Title: State v. Travis Vondell Cross

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 70 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP3-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Travis Vondell Cross, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 8, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
St. Croix   
 
JUDGE: 
Eric J. Lundell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by William E. Schmaal, assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP3-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2005CF614) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Travis Vondell Cross, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 8, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for St. Croix County, Eric J. Lundell, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   Travis Vondell Cross pled 
guilty to second degree sexual assault of a child, and was 
informed by the State, the circuit court, and his own attorney 
that this offense was punishable by 40 years imprisonment with a 
maximum initial confinement of 25 years.  The circuit court 
imposed the maximum sentence.  Cross later discovered that he 
should have been subject to a maximum of only 30 years 
imprisonment with 20 years initial confinement. 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The circuit court denied Cross's postconviction motion 
requesting a plea withdrawal, but did grant his motion for 
resentencing, where Cross again received the maximum.  Cross 
appealed, and the State petitioned this court for bypass 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60 (2007-08),1 which we 
granted. 
¶3 
The issue before us is whether Cross's plea was 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent in spite of the fact that he 
was told an incorrect maximum potential sentence before entering 
his guilty plea. 
¶4 
We hold that where a defendant is told that he faces a 
maximum possible sentence that is higher, but not substantially 
higher, than that authorized by law, the circuit court has not 
violated the plea colloquy requirements outlined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 and our Bangert line of cases.  In other words, where a 
defendant pleads guilty with the understanding that he faces a 
higher, but not substantially higher, sentence than the law 
allows, the circuit court has still fulfilled its duty to inform 
the defendant of the range of punishments.  Therefore, the 
defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and plea 
withdrawal remains in the discretion of the circuit court and 
will not be disturbed unless the defendant shows that it is 
necessary to correct a manifest injustice. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
3 
 
¶5 
In this case, Cross was told he faced a maximum 
exposure of 25 years initial confinement with 15 years extended 
supervision, when the actual maximum was 20 years initial 
confinement with 10 years extended supervision.  We conclude 
that Cross pled guilty under the belief that he faced a higher, 
but not substantially higher, maximum penalty.  We hold that as 
a matter of law, Cross's plea was therefore made knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  Moreover, Cross has not 
demonstrated that withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct 
a manifest injustice.  Accordingly, the judgment and order of 
the circuit court is affirmed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶6 
On December 8, 2005, Cross was charged with first 
degree sexual assault of a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1) (2001-02).2  The State alleged that Cross sexually 
assaulted his ten-year-old great-granddaughter in December 2002 
and again in January 2003.  At the arraignment, the circuit 
court informed Cross that the offense was a Class B felony, and 
that conviction could lead to a maximum sentence of 60 years. 
¶7 
On January 5, 2007, the State entered into a plea 
agreement with Cross.  Cross agreed to plead guilty to a reduced 
charge of second degree sexual assault (a violation of Wis. 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1) (2001-02) reads: "FIRST DEGREE 
SEXUAL 
ASSAULT. 
 
Whoever 
has 
sexual 
contact 
or 
sexual 
intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 13 
years is guilty of a Class B felony." 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
4 
 
Stat. § 948.02(2) (2001-02)3), to have no contact with the child 
or her family, to register as a sex offender, to make necessary 
restitution, and to agree to lifetime supervision if he lived or 
worked in Wisconsin at any time in the future.  In exchange, the 
State consented to the single, reduced charge and agreed to 
recommend a sentence of 24 months to be served concurrently with 
time he was already serving in Minnesota for similarly violating 
a minor family member. 
¶8 
At the plea hearing, counsel for Cross informed the 
circuit court that second degree sexual assault was a Class C 
felony and that the maximum total sentence was 40 years, 
consisting of a maximum initial imprisonment of 25 years 
followed by 15 years of extended supervision.  An attachment to 
Cross's plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form, which he 
signed, also stated that the Class C felony carried a maximum 
sentence of 40 years with a maximum initial confinement in 
prison for 25 years.  During Cross's plea colloquy, Judge 
Lundell repeated the same maximum punishments for a Class C 
felony (25 years maximum initial confinement plus 15 years of 
extended supervision).  Judge Lundell also made clear that he 
would not be bound by "any agreement that the attorneys may 
have."  He then asked Cross if he understood that "in the end, I 
would make up my mind as to what's best for this case," and 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(2) (2001-02) states as follows: 
"SECOND DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT.  Whoever has sexual contact or 
sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 
16 years is guilty of a Class C felony." 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
5 
 
that, "I'm not bound by any agreement."  To both inquiries, 
Cross replied, "Yes, sir."  After questioning Cross, Judge 
Lundell found that Cross "freely, voluntarily, and knowingly" 
waived his rights; he accepted Cross's guilty plea, and set a 
date for sentencing. 
¶9 
The sentencing hearing occurred on March 26, 2007.  
The court considered numerous victim impact statements filed in 
the case.  According to those statements, Cross had molested or 
otherwise sexually assaulted many family members.  The court 
called Cross's pattern of abuse "one of the saddest situations 
that I have come across."  Judge Lundell cited his almost two 
decades of judicial experience and years of prosecuting before 
his service on the bench and commented, "It is rare to have an 
individual your age have affected so many people in the same 
family." 
¶10 The court sternly admonished Cross, saying: 
Frankly, I have no pity for you whatsoever.  I think 
you should receive a serious sentence.  I think that 
in and of itself may help some of the misery you have 
caused, but it will never, of course, heal everything.  
The only way to deal with a person such as yourself 
who just——I can't comprehend why you did what you did, 
but I can deal with it.  And my way of dealing with it 
is, frankly, never letting you out of prison until you 
die.  That's how I deal with it.  I don't want to give 
you any opportunity to molest anyone ever again in 
your family. . . .  
[W]hy bother trying to treat you?  I don't think 
there's any hope for you.  You have caused so much 
harm to your family that this is purely a punishment 
type case.  I gave you, you know, for five seconds, I 
gave thought to rehabilitation of you.  And I quickly 
dismissed that because, frankly, there's no need to 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
6 
 
rehabilitate you.  For what you have done to your 
family, you deserve the worst.  You deserve to be 
punished about as hard as I can punish you. 
Ultimately, Judge Lundell disregarded the recommendation of the 
State and sentenced Cross to the maximum 25 years imprisonment 
followed by 15 years of extended supervision. 
¶11 Cross moved for postconviction relief on multiple 
grounds, only one of which is relevant to us today.4  On the 
night before the hearing on his postconviction motion, Cross's 
attorney discovered that the offense occurred prior to the 
changeover from Truth in Sentencing 1 guidelines ("TIS-1") to 
Truth in Sentencing 2 guidelines ("TIS-2").5  Cross had been 
advised of and sentenced to the maximum according to the TIS-2 
penalties, which classified his offense as a Class C felony with 
a 40-year maximum, including 25 years of initial confinement.  
Under the TIS-1 guidelines, the felony should have been treated 
as Class BC, which carries a maximum initial sentence of 20 
years in prison followed by 10 years extended supervision, for a 
total of 30 years.  Cross argued that because he was incorrectly 
                                                 
4 Cross's attorney actually discovered the sentencing error 
several 
months 
after 
filing 
his 
original 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief, and made the claim at issue here in a 
later supplemental motion. 
5 Felonies committed after December 31, 1999, but prior to 
February 1, 2003, are subject to sentencing requirements 
established by Part I of Truth-In-Sentencing legislation (TIS-
I), 1997 Wis. Act 283.  Felonies committed after February 1, 
2003, are subject to sentencing requirements established by Part 
II of Truth-In-Sentencing legislation (TIS-2), 2001 Wis. Act 
109.  These sentencing requirements were codified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.50 (2001-02). 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
7 
 
advised of the penalties prior to his guilty plea, his plea was 
not knowing and intelligent and he was entitled to withdraw his 
plea.6 
¶12 On March 24, 2008, the circuit court denied Cross's 
motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea, but did vacate the 
sentence and order resentencing.  Cross was resentenced on July 
23, 2008, this time under the correct TIS-1 guidelines.  He was 
sentenced again to the maximum penalty allowed——20 years of 
initial confinement in prison followed by 10 years of extended 
supervision. 
¶13 On December 26, 2008, Cross appealed the judgment of 
conviction and the denial of his motion for plea withdrawal.  
The State petitioned this court to bypass the court of appeals, 
which we granted. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 A 
plea 
not 
entered 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently violates fundamental due process, and a defendant 
therefore may withdraw the plea as a matter of right.  State v. 
Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶19, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906.  
Whether 
a 
plea 
was 
entered 
knowingly, 
voluntarily, 
and 
intelligently presents a question of constitutional fact that is 
                                                 
6 The court was notified of this for the first time during 
the hearing on Cross's postconviction motion on January 3, 2008.  
During this hearing, the circuit court allowed Cross's trial 
attorney and Cross himself to testify, with examination by 
counsel for the State and by Cross's attorney.  The testimony 
centered on the fact that all parties simply erred in good faith 
and told Cross the incorrect maximum allowable punishment. 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
8 
 
reviewed independently.  Id.  In making this determination, this 
court accepts the circuit court's findings of historical or 
evidentiary facts unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶15 This case raises a threshold question of how to 
analyze a claim for plea withdrawal when a defendant was 
informed that his maximum punishment was higher, but not 
substantially higher, than the law actually authorized.  We 
address this question in Part A, concluding that this does not 
constitute a Bangert violation, and therefore, the burden is on 
the defendant in such situations to demonstrate that granting 
plea withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.  
In Part B, we apply this analytical framework to the facts in 
the case at bar.  We conclude that Cross is not entitled to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
A. Analytical Framework 
¶16 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, a defendant's 
guilty 
plea 
must 
be 
affirmatively 
shown 
to 
be 
knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶25.  In 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08, 
the 
legislature 
established 
certain 
requirements for ensuring a guilty plea is knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent.  This court has also provided additional 
requirements in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986), and subsequent cases.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶23. 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
9 
 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) provides: 
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following: 
(a) Address the defendant personally and determine 
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding 
of the nature of the charge and the potential 
punishment if convicted.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶18 This court has also required circuit courts to do the 
following during a plea hearing: 
1. Determine the extent of the defendant's education 
and general comprehension so as to assess the 
defendant's capacity to understand the issues at 
the hearing; 
2. Ascertain whether any promises, agreements, or 
threats 
were 
made 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
defendant's anticipated plea, his appearance at the 
hearing, or any decision to forgo an attorney; 
3. Alert the defendant to the possibility that an 
attorney 
may 
discover 
defenses 
or 
mitigating 
circumstances that would not be apparent to a 
layman such as the defendant; 
4. Ensure the defendant understands that if he is 
indigent and cannot afford an attorney, an attorney 
will be provided at no expense to him; 
5. Establish the defendant's understanding of the 
nature of the crime with which he is charged and 
the range of punishments to which he is subjecting 
himself by entering a plea; 
6. Ascertain personally whether a factual basis exists 
to support the plea; 
7. Inform the defendant of the constitutional rights 
he waives by entering a plea and verify that the 
defendant understands he is giving up these rights; 
8. Establish personally that the defendant understands 
that the court is not bound by the terms of any 
plea agreement, including recommendations from the 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
10 
 
district attorney, in every case where there has 
been a plea agreement; 
9. Notify the defendant of the direct consequences of 
his plea; and 
10. Advise the defendant that "If you are not a citizen 
of the United States of America, you are advised 
that a plea of guilty or no contest for the offense 
[or offenses] with which you are charged may result 
in deportation, the exclusion from admission to 
this country or the denial of naturalization, under 
federal 
law," 
as 
provided 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(c). 
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35 (footnotes omitted).  The relevant 
requirement at issue here is number five, which requires circuit 
courts to "[e]stablish the defendant's understanding of . . . 
the range of punishments to which he is subjecting himself by 
entering a plea."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶19 If the circuit court fails at one of these duties 
(also called a "Bangert violation"), the defendant may be 
entitled to withdraw his plea.  Id., ¶36.  A defendant 
establishes that the circuit court failed at one of its duties 
by filing a motion (a "Bangert motion") that: (1) makes a prima 
facie showing of a violation of § 971.08(1) or other court-
mandated duties; and (2) alleges that "the defendant did not 
know or understand the information that should have been 
provided at the plea hearing."  Id., ¶39.  A defendant 
attempting to make this prima facie showing must point to 
deficiencies 
in 
the 
plea 
hearing 
transcript; 
conclusory 
allegations are not sufficient.  See id. 
¶20 Upon making this showing, the defendant is entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing (known as a "Bangert hearing") at which 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
11 
 
the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent despite 
the deficiencies in the plea hearing.  Id.  If the State cannot 
meet its burden, the defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea 
as a matter of right.  See State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 
139, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997).  However, if a defendant seeking to 
withdraw his guilty plea cannot show that the circuit court 
failed in its duties during the plea hearing, or if the State 
meets its burden of proving the plea was knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent, withdrawal of the plea is left to the discretion of 
the circuit court and will not be disturbed unless the defendant 
demonstrates a manifest injustice will result from the court's 
refusal to allow the plea to be withdrawn.  State v. Trochinski, 
2002 WI 56, ¶15, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891; State v. 
Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836.  
¶21 In this case, Cross was informed that his maximum 
punishment was higher than the law actually authorized.  The 
question is whether this constitutes a Bangert violation——that 
is, a failure by the circuit court to fulfill its required 
duties under § 971.08(1) and our case law during the plea 
colloquy. 
¶22 Cross asserts that when the maximum punishment has 
been incorrectly communicated, and the defendant's understanding 
was based on this incorrect information, the defendant has 
established a Bangert violation.  Cross further argues that in 
such a scenario, the State cannot show the plea was knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent.  The upshot is, according to Cross, 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
12 
 
if a defendant is told and believes a potential maximum 
punishment that turns out to be incorrect, the defendant may 
withdraw the guilty plea as a matter of right.  The State 
counters that the rule is not so black and white. 
¶23 Two factually similar published court of appeals 
opinions approach this question in different ways, demonstrating 
the need for further clarity in the law. 
¶24 The State finds support for its position in State v. 
Quiroz, 2002 WI App 52, 251 Wis. 2d 245, 641 N.W.2d 715.  In 
that case, the defendant argued that he was entitled to withdraw 
his guilty plea in part because he was incorrectly informed that 
his maximum punishment was 14 years instead of 13.  Id., ¶1.  
The court of appeals ultimately concluded that the correct 
penalty was in fact 14 years, and therefore he was not 
misinformed.  Id., ¶14.  The court then stated: 
Furthermore, even if the maximum penalty had been 
overcalculated, which we have determined it was not, 
Quiroz fails to establish that a plea withdrawal would 
correct a manifest injustice.  Quiroz was sentenced to 
twelve years in prison, less than the fourteen-year 
maximum correctly calculated by the court and less 
than the thirteen-year maximum incorrectly calculated 
by Quiroz.  No matter which way the maximum sentence 
is calculated, Quiroz received less than the maximum.  
Furthermore, Quiroz willingly pled guilty to a crime 
with 
a fourteen-year maximum penalty; he cannot 
credibly argue that he would not have so pled had he 
been informed that the maximum was thirteen years. 
Id., ¶16. 
¶25 Implicit in the court of appeals' analysis is the idea 
that this scenario would not be a Bangert violation, presumably 
because the defendant would have understood the "range of 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
13 
 
punishments," even if he was told 14 years and the actual 
maximum punishment was 13 years. 
¶26 Cross, on the other hand, looks to State v. Harden, 
2005 WI App 252, 287 Wis. 2d 871, 707 N.W.2d 173, which presents 
a factual scenario nearly identical to this case.  In Harden, 
the defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement and was 
informed that his maximum punishment was 19 years, six months, 
when the correct maximum exposure was 16 years.  Id., ¶2.  The 
court imposed a sentence of three years initial confinement and 
four years extended supervision.  Id.  The defendant moved to 
withdraw his plea, but the circuit court denied the motion.  The 
circuit court relied on Quiroz, finding that the defendant had 
not presented credible evidence showing that the misinformation 
affected his plea decision.  Id., ¶¶1, 3. 
¶27 The court of appeals reversed.  It concluded that the 
burden was on the State to prove "that Harden knew the correct 
maximum sentence despite being given erroneous information."  
Id., ¶5.  It further stated that under State v. Bartelt, 112 
Wis. 2d 467, 484, 334 N.W.2d 91 (1983), the defendant need not 
show that the misinformation affected his plea decision.  Id., 
¶5.  Thus, it stated that the earlier holding in Quiroz was not 
in accord with binding supreme court precedent; it was dicta and 
should not be followed.  Id., ¶6. 
¶28 By placing the burden on the State to prove that the 
defendant knew the precise maximum sentence, the Harden court 
implicitly assumed this was a Bangert violation.  Its conclusion 
appears to be premised on the assumption that any deviation from 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
14 
 
the precise maximum punishment prevents a plea from being 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 
¶29 We begin our analysis with this pronouncement by the 
United States Supreme Court: 
A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea 
merely because he discovers long after the plea has 
been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the 
quality of the State's case or the likely penalties 
attached to alternative courses of action. . . .  
. . . We find no requirement in the Constitution 
that a defendant must be permitted to disown his 
solemn admissions in open court that he committed the 
act with which he is charged simply because it later 
develops that the State would have had a weaker case 
than the defendant had thought or that the maximum 
penalty 
then 
assumed 
applicable 
has 
been 
held 
inapplicable in subsequent judicial decisions. 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970).  In Brady, the 
United States Supreme Court held that even though the maximum 
punishment——the death penalty——was later held to be unavailable 
for the charges against Brady, the defendant's guilty plea was 
nonetheless knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  Id. at 756-58.  
Brady therefore teaches that a plea based on an understanding of 
the precise maximum penalties that ultimately proves incorrect 
is not necessarily a violation of due process. 
¶30 In our view, a defendant who has been told a maximum 
punishment higher, but not substantially higher, than that 
authorized by law, has not necessarily made a prima facie case 
that the requirements of § 971.08 and our case law have been 
violated.  Several reasons support our approach.  
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
15 
 
¶31 First, a defendant who believes he is subject to a 
greater punishment is obviously aware that he may receive the 
lesser punishment.  Thus, the defendant in Harden, who was told 
he faced 19 years, six months maximum exposure, was certainly 
aware that he faced 16 years imprisonment.  Moreover, we do not 
believe a defendant's decision to represent in open court that 
he committed the crimes he is charged with is likely to be 
affected by insubstantial differences in possible punishments. 
¶32 Second, requiring an evidentiary hearing for every 
small deviation from the circuit court's duties during a plea 
colloquy is simply not necessary for the protection of a 
defendant's constitutional rights.  The Bangert requirements 
exist as a framework to ensure that a defendant knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently enters his plea.  We do not 
embrace a formalistic application of the Bangert requirements 
that 
would 
result 
in 
the 
abjuring 
of 
a 
defendant's 
representations in open court for insubstantial defects. 
¶33 Third, the great weight of authorities from other 
state and federal courts reject the notion that the failure to 
understand the precise maximum punishment is a per se due 
process violation.  Though not uniform in the applicable test, 
these cases generally put the burden on the defendant to show he 
was prejudiced or would not have pled guilty had he known the 
correct possible imprisonment.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Molina, 469 F.3d 408, 410-12 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the 
defendant did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that he 
would not have pled guilty but for the district court's 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
16 
 
misstatement of the maximum sentence); Long v. United States, 
883 
F.2d 966, 
968 
(11th 
Cir. 
1989) 
("[I]f 
the 
court's 
misstatement was unintentional, and the convicted offender 
cannot show prejudice as a result of the misstatement . . . he 
will not be granted relief."); Allen v. United States, 634 
F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that an overstatement 
of the maximum sentence by ten years was not a "material factor" 
affecting the petitioner's decision to plead guilty, despite the 
fact that such a contention was stated in the petitioner's 
affidavit).7 
¶34 Fourth, we find further support for this position in 
Wis. Stat. § 973.13.  That statute provides: "In any case where 
the court imposes a maximum penalty in excess of that authorized 
                                                 
7 See also United States v. Fuller, 769 F.2d 1095, 1096 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (holding that misinformation regarding the maximum 
sentence did not induce the defendant to enter the plea or 
prejudice him); Barton v. United States, 458 F.2d 537, 541 (5th 
Cir. 1972) (holding that misinformation regarding the maximum 
possible sentence did not entitle the defendants to withdraw 
their pleas because they were voluntarily entered into); 
Schofield v. United States, 441 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir. 1971) 
(holding that the defendant's misunderstanding of the possible 
penalties did not render the defendant's plea unintelligent or 
involuntary); Brooks v. State, 606 So. 2d 615, 616-17 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1991) (holding that misinformation regarding the 
maximum sentence did not entitle the defendant to withdraw her 
plea because she would not have changed her mind regarding the 
plea had she been informed of the precise punishment); Grant v. 
State, 585 N.E.2d 284, 285-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that  
misinformation regarding the maximum sentence did not entitle the 
defendant to withdraw his plea because it did not prejudice him); 
Commonwealth v. Sherman, 864 N.E.2d 1241, 1247 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2007) (holding that misinformation regarding the maximum sentence 
did not entitle the defendant to withdraw his plea because the 
favorable sentencing consequences of the plea rendered the 
deviation insignificant). 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
17 
 
by law, such excess shall be void and the sentence shall be 
valid only to the extent of the maximum term authorized by 
statute and shall stand commuted without further proceedings."  
Section 973.13 applies when defendants are found guilty, either 
by plea or by trial.  When given a sentence greater than that 
authorized by law, which presumably would also involve an error 
in the understanding of the possible maximum penalty, the remedy 
here is a commuted sentence, not plea withdrawal. 
¶35 This means that in the exact scenario in the case at 
bar——a guilty plea where the maximum sentence is miscommunicated 
to and misunderstood by the defendant——the remedy provided by 
the Wisconsin legislature is commutation of that portion of the 
sentence imposed in excess of the actual maximum permitted.  
Unless the defendant's misinformation amounts to a due process 
violation, the statutory remedy should govern. 
¶36 Finally, we see an analogue in Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11, which governs pleas.  The rule specifies 
that a court accepting a guilty plea must inform the defendant 
and ensure the defendant understands "any maximum possible 
penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised 
release."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H).  Unlike the Wisconsin 
Statutes, the federal rules specifically require that the 
defendant know and understand the "maximum" penalty.  Yet, Rule 
11(h) states that any "variance from the requirements of this 
rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial 
rights."  By clear implication, the failure of the defendant to 
know and understand the precise maximum is subject to a harmless 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
18 
 
error test.  It is not a per se violation of the defendant's due 
process rights. 
¶37 It is clear, then, that a defendant's due process 
rights are not necessarily violated when he is incorrectly 
informed of the maximum potential imprisonment. 
¶38 We conclude also that a defendant can be said to 
understand the range of punishments as required by § 971.08 and 
Bangert when the maximum sentence communicated to the defendant 
is higher, but not substantially higher, than the actual 
allowable sentence.  This accords with common sense; not all 
small deviations from the requirements in our Bangert line of 
cases equate to a Bangert violation and require a formal 
evidentiary hearing.8 
¶39 However, when the difference is significant, or when 
the defendant is told the sentence is lower than the amount 
allowed by law, a defendant's due process rights are at greater 
risk and a Bangert violation may be established.  If a Bangert 
violation is established, the burden falls on the State to prove 
at an evidentiary hearing that the plea was knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent. 
                                                 
8 The concurrence critiques our adoption of a "substantially 
higher" standard, arguing that such a standard creates a 
"judicially crafted gray area."  Concurrence, ¶54.  Yet, without 
any real analysis, the concurrence likewise concludes that 
Cross's plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  Id., ¶59.  
Thus, 
whether 
or 
not 
a 
Bangert 
violation 
occurred, 
the 
concurrence 
implicitly 
concedes 
that 
insubstantial 
errors 
regarding the precise maximum sentence do not implicate a 
defendant's due process rights. 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
19 
 
¶40 Consequently, we overrule State v. Harden, 2005 WI App 
252, 287 Wis. 2d 871, 707 N.W.2d 173.  We also withdraw the 
language in State v. Quiroz, 2002 WI App 52, ¶16, 251 
Wis. 2d 245, 641 N.W.2d 715, which requires the defendant to 
show he would have pled differently had he known the correct 
maximum sentence.  Our holding is more straightforward: where 
the sentence communicated to the defendant is higher, but not 
substantially 
higher, 
than 
that 
authorized 
by 
law, 
the 
incorrectly communicated sentence does not constitute a Bangert 
violation and will not, as a matter of law, be sufficient to 
show that the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right 
to due process of law.  
B. Application to Cross 
¶41 We conclude that Cross has not made a prima facie 
showing that the circuit court failed to comply with § 971.08 or 
the requirements outlined in Brown and Bangert when he was 
misinformed of the potential maximum punishment.  Cross was 
informed of a punishment greater than what the law provided——25 
years 
of 
initial 
confinement 
and 
15 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision, instead of 20 years of initial confinement followed 
by 10 years of extended supervision.  While the determination of 
when a difference is "substantial" will depend on the facts of 
the case, the difference in this case is, in our view, not 
substantial.  We therefore find that Cross did understand the 
range of punishments and did not make a prima facie showing that 
the circuit court failed in its duties under § 971.08 and our 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
20 
 
Bangert line of cases.  Accordingly, Cross's plea was made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 
¶42 We also conclude that Cross has not shown plea 
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.  Before 
sentencing, the court should permit a plea withdrawal for "any 
fair and just reason."  State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 861, 
532 N.W.2d 111 (1995).  After sentencing, however, a guilty plea 
may not be withdrawn unless the defendant proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that withdrawal is necessary to correct a 
manifest injustice.  Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶16.  The higher 
post-sentencing burden reflects the State's interest in the 
finality of convictions, and reflects the fact that the 
presumption of innocence no longer exists.  Id.  A manifest 
injustice occurs when there has been "a serious flaw in the 
fundamental integrity of the plea."  Id. (quoting State v. 
Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d 373, 379, 534 N.W.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1995)).  
The only flaw Cross points to is that the plea was made with a 
misunderstanding of the precise maximum sentence. 
¶43 We believe Cross's solemn admission in open court that 
he had sexual contact with his ten-year-old great-granddaughter 
should not be thrown aside.  Cross entered into a highly 
favorable plea agreement.  Under the original charge, first 
degree sexual assault, Cross understood that he faced a maximum 
sentence of 60 years.  He agreed to plead guilty to second 
degree sexual assault, which he understood as subjecting him to 
40 years imprisonment.  In fact, the reduced charge resulting 
from the plea agreement was even more favorable to him than he 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
21 
 
thought when he entered into it, because it reduced his maximum 
exposure to 30 years.  The record also reflects that the 
prosecutor could have charged him with multiple counts of first 
degree sexual assault, which would have likely made the State's 
case stronger.  Cross's plea agreement provided him with 
benefits that were only enhanced by the reduced maximum 
sentence. 
¶44 In short, the burden is on Cross to demonstrate that 
he should be allowed to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest 
injustice.  Cross has not met that burden, and therefore, his 
conviction and sentence are affirmed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶45 We hold that where a defendant is told that he faces a 
maximum possible sentence that is higher, but not substantially 
higher, than that authorized by law, the circuit court has not 
violated the plea colloquy requirements outlined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 and our Bangert line of cases.  In other words, where a 
defendant pleads guilty with the understanding that he faces a 
higher, but not substantially higher, sentence than the law 
allows, the circuit court has still fulfilled its duty to inform 
the defendant of the range of punishments.  Therefore, the 
defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and plea 
withdrawal remains in the discretion of the circuit court and 
will not be disturbed unless the defendant shows that it is 
necessary to correct a manifest injustice. 
¶46 In this case, Cross was told he faced a maximum 
exposure of 25 years initial confinement with 15 years extended 
No. 
2009AP3-CR   
 
22 
 
supervision, when the actual maximum was 20 years initial 
confinement with 10 years extended supervision.  We conclude 
that Cross pled guilty under the belief that he faced a higher, 
but not substantially higher, maximum penalty.  We hold that as 
a matter of law, Cross's plea was therefore made knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.  Moreover, Cross has not 
demonstrated that withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct 
a manifest injustice.  Accordingly, the judgment and order of 
the circuit court is affirmed. 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
is affirmed. 
No.  2009AP3-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶47 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I do not 
join the majority opinion because it unnecessarily departs from 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and this court's precedents in State v. 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (Wis. 1986), and its 
progeny, including State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
716 N.W.2d 906.  Bangert was decided in 1986.  It was reaffirmed 
by Brown in 2006.  The Bangert line of cases sets down simple,  
relatively "bright-line" rules in this area of the law, and 
there is no indication the framework is not working.  Why 
disturb it now?  
¶48 I conclude that Cross's motion to withdraw his plea 
satisfied the two requirements set forth in Bangert.  Unlike the 
majority opinion, I conclude that Cross made a prima facie 
showing 
of 
a 
violation 
of 
§ 971.08(1)(a) 
(a 
"Bangert 
violation"), namely that he was misinformed about the maximum 
penalties.  When a defendant is told that he faces a higher 
punishment than provided by law and pleads guilty, the plea 
colloquy 
is on its face defective under Bangert.  The 
defendant's motion contained the proper allegation that he "did 
not know or understand the information that should have been 
provided at the plea hearing."  I therefore conclude that Cross 
was entitled to a Bangert hearing at which the State had the 
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent despite 
the deficiencies in the plea hearing.   
No.  2009AP3-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) requires a circuit 
court, before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, to 
"[a]ddress the defendant personally and determine that the plea 
is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the 
charge and the potential punishment if convicted."     
¶50 Bangert and Brown interpreted "potential punishment if 
convicted" to mean "the range of punishments to which he [the 
defendant] is subjecting himself by entering a plea."  Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 261-62; Brown, 293 Wis. 2d at 617.  When the 
circuit court does not establish the defendant's understanding 
of "the range of punishments," the defendant can make a prima 
facie showing of a "Bangert violation," which entitles the 
defendant to an evidentiary hearing.  See majority op., ¶¶19-20. 
¶51 In the present case, a hurriedly convened Bangert 
hearing was held in the circuit court.  The State had the burden 
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's 
plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent despite the 
deficiencies in the plea hearing.  The State called Cross's 
trial counsel as a witness.  Trial counsel testified that she 
told the defendant the wrong maximum penalty.  Defense counsel 
called Cross as a witness.  Cross stated that he had an 
incorrect understanding of the penalties when he entered his 
guilty plea.   
¶52 What comes through loud and clear from the Bangert 
hearing is that all the participants were acting in good faith 
and that none of them knew the correct statutory punishment——not 
the court, not the prosecutor, not the defense counsel, and not 
No.  2009AP3-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
the defendant.  The problem about the punishment arose because a 
statute had changed and no one was applying the law in effect at 
the relevant time.1  It is hard to conceive that the defendant 
knew the correct penalty, but none of the legally trained people 
knew it.   
¶53 No matter how you cut it, Cross was misinformed about 
the "potential punishment," the "range of punishments," to which 
he was subjecting himself by entering a guilty plea.  "Potential 
punishment"2 or "range of punishments"3 means the precise 
punishment set forth in the statutes.  These phrases do not 
either say or mean that the defendant should be told the 
"approximate" statutory punishment.  The majority opinion now 
says these phrases mean, in effect, "close enough for a criminal 
case."   
¶54 The majority has established one set of rules for 
cases 
in 
which 
misinformation 
about 
punishment 
is 
"not 
substantially higher" than the statutory punishment and another 
set of rules for cases in which misinformation about punishment 
is "substantially higher."  See majority op., ¶4.  Neither Wis. 
Stat. § 971.08 nor any case cited by the majority has previously 
used a standard of "substantially higher."  The majority does 
not elaborate on the meaning of "substantially higher."  The 
majority opinion has, in my opinion, departed from a clear and 
                                                 
1 The majority opinion discusses the nature of the mistake 
at ¶11 & nn.5-6. 
2 Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a). 
3 State v. Brown, 293 Wis. 2d at 617; majority op., ¶18. 
No.  2009AP3-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
simple rule to unnecessarily open a judicially crafted gray 
area, inviting further litigation centered on the meaning of 
"substantially higher."4  
¶55 Rather than enter this gray area, I resolve this case 
by applying the existing framework of the law under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08, Bangert, and Brown.  No court has ruled on whether the 
State carried its burden at the Bangert hearing that was held in 
the present case.  The majority fails to do so because it 
concludes a Bangert hearing was not necessary.   
¶56 The issues under my analysis become two-fold: First, 
whether the State carried its burden at the Bangert hearing to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea 
was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent despite the deficiencies 
in the plea hearing; and second, whether the defendant has 
otherwise carried his burden to show that withdrawal is 
necessary to correct a manifest injustice, that is, a serious 
flaw in the fundamental integrity of the plea.5  Because of the 
posture of the case, I shall treat these two analyses together.   
                                                 
4 Cf. State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (Crooks, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) 
(discussing State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 
(1997)). 
5 "When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea after 
sentencing, he must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would result in 
'manifest injustice.'  One way for a defendant to meet this 
burden is to show that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily enter the plea."  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶18, 
293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906 (2006).  Here the primary 
dispute 
is 
whether 
the 
plea 
was 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. 
No.  2009AP3-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶57 Although I am concerned that this case is close to the 
line of inappropriate judicial assumptions and speculations 
about what a defendant knew, would do, or should have done in 
deciding whether to enter a guilty plea, I nevertheless 
conclude, on the basis of the unusual facts of the present case 
and the limited record, that the defendant's plea was knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent and that no constitutional flaw or 
manifest injustice undermines the integrity of the guilty plea.     
¶58 Cross had a very favorable plea agreement.  His 
potential punishment on the original charges was 60 years' 
imprisonment 
(40 
years' 
initial 
confinement). 
 
The 
misinformation of the potential punishment on the amended charge 
was 40 years' imprisonment (25 years' initial confinement).  The 
correct information about the amended information was 30 years' 
imprisonment (20 years' initial confinement).  Thus, once the 
error was discovered, the plea agreement actually gave Cross a 
better deal than it appeared at the time he entered his plea.  
The plea agreement was also favorable because the prosecutor 
agreed to recommend only two years' imprisonment concurrent with 
his existing Minnesota sentence.  The fact that the sentencing 
judge disregarded the prosecutor's recommendation after the 
defendant entered his plea, see majority op., ¶10, does not 
affect whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
at the time it was entered. 
¶59 Under these circumstances, regardless of who has the 
burden of proof, I cannot conclude that the misinformation about 
the potential punishment, arising from a good faith mistake of 
No.  2009AP3-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
all involved, defeated the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
nature of Cross's guilty plea.   
¶60 For 
the 
foregoing 
reasons, 
I 
concur 
and 
write 
separately.  
¶61 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP3-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1