Title: Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc. v. Pfeifler

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
___________________________
Nos. SC01-2062 & SC01-2079
____________________________
PHYSICIANS HEALTHCARE PLANS, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND PFEIFLER, et ux.,
Respondents.
KURSHID KAHN, M.D., et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND PFEIFLER, et ux.,
Respondents.
[May 1, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc., Dr. Kurshid Kahn, and others petition this
Court for a writ of prohibition.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla.
Const.
1. In our recent review of the Report and Recommendations of the
Committee On Appointment and Assignment of Senior Judges, “we
acknowledge[d] the reality of problems in isolated cases with senior judges
presiding over complex and lengthy trials” and urged chief judges “to respond
directly to concerns expressed when such problems are presented to them.”  In re
Report & Recommendations of the Comm. on Appointment & Assignment of
Senior Judges, No. SC02-593, slip op. at 15 (Fla. May 1, 2003).  Despite such
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The instant case arose from a 1998 medical malpractice action by Raymond
and Cynthia Pfeifler against Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc. (Physicians), Dr.
Kurshid Kahn (Kahn), and others, which was set for trial on the senior judges’
docket in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit.  In July 2000, the codefendants filed a
motion in circuit court to return the case to the elected circuit judge, arguing that the
assignment to a senior judge violated both this Court’s general guidelines and
procedures for the assignment of senior judges and the Florida Constitution.  The
circuit court heard argument in November 2000, denied the motion, but certified the
issue as being of great public importance and invited the codefendants to seek a
writ of prohibition to resolve the issues presented.
Petitioners Physicians and Kahn have filed two separate petitions for writs of
prohibition with this Court.  Both petitions raise a number of challenges to the
senior judges’ docket in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit and ask this Court to
prohibit the assignment of senior judges to preside over “long trial” medical
malpractice and other “complex litigation” cases.1  We have consolidated the cases
problems, we declined to adopt “either a per se prohibition on the assignment of
senior judges to complex cases or a requirement that chief judges be required to
show a good cause for such assignments,” recognizing that “[c]hief judges must be
afforded deference and latitude in the management of judicial assignments and
dockets.”  Id. at 15-16.  Finally, we reminded the chief judges of their duty to
“select senior judges with the proper skills and experience to preside over complex
cases when such assignments are necessary” and their responsibility to
“periodically review[] the progress of all cases assigned to senior judges to ensure
expeditious and proper handling.”  Id. at 16.
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as they present the same issues for the Court’s resolution.
Before considering the challenges raised in the petitions, we find it necessary
to explain the background relating to the assignment of senior judges.  For the
purposes of judicial administration, a “retired judge” is defined as a judge not
engaged in the practice of law who has been a judicial officer of this state.  See Fla.
R. Jud. Admin. 2.030(a)(3)(B).  Section 25.073(1), Florida Statutes (2001), also
specifies that a retired judge may not have been defeated in seeking reelection or
retention to his or her last judicial office.  In 1990, Florida Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.030(a)(3) was amended to provide that a retired judge serving on
assignment to temporary judicial duty may be referred to by the honorary
designation "senior judge."  This designation had no effect on the responsibilities or
conduct of the retired judge.  See In re Amendment to Rules of Judicial Admin.,
560 So. 2d 786, 787 (Fla. 1990).
This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review judicial assignments based
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upon article V, section 2(a)-(b) of the Florida Constitution.  Article V, section 2(a)
gives this Court authority to adopt rules for the administrative supervision of all
courts.  Article V, section 2(b) gives the chief justice of this Court, as the chief
administrative officer of the judicial system, “the power to assign justices or judges,
including consenting retired justices or judges, to temporary duty in any court for
which the judge is qualified and to delegate to a chief judge of a judicial circuit the
power to assign judges for duty in that circuit.”  Florida Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.050(b)(4) delegates the chief justice's assignment power to the
chief judges of the judicial circuits to “assign any judge to temporary service for
which the judge is qualified in any court in the same circuit.”  “When a chief judge
exercises this delegated assignment authority, the judge is acting under the Chief
Justice's constitutional power to make temporary judicial assignments to ensure the
speedy, efficient, and proper administration of justice within the various circuits.” 
Wild v. Dozier, 672 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 1996).  Because of the vital role temporary
judicial assignments play in the administration of our court system, this Court must
have exclusive jurisdiction to review such assignments under its article V, section
2(a) authority to oversee the administrative supervision of all courts.  See id.
This Court has long recognized the necessity of assigning retired judges and
justices to judicial service in Florida courts.  See In re Assignments of Justices &
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Judges, 222 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1969).  As we have explained, “unless retired justices
and judges are assigned to . . . other courts, long delays in the discharge of case
loads of some of the trial courts will result.”  Id. at 23.  Thus, retired judges have
provided valuable service to Florida’s judicial system for many years by assisting
with increased caseloads and providing relief to active judges when they are ill or
disqualified.  See In re Rules Governing Assignment to Duty of Retired Justices &
Judges, 239 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1970).  “Were it not for the availability of this
resource, the delays in scheduling hearings and trials . . .  would be much greater.” 
In re Certification of Judicial Manpower, 592 So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 1992). 
Furthermore, “[t]he use of retired judges is the most cost effective and flexible
program we have to address calendaring problems and emergencies as they arise.” 
In re Certification of Judicial Manpower, 576 So. 2d 1303, 1307 (Fla. 1991).  We
have repeatedly noted that the services of retired judges “are available at much less
expense than full-time judges.”  In re Certification of Need for Additional Judges,
669 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1996).  Senior judges currently perform the work of
approximately thirty-five full-time judges, at a cost of about $2.9 million, a small
fraction of the cost of that number of full-time judges.  See Comm. On
Appointment and Assignment of Senior Judges, Report and Recommendations of
the Committee On Appointment and Assignment of Senior Judges, 4 (Feb. 22,
2. The Kahn petition makes two challenges that were not raised below:  the
time standards for civil litigation are violated by the use of senior judges and the
intent of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act is similarly violated.  This Court
should not address issues relating to judicial assignments that have not been raised
to the trial court.  See Wild.  Accordingly, we decline to address these challenges.
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2002) (on file with Clerk, Fla. Sup. Ct.).
It is against this background that we address the petitioners’ challenges to the
assignment of senior judges.  The petitioners claim that the use of senior judges
violates the suffrage rights of voters; the assignment of cases to the senior judges’
docket in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit constitutes an improper permanent
assignment and violates the constitutional prohibition against the creation of special
court divisions; the assignment of a retired judge who resides in another judicial
circuit violates the constitutional judicial qualifications; the assignment of complex
cases to the senior judge docket results in delay which  constitutes an
unconstitutional restraint on access to courts; judges younger than seventy years of
age and those who are not eligible for retirement benefits under the state retirement
system do not meet the constitutional definition of a retired judge; and senior judges
may not be appointed for matters of convenience.2
The petitioners argue that the use of senior judges violates their suffrage
rights.  See Art. V, § 10(b) Fla. Const. (providing for election of circuit court and
county court judges unless a majority of the voters in the jurisdiction approve a
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local option to select judges by merit selection and retention); id. § 11(b) (providing
that when a vacancy occurs on a circuit or county court where the judges are
elected by the voters the governor shall appoint a judge to fill the vacancy but an
election shall be held to fill the judicial office at the end of the appointed term).  The
petitioners contend that voters are being deprived of the right to have their cases
tried by judges who are accountable to the public because senior judges are not
elected to judicial office.  However, constitutional provisions must be read in pari
materia “to form [a] congruous whole so as not to render any language
superfluous.”  Department of Envtl. Prot. v. Millender, 666 So. 2d 882, 886  (Fla.
1996).  The Florida Constitution specifically grants the chief justice power to assign
retired justices or judges to temporary duty in any court for which they are qualified
and the authority to delegate this power to the chief judge of a judicial circuit.  See
art. V, § 2(b), Fla. Const.  Thus, where appointments fall within the parameters
outlined in this provision, the Florida Constitution obviously permits appointment
of nonelected judges and does not consider this to be a violation of suffrage rights.
Next the petitioners contend that the use of senior judges in the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit constitutes an improper permanent assignment, which violates the
chief justice’s constitutional authority to assign retired judges to “temporary duty.” 
Art. V, § 2(b).  Based upon our previous cases, we can glean some basic
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constitutional parameters relating to the temporal nature of judicial assignments.  A
county judge cannot be assigned to perform solely circuit court work, and vice
versa, unless the assignment is for a relatively short time.  See Payret v. Adams,
500 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1986); Crusoe v. Rowls, 472 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1985). 
However, a judge may be assigned to hear other court work on a temporary, regular
basis as long as the assignment is directed to a specified class of cases, is used to
maximize the efficient administration of justice, and supplements and assists the
judges in the other court rather than replaces them.  See Holsman v. Cohen, 667
So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1996); Wild; Crusoe.
In determining whether a judicial assignment is a temporary assignment under
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b)(4), this Court considers more than
the duration of the individual assignment.  The successive nature of the assignment,
the type of case covered by the assignment, and the practical effect of the
assignment on the court’s jurisdiction over a particular type of case also must be
considered.  See Wild.  At one end of the spectrum, this Court has concluded that
successive assignments totaling more than two years may be considered temporary
where the class of cases covered by the assignment is limited and the practical
effect is to assist the judges rather than usurp the court’s jurisdiction over a
particular type of case.  See Crusoe.  However, successive and repetitive
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assignments which might be valid if considered individually are not temporary
where the practical effect is to create a de facto permanent circuit judge by
administrative order.  See Payret.
The petitioners have not challenged specific successive senior judge
assignments, but instead make a blanket claim that the senior judge docket in the
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit is not a temporary assignment.  However, even
assuming that some of the senior judge assignments have been successive, this
Court has approved other successive judicial assignments.  See Wild (approving
successive six-month assignments spanning four years of county judge to preside
in circuit court over half of all felony cases in a county); Rivkind v. Patterson, 672
So. 2d 819, 820-21 (Fla. 1996) (approving successive monthly assignments
spanning several years as “a logical and lawful means to ensure the expeditious and
efficient resolution of domestic violence issues in the Eleventh Circuit”); J.G. v.
Holtzendorf, 669 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1996)(approving successive six-month
assignments of county judge to hear most, though not all, of the juvenile cases in
the county and a few other circuit court actions over the course of five years);
Holsman (approving successive monthly assignments spanning several years of
circuit court judge to handle a limited number of county court domestic violence
misdemeanors in special domestic violence court); but see Payret (disapproving
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successive one-year assignments of county court judge assigned to hear all circuit
court matters in special jury district of Fifteenth Judicial Circuit over five years ).
Under Wild, however, the successive nature of the assignment is only one of
three factors to be considered in determining whether an assignment is temporary. 
The type of case covered by the assignment and the practical effect of the
assignment on circuit court jurisdiction over a particular type of case must also be
considered.  See Wild, 672 So. 2d at 19.  In the instant case, there is a factual
dispute over the type of cases handled by the senior judge docket.  The petitioners
contend that the senior judge docket handles only complex, long-duration cases. 
The respondents counter that the records of the senior judge docket show that a
wide range of circuit court cases and matters are being handled by senior judges. 
In fact, the circuit court’s assignment records indicate that cases are assigned to
senior judges primarily because of overcrowded and backlogged calendars in both
the civil and criminal court dockets or because the case is likely to be one of long
duration.  The docket records of the elected judges also indicate that not all long-
duration trials are transferred to the senior judge docket.  Senior judge utilization
statistics reflect senior judge assignments in each division of the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, and far more in the criminal division than in any other.  Further, as
noted in the procedures for assignment of senior judges issued by this Court and
3.  Article V, section 7 of the Florida Constitution provides that “[a]ll courts
except the supreme court may sit in divisions as may be established by general
law.”  Section 43.30, Florida Statutes (2001), provides that divisions may be
created by a local rule which is approved by this Court.  Thus, a special division
may not be created by means of the temporary appointment power of the chief
justice which is delegated to the chief judges of the circuit courts.
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the forms for senior judge assignments, we conclude that the senior judge
assignments in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit are compatible with the instructions
and the guidance of this Court.
As to the final Wild factor of the practical effect of the assignment on circuit
court jurisdiction, the senior judge assignments here are used to maximize the
efficient administration of justice and have the practical effect of supplementing and
assisting the circuit court judges rather than usurping the judges’ jurisdiction over a
particular type of case.  Under these criteria, we conclude the senior judge
assignments are temporary and thus do not violate the constitutional parameters of
article V, section 2(b).
Unlike the judicial assignment cases cited above, the petitioners here
challenge more than the temporal nature of the senior judge assignments.  The
petitioners also contend that the senior judge docket is a de facto complex case
division which cannot be established by administrative order, but must be
established through a local rule which is approved by this Court.3  The petitioners
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note that the administrative judge who handles requests for transfer to the senior
judge docket in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit has described the docket as “our
complex litigation division,” handling “cases that take more than three weeks to
try.”
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b), chief judges of
the circuit courts issue administrative orders to coordinate administrative matters
within their jurisdiction.  Unlike local rules, administrative orders generally do not
have to be approved by this Court.  As explained in In re Report of Commission
on Family Courts, 646 So. 2d 178, 181 (Fla. 1994), divisions of Florida courts are
to be established through local rules approved by this Court.  See also art. V, § 7,
Fla. Const.; § 43.30, Fla. Stat. (2001).  Under the provisions of rule 2.050, local
rules must be approved by a majority of the judges in a circuit, must be noticed and
advertised, and must be approved by this Court.
Thus, if the senior judge docket is deemed a “division” it would need to be
created by local rule and approved by this Court.  However, this Court has
approved the creation of a drug “division” of the criminal court created by
administrative order in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit.  See Mann v. Chief Judge of
the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 696 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1997).  As this Court
explained, despite its characterization as a division, the drug court was “more
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properly viewed as a specialized section or subdivision of the criminal division of
the circuit court.”  Id. at 1185.  In Mann, we cited our previous opinion in
Administrative Order Fourth Judicial Circuit (Division of Courts), 378 So. 2d 286,
286 (Fla. 1979), for the proposition that the Florida Constitution “only requires the
establishment of subject matter divisions, i.e., criminal, civil, juvenile, probate, and
traffic.”  Accordingly, we concluded that the drug court division at issue in Mann
was properly created by administrative order.  696 So. 2d at 1185.  We further
noted that it would place “too great a burden upon the efficient administration of
justice . . . [t]o require every specialized section of the major subject-matter
divisions of a court to be approved by local rule.”  Id.
In light of our reasoning in Mann and the senior judge utilization statistics for
the circuit, we conclude that the use of senior judges to relieve overcrowding of the
civil and criminal dockets in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit does not constitute a
complex case division that requires approval by local rule.  Thus, the senior judge
assignments are proper via administrative order of the chief judge.
Next the petitioners argue that the assignment of a retired judge who resides
in a different judicial circuit violates the constitutional eligibility requirements of
article V, section 8 of the Florida Constitution.  This section provides in pertinent
part that “[n]o person shall be eligible for office of justice or judge of any court
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unless the person is an elector of the state and resides in the territorial jurisdiction
of the court.”  Despite this seeming constitutional restriction, this Court has ruled
that a circuit judge may be assigned temporarily to serve in a circuit other than the
one in which he or she was elected.  See Card v. State, 497 So. 2d 1169 (Fla.
1986); see also Judges of Polk County Court v. Ernst, 615 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1993) (concluding that a county judge may be temporarily assigned to serve
outside the county where elected).  Based upon these cases, we find no impediment
to a similar temporary assignment of a senior judge.  Further, as we explained in In
re Report & Recommendations of the Committee on Appointment & Assignment
of Senior Judges, No. SC02-593 (Fla. May 1, 2003), “the accountability for senior
judges rests with the chief justice rather than the voters of a particular circuit or
district.  Because the chief justice’s authority and responsibility extend throughout
the state, the chief justice can assign a senior judge to duty without limitation to the
jurisdiction of the senior judge’s prior service.”  Slip op. at 18.  Thus, we find no
merit to this challenge.
The petitioners argue that the assignment of complex cases to the senior
judge docket results in delay which constitutes an unconstitutional restraint on
access to courts.  See art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. (“The courts shall be open to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale,
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denial, or delay.”).  However, most of the petitioners’ delay arguments seem to be
addressed to the crowded civil docket and the resulting delay of civil litigation in
general.  The petitioners have made no convincing arguments that these cases
would be resolved any more quickly if they remained on the regular civil docket. 
Statistics indicate that the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit is very efficient in its
management and administration of judges and the conduct of its jury trials.  It is
counterintuitive to assume judicial efficiency would improve if we reduced the
number of judges handling cases in the circuit by eliminating the use of senior
judges.  As noted above, senior judges currently perform the work of
approximately thirty-five full-time judges statewide.  Our judicial system would be
severely hamstrung without these services.  See, e.g., In re Certification of Judicial
Manpower, 592 So. 2d 241, 246 (Fla. 1992) (“Florida trial courts have continued to
address workload pressures by relying heavily on the temporary assignment of
senior judges.”).  We would all like to see cases disposed of expeditiously. 
However, limited judicial resources and burgeoning court dockets require that the
chief judges retain the freedom to manage the resources for “the efficient and
proper administration of all courts within [the] circuit.”  Fla. R. Jud. Admin.
2.050(b)(3).  “[A]s the administrative officer of all courts within a judicial circuit,
the chief judge is best equipped to assess the needs of each trial court and to
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allocate the judicial labor available within the circuit accordingly.”  Wild, 672 So. 2d
at 17-18 (footnote omitted).
The petitioners make two challenges relating to the definition of a “retired
judge.”  First, they argue that only those judges who have reached the constitutional
age of retirement, seventy years of age, meet the definition of a retired judge who
may be temporarily appointed to judicial service under article V, section 2(b).  The
petitioners rely upon the judicial eligibility provision in article V, section 8 of the
Florida Constitution, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o justice or judge
shall serve after attaining the age of seventy years except upon temporary
assignment or to complete a term, one-half of which has been served.”  The
petitioners contend that when the mandatory retirement provision in article V,
section 8 is read in pari materia with the judicial appointment power in article V,
section 2(b), we must conclude that only those judges who have reached retirement
age are eligible for temporary appointment.  Second, the petitioners contend that
only those judges who are eligible for retirement benefits under the state retirement
system qualify as retired judges who may be temporarily appointed to judicial
service under article V, section 2(b).  Thus, the petitioners argue, persons who have
resigned from judicial office or have chosen not to seek reelection to judicial office
are not qualified for appointment as senior judges.  The petitioners argue that these
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eligibility restrictions on the appointment of senior judges diminish the intrusion on
the constitutional right to suffrage as the judges who have performed the required
years of judicial service have withstood the challenge of election and reelection and
have a demonstrated history of support by their electors.
We are not persuaded by either argument.  The Florida Constitution gives the
chief justice authority to assign “retired justices or judges” to temporary duty.  Art.
V, § 2(b), Fla. Const.  For the purpose of judicial administration, a retired judge is
defined as “a judge not engaged in the practice of law who has been a judicial
officer of this state.”  Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.030(a)(3)(B).  Florida Statutes also
define a retired judge as “any former justice or judge” who has not been defeated in
seeking reelection or retention in his or her last judicial office and is not engaged in
the practice of law.  See § 25.073(1), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added).  Thus,
under both the Rules of Judicial Administration and the Florida Statutes there are
only two restrictions on the eligibility of retired judges who may be assigned to
temporary judicial duty:  they may not be engaged in the practice of law; and they
may not have been defeated for reelection or retention in their last judicial office.
In our recent review of the Report and Recommendations of the Committee
on the Appointment and Assignment of Senior Judges, we concluded that 
“deference to the constitutional electoral process dictate[s]” that “judges or justices
4. At the time of our decision in Spector, appellate judges and Supreme
Court justices were subject to election by the voters.  In November 1976, Florida
voters approved an amendment whereby appellate judges and justices are subject to
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who fail to win reelection or retention in their last judicial position are not eligible for
senior judge service.”  In re Report & Recommendations of the Committee on
Appointment & Assignment of Senior Judges, No. SC02-593, slip op. at 6 (Fla.
May 1, 2003).  However, the same concerns do not attend the temporary
assignment of qualified and competent judges who have chosen to resign from
judicial office before reaching the constitutional age of retirement or who are not yet
eligible for retirement benefits under the state retirement system.  Thus, we find no
merit to the definition challenges raised by the petitioners.
Finally, the petitioners argue that senior judges may not be appointed for
matters of convenience and instead all senior judge appointments must be measured
by an “emergency of public business” standard.  The petitioners cite our opinion in
Spector v. Glisson, 305 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1974), to support the “emergency of
public business” standard.  Spector involved the question of whether a Supreme
Court justice’s resignation tendered for a future date created a current vacancy that
should be filled during an upcoming general election.  In concluding that a present
vacancy had been created and that the vacancy could be filled in the upcoming
election,4 this Court stated:  
merit selection and retention.  See art. V, § 10(a), Fla. Const.
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It has been said that the only excuse for the appointment of any officer
made elective under the law is founded on the emergency of the public
business and that when an elective office is made vacant the policy of
the law is to give the people a chance to fill it as soon as possible.
Id. at 781 (quoting 63 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees § 128).  When
considered in its proper context, this opinion neither addressed the chief justice’s
constitutional power to assign judges to temporary duty nor created an “emergency
of public business” before that power could be exercised. 
The express language of the constitutional provision which gives the chief
justice the power to appoint judges does not restrict the power to “emergencies.” 
Indeed, this Court has consistently measured the power to make temporary
assignments by a standard of flexibility and efficiency.  See, e.g., Rivkind, 672 So.
2d at 820-21 (“We find that the judicial assignments at issue constitute a logical and
lawful means to ensure the expeditious and efficient resolution of domestic violence
issues in the Eleventh Circuit.”) (emphasis added); Wild, 672 So. 2d at 18 (“When
a chief judge exercises this delegated assignment authority, the judge is acting under
the Chief Justice's constitutional power to make temporary judicial assignments to
ensure the speedy, efficient, and proper administration of justice within the various
circuits.”) (emphasis added); Holsman, 667 So. 2d at 772 (“The assignment . . . is
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used to maximize the efficient administration of justice . . . .”); Crusoe, 472 So. 2d
at 1165 (“Flexibility must be given the chief judge to utilize effectively judicial
manpower in the mutual assistance of each trial court.”).  Thus, we conclude that
an assignment which meets the constitutional requirement of “temporary duty” need
not be based on an emergency of public business.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the assignment of cases
to the senior judge docket in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit is constitutional and in
accord with applicable law.  Thus, we deny the petitions for writ of prohibition, lift
the stay on further proceedings below, and remand this cause to the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS, J., and SHAW and HARDING, Senior Justices,
concur.
WELLS, J., concurs with an opinion.
LEWIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., concurring.
I concur with the majority's decision.
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I write to express my view, however, that it is clearly necessary to the proper
administration of justice in our trial courts for the chief judge and trial counsel in
each circuit to have an ongoing meaningful discussion about the type of problems
which have been raised in these proceedings and before our Committee on the
Appointment and Assignment of Senior Judges.  We on this Court are very
dependent on the chief judges of the circuits to exercise their discretion in the
administration of the circuits because each circuit has different problems which can
only be effectively worked upon by those who have daily experience at the local
level.  The chief judges and their administrative judges benefit from regular and
substantive meetings with trial counsel.  Many of our chief judges presently do this. 
However, I believe that there needs to be a regularly working committee in each
circuit for this purpose.  I urge that in each circuit a bench-bar committee be
established and that there be a meeting of this committee at least once every three
months.  This committee should consist of the chief judge of the circuit, all
administrative judges in the circuit, and selected counsel participants who are active
trial lawyers in the circuit.  I suggest that the counsel participants be either some or
all of the circuit's representatives on the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar or
their nominees.
5.  While the problem presented here may be unique to the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, that fact, standing alone, does not relieve this Court of its
responsibility to ensure that the circuit adhere to constitutional constructs governing
judicial assignments.
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LEWIS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the rejection of several challenges presented here, I write
to express my disagreement with the majority’s determination that the assignments
of senior judges in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit are indeed “temporary,” and that
the circuit has not effectively created a special senior division for the purpose of
trying complex civil cases.5  I believe that the pattern of assigning such cases in that
circuit exceeds the constitutional parameters permitting the assignment of senior
judges for temporary service.  In approving this de facto division, I believe this
Court has permitted the concept of temporary assignment – conceived to serve
important public interests – to evolve into a constitutionally impermissible broad
rule of convenience.  Moreover, I believe a separate “complex case” or “senior
judges’” docket has been created in violation of this State’s constitutionally
mandated court structure.  Thus, for the reasons articulated herein, I must dissent
from the majority’s determination that the assignment process in the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit is constitutionally proper.
The ability of the Chief Justice of this Court to make temporary judicial
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assignments is grounded in the need to ensure the speedy, efficient, and proper
administration of justice.  See Wild v. Dozier, 672 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 1996). 
Senior judges are a vital part of achieving this important goal.  By appointing senior
judges, judicial circuits can increase case disposition, address court emergencies,
and solve calendar conflicts in a cost-effective manner.  However, neither the need
for efficiency nor the corresponding ability of senior judges to meet that objective
justifies exceeding the constitutional requirement that nonelected judges receive
assignment on a temporary basis, only.  See art. V, § 2(b), Fla. Const.  We cannot
allow the goal of judicial efficiency, however laudable it may be, to trammel clear
and direct constitutional directives.  See Wild, 672 So. 2d at 21 (Kogan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In reaching its decision, the majority must engage in a “judicial wink” as it
considers the true definition of “temporary.”  As recognized by this Court,
“[t]emporary is an antonym for permanent.”  Crusoe v. Rowls, 472 So. 2d 1163,
1165 (Fla. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A temporary assignment, by
definition, cannot “usurp, supplant, or effectively deprive circuit court jurisdiction
of a particular type of case on a permanent basis.”  Id.  Our decision in Payret v.
Adams, 500 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1986), compels us to be wary against circumstances
rendering de facto permanency to allegedly temporary assignments.  See id. at 138
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(invalidating an assignment that was successive and repetitive, having been renewed
annually for a period of five years).  Thus, we must examine the judicial
assignment’s duration as well as its nature, the type of cases covered, and the
practical effect of the assignment on circuit court jurisdiction over a particular type
of case.  See Wild, 672 So. 2d at 19.
The regularized process of assigning complex civil cases to senior judges in
the Seventeenth Circuit effectively supplants the jurisdiction of active judges over
those matters.  The invalidity of this process is not mitigated by the fact that not
every complex civil litigation matter is assigned to the senior judges’ docket.  A
substantial percentage are, with consequent impact on the rights of the parties
involved.  There is no corresponding emergency, such as a violation of the speedy
trial rules, to justify consistent reassignment of these cases.  Indeed, the only
justification offered is the mantra of judicial efficiency, which, however noble,
cannot create its own constitutional foundation that so clearly violates constitutional
strictures.
In determining that no special division has been created in the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, the majority, in my opinion, glosses over the practical de facto
effect of the process in operation there.  By giving notice that the trial of a case will
likely exceed two-and-a-half weeks, attorneys can almost ensure placement on the
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docket slated for hearing by a senior judge.  The process effectively allocates cases
to a distinct group of judges – not by subject matter – but by the complexity of the
case and projected length of trial.  Cf. Mann v. Chief Judge of the Thirteenth
Judicial Circuit, 696 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 1997).  Thus, a distinct de facto
“complex case” division has been created in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit
without issuance of a local rule in accordance with proper procedure.
In Broward County, senior judges have become a de facto permanent circuit
division for the trial of complex civil cases not by the method authorized by the
Florida Constitution, but by judicial direction.  While I understand the demands
placed upon those responsible for the administration of the local system and the
current status of resources, a de facto system such as this exists beyond
constitutional parameters, and I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion
as outlined herein.
Two Cases Consolidated:
Two Original Proceedings - Writ of Prohibition
Louise H. McMurray and Douglas M. McIntosh of McIntosh, Sawran, Peltz &
Cartaya, Miami, Florida, on behalf of Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc.; F. Bryant
Blevins of Marlow, Connell, Valerius, Abrams, Adler & Newman, Miami, Florida,
on behalf of Ronald S. Gup, M.A., etc.; Kevin P. O'Connor of O'Connor,
Chimpoulis, Restani, Marreo & McAllister, P.A., Coral Gables, Florida, on behalf
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of Ralph Greenwasser, Jr., D.O.; and Nancy W. Gregoire and Michael J. Rotundo
of Bunnell, Woulfe, Kirschbaum, Keller, McIntyre & Gregoire, P.A., Fort
Lauderdale, Florida, on behalf of Khurshid Khan, M.D., et al.,  
Petitioners
Gary M. Farmer, Jr. of Gillespie, Goldman, Kronengold & Farmer, P.A., Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Charles M.
Fahlbusch, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Michael S.
Freedland of The Law Offices of Freedland & Glassman, Weston, Florida,   
for Respondents