Title: P. v. McKee

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 1/28/10 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S162823 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/1 D050554 
RICHARD MCKEE, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. MH97752 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
Proposition 83, passed by the voters in November of 2006, modified the terms by 
which sexually violent predators (SVP‟s) can be released from civil commitment under 
the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP Act or Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.).  
In essence, it changes the commitment from a two-year term, renewable only if the 
People prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual still meets the 
definition of an SVP, to an indefinite commitment from which the individual can be 
released if he proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he no longer is an SVP. 
Defendant, who is subject to indeterminate commitment pursuant to Proposition 
83, challenges the law on several constitutional grounds: that it violates the due process 
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and that it violates the ex post facto clause, article I, section 10 of the United 
States Constitution.  Like the Court of Appeal, we conclude that defendant‟s due process 
and ex post facto challenges are without merit.  As for the equal protection challenge, we 
conclude that the state has not yet carried its burden of demonstrating why SVP‟s, but not 
2 
any other ex-felons subject to civil commitment, such as mentally disordered offenders, 
are subject to indefinite commitment.  As explained below, we remand to the trial court 
to permit the People the opportunity to justify the differential treatment in accord with 
established equal protection principles.  (See In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457.) 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On November 8, 2004, a petition was filed to establish Richard McKee as an SVP 
within the meaning of the Act.  The petition alleged McKee was “a person who has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims for which he was 
sentenced and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes him a danger to the health 
and safety of others, in that it is likely he will engage in sexually violent predatory 
criminal behavior.”  It alleged he had been convicted of two counts of committing lewd 
and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).  One 
victim was an 11-year-old girl and the other was an eight-year-old girl.1  The petition 
requested that McKee be committed to the custody of the State Department of Mental 
Health (DMH) for a period of two years. 
 
On February 16, 2007, McKee demurred to the petition on the ground that the Act, 
as amended on November 7, 2006, by the voters‟ passage of Proposition 83, was 
unconstitutional.  The trial court overruled the demurrer. 
 
On March 5, 2007, an amended petition was filed restating the original petition‟s 
factual allegations and requesting that McKee be committed to an indeterminate term 
pursuant to the amended Act.  On March 12, following a five-day trial, the jury returned a 
verdict finding McKee was an SVP within the meaning of the Act.  On March 13, the 
                                              
1  
At trial, the evidence showed McKee had been convicted in 1991 for committing 
lewd acts against an 11-year-old babysitter and in 1998 for committing lewd acts against 
his eight-year-old niece. 
3 
trial court issued an order committing McKee to the custody of the DMH for an 
indeterminate term pursuant to the Act.   
 
McKee timely filed a notice of appeal.  The court rejected McKee‟s claims that the 
indeterminate commitment instituted by Proposition 83 violated federal or state due 
process, ex post facto or equal protection provisions.  The court also rejected McKee‟s 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the adequacy of the jury instructions.  
We granted review, and subsequently limited the issues to whether the Act as amended 
by Proposition 83 violated McKee‟s constitutional rights under the due process, equal 
protection, and ex post facto clauses.
2 
II. 
THE SVP ACT AND PROPOSITION 83 
 
The Act, as originally enacted (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 3, p. 5922), provided for the 
involuntary civil commitment for a two-year term of confinement and treatment of 
persons who, by a unanimous jury verdict after trial (Welf. & Inst. Code, former §§ 6603, 
subd. (d), 6604),3 are found beyond a reasonable doubt to be an SVP (former § 6604).  
(People v. Williams (2003) 31 Cal.4th 757, 764; Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 
Cal.4th 1138, 1143, 1147 (Hubbart).)  A person‟s commitment could not be extended 
beyond that two-year term unless a new petition was filed requesting a successive two-
year commitment.4  (Former §§ 6604, 6604.1; Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 
                                              
2  
McKee does not contend that the amended Act was not intended to apply to 
someone in his situation, who was committed as an SVP after the passage of Proposition 
83.  This is therefore not a case in which Proposition 83 is being imposed retroactively.  
(See People v. Litmon (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 383, 411-412 [concluding Prop. 83 does 
not retroactively apply to indefinitely extend the two-year commitment of an SVP 
imposed prior to the Act‟s amendment].) 
3  
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise 
specified. 
4  
Former section 6604 provided in pertinent part: “[T]he person shall not be kept in 
actual custody longer than two years unless a subsequent extended commitment is 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
4 
Cal.4th 228, 243, fn. 5.)  On filing of a recommitment petition, a new jury trial would be 
conducted at which the People again had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the person was currently an SVP.  (Former §§ 6604, 6605, subds. (d), (e).)  As was 
stated in People v. Munoz (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 421, 429: “[A]n SVP extension 
hearing is not a review hearing. . . .  An SVP extension hearing is a new and independent 
proceeding at which . . . the [People] must prove the [committed person] meets the [SVP] 
criteria, including that he or she has a currently diagnosed mental disorder that renders 
the person dangerous.” 
 
As originally enacted, an SVP was defined as “a person who has been convicted of 
a sexually violent offense against two or more victims for which he or she received a 
determinate sentence and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a 
danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in 
sexually violent criminal behavior.”  (Former § 6600, subd. (a).)  A “sexually violent 
offense” included a Penal Code section 288 lewd act on a child under age 14.  (Former 
§ 6600, subd. (b); Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1145.)  Under the Act, a person is 
“likely” to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior (i.e., reoffend) if he or she 
“presents a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk, that he or she will 
commit such crimes if free in the community.”  (People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 922.)  
 
The Act was “designed to ensure that the committed person does not „remain 
confined any longer than he suffers from a mental abnormality rendering him unable to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
obtained from the court incident to the filing of a new petition for commitment under this 
article or unless the term of commitment changes pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 
6605.” 
5 
control his dangerousness.‟  [Citation.]”  (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1177.)  The 
Act therefore provides “two ways a defendant can obtain review of his or her current 
mental condition to determine if civil confinement is still necessary.  [First,] [s]ection 
6608 permits a defendant to petition for conditional release to a community treatment 
program. . . .  [Second,] [s]ection 6605 [requires] an annual review of a defendant‟s 
mental status that may lead to unconditional release.”  (People v. Cheek (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 894, 898, fn. omitted.)   
 
On November 7, 2006, California voters passed Proposition 83, entitled “The 
Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica‟s Law” amending the Act effective 
November 8, 2006.  Proposition 83 is a wide-ranging initiative that seeks to address the 
problems posed by sex offenders.  It increases penalties for sex offenses, both by altering 
the definition of some sex offenses and by providing longer penalties for some offenses 
as well as modifying probation and parole provisions:  it requires a GPS tracking device 
for felons subject to such registration for the remainder of their lives; it prohibits a 
registered sex offender from living within 2,000 feet of schools and parks; and it changes 
the SVP Act by reducing the number of sexually violent offenses that qualify an offender 
for SVP status from two to one.  (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 
2006) analysis by the Legislative Analyst of Prop. 83, pp. 43-44.)  Proposition 83 also 
changes an SVP commitment from a two-year term to an indefinite commitment.  It is 
this latter provision with which this case is concerned and which will be described in 
more detail below.   
 
Pursuant to Proposition 83, section 6604, which had prescribed a two-year term 
for SVP‟s, now provides in relevant part: “If the court or jury determines that the person 
is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed for an indeterminate term to 
the custody of the DMH for appropriate treatment and confinement . . . .”  (Italics added.)  
Proposition 83 did not change section 6604‟s requirement that a person‟s initial 
6 
commitment as an SVP be proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.  Under Proposition 
83, section 6605 continues to require current examinations of a committed SVP at least 
once every year.  (§ 6605, subd. (a).)  However, Proposition 83 added new provisions to 
section 6605 regarding the DMH‟s obligations:  Pursuant to section 6605, subdivision (a), 
the DMH now files an annual report in conjunction with its examination of SVP‟s that 
“shall include consideration of whether the committed person currently meets the 
definition of a sexually violent predator and whether conditional release to a less 
restrictive alternative or an unconditional release is in the best interest of the person and 
conditions can be imposed that would adequately protect the community.”  Subdivision 
(b) now provides that “[i]f the [DMH] determines that either: (1) the person‟s condition 
has so changed that the person no longer meets the definition of a sexually violent 
predator, or (2) conditional release to a less restrictive alternative is in the best interest of 
the person and conditions can be imposed that adequately protect the community, the 
director shall authorize the person to petition the court for conditional release to a less 
restrictive alternative or for an unconditional discharge.”  (§ 6605, subd. (b).)  If the state 
opposes the director‟s petition, then, as under the pre-Proposition 83 statute, it must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person still meets the definition of an SVP.  
 
In the event the DMH does not authorize the committed person to file a petition 
for release pursuant to section 6605, the person nevertheless may file, as was the case 
with the pre-Proposition 83 Act, a petition for conditional release for one year and 
subsequent unconditional discharge pursuant to section 6608.  (§ 6608, subd. (a).)  
Section 6608, subdivision (i), which was also unamended by the Act, provides: “In any 
hearing authorized by this section, the petitioner shall have the burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”  (Italics added.)  After a trial court denies a section 6608 
petition, “the person may not file a new application until one year has elapsed from the 
date of the denial.”  (§ 6608, subd. (h).) 
7 
 
In short, under Proposition 83, an individual SVP‟s commitment term is 
indeterminate, rather than for a two-year term as in the previous version of the Act.  An 
SVP can only be released conditionally or unconditionally if the DMH authorizes a 
petition for release and the state does not oppose it or fails to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the individual still meets the definition of an SVP, or if the individual, 
petitioning the court on his own, is able to bear the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he is no longer an SVP.  In other words, the method of petitioning the 
court for release and proving fitness to be released, which under the former Act had been 
the way an SVP could cut short his two-year commitment, now becomes the only means 
of being released from an indefinite commitment when the DMH does not support 
release.5 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Due Process Claim 
 
McKee contends his indefinite involuntary commitment as an SVP under the Act 
violates his federal constitutional right to due process of law.  There is no question that 
civil commitment itself is constitutional so long as it is accompanied by the appropriate 
                                              
5  
Proposition 83‟s findings state: “The People find and declare each of the 
following: [¶] . . . [¶] (k) California is the only state, of the number of states that have 
enacted laws allowing involuntary civil commitments for persons identified as sexually 
violent predators, which does not provide for indeterminate commitments.  California 
automatically allows for a jury trial every two years irrespective of whether there is any 
evidence to suggest or prove that the committed person is no longer a sexually violent 
predator.  As such, this act allows California to protect the civil rights of those persons 
committed as a sexually violent predator while at the same time protect society and the 
system from unnecessary or frivolous jury trial actions where there is no competent 
evidence to suggest a change in the committed person.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. 
Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) text of Prop. 83, § 2, p. 127; see Historical & Statutory Notes, 47C 
West‟s Ann. Pen. Code (2008) foll. § 209, pp. 52-53.) 
8 
constitutional protections. “States have in certain narrow circumstances provided for the 
forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who 
thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety.  [Citations.] . . .  It . . . cannot be 
said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous persons is 
contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty.”  (Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 
346, 356-357 (Hendricks).)  In order to properly justify a civil commitment, “[a] finding 
of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to 
justify indefinite involuntary commitment.  We have sustained civil commitment statutes 
when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, 
such as a „mental illness‟ or „mental abnormality.‟  [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 358.) 
 
McKee contends that it is the fact that his commitment is now indefinite, and that 
it is his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer an SVP, 
that violates his federal due process rights.  In making this argument, he relies in large 
part on Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418 (Addington).)   In Addington, the court 
held unconstitutional a civil involuntary commitment statute that authorized an indefinite 
commitment when the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
individual was mentally incompetent.  (Id. at pp. 419-422.)  As Addington explained: 
“The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to 
its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the 
state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the 
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.  Under the Texas Mental Health 
Code, however, the State has no interest in confining individuals involuntarily if they are 
not mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to themselves or others.”  (Addington, 
supra, 441 U.S. at p. 426.)  The Addington court assessed the risk of improperly 
subjecting an individual to civil commitment: “At one time or another every person 
exhibits some abnormal behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a 
9 
mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is 
generally acceptable.  Obviously, such behavior is no basis for compelled treatment and 
surely none for confinement.  However, there is the possible risk that a factfinder might 
decide to commit an individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual 
conduct.  Loss of liberty calls for a showing that the individual suffers from something 
more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior.  Increasing the burden of 
proof is one way to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and 
thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that inappropriate commitments will be ordered. 
[¶] The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when 
the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the 
state.”  (Id. at pp. 426-427.) 
 
The Addington court therefore concluded that “the individual‟s interest in the 
outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process 
requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere 
preponderance of the evidence.”  (Addington, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 427.)  It held that due 
process required proof by clear and convincing evidence at the appellant‟s initial civil 
commitment hearing.  (Id. at p. 433.) 
 
McKee argues Addington requires the state to prove by at least clear and 
convincing evidence in not only the first commitment hearing but periodically at 
subsequent commitment hearings as well, and that therefore section 6608, subdivision (i) 
violates due process by imposing on the petitioner the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to release.  As explained below, the 
United States Supreme Court case law decided after Addington leads to the conclusion 
that the clear and convincing evidence standard does not apply to subsequent 
commitment proceedings for SVP‟s. 
10 
 
The primary case relied on by the People is Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 
354 (Jones).  Jones considered a District of Columbia statute that governed civil 
commitment of those who had been adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity of criminal 
charges (NGI‟s).  Under that statutory scheme, a defendant was required to prove his 
affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.  (Id. at p. 356, fn. 1.)  
After his acquittal by reason of insanity, another statute provided for his immediate 
commitment, with a hearing required within 50 days to determine whether he was eligible 
for release.  At the hearing, he had “the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he [was] no longer mentally ill or dangerous.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 357.)  
If he did not meet that burden at the 50-day hearing, he was “entitled [by statute] to a 
judicial hearing every six months at which he may establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he is entitled to release.  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 358, fn. omitted.) 
 
The court rejected a due process challenge to the statute.  Congress had 
determined “that a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in the 
District of Columbia should be committed indefinitely to a mental institution for 
treatment and the protection of society.  [Citations.]”  (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 361-
362.)  An NGI determination “establishe[d] two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act 
that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental 
illness.”  (Id. at p. 363.)  Jones stated: “Congress has determined that these findings 
constitute an adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous and mentally ill 
person.  [Citations.]  We cannot say that it was unreasonable and therefore 
unconstitutional for Congress to make this determination. [¶] The fact that a person has 
been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly 
indicates dangerousness.  [Citation.]  Indeed, this concrete evidence [of commission of a 
criminal act] generally may be at least as persuasive as any predictions about 
11 
dangerousness that might be made in a civil-commitment proceeding.”  (Id. at p. 364, fns. 
omitted.) 
 
Distinguishing Addington, the court explained that in equating NGI commitment 
with the ordinary civil commitment at issue in Addington, “petitioner ignores important 
differences between the class of potential civil-commitment candidates and the class of 
insanity acquittees that justify differing standards of proof.  The Addington Court 
expressed particular concern that members of the public could be confined on the basis of 
„some abnormal behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental 
or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally 
acceptable.‟  [Citations.] . . . But since automatic commitment under [the District of 
Columbia‟s NGI commitment statute] follows only if the acquittee himself advances 
insanity as a defense and proves that his criminal act was a product of his mental illness, 
there is good reason for diminished concern as to the risk of error.  More important, the 
proof that he committed a criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk that 
he is being committed for mere „idiosyncratic behavior[.]‟  [Citation.]”  (Jones, supra, 
463 U.S. at p. 367, fns. omitted.)  Jones therefore concluded that “concerns critical to our 
decision in Addington are diminished or absent in the case of insanity acquittees.  
Accordingly, there is no reason for adopting the same standard of proof in both cases. . . .  
The preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due process for commitment 
of insanity acquittees.”  (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 367-368.) 
Although McKee was not found not guilty by reason of insanity, he has been 
found beyond a reasonable doubt in his initial commitment to meet the definition of an 
SVP.  That finding is, for present constitutional purposes, the functional equivalent of the 
NGI acquittal in Jones.  As in Jones, McKee has already been found not only to have 
previously committed the requisite criminal acts but was found beyond a reasonable 
doubt to have “a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health 
12 
and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent 
criminal behavior.”  (§ 6600, subd. (a).)  Therefore, as in Jones, the danger recognized in 
Addington “that members of the public could be confined on the basis of „some abnormal 
behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional 
disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable‟ ” or 
“for mere „idiosyncratic behavior‟ ” (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 367) is greatly 
diminished.  Accordingly, as in Jones, the requirement that McKee, after his initial 
commitment, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer an SVP 
does not violate due process. 
 
McKee seeks to distinguish Jones, arguing that in the latter case, an individual was 
entitled to a hearing every six months, whereas there is no such entitlement for the SVP 
after Proposition 83.  In fact, section 6608, subdivision (h) permits an SVP to file a new 
petition for release as early as a year after the previous petition was denied.  The statute 
does permit the court to deny a hearing if the petition is frivolous.  Section 6608, 
subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: “If a person has previously filed a petition for 
conditional release without the concurrence of the director and the court determined, 
either upon review of the petition or following a hearing, that the petition was frivolous 
or that the committed person‟s condition had not so changed that he or she would not be a 
danger to others in that it is not likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent 
criminal behavior if placed under supervision and treatment in the community, then the 
court shall deny the subsequent petition unless it contains facts upon which a court could 
find that the condition of the committed person had so changed that a hearing was 
warranted. Upon receipt of a first or subsequent petition from a committed person 
without the concurrence of the director, the court shall endeavor whenever possible to 
review the petition and determine if it is based upon frivolous grounds and, if so, shall 
deny the petition without a hearing.”   
13 
 
McKee contends that the court‟s discretion to deny a petition without a hearing as 
frivolous denies due process.  We disagree.  A frivolous petition is one that “indisputably 
has no merit.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650 [defining frivolous 
appeals].)  McKee cites no authority for the proposition that due process is violated by 
not granting such petitions a hearing.   The fact that the statute gives the court the 
authority to deny such petitions does not, of itself, serve as an obstacle to the primary due 
process goal of ensuring that only those individuals who continue to meet SVP criteria 
will remain involuntarily committed.6   
McKee further contends that his lack of access to mental health experts to 
challenge his continuing commitment violates due process.  As he points out, although 
section 6605, subdivision (d) mandates the appointment of experts when the DMH 
authorizes an indigent inmate to petition for release, section 6608, subdivision (a) merely 
provides that petitioner has the right to counsel, with no mention of experts, when he 
petitions without the DMH‟s approval. 
McKee is correct that expert testimony is critical in an SVP commitment 
proceeding, in which the primary issue is not, as in a criminal trial, whether the individual 
committed certain acts, but rather involves a prediction about the individual‟s future 
behavior.  If the state involuntarily commits someone on the basis of expert opinion about 
future dangerousness, places the burden on that person to disprove future dangerousness, 
and then makes it difficult for him to access to his own expert because of his indigence to 
                                              
6 
Of course, nothing we say here precludes an individual from challenging an 
erroneous judicial determination that a petition is frivolous.  (See People v. Collins 
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 340, 350 [“if the defendant‟s position has some merit on the 
issue of whether he or she may qualify for conditional release, the statute requires that the 
court provide the defendant a hearing on the matter”].) 
14 
challenge his continuing commitment, that schema would indeed raise a serious due 
process concern. 
We do not believe, however, that the statute needs to be interpreted in this narrow 
manner.  It is true that section 6608, subdivision (a), unlike section 6605, subdivision (d), 
does not explicitly provide for experts when an SVP petitions the court for release.  But 
section 6605, subdivision (a) states that in conjunction with the DMH‟s examination of 
an SVP‟s mental condition, which must occur “at least once every year,” an SVP who is 
indigent may request and the court may appoint “a qualified expert or professional person 
to examine him or her.”  Although section 6605, subdivision (a) does not explicitly 
provide for the appointment of the expert in conjunction with a section 6608 petition, 
such appointment may be reasonably inferred.  As is clear from the context, the annual 
examination authorized by section 6605, subdivision (a), occurs not solely or even 
primarily for the purpose of assessing the SVP‟s treatment needs, but mainly for 
determining whether involuntary commitment is still required, or whether the SVP has 
sufficiently changed as a result of treatment to be released.  There is no indication that the 
Legislature that authorized these expert appointments on behalf of an indigent SVP 
believed that such experts should be disallowed from testifying at an SVP‟s section 6608 
hearing, nor that an SVP‟s indigence should serve as an obstacle to such testimony.  On 
the contrary, the statute appears to encourage state-funded qualified expert appointed for 
a petitioner‟s benefit so as to ensure that the commitment lasts no longer than is 
necessary.   
 
We construe statutes when reasonable to avoid difficult constitutional issues.  (See 
In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1269.)  After Proposition 83, it is still the case that an 
individual may not be held in civil commitment when he or she no longer meets the 
requisites of such commitment.  An SVP may be held, as the United States Supreme 
Court stated under similar circumstances, “as long as he is both mentally ill and 
15 
dangerous, but no longer.”  (Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) 504 U.S. 71, 77.)  Given that the 
denial of access to expert opinion when an indigent individual petitions on his or her own 
to be released may pose a significant obstacle to ensuring that only those meeting SVP 
commitment criteria remain committed, we construe section 6608, subdivision (a), read 
in conjunction with section 6605, subdivision (a), to mandate appointment of an expert 
for an indigent SVP who petitions the court for release. 
 
Construing the amended Act in the above manner, we conclude it does not violate 
the due process clause.  
B. Ex Post Facto Claim 
 
McKee also contends his indefinite commitment under the terms of Proposition 83 
violated the federal constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because it is 
punitive and was applied to his conduct prior to its enactment.  We disagree. 
 
Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution provides: “No state shall . . . 
pass any . . . ex post facto law . . . .”  The ex post facto clause prohibits only those laws 
that “retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal 
acts.”  (Collins v. Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 43.) 
 
In Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1138, we made clear, in considering an ex post facto 
challenge to the pre-Proposition 83 version of the Act, that the Legislature had 
“disavowed any „punitive purpose[],‟ and declared its intent to establish „civil 
commitment‟ proceedings in order to provide „treatment‟ to mentally disordered 
individuals who cannot control sexually violent criminal behavior.  [Citations.]  The 
Legislature also made clear that, despite their criminal record, persons eligible for 
commitment and treatment as SVP‟s are to be viewed „not as criminals, but as sick 
persons.‟  [Citation.]  Consistent with these remarks, the [Act] was placed in the Welfare 
and Institutions Code, surrounded on each side by other schemes concerned with the care 
and treatment of various mentally ill and disabled groups.”  (Hubbart, at p. 1171.) 
16 
 
In concluding that our Act is not punitive, and therefore not within the scope of the 
ex post facto clause, we relied on the United States Supreme Court‟s similar conclusion 
in Hendricks with respect to Kansas‟ Sexually Violent Predator Act.  As the court stated: 
“Far from any punitive objective, the confinement‟s duration is instead linked to the 
stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his mental 
abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others.  [Citation.]  If, at any time, the 
confined person is adjudged „safe to be at large,‟ he is statutorily entitled to immediate 
release.  [Citation.]”  (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 363-364, italics added.) 
 
We therefore concluded the Act was not punitive because “[v]iewed as a whole, 
the SVPA is also designed to ensure that the committed person does not „remain confined 
any longer than he suffers from a mental abnormality rendering him unable to control his 
dangerousness.‟ ”  (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1177, citing Hendricks, supra, 521 
U.S. at p. 364.)  It is true that, in elaborating on this statement, we pointed to the fact that 
“each period of commitment is strictly limited and cannot be extended unless the state 
files a new petition and again proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person is 
dangerous and mentally impaired.  (§ 6604.)”  (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1177.)  
But nothing in Hubbart suggests that these requirements are indispensable to shielding 
the Act from an ex post facto challenge.  In fact, the nonpunitive objectives of the Act — 
treatment for the individual committed and protection of the public — remain the same 
after Proposition 83.  Moreover, under the Act after Proposition 83, as before, a person is 
committed only for as long as he meets the SVP criteria of mental abnormality and 
dangerousness.  As such, the Proposition 83 amendments at issue here cannot be regarded 
to have changed the essentially nonpunitive purpose of the Act. 
 
McKee also argues that Proposition 83, taken as a whole, including increased 
provisions regarding the punishment for those convicted of sexually related offenses, 
evinces a punitive purpose.  Obviously, the portion of Proposition 83 that concerns 
17 
increased punishment for sex offenses is punitive.  But the fact that the amendments to 
the civil commitment statute are part of the same legislative enactment as amendments to 
the Penal Code does not render the former amendments punitive. 
 
McKee also argues the seven-factor test articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144, 168-169, applies to invalidate the Proposition 83 
amendments at issue here.  As the United States Supreme Court has explained, the 
Mendoza-Martinez factors provide “a useful framework.  These factors, which migrated 
into our ex post facto case law from double jeopardy jurisprudence, have their earlier 
origins in cases under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Bill of Attainder 
and the Ex Post Facto Clauses.  Because the Mendoza-Martinez factors are designed to 
apply in various constitutional contexts, we have said they are „neither exhaustive nor 
dispositive‟ [citations], but are „useful guideposts‟ [citation].  The factors most relevant to 
our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been 
regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability 
or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a 
nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.”  (Smith v. Doe (2003) 
538 U.S. 84, 97.)7  
                                              
7  
The Smith v. Doe court, which addressed whether the imposition of a registration 
requirement for sex offenders fell within the scope of the ex post facto clause, explained 
that “[t]he two remaining Mendoza-Martinez factors — whether the regulation comes 
into play only on a finding of scienter and whether the behavior to which it applies is 
already a crime — are of little weight in this case.  The regulatory scheme applies only to 
past conduct, which was, and is, a crime.  This is a necessary beginning point, for 
recidivism is the statutory concern.  The obligations the statute imposes are the 
responsibility of registration, a duty not predicated upon some present or repeated 
violation.”  (Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 105.) In the case of the SVP Act at issue 
here, although the trigger for eligibility is a certain type of past criminal conduct, the 
commitment cannot be effectuated without a determination of a current mental disorder 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
18 
 
Although one of the five factors — affirmative restraints on liberty — is present 
here, as it is with all involuntary civil commitments, the other four factors go against 
McKee:  (1) civil commitment has historically been imposed nonpunitively on those 
whose inability to control their behavior poses a danger to the public (see Hendricks, 
supra, 521 U.S. at p. 357); (2) as discussed above, the amendments to the SVP Act under 
consideration here do not alter the Act‟s nonpunitive purpose of treatment and public 
protection; (3) the civil commitment has a rational connection with those purposes; and 
(4) even with indefinite commitment and alterations in the burden and standard of proof, 
the commitment authorized by the Act is not excessive and is designed to last only as 
long as that person meets the definition of an SVP.  We therefore conclude that the 
Proposition 83 amendments do not make the Act punitive and accordingly do not violate 
the ex post facto clause. 
C. Equal Protection Clause 
 
McKee contends his involuntary commitment as an SVP under the Act, as 
amended by Proposition 83 in 2006, violated his federal constitutional right to equal 
protection under the law because it treats SVP‟s significantly less favorably than those 
similarly situated individuals civilly committed under other statutes.  We conclude his 
claim has some merit and will require remand for further proceedings. 
 
In re Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d 457 (Moye) is highly relevant to assessing McKee‟s 
claim and will be discussed  at length.  Moye followed In re Franklin (1972) 7 Cal.3d 
126, in which the court held that a person who has been found not guilty by reason of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
and future dangerousness.  The above two Mendoza-Martinez factors therefore do not 
count in McKee‟s favor. 
19 
insanity can be civilly committed for at least the maximum term of the underlying 
offense, and may only be released from commitment during that term if he proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer a danger to the health and safety of 
himself or others.  (Id. at p. 148.)  As Moye summarized, we explained in Franklin “that 
by reason of the prior judicial determination of insanity, „persons acquitted by reason of 
insanity fall within a special class, thereby providing a rational basis for differences in the 
treatment afforded them. . . .  [¶]  . . .  “The special interest which the public has acquired 
in the confinement and release of people in this exceptional class results from the fact 
that there has been a judicial determination that they have already endangered the public 
safety and their own as a result of their mental conditions as distinguished from people 
civilly committed because of only potential danger.” ‟ ”  (Moye, supra, at pp. 462-463.)  
The question presented in Moye, however, was whether the commitment can continue 
under the same rules after that maximum term, requiring an individual to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that he was no longer in need of such commitment.  (Moye, 
supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 460.) 
This court concluded that such extension of the commitment would violate equal 
protection.  The court compared NGI commitment to commitment under the former 
Mentally Disordered Sex Offender (MDSO) Act, the forerunner of the SVP Act, although 
unlike SVP‟s, those committed under the MDSO Act were civilly committed in lieu of a 
prison term, rather than after that term.  As we observed: MDSO‟s “comprise a class of 
individuals quite similar to those, such as petitioner, who have been acquitted of a 
criminal offense by reason of insanity.  Both classes, for example, involve persons who 
initially have been found to have committed a criminal act, but whose mental condition 
warrants a period of confinement for treatment in a state institution, in lieu of criminal 
punishment.”  (Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 463.)  Although MDSO‟s had been initially 
subject to indefinite commitment, our own decisions cast doubt on the validity of such 
20 
commitments and “the Legislature has subsequently enacted new provisions which limit 
the duration of all MDSO commitments . . . [to] the „longest term of imprisonment which 
could have been imposed for the offense or offenses of which the defendant was 
convicted . . . .”  (Id. at p. 464.)  The Legislature then added former section 6316.2, which 
provided “for a special extended commitment of one year beyond the maximum term of 
imprisonment following jury trial if it is found that the patient suffers from a mental 
disorder and, as a result thereof, „is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to 
such a degree that he presents a serious threat of substantial harm to the health and safety 
of others.‟  (§ 6316.2, subd. (a)(2).)  Additional one-year commitments were available, 
following similar annual hearings.  (Id., subd. (h).)”  (Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 464.)  
The burden of proof in these hearings was on the People to prove the individual suffers 
from a mental disorder that predisposes him to commit sexual offenses that represented 
danger to the public.  (Ibid.) 
Thus, comparing the NGI and MDSO statutory schemes, we stated: “The 
foregoing provisions demonstrate the marked differences between the statutory 
commitment and release procedures applicable to MDSOs on the one hand and persons 
committed under section 1026 on the other.  Yet, as we have noted the preconditions to 
both commitments are similar: the initial commitment follows commission of a criminal 
act and is based upon a finding of a mental disorder which might present a danger to 
others.  The MDSO can be confined for only a limited period, measured by the maximum 
term for the underlying offense, unless thereafter the People (or other committing 
authority) can establish grounds for an extended commitment.  In contrast, persons in 
petitioner‟s class face indefinite, lifetime confinement unless they can prove that their 
sanity has been restored.”  (Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 464-465.) 
The Moye court then reviewed other California civil commitment statutes, 
including the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act), commitment for juvenile offenders, 
21 
and those deemed incompetent to stand trial, each of which had rules for recommitment 
similar to the MDSO Act.  The court concluded: “In summary, our research reveals that 
commitments under section 1026 represent the sole instance of a potential lifetime 
confinement, imposed without regard to the nature of the underlying offense or the 
maximum punishment prescribed for it, and without the additional protection of periodic 
review and recommitment hearings.  Thus, disparity of treatment seems clearly to exist.”  
(Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 465.) 
The court then reasoned: “Because petitioner‟s personal liberty is at stake, the 
People concede that the applicable standard for measuring the validity of the statutory 
scheme now before us requires application of the strict scrutiny standard of equal 
protection analysis.  Accordingly, the state must establish both that it has a „compelling 
interest‟ which justifies the challenged procedure and that the distinctions drawn by the 
procedure are necessary to further that interest.  [Citation.]  At the very least, persons 
similarly situated must receive like treatment under the law. [Citation.]  As we have 
noted, by reason of their commission of a prior criminal act and the finding of a mental 
disorder justifying the initial commitment, persons committed as MDSOs are „similarly 
situated‟ with persons like petitioner.”  (Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 465-466.) 
The court then rejected the People‟s attempts to justify the differences in treatment 
between NGI and MDSO commitments.  “The People suggest that MDSOs suffer from a 
more „limited‟ form of mental disorder (predisposition toward commission of sexual 
offenses) when compared with persons found to be insane under [Penal Code] section 
1026.  It seems quite clear, however, that both classes of persons present equally 
substantial risks of harm.  By statutory definition, an MDSO is a person „who by reason 
of mental defect, disease, or disorder, is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses 
to such a degree that he is dangerous to the health and safety of others.‟  (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 6300, italics added.)  Yet, despite their potential dangerousness, MDSOs must be 
22 
released from confinement when the maximum term for their underlying offense has 
expired, unless the People can establish grounds for an extended commitment.  (Id., 
§ 6316.2.)  We believe that constitutional demands of equal protection require a similar 
shifting of the burden of proof in favor of persons acquitted as insane, in order to retain 
them in confinement beyond the maximum term prescribed for the offense they 
committed while insane.”  (Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 466.) 
The court then concluded: “Specifically, we hold that principles of equal 
protection require . . . that persons committed to a state institution following acquittal of a 
criminal offense on the ground of their insanity cannot be retained in institutional 
confinement beyond the maximum term of punishment for the underlying offense of 
which, but for their insanity, they would have been convicted.”  (Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d 
at p. 467.)  The court further concluded that “[t]o the extent practicable, and in the 
absence of further legislation on the subject, the procedure for the extended commitment 
of persons committed [under the NGI statute] should conform to the procedures specified 
in section 6316.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.”  (Ibid.)  Although the court did 
not mention it, section 6316.2, subdivision (e) then provided that MDSO‟s “shall be 
entitled to the rights guaranteed under the Federal and State Constitutions for criminal 
proceedings,” which includes imposing on the People the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the individual continues to meet the definition of an MDSO.  (Stats. 
1977, ch. 164, § 3, p. 635; see In re Winship (1970) 391 U.S. 358, 364 [proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt constitutionally required for criminal trials]; see also People v. Burnick 
(1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 332 [proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for MDSO‟s].) 
Decisions by this court and the United States Supreme Court before and since 
Moye have used the equal protection clause to police civil commitment statutes to ensure 
that a particular group of civil committees is not unfairly or arbitrarily subjected to 
greater burdens.  (See Baxtrom v. Herold (1966) 383 U.S. 107 [when the state seeks to 
23 
civilly commit a person after expiration of prison term, equal protection is violated when 
it does not afford a jury trial as for other civil committees]; Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 
406 U.S. 715 [the state may not indefinitely commit an individual deemed incompetent to 
stand trial, denying procedural protections afforded other civil committees]; Humphrey v. 
Cady (1974) 405 U.S. 504, 509 [habeas corpus petitioner stated prima facie case that 
Wisconsin statute that civilly committed sex offenders violated equal protection by not 
providing jury trial available under the general civil commitment statute]; Foucha v. 
Louisiana, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 84-85 [subjecting someone no longer insane to special 
civil commitment regime for insanity acquittees rather than to the general civil 
commitment statute violates equal protection]; In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, 307-
308 [those committed by the former Youth Authority and subsequently civilly committed 
when they reach the age of 21 must pursuant to the equal protection clause be granted a 
jury trial afforded others civilly committed]; Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 28 
Cal.3d 161, 178-179 (Hofferber) [equal protection requires the determination that a 
conservatorship under the LPS Act for an individual initially determined to be 
incompetent to stand trial be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt when it is 
claimed the individual has a dangerous mental disorder].) 
 
Most recently in In re Smith, supra, 42 Cal.4th 1251 (Smith), we concluded that a 
substantial equal protection issue was raised when a person imprisoned for a conviction 
overturned on appeal was treated as an SVP rather than forcing the state to meet the more 
stringent civil commitment requirements of the LPS Act.  We therefore interpreted an 
ambiguous section of the SVP Act providing that SVP petitions are not to be dismissed 
because of “a good-faith mistake of fact or law” as not applying to such a person in order 
to avoid the equal protection issue.  (Id. at p. 1255.)  In arriving at our conclusion, we 
summarized the relevant principles for applying equal protection analysis to civil 
commitment statutes: “(1) generally speaking, no individual or group when being civilly 
24 
committed may be denied substantive or procedural protections that are provided to the 
population as a whole; (2) on the other hand, the Legislature may make reasonable 
distinctions between its civil commitment statutes based on a showing that the persons 
are not similarly situated, meaning that those who are reasonably determined to represent 
a greater danger may be treated differently from the general population; (3) in particular, 
those who are criminally convicted, and those indicted on criminal charges but 
incompetent to stand trial, may be distinguished, at least initially, from the general 
population for civil commitment purposes, because their criminal acts demonstrate that 
they potentially pose a greater danger to society than those not in the criminal justice 
system.”  (Id. at pp. 1266-1267.) 
 
Our statement of these principles in Smith followed an extensive discussion of 
Hofferber.  In Hofferber, we found that those charged with criminal acts determined to be 
incompetent to stand trial could be subject to civil commitment under the LPS Act even 
though the state was not initially required to prove such persons were “gravely disabled” 
(§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A)) within the meaning of that act.  (Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at 
pp. 170-174.)  “[The state] may adopt more than one procedure for isolating, treating, and 
restraining dangerous persons; and differences will be upheld if justified.  [Citations.]  
Variation of the length and conditions of confinement, depending on degrees of danger 
reasonably perceived as to special classes of persons, is a valid exercise of state power.”  
(Id. at p. 172, italics added.)  For this reason, we concluded, “some separate treatment of 
permanently incompetent criminal defendants formally charged with violent felonies is 
justified.  Allegedly they have engaged in violence so critical that serious criminal 
charges were believed appropriate.  Magistrates or grand juries have found substantial 
evidence that the alleged conduct actually was committed as alleged.  Those 
determinations of probable cause establish strong grounds to believe that, by concrete 
25 
acts, the incompetent defendants already have seriously imperiled public safety and thus 
are particularly dangerous.”  (Id. at p. 173.) 
 
In Smith, we concluded that the reasonably perceived greater danger of SVP‟s 
justifies their being treated differently from those subject to the LPS Act, the general civil 
commitment statute, who cannot be subject to long-term commitment based on 
psychiatric opinion alone.  “Individuals in prison with felony convictions have yet to 
demonstrate their capacity or willingness to keep their conduct within the bounds of the 
law and to break old criminal habits, and the Legislature could legitimately conclude that 
such felons who have prior sexually violent offenses represent a particular danger to 
society that justifies a separate system of civil commitment.”  (Smith, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 
p. 1268.)  It is reasonable to suppose that those who have been adjudicated to have 
committed criminal acts represent a class that is on the whole more dangerous than those 
who have not — in other words, that such adjudication is a reasonable proxy for greater 
dangerousness. 
 
With these principles in mind, we turn to McKee‟s equal protection claim.  He 
contends that SVP‟s are treated less favorably than those similarly situated under the 
Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) Act, Penal Code section 2960 et al., in violation of 
the equal protection clause.  To evaluate this claim, we briefly review the MDO Act. 
 
“As a condition of parole, a prisoner may be designated and civilly committed as 
an MDO for involuntary treatment of a „severe mental disorder‟ if certain conditions are 
met.  (Pen. Code, §§ 2962, 2966; [citations].)  Section 2962 provides that a prisoner is 
subject to the MDO Act if: „(a) The prisoner has a severe mental disorder that is not in 
remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment‟; „(b) The severe mental 
disorder was one of the causes of or was an aggravating factor in the commission of the 
crime for which the prisoner was sentenced to prison‟; „(c) The prisoner has been in 
treatment for the severe mental disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior to the 
26 
prisoner‟s parole or release‟; „(d)‟ a special team of mental health professionals evaluated 
the prisoner and concluded that criteria (a), (b) and (c) above have been met, and that due 
to the severe mental disorder, the prisoner “represents a substantial danger of physical 
harm to others”; „(e)‟ the prisoner received a determinate sentence for the crime 
referenced in subdivision (b), and the crime is one of the enumerated crimes in 
subdivision (e).  (§ 2962, subds. (a)-(e).)  If such are found to exist, the prisoner may 
request a de novo hearing before the Board of Parole Hearings.  (§ 2966.)  If the Board of 
Parole Hearings concludes that the criteria are met, the prisoner may request a jury trial in 
the superior court.  (Ibid.)  „The standard of proof shall be beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and if the trial is by jury, the jury shall be unanimous in its verdict.‟  (§ 2966, subd. (b); 
[citation].) 
 
“Before an MDO‟s current commitment period expires, the district attorney may 
petition to extend that commitment by one year.  (§ 2970.)  To do so, the medical director 
of the state hospital, the community program director, or the Director of Corrections first 
„shall submit‟ to the district attorney a written evaluation of the prisoner „[n]ot later than 
180 days‟ before the prisoner‟s termination of parole or release, . . .‟ ”  (People v. Allen 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 99.)  An MDO‟s commitment may be extended by one year if it is 
once again established beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury verdict that the 
individual meets the definition of an MDO.  (§ 2972, subds. (a) & (c).) 
As stated above, a prisoner is only eligible for MDO commitment if he or she has 
committed certain crimes of violence.  These crimes are set forth in Penal Code section 
2962, subdivision (c) and include voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, carjacking, rape, 
forcible sodomy, armed robbery, arson, attempted murder, and other crimes in which the 
prisoner used force or violence or caused serious bodily injury. 
In summary, SVP‟s under the amended Act are given indeterminate commitments 
and thereafter have the burden to prove they should be released (unless the DMH 
27 
authorizes a petition for release).  In contrast, an MDO is committed for one-year periods 
and thereafter has the right to be released unless the People prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he or she should be recommitted for another year.  There is therefore no 
question that, after the initial commitment, an SVP is afforded different and less 
favorable procedural protections than an MDO. 
As we have stated: “ „The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal 
protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two 
or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.‟  [Citations.]  This initial inquiry 
is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but „whether they are 
similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.‟ ”  (Cooley v. Superior Court, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 253.)  In other words, we ask at the threshold whether two classes 
that are different in some respects are sufficiently similar with respect to the laws in 
question to require the government to justify its differential treatment of these classes 
under those laws.  
The Court of Appeal, in rejecting McKee‟s equal protection challenge, concluded 
that SVP‟s and MDO‟s are not similarly situated.  “The classifications of an SVP and an 
MDO are different.  An SVP is defined as „a person who has been convicted of a sexually 
violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that 
makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or 
she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.‟  (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).)  In 
contrast, an MDO is generally defined as a person with a severe mental disorder that 
cannot be kept in remission without treatment and that was a cause or factor in the 
commission of a felony offense and, because of that severe mental disorder, represents a 
substantial danger of physical harm to others.  (Pen. Code, § 2962, subds. (a)-(e); People 
v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 99.)  Therefore, the dangers posed by an SVP and an 
MDO are different.  An SVP is civilly committed for treatment and confinement, in part, 
28 
because of the danger posed that he or she will likely engage in sexually violent criminal 
behavior in the future.  An MDO is civilly committed for treatment and confinement, in 
part, because of a substantial danger he or she will physically harm others in the future.  
Although both SVP‟s and MDO‟s have mental disorders, the dangers they pose (which 
provide the bases for their respective civil commitments) are different and therefore they 
are not similarly situated.”  
 
All that the above passage demonstrates is the incontrovertible point that SVP‟s 
and MDO‟s do not share identical characteristics.  But the identification of the above 
differences does not explain why one class should bear a substantially greater burden in 
obtaining release from commitment than the other.  
We conclude that MDO‟s and SVP‟s are similarly situated for our present 
purposes.  As was stated in In re Calhoun (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1315, in which the 
court struck down a policy that granted to SVP‟s a more restricted right to refuse 
antipsychotic medication medication than MDO‟s, both MDO‟s and SVP‟s “have been 
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to suffer from mental disorders that render them 
dangerous to others.  The dangerous finding requires only an assessment of future 
dangerousness.  It does not require proof of a recent overt act.  Both have been convicted 
of a serious or violent felony.  At the end of their prison terms, both have been civilly 
committed to the Department of Mental Health for treatment of their disorders.  
Furthermore, the purpose of the MDO Act and the SVPA is the same: to protect the 
public from dangerous felony offenders with mental disorders and to provide mental 
health treatment for their disorders.”  (Id. at pp. 1351-1352, accord People v. Buffington 
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156 (Buffington) [concluding that SVP‟s and MDO‟s are 
similarly situated because “they are currently suffering from a mental disorder that 
renders them dangerous”]; [People v. Gibson (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1425, 1436 [an 
MDO is similarly situated to other adult persons involuntarily committed because “[o]ne 
29 
purpose of all of these pertinent involuntary commitment schemes is the protection of the 
public from the dangerous mentally ill and their involuntary commitment for 
treatment”].)  We agree that these common features make SVP‟s and MDO‟s similarly 
situated.  Therefore, when the state makes the terms of commitment or recommitment 
substantially less favorable for one group than the other, the case law reviewed above 
teaches that it is required to give some justification for this differential treatment. 
In other terms, imposing on one group an indefinite commitment and the burden of 
proving they should not be committed, when the other group is subject to short-term 
commitment renewable only if the People prove periodically that continuing commitment 
is justified beyond a reasonable doubt, raises a substantial equal protection question that 
calls for some justification by the People.  As the United States Supreme Court has made 
clear, standards and burdens of proof represent societal determinations of who should 
bear the risk that a court‟s or jury‟s judgment will be in error.  (Addington, supra, 441 
U.S. at pp. 426-427.)  Standards and burdens of proof, like other due process protections 
afforded both criminal defendants and persons subject to involuntary commitment, also 
balance the individual‟s fundamental liberty interest in not being incarcerated or 
involuntarily confined with the state‟s compelling interest in protecting society from 
dangerous persons, in punishing criminal behavior in the case of criminal defendants, and 
in treating mental illness in the case of civil committees.  Because MDO‟s and SVP‟s 
have the same interest at stake — the loss of liberty through involuntary civil 
commitment — it must be the case that when society varies the standard and burden of 
proof for SVP‟s in the manner in which Proposition 83 did, it does so because of the 
belief that the risks involved with erroneously freeing SVP‟s from their commitment are 
30 
significantly greater than the risks involved with freeing MDO‟s.  (See Moye, supra, 22 
Cal.3d at pp. 465-467.)  A substantial question is raised about the basis for this belief.8 
The People argue that the state has a wide latitude in classifying different types of 
civil commitments, citing People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838, a criminal 
case.  There is no question that the determination of punishment for various offenses 
inherently involves value and policy determinations left to the Legislature, or to the 
people acting in a legislative capacity, and penal classifications will be upheld unless they 
are irrational.  (See People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1201.)  But as discussed 
above, the MDO and SVP Acts are not penal statutes.  The differentiation between 
MDO‟s and SVP‟s must be made with reference to the goals of the statutes, i.e. treatment 
of the mentally disordered or public protection.  Therefore, as discussed above, the 
Legislature may make reasonable distinctions between its civil commitment statutes 
based on a showing “that those who are reasonably determined to represent a greater 
danger may be treated differently from the general population.”  (Smith, supra, 42 Cal.4th 
at p. 1266.)  A prior adjudication of criminal conduct is a reasonable proxy for greater 
danger to the public and may therefore serve as a basis for treating civil committees 
subject to such an adjudication differently from the general class of individuals subject to 
                                              
8  
The concurring and dissenting opinion argues that because there is some overlap 
between the SVP Act and the MDO Act, and because the former was enacted after the 
latter, it follows that “sexually violent predators are a particularly dangerous subset of 
the broader group of persons who may be civilly committed under the MDO Act.”  
(Conc. & dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at p. 14, italics in original.)  But if the concurring and 
dissenting opinion means to suggest that SVP‟s are therefore more dangerous than 
persons committed under the MDO Act, that inference neither follows logically from the 
circumstances of overlap and later enactment, nor is it supported by authority or 
evidence.  Indeed, that inference is contrary to the fact that originally the terms under 
which MDO‟s and SVP‟s were committed were substantially similar.  (See Buffington, 
supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1156-1162.) 
31 
civil commitment.  (Ibid.; see also Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 171-173.)  This 
differential treatment may result at least initially in imposing a greater burden of proof in 
order to be released from involuntary commitment.  (Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 462-
463.)  Here, however, both SVP‟s and MDO‟s have suffered prior felony convictions, 
and both have been determined by mental health experts to suffer from mental disorders 
that make them a continuing danger.  Therefore, the reasons for differential treatment are 
not immediately obvious from the face of the two statutory schemes. 
 
The People also rely on a passage from Buffington that attempts to justify the fact 
that MDO‟s receive treatment while in prison while SVP‟s do not.  As that court stated: 
“Prisoners who suffer from conditions that may with treatment be kept in remission are 
the target of the MDO Act, whereas the SVPA covers prisoners whose conditions pose a 
risk of future sexually violent criminal behavior and who may never be completely 
treated.  (Pen. Code, § 2962; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6606, subd. (b).)  Given these 
contrasting backgrounds and expectations related to treatment, we cannot say the two 
groups are similarly situated in this respect for equal protection purposes.”  (Buffington, 
supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163.) People v. Hubbert (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1222, 
provides a somewhat more specific rendering of the above: “[T]he MDO law targets 
persons with severe mental disorders that may be kept in remission with treatment (Pen. 
Code, § 2962, subd. (a)), whereas the SVP [Act] targets persons with mental disorders 
that may never be successfully treated.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6606, subd. (b).)”  The 
People then argue that “[g]iven these „contrasting backgrounds and expectations related 
to treatment,‟ [SVP‟s and MDO‟s] are not similarly situated for purposes of how long 
they should be confined and treated.”   
 
The truth of this assertion is unclear from the face of the statutes in question.  The 
two statutes cited in Buffington and Hubbart are Penal Code section 2962 and Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 6606, subdivision (b).  Penal Code section 2962, 
32 
subdivision (a) states, in pertinent part that a prisoner may be classified as an MDO if he 
“has a severe mental disorder that is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission 
without treatment.  (Italics added.)  Welfare and Institutions Code section 6606, 
subdivision (b) provides: “Amenability to treatment is not required for a finding that any 
person is a person described in Section 6600, nor is it required for treatment of that 
person.  Treatment does not mean that the treatment be successful or potentially 
successful, nor does it mean that the person must recognize his or her problem and 
willingly participate in the treatment program.”   
 
In other words, Penal Code section 2962, subdivision (a) includes two classes of 
MDO‟s: those whose mental disorders are simply found to be not in remission, and those 
whose mental disorders are found to be in remission only due to treatment.  While the 
statute therefore contemplates that the latter class of MDO‟s will need and respond to 
treatment, it also includes in the former class those whose illnesses are not in remission 
and do not necessarily respond to treatment.  There is therefore little difference in this 
respect between MDO‟s and SVP‟s; section 6606, subdivision (b) envisions that some 
SVP‟s will, and some will not, respond to treatment. 
It is true that unlike the SVP commitment, an MDO commitment initially arises as 
a condition of parole and is only extended beyond parole if the individual‟s mental 
disorder is found not to be in remission.  (See Pen. Code, §§ 2962, 2970.)  This 
circumstance may arguably evince a legislative expectation that those initially classified 
as MDO‟s as a condition of parole may be more amenable to treatment than persons 
subject to SVP commitment immediately following a prison sentence.  But it is not 
evident that those who are committed as MDO‟s after their parole term has expired, who 
have not yet demonstrated an amenability to treatment and have been determined to pose 
a continuing danger as a result of a mental disorder, differ materially from SVP‟s in terms 
of danger to society and need for continuing commitment.   
33 
The Court of Appeal below, in concluding that SVP‟s are more of a danger than 
MDO‟s, relied upon the legislative findings to Proposition 83:  “As the California 
Supreme Court noted, the Act, on its original enactment, „narrowly target[ed] “a small 
but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable 
mental disorders [who] can be identified while they are incarcerated.” ‟  (Cooley v. 
Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 253.)  [¶]  Thereafter, on passage of Proposition 
83, the voters‟ information pamphlet for Proposition 83 noted: „Sex offenders have very 
high recidivism rates.  According to a 1998 report by the U.S. Department of Justice, sex 
offenders are the least likely to be cured and the most likely to reoffend, and they prey on 
the most innocent members of our society.  More than two-thirds of the victims of rape 
and sexual assault are under the age of 18.  Sex offenders have a dramatically higher 
recidivism rate for their crimes than any other type of violent felon.‟  (See Voters 
Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) text of Prop. 83, p. 127; Historical and Stat. 
Notes, 47C West‟s Ann. Pen. Code (2008) foll. § 209, p. 52.)” 
But these assertions, written into the findings of Proposition 83 by those who 
drafted the initiative, are not the same as facts, and an allusion to an uncited United States 
Department of Justice study does not make them so.9  When a constitutional right, such 
as the right to liberty from involuntary confinement, is at stake, the usual judicial 
deference to legislative findings gives way to an exercise of independent judgment of the 
                                              
9  
Our own research has been unable to locate a relevant 1998 United States 
Department of Justice study.  We have uncovered a 1997 study of sex offenders by the 
United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.  (Greenfeld, Bur. of 
Justice Statistics, Sex Offenses and Offenders: An Analysis of Data on Rape and Sexual 
Assault (Feb. 1997).)  It is unclear from an intitial reading of the report whether it 
supports the factual assertions about recidivism made by the Proposition 83 legislative 
findings.  (See also Langan & Levin, Bur. of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners 
Released in 1994 (2002).) 
34 
facts to ascertain whether the legislative body “has drawn reasonable inferences based on 
substantial evidence.”  (Professional Engineers v. Department of Transportation (1997) 
15 Cal. 4th 543, 569, citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1994) 512 U.S. 
622, 666 (lead opn. of Kennedy, J.); see also Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of 
Azusa (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 501, 514.)  Thus, for example, where a constitutional right to 
privacy is at issue, evidence introduced at trial may call into question legislative fact-
finding.  (American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 354-356)  
Therefore, the legislative findings recited in the ballot initiative do not by themselves 
justify the differential treatment of SVP‟s.  Nor do these findings reference any 
comparisons between SVP‟s and MDO‟s. 
 
Nor is it a response to McKee‟s equal protection challenge that the SVP 
commitment statute does not violate the due process clause, as discussed above.  Due 
process and equal protection protect different constitutional interests: due process affords 
individuals a baseline of substantive and procedural rights, whereas equal protection 
safeguards against the arbitrary denial of benefits to a certain defined class of individuals, 
even when the due process clause does not require that such benefits be offered.  (See, 
e.g., Califano v. Wescott (1979) 443 U.S. 76 [rule that welfare benefits may be granted to 
families with dependent children when the father becomes unemployed but not the 
mother violates equal protection].)  Here, as in Moye and related cases, when certain due 
process protections for those civilly committed are guaranteed by statute, even if not 
constitutionally required, the denial of those protections to one group must be reasonably 
justified in order to pass muster under the equal protection clause. 
 
McKee argues that NGI‟s and SVP‟s are also similarly situated and that a 
comparison of the two commitment regimes raises similar equal protection problems as 
discussed above.  His argument has merit.  NGI‟s as discussed are those who have 
committed criminal acts but have been civilly committed rather than criminally penalized 
35 
because of their severe mental disorder.  Under the current statutory scheme they may not 
be in civil custody longer than the maximum state prison term to which they could have 
been sentenced for the underlying offense (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (a); People v. 
Crosswhite (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 494) unless at the end of that period the district 
attorney extends the commitment for two years by proving in a jury trial beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the person presents a substantial danger of physical harm to others 
because of a mental disease, defect, or disorder.  (Pen. Code, § 1026.5, subd. (b)(1); 
People v. Hayne (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1226; People v. Superior Court (Blakely) 
60 Cal.App.4th 202, 216.)  We agree that, as with MDO‟s, the People have not yet 
carried their burden of justifying the differences between the SVP and NGI commitment 
statutes. 
 
We do not conclude that the People could not meet its burden of showing the 
differential treatment of SVP‟s is justified.  We merely conclude that it has not yet done 
so.  Because neither the People nor the courts below properly understood this burden, the 
People will have an opportunity to make the appropriate showing on remand.  In must be 
shown that, notwithstanding the similarities between SVP‟s and MDO‟s, the former as a 
class bear a substantially greater risk to society, and that therefore imposing on them a 
greater burden before they can be released from commitment is needed to protect society.  
This can be shown in a variety of ways.  For example, it may be demonstrated that 
inherent nature of the SVP‟s mental disorder makes recidivism as a class significantly 
more likely.  Or it may be that SVP‟s pose a greater risk to a particularly vulnerable class 
of victims, such as children.  Of course, this latter justification would not apply to SVP‟s 
36 
who have no history of victimizing children.  But in the present case, McKee‟s previous 
victims were children. 10  Or the People may produce some other justification. 
The concurring and dissenting opinion objects to any such remand, declaring that 
“whether society should treat sex crimes and their perpetrators differently than other 
crimes is a judgment call for society to make, not a „fact‟ for a judge to determine after an 
evidentiary hearing.”  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at p. 27.)  In support of its 
position it cites a criminal case, Powell v. Texas (1968) 392 U.S. 514, in which the 
United States Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the criminalization of 
public intoxication.  If we were considering a criminal statute and the legislative 
judgment about how to punish sex crimes, we would agree with the concurring and 
dissenting opinion.  But as discussed above, the SVP Act is not a penal statute, and 
distinctions in the terms of civil commitment statutes that substantially disfavor a 
particular group are to be made “on the basis of degree of danger presented.”  (Hofferber, 
supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 173.)  Nor does the fact that we have recognized that SVP‟s are 
“ „extremely dangerous‟ ” (Cooley v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 253) resolve 
the equal protection claim before us, as the concurring and dissenting opinion appears to 
conclude.  Here SVP‟s are being compared to other classes of persons subject to civil 
commitment who also are being committed because of the substantial danger they pose to 
society. 
                                              
10  
It is not entirely clear why SVP‟s who target children are more dangerous to 
society than MDO‟s or NGI‟s whose victims were children.  It may be the case that 
SVP‟s whose previous victims are children are more likely, because of the nature of their 
mental disorder, to target children in the future, whereas MDO‟s or NGI‟s who have 
committed violent acts against children are less likely to specifically target child victims 
if they reoffend.  This argument was not made below, and we have no way of knowing 
whether it has a factual basis.  
37 
 
We therefore remand this case to the trial court to determine whether the People, 
applying the equal protection principles articulated in Moye and related cases discussed in 
the present opinion, can demonstrate the constitutional justification for imposing on 
SVP‟s a greater burden than is imposed on MDO‟s and NGI‟s in order to obtain release 
from commitment.11  The trial court may, if appropriate, permit expert testimony.12 
                                              
11  
McKee also argues that equal protection is violated because he is treated 
differently from those committed under the LPS Act.  The LPS Act (§ 5000 et seq.) is 
California‟s general civil commitment statute and applies to those mentally incompetent 
individuals who are gravely disabled and/or represent a danger to themselves and others.  
(See Smith, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 1267-1268.)  Although some committed under the 
LPS Act have been found incompetent to stand trial on criminal charges (see § 5008, 
subd. (h)), they have not been definitively determined to have committed serious felonies, 
and in that respect differ from SVP‟s, MDO‟s, and NGI‟s.  As noted, “[i]ndividuals in 
prison with felony convictions have yet to demonstrate their capacity or willingness to 
keep their conduct within the bounds of the law and to break old criminal habits, and the 
Legislature could legitimately conclude that such felons who have prior sexually violent 
offenses represent a particular danger to society that justifies a separate system of civil 
commitment.”  (Smith, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1268.)  Because these SVP‟s, MDO‟s, and 
NGI‟s more closely resemble one another than they do those persons committed under 
the LPS Act, it is appropriate on remand to focus on these groups rather than on those 
persons committed under the LPS Act in assessing McKee‟s equal protection claim. 
 
In this connection, we note that the concurring and dissenting opinion goes to 
considerable length to demonstrate a point no one contests, no matter what the standard 
of review being applied — that SVP‟s may be validly subject to a different statutory 
scheme than those subject to the general civil commitment statute.  Indeed, the out-of-
state cases that the concurring and dissenting opinion cites for the most part merely 
support this unremarkable proposition.  (See Martin v. Reinstein (Ariz.Ct.App. 1999) 987 
P.2d 779, 796; Westerheide v. State (Fla. 2002) 831 So.2d 93, 111-112; In re Detention of 
Samuelson (Ill. 2000) 727 N.E.2d 228, 236-237; In re Detention of Williams (Iowa 2001) 
628 N.W.2d 447, 453-454; In re P.F. (N.D. 2008) 744 N.W.2d 724, 731-732; In re 
Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh (S.C. 2002) 568 S.E.2d 338, 351; In re Commitment 
of Petersen (Wn.Ct.App. 2000) 36 P.3d 1053, 1057; see also Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 
at p. 377 (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.).) 
 
The two out-of-state cases cited by the concurring and dissenting opinion that are 
remotely on point are readily distinguishable.  In State v. Post (Wis. 1995) 541 N.W.2d 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
38 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
115, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered an equal protection challenge to their SVP 
statute.  Among the challenges considered was that the terms of release from commitment 
were different from parallel terms in the general civil commitment statute.  (541 N.W.2d 
at p. 132.)  In addition to the fact that the court considered a comparison only between the 
SVP statute and the general commitment statute, the SVP statute under consideration was 
substantially different from the statute at issue here.  The Wisconsin statute provided that 
an SVP could “petition for supervised release every six months and must be released 
unless the state can show clear and convincing evidence that continued secure 
confinement is necessary.”  (541 N.W.2d at p. 132.)  
 
In In re Care and Treatment of Coffman (Mo. 2007) 225 S.W.3d 439 (in bank), 
the petitioner challenged Missouri‟s SVP act on equal protection grounds because other 
persons involuntarily civilly committed were not required to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the commitment should not continue.  (Id. at p. 445.)  The court 
concluded that “[b]ecause the basis for commitment of sexually violent predators is 
different from general civil commitments, there is no requirement that sexually violent 
predators be afforded exactly the same rights as persons committed under the general 
civil standard.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  But the equal protection challenge at issue in this 
case arises not from a comparison between SVP‟s and those subject to a general civil 
commitment statute, but between SVP‟s and two other groups of highly dangerous civil 
committees — MDO‟s and NGI‟s — and the differences between these groups in terms 
of danger to the public is not readily apparent. 
12  
We also note that Senate Bill No. 1128 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.), enacted in 
September 2006 as an urgency measure, shortly before the passage of Proposition 83, 
anticipated the indefinite commitment term for SVP‟s that was later included in that 
proposition. (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, §§ 55, 57; see Bourquez v. Superior Court (2007) 156 
Cal.App.4th 1275, 1280-1281.)  The People have not addressed whether the legislative 
history of that statute contains any justification for treating SVP‟s differently from 
MDO‟s and may do so on remand.  Although the concurring and dissenting opinion 
makes much of the fact that the Legislature enacted reforms shortly before the passage of 
Proposition 83 similar to those considered here, it cites no factual findings in the 
legislative history that explain the distinction between SVP‟s and MDO‟s or NGI‟s.  
 
We further note that the concurring and dissenting opinion‟s speculation that we 
are contemplating the use of “nonexpert testimony” on remand (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Chin, J., post, at p. 26) is unwarranted. 
39 
 
In remanding the case, we make clear that different classes of individuals civilly 
committed need not be treated identically.  In Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d 161, even as 
we affirmed that fundamental distinctions between classes of individuals subject to civil 
commitment are subject to strict scrutiny (id. at p. 171, fn. 8), we also acknowledged the 
government‟s legitimate capacity to make reasonable distinctions:  “The state has 
compelling interests in public safety and in humane treatment of the mentally disturbed.  
[Citations.]  It may adopt more than one procedure for isolating, treating, and restraining 
dangerous persons; and differences will be upheld if justified.  [Citations.]  Variation of 
the length and conditions of confinement, depending on degrees of danger reasonably 
perceived as to special classes of persons, is a valid exercise of state power.”  (Id. at pp. 
171-172, fn. omitted.)  Moreover, we have recognized “the importance of deferring to the 
legislative branch in an area which is analytically nuanced and dependent upon medical 
science.”  (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1156.)  But the government has not yet shown 
that the special treatment of SVP‟s is validly based on the degree of danger reasonably 
perceived as to that group, nor whether it arises from any medical or scientific evidence.  
On remand, the government will have an opportunity to justify Proposition 83‟s 
indefinite commitment provisions, at least as applied to McKee, and demonstrate that 
they are based on a reasonable perception of the unique dangers that SVP‟s pose rather 
than a special stigma that SVP‟s may bear in the eyes of California‟s electorate.13 
                                              
13  
Moreover, we strongly disagree with the concurring and dissenting opinion‟s 
characterization of our view as being “that every detail of every civil commitment 
program is subject to strict scrutiny.”  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at pp. 11-12.)  
Nor do we agree with the concurring and dissenting opinion inasmuch as it means to 
imply that the change from a short-term commitment, renewable only if the state carries 
its burden beyond a reasonable doubt, to an indefinite commitment in which the person 
committed has the burden of proof is merely an alteration of a minor detail of the 
commitment scheme. 
40 
 
Moreover, we emphasize that mere disagreement among experts will not suffice to 
overturn the Proposition 83 amendments.  The trial court must determine whether the 
legislative distinctions in classes of persons subject to civil commitment are reasonable 
and factually based— not whether they are incontrovertible or uncontroversial. The trial 
court is to determine not whether the statute is wise, but whether it is constitutional.14 
 
IV. 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and 
the cause is remanded with directions to remand to the trial court for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
                                              
14  
We also emphasize that our holding in the present case does not mean that statutes 
pertaining to sexual offenders in general must be subject to heightened scrutiny.  The 
lifetime registration requirements imposed by Penal Code section 290, for example, do 
not involve the loss of liberty.  (See Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 100;)  Such 
regulatory statutes not involving affirmative disability or restraint, are subject to rational 
basis review, and the Legislature will be given wide latitude to decide who should be 
subject to registration requirements.  (See People v. Monroe (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 
1205, 1215.) 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
In 2006, the Legislature and then, in an identical fashion, the electorate, reformed 
provisions of California‟s Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA, Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 6600 et seq.) concerning the procedures for releasing sexually violent predators from 
civil commitment and permitting them to rejoin society.1  The issue before us is whether 
these reforms are constitutional. 
The majority holds that the reforms do not violate defendant‟s ex post facto and 
due process rights.  I agree.  But, because the Legislature and electorate did not make 
similar changes to other civil commitment schemes, the majority also holds that an 
evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether the changes violate equal protection 
principles.  I disagree.  Consistent with the unanimous view of all seven panels in five 
Courts of Appeal that have considered this precise question in originally published 
opinions, and of all the decisions in other states that have rejected this or similar equal 
protection contentions, I would find no equal protection violation.  I would uphold the 
legislative and electoral reforms against all of the constitutional challenges of this case. 
The equal protection question comes down to this:  May society treat sexually 
violent predators — those who have committed and been convicted of sex crimes — 
                                              
1  
The majority opinion briefly acknowledges the Legislature‟s action (maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 38, fn. 12), but otherwise it discusses only what the electorate did and largely 
ignores the fact that the Legislature acted first. 
2 
differently from persons who did not commit sex crimes?  To ask the question should be 
to answer it.  As the United States Supreme Court and this court have recognized, 
sexually violent predators are different from other criminals; they are “particularly” 
(Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 364 (Hendricks)) or “ „extremely‟ ” (Cooley 
v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253) dangerous.  We do not need an evidentiary 
hearing to conclude that they present a unique danger to society that warrants specific 
remedies. 
A community may take action to protect its children and other vulnerable 
members from violent sex offenders, even if that action does not apply to persons subject 
to other civil commitment schemes.  The Legislature or electorate may, without running 
afoul of equal protection principles, address one societal problem even if it does not 
simultaneously address other problems.  Society has long treated sexual predators 
differently from others.  Good reason exists for this different treatment.  Sexual predators 
are different.  And their sexually predatory conduct has a uniquely traumatizing effect on 
their victims.  The Legislature or the electorate or, as here, both, may address the dangers 
that sexually violent predators pose separately from other societal problems, and craft 
remedies to protect society from their depravations that differ from remedies crafted for 
non-sex offenders. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A historical review is necessary to place this issue fully into context.   
“Historically, the states have exercised a power of involuntary civil commitment 
involving the care and treatment of dangerous mentally disordered individuals.”  
(Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1143 (Hubbart).)  “In recent years, 
lawmakers across the country have perceived a link between certain diagnosable mental 
disorders and violent sexual behavior that is criminal in nature.  Through passage of the 
SVPA, California is one of several states to hospitalize or otherwise attempt to treat 
3 
troubled sexual predators apart from any criminal sanctions they might receive, and apart 
from civil commitment schemes targeting other mental health problems.  (Kansas v. 
Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 380-389 (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.) [identifying 17 states 
with such statutes] (Hendricks).)”  (Hubbart, supra, at p. 1143, italics added.) 
One early statute dealing specifically with sexual predators is a Kansas law 
enacted in 1994 entitled, much like the California statute at issue here, the Sexually 
Violent Predator Act.  (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 et seq.)  In 1997, the United States 
Supreme Court considered — and rejected — a constitutional challenge (that did not 
include an equal protection challenge) to that law.  (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346.)  
The high court explained that the “Kansas Legislature enacted the Sexually Violent 
Predator Act . . . in 1994 to grapple with the problem of managing repeat sexual 
offenders.  Although Kansas already had a statute addressing the involuntary 
commitment of those defined as „mentally ill,‟ the legislature determined that existing 
civil commitment procedures were inadequate to confront the risks presented by ‘sexually 
violent predators.‟ ”  (Id. at pp. 350-351, fn. omitted, italics added.) 
The court quoted with approval the preamble to the Kansas law, where the Kansas 
Legislature explained that a “ „small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent 
predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate 
for involuntary treatment pursuant to the [general involuntary civil commitment 
statute] . . . .  In contrast to persons appropriate for civil commitment under the [general 
involuntary commitment statute], sexually violent predators generally have anti-social 
personality features which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities 
and those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior.  The 
legislature further finds that sexually violent predators‟ likelihood of engaging in repeat 
acts of predatory sexual violence is high.  The existing involuntary commitment 
procedure . . . is inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent predators pose to 
4 
society.  The legislature further finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually violent 
predators in a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of this population are very long 
term and the treatment modalities for this population are very different than the 
traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the [general 
involuntary civil commitment statute].‟ ”  (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 351, italics 
added.) 
The Kansas statute defined a “sexually violent predator” as “ „any person who has 
been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in 
the predatory acts of sexual violence.‟ ”  (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 352.)  Under 
that law, a person could be civilly committed as a sexually violent predator only after 
prescribed procedures were followed, including “a trial [that] would be held to determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt whether the individual was a sexually violent predator.”  (Id. 
at p. 353.)  After that determination was made, “[c]onfined persons were afforded three 
different avenues of review:  First, the committing court was obligated to conduct an 
annual review to determine whether continued detention was warranted.  [Citation.]  
Second, the Secretary [of Social and Rehabilitation Services] was permitted, at any time, 
to decide that the confined individual‟s condition had so changed that release was 
appropriate, and could then authorize the person to petition for release.  [Citation.]  
Finally, even without the Secretary‟s permission, the confined person could at any time 
file a release petition.  [Citation.]  If the court found that the State could no longer satisfy 
its burden under the initial commitment standard, the individual would be freed from 
confinement.”  (Ibid.) 
In upholding the Kansas law, the high court found that “the Kansas Legislature has 
taken great care to confine only a narrow class of particularly dangerous 
individuals . . . .”  (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 364, italics added.)  It recognized 
5 
“that psychiatric professionals are not in complete harmony in casting pedophilia, or 
paraphilias in general, as „mental illnesses.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 360, fn. 3.)  Reiterating what it 
had said in an earlier case, however, the court stated that “[t]hese disagreements . . . do 
not tie the State‟s hands in setting the bounds of its civil commitment laws.  In fact, it is 
precisely where such disagreement exists that legislatures have been afforded the widest 
latitude in drafting such statutes.”  (Ibid., citing Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 
354, 365, fn. 13.)  The court added that “when a legislature „undertakes to act in areas 
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially 
broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.‟ ”  (Hendricks, supra, at p. 
360, fn. 3, quoting Jones v. United States, supra, at p. 370.) 
Justice Breyer, speaking for four members of the court, dissented in Hendricks, 
but only on the ex post facto point.  (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 373-374 (dis. opn. 
of Breyer, J.)  Speaking for three members of the court, Justice Breyer expressly agreed 
that, other than the ex post facto concern, the Kansas act was constitutional.  (Id. at pp. 
374-378.)2  He noted that the “Constitution does not require Kansas to write all of its 
civil commitment rules in a single statute or forbid it to write two separate statutes each 
covering somewhat different classes of committable individuals.”  (Id. at p. 377.) 
California‟s SVPA was enacted a year after Kansas‟s, and took effect January 1, 
1996.  (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 3.)  In many respects, California‟s SVPA is similar to the 
Kansas act.  (See Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1153.)  As originally written, the 
SVPA required that, to qualify as a sexually violent predator, a person had to have been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims.  (See Hubbart, 
                                              
2  
Justice Ginsburg joined the dissent on the ex post facto point and expressed no 
opinion regarding the other issues.  Thus, “at least eight justices found no basis on which 
to conclude that the act violated Hendricks‟s due process rights.”  (Hubbart, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at p. 1155, fn. 22.) 
6 
supra, at p. 1144, fn. 6.)  Today, only one victim is required.  Accordingly, the SVPA 
today defines a “ „sexually violent predator‟ ” as “a person who has been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental 
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is 
likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”  (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1).)  This definition is similar to that of the Kansas law reviewed 
in Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, except that California requires the person to have 
been convicted of, and not merely charged with, the sexually violent offense.  Under the 
original SVPA, and still today, a person can be confined as a sexually violent predator 
only after a jury trial (if either party requests a jury) where the state has the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the person is, in fact, a sexually violent predator.  
(See Hubbart, supra, at p. 1147.)  Any civil commitment as a sexually violent predator 
was for a two-year period and could be extended for additional two-year periods only if 
the state filed a new petition for extended commitment and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt at another jury trial (if requested) that the person remained a sexually violent 
predator.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 3-4.) 
The California SVPA was accompanied by legislative findings similar to those 
stated in the preamble to the Kansas law.  (See Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1153.)  In 
an uncodified statement, the California Legislature found and declared “that a small but 
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental 
disorders . . . are not safe to be at large and if released represent a danger to the health 
and safety of others in that they are likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.”  (Stats. 
1995, ch. 763, § 1; quoted in full in Hubbart, supra, at p. 1144, fn. 5.) 
In Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1138, this court upheld the SVPA‟s constitutionality 
against a broad-based attack, including an equal protection challenge.  We relied heavily 
on Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, and explained that equal protection and due process 
7 
analysis regarding the SVPA is the same under both the United States and the California 
Constitutions.  (Hubbart, supra, at p. 1152, fn. 19.)  We noted that “Hendricks 
emphasized the importance of deferring to the legislative branch in an area which is 
analytically nuanced and dependent upon medical science.”  (Id. at p. 1156.)  We also 
explained that the “SVPA is narrowly focused on a select group of violent criminal 
offenders who commit particular forms of predatory sex acts against both adults and 
children . . . .  The problem targeted by the [SVPA] is acute, and the state interests — 
protection of the public and mental health treatment — are compelling.”  (Id. at p. 1153, 
fn. 20.) 
The year 2006 saw the enactment of a number of reforms in the law‟s treatment of 
sexual predators.  “On September 20, 2006, the Governor signed the Sex Offender 
Punishment, Control, and Containment Act of 2006, Senate Bill No. 1128 (2005-2006 
Reg. Sess.)  (Senate Bill 1128).  (Stats. 2006, ch. 337.)  Senate Bill 1128 was urgency 
legislation that went into effect immediately.  (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 62.)  Among other 
things, it amended provisions of the SVPA to provide the initial commitment set forth in 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6604 was for an indeterminate term.  (Stats. 2006, 
ch. 337, § 55.)  All references to an extended commitment in sections 6604 and 6604.1 of 
the Welfare and Institutions Code were deleted.  (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, §§ 55, 56.)”  
(Bourquez v. Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1280-1281.)  In an uncodified 
statement, the California Legislature found and declared that “[t]he primary public policy 
goal of managing sex offenders in the community is the prevention of future 
victimization,” and that the Legislature enacted the legislation “[i]n order to accomplish 
these goals . . . .”  (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 2(a), (d).)  The bill passed by a 40-0 vote in the 
Senate and a 75-0 vote in the Assembly.  (Sen. J. (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) pp. 5554-5555; 
Assem. J. (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) pp. 7324-7325.) 
8 
The majority correctly explains that “[o]n November 7, 2006, California voters 
passed Proposition 83, entitled „The Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: 
Jessica‟s Law‟ amending the [SVPA] effective November 8, 2006.  Proposition 83 is a 
wide-ranging initiative that seeks to address the problems posed by sex offenders.  It 
increases penalties for sex offenses, both by altering the definition of some sex offenses 
and by providing longer penalties for some offenses as well as modifying probation and 
parole provisions:  it requires a GPS tracking device for felons subject to such registration 
for the remainder of their lives; it prohibits a registered sex offender from living within 
2,000 feet of schools and parks; and it changes the [SVPA] by reducing the number of 
sexually violent offenses that qualify an offender for [sexually violent predator] status 
from two to one.  (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) analysis by 
the Legislative Analyst of Prop. 83, pp. 43-44.)”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.) 
Proposition 83 also “ „requires that [sexually violent predators] be committed by 
the court to a state mental hospital for an undetermined period of time rather than the 
renewable two-year commitment provided for under existing law.‟  (Voter Information 
Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) analysis of Prop. 83 by Legis. Analyst, p. 44.)”  
(Bourquez v. Superior Court, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1281.)  As relevant to the 
issues before us, Proposition 83 enacted the same reforms as had the Legislature the 
previous September.  (Bourquez v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 1281-1282; People v. 
Shields (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 559, 562-563.) 
Proposition 83‟s findings include the following: “The People find and declare each 
of the following:  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  (b)  Sex offenders have very high recidivism rates.  
According to a 1998 report by the U.S. Department of Justice, sex offenders are the least 
likely to be cured and the most likely to reoffend, and they prey on the most innocent 
members of our society.  More than two-thirds of the victims of rape and sexual assault 
are under the age of 18.  Sex offenders have a dramatically higher recidivism rate for 
9 
their crimes than any other type of violent felon.  [¶] . . .  [¶] (k)  California is the only 
state, of the number of states that have enacted laws allowing involuntary civil 
commitments for persons identified as sexually violent predators, which does not provide 
for indeterminate commitments.  California automatically allows for a jury trial every 
two years irrespective of whether there is any evidence to suggest or prove that the 
committed person is no longer a sexually violent predator.  As such, this act allows 
California to protect the civil rights of those persons committed as a sexually violent 
predator while at the same time protect society and the system from unnecessary or 
frivolous jury trial actions where there is no competent evidence to suggest a change in 
the committed person.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) text of Prop. 
83, § 2, p. 127; see Historical & Statutory Notes, 47C West‟s Ann. Pen. Code (2008) foll. 
§ 209, pp. 52-53.) 
Proposition 83‟s intent clause provides as relevant:  “It is the intent of the People 
of the State of California in enacting this measure to strengthen and improve the laws that 
punish and control sexual offenders.”  (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, text 
of Prop. 83, § 31, p. 138; see Historical & Statutory Notes, 47C West‟s Ann. Pen. Code, 
supra, foll. § 209, p. 53.) 
Proposition 83 was approved by a 70.5 percent majority of the voters casting votes 
on the proposition.  (See Cal. Sect. of State, Votes for and Against November 7, 2006 
Statewide Ballot Measures  [as of Jan. 28, 2010].) 
As relevant here, the majority accurately summarizes the substance of the 2006 
reforms:  “In short, under Proposition 83 [and also under the Sex Offender Punishment, 
Control, and Containment Act of 2006], an individual [sexually violent predator‟s] 
commitment term is indeterminate, rather than for a two-year term as in the previous 
version of the [SVPA].  [A sexually violent predator] can only be released conditionally 
or unconditionally if the [Department of Mental Health] authorizes a petition for release 
10 
and the state does not oppose it or fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
individual still meets the definition of [a sexually violent predator], or if the individual, 
petitioning the court on his own, is able to bear the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he is no longer [a sexually violent predator].  In other words, the 
method of petitioning the court for release and proving fitness to be released, which 
under the former Act had been the way [a sexually violent predator] could cut short his 
two-year commitment, now becomes the only means of being released from an indefinite 
commitment when the [Department of Mental Health] does not support release.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 7.) 
Two recent Court of Appeal opinions have held that the 2006 reforms apply to 
sexually violent predators who were already civilly committed under the SVPA.  
(Bourquez v. Superior Court, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 1275; People v. Shields, supra, 155 
Cal.App.4th 559.)  But various sexually violent predators, including defendant Richard 
McKee, who was convicted in 1991 of committing lewd acts against an 11-year-old 
babysitter and in 1998 of committing lewd acts against his eight-year-old niece, have 
challenged the reforms‟ constitutional validity.  In an opinion originally certified for 
publication, the Court of Appeal in this case upheld the reforms against defendant‟s 
challenges, including an equal protection challenge.  We granted review.  Since then, six 
other unanimous Court of Appeal opinions, representing five of California‟s six appellate 
districts, have upheld the reforms against all challenges, including equal protection.  We 
have granted review in each case and are holding each pending resolution of this case.  
(People v. Johnson, S164388, review granted Aug. 13, 2008; People v. Riffey, S164711, 
review granted Aug. 20, 2008; People v. Boyle, S166167, review granted Oct. 1, 2008; 
People v. Garcia, S166682, review granted Oct. 16, 2008; People v. Johndrow, S175337, 
review granted Sept. 17, 2009; People v. Rotroff, S178455, review granted Jan. 13, 
2010.)  Although our grants of review effectively depublished these opinions (Cal. Rules 
11 
of Court, rule 8.1105(e)(1)), we may judicially notice our own records.  (Evid. Code, 
§§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)  These records show that each of the seven Court of Appeal 
panels that have decided this issue found that sexually violent predators subject to the 
SVPA are not situated similarly to persons subject to other civil commitment programs 
for purposes of the 2006 reforms.  
Thus, seven originally published Court of Appeal opinions rejected constitutional 
challenges to the 2006 reforms, including the equal protection challenge at issue here.  
Until today, no court has reached a contrary result. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Although the majority upholds the 2006 reforms against due process and ex post 
facto challenges, it finds they potentially violate equal protection principles.  I disagree.  
The reforms are constitutional in all respects. 
I will discuss (1) whether the law must treat sexually violent predators the same as 
others in deciding when to release them into society; (2) the majority‟s apparent view that 
every detail of every civil commitment program is subject to strict scrutiny (see maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 21, 39); (3) out-of-state cases which, as will be seen, unanimously reject 
this or closely similar equal protection contentions; and (4) the evidentiary hearing the 
majority has mandated. 
A.  Equal Protection 
“ „ “The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the 
proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the 
law receive like treatment.” ‟  [Citation.]  „The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim 
under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification 
that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.‟  [Citations.]  
This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but 
12 
„whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.‟  [Citation.]”  
(Cooley v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 253.) 
An express purpose of the SVPA in general, and the 2006 reforms specifically, is 
to protect society from sexually violent predators.  This is certainly a legitimate purpose.  
“The problem targeted by the [SVPA] is acute, and the state interests — protection of the 
public and mental health treatment — are compelling.”  (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 
1153, fn. 20.)  The question before us is whether sexually violent predators are situated 
similarly regarding this legitimate purpose to persons who are not sexually violent 
predators. 
The majority finds that sexually violent predators are similarly situated for these 
purposes to persons civilly committed under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act 
(MDO Act) (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.) and that, because the 2006 reforms did not extend 
to the MDO Act, those reforms potentially violate equal protection.3  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 28.)  It orders the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to “determine whether 
the legislative distinctions in classes of persons subject to civil commitment are 
reasonable and factually based . . . .”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 40.)  If the court on remand 
finds that the distinction in classes, i.e., the distinction between sexually violent predators 
subject to civil commitment and others subject to civil commitment, is not reasonable and 
factually based, the court presumably is to declare the Sex Offender Punishment, Control, 
and Containment Act of 2006 and Proposition 83 unconstitutional.  I disagree.  Society 
can reasonably determine that sexually violent predators present an acute danger that 
                                              
3  
Defendant and the majority also discuss to some extent other civil commitment 
programs such as those for persons found not guilty of a crime due to insanity.  Because 
these programs are even farther removed from the SVPA than the MDO Act, and the 
majority concentrates on the MDO Act, I will not discuss the other civil commitment 
programs.  What I say about the MDO Act applies even more strongly to other programs. 
13 
situates them differently than nonsex offenders.  As it relates to the 2006 reforms, they 
are situated differently for purposes of the procedures whereby they are released into 
society. 
The MDO Act, enacted in 1985 (People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 97), 
provides for the civil commitment of mentally disordered offenders who were convicted 
of one or more of a wide range of crimes.  Some of the eligible crimes are sexual 
offenses, but most are not.  (Pen. Code, § 2962, subd. (e)(2).)  For example, one of the 
eligible crimes is “[a] crime in which the perpetrator expressly or impliedly threatened 
another with the use of force or violence likely to produce substantial physical harm in 
such a manner that a reasonable person would believe and expect that the force or 
violence would be used.  For purposes of this subparagraph, substantial physical harm 
shall not require proof that the threatened act was likely to cause great or serious bodily 
injury.”  (Pen. Code, § 2962, subd. (e)(2)(Q).) 
The MDO Act is thus very broad and includes in its coverage a wide range of 
violent offenders.  It is California‟s general involuntary civil commitment program for 
mentally disordered offenders.  “In contrast, the SVPA,” enacted a decade after the MDO 
Act, “narrowly targets „a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent 
predators that have diagnosable mental disorders [who] can be identified while they are 
incarcerated.‟  (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1, p. 5921.”  (Cooley v. Superior Court, supra, 29 
Cal.4th at p. 253.)  Thus, sexually violent predators are a particularly dangerous subset 
of the broader group of persons who may be civilly committed under the MDO Act.  The 
Legislature and electorate, or both, may validly enact specific provisions concerning this 
particularly dangerous subset that do not apply to the broader range of persons subject to 
the MDO Act.  Specifically, the Legislature and the electorate may enact rules for 
releasing sexually violent predators into society that are different than the rules that apply 
to the general civil commitment program. 
14 
The majority cites virtually no authority addressing the question actually before 
us — whether society may treat sex offenders differently, and less favorably, than nonsex 
offenders.  It relies almost exclusively on general authority that, as relevant here, merely 
stands for the obvious proposition that civil commitment programs are subject to equal 
protection principles.4  In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, for example, involved the 
opposite situation from this case:  treating nonsex offenders less favorably than sex 
offenders.  (Id. at p. 466.)  I will focus, instead, on the specific issue presented. 
Society — speaking usually through its elected representatives and sometimes 
directly or, as here, both — has long considered sex offenders different from others and 
has long prescribed specific remedies for the specific problem they present.  For example, 
many lifetime registration requirements apply to sex offenders that do not apply to other 
offenders.  (Pen. Code, § 290.)  Failure of a sex offender to obey these registration 
requirements can have serious consequences.  As the majority opinion recognizes, 
Proposition 83 itself “is a wide-ranging initiative that seeks to address the problems 
posed by sex offenders.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.)  It requires GPS tracking of sex 
offenders and prohibits them from living within 2,000 feet of schools and parks.  These 
requirements do not apply to nonsex offenders.  All of these requirements are reasonably 
based on the perception that sex offenders are particularly dangerous.  None of them 
violate equal protection. 
                                              
4  
The majority cites only one case finding an equal protection violation that actually 
involves treating sexually violent predators less favorably than others.  (In re Calhoun 
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1315; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 28)  Calhoun found an equal 
protection violation in permitting persons committed under the MDO Act, but not 
sexually violent predators committed under the SVPA, to refuse antipsychotic 
medication.  (In re Calhoun, supra, at pp. 1350-1351.)  I need not consider whether 
Calhoun was correct in this regard because it hardly applies here.  The exact criteria for 
medicating mentally disordered offenders is an entirely different matter from the 
procedures adopted for releasing them into society. 
15 
The 2006 reforms were limited to addressing the danger that sex offenders pose.  
They do not address other societal problems, such as those posed by mentally disordered 
offenders governed by the MDO Act.  But that circumstance does not make the reforms 
unconstitutional.  Addressing some societal problems but not others in a single piece of 
legislation does not violate equal protection.  “[B]oth the United States Supreme Court 
and this court have recognized the propriety of a legislature‟s [or, presumably, the 
electorate‟s] taking reform „ “one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the 
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” ‟  [Citation.]  „[A] legislature 
need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme simply because it failed, 
through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been 
attacked.‟ [Citation.]”  (Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 488.)  Society 
reasonably believes that sex offenders pose a particularly “acute” problem.  (Hubbart, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1153, fn. 20.)  It can validly address that problem without 
attempting at the same time to address all other problems. 
Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, the high court decision that upheld Kansas‟s 
Sexually Violent Predator Act, did not specifically address an equal protection challenge.  
But that does not make the decision irrelevant.  Rather, Hendricks is instructive.  The 
high court noted that the Kansas Legislature had enacted its act “to grapple with the 
problem of managing repeat sexual offenders” and had determined that existing civil 
commitment programs were inadequate to confront that problem.  (Hendricks, supra, at 
pp. 350-351.)  It also noted that “the Kansas Legislature has taken great care to confine 
only a narrow class of particularly dangerous individuals . . . .”  (Id. at p. 364.)  In the 
portion of his separate opinion agreeing with the majority, Justice Breyer added that 
“[t]he Constitution does not require Kansas [or presumably California] to write all of its 
civil commitment rules in a single statute or forbid it to write two separate statutes each 
covering somewhat different classes of committable individuals.”  (Id. at p. 377 (dis. opn. 
16 
of Breyer, J.).)  It should be obvious that if a state enacts a new civil commitment 
program to deal specifically with sexual offenders because the existing civil commitment 
programs are inadequate to do so, then the new program will not be identical to the 
existing programs.  Creating a new program identical to an existing inadequate program 
would accomplish nothing.  Rather, the new program will necessarily be different and, in 
some respects at least, less favorable to sexual offenders than the existing programs.  So 
was the case in Kansas; so is the case in California. 
In short, the SVPA seeks to protect the public from sexually violent predators.  
This purpose is entirely legitimate.  Regarding this legitimate purpose, those predators are 
situated differently from others.  The Legislature and the electorate may prescribe rules 
for their release into society that are different from the rules that apply to California‟s 
general, much broader, civil commitment program. 
B.  Strict Scrutiny 
I question whether the 2006 reforms are subject to strict scrutiny rather than 
review under the more deferential rational basis test.  (See generally People v. Wilkinson 
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836-838.)  I recognize that “this court has traditionally subjected 
involuntary civil commitment statutes to the most rigorous form of constitutional 
review . . . .”  (Hubbart v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1153, fn. 20.)  But this 
court has never considered, in an adversarial setting, whether every detail of involuntary 
civil commitment procedures should be subjected to strict scrutiny. 
The belief that strict scrutiny adheres to commitment proceedings like the SVPA 
can be traced to In re Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at page 465, which in turn cited People v. 
Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 251.  Olivas involved commitment of juveniles to the 
California Youth Authority, so it is not on point.  But it invoked strict scrutiny because 
“personal liberty,” a “fundamental interest,” was at stake.  (Olivas, supra, at p. 251.)  
Moye cited Olivas and said that strict scrutiny applies “[b]ecause petitioner‟s personal 
17 
liberty is at stake.”  (Moye, supra, at p. 465.)  In Moye, the People had conceded that 
strict scrutiny applied.  (Ibid.)  Because of this concession, this court has never really 
grappled with the question.  Here, the Attorney General argues that strict scrutiny does 
not apply, and that the rational basis test should apply.  He makes a strong case. 
Recently, in People v. Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th 821, we rejected the notion 
that strict scrutiny applies whenever a statutory classification would subject a person to a 
greater period of incarceration.  (Id. at pp. 837-838.)  Wilkinson was a criminal case and 
involved a criminal classification.  This case involves civil commitments.  Nevertheless, 
Wilkinson teaches that we cannot simply say that a classification is subject to strict 
scrutiny merely because it touches on personal liberty.  A person may have a fundamental 
interest in his or her liberty, but I question whether this fundamental interest extends to 
all procedures whereby decisions involving personal liberty are made.  As I will show in 
part II. C., post, courts from other states that have considered the question have 
overwhelmingly concluded that strict scrutiny does not apply to equal protection 
challenges to civil commitment programs. 
Sexually violent predators are certainly not a suspect class.  Additionally, I 
question whether a person has a fundamental interest in any particular burden or standard 
of proof leading to a possible finding that he no longer qualifies as a sexually violent 
predator.  Penal classifications that can lead to greatly enhanced prison sentences are 
subject to the rational basis test.  (People v. Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 838.)  
Similarly, a strong argument exists that matters regarding the burden and standard of 
proof in deciding whether a person is no longer a sexually violent predator should be 
governed by the rational basis test.  To say that a person has a fundamental interest in a 
particular burden or standard of proof trivializes the concept of what is fundamental. 
The majority notes that the imposition of lifetime registration requirements on sex 
offenders, but not others, is subject to rational basis review.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 40, fn. 
18 
14.)  But, because the stigma attached to the requirements may be great and the penal 
consequences of failure to register immense, the registration requirements can have a far 
greater impact on a sex offender‟s life than the exact procedures of a civil commitment 
program.  To say that the former is subject to rational basis review but the latter to strict 
scrutiny seems contrived at best.  
Ultimately, we do not have to decide the exact test that applies here, because, as I 
have explained, sexually violent predators are not situated similarly to other offenders for 
equal protection purposes.  Moreover, the high court has not yet expressly decided the 
point.  (See Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 318-319.)  If and when it does so, this 
court will presumably follow its lead, as we have stated that equal protection analysis in 
this regard is the same under both the United States and California Constitutions.  
(Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1152, fn. 19.) 
C.  Cases from Other States 
Every case outside of California of which I am aware (neither defendant nor the 
majority cite any to the contrary) that has considered this or a closely similar equal 
protection contention has found no violation in treating civilly committed sex offenders 
less favorably than persons committed under other civil commitment programs.  I discuss 
some of the cases in alphabetical order by state. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the argument that strict scrutiny applies to 
an equal protection challenge to Arizona‟s version of the SVPA despite the fact that 
personal liberty is involved:  “We conclude that the rational basis test applies.  Petitioners 
have viewed too expansively the interest at stake. . . .  [T]hey have not pointed us to, and 
we have not found, a fundamental right to have particular procedures apply.  The courts 
that have analyzed equal protection challenges based upon the application of differing 
sets of rules have applied the rational basis test, even in cases such as this one, where 
liberty may ultimately be at stake.  [Citations.]”  (Martin v. Reinstein (Ariz. Ct. App. 
19 
1999) 987 P.2d 779, 796.)  The court also rejected an equal protection challenge to the 
Arizona act‟s treating sex offenders differently from those committed under Arizona‟s 
general civil commitment statutes.  Noting that the Arizona “legislature has found that 
members of Petitioners‟ class [i.e., sex offenders] tend to repeat their criminal acts and 
pose a higher risk of danger to the public than do other classes of mentally ill or mentally 
disabled persons,” the court held “that it was not irrational or unreasonable for the 
legislature to create a different classification for Petitioners.”  (Id. at p. 797.) 
The Florida Supreme Court also rejected the argument that strict scrutiny applies 
to an equal protection challenge to the Ryce Act, Florida‟s version of the SVPA, despite 
the fact that personal liberty is involved:  “[Petitioner] contends that his fundamental 
right to liberty is at issue here and, thus, strict scrutiny is the proper standard by which 
the statute should be measured.  However, we conclude that [petitioner] mischaracterizes 
the nature of his equal protection claim.  Even though [petitioner‟s] liberty may 
ultimately be at stake, his claim challenges the Legislature‟s decision to create a special 
classification for sexually violent predators and to apply special procedures to such 
involuntary civil commitments.  Thus, we conclude that [petitioner‟s] equal protection 
claim should be evaluated under the rational basis test.”  (Westerheide v. State (Fla. 2002) 
831 So.2d 93, 111, citing Martin v. Reinstein, supra, 987 P.2d at pp. 795-798.) 
The Florida Supreme Court also rejected an equal protection challenge to the Ryce 
Act‟s treating sex offenders differently from those subject to the Baker Act, another civil 
commitment program.  “The Ryce Act serves the dual state interests of providing mental 
health treatment to sexually violent predators and protecting the public from these 
individuals.  Further, the act applies equally to all members of the statutory class of 
‘sexually violent predators.‟  [Petitioner‟s] equal protection argument rests on the false 
premise that individuals subject to commitment under the Ryce Act are similarly situated 
to mentally ill persons committed under the Baker Act.  The Legislature has clearly stated 
20 
the reasons for distinguishing sexually violent predators from other mentally ill persons.”  
(Westerheide v. State, supra, 831 So.2d at p. 112, italics added.)  After citing legislative 
findings comparable to those concerning California‟s SVPA, the court “conclude[d] that 
the specialized treatment needs of sexually violent predators and the high risk that they 
pose to the public if not committed for long-term control, care, and treatment justify the 
Legislature‟s separate classification and treatment scheme.  Thus, we find no equal 
protection violation . . . .”  (Ibid.) 
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois equivalent of California‟s SVPA 
“is subject to the rational basis test. . . .  The statutory classifications assailed by 
defendant are not based on race, national origin, sex or illegitimacy, nor do they implicate 
fundamental rights.”  (In re Detention of Samuelson (Ill. 2000) 727 N.E.2d 228, 236.)  It 
also rejected an equal protection challenge to Illinois‟s treating sex offenders differently 
than those subject to commitment under a broader civil commitment act.  It held that 
those who qualify as sexually violent persons “present different societal problems than 
those whose conduct is subject to the larger, more inclusive class as defined by” the 
broader civil commitment act.  (Id. at p. 237.)  “Accordingly, we cannot say that the 
classification formulated by the legislature is unreasonable.”  (Ibid.) 
The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the argument that strict scrutiny applies to an 
equal protection challenge to Iowa‟s version of the SVPA, despite the fact that personal 
liberty is involved:  “As the Arizona Court of Appeals recently observed, governmental 
classifications of the mentally ill have historically been analyzed under the rational basis 
test even when individual liberty was at stake.”  (In re Detention of Williams (Iowa 2001) 
628 N.W.2d 447, 453, citing Martin v. Reinstein, supra, 987 P.2d at p. 796.)  It also 
rejected an equal protection challenge to Iowa‟s treating sex offenders differently from 
those subject to commitment under other laws.  “The legislation under review plainly 
states the reasons for distinguishing between mentally ill sex offenders and other 
21 
mentally ill persons.”  (Williams, supra, at p. 453.)  After citing legislative findings 
comparable to those concerning California‟s SVPA, the court concluded that the 
distinction between sexually violent predators and those committed under another 
provision “dictates different treatment, both in method and duration.  As this court noted 
in [another case], „[t]he particularly devastating effects of sexual crimes on victims, and 
the offenders‟ need for specialized treatment provide a rational basis for the 
classification.‟  [Citation.]  So also here, the specialized treatment needs of [sexually 
violent predators], when compared to others who suffer from different mental 
abnormalities, justify the different classification and treatment chosen by the legislature.”  
(Id. at p. 454.) 
The Missouri Supreme Court was one of the few to subject a law comparable to 
the SVPA “to strict scrutiny because it affects the fundamental right of liberty.”  (In re 
Care and Treatment of Coffman (Mo. 2007) 225 S.W.3d 439, 445.)  Nevertheless, the 
court rejected an equal protection challenge similar to the one here.  In that case, the 
petitioner, who had already been determined to be a sexually violent predator, sought to 
be released from civil commitment.  Under the Missouri law, in order to obtain a jury 
trial, he had to either (1) receive authorization from the director of the department of 
mental health, or (2) show by a preponderance of the evidence that he should be released.  
(Id. at p. 443.)  The petitioner argued “that the requirement that he demonstrate his 
entitlement to release by a preponderance of the evidence violates equal protection 
because „[n]o other person involuntarily civilly committed must make a preliminary 
showing to a trial court of facts “warranting” a second trial[.]‟ ”  (Id. at p. 445.)  The 
court disagreed.  “This argument ignores the fact that persons who are committed as 
sexually violent predators are committed because they are „distinctively dangerous‟ to 
society.  [Citation.]  Because the basis for commitment of sexually violent predators is 
different from general civil commitments, there is no requirement that sexually violent 
22 
predators be afforded exactly the same rights as persons committed under the general 
civil standard.  [Citation.]  The requirement that a sexually violent predator demonstrate 
his initial right to release by a preponderance of the evidence is narrowly tailored to the 
state‟s interest in keeping people committed if it is more likely than not that they will 
commit sexually violent crimes if released.  The . . . statute does not violate the equal 
protection clause.”  (Ibid.) 
The North Dakota Supreme Court did not decide what level of scrutiny North 
Dakota‟s equivalent of the SVPA should receive because the North Dakota law “survives 
[the] equal protection challenge under even the highest level of scrutiny.”  (In re P.F. 
(N.D. 2008) 744 N.W.2d 724, 731.)  “There are important differences between those 
committed because the court has determined they are sexually dangerous and those 
committed because of mental illness or chemical dependency.”  (Id. at pp. 731-732.)  
“The potential level of danger these two groups pose to society is different.  Sexually 
dangerous individuals are distinctively dangerous due to the high probability that they 
will commit further acts of sexually predatory conduct if not confined in a secure 
facility.”  (Id. at p. 732.)  “The State has a compelling interest in protecting the public, 
and that interest justifies treating sexually dangerous individuals differently.”  (Ibid.)  
“The heightened risk sexually dangerous individuals pose and the State‟s compelling 
interest in protecting the public justify the classification and differences in the treatment 
of sexually dangerous individuals, and the distinct procedures and safeguards further the 
State‟s interest in protecting the public.”  (Id. at p. 733.)    Accordingly, the court found 
no equal protection violation in treating sexually dangerous persons differently than 
others.  (Ibid.) 
The South Carolina Supreme Court applied the rational basis test to an equal 
protection challenge to South Carolina‟s equivalent of the SVPA.  (In re Treatment and 
Care of Luckabaugh (S.C. 2002) 568 S.E.2d 338, 351.)  Citing with approval In re 
23 
Detention of Williams, supra, 628 N.W.2d 447, the also court rejected the challenge.  “To 
require the Legislature to treat the two groups [sexually violent predators and those 
committed under another civil commitment process] similarly would require overruling a 
rational determination that sexually violent predators have certain characteristics which 
make their treatment needs different from other involuntarily committed individuals.  The 
potential danger to the community provides a rational reason why sexually violent 
predators should be treated differently than other committed patients.  The classification 
is not plainly arbitrary, but, instead, is reasonable in light of the differences between the 
two groups.  [Citation.]”  (Luckabaugh, supra, at p. 352.) 
Washington applies the rational basis test to equal protection challenges to its 
version of the SVPA.  (In re Detention of Stout (Wn. 2007) 150 P.3d 86, 96.)  The 
Washington Court of Appeals rejected an equal protection challenge quite similar to the 
one of this case.  “[Appellant] argues that the differences . . . in the release procedures 
violate his right to equal protection. . . .  [¶]  There is a rational basis for treating sexually 
violent predators and other mentally ill persons differently with respect to release 
procedures. . . .  [D]ifferences in dangerousness, treatment methods, and prognosis for the 
mentally ill and violent sex offenders justify treating the two groups differently.  [¶]  . . .  
[A]llowing those committed under [the civil commitment statute for other mentally ill 
persons] to be released solely on the recommendation of the superintendent but requiring 
a show cause and a full evidentiary hearing before sexually violent predators are released 
does not violate equal protection.”  (Petersen v. State (Wn. Ct. App. 2000) 36 P.3d 1053, 
1057, fns. omitted.) 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to decide whether strict scrutiny or 
rational review applies to an equal protection challenge to Wisconsin‟s version of the 
SVPA because it was not necessary to do so.  (State v. Post (Wis. 1995) 541 N.W.2d 115, 
130.)  It considered an equal protection challenge to the release procedures that apply in 
24 
Wisconsin to sexually violent persons, which are closely similar to the California 
procedures challenged in this case, and which, like the analogous California procedure, 
are more stringent than the procedures under Wisconsin‟s general civil commitment 
statute.  (Id. at p. 128, fn. 22.)  It then rejected that challenge:  “[T]he people can choose, 
through their duly elected representatives, to address complex social problems in more 
than one way. . . .  [¶]  . . .  The legislature has determined that, as a class, persons 
predisposed to sexual violence are more likely to pose a higher level of danger to the 
community than do other classes of mentally ill or mentally disabled persons.  This 
heightened level of dangerousness and the unique treatment needs of sexually violent 
persons justify distinct legislative approaches to further the compelling governmental 
purpose of protection of the public.”  (Id. at p. 130.) 
D.  The Evidentiary Hearing 
The majority today orders a superior court judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
to decide whether society may take steps to protect itself from sexually violent predators 
that differ from steps it takes regarding persons subject to California‟s general 
involuntary civil commitment program.  At the hearing, “[t]he trial court may, if 
appropriate, permit expert testimony.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 37.)  The purpose of the 
hearing, according to the majority, is to give the government the opportunity to 
demonstrate that the 2006 reforms are “based on a reasonable perception of the unique 
dangers that [sexually violent predators] pose rather than a special stigma that [sexually 
violent predators] may bear in the eyes of California‟s electorate.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
39.)  (The majority opinion should, but does not, add “and the California Legislature.”) 
At the evidentiary hearing, however, the court apparently is not to resolve any 
factual dispute in the way courts normally do.  The majority adds that “mere 
disagreement among experts will not suffice to overturn the Proposition 83 amendments 
[and, presumably, the Legislature‟s amendments].  The trial court must determine 
25 
whether the legislative distinctions in classes of persons subject to civil commitment are 
reasonable and factually based — not whether they are incontrovertible or 
uncontroversial.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 40.) 
Fortunately, I will not be the trial judge who has to try to make sense of these 
pronouncements on remand, but apparently the trial court will not be allowed to resolve a 
factual dispute among experts.  Indeed, the majority seems to give the trial court 
discretion to prohibit expert testimony entirely, for it says that the court “may” admit 
such testimony “if appropriate.”  The majority does not suggest under what 
circumstances expert testimony might be inappropriate, but noting that expert testimony 
might be admitted if appropriate implies that nonexpert testimony might be appropriate 
instead.  If expert testimony is found inappropriate, what kind of testimony would be 
appropriate?  Anecdotal evidence about particular sexually violent predators who, in the 
view of the witness, either are or are not as dangerous as sexually violent predators?  Or, 
conversely, anecdotal evidence about particular persons subject to the MDO Act who, in 
the view of the witness, either are or are not as dangerous as sexually violent predators?  
Or perhaps testimony from a person who was (or was not) the victim of a sexual crime 
that, in the witness‟s view, sexually violent predators in general either are or are not 
particularly dangerous?  None of this would be helpful, and surely either side could find 
plenty of witnesses to supply whatever testimony of that kind it desired. 
The majority states it is not contemplating the use of nonexpert testimony.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 38, fn. 12.)  That is reassuring, but if so, it seems the hearing on remand 
will necessarily turn on expert testimony.  Whether society should treat sex crimes and 
their perpetrators differently from those who commit other crimes, however, is a 
judgment call for society to make, not a “fact” for a judge to determine after an 
evidentiary hearing.  In Powell v. Texas (1968) 392 U.S. 514, the United States Supreme 
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to making public intoxication a crime.  There, 
26 
the trial court, in invalidating the law, purported to make factual findings that alcoholism 
is a disease that a person cannot control.  The high court rejected these findings:  
“Whatever else may be said of them, these are not „findings of fact‟ in any recognizable, 
traditional sense in which that term has been used in a court of law . . . .”  (Id. at p. 521.)  
Similarly, whether the California legislature, the California electorate, and legislatures 
throughout the country may reasonably treat sex offenders as a separate category with 
separate remedies is not a fact comparable to other facts that trial courts determine.  
Neither sociology nor penology is an exact science.  This court and the high court have 
already described sexually violent predators as “ „extremely dangerous‟ ” (Cooley v. 
Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 253) or “particularly dangerous” (Hendricks, 
supra, 521 U.S. at p. 364).  An evidentiary hearing cannot change that.  
Moreover, the victims of sexual crimes are especially likely to be traumatized 
because, as the Iowa Supreme Court noted, sexual crimes have “ „particularly devastating 
effects‟ ” on the victims.  (In re Detention of Williams, supra, 628 N.W.2d at p. 454.)  
The exact nature of these effects and this traumatization cannot be quantified at an 
evidentiary hearing, but I reject the notion that a single judge could conclude that it is 
unreasonable to view the traumatizing effects of sexual crimes as different from the 
effects of other crimes. 
In upholding Kansas‟s version of the SVPA, the high court stressed that 
legislatures must be given the widest latitude to legislate in areas fraught with medical 
and scientific uncertainty.  (Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 360, fn. 3, 370.)  That 
describes this situation.  How to treat sex crimes is “analytically nuanced” and, as such, 
we must defer to the legislative branch.  (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1156.)  The 
California Legislature and electorate must be given the widest latitude to legislate in this 
area, which is why the high court upheld Kansas‟s SVPA, and why courts throughout the 
nation have upheld their states‟ versions of the SVPA. 
27 
The majority cites some specific factual statements by Proposition 83‟s proponents 
and the proponents‟ reference to a “1998 report” as also warranting an evidentiary 
hearing.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.)  I disagree for two reasons.  First, the issue before us 
is whether society may treat sex offenders differently from other offenders, not whether 
specific factual claims by proponents of legislation are correct.  Second, the Legislature 
did not rely on those findings and that report when it enacted the Sex Offender 
Punishment, Control, and Containment Act of 2006.  Thus, even if a perceived 
inaccuracy in the factual findings cited by Proposition 83‟s proponents would provide a 
reason to overturn that initiative measure, the inaccuracy would provide no reason to 
overturn the Legislature‟s identical provisions. 
The majority acknowledges only obliquely, in a footnote near the end of its 
opinion, that the Legislature also enacted the reforms the majority finds potentially 
invalid.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 38, fn. 12.)  Then it gets technical.  It says, “The People 
have not addressed whether the legislative history of that statute contains any justification 
for treating [sexually violent predators] differently from [mentally disordered offenders] 
and may do so on remand.”  (Ibid.)  (However, the majority also directs the Court of 
Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its 
opinion, i.e., for an evidentiary hearing.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 41.)  Thus, it is not clear 
when the People are supposed to have the opportunity to defend the Legislature‟s 
actions.)  I agree the People have not made a separate argument that the Sex Offender 
Punishment, Control, and Containment Act of 2006 is valid even if Proposition 83 is 
invalid.  Such an argument would seem unnecessary given that the two provisions are 
identical as relevant here.  But at least the People have noted that both the Legislature and 
the electorate enacted the reforms at issue.  Defendant never even cites the Legislature‟s 
actions.  If we are to get technical, I suppose we would have to say that defendant 
challenges only Proposition 83, and not also the Legislature‟s enactment of the same 
28 
reforms.  If so, today‟s opinion only could endanger Proposition 83 and not also the 
Legislature‟s reforms.  It may seem absurd to invalidate one but not the other, given that 
they are identical, but that seems to be the necessary consequence of the majority‟s 
refusal to confront directly the fact that the legislation it finds potentially unreasonable 
was enacted by both the Legislature and the electorate. 
The majority confidently asserts that any ruling invalidating the reforms of 2006 
would not endanger the constitutional validity of other ways in which society has treated 
sex offenders differently from others, for example, by imposing lifetime registration 
requirements.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 40, fn. 14.)  I hope future potential litigants and 
courts will heed this assertion.  But if the result of the mandated evidentiary hearing is the 
trial court‟s finding that the 2006 reforms are not “based on a reasonable perception of 
the unique dangers that [sexually violent predators] pose,” but rather are based on “a 
special stigma that [sexually violent predators] may bear in the eyes of California‟s 
electorate [and the Legislature]” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 39) — and thus the 2006 reforms 
violate equal protection guarantees — it is hard to imagine how society could reasonably 
impose lifetime registration requirements on those same persons that are not imposed on 
others. 
I need not resolve this conundrum, because I believe the law may use different 
procedures for deciding when to release sexually violent predators into society than it 
uses regarding other civilly committed persons.  No evidentiary hearing can invalidate 
this legislative choice. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The majority has empowered a single superior court judge to find unreasonable all 
of the following:  the unanimous judgment of both branches of California‟s Legislature; 
the overwhelming judgment of the California electorate; the judgment of legislatures 
throughout the nation; and the decision of the United States Supreme Court approving of 
29 
the Kansas Legislature‟s determination that sexually violent predators present risks that 
the state‟s general involuntary commitment procedure was inadequate to address.  This 
action is contrary to the unanimous judgment of all seven Court of Appeal opinions that 
considered this precise question in originally published opinions, as well as the judgment 
of courts around the nation that have rejected equal protection challenges to their states‟ 
equivalent of the SVPA.  I cannot agree.  Whether sexually violent predators present a 
distinct danger warranting unique remedies is for society to determine, not a trial judge. 
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority‟s equal protection holding.  I would 
affirm entirely the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
CHIN, J. 
I CONCUR: 
BAXTER, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. McKee 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 160 Cal.App.4th 1517 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S162823 
Date Filed: January 28, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Peter Gallagher 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Steven M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, Steve Oetting and Bradley A. Weinreb, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Steven M. Hinkle 
3529 Cannon Road, Suite 2B-311 
Oceanside, CA  92056 
(760) 295-1541 
 
Bradley A. Weinreb 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2290