Title: State v. Hirschberg

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 109,689 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KEVIN ADDISON HIRSCHBERG, 
Appellant. 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
Non-sex offenders seeking to avoid retroactive application of provisions of the 
Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) must, in order to satisfy the "effects" prong of 
the test set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 
L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963), produce a record that distinguishes—by the "clearest proof"—
KORA's effect on those classes of offenders from the Act's effects on sex offenders as a 
class. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed May 9, 2014. 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; RICHARD D. ANDERSON, judge. Opinion filed August 11, 2017. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for 
appellant.  
 
Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, Jodi Litfin, senior assistant district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the briefs for appellee. 
 
 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
STEGALL, J.:  In December 2010, Kevin Addison Hirschberg sold a bag of 
methamphetamine to an undercover officer. He later pled guilty to one count of 
possession with intent to sell, deliver, or distribute methamphetamine. Prior to his plea, 
the Kansas Legislature amended the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA), K.S.A. 
22-4901 et seq., lengthening the amount of time Hirschberg was required to register as a 
drug offender from 10 years to 15 years. See L. 2011, ch. 95, sec. 6; K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 
22-4906(a)(1)(O). During the sentencing hearing, Hirschberg asked the court to impose a 
10-year registration period, but the court overruled the objection and imposed a 15-year 
period, finding that the 2011 amendments applied retroactively. It ultimately sentenced 
him to 40 months' imprisonment and 24 months' postrelease supervision. Hirschberg 
appealed. 
 
A panel of our Court of Appeals rejected the merits of Hirschberg's claim that 
retroactively applying the amendments to him violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. State v. 
Hirschberg, No. 109,689, 2014 WL 1887646, at *2 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished 
opinion). It also disagreed that the district court violated his constitutional rights pursuant 
to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), 
when it used his prior criminal convictions to increase his sentence without requiring the 
State to prove them to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 2014 WL 1887646, at *2 (citing 
State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 46, 41 P.3d 781 [2002]). We granted review solely to address 
the ex post facto claim. 
 
We recently analyzed KORA in this context using the intent-effects test set forth 
by the United States Supreme Court and concluded lifetime sex offender registration does 
not constitute "punishment" for purposes of applying any provision of the federal 
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Constitution. State v. Petersen-Beard, 304 Kan. 192, 198-209, 377 P.3d 1127 (2016) 
(relying on the factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 
83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 [1963]). We therefore held that the 2011 version of KORA 
could not violate federal prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. See 304 Kan. 
at 208. And not long ago, we "explicitly extend[ed] the holding of Petersen-Beard to 
apply to ex post facto challenges." State v. Reed, 306 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 
110,277, filed August 4, 2017), slip op. at 8. 
 
Therefore, to prevail, Hirschberg must demonstrate that drug offenders as a class 
are sufficiently distinguishable from the class of sex offenders such that the effects of the 
law become punitive rather than civil when applied to drug offenders. We recently 
confronted this question in State v. Meredith, 306 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 110,520, 
filed August 4, 2017). In that case, we declined to hold that KORA registration is 
punishment where "the record . . . is insufficiently developed for [the defendant] to 
persuasively argue KORA's allegedly punitive effects on drug offenders as a class 
separate and distinct from sex offenders." Meredith, 306 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 6; see 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003) ("Because we 
'ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated intent,' [citation omitted] '"only the clearest 
proof" will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been 
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,' [citations omitted]."); see also State 
v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 (1997) 
(holding that the legislature's intent in enacting KORA was to create a nonpunitive civil 
regulatory scheme); Doe v. Thompson, 304 Kan. 291, 373 P.3d 750 (2016) (upholding 
Myers' determination that the legislature intended to enact a nonpunitive scheme), 
overruled on other grounds by Petersen-Beard, 304 Kan. 192. We further explained in 
Meredith that such an inquiry "requires a robust record because the effects prong of the 
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applicable legal test obliges an appellate court to premise its legal conclusion on at least 
some fact-intensive questions." Meredith, 306 Kan. at ____, slip op. at 10.  
 
Hirschberg's claim suffers from the same flaw. He is unable to satisfy the "clearest 
proof" standard because the record below has not been sufficiently developed. As a 
result, we cannot—at this time—hold that KORA's registration requirements as applied 
to drug offenders are punishment and subject to the limitations of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. 
 
Affirmed. 
 
*** 
 
BEIER, J., dissenting:  Consistent with my votes in State v. Petersen-Beard, 304 
Kan. 192, 377 P.3d 1127 (2016); State v. Reed, 306 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 
110,277, filed August 4, 2017); and State v. Meredith, 306 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 
110,520, filed August 4, 2017), I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision in this 
case. "Kansas' requirement of offender registration—especially in its modern, maximally 
invasive, maximally pervasive, and infinitely more public incarnation—is punishment, 
certainly in effect if not in intent. It is no less so for a drug offender than for a sex 
offender or a violent offender. It is no less so when the Ex Post Facto Clause is before us 
than when Apprendi or the Eighth Amendment is before us." Meredith, 306 Kan. at ___, 
slip op. at 11-12 (Beier, J., dissenting). 
 
ROSEN and JOHNSON, JJ., join the foregoing dissent.