Title: DOLES v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DOLES v. STATE2002 WY 14655 P.3d 29Case Number: 01-172Decided: 10/01/2002
April Term, A.D. 2002

 

JEFFREY 
DOLES,

Appellant(Defendant) ,

 
 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Defendant) .

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
    

Representing 
Appellant:

James P. Castberg, Sheridan, WY.

 
 
   

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
           
     

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

*Chief Justice at time of expedited case 
conference.

 
 
      

  LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      After 
entering a plea of guilty to conspiring to deliver a controlled substance, 
pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant took leave of the court's 
jurisdiction.  Upon his apprehension 
approximately two years later, he was sentenced.  Appellant seeks to have the conviction 
set aside claiming he was denied counsel until he first appeared in the district 
court; for the court's denial of his request to withdraw his plea; and for a 
sentence he claims was contrary to the original plea agreement.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]

1.  Is 
the fact that appellant did not have counsel in the county court where he waived 
his preliminary hearing reversible error?

2.  Did 
the court err by denying appellant's motion to withdraw his plea of 
guilty?

3.  Was imposition of a consecutive sentence 
contrary to the plea agreement?

 
 
         

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In June 1998, 
appellant was charged with conspiring to deliver methamphetamine.  Following his arrest, he appeared in the 
Circuit Court1 for Natrona County where he 
eventu­ally executed a Waiver of Preliminary Hearing.  The record provides little information 
regarding what transpired in the circuit court, however the order binding 
appellant over to the district court indicates he appeared pro se.  At his arraignment in district court, 
the public defender was appointed to represent appellant.  A couple of months after counsel was 
appointed, appellant filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss the charges based upon the 
circuit court's failure to appoint counsel.  The 
record contains no disposition of that motion.

 
      
 

[¶4]      A jury trial was 
eventually scheduled for January 4, 1999.  
On the morning of trial, appellant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a 
plea agreement.  Appellant was then 
appar­ently released on bond and disappeared.  The record is silent for some two years 
until, in March of the year 2001, a Notice of Setting of sentencing was 
filed.  Prior to sentencing, 
appellant's counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty.  At the sentencing hearing, after 
argument, the court denied that motion and proceeded to sentence appellant.  The State did recommend a term of months 
consistent with the original plea agreement and further argued it should be 
imposed to be served consecutively with another sentence.  The court did, in fact, impose the 
sentence to be served consecutively.  

 

DISCUSSION

 

Issue 
1:  Denial of counsel in circuit 
court

 

[¶5]      We find little 
merit in appellant's argument for two reasons.  First, the record does not support his 
conclusion that he was denied counsel.  
It is appellant's burden on appeal to make an affirmative showing of 
error.  Gregory v. Sanders, 
635 P.2d 795, 801 (Wyo. 1981).   
Here, the only thing we are offered are his claims that he requested 
counsel.  Transcripts from the 
circuit court are conspicuous in their absence, and this court can decide issues 
only on the basis of the record presented.  
Bird v. State, 901 P.2d 1123, 1132 (Wyo. 1995).

 
   

[¶6]      The second reason 
is Wyoming law, which clearly indicates a waiver of this issue upon his plea of 
guilty.  In Davila v. State, 
831 P.2d 204 (Wyo. 1992), the appellant appeared without counsel at his 
preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court.  In the district court, his retained 
counsel filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground that he was 
denied counsel at his preliminary hearing.  
The district court denied the motion, and the appellant subsequently 
entered a no contest plea to a burglary charge.  On appeal, this 
court said:

 
    

            
Davila's claim that he was improperly denied counsel at his preliminary 
hearing is nonjurisdictional.  
Denial of the right to representation does not implicate "the very power 
of the state to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought 
against him," Blackledge [v. Perry], 417 U.S. [21] at 30, 94 S.Ct. 
[2098] at 2103, 40 L.Ed.2d [628] at 636 [(1974)], and would not have prevented a 
trial.  The district court had 
juris­diction to proceed to trial and, in fact, had it granted Davila's 
motion to dismiss, the state could have refiled and proceeded with a new 
preliminary hearing and trial.  As a result, Davila's plea of nolo contendere 
waived his claim that he was denied counsel at his preliminary 
hearing.

 
  
             
    

Davila, 
at 206.  See also Duffy v. 
State, 837 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Wyo. 1992).  It is 
apparent that any error regarding denial of counsel that may have occurred in 
the circuit court was waived by appellant's guilty plea.

 
       
              
  

[¶7]      Finally, 
appellant asserts the court erred by not considering appellant's pro se Motion 
to Dismiss based upon his denial of counsel.  The issues surrounding that motion find a 
similar fate to the underlying claim upon his plea of guilty.

 
      
           

Issue 
2:  Did the court err in denying 
appellant's motion to withdraw plea of guilty

 

[¶8]      Appellant's 
motion alleged his guilty plea was the product of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  The standard for reviewing 
a claim of ineffectiveness was recently outlined in Reyna v. State, 2001 
WY 105, ¶19, 33 P.3d 1129, ¶19 (Wyo. 
2001):

 
   

            
"When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of coun­sel, the 
paramount determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial 
counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance.  Herdt v. 
State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo. 1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 
1266-67 (Wyo. 1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 1994); 
Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986).  The reviewing court should indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all 
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.  Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 
1266; Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  

 

            
Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and 
Frias, an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of coun­sel must 
demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was deficient and that 
prejudice resulted.  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, at 
1266;  King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo. 1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 
728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo. 1986);  
Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.   In other words, to warrant 
reversal on a claim of ineffec­tive assistance of counsel, an appellant must 
demonstrate that his counsel failed to render such assistance as would have 
been offered by a reasonably competent attorney' and that counsel's deficiency 
prejudiced the defense of [the] case.'  
Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990).  The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result.'  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2064."

 
        

(Quoting 
Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶6, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001) and 
Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Wyo. 2000).)  "The district court does not abuse its 
discretion by denying a motion made prior to sentencing to withdraw a guilty 
plea if the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11 are complied with at the time the plea 
is accepted.  We will not disturb 
the district court's decision so long as it could have reasonably concluded as 
it did."  Stout v. State, 
2001 WY 114, ¶15, 35 P.3d 1198, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2001) (footnote and citations omitted).

 
       

[¶9]      Once again we are 
led to this discussion by conclusions made in appellant's brief and an affidavit 
of his mother who states that she overheard appellant's attorney tell him that 
if he did not accept the plea agreement, the judge would be upset.  Appellant concludes in his brief that he 
did not receive effective assistance of counsel because she had refused to file 
a motion to dismiss the charges based upon the circuit court's refusal to 
appoint counsel.  As a result, 
appellant had to file the motion pro se, and it was never resolved by the 
court.  Even assuming appellant did request his 
counsel to file such a motion, it would be difficult to find her ineffective for 
failing to do so given the dearth of factual or legal bases for such a 
motion.

 
    
               
               
  

[¶10]   The second basis is premised upon 
appellant's counsel telling him that the judge would be upset if he did not 
accept the proposed plea agreement.  
From that alleged discus­sion, appellant claims he was coerced into 
entering a plea of guilty.  
Appellant does not contend the court failed to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 
11.  

 

[¶11]   In Frame v. State, 2001 WY 
72, 29 P.3d 86 (Wyo. 2001), this court discussed a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea filed before sentencing, where the defendant alleged that he was forced to 
plead guilty.  As in this case, the 
claim of coercion in Frame was portrayed on appeal as an issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and there was no contention that the district 
court failed to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 11.  
This court 
suggested the following analysis:

 
     

            
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea, such as that filed here, is governed 
by W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) which provides that if a motion for withdrawal of a guilty 
plea is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal upon a 
showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason.  A defendant has no absolute right to 
withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is imposed, and where the strictures 
of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been met, and the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and 
voluntarily entered into his plea of guilty, the district court's decision to 
deny such a motion is within its sound discretion.  Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 
929-30 (Wyo. 1999); 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Criminal 2d § 538 (1982 and Supp. 
2001).  Seven factors have been 
suggested as pertinent to the exercise of the court's discretion:  (1) Whether the defendant has asserted 
his innocence; (2) whether the gov­ernment would suffer prejudice; (3) 
whether the defendant has delayed in filing his motion; (4) whether withdrawal 
would sub­stantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether close assistance 
of counsel was present; (6) whether the original plea was knowing and voluntary; 
and (7) whether the withdrawal would waste judicial resources.  3 Wright, Federal Practice and 
Proce­dure:  Criminal 2d § 538 
(Supp. 2001); United States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 
(10th Cir. 2000).

 
    

Frame, at ¶7.

 
 
 

[¶12]   Regarding the seven factors guiding 
the district court's discretion, it may be said from this record:  (1) appellant's only assertion of innocence was his original plea of 
not guilty; he confessed to the crime when interviewed after his arrest; 
(2) the government would likely suffer prejudice from a plea of withdrawal 
because the crime involved an informant and occurred three years earlier; 
(3) appellant delayed filing his motion to withdraw plea of guilty more 
than two years after his original plea of not guilty; (4) such a long delay 
would sub­stantially inconvenience the court and would have the effect of 
rewarding appellant's flight from justice; (5) there is nothing to suggest 
appointed counsel's assistance was inadequate or unavailable; (6) the 
original guilty plea was accepted after a thorough colloquy establishing its 
knowing and voluntary character; and (7) withdrawal of the plea would 
obviously squan­der not only judicial resources but the time and efforts of 
the prosecutor and defense attorney.

 
    
              
         
             
          
              
         
            
         
          
          
          
           

[¶13]   It is evident that appellant failed 
to supply the district court with any fair and just rea­son for withdrawing 
the guilty plea, and the record manifestly demonstrates compliance with Rule 11 
in accepting the plea.  Denying the motion was a sound exercise of the court's 
dis­cretion.

 
  
        

Issue 
3:  Did the court err by imposing a 
consecutive sentence

 

[¶14]   On appeal, this court gives great 
deference to the district court's findings of fact regard­ing the existence 
and terms of a plea agreement:

 
      
           
     

            
 It is the district courtas 
the trier of factwho must assess the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 
be given their testimony, in deciding whether there existed a valid plea 
agreement and its terms and conditions.  
People v. Navarroli, 121 Ill. 2d 516, 118 Ill.Dec. 414, 416, 521 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1988).  Whether a 
plea agreement exists dovetails with our own standard of review for questions of 
fact:

We 
assume that evidence in favor of the successful party is true, disregarding 
entirely the evidence of the unsuc­cessful party in conflict therewith, and 
give to the evidence of the successful party every favorable infer­ence 
which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it.  "So long as there exists substantial 
evidence supporting the trier of fact's determination, we will not second guess 
it on appeal."  Richardson v. Green, 
644 P.2d 778, 779 (Wyo. 1982).  
See also Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Wyo. 
1984).

 
   

Clouse 
v. State, 
809 P.2d 791, 794 (Wyo. 1991).

 
   

[¶15]   At the sentencing hearing, the 
transcript of the change of plea hearing, which included the discussions of the 
plea agreement, was not in the file.  
Appellant, pressing the advantage of his two-year hiatus, asserted:  "If there's a record of the transcript 
to be found, the record will reflect that the State of Wyoming agreed not to 
recommend a consecutive sentence.  
That was part of the plea agreement.  That was the only reason I entered into 
the agreement."  The court, however, 
was not swayed by appellant's recall, and had a copy of the change of plea 
transcript prepared.  Within that 
transcript, it became obvious that there was no agree­ment on the part of 
the State not to recommend a consecutive sentence.  Appellant, therefore, now argues that because the State did not 
specifically reserve the right to argue for a con­secutive sentence, it 
violated the agreement.

 
     
             
     

[¶16]   In Tilley v. State, 912 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Wyo. 
1996), this court said:

 
      

The 
sentencing judge has discretion to determine whether sen­tences shall be 
served consecutively or concurrently.  
Loper v. Shillinger, 772 P.2d 552, 553 (Wyo. 1989).  We have also said that "[s]eparate 
penalties will ordinarily be exacted upon con­victions for distinct 
offenses."  Kennedy v. State, 
595 P.2d 577, 577 (Wyo. 1979); see also Pearson v. State, 866 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Wyo. 
1994).

 
 
  

There 
was nothing in appellant's plea agreement that purported to alter this 
principle.  The agreement did not 
require the court to impose a concurrent sentence, nor did it require the 
prosecutor to refrain from asking for a consecutive sentence.  

 

[¶17]   The district court correctly found 
that there was no agreement that the sentence was to be concurrent, and the 
terms of the agreement show that the prosecutor was not required to refrain from 
asking for a consecutive sentence.  
Consequently, it was permissible for the prosecutor to argue for a 
consecutive sentence, and the agreement was not breached by the State in any 
respect.  The district court committed no error in 
imposing a consecutive sen­tence.

 
   
       

CONCLUSION

 

[¶18]   For the reasons set forth above, 
appellant's conviction is affirmed in all respects.

 
      
      

FOOTNOTES

 

1At 
the time of appellant's appearance, circuit courts had not been 
established.  The Circuit Court of 
the Seventh Judicial District, Natrona County, State of Wyoming, succeeded the 
Natrona County Court July 1, 2000.  
2000 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 24, §9 provides:  "All judicial files, records, and 
dockets belonging to or appertaining to the office of the county court judges 
and county courts of the counties shall be filed in the appropriate office of 
the circuit court and safely kept therein, or may be stored and shall in all 
respects constitute records of the circuit court."