Title: DeBruce v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MALACHAI Z. DEBRUCE, 
(f/k/a Michael D. Glenn), 
 
 
Defendant Below– 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below– 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 264, 2019 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below–Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID 1608006240 (K) 
§   
§ 
§   
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 25, 2019 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 29, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
Upon consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion 
to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Malachai Z. DeBruce, appeals from the Superior 
Court’s June 7, 2019 order sentencing him for his second violation of 
probation (“VOP”).  The State has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below 
on the ground that it is manifest on the face of DeBruce’s opening brief that 
his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm.   
 
(2) 
The record reflects that DeBruce pleaded guilty to one count of 
felony theft on August 25, 2016.  The Superior Court sentenced DeBruce to 
 
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two years of Level V imprisonment, suspended after six months for one year 
of Level III probation.  In February of 2018, the Superior Court found 
DeBruce had violated the terms of his probation and sentenced him to eighteen 
months of Level V incarceration, suspended after six months for nine months 
of Level IV work release to be followed by one year of Level III probation.  
DeBruce filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 35(a), which the Superior Court denied.  DeBruce appealed. 
 
(3) 
On appeal, the State acknowledged that the total suspended 
portion of DeBruce’s original sentence was eighteen months and, thus, 
conceded that the Superior Court’s VOP sentence totaling twenty-seven 
months was illegal.  We reversed the Superior Court’s denial of DeBruce’s 
motion for correction of an illegal sentence and remanded with directions for 
the Superior Court to correct its sentence by reducing the Level III portion of 
DeBruce’s VOP sentence from one year to three months.1 
 
(4) 
On remand, the Superior Court sentenced DeBruce to eighteen 
months of Level V incarceration, suspended after six months for nine months 
of Level IV work release to be followed by three months of Level III 
probation.  As corrected, DeBruce’s sentence totaled eighteen months. 
                                                 
1 DeBruce v. State, 2018 WL 5809814 (Del. Nov. 5, 2018). 
 
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(5) 
A probation administrative warrant was issued for DeBruce on 
May 23, 2019, alleging that DeBruce had violated the terms of his probation 
by committing new criminal offenses.  On June 7, 2019, the Superior Court 
found DeBruce had violated the terms of his probation and sentenced him to 
eleven months of Level V incarceration, with credit for time served.  DeBruce 
appeals. 
(6) 
DeBruce does not dispute that he violated the terms of his 
probation.  His sole issue on appeal relates to his sentence.  DeBruce argues 
that the Superior Court did not comply with this Court’s prior order and 
contends that, under that order, the maximum Level V sentence the court 
could have imposed at his June 7, 2019 VOP hearing was three months, or the 
Level III portion of his corrected sentence.  DeBruce is incorrect.  We reversed 
DeBruce’s February 2018 VOP sentence because it exceeded the balance of 
the Level V time remaining under his original sentence and the Superior Court 
corrected DeBruce’s sentence to comply with our order.  This Court’s review 
of a sentence generally is limited to determining whether the sentence is 
within statutory limits.2  Once the State has proven by a preponderance of 
evidence that a VOP has occurred, the Superior Court is authorized to impose 
any period of incarceration up to and including the balance of the Level V 
                                                 
2 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842-43 (Del. 1992). 
 
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time remaining to be served on the original sentence.3  Accordingly, the 
Superior Court could have sentenced DeBruce up to the balance of the Level 
V time remaining on his original sentence—at that point, twelve months.  His 
sentence of eleven months of Level V time was not improper.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
3 11 Del. C. § 4334(c).