Title: Commonwealth v. Gardner

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12495 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RICHARD GARDNER. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     May 7, 2018. - September 14, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Due Process of Law, Sex offender.  Jurisdiction, 
Sex offender.  Imprisonment, Transfer of 
prisoner.  Statute, Construction.  Words, "Prisoner." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 14, 2017. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Mark C. Gildea, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney (Shanan L. 
Buckingham, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Joseph M. Kenneally for the defendant. 
 
David B. Hirsch, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  We are called upon once again to determine the 
scope of persons who the Commonwealth may lawfully seek to 
commit as sexually dangerous persons under G. L. c. 123A.  
2 
 
General Laws c. 123A, § 12 (b), authorizes the Commonwealth to 
file a petition to civilly commit a "prisoner or youth" deemed 
likely to be a "sexually dangerous person" (SDP), as that phrase 
is defined in G. L. c. 123A, § 1.  "Prisoner" refers, in 
pertinent part, to a person who has previously been convicted of 
an enumerated sexual offense in § 1, and is presently in custody 
as a result of a criminal conviction.  See Commonwealth 
v. Libby, 472 Mass. 93, 95-96 (2015).  We consider in this case 
whether "prisoner" includes an individual in the custody of, and 
serving a sentence in, another State.  Applying the required 
narrow construction of the SDP statute, our answer is no.  There 
can be no doubt that the Legislature intended SDP commitment to 
extend only to those prisoners who are in Massachusetts custody, 
serving a Massachusetts sentence, at the time the Commonwealth 
files a commitment petition under § 12 (b). 
When the Commonwealth filed the petition in this case, the 
defendant was serving a Rhode Island sentence, albeit in a 
Massachusetts prison, pursuant to his transfer under the New 
England Interstate Corrections Compact (NEICC).  The NEICC is an 
agreement among the six New England States authorizing the 
transfer of inmates between correctional facilities in those 
States, in order to provide "for the confinement, treatment and 
rehabilitation of offenders with the most economical use of 
human and material resources."  Under the NEICC, the defendant 
3 
 
remains under the jurisdiction of Rhode Island, not 
Massachusetts, following his transfer to a Massachusetts prison 
–- meaning the transfer conferred upon the Commonwealth no 
greater authority to commit him than it possessed while the 
defendant was in Rhode Island, which is none.  We affirm the 
motion judge's dismissal of the Commonwealth's petition. 
 
Facts.  The defendant, Richard Gardner, was convicted of 
several sexual assaults committed against four children in 1987 
and 1988.  The 1987 offense occurred when the defendant was 
twenty-one years old; he was charged with kidnapping and rape of 
a child in Massachusetts.  While released on bail, in June and 
July of 1988, the defendant sexually assaulted three additional 
children in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.  He was apprehended 
in Rhode Island, and in May, 1989, a Rhode Island jury found him 
guilty of sexual offenses and other crimes.  He was ultimately 
sentenced in Rhode Island to fifty years in prison, with thirty 
years to serve and the balance suspended.1  Separately, in 
August, 1989, while in Rhode Island custody, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to the Massachusetts charges of kidnapping and 
child rape, stemming from the 1987 incident; for this he 
received a sentence of from ten to fifteen years in prison.  In 
                     
 
1 The defendant was originally sentenced to 190 years in 
prison, but in 1992 his Rhode Island convictions were reversed; 
he pleaded guilty to the same charges in 1993 and received the 
revised fifty-year sentence. 
4 
 
May, 1991, the defendant also pleaded guilty to Massachusetts 
charges for the sexual offenses he had committed in July, 1988, 
and received another sentence of from seven and one-half to ten 
years.2 
 
In April, 2004, Rhode Island released the defendant to the 
custody of the Massachusetts Department of Correction to serve 
the two Massachusetts sentences.  Near the end of the 
defendant's sentences, the Plymouth County district attorney 
(district attorney) was notified of the defendant's impending 
release, but for reasons that are unclear, the district attorney 
failed at that time to petition to have the defendant civilly 
committed as a sexually dangerous person.  In October, 2016, the 
defendant was released from Massachusetts custody to begin his 
probationary sentence in Rhode Island. 
Eleven days after his release, the defendant was arrested 
in Quincy for violating a local bylaw that prohibits sex 
offenders from entering the public library.3  He was brought back 
to Rhode Island where he was found in violation of his probation 
and sentenced to one year in prison, with the balance of his 
                     
 
2 While in Rhode Island custody, the defendant sued the 
Massachusetts commissioner of correction, in an unsuccessful 
attempt to receive credit against his Massachusetts sentences 
for the time he had served in Rhode Island.  See Gardner v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 31, 33-34 (2002). 
 
 
3 Because the defendant is a Massachusetts resident, his 
Rhode Island probation was transferred to the Superior Court in 
Norfolk County for supervision. 
5 
 
probation to resume upon his release.  In March, 2017, the 
district attorney contacted an administrator with the 
Massachusetts Department of Correction to inform him of the 
district attorney's ongoing efforts to "get [the defendant] back 
to" Massachusetts to secure "access to [the defendant] to file 
the [SDP] petition."  With four weeks left to serve on his one-
year Rhode Island sentence, the defendant was involuntarily 
transferred to Massachusetts, pursuant to the NEICC, to serve 
the remainder of his sentence.  The day after the defendant's 
transfer from Rhode Island to Massachusetts, the Commonwealth 
filed the underlying petition in the Superior Court seeking his 
civil commitment as an SDP. 
With the defendant's sentence set to expire on July 13, 
2017, the Superior Court judge temporarily committed the 
defendant pending a probable cause determination.  Later that 
month, the judge found probable cause to believe that the 
defendant was sexually dangerous, and continued his temporary 
commitment pending a psychological examination and trial.  In 
August, 2017, the defendant moved to dismiss the petition, 
arguing that (1) the district attorney lacked the authority to 
file the petition because the defendant was not serving a 
Massachusetts sentence at the time it was filed, and (2) the 
defendant's transfer was invalid because it violated provisions 
of the NEICC.  The judge granted the defendant's motion, 
6 
 
agreeing that because the defendant was not serving a 
Massachusetts sentence, the district attorney lacked the 
authority to petition for the defendant's commitment.  The judge 
stayed the defendant's release pending the Commonwealth's 
appeal, which entered in the Appeals Court in January, 2018, and 
was transferred, sua sponte, to this court in March.  The 
defendant remains civilly committed in the Massachusetts 
Treatment Center, where he has been since the expiration of his 
Rhode Island sentence in July, 2017. 
Discussion.4  General Laws c. 123A, § 12 (b), provides: 
 
"When the district attorney or the attorney general 
determines that the prisoner or youth . . . is likely to be 
a sexually dangerous person as defined in [§ 1], the 
[prosecutor] . . . may file a petition alleging that the 
prisoner . . . is a sexually dangerous person . . . ."5 
 
 
"Prisoner or youth" are not defined terms in G. L. c. 123A.  
We have recognized, however, that those terms (as they are 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the brief submitted by amicus curiae, the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
 
5 "Sexually dangerous person" is defined, in pertinent part, 
as "any person who has been [] convicted of . . . a sexual 
offense" enumerated in § 1, "and who suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person 
likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure 
facility."  G. L. c. 123A, § 1. 
 
 
"Sexual offense" is defined to include a host of enumerated 
sexual offenses under Massachusetts law, "or a like violation of 
the laws of another state, the United States or a military, 
territorial, or Indian tribal authority; and any other offense, 
the facts of which, under the totality of the circumstances, 
manifest a sexual motivation or pattern of conduct or series of 
acts of sexually-motivated offenses."  Id. 
7 
 
employed in § 12 [b]) are "plainly a shorthand reference" to 
"the three categories of persons for whom notice must be given 
of their impending release" under § 12 (a), "and are limited in 
scope to those three categories."  Libby, 472 Mass. at 95, 100.  
See id. at 95 ("It is plain from the statute that the relevant 
district attorney or the Attorney General may file an SDP 
petition only against a person who is included within the three 
categories of persons for whom notice must be given").  Under 
§ 12 (a), an "agency with jurisdiction" must notify "the 
district attorney of the county where the offense occurred and 
the attorney general six months prior to the release" of three 
categories of persons.  These are "person[s] who [have] been 
convicted of a sexual offense," and are presently "in custody 
because of [1] a criminal conviction, [2] an adjudication as a 
delinquent juvenile or youthful offender, or [3] a judicial 
finding that the person is incompetent to stand 
trial."  Libby, supra at 93.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (a).6 
                     
 
6 Section 12 (a) describes the three categories of persons 
for whom notice must be given as "(1) 'a person who has ever 
been convicted of or adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or 
youthful offender by reason of a sexual offense as defined in 
[§ 1], regardless of the reason for the current incarceration, 
confinement or commitment'; (2) a person charged with such 
sexual offense who 'has been found incompetent to stand trial,' 
and (3) a person charged with 'any offense,' who 'is currently 
incompetent to stand trial,' and who 'has previously been 
convicted of or adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or youthful 
offender by reason of a sexual offense.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Libby, 472 Mass. 93, 95 (2015), quoting G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (a).  
8 
 
The Commonwealth contended that the defendant falls under 
the first category, as he was previously convicted of an 
enumerated sexual offense, and is currently in custody as a 
result of a conviction for violating his Rhode Island probation.  
In the Commonwealth's view, the fact that the defendant is not 
currently serving a Massachusetts sentence makes no difference 
concerning its authority to petition for his commitment in 
Massachusetts.7  Its position was that G. L. c. 123A confers the 
authority to file a petition against a person serving an out-of-
State sentence anywhere in the country, so long as he or she 
                                                                  
As mentioned, this court clarified in Libby that § 12 (a) also 
defines "the three categories of persons . . . who are subject 
to the filing of an SDP petition."  Id. at 100.  Narrowly 
construing the statute, the court held that an SDP petition 
under § 12 (b) may be filed "against a person who has been 
convicted of a sexual offense only where the person is in 
custody because of a criminal conviction, an adjudication as a 
delinquent juvenile or youthful offender, or a judicial finding 
that the person is incompetent to stand trial."  Id. at 93.  
Necessarily, this also means that these are the three categories 
of persons for whom notice must be given under § 12 (a) -- and 
hence, we articulate these three categories using the language 
from Libby, rather than the literal language of § 12 (a).  It is 
also important to note that the court's interpretation in Libby 
was based in part on its explanation that the phrase in 
§ 12 (a), "regardless of the reason for the current 
incarceration, confinement or commitment," was intended only to 
"allow an SDP petition to be filed against a person convicted of 
a sexual offense who was serving a sentence for a nonsexual 
offense, or who was found incompetent to stand trial on a 
nonsexual offense."  Libby at 97. 
 
7 The Commonwealth conceded in the Superior Court that the 
defendant's transfer to Massachusetts under the NEICC did not 
transform his Rhode Island probation sentence into a 
Massachusetts sentence. 
9 
 
previously committed a sex offense in Massachusetts.  The 
defendant moved to dismiss, arguing in part that the 
Commonwealth lacks jurisdiction because he was not serving a 
Massachusetts sentence at the time the Commonwealth filed the 
petition.  The Superior Court judge agreed, finding an absence 
of legislative intent that the SDP commitment scheme should 
extend to prisoners of other States.  He also noted that "[t]he 
Commonwealth's interpretation would drastically expand the scope 
of the SDP statute, implicating due process concerns." 
 
Because G. L. c. 123A is a statute in derogation of 
liberty, we must interpret its terms narrowly.  Commonwealth 
v. Gillis, 448 Mass. 354, 357 (2007).  This "more stringent 
analysis . . . not only helps avoid possible constitutional due 
process problems . . . but also helps ensure that individuals 
are not deprived of liberty without a clear statement of 
legislative intent to do so."  Id., citing Commonwealth 
v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 583, 597-598 (2006).  Accordingly, our 
courts have consistently declined to broaden the class of 
persons subject to SDP commitment in the absence of such a clear 
statement of legislative intent.  Gillis, supra at 358, 
citing Commonwealth v. McLeod, 437 Mass. 286, 294 (2002).  See, 
e.g., Gillis, supra at 354-355 (individuals not serving any 
criminal sentence and have no pending charges, but who are in 
State custody as result of civil commitment due to mental 
10 
 
illness, not subject to SDP proceedings); Commonwealth v. Allen, 
73 Mass. App. Ct. 862, 864 (2009) (individual who had completed 
criminal sentence, yet remained in custody solely due to 
clerical error, not "prisoner" subject to commitment); Coffin 
v. Superintendent, Mass. Treatment Ctr., 458 Mass. 186, 187 
(2010) (Commonwealth may not petition for commitment of 
individual incarcerated for violating terms of sentence imposed 
under unconstitutional statute); Libby, 472 Mass. at 100 
(persons previously convicted of sexual offense who are 
currently in custody awaiting trial not subject to SDP 
commitment). 
In support of its position that a § 12 (b) petition may be 
filed against an out-of-State prisoner, the Commonwealth cites 
the plain language of the statute, which permits a commitment 
petition to be filed against a "prisoner," without any 
qualifier.  The Legislature never restricted § 12 (b) solely to 
"Massachusetts prisoners," the Commonwealth argues, and by 
imposing such a limitation the motion judge effectively rewrote 
the statute, by inserting the word "Massachusetts."  The 
Commonwealth suggests that the all-purpose definition of 
"prisoner" is contained in G. L. c. 125, § 1 (m), which defines 
that term as "a committed offender and such other person as is 
placed in custody in a correctional facility in accordance with 
11 
 
law."8  Gardner fits these definitions, the Commonwealth posits, 
as he was found in violation of his Rhode Island probation, 
Rhode Island sentenced him to one year in prison, and he is 
presently in custody serving that sentence in a correctional 
facility. 
Our cases make clear, however, that "[i]n determining 
eligibility for civil commitment, the fact of custody alone is 
not determinative. . . . Nor is it enough that an individual is 
serving a sentence."  Coffin, 458 Mass. at 189, citing Allen, 73 
Mass. App. Ct. at 864.  Likewise, this court rejected the 
Commonwealth's argument that the definition of "prisoner" in 
G. L. c. 125, § 1 (m), applies in the SDP context over a decade 
ago, in Gillis, 448 Mass. at 358-359.  See Allen, 73 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 864, citing Gillis, supra ("the Supreme Judicial Court 
has held that the definition of 'prisoner' contained in G. L. 
c. 125, § 1 (m), . . . is not to be used for G. L. c. 123A, § 12 
[b]").  There we observed that G. L. c. 125, § 1, states that 
its definitions shall apply "unless the context otherwise 
requires," and we held that "the context of the SDP statute" -- 
a statute in derogation of liberty -- "requires a construction 
                     
8 "Committed offender" is defined as "a person convicted of 
a crime and committed, under sentence, to a correctional 
facility."  G. L. c. 125, § 1 (c).  "Correctional facility" 
refers to "any building . . . used for the custody, control and 
rehabilitation of committed offenders and of such other persons 
as may be placed in custody therein in accordance with law."  
G. L. c. 123A, § 1 (d). 
12 
 
of 'prisoner' that is no broader than its ordinary 
usage."  Gillis, supra at 359.  Accordingly, the court adopted, 
for purposes of deciding that case, the more narrow, dictionary 
definition of "prisoner," which is "an individual who is either 
serving a criminal sentence or awaiting trial."  Id. at 358-259 
citing 12 Oxford English Dictionary 513 (2d ed. 1989).9 
Examining § 12 (b) in its proper context, and as part of 
G. L. c. 123A as a whole, see Commonwealth v. Poissant, 443 
Mass. 558, 563 (2005) (we interpret SDP statute "as a whole to 
produce an internal consistency" [citation omitted]), we discern 
no legislative intent to commit out-of-State prisoners.  To the 
contrary, the several provisions of G. L. c. 123A that make up 
the commitment procedure evince a legislative recognition that 
the Commonwealth may only commit those within its own custody.  
Under § 12 (a), which informs our understanding of "prisoner or 
youth" in § 12 (b), see Libby, 472 Mass. at 95, and which 
represents the first step in the commitment process, see Nieves, 
446 Mass. at 586, an "agency with jurisdiction" over the person 
                     
 
9 Subsequently, in Libby, 472 Mass. at 99-100, we clarified 
that our adoption of the dictionary definition of "prisoner" was 
for purposes of deciding the issue in Commonwealth v. Gillis, 
448 Mass. 354, 358-359 (2007), and that persons in custody 
"awaiting trial" are not in fact subject to commitment under 
G. L. c. 123A.  "[I]t would be unreasonable to strip the words 
'prisoner or youth' from their context in § 12 (b), apply their 
dictionary definitions, and conclude that the Legislature 
intended that a district attorney may file an SDP petition 
against any prisoner or youth, as those words are commonly 
used."  Libby, supra at 100. 
13 
 
named in the petition "shall notify in writing" the relevant 
district attorney and the Attorney General six months prior to 
the prisoner's release, and "shall also identify those prisoners 
. . . who have a particularly high likelihood of meeting the 
criteria for a sexually dangerous person."  See Commonwealth 
v. Kennedy, 435 Mass. 527, 530 (2001) ("The word 'shall' in this 
context, where substantive rights are involved, indicates that 
the action is mandatory.  This imperative is at its strongest in 
such cases").  "Agency with jurisdiction" is defined as "the 
agency with the authority to direct the release of a person 
presently incarcerated, confined, or committed."  G. L. c. 123A, 
§ 1. 
Under the Commonwealth's interpretation, in the case of an 
out-of-State prisoner, § 12 (a) would constitute a directive 
from Massachusetts to an agency of another State (for that State 
would possess "the authority to direct the release of [the] 
[prisoner]," § 1), to undertake such tasks as an analysis of 
Massachusetts law.  We decline to interpret G. L. c. 123A in 
this manner, because legally and practically, the Legislature is 
powerless to impose such obligations on another State.  See, 
e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) 
("it would be impossible to permit the statutes of [one State] 
to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State . . . without 
throwing down the constitutional barriers by which all the 
14 
 
States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful 
authority and upon the preservation of which the Government 
under the Constitution depends"). 
The Commonwealth's argument fares no better even if it took 
the more narrow position that although SDP petitions generally 
cannot be filed against out-of-State prisoners, the defendant is 
in fact a Massachusetts prisoner due to his transfer to a 
Massachusetts correctional institution under the NEICC.10  The 
NEICC states that "[i]nmates confined in an institution pursuant 
to the terms of this compact shall at all times be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at any time be 
removed therefrom for transfer to a prison or other institution 
within the sending state . . . ."  This provision is 
incorporated into the Federal and Interstate Compact policies 
and procedures of the Department of Correction.  See 103 DOC 
419.09 (2017) ("[i]nmates confined in an institution pursuant to 
the provisions of the [NEICC] shall be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the sending state").  Even in these 
circumstances, then, the "agency with jurisdiction" over the 
                     
10 Although the Commonwealth's position in the Superior 
Court was that the defendant's transfer to Massachusetts under 
NEICC was irrelevant to its authority to petition for his 
commitment here, at oral argument before this court, the 
Commonwealth seemed to agree that had the defendant remained in 
Rhode Island and finished serving his sentence there, the 
Commonwealth would be powerless to initiate commitment 
proceedings against him. 
15 
 
defendant remained a Rhode Island agency, not the Massachusetts 
Department of Correction.  Likewise, the purpose of the six-
month notice requirement in § 12 (a) is to ensure "that the 
Commonwealth will be in a position to complete most, if not all, 
of the G. L. c. 123A proceedings before the inmate's 
discharge."  Kennedy, 435 Mass. at 530-531.  This cannot 
reasonably apply to prisoners such as the defendant who are 
transferred under the NEICC, because the agreement states that 
they can be removed from the Commonwealth "at any time."  We 
applied the same reasoning in Libby to reject the Commonwealth's 
argument that a § 12 (b) petition may be filed against a person 
held in custody before trial solely due to an inability to post 
bail.  See Libby, supra at 99 ("Such a notice requirement 
reasonably could not be applied to a person who is in custody 
only because of an inability to post bail, who could obtain 
immediate release upon posting bail. . . .  If the Legislature 
had contemplated that an SDP petition could be filed after a 
person's arrest while that person was in custody awaiting a bail 
determination or seeking the funds to post bail, it would have 
recognized this possibility in its notice provision"). 
That the Legislature intended SDP commitment to extend only 
to those "prisoner[s] or youth[s]" within Massachusetts custody 
is further demonstrated by the other procedural components of G. 
L. c. 123A.  After notice under § 12 (a), and the filing of the 
16 
 
§ 12 (b) petition, the court holds a hearing under § 12 (c) to 
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the 
person named in the petition is sexually dangerous.  Here the 
Legislature specified that the prisoner "shall be provided . . . 
an opportunity to appear in person" at the hearing, which would 
generally be impossible if he or she were in the custody of 
another State. 
Likewise, G. L. c. 123A, §§ 12 (e), 13 (a), and 14 (a), 
authorize the temporary commitment of the person named in the 
petition for the course of commitment proceedings; in 
particular, § 13 (a) directs that the individual "shall" be held 
for the purposes of psychological examination and trial.  This 
provision assumes that the Commonwealth has access to the person 
named in the petition, which, in the case of an out-of-State 
prisoner, would be possible only through the cooperation of 
another State sending its prisoner to Massachusetts, before the 
prisoner has completed his or her sentence in that State, for 
indefinite commitment here.  It makes no sense that the 
Legislature would employ the word "shall" in this context, to 
impose several procedural requirements that in reality could 
only happen for out-of-State prisoners through the voluntary 
(and perhaps unlikely) act of another sovereign.  The far more 
sensible interpretation, and the one that gives greatest effect 
to the terms of G. L. c. 123A, is that the Legislature intended 
17 
 
SDP commitment to extend only to those "prisoner[s] or youth[s]" 
already in the Commonwealth's custody, serving a sentence here, 
when the § 12 (b) petition is filed.  See Chin v. Merriot, 470 
Mass. 527, 537 (2015) ("we give effect to all words of a 
statute, assuming none to be superfluous" [quotations and 
citation omitted]). 
We note finally that this limitation is also necessary from 
a jurisdictional standpoint.  If the Commonwealth is to deprive 
an individual of his or her liberty "for an indeterminate period 
of a minimum of one day and a maximum of such person's natural 
life," as the SDP statute provides, see G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d), 
there must be some jurisdictional basis -– a nexus to 
Massachusetts -– for that act.  See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) ("As a general rule" 
under due process clause, "neither statute nor judicial decree 
may bind strangers to the State").  In the Superior Court, the 
Commonwealth argued that this nexus is established by a 
requirement that a prisoner has previously committed a sexual 
offense in Massachusetts.  As the Superior Court judge 
explained, "the Commonwealth's position is that Chapter 123A 
confers the authority to file a petition against a prisoner 
serving an out of state sentence anywhere in the country, as 
long as he committed a sex offense in the Commonwealth at some 
point in the past".  Although on the particular facts of this 
18 
 
case, the defendant committed several sexual offenses in 
Massachusetts, that is not a prerequisite to his eligibility for 
commitment under the scheme enacted by the Legislature.  In 
defining "sexual offense" -- the principal predicate for 
consideration as an SDP -- the Legislature included not only 
Massachusetts offenses, but also "like violation[s] of the laws 
of another state, the United States, or a military, territorial 
or Indian tribal authority."  G. L. c. 123A, § 1.  Were we to 
agree with the Commonwealth that G. L. c. 123A permits the 
commitment of out-of-State prisoners, in addition to those who 
have previously committed solely out-of-State sexual offenses, 
as the Legislature has already provided, the result would be 
that § 12 (b) petitions could be filed against individuals with 
no connection to Massachusetts whatsoever.  That cannot be the 
case if G. L. c. 123A is to comport with due process.  
See Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 269 (1974) ("We must 
construe [G. L. c. 123A], if fairly possible, so as to avoid not 
only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave 
doubts upon that score" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
Conclusion.  We affirm the Superior Court judge's dismissal 
of the petition, and remand the case for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.