Title: KENNETH RALPH LaPLANT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KENNETH RALPH LaPLANT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 154148 P.3d 4Case Number: No. 05-182Decided: 12/15/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
KENNETH 
RALPH LaPLANT,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Roden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Elizabeth B. Lance, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Lance.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL,* KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 
* Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Kenneth LaPlant 
entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine, a felony offense due to LaPlant's prior possession 
convictions.  He reserved the right 
to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the 
methamphetamine discovered after an investigatory stop.  Finding no error in the district court's 
decision denying the motion, we affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      LaPlant presents 
the following issue for our review:

 
 
Did the 
district court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress the 
evidence?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On the morning of 
August 22, 2004, Mills police officer Derek Ransom noticed a vehicle with Idaho 
license plates parked on LaPlant's property in Mills, Wyoming.  He ran the plate number through dispatch 
and learned that the license plates were reported to be stolen.  Officer Ransom did not pursue the matter 
further at that time because of other immediate duties. 

 
 
[¶4]      Approximately two 
and one-half hours later, at about 11:17 a.m., Officer Ransom saw the same 
vehicle parked at the Extra Storage units in Mills.  Officer Ransom activated his car's 
overhead lights and pulled up behind the vehicle.  LaPlant immediately stepped out of the 
vehicle's front passenger side and started to walk away.  Officer Ransom directed LaPlant to get 
back into the vehicle.  LaPlant 
stated he was going to a storage unit.  
Officer Ransom again told LaPlant to get back inside the car.  

 
 
[¶5]      Officer Ransom 
then approached the driver's side of the vehicle and asked the driver, Jay 
Gibson, for his driver's license and proof of vehicle insurance, and requested 
identification from LaPlant.  Gibson 
could not produce either.  Officer 
Ransom asked Gibson whose license plates were on the vehicle, and he replied 
that they belonged to a friend.  
While Officer Ransom was speaking with Gibson, Natrona County Deputy 
Keith Wilhelm arrived at the scene as backup and stood by the front passenger 
side of the vehicle.  

 
 
[¶6]      Shortly 
thereafter, Officer Ransom returned to his patrol car and asked dispatch to 
check the driver's license status of Gibson and whether there were any active 
warrants relating to the men.  
Dispatch informed Officer Ransom that Gibson's driver's license was 
suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.  Officer Ransom told Gibson the news, 
placed him under arrest, and took him to his patrol car.  By this time, Trooper Henderson had 
arrived on the scene. 

 
 
[¶7]      While Deputy 
Wilhelm was standing by the passenger side of the vehicle, he observed LaPlant 
fiddling with some keys which were attached to a key chain containing a 
bullet-shaped item.  Deputy Wilhelm 
knew LaPlant from previous encounters relating to driving infractions and 
possible drug activities.  Deputy 
Wilhelm knew from experience in investigating drug crimes that drug users carry 
drugs in bullet-shaped containers on key chains.  Deputy Wilhelm had seen methamphetamine 
carried in similar containers on previous occasions and had found 
methamphetamine in such a container earlier that month.  Around 11:35 a.m., approximately 
eighteen minutes into the stop and three minutes after Gibson's arrest, Deputy 
Wilhelm informed Officer Ransom and Trooper Henderson of his suspicions.  

 
 
[¶8]      Trooper Henderson approached 
LaPlant, who was still seated in the front passenger seat, and asked him if he 
could look at the bullet-shaped object on the key chain.  LaPlant did not respond and continued to 
play with his keys.  When Trooper 
Henderson asked again to see the object, LaPlant removed it from the key chain 
and handed it to the trooper.  
Trooper Henderson opened the bullet and found a glass 
vial with suspected methamphetamine residue.  At that point, LaPlant was removed from 
the vehicle and placed under arrest.  
A search of LaPlant's person incident to his arrest revealed a small 
black leather bag containing methamphetamine.  

 
 
[¶9]      LaPlant was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2005), with a felony enhancement based on two 
prior possession convictions.  He 
moved to suppress the drug evidence, claiming it was the product of an unlawful 
seizure.  After a hearing, the 
district court denied the motion.  
The court concluded that the investigatory stop and the subsequent 
detention of LaPlant were supported by reasonable suspicion.  LaPlant subsequently entered a 
conditional plea of guilty to the possession charge, reserving the right to 
appeal the court's suppression ruling. The district court sentenced LaPlant to 
three years of supervised probation under specified terms and conditions.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   The standard employed by this Court 
for reviewing a district court's suppression ruling is well 
known:

 
 
When 
reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer 
to the court's findings on factual issues unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004).  We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's decision because it 
is in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility, weigh the evidence 
and make the necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions.  Id.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search or seizure, however, is a question of law that we review de novo.  Id.

 
 

Hembree 
v. State, 2006 
WY 127, ¶ 7, 143 P.3d 905, 907 (Wyo. 2006).  See also Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 
9, 135 P.3d 620, 623 (Wyo. 2006); Gompf 
v. State, 2005 WY 112, ¶ 14, 120 P.3d 980, 984-85 (Wyo. 2005); Lindsay v. State, 2005 WY 34, ¶ 12, 108 P.3d 852, 855 (Wyo. 2005); Meadows v. 
State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 14, 65 P.3d 33, 36-37 (Wyo. 2003); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 
(Wyo. 1999).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   LaPlant argues that the district 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress.  As we recently stated in Hembree, such a general statement is 
decidedly unhelpful to this Court.  
Hembree, ¶¶ 8-10, 143 P.3d  at 
907-08.  Furthermore, the argument 
presented by LaPlant in his brief is confusing and lacks coherence, blurring 
what should be a clear distinction between individual concepts.  Consequently, this Court is left to 
ascertain LaPlant's fundamental argument(s) with little concrete guidance.  As best we can determine, LaPlant claims 
he was illegally seized in violation of Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution 
and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when Officer Ransom 
ordered him back into the vehicle at the outset of the investigatory stop.  According to LaPlant, Officer Ransom had 
no reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the initial 
seizure and, consequently, the incriminating drug evidence should have been 
suppressed.

 
 
[¶12]   Initially, we note that LaPlant did 
not articulate an independent state constitutional analysis to the district 
court regarding his suppression motion.  
LaPlant concedes as much on appeal, but urges this Court to provide a 
state constitutional ruling on his suppression issue in light of our decision in 
O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2005).  We decline to 
do so.

 
 
[¶13]   In O'Boyle, we considered the state 
constitutional claims because O'Boyle directly raised those claims in the 
district court through proper argument and briefing.  O'Boyle, ¶¶ 12-16, 21-22, 117 P.3d  at 
405-06, 407-08.  Here, on the other 
hand, LaPlant neither briefed nor argued in the district court that his 
detention violated the tenets of Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  LaPlant's only 
mention of the state constitution in the district court proceedings was a mere 
reference to Art. 1, § 4 in his motion to suppress.  This Court has consistently refused to 
consider state constitutional issues presented for the first time on appeal, 
particularly when the appeal arises from a guilty plea.  Custer, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d  at 624; Lindsay, ¶ 16, 108 P.3d  at 856; State v. Williams, 2004 WY 53, ¶ 16, 90 P.3d 85, 89 (Wyo. 2004); Bailey v. 
State, 12 P.3d 173, 177-78 (Wyo. 2000).  We find no reason to deviate from our 
longstanding rule under the facts of this case.  Accordingly, we will confine our 
analysis of LaPlant's complaint to Fourth Amendment 
principles.

 
 
[¶14]   The Fourth Amendment protects 
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]"  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  An investigatory stop represents a 
seizure which implicates the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, requires the 
presence of specific, articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or 
may be committing a criminal offense.  
Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 
637 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219-20 
(Wyo. 
1994)).  A dual inquiry exists for 
evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory stop: (1) whether the 
officer's actions were justified at the inception; and (2) whether it was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference 
in the first instance.  Putnam, 995 P.2d  at 637 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S. Ct. 675, 
680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985); Terry, 
392 U.S.  at 20-21, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879; Wilson, 874 P.2d at 223).  An officer's conduct is judged by an 
objective standard taking into account the totality of the circumstances.  Putnam, 995 P.2d  at 637 (citing Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 
1879-81; United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 965 (10th Cir. 1996)); see also Martindale v. State, 2001 WY 
52, ¶ 11, 24 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶15]   In this case, no question exists 
that LaPlant was seized when he was ordered back into the vehicle.  See McChesney, 988 P.2d  at 1074 (a 
seizure occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when a reasonable 
person under the circumstances would believe he is not free to leave).  LaPlant insists the seizure was not 
justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  The majority of LaPlant's argument is 
based on a faulty premise that his seizure was the product of a routine traffic 
stop.  He therefore attempts to 
analogize his situation to that of a passenger of a vehicle involved in a 
routine traffic stop.  Such an 
analysis is wholly inapplicable under the facts of this case. 

 
 
[¶16]   The encounter between Officer 
Ransom and LaPlant was an investigatory stop, the purpose of which was to 
investigate the reported stolen plates.  
The only question is whether Officer Ransom had reasonable suspicion to 
seize and detain LaPlant during the investigation.  After reviewing the record, we conclude 
that he did.  The record discloses 
that Officer Ransom observed a vehicle with stolen Idaho plates parked on 
LaPlant's property.  Around two and 
one-half hours later, Officer Ransom noticed the same vehicle with the stolen 
Idaho plates 
parked at a storage unit.  LaPlant 
was in the car.  When the officer 
approached the vehicle, LaPlant exited the car and attempted to walk away.  These facts and the rational inferences 
to be drawn from them support a reasonable suspicion that LaPlant may have been 
involved in illegal activity.  
Therefore, LaPlant's detention was constitutionally permissible under the 
circumstances.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶17]   We hold that the investigatory stop 
of LaPlant was supported by reasonable suspicion.  Because the stop was proper, no grounds 
exist mandating suppression of the incriminating drug evidence.  The district court's order denying 
LaPlant's motion to suppress is affirmed.