Title: City of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha Board of Review

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2021 WI 89 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1479 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. City of Waukesha, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Waukesha Board of Review, 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
Salem United Methodist Church, 
          Interested Party-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 395 Wis. 2d 239,952 N.W.2d 806 
PDC No:2020 WI App 77 - Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 21, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 27, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael O. Bohren   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Brian E. Running, city attorney. There was an oral 
argument by Brian E. Running. 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Eric J. Larson and Municipal Law & Litigation Group, S.C., 
Waukesha. There was an oral argument by Eric J. Larson. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of League of 
Wisconsin Municipalities by Claire Silverman, Madison.  
 
 
 
 
2021 WI 89 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1479 
(L.C. No. 
2018CV1432) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. City of Waukesha, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Waukesha Board of Review, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
 
Salem United Methodist Church, 
 
          Interested Party-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 21, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, City of 
Waukesha (the City), seeks review of a published opinion of the 
court of appeals that reversed the circuit court's order that 
allowed the City to seek certiorari review of a tax assessment 
determination of the City of Waukesha Board of Review (the 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
2 
 
Board).1  The court of appeals concluded instead that the City 
could not seek such review, reversed the circuit court's 
determination, and remanded to the circuit court with directions 
to quash the writ of certiorari and dismiss the action. 
¶2 
This case raises the novel question of whether the 
municipality 
itself 
can 
seek 
certiorari 
review 
of 
a 
determination of the municipality's board of review.  The City 
contends that the statutory language of Wis. Stat. § 70.47 
(2017-18)2 allows it to appeal a Board determination by bringing 
a certiorari action pursuant to § 70.47(13).  The Board, in 
contrast, argues that the City has no such right and that the 
City's participation in a tax assessment proceeding ends after 
the Board has made its decision. 
¶3 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 70.47 does not allow the 
City to seek certiorari review of a decision of the Board.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
The Salem United Methodist Church (the Church) owns a 
piece of property located within the City.  In 2017, the 
property was assessed at a value of $51,900, but the following 
year the assessment was raised to $642,200.  The reassessment 
was triggered by the Church putting the property up for sale.  
                                                 
1 State ex rel. City of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha Bd. of 
Rev., 2020 WI App 77, 395 Wis. 2d 239, 952 N.W.2d 806 (reversing 
and remanding the order of the circuit court for Waukesha 
County, Michael O. Bohren, Judge). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
3 
 
Ultimately, the Church received an offer of $1,000,000 for a 
portion of the property.3 
¶5 
Taking exception to the increase in the assessed value 
of its property, the Church filed an objection.  It submitted 
that the value of the property should be properly assessed at 
$108,655.  The Church argued that the City's valuation was based 
on speculative future use and that it did not properly account 
for the undeveloped nature of the land.  
¶6 
At a hearing held before the Board, both the taxpayer 
and the City appeared as parties.  The City argued in favor of 
the City assessor's valuation.  After taking testimony from the 
assessor and a representative of the Church, the Board accepted 
the Church's valuation, but rounded up slightly to arrive at a 
value of $108,700. 
¶7 
The City appealed the Board's determination by seeking 
certiorari review in the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(13).4  It argued that the Board acted contrary to law 
                                                 
3 The property at issue consists of 23.16 acres.  Of this 
amount, the Church listed for sale two parcels consisting of 
8.77 acres for a total asking price of $1,400,000.  The 
referenced offer was for a 5.27 acre parcel. 
4 Governing 
certiorari 
review 
of 
board 
of 
review 
proceedings, Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) provides: 
Except as provided in s. 70.85, appeal from the 
determination of the board of review shall be by an 
action for certiorari commenced within 90 days after 
the taxpayer receives the notice under sub. (12).  The 
action shall be given preference.  If the court on the 
appeal finds any error in the proceedings of the board 
which renders the assessment or the proceedings void, 
it shall remand the assessment to the board for 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
4 
 
because it failed to uphold the presumption of correctness that 
attaches 
to 
an 
assessor's 
valuation,5 
that 
the 
Board's 
determination was not supported by sufficient credible evidence, 
and that the Board's decision was arbitrary and unreasonable.6 
¶8 
Contending that the City's petition failed to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted, the Board moved to quash 
the writ.  As relevant here, it asserted that the City lacks the 
authority under Wis. Stat. § 70.47 to appeal a decision of its 
own Board of Review by certiorari.  In other words, it argued 
that § 70.47 affords only taxpayers, and not municipalities, the 
ability to seek certiorari review of a board decision. 
¶9 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
motion 
to 
quash, 
concluding that Wis. Stat. § 70.47 "does give the City the 
                                                                                                                                                             
further proceedings in accordance with the court's 
determination and retain jurisdiction of the matter 
until the board has determined an assessment in 
accordance with the court's order.  For this purpose, 
if final adjournment of the board occurs prior to the 
court's decision on the appeal, the court may order 
the governing body of the assessing authority to 
reconvene the board. 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8)(i) ("The board shall presume 
that the assessor's valuation is correct.  That presumption may 
be rebutted by a sufficient showing by the objector that the 
valuation is incorrect."); Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of 
Rev., 2014 WI 9, ¶26, 352 Wis. 2d 576, 843 N.W.2d 39. 
6 On certiorari review, a court's inquiry is limited to 
whether the board's actions were:  (1) within its jurisdiction; 
(2) according to law; (3) arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable 
and represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) supported 
by evidence such that the board might reasonably make the order 
or determination in question.  State ex rel. Collison v. City of 
Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., 2021 WI 48, ¶20, 397 Wis. 2d 246, 960 
N.W.2d 1. 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
5 
 
ability to intervene and have a role in the writ of certiorari 
proceedings."  Turning to the merits of the City's claims, the 
circuit court agreed with the City that the Church did not 
present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of 
correctness.  It thus granted the writ of certiorari and 
remanded to the Board for further proceedings. 
¶10 The Board appealed, and the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court's order, concluding "that § 70.47(13) does not 
authorize the City to commence a certiorari action."  State ex 
rel. City of Waukesha v. City of Waukesha Bd. of Rev., 2020 WI 
App 77, ¶2, 395 Wis. 2d 239, 952 N.W.2d 806.  Accordingly, it 
determined that the circuit court erred in denying the Board's 
motion to quash and as a result did not address the merits of 
the 
City's 
arguments 
that 
the 
Board 
acted 
unlawfully, 
unreasonably, and contrary to the credible evidence.  Id., ¶2 
n.2.  The City petitioned for this court's review. 
II 
¶11 We are called upon to review the court of appeals' 
determination that the circuit court erroneously denied the 
Board's motion to quash.  "A motion to quash a writ of 
certiorari is in the nature of a motion to dismiss."  Fee v. Bd. 
of Rev. for Town of Florence, 2003 WI App 17, ¶7, 259 
Wis. 2d 868, 657 N.W.2d 112.  Whether a motion to dismiss was 
properly granted or denied is a question of law this court 
reviews independently of the determinations rendered by the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Town of Lincoln v. City of 
Whitehall, 2019 WI 37, ¶21, 386 Wis. 2d 354, 925 N.W.2d 520. 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
6 
 
¶12 In our review, we are required to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47.  Statutory interpretation likewise presents a question 
of law we review independently of the determinations of the 
circuit court and court of appeals.  Yacht Club at Sister Bay 
Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Village of Sister Bay, 2019 WI 4, ¶17, 385 
Wis. 2d 158, 922 N.W.2d 95. 
III 
¶13 For context, we begin by providing background on board 
of review proceedings.  Subsequently, we address the question of 
whether the City may seek certiorari review of a Board decision 
under the terms of Wis. Stat. § 70.47. 
A 
¶14 Assessment of real property in every municipality in 
Wisconsin is accomplished according to the terms of ch. 70 of 
the Wisconsin Statutes.  Wis. Stat. § 70.05(1).  All property is 
valued by the municipality's assessor and reported in an 
assessment roll for the taxation district.  Nankin v. Village of 
Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶17, 245 Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141. 
¶15 Chapter 70 also "establishes a comprehensive procedure 
by which property owners may challenge the valuation or the 
amount of property assessed for taxation."  Hermann v. Town of 
Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 379, 572 N.W.2d 855 (1998).  "If a 
property owner disagrees with an assessment, the owner may file 
a formal objection with the municipality's board of review."  
Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶17 (citing Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(a) 
(1997-98)).  
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
7 
 
¶16 The board of review is a quasi-judicial body that 
hears evidence and decides whether the assessor's valuation is 
correct.  Id., ¶18 (citation omitted).  It is not an assessing 
body.  Id.  The board presumes that the assessor's valuation is 
correct, but this presumption may be rebutted "by a sufficient 
showing by the objector that the valuation is incorrect."  Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(8)(i); Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Rev., 
2014 WI 9, ¶26, 352 Wis. 2d 576, 843 N.W.2d 39.  If the 
assessment is determined to be incorrect, "the board shall raise 
or lower the assessment accordingly and shall state on the 
record the correct assessment and that that assessment is 
reasonable in light of all of the relevant evidence that the 
board received."  § 70.47(9)(a). 
¶17 A detailed method for appealing a decision of the 
board of review is provided within the statutory scheme of chs. 
70 and 74.  Hermann, 215 Wis. 2d at 379.  Three options exist 
for property owners who wish to appeal a board decision:  (1) 
certiorari review pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13); (2) a 
written complaint with the Department of Revenue to revalue the 
property under Wis. Stat. § 70.85;7 and (3) an excessive 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.85 provides an alternative procedure 
by which a taxpayer may seek the Department of Revenue's review 
of a board determination in specific circumstances.  Namely, 
pursuant to § 70.85(1),  
A taxpayer may file a written complaint with the 
department of revenue alleging that the assessment of 
one or more items or parcels of property in the 
taxation district the value of which, as determined 
under 
s. 
70.47, 
does 
not 
exceed 
$1,000,000 
is 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
8 
 
assessment action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.37.8  U.S. Oil Co., 
Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2011 WI App 4, ¶15, 331 Wis. 2d 407, 
794 N.W.2d 904; Thomas J. McAdams, Over Assessed?  Appealing 
Home 
Tax 
Assessments, 
Wis. 
Law., 
July 
2011, 
at 
18-19.  
"Compliance 
with 
the 
board 
of 
review 
procedures 
is 
a 
prerequisite to all three forms of appeal and the three sections 
are 
the 
exclusive 
method 
for 
challenging 
an 
excessive 
assessment."  Reese v. City of Pewaukee, 2002 WI App 67, ¶6, 252 
Wis. 2d 361, 642 N.W.2d 596. 
¶18 This case involves the first of these three options, a 
certiorari action.  Certiorari is a mechanism by which a court 
may test the validity of a decision rendered by a municipality, 
administrative agency, or other quasi-judicial tribunal.  State 
ex rel. Anderson v. Town of Newbold, 2021 WI 6, ¶11, 395 
Wis. 2d 351, 954 N.W.2d 323 (citing Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 
2011 WI 18, ¶34, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411).   
¶19 On certiorari review, the reviewing court's inquiry is 
narrow.  It is limited to the record before the board and 
addresses only whether the board's actions were:  (1) within its 
jurisdiction; (2) according to law; (3) arbitrary, oppressive, 
                                                                                                                                                             
radically out of proportion to the general level of 
assessment of all other property in the district.   
8 An action under Wis. Stat. § 74.37 is a new trial, not a 
certiorari action.  Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 
4, ¶23, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784.  Such an action is not 
confined to the record before the board and new evidence may be 
presented.  Trailwood Ventures, LLC v. Village of Kronenwetter, 
2009 WI App 18, ¶7, 315 Wis. 2d 791, 762 N.W.2d 841. 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
9 
 
or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; 
and (4) supported by evidence such that the board might 
reasonably make the order or determination in question.  Thoma 
v. Village of Slinger, 2018 WI 45, ¶10, 381 Wis. 2d 311, 912 
N.W.2d 56. 
B 
¶20 With this background in hand, we turn next to address 
the specific issue in this case.   The parties raise a novel 
question regarding whether a municipality may appeal its board 
of review's determination by certiorari review. 
¶21 Answering this question requires us to examine the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 70.47, which governs board of review 
proceedings.  When interpreting statutes, we begin with the 
language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
If the meaning of the statute is plain, we need not inquire 
further.  Id. 
¶22 "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id.  We also interpret statutory 
language "in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
¶23 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(13) 
addresses 
certiorari 
review of board decisions.  This subsection provides in relevant 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
10 
 
part:  "Except as provided in s. 70.85, appeal from the 
determination of the board of review shall be by an action for 
certiorari commenced within 90 days after the taxpayer receives 
the notice under sub. (12)."  § 70.47(13). 
¶24 The language of subsec. (13) thus guides the reader to 
subsec. (12), which sets forth:   
Prior to final adjournment, the board of review shall 
provide the objector, or the appropriate party under 
sub. (10),[9] notice by personal delivery or by mail, 
return 
receipt 
required, 
of 
the 
amount 
of 
the 
assessment 
as 
finalized 
by 
the 
board 
and 
an 
explanation of appeal rights and procedures under sub. 
(13) and ss. 70.85, 74.35 and 74.37.  Upon delivering 
or mailing the notice under this subsection, the clerk 
of the board of review shall prepare an affidavit 
specifying the date when that notice was delivered or 
mailed. 
                                                 
9 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 70.47(10), "If the board has 
reason to believe that property for which no objection has been 
raised is incorrectly assessed, the board must also review the 
assessment 
for 
such 
property 
and 
correct 
any 
error 
it 
discovers."  Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 379, 
572 N.W.2d 855 (1998).  Section 70.47(10) provides in relevant 
part: 
If the board has reason to believe, upon examination 
of the roll and other pertinent information, that 
other property, the assessment of which is not 
complained of, is assessed above or below the general 
average of the assessment of the taxation district, or 
is omitted, the board shall: 
(a) Notify the owner, agent or possessor of such 
property of its intention to review such assessment or 
place it on the assessment roll and of the time and 
place fixed for such hearing in time to be heard 
before the board in relation thereto, provided the 
residence of such owner, agent or possessor be known 
to any member of the board or the assessor. 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
11 
 
¶25 The Board argues, and the court of appeals agreed, 
that the above language gives the taxpayer exclusively, and not 
the City, the authority to seek certiorari review of a Board 
decision.  Specifically, the Board asserts that the trigger for 
filing a certiorari action contained in Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) 
is the receipt of notice by the taxpayer.  In contrast, 
§ 70.47(13) does not, according to the Board, include any 
trigger for the City to file a certiorari action or even any 
requirement that the City receive notice of a Board decision. 
¶26 On the other hand, the City contends that subsec. (13) 
addresses only when certiorari review may be sought, not who may 
seek it.  In other words, the City asserts that nothing in Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(13) grants any right to appeal whatsoever, and 
that instead it only ensures that the taxpayer is aware of a 
right to appeal and fixes the timing of the notice that must be 
sent.  The fact that § 70.47(13) mentions the taxpayer only and 
not the City is of no moment, according to the City, because the 
City will be aware of the clerk's affidavit referenced in 
subsec. (12) and will use the affidavit to determine the date 
the notice was delivered and calculate the appeal deadline. 
¶27 For additional support, the City points to Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(11), which provides:  "In all proceedings before the 
board the taxation district shall be a party in interest to 
secure or sustain an equitable assessment of all the property in 
the taxation district."  See Wis. Stat. § 70.045 (defining a 
"taxation district" as "a town, village or city in which general 
property taxes are levied and collected").  In the City's view, 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
12 
 
it would not be a reasonable reading of the statute to conclude 
that the City has a protectable interest before the Board, but 
it does not maintain that interest after the Board makes its 
decision.  The City advances that such a reading of § 70.47(11) 
would render its interest illusory. 
¶28 Synthesizing the text of subsecs. (11), (12), and 
(13), we agree with the Board's argument.10  Beginning with Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(13), that subsection provides that "appeal from 
the determination of the board of review shall be by an action 
for certiorari commenced within 90 days after the taxpayer 
receives the notice under sub. (12)."  What is notable about 
subsec. (13) for our analysis is that it conditions the appeal 
deadline on when notice is received by the taxpayer.  There is 
nothing in the statute that triggers the 90-day period for the 
City.  We also highlight that it is the taxpayer's receipt of 
the notice described in subsec. (12), and not when the notice is 
sent, that begins the statutory appeal period. 
¶29 Moving to subsec. (12), specific directions are given 
as to the delivery of the notice referenced in subsec. (13).  
The first sentence of Wis. Stat. § 70.47(12) provides:   
Prior to final adjournment, the board of review shall 
provide the objector, or the appropriate party under 
sub. (10), notice by personal delivery or by mail, 
return 
receipt 
required, 
of 
the 
amount 
of 
the 
                                                 
10 Because we determine that the City does not have appeal 
rights under the applicable statutes, we need not address the 
City's contention that the taxpayer here failed to meet its 
burden to overcome the presumption that the assessor's valuation 
is correct. 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
13 
 
assessment 
as 
finalized 
by 
the 
board 
and 
an 
explanation of appeal rights and procedures under sub. 
(13) and ss. 70.85, 74.35 and 74.37.   
¶30 Like 
subsec. 
(13), 
subsec. 
(12) 
refers 
to 
the 
taxpayer, or "objector," only.  It does not refer to the City 
and does not provide for any notice to be given to the City.  
This means that the City is not required to receive the 
"explanation of appeal rights and procedures" that the taxpayer 
receives. 
¶31 Further parsing the statutory language, subsec. (12) 
offers two options for providing the requisite notice to the 
taxpayer:  personal delivery or mail.  The second sentence of 
this subsection contains additional information regarding these 
two options.  It sets forth:  "Upon delivering or mailing the 
notice under this subsection, the clerk of the board of review 
shall prepare an affidavit specifying the date when that notice 
was delivered or mailed."  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(12).  In other 
words, the clerk of the board of review must prepare an 
affidavit stating when the notice was delivered, if personally 
delivered, or when it was mailed, if mailed.   
¶32 Notably, there is no requirement for the clerk of the 
board of review to submit an affidavit with any delivery or 
receipt information if the notice is mailed.  Only the "date 
when that notice was . . . mailed" is required, not the date 
when the notice was received.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(12).  This 
is an important point because the City asserts that it would 
calculate its filing deadline using the affidavit referred to in 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
14 
 
subsec. (12), despite the fact that subsec. (13) does not refer 
to the City. 
¶33 However, a close reading of subsecs. (12) and (13) 
reveals that the City's argument does not hold water.  Again, 
subsec. (13) sets forth that the deadline for filing a 
certiorari action is triggered by the taxpayer's receipt of the 
notice described in sub. (12).  But subsec. (12) does not 
provide an avenue for the City to be informed of when a taxpayer 
receives the notice.   
¶34 As stated, if the mail option is utilized, then the 
board clerk's affidavit indicates only when the notice was 
mailed, not when it was delivered or received by the taxpayer.  
See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(12).  However, the date a notice is 
mailed is most likely not the same as the date the notice is 
received.  The City could guess as to what its ultimate filing 
deadline would be, estimating the length of time the mail would 
take to arrive and surmising when someone would be available to 
sign for the "return receipt required" mail.  There is no 
statutory mechanism for calculating an exact date.   
¶35 Additionally, subsec. (12) contains no requirement 
that the board clerk provide a copy of the affidavit to the 
City.  Although in practice the City may receive it from the 
board clerk, there is no statutory language to support the 
proposition that it is required to be provided with the 
affidavit. 
¶36 The fact that there is no certain statutory deadline 
provided for the City to file a certiorari action indicates that 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
15 
 
the City does not have such a right.  Elsewhere in the statutes, 
where a party has a right to file an appeal to the circuit court 
or court of appeals, the legislature has provided a clear 
deadline for doing so.11   
¶37 Further, 
in 
other 
areas 
of 
the 
statutes 
the 
legislature has clearly given a municipality the ability to 
appeal the decision of a quasi-judicial board.  For example, a 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 102.25(1) ("Any party aggrieved 
by a judgment entered upon the review of any order or award [in 
a worker's compensation matter] may appeal the judgment within 
the period specified in s. 808.04(1)."); 227.53(1)(a)2. ("Unless 
a rehearing is requested under s. 227.49, petitions for review 
of contested cases shall be served and filed within 30 days 
after the service of the decision of the agency upon all parties 
under s. 227.48."); 227.58 ("Any party, including the agency, 
may secure a review of the final judgment of the circuit court 
by appeal to the court of appeals within the time period 
specified 
in 
s. 
808.04(1)."); 
800.14(1) 
("Appeals 
from 
judgments, decisions on motions brought under s. 800.115, or 
determinations regarding whether the defendant is unable to pay 
the judgment because of poverty, as that term is used in s. 
814.29(1)(d), may be taken by either party to the circuit court 
of the county where the offense occurred.  The appellant shall 
appeal by giving the municipal court and other party written 
notice of appeal and paying any required fees within 20 days 
after the judgment or decision."); 808.04(1) ("An appeal to the 
court of appeals must be initiated within 45 days of entry of a 
final judgment or order appealed from if written notice of the 
entry of a final judgment or order is given within 21 days of 
the final judgment or order as provided in s. 806.06(5), or 
within 90 days of entry if notice is not given, except as 
provided in this section or otherwise expressly provided by 
law."); 809.30(2)(j) ("The person shall file in circuit court 
and serve on the prosecutor and any other party a notice of 
appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence or final 
adjudication and, if necessary, from the order of the circuit 
court on the motion for postconviction or postdisposition relief 
within 20 days of the entry of the order on the postconviction 
or postdisposition motion."). 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
16 
 
determination on "an initial permit, license, right, privilege, 
or authority, except an alcohol beverage license" is reviewable 
under ch. 68 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  Wis. Stat. § 68.02(1).  
In Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1) the legislature provides that "[a]ny 
party to a proceeding resulting in a final determination may 
seek review thereof by certiorari within 30 days of receipt of 
the final determination" (emphasis added).   
¶38 Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)10. specifies that 
certiorari review of a decision of a city zoning board of 
appeals is open to "[a]ny person or persons, jointly or 
severally aggrieved by any decision of the board of appeals, or 
any taxpayer, or any officer, department, board or bureau of the 
municipality."  See also Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10) (specifying 
that certiorari review of a decision of a county zoning board of 
adjustment may be undertaken by "[a] person aggrieved by any 
decision of the board of adjustment, or a taxpayer, or any 
officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality").   No 
such language is present in Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13).  The 
legislature thus knows how to provide municipalities with the 
right to bring a certiorari action, but it did not do so in 
§ 70.47(13). 
¶39 The City's reliance on Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) would 
reduce its appeal deadline to mere guesswork.  As the court of 
appeals put it, "because the taxpayer is the only person 
statutorily required to receive the notice and the date of that 
receipt sets the appeal clock ticking, it strongly suggests that 
the certiorari appeal provision was intended only for the 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
17 
 
benefit of an aggrieved taxpayer."  City of Waukesha, 395 
Wis. 2d 239, ¶27.  We therefore conclude that Wis. Stat. § 70.47 
does not allow the City to seek certiorari review of a decision 
of the Board. 
¶40 This 
conclusion 
is 
supported 
by 
this 
court's 
precedent.  In Hermann, 215 Wis. 2d at 379, we described chs. 70 
and 74 as establishing "a detailed method for taxpayers to 
appeal a decision of the board of review" (emphasis added).12  
Likewise, the court in Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶3, construed 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) as providing a means by which "an owner 
can appeal from the board's determination by an action for 
certiorari to the circuit court" (emphasis added).  The City has 
cited no published case, and we have found none, that 
contradicts this understanding. 
¶41 Such 
an 
understanding 
is 
further 
supported 
by 
legislative history.  See State v. Wilson, 2017 WI 63, ¶23, 376 
Wis. 2d 92, 896 N.W.2d 682 (explaining that "legislative history 
and other authoritative sources may be consulted to confirm a 
plain meaning interpretation").  The current language in Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(13) that begins the appeal period 90 days after 
"the taxpayer receives the notice under sub. (12)" was added to 
the statute in 1994.  See 1993 Wis. Act 307, § 3.  In the fiscal 
estimate prepared by the Department of Revenue regarding the 
                                                 
12 Although the court in Hermann, 215 Wis. 2d at 379, 
referred to both chapter 70 and chapter 74, our decision in this 
case 
is 
limited 
to 
certiorari 
actions 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(13).   
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
18 
 
bill that became 1993 Wis. Act 307, the Department described the 
thrust of the change as to "clarify the intended meaning of the 
90-day period during which a property owner may appeal a board 
of review decision to the circuit court."  Drafting File for 
1993 Wis. Act 307, Fiscal Estimate of 1993 A.B. 1095, 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.   
¶42 Subsection (11) does not change this result and cannot 
carry the weight the City places on it.  Its plain language 
grants the City the right to appear as a party in interest 
"before the board," but such a grant goes no further.  Neither 
subsec. (12) nor subsec. (13) refers to the City as a "party in 
interest" beyond proceedings before the board.   
¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 70.47(11) does not clearly state or 
imply that the City may file a certiorari action to appeal a 
Board decision.  Instead, it limits a municipality's role to 
participation in proceedings "before the board" for the express 
purpose of "secur[ing] or sustain[ing] an equitable assessment 
of all the property in the taxation district." 
¶44 Additionally, were the City to prevail in this appeal 
and accordingly raise the assessed value of the Church property 
above the value as determined by the Board, there is no 
statutory remedy to which the City can readily point.  When the 
court inquired about the apparent lack of a remedy at oral 
argument, the City acknowledged that it did not know what the 
remedy should be if it were to win.13   
                                                 
13 The following exchange between the court and counsel for 
the City took place: 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
19 
 
¶45 In sum, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 70.47 does not 
allow the City to seek certiorari review of a decision of the 
Board.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
THE COURT:  The tax levy is what it is.  So if the 
Church is under-assessed it means the other taxpayers 
in the district are going to have a higher tax 
bill. . . . Where does the money go if the City 
ultimately prevails and the Church's assessment is 
increased?  Will the taxpayers receive a refund 
because they paid too high of a tax rate?  Is there a 
law that addresses where the money goes? 
 . . .  
COUNSEL:  I do not know.  I presume that the taxpayers 
would not receive a refund.  It would be ridiculous to 
think that a tiny check of less than a dollar is going 
to be mailed out in the City.  Certainly there are 
statutory 
procedures 
that 
the 
assessor 
and 
the 
treasurer follow when they handle income.  And 
certainly there are instances where money is received, 
tax revenue, after that tax year closes.  There are 
procedures for that.  I cannot direct you to the 
specific statutes that control that. 
No. 
2019AP1479   
 
 
 
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