Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Harmon

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Harmon, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4171.] 
  
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-4171 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. HARMON. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Harmon,  
Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4171.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—
Conditionally stayed two-year suspension and monitored probation. 
(No. 2018-0817—Submitted January 9, 2019—Decided October 15, 2019.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct  
of the Supreme Court, No. 2017-036. 
______________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Phillip Louis Harmon, of Worthington, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0033371, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1980.1 
{¶ 2} In a complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct on 
August 8, 2017, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Harmon with professional 
misconduct arising from his representation of a single client in several legal matters, 
                                                          
 
1. Harmon is also admitted to practice law in the District of Columbia.   
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including his service as the client’s attorney-in-fact pursuant to two powers of 
attorney. 
{¶ 3} The parties entered into extensive factual stipulations and submitted 
hundreds of exhibits along with the testimony of seven witnesses, including 
Harmon.  During his disciplinary hearing, Harmon admitted that he had committed 
each of the alleged rule violations.  On that evidence, the panel found that Harmon 
committed all of the charged misconduct, and it recommended that he be suspended 
from the practice of law for two years with the final 18 months stayed on conditions.  
The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommended sanction. 
{¶ 4} Despite having stipulated to many of the board’s factual findings and 
having admitted to the charged misconduct, Harmon objects to the board’s findings 
of fact and misconduct, arguing that they are not supported by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the board failed to afford sufficient weight to his evidence, and that 
the charges against him should therefore be dismissed.  In addition, he argues that 
he has been prejudiced by evidentiary rulings and procedural flaws in the 
proceedings below.  For the reasons that follow, we overrule each of Harmon’s 
objections and adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct.  Having 
independently weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the board, 
however, we find that the appropriate sanction for Harmon’s misconduct is a two-
year suspension, stayed in its entirety on the condition that he engage in no further 
misconduct, combined with a term of monitored probation. 
The Board’s Findings of Fact and Misconduct 
{¶ 5} The conduct at issue in this case arose from Harmon’s personal 
friendship with and legal representation of Donald Harper.  Donald, a 1956 
Olympic Silver Medalist, had been Harmon’s high-school diving coach, and 
Harmon had known him and his wife, Sandra, for more than 40 years when he 
drafted their estate plan in 2011. 
January Term, 2019 
3 
 
{¶ 6} By 2015, Donald had been diagnosed with dementia and was living 
in a facility that specialized in caring for people with dementia.  When the Harpers 
told Harmon that they wanted to end their marriage, he advised them that he would 
not be able to represent either of them in an adversarial proceeding because doing 
so would place him in a conflict-of-interest situation.  Harmon and Sandra 
discussed the possibility of his representing Donald, so long as the termination of 
the marriage remained nonadversarial, and shortly thereafter, Sandra retained her 
own attorney.  Although Harmon was aware that Sandra was represented by 
counsel, he communicated with her directly on several occasions from mid-
November 2015 through late January 2016. 
{¶ 7} In early November 2015, while away from the residential care facility 
on a supervised home visit, Donald drove away in the family car without telling 
anyone where he was going.  He drove to his daughter Anne Halliday’s home in 
Colorado and then back to Ohio, but he refused to return to the residential care 
facility.  Instead, he returned to the marital residence, where Sandra was still living, 
for a few days.  On November 13, 2015, the police were called to the residence, 
and Donald was arrested and charged with domestic violence and assault following 
an altercation with Sandra. 
{¶ 8} On November 14, Harmon entered an appearance as counsel in 
Donald’s criminal case and Donald was released on bond.  He later helped Donald 
move into an extended-stay hotel. 
{¶ 9} On November 19, 2015, Harmon drafted and Donald signed a general 
and durable power of attorney that revoked a previously executed power of 
attorney, named Harmon as Donald’s attorney-in-fact, and named Halliday as his 
successor attorney-in-fact.  The newly executed power of attorney bore an 
expiration date of February 28, 2016. 
{¶ 10} On December 8, Donald signed a third power of attorney, identical 
to the November 19 power of attorney, except that it specified that it was for an 
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unlimited period of time and it expressly revoked the November 19 power of 
attorney.  Harmon then accompanied Donald to a bank, where Donald opened a 
new credit-card account and took a $5,000 cash advance.  Donald deposited the 
money into his checking account and issued a $2,500 check to Harmon as partial 
payment for legal services rendered in his criminal case.  Two days later, Donald 
issued a $5,000 check to Harmon.  Although the memo line of the check stated that 
it was for “POA matters,” Harmon actually used the money to pay for legal and 
nonlegal services that he had rendered on Donald’s behalf—including visiting with 
Donald, taking him to the gym, and making sure that he took his medications—all 
of which Harmon billed at the rate of $200 an hour. 
{¶ 11} In mid-December, Harmon sent Halliday an e-mail asking her to 
immediately assume custody of and take care of her father.  Halliday replied that 
she was willing to find a permanent living arrangement for her father in Colorado 
or Ohio.  In response, Harmon informed Halliday that he preferred that Donald live 
in Colorado and asked her to assume custody no later than January 31, 2016.  
Harmon continued to confer directly with Halliday regarding Donald’s living 
situation into January 2016, even though he knew that Halliday was represented by 
counsel. 
{¶ 12} On January 5, 2016, Donald entered a plea to an amended charge of 
disorderly conduct/intoxication.  He was sentenced to two years of community 
control and ordered to pay a fine of $100 and to stay away from Sandra and the 
marital home.  As a condition of his community control, Donald was required to 
obtain permission from his probation officer before leaving Franklin County for 
more than 72 hours. 
{¶ 13} Several days after Donald entered his plea, Harmon e-mailed 
Sandra’s attorney a proposal to dissolve the Harpers’ marriage and suggested that 
the marital assets be divided equally.  Harmon requested a $50,000 advance against 
Donald’s share to pay his bill of approximately $18,000 for services rendered plus 
January Term, 2019 
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a $10,000 retainer for future services, with the remainder allocated to pay Donald’s 
credit-card bill and future living expenses.  On January 22, Harmon informed 
Sandra’s attorney that he intended to file a complaint for divorce on Monday, 
January 25. 
{¶ 14} But when Harmon went to Donald’s hotel room on Friday, January 
22, he found only Donald’s friend Edward Bruno.  Bruno, who had taken Donald 
to the airport to catch a flight to Colorado, denied knowing where Donald was.  
Harmon filed a missing-person report with local police and sent an e-mail to 
Sandra’s attorney detailing his efforts to locate Donald. 
{¶ 15} At 7:49 p.m. that evening, Halliday sent an e-mail to all concerned 
stating that Donald had arrived safely in Colorado, that he intended to reside there, 
and that she would personally see to any medical or personal care that he needed.  
Shortly thereafter, Halliday’s husband left Harmon a voicemail message stating that 
Donald was safe.  But at 8:19 p.m., Harmon sent an e-mail to all concerned stating 
that Donald was “not ‘safe,’ medically or legally,” because the terms of his 
probation prohibited him from leaving the state and he had important medical 
appointments scheduled in Ohio.  He also advised that anyone who had knowingly 
assisted Donald in violating his probation would be subject to criminal prosecution. 
{¶ 16} Ensuing communications demonstrate that Harmon believed that 
Donald’s departure from the state had been involuntary or the product of undue 
influence and that Harmon refused to believe that Donald was safe.  But at 3:13 
p.m. on January 23, Halliday sent him an e-mail with an attached letter, signed by 
Donald and herself, stating that Donald had left Ohio of his own free will and that 
he no longer wanted Harmon to represent him.  New counsel for Donald quickly 
intervened to modify the terms of Donald’s probation, thereby eliminating the 
threat of sanctions for his departure from Franklin County. 
{¶ 17} Despite having received notice that Donald no longer wanted 
Harmon to represent him, Harmon continued to e-mail Sandra’s attorney seeking a 
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“global settlement” that would require (1) all concerned parties and their attorneys 
to sign a confidential mutual settlement-and-release agreement, releasing all claims 
against all parties and all attorneys, (2) payment of all attorney fees owed to the 
attorneys for the parties, including Harmon’s fees, which exceeded $25,000, and 
(3) the return of Donald’s Olympic ring, which Harmon claimed to hold as 
collateral for payment of his fees. 
{¶ 18} When that effort proved unsuccessful, Harmon filed a petition for 
declaratory judgment and other relief against Donald, Sandra, Halliday, Bruno, and 
the trustee of the Harper Family Trust Agreement in the Franklin County Probate 
Court.  In that pleading, Harmon advised the court that he faced a conflict of interest 
that required judicial review and resolution and asked the court to construe 
Donald’s December 8, 2015 power of attorney and the Harper Family Trust 
Agreement. 
{¶ 19} Harmon’s petition for declaratory judgment also stated civil claims 
for (1) tortious interference with a contractual fiduciary relationship, for which he 
sought an amount sufficient to compensate himself and Donald for the loss of the 
benefits of their contractual relationship, (2) undue influence, for which he sought 
an amount sufficient to compensate Donald for the loss of his share of the marital 
estate, and (3) an award of spousal support for Donald, including Harmon’s legal 
fees and costs related to his role as Donald’s attorney-in-fact.  In addition, Harmon 
sought leave of court to withdraw from all representations and requested the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem and legal counsel to represent Donald in the 
proceedings.  He later filed a notice in the probate court claiming that Halliday had 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by drafting letters and documents 
signed by her father, including a document revoking Harmon’s power of attorney. 
{¶ 20} Harmon voluntarily dismissed his petition for declaratory judgment 
at a March 28, 2016 status conference—but not before he falsely informed the 
magistrate that Donald had been “kidnapped” and that he had not received any 
January Term, 2019 
7 
 
information regarding Donald’s safety and welfare.  The next day, Harmon asked 
Donald and Sandra to suggest a fair payment for the services he had rendered and 
another attorney submitted Sandra’s grievance against Harmon to relator.  
Approximately one week later, Harmon revised his timesheets and voluntarily 
reduced his proposed legal fees from $9,350 to $8,684 for his work in the domestic-
relations matter and from $20,954 to $7,438 for the services he had provided as 
Donald’s attorney-in-fact.  He also offered to consider further reduction of his fees 
upon request. 
{¶ 21} At Harmon’s disciplinary hearing, attorney Michael Murman 
testified as an expert witness on behalf of relator.  He expressed his opinion that 
Harmon’s petition for declaratory judgment “[w]as very irregular and evidence of 
really bad-faith, an attempt to complicate things, an acting out.”  He further opined 
that the filing of the suit was “completely inappropriate” as a tactic for Harmon to 
get his fees paid. 
{¶ 22} Based on these findings, the board found that Harmon violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, 
or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee), 1.7(a)(2) (providing that a lawyer’s 
continued representation of a client creates a conflict of interest if there is a 
substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to represent the client will be materially 
limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, former client, or third 
person or by the lawyer’s own personal interests), 1.16(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to 
withdraw from representation if the lawyer is discharged), 3.1 (prohibiting a lawyer 
from bringing or defending a proceeding that is unsupported by law or lacks a good-
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law), 3.3(a)(1) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal), 4.2 (prohibiting a lawyer from communicating about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer 
unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law or a 
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court order), and 4.4 (prohibiting a lawyer, while representing a client, from using 
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, harass, delay, or 
burden a third person). 
Harmon’s Objections to the Board’s Proceedings and Findings 
{¶ 23} In response to the board’s report and recommendation, Harmon 
asserts four propositions of law, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with 
respect to each of the seven ethical violations found by the board, and raises five 
objections related to alleged prejudice caused by relator’s investigation and the 
panel’s evidentiary and procedural rulings. 
Stipulations of Fact Can Constitute Clear and 
Convincing Evidence of a Violation 
{¶ 24} In a disciplinary proceeding, the relator bears the burden of proving, 
by clear and convincing evidence, the facts necessary to establish a violation of a 
professional-conduct rule.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 130 Ohio St.3d 368, 
2011-Ohio-5578, 958 N.E.2d 914, ¶ 34; Gov.Bar R. V(12)(I). 
{¶ 25} As his first proposition of law, Harmon asserts that “[a] stipulation 
in a disciplinary proceeding is not proof of a violation by clear and convincing 
evidence unless the stipulation is supported by sufficient evidence.”  With this 
proposition, Harmon suggests that stipulations of fact cannot constitute clear and 
convincing evidence that an attorney has committed an ethical violation unless 
those stipulations are also supported by clear and convincing evidence.  Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1641 (10th Ed.2014) defines “stipulation” as a “voluntary 
agreement between opposing parties concerning some relevant point; esp., an 
agreement relating to a proceeding, made by attorneys representing adverse parties 
to the proceeding.”  Thus, a stipulation is nothing more than an agreement as to the 
truth of a fact in issue.  And this court has long recognized the rule that  
 
January Term, 2019 
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parties “may waive certain rights which are given them in a court of 
justice; they may agree that certain facts exist, without other proof 
of their existence; a party may waive exception to evidence not 
technically legal, may waive informalities in adversary pleading, or 
may admit, generally, that the issue joined against him, and suffer 
judgment without an investigation of the facts.” 
 
State v. Tate, 138 Ohio St.3d 139, 2014-Ohio-44, 4 N.E.3d 1016, ¶ 19, quoting 
Gittings v. Baker, 2 Ohio St. 21, 23-24 (1853).  Thus, contrary to Harmon’s 
proposition of law, stipulations of fact can constitute clear and convincing evidence 
of a rule violation. 
{¶ 26} However, the board’s prehearing instructions plainly state, “Parties 
should bear in mind that stipulations of rule violations must be supported by clear 
and convincing evidence of each alleged rule violation.  The hearing panel is not 
bound to accept stipulated rule violations that are not supported by stipulated facts 
and exhibits or evidence presented at the hearing.”  (Emphasis added.)  Ohio Board 
of 
Professional 
Conduct, 
Prehearing 
Instructions, 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/b9a93d_6cb1cc01f5df45ac9f5ae4d0a7d69474.pdf 
(accessed June 12, 2019).  In other words, there must be sufficient facts to support 
each element of a rule violation, and when the parties have not stipulated to all the 
facts necessary to prove an alleged rule violation, it is incumbent upon the relator 
to  establish the remaining elements of the offense by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
{¶ 27} Relator could have submitted this case to the board on the parties’ 
stipulated facts if he believed that those facts were sufficient to prove his case.  In 
this instance, however, relator elected to present additional evidence—the 
testimony of seven witnesses, including Harmon, and over 160 exhibits—all of 
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which were considered by the board and this court in determining whether relator 
has proved his case by clear and convincing evidence. 
Mitigation Evidence Is Evidence that 
May Weigh in Favor of a Less Severe Sanction 
{¶ 28} As his second proposition of law, Harmon asserts that “[m]itigation 
evidence that contradicts a stipulation in a disciplinary proceeding is permitted if a 
party seeks and is granted leave to present additional evidence to contradict the 
stipulation.”  Here, however, Harmon did not seek to withdraw his stipulations or 
obtain leave to present additional evidence regarding his conduct.  Rather, he stated 
at his disciplinary hearing that he stipulated to all seven alleged violations and that 
he would like to have an opportunity to “present some mitigation evidence,” to 
which the panel chair replied, “Certainly.”  And pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C), 
mitigation evidence consists of evidence that may weigh in favor of a less severe 
sanction—not evidence that purports to contradict the very stipulations of fact and 
misconduct that the respondent freely and voluntarily entered into.  We therefore 
conclude that the panel chair did not grant Harmon leave to withdraw his 
stipulations of fact and misconduct or to present evidence that contradicted those 
stipulations but permitted him to present evidence that might weigh in favor of a 
less severe sanction. 
The Board Has No Obligation to Provide More Detailed Findings of Fact 
{¶ 29} As his third proposition of law, Harmon asserts that “[i]f a grievant 
in a disciplinary proceeding requests findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
each charge, the Board of Professional Conduct must identify the specific facts and 
legal authority on each separate charge which supports its recommended sanction.” 
And as his fifth objection to the board’s report, Harmon argues that he was 
prejudiced by the board’s failure to identify the elements of each offense and to 
articulate the specific facts that prove each of those elements.  Harmon does not 
offer any support for these arguments or even suggest how the board’s alleged 
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failure prejudiced his case.  Moreover, nothing in the rules requires the board to 
provide the level of specificity that Harmon demands.  On the contrary, Gov.Bar R. 
V(12)(K) provides: 
 
If the Board determines that a public reprimand, suspension 
for a period for a period of six months to two years, probation, 
suspension for an indefinite period, or disbarment is merited, the 
Board shall file a certified report of its proceedings, including its 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction, 
with the clerk of the Supreme Court. 
 
{¶ 30} We find that the board’s 15-page report conforms to the 
requirements of the rule and provides ample information both to Harmon and to 
this court, allowing us to effectively evaluate Harmon’s conduct.  Consequently, 
we overrule Harmon’s arguments in this regard. 
Harmon’s Declaratory-Judgment Action Was Not Necessary or Reasonably 
Calculated to Protect His Client 
{¶ 31} As his fourth proposition of law, Harmon asserts that it is not a 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for an attorney and fiduciary to 
report perceived financial injury of an impaired client by filing a civil action in the 
probate court under R.C. 1337.36 (permitting certain interested persons to petition 
a court to construe a power of attorney or review the agent’s conduct and grant 
appropriate relief).  He cites Dayton Bar Assn. v. Parisi, 131 Ohio St.3d 345, 2012-
Ohio-879, 965 N.E.2d 268, for the proposition that his declaratory-judgment action 
was necessary to effectuate his withdrawal from Donald’s representation, to protect 
Donald going forward, and to collect his fee.  Consequently, Harmon contends that 
the board’s findings that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(a)(3), 3.1, and 4.4 are not 
supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
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{¶ 32} While we agree with the general principle that an attorney does not 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct by reporting the perceived financial 
injury of an impaired client to a probate court, we find that Harmon’s declaratory-
judgment action was neither required by Parisi nor reasonably calculated to protect 
Donald’s interests. 
{¶ 33} In Parisi, we found that an attorney had engaged in conduct that was 
prejudicial to the administration of justice by obtaining a power of attorney over 
her client’s affairs after she had filed an application for guardianship alleging that 
the client was incompetent and then using that power of attorney to pay herself 
nearly $19,000 for her legal services without obtaining the probate court’s approval.  
Parisi at ¶ 7.  Harmon, in contrast, served as Donald’s agent and attorney-in-fact 
pursuant to a power of attorney that required no court approval for his termination, 
withdrawal from the representation, or payment of his reasonable fees.  See, e.g., 
R.C. 1337.30(B)(1) (providing that an agent’s authority terminates when the 
principal revokes the authority); R.C. 1337.38 (permitting an agent to resign by 
giving notice to the principal and if the principal is incapacitated, to the principal’s 
caregiver, another person reasonably believed by the agent to have sufficient 
interest in the principal’s welfare, or a governmental agency having authority to 
protect the welfare of the principal); R.C. 1337.32 (providing that unless the power 
of attorney provides otherwise, an agent is entitled to compensation that is 
reasonable under the circumstances). 
{¶ 34} And here, there is ample evidence that Harmon’s declaratory-
judgment action was not reasonably calculated to protect his client from his 
family’s alleged neglect, abuse, and undue influence as Harmon claimed.  Indeed, 
Harmon waited nearly four weeks after Donald’s purported kidnapping to file the 
action.  And rather than seek guardianship or limited guardianship under R.C. 
2111.03 to ensure Donald’s long-term physical and financial well-being, Harmon 
sought only to have a guardian ad litem appointed to protect Donald’s interests in 
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the declaratory-judgment action.  Furthermore, there was no need to construe 
Harmon’s authority under the power of attorney given that Donald had already 
terminated Harmon’s authority to act as his attorney in fact and at law and Halliday 
had done exactly as Harmon had asked by relocating her father to Colorado before 
January 31, 2016, and taking care of his affairs as his successor attorney-in-fact.  
Despite Harmon’s arguments and evidence to the contrary, the board found and we 
agree that the primary purposes of Harmon’s declaratory-judgment action were to 
collect his fees and to harass and embarrass Halliday and Bruno for interfering in 
his relationship with Donald.  Because the record does not weigh heavily against 
those findings, we defer to the credibility determinations of the panel members who 
were able to see and hear the witnesses firsthand.  See, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 
Statzer, 101 Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8.  We therefore 
overrule Harmon’s objections in this regard and adopt the board’s findings of fact 
and misconduct with respect to Harmon’s violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(a)(3), 
3.1, and 4.4. 
The Board’s Remaining Findings of Fact and Misconduct 
Are Supported by Clear and Convincing Evidence 
{¶ 35} Next, Harmon challenges the board’s findings that he charged a 
clearly excessive fee, had a conflict of interest that should have prevented him from 
representing Donald in the termination of his marriage, had improper 
communication with a represented party, and made false statements to the probate 
magistrate, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a), 1.7(a)(2), 4.2, and 3.3(a).  He argues 
that the fee he charged for Donald’s legal and nonlegal matters was a technical 
rather than a substantive violation of the professional-conduct rules, noting that he 
could reasonably have charged a higher rate for his legal services and ultimately 
had agreed to lower the hourly rate he charged for his nonlegal services.  But 
Harmon’s arguments do not diminish the fact that he has admitted that he charged 
the same hourly rate for legal and nonlegal services—a practice that we have 
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previously denounced as violating the rule against charging a clearly excessive fee.  
See, e.g., Erie-Huron Cty. Bar Assn. v. Zelvy, 155 Ohio St.3d 609, 2018-Ohio-5095, 
122 N.E.3d 1267.  His arguments that the parties orally consented to his 
representing Donald in the termination of his marriage and agreed to engage in a 
collaborative family-law process that would permit him to have direct 
communication with Sandra are likewise without merit as he has presented no 
evidence that either Sandra or Donald gave written consent to either the 
representation despite the conflict of interest as required by Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(b) or 
the collaborative family-law process as required by R.C. 3105.44(A).  And despite 
Harmon’s assertion that the board found only that he had misled the probate-court 
magistrate, we note that the board expressly found that Harmon had knowingly 
made false statements of fact or law to a tribunal by advising the magistrate that 
Donald had been kidnapped and that he had not received any information regarding 
Donald’s safety and welfare.  We therefore overrule Harmon’s objections in this 
regard and adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct with respect to 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a), 1.7(a)(2), 4.2, and 3.3(a). 
Harmon’s Procedural Objections Are Without Merit 
{¶ 36} As his four remaining objections, Harmon argues that he was 
prejudiced by (1) relator’s failure to complete his investigation within one year of 
Sandra’s filing a grievance against him, (2) relator’s failure to interview Donald or 
Sandra during the course of this disciplinary proceeding, (3) the panel chair’s denial 
of his motion to depose relator regarding his alleged collusion with former 
disciplinary counsel to initiate an unwarranted investigation against Harmon,2 and 
(4) the panel chair’s exclusion of certain exhibits that Harmon sought to admit in 
an effort to prove that others involved in the underlying litigation had engaged in 
                                                          
 
2. Harmon has moved to strike relator’s answer to this objection and to impose sanctions on relator 
based on relator’s alleged inclusion of facts that are not part of the record in this case.  Because 
Harmon failed to object to those facts, which were stated in no fewer than four of relator’s previous 
filings beginning in September 2017, we overrule his motion to strike and for sanctions.   
January Term, 2019 
15 
 
misconduct.  Having thoroughly reviewed Harmon’s arguments and the record, 
however, we find that these objections are without merit. 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 37} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
the relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 38} As aggravating factors, the board found that Harmon had acted with 
a dishonest or selfish motive; had committed multiple offenses; and had failed to 
make restitution for the legal fees that Halliday, Sandra, and Bruno incurred as a 
result of his misconduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2), (4), and (9).  In addition, 
the board found that despite his extensive factual stipulations and his eventual 
admission that he had committed the charged violations, Harmon had failed to fully 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(7).  
In mitigation, the board found that Harmon had no prior discipline and had 
submitted a number of letters attesting to his good character.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(1) and (5). 
{¶ 39} Finding that there are no Ohio disciplinary cases involving the exact 
combination of rule violations found in this case, the board considered the sanctions 
we have imposed in cases involving just some of those violations.  For example, in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Maniscalco, 68 Ohio St.3d 483, 628 N.E.2d 1357 (1994), 
we publicly reprimanded an attorney who had filed two frivolous lawsuits.  In 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Schuman, 152 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio-8800, 92 N.E.3d 
850, we imposed a one-year suspension with six months stayed on conditions on 
an attorney who had collected a clearly excessive fee and had knowingly made a 
false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.  And in Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Alsfelder, 
103 Ohio St.3d 375, 2004-Ohio-5216, 816 N.E.2d 218, we imposed a conditionally 
stayed one-year suspension stayed on condition on an attorney who had failed to 
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obtain his client’s informed consent to a conflict of interest, had charged legal rates 
for nonlegal services, and had failed to maintain complete records of client property 
coming into his possession.  Recognizing that Harmon’s conduct was more 
extensive than the misconduct committed by Maniscalo, Schuman, and Alsfelder, 
the board believed that a greater sanction was warranted.  The board cited 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Lukey, 110 Ohio St.3d 128, 2006-Ohio-3822, 851 N.E.2d 
493, ¶ 23, for the proposition that “[a]n actual suspension of a lawyer’s license to 
practice is the appropriate sanction when the lawyer has intentionally 
misrepresented a crucial fact to a court in order to benefit a party” and 
recommended that Harmon be suspended for two years with 18 months stayed on 
the conditions that he engage in no further misconduct and make full restitution to 
Halliday, Sandra, and Bruno. 
{¶ 40} Having sought a general dismissal of relator’s complaint, Harmon 
has not specifically objected to the board’s recommended sanction.  He notes, 
however, that this is his first disciplinary offense after almost 40 years of practice, 
that he fully cooperated with relator’s investigation, and that he entered into 
extensive stipulations of fact in this matter.  He also suggests that his false 
statements to the probate-court magistrate “were an overstatement in the midst of 
an emotional legal argument.”  At the panel hearing, Harmon stated that he had 
previously never served under a power of attorney or as a guardian, and it is evident 
from his testimony that his emotional involvement and his desire to protect his 
friend and mentor of more than 40 years clouded his judgment in this case.  We 
also note that Harmon has submitted more than 30 letters from attorneys, former 
clients, and friends attesting to his good character, reputation, and legal skill.  On 
these facts, we believe that a two-year suspension, all stayed on the condition that 
Harmon engage in no further misconduct, combined with a two-year period of 
monitored probation will adequately protect the public from future harm. 
January Term, 2019 
17 
 
{¶ 41} The board has also recommended that Harmon be required to make 
restitution of $12,961 to Halliday, $38,675.25 to Sandra, and $1,000 to Bruno to 
compensate them for the attorney fees they incurred in defending his declaratory-
judgment action.  Although we have ordered a respondent to reimburse a client for 
the additional attorney fees the client incurred by hiring another attorney to perform 
the work the respondent had failed to complete, see Toledo Bar Assn. v. Harvey, 
141 Ohio St.3d 346, 2014-Ohio-3675, 24 N.E.3d 1106, ¶ 30, 37, superseded in part 
on other grounds by rule as stated in Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fernandez, 147 Ohio 
St.3d 329, 2016-Ohio-5586, 65 N.E.3d 724, relator has cited no case in which we 
have ordered a respondent to make restitution to a third party for attorney fees 
allegedly occasioned by the respondent’s misconduct.  Because Halliday, Sandra, 
and Bruno had the opportunity to seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to Civ.R. 
11, we decline to award those fees as restitution in this case. 
{¶ 42} Accordingly, Phillip Louis Harmon is suspended from the practice 
of law in Ohio for two years, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that 
he engage in no further misconduct.  Harmon shall also serve a two-year period of 
monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21).  If Harmon fails to 
comply with the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he shall serve the 
full two-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to Harmon. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by STEWART, J. 
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
STEWART, J., dissents and would order restitution to the third parties. 
_________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 43} Today the majority imposes on respondent, Phillip Louis Harmon, a 
two-year suspension, all stayed, and a term of monitored probation for a wide array 
of professional misconduct.  Because our precedent, together with the aggravating 
factors and minimal mitigating factors in this case, requires the imposition of a term 
of actual suspension, I dissent.  I would adopt the recommendation of the Board of 
Professional Conduct regarding the suspension and impose a two-year suspension 
with 18 months stayed on the condition that Harmon engage in no further 
misconduct.  I would not order probation in this case.  Further, I note that the 
majority fails to include any conditions of probation, which this court must include 
as part of imposing a term of monitored probation, see Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Halligan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-3748, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 39-45 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 44} Harmon committed multiple violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct in his representation of Donald Harper, including charging clearly 
excessive fees (Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)), making a false statement to a tribunal 
(Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1)), failing to obtain written consent to represent a party 
despite a conflict of interest (Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a)(2)), and bringing an action 
unsupported by law for the purpose of collecting his fees and harassing and 
embarrassing Donald’s daughter, Anne Halliday, and Donald’s friend, Edward 
Bruno (Prof.Cond.R. 4.4). 
{¶ 45} As aggravating factors, the board found and the justices joining the 
lead opinion agreed that Harmon acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, 
committed multiple offenses, and failed to fully acknowledge the wrongful nature 
of his misconduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2), (4), and (7).  I agree with these 
findings, but based on a review of the record, I would also find as an aggravating 
factor that Harmon’s misconduct caused harm to a vulnerable person, see Gov.Bar 
January Term, 2019 
19 
 
R. V(13)(B)(8), on the basis that Harmon’s misconduct involved a victim who had 
been diagnosed with dementia. 
{¶ 46} While I fully acknowledge as mitigating that this is Harmon’s first 
disciplinary offense in a long career in the practice of law and that more than 30 
letters attesting to his good character, reputation, and legal skill were submitted, I 
disagree with the lead opinion’s determination that Harmon’s judgment was 
“clouded” by “his desire to protect his friend and mentor,” lead opinion at ¶ 40, and 
I reject the idea that Harmon’s testimony that he had never previously served as an 
agent under a power of attorney or as a guardian merits consideration as mitigating. 
{¶ 47} I agree that Harmon’s judgment was clouded, but I do not agree that 
it was clouded by a desire to protect his friend.  His actions belie the notion that he 
had Donald’s best interests at heart and instead demonstrate an overriding desire to 
collect his fees.  Who protects a friend suffering from dementia by doing the 
following: accompanying him to a bank and having him open a new credit-card 
account in order to secure a $5,000 cash advance and then taking $2,500 of those 
funds; charging a legal rate for nonlegal services such as visiting him, driving him 
to the gym, and making sure he took his medication; or holding his 1956 Olympic 
ring as collateral until his attorney fees are paid?  From obtaining the original power 
of attorney to seeking a $50,000 advance from Donald’s share of a proposed 
divorce settlement to the filing of the action in probate court, Harmon’s actions 
demonstrated the relentless pursuit of fees. 
{¶ 48} As for Harmon’s claim to never having served as an agent under a 
power of attorney or as a guardian constituting some mitigating evidence, one of 
the foundational aspects of the Rules of Professional Conduct is that a lawyer 
should assume representation of a client only in those matters that the lawyer is 
competent to undertake.  Prof.Cond.R. 1.1.  If Harmon’s legal experience was such 
that he could not competently represent Donald under a power of attorney or as a 
guardian, then he should have declined to undertake the representation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
{¶ 49} I agree with the lead opinion’s determination that there is no Ohio 
disciplinary case involving the combination of rule violations at issue here; the 
board nevertheless examined three separate cases involving some of the rule 
violations at issue here, and those cases, together with the aggravating factors and 
minimal mitigating factors in this case, support the imposition of an actual term of 
suspension. 
{¶ 50} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Schuman, 152 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio-
8800, 92 N.E.3d 850, an attorney who had served as a court-appointed guardian ad 
litem in a child-custody case filed an action against the parents in municipal court 
to recover attorney fees charging a legal-services rate of $150 an hour despite the 
fact that the juvenile court had approved a rate of $80 an hour.  Schuman then 
moved for a default judgment after the parents failed to answer the complaint.  
Attached to the motion for default judgment was an affidavit indicating that $150 
an hour was a reasonable rate and an itemized bill that had been submitted and filed 
with the juvenile court.  Schuman had altered the itemized bill by changing the $80-
an-hour court-approved rate and the total fees due.  The aggravating factors in that 
case were a selfish motive, multiple offenses, and harm to a vulnerable person.  The 
mitigating factors were no prior disciplinary record, a cooperative attitude and full 
and free disclosures to the board, and 55 letters attesting to Schuman’s good 
character.  We suspended Schuman from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, 
with the final six months stayed on the conditions that he commit no further 
misconduct and complete two continuing-legal-education courses on law-office 
management. 
{¶ 51} Here, Harmon’s misleading of the tribunal did not involve falsifying 
documents, but he knowingly made false statements to a magistrate in an action 
unsupported by law that he had filed in an effort to collect his own fees.  Moreover, 
Harmon violated additional professional-conduct rules that Schuman did not 
violate. 
January Term, 2019 
21 
 
{¶ 52} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Maniscalco, 68 Ohio St.3d 483, 628 
N.E.2d 1357 (1994), this court adopted the parties’ stipulated sanction and publicly 
reprimanded an attorney who had filed two frivolous lawsuits.  In that case, no 
aggravating factors were found and the parties stipulated to mitigating factors of no 
prior misconduct, cooperation with the investigation, and full and free disclosure to 
the board.  But unlike in this case, Maniscalco’s clients were willing participants in 
the filing of the frivolous lawsuits.  Here, Harmon had no client prompting him to 
file suit; he did so to benefit himself.  And Harmon committed significant violations 
that were not at issue in Maniscalco. 
{¶ 53} In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Alsfelder, 103 Ohio St.3d 375, 2004-Ohio-
5216, 816 N.E.2d 218, we adopted the panel’s recommended sanction, with a slight 
modification, instead of the board’s recommended sanction.  The panel 
recommended a stayed one-year suspension for Alsfelder’s failing to obtain 
informed consent from a client regarding a conflict of interest, billing for nonlegal 
services at a legal rate, and failing to maintain complete records of all client funds 
that came into his possession and render appropriate accounts regarding those 
funds.  The board recommended a one-year suspension with only the last six 
months stayed.  The case centered on Alsfelder’s charging a client an exorbitant 
flat annual rate for legal services even though the time he spent with the client often 
involved nonlegal services; it seemed the client did not require sophisticated legal 
counsel but instead craved attention. The panel recommended the stay be 
“conditioned on repayment of almost half of the fees,” id. at ¶ 32, while we required 
the payment of restitution in full within six months of the date of the order.  In 
reaching our decision, we noted that the panel had not found a violation of the 
attorney-conduct rule prohibiting an attorney from intentionally damaging or 
prejudicing a client during their professional relationship.  We took from the panel’s 
recommendation that “the panel credited [Alsfelder’s] claim that his misconduct 
was all the result of a grave but well-intentioned mistake.”  Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
{¶ 54} In contrast, there was nothing well-intentioned about Harmon’s 
behavior in this case.  As the lead opinion recognizes, the filing of the declaratory-
judgment action was calculated to collect fees—including legal fees knowingly 
charged for nonlegal work—and to harass and embarrass people close to Donald.  
Harmon knew he had a conflict of interest that prevented him from ethically 
representing either party in the divorce case, but he continued to represent Donald, 
and he repeatedly contacted Sandra Harper even though she was represented by 
other counsel.  He misled the magistrate in the probate case by indicating that he 
did not know Donald’s whereabouts. 
{¶ 55} I would hold that this case is more akin to Schuman and requires a 
similar actual suspension.  “[W]hen an attorney’s misconduct involves repeated 
dishonesty—and 
especially 
when 
the 
dishonesty 
includes 
making 
misrepresentations to a court—an actual suspension from the practice of law is 
warranted.”  Schuman, 152 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio-8800, 92 N.E.3d 850, at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 56} “[T]he primary purpose of disciplinary sanctions is not to punish the 
offender, but to protect the public.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53.  “Protecting the public, 
however, is not strictly limited to protecting clients from a specific attorney’s 
potential misconduct.  Imposing attorney-discipline sanctions also protects the 
public by demonstrating to the bar and the public that this type of conduct will not 
be tolerated.”  Schuman at ¶ 17.  And we should demonstrate through our sanction 
in this case that behavior such as Harmon’s will not be tolerated: 
 
A lawyer who engages in a material misrepresentation to a court or 
a pattern of dishonesty with a client violates, at a minimum, the 
lawyer’s oath of office * * *.  Such conduct strikes at the very core 
of a lawyer’s relationship with the court and with the client.  Respect 
for our procession is diminished with every deceitful act of a lawyer.  
January Term, 2019 
23 
 
We cannot expect citizens to trust that lawyers are honest if we have 
not yet sanctioned those who are not. 
 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 190, 658 N.E.2d 237 
(1995). 
{¶ 57} For all the foregoing reasons, I would impose a two-year suspension 
with the final 18 months stayed on the condition of no further misconduct.  I would 
not impose probation on Harmon; he has practiced law for nearly 40 years without 
any other involvement in the disciplinary process, and his behavior here seems the 
result of human frailties—avarice and emotion—rather than a result of ongoing 
professional shortcomings.  If he engages in further misconduct, the stay on his 
two-year suspension will be lifted.  But because the majority does impose 
probation, it should impose conditions on that probation.  See Halligan, ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-3748, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 39-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that when this court imposes probation, 
it must also impose conditions for the probation).  I agree with the other dissenting 
opinion that this court should not overburden attorneys who contribute their time 
to volunteer as probation monitors.  Therefore, probation should be meted out 
judiciously rather than reflexively and this court should set forth the conditions of 
the probation, providing clear guidance for both the monitor and the respondent.  
After all, the first duty listed for monitors in Gov.Bar R. V(21)(B)(1) is to 
“[m]onitor compliance by the respondent with the conditions of probation imposed 
by the Supreme Court.”  Specific conditions provide parameters and predictability 
for monitors; in contrast, a broad mandate to monitor creates uncertainty as to the 
breadth and depth of the monitor’s responsibility.  The work of an attorney is often 
fast-paced and complex; every day brings new challenges related to achieving the 
goals of clients.  Monitors should be given a framework in which to skillfully 
examine certain aspects of a respondent’s practice, rather than be forced to attempt 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
an all-encompassing, untargeted supervision of the practice.  Defining the duties 
for a monitor—by way of establishing expectations for a respondent—makes the 
monitoring more manageable, not overtaxing.  It’s also what the Rules for the 
Government of the Bar require. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 58} Like the other dissenting opinion, I too would impose a two-year 
suspension with 18 months stayed on the condition that respondent, Philip Louis 
Harmon, engage in no further misconduct. 
{¶ 59} I disagree with the other dissenting opinion, however, to the limited 
extent that it calls for specific conditions in each and every case in which monitored 
probation is imposed as a sanction. 
{¶ 60} As I have previously observed, see Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Halligan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-3748, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 33-37 (Fischer, 
J., concurring), no rule in the Rules for the Government of the Bar mandates that 
this court specify conditions during a probation period.  In fact, as each disciplinary 
case is unique, the rules are written to give the Board of Professional Conduct the 
flexibility to recommend any conditions, and for the court to order conditions, if 
any, as may be desirable given the specific facts and circumstances involved.  Id. 
{¶ 61} Additionally, as a practical matter, reading such an intense 
requirement into the rules poses certain problems.  This court relies a great deal 
upon volunteers to help administer Ohio’s attorney-discipline system.  This 
includes the attorneys who volunteer to serve as probation monitors.  If the court 
were to impose numerous specific conditions in monitored-probation cases, it 
would tax those attorneys, who are already so generous with the time they spend 
volunteering as monitors, by asking even more of them. 
{¶ 62} Therefore, I respectfully and separately dissent. 
January Term, 2019 
25 
 
____________________________ 
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, Joseph M. Caligiuri, Chief Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for 
relator. 
Phillip L. Harmon, pro se. 
_____________________________