Title: STATE v MITCHELL

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-38 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, VS . HAROLD W. MITCHELL, JR., Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Lake. Honorable John McCarvel, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Datsopoulos, MacDonald and Lind, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Richard P. Heinz, County Attorney, Polson, Montana Submitted on briefs: December 30, 1980 Decided: APR 1 19@ Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. D e f e n d a n t , H a r o l d W. M i t c h e l l , J r . , a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n s of f e l o n y c r i m i n a l mischief and s o l i c i t a t i o n e n t e r e d i n t h e Lake County D i s t r i c t C o u r t , t h e Honorable John M. McCarvel p r e s i d i n g . E a r l y i n t h e morning o f O c t o b e r 3 0 , 1 9 7 7 , t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s mobile home and its c o n t e n t s were d e s t r o y e d by f i r e . The p r o p e r t y was l o c a t e d i n a r u r a l s u b d i v i s i o n near S t . I g n a t i u s , Montana. The n e x t day a j u v e n i l e , John T. Hammond, c o n t a c t e d t h e Lake County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e and t o l d them t h a t M i t c h e l l had r e c e n t l y purchased a $25,000 f i r e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y on t h e t r a i l e r home. Hammond f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had removed most of t h e v a l u a b l e items i n t h e t r a i l e r t o an a d j a c e n t shop b u i l d i n g and t o a n o t h e r t r a i l e r home owned by JoAnn Roske. Hammond a l s o s t a t e d t h a t h e h e l p e d i n r e p l a c i n g t h e removed f u r n i t u r e w i t h f u r n i s h i n g s of an i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y . On November 2 , 1977, Hammond informed t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , i n a t a p e recorded s t a t e m e n t , t h a t he i n f a c t had set t h e f i r e a f t e r M i t c h e l l o f f e r e d him $500 and a c a r t o burn t h e t r a i l e r while M i t c h e l l was o u t of town f o r t h e weekend. Hammond i n d i c a t e d he set t h e f i r e by p l a c i n g g a s o l i n e - s o a k e d r a g s a r o u n d t h e t r a i l e r ' s f u r n a c e and l i g h t i n g them with a c i g a r e t t e l i g h t e r . On October 31, 1977, d e f e n d a n t M i t c h e l l f i l e d a c l a i m t o c o l l e c t on t h e f i r e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . The i n s u r a n c e a g e n t , upon r e c e i v i n g t h e c l a i m and a f t e r being a d v i s e d by t h e county s h e r i f f t h a t t h e f i r e was under i n v e s t i g a t i o n , asked d e f e n d a n t t o make a l i s t d e s c r i b i n g t h e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y d e s t r o y e d and its v a l u e . T h i s information was needed b e f o r e payment of t h e c l a i m could be r e m i t t e d . The s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e a l s o expressed an i n t e r e s t i n o b t a i n i n g t h i s list once it was r e c e i v e d by t h e a g e n t . Defendant responded t o t h e r e q u e s t w i t h a h a n d w r i t t e n i n v e n t o r y which was submitted unsigned. A t t h e r e q u e s t of t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , t h e i n s u r a n c e a g e n t t y p e d t h e i n v e n t o r y and asked d e f e n d a n t t o s i g n it and t h e n have it c e r t i f i e d . I n a l e t t e r t h e agent a l s o made an i n v i t a t i o n f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t t o add an addendum should he wish t o i n c l u d e a d d i t i o n a l p r o p e r t y . Defendant s i g n e d t h e typed list, c e r t i f i e d it, and r e t u r n e d it w i t h a d d i t i o n a l p r o p e r t y l i s t e d i n an addendum a s being d e s t r o y e d . The i n s u r a n c e a g e n t forwarded t h e signed l i s t t o t h e county s h e r i f f . T h i s l i s t was t h e n shown t o Hammond who i n d i c a t e d which i t e m s had been moved t o Roske's t r a i l e r . A s a r e s u l t of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , a s e a r c h w a r r a n t was i s s u e d , and v a r i o u s items were s e i z e d from t h e Roske t r a i l e r t h a t corresponded w i t h items on t h e list. M i t c h e l l was a r r e s t e d on December 16, 1977, and charged w i t h s o l i c i t a t i o n and c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . The f i r s t o f f e n s e was based on an a l l e g a t i o n t h a t M i t c h e l l commanded, encouraged, or f a c i l i t a t e d t h e commission of t h e crime of c r i m i n a l mischief by r e q u e s t i n g Hammond t o burn h i s t r a i l e r home. The second o f f e n s e , c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f , was based on a charge t h a t he knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y d e s t r o y e d t h e t r a i l e r w i t h t h e purpose t o d e f r a u d an i n s u r e r by means of f i r e s e t by a n o t h e r whom he had s o l i c i t e d , a i d e d and a b e t t e d . D u r i n g t r i a l , Hammond was p r e s e n t e d a s t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s key w i t n e s s . H e t e s t i f i e d t o h e l p i n g d e f e n d a n t move v a r i o u s items o u t of t h e t r a i l e r t o t h e Roske r e s i d e n c e and r e l a t e d how he burned t h e t r a i l e r a f t e r being approached by M i t c h e l l . Hammond a l s o r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e n i g h t b e f o r e t h e f i r e , while d e f e n d a n t was o u t of town, he had a p a r t y i n d e f e n d a n t ' s t r a i l e r . Hammond s t a t e d t h e p a r t y was a t t e n d e d by about twenty-five people b u t t h a t no s i g n i f i c a n t damage was done t o t h e t r a i l e r . According t o a neighbor, however, who was d i s t u r b e d by t h e n o i s e and i n v e s t i g a t e d , t h e t r a i l e r was i n a c o n s i d e r a b l e mess a s a r e s u l t of t h e p a r t y . M i t c h e l l denied having induced Hammond t o set t h e f i r e . H e f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he and Roske had r e c e n t l y s e p a r a t e d a f t e r l i v i n g t o g e t h e r f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s and t h a t t h e f u r n i t u r e and o t h e r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y moved o u t of h i s t r a i l e r belonged t o Roske. According t o d e f e n d a n t , t h e s e were n o t t h e items included on t h e l i s t a s being d e s t r o y e d i n t h e f i r e . The deputy f i r e marshal1 who i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e f i r e could n o t determine its cause. H e was unable t o f i n d t h e p r e s e n c e of hydrocarbons a t t h e scene which would have i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e f i r e had an i n c e n d i a r y o r i g i n . H e d i d t e s t i f y , however, t h a t t h e evidence was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Hammond's s t a t e m e n t t h a t he had set t h e f i r e . Following t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d of both s o l i c i t a t i o n and c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . The c o u r t sentenced him t o e i g h t y e a r s ' imprisonment w i t h s i x y e a r s suspended on each c o u n t , t h e s e n t e n c e s t o run c o n c u r r e n t l y . Defendant now a p p e a l s . The f i r s t i s s u e is whether t h e testimony of Hammond, a s an accomplice, was c o r r o b o r a t e d by s u f f i c i e n t independent evidence. The s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r c o r r o b o r a t i o n a r e set f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 46-16-213, MCA: "A c o n v i c t i o n cannot be had on t h e t e s t i m o n y of one r e s p o n s i b l e o r l e g a l l y a c c o u n t a b l e f o r t h e same o f f e n s e , a s d e f i n e d i n 45-2-301, u n l e s s t h e t e s t i m o n y is c o r r o b o r a t e d by o t h e r evidence which i n i t s e l f and w i t h o u t t h e a i d of t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e one r e s p o n s i b l e o r l e g a l l y a c c o u n t a b l e f o r t h e same o f f e n s e t e n d s t o c o n n e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e . The c o r r o b o r a t i o n is n o t s u f f i c i e n t i f it merely shows t h e com- m i s s i s o n of t h e o f f e n s e o r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e r e o f . " Montana c a s e law concerning c o r r o b o r a t i o n is w e l l s e t t l e d . I t p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e c o r r o b o r a t i n g evidence may be s u p p l i e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t o r h i s w i t n e s s e s ; it may be c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ; it n e e d n o t b e s u f f i c i e n t t o s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n o r e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e c a s e o f g u i l t ; and, it need o n l y tend t o c o n n e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e crime a s charged. Where t h e claimed c o r r o b o r a t i o n , however, shows no more t h a n an o p p o r t u n i t y t o commit a c r i m e , simply p r o v e s s u s p i c i o n , o r is e q u a l l y consonant w i t h a r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n p o i n t i n g toward i n n o c e n t conduct on p a r t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e e v i d e n c e i s t o b e deemed i n s u f f i c i e n t . See S t a t e v. Kemp ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 597 P.2d 96, 36 St.Rep. 1215; S t a t e v. Owens ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 597 P.2d 72, 36 St.Rep. 1182; S t a t e v. Coleman ( 1 9 7 8 ) t Mont. , 579 P.2d 732, 35 St.Rep. 560; S t a t e v. J o n e s ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 95 Mont. 317, 26 P.2d 341; S t a t e v . Cobb ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 76 Mont. 89, 245 P. 265. The S t a t e m a i n t a i n s t h a t Hammond's t e s t i m o n y is s u f f i c i e n t l y c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g : d e f e n d a n t ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t h i s t r a i l e r was n o t i n s u r e d u n t i l s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e f i r e ; t e s t i m o n y of d e f e n d a n t and Roske t h a t numerous items of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y belonging t o Roske were moved from the premises to Roske's trailer; the various items seized in Roske's trailer which corresponded with items listed on defendant's insurance claim as destroyed in the fire; the testimony of Gladys Orr that upon visiting Roske's trailer shortly before the fire she viewed various pieces of furniture and other personal property which again corresponded with items listed by defendant as destroyed; and, the testimony of Bud Castor and Butch Pierce that Hammond told them prior to the actual fire that defendant offered him cash and a car to set fire to the trailer. In determining the sufficiency of the offered evidence, we must first reject the State's inclusion of the testimony by Castor and Pierce. Even though this testimony was offered to rebut defendant's charge of subsequent fabrication and, thus, was admissible as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(l)(B), Mont.R.Evid. (see State v. Mackie (1981), Mont . , 622 P.2d 673, 38 St.Rep. 86), its use as corroborating evidence is improper. The State has cited State v. Dolan (1980), Mont. , 620 P.2d 355, 37 St.Rep. 1860, in support of using this testimony. This case is easily distinguishable. In Dolan the prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant had admitted the offense to a bartender who later testified to the conversation at trial. The court held that the bartender's testimony was nonhearsay and substantive evidence sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. Here, however, the State is attempting to use, not a previous statement by the defendant to corroborate an accomplice, but a previous statement of the accomplice. Consequently, i f we were t o a l l o w t h e testimony t o be used a s c o r r o b o r a t i n g evidence, w e would i n e f f e c t be allowing a p r i o r s t a t e m e n t made by an accomplice t o c o r r o b o r a t e h i s own testimony. Such a r e s u l t would f r u s t r a t e t h e purpose of t h e s t a t u t e and w i l l n o t be p e r m i t t e d . Being unable t o make use o f t h e testimony of Castor and P i e r c e , t h e S t a t e , i n a n a t t e m p t t o c o r r o b o r a t e Hammond's testimony, is l e f t w i t h evidence showing t h e purchase of t h e i n s u r a n c e by d e f e n d a n t , t h e t r a n s f e r of v a r i o u s items from d e f e n d a n t ' s t r a i l e r t o Roske's t r a i l e r , and items s e i z e d a f t e r t h e f i r e and viewed i n Roske's t r a i l e r s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e f i r e which correspond t o items l i s t e d on an i n s u r a n c e c l a i m a s being d e s t r o y e d . Upon reviewing t h i s evidence, we f i n d t h a t it is s u f f i c i e n t c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Hammond's testimony. The t o t a l sum of t h e evidence does more t h a n c r e a t e a mere s u s p i c i o n of g u i l t . I t is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e S t a t e ' s t h e o r y of c u l p a b i l i t y and is s u p p o r t i v e of a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e evidence t e n d s t o connect d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y a t i s s u e . W e acknowledge t h a t t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d d o e s n o t e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e c a s e of c u l p a b i l i t y ; however, such a f i n d i n g is n o t a n e c e s s a r y requirement f o r c o r r o b o r a t i o n . The evidence can be c i r c u m s t a n t i a l and need o n l y ". . . t e n d t o connect t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h t h e commission of t h e c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e . " S e c t i o n 46-16-213, MCA. The evidence i n t h i s r e g a r d is deemed s u f f i c i e n t . The second i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t concerns h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t a c o n v i c t i o n o f b o t h s o l i c i t a t i o n and c r i m i n a l mischief is b a r r e d by s e c t i o n 46-11-502(2), MCA, which p r o v i d e s : "When t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n may e s t a b l i s h t h e commission of more t h a n one o f f e n s e , a person charged w i t h such conduct may be p r o s e c u t e d f o r each such o f f e n s e . H e may n o t , however, be c o n v i c t e d of more t h a n one o f f e n s e i f : " ( 2 ) one o f f e n s e c o n s i s t s o n l y o f a c o n s p i r a c y o r o t h e r form of p r e p a r a t i o n t o commit t h e o t h e r ; " Under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , w e must a g r e e w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . Count I1 of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n , a s f i l e d , a l l e g e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y o f c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f s o l e l y on t h e t h e o r y of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y because he " s o l i c i t e d . . . aided and a b e t t e d " Hammond. The a c t u a l s o l i c i t a t i o n of Hammond, a s charged i n Count I , was t h u s a n e c e s s a r y - p r e p a r a t o r y a c t t o t h e o f f e n s e o f c r i m i n a l ---- m i s c h i e f , and a c o n v i c t i o n on both c o u n t s was improper. The S t a t e concedes t h a t a c o n v i c t i o n on both c h a r g e s was improper. I t a r g u e s , however, t h a t s i n c e d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d t o o b j e c t a t t r i a l t o t h e submission of both c o u n t s t o t h e j u r y , he is precluded from r a i s i n g t h i s i s s u e on a p p e a l . I n r e j e c t i n g t h i s argument, we need o n l y n o t e t h a t t h e e r r o r d i d n o t occur when t h e c h a r g e s were p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y b u t a r o s e o n l y a f t e r t h e D i s t r i c t Court rendered a f i n a l judgment of c o n v i c t i o n on both c o u n t s . See s e c t i o n s 46-11-502 and 46-1-201(2), MCA. The e r r o r a t t r i a l being p r e d i c a t e d s o l e l y on an a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e f i n a l judgment of c o n v i c t i o n was improperly e n t e r e d , d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t p r i o r t o c o n v i c t i o n does n o t p r e c l u d e review by t h i s Court . The f a c t t h a t t h i s i s s u e is decided i n f a v o r of t h e d e f e n d a n t does n o t mean, however, t h a t d e f e n d a n t is now e n t i t l e d t o a new t r i a l o r a d i s m i s s a l of a l l charges. A s p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n e n t e r i n g judgment of c o n v i c t i o n on both c o u n t s , n o t i n s u b m i t t i n g t h o s e c h a r g e s t o t h e j u r y . Consequently, i f any p r e j u d i c e t o d e f e n d a n t r e s u l t e d from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s e r r o r , it a r o s e s o l e l y i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e s s which was conducted on t h e b a s i s of an improper c o n v i c t i o n of both s o l i c i t a t i o n and c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . P r e j u d i c e t o d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s r e g a r d can be cured by remanding t h e c a u s e f o r r e s e n t e n c i n g . The judgment o f c o n v i c t i o n f o r s o l i c i t a t i o n i s v a c a t e d and d i s m i s s e d . The judgment of c o n v i c t i o n f o r c r i m i n a l mischief is a f f i r m e d , and t h e c a u s e is remanded f o r r e s e n t e n c i n g . W e concur: @ ~ 4 , Chief J u s t i c e