Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO IH v. HOT SPRINGS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO IH v. HOT SPRINGS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES2001 WY 10033 P.3d 172Case Number: C-00-12Decided: 10/18/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
  

 

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE TERMINATION

OF 
PARENTAL RIGHTS TO IH,

Minor 
Child:

 

EBH, 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

HOT 
SPRINGS DEPARTMENT

OF 
FAMILY SERVICES, 

Appellee(Petitioner).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Hot Springs County

The 
Honorable Gary Hartman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Thomas 
L. Burnside of Burnside Law Office, Cody, WY.  Argument by Mr. Burnside.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; and 
Dan Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Wilde.

  

Guardian 
Ad Litem: 

            
Mary L. Scheible, Thermopolis, WY.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
            
HILL, Justice.

 [¶1]      EBH appeals a 
district court order terminating his parental rights.  We conclude that the district court's 
decision was supported by clear and convincing evidence, and EBH was provided 
with due process.  Accordingly, the 
district court's decision terminating EBH's parental rights is 
affirmed.

 

[¶2]      Appellant EBH 
sets out four issues for consideration:

1.      
Did the 
District Court err when it terminated [EBH's] parental rights when the petition 
to terminate parental rights did not contain incidents of abuse or neglect by 
[EBH] and the termination relied on lack of support and lack of communication 
theories?

 

2.      
Was 
[EBH] denied due process when the Wyoming Department of Family Services failed 
to provide a clear statement of the consequences of [EBH's] failure to bring a 
child support obligation current?

 

3.      
Was 
[EBH] denied due process when the Wyoming Department of Family Services did not 
inform [EBH] of its decision to change the goal of family reunification to long 
term foster care or adoption?

 

4.      
Did the 
Wyoming Department of Family Services fail to follow its own rules when the 
agency changed its goal from family reunification to long term foster 
care/adoption without informing [EBH] and when the agency did not seek 
alternative foster placement in [EBH's] state of residence in 
Idaho?

 

The 
Department of Family Services (DFS) condenses the matter to a single 
issue:

Whether the district court's finding 
that appellant's parental rights to IH should be terminated was established by 
clear and convincing evidence?

 

[¶3]      The Petition to 
Terminate Parental Rights was filed on August 13, 1998.  The State's petition alleged three 
grounds for termination:

 

10.             
That 
both children are neglected by [CP] and [EBH] and efforts by the Wyoming 
Department of Family Services have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the 
family and/or [CP] and [EBH] have refused rehabilitation treatment by failing to 
comply with the Juvenile Court Multi-Disciplinary Assessment Team's 
recommendations to comply with requirements contained within the Juvenile Court 
Order.

 

11.             
That 
both children have been left in the care of another person, i.e., the 
Wyoming Department of Family Services, without provision for the children's 
support and without communication from the absent parent for a period of at 
least one (1) year, disregarding incidental contacts.

 

. . . 
.

 

15.             
That 
[the children] have been in foster care for 22 of the last 22 
months.

 

A 
four-day bench trial on the petition was held from December 13-16, 1999.  The State presented evidence through DFS 
employees and caseworkers, the Idaho caseworker who completed the 1999 home 
study, and two of IH's teachers. The State also offered the deposition testimony 
of the psychologist who evaluated the children and their parents in 1995, along 
with the reports detailing those evaluations.1  EBH countered with evidence from an 
expert psychology witness and his own testimony.

 

[¶4]      In 1991, EBH and 
CP had a son, IH.  CP also had a 
daughter from another relationship.2  In April of 1995, CP moved from Boise, 
Idaho to Thermopolis, Wyoming with her daughter and son.  In May, the Department of Family 
Services began investigating reports of neglect and lack of supervision.  The reports alleged that CP was leaving 
the children alone in her apartment and having someone drop by to check on 
them.  CP would also leave her 
children with neighbors and disappear for long periods of time.  At the time, CP was drinking 
heavily.  On June 2, 1995, CP was 
placed in emergency detention after threatening suicide.  On June 10, CP was arrested for public 
intoxication. Her arrest led to the discovery that CP had left the children with 
an intoxicated acquaintance.  The 
children were taken into protective custody that evening and placed with a 
foster family.  Based on the events 
of June 10, DFS substantiated general neglect on June 12.

 

[¶5]      On September 27, 
1995, DFS substantiated psychological and emotional neglect of the children.3  The substantiation was based on the case 
history and a psychological evaluation of the children and their parents.  The psychologist who examined IH 
concluded that he was "a severely delayed, presently Mildly Mentally Retarded 
youngster with especially profound expressive language and verbal reasoning 
skill deficits, who appears to come from a background deficient in basic 
psychosocial nurturance and academically-related and intellectually-related 
stimulation."  The psychologist 
warned:

 

Without intensive remediation for 
his developmental delays and his psychosocial deficits coupled with intensive 
family intervention to restore him to some form of safe, stable, consistent 
household environment, this youngster will grow up to have grave, even 
debilitating adaptive or life-skill deficits, and may well be on his way already 
to developing an abusive, explosive or excessively aggressive and dysfunctional 
personality style.

 

IH's 
preschool teacher noted that he would approach total strangers, hug them, and 
tell them that he loved them.  
Later, the Director of Special Services for Hot Springs School District 
No. 1 indicated that IH's cognitive abilities and IQ scores had improved 
substantially by 1998.

 

[¶6]      IH's father, EBH, 
has a long history of criminal activity, including convictions for grand 
larceny, first degree burglary, and domestic violence.  EBH also has an extensive history of 
abusing drugs, including alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine.  The State's psychiatrist examined EBH 
shortly after IH was taken into protective custody in 1995 and reached the 
following conclusions:

 

The 
results of this evaluation suggested [EBH] to be a grossly disturbed, 
characterologically fixated man of average overall intellect who may have signs 
of clinical hyperthyroidism, but more likely suffers from the residual affects 
[sic] of long-term injectable amphetamine abuse  with a strong hint of 
dependency continuing into the future . . .[.]  . . . [H]e appears to be 
grossly self-centered and grandiose in his self-assessments, to be highly 
unrealistic in terms of evaluating himself as a social entity, and to have the 
marks of primary psychopathy that often are found in convict populations 
. . . [.]  . . . There appear to be several areas 
of functional deficit for this gentleman that could gravely interfere with his 
ability to serve as a proper, facilitative, optimally-healthy parent figure: his 
odd, schizotypal thinking and interactive style; his vulnerability to resumed 
amphetamine abuse; his vulnerability to resumed criminality (and consequent 
possible return to prison); his history of failure to comply with probation, 
leading again to a return to prison on several occasions; and most immediately, 
his admitted discomfort in discharging the parenting duties of a single male 
parent for a toddler.

 

This 
examiner could not in good conscience recommend this gentleman as the primary 
custodial parent at this point.

 

The 
State's psychiatrist suggested a long-term treatment plan for EBH that included 
intensive psychotherapy for his psychopathy and narcissism, medical treatment 
for his hyperthyroidism, and drug treatment including random testing. 

 

[¶7]      A 
multidisciplinary assessment team (MAT or team) was assembled consisting of 
various DFS personnel, the children's parents, EBH and CP, a school and mental 
health representative, and a guardian ad litem.  The MAT set forth goals and objectives 
with the stated aim of reuniting IH and his sister with their parents.  The team identified several issues EBH 
would have to address to facilitate the return of his son:  EBH was to remain sober and drug-free, 
regularly attend alcohol/drug counseling and submit to random testing, establish 
and maintain a permanent residence, attend parenting classes, and pay child 
support.

 

[¶8]      Although EBH 
traveled from Boise to Thermopolis immediately after IH was taken into 
protective custody in June of 1995, EBH's cooperation and compliance with the 
MAT directives was sporadic to non-existent over the next four years.  EBH never voluntarily made a child 
support payment.4  He attended one parenting class and 
received low marks for participation.  
At one point, EBH was evaluated by a substance abuse center.  The MAT plans specifically required EBH 
to grant a release to DFS for the results of his examination; however, EBH 
rescinded the release and refused DFS access to the results of the examination. 
EBH did begin to receive professional counseling in October of 1999, just prior 
to the termination hearing in December.  
In addition, EBH failed to establish a stable address, moving several 
times between various residences in Idaho and Washington during this 
period.

 

[¶9]      Initially, EBH 
maintained contact with IH and his sister.  
During 1995, EBH traveled from Idaho to Thermopolis to make in-person 
visits on eight occasions.  In 1996 
from January to July, EBH had twelve telephone visits and three in-person 
visits.  On July 22, 1996, EBH was 
late for a scheduled telephone visit, and the children refused to take his 
call.  On July 25, all visitations 
between EBH and the children were stopped by court order for 90 days.  The non-visitation period was ended 
early on October 16, 1996, and EBH was informed that he could begin letter 
contact.  Nevertheless, once his 
visitation rights were restored, EBH did not contact IH until November 10, 
1998.  Earlier in April 1998, DFS 
even offered to pay for transportation to bring EBH to Thermopolis.  EBH never accepted the offer.  From November 10, 1998, until the filing 
of the petition to terminate his parental rights in August of 1999, EBH had four 
telephone visits and one in-person visit.  
EBH did send Christmas and birthday gifts for IH in January of 1999.  He also sent a valentine, an Easter 
gift, and a package between February and April of 1999.  In November of 1999, the court stopped 
all in-person visitations because of violent and destructive behavior by IH that 
manifested itself after visitations with EBH.

 

[¶10]   DFS attempted several home studies 
in order to determine whether it was feasible and appropriate to place IH with 
his father or other relatives in Idaho.  
The first two home studies were not completed.  EBH objected to a planned home study on 
CP's sister because of her alleged drug usage and dealing at the residence.  On another occasion, EBH refused to give 
his home address to the Idaho authorities, preventing them from conducting a 
home study.  Ultimately, a home 
study was completed by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare on December 3, 
1999, just prior to the termination hearing.  At the time of that study, EBH had 
entered into a relationship with SR, which would culminate in their marriage. 
 SR had six children of her own from 
previous relationships, and four of the children resided with her and EBH at the 
time of the study.  EBH indicated 
that SR would be the primary caregiver if IH came to live with them.  The report noted that SR had an 
extensive child protection record in Idaho with 23 referrals, 20 of which 
resulted in investigations.  There 
have been at least five substantiated referrals of SR relating to lack of 
supervision and neglect.  Idaho 
refused to recommend IH's placement with EBH and SR because of "significant 
concerns for the well being of [IH] if placed with [EBH]." 

 

[¶11]   Dr. Charles Rice, EBH's expert, 
testified about EBH's personal and family history.  He detailed EBH's alcoholism, drug 
usage, physical abuse and neglect on the part of his parents, prison time, and 
physical disabilities including dyslexia and hyperthyroidism.  The expert concluded that EBH was 
"co-dependent" and was "poly substance" abuse dependent, in remission with 
antisocial behavior, and had obsessive-compulsive personality disorder traits 
with "avoidant and schizoid personality features."  The expert also had a brief interview 
with IH and administered several basic psychological drawing tests.  The interview and tests were limited to 
a determination of IH's perceptions of his father.  Dr. Rice testified that IH had generally 
positive perceptions of his father.5

 

[¶12]   In his testimony at the termination 
hearing, EBH admitted to using illegal drugs with IH's mother.  However, EBH indicated that he had been 
drug-free for two years until a three- to four-month relapse in 1991.  Except for another brief relapse in 
1997, EBH claimed he had remained drug-free since the 1991 relapse.  He also admitted to his criminal history 
and past incarcerations, including a parole violation resulting in ten months in 
a work release facility, when IH was two years old.  Nevertheless, EBH opined that he could 
provide the appropriate level of care and a stable home environment for IH with 
his new wife and her children.

 

[¶13]   The district court concluded that 
the State had proven each of its allegations by clear and convincing evidence, 
and that the termination of EBH's parental rights was in the best interests of 
IH, and granted the State's petition to terminate parental rights.  EBH has now appealed that decision to 
this Court.

 

[¶14]   Our standard for reviewing the 
grant of a petition to terminate parental rights was set forth in In re 
JL, 989 P.2d 1268, 1270-71 (Wyo. 1999):

 

   We have held that the right to 
associate with one's family is a fundamental liberty under both the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 2, 6, 7, and 36 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.  DS v. Department 
of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 918 (Wyo. 
1980).  In Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 982 (Wyo. 1984) our standard of review was set forth as 
follows:

   Strict scrutiny is the test which 
will be employed when balancing a fundamental right against a compelling state 
interest, which interest is, in this case, the welfare of the children.  The compelling state interest having 
been established, it is necessary to prove that the method sought to achieve it 
is the least intrusive of those methods by which the state's interest can be 
fulfilled. State in Interest of C, Wyo., 638 P.2d 165 (1981) [citations 
omitted].

   The evidence which will 
countenance a termination must be clear and convincing (§ 14-2-309(a), 
supra).  We explained what we mean 
by "clear and convincing" evidence in Thomasi v. Koch, Wyo., 660 P.2d 806, 811-812 (1983), where we said:

   "* * * This court previously has 
adopted language to this effect:

" * * * 
When the evidence is such that the mind readily reaches a satisfactory 
conclusion as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact in dispute, then the 
evidence is, of necessity, clear and satisfactory.' Continental Sheep Co. v. 
Woodhouse, 71 Wyo. 194, 202, 256 P.2d 97 (1953), quoting language found in 
Good Milking Mach. Co. v. Galloway, 168 Iowa 550, 150 N.W. 710, 712 
(1915).

"We 
further have said that clear and convincing evidence is that kind of proof 
which would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly 
probable.' MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., Wyo., 612 P.2d 830, 
839 (1980)."

See also 
Matter of ZKP, 979 P.2d 953 (Wyo. 1999).  We accept as 
true the evidence of the successful party, leave out of consideration the 
evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give the evidence 
of the successful party every favorable inference which may fairly and 
reasonably be drawn therefrom. Id.; DS, 607 P.2d  at 
918.

 

[¶15]   Wyoming's statute setting forth the 
grounds for termination of the legal parent-child relationship provides, in 
relevant part:

 

(a)   The parent-child legal relationship 
may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following facts is established 
by clear and convincing evidence:

(i)  The child has been 
left in the care of another person without provision for the child's support and 
without communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) 
year.  In making the above 
determination, the court may disregard occasional contributions, or incidental 
contacts and communications;

. . . 
.

(iii)  The 
child has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable efforts by an 
authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in 
rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative 
treatment,  and it is shown that the 
child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or 
returning to the parent;

. . . 
.

(v)  The 
child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the state of Wyoming 
for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, and a showing that 
the parent is unfit to have custody and control of the 
child.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(i), (iii), and (v) (LexisNexis 2001).  The State's allegations in support of 
the petition to terminate EBH's parental rights were based on all three of these 
grounds, although the statute requires clear and convincing proof of only one to 
effectuate termination.  The 
district court found clear and convincing evidence to support termination on all 
three grounds.  In his brief, EBH 
directly addresses the district court's decision only in regard to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(i), while implicitly arguing against the application of the 
other two grounds.  Our review of 
the record, however, convinces us that clear and convincing evidence exists in 
support of the termination of EBH's parental rights to IH on all three grounds 
cited by the district court.

 

[¶16]   EBH's argument against the district 
court's evidentiary conclusions in support of the decision to terminate parental 
rights consumes less than a single, double-spaced page of his brief.  Specific to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(i), EBH contends that the statutory provision is inapplicable 
because he did not leave his child in the care of another and "[a]lthough, 
[EBH's] financial support and communication were sporadic, these elements were 
not precedent to leaving the children in the care of another person."  Implicitly, EBH argues that there is no 
evidence that he personally neglected IH (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii)) or 
that he was an unfit parent (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(v)).

 

[¶17]   We begin with EBH's argument that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(i) was inapplicable to his situation.  Our resolution requires us to refer to 
our standards for interpreting statutory language:

 

[W]e 
look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the 
statute is ambiguous. Olheiser v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation 
Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1994), citing Parker Land & Cattle Co. 
v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1993).  A statute is clear and unambiguous if 
its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning 
with consistency and predictability. Parker Land & Cattle, at 1043. 
Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and 
subject to varying interpretations. Id. * * * Ultimately, whether a 
statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court. 
Id.

 

. . . 
.

 

When a 
statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction. Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 954 (Wyo. 1996); Butts 
v. State Board of Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 1996).  Instead, our inquiry revolves around the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  In 
doing so, we view the statute as a whole in order to ascertain its intent and 
general purpose and also the meaning of each part.  "We give effect to every word, clause 
and sentence and construe all components of a statute in pari materia." 
Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1042.

 

Murphy 
v. State Canvassing Board, 12 P.3d 677, 679 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Campbell County School District v. 
Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 1284 (Wyo. 2000)).

 

[¶18]   EBH's claim that he did not leave 
his child in the care of another  IH was taken from his estranged significant 
other, CP  is irrelevant in reference to the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-2-309(a)(i).  The statute 
simply requires the child to have "been left in the care of another 
person[.]"  There is no 
specification of fault or explanation for why the child has been left in the 
care of another person.  The 
undisputed fact is that IH was left in the care of another person, DFS, not the 
absent parent.  That is all the 
statute requires.

 

[¶19]   Next, we consider EBH's contention 
that his communication and support of the child, while sporadic, was not 
precedent to leaving the child in the care of another.  Apparently, EBH is assuming that the 
failure to provide support and communication to the child is the 
grounds for having the child taken into the care of another and is 
arguing that he supported and communicated with his child prior to IH being 
taken into protective custody.  This 
is an incorrect assumption under the plain language of the statute.  The statute unambiguously uses the 
phrases, "The child has been left in the care of another person" and "without 
provision for the child's support and without communication from the absent 
parent" with "for a period of at least one (1) year," to refer to 
contemporaneous conditions.  In 
other words, the phrase, "for a period of at least one (1) year," applies to 
each of the three preceding elements of the statute.  For termination to lie under this 
subsection, it must be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the 
child has been in the care of another without provision for support or 
communication from the absent parent for one year.  The statute is referring to a concurrent 
condition, not a precedent one.

 

[¶20]   As noted, we found clear and 
convincing evidence in the record to support all three of the grounds cited by 
the district court in granting the termination petition.  We will review each of those grounds and 
the evidence in the record supporting the district court's conclusions.  First, there is clear and convincing 
evidence supporting termination of EBH's parental rights pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(i).  IH was in 
the care of DFS from the time he was taken into protective custody on June 10, 
1995, through at least the dates of the termination hearing in December of 
1999.  The record clearly 
demonstrates that EBH went from October 16, 1996, until November 10, 1998, 
without having any contact whatsoever with IH.  Further, EBH has never voluntarily paid 
a single cent in child support for IH despite court orders compelling him to do 
so.6  These facts are uncontradicted in the 
record and constitute clear and convincing evidence for termination under § 
14-2-309(a)(i).

 

[¶21]   Section 14-2-309(a)(iii), as it 
relates to the circumstances of this case, allows for termination of a 
parent-child relationship if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that 
the child has been neglected, reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family were 
unsuccessful or refused, and returning to the parent would seriously jeopardize 
the child's health and safety.  
"Neglect" with respect to a child under this subsection 
means:

 

(vii)   a failure or refusal by those 
responsible for the child's welfare to provide adequate care, maintenance, 
supervision, education or medical, surgical or any other care necessary for the 
child's well being.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (LexisNexis 2001).   EBH argues that it was CP that 
neglected IH, and there is no evidence that he did.  DFS substantiated neglect and lack of 
supervision on the part of CP that was the basis for the initial decision to 
take IH into protective custody.  
However, the record also shows that on September 27, 1995, DFS 
substantiated psychological and emotional neglect of the children that went 
beyond the initial basis for protective custody.  As noted in the facts above, the 
psychological exam of IH revealed a child with profound language and verbal 
skill deficits and who was from a background deficient in basic psychological 
nurturance and academic and intellectual stimulation.  The psychologist concluded from his 
examination of EBH that he had severe deficiencies that affected his ability to 
provide adequate care to IH, and it was recommended that EBH not be the primary 
custodial parent.  Furthermore, IH 
had resided in the same household with his parents, EBH and CP, from his birth 
on January 3, 1991, until sometime in April of 1995.  It is a reasonable inference to draw 
from these facts that IH's developmental, psychological and emotional 
deficiencies were the result of neglect on the part of both parents with whom 
the child had been living.

 

[¶22]   EBH also failed to cooperate with 
attempts to rehabilitate the family unit.  
The conditions set forth by the MAT were designed to enhance EBH's 
parenting ability and to provide a safe, stable home environment for IH.  EBH, however, consistently failed to 
cooperate with the MAT.  EBH failed 
to: provide proof that he was not using drugs or alcohol, grant a release to DFS 
for the results of a substance abuse evaluation, establish a stable home and 
refusing on several occasions to provide DFS with his current address, and 
obtain professional counseling until October of 1999  four years after IH was 
taken into protective custody, over one year after the petition for termination 
had been filed and only two months before the hearing on the petition.  The record clearly and convincingly 
establishes that the rehabilitative efforts were 
unsuccessful.

 

[¶23]   Section 14-2-309(a)(iii) also 
requires a showing that the child's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by a return to the parent.  
There is no question that IH was a significantly troubled child with 
special needs and care required when he was taken into protective custody.  Testimony indicated that IH would react 
to visits with EBH with incidents of extreme violent behavior.  The State's psychologist indicated in 
1995 that EBH did not have the necessary parental skills to have custody of 
IH.  The evidence in the record 
supports a conclusion that EBH had not acquired those necessary skills in the 
time between 1995 and the termination hearing in December of 1999.  Indeed, all of the evidence indicates 
that placing IH with EBH would seriously jeopardize IH's health and safety.  EBH planned to have IH live in Idaho 
with him and his new wife, SR, and her children.  EBH indicated that SR would be IH's 
primary care giver.  However, EBH's 
new wife has an extensive history of neglect and lack of supervision of her own 
children.  The Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare refused to recommend placement of IH in that household citing 
significant concerns relating to the well being of IH if placed into that 
circumstance.  There is clear and 
convincing evidence that placement of IH with EBH would seriously jeopardize his 
health and safety.

 

[¶24]   The third of the grounds cited by 
the district court in support of its decision terminating EBH's parental rights 
was Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v), which requires the child to have been in 
foster care under the responsibility of the State of Wyoming for 15 of the most 
recent 22 months and a showing that the parent is unfit to have custody and 
control of the child.  IH has been 
in foster care under the responsibility of the State of Wyoming (DFS) 
continuously since he was taken into protective custody in June of 1995 through 
the termination hearing.  For the 
reasons noted above, we also find that there is clear and convincing evidence 
that EBH was unfit to have custody and control of IH.

 

[¶25]   EBH raises three additional issues, 
two of which he characterizes as due process violations. First, he claims he was 
denied due process because DFS failed to provide a clear statement of the 
consequences for failure to bring child support arrears current.  Second, he argues he was also denied due 
process because DFS failed to inform him that it was changing the goal of the 
process from family reunification to long-term foster care or adoption.  Finally, EBH contends that DFS failed to 
follow its own rules when it did not seek alternative foster care placement of 
IH in Idaho.  None of these issues 
were raised before the district court.  
Normally, we decline to address issues that are raised for the first time 
on appeal.  Cooper v. Town of 
Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1208 (Wyo. 2000).  There are two exceptions to this rule: 
when the issue raises jurisdictional questions or when the issue is of such a 
fundamental nature that it must be considered.  Id.  Given the importance attached to a 
fundamental right like the parent-child relationship, we will give EBH the 
benefit of the doubt and briefly discuss each of the issues he has 
raised.

 

[¶26]   In his first issue, EBH claims DFS 
failed to provide him with a clear statement relating the consequences of his 
failure to bring child support arrears current.  He insists that this action denied him 
due process.  In support of his 
position, EBH cites Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-110(b) (LexisNexis 2001), which 
provides:

 

Any 
petition filed pursuant to paragraphs (a)(iv) or (ix) of this section shall 
contain a clear statement of the consequences of the respondent's failure to 
bring the support obligation current.

 

EBH acknowledges that the statute 
applies only to nonconsensual adoptions and not to termination proceedings.  He suggests, however, that he is 
entitled to receive the same due process protections as those being subjected to 
a nonconsensual adoption.

 

[¶27]   Our review of the record indicates 
that EBH received notice sufficient to make him aware that his failure to pay 
child support could lead to the termination of his parental rights.  The MAT plan EBH signed in October of 
1997 clearly states that failure to abide by the plan could result in long-term 
foster care for the child or termination of parental rights.  Furthermore, the petition to notify was 
filed in August of 1998 and, as we noted above, one of the grounds cited for 
termination was the failure to pay child support.  Between the date the petition was filed 
and the termination hearing in December 1999, DFS continued to attempt to 
rehabilitate the family.  EBH had 
notice for almost 16 months prior to the termination hearing that his failure to 
make those payments would be one of the grounds for termination. Nevertheless, 
EBH chose not to make the requisite child support payments.  We conclude that EBH had enough notice 
of what was required of him to satisfy due process considerations.7

 

[¶28]   In his next issue, EBH complains 
that he was denied due process when DFS failed to inform him of the decision to 
change its goal from family reunification to long-term foster care or 
adoption.  He argues that this 
change necessarily implies a determination to terminate his parental 
rights.  EBH points out that the 
change occurred near the time that his visitation rights were restricted from 
July to October of 1996.  While his 
brief is not clear, EBH seems to be suggesting that the timing of the no-contact 
period was designed to create "emotional distance" between him and his child 
without informing him of the consequences of not re-establishing contact with 
IH.  Apparently, EBH is arguing that 
the no-contact period was part of a greater plan by DFS to force a termination 
of his parental rights.

 

[¶29]   We are at a loss to completely 
understand EBH's position, but our review of the record suggests that there were 
no improprieties occasioned by DFS, and EBH was well aware of the change in the 
goals.  The records of the MAT 
meetings show that EBH was in attendance, or appearing by phone, when the goals 
of the team were discussed.  The 
team coordinators testified that EBH received notice of all meetings and 
received copies of the case plans.  
Furthermore, the no-contact period was not counted when assessing EBH's 
contacts with his child for purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii).  After the no-contact period expired, EBH 
had no contact with his child from October 16, 1996, until November 10, 
1998.  Nothing DFS did prevented EBH 
from contacting IH.  In point of 
fact, DFS even offered in April of 1998 to pay for EBH's transportation to and 
from Thermopolis for the sole purpose of visiting his son.  EBH never took up that offer.  There comes a time when a person must 
accept responsibility for his own actions.  
Nobody but EBH is responsible for his lack of contact with his 
son.

 

[¶30]   In his final issue, EBH argues that 
DFS failed to follow its own rules when it did not seek alternative foster care 
placement in EBH's home state of Idaho.  
EBH points to the Department of Family Services Division of Youth 
Services Child Protection Rules Chapter 3, Section 4(d)(iv), which states the 
"placement plan will include the following: . . .  Placement of 
the child in as close proximity to his home as possible."  DFS considered placement of IH with his 
aunt in Boise.  EBH objected to that 
action, however, based on the aunt's drug usage and dealing.  EBH states that more of an effort to 
find appropriate foster placement in Idaho was required by 
DFS.

 

[¶31]   We find little merit in EBH's 
argument.  He fails to explain, if 
his allegation is true, how it affects the findings supporting the termination 
of his parental rights.  
Furthermore, the term "home" is not defined in the rules, but its 
ordinary meaning is defined as:

 

One's own dwelling place; the house 
in which one lives, especially the house in which one lives with his family; the 
habitual abode of one's family; . . . .  That place in which one in fact resides 
with the intention of residence, or in which he has so resided, and with regard 
to which he retains residence or to which he intends to 
return.

 

Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth 
Edition 733 (1990).  The structure 
of the rule indicates that the reference to "home" is to the home of the only 
individual referenced therein  the child.  
IH's home at the time he was taken into custody was in Thermopolis, not 
Boise.  IH's mother resided in 
Thermopolis, albeit sporadically, for much of the time IH was in foster care, 
and he had other relatives in the area.  
EBH does not offer an explanation as to how the rule could apply to his 
home in Boise when the rule references the child's home.  DFS was not under any obligation to seek 
placement of IH in foster care near EBH's residence, although the agency did 
seek placement there on at least three occasions.  We cannot find any improper conduct on 
the part of DFS in handling IH's foster care placement.

 

CONCLUSION

[¶32]   The district court's decision to 
terminate the parental rights of EBH to his son IH was supported by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Since there is 
no other error in the proceedings below, the decision is 
affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The psychologist 
was unavailable to testify at the time of the hearing having accepted a position 
at a university in Cairo, Egypt.

 

  
2CP's parental 
rights to both her children were also subject to the termination proceedings 
below.  CP did not cooperate with 
her court-appointed attorney or appear at the hearing to contest the termination 
of her parental rights.  CP has not 
appealed the district court's decision terminating her parental rights, and EBH 
had no legal parental rights vis- -vis CP's daughter. This appeal is, therefore, 
only concerned with EBH's rights in relation to his biologic son, 
IH.

  
3The record 
indicates that a "shelter care" hearing was held based on the substantiations of 
neglect.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 14-3-401 et seq. (LexisNexis 2001).  The record does not reveal the results 
of that hearing.  However, since the 
children have remained continuously in the custody of the State since June 10, 
1995, we assume that the children were adjudged neglected at that time.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-429 
(LexisNexis 2001).

  
4After the 
petition for termination was filed, EBH asked DFS if his child support arrearage 
could be waived if he would relinquish his parental rights.  He was informed that it could not 
be.

  
5Dr. Rice 
prepared a report based on his interview and tests with IH.  The report was admitted into evidence 
but was not made a part of the record on appeal.

  
6The only child 
support the State ever received for IH was from a single, involuntary tax 
intercept on EBH's paycheck.

  
7We also note 
that even if we had concluded EBH had not received proper notice, it would not 
affect the validity of the district court's termination of EBH's parental rights 
based on Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-309(a)(i) & 
(v).