Title: State v. Coffee

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 1 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2292-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Donavinn D. Coffee, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 385 Wis. 2d 211,923 N.W.2d 181 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 9, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 21, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Fredrick C. Rosa   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered 
the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I 
through III and Part IV.C. and D., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., 
HAGEDORN, and KELLY, JJ., joined.  KELLY, J., filed a concurring 
opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined ¶¶59-63.  
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Nicole M. Masnica, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Nicole M. Masnica. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by Aaron 
R. O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 
Aaron R. O’Neil.
 
 
2020 WI 1
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2292-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF4965) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Donavinn D. Coffee, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 9, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the 
majority opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I through III 
and Part IV.C. and D., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., HAGEDORN, and 
KELLY, JJ., joined.  KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in 
which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined ¶¶59-63.  ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
per curiam decision of the court of appeals, State v. Coffee, No. 
2017AP2292-CR, unpublished slip. op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2018), 
affirming the Milwaukee County circuit court's1 judgment of 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Frederick C. Rosa presided. 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
2 
 
conviction and order denying Donavinn D. Coffee's ("Coffee") 
postconviction motion for resentencing.2  Coffee argues that the 
circuit court violated his due process rights because the circuit 
court relied on inaccurate information at sentencing, and that 
error was not harmless.  Neither Coffee nor his counsel objected 
to the inaccurate information at the sentencing hearing.  Rather, 
Coffee's first objection to the inaccurate information was in his 
postconviction motion.  The postconviction court concluded that: 
(1) the State introduced inaccurate information at the sentencing 
hearing; and (2) the circuit court actually relied on the 
inaccurate information; but (3) the error was harmless.  Thus, the 
postconviction court denied Coffee's motion for resentencing.  The 
court of appeals affirmed, but not on the merits of Coffee's 
inaccurate information at sentencing claim.  Instead, the court of 
appeals concluded that Coffee forfeited his claim because he failed 
to object at the sentencing hearing.  We now affirm, but we resolve 
this case on the merits. 
¶2 
A defendant has a constitutional due process right to be 
sentenced upon accurate information.  State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 
66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1.  Coffee's constitutional 
due process right was violated.  Indeed, both Coffee and the State 
agree that the circuit court actually relied on inaccurate 
information when it sentenced Coffee.  Accordingly, the issues 
before this court are: (1) whether Coffee forfeited his ability to 
                                                 
2 The postconviction court also denied Coffee's motion for a 
sentence modification.  Coffee did not appeal that denial and the 
issue is not before this court.   
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
3 
 
later challenge the inaccurate information because he failed to 
object at the sentencing hearing; and, (2) if Coffee did not 
forfeit his claim, whether the circuit court's reliance on the 
inaccurate information at sentencing was harmless error. 
¶3 
We conclude that the forfeiture rule does not apply to 
previously unknown, inaccurate information first raised by the 
State at sentencing.  Rather, a postconviction motion is also a 
timely manner in which to bring that claim.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Coffee did not forfeit his ability to challenge the 
inaccurate information at his sentencing.  We nonetheless conclude 
that the circuit court's reliance on inaccurate information at 
Coffee's sentencing was harmless error.  Thus, we affirm the court 
of appeals. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
 On November 10, 2015, in Milwaukee, G.B. was robbed at 
gunpoint.  He stated that he was talking on the phone in an alley 
when a white Mercury Mountaineer sped toward him.  It stopped near 
him and a black male with dreadlocks exited the rear passenger-
side door of the SUV, gun in hand.  The driver and the gunman 
demanded that G.B. give them all his "stuff."  G.B. gave the gunman 
$50.00, and the gunman took G.B.'s cell phone and wallet.  Both 
suspects then fled in the white SUV. 
¶5 
About five minutes later, just a few blocks away, D.J. 
was shot from behind while attempting to flee from a white SUV.  
He stated that the white SUV pulled up alongside him, and a black 
male with dreadlocks opened the rear passenger-side door.  He 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
4 
 
exited the SUV, holding a gun, and told D.J., " [Y]ou better not 
run."  But, fearing for his safety, D.J. did run.  Moments later, 
he was shot in the back.  D.J. suffered shotgun pellet wounds to 
the upper back and left ear. 
¶6 
City of Milwaukee police officers investigated shots 
fired in the area.  Officer Joseph Goggins spotted a white Mercury 
Mountaineer, turned on his emergency lights and siren, and pursued 
the suspect SUV.  The SUV sped up, forcing a pursuit for 22 blocks.  
It finally stopped, but the two suspects then fled on foot.  
Donavinn Coffee and Antonio Hazelwood were eventually detained.  
Coffee later admitted he was the gunman. 
 
II.  PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶7 
On November 15, 2015, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Coffee and Hazelwood, charging them each with 
three counts——armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, and first-
degree recklessly endangering safety, all as a party to a crime.  
The State also charged Hazelwood with a fourth count of fleeing or 
eluding an officer. 
¶8 
On June 6, 2016, Coffee pled guilty to all three counts 
against him.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State would 
recommend "a substantial prison sentence."  On June 23, 2016, the 
circuit court held a sentencing hearing.  What unfolded at the 
sentencing hearing is crucial to Coffee's appeal.  At the hearing, 
the prosecutor recommended "substantial" prison time.  During his 
statement to the circuit court, the prosecutor discussed Coffee's 
record.  He stated: 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
5 
 
[Coffee] does have two prior convictions.  There was a 
2014 misdemeanor case.  It came in as a criminal damage 
to property, disorderly conduct and contact after 
domestic abuse arrest. 
The conviction was for the contact after the 
domestic abuse arrest.  He pled guilty on that July 1, 
2014.  Judge Flanagan sentenced him to probation.  He 
also has a conviction in January of 2013 for carrying a 
concealed weapon.  In that case, he received probation 
as well. 
There were two cases that were no process by my 
office, October 2014, there was a misdemeanor battery.  
What's alarming from the State's [perspective] because 
of the nature of this offense that's in front of the 
Court is that December 2011 there was an armed robbery 
case that was sent to my office.  That was a no process. 
So what the defendant has shown here with his past 
criminal conduct, not only is there a weapon's related 
offense, but there was something that triggered a law 
enforcement investigation and reviewed by my office for 
offenses by a title similar in nature to this. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶9 
The State told the circuit court that Coffee had a prior 
arrest for armed robbery.  That was inaccurate.  He was not 
arrested for armed robbery, but rather for suspicion of strong-
arm robbery and then released.  The State concedes that Coffee was 
never arrested for armed robbery in December 2011.  The State never 
filed any charges against Coffee for strong-arm robbery in December 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
6 
 
2011.3  Thus, the State introduced inaccurate information at the 
sentencing hearing. 
¶10 Next, Coffee's counsel and Coffee each made a statement.  
Consistent with the plea agreement, each acknowledged that prison 
time was merited in this case.  Then the circuit court spoke.  
Importantly, the circuit court explicitly referenced a prior 
arrest for armed robbery.  The circuit court said to Coffee: 
So [the prosecutor] there says you had a couple of police 
contacts.  No charges but one of them was an armed 
robbery.  Then you had these domestic violence 
situations.  So then you were kind of becoming acquainted 
with the criminal justice system. 
Any reason why those contacts were not enough to 
get you to kind of think about your associations and 
your choices that you were making out there? 
(Emphasis added.)  And later the circuit court stated: 
So you have got some misdemeanor cases; one 
successful probation, one unsuccessful probation.  You 
have got a couple of police contacts; one significant 
concern because it sounds like it was an armed robbery 
which is what these offenses are. 
So you basically are engaging in behavior that is 
kind of getting more serious.  Domestic violence by 
itself is natured as assaultive behavior, meaning 
violence against another human being. 
                                                 
3 Some conclude that Coffee did not commit strong-arm robbery; 
that he was wrongfully arrested because two witnesses told law 
enforcement that the offender was not Coffee.  The presumption of 
innocence certainly applies, but experience demonstrates that, 
without knowing more, we can reach no conclusion.  Using a police 
report alone to analyze and conclude the guilt or innocence of a 
person is not what our court should do.  Who committed the strong-
arm robbery is not an issue before us today.  Indeed, Coffee has 
not been charged with strong-arm robbery.  
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
7 
 
But these other things are violence and property 
crimes, and I don't know what else to call it.  So that 
pattern of your behavior or undesirable behavior is 
escalating. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶11 Thus, the circuit court relied on the inaccurate 
information——a prior arrest for armed robbery——at the sentencing 
hearing.  But the circuit court also discussed other relevant 
information at the hearing.  Indeed, the circuit court began its 
sentencing remarks by stating, "My responsibility in imposing a 
sentence is to look at the gravity of the offense.  I look at your 
character, offenses, plural, look at the need to protect the 
public."  The circuit court then went on to discuss the significant 
harm to the victims in this case, the increasing gun violence 
problem in Milwaukee, Coffee's criminal intent, the harm to 
Coffee's family (including his young son), Coffee's education and 
work history, and the need to protect the public.  We describe the 
circuit court's discussion of each of these factors in more detail 
below.   
¶12 The circuit court then took a brief recess to deliberate 
over the proper sentence for Coffee.  After the recess, the circuit 
court noted that both parties agreed that prison time was 
appropriate in this case.  "Nobody has requested probation in this 
case because it isn't a probation case.  These are really serious 
offenses.  There's been substantial harm to the victims."  The 
circuit court added that it imposed consecutive sentences for each 
count to "underscore" that each count was a serious offense.  The 
circuit court then pronounced a sentence of four years of initial 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
8 
 
confinement and three years of extended supervision each for the 
armed robbery and attempted armed robbery counts.  For the first-
degree reckless endangerment count, the circuit court imposed five 
years of initial confinement and three years of extended 
supervision.  Thus, Coffee was sentenced to 13 years of initial 
confinement and nine years of extended supervision. 
¶13 On 
August 
7, 
2017, 
Coffee 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief.  Coffee argued that he must be resentenced 
because the State introduced inaccurate information at sentencing, 
the circuit court actually relied on it, and the error was not 
harmless.  Specifically, Coffee argued that his Criminal 
Information Bureau ("CIB") report did not show any arrests in 
December 2011.  The State filed a response brief, to which it 
appended a Milwaukee Police Department Incident Report from 
December 27, 2011.  According to that report, Coffee and another 
person were arrested for suspicion of strong-arm robbery.  The 
State provided no explanation as to why the December 2011 arrest 
was not included in Coffee's CIB report. 
¶14 On October 31, 2017, the postconviction court issued a 
decision and order denying Coffee's motion for postconviction 
relief.  The postconviction court took issue with the State's use 
of the incident report because it described an arrest for strong-
arm robbery, not armed robbery, "and more significantly, [Coffee] 
apparently was not involved in the offense."  Ultimately, the 
postconviction court concluded that it had considered the December 
2011 arrest at the sentencing hearing, but the error was harmless. 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
9 
 
Although the court considered the December 2011 incident 
during its sentencing decision, the court focused 
primarily on the defendant's conduct in this case, his 
contribution to the prevalence of gun violence that is 
threatening the fabric of our community, the impact of 
his crimes upon the victims and the greater community, 
his background and rehabilitative needs, and the need to 
protect the public.  Even without information about the 
December 2011 police contact, the fact that the 
defendant used a weapon in the commission of the offenses 
in this case and that he shot one of his victims would 
have led the court to the same conclusion that he was 
"engaging in behavior that is getting more serious" and 
that his "pattern . . . of undesirable behavior is 
escalating."  . . .  Consequently, to the extent that 
the court relied upon the December 2011 incident at the 
sentencing hearing, the error was harmless because it 
did not materially affect the court's sentencing 
decision in this case. 
¶15 Coffee appealed.  He again argued that his due process 
right to be sentenced based on accurate information was violated, 
and the error was not harmless.  In response, the State argued for 
the first time that Coffee had forfeited his inaccurate information 
at sentencing claim because he failed to object at the sentencing 
hearing.  The court of appeals agreed.  On November 6, 2018, the 
court of appeals concluded that Coffee had forfeited his claim 
because he "had numerous chances to object to the 2011 arrest 
information during the sentencing hearing and failed to do so."  
Coffee, No. 2017AP2292-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶12. 
¶16 On December 4, 2018, Coffee petitioned this court for 
review.  We granted the petition. 
 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 We are asked to decide whether Coffee forfeited his 
inaccurate information at sentencing claim and, if not, whether 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
10 
 
the error was harmless.  Whether a claim is forfeited or adequately 
preserved for appeal is a question of law this court reviews de 
novo.  State v. Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 405, 572 N.W.2d 845 
(1998).  Whether a defendant has been sentenced in violation of 
his due process rights, and whether that error is harmless are 
questions of law this court reviews de novo.  Tiepelman, 291 
Wis. 2d 179, ¶9; State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶20, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 
832 N.W.2d 491. 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Forfeiture Generally 
¶18 The State argues that Coffee forfeited his inaccurate 
information at sentencing claim because he failed to object at the 
sentencing hearing.  Coffee argues that the forfeiture rule does 
not, and should not, apply to inaccurate information at sentencing 
claims because applying the forfeiture rule would not promote the 
fair and orderly administration of justice.  Before we analyze the 
issue, a summary of the forfeiture rule, its purpose, and its 
effect is helpful. 
¶19  Forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right.  
State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.  
Under the forfeiture rule, a defendant may forfeit a right if the 
defendant fails to object at the time the right is violated.  Id., 
¶30.  The forfeiture rule fosters the fair, efficient, and orderly 
administration of justice. 
The purpose of the "forfeiture" rule is to enable the 
circuit court to avoid or correct any error with minimal 
disruption of the judicial process, eliminating the need 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
11 
 
for appeal.  The forfeiture rule also gives both parties 
and the circuit court notice of the issue and a fair 
opportunity 
to 
address 
the 
objection; 
encourages 
attorneys to diligently prepare for and conduct trials; 
and prevents attorneys from "sandbagging" opposing 
counsel by failing to object to an error for strategic 
reasons and later claiming that the error is grounds for 
reversal. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶56, 
356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207; State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, 
¶11, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727. 
¶20 Some rights are so fundamental that they are not subject 
to the forfeiture rule.  Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶31. For example, 
the right to counsel, the right to refrain from self-incrimination, 
and the right to a jury trial are not subject to forfeiture.  
Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶14.  Rather, those fundamental 
constitutional rights generally must be waived.4  Id.  But see 
State v. Suriano, 2017 WI 42, ¶1, 374 Wis. 2d 683, 893 N.W.2d 543 
(holding that the defendant forfeited the right to counsel by his 
conduct). 
¶21 And in some cases, a court may choose to ignore the 
forfeiture rule and reach the merits of a claim.  After all, the 
forfeiture rule is a rule of judicial administration, not a 
mandate.  See, e.g., Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶38 (reaching the 
merits of a claim where "both parties failed to make objections in 
a timely manner").  The forfeiture rule should not be applied where 
                                                 
4 "'Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely 
assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right.'"  State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 
315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (quoting United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
12 
 
its application would not further its purpose——the fair, 
efficient, and orderly administration of justice. 
¶22 If a court applies the forfeiture rule to a claim, then 
"the normal procedure in criminal cases is to address [that claim] 
within the rubric of the ineffective assistance of counsel."  State 
v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  Thus, 
rather than arguing the merits of an underlying claim, the 
defendant would have to argue that defense counsel performed 
deficiently when counsel failed to object (forfeiting the 
defendant's claim) and that failure to object prejudiced the 
defendant.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
¶23 Bearing in mind the purpose and effect of the forfeiture 
rule, we now turn to the issue of whether Coffee forfeited his 
ability to later challenge by postconviction motion the inaccurate 
information presented at his sentencing. 
 
B.  Coffee Did Not Forfeit His Inaccurate  
Information At Sentencing Claim. 
¶24 In this case, the State first introduced inaccurate 
information regarding a December 2011 prior arrest, stating that 
it was for armed robbery rather than strong-arm robbery, at 
Coffee's sentencing hearing.  Coffee's counsel did not object at 
sentencing.  Rather, Coffee filed a postconviction motion, arguing 
that his due process right to be sentenced based on accurate 
information was violated. 
¶25 The State argues that Coffee forfeited his request to be 
resentenced because he failed to object to the inaccurate 
information at the sentencing hearing.  Furthermore, the State 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
13 
 
argues that the failure to contemporaneously object is harmful to 
the judicial process and the State's interest in finality.  Coffee 
argues that the forfeiture rule should not apply in cases like 
this——where the previously unknown, inaccurate information is 
first introduced by the State at the sentencing hearing and counsel 
has not had an opportunity to confer with the defendant regarding 
the nature and extent of the inaccuracy.  According to Coffee, 
application of the forfeiture rule to claims of inaccurate 
information first introduced and known at sentencing would not 
promote the fair and orderly administration of justice.  We agree 
with Coffee. 
¶26 We conclude that the forfeiture rule does not preclude 
the 
ability 
to 
later 
challenge 
the 
State's 
spontaneous 
presentation at sentencing of previously unknown, inaccurate 
information.  Rather, while counsel may object to this information 
at the sentencing hearing, and while that may be the best practice 
to ensure the sentence is based on accurate information, a 
postconviction motion like that presented here is also available.  
Applying the forfeiture rule to these claims would not promote the 
fair, efficient, and orderly administration of justice because it 
could put defense counsel in an impossible predicament.  
¶27 The State's position here is that the forfeiture rule 
requires defense counsel to object contemporaneously at sentencing 
to previously unknown and largely unavailable information and to 
spontaneously understand the importance of that information to 
sentencing.  We recognize that a best practice in these cases may 
be to contemporaneously bring this new information to the circuit 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
14 
 
court's attention and object to the circuit court relying on the 
new information or to request adjournment.  This practice might 
obviate the need to later file a postconviction motion. 
¶28 Requesting 
an 
adjournment, 
however, 
has 
its 
shortcomings.  Discovering the details of the new information may 
actually be to the detriment of the defendant, and counsel may 
have consequently acted contrary to the defendant's interest by 
requesting adjournment.  While it is just and fair to ensure that 
the circuit court has the most accurate information at sentencing, 
and a defense lawyer's duty is to act as an officer of the court, 
a defense lawyer's duty is also to properly  advocate for the 
client.5 
¶29 When 
suspected 
inaccurate 
information 
is 
first 
introduced by the State at sentencing, defense counsel does not 
know what defense counsel does not know.  Defense counsel cannot 
possibly make an informed decision of how exactly to object, if at 
all.  Nor can defense counsel possibly know whether the objection 
would help or hurt the defendant.  Nor can defense counsel know, 
at the time the suspected inaccurate information is introduced, 
whether the circuit court will actually rely on it.  At oral 
                                                 
5 Applying the forfeiture rule here could put defense counsel 
in an impossible predicament——between a rock and a hard place.  If 
counsel fails to object, then the claim may be forfeited.  If 
counsel objects, and the information is in fact accurate, then the 
objection may have actually made the defendant's position at 
sentencing worse.  If the information is inaccurate, but the truth 
is even more damaging to the defendant, then the defendant could 
face a harsher sentence than if defense counsel had not objected.  
This could also result in an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim if counsel's objection prejudiced the defendant. 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
15 
 
argument, this court asked the State what an appropriate 
contemporaneous objection at sentencing would look like.  The 
State's only response was that it would depend on the facts of 
each case.  But if counsel does not know what counsel does not 
know, then defense counsel cannot possibly be required to make an 
appropriate objection based on the unknown facts. 
¶30 In contrast, if the forfeiture rule does not apply to 
challenges to this type of spontaneously raised information, then 
defense counsel has time to evaluate the information, discuss it 
with the defendant, determine if it is indeed inaccurate, and 
ascertain whether it was actually relied on at sentencing.  A 
postconviction motion may or may not be necessary.  
¶31 The forfeiture rule is supposed to promote the fair, 
efficient, and orderly administration of justice.  See Huebner, 
235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶11.  Its application here could actually promote 
the opposite.  Thus, we conclude that the forfeiture rule does not 
apply to previously unknown, inaccurate information first raised 
by the State at sentencing.  Rather, while an objection may be the 
best practice, a postconviction motion is also a timely manner in 
which to assert that claim.   
¶32 The State's argument that the forfeiture rule should 
apply at sentencing relies in part on Handel v. State, 74 
Wis. 2d 699, 247 N.W.2d 711 (1976), State v. Mosley, 201 
Wis. 2d 36, 547 N.W.2d 806 (Ct. App. 1996), and State v. Johnson, 
158 Wis. 2d 458, 463 N.W.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1990).  In each case, 
the court concluded that a claim regarding inaccurate or improper 
information at sentencing was forfeited for failure to object at 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
16 
 
sentencing.  But each of those cases involved information in a 
presentence investigation report ("PSI").  Importantly, defense 
counsel receives a copy and has the opportunity to review the PSI 
with the defendant before the sentencing hearing.  And defense 
counsel can make a fully-informed and carefully-prepared objection 
to the contents of a PSI at sentencing.  The same cannot be said 
here.  
¶33 The State also relies on the court of appeals' decisions 
in State v. Samuel, 2001 WI App 25, 240 Wis. 2d 756, 623 N.W.2d 565 
(claim that circuit court relied on sealed record defendant did 
not have access to before sentencing was forfeited), and State v. 
Leitner, 2001 WI App 172, 247 Wis. 2d 195, 633 N.W.2d 207 (claim 
that circuit court relied on behavior underlying expunged 
convictions at sentencing was forfeited).  But neither of those 
cases involved inaccurate information at sentencing claims.   
¶34 Finally, the State cites State v. Benson, where the court 
of appeals held that a defendant forfeited an inaccurate 
information at sentencing claim by failing to object at sentencing.  
2012 WI App 101, ¶17, 344 Wis. 2d 126, 822 N.W.2d 484.  But this 
case is also easily distinguished.  In Benson, it was defense 
counsel who introduced the allegedly inaccurate information at 
sentencing.  Id.  Before the sentencing hearing, defense counsel 
submitted a report detailing the presence of Ambien in Benson's 
system at the time of his car crash.  Id., ¶5.  Defense counsel 
had the information before sentencing and had time to determine 
whether the information was accurate.  Furthermore, it was defense 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
17 
 
counsel who submitted the inaccurate information, not the State.  
Thus the court of appeals concluded:  
Because Benson's counsel himself submitted [the] 
report to the court and failed to correct or object to 
the 
Ambien-related 
information 
prior 
to 
Benson's 
sentencing, Benson cannot now claim his due process 
rights were violated by the court's consideration of 
that same information.  He has forfeited the issue.   
Id., ¶17.  Application of the forfeiture rule was appropriate in 
Benson.  Benson is readily distinguishable from the case at issue. 
¶35 We are also unpersuaded by the State's argument that the 
forfeiture rule should apply because it has a reliance interest in 
finality.  Finality is important, but so is the opportunity to 
evaluate previously unknown, inaccurate information first raised 
by the State at sentencing.   
¶36 Having concluded that Coffee did not forfeit his 
inaccurate information at sentencing claim, we now proceed to 
further analyze whether a resentencing is warranted. 
C.  Inaccurate Information At Sentencing Claims Generally 
¶37 "No person may be held to answer for a criminal offense 
without due process of law . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 
1.  Defendants have a due process right to be sentenced based upon 
accurate information.  Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶9.  This right 
was first set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Townsend 
v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), and further developed in United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).6  This court's analysis has 
                                                 
6 Under the United States Constitution, "No person shall 
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
18 
 
also been informed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' 
decision in United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863 (7th 
Cir. 1984).  Defendants "have a right to a fair sentencing process—
—one in which the court goes through a rational procedure of 
selecting a sentence based on relevant considerations and accurate 
information."  Id. at 865.  As this court has stated: 
When a circuit court relies on inaccurate information, 
we are dealing "not with a sentence imposed in the 
informed discretion of a trial judge, but with a sentence 
founded at least in part upon misinformation of 
constitutional magnitude."  A criminal sentence based 
upon materially untrue information, whether caused by 
carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due process 
of law and cannot stand. 
Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶17 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Tucker, 
404 U.S. at 447).   
¶38 A defendant who was sentenced based on inaccurate 
information may request resentencing.  Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 
¶26.  The defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence 
that: (1) some information at the original sentencing was 
inaccurate, and (2) the circuit court actually relied on the 
inaccurate 
information 
at 
sentencing. 
 
Id.; 
Travis, 
347 
Wis. 2d 142, ¶22.  A circuit court actually relies on incorrect 
information when it gives "'explicit attention' or 'specific 
consideration' to it, so that the misinformation 'formed part of 
the basis for the sentence.'"  Tiepelman, 291 Wis. 2d 179, ¶14 
(quoting Lane, 738 F.2d at 866).  If the defendant meets this 
burden, then the burden shifts to the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.  Travis, 347 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
19 
 
Wis. 2d 142, ¶86.  If the State fails to meet this burden, then 
the defendant is entitled to resentencing.  If the State meets 
this burden, then the sentence remains undisturbed.  "The State 
can meet its burden to prove harmless error by demonstrating that 
the sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence absent 
the error."  Id., ¶73.  The most important piece of evidence for 
a reviewing court is the sentencing transcript itself, not "the 
[postconviction] court's assertions" or "speculation about what a 
circuit court would do in the future upon resentencing."  Id. 
(citing State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 262-63, 280, 558 
N.W.2d 379 (1997); Lane, 738 F.2d at 868; Tucker, 404 U.S. 443).  
Accordingly, our analysis in this case focuses on the sentencing 
transcript and avoids speculation.  
D.  The Error Was Harmless. 
¶39 The record is clear that the State introduced inaccurate 
information at sentencing——Coffee was not arrested for armed 
robbery in December 2011.  The record is also clear that the 
circuit court actually relied on the armed robbery arrest at the 
sentencing hearing——the court specifically referenced it twice.  
Coffee met his burden.  The issue before this court then becomes 
whether the State has demonstrated that the error was harmless. 
¶40 Coffee argues that the error was not harmless because 
the inaccurate information here was so integral to the sentencing 
hearing that it cannot be "excised" without speculation or a 
"retrospective hunt" for other information to justify the 
sentence, both of which are forbidden by Tiepelman, Travis, and 
Lane.  The State argues that the error was harmless because, 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
20 
 
regardless of whether Coffee had a prior arrest for armed robbery, 
the circuit court's statements at sentencing remain accurate and 
the circuit court would have imposed the same sentence.  We agree 
with the State. 
¶41 We 
note 
that 
the 
postconviction 
court 
had 
the 
opportunity to address this issue.  It made clear that its sentence 
would have been the same.  The postconviction court concluded, 
"[T]o the extent that the [circuit] court relied upon the December 
2011 incident at the sentencing hearing, the error was harmless 
because it did not materially affect the court's sentencing 
decision in this case."  But we look to the sentencing transcript 
to determine whether the State has met its burden.  Travis, 347 
Wis. 2d 142, ¶73. 
¶42 At the sentencing hearing, the first time the circuit 
court gave "specific consideration" to the arrest for "armed 
robbery," it was in the context of a discussion of Coffee's 
multiple prior police contacts.  The circuit court then asked, 
"Any reason why those contacts were not enough to get you to kind 
of think about your associations and your choices that you were 
making out there?"  Thus, to the circuit court, prior police 
contacts put Coffee on notice, and ought to have given him pause.  
Importantly, this logic would remain true regardless of whether 
Coffee was arrested for armed robbery in December 2011.  Coffee 
had two prior misdemeanor convictions for domestic abuse and 
carrying a concealed weapon.  He also had a prior arrest for 
misdemeanor battery.  Based on those three prior police contacts 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
21 
 
alone, the circuit court's question made sense.  "Any reason why 
those contacts were not enough . . . ?" 
¶43 The second time the circuit court gave "specific 
consideration" to the arrest for "armed robbery," it was in the 
context of Coffee's escalating criminal conduct.  The circuit court 
described the prior convictions and other police contacts, and 
then concluded, "So that pattern of your behavior or undesirable 
behavior is escalating."  This conclusion also remains true 
regardless of whether Coffee was arrested for armed robbery in 
December 2011.  Coffee had been convicted for domestic abuse and 
carrying a weapon on separate occasions.  And in this case, he had 
shot a man.  His conduct was getting increasingly violent, and 
increasingly serious, from misdemeanors to felonies.  Prior armed 
robbery arrest or no, Coffee's "undesirable behavior [was] 
escalating." 
¶44 We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has 
met its burden to demonstrate that the circuit court's remarks and 
conclusions at Coffee's sentencing would have been the same absent 
the inaccurate information.  Furthermore, it cannot be said that 
the prior arrest for armed robbery was integral to Coffee's 
sentence. 
¶45 At sentencing, the circuit court's remarks began with a 
discussion of Coffee's victims.  The circuit court stated:  
They really change the way they live their lives because 
now they're afraid it might happen again.   
 
This poor gentleman that you shot, those feelings 
of violation and fear and taking away whatever security 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
22 
 
he might have felt to that point, that's really amplified 
in his situation. 
¶46 Second, the circuit court discussed the increasing gun 
violence problem in Milwaukee.  The circuit court stated: 
We're getting killed here in Milwaukee with gun 
violence.  I mean, it is off the charts.  We have so 
many 
shootings, 
robberies 
involving 
guns, 
drug 
activities involving guns, people with disputes, beefs 
against each other involving guns. 
¶47 Third, the circuit court discussed Coffee's criminal 
intent, saying it "seem[ed] like it was just as much for kicks, 
fun, enjoyment, thrill, whatever it was, for actually taking 
property from these particular individuals."   
¶48 Fourth, the circuit court discussed the impact to 
Coffee's family.  "Even when they aren't directly the victims, 
they suffer consequences too, because this is the city they have 
to live in also with all of these kinds of things going on."  The 
circuit court also noted the impact on Coffee's young son. 
¶49 Fifth, the circuit court considered Coffee's education 
and work experience.  And sixth, the circuit court considered the 
need to protect the public.  "Suffice it to say, that there's a 
real community interest in being protected here."  The circuit 
court then took a brief recess prior to pronouncing sentence. 
¶50 After the recess, the circuit court did not mention a 
prior arrest for armed robbery whatsoever.  Rather, the circuit 
court noted that both the State and Coffee's counsel understood 
this case required prison time. "[T]hey believe because of what 
you did and for the good of the community, you do have to be 
removed from the community for a substantial period of time."  The 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
23 
 
circuit court stated that Coffee had caused "substantial harm to 
the victims" and that Coffee had been on "probation before, and 
it's not been successful."  The circuit court then pronounced a 
sentence of 13 years of initial confinement and nine years of 
extended supervision. 
¶51 The sentencing transcript is clear that the circuit 
court based its sentence on Coffee's contribution to gun violence 
in Milwaukee, the harm to the community, the harm to the victims, 
and Coffee's need to be removed from the community.  It is clear 
that these factors were not merely other factors that supported 
Coffee's sentence, but were the basis of the sentence.  We have 
not gone on a "retrospective hunt" for other information that would 
have justified Coffee's sentence.  The circuit court clearly stated 
on the record at the sentencing hearing what justified the 
sentence.  We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that "the 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence absent the 
error."  Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶73.  Thus, we conclude that the 
error was harmless. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶52 We conclude that the forfeiture rule does not apply to 
previously unknown, inaccurate information first raised by the 
State at sentencing.  Rather, a postconviction motion is also a 
timely manner in which to bring that claim.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Coffee did not forfeit his ability to challenge the 
inaccurate information at his sentencing.  We nonetheless conclude 
that the circuit court's reliance on inaccurate information at 
No. 
2017AP2292-CR   
 
24 
 
Coffee's sentencing was harmless error.  Thus, we affirm the court 
of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2017AP2292-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
¶53 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  Mr. Coffee forfeited 
his right to object to the inaccurate information about his arrest, 
so I disagree with that part of the court's opinion.  But since I, 
like the majority, agree that the circuit court's reliance on the 
mistake was harmless, I join the court's mandate as well as Parts 
I-III and Part IV.C & D of the majority opinion. 
I.  FORFEITURE 
¶54 When the circuit court said Mr. Coffee "had a couple of 
police contacts . . . [and] one of them was an armed robbery," it 
misstated the facts.  One of those contacts was for strong-arm 
robbery, not armed robbery.  But Mr. Coffee held his tongue and 
allowed the court to pronounce sentence based on information he 
knew to be incorrect.1  The majority says he may simultaneously 
preserve his silence and his right to challenge his sentence at 
some later point based on the misstatement about which he said 
nothing. 
¶55 The court says this rule is necessary to avoid putting 
defense counsel "in an impossible predicament——between a rock and 
a hard place": 
If counsel fails to object, then the claim may be 
forfeited.  If counsel objects, and the information is 
in fact accurate, then the objection may have actually 
made the defendant's position at sentencing worse.  If 
the information is inaccurate, but the truth is even 
more damaging to the defendant, then the defendant could 
face a harsher sentence than if defense counsel had not 
objected.  This could also result in an ineffective 
                                                 
1 According to the police report——created at the time of his 
arrest——Mr. Coffee was arrested specifically for strong-arm 
robbery. 
No.  2017AP2292-CR.dk 
 
2 
 
assistance of counsel claim if counsel's objection 
prejudiced the defendant. 
Majority op., ¶28 n.5. 
¶56 But defense attorneys are intimately familiar with rocks 
and hard places.  This so-called "predicament" is really just the 
omnipresent, on-going cost-benefit calculation counsel must 
perform as a matter of course throughout trial.  As the prosecution 
presents its case, defense counsel must carefully consider, in 
real time, every piece of evidence as it comes in throughout the 
entirety of the proceeding.  Upon hearing each piece of 
information, often for the first time, he must assess its accuracy 
against the information in his possession, weigh its likely impact 
on the jury, consider how it might strengthen or weaken his theory 
of defense, determine its effect on evidence yet to be introduced, 
and analyze its compliance with evidentiary rules.  And he must do 
all of that in the heartbeat that passes between when he hears the 
evidence and he rises to announce his objection.  This he must do 
upon pain of forfeiting the claimed error:  "Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless . . . a timely objection or motion to strike appears of 
record . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1)(a)(2017-18).  We have 
reiterated that rule many times.  See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 78 
Wis. 2d 263, 270, 254 N.W.2d 244 (1977) ("A failure to make a 
timely objection constitutes a waiver of the objection."); Holmes 
v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 259, 272, 251 N.W.2d 56 (1977) ("This court 
has repeatedly held that one of the rules of evidence is that an 
objection must be made as soon as the opponent might reasonably be 
aware of the objectionable nature of the testimony."). 
No.  2017AP2292-CR.dk 
 
3 
 
¶57 So why do we suddenly change the rules when the case 
enters the sentencing phase?  With respect to evidentiary matters, 
the statutory and constitutional safeguards are no different.  The 
majority says that "[d]efendants have a due process right to be 
sentenced based upon accurate information."  Majority op., ¶37 
(citing State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 
N.W.2d 1).  But that's true of the conviction-producing trial, 
too.  The whole purpose of an adversarial justice system is the 
ascertainment of the truth.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 
(1970) ("[P]roof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is 
constitutionally required.  . . .  These rules are historically 
grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men from 
dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of 
life, liberty and property." (quoted source and internal marks 
omitted)); McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 751, 275 N.W.2d 692 
(1979) ("To safeguard the system of the search for truth we have 
built up the various rules of evidence, again based on long 
experience, so that evidence and testimony going to the jury will 
be free from elements tending to distort the search."); Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348, (1976) ("The essence of due process 
is the requirement that 'a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be 
given] . . . [an] opportunity to meet it.'" (quoted source 
omitted, some alterations in original)).  If there is some 
principle lurking around our constitutional jurisprudence that 
says a defendant has a lesser due process interest in conviction 
upon accurate information than in sentencing upon accurate 
information, no one has identified it. 
No.  2017AP2292-CR.dk 
 
4 
 
II.  HARMLESS ERROR 
¶58 Although I believe there is no need to consider Mr. 
Coffee's claimed error, I agree with the court that the distinction 
between "armed robbery" and "strong arm robbery" was harmless.  
But that was not the only error Mr. Coffee assigned to the court's 
treatment of the arrest record.  The second is Mr. Coffee's claim 
that referencing the arrest at all, without regard to its taxonomy, 
was problematic because he did not commit the crime.  And according 
to Mr. Coffee, the police records vindicate him on this point.  
The court's opinion, however, refuses to engage with this alleged 
error. 
¶59 I want to address this aspect of the court's opinion 
(or, rather, its lack of this aspect) because of a curious, and 
troubling, juxtaposition between two of the thoughts it expressed.  
The first is the premise of the analysis:  "A defendant has a 
constitutional due process right to be sentenced upon accurate 
information," the court says.  Majority op., ¶2.  The second is 
the court's casual indifference to whether the arrest tells us 
anything accurate about Mr. Coffee at all: 
Some conclude that Coffee did not commit strong-
arm robbery; that he was wrongfully arrested because two 
witnesses told law enforcement that the offender was not 
Coffee.  The presumption of innocence certainly applies, 
but experience demonstrates that, without knowing more, 
we can reach no conclusion. Using a police report alone 
to analyze and conclude the guilt or innocence of a 
person is not what our court should do.  Who committed 
the strong-arm robbery is not an issue before us today.  
Indeed, Coffee has not been charged with strong-arm 
robbery. 
Id., ¶9 n.3 (emphasis added).   
No.  2017AP2292-CR.dk 
 
5 
 
¶60 Actually, who committed the strong-arm robbery is at 
issue today.  It's true that "without knowing more, we can reach 
no conclusion"2 about whether Mr. Coffee had anything to do with 
the alleged offense.  But we still consider ourselves free to use 
that arrest against him.  And that, oddly enough, is actually the 
rule in Wisconsin:  "This court has stated that the trial court in 
imposing sentence for one crime can consider other unproven 
offenses, since those other offenses are evidence of a pattern of 
behavior which is an index of the defendant's character, a critical 
factor in sentencing."  Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 284, 286 
N.W.2d 559 (1980) (emphasis added); id. ("This court held in Grant 
v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 441, 243 N.W.2d 186 (1976) that the trial 
court could consider offenses which were uncharged and unproven.") 
(emphasis added). 
¶61 Here's the juxtaposition that worries me.  We affirm Mr. 
Coffee's constitutionally-protected right to have his sentence 
based on nothing but accurate information while simultaneously 
denying any interest in the accuracy of one of the pieces of 
information used against him.  It is certainly true that we use 
uncharged and unproven offenses against defendants at sentencing 
because——we say——they "are evidence of a pattern of behavior which 
is an index of the defendant's character."  Id.  But it is also 
patently true that this is absurd.  Every single person ever 
acquitted after trial was first arrested.  Sometimes the defendant 
is acquitted because the State didn't meet its high standard of 
proof.  But sometimes it's because the defendant didn't actually 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶9 n.3.   
No.  2017AP2292-CR.dk 
 
6 
 
commit the crime.  And arrestees frequently don't even go to trial 
because the police find the perpetrator who did commit the offense.  
And yet, according to our rules, that arrest forever remains a 
valid basis for influencing a sentence, even though it may not in 
fact say anything at all about him. 
¶62 With respect to character, an arrest (by itself) is a 
question mark, nothing more.  Police may arrest an individual based 
on information "which would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution 
in the belief' that a felony has been committed."  Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (quoted source omitted).  
This is not "evidence which would suffice to convict," id., it is 
simply the reasonable belief of a single person.  And sometimes 
that belief is mistaken.  A witness may have inaccurately 
identified the arrestee as the culprit, or he may have been driving 
the same type of car as the actual perpetrator, or he was just at 
the wrong place at the wrong time——the explanations could go on at 
length.  And, of course, we sometimes find that an officer simply 
didn't have sufficient information to arrest the individual.3  All 
of this demonstrates why an arrest——without more——is not proof of 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Henes v. Morrissey, 194 Wis. 2d 338, 355, 533 
N.W.2d 802 (1995) ("[W]e conclude that the deputies lacked 
probable cause to arrest [the defendant] for refusing to identify 
himself; his refusal could not elevate the deputies' reasonable 
suspicion that he committed the car theft to probable cause that 
he obstructed their investigation."); State v. Marquardt, 2001 
WI App 219, ¶19, 247 Wis. 2d 765, 635 N.W.2d 188 (Explaining that 
there was "nothing in the facts to tie [the defendant] to the 
crime, much less to tie his home to the crime."); State v. Travis, 
No. 1994AP385-CR, unpublished slip op., *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 
1994) (Holding that an informant's tip did not provide enough 
information to create probable cause to arrest the defendant.). 
No.  2017AP2292-CR.dk 
 
7 
 
the arrestee's character.  At most, it is proof of what the 
arresting officer thought about the person at the time of arrest.  
Those are not the same things, but we act as though they are. 
¶63 If we are committed to sentences based on accurate 
information, it should matter whether an arrest really does 
evidence culpable behavior or bad character.  If it doesn't matter, 
then we are at risk of increasing a defendant's sentence based on 
a criterion that says nothing relevant about him. 
 * * *  
¶64 Ultimately, the error in this case is still harmless 
because the circuit court would have imposed the same sentence 
even without referring to the arrest at all.  The circuit court's 
rationale for the sentence was that Mr. Coffee's "pattern 
of . . . behavior or undesirable behavior [was] escalating."  That 
is obvious from Mr. Coffee's record.  Mr. Coffee had already been 
convicted for two misdemeanors (criminal damage to property and 
carrying a concealed weapon) before facing these charges, and now 
he has been convicted of armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, 
and first-degree recklessly endangering safety.  Majority op., 
¶¶7-8.  So, the circuit court was correct that Mr. Coffee "was 
engag[ed] in behavior that [was] kind of getting more serious."  
Therefore, I concur with the court's conclusion that the circuit 
court's mention of the arrest (without regard to the inaccurate 
characterization of the robbery) was harmless. 
¶65 I am authorized to state Justice REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY 
joins ¶¶59-63 of this opinion. 
No.  2017AP2292-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶66 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Donavinn Coffee 
was arrested for a strong-arm robbery.  Yet, there is not a shred 
of evidence that he had anything to do with it.  Nothing. 
¶67 In fact, he was quickly released after the victims of 
the robbery told police that it was a misidentification.  Coffee 
didn't rob them.  Such a course of action was further supported by 
the available evidence:  the robber had tattoos on his arms, and 
Coffee does not. 
¶68 Nevertheless, the State brought up this mistaken arrest 
at Coffee's sentencing for a completely separate crime to which he 
did plead guilty.  The circuit court relied on the mistaken arrest 
as an example of Coffee's supposedly "escalating" conduct and 
sentenced him to a total of 13 years of initial confinement and 
nine years of extended supervision.  All parties now agree that 
the information the State gave to the circuit court, and on which 
the circuit court relied, was inaccurate. 
¶69 No harm, no foul, says the majority. 
No.  2017AP2292-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶70 I agree with the majority/lead opinion1 that "the 
forfeiture rule does not apply to previously unknown, inaccurate 
information first raised by the State at sentencing" and that "a 
postconviction motion is also a timely manner in which to bring 
that claim."  Majority/lead op., ¶3.  Therefore, I also agree that 
under the facts of this case, Coffee has not forfeited his direct 
challenge to this inaccurate information.  Id.   
                                                 
1 I refer to Justice Ziegler's opinion as the "majority/lead" 
opinion because the opinion in its entirety is not joined by a 
majority of the court.  Justice Kelly joins Parts I-III and Part 
IV.C and D of the opinion, but he does not join Part IV.A and B.  
See Justice Kelly's concurrence, ¶53.  Despite this dissent's 
agreement that the forfeiture rule does not apply in this case, 
Parts IV.A and B do not constitute a "majority" opinion of the 
court under State v. Griep, 2015 WI 40, ¶37 n.16, 361 Wis. 2d 657, 
863 N.W.2d 567.  In Griep, the court set forth, "[u]nder Marks, 
the positions of the justices who dissented from the judgment are 
not counted in examining the divided opinions for holdings."  Id. 
(citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).  
Although the vitality of Griep has been called into question, 
currently it remains in force.  See State v. Hawley, No. 
2015AP1113-CR, unpublished certification, 2-3 (Nov. 21, 2018). 
The only reference to "lead opinions" in our Internal 
Operating Procedures (IOPs) states that if during the process of 
circulating and revising opinions, "the opinion originally 
circulated as the majority opinion does not garner the vote of a 
majority of the court, it shall be referred to in separate writings 
as the 'lead opinion' unless a separate writing garners the vote 
of a majority of the court."  IOP III.G.4.   
For further discussion of our procedure regarding lead 
opinions, see Koss Corp. v. Park Bank, 2019 WI 7, ¶76 n.1, 385 
Wis. 2d 261, 922 N.W.2d 20 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring).  
See also two prior certifications from the court of appeals that 
have asked us to reexamine our lead opinion procedure.  State v. 
Dowe, 120 Wis. 2d 192, 192-93, 352 N.W.2d 660 (1984) (per curiam); 
Hawley, No. 2015AP1113-CR, unpublished certification, 2-3; see 
also State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶145, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 
(Abrahamson and Ann Walsh Bradley, JJ., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).   
No.  2017AP2292-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶71 However, I part ways with the majority's harmless error 
analysis.  The circuit court's reliance on the inaccurate 
information the State presented was not harmless, and instead 
permeated the proceeding to an extent that resentencing should be 
required. 
¶72 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶73 After pleading guilty to three separate charges, Coffee 
came before the circuit court for sentencing.  Majority/lead op., 
¶8.  At the sentencing hearing, the State "told the circuit court 
that Coffee had a prior arrest for armed robbery."  Id., ¶9.  
Specifically, the State argued at sentencing:  
What's alarming from the State's [perspective] because 
of the nature of this offense that's in front of the 
Court is that December 2011 there was an armed robbery 
case that was sent to my office.  That was a no process. 
So what the defendant has shown here with his past 
criminal conduct, not only is there a weapon[s] related 
offense, but there was something that triggered a law 
enforcement investigation and reviewed by my office for 
offenses by a title similar in nature to this. 
¶74 As the majority acknowledges, "[t]hat was inaccurate."  
Id.  It turned out that Coffee was arrested for strong-arm robbery, 
the arrest was the result of a misidentification, and Coffee was 
quickly released.  But these facts were not presented to the 
circuit court and it specifically cited the inaccurate information 
in fashioning Coffee's sentence.  On several occasions during its 
sentencing remarks, the circuit court mentioned Coffee's previous 
mistaken arrest for armed robbery, and it tied the arrest into 
No.  2017AP2292-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
what it termed Coffee's "escalating" undesirable behavior.  Id., 
¶10.   
¶75 After he was sentenced, Coffee moved for postconviction 
relief, arguing that the circuit court's reliance on the inaccurate 
information violated his due process right to be sentenced upon 
accurate information.  Id., ¶13.  The circuit court denied his 
motion, 
indicating 
that 
it 
had 
considered 
the 
incorrect 
information in pronouncing Coffee's sentence, but that even 
without the information it would have reached the same sentence.  
Id., ¶14.  In the circuit court's words, "the error was harmless 
because it did not materially affect the court's sentencing 
decision in this case."  Id. 
¶76 The court of appeals affirmed.  But rather than embracing 
the explanation given by the circuit court, it relied on different 
grounds.  It determined that by failing to object at the sentencing 
hearing, "Coffee forfeited the claim that he was sentenced based 
on inaccurate information . . . ."  State v. Coffee, No. 
2017AP2292-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 
2018) (per curiam). 
¶77 Now affirming the court of appeals, the majority/lead 
relies on the same grounds utilized by the circuit court——harmless 
error.  Majority/lead op., ¶52.  Contrary to the court of appeals, 
the majority/lead determines that Coffee did not forfeit his 
inaccurate information claim.  Id., ¶26.  However, it concludes 
that the circuit court's reliance on the incorrect information was 
harmless.  Id., ¶51. 
No.  2017AP2292-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
II 
¶78 As an initial matter, I write to clear up a fact of 
record that has been severely muddied by the majority..  Somewhat 
inexplicably, the majority views the only inaccuracy in the 
information relied upon by the circuit court as that Coffee was 
arrested for strong-arm robbery and not armed robbery.  Id., ¶9.   
¶79 The majority appears to insinuate that Coffee could have 
had something to do with the strong-arm robbery for which he was 
mistakenly arrested.  Id., ¶9 n.3.  It declares that "[s]ome 
conclude that Coffee did not commit strong-arm robbery; that he 
was wrongfully arrested because two witnesses told law enforcement 
that the offender was not Coffee.  The presumption of innocence 
certainly applies, but experience demonstrates that, without 
knowing more, we can reach no conclusion."  Id.  Whose experience?  
And why does it justify turning a blind eye to the actual facts of 
this case? 
¶80 Based 
on 
this 
self-proclaimed 
"experience," 
the 
majority/lead glosses over the record facts indicating that the 
arrest was the result of a misidentification.  There is no evidence 
at all in the record tying Coffee to either the crime of strong-
arm robbery or armed robbery.  The police report from the incident, 
which is included in the record before this court, reveals the 
majority's error. 
¶81 In the report, it is related that a victim of the strong-
arm robbery for which Coffee was initially arrested stated that he 
first observed the perpetrators from behind and that Coffee "could" 
have been a subject who robbed him.  However, after viewing 
No.  2017AP2292-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
Coffee's face, he determined that Coffee was "not involved in this 
incident."  The report further indicates the witness's description 
of the suspect as having dreadlocks and tattoos on his arms.  
Coffee has dreadlocks, but does not have tattoos on his arms. 
¶82 The record therefore does not indicate that the only 
error in the information presented to the circuit court was the 
type of robbery for which Coffee was arrested.  Indeed, there was 
no evidence at all that Coffee committed a robbery of any type in 
2011.   
¶83 Which brings me to the majority's harmless error 
analysis.  In the majority's view, the circuit court's sentence 
would have been the same even if the inaccurate information 
regarding Coffee's arrest was not considered.  Majority/lead op., 
¶¶40-41.   
¶84 Pursuant to this court's established methodology, a 
defendant seeking resentencing based on the presentation of 
inaccurate 
information 
before 
the 
sentencing 
court 
must 
demonstrate that the information was inaccurate and that the 
circuit court actually relied on the inaccurate information.  State 
v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶2, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1.  After 
the defendant meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the 
State to demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id., ¶3; State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶86, 347 
Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 491.  
¶85 The State can meet its burden to prove harmless error in 
a sentencing proceeding by demonstrating that the sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence absent the error.  Id., ¶73.  
No.  2017AP2292-CR.awb 
 
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But we cannot simply take the circuit court's word that it would 
have done so.  See id. ("The State therefore correctly relies on 
the transcript of the sentencing proceeding in making its argument, 
and correctly refrains from relying on the circuit court's 
assertions during the hearing on the defendant's postconviction 
motion or speculation about what a circuit court would do in the 
future upon resentencing."). 
¶86 Thus, I turn to the transcript of the sentencing 
proceeding.  When pronouncing its sentence, the circuit court 
specifically referenced this arrest, speaking of Coffee's police 
contacts and stating that this arrest is of "significant concern 
because it sounds like it was an armed robbery which is what these 
offenses are."  The circuit court saw this arrest as indicative of 
the "escalating" nature of Coffee's "undesirable behavior."   
¶87 But what does the mistaken arrest really tell us about 
Coffee's behavior?  What does it tell us about his character?  What 
information does it provide that is at all relevant to his 
sentence?  Given the facts in the record that Coffee had nothing 
to do with the crime, the answer to all of these questions is 
"nothing." 
¶88 As Coffee posits in his reply brief, "his arrest for a 
robbery, armed or otherwise, was plainly irrelevant to his 
character.  Instead, evidence of the prior arrest spoke only to 
the fact that as a young black man with long dreadlocks, Coffee 
once resembled someone who committed a robbery in December 2011."   
¶89 It is true that Coffee pleaded guilty to a violent crime.  
The majority focuses on the circuit court's comments in this 
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regard, stating that "the circuit court based its sentence on 
Coffee's contribution to gun violence in Milwaukee, the harm to 
the community, the harm to the victims, and Coffee's need to be 
removed from the community."  Majority/lead op., ¶51.   
¶90 But that the nature of Coffee's offense demanded a prison 
sentence does not mean that Coffee would have received the same 
sentence had the State not raised the inaccurate information 
regarding Coffee's prior arrest.  The erroneous consideration of 
an arrest for a violent offense can certainly affect a circuit 
court's view of a defendant.   
¶91 Indeed, the references in the sentencing transcript to 
Coffee's mistaken arrest indicate that the circuit court viewed 
the arrest as a step in Coffee's "escalating" behavior.  Absent 
consideration of the arrest, would the same pattern of "escalating" 
behavior have been established?  We cannot be sure beyond a 
reasonable doubt as we must be to say the error was harmless.  See 
Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶86.  Accordingly, Coffee is entitled to 
resentencing. 
¶92 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶93 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
 
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