Title: Stagner v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Stagner v. State1992 WY 153842 P.2d 520Case Number: 89-242Decided: 11/25/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Cheryl 
Marie STAGNER, Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
The STATE 
of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender 
Aid Program, Terrance R. Martin, Student Intern, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Karen A. Byrne, 
Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Cheryl Marie Stagner 
(Stagner) was convicted of receiving or concealing a stolen Lincoln Continental 
Mark IV in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-403(a)(i) (1988).1 She testified that another 
defendant told her he had purchased the car. She asked the trial judge to give a 
"Mistake of Fact" instruction to the jury as part of her theory of defense. The 
trial judge refused. We reverse.

 
 

[¶2.]     Because we reverse the 
conviction based upon the issue of the refused "Mistake of Fact" defense 
instruction, we do not address the additional issues advanced by 
Stagner.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3.]     The prosecutor 
presented several witnesses to prove Stagner was guilty of receiving or 
concealing stolen property. First, a high school teacher testified he had a 1973 
Lincoln Continental Mark IV stolen from his locked garage in Huntley, Montana. A Wyoming rancher from FremontCounty testified that he had called the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in the early hours of January 10, 1989 to report 
two vehicles heading onto his absent neighbor's ranch.

 
 

[¶4.]     The two BIA agents 
testified that they responded to the rancher's call. They discovered an area 
that was cluttered with junk vehicles when they arrived at the neighboring 
property. There they spotted a pickup in pretty good shape that had new 
Wyoming 
license plates. One agent approached the pickup on foot and had to peer inside 
before seeing two people lying down on the seat. He identified Stagner as one of 
those people. The other agent identified Hal Alcorn (Alcorn) as the other 
person. One agent testified that a tribal game warden, who had showed up to 
assist them, spotted a Lincoln Continental Mark IV. The engine was still warm 
but had no license plates. When they checked the vehicle identification numbers, 
they discovered that the car had been stolen. When they searched Stagner 
pursuant to her arrest, they discovered the keys to the Lincoln in her coat 
pocket. They also found three handguns in the pickup which Stagner indicated 
were hers.

 
 

[¶5.]     Another prosecution 
witness, Les Kilwein (Kilwein), testified that he brought the Lincoln to FremontCounty and showed it to Alcorn and 
Stagner. Although his testimony incriminated himself as well as Stagner, he 
waived his privilege against self-incrimination apparently on the advice of his 
defense counsel.

 
 

[¶6.]     Kilwein testified the 
stolen car originally had no license plates when he took possession of it in 
Montana and that he attached a Wyoming license plate to 
the back. When he got to Morton, Wyoming, he stopped at the Stage Stop Bar. He 
testified he met Stagner at that bar and told her the Lincoln was stolen. He 
said she responded by saying they had to get the car off the bar property. 
Kilwein testified that Stagner drove the car, with him as a passenger, to a 
field with a trailer house and parked behind the trailer.

 
 

[¶7.]     Alcorn testified he 
followed in the pickup as Stagner led him to the ranch around four in the 
morning. He also testified that when they saw the lights of the BIA agents, 
Stagner and he tried to figure out a plan of escape and that Stagner was 
armed.

 
 

[¶8.]     In attempting to refute 
this evidence, Stagner testified to quite a different story. Her testimony, 
relevant to her requested but refused jury instruction, included the claim that 
Kilwein told her he bought the car in Billings, Montana and had traded a Camaro plus $150 
dollars for the car. She further testified that he insisted she take the 
Lincoln for a 
drive. She said that when she asked how he could afford the car, he again said 
he had traded a Camaro plus $150 for it. She also testified that she told the 
BIA officers that she did not know the car was stolen.

 
 

[¶9.]     When it came time for 
the trial judge to give the jury its instructions, the defense attorney asked 
for a "Mistake of Fact" jury instruction, but the trial judge 
refused.

 
 

[¶10.]  The instruction 
stated:

 
 
     An act committed or an 
omission made under a mistake of fact which nullifies the requisite intent as an 
element of the crime charged is a defense to that crime.

 
 
     Thus a person is not 
guilty of a crime if he commits an act or omits to act under an honest and 
reasonable belief in the existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if 
true, should make such act or omission lawful.

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶11.]  The standard of review for a requested 
but refused jury instruction is established by Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544, 547 
(Wyo. 1990) and Thom v. State, 792 P.2d 192, 
195 (Wyo. 
1990). "The refusal to allow an instruction requested by the defendant when due 
process requires the defendant's instruction be given is reversible error per 
se." Oien, 797 P.2d  at 549.

 
 

[¶12.]  In Thom, 792 P.2d  at 195, we said "a 
defendant has the right to have instructions on his theory of the case or his 
theory of defense presented to the jury if the instructions sufficiently inform 
the jury of the theory or defense and if competent evidence exists which 
supports the law expressed in the instructions." In Oien, 797 P.2d  at 549, we 
said we view the evidence in a light favorable to the accused and that "the 
accused's testimony must be taken as entirely true" to determine if the evidence 
is competent. See Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 1985); Patterson v. State, 682 P.2d 1049 (Wyo. 1984); and Reid v. United States, 
581 A.2d 359 (D.C.App. 1990).

 
 

[¶13.]  The standard of criminal law that the 
accused has a right to have a theory of the defense instruction, if fairly 
supported by the evidence, see 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure 
§ 538 (12th ed. 1976), has a strong and continued history in Wyoming precedent. 
"[T]he defendant had a right to have his main defense in the case affirmatively 
presented to the jury." State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 41, 69, 178 P.2d 119, 131 (1947). See Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1977); Thomas v. State, 562 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1977); and Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1970). See also Best 
v. State, 736 P.2d 739 (Wyo. 1987); Naugher v. 
State, 685 P.2d 37 (Wyo. 1984); Patterson, 682 P.2d 1049; Scheikofsky v. State, 636 P.2d 1107 (Wyo. 1981); and Benson v. State, 571 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 
1977).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶14.]  Whether or not the evidence is competent 
to support the request for the "Mistake of Fact" jury instruction is critical to 
our decision. Stagner twice testified that Kilwein told her he bought the car in 
Billings, Montana and had traded a Camaro plus $150 for 
it. Under Oien and Thom, such testimony must be taken as entirely true for 
purposes of testing the competency of evidence needed to support a theory of 
defense jury instruction. Taking her testimony for the purposes of this review, 
the evidence is competent to support a "Mistake of Fact" 
instruction.

 
 

[¶15.]  Stagner's testimonial evidence was 
sufficient to refute Kilwein's assertion and support the giving of the 
instruction. It is for no one but the jury to decide who is credible. "The 
question is whether the defensive evidence raised the issue of mistake of fact, 
because if it did appellant was entitled to an affirmative submission on the 
issue." Lynch v. State, 643 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983). See People v. 
Ellison, 126 Ill. App.3d 985, 81 Ill.Dec. 222, 466 N.E.2d 1024, 1032 (1984) and Willis v. State, 790 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.Cr.App. 1990). The 
refusal to give the instruction under this circumstance violated federal and 
Wyoming due 
process. Best, 736 P.2d 739; Blakely, 474 P.2d 127; Stevenson v. 
United States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S. Ct. 839, 40 L. Ed. 980 
(1896).

 
 

[¶16.]  The theory of the case instruction, where 
appropriate evidence exists, is a basic tenet of criminal law and a procedural 
concomitant of due process. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6. The commonly accepted 
enunciation is "[a] requested instruction on a party's theory of prosecution or 
theory of defense must be given if such theory is fairly supported by the 
evidence." 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure, supra, § 538 at 
11. Initially phrased in Stevenson, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S. Ct. 839, 40 L. Ed. 980 
and restated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S. Ct. 883, 99 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1988):

 
 
     As a general 
proposition a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized 
defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find 
in his favor. Stevenson v. United 
States, 162 U.S. 313[, 16 S. Ct. 839, 40 L. Ed. 980] (1896); 4 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 538, p. 11 (12th ed. 
1976) * * *. A parallel rule has been applied in the context of a lesser 
included offense instruction * * *.

 
 

[¶17.]  The Wyoming Supreme Court has generally 
recognized the due process component of this principle which essentially 
addresses both the accused's right to defend and the jury's right to weigh and 
assess evidentiary validity and sufficiency. Blakely, 474 P.2d 127. Goodman, 573 P.2d  at 409 (quoting 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1313) (emphasis added) teaches us 
that

 
 
"the weight 
and sufficiency of the evidence to establish a fact in issue are a question for 
the jury, it is generally recognized that 
any evidence which will authorize the jury to find on it, although in the 
opinion of the court it may be weak, inconclusive, or unworthy of belief, is 
sufficient to justify an instruction on the issue raised by such evidence, and 
even positive testimony is not required, for it is sufficient if the fact in 
issue reasonably may be inferred from circumstances proved. However, in 
order to warrant giving an instruction, the evidence should be sufficient fairly 
to raise the question involved therein."

 
 

[¶18.]  The review required by the trial court, 
Reid, 581 A.2d  at 368, directs attention only to the existence of an evidentiary 
basis for the jury's consideration and not a criteria of some convincing 
character of the evidence as analyzed by the trial court or the appellate 
jurist.2 Oien, 797 P.2d 544; Best, 736 P.2d 739; Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 571 A.2d 1251 (1990); State v. 
Aubert, 120 N.H. 634, 421 A.2d 124 (1980); Willis, 790 S.W.2d 307; Lynch, 643 S.W.2d 737.

 
 

[¶19.]  Because Stagner was entitled to the 
theory of defense instruction she requested, under Oien and Thom, we 
reverse.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Wyo. Stat. § 
6-3-403(a)(i) provides:

 
 
(a) A person who buys, 
receives, conceals or disposes of property which he knows, believes or has 
reasonable cause to believe was obtained in violation of law is guilty 
of:

 
 
     (i) A felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more 
than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is 
five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more[.]

 
 

2 What the appellate 
jurist expects the trial court to do is not the appropriate test to justify 
denial to that jury of a decisional responsibility. The knowledgeable 
FremontCounty jury in Lander, Wyoming can more responsively weigh believability from the 
live witnesses' testimony and demeanor than can the appellate court from a cold 
record in Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

MACY, Chief 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶20.]  An accused has a right to have a 
theory-of-defense instruction given to the jury if the instruction is supported 
by competent evidence. Pearson v. State, 811 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1991); McInturff v. State, 808 P.2d 190, 195 
(Wyo. 1991). 
The test is not whether there was any evidence but whether the evidence was 
competent.

 
 

[¶21.]  It is inconceivable that a jury would 
find that Stagner did not know the vehicle was stolen in light of all the 
evidence to the contrary. This is especially true since the jury was instructed 
that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Stagner "knew, believed or had 
reasonable cause to believe [the Lincoln automobile] was obtained in violation 
of the law."

 
 

[¶22.]  Stagner's constitutional right to a fair 
trial was satisfied.

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting, with whom MACY, Chief 
Justice, joins.

 
 

[¶23.]  I must dissent from the decision in this 
case. It is contrary to our well-established and long-standing jurisprudence 
concerning theory of the case instructions. In our work, as well as in other 
fields of endeavor, it is important for the left hand to be aware of what the 
right hand is doing. I am satisfied that this decision is inconsistent with the 
most recent cases of the court in this area, Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125 
(Wyo. 1992), and Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486 (Wyo. 
1992). Without attempting to be exhaustive, this decision also conflicts with a 
series of decisions in just the past five years. Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379 
(Wyo. 1992); Pearson v. State, 811 P.2d 704 (Wyo. 1991); Amin v. State, 811 P.2d 255 (Wyo. 1991); Thom v. State, 792 P.2d 192 (Wyo. 1990); Murray v. State, 776 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 1989); Smith v. State, 773 P.2d 139 (Wyo. 1989); Prime v. State, 
767 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1989); Simonds v. State, 762 P.2d 1189 (Wyo. 1988); Phillips 
v. State, 760 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1988); Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1988); 
Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246 (Wyo. 1988); and Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739 
(Wyo. 1987). The justification for this departure, if there is any, is 
essentially mystical. Suffice it to say that the view of the dissenting justice 
in Virgilio and Bouwkamp now has become the view of the majority in this 
case.

 
 

 [¶24.] Cheryl Marie Stagner (Stagner) went to trial on 
her plea of not guilty to the crime of receiving stolen property in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-403(a) (1988). That statute makes it an offense for any person 
to receive property "which he knows, believes or has reasonable cause to believe 
was obtained in violation of law * * * [emphasis added]." The mistake of fact 
upon which the majority asserts that Stagner was entitled to a theory of defense 
instruction is premised upon her testimony that she did not know the property 
was stolen, i.e., she did not know it had been obtained in violation of law. In 
Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d  at 490-491, this court said:

 
 
     Theory of defense 
instructions are to be derived from and address criminal defenses provided for 
by statute or acknowledged by this court. "Common-law defenses are retained 
unless otherwise provided by this act." Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-102(b) (June 1988). 
Additionally, this court has discussed acceptable defenses, notably in Keser v. 
State, 706 P.2d 263, 269 (Wyo. 1985). See also 1 Paul H. Robinson, 
Criminal Law Defenses § 21, 70 n. 1 (1984); 1 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's 
Criminal Law § 39 (14th ed. 1978). Bouwkamp's "theory of defense" does not state 
a defense recognized in Wyoming by statute or judicial 
decision.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     Bouwkamp did not rely 
on a defense recognized by Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-102 or this court that would merit a 
theory of the case instruction. Instead, 
his true defense was the simplest and most direct of all: he denied guilt of the 
crime charged. He argued he was not guilty of killing Millox, although he was 
willing to admit that he helped cover up the murder. In other words, he defended 
by claiming to be innocent of the crime charged. On this argument he received 
adequate instructions (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶25.]  In Virgilio, this court held that 
instructions are sufficient if they permit an appropriate argument to the jury. 
I am satisfied that the circumstances in this case, as I will explain more 
fully, fit well within Bouwkamp and Virgilio, and that no error occurred in the 
failure to give the claimed theory of defense instructions. If proof of the 
offense charged depends upon proof of knowledge, belief, or reasonable cause to 
believe, as this offense does, then any instruction upon mistake with respect to 
that knowledge or belief is superfluous.

 
 

[¶26.]  The material facts in this case are not 
difficult, although there are some nuances not mentioned in the majority 
opinion. On November 12 or 13, 1988, a 1973 Lincoln Continental Mark IV was 
stolen from a garage in Huntley, Montana. In the early morning hours of January 
10, 1989, the same automobile was located on some rural property owned by an 
acquaintance of Stagner. Stagner was there with a friend named Hal Alcorn. She 
and Alcorn were discovered while attempting to hide by lying down in the front 
seat of Alcorn's pickup. Stagner was searched, and keys to the Lincoln were discovered in 
her pocket.

 
 

[¶27.]  If there is any complexity in the facts 
found in the record, that is attributable to different versions given by the 
participants. Each of the witnesses told a different story at trial and, in some 
instances, behavior was reported sufficiently bizarre as to be perceived 
incredible. The chief testimony in the State's case was the incrimination of 
Stagner by a witness who had stolen the car and who testified that Stagner knew 
the car was stolen because he told her it was stolen. Stagner's defense was that 
she did not know the car was stolen.

 
 

[¶28.]  Stagner asserted that she was entitled to 
an instruction on the defense of mistake of fact. The proffered instruction 
stated:

 
 
     An act committed or an 
omission made under a mistake of fact which nullifies the requisite intent as an 
element of the crime charged is a defense to that crime.

 
 
     Thus a person is not 
guilty of a crime if he commits an act or omits to act under an honest and 
reasonable belief in the existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if 
true, should make such act or omission lawful.

 
 

[¶29.]  As the evidentiary predicate for the 
claim to entitlement to a theory of defense instruction, Stagner's story was 
that, while she really wanted to retire for the evening, Alcorn had insisted 
that she drive him to her acquaintance's property in the stolen Lincoln because 
his truck was low on gas. His purpose in going there was to retrieve a panel 
truck from the acquaintance's property, which Alcorn believed Stagner's 
acquaintance had stolen from a friend of Alcorn's who lived in Rawlins. Alcorn 
drove his pickup and Stagner drove the Lincoln to the acquaintance's property. The 
first thing they did, after reaching their destination, was to siphon gasoline 
out of the Lincoln to use in Alcorn's 
pickup.

 
 

[¶30.]  When the officers arrived at the scene, 
Stagner told them that she didn't know anything about the Lincoln nor how it came to 
be at that place. She also testified that a man named Les Kilwein, who had 
"possession" of the car just prior to her "possession" of it, told her he had 
purchased it, and she did not know it was stolen. Kilwein's contrary testimony 
was that he told Stagner the car was stolen, and Stagner then took it from him 
after agreeing to find a place where it could be safely 
stored.

 
 

[¶31.]  The State's theory and its evidence were 
not complex. Stagner was discovered after she drove the stolen Lincoln to a remote 
location in the middle of the night. The car was taken to that place because it 
was not likely to be discovered there; Stagner knew the owner of the property 
was out of town and wouldn't know the car was there; a number of different kinds 
of vehicles were located at the property, and the Lincoln probably would not 
have been noticed; and, if it were found, the probability was that the owner of 
the property would be the person suspected of taking it. There is a wealth of 
information, concededly in some instances circumstantial, supporting the State's 
theory. From the evidence, the jury could have found that Stagner did know, 
believe, or have reasonable cause to believe, that the Lincoln was 
stolen.

 
 

[¶32.]  Stagner had borrowed a car from a friend 
in November to drive to Billings, Montana. The Lincoln was stolen from a smaller community only a few 
miles from Billings. A license plate from the car Stagner 
drove to Billings was found on the Lincoln, and the borrowed 
car was not returned by Stagner until later in the spring at which time it had a 
missing license plate. The car Stagner had borrowed was left in Billings for most of that 
period of five months. I emphasize that, when the officers interrogated Stagner 
at the site where the automobile was located, she told them she did not know 
anything about the Lincoln or how it came to be there. Based on 
her statement, it is difficult to understand, and she did not explain, why she 
had keys to the car in her pocket.

 
 

[¶33.]  Our general rule is that a defendant has 
a right to an affirmative instruction on his theory of the case when there is 
competent and substantial evidence to sustain that theory, and the offered 
instruction is sufficient to apprise the trial court of the theory. Under those 
circumstances, the failure to affirmatively instruct the jury with respect to 
the defendant's theory of the case violates due process and is prejudicial 
error. Naugher v. State, 685 P.2d 37 (Wyo. 1984). The Naugher rule, however, is 
tempered by our corollary rule that such an instruction should not be based on 
evidence which, at best, raises a possibility, or leads to some conjecture, that 
is inconsistent with the objective facts. When reviewing the evidence to 
determine whether an instruction should be given, we review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the defendant insofar as that is justified, and we do 
accept the testimony of the defendant as true. Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021 
(Wyo. 1985); Patterson v. State, 682 P.2d 1049 
(Wyo. 
1984).

 
 

[¶34.]  To the extent that reliance is placed 
upon State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 41, 178 P.2d 119 (1947), that case must 
be distinguished. Obviously, it was a case involving a specific intent. I have 
no difficulty in understanding that a mistake of fact that would inhibit the 
presence of a specific intent is an appropriate theory of the case as to which 
an instruction should be given. The argument based upon Hickenbottom is 
antithetical to our holding in Capshaw v. State, 737 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1987), that specific 
intent is not an element of the crime of receiving stolen property. In order to 
develop her theory of the case contention, however, Stagner's claim is that 
Capshaw must be distinguished and, in any event, does not justify denial of the 
proffered instruction. The trial court correctly relied upon Capshaw in refusing 
to give Stagner's proffered instruction.

 
 

[¶35.]  Furthermore, if a concession were made 
that Stagner was entitled to a mistake of fact instruction, in the context of 
the facts of this case, the proffered instruction was so general and unfocused 
as to render it inefficacious in conveying anything of real significance to the 
jury. Hatheway v. State, 623 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1981). While it appears the proffered 
instruction is a pattern jury instruction, that fact does not relieve Stagner of 
the obligation to offer a properly worded instruction. A theory of the case 
instruction must relate to the case that has been presented to the jury, not to 
some generic circumstances or crime.

 
 

[¶36.]  It may be true that, in our prior 
decisions, we have too casually repeated that a criminal defendant is entitled 
to a "theory of the case instruction." What we should have said is that a 
defendant is entitled to an instruction on the law that encompasses the theory 
of the case. When Stagner's "theory" is analyzed, the conclusion must be reached 
that "mistake of fact" had nothing to do with her defense. Her case was premised 
on her claim that she did not know the car was stolen. This was an element of 
the offense that the State had to prove beyond any reasonable doubt. In the 
light of other evidence presented, that was simply a matter for the jury to 
resolve in the context of credibility.

 
 

[¶37.]  Mistake of fact is concerned with 
something entirely different from what Stagner contended. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE 
& AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1(b) (1986); Model 
Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.04 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). 
In Stagner's case, virtually all of the circumstances proclaimed that the car 
was stolen, and the person who had possession of that stolen car testified that 
he told Stagner the car was stolen. Her contrary testimony in her defense was 
that Kilwein told her the car was his. This is not a "mistake of fact" 
situation. It simply presents the opportunity for the jury to resolve the 
credibility of the witnesses in favor of a finding of guilt or innocence (in 
this case guilt).

 
 

[¶38.]  In my opinion, the jury was given all the 
instructions required or needed to resolve this case. Instruction No. 1 stated, 
in pertinent part:

 
 
     On the other hand, it 
is the exclusive province of the jury to weigh and consider all evidence which 
is presented to it; to determine the credibility and reliability of all 
witnesses who testify before you; and from such witnesses and the evidence, to 
determine in this case whether the defendant is guilty as charged or that the 
evidence does not establish such guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     The jury is the sole 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their 
testimony. You should take into consideration their demeanor upon the witness 
stand, their apparent intelligence or lack of intelligence, their means of 
knowledge of the facts testified to, the interest, if any, which a witness may 
have in the outcome of this trial, the prejudice or motives, or feelings of 
revenge, if any has been shown by the evidence.

 
 
     You may take into 
consideration all of the facts and circumstances in the case, and give each such 
weight you think the same are entitled to, in the light of your experience and 
the knowledge of human affairs which you share with mankind in 
general.

 
 

[¶39.]  Instruction No. 2 provided, in 
part:

 
 
     It is the purpose of 
these instructions to provide you with basic propositions of law applicable to 
all the contentions of each party to the case. It is the jury's duty to 
determine whether any contention is supported by substantial evidence. Each 
party has a right to have the jury instructed on every claim and defense 
presented. It is the function of the jury to determine which contentions are 
valid in fact, based on the evidence presented and in accordance with the law so 
given.

 
 

[¶40.]  In Instruction No. 4, the elements of the 
offense were articulated, and that instruction informed the jury, among other 
things that it was required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Stagner 
knew, believed, or had reasonable cause to believe the car was obtained in 
violation of law. Instruction No. 6 advised the jury that, if it determined the 
car was recently stolen, it could infer that Stagner's possession was with 
knowledge that it was stolen unless "such possession is explained by the facts 
and circumstances in this case which are in some way consistent with the 
defendant's innocence."

 
 

[¶41.]  The issue was not complex, and there was 
no need to explain it further to the jury. The proffered instruction would not 
have assisted the jury in resolving the simple question of whether Kilwein told 
Stagner the car was stolen or whether he told her it was his. Even if it did not 
believe Kilwein's testimony, the jury certainly could have inferred, beyond any 
reasonable doubt, from Stagner's other conduct, that she believed or had 
reasonable cause to believe the car was stolen. Alternatively, it simply had to 
consider whether it was satisfied there was reasonable doubt the State had 
failed to prove Stagner "knew, believed or had reasonable cause to believe [the 
Lincoln 
automobile] was obtained in violation of law."

 
 

[¶42.]  In State v. Lindsay, 77 Wyo. 410, 418, 317 P.2d 506, 509 (1957), Mr. Justice Parker perhaps was prophetic as to this case in 
saying:

 
 
These 
instructions [defining the material elements of robbery and burglary] would seem 
to have adequately informed the jury as 
to the elements of robbery and to have made unnecessary any explanation of what 
was not robbery [emphasis added].

 
 
In 
Stagner's instance, the instruction that enumerated the elements of the crime 
charged was sufficient to inform the jury of the nature of the crime and to 
permit Stagner to argue that the evidence did not suffice to find her 
guilty.

 
 

[¶43.]  Essentially, Stagner's effort, which this 
court now approves, is to have the trial court make her argument for her in its 
instructions. If this proffered instruction must be given, then in every 
instance, and not just in cases involving this offense, a defendant will be 
insisting that the trial court offer a theory of the case instruction that 
simply explains why the defendant didn't commit whatever crime is charged. I 
think the trial bench would have a difficult time avoiding the temptation to use 
such instructions, because certainly the State of Wyoming cannot get a case 
reversed because of an improper instruction. Then, of course, every closing 
argument on behalf of the defendant will commence with this phrase, "as the 
judge already has told you * * *." The net effect of requiring such an 
instruction is that the trial judge becomes an advocate for the 
defendant.

 
 

[¶44.]  If the defendant is to be given that 
additional advantage, then it seems to me that the prosecution is entitled to a 
similar explanation by the trial court about its theory of the case. Having the 
court make the arguments for the parties is unnecessary; an unwarranted 
complication of the criminal process; and does not contribute anything beyond 
the instructions that are given on the elements of the offense in a case like 
this. Nothing more was required in this case to permit the jury to understand 
the defense relied upon by Stagner.

 
 

[¶45.]  I dissent because the decision is not 
compatible with well-established precedent, and I am unable to fit it, or the 
decision in Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544 (Wyo. 1990), into the larger body of our 
jurisprudence. If these cases are for some reason sui generis, then we should 
reaffirm the usual rules and say that they do not apply to this case for some 
particular reason. Otherwise, when we develop inconsistent rules in different 
cases, as we do here, instead of assisting with a rational development of the 
law, we are guilty of compounding confusion for the bench and the bar in the 
future.

 
 

[¶46.]  I would affirm the judgment and sentence 
in this case.