Title: State v. Gillard

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Gillard, Appellant. 
[Cite as State v. Gillard (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d __ .] 
Criminal law -- Aggravated murder -- Death penalty -- Trial errors that 
are either harmless or waived by effective counsel are not 
mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) -- Death penalty 
upheld after remand for limited purpose of evidentiary hearing on 
possible conflict of interest -- Supreme Court retains jurisdiction. 
Trial errors that are either harmless or waived by effective counsel are not 
mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
 
(No. 96-221 -- Submitted January 21, 1997 -- Decided June 11, 1997.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, Nos. CA-6701 and 
95CA0257. 
 
We have considered various issues in this capital case on two prior 
occasions and provided detailed accounts of its facts and procedural history at 
each opportunity.  State v. Gillard (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 226, 533 N.E.2d 272 
(“Gillard I”), and State v. Gillard (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 304, 595 N.E.2d 878 
(“Gillard II”).  For that reason, we provide only a brief procedural history here. 
 
2 
 
In Gillard I, we reinstated appellant’s convictions for the  aggravated 
murders of Denise Maxwell and Leroy Ensign, and for the attempted 
aggravated murder of Ronnie W. Postlethwaite. 40 Ohio St. 3d at 235, 533 
N.E.2d at 281-282. We also remanded the cause to the court of appeals to 
conduct its independent review of the appropriateness and proportionality of 
appellant’s death sentence.  Thereafter, the court of appeals affirmed the death 
sentence, and appellant again appealed to this court. See State v. Gillard (June 
25, 1990), Stark App. No. CA-6701, unreported. 
 
In Gillard II, we remanded the cause to the trial court with instructions 
to conduct a hearing to determine whether an actual conflict of interest existed 
in trial counsel’s representation of appellant. 64 Ohio St.3d at 312, 595 N.E.2d 
at 883.  We also ordered the trial court to conduct a new trial if it found that an 
actual conflict existed.  After a hearing, the trial court determined that there 
was no conflict of interest and returned the matter to this court pursuant to our 
original remand.  Accordingly, we resume our review of this cause.  
 
3 
 
Robert D. Horowitz, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald 
Mark Caldwell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Michael J. Benza and Cynthia 
Yost, Assistant State Public Defenders, for appellant. 
 
COOK, J.   Given our determination in Gillard II, the tasks remaining in 
this case include a review of the issue of the alleged conflict of interest of 
appellant’s trial counsel and our own independent review of the 
appropriateness and proportionality of the death sentences pursuant to R.C. 
2929.05(A).  Although appellant challenges his convictions and sentence, these 
propositions of law present issues beyond the scope of the Gillard II remand 
and, as such, are beyond the scope of our current review.  Further, appellant 
failed to raise these issues in his 1988 cross-appeal when we affirmed his 
convictions and remanded the cause to the court of appeals. See Gillard I, 
supra.  These new issues are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and we 
overrule propositions of law six, nine through thirteen, and fifteen without 
 
4 
further consideration. State v. D’Ambrosio (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 141, 143, 652 
N.E.2d 710, 713. 
 
Appellant does raise additional matters that he has not had the prior 
opportunity to argue and which may not be barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata.  Thus, although they are technically beyond the scope of the remand, 
we will consider appellant’s challenges to the 1990 “resentencing” hearing of 
the trial court and to the effectiveness of his appellate counsel.    
 
After the court of appeals affirmed the original death sentence, the 
appellate court issued a special mandate directing the common pleas court to 
“carry this judgment into execution.”  State v. Gillard (June 25, 1990), Stark 
App. No. CA-6701, unreported.  The common pleas court, in response to the 
mandate, held a hearing to set a new execution date, not to “resentence” 
appellant.  At the hearing, the trial court had no authority to reopen the 
question of whether the appellant should receive the death sentence, and could 
not receive evidence or reweigh the aggravating circumstances against the 
 
5 
mitigating factors.  Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s fourteenth proposition 
of law. 
 
In his seventh proposition of law, appellant claims his appellate counsel 
in Gillard I was ineffective because only two issues were raised in his cross-
appeal.  Gillard I, however, was appellant’s second appeal as of right (notably, 
a claimed appeal as of right).  As such, appellant was not entitled to effective 
assistance of appellate counsel.  State v. Buell (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 1211, 
1212, 639 N.E.2d 110. 
 
In this same proposition, appellant also argues that he received 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the court of appeals’ proceedings 
on remand from Gillard I because counsel did not attempt to raise issues 
beyond the scope of the remand.   Because counsel appropriately focused on 
the issues before the court on remand -- that court’s independent review of the 
sentence - we overrule appellant’s seventh proposition of law.1 
 
We have previously held that R.C. 2929.05 does not require this court to 
address and discuss, in opinion form, each and every proposition of law raised 
 
6 
in a capital case on appeal from the court of appeals.  See, e.g., State v. Davis 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 110, 666 N.E.2d 1099, 1104; State v. Allen (1995), 
73 Ohio St.3d 626, 628, 653 N.E.2d 675, 680.  We thus address here only those 
issues that warrant discussion.  For the reasons that follow, we find no actual 
conflict of interest in trial counsel’s representation of appellant and affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals as to both the convictions and sentence. 
I 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
 
Appellant contends that his trial counsel, Louis Martinez, labored under 
an actual conflict of interest because Martinez also represented William A. 
Gillard, appellant’s brother.  Martinez represented William when he pled no 
contest to and was found guilty of a misdemeanor for illegally discharging a 
firearm at the crime scene immediately prior to the murders.   William was also 
under investigation by the grand jury during appellant’s trial for his 
involvement in the murders. 
 
7 
 
At our direction, the trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether 
Martinez represented appellant under the cloud of an actual conflict of interest.  
Appellant presented testimony from three witnesses: Craig Chessler, co-
counsel for appellant at trial; Don Wuertz, an investigator employed by 
Martinez during appellant’s trial; and Charles Kirkwood, a retired professor of 
law.  Martinez was unable to testify at the remand hearing, having suffered a 
stroke sometime after the trial.   
 
The trial court concluded that Martinez did not represent appellant under 
an actual conflict of interest.  Based on the limited nature of the remand by this 
court,  the court of appeals dismissed appellant’s appeal of the trial court’s 
findings for lack of jurisdiction.  State v. Gillard (Dec. 13, 1995), Stark App. 
No. 95CA0257, unreported.  
A.  Procedural Challenges 
 
Appellant initially challenges this court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
the trial court’s proceedings on remand absent the court of appeals’ 
intermediate review.  Appellant argues in his first proposition of law that the 
 
8 
court of appeals, not this court, has jurisdiction over direct appeals from 
common pleas courts pursuant to Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution.2  In this case, however, the decision of the trial court on the 
conflict issue is not returned to this court as “an appeal” from the trial court.  
This court never relinquished the jurisdiction acquired in Gillard II.  By 
instructing the trial court in Gillard II  to “return this cause” to this court, we 
retained our jurisdiction and remanded only the conflict issue for the limited 
purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing.    See, also, State v. Berry 
(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 1439, 671 N.E.2d 1279 (remand to trial court for 
competency hearing while retaining jurisdiction over matter); see, generally, 16 
Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure (1996) 700, Section 
3937.1 (describing and approving federal courts’ use of remand-while-
retaining-jurisdiction procedural device).  Because appellant had no right to 
appeal the conflict issue to the court of appeals, we overrule his first 
proposition of law.    
 
9 
 
In his second proposition of law, appellant challenges the remedy we 
fashioned in Gillard II for the trial court’s failure to inquire into the possible 
conflict of interest during the original trial.  Appellant contends that a new trial 
is the sole remedy for the trial court’s failure to conduct an inquiry into a 
potential conflict of interest at trial after the trial court has been alerted to one.   
 
In support of his argument, appellant cites Wood v. Georgia (1981), 450 
U.S. 261, 272,  101 S.Ct. 1097, 1104, 67 L.Ed.2d 220, 231, fn. 18, where the 
court stated that the United States Constitution “mandates a reversal when the 
trial court has failed to make an inquiry even though it ‘knows or reasonably 
should know that a particular conflict exists.’” (Emphasis added.)  In Wood, the 
trial court failed to inquire into a possible conflict of interest after the court was 
alerted to its potential during a probation revocation hearing.  Nonetheless, the 
Wood court ordered the trial court to “hold a hearing to determine whether the 
conflict of interest * * * actually existed * * *,” rather than a new revocation 
hearing.  Only “[i]f the court finds that an actual conflict of interest existed” 
 
10 
was it to grant a new revocation hearing.  450 U.S. at 273-274, 101 S.Ct. at 
1104, 67 L.Ed.2d at 231. 
 
Additionally, the United States Constitution is violated by an actual 
conflict of interest, not a possible one. Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 
348-350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718-1719, 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 346-347; State v. 
Manross (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 180, 182, 532 N.E.2d 735, 738. When a 
possible conflict of interest exists, a defendant is entitled only to an inquiry by 
the trial court.  The trial court’s failure to conduct the inquiry, however, does 
not transform a possible conflict into an actual one.  A retrial for failing to 
inquire into a possible conflict of interest is premature.  Rather, reversal is 
mandated only if an actual conflict is found.  See Brien v. United States (C.A.1, 
1982), 695 F.2d 10, 15, fn. 10; United States v. Winkle (C.A.10, 1983), 722 
F.2d 605, 611-612; Bonin v. Vasquez (D.C.Cal. 1992), 807 F.Supp. 589, 606, 
fn. 16.  Appellant’s second proposition of law is overruled. 
 
In its opinion on the remand, the trial court indicated that it reviewed 
only parts of the original trial record.  Appellant argues in his fifth proposition 
 
11 
of law that, as a result, the trial court’s factual findings are unreliable and that 
we should remand the issue for a complete review of the record.  The facts 
surrounding the alleged conflict of interest were largely undisputed and the 
trial court did not need to review the entire trial record to properly reach its 
findings.  In any event, whether an actual conflict of interest existed is a mixed 
question of law and fact, subject to de novo review on appeal.  Cuyler, 446 U.S. 
at 342, 100 S.Ct. at 1715, 64 L.Ed.2d at 342; Winkler v. Keane (C.A.2, 1993), 7 
F.3d 304, 308.   Because the trial court is in a far better position to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses testifying at the remand hearing, its findings should 
be accepted unless clearly erroneous.  United States v. Gambino (C.A.3, 1988), 
864 F.2d 1064, 1071, fn. 3.  We find no clear errors in the trial judge’s 
findings.  Appellant’s fifth proposition of law is overruled. 
B.  Merits 
 
In his third and eighth propositions of law, appellant challenges the trial 
court’s finding on remand that no actual conflict existed in Martinez’s 
representation of appellant.  In order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation 
 
12 
due to a conflict of interest, a defendant who failed to object at trial must 
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s 
performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d at 346-
347. 
 
A possible conflict of interest exists where the “‘interests of the 
defendants may diverge at some point so as to place the attorney under 
inconsistent duties.’” (Emphasis added.) State v. Dillon (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 
166, 168, 657 N.E.2d 273, 275-276, quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 356, 100 S.Ct. 
at 1722, 64 L.Ed.2d at 351-352, fn. 3.   It follows, then, that an actual conflict 
of interest exists if, “‘during the course of the representation, the defendants’ 
interests do diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a 
course of action.’” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 169, 657 N.E.2d at 276, quoting 
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 356, 100 S.Ct. at 1722, 64 L.Ed.2d at 351-352, fn. 3; see, 
also, Winkler, 7 F.3d at 307.  Indeed, we have said that a lawyer represents 
conflicting interests “when, on behalf of one client,  it is his duty to contend for 
 
13 
that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.” Manross, 40 Ohio 
St.3d at 182, 532 N.E.2d at 738. 
 
Appellant contends that an actual conflict of interest in Martinez’s 
representation of him and his brother, William, is apparent during appellant’s 
trial because Martinez failed to use the evidence linking William to the murders 
to argue that William, and not appellant, committed them.  Appellant cites the 
following evidence adduced at trial:  William, armed with brass knuckles, 
attended a New Year’s Eve party at the home of Tim Hendricks.  William was 
evicted from the party after he and another partygoer, Leroy Ensign, got into a 
bloody fight.  William returned to the Hendricks home and fired a gun outside 
the house minutes before the murders occurred there.  William provided a false 
name to the police when he was apprehended several hours after the murders.  
When he was apprehended, William’s shirt had blood stains that matched one 
victim, and his jacket had blood stains that could not be excluded as coming 
from another victim.  William also possessed a bullet matching those found at 
the crime scene.    
 
14 
 
To demonstrate an actual conflict of interest based upon what an attorney 
has failed to do, appellant must show two elements.  First, he must demonstrate 
that “some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been 
pursued.  He need not show that the alternative defense would necessarily have 
been successful if it had been used, but that it possessed sufficient substance to 
be a viable alternative.  Second, he must establish that the alternative defense 
was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney’s other 
loyalties or interests.” United States v. Fahey (C.A.1, 1985), 769 F.2d 829, 836; 
see, also, Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1070-1071; Winkler, 7 F.3d at 309. 
 
Martinez, appellant maintains, could not argue that William committed 
the murders as part of appellant’s defense due to Martinez’s duty to protect 
William from future prosecution.  Martinez’ sole defense strategy was an alibi 
defense.  To this end, appellant and three other witnesses testified that 
appellant was at a New Year’s Eve party at the home of friends at the time of 
the murders. Martinez also called William as a defense witness.  William 
denied firing a gun at the crime scene immediately prior to the murders and 
 
15 
denied any involvement in the murders.  He also denied speaking to or seeing 
appellant after William’s fight with Ensign.  
 
At the remand hearing, Professor Kirkwood testified that the viable 
defense Martinez should, but could not, have presented was an alibi and an  
alternate suspect defense.   Under this theory, instead of solely arguing an alibi 
defense, Martinez should have also argued that William committed the 
murders.   In Kirkwood’s opinion, the circumstantial evidence pointing to 
William’s involvement made the alternate suspect a viable, plausible defense.  
 
At the remand hearing, appellant also introduced a plea agreement 
between the state and William dated two and one-half years after appellant’s 
trial while William was represented by counsel other than Martinez.  According 
to the agreement, William pled guilty to the aggravated burglary of the 
Hendricks home, agreed to testify against appellant if appellant were to be 
retried and, in exchange, received probation for the offense.  Appellant argues 
that the plea agreement demonstrates that the interests of appellant and his 
 
16 
brother differed so that any attorney would have used William’s involvement to 
exculpate appellant. 
 
We disagree.  We cannot say either that the alternative defense was 
viable or that Martinez’s failure to argue, on behalf of appellant, that William 
was the “real killer” was due to Martinez’s obligations to William.  Although 
William may have been a plausible suspect, he was not an alternative suspect.  
Evidence of William’s involvement was not inconsistent with appellant’s guilt, 
i.e., none of the evidence implicating William either negated appellant’s 
involvement or strengthened his alibi.    
 
To the contrary, the state claimed that both appellant and his brother 
were involved in the murders. For example, the state presented evidence that 
William’s fight with Ensign provided appellant with the motive to kill Ensign. 
Additionally, the state called Ronald Webb, who testified that appellant 
confessed to him that “I pulled the trigger, and my brother’s taking the fall.” 
 
Moreover, both appellant and his brother were positively identified by 
the attempted-murder victim, Ronnie Postlethwaite.  Postlethwaite testified that 
 
17 
he saw William fire the shots outside Hendricks’s house. Twenty minutes later, 
Postlethwaite heard more than one person enter the house and then heard a shot 
fired in the kitchen.  Soon after, Postlethwaite testified, appellant grabbed his 
hair from behind, turned his head around and shot him in the temple. 
Postlethwaite then saw appellant shoot his fiancee, Denise Maxwell, in the 
head while she slept on the couch.  While he lay wounded at the scene, 
Postlethwaite identified appellant to the police as the shooter.  Naturally, 
Postlethwaite’s identification testimony and his credibility were crucial to the 
interests of both appellant and his brother.   
 
If Martinez emphasized William’s involvement in the murders, he would 
have conceded that the state’s theory was in part correct.   For example, by 
blaming William for the murders, Martinez risked substantiating Webb’s 
testimony that William was “taking the fall” for appellant.  Likewise, taking the 
position that William fired shots outside the murder scene that night would 
bolster the general credibility of Postlethwaite, the state’s sole identifying 
witness.  If the jury believed the portion of Postlethwaite’s testimony 
 
18 
identifying appellant as the gunman, evidence of William’s involvement would 
not assist appellant’s defense.  On the other hand, if the jury believed William’s 
testimony that he did not fire shots on the night of the murders, the jury would 
have necessarily rejected Postlethwaite’s idenitification of William and would 
be more likely to reject his identification of appellant.   By attacking the state’s 
evidence implicating William, Martinez undermined the state’s case against 
appellant. 
 
There is “no conflict of interest adversely affecting the attorney’s 
performance at trial if an attorney at trial does not raise a defense on behalf of 
his client because to do so is not in that client’s interest even though it is also in 
the interest of another client that it not be raised.  To the contrary, that is a 
coincidence of interests.”  Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1071.  We find here that 
Martinez labored under a coincidence of interests rather than an actual conflict 
of interests. 
 
Contrary to appellant’s assertions in his fourth proposition of law, 
neither the trial court nor this court engage in harmless error review by 
 
19 
discussing the merits of Martinez’s strategy.  Discussion of the merits of 
Martinez’s strategy is relevant to whether an actual conflict adversely affected 
Martinez’s performance at trial.  Appellant placed the merits of Martinez’s 
strategy in issue by presenting Kirkwood’s testimony and by arguing to this 
court that “[t]he impact of the conflict of interest was not in the presentation of 
the defense, but rather in the initial selection of the defense to present.” 
 
In accordance with the above, we overrule appellant’s third, fourth, and 
eighth propositions of law. 
II 
  INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.05, we independently review appellant’s death 
sentence to determine whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of 
aggravating circumstances; to reweigh the aggravating circumstances against 
the mitigating factors; and to determine whether the death sentence is 
proportionate compared to other similar cases.  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm appellant’s sentence. 
 
20 
A.  Aggravating Circumstances v.  Mitigating Factors 
 
Appellant’s four convictions of aggravated murder must merge into two, 
since he killed two victims. State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 22, 28, 553 
N.E.2d 1058, 1066.  Each count has two aggravating circumstances: multiple 
murder, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and murder during the commission of an 
aggravated burglary, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  As we noted in both Gillard I and  
Gillard II,  there is overwhelming evidence supporting appellant’s guilt of 
these offenses. 40 Ohio St.3d at 229, 533 N.E.2d at 276; 64 Ohio St.3d at 312, 
595 N.E.2d at 883.  
 
Appellant presented no evidence during the penalty phase and, instead,  
argued residual doubt as the sole mitigating factor.  After a review of the 
record, we find that the evidence of appellant’s guilt is overwhelming and 
convincing.  We conclude that residual doubt is not an important mitigating 
factor in this case. 
 
Postlethwaite positively identified appellant as Maxwell’s killer as 
Postlethwaite lay wounded on the floor at the crime scene.  Appellant attempts 
 
21 
to discredit Postlethwaite’s identification by noting the following:  the only 
light by which Postlethwaite was able to see came from another room; 
Postlethwait drank eight small glasses of beer at the party prior to the murders; 
and Postlethwaite’s right eye was partly blinded by the shooting.  However, 
Postlethwaite retained 20/20 vision in his left eye and saw appellant’s face 
before he was shot.  Moreover, Postlethwaite knew both appellant and his 
brother.  
 
Appellant also refers to the possible involvement of his brother, William, 
and Tim Foehrenbach in the murders.  The evidence does not show with 
complete certainty that appellant shot Ensign himself, and here, residual doubt 
is arguably entitled to some weight.   The evidence clearly shows, however, 
that appellant was the principal offender in Maxwell’s murder.  Ensign and 
Maxwell were also shot by the same gun, raising a strong inference that the 
same perpetrator shot both.  Appellant’s actions after the murders also 
corroborate his guilt.  Appellant fled to West Virginia, where he altered his 
appearance and used the alias “Butch Johnson.”   Appellant also confessed to 
 
22 
Ronald Webb that he “pulled the trigger.”  Although appellant challenges 
Webb’s credibility, we are unconvinced that the record supports his arguments. 
 
The trial court found that the guilt-phase evidence raised three other 
mitigating factors: provocation, R.C. 2929.04(B)(2); lack of a substantial 
history of criminal convictions, R.C. 2929.04(B)(5); and appellant’s 
consumption of alcohol before the killings, R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  The trial court 
assigned little weight to provocation in the Ensign murder and little weight to 
the other two factors but gave provocation no weight in the Maxwell murder. 
 
We, too, assign little weight to appellant’s alcohol consumption and lack 
of a substantial criminal history.  We also find that provocation is entitled to no 
weight in either the Maxwell or Ensign murders.  There was some testimony 
that Ensign started the fight with William.  Nonetheless, Ensign inflicted no 
direct injury on appellant and Maxwell did not provoke appellant in any way. 
 
We also consider that appellant is the oldest of thirteen children and the 
father of two children.  He is a high school graduate, has been self-employed as 
an auto mechanic, and has worked on pit crews in auto and motorcycle races.   
 
23 
Ironically, appellant cites his close family ties as evidence of mitigation, since 
loyalty to his brother is one of the alleged motives for his crimes. 
 
Appellant raises, in his sixteenth and eighteenth propositions of law,  the 
question of whether alleged legal errors in the trial or sentencing proceedings 
are R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) mitigating factors.  We conclude that they are not.   
 
Generally, prejudicial errors at trial will require reversal of the 
conviction or sentence, rendering independent review of the appropriateness 
and proportionality of the death sentence moot.   Similarly, errors that are 
waived, but amount to plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel, will 
require reversal of the conviction or sentence and any independent review 
would be moot.  Under appellant’s argument, the only trial errors that would  
be considered in a reviewing court’s independent review are harmless errors or 
errors waived by effective counsel that are not plain errors.  We see no reason 
why these types of errors, committed during a fundamentally fair trial of a 
defendant represented by competent counsel, should be considered mitigating 
 
24 
factors.  Thus, we hold that trial errors that are either harmless or waived by 
effective counsel are not mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
 
In weighing the mitigating factors against the aggravating circumstances, 
we are mindful that “[w]hen a capital defendant is convicted of more than one 
count of aggravated murder, * * * [o]nly the aggravating circumstances related 
to a given count may be considered in assessing the penalty for that count.” 
State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895, paragraph three of 
the syllabus.  We find that the aggravating circumstances in the Maxwell 
murder outweigh the mitigating factors and that the aggravating circumstances 
in the Ensign murder outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
B.  Proportionality 
 
We conclude that the death penalty is appropriate and proportionate for 
both aggravated murder convictions.  The sentence is appropriate when 
compared with similar “course of conduct” cases involving the purposeful 
killing, or attempt to kill, two people. See State v. Brooks (1986), 25 Ohio 
 
25 
St.3d 144, 25 OBR 190, 495 N.E.2d 407; State v. Frazier (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 
247, 574 N.E.2d 483; State v. Combs (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 581 N.E.2d 
1071; State v. Davis (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 581 N.E.2d 1362.  The 
sentence is also proportionate when compared with other aggravated burglary-
murder cases. See State v. Wiles (1990), 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 571 N.E.2d 97; State 
v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 588 N.E.2d 819.  We reject appellant’s 
arguments that his sentence is disproportionate to the sentences received by 
William Gillard and Tim Foehrenbach.  The cases are not similar because 
neither of these defendants was tried for aggravated murder.  Appellant’s 
seventeenth proposition of law is overruled. 
C.  Constitutionality 
 
In his final proposition of law, appellant challenges the constitutionality 
of Ohio’s death-penalty statutory framework.  We have consistently held that 
Ohio's death penalty scheme is constitutional and we continue to adhere to that 
position. See State v. Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 337-338, 667 N.E.2d 
960, 972;  State v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 65, 656 N.E.2d 623, 638. 
 
26 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s finding of no actual 
conflict, and affirm the convictions and the death penalty sentence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 
Appellant makes a related argument in his nineteenth proposition of law 
that he was denied “meaningful” appellate review because the court of appeals 
neither considered the mitigating factors nor independently reweighed the 
aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors.  This court’s independent 
review, however, will correct any errors by the court of appeals. State v. Clark 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 263, 527 N.E.2d 844, 856. 
2 
Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution states:  
 
“Courts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by 
law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the 
 
27 
courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district and shall 
have such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and 
affirm, modify, or reverse final orders or actions of administrative officers or 
agencies.” 
APPENDIX 
 
“Proposition of Law No. I [:]  A decision by a court of common pleas 
after the remand by an appellate court is reviewable by the court of appeals. 
 
 “Proposition of Law No. II [:]  The failure of a trial court to hold a 
hearing into the conflict of interest mandates reversal of the convictions and 
sentences. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. III [:]  Joint representation of a defendant and a 
potential defendant constituted an actual conflict of interest mandating reversal 
of the conviction and sentence. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. IV [:]  When a defense attorney labors under an 
actual conflict of interest the error is a fundamental and structural error which 
is not susceptible [of] harmless error review. 
 
28 
 
“Proposition of Law No. V [:]  When a hearing court fails to review the 
entire record on the trial, the factual conclusions of the trial court are unreliable 
and not binding on the reviewing court. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VI [:]  A capital defendant’s convictions and 
sentences are unreliable and inappropriate when he is denied the effective 
assistance of counsel, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10, 
and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VII [:]  Appellant Gillard was denied the 
effective assistance of appellate counsel in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Sections 10 and 
16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VIII [:]  When counsel fails to investigate and 
present mitigating evidence and labors under a conflict of interest, the 
defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his 
constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
 
29 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 2, 9, 10, 
and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. IX[:]  The prosecutor’s misconduct in the trial 
phase of John Gillard’s capital case denied Mr. Gillard his due process right to 
a fair trial. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. X[:]  When the appearance of judicial bias and 
impropriety are present a defendant is denied a fair trial, in violation of the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Sections 2, 5, 9, and 16 of the Ohio Constitution and Canon 3 of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XI[:]  The trial court procedures at all stages of 
appellant Gillard’s trial violated his rights of due process and to a reliable 
determination of the appropriateness of the death sentence in violation of the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Sections 9, 10 and 16, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
30 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XII[:]  When a trial court releases grand jury 
transcripts to the state to aid in preparation of an appeal, the court must release 
the transcripts to the defense and make the transcripts a part of the record on 
appeal. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XIII[:]  The evidence in appellant Gillard’s case 
was not sufficient to support his convictions under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Sections 9 and 16, Article I 
of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XIV[:]  Appellant Gillard’s rights under the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Sections 9, 10, and 16[,] Article I of the Ohio Constitution 
were violated when the trial court reimposed the death penalty at the 
resentencing hearing. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XV[:]  The death sentence is inappropriate and 
unreliable when voir dire errors deny a capital defendant his right to a fair trial 
and a fair jury, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
 
31 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 2, 5, 9, 
10, and 16 of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XVI[:]  The death sentence imposed on 
appellant Gillard is unreliable, inappropriate and violates the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Section[s] 9 and 16, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution and O.R.C. Sec. 2929.05. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XVII[:]  Appellant Gillard’s death sentence was 
disproportionate and violated the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Sections 9 and 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XVIII[:]  A capital defendant’s death sentence 
is unreliable and inappropriate when he is denied the procedural safeguard of a 
meaningful, independent review by the trial court under the Fifth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Sections 9 and 16, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution, O.R.C. Sec. 2929.03(F) and O.R.C. Sec. 
2929.05. 
 
32 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XIX[:]  A capital defendant’s death sentence is 
unreliable and inappropriate when he is denied the procedural safeguard of a 
meaningful, independent review by the appellate court under the Fifth, Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Sections 9 and 
16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, O.R.C. Sec. 2929.03(F) and O.R.C. Sec. 
2929.05. 
 
“Proposition of Law XX[:]  The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Sections 2, 9, 10, and 16, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution establish requirements for a valid death 
penalty scheme.  Ohio Revised Code Sections 2903.01,  2929.02, 2929.021, 
2929.022, 2929.023, 2929.03, 2929.04 and 2929.05, Ohio’s statutory 
provisions governing the imposition of the death penalty, do not meet the 
prescribed constitutional requirements and are unconstitutional, both on their 
face and as applied to appellant Gillard.” 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  I believe an actual conflict of 
interest existed that adversely affected the performance of John Gillard’s 
 
33 
lawyer.  Consequently, Gillard was denied his constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel and his conviction should be reversed. Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
The trial court’s initial failure to conduct a hearing on the issue of 
conflict of interest does not mandate reversal.  John Gillard’s attorney, Louis 
Martinez, never directly raised the issue of conflict of interest on behalf of John 
before the trial court.  Instead, the state raised the issue when William was 
called to testify on his brother’s behalf and the state requested the court to 
advise William of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.  This was not the 
equivalent of an objection on behalf of John.  Although the trial court 
appointed other counsel for the limited purpose of advising William of his 
rights, Martinez represented William at least until he testified at John’s trial.  
State v. Gillard (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 304, 307, 595 N.E.2d 878, 879-880. 
 
A court is not required to sua sponte raise the issue of conflict of 
interest.   
 
34 
A better practice would have been for the trial court to stop the proceedings 
and to inquire into the potential of a conflict of interest.  The fact that Martinez 
was later unable to testify for medical reasons at the remand hearing further 
underscores the importance of the timeliness of an inquiry.   However, if a 
conflict is not raised, or inquired into, in such a hearing, a judgment will be 
reversed only if an appellant shows that an actual conflict adversely affected 
counsel’s representation of the appellant.  State v. Manross (1988), 40 Ohio 
St.3d 180, 532 N.E.2d 735; Hamilton v. Ford (C.A.11, 1992), 969 F.2d 1006, 
1011. 
 
I believe that the evidence clearly shows that an actual conflict of 
interest existed because Martinez represented both John Gillard and his 
brother, William, who was implicated in these crimes.  Although John and 
William were not defendants in the same case, William had been originally 
charged with these murders and the attempted murder.  William, represented by 
Martinez, later pleaded no contest to discharging a firearm within city limits.  
An ongoing investigation into these crimes continued during John’s trial and 
 
35 
William remained the subject of the investigation.  Some two and one-half 
years later, William agreed in a plea agreement to testify against his brother in 
a retrial in exchange for a recommendation of early release following a guilty 
plea and sentencing for the aggravated burglary of the Hendricks home.  
 
Because Martinez represented both brothers, the choices he made before 
and during John’s trial lead to the inescapable conclusion that Martinez was 
hampered by divided loyalties that adversely affected his performance.  The 
evidence clearly shows that Martinez’s joint representation of John and 
William influenced his selection of witnesses, his overall defense strategy, and 
his ability to zealously represent the interests of John. The United States 
Supreme Court has held that once a conflict of interest that has adversely 
affected the lawyer’s performance is identified, prejudice to the defendant is 
presumed.  Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 349, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1719, 
64 L.Ed.2d 333, 347. 
 
36 
 
There is abundant testimony in the record that clearly incriminated 
William Gillard.  Professor Kirkwood testified at the remand hearing that the 
following pieces of circumstantial evidence connected William to these crimes: 
• William was at the house the night the murders occurred and had been in a 
fight with one of the victims. 
• William was carrying brass knuckles. 
• William was forcibly removed from the house. 
• William later returned to the house and fired a gun outside shortly before 
the murders occurred. 
• William fled the scene and was arrested four hours after the shootings. 
• William gave the police a false name when he was arrested. 
• Blood consistent with that of victim Denise Maxwell was found on 
William’s shirt, and blood from victim Leroy Ensign was found on 
William’s jacket. 
•  A bullet that matched the type of bullets from the murder weapon was 
found on William. 
 
37 
 
Martinez’s trial strategy was to establish an alibi defense for John.  
However, based upon the compelling evidence presented at trial, there existed a 
plausible defense that implicated William as a substitute or alternate defendant. 
Instead of bolstering John’s alibi with an alternate defendant defense, Martinez 
decided to rely solely on the alibi defense.  Martinez did not and could not 
consider this alternative defendant theory or even a combination of the 
alibi/alternative defendant theory because he represented William as well as 
John.  Where the attorney’s choice of strategy would have been different had 
there been separate representation, the attorney renders ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Griffin v. McVicar (C.A.7, 1996), 84 F.3d 880, 887. 
 
Further evidence of an actual conflict of interest is demonstrated by 
Martinez’s direct examination of William, who testified on behalf of his 
brother.  A conflict of interest may arise when counsel representing two 
defendants must decide whether either or both of the defendants should testify.  
“This kind of decision, difficult enough where two defendants at the same trial 
are represented by different counsel, is made doubly difficult where they are 
 
38 
represented by the same counsel.” Morgan v. United States (C.A.2, 1968), 396 
F.2d 110, 114.  This decision “may be unduly affected by the risk that [one 
defendant’s] testimony may develop so as to disclose matters which are 
harmful to the other defendant or which conflict with the other defendant’s 
story.  The attorney’s freedom to cross-examine one defendant on behalf of 
another will be restricted where the attorney represents both defendants.”  Id.   
 
Here, although William was not a defendant in this case, his actions were 
so intertwined in the facts of the case that Martinez was tactically unable to 
fully examine William to extract testimony helpful to John because it would 
also tend to incriminate William.  The majority finds that this choice of strategy 
was not prejudicial because the dangers of pursuing the alternative defendant 
theory could have had an adverse impact on John.  However, the court in 
United States v. Carrigan  (C.A.2, 1976), 543 F.2d 1053, 1057, stated: 
 
“We cannot accept the proposition that the more potent the 
Government’s case, the less compelling the criminal defendant’s constitutional 
right to independent counsel. * * * Trial counsel could not possibly have given 
 
39 
his full measure of professional devotion to clients presenting inconsistent 
defenses.  Each was entitled to zealous and independent counsel.  While here 
counsel obviously slighted White [one client] and favored Carrigan [his other 
client], he could not fully exploit Carrigan’s willingness to testify without 
further damaging White’s credibility.  We see no need to speculate as to how 
independent counsel could have more competently handled the defense of 
either defendant.  The record discloses the sharp conflict in their positions 
which, in the nature of things, prejudiced each even if one was apparently less 
disadvantaged than the other.”   
 
Here, Martinez clearly did not vigorously pursue an allegation that 
William was the participant in the murders and that John had an alibi, because 
this would prejudice his own client, William. 
 
The majority reasons that if William had taken the fall, so would John by 
association.  This “united we stand, divided we fall” approach was rejected in 
Foxworth v. Wainwright (C.A. 5, 1975), 516 F. 2d 1072, because, the court 
concluded, the conflict occurs not in presenting the defense chosen by counsel 
 
40 
but in selecting defenses and strategies in the first place.  The Foxworth court 
stated: 
 
“Under these circumstances, counsel’s choice of the ‘united we stand, 
divided we fall’ defense was not a free choice of strategy.  It was the only 
course open to an attorney with the unenviable task of saving three boys from 
the electric chair.  ‘It must be remembered that in cases involving conflicts of 
interest, the conflict does not always appear full-blown upon the record, since 
counsel may throughout endeavor to reconcile the conflict.’” (Emphasis 
added.)  Id., 516 F.2d at 1079-1080. The Foxworth court reasoned that had 
counsel represented one defendant only, counsel could have more fully cross-
examined prosecution witnesses on their testimony to inculpate the co-
defendant, but that was not an avenue open because of counsel’s joint 
representation.  Id. at 1080. 
 
As was the case in Foxworth, I believe Martinez was so hindered by the 
joint representation that he also failed to effectively cross-examine other 
witnesses.  Ron Postlethwaite, one of the victims, testified that he had heard 
 
41 
gunshots in the backyard and saw William shoot a gun into the air.  
Postlethwaite then went back to sleep.  Postlethwaite also testified that there 
was a third party present that evening, Timothy Foehrenbach.  Martinez did not 
pursue inconsistencies in Postlethwaite’s testimony regarding mistaken 
identity, his demeanor when police and emergency personnel arrived, and his 
failure to identify John to the paramedics who treated him at the scene.  
Paramedics noted that Postlethwaite was oriented, yet a police officer on the 
scene described him as “raving.”  A thorough cross-examination of  
Postlethwaite and other prosecution witnesses to emphasize William’s presence 
at the scene would have strengthened John’s alibi defense and could have 
established sufficient reasonable doubt in the jury’s mind as to the guilt of 
John.  However, because of the joint representation, Martinez did not, and 
could not, pursue questioning that would have implicated William which, at the 
same time, would have exonerated John. 
 
The case of Griffin v. McVicar, (C.A.7, 1996), 84 F.3d 880, is 
particularly on point.  In Griffin, defense counsel represented two defendants, 
 
42 
Griffin and Smith, who were both charged with the murder of three individuals 
and an attempt to murder a fourth.  Counsel presented a joint alibi defense.  His 
main strategy was to discredit the eyewitness identifications of both 
defendants. 
 
While eyewitness testimony consistently implicated Griffin’s co-
defendant, there were significant contradictions in the testimony implicating 
Griffin.  Id. at 889.  Griffin asserted that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel.  Griffin claimed that his attorney failed to present the alternative 
defense that Griffin was merely a nonparticipating bystander, that his attorney 
was unable to emphasize testimony that would exonerate Griffin at the expense 
of Smith, and that his attorney failed to pursue lines of inquiry to aid Griffin at 
the expense of his co-defendant. Griffin claimed that, instead, his attorney’s 
defense strategy was highly prejudicial to Griffin. 
 
As to ineffective assistance of Griffin’s counsel, the Seventh Circuit 
cited conclusions reached by the state court of appeals in the same case: 
 
43 
 
“‘As it was, [the attorney] only pointed to the inconsistencies and 
ambiguities as matters going to the credibility of the State’s witnesses.  
Counsel could not give Griffin the best possible defense under the 
circumstances because to do so would have been disloyal to Smith, his original 
client.  Because of this conflict of loyalties, he remained silent when 
independent counsel would have spoken out on Griffin’s behalf.’”  Id. at 885, 
quoting People v. Griffin (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 169, 181, 463 N.E.2d 1063, 
1072. 
 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of Griffin’s petition for writ of 
habeas corpus.  The court found that a conflict of interest existed on the basis 
that Griffin’s counsel had failed to discuss with him the likely untruth of his 
alibi and the near certainty it would not be believed by a jury.  This, coupled 
with the failure to assert an alternate defense that could rest on the weaknesses 
and contradictions in the testimony that implicated him in this shooting, left 
Griffin with the task of refuting the evidence against both defendants as well as 
to establish an alibi on behalf of both of them.   The Griffin court reasoned: 
 
44 
 
“In the face of the uncontradicted evidence placing Smith at the scene 
during the shootings, Griffin’s testifying to an alibi which involved Smith 
could do nothing but damage his own case.  While a defense based on simply 
raising doubts about the credibility of the testimony implicating Griffin in the 
shootings might well have been unsuccessful, the joint alibi defense was nearly 
as weak as no defense at all.  There was only the slimmest chance, if any, that a 
jury would believe the alibi in the face of the consistent eyewitness testimony 
placing Griffin and Smith at the scene of the murders.  On the other hand, an 
attorney representing only Griffin could have impeached the identifications of 
Griffin as a shooter by exploiting obvious inconsistencies in testimony.  The 
joint representation prevented [Griffin’s counsel] from exploiting the disparity 
in strength of the respective prosecution cases again Griffin and Smith.  
 
“ * * * It is often the unenviable job of defense counsel to choose among 
unpromising defenses.  However, when an actual conflict of interest due to 
joint representation constrains an attorney to choose the hopeless in favor of 
 
45 
the unpromising, the defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel.”  
Id. at 890. 
 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that the record disclosed no waiver of 
the conflict on Griffin’s part or any evidence that the attorney discussed the 
potential of conflict of interest or the alternative defendant theories with his 
client.  Nor was there any evidence presented at the remand hearing that 
Martinez had discussed the conflict of interest that existed because of his 
representation of  both John and William so that John could make an informed 
choice about waiver and the selection of other defense theories. 
 
Although William was not a co-defendant in the same trial as John, he 
was charged with the same crimes.  The reasons for the existence of the conflict 
of interest are identical to those in the cases cited.  The record in this case is 
replete with evidence implicating William in these crimes, from blood on his 
jacket, a matching bullet found on his body, and his flight from the scene, to his 
fight with one of the victims on the night of the murders.  Initially, an arrest 
warrant was issued only for William.  William’s plea of no contest to the 
 
46 
unlawful discharge of a firearm placed him by his own admission at the scene 
of these crimes.  William’s later plea included an agreement to testify against 
his brother if retrial occurred.  Clearly, there was sufficient evidence upon 
which Martinez should have established an alternate defendant theory.  
Martinez could have used this evidence to attack the strength of the 
identification of John at the scene of the crime.  However, Martinez did not 
present this evidence as part of a defense strategy, nor did he argue it to the jury 
in support of reasonable doubt for John’s involvement.   Because of Martinez’s 
joint representation, he was constrained to rely solely on the alibi defense and 
was not free to pursue this plausible alternate defendant theory as part of his 
defense strategy. 
 
Although this case has a long and tortuous history, one still cannot 
overlook the actual conflict that clearly affected Martinez’s ability to zealously 
represent John.  Martinez was left with no choice but to choose the weaker line 
of defense.  For these reasons, I believe reversal is mandated and, therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
47 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.