Title: Stokes v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Dontee Stokes v. State of Maryland, No. 47, September Term, 2003
CRIMINAL LAW — RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY — ISSUES RELATING TO JURY
TRIAL — DELIBERATIONS IN GENERAL — In a proceeding in which a defendant has
entered pleas of not guilty and not criminally responsible, Rule 4-314 requires that the
alternate jurors be “retained.”  The alternate jurors should be retained throughout the
guilt/innocence phase under any restrictions imposed by the trial court.  The trial court erred
in sending the alternate jurors into the jury room to deliberate on the guilt/innocence phase
of the trial.
CRIMINAL LAW — RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY — REVIEW — HARMLESS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR — The presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations creates
a presumption of prejudice.  In order to rebut prejudice, it must affirmatively appear that
there was not, and could not have been, any prejudice.  The presumption of prejudice may
not be rebutted by inquiring into the proceedings inside the jury room or into the juror’s
mental processes or any statements made during deliberations.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 102161031
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 47
September Term, 2003
______________________________________________
DONTEE STOKES
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
______________________________________________
Filed:   February 18, 2004
This criminal case presents issues relating to a defendant’s right to a trial by a jury
of twelve jurors and the treatment of alternate jurors in a case in which the defendant has
entered a plea of not criminally responsible and requests a bifurcated trial. In the
guilt/innocence stage of the trial, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City retained the four
alternate jurors and permitted them to participate in the juror deliberations.  Appellant’s
argument is that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting sixteen jurors to
enter the jury room and deliberate on the guilt/innocence phase of his trial.  We agree with
appellant that it was reversible error to permit the four alternate jurors to be present in the
jury room during deliberations and shall reverse the convictions and order a new trial. 
I.
Dontee Stokes, appellant, was indicted by the Grand Jury for Baltimore City with the
offenses of attempted first degree murder; assault; reckless endangerment; use of a handgun
in a crime of violence; wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun; carrying or knowingly
transporting a handgun in a vehicle; and discharging a firearm within city limits.  He entered
a plea of not guilty and not criminally responsible pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-242(a).  The
State alleged that appellant shot and wounded Maurice Blackwell, appellant’s priest when
appellant was a young boy.  In his statement to the police, appellant admitted shooting
Blackwell.  At trial, appellant maintained that from the time he was thirteen years old until
he was seventeen years old, Blackwell had repeatedly sexually abused him and that as a
result, in addition to lacking criminal responsibility, appellant lacked the ability to form
1Maryland Rule of Procedure 4-314 provides that a defendant who has entered pleas
of both not guilty and not criminally responsible by reason of insanity, and who has elected
a jury trial, may move for a bifurcated trial in which the issue of criminal responsibility will
be heard separately from the issue of guilt.  The issue of guilt shall be tried first.
-2-
specific intent at the time of the shooting.
The trial commenced before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on
December 10, 2002.  Pursuant to Maryland Rule of Procedure 4-314,1 appellant elected to
proceed to trial in a bifurcated proceeding, and in accordance with the Rule, the court
commenced with the guilt/innocence phase.  In his opening statement to the jury, defense
counsel stated that “we will plead guilty on possession of the handgun and we’ll take
whatever wrath the judge imposes on us.”  As to the remaining charges, counsel asked the
jury to find appellant not guilty.
At the conclusion of all the evidence in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, and
following jury instructions and closing arguments, the court instructed the jurors as follows:
“Madam Forelady, ladies and gentlemen, under the Rule 4-314
that creates a bifurcated trial, at the present time, you are all
jurors.  You are not both jurors and alternates, even though we
so designated you.  
* * *
Now, when you have a verdict, Madam Forelady, make sure it
is unanimous.  Make sure that all sixteen of you agree with the
verdict.  Mark on the verdict sheet not guilty or guilty as to each
of the nine counts.  Be careful that everybody is unanimously on
board, because once the verdict is announced, either side can
ask for a poll.  In the poll, the clerk will ask jurors two through
sixteen, you’ve heard the verdict of your Forelady, is that your
verdict?
If anybody says no or maybe, then you have to continue
-3-
deliberations.  It is only when all sixteen of you are prepared to
publicly defend the same verdict do we have a judgment
sufficient to end this phase of the case and begin the next phase
of the case, whatever that next phase is.”
Appellant’s counsel objected to the alternate jurors being permitted to deliberate.  The
trial court overruled the objection, responding that, according to Rule 4-314, a bifurcated
trial is a single continuous trial, in two stages, and the Rule requires that the alternate jurors
must be retained throughout the trial.  The sixteen person jury deliberated for about one half-
hour that day.  Following a weekend recess, the jury continued deliberating.  After about two
hours of deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court with the question, “Do alternates
count?”
The jury note regarding the role of alternate jurors, for the first time, sparked a
discussion between the court and counsel of the role of alternate jurors in a bifurcated case
under Rule 4-314.  Focusing on the language of the Rule that “The court shall appoint at
least four (sic) alternate jurors, who shall be retained throughout the trial,” the court noted
as follows:
“So, in what I believe to be a case of first impression in
Maryland, because there is no annotation in the rule since the
rule was passed in July 1989, that means that alternates
deliberate on the criminal agency phase, and then are dismissed
when it’s time to deliberate for the not criminally responsible
phase.  Because (b) (5) says, ‘Trial issue of criminal
responsibility, (A), except as otherwise provided in paragraph
(B) or (C) of the subsection, the issue of criminal responsibility
shall be tried before the same jury that tried the issue of guilt.
Any juror who dies, becomes incapacitated, disqualified or is
otherwise discharged before the jury begins to deliberate in the
-4-
criminal responsibility phase shall be replaced by an alternate
juror in the order of selection.’  So, if they’re there in the jury
room while the deliberations are going on what do they do other
than deliberate.”  
The court considered two choices:  Should the alternate jurors stay in the jury room as non-
participants so that they are aware of the deliberations in case they are needed as jurors in
the insanity phase, or do they function and participate as jurors in the guilt/innocence phase?
After an extended discussion, the court decided to instruct the jury that the alternates were
to be mere observers.  The court responded to the jury inquiry as to whether alternate jurors
vote as follows: 
“[W]e’ve decided after lengthy research and argument to do the
following, to have the twelve jurors deliberate, and to have the
four alternates in the jury room as observers so that they’ll
know what went on for the next phase of the case, where they
might actually become jurors if someone can’t complete it.  So
the best that we can tell from what the discussion before the
Rules Committee was and from the wording of the Rule, is that
alternates are not to be discharged because they’re needed for
the next phase if there’s going to be a next phase.  But by the
same token, it might be safer not to have the alternates
deliberate or vote.  So Mister and Madams Alternate, I know
that kind of puts a burden on you to kind of sit there and wait to
find out whether you get to play a role or not, but it’s better for
you to be in there knowing what’s going on, than out and not
knowing what’s going on.  So we’re going to ask you to
perform that function.  So with that --- it has to be a unanimous
decision of the twelve of you, and when we poll the jury it’ll be
the poll of the twelve of you.  The alternates are basically just
in a holding pattern as observers so that they know what went
on in case one or more of them becomes a juror if we reach the
next phase.  So with that you may now retire to resume your
deliberations with those guidelines.  Thank you.” 
-5-
Defense counsel reiterated his objection to the presence of alternates in the jury room.
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty of attempted murder, assault, reckless
endangerment, and use of a handgun in a crime of violence.  The jury convicted appellant
of three counts: wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun; wearing, carrying or
transporting a handgun in a vehicle; and discharging a firearm within the city limits.  
The next day, appellant withdrew his plea of not criminally responsible in return for
an agreement with the State that the State would recommend a sentence of three years
incarceration, with all but eighteen months suspended, three years probation, and full credit
against the sentence based on the time appellant spent in home detention pretrial.  The court
imposed a sentence in accord with the State’s recommendation.
  
Appellant noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Prior to
consideration by that court, this Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider the issues
presented in Stokes’ appeal.  376 Md. 543, 831 A.2d 3 (2003).
II.
The right to a trial by jury, of twelve persons, has been part of the common law for
centuries, along with the requirement of unanimity.  The right to trial by jury is guaranteed
by the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Maryland Rules, as well as the United States
Constitution.  See Kawamura v. State, 299 Md. 276, 473 A.2d 438 (1984).  Article 5 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in pertinent part, “That the Inhabitants of
-6-
Maryland are entitled to . . . trial by Jury. . . .”  Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights
provides, in pertinent part, “That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to
a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be
found guilty.”  Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights provides, in pertinent part, “In the trial
of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the
Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.”  Article 24 of
the Declaration of Rights provides, “That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges . . . or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived
of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.”
The reference to “jury” in our organic laws, refers to a jury as constituted under the common
law, unless the contrary plainly appears.  See State v. Kenney, 327 Md. 354, 361, 609 A.2d
337, 340 (1992); State v. Ledger, 499 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (citing State
v. Gollmar, 145 N.W.2d 670, 671-72 (1966)).  Cf. Bryan v. State Roads Comm’n, 356 Md.
4, 14, 736 A.2d 1057, 1061 (1999) (holding that the 1992 amendment to Article 5 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights permits a six person jury in all cases except criminal cases);
Thompson v. State, 278 Md. 41, 53, 359 A.2d 203, 210 (1976) (noting that common law
right to a jury trial exists absent a rule or statute taking the right away where it would be
constitutionally permissible to do so).
Although a jury was comprised of twelve persons under the common law, the United
States Supreme Court has made it clear that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
-7-
United States Constitution do not require a jury of twelve persons, although the
constitutional right to a jury trial guarantees the right to have at least six jurors.  See Ballew
v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 98 S. Ct. 1029, 55 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1978).  Judge McAuliffe,
writing for this Court in State v. Gorwell, 339 Md. 203, 661 A.2d 718 (1995), observed as
follows:
“Although at one time in the jurisprudential history of this
country it was widely believed that the constitutional right to a
jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
included the right to insist upon a jury of twelve persons, the
Supreme Court has declared that not to be the case.  In Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86, 90, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1898, 1900, 26
L. Ed. 2d 446 (1970), the Court opined that the fixing of the
number of jurors at twelve ‘appears to have been a historical
accident,’ and that this feature of the jury had not been
immutably codified into the Constitution.  The Court was
careful to point out, however, that the States were at liberty to
require twelve person juries.
‘We do not mean to intimate that legislatures can
never have good reasons for concluding that the
12-man jury is preferable to the smaller jury, or
that such conclusions—reflected in the provisions
of most States and in our federal system—are in
any sense unwise.  Legislatures may well have
their own views about the relative value of the
larger and smaller juries, and may conclude that,
wholly apart from the jury’s primary function, it
is desirable to spread the collective responsibility
for the determination of guilt among the larger
group.  In capital cases, for example, it appears
that no State provides for less than 12 jurors—a
fact that suggests implicit recognition of the value
of the larger body as a means of legitimating
society’s decision to impose the death penalty.
Our holding does no more than leave these
considerations to the Congress and the States,
2All future references shall be to the Criminal Law Article of the Maryland Code
(2002, 2003 Cum. Supp.).
-8-
unrestrained by an interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment that would forever dictate the precise
number that can constitute a jury.’
Id. at 103, 90 S. Ct. at 1907.”
Id. at 212-13, 661 A.2d at 723 (footnote omitted).
While trial by a jury of twelve is not mandated by the United States Constitution, the
Maryland Constitution and the Maryland Rules require a jury of twelve in criminal cases
unless a lesser number is agreeable to both the State and the defendant.  Maryland Rule 4-
311 provides, unequivocally, that a jury shall consist of twelve persons unless the parties
stipulate, in writing or on the record, that the jury shall consist of any number less than
twelve.  See State v. Kenney, 327 Md. 354, 609 A.2d 337 (1992).  Rule 4-312 addresses jury
selection as well as alternate jurors generally.  Rule 4-314 addresses the procedure to be
followed when the defendant interposes the defense of not criminally responsible by reason
of insanity and also addresses alternate jurors.  Rule 4-312(b)(3) provides that an alternate
juror shall replace a juror who is unable to perform a juror’s duty before the time the jury
retires to consider its verdict.  The Rule also provides that “[a]n alternate juror who does not
replace a juror shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict.”  Rule 4-
312(b)(3).  Maryland Code (2002, 2003 Cum. Supp.) § 2-303 of the Criminal Law Article2
addresses the sentencing procedure in capital cases.  Section 2-303(d) addresses jury
composition and alternate jurors.
3This case has an additional wrinkle because, as we have noted, appellant withdrew
his plea of not criminally responsible after the jury returned its verdict of not guilty on the
major criminal charges and appellant negotiated a sentence recommendation on the counts
on which he was convicted.  Therefore, the trial court never reached the issue of
reintroducing the alternates back into the jury.
4The presence of alternate jurors in the jury room during deliberations is generally
regarded as error.  See, e.g., State v. Rocco, 579 P.2d 65, 66-67 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978);
People v. Boulies, 690 P.2d 1253, 1255-56 (Colo. 1984); State v. Murray, 757 A.2d 578,
581 (Conn. 2000); Berry v. State, 298 So. 2d 491, 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Johnson
v. State, 220 S.E.2d 448, 454 (Ga. 1975); Commonwealth v. Smith, 531 N.E.2d 556, 558-61
(Mass. 1988); Luster v. State, 515 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (Miss. 1987); State v. Crandall, 452
N.W.2d 708, 709-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Scrivner, 676 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984); State Highway Comm’n v. Dunks, 531 P.2d 1316, 1317-18 (Mont. 1975); State
v. Coulter, 652 P.2d 1219, 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Bindyke, 220 S.E.2d 521,
531 (N.C. 1975); Yancey v. State, 640 P.2d 970, 971 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982);
-9-
When a defendant has entered pleas of not guilty and not criminally responsible, the
procedure as to alternate jurors is more tricky.  A bifurcated trial is a single continuous trial
in two stages.  Rule 4-314(b)(1).  The court must appoint at least two alternates, who shall
be retained throughout the trial.  Rule 4-314(b)(4).  Rule 4-314(b)(2) sets out the sequence
of the trial: the issue of guilt shall be tried first, followed by the issue of criminal
responsibility, to be tried as soon as practicable after the jury returns a verdict of guilt on any
charge.  The trial judge aptly noted that this case presents an issue of first impression and
an interpretation of Rule 4-314 as it relates to the use of alternate jurors in a bifurcated
criminal responsibility case.  The Rule is silent as to how the alternate jurors are to be treated
in the two phases of the trial.3
We hold that the trial court erred in sending the alternate jurors into the jury room to
deliberate on the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.4  A criminal defendant’s constitutional
Commonwealth v. Krick, 67 A.2d 746, 749 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949); Patten v. State, 426
S.W.2d 503, 506-07 (Tenn. 1968); State v. Cuzick, 530 P.2d 288, 289-90 (Wash. 1975);
State v. Lightner, 520 S.E.2d 654, 659 (W. Va. 1999).  Contra People v. Valles, 593 P.2d
240, 243 (Cal. 1979) (alternate may remain in jury room if defendant so stipulates);
Wilcoxen v. State, 619 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind. 1993) (alternate jurors may attend deliberations
as long as they are instructed not to participate); State v. Grant, 717 P.2d 562, 566-68 (Mont.
1986) (distinguishing Dunks, supra).  See generally Koch v. Rist, 730 N.E.2d 963 (Ohio
2000).
5The allowance for the substitution of an alternate juror when a regular juror is unable
to deliberate on the case was borne of judicial economy to avoid retrials, because when the
jury is less than twelve jurors, a mistrial must be declared unless the parties consent to
proceeding with eleven jurors.  See Pollitt v. State, 344 Md. 318, 324, 686 A.2d 629, 632
(1996).  The same rationale does not apply when more than twelve jurors are in the jury
room.  Unlike several other states, Maryland permits the substitution of an alternate juror
only before the jury begins to deliberate on the case, and not after deliberations have
commenced.  For statutes and rules in states permitting substitutions, see, for example, Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 18.5; Cal. Penal Code § 1089 (West 1985, 2004 Supp.); Ga. Code Ann. §
15-12-172 (2001, 2003 Supp.); Idaho Crim. R. 24; Ind. R. Trial P. 47; Kan. Stat. Ann. §
22-3412 (1995, 2002 Supp.); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 234 § 26B (Law. Co-op 2000, 2003
Supp.); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.061 (2002); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 500-A:13 (1997, 2003
Supp.); N.J. R. Court § 1:8-2; Wash. Crim. R. 6.5.  We express no opinion as to whether a
defendant may stipulate to more than twelve persons on the jury.  In the case sub judice, the
record is clear that appellant objected to more than the twelve jurors deliberating on the case.
6The State conceded at oral argument that the trial court committed error in permitting
the four alternate jurors to deliberate with the twelve “regular” jurors and then, after a few
hours of deliberation, instructing them merely to observe the proceedings without
-10-
right to a jury trial under the Maryland Constitution means a trial by twelve people, unless
the defendant stipulates in writing, or on the record, to a jury of less than twelve people.  See
 Rule 4-311(b).5
The trial court went down the wrong path when it concluded that the word “retained”
in Rule 4-314(b)(4) meant that alternate jurors must go into the jury room and deliberate
along with the jury during the guilt/innocence phase.6  The trial court realized that it had
participating in the deliberations.  In light of the State’s acknowledgment that the procedure
followed by the trial court was error, we do not address the State’s argument in its brief that
the word “retained” in Rule 4-314 should be construed to permit alternate jurors to enter the
jury room but to remain as passive observers because such a procedure would serve the
purpose of permitting alternate jurors to understand the course of deliberations should they
be required to participate during subsequent deliberations on criminal responsibility.
7A bifurcated proceeding in which a defendant pleads not criminally responsible
based on insanity is similar to a death penalty proceeding in that the second phase of
deliberations occurs if and when the jury finds the defendant guilty in the merits phase—the
guilt/innocence part of the proceedings.  Notably, the language of Rule 4-314(b)(4) closely
parallels that of Criminal Law Article § 2-303(d), which governs the treatment of alternate
jurors in a capital case.  The Rules of Procedure contemplate that alternate jurors in a
bifurcated criminal responsibility trial will be treated in a similar manner as in death penalty
trials. 
The trial judge referred to the minutes of the Court of Appeals Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, February 10, 1989, when Rule 4-314 was adopted,
noting that the minutes reflected that “alternates used in bifurcated trials will be treated
-11-
erred in permitting the alternates to deliberate and attempted to cure the error by permitting
them to remain in the jury room but not to participate in the deliberations.  Once the
additional jurors entered the jury room with the jurors to consider the verdict, and the
deliberations commenced, the error could not be cured.  As we have indicated, the presence
of the alternate jurors during the jury deliberations is, without any doubt, a deviation from
Rule 4-312(b)(3).  Appellant objected to the alternates’ participation.  The deliberations of
the regular jurors are of no concern to the alternates; if, after deliberations have commenced,
a regular juror becomes unable to complete the deliberations, under Maryland law, unlike the
procedure in some other states, an alternate juror may not be substituted.  There can be no
doubt that, despite his good intentions and attempt to cure the error, the judge erred by
allowing the alternates to attend any part of the jury deliberations.7  The trial court clearly
similar to alternates in death penalty trials.”  Although Criminal Law Article § 2-303(d) does
not state explicitly how alternates are to be treated, § 2-303(d)(2) requires that alternate
jurors in capital cases “be retained throughout the proceedings under any restrictions that the
judge imposes.”  Section 2-303(d)(4) provides that alternates “may not replace a juror who
is discharged during the actual deliberations of the jury on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant or on sentencing.”  The prohibition on replacing a juror with an alternate during
any phase of the deliberations, by implication, prohibits the presence of alternate jurors in
the jury room.  It has been the practice in this State to keep alternate jurors separate and apart
from the regular jury during the first phase of deliberations, and when there is a guilty
verdict qualifying the defendant for the death penalty, the alternate jurors rejoin the regular
jury for the sentencing phase.  The same practice should be followed with alternate jurors
in bifurcated criminal responsibility proceedings.
-12-
erred.
III.
The remaining question is whether there should be any remedy, and, if so, what the
remedy should be, in light of the values sought to be protected by Rule 4-311 and the judge’s
instructions to the jury—first, instructing them to fully participate in the deliberations and
then, instructing them not to participate but simply to observe the deliberations.
The State’s principal argument is that appellant’s convictions on the handgun counts
should  not be reversed because he was not prejudiced by the presence of the alternate jurors
in the jury room.  The State maintains that a presumption of prejudice standard is
inapplicable and that the trial court’s error was harmless.  Alternatively, the State argues that
even if a presumption of prejudice applies, the presumption has been rebutted.  The State’s
argument relies on appellant’s counsel’s remark in opening statement to the jury that Stokes
“will plead guilty on possession of the handgun” and that Stokes testified under oath at the
8In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993),
the Supreme Court clarified the standard for plain error in federal courts, under Federal Rule
of Procedure 52(b), holding that the plain error rule applies when alternate jurors join
regular jurors in the jury room when jury deliberations begin, without objection.  The instant
case is not a plain error case; appellant objected to the additional jurors and the issue was
preserved for appellate review.
-13-
trial that he committed acts constituting those crimes.  In other words, the States argues that,
assuming the trial court error, and assuming that a presumption of prejudice is applicable to
such error, the presumption was rebutted and the convictions should be affirmed.  
Appellant argues that the trial court’s error violated the Maryland Rules and his right
to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the United States
Constitution.  He maintains that the presence and input of alternates in the jury room
violated the principle that jury deliberations are to be impartial, private, and secret.  He
asserts that the trial court’s error in permitting the jurors first to deliberate with the regular
jury, and then to act merely as observers, creates a presumption of prejudice, which in this
case cannot be rebutted and thus a new trial is required.  Distinguishing the Supreme Court
case of United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993),8
and relying primarily on Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003) and Hayes v.
State, 355 Md. 615, 735 A.2d 1109 (1999), appellant argues that “the alternate jurors were
no different than third parties who invaded the privacy, impartiality and secrecy of the jury
. . . expos[ing] the jury to impermissible outside influences, which is inherently prejudicial
to Appellant.”
We have not had the occasion to determine the effect of a violation of Rule 4-311(b)
-14-
and whether the presence of alternate jurors in the jury room after deliberations have begun
constitutes presumptive prejudice or if it constitutes fundamental error.  See Annot., Presence
of Alternate Juror in Jury Room as Ground for Reversal of State Criminal Conviction, 15
A.L.R.4th 1127 (1982, 2003 Supp.).  Our jurisprudence related to the right to a jury trial has
zealously guarded against intrusions into the jury room and jury deliberations.  The Maryland
Rules, implementing the right to a jury trial, clearly distinguish between alternate jurors and
regular jurors and no rule or statute permits more than twelve into the jury room during
deliberations.
An alternate juror has been likened to a stranger to the proceedings.  See
Commonwealth v. Smith, 531 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Mass. 1988); State v. Menuey, 476 N.W.2d
846, 851 (Neb. 1991).  Alternate jurors, in the literal sense, are not “strangers” to the
proceedings.  They are not strangers in the sense that they are selected in the same manner
as regular jurors, subjected to the same voir dire and tests of impartiality, and hear the same
evidence, jury instructions, and closing arguments.  See Rule 4-312(b) (stating that “alternate
juror shall be drawn in the same manner, have the same qualifications, be subject to the same
examination, take the same oath, and have the same functions, powers, facilities, and
privileges as a juror”; State v. Lightner, 520 S.E.2d 654, 660 (W. Va. 1999).  They clearly
are different than regular jurors, however, and in a sense, their status is that of a third party.
“‘[A]lternate jurors,’ as long as they remain alternates, really are not jurors.”  Smith, 531
N.E.2d at 559.   The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed the
-15-
status of an alternate juror, and in holding that an accused’s right to an impartial jury had
been violated, stated as follows:
“Once these proceedings [have] commenced, ‘the jury’
consisted only of the prescribed number of jurors.  The alternate
then became as any other stranger to the proceedings regardless
of whether she had been discharged . . . .  Once the prescribed
number of jurors becomes ‘the jury,’ then, and immediately, any
other persons are strangers to its proceedings.  Their presence
destroys the sanctity of the jury . . . .”
United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 469 (10th Cir. 1972).
In addition to breaching the sanctity and privacy of the jury deliberations, the
participation of an alternate is disapproved for another reason—the lack  of accountability.
An alternate juror, as an unauthorized individual, is not committed to the decision and is not
faced with the ultimate and weighty responsibility to decide the case.  See State v. Cuzick,
530 P.2d 288, 289-90 (Wash. 1975).  The notion of juror accountability has been expressed
as follows:  
“A fundamental underpinning of our jury system, both in the
criminal and civil contexts, is that accountability should exist
with each of the decision-makers.  By participating, the alternate
was able to influence the other jury members, the actual
decision-makers, while remaining unrestrained by any actual
responsibility regarding the outcome of the case.  Without this
type of accountability, faith that the alternate made a
conscientious decision while participating in either criminal or
civil deliberations would be significantly undermined.”
Jones v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc., 994 P.2d 838, 842 (Wash. 2000).
Although almost every court that has considered the issue of the presence of an
-16-
alternate juror during deliberations has found it to be error, courts are not uniform as to the
remedy and whether prejudice is presumed, whether the error is per se reversible or whether
harmless error concepts apply.  See Annot., Presence of Alternate Juror in Jury Room as
Ground for Reversal of State Criminal Conviction, supra.  Some courts have chosen a
presumption of prejudice approach, see, e.g., United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1392
(11th Cir. 1982); People v. Boulies, 690 P.2d 1253, 1255-56 (Colo. 1984); Johnson v. State,
220 S.E.2d 448, 454 (Ga. 1975); State v. Crandall, 452 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990); State v. Scrivner, 676 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Coulter, 652 P.2d
1219, 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Yancey v. State, 640 P.2d 970, 971 (Okla. Crim. App.
1982); Cuzick, 530 P.2d at 290; other courts have chosen an automatic reversal requirement,
see, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 470 (10th Cir. 1972); Bouey v. State, 762
So. 2d 537, 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Commonwealth v. Smith, 531 N.E.2d 556, 561
(Mass. 1988); State v. Bindyke, 220 S.E.2d 521, 533 (N.C. 1975); Brigman v. State, 350 P.2d
321, 322-23 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); Commonwealth v. Krick, 67 A.2d 746, 749 (Pa. Super
Ct. 1949).  At least two courts have required the defendant to establish prejudice.  See Potter
v. Perini, 545 F.2d 1048, 1050 (6th Cir. 1976); State v. Grovenstein, 517 S.E.2d 216, 218
(S.C. 1999).
Our recent treatment of juror contact with a trial witness is instructive.  In Jenkins v.
State, 375 Md. 284, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003), we considered whether the defendant was entitled
to a new trial based on improper contact during the trial between a juror and a police witness
-17-
for the State.  We noted that “[r]egardless of whether details of the ongoing trial were
discussed, personal and prolonged contact as occurred in this case not only interjects an
inherent prejudice to petitioner in the form of possible bias in favor of the State’s case, but
also creates an appearance of serious impropriety and causes subsequent serious harm to the
perception of the integrity of the jury process itself.” Id. at 289, 825 A.2d at 1011.  We
presumed prejudice and held that a new trial was mandated.  Judge Cathell, writing for the
Court, explained as follows:
“The harm done is patent due to the difficulty of proving such
contentions post-verdict where in Maryland the court’s ability
to inquire into jury motives is, to a large degree, proscribed by
rule [5-606].  Therefore, a presumption of prejudice is
appropriate in such cases.”
Id. at 316, 825 A.2d at 1027.  As to the possibility of rebutting prejudice, we further noted
that, because Rule 5-606 precludes any inquiry into a juror’s motives during deliberations,
it would “be very difficult for the State to rebut any presumption of prejudice under such
circumstances.”  Id. at 305 n.19, 825 A.2d at 1020 n.19.
We had the occasion in Hayes v. State, 355 Md. 615, 735 A.2d 1109 (1999), to
consider whether an alternate juror may be substituted for a regular juror after the alternate
juror had been excused and after the jury had begun deliberations.  Judge Wilner, writing for
the Court, discussed the history of the use of alternate jurors in Maryland as well as in federal
and other state courts.  At issue was the meaning of “when the jury retires to consider its
9Rule 4-312(b)(3) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Any juror who, before the time the jury retires to consider its
verdict, becomes or is found to be unable or disqualified to
perform a juror’s duty, shall be replaced by an alternate juror in
the order of selection. An alternate juror who does not replace
a juror shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its
verdict.”
-18-
verdict,” contained in Rule 4-312(b)(3).9  We concluded as follows:
“[A]n alternate juror who remains qualified to serve may be
substituted for a regular juror who is properly discharged, until
such time as the jury enters the jury room to consider its verdict
and closes the door.  We view the closing of the door as marking
the point at which the ability to substitute ends---the effective
point at which we consider the jury to have commenced
deliberations.”
Id. at 635, 735 A.2d at 1120.  Once the door has closed, prejudice to the defendant is
presumed and reversal is required.  In so holding, we rejected “the Federal approach of
circumventing the rule through an expansive harmless error or presumptive non-prejudice
doctrine that is entirely foreign to our jurisprudence.”  Id.  The standard we adopted in Hayes
we deemed to be a practical one, “because compliance with it can be established through
objective and extrinsic evidence, without the need to question jurors as to what went on in
the jury room after the door was closed—when deliberations really started.”  Id. at 636, 735
A.2d at 1120.
It has long been the rule in Maryland, without any deviation, that a juror may not
impeach his or her verdict.  See Jenkins, 375 Md. at 331, 825 A.2d at 1036; Williams v. State,
-19-
204 Md. 55, 67, 102 A.2d 714, 720 (1954); Browne v. Browne, 22 Md. 103, 113 (1864).
Maryland Rule 5-606 prohibits inquiry into the juror’s mental processes or statements made
during deliberations.  The reason for the rule has been stated as follows:
“‘Such evidence is forbidden by public policy, since it would
disclose the secrets of the jury room and afford an opportunity
for fraud and perjury. It would open such a door for tampering
with weak and indiscreet men that it would render all verdicts
insecure; and, therefore, the law has wisely guarded against all
such testimony and has considered it unworthy of notice. It
would be a most pernicious practice, and in its consequences
dangerous to this much valued mode of trial, to permit a verdict,
openly and solemnly declared in the Court, to be subverted by
going behind it and inquiring into the secrets of the jury room.’”
Brinsfield v. Howeth, 110 Md. 520, 530 (1909) (quoting 14 Ency. Pleading and Practice
906).  Chief Judge Sobeloff, writing for the Court in Williams, further amplified on the
reasons behind the rule:
“Other risks sought to be averted, it has been said, are
harassment of jurors by disgruntled losing parties; removal of an
element of finality from judicial decisions; and through allowing
jurors to swear to alleged examples of reprehensible conduct, a
decrease in public confidence in the judicial process.  In an offer
to prove facts nullifying the verdict on a motion for a new trial,
the theory for exclusion of the jurors’ deliberations during
retirement, their expressions, arguments, motives, and beliefs,
may, according to Prof. Wigmore, embrace both the Privileged
Communications Rule and the Parol Evidence Rule. 8 Wigmore,
Evidence, Secs. 2346, 2348.”
Williams, 204 Md. at 67-68, 102 A.2d at 720.  See also American Bar Association, ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury 267-68 (3d ed. 1996).
We consider the presence of alternate jurors during the jury deliberations as
-20-
sufficiently impinging upon the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial as guaranteed
by the Maryland Constitution and Maryland Rules of Procedure to create a presumption of
prejudice.  Jury deliberations are private and are to be conducted in secret.  See Jenkins, 375
Md.  284, 825 A.2d 1008.  The rule prohibiting verdict impeachment is stringent and of long
standing; one reason for the rule is to protect the secrecy of jury deliberations.  Harford
Sands v. Groft, 320 Md. 136, 145, 577 A.2d 7, 11 (1990).  It has been said that while
privacy is not a constitutional end in itself, it is the means of ensuring the integrity of the
jury trial itself.  See Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1981).  The presence
of alternate jurors who have no legal standing as jurors injects an improper outside influence
on jury deliberations and impairs the integrity of the jury trial.  Prejudice must be presumed
where alternates breach the sanctity of the jury room.
The application of a presumptive prejudice test is consistent with our prior cases
where the type of error involved made it difficult to prove actual prejudice.  For example,
this Court has held that a violation of Rule 4-361(b), dealing with substitution of a judge
during a jury trial, warrants a presumption of prejudice.  Hood v. State, 334 Md. 52, 637
A.2d 1208 (1994).  In Hood, we stated:
“[W]e believe the creation of a presumption of prejudice for a
violation of this Rule recognizes the importance of compelling
compliance with its requirements and recognizes as well the
difficulty of proving actual prejudice . . . .”
Id. at 62, 637 A.2d at 1213.
10Since the Supreme Court decision in Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.
Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1993), some jurisdictions have modified this view on the issue,
particularly when there was no objection below and the threshold issue on appeal is whether
the issue is preserved for appellate review, and then the matter is considered under the plain
error doctrine.  See id. at 739, 113 S. Ct. at 1780, 123 L. Ed. 2d at 523 (stating “the issue
here is whether the alternates’ presence sufficed to establish remedial authority under Rule
52(b), not whether it violated the Sixth Amendment or Due Process Clause”).  The issue of
preservation for appellate review or waiver is not an issue in the case sub judice because
appellant objected to the presence of alternate jurors in the jury room.
-21-
This view is consistent with our jurisprudence and the better reasoned opinions from
other jurisdictions that have considered this issue.  In this regard, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina noted, in State v. Bindyke, 220 S.E.2d 521 (1975) as follows:
“The rule formulated by the overwhelming majority of the
decided cases is that the presence of an alternate, either during
the entire period of deliberation preceding the verdict, or his
presence at any time during the deliberations of the twelve
regular jurors, is a fundamental irregularity of constitutional
proportions which requires a mistrial or vitiates the verdict, if
rendered.   And this is the result notwithstanding the defendant’s
counsel consented, or failed to object, to the presence of the
alternate.[10]  See United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468 (10th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Virginia Erection Corporation, 335
F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964); People v. Britton, 4 Cal. 2d 622, 52
P.2d 217 (1935); People v. Adame, 36 Cal. App. 3d 402, 111
Cal. Rptr. 462 (1973); People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal. App. 2d 75,
40 P. 2d 891 (1935); Berry v. State, 298 So. 2d 491 (Fla. App.
4th Dist. 1974); Glenn v. State, 217 Ga. 553, 123 S.E.2d 896
(1962); State Highway Comm. v. Dunks, Mont., 531 P.2d 1316
(1975); People v. King, 13 A.D.2d 264, 216 N.Y.S.2d 638
(1961); Brigman v. State, 350 P.2d 321 (Okl. Cr. App. 1960);
Commonwealth v. Krick, 164 Pa. Super. 516, 67 A.2d 746
(1949); State v. Cuzick, 85 Wash. 2d 146, 530 P.2d 288 (1975);
Annot., Alternate or Additional Jurors, 84 A.L.R.2d 1288,
-22-
1312-14 (1962); 50 C.J.S. Juries § 123 c and d (1947).”
 
Id. at 531.  Following a discussion of several cases finding reversible error based on the
presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations, the court concluded as follows:
“After considering the decisions expounding both the majority
and minority views we are constrained to adopt the majority rule
and hold that the presence of an alternate in the jury room during
the jury’s deliberations violates N. C. Const. art. I, §  24 and
G.S. 9-18 and constitutes reversible error per se.  We find the
rationale upon which this rule is based irrefutable: (1)
Participation of an alternate in the deliberations of the jury
negates a defendant’s right to trial by jury as it existed at
common law, that is, by a jury of twelve in the inviolability,
confidentiality and privacy of the jury room. (2) Public policy
and practical considerations preclude any hearing to determine
whether the alternate’s presence in the jury room during
deliberations affected the jury’s verdict or prejudiced the
defendant in that (a) any such hearing would necessarily be
inconclusive because no adequate standards can be devised for
determining whether the alternate’s presence affected the jury;
(b) upon a hearing in which a defendant attempts to show
prejudice he would have to rely upon either the testimony of the
alternate juror, members of the panel or both; and (c) an inquiry
into what transpired in the jury room during the alternate’s
presence itself invades the sanctity, confidentiality, and privacy
of the jury process and gives the appearance of judicial
interference with the jury.
We cannot adopt a rule which would allow the trial judge to
attempt to determine whether the alternate was present in the
jury room a ‘substantial’ length of time during deliberations or
had participated in the deliberations to defendant’s prejudice.
Where would the court draw the line between insubstantial and
substantial presence?  In Beasley the court held that presence for
twenty minutes invalidated the verdict; in Krick, ten minutes
voided the trial.  We hold that at any time an alternate is in the
-23-
jury room during deliberations he participates by his presence
and, whether he says little or nothing, his presence will void the
trial.
There is, however, no substitute for common sense, and the
foregoing rule has no application where the alternate’s  presence
in the jury room is inadvertent and momentary, and it occurs
under circumstances from which it can be clearly seen or
immediately determined that the jury has not begun its function
as a separate entity.”
Id. at 533-34.
In the oft-cited case of State v. Cuzick, 530 P.2d 288 (Wash. 1975), the Supreme Court
of Washington considered the effect of the presence of a thirteenth juror on the verdict.  The
court reversed, holding that where the intrusion by the juror involved the visible presence of
an alternate juror for the full length of the deliberations, the presumption of prejudice clearly
was not conclusively overcome.  Id. at 290.  The court’s reasoning is persuasive.  The court
noted that no statutory authorization for more than twelve jurors existed in Washington State.
Id. at 289.  The court went beyond “the somewhat strained argument that the alternate juror’s
presence in the jury room made him part of the jury and thus caused the jury to be composed
of an unauthorized number of persons,” and instead noted that “the very fact that the alternate
was not a full participant in the jury’s discussions raises a more significant issue: the
maintenance of proper jury secrecy.”  Id.  The court held that the error was reversible,
adopting the strict standard that “prejudice will be presumed to flow from a substantial
intrusion of an unauthorized person into the jury room unless ‘it affirmatively appears that
-24-
there was not and could not have been any prejudice.’”  Id. at 290.  The court concluded that
where, as here, the intrusion involves the visible presence of a nonjuror for the full length of
deliberations, the presumption of prejudice clearly has not been so conclusively defeated.”
Id. (citations omitted).
The State argues that any prejudice is rebutted based on counsel’s opening remarks
and appellant’s testimony.  We disagree.
In order to rebut prejudice, it must affirmatively appear that there was not, and could
not have been, any prejudice.  Because Rule 5-606 prevents a juror from impeaching the
verdict, the presumption of prejudice which arises from the presence of the alternate jurors
may not be rebutted by inquiring into the proceedings inside the jury room or into the juror’s
mental processes or any statements made during the deliberations.  See Jenkins, 375 Md. at
331, 825 A.2d at 1036; Williams, 204 Md. at 67, 102 A.2d at 720 (1955); Browne, 22 Md.
103, 113 (1864).  To follow the State’s logic, we would have to inquire into the jury
deliberations.  That we will not do. 
The presence of alternate jurors during deliberations creates a presumption of
prejudice that is effectively unrebuttable under most circumstances.  The presumption may
be rebutted, for example, by showing that the alternate juror was not in the jury room after
the door was shut, see Hayes, 355 Md. 615, 735 A.2d 1109, or where the alternate juror
entered the jury room merely to get a coat and deliberations had not yet begun, see People
-25-
v. Rhodes, 231 N.E.2d 400 (Ill. 1967) (where alternate juror went into jury room to get her
coat and was not present during jury deliberations, her presence did not require reversal of
defendant’s conviction).
We reject the State’s argument that the presumption of prejudice is rebutted because
appellant admitted during his testimony that he transported a handgun and his counsel made
certain statements in opening remarks to the jury.  Notwithstanding the testimony of
petitioner, the burden remains on the State to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, and
jurors are free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness.  To apply the logic of the
State, we would necessarily have to inquire into the deliberations and mental processes of
the jurors.  It is undisputed that the alternates were present throughout the jury deliberations,
and under the circumstances presented herein, the presumption of prejudice has not been
overcome.  Reversal is mandated. 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED;
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
FOR A NEW TRIAL; COSTS TO BE
PAID BY BALTIMORE CITY.