Title: Commonwealth v. Davidson

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13438 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARK DAVIDSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 13, 2023. - December 6, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Anti-Discrimination Law, Housing.  Lead Poisoning.  Housing 
Court, Jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction, Housing Court.  
Statute, Construction.  Practice, Civil, Interlocutory 
appeal. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint filed in the Superior Court Department on March 
30, 2022. 
 
 
Following transfer to the Northeast Division of the Housing 
Court Department, a motion to transfer the case to the Superior 
Court Department was heard by Alex Mitchell-Munevar, J. 
 
 
A proceeding for interlocutory review was heard in the 
Appeals Court by Peter W. Sacks, J., and the case was reported 
by him to a panel of the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial 
Court transferred the case on its own initiative. 
 
 
 
David Rangaviz, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Dierdre Ann Hosler, for Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
BUDD, C.J.  The Attorney General commenced a civil action 
in the Superior Court alleging housing discrimination against 
the defendant, Mark Davidson, on behalf of Laura Smith and 
Daniel Hocking (complainants).  The defendant thereafter 
transferred the case to the Housing Court.  The Attorney 
General, who was unsuccessful in having the matter transferred 
back to the Superior Court, sought interlocutory relief.  
Because the Housing Court does not have jurisdiction over a 
discrimination claim in this procedural posture, the case must 
be returned to the Superior Court. 
Background.  The complainants filed an administrative 
complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination (commission) alleging that the defendant had 
discriminated against them in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4, 
and G. L. c. 111, § 199A.  Specifically, the complainants 
alleged that when the defendant learned that Smith was pregnant, 
he terminated their lease in an attempt to avoid having to 
comply with G. L. c. 111, § 197, the lead containment or 
abatement statute.  See G. L. c. 111, § 199A (prohibiting 
housing discrimination against individuals with children to 
avoid having to comply with G. L. c. 111, § 197). 
After the commission gave notice to the defendant that 
probable cause existed to pursue the complaint, he elected to 
have the matter heard in court rather than by the commission.  
3 
 
See G. L. c. 151B, § 5.  The commission subsequently transferred 
the matter to the Attorney General's office, which in turn 
commenced this action against the defendant in the Superior 
Court as required by statute.  See id.  The defendant thereafter 
filed a notice of transfer to the Housing Court. 
After the case was transferred, the Attorney General moved 
to transfer the case back to the Superior Court on 
jurisdictional grounds.  Believing that he did not have 
authority to transfer the case back to the Superior Court, the 
Housing Court judge directed the Attorney General to request the 
transfer pursuant to Trial Court Rule XII (1).1  Taking the 
position that the trial court rule was inapplicable, the 
Attorney General instead filed a petition for interlocutory 
relief with a single justice of the Appeals Court.  The single 
justice ordered the case transferred back to the Superior Court 
and reported the matter to the full panel of the Appeals Court.  
This court transferred the matter here on our own motion. 
 
1 Trial Court Rule XII (1) states in pertinent part: 
 
"If two or more actions are pending in different 
departments of the Trial Court, and if a judge, Clerk 
Magistrate, register, or party determines that the separate 
actions are related actions involving substantially the 
same or similar issues and parties, the judge, Clerk-
Magistrate, register, or party may request that the Chief 
Justice [of the Trial Court] make an appropriate 
interdepartmental assignment so that one judge may hear all 
related matters." 
4 
 
Discussion.  To determine whether the Housing Court 
department has jurisdiction over this matter, we turn to G. L. 
c. 151B, § 5, which deals with enforcement of the Commonwealth's 
antidiscrimination laws and details how discrimination 
complaints filed with the commission are handled when either 
party chooses to have the matter heard in court.2  The statute 
states in pertinent part: 
"If any complainant or respondent elects judicial 
determination as aforesaid, the commission shall authorize, 
and not later than thirty days after the election is made 
the attorney general shall commence and maintain, a civil 
action on behalf of the complainant in the [S]uperior 
[C]ourt for the county in which the unlawful practice 
occurred." 
 
G. L. c. 151B, § 5. 
When interpreting a statute, we begin, as always, with the 
statutory language.  The language of § 5 unambiguously indicates 
that the Superior Court is the proper court for actions such as 
this one.  Further, the Legislature's use of the word "shall" is 
instructive here, as it commands, rather than suggests, that the 
action is to be commenced in the Superior Court, and not 
elsewhere.  Id.  See Galenski v. Erving, 471 Mass. 305, 309 
(2015), quoting Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 609 (1983) 
 
2 Although we typically review decisions of the single 
justice of the Appeals Court for error of law or abuse of 
discretion, see Vega v. Commonwealth, 490 Mass. 226, 230 (2022), 
where, as here, the issue turns on a question of statutory 
interpretation, we review the matter de novo.  See Chadwick v. 
Duxbury Pub. Sch., 475 Mass. 645, 651 (2016). 
5 
 
("The word 'shall' is ordinarily interpreted as having a 
mandatory or imperative obligation").  Finally, the use of the 
phrase "commence and maintain" is an equally clear directive 
that such actions brought by the Attorney General, once 
initiated, are to remain in the Superior Court.  See 
Commonwealth v. Disler, 451 Mass. 216, 227 (2008), citing Matter 
of a Civil Investigative Demand Addressed to Yankee Milk, Inc., 
372 Mass. 353, 358 (1977) ("every word in a statute should be 
given meaning"); Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & 
Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617, 618 (1967) ("[n]one of the 
words of a statute is to be regarded as superfluous" [citation 
omitted]). 
We are unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that the 
Housing Court has concurrent jurisdiction over this matter.3  It 
is true that G. L. c. 185C, § 3, establishes the Housing Court's 
broad subject matter jurisdiction, as encompassing "all civil 
actions . . . concerned directly or indirectly with the health, 
safety, or welfare, of any occupant of any place . . . of human 
habitation."  However, the unambiguous and mandatory language of 
G. L. c. 151B, § 5, takes precedence over the generalized grant 
 
3 Although the defendant did not submit a brief and waived 
participation in oral argument, his argument is laid out in both 
his oppositions to the Attorney General's motion to transfer the 
case and to the Attorney General's appeal from the denial of 
that motion. 
6 
 
of jurisdiction in G. L. c. 185C, § 3.  See Lexington Pub. Sch. 
v. K.S., 489 Mass. 309, 329 (2022), quoting Pereira v. New 
England LNG Co., 364 Mass. 109, 118 (1973) ("If a general 
statute and a specific statute cannot be reconciled, the general 
statute must yield to the specific statute").  See also G. L. 
c.  151B, § 9 (instructing that "any law inconsistent" with 
c. 151B "shall not apply" to operation of c. 151B).4 
Notably, the complainants had the option of commencing a 
civil action in the Housing Court rather than filing a complaint 
with the commission.  See G. L. c. 151B, § 9.5  Had they done so, 
the Housing Court properly would have had jurisdiction over the 
matter.  However, because the complainants filed with the 
commission and the defendant elected to have the matter heard in 
court, the Superior Court is the only court with jurisdiction 
 
4 Nor are we persuaded by the defendant's argument that 
G. L. c. 185C, § 20, which generally authorizes the transfer of 
cases within the Housing Court's jurisdiction to that court, is 
helpful to his argument.  That statute states, in part, that 
"[a]ny civil action within the jurisdiction of the [H]ousing 
[C]ourt department which is pending in another court department 
may be transferred to the [H]ousing [C]ourt department by any 
party thereto."  Although the statute provides for the transfer 
of cases to the Housing Court, it does not confer Housing Court 
jurisdiction over those cases.  As stated above, cases brought 
by the Attorney General pursuant to G. L. c. 151B, § 5, are not 
within the jurisdiction of the Housing Court.  Therefore, G. L. 
c. 185C, § 20, is inapplicable here. 
 
5 General Laws c. 151B, § 9, also provides for the 
commencement of such actions in the Probate and Family Court or 
the Superior Court. 
7 
 
given the plain language of G. L. c. 151B, § 5.  Thus, transfers 
of such actions to the Housing Court or any other trial court 
department is prohibited.6  As for the procedure to transfer the 
matter back to the Superior Court, we agree with the Attorney 
General that Trial Court Rule XII (1), which provides for the 
consolidation of two or more related actions pending in 
different trial court departments, is not applicable because 
here there is only one case at issue. 
However, G. L. c. 211B, § 9, empowers the Chief Justice of 
the Trial Court to engage in the "general superintendence of the 
judicial policy of the trial court."  Among those powers 
explicitly granted to the Chief Justice of the Trial Court is 
the authority to "monitor and to assist in the case processing 
and caseflow management capabilities of the trial court 
departments" and to "transfer cases and matters from a court to 
any other court."  Id.  See Konstantopoulos v. Whately, 384 
Mass. 123, 129-130 (1981) ("the proper procedure is for the 
judge to ask the Chief Administrative Justice to transfer the 
case . . . to the appropriate department of the Trial Court").  
Thus, where a judge of a particular trial court department finds 
that the court lacks jurisdiction over a particular matter, the 
 
6 Given the clarity of § 5's plain meaning, we need not 
address the additional arguments raised by the Attorney General. 
8 
 
judge may request an order from the Chief Justice of the Trial 
Court to transfer the case to the appropriate court department.7 
Conclusion.  For the aforementioned reasons, the Housing 
Court lacks jurisdiction over enforcement actions brought by the 
Attorney General under G. L. c. 151B, § 5.  We clarify that a 
trial court department may seek to transfer cases outside its 
subject matter jurisdiction by requesting a transfer order from 
the Chief Justice of the Trial Court. 
The order of the single justice of the Appeals Court is 
affirmed, and the stay of any proceedings in the Superior Court 
is vacated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
7 The Attorney General urges this court to hold that the 
"inherent powers of the judiciary" enable Housing Court judges 
to transfer cases outside their subject matter jurisdiction to 
other judicial departments.  See Bower v. Bournay-Bower, 469 
Mass. 690, 698 (2014), quoting O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of 
the County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 510, 514 (1972) 
(inherent powers of judiciary are those "necessary to 'secure 
the full and effective administration of justice' and thus 
extend beyond adjudication to ancillary functions such as rule-
making and judicial administration'").  However, we do not find 
it necessary in this case to elaborate on the inherent powers of 
the Housing Court, where the Chief Justice of the Trial Court is 
authorized by statute and well positioned to assist in resolving 
issues of this nature.