Title: Gunzl v. Chadwick, et al.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ANTHONY GUNZL, SR.,1 
 
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§ 
No. 439, 2009 
 
Plaintiff Below,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
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Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
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of the State of Delaware in and  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
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for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
JILL CHADWICK AKA JILL A.  
§ 
 
DEANGELIS and DOUGLAS R. 
§ 
DEANGELIS, RUTH LIONS,   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellees,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
and 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
WELLS FARGO HOME  
 
§ 
MORTGAGE, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
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C.A. No. 08L-08-234 
 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 25, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
July 23, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 23rd day of July 2010, upon consideration of the briefs filed by the 
appellant, Anthony Gunzl, Sr. (“Gunzl”) and the cross-appellant/appellee, Wells 
                                          
 
1 The pro se appellant sought to prosecute the appeal in his name and in the name of his sole, 
unincorporated contracting business, United Contractors.  In the absence of the appellant’s filing 
of an amended notice of appeal as instructed by the Clerk, the Court has deleted United 
Contractors as a named party on appeal.   
 
2
Fargo Home Mortgage (“Wells Fargo”), and the motions to affirm filed by the 
appellees, Jill Chadwick (“Chadwick”) and Ruth Lions (“Lions”), it appears to the 
Court that: 
 
(1) 
In early 2008, Chadwick hired Gunzl, a building contractor, to make 
repairs on a house that was damaged in a fire.  Chadwick and De-Angelis co-
owned the house.  Lions was a real estate agent who listed the house for sale.  
Wells Fargo was a mortgagee on the house and a co-loss payee on insurance 
proceeds that were paid on Chadwick’s homeowner’s claim. 
 
(2) 
In August 2008, Gunzl filed a pro se complaint against Chadwick, 
DeAngelis, Lions and Wells Fargo, “individually and jointly,” for breach of 
contract, quantum meruit, and a mechanic’s lien.  At a June 1, 2009 hearing, the 
Superior Court dismissed Gunzl’s complaint as to “all defendants” and granted 
summary judgment to Wells Fargo and Lions.  By order dated July 9, 2009, the 
Superior Court denied Gunzl’s motion for reargument and denied Wells Fargo’s 
and Lions’ requests for attorney’s fees. 
 
(3) 
Gunzl filed an appeal from the summary disposition of his complaint 
and the denial of reargument.  Wells Fargo filed a cross-appeal from the denial of 
attorney’s fees.  Following the parties’ submissions, we remanded this case to the 
 
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Superior Court for clarification of the decisions on appeal.2  With the return of the 
case from remand, and the filing of a supplemental opening brief by Gunzl, the 
case is before us for decision.3 
 
(4) 
The Court reviews de novo a dismissal for lack of personal 
jurisdiction based on improper service4 and for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted.5  On such a dismissal “we must determine whether the 
plaintiff would be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of 
circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint.”6 
 
(5) 
  The Court also reviews de novo a ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment.7 On a motion for summary judgment, we must determine whether, 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving 
party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.8 
                                          
 
2 The March 3, 2010 remand order asked the Superior Court to give its rationale for the July 9, 
2009 denial of attorney’s fees and to clarify whether the June 1, 2009 dismissal as to “all 
defendants” was intended to include DeAngelis. 
3 Nothing further was filed by the cross-appellant/appellees.  
4 AeroGlobal Capital Mgmt. v. Cirius Indus., 871 A.2d 428, 437 (Del. 2005). 
5 Ramirez v. Murdick, 948 A.2d 395, 399 (Del. 2008). 
6 Haskins v. Kay, 2008 WL 5227187 (Del. Supr.) (citing Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 
(Del. 1978)).   
7 Id. 
8 Fletcher v. City of Wilmington, 2006 WL 2335237 (Del. Supr.) (citing Merrill v. Crothall-
American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99 (Del. 1992)).  
 
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(6) 
Applying these legal precepts to this case, we agree that Gunzl’s 
complaint was properly dismissed in its entirety as to Chadwick and Lions for the 
reasons stated by the Superior Court at the June 1, 2009 hearing.9  Similarly, for 
the reasons stated by the Superior Court at the same hearing, we agree that Wells 
Fargo was entitled to the dismissal of Gunzl’s breach of contract and mechanic’s 
lien claims as well as the entry of summary judgment on those claims.10 
 
 
(7) 
We do not agree, however, with the Superior Court’s summary 
disposition of Gunzl’s quantum meruit claim against Wells Fargo for certain 
insurance proceeds.11  On the record before us,12 including Wells Fargo’s motion 
                                          
 
9 The complaint was dismissed as to Chadwick for lack of service.  The complaint was dismissed 
and summary judgment entered on behalf of Lions on the basis that she was, at most, an agent of 
disclosed principals, and that no material facts as to Lions were in dispute. 
10 The breach of contract claim was dismissed in the absence of an allegation that Gunzl had 
entered into any contract with Wells Fargo.  The mechanic’s lien claim was dismissed for 
Gunzl’s failure to comply with the governing statute. 
11 Gunzl claims that Wells Fargo is holding insurance proceeds that Chadwick’s homeowner’s 
insurer made payable to him as a co-loss payee. 
12 The Superior Court record as electronically transmitted appears to be missing documents that 
were conventionally filed by Gunzl over the course of the trial court proceedings.  
 
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for summary judgment,13 and the parties’ submissions on appeal,14 “it seems 
desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts [of Gunzl’s claim for insurance 
proceeds] to clarify the application of law to the circumstances.”15  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the Superior Court’s judgment in part and reverse in part and 
remand this matter for further proceedings.  
 
 NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court dismissing Gunzl’s quantum meruit claim against Wells Fargo for certain 
insurance proceeds is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for further 
proceedings.  In all other aspects, the judgment of the Superior Court, including the 
                                          
 
13 In its motion for summary judgment, Wells Fargo stated: 
Wells Fargo believes, but cannot yet assert under oath, that the 
check to which [Gunzl] refers was an insurance check in which 
[Gunzl] did not have any interest. . . . It is unnecessary for the 
[Superior] Court to resolve this question, however, until [Gunzl] 
amends the Complaint to state a cause of action associated with 
this disjointed fact. 
 
When ruling on the claim at the June 1 hearing, the Superior Court stated: 
I note also that [Gunzl] alleges that Wells Fargo has cashed a 
check without Mr. Gunzl’s signature in that that is grand larceny.  
Well, apart from the fact we have no crime labeled, quote, grand 
larceny, unquote, anywhere in the Delaware Code, it’s not at all 
apparent to the Court what breach of contract claim that somehow 
relates to. 
Hr’g Tr. at 12 (June 1, 2009).   
14 In the interest of justice, and for the limited purpose of considering Gunzl’s opposition to 
summary judgment, we have drawn reasonable inferences from the documents appended to 
Gunzl’s briefs notwithstanding that some of those documents may not be in the record.   
15 Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del. 1962). 
 
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Superior Court’s denial of attorney’s fees, is AFFIRMED.  Wells Fargo’s request 
for attorney’s fees on appeal is DENIED.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
16 In its brief filed on cross-appeal, Wells Fargo requested “attorneys’ fees and costs in 
connection with this appeal.”