Title: Romero v. Hoppal

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Romero v. Hoppal1993 WY 92855 P.2d 366Case Number: 92-159Decided: 06/28/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Ernest 
D. ROMERO; State of Wyoming; and Wyoming State Highway Department, 

Petitioners,

v.

Richard 
W. HOPPAL individually and as Personal Representative of Jean M. Hoppal, 
deceased; Michelle Hoppal, Anita Hoppal, and Greg Hoppal by their next friend, 
Richard W. Hoppal, Respondents.

 

Josephine 
T. Porter, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioners.

Mitchell 
E. Osborn, Cheyenne, for respondents.

Robert 
W. Tiedeken of Wolf & Tiedeken and George Santini of Graves, Santini & 
Villemez, Cheyenne, for amicus curiae, Wyoming Trial Lawyers 
Ass'n.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

Thomas, 
J., dissented and filed opinion.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This was an 
action by respondents Hoppal against petitioners, State of Wyoming and its 
employee, to recover personal injury and wrongful death damages. The State of 
Wyoming, claiming the bar of governmental immunity, moved for summary judgment. 
Respondents Hoppal moved also for summary judgment. The trial court denied the 
State's summary judgment motion and partially granted Hoppals' summary judgment, 
holding immunity was not available to the State. We granted the State's petition 
for writ of certiorari to answer the following question:

Whether 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-120(a)(iii), in effect at the time of the accident, bars 
respondents' suit against petitioners when the collision occurred while the 
snowplow was in the process of maintaining the roadway to compensate for weather 
conditions.

We 
answer the question in the negative and affirm the district court's grant of 
partial summary judgment in favor of respondents.

[¶2]      On March 22, 
1991, respondent Richard Hoppal was driving a 1988 Dodge Caravan westbound on 
Wyoming Highway 34 in Albany County, Wyoming (also known as Sybille Canyon 
Road). Decedent Jean Hoppal and respondents Michelle Hoppal, Anita Hoppal and 
Greg Hoppal were passengers in the vehicle. Ahead of the Hoppals on this 
highway, and traveling in the same direction, petitioner Ernest Romero, acting 
within the scope and course of his employment with petitioner Wyoming State 
Highway Department, was operating a state snowplow plowing snow from the 
road.

[¶3]      As the two 
vehicles proceeded westbound, the Hoppal van began to pass the snowplow in an 
authorized passing zone. To allow additional room for Hoppal to pass, Mr. Romero 
pulled the snowplow toward the right shoulder. The snowplow's blade, still 
engaged with the road, dug into the asphalt, causing the snowplow to rotate and 
flip over onto its side into the traffic lane of the passing Hoppal van. The van 
collided with the snowplow, causing Jean Hoppal's death and respondents' 
injuries. 

[¶4]      Respondents 
Richard Hoppal, Michelle Hoppal, Anita Hoppal and Greg Hoppal filed a complaint 
seeking damages for personal injury and wrongful death against petitioners 
Ernest Romero, the State of Wyoming and the Wyoming State Highway Department. 
The complaint alleged that on March 22, 1991, Mr. Romero negligently caused 
respondents' injuries and Mrs. Hoppal's death.

[¶5]      The State moved 
for summary judgment claiming sovereign immunity. Respondents moved for partial 
summary judgment claiming the State had waived its immunity for state employees' 
negligent operation of motor vehicles, including snowplows. In granting the 
respondents' motion for partial summary judgment, the district court held that 
the State waived its immunity from suit for a state employee's negligent 
operation of a snowplow while plowing snow from state highways. The State, 
pursuant to Rule 13 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, petitioned for, 
and this Court granted, a writ of certiorari to review the district court's 
grant of respondents' partial summary judgment.

[¶6]      Summary judgment 
is proper when there is no disputed question of material fact and summary 
judgment should be entered as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c). The material 
facts for purposes of the motion are undisputed. The State's employee was 
operating a motor vehicle (snowplow) in the course of his employment at the time 
of the accident. The question of law presented is: "Was he maintaining the 
highway at the time within the meaning of our statute?"

We 
review summary judgments in the same light as the district court, using the same 
materials and following the same standards. Summary judgment is proper only when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Elmore 
v. Van Horn, 844 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Zmijewski v. Wright, 809 P.2d 280, 282 (Wyo. 1991)).

[¶7]      At the time of 
this accident, W.S. 1-39-105, concerning governmental immunity, 
provided:

A 
governmental entity is liable for damages 
resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the 
negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties 
in the operation of any motor vehicle, aircraft or watercraft. [emphasis 
added]

Wyoming 
Statute 1-39-120(a)(iii) provided:

(a) 
The liability imposed by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 does not include 
liability for damages caused by:

* 
* * * * *

(iii) 
The maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of 
any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking 
area.

[¶8]      In holding that 
W.S. 1-39-120(a)(iii) did not bar respondents' suit against the State, the 
district court stated:

     I believe that the 
words "motor vehicles," as used in 1-39-105, and "the maintenance, including 
maintenance to compensate for weather conditions of any * * * highway[,] roadway 
* * *," as used in 1-39-120, are mutually exclusive and that the waiver of 
immunity, attached to "motor vehicles" in "105," is not affected by the 
assertion of immunity in "120" in its reference to 
maintenance.

* 
* * Clearly, the word maintenance [in W.S. 1-39-120(a)(iii) is] a noun and not a 
verb [and] means that the maintenance is not the act of maintaining, but rather 
the result of any said act.

[¶9]      In light of 
recent legislative enactments, we find the district court's reasoning 
persuasive. In 1991, the legislature amended W.S. 1-39-120(a), removing the 
reference to W.S. 1-39-105. As amended, W.S. 1-39-120(a)(iii) 
reads:

(a) 
The liability imposed by W.S. 1-39-106 through 1-39-112 does not include 
liability for damages caused by:

* 
* * * * *

(iii) 
The maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of 
any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area. 
[emphasis added]

The 
statement of purpose in the enacting clause explains the amendment to W.S. 
1-39-120(a):

AN 
ACT to amend W.S. 1-39-120(a) introductory paragraph relating to the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act; providing that the liability of governmental 
entities for damages resulting from negligent operation of vehicles includes 
vehicles engaged in specified construction and maintenance activities; and 
providing for an effective date.

1991 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 34 § 1 (emphasis added).

[¶10]   The State concedes that the 
legislature's amendment of W.S. 1-39-120(a) does abrogate immunity after the 
effective date of the amendment. It is also clear that before adoption of 
amended W.S. 1-39-120(a) immunity was waived for negligent operation of motor 
vehicles. The State contends, therefore, that beginning in 1986 with the 
adoption of amended W.S. 1-39-120(a) and ending July 1, 1991, when it was 
further amended to exclude W.S. 1-39-105, the State had immunity for the 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle while plowing snow.

[¶11]   The State argues that the district 
court's interpretation of these statutes is inconsistent in that it allows 
immunity for failure to maintain a roadway to compensate for weather conditions, 
but no immunity for the actual maintenance itself. We fail to perceive the 
inconsistency. Hoppals respond that the State's position would allow it to 
successfully assert immunity even if a highway maintenance employee or a 
snowplow operator negligently turned his vehicle into oncoming traffic or if a 
highway design engineer should rear-end another vehicle on his way to a bridge 
job. We think respondent's argument is well taken.

[¶12]   The State next points to an 
affidavit given by the sponsor of the legislation which deleted the reference in 
W.S. 1-39-120 to section 1-39-105 claiming that because the sponsor felt it 
necessary to amend W.S. 1-39-120, that immunity therefore must have existed 
before the amendment. Rather than supporting the State's interpretation, the 
amendment which deleted the reference to W.S. 1-39-105 demonstrates that the 
legislature was concerned that the then existing language in the statute might 
lead to a result not intended. The sponsor evidently feared that liability for 
operation of motor vehicles, which the legislature had established by statute, 
might be abrogated by judicial interpretation. Therefore, the legislature made 
clear that there is no bar to liability for operation of a motor vehicle, even 
if the motor vehicle is engaged in plowing snow on a roadway. We have held that 
"`where, in the enactment of a law, the legislature employs in a subsequent 
clause of the same act or in later legislation on the same subject language 
clarifying a doubtful expression theretofore used, the court should give that 
language the meaning the legislature intended.'" State Bd. of Equalization v. 
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 54 Wyo. 521, 94 P.2d 147, 153 (1939) (quoting Moore 
v. Pleasant Hasler Const. Co., 51 Ariz. 40, 76 P.2d 225 (1937)). See also 
Osborne v. Consolidated Judicial Retirement Sys., 333 N.C. 246, 424 S.E.2d 115, 
117 (1993); State v. Nuckolls, 606 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Fla.App. 1992) (subsequent 
legislation adopted to clarify the legislature's intention is properly 
considered in construing a prior statute); Daley v. Zebra Zone Lounge, Inc., 236 
Ill. App.3d 511, 177 Ill.Dec. 715, 717, 603 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1992) (subsequent 
amendment may reveal intent, especially when amendment enacted soon after 
"controversy developed over the original version").

[¶13]   The State also cites two prior 
cases from our court, Oroz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1978) 
and Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772 (Wyo. 1991). The State contends that in Oroz, 
the court addressed the issue of whether the county was immune from suit for the 
negligent maintenance of a county highway. Based on Oroz, the State argues: 
"Certainly, if the court considers the growth of trees along the side of a 
roadway to be `maintenance,' the operation of a snowplow, while clearing slush 
off the highway is within the reach of the immunity granted for maintenance of a 
roadway to compensate for weather conditions." We have examined Chief Justice 
Guthrie's opinion in Oroz and nowhere does the court construe the term 
"maintenance." Oroz, 575 P.2d  at 1156-59. In Oroz this court, in abolishing 
governmental immunity as applied to counties, did not interpret the term 
"maintenance."

[¶14]   Soles v. State, involved a suit 
against the State to recover damages when a person was injured on a stairway 
that the State, allegedly, negligently inspected. Soles, 809 P.2d  at 772-73. The 
district court found that the State was immune from suit and granted summary 
judgment in favor of the State, and this court affirmed. Soles, 809 P.2d  at 772. 
The plaintiffs in Soles sought to overcome the State's immunity by utilizing 
W.S. 1-39-106, which imposes liability on governmental entities for damages 
caused by "the negligence of public employees" in the "operation or maintenance 
of any building, recreation area or public park." W.S. 1-39-106. This court 
found that immunity was not waived by section 1-39-106 because the inspections 
conducted by the State were simply "not `maintenance' as contemplated by that 
statute." Soles, 809 P.2d  at 773-74.

[¶15]   The State argues that the 
definition from Soles, shows that maintenance means the act of maintaining or 
keeping something in a state of repair and therefore includes the negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle in the act of plowing snow. The State misperceives 
the application of Soles. In Soles we were construing a different section of the 
statute, W.S. 1-39-106. We only examined what the legislature intended by use of 
the word "maintenance" as applied to the "inspection" that was done by the 
county. We have difficulty applying the interpretation of the word "inspection" 
to an analogy involving the negligent operation of a snowplow. Therefore, our 
decision in Soles does not control the outcome of this 
case.

[¶16]   The legislature's subsequent 
amendment of W.S. 1-39-120(a)(iii) demonstrates it always intended the State not 
have immunity for accidents resulting from the negligent operation of motor 
vehicles, including snowplows. This later enactment confirms that the district 
court's interpretation of W.S. 1-39-120(a)(iii) accurately reflects the 
legislature's intent. We therefore hold that W.S. 1-39-120(a)(iii), in effect at 
the time of the accident, does not bar respondents' suit against petitioners. 
The district court's order granting partial summary judgment is, 
therefore,

[¶17]   Affirmed.

THOMAS, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion.

THOMAS, 
Justice, dissenting.

[¶18]   I cannot agree with the result of 
the majority opinion, which affirms the grant of a partial summary judgment 
entered by the trial court in favor of the respondents. According to the 
majority, the waiver of immunity for negligence in the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act set forth in WYO. STAT. § 1-39-105 controlled over the provisions of 
WYO.STAT § 1-39-120, which maintains governmental immunity for "the maintenance, 
including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of any bridge, 
culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area." The effect 
of the majority opinion is that the substantive impact of the Governmental 
Claims Act before the amendment of § 1-39-120 was identical to its substantive 
impact after the amendment. I cannot agree that the legislature did not intend a 
change in the law in 1991, and I dissent. I would not grant the motion for 
summary judgment sought by the State, however, because I perceive a factual 
issue as to whether § 1-39-105 or § 1-39-120 should control immunity in this 
instance.

[¶19]   At the time of the occurrence that 
led to this case, WYO. STAT. § 1-39-120 (1988) read:

Exclusions 
from waiver of immunity.

(a) 
The liability imposed by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 does not include 
liability for damages caused by:

(i) 
A defect in the plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, 
alley, sidewalk or parking area;

(ii) 
The failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, 
street, alley, sidewalk or parking area; or

(iii) 
The maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of 
any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking 
area.

In 
1991, WYO. STAT. § 1-39-120 (Supp. 1992) was amended to 
read:

Exclusions 
from waiver of immunity.

(a) 
The liability imposed by W.S. 1-39-106 through 1-39-112 does not include 
liability for damages caused by:

(i) 
A defect in the plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, 
alley, sidewalk or parking area;

(ii) 
The failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, 
street, alley, sidewalk or parking area; or

(iii) 
The maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of 
any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking 
area.

Obviously 
the only change was to delete the reference to "W.S. § 1-39-105" in this 
statutory provision. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-105 (1988), at the time of this 
occurrence and now, reads:

Liability; 
operation of motor vehicles, aircraft and watercraft.

A 
governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful 
death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while 
acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of any motor vehicle, 
aircraft or watercraft.

Neither 
of these statutory provisions is ambiguous, and there is certainly nothing 
ambiguous about the number 5, which later was changed to the number 6 by 
amendment. The majority opinion seems to treat the reference in WYO. STAT. § 
1-39-120 (1988), to "W.S. § 1-39-105 [(1988)]" as nothing more than a 
typographical error.

[¶20]   In Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Wyo. 1993), in connection 
with a comprehensive review of rules of statutory construction, we 
said:

For 
example, "It is generally held that statutes authorizing suit against the state 
are to be strictly construed, since they are in derogation of the state's 
sovereignty." Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 63 Wyo. 13, 24-25, 177 P.2d 397, 399 (1947); accord Retail Clerks Local 187 v. Univ. of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884, 886 (Wyo. 1975). Thus, we require in this particular area of the law that 
evidence of legislative intent be both unequivocal and textual. Retail Clerks 
Local 187, 531 P.2d  at 886 ("We find no words of clear or direct consent to suit 
against the state contained in these statutes, and consent must be clearly 
shown"). (Footnote omitted.)

We 
also have frequently repeated the rule that every word, clause, and sentence 
must be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous when read in 
pari materia. E.g., Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993 (Wyo. 1993); Parker Land and 
Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1993); Wyo. Ins. 
Guar. v. Allstate Indem., 844 P.2d 464 (Wyo. 1992); Johnson v. State Hearing 
Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992); Matter of ALJ, 836 P.2d 307 (Wyo. 
1992); Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552 (Wyo. 1992); State By and Through 
Dep't of Family Services v. Jennings, 818 P.2d 1149 (Wyo. 1991); Matter of 
Paternity of JRW, 814 P.2d 1256 (Wyo. 1991); City of Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991). By contrast, the majority opinion offers a liberal construction 
of the Wyoming Tort Claims Act, and does not give effect to the unambiguous 
provisions of § 1-39-120.

[¶21]   This case is a peculiarly 
appropriate one in which to apply the doctrine articulated in Wetering v. 
Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Wyo. 1984):

We 
further must assume that the legislature did not intend futile acts and that its 
amendment of the statute indicated some change in the existing law was intended. 
DeHerrera v. Herrera, supra [565 P.2d 479 (Wyo. 1977)]; Jordan v. Delta Drilling 
Company, supra [541 P.2d 39, 78 A.L.R.3d 1215 (Wyo. 1975)]; and In re Kosmicki, 
Wyo. 468 P.2d 818 (1970).

 

See 
also, Barcon, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 845 P.2d 373, 380 (Wyo. 
1992).

There 
seems little question that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act was available to the 
Wyoming legislature when the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act was adopted, and at 
least one scholar has suggested that it served as a model for the Wyoming 
statute. Lawrence J. Wolfe, Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign 
Immunity With Exceptions - A Statutory Analysis, 15 Land and Water L.Rev. 619, 
623 (1980). Yet, the New Mexico Tort Claims Act never has provided immunity for 
maintenance of highways. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-11 (Michie 1989). Obviously, 
this fact was known to the Wyoming legislature and, in 1986, when WYO. STAT. § 
1-39-120 (1988) was adopted, a studied choice was made to extend immunity to 
maintenance activities despite the waiver in Wyo.Stat § 1-39-105 (1988). In 
1991, that choice was revisited and a change was made.

[¶22]   In the Brief of 
Plaintiffs/Respondents the following argument appears:

If 
a Wyoming snowplow driver is immune from liability, regardless of the 
circumstances, just because he is involved in "maintenance", § 1-39-105 and § 
1-39-120 are in conflict. Therefore, to reconcile the language of these 
statutes, § 1-39-120 must be read and applied only to exclude liability when 
damages are "caused by the maintenance".

Brief 
of Plaintiffs/Respondents at 7.

[¶23]   It is in following this analysis 
that I am persuaded the plaintiffs are entitled to a trial in this case. The 
apparent conflict between the two statutes, both of which are to be given effect 
if reconciliation is possible, is resolved by recognition that the facts must 
determine which statute applies. If the accident was caused by Romero while 
acting negligently in the operation of the snow plow as a motor vehicle, there 
is no immunity. If the accident was caused by Romero while acting negligently in 
"[t]he maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, 
of any * * * highway, * * *," then immunity pertains. The jury must decide what 
Romero was doing at the time of the accident. This resolution affords 
recognition, and application, of the foregoing principles of statutory 
interpretation.

[¶24]   I would reverse the decision of the 
district court granting a partial summary judgment on the question of sovereign 
immunity. The presence or absence of immunity should be resolved by the finder 
of fact based upon proper instructions.