Title: State v. MaineHealth

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT     
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME 115 
Docket: 
BCD-11-285 
Argued: 
October 11, 2011 
Decided: 
November 17, 2011 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
MAINEHEALTH et al. 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
 
[¶1]  Central Maine Medical Center (CMMC) appeals from an order entered 
in the Business and Consumer Docket (Horton, J.) denying CMMC’s motion to 
intervene in an antitrust enforcement action commenced by the State of Maine 
against MaineHealth, Maine Medical Center, Maine Cardiology Associates, P.A., 
and Cardiovascular Consultants of Maine, P.A. (collectively, the MaineHealth 
entities).  See 10 M.R.S. § 1104(2) (2010).1  CMMC contends that the court abused 
                                         
1  This statute provides: 
 
Injunction.  The Attorney General may institute proceedings in equity to prevent and 
restrain violations of sections 1101, 1102 and 1102-A.  
 
A. These proceedings may be by way of petitions setting forth the case and 
praying that the violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. 
 
B. When the parties complained of have been duly notified of that petition, the 
court shall proceed as soon as possible to the hearing and determination of the 
case. 
 
 
2 
its discretion in denying the motion to intervene, filed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 24, 
and inappropriately relied on federal antitrust law in reaching its decision.  We 
affirm the denial of CMMC’s motion to intervene. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  On March 22, 2011, the State of Maine filed a complaint for antitrust 
enforcement against the MaineHealth entities based on the proposed acquisition by 
MaineHealth of two major Portland-area cardiology practices: Maine Cardiology 
Associates and Cardiovascular Consultants of Maine.  MaineHealth is Maine’s 
largest health system and owns Maine Medical Center in Portland, which is 
Maine’s largest hospital. 
 
[¶3]  On the day that the State filed the complaint, it also filed a motion for 
approval of a consent decree between the State and the MaineHealth entities.  The 
matter was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket upon the State’s and 
the MaineHealth entities’ application for transfer, and the court entered a 
procedural order indicating that it would accept written comments from the public. 
                                                                                                                                   
C. Pending the petition and before final decree, the court may at any time make 
such temporary restraining order or prohibition as considered just under the 
circumstances. 
 
D. Any person who violates the terms of an injunction issued under this section 
must forfeit and pay to the State, to be applied in carrying out this chapter, a civil 
penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation. 
 
10 M.R.S. § 1104(2) (2010). 
 
3 
 
[¶4]  In April 2011, CMMC moved to intervene in the proceeding, either of 
right or permissively.  See M.R. Civ. P. 24(a), (b).  CMMC argued that it had an 
interest in the case as Maine Medical Center’s principal competitor in southern 
Maine regarding cardiovascular surgery and that it could be driven from the market 
for cardiovascular surgery and angioplasty services as a result of the proposed 
merger, to the detriment of CMMC and its patients.  CMMC contended that it 
should be allowed to intervene as it had when these parties attempted to merge in 
2010.  CMMC did not file a proposed pleading presenting allegations against any 
of the already-joined parties as required by M.R. Civ. P. 24(c).2 
 
[¶5]  After receiving written objections and memoranda, the court denied 
CMMC’s motion to intervene.  The court held that CMMC could not intervene of 
right, see M.R. Civ. P. 24(a), because it had failed to show any adverse effect on its 
ability to protect its interests through other mechanisms.  See 10 M.R.S. § 1104(1) 
(2010); 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (LexisNexis 1985).  The court also declined to allow 
permissive intervention because it is rarely permitted in antitrust enforcement 
actions brought by the government and generally requires some showing of 
                                         
2  Rule 24(c) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a motion to intervene “be 
accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.”  Because 
no such proposed pleading was filed in this matter, the court could have dismissed the motion for failure 
to comply with the rule, but it did not.  Neither the State nor MaineHealth raised this deficiency to the 
court in their memoranda in opposition to intervention, however, and the court’s decision to address the 
motion on its merits did not constitute obvious error.  See Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Hankins, 2011 ME 
82, ¶ 15, 25 A.3d 960 (stating that unpreserved errors will be reviewed only for any “seriously prejudicial 
error tending to produce a manifest injustice” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
4 
governmental bad faith.  The court noted that CMMC would have the opportunity 
to participate in a nontestimonial oral argument as authorized by the court in a 
separate order that invited “oral comment and written submissions” from third 
parties due to the public interest involved in the case. 
 
[¶6]  CMMC did file extensive written comments, and it requested the 
opportunity for oral argument within the time prescribed by the court, but it also 
appealed to us from the denial of its motion to intervene, which resulted in a stay 
of all proceedings in the Superior Court during the pendency of the appeal.  See 
M.R. App. P. 3(b).  We denied the State’s and MaineHealth’s motions for 
summary affirmance or immediate remand, but we granted their motion for 
expedited review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Interlocutory Appeal 
[¶7]  Although a final judgment is normally required before an appeal may 
be taken, see Morse Bros., Inc. v. Webster, 2001 ME 70, ¶ 13, 772 A.2d 842, we 
have recognized an exception to the final judgment rule for appeals challenging the 
denial of a motion to intervene, see Francis v. Dana-Cummings, 2007 ME 16, ¶ 15, 
915 A.2d 412.  The exception applies whether the party sought intervention of 
right or permissive intervention.  Donna C. v. Kalamaras, 485 A.2d 222, 223 (Me. 
1984).  We therefore immediately review the court’s denial of CMMC’s motion to 
 
5 
intervene for error of law or abuse of discretion.  Doe v. Roe, 495 A.2d 1235, 1238 
(Me. 1985); Donna C., 485 A.2d at 224-25. 
B. 
Intervention in Antitrust Actions in Maine 
 
[¶8]  Under Maine statutory law, the Attorney General may seek injunctive 
relief by commencing a “proceeding[] in equity to prevent and restrain [antitrust] 
violations.”  10 M.R.S. § 1104(2).  The statute also authorizes “[a]ny person . . . 
injured directly or indirectly in its business or property” by an antitrust violation to 
sue for the injury in a separate civil action for treble damages and reasonable costs 
and fees.  10 M.R.S. § 1104(1).  The statute does not, however, authorize private 
entities to file complaints seeking injunctive relief.  See id.   
[¶9]  CMMC acknowledges that no Maine statute authorizes it to seek 
injunctive relief against the MaineHealth entities as a remedy for antitrust 
violations.  CMMC does not argue that we have allowed or authorized such 
intervention in the past.3  Nor does it cite to any supporting authority from other 
jurisdictions in which the statutes similarly permit only the government to seek 
injunctive relief.  Nonetheless, CMMC argues that it should have been permitted to 
intervene, either of right or permissively, in the antitrust claim brought by the 
                                         
3  Although CMMC emphasizes that it was allowed to intervene in a prior action, we did not review 
the court’s determination in that case. 
 
6 
Attorney General seeking injunctive relief.  We address each ground for 
intervention separately. 
1. 
Intervention of Right 
 
[¶10]  Pursuant to Rule 24(a), intervention is permitted of right in either of 
two circumstances: 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; 
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless 
the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 
 
The first ground for intervention is inapplicable here because no “statute confers an 
unconditional right to intervene.”  M.R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1).  Thus, the question for 
our consideration is whether CMMC satisfied the requirements of the second 
ground for intervention of right, which is allowed when, “on timely application: 
(1) [a party] claims an interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of 
the action, and (2) [the party] is so situated that the disposition of the action may 
impair or impede [its] ability to protect [its] interest, and (3) [its] interest is not 
adequately represented by the existing parties to the action.”  Doe, 495 A.2d at 
1237; see M.R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). 
 
[¶11]  As one of the competitors of the MaineHealth entities, CMMC has an 
interest related to the antitrust action, but CMMC did not demonstrate that the 
 
7 
disposition of the antitrust action would impair or impede its ability to protect its 
own interests through independent litigation.  See M.R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).  Maine 
antitrust law allows any person injured in business or property, whether directly or 
indirectly, to sue for the injury in a civil action and seek treble damages.  
10 M.R.S. § 1104(1).4  Only the Attorney General, however, is authorized to 
“institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain [antitrust] violations.”  Id. 
§ 1104(2). 
[¶12]  Thus, as the United States Supreme Court has held with regard to 
comparable federal antitrust law, private and public actions “were designed to be 
cumulative, not mutually exclusive.”  Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States, 366 
U.S. 683, 689 (1961) (quotation marks omitted).  Because private parties are not 
bound by the government litigation, any liability to private parties may be 
determined separately under Maine’s statutory framework.  See 10 M.R.S. 
§ 1104(1), (2); Sam Fox Publ’g Co., 366 U.S. at 689-90.  Thus, there is no 
entitlement in a private party to intervene of right in a State antitrust enforcement 
                                         
4  The statute provides: 
 
Right of action and damages.  Any person, including the State or any political 
subdivision of the State, injured directly or indirectly in its business or property by any 
other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by 
section 1101, 1102 or 1102-A, may sue for the injury in a civil action.  If the court finds 
for the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall recover 3 times the amount of the damages sustained 
and cost of suit, including necessary and reasonable investigative costs, reasonable 
experts’ fees and reasonable attorney’s fees.  
 
10 M.R.S. § 1104(1) (2010). 
 
8 
action in Maine unless the party provides evidence of bad faith or malfeasance on 
the part of the government such that intervention is necessary to protect the 
public’s interests.  See 10 M.R.S. § 1104(1), (2); Sam Fox Publ’g Co., 366 U.S. at 
689; United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 534 F.2d 113, 117 (8th Cir. 
1976); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11872, at *2-3 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2000); United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 563 
F. Supp. 642, 648-49 (D. Del. 1983); United States v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 
F. Supp. 22, 26-27 (D. Conn. 1972). 
[¶13]  CMMC argues that the federal authorities to which we have referred 
above are now outdated because Congress has amended its statutes to allow for 
intervention in government antitrust cases.  See 15 U.S.C.S. § 16 (LexisNexis 1985 
& Supp. 2011).  Maine’s antitrust enforcement statute has not been amended, 
however, since 1991.  See P.L. 1991, ch. 137, §§ 2, 3 (effective October 9, 1991) 
(codified at 10 M.R.S. § 1104 (2010)).  Because the Maine statute authorizes only 
one party—the Attorney General—to bring an enforcement action seeking 
injunctive relief, see 10 M.R.S. § 1104(2), and does not authorize private 
intervention, the federal cases cited above remain persuasive regarding the 
limitations on private intervention in Maine. 
 
[¶14]  Because CMMC made no evidentiary showing of bad faith, collusion, 
or other malfeasance, intervention of right was properly denied. 
 
9 
2. 
Permissive Intervention 
 
[¶15]  Pursuant to Rule 24(b), a person who files a timely application “may 
be permitted to intervene in an action when an applicant’s claim or defense and the 
main action have a question of law or fact in common.”  In making this 
discretionary determination, “the court shall consider whether the intervention will 
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.”  
M.R. Civ. P. 24(b). 
 
[¶16]  Here, the court determined that joining a private cause of action to the 
State’s enforcement claim would unduly burden the proceedings, and the court 
supplied an alternative method for CMMC to participate in the enforcement action 
by providing oral comments and written submissions to the court.  The court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention.  Although CMMC 
contends that it occupies an exceptional position as a competitor of the 
MaineHealth entities, its situation is not unique.  The MaineHealth entities have 
other competitors for cardiac care, and all are entitled to participate in the State’s 
enforcement action as permitted by the court, or to bring an independent claim for 
damages, see 10 M.R.S. § 1104(1); 15 U.S.C.S. § 15, or both. 
 
The entry is: 
Order denying CMMC’s motion to intervene 
affirmed. 
 
 
10 
_________________________________ 
 
On the briefs: 
 
       Michael R. Poulin, Esq., Skelton, Taintor & Abbot, Auburn, for 
       appellant Central Maine Medical Center  
 
       Peter J. Brann, Esq., Heather B. Sanborn, Esq., Brann & 
       Isaacson , Lewiston,  for appellee MaineHealth 
 
       William J. Schneider, Attorney General, Christina M. Moylan 
       AAG, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine  
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
      Michael R. Poulin, Esq., for appellant Central Maine Medical 
      Center 
 
      Peter J. Brann, Esq. for appellee MaineHealth 
 
      Christina Moylan, AAG, for appellee State of Maine  
    
 
 
 
 
Business and Consumer Docket docket no. BCD-CV-2011-8 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY