Title: Magazu v. Dep't of Children and Families

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11864 
 
GREGORY T. MAGAZU & another1  vs.  DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     September 10, 2015. - January 4, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Department of Children & Families.  Adoption, Foster parents.  
Constitutional Law, Freedom of religion.  Religion.  
Administrative Law, Substantial evidence. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
July 25, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Brian A. Davis, J., on a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
David P. Bodanza (Amanda M. Mastalerz with him) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Annapurna Balakrishna, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Melanie A. Magazu. 
2 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  Gregory T. Magazu and his wife, Melanie, appeal 
from a judgment of the Superior Court that dismissed their 
appeal from a final decision of the Department of Children and 
Families (department) denying their application to become foster 
and preadoptive parents because of their use of corporal 
punishment as a form of discipline in their home.  The Magazus 
argue that the department's decision is inconsistent with its 
regulations, is arbitrary and capricious, and is not supported 
by substantial evidence where they were willing to agree not to 
use corporal punishment on a foster child.  They also contend 
that, because physical discipline is an integral aspect of their 
Christian faith, the department's decision impermissibly 
infringes on their constitutional right to the free exercise of 
religion.  We transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the 
department's decision to deny the Magazus' application is based 
on a reasonable interpretation of its enabling legislation and 
related regulations, is not arbitrary or capricious, and is 
supported by substantial evidence.  We also conclude that 
although the department's decision imposes a substantial burden 
on the Magazus' sincerely held religious beliefs, this burden is 
outweighed by the department's compelling interest in protecting 
the physical and emotional well-being of foster children.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
3 
 
 
 
1.  Statutory and regulatory framework.  We begin with an 
overview of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions 
that govern the foster care proceedings in this case.  The 
Legislature has vested the department with the authority to 
provide substitute care for children when "the family itself or 
the resources available to the family are unable to provide the 
necessary care and protection to insure the rights of any child 
to sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral 
development."  G. L. c. 119, § 1.  See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 
649, 663 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) (State has 
compelling interest in keeping children safe from physical or 
emotional trauma that may scar them well into adulthood).  In 
providing such care, "[t]he health and safety of the child shall 
be of paramount concern and shall include the long-term well-
being of the child."  G. L. c. 119, § 1.  The department shall 
define the "best interests of the child" as including, among 
other considerations, "the effectiveness, suitability and 
adequacy of . . . placement decisions."  Id. 
 
In accordance with its authority, the department has 
promulgated regulations concerning eligibility requirements and 
standards of licensure for a foster or preadoptive parent.  See 
110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.100, 7.104 (2009).  See also G. L. 
c. 119, § 37 ("The department shall make rules and regulations 
concerning the administration of its duties").  The department 
4 
 
 
is required to evaluate an applicant's home and all members of 
the household.  See 102 Code Mass. Regs. § 5.10(5) (1998).  The 
assessment shall be completed by a social worker who has met 
specified qualifications, see 102 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 5.05(2), 
5.10(11)-(12) (1998), and must document, among other things, 
"parenting ability, including child rearing and discipline."  
102 Code Mass. Regs. § 5.10(5)(d)(6).  An applicant must 
demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the department, numerous 
attributes, including "the ability:  (a) to assure that a child 
placed in his or her care will experience a safe, supportive, 
nurturing and stable family environment which is free from abuse 
or neglect; . . . (d) to promote the physical, mental, and 
emotional well-being of a child placed in his or her care . . . 
; and (q) to assume and carry out all other responsibilities of 
a foster/pre-adoptive parent as detailed in the standard written 
agreement between the [d]epartment and foster/pre-adoptive 
parents."  110 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.104(1). 
 
Within ten working days after the completion of its 
comprehensive assessment, the department shall decide whether to 
license the applicant, see 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.107(5) 
(2009), and within ten working days thereafter shall provide 
written notice of its decision to the applicant.  See id. at 
§ 7.107(6).  In those cases where the department decides not to 
license the applicant, the written notice must include the 
5 
 
 
reasons for such decision, as well as information about the 
applicant's right to appeal the determination.  See id. at 
§ 7.107(6)(b).  The regulations provide that once an applicant 
has been licensed as a foster parent and has completed the 
requisite parent training, the department and the foster parent 
shall enter into a written agreement that will govern the foster 
care arrangement.  See 102 Code Mass. Regs. § 5.10(7)(a); 110 
Code Mass. Regs. § 7.111 (2009).  The agreement "shall be 
renewed annually, and shall include at least the following 
terms:  . . . (3) a prohibition against the use of any form of 
corporal punishment by foster/pre-adoptive parents upon any 
foster child(ren)."  110 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.111(3).  The 
department shall reimburse foster parents for each child placed 
in their home at rates that the department has established for 
the provision of foster care.  See 110 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 7.130(1) (2008). 
 
2.  Factual and procedural background.  The Magazus are a 
married couple whose lives are guided by their deeply held 
Christian beliefs.  They have two young daughters.  In 
September, 2012, the Magazus filed an application with the 
department for a "family resource license" that would enable 
them to become foster and preadoptive parents.2  During the 
                     
 
2 It was the Magazus' intention to eventually adopt one or 
more of the foster children placed in their care.  Consequently, 
6 
 
 
application process, they completed the "Massachusetts Approach 
to Partnership in Parenting" training program and the "Family 
Resource License Study" (license study), as required by the 
department's regulations.  See 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.107(1), 
(2) (2009).  As part of the license study, the department asked 
the Magazus about their personal histories as well as their 
parenting experiences and attitudes, including methods of 
discipline.  In response to the department's questions, the 
Magazus stated that they "have used physical discipline on their 
daughters," and that such discipline is "appropriate when there 
is a continuous pattern of disobedience."  More specifically, 
they explained that their parenting style includes "spanking on 
the buttocks, using Greg or Melanie's hand, in the privacy of 
their bed room so that [the children] are not humiliated in 
front of others." 
 
The Magazus "feel [that physical discipline] is a small 
part of their parenting style, and only used when necessary."  
They acknowledged their understanding of the department's policy 
against corporal punishment, and expressed a willingness to 
refrain from using physical discipline on a foster child placed 
in their home.  Because they discipline their own two daughters 
                                                                  
from the beginning of the application process, the department 
assessed the Magazus as a permanent placement.  For ease of 
reference, we refer to the status of the Magazus during these 
proceedings simply as foster parents. 
7 
 
 
in private, the Magazus are of the view that a foster child 
would not actually witness any corporal punishment.  Throughout 
the application process, the Magazus were forthcoming, honest, 
and cooperative in answering the department's inquiries, and 
they thought that they had been portrayed accurately and fairly 
in the license study. 
 
By decision dated February 7, 2013, the department notified 
the Magazus that their application had been denied because of 
their use of corporal punishment, and their expressed belief 
that such punishment "is an appropriate and effective means of 
discipline for [their] children."  The department determined 
that the Magazus had not met specific licensing standards, 
including the ability to sign the department's standard written 
agreement prohibiting the use of any form of corporal punishment 
on a foster child.  See 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.104(1)(q), 
7.111(3).  Therefore, the department concluded that it was 
unable to license the Magazus as an unrestricted foster or 
adoptive family. 
 
The Magazus made a timely request for a so-called "fair 
hearing" pursuant to 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.06(4)(a) (2008).  
An evidentiary hearing was held on May 8, 2013, at which the 
Maguzus testified, as did three witnesses on behalf of the 
department.  On June 24, 2013, a hearing officer affirmed the 
8 
 
 
decision of the department not to approve the Magazus' 
application to become foster parents. 
 
The hearing officer concluded that the Magazus had failed 
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision did 
not conform with the department's regulations and policies, or 
that it was unreasonable.  She found that the department 
expressly prohibits the use of corporal punishment on foster 
children, see 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.111(3), and that the 
department's "clinical practice" prohibits exposing foster 
children to the use of corporal punishment on other children in 
a household.  The hearing officer highlighted the Magazus' 
inability "to recognize that the employment of physical 
punishment [on] any child in their home could lead to serious 
emotional consequences for the [d]epartment[']s children."  She 
pointed out that children placed by the department have been 
exposed to an array of neglect and abuse, and their awareness of 
acts of corporal punishment in their foster homes "could well 
trigger the very trauma the placement was intended to mitigate."  
The hearing officer stated that the department could not simply 
place with the Magazus a child who had not been physically 
abused because foster children often do not disclose the full 
extent of their experiences until after being placed in 
substitute care.  Moreover, she continued, the Magazus' 
willingness to refrain from using corporal punishment on a 
9 
 
 
foster child did not alleviate the department's concerns 
regarding the discipline of such child postadoption, when the 
child would no longer be under the purview of the department.  
The hearing officer found that the Magazus are "people of deep 
faith," but she stated that there was no evidence to support 
their assertion that the denial of their application was due to 
their Christian beliefs.  Recognizing that the Magazus have "a 
sincere desire to offer permanency to children in need," the 
hearing officer said that, even though the Magazus could not 
provide foster care for children placed by the department, they 
were free to pursue adoption through another agency that might 
be more compatible with their values. 
 
The Magazus appealed the department's decision by filing a 
complaint for judicial review in the Superior Court pursuant to 
G. L. c. 30A, § 14.  They alleged that their substantial rights 
had been prejudiced because the department's decision violated 
constitutional provisions (§ 14 [7] [a]), exceeded the 
department's authority (§ 14 [7] [b]), was based on errors of 
law (§ 14 [7] [c]), was not supported by substantial evidence 
(§ 14 [7] [e]), and was arbitrary or capricious (§ 14 [7] [g]).  
The Magazus also alleged that the department had violated their 
right to the free exercise of religion under the Federal and 
State Constitutions.  The department filed the administrative 
record as its answer.  Thereafter, the Magazus filed a motion 
10 
 
 
for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 
(c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), and Standing Order 1-96(4) of the 
Superior Court, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, at 1138-1139 
(LexisNexis 2015-2016). 
 
Following a hearing, a judge denied the Magazus' motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and dismissed their complaint.  The 
judge first concluded that the Magazus' substantial rights had 
not been prejudiced by the department's decision, and, 
therefore, they were not entitled to relief under G. L. c. 30A, 
§ 14 (7) (b), (c), (e), or (g).  He stated that the 
administrative record in this case contained substantial 
evidence to support the department's rational belief that 
children who already have been traumatized by abuse should not 
be subjected to corporal punishment in their foster or adoptive 
homes, either directly or indirectly, for fear that the 
experience will revive or exacerbate their trauma.  Further, the 
judge continued, the administrative record contained substantial 
evidence to show that the department's decision to deny the 
Magazus' application did not result from its desire to meddle in 
the Magazus' parenting of their own two daughters.  Rather, the 
decision reflected the department's genuine concern that a 
foster child placed in the Magazus' care "likely would be 
subjected to potentially traumatic episodes of corporal 
punishment, if only from a distance, and that any child the 
11 
 
 
[Magazus] ultimately might adopt likely would be subjected to 
potentially traumatic episodes of corporal punishment in a very 
direct way."  Having determined that a substantial evidentiary 
basis existed for the department's concerns, the judge stated 
that the department had acted in a reasonable manner according 
to its statutory and regulatory authority in denying the 
Magazus' application to become foster parents. 
 
The judge next concluded that the Magazus were not entitled 
to relief under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (a), for the purported 
violation of their constitutional right to the free exercise of 
religion.  Relying on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), 
and Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 418 Mass. 316 (1994), the judge 
stated that the department's decision did not impose a 
"substantial burden" on the Magazus' ability to exercise their 
sincerely held religious beliefs.  In the judge's view, the 
department's decision did not prevent the Magazus from 
disciplining their own two daughters in accordance with their 
Christian values, or otherwise coerce the Magazus into acting in 
violation of those values.  Rather, the judge continued, such 
decision merely precluded the Magazus -- for wholly secular 
reasons -- from subjecting any child in the department's care to 
the Magazus' religiously based disciplinary practices.  The 
12 
 
 
judge determined that this result did not violate the Magazus' 
constitutional rights.3  The present appeal ensued. 
 
3.  Standard of review.  Judicial review of a decision by 
the department is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and is 
"confined to the record," except in limited circumstances not 
present here.  Id. at § 14 (5).  See 110 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 10.30 (2008) (decision by hearing officer is final decision of 
department and is subject to appeal under G. L. c. 30A).  A 
reviewing court will not disturb the department's decision 
unless it determines that "the substantial rights of any party 
may have been prejudiced" because the decision was (a) in 
violation of constitutional provisions; (b) in excess of the 
department's authority or jurisdiction; (c) based on an error of 
law; (d) made on unlawful procedure; (e) unsupported by 
substantial evidence; (f) unwarranted by the facts; or (g) 
arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.  G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  See Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry 
                     
 
3 Because the judge concluded that the Magazus had not 
satisfied their initial burden of demonstrating that the 
department's denial of their application imposed a "substantial 
burden" on their right to freely exercise their religious 
beliefs, the judge did not consider whether the department's 
prohibition on subjecting foster children to corporal punishment 
"pursues an unusually important governmental goal," and whether 
granting the Magazus an exemption from such prohibition "would 
substantially hinder the fulfillment of [that] goal."  Attorney 
Gen. v. Desilets, 418 Mass. 316, 323 (1994), quoting L.H. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law § 14-12, at 1242 (2d ed. 1988). 
13 
 
 
Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 108-109 (2014).  "The court shall give due 
weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized 
knowledge of the [department], as well as to the discretionary 
authority conferred upon it."  G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).  See 
Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 657 
(2006), and cases cited.  "We ordinarily accord an agency's 
interpretation of its own regulation[s] considerable deference."  
Ten Local Citizen Group v. New England Wind, LLC, 457 Mass. 222, 
228 (2010), quoting Warcewicz v. Department of Envtl. 
Protection, 410 Mass. 548, 550 (1991).  See J.M. Hollister, LLC 
v. Architectural Access Bd., 469 Mass. 49, 55 (2014).  Such 
deference, however, is not unlimited, and a reviewing court will 
overrule an agency's interpretation of its governing statutes 
and regulations where such interpretation is "not rational."  
Ten Local Citizen Group, supra.  See J.M. Hollister, LLC, supra. 
 
4.  Right to relief under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (b), (c), 
(e), or (g).  The Magazus contend that the department's 
regulations do not preclude foster parent applicants from using 
appropriate corporal punishment on their own children, or 
disqualify such applicants from licensure.  Rather, they 
continue, the regulations only prohibit the use of corporal 
punishment on a foster child.  The Magazus assert that, in 
accordance with 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.111(3), they were 
willing to sign and comply with the department's standard 
14 
 
 
written agreement that sets forth such prohibition.  In their 
view, the department's concern that a foster child could be 
traumatized by living in a home where the foster parents' own 
children are physically disciplined is unwarranted where, as in 
this case, such corporal punishment would occur outside the 
sight and hearing of the foster child.  Moreover, the Magazus 
argue that by effectively prohibiting the use of any physical 
discipline in a foster home, the department has improperly 
grafted a new requirement onto its regulations.  The Magazus 
claim that, because the department's decision does not conform 
with its own regulations and is arbitrary and capricious, they 
have suffered substantial prejudice.  Further, they continue, 
the department's decision is not based on substantial evidence 
where, in their view, they have satisfied all of the necessary 
requirements for licensure as foster parents.  We disagree with 
the Magazus' contentions.4 
                     
 
4 Pursuant to 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.107(6) (2009), the 
written notice not to license an applicant as a foster parent 
shall include "the reason(s) for the decision."  The Magazus 
point out that the only two regulations specifically cited in 
the written notice were 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.104(1)(q) and 
7.111(3) (2009), which require a foster parent to sign the 
department's standard written agreement prohibiting the use of 
corporal punishment on a foster child.  That being the case, the 
Magazus seem to suggest that these are the only regulations on 
which the department's decision was based.  Contrary to their 
suggestion, we read the entirety of the language in the written 
notice as more broadly informing the Magazus that the basis for 
the denial of their application was the department's concern 
about their use of corporal punishment, not merely their related 
15 
 
 
 
The Magazus have the burden of showing, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the department's decision "was not in 
conformity with [its] policies and/or regulations and resulted 
in substantial prejudice to the [Magazus]."  110 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 10.23(a) (2008).  The Legislature has vested the 
department with the authority to arrange substitute care for 
children whose own families are unable to protect their best 
interests.5  See G. L. c. 119, § 1.  Consonant with its enabling 
legislation, the department has determined that an applicant for 
licensure as a foster parent must demonstrate, among other 
qualities, the ability "to promote the physical, mental, and 
emotional well-being of a child placed in his or her care."  110 
Code Mass. Regs. § 7.104(1)(d).  The department's unwritten 
policy of not placing a foster child in a home where the parents 
use corporal punishment on their own children falls under the 
umbrella of this regulation. 
                                                                  
inability to sign the written agreement.  Indeed, the notice 
states that the licensing standards not met by the Magazus 
"include" their inability to satisfy 110 Code Mass. Regs. 
§§ 7.104(1)(q) and 7.111(3).  The fact that the written notice 
did not specifically cite additional regulations pertaining to 
the department's responsibility to protect the safety and well-
being of children placed in its care, see, e.g., 110 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 7.104(1)(d) (2009), is not significant where the reasons 
for the department's decision are readily apparent from the 
notice. 
 
 
5 We note that foster parents are "temporary contract 
service providers with a defined set of rights and 
responsibilities that clearly differs from those of a child's 
parents."  Kerins v. Lima, 425 Mass. 108, 112 n.6 (1997). 
16 
 
 
 
At the fair hearing, Jamie Caron, the regional clinical 
director for the department, testified that corporal punishment 
is not appropriate for children in need of substitute care 
through the department, and that individuals who use this form 
of discipline in their homes have not been approved as foster 
parents.  She and Patricia Savelli, the adoption licensing and 
development supervisor for the department, both explained that 
the department's explicit prohibition against the use of 
corporal punishment on foster children, see 110 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 7.111(3), arises from the fact that these children typically 
have a history of neglect or abuse.6  Caron acknowledged that the 
department does not have a written policy stating that parents 
who use physical discipline on their own children will not be 
approved as foster parents.  Nonetheless, she pointed out that 
the department has an obligation to evaluate the "family 
dynamics" of a household, including whether foster children are 
treated in the same manner as biological and adopted children, 
                     
 
6 The resource materials provided to the Magazus as part of 
the "Massachusetts Approach to Partnership in Parenting" 
training program state, in relevant part, that "[f]or 
children/youths who have been abused, spanking or smacking can 
be terribly damaging.  Sometimes, of course, a child/youth's 
foster parents will not know for certain that a child/youth has 
been physically or sexually abused until the child/youth's 
behavior in the foster home so indicates.  Therefore, using 
alternatives to physical punishment has two important benefits.  
First, it minimizes the risk of additional injury to a 
child/youth.  Second, it helps break the intergenerational cycle 
of physical abuse." 
17 
 
 
both at the time of the foster care placement and into the 
future, given that the department's mission is to find permanent 
homes for foster children.  Caron emphasized that the 
department's assessment is of "an overall family, family 
functioning, and how a child will fit into [a particular] home."  
She stated that "the use of corporal punishment for some 
children and not for others, can have a significant bearing on 
the family, those respective children's sense of belonging and 
their place within their family."  Further, she continued, "any 
significant discrepancies in the practices with respect to 
parenting kids can lead to some struggles or some issues that 
[the department] think[s] are not optimal for all the kids 
involved."  Caron expressed the department's belief that, where 
a foster child has been placed with "an open, expressive and 
communicative family," the foster child will be aware of and 
affected by the use of corporal punishment on other children in 
the home.  According to Savelli, a foster child exposed to this 
form of discipline could reexperience feelings of trauma based 
on the child's history.7  Caron stated that because the 
                     
 
7 Pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 11 (5), pertaining to the 
conduct of adjudicatory proceedings before administrative 
agencies, such "[a]gencies may utilize their experience, 
technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the 
evaluation of the evidence presented to them."  Fair hearing 
officers who are employed by the department "shall have, at a 
minimum, two years of direct service experience as well as legal 
training and/or experience."  110 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.03 
18 
 
 
department could not always be certain about the precise nature 
and scope of a foster child's prior trauma, it was neither 
realistic nor feasible for the department to attempt to place 
with the Magazus only a foster child who had not been the victim 
of physical or sexual abuse. 
 
In the department's opinion, what made this case unique was 
the fact that, notwithstanding their awareness of the 
department's policy against corporal punishment, the Magazus had 
made it clear during their assessment that physical discipline 
is an important, albeit infrequently used, aspect of their 
parenting style.  That being the case, Caron testified that the 
department reasonably assumed and was concerned that if a foster 
child was placed with and subsequently adopted by the Magazus, 
the child eventually would be subjected to corporal punishment 
just like the Magazus' own daughters.  The Magazus' willingness 
to sign the department's standard written agreement, stating 
                                                                  
(2008).  Consistent with the "great deference" we afford to the 
department's expertise and experience, Lindsay v. Department of 
Social Servs., 439 Mass. 789, 799 (2003), we conclude that the 
department was not required to present expert testimony 
regarding the harm that a foster child could experience as a 
consequence of being exposed to corporal punishment, either 
directly or indirectly, in a foster home.  The hearing officer, 
based on her background and specialized knowledge, would have 
understood the nature and scope of such harm.  See Alsabti v. 
Board of Registration in Med., 404 Mass. 547, 549 (1989), 
quoting New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 
Mass. 456, 466 (1981) (agency's decision will be upheld if it 
"could have been made by reference to the logic of experience" 
[emphasis in original]). 
19 
 
 
that they would not use corporal punishment on a foster child, 
did not alleviate the department's concerns about the use of 
physical discipline in the home and the use of such discipline 
on a foster child after adoption.  In light of the Magazus' 
values and practices concerning discipline, which were not 
compatible with the department's expectations, Caron stated that 
the Magazus were not a "suitable match" for the department.8   
 
Although 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.111(3) explicitly forbids 
the use of corporal punishment on a foster child, we agree with 
the Magazus that the department's policy and practice of not 
placing a foster child in a home where parents administer 
physical discipline to their own children is not similarly 
articulated in express terms.  Nonetheless, we conclude that 
such a policy falls squarely within the parameters of the 
department's enabling legislation and companion regulations, and 
                     
 
8 We note that in the context of criminal proceedings 
charging a father with assault and battery for spanking his 
minor child, we recently held that "a parent or guardian may not 
be subjected to criminal liability for the use of force against 
a minor child under the care and supervision of the parent or 
guardian, provided that (1) the force used against the minor 
child is reasonable; (2) the force is reasonably related to the 
purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, 
including the prevention or punishment of the minor's 
misconduct; and (3) the force used neither causes, nor creates a 
substantial risk of causing, physical harm (beyond fleeting pain 
or minor, transient marks), gross degradation, or severe mental 
distress."  Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 472 Mass. 1, 12 (2015).  
This holding was based, in part, on an awareness that "a 
privilege to use reasonable force in disciplining a minor child 
has long been recognized at common law."  Id. at 8. 
20 
 
 
is rationally related to the department's objectives in the 
placement of foster children.  See generally Anusavice v. Board 
of Registration in Dentistry, 451 Mass. 786, 795 (2008) (where 
board's policy "is not contrary to the language of its enabling 
statute, and is rationally related to furthering the board's 
purpose to safeguard the public health and welfare, it will be 
upheld"); Arthurs v. Board of Registration in Med., 383 Mass. 
299, 312-313 (1981) ("It is a recognized principle of 
administrative law that an agency may adopt policies through 
adjudication as well as through rulemaking").  As such, the 
department's decision to deny the Magazus' application to become 
foster parents did not exceed the department's authority, is not 
arbitrary or capricious, and is supported by substantial 
evidence.  Accordingly, the Magazus are not entitled to relief 
under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (b), (c), (e), or (g). 
 
5.  Right to relief under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (a), for 
violation of constitutional provisions.  The Magazus assert 
that, in accordance with their sincerely held Christian beliefs, 
they use appropriate corporal punishment on their own two 
daughters as a matter of loving parenting and biblical 
understanding.  They contend that the department's denial of 
their application to become foster parents substantially burdens 
their right to the free exercise of religion under art. 46, § 1, 
of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, amending 
21 
 
 
art. 18 of the Amendments, and that the department has failed to 
demonstrate a sufficiently compelling State interest to justify 
this burden.  Therefore, the Magazus continue, because the 
department's decision impermissibly infringes on their 
constitutional right, their application to become foster parents 
should be allowed.  We disagree. 
 
Article 46, § 1, of the Amendments provides, "No law shall 
be passed prohibiting the free exercise of religion," and 
parallels the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
which states, "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the 
free exercise [of religion] . . . ."9  See Commonwealth v. 
Nissenbaum, 404 Mass. 575, 578 & n.3 (1989).  Notwithstanding 
the similarity between these two constitutional provisions, "the 
scope of protection afforded the right to freely exercise one's 
religion under the Massachusetts Constitution is greater than 
that afforded by the United States Constitution."  Rasheed v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 446 Mass. 463, 467 (2006).  We 
                     
 
9 The right to freely exercise one's religion also is 
embodied in art. 2 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 
which ensures that no person "shall be hurt, molested, or 
restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping 
GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of 
his own conscience; or for his religious profession or 
sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or 
obstruct others in their religious worship."  See Rasheed v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 446 Mass. 463, 466 (2006).  In the 
present appeal, the Magazus' free exercise claim focuses on the 
purported violation of art. 46, § 1, of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, amending art. 18 of the Amendments. 
 
22 
 
 
assess a claim that the Commonwealth has impermissibly burdened 
the free exercise of religion in violation of art. 46, § 1, of 
the Amendments by using the balancing test articulated in 
Desilets, 418 Mass. at 321-323.10  See Rasheed, supra; Society of 
Jesus of New England v. Commonwealth, 441 Mass. 662, 669-670 
(2004). 
 
This balancing test requires that we determine whether the 
State action about which a party has complained (here, a 
                     
 
10 In Desilets, 418 Mass. at 321, this court stated that it 
"should reach its own conclusions on the scope of the 
protections of art. 46, § 1, [of the Amendments] and should not 
necessarily follow the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of 
the United States under the First Amendment."  This 
pronouncement arose as a consequence of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), "a much criticized opinion that 
weakened First Amendment protections for religious conduct."  
Desilets, supra.  See Abdul-Alázim v. Superintendent, Mass. 
Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 449, 453-
454 & n.8 (2002).  Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court had 
employed a balancing test to analyze free exercise claims under 
the First Amendment, requiring a State to identify a compelling 
interest that would outweigh the burden on the free exercise of 
religion.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-215 (1972); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-409 (1963).  See also 
Society of Jesus of New England v. Commonwealth, 441 Mass. 662, 
669 n.7 (2004).  In Smith, supra at 878, the Supreme Court 
rejected this approach, holding that if the burden on free 
exercise is "merely the incidental effect of a generally 
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment 
has not been offended."  See Society of Jesus of New England, 
supra.  We subsequently stated in Desilets, supra at 321-322, 
that when interpreting art. 46, § 1, of the Amendments, 
Massachusetts courts would adhere to the standards of First 
Amendment jurisprudence that predated Smith, and would continue 
to use the compelling State interest balancing test for claims 
alleging an impermissible burden on the free exercise of 
religion. 
23 
 
 
prohibition on the use of corporal punishment in a foster home) 
"substantially burdens [the] free exercise of religion, and, if 
it does, whether the Commonwealth has shown that it has an 
interest sufficiently compelling to justify that burden."  
Desilets, 418 Mass. at 322.  See Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 
59, 73-74, cert. denied sub nom. Carroll v. Alberts, 474 U.S. 
1013 (1985); Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 375, cert. 
denied sub nom. Bailey v. Bellotti, 459 U.S. 970 (1982).  See 
also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 ("only those interests of the 
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance 
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion"); Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-409 (1963).  More specifically, the 
party claiming an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise 
of religion "must show (1) a sincerely held religious belief, 
which (2) conflicts with, and thus is burdened by, the [S]tate 
requirement.  Once the claimant has made that showing, the 
burden shifts to the [S]tate.  The [S]tate can prevail only by 
demonstrating both that (3) the requirement pursues an unusually 
important governmental goal, and that (4) an exemption would 
substantially hinder the fulfillment of the goal" (footnotes 
omitted).  Desilets, supra at 322-323, quoting L.H. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law § 14-12, at 1242 (2d ed. 1988).  See 
Rasheed, 446 Mass. at 467, 472.  "[T]he State's assertion of a 
compelling interest, and the balancing of that interest against 
24 
 
 
the burden imposed on the exercise of religion, is considered in 
a concrete, pragmatic, and fact-specific way."  Society of Jesus 
of New England, 441 Mass. at 671. 
 
As an initial matter, the Magazus suggest that the 
department, through its regulations and policies, has 
impermissibly infringed on the Magazus' religious beliefs, not 
their conduct.  We disagree with this characterization of the 
department's purported constitutional infringement.  The free 
exercise of religion "embraces two separate concepts, 'freedom 
to believe and freedom to act.'"  Bailey, 386 Mass. at 375, 
quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  See 
note 9, supra.  "Religious beliefs -- what a person thinks, what 
faith he holds in his heart and mind -- are indeed protected 
absolutely" from governmental interference.  Society of Jesus of 
New England, 441 Mass. at 676.  See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402 
("The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed 
against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as 
such" [emphasis in original]); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New 
England, Inc., 409 Mass. 842, 851, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 865 
(1991).  "Conduct in furtherance of those beliefs, however, is 
the 'exercise' of religion, and government infringements on 
religiously inspired conduct are permissible if they satisfy the 
compelling State interest balancing test."  Society of Jesus of 
New England, supra.  See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 ("activities of 
25 
 
 
individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to 
regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted 
power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare"); 
Alberts, 395 Mass. at 73 (freedom to act on religious beliefs 
subject to regulation for societal protection).  Contrary to the 
Magazus' suggestion, this case is not about their freedom to 
believe particular religious tenets, including those pertaining 
to the raising and disciplining of children.  Rather, these 
proceedings are about specific conduct -- corporal punishment -- 
that is and would continue to be used in the Magazus' home even 
if they became foster parents.  To the extent that the 
department may have infringed on the Magazus' constitutional 
rights, such infringement is on their freedom to act, not on 
their freedom to believe.  We turn now to consideration of the 
balancing test articulated in Desilets. 
 
The department has not challenged the Magazus' contention 
that their use of corporal punishment is based on their 
sincerely held religious beliefs.  Therefore, in order to 
succeed on their claim, the Magazus must establish that the 
department's prohibition against the use of corporal punishment 
in a foster home constitutes a "substantial burden" on their 
exercise of those beliefs.  Curtis v. School Comm. of Falmouth, 
420 Mass. 749, 761 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996), 
quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 
26 
 
 
680, 699 (1989).  See Rasheed, 446 Mass. at 472; Desilets, 418 
Mass. at 322.  "[A] 'substantial burden' is one that is coercive 
or compulsory in nature."  Curtis, supra.  "[I]ncidental effects 
of government programs, which may make it more difficult to 
practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce 
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, [do 
not] require government to bring forward a compelling 
justification for its otherwise lawful actions."  Id. at 762, 
quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 
U.S. 439, 450-451 (1988). 
 
Here, because the department's prohibition against the use 
of corporal punishment in a foster home is inherently 
incompatible with the Magazus' religious beliefs, the Magazus 
are compelled to make a choice.  On the one hand, they can 
adhere to the teachings of their religion and use corporal 
punishment as a form of discipline in their home, thereby 
forfeiting the opportunity to become foster parents.  On the 
other hand, they can abandon this particular religious tenet in 
the hope of being approved as foster parents.  We conclude that, 
by conditioning the Magazus' opportunity to become foster 
parents on their willingness to forsake a sincerely held 
religious belief, the department has substantially burdened the 
Magazus' constitutional right under art. 46, § 1, of the 
Amendments to the free exercise of religion.  See, e.g., 
27 
 
 
Rasheed, 446 Mass. at 474 (prohibiting prison inmate from 
acquiring Islamic festival meats that inmate believed he must 
consume to comply with faith constituted substantial burden on 
free exercise of religion).  That being the case, we proceed to 
consider whether the department has demonstrated a sufficiently 
compelling interest to justify this burden.  See Desilets, 418 
Mass. at 322, and cases cited. 
 
"It cannot be disputed that the State has a compelling 
interest to protect children from actual or potential harm."  
Blixt, 437 Mass. at 656.  This is especially true with respect 
to foster children whose need for safety, security, and 
stability is readily apparent.  See generally Petition of the 
Dep't of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 383 
Mass. 573, 587-588 (1981), quoting Richards v. Forrest, 278 
Mass. 547, 553 (1932) ("The State as parens patriae may act to 
protect minor children from serious physical or emotional 
harm. . . .  In such matters 'the first and paramount duty of 
courts is to consult the welfare of the child.  To that 
governing principle every other public and private consideration 
must yield'").  Consistent with this compelling State interest, 
the department has determined that a foster child should not be 
placed in a home where corporal punishment is used as a 
disciplinary measure.  Creating an exception to this policy for 
individuals like the Magazus who employ physical discipline in 
28 
 
 
conformity with their religious beliefs would severely undermine 
the department's substantial interest in protecting the physical 
and emotional well-being of children whose welfare has been 
entrusted to the department's care.  Moreover, expecting the 
department to place with the Magazus children who have not 
suffered neglect or abuse is neither realistic nor feasible 
given the type of children served by the department and the 
potential dearth of information concerning the precise nature 
and scope of their prior trauma.  Based on the department's 
compelling interest in protecting the welfare of foster 
children, we conclude that its prohibition against the use of 
corporal punishment in a foster home outweighs the burden on the 
Magazus' right to employ physical discipline in accordance with 
their religious beliefs.  Accordingly, the Magazus are not 
entitled to relief under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (a). 
 
6.  Conclusion.  The judgment of the Superior Court 
dismissing the Magazus' appeal from the final decision of the 
department is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
CORDY, J. (concurring, with whom Botsford and Duffly, JJ., 
join).  I concur in the court's conclusion that the Department 
of Children and Families (department) has a compelling interest 
in protecting the physical and emotional well-being of foster 
children, and that it could reasonably interpret its enabling 
legislation to deny an application to become foster and 
preadoptive parents because of the applicants' use of physical 
discipline as a form of disciplining their own children.  I 
write separately to question the uniformity of the department's 
application of its standards for assessing the suitability of 
foster parents and their licensing across the department's 
western region, and the consistency of the rigor it applied to 
the plaintiffs' application compared to the applications of 
others who posed significant risks to the compelling interests 
the department is charged with protecting.1 
 
I begin with several propositions that I expect would be 
beyond dispute.  First, the department's filings for custody 
have been significantly increasing, some would say "soaring," 
                     
 
1 In its 2015 annual report, the Office of the Child 
Advocate reported that on the basis of its reviews of G. L. 
c. 119, § 51A, neglect and abuse reports filed with, 
investigated, and supported by the Department of Children and 
Families (department) in the prior year, its staff had found 
"concerning trends" within foster homes and regarding the 
selection of certain foster homes.  Of the § 51A reports it 
reviewed, more than sixty per cent involved children in foster 
homes.  See Office of the Child Advocate, Annual Report:  Fiscal 
Year 2015, at 9-10. 
2 
 
 
over the last several years.2  Second, the department is in dire 
need of qualified foster parents and homes to care for this 
burgeoning population of children who have been removed from the 
custody of their parents because of severe abuse and neglect.  
Third, the challenges facing foster parents can be as daunting 
as their role is important, and the department must provide them 
both an appropriate level of oversight and support to ensure the 
successful transition of the children in their care. 
 
Turning to the plaintiffs and their interest in providing a 
safe, caring, and nurturing environment to this particularly 
vulnerable population, it is apparent from the record that in 
every respect (but for one) they were ideal foster and 
preadoptive candidates.  They had a very stable home 
environment, a nurturing supportive relationship with their own 
two children, and an excellent record of employment and 
community involvement.  The department's file reveals that it 
conducted an indepth and thorough inquiry into and review of the 
plaintiffs' personal and family experiences and upbringing, as 
well as their home life.  The plaintiffs cooperated fully and 
candidly in detailing their experiences, their reasons for 
                     
 
2In June, 2014, the Boston Globe reported that from December 
2013, through May, 2014, the department had filed 2,000 court 
petitions to gain custody of children it determined to be at 
risk of abuse or neglect, a fifty-two per cent increase from the 
previous year.  It further reported that in May, 2014, the 
department filed 265 petitions, a seventy per cent jump from 
May, 2013.  See P. Schworm, State Filings for Custody of 
Children Soaring, Boston Globe, June 20, 2014, at A.1. 
3 
 
 
wanting to serve as foster parents, and the relationship with 
their two children. 
 
In the end, the only flaw latched onto by the department 
was the plaintiffs' explanation that their deeply held Christian 
religious beliefs included the use of physical discipline 
(albeit sparingly applied) in the upbringing of their children.  
This honest revelation led to further intense inquiry as to 
whether such punishment would be used on children placed into 
their care by the department, which would be contrary to its 
explicit regulation against the use of such discipline on foster 
children.  The plaintiffs advised the department that they fully 
understood this limitation and would comply with the regulation 
and the required written contract provisions that would govern 
their relationship. 
 
The department conceded that there was no reason for the 
department to doubt the sincerity of the plaintiffs, but wanted 
additional assurances (beyond what was required in its 
regulations and its contract) that the plaintiffs would not 
physically discipline their own children during periods when 
they had foster children in their care.  The plaintiffs could 
not agree to this condition because of their religious views, 
but advised that they did not physically discipline either of 
their children in the presence of the other and would not do so 
in the presence of the foster children in their care.  This 
4 
 
 
apparently was not good enough, and the department found that 
the plaintiffs did not meet the department's licensing standards 
because they physically disciplined their own children. 
 
While the department's position might, when balanced 
against all of the positives the plaintiffs possessed, seem 
overly rigid and cautious in the extreme, the department's 
responsibility to children already exposed to abuse or neglect 
is very substantial.  That heightened responsibility could 
justify the department's declining a family setting in which 
such a child might feel insecure or unsafe or traumatized if 
they become aware that physical discipline was being meted out 
to other children. 
 
One is left to wonder, however, whether the real problem in 
this case was not so much the department's concern for child 
safety, but rather a disagreement with the plaintiff's beliefs 
regarding the upbringing of their children.  While we have no 
other licensing investigation files in the record before us, it 
is hard to ignore the highly public tragedies of the last two 
years regarding children under the supervision of the department 
in foster homes, and not to question whether the high standards 
and intensive assessment and scrutiny applied to the plaintiffs 
is the exception rather than the norm, particularly in the 
western region. 
5 
 
 
 
Fuel for this concern comes most recently in an official 
investigative report of the death and near death of two foster 
children placed in the foster home of a woman, also located in 
the western region.3  The death and injury were due to severe 
neglect.  The investigative report of the case is revealing in 
many respects, but most particularly in its description of the 
licensing investigation, and its inadequacies, that led to the 
licensure of the woman as a foster parent shortly after the 
plaintiffs' application was denied.  According to the report, 
the applicant was an unmarried woman with medical issues, who 
was supported by Supplemental Security Income disability 
payments, and who had two children who no longer had contact 
with their father, as well as an adopted third child.  At least 
one of these children also had serious medical issues, and 
during the licensing investigation the doctor for the woman's 
children advised that she was already overwhelmed by managing 
her own children's medical needs.  In addition, G. L. c. 119, 
§ 51A, reports of abuse and neglect had been filed against her;4 
                     
 
3 See generally, "Case Review:  The Foster Home of Kimberly 
Malpass, September 30, 2015," prepared by the Executive Office 
of Health and Human Services, Department of Children and 
Families. 
 
 
4 One of these reports, filed in June of 2012 (before she 
was licensed), alleged neglect of her three children and that 
one or more of her children had been beaten with a belt by her 
boy friend.  After the woman was licensed, and six months prior 
to the death of one of the foster children placed in her care, 
the department received another report that the woman's boy 
6 
 
 
the school attended by one of her children reported that the 
child was chronically absent, and was out of control; and it was 
known that there was a family history of neglect.  Further, the 
licensing investigation did not include a routine check with the 
local police, which would have revealed that the police had been 
called at least twenty-five times in response to problems at her 
home.  Regardless, the woman was licensed by the department, and 
at the time of the tragedy, she had three children assigned to 
her care by the department (in addition to her other three 
children).5 
 
Whether the department's process and standards resulting in 
the licensing of this foster mother is the norm or the 
exception, we do not know.  Hopefully, it is the exception and, 
whatever the licensing standard actually is, it will be 
uniformly applied. 
 
                                                                  
friend had been living in the home (unreported), was a drug 
user, was a "disciplinarian in the home and [had] hit [one of 
the foster children] in the head . . . when [the foster child] 
was not listening."  Although it was apparent that she likely 
was not truthful in the subsequent "investigation," at least 
with respect to her relationship with her boy friend and their 
living arrangements, no action was taken except that it was 
"emphasized" to her that "all frequent visitors needed to be 
approved by [the department]." 
 
 
5 Foster parents receive a daily financial stipend from the 
department for each child in their care, plus allowances for 
clothing, birthdays, and holidays.