Title: State ex rel. Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Moss

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Moss, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3539.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-3539 
THE STATE EX REL. RYAN ALTERNATIVE STAFFING, INC., APPELLEE, v. 
MOSS; INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Moss, Slip 
Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3539.] 
Workers’ compensation—Nothing in R.C. 4123.56(A) or Ohio Adm.Code 
4121-3-32(A)(6) permits an injured worker to receive temporary-total-
disability compensation after refusing a good-faith offer of suitable 
alternative employment, even if the injured worker exercised good faith in 
refusing the offer—Orders of the Industrial Commission’s hearing officers 
exhibit confusion about the correct standard under which employer’s good 
faith is to be determined—Court of appeals’ judgment vacated and limited 
writ issued ordering the commission to reconsider this case under the 
proper standard. 
(No. 2020-1545—Submitted June 29, 2021—Decided October 6, 2021.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 19AP-245, 2020-
Ohio-5197. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Industrial Commission of Ohio, granted temporary-total-
disability (“TTD”) compensation to Bridget M. Moss.  Moss’s employer, appellee, 
Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. (“Ryan”), asked the Tenth District Court of Appeals 
for a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order and deny 
compensation because Moss had refused an offer of alternative employment within 
her medical restrictions.  The Tenth District granted the writ. 
{¶ 2} We vacate the Tenth District’s judgment and issue a limited writ 
ordering the commission to reconsider the claim under the correct standard, as 
explained below. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 3} Moss sustained a work injury while employed by Ryan in a second-
shift position, working 4:00 p.m. to midnight.  Her workers’ compensation claim 
was allowed for a knee sprain, and she requested TTD compensation.  Ryan, a self-
insuring employer, offered Moss work within her medical restrictions, but on the 
day shift.  Moss refused the offer because she had to care for her granddaughter 
during the day while her daughter worked.  Ryan denied Moss’s TTD-
compensation request because she had turned down the job offer. 
{¶ 4} Moss asked the commission to order Ryan to approve compensation, 
asserting that Ryan knew she could not work the day shift, so its offer of light-duty 
work was not made in good faith.  A district hearing officer (“DHO”) denied the 
motion, finding that Ryan had not consciously crafted a position it knew Moss 
could not accept. 
{¶ 5} Moss appealed, and a staff hearing officer (“SHO”) vacated the 
DHO’s order and granted Moss’s request for TTD compensation, finding that while 
January Term, 2021 
 
3
Ryan had made the offer in good faith, Moss had also refused it in good faith.  Ryan 
appealed the SHO’s decision; the commission declined to hear the appeal.  Ryan 
moved for reconsideration, which the commission likewise denied. 
{¶ 6} Ryan then filed this action in the Tenth District seeking a writ of 
mandamus ordering the commission to vacate the SHO’s order and reinstate the 
DHO’s order.  The magistrate recommended denying the writ, but the court 
sustained Ryan’s objections and granted it.  2020-Ohio-5197, ¶ 1, 8.  The 
commission appealed. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A. Mandamus Standard 
{¶ 7} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Ryan must show that it has a 
clear legal right to the relief requested, that the commission has a clear legal duty 
to provide it, and that Ryan lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 
law.  State ex rel. Omni Manor, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 162 Ohio St.3d 264, 2020-
Ohio-4422, 165 N.E.3d 273, ¶ 9. 
B. Good-Faith Offer of Suitable Alternative Employment 
{¶ 8} R.C. 4123.56(A) provides that payment for TTD compensation “shall 
not be made” for periods “when work within the physical capabilities of the 
employee is made available by the employer.”  In State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, 
Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, ¶ 13, 
we held that R.C. 4123.56(A) must be read in pari materia with Ohio Adm.Code 
4121-3-32(A)(6), which provides, “ ‘Job offer’ means a proposal, made in good 
faith, of suitable employment within a reasonable proximity of the injured worker’s 
residence.”  “Suitable employment” simply means “work which is within the 
employee’s physical capabilities.”  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(3). 
{¶ 9} There is no dispute that Ryan made an offer of suitable alternative 
employment, and no one claims it was not within a reasonable proximity of Moss’s 
residence.  The commission also found that the offer was made in good faith. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
4
{¶ 10} The question presented is whether in such a situation the commission 
may nevertheless award TTD compensation if the employee refuses the offer in 
good faith based on family circumstances.  R.C. 4123.56(A) answers this question 
in the negative: “payment shall not be made for the period * * * when work within 
the physical capabilities of the employee is made available by the employer or 
another employer.”  (Emphasis added.)  The statute grants the commission no 
discretion to award TTD compensation if the employer makes an offer complying 
with R.C. 4123.56(A) and Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6). 
{¶ 11} Despite the statute’s clear directive, the parties, commission, and 
court of appeals all analyzed this case under Ellis, the facts of which were similar 
to those in this case.  In Ellis, an injury prevented Susan Hudgel from returning to 
her former day-shift position, but her employer, Ellis Super Valu, Inc. (“ESV”), 
offered her a light-duty position on the evening shift.  115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-
Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, at ¶ 1-3.  Hudgel rejected the offer because her 
husband also worked in the evenings and she did not want to leave her two teenaged 
children home alone.  Id.  The DHO treated the matter as a case of voluntary 
abandonment of employment and denied TTD compensation, but the SHO reversed 
that decision and awarded compensation, finding that Hudgel had a good reason for 
declining the light-duty offer and therefore did not voluntarily abandon her 
employment.  The Tenth District declined to issue a writ of mandamus, and ESV 
appealed. 
{¶ 12} In Ellis, we first explained that the case did not involve a voluntary 
abandonment of employment but rather implicated a different defense to the 
obligation to pay TTD compensation: refusal of an offer of suitable alternative 
employment.  Id. at ¶ 6, citing R.C. 4123.56(A).  We then explained: “[T]he 
relevant inquiry in this situation is why the claimant has rejected an offer to 
ameliorate the amount of wages lost.  This, in turn, can involve considerations of, 
January Term, 2021 
 
5
for example, employment suitability, the legitimacy of the job offer, or whether the 
position was offered in good faith.”  Id. at ¶ 9.  Finally, we concluded: 
 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6) defines “job offer” in this context 
as a proposal “made in good faith.”  The parties debate whether good 
faith existed, but contrary to their suggestion, the commission has 
not addressed this issue.  Whether Hudgel exercised good faith in 
refusing the job offer does not answer whether ESV exercised good 
faith in extending it, which must be addressed.  If ESV consciously 
crafted a job offer with work shifts that it knew Hudgel could not 
cover—as Hudgel alleges and ESV denies—then good faith may not 
exist.  That, however, is a factual determination for the commission. 
      
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at ¶ 13.  We returned the matter to the commission to further 
consider the claim.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 13} In this case, the commission focuses on the language in our Ellis 
decision that states that the “relevant inquiry in this situation is why the claimant 
has rejected an offer” and that the inquiry “can involve considerations of, for 
example, employment suitability, the legitimacy of the job offer, or whether the 
position was offered in good faith” (emphasis added), Ellis at ¶ 9.  Based on this, 
the commission asserts that the existence of a good-faith offer is only one of several 
factors it may consider and that it properly exercised its discretion by determining 
that Moss’s good-faith rejection of the job offer meant that she could receive TTD 
compensation. 
{¶ 14} However, nothing in R.C. 4123.56(A) or Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-
32(A)(6) permits an injured worker to receive TTD compensation after refusing a 
good-faith offer of suitable alternative employment, even if the injured worker 
exercised good faith in refusing the offer.  And we did not create an exception in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
6
Ellis for situations in which familial obligations prevent an injured worker from 
accepting a legitimate, good-faith offer of suitable alternative employment—nor 
could we have, as this court cannot create a duty enforceable in mandamus, State 
ex rel. Manor Care, Inc. v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 163 Ohio St.3d 87, 2020-Ohio-
5373, 163 N.E.3d 434, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 15} Ryan’s knowledge of Moss’s daytime obligations was relevant to the 
commission’s determination of Ryan’s good faith in making the offer.  But Moss’s 
familial obligations were not an independent reason that could justify an award of 
TTD compensation in spite of a job offer complying with R.C. 4123.56(A) and 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6). 
C. Limited Writ 
{¶ 16} That conclusion raises the question whether the matter should be 
returned to the commission for further consideration, rather than for the issuance of 
an order denying compensation, as the Tenth District directed.  The commission is 
the exclusive finder of fact in workers’ compensation matters.  State ex rel. 
Navistar, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 160 Ohio St.3d 7, 2020-Ohio-712, 153 N.E.3d 7,  
¶ 21.  And the existence of good faith is “a factual determination for the 
commission.”  Ellis, 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, at  
¶ 13. 
{¶ 17} Ryan argues that because the commission already found that it made 
the job offer in good faith, the matter is settled.  However, the orders of the 
commission’s hearing officers exhibit confusion about the correct standard under 
which Ryan’s good faith is to be determined. 
{¶ 18} Both the DHO’s and the SHO’s orders evince confusion about what 
facts can establish bad faith on the part of an employer.  The DHO focused on our 
statement in Ellis that “good faith may not exist” if the employer consciously crafts 
a job offer with work shifts that it knows the injured worker cannot cover, id. at 
¶ 13.  The DHO stated, “[T]he offer of employment * * * is not deemed to have 
January Term, 2021 
 
7
been ‘consciously crafted’ to present the Injured Worker with a position which she 
could not accept.  Accordingly, this offer is deemed to have been made in ‘good 
faith,’ * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 19} But our discussion in Ellis was driven by the specific allegation of 
bad faith in that case—it was not a limitation on what might constitute good or bad 
faith in other cases.  The conscious crafting of a position that the employer knows 
the employee cannot accept is one way—but not the only way—an employer might 
make a job offer in bad faith.  Yet the DHO appears to have believed that the 
commission could find bad faith on Ryan’s part only if Ryan consciously crafted a 
position it knew Moss could not accept.  The DHO’s finding of good faith hinged 
on the fact that Ryan had offered other injured workers a similar position before 
and therefore did not craft this position specifically for Moss, yet that fact does not 
necessarily mean that Ryan acted in good faith in Moss’s case. 
{¶ 20} The SHO vacated the DHO’s order but, like the DHO, found that 
Ryan had made the offer in good faith.  The SHO made this finding with almost no 
explanation or analysis, suggesting that she may have relied on the DHO’s 
reasoning.  The only reason the SHO gave for her finding was that the proffered 
position was the only one Ryan had available that fit Moss’s medical restrictions.  
But that fact also does not necessarily mean that Ryan acted in good faith in this 
case.  Moreover, despite her finding of “good faith,” the SHO clearly believed that 
Moss should receive TTD compensation—an incorrect result under the statute, if 
the correct standard for determining good faith had been applied. 
{¶ 21} We therefore vacate the Tenth District’s judgment and issue a 
limited writ ordering the commission to reconsider this case under the proper 
standard, as articulated in this opinion.  See State ex rel. Nicholls v. Indus. Comm., 
81 Ohio St.3d 454, 458-459, 692 N.E.2d 188 (1998) (commission’s exercise of 
continuing jurisdiction is justified by clear mistake of fact and/or clear mistake of 
law). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
8
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 22} In light of the foregoing, we vacate the Tenth District’s judgment 
and issue a limited writ ordering the commission to reconsider the claim in 
conformity with this opinion. 
Judgment vacated 
and limited writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, J. 
_________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 23} Because Bridget M. Moss declined a good-faith offer of suitable 
employment for reasons unrelated to her workplace injury, she severed the causal 
connection between her injury and her loss of wages.  For this reason, she is no 
longer entitled to temporary-total-disability (“TTD”) compensation.  I therefore 
would affirm the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ judgment granting a writ of 
mandamus in favor of Moss’s employer, appellee, Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. 
(“Ryan”), to compel appellant, Industrial Commission of Ohio, to vacate its order 
granting Moss TTD compensation and to deny compensation.  Because the majority 
vacates the court of appeals’ decision based on arguments that no one has asserted 
and that are contrary to the commission’s statements in the record, I dissent. 
{¶ 24} The principle underlying Ohio’s system of workers’ compensation 
is that “[a]ll forms of death and disability benefits provided by R.C. Chapter 4123 
are intended to compensate ‘for loss sustained on account of the injury.’ ”  State ex 
rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc., 97 Ohio St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 
N.E.2d 51, ¶ 35, quoting R.C. 4123.54(A).  Based on this principle, we have 
recognized that “a causal relationship must exist between the employee’s industrial 
injury and the loss that the requested benefit is designed to compensate.”  Id.  When 
January Term, 2021 
 
9
an injured worker’s loss of wages is caused by something other than the workplace 
injury, TTD compensation is not available. 
{¶ 25} For this reason, an injured worker is not entitled to TTD 
compensation when he or she voluntarily abandons employment by quitting, State 
ex rel. James v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 149 Ohio St.3d 700, 2017-Ohio-1426, 77 
N.E.3d 952, ¶ 18, resigning on two weeks’ notice, State ex rel. Bilaver v. Indus. 
Comm., 131 Ohio St.3d 132, 2012-Ohio-26, 961 N.E.2d 675, ¶ 5, retiring, State ex 
rel. Corman v. Allied Holdings, Inc., 132 Ohio St.3d 202, 2012-Ohio-2579, 970 
N.E.2d 929, ¶ 6-7, being incarcerated, State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm., 34 
Ohio St.3d 42, 44-45, 517 N.E.2d 533 (1987), or being terminated from 
employment for violating work rules, State ex rel. Parraz v. Diamond Crystal 
Brands, Inc., 141 Ohio St.3d 31, 2014-Ohio-4260, 21 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 15-16. 
{¶ 26} The causal connection between the workplace injury and the loss of 
wages is also severed “when work within the physical capabilities of the employee 
is made available by the employer.”  R.C. 4123.56(A).  If the injured worker 
declines a good-faith offer of suitable employment, the worker is no longer entitled 
to TTD compensation.  State ex rel. Pacheco v. Indus. Comm., 157 Ohio St.3d 126, 
2019-Ohio-2954, 132 N.E.3d 670, ¶ 27.  In those circumstances, it is the injured 
worker’s rejection of the employment offer for reasons unrelated to the workplace 
injury—not the workplace injury itself—that causes the loss of wages. 
{¶ 27} However, we have previously described voluntary abandonment and 
the rejection of a good-faith offer of suitable employment as “mutually exclusive.”  
State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-
Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, ¶ 12.  In Ellis Super Valu, we reasoned that “[a]n offer 
of alternate employment would occur only when a claimant is medically unable to 
return to the former position of employment.  In such a case, a finding of voluntary 
abandonment could not be sustained, since a claimant cannot voluntarily abandon 
a position that he or she is medically incapable of performing.”  Id.  However, this 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
10 
statement is no longer good law, as we have recently held that a claimant can 
voluntarily abandon a position even if he or she is medically incapable of 
performing it.  State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 155 Ohio 
St.3d 78, 2018-Ohio-3890, 119 N.E.3d 386, ¶ 2.  The question in these cases is 
always the same: Did the workplace injury cause the injured worker’s continued 
loss of wages?  The answer in this case is no. 
{¶ 28} Moss suffered a workplace injury as a second-shift employee 
working from 4:00 p.m. to midnight for Ram Plastics, where Ryan had placed Moss 
as a temporary employee.  She sought TTD compensation from Ryan, her self-
insuring employer.  One of Ryan’s employees, Pam Plasky, contacted Ram Plastics 
and learned that it had no positions compatible with Moss’s medical restrictions.  
Plasky then called Moss and offered her a clerical position working directly for 
Ryan between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.  According to Plasky, as a temporary 
staffing agency, Ryan is open only during business hours.  Moss declined the job 
offer because she had a “prior obligation to her daughter to take care of her 
granddaughter that was disabled while her daughter is at work.”  Ryan then denied 
Moss’s request for TTD compensation because Moss had rejected a position that 
was compatible with her medical restrictions. 
{¶ 29} Moss challenged the denial of TTD compensation before the 
commission, asserting that Ryan purposely offered her work that it knew she could 
not accept because it was on the day shift.  She therefore maintained that she was 
entitled to TTD compensation because Ryan had not made an offer of suitable 
employment in good faith.  At a hearing before the district hearing officer (“DHO”), 
Ryan presented Plasky’s testimony that it was open only during daytime business 
hours and that it had previously provided injured workers with positions at its 
offices when other suitable employment with its clients was not available.  The 
DHO credited this testimony, finding that  
 
January Term, 2021 
 
11 
[the] testimony regarding the regular course of business of the 
temporary staffing agency in such situations is found to be 
probative.  Thus, the offer of employment at the temporary staffing 
agency’s offices, albeit at a different time than the Injured Worker 
was accustomed to work, is not deemed to have been “consciously 
crafted” to present the Injured Worker with a position which she 
could not accept.  Accordingly, this offer is deemed to have been 
made in “good faith,” in accordance with the provisions of Ohio 
Adm. Code 4121-3-32(A)(6). 
 
The DHO acknowledged Moss’s statement that Ryan “was aware of her scheduling 
requirements when she first signed up for work with the temporary staffing 
agency,” but he rejected her argument that Ryan had displayed a lack of good faith 
in making the job offer, and he denied her request for TTD compensation. 
{¶ 30} On review, the staff-hearing officer (“SHO”) “specifically [found] 
that the job offer was made in good faith by the Employer as this was the only 
position that the Employer had available to accommodate the Injured Worker’s 
physical restrictions.”  But the SHO went further, explaining that because Moss had 
refused the job offer in good faith and could not return to her prior position due to 
medical restrictions, she was entitled to TTD compensation. 
{¶ 31} The Tenth District Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus 
compelling the commission to vacate its order and deny TTD compensation.  On 
appeal to this court, the commission’s sole argument is that it “does not abuse its 
discretion in awarding temporary total disability compensation to an injured worker 
where there is some evidence that the injured worker acted in good faith in 
declining a light duty job offer from the employer due to pre-existing family 
obligations at the time of the scheduled shift as provided within the light duty job 
offer.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
12 
{¶ 32} But as the majority correctly points out, “nothing in R.C. 4123.56(A) 
or Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(6) permits an injured worker to receive TTD 
compensation after refusing a good-faith offer of suitable alternative employment, 
even if the injured worker exercised good faith in refusing the offer.”  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 14.  The commission’s argument is therefore not well-taken. 
{¶ 33} But although the DHO and SHO expressly found that Ryan offered 
Moss suitable employment in good faith, the majority opinion speculates that the 
DHO and SHO were confused regarding how the absence of “good faith” may be 
established.  The majority opinion states that “the DHO appears to have believed 
that the commission could find bad faith on Ryan’s part only if Ryan consciously 
crafted a position it knew Moss could not accept.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 19.  It also 
says that “the SHO clearly believed that Moss should receive TTD compensation—
an incorrect result under the statute, if the correct standard for determining good 
faith had been applied.”  Id. at ¶ 20.  But Moss’s theory of her case was that Ryan 
had purposefully offered her the clerical position on the day shift with the intention 
that she would have to refuse it due to her childcare responsibilities.  The DHO and 
SHO each had to reject that argument to decide, as they did, that Ryan acted in good 
faith.  And whether there are some other bases for finding that Ryan exhibited a 
lack of good faith is something that has never been an issue in this case.  Rather 
than exhibiting confusion over how an employer’s good faith may be established, 
the SHO’s determination reflects the commission’s erroneous position in this case 
that the commission may award TTD compensation if the injured worker in good 
faith turns down a good-faith offer of employment.  That misunderstanding of the 
law aside, the DHO’s and SHO’s findings are unambiguous: Ryan offered Moss 
suitable employment in good faith and she rejected that offer. 
{¶ 34} No one has argued in this court that the evidence does not support 
the commission’s finding that Ryan acted in good faith.  Only the commission 
appealed the Tenth District’s decision, and it has not argued that the evidence is 
January Term, 2021 
 
13 
insufficient to support its own finding that Ryan acted in good faith.  Rather, it 
acknowledges that Ryan made the light-duty work available in good faith.  Moss 
did not appeal, and although she filed a brief in this court, she does not dispute that 
Ryan made a good-faith job offer.  She therefore abandoned the argument she made 
before the commission that Ryan had not given her a good-faith job offer because 
“[t]he job offer was purposefully offered in a day shift capacity, which she was not 
going to be able to perform.” 
{¶ 35} Whether or not Ryan acted in good faith, then, is not properly before 
this court for review.  The sole issue litigated by the parties in this court is whether 
an employee’s good-faith refusal of a good-faith offer of suitable employment 
preserves entitlement to TTD compensation.  However, R.C. 4123.56(A) provides 
that payment for TTD compensation “shall not be made” for periods “when work 
within the physical capabilities of the employee is made available by the employer.”  
Therefore, when an employer offers an injured worker suitable employment in good 
faith and the injured worker refuses it, the causal connection between the injury and 
loss of wages is broken.  And here, it was Moss’s daughter’s need for Moss to 
provide childcare during the day that precluded Moss from accepting the job offer.  
Because her workplace injury did not prevent her from accepting the light-duty 
position, her refusal to accept it for other reasons, however justifiable, does not 
maintain the causal connection between the workplace injury and the loss of wages 
that is required for her to be entitled to TTD compensation. 
{¶ 36} The majority today reaches to decide an issue that has not been 
briefed by the parties in this court.  We should not abandon this court’s “role of 
neutral arbiter of matters the parties present,” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 
237, 243, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008), by injecting new arguments into 
this case.  As Judge Richard Posner once explained, “we cannot write a party’s 
brief, pronounce ourselves convinced by it, and so rule in the party’s favor.  That’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
14 
not how an adversarial system of adjudication works.”  Xue Juan Chen v. Holder, 
737 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir.2013). 
{¶ 37} For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals and issue a writ of mandamus to compel the commission to vacate 
its order and to deny the request for TTD compensation.  The majority does not, 
based on factual issues that the commission—the sole appellant—has not raised 
and arguments that no one has asserted.  I therefore dissent. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Morrow & Meyer, L.L.C., and Mary E. Ulm, for appellee. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Douglas R. Unver, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellant. 
_________________