Title: Nicholls v. Nicholls

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Nicholls v. Nicholls1986 WY 152721 P.2d 1103Case Number: 86-55Decided: 07/14/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Arthur T. NICHOLLS, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

Cara O. NICHOLLS, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Arthur T. 
Nicholls, pro 
se.

Michael 
Shoumaker, Sheridan, for appellee 
(plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     An increased 
child-support obligation, derived from a modification proceeding, arrives here 
by appeal of the not surprisingly dissatisfied father.

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The parties were 
married in 1963. Two children were born of the marriage who were 16 and 13 at 
the time of the divorce in 1982. The defendant father (an attorney in Nevada) was originally 
represented in the initial proceeding but separated from his attorney about the 
time of trial, and acted pro se when the decree was entered May 14, 1982, and 
supplemented by order of May 24, 1982.

[¶4.]     In addition to 
extensive provision for property settlement, a child-support provision 
accommodating custody by the mother provided for the payment of $200 per month 
per child.

[¶5.]     The oldest child 
reached majority in 1985, and the father discontinued half his $400 per month 
support payment. The mother reciprocated by a motion for an increase in child 
support.

[¶6.]     Trial was held, but, 
like the original proceeding, no record is available since a court reporter was 
not secured. Concluding the decisional process from the modification hearing, 
the trial court entered an amended support order for the remaining child of 15 
percent of the father's gross income, or $400 per month, whichever is less, from 
which amended support order the present appeal is taken.

[¶7.]     Appellant filed a 
statement of proceedings and evidence, the mother filed a reply in response, and 
the court filed a statement of proceedings and evidence, settling the record 
pursuant to Rule 4.03 W.R.A.P. (identical to Rule 10(c) F.R.A.P.), and factually 
supporting the earlier decision by the following 
conclusions:

"4. Evidence presented 
indicated to the Court that Plaintiff Appellee's present income was 
approximately one half of what her income was at the time of the 
Divorce.

"5. The evidence 
indicated to the Court that Defendant Appellant's income from his position as 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in Reno was $36,000.00 as opposed to $23,000.00 at 
the time of the Divorce."

[¶8.]     The father contends 
error in this factual resolution, stating the issue:

"More specifically, the 
question is whether the evidence supported the Judge's action and whether he 
applied legally recognizable standards or whether he arbitrarily ruled based on 
his personal beliefs."

[¶9.]     The father contests an 
income comparison differential between 1982 and 1985, and argues that the 
mother, by the original decree, obtained an unequal distribution of the property 
then owned by the parties. His characterization of the portions of his statement 
deleted by the judge was:

"They were not deleted 
because they weren't true or accurate, they were deleted because they were true 
and accurate and wouldn't help in justifying the final 
decision."

[¶10.]  Appellant strongly contends that 
inadequate inclusions were afforded by the judge from the father's submissions 
of fact, and erroneous conclusions were thus derived.

[¶11.]  This court concludes, as derived from its 
more exhaustive review of the subject in Feaster v. Feaster, 721 P.2d 1087 (Wyo. 
1986) (1986), that the only "facts" in this case available for consideration are 
those drawn from the settled statement of the trial court.

"* * * Thereupon the statement and any objections or 
proposed amendments shall be submitted to the district court for settlement and 
approval and as settled and approved 
shall be included by the clerk of the district court in the record on appeal." (Emphasis added.) 
Rule 4.03, W.R.A.P.

[¶12.]  The record facts for review simply do not 
include either the submission of the appellee or that of the appellant, but only 
those facts derived and settled by the trial court. Camps v. New York City Transit 
Authority, 261 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1958); Hawkins v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 188 F.2d 348 (8th Cir. 1951); Graham v. Carr, 112 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1940). 
Appellant's brief affords no authority contrary to this uniformly accepted rule. 
We especially draw attention to the comprehensively detailed case of Carson 
Ready Mix, Inc. v. First National Bank of Nevada, 97 Nev. 474, 635 P.2d 276 
(1981):

"It is the responsibility 
of appellant to make an adequate appellate record. * *

"Furthermore, the 
difficulty here is not merely in the failure of the record on appeal to conform 
to the rules in some technical respect. In essence, the problem lies in the 
failure of the record made in the court below to reflect fully and accurately 
what occurred. That defect cannot be corrected here." 635 P.2d  at 
277-278.

[¶13.]  It is neither briefed nor contended that 
the right of modification of a child-support order does not exist pursuant to 
Wyoming law. 
The only question is whether the modification is an abuse of discretion as 
devolved from a determination of changed circumstances. The significance of a 
proper record as a premise for appellate review was adequately enunciated in 
Feaster v. Feaster, supra. See also W.E. Bill Sauer's Drilling Company v. 
Gendron, 720 P.2d 909 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶14.]  May it suffice to say that an attorney 
who does not obtain a court reporter in a modification proceeding cannot 
exercise the contemplative review of this tribunal by recriminatory challenge to 
the factual Rule 4.03 settlement conclusion of the trial court. Anguish and 
anger in an appellate brief presentation are no substitute for a solid legal 
basis for effectuation of this court's appellate responsibility. In order to 
reverse a trial court which exercises its recognized discretionary capacity, a 
factual basis must be evidenced, and that responsibility lies with the appellant 
who was, in this case as pro se, himself an attorney. See Feaster v. Feaster, 
supra. Fortunately, the remaining child will be 19 on February 26, 1988, when 
court ordered support will end. Maybe also the controversy will moderate as the 
parties continue to look at college education for their two 
children.

[¶15.]  Furthermore, it was neither home-town 
justice nor the experience of the trial judge which determined the conduct of 
the case by appellant as an experienced practicing attorney in representing 
himself. Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First National Bank of Nevada, supra. Were the 
court sympathetic, it could do no differently, under established rules with 
nationwide application.

[¶16.]  We must then face the second aspect of 
appellate resolution, less certainly determinable on appeal denial of appellate 
resolution: the question of assessment of costs and attorney's 
fees.

[¶17.]  Fees and costs will be automatically 
charged under the present rules. Hance v. Straatsma, 721 P.2d 575 (Wyo. 1986). Furthermore, 
we find lack of good cause shown under Rule 10.05, W.R.A.P., to deny the 
addition of a charge against appellant for appellee's attorney's 
fees.

"When, in a civil case, 
the judgment or final order is affirmed, appellee shall recover the cost for 
typewriting and reproducing his brief, such cost to be computed at the rate 
allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence. Unless the court 
certifies that there was reasonable cause for the appeal, there shall also be 
taxed as part of the costs in the case, a reasonable fee, to be fixed by the 
court, not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than five hundred 
dollars ($500.00), to the counsel of the appellee, and to the appellee damages 
in such sum as may be reasonable, not exceeding one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00), unless the judgment or final order directs the payment of money, 
and execution thereof was stayed, when in lieu of such penalty, it shall bear 
additional interest at a rate not exceeding five percent (5%) per annum, for the 
time for which it was stayed, to be ascertained and awarded by the court." Rule 
10.05, W.R.A.P.

[¶18.]  This court cannot, without a proper 
factual record, certify a reasonable cause for the appeal on a conflict-of-fact 
contention, and will therefore assess legal fees of $500, in addition to 
costs.1

[¶19.]  The decision of the trial court is 
affirmed by denial of this appeal, with costs to be assessed pursuant to Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, including, in addition, legal fees of $500 to be 
granted to appellee and charged to appellant.

FOOTNOTES

1 The amount of attorney's 
fees that may be assessed can be substantially increased when the amended rule, 
Rule 10.05, W.R.A.P. goes into effect July 15, 1986. Divorce-case modification 
appeals should be realistically premised upon an adequate factual 
record.