Title: Short v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

250 Ind. 459 (1968)
237 N.E.2d 258
SHORT
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,985.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed May 29, 1968.
*460 John M. Heeter, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Murray West, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
JACKSON, J.
Appellant was charged by affidavit with Commission of Robbery While Armed. Following the trial by jury he was convicted and sentenced to a term of twenty years in the Indiana State Reformatory. From such conviction stems this appeal.
The affidavit on which appellant was tried, omitting formal parts thereof, reads as follows:
Appellant waived arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial was had by jury which returned its verdict as follows:
After pre-sentence investigation the court imposed sentence as follows:
Thereafter appellant filed his Motion for a New Trial, which is too voluminous to set forth in detail, but in essence the grounds therefore may be grouped in the following four categories:
*462 The Motion for New Trial was filed October 25, 1965, and was overruled on March 16, 1966.
Appellant's Assignment of Errors, omitting formal parts, reads as follows:
Appellant contends in his brief that the court erred in admitting into evidence his admission made after the arrest because the police did not advise him he had a right to remain silent. In support of his contention he cites Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 84 S. Ct. 1758, and Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.
Escobedo only holds that if during police interrogation the defendant requests and does not get counsel, then any statement made cannot be used against him.
Miranda is not in point as it is not applicable to cases tried prior to June 13, 1966. See: Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), 384 U.S. 719, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, 86 S. Ct. 1772. In the case at bar the trial occurred on September 27, 1965.
Appellant contends the court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial. On cross examination Officer Jarvis, a State's witness, testified as follows:
*463 In Greenwalt v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 608, 620, 209 N.E.2d 254, 260, this Court stated as follows:
"It is within the sound discretion of the court to determine if legal necessity exists for the discharge of the jury."
Since appellant has not alleged or shown an abuse of discretion by the court, we find no error here. Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the officer's answer. In 53 Am. Jur., Trial § 999, it is stated as follows:
On the question of the admission of State's Exhibit 7 appellant claims error. The witness Phillips, who admitted the robbery, testified as a witness for appellant and testified on direct examination that appellant was not with him at the time. On cross examination the State introduced its Exhibit No. 7, which was a written statement of Phillips stating appellant was with him at the time of the robbery.
Where evidence is received over accused's objection, accused cannot on appeal urge for first time other or different objections. In Gernhart v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 470, 473, 120 N.E.2d 265, this Court stated as follows:
*464 At the time said Exhibit No. 7 was offered in evidence, appellant objected on the grounds that "it brings into a collateral matter the signing of these exhibits, or statements, or whatever they purport to be, for one reason. Secondly, they are not signed in the presence, and are not made in the presence of this defendant. And third, they are seeking to do by indirection something they cannot do here by way of impeachment," and for the further reason that "the record is barren as to how that purported exhibit was obtained from the witness, whether voluntary or involuntary."
Since appellant did not specifically raise the question of improper foundation in the trial court, he cannot do so now on appeal.
Appellant contends his instruction No. 22 should have been given and predicates error on the court's refusal to give the same.
Appellant cites Escobedo and Miranda as authority to support his contention the instruction should have been given. As previously pointed out herein Escobedo and Miranda do not apply to the case at bar. Appellant has cited no other authority in support of his instruction No. 22. In Hutton v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 589, 207 N.E. 816, this Court held that if no authority is cited for a proposition, the alleged error is waived.
At point five of his brief appellant urges that the court erred in refusing to give an instruction regarding a lesser included offense. The matter purports to be raised by the affidavit of appellant's trial counsel, William C. Erbecker. Such affidavit, omitting formal parts, reads as follows:
It is our opinion that the manner in which the request was made was inadequate and insufficient as the appellant seeks to take advantage of an alleged refusal of the court to act on the request allegedly made by the State. We are of the opinion that the duty to request such an instruction, in writing, developed upon the defendant. If he wished such an instruction he should have tendered it, failing to tender such an instruction, in writing, waived the error, if any.
First of all, there is nothing in the records to show that appellant tendered such an instruction in writing. An instruction must be in writing and tendered to the court before the commencement of argument in order to be properly preserved for review. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 260, p. 584, as amended, being § 9-1805 Burns' 1956 Repl. provides in part as follows:
In Flatters v. State (1920), 189 Ind. 287, 291, 292, 127 N.E. 5, this Court stated as follows:
In Wiley v. State (1929), 200 Ind. 572, 165 N.E. 313, this Court held that if the requested instruction is not signed it cannot be presented on appeal.
In the case at bar, since nothing in the records shows a written request for said instruction, appellant waives this question for this reason alone.
In In re Sobieski (1965), 246 Ind. 222, 204 N.E.2d 353, this Court held that the trial court is not required to give an instruction on a lesser included offense unless requested to do so. Since appellant, in the case at bar, has not properly requested this type of instruction in the trial court, as above mentioned, he cannot raise this question on appeal.
There was at most an oral request for this instruction, and appellant attempts to show said oral request by attaching an affidavit to this effect to his Motion for New Trial. This affidavit is not proper because an affidavit cannot be used to support allegations of a fact which took place during the trial and in the presence of the court. McCoy v. State (1960), 241 Ind. 104, 170 N.E.2d 43, 49.
All other issues raised in the Motion for New Trial have been waived by appellant's failure to discuss them in the argument section of his brief. Supreme Court Rule 2-17.
The judgment is affirmed.
Lewis, C.J., and Arterburn and Hunter, JJ., concur; Mote, J., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 237 N.E.2d 258.