Title: State of New Jersey v. Noel Reyes

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

In this appeal, the Court determines whether the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to 33 (Domestic Violence Act or Act), authorizes New Jersey courts to issue domestic violence restraining orders when the victim has fled to New Jersey in order to seek shelter from abuse that occurred out-of-state and the abuser commits an act of domestic violence in New Jersey. Defendant, Noel Reyes, and Florinda Silva were married and living together with their child in the Bronx, New York. On the morning of April 27, 2000, the couple had an argument, which resulted in Reyes screaming at Silva and slapping her in the face. After Reyes left for work, Silva telephoned her sister, who lived in Somerville, New Jersey, and made arrangements for her and her child to go to her sister s apartment. That evening, Reyes appeared at the Somerville apartment seeking to speak with Silva. Silva denied Reyes entry into the apartment. Reyes, however, repeatedly knocked on the door and rang the doorbell. Frightened, Silva and her sister telephoned the Somerville police, who arrived shortly thereafter. Silva told the police of the incident that morning in New York that led her to seek shelter in New Jersey. She was transported to the police station where she filed a Domestic Violence Civil Complaint describing the events that had occurred that evening at her sister s apartment. In her complaint, Silva added that she had fled to New Jersey because Reyes had struck her at their home in New York. She also marked the word harassment on the complaint. Later that night, a Somerville Municipal Court judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against Reyes, prohibiting him from returning to the scene of violence, and further prohibiting future acts of violence or any other form of contact with Silva or her sister. The order was returnable before the Somerset Superior Court on May 4. On the return date of the order, Silva told the judge that Reyes had attempted to speak with her that morning to dissuade her from pursuing the complaint, and further that Reyes doesn t leave [her] alone. Based on Reyes communication with her earlier that morning, Silva filed another complaint against him, alleging that Reyes had knowingly and purposefully violated the TRO. As a result, the court ordered Reyes arrest. Following the hearing on the TRO, the judge issued a Domestic Violence Final Restraining Order (FRO), based on the testimony of both Silva and Reyes regarding the incident that occurred in New York on April 27. The court s finding of an act of violence was limited to that assault. Although Silva had alleged in her complaint that Reyes had assaulted her on prior occasions, the judge did not make any findings in respect of those assaults. On June 15, Reyes pled guilty to violating the April 27, 2000, TRO. He was sentenced to one year of probation and ordered to pay miscellaneous fines for the May 4 violation. The Appellate Division reversed the entry of the FRO. The panel found that the assault did not constitute an act of domestic violence within the meaning of the Act, applying the jurisdictional limits of the Code of Criminal Justice, which requires the assault to occur in this State. The Supreme Court granted the State s petition for certification, as well as the motions of Legal Services of New Jersey and the New Jersey Coalition for Battered Women for leave to appear as amici curiae. HELD : New Jersey s Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to 33, authorizes New Jersey courts to issue domestic violence restraining orders when the victim has fled to New Jersey to seek shelter from abuse that occurred out-of-state and the abuser commits an act of domestic violence in New Jersey. Moreover, New Jersey courts may assert jurisdiction when the only act of domestic violence occurred out-or-state where the victim seeks refuge in New Jersey and the defendant pursues the victim in this State for the purpose of making contact with the victim. 1. The Legislature enacted the Domestic Violence Act to assure victims of domestic violence maximum protection from abuse the law can provide. Given the remedial nature of the Act, the Legislature directed that it be construed liberally. (p. 7) 2. The Act sets forth fourteen offenses, including assault and harassment, that constitute domestic violence and provides both emergency and long-term civil and criminal remedies and sanctions, and encourages the broad application of those remedies in the courts of this State. Thus, a victim may apply for relief under the Act in a court having jurisdiction over the place where the alleged act of violence occurred, where the defendant resides, or where the plaintiff resides or is sheltered. (pp. 8-9) 3. New Jersey courts have concluded that New Jersey has jurisdiction to issue an FRO to a victim sheltered in New Jersey, even when the act of domestic violence occurred in another state. (pp. 9-15) 4. Apart from whether Reyes conduct in New York alone was a basis for jurisdiction, his subsequent and separate harassment of Silva in New Jersey justifies the lower courts assertion of jurisdiction. (pp. 15-18) 5. The Appellate Division erred in applying the general jurisdictional requirements for the prosecution of criminal offenses set forth in the Code of Criminal Justice at the expense of the specific jurisdictional authorization found in the domestic violence statute. There is no indication that the Legislature intended to incorporate the Criminal Code s jurisdictional requirement. (pp. 19-20) 6. Because this is not a criminal proceeding, the provisions of the Criminal Code do not limit the jurisdiction of New Jersey courts. (pp. 20-21) 7. In order to provide comprehensive protection to victims of domestic abuse who seek shelter, New Jersey courts must be able to issue restraining orders against abusers who pursue their victims in this State. (pp. 21-22) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI s opinion. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NOEL REYES, Defendant-Respondent. Argued February 13, 2002 Decided May 21, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. James L. McConnell, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Wayne J. Forrest, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Tara L. Johnson, on the brief). Robert J. Ferb argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Ferb, attorney; Joan Sabat-Schmid, on the briefs). Risa E. Kaufman argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Coalition for Battered Women, Inc. (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys; Ms. Kaufman and Lawrence S. Lustberg, on the briefs). Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (David N. Samson, Attorney General, attorney). Nancy Goldhill argued the cause for amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey (Melville D. Miller, Jr., President, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZAZZALI, J. This appeal requires us to determine whether the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -33 (Domestic Violence Act or Act), authorizes New Jersey courts to issue domestic violence restraining orders when the victim has fled to New Jersey in order to seek shelter from abuse that occurred out-of-state and the abuser commits an act of domestic violence in New Jersey. The trial court issued a Final Restraining Order (FRO) to Florinda Silva (Silva) based on a finding that her husband, defendant Noel Reyes, struck Silva at their residence in New York. The Appellate Division reversed, reasoning that New Jersey courts lack jurisdiction to issue an FRO based solely on an act of domestic violence occurring out-of-state. Because the record demonstrates that an act of domestic violence did occur in New Jersey, thus conferring jurisdiction on our courts, we reverse. We also hold that when the only act of domestic violence occurred out-of-state, New Jersey courts nevertheless may assert jurisdiction when the victim seeks refuge in New Jersey and the defendant pursues the victim in this State for the purpose of making contact with the victim. SILVA: Yes. A lot. The court also raised the subject with defendant: THE COURT: Have you ever hit your wife? DEFENDANT: It was before, but now I haven t slap [sic] her, haven t hit my wife. Defendant s response is ambiguous, but the use of before suggests prior violent conduct. However, although the court found that an assault occurred on April 27, it did not make any findings in respect of prior assaults. On June 15, defendant pled guilty to violating the April 27, 2000 TRO. At the hearing, defendant admitted that he was aware of the order prohibiting him from contact with his wife and that he spoke with her in order to convince her to withdraw her complaint. As part of defendant s plea agreement, the court dismissed the charges based on the events of April 28 and 29. Defendant was sentenced to one year of probation and ordered to pay miscellaneous fines for the May 4 violation. The Appellate Division reversed the entry of the FRO. We granted the State s petition for certification. 170 N.J. 386 (2001). See footnote 1 We also granted the motions of Legal Services of New Jersey and the New Jersey Coalition for Battered Women for leave to appear as amici curiae. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; . . . . (Emphasis added). After assaulting his wife in New York on the morning of April 27, defendant pursued her later that day to her sister s apartment in Somerville, New Jersey. Defendant repeatedly knocked on the door and rang the doorbell, demanded to speak with her, created a disturbance, and refused to leave. His conduct led to the summoning of the police, his wife s application for a TRO, and the issuance of a TRO. Defendant s actions in Somerville, when viewed in the context of his actions earlier that day assaulting Silva in New York and following her to New Jersey fall within the purview of our harassment statute because his actions were communications likely to cause annoyance or alarm. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a. The Appellate Division stated that the subject of the complaint was the incident in New York, and not anything that occurred in Somerville later that evening. The allegations in Silva s complaint, however, focus on defendant s actions at her sister s house and not the incident in New York. Although the complaint refers to the New York incident, it is primarily described as a foundation for the events that occurred later that day in New Jersey. Specifically, Silva stated in her complaint that [d]efendant repeatedly banged on the victim s sister s house attempting to speak with the victim. Victim had fled to her sister s house earlier that evening because the defendant had struck her at their residence in New York. We do not know the trial court s reasons for limiting its findings to the New York incident, given the facts alleged by Silva in her complaint. In any event, the trial court believed Silva s testimony concerning those events. Although the trial court s specific findings of fact related to the acts in New York, its determination that Silva s testimony was more credible than defendant s suggests that the court found Silva s entire testimony including that relating to the events in Somerville credible. Defendant neither objected to nor contradicted that testimony and does not now allege that any prejudice resulted to him from that testimony. Despite the trial court s failure to make a specific finding about defendant s conduct at the Somerville apartment on the evening of April 27, we conclude from the record that an act of domestic violence occurred in New Jersey. Additionally, defendant approached Silva on May 4 and asked her to withdraw the complaint. Silva subsequently filed a new complaint for violation of the TRO. Defendant s prohibited contact with Silva also constituted an act of harassment because it was likely to cause annoyance. Our review of defendant s conduct also leads us to conclude that but for defendant s conduct in New Jersey, it is unlikely that she would have sought relief from our courts. Silva did not seek a TRO until defendant tracked her down in Somerville and harassed her to the point that police intervention was sought. Accordingly, there are two communications that constituted harassment within the meaning of the Act the disturbance created by defendant on April 27 in Somerville, and his improper contact with Silva on May 4, the morning of the TRO hearing. Those acts, considered either individually or in combination, vested jurisdiction in our courts to issue injunctive relief. [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18.] The fourteen predicate offenses set forth in the statute define the acts that constitute domestic violence and do not import other sections of the Criminal Code. Defendant s reading of the statute ignores its clear mandate that an abused victim can apply for relief where he or she is sheltered. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28 to -29. Any other interpretation ignores the Legislature s encourage[ment of] the broad application of the remedies available under this act in the civil and criminal courts of the State. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. The most that can be said for defendant s claim is that the Criminal Code applies to the Act but only as a limitation on criminal prosecutions. For example, the Act states that filing a civil complaint shall not prevent the filing of a criminal complaint for the same act. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28a, and that testimony in a domestic violence proceeding may not be used in the simultaneous or subsequent criminal proceeding against the defendant, with the exception of contempt. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a. Those distinctions underscore the conclusion that criminal and civil statutes concerning domestic violence create separate rights and remedies. Thus, although defendant could not be prosecuted criminally in New Jersey because the assault occurred in New York, our Act provides twin avenues of relief encompassing both criminal and civil proceedings. Because this is not a criminal proceeding, the provisions of the Criminal Code do not limit the jurisdiction of our courts. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19a, which lists the predicate offenses, defines domestic violence as the occurrence of one or more of the acts listed in the statute. Here, defendant committed the offense of harassment, one of the predicate offenses listed in the statute, in New Jersey. NO. A-37 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NOEL REYES, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED May 21, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY