Title: State ex rel. Capretta v. Zamiska

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Capretta v. Zamiska, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-69.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-69 
THE STATE EX REL. CAPRETTA, APPELLANT, v. ZAMISKA ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Capretta v. Zamiska,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-69.] 
Quo warranto—Adequate remedy by way of appeal precluded issuance of writ of 
quo warranto—Court of appeals’ judgment denying claim affirmed. 
(No. 2012-1287—Submitted January 9, 2013—Decided January 16, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Medina County, No. 11CA0085-M. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Anthony P. Capretta, appeals from a judgment denying 
his claim for a writ of quo warranto to oust appellee Lisa J. Zamiska from the 
office of city council member for Ward 4 of the city of Brunswick, Ohio, to 
restore him to the office, and to require appellees Brunswick and its city council 
to provide him lost wages and public-employee-retirement-system credit for the 
time that he was improperly ousted from office.  Because Capretta had an 
January Term, 2013 
 
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adequate remedy by way of administrative appeal from his removal, we affirm the 
judgment. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} On November 6, 2007, Capretta was reelected to a four-year term 
as city council member for Brunswick Ward 4 and began serving that term on 
January 1, 2008.  In May 2010, Capretta contacted the city service director about 
reimbursing one of his constituents for the replacement cost of a mailbox 
destroyed by a city snowplow.  As a result of that contact, the city manager and 
the service director filed complaints against Capretta with the Brunswick Board of 
Ethics.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the board of ethics determined that the 
service director’s complaint had merit.  The board concluded that Capretta had 
violated Section 3.05(b) of the Brunswick Charter, which provides: 
 
Interference with Administration 
Except for the purpose of inquiries and investigations under 
Article VI, Section 6, the Council or its members shall deal with 
City officers and employees who are subject to the direction and 
supervision of the City Manager solely through the City Manager 
or his/her designee(s), and neither the Council nor its members 
shall give orders to any such officer or employee either publicly or 
privately. 
 
{¶ 3} On September 27, 2010, following an evidentiary hearing, the 
remaining members of the Brunswick City Council removed Capretta from office 
as council member for Ward 4 for violating Section 3.05(b) of the charter.  See 
Brunswick Charter, Sections 3.06(b)(2) (council member shall forfeit office if the 
member “[v]iolates any express prohibition of this Charter”) and 3.07 (“The 
Council shall be the judge of the election and qualifications of its members and of 
January Term, 2013 
 
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the grounds for forfeiture of their office and for that purpose shall have the power 
to subpoena witnesses, administer oaths and require the production of evidence”).  
On October 18, 2010, Zamiska was appointed to fill the vacancy created by 
Capretta’s removal. 
{¶ 4} On October 26, 2010, Capretta filed an administrative appeal 
pursuant to R.C. 2506.01 from the city council’s decision removing him from his 
elective position of council member.  On September 1, 2011, the Medina County 
Court of Common Pleas affirmed the city council’s decision.  Capretta appealed 
the common pleas court’s judgment to the court of appeals, and on October 22, 
2012, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal based on mootness.  Capretta v. 
Brunswick City Council, 9th Dist. No. 11CA0094-M, 2012-Ohio-4871.  
According to the court of appeals, the term of office for which Capretta sought 
reinstatement expired in 2011, and he was subsequently reelected to that office. 
{¶ 5} In August 2011, a few weeks before the common pleas court 
decided his administrative appeal, Capretta filed a petition for a writ of quo 
warranto in the court of appeals.  Capretta requested that Zamiska be ousted and 
that he be restored to the office of council member for Brunswick Ward 4.  
Capretta also requested that the city and the city council be required to pay his 
lost wages and provide him with service credit from his September 27, 2010 
ouster until the date the writ is granted and he is returned to office.  Appellees 
filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment, and Capretta filed a 
response opposing the motion.  The court of appeals granted appellees’ motion for 
summary judgment and, in effect, denied the writ. 
{¶ 6} This cause is now before the court upon Capretta’s appeal as of 
right. 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
 
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Analysis 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals determined that Capretta’s administrative 
appeal constituted an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which 
precluded his claimed entitlement to a writ of quo warranto.  We agree. 
{¶ 8} “Extraordinary writs like quo warranto provide extraordinary, not 
alternative remedies, and they will not lie where there exists an adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of the law.”  State ex rel. Johnson v. Talikka, 71 Ohio St.3d 
109, 110, 642 N.E.2d 353 (1994).  An administrative appeal constitutes an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that precludes extraordinary relief 
in quo warranto.  See State ex rel. Fogle v. Carlisle, 99 Ohio St.3d 46, 2003-Ohio-
2460, 788 N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 9} On appeal, Capretta does not dispute this general proposition or 
suggest that the city council did not exercise quasi-judicial power in removing 
him from office.  See State ex rel. Zeigler v. Zumbar, 129 Ohio St.3d 240, 2011-
Ohio-2939, 951 N.E.2d 405, ¶ 20 (“R.C. 2506.01 provides for administrative 
appeals only from quasi-judicial proceedings”). 
{¶ 10} Instead, Capretta claims that his administrative appeal does not 
constitute an adequate remedy, because he cannot get back pay and retirement-
system credit in an administrative appeal but can obtain these remedies pursuant 
to R.C. 2733.181 if a writ of quo warranto issues. 
{¶ 11} Capretta waived this claim, however, by failing to raise it in the 
court of appeals in response to appellees’ motion for summary judgment, in which 
they claimed that Capretta’s administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506 
                                          
 
1.  R.C. 2733.18 provides: 
 
Within one year after the date of a judgment mentioned in section 2733.17 of the 
Revised Code, the person in whose favor the judgment is rendered may bring an 
action against the party ousted, and recover the damages he sustained by reason 
of such usurpation. 
 
January Term, 2013 
 
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provided him with an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  See 
generally Strothers v. Norton, 131 Ohio St.3d 359, 2012-Ohio-1007, 965 N.E.2d 
282, ¶ 18; McGhan v. Vettel, 122 Ohio St.3d 227, 2009-Ohio-2884, 909 N.E.2d 
1279, ¶ 26. 
{¶ 12} Moreover, Capretta cites no case in support of his claim that R.C. 
2506.04 does not authorize an award of back pay and benefits in the context of an 
administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506.01.  He cannot meet his burden of 
demonstrating reversible error under these circumstances.  See In re Application 
of Columbus S. Power Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 271, 2011-Ohio-2638, 951 N.E.2d 
751, ¶ 14 (court can reject argument on appeal when the appellant fails to cite any 
legal authority in support). 
{¶ 13} Finally, in comparable writ cases, we have held that the mere fact 
that the tribunal hearing a civil-service appeal from the removal of a classified 
employee from a position is not authorized to award back pay does not warrant 
the conclusion that the administrative appeal is inadequate and may be bypassed 
by an action for extraordinary relief.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Weiss v. Indus. 
Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 470, 476, 605 N.E.2d 37 (1992). 
{¶ 14} Therefore, Capretta failed to establish that the court of appeals 
erred in denying the requested extraordinary relief in quo warranto.  We affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
_____________________ 
 
Joseph F. Salzgeber, for appellant. 
 
Kenneth J. Fisher Co., L.P.A., and Kenneth J. Fisher, for appellees. 
_____________________