Title: Imbraguglio v. Great Atlantic Tea

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Ethel Imbraguglio et al. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. et al., No. 80,
September Term, 1999.
[Premises Liability - Summary Judgment.  After discussion of matter appropriately
considered on summary judgment, held:  By working six to seven feet above the ground
while standing on a stationary platform that had no guardrails plaintiff did not assume the
risk of injury as a matter of law.]
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 93308020/CL175155
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 80
September Term, 1999
_________________________________________
ETHEL IMBRAGUGLIO
et al.
v.
GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC
TEA COMPANY, INC. et al.
_________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Harrell
Karwacki, Robert L.
  (retired, specially assigned),
JJ. 
_________________________________________
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
________________________________________
Filed:   March 10, 2000
In this wrongful death and survival action the decedent was killed when he fell from
a forklift-elevated pallet.  The Circuit Court for Baltimore City entered summary judgment
in favor of the defendants on the ground that the decedent had assumed the risk of the injury
as a matter of law, and, in an unreported opinion,  the Court of Special Appeals affirmed on
that ground.  We issued the writ of certiorari, Imbraguglio v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 356
Md. 16, 736 A.2d 1064 (1999), primarily to address some fundamental misconceptions in
the arguments of the parties concerning the summary judgment process.  As to the merits,
we shall reverse. 
The decedent, Salvatore Imbraguglio (Imbraguglio), was employed by Supermarket
Distribution Services, Inc. (SDS) as a supervisor and forklift operator in a grocery warehouse
and distribution center where he had worked for thirty-five years.  SDS is a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. (A & P), one of the
Respondents.  Imbraguglio's fatal fall occurred in a warehouse which was owned by A & P
but managed by the other respondent, Super Fresh Food Markets of Maryland, Inc. (Super
Fresh), also a wholly owned subsidiary of A & P. 
The petitioner and plaintiff is Ethel Imbraguglio, individually and as personal
representative of the Estate of Imbraguglio (Petitioner).  This case is a third-party action to
the workers' compensation claim which has been resolved.  In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co. v. Imbraguglio, 346 Md. 573, 697 A.2d 885 (1997), we held that A & P, which is the
workers' compensation self-insurer for its subsidiaries, did not enjoy a defense on that basis
to this third-party action and that the record did not establish as a matter of law that Super
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Fresh was the statutory employer of Imbraguglio under Maryland Code (1991), § 9-508 of
the Labor and Employment Article.  A summary judgment which had been entered in favor
of A & P and Super Fresh (Respondents) was reversed in that earlier appeal, and the action
was remanded.
Respondents again moved for summary judgment, contending that Imbraguglio had
assumed the risk of injury.  The circuit court granted that motion for the reasons advanced
by Respondents.  As we shall see, infra, the memoranda submitted to the circuit court in
support of, and in opposition to, summary judgment did not present the evidence most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment as that evidence appeared in
Respondents' supporting materials.
The facts that are undisputed are that the warehouse where Imbraguglio worked was
very large, containing as many as sixty aisles.  Supermarket grocery-department products
were moved and stored in the warehouse in their transportation cartons on forklift pallets.
Loaded pallets were stored in or on racks that formed the aisles in which forklifts operated.
Those racks were vertically and horizontally divided into sections, each of which was the
storage receptacle or bin for one loaded pallet.  These bins were tiered to a height of at least
three bins and were largely open.  In addition to the aisle side or face of a bin being open,
it appears that there were no solid barriers and no closely spaced, intermittent barriers
between bins that adjoined vertically or horizontally, at least in the section of the warehouse
with which we are concerned.
- 3 -
Thus, it was possible and, one may infer, not an infrequent occurrence, for one or
more cartons of product to become "mispositioned," either by having fallen off of a pallet
into a bin on one or another side of the intended storage bin, or by having fallen to a level
below that of the intended storage bin.  Cartons could fall from a pallet when, for example,
loaded pallets were being inserted into or withdrawn from a particular bin.  Although the
allegations of primary negligence in Petitioner's amended complaint are vague, at least one
theory of liability suggested by Petitioner's argument is that the Respondents, as owner and
manager of the warehouse, failed to furnish a safe place to work by, inter alia, failing to
supply bins with barriers that would prevent cartons from becoming mispositioned.
Part of the duties of a warehouse worker such as Imbraguglio was to place in the
proper position a product that had become mispositioned.  When the mispositioned product
was in a bin other than at ground level a worker would reach the higher elevation by a
procedure that required two workers.  A forklift with an empty pallet placed upon the forks
was positioned in front of the column of bins where the task was to be performed.  One
worker would stand on the pallet while a second worker operated the controls of the
stationary forklift in order to raise the pallet to the desired elevation.  It was also necessary
for the warehouse workers to be raised in this fashion when taking inventory.
- 4 -
The parties have not taken any pains to distinguish between Respondents in
1
presenting this certiorari review, and we shall not undertake to do otherwise.  Precisely
which, if either, Respondent breached a duty, if any, owed to Imbraguglio is immaterial to
the assumption of risk defense on which Respondents' motion for summary judgment was
predicated.
There was also some evidence from Respondents that a worker, when elevated on a
2
forklift, was also to use a harness.  At argument in this Court Respondents acknowledged that
the harness was to be attached to the cage.  Consequently, the harness does not present an
alternative way of performing the repositioning operation, and we do not consider it further
on the assumption of risk issue that is before us.
Respondents assert that the report of the MOSHA investigation is irrelevant and
3
should not be considered.  As explained below, we find that the facts reported are relevant
to our ground of decision. 
Respondents  had caused some number of the ordinary pallets to be modified by
1
erecting a post at each corner and by affixing a railing between the posts.  Respondents call
these modified pallets "cages."  The evidence on behalf of Respondents is that warehouse
workers who were repositioning stock or taking inventory were required by management to,
and so far as management knew, universally did, use cages when the workers were elevated
by forklift.2
On the other hand, evidence on behalf of Petitioner, derived from the report of the
Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA) inspectors, is that the warehouse
workers did not regularly use cages and that the storage area for the cages was "at the far end
of the warehouse which was not an area" where they could be "easily retrieved by the
employees for use."  Instead, the warehouse workers used pallets that had not been modified
into cages.  Imbraguglio fell to his death after he had been elevated on an unmodified pallet.3
- 5 -
We also learn from the MOSHA inspectors' report that Imbraguglio's fall was caused
by his having lost his balance due to a shift of position by at least one of the cartons in the
bin where he was working.  The inference most favorable to Petitioner is that the shift took
place among the product that remained in the bin and that it was not a shift in weight of a
carton that Imbraguglio was then handling.
Respondents' position on summary judgment is that Imbraguglio voluntarily chose to
use an unguarded pallet when the alternative of using a cage was available to him and that,
by this voluntary choice, Imbraguglio assumed the risk of falling.  The director of
warehousing for SDS acknowledged on deposition that the cages did not comply with the
Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act requirements, but the particulars of that
noncompliance are not developed in the record.  From this unspecific noncompliance
Petitioner argues that use of a cage was not a safe alternative.  
I
Initially, we need to determine the record that may properly be considered on this
summary judgment motion.  In support of their motion Respondents submitted four items of
evidence.  The first is a typewritten and signed, but unsworn, statement by David Alonzo
Williams (Williams) that was given to a representative of Respondents.  Williams was the
co-worker who was operating the forklift controls when Imbraguglio was elevated on the
pallet.  The second item is the transcript of the testimony given before the Maryland
Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission) by Jeffrey Kidd (Kidd), a witness
called by SDS in defense of the Petitioner's workers' compensation claim.  Kidd was
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employed by Super Fresh as the grocery warehouse manager.  Excerpts from the deposition
of Walter L. Swift (Swift), who was described in Respondents' motion papers as the
maintenance supervisor at SDS, form the third item of evidence.  The fourth consists of
excerpts from the deposition of Gary Farmer (Farmer), the director of warehousing for SDS.
Petitioner's principal evidence is the report of the MOSHA inspectors.  The first issues before
us are raised by Petitioner's contentions that Kidd's testimony and Williams's statement
should not be considered.  Petitioner makes no objection to the deposition testimony of Swift
or Farmer, or to any part thereof.  
A
Petitioner argues that the circuit court ought not to have considered the statement of
Williams because, on summary judgment, the court could only consider evidence that would
be admissible at trial and the statement, sworn or unsworn, could not be admissible at trial.
Respondents advance four reasons, none of them availing, why the statement was properly
considered.  First, Respondents say that the matters of fact contained in the statement would
be admissible in evidence at trial and, thus, may be considered on summary judgment.  But
the facts contained in the statement would not be admissible at trial if presented in the form
of the statement; ordinarily Williams would have to testify in person or, under certain
circumstances, by deposition, for his evidence to be admitted at trial.  At the summary
judgment stage the court, under the circumstances here, could not consider the statement
absent an affidavit from Williams in which he asserted, inter alia, his personal knowledge
- 7 -
of the facts contained in the statement or in which he otherwise demonstrated the
admissibility through him at trial of testimony as to those facts.  
Use on summary judgment of an unsworn statement of a party opponent was
attempted in Diffendal v. Kash & Karry Service Corp., 74 Md. App. 170, 536 A.2d 1175
(1988).  In that case the court rejected an unsworn statement of the plaintiff who, while
looking at items displayed in a supermarket, had fallen over an "L-bed" cart that had been
left in the aisle.  Asserting that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent, the defendant
moved for summary judgment and supported the motion with a paper, purporting to be a
verbatim transcript of a recorded conversation between the plaintiff and, apparently, an
adjuster for the defendant's insurer.  In that "transcript" the plaintiff admitted that, before she
fell, she had seen the L-bed cart near her in the supermarket aisle.  The store argued that this
statement constituted an admission that the trial court properly had considered in granting
the store's motion.  Rejecting this argument, the Court of Special Appeals concluded:
 "Mrs. Diffendal's comment that she had seen the L-cart prior to her fall was
not in response to a formal admission of fact under Rule 2-424.  ... The
transcript does not represent on its face that the conversation was under oath,
and appellee has not made that claim.  Additionally, no affidavit has been
made ... part of the record, claiming, under oath, that [she] engaged in a
conversation ... or that the recorded statement is an accurate transcription of
such a conversation."  
Id. at 181, 536 A.2d at 1181.
The court then quoted P.V. Niemeyer & L.M. Richards, Maryland Rules Commentary
252 (1984).  In the more recent edition of that work the authors continue to make plain that
- 8 -
"[a] document can be made part of the motion [for summary judgment] only
through affidavit, deposition, or answers to interrogatories that adequately lay
the proper foundation for the document's admission into evidence.
Authenticity and relevancy of the document must be shown.  Attaching
documents to a motion for summary judgment without the necessary affidavit
is no more acceptable than standing up in open court and attempting to offer
the same documents into evidence without a witness or a stipulation."
P.V. Niemeyer & L.M. Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary 332 (2d ed. 1992) (citation
omitted).  See also Vanhook v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md. App. 22, 26-27, 321 A.2d
540, 542-43 (1974) (listing "[s]ome of the ways" to place facts before the court on summary
judgment to be affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions of fact,
stipulations or concessions and, under some circumstances, pleadings).  The unsworn
statement of a witness is not, as Respondents contend, an unlisted, but appropriate, form of
placing evidence before the court over objection.
Respondents also argue that no affidavit from Williams is required because the
summary judgment rule states that "[t]he motion shall be supported by affidavit if filed
before the day on which the adverse party's initial pleading or motion is filed."  Md. Rule 2-
501(a).  Respondents conclude that, inasmuch as this action was at issue when their summary
judgment motion was filed, no affidavit from Williams was required.  The purpose of the
"affidavit" requirement at that early stage is to place facts before the court where, otherwise,
there would be no record.  It does not follow, however, from the affirmative statement of the
requirement in Rule 2-501(a) that an affidavit is never required, under general summary
judgment practice, in stages of the action that fall outside of the period described in the
sentence quoted from Rule 2-501(a).  
- 9 -
The next reason assigned by Respondents for considering Williams's unsworn
statement is that it was attached to Respondents' answers to interrogatories.  From a
procedural standpoint, Respondents' answers to interrogatories were not part of the record
in the circuit court.  See Rule 2-401(d)(2) (discovery material ordinarily is not to be filed
with the court).  The fact that Respondents have included the answers to interrogatories as
an appendix to their brief in this Court does not render the answers part of the official record.
From a substantive standpoint Respondents' argument also fails because a party cannot
convert hearsay material into evidence admissible at trial by the simple expedient of
furnishing the hearsay material to the adversary in discovery.  
Finally, Respondents say that the Petitioner waived objection to considering
Williams's statement on summary judgment because the document's "essential contents were
made part of the record in the depositions of" Swift and Farmer without objection at those
depositions.  The defect in Williams's statement, for use on summary judgment, is the lack
of an affidavit.  This defect is unrelated to use of the statement to examine other potential
witnesses on deposition.  Further, Petitioner was relieved of any requirement to object at
deposition by Rule 2-415(g) ("An objection to the competency of a witness or to the
competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony is not waived by failure to make it before
or during a deposition unless the ground of the objection is one that might have been
obviated or removed if presented at that time.").  At the Swift and Farmer discovery
depositions, Respondents could not cure the hearsay character of the factual material in
- 10 -
The defenses raised by SDS before the Commission do not appear in the record in
4
this case.  The record does reflect that, at the conclusion of the employer's presentation,
counsel for SDS said:  "Your Honor, the cases that we're relying upon deal with the same
type of situation where the decedent is in charge of his own activity and that's basically the
argument we make." 
Williams's statement, in that form, by examining the deponents who had no personal
knowledge of that factual matter.  
We hold that the Williams statement was not part of the record properly considered
on summary judgment. 
B
Petitioner also maintains that the testimony of Kidd, given under oath before the
Commission, ought not to have been considered in granting summary judgment.  In this
Court, Petitioner argues that the testimony was inadmissible because it failed to comply with
Maryland Rule 2-311 ("Motions"), § (d) which reads:  "A motion or a response to a motion
that is based on facts not contained in the record or papers on file in the proceeding shall be
supported by affidavit and accompanied by any papers on which it is based."  The argument
seems to be that Respondents were required to present an affidavit of Kidd containing the
substance of this testimony because an asserted difference in the issues before the
Commission and those before the circuit court precluded the introduction of the earlier
testimony.   Petitioner does not contend that Kidd's testimony is irrelevant, and, as we shall
4
demonstrate, infra, we find it to be highly relevant.  
- 11 -
At no stage in this case, including the present stage before this Court, has Petitioner
5
cited Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-804(b)(1).  This subsection, which applies only when
the declarant is unavailable, states that the following is excluded from the hearsay rule and
hence admissible:
"Testimony given as a witness in any action or proceeding or in a deposition
taken in compliance with law in the course of any action or proceeding, if the
party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or
proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive
to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."
Cf. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 439-44, 601 A.2d 633, 642-45
6
(1992) (setting forth the requirements for the use at trial of depositions from previous cases
to which the opponent of such evidence was not a party).
At trial, a transcript of Kidd's former testimony, if offered by Respondents, would be
inadmissible over objection unless Respondents could show that Kidd was unavailable within
the meaning of Rule 5-804(a), and that the Petitioner had "an opportunity and similar motive
to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination" in the workers'
compensation proceeding.  See Rule 5-804(b)(1).   The argument, however, confuses the
5
requirements for admitting evidence at trial with the requirement, in the summary judgment
context, that the movant "plac[e] before the court facts which would be admissible in
evidence."  Vanhook, 22 Md. App. at 26, 321 A.2d at 542.   
6
The distinction between summary judgment and trial becomes apparent by
considering the different functions of an affidavit in each context.  An affidavit suffices in
the summary judgment context to place before the court a fact that, if testified to by the
affiant at trial, would be admissible, even though the affidavit itself generally is not
admissible at trial.  The court can reasonably assume that, if called as a witness at trial, the
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This lead paint case was the later of two appeals, Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md.
7
App. 34, 651 A.2d 908 (1994), cert. denied, 338 Md. 557, 659 A.2d 1293 (1995) (Casey I),
and Casey v. Grossman, supra (Casey II).  Casey I reversed a jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony,
offered on behalf of the plaintiff, concerning abatement methods and post-abatement
conditions of the premises, when that evidence was inconsistent with the plaintiffs'
affirmative statements in their answers to interrogatories, and when they did not file any
supplemental answers.  Casey I, 103 Md. App. at 48-51, 651 A.2d at 914-16.  That court also
stated, however, that its "determination [concerning the improperly admitted testimony] ...
does not necessarily preclude admission of the evidence at any retrial, for [the defendant]
could no longer claim surprise or prejudice."  Id. at 51, 651 A.2d at 915-16.  The court then
(continued...)
affiant would testify to the same facts as those set forth in the affidavit.  Thus, the trial judge
may consider the affidavit in the summary judgment context even though, at trial, the
affidavit itself generally would be inadmissible and the affiant would have to testify.
A transcript of former testimony possesses the same indicia of reliability as an
affidavit in the summary judgment context.  The transcript indicates the matters to which the
witness, if called in the present case, would testify, because, like an affiant, the witness gave
the former testimony under oath.  By a parity of reasoning, the court on summary judgment
may consider the transcript of the former testimony even though, at trial, the transcript itself
might not be admissible under Rule 5-804(b)(1).  
Although it appears that no Maryland court has addressed specifically this issue in the
summary judgment context, the Court of Special Appeals has held that testimony from a
previous trial may be attached as an exhibit to a response to a motion for summary judgment
filed in the same case upon remand.  See Casey v. Grossman, 123 Md. App. 751, 758, 720
A.2d 959, 962 (1998), cert. denied, 353 Md. 269, 725 A.2d 1068 (1999).   Other courts
7
- 13 -
(...continued)
7
remanded the case in light of the Court of Appeals' holdings in more recently decided lead
paint cases.
On remand, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
plaintiff had failed to prove causation.  Casey II, 123 Md. App. at 755, 720 A.2d at 961.  In
response to this motion, the plaintiff attached the testimony concerning the post-abatement
conditions that the Casey I court had determined inadmissible.  Casey II held that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment for reasons unrelated to the attachment of this
testimony.  In so holding, however, that court stated that "the testimony should have been
considered in deciding the issue of summary judgment."  Id. at 758, 720 A.2d at 962.  Casey
II did not address the issues of any difference in issues between the first trial and the trial
upon remand, or the adequacy of authentication.
See, e.g., United States v. O'Connell, 890 F.2d 563, 567 (1st Cir. 1989) (asserting,
8
in civil trial of corporation for defrauding government, that trial court properly considered
on summary judgment testimony from previous criminal trial of corporation's one-third
owner because "'[a]ll of the hallmarks of reliability attend upon such transcripts,'" and
because they contain "'sworn testimony faithfully recorded during the conduct of a judicially-
supervised adversarial proceeding'") (quoting Advance Fin. Corp. v. Isla Rica Sales, Inc., 747
F.2d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 1984)); Advance Fin. Corp., 747 F.2d at 27 ("If a party, for summary
judgment purposes, may rely on affidavits ... and if depositions and answers to
interrogatories may be considered, there is no sensible rationale which would preclude
reliance on sworn testimony faithfully recorded during the conduct of a judicially supervised
adversarial hearing.") (citations omitted); Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp., 67 So. 2d
913, 915 (Fla. 1953) ("We have the view that pertinent excerpts from the transcription of the
testimony introduced in the first trial was easily as dependable for the purpose of testing the
motion [for summary judgment] as depositions, admissions and affidavits would have been
and that, therefore, the court committed no error in considering it for that purpose."); Tye v.
Board of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 466, 468, 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that state trial
court, in deciding plaintiff's summary judgment motion in suit to compel arbitration, properly
considered a transcript from her separate federal Title VII action against the same defendants
because the "transcribed testimony meets the criterion of reliability as it is sworn testimony
(continued...)
addressing this issue also have decided that a trial judge, when ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, properly may consider a transcript of former testimony because the
transcript has the sort of reliability just noted.   Although some courts have decided
8
- 14 -
(...continued)
8
in a courtroom hearing at which the [defendants] were represented by counsel"); State Bar
v. Erskine, 954 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the trial court, in
granting summary judgment in favor of attorney in disciplinary action against him, properly
considered transcript of testimony of complaining witness at a previous grievance hearing,
because the transcript was adequately authenticated); see also 10A C.A. Wright, A.R. Miller,
& M.K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2722, at 373 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that
"depositions taken for purposes of another case also may be utilized" in the summary
judgment context).
See Copeland v. Samford Univ., 686 So. 2d 190, 195 (Ala. 1996) (refusing to adopt
9
the rule that "testimony from previous adversarial proceedings should be admitted for
consideration on motions for summary judgment" because, in wrongful death action against
university, the latter was not a party to the previous criminal trial of professor who had killed
student); Gatton v. A.P. Green Servs., Inc., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 523, 526 (Ct. App. 1998)
(upholding trial court's refusal to consider deposition testimony from two previous cases,
neither involving defendant, because defendant succeeded under statutorily provided
"admissibility objections" in showing that the record "fail[ed] to satisfy either the
unavailability or interest-and-motive requirement").
otherwise, those cases appear to involve the use of trial or deposition testimony from a
previous case to which the plaintiff or defendant against whom the evidence presently is
offered was not a party.   The latter holdings do not apply here, where Petitioner was a party
9
to the workers' compensation proceeding at which Kidd testified.  Consequently, we indicate
no opinion on whether the latter holdings have any vitality in Maryland.
The transcript of Kidd's testimony before the Commission reliably indicated the
matters to which he would testify at trial, and the trial court properly considered this
transcript when ruling on Respondents' motion for summary judgment. 
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II
From the record, properly constituted, we must now determine the facts most
favorable to Petitioner, as the party opposing summary judgment.  Further, inasmuch as the
only issue is whether Imbraguglio assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law, our concern
is only with the facts most favorable to the Petitioner on that issue.  The parties have
consistently argued the summary judgment motion, and the courts below have treated the
record, as if the evidence most favorable to the Petitioner was that Imbraguglio fell from a
height of  fourteen feet.  That is not what the record reflects.
In his deposition Farmer said, "I can tell you exactly what happened."  Farmer's
version of the accident seems to be part personal observation of the scene, part opinion based
on experience, and part hearsay based on what Williams told Farmer.  Nevertheless,
Respondents offered Farmer's evidence without objection.  
Farmer said:
"[Imbraguglio] was running a let-down fork.  He was going to retrieve a pallet
of tissue.  And, when he did, he dropped probably three or four cases off that
pallet of 15.  And, so, he brought down the rest of them [which] had stayed on
the pallet.  Then he went up to get his other three or four cases." 
When asked about his report that Imbraguglio had fallen approximately fourteen feet
to the floor, Farmer said, "Oh, that was a guesstimate."  The "guesstimate" was calculated
as follows, according to Farmer:
"[T]he pallet [i.e., bin] heights that [Imbraguglio] was at ... were six foot
heights, to the level that the bar that he was at would have been about a 12 and
a half foot high, lifted up area, would have been lifted, probably waist high.
So, his head from the floor was probably about 14 feet."
- 16 -
In Respondents' memorandum in support of summary judgment they represented to
10
(continued...)
The record does not reflect how tall Imbraguglio was.  Nevertheless, it is clear that
the fourteen foot measurement is not the elevation of the pallet platform above the floor, but
an estimate of the distance from the floor to the top of Imbraguglio's head.  Furthermore, a
trier of fact could interpret this testimony to mean that Imbraguglio was attempting to retrieve
the dropped cartons from the second tier of bins, but we do not know how high within a six
foot tall bin the product was mispositioned.  If we assume, as did Farmer, that Imbraguglio
was attempting to position the pallet on the forklift so that his waist would be approximately
parallel to the top of the mispositioned cartons in the second tier, which resulted in the top
of Imbraguglio's head being fourteen feet above the floor, the pallet on which Imbraguglio
was standing would have been less than ten feet above the floor, unless Imbraguglio was less
than four feet tall.
The evidence bearing on the elevation of the unprotected pallet that is most favorable
to Petitioner is found in Kidd's testimony.  Kidd testified as follows:
"[Williams] was stopped by [Imbraguglio] and asked to raise
[Imbraguglio] up to the second level to fix some cases that had become 'mis-
positioned' in the rack.  [Imbraguglio] had already gotten an empty pallet and
positioned the forklift.  He stood on the [pallet placed upon the] forklift and
[Williams] raised him up to approximately six to seven feet.  The pallet itself
was between six and seven feet off the floor.  The pallet was still in the same
position when I got over there after the accident had happened.  I asked
[Williams]--I said, 'Is that where the pallet was when [Imbraguglio] fell?'  He
said, 'Yeah.  I haven't touched anything.'" 
(Emphasis added).  
10
- 17 -
(...continued)
10
the court that "Mr. Kidd testified that on April 21, 1992, the decedent requested a fellow
employee to lift him to a height of approximately thirteen (13) to fourteen (14) feet above
the ground."  Respondents further stated to the circuit court that "[a]ccording to Mr. Farmer,
Mr. Imbraguglio was lifted to a height of approximately 14 feet in order to complete this
undertaking." 
The circuit court properly could have considered the above-quoted evidence.  The
Kidd testimony was presented by Respondents, and Petitioner's reasons for objecting thereto
were not well taken.  Further, even if Williams's statement to Kidd, as presented by Kidd in
his testimony, should be excluded from consideration, it is nevertheless clear that Kidd
arrived on the scene promptly after the accident and personally observed the height to which
the forks were then elevated.  From this a trier of fact properly could infer that the platform
was less than seven feet above the floor when Imbraguglio fell.  Common human experience
indicates that Williams's first concern would have been to get help for Imbraguglio and not
to play with the elevation controls on the forklift.  
The height to which the platform was elevated is a material factor under the law of
assumption of risk and by reference to OSHA safety regulations, as we explain below.
III
"Assumption of the risk is a defense applicable to negligence claims."
JBG/Twinbrook Metro Ltd. Partnership v. Wheeler, 346 Md. 601, 619, 697 A.2d 898, 907
(1997).  The defendant must specially plead assumption of risk under Maryland Rule
2-323(g)(3), and the defendant bears the burden of proof.  See ADM Partnership v. Martin,
348 Md. 84, 90-91, 702 A.2d 730, 734 (1997).  Specifically, "the defendant must show that
- 18 -
the plaintiff:  (1) had knowledge of the risk of the danger; (2) appreciated that risk; and (3)
voluntarily confronted the risk of danger."  Id. (citing Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303
Md. 619, 630, 495 A.2d 838, 843 (1985)). 
As the reasoned justification for this defense, this Court has stated that "[t]he doctrine
of assumption of risk rests upon an intentional and voluntary exposure to a known danger
and, therefore, consent on the part of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of an obligation
of conduct toward him and to take his chances from harm from a particular risk."  Rogers v.
Frush, 257 Md. 233, 243, 262 A.2d 549, 554 (1970).  W.P. Keeton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68, at 489 (Lawyer's 5th ed. 1984), state that "[i]n the usual
case, [the plaintiff's] knowledge and appreciation of the danger will be a question for the
jury; but where it is clear that any person in his position must have understood the danger,
the issue may be decided by the court."  (Footnote omitted).  
According to Respondents, Imbraguglio is deemed to have known and appreciated the
risk under Martin.  Citing Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 592 A.2d 1119 (1991), Gibson
v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 226 A.2d 273 (1967), and Evans v. Johns Hopkins University, 224
Md. 234, 167 A.2d 591 (1961), this Court stated in Martin:
"'In determining whether a plaintiff had knowledge and appreciation of
the risk, an objective standard must be applied and a plaintiff will not be heard
to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been obvious to
him.'  Gibson, 245 Md. at 421, 226 A.2d at 275.  Thus, 'when it is clear that
a person of normal intelligence in the position of the plaintiff must have
understood the danger, the issue is for the court.'  Schroyer, 323 Md. at
283-84, 592 A.2d at 1123; see also Gibson, 245 Md. at 421, 226 A.2d at 275
(quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 55, at 310 (2d ed.
[1955])); Evans, 224 Md. at 238-39, 167 A.2d 591.  Moreover, 'there are
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certain risks which anyone of adult age must be taken to appreciate:  the
danger of slipping on ice, of falling through unguarded openings, of lifting
heavy objects ... and doubtless many others.'  Prosser and Keeton § 68, at
488."
Martin, 348 Md. at 91-92, 702 A.2d at 734.  Respondents emphasize "falling through
unguarded openings," when arguing that Imbraguglio knew and appreciated the risk of his
injury.  The question here, however, is whether Imbraguglio assumed the risk as a matter of
law.  
Petitioner focuses her attack on the summary judgment at the third element of
assumption of risk, voluntariness.  She points to the evidence that the "cages" were not
OSHA compliant, a fact that is not further explained in the record.  From this Petitioner
concludes that there was no choice because either type of platform--an unguarded pallet or
a modified pallet referred to by Respondents as a cage--was dangerous.  That conclusion by
no means follows from the present state of the record.  Further, Imbraguglio's decision to use
a pallet without a guardrail was a voluntary act.  The fact that it was more convenient for him
to use the unguarded pallet does not make his action non-voluntary.  See Brady v. Parsons
Co., 327 Md. 275, 289-90, 294, 609 A.2d 297, 304, 306 (1992) (affirming jury verdict that
employee assumed risk, and noting that he may have decided not to perform the task in a
safer manner "because his [own] method was somewhat faster and 'easier,'" and that proof
of an OSHA violation does not preclude consideration of this defense); Schroyer, 323 Md.
at 288-89, 592 A.2d at 1125-26 (holding that hotel guest assumed the risk as a matter of law
- 20 -
when she chose to park on and walk across ice-covered portion of parking lot "for her own
purposes, i.e., her convenience in unloading her belongings").
Our conclusion as to the voluntariness of Imbraguglio's decision, however, is not the
end of the matter.  It simply illuminates the issue.  Here, a trier of fact could infer that the
immediate cause of Imbraguglio's fall was the shift of a carton in the bin from which
Imbraguglio was retrieving part of an order that he had been filling which had fallen off the
storage pallet. Thus, the issue is whether Imbraguglio assumed the risk of injury or death
from a fall caused by a shift in bin content, while he was standing on an unguarded pallet
between six and seven feet from the floor, when that fall might or might not have been
prevented by a pallet with a single course railing.  
Some of our cases have involved falls from heights.  Most recently, Brady, supra,
dealt with a worker who stepped from an unguarded scaffold onto a wall from which he fell
forty feet to his death.  We held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find
assumption of risk.  There was a difference of thirty-five feet in the drop on one side of the
wall as compared with the other.  Focusing on the greater drop, we said:
"Although a fall from that wall to the east ... would have involved a distance
of only about five feet, a fall to the west meant a drop of approximately 40 feet
to the ground below.  The risk was immediately apparent, and the evidence
was sufficient to support a finding that [the decedent] knew of the existence
of the risk and appreciated its unreasonable character."
327 Md. at 288, 609 A.2d at 303.  It was unnecessary in Brady to determine whether the
decedent had assumed the risk as a matter of law, inasmuch as the jury returned a defendant's
verdict.
- 21 -
In Kasten Construction Co. v. Evans, 260 Md. 536, 273 A.2d 90 (1971), a worker was
injured when the telephone pole that he had climbed toppled to the ground.  The pole was
thirty feet long but remained only two feet into the ground after the defendant had excavated
three feet of the earth in which the pole had been erected.  The worker, who was wearing a
safety belt, was at the top of the pole, pulling on an electric line in order to make a
connection when the pole fell.  The defendant argued for assumption of risk as a matter of
law.  This Court said that the plaintiff "assumed no risk in merely climbing the pole."  Id. at
544, 273 A.2d at 94.  Further, we said that "[i]t would be putting it too high, we think, to say
that, as a matter of law, [the plaintiff] knew, understood and appreciated the likelihood or
possibility that a third pull [on the electric line to be connected] would cause the pole to
break out of the ground and that he voluntarily assumed that risk."  Id. at 545, 273 A.2d at
94. 
The plaintiff in Hilton Quarries, Inc. v. Hall, 161 Md. 518, 158 A. 19 (1932), was
standing on the cab of his truck at the defendant's quarry where the truck was being loaded
with a box of stone that was lowered from a boom affixed to a derrick.  The load suddenly
dropped knocking the plaintiff from the cab roof to the ground where he was further injured
by debris.  In holding that the plaintiff had not assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law
this Court said:
"Defenses of assumption by the plaintiff of the risk of injury, and of
contributory negligence on his part, which are much relied on in the case, both
refer to the effect of his taking the position on the top of the cab of his truck,
and are two aspects of the same contention:  That in taking that position he, of
his own volition, put himself within the dangers from which his injury
- 22 -
resulted; and, having done so, cannot recover for the injury as brought upon
him by a wrong of the defendant.  In so far as it is contended that, merely by
consciously taking the more dangerous of two possible positions, a visitor
assumes the risk of injury in that position from any cause, this court disagrees,
because the visitor might properly regard the position as attended with some
dangers, yet not those from which injury comes to him, and might rightly be
satisfied of his ability to cope with the former dangers, yet be justified in
ignoring the other possible but unexpected dangers.  He might be held bound
to anticipate and so to assume dangers from operation in ordinary course, yet
not to anticipate and assume the risk of rare casualties such as the derrick
operator has described in this case, unless he occupies his position without the
permission and contrary to the directions of the proprietor of the premises and
the work.  And in that connection, the evidence of the quarryman of his
warnings and orders to the truck driver are to be considered."
Id. at 523-24, 158 A. at 20-21.  Obviously, if voluntarily choosing to stand on the roof of the
truck, instead of choosing the alternative of a ground level position, was assumption of risk
as a matter of law, there would have been no need for the Court to discuss the evidence about
warnings and about the actual cause of the plaintiff's fall.
Here, the shifting of content in the second tier bin can be analogized to the sudden
drop of the box of stone in Hilton Quarries, or to the swing in an unexpected direction of a
cargo boom with a load of lumber that injured the plaintiff in Bull Steamship Lines v. Fisher,
196 Md. 519, 77 A.2d 142 (1950), where assumption of risk was also held to be a jury
question.  In the latter case we said that 
"every risk is not necessarily assumed by one who works in a dangerous place
or at a dangerous occupation.  He assumes only those risks which might
reasonably be expected to exist, and, if by some action of the defendant, an
unusual danger arises, that is not assumed.  Where there is a dispute whether
the risk is assumed or not, that question is usually left to the jury."
- 23 -
Id. at 526, 77 A.2d at 146.  We cannot determine, on the instant record, whether a shift in
the contents of a bin, while a worker is retrieving dropped cartons, is an expected or
unexpected occurrence.  Respondents have failed to meet their burden of producing evidence
on that point.  
The principle governing the issue before us is stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 496D (1965), dealing with "Knowledge and Appreciation of Risk," and reading:
"Except where he expressly so agrees, a plaintiff does not assume a risk of
harm arising from the defendant's conduct unless he then knows of the
existence of the risk and appreciates its unreasonable character."
Comment b further explains as follows:
"The basis of assumption of risk is the plaintiff's consent to accept the risk and
look out for himself.  Therefore he will not be found, in the absence of an
express agreement which is clearly so to be construed, to assume any risk
unless he has knowledge of its existence.  This means that he must not only be
aware of the facts which create the danger, but must also appreciate the danger
itself and the nature, character, and extent which make it unreasonable.  Thus
the condition of premises upon which he enters may be quite apparent to him,
but the danger arising from the condition may be neither known nor apparent,
or, if known or apparent at all, it may appear to him to be so slight as to be
negligible.  In such a case the plaintiff does not assume the risk.  His failure
to exercise due care either to discover or to understand the danger is not
properly a matter of assumption of risk, but of the defense of contributory
negligence."
On the present record, a trier of fact could find that the risk of shifting bin contents
would appear negligible to a worker in Imbraguglio's position.
Respondents have presented their defense by emphasizing the absence of a guardrail
on the pallet that Imbraguglio chose to use.  They view the risk to be the risk of falling,
without regard to the immediate cause of the fall.  Although Imbraguglio possessed
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knowledge, as a matter of law, of the possibility of falling from the unguarded elevated
pallet, because that danger was self-evident, the element of "appreciation" is less clear.  In
a case of the instant type, an important factor in the objective evaluation of appreciation of
a plaintiff's risk, i.e., of the nature and magnitude of the potential injury, is the height at
which the plaintiff was working without a guardrail.  In the workplace context considerable
guidance on the degree to which Imbraguglio is charged with appreciation of the risk can be
gleaned from OSHA safety regulations.  
The OSHA regulation dealing with the use of forklifts is 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178 titled
"Powered industrial trucks."  The only section of that regulation that relates to circumstances
possibly analogous to those before us is § 1910.178(m)(12), which reads:
"Whenever a truck is equipped with vertical only, or vertical and horizontal
controls elevatable with the lifting carriage or forks for lifting personnel, the
following additional precautions shall be taken for the protection of personnel
being elevated.
"(i)
Use of a safety platform firmly secured to the lifting carriage
and/or forks.
"(ii)
Means shall be provided whereby personnel on the platform can
shut off power to the truck.
"(iii)
Such protection from falling objects as indicated necessary by
the operating conditions shall be provided."
Subsection (m)(12) concerns itself with protecting persons who are in the process of being
raised or lowered and so does not apply to the instant case.  
This reading is consistent with the decision and order of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission (the Agency) in Secretary of Labor v. Seward Motor Freight,
- 25 -
Specifically, the Agency said:
11
"That the hazard attendant upon using such a platform-rigged fork lift
was recognized by users of powered industrial trucks, which include such
equipment, is established by the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), Safety Standard for Powered Industrial Trucks.  Section 513, of that
Standard requires that whenever a 'truck' (here a fork lift) is used to elevate
personnel for any reason, there shall be an operator in the control position of
the truck for the protection of the person being elevated.  Likewise the
standard provides that if the platform is equipped with vertical hoisting
controls that for the protection of the personnel being elevated the personnel
on the platform be provided means of shuttting off power to the truck.  Here
the respondent omitted the industry required precautions of having an operator
present at all times while personnel was elevated or of supplying controls on
the platform."
(Citation omitted).
Inc., 1987 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 28085, full text available in 1987 WL 245514.  There, employees
who were repairing over-the-highway semi-trailers were required to work on the roofs which
were approximately thirteen feet above the ground.  To work at that level some employees
stood on a wooden platform affixed to the forks of a forklift but, unlike the procedure in the
instant matter, elevating the platform was a one person operation.  The worker first would
elevate the platform to the desired height, then climb to the top of the roll cage of the forklift,
and then climb the extended mast of the forklift to the work platform.  One of the workers
was seriously injured when he fell while descending from the platform in the reverse of the
described procedure.  Significant to the case before us is the Agency's conclusion that the
violations of § 1910.178(m)(12) were failing to have an operator at the control position in
the forklift and failing to have controls on the platform.   Here, Imbraguglio had already
11
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reached the desired elevation of six to seven feet, and was working from the stationary
platform when he fell. 
On the other hand, if 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178(m)(12) means that only a powered
industrial truck equipped with controls elevatable with the lifting carriage may be used for
lifting personnel, then Imbraguglio could not have voluntarily rejected using it because that
type of industrial powered truck was not available to him.  Thus, the issue before us remains
the same, that is, whether Imbraguglio assumed the risk as a matter of law by choosing the
unguarded pallet versus the pallet with a guardrail.  
Once Imbraguglio had been lifted six to seven feet off the ground he was using the
pallet, for all practical purposes, as a scaffold.  Scaffolds are one of the subjects addressed
in Part 1910 of the OSHA standards, 29 C.F.R., subpart D, "Walking-working surfaces,"
§ 1910.28, titled "Safety requirements for scaffolding."  
For purposes of § 1910.28, a scaffold is defined as "[a]ny temporary elevated platform
and its supporting structure used for supporting workmen or materials or both."  §
1910.21(f)(27).  Throughout the safety regulations dealing with scaffolds, guardrails are
required when the scaffold is more than ten feet above the ground or floor.  For example, §
1910.28(b), dealing with requirements for wood pole scaffolds, provides in subsection (15):
"Guardrails not less than 2 x 4 inches or the equivalent and not less than 36
inches or more than 42 inches high, with a mid-rail, when required, of 1 x
4-inch lumber or equivalent, and toeboards, shall be installed at all open sides
on all scaffolds more than 10 feet above the ground or floor.  Toeboards shall
be a minimum of 4 inches in height.  Wire mesh shall be installed in
accordance with paragraph (a)(17) of this section."
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The same ten foot minimum elevation before guardrails are required is found in the
regulations as to tube and coupler scaffolds, § 1910.28(c)(14), as to tubular welded frame
scaffolds, § 1910.28(d)(7), as to masons' adjustable multiple-point suspension scaffolds,
§ 1910.28(f)(15), as to two-point suspension scaffolds (swinging scaffolds), §1910.28(g)(5),
as to stone setters' adjustable multiple-point suspension scaffolds, § 1910.28(h)(8), as to
carpenters' bracket scaffolds, § 1910.28(k)(5), as to horse scaffolds, § 1910.28(m)(7), and
as to plasterers', decorators', and large area scaffolds, § 1910.28(o)(2). 
The same ten foot minimum height before guardrails are required is found in the
OSHA regulations dealing with scaffolds in the construction industry.  There a scaffold
similarly is defined as "any temporary elevated platform (supported or suspended) and its
supporting structure ... used for supporting employees or materials or both."  29 C.F.R.
§ 1926.450(b).  A pallet suspended on a forklift, used to support an employee, fits this
definition of a scaffold.  Indeed, the regulations contemplate the use of forklifts to support
scaffolds, saying, "Fork-lifts shall not be used to support scaffold platforms unless the entire
platform is attached to the fork and the fork-lift is not moved horizontally while the platform
is occupied."  29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(c)(2)(v) (emphasis added).  That is how the forklift was
being used to support the scaffold in the case before us.  As to the risk of falls, the
regulations require only that "[e]ach employee on a scaffold more than 10 feet (3.1 m) above
- 28 -
We also note that the regulations dealing with working on a stationary platform or
12
scaffold that is less than ten feet above the ground do not contain any requirement for a
harness.
a lower level shall be protected from falling to that lower level."  29 C.F.R.
§ 1926.451(g)(1).   
12
IV
To summarize, the principal relevant circumstances, construed most favorably to
Petitioner as the non-moving party on summary judgment, are these.  Imbraguglio had
worked at the warehouse for about thirty-five years.  Workers there were required to be
elevated by forklift to align or count inventory.  Workers there regularly did not use cages
when being so elevated, despite a management rule requiring cages, and, instead, the workers
used pallets without guardrails.  The immediate cause of Imbraguglio's falling was a shifting
in the content of a bin, an event that may or may not have been expected to occur.  A trier
of fact further could find that Imbraguglio fell from a height of six or seven feet while the
pallet and forklift were stationary and while Imbraguglio was using the platform as a
scaffold.  Reference to OSHA regulations dealing with scaffolding indicates that a guardrail
is not required at elevations of ten feet or less (measured from the scaffold platform to the
floor or ground, and not from the top of the worker's head to the floor or ground).  Triers of
fact might or might not find that a worker in Imbraguglio's position, by choosing an
unguarded pallet on which to work, so appreciated the risk of falling, or of being caused to
fall, from a height of six to seven feet, that the worker in effect consented to relieve the
- 29 -
Respondents of any alleged obligation for the worker's safety, for example, to erect a barrier
between bins.  Accordingly, we cannot say that Imbraguglio assumed the risk as a matter of
law.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT FOR THE ENTRY OF A
JUDGMENT REVERSING THE JUDGMENT
OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE
CITY AND REMANDING THIS CASE TO
THAT 
COURT 
FOR 
FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENTS.