Title: Ex parte Teshia Gulas and Carla Pruitt.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: June 26, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180317
____________________
Ex parte Kathy Russell, R.N.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Lamerle Miles, as personal representative of the
Estate of Tameca Miles, deceased
v.
Coosa Valley Medical Center et al.)
____________________
1180318
____________________
Ex parte Kristen Blanchard, R.N.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Lamerle Miles, as personal representative of the
Estate of Tameca Miles, deceased
v.
Coosa Valley Medical Center et al.)
____________________
1180319
____________________
Ex parte Teshia Gulas and Carla Pruitt
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Lamerle Miles, as personal representative of the
Estate of Tameca Miles, deceased
v.
Coosa Valley Medical Center et al.)
(Talladega Circuit Court, CV-15-900184)
MITCHELL, Justice.
Lamerle Miles ("Miles"), as the personal representative
of the estate of her deceased mother Tameca Miles ("Tameca"),
sued Coosa Valley Medical Center ("CVMC") and other named and
fictitiously named parties, alleging that they had engaged in
negligent, wanton, 
and 
outrageous 
conduct 
that 
caused 
Tameca's
death.  Miles specifically alleged that multiple CVMC
employees had breached the applicable standards of care,
2
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
resulting in the Sylacauga Police Department removing Tameca
from the CVMC emergency room before she was treated for what
was ultimately determined to be bacterial meningitis.  Miles
did not identify any specific CVMC employees in her original
complaint, but she later filed a series of amendments
substituting Kristen Blanchard, Teshia Gulas, Carla Pruitt,
and Kathy Russell (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"the CVMC petitioners") for fictitiously named defendants.
After 
being 
substituted 
as 
defendants, 
the 
CVMC
petitioners moved the trial court to enter summary judgments
in their favor, arguing that they had not been named
defendants within the two-year period allowed by the statute
of limitations governing wrongful-death actions.  The
Talladega Circuit Court denied those motions, and the CVMC
petitioners now seek mandamus relief in this Court.  We deny
the petitions filed by Blanchard, Gulas, and Pruitt and grant
the petition filed by Russell.
Facts and Procedural History
At issue in these petitions is whether the CVMC
petitioners were appropriately substituted for fictitiously
named defendants after the statute of limitations had 
expired:
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1180317, 1180318, 1180319
(1) Kristen Blanchard, one of the emergency-room nurses who
was on duty when Tameca was first brought to the emergency
room; (2) Teshia Gulas, the emergency-room secretary; (3)
Carla Pruitt, an admissions clerk who, along with Gulas,
unsuccessfully attempted to get identifying information from
Tameca before Tameca was removed from the emergency room by
police; and (4) Kathy Russell, the nursing supervisor and
highest ranking administrator on duty at CVMC when Tameca was
first brought to the emergency room.  The involvement that
each of these individuals had in the events giving rise to
this action are described in detail below. 
A. Hospital Visits and Death of Tameca
At 6:05 p.m. on December 28, 2013, Tameca telephoned 911
seeking emergency medical assistance for a severe headache. 
Michael 
Ashworth, an 
emergency medical 
technician 
("EMT") 
with
Sylacauga Ambulance Service, was dispatched to her residence. 
When he arrived on the scene, Tameca was agitated and in
extreme pain.  Ashworth states that he did not have any
medication he could give Tameca for the pain so he just tried
to help her calm down after she entered the ambulance for the
trip to CVMC.  Once Tameca was in the ambulance, Ashworth had
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1180317, 1180318, 1180319
difficulty measuring her blood pressure and pulse because she
would not be still and was repeatedly unbuckling her seat belt
and hitting the cabinets at her side.  Ashworth states that,
after Tameca began sticking her fingers in her mouth in an
apparent attempt to induce vomiting, he was able to grab her
hands and hold them in her lap for the duration of the trip. 
As they approached CVMC, the EMT driving the ambulance radioed
the emergency room to, as Ashworth describes it, "tell them we
were coming and kind of what we had."  That radio report was
received by Kristen Blanchard, an emergency-room nurse, who
recorded the report in the communication-control log.
At 6:26 p.m., the ambulance carrying Tameca arrived at
the CVMC emergency room, where it was met by two security
guards from Delta Security Services, Inc. ("Delta"), which
CVMC retained to provide security.  Ashworth states that
Tameca initially cooperated in exiting the ambulance, but 
that
she became loud and combative.  According to Ashworth, upon
entering the emergency room with Tameca, he described her
condition and behavior to the emergency-room staff at the
nurses' station, including Blanchard and Dr. Jenna Johnson,
before leaving to respond to another emergency call.
5
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
Jeff Hill was one of the security guards who assisted
Ashworth with Tameca when she arrived at CVMC.  Hill states
that he witnessed Ashworth telling Blanchard and 
Teshia Gulas,
the emergency-room secretary, about Tameca when they entered
the emergency room.  Hill states that "[Tameca] was being very
combative.  She was spitting.  She was hissing.  She was
cussing people out."  According to Hill, Tameca continued to
be uncooperative while Carla Pruitt, an admissions clerk,
attempted to get her name and birth date so that Pruitt could
register her as a patient.  During this time, Gulas also
unsuccessfully attempted to get identifying information from
Tameca.  According to Hill, after Tameca's behavior continued
to escalate, he telephoned his supervisor at Delta as well as
Russell, the nursing supervisor at CVMC who was not in the
emergency room at that time, for guidance on how to handle
Tameca.  Hill states that, after he talked to Russell a second
time, she told him:  "[I]f you need to call the police, call
them."  Hill then contacted the Sylacauga police, and, after
two police officers arrived, he apprised them of the
situation.  When the police officers approached Tameca, who
was still in the emergency-room waiting area, she swore at
6
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
them and kicked one of the officers.  The police officers then
tried to talk to Tameca for what Hill estimated to be 15
minutes.  After Tameca attempted to kick and bite the
officers, they handcuffed her and transported her to the
Talladega County jail.  
Tameca spent the night of December 28 in jail.  During
that time, she was evaluated by personnel from Quality
Correctional Health Care, Inc. ("QCHC"), which provided
health-care services at the jail.  At some point on December
29, the decision was made to transport Tameca back to CVMC to
be treated.  This time, Tameca received medical treatment and
was eventually diagnosed with bacterial meningitis.  At
approximately 5:30 p.m. on December 29, Tameca died.
B. Filing of This Lawsuit and Initial Discovery
On May 19, 2015, Miles filed a three-count complaint
initiating this wrongful-death action.  Miles specifically
named CVMC and QCHC as defendants, along with other yet-to-be
identified parties who were identified under Rule 9(h), Ala.
R. Civ. P., as fictitiously named defendants.  In the first
count, Miles claimed that the defendants, both named and
fictitiously named, negligently breached the applicable
7
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
standard of care by (1) "failing to timely and properly
triage, evaluate or diagnose Tameca's complaints;" (2)
"failing to timely and properly treat Tameca's complaints;"
and (3) "failing to timely and properly notify physician(s) of
Tameca's 
symptoms 
and 
her 
emergency 
serious 
medical
condition."  Miles's second count claimed that those same
failures constituted a wanton breach of the applicable
standard of care.  Finally, Miles claimed in count three that
CVMC and the fictitiously named defendants had "acted
outrageously by failing to diagnose, monitor, manage, or 
treat
Tameca, a seriously ill patient, but rather having her
arrested and sent to jail."
In 
conjunction 
with 
filing 
her 
complaint, 
Miles 
propounded 
discovery 
requests 
to 
CVMC. 
Through
interrogatories, Miles requested that CVMC identify any
employees or agents who were involved in, had witnessed, or
had knowledge of the events described in the complaint.  Among
other things, Miles requested that CVMC disclose all 
documents
it maintained that were "pertinent" to Tameca's December 28
and 29 visits and provide a list of all personnel who were
working in the emergency room on those dates. 
8
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
On May 29, 2015, CVMC was served with Miles's complaint
and discovery requests; CVMC filed its answer on June 29,
2015.  Shortly thereafter, Miles's attorney began inquiring
about the status of CVMC's discovery responses, even though
those responses were not yet due under Rules 33(a) and 34(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P.  A time line of those inquiries and Miles's
further attempts to conduct discovery over the next three
months is as follows:
July 2, 2015:  Miles's attorney sent CVMC's attorney
an e-mail stating:  "We want to take the deposition
of the nurse who saw [Tameca] the day she was sent
to the jail.  Can you give me her name ...?"
July 9, 2015:  Miles's attorney sent CVMC's attorney
a letter requesting CVMC's discovery responses
within 15 days.
July 28, 2015:  Miles's attorney sent CVMC's
attorney another e-mail, stating:  "Following up
with you on discovery responses and the nurse names. 
Please let me hear from you [as soon as possible]."
July 31, 2015:  A conference call was held for all
the attorneys in the case to discuss deposition
scheduling.  Miles's attorney followed up with an e-
mail to those attorneys summarizing the content of
the call and noting that Miles would be deposed on
October 5, 2015; that he would attempt to schedule
the depositions for Ashworth and the other EMT for
the week of October 5; and that CVMC's attorney
would "check with his client to see if we can take
the triage nurse or whoever the nurse that saw
[Tameca] on 12/28, the day she initially reported to
[CVMC]."
9
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
August 4, 2015:  Miles's attorney sent another e-
mail to CVMC's attorney requesting that he "[p]lease
let me know where you are on discovery responses." 
That same day, Miles also issued subpoenas to
Ashworth and the other EMT setting their depositions
for October 6, 2015.1
August 7, 2015:  Miles moved the trial court to
enter an order compelling CVMC to respond to her
discovery requests.
August 26, 2015:  Miles's attorney sent CVMC's
attorney an e-mail requesting to talk about the case
and noting that "I still have not received your
discovery responses."
On September 3, 2015, the trial court granted Miles's
motion to compel and ordered CVMC to serve its discovery
responses within 30 days.  On September 17, 2015, Miles's
attorney sent CVMC's attorney an e-mail asking if there was
"[a]ny update on discovery and records yet?"  CVMC's attorney
responded that same day by leaving Miles's attorney a voice
mail in which he apparently indicated that CVMC was not yet
ready to send some documents and video.  Miles's attorney
responded with the following e-mail later that afternoon:
"Listened to your voicemail.  All of that is fine. 
However, why can't you go ahead and send me the
medical records and discovery?  You can send the
other documents and video later.  I know you have
1On September 14, 2015, Miles's attorney canceled the
depositions of the EMTs because of a conflict with a trial in
another case.
10
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
the medical records and discovery ready.  As you
know, I need those to discover my case.  I have to
send experts, etc., just like you.  Please send the
medicals and discovery."
On September 25, 2015, CVMC's attorney sent the medical
records from Tameca's admission on December 29, 2013, to
Miles's attorney; the rest of CVMC's responses were provided
to Miles's attorney four days later on September 29, 2015.  In
those responses, CVMC did not identify any documents
associated with Tameca's visit to the emergency room on
December 28, 2013, nor did it identify any specific CVMC staff
members who interacted with Tameca, witnessed her behavior, or
otherwise had knowledge of her visit to the emergency room on
that date.  CVMC did, however, provide a list of 14 staff
members who had been assigned to the emergency room on
December 28, 2013, along with a description of their positions
and the hours each of them had worked.  Blanchard and Gulas
were included on that list, but not Pruitt or Russell.
C. Continuing Discovery Following CVMC's September 2015
Discovery Responses
Miles subsequently issued subpoenas to Ashworth and the
other EMT setting their depositions for November 18, 2015, but
she states that those subpoenas were returned without being
11
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
served.  New subpoenas were thereafter issued and served,
setting those depositions for January 21, 2016.  Ashworth's
deposition was held as scheduled on that date, and, as recited
above, he testified that he talked to Blanchard and Dr.
Johnson about Tameca when he brought her into the emergency
room on December 28, 2013.  Six days after Ashworth's
deposition –– on January 27, 2016 –– Miles amended her
complaint and substituted Blanchard, Dr. Johnson, and Delta
for fictitiously named defendants.2 
On February 25, 2016, Blanchard moved the trial court to
enter a summary judgment in her favor, arguing that Miles's
claims against her were barred by the statute of limitations.3 
Specifically, Blanchard argued: (1) that CVMC's September 29,
2015, discovery responses identified her as a nurse on duty in
the emergency room when Tameca was brought in on December 28,
2013; (2) that Tameca died on December 29, 2013; (3) that the
two-year period during which a wrongful-death claim based upon
Tameca's death could be asserted expired on December 29, 2015;
2The trial court later dismissed Delta and QCHC.
3Section 6-5-410(d), Ala. Code 1975, provides that a
wrongful-death claim must be asserted "within two years from
and after the death of the testator or intestate."
12
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
and (4) that Miles did not name her as a defendant until
January 27, 2016.  Dr. Johnson thereafter filed her own motion
for a summary judgment making a similar argument.
In the meantime, Miles continued taking discovery.  On
March 3, 2016, Miles's attorney contacted CVMC's attorney
requesting 
to 
schedule 
Blanchard's 
deposition; 
they 
ultimately
agreed on a date of May 11, 2016.  On April 29, 2016, in
advance of Blanchard's deposition, CVMC supplemented its
September 29, 2015, response to Miles's initial discovery
requests by producing a copy of the communication-control log
for December 28, 2013.  This log contained the entry made by
Blanchard indicating that an EMT had radioed the emergency
room at 6:20 p.m. on December 28 regarding a 40-year-old
female patient who was being transported.  Written inside the
box labeled "Initial Pt. Assessment Information/Orders" were
two notes –– "HA," shorthand for headache, and "aggressive." 
The entry further listed the physician as "Johnson" and the
nurse as "KNB," which is acknowledged to be Blanchard. 
Blanchard's scheduled deposition was ultimately delayed, but
when she was finally deposed, she acknowledged that she had
made this entry.
13
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
On May 20, 2016, Miles's attorney again contacted CVMC's
attorney by e-mail, expressing his frustration with his
inability to obtain requested information from CVMC and
stating that he would ask the trial court to intervene if CVMC
was not forthcoming about which CVMC employees "saw" Tameca on
December 28, 2013.  CVMC's attorney responded on May 22, 2016,
stating that CVMC had already identified the CVMC employees
who were working in the emergency room on December 28 and 29
in its September 29, 2015, discovery responses and that he
would try to make them available for depositions as soon as
possible.  Miles's attorney responded later that day, stating:
"We requested the names of the employees who saw [Tameca] not
the ones who worked there.  You and I discussed this before." 
On May 27, 2016, Miles moved the trial court to compel CVMC to
fully respond to its May 2015 discovery requests, asking the
court 
to 
order 
CVMC 
to 
identify 
all
"nurses/employees/witnesses who saw, witnessed, provided
treatment to, or otherwise [were] involved with [Tameca] on
December 28 and 29, 2013." 
On June 10, 2016, CVMC served supplemental discovery
responses, one of which provided:
14
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
"All witnesses with knowledge of the facts
related to Tameca Miles on December 28 and 29 are
not known.  A list of staffing for the emergency
room on December 28, 2013, was [previously] provided
....  This list includes emergency room staff that
saw Tameca Miles on December 28, 2013, including
Kristen Blanchard, RN, and Teshia Gulas, Unit
Secretary.  In addition, admissions clerk Carla
Pruitt saw Tameca Miles on December 28, 2013."
On June 24, 2016, Miles amended her complaint to substitute
Gulas and Pruitt for fictitiously named defendants, and, on
June 28, 2016, the trial court denied Miles's motion to compel
as moot.
Over the next two months, the parties worked to schedule
depositions, and Miles repeatedly sought confirmation from
CVMC that no other CVMC employees had information about
Miles's visit and removal from the emergency room on December
28.  Depositions for the Delta security guards and the CVMC
employees who had been named as defendants were ultimately
scheduled for the end of August 2016, but CVMC eventually
canceled those depositions after its attorneys concluded that
they could not represent all the CVMC employees.  
After Gulas and Pruitt were provided with separate
counsel, 
Blanchard's deposition 
was 
scheduled 
for 
November 
10,
2016.  During that deposition, Blanchard acknowledged that she
15
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
had been at the nurse's station when Ashworth brought Tameca
into the emergency room, but she denied receiving an oral
report from him at that time, stating that she was merely
there to get a different patient's chart and that she heard
Ashworth talk about Tameca for only "a few seconds."  She
otherwise 
denied 
assessing, 
treating, 
or being 
given
responsibility for Tameca's care in any way on December 28.
A status conference was conducted by the trial court
later that month, and Miles states that the parties were
thereafter able to reach an agreement about the scheduling of
future depositions.  The deposition of Delta security guard
Jeff Hill was conducted on January 31, 2017, and, during that
deposition, Hill stated that he had spoken with Russell on the
telephone about what to do with Tameca on December 28.  This
was the first time Miles learned of Russell's involvement with
Tameca, and, on February 3, 2017, she amended her complaint
for a third time to substitute Russell for a fictitiously
named defendant.
Depositions for Gulas and Pruitt were conducted on March
23, 2017; both confirmed that they had interacted with Tameca
on December 28 but stated that they had been unable to obtain
16
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
identifying information from her.  When Russell was deposed on
August 31, 2017, she denied having had any conversation with
Hill on December 28 about Tameca or any other unruly or
aggressive patient in the emergency room.
D. Hearing and Disposition of Summary-Judgment Motions
That Form the Basis of These Petitions
On September 14, 2017, Gulas and Pruitt filed a joint
motion for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things,
that the claims Miles had asserted against them were barred by
the statute of limitations.  The next day, Russell filed her
own summary-judgment motion making a similar argument.  Miles
thereafter filed a single response opposing the summary-
judgment motions filed by (1) Blanchard, (2) Dr. Johnson, (3)
Gulas and Pruitt, and (4) Russell.  Miles argued that she had
properly substituted these defendants for fictitiously named
defendants who were specifically described in her May 2015
complaint and that her claims against them were therefore
timely under Rules 9(h) and 15(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Miles
further argued that any delay in making those substitutions
was attributable to CVMC's failure to timely respond to her
discovery requests.  
17
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
On November 8, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing
on the pending summary-judgment motions.  For reasons that are
not clear from the materials before this Court, the trial
court did not rule on those motions in the ensuing months,
and, on September 4, 2018, it conducted a second hearing.  On
December 7, 2018, the trial court denied all four summary-
judgment motions.  Blanchard, Dr. Johnson, Gulas, Pruitt, and
Russell subsequently petitioned this Court for writs of
mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss on statute-of-
limitations grounds the claims Miles had asserted against
them.4  We have consolidated the petitions for the purpose of
issuing one opinion.
Standard of Review
This Court explained in Ex parte Integra LifeSciences
Corp., 271 So. 3d 814, 817 (Ala. 2018), the standard of review
that we apply in mandamus proceedings that involve a dispute
about the use of fictitiously named parties to avoid a statute
of limitations:
"'"A 
writ 
of 
mandamus 
is 
an
extraordinary remedy, and one petitioning
for it must show: (1) a clear legal right
4This Court dismissed Dr. 
Johnson's petition after she 
and
Miles jointly moved the Court to do so.
18
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
in the petitioner to the order sought; (2)
an imperative duty on the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction
of the court ...."'
"Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 74 So. 3d 424, 427
(Ala. 2011) (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d
681, 684 (Ala. 2000)).
"Although mandamus will not generally issue to
review the merits of an order denying a motion for
a summary judgment, this Court has held that, in the
'narrow class of cases involving fictitious parties
and the relation-back doctrine,' mandamus is the
proper method by which to review the merits of a
trial court's denial of a summary-judgment motion in
which the defendant argues that the plaintiff's
claim was barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.  Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 74 So. 3d at
427-28 (quoting Jackson, 780 So. 2d at 684)."
Analysis
The CVMC petitioners seek mandamus relief from this Court
on statute-of-limitations grounds.  Although the specific
circumstances of each petitioner are different, the same
general principles of fictitious-party practice guide our
review.  Accordingly, we began our analysis with a review of
those principles.
The use of fictitiously named parties is authorized by
Rule 9(h), which states:
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1180317, 1180318, 1180319
"When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing
party and so alleges in the party's pleading, the
opposing party may be designated by any name, and
when the party's true name is discovered, the
process and all pleadings and proceedings in the
action may be amended by substituting the true
name."
Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., further provides that an
amendment substituting the true name of a party under Rule
9(h) "relates back to the date of the original pleading" if
relation back is consistent with "principles applicable to
fictitious party practice."  This Court summarized those
principles in Ex parte Noland Hospital Montgomery, LLC, 127
So. 3d 1160, 1167 (Ala. 2012):
"In order to avoid the bar of a statute of
limitations when a plaintiff amends a complaint to
identify a fictitiously named defendant on the
original complaint, the plaintiff: (1) must have
adequately 
described 
the 
fictitiously 
named
defendant in the original complaint; (2) must have
stated a cause of action against the fictitiously
named defendant in the body of the original
complaint; (3) must have been ignorant of the true
identity of the fictitiously named defendant; and
(4) must have used due diligence in attempting to
discover the true identity of the fictitiously named
defendant.  Ex parte Tate & Lyle Sucralose[, Inc.],
81 So. 3d [1217,] 1220–21 [(Ala. 2011)]."  
This Court has further emphasized that the due-diligence
requirement applies both before and after the filing of the
original complaint and that a plaintiff must similarly
20
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
exercise due diligence in amending his or her complaint once
the true identity of a defendant is discovered.  Ex parte
Cowgill, [Ms. 1180936, February 7, 2020] ___ So. 3d ___, ___
(Ala. 2020).  We now turn to the specific arguments made by
each of the CVMC petitioners.
A. Kristen Blanchard
Blanchard 
argues 
that 
Miles's 
amended 
complaint
substituting her as a defendant does not relate back to the
original complaint because, she says, Miles did not exercise
due diligence to identify her before the statute of
limitations expired.  Blanchard does not argue that Miles
should have been able to identify her before Miles filed her
original complaint in May 2015, but she emphasizes that CVMC's
September 29, 2015, discovery responses identified her as one
of only five nurses on duty in the emergency room at the time
Tameca was brought in on December 28, 2013.  Miles had three
months at that point to seek more information about the listed
nurses before the statute of limitations expired, but,
Blanchard states, Miles failed to initiate any discovery
during that period to determine whether any of those nurses
were potential defendants.  Blanchard argues that this was a
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1180317, 1180318, 1180319
lack of due diligence that bars Miles from invoking Rule 9(h)
to substitute her for a fictitiously named defendant. 
In support of her argument, Blanchard primarily relies
upon Sherrin v. Bose, 608 So. 2d 364, 365-67 (Ala. 1992), in
which this Court held that a physician was entitled to a
summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds when the
undisputed facts showed that the plaintiff had learned the
physician's name –– and that the physician had actually seen
the 
now 
deceased 
patient 
in 
the 
emergency 
room 
––
approximately 10 months before amending her complaint to
substitute him for a fictitiously named party after the
statute of limitations had expired.  Blanchard asserts that
Sherrin controls this case because, she says, Miles similarly
knew of Blanchard's identity for several months before
amending her complaint to substitute Blanchard as a defendant
after the statute of limitations expired. 
We disagree that this Court's holding in Sherrin requires
the same result here.  In Sherrin, the plaintiff learned in
the responses she received to her interrogatories not just
that the physician she later substituted as a defendant was on
duty in the emergency room when the patient went there for
22
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
treatment, but also that this physician had actually seen the
patient on that date and was, in fact, the first physician to
have treated her.  608 So. 2d at 366.  In contrast, it is
undisputed in this case that Miles did not learn that
Blanchard had any specific connection to Tameca until after
the statute of limitations expired.  All Miles knew before the
statute of limitations expired was that Blanchard had been on
duty in the emergency room when Tameca was brought in, and,
Miles argues, any suggestion that she should have amended her
complaint to substitute Blanchard as a defendant on that basis
alone was refuted by this Court in Oliver v. Woodward, 824 So.
2d 693, 699 (Ala. 2001):
"Although 
Dr. 
Woodward 
argues 
that 
[the
plaintiff] should have sued him and the other
emergency-room 
doctor 
as 
soon 
as 
they 
were
identified by [the hospital] in November 1998 [as
being the emergency-room doctors on duty when the
plaintiff went to the hospital], substitution of Dr.
Woodward and the other emergency-room doctor for
fictitious defendants without a reasonable factual
basis or a substantial justification for the
substitution would have subjected [the plaintiff] to
sanctions under Rule 11, Ala. R. Civ. P., and the
Alabama Litigation Accountability Act, § 12–19–270
et seq., Ala. Code 1975."
The facts of this case are more akin to Oliver –– in
which the plaintiff had no knowledge that the physician
23
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
eventually substituted for a fictitiously named defendant had
a connection to the case, beyond merely being on duty in the
emergency room when the plaintiff was there, until after the
statute of limitations expired –– than Sherrin –– in which it
was undisputed that the plaintiff knew for months before the
statute of limitations expired that the physician who was
belatedly substituted for a fictitiously named defendant was
involved in the decedent's treatment.  But Oliver is not
dispositive.  Blanchard asserts that Miles failed to exercise
due diligence because she did not initiate any discovery to
learn the extent of Blanchard's knowledge of, and involvement
with, Tameca in the three-month window after Blanchard was
first identified and before the statute of limitations
expired.  This argument implicitly asks us to give no
consideration to the discovery Miles initiated before
Blanchard was generically identified to which CVMC failed to
file timely and complete responses.
Miles argues that Blanchard's status as a potential
defendant would have been known much sooner if CVMC had given
timely, 
complete, 
and 
accurate 
responses 
to 
the
interrogatories and requests for production that she served
24
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
upon it in May 2015.  We discuss the substance of the
interrogatories more in the following section, but we note
that Miles's requests for production sought "all ... 
documents
... which are in any wise pertinent to anything that happened
to or was experienced by [Tameca] on December 28 or 29, 2013." 
That document request clearly encompassed the communication-
control log, which identified Blanchard as the nurse on the
December 28, 2013, entry that undisputedly refers to Tameca. 
This document, however, was not produced until April 2016 ––
11 months after Miles's request for production was made, 4
months after the statute of limitations expired, and 3 months
after Blanchard was substituted as a defendant.  A writ of
mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has shown a clear
legal right to the order sought.  Integra LifeSciences Corp.,
271 So. 3d at 817.  We cannot conclude that such a showing has
been made here, where the trial court could have reasonably
concluded 
that 
Miles 
had 
diligently pursued 
discovery 
targeted
toward identifying Blanchard but had been hindered by CVMC's
failure to timely disclose a requested record that would have
25
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
clearly revealed a connection between Blanchard and Tameca.5 
Accordingly, Blanchard's petition is denied.
B. Teshia Gulas
The argument Gulas makes in her petition is similar to
the argument made by Blanchard –– CVMC's September 29, 2015,
discovery responses identified her as 1 of 14 CVMC employees
who was working in the emergency room on December 28, 2013,
but, Gulas argues, Miles took no action over the next three
months to determine whether Gulas was a potential defendant
and instead allowed the statute of limitations to expire. 
Gulas contends that this is a lack of due diligence that bars
Miles from relying upon Rule 9(h) to substitute her for a
fictitiously named defendant.  
As Gulas notes, a long line of this Court's cases makes
clear that, when a plaintiff has asserted a claim alleging
that an injury or death was caused by an act of medical
malpractice, that plaintiff is obligated to diligently
5CVMC was apparently aware of the communication-control
log when it served its September 2015 interrogatory responses
because one response stated that "Sylacauga Ambulance called
[the CVMC emergency room] at 6:20 p.m. to report that they
were transporting a 40 year old, aggressive female who was
complaining of a headache."  It is unclear where this
information was 
obtained 
if 
not 
from 
the 
communication-control
log.
26
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
investigate 
the 
involvement of 
every 
health-care 
provider 
that
has been identified as being involved in the injured or
deceased party's treatment.  The failure to exercise due
diligence in this respect prevents the plaintiff from
subsequently relying upon Rule 9(h) to substitute a long-
identified party for a fictitiously named defendant.  See,
e.g., McGathey v. Brookwood Health Servs., Inc., 143 So. 3d
95, 108 (Ala. 2013) ("Because of the medical records she
obtained, [the plaintiff] knew [the health-care providers']
names shortly after her surgery and knew that they were
involved in her treatment during the surgery.  Despite this
knowledge, there is no indication that, in the nearly two
years between the time [the plaintiff] received the medical
records and the time she filed her complaint, [the plaintiff]
performed any investigation to determine whether either of
those individuals was responsible for her injury."); Weber v.
Freeman, 3 So. 3d 825, 833 (Ala. 2008) ("Because [the
plaintiff] knew of Dr. Weber's involvement in 
[the decedent's]
treatment, it was incumbent upon her, before the statute of
limitations on her claim expired, to investigate and evaluate
the claim to determine who was responsible for [the
27
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
decedent's] death."); Harmon v. Blackwood, 623 So. 2d 726, 727
(Ala. 1993) ("[W]hen a plaintiff knows the name of a physician
and the involvement of that physician in the treatment of the
patient, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff, before the
running of the statutory period, to investigate and to
evaluate his claim to determine who is responsible for the
injury and to ascertain whether there is evidence of
malpractice.").  
Crucially, the principle applied in McGathey, Weber, and
Harmon applies only when the plaintiff had reason to know,
before the statute of limitations expired, that the health-
care provider had some involvement in the facts upon which the
action was based.  Here, Miles had no medical records or other
information indicating which CVMC employees interacted with
Tameca or were otherwise involved in her treatment on December
28, 2013, until after the statute of limitations expired. 
Although Gulas was identified in a list of 14 CVMC employees
who worked in the emergency room on December 28, 2013, Miles
had no knowledge of Gulas's relevance to this case until CVMC
supplemented its discovery responses on June 10, 2016, and
revealed for the first time that Gulas "saw Tameca Miles on
28
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
December 28, 2013."  Miles then amended her complaint to
substitute Gulas as a defendant that same month.
Gulas nevertheless argues that Miles should have done
more to determine whether she was a potential defendant in the
three-month period after she was identified as having been on
duty on December 28, 2013; like Blanchard, however, she
ignores the fact that Miles diligently conducted discovery
even before Gulas was identified that, if CVMC had promptly
and fully responded, would have revealed that Gulas was a
potential defendant.  That discovery included interrogatories
served in May 2015 specifically asking CVMC to identify (1)
its employees who were "involved in any way with the treatment
of [Tameca] on December 28"; (2) any individual "who witnessed
or has knowledge regarding the facts and circumstances
surrounding the happening of the incident made the basis of
this case"; and (3) its employees "(whether administrative,
nursing, technical staff or otherwise) ... who played any role
in administering health care services to Tameca."  Despite
those interrogatories and repeated informal requests by
Miles's counsel for more specific information –– catalogued
above in the first section of this opinion –– Gulas was not
29
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
identified as an individual who interacted with Tameca on
December 28, 2013, until five and a half months after the
statute of limitations expired.  Under these 
circumstances, we
are satisfied that Miles had no knowledge that Gulas "was in
fact a party intended to be sued" when the statute of
limitations expired and that Miles exercised due diligence in
her attempt to identify Gulas.  Harmon, 623 So. 2d at 727.
Gulas has not shown that she has a clear legal right to the
relief she seeks, and her petition for the writ of mandamus is
therefore denied.
C. Carla Pruitt
Carla Pruitt was not identified in CVMC's September 2015
discovery responses as one of the CVMC employees on duty in
the emergency room on December 28, 2013; the materials before
us do not explain why she was omitted from that list.  But it
is undisputed that Pruitt was first identified as an employee
who interacted with Tameca in June 2016, five and a half
months after the statute of limitations expired, when CVMC
disclosed her name for the first time and revealed that she
"saw Tameca Miles on December 28, 2013."  Miles substituted
Pruitt as a defendant that same month, and Pruitt does not
30
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
argue that Miles failed to exercise due diligence in either
identifying her or substituting her as a defendant.  Pruitt
instead argues that her substitution for a fictitiously named
defendant was improper because (1) she was not adequately
described as a fictitiously named defendant in the original
complaint; and (2) the original complaint did not assert a
cause of action against her.  We disagree.
Miles's original complaint identified as "Defendant G"
any "medical services therapist, technician, or worker who
undertook to provide services to [Tameca] [on] the occasion
made the basis of this suit, the negligence, breach or
contract, or other actionable conduct of whom contributed to
cause [Tameca's] death."  As an employee of CVMC, Pruitt can
reasonably be 
considered a 
medical-services worker. 
 
Moreover,
Pruitt has acknowledged that she attempted to get information
from Tameca so that she could register her as a patient.  It
is therefore at least arguable that Pruitt "undertook to
provide services" to Tameca when she first visited the CVMC
emergency room on December 28, 2013.  Our caselaw does not
require that the description of the fictitiously named
defendant "perfectly" or "exactly" describe the party that the
31
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
plaintiff eventually seeks to substitute; it requires only an
"adequate[]" description.  Noland Hosp., 127 So. 3d at 1167. 
Miles's complaint meets that standard in its substitution of
Pruitt. 
Pruitt also argues that Miles's original complaint did
not assert a claim against her.  This Court explained in Ex
parte International Refining & Manufacturing Co., 972 So. 2d
784, 789 (Ala. 2007), that "[a] complaint stating a claim
against 
a 
fictitiously named 
defendant must 
contain 
sufficient
specificity to put that defendant on notice of the plaintiff's
claim if it were to read the complaint."  Moreover, "the
complaint must describe the actions that form the basis of the
cause of action against the fictitiously named defendant." 
Id.  We have further explained that "[o]ne need not state with
more particularity a cause of action against an unknown party
as compared to a named party –– the test is the same." 
Columbia Eng'g Int'l, Ltd. v. Espey, 429 So. 2d 955, 960 (Ala. 
1993).  Because Miles's wrongful-death action asserts claims
against health-care providers, the provisions of the Alabama
Medical Liability Act apply; § 6-5-551, Ala. Code 1975, of
that Act requires a plaintiff to include in his or her
32
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
complaint 
"a 
detailed 
specification and 
factual 
description 
of
each act and omission alleged by [the] plaintiff to render the
health care provider liable." 
Miles's original complaint alleged that the fictitiously
named defendants committed the following negligent and wanton
acts that proximately resulted in Tameca's death: (1) they
failed "to timely and properly triage, evaluate or diagnose
Tameca's 
complaints of 
severe 
headache, 
altered 
mental 
status,
confusion, etc."; (2) they failed "to timely and properly
treat Tameca's complaints of severe headache, altered mental
status, confusion, etc."; (3) they failed "to timely and
properly notify physician(s) of Tameca's symptoms and her
emergency serious medical condition"; and (4) they "acted
outrageously by failing to diagnose, monitor, manage, or 
treat
Tameca, a seriously ill patient, but rather having her
arrested and sent to jail."  Miles argues that Pruitt, as the
admissions clerk, represented the first step in the "triage"
process and that she bore some responsibility in determining
that Tameca was in urgent need of care.  Pruitt, however,
states that she had no such responsibility for evaluating a
patient or determining whether a physician was needed.  
33
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
It is not the role of this Court to make a factual
determination of Pruitt's job responsibilities; it is enough
for us to note that Miles's original complaint is sufficiently
specific to assert a cause of action against Pruitt.  For
these reasons, the trial court did not err in allowing Miles
to substitute Pruitt for a fictitiously named defendant under
Rule 9(h).6  Accordingly, Pruitt's petition for the writ of
mandamus is due to be denied.
D.  Kathy Russell
Russell states that Miles should not have been allowed to
rely upon Rule 9(h) to avoid the statute of limitations with
regard to the claims asserted against her because, she argues,
(1) she was not adequately identified in the original
complaint; (2) the original complaint did not assert a cause
of action against her; and (3) Miles did not exercise due
diligence in attempting to discover her identity.  Noland
6Gulas and Pruitt filed a joint petition.  Although the
argument in that petition about whether Miles's original
complaint was sufficiently specific primarily addressed
Pruitt's 
circumstances, Gulas 
states 
that 
the 
argument 
applies
with equal force to her.  Because Gulas and Pruitt were
similarly involved in this case –– both were administrative
employees who attempted to get identifying information from
Tameca so that she could be registered as a patient in the
CVMC computer system –– we also reject this argument as it
relates to Gulas.
34
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
Hosp., 127 So. 3d at 1167.  For the reasons that follow, we
agree that Miles did not state a cause of action against
Russell in the body of the original complaint; thus, Russell's
summary-judgment motion was due to be granted.
As explained in the preceding section, "[a] complaint
stating a claim against a fictitiously named defendant must
contain sufficient specificity to put that defendant on 
notice
of the plaintiff's claim if it were to read the complaint." 
International Refining & Mfg., 972 So. 2d at 789.  Miles's
original complaint alleges that the fictitiously named
defendants committed the following negligent and wanton acts
that proximately caused Tameca's death: (1) they failed "to
timely and properly triage, evaluate or diagnose Tameca's
complaints of severe headache, altered mental status,
confusion, etc."; (2) they failed "to timely and properly
treat Tameca's complaints of severe headache, altered mental
status, confusion, etc."; (3) they failed "to timely and
properly notify physician(s) of Tameca's symptoms and her
emergency serious medical condition"; and (4) they "acted
outrageously by failing to diagnose, monitor, manage, or 
treat
35
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
Tameca, a seriously ill patient, but rather having her
arrested and sent to jail."
It is undisputed that Russell was never in the emergency
room or involved in any attempt to provide medical services to
Tameca.  Rather, Russell is alleged only to have told the
security guard Hill –– after he telephoned her to describe a
disturbance in the emergency room –– "if you think you need to
call the police, call them."  Thus, Russell did not summon the
police, instruct Hill to summon the police, or make the
decision to have Tameca arrested and taken to jail; she merely
told Hill he could contact the police if he thought the
situation warranted it.  Because none of the allegedly
tortious acts described in Miles's complaint adequately
describe the act Russell is accused of committing –– telling
the security guard he could call the police if he thought it
was necessary to do so –– Miles cannot use Rule 9(h) to avoid
the statute of limitations and assert an otherwise untimely
claim against Russell.  The trial court therefore erred by
denying her motion for a summary judgment.
36
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
Conclusion
In May 2015, Miles sued CVMC and other fictitiously named
defendants, including unnamed CVMC employees, alleging that
their wrongful acts had caused the December 2013 death of
Tameca.  Upon learning that CVMC employees Blanchard, Gulas,
Pruitt, and Russell were allegedly involved in the police
removing Tameca from the CVMC emergency room before she was
treated for what was ultimately determined to be bacterial
meningitis, Miles filed a series of amendments substituting
those employees for the fictitiously named defendants.  Those
CVMC employees all subsequently moved the trial court to enter
summary judgments in their favor, arguing that the claims
Miles had asserted against them were untimely because they had
not been named defendants within the two-year period allowed
by the statute of limitations governing wrongful-death
actions.  After the trial court denied those motions, the CVMC
petitioners sought mandamus relief in this Court.
As discussed above, we deny the petitions filed by
Blanchard, Gulas, and Pruitt.  We grant Russell's petition,
however, because Miles's May 2015 complaint did not state a
cause of action against her.  The trial court is directed to
37
1180317, 1180318, 1180319
vacate 
the 
order 
denying 
Russell's 
summary-judgment motion 
and
to enter an order granting the same.
1180317 –– PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
Mendheim, J., concurs in the result.
Parker, C.J., recuses himself.
1180318 –– PETITION DENIED.
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ.,
concur.
Parker, C.J., recuses himself.
1180319 –– PETITION DENIED.
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ.,
concur.
Parker, C.J., recuses himself.
38