Title: State ex rel. Ramirez-Ortiz v. Twelfth District Court of Appeals

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Ramirez-Ortiz v. Twelfth Dist. Court of Appeals, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7816.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-7816 
THE STATE EX REL. RAMIREZ-ORTIZ v. TWELFTH DISTRICT COURT OF 
APPEALS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Ramirez-Ortiz v. Twelfth Dist. Court of Appeals, 
Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-7816.] 
Prohibition—Respondent appellate court patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction to review trial court’s credibility determinations—Writ 
granted. 
(No. 2016-1730—Submitted June 6, 2017—Decided September 27, 2017.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this original action, relator, Efranin Ramirez-Ortiz, seeks a writ of 
prohibition to bar respondent Twelfth District Court of Appeals from hearing the 
state’s appeal of his Crim.R. 29(A) acquittal.  The appellate court has filed a motion 
to dismiss, and Ramirez-Ortiz has asked for leave to amend his complaint.  We 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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hereby grant the motion for leave to amend, deny the motion to dismiss, and grant 
a peremptory writ of prohibition. 
Background 
{¶ 2} In his complaint, Ramirez-Ortiz makes the following factual 
allegations, which do not appear to be in dispute. 
{¶ 3} Ramirez-Ortiz was indicted in Butler County on two counts of 
aggravated burglary and two counts of felonious assault.  The case was tried to a 
jury. 
{¶ 4} After the state presented its evidence, Ramirez-Ortiz moved for a 
judgment of acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A).  The trial court granted the motion as 
to all counts.  In announcing the ruling, the court commented that the state’s 
witnesses lacked credibility.  Reminded by the prosecutor that Crim.R. 29(A) 
required the court to construe the evidence in the state’s favor, the court indicated 
that it had done so.  The court then ordered the entry of a judgment of acquittal 
under Crim.R. 29(A) on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a 
conviction as a matter of law. 
{¶ 5} The state filed a notice of appeal in the Twelfth District Court of 
Appeals, along with a motion for leave to appeal.  Ramirez-Ortiz opposed the 
motion for leave and filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  
The appellate court granted the motion for leave to appeal without explicitly 
mentioning the motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 6} Ramirez-Ortiz then commenced this action for a writ of prohibition to 
prevent the court of appeals from hearing the state’s appeal.  The appellate court 
filed a motion to dismiss, which Ramirez-Ortiz has opposed. 
Analysis 
{¶ 7} For the requested writ of prohibition to issue, Ramirez-Ortiz must 
show that the Twelfth District is about to exercise judicial power, that it lacks 
authority to exercise that power, and that denying the writ would result in injury for 
January Term, 2017 
 
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which no adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. 
Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13.  
However, if the Twelfth District patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, 
then Ramirez-Ortiz need not establish the third prong, the lack of an adequate 
remedy at law.  State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 
368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. 
First argument in the motion to dismiss 
{¶ 8} The Twelfth District argues that it is not sui juris1 and therefore cannot 
be sued.  But Ramirez-Ortiz has filed an unopposed motion for leave to amend his 
complaint to name all five judges of the Twelfth District, as well as the magistrate, 
as respondents.  We grant the motion, thereby mooting the first argument asserted 
in the Twelfth District’s motion to dismiss. 
Second argument in the motion to dismiss 
{¶ 9} The state is not permitted to appeal a final verdict in a criminal case, 
R.C. 2945.67(A), including a judgment of acquittal under Crim.R. 29.  State v. 
Hampton, 134 Ohio St.3d 447, 2012-Ohio-5688, 983 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 12.  However, 
the state is permitted to seek leave to appeal “ ‘any other decision,’ ” such as 
evidentiary rulings.  State v. Keeton, 18 Ohio St.3d 379, 381, 481 N.E.2d 629 
(1985), quoting R.C. 2945.67(A).  In State v. Bistricky, for example, the trial court 
made preliminary rulings regarding the scope of an immunity statute and the burden 
of proof relating thereto and then granted the defendants’ motion for a judgment of 
acquittal based on the statutory immunity.  51 Ohio St.3d 157, 555 N.E.2d 644 
(1990).  This court held that the state could pursue a discretionary appeal of 
“substantive law rulings * * * which result in a judgment of acquittal so long as the 
judgment itself is not appealed.”  Id. at syllabus. 
                                                 
1 “Sui juris” means “[o]f his own right; possessing full social and civil rights; not under any legal 
disability, or the power of another, or guardianship.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1434 (6th Ed.1990). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 10} In its second argument for dismissal, the court of appeals contends 
that it does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction because, as in Keeton 
and Bistricky, the state is not appealing the trial court’s judgment per se but, rather, 
“the trial court’s substantive legal ruling that led to the judgment of acquittal.”  
According to the Twelfth District, the trial court went beyond considering the 
sufficiency of the evidence when it acquitted Ramirez-Ortiz and instead made an 
independent legal ruling based on its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, 
as evinced by the trial court’s comments that the testimony of the prosecution 
witnesses was “not believable.” 
{¶ 11} The appellate court’s argument misconstrues the reasoning of 
decisions like Bistricky.  As we explained in State v. Ross, the state can appeal a 
discrete legal issue when the question is capable of repetition yet evading review 
(by virtue of the acquittal).  128 Ohio St.3d 283, 2010-Ohio-6282, 943 N.E.2d 992, 
¶ 33.  However, to the extent that the appeal “ ‘subject[ed] the defendant to 
postacquittal factfinding,’ ” such an appeal would have “ ‘no proper purpose.’ ”  Id. 
at ¶ 32, quoting Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145, 106 S.Ct. 1745, 90 
L.Ed.2d 116 (1986).  So in Ross, the state was permitted to appeal the trial court’s 
legal ruling that it had jurisdiction to grant an untimely Crim.R. 29(C) motion for a 
judgment of acquittal by treating it as a motion for reconsideration, but the court of 
appeals could not disturb the acquittal itself.  Id. at ¶ 32-34, 51. 
{¶ 12} According to the Twelfth District, the state seeks “to appeal the trial 
court’s underlying assessment of state witnesses (and the standard of review it 
applied).”  But the correctness of the trial court’s credibility assessments does not 
present an independent legal issue; asking the appellate court to review the trial 
court’s credibility determinations is exactly the same thing as asking the appellate 
court to review and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 
{¶ 13} Alternatively, the Twelfth District asserts that it must review the 
standard that the trial court used in granting the Crim.R. 29(A) motion.  But there 
January Term, 2017 
 
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is no dispute over what standard was applicable.  In its judgment entry, the trial 
court correctly framed its decision granting the Crim.R. 29(A) motion as based on 
its determination that “the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction as a matter 
of law.”  What is in dispute is whether the trial court actually applied that standard 
or merely paid lip service to it, but that question is not a legal issue capable of 
repetition, because it is tied to the specific facts of this case. 
{¶ 14} Because the Twelfth District has failed to show that it has 
jurisdiction to hear the state’s appeal, we deny the motion to dismiss. 
The question of remedy 
{¶ 15} In an original action before this court, once the respondent’s time to 
answer or move for dismissal has elapsed, our rules provide for four possible 
judgments: the court may (1) dismiss the complaint, (2) issue an alternative writ, 
thereby requiring the parties to submit evidence and additional briefing, (3) issue a 
peremptory writ of mandamus or prohibition, or (4) deny the writ outright.  
S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04(C).  Summary disposition is generally not proper in a mandamus 
action, when the underlying facts establishing the legal duty and/or the right to 
relief are in dispute or have not been admitted.  State ex rel. Temke v. Outcalt, 49 
Ohio St.2d 189, 191, 360 N.E.2d 701 (1977). 
{¶ 16} However, this prohibition case presents a pure question of law.  Our 
decision does not depend on the resolution of factual disputes, and therefore 
additional briefing by the parties is unnecessary. 
{¶ 17} For this reason, pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04(C), we hereby grant 
a peremptory writ of prohibition barring the Twelfth District Court of Appeals from 
hearing the state’s appeal in State v. Ramirez-Ortiz, No. CA2016-09-0179. 
Motion to dismiss denied, 
motion for leave granted,  
and writ granted. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, and DEWINE, 
JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
_________________ 
Repper, Pagan, Cook, Ltd., and Christopher J. Pagan, for relator. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Sarah E. Pierce and Zachery P. 
Keller, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents. 
_________________