Title: State v. Bigelow

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

76 Ariz. 13 (1953) 258 P.2d 409 STATE v. BIGELOW. No. 1036. Supreme Court of Arizona. May 26, 1953. *14 Wm. P. Mahoney, Jr., County Atty., and James H. Green, Jr., Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for the State. Harold E. Whitney, of Phoenix, for defendant. PHELPS, Justice. This cause comes to us under the provisions of section 44-2401, A.C.A. 1939. There have been certified to us the following questions of law for our determination: Section 66-156, Cum.Supp. 1952, makes it unlawful for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within the state and subsection (d) thereof provides: It is to be noted by the specific provisions of the foregoing section that on second or subsequent convictions the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 90 days nor more than one year and in addition thereto, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of not more than $1,000. Patently, if imprisonment is to be meted out there is a minimum and a maximum. Likewise, if there is superimposed a fine there is a minimum and a maximum. The power vested in the court to grant probation upon conviction of any public offense is found in section 44-2229, A.C.A. 1939, which reads as follows: This is a general section applicable upon conviction of any public offense. By its terms the court is empowered to grant probation in any case "where discretion is conferred upon the court as to the extent of the punishment". As pointed out above, the statute providing the penalty on second or subsequent convictions of drunk driving provides the extent of the punishment, i.e., a maximum and a minimum, which language vests a discretion in the trial court, as to the extent of the punishment. By the express provisions of this statute conferring upon the judge the power to grant probation the court is expressly admonished that if it is of a mind to consider probation, it shall take into consideration any circumstances in mitigation of the punishment that might exist, or any other circumstances tending to show that the ends of justice would be subserved by granting probation. This all contemplates that the court will exercise a sound discretion in the premises, keeping in mind punishment where it is deserved, the protection of the public, the probability of the defendant offending again, and the rehabilitation of the defendant. It should be remembered that the right of the public to protection from injury and death in its use of the public highways transcends the rights of any individual citizen and if it appears probable that a defendant convicted of drunk driving a second time will repeat the offense, the interest of the public should not be ignored. In speaking of the discretion vested in the trial court to grant probation we said in Varela v. Merrill, 51 Ariz. 64, 74 P.2d 569, 574, that: Nevertheless we desire to point out to the trial courts that the legislature in fixing the penalty for second and subsequent convictions for drunk driving prescribed a more severe penalty. This undoubtedly for the reason, which is a matter of common knowledge, that an automobile, driven by a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor, is a dangerous instrumentality which is capable of maiming and wasting human life often the bodies and lives of innocent and unsuspecting persons. It would seem that second and subsequent offenders of this law are unconscious of their dangerous potentialities or are so debased that they don't care. We believe these considerations prompted the legislature to enact section 66-156, supra, but in view of the fact that the legislature, at that time, repealed section 66-402, A.C.A. 1939, which expressly made it mandatory upon the trial court to impose a jail sentence of not less than 30 nor more than 90 days for a first offense of drunk driving and having failed to expressly incorporate a similar mandate in the amended act we are of the opinion that it did not intend to divest the trial court of the discretion vested in it under the provisions of section 44-2229, supra, to suspend sentences. Until the legislature deems it proper to make it mandatory upon the trial judge to impose a jail sentence for conviction of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor with previous conviction, the conscience of the trial judge under his oath of office, and his responsibility to the people of the state, constitute the only restraint against abuse of this discretion. With reference to questions, one, two and three, we hold that the superior court is empowered to suspend sentences in such cases, and if a jail sentence is imposed it must be for a period of not less than 90 days. With respect to the fourth question, we are unable to find any authority under a statute similar to ours justifying the imposition of judgment and sentence providing for intermittent incarceration for any offense. The superior courts of the state have such powers as have been conferred upon them by the constitution and statutes of the state plus such common-law powers as are exercised by courts of similar character under the common law. If the crime did not exist at common law the superior court is limited to its statutory or constitutional definition as to what constitutes that particular crime. If it did exist at common law the court may supply any statutory defect in its definition by application of the common-law elements of the particular crime in question. The question here, however, concerns adjective law, administrative in character, but we believe the same rule applies as in substantive law above mentioned. Under our suspended *18 sentence statute, the court is authorized to suspend the imposition of sentence. With the one exception hereinafter quoted, it may not pronounce judgment and sentence fixing the term of such sentence and then suspend its execution. No power existed in courts at common law to suspend the imposition of sentence. The case of State v. Everett, 164 N.C. 399, 79 S.E. 274, 275, 47 L.R.A., N.S., 848, cited by the defendant in support of his contention that the courts of this state have inherent power to suspend sentence does not support the contention. In that case the court said: It will be observed that this amounts merely to a reprieve, a delay in the imposition of sentence for the purpose of ascertaining additional facts or for the purpose of relief from the crown but is not a suspended sentence in the sense in which our legislature used it in granting authority to the courts to exercise it. Therefore the power of the superior court relating to the suspension of sentences must be found in the statutes of the state. The superior courts of Arizona possess no inherent power to suspend the imposition or execution of sentences in any case. They have inherent power only to delay the passing of sentence for the purpose of further investigation. Varela v. Merrill, supra; Smith v. State, 37 Ariz. 262, 293 P. 23. The statute fixing the term of punishment for the crime involved here fixes a minimum and a maximum term. Under such statutes the court may impose a sentence for any period of time including the minimum, or any intermediate period between that and the maximum, or it may impose the maximum. When a person convicted of crime has entered upon the execution of a valid sentence the court has no jurisdiction to set it aside and render a new sentence. State v. McKelvey, 30 Ariz. 265, 246 P. 550, 551. It was said in that case: We believe the McKelvey case, supra, answers the last question. When a defendant serves one day in jail he has entered upon the execution of the judgment pronounced and the attempt to have the judgment executed by intermittent incarcerations amounts to a suspension of the execution thereof after defendant has entered upon its execution. This can neither be done at the time sentence is imposed or thereafter. If the court may pronounce a sentence in a drunk driving case to be served at interrupted periods, it can impose sentence of incarceration in the penitentiary for 10 to 20 years to be served only during the months of the year that would be most convenient to the defendant. This, of course, would be absurd. We therefore hold that the court must either impose one of the sentences as fixed by the statute or he may suspend the imposition of such sentence in proper cases. It has no authority whatever to impose a sentence providing for intermittent incarceration in jail. The submitted questions are therefore answered as follows: question one, yes; questions two, three and four, no. STANFORD, C.J., and LA PRADE, UDALL and WINDES, JJ., concur.