Title: In re Harris

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re JOHN HARRIS, JR., 
on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S272632 
 
First Appellate District, Division Three 
A162891 
 
San Mateo County Superior Court 
21-NF-002568-A 
 
 
June 27, 2024 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Evans concurred. 
 
1 
In re HARRIS 
S272632 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
The California Constitution guarantees a person charged 
with a noncapital offense the right to pretrial release on bail, 
subject to narrow exceptions.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12.)  One 
exception appears in article I, section 12, subdivision (b) of the 
California Constitution (article I, section 12(b)), which 
authorizes a trial court to detain an individual without bail for 
“[f]elony offenses involving acts of violence on another person, 
or felony sexual assault offenses on another person, when the 
facts are evident or the presumption great and the court finds 
based upon clear and convincing evidence that there is a 
substantial likelihood the person’s release would result in great 
bodily harm to others.”  We granted review to decide whether an 
order denying bail pursuant to article I, section 12(b) requires 
evidence that would be admissible at a criminal trial, and if not, 
whether the prosecution may meet its burden under this 
provision through a proffer describing the evidence supporting 
pretrial detention. 
Here, petitioner John Harris, Jr., filed a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus challenging the trial court’s pretrial order 
detaining him without bail pursuant to article I, section 12(b).  
The Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s arguments that under 
the state Constitution and federal and state due process 
principles, only evidence that would be admissible at a criminal 
trial could support pretrial detention without bail.  However, 
because the trial court failed to also make findings on the record 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
that there were no less restrictive alternatives to detention that 
could reasonably protect the government’s interests in pretrial 
detention (see In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135, 156 
(Humphrey)), the Court of Appeal conditionally vacated the 
order denying bail and remanded the matter to the trial court 
for further findings.   
We conclude that when a trial court makes a pretrial 
detention determination under article I, section 12(b), the court 
must be guided by a duty to ensure that the evidence it considers 
is reliable given an arrestee’s fundamental right to pretrial 
liberty.  In protecting these interests and in determining 
whether “the facts are evident or the presumption great” that 
the defendant committed the underlying offense, and whether 
there is “clear and convincing evidence” of “a substantial 
likelihood the person’s release would result in great bodily harm 
to others,” the court is not limited to considering only evidence 
that would be admissible at a criminal trial.  The text of article I, 
section 12(b) does not contain such a limitation, which would 
deviate from standard practices at bail hearings, and significant 
policy considerations counsel against the categorical rule that 
petitioner proposes.  When deciding whether to detain a 
defendant without bail under article I, section 12(b), the trial 
court may properly consider hearsay and documents tendered 
without the full evidentiary foundation that would be required 
at trial.  In evaluating such evidence, the trial court should 
reject or discount material it regards as unreliable and retains 
discretion to demand the production of additional, admissible 
evidence, 
including 
live 
testimony, 
in 
appropriate 
circumstances.  We further hold that the trial court’s 
consideration of reliable proffers and hearsay evidence at a 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
pretrial detention hearing does not offend federal or state due 
process principles.   
In this case, the trial court identified evidence supporting 
its no-bail determination, but the record does not establish that 
the court conducted a proper evaluation of the sufficiency of the 
evidence of petitioner’s guilt, rather than simply presuming the 
truth of the charges.  We conclude the best course is to remand 
the case so the trial court can apply the standards discussed in 
this opinion in addition to considering less restrictive 
alternatives to detention in accordance with the Court of 
Appeal’s instruction. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner was arrested on February 24, 2021, after DNA 
obtained from the victim of a violent rape committed more than 
30 years prior was found to match petitioner’s DNA.  The People 
charged petitioner with attempted first degree murder and 
aggravated mayhem in connection with that incident.  (Pen. 
Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a), 189, 205.)  The People 
alleged that petitioner used a deadly and dangerous weapon in 
the commission of both offenses (id., § 12022, subd. (d)), and 
inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of attempted 
murder (id., §§ 1203.075, 12022.7, subd. (a)).   
Prior to petitioner’s arraignment, the San Mateo County 
Probation Department submitted a pretrial services report 
indicating that petitioner was an appropriate candidate for 
release on his own recognizance with enhanced monitoring.  On 
February 26, 2021, the trial court appointed counsel for 
petitioner and set bail at $5 million dollars.  Defense counsel 
requested a continuance of the arraignment to review discovery.  
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
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On March 25, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to all 
charges.   
On April 16, 2021, several weeks after this court decided 
Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th 135, petitioner filed a motion 
requesting release on his own recognizance.  The motion 
acknowledged that petitioner had two prior misdemeanor 
convictions (a 1991 conviction for theft and a 1998 conviction for 
driving without a license), but emphasized that petitioner 
successfully completed probation in both cases and had no 
known bench warrant history.  The motion also alleged that 
petitioner did not present a flight risk, he had significant 
community ties, and there was no identifiable threat that 
petitioner would pose a risk of harm to the alleged victim or the 
public if released.  Petitioner attached supporting statements 
from family and friends.  He also attached a declaration from 
defense counsel, attesting to petitioner’s indigency.   
The People opposed petitioner’s motion.  They requested 
that bail remain set at $5 million dollars, or, alternatively, that 
the trial court deny bail altogether under article I, section 12(b).  
The People alleged that petitioner would be a significant danger 
if released to the community and there were no viable conditions 
of release that would ensure public safety.   
The People’s opposition also described the severity of the 
charged offenses, petitioner’s criminal history, and petitioner’s 
subsequent conduct with his former wives and girlfriends that 
bore similarities to the underlying incident.  Regarding the 
charged offenses, the People detailed the responding police 
officer’s observations of the alleged victim’s injuries, a summary 
of the victim’s interview with police officers, and a statement 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
from the victim’s treating physician, with the responding officer 
and treating physician both being identified by name.   
As described in the opposition, on March 4, 1989, the 
victim woke up in her bed with scarves tied around her ankles.  
She saw a man kneeling at the foot of her bed with one scarf on 
his forehead and another covering his mouth.  The perpetrator 
tied bandanas tightly around the victim’s eyes and neck, held a 
serrated knife to her throat, and ordered her to spread her legs.  
The perpetrator then raped the victim, tried to strangle her with 
a scarf, and sawed at the back of her neck with the knife.  As the 
perpetrator struggled with the victim, he slashed her neck with 
the knife and threatened to cut her eye out.  The victim pleaded 
for her life and begged the perpetrator to leave, but he expressed 
concern that she would call the police.  The victim then told him 
to unplug her phone, which she said would slow her down, and 
the perpetrator eventually left.  According to the opposition 
brief, one of the responding officers found the victim slumped on 
the floor in her apartment with a scarf on her neck saturated in 
blood.  The officer described the victim’s injury as one of the 
worst neck wounds he had ever seen.  The People represented 
that the victim’s treating physician similarly described the 
victim’s neck injury as “pretty horrific.”  He reported that if the 
laceration to the victim’s throat had been “a hair more,” the cut 
would have severed the external jugular and likely resulted in 
her death.  The opposition also explained that DNA analysis 
comparing semen located on a floral scarf found at the scene and 
the 
victim’s 
vaginal 
swab 
matched 
petitioner’s 
DNA.  
Photographs of the victim’s injuries and of the serrated knife 
and bloody scarves found at the scene were attached as exhibits 
to the opposition.   
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
The People’s opposition also described the circumstances 
surrounding petitioner’s 1991 conviction for petty theft, albeit 
without connecting these facts to any witnesses or other sources.  
As specified in the opposition, on December 14, 1990, petitioner 
walked up behind a female victim, who was wearing a scarf tied 
around her neck.  Petitioner reached over the victim’s shoulder, 
pulled her scarf over her head, and ran away.  He told police 
officers that he was having emotional and personal problems 
and that he had grabbed the scarf to satisfy his anger and 
frustration.   
Additionally, the People’s opposition summarized recent 
interviews with several of petitioner’s ex-wives and former 
girlfriends.  Each interview was conducted by an inspector in 
the district attorney’s office, also identified by name within the 
opposition.  The opposition did not attach the interview 
transcripts, which included multiple levels of hearsay and 
unsworn statements.  One of petitioner’s ex-wives, who was 
married to petitioner from 1997 to 2005, reported that petitioner 
kept a collection of scarves in the garage even though she had 
asked him to throw the scarves away and that petitioner told 
her he used the scarves to tie arms and legs onto posts.  An ex-
girlfriend who had dated petitioner from 2005 to 2015 stated 
that petitioner liked to tie her up with scarves and blindfolds 
during sex, that he liked to role-play, and that he frequently 
pretended to be a rapist who broke into her home and 
threatened to kill her if she said anything.  Another ex-girlfriend 
reported that in 2019, petitioner disclosed he had a sexual fetish 
associated with scarves.  Petitioner had asked her to buy scarves 
with a floral pattern and border around the edges, but when she 
purchased a scarf, petitioner said it was the wrong type and 
asked her to buy the correct one.  Petitioner liked to tie her to 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
the bed and gag her with scarves and requested photographs of 
herself bound to the bed with scarves.   
According to the People’s opposition, petitioner’s fourth ex-
wife, who married petitioner in 2020, told law enforcement that 
petitioner was “into scarves” and had placed a scarf over her 
mouth and eyes on a few occasions and told her not to touch him.  
Once when petitioner was drunk, he told his ex-wife, “This girl 
crawled into my bed naked and you’re not going to lay in my bed 
and not give me any.  So she tried to say I raped her.”  The 
following day, petitioner denied making this statement.  The 
People’s opposition represented that another woman who had 
met petitioner in late 2020 told the investigator that petitioner 
told her that he had enjoyed being tied up during a previous 
sexual encounter and wanted to experience that again.  She 
found petitioner strange and was not interested in a sexual 
relationship with him.  Petitioner mailed her four silk scarves, 
including a floral scarf with a border.   
The trial court held a hearing on petitioner’s bail motion 
on April 20, 2021.  Defense counsel emphasized that the charged 
offenses occurred 30 years prior and that petitioner had only a 
limited criminal record.  Defense counsel also asserted there 
was no evidence that petitioner still posed a risk to the victim or 
to the public.  The prosecutor focused on the violent and serious 
nature of the charged offenses, and the former wives’ and 
girlfriends’ statements describing aggressive behavior involving 
scarves and rape fantasies.  One of the inspectors who had 
interviewed these women was present in court but did not 
testify.  The victim of the 1989 attack also addressed the court.  
She stated, “[Thirty] years ago I suffered and survived this 
person trying to kill me,” referring to petitioner, then described 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
her fear of petitioner being released on bail.1  Defense counsel 
responded that there was no evidence petitioner had attempted 
to contact the victim, the victim had actually identified two 
other people as the perpetrators near the time of the incident, 
defense counsel had not received any DNA evidence, another 
person had left a note on the victim’s car that stated “gotcha,” 
and according to the police report, petitioner was not the only 
suspect with similar DNA. 
Following argument on the bail motion, the trial court 
asked defense counsel whether she agreed that Humphrey does 
not require live testimony at a bail hearing and that the 
evidence may be presented through an offer of proof by 
“providing the facts of the case as each side knows them based 
upon the evidence that has been collected.”  Defense counsel 
replied, “I do not, your honor.  I actually think that Humphrey 
elevated the [bar] with regards to clear and convincing 
[evidence].  So a proffer, I don’t believe, is sufficient.  I know the 
court has been — we have been making these proffers, but since 
I don’t have the burden, I don’t have to present any evidence to 
the court, the People do.”  Defense counsel added that she had 
only been provided discovery relating to two of the witnesses 
who had given statements to investigators, had not previously 
seen the photographs attached to the People’s motion, and did 
not receive evidence linking petitioner’s DNA to the crime scene.   
The prosecutor responded that she was unaware of any 
authority holding that a bail hearing must be conducted as “a 
whole blown mini trial.”  She maintained that proffers were 
sufficient and that was “typically how it is done” at bail 
 
1  
The victim was not placed under oath or subject to cross-
examination. 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
hearings.  The prosecutor also argued that this court’s decision 
in Humphrey established that, at a bail hearing, the court “must 
accept that the charges are true and that the defendant is the 
person responsible for those charges.”   
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied bail 
pursuant to article I, section 12(b).  The court ruled that “the 
prosecutor may show evidence of dangerousness or danger to 
return to court or concern for public safety via proffer and 
through evidence such as what has been presented to the court 
in the People’s opposition to the bail motion presented today.”  
Turning to this showing, the court cited (1) the People’s “very 
detailed account of what the People believe [the] evidence is” 
linking petitioner to the charged offenses, (2) the “statements 
from various women involved with [petitioner] significantly 
after the time of this alleged offense . . . that does in some way 
mirror the details involving the scarves, involving the angry 
aggressive behavior of [petitioner] and also causing the court to 
continue to be concerned that despite [petitioner’s] de minimis 
record . . . there is still a substantial likelihood that his [release] 
could cause great harm to other individuals,” and (3) petitioner’s 
1991 misdemeanor theft conviction, which the court found 
involved conduct “that is very similar to what the People 
described as happening to the alleged complaining witness with 
the charge[d] offense[s].”  The court also found “the fact that 
[petitioner] has been evading arrest according to the People for 
at least the last 32 years is a significant factor to consider in risk 
of flight.”   
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with 
the Court of Appeal.  He asserted that (1) the trial court erred 
in relying on the People’s proffer rather than requiring live 
testimony before ordering petitioner detained without bail 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
before trial under article I, section 12(b); and (2) the court 
abused its discretion when it entered a no-bail pretrial detention 
order without making findings required under Humphrey, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th 135, that no nonfinancial, less restrictive 
alternatives to detention would protect the state’s interest in 
public safety.  The Court of Appeal rejected the first argument 
but agreed with the second contention.   
Regarding the presentation of evidence, the Court of 
Appeal held that a trial court may base its pretrial detention 
order under article I, section 12(b) on a proffer by the 
prosecution.  (In re Harris (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1097 
(Harris).)  It rejected petitioner’s argument that the language of 
article I, section 12(b), read in connection with various 
provisions of the Evidence Code, means that “only evidence that 
would be admissible at a formal trial can support pretrial 
detention.”  (Harris, at p. 1096; see also id. at pp. 1097, 1100–
1101.)   
The court also found unpersuasive petitioner’s argument 
that due process limits pretrial detention without bail to 
circumstances in which the People establish a defendant’s 
unsuitability through admissible evidence.  On this point, the 
court emphasized that an analogous federal bail reform statute, 
which contains a clear and convincing evidence standard and 
allows the presentation of evidence by proffer in support of 
pretrial detention, has withstood similar scrutiny.  (Harris, 
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1097–1098.)  The Court of Appeal 
stressed, however, that “it remains within the discretion of the 
trial court to decide whether particular instances of proffered 
evidence may be insufficient, and whether to insist on the 
production of live testimony or other evidence in compliance 
with more stringent procedural requirements.”  (Id. at p. 1101.) 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
Turning to the trial court’s decision to deny bail under 
article I, section 12(b), the Court of Appeal determined that the 
record contained substantial evidence of a qualifying offense 
under article I, section 12(b), and that any reasonable fact finder 
could have found, by clear and convincing evidence, a 
substantial likelihood that the petitioner’s release would result 
in great bodily harm to others.  (Harris, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 
at pp. 1101–1103; see In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 471 
(White).)  Nevertheless, it determined that a limited remand was 
required because the trial court failed to make the express 
findings required under Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th 135, that 
no less restrictive condition than detention could reasonably 
protect the interests in public or victim safety.  (Harris, at 
pp. 1104–1106; see Humphrey, at pp. 139–140, 151–152.)  The 
Court of Appeal explained that “while overlapping reasons may 
exist for making the applicable findings under [article I,] section 
12(b) and Humphrey, the [trial] court’s failure to articulate its 
evaluative process requires that [the Court of Appeal] speculate 
as to why the court believed that no nonfinancial conditions 
could reasonably protect the interests in public or victim safety,” 
thus necessitating remand.  (Harris, at p. 1105.)   
We granted review to address petitioner’s contention that 
only evidence that would be admissible at a criminal trial can 
support a pretrial detention order under article I, section 12(b).   
II.  DISCUSSION   
Petitioner renews his argument that only admissible 
evidence can satisfy article I, section 12(b)’s standards of proof.  
He contends that unsworn, untested statements can never meet 
either of the standards necessary to support a pretrial detention 
order made pursuant to this constitutional provision.  We reject 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
petitioner’s invitation to adopt this categorical approach.  We 
conclude instead that a trial court may rely on an evidentiary 
proffer provided that the court’s decision is based on reliable 
evidence so that an arrestee’s fundamental right to pretrial 
liberty is protected.   
A. Article I, Section 12(b) and Relevant Statutory 
Law Allow for Evidentiary Proffers  
1. Constitutional Text  
Article I, section 12, of the California Constitution 
provides in full as follows:  “A person shall be released on bail 
by sufficient sureties, except for:  [¶]  (a) Capital crimes when 
the facts are evident or the presumption great;  [¶]  (b) Felony 
offenses involving acts of violence on another person, or felony 
sexual assault offenses on another person, when the facts are 
evident or the presumption great and the court finds based upon 
clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial 
likelihood the person’s release would result in great bodily harm 
to others; or  [¶]  (c) Felony offenses when the facts are evident 
or the presumption great and the court finds based on clear and 
convincing evidence that the person has threatened another 
with great bodily harm and that there is a substantial likelihood 
that the person would carry out the threat if released.  [¶]  
Excessive bail may not be required.  In fixing the amount of bail, 
the court shall take into consideration the seriousness of the 
offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, 
and the probability of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing 
of the case.  [¶]  A person may be released on his or her own 
recognizance in the court’s discretion.”   
This section has evolved over time.  As ratified by voters 
in 1849, the California Constitution provided that “[a]ll persons 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
shall be bailable, by sufficient sureties, unless for capital 
offences, when the proof is evident or the presumption great.”  
(Cal. Const. of 1849, art. I, § 7; see Browne, Rep. of Debates in 
Convention of Cal. on Formation of State Const. (1850) p. 293.)  
This provision was later shifted to article I, section 6 within the 
California Constitution of 1879, yet its language remained 
unchanged until 1974.  At that time, as part of a more extensive 
constitutional revision, article I, section 6 was moved to section 
12 within the same article and certain changes were made to the 
provision’s text, including the replacement of “proof is evident” 
with “facts are evident.”  Finally, in 1982, Proposition 4 
broadened the circumstances in which courts may deny bail by 
adding subdivisions (b) and (c) to article I, section 12.2   
 
2  
Voters also approved the Victims’ Bill of Rights at the 
same election.  This measure also addressed bail, providing in 
part, “A person may be released on bail by sufficient sureties, 
except for capital crimes when the facts are evident or the 
presumption great.  Excessive bail may not be required.  In 
setting, reducing, or denying bail, the judge or magistrate shall 
take into consideration the protection of the public, the 
seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record 
of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at 
the trial or hearing of the case.  Public safety shall be the 
primary consideration.”  (Cal. Const., former art. I, § 28, subd. 
(e).)  Similar language, as subsequently amended by initiative 
(see Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) text of 
Prop. 9, p. 129), now appears at article I, section 28, subdivision 
(f)(3) of the California Constitution.  We need not decide in this 
case how the two constitutional provisions addressing the denial 
of bail can or should be reconciled.  (See Humphrey, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at p. 155, fn. 7; People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
858, 875, 877–878 (Standish).) 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
14 
2. Prior Case Law 
The case law construing article I, section 12 and its 
predecessor provisions sheds little light on the question before 
us.  We have never been asked to decide whether an order 
detaining a defendant without bail prior to trial must rest upon 
evidence that would be admissible at a criminal trial.  Our prior 
treatment of related issues provides only limited and mixed 
guidance on this subject.   
In People v. Tinder (1862) 19 Cal. 539 (Tinder), 
disapproved in Greenberg v. Superior Court (1942) 19 Cal.2d 
319, we held that under existing law, an indictment for a capital 
offense was sufficient to “furnish a presumption of the guilt of 
the defendant too great to entitle him to bail as a matter of right 
under the Constitution, or as a matter of discretion under the 
legislation of the State.”  (Tinder, at p. 543.)3  An indictment is 
not evidence that would normally be admissible at a criminal 
trial.  Yet we also based our conclusion in Tinder partly on the 
fact that, as the law stood at the time, a grand jury was to 
“ ‘receive none but legal evidence, and the best evidence in 
degree, to the exclusion of hearsay or secondary evidence,’ ” and 
when the jurors had “ ‘reason to believe that other evidence 
within their reach will explain away the charge, they should 
order such evidence to be produced.’ ”  (Tinder, at pp. 542–543.)  
In any event, Tinder merely identified a sufficient, rather than 
 
3  
After we decided Tinder, the Legislature enacted Penal 
Code section 1270, which provided that the finding of an 
indictment in a capital offense does not add to the strength of 
the proof or the presumptions to be drawn therefrom at a bail 
hearing for an individual charged with a capital offense.  (1872 
Pen. Code, § 1270, amended by Stats. 1986, ch. 248, § 165, 
p. 1267 and renumbered as § 1270.5.) 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
15 
a necessary, basis for a pretrial detention order.  That decision 
therefore provides little guidance here.4 
In the more than 150 years that have elapsed since the 
Tinder decision, some of the cases in which we have reviewed 
the sufficiency of the evidence behind a no-bail determination 
involved the presentation of some kind of live testimony (e.g., In 
re Troia (1883) 64 Cal. 152, 152–153), but the nature of the 
evidence presented in other cases is less apparent (e.g., Ex parte 
Curtis (1891) 92 Cal. 188, 191; Ex Parte Wolff (1880) 57 Cal. 94).  
In any event, none of these cases involved significant disputes 
over the admissibility of the evidence that was presented at the 
bail hearing. 
Most recently, in White, supra, 9 Cal.5th 455, we upheld a 
no-bail order under article I, section 12(b) based on live 
testimony and the defendant’s recorded interviews with law 
enforcement introduced at a preliminary hearing.  (White, at 
pp. 459, 471.)  White also did not involve any evidentiary 
dispute, but its analysis is relevant insofar as it considered the 
standards of proof under article I, section 12(b).  We first 
addressed the clause within this provision that “allows courts to 
 
4  
Our decision in Tinder also expressed concerns relating to 
the administrability of bail proceedings.  We rejected the notion 
that affidavits or oral testimony as to the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant could rebut the presumption of guilt arising from 
the indictment, reasoning that this would transform “ ‘a motion 
to bail into an examination into the guilt or innocence of the 
prisoner,’ ” which “ ‘would be attended with most serious 
inconvenience.’ ”  (Tinder, supra, 19 Cal. at pp. 545–546; see id. 
at p. 546 [noting that most state and federal courts imposed the 
same rule precluding additional evidence upon an application 
for bail after indictment for a capital offense, unless special and 
extraordinary circumstances existed].) 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
16 
deny bail when the facts underlying the qualifying charge are 
‘evident’ or the ‘presumption great.’ ”  (White, at p. 463.)  Our 
decision in White reaffirmed that “[o]ur court, in step with the 
broad consensus that has since emerged in other states, has 
interpreted this odd terminology to require evidence that would 
be sufficient to sustain a hypothetical verdict of guilt on appeal.”  
(Ibid.)  We noted that this standard “is more stringent than 
mere ‘sufficient cause,’ which is the showing required to hold a 
defendant to answer for an offense.”  (Id. at p. 463, fn. 3.)  At the 
same time, however, we did not take a position on whether the 
prosecution could only meet this standard through evidence that 
would be admissible at an eventual trial as that issue was not 
before us.   
Turning to the second clause of article I, section 12(b), we 
further held in White that the question of whether an arrestee 
poses a substantial likelihood of great bodily harm to others is a 
question of fact that must be established by “clear and 
convincing evidence.”  (White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 467.)  This 
standard of proof, we explained, “requires a specific type of 
showing — one demonstrating a ‘ “high probability” ’ that the 
fact or charge is true.”  (Ibid.)  We also emphasized that the 
finding of a substantial likelihood of great bodily harm, like 
other 
future-harm 
determinations 
under 
various 
civil 
commitment schemes, was subject to review for substantial 
evidence.  (Id. at p. 466.)   
Although White elaborated on the standards of proof that 
must be met before a trial court may order an individual 
detained without bail under article I, section 12(b), we did not 
address whether the prosecution could meet this standard only 
through evidence that would be admissible at an eventual trial.  
It is well settled that the admissibility of evidence is a wholly 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
separate concept from the standard of proof.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 920 [“ ‘While the admission of 
evidence of the uncharged sex offense may have added to the 
evidence the jury could consider as to defendant’s guilt, it did not 
lessen the prosecution’s burden to prove his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt’ ” (italics added)].)  Accordingly, our 
jurisprudence in this area sheds little light on the presentation 
of evidence required to support a no-bail determination under 
article I, section 12(b). 
3. Analysis 
This dearth of case law means that we must evaluate 
article I, section 12(b) without significant guidance from our 
prior decisions.   
Beginning with the text of this provision, as observed by 
the Court of Appeal below (Harris, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1097), nowhere on its face does article I, section 12(b) indicate 
that a court may consider only evidence that would be 
admissible at a criminal trial in determining whether “the facts 
are evident or the presumption great,” or whether the People 
have shown by “clear and convincing evidence that there is a 
substantial likelihood the person’s release would result in great 
bodily harm to others.”  The first clause of the provision refers 
to the presentation of “facts,” but does not prescribe how these 
facts are to be shown.  The second clause likewise does not limit 
how the People are to make the required showing of proof by 
clear and convincing evidence.  Although the latter clause uses 
the word “evidence,” as noted this describes the standard of 
proof involved; it is not a limitation regarding the form in which 
evidence must be presented.   
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
Nor do we perceive any underlying intent, not captured on 
the face of article I, section 12(b), to limit this provision through 
the categorical rule that petitioner proposes.  No clear 
indications of such an intent appear in the debates regarding 
the 1849 Constitution, the legislative materials accompanying 
the 1974 constitutional revisions, or in the ballot materials 
associated with Proposition 4 in 1982.5  Indeed, despite the 1974 
constitutional revision’s change in wording from “proof is 
evident” to “facts are evident” (Cal. Const. Revision Com., 
Proposed Revision (1971) p. 19), a revision that on its face seems 
potentially significant, the “comments accompanying the 
constitutional revision indicate that the measure generally 
intended no substantive changes by such minor changes in 
language.”  (In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 929, fn. 6.)   
The absence of any such indicia regarding Proposition 4 is 
of particular note.  Had this measure included a deviation from 
conventional practices at bail hearings, which commonly involve 
informal proffers by the prosecution and defense alike, one 
might expect to see some mention of that in the ballot 
materials.6  But none appears.  Indeed, a legislative report on 
 
5  
The Constitution Revision Commission’s background 
study from 1969 merely observed that, under the then-existing 
constitutional provision exempting capital defendants from bail 
when the “ ‘proof is evident or the presumption great,’ ” trial 
courts “have a great deal of discretion in determining whether 
bail must be denied pursuant to this exception.”  (Cal. Const. 
Revision Com., Article I Declaration of Rights Background 
Study 4 (Dec. 1969).)   
6  
In the period leading up to Proposition 4, the Legislature 
passed laws allowing courts making bail determinations to 
consider a variety of sources, including arrest reports and other 
 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
an earlier version of the draft amendment queried whether 
there should be “testimonial evidence as opposed to hearsay 
statements or oral allegations,” suggesting the Legislature did 
not view the existing “facts are evident” standard as assuring 
the production of admissible evidence.  (Assem. Com. on 
Criminal Justice, Analysis of Assem. Const. Amend. No. 14 
(1981–1982 Reg. Sess.), as amended May 6, 1981, p. 3.) 
It also seems doubtful that article I, section 12(b) was 
intended to constitutionalize an extension of the rules regarding 
the admission of evidence at a criminal trial when the timeline 
for setting or denying bail may make it difficult or impossible for 
the parties to present evidence in the manner required at trial.  
Initial bail hearings occur at the earliest stages of a criminal 
proceeding, often at the time of a defendant’s arraignment (Pen. 
Code, §§ 825, 1269b, subd. (b)) when the parties’ ability to secure 
witnesses through subpoena is limited.  (Id., § 1328 [police 
officer may refuse to accept service of subpoena if tendered less 
than five working days prior to date of hearing]; Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1987, subd. (a) [witnesses must be allowed a “reasonable time” 
for preparation and travel]; cf. United States v. Montalvo-
Murillo (1990) 495 U.S. 711, 720 [“Detention proceedings take 
place during the disordered period following arrest”]; U.S. v. 
LaFontaine (2d Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 125, 131 [“informality of bail 
hearings serves the demands of speed”].)   
 
records, sworn statements and affidavits.  (Stats. 1968, ch. 1362, 
§ 1, p. 2599; Pen. Code, former § 1204.5; Stats. 1973, ch. 810, § 3, 
p. 1445; Pen. Code, former § 1269c; O’Neal v. Superior Court 
(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1086, 1092 [describing legislative history 
of former Pen. Code, § 1204.5’s provision allowing consideration 
of accused’s prior criminal record at bail hearing].)   
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
Moreover, as the Attorney General observes, “a victim of a 
recent violent crime may be physically unable to appear so soon 
after the crime occurs,” whether because of their injuries or 
because “[v]ictims or witnesses suffering trauma from a serious 
crime may be emotionally or mentally unable to appear and face 
the defendant immediately after the defendant’s arrest or the 
filing of charges.”  And “[o]ther witnesses may be unable to make 
an immediate appearance because of previously scheduled work 
or childcare needs or an inability to travel.”  Petitioner’s 
approach also implicates the possibility of mini trials ahead of a 
bail hearing at which the admissibility of certain evidence, such 
as a defendant’s confession, would be disputed.  Neither the 
constitution nor the statutory scheme contemplates these kinds 
of additional procedures.  These practical issues suggest that 
petitioner’s categorical rule would disserve the intent behind 
article I, section 12(b). 
Petitioner’s proposed rule also finds little support in 
contemporary standards regarding bail hearings and the 
descriptions of these hearings found in leading treatises, which 
emphasize the informal nature of these proceedings.  (See, e.g., 
Cal. Criminal Law:  Procedure and Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 
2021) § 5.29 [“[T]he bail hearing is informal and devised to 
discover salient information relating to permissible guidelines 
for setting bail.  Either side may produce evidence through 
testimony, declarations, or representations”]; 4 LaFave et al., 
Criminal Procedure (4th ed. 2022) § 12.1(d), p. 19 [“The receipt 
of information at a bail hearing is much more informal than the 
taking of evidence at a criminal trial”]; LaFave, Search and 
Seizure:  A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (6th ed. 2022) 
§ 1.6(e) [“Generally, it may be said that information offered at a 
pretrial hearing concerning the terms and conditions of 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
defendant’s release need not conform to the rules of evidence”]; 
ABA Stds. for Crim. Justice (3d. ed. 2007) stds. 10-5.10(a)(iv), 
p. 133 [at any pretrial detention hearing defendant should have 
the right to present information by proffer or otherwise]; 10-
5.10(d), p. 133 [“At any pretrial detention hearing, the rules 
governing admissibility of evidence in criminal trials should not 
apply.  The court should receive all relevant evidence”]; id., com. 
to std. 10-5.10(a), p. 136 [“Proceeding by proffer is consistent 
with current practice which allows for less formal evidentiary 
rules at this early stage of proceedings”].)  Indeed, “it has been 
noted that ‘Bail hearings are “typically informal affairs, not 
substitutes for trial or even for discovery.  Often the opposing 
parties simply describe to the judicial officer the nature of their 
evidence; they do not actually produce it.” ’ ”  (ABA Stds. for 
Crim. Justice, supra, com. to std. 10–5.10(a), p. 136.) 
Finally, there is no reason to believe that the standards of 
proof specified in article I, section 12(b) can, as a practical 
matter, be met only through admissible evidence.  Admissible 
evidence is not required to ascertain whether facts exist that 
“would be sufficient to sustain a hypothetical verdict of guilt” of 
one or more qualifying crimes.  (White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 
p. 463.)  And it is well established that in federal bail 
proceedings, an unsworn proffer may establish a high 
probability of the truth of a fact justifying pretrial detention.  
(See, e.g., U.S. v. Smith (D.C. Cir. 1996) 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 
(Smith) [“Every circuit to have considered the matter . . . has . . . 
permitted the Government to proceed by way of proffer”]; U.S. 
v. Gaviria (11th Cir. 1987) 828 F.2d 667, 669; U.S. v. Winsor (9th 
Cir. 1986) 785 F.2d 755, 756; U.S. v. Delker (3d Cir. 1985) 
757 F.2d 1390, 1397–1398; U.S. v. Acevedo-Ramos (1st Cir. 
1985) 755 F.2d 203, 206 (Acevedo-Ramos).)  In sum, we reject 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
petitioner’s argument that the evidence offered by the 
prosecution in support of a request to deny bail under article I, 
section 12(b) must always be presented in a manner that would 
render it admissible at a criminal trial.  As discussed below, 
however, trial courts must ensure that the evidence they 
consider is sufficiently reliable in order to protect an arrestee’s 
liberty interests.   
4. Counterarguments 
Petitioner relies on case law from courts in other states to 
support his argument that only evidence that would be 
admissible at trial may be utilized to satisfy article I, section 
12(b)’s standards.  Meanwhile, amici curiae Civil Rights Corps, 
the ACLU of Northern California, the California Public 
Defenders Association, Ventura County Public Defender 
Claudia Y. Bautista, and Human Rights Watch (collectively, 
amici curiae) cite such decisions in support of their alternative 
proposed holding that (1) article I, section 12(b) precludes the 
use of inadmissible hearsay, over a defendant’s objection, to 
establish a disputed fact material to a pretrial detention 
determination, unless the trial court finds “good cause” to 
permit the hearsay; and (2) even when good cause exists to allow 
the introduction of hearsay evidence, a court may not make any 
factual finding supporting pretrial detention based solely on 
such hearsay.  Amici curiae characterize their position as 
supported by “a wide judicial consensus in other jurisdictions.”  
We are unconvinced. 
On this subject, approximately 40 state constitutions 
contain provisions limiting the right to bail in capital cases 
“ ‘when the proof is evident or the presumption great,’ ” or 
substantially similar language.  (See Fry v. State (Ind. 2013) 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
990 N.E.2d 429, 438–439, fn. 10 (Fry).)  Yet these states have 
adopted somewhat different standards to determine the reach of 
such provisions.  (The Administration of Bail (1931) 41 Yale L.J. 
293, 294 [“in interpreting and applying the clause excepting 
from the guaranty capital cases where the proof is evident or the 
presumption great, courts have arrived at strikingly different 
results”]; 4 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure, supra, § 12.4(a) 
[there is considerable variation among the states regarding the 
extent of the burden of proof]; see also Fountaine v. Mullen (R.I. 
1976) 366 A.2d 1138, 1140 (Fountaine) [courts in approximately 
40 states with similar constitutional provisions “that have 
addressed the question of quantum of proof have split five 
different ways”].)   
These differences notwithstanding, there is a broader if 
not absolute consensus among these jurisdictions that extending 
the full array of evidentiary rules attendant to a criminal trial 
to bail hearings would be unworkable and unwise.  Many states 
have implemented this view through statutes or court rules that 
make it clear that bail hearings are not covered by the same 
principles that govern the admissibility of evidence in criminal 
proceedings.7  Where such statutes and rules exist, they have 
 
7  
See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-13-3, subd. (b)(6); Alaska Stat. 
§ 12.30.006, subd. (g); Ark. Rules Evid., rule 1101(b); Colo. Rules 
Evid., rule 1101(d); Del. Rules Evid., rule 1101; Fla. Rules Crim. 
Proc, rule 3.132(b); Idaho Rules Evid., rule 101; Ill. Rules Evid., 
rule 1101(b); Ind. Rules Evid., rule 101(d); Iowa Rules Evid., 
rule 5.1101(c); Kan. Stat. § 22-2802(12); La. Code Evid., art. 
1101(C)(2); Me. Rules Evid., rule 101(b)(8); Mich. Court Rules, 
rule 6.106(G)(2)(b); Minn. Rules Evid., rule 1101(b)(3); Miss. 
Rules Evid., rule 1101(b)(4); Mont. Rules Evid., rule 101(c)(3); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1101(4)(b); Nev. Stat. § 47.020; N.D. Rules 
 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
been relied upon as grounds for allowing the prosecution to 
proceed by proffer in arguing that a defendant should be held 
pending trial without bail.  (See, e.g., People v. Simmons (Ill. 
App.Ct. 2019) 143 N.E.3d 833, 838–839; State ex rel. Torrez v. 
Whitaker (N.M. 2018) 410 P.3d 201, 216–217 (Whitaker).) 
In states where the issue has not been resolved by a 
statute or rule, courts have taken different approaches to the 
admissibility of evidence at a pretrial detention hearing under a 
provision requiring that the proof be evident or presumption 
great to justify a no-bail order.  Some courts require that the 
prosecution show bail ineligibility through evidence that would 
be admissible at trial.  (E.g., Fry, supra, 990 N.E.2d at p. 449; 
Young ex rel. Boone v. Russell (Ky. 1960) 332 S.W.2d 629, 633; 
see State v. Passino (Vt. 1990) 577 A.2d 281, 284 [constitutional 
provision allowing court to deny bail in capital case “where the 
evidence of guilt is great” cannot be met by inadmissible 
evidence].)  One decision in this camp, recognizing the practical 
difficulties of conducting such a hearing on short notice, has 
allowed that “the court can hold a defendant charged with an 
offense punishable by life imprisonment without bail for such 
time as is necessary to enable the parties to prepare for a full 
bail hearing and to make appropriate motions,” while also 
emphasizing that the hearing “must be scheduled as soon as 
reasonably possible.”  (Passino, at p. 285.)  Another approach 
requires admissible evidence, but allows the prosecution to rely 
 
Evid., rule 1101(d)(3)(F); N.M. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 5-401P; 
Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2103(B); R.I. Rules Evid., rule 101(b)(3); 
S.C. Code, § 17-15-60; S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-43-12; Tex. 
Rules Evid., rule 101(e)(3); Utah Rules Evid., rule 1101(c)(4); 
Wn. Rules Evid., rule 1101(c)(3); Wis. Stat. § 911.01(4)(c); Wyo. 
Rules Evid., rule 1101 (b)(3). 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
25 
to some degree, when necessary, upon evidence that otherwise 
might be inadmissible.  (Commonwealth v. Talley (Pa. 2021) 
265 A.3d 485, 524, fn. 35.)  This is the line of authority that 
amici curiae regard as most persuasive.  A third view allows the 
prosecution to rely upon hearsay, provided that this hearsay is 
either sufficiently reliable or otherwise provides a basis for the 
court to make an independent assessment of whether there is 
sufficient proof of the defendant’s guilt.  (Rico-Villalobos v. 
Guisto (Or. 2005) 118 P.3d 246, 255 (Rico-Villalobos); State v. 
Arthur (Fla. 1980) 390 So.2d 717, 720; Bates v. Ogata (Hawaii 
1971) 482 P.2d 153, 155.) 
Given the variety of interpretations advanced in these 
cases, influenced in some instances by matters such as the 
standard of proof applicable to a no-bail order (e.g., Fountaine, 
supra, 366 A.2d at p. 1140), we conclude these decisions are of 
limited consequence to the issue before us.  We do note, however, 
that most jurisdictions that have considered the question allow 
a no-bail order to be premised at least to some extent on hearsay 
evidence that would not necessarily be admissible at a criminal 
trial.  Also, the most persuasive of the decisions addressing the 
use at a pretrial detention hearing of evidence that would be 
inadmissible at a criminal trial properly focus upon the ultimate 
question of the burden or burdens that the prosecution must 
satisfy, and have declined to either forbid hearsay altogether or 
broadly require “good cause” for its admission.   
In Rico-Villalobos, supra, 118 P.3d 246, for example, the 
Supreme Court of Oregon examined a provision in the Oregon 
state constitution that provides all offenses shall be bailable by 
sufficient sureties, except for murder or treason, “ ‘when the 
proof is evident, or the presumption strong.’ ”  (Id. at p. 248, 
citing Or. Const., art. I, § 14.)  The court determined that 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
26 
“[w]hile the text of [the constitutional provision] shows that the 
framers of the provision wanted to establish a high threshold of 
proof before a person could be held without bail, even when 
charged with murder, the words themselves do not suggest any 
limit on the kind of evidence that would be admissible in a 
proceeding to determine whether to allow bail.”  (Rico-
Villalobos, at p. 252.)  The court noted that early cases in other 
jurisdictions with similar bail provisions, while split over 
whether an indictment was sufficient proof to deny bail, 
“suggest[] that those provisions imposed no particular 
limitations on the kind of proof that a court could consider in 
determining whether or not a defendant in a murder case was 
bailable.”  (Id. at p. 253.)  The court concluded that “the burden 
[is] on the state at the pretrial release hearing to present 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which the trial court can 
make an independent determination that evidence that likely 
will be admissible at trial shows that the proof of defendant’s 
guilt is ‘evident’ or the ‘presumption strong’; however, that 
provision does not preclude the state from making that showing 
by means of hearsay evidence.”  (Id. at p. 255.)   
Neither Rico-Villalobos nor any other decision from 
another jurisdiction is on all fours with this matter.  Among 
these differences, article I, section 12(b)’s concern with public 
safety suggests it would be misguided to limit a proffer under 
this provision to describing facts likely to be admitted at a 
defendant’s trial when some such facts, though relevant to 
future dangerousness, might not be sufficiently relevant to the 
charged offenses as to warrant admission at trial.  Yet Rico-
Villalobos and other decisions that allow for the introduction of 
hearsay without first ascertaining good cause, or requiring 
additional evidence that would be admissible at trial, contradict 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
27 
amici curiae’s assertion that a broad judicial consensus supports 
their position.  We also agree with Rico-Villalobos insofar as it 
declined to regard all evidentiary rules that apply at trial as 
extending to bail hearings pursuant to a state constitutional 
provision that does not on its face or by implication impart such 
a limitation.  Amici curiae’s argument fails for a similar reason; 
it seeks to import into the state Constitution’s language — that 
“facts are evident or the presumption great” (art. I, § 12(b)) — 
restrictions that are not reasonably read into its text.  
Amici curiae’s reliance upon decisions from other 
jurisdictions is even less tenable with regard to article I, section 
12(b)’s “clear and convincing evidence” standard.  As previously 
noted, federal appellate courts have uniformly rejected the 
argument that a court may not base its pretrial detention 
determination on hearsay evidence when it makes a finding by 
clear and convincing evidence of future dangerousness.  (Smith, 
supra, 79 F.3d at p. 1210; U.S. v. Gaviria, supra, 828 F.2d at 
p. 669; U.S. v. Winsor, supra, 785 F.2d at p. 756; U.S. v. Delker, 
supra, 757 F.2d at pp. 1397–1398; Acevedo-Ramos, supra, 
755 F.2d at p. 206; U.S. v. Vondette (2d. Cir. 2001) 5 Fed.Appx. 
73, 76.)  Our sister state courts are largely in accord.  (See State 
v. Pinkston (N.J. 2018) 187 A.3d 113, 117; Abbott A. v. 
Commonwealth (Mass. 2010) 933 N.E.2d 936, 946–947; Wheeler 
v. State (Md. 2005) 864 A.2d 1058, 1065–1066; Lynch v. U.S. 
(D.C. 1989) 557 A.2d 580, 582.)  In Whitaker, supra, 410 P.3d 
201, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held:  “We agree with 
courts in all other federal and state bail reform jurisdictions that 
have considered the same issues, and we hold that the showing 
of dangerousness required by the new constitutional authority 
is not bound by formal rules of evidence but instead focuses on 
judicial assessment of all reliable information presented to the 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
28 
court in any format worthy of reasoned consideration. . . .  [¶]  In 
most cases, credible proffers and other summaries of evidence, 
law enforcement and court records, or other nontestimonial 
information should be sufficient support for an informed 
decision that the state either has or has not met its 
constitutional burden.”  (Id. at p. 203.) 
In sum, we do not find the alternative approaches 
advanced by amici curiae or utilized in other jurisdictions to be 
workable or persuasive under California law.  A rule that 
permits holding defendants in custody for extended periods 
while the parties arrange for the appearance of witnesses is not 
a particularly attractive alternative to a rule that permits 
making bail determinations based on a wider scope of evidence, 
but also allows for reconsideration of bail determinations based 
on developing facts.  Moreover, the alternative approaches 
suffer from the same fundamental flaws, namely, neither is 
grounded in the constitutional text nor consistent with the 
prevailing practices at bail hearings. 
5. Proffers Must Be Reliable 
While a trial court has considerable discretion in 
evaluating the evidence presented in connection with a no-bail 
determination under article I, section 12(b), “this should not be 
taken to mean that information must be accepted by the court 
without regard to its reliability.”  (4 LaFave et al., Criminal 
Procedure, supra, § 12.1(d), p. 19.)  As a threshold matter, even 
though strict compliance with the rules of evidence applicable at 
a criminal trial is not required, a trial court must ensure that 
an arrestee’s liberty interests are protected and base its decision 
on reliable facts, not merely general assertions by the 
prosecution regarding what the evidence is likely to show.  (See, 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
29 
e.g., State v. Pan (Conn. 2022) 291 A.3d 82, 104 [distinguishing 
between 
“simple 
representations 
of 
counsel,” 
deemed 
inadequate to satisfy a party’s burden at a bail hearing, and a 
“proffer, supported by reliable hearsay evidence, relevant 
documents, and other documentary or testimonial evidence,” 
which could meet this burden]; In re Application of Haynes (Or. 
1980) 619 P.2d 632, 642 [“A prosecutor’s assertions about 
evidence that he ‘feels’ he ‘may be able to introduce’ are not 
‘proof’ ”].)   
The court’s exercise of discretion to order a defendant 
detained under article I, section 12(b) should also “reflect an 
awareness of the high stakes involved.”  (U.S. v. Martir (2d Cir. 
1986) 782 F.2d 1141, 1145; see also Humphrey, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at p. 147 [noting that pretrial detention can result in 
“immense and profound” consequences, such as the loss of a job, 
home, or custody of a child]; Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 
424, 435–437 (Van Atta) [detailing the “ ‘grievous loss’ ” pretrial 
detention “inflicts” upon the detainee].)  “ ‘[A] pretrial detention 
hearing may restrict for a significant time the liberty of a 
presumably innocent person.’  [Citation.]  The judge . . . 
accordingly retains the responsibility for assessing the 
reliability and accuracy of the government’s information, 
whether presented by proffer or by direct proof.”  (Martir, at 
p. 1145.)   
A trial court thus must ensure its decision to detain an 
individual without bail under article I, section 12(b) is supported 
by reliable information.  If the court is not satisfied with the 
reliability of the prosecution’s proffer, it should demand 
additional facts or find the relevant standards unmet.  
(Whitaker, supra, 410 P.3d at pp. 203–204 [“a court necessarily 
retains the judicial discretion to find proffered or documentary 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
30 
information insufficient to meet the constitutional clear and 
convincing evidence requirement in the context of particular 
cases”]; State v. Ingram (N.J. 2017) 165 A.3d 797, 799 [“Trial 
judges . . . retain discretion to require direct testimony when 
they are dissatisfied with the State’s proffer” in support of 
pretrial detention]; Acevedo-Ramos, supra, 755 F.2d at p. 207 
[the trial court “possesses adequate power to reconcile the 
competing demands of speed and of reliability, by selectively 
insisting upon the production of the underlying evidence or 
evidentiary sources where their accuracy is in question”].)   
The Attorney General has offered several nonexclusive 
factors relevant to determining whether a proffer is sufficiently 
reliable to support the findings that article I, section 12(b) 
requires, including:  (1) the specificity and comprehensiveness 
with which the proffer describes the evidence; (2) the extent to 
which the proffer is supported by other evidence, such as 
photographs, videos, documents, or testimony; (3) whether the 
proffer attributes its information to identified witnesses with 
firsthand knowledge; (4) whether the government has failed to 
provide more precise evidence that it could readily have 
submitted, such as transcripts, recordings, or photographs that 
the proffer describes; and (5) whether the defense has, by proffer 
or otherwise, provided a specific basis for doubting the proffer’s 
reliability.  We agree these factors are useful in a trial court’s 
evaluation of whether a proffer is reliable and satisfies article I, 
section 12(b)’s required findings.  We note that a court may also 
consider (6) whether the government has failed to produce 
readily available witnesses and (7) whether information was 
sworn or made under oath. 
In Humphrey, we affirmed “[a] court’s procedures for 
entering an order resulting in pretrial detention must also 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
31 
comport with other traditional notions of due process to ensure 
that when necessary, the arrestee is detained ‘in a fair 
manner,’ ” which include “the court’s obligation to set forth the 
reasons for its decision on the record and to include them in the 
court’s minutes.”  (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 155.)  In 
connection with our ruling today, we add that when the 
defendant has made a competing proffer, or objected to the 
prosecution’s proffer as inadequately supported or otherwise 
unreliable, the trial court should endeavor to make a record of 
the basis on which it found the prosecution’s proffer reliable.  
Doing so furthers the goals of fairness and reasoned 
decisionmaking.  As augmented, these procedures will facilitate 
meaningful review of a trial court’s ultimate decision to deny 
bail pursuant to article I, section 12(b).  While such a decision is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion, the trial court’s factual findings 
are reviewed for substantial evidence, and the reviewing court 
is not permitted to reweigh the evidence.  (See White, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at pp. 469–470.)   
Finally, 
we 
emphasize 
that 
an 
initial 
no-bail 
determination is not necessarily permanent.  A defendant may 
renew a request for release on bail in light of new facts and 
evidence.  A defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing 
within 10 court days of arraignment, at which time the 
defendant may cross-examine testifying witnesses.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 859b.)  If evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing casts 
doubt on prior findings made under article I, section 12(b), the 
defendant may ask the court to revisit an earlier no-bail 
determination.  (Standish, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 883, fn. 8; 
Pen. Code, § 1273; see id., § 1289.)  As this court recognized over 
a century ago, “There may be cases in which new facts have been 
developed, or new evidence discovered, after the conclusion of 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
32 
the preliminary examination, in which it would be proper to 
hear additional testimony on the application for bail.”  (Ex Parte 
Curtis, supra, 92 Cal. at p. 190.) 
6. Applicability of Humphrey’s Instruction 
The parties also ask us to address whether Humphrey’s 
instruction that the trial court “must assume the truth of the 
criminal charges” (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 153) 
applies to the findings required under article I, section 12(b).  
We agree with the parties that it does not.   
The instruction in Humphrey that trial courts must 
assume the truth of the criminal charges appeared within that 
decision’s discussion of the general framework governing the 
setting of bail.  (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 152.)  We 
explained that where the record reflects a risk of flight or a risk 
to public or victim safety and the trial court has concluded 
money bail is reasonably necessary, “then the court must 
consider the individual arrestee’s ability to pay, along with the 
seriousness of the charged offense and the arrestee’s criminal 
record.”  (Id. at p. 154, italics added.)  It was within the context 
of considering the seriousness of the charged offense in relation 
to victim and public safety that we held the trial court must 
assume the truth of those charged offenses.  (Id. at p. 153.)  At 
the same time, we made clear that Humphrey did not involve an 
order denying bail.  (Id. at p. 155, fn. 7. )   
As noted, article I, section 12(b) permits a trial court to 
deny bail under narrow circumstances and places the burden on 
the People to present facts to support their position.  The 
constitutional provision specifies that a person shall be released 
on bail except for certain qualifying offenses “when the facts are 
evident or the presumption great,” a standard of proof we have 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
33 
construed to mean “enough evidence of reasonable, credible, and 
solid value to sustain a guilty verdict on one or more of the 
qualifying crimes.”  (White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 463.)  To hold 
that a court must assume the truth of the criminal charges in 
making such a determination would improperly relieve the 
People of the burden that the constitutional text, so construed, 
assigns to them.  Accordingly, we clarify here that a court does 
not assume the truth of the criminal charges when evaluating 
whether to order a defendant held without bail under article I, 
section 12(b). 
B. Evidence Code Section 300 Does Not Limit the 
Types of Evidence a Trial Court May Consider 
at a Bail Hearing 
Petitioner also asserts that various provisions of our 
Evidence Code support his position that only evidence that 
would be admissible at a criminal trial may be admitted at a bail 
hearing.  He places particular emphasis upon Evidence Code 
section 300, which provides:  “Except as otherwise provided by 
statute, this code applies in every action before the Supreme 
Court or a court of appeal or superior court, including 
proceedings in such actions conducted by a referee, court 
commissioner, or similar officer, but does not apply in grand jury 
proceedings.”  We are unpersuaded by this argument.   
As noted, section 300 of the Evidence Code specifies that 
the code’s provisions apply “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
statute.”  Other statutes establish to our satisfaction that bail 
hearings are exempted from the standard evidentiary 
procedures in the Evidence Code that are at issue here.  
Numerous 
statutes 
allow 
trial 
judges 
making 
bail 
determinations to consider material that would not be similarly 
admissible at a criminal trial.   
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
34 
Penal Code section 1204.5, for example, specifically 
excepts bail hearings from the general rule forbidding trial 
courts from considering arrest reports and prior criminal 
histories.  (Pen. Code, § 1204.5, subd. (a) [“In any criminal 
action, . . . no judge, shall read or consider any written report of 
any law enforcement officer or witness to any offense, any 
information reflecting the arrest or conviction record of a 
defendant, or any affidavit or representation of any kind, verbal 
or written, without the defendant’s consent given in open court, 
except . . . in any application for an order fixing or changing 
bail”].)  Penal Code section 1269c, meanwhile, likewise permits 
a peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe the amount 
of bail set forth in the bail schedule for a felony offense is 
insufficient to ensure the defendant’s appearance or to protect a 
victim or the victim’s family member to “prepare a declaration 
under penalty of perjury setting forth the facts and 
circumstances in support of his or her belief and file it with a 
magistrate.”  And Penal Code section 1319 specifies that before 
an individual arrested for a violent felony may be released on 
his or her own recognizance, the trial court must hold a bail 
hearing and consider, among other factors, “[a]ny other 
information presented in [an investigative report regarding 
bail]” and “[a]ny other information presented by the prosecuting 
attorney.”  (Id., § 1319, subd. (b)(2)–(3).)  Likewise, Penal Code 
section 1275, subdivision (a)(1) provides that “[i]n setting, 
reducing, or denying bail, a judge or magistrate shall take into 
consideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the 
offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, 
and the probability of his or her appearing at trial or at a 
hearing of the case.”  In setting bail, Penal Code section 1275, 
subdivision (a) permits a judge or magistrate to “consider factors 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
35 
such as the information included in a report prepared in 
accordance with Section 1318.1,” with this information 
including the defendant’s outstanding warrants, prior failures 
to appear in court, and verification of the defendant’s criminal 
record and place of residence (id., § 1318.1, subd. (b)).   
The statutes concerning bail hearings thus contemplate 
that these proceedings will involve the court’s consideration of 
at least some hearsay that would not normally be admissible at 
a criminal trial.  Accordingly, we reject petitioner’s argument 
that Evidence Code section 300 functions to limit the evidence 
that may be introduced at a bail hearing. 
C. Due Process Principles Do Not Preclude Trial 
Courts from Making No-bail Decisions Based on 
Evidentiary Proffers 
Petitioner also contends that the prosecution’s use of a 
proffer violated his due process rights under the federal and 
state Constitutions.  We find no constitutional error. 
1. Legal Principles 
The federal and state Constitutions forbid the government 
from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law.  (U.S. Const., 14th Amend. [“nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law”]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a) [“A person may 
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law”].)  “In light of the virtually identical language of the 
federal and state guarantees, we have looked to the United 
States Supreme Court’s precedents for guidance in interpreting 
the contours of our own due process clause and have treated the 
state clause’s prescriptions as substantially overlapping those of 
the federal Constitution.”  (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
36 
Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212 
(Today’s Fresh Start).) 
“ ‘The essence of due process is the requirement that “a 
person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case 
against him and opportunity to meet it.” ’  [Citations.]  The 
opportunity to be heard must be afforded ‘at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.’  [Citations.]  To ensure that the 
opportunity is meaningful, the United States Supreme Court 
and this court have identified some aspects of due process as 
irreducible minimums.  For example, whenever ‘due process 
requires a hearing, the adjudicator must be impartial.’ ”  
(Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 212.) 
“Beyond these broad outlines, however, the precise 
dictates of due process are flexible and vary according to 
context.”  (Today’s Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 212; 
Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [“It has been said 
so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of 
authority that due process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands”].)  
“Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has rejected 
absolute rules in favor of balancing three considerations:  ‘First, 
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.’ ”  (Today’s 
Fresh Start, at p. 213.)   
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
37 
“With a minor modification, we have adopted the [high 
court’s] balancing test as the default framework for analyzing 
challenges to the sufficiency of proceedings under our own due 
process clause.  The first three factors — the private interest 
affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government’s 
interest — are the same.  [Citations.]  In addition, we may also 
consider a fourth factor, ‘ “the dignitary interest in informing 
individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the 
action and in enabling them to present their side of the story 
before a responsible government official.” ’ ”  (Today’s Fresh 
Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 213; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. 
(a).)   
It is well settled that the accused retains a fundamental 
constitutional right to liberty before trial.  (See, e.g., Humphrey, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 150; Van Atta, supra, 27 Cal.3d at 
pp. 435–436.)  We have not had occasion to address what 
procedural protections are required when the People seek to 
detain a defendant prior to trial under article I, section 12(b).  
However, other courts, including the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Salerno (1987) 481 U.S. 739 (Salerno), 
have considered similar due process issues implicated by other 
bail statutes.  We now turn to those decisions for guidance.   
“Prior to 1970, in the vast majority of jurisdictions 
defendants had a constitutional or statutory right, at least on 
paper if not always in practice, to be released on bail prior to 
trial for virtually all crimes not punishable by death.”  
(Whitaker, supra, 410 P.3d at p. 208, citing Bail:  An Ancient 
Practice Reexamined (1961) 70 Yale L.J. 966, 967.)  “In a 
significant change from that history, Congress gave new risk-
focused pretrial detention authority to District of Columbia 
judges as part of the District of Columbia Court Reform and 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
38 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.”  (Whitaker, at p. 208; D.C. 
Code § 23-1322, hereinafter the D.C. Bail Act.)  As originally 
enacted, the D.C. Bail Act allowed a judicial officer to order a 
suspect arrested for certain enumerated offenses detained if the 
judicial officer found “(1) that there is clear and convincing 
evidence that the accused falls into one of the categories of 
persons eligible for detention . . . (2) that . . . there is ‘no 
condition or combination of conditions of release which will 
reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the 
community,’ [citation] and (3) that there is ‘a substantial 
probability that the person committed . . . the offense for which 
he is present before the judicial officer.’ ”  (U.S. v. Edwards (D.C. 
1981) 430 A.2d 1321, 1334 (Edwards).)  The D.C. Bail Act also 
provided that the defendant is entitled to representation by 
counsel and “ ‘to present information by proffer or otherwise, to 
testify, and to present witnesses in his own behalf.’ ”  (Edwards, 
at p. 1334.) 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed the 
constitutionality of the D.C. Bail Act in Edwards, supra, 
430 A.2d 1321.  In that case, the trial court had ruled that the 
Fifth and Eighth Amendments 
to the United States 
Constitution require that criminal defendants be afforded an 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses at pretrial 
detention hearings, and that to the extent the detention statute 
permitted the use of proffers or hearsay, it was unconstitutional.  
(Edwards, at p. 1324.)  The appellate court disagreed.  (Id. at 
pp. 1333–1334.)  It held that the D.C. Bail Act provided 
sufficient procedural safeguards — a hearing before a judicial 
officer, the right to counsel, and the right “ ‘to present 
information by proffer or otherwise, to testify, and to present 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
39 
witnesses in his own behalf’ ” — to comply with due process.8  
(Edwards, at p. 1334.)   
The Edwards court was also guided by the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 
103 (Gerstein), in determining what process is constitutionally 
required in a pretrial detention hearing.  (Edwards, supra, 
430 A.2d at p. 1335.)  In Gerstein, the high court considered 
“whether a person arrested and held for trial under a 
prosecutor’s information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial 
determination of probable cause for pretrial restraint of liberty.”  
(Gerstein, at p. 105.)  The Gerstein court held that “the Fourth 
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause 
as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following 
arrest” (id. at p. 114), but it rejected the notion that the 
 
8  
The Edwards court also perceived its holding as consistent 
with legislative intent and prevailing practices.  It explained, 
“The legislative history of the statute confirms Congress’ intent 
that the information upon which the judicial officer makes his 
finding need not be sworn testimony, and that the hearing is not 
designed to afford defendants a discovery device.”  (Edwards, 
supra, 430 A.2d at p. 1334.)  It cited a House Report discussing 
the use of proffers in detention hearings, which stated:  “ ‘[A]s is 
the present practice under the [D.C. Bail Act], . . . the use of 
sworn testimony will be the exception and not the rule . . . .  Bail 
hearings under the [D.C. Bail Act], which frequently result in 
detention of the accused, proceed primarily by way of proffers.  
They are not formal trials requiring strict adherence to technical 
rules of evidence.  If the court is dissatisfied with the nature of 
the proffer, it can always, within its discretion, insist on direct 
testimony.  But the discretion should be left to the court without 
imposing on it the burden of limiting admissibility to that it 
would permit a jury to hear.’ ”  (Edwards, at p. 1334, italics 
omitted.)  “Accordingly,” the court concluded, “hearsay evidence 
may be presented, although the court may require direct 
testimony if dissatisfied with a proffer.”  (Ibid.) 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
40 
determination of probable cause must be accompanied by “the 
full panoply of adversary safeguards” (id. at p. 119).  The 
Gerstein court explained that the issue of whether there is 
probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending 
further proceedings, like the question of whether there is 
probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime, 
“can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing,” and 
“traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a 
nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, 
and the Court has approved these informal modes of proof.”  (Id. 
at p. 120.)  It also emphasized:  “Criminal justice is already 
overburdened by the volume of cases and the complexities of our 
system.  The proceeding of misdemeanors, in particular, and the 
early stages of prosecution generally are marked by delays that 
can seriously affect the quality of justice.  A constitutional 
doctrine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained 
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay.”  
(Id. at p. 122, fn. 23.) 
Citing Gerstein, the Edwards court reasoned that identical 
interests were at stake in a preliminary hearing for probable 
cause (as in Gerstein) and a pretrial detention hearing.  “The 
effect of the findings in a detention hearing and a preliminary 
(Gerstein) hearing is the same:  each hearing determines 
whether the accused may be detained pending trial.  The 
individual’s liberty interest affected by each proceeding is 
accordingly the same.”  (Edwards, supra, 430 A.2d at p. 1336.)  
The appellate court also concluded that the nature of the 
government’s interest was similar in both proceedings (id. at 
p. 1337), explaining that “the government has an obvious 
interest in not conducting a full-blown criminal proceeding 
twice, once for pretrial detention and a second time for the trial 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
41 
on the charges.  Indeed, the individual’s and the government’s 
mutual interest in holding the hearing soon after the time of the 
arrest necessarily precludes the full-scale preparation and 
investigation that is commensurate with a criminal trial.  
Conversely, the limited function of a pretrial detention hearing, 
i.e., to determine the appropriateness of detention for a 
maximum of 60 days pending a trial on the charges with the full 
panoply of criminal trial rights, weighs in favor of a simplified 
hearing.”  (Id. at p. 1337, fn. omitted; see id. at p. 1336 
[“Consideration of the individual’s liberty interest and the 
government’s interests in a simplified yet fair pretrial detention 
hearing leads us to the conclusion that the interests involved are 
closer to those in a Gerstein preliminary hearing than those 
involved in a [parole revocation] hearing, and that the statutory 
procedures challenged here are constitutionally adequate”].)  As 
in Gerstein, the Edwards court concluded that “the government 
may proceed by the use of proffer and hearsay, subject to the 
discretion of the judge as to the nature of the proffer and the 
need for admissible evidence.”  (Edwards, at p. 1337.) 
In 1984, Congress passed the federal Bail Reform Act of 
1984 (18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., hereinafter the federal Bail 
Reform Act), which gave federal courts pretrial detention 
authority similar to that provided by the D.C. Bail Act.  In 
Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 746–747, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the federal Bail Reform Act did not 
violate the due process clause of the United States Constitution.  
The statute, similar to article I, section 12(b), authorizes pretrial 
detention of arrestees charged with certain serious felonies if 
the court finds clear and convincing evidence that no release 
conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person 
and the community.  (Salerno, at p. 742, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142, 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
42 
subd. (f).)  It also provides arrestees with several procedural 
safeguards at the detention hearing, including the right to 
request counsel, to testify and present witnesses, to put forward 
evidence, and to cross-examine other witnesses appearing at the 
hearing.  (Salerno, at p. 742, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142, subd. (f).)  
In addition, the federal Bail Reform Act specifies the 
considerations relevant to making a pretrial detention 
determination, including the nature and seriousness of the 
charges, the weight of the government’s evidence, the arrestee’s 
background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness 
of the danger posed by his release.  (Salerno, at pp. 742–743, 
citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142, subd. (g).)   
In Salerno, the defendants were charged with various 
offenses related to racketeering activity, mail and wire fraud, 
extortion, and criminal gambling violations.  (Salerno, supra, 
481 U.S. at p. 743.)  The government sought to have the 
defendants held in custody under the federal Bail Reform Act.  
(Salerno, at p. 743.)  At the pretrial detention hearing, the 
government “made a detailed proffer of evidence” based 
primarily on conversations intercepted by a court-ordered 
wiretap.  (Ibid.)  The district court granted the government’s 
detention motion, concluding it had established by clear and 
convincing evidence that no condition or combination of 
conditions of release would ensure the safety of the community 
or any person.  (Id. at pp. 743–744.)  
The defendants in Salerno raised facial challenges to the 
federal Bail Reform Act on substantive and procedural due 
process grounds.  The high court rejected these attacks.  
(Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 745–752.)  Regarding the 
substantive due process claim, the court explained that pretrial 
detention under the statute serves a legitimate regulatory goal 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
43 
of preventing danger to the community (id. at p. 747), the 
federal Bail Reform Act “carefully limits the circumstances 
under which detention may be sought to the most serious of 
crimes” (Salerno, at p. 747), and “the [g]overnment’s regulatory 
interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, 
outweigh an individual’s liberty interest” (id. at p. 748).  (See 
ibid. [“Even outside the exigencies of war, we have found that 
sufficiently compelling governmental interests can justify 
detention of dangerous persons”]; id. at p. 749 [“an arrestee may 
be incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk of flight, 
[citation], or a danger to witnesses”].)  The court concluded that 
the government’s “legitimate and compelling” interest in 
preventing crime by arrestees, which is at its greatest when the 
evidence shows that the arrestee presents a demonstrable 
danger to society, outweighs the individual’s “strong interest in 
liberty.”  (Id. at pp. 749–750.)   
The Salerno court also rejected the defendants’ procedural 
due process challenges to the federal Bail Reform Act.  (Salerno, 
supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 751–752.)  It explained:  “Detainees have 
a right to counsel at the detention hearing.  [Citation.]  They 
may testify in their own behalf, present information by proffer 
or otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the 
hearing.  [Citation.]  The judicial officer charged with the 
responsibility of determining the appropriateness of detention 
is guided by statutorily enumerated factors, which include the 
nature and the circumstances of the charges, the weight of the 
evidence, the history and characteristics of the putative 
offender, and the danger to the community.  [Citation.]  The 
Government must prove its case by clear and convincing 
evidence.  [Citation.]  Finally, the judicial officer must include 
written findings of fact and a written statement of reasons for a 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
44 
decision to detain.  [Citation.]  The Act’s review provisions 
[citation], provide for immediate appellate review of the 
detention decision.  [¶]  We think these extensive safeguards 
suffice to repel a facial challenge.”9  (Salerno, at pp. 751–752.)   
Although Humphrey did not involve an order denying bail 
(Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 155, fn. 7), it nonetheless 
recognized and drew upon Salerno’s analysis of due process at 
bail hearings.  We agreed that “[w]hile due process does not 
categorically prohibit the government from ordering pretrial 
detention, it remains true that ‘[i]n our society liberty is the 
norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully 
limited exception.’ ”  (Id. at p. 155, quoting Salerno, supra, 
481 U.S. at p. 755.)  We added:  “Marking the boundary between 
the general rule and the limited exception requires a careful 
balancing of the government’s interest in preventing crime 
against the individual’s fundamental right to pretrial liberty.  
[Citation.]  This territory has not yet been fully mapped, but we 
can nonetheless discern that an order of detention requires an 
interest that ‘is sufficiently weighty’ in the given case — and 
courts should likewise bear in mind that Salerno upheld a 
scheme whose scope was ‘narrowly focuse[d] on a particularly 
acute problem.’  [Citation.]  Indeed, the law under review there 
authorized pretrial detention ‘only on individuals who have been 
arrested for a specific category of extremely serious offenses.’ ”  
(Humphrey, at p. 155, citing Salerno, at pp. 749–750.) 
 
9  
The defendants in Salerno challenged the use of proffers 
along with other procedural aspects of the federal Bail Reform 
Act.  In finding no due process violation, the high court 
concluded the Bail Reform Act’s procedures met, and possibly 
“far exceed[ed],” the requirements of due process.  (Salerno, 
supra, 481 U.S. at p. 752.)  
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
45 
2. Analysis 
The Court of Appeal below determined that Salerno 
“would seem to foreclose a federal constitutional due process 
challenge to the sufficiency of proffers in bail hearings, at least 
where, as here, procedural safeguards are provided similar to 
those provided in the federal context.”  (Harris, supra, 
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098.)  We agree petitioner’s due process 
challenge here fails.   
As we recognized in Humphrey, Salerno instructs that 
when a defendant is adequately shown to present an identified 
and articulable threat of great physical harm to an individual or 
the community, a court may, without violating due process 
principles, utilize pretrial detention to disable the defendant 
from executing that threat.  (Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
p. 153, citing Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 751.)  Such a scheme 
is “ ‘narrowly focuse[d] on a particularly acute problem.’ ”  
(Humphrey, at p. 155.)  Yet “[a] court’s procedures for entering 
an order resulting in pretrial detention must also comport with 
other traditional notions of due process to ensure that when 
necessary, the arrestee is detained ‘in a fair manner.’ ”  (Ibid., 
quoting Salerno, at p. 746.)  Significantly, as explained above 
the high court in Salerno held that the federal Bail Reform Act’s 
procedures, which have been interpreted to allow the 
government to proceed by proffer to demonstrate clear and 
convincing evidence that no release conditions will reasonably 
assure the safety of any other person and the community, 
comported with these “traditional notions of due process.”  
(Humphrey, at p. 155; see Salerno, at p. 742; Smith, supra, 
79 F.3d at pp. 1209–1210.)  Thus, unless petitioner can establish 
that the presentation of evidence permitted under article I, 
section 12(b) is materially different from that permitted under 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
46 
the federal Bail Reform Act, his due process challenge must be 
rejected.  He has not done so. 
Petitioner attempts to distinguish this case from Salerno, 
asserting that the procedures used in his hearing, “including the 
reliance on statements by the prosecution, lack of discovery, lack 
of notice, and lack of opportunity for petitioner to test the 
evidence or cross-examine the complaining witness, violated 
petitioner’s rights to due process under both the state and 
federal standards.”  He claims that “[i]n order for this Court to 
determine if the use of ‘proffer’ violated due process, the Court 
must consider the detention hearing’s procedures as a whole.”  
Although petitioner acknowledges that he was “provided certain 
safeguards, such as the right to counsel, the right to present 
evidence, and the right to testify,” he maintains that his due 
process rights were violated because he was “denied discovery, 
notice, the ability to cross-examine, and an expedited appellate 
review.”   
We do not find a violation of federal due process on the 
record before us.  Here, as in Salerno, petitioner had counsel 
present at his bail hearing.  He was permitted to testify on his 
own behalf and to also present information by proffer or 
otherwise.  The record also indicates petitioner indeed received 
notice of the People’s intent to request no bail under article I, 
section 12(b) via their opposition to petitioner’s request to 
reduce bail, and that he also received at least some discovery.  
Regarding petitioner’s cross-examination claim, he failed to 
adequately brief it in his petition for writ of habeas corpus before 
the Court of Appeal.  (Harris, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098, 
fn. 5.)  The trial court was guided by the factors set forth in 
article I, section 12(b), which include the nature and the 
circumstances of the offenses and whether there was a 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
47 
substantial likelihood that petitioner’s release would result in 
great bodily harm to others and retained discretion to reject any 
unreliable evidence.  The trial court was also required to provide 
a written statement of reasons for its detention decision 
(Humphrey, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 155–156), which was 
subject to immediate review (Pen. Code, § 1490; Gray v. 
Superior Court (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 629, 636, fn. 3).   
We likewise conclude that the prosecution’s use of proffers 
at the bail hearing did not violate “ ‘ “the dignitary interest in 
informing [petitioner] of the nature, grounds, and consequences 
of the action and in enabling [him] to present [his] side of the 
story before a responsible government official.” ’ ”  (Today’s 
Fresh Start, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 213.)  Indeed, petitioner fails 
to explain how the prosecution’s reliance on a proffer deprived 
him of his right to notice or a timely hearing.  Petitioner retained 
the opportunity to present his own proffer and other evidence as 
well as the right to a timely hearing. 
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Naidu v. Superior Court (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 300 (Naidu) 
counsels in favor of a different result.  In Naidu, the defendants 
challenged a court order suspending their professional licenses 
as a condition of bail.  (Id. at p. 305.)  The appellate court held 
that the trial court violated the defendants’ due process rights 
when it suspended their licenses in the absence of any evidence 
that this condition was necessary to protect the public.  (Id. at 
p. 313.)  The court characterized the state licensing board’s 
written request for suspension and counsel’s supporting 
declaration as containing mere assertions, but not “actual 
evidence,” that the defendants’ conduct made their business 
license subject to suspension.  (Id. at pp. 313–314.)  It viewed 
the board’s request to be akin to the filing of a criminal 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
48 
complaint, which it held would not sufficiently support the 
suspension of a business license as a condition of release on bail.  
(Ibid.) 
Naidu does not provide a persuasive basis to reconsider 
our conclusion here.  It is unclear whether that court actually 
demanded the presentation of evidence that would be 
admissible at a criminal trial.  (Naidu, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 313 [characterizing statements contained in counsel’s written 
declaration, a form of hearsay evidence, as “admissible 
evidence”].)  Indeed, the court in Naidu acknowledged that “a 
license suspension could, in at least some cases, be supported by 
no more than the return of an indictment or the filing of an 
information.”  (Id. at p. 314.)  The court’s principal concern 
involved the conclusory nature of the proffer submitted in 
support of the license suspension, which simply related counsel’s 
assertion that, based on the charges against them, the 
defendants could not safely continue their work as contractors.  
(Id. at p. 313.)  By itself, a similar representation by counsel 
would be inadequate in the context of a no-bail determination, 
as well.  However, to the extent Naidu v. Superior Court, supra, 
20 Cal.App.5th 300 may be read to suggest that due process 
necessarily requires admissible evidence at a bail hearing, it is 
disapproved.   
To summarize, neither the language of article I, section 
12(b), nor the mandates of due process, categorically preclude 
the use of hearsay evidence or reliable offers of proof at a pretrial 
detention hearing, although the trial court always retains 
discretion to require additional evidence.   
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
49 
D. Remand is Required to Determine Whether the 
Prosecution’s Proffered Evidence Satisfied the 
Elements of Article I, Section 12(b)  
Having concluded that a trial court may consider reliable 
proffered evidence in making factual findings under article I, 
section 12(b) without offending federal or state due process 
principles, we turn to the question of whether the prosecution’s 
presentation of evidence satisfied the elements of the 
constitutional provision in this case.  “In reviewing a denial of 
bail, an appellate court must determine . . . whether the record 
contains substantial evidence of a qualifying offense — and, if 
so, whether any reasonable fact finder could have found, by clear 
and convincing evidence, a substantial likelihood that the 
defendant’s release would result in great bodily harm to one or 
more members of the public.”  (White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 471.)  
Applying these standards, the Court of Appeal held that the 
evidence presented below satisfied both elements.10  (Harris, 
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1103.)   
As noted, in its opposition to defendant’s motion to reduce 
bail and at the bail hearing, the prosecution presented a detailed 
proffer summarizing the evidence it had collected of petitioner’s 
alleged guilt of the charged offenses and the alleged threat he 
posed to public safety.  The prosecution submitted photographs 
relating to the charged offenses, but did not provide the court 
 
10  
As noted, the Court of Appeal determined remand was 
nevertheless required because the record did not permit 
meaningful review of whether sufficient evidence supported a 
conclusion that “less restrictive alternatives to detention could 
not reasonably protect the interests in public or victim safety.”  
(Harris, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1106.)  No party has 
challenged this aspect of the Court of Appeal’s decision. 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
50 
with the police reports, written statements, or interview 
transcripts on which it based its account.  The prosecution also 
took the position that under Humphrey, a court must assume 
that the criminal charges are true.  Defense counsel, meanwhile, 
disputed whether the evidence established that petitioner posed 
such a risk, noted petitioner had not received complete 
discovery, called into question the DNA evidence, and 
emphasized the victim had identified two other people as the 
perpetrator near the time of the offenses.  Yet the defense, too, 
conceded that Humphrey directed the court to assume the truth 
of the charges.  In its ruling denying bail, the trial court cited 
the prosecution’s detailed account of the evidence linking 
petitioner to the charged offenses as well as the statements from 
other women regarding petitioner’s scarf fetish and angry 
aggressive behavior.   
Based on the record before us, we cannot foreclose the 
possibility that the trial court erred by presuming the truth of 
the criminal charges against petitioner when determining 
whether the “facts are evident or the presumption great” that 
petitioner committed the charged offenses.  (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 12, subd. (b).)  The court also did not have the benefit of the 
standards and reliability guidelines we announce today.  Under 
these circumstances, a remand is warranted so that the trial 
court may apply the standards set forth in article I, section 
12(b), as we have clarified them today. 
In re HARRIS 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
51 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as 
that court held the record contained substantial evidence that 
the elements of article I, section 12(b) were met.  We remand the 
matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to remand the case 
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  We leave undisturbed the Court of Appeal’s 
determination that the matter must be remanded to the trial 
court to make additional findings pursuant to Humphrey, supra, 
11 Cal.5th 135, regarding the feasibility of less restrictive 
alternatives to detention.   
GUERRERO, C. J. 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Harris 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 71 Cal.App.5th 1085  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S272632 
Date Filed:  June 27, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  San Mateo 
Judge:  Amarra A. Lee 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Marsanne Weese and Rose Mishaan, under appointments by the 
Supreme Court, for Petitioner John Harris, Jr. 
 
Michael C. McMahon; Salil Dudani, Katherine Hubbard, Carson 
White; Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Daniel S. Volchok and 
Allison M. Schultz for The California Public Defenders Association, the 
Ventura County Public Defender, Civil Rights Corps and The ACLU of 
Northern California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner John 
Harris, Jr. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitor General, Jeffrey 
M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Aimee Feinberg and Joshua 
A. Klein, Deputy State Solicitors General, Katie L. Stowe, Deputy 
Attorney General; Stephen M. Wagstaffe, District Attorney, Alpana 
Samant and Nicole A. Sato, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent 
the People. 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Marsanne Weese  
Rose Mishaan  
Law Offices of Marsanne Weese 
255 Kansas Street, Suite 340 
San Francisco, CA 94103 
(415) 565-9600 
 
Joshua A. Klein 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
1515 Clay Street, Suite 2000 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(510) 879-0756