Title: Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5380.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5380 
HOLMES, APPELLANT, v. CRAWFORD MACHINE, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5380.] 
Workers’ compensation—R.C. 4123.512(F)—Once a claimant’s right to 
participate in the workers’ compensation fund has been established, a 
trial court does not abuse its discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) by 
awarding the claimant reimbursement for costs related to the conditions 
for which the trier of fact determined the claimant was ineligible to 
participate in the fund. 
(No. 2011-2040—Submitted August 21, 2012—Decided November 27, 2012.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Crawford County,  
No. 3-11-12, 2011-Ohio-5741. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When a claimant’s right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund is 
established on appeal, R.C. 4123.512(F) requires the trial court to award 
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the claimant his or her costs.  The trial court is not required to apportion 
costs based on the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition. 
__________________ 
 
MCGEE BROWN, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to resolve a conflict between the Third 
and Tenth District Courts of Appeals.  The issue is whether after a claimant’s 
right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund has been established, a trial 
court abuses its discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) when it awards the claimant 
his or her costs related to the conditions for which the trier of fact determined the 
claimant was ineligible to participate in the fund.  We hold that when a claimant’s 
right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund is established on appeal, 
R.C. 4123.512(F) requires the trial court to award the claimant his or her costs.  
R.C. 4123.512 requires the trial court to use “the effort expended” as the criterion 
for setting the amount of the award.  Thus, we hold that under R.C. 4123.512, a 
trial court is not required to apportion costs based on the outcome of a particular 
claim and/or condition.  Accordingly, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by 
awarding costs under R.C. 4123.512(F) when it reimburses a claimant for costs 
incurred on appeal without regard to the outcome of a particular claim and/or 
condition. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Jeff Holmes, filed a workers’ compensation claim 
against appellee Crawford Machine, Inc., for multiple conditions.  Holmes alleged 
that while he was working on a machine and using a tool to tighten wires, he was 
jolted with electricity for approximately 30 seconds.  An Ohio Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation administrator allowed Holmes’s claim for electric-
current effects and sprain of left shoulder/arm, and Crawford Machine appealed.  
After reviewing the appeal, a district hearing officer vacated the administrator’s 
order and disallowed Holmes’s claim.  Holmes appealed.  Upon consideration of 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
the matter, a staff hearing officer vacated the district hearing officer’s order and 
granted Holmes’s injured-worker claim on the following conditions: (1) left-
shoulder strain, (2) electrical shock, (3) low back strain, (4) left-rotator-cuff tear, 
(5) left-posterior-shoulder dislocation, and (6) abrasion of right fifth finger.  
Crawford Machine appealed this order, but an administrative appeal was refused 
by the Industrial Commission. 
{¶ 3} Pursuant to R.C. 4123.512, Crawford Machine appealed the staff 
hearing officer’s order to the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas.  And 
Holmes filed a petition and complaint on appeal seeking participation in the State 
Insurance Fund for all his injuries and an award of attorney fees and costs.  
Crawford Machine filed an answer denying the assertions in Holmes’s complaint 
that would entitle him to participate in the fund and asking that Holmes’s 
complaint be dismissed with prejudice at Holmes’s cost.  The Ohio Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation filed a similar answer. 
{¶ 4} The case was tried before a jury in February 2011.  In accordance 
with the verdicts of the jury, the trial court held that Holmes was entitled to 
participate in the Ohio Workers’ Compensation system for the condition of 
“abrasion right fifth finger” but was not entitled to participate for the other 
conditions that had been allowed by the staff hearing officer.  Thereafter, Holmes 
filed a motion for attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of the appeal.  
Crawford Machine opposed the motion, arguing that Holmes was not entitled to 
reimbursement of his attorney fees or costs, because he had not incurred any 
attorney fees or costs in relation to his fifth-finger-abrasion condition.  The trial 
court granted Holmes’s motion and ordered that Holmes’s attorney be paid $4,200 
in attorney fees and that Holmes be reimbursed for costs in the amount of 
$7,551.23. 
{¶ 5} Crawford Machine appealed from the judgment granting attorney 
fees and costs, and Holmes appealed from the judgment allowing one, but not all, 
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of his claims.  The Third District Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.  The 
court upheld the judgment allowing only one claim, and that issue is not before us 
in this case.  The court reversed the trial court’s judgment ordering attorney fees 
and costs and remanded the matter.  The court further held that its judgment in the 
consolidated appeal was in conflict with the judgment rendered in Hollar v. 
Pleasant Twp., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-250, 2003-Ohio-6827, on the issue of 
reimbursement of costs under R.C. 4123.512(F), and it certified the conflict to this 
court.  We certified the following issue: 
 
“When a claimant/employee petitions the common pleas 
court to participate in the workers’ compensation fund for multiple 
claims/conditions 
and 
the 
trier 
of 
fact 
finds 
that 
the 
claimant/employee is entitled to participate in the fund for at least 
one of those claims/conditions but not all of the claims/conditions, 
does the trial court abuse its discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) by 
taxing an opposing party attorney’s fees and costs that are strictly 
related to the claims/conditions for which the trier of fact 
determined that the claimant/employee was ineligible to participate 
in the fund?”   
 
131 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2012-Ohio-896, 962 N.E.2d 802, quoting the court of 
appeals’ entry.  For the reasons that follow, we answer the question in the 
negative and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 6} R.C. 4123.512(F) provides for the reimbursement of the “cost of 
any legal proceeding,” including attorney fees, incurred by a claimant who 
prevails on a workers’ compensation appeal.  R.C. 4123.512(F); Schuller v. 
United States Steel Corp., 103 Ohio St.3d 157, 2004-Ohio-4753, 814 N.E.2d 857 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
(2004).  Reimbursement for these costs “is subject to the trial court’s 
determination of their reasonable necessity to the presentation of the claimant’s 
appeal.”  Kilgore v. Chrysler Corp., 92 Ohio St.3d 184, 188, 749 N.E.2d 184 
(2001); see also R.C 4123.512(F).  R.C. 4123.512(F) states:  
 
The cost of any legal proceedings authorized by this 
section, including an attorney’s fee to the claimant’s attorney to be 
fixed by the trial judge, based upon the effort expended, in the 
event the claimant’s right to participate or to continue to participate 
in the fund is established upon the final determination of an appeal, 
shall be taxed against the employer or the commission if the 
commission or the administrator rather than the employer 
contested the right of the claimant to participate in the fund.  The 
attorney’s fee shall not exceed forty-two hundred dollars. 
 
{¶ 7} We have previously explained that R.C. 4123.512(F) is a provision 
intended to protect a claimant who is forced to litigate an appeal.  “[T]he 
legislative intent behind [R.C. 4123.512(F)] * * * is that ‘a claimant’s recovery 
shall not be dissipated by reasonable litigation expenses connected with the 
preparation and presentation of an appeal.’ ”  Schuller at ¶ 10, quoting Moore v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., Terex Div., 18 Ohio St.3d 259, 262, 480 N.E.2d 1101 (1985).  
Since claimants in this position incur out-of-the-ordinary expenses in order to 
establish their right to participate in the fund, expenses that other claimants do not 
incur, R.C. 4123.512(F) provides a financial award to a successful claimant so 
that he or she can retain more of the recovery.  See Kilgore at 187.  This policy 
behind the statute and our cases interpreting the statute focus not on the outcome 
of the particular claims raised by a claimant, but instead on the cost of litigating 
the appeal.  Schuller at ¶ 13 (stating that costs “directly related to a [claimant’s] 
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appeal” are reimbursable expenses), Kilgore at 187-188 (discussing certain costs 
as a “litigation expense”). 
{¶ 8} The issue certified to this court is whether after a claimant’s right 
to participate in the workers’ compensation fund has been established, a trial court 
abuses its discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) by awarding the claimant 
reimbursement for costs related to the conditions for which the trier of fact 
determined the claimant was ineligible to participate in the fund.  The Third 
District Court of Appeals determined that a trial court’s decision to reimburse 
costs under R.C. 4123.512(F) that were related only to unsuccessful claims and/or 
conditions is an abuse of discretion.  Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc., 3d Dist. 
No. 3-11-12, 2011-Ohio-5741, ¶ 65-80.  In Hollar, however, the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals concluded that if a claimant is successful with at least one of his 
claims, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding the claimant all of 
his costs under R.C. 4123.512(F).  Hollar, 2003-Ohio-6827, at ¶ 19-20.  
Resolution of this matter requires only that we look to the plain language of the 
statute. 
{¶ 9} R.C. 4123.512(F) applies specifically to a claimant who is 
adjudged on appeal to be eligible to participate in the fund.  In other words, the 
event that triggers the availability of reimbursement under R.C. 4123.512(F) is the 
establishment on appeal that a claimant has the right to participate or continue to 
participate in the fund.  The section does not delineate additional factors that must 
be satisfied by the claimant.  In fact, language referring to allowed or nonallowed 
conditions is not found anywhere in the section. 
{¶ 10} We must apply the section in a manner consistent with the plain 
meaning of the statutory language; we cannot add words.  State ex rel. Burrows v. 
Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 676 N.E.2d 519 (1997).  We would 
impermissibly add language to the statute if we were to hold that a claimant must 
be reimbursed for costs only when his or her right to participate or to continue to 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
participate in the fund is established upon the final determination of an appeal and 
when the costs are related to a particular claim and/or condition. 
{¶ 11} Therefore, we hold that the plain language of R.C. 4123.512(F) 
requires a trial judge to order reimbursement of costs to a claimant for any legal 
proceeding authorized under R.C. 4123.512 once the claimant’s right to 
participate or to continue to participate in the workers’ compensation fund is 
established on appeal.  When a claimant’s right to participate in the fund is 
established, the trial court is not required under R.C. 4123.512(F) to apportion 
costs based on the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition. 
{¶ 12} The trial court’s determination of the reimbursement award must 
be based on the criterion set forth in the statute.  R.C. 4123.512(F) requires that 
the costs be “fixed by the trial judge, based upon the effort expended.”  Applying 
common grammar and usage to the statutory language, the statute requires that the 
award of costs be based on the effort spent by the claimant’s attorney in litigating 
the appeal.  The trial court must make this determination and set the 
reimbursement award accordingly. 
{¶ 13} We have said that a trial court must make a determination that such 
costs are reasonable.  See Schuller, 103 Ohio St.3d 157, 2004-Ohio-4753, 814 
N.E.2d 857, at syllabus.  However, we refuse to hold that courts should use the 
outcome of a claimant’s particular claim to determine whether the “effort 
expended” on appeal on that claim was reasonable.  The outcome of an appeal is 
not the conclusive indicator of whether effort was reasonably expended on a 
claimant’s behalf.  Under R.C. 4123.512, reasonable expenses are those “bearing 
a direct relation to a claimant’s appeal that lawyers traditionally charge to 
clients.” Kilgore, 92 Ohio St.3d at 188, 749 N.E.2d 184. 
{¶ 14} The plain language of R.C. 4123.512(F) requires a trial judge to 
order reimbursement to a claimant for costs, including attorney fees up to $4,200, 
if the claimant’s right to participate in the fund is established or upheld on appeal.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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In this case, Holmes was adjudged to be entitled to participate in the fund for a 
fifth-finger abrasion.  Therefore, pursuant to R.C. 4123.512(F), the trial court was 
required to reimburse him for his costs, including attorney fees, associated with 
his appeal.  Since R.C. 4123.512(F) does not require an apportionment of these 
costs based on the outcome of Holmes’s particular conditions, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion when it made no such division of costs.  Accordingly, we 
answer the certified-conflict question in the negative and reverse the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 15} The plain language of R.C. 4123.512(F) requires a trial judge to 
order reimbursement of costs to a claimant for any legal proceeding authorized 
under R.C. 4123.512 once the claimant’s right to participate or to continue to 
participate in the workers’ compensation fund is established on appeal.  
Apportionment of these costs is not required under the statute.  R.C. 4123.512 
requires the trial court to use “the effort expended” as the criterion for setting the 
amount of the award.  Therefore, once a claimant’s right to participate in the 
workers’ compensation fund has been established, a trial court does not abuse its 
discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) by awarding the claimant reimbursement for 
costs related to the conditions for which the trier of fact determined the claimant 
was ineligible to participate in the fund. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 16} Respectfully, I dissent. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 17} In my view, R.C. 4123.512(F) does not require an employer to pay 
the costs and fees associated with a claimant’s unsuccessful workers’ 
compensation claims.  In this case, although Holmes had been entitled to 
participate in the workers’ compensation fund only for an abrasion on his finger, 
the trial court awarded $7,551.23 in costs and $4,200 in attorney fees incurred for 
other unsuccessful claims.  Because the statute does not permit this award, I 
would affirm the appellate court’s judgment. 
Facts and Procedural Background 
{¶ 18} Jeff Holmes, an employee of Crawford Machine, Inc., sought 
workers’ compensation benefits for injuries allegedly arising from a July 2009 
industrial accident.  The Industrial Commission allowed his claims for left 
shoulder strain, electrical shock, low back strain, left rotator cuff tear, left 
posterior shoulder dislocation, and an abrasion of the right fifth finger.  Crawford 
Machine appealed the allowance to the common pleas court, and after a trial, a 
jury found that Holmes could participate in the workers’ compensation fund, but 
only for the abrasion on his right fifth finger,  disallowing all the other claims.  
Holmes appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. 
{¶ 19} Subsequently, the trial court awarded Holmes $7,551.23 in costs 
and $4,200 in attorney fees based on his right to participate in the workers’ 
compensation fund for the abrasion on his finger.  The Third District Court of 
Appeals reversed that award, holding that Crawford Machine could not be 
required to pay costs and fees that were not related to Holmes’s successful claim 
for benefits.  The Third District certified that its holding conflicted with the 
holding in Hollar v. Pleasant Twp., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-250, 2003-Ohio-6827.  
We accepted the certified conflict and ordered the parties to brief the following 
question: 
 
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“When a claimant/employee petitions the common pleas 
court to participate in the workers’ compensation fund for multiple 
claims/conditions 
and 
the 
trier 
of 
fact 
finds 
that 
the 
claimant/employee is entitled to participate in the fund for at least 
one of those claims/conditions but not all of the claims/conditions, 
does the trial court abuse its discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) by 
taxing an opposing party attorney’s fees and costs that are strictly 
related to the claims/conditions for which the trier of fact 
determined that the claimant/employee was ineligible to participate 
in the fund?” 
 
131 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2012-Ohio-896, 962 N.E.2d 802, quoting the court of 
appeals’ entry. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 20} In Ward v. Kroger Co., 106 Ohio St.3d 35, 2005-Ohio-3560, 830 
N.E.2d 1155, ¶ 10, we explained that a workers’ compensation claim constitutes 
the recognition of an employee’s right to participate in the worker’s compensation 
fund “for a specific injury or medical condition, which is defined narrowly, and it 
is only for that condition, as set forth in the claim, that compensation and benefits 
provided under the [Workers’ Compensation Act] may be payable.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  We stated in Ward that each alleged injury or condition “must be 
considered as a separate claim for purposes of R.C. 4123.511 and 4123.512.”  Id. 
at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 21} Relevant to the certified question in this appeal is R.C. 
4123.512(F), which provides for the award of costs and fees associated with a 
successful claim for workers’ compensation benefits and which states: 
 
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11 
 
The cost of any legal proceedings authorized by this 
section, including an attorney’s fee to the claimant’s attorney to be 
fixed by the trial judge, based upon the effort expended, in the 
event the claimant’s right to participate or to continue to 
participate in the fund is established upon the final determination 
of an appeal, shall be taxed against the employer or the 
commission if the commission or the administrator rather than the 
employer contested the right of the claimant to participate in the 
fund.  The attorney’s fee shall not exceed forty-two hundred 
dollars. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 22} R.C. 4123.512(F) does not authorize the award of costs and fees 
incurred in bringing unsuccessful claims.  Each claimed injury represents a 
separate claim for the right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund, and 
the legislature intended that a court award only those costs and fees that relate to 
the specific injury entitling the employee to participate.  In its enactment of R.C. 
4123.512(F), the General Assembly did not intend to shift the costs of litigating 
unsuccessful claims to employers; rather, it intended only that workers not bear 
the costs of seeking to participate for legitimate injuries occurring in the 
workplace, and it therefore limited reimbursement to successful claims.  Thus, the 
General Assembly did not intend to require employers to pay costs and fees for 
claims on which they prevailed. 
{¶ 23} Further, R.C. 4123.512(F) affords discretion to a trial court to 
award the costs and fees of any legal proceedings authorized by R.C. 4123.512, 
but only if the award is reasonable and is based upon the effort expended, and if 
the right to participate in the fund has been established.  Thus, in Schuller v. 
United States Steel Corp., 103 Ohio St.3d 157, 2004-Ohio-4753, 814 N.E.2d 857, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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syllabus, we held that an expert witness’s fee for live in-court testimony is a 
reimbursable cost of legal proceedings pursuant to R.C. 4123.512(F), subject to a 
trial court’s determination that the fee is reasonable.  And in Cave v. Conrad, 94 
Ohio St.3d 299, 762 N.E.2d 991 (2002), syllabus, we held that “reasonable 
videotaped deposition expenses may be taxed as costs and awarded to a successful 
workers’ compensation claimant in an action brought pursuant to R.C. 4123.512.”  
(Emphases added.) 
{¶ 24} In this case, the jury found Holmes entitled to participate in the 
workers’ compensation fund only for an abrasion on his right fifth finger, an 
injury treated on site with a bandage.  And although Holmes’s expert did not 
examine this finger or base an opinion on it, the trial court awarded Holmes the 
expert’s fee.  This award, in my view, is therefore unreasonable and not based on 
the effort expended.  Nor is it reasonable to award $7,551.23 in costs for an injury 
that consisted of a small abrasion treated by a bandage. 
{¶ 25} Thus, the trial court awarded costs and fees that are not related to 
the injury for which Holmes is entitled to participate in the workers’ 
compensation fund but rather were incurred to pursue unsuccessful claims.  
Because these costs and fees are neither reasonable nor based on the effort 
expended on the successful claim, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate 
court. 
CUPP, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg Co., L.P.A., Jennifer L. Lawther, Jerald A. 
Schneiberg, and Stacy M. Callen, for appellant. 
Oldham Kramer and Barbara A. Knapic, for appellee Crawford Machine, 
Inc. 
Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, and Alexandra T. Schimmer, 
Solicitor General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, Elisabeth A. 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Kevin J. Reis and Colleen C. Erdman, Assistant 
Attorneys General, for appellee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton, and Chelsea J. Fulton, urging 
reversal for amici curiae Ohio Association of Claimants’ Counsel and Ohio 
Association for Justice. 
Oldham Kramer and Barbara A. Knapic, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae Ohio Manufacturers’ Association. 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Thomas R. Sant, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Self-Insurers Association. 
______________________