Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Harris

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Harris, 96 Ohio St.3d 138, 2002-Ohio-2988.] 
 
 
CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. HARRIS. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Harris, 96 Ohio St.3d 138, 2002-Ohio-2988.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Converting money 
entrusted by an institutionalized client — Failing to cooperate in 
disciplinary investigation. 
(No. 2001-2231 — Submitted May 7, 2002 — Decided July 31, 2002.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 00-67. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
We must decide in this case whether an attorney who converted 
money entrusted to him by an institutionalized client should be indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law in Ohio.  The Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court recommended that sanction 
against respondent, Caesar M. Harris of Cleveland Heights, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0021529, after finding him in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and 
(6) (engaging in dishonest conduct or conduct that otherwise reflects adversely on 
his fitness to practice law), 2-106(A) (charging an excessive fee), 6-101(A)(3) 
(neglecting an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(3) (prejudicing or damaging 
client during course of professional relationship), 9-102(B)(1), (3), and (4) 
(failing to promptly advise, account for, and return client’s funds), and Gov.Bar 
R. V(4)(G) (failing to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation).  We agree that an 
indefinite suspension is the appropriate punishment. 
{¶2} 
Respondent, a solo practitioner, was originally retained in 1983 by 
a client to protect her interests in a divorce proceeding, particularly her right to 
alimony payments ordered by the Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court.  
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By January 1985, respondent had negotiated an agreement through which his 
client would receive fixed monthly alimony payments.  In 1991, the client 
executed a special power of attorney appointing respondent as her attorney-in-fact 
to oversee her finances.  Around the same time, the client’s mental instability and, 
later, her adjudicated incompetence began necessitating a series of involuntary 
hospitalizations. 
{¶3} 
During the next several years, the Cuyahoga County Support 
Enforcement Agency paid respondent at least $29,760.64 in alimony pursuant to 
the power of attorney.  By November 6, 1998, however, respondent had 
personally exhausted all but $742.54 of this amount in what he would later 
describe as “petty-cash-type withdrawals.”  He gave the remaining $742.54 to 
Theresa Lockridge, his client’s case manager at Northeast Community Health 
Center, in response to Lockridge’s persistent attempts to recover all of the missing 
alimony and to get an accounting from respondent.  Lockridge had submitted a 
grievance concerning respondent’s conduct to relator, the Cleveland Bar 
Association. 
{¶4} 
Respondent’s client’s guardian, Nelli Johnson, also took action to 
recover the missing alimony.  She filed a complaint for concealment of assets 
against respondent in the Cuyahoga County Probate Court.  That court found 
respondent guilty based on the itemized fee statement he had specifically prepared 
for the Cuyahoga County Support Enforcement Division to justify, long after the 
fact, the alimony money he had spent.  The court considered the statement, which 
claimed that respondent had earned over $24,000 in fees, incredibly excessive and 
held that, at best, respondent could have legitimately charged his client only about 
one third of that amount. 
{¶5} 
After investigating Lockridge’s grievance, relator initiated this 
action on August 14, 2000, by filing a complaint with the board.  A panel of the 
board heard the cause, including the parties’ stipulations of fact, and found the 
January Term, 2002 
3 
facts as stated.  Based on the panel’s report, the board concluded that respondent 
had acted dishonestly and unprofessionally in that he had charged an excessive 
fee, neglected his client’s interests, and failed to appropriately account for his 
client’s money and, thus, that he had violated the cited Disciplinary Rules.  
Moreover, because respondent repeatedly failed to respond to relator’s inquiries 
during the investigation of this misconduct, the board found him in violation of 
Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
{¶6} 
We concur in the board’s findings of misconduct and its 
recommendation that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of 
law.  While we historically have imposed the strictest discipline—permanent 
disbarment—in misappropriation cases, Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Belock (1998), 82 
Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 694 N.E.2d 897, we have also recognized that a lesser penalty 
may be in order where sufficient mitigating factors exist and the board 
recommends it.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Kurtz (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 55, 693 
N.E.2d 1080; Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Knowlton (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 76, 689 
N.E.2d 538.  Here, in addition to the board’s recommendation, we have before us 
an honorably discharged veteran who has been a member of the bar for twenty-
seven years and has never been disciplined for professional misconduct before.  
Respondent has been active his entire life in the Open Door Missionary Baptist 
Church.  His pastor and several professional acquaintances, including past and 
present members of the judiciary, submitted letters or gave testimony to assure us 
that respondent was dedicated and trustworthy.  The probate court thought that 
some of respondent’s efforts constituted legitimate professional services. 
{¶7} 
Respondent’s conduct toward his defenseless client is most 
certainly egregious.  But the board recommended against permanent disbarment, 
and we can see some justification for leniency.  We therefore order that 
respondent be suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for an indefinite period.  
Costs are taxed to respondent. 
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Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting. 
{¶8} 
I decline to follow the board’s recommendation and would instead 
disbar Harris. 
{¶9} 
The majority’s characterization of the matter before this court—
“We must decide in this case whether an attorney who converted money entrusted 
to him by an institutionalized client should be indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio”—suggests an incorrect analytic approach that 
necessitates comment at the outset.  The court’s analysis should not begin with 
whether an indefinite suspension is warranted.  We have continually stated that 
when the misappropriation of client funds is among an attorney’s acts of 
misconduct, the court begins with the presumptive sanction of disbarment.  
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Glatki (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 381, 384, 726 N.E.2d 993; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wise (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 169, 171, 707 N.E.2d 852; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Connaughton (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 644, 645, 665 N.E.2d 
675.  Thus, precedent dictates that the threshold question must be whether there is 
any reason why we should not disbar Harris. 
{¶10} The majority acknowledges our precedent calling for disbarment, 
but then proceeds to find that sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to impose a 
lesser sanction.  I agree that a lack of prior discipline constitutes some mitigation.  
See Section 10(B)(2)(a) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline.  I also accord some weight to Harris’s character references.  See 
January Term, 2002 
5 
Section 10(B)(2)(e).  But I find his claim to other mitigating circumstances 
unpersuasive. 
{¶11} The 
recommended 
sanction 
of 
the 
board—an 
indefinite 
suspension—is not a mitigating factor.  And Harris’s having been in practice for 
27 years is not mitigating when his dishonesty in this case spanned more than 
one-third of that career. 
{¶12} The majority “infers” from the foregoing claimed mitigation 
evidence, as well as from Harris’s military service and his church activities, that 
Harris’s misconduct arose from his misguided perception of his role and 
responsibility in the legal profession.  I cannot agree.  The panel taking the 
evidence characterized Harris’s misconduct as “go[ing] to the very nature of the 
attorney-client relationship.”  It explained that “[a]ttorneys are charged with the 
duty of helping those in need of counsel and are further charged with doing 
justice.  [Harris] has shown himself to not be of the fiber to perform these most 
basic tasks essential to being an attorney.  One who cannot be counted on to 
protect the interests of a special needs client, or one who misappropriates the 
funds of any client, is unfit to practice law in the State of Ohio.”  I agree with the 
panel’s assessment in these circumstances.  If, as the majority “infers,” Harris 
truly cannot understand this fundamental aspect of the practice of law after nearly 
three decades as a practitioner, then reinstatement seems improbable. 
{¶13} This court has held that in most instances, “[t]he continuing public 
confidence in the judicial system and the bar requires that the strictest discipline 
be imposed in misappropriation cases.”  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Belock (1998), 82 
Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 694 N.E.2d 897.  Harris stole from a client for many years.  In 
an effort to cover up his actions, he submitted an incredible, excessive fee 
statement to the probate court.  When confronted with a disciplinary inquiry, he 
repeatedly failed to cooperate.  And he has failed to accept responsibility for the 
nature and severity of his actions.  Harris has thus demonstrated contempt for the 
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ethical considerations of this profession, for the courts, and for the disciplinary 
process. 
{¶14} Because his mitigating circumstances do not offset the more 
compelling interest of protecting the public, this court should disbar Harris from 
the practice of law. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Arter & Hadden, L.L.P., Robert J. Hanna and Nicholas C. York, for 
relator. 
 
Wesley A. Dumas, Sr., for respondent. 
__________________