Title: King v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
VAUGHN KING,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 75, 2007 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID. No. 0606017641 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 19, 2007 
Decided:  October 11, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 11th day of October 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
 
(1) 
Vaughn King, defendant-appellant, appeals his Superior Court 
conviction of first degree attempted robbery of Patricia Walston.1  King argues that 
the trial judge violated his due process rights under the U.S. Constitution and 11 
Del. C. § 206(c) when he denied King’s request to instruct the jury on a lesser-
included offense of second degree attempted robbery.  Specifically, King argues 
that the testimony at trial did not establish that Walston suffered any physical 
injury and, therefore, the State offered no evidence to support an essential element 
                                          
 
1. 
In the same trial, King was also convicted of second degree attempted robbery of Hector 
Babilonia.  That conviction is not appealed.   
 
2
of the offense of attempted robbery in the first degree.  A review of the record, 
however, shows that Watson’s uncontradicted testimony established that she 
suffered injury during the robbery.  Therefore, the trial judge properly denied 
King’s request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of second 
degree attempted robbery.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
 
(2) 
On May 26, 2006, Walston, a blind Wilmington resident, and her 
friend and neighbor, Babilonia, walked home after shopping at two convenience 
stores.  Shortly after leaving the second store, a man, later identified as King, 
grabbed Walston from behind and choked her, rummaged through her clothing and 
pockets, and demanded money.  While King choked Walston, Walston told 
Babilonia to run with the money.  Babilonia pretended to grab something from 
Walston, yelled to King that he had the money, and ran away.  King then chased 
Babilonia.  Babilonia managed to escape and called the police.  
 
(3) 
At trial, King’s counsel crossexamined Walston about her statement to 
the police regarding the robbery.   
King’s Counsel:  Is it correct that you told the officers that you 
weren’t hurt and you didn’t need any medical attention?  
Walston:  Well, you know what, I’m going to tell you the truth.  The 
way he choked me, I didn’t know—it wasn’t as though I would have 
to be hospitalized for it, but he choked me hard enough though where 
I felt the pain the next day.  But I didn’t go and see no medical.  
King’s Counsel:  And that pain went away in a period of time; 
correct?  
 
3
Walston:  Yes.  Well, during the next day, you know, after I put an ice 
pack or something on it, yeah.  But by me, you know, easing up on 
my tippy toes to ease the pressure from the way he had me, you know, 
it wasn’t as bad as it could have been.  
On redirect, Walston testified that she had pain in her neck the day King choked 
her and caused “just a couple little bruises there.”  King requested that the court 
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second degree attempted robbery.  
The court denied this request because no credible evidence contradicted Walston’s 
testimony about a neck injury.  The jury convicted King of first degree attempted 
robbery of Walston.  In March 2007, the trial judge sentenced King.  This appeal 
followed.   
 
(4) 
King argues on appeal that the trial judge should have instructed the 
jury on second degree attempted robbery, as a lesser-included offense, because the 
State offered no credible evidence that Walston suffered a “physical injury.”  We 
review the denial of requested jury instructions de novo.2    
 
 
(5) 
“A person is guilty of [first degree robbery] when he commits the 
crime of [second degree robbery] and, in the course of commission, ‘causes 
physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime.’”3  “‘Physical 
                                          
 
2  
Bentley v. State, 2007 Del. LEXIS 267, at *21; Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 
2006). 
3  
McKnight v. State, 753 A.2d 436, 436 (Del. 2000). 
 
4
injury’ means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.”4  King 
contends that Walston’s testimony alone did not establish “physical injury” and 
that the jury should have, therefore, been instructed on attempted second degree 
robbery as a lesser-included offense. 
 
(6) 
Under Delaware law and the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution, the jury must be instructed on a lesser-included offense if “there is a 
rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting the defendant of the included offense.”5  The trial judge 
must instruct on the lesser-included offense if:  (a) the defendant makes a proper 
request; (b) the lesser-included offense contains some but not all of the elements of 
the charged offense; (c) the elements differentiating the two offenses must be in 
dispute; and (d) there must be some evidence that would rationally allow the jury 
to acquit the defendant on the greater charge and to convict on the lesser charge.6 
 
(7) 
The State does not dispute that King met the first two factors.  King 
argues that Walston’s testimony failed to establish that she suffered a “physical 
injury” and thus a distinguishing element of the attempted first degree robbery was 
in dispute.  Because a jury could find no “physical injury” occurred, they, he 
                                          
 
4  
11 Del. C. § 222 (22). 
5  
11 Del. C. § 206(c); Bentley, 2007 Del. LEXIS 267, at *21; Henry v. State, 805 A.2d 860, 
864 (Del. 2002). 
6  
Bentley, 2007 Del. LEXIS 267, at *21–22; Henry, 805 A.2d at 864. 
 
5
contends, could acquit on first and convict on second degree attempted robbery.  
He contends that the lack of evidence of physical injury constitutes “some 
evidence” that would “rationally allow” the jury to acquit him of first degree 
attempted robbery and allow them to convict him of the lesser-included offense of 
second degree attempted robbery.   
 
(8) 
King does not dispute that the attempted robbery caused Walston 
pain.  Instead, King contends that Walston’s testimony about her injuries conflicted 
with the police report because she refused medical treatment after the incident.  
Although King argued in his request for the instruction that Walston told the 
responding officer that “she was not injured in this incident and refused medical 
response,” the record shows that this § 3507 statement was not introduced during 
trial and, therefore, was not evidence the jury could consider in weighing her 
credibility.  Defense counsel’s question putting the proposition to her does not 
constitute evidence.  Her response neither confirms nor denies the statement to the 
police.  It does no more than confirm that she did not seek medical attention.  Even 
if King could press for the instruction based on a statement outside the record, 
Walston’s statement to the police did not contradict her testimony that her neck 
injury “wasn’t as though I would have to be hospitalized for it.”  Generally, 
“conflicting testimony as to the element that distinguishes the charged offense 
 
6
from the lesser-included offense” will satisfy the fourth prong.7   Further, a 
“defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense if there is any 
evidence fairly tending to bear upon the lesser-included offense, ‘however weak’ 
that evidence may be.”8  The record here, however, is devoid of any evidence, let 
alone weak evidence, that supported giving the requested instruction.  Walston 
testified that King’s choking her caused physical pain, she required an ice pack to 
ease her pain, it left bruises, and that she stood “up on [her] tippy toes to ease the 
pressure from the way he had [her]” during the attempted robbery.     
 
(9) 
But, according to King, because Walston did not immediately go to 
the hospital, she must not have suffered physical injury as contemplated by the 
statute.  King’s contention has no merit.  Although “physical injury” requires a 
“physical impairment or substantial injury,” the statute does not require 
confirmation through medical treatment.9  We are satisfied that Walston, who was 
bruised as a result of choking at the neck during an attempted robbery, was 
physically injured within the meaning of the statute even though she did not seek 
immediate medical attention.  Moreover, we do not believe that a jury instruction 
on a lesser-included offense is required in every case that includes a “physical 
                                          
 
7  
Bentley, 2007 Del. LEXIS 267, at *21. 
8  
Id.  
9  
See 11 Del. C. § 222 (22). 
 
7
injury” as an element of a crime simply because the victim refused medical 
treatment.  Evidence other than medical treatment can sufficiently establish that an 
injury occurred.10  
 
(10) King fails to establish any “rational basis” from the actual record to 
conclude that he could be acquitted of first degree attempted robbery and instead 
be convicted of second degree attempted robbery.  Accordingly, the trial judge 
properly rejected the requested instruction for the lesser-included offense.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
 
                                          
 
10  
“‘[A] victim’s testimony concerning the extent of [his or her] physical injuries [is] 
sufficient by itself to sustain [the defendant’s] conviction for first degree robbery.’”  McKnight 
753 A.2d at 438 (Del. 2000) (quoting Snowden v. State, 1995 Del. LEXIS 290).