Title: Devine v. Buki

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, and  
 
    Powell, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
NANCY W. DEVINE 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 140305 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
JANUARY 8, 2015 
CHARLES Z. BUKI, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY 
Harry T. Taliaferro, III, Judge 
 
 
Nancy W. Devine (“Devine”) appeals the judgment of the 
trial court rescinding the sale of the property known as Rock 
Hall to Charles Z. Buki (“Buki”) and Kimberly A. Marsho 
(“Marsho”).  Buki and Marsho assign cross-error to the trial 
court’s denial of their claim under the Virginia Consumer 
Protection Act (“VCPA”), Code § 59.1-196, et seq., and their 
request for punitive damages. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The present case involves the sale of Rock Hall, a wood 
frame house that is more than 200 years old, by Nancy and her 
husband, Donald M. Devine, Jr. (“Donald”).  The facts regarding 
the sale of Rock Hall and the subsequent lawsuit are the same as 
those discussed in the companion case of Donald M. Devine, Jr. 
v. Charles Z. Buki, et al., ___ Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2015) 
(this day decided).  Therefore, we will address only the facts 
that are particularly relevant to this case. 
 
The trial court, in ruling on this matter, found that 
Nancy’s involvement in the present case was limited to signing 
 
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the contract agreeing to sell Rock Hall to Buki and Marsho for 
$590,000 (the “Real Estate Contract”) and other documents 
pertaining to the sale of Rock Hall.  It specifically noted that 
there was no evidence that Nancy took part in any of the 
fraudulent acts.  Similarly, the commissioner made no finding 
with regard to Nancy or attributed any fraud, misrepresentation 
or concealment to her.  According to the trial court, Nancy 
merely “reaped the benefit” of the sale of Rock Hall. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that she committed no wrong, the 
trial court granted rescission of the Real Estate Contract 
against both Donald and Nancy.  The trial court determined that 
it was fair and equitable to require Nancy “to be responsible 
jointly and severally with her husband for the repayment of the 
purchase price” of Rock Hall.  The trial court also awarded 
prejudgment interest on the purchase price of Rock Hall, running 
from the date of closing.  However, the trial court declined to 
award consequential damages or damages under the VCPA against 
Nancy. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Nancy contends that the trial court 
affirmatively found that she committed no wrong and, therefore, 
could not award any remedy against her.  She further argues 
that, having found that she committed no wrong, the trial court 
no longer had equitable jurisdiction over her.  Finally, she 
 
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asserts that, assuming the trial court did not err in awarding 
rescission, it erred in awarding Buki and Marsho prejudgment 
interest on the purchase price of Rock Hall.  In their 
assignments of cross-error, Buki and Marsho assert that the 
trial court erred in dismissing their VCPA claim and in not 
awarding punitive damages. 
A.  RESCISSION 
 
Nancy argues that the trial court erred in granting 
rescission because the trial court specifically found that Buki 
and Marsho failed to prove that she committed any fraudulent 
acts.  Therefore, according to Nancy, the trial court was 
without the necessary “cognizable basis for granting equitable 
relief.”  Waikoloa Ltd. P’ship v. Arkwright, 268 Va. 40, 48, 597 
S.E.2d 49, 54 (2004). 
 
In response, Buki and Marsho contend that the flexibility 
of equity allows the trial court to fashion certain remedies, 
even in the absence of wrongdoing.  Buki and Marsho assert that 
Nancy likely reaped the benefits of the sale.  They also focus 
on the fact that the purpose of rescission is to return the 
parties to the status quo ante.  Therefore, according to Buki 
and Marsho, the grant of rescission does not place Nancy in any 
worse position than she was in before the sale. 
 
It has long been recognized that “an entity may not be made 
the subject of a remedial decree absent some finding of 
 
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liability.”  Bacon v. City of Richmond, 475 F.3d 633, 638 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803)); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 
U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (“As with any equity case, the nature of the 
violation determines the scope of the remedy”).  “Remedies, in 
other words, do not exist in the abstract; rather, they flow 
from and are the consequence of some wrong.”  Bacon, 475 F.3d at 
638.  Therefore, absent “a cognizable basis for granting 
equitable relief,” a trial court “is not authorized to take a 
particular course of action simply because [it] thinks that such 
action is just and appropriate.”  Waikoloa Ltd. P’ship, 268 Va. 
at 48, 597 S.E.2d at 54.  See also Tiller v. Owen, 243 Va. 176, 
179, 413 S.E.2d 51, 53 (1992)(“A trial court must have a 
cognizable basis for granting equitable relief.”). 
 
As discussed at length in Donald’s case, Buki and Marsho 
were entitled to rescission due to Donald’s fraudulent activity.  
However, at the same time, there was no evidence of any 
wrongdoing on the part of Nancy in the present case.  
Accordingly, the trial court had no basis for awarding any 
remedy against Nancy.* 
 
 
                     
 
* In light of our decision reversing the trial court’s award 
of a remedy against Nancy, we need not address Nancy’s other 
arguments. 
 
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B. CROSS-ERROR 
 
In their assignments of cross-error, Buki and Marsho take 
issue with the trial court’s decisions dismissing their VCPA 
claim and denying them punitive damages.  With regard to their 
VCPA claim, Buki and Marsho contend that the consequential 
damages were still damages that could be doubled under the VCPA.  
We note, however, that the trial court did not award any 
consequential damages against Nancy, nor did Buki and Marsho 
assign error to the trial court’s failure to make such an award. 
 
Buki and Marsho next argue that the trial court erred in 
failing to award punitive damages after it struck their VCPA 
claim.  We note, however, that Buki and Marsho do not argue that 
the trial court should have awarded punitive damages against 
Nancy.  Rather, they argue that “it was clear error for the 
trial court to fail to impose equivalent damages on Donald 
Devine as punitive damages.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
None of the relief sought in the assignments of cross-error 
by Buki and Marsho apply to Nancy.  Accordingly, we will dismiss 
their assignments of cross-error as improvidently granted. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will reverse the judgment of 
the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with Part II.B. of the majority opinion in its 
disposition of the appellees' assignments of cross-error, but I 
disagree with the analysis and conclusions regarding the issue 
of rescission in Part II.A.  For the reasons stated in my 
separate opinion (concurring in part and dissenting in part) in 
the companion case of Donald M. Devine, Jr. v. Charles Z. Buki, 
et al., __ Va. __, __ S.E.2d __ (2015) (this day decided), I 
would affirm the circuit court in fully rescinding the subject 
real estate contract, and ordering repayment of the purchase 
price by Donald and Nancy Devine in exchange for reconveyance of 
the subject property by the appellees.