Title: Smith v. Smith

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

317 S.W.2d 275 (1958) Clint SMITH, Administrator, Appellant, v. A. L. SMITH, Administrator, et al., Appellees. No. 5-1621. Supreme Court of Arkansas. November 3, 1958. Rehearing Denied December 1, 1958. *276 Lee Seamster, Fayetteville, Barney Hamilton, Kansas, Okl., Russell Elrod, Siloam Springs, for appellant. A. L. Smith, Siloam Springs, for appellees. HARRIS, Chief Justice. Hugh Smith and Lucy Coleman Smith, his wife, lived at Siloam Springs, Arkansas. They had no children. On April 22, 1947, Mrs. Smith executed a will leaving all property to her husband.[1] On November 3, 1952, Mr. Smith executed a will leaving all property to his wife. On April 19, 1957, while riding together in an automobile, the Smiths had an accident. Hugh Smith was dead when assistance arrived at the scene, and Lucy Coleman Smith was unconscious, and remained so until her death seventeen days later on May 6th. Clint Smith, appellant herein, and brother of the deceased, was named administrator, with the will annexed, of the estate of Hugh Smith. A. L. Smith, appellee herein, was named administrator, with the will annexed, of the estate of Lucy Coleman Smith. Both estates are now pending in the Benton County Probate Court. The administrator of the Hugh Smith estate filed a petition asking for a construction of the two wills. A. L. Smith, administrator of the estate of Lucy Coleman Smith, demurred to the petition, setting out that the petition with exhibits[2] thereto, showed on its face that the two wills were not ambiguous, that appellant had no right or interest in the estate of Lucy Coleman Smith that would entitle him to a construction of her will; that the petition showed that the estate of Hugh Smith, under the terms of his will, became the property of Lucy Coleman Smith at his death, and since her decease, had become the property of her heirs, named in the petition; that the petition set forth no facts which would authorize the consolidation of the cases for the purpose of construing the wills of Hugh Smith and Lucy Coleman Smith, and asked that the demurrer be sustained and the petition dismissed. The heirs of Mrs. Smith also filed a demurrer, adopting as their own the demurrer filed by appellee administrator. On hearing, the court sustained the demurrers, and dismissed the petition of appellant for construction of the wills. From such order, comes this appeal. We deem it first proper to relate the provisions of the two wills. Lucy Coleman Smith's will was properly executed on April 22, 1947, and after formalities, consists of three items. Item one directs the payment of debts at the time of death, and expenses of last illness and funeral. Item two provides: *277 "All the rest and residue of my property, real, personal or mixed, and wheresoever it may be situate, and of whatsoever it may consist, I give, devise and bequeath to my husband, Hugh Smith, absolutely and without any limitation whatever." Item three appoints the husband, Hugh Smith, as executor of the will, to serve without bond. Hugh Smith's will was executed on November 3, 1952, and after formalities, consists of two items. Item one directs the payment of debts at the time of death, and expenses of last illness and funeral. Item two reads as follows: "All of the rest and residue of my property, of whatsoever it may consist, and wheresoever it may be situated, I give, devise and bequeath to my wife, Lucy Coleman Smith, absolutely and without any limitations whatever, and I hereby nominate and appoint said Lucy Coleman Smith to be Executrix of my will, and request that she be permitted to serve as such without giving bond." These instruments would seem to be entirely clear, but appellant bases his argument for reversal upon the allegation that a latent ambiguity was created, and that in such a situation, the court will aid itself by resorting to extrinsic facts and circumstances to determine the actual intent of the testators. The latent ambiguity, says appellant, is created by the following circumstances: first, the wills provide for the survivor to be executor, or executrix, as the case might be, without any alternate or substitute mentioned; second, as a result of the accident, both testators lost their power to will at the same instant; third, the Arkansas Uniform Simultaneous Death Act placed a common disaster clause in both wills, and finally, "facts and circumstances surrounding the accident." These "facts and circumstances" are not set out in any pleading. The petition for construction contains a quite unusual and unique allegation. We quote: It is interesting to note that these allegations are entirely contrary to an earlier petition filed on the approved Probate form by appellant, when seeking to admit Hugh Smith's will to Probate. There, it was averred: On the same date, a prepared petition was filed by Clint Smith, together with Dr. John L. Stockton, a nephew of Hugh Smith, containing the following allegation: These petitions sought to name appellant as executor of Hugh Smith's estate (which order was subsequently entered), and apparently as evidence of Lucy Coleman Smith's inability to act, a letter from C. D. Gunter, M.D., was attached to the petition. The letter is as follows: However, we shall not include in this discussion the question of whether appellant is bound by the statements made in the earlier petitions, but we mention them only to show that after Hugh Smith's death, Mrs. Smith continued to live, in the ordinary and accepted meaning of the word, and that appellant recognized that fact. We proceed to a perusal of appellant's contention that a latent ambiguity was created. An "ambiguity" is defined by 1 Bouv. Law Dict., Rawle's Third Revision, p. 186, as "indistinctness, or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument." There are two kinds of ambiguitypatent and latent. According to Bouvier: "Patent is that which appears on the face of the instrument; that which occurs when the expression of an instrument is so defective that a court which is obliged to place a construction upon it, cannot, placing itself in the situation of the parties, ascertain therefrom the parties' intention." On the other hand, according to 2 Bouv.Law Dict., Rawle's Third Revision, p. 1869, a latent ambiguity is "one which does not appear on the face of the instrument. A latent ambiguity is where words apply equally to different things or subject matter. * * *" Further discussing the subject, the writer says: Interesting examples are then mentioned. For instance: Further, Possibly a more simple example of latent ambiguity would occur if a testator should leave a bequest to John Smith, and there were two John Smiths who could be intended as legatee. In such event, evidence *279 would be admissible to show which John Smith the testator intended. We will discuss each fact that appellant contends, taken together, creates a latent ambiguity, except the "facts and circumstances surrounding the accident." This cannot be discussed nor considered, because the allegation is only general, and no specific facts or circumstances are set out in the petition. First, appellant says the fact that neither testator named an alternate executor showed that each expected the other to live and enjoy the property bequeathed and devised. Frankly, we see no significance to this circumstance. Naturally, when one executes a will, he more or less assumes that the executor named will be able to serve; otherwise, he would name someone else. But, though unable to check the point, we venture to say that a majority of wills do not provide for an alternate executor, while some others name no executor at all. The wills before us seem to have been made in a completely normal manner. A husband, or wife, more often than not, names the other as executor (or executrix), and in a great many instances, leaves all property to the surviving spouse. This, of course, is particularly true where there are no children. Nor are we impressed by appellant's argument as to the second circumstance relied upon by him. In the brief, appellant states: It is pointed out that the petition for construction of the wills (heretofore quoted) was disposed of by demurrer, which means that the facts alleged in the petition are admitted to be true;[3] that if such facts are true, a cause of action is stated, and appellant accordingly should be permitted to proceed with his proof. Let it first be observed that in reading appellant's petition, as a whole, the assertion of the death of Lucy Coleman Smith appears to be predicated on the theory that such demise occurred "as a matter of medical science", and of course, appellant could not have meant otherwise, for he had already filed the petitions, heretofore mentioned, in the probate court, together with the physician's letter, stating that Mrs. Smith was a patient in the hospital, and would be incapacitated for several months. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, page 488, defines death as follows: Admittedly, this condition did not exist, and as a matter of fact, it would be too much of a strain on credulity for us to believe any evidence offered to the effect that Mrs. Smith was dead, scientifically or otherwise, unless the conditions set out in the definition existed. The trial court was entirely justified in sustaining the demurrers. In Vol. 41, American Jurisprudence, Sec. 244, page 463, we find: For instance, in Southern Railway Company v. Covenia, 100 Ga. 46, 29 S.E. 219, 40 L.R.A. 253, the court took judicial notice of the fact that an infant twenty months of age, is incapable of rendering valuable services, such as running errands, bringing in wood, etc., despite allegations to the contrary. There, a child 18 months and 10 days of age was killed by one of appellant's trains, and suit was instituted, alleging inter alia that the child The railroad demurred to these allegations, and the trial court overruled such demurrer. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in an opinion written by the Chief Justice, said: Appellant contends that the provisions of the Simultaneous Death Act, found in Section 61-124, Volume 5, Arkansas Statutes Annotated, apply. This section reads as follows: Appellant argues that this is a "common disaster" statute, and that under such an interpretation, Smith and his wife died at the same time, because they died as a result of a common disaster. Three cases are cited, but none of these deal with an interpretation of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. The main case relied upon by appellant is Hackensack Trust Co. v. Hackensack Hospital Ass'n, 120 N.J.Eq. 14, 183 A. 723, 724. The facts were as follows: Mrs. Flora Curry Adams and daughter were in an automobile accident in which they were fatally injured. They were taken to a hospital, where Mrs. Adams died in about one hour and the daughter about thirteen hours later. Mrs. Adams had made a will which left all of her property to her daughter, except Here, contingent beneficiaries were named. The Court said: Referring to the will: It will be noted that there is no reference in Hugh Smith's will to death from common disaster; for that matter, there is nothing in the Statute which refers to death by common disaster, though, of course, the situation of simultaneous death would, in a great majority of instances, arise from such an event. But it is possible for people to die simultaneously from natural causes under circumstances that would prevent a determination of who died first. See In re Dunham's Will, 188 Misc. 1027, 69 N.Y.S.2d 571. At any rate, according to Webster's dictionary, simultaneous means, "the same time", and the Statute refers only to such deaths. Volume 9-C, Uniform Laws, Annotated, reflects that this section is an exact copy of Section 1 of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, which has been adopted in at least thirty-seven of our states. A study of the cases quoted reflects that the provisions of the statute never apply unless there is no sufficient evidence to determine which party died first. In the case, Sauers v. Stolz, 121 Colo. 456, 218 P.2d 741, 742, a husband and wife were in an automobile accident, and the evidence showed that the husband outlived the wife for a few moments. The trial court found that the husband and wife died simultaneously, and the Colorado Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, said: See also In re Di Bella's Estate, 199 Misc. 847, 100 N.Y.S.2d 763, 770, where the court, in construing Section 1, Decedent Estate Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 13, § 89, stated: To summarize and conclude, this litigation is determined by two facts. First, Hugh Smith and Lucy Coleman Smith did not die simultaneously, and second, there is no ambiguity. It is well settled law in this state, so well settled as to require no citation of authority, that where there is no ambiguity, or no conflict or repugnance between provisions of a will, judicial interpretation or construction is not required. Accordingly, the order sustaining the demurrers, and dismissing the petition for the construction of the wills is affirmed. [1] On February 10, 1954, Mrs. Smith signed a typewritten statement in the form of a will, attempting to dispose of certain property which she had received in 1948 from a deceased sister, Mrs. Mary Grant Sills of Denver, Colorado. These addenda attempted to make certain bequests for the benefit of a brother, certain nephews and nieces, and the establishment of a memorial. This statement was signed by Mrs. Smith but not witnessed. We do not consider that this statement has any bearing on the issues in this case. [2] The will of Hugh Smith, the will of Lucy Coleman Smith, and the typewritten statement signed by the latter. [3] For the purpose only of determining the sufficiency of the pleadings. [4] The court then mentions several imaginary situations that would not be admitted by demurrer; for instance, if the child had been 6 months of age; allegations charging a five year old boy with rape, etc. [5] Referring to the trial court. [6] Emphasis supplied.