Title: Sosa, etc. v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., etc.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1849 
____________ 
 
LAZARO E. SOSA, etc.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
SAFEWAY PREMIUM FINANCE COMPANY, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[July 7, 2011] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
Lazaro E. Sosa seeks review of the decision of the Third District Court of 
Appeal in Safeway Premium Finance Co. v. Sosa, 15 So. 3d 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), 
asserting that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decisions of the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal in Olen Properties Corp. v. Moss, 981 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2008), and Smith v. Glen Cove Apartments Condominiums Master Ass‟n, 
Inc., 847 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
This appeal arises from a motion for class certification filed in the trial court 
by Sosa.  That motion emanated from a cause of action initiated by Sosa in which 
 
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Sosa claimed that Safeway Premium Insurance Company (“Safeway”) violated 
sections 627.840(3)(b) and 627.835, Florida Statutes (2003), by knowingly 
overcharging him an additional service charge of $20 twice in a twelve-month 
period in two premium finance agreements which he entered into with Safeway.  
The trial court granted the motion for class certification.  The Third District Court 
of Appeal, however, reversed the order and held that the trial court erred because 
Sosa and the putative class members did not satisfy the requirements of 
commonality and predominance needed for class certification under Florida Rule 
of Civil Procedure 1.220.  This discretionary review proceeding followed.   
 
The decision of the Third District was incorrect because, in making its own 
factual findings as to whether Sosa and the putative class members satisfied rule 
1.220, the Third District afforded no deference to the trial court‟s actual factual 
findings and conducted a de novo review.  That constituted error because, as 
demonstrated by Glen Cove and Olen Properties, the proper appellate standard of 
review for a grant of class certification is abuse of discretion.   
Furthermore, the Third District incorrectly addressed whether Sosa satisfied 
section 627.835‟s “knowingly” requirement.  It also incorrectly held that Sosa and 
the putative class members failed to satisfy rule 1.220‟s commonality and 
predominance requirements.  In so holding, the Third District created conflict with 
Glen Cove and Olen Properties.  We conclude that Glen Cove provides a proper 
 
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analysis of rule 1.220‟s commonality and predominance requirement, and Olen 
Properties provides a proper analysis of rule 1.220‟s commonality requirement.  
Therefore, we quash the Third District‟s decision in Sosa and approve the 
decisions in Glen Cove and Olen Properties.   
FACTS 
In December 2002, Sosa purchased an automobile insurance policy from 
United Automobile Insurance Company (“United Auto”).  Concomitant to this 
agreement, Sosa entered into a six-month premium finance agreement with 
Safeway, an affiliate of United Auto.  United Auto and Safeway also share some of 
the same stockholders.   
A premium finance agreement is an agreement between an insured and a 
premium finance company in which the premium finance company agrees to pay 
the insurer the insured‟s total insurance premium.  See § 627.827, Fla. Stat. 
(2010).1   In return, the insured repays, with service charges and a possible 
“additional service charge,” the premium finance company in monthly 
                                         
1.  Section 627.827, Florida Statutes (2010), defines a “premium finance 
agreement” as: 
 
a promissory note or other written agreement by which an insured 
promises or agrees to pay to, or to the order of, a premium finance 
company the amount advanced or to be advanced under the agreement 
to an insurer or to an insurance agent, in payment of premiums on an 
insurance contract, together with a service charge as authorized and 
limited by law. 
 
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installments.  See id.  A “service charge,” which is usually in the form of interest 
on the amount financed, is added to the principal amount billed to the insured by 
the premium finance company “for financing the premiums under the agreement.”  
§ 627.840(2), Fla. Stat. (2010).  An “additional service charge” is a statutorily 
limited service charge that may be imposed in addition to a service charge.  See id. 
§ 627.840(3)(a).  For example, under section 627.840(3)(b), a premium finance 
company may assess to an insured a service charge that does not exceed “a 
maximum of $12 per $100 per year.”  In addition to this service charge, a premium 
finance company may make an “additional [service] charge not exceeding $20,” 
which “may be charged only once in a 12-month period for any one customer 
unless that customer‟s policy has been canceled due to nonpayment within the 
immediately preceding 12-month period.”  Id.   
Under the first six-month premium finance agreement between Sosa and 
Safeway, Safeway agreed to, and did, pay the entire automobile insurance 
premium to United Auto on behalf of Sosa.  In return, Sosa agreed to, and did, pay 
to Safeway in equal monthly installments the amount advanced by Safeway to 
United Auto for his automobile insurance premiums plus a service charge—a.k.a., 
a finance charge—of 12% per annum interest and an additional service charge of 
$20.  In May 2003, Sosa renewed his insurance policy with United Auto and 
entered into a second six-month premium finance agreement with Safeway.  The 
 
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terms of the second agreement mirrored the terms of the first agreement and 
included a second additional service charge of $20.  Sosa also made all payments 
due to Safeway under the second agreement. 
In November 2003, Sosa renewed his automobile insurance with United 
Auto and entered into a third six-month premium finance agreement with Safeway.  
Although that agreement also contained an additional service charge of $20, 
Safeway waived that charge by way of a $20 credit to Sosa‟s account.2   Safeway 
granted Sosa that waiver because it found that it had charged Sosa an additional 
service charge of $20 during the six-month period preceding the third premium 
finance agreement.   
Safeway discovered its November 2003 overcharge when it checked Sosa‟s 
account in accordance with a manual system designed to spot and correct such 
illegal charges.  Safeway created this manual system only after Florida‟s 
Department of Insurance (now Florida‟s Department of Financial Services) found, 
pursuant to a February 2001 audit of Safeway, that Safeway had been routinely and 
                                         
2.  Throughout the trial court proceedings, the parties argued over whether 
the reassessment of the $20 to Sosa‟s account was a “waiver” or “credit.”  
Although Safeway labeled it a waiver in its computer operating system, this is 
semantics.  As found by the trial court, the result of the reallocation of funds is the 
same regardless of what it is labeled, i.e., Sosa was credited $20 on his balance for 
his third premium finance agreement with Safeway because, in contravention of 
section 627.840, Safeway impermissibly charged him an additional service charge 
of $20 twice in a twelve month period by assessing that charge on Sosa‟s first and 
second premium finance agreements.   
 
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impermissibly charging its customers an additional service charge of $20 twice in 
twelve-month periods.  The Department required Safeway to initiate a systemic 
plan that would stop future overcharges.  The Department did not demand that 
Safeway review its records to address past overcharges.  As a result, Safeway, at 
the time of the Department‟s audit, did not conduct a retroactive audit for past 
overcharges, nor did it make proactive efforts to issue refunds or credits to 
customers for past overcharges.  Rather, it simply initiated a manual system that 
attempted to check for future potential overcharges where it had impermissibly 
charged an insured a $20 additional service charge in the previous six months 
contrary to Florida law.   
Under the manual system, an insurance agent facilitated the submission of 
an application for, and a copy of, a six-month premium finance agreement by the 
insured to Safeway.  These agents were not direct employees of Safeway, but 
rather, worked with insurance agencies that had full access to Safeway‟s 
application forms and premium finance agreements through the technology of 
QuickQuote.  QuickQuote provided the agents with software that provided direct 
access to Safeway‟s application forms and Safeway‟s premium finance 
agreements.  The agent‟s incentive was to use the financing supplied by Safeway 
to complete a transaction for insurance with United Auto.   When Sosa filed this 
 
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action, Safeway had approximately 300 agents in the network submitting these 
applications and agreements.   
The signed application and premium finance agreement reflected the full 
amount that Safeway charged the insured under a premium finance agreement, 
including the additional service charge of $20.  Each premium finance agreement 
routinely contained an additional service charge of $20 even if the applicant had 
already paid the additional service charge in a prior six-month premium finance 
agreement.  The agent then forwarded the application to Safeway.   
Upon arrival of the applications and premium finance agreements in 
Safeway/United Auto‟s shared mailroom, a mailroom clerk would check the 
applications and premium finance agreements in an attempt to determine if the 
applicant had a previous premium finance agreement with Safeway spanning the 
previous six months.  If the clerk found that the applicant had a previous premium 
finance agreement with Safeway, and that previous agreement spanned the prior 
six-month period, the clerk would set aside the application.  A second Safeway 
clerk would then obtain the set-aside applications and check whether Safeway had 
canceled the applicant‟s previous premium finance agreement for nonpayment.  If 
Safeway canceled the previous premium finance agreement for nonpayment, the 
application and new agreement were returned to the stack for processing with the 
additional service charge of $20, as that additional charge was permissible under 
 
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section 627.840(3)(b) due to the insured‟s nonpayment.  If Safeway had not 
canceled the previous premium finance agreement for nonpayment, Safeway 
would process the application and new premium finance agreement through its 
computer software, known as UNICORP, with a directive to waive the additional 
service charge of $20 by way of a credit to the balance owed to Safeway.  Safeway 
assessed this credit by having a Safeway employee punch code “4” into the 
UNICORP system upon processing the application and new premium finance 
agreement.  Thereafter, Safeway sent a letter to the applicant that indicated the 
applicant‟s new remaining balance after the $20 reduction.   
Safeway admitted that the manual process and the large quantity of 
applications resulted in overcharges.  Specifically, Safeway failed to assess credits 
due and, in fact, after Sosa filed this action in 2003, Safeway conducted its own 
audit retroactive to 1998, which revealed that it had impermissibly overcharged 
approximately 8000 people a $20 additional service charge twice in a twelve-
month period.  In an attempt to retroactively address some impermissible 
overcharges, Safeway issued, by way of a mailing in a white company envelope, 
4000 $20-refund checks.  For the remaining 4000 customers, Safeway attempted to 
utilize a credit by way of a waiver on the customer‟s renewed premium finance 
agreement.  At the time the trial court considered this case, approximately 1300 of 
the insureds had not cashed their $20-refund checks.   
 
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It was not until Sosa filed this action that Safeway modified the UNICORP 
system.  It installed software that enabled UNICORP to automatically verify the 
names and addresses of premium finance agreement applicants and, without human 
intervention, credit an applicant‟s balance by $20 if the applicant had a premium 
finance agreement with Safeway in the previous six months.  This process was 
automated and eliminated the need for the manual entries to enable the $20 credit.   
Although an attempt was made to credit Sosa‟s third premium finance 
agreement before he filed this cause of action, Safeway sent an additional $20-
refund check to him, which was not received until after this action was filed.  At 
the time the trial court rendered the appealed order, Sosa had not cashed his refund 
check, and it had been returned to Safeway‟s counsel.  Sosa initiated this cause of 
action in December 2003, after he entered into the third premium finance 
agreement with Safeway.  Sosa initiated this action after he discovered that his first 
monthly installment payment for the third premium finance agreement with 
Safeway was inexplicably high in price.  Concerned with the reason for the high 
price, Sosa consulted his personal attorney.  After reviewing Sosa‟s three premium 
finance agreements with Safeway, Sosa‟s personal attorney was able to decipher 
that Safeway had overcharged Sosa contrary to Florida law by charging him an 
additional service charge of $20 twice in a twelve-month period.   
 
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To rectify this wrong, and to provide relief to others also overcharged by 
Safeway, Sosa initiated as class representative a class action against Safeway for 
its illegal overcharge of multiple service charges in a twelve-month period.  Sosa 
based his complaint on the overcharges resulting from his first and second 
premium finance agreements with Safeway.  He did not include in his complaint 
his third premium finance agreement with Safeway.  He alleged that Safeway‟s 
imposition of an additional service charge twice in a twelve-month period violated 
section 627.840(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), and that, due to this violation, he 
and the putative class members were entitled to the return of the premium finance 
charges assessed against them by Safeway plus “twice the entire amount of the 
premium finance charge so paid.”  § 627.835, Fla. Stat. (2003).  
After filing his complaint, Sosa moved for class certification.  In Sosa‟s 
motion, he contended that class certification was proper because the factual and 
legal issues presented were common to all class members.  Sosa contended that his 
proposed class satisfied the requirements for class certification as provided by 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(a) because:  (1) the class Sosa sought to 
represent was so numerous that joinder of all members was impracticable 
(numerosity); (2) Sosa‟s claim raised questions of law or fact common to the 
questions of law or fact raised by the claims of each member of the class 
(commonality); (3) Sosa‟s claim was typical of the class members‟ claims 
 
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(typicality); and (4) Sosa could fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class (adequacy).  In addition to the requirements of rule 1.220(a), Sosa alleged 
that he fulfilled the requirements under rule 1.220(b)(3).  He contended that the 
common questions of law and fact predominated over issues affecting only 
individual members, and that class treatment is a superior method for adjudication 
of the matter at issue.  
The trial court conducted a hearing on Sosa‟s motion for class certification.  
During the hearing, the trial court considered depositions, documents, affidavits, 
and discovery.  The trial court found that Sosa had standing because he may have 
endured a temporary conversion of funds due to Safeway unlawfully charging him 
the illegal additional service charge on the second premium finance agreement, 
which presented a live controversy with a redressable injury suitable for 
adjudication.  The trial court also stated that whether the “knowingly” requirement 
in section 627.835 was fulfilled was a matter to be determined at trial and, hence, 
not a reason to deny class certification.  After holding that Sosa‟s claim satisfied 
rule 1.220‟s class certification requirements, the trial court granted Sosa‟s motion 
for class certification.   
The Third District reversed the certification order, holding that “Sosa d[id] 
not state a cause of action for which a class action is appropriate.”  Sosa, 15 So. 3d 
at 11.  The foundation of the Third District‟s holding was a determination that (1) 
 
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Sosa failed to establish rule 1.220(a)‟s commonality requirement, and (2) Sosa‟s 
individual questions of law and fact predominated over the class claims.  See id. at 
10-11.  The Third District held that “there would be different circumstances for 
each individual member of the class which would serve as the bases for and as 
defenses to the additional premiums charged such that the class action requirement 
of commonality cannot be met.”  Id. at 11.  The court provided examples of 
different circumstances, stating:   
These different facts leading to the additional premiums charged 
include situations where an insured changed his or her name or his or 
her address from one six-month premium application to the next, 
leading Safeway to treat the applications as though they were from 
different individuals, or the company generated more than one bill to 
the same address in a twelve-month period or committed other 
mistakes, unintentionally, in the processing of an application. 
Id.   
The Third District then held that the individual claims of Sosa and of each 
class member predominated over any common allegations of an overcharge and 
negated a class action.  See id.  According to the Third District, to prove the 
overcharges, the trial court would need to preliminarily and individually address 
each individual member‟s claims, as Safeway could have a different explanation 
and defense to an alleged knowing violation of section 627.840 for each individual 
class member.  See id.  
The Third District‟s ruling also addressed section 627.835‟s “knowingly” 
requirement.  See id.  The court explained that to act “knowingly” requires an 
 
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intentional or willful act.  See id.  Therefore, Sosa, to meet rule 1.220(a)‟s 
requirements, was required to allege facts that implicated Safeway‟s specific intent 
to overcharge not only Sosa, but each class member on an individual basis.  See id.  
Sosa and the individual class members failed to establish a knowing violation of 
sections 627.840 and 627.835, and, therefore, the Third District concluded that the 
trial court erred in granting class certification and reversed the trial court‟s order.  
See id.   
Sosa thereafter petitioned this Court for discretionary review.  We granted 
review on the basis of express and direct conflict jurisdiction, as provided in article 
V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.   
ANALYSIS 
The Third District Applied the Wrong Standard of Review 
Because this is a pure question of law, this Court‟s standard of review is de 
novo.  See Bosem v. Musa Holdings, Inc., 46 So. 3d 42, 44 (Fla. 2010) (citing So. 
Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc. v. Welker, 908 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 2005), and 
D‟Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003)); see, e.g., Fayad v. 
Clarendon Nat‟l Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 1082, 1085 (Fla. 2005) (applying the de novo 
standard of review in an assessment of whether Florida‟s Third District Court of 
Appeal reached a correct conclusion of law with regard to the application of an 
exclusion in an all-risk insurance policy). 
 
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This Court has established that an appellate court reviews a trial court‟s 
grant of class certification for an abuse of discretion.  See Engle v. Liggett Grp., 
Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1267 (Fla. 2006) (citing Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Updegraff, 
807 So. 2d 768, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)).  That is because “the determination that 
a case meets the requirements of a class action is a factual finding,” which falls 
within a trial court‟s discretion.  Updegraff, 807 So. 2d at 771.  The discretion of a 
trial court is to be applied within the structure of rule 1.220.  The certification of a 
class follows the parameters of the class action rule and the theory upon which the 
rule is based when the court is faced with a multiplicity of individual actions.  The 
class action rule has a real and meaningful position in the administration of justice 
to address the ever-increasing caseload burden placed upon our trial courts.   
In Olen Properties and Glen Cove, the Fourth District, in reviewing a trial 
court‟s certification of a class, employed the abuse of discretion standard of 
review.  See Olen Props., 981 So. 2d at 518 (“A trial court‟s certification of a class 
action is reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard.”); Glen Cove, 847 So. 2d 
at 1112 (“Based upon this analysis, we conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying appellants‟ motion for class certification.”).  The other four 
district courts of appeal, including the Third District, have also applied this 
standard to a trial court‟s order on class certification.  See, e.g., Cole v. Echevarria, 
McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier, 965 So. 2d 1228, 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); 
 
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Sonic Auto., Inc. v. Galura, 961 So. 2d 961, 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); United Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Diagnostics of S. Fla., Inc., 921 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); 
Seminole Cnty. v. Tivoli Orlando Assocs., 920 So. 2d 818, 821 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2006). 
In this matter, the Third District erred by not applying the abuse of 
discretion standard of review to the trial court‟s grant of class certification.  See 
Sosa, 15 So. 3d at 9-11.  Rather, the Third District conducted a de novo review, as 
it gave no deference to the trial court‟s factual findings and made its own 
independent determination as to whether Sosa satisfied the requirements of rule 
1.220.  See id.  More specifically, in lieu of pointing to the lack of competent, 
substantial evidence supporting the trial court‟s order, or stating why the trial 
court‟s conclusions of law were erroneous, the Third District made its own 
findings that Sosa and the putative class members did not satisfy the commonality 
and predominance elements of rule 1.220, and that Sosa failed to meet section 
627.835‟s “knowingly” requirement.  Then, the Third District held that the trial 
court erred because it did not find the same.  This constituted a de novo review and 
error.  Conversely, the Fourth District in Olen Properties and Glen Cove—by 
applying the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court order on class 
certification—exemplified the proper methodology to be employed by an appellate 
court when it reviews a trial court‟s order on class certification.   
 
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Third District‟s Misapplication of Section 627.835‟s “Knowingly” Requirement 
Section 627.835 penalizes a party if it “knowingly” violates section 
627.840(3)(b).  See § 627.835.  The purpose of section 627.840(3)(b) is to regulate 
the service charges that a premium finance company may allocate.  Section 
627.840(3)(b) provides:   
(b) The service charge shall be a maximum of $12 per $100 per 
year plus an additional charge not exceeding $20, which additional 
charge need not be refunded upon prepayment. Such additional charge 
may be charged only once in a 12-month period for any one customer 
unless that customer‟s policy has been canceled due to nonpayment 
within the immediately preceding 12-month period.  
 
(emphasis added.)  In 1995, Florida‟s Department of Financial Services, which 
succeeded Florida‟s Department of Insurance (the agency that audited and 
regulated Safeway), adopted a rule interpreting this section.  That rule states:  
69O-196.038 Limit on Additional $20 Service Charge. 
 
(1) The additional $20 charge referred to in Section 627.840(3)(b), 
F.S., may be charged only once in a 12-month period for any one 
customer regardless of the number of premium finance agreements 
entered into during the 12-month period or the number of policies 
financed in each finance agreement. 
 
(2) The only exception to the limitation on the additional charge is 
in instances where a customer‟s finance contract has been cancelled 
due to nonpayment within the immediately preceding 12-month 
period. In such instances, a company may collect the additional charge 
again if it refinances the customer‟s policy during the same 12-month 
period 
 
Fla. Admin. Code R. 69O-196.038 (formerly Fla. Admin. Code R. 4-196.038). 
 
 
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Section 627.835 states:   
Any person, premium finance company, or other legal entity who 
or which knowingly takes, receives, reserves, or charges a premium 
finance charge other than that authorized by this part shall thereby 
forfeit the entire premium finance charge to which such person, 
premium finance company, or legal entity would otherwise be 
entitled; and any person who has paid such unlawful finance charge 
may personally or by her or his legal or personal representative, by 
suit for recovery thereof, recover from such person, premium finance 
company, or legal entity twice the entire amount of the premium 
finance charge so paid. 
 
§ 627.835 (emphasis added).  Because the Florida Legislature does not define 
“knowingly” in chapter 627 of the Florida Statutes, to construe its meaning, we 
refer to the term‟s plain and ordinary meaning, which is discerned from a 
dictionary.  See Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Schs., Inc., 3 
So. 3d 1220, 1223 (Fla. 2009).  Black‟s Law Dictionary defines “knowing,” of 
which “knowingly” is the adverb form, as “[h]aving or showing awareness or 
understanding; well-informed.”  Black‟s Law Dictionary 950 (9th ed. 2009).  Thus, 
a party violates section 627.835 if it, with awareness and understanding of its 
actions, or through a common and routine billing practice, overcharges another in 
contravention of chapter 627 of the Florida Statutes.   
The Third District in Sosa erred when it held that the trial court improperly 
granted Sosa‟s motion for class certification on the basis that Sosa failed to 
demonstrate that Safeway knowingly overcharged him in contravention of sections 
627.840 and 627.835.  See Sosa, 15 So. 3d at 11.  The Third District erred because 
 
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whether Safeway “knowingly” overcharged Sosa is a question of fact for a jury, 
and, therefore, Sosa was not required to prove that element in his pretrial motion 
for class certification.  See Lynch v. Brown, 489 So. 2d 65, 66-67 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1986).  When it determined that Sosa could not serve as class representative 
because he failed to demonstrate that Safeway “knowingly” overcharged him, the 
Third District improperly conflated rule 1.220‟s class certification requirements 
with a question for the trier of fact.  Rather, at issue during Sosa‟s motion for class 
certification was whether Sosa and the putative class members, based on the 
parties‟ arguments, pleadings, and discovery, met the requirements for class 
certification—an inquiry that restricted the trial court‟s examination to the 
substance of the motion and not the merits of the cause of action or questions of 
fact for a jury.  See Morgan v. Coats, 33 So. 3d 59, 63-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) 
(“Although a trial court will generally be required to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether to certify a class, the trial court‟s proper focus is on 
whether the requirements of rule 1.220 have been met and not on whether the 
moving party will prevail on the merits.” (quoting City of Tampa v. Addison, 979 
So. 2d 246, 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007))); Policastro v. Stelk, 780 So. 2d 989, 991 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (“Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(d)(1) does not 
contemplate merits discovery prior to class certification; rather, the rule permits 
discovery „concerning whether the claim or defense is maintainable on behalf of a 
 
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class.‟  Until discovery on this limited issue is completed, the trial court may 
postpone the determination of class certification.”).  
Hence, because Sosa did not need to prove the factual issue of whether 
Safeway “knowingly” overcharged him in the motion for class certification, that 
matter was not before the trial court.  The Third District, therefore, erred in 
definitively adjudicating it on appeal as part of its review concerning whether the 
trial court properly granted class certification.  
The Trial Court Properly Granted Class Certification 
As with district courts of appeal, this Court reviews a trial court‟s order on 
class certification for an abuse of discretion, see Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1266, 
examines a trial court‟s factual findings for competent, substantial evidence, and 
reviews conclusions of law de novo, see Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Gov‟t v. 
City of Sarasota, 48 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 2010).  It also reviews a district court‟s 
application and conclusions of law de novo.  See Fayad v. Clarendon Nat‟l Ins. 
Co., 899 So. 2d 1082, 1085 (Fla. 2005). 
A trial court must make its determination as to class certification at an early 
stage in a cause of action, i.e., “certainly before trial, and typically before 
discovery is completed.”  Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1266.  To certify a class, a trial 
court must engage in an analysis with regard to whether the class representative 
and putative class members meet the requirements for class certification 
 
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promulgated in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220.  See Canal Ins. Co. v. 
Gibraltar Budget Plan, Inc., 41 So. 3d 375, 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).  Although 
rule 1.220 does not demand it, and certainly not all situations require it, a trial 
court may conduct an evidentiary hearing to evaluate the basis for class 
certification when there may be questions with regard to whether common issues 
predominate or whether the proposed class representatives provide a superior 
method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.  See Barton-
Malow Co. v. Bauer, 627 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citing Merrill v. 
S. Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1986)).  A trial court should resolve 
doubts with regard to certification in favor of certification, especially in the early 
stages of litigation.  See Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. v. Procher, 898 So. 2d 153, 
156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  
When determining whether to certify a class, a trial court should focus on 
the prerequisites for class certification and not the merits of a cause of action.  See 
Morgan, 33 So. 3d at 63-64.  However, if consequential to its consideration of 
whether to certify a class, a trial court may consider evidence on the merits of the 
case as it applies to the class certification requirements.  See Freedom Life Ins. Co. 
of Am. v. Wallant, 891 So. 2d 1109, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“[W]hen deciding 
whether to certify a class, the trial court‟s focus should be on whether the 
prerequisites for class certification have been established.  However . . . the court 
 
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may still consider evidence on the merits of the case . . . in determining whether 
the prerequisites for class certification have been established.”  (citing Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974))).  Nevertheless, the trial court‟s 
consideration of the merits during class certification review must not result in a 
determination on the merits or a shift in focus from deciding whether a litigant‟s 
claim is suited for class certification.  See id. (holding that the trial court did not err 
because it considered the merits of the claim only as they applied to a class 
certification finding and made no determination on the merits). 
To obtain class certification, the proponent of class certification carries the 
burden of pleading and proving the elements required under rule 1.220.  See 
InPhyNet Contr. Servs. v. Soria, 33 So. 3d 766, 771 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).  This 
includes the four elements of rule 1.220(a).  See Canal Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Budget 
Plan, Inc., 41 So. 3d 375, 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).  As delineated by rule 
1.220(a), the four elements that a party must satisfy to obtain class certification are:   
(1) the members of the class are so numerous that separate joinder of 
each member is impracticable [numerosity], (2) the claim or defense 
of the representative party raises questions of law or fact common to 
the questions of law or fact raised by the claim or defense of each 
member of the class [commonality], (3) the claim or defense of the 
representative party is typical of the claim or defense of each member 
of the class [typicality], and (4) the representative party can fairly and 
adequately protect and represent the interests of each member of the 
class [adequacy]. 
 
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a) (emphasis added).  
 
- 22 - 
 
In addition, the proponent of class certification must satisfy one of the three 
subdivisions of rule 1.220(b).  See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b) (stating that a party may 
maintain a claim or defense on behalf of a class if it satisfies rule 1.220(a) and 
1.220(b)).  Rule 1.220(b)(3) states that if sections 1.220(b)(1) and 1.220(b)(2) are 
not satisfied,3 then a party may satisfy the requisites of 1.220(b) by fulfilling rule 
1.220(b)(3).  Rule 1.220(b)(3) provides: 
(3) the claim or defense is not maintainable under either 
subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), but the questions of law or fact common 
                                         
3.  Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(b)(1)-(2) provides:   
 
A claim or defense may be maintained on behalf of a class if the court 
concludes that the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and 
that: 
 
(1) the prosecution of separate claims or defenses by or against 
individual members of the class would create a risk of either: 
 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications concerning 
individual members of the class which would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the 
class; or 
 
(B) adjudications concerning individual members of the 
class which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the 
interests of other members of the class who are not parties to 
the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede the ability 
of other members of the class who are not parties to the 
adjudications to protect their interests; or 
 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds generally applicable to all the members of the class, thereby 
making final injunctive relief or declaratory relief concerning the class 
as a whole appropriate; . . . . 
 
- 23 - 
to the claim or defense of the representative party and the claim or 
defense of each member of the class predominate over any question of 
law or fact affecting only individual members of the class, and class 
representation is superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The conclusions shall be 
derived from consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances, 
including (A) the respective interests of each member of the class in 
individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims or 
defenses, (B) the nature and extent of any pending litigation to which 
any member of the class is a party and in which any question of law or 
fact controverted in the subject action is to be adjudicated, (C) the 
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation in the 
forum where the subject action is instituted, and (D) the difficulties 
likely to be encountered in the management of the claim or defense on 
behalf of a class. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
i. 
Commonality 
Sosa and the putative class members satisfied rule 1.220(a)‟s commonality 
requirement because their claims arose from the same course of conduct and 
routine billing practice by Safeway and were based on the same legal theory, i.e., 
Safeway knowingly overcharged Sosa and the class members in contravention of 
sections 627.840 and 627.835.  The Third District risked perverting rule 1.220(a) 
by misapplying that rule‟s commonality requirement.  The primary concern in the 
consideration of commonality is whether the representative‟s claim arises from the 
same practice or course of conduct that gave rise to the remaining claims and 
whether the claims are based on the same legal theory.  See Morgan, 33 So. 3d at 
64 (citing Powell v. River Ranch Prop. Owners Ass‟n, Inc., 522 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1988)).  
 
- 24 - 
The threshold of the commonality requirement is not high.  See Broin v. 
Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 641 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (citing Jenkins v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F. 2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986)).  A mere factual 
difference between class members does not necessarily preclude satisfaction of the 
commonality requirement.  See Morgan, 33 So. 3d at 64 (citing Leszczynski v. 
Allianz, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 659, 671 (S.D. Fla. 1997)).  Individualized damage 
inquiries will also not preclude class certification.  See id. at 65; Ouellette v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 888 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Broin, 641 So. 2d at 891 
(“Entitlement to different amounts of damages is not fatal to a class action.” (citing 
Cohen v. Camino Sheridan, Inc., 466 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985))). 
Rather, the commonality requirement is aimed at determining whether there 
is a need for, and benefit derived from, class treatment.  See Broin, 641 So. 2d at 
890 (quoting Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 473).  More specifically, the commonality prong 
only requires that resolution of a class action affect all or a substantial number of 
the class members, and that the subject of the class action presents a question of 
common or general interest.  See Wallant, 891 So. 2d at 1116 (quoting Colonial 
Penn Ins. Co. v. Magnetic Imaging Sys. I, Ltd., 694 So. 2d 852, 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1997)). 
Furthermore, the commonality requirement is satisfied if the common or 
general interest of the class members is in the object of the action, the result 
 
- 25 - 
sought, or the general question implicated in the action.  See Imperial Towers 
Condo., Inc. v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (citing Port 
Royal, Inc. v. Conboy, 154 So. 2d 734, 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)).  This core of the 
commonality requirement is satisfied if the questions linking the class members are 
substantially related to the resolution of the litigation, even if the individuals are 
not identically situated.  See Morgan, 33 So. 3d at 64. 
For example, in Morgan, the Second District held that the proposed class 
representative, a detention deputy for a sheriff‟s office, as well as a putative class 
of other detention deputies, satisfied rule 1.220(a)‟s commonality requirement.  
The common claims asserted by the class representative and class members were 
breach of an oral contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment.   The class 
members predicated their claims on the supposition that the class representative 
and class members, for a period of approximately two years, were being 
compensated for an eight-hour work day when they worked 8 1/2 hours. 
The trial court found that the class representative and putative class members 
failed to meet the commonality prong because each class member would base his 
or her claim on unique facts, with each claim requiring individualized proof.  The 
Second District reversed and concluded that the class representative and putative 
class members satisfied the commonality requirement because the facts upon 
which the claims rested arose from the same course of conduct by the sheriff‟s 
 
- 26 - 
office and the same legal theory, i.e., the failure to pay the deputies for their entire 
workday, resulting in claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, or unjust 
enrichment.  See Morgan, 33 So. 3d at 64-65.  Although the Second District 
admitted that there may have been some factual variations among the class 
members‟ claims, such as the duration of employment, those differences did not 
preclude a finding of commonality.  See id. at 65.  Instead, those nuanced factual 
differences went to each individual damage determination, which did not preclude 
a finding of commonality.  See id.  The Second District held that class certification 
was proper because it was clear that each class member predicated a claim upon 
the same course of conduct by the sheriff‟s office, and had based his or her claim 
on the same legal theories.  See id. 
Likewise, in Broin, the Third District, in reversing a trial court, held that a 
class representative and putative class members satisfied rule 1.220(a)‟s 
commonality requirement.  There, the purported class representative and members 
were thirty nonsmoking flight attendants employed by various airlines throughout 
the United States.  The class representative and class members claimed that by 
inhaling second-hand smoke emitted in airplane cabins, they had suffered diseases 
and medical disorders.  According to the claimants, these diseases and disorders 
justified a cause of action against the defendant, a cigarette company, for damages 
based on theories of strict tort liability, breach of implied warranty, negligence, 
 
- 27 - 
fraud, misrepresentation, and conspiracy to commit fraud.  The trial court denied 
the claimants‟ motion for class certification based on a finding that the class was 
too large, the complaint raised issues of first impression, and the class 
representative raised issues not common to the class members.   
The Third District reversed and held that the class representative and 
putative class members satisfied the commonality requirement because they all 
engaged in the same conduct by inhaling the smoke; the defendant acted toward 
each member in a similar manner by manufacturing the cigarettes; and they all 
sought recovery under a shared a common interest in obtaining relief, i.e., they 
were all damaged by the cigarette smoke and sought relief for the harm done by it.  
See Broin, 641 So. 2d at 891.  The Third District further held that the differences 
between the class members—such as entitlement to relief under each individual 
claimant‟s applicable statute of limitations and amount of individualized damages 
owed to each claimant—did not preclude a finding of commonality.  See id.  These 
differences did not preclude relief because they were merely factual and did not 
negate the common, general interest shared by the putative class members.  See id.   
Also bolstering the Third District‟s decision in Broin was the fact that the 
cigarette company was to assert common, if not identical, defenses to the class 
members‟ claims.  See id.  This favored class treatment because a class action in 
 
- 28 - 
such a scenario would aid judicial efficiency and economy, and was warranted to 
avoid duplicitous litigation of the class members‟ common issues.  See id. 
Additionally, as part of its decision, the Third District reasoned:   
It would be a perversion of the spirit behind rule 1.220, and the 
cases interpreting the rule, to hold, as defendants urge, that plaintiffs‟ 
class action allegations fail because plaintiffs do not present identical 
claims.  If class actions were dependent on class members presenting 
carbon copy claims, there would be few, if any, instances of class 
action litigation.  It is virtually impossible to design a class whose 
members have identical claims.  Even in the context of a mass 
disaster, each afflicted member experiences the impact differently, 
according to the member‟s relative location and proximity to the 
event.  Defendants‟ proposed holding would nullify the class action 
rule, a course of conduct we decline to follow. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  Similarly, in the conflict cases of Glen Cove and Olen 
Properties, the Fourth District correctly complied with the spirit of rule 1.220(a) 
and its commonality requirement. 
In Glen Cove, the class members filed a class action claim against the 
defendant for failure to maintain the roofs of two buildings, which resulted in the 
collapse of the roofs and condemnation by the City of Lauderdale Lakes, Florida.  
847 So. 2d at 1109.  The claimants—who were the occupants of the condemned 
buildings—asserted that, by not maintaining the roofs, the defendants—who 
owned and leased the condemned buildings—breached a statutory duty, were 
negligent, and constructively and wrongfully evicted the claimants.  See id.  The 
Fourth District held that the claimants satisfied rule 1.220(a)‟s commonality 
 
- 29 - 
requirement because they based their claims on the same legal theories, with those 
claims arising from the same course of conduct by the defendant, i.e., the failure to 
maintain the roofs.  See id. at 1110. 
 
Likewise, in Olen Properties, the Fourth District upheld a trial court‟s grant 
of class certification, holding that the putative class members satisfied rule 
1.220(a)‟s commonality requirement.  981 So. 2d at 519-20.  There, the class 
representative and putative class members were tenants of the defendants.  See id.  
In the class members‟ lease agreement with the defendants, there was a 
cancellation fee for early termination that equaled one monthly rent payment.  See 
id. at 517.  This fee was in the form of liquidated and not actual damages, and did 
not take into account mitigating factors in the defendants‟ recovery for a tenant‟s 
early termination.  See id.  When the class representative exercised her right to 
early termination, the defendants attempted to apply that provision, to which the 
class representative responded by filing a class action claim on behalf of herself 
and the other tenants.  See id. 
The trial court granted class certification and the Fourth District affirmed.  
See id.  It held that although the different tenants may have been subject to 
different fees than that of the class representative, this did not negate commonality, 
because the tenants still shared a common issue.  See id. at 520.  More specifically, 
the Fourth District held that commonality existed because at issue was not whether 
 
- 30 - 
the types of fees were the same, but rather, whether the defendants‟ common 
practice of assessing liquidated damages as opposed to actual damages to the class 
members if they terminated their leases early was permissible.  See id.   
 
In this case, Sosa and the putative members filed the action against Safeway 
predicated on a routine course of conduct and common billing practice that 
Safeway knowingly charged them an additional premium service charge twice in a 
twelve-month period in contravention of sections 627.840 and 627.835.  See Sosa, 
15 So. 3d at 9-10.   The trial court found that Sosa and the putative class members 
satisfied the commonality requirement, but the Third District reversed that finding.  
See id. at 11.  The Third District‟s reason for the reversal was that “there would be 
different circumstances for each individual member of the class which would serve 
as the base for and as defenses to the additional premiums charged.”  Id. at 11. 
The approach of the Third District was erroneous and conflicted with the 
proper application of the commonality requirement articulated in Glen Cove and 
Olen Properties, because it diverted the proper focus from the common and routine 
course of conduct and billing practice of Safeway overcharging its customers to the 
mere factual differences surrounding each putative class member‟s claim.  The 
Third District did not even consider that Safeway‟s common course of conduct and 
routine billing practice served as the basis for Sosa‟s and the putative class 
members‟ claims.  Rather, to negate commonality, the Third District focused only 
 
- 31 - 
on the possibility of mere factual differences in the individual circumstances 
surrounding each of the putative class members‟ claims and the variances in 
defenses to them.  This was error, as the focus of a court in reviewing a finding of 
the commonality requirement is on whether the class members predicated their 
claims on the same common course of conduct by the defendant and the same legal 
theory.  See Morgan, 33 So. 3d at 64 (“ „The . . . primary concern in considering 
the . . . commonality of claims should be whether the representative‟s claim arises 
from the same practice or course of conduct that gave rise to the remaining claims 
and whether the claims are based on the same legal theory.‟ ” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Powell, 522 So. 2d at 70)).   
The dissent incorrectly asserts that there has been a failure to properly allege 
commonality.  That mistaken supposition serves as the entire basis for the dissent‟s 
assertion that this case is distinguishable from Glen Cove and Olen Properties.  
Contrary to the dissent‟s argument and the holding of the Third District, Sosa 
clearly satisfied the commonality requirement.  The complaint sets forth 
allegations that Safeway engaged in the common course of conduct and business 
practice of “assessing and accepting for payment from Mr. Sosa and the Class 
members an additional charge in excess of twenty dollars ($20) in a 12-month 
period,” which violated sections 637.835 and 627.840.  Complaint at 128.  As with 
the allegations of commonality in Glen Cove and Olen Properties, the allegations 
 
- 32 - 
of commonality in this case focused on allegations of the common course of 
conduct of the defendant which allegedly resulted in the same alleged injury to the 
class representative and the putative class members.  Therefore, commonality was 
clearly satisfied if true because the common course of conduct and routine business 
practice by Safeway and the same legal theory—i.e., Safeway overcharging Sosa 
and the putative class members in contravention of section 627.840 and 627.835—
served as the basis for all claims.  See Morgan, 33 So. 3d at 64-65 (stating that 
mere factual differences and differing individual damage amounts do not preclude 
satisfaction of rule 1.220(a)‟s commonality requirement).  A common course of 
conduct and common business practice is, most assuredly, intentional action, and 
not some freak occasion or accident.   
Further, the dissent and Third District mischaracterize the effect of the 
“knowingly” element of section 627.835 on the commonality requirement.  
Whether Safeway in fact engaged in the common course of conduct that resulted in 
the overcharges as alleged is a fact question reserved for the jury and does not 
negate the trial court‟s determination that, if proven, Safeway‟s common business 
practice would have injured Sosa and the putative class members in the same way.  
See Horne, 533 So. 2d at 264.  Therefore, the dissent is incorrect in its assertion 
that an absence of the “knowingly” element of section 627.835 negates satisfaction 
of the commonality requirement.  This case is allegedly about an intentional 
 
- 33 - 
common course of conduct and a business practice which, if proven, answers the 
question.  This holding is consistent with the recent decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 79 U.S.L.W. 4416 
(U.S. June 6, 2011) (No. 09-1403).  That case involved a class action claim for 
alleged securities fraud, and the lower court held that class certification was not 
proper because the putative class members did not prove “loss causation” at the 
class certification stage.  See id. at 4416-18.  The High Court reversed and held 
that the putative class members need not prove that fact question at the class 
certification stage.  See id. at 4419. 
ii. 
Predominance 
 
Sosa and the putative class members satisfy the predominance requirement 
of rule 1.220(b)(3), as we are presented with a classic case for a class action.  The 
Third District incorrectly held that the class members‟ individual claims 
predominated over the common questions.  Rather, the common questions for Sosa 
and the putative class members pervade the individualized claims because they are 
based on the common question of whether Safeway engaged in a common course 
of conduct and business practice that resulted in it overcharging Sosa and the 
putative class members in violation of Florida law, which is a claim that requires 
generalized, class-wide proof.   
 
- 34 - 
In addition, Sosa sought, and the trial court granted, class certification based 
on rule 1.220(b)(3).  To meet the requirements of rule 1.220(b)(3), the party 
moving for class certification must establish that the class members‟ common 
questions of law and fact predominate over individual class member claims.  See 
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(3); see also InPhyNet Contracting Servs., Inc. v. Soria, 33 
So. 3d 766, 771 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 
860, 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)).  Florida courts have held that common questions of 
fact predominate when the defendant acts toward the class members in a similar or 
common way.  See Stone v. Compuserve Interactive Servs., Inc., 804 So. 2d 383, 
388 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).  The predominance and commonality requirements 
parallel one another, but are not identical.  The predominance requirement is more 
stringent because, to satisfy this requirement, common questions must not only 
exist but also predominate and pervade.  See Soria, 33 So. 3d at 771-72; Rollins, 
Inc., 951 So. 2d at 868; Wyeth, Inc. v. Gottlieb, 930 So. 2d 635, 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2006); see also Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F. 3d 1256, 1270 (11th Cir. 
2009) (“Even if the court can identify common questions of law or fact, however, 
„[t]he predominance inquiry . . . is “far more demanding” than Rule 23(a)‟s 
commonality requirement.‟”  (alterations in original) (quoting Rutstein v. Avis 
Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000))). 
 
- 35 - 
The methodology employed by a trial court in determining whether class 
claims predominate over individual claims involves a proof-based inquiry.  More 
specifically, a class representative establishes predominance if he or she 
demonstrates a reasonable methodology for generalized proof of class-wide 
impact.  See Soria, 33 So. 3d at 771.  A class representative accomplishes this if he 
or she, by proving his or her own individual case, necessarily proves the cases of 
the other class members.  See id. (citing Seminole Cnty. v. Tivoli Orlando Assocs. 
Ltd., 920 So. 2d 818, 824 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)).   
Whether class claims predominate also requires the consideration of how the 
resolution of the class claims will affect each class member‟s underlying cause of 
action.  See id. at 772 (“ „To assess the impact of a common question on the class 
members‟ claims, a . . . court obviously must examine not only the defendant's 
course of conduct towards the class members, but also the class members‟ legal 
rights and duties.‟ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. 
v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs., Inc., 601 F.3d 1159, 1170 (11th Cir. 
2010))).  If, in examining the claims, a trial court finds that common issues of fact 
and law impact more substantially the efforts of every class member to prove 
liability than the individual issues that may arise, then class claims predominate.  
See id. (citing Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc., 601 F. 3d at 1170).  However, it is 
not the burden of the class representative to illustrate that all questions of fact or 
 
- 36 - 
law are common.  See Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc., 601 F. 3d  at 1178.  Rather, 
the class representative must only demonstrate that some questions are common, 
and that they predominate over individual questions.  See id. (citing Klay v. 
Humana, Inc., 382 F.2d 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
In Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003), 
the Eleventh Circuit held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding 
that a class representative and putative class members fulfilled the predominance 
requirement.  See id. at 1260-61.  At issue was whether Exxon systematically 
overcharged 10,000 of its current and former dealers in thirty-five states.  See id. at 
1251.  Exxon sought dealer participation in a pricing system under which retail 
customers who paid cash for gasoline would pay a few cents less than customers 
who paid with credit cards.  See id. at 1252.  In an effort to maximize dealer 
participation in this pricing system, Exxon began charging dealers a 3% processing 
fee on sales of gasoline to consumers who paid by credit card, but promised to 
offset the charge by reducing the wholesale price that each dealer paid for gasoline.  
See id.  Exxon kept this promise for six months.  See id.  After that six-month 
period, Exxon, without informing the dealers, stopped providing the offset.  See id.  
The dealers alleged that by removing the offset, Exxon was overcharging them for 
gasoline.  See id.  Based on this allegation, the dealers filed a class action against 
 
- 37 - 
Exxon for breach of contract and fraudulent concealment of a breach of contract.   
See id.   
The trial court certified the dealers‟ class action.  See id.  On appeal to the 
Eleventh Circuit, Exxon contended that the trial court erred by certifying the class 
because individual claims predominated over class claims.  See id. at 1260.  Exxon 
averred that the trial court erred because each dealer‟s claim and Exxon‟s 
affirmative defenses would be resolved on the basis of a single set of facts, which 
ignored the unique factual and legal issues relevant to the claims of each individual 
class member.  See id.   
The Eleventh Circuit, however, upheld the class certification and held that 
class claims predominated because  
all of the dealer agreements were materially similar and Exxon 
purported to reduce the price of wholesale gas for all dealers. . . . 
Whether it breached that obligation was a question common to the 
class and the issue of liability was appropriately determined on a 
class-wide basis. 
 
Id. at 1261. 
The Eleventh Circuit held further that the individual issues raised by the 
affirmative defenses of Exxon pertained primarily to the determination of damages 
and not liability.  See id.  This factor did not negate predominance because the 
court held that the presence of individualized damage issues did not prevent a 
finding that the common issues in the case predominated.  See id.   
 
- 38 - 
In this case, Sosa and the putative class members satisfied rule 1.220(b)(3)‟s 
predominance requirement because the common class questions for Sosa and the 
putative class members require generalized proof and not individual inquiries or 
mini-trials.  To resolve whether Safeway overcharged Sosa and the putative class 
members in contravention of sections 627.840 and 627.835, the trial court need 
only determine whether Safeway was aware of, and understood that, its common 
course of conduct and routine business billing practice would result in an 
overcharge to the class members.  Such inquiry applies equally to Sosa and all 
putative class members, as each of these claims emanates from Safeway‟s common 
course of conduct and routine business practice that resulted in the overcharges.   
Further bolstering the predominance of the class claims here is that any 
minor variance in factual circumstances would be with regard to the issue of 
damages and not liability, which does not preclude class certification.  Also, any 
defense by Safeway would involve a defense common to all class members, i.e., 
that it was not aware, nor did it understand, that its conduct would result in an 
overcharge to all class members.   
In addition, any variance in damage recovery between the class members is 
calculable by using a systematic formula, strengthening the predominance of the 
class claims.  More specifically, although the damage assessment for each class 
member may vary—as each class member‟s claim might involve a different 
 
- 39 - 
number of premium finance agreements, varying amounts of premium finance 
charges, and differing credits and refunds obtained from Safeway—each unique 
damage calculation may be found upon Safeway crediting to each class member 
the amount of premium finance charges they paid plus twice the amount the class 
member paid and then subtracting that amount by any amount that has been 
credited or refunded.  See § 627.835, Fla. Stat.  This lack of complexity in the 
damage assessment for Sosa and the putative class members supports the trial 
court‟s finding of predominance and negates the validity of the Third District‟s 
ruling to the contrary.   
This determination is in accord in with the principles of class-action 
litigation, because, as stated in the dissent in Sosa: 
Rather than have an unmanageable number of plaintiffs filing 
individual $20 lawsuits, this class action empowers the little guy and 
gives him leverage to fight an otherwise insurmountable foe. If 
plaintiff prevails, the big guy no longer lifts $20 from unsuspecting 
customers‟ pockets, the plaintiffs are made whole, and justice can 
reign supreme. 
 
Sosa, 15 So. 3d at 17 (Gersten, C.J., dissenting).   
 
iii. 
Numerosity 
 
Sosa and the putative class members satisfied rule 1.220(a)‟s numerosity 
requirement because the members of the proposed class were so numerous as to 
make joinder impractical. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a).  No specific number and no 
precise count are needed to sustain the numerosity requirement.  See Toledo v. 
 
- 40 - 
Hillsborough Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 747 So. 2d 958, 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); 
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 720 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D. Fla. 1989).  Rather, class 
certification is proper if the class representative does not base the projected class 
size on mere speculation.  See Toledo, 747 So. 2d at 961 (“It is well-settled that, 
while a plaintiff is not required to plead the exact number of persons included in a 
proposed class, a plaintiff is precluded from relying on speculation as to class 
size.”).   
In this case, Sosa asserted a projected class of at least several hundred, if not 
thousands, of aggrieved class members.  This assuredly satisfies the numerosity 
requirement.  See, e.g., Union Am. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 696 So. 2d 1248, 1249 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (concluding numerosity has been established where the trial 
court found that the class will be in excess of 20,000 people); Broin, 641 So. 2d at 
889 (concluding numerosity prong was met because separate joinder of the 
members would be impractical because there were over 60,000 people in the 
class); Maner Props., Inc. v. Siksay, 489 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) 
(determining numerosity requirement was satisfied because evidence that there 
were potentially over 350 plaintiffs in class was sufficient to support the trial 
court‟s determination that plaintiff class was so numerous that separate joinder 
would be impractical).   
 
- 41 - 
Sosa also did not base the class number on mere speculation, as the class 
included all persons in Florida who financed insurance premiums with Safeway 
and to whom Safeway overcharged an additional service charge of $20 in a twelve-
month period.  See Sosa, 15 So. 3d at 16 (Gersten, C.J., dissenting).  Therefore, 
given the geographical and chronological span of the class, numerosity was clearly 
established.   
iv. 
Typicality 
 
Class certification was proper because Sosa and the putative class members 
satisfied rule 1.220(a)‟s typicality requirement.  The key inquiry for a trial court 
when it determines whether a proposed class satisfies the typicality requirement is 
whether the class representative possesses the same legal interest and has endured 
the same legal injury as the class members.  See Morgan, 33 So. 3d at 65 (citing 
Clausnitzer v. Fed. Express Corp., 248 F.R.D. 647, 656 (S.D. Fla. 2008)).  The test 
for typicality is not demanding and focuses generally on the similarities between 
the class representative and the putative class members.  See id. (citing Basco v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 592, 599 (E.D. La. 2002)).  Mere factual 
differences between the class representative‟s claims and the claims of the class 
members will not defeat typicality.  See Glen Cove, 847 So. 2d at 1111.  Rather, 
the typicality requirement is satisfied when there is a strong similarity in the legal 
theories upon which those claims are based and when the claims of the class 
 
- 42 - 
representative and class members are not antagonistic to one another.  See Morgan, 
33 So. 3d at 65 (“ „The typicality requirement may be satisfied despite substantial 
factual differences . . . when there is a strong similarity of legal theories.‟ ” 
(quoting Clausnitzer, 248 F.R.D. at 656)).  
 
For example, in Morgan, 33 So. 3d at 65, the Second District held that the 
class representative‟s claims were typical to those of the class members.  There, the 
class representative alleged that he suffered the same injury as the class members.  
See id.  He also based his claims on the same legal theories as those in the class.  
See id.  There were, however, factual differences between the class representative 
and the class members regarding the extent of injury and perceived damage 
recovery.  See id.  The Second District held that the class representative satisfied 
the typicality prong by illustrating that he possessed the same legal interest and had 
suffered the same type of legal injury as the other class members.  See id.  It also 
held that although the extent of the class representative‟s injury—i.e., damages—
might vary from that of the other class members, this did not serve as a bar to a 
finding of typicality.  See id.   
 
In this case, the claims of Sosa and the putative class members are based on 
the same legal theory—a violation of sections 627.840 and 627.835—that arose 
from the same course of conduct that caused a similar injury—Safeway 
overcharging Sosa and the putative class members an additional service charge of 
 
- 43 - 
$20 twice in a twelve-month period.  The fact that Sosa‟s and the putative class 
members‟ damage recovery might differ because Sosa received a $20 credit on his 
third premium finance agreement is a mere factual difference as to the extent of his 
injury and damage recovery, which does not preclude a finding of typicality.  
Accordingly, class certification was proper and the Third District erred in 
concluding that this element of rule 1.220(a) had not been established.   
v. 
Adequacy 
Sosa fulfilled rule 1.220(a)‟s adequacy requirement.  To grant class 
certification, a trial court must determine that the class representative satisfies the 
adequacy requirement of rule 1.220(a), i.e., it must find that “the representative 
party can fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of each member 
of the class.”  Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a)(4).  This inquiry serves to uncover conflicts 
of interest between the presumptive class representative and the class he or she 
seeks to represent.  See Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell, 827 So. 2d 261, 268 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2002).  A trial court‟s inquiry concerning whether the adequacy 
requirement is satisfied contains two prongs.  See City of Tampa v. Addison, 979 
So. 2d 246, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). The first prong concerns the qualifications, 
experience, and ability of class counsel to conduct the litigation.  See id.  The 
second prong pertains to whether the class representative‟s interests are 
antagonistic to the interests of the class members.  See id. 
 
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In this case, Sosa was willing and able to take an active role as class 
representative and advocate on behalf of all class members.  His interests were not 
antagonistic to those of the rest of the class.  On the contrary, they paralleled the 
interests of the class members, as he and the class members sought redress from 
Safeway based on alleged violations of sections 627.835 and 627.840.  Further, the 
trial court determined that Sosa‟s legal team was competent and experienced, 
giving them the ability to advocate effectively on behalf of Sosa and the putative 
class members.  Accordingly, Sosa fulfilled the adequacy requirement of rule 
1.220(a).   
vi. 
Superiority 
 
Sosa and the putative class members satisfied rule 1.220(b)(3)‟s superiority 
requirement because a class action is the most manageable and efficient way to 
resolve the individual claims of each class member.  See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(3) 
(requiring that “class representation is superior to other available methods for the 
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”).  Three factors for courts to 
consider when deciding whether a class action is the superior method of 
adjudicating a controversy are (1) whether a class action would provide the class 
members with the only economically viable remedy; (2) whether there is a 
likelihood that the individual claims are large enough to justify the expense of 
separate litigation; and (3) whether a class action cause of action is manageable.  
 
- 45 - 
See Morgan, 33 So. 3d at 66 (citing Liggett Grp. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 445-46 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2003), approved in part and quashed in part on other grounds, 945 
So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006)).  The superiority factors weigh in favor of class 
certification.  See id.  
 
In this case, Sosa‟s cause of action is suitable for class certification because 
it is the superior form of adjudication for this controversy.  There are potentially 
thousands of prospective class members and their small individual economic 
claims involving a $20 overcharge are not so large as to economically justify each 
individual filing a separate action.  Allowing Sosa and the putative class members 
to proceed with this class action is the most economically feasible remedy given 
the potential individual damage recovery for each class member.  Furthermore, 
because of the large number of potential class members who based their claims on 
the same common course of conduct by Safeway, a class action would be a more 
manageable and more efficient use of judicial resources than individual claims.  
Therefore, Sosa and the putative class members satisfy rule 1.220(b)(3)‟s 
superiority requirement.   
Sosa Had Legal Standing to Serve as Class Representative 
 
A threshold inquiry in a motion for class certification is whether the class 
representative has standing to represent the putative class members.  See Stone v. 
Compuserve Interactive Servs., 804 So. 2d 383, 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing 
 
- 46 - 
W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Webb, 699 So. 2d 859, 860-61 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), and 
Taran v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 685 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1997)).  A trial court‟s decision as to whether a party has satisfied the standing 
requirement is reviewed de novo.  See Found. for the Developmentally Disabled, 
Inc. v. Step by Step Early Childhood Educ. & Therapy Ctr., Inc., 29 So. 3d 1221, 
1223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“We note that a trial court‟s decision regarding a party‟s 
standing to file suit is reviewed using the de novo standard of review.” (citing Fox 
v. Prof‟l Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 178 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2001))). 
 
To satisfy the standing requirement for a class action claim, the class 
representative must illustrate that a case or controversy exists between him or her 
and the defendant, and that this case or controversy will continue throughout the 
existence of the litigation.  See Olen Props., 981 So. 2d at 517 (citing Ferreiro v. 
Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 928 So. 2d 374, 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)).  In deciding if a 
party has alleged a justiciable case or controversy, “the trial court is not required to 
determine the merits of the case.”  Id. at 518; see also Peace River/Manasota Reg‟l 
Water Supply Auth. v. IMC Phosphates Co., 18 So. 3d 1079, 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2009) (“[T]he proof required is proof of the elements of standing, not proof 
directed to the elements of the case or to the ultimate merits of the case.”).  Rather, 
the trial court must determine if the class representative has alleged sufficient facts 
 
- 47 - 
to establish a legal issue for the court‟s resolution.  See Olen Props., 981 So. 2d at 
517. 
A case or controversy exists if a party alleges an actual or legal injury.  See 
id. (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)).  An actual injury 
includes an economic injury for which the relief sought will grant redress.  See 
Peregood v. Cosmides, 663 So. 2d 665, 668 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (stating that an 
actual injury may be economic in nature).  That injury must be distinct and 
palpable, not abstract or hypothetical.  See id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 501 (1975), and Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 741 (1984)).  
In this case, Sosa has suffered an economic injury, fulfilling the actual injury 
requirement of standing.  This is despite Safeway having credited Sosa $20 on his 
third premium finance agreement, which equaled the amount Safeway overcharged 
Sosa on his second premium finance agreement.  Rather, Sosa‟s economic injury 
for which he may pursue redress is in the form of a damage recovery of the entire 
premium finance charge plus twice the amount of the premium finance charge 
assessed by Safeway—which is the damage award provided under section 627.835.   
More specifically, section 627.840 permits a premium finance company to 
charge an individual a maximum additional service charge of $20 in a twelve 
month period.  Section 627.835 provides that any person who unlawfully charges a 
premium finance charge owes the person to whom they assessed the overcharge 
 
- 48 - 
the entire premium finance charged plus twice the entire amount of the premium 
charge so paid.  In a twelve month period, Safeway charged Sosa an additional 
service charge of $20 twice, i.e., it assessed the $20 additional service charge to 
Sosa in each of his first two premium finance agreements whose individual 
duration was for six months.  It is alleged that by doing so, Safeway violated 
section 627.840.  If Sosa successfully proves this violation at trial, Safeway will 
owe Sosa and the members of the class the damage award allocated under section 
627.835.  This is an economic injury for which Sosa and other class members may 
seek redress. 
The Trial Court Conducted a Proper Rule 1.220 Analysis 
 
In undertaking the initial analysis, a trial court may look beyond the 
pleadings and, without resolving disputed issues, determine how disputed issues 
might be addressed on a classwide basis.  See Earnest v. Amoco Oil Co., 859 So. 
2d 1255, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Stone, 804 So.2d at 387).  The initial 
analysis is needed for class certification because the granting of class certification 
may expand the dimensions of the action.  See Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. 
Demario, 661 So. 2d 319, 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); see also Chase Manhattan 
Mortg. Corp. v. Porcher, 898 So. 2d 153, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  By conducting 
a rule 1.220 analysis, a trial court ensures that the requirements for class 
certification under rule 1.220 have been satisfied, and that the certification has a 
 
- 49 - 
sound basis in fact and is not predicated on mere supposition.  See Demario, 661 
So. 2d at 321.  This analysis is also needed to assure that the decision on whether 
or not to certify a class is made carefully and on the basis of sufficient information.  
See id. (quoting Barton-Malow Co., 627 So. 2d at 1235).   
Furthermore, rule 1.220(d)(1) demands that the trial court, after it has 
considered the pleadings and conducted a hearing, render an order on class 
certification as soon as practicable, with that order separately detailing the trial 
court‟s factual findings and conclusions of law, and, if proceeding with a class, 
specifically designating the applicable section of rule 1.220(b).  See Porcher, 898 
So. 2d at 156.  That rule also requires that the trial court‟s order articulate the 
factual findings that support the trial court‟s conclusions of law.  See Grosso v. 
Fid. Nat‟l Title Ins. Co., 983 So. 2d 1165, 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Fla. Health 
Scis. Ctr., Inc. v. Elsenheimer, 952 So. 2d 575, 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“Rule 
1.220(d)(1) requires the trial court‟s order to „separately state the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law upon which the determination is based.‟ ”); City of Tampa 
v. McAfee, 896 So. 2d 943, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“This court has made it clear 
that it will not accept conclusory findings in an order granting class certification.”).  
 
In this case, the trial court conducted a rigorous analysis, and determined 
facts which made class certification proper.  Before rendering the certification 
order, the trial court evaluated written arguments for and against class certification.  
 
- 50 - 
It also considered affidavits, deposition testimony, as well as all discovery, 
documentation, and court filings that constituted the entire case file.  Additionally, 
the trial court held a hearing where it entertained argument from both parties.   
During that hearing, the trial court evaluated whether Sosa had standing and, 
if so, whether he and the putative class members satisfied the requirements of rule 
1.220.  It then issued an oral pronouncement during the hearing that Sosa had 
standing, and that he and the putative class members satisfied the requirements of 
rule 1.220.  It memorialized that pronouncement in writing by way of a written 
order that outlined why Sosa had standing and how Sosa and the putative class 
members satisfied the requirements of rule 1.220.  That order complied with rule 
1.220(d) because it specifically detailed the trial court‟s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as to why class certification was proper, while noting what 
section of rule 1.220(b) was applicable to its decision.  Although brief, these 
findings were not conclusory because they demonstrated why—both factually and 
legally—the trial court held in favor of Sosa and the putative class members.   
Therefore, the trial court‟s order reflects a rigorous analysis performed by 
the trial court and meets rule 1.220(d)‟s procedural requirement.   
CONCLUSION 
The Third District in Sosa erred by not applying the abuse of discretion 
standard of review to the trial court‟s order granting class certification, and by 
 
- 51 - 
conflating its class certification review by incorrectly addressing section 627.835‟s 
“knowingly” requirement during its examination of whether Sosa satisfied rule 
1.220‟s requirements and failing to consider the common course of conduct and 
routine billing practice that produce an alleged statutory violation.  The Third 
District also erred because Sosa and the putative class members satisfied rule 
1.220‟s requirements for class certification, with Sosa having legal standing to 
serve as class representative.  We, therefore, quash the decision in Sosa, approve 
the decisions in Glen Cove and Olen Properties, and remand this case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
It is so ordered.  
PARIENTE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE and POLSTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
 
CANADY, C.J., dissenting. 
 
Because I conclude that there is no basis for this Court to exercise 
jurisdiction, I would discharge this case.  I therefore dissent. 
 
Contrary to the view adopted by the majority, the decision of the Third 
District in Safeway Premium Finance Co. v. Sosa, 15 So. 3d 8 (Fla. 2009), does 
not expressly and directly conflict with either Olen Properties Corp. v. Moss, 981 
So. 2d 515 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), or Smith v. Glen Cove Apartments 
Condominiums Master Association, Inc., 847 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). 
 
- 52 - 
 
The decision of the Third District on review turned on the court‟s conclusion 
that “Sosa failed to allege sufficiently a knowing violation of the statute, and 
therefore his claim is not an appropriate claim for a class action.”  Sosa, 15 So. 3d 
at 9 (emphasis added).  In its analysis of whether a class action could properly be 
certified, the court relied on Sosa‟s failure to allege “any individual facts showing 
intentional action by Safeway or on behalf of potential members of the class 
sufficient to demonstrate a cause of action for damages under” the statute.  Id. at 
11.  The court further observed that “individual questions pertinent to all potential 
class members are subject to different explanations and defenses related to 
knowing violations.”  Id.  Based on these circumstances, the court concluded that 
the commonality requirement of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(a) was not 
satisfied. 
 
The need to establish knowing statutory violations sets Sosa apart from both 
Glen Cove and Olen Properties.  Nothing in the analysis of the commonality issue 
in either Glen Cove or Olen Properties is in anyway inconsistent with Sosa. 
 
In Glen Cove “[t]he common questions of law and fact against [the] appellee 
[condominium association was] whether appellee violated its statutory duty or was 
negligent in its failure to maintain the roofs causing damages to appellants and the 
members of the class.”  847 So. 2d at 1110.  The focus was on the condominium 
 
- 53 - 
association‟s failure to maintain condominium roofs to the detriment of those who 
lived below those roofs. 
 
In Olen Properties the action related to a form lease containing a provision 
for the payment of “an early cancellation fee.”  981 So. 2d at 517.  The court 
concluded that the commonality requirement was satisfied because the issue in the 
case was “whether or not Appellants‟ practice of charging liquidated damages 
rather than actual damages violated Florida law or whether Appellants were 
required to credit tenants‟ accounts with rent it received from re-letting the 
premises.”  Id. at 520. 
 
Both Olen Properties, 981 So. 2d at 519, and Glen Cove, 847 So. 2d at 1110, 
quote the following principle from Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell, 827 So. 2d 
261, 267 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002):  “The primary concern in determining commonality 
is whether the representative members‟ claims arise from the same course of 
conduct that gave rise to the other claims, and whether the claims are based on the 
same legal theory.”  Sosa does not discuss this principle, but it is not in conflict 
with it.  Sosa is based on the conclusion that “there would be different 
circumstances” underlying overcharges paid by different members of the class and 
that some circumstances would demonstrate a knowing violation while other 
circumstances would demonstrate an inadvertent violation.  Sosa, 15 So. 3d at 11.  
The Third District thus in effect recognized that Sosa had not alleged a “course of 
 
- 54 - 
conduct” evidencing a knowing violation of the statute affecting the members of 
the class.  Since a common course of conduct was present in Olen Properties and 
Glen Cove, Sosa is readily distinguishable. 
 
In the absence of express and direct conflict, review of Sosa should be 
discharged. 
QUINCE and POLSTON, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D-579 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Benjamin R. Alvarez, Paul B. Feltman and Eduardo Gomez of Alvarez, Carbonell, 
Feltman, Jimenez, and Gomez, PL, Coral Gables, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Maria Elena Abate of Colodny, Fass, Talenfeld, Karlinsky, and Abate, P.A., Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent