Title: Williams v. Philip Morris Inc.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  February 2, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
MAYOLA WILLIAMS,
Personal Representative of the Estate of
JESSE D. WILLIAMS, Deceased,
Respondent on Review,
v.
PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED,
nka PHILIP MORRIS USA INC.,
Petitioner on Review,
and
RJ REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,
FRED MEYER, INC.,
and PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES, INC.,
Defendants.
(CC 9705-03957; CA A106791; SC S51805)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 10, 2005.
William F. Gary, of Harrang Long Gary Rudnick P.C., Eugene,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. 
With him on the briefs were Sharon A. Rudnick and James E.
Mountain, Jr.
James S. Coon, of Swanson, Thomas & Coon, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.  With
him on the surreply brief were Raymond F. Thomas, Portland,
Robert S. Peck, of Center for Constitutional Litigation PC, pro
hac vice, Washington, D.C., William A. Gaylord, of Gaylord
Eyerman Bradley PC, Portland, Charles S. Tauman, Portland,
Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, and Maureen Leonard, Portland.
Thomas W. Brown, of Cosgrave Vergeer Kester LLP, Portland,
filed the briefs for amicus curiae Associated Oregon Industries.
Thomas W. Sondag, of Lane Powell PC, Portland, filed the
brief for amicus curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America.
Steven C. Berman, of Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter
P.C., Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae Alliance for
Lung Cancer Advocacy, Support and Education; American Cancer
Society (Greatwest Division); American Heart Association;
American Lung Association of Oregon; and Tobacco Free Coalition
of Oregon.
David F. Sugerman, of Paul & Sugerman, PC, Portland, filed
the brief for amici curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association and
Oregon Consumer League.
Charles F. Adams and James A. Zehren, of Stoel Rives LLP,
Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Business
Association.
Before Carson, Chief Justice,** and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
and De Muniz,*** Justices.****
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Anna J. Brown, Judge. 182 Or App 44, 48 P3d 824 (2002), adh'd to on recons, 183 Or App 192, 51 P3d 670, rev den, 335 Or 142, 61 P3d 938 (2002), vac'd and rem'd, 540 US 801, 124 S Ct 56, 157 L Ed 2d 12 (2003), on remand, 193 Or App 527, 92 P3d 126 (2004).
**Chief Justice when case was argued.
***Chief Justice when decision was rendered.
****Balmer and Kistler, JJ., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
GILLETTE, J.
This tort case arose out of the death of Jesse
Williams, a smoker, who died of lung cancer.  Plaintiff Mayola
Williams is the widow of Jesse Williams and personal
representative of his estate.  Plaintiff sued defendant Philip
Morris Inc. for, inter alia, negligence and fraud, asserting a
causal connection between Jesse Williams's smoking habit and his
death.  A jury found for plaintiff on both causes of action.  The
jury awarded both economic and noneconomic damages; it also
awarded plaintiff punitive damages of $79.5 million.  The issue
before us is whether that punitive damage award violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  The Court of Appeals concluded that it did not. 
Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 182 Or App 44, 48 P3d 824 (2002)
(Williams I), adh'd to on recons, 183 Or App 192, 51 P3d 670, rev
den, 335 Or 142, 61 P3d 938 (2002), vac'd and rem'd, 540 US 801,
124 S Ct 56, 157 L Ed 2d 12 (2003), on remand, 193 Or App 527, 92
P3d 126 (2004) (Williams II).  For the reasons that follow, we
agree.
I. FACTS
Because the jury ruled in favor of plaintiff, we state
all facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff.  See Parrott
v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 331 Or 537, 556, 17 P3d 473 (2001)
("[W]hen reviewing a punitive damages award for excessiveness,
the reviewing court must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict if there is evidence in the
record to support them.").  Because the parties do not dispute
the way that the Court of Appeals framed the facts, we quote
extensively from that court's opinions.  
Jesse Williams was a lifelong smoker who eventually
died of lung cancer.  The cancer was caused by Williams's
smoking.
"From the early 1950s until his death from a
smoking-related lung cancer in 1997, Williams smoked
[Philip Morris]'s cigarettes, primarily its Marlboro
brand, eventually developing a habit of three packs a
day.  At that point, he spent half his waking hours
smoking and was highly addicted to tobacco, both
physiologically and psychologically.  Although, at the
urging of his wife and children, he made several
attempts to stop smoking, each time he failed, in part
because of his addiction.  Despite the increasing
amount of information that linked smoking to health
problems during that 40-year period, Williams resisted
accepting or attempting to act on it.  When his family
told him that cigarettes were dangerous to his health,
he replied that the cigarette companies would not sell
them if they were as dangerous as his family claimed. 
When one of his sons tried to get him to read articles
about the dangers of smoking, he responded by finding
published assertions that cigarette smoking was not
dangerous.  However, when Williams learned that he had
inoperable lung cancer he felt betrayed, stating 'those
darn cigarette people finally did it.  They were lying
all the time.' He died about six months after his
diagnosis."
Williams II, 193 Or App at 530-31.
Plaintiff based her fraud claim against Philip Morris
on a 40-year publicity campaign by Philip Morris and the tobacco
industry to undercut published concerns about the dangers of
smoking.  Id. at 531.  Philip Morris and the tobacco industry had
known for most of those 40 years, if not all of them, that
smoking was dangerous.  Id.  Nevertheless, they tried to create
in the public mind the impression that there were legitimate
reasons to doubt the danger of smoking.  Id.  Philip Morris and
the tobacco industry did so to give smokers a reason to keep
smoking (or, perhaps more accurately, to undermine one of the
main incentives for smokers to stop smoking).  Id.
The Court of Appeals summarized the evidence regarding
the campaign as follows:
"The industry established its strategy and began
developing its public image in response to a decline in
cigarette sales in 1953 that was the apparent result of
studies that showed that cigarette tar could cause
cancer in mice and that established the existence of
statistical correlations between smoking and lung
cancer.  The first public joint effort by the industry
occurred in January 1954, when [Philip Morris] and
other tobacco companies published a joint statement in
448 newspapers throughout the country.  In that
statement, among other things, they announced the
creation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee
(TIRC), one of whose stated goals was to conduct
research into 'all phases of tobacco use and health.'
In 1964, the year of the Surgeon General's report on
the hazard of smoking to health, the industry divided
the TIRC into two parts, one of which, the Council on
Tobacco Research (CTR), continued to support scientific
research.  The other part, named the Tobacco Institute,
focused on public relations and lobbying.
"Between 1954 and the 1990s, those organizations
developed and promoted an extensive campaign to counter
the effects of negative scientific information on
cigarette sales.  The individual tobacco companies,
including [Philip Morris], were part of the
organizations and acted in cooperation with them.  At
first, the industry publicly denied that there was a
problem; for example, in the 1950s and early 1960s,
[Philip Morris]'s officials told the public that
[Philip Morris] would 'stop business tomorrow' if it
believed that its products were harmful.  For most of
that period, however, the industry did not attempt to
refute the scientific information directly; rather, it
tried to find ways to create doubts about it.  The
industry's goal was to create the impression that
scientists disagreed about whether cigarette smoking
was dangerous, that the industry was vigorously
conducting research into the issue, and that a
definitive answer would not be possible until that
research was complete.  As one of [Philip Morris]'s
vice-presidents explained in an internal memo, the
purpose was to give smokers a psychological crutch and
a self-rationale that would encourage them to continue
smoking.  A Tobacco Institute internal memorandum
similarly described the industry's purpose to provide
smokers 'ready-made credible alternatives' to the
evidence of the dangers of smoking.
"Both the industry as a whole and [Philip Morris]
acted consistently with those purposes.  Among other
things, they avoided developing contradictory
information.  Despite the industry's nominal emphasis
on the need for further research, the CTR designed its
research program to avoid studying the biological
effects of tobacco use, the very question that,
according to the industry's statements, required more
research.  To the extent that [Philip Morris] conducted
research on that issue independently of the CTR, it did
so in a European laboratory that it purchased, and it
was careful to avoid preserving records of the results
in this country.  [Philip Morris]'s director of
research in the late 1970s and 1980s explained to a
subordinate that his job was to attack outside research
that was inconsistent with the industry's position by
casting doubt on it.  The jury could also have found
that there was a 'gentleman's agreement' not to conduct
research beyond what the CTR did.  The primary purpose
of the CTR's research was to provide expert witnesses
for congressional hearings and lawsuits, not to
determine the relationship between smoking and disease. 
The CTR's lawyers, rather than its scientists,
established its research priorities; developing
accurate information on the biological effects of
smoking was not one of the lawyers' priorities.
"The jury could have found that, throughout this
period of time, [Philip Morris] and the other tobacco
companies actually had little doubt that cigarette
smoking was causally related to a number of diseases. 
In 1958, three British researchers found that the
American tobacco scientists with whom they spoke
believed that cigarette smoke could cause cancer.  In
1961, [Philip Morris]'s director of research stated
that cigarette smoke contained so many carcinogens that
the best that the company could do was to reduce their
amounts.  Internal company memoranda agreed and
suggested that it could not admit those facts publicly
because of adverse legal consequences.  At least by the
1970s, there was absolutely no scientific basis for
denying the connection between cigarette smoking and
cancer and other diseases.  However, [Philip Morris]
continued to assert that the hazard of cigarette
smoking to health was uncertain when it actually knew
that there was no legitimate controversy about that
subject.
"The jury could also have found that [Philip
Morris] recognized both that nicotine was addictive and
that its addictive effect was the primary reason that
people continued to smoke.  [Philip Morris] spent
considerable effort discovering ways to deliver the
optimal dose of nicotine in each cigarette without
actually adding nicotine to its product.  It also
concluded that, because of nicotine's addictive effect,
smoking cessation programs and technologies would be
unlikely to work without significant behavioral
therapy.  In its view, providing smokers a reason to
believe that there were serious doubts that tobacco was
harmful would discourage smokers from making the effort
that was necessary to quit smoking.
"Also, the jury could have found that [Philip
Morris] and the industry used a large number of methods
to create the public impression of a legitimate
controversy, despite the lack of supporting scientific
evidence.  They issued press releases, influenced the
content of apparently neutral articles, cultivated
opinion leaders, attempted to use their advertising
power to get favorable treatment from the print media,
and appeared on commercial and public television to put
forth that message.  Those individuals who spoke for
[Philip Morris] and the industry emphasized that the
evidence concerning the dangers of smoking was
primarily based on statistical relationships, and they
argued that there was no proof that a specific
component of tobacco smoke caused a specific disease. 
Even after the early 1990s, when the industry finally
had to admit that tobacco could be a risk factor
associated with a number of diseases, it argued that
there was a long chain of intervening events before a
disease actually arose from cigarette smoking.  The
industry, including [Philip Morris], also continued to
deny that cigarette smoking was addictive and
publicized that message throughout the country,
including Oregon."
Id. at 531-34.
Philip Morris and the tobacco industry intended to
deceive smokers like Williams, and it did in fact deceive him.
"As a smoker, Williams was one of the intended
recipients of the industry's message, and, in fact, the
jury could have found that he received its message and
relied on its representations.  [The jury further could
have found that t]hose representations affected his
decision to continue smoking and not to make greater
efforts to overcome his addiction.  When his family
urged him to stop smoking, he responded that he had
learned from watching television that smoking did not
cause lung cancer.  After his diagnosis, he blamed the
'cigarette people' for betraying him -- which, given
his exclusive use of [Philip Morris]'s products, must
at least have included [Philip Morris].  The jury could
have found on the evidence before it that, as a result
of [Philip Morris]'s representations, Williams suffered
his fatal lung cancer.  The jury also could have found
that Williams was one of thousands of Oregonians who
received [Philip Morris]'s message, acted on it, and,
like him, suffered cancer or other diseases as a
result."
Id. at 534.
Furthermore, Philip Morris also deceived other smokers
in Oregon:
"Although a tobacco industry survey indicated that 85
percent of smokers wished that they had never started
smoking, [Philip Morris] concealed information that the
addictive effects of nicotine made it difficult for
them to stop without significant assistance.  The
fraudulent statements from [Philip Morris] and the rest
of the industry reinforced those addictive effects by
giving smokers a reason not to make the necessary
effort to break the addiction.  The jury could [have
found] on this record that [Philip Morris]'s public
relations campaign had precisely the effect that
[Philip Morris] intended it to have and that it
affected large numbers of tobacco consumers in Oregon
other than Williams.  It is also reasonably inferable
from the evidence that [Philip Morris]'s products, used
as [Philip Morris] intended them to be used, caused a
significant number of deaths each year in Oregon during
the pertinent time period, together with other serious
but nonfatal health problems with their attendant
economic consequences."
Williams I, 182 Or App at 66-67. (1)
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
At trial, the jury found in favor of plaintiff on both
the negligence and fraud claims, and it awarded compensatory
damages of $821,485.50 -- $21,485.80 in economic damages and
$800,000 in noneconomic damages.
As to the negligence claim, the jury found Williams 50%
responsible for the damages.  The jury declined to award any
punitive damages respecting that claim.  As to the fraud claim,
however, the jury awarded punitive damages of $79.5 million.
The trial court significantly reduced the amounts
awarded to the plaintiff.  The court "capped" the noneconomic
damages at $500,000 pursuant to former ORS 18.560 (1999),
renumbered as ORS 31.710 (2003), thereby producing a total
compensatory damage award of $521,485.80. (2)  The court also
reduced the punitive damage award.  The court did conclude that
$79.5 million "was within the range a rational juror could assess
based on the record as a whole and applying the Oregon common law
and statutory factors."  Nevertheless, the court concluded, the
$79.5 million punitive damage award "was excessive under federal
standards."  The trial court therefore reduced the punitive
damage award to $32 million.
Both plaintiff and Philip Morris appealed to the Court
of Appeals.  In Williams I, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court on plaintiff's appeal and reinstated the $79.5
million punitive damage award.  182 Or App at 72.  It affirmed on
Philip Morris's cross-appeal.  Id. at 47.  The court later
adhered to its opinion on reconsideration.  Williams, 183 Or App
at 197.  This court denied review.  335 Or 142, 61 P3d 938
(2002).
The United States Supreme Court then granted
certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment, and remanded
the case to the Court of Appeals for that court to reconsider the
amount of the punitive damages award in light of State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 US 408, 123 S Ct 1513, 155 L
Ed 2d 585 (2003).  Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 540 US
801, 124 S Ct 56, 157 L Ed 2d 12 (2003).  The Court of Appeals
did so in Williams II, again reversing on plaintiff's appeal and
affirming on Philip Morris's cross-appeal.  We allowed review.
III. ISSUES ON REVIEW
On review, Philip Morris asks us to consider four
issues, which it states as follows:
"A. Is a defendant entitled to have the jury
instructed that any award of punitive damages must bear
a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to the
plaintiff and that punitive damages cannot be imposed
for alleged harm to non-parties?
"B. Are the punitive damages assessed in this case
unconstitutionally excessive in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution?
"C. Must a plaintiff prove receipt of and reliance
upon the defendant's allegedly fraudulent
communications when he or she claims that a defendant
committed fraud by communicating a false impression to
the general public through mass media?
"D. Does the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, 15 USC §§ 1331 et seq., preempt the
'false impression' theory relied upon by the Court of
Appeals, which is based in part upon a defendant's
failure to disclose information beyond that prescribed
by the congressionally mandated warnings?"
We will not consider the third and fourth issues.  This
court earlier declined review of all the issues decided in
Williams I.  The appeal remained alive only because of, and to
the extent that, the United States Supreme Court later directed
the Court of Appeals to reconsider its decision respecting the
amount of punitive damages in light of Campbell.  The Court of
Appeals performed that limited function in Williams II, and we
allowed review of that decision.  We decline to go beyond the
Supreme Court's mandate, and the Court of Appeals' opinion in
Williams II, to consider issues that this court previously
determined were not review-worthy.  See ORAP 9.20(2) (this
court's opinion need not address every question presented on
review).
The Supreme Court's decision in Campbell clearly
relates to the second issue presented by Philip Morris.  Philip
Morris asserts that Campbell also relates to the first issue,
regarding jury instructions.  Because of that, and because the
Court of Appeals addressed both issues in Williams II, we will
consider those issues here.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Overview of State Farm v. Campbell
We begin by reviewing the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Campbell.
The punitive damage award at issue in Campbell arose
from an insured's action against an insurer for bad faith, fraud,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  538 US at 414. 
Campbell, the insured, had caused an automobile accident that
killed one person and permanently disabled another.  Id. at 412-13.  When Campbell was sued, Campbell's insurer, State Farm,
chose to contest liability.  Id. at 413.  It refused settlement
offers that were within policy limits and took the case to trial
despite the advice of one of its own investigators, in the
process assuring Campbell and his wife that they would face no
personal liability.  Id.  When the jury returned a verdict
substantially above the policy limits, State Farm initially
refused to cover the excess, telling the Campbells to put "for
sale" signs on their property.  Id.  State Farm also refused to
post a supersedeas bond to appeal the verdict.  Id. 
In their action against State Farm, the Campbells
introduced evidence that State Farm's decision to try the case
was part of a nationwide effort to limit payouts on insurance
claims.  Id. at 415.  The evidence "concerned State Farm's
business practices for over 20 years in numerous States.  Most of
these practices bore no relation to third-party automobile
insurance claims, the type of claim underlying the Campbells'
complaint against the company."  Id.  The jury awarded the
Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million
in punitive damages.  Id.  The trial court reduced the
compensatory damages to $1 million and the punitive damages to
$25 million.  Id.  On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated
the $145 million punitive damage award.  Id.  The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Id. at 416.
The Court first noted that compensatory damages are
intended to compensate for a loss, while punitive damages "are
aimed at deterrence and retribution."  Id.  However, the Court
noted, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits
imposing "grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments" on a
tortfeasor.  Id.  A person must have fair notice, not just that
the state will punish certain conduct, but also how severely it
will do so.  Id. at 417. 
The Court identified two risks peculiar to punitive
damages.  First, although punitive damage awards are similar to
criminal sanctions, defendants do not receive the procedural
protections required of criminal trials.  Id.  Second, vague jury
instructions can leave the jury with too much discretion in
choosing the amount of punitive damages, allowing it to express
preexisting biases or to rely too much on tangential or
inflammatory evidence.  Id. at 417-18.  For those reasons, the
Court had directed "[e]xacting appellate review" of a jury's
punitive damage award, considering three "guideposts" identified
in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559, 116 S Ct 1589,
134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996):
"(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between
the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases."
Campbell, 538 US at 418.  
The Court then applied those guideposts.  The first
guidepost, the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct,
represents "'[t]he most important indicium of the reasonableness
of a punitive damages award.'"  Id. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 US
at 575).  In analyzing reprehensibility, courts should consider
whether
"the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;
the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;
the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;
the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the result of
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident."
Id. (citing Gore, 517 US at 576-77).
In analyzing that guidepost in Campbell, however, the
Court did not itself focus on those five considerations. 
Instead, it concentrated on how evidence of out-of-state conduct
and dissimilar conduct had skewed the reprehensibility analysis
against State Farm.  The state wrongly relied on such conduct,
the Court ruled, because a state cannot punish a defendant for
its lawful conduct in another state, or for conduct that
"occurred outside [the state] to other persons."  Id. at 421.  In
Campbell, most of the out-of-state conduct was lawful where it
took place, and it was not connected to the harm to the
Campbells.  Id. at 422.  Furthermore, the Court held, a state
cannot punish a defendant for "dissimilar acts":  "A defendant
should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not
for being an unsavory individual or business."  Id. at 423.  In
sum, the Court held that, because the Campbells showed "no
conduct by State Farm similar to that which harmed them, the
conduct that harmed them is the only conduct relevant to the
reprehensibility analysis."  Id. at 424.
The second Gore guidepost examines the ratio between
the punitive damage award and the actual or potential harm to the
plaintiff.  Campbell, 538 US at 424.  The ratio, however, is no
mechanical formula.  Id.  ("we have been reluctant to identify
concrete constitutional limits on the ratio"); id. at 425 ("[w]e
decline again to impose a bright-line ratio"); id. ("there are no
rigid benchmarks that a punitive damage award may not surpass").  
That said, the Court proceeded to give some guidance
regarding the second guidepost.  Twice in the past, the Court
noted, it had suggested that a punitive damage award more than
four times compensatory damages "might be close to the line of
constitutional impropriety."  Id. at 425 (citing Gore, 517 US at
581, and Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 US 1,
23-24, 111 S Ct 1032, 113 L Ed 2d 1 (1991)).  The Court also had
noted previously that, for 700 years, legislatures had authorized
double, treble, or quadruple damages as a sanction.  Campbell,
538 US at 425 (citing Gore, 517 US at 581 & n 33).  The Court
concluded that, "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant
degree, will satisfy due process."  538 US at 425.
"Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport
with due process, while still achieving the State's
goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with
ratios in [the] range of 500 to 1, or, in this case, of
145 to 1."
Id. (citation omitted).
The Court did acknowledge, however, that even those
tentative ratios might be adjusted up or down.  A greater ratio
might comport with due process if "'a particularly egregious act
has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages,'" if
"'the injury is hard to detect,'" or if "'the monetary value of
noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.'"  Id.
at 425 (quoting Gore, 517 US at 582).  With a "substantial"
compensatory damage award, however, due process might require "a
lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages."  Id. 
But "[t]he precise award * * * must be based upon the facts and
circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the
plaintiff."  Id.
In applying the second Gore guidepost, the Court stated
that there is "a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-1
ratio."  Id. at 426.  The Campbells had received a substantial
compensatory damage award; they were injured economically, not
physically; and State Farm paid the excess verdict before the
Campbells sued them, so their economic injuries were minor.  Id. 
Additionally, the outrage and humiliation that State Farm caused
the Campbells may have been considered twice -- once in the
compensatory damage award and again in the punitive damage award. 
Id. 
The Court also rejected several other factors that the
Utah Supreme Court had identified in support of the punitive
damage award.  For example, the Utah Supreme Court had pointed to
State Farm's wealth.  The Court concluded that wealth should not
have been considered:
"While States enjoy considerable discretion in deducing
when punitive damages are warranted, each award must
comport with the principles set forth in Gore. * * *
The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise
unconstitutional punitive damages award.  Gore, 517 US,
at 585 ('The fact that BMW is a large corporation
rather than an impecunious individual does not diminish
its entitlement to fair notice of the demands that the
several States impose on the conduct of its business');
see also id., at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring)
('[Wealth] provides an open-ended basis for inflating
awards when the defendant is wealthy * * *.  That does
not make its use unlawful or inappropriate; it simply
means that this factor cannot make up for the failure
of other factors, such as "reprehensibility," to
constrain significantly an award that purports to
punish a defendant's conduct')."
Id. at 427-28.
The third guidepost compares the punitive damage award
to comparable civil and criminal penalties.  Id. at 428. 
Criminal penalties, however, do not help as much in determining
"the dollar amount of the award": 
"Great care must be taken to avoid use of the civil
process to assess criminal penalties that can be
imposed only after the heightened protections of a
criminal trial have been observed, including, of
course, its higher standards of proof.  Punitive
damages are not a substitute for the criminal process,
and the remote possibility of a criminal sanction does
not automatically sustain a punitive damages award."
Id. 
The comparable civil sanctions in Campbell fell well
below the punitive damage award.  The Court identified only one,
a $10,000 fine for fraud.  Id.  The Utah Supreme Court had
pointed to other, more substantive penalties, but they were all
based on evidence of out-of-state and dissimilar conduct.  Id. 
In all, the Court in Campbell found the case "neither
close nor difficult," id. at 418, and concluded that $145 million
in punitive damages violated due process, see id. at 429
(concluding award was "irrational and arbitrary deprivation" of
property).  The Court suggested that the guideposts,
"especially in light of the substantial compensatory
damages awarded (a portion of which contained a
punitive element), likely would justify a punitive
damages award at or near the amount of compensatory
damages."
Id.  However, the Court concluded, Utah state courts should
calculate punitive damages in the first instance.  Id. at 429.
With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to the
questions presented on review.
B. The Trial Court's Refusal to Give Philip Morris's Proposed
Jury Instruction No. 34
Philip Morris first argues that the trial court erred
in refusing to give its proposed jury instruction number 34. 
That instruction stated, in part:
"The size of any punishment should bear a reasonable
relationship to the harm caused to Jesse Williams by
the defendant's punishable misconduct.  Although you
may consider the extent of harm suffered by others in
determining what that reasonable relationship is, you
are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its
alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring
lawsuits of their own in which other juries can resolve
their claims and award punitive damages for those
harms, as such other juries see fit."
In Williams I, the Court of Appeals concluded that that
instruction was incorrect under state law.  182 Or App at 63-64. 
We agree.  See Parrott, 331 Or at 563 (evaluating punitive damage
award; "Because defendant's tortious conduct was a routine part
of its business practice that it was unwilling to change, we also
consider the potential injury that its misconduct may have caused
to past, present, and future customers.").  That is, the jury
could consider whether Williams and his misfortune were merely
exemplars of the harm that Philip Morris was prepared to inflict
on the smoking public at large.
Philip Morris, however, contends that Campbell
overrules state rules like the one set out in Parrott. 
Specifically, Philip Morris asserts that Campbell prohibits the
state, acting through a civil jury, from using punitive damages
to punish a defendant for harm to nonparties. (3)  In support
of that argument, Philip Morris quotes the following from
Campbell:
"Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation
of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other
parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under
the guise of the reprehensibility analysis * * *. 
* * * Punishment on these bases creates the possibility
of multiple punitive damages awards for the same
conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not bound
by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains.  Gore,
supra, [517 US] at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring)
('Larger damages might also "double count" by including
in the punitive damages award some of the compensatory,
or punitive, damages that subsequent plaintiffs would
also recover')."
538 US at 423.
We think that Philip Morris takes the foregoing quoted
material from Campbell out of context.  The quote referred only
to dissimilar acts and dissimilar claims; the Court intended to
prohibit a punitive damage award from becoming a referendum on a
corporate defendant's general behavior as a citizen.  The full
paragraph in Campbell states:
"For a more fundamental reason, however, the Utah
courts erred in relying upon this and other evidence: 
The courts awarded punitive damages to punish and deter
conduct that bore no relation to the Campbells' harm. 
A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the
acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve
as the basis for punitive damages.  A defendant should
be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff,
not for being an unsavory individual or business.  Due
process does not permit courts, in the calculation of
punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other
parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under
the guise of the reprehensibility analysis, but we have
no doubt the Utah Supreme Court did that here.  65 P3d,
at 1149 ('Even if the harm to the Campbells can be
appropriately characterized as minimal, the trial
court's assessment of the situation is on target:  "The
harm is minor to the individual but massive in the
aggregate"').  Punishment on these bases creates the
possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the
same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not
bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains. 
Gore, supra, [517 US] at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring)
('Larger damages might also "double count" by including
in the punitive damages award some of the compensatory,
or punitive, damages that subsequent plaintiffs would
also recover')."
538 US at 422-23 (emphasis added).  
Considering the foregoing material as a whole, we
conclude that evidence of similar conduct against other parties
may be relevant to a punitive damage award.  The Court criticized
the Utah courts only for allowing in evidence of dissimilar
conduct:
"The Campbells have identified scant evidence of
repeated misconduct of the sort that injured
them. * * *  Although evidence of other acts need not
be identical to have relevance in the calculation of
punitive damages, the Utah court erred here because
evidence pertaining to claims that had nothing to do
with a third-party lawsuit was introduced at
length. * * *  The reprehensibility guidepost does not
permit courts to expand the scope of the case so that a
defendant may be punished for any malfeasance, which in
this case extended for a 20-year period.  In this case,
because the Campbells have shown no conduct by State
Farm similar to that which harmed them, the conduct
that harmed them is the only conduct relevant to the
reprehensibility analysis."
Id. at 423-24 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 427 ("The
failure of the company to report the Texas award is out-of-state
conduct that, if the conduct were similar, might have had some
bearing on the degree of reprehensibility, subject to the
limitations we have described." (emphasis added)).
Philip Morris's proposed jury instruction would have
prohibited the jury from "punish[ing] the defendant for the
impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons," even if those
other persons were Oregonians who were harmed by the same conduct
that had harmed Williams, and in the same way.  As we noted, that
is not correct as an independent matter of Oregon law respecting
the conduct of jury trials and instructions that are given to
juries.  Neither, as we read in Campbell, does it correctly state
federal due process law.  Because the proposed jury instruction
did not accurately reflect the law, the trial court did not
commit reversible error when it refused to give it.  See
Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 106, 957 P2d 147
(1998) (trial court's refusal to give requested jury instruction
"is no[t] error if the requested instruction is not correct in
all respects").
Philip Morris also claims that the trial court
committed reversible error because the jury instructions that
were given did not accurately reflect some aspects of Campbell's
holding.  But Philip Morris did not preserve that argument before
the Court of Appeals.  See ORAP 5.45(1) ("No matter claimed as
error will be considered on appeal unless the claimed error * * *
is assigned as error in the opening brief * * *."); Ailes v.
Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 380, 823 P2d 956 (1991) (to
preserve error, "the adversely affected party must have * * *
raised the issue on appeal by an assignment of error in its
opening brief").  Fairly read, Philip Morris's assignment of
error in the Court of Appeals claimed only that the trial court
erred in refusing to give requested instruction number 34.  That
narrow assignment of error did not give the Court of Appeals
notice that it needed to consider any challenge to the
instructions actually given.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the Court
of Appeals on the first issue.
C. The Punitive Damage Award and Federal Due Process
On review of a punitive damage award under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a court must
determine whether the punitive damage award is "'grossly
excessive'."  Parrott, 331 Or at 554 (emphasis deleted; citing
Gore, 517 US at 568).  Whether the verdict exceeds the gross
excessiveness standard is a question of law.  Id. at 555.
In Parrott, this court identified five factors to be
considered to determine whether a punitive damage award is
grossly excessive:
"[T]he range that a rational juror would be entitled to
award depends on the following:  (1) the statutory and
common-law factors that allow an award of punitive
damages for the specific kind of claim at issue; (2)
the state interests that a punitive damages award is
designed to serve; (3) the degree of reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct; (4) the disparity between
the punitive damages award and the actual or potential
harm inflicted; and (5) the civil and criminal
sanctions provided for comparable misconduct."
Id. (citations omitted).  Parrott has been superseded somewhat by
Campbell, but the last three Parrott factors are, of course, the
Gore guideposts as they have been further elucidated by Campbell. 
We consider only those guideposts in the following analysis.
The first guidepost directs us to consider, based on
the facts contained in the record, how reprehensible Philip
Morris's conduct was.  As noted, we consider whether:
"the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;
the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others;
the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;
the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the result of
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident."
Campbell, 538 US at 419 (citing Gore, 517 US at 576-77).  And, as
we have explained, the jury, in assessing the reprehensibility of
Philip Morris's actions, could consider evidence of similar harm
to other Oregonians caused (or threatened) by the same conduct.  
Again, we construe all facts in favor of plaintiff, the
party in whose favor the jury ruled.  Doing so, there can be no
dispute that Philip Morris's conduct was extraordinarily
reprehensible.  Philip Morris knew that smoking caused serious
and sometimes fatal disease, but it nevertheless spread false or
misleading information to suggest to the public that doubts
remained about that issue.  It deliberately did so to keep
smokers smoking, knowing that it was putting the smokers' health
and lives at risk, and it continued to do so for nearly half a
century.
Philip Morris's fraudulent scheme would have kept many
Oregonians smoking past the point when they would otherwise have
quit.  Some of those smokers would eventually become ill; some
would die.  Philip Morris's deceit thus would, naturally and
inevitably, lead to significant injury or death.
Although it weighs less in our analysis, we also note
that Philip Morris harmed a much broader class of Oregonians. 
Every smoker tricked by its scheme, even those who never got ill,
kept buying cigarettes -- taking money out of their pockets and
putting it into the hands of Philip Morris and other tobacco
companies.  And every one of those smokers risked serious illness
or death for as long as they remained deceived.
Of the five reprehensibility factors listed in Gore and
recited -- if not precisely used -- in Campbell, four certainly
are met here.  The harm to Williams was physical -- lung cancer
cost Williams his life.  Philip Morris showed indifference to and
reckless disregard for the safety not just of Williams, but of
countless other Oregonians, when it knowingly spread false or
misleading information to keep smokers smoking.  Philip Morris's
actions were no isolated incident, but a carefully calculated
program spanning decades.  And Philip Morris's wrongdoing
certainly involved trickery and deceit. (4)  We conclude, then,
that the first Gore guidepost favors a very significant punitive
damage award.
We also conclude that the third Gore guidepost --
comparable civil or criminal sanctions -- favors plaintiff.  In
examining that guidepost, however, we believe that it is
important to correct two errors that the Court of Appeals
committed in applying it.  
In Williams I, the Court of Appeals suggested that,
because the comparable sanctions guidepost was about notice to a
prospective defendant, "the established Oregon law of punitive
damages, including ORS 30.925(2)," gave Philip Morris adequate
notice here.  182 Or App at 72.  That was not correct.
Courts consider comparable sanctions for two reasons. 
First, comparable sanctions suggest a legislative determination
about what constitutes an appropriate sanction for the conduct, a
determination that is entitled to "substantial deference."  Gore,
517 US at 583 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Second, comparable sanctions may give a defendant fair notice of
the penalties that the conduct may carry.  Id. at 584 ("None of
these statutes would provide an out-of-state distributor with
fair notice that the first violation -- or, indeed the first 14
violations -- of its provisions might subject an offender to a
multimillion dollar penalty.").  
Those reasons explain why we conclude that the Court of
Appeals misunderstood the guidepost.  Neither Oregon law
generally, nor ORS 30.925(2) specifically, (5) suggest how
severely the state may chose to punish Philip Morris's conduct. 
Thus, they do not independently provide a legislative standard
entitled to substantial deference.  If the Court of Appeals'
analysis were correct, then the third Gore guidepost would always
support any punitive damage award, i.e., the mere existence of
the award would justify itself automatically, regardless of the
amount awarded.  That reasoning is circular, and we reject it.
In Williams I, the Court of Appeals also suggested that
the comparable sanctions guidepost does not "play[] a major role
one way or the other," because it concluded that there were no
comparable civil penalties and that criminal penalties were not
truly comparable.  182 Or App at 72.  Although it is not clear to
us that the foregoing statement correctly interprets and applies
the law as Campbell now explicates that law, we need not pursue
that issue definitively here.  That is true, because applying the
comparable sanctions guidepost involves more than just asking
whether the dollar amount of the sanction equals or exceeds the
punitive damage award.  Campbell proves that.  There, the most
relevant civil sanction was $10,000; the Court found that civil
sanction was "dwarfed" by the $145 million punitive damage award. 
538 US at 428.  Yet the Court approved a punitive damage award
"at or near the amount of compensatory damages," id. at 429,
i.e., an award somewhere around $1 million.  And a $1 million
punitive damage award was still 100 times the comparable
sanction.
So far as we can discern from Campbell, then, the
"comparable sanctions" guidepost requires three steps.  First,
courts must identify comparable civil or criminal sanctions. 
Second, courts must consider how serious the comparable sanctions
are, relative to the universe of sanctions that the legislature
authorizes to punish inappropriate conduct.  Third, courts must
then evaluate the punitive damage award in light of the relative
severity of the comparable sanctions.  The guidepost may militate
against a significant punitive damage award if the state's
comparable sanctions are mild, trivial, or nonexistent.  However,
the guidepost will support a more significant punitive damage
award when the state's comparable sanctions are severe.
We turn, then, to consider the facts of this case, in
light of the guideposts and the Fourteenth Amendment.  If there
are comparable civil sanctions, the parties did not cite them to
us and we have not found them by independent investigation.
There are what we consider to be comparable criminal
sanctions, but we must exercise care when relying on them.  As
the Court took pains to caution in Campbell:
"The existence of a criminal penalty does have [a]
bearing on the seriousness with which a State views the
wrongful action.  When used to determine the dollar
amount of the award, however, the criminal penalty has
less utility.  Great care must be taken to avoid use of
the civil process to assess criminal penalties that can
be imposed only after the heightened protections of a
criminal trial have been observed, including, of
course, its higher standards of proof.  Punitive
damages are not a substitute for the criminal process,
and the remote possibility of a criminal sanction does
not automatically sustain a punitive damages award."
538 US at 428.  That admonition is important, of course.  But the
basis for holding that Philip Morris's actions in this case
compare to a familiar crime is not speculative or remote. 
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
Philip Morris's actions, under the criminal statutes in place at
the beginning of its scheme in 1954, would have constituted
manslaughter.  See ORS 163.040 (1953). (6)  Today, its actions
would constitute at least second-degree manslaughter, a Class B
felony.  See ORS 163.125(1)(a). (7)  Individuals who commit
Class B felonies may face up to 10 years in prison and a fine of
up to $250,000.  ORS 161.605(2) (term of imprisonment);
ORS 161.625(1)(c) (fine).  Corporations that commit a felony of
any class may be fined up to $50,000, or required to pay up to
twice the amount that the corporation gained by committing the
offense.  ORS 161.655(1)(a) and (3).  Thus, the possibility of
severe criminal sanctions, both for any individual who
participated and for the corporation generally, put Philip Morris
on notice that Oregon would take such conduct very
seriously. (8)  We conclude that the third guidepost, like the
first, supports a very significant punitive damage award. 
The same cannot be said of the second Gore guidepost. 
As noted, that guidepost considers the ratio between the punitive
damage award and the compensatory damage award.  The numerator of
the ratio is fixed by the punitive damage award:  $79.5 million.
To determine the denominator of the ratio, we consider
not only the harm actually suffered by plaintiff, but also the
potential harm to plaintiff.  See Campbell, 538 US at 418
("actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff"); id. at
424 (ratio "between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and
the punitive damages award").  Plaintiff suffered relatively
small economic damages for Williams's wrongful death -- less than
$25,000.  However, that low figure occurred only because Williams
died shortly after being diagnosed with cancer.  If Williams had
lived long enough to incur substantial medical bills, for
example, economic damages could easily have been 10 or more times
the amount awarded here.  Only chance saved Philip Morris from a
much higher compensatory damage award. (9)
In analyzing the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages, the Court of Appeals also added to the compensatory
damages calculus the estimated harm to others.  Williams II, 193
Or App at 562 (estimating that 100 Oregonians had been harmed by
Philip Morris's scheme, and so concluding ratio was less than
4:1).
Using harm to others as part of the ratio may have been
correct under the plurality opinion in TKO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 US 443, 460, 113 S Ct 2711, 125 L
Ed 2d 366 (1993) (Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Blackmun, J.)  (relationship between actual and punitive damages
should consider "the possible harm to other victims that might
have resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred"). 
However, it no longer appears to be permissible (if it ever was)
to factor in that consideration.  Although Campbell held that
similar acts could bear on reprehensibility (discussed above), it
now appears that harm to others should not be considered as part
of the ratio guidepost.  See 538 US at 426-27 ("Since the Supreme
Court of Utah discussed the Texas award when applying the ratio
guidepost, we discuss it here.  The Texas award, however, should
have been analyzed in the context of the reprehensibility
guidepost only." (emphasis added)); see also id. at 427 (had
Texas award involved similar conduct, it "might have had some
bearing on the degree of reprehensibility"); Gore, 517 US at 582-83 (Court used 500:1 as ratio, although Court noted in footnote
35 that ratio would have been 35:1 if damages to other Alabama
consumers had been included).  From the foregoing, we conclude
that the ratio guidepost considers only harm to the plaintiff. 
See Campbell, 538 US at 425 (precise award must be based on "the
defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff" (emphasis
added)); id. at 426 (punishment must be "reasonable and
proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the
general damages recovered" (emphasis added)).
There also is some imprecision regarding what amount we
should use for noneconomic damages -- is it the $800,000 awarded
by the jury, or the $500,000 awarded by the trial court after
applying the statutory cap?  We need not decide between the
"capped" or "uncapped" figure, however, because it makes no
difference here.  Either way, the second Gore guidepost is not
met.  All arguable versions of the ratios substantially exceed
the single-digit ratio (9:1) that the Court has said ordinarily
will apply in the usual case.  See Campbell, 538 US at 425 (so
stating).
In Williams II, the Court of Appeals also relied on
Philip Morris's wealth to conclude that the jury's punitive
damage award did not violate due process.  193 Or App at 563. 
Philip Morris objects that Campbell prohibits using wealth in
that way.  We agree.  Wealth "cannot justify an otherwise
unconstitutional punitive damages award."  Campbell, 538 US at
427.  If a punitive damage award is grossly excessive under Gore
and Campbell, then the defendant's wealth will not make it
constitutional.  In short, wealth is not a fourth Gore guidepost.
However, Campbell did not otherwise remove wealth from
the punitive damage equation, as Philip Morris asserts.  A jury
still may levy a higher punitive damage award against a wealthy
defendant, as long as the final punitive damage award does not
exceed the constitutional limits established by the three Gore
guideposts.  Id. at 427 (wealth "cannot justify an otherwise
unconstitutional punitive damages award," indicating that
punitive damage award could be constitutional even though jury
considered wealth (emphasis added)); see id. at 428 (wealth is
not "'unlawful or inappropriate'" factor (quoting Gore, 517 US at
591 (Breyer, J., concurring))).  Consistently with the foregoing,
Oregon law specifically permits a jury to consider a defendant's
financial condition when it imposes a punitive damage award.  ORS
30.925(2)(f).
Of the three Gore guideposts, then, two support a very
significant punitive damage award.  One guidepost -- the ratio --
cuts the other way.  In the end, we are left to use those
competitive tools to assess whether the jury's punitive damage
award was not "grossly excessive" and therefore should be
reinstated.  
The Gore guideposts are not bright-line tests.  See,
e.g., Campbell, 538 US at 425 ("there are no rigid benchmarks
that a punitive damages award may not surpass"); see also Gore,
517 US at 582 ("we have consistently rejected the notion that the
constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula"). 
In other words, the guideposts are only that -- guideposts.  Gore
also referred to them as indicia.  517 US at 575
(reprehensibility is "most important indicium"); id. at 580
(ratio is "second and perhaps most commonly cited indicium"); id.
at 583 (comparable sanctions "provides a third indicium for
excessiveness").  Campbell specifically contemplated that some
awards exceeding single-digit ratios would satisfy due process. 
See id. at 425 ("in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant
degree, will satisfy due process").  Single-digit ratios may mark
the boundary in ordinary cases, but the absence of bright-line
rules necessarily suggests that the other two guideposts --
reprehensibility and comparable sanctions -- can provide a basis
for overriding the concern that may arise from a double-digit
ratio.
And this is by no means an ordinary case.  Philip
Morris's conduct here was extraordinarily reprehensible, by any
measure of which we are aware.  It put a significant number of
victims at profound risk for an extended period of time.  The
State of Oregon treats such conduct as grounds for a severe
criminal sanction, but even that did not dissuade Philip Morris
from pursuing its scheme.  
In summary, Philip Morris, with others, engaged in a
massive, continuous, near-half-century scheme to defraud the
plaintiff and many others, even when Philip Morris always had
reason to suspect -- and for two or more decades absolutely knew
-- that the scheme was damaging the health of a very large group
of Oregonians -- the smoking public -- and was killing a number
of that group.  Under such extreme and outrageous circumstances,
we conclude that the jury's $79.5 million punitive damage award
against Philip Morris comported with due process, as we
understand that standard to relate to punitive damage awards.  It
follows that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial
court should have entered judgment against Philip Morris for the
full amount of the jury's punitive damage award.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. These last statements reflect the one real disagreement
between the parties over the record.  Philip Morris claims
repeatedly that the record does not show that its fraud injured
any party other than Williams.  However, its opening brief
indicates that Philip Morris does not contest how the Court of
Appeals summarized the record.  Rather, it argues that plaintiff
did not put on any specific evidence to show that any particular
person (other than Williams) continued smoking because of the
fraud.  
"There is nothing in the record that supports
the Court of Appeals' assumption that any
Oregon smoker other than Williams smoked and
sustained injuries in reliance on the alleged
fraud.  At most, plaintiff introduced
evidence that smoking per se injured non-parties.  However, the mere act of selling
cigarettes is lawful conduct.  Plaintiff
never connected the injuries of non-parties
to the fraud alleged in this case."
(Emphasis in original.)
In essence, Philip Morris is claiming that one
cannot reasonably infer that anyone was actually fooled by its
40-year advertising campaign directed to thousands of Oregonians. 
Yet even the simplest assessment of human nature, viewed in light
of the designedly addictive properties of cigarettes, tells any
reasonable person that those lies would have been very
persuasive.  We think that such an appreciation of human nature
fairly may be attributed to jurors, including the ones who heard
this case.  Moreover, Philip Morris's own conduct belies its
protestations.  As a for-profit corporation, it would not spend
over 40 years of time, effort, and money to deceive people,
unless it thought it was succeeding.
2. There is no issue in this case as it comes before us
respecting the propriety of the trial court's application of
former ORS 18.560.
3. Philip Morris does not explain how its instruction
summarizes its interpretation of Campbell.  It is unclear to us
how a jury could "consider" harm to others, yet withhold that
consideration from the punishment calculus.  If a jury cannot
punish for the conduct, then it is difficult to see why it may
consider it at all. 
4. Only one factor arguably is not met:  There is no evidence
that Williams was especially financially vulnerable.
Plaintiff argues that Williams was vulnerable in
another way, because he was addicted to cigarettes and so more
susceptible to Philip Morris's deceptive message.  Gore
indirectly suggests that reprehensibility may include other sorts
of vulnerability than financial.  See 517 US at 576 (suggesting
that higher punitive damages are appropriate, even though the
injury is solely economic, if "the target is financially
vulnerable").  However, as we will discuss, we would affirm this
punitive damage award even if that factor was not met.
5. ORS 30.925 provides, in part:
"(2) Punitive damages, if any, shall be
determined and awarded based upon the
following criteria:
"(a) The likelihood at the time that
serious harm would arise from the defendant's
misconduct;
"(b) The degree of the defendant's
awareness of that likelihood;
"(c) The profitability of the
defendant's misconduct;
"(d) The duration of the misconduct and
any concealment of it;
"(e) The attitude and conduct of the
defendant upon discovery of the misconduct;
"(f) The financial condition of the
defendant; and
"(g) The total deterrent effect of other
punishment imposed upon the defendant as a
result of the misconduct, including, but not
limited to, punitive damage awards to persons
in situations similar to the claimant's and
the severity of criminal penalties to which
the defendant has been or may be subjected."
Of course, those criteria were established without
the benefit of the Campbell decision, and may be applied only to
the extent that they comport with that decision.
6. In 1953, that statute provided, in part:
"(2) Any person who, in the commission
of * * * a lawful act without due caution or
circumspection, involuntarily kills another,
is guilty of manslaughter. * * *
"(3) Every killing of a human being by
the act, procurement or culpable negligence
of another, when the killing is not murder in
the first or second degree, or is not
justifiable or excusable or negligent
homicide as provided in ORS 163.090
[negligent homicide by operation of motor
vehicle], is manslaughter."
7. The Oregon statutes generally define criminal homicide as
follows:
"A person commits criminal homicide if,
without justification or excuse, the person
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with
criminal negligence causes the death of
another human being."
ORS 163.005(1).  
Second-degree manslaughter is a specific category
of criminal homicide:
"(1) Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter in the second degree when:
"(a) It is committed recklessly[.]
"* * * * *
"(2) Manslaughter in the second degree
is a Class B felony."
ORS 163.125.
Reckless conduct is defined in ORS 161.085(9):
"'Recklessly,' when used with respect to
a result or to a circumstance described by a
statute defining an offense, means that a
person is aware of and consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
result will occur or that the circumstance
exists.  The risk must be of such nature and
degree that disregard thereof constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would observe in the
situation."
8. The fines and periods of imprisonment have changed over the
many years that Philip Morris carried out its scheme.  In 1953,
for example, manslaughter carried a much longer prison term (15
years), but a much lower fine ($5,000).  ORS 163.080 (1953).  The
point, however, is that reckless conduct like Philip Morris's,
when it resulted in death (as it did here), always has
constituted a criminal act to which attached a severe potential
criminal penalty.
9. One sentence in Campbell suggested that a small award of
"'economic damages'" might, when combined with particularly
egregious conduct, justify a higher ratio.  538 US at 425
(quoting Gore, 517 US at 582; emphasis added).  
We conclude, however, that the Court meant
compensatory damages generally, not economic damages
specifically.  See id. ("The converse is also true, however. 
When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser
ratio * * * can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee." (emphasis added)); see also id. at 426 (expressing
concern that compensatory damages might have included outrage or
humiliation component duplicated in punitive damage award).  That
accords with Gore, 517 US at 582 ("[L]ow awards of compensatory
damages may properly support a higher ratio than high
compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious
act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages."
(emphasis added)).