Title: Quirico v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
HECTOR QUIRICO,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 328, 2003 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   Cr. A. Nos. IN02-05-0483                           
                              thru 0486
 
Submitted:  November 10, 2003 
   Decided:  January 27, 2004   
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
         This 27th day of January 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to withdraw, and 
the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Hector Quirico, was found guilty by a 
Superior Court jury of Possession of Cocaine (as a lesser-included offense of 
Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine), Possession with Intent to Deliver 
Marijuana, Maintaining a Dwelling for the Purpose of Keeping Controlled 
Substances, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.  He was sentenced to a total of 
6 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 3 years for probation.  This 
is Quirico’s direct appeal. 
 
 
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(2) 
Quirico’s trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 
26(c) is twofold: a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that could arguably 
support the appeal; and b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable 
issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation. 1 
 
(3) 
Quirico’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, 
Quirico’s counsel informed Quirico of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided 
him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the 
complete trial transcript.  Quirico also was informed of his right to supplement his 
attorney’s presentation.  Quirico responded with a brief that raises six issues for 
this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken by 
Quirico’s counsel as well as the issues raised by Quirico and has moved to affirm 
the Superior Court’s judgment.   
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
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(4) 
Quirico raises six issues for this Court’s consideration.  He claims 
that: a) the trial judge’s questioning of the investigating officer was improper; b) 
the investigating officer’s expert opinion that the drugs were packaged for sale 
rather than for personal use was improper because it encompassed an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact; c) the prosecutor improperly injected a 
personal opinion into her closing argument by repeatedly using the pronoun “I”; d) 
the State failed to turn over pretrial discovery, which prejudiced his case; e) his 
attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to provide him with requested 
documents; and f) the evidence of drug activity seized from his apartment should 
have been suppressed.  We review Quirico’s first four claims for plain error, since 
no objections were made either before or at trial with respect to those claims.2  
 
(5) 
On the day before trial, defense counsel, who recently had been 
retained by the defendant, filed a motion for leave to file a motion to suppress out 
of time.  On the morning of trial, the trial judge denied the motion on the ground 
that the defendant had not been diligent in retaining counsel and, moreover, there 
did not appear to be a factual basis for suppressing the evidence.  The judge 
permitted the defendant to renew his motion during the trial. 
                                                 
2 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (Plain error is “so clearly 
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”) 
 
 
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(6) 
The following facts were adduced at trial.  In the morning of April 24, 
2002, Sergeant Jason Sapp, a member of the Governor’s Task Force on drug 
enforcement, a probation officer named Mark Lewis and a state trooper named 
David Myers attempted to execute a warrant on an individual named Chanel Harris 
at 2210 Market Street in Wilmington, Delaware.  When they were not able to 
locate Chanel Harris, they went to Apartment B of 2208 Market Street, which 
adjoins 2210 Market Street.  While Sergeant Sapp testified on direct examination 
that one of the other residents in the building suggested Chanel Harris might be in 
that apartment, neither the police report nor the affidavit of probable cause, which 
supported the application for a search warrant, specifically so stated.     
 
(7) 
When the officers arrived at Apartment B, they detected an odor of 
marijuana.  Sergeant Sapp knocked on the door, heard a male voice ask, “Who is 
it?” and identified himself as a police officer.  A man, later identified as Quirico, 
partially opened the door with his left hand.  The odor of marijuana intensified.  
Sergeant Sapp asked if he could enter and Quirico, with his left hand still on the 
doorknob, opened the door wider while backing away.  Sergeant Sapp testified that 
Quirico also nodded his head up and down.  Quirico had his right hand in his 
pocket and the officers asked him to remove it so they could check for the presence 
of a weapon.  No weapon was found.         
 
 
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(8) 
Once inside the apartment, Officer Lewis observed marijuana and 
rolling paper lying on the kitchen table.  Sergeant Sapp then handcuffed Quirico 
and patted him down.  Inside Quirico’s pants pocket he found a plastic baggie 
containing several smaller baggies.  The smaller baggies contained a white, chalky 
substance later identified as crack cocaine weighing approximately 1 gram.  While 
walking through the apartment, the officers also saw a bowl of marijuana, later 
determined to weigh approximately 91 grams, on the floor in the bedroom.   
 
(9) 
After taking Quirico to the police station, Sergeant Sapp obtained a 
search warrant and executed it at the apartment.  He found an additional 20 baggies 
of marijuana later determined to weigh approximately 30 grams, dozens of empty 
baggies, a baggie containing a white, chunky substance later determined not to be 
cocaine, a receipt for a bus ticket from Wilmington, Delaware to New York City 
showing the name of “Hector Quirico”, approximately $135 in U.S. currency, and 
a digital scale.   Sergeant Sapp testified that, in his opinion, the substance 
determined not to be cocaine could be a “cutting agent,” which is used either to 
increase the weight of cocaine packaged for sale or to cook powdered cocaine to 
create crack cocaine.  On cross examination, however, Sergeant Sapp agreed that 
the Medical Examiner’s report identified the substance as “nicotinamide” and that 
he did not know if that substance could be used as a “cutting agent.”  He also 
 
 
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conceded that only crack cocaine, and no powdered cocaine, was seized at the 
apartment.   
 
(10) 
Toward the end of Sergeant Sapp’s testimony, the Superior Court 
judge asked the following question:  “ . . . if you just had the drugs . . . that 
quantity that you seized, in your opinion and experience, would that be something 
that would be utilized for their personal use, or would that be  . . . an individual 
that was possessing them with the intent to distribute them to others for their use?”  
After Sergeant Sapp stated that he believed the drugs were intended for sale, the 
judge asked this question:  “And I take it in your charging decision  . . . you took 
that opinion  . . . and made the decision to charge it as a Possession with Intent to 
Deliver  . . .  based upon all the evidence seized?”  Sergeant Sapp answered, “Yes, 
sir, absolutely.”     
 
(11) 
At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved to suppress 
the evidence of drug activity seized from Quirico’s apartment, arguing that 
Quirico’s non-verbal actions did not constitute consent to entry by the police and 
there were no exigent circumstances warranting a search of the apartment once the 
police had entered it.  The Superior Court judge denied the motion to suppress 
stating that Quirico had consented to the search and that subsequent actions taken 
 
 
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by the officers to pat down Quirico and canvass the apartment were reasonable in 
the interest of their own safety. 
 
(12) 
Quirico testified as the sole defense witness.  He stated that he did not 
give his consent to the officers to enter his apartment.  He also stated that he had 
been a regular marijuana smoker for approximately 14 years, that he had recently 
begun smoking crack cocaine, which he mixed together with the marijuana, and 
that the drugs in his apartment were solely for his own use.  Defense counsel did 
not renew his motion to suppress following Quirico’s testimony.   
 
(13) 
In her closing argument, the prosecutor used the pronoun “I” on seven 
separate occasions, with no objection from defense counsel.  She stated as follows:  
“What I ask you to do is to look at the totality of the circumstances and really 
consider the testimony of Sergeant Sapp . . . . ”  “[W]hy would anyone have 50 . . . 
little baggies . . . .?  I think that’s something that you need to consider.”  “I don’t 
know how much food you’d get on that scale.”  “I think what you have to think 
about is to assess what you heard from the two officers and then assess what you 
heard from Mr. Quirico . . . .”  “I think what you have here is the drugs were in the 
apartment.”  “[The officers’] actions, I believe, were within the law, and they did 
not do anything beyond proper police procedure.”  “ . . . I ask you to find Mr. 
Quirico guilty . . . .” 
 
 
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(14) 
Quirico’s first claim is that the trial judge’s questioning of Sergeant 
Sapp was improper.  While it is not per se improper for a trial judge to question a 
witness in front of the jury, the judge must use extreme caution in doing so.3  “The 
need for a judge to exercise self-restraint and preserve an atmosphere of 
impartiality in the questioning of an expert witness arises from the judge’s absolute 
duty of neutrality.  Departure from that rule may be grounds for reversal on the 
basis of plain error.”4  We have reviewed carefully the transcript of the trial, 
including the judge’s questioning of Sergeant Sapp.  We find no compromise of 
the principles of self-restraint and impartiality on the part of the judge and, 
therefore, find no error, plain or otherwise, in his questioning of Sergeant Sapp.   
 
(15) 
Quirico’s second claim is that Sergeant Sapp should not have been 
permitted to offer an expert opinion concerning whether the drugs were for sale or 
for personal use because that opinion encompassed an ultimate issue to be decided 
by the trier of fact.  Opinion testimony by an expert “is not objectionable merely 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”5  Even 
though Sergeant Sapp’s opinion that the drugs were for sale rather than for 
personal use embraced an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, its admission 
                                                 
3 Price v. Blood Bank of Delaware, Inc., 790 A.2d 1203, 1210-11 (Del. 2001). 
4 Id. 
5 D.R.E. 704. 
 
 
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did not improperly invade the province of the jury.  We, therefore, find no error, 
plain or otherwise, in the admission of this testimony.  
 
(16) 
Quirico’s third claim is that the prosecutor improperly injected a 
personal opinion into her closing argument by continually using the pronoun “I.”  
A prosecutor should avoid using the pronoun “I” during closing argument because 
“it serves to emphasize for the jury that the prosecutor . . . personally believes the 
point that is being submitted to the jury.”6  Improper vouching occurs when a 
prosecutor implies that he or she has superior knowledge, beyond that logically 
inferable from the evidence, that a witness has testified truthfully. 7   
 
(17) 
We have reviewed the carefully the transcript of trial, including the 
prosecutor’s closing argument and find no improper vouching except for the 
statement expressing the prosecutor’s belief that the officer’s actions were “within 
the law” and in accordance with “proper police procedure.”  While this statement 
clearly was improper, we do not find that it, standing alone, was so clearly 
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the 
trial process.8   
                                                 
6 Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 2002) (quoting Brokenbrough v. State, 
522 A.2d 851, 859 (Del. 1987). 
7 Saunders v. State, 602 A.2d 623, 624 (Del. 1984). 
8 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d at 1100. 
 
 
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(18) 
Quirico’s fourth claim is that the State failed to turn over pretrial 
discovery, which prejudiced his case.  While Quirico’s argument is not entirely 
clear, he appears to complain that the State never turned over a witness statement 
indicating that drug activity was taking place in his apartment.  Quirico’s argument 
is without merit because the State is not required to turn over witness statements to 
the defense prior to trial. 9  To the extent Quirico argues that he suffered prejudice 
because of an alleged discovery violation by the State, he offers no factual support 
for that argument.  We, therefore, find no error, plain or otherwise, in connection 
with this claim. 
 
(19) 
Quirico’s next claim is that his counsel provided ineffective assistance 
of counsel by failing to provide him with copies of various documents to assist him 
in his appeal.  It is settled law, however, that this Court will not consider a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal. 10  Accordingly, 
we will not review Quirico’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this appeal.  
It does not appear that there is any merit to this particular claim in any case, since 
Quirico provides no evidence supporting the proposition that the absence of certain 
                                                 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16(a)(2). 
10 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
 
 
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documents such as the arrest warrant for Chanel Harris, the search warrant and the 
affidavit of probable cause has hampered his ability to present his claims.11   
 
(20) 
Quirico’s final claim is that the evidence of drug activity seized from 
his apartment should have been suppressed.  When a search by law enforcement 
officers is necessary for reasons of safety, the permissible scope of such a search is 
determined by balancing the competing interests of the officers’ safety and the 
degree of intrusion upon a person’s privacy rights.12  Warrantless seizures of items 
in plain view are legitimate when law enforcement officers are lawfully in a 
position to observe the items and the items’ evidentiary value is immediately 
apparent.13  We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence seized under such circumstances for abuse of discretion.14   
 
(21) 
In this case, the officers’ testimony supported the judge’s finding of 
consent to enter the apartment, at which point the drugs could be seen in plain view 
on the kitchen table.  The testimony also supported the judge’s finding that the 
officers acted reasonably to pat down Quirico and canvass the apartment in the 
                                                 
11 Quirico also claimed that counsel had not sent him a copy of the complete trial 
transcript.  The record reflects that counsel initially sent Quirico only those portions of the 
transcript relevant to his appeal.  On December 24, 2003, counsel sent him the remaining 
portions of the transcript.   
12 Morrow v. State, 603 A.2d 835, 837 (Del. 1992). 
13 Williamson v. State, 707 A.2d 350, 358 (Del. 1998). 
14 Virdin v. State, 780 A.2d 1024, 1030 (Del. 2001). 
 
 
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interest of their safety, which yielded additional evidence of drug activity, and, 
ultimately, resulted in the obtaining of a search warrant.  Under these 
circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in 
denying defense counsel’s motion to suppress. 
 
(22) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Quirico’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We also are satisfied that Quirico’s counsel has made a conscientious effort 
to examine the record and has properly determined that Quirico could not raise a 
meritorious claim in this appeal.   
        NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to 
withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice