Title: Dolan v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
MICHAEL DOLAN, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 345/368, 2006 (Consolidated) 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0508021003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  April 4, 2007 
Decided:  May 10, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the court en banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal form the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
 
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware 
for appellant. 
 
 
Kevin M. Carroll, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
 
 
 
2
Defendant-appellant Michael Dolan appeals his conviction for burglary in 
the second degree.1  Dolan argues on appeal that the Superior Court judge who 
convicted him after a bench trial erred in two respects.  Specifically, the trial judge:  
(1) incorrectly interpreted 11 Del.C. § 825(a) in ruling that Dolan formulated the 
necessary intent to commit a crime in a dwelling after illegally entering the 
Delaneys’ home and remaining in the home unlawfully; and, (2) erroneously 
concluded that he did not have to consider the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the inference that Dolan formulated the intent to commit a crime in the 
Delaney’s home at the time he entered it unlawfully.  Dolan claims that one 
accused of violating 11 Del.C. § 825(a) must form the intent to commit a crime 
inside a dwelling either when or before he enters the dwelling unlawfully.   
Whether a defendant must formulate the intent to commit a crime inside a 
home at the time he enters the home unlawfully, for purposes of the second degree 
burglary statute, is an issue of first impression.   
After examining the record and relevant case law, we, joining the majority 
of jurisdictions, and hold that, to be convicted of second degree burglary,2 a person 
must form the intent to commit a crime inside before or at the time he enters the 
dwelling.  The record of the bench trial does not establish that the trial judge 
                                                 
1  
11 Del. C. § 825 (a). 
 
2  
Id.  
 
 
3
considered this factor in his findings supporting the judgment of conviction.  
Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for further findings and conclusions 
consistent with this Opinion. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 20, 2005, Robert and Robin Delaney went on vacation with their 
children.  The Delaneys asked their neighbor, Eulekoa Kanamee, to watch their 
house and feed their cat while they were away.  They gave Kanamee the key to 
their house and Robert’s cell phone number. 
On August 24, 2005, Dolan3 called the Delaneys while they were in Ocean 
City, Maryland, and asked them if he could stay at their house.  Because of 
concerns about Dolan’s drug and alcohol abuse problems, the Delaneys told Dolan 
that he could not stay at their house while they were away.  During this phone 
conversation, Dolan asked three different times if he could stay at their house, and 
each time Robert told him no.  Dolan seemed angry, and hung up the phone.   
Later that day, Robert checked his voice mail and heard a message from 
Kanamee asking Robert to call him back.  Robert called him back at around 4:30 
p.m., Kanamee told Robert that at around 3:30 p.m., Dolan had come over to his 
house and said “my name is Mike Dolan, and you don’t need to come over and 
                                                 
3  
Dolan is Robin Delaney’s brother.   
 
4
feed the cats tonight or watch the house . . . I’m going to go ahead and do it.”  
Dolan told Kanamee that he had talked to Robert and had permission to stay at the 
Delaneys’ house.  In response, Robert told Kanamee that Dolan “absolutely didn’t 
have permission to be in the house.”   
After talking to Robert, Kanamee, at around 4:45 p.m., went to the 
Delaneys’ house to check on the cat and get the mail.  When Kanamee got there, 
he noticed that Robert’s truck, which had been parked in front of the house at 3:30 
p.m., was gone.  Later, at approximately 9 p.m., Kanamee heard Robert’s truck 
pull into the driveway.  Kanamee looked through his window and saw Dolan get 
out of the truck and walk towards the Delaneys’ house.  Kanamee immediately 
called the Delaneys, and Robert told Kanamee to call 911.   
After he called 911, Kanamee continued to observe Dolan as Dolan initially, 
but unsuccessfully, tried to enter the Delaneys’ house through a side door.  
Kanamee then saw Dolan walk to the back of the house.  Approximately five 
minutes later, a light went on inside the Delaneys’ house and Kanamee saw Dolan 
walk by a second floor window.  The police arrived a few minutes later and took 
Dolan into custody.  Officer Dale Legace testified that he found a screen on the 
ground at the rear left corner of the Delaneys’ house with a large cut in the center 
of it.  Legace further testified that the window from which the screen had been 
removed had a lawn chair placed directly below it.   
 
5
The Delaneys returned to their house the following morning.  After taking 
inventory of their personal property, they noticed that several items were missing, 
including $200 in change that was in their daughter’s room, a drill, Robert’s work 
credit card, and two six-packs of beer.   
At trial, Dolan testified that on August 23, 2005, the day before he was 
arrested, Robert gave him permission to stay at his house.  According to Dolan, 
Robert told him to go to Kanamee’s house to get a key.  Dolan testified that when 
he went to Kanamee’s house on August 23 to get a key, no one answered the door.  
Dolan then went to the Delaneys’ backyard and saw “an extension cord running 
through the back window . . . so the window wasn’t . . . locked.”  Dolan “pushed 
the window up and . . . went inside the [Delaneys’] house.”   
Dolan further testified that once he was inside he took the keys to Robert’s 
truck and went to the store.  After returning to the house thirty minutes later, Dolan 
remained there for the rest of the evening of August 23.  The next morning, Dolan 
went into the kitchen, pulled out a beer, and continued to drink the entire morning 
of August 24.  That afternoon, Dolan went to Kanamee’s house and introduced 
himself as the man who would be staying at the Delaneys’ house.4  Afterward, he 
returned to the house, took some money, and bought beer.  Dolan also testified that 
                                                 
4  
This is the same conversation discussed above that prompted Kanamee to call the 
Delaneys (i.e., the conversation in which Dolan “said my name is, Mike Dolan, and you don’t 
need to come over  . . . .”). 
 
6
he took Robert’s drill.  Finally, Dolan testified that he did not intend to steal when 
he entered their home, but that he lost control after he started drinking. 
Dolan waived his right to a jury trial, and on February 15, 2006, a Superior 
Court judge found him guilty of burglary in the second degree, misdemeanor theft, 
and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.  On June 2, 2006, the judge sentenced 
Dolan to 8 years at level V, suspended after 4 years for 18 months at Level III 
probation, for the burglary charge; and 1 year at level V, suspended for 1 year 
Level III probation, for both the theft and motor vehicle charges. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Dolan argues that the State presented no evidence that he intended to 
commit theft when he entered and remained unlawfully in the Delaney’s home.  
The trial judge, he would have us conclude, had no evidence on which to base a 
conviction of second degree burglary.  Dolan contends that the trial judge erred 
when he interpreted 11 Del.C. §825(a) to allow the element of an intent to commit 
a crime inside the Delaneys’ home to be formed while Dolan remained in the home 
unlawfully.  Citing New York case law,5 Dolan argues that the trial judge applied 
the second degree burglary statute too broadly, and that a person must form the 
                                                 
5  
See People v. Gaines, 546 N.E. 2d 913 (N.Y. 1989).  
 
7
intent to commit a crime in a dwelling either when or before he enters the premises 
unlawfully.   
We review a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence “to 
determine whether a rational trier of fact, considering the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, could find the essential elements of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”6  We review a trial judge’s interpretation of a statute 
de novo.7 
The State argues that defense counsel conceded at argument that if someone 
enters unlawfully and then, once inside, forms the intent to steal, he has committed 
burglary second.8  We disagree.  Defense counsel, as the cited transcript indicates, 
                                                 
6  
Poon v. State, 880 A.2d 236, 238 (Del. 2005). 
 
7  
Patrick v. State, 2007 WL 773387, *2 (Del.) (Table). 
 
8  
At trial, Dolan testified that he did not intend to steal anything from the Delaneys when 
he entered their home, but he lost control when he started drinking.  After Dolan’s testimony, his 
trial counsel requested that the trial judge find him not guilty of burglary in the second degree 
because the evidence (i.e., Dolan’s testimony) indicated that Dolan did not formulate the intent 
to steal until after he entered the house.   
 
 
The following exchange took place between defense counsel and the trial judge: 
 
 
Defense Counsel: 
Burglary in the second is entering with the intent to commit 
a crime.   
. . .  
Defense Counsel:  
Right, my position is that [Dolan] is not guilty of [burglary 
second if] he does not have that intent [to commit a crime therein] and if the intent 
comes or is formed after he is in the house, and started doing, whatever, and 
decided that he, he needed some dollars, so when he went in, he was in there 
planning to stay there . . . 
 
Trial judge: 
Let me explore that for a second.  Burglary is not just entering 
unlawfully, it’s also remaining unlawfully, is it not? 
 
8
raised the issue before the trial judge at a bench trial.  Once the trial judge made it 
clear that he interpreted the statute differently than defense counsel argued, little 
purpose would have been served by defense counsel rearguing the issue.  
Therefore, the defense did not concede the State’s legal position, and we review 
the trial judge’s interpretation of our Burglary Second Statute de novo.  
Under 11 Del. C. § 825(a), “[a] person is guilty of burglary in the second 
degree when the person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully [i]n a dwelling 
with intent to commit a crime therein.”  The issue of whether a defendant must 
form the intent to commit a crime in the dwelling before or at the time he breaks 
and enters the premises unlawfully is one of first impression. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Defense Counsel: 
That is correct. 
 
Trial judge: 
Okay.  Now let me finish my question.  [Dolan] has entered 
unlawfully, and now he’s remaining unlawfully, and forms the intent he’s going 
to take some property.  Isn’t that burglary second?   
 
Defense Counsel: 
If the facts are, if you are going to find the facts that way.  
Our position is that he is entering lawfully because he spoke [to the Delaneys] and 
had the consent.   
 
Trial judge: 
Okay, I understand. 
 
Defense Counsel: 
So, what Your Honor has defined certainly is burglary in 
the second degree if he enters unlawfully and then forms the intent to do that 
[commit a crime therein], but what we’re saying, Your Honor, is that he entered 
lawfully or under a belief that he had permission[.] 
 
Trial judge: 
In which case he is not guilty of any degree of burglary but is 
guilty of misdemeanor theft.   
 
 
 
9
There is a split of authority among the states with similar statutes; however, 
a majority of those states that have addressed this issue have held that a person 
must form the intent to commit a crime in the dwelling either before entering the 
premises or contemporaneously upon entering the premises.9  A minority of 
jurisdictions have held that a person may form the required intent to commit a 
crime “therein” while he remains unlawfully in the dwelling.10   
                                                 
9  
The states that have similar statues and that have addressed the issue and held that a 
person must formulate the intent to commit a crime therein either before entering the premises or 
contemporaneous with entry into the premises are: New York (see People v. Gaines, 546 N.E. 2d 
913 (N.Y. 1989)); Colorado (See Cooper v. People, 973 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Colo. 1999) (“Thus, to 
convict a defendant of burglary, a jury must conclude that the defendant had made up his mind to 
commit some other offense at the point at which he or she becomes a trespasser.  If the defendant 
forms the intent to commit the crime after the trespass is under way, he or she may be guilty of 
that underlying crime (or attempt) and of trespass - but is not guilty of burglary.”); Hawaii (See 
State v. Mahoe, 972 P.2d 287, 291-292 (Haw. 1998) (“The intent to commit the offense must 
have existed at the time the unlawful entry was made.”); Alaska (See Arabie v. State, 699 P.2d 
890, 894 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985)); Illinois (See People v. Collins, 368 N.E. 2d 685, 688) (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1977)); New Jersey (See State v. Cuni 697 A.2d 550, 555 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1997)); Pennsylvania (See Commonwealth v. Magnum, 654 A.2d 1146, 1147 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1995)); Florida (See Valentine v. State, 774 So.2d 934, 937 (Fla. App. Ct. 2001)); Texas (See 
Linder v. State, 828 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex. App. Ct. 2001) (“To prove intent to commit a felony 
or theft in a prosecution for burglary, the State must show that the defendant's intent existed at 
the time of his entry.”)).   
 
 
10  
States with similar statutes that have addressed the issue and take the minority position 
that a person may form the intent while he remains unlawfully are: South Dakota (See State v. 
DeNoyer, 541 N.W.2d 725, 732 (S.D. 1995) (“[W]e conclude that the current burglary statute 
simply requires that the person remain in the structure after forming the intent to commit a 
crime.”); Utah (See State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1228-1229 (Utah 1998) (“In sum, we agree 
with those cases holding that the “remaining unlawfully” provision applies regardless of whether 
the initial entry was lawful.”); Kansas (See State v. Skelton, 795 P.2d 349 (Kan. 1990)); Georgia 
(See Hewatt v. State, 455 S.E.2d 104, 106 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (“The requisite intent necessary 
for commission of burglary, pursuant to OCGA § 16-7-1(a), need not be formed at the precise 
moment of entry, but can be formed thereafter while the perpetrator is remaining on the 
premises.”); Alabama (See Gratton v. State, 456 So.2d 865 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (“However, 
under the criminal code definition of burglary, the intent to commit a crime may be concurrent 
 
10
Under New York law, a person is guilty of the felony of third degree 
burglary when he “knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with 
intent to commit a crime therein.”11  In People v. Gaines,12 the Court of Appeals of 
New York held that a defendant must intend to commit the crime at the time of 
entry in order to be guilty of third degree burglary.13  Gaines was a homeless man 
who entered a building seeking refuge from the cold and heavy snow.  When 
police found him, he was wearing coveralls and a jacket that belonged to a 
company employee with company pens in the jacket pocket.14   Gaines argued that 
the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that he had to have the intent to 
commit a crime at the time he entered the premises unlawfully to be guilty of third 
degree burglary.15   
                                                                                                                                                             
with the unlawful entry or it may be formed after the entry and while the accused remains 
unlawfully.”); Oregon (See State v. Papineau, 630 P.2d 904, 907 (Or. App. Ct. 1981) “The crime 
committed therein is the object of the burglary even though it may not have been the intention of 
the defendant when he entered the dwelling.”).  
 
11  
546 N.E.2d 913, 914 (N.Y. 1989) (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 140.20 (McKinney 2007)).  
New York’s third degree burglary statute is similar to Delaware’s second degree burglary statute 
11 Del. C. § 825 (a).  We are mindful that 11 Del. C. § 825 (a) (1) involves a dwelling and N.Y. 
Penal Law § 140.20 involves a building.  For the purposes of our analysis, we are focusing on 
the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of both statutes.  The building/dwelling 
distinction is not critical. 
 
12  
Id. at 914. 
 
13  
Id. at 915-916. 
 
14  
Id. at 914.  
 
15  
Id.  
 
 
11
The New York Court of Appeals examined common law burglary and New 
York’s former Penal Code for guidance.  The Court concluded that “[b]y the words 
‘remains unlawfully’ the Legislature sought to broaden the definition of criminal 
trespass, not to eliminate the requirement that the act constituting criminal trespass 
be accompanied by contemporaneous intent to commit a crime.”16  The Court went 
on to explain: 
In order to be guilty of burglary for unlawful remaining, a 
defendant must have entered legally, but remain for the purpose of 
committing a crime after authorization to be on the premises 
terminates.  And in order to be guilty of burglary for unlawful entry, a 
defendant must have had the intent to commit a crime at the time of 
entry.  In either event, contemporaneous intent is required.17    
 
The New York Court held that the trial judge had erred by denying Gaines’s 
requested instruction.  It further held that Gaines was “entitled to a charge clearly 
stating that the jury must find that he intended to commit a crime at the time he 
entered the premises unlawfully.”18 
In 1935, the Court of General Sessions of Delaware in State v. Edell 
examined common law burglary in relation to the defendant’s offense of breaking 
and entering a dwelling house.19  The Court noted:  
                                                 
16  
Id. at 915.  
 
17  
Id. at 915-916. 
 
18  
Id. at 916.  
 
19  
183 A. 630 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1935)  
 
12
Burglary at common law was the breaking and entering of a 
dwelling house of another in the night time with the intent to commit 
some felony in the same, whether that felonious intent was executed 
or not. The Legislature of this state has divided that offense into two 
offenses, the difference being merely in the statement of the crimes 
intended to be committed after the breaking and entering.20 
 
We believe that the current second degree burglary statute, 11 Del. C. § 825, 
continues to require that a person intend to commit a crime in the dwelling he 
enters unlawfully at the time he enters the dwelling.  We join the majority of 
jurisdictions that so require.  Therefore, we conclude that the trial judge erred as a 
matter of law when interpreting 11 Del. C. § 825 (a) to read that the element of 
intent to commit a crime therein could be established by showing that Dolan 
formulated an intent to commit a crime while remaining unlawfully in the 
Delaney’s home after he illegally entered.21   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The indictment [was] found under section 4730 of the Revised Code of this state 
which provide[d] that, “Whoever shall, in the night time, break and enter into the 
dwelling-house of another person with intent to commit any felony other than that 
of murder, rape, or arson of the first degree, whether such intent be executed or 
not, shall be deemed guilty of felony.” 
 
20  
Id.  
 
21  
The following exchange took place between defense counsel and the trial judge: 
 
 
Defense Counsel: 
Burglary in the second is entering with the intent to commit 
a crime.   
. . .  
Defense Counsel:  
Right, my position is that [Dolan] is not guilty of [burglary 
second if] he does not have that intent [to commit a crime therein] and if the intent 
comes or is formed after he is in the house, and started doing, whatever, and 
decided that he, he needed some dollars, so when he went in, he was in there 
planning to stay there . . . 
 
13
During the bench trial, the trial judge made a factual finding that Dolan had 
the intent to break and enter the Delaneys’ home unlawfully.  But, the record is 
silent about whether Dolan formulated his intent to commit a crime in the dwelling 
either before or at the time he broke into and entered the Delaneys’ home 
illegally.22  Therefore, we must reverse the judgment convicting Dolan of Burglary 
in the Second Degree. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Trial judge: 
Let me explore that for a second.  Burglary is not just entering 
unlawfully, it’s also remaining unlawfully, is it not? 
 
Defense Counsel: 
That is correct. 
 
Trial judge: 
Okay.  Now let me finish my question.  [Dolan] has entered 
unlawfully, and now he’s remaining unlawfully, and forms the intent he’s going 
to take some property.  Isn’t that burglary second?   
 
Defense Counsel: 
If the facts are, if you are going to find the facts that way.  
Our position is that he is entering lawfully because he spoke [to the Delaneys] and 
had the consent.   
 
Trial judge: 
Okay, I understand. 
 
Defense Counsel: 
So, what Your Honor has defined certainly is burglary in 
the second degree if he enters unlawfully and then forms the intent to do that 
[commit a crime therein], but what we’re saying, Your Honor, is that he entered 
lawfully or under a belief that he had permission – 
 
Trial judge: 
In which case he is not guilty of any degree of burglary but is 
guilty of misdemeanor theft.   
 
 
22  
The trial judge made the following factual finding on the record: 
 
 
With regard to burglary in the Second Degree, the factual issue The Court 
has to decide is whether the defendant entered with or without the permission of 
the owners of the house.  And the Court finds the defendant guilty because . . .the 
testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Delaney is consistent and coherent.   
The testimony of Mr. Dolan concerning his getting permission just doesn’t 
make sense primarily because if you have permission, you don’t [persist] in 
 
14
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
entering and leaving a house through a window and not asking a person who has 
custody of the key to turn it over and say, a simple thing, you go over and say the 
Delaneys. . . are going to allow me to stay there and they said I can get a key from 
you.   
It’s just that simple.   
You don’t have to concoct a story about you don’t have to come over here 
and take care of the cat[.]  I’m going to do that.  So the defendant is found guilty 
of burglary Second Degree.