Title: Willmeth v. Harris

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

193 Kan. 111 (1964)
392 P.2d 101
EARL WILLMETH, JACK BYERS and JOE E. FOBES, Appellants,
v.
NEAL C. HARRIS, V.E. TULLAR and RAY DIETZ, County Commissioners in and for Jewell County, Kansas, Appellees.
No. 43,679

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 9, 1964.
Tweed W. Ross, of Beloit, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellants.
Robert H. Meyer, County Attorney of Jewell County, argued the cause, and John S. Dean and B.L. Pringle, both of Topeka, Geo. E. Teeple, L.E. Weltmer, L.M. Weltmer, and Roderick E. Weltmer, all of Mankato, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This appeal stems from an action to enjoin a tax levy and a bond issue for the purchase of a site and the erection of a long-term care and convalescent county hospital thereon. The plaintiffs challenge the validity of the notice of the election, the validity of the ballot used in the election and the validity of the declared results of the election. They also challenge the validity of the purpose of the election and the purpose for which the bonds were to be used.
The questions for consideration in this appeal involve only facts *112 pertaining to procedural matters. The pertinent facts are not in dispute.
On November 6, 1962, the Board of County Commissioners of Jewell County, Kansas called a special election on the question of a two mill levy for the purchase of a site, or sites, and the erection of a long-term care and convalescent county hospital thereon, in the city of Mankato, Jewell County, Kansas. The election was called pursuant to G.S. 1961 Supp., 19-1801.
According to the official election canvass, the proposition for the levy resulted in 1689 votes for and 1687 votes against.
On December 3, 1962, the plaintiffs filed their petition in this action. The petition will be summarized. It first alleged the status and qualifications of the plaintiffs to bring the action, and that the defendants advertised for bids and had offered to sell on December 4, 1962, and if not restrained would sell, bonds and credits of Jewell County, Kansas.
The petition challenged the validity of the action of the defendants on numerous grounds. It contended that G.S. 1961 Supp., 19-1801, et seq., was not authority for the county to construct a long-term care and convalescent county hospital; that the petition for the election was equivocable, ambiguous and misleading as well as illegal as to form and content; that the ballots, a copy of which was attached to the petition, were equivocable, ambiguous and misleading as to the purpose for which the tax was to be levied and was contrary to and in conflict with the provisions of the statute above mentioned; that the statement in the ballot concerning the possibility of money in any amount being furnished by a federal agency was unnecessary, improper, illegal and misleading, and that there were only a majority of two votes cast in favor of the tax levy and that eight persons, who were named, illegally cast votes in favor of the tax levy and their vote was sufficient to change the result of the election.
On December 19, 1962, the defendants demurred to the petition stating as their grounds for the demurrer that there was a misjoinder of cause of action and "for the further reason that said petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants and in favor of the plaintiffs."
The bizarre proceedings which followed should next receive our attention.
On January 3, 1963, a pretrial conference was held on the *113 demurrer. At the conference a stipulation was entered into by counsel for the parties. We quote from the supplemental counter abstract of the appellees:
"MR. ROSS: Wait a minute. Read the stipulation.
On January 16, 1963, a hearing was held to consider the yellow sample ballots which were voted in Buffalo Township. Counsel for defendants opened with the following statement:
Counsel for plaintiffs made no objection to the procedure but did appear to believe that only evidence pertaining to the validity of the same ballots was to be considered. His opening statement reads in part:
*114 The defendants called the ten witnesses mentioned in the opening statement. They testified as to the means by which the yellow sample ballots were placed in the hands of the voters and reached the ballot box. After the introduction of the testimony the following occurred:
"THE COURT: Your request is granted.
"THE COURT: All right, it is so ordered.
On February 23, 1963, the district court made and filed extended findings of fact and conclusions of law, and based thereon concluded that the demurrer to the petition should be sustained. The court appears to have given very little consideration, if any, to the allegations of the petition.
On March 11, 1963, the plaintiffs filed an amended petition which added additional paragraphs and extended many of the paragraphs previously alleged. On March 12, 1963, the defendants filed a motion to strike the amended petition from the files for the reason that it stated no new actionable matter and that:
*115 On April 6, 1963, the district court sustained the motion to strike and decreed as follows:
The plaintiffs then appealed. They specify as error the judgments of the lower court sustaining the demurrer to the original petition and sustaining the motion to strike the amended petition from the files.
Although not specifically raised by the parties, we should first suggest that pretrial procedure has no place in the consideration of a demurrer to a petition. Pretrial proceedings are not authorized until such time as all necessary proceedings are on file and the case is at issue. In Cow Creek Valley Flood Prevention Ass'n v. City of Hutchinson, 163 Kan. 261, 263, 181 P.2d 320, this court stated:
Again in Connell v. State Highway Commission, 192 Kan. 371, 375, 388 P.2d 637, we stated:
A trial court should not attempt to hear testimony and determine disputed questions of fact at a pretrial conference.
The appellees contend:
The appellants suggest that the stipulation did not go to the extent or have the effect contended by appellees. We are inclined to agree. The agreement does appear to cover pretrial of the legality of the yellow sample ballots, but appellants did not agree that the ballot box be opened. When the court directed that the ballot box be opened and the sample ballots counted, appellants stated: "Just to establish the number." There was no agreement that the votes be counted. However, we need not concern ourselves with the extent or effect of the agreement.
A demurrer to a pleading is to be considered entirely upon the allegations contained therein and proper exhibits attached thereto. Evidentiary matters considered at a pretrial conference, agreements, stipulations and exhibits not made a part of the petition may not be considered. (Southard v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 177 Kan. 26, 276 P.2d 299.)
In Whitaker v. Douglas, 177 Kan. 154, 157, 277 P.2d 641, this court, in considering admissions made outside the petition, stated:
..............
Again in Franks v. State Highway Commission, 182 Kan. 131, 319 P.2d 535, it is stated on page 134 of the opinion:
*117 The decisions of this court appear to be in harmony with the general rule. In 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 256, 257, it is stated:
Also in 41 Am. Jur. Pleading § 246, p. 466, it is stated:
This court has permitted stipulations to be considered in determining a ruling on a demurrer to a petition when, but only when, the stipulation is incorporated in, or made a part of, the petition. (Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Cities Service Gas Co., 181 Kan. 526, 313 P.2d 279.)
The trial court had no authority to hold a pretrial conference, hear testimony and determine factual issues as preliminary to a determination of the ruling on the demurrer to the petition.
Appellees contend that when the demurrer was sustained to the original petition and plaintiffs filed an amended petition, they waived the right to appeal from the ruling on the demurrer. They further contend that, in any event, the notice of appeal from the judgment sustaining the demurrer was not filed until 68 days after the judgment was rendered and was not in time. They also contend that the amended petition was nothing more than a refiling of the original petition with minor and unimportant changes, that the amended petition was properly stricken from the files, and did not extend the time for appeal from the judgment sustaining the demurrer to the original petition.
We will not labor the question as to whether the demurrer to the original petition is still before the trial court because it was never *118 determined by proper judicial procedure. However, it is difficult to see how plaintiffs could acquiesce in the trial court's ruling on the demurrer to the original petition by filing the amended petition when the demurrer to the original petition had not received a proper judicial determination. (Steel v. Rapp, 183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053.) This controversy can be determined on more firmly established grounds.
Appellees cite Rockhill, Administrator v. Tomasic, 186 Kan. 599, 352 P.2d 444 in support of their contention that the time in which an appeal may be taken cannot be extended by merely refiling what amounts to the same petition. We have no quarrel with appellees' statement of the law. However, we cannot agree with their factual conclusion. We will not set out the extended allegations of the amended petition, but as we have previously stated, it contained additional paragraphs and extended many of those originally alleged. The amended petition did amplify the original and plaintiffs had the right to have the new allegations considered.
Neither do we have here a situation where the ruling on the demurrer to the original petition became the law of the case. It cannot be said that the demurrer was sustained on controverted questions of law. It was rather sustained on issues of fact not raised by the petition.
Perhaps it is now immaterial as to whether the original petition stated a cause of action, as the amended petition, from which the appeal was also taken, did. It should be stated, however, that although the filing of an amended petition constitutes acquiesence in a former ruling sustaining a demurrer and prevents an appeal therefrom as from a final order, it is not conclusive on the appellant as to questions involved therein on appeal from a similar ruling on an amended petition amplifying the original. (Miles v. Hamilton, 106 Kan. 804, 189 Pac. 926; Fruit v. Stacy, 168 Kan. 632, 215 P.2d 140.) The question was before this court in Fisher v. Pendleton, 184 Kan. 322, 332, 336 P.2d 472. It is there stated:
*119 We have no hesitancy in concluding that both the original and the amended petition stated a cause of action.
We have not overlooked, but have disregarded, many of the legal questions which may be of paramount importance after the issues are formed by the pleadings and the factual questions are determined by the trial court. Such questions should not be considered and determined piecemeal.
The judgment is reversed with instructions that the trial court require the defendants to plead to the amended petition and proceed with the determination of the controversy on its merits.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.