Title: The Stop & Shop Supermarket Company v. The Board of Adjustment of the Township of Springfield

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). STEIN, J., writing for a majority Court. In this appeal, the Court addresses the extent to which a previously granted use variance to an applicant operating a retail business use binds the municipality to permit the applicant's transferee, engaged in a different retail business use, to succeed to the rights conferred by the use variance. Stop & Shop Supermarket Company (S&S) sought to open and operate a retail supermarket on property in the Township of Springfield previously owned by Saks Fifth Avenue (Saks) and occupied since 1956 by Saks' retail department store. S&S filed suit to challenge the determination of the Springfield Board of Adjustment (Board) that S&S cannot rely on the use variance granted to Saks by the Board in 1956 to permit parking on the residentially zoned portion of the lot, and in 1968 to permit construction of an addition to the store on that same part of the lot. The Springfield portion of the property was split-zoned into two portions: residential and commercial. From 1957 until 1968, the department store was a 64,000 square-foot structure located entirely within the commercial zone, and the accessory parking was located partly in the commercial zone and, pursuant to the 1956 use variance, partly in the residential zone. Pursuant to a second use variance in 1968, Saks was permitted to construct a 19,000 square foot addition to its building, of which 13,000 square feet were located in the residentially-zoned portion of the property. In granting the 1956 use variance to Saks, the Board concluded that the residentially-zoned portion of the Saks property was unsuitable for residential development; that the property's highest and best use would be achieved by the grant of the use variance to integrate development of the entire property for retail commercial use; and that the proposed use would promote that general welfare and preserve and enhance property values by removing the danger of haphazard and inconsistent residential development. In 1968, the Board granted the second use variance noting that the area in question was no longer suited for residential use and that Saks provided shopping of a quality not otherwise available in the community. In 1994, S&S was informed by the Zoning Officer that it could not rely on the previously-granted use variances to operate its retail supermarket on Saks' property. S&S was notified that it could either seek a new variance, rezoning of the property, or Board review of the Zoning Officer's determination. S&S appealed to the Board pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70 (a) and (b) of the Municipal Land Use Law, contending that it was entitled to rely on the use variances previously granted to Saks. At the conclusion of hearings held in 1996, the Board voted to sustain the Zoning Officer's conclusion that S&S required a new use variance to operate its supermarket on the Saks property. The Board's resolution noted that S&S declined to offer proofs concerning a qualitative comparison between the previously approved use of the residentially-zoned property and the newly proposed use of that property. The Board concluded that S&S failed to demonstrate that the business it intends to operate on the property is of a similar nature, kind, or use intensity to that of the Saks operation and thus S&S cannot rely on the previously-granted use variances. S&S filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ challenging the Board's decision. The Colonial Association of Springfield, comprised of residents potentially affected by the proposed use, and the Township of Millburn were permitted to intervene as defendants. The trial court reversed the Board's determination as an abuse of discretion, ruling that S&S did not need a new use variance to operate a supermarket on the property. In reaching its determination, the court reasoned that the question whether S&S's use of property was qualitatively similar to Sak's use was irrelevant; that the category under which both types of retail services fell were not distinguished in the zoning ordinance; and that use variances are not personal to the owner, but run with the land. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the decision of the trial court, finding that the differences between the two enterprises precluded reliance on the previously-granted use variances. The Supreme Court granted S&S's petition for certification. HELD: The 1956 variance that permitted Saks to use the residentially-zoned portion of its property for parking accessory to its department store use, and the 1968 variance that permitted Saks to expand its building into the residentially-zoned portion of its property, are applicable to and may be relied on by S&S in its proposed use of the property for a retail supermarket. 1. For most commercial use variance applications, the required proof of special reasons focuses exclusively on the special characteristics of the property and imposes on the applicant the burden of establishing either that the proposed use will serve the general welfare because the use is peculiarly fitted to the particular location for which the variance is sought, or that undue hardship exists because the property for which the use variance is sought cannot reasonably be adapted to a conforming use. Variances run with the property and are not personal to the applicant; thus, successors in title may avail themselves of the previously-granted use variance. (pp. 15-23) 2. Notwithstanding the prospect of a more intense use of the property and the obvious distinction between the enterprises carried on by a supermarket and by a retail department store, the decisive factor is the municipal ordinance in effect when S&S submitted its application. That ordinance treated the two uses identically - retail department stores and retail food stores fall under the same use category in the ordinance. (pp. 24-27) 3. The Court's disposition is supported by its decision last term in Rogers v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Village of Ridgewood. Moreover, the objectors' reliance on the very upscale and very expensive quality of Saks merchandise and its dignified atmosphere fails to take into account the possibility that Saks could have sold its property to a less dignified department store whose hours, volume and traffic patterns could have been far more intrusive on the neighborhood than the Saks store. (pp. 27-29) 4. The question is not whether the successor use is essentially duplicative of the use for which the variance was granted, as suggested by the dissent, but rather, whether, considering all relevant factors, the successor use is sufficiently similar to the variant use to afford it the benefit of the variance. In this case, the parking lot use for which the variance was granted remains unchanged, except that it will be a use accessory to a supermarket rather than a department store. By classifying those two uses identically in its zoning ordinance, the Township of Springfield has demonstrated that the distinction does not constitute a valid basis for denying S&S the benefit of the prior variances. (pp. 29-30) Judgment of The Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Township of Springfield for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN, dissenting, in which JUSTICE GARIBALDI joins, is of the view that the question should be whether the new owner's intended use of the land so significantly differs from the variant use as to unreasonably affect a legitimate land use purpose. Justice Coleman would affirm the decision of the Board because S&S failed to present evidence showing that its intended use of the property is significantly similar in kind, nature, or use intensity to the retail merchandising conducted by Saks, in terms of the qualitative nature and intensity of use of the parking lot. Because S&S failed to show that its proposed use does not represent a substantial change in the variant use, a new application to the Board was required. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, LONG and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE STEIN'S opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE GARIBALDI joins. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 92 September Term 1998 THE STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY, a corporation of the State of Delaware and STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, not in its individual capacity, but solely as Trustee under a Trust Agreement dated as of April 26, 1994, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF SPRINGFIELD, COLONIAL ASSOCIATION OF SPRINGFIELD and THE TOWNSHIP OF MILLBURN, Defendants-Respondents, and VILLAGE SUPER MARKET, INC., a corporation of the State of New Jersey and SUMAS REALTY CORPORATION, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, Intervenors-Respondents. Argued November 8, 1999 -- Decided February 9, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 315 N.J. Super. 427 (1998). James V. Segreto argued the cause for appellants (Sigrid & Sigrid, attorneys; Mr. Sigrid and Paul A. Sigrid, on the brief). Roger S. Clapp argued the cause for respondent The Township of Millburn (Cooper, Rose & English, attorneys; Mr. Clapp and Bruce S. Goodman, on the brief). Stephen E. Barcan argued the cause for intervenors-respondents, Village Super Market, Inc. and Sumas Realty Corporation (Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, attorneys; Mr. Barcan and Donna M. Jennings, on the briefs). Neil J. Dworkin argued the cause for respondent The Board of Adjustment of the Township of Springfield. Michael S. Feldman argued the cause for respondent Colonial Association of Springfield (Wasser & Feldman, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J. The principal issue presented by this appeal concerns the extent to which a previously granted use variance to an applicant conducting a retail business use binds the municipality to permit the applicant's transferee, engaged in a different retail business use, to succeed to the rights conferred by the use variance. Stating the question more narrowly, where the prior use variance allowed a retail department store, a permitted use, to use the residentially-zoned portion of its split-zoned lot for parking as a use accessory to the permitted retail use, is the benefit of that use variance for parking available to a retail supermarket, the department store's transferee, whose proposed use also constituted a permitted retail use under the ordinance? In a published opinion, the Appellate Division, reversing the judgment of the Law Division holding that the retail supermarket succeeded to the rights conferred by the earlier use variance, determined that the differences between the two enterprises precluded reliance on the earlier variance. Stop & Shop v. Board of Adj. of Springfield, 315 N.J. Super. 427, 436-37 (1998). That court observed that [i]n granting these variances, the Board considered only the specific enterprise proposed by Sak's in its application. . . . [A]ny proposed, significant change or alteration in the use of the property required further consideration by the board of adjustment. Id. at 435. We granted Stop & Shop's petition for certification, 158 N.J. 687 (1999), and now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division. Other New Jersey cases have emphasized that use variances adhere to the property and are not personal to the applicant. See, e.g., Soho Park Land Co. v. Board of Adj. of Belleville, 6 N.J. Misc., 686, 687 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (invalidating condition attached to use variance allowing construction of industrial building in residential zone that limited building to use solely as a wire factory by applicant for variance, noting that condition constituted restraint on alienation that would affect value of property); Aldrich v. Schwartz, 258 N.J. Super. 300, 308 (App. Div. 1992) (noting that [v]ariances run with the land and are not personal to the property owner who obtained the grant ); Berninger v. Board of Adj. of Midland Park, 254 N.J. Super. 401, 405 (App. Div. 1991), aff'd 127 N.J. 226 (1992) (noting that a condition [that] limits the life of a variance to ownership by a particular individual is patently illegal, as it advances no legitimate land use purpose ); DeFelice v. Board of Adj. of Point Pleasant Beach, 216 N.J. Super. 377, 383 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that a variance runs with the land and is not personal to the property owner ); Farrell v. Estell Manor Bd. of Adj., 193 N.J. Super. 554, 558 (App. Div. 1984) (stating that [a] variance granted is not personal to the owner to whom granted but is available to the grantee's successors ). The caselaw throughout the country, consistent with our decisions, recognizes that variances run with the land and that their benefit is available to the applicant's successors in title. See Garibaldi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Norwalk, 303 A.2d 743, 745 (Conn. 1972); National Black Child Development Institute, Inc. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adj., 483 A.2d 687, 691-92 (D.C. App. 1984); Halifax Area Council on Alcoholism v. City of Daytona Beach, 385 So. 2d 184, 188 n.5 (Fla. App. 1980); Huntington v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Hadley, 428 N.E.2d 826, 829-830 (Mass. App. 1981); State v. Konopka, 200 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ohio App. 1963); Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head, 146 A.2d 257, 260 (N.H. 1958); Mechem v. City of Santa Fe, 634 P.2d 690, 694 (N.M. 1981); St. Onge v. Donovan, 522 N.E.2d 1019, 1022-23 (N.Y. 1988); Neiburger v. Lewis, 57 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544-45 (N.Y.Sup. 1945); Mastrati v. Strauss, 67 A.2d 29, 30-31 (R.I. 1949); Nuckles v. Allen, 156 S.E.2d 633, 637-38 (S.C. 1967); Goldberg v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 340 N.W.2d 558, 561-62 (Wis. App. 1983). Accord, Robert M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning, 14.29 (1968); Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 38.07 (4th ed. 1994); Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Control, 43.03 (1984); Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice, 21-2 (4th ed. 1979); Phillip P. Green Jr., The Power of The Zoning Board of Adjustment to Grant Variances From the Zoning Ordinance, 29 N.C. L. Rev. 245, 278 (1951); Note, Zoning Variances, supra, 74 Harv. L. Rev. at 1398. Perhaps the clearest explanation of the principle that the specific representations and circumstances of the successful applicant for a use variance cannot be permitted to limit the availability of the variance to successors in title is found in an opinion by the New York Court of Appeals in Dexter v. Town Board of Gates, 324 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1975). In Dexter, the applicant successfully sought rezoning of a twelve-acre residentially-zoned tract of land to permit its development as a retail shopping center. In rezoning the property, the Town Board imposed as a condition that the rezoning would inure only to the benefit of the applicant and only for the specific use contemplated by the application. In invalidating that condition, the New York Court of Appeals distinguished between the representations made to encourage rezoning or variance grants and the proper scope of the action taken by the municipal agency: While it is a fundamental principle of zoning that a zoning board is charged with the regulation of land use and not with the person who owns or occupies it, we recognize that customarily, as is here illustrated, when a change of zone, a variance or a special permit is sought, there is a specific project sponsored by a particular developer which is the subject of the application. As a practical matter, the application is usually predicated on a particular type structure, often accompanied by architectural renderings, for a particular use by a specific intended user. In the usual case, the application and accompanying graphic material come to constitute a series of representations frequently bolstered at the hearing by additional promises or assurances made to meet objections there raised. Throughout, attention focuses on the reputation of the applicant and his relationship to the community and the particular intended use. And all too often the administrative or legislative determination seems to turn on the identity of the applicant or intended user, rather than upon neutral planning and zoning principles. The error in this approach, however, is lack of adherence to the fundamental rule that zoning deals basically with land use and not with the person who owns or occupies it. While it is proper for a zoning board to impose appropriate conditions and safeguards in conjunction with a change of zone or a grant of a variance or special permit, such conditions and safeguards must be reasonable and relate only to the real estate involved without regard to the person who owns or occupies it. [Id. at 871 (citations omitted).] We hold that the 1956 variance that permitted Saks to use the residentially-zoned portion of its property for parking accessory to its department store use, and the 1968 variance that permitted Saks to expand its building into the residentially zoned portion of its property, are applicable to and may be relied on by S&S in its proposed use of the property for a retail supermarket. That holding does not imply that all successors in interest to property that has benefitted from a use variance may assert the rights accorded by that variance, and we shall address in this opinion the considerations that may justify limitations on a successor's right to rely on a use variance. Nor are we insensitive to the contentions of respondents that S&S's proposed use may involve longer hours, more traffic, and a greater volume of business than did the Saks use. Notwithstanding the prospect of a more intense use of the property, and the obvious distinction between the businesses carried on by a department store and by a supermarket, the factor that is decisive to our disposition is that the municipal ordinance in effect when S&S submitted its application treated the two uses identically. Pursuant to the 1993 Springfield Land Use Ordinance, the following eleven uses were permitted in the GC zone: (1) Church or other place of worship parish house, Sunday school, church school; (2) Municipal building or use; (3) Public School, park, playground or other quasi-public use; (4) Retail sales and service stores; (5) Business and professional offices; (6) Medical offices and immediate medical care facilities; (7) Bank and financial institutions; (8) Private schools; (9) Indoor movie theater; (10) Shopping centers containing any of the above permitted uses; (11) Child care center. The ordinance's definition of Retail Sales and Services, supra at (slip op. at 5), includes the sale of goods for use or consumption off the premises, which goods are intended to meet direct consumer food, clothing . . . or other needs . . . . (emphasis added). That Springfield classifies both retail department stores and retail food stores under the same permitted use category in its zoning ordinance establishes beyond dispute that the two uses are sufficiently congruent to make available the variances obtained by the department store use for the proposed supermarket use. Other considerations support that legal conclusion. Our cases recognize the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to the decisions of boards of adjustment. See Bressman v. Gash, 131 N.J. 517, 526-27 (1993); Russell v. Tenafly Bd. of Adj., 31 N.J. 58, 65-66 (1959). We observed in Bressman that [a]s a general rule, an adjudicative decision of an administrative agency 'should be accorded the same finality that is accorded the judgment of a court.' 131 N.J. at 526 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments 83 comment b (1982). Although our application of res judicata to board of adjustment proceedings has not been rigid, Russell, supra, 31 N.J. at 65-67, we cannot ignore the clarity and decisiveness of the Springfield Board of Adjustment's finding in 1956 that the residence zoned portion of the subject premises [does] not lend [itself to] the construction of houses, and its finding in 1968 that since the store is located where it is, the area into which applicant seeks to extend the store is no longer suited for residential use. When the Springfield Board determined in 1996 that S&S was required to seek new variances, the only variances required were the right to use the residentially-zoned portion of the property, now zoned S-75 rather than S-120, for parking (under S&S's first alternative proposal), and the right to use the residentially zoned part of the property for a smaller portion of building area that was used by Saks (under S&S's second alternative proposal). In our view, the Board could not reasonably be permitted to contradict its earlier findings that residential development of the residentially-zoned portion of the property was inappropriate because it would abut immediately on a business zone; that residential development would be incompatible with the established patterns of homes in the [abutting] residential area, and that the highest and best use of the residential parcel would be achieved by the integrated development of the entire parcel for a retail commercial use. Nor could the Board justifiably rescind its 1956 conclusion that the statutory negative criteria had been satisfied in that the use of the residentially-zoned portion of the property for accessory parking would not substantially impair the zone plan or be substantially detrimental to the public good. We infer that the force of the reasoning underlying those findings has been strengthened by the passage of more than forty years during which the residentially zoned portion of the premises continuously has been used for retail commercial purposes. Our disposition of this appeal also is supported by our decision last term in Rogers v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Village of Ridgewood, 158 N.J. 11 (1999). In Rogers we invalidated an ordinance of the Village of Ridgewood that required all non-conforming sign structures that were accessory to primary commercial uses to be removed if the primary use was changed. The ordinance was challenged when the Village attempted to cause the removal of a non-conforming sign because a building previously occupied as an insurance office would in the future be occupied by a nail salon, both uses being permitted by the Village ordinance. Affirming the Appellate Division's invalidation of the ordinance, 309 N.J. Super. 630 (1998), which in turn relied on Judge Skillman's dissent in Camara v. Board of Adjustment of Belleville, 239 N.J. Super. 51, 61 (App. Div. 1990), we held that the Village ordinance could not deprive the property owner of the statutory protection afforded to non conforming accessory structures, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68, merely because of a change from one permitted primary use to another. Because uses granted by variance enjoy a higher status under our law than do non-conforming uses, see Industrial Lessors, supra, 119 N.J. Super. at 183, the Township of Springfield cannot be permitted to afford less protection to the use variance for accessory parking on the S&S property than the Village of Ridgewood was required to afford to accessory non-conforming signs. In both instances, the change from one permitted use to another does not permit the municipality to terminate the accessory use, whether it be non-conforming or the result of a use variance. We also note that the objectors' reliance on the very upscale, very expensive quality of the Saks merchandise and its dignified atmosphere fails to take into account the possibility that Saks could have sold its property during the intervening years to less dignified department store retailers whose hours of operation, sales volume, and traffic patterns might have been far more intrusive on the neighborhood than was the Saks operation. That possibility of Saks' sale, or its own conversion, to a busier, more intense retail department store use -- which indisputably could rely on the earlier variances - points up the wisdom of the warning sounded by the New York Court of Appeals in Dexter, supra, 324 N.E.2d at 871, that all too often the administrative . . . determination seems to turn on the identity of the applicant or intended user, rather than upon neutral planning and zoning principles. The lesson is that in granting use variances boards of adjustment must anticipate that users in the same use category as the applicant, but with different merchandising characteristics, may someday occupy the property and claim the benefit of the prior variance. The question is not whether the successor use is essentially duplicative of the use for which the variance was granted, as our dissenting colleagues suggest, post at ___ (slip op. at 10), but rather whether, considering all relevant factors, the successor use is sufficiently similar to the variant use to afford it the benefit of the variance. In this case, the parking lot use for which the variance was granted remains unchanged, except that it will be a use accessory to a supermarket rather than a department store. The Township of Springfield, by classifying those two uses identically within its zoning ordinance, has demonstrated that the distinction does not constitute a valid basis for denying Stop & Shop the benefit of the prior variances. We emphasize that the municipality is not powerless to address the specific problems that may be presented by S&S's proposed use of the property. Pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -129, municipal planning boards possess a broad reservoir of authority to review and approve site plan applications, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-50, and to insure compliance with the provisions of the local site plan ordinance. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-41. Such review typically encompasses such issues as location of structures, vehicular and pedestrian circulation, parking, loading and unloading, lighting, screening and landscaping. We anticipate that the Springfield Planning Board, informed by the concerns of residents in the vicinity of the property, will impose appropriate conditions and restrictions on S&S's proposed development and use of the property in order to minimize any intrusion on or inconvenience to the continued use and enjoyment of those neighboring residential properties. THE STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY, a corporation of the State of Delaware and STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, not in its individual capacity, but solely as Trustee under a Trust Agreement dated as of April 26, 1994, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF SPRINGFIELD, COLONIAL ASSOCIATION OF SPRINGFIELD and THE TOWNSHIP OF MILLBURN, Defendants-Respondents, and VILLAGE SUPER MARKET, INC., a corporation of the State of New Jersey and SUMAS REALTY CORPORATION, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, Intervenors-Respondents. Coleman, J., dissenting The question presented by this appeal is not whether a variance runs with the land, about which there is no debate. The Appellate Division in this case acknowledged that use variances are not personal to the owner, but run with the land. Stop & Shop, supra, 315 N.J. Super. at 434. Rather, the question is whether the new owner's intended use of the land so significantly differs from the variant use as to unreasonably affect a legitimate land use purpose. Berninger v. Board of Adjustment, 254 N.J. Super. 401, 405 (App. Div. 1991), aff'd o.b., 127 N.J. 226 (1992). Unlike the majority, I would affirm the decision of the Springfield Board of Adjustment (Board). Stop & Shop (S&S) failed to present evidence showing that its intended use of the property is significantly similar in kind, nature, or use intensity to the retail merchandising conducted by Saks Fifth Avenue (Saks), in terms of the qualitative nature and intensity of use of the parking lot. Absent proofs to the contrary, the Board could infer that S&S's intended use of the premises to conduct business activities related to the operation of a mega supermarket differs substantially from Saks's operation of an upscale retail department store. The Board also could reasonably infer that the change in use will substantially increase vehicular and pedestrian traffic and hours of operation that will have a significant and unreasonable land use impact. I wholeheartedly agree with the Appellate Division that because S&S failed to demonstrate that its proposed use does not represent an insubstantial change in the variant use, a new application to the Board was required. Stop & Shop, supra, 315 N.J. at 431, 437. Hence, I dissent from the majority's contrary holding. NO. A-92 THE STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY, a corporation of the State of Delaware and STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, not in its individual capacity, but solely as Trustee under a Trust Agreement dated as of April 26, 1994, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF SPRINGFIELD, COLONIAL ASSOCIATION OF SPRINGFIELD and THE TOWNSHIP OF MILLBURN, Defendants-Respondents, and VILLAGE SUPER MARKET, INC., a corporation of the State of New Jersey and SUMAS REALTY CORPORATION, a corporation of the State of New Jersey, Intervenors-Respondents. DECIDED February 9, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz