Title: LG Chem, Ltd. v. Goulding

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as LG 
Chem, Ltd. v. Goulding, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2065.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-2065 
LG CHEM, LTD. v. GOULDING, JUDGE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as LG Chem, Ltd. v. Goulding, 
Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2065.] 
Prohibition—Personal jurisdiction—Products liability—Personal jurisdiction over 
defendant in products-liability action was not patently and unambiguously 
lacking in the trial court—Writ denied. 
(No. 2021-0804—Submitted March 8, 2022—Decided June 22, 2022.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relator, LG Chem, Ltd., is a defendant in a products-liability action 
pending before respondent, Judge Michael R. Goulding, in the Lucas County Court 
of Common Pleas.  Claiming a lack of personal jurisdiction in the trial court, LG 
Chem asks this court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Goulding from 
exercising jurisdiction over the products-liability action.  Because LG Chem has 
not demonstrated a patent and unambiguous lack of personal jurisdiction in the trial 
court, we deny the writ. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} Jeremy M. Darrow and Dale J. Mocek (collectively, “the Darrow 
plaintiffs”) are the plaintiffs in Darrow v. LG Chem, Ltd., Lucas C.P. No. G-4801-
CI-202003553-000, which is pending before Judge Goulding.  Each plaintiff has 
alleged that he was seriously injured in March 2016 when an “LG Lithium ion 
18650 battery” exploded while he was carrying the battery in his pants pocket.  
Darrow allegedly purchased two LG 18650 lithium-ion batteries from Vape Super 
Center in Toledo in August 2015.  Mocek’s wife allegedly purchased two LG 18650 
lithium-ion batteries for him at Vapors Electronic Smoke Shop in Toledo in 
November or December 2015.  Each plaintiff used the batteries in electronic-
cigarette devices. 
{¶ 3} LG Chem is a Korean company with its headquarters and principal 
place of business located in Seoul, South Korea.  The Darrow plaintiffs alleged 
“upon * * * information and belief” that “all defendants were present or transacted, 
solicited, and engaged in business in Lucas County, Ohio through their employees, 
agents, or sales representatives, and derived substantial revenue from such business 
conducted in Lucas County, Ohio.”  The Darrow plaintiffs also alleged that LG 
Chem had “designed, manufactured, assembled, distributed, placed into the stream 
of commerce, and sold” the batteries that injured them.  The products-liability 
complaint does not allege that LG Chem had sold the batteries to Vape Super Center 
or Vapors Electronic Smoke Shop, nor does it contain specific allegations regarding 
LG Chem’s activities in Ohio relating to the marketing, sale, or distribution of the 
batteries for consumer use. 
{¶ 4} LG Chem avers that it manufactured LG 18650 lithium-ion batteries 
“for use by sophisticated companies in specific applications, such as power tools, 
where the cells are encased in a battery pack with protective circuitry.”  It states 
that it never designed, manufactured, distributed, advertised, or sold the batteries 
for sale or use as standalone, replaceable batteries.  It acknowledges that it shipped 
January Term, 2022 
3 
 
1,160 “sample 18650 cells” to Ohio to fulfill the orders of an original-equipment 
manufacturer during the three-year period preceding the Darrow plaintiffs’ injuries 
allegedly caused by the cells.  But LG Chem contends that it “did not market or 
advertise” the batteries in Ohio, “did not have any licensed dealers or retailers” of 
the batteries in Ohio, and “did not authorize or advertise consumer repair or 
replacement services” for the batteries in Ohio.  LG Chem also says that it has never 
conducted business with either Vape Super Center or Vapors Electronic Smoke 
Shop and that it has never authorized anyone or any entity to advertise, sell, or 
distribute the LG lithium-ion batteries for individual-consumer use as standalone, 
replaceable batteries in electronic-cigarette devices or for any other purpose. 
{¶ 5} LG Chem filed a motion to dismiss the products-liability action for 
lack of personal jurisdiction under Civ.R. 12(B)(2), which the Darrow plaintiffs 
opposed.  Judge Goulding denied LG Chem’s motion without a hearing. 
{¶ 6} LG Chem filed this prohibition action on June 24, 2021, seeking a 
writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Goulding from exercising jurisdiction over the 
products-liability action and directing him to dismiss the action for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  Judge Goulding filed a motion to dismiss, which LG Chem opposed.  
We denied Judge Goulding’s motion to dismiss, granted an alternative writ, and set 
a schedule for the submission of evidence and briefing on the merits.  165 Ohio 
St.3d 1402, 2021-Ohio-3631, 175 N.E.3d 551.  The case is now ripe for decision. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 7} A writ of prohibition “is granted in limited circumstances with great 
caution and restraint.”  State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554, 740 
N.E.2d 265 (2001).  To obtain the writ, LG Chem must show (1) that Judge 
Goulding is about to or has exercised judicial power, (2) that Judge Goulding’s 
exercise of that power is not authorized by law, and (3) the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  See State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 
Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13.  LG Chem must show its 
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entitlement to the writ by clear and convincing evidence.  See State ex rel. Evans v. 
McGrath, 153 Ohio St.3d 287, 2018-Ohio-3018, 104 N.E.3d 779, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 8} The first requirement for obtaining the writ is not in dispute; Judge 
Goulding has exercised and is exercising judicial power in the Darrow plaintiffs’ 
products-liability action.  As to the third requirement, absent the trial court’s patent 
and unambiguous lack of personal jurisdiction over LG Chem, a postjudgment 
appeal of Judge Goulding’s decision on the personal-jurisdiction question is an 
adequate legal remedy.  See State ex rel. Toma v. Corrigan, 92 Ohio St.3d 589, 
591-592, 752 N.E.2d 281 (2001).  LG Chem argues that the availability of a remedy 
by way of appeal is immaterial here because, in its view, personal jurisdiction is 
patently and unambiguously lacking in the trial court.  See State ex rel. Sapp v. 
Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 
500, ¶ 15. 
A.  Personal Jurisdiction and Due Process 
{¶ 9} This court’s “issuance of a writ of prohibition based on the alleged 
lack of personal jurisdiction is, even more than a claimed lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, an ‘extremely rare occurrence.’ ”  State ex rel. Suburban Constr. Co. 
v. Skok, 85 Ohio St.3d 645, 647, 710 N.E.2d 710 (1999), quoting Clark v. Connor, 
82 Ohio St.3d 309, 315, 695 N.E.2d 751 (1998).  In the “extremely rare cases” in 
which this court has issued the writ, “the lack of jurisdiction was ‘premised on a 
complete failure to comply with constitutional due process.’ ”  Id., quoting 
Fraiberg v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 76 Ohio St.3d 374, 378, 667 
N.E.2d 1189 (1996). 
{¶ 10} An Ohio trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant when (1) the long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382, and the Rules of Civil 
Procedure confer jurisdiction and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 
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930 N.E.2d 784, ¶ 28.  LG Chem’s argument focuses on the constitutional due-
process requirement. 
{¶ 11} The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “limits the power 
of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident 
defendant.”  World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 
S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).  For a court’s exercise of jurisdiction to comport 
with due process, the defendant must have “minimum contacts” with the forum 
state such that “the maintenance of the suit” is reasonable and “does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”  Internatl. Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), quoting Milliken 
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940). 
{¶ 12} The United States Supreme Court has recognized two types of 
personal jurisdiction: “general” and “specific.”  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S.Ct. 
1773, 1779-1780, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017).  The “paradigm forum” for the exercise 
of general jurisdiction over a corporation is a state “in which the corporation is 
fairly regarded as at home.”  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915, 924, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011).  The Darrow plaintiffs 
conceded in the trial court that LG Chem is not subject to general jurisdiction in 
Ohio.  Thus, the issue before us is whether the trial court has specific jurisdiction 
over LG Chem. 
{¶ 13} Specific jurisdiction exists when the matter before the court arises 
out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.  Bristol-Myers 
Squibb at ___, 137 S.Ct. at 1780.  For a court to lawfully exercise specific 
jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have taken “some act[ion] by 
which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum state.”  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 
1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).  Purposeful availment occurs when “the defendant 
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deliberately ‘reache[s] out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploit[ing] a 
market’ in the forum state or entering a contractual relationship centered there.”  
(Second brackets added in Ford Motor Co.)  Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth 
Judicial Dist. Court, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1025, 209 L.Ed.2d 225 
(2021), quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 
12 (2014).  Even when purposeful availment has occurred, personal jurisdiction 
extends only to certain cases: the plaintiff’s claims must “ ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] 
to the defendant’s contacts’ ” with the forum state.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 
U.S. 117, 127, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014), quoting Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 
L.Ed.2d 404 (1984), fn. 8.  “In other words, there must be ‘an affiliation between 
the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an 
occurrence that takes place in the forum state and is therefore subject to the state’s 
regulation.’ ”  (Brackets added in Bristol-Myers Squibb.)  Bristol-Myers Squibb at 
___, 137 S.Ct. at 1780, quoting Goodyear at 919.  When there is no connection 
between the plaintiff’s claims and the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of the 
defendant’s unconnected activities in the state.  Id. at __, 137 S.Ct. at 1781. 
B.  Personal Jurisdiction and Writs of Prohibition 
{¶ 14} LG Chem argues that a writ of prohibition is appropriate in this case 
because it did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
in Ohio and the benefits of Ohio law and that, even if it had, there is no causal 
connection between its contacts with Ohio and the Darrow plaintiffs’ claims.  Thus, 
LG Chem contends that a writ of prohibition should issue because personal 
jurisdiction over it is patently and unambiguously lacking. 
{¶ 15} We have found a patent and unambiguous lack of personal 
jurisdiction to support a writ of prohibition only twice in the past 40 years.  In State 
ex rel. Stone v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Div., 14 Ohio 
January Term, 2022 
7 
 
St.3d 32, 34, 470 N.E.2d 899 (1984), we affirmed a court of appeals’ grant of a writ 
of prohibition to restrain a juvenile court from adjudicating a paternity action when 
it was undisputed that (1) the child was conceived and born outside of Ohio and (2) 
there was no evidence that the putative father had had any contacts with Ohio.  And 
in State ex rel. Connor v. McGough, 46 Ohio St.3d 188, 189, 192, 546 N.E.2d 407 
(1989), we granted a writ of prohibition to enjoin proceedings in an estate 
administrator’s wrongful-death action in an Ohio common pleas court arising from 
a car accident in Germany that killed the decedent, who had lived in Ohio.  In both 
cases, it was undisputed that the defendant had had no contacts with Ohio.  The 
only connection to Ohio in each case was that Ohio was where the plaintiff resided.  
Thus, the availability of an appellate remedy was immaterial because personal 
jurisdiction was totally lacking.  Id. at 191; Stone at 33-34. 
{¶ 16} LG Chem argues that it never served a market in Ohio (or any other 
state) for “standalone, replaceable consumer batteries.”  It contends that it never 
designed, manufactured, distributed, advertised, or sold LG 18650 lithium-ion 
batteries for individual consumer use in electronic cigarettes or for any other 
purpose and that it never conducted any business with the retailers who sold the 
products to the Darrow plaintiffs or any retailer who sold the batteries to consumers 
as a replaceable, standalone product.  LG Chem argues that “it is undisputed” that 
the batteries arrived in Ohio due to the “unilateral actions of third parties” who 
brought the products to Ohio for sale as consumer products for electronic-cigarette 
equipment.  And it notes that the unilateral activity of third parties cannot satisfy 
the due-process requirement that an out-of-state defendant such as LG Chem have 
minimum contacts with the forum state.  See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 
U.S. 462, 473, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (a defendant’s placing a 
product into the stream of commerce supports a finding of personal jurisdiction if 
the defendant purposefully directed activity at the forum state); J. McIntyre Mach., 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 (2011) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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(plurality opinion) (“The defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of 
jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a 
general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods 
will reach the forum State”). 
{¶ 17} The record, however, contains an affidavit from Kiwon Choi, a sales 
professional who was responsible for LG Chem’s sale of LG 18650 lithium-ion 
batteries during the time that Vape Super Center and Vapors Electronic Smoke 
Shop sold the allegedly defective batteries in Ohio.  Choi testified: 
 
 
I have confirmed, through a review of LG Chem’s sales 
records, that LG Chem did not sell or distribute any 18650 lithium-
ion batteries to any customer located in Ohio from January 1, 2013 
through March 31, 2016, the month Plaintiffs were allegedly 
injured.  During that time period, LG Chem received three orders 
from an original equipment manufacturer, located in Macao, for 
sample 18650 cells.  LG Chem shipped 200 sample 18650 cells to 
Ohio for the Macao customer for an order dated October 15, 2013; 
LG Chem shipped 200 sample 18650 cells to Ohio for the Macao 
customer for an order dated November 11, 2013; and LG Chem 
shipped 760 sample 18650 cells to Ohio for the Macao customer for 
an order dated June 17, 2014. 
 
{¶ 18} Choi’s affidavit appears to be inconsistent: he testified that LG 
Chem did not sell or distribute LG 18650 lithium-ion batteries “to any customer 
located in Ohio” in the three-year period preceding the Darrow plaintiffs’ injuries, 
yet he stated that LG Chem had shipped 1,160 such batteries to Ohio to fulfill three 
orders of an equipment manufacturer in 2013 and 2014.  Even accepting the 
assertion that the manufacturer was “located in Macao,” the delivery of the batteries 
January Term, 2022 
9 
 
to Ohio shows that LG Chem had some connection to Ohio, unlike the defendants 
who challenged the courts’ personal jurisdiction over them in Stone and McGough.  
Indeed, in Stone and McGough, the defendants in the underlying actions had had 
no contacts whatsoever with Ohio and (unlike this case) none of the acts giving rise 
to the actions took place in Ohio. 
{¶ 19} Moreover, the Darrow plaintiffs allege that LG Chem conducted 
substantial activities in Ohio relating to the distribution and sale of the batteries.  In 
their complaint in the underlying action, they alleged the following: 
• 
The LG 18650 lithium-ion battery “was designed, manufactured, 
assembled, distributed, placed into the stream of commerce, and sold by 
defendants LG, Vape Defendants, Vapors, and Unknown Defendants in 
Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio”; 
• 
All the defendants “conducted activity that gave rise to the claim” in Toledo, 
Lucas County; 
• 
On their information and belief, “all defendants were present or transacted, 
solicited, and engaged in business in Lucas County, Ohio through their 
employees, agents, or sales representatives, and derived substantial revenue 
from such business”; 
• 
LG Chem “expected or should have expected” that its acts would have 
consequences in Lucas County; 
• 
The batteries that injured the Darrow plaintiffs were “placed into the stream 
of commerce, and sold by” LG Chem, and the Darrow plaintiffs were 
foreseeable users of the batteries; and 
• 
LG Chem “labeled, prepared, marketed, sold, supplied, and introduced” the 
batteries for use in electronic cigarettes “and knew that such batteries were 
sold or marketed in Ohio for such purpose.” 
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{¶ 20} The Darrow plaintiffs sought discovery related to their allegations, 
which is germane to the personal-jurisdiction defense raised by LG Chem.  The 
Darrow plaintiffs asked LG Chem for information and/or documents related to, 
among other things, (1) the names and locations of LG Chem’s distributors in Ohio, 
(2) where LG Chem manufactured lithium-ion batteries that were distributed and 
sold to consumers from 2014 through 2016, (3) LG Chem’s business activities in 
Ohio, and (4) shipments of lithium-ion batteries distributed to retailers and sold in 
the United States.  LG Chem did not respond substantively to many of these 
requests, instead objecting on numerous grounds, including the requests’ purported 
overbreadth, lack of relevance, and involvement of confidential proprietary 
business information.1 
{¶ 21} In the underlying action, Judge Goulding did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing on LG Chem’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  
“Accordingly, he was required to view allegations in the pleadings and the 
documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, resolving all 
reasonable competing inferences in their favor.”  Goldstein v. Christiansen, 70 
Ohio St.3d 232, 236, 638 N.E.2d 541 (1994).  This court has heeded that standard 
when deciding whether a writ of prohibition should issue due to a lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  See id. at 236-238. 
{¶ 22} Here, viewing the allegations in the complaint combined with the 
negative inferences that can be drawn from LG Chem’s discovery responses (or 
lack thereof), we conclude that personal jurisdiction over LG Chem is not patently 
and unambiguously lacking in the trial court.  The Darrow plaintiffs’ claims are 
related to LG Chem’s activities in Ohio, because the allegations in the complaint 
 
1.  The Darrow plaintiffs filed a motion to compel in the trial court, seeking full responses to their 
discovery requests.  They agreed to withdraw the motion to compel in reliance on LG Chem’s 
representation that it would provide fuller responses to the disputed requests.  According to an 
affidavit from the Darrow plaintiffs’ counsel sworn to on November 8, 2021, complete responses to 
the requests had not been provided and the discovery dispute had not been resolved. 
January Term, 2022 
11 
 
and inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the record arguably show that 
(1) LG Chem served a market for LG 18650 lithium-ion batteries in Ohio, (2) the 
Darrow plaintiffs purchased such batteries in Ohio, and (3) the batteries injured the 
plaintiffs in Ohio.  See Ford Motor Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 141 S.Ct. at 1027, 209 
L.Ed.2d 225 (personal jurisdiction attaches when a defendant “serves a market for 
a product in the forum state and the product malfunctions there”). 
{¶ 23} This is not to say that the Darrow plaintiffs will be able to prove that 
LG Chem engaged in activities in Ohio that satisfy the due-process requirements 
for personal jurisdiction.  But we need not decide the ultimate personal-jurisdiction 
issue today, because our review in prohibition “is limited to whether personal 
jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Goldstein at 
238.  When, as here, the finding of personal jurisdiction turns on the trial court’s 
resolution of disputed facts, “[the court’s] ruling that it has jurisdiction, if wrong, 
is simply error for which prohibition is not the proper remedy.”  Id.  On the record 
before us, we cannot say that Judge Goulding’s denial of LG Chem’s motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is tantamount to “a complete failure to 
comply with constitutional due process,” Fraiberg, 76 Ohio St.3d at 378, 667 
N.E.2d 1189. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 24} LG Chem has failed to show that there is a patent and unambiguous 
lack of personal jurisdiction over it in the trial court.  We therefore deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and 
BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs, with an opinion. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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KENNEDY, J., concurring. 
{¶ 25} This is the third case that has come before this court in which relator, 
LG Chem, Ltd., has sought a writ of prohibition against an Ohio judge.  See LG 
Chem, Ltd. v. Hagan, 159 Ohio St.3d 1428, 2020-Ohio-3474, 148 N.E.3d 558; LG 
Chem, Ltd. v. Routson, 165 Ohio St.3d 1463, 2021-Ohio-4086, 177 N.E.3d 276.  
Each of the three cases has involved products-liability claims brought in an Ohio 
common pleas court, with the plaintiffs alleging injuries caused by LG Chem 18650 
lithium-ion batteries that were contained in electronic-cigarette devices when the 
batteries exploded. 
{¶ 26} In this case, LG Chem seeks a writ of prohibition against respondent, 
Judge Michael R. Goulding, a judge of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas.  
For a writ of prohibition to issue, the relator must prove three elements by clear and 
convincing evidence: (1) the exercise of judicial (or quasi-judicial) power, (2) the 
lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and (3) the lack of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Federle v. Warren Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 156 Ohio St.3d 322, 2019-Ohio-849, 126 N.E.3d 1091, ¶ 10.  
“However, if the absence of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, a petitioner 
need not establish the third prong, the lack of an adequate remedy at law.”  State ex 
rel. Magsig v. Toledo, 160 Ohio St.3d 342, 2020-Ohio-3416, 156 N.E.3d 899, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 27} LG Chem has alleged a lack of personal jurisdiction in this case, as 
it did in its two other prohibition cases, but an “appeal from a decision overruling 
a Civ.R. 12(B)(2) motion to dismiss based upon lack of personal jurisdiction will 
generally provide an adequate legal remedy which precludes extraordinary relief 
through the issuance of a writ of prohibition,” Goldstein v. Christiansen, 70 Ohio 
St.3d 232, 235, 638 N.E.2d 541 (1994).  Therefore, since LG Chem brings its 
current claim in prohibition, the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court must be patent 
and unambiguous in order for this court to grant the writ.  This case is the first of 
LG Chem’s three prohibition cases that has generated a majority opinion.  The two 
January Term, 2022 
13 
 
other cases were dismissed through entries.  See Hagan; Routson.  I dissented with 
an opinion in Hagan at ¶ 1-16 and without an opinion in Routson, and I would have 
granted writs of prohibition in both of those cases. 
{¶ 28} For the first time in LG Chem’s three prohibition cases in this court, 
a plaintiff in the underlying products-liability case has produced evidence that the 
common pleas court may have specific jurisdiction over LG Chem, a Korean 
company headquartered in Seoul, South Korea.  “Specific jurisdiction * * * 
depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ 
principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is 
therefore subject to the State’s regulation.”  (Brackets added in Goodyear.)  
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 
2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011), quoting von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1121, 1136 (1966).  In other 
words, “a state tribunal has specific jurisdiction when a defendant’s in-state activity 
is continuous and systematic and that activity gave rise to the cause of action.”  
Hagan, 159 Ohio St.3d 1428, 2020-Ohio-3474, 148 N.E.3d 558, at ¶ 10 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting), citing Goodyear at 923.  Or if the activity “could be categorized as 
only single or occasional acts or having only an impact within the forum state,” the 
inquiry becomes “ ‘whether there was “some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” ’ ”  (Brackets 
added in Hagan.)  Id. at ¶ 11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), quoting Goodyear at 924, 
quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 
(1958).  And even in those instances, “specific jurisdiction extends only to litigation 
in which the alleged injuries ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities in the forum 
state.”  Id.  (Kennedy, J., dissenting), quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 
U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 29} LG Chem acknowledges in this case that it shipped 1,160 “sample 
18650 cells” to Ohio to fulfill the orders of an original-equipment manufacturer 
during the three-year period preceding the plaintiffs’ injuries allegedly caused by 
LG Chem’s batteries.  This is the same type of battery that allegedly caused the 
plaintiffs’ injuries.  I agree with the majority that LG Chem’s transmission of those 
batteries does not resolve the personal-jurisdiction issue in the underlying case but 
that it does create an evidentiary issue regarding specific jurisdiction such that any 
lack of personal jurisdiction is not patent and unambiguous.  And absent a patent 
and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, LG Chem will have an adequate remedy in 
the ordinary course of the law to challenge the trial court’s personal jurisdiction 
over it if the trial court issues a final judgment. 
{¶ 30} Therefore, because LG Chem cannot satisfy the elements necessary 
for this court to issue a writ of prohibition, I concur in the majority opinion. 
________________________ 
Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, L.L.P., and Daniel A. Leister, for 
relator. 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett and 
Kevin A. Pituch, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondent. 
________________________