Title: IN THE INTEREST OF SNK, A MINOR CHILD

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE INTEREST OF SNK, A MINOR CHILD2003 WY 14178 P.3d 1032Case Number: C-03-5Decided: 11/04/2003.
October 
Term, A.D. 2003

 

 

IN 
THE INTEREST OF SNK, a minor child:

 

NORTHERN 
ARAPAHO TRIBE,

 

Appellant(Intervenor) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT

OF 
FAMILY SERVICES,

 

Appellee(Petitioner) 
.

 

 

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Andrew 
Baldwin and Christopher J. Schneider of Baldwin & Crocker, P.C., Lander, 
WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Schneider.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Dan S. 
Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Sandra Siel Kitchen, of 
Copenhaver, Kath & Kitchen, LLC, Powell, WY as Guardian ad Litem for 
SNK.  Argument by Mr. 
Wilde.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, 
J., 
delivered the opinion of the court.  
GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, 
the Northern Arapaho Tribe (Tribe), seeks review of the district court's order 
continuing the placement of the minor child involved in this case, SNK, in a 
non-Indian foster home.  
Essentially, the Tribe argues that the district court in rendering its 
decision improperly determined that the "existing Indian family" exception to 
the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied.  After our review, we hold that the 
issues presented are moot.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      
The Tribe raises the following issues on appeal: 
 

1.  Did the district court err in holding that [ICWA] was 
not applicable to this case?
 

2.  Did 
the district court provide proper notice to all parties?

 

3.  Did the district court comply with the Due Process 
requirements of the Wyoming State Constitution?
 

4.  Did the district court comply with the Due Process 
requirements of the United States Constitution?
 

Appellee, 
State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services (State), phrases the issues on 
appeal as:

 

I.  Whether an order from a 12-month review hearing issued 
in a juvenile proceeding that has not progressed to an adjudica­tory hearing 
is a final order for purposes of an appeal.
 

II.  Whether the juvenile court's statement that [ICWA] was 
not applicable equates to the adoption of the "existing Indian family exception" 
to [ICWA].
 

III.  Whether the juvenile court's statement that [ICWA] is 
not applicable to this matter presents a justiciable controversy for the court 
to adopt or reject the "existing Indian family 
excep­tion."

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      SNK is an 
enrolled member of the Tribe as is her biological father.  However, SNK's biological mother and 
ex-stepfather are non-Indian.  SNK's 
biological parents were never married.  
Nevertheless, SNK lived with her biological mother and biological father 
for four months during the first year of her life.  SNK has had very limited contact with 
her biological father since that time.  
SNK's biological mother and her ex-stepfather were married in 1994, and 
SNK resided with both of them or either of them, individually, for most of her 
life.1  SNK's biological mother and 
ex-stepfather were divorced in 2001; but SNK, her biological mother, and her 
ex-stepfather still maintain very close relationships.  SNK also has three stepsiblings by 
virtue of the union between her biological mother and her ex-stepfather.  SNK has resided with these stepsiblings 
for a substantial period of her life, and has a close relationship with each of 
them.  

 

[¶4]      In March of 2001, 
the State filed a juvenile neglect proceeding against SNK's biologi­cal 
mother.  At the time the State did 
not know the whereabouts of either SNK's biological mother or biological 
father.  The district court, 
therefore, ordered legal and physical custody to SNK's ex-stepfather under the 
supervision of the State.  In August 
of 2001, the district court learned that SNK was living with her biological 
mother in Baker, Montana.  Following 
this discovery, the district court found that SNK's ex-stepfather had violated 
its order and that continued placement of SNK in his home would not be in her 
best interests and thus placed SNK in a foster home. 

 

[¶5]      In February 2002 
the Tribe was allowed to intervene in the action.  Upon its interven­tion, the Tribe 
did not question the jurisdiction of the district court or file a motion to 
remove this matter to a different tribunal.  Rather, the Tribe has participated as a 
party, including participation in the multi-disciplinary team (MDT) 
meetings.  

 

[¶6]      On October 17, 
2002, the district court held a twelve-month review hearing.  At this hearing the district court took 
evidence and heard testimony from various individuals, including SNK's mental 
counselor.  Argument was also 
presented that the "existing Indian family" exception to ICWA applied.  Near the conclusion of this hearing, the 
district court stated:

 

            
Okay.  And I will go ahead 
and enter the order at this point, having considered all of the testimony 
presented and the arguments and the legal authorities cited.  This Court also has considerable 
familiarity with the Indian Child Welfare Act.  And the Court will find that, first of 
all, the Indian Child Welfare Act is not applicable in this instance for the 
reasons cited and the cases cited and the law cited by [the appointed guardian 
ad litem for SNK] and by [counsel for the biological mother of 
SNK].

 

            
The Court will find that it is in the best interests of the child that 
she remain in the present placement until further order of the Court, and will 
make the necessary findings for the 12-month review as required by 
law.

 

            
The Court will still consider the primary goal, until further order of 
the Court, to be reconciliation with the mother, in whose custody she was in 
before all of this started, and, as an alternative to that, will consider 
placement in the home of [the ex-stepfather].

 

. . .

 

            
. . . We don't have the home study yet, and of course we don't know 
what that's going to say; we haven't seen it yet.  But we do know that this child has said 
that sheher first choice was to live with her mother.  She would also like to be with her 
siblings.  And the Court does have 
some concern, in the event that the home study on [the ex-stepfather] isdoes 
not indicate the viability of a placement there, and not knowing how long the 
mother may continue to be incarcerated or unavailable or whether she'll be ready 
to take custody upon her release, I think that it also is necessary that the 
court order a home study of the home on the reservation that was mentioned by 
Mr. Trosper.[2]

 

The 
district court entered its written order on December 9, 2002, finding "that the 
Indian Welfare Act (ICWA) is not applicable in this matter."  The Tribe, having unsuccessfully moved 
for reconsideration, now appeals.  

 

[¶7]      Subsequent to the 
filing of appeal, the district court held a hearing on February 4, 2003, and 
ruled that SNK should be placed in the home of her ex-stepfather until further 
"permanency" proceedings could be held.  
All parties to this action, including the Tribe, agreed with SNK's 
temporary placement as ordered.  The 
Tribe, however, continues to object to any aspect of the proceedings that fail 
to apply the provisions of ICWA.3 

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶8]      In Ekberg v. 
Sharp, 2003 WY 123, ¶10, 76 P.3d 1250, ¶10 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Carroll v. 
Bergen, 2002 WY 166, ¶9, 57 P.3d 1209, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002) and Springer v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wyo. 
1997)), we stated:

 

The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court 
may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record.  Due regard is given to the opportunity 
of the trial judge to assess the credi­bility of the witnesses, and our 
review does not entail weighing disputed evidence.  Findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  
A finding is clearly errone­ous when, although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.  We review a district court's conclusions 
of law de novo on appeal.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Appealable Order

 

[¶9]      Initially the 
State contends the district court's order is not an appealable order and that 
the Tribe cannot only appeal the district court's ruling on ICWA.  The Tribe counters by arguing that the 
district court's ruling effectively denies it the right to intervene in the 
case, thereby depriving the Tribe of its federally recognized interest in 
protecting the best interests of its children, Indian culture, and way of 
life.  The Tribe also asserts that 
pursu­ant to W.R.A.P. 1.05, the district court's order must be considered an 
appealable order because it affected a substantial right of the Tribe and, in 
effect, determined this action.4

 

[¶10]   We do not find the Tribe's argument 
that it has been effectively denied an opportu­nity to participate as an 
intervening party by virtue of the district court's order persuasive.  As indicated earlier, the Tribe was 
allowed to intervene in this action as specifically provided for by ICWA.  25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).  Since being allowed to intervene, the 
Tribe has actively participated as a party, making appearances at hearings and 
at MDT meetings.  Indeed, when asked 
by the district court at the review hearing held subsequent to the appeal in 
this case if the Tribe desired to continue as a party in the action, the Tribe 
indicated through its attorney that it certainly desired to participate as 
a party and the Tribe was allowed to do so.  Furthermore, the Tribe has not contested 
the jurisdiction and authority of the district court and has not attempted to 
remove this action to a different tribunal.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). The 
Tribe received due process when it was notified of the twelve-month review 
hearing and was allowed to participate in that hearing. 

 

[¶11]   However, we hold that the district 
court's order ruling that ICWA was not applica­ble in this case does 
sufficiently affect a substantial right of the Tribe pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
1.05(b).  The very purpose for 
Congress' enactment of ICWA was to protect the best interests of Indian children 
and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.  25 U.S.C. § 1902.  Congress, when enacting ICWA, expressly 
found that there is no resource that is more vital to the existence and 
integrity of Indian tribes than their children, that States have often failed to 
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and 
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families, and that the 
protection and preservation of Indian Tribes and their resources is of utmost 
importance.  25 U.S.C. § 1901.  Hence, the district court's 
determination that ICWA did not apply critically affected the Tribe's right to 
effectuate the aforementioned substantial goal of ICWA.  This court has previously held that 
proceedings under the Juve­nile Court Act are "special proceedings."  State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165, 168 (Wyo. 1981).      

 

[¶12]   As pointed out by the Tribe, this 
court alternatively has the power of certiorari and the discretion to consider a 
notice of appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari even if the order being 
appealed is not final.  In re 
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River System, 
803 P.2d 61, 67-68 (Wyo. 1990).  
Review pursuant to certiorari should be granted when the timely 
resolution of matters coming to our attention is of extreme and lasting 
importance to the citizens of this State and may contribute to judicial 
efficiency.  Id.  As indicated previously, the 
applicability of ICWA is of extreme impor­tance to the Tribe and to its 
members as citizens of Wyoming, including most importantly the child and other 
individuals directly involved in this action.  Accordingly, we hold that the order 
issued by the district court concerning the twelve-month review hearing is an 
appealable order.

 

Justiciability

 

[¶13]   The State argues that, because a 
factual hearing has not been held in this action, there is no factual basis for 
this court to review and thus take the steps to accept or reject the "existing 
Indian family" exception to ICWA.5  Therefore, the State asserts no 
justicia­ble controversy exists for this court to review.  The Tribe replies that it is apparent 
that the basis of the district court's ruling was that the "existing Indian 
family" exception applied because the district court adopted the exception's 
reasoning as support for its ruling.  
The Tribe further argues that this case does present an actual 
justiciable controversy and that the Tribe is entitled to redress for injury to 
its federally protected rights.  The 
Tribe finally asserts that the State and SNK's appointed guardian ad litem 
should not be allowed to advocate and obtain a ruling at the district court 
level based upon the "existing Indian family" exception but then prevent 
appellate review simply by asserting that they no longer wish to maintain that 
argument. 

 

[¶14]   In 
Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 978 P.2d 1138, 
1142 (Wyo. 1999), we recognized that a justiciable controversy must exist before 
a court may grant relief.  Citing 
Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1992), this 
court further enunciated that a justiciable controversy is "defined generically 
as a controversy fit for judicial resolution."  To establish a justiciable 
controversy:
 

1.  The parties must have existing and genuine, as 
distin­guished from theoretical, rights or interests.
 

2.  The controversy must be one upon which the judgment of 
the court may effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument 
evoking a purely political, administrative, philosophical or academic 
conclusion.  
 

3.  It must be a controversy the judicial determination of 
which will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in 
equity upon the rights, status or other legal relation­ships of one or more 
of the real parties in interest, or, wanting these qualities to be of such great 
and overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of 
them.  
 

4.  The proceedings must be genuinely adversary in 
character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with sufficient 
mili­tancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major 
issues.
 

Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., at 
1142. 
 

[¶15]   
For the same reasons stated above, we conclude that the Tribe has 
an obvious exist­ing and real continuing interest in this case, namely, the 
protection of the best interests of Indian children; the promotion of the 
stability and security of Indian tribes and families to ensure the existence and 
integrity of Indian tribes; and the continuation of the cultural and social 
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.  Similarly, the order at issue squarely 
affects such interests, and the Tribe has clearly entered this foray as a 
genuine adversary so as to ensure that the Tribe will advance its position with 
vigor.  
 

[¶16]   Nevertheless, 
in argument espoused at oral argument before this court, the State infers that 
this matter must be considered moot because, after entry of the district court's 
order concerning the twelve-month review hearing, the district court entered 
another order on February 28, 2003, temporarily placing SNK in the home of her 
ex-stepfather until further "permanency" proceedings could be held in this 
action.6  Thus, the State argues that any holding 
concerning the district court's twelve-month review hearing would be of 
absolutely no significance.7  

 

[¶17]   This court 
has often recognized:
 

            
Under the umbrella of the justiciable controversy con­cept stand "the 
political question[s] doctrine, the administrative questions doctrine, the 
advisory opinions doctrine, the feigned and collusive cases doctrine, the 
doctrine of standing, the doc­trine of ripeness, and the doctrine of 
mootness." Reiman, 838 P.2d  at 1186. "These doctrines are premised upon 
jurispru­dential principles which are designed to promote judicial 
econ­omy and the wise exercise of judicial power." Id.
 

. . .
 

            
In this case, Appellants' initial challenge to the jurisdic­tion of 
the district court arises under the doctrine of mootness.  
 

The doctrine of mootness encompasses those circum­stances which 
destroy a previously justiciable controversy. This doctrine represents the time 
element of standing by requiring that the interests of the parties which were 
originally sufficient to confer standing persist throughout the duration of the 
suit.  Thus, the central question in 
a mootness case is "whether decision of a once living dispute continues to be 
justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision will have an impact on the 
parties."   Wright & Miller 
§ 3533.
 

Reiman, 838 P.2d  at 1187 (citations omitted).
 

Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., at 
1142-43.
 

[¶18]   We have also 
stated on a number of occasions: 
 

Our 
general law on justiciability provides that courts should not consider issues 
which have become moot.  Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227, 233 
(Wyo. 1985).  We do not decide cases 
when a decision will have no effect or pertains only to matters that might arise 
in the future.  McLain v. 
Anderson, 933 P.2d 468, 472 (Wyo. 1997).  A case is moot when the determination of 
an issue is sought which, if provided, will have no practical effect on the 
existing controversy.  
Id.  Therefore, if 
events occur during the pendency of an appeal that cause a case to become moot 
or make determi­nation of the issues unnecessary, we will dismiss it.  Id.; see also Rocky Mountain 
Helicopters, Inc. v. Air Freight, Inc., 773 P.2d 911, 924-25 (Wyo. 
1989).

 

In 
Sanchez v. State, 982 P.2d 149, 150 (Wyo. 1999), we fur­ther 
elaborated that a case is moot when the matter upon which a determination is 
sought presents no actual controversy or when a decision can have no practical 
effect.  We have also recognized the 
general rule that the issue of mootness consti­tutes a question of law and 
may be properly addressed by a court sua sponte.  Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1201 (Wyo. 2000) (citing, in part, Fund for Animals v. 
Babbitt, 89 F.3d 128, 132 (2ndCir. 1996)); 
see also Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 617 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Wyo. 1980).

 

Wyoming Bd. of Outfitters & Prof'l Guides v. Clark, 2002 
WY 24, ¶9, 39 P.3d 1106, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Smith Keller & Assocs. 
v. Dorr, 4 P.3d 872, 876 (Wyo. 2000)). 
 

[¶19]   Any 
determination by this court relating to the basis upon which the district court 
continued to place SNK in the non-Indian foster home as of October 17, 2002, by 
virtue of its order at the twelve-month review hearing is moot in that it would 
be wholly ineffectual and of no practical effect.  The district court has now temporarily 
placed SNK in the home of her ex-stepfather.  Indeed, if this court were to rule that 
the district court should not have placed SNK in the non-Indian foster home in 
October of 2002, this determination would be inconsequential and of no practical 
value as another temporary placement of SNK was later effectuated.  In fact, SNK's last temporary placement 
does not appear to be based on reasons related to ICWA and was not contested by 
any party, including the Tribe.   

 

[¶20]   Further, we 
recognize that the parties are at odds as to the actual basis utilized by the 
district court in its ruling that ICWA does not apply to this case, i.e., either 
through application of the "existing Indian family" exception or otherwise.  Our review of both statements made by 
the district court during the twelve-month review hearing and the dis­trict 
court's written order concerning that hearing is of little assistance in 
determining the basis of the district court's ultimate ruling.  Review of the record on appeal leaves 
this court with an indication that the district court's statements during the 
hearing may be char­acterized as obiter dictum.  
 

[¶21]   This 
conclusion is particularly supported by the fact that the district court heard 
from a qualified expert on the suggested temporary placement options for SNK and 
the sur­rounding circumstances, including the preference expressed by SNK's 
biological mother.  The district 
court ordered a "home-study" of SNK's ex-stepfather's home as well as the Indian 
foster home suggested by the Tribe.  
In addition, the district court's statements during the twelve-month 
review hearing are less than clear especially considering that the district 
court did not include in its related written order the specific reason for its 
determi­nation that ICWA did not apply.  Finally, it again should be noted that 
at the February 4, 2003 review hearing, some months after the twelve-month 
review hearing, the Tribe indi­cated when asked that it continued to desire 
to participate as a party.  
The only means by which the Tribe could have been allowed to participate 
as a party in this action is through the applicability of ICWA.  Accordingly, while the district court 
previously ruled that ICWA did not apply, it apparently overruled that 
determination by later allowing the Tribe to participate as a party. 
 

[¶22]   Therefore, we 
conclude that the issue in this case regarding the applicability of ICWA and the 
"existing Indian family" exception to ICWA is moot.  While we recognize that the 
applicability of the "existing Indian family" exception to ICWA in Wyoming is an 
important issue that needs to be addressed, we simply do not believe that, under 
the circumstances presented by this case, it is appropriate for this court to 
make such a deter­mination at this time.   
 

[¶23]   Accordingly, 
although we hold that the order from which the Tribe appeals is an appealable 
order, the issues presented by the Tribe are moot.  This court has clearly estab­lished 
that it will not make determinations which may be characterized as advisory, and 
this court will not digress from such a position unless extreme circumstances 
demand.  
 

"Although the question as postulated in this case may be 
prop­erly before us in the future, to render an opinion here would be to 
issue an advisory opinion.  This 
Court has said repeatedly that it will not issue advisory opinions, and we 
decline to do so now." State Bd. of Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski 
Corp., 745 P.2d 58, 59 (Wyo. 1987) (citing Graham v. Wyoming Peace 
Officer Standards and Training Com'n, 737 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 1987)); see also 
Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 772 
(Wyo. 1995).
 

State Dep't of Rev. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 7 P.3d 35, 41 (Wyo. 
2000).
 

 

 

[¶24]   For those reasons given, we hold 
the issues presented to this court are moot and not reviewable on appeal. 
Board of County Comm'rs for Sublette County v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2002 WY 
151, ¶18, 55 P.3d 714, ¶18 (Wyo. 2002).  

 

  
GOLDEN, 
J., dissenting.

 

[¶25]      
I 
respectfully dissent.  The issue is 
not, as the majority opinion suggests, a challenge to a specific placement 
order.  The issue is what law 
applies to the underlying juvenile court proceedings.  This is an important question that is 
appealable, justiciable, and cannot possibly become moot because the answer to 
the question affects almost every aspect of the juvenile court proceeding.  

 

[¶26]      
The 
specific issue is whether the ICWA applies to this case.  The ICWA is not something of limited 
application.  The ICWA provides a 
myriad of substantive and procedural safeguards that must be met in addition to 
state law standards.  Orders that do 
not comply with the requirements of the ICWA face the possibility of being 
declared void.  25 U.S.C. § 
1914.  Because the dictates of the 
ICWA potentially affect the very nature and course of proceedings, the 
determination of its application can never be considered moot.1

 

[¶27]      
Because 
of the mandatory requirements of the ICWA, it is critical to determine as early 
as possible whether the ICWA applies to a proceeding.  In this case, it is an easy 
determination to make.  The child 
who is the subject of this proceeding is an enrolled member of the Northern 
Arapaho Tribe.  She is subject to 
involuntary foster care.  The ICWA 
applies.  25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i); 25 
U.S.C. § 1912.

 

[¶28]      
While 
it may not have been as clearly presented as this Court might have hoped, there 
is only one possible reason the trial court could have determined that the ICWA 
did not apply.  It was argued that 
the ICWA did not apply because of the "existing Indian family" exception that 
has been judicially created in some states.  The 
"existing Indian family" doctrine, which has not been addressed or adopted by 
the Wyoming courts, precludes application of the ICWA when the Indian child's parent or 
parents have not maintained a significant social, cultural, or political 
relationship with his or her tribe. See State in 
Interest of D.A.C., 
933 P.2d 993 (Utah App. 1997); In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. App. 1996). 
Since 
this judicially created exception was first introduced in the case of In re 
adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982), it has been widely 
criticized.  See 
State in 
Interest of D.A.C., 
933 P.2d 993 (Utah App. 1997) (collecting cases).  There is currently pending in the United 
States House of Representatives a bill, H.R. 2750, that would clarify that the 
ICWA applies to all Indian children, regardless of whether an Indian child has 
been part of an Indian family or has maintained a social or cultural 
relationship with an Indian tribe. 

 

[¶29]      
I 
would hold that, as a matter of law, the "existing Indian family" exception 
defies that clear language and intent of the ICWA, which includes promoting the 
stability and security of Indian tribes and protecting the unique Indian 
culture.  25 U.S.C. § 1902.  Wyoming should not recognize the 
judicially created "existing Indian family" exception.  Because, as a matter of law, the 
"existing Indian family" exception is not recognized in Wyoming, no factual 
question exists as to whether the exception applies in this specific case.  SNK is an Indian child as defined by the 
ICWA and the ICWA applies to this case.  
I would remand this case to the juvenile court for further proceedings 
consistent with the mandates of ICWA.  
This would include conducting a new placement hearing, taking into 
account the factors required by the ICWA.  
25 U.S.C. § 1915.

 

FOOTNOTES

1At 
the date of filing this appeal in 2002, SNK was ten years old.  

2On 
behalf of the Tribe, Mr. Trosper suggested at the twelve-month review hearing 
that the district court consider placing SNK in the home of a great-aunt on her 
biological father's side of the family who lived on an Indian reservation near 
Riverton. 

 

3Upon 
motion to modify the record on appeal by the State, this court ordered the 
modification of the record to include the order of the district court entered on 
February 28, 2003, placing SNK in the home of her ex-stepfather. 

4W.R.A.P. 
1.05 provides, in applicable part:

 

An 
appealable order is:

 

(a)  An 
order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, 
determines the action and prevents a judgment; or

 

(b)  An 
order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding[.]  

 

5Some 
state courts have held that ICWA does not apply to an Indian child raised by a 
non-Indian parent with no tribal contact.  
Such reasoning is referred to as the "existing Indian family" exception. 

6Again, 
all parties, including the Tribe, agreed with SNK's temporary placement in her 
ex-stepfather's home as ordered. 

 

7After 
all appellate briefs were filed with this court the State moved this court for 
supplementation of the record on appeal to include the transcript and order 
regarding the review hearing held by the district court on February 4, 
2003.  This motion was 
granted.

 
Footnotes for the Dissent

1I 
strongly disagree with the assumption made in the majority opinion that, since 
the juvenile court gave the Tribe the opportunity to remain in the case as a 
party, the juvenile court must have changed its mind and decided the ICWA 
applies.  A party is defined in the 
Juvenile Protection Act as "any  person made a party by an order to appear, or 
named by the juvenile court."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-402(a)(xiv) (LexisNexis 2003).  The juvenile court could allow the Tribe 
to remain a party for any reason.  
The juvenile court did not express any change in its decision that ICWA 
does not apply to the proceedings.