Title: State Board of Retirement v. Finneran

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-12069 
 
STATE BOARD OF RETIREMENT  vs.  THOMAS M. FINNERAN & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 8, 2016. - April 5, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Budd, 
JJ.2 
 
 
Retirement.  State Board of Retirement.  Public Employment, 
Forfeiture of retirement benefits.  Constitutional Law, 
Excessive fines clause.  Practice, Civil, Action in nature 
of certiorari. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 4, 2015. 
 
 
The case was reported by Lenk, J. 
 
 
 
David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Nicholas Poser (Thomas R. Kiley also present) for Thomas M. 
Finneran. 
 
 
1 Justices of the Dorchester Division of the Boston 
Municipal Court Department, as nominal parties. 
 
 
2 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
                     
2 
 
 
LENK, J.  Former Speaker of the House Thomas Finneran 
pleaded guilty in the United States District Court in 2007 to 
one count of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503.  The obstruction of justice conviction related to false 
testimony that he had provided in relation to a Federal court 
action challenging the 2001 redistricting act, St. 2001, c. 125 
(redistricting act).  Finneran had played a significant role in 
the development of the redistricting act from the point of its 
inception but denied under oath that he had played any part in 
its development.  Indeed, he testified that he had not even seen 
the plan before it was released to the full House of 
Representatives. 
 
After his conviction, Finneran was informed by the State 
Retirement Board (board) that his crime constitutes a "violation 
of the laws applicable to his office or position," pursuant to 
G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), requiring the forfeiture of his pension.  
Finneran appealed from the board's determination to the Boston 
Municipal Court.  A Boston Municipal Court judge reversed, 
discerning no direct link between Finneran's "conviction and his 
position as a Member and/or Speaker of the House."  We reach the 
opposite conclusion, and accordingly reverse the decision of the 
Boston Municipal Court judge and affirm the conclusion of the 
board. 
3 
 
1.  Background.3  Finneran was first elected to the House of 
Representatives in 1978, as the representative of the Twelfth 
Suffolk District.  Thereafter, he was reelected every two years, 
and concurrently served as Speaker of the House from 1996 until 
his resignation in 2004. 
In 2001, Finneran played a key role in shepherding the 
Commonwealth through the redistricting process pursuant to the 
2000 decennial United States census.  The Legislature bore the 
responsibility of revising the Commonwealth's legislative 
districts to account for the change in population reflected in 
the census.  Toward that end, the Legislature established a 
joint committee (committee) comprised of members of the Senate 
and House of Representatives to put together a redistricting 
plan.  Finneran, as Speaker, appointed the House members of the 
committee.  He also took part in the planning process and was 
consulted in regard to "virtually all" of the difficult 
decisions concerning the committee's redistricting plan. 
One week before the plan was released to the full House, 
Finneran convened and attended a meeting concerning the 
redistricting plan.  At that meeting, he reviewed the proposed 
plan in detail and suggested several changes to it that 
 
3 The facts, which the parties do not materially dispute, 
are taken from the Boston Municipal Court judge's decision and 
the administrative record, including the plea colloquy in the 
Federal court. 
                     
4 
 
pertained to his own district, at least some of which became 
part of the final redistricting plan.  In the days leading up to 
the release of the plan, Finneran met with several of his fellow 
House members and explained to them how it would affect their 
districts.  Shortly after the joint committee released the 
redistricting plan to the full House, then Acting Governor Jane 
Swift signed the redistricting act, enacting the plan into law 
on November 8, 2001.4  The redistricting act, among other things, 
increased the proportion of eligible white voters in Finneran's 
House district. 
In June, 2002, a group of African-American and Latino 
voters filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts against Finneran, then Secretary 
of the Commonwealth William Galvin, and Acting Governor Swift,5 
challenging the redistricting act as it applied to House 
districts in the Boston area.  They contended that the House 
districts were redrawn with the purpose of limiting the voting 
power of African-American and Latino voters, in violation of the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and that the 
redistricting act had a discriminatory effect against such 
 
4 The plan did not change significantly between the time it 
was released to the full House and when it was signed into law. 
 
5 The plaintiffs sued all of the defendants in their 
official capacities. 
                     
5 
 
voters in violation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973(b).  In particular, they argued that Finneran's Twelfth 
Suffolk District was redrawn to decrease the number of minority 
voters in the district and "super-pack" the neighboring Sixth 
Suffolk District with African-American, Latino, and other 
minority voters.  In May, 2003, the plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint naming only Secretary Galvin as a defendant.  The case 
was tried before a three-judge panel appointed by the Chief 
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit. 
Finneran was deposed during the course of the lawsuit, and 
testified voluntarily on behalf of the defense in 
November, 2003.  The plaintiffs cross-examined Finneran on, 
among other things, the role he played in relation to the 
formation of the redistricting act and, in particular, any 
effort he had undertaken or role he had had in facilitating the 
changes made to his House district.  In his testimony, Finneran 
conceded that he had engaged in communications with the House 
members on the redistricting committee, but denied any 
substantive knowledge of the redistricting plan prior to its 
publication to the full House.  When asked whether he had 
reviewed "any of the redistricting plans as the process 
proceeded," Finneran responded, "Not as the process proceeded.  
No sir."  Finneran subsequently falsely testified that he first 
6 
 
saw the redistricting plan after it was released to the full 
House. 
In February, 2004, the Federal District Court panel ruled 
for the plaintiffs on the ground that the redistricting act had 
resulted in a discriminatory impact on African-American voters, 
in violation of the Voting Rights Act.  Black Political Task 
Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 294 (D. Mass. 2004).6  The 
panel also stated in a footnote that "[a]lthough Speaker 
Finneran denied any involvement in the redistricting process, 
the circumstantial evidence strongly suggests the opposite 
conclusion."  Id. at 295 n.3.  One year later, in June, 2005, a 
Federal grand jury indicted Finneran on three counts of perjury 
and one count of obstruction of justice in relation to his false 
deposition testimony.7  On January 5, 2007, Finneran pleaded 
6 As a result of this conclusion, the court did not reach 
the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments.  Black Political Task 
Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 294 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 
7 The charge of obstruction of justice alleged that Finneran 
had provided "misleading and false statements" in his testimony 
concerning 
 
"(a) whether [he] had reviewed and seen a redistricting 
plan before the [c]ommittee plan was filed with the Clerk 
of the House of Representatives . . . ; (b) when [Finneran] 
first had information about the [c]ommittee's proposed 
changes to the [Twelfth] Suffolk District . . . ; 
(c) whether [Finneran] spoke with [the committee chairman] 
about any matters relating to the configuration of the 
[Twelfth] Suffolk District . . . ; (d) whether [Finneran] 
had knowledge of the scope of the work performed by 
[attorney] Lawrence DiCara in the crafting of the 
                     
7 
 
guilty to obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1503, and received a sentence of eighteen months of probation 
and a $25,000 fine.8 
In January, 2007, the board ceased payments of Finneran's 
pension on the ground of his conviction, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 32, § 15 (4).9  Following a hearing in April, 2012, the 
hearing officer concluded that Finneran's pension is forfeit 
under G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), because he had "been convicted of a 
[c]ommittee plan . . . ; (e) whether [Finneran] had 
information within his custody and control regarding the 
racial characteristics of the precincts he lost in 
redistricting and the precincts he gained in redistricting, 
other than that to which he testified in his deposition 
. . . ; (f) the extent of [Finneran's] knowledge, at the 
time of his deposition, regarding what neighborhoods were 
removed from the [Twelfth] Suffolk District during 
redistricting, [and] the areas that were added to the 
[Twelfth] Suffolk District during redistricting . . . ; and 
(g) whether [Finneran] had within his custody and control a 
calendar which recorded campaign activities or events, 
including fundraisers, held by or on his behalf . . . ." 
 
 
8 The three perjury charges were dismissed as part of 
Finneran's plea bargain. 
 
 
9 General Laws c. 32, § 15 (4), provides: 
 
 
"In no event shall any member after final conviction 
of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws 
applicable to his office or position, be entitled to 
receive a retirement allowance under the provisions of [§§ 
1 to 28], inclusive, nor shall any beneficiary be entitled 
to receive any benefits under such provisions on account of 
such member.  The said member or his beneficiary shall 
receive, unless otherwise prohibited by law, a return of 
his accumulated total deductions; provided, however, that 
the rate of regular interest for the purpose of calculating 
accumulated total deductions shall be zero." 
                                                                  
8 
 
criminal offense involving violation of the laws applicable to 
his office or position."  The hearing officer's conclusion 
rested on three primary grounds:  (1) Finneran had testified in 
his official capacity; (2) the "subject matter of his testimony 
was . . . directly tied to his official duties;" and 
(3) "Finneran’s duties as a legislator and the mandate of his 
oath [to uphold the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth] . . . gave him a heightened 
obligation to be forthcoming with the Court" given that the case 
concerned the right to vote.  The board subsequently voted to 
accept the hearing officer's decision. 
Finneran appealed to the Boston Municipal Court under G. L. 
c. 32, § 16 (3).  A Boston Municipal Court judge reversed the 
board's decision, concluding that Finneran's conviction does not 
bear "a direct factual link to his position as a House Member 
and/or Speaker" and that "there is no substantial evidence to 
support the [b]oard's conclusion that Finneran's conviction 
violated a core function of his position as a House Member 
and/or Speaker because there is no evidence in the record of any 
code, rule or law applicable to Finneran's public position that 
connects his conviction with his office."  The board filed a 
complaint in the nature of certiorari in the county court, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4, asserting that the Boston 
Municipal Court judge had committed an error of law in ruling 
9 
 
that there is no "direct link between the criminal offense 
Finneran committed . . . and his official duties as a Member and 
Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives."  A 
single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full 
court. 
2.  Discussion.  The primary question before us is whether 
Finneran's pension is subject to forfeiture under G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (4).  Finneran also contends that, even if we were to 
determine that forfeiture is appropriate under the statute, it 
nonetheless would constitute an excessive fine in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We 
consider each issue in turn. 
a.  Standard of review.  General Laws c. 249, § 4, 
"provides for limited judicial review in the nature of 
certiorari to correct errors of law in administrative 
proceedings where judicial review is otherwise 
unavailable."  State Bd. of Retirement v. Bulger, 446 Mass. 169, 
173 (2006) (Bulger).  We may "correct only a substantial error 
of law, evidenced by the record, which adversely affects a 
material right of the plaintiff . . . [and] may rectify only 
those errors of law which have resulted in manifest injustice to 
the plaintiff or which have adversely affected the real 
interests of the general public."  Garney v. Massachusetts 
Teachers' Retirement Sys., 469 Mass. 384, 388 (2014), 
10 
 
quoting Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Auditor of the 
Commonwealth, 430 Mass. 783, 790 (2000). 
b.  Forfeiture pursuant to G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4).  The 
gravamen of the board's argument is that Finneran's conviction 
of obstruction of justice concerns a "violation of the laws 
applicable to his office or position" under G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 (4), and that his pension is thereby forfeit.  General Laws 
c. 32, § 15 (4), provides that "[i]n no event shall any member 
[of the State employees’ retirement system] after final 
conviction of a criminal offense involving violation of the laws 
applicable to his office or position, be entitled to receive a 
retirement allowance." 
Our review of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (4), "is guided by the 
familiar principle that 'a statute must be interpreted according 
to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated.'"  Retirement Bd. of Somerville v. Buonomo, 467 
Mass. 662, 668 (2014) (Buonomo), quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 
Mass. 444, 447 (1934).  Section 15 (4) "is considered to be 
penal" in nature, and "its language must be construed narrowly, 
11 
 
not stretched to accomplish an unexpressed result."  See Bulger, 
446 Mass. at 174-175. 
Section 15 (4) was enacted in response to this court's 
decision in Collatos v. Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684 
(1986), and was adopted to "broaden the range of crimes that 
would lead to pension forfeiture."  See Gaffney v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 423 Mass. 1, 3 (1996).  In that case, we 
observed that § 15 (4) was not meant to "operate only in cases 
of violations of highly specialized crimes addressing official 
actions," nor to facilitate forfeiture "as a sequelae of any and 
all criminal convictions."  Id. at 4-5.  Rather, "[l]ooking to 
the facts of each case for a direct link between the criminal 
offense and the member's office or position best effectuates the 
legislative intent of § 15 (4)."  Id. at 5.  "This 'direct link' 
requirement 'does not mean that the crime itself must reference 
public employment or the employee's particular position or 
responsibilities,' . . . or that the crime necessarily must have 
been committed at or during work."  See Garney, 469 Mass. at 
389, quoting Maher v. Justices of the Quincy Div. of the Dist. 
Court Dep't, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 612, 616 (2006).  Rather, the 
"substantive touchstone intended by the General Court is 
criminal activity connected with the office or 
position."  Gaffney, 423 Mass. at 4. 
12 
 
The "direct link" standard discussed in Gaffney blossomed 
into two separate lines of cases concerning when forfeiture 
under § 15 (4) would be appropriate.  What has emerged are two 
recognized types of "direct links" between a public employee's 
position and the crime committed:  factual links and legal 
links. 
i.  Factual links.  In cases involving factual links, a 
public employee's pension is subject to forfeiture under 
§ 15 (4) only where there is a direct factual connection between 
the public employee's crime and position.  See Gaffney, 423 
Mass. at 4-5 (superintendent of municipal water and sewer 
department who stole money from town was subject to pension 
forfeiture); Durkin v. Boston Retirement Bd., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 
116, 116-117, 119 (2013) (police officer who used department-
issued firearm to shoot fellow officer while off duty was 
subject to pension forfeiture); Maher, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 613, 
616-617 (city employee who broke into city hall and stole 
documents from his personnel file was subject to pension 
forfeiture).  Contrast Garney, 469 Mass. at 385-386, 389-391 (no 
forfeiture where teacher purchased and stored child pornography 
on home computer because no connection to either his students or 
school property); Retirement Bd. of Maynard v. Tyler, 83 Mass. 
App. Ct. 109, 109, 112-113 (2013) (no forfeiture where fire 
fighter sexually abused children because acts occurred off duty 
13 
 
outside of fire house and fire fighter did not use "his 
position, uniform, or equipment for the purposes of his indecent 
acts"); Herrick v. Essex Regional Retirement Bd., 77 Mass. App. 
Ct. 645, 646-647, 654-655 (2010) (no forfeiture where housing 
authority custodian committed indecent assault and battery on 
daughter because offense not committed on housing authority 
property nor against any residents there, and did not bear other 
connection to custodian's position). 
ii.  Legal links.  The other line of cases, involving 
direct legal links, mandates forfeiture under § 15 (4) when a 
public employee commits a crime directly implicating a statute 
that is specifically applicable to the employee's position.  
See Buonomo, 467 Mass. at 664-666, 670-671 (pension forfeiture 
where register of probate embezzled funds in violation of Code 
of Professional Responsibility for Clerks of Courts); Bulger, 
446 Mass. at 177-180 (same with respect to clerk-magistrate who 
committed perjury and obstruction of justice).  Contrast Garney, 
469 Mass. at 393 ("Criminal conduct that is merely inconsistent 
with a concept of special public trust placed in the position or 
defiant of a general professional norm applicable to the 
position, but not violative of a fundamental precept of the 
position embodied in a law applicable to it . . . is 
insufficient to justify forfeiture under G. L. c. 32, 
§ 15 [4]").  The requisite direct legal link is shown where the 
14 
 
crime committed is "contrary to a central function of the 
position as articulated in applicable laws."  Id. at 391. 
iii.  Analysis.  Finneran's conduct falls squarely within 
the first category, requiring forfeiture where there is a direct 
factual link between the public employee's position and the 
offense.10  Finneran's false testimony concerning his knowledge 
of and participation in the redistricting planning process is in 
at least two respects directly linked as a factual matter to his 
position as Speaker of the House. 
First and foremost, Finneran's false testimony directly 
concerns and relates to his work on the redistricting plan as 
Speaker of the House.  Unlike those cited cases where a public 
employee's crime bore no relationship to his office or position, 
see, e.g., Garney, 469 Mass. at 389, Finneran's crime directly 
concerns actions that he had carried out when he served as 
Speaker, in his role as Speaker.  He worked on the redistricting 
plan in his capacity as Speaker and later testified falsely 
about it.  On its face, this connection is enough to create a 
10 Because we conclude that Finneran's conviction bears a 
direct factual link to his position as Speaker of the House, we 
do not address the question whether there is a direct legal link 
between the offense and his position. 
 
                     
15 
 
"direct link between the criminal offense and [Finneran's] . . . 
position." 11  See Gaffney, 423 Mass. at 5. 
Another factual link between Finneran's crime and his 
position as Speaker of the House is his admitted motivation for 
its commission.  It had been alleged that the plan was adopted 
in order to dilute minority representation in a number of House 
districts, including Finneran's own district.12  By his own 
account, Finneran provided his false testimony to vindicate his 
conduct as Speaker of the House regarding the redistricting 
plan.  This further underscores the factual connection between 
Finneran's false testimony and his work on the redistricting 
plan as Speaker of the House. 
Finneran contends that forfeiture is inappropriate because 
his offense does not fall within the scope of his duties as 
 
11 It is irrelevant whether Finneran's work on the 
redistricting process was a necessary part of his duties as 
Speaker of the House.  That he in fact played an integral part 
in the redistricting process through his role as Speaker is what 
creates the direct link to his false testimony. 
12 During his plea colloquy, Finneran stated: 
 
 
"The accusations contained in the civil suit, your 
Honor, I found very, very troubling.  For [twenty-six] 
years I had represented a district that was overwhelmingly 
African-American, and I took great pride in my service of 
this district.  The accusations spoke to -- the plaintiff's 
civil suit spoke and alleged a deliberate racial 
manipulation in order to depress or suppress legitimate 
efforts at minority representation.  I was offended by the 
accusation.  I was angered by it, and I think, quite 
frankly, your Honor, it has led to this entire series of 
events which brings us here today." 
                     
16 
 
Speaker of the House.  This argument is unavailing.  While 
Finneran's offense itself does not directly implicate his duties 
as Speaker of the House,13 it is nonetheless inextricably 
intertwined with his position.  Simply put, it is only because 
he had been Speaker of the House at the relevant time that he 
was in a position to testify as to the genesis of the 
redistricting plan and to do so falsely.  This connection is 
enough to warrant forfeiture under § 15 (4).  See, e.g., Maher, 
67 Mass. App. Ct. at 616-617 (forfeiture proper where public 
employee broke into city hall and stole his personnel records).  
Given this, Finneran's conviction of obstruction of justice is a 
"violation of the laws applicable to his office or position," 
pursuant to § 15 (4), and accordingly requires the statutory 
forfeiture of his pension. 
c.  Eighth Amendment claim.  Finneran also contends that 
should we conclude, as we have, that his pension is forfeit 
pursuant to § 15 (4), such a penalty would be an excessive fine 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.14  He relies in this regard 
13 Nothing in the record suggests that Finneran testified in 
his official capacity as Speaker of the House or that he was in 
any way obligated to testify pursuant to his duties as the 
Speaker of the House. 
 
 
14 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."  
The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the States through the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
                     
17 
 
upon our recent decision in Public Employee Retirement Admin. 
Comm'n v. Bettencourt, 474 Mass. 60 (2016) (Bettencourt).  
There, we determined that the forfeiture of a police officer's 
pension, worth at least $659,000, which was due to an offense 
for which he was given a $10,500 fine, without probation or 
prison time, violated the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 71-75.  Not 
having raised this argument below, Finneran is precluded from 
raising the issue on appeal.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 429 
Mass. 620, 623 (1999).  Nonetheless, even if Finneran had 
preserved the issue, the result would be the same. 
"The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the 
Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality:  The 
amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the 
gravity of the offense that it is designed to 
punish."  Bettencourt, 474 Mass. at 72, quoting United States 
v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).  In applying this 
standard, we first consider the amount of the 
forfeiture.  Bettencourt, supra.  We then "gauge the degree of 
[Finneran's] culpability and, in that regard, . . . [1] consider 
the nature and circumstances of his offenses, [2] whether they 
were related to any other illegal activities, [3] the aggregate 
Constitution.  See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-434 (2001). 
                                                                  
18 
 
maximum sentence that could have been imposed, and [4] the harm 
resulting from them."  Id., citing Bajakajian, supra at 337-339. 
In considering the amount of the forfeiture, Finneran 
relies on the Public Employee Retirement Administration 
Commission's determination that the present value of his "future 
benefits as of his retirement date was approximately $433,400."15  
We apply to that figure the four-factor standard from Bajakajian 
for gauging proportionality under the Eighth Amendment.  As to 
the first and second factors, Finneran was convicted of a 
felony, viz., obstruction of justice, his crime consisting of 
false testimony as to his involvement in a redistricting process 
that was later found to be in violation of the Voting Rights 
Act.16  With regard to the third factor, the maximum penalty for 
Finneran's crime was "a period of imprisonment of ten years, a 
$250,000 fine, a period of three years of supervised release, a 
five year period of probation, and a $100 special assessment."  
Fourth, given that the plaintiffs prevailed in the judicial 
proceeding, little apparent harm flowed from Finneran's crime. 
 
15 The board disputes this amount and points out that 
Finneran's failure to raise this argument below means that the 
value of his pension has never been presented to a judicial fact 
finder. 
 
16 We note that the United States District Court panel held 
that the redistricting plan had a discriminatory impact on 
African-American voters, but did not conclude that the plan was 
enacted with discriminatory intent.  Black Political Task Force, 
300 F. Supp. 2d at 315-316. 
                     
19 
 
The gravity of Finneran's offense and the maximum potential 
penalty for it distinguish his crime from the circumstances 
of Bettencourt.  That case involved a forfeiture of at least 
$659,000 in pension benefits, plus health benefits, following a 
series of misdemeanor offenses,17 which did not relate to any 
other illegality, and carried an aggregate maximum penalty of 
630 days imprisonment and a fine of $21,000.  See Bettencourt 
474 Mass. at 72-74.  In stark contrast, Finneran's offense is a 
felony connected to a redistricting plan which violated Federal 
law, carrying a maximum penalty that includes ten years' 
imprisonment and a $250,000 fine.  The forfeiture of $433,400 in 
pension payments pursuant to § 15 (4) therefore does not qualify 
as an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
3.  Conclusion.  The case is remanded to the county court 
where an order shall enter reversing the judgment of the Boston 
Municipal Court, affirming the decision of the board, and 
remanding to the Boston Municipal Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
17 The case involved a police officer who unlawfully 
accessed the civil service promotional examination scores of 
twenty-one of his fellow officers in violation of G. L. c. 266, 
§ 120F.  See Public Employee Retirement Admin. Comm'n v. 
Bettencourt, 474 Mass. 60, 61-62 (2016).