Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Patrick J. Hudec

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 39 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP523-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Patrick J. Hudec, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Patrick J. Hudec, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HUDEC 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 18, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
      
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
      
 
 
2019 WI 39
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP523-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Patrick J. Hudec, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Patrick J. Hudec, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
APR 18, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review Referee Richard M. Esenberg's 
report and recommendation concluding that Attorney Patrick J. 
Hudec violated the rules of professional conduct in connection 
with his representation of two clients, D.B. and N.K.  The 
referee recommended that this court impose a 60-day suspension 
of Attorney Hudec's law license and condition Attorney Hudec's 
continued practice of law on his satisfaction of a monetary 
judgment entered in N.K.'s civil lawsuit against him.  We adopt 
the referee's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
2 
 
recommendation regarding discipline.  We impose the full costs 
in this matter, which total $4,319.04 as of January 24, 2019.   
¶2 
Attorney Hudec was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin on May 21, 1979.  He has a substantial disciplinary 
history:  a 1989 consensual private reprimand; a 1993 consensual 
private reprimand; a 2001 consensual private reprimand; a 2008 
consensual public reprimand; and a 2014 public reprimand.   
¶3 
On March 22, 2017, the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR) filed a complaint against Attorney Hudec alleging six 
counts 
of 
professional 
misconduct 
arising 
out 
of 
his 
representation of D.B. and N.K.  Attorney Hudec moved to dismiss 
the complaint on a variety of grounds.  This court appointed a 
referee, who denied the motion.  Attorney Hudec then filed an 
answer in which he denied all misconduct.  
¶4 
Attorney Hudec later entered into a stipulation in 
which he agreed to plead no contest to the six counts of 
misconduct charged in the complaint.  Attorney Hudec agreed that 
the referee could use the allegations of the complaint as a 
factual basis for the referee's determination of misconduct.  
The parties stipulated that a 60-day suspension was appropriate 
discipline.  The parties further stipulated that, as a condition 
upon his continued practice of law, Attorney Hudec must comply 
with any judgment resulting from a pending civil case against 
him brought by N.K.  The parties further agreed that the 
stipulation was not the result of plea bargaining; that Attorney 
Hudec's entry into the stipulation was knowing and voluntary; 
and that he understood the misconduct allegations made in the 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
3 
 
OLR's complaint, his right to contest those allegations, his 
right to consult with counsel, and the ramifications of his 
entry into the stipulation. 
¶5 
In January 2019, the referee filed his report and 
recommendation.  The referee accepted the parties' stipulation 
and found, based on the stipulation, that the following facts 
were true. 
Representation of D.B. (Counts 1-3) 
¶6 
D.B.'s mother, J.A.R., died in May 2012.  In June 
2012, D.B. hired Attorney Hudec to represent her in her capacity 
as personal representative for her mother's estate.  D.B. paid 
Attorney Hudec a $1,500 advanced fee.  Attorney Hudec did not 
communicate the scope of the representation or the basis or rate 
of the fee in writing to D.B. within a reasonable time of 
commencing the representation, nor did he provide her with a 
written communication explaining the purpose and effect of the 
advanced fee. 
¶7 
J.A.R.'s will was admitted to probate.  On November 
16, 2012, C.D., another daughter of J.A.R., filed a claim 
against the estate concerning payments made on her mother's 
behalf and an asserted interest in a house she had shared with 
her mother.  Attorney Hudec received a copy of the claim. 
¶8 
Attorney Hudec failed to file an objection to C.D.'s 
claim within 60 days as required by Wis. Stat. § 859.33.  He 
also failed to promptly respond to several of D.B.'s emails and 
telephone calls requesting information regarding the status of 
the estate proceeding. 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
4 
 
¶9 
On November 6, 2013, nearly a year after C.D. filed 
her claim, C.D.'s counsel moved for a default judgment on the 
claim, as well as for a protective order relating to discovery. 
¶10 On 
November 
20, 
2013, 
Attorney 
Hudec 
filed 
an 
objection to C.D.'s claim, a motion for an extension of time for 
objections to claims, and various filings in opposition to 
C.D.'s motions for default judgment and for a protective order. 
¶11 In a December 23, 2013 order, the circuit court 
granted C.D.'s motion for default judgment.  The circuit court 
also granted C.D.'s requested protective order.   
¶12 On December 30, 2013, C.D. filed a notice of entry of 
judgment.   
¶13 On January 8, 2014, Attorney Hudec filed a motion for 
reconsideration and a "Motion to Reopen Judgment."  The circuit 
court denied these motions, noting that Attorney Hudec's failure 
to timely file an objection to C.D.'s claim was not the result 
of excusable neglect, but rather was part of a pattern of late 
filings in his handling of the estate proceedings. 
¶14 Attorney Hudec did not timely appeal from the circuit 
court's default judgment.  He did, however, timely appeal from 
the circuit court's order denying the estate's motions for 
reconsideration and to "reopen" the default judgment.   
¶15 In November 2014, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's order.  In doing so, it noted the circuit 
court's observation that Attorney Hudec had engaged in a pattern 
of missed deadlines for reasons that did not meet the standard 
for excusable neglect. 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
5 
 
¶16 In March 2015, the circuit court ordered that D.B. 
continue as the personal representative and retain new counsel.   
¶17 In a November 2015 letter to the OLR, D.B. stated that 
Attorney Hudec had not provided her with copies of the circuit 
court and appellate decisions; that he had provided "only a 
general synopsis of what took place"; that successor counsel had 
provided her with copies of these decisions; and that she was 
"astonished" by what she read and disappointed in the amount of 
information Attorney Hudec had withheld from her. 
¶18 In February 2016, the circuit court entered a final 
judgment, 
entered 
an 
order 
discharging 
the 
personal 
representative, and closed the case. 
¶19 The OLR complaint alleged, the parties stipulated, and 
the referee determined that by failing to communicate the scope 
of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee in 
writing to D.B. within a reasonable time after commencing the 
representation, and by failing to communicate the purpose and 
effect of the advanced fee in writing to D.B., Attorney Hudec 
violated SCR 20:1.5(b)(1) and (2)1 (Count 1). 
                                                 
1 SCR 20:1.5(b) provides:   
(1) The scope of the representation and the basis 
or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client 
will be responsible shall be communicated to the 
client in writing, before or within a reasonable time 
after commencing the representation, except when the 
lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on 
the same basis or rate as in the past.  If it is 
reasonably 
foreseeable 
that 
the 
total 
cost 
of 
representation to the client, including attorney's 
fees, will be $1000 or less, the communication may be 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
6 
 
¶20 The OLR complaint alleged, the parties stipulated, and 
the referee determined that by failing to timely object to 
C.D.'s claim against the Estate, by failing to timely appeal 
from the trial court's default judgment, and by failing to 
comply with several deadlines during the case, Attorney Hudec 
violated SCR 20:1.32 (Count 2). 
¶21 The OLR complaint alleged, the parties stipulated, and 
the referee determined that by failing to keep D.B. reasonably 
informed about the status of the case and by failing to promptly 
respond to several of D.B.'s requests for information regarding 
the case, Attorney Hudec violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4)3 
(Count 3). 
Representation of N.K. (Counts 4-6) 
                                                                                                                                                             
oral or in writing.  Any changes in the basis or rate 
of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated in 
writing to the client.   
(2) If the total cost of representation to the 
client, including attorney's fees, is more than $1000, 
the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee 
that is paid to the lawyer shall be communicated in 
writing. 
2 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
3 SCR 20:1.4(a) provides:  "A lawyer shall:  
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of 
the matter. 
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests by the client 
for information." 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
7 
 
¶22 In January 2012, N.K. hired Attorney Hudec to pursue a 
defamation claim against B.K. regarding B.K.'s complaint to the 
Better Business Bureau about N.K.'s business.  In April 2012, 
Attorney Hudec filed a defamation suit on behalf of N.K. and her 
business against B.K. and B.K.'s husband, D.K.   
¶23 In June 2012, D.K. filed a motion for sanctions on the 
basis that there was no evidence he was a party to the alleged 
defamation and, therefore, he should not have been named as a 
defendant.  Also in June 2012, B.K. filed an answer and 
affirmative defenses to N.K.'s complaint, and D.K. filed a 
counterclaim and a motion to dismiss. 
¶24 In July 2012, Attorney Hudec filed documents in 
opposition to D.K.'s motions for sanctions and to dismiss. 
¶25 In August 2012, the circuit court held a hearing and 
granted D.K.'s motion to dismiss on the ground that there was no 
evidence to justify naming him as a party.  The circuit court 
denied D.K.'s motion for sanctions. 
¶26 In October 2012, Attorney Hudec filed a reply to the 
counterclaim and motion to dismiss that D.K. had filed several 
months earlier.  D.K. responded by moving to strike Attorney 
Hudec's filing as untimely and moving for a default judgment on 
the counterclaim.  The circuit court ultimately granted D.K.'s 
motions.  Attorney Hudec failed to adequately communicate that 
fact to N.K. 
¶27 Over the following months, Attorney Hudec missed a 
variety of court-imposed deadlines.  In April 2013, B.K. filed a 
motion for sanctions as a result of these missed deadlines.  
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
8 
 
Attorney Hudec failed to inform N.K. of this motion, and failed 
to inform her of the subsequently scheduled hearing on the 
motion.  Attorney Hudec then failed to appear at the sanctions 
hearing.  The circuit court dismissed plaintiffs' case with 
prejudice, finding Attorney Hudec's actions were egregious, 
extreme, substantial, and persistent.  The circuit court noted 
the following facts:  (1) Attorney Hudec had been granted 
extensions for various medical issues; (2) court-mandated 
mediation never took place; (3) Attorney Hudec failed to provide 
requested discovery to opposing counsel; (4) Attorney Hudec 
failed to file a pretrial report; and (5) Attorney Hudec stated 
that he intended to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff, but 
failed to so do, filing only unsigned documents. 
¶28 As 
a 
sanction 
for 
failing 
to 
comply 
with 
its 
scheduling order, the circuit court imposed attorney's fees of 
$3,862.50 against plaintiffs and Attorney Hudec.  The court gave 
plaintiffs 
leave 
to 
seek 
relief 
from 
the 
imposition 
of 
attorney's fees by filing a motion with the court.  
¶29 The circuit court kept a scheduled final pretrial 
conference on its calendar to discuss matters related to D.K.'s 
counterclaim.  N.K. appeared at the final pretrial conference.  
Attorney Hudec did not.  N.K. did not know that Attorney Hudec 
would not be in attendance.  She did not know that the circuit 
court had dismissed her claims against the defendants.  She did 
not know that the circuit court had imposed sanctions against 
her and Attorney Hudec. 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
9 
 
¶30 In May 2013, N.K. paid an amount to the defendants in 
order to settle the default judgment that D.K. had obtained on 
his counterclaim. 
¶31 In June 2013, N.K. retained a new lawyer and satisfied 
the sanctions judgment in favor of the defendants. 
¶32 In December 2016, N.K. filed a civil suit against 
Attorney Hudec, his law office, and his insurance carrier, if 
any, seeking recovery of her previous payments to Attorney Hudec 
and other damages she alleged were caused by him.  This lawsuit 
was pending at the time of the parties' stipulation.  Although 
the referee's report does not note as much, the court takes 
judicial notice that, according to Wisconsin's Consolidated 
Court Automation Programs (CCAP) records, a $9,235.48 judgment 
against Attorney Hudec and in N.K.'s favor was entered on 
December 14, 2018, and Attorney Hudec has not filed a notice of 
appeal of the judgment. 
¶33 The OLR complaint alleged, the parties stipulated, and 
the referee determined that by failing to timely file a reply to 
D.K.'s counterclaim resulting in the court striking plaintiffs' 
pleading and granting default judgment on the counterclaim, and 
by failing to comply with the court's scheduling order, Attorney 
Hudec violated SCR 20:1.3 (Count 4).  
¶34 The OLR complaint alleged, the parties stipulated, and 
the referee determined that by failing to inform N.K. that he 
did not timely file a reply to D.K.'s counterclaim, by failing 
to inform N.K. that the court granted a default judgment on the 
counterclaim, and by otherwise failing to keep N.K. reasonably 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
10 
 
informed about the status of the case, Attorney Hudec violated 
SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) (Count 5). 
¶35 The OLR complaint alleged, the parties stipulated, and 
the referee determined that by failing to make a reasonably 
diligent effort to comply with defendants' discovery requests, 
Attorney Hudec violated SCR 20:3.4(d)4 (Count 6). 
¶36 The 
referee 
recommended 
a 
60-day 
suspension 
of 
Attorney Hudec's license in his report.  The referee noted that 
Attorney Hudec has an extensive disciplinary record (three 
private and two public reprimands), and that his previous 
misconduct included neglect similar to what occurred here.   
See, e.g., Public Reprimand of Patrick J. Hudec, No. 2008-2 
(electronic 
copy 
available 
at 
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/raw/002005.html) (imposing a 
public reprimand for misconduct that included failing to act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness, failing to keep his 
client reasonably informed, and failing to timely respond to the 
OLR's investigative efforts); In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Hudec, 2014 WI 46, 354 Wis. 2d 728, 848 N.W.2d 287 
(imposing a public reprimand for misconduct that included 
failing 
to 
provide 
competent 
representation; 
e.g., 
gross 
inattention to detail in circuit court litigation, filing a 
principal appellate brief rife with grammatical and spelling 
                                                 
4 SCR 20:3.4(d) provides:  "A lawyer shall not in pretrial 
procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make 
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper 
discovery request by an opposing party." 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
11 
 
errors, and filing an appellate reply brief that was struck as 
untimely and was not served on opposing counsel). 
¶37 The referee also pointed to certain cases that support 
a 60-day suspension under similar circumstances.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moldenhauer, 2016 WI 43, 369 
Wis. 2d 1, 879 N.W.2d 605 (imposing a 60-day suspension for 
failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness and 
failing to keep a client reasonably informed; respondent-
lawyer's disciplinary history included a private reprimand and 
three 
public 
reprimands 
for 
similar 
misconduct); 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Theobald, 2010 WI 102, 329 
Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 834 (imposing a 60-day suspension for 
failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness and 
failing to keep a client reasonably informed; respondent-
lawyer's disciplinary history included two public reprimands for 
similar misconduct); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Anderson, 2010 WI 39, 324 Wis. 2d 627, 782 N.W.2d 100 (imposing 
a 60-day suspension for failing to act with reasonable diligence 
and promptness and failing to properly communicate with a 
client; respondent-lawyer's disciplinary history included two 
public 
reprimands 
and 
a 
private 
reprimand 
for 
similar 
misconduct). 
¶38 The referee also deemed it reasonable for the court to 
require Attorney Hudec to comply with any judgment resulting 
from N.K.'s lawsuit against him——a term the parties agreed to in 
their stipulation. 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
12 
 
¶39 Neither party appealed the referee's report, so this 
matter is submitted to the court for review pursuant to 
SCR 22.17(2).  We review a referee's findings of fact subject to 
the clearly erroneous standard.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 
675 N.W.2d 747.  We review the referee's conclusions of law de 
novo.  Id.  We determine the appropriate level of discipline 
independent of the referee's recommendation.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶40 We agree with the referee that a 60-day suspension is 
appropriate.  Clearly, Attorney Hudec's many previous reprimands 
have not impressed upon him the importance of his ethical 
obligations.  "This court has long adhered to the concept of 
progressive discipline in attorney regulatory cases."  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Netzer, 2014 WI 7, ¶49, 352 
Wis. 2d 310, 841 N.W.2d 820.  A suspension is the next step in 
the progressive discipline process, and Moldenhauer, Theobald, 
and Anderson instruct that under circumstances like those 
present here, a 60-day suspension is appropriate. 
¶41 We turn next to the issue of restitution.  The OLR did 
not 
request 
restitution 
related 
to 
Attorney 
Hudec's 
representation of D.B.  The OLR reports that while some of 
Attorney Hudec's work on D.B.'s mother's estate was clearly 
deficient, its investigation did not provide a reasonably 
ascertainable amount of funds to be restored.  In addition, the 
OLR reports, any losses the estate incurred as a result of 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
13 
 
Attorney Hudec's failure to object to C.D.'s claim would 
constitute incidental or consequential damages, as opposed to 
funds that were under Attorney Hudec's direct control.  Given 
these circumstances, we agree with the OLR that no restitution 
is warranted related to the D.B. matter.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Blessinger, 
2017 
WI 
107, 
¶21, 
378 
Wis. 2d 539, 905 N.W.2d 122 (noting that the OLR's policy is to 
seek restitution only when, among other things, there is a 
reasonably ascertainable amount of restitution, and the funds to 
be restored were in the lawyer's direct control and do not 
constitute incidental or consequential damages).   
¶42 Although the OLR did not seek restitution related to 
the N.K. matter, the parties stipulated, and the referee agreed, 
that the court should condition Attorney Hudec's continued 
practice of law on his satisfaction of any monetary judgment 
entered in N.K.'s civil lawsuit against him.   As mentioned 
above, CCAP records show that N.K. obtained a $9,235.48 judgment 
against Attorney Hudec in December 2018.  Consistent with the 
parties' stipulation and the referee's recommendation, we deem 
it appropriate to require, as a condition of the reinstatement 
of his Wisconsin law license, that Attorney Hudec satisfy this 
judgment.  
¶43 Finally, we deem it appropriate to impose the full 
costs of this disciplinary proceeding on Attorney Hudec, as is 
our usual custom.  See SCR 22.24(1m). 
¶44 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Patrick J. Hudec is 
suspended for a period of 60 days, effective May 30, 2019. 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
14 
 
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Patrick J. Hudec shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$4,319.04 as of January 24, 2019.   
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a condition of 
reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, 
Patrick J. Hudec shall satisfy the judgment issued against him 
and in N.K.'s favor in connection with the misconduct described 
herein. 
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Patrick J. Hudec shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.28(2). 
 
 
No. 
2017AP523-D   
 
 
 
1