, supra n. 6, 648 P.2d 
at 547-548:

"* * * A statute designed 
to change the common law must be strictly construed. Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 
Wyo., 426 P.2d 442 (1967). It must speak in clear and unequivocal terms, for the 
presumption is that no change is intended unless the statute is 
explicit."

8 As mandated by Mau v. Stoner's interpretation of Art. 
5, § 18, of the Wyoming Constitution.

9 State v. Ginther, supra; State v. Arnold, supra; State v. Weathers, supra; 24 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law § 1659, supra; and see State 
v. Stovall, supra n. 6, for reaffirmation of the rule pertaining to the 
strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common-law 
concept.