Title: In re Guite

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 58













In re Guite (2010-239)
 
2011 VT 58
 
[Filed 10-Jun-2011]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that
corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2011 VT 58 
 
No. 2010-239
 
In re Petition of J. Michel Guite
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
    
Windsor Superior Court 
 
 

  January Term, 2011
 
 
Harold
  E. Eaton, Jr., J.
 
Robert D. Rachlin and
  Christopher D. Roy of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Burlington, for
  Petitioner-Appellant.
 
Jerome B. King, Pro Se,
  Hanover, New Hampshire, Respondent-Appellee.
 
 
PRESENT:  Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ., and Grearson, Supr. J., 
                    
Specially Assigned
 
 
¶ 1.            
DOOLEY, J.   This case concerns the use of a hilltop
cemetery on a farm in Hartland, Vermont.  The petitioner, Harold Guite,
now owns the farm property.  He claims that the cemetery plot is owned by
heirs of the Aldrich family, who settled the property as a farm in approximately
1775 and remained there until selling the farm in 1853.  Respondent's
family purchased the farm property in 1950 and owned
it until 1983.  Prior to selling the property, respondent, Jerome King,
buried the cremated remains of his parents in the hilltop cemetery. 
Respondent claims that the Aldrich family reserved only an easement in the
cemetery plot.  Thus, he contends title to the plot remained with the farm
so that he could use it to bury his parents and the remains cannot be moved. 
The trial court adopted respondent's theory and denied the petition.  We
conclude that petitioner's theory is correct and reverse.
¶ 2.            
The material facts are not in dispute.  During their ownership and
use of the Hartland farm from approximately 1775 until 1853, the Aldrich family
and its descendants buried at least three family members in the hilltop
cemetery.  When Aldrich family descendants Jude and Rebecca Adams sold the
entire farm property in 1853, the deed included the following language: 
"We . . . do freely give grant sell convey and confirm . . . a certain piece of
land lying and being in Hartland . . . . Possession to be
given the first day of April 1854.  Excepting out of the above
described premises 41 feet of ground by 27 feet which is the burying ground
on said premises."  (Emphasis added.)  The record contains no
evidence that the Adams's or their heirs recorded a separate deed to the
cemetery plot, nor any evidence that the family ever paid property taxes on the
plot.  The cemetery exception that began with the 1853 deed was included
in all subsequent deeds transferring the farm property.  
¶ 3.            
In 1950, respondent's parents purchased the farm and lived there for
about thirty years.  In 1981, after his parents passed away, respondent
buried both of their cremated remains in the cemetery.  When respondent
carried out this burial, he neglected to obtain any burial permits from the
town.  He did not seek permission to use the hilltop cemetery from any
remaining Aldrich family descendants.  In 1983, respondent sold the entire
Hartland farm property on behalf of his family's trust.  Respondent
included the following language pertaining to the cemetery plot in the 1983
deed:  
The
reservation in fee of the cemetery "41 feet of ground by 27 feet which is the
burying ground on said premises" appears at Volume 16, Page 240 of the Hartland
Land Records.  It is the mutual wish of the Grantors and the Grantee that
the burial ground be maintained; by acceptance of this deed the Grantee for
herself and her heirs and assigns agrees to keep the burial ground in a neat
and orderly condition permitting such reasonable access to the cemetery as may
be desired by the Grantors and their successors and assigns . . . . 
 
¶ 4.            
Following the 1983 sale, the farm passed through several different
owners before petitioner purchased it in September 2008.  Petitioner was
aware of the cemetery and its location when he bought the property.  His
deed stated that "The lands and premises are conveyed subject to: (1) the
reservation of the Aldrich Cemetery,' so-called, as set forth in the Warranty
Deed . . . dated December 26, 1853 . . . . Also conveying
with quit claim covenants only any interest in and easements or rights of way
to the aforesaid Aldrich Cemetery.' "  
¶ 5.            
Petitioner petitioned for a declaratory judgment regarding rights
asserted by respondent in the hilltop cemetery.  He requested a judgment
authorizing removal of the cemetery from its current location, allowing the
cemetery plot to "revert to private farm property."  Petitioner now
challenges a summary judgment decision from the trial court, which concluded
that descendants of respondent's parents are the beneficiaries of both an
implied easement in the hilltop cemetery from the 1853 deed and a recorded
easement from the 1983 deed that places subsequent owners of the farm on notice
of their obligation to "keep the burial ground in a neat and orderly condition
permitting such reasonable access to the cemetery as may be desired by
[respondent's family]."  (Quotation marks omitted.)  
¶ 6.            
The trial court relied primarily on our decision in In re Estate of
Harding, 2005 VT 24, 178 Vt. 139, 878 A.2d 201.  In Harding, we
held that a deed that reserved and excepted a burial
plot from a conveyance of property created only an easement that would protect
the plot and allow heirs to visit it.  Id. ¶ 19. 
Here, the trial court held that the Aldrich heirs had only an easement and
respondent had title to the cemetery plot when he owned the surrounding
property. As a result, the court concluded respondent had a right to bury the
cremated remains of his parents in the cemetery plot.  The trial court
held that petitioner, as a subsequent purchaser of the farm, took the whole
property "subject to the easements that were established before him," and the
court ultimately granted respondent's motion for summary judgment and denied
petitioner's cross-motion for summary judgment.  This appeal followed.
¶ 7.            
Petitioner argues on appeal that the trial court erred for ten reasons,
the first of which decides this case: under the terms of the 1853 deed, the
grantors retained a fee simple interest in the cemetery plot so that respondent
had no interest in that plot.  On this basis, petitioner argues that the
trial court erred in holding to the contrary. There is no dispute about the
logic of this argumentthat is, fee simple ownership of the cemetery plot by
the Aldrich family would prevent ownership by respondent on which his defense
is based.  Respondent's family could not have retained any easements,
express or implied, because one may reserve only property rights that one holds
at the time of a conveyance.  See Okemo Mountain, Inc. v. Town of
Ludlow, 171 Vt. 201, 205, 762 A.2d 1219, 1223 (2000); Okemo Mountain,
Inc. v. Town of Ludlow Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 164 Vt. 447, 451, 671 A.2d 1263, 1267 (1995); see also Boudreau v. Coleman, 564 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1990) ("Only rights held by grantors at the time of the conveyance may
be expressly reserved in a deed.").  Thus, the first issue requires us to
determine the effect of the 1853 deed.  If the deed retained in the
grantors the cemetery plot in fee simple, as petitioner argues, then respondent
had no right in the cemetery plot.  If the 1853 deed created only an
easement in the Aldrich heirs, then respondent owned the cemetery land subject
to the easement of the heirs, and petitioner cannot prevail on this point.
¶ 8.            
In an appeal from a summary judgment decision, this Court reviews the
motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard of review as
the trial court.  Madowitz v. Woods at Killington Owners' Ass'n,
2010 VT 37, ¶ 9, ___ Vt. ___, 6 A.3d 1117.  We will affirm summary
judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and a party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.; see V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3).  On review, we afford the nonmoving party the
benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences.  Ianelli
v. U.S. Bank, 2010 VT 34, ¶ 7, 187 Vt. 644, 996 A.2d 722 (mem.) (quotation omitted). 
¶ 9.            
In addressing whether the grantor retained a burial easement or a fee
interest, we must consider the 1853 deed as a whole and attempt to ascertain
the intent of the parties when they used the language in question.  Kipp v. Chips Estate, 169 Vt. 102, 105, 732 A.2d 127, 129
(1999).  " Our master rule for the
construction of deeds is that the intention of the parties, when ascertainable
from the entire instrument, prevails over technical terms or their formal
arrangement.' " Kennedy v. Rutter, 110 Vt. 332, 338, 6 A.2d 17, 20
(1939) (quoting Vermont Kaolin Corp. v. Lyons, 101 Vt. 367, 376, 143 A. 639, 642 (1928)); see P. Jackson, The Law of Cadavers 219 (1936)
(distinguishing "exception" from "reservation" and noting that "the scrivener's
choice of terms is given appropriate but not conclusive weight").  These
general principles apply here.  
¶ 10.         As we
stated above, the trial court relied heavily on our decision in Harding
in reaching its decision that the 1853 deed did not leave the grantors with a
fee simple interest in the cemetery plot.  In Harding, the
plaintiff's great-great-granduncle, the Reverend Doran B. Harding, died and was
buried on Caleb Harding's farm in Charlotte.  The following year, Caleb
Harding sold the farm, and the deed for this transaction included the following
provision, whose meaning was at issue in the case: "Excepting
and reserving therefrom the yard or enclosure on said land where Doran B.
Harding was interred."  Harding, 2005 VT 24, ¶ 2
(quotation marks omitted).  Based on this provision, the plaintiff
sought a declaration that Caleb Harding's heirs owned the burial plot in fee
simple.  The probate and superior courts concluded that the deed language
gave rise not to a fee interest in the plot, but rather to an easement
benefitting the grantor and his heirs, and we affirmed.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 5.
¶ 11.         The
only evidence we had before us in Harding was two one-page deeds that
were more than 160 years old.  Id. ¶ 7. 
The defendants argued that, by itself, the deed language at issue provided
insufficient evidence upon which to conclude that the parties to the original
deed recognized a separate fee in the burial yard, and we agreed.  Id. 
We noted that at common law, the establishment of a family burial plot created
an easement against the fee.  Id. ¶ 11. 
We considered a number of factors to determine whether the facts indicated a
clear intent to create a fee interest as opposed to an easement.  These
factors included the historic use of the terms "reservation" and "exception,"
the quality of the deed's boundary description of the plot, and whether a
separate deed existed for the plot.  Id. ¶¶ 9-10,
13, 16.  We ultimately concluded that the plaintiff had failed to
prove the existence of the purported fee.  Id. ¶
19.  In the absence of a clear expression of intent to create a
fee, we based our holding on the common law rule of family gravesites, which
indicated that an easement had been created.  Id.
¶ 18.
¶ 12.         We
conclude that this is a significantly different case from Harding.
 The main difference is in the nature of the interest retained as
expressed in the deed.  In Harding, the property involved was the
"yard or enclosure on said land where Doran B. Harding was interred."  2005 VT 24, ¶ 2 (quotation marks omitted).  We noted
that this description included no specification of the burial plot's size or
boundaries.  Id.  There was no delineation of the gravesite except
the presence of a headstone.  Id.  Here, the description of
the interest retained specifies the area as a plot of "41 feet of ground by 27
feet."  In Harding, the interest retained was in the "yard or
enclosure on said land."  Id. (emphasis added).  Here,
the interest is in the "ground."  In Harding, the interest was in
the graveyard or enclosure.  Id.  Here, the interest is in the
described plot, "which is the burying ground."  Each of these differences
is an indication that the deed in this case has excepted
from the conveyance a fee interest in a particular plot of land, rather than a
burial easement as recognized at common law.
¶ 13.         The
language of the interest retention in this case supports this
construction.  The plot is excepted "out of the
above described premises."  The terms "excepting" and "exception" are
generally used to withhold from a grant or conveyance something that would
otherwise pass in the grant.  See Harding, 2005 VT 24, ¶ 9 ("A deed
exception takes something out of the conveyance that would otherwise pass");
see also Sheldon Slate Prods. Co. v. Kurjiaka, 124 Vt. 261, 267, 204 A.2d 99, 103 (1964) ("[A] reservation is some newly created right which the
grantee impliedly conveys to the grantor, while an exception is something
withheld from a grant which would otherwise pass as a part of it.").  This
technical meaning of the words "excepting" and "exception" dates back to the
era of the 1853 deed.  See, e.g. Roberts v. Robertson, 53 Vt. 690,
692 (1881) ("The office of an exception in a deed is to take something
out of the thing granted that would otherwise pass, while a reservation
creates in favor of the grantor some new right out of the thing
granted which was not before in esse."); Keeler v. Wood, 30 Vt.
242, 245-46 (1858) ("[T]he word reserving,' strictly and technically used,
would imply a reservation of some use, or lesser estate, out of the estate
granted, while the words excepting' or saving' imply an exception out of the
conveyance of a part or parcel of the very thing granted, and are appropriate
to describe the exclusion of the land itself from the operation of the
deed.").  As this Court has previously recognized, the drafters of deeds
have sometimes used the terms "reserving" and "excepting"
synonymously.  Roberts, 53 Vt. at 692; Keeler, 30 Vt. at
246; see also Harding, 2005 VT 24, ¶ 8.  Where it is possible that
the terms were being treated as synonyms in a deed, the Court must interpret
the terms within the context of the surrounding language "in a way to effectuate
the intent of the parties." Roberts, 53 Vt. at 692. 
Thus, for example, "words creating an exception are to have effect as such,
although the word reservation is employed."  Id.  In Harding,
the interest was both excepted and reserved,
suggesting that it was something other than a fee interest.  2005 VT 24, ¶ 10.  We recognize that Harding
held that categorizing an interest as having been created by an exception,
rather than a reservation, is not necessarily inconsistent with the conclusion
that the interest involved is an easement rather than title in fee
simple.  Id., ¶¶ 9-10.  In this case, however, the deed
language creating an exception, combined with the description of the property
as discussed above, points to fee simple title.
¶ 14.         In addition
to the above analysis, we have looked at cases from other jurisdictions. 
Only a few appear to be helpful, and, not surprisingly, they are quite
dated.  The closest to this case is Mannerback v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
16 Pa. Super. 622, 1901 WL 3656 (Pa. Super. 1901), where the deed reserved and excepted "the graveyard on the lands hereby conveyed." 
Id. at *2 (quotation marks omitted).  In
holding that a fee interest in the graveyard land had been excepted,
the court reasoned:
 
The deed . . . described a tract of land which included the graveyard. 
That which was withheld from the grantee, by the clause quoted, was a part of
the tract conveyed.  It was a piece of the land, described by the use to
which it was then put.  A "graveyard" is impossible of definition, if
reference to the fact that it is a piece or parcel of land be denied.
 
Id. at
*3.  In another, Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Williams, 57 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), the deed in issue conveyed a tract of land
but added, "Save and except about ½ acre of land in the south end of this
tract, known as the McCutcheon Graveyard."  Id.
at 383 (quotation marks omitted).  The court noted that the deed
described property "in terms sufficiently explicit to enable it to be
identified," noting that the identification of the land as the McCutcheon
Graveyard was used to identify the location of the "about ½ acre of
land."  Id. at 383-84 (quotation marks omitted). 
It found that the words "save" and "except" in that context meant that the
grantor had retained the "about ½ acre of land" in fee simple.  Id. at 384 (quotation marks omitted).
¶ 15.         The
deed in this case has the attributes of those in Mannerback and Williams, specifically that the grantor retained an
ascertainable tract of land, with the burial plot description being used to
locate where the tract is to be found.  As the court stated in Mannerback,
"[i]t was a piece of the land, described by the use to which it was then
put."  16 Pa. Super. 622, 1901
WL 3656 at *3.  For that reason primarily, we conclude that the
deed excepted from the conveyance the burial ground,
which remained with the grantor in fee simple.
¶ 16.         The
trial court relied upon two factors in reaching the opposite conclusionthat
the grantor never created a separate deed to the cemetery lot, and that there
was no evidence that the grantor continued to pay property taxes on the
lot.  The first factor is discussed in Harding, 2005 VT 24, ¶ 13,
but in a specific context.  In that case, there was no description of the
size or metes and bounds of the burial yard, but the Court noted that a fee
interest could still be found "when other deeds that can provide a more precise
description of the property boundaries are incorporated by reference, but in
this case there is no evidence that Caleb Harding recorded a separate deed for
the burial plot."  Id.  Here, the need for a separate deed is
much less clearthe size and location descriptions of the burying ground were
apparently sufficient to determine the property boundaries.  Thus, a
separate deed is not necessary for a fee simple interest.
¶ 17.         The
second factor is of lesser significance.  There is no evidence that the
grantor of the 120 acres ever paid property taxes on the burying ground or that
the grantee ever paid property taxes on the full 120 acres as if the exception
had not occurred.  It may be that the property taxes on a 41' by 27' plot,
containing graves, would be de minimis.  In any event, the significance of
these facts, if they could be determined, is limited to a relatively short
period between 1853 and 1876.  In the latter year, the Legislature
exempted "[a]ll lands used for cemetery purposes" from property taxes.  See 1876, No. 90, § 1.  They have been continuously
exempt since 1876.  See 32 V.S.A. § 3802(7).  The absence of evidence
on taxation does not change our conclusion.
¶ 18.         Respondent
makes an additional argument why no fee interest was retained.  He argues
that if one begins reading the 1853 deed from the words "meaning to convey all
the land we now own in Hartland," it becomes clear that "[e]xcepting out of the
above described premises" was not meant to qualify "all the land we now
own."  Rather, respondent argues that the "[e]xcepting out" language was
meant to qualify the immediately preceding sentence, "Possession to be given
the first day of April 1854."  He interprets this qualification to mean
that possession of the burial plot was excepted out of
the property by the Aldrich descendants such that no subsequent owners of the
farm could "possess" it and subsequent generations could merely use the plot
for its purpose as a cemetery.  The arrangement of these sentences does
not change our interpretation of the "[e]xcepting out" phrase.  By the
language, the exception is from the "premises" conveyed, not from the
possession passed.  In fact, respondent's interpretation of the
"possession" language supports the conclusion that the grantors in the 1853
deed retained fee simple ownership in the plot because they did not intend to
give possession of it to the grantees.  As Harding holds, the
alternative interest is an easement as recognized at common law, not some right
of possession.  See 2005 VT 24, ¶¶ 9, 12. 
Nothing in the deed indicates, as respondent seems to contend, that the
grantors intended to create a piece of property "possessed" by no one and open
for use as a burial plot to anyone who owned the surrounding farm.  We
would need to distort the language of the deed to find such an
intent.
¶ 19.         In Harding,
we ruled that where we could not ascertain the true intent of the parties to
the original deed, and in the absence of a "clearer expression of intent," we
would rely only upon the common law of family gravesites, which creates an
easement.  2005 VT 24, ¶ 18.  The deed in
this case contains the necessary clearer expression of intent. 
Accordingly, we find that the 1853 deed excepted from
its grant the 41' by 27' burial plot, and the plot is owned in fee simple by
the heirs of the Aldrich family.  Thus, it was never owned by the King
family, and they had no right to bury the cremated remains in it.   
¶ 20.         Because
we hold in favor of petitioner and reverse the trial court on the basis of the
issues discussed above, we decline to reach petitioner's additional
arguments.  
Reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 
 
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice