Title: State v. Lamb

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

142 Ariz. 463 (1984) 690 P.2d 764 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Glenn Ray LAMB, Appellant. No. 6018. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. October 25, 1984. *465 Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III and Barbara A. Jarrett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. George F. Klink, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Justice. The defendant, Glenn Ray Lamb, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, A.R.S. § 13-1105, and one count of armed robbery, A.R.S. § 13-1904. He was sentenced to twenty-one years for the robbery, A.R.S. § 13-702, and to two terms of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years for the murder convictions, A.R.S. § 13-703. The murder sentences were made consecutive to the robbery sentence but concurrent to each other. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz.Const.Art. 6, § 5(3) and A.R.S. § 13-4031. The issues we must resolve are: The facts follow. On 18 September 1979 the victims, Roberta Mae Durr and Russell Wilson, operated the K & L Bar in downtown Phoenix. They closed the bar between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. and, as they often did, went with their friend, Harold Starr, to the nearby Silver Dollar Bar where the defendant was the bartender. As was their custom, the victims took the cash from the register at the K & L Bar, purported to be over $400, with them. After a while, Starr left for the victims' apartment. The victims intended to follow after him. Three electricians were also in the bar when the trio arrived, and they were still there when Starr left. It is unclear from the testimony whether the victims or the electricians left the Silver Dollar first. It is also unclear exactly what time the electricians left. They had all left, however, when, sometime between 10:30 and 11:30, two policemen drove down the alley behind the Silver Dollar and saw the defendant mopping the area inside the back door of the bar. The officers testified Durr's light blue Thunderbird was in the alley. Around 2:00 a.m. on the 19th, Starr, who had been sleeping at the victims' apartment, noticed the victims were not yet home. He drove to the K & L looking for them but they were not there. He drove past the Silver Dollar, but the bar was closed and the lights were out. About 3:30 Lawrence Prince arrived for work at his produce company, situated behind the Silver Dollar. He saw a man lying beside a car in the alley and called the police. The police drove through the area but did not stop. Prince called again, and when the police arrived the second time Prince stopped them in the alley and told them what he had seen. The officers discovered Wilson next to the Thunderbird in a pool of blood, badly beaten but still alive. Paramedics arrived shortly thereafter, but Wilson died before regaining consciousness. While one of the paramedics was looking for something with which to prop up Wilson's head, he found Durr's body in a dumpster next to the rear door of the Silver Dollar. She had been beaten with a blunt instrument, put in the dumpster, and covered with a plastic sheet. Durr's keys were found in the ignition of her car and her empty purse was on the front seat. The defendant was interviewed between 6:00 and 7:00 the morning of the 19th. He claimed the victims left the bar shortly after Starr. At approximately 9:20 that morning, the defendant registered for a room at the Hyatt Regency Hotel under the name of Glenn Neff. He paid the $42 fee for one night and also rented a safe deposit box from the hotel. Shortly thereafter, the defendant gave the key to the box to his employer, Jerry Ornatek, and asked him to hold it for him. Later that morning, the police discovered blood spots in the area near the rear entrance of the Silver Dollar. There were droplets on the inside of the door, on the inside wall, on the door frame, around the baseboard, and around the restroom door. The wooden bar used to secure the door had blood on it, and there was what one witness testified looked like blood mixed with water underneath a booth near the rear entrance. After this discovery, the police again interviewed the defendant. After this second interview, the defendant was arrested. Ornatek turned the defendant's keys over to the police. In December they located the safe deposit box and found $333 in it. On 29 January 1980 the public defender assigned to represent the defendant withdrew because of a conflict of interest. On 13 June 1980 the charges against the defendant were dropped without prejudice. In September of 1982, three years after the victims' deaths, the defendant was staying in Texas with his brother and sister-in-law, Roger and Bettye Lamb. Bettye and a friend, John Osborne, both testified that the defendant claimed you could get away with murder in Phoenix if you knew the right people. Bettye testified she did not take his comments seriously at first, *467 but after he repeated them several times and stole $20,000 from her, she decided he was telling the truth and had been involved in the Phoenix murders. She further testified the defendant stated he was not worried about returning to Phoenix because he had "gotten away with murder there." The defendant was again arrested and tried and convicted, and now appeals. I. Was there probable cause to arrest The defendant claims his 1979 arrest was illegal because it was not based on probable cause, and "therefore all evidence subsequently seized or acquired was the fruit of that illegality." He insists his arrest was based on no more than a hunch or mere suspicion. He claims at the time of his arrest the police knew other people had threatened the victims' lives, that there was no evidence connecting him to the crimes, that there was at the time no evidence connecting him with any money, that there was no evidence of exactly where Durr was killed, and that there was no reason to suspect that he committed the murders or the robbery. We do not agree. Probable cause has been defined as follows: Monroe v. Pape, 221 F. Supp. 635, 642-43 (N.D.Illinois 1963). The two bludgeoned bodies, of course, indicated that a public offense had been committed. The question is whether the police had probable cause to believe the defendant had committed the crimes. In answering this question, we consider only the facts the police knew at the time of the arrest. The victims had been in the Silver Dollar Bar the previous evening, and their bodies were found at the rear of the bar near the back door. The defendant was the bartender at the bar. Between 10:30 and 11:30 p.m. the defendant had been observed mopping the area inside the back door of the bar. The police found fresh blood inside the bar, on the two by four the defendant used to prop the back door of the bar open, on the two by six the defendant used to close the back door, and on the inside of the door frame. As Officer Harry Jennings of the Phoenix Police Department testified: The physical evidence, together with defendant's incriminating statements to the police, raised a reasonable inference that it was the defendant who had murdered the two victims. We find the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant at the time they arrested him. We find no error. II. Irregularities in the Grand Jury proceedings The defendant next argues "Refusal to disclose [to the Grand Jury] the fact of the Public Defender's prior representation and the reasons for his removal from the case constitute[d] prosecutorial misconduct and a denial of [the defendant's] right to a fair trial and impartial presentation of the evidence." Defendant cites Crimmins v. Superior Court, 137 Ariz. 39, 668 P.2d 882 (1983) in support of his claim, and insists that, by withholding evidence, the prosecutor controlled the result of the grand jury proceeding. We need not reach this question, *468 however, because Crimmins, supra, does not apply to this case. In Crimmins, the appellant brought a petition for special action prior to his trial challenging the grand jury proceedings. In the instant case, the defendant did not challenge the determination of probable cause until the instant appeal. He waived his right to challenge the determination of probable cause by failing to act in a timely manner. Rule 12.9, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. As we have stated: State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 247-48, 599 P.2d 199, 203-04 (1979) (citation omitted). We find no error. III. Testimony of the public defender The public defender initially assigned to represent the defendant, Michael Edwards, withdrew from the case in January, 1980. His motion stated: The defendant, at the hearing on his motion to compel discovery, attempted to learn the factual circumstances behind that motion. Edwards testified the other client communicated information to another attorney in the office, and Edwards learned of the information while working in the office. He would not reveal the name of the other client but did admit his source was twofold, he had seen a police report and he had spoken with an investigator in the Public Defender's Office about the client. The defendant asked whether a specific police report of an assault (with a baseball bat) by a Mr. J. was the report in question, but Edwards claimed the attorney-client privilege. The trial court took the matter under advisement and later ruled the communication and identity of the other defendant were privileged, stating: Later at trial the defendant attempted to introduce Edwards' motion to withdraw, but the trial court sustained the prosecution's objection to admission of the motion. The trial judge indicated he did not allow the introduction of the motion to withdraw because he thought it involved mere conclusions of the witness. The defendant claims the motion should have been admitted and Edwards should have been ordered to testify as to the facts surrounding his withdrawal. We believe the trial court was correct for two reasons. First, the information about the conflict in interest came from a communication within the public defender's office with the other client, and this communication was privileged. The police report, though not in itself privileged, if admitted, would reveal the name of the Public Defender's Office's client. We had reason to consider a similar question: State v. Macumber, 112 Ariz. 569, 571, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1976) (citations omitted). Defendant claims, however, that at least he should be able to know the name of the client. Generally, the name of a client is not privileged. Dunipace v. Martin, 73 Ariz. 415, 242 P.2d 543 (1952); State v. Alexander, 108 Ariz. 556, 503 P.2d 777 (1972). In the instant case, however, the attorney, in order to properly give the court sufficient facts upon which it could rule on the motion, said more than he would normally have said. He need not be required to say more. Second, the motion was based on mere conclusions. The motion to withdraw included the unsupported claim the attorney had learned evidence "exculpatory [in] nature as to defendant Lamb * * * [but] inculpatory as to [another] client." Edwards gave very few supporting facts concerning this broad allegation, and the motion to withdraw itself, without background information, was unreliable and prejudicial. We find no error. IV. Prejudicial testimony During direct examination of Bettye Lamb the following occurred: The court then asked the prosecutor to make his question exact to avoid bringing in extra matters. The prosecutor assured the court that he had instructed the witness not to make such statements: The defendant's attorney again objected, and the prosecutor stated: Before closing arguments the court read a stipulation to the jury which stated: The defendant claims Bettye Lamb's reference to "other murders" and "other people" was reversible error and the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial. In support the defendant cites State v. Kellington, 93 Ariz. 396, 381 P.2d 215 (1963); State v. Hunt, 91 Ariz. 145, 370 P.2d 640 (1962); State v. Byrd, 62 Ariz. 24, 152 P.2d 669 (1944); and State v. Serrano, 17 Ariz. App. 473, 498 P.2d 547 (1972). The defendant also cites a Washington case, State v. Suleski, 67 Wash. 2d 45, 406 P.2d 613 (1965), for the proposition that once inherently prejudicial evidence, which is of such a nature that the minds of the jurors are most likely to be impressed, is admitted, withdrawal of the evidence even with an instruction to disregard will not remove the prejudice. We agree that some evidence, once admitted, will so taint the jury as to require a mistrial. We do not agree that was the case here. The cases cited by the defendant all present facts significantly more egregious than those of the instant case. In Kellington, prosecution witnesses testified the accused had prior felony convictions, a fact that should only be admitted into trial if the defendant testified, which he did not, and even then the use of the prior convictions is restricted. See Rule 609, Arizona Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S. In Hunt, prejudicial statements of the accused and testimony the accused had only recently been released from prison were improperly admitted at trial. In Byrd, the prosecutor asked a rebuttal witness if the defendant had ever attacked her. The court instructed the jury to ignore the question, but this court nevertheless held that under the facts in that case, the question was improper and prejudicial. Therefore, merely asking the question was sufficient harm to mandate reversal. In Serrano, the county attorney elicited testimony from police officers which indicated the defendant previously had dealt with the officers, and, during argument, the attorney explained the police could readily identify the defendant because that case was not the first time the defendant had dealt with the police. The Court of Appeals held the error was prejudicial and reversed the convictions. In Suleski, the Washington Supreme Court *471 held that, even though the jury was instructed to disregard the improper opening statement, the testimony and the attempts to introduce inadmissible evidence so tainted the trial as to require reversal. The court said, "[T]he bells of the dismissed burglary tools charge, prior burglary convictions, a four or five-page F.B.I. record, a possible violation of the Federal Firearms Act, and fruits of the various searches, were so conclusively rung as to effectively preclude their `unringing.'" Suleski, supra, at 51, 406 P.2d at 616. In the instant case, there was no improper or overreaching conduct by the prosecutor. The prosecutor, in fact, instructed Bettye Lamb not to mention extraneous facts, and he tried to phrase questions so she would testify properly. Also, Bettye Lamb's bias against the defendant was evident and the jury could easily disregard her testimony. We have stated: State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 262, 665 P.2d 972, 984, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 204, 78 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1983) (citations omitted). Under the facts of this case, and particularly in light of the stipulation read to the jury, we believe any error was cured. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not granting a mistrial. V. Improper testimony The defendant next contends the court erred in allowing certain testimony of two of the state's witnesses, Sergeant George Kinney and Criminalist Alan Raphael. Kinney testified about his investigation of the crime. On voir dire he admitted his testimony was based on both his own recollection of the events and his review of police reports which he did not write, and that he could not differentiate the two sources. The defendant objected to the testimony at trial, but the objection was overruled. On redirect, Kinney testified he was present at the investigation of the crime and he reviewed the police report shortly after it was written and made no corrections. Therefore, his observations must have been the same as those of the officer who wrote the report. We agree that at least some of Kinney's testimony was hearsay. Kinney admitted some of his recollections were based on his review of the reports. However, we do not think the defendant was prejudiced by the testimony. Kinney's testimony was that he found what appeared to be blood on the back door of the Silver Dollar Bar. Two other witnesses later testified to the same effect, including the author of the report Kinney used to refresh his memory. The testimony Kinney gave was therefore cumulative, and we find no prejudice or error in admitting it at trial. Cf. State v. Garcia, 141 Ariz. 97, 101-102, 685 P.2d 734, 738-739 (1984) (evidence elucidated by leading questions not prejudicial because same evidence was received by proper questioning). We find no error. Raphael testified he saw what appeared to be blood diluted with water inside the Silver Dollar Bar where the defendant was seen mopping up on the night of the crime. The defendant objected to Raphael's conclusion that the blood was diluted, but the objection was overruled. The defendant now claims the objection should have been sustained. We do not agree. Raphael testified as an expert witness for the state. He tested a sample taken from that location and found it was blood, but he did not have a sufficient sample to determine what type. He testified the blood appeared to be diluted, and as an expert he was entitled to testify as to opinions under *472 our rules. Rule 702, Arizona Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S. We find no error. VI. Two forms of verdict The defendant claims he was denied his right to a unanimous verdict because the jury was given only one form of verdict for first-degree murder, rather than a form for first-degree felony murder and a separate form for first-degree premeditated murder. He admits we have rejected this contention in the past but urges us to reconsider our prior rulings in this matter. We have stated: State v. Encinas, 132 Ariz. 493, 496, 647 P.2d 624, 627 (1982) (citations omitted). We affirm the use of one form of verdict in first-degree murder cases. See State v. Berndt, 138 Ariz. 41, 45, 672 P.2d 1311, 1315 (1983). [See also State v. Kinkade, 140 Ariz. 91, 95, 680 P.2d 801, 805 (1984).] VII. Lesser-included instructions At trial, the defendant requested instructions for second-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. A.R.S. §§ 13-1104, -1103, and -1102. He claims the evidence presented at trial supported those instructions, and claims "premeditation" under A.R.S. § 13-1105 necessarily includes the "less serious mental states" required for second-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. He bases his claim on A.R.S. § 13-202, and particularly the following subsection: We do not agree. Neither the statute cited nor the case law provides that premeditation, which is a necessary element of first-degree murder, is the same as criminal negligence or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly killing a person. Premeditation is a more culpable state than the conduct described in the statute. Admittedly, when supported by the evidence, instructions for second-degree murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide are required in first-degree murder trials. To fail to do so is fundamental error. See State v. Celaya, 135 Ariz. 248, 660 P.2d 849 (1983); State v. Dalglish, 131 Ariz. 133, 639 P.2d 323 (1982); State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633 P.2d 315 (1981). "The evidence, however, must support the giving of a lesser-included offense instruction which may not be given when the state of the evidence is such that the defendant can only be guilty of the crime charged or not guilty at all." State v. McNair, 141 Ariz. 475, 482, 687 P.2d 1230, 1237 (1984). The evidence produced at trial in the instant case did not indicate the deaths were caused by intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct, without premeditation, as proscribed by A.R.S. § 13-1104 (second-degree murder); it did not show the deaths were caused by recklessness, an intent to aide a suicide, a killing in the heat of passion, a coerced second-degree murder, A.R.S. § 13-1103 (manslaughter); and there was no evidence of criminal negligence as required in A.R.S. § 13-1102 (negligent homicide). The defendant denied that he was the one who committed the crime and, under the evidence, could only have been found guilty of first-degree murder or not guilty. The trial court properly refused the defendant's requested instructions. See State v. Noleen, 142 Ariz. 101, 107, 688 P.2d 993, 999 (1984). We find no error. VIII. Instruction on lost or destroyed evidence Prior to trial, the safety deposit box key which gave access to the money introduced *473 at trial was disposed of by the evidence custodian. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which was denied, and then, relying on State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964), asked the court to instruct the jury that: The court refused the instruction, and the defendant claims this was error. The defendant does not claim there was any bad faith or connivance on the part of the state, and bad faith or connivance was not indicated by the evidence. In order for a Willits instruction to be appropriate, a defendant must show the evidence might have tended to exonerate or exculpate him. See e.g. State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 463, 687 P.2d 1214, 1218 (1984). Whether the necessary prejudice was shown is a question for the trial court which will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 464, 687 P.2d at 1219. At trial, the defendant admitted the existence of the key and the money, and he admitted he gave the key to his employer. The police found the money but through an inadvertent error the key itself was discarded. We do not conceive of any exculpatory use the key could have been put to. Indeed, if anything, it would have been inculpatory. We do not think the trial court abused its discretion in not giving the instruction. We find no error. See also State v. Soloman, 125 Ariz. 18, 22, 607 P.2d 1, 5 (1980); State v. Watkins, 126 Ariz. 293, 301-02, 614 P.2d 835, 843-44 (1980). IX. Improper sentencing The defendant claims the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to the aggravated term of twenty-one years for the robbery conviction because the court utilized the defendant's "extensive arrest record," and because the court did not properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors on the record "as required by the statute." The defendant further claims the court, in imposing consecutive sentences, did not comply with A.R.S. § 13-708. Our code states in pertinent part: A.R.S. § 13-702(E)(5). At sentencing the trial court stated: We have held, "[T]he trial judge is in the best position to study the defendant and his discretion in the matter of sentencing will not be disturbed except in the most unusual circumstances provided it is within the statutory limits." State v. Thomas, 110 Ariz. 106, 111, 515 P.2d 851, 856 (1973). We do not think, considering the defendant's *474 past arrest record, that the sentence was inappropriate or an abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to twenty-one years for the robbery. See State v. Waldrip, 111 Ariz. 516, 518, 533 P.2d 1151, 1153 (1975). As to consecutive sentences, our code states: A.R.S. § 13-708. The trial court did not expressly state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences while in the act of imposing those sentences. The court did, however, state the crime was a very brutal one, and that therefore "a more severe penalty [was] appropriate." As our Court of Appeals has noted: State v. Bishop, 137 Ariz. 5, 9, 667 P.2d 1331, 1335 (App. 1983). We have searched the record for fundamental error pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4035, Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), and find none. The convictions, judgments, and sentences of the defendant are affirmed. HOLOHAN, C.J., GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS and FELDMAN, JJ., concur.