Title: Commonwealth v. Warren

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC 11956 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JIMMY WARREN. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 9, 2016. - September 20, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Firearms.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress.  
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable 
suspicion.  Search and Seizure, Reasonable suspicion. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Roxbury Division of 
the Boston Municipal Court Department on December 19, 2011. 
 
 
After transfer to the Central Division, a pretrial motion 
to suppress evidence was heard by Tracy-Lee Lyons, J., and the 
case was heard by Annette Forde, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Nelson P. Lovins for the defendant. 
 
Michael Glennon, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
HINES, J.  After a jury-waived trial in the Boston 
Municipal Court, the defendant, Jimmy Warren, was convicted of 
unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).2  The 
complaint arose from the discovery of a firearm after an 
investigatory stop of the defendant in connection with a 
breaking and entering that had occurred in a nearby home 
approximately thirty minutes earlier.  Prior to trial, the 
defendant filed a motion to suppress the firearm and statements 
made after his arrest, arguing that police lacked reasonable 
suspicion for the stop.  The judge who heard the motion denied 
it, ruling that, at the time of the stop, the police had 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was one of the 
perpetrators of the breaking and entering.  The defendant 
appealed, claiming error in the denial of the motion to 
suppress.3  The Appeals Court affirmed, Commonwealth v. Warren, 
87 Mass. App. Ct. 476, 477 (2015).  We allowed the defendant's 
application for further appellate review and conclude that 
because the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the 
                                                          
 
 
2 The trial judge allowed the defendant's motion for a 
required finding of not guilty on a trespass charge, G. L. 
c. 266, § 120. 
 
 
3 Given our conclusion, we need not address the defendant's 
argument about the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
conviction. 
3 
 
investigatory stop, the denial of the motion to suppress was 
error.  Therefore, we vacate the conviction. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as found by the judge 
at the hearing on the motion to suppress, supplemented by 
evidence in the record that is uncontroverted and that was 
implicitly credited by the judge.  Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 
Mass. 278, 286 (2015).  On December 18, 2011, Boston police 
Officer Luis Anjos was patrolling the Roxbury section of Boston 
in a marked police cruiser when, at 9:20 P.M., he received a 
radio call alerting him to a breaking and entering in progress 
on Hutchings Street, where the suspects were fleeing the scene. 
The dispatcher gave several possible paths of flight from 
Hutchings Street, one toward Seaver Street and the other toward 
Jackson Square, locations that are in the opposite direction 
from one another.4 
 
Anjos went to the scene and spoke to the victims, a teenage 
male and his foster mother.  The male reported that as he was 
leaving the bathroom in the residence, his foster mother said 
that she heard people in his bedroom.  The victim opened his 
                                                          
 
 
4 The record contains a map of the area in question, 
providing geographical context for our review of the judge's 
ruling that the police had reasonable suspicion for the seizure 
of the defendant.  We may take judicial notice of the location.  
See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 472 Mass. 448, 457 n.14 (2015), 
citing Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Therrien, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 
523, 525 (1997) ("facts that are verifiably true, such as 
geographic locations, are susceptible to judicial notice"). 
4 
 
bedroom door and saw a black male wearing a "red hoodie" (hooded 
sweatshirt) jump out of the window.  When the victim looked out 
the window he saw two other black males, one wearing a "black 
hoodie," and the other wearing "dark clothing."  When the victim 
checked his belongings, he noticed that his backpack, a 
computer, and five baseball hats were missing.  The victim saw 
the three males run down Hutchings Street, but he could only 
guess which direction they took thereafter.  Anjos peered out 
the window but could only see twelve to fifteen yards up the 
street to the intersection of Hutchings and Harold Streets.  
After speaking to the victims for approximately eight to twelve 
minutes, Anjos left the scene and broadcast the descriptions of 
the suspects. 
 
For the next fifteen minutes or so, Anjos drove a four to 
five block radius around the house, searching for persons 
fitting the suspects' descriptions.  Because of the cold 
temperature that night, Anjos did not come across any 
pedestrians as he searched the area.  At around 9:40 P.M., Anjos 
headed back toward the police station.  While on Martin Luther 
King Boulevard, he saw two black males, both wearing dark 
clothing, walking by some basketball courts near a park.  One 
male wore a dark-colored "hoodie."  Neither of the two carried a 
backpack.  Anjos did not recognize either of the males, one of 
5 
 
whom was the defendant, as a person he had encountered 
previously in the course of his duties as a police officer. 
 
When Anjos spotted the defendant and his companion, he had 
a hunch that they might have been involved in the breaking and 
entering.  He based his hunch on the time of night, the 
proximity to the breaking and entering, and the fit of the males 
to the "general description" provided by the victim.  He decided 
"to figure out who they were and where they were coming from and 
possibly do [a field interrogation observation (FIO)]."5  He 
rolled down the passenger's side window of the cruiser and 
"yelled out," "Hey guys, wait a minute."  The two men made eye 
contact with Anjos, turned around, and jogged down a path into 
the park. 
 
After the two men jogged away, Anjos remained in the police 
cruiser and radioed dispatch that three men6 fitting the 
descriptions provided by the victim were traveling through the 
park toward Dale Street.  Boston police Officers Christopher R. 
                                                          
 
 
5 "A 'field interrogation observation' (FIO) has been 
described as an interaction in which a police officer identifies 
an individual and finds out that person's business for being in 
a particular area."  Commonwealth v. Lyles, 453 Mass. 811, 813 
n.6 (2009).  FIOs are deemed consensual encounters because the 
individual approached remains free to terminate the conversation 
at will.  See id. at 815, and cases cited. 
 
 
6 During cross-examination, Officer Anjos admitted that he 
observed only two males. 
6 
 
Carr and David Santosuosso, who had heard the original broadcast 
of the breaking and entering, were very near Dale Street and 
headed in that direction.  Arriving quickly, Carr and 
Santosuosso observed two males matching Anjos's description 
walking out of the park toward Dale Street.  Carr parked the 
cruiser on Dale Street and both officers approached the 
defendant and his companion as they left the park.  The 
defendant and his companion walked with their hands out of their 
pockets.  Carr saw no bulges in their clothing suggesting the 
presence of weapons or contraband. 
 
Carr was closer to the two males, approximately fifteen 
yards away.  When he uttered the words, "Hey fellas," the 
defendant turned and ran up a hill back into the park.  His 
companion stood still.  Carr ordered the defendant to stop 
running.  After the command to stop, Carr observed the defendant 
clutching the right side of his pants, a motion Carr described 
as consistent with carrying a gun without a holster.7 
 
Ignoring the command to stop, the defendant continued to 
run and eventually turned onto Wakullah Street.  Carr lost sight 
                                                          
 
 
7   The Commonwealth persists in claiming that the police 
observed the defendant clutching the right side of his pants 
before the command to stop.  As did the Appeals Court, see 
Commonwealth v. Warren, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 476, 479 n.7 (2015), 
we reject this view of the facts where the judge explicitly 
found that "[t]his observation was after a verbal command to 
stop." 
7 
 
of the defendant for a few seconds before catching up with him 
in the rear yard of a house on Wakullah Street.  Carr drew his 
firearm, pointed it at the defendant, and yelled several verbal 
commands for the defendant to show his hands and to "get down, 
get down, get down."  The defendant moved slowly, conduct that 
Carr interpreted as an intention not to comply with his 
commands.  After a brief struggle, Carr arrested and searched 
the defendant but found no contraband on his person.  Minutes 
after the arrest, police recovered a Walther .22 caliber firearm 
inside the front yard fence of the Wakullah Street house.  When 
asked if he had a license to carry a firearm, the defendant 
replied that he did not. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant challenges the judge's denial of 
the motion to suppress, claiming error in the judge's ruling 
that at the time of the stop on Dale Street, the police had a 
sufficient factual basis for reasonable suspicion that the 
defendant had committed the breaking and entering.8  In sum, he 
argues that the police pursued him with the intent of 
                                                          
 
 
8 Although the defendant argues in his brief that a stop 
occurred "when Officer[s] Anjos and Carr approached the 
defendant . . . with the intent of questioning the defendant," 
we assume that this was a typographical error because it is 
undisputed that Anjos never left his vehicle.  Rather, it was 
Officers Santosuosso and Carr who approached the defendant and 
his companion as they exited the park.  Therefore, we do not 
address whether the first encounter, when Anjos called out to 
the defendant from his cruiser, was an investigatory stop. 
8 
 
questioning him, while lacking any basis for doing so.  
Accordingly, he claims that any behavior observed during the 
pursuit and any contraband found thereafter must be suppressed. 
 
1.  Standard of review.  "In reviewing a ruling on a motion 
to suppress evidence, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings 
of fact absent clear error and leave to the judge the 
responsibility of determining the weight and credibility to be 
given oral testimony presented at the motion hearing" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 390, 393 (2004).  
However, "[w]e review independently the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts found."  Id.  We apply 
these principles in deciding whether the seizure was justified 
by reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed the 
breaking and entering on Hutchings Street.  Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004). 
 
2.  Reasonable suspicion.  The judge ruled, and the 
Commonwealth concedes, that the seizure occurred when Officer 
Carr ordered the defendant to stop running and pursued him onto 
Wakullah Street.  If a seizure occurs, "we ask whether the stop 
was based on an officer's reasonable suspicion that the person 
was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a crime."  
Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 303 (2014).  "That 
suspicion must be grounded in 'specific, articulable facts and 
reasonable inferences [drawn] therefrom' rather than on a 
9 
 
hunch."  Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 371 (2007), 
quoting Scott, 440 Mass. at 646.  The essence of the reasonable 
suspicion inquiry is whether the police have an individualized 
suspicion that the person seized is the perpetrator of the 
suspected crime.  Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 243 
(2010) (stop is lawful only if "information on which the 
dispatch was based had sufficient indicia of reliability, and . 
. . the description of the suspect conveyed by the dispatch had 
sufficient particularity that it was reasonable for the police 
to suspect a person matching that description"). 
 
According to the judge's ruling, the following information 
established reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop:  
the defendant and his companion "matched" the description of two 
of the three individuals being sought by the police; they were 
stopped in close proximity in location (one mile) and time 
(approximately twenty-five minutes) to the crime; they were the 
only persons observed on the street on a cold winter night as 
police canvassed the area; and they evaded contact with the 
police, first when both men jogged away into the park, and later 
when the defendant fled from Carr after being approached on the 
other side of the park.9 
                                                          
 
 
9 The judge also cited her finding that the police observed 
the defendant engaging in behavior suggestive of the presence of 
a firearm.  That finding must be discounted in the reasonable 
 
10 
 
 
We review the judge's findings as a whole, bearing in mind 
that "a combination of factors that are each innocent of 
themselves may, when taken together, amount to the requisite 
reasonable belief" that a person has, is, or will commit a 
particular crime.  Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 77 
(2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1187 (2006), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Fraser, 410 Mass. 541, 545 (1991).  We are not persuaded that 
the information available to the police at the time of the 
seizure was sufficiently specific to establish reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant was connected to the breaking and 
entering under investigation. 
 
a.  The description of the suspects.  First, and perhaps 
most important, because the victim had given a very general 
description of the perpetrator and his accomplices, the police 
did not know whom they were looking for that evening, except 
that the suspects were three black males:  two black males 
wearing the ubiquitous and nondescriptive "dark clothing," and 
one black male wearing a "red hoodie."  Lacking any information 
about facial features, hairstyles, skin tone, height, weight, or 
other physical characteristics, the victim's description 
"contribute[d] nothing to the officers' ability to distinguish 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
suspicion analysis, however, as the judge explicitly found that 
this conduct occurred after the police commanded the defendant 
to stop. 
11 
 
the defendant from any other black male" wearing dark clothes 
and a "hoodie" in Roxbury.  Commonwealth v. Cheek, 413 Mass. 
492, 496 (1992) (insufficient detail in generalized description 
of suspect to justify stop where defendant was observed walking 
on street approximately one-half mile from scene of reported 
stabbing, without indication he was fleeing crime scene or had 
engaged in criminal activity). 
 
With only this vague description, it was simply not 
possible for the police reasonably and rationally to target the 
defendant or any other black male wearing dark clothing as a 
suspect in the crime.  If anything, the victim's description 
tended to exclude the defendant as a suspect:  he was one of two 
men, not three; he was not wearing a red "hoodie"; and, neither 
he nor his companion was carrying a backpack.10  Based solely on 
this description, Anjos had nothing more than a hunch that the 
defendant might have been involved in the crime.  He 
acknowledged as much when he explained that the purpose of the 
stop was "to figure out who they were and where they were coming 
from and possibly do an FIO."  As noted, an FIO is a consensual 
encounter between an individual and a police officer.  
Therefore, the defendant was not a "suspect" subject to the 
                                                          
 
10 There is no suggestion in the judge's findings that the 
defendant and his companion changed clothing or jettisoned the 
backpack before being stopped by the police. 
12 
 
intrusion of a threshold inquiry.  Unless the police were able 
to fortify the bare-bones description of the perpetrators with 
other facts probative of reasonable suspicion, the defendant was 
entitled to proceed uninhibited as he walked through the streets 
of Roxbury that evening. 
 
b.  Proximity.  We agree with the motion judge that 
proximity of the stop to the time and location of the crime is a 
relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.  
Commonwealth v. Foster, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 671, 672-673, 676 
(2000) (reasonable suspicion established where police observed 
persons matching physical description on same street and headed 
in same direction as indicated by informant).  Proximity is 
accorded greater probative value in the reasonable suspicion 
calculus when the distance is short and the timing is close.  
See Commonwealth v. Doocey, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 555 n.8 
(2002), and cases cited.  Here, the defendant was stopped one 
mile from the scene of the crime approximately twenty-five 
minutes after the victim's telephone call to the police.  
Several considerations, however, weigh against proximity as a 
factor supporting an individualized suspicion of the defendant 
as a suspect in the breaking and entering. 
 
The location and timing of the stop were no more than 
random occurrences and not probative of individualized suspicion 
where the direction of the perpetrator's path of flight was mere 
13 
 
conjecture.  Although the police appropriately began their 
investigation with the information available to them, this lack 
of detail made it less likely that a sighting of potential 
suspects could be elevated beyond the level of a hunch or 
speculation.  As noted by the dissenting Justices in the Appeals 
Court opinion, given the nearly thirty-minute time period 
between the breaking and entering and the stop on Dale Street, 
the suspects could have traveled on foot within a two mile 
radius of the crime scene, a substantial geographic area 
comprising 12.57 square miles.11  Warren, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 
499 n. 1 (Rubin, J., dissenting).  See id. at 488-489 (Agnes, 
J., dissenting).  Other than the victim's report that the 
perpetrators fled toward Harold Street, the responding officers 
had nothing more than the information in the dispatch suggesting 
that the perpetrators could have fled toward Seaver Street or 
Walnut Avenue.  Depending on the direction taken, these paths of 
flight would lead to different Boston neighborhoods, Dorchester 
or Jamaica Plain, in different areas of the city. 
 
In addition, Anjos testified to two important geographical 
facts that undermine the proximity factor.  He acknowledged that 
                                                          
 
 
11 Because the map of the area is part of the record, we are 
persuaded by the observation of a dissenting Justice in the 
Appeals Court opinion that the suspects could have been anywhere 
within twelve square miles of the crime scene by the time of the 
encounter with Anjos.  See Warren, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 499 n.1 
(Rubin, J., dissenting). 
14 
 
Dale Street is in the opposite direction from where either of 
the reported paths of flight might lead.  And, most important, 
Anjos also stated that if the perpetrators had headed in the 
direction of Dale Street, they likely would have reached that 
location well before his first encounter with the defendant and 
his companion.  Thus, where the timing and location of the stop 
lacked a rational relationship to each other, proximity lacks 
force as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus. 
 
c.  Lack of other pedestrians.  The judge considered in her 
analysis that the defendant and his companion were the only 
people observed on the street as Anjos canvassed the four to 
five block radius of the Hutchings Street address, traveling "up 
and down Harold Street, Walnut Avenue and Holworthy Street" 
before turning onto Martin Luther King Boulevard to return to 
the station.12  This factor also is of questionable value in the 
analysis given the lapse of time and the narrow geographical 
scope of the search for suspicious persons.  Anjos spoke to the 
victim for approximately fifteen minutes and thereafter 
                                                          
 
 
12 One of the police officers testified during the motion to 
suppress hearing that another officer reported seeing a 
different young black male with a backpack in a nearby 
neighborhood.  Thus, we agree with one of the dissenting 
Justices in the Appeals Court opinion that if the judge credited 
this testimony, the fact that Anjos saw no other pedestrians on 
the street that night was not a factor supporting reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant was involved in the breaking and 
entering.  See Warren, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 489-490 (Agnes, J., 
dissenting). 
15 
 
canvassed only four to five blocks surrounding the location of 
the breaking and entering.  The lapse of time between the 
victim's report and the canvassing suggests that the 
perpetrators could have fled the immediate area before Anjos 
began his search.  Thus, the defendant's presence on the street, 
some distance away from the crime, within a time frame 
inconsistent with having recently fled the scene, is hardly 
revelatory of an individualized suspicion of the defendant as 
the perpetrator of the crime. 
d.  Flight.  We recognize that the defendant's evasive 
conduct during his successive encounters with police is a factor 
properly considered in the reasonable suspicion analysis.  
Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 791 (1996) (failure to 
stop combined with accelerated pace contributed to officer's 
reasonable suspicion).  But evasive conduct in the absence of 
any other information tending toward an individualized suspicion 
that the defendant was involved in the crime is insufficient to 
support reasonable suspicion.  Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 
Mass. 367, 371 (1996) ("Neither evasive behavior, proximity to a 
crime scene, nor matching a general description is alone 
sufficient to support . . . reasonable suspicion"); Commonwealth 
v. Thibeau, 384 Mass. 762, 764 (1981) (quick maneuver to avoid 
contact with police insufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion).  "Were the rule otherwise, the police could turn a 
16 
 
hunch into a reasonable suspicion by inducing the [flight] 
justifying the suspicion."  Stoute, supra at 789, quoting 
Thibeau, supra.  Although flight is relevant to the reasonable 
suspicion analysis in appropriate circumstances, we add two 
cautionary notes regarding the weight to be given this factor. 
First, we perceive a factual irony in the consideration of 
flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.    
Unless reasonable suspicion for a threshold inquiry already 
exists, our law guards a person's freedom to speak or not to 
speak to a police officer.  A person also may choose to walk 
away, avoiding altogether any contact with police.  Commonwealth 
v. Barros, 435 Mass. 171, 178 (2001) (breaking eye contact and 
refusing to answer officer's initial questions did not provide 
reasonable suspicion for detention or seizure as "[i]t was the 
defendant's right to ignore the officer").  Yet, because flight 
is viewed as inculpatory, we have endorsed it as a factor in the 
reasonable suspicion analysis.  See Commonwealth v. Sykes, 449 
Mass. 308, 315 (2007) (defendant's abandonment of bicycle in 
"effort to dodge further contact with the police was 
significant" in determining reasonable suspicion); Commonwealth 
v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 139-140 (2001) (attempt to avoid 
contact with police may be considered with other factors in 
establishing reasonable suspicion).  Where a suspect is under no 
obligation to respond to a police officer's inquiry, we are of 
17 
 
the view that flight to avoid that contact should be given 
little, if any, weight as a factor probative of reasonable 
suspicion.  Otherwise, our long-standing jurisprudence 
establishing the boundary between consensual and obligatory 
police encounters will be seriously undermined.  Thus, in the 
circumstances of this case, the flight from Anjos during the 
initial encounter added nothing to the reasonable suspicion 
calculus. 
 
Second, as set out by one of the dissenting Justices in the 
Appeals court opinion, where the suspect is a black male stopped 
by the police on the streets of Boston, the analysis of flight 
as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus cannot be 
divorced from the findings in a recent Boston Police Department 
(department) report documenting a pattern of racial profiling of 
black males in the city of Boston. Warren, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 
495 n.18 (Agnes. J., dissenting), citing Boston Police 
Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation and Observation (FIO) 
Study Results, http://bpdnews.com/news/2014/10/8/boston-police-
commissioner-announces-field-interrogation-and-observation-fio-
study-results [https://perma.cc/H9RJ-RHNB].13   According to the 
                                                          
 
 
13  See also Warren, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 495 n.18 (Agnes, J., 
dissenting), citing American Civil Liberties Union, Stop and 
Frisk Report Summary, https://www.aclum.org/sites/all/files/ 
images/education/stopandfrisk/stop_and_frisk_summary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7APK-8MG9] ("[sixty-three per cent] of Boston 
 
18 
 
study, based on FIO data collected by the department,14 black men 
in the city of Boston were more likely to be targeted for 
police-civilian encounters such as stops, frisks, searches, 
observations, and interrogations.15  Black men were also 
disproportionally targeted for repeat police encounters.16  We do 
not eliminate flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion 
analysis whenever a black male is the subject of an 
investigatory stop.  However, in such circumstances, flight is 
not necessarily probative of a suspect's state of mind or 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
police-civilian encounters from 2007-2010 targeted blacks, even 
though blacks made up less than [twenty-five per cent] of the 
city's population"). 
 
 
14 The study by the Boston Police Department (department) 
reviewed all field interrogation and observation (FIO) reports, 
approximately 205,000 in total, submitted by Boston police 
officers from 2007 through 2010.  Warren, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 
495 n.18 (Agnes, J., dissenting). 
 
 
15 "[T]he targets of FIO reports were disproportionately 
male, young, and Black.  For those 204,739 FIO reports, the 
subjects were 89.0 percent male, 54.7 percent ages 24 or 
younger, and 63.3 percent Black."  Final Report, An Analysis of 
Race and Ethnicity Patterns in Boston Police Department Field 
Interrogation, Observation, Frisk, and/or Search Reports, at 2 
(June 15, 2015). 
 
16 The department's study revealed that five per cent of the 
individuals repeatedly stopped or observed accounted for more 
than forty per cent of the total interrogations and observations 
conducted by the police department.  Warren, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 495 n.18 (Agnes, J., dissenting), quoting Boston Police 
Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation and Observation (FIO) 
Study Results, http://bpdnews.com/news/2014/ 
10/8/boston-police-commissioner-announces-field-interrogation-
and-observation-fio-study-results [https://perma.cc/H9RJ-RHNB]. 
19 
 
consciousness of guilt.  Rather, the finding that black males in 
Boston are disproportionately and repeatedly targeted for FIO 
encounters suggests a reason for flight totally unrelated to 
consciousness of guilt.  Such an individual, when approached by 
the police, might just as easily be motivated by the desire to 
avoid the recurring indignity of being racially profiled as by 
the desire to hide criminal activity.  Given this reality for 
black males in the city of Boston, a judge should, in 
appropriate cases, consider the report's findings in weighing 
flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus. 
Here, we conclude that the police had far too little 
information to support an individualized suspicion that the 
defendant had committed the breaking and entering.  As noted, 
the police were handicapped from the start with only a vague 
description of the perpetrators.  Until the point when Carr 
seized the defendant, the investigation failed to transform the 
defendant from a random black male in dark clothing traveling 
the streets of Roxbury on a cold December night into a suspect 
in the crime of breaking and entering.  Viewing the relevant 
factors in totality, we cannot say that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts. 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, the police 
lacked reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop of the 
defendant.  Therefore, we vacate the judgment of conviction and 
20 
 
remand the matter to the Boston Municipal Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.