Title: In re N.C.E.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-141 
No. 366A20 
Filed 5 November 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: N.C.E. and N.D.C. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 29 April 
2020 by Judge Meader W. Harriss III in District Court, Pasquotank County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 30 September 2021 
but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) 
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Frank P. Hiner IV for petitioner-appellee Pasquotank County Department of 
Social Services. 
 
Chelsea K. Barnes for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
HUDSON, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s orders terminating her 
parental rights to N.C.E. (Nathan) and N.D.C. (Nick).1 Because we hold the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by concluding that it was in Nathan’s and Nick’s best 
interests to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights, we affirm the trial court’s 
orders. 
                                            
1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of the juveniles. 
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I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
During a thunderstorm on the evening of 18 August 2018, respondent-mother 
left then twenty-month-old Nathan on the front porch of the maternal grandmother’s 
temporary residence. After leaving, respondent-mother called the maternal 
grandmother to let her know that Nathan was on the porch and that respondent-
mother would be back to pick him up in the morning. The maternal grandmother 
reported this incident to the Elizabeth City Police Department.  
¶ 3 
 
A law enforcement officer and a social worker with the Pasquotank County 
Department of Social Services (DSS) responded to the maternal grandmother’s 
residence. The maternal grandmother was unable to provide respondent-mother’s 
location or the location of Nathan’s younger brother, Nick, and respondent-mother 
did not respond to attempts to contact her. The social worker initiated a Child 
Protective Services investigation and determined that neither the maternal 
grandmother nor the children’s maternal aunt (with whom the maternal 
grandmother was residing) were willing or able to provide care for Nathan on an 
ongoing basis.  
¶ 4 
 
On 20 August 2018, after learning that DSS had opened an investigation, 
Nick’s purported paternal grandmother brought him to DSS. The purported paternal 
grandmother stated that she often cared for Nick. The next day, respondent-mother 
and Nick’s purported paternal grandmother reported to DSS along with several other 
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parties. A domestic incident occurred at the agency which resulted in a law 
enforcement officer taking respondent-mother into custody, whereupon she requested 
that DSS take custody of Nathan and Nick.  
¶ 5 
 
On 22 August 2018, DSS filed separate juvenile petitions in District Court, 
Pasquotank County, alleging that Nathan and Nick were neglected and dependent 
juveniles. On 17 October 2018, the trial court entered an adjudication order 
concluding that Nathan and Nick were neglected and dependent juveniles. See 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9), (15) (2019). In a disposition order entered the same day, the 
trial court ordered that respondent-mother participate in a Parenting Capacity 
Evaluation and follow all recommendations, participate in outpatient mental health 
counseling/therapy addressing anger management and parenting education, secure 
employment and stable independent housing, keep all scheduled visitations with her 
children, maintain weekly contact with DSS regarding her whereabouts, and meet 
with a social worker monthly. The trial court allowed respondent-mother two hours 
of weekly supervised visitation with the children. The trial court granted DSS custody 
and placement authority over the children and ordered DSS to place the children in 
a licensed foster home or other court-approved placement. 
¶ 6 
 
On 18 December 2018, the matter came on for a ninety-day review hearing. In 
the resulting order entered on 30 January 2019, the trial court ordered that DSS 
continue to provide for and arrange placement of the children in a licensed foster 
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home or any other home approved by the court. 
¶ 7 
 
On 24 May 2019, the trial court entered a permanency-planning order. The 
trial court set the permanent plan for the children as reunification with a concurrent 
plan of custody with a relative or court-approved caretaker. The trial court also 
ordered that if respondent-mother “ha[d] not done the items ordered [by the next 
review hearing], [DSS] shall recommend changing the permanent plan to adoption.” 
The matter came on for review on 27 August 2019. In its 10 October 2019 
permanency-planning order, the trial court set the permanent plan for the children 
as adoption and the concurrent plan as reunification. The trial court ordered DSS to 
file a petition to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights. 
¶ 8 
 
On 3 December 2019, DSS filed separate petitions for termination of 
respondent-mother’s parental rights in Nathan and Nick. With respect to each child, 
DSS alleged that respondent-mother had neglected the children within the meaning 
of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1); willfully left the children in foster care or placement 
outside the home for more than twelve months without showing to the satisfaction of 
the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances had been made in 
correcting those conditions which led to the children’s removal within the meaning of 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2); and for a continuous period of six months next preceding 
the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights, willfully failed to pay a 
reasonable portion of the children’s cost of care in DSS custody although physically 
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and financially able to do so within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3).  
¶ 9 
 
On 11 March 2020, the trial court conducted an adjudication hearing on DSS’s 
petitions to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights in Nathan and Nick. On 
29 April 2020, the trial court entered orders adjudicating grounds for termination of 
respondent-mother’s parental rights and concluded that as alleged by DSS, grounds 
existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (3).  
¶ 10 
 
On 23 March 2020, the trial court conducted a disposition hearing. It concluded 
that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of 
Nathan and Nick. Accordingly, in orders entered 29 April 2020, the trial court 
terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights in both children. Respondent-
mother appeals.  
II. 
Analysis 
¶ 11 
 
Respondent-mother does not contest the trial court’s adjudication of grounds 
to terminate her parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3). She confines her 
appeal to challenging the trial court’s dispositional determination under N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1110(a), that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate her parental 
rights. 
¶ 12 
 
At the disposition stage of a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, the 
trial court must “determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the 
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juvenile’s best interest[s].” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). In making its 
determination,  
[t]he court may consider any evidence, including hearsay 
evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court 
finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine 
the best interests of the juvenile. In each case, the court 
shall consider the following criteria and make written 
findings regarding the following that are relevant: 
 
(1) The age of the juvenile. 
 
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
 
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in 
the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile. 
 
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
 
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and 
the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other 
permanent placement. 
 
(6) Any relevant consideration. 
 
Id. “Although the trial court must consider each of the factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a), written findings of fact are required only ‘if there is conflicting evidence 
concerning the factor, such that it is placed in issue by virtue of the evidence 
presented before the district court.’ ” In re G.G.M., 377 N.C. 29, 2021-NCSC-25, ¶ 22 
(quoting In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 199 (2019)). 
¶ 13 
 
“The trial court’s dispositional findings of fact are reviewed under a ‘competent 
evidence’ standard.” In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. 504, 508 (2020) (quoting In re K.N.K., 374 
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N.C. 50, 57 (2020)). “We are likewise bound by all uncontested dispositional findings.” 
In re E.F., 375 N.C. 88, 91 (2020) (citing In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437 (2019)). We 
review a trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best interests only for abuse of 
discretion. In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 199. “Under this standard, we defer to the trial 
court’s decision unless it is ‘manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that 
it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.’ ” In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787, 
791 (2020) (quoting In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 100 (2020)). 
¶ 14 
 
As an initial matter, we note the trial court entered separate disposition orders 
for Nathan and Nick, with substantially similar, if not identical, findings of fact. In 
addressing respondent-mother’s challenges to specific findings of fact, we will quote 
from the “Disposition Order for Termination of Parental Rights” in Nathan’s case. 
¶ 15 
 
In both of its disposition orders, the trial court made findings of fact correlating 
to each of the statutory criteria in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(1)–(5). Addressing N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1110(a)(1) and (2), the trial court noted Nathan’s and Nick’s ages and found the 
likelihood of their adoption “extremely high” due to their ages, health, and 
personalities. Addressing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(3), the trial court found that 
termination of parental rights was necessary to accomplish the permanent plan of 
adoption. Addressing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(4), the trial court found that “no bond” 
existed between respondent-mother and either child. Addressing N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1110(a)(5), the trial court found that because neither child was in an adoptive 
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placement, “there [was] no information on the quality of the relationship between [the 
children] and the proposed adoptive parent[s].” As respondent-mother does not 
challenge these findings, they are binding on appeal. See In re E.F., 375 N.C. at 91. 
A. Sufficiency of findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(5) 
¶ 16 
 
Respondent-mother first argues that the trial court failed to make additional 
findings of fact required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(5) to address the quality of the 
relationship between the children and the permanent placements proposed by 
respondent-mother, specifically the children’s maternal grandmother and maternal 
great-grandparents. 
¶ 17 
 
Although respondent-mother did not attend the disposition hearing, the 
transcript and the trial court’s findings show that the maternal grandmother testified 
and offered herself as a permanent placement for the children. However, the record 
provides no indication that the maternal great-grandparents were proposed as a 
placement option during the termination proceedings. Moreover, while the maternal 
grandmother sought to be considered as a permanent placement, a review of the 
record reveals no conflict in the evidence regarding the quality of her relationship 
with Nathan or Nick. Therefore, the trial court did not err by failing to make written 
findings on this issue under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(5). See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 
199. 
 
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B. Accuracy of findings under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6) 
¶ 18 
 
Respondent-mother next argues that “the trial court’s findings of fact which 
held the maternal great-grandparents and maternal grandmother were not 
appropriate placement providers for the children were not supported by . . . competent 
evidence.” She further contends that “[t]he competent evidence supports a finding 
that the children’s placement with the maternal great grandparents and the 
maternal grandmother [is] appropriate.”  
¶ 19 
 
Although the availability of a relative placement is not among the specific 
dispositional factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(1)–(5), we have held the trial 
court “may treat the availability of a relative placement as a ‘relevant consideration’ ” 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6). In re S.D.C., 373 N.C. 285, 290 (2020). “[T]he extent 
to which it is appropriate to do so in any particular proceeding [is] dependent upon 
the extent to which the record contains evidence tending to show whether such a 
relative placement is, in fact, available.” Id. 
¶ 20 
 
Here, respondent-mother challenges the following findings as unsupported by 
the evidence: the trial court had previously denied respondent-mother’s request to 
place the children with the maternal great-grandparents at the ninety-day review 
hearing on 18 December 2018; the maternal grandmother believed respondent-
mother was a “good mother” and blamed others for the children being in DSS custody; 
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and the trial court received “scant evidence” about the quality of care the children 
would receive if placed with their maternal relatives. 
¶ 21 
 
With regard to the finding that the trial court had declined to place the children 
with the maternal great-grandparents at the ninety-day review hearing, DSS Social 
Worker Dale Corbin testified during the termination hearing about the assessment 
conducted with the maternal great-grandparents as a potential placement option. At 
the time of the initial kinship assessment on 29 August 2018, the maternal great-
grandparents’ 48-year-old son, who has a “criminal background,” was living in the 
home. DSS’s concerns are also reflected in the trial court’s findings in the 30 January 
2019 ninety-day review order.2 The maternal great-grandparents made the following 
disclosures to Social Worker Corbin at a meeting on 29 November 2018: 
[The maternal great-grandmother] stated they could not 
have the children placed in their home as neither she nor 
her husband were capable of caring for the children, given 
[Nathan] being a very active child and needing to be 
watched constantly. [The maternal great-grandparents] 
advised they know what would happen if the children were 
placed with them citing that neither [respondent-mother] 
nor their maternal grandmother . . . would do anything. 
[The maternal great-grandmother] stated that neither [the 
maternal grandmother] nor [respondent-mother] “want the 
children” and were not going to do what they are supposed 
to do to get the children back. . . . Further, [the maternal 
great-grandmother] advised the children would just be left 
with them and they could not care for them full time. [She] 
stated she feels better knowing the children are currently 
                                            
2 The trial court took judicial notice of all orders entered in the underlying juvenile 
proceedings. 
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being cared for and are safe where they were. 
The trial court also found that the maternal great-grandmother had contacted Social 
Worker Corbin on 3 December 2018 in an attempt to disavow these statements, 
explaining that respondent-mother and the maternal grandmother “were very upset 
and angry with her and [the maternal great-grandfather] for telling Social Worker 
Corbin that they could not care for the children” and claiming that “she and her 
husband wanted the children brought to her home to stay.” However, Social Worker 
Corbin believed the maternal great-grandparents had been “upfront, honest and not 
hesitant in advising of their situation” on 29 November 2018.  
¶ 22 
 
Although the ninety-day review order did not expressly reject the maternal 
great-grandparents’ request to serve as a placement for Nathan and Nick, the order 
maintained the children in DSS custody and directed DSS to continue to arrange for 
their placement “in a licensed foster home or . . . any other home or facility approved 
by the Court.” Given the order’s findings and Social Worker Corbin’s testimony at the 
disposition hearing, one could reasonably infer that the trial court had deliberately 
chosen not to place the children with the maternal great-grandparents at the prior 
hearing in December 2018. We further conclude that any error in this dispositional 
finding is harmless, inasmuch as the maternal great-grandparents were not proposed 
as a placement option for the children at the time of the termination hearing. See In 
re E.F., 375 N.C. at 94. 
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¶ 23 
 
The trial court’s findings that the maternal grandmother believed respondent-
mother to be a “good mother” and assigned blame “to everyone except her daughter” 
are fully supported by the maternal grandmother’s testimony at the disposition 
hearing. Respondent-mother argues the trial court’s findings misconstrue this 
testimony, noting the maternal grandmother’s qualification that she did not agree 
with the way respondent-mother had been “handling things” and that respondent-
mother is a good mother in “some aspects.” However, the transcript reflects the 
maternal grandmother testified that “[w]hen I say she’s a good mother, she loves her 
children. She—she was never abusive to them or, you know, anything that would rule 
you out as a good mother. She just was a good mother in general.”  
¶ 24 
 
As for the maternal grandmother assigning blame to people other than 
respondent-mother for the children remaining in DSS custody, the maternal 
grandmother testified that the children’s relatives had asked DSS to be a kinship 
placement for the children but were refused “because of little things . . . little stuff” 
despite her assurance to Social Worker Corbin that “whatever h[e] and DSS needed 
us to do we would do it.” The maternal grandmother repeatedly expressed her 
frustration that respondent-mother and her family were being held to an unrealistic 
standard of perfection in being denied custody of the children. She characterized the 
court proceedings as “a mess[,]” “ridiculous[,]”and “unnecessary[,]” and insisted the 
children should be with their family rather than in foster care. While acknowledging 
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she had disapproved of respondent-mother’s past behavior, the maternal 
grandmother explained that 
her problem—her issue is is that she’s young and some of 
the things that she wanted to do were just not appropriate 
for you having two children at the time. Some things that I 
didn’t agree with. Maybe hanging out a little bit and things 
like that and I’m having to babysit. Things that can be 
fixed. Nothing like she was abusive or—or on drugs or 
anything out of the way like that. 
Because the trial court’s findings fairly characterize the maternal grandmother’s 
testimony, we overrule respondent-mother’s challenge. See In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. at 
508. 
¶ 25 
 
Competent evidence also supports the trial court’s findings that it received 
“scant” evidence about the quality of care that the maternal grandmother could 
provide the children. In contesting these findings, respondent-mother asserts the 
trial court previously found the maternal grandmother’s home to be a “perfect” 
placement for Nathan in its initial disposition order entered following the children’s 
adjudication as neglected and dependent juveniles in October 2018. Having reviewed 
the trial court’s 17 October 2018 disposition order we find respondent-mother’s 
argument unpersuasive. 
¶ 26 
 
The finding cited by respondent-mother states as follows:  
32. [The maternal grandmother] testified that she called 
[DSS] and reported her daughter because . . . [she] was not 
taking her parenting seriously. . . . [The maternal 
grandmother] believes [respondent-mother] gets the 
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seriousness of it now. In the past [the maternal 
grandmother] has been a placement provider for the 
children. [Nathan] has always been with her and [maternal 
grandmother] can handle [Nathan]’s behavioral problems. 
[The maternal grandmother]’s home is the perfect place for 
[Nathan] to be placed. [The maternal grandmother] wants 
both of the children out of foster care and placed with her 
and/or her mother[, the maternal great-grandmother]. 
Fairly construed, this finding merely summarizes the maternal grandmother’s 
testimony and does not reflect the trial court’s own assessment that her residence is 
“perfect” for Nathan. As respondent-mother does not direct our attention to any other 
evidence probative of the quality of care the maternal grandmother could provide the 
children, we reject respondent-mother’s challenge to the trial court’s findings of 
“scant” evidence on the subject. See In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. at 508. 
¶ 27 
 
To the extent respondent-mother separately contends there is competent 
evidence to support a finding that the maternal grandmother or maternal great-
grandmother would be an appropriate placement for the children, we find no merit to 
her contention. “Although the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the findings may be raised on appeal, our appellate courts are bound by the trial 
courts’ findings of fact where there is some evidence to support those findings, even 
though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.” In re Montgomery, 311 
N.C. 101, 110–11 (1984) (citation omitted). 
¶ 28 
 
The trial court heard no evidence the maternal great-grandmother was willing 
or able to provide a permanent home for the children. See In re E.F., 375 N.C. at 94. 
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Moreover, although the maternal grandmother testified about her own willingness 
and ability to care for the children, it was the trial court’s role as fact-finder “to pass 
upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 196 
(cleaned up). The trial court expressly found that 
It would not be in the best interest of the minor child[ren] 
to be placed with either [the maternal grandmother] or [the 
maternal aunt]. The Court was able to observe them during 
their testimony and hear the tone in which they spoke. 
They both believe that [respondent-mother] is a good 
mother in spite of the facts made known in the termination 
of parental rights proceeding, the fact that [respondent-
mother] was not at the hearing, and the fact that her 
child[ren do] not have a bond with her. Amongst other 
things, this Court is concerned with their judgment and 
especially their ability to provide a safe and nurturing 
environment for [the children], especially at [their] tender 
age[s]. 
Respondent-mother’s exception is overruled. 
C. The best interests determination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) 
¶ 29 
 
Finally, respondent-mother claims the trial court abused its discretion by 
concluding it was in Nathan’s and Nick’s best interests to terminate her parental 
rights. She contends the trial court failed to follow a statutory preference for placing 
children with relatives over non-relatives when children are removed from the 
parent’s home. Respondent-mother cites N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-900 and 7B-903(a1) under 
Article 9, which governs dispositions in abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings, 
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as an example of this preference. See In re S.D.C., 373 N.C. at 290 (citing N.C.G.S. §§ 
7B-903(a1) and 7B-906.1(e)(2) for the proposition that “[a] trial court is required to 
consider whether a relative placement is available for a juvenile in deciding the issues 
raised in an abuse, neglect, and dependency proceeding”). But cf. id. (“[T]he trial court 
is not expressly directed to consider the availability of a relative placement in the 
course of deciding a termination of parental rights proceeding . . . .”). Respondent-
mother further notes that custody with a relative or court-approved caretaker was 
designated as the children’s concurrent permanent plan throughout the underlying 
juvenile proceedings. Because “[t]he trial court did not adequately evaluate the 
appropriateness of [the] maternal relatives’ placement” proposed by [the] maternal 
grandmother at the termination hearing, respondent-mother argues the court “failed 
to make [a] reasoned decision” about the children’s best interests.  
¶ 30 
 
It is true that Article 9 of the Juvenile Code—which governs dispositions 
entered in ongoing juvenile abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings—provides 
that a juvenile receiving out-of-home care should be placed with a suitable relative 
when such a placement is available, “unless the court finds that the placement is 
contrary to the best interests of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-903(a1) (2019). However, 
“[a] termination proceeding is separate and distinct from an underlying adjudication 
proceeding” and is governed by the statutes in Article 11. In re A.S.M.R., 375 N.C. 
539, 542 (2020). Article 11’s dispositional statute, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110, gives no 
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priority to relative placements, focusing solely upon identifying the best interests of 
the child. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)–(b). While the availability of an appropriate 
relative placement may be a “relevant consideration” under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(6), 
In re S.D.C., 373 N.C. at 290, it is left to the trial court’s discretion to weigh the 
various competing factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) in arriving at its determination 
of the child’s best interests. See In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. at 795 (explaining that “the 
bond between parent and child is just one of the factors to be considered under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and the trial court is permitted to give greater weight to other 
factors” (quoting In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 437)). 
¶ 31 
 
The court’s unchallenged findings of fact show DSS had contacted and assessed 
fourteen potential relative placements during the course of the underlying 
proceedings but found none to be acceptable. As discussed above, the trial court 
acknowledged the maternal grandmother’s request that the children be placed with 
her but made findings explaining why such a placement would be inappropriate and 
contrary to the children’s best interests. While the court “d[id] find value in placing a 
child with relatives[,]” the court concluded, based on the evidence before it, that 
freeing Nathan and Nick for adoption would afford them “the greatest opportunity to 
be nurtured, loved, and cared for in a safe and stable environment” and “to reach [the] 
full development of [their] physical, mental, emotional, moral and spiritual faculties.”  
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¶ 32 
 
Because the trial court made sufficient dispositional findings of fact under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(1)–(5) and provided a reasoned explanation of its weighing of 
the statutory factors, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
concluding that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights in Nathan and 
Nick was in the children’s best interests. See In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. at 791. 
Accordingly, the trial court’s orders are affirmed. 
AFFIRMED.