Title: Rigterink v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-971 
____________ 
 
THOMAS RIGTERINK, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[April 21, 2016] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a motion to 
vacate convictions for first-degree murder and sentences of death under Florida 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of 
relief on all claims.   
FACTS 
Thomas Rigterink was convicted for the 2003 murders of Jeremy Jarvis and 
Allison Sousa and sentenced to death for both murders.  Rigterink v. State 
(Rigterink I), 2 So. 3d 221, 227 (Fla. 2009), vacated by Florida v. Rigterink 
 
 
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(Rigterink II), 559 U.S. 965 (2010).  The facts were detailed by this Court in 
Rigterink I: 
Shortly after 3:00 p.m. on September 24, 2003, a male in his 
late twenties to early thirties, who fit the general description of 
Rigterink, attacked victim Jeremy Jarvis with a ten-to-eleven-inch 
knife.  The attack began inside the warehouse residence of Jarvis, 
which was located in the fifth unit of the complex, and eventually 
moved outside.  A male eyewitness testified that as he drove past this 
location, he slowed his vehicle and viewed two men—one, an 
apparent attacker, standing above another, an apparent victim.  The 
victim was lying on the sidewalk immediately in front of one of the 
building units. . . .  It appeared that the attacker was attempting to drag 
the victim into the last unit of the building. . . .  When the victim fled 
toward the first unit of the complex, the witness observed a significant 
amount of blood flowing from wounds on his chest.  The witness 
observed the victim approach and open the door of the first unit, while 
the attacker—who was “about halfway down” the sidewalk at this 
point—remained in pursuit. . . .   
At the time, units 1 and 2 of this dual-use warehouse complex 
served as the office of a construction business.  A second victim, 
Allison Sousa, and a female eyewitness were both secretaries at this 
establishment . . . .  That afternoon, Sousa and the female witness 
heard screaming outside of the construction office.  They approached 
and opened the door of unit 1, and [Jarvis] entered the office and sat 
down in a chair near the door.  The female eyewitness testified that 
Jarvis appeared to be experiencing serious blood loss from a wound 
on the right side of his chest. . . .  Sousa began to care for the man and 
to call 911.  She instructed the female witness to go to the office 
kitchen in the back to obtain some towels to address the obvious 
injuries . . . .  The witness obeyed, and as she began to return to the 
front of unit 1, the witness heard the door slam.  She continued 
forward toward a pass-through window located between the main-
office and lobby areas.  Through this window, the witness observed a 
second male aggressively approaching Sousa. . . .  The witness saw 
that Sousa was still attempting to call 911, and she also caught a 
glimpse of the second man’s profile and a side view of his body.  At 
trial, she described him . . . [and] th[e] description is consistent with 
Rigterink’s appearance on September 24, 2003.  The witness . . . felt 
 
 
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that he was “going after” Sousa and that he had seen her (the witness) 
approach the window.  For that reason, the witness fled to an office 
located further toward the rear of unit 1.  As the witness ran, she heard 
Sousa scream, “Don’t hurt me.  Don’t hurt me.”  When the witness 
reached the rear office, she closed the door, locked the deadbolt, and 
dialed 911. 
The PCSO [(Polk County Sheriff’s Office)] received two 911 
calls from this location on September 24, 2003.  The dispatcher 
received Sousa’s call at 3:07:37 p.m. and received the female 
eyewitness’s call at 3:07:46 p.m.  The recording of the first call 
reveals: 
 
911 Operator:  “911.  What’s your emergency?  Hello?” 
911 Caller:  “Oh, my God.  Don’t—don’t hurt me.  No. . . .”  
 
The dispatcher then heard “people . . . throwing something 
around” and afterward total silence.  The line remained open for four 
minutes. . . .  At trial, the female eyewitness testified that . . . she 
heard scuffling, banging, and impacts against the walls . . . .  She later 
heard someone rub against the walls and attempt to gain access to the 
rear office in which she was hiding.  She only opened the door and 
emerged from the office once PCSO deputies had arrived and secured 
the crime scene. . . . 
When PCSO personnel arrived, they secured the entire complex 
and discovered the lifeless bodies of Jarvis and Sousa in the rear-
warehouse area of unit 1. . . .  [T]he medical examiners established 
that the attacker stabbed or cut Jarvis a total of twenty-two times and 
stabbed or cut Sousa a total of six times.  Both victims had several 
injuries to their hands and limbs that were consistent with defensive 
wounds. . . .   
Inside unit 1 . . . the CSTs [(Crime Scene Technicians)] 
encountered abundant evidence of a bloody, vicious attack.  Both 
sides of the entry door to unit 1 were smeared with blood.  There was 
a large pool of blood near the entrance, as if someone had been 
standing or sitting there while bleeding heavily . . . .  The CSTs also 
found a blood-smeared gumball dispenser in the lobby, which was 
overturned, separated from its base . . . .  The heavy blood stains on 
the walls and doors of unit 1 were consistent with someone forcefully 
pushing another—who was bleeding profusely—against these 
surfaces. . . .  Further, the pass-through window and the entire hallway 
 
 
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leading through unit 1 were smeared with blood.  In the main-office 
area, there was a large pool of blood under a desk as if one of the 
victims had sought refuge there.  A phone on top of the desk was off 
the hook and dangling from its cord just above the floor.  A veritable 
trail of blood continued down the hallway into the kitchen area, where 
large amounts of blood were smeared on a refrigerator, a trash bin, 
and some of the cabinets.  Continuing along this trail of blood toward 
the rear of the unit, the door between the rear-office and warehouse 
areas had been damaged along with its locking mechanism and frame.  
This damage was consistent with someone attempting to charge or 
crash through the door . . . .  Additionally, there were bloody, smeared 
palm prints on the door.  The blood trail finally ended in the rear-
warehouse area near the bodies of Jarvis and Sousa. . . .  The victims’ 
wounds were consistent with the attacker stabbing or cutting them 
with a ten- or eleven-inch blade. 
Inside unit 5 (the residence of Jarvis), the CSTs discovered 
large blood smears on the wall adjacent to the entryway—consistent 
with the conclusion that a struggle occurred . . . .  Blood also covered 
much of the flooring.  Furniture, including a sofa, was overturned and 
in disarray.  A trail of blood droplets led from unit 5 along the 
sidewalk to the entrance of unit 1.  FDLE personnel developed two 
bloody latent fingerprints on the inside of the door to unit 5, which 
were later determined to match Rigterink’s relevant print patterns.  
Fingerprint analyst Patricia Newton testified that the photographs of 
these prints . . . were consistent with the print-donor’s fingers having 
already been covered in blood and the donor then touching the door, 
rather than the surface of the door having blood on it with the print-
donor merely touching the freshly deposited blood.  At various 
locations hidden inside unit 5 . . . the CSTs found three to five pounds 
of marijuana with a street value of several thousand dollars. . . .  
Jarvis’s mobile phone was the final significant item of evidence that 
the PCSO discovered in unit 5.  Detective Jerry Connolly, the lead 
detective on this case, and other PCSO investigators eventually used 
this phone, and associated phone records, to compile a list of Jarvis’s 
known associates . . . . 
. . . . 
Using the call log on Jarvis’s mobile phone, along with the 
phone records that the PCSO later obtained from [Jarvis’s] service 
provider, Detective Connolly and his colleagues began to establish 
contact with Jarvis’s known associates.  One of the first associates that 
 
 
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they contacted was Marshall Mark Mullins. . . .  Detective Connolly 
and a group of PCSO detectives . . . contacted Mullins at his home.  
The detectives . . . questioned him with regard to his whereabouts 
during the afternoon of September 24, 2003.  Mullins provided a 
complete alibi. . . .   
. . . . 
At approximately 11:30 a.m. on the morning of September 25, 
2003 (the day following the murders), two detectives . . . went to 
Rigterink’s condominium (“condo”) . . . .  They were interested in this 
location because of phone calls between a phone located at this 
address and Jarvis’s mobile phone, which occurred on the day of the 
murders.  [N]o one responded to the door. . . .   
While they waited outside, the detectives contacted Rigterink’s 
parents, who agreed to bring him to his condo for an interview.  
Rigterink arrived at 7:30 p.m. and invited the detectives inside.  At 
approximately 7:45 p.m., two additional detectives . . . arrived to 
question Rigterink.  Rigterink explained that . . . he called Jarvis to 
purchase some marijuana.  He also stated that sometime after 2 p.m., 
he had another phone conversation with Jarvis concerning the same 
topic. . . .  As part of this questioning, Rigterink volunteered the 
names of three additional known associates of Jarvis—including . . .  
Mullins—who were also allegedly involved in the drug trade. . . .  
PCSO investigators next made contact with Rigterink on 
October 9, 2003.  By this time, the PCSO—with FDLE assistance—
had been able to obtain suitable photographs of the bloody latent 
prints recovered from the front door of unit 5, and they were in the 
process of obtaining “elimination prints” from all known associates of 
Jarvis to rule them out as suspects in the ongoing murder 
investigation.  On October 9, Detective Connolly spoke with 
Rigterink in his condo.  The two men discussed Rigterink’s dealings 
with Jarvis in regard to purchasing marijuana and the timeframe 
during which Rigterink had placed the phone calls to Jarvis on the day 
of the murders.  Rigterink agreed to visit the PCSO the next day, 
October 10, 2003, to provide “elimination prints,” but never appeared 
for that appointment. 
At 4:30 p.m. on October 10, Rigterink called Detective 
Connolly to explain that he would not be able to provide his 
fingerprints that day due to a lack of transportation.  As an alternative, 
Rigterink offered to appear the following Monday, October 13, 2003.  
Rigterink also failed to appear on the 13th . . . .  On October 14 and 
 
 
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15, the PCSO investigators were unable to establish contact with 
Rigterink . . . .  At trial, Rigterink testified that he then decided to hide 
on his parents’ roof . . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
While on the roof, Rigterink saw the PCSO investigators come 
and go on October 15, 2003.  During this time, the PCSO . . . executed 
[a] consent-search form to . . . search a 1992 blue Toyota pickup that 
belonged to Rigterink’s father. . . .  [T]he CSTs later discovered blood 
near the driver-side door, armrest, seatbelt and seatbelt assembly, 
steering wheel and column, and the passenger-side floorboard area.  
At trial, Rigterink admitted that he borrowed his father’s . . . pickup 
on Monday, September 22, 2003, and that he continued driving the 
truck until Wednesday, September 24, 2003.  The PCSO investigators 
were not aware of this information at the time, but the blood found 
inside the truck was genetically consistent with that of Jarvis. . . .  
[Some] samples were consistent with mixtures of Rigterink’s and 
Jarvis’s blood, but excluded Sousa as a possible donor.  [N.10] 
 
[N.10]  Additionally, the PCSO could not exclude 
Rigterink as the source of the foreign DNA discovered 
under Jarvis’s fingernails.   
 
On the morning of October 16, 2003, from his perch on the 
roof, Rigterink saw his mother, Nancy, who appeared to be distressed.  
Rigterink descended from the roof to comfort her.  At approximately 
10 a.m. on the 16th, Nancy called Detective Connolly and explained 
that Rigterink was ready to speak with the PCSO investigators.  When 
Detective Connolly and other investigators arrived, Rigterink had just 
finished a shower and, while he dressed, Rigterink told Detective 
Connolly that two men from Lake Wales who sold “ice” (i.e., 
methamphetamines) might have murdered Jarvis and Sousa.  After 
some discussion, Rigterink agreed to accompany the police to the 
PCSO Bureau of Criminal Investigations (“BCI”) to provide 
“elimination prints.”  Rigterink was driven by his parents to the BCI 
office. 
After Rigterink provided “elimination prints,” he was 
interviewed by a group of PCSO detectives.  Following several hours 
of questioning—which included repeated accusations of dissembling 
and the disclosure that Rigterink’s fingerprints matched those 
discovered in blood at the crime scene—Rigterink eventually admitted 
 
 
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in a videotaped statement that (1) he traveled to the dual-use 
warehouse complex on September 24, 2003, to purchase marijuana 
from Jarvis; (2) he struggled with Jarvis while holding a large knife, 
but did not recall stabbing anyone; (3) he pursued Jarvis into unit 1; 
(4) he recalled certain aspects of these events, but his memories 
appeared as disjointed “Polaroid snapshots”; (5) he eventually 
discovered Sousa’s body and “freaked out”; and (6) in the midst of 
“hauling ass” away from the warehouse complex, he disposed of the 
bloody knife and a black Jansport backpack—which contained his 
bloody clothing—by throwing these items off of a bridge.  At the 
conclusion of this interrogation, PCSO personnel arrested Rigterink 
for the murders of Jarvis and Sousa. 
 
 
. . . . 
In total, the October 16 police interview or interrogation 
continued for over four hours as Rigterink remained in the same small 
room.  However, the unrecorded portion of the interrogation, which 
was not challenged [in a motion to suppress], covered from 
approximately 11 a.m. until 2:24 p.m. (roughly 3.5 hours). . . .  
. . . . 
 
While the police were waiting for fingerprint analysts to 
compare Rigterink’s fingerprints to the bloody latent prints discovered 
at the crime scene, Rigterink was taken to a six-by-eight, sound-
insulated interrogation room, which contained three chairs and a small 
desk.  Initially, Detectives Connolly, Rench, and Raczynski were all 
inside this small room with Rigterink. . . .  [T]he interrogation-room 
door was closed but not locked.  PCSO personnel instructed 
Rigterink’s parents to remain waiting in the lobby.  Rigterink was not 
handcuffed or restrained during the interrogation. 
During the unrecorded portions of the interrogation, Rigterink 
provided three irreconcilable stories in response to repeated 
accusations from the detectives that he was lying with regard to his 
activities and whereabouts on the day of the murders.  First, Rigterink 
claimed that he called Jarvis to establish a marijuana deal on 
September 24, 2003 (the day of the murders), but he never actually 
went to Jarvis’s home that day.  At the conclusion of his first story, 
the detectives accused Rigterink of lying.  In response, Rigterink 
offered a different version of the facts:  He traveled to Jarvis’s home 
on the day of the murders, completed a purchase of marijuana, and left 
at a time when Jarvis was alone and unharmed.  At the conclusion of 
 
 
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Rigterink’s second story, the detectives again stated that he was lying 
and that he was somehow involved with these murders. 
The detectives finally decided to confront Rigterink with the 
fact that two of his fingerprints matched the bloody latent prints 
recovered from the crime scene.  After being confronted with the 
fingerprint match, Rigterink provided a still different version of the 
facts.  In this third rendition, Rigterink stated that he arrived after the 
murders occurred.  Specifically, he claimed that when he approached 
unit 5, he saw blood smeared over the entryway.  Rigterink then 
walked inside unit 5 and “touched everything” in the process of 
looking for Jarvis.  He was unable to find Jarvis in unit 5, so he exited.  
Once outside, he noticed a blood trail leading from unit 5 to unit 1, so 
he followed the trail until he arrived at unit 1.  He entered unit 1 and 
observed a large amount of blood and two people lying on the floor.  
Rigterink then approached the bodies and checked both of their 
pulses.  He could not find a pulse on either victim.  At this point, 
Rigterink realized that he was covered in blood and became scared, so 
he fled and drove home.  Rigterink could not explain why he was 
covered in blood.  He did not call 911 because he was frightened.  
Rigterink estimated that he spent only five minutes at the crime scene. 
At the conclusion of his third story, the detectives again 
accused Rigterink of lying with regard to his involvement in these 
murders.  Rigterink then replied that he would tell the detectives “the 
whole truth.”  Detective Connolly testified that Rigterink was 
responsive and alert throughout this process.  It was only after 
Rigterink had agreed to “tell the whole truth,” that Detective Connolly 
verbally advised him of his Miranda rights and requested that he read 
and sign a rights-waiver form to ensure the admissibility of his 
confession. . . .  Once Rigterink was read his Miranda rights . . . 
Detective Connolly turned on a hidden recording device and 
microphone located within the interview room. 
 
 
. . . . 
Rigterink . . . drove his father’s blue 1992 Toyota pickup to the 
warehouse complex. . . .   
When Rigterink traveled to Jarvis’s home on the 24th, he 
carried a black Jansport backpack in which he placed a black hunting 
knife with a ten- or eleven-inch blade that began straight but curved 
toward its tip. . . .  
Rigterink described the remaining events through a series of 
five “Polaroid snapshots.”  Once he entered unit 5, he and Jarvis 
 
 
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spoke briefly about the new batch of marijuana, and then Jarvis began 
to reach under his sofa to retrieve something.  This is the last thing 
that Rigterink remembered before being “locked up” in a struggle 
with Jarvis near the front door of unit 5. . . .  As part of the first 
“Polaroid snapshot,” Rigterink stated that he saw himself “locked up” 
with Jarvis and perceived that he had the hunting knife in his hand and 
that he was covered in blood. . . .   
When they moved outside, Rigterink saw himself standing, 
while Jarvis was kneeling, which is consistent with the testimony of 
the male eyewitness presented at trial. . . .  Rigterink then recalled a 
second “Polaroid snapshot”: 
 
I remember being there.  I can tell you exactly the 
position we were in. . . .  And I remember I was holding 
onto him.  I don’t know if I had the knife in my hand 
because I thought I had him with two hands, but I know I 
still had the knife in my hand, holding onto him.  And the 
next thing I remember—I don’t—I don’t remember at all. 
. . .  [A]nd in any event, the next thing I remember is 
running.  I think I was right behind him. 
 
He then transitioned to a third “Polaroid snapshot,” this time 
within unit 1:  “And the . . . next image I have is [Jarvis] swinging a 
bubble gum dispenser at me.”. . .  Rigterink then recalled a fourth 
“Polaroid snapshot”:  He ran down a long hallway in unit 1 and 
“jumped into” or “ran through” the doorway separating the rear-office 
area from the warehouse area. . . .   
Rigterink then segued into his fifth “Polaroid snapshot”:  “And 
the last thing I remember is looking at the girl [Allison Sousa].  I 
didn’t even see Jeremy [Jarvis] in the back room.  And then I hauled 
ass.”. . .    
After these events, Rigterink claimed that he removed his 
bloody shirt and ran back into unit 1 to retrieve the backpack before 
leaving. . . .   
Rigterink then described his drive away from the crime scene:  
“I remember being at [a traffic] light and looking down and being 
covered in blood.”  When Rigterink looked down and discovered that 
he was covered in blood, he thought “[w]hat the f*ck happened.”  At 
that moment, he determined that it would be best to get rid of the 
knife and the backpack because they were “obviously evidence at that 
 
 
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time that something had happened.”  Rigterink claimed that he threw 
the knife and the black backpack over a bridge that he crossed on his 
way home (despite searching, the PCSO never recovered these 
evidentiary items). . . .  
 
 
. . . . 
Rigterink claimed that by “[t]hat Friday[, September 26, 2003,] I 
knew that I’d done it. . . .  I don’t remember the event but I knew what 
had happened.”  Rigterink stated that he did not discuss the killings 
with anyone or tell anyone what he had done. 
 
 
. . . . 
Rigterink was 32 years old when he provided his confession and, until 
his arrest, he was not placed in handcuffs or otherwise restrained. 
. . . . 
During the defense case-in-chief, Rigterink took the stand and 
testified . . . .  Through his testimony, he offered a fifth version of the 
facts with regard to his activities and whereabouts on Wednesday, 
September 24, 2003.  In the process, he contradicted almost 
everything that he had previously told the police and, instead, claimed 
that he intentionally misled the PCSO investigators because Marshall 
Mark Mullins had threatened to kill him, his parents, and his former 
girlfriend if he mentioned that Mullins or an unnamed group of 
“others” were involved in the murders of Jarvis and Sousa.  
During his testimony at trial, Rigterink again admitted that he 
was at the crime scene, but claimed that he arrived after an apparent 
attack, explored unit 5, followed the blood trail to unit 1, and then ran 
down the hallway in unit 1 where he crashed through the doorway 
separating the rear-office and warehouse areas.  Once inside the 
warehouse area, he discovered both victims.  According to Rigterink, 
Jarvis was still alive and reached up and grabbed Rigterink’s hand and 
arm and then slumped back to the floor.  Rigterink then heard what he 
thought were car doors slamming shut, so he ran outside.  As he 
exited unit 1, he saw a dirty white van drive away.  When the van 
drove past, Rigterink made eye contact with the driver and a 
passenger. . . .   
In an apparent attempt to explain his unorthodox response to 
discovering two very bloody murder victims (one of whom was an 
acquaintance or friend), Rigterink consistently described himself as 
“freaked out,” and explained that he had never encountered this type 
of situation.  He never called 911 and never told anyone about the 
gory, blood-filled scene that he had discovered because on the 24th he 
 
 
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was still “freaked out,” and on the 25th, Mullins allegedly visited 
Rigterink at his condo and issued the death threats. 
 
 
. . . . 
Much of Rigterink’s trial testimony was also inconsistent with 
the testimony of other witnesses.  For example, his ex-wife testified 
that he always kept a large military knife with a curved tip and a ten-
or eleven-inch black blade lodged between their mattress and box 
spring.  Also, both the male and female eyewitnesses testified that one 
man—not a group of two or three men—pursued Jarvis.  An 
additional concern with Rigterink’s testimony involved the amount of 
time between when the PCSO received the 911 calls (close to 3:08 
p.m.) and when the first responders arrived on scene (close to 3:18 
p.m.), which would have made it difficult for Rigterink to have 
arrived after the murders occurred and to have then explored units 5 
and 1 before “freaking out” and leaving all before law enforcement 
arrived. . . .   
 
2 So. 3d at 228-240 (footnotes omitted) (some alterations in original).  After the 
jury convicted Rigterink for the first-degree murders of Jarvis and Sousa, it 
recommended a sentence of death for each murder by votes of seven to five.  Id. at 
227.  The trial court found two aggravating circumstances with respect to both 
murders, and assigned them great weight: (1) Rigterink had previously been 
convicted for a capital felony (based on the contemporaneous murders); and (2) the 
murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  Id.  With respect to 
Sousa, the trial court also found the aggravating circumstance that she was 
murdered to avoid lawful arrest, and assigned this factor great weight.  Id.  The 
trial court found one statutory mitigating factor—that Rigterink did not have a 
significant history of prior criminal activity.  Id.  The trial court assigned this factor 
only some weight because Rigterink admitted that he used illegal drugs since his 
 
 
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late teens, stole from his employer, and drove with a suspended driver’s license.  
Id.  The trial court also found twelve nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:   
(1) use of drugs (little weight); (2) reputation with family and friends 
as a peaceful person (some weight); (3) kindness and attention to 
maternal and paternal grandmothers (some weight); (4) desire to help 
other prison inmates (some weight); (5) religious commitment while 
in prison (some weight); (6) assisted turtles across roadways (little 
weight); (7) supportive family (moderate weight); (8) capable of 
kindness (some weight); (9) one credit hour remaining to obtain 
bachelor of science degree in biology (little weight); (10) sympathy 
for the victims’ families (little weight); (11) ability to be educated and 
to educate others (little weight); and (12) exhibited appropriate 
courtroom behavior (little weight). 
 
Id. at 228 n.7.  On the initial direct appeal, this Court reversed the conviction 
because it determined that the Miranda warnings were insufficient under its prior 
precedent of State v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531, 540 (Fla. 2008).  Rigterink I, 2 So. 3d 
at 253.  The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari review of 
Powell and Rigterink I, and held that the warning in Powell was sufficient.  Florida 
v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 63 (2010).  The Supreme Court thereafter vacated 
Rigterink I and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Powell.  Rigterink 
II, 559 U.S. at 965.  On reconsideration, this Court held that the warning provided 
to Rigterink was sufficient and affirmed his convictions and sentences.  Rigterink 
v. State (Rigterink III), 66 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 2011).   
On June 22, 2012, Rigterink filed a motion to vacate his convictions and 
sentences pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  He filed an 
 
 
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amended motion on November 1, 2012.  Rigterink requested an evidentiary 
hearing for the following claims, the denial of which are challenged in this appeal:1 
(1) Rigterink was denied a fair guilt phase because counsel were ineffective for: (a) 
failing to move to suppress the knife seized from Rigterink’s condominium by his 
girlfriend; (b) failing to (i) investigate the circumstances surrounding Rigterink’s 
statements, (ii) file a comprehensive motion to suppress all statements to law 
enforcement on October 16, 2003, on the basis that he was in custody when he 
provided the statements, or unable to waive his Miranda rights because of drug use 
and sleep deprivation, or (iii) present evidence to the jury that his statements were 
                                          
 
1.  Rigterink did not appeal the denial of the following claims for which he 
requested an evidentiary hearing: (1) he was deprived of a fair guilt phase because 
counsel were ineffective for failing to: (a) effectively challenge Rigterink’s 
statements to police; (b) consult with or call an independent forensic witness 
trained in bloodstain pattern analysis; and (c) utilize the services of an expert 
sociologist or psychologist to assist the jury in understanding that an accused can 
falsely confess to a crime; (2) he was deprived of a fair penalty phase because 
counsel were ineffective for failing to: (a) utilize the services of a mitigation expert 
to any meaningful extent; and (b) consult with an independent forensic medical 
examiner regarding issues surrounding the deaths of the victims, and the extent to 
which each victim suffered or apprehended their fate; and (3) cumulative error.  
Rigterink also did not appeal the denial of the following claims, for which he did 
not request an evidentiary hearing: (1) counsel were ineffective for failing to renew 
objections that Florida’s death penalty scheme violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002); and (2) the death sentences violate Rigterink’s right of protection from 
cruel and unusual punishment because he may be incompetent at the time of 
execution.  In addition, we do not presently address the United States Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), because 
Rigterink has not raised a Ring or Hurst claim in his postconviction motion or in 
this appeal. 
 
 
- 14 - 
not voluntary; (c) failing to object to the cross-examination of Rigterink regarding 
his uncharged theft from his former employer; (d) failing to conduct adequate 
attorney-client interviews with Rigterink and prepare him to testify; (e) failing to 
(i) adequately investigate alternate suspects and (ii) establish a foundation for 
William Farmer’s testimony to satisfy the requirements of sections 90.405 and 
90.804, Florida Statutes (2005); (f) failing to (i) thoroughly investigate Rigterink’s 
mental state at the time of the murders, and (ii) follow up on recommendations by 
mental health professionals; and (g) failing to object to the introduction of shoes 
purchased by the State that matched the tread found at the murder scene; and (2) 
Rigterink was denied a fair penalty phase because counsel were ineffective for: (a) 
failing to (i) have Rigterink examined by a mental health expert, (ii) utilize 
Rigterink’s drug history to establish the mitigating factors that at the time of the 
murders, Rigterink’s ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law 
was impaired (substantially or otherwise), and/or he was under a mental or 
emotional disturbance (extreme or otherwise), and (iii) present witnesses who 
could testify about Rigterink’s drug abuse and bizarre conduct at or near the time 
of the murders; (b) attempting to develop the statutory mitigator of no significant 
criminal history, but allowing Rigterink to testify regarding uncharged criminal 
conduct; (c) conceding the aggravating circumstances of prior violent felony and 
HAC; and (d) failing to object to argument by the State that the jury should 
 
 
- 15 - 
consider the non-statutory aggravating factors of self-centeredness, lack of 
appreciation for others, manipulation of others, drug use causing financial hardship 
for his family and causing his marriage to fail, theft from his employer, and that 
Rigterink is shockingly evil. 
The circuit court held a Huff2 hearing and granted an evidentiary hearing on 
each of these claims.3  During the hearing, Rigterink presented the testimony of 
David Carmichael and Byron Hileman, Rigterink’s trial counsel; Rosalie Bolin, the 
investigator and mitigation specialist hired during trial and for the postconviction 
proceedings; Julie Dantzler, a licensed mental health counselor who met with 
Rigterink prior to the murders; Dr. Jeffrey Hunter, a doctor who conducted drug 
tests on Rigterink prior to the murders; Dr. Tracy Hartig, a psychologist who was 
consulted prior to trial; Dr. Thomas McClane, a psychiatrist who was consulted 
before trial; Dr. Daniel Buffington, a clinical pharmacologist hired for the 
postconviction proceedings; and Dr. Harry Krop, a psychologist hired for the 
postconviction proceedings.  Additionally, Rigterink presented the testimony of 
Catherine Enriquez, his ex-wife; Richard Rigterink, his uncle; Mary Dezialo, his 
sister; and Courtney Sheil Betz, his girlfriend at the time of the murders.  These 
                                          
 
2.  Huff v. State, 495 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1986).   
 
3.  The circuit court also granted an evidentiary hearing for the claim that 
counsel were ineffective because they failed to effectively challenge Rigterink’s 
statements to police.   
 
 
- 16 - 
individuals testified with respect to their knowledge of Rigterink’s drug abuse prior 
to and around the time of the murders.   
Hileman and Carmichael testified with regard to their representation of 
Rigterink.  They stated that although both the guilt and penalty phases were 
blended efforts, Hileman predominantly worked on the guilt phase and Carmichael 
predominantly worked on the penalty phase.  Both Hileman and Carmichael 
testified that their options and approach to the defense changed once Rigterink 
renounced his confession and asserted he was coerced into claiming involvement 
in the murders.   
Bolin testified with respect to a number of topics also testified to by Hileman 
and Carmichael.  However, Bolin’s testimony was contrary to that of the attorneys 
on a number of issues, predominantly with respect to their diligence and 
investigation into Rigterink’s drug abuse.  For example, counsel and Bolin 
presented conflicting testimony with respect to whether counsel received a 
memorandum written by Bolin that she claimed to have faxed to Hileman’s office 
on October 22, 2003, and which concerned her interview of Rigterink on October 
20, 2003.  The memo indicated that Rigterink informed Bolin that before 2 p.m. on 
the day of the murders, he consumed ice,4 Xanax, and Darvocet within an hour of 
                                          
 
4.  Dr. Buffington testified that ice is methamphetamine.  Hileman testified 
that ice refers to crystal methamphetamine.    
 
 
- 17 - 
each other.  The memo also contained a list of associates he received drugs from, 
and a history of his drug use, including that over the previous fifteen years, he had 
used acid one hundred times, ecstasy one hundred times, cocaine thirty times, 
methamphetamine forty to fifty times, and marijuana all the time.  The memo also 
indicated that Rigterink used prescription drugs, including Xanax, Percocet, 
Vicodin, and Darvocet, as well as ice.  Bolin testified that she conducted this 
interview at Hileman’s direction, but Hileman testified that he did not believe he 
had been hired to represent Rigterink at the time the interview was conducted, and 
he could not recall ever directing an investigator to interview an individual before 
he had been officially retained and the attorney-client privilege had attached.  In 
response to the conflicting testimony, the State presented evidence to impeach 
Bolin, including her personal relationship with a capital defendant and a billing 
disagreement between her and Carmichael.   
Dantzler testified that Rigterink was referred to her prior to the murders.  
She diagnosed Rigterink with cannabis dependence and suspected polysubstance 
abuse.  Similarly, Dr. Hunter testified that he performed two drug tests on 
Rigterink prior to the murders.  The first test was taken on August 25, 2003, 
approximately one month before the murders, and indicated the presence of 
amphetamines, tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), and opiates.  The second test was 
taken on September 15, 2003, and indicated the presence of only THC.   
 
 
- 18 - 
Dr. Hartig testified that she was retained by the public defender’s office after 
Rigterink’s arrest.5  Based on her initial consultation, she concluded that Rigterink 
was sane, but she wished to perform further tests and recommended consultation 
with other experts in light of Rigterink’s report of an increase in substance abuse 
prior to his arrest, blackout experiences, seizures, a history of head injuries, and 
memory issues.  Similarly, Dr. McClane was hired by Hileman before trial to 
evaluate Rigterink, and Rigterink provided him with a history of extensive drug 
use.  Dr. McClane testified that he believed Rigterink was a chronic drug abuser, 
and that he would have investigated substance abuse had he been retained further.   
Dr. Buffington was consulted for the postconviction proceedings and 
testified during the hearing with respect to the effects of acute and chronic 
substance abuse.  He testified that a blood test taken the day of the confession 
indicated the presence of hydroxyalprazolam (indicating he consumed Xanax), 
cannabinoids, and norpropoxyphene (the active ingredient in Darvocet).  He 
testified that he could not determine whether Rigterink would have been affected 
by these drugs at the time of the statement, but would not rule it out as a 
possibility.  He concluded that either acute drug use at the time of the murders or 
chronic substance abuse substantially impaired his ability to conform his conduct 
                                          
 
5.  Rigterink was represented by a public defender for several days before 
his parents retained Hileman.  Carmichael was later appointed as cocounsel.   
 
 
- 19 - 
to the requirements of the law, and caused him to be under an extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance.   
Dr. Krop was also retained for the postconviction proceedings.  He testified 
that based on his understanding of Rigterink’s drug use, he would opine that as a 
result of acute and chronic drug use, Rigterink’s capacity to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law was compromised on the day of the murders, and 
Rigterink was under a serious emotional disturbance.  He preferred to use the term 
“compromised” rather than “severe” because he felt the jury would determine 
whether it was severe, and compromised was a more clinical term.  
In response, the State presented the testimony of Hileman; Carmichael; Dr. 
Enrique Suarez, a psychologist; Detective Joseph Britt Williams; Lieutenant Jerry 
Connolly; Sergeant Kenneth Raczynski; and Sergeant Ivan Navarro.  Detective 
Williams and Sergeant Navarro met with Rigterink at his condominium on 
September 25, 2009, the day after the murders, and they testified that Rigterink did 
not appear to be under the influence of any drugs.6  Lieutenant Connolly and 
Sergeant Raczynski met with Rigterink on October 9, 2003, and testified that 
Rigterink did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs at this time.  
                                          
 
 
6.  Detective Williams testified Detectives Thomas Van Skyver and Brett 
Thompson accompanied him when he met with Rigterink.  Sergeant Navarro stated 
that Detective Tracy Smith accompanied him when he met with Rigterink.   
 
 
- 20 - 
Additionally, they were both present during Rigterink’s October 16, 2003, 
interrogation and testified that Rigterink did not appear to be under the influence of 
any drugs at that time.   
Dr. Suarez testified that his review of Rigterink’s videotaped confession 
demonstrated Rigterink was not impaired by drugs or alcohol.  He also concluded 
that Rigterink’s actions on the day of the murders demonstrated that he was not 
suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  He also testified that, 
based on his review of the materials in this case, “[t]here’s no sign at all that 
[Rigterink] was experiencing a delirious state, none.”   
On April 11, 2014, the circuit court denied relief on all claims.   
ANALYSIS 
With respect to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court has 
explained:  
[T]he test when assessing the actions of trial counsel is not how, in 
hindsight, present counsel would have proceeded.  See Cherry v. 
State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1995).  On the contrary, a claim for 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel must satisfy two criteria.  First, 
counsel’s performance must be shown to be deficient.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  Deficient performance in this 
context means that counsel’s performance fell below the standard 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Id.  When examining counsel’s 
performance, an objective standard of reasonableness applies, id. at 
688, and great deference is given to counsel’s performance.  Id. at 
689.  The defendant bears the burden to “overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 
considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 
350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  This Court has made clear that “[s]trategic 
 
 
- 21 - 
decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”  See 
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  There is a 
strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not 
ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669.  
Second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the 
defendant, ultimately depriving the defendant of a fair trial with a 
reliable result.  [Id. at] 689.  A defendant must do more than speculate 
that an error affected the outcome.  Id. at 693.  Prejudice is met only if 
there is a reasonable probability that “but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.  Id. at 694.  Both deficient performance 
and prejudice must be shown.  Id. 
 
Zommer v. State, 160 So. 3d 368, 376-77 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Bradley v. State, 33 
So. 3d 664, 671-72 (Fla. 2010)).  In reviewing claims that allege ineffective 
assistance, this Court employs a mixed standard of review.  See State v. Woodel, 
145 So. 3d 782, 791 (Fla. 2014).  The Court reviews the factual findings of the 
circuit court for competent, substantial evidence, but reviews legal conclusions de 
novo.  Id.  Where one prong of the Strickland standard is not met, this Court need 
not address the second prong.  Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. 2003).   
Investigation into Rigterink’s Mental State 
Rigterink contends that counsel provided ineffective assistance during the 
guilt phase because they failed to thoroughly investigate his mental state at the 
time of the murders, and failed to follow up on either of the examinations that were 
undertaken, or the recommendations of mental health professionals.  However, 
Rigterink does not allege that his mental condition would support an insanity 
 
 
- 22 - 
defense.  Indeed, Dr. Krop testified, “I would not diagnose him of having any 
psychiatric disorder, just the substance abuse disorder.”   
We conclude Rigterink fails to establish deficiency.  Florida does not 
recognize the defense of diminished capacity in this context.  See Spencer v. State, 
842 So. 2d 52, 63 (Fla. 2003); Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820, 824-25 (Fla. 
1989).  The failure to raise a meritless claim does not result in deficient 
performance.  See Spencer, 842 So. 2d at 63; see also Buzia v. State, 82 So. 3d 
784, 796 (Fla. 2011) (holding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to present 
evidence of drug and alcohol addiction during guilt phase to demonstrate that the 
murder was not planned because voluntary intoxication is not a valid defense).  
Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.   
Motion to Suppress on the Basis of Voluntariness 
 
Rigterink alleges that counsel provided ineffective assistance during the guilt 
phase when they failed to file a pretrial motion to suppress his October 16, 2003, 
statements to law enforcement on the basis that they were involuntary as a result of 
Rigterink’s drug use.  Alternatively, Rigterink asserts that even if the statements 
could not be suppressed, evidence of drug use should have been presented during 
trial so that the jury could have evaluated the voluntariness of the statements, or 
considered drug use as a basis for his inconsistent statements.  A blood test taken 
 
 
- 23 - 
after Rigterink provided his October 16 statements revealed the presence of Xanax, 
Darvocet, and marijuana in his blood.   
In support of this claim, Rigterink presented the pretrial report of Dr. Hartig, 
which advised: 
It might be important to explore Mr. Rigterink’s ability to waive 
Miranda, considering his substance abuse at the time of his arrest.  I 
recommend Mr. Rigterink be evaluated by a neurologist and a 
neuropsychologist to address Mr. Rigterink’s blackout experiences, 
seizures, history of head injury and memory issues.  Also, evaluation 
by an expert in illicit substances and pharmaceuticals to address 
substance effects on Mr. Rigterink’s functioning [is] recommended. 
. . . .   
Background information provided by Mr. Rigterink was 
remarkable for escalating substance abuse problems . . . .    
 
Similarly, Dantzler and Dr. McClane testified with respect to their understanding 
of Rigterink’s drug abuse.  For example, Dantzler testified that when she met with 
Rigterink in May and June 2003, he reported past rampant and indiscriminate drug 
use.  Although Dantzler suspected polysubstance abuse, Rigterink informed her he 
used only marijuana at that time, and she rendered a provisional diagnosis of 
cannabis dependence.   
Rigterink also presented Dr. Buffington, who testified during the evidentiary 
hearing that he believed Rigterink’s substance abuse could have affected his ability 
to provide a voluntary statement to law enforcement.  With respect to the results of 
the blood draw taken after Rigterink confessed, Dr. Buffington testified that he 
could not “opine emphatically” that Rigterink would have been actively affected 
 
 
- 24 - 
by the drugs present in his system, but it was possible.  He also testified that the 
blood test demonstrated marijuana could have been ingested within hours of the 
blood draw, but that there is no method to determine degree of impairment based 
on the test.   
 
This vague testimony does not provide significant support for Rigterink’s 
claim that his statements were involuntary.  Notably, Dr. Buffington never 
reviewed the videotape recording of Rigterink’s confession.  Moreover, his opinion 
did not take into consideration the observations of the individuals with whom 
Rigterink interacted that day, despite Dr. Buffington’s own testimony that when 
determining the degree of a person’s impairment, it is relevant and helpful to 
consider descriptions of the person’s behavior by those who interacted with him or 
her.  Rigterink’s family members and Detective Connolly, the officer who took 
Rigterink’s confession, described Rigterink’s behavior as normal.  When informed 
of this, Dr. Buffington discounted the helpfulness of these observations, explaining 
that to Rigterink’s family, bizarre behavior by Rigterink would be viewed as 
normal.  Dr. Buffington also stated that Detective Connolly’s observations did not 
alter his opinion because, as a detective, he would not necessarily be capable of 
determining Rigterink’s cognitive status.   
In contrast, Dr. Suarez, the mental health expert presented by the State, 
testified that his review of the videotaped statement revealed no indication that 
 
 
- 25 - 
Rigterink was impaired by drug use.  He explained that Rigterink was attentive and 
verbally fluent, provided responsive answers without hesitation, was engaged, and 
displayed no mispronunciation or slurring.  The circuit court found Dr. Suarez’s 
testimony to be more persuasive than that of Dr. Buffington.   
Counsel testified that they were aware of the positive drug test results from 
the blood sample taken after Rigterink confessed.  Carmichael consulted with Dr. 
Mark Montgomery, a toxicologist who performed retrograde extrapolation of the 
test results.  Dr. Montgomery concluded that the test results indicated the drugs 
present fell below a clinical level.  Carmichael also deposed the State toxicology 
expert and learned that the results of the State’s test were consistent with the 
results of the test taken by the public defender’s office.  Carmichael testified that 
he considered the issue of involuntariness, but believed there was no good faith 
basis for such an argument.   
The circuit court’s finding that Rigterink failed to establish that his 
statements deserved any diminished weight, or that his drug use demonstrated that 
his statement was not given freely, knowingly, and voluntarily, is supported by 
competent, substantial evidence.  We have previously held that an inebriated 
condition does not affect the admissibility of a confession unless it rises to the 
level of mania.  See Thomas v. State, 456 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1984) (citing 
Lindsey v. State, 63 So. 832, 833 (Fla. 1913)).  Instead, this evidence may be 
 
 
- 26 - 
presented to the jury so that it may consider the weight and credibility to be given 
to the confession.  Id. 
This Court has affirmed the ruling of a trial court with respect to the 
admissibility of a confession alleged to be inadmissible because of intoxication 
where the ruling was supported by competent, substantial evidence.  In Orme v. 
State, 677 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla. 1996), the trial court ruled that a statement was 
admissible despite testimony by friends and family of the defendant that he was 
severely intoxicated during the relevant time period.  In contrast to that testimony, 
the officers who were present when the defendant provided his statement testified 
that he was coherent and responsive.  Additionally, the trial court reviewed the 
statement, which was taped, and determined that it supported the position of the 
State.  We held this constituted competent, substantial evidence to support the 
ruling of the trial court.  Id. at 263; see also Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 576 
(Fla. 2007) (affirming denial of a motion to suppress on the basis of intoxication 
despite conflicting evidence because the testimony of the officers that the 
defendant was coherent and forthcoming constituted competent, substantial 
evidence that supported the ruling of the trial court).   
Here, the evidence provided by Rigterink—the results of the blood test and 
the reports of various doctors—contrasts with the information provided to 
Rigterink’s trial counsel, the observations of Detective Connolly, Rigterink’s 
 
 
- 27 - 
appearance and demeanor in the videotaped confession, and the opinion of Dr. 
Suarez.  The State introduced competent, substantial evidence that Rigterink’s 
statements were not involuntary or entitled to diminished weight.  Moreover, 
counsel investigated this potential claim, and reasonably decided that it was 
without merit.  Therefore, Rigterink has failed to establish deficiency and we deny 
relief on this claim.  See Merck v. State, 124 So. 3d 785, 800 (Fla. 2013) (holding 
counsel cannot be deficient for failing to present a meritless defense).   
Failure to Present Mitigation Related to Drug Abuse 
 
Rigterink also claims counsel provided ineffective assistance during the 
penalty phase because they failed to present evidence of his drug abuse to 
demonstrate how his ability to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law 
was impaired, substantially or otherwise, or that he was under a mental or 
emotional disturbance at the time of the murders, extreme or otherwise.  In support 
of this claim, Rigterink presented the previously discussed testimony of Dr. Hartig.  
Additionally, Rigterink presented the intake form he completed for Dr. McClane.  
On the form, he indicated that he had “extensive drug use in past,” including the 
use of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine-ice, methylenedioxy-
methamphetamine (MDMA), gamma-hydroxybutyric acid (GHB), alprazolam 
(Xanax), OxyContin, Darvocet, Percocet, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and 
mushrooms.  Additionally, Dr. McClane testified based on his notes that Rigterink 
 
 
- 28 - 
reported he consumed methamphetamine a couple of days prior to the offenses and 
at approximately 2 p.m. on the day of the offenses, took four milligrams of Xanax 
two nights before the offenses and two milligrams of Xanax the night before the 
offenses, and smoked marijuana throughout that time period.  Dr. McClane 
testified that he would diagnose Rigterink as a chronic drug abuser; however, 
Rigterink did not inform Dr. McClane that he was addicted to methamphetamine.   
Rigterink also presented the testimony of Dr. Krop, who determined that 
Rigterink suffered from substance dependence.  Dr. Krop concluded that 
Rigterink’s use of amphetamines would have resulted in significant cognitive and 
emotional behavioral manifestations.  With regard to mitigation, Dr. Krop testified 
that there was a reasonable degree of psychological probability that Rigterink’s 
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was compromised 
on the day of the murders.  He also testified that Rigterink’s chronic and acute drug 
use would result in a serious emotional disturbance on the day of the murders.  Dr. 
Krop also opined that Rigterink was in an irrational frenzy during the murders.   
 
Further, Dr. Buffington testified that Rigterink suffered from both acute and 
chronic substance abuse at the time of the murders.  With respect to acute drug use, 
Rigterink informed Dr. Buffington that he used cocaine, marijuana, and 
methamphetamine at or around the time of the murders, which Dr. Buffington 
opined would have rendered Rigterink impaired.  Dr. Buffington testified that 
 
 
- 29 - 
either the chronic or acute substance abuse by Rigterink at the time of the murders 
created a significant concern that his ability to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law was impaired.  He also testified that either the chronic or 
acute substance abuse by Rigterink at the time of the murders resulted in him 
suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance.   
 
In contrast, Dr. Suarez testified that he found no evidence that Rigterink 
suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the 
crimes.  He explained that a delirium state can lead to a blackout, but that 
Rigterink’s behavior was inconsistent with a delirium state.  For example, 
Rigterink engaged in goal-directed behavior—such as checking the victims’ 
pulses, retrieving his backpack from Jarvis’s unit, and disposing of evidence—but 
Dr. Suarez testified that a person in a delirium would not know what he or she was 
doing, and would be disoriented and detached.  Additionally, Dr. Suarez testified 
that a delirium state would not be short-lived and would have been noticed by 
those who interacted with Rigterink only shortly after the murders.  Dr. Suarez also 
explained that the extreme degree of inconsistency between the stories provided by 
Rigterink suggested he was malingering and feigning, and no validity could be 
ascribed to what Rigterink said.   
 
With respect to Rigterink’s behavior after the murders, Betz, who was 
Rigterink’s girlfriend at the time, testified that she met Rigterink around 6:30-7 
 
 
- 30 - 
p.m., approximately three-and-a-half to four hours after the murders.  She stated 
that Rigterink behaved normally and rationally, did not appear concerned, and did 
not have any memory problems.  She had previously observed Rigterink while he 
was under the influence of methamphetamine and cocaine, and testified that he did 
not appear to be under the influence of any drugs that evening.   
 
Although investigator Bolin testified that counsel failed to pursue several 
penalty phase issues, this was contradictory to the testimony of counsel.  Counsel 
testified that they were aware that Rigterink utilized drugs, and they consulted 
members of Rigterink’s family with respect to his drug use.  They reviewed the 
drug tests conducted by Dr. Hunter, and were informed as to the recommendations 
made by Dr. Hartig and Dr. McClane.  Hileman testified that he specifically 
questioned Rigterink with respect to abuse of the drug ice, which was denied by 
Rigterink.  Additionally, Carmichael testified that he discussed Rigterink’s drug 
use with Bolin, but she never indicated Rigterink’s use of drugs other than 
marijuana was more than experimental.   
Additionally, counsel testified that they considered the mitigating factors of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance and Rigterink’s ability to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law, but that when Rigterink declared his earlier 
statements regarding the snapshot memories were false, this avenue of 
investigation was no longer viable.  Carmichael described their strategy as follows: 
 
 
- 31 - 
[W]e did not believe that there was a sufficient basis to say that there 
was substantial drug use, or some sort of hard or nefarious drug [use] 
that went beyond what the jury already heard.  They had already heard 
about the use of marijuana. . . .  I did not get the feel[ing] that the jury 
in this particular case, after having convicted him . . . was going to give 
him some kind of benefit for using drugs, when it appeared that drugs 
were both the cause and the motive for the homicide of Jeremy Jarvis, 
and then what actions occurred with Allison Sousa afterwards.   
And, in fact, I felt that they were going to be counterproductive, 
that instead we should focus on who [Rigterink] was before he 
engaged in drugs and what kind of support system that he had . . . .  I 
want[ed] them to see who he could be, what he could do in the future, 
what he was doing right now, to show that he was a different person 
now than he was at the time that that happened, who his support group 
was going to be, who he was before he got involved in drugs, and to 
humanize him. 
 
Hileman also testified that he believed drug use, and particularly use of 
methamphetamine, was not a mitigating factor favored by juries unless it rose to 
the level of causing brain damage.   
 
Counsel is not ineffective for failing to present mitigation based on a 
strategic decision made after a reasonable investigation.  See Dufour v. State, 905 
So. 2d 42, 56 (Fla. 2005).  Evidence of drug abuse may present a double-edged 
sword, and the election to avoid the potential negative impact of such evidence is 
not unreasonable.  See Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 437 (Fla. 2004) (holding 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to present evidence that the defendant “once 
broke his grandmother’s nose, abused drugs over many years, was jailed on 
various occasions, continued his drug use after his brother took him in on the 
condition that he stop using drugs, and threatened to kill his brother’s wife”).  
 
 
- 32 - 
Additionally, this Court has held that the decision to humanize a defendant by 
focusing on positive character traits was not deficient where counsel determined 
other mitigation was not strong and was potentially more harmful than helpful.  
See Jennings v. State, 123 So. 3d 1101, 1114 (Fla. 2013) (holding the decision by 
trial counsel not to present mental mitigation evidence was not unreasonable where 
the mental mitigation would have opened the door to the defendant’s extensive 
drug use and criminal history, and where the decision was “based on [trial 
counsel’s] experience, the reports of competent experts, and [trial counsel’s] 
strategy of emphasizing [the defendant’s] many positive character traits over his 
negative traits”).  Here, counsel investigated and were aware of Rigterink’s drug 
history and reasonably determined that a better strategy was to develop positive 
mitigation.  Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048 (“[S]trategic decisions do not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and 
rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional 
conduct.”).   
Moreover, during trial, Rigterink disavowed the snapshot version of events 
that he provided to Drs. Hartig and McClane and testified that he was not involved 
in the murders.  Thus, presentation of these doctors would have contradicted the 
trial testimony of Rigterink.  Counsel is not ineffective for making a tactical 
decision not to present evidence contradictory to that presented during trial.  Cf. 
 
 
- 33 - 
Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1126 (Fla. 2006) (holding counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to investigate and present mental health mitigation that was 
inconsistent with an innocence defense because defendant insisted on maintaining 
his innocence and wished to focus on his character); Cummings-El v. State, 863 
So. 2d 246, 252 (Fla. 2003) (holding counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
present evidence of drug use, poor upbringing, and family history of criminal 
convictions that would have been inconsistent with the strategy of presenting the 
defendant in a positive light, and the defendant made it extremely difficult for 
counsel to obtain mitigating evidence).  Accordingly, Rigterink is not entitled to 
relief on this claim.   
Failure to Present Mitigation Related to Mental Health 
 
Rigterink next claims that counsel provided ineffective assistance during the 
penalty phase because they failed to have him examined in any meaningful way by 
an expert in the field of psychiatry, psychology, or mental health.  However, 
Rigterink fails to establish any possible prejudice that is separate and distinct from 
that alleged in the previous claim.  No mental health expert during the 
postconviction proceedings diagnosed him with any major mental illness unrelated 
to substance abuse.  This is consistent with the findings of Drs. Hartig and 
McClane that counsel received prior to trial.   
 
 
- 34 - 
Moreover, Dr. Hartig conducted a personality test on Rigterink prior to trial, 
and found “significant psychopathology with depression, anxiety, substance abuse 
and bizarre thought processing.”  Other personality tests administered by Dr. 
Hartig revealed “an antisocial individual who was impulsive, aggressive and at 
time engaged in irrational behaviors.”  Counsel did not wish to present this type of 
testimony to the jury.  Additionally, counsel testified that they considered 
presenting evidence related to mental health, but their strategy changed once 
Rigterink informed them that he claimed to have experienced blackouts because he 
read that in a psychology textbook.  Instead, counsel elected a reasonable strategy 
in which they chose to humanize Rigterink.  Accordingly, Rigterink is not entitled 
to relief on this claim.  Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048.   
Failure to Present Mitigation Related to Bizarre Behavior 
Rigterink claims counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty 
phase because they failed to investigate potential mitigation, or interview and 
present potential witnesses who would have testified with respect to Rigterink’s 
drug abuse and bizarre conduct at or near the time of the offenses.  Again, this 
claim is not dissimilar to the claim that Rigterink’s drug abuse should have been 
presented in mitigation, except that it identifies specific individuals who would 
have testified with respect to his drug use.  Those individuals include his sister, 
Mary Dezialo; his ex-wife, Catherine Enriquez; Betz; and his uncle, Richard 
 
 
- 35 - 
Rigterink.  Each of these individuals testified during the evidentiary hearing 
regarding his drug use.  Rigterink also presented the testimony of Dr. Hunter, who 
conducted two drug tests within approximately one month of the murders.  Dr. 
Hunter testified that the first test results were positive for amphetamines, THC, and 
opiates, and the second test showed THC.  Rigterink also relies on the previously-
discussed testimony of Bolin regarding counsels’ alleged deficiencies in 
investigating mitigation.   
Enriquez testified that Rigterink regularly used marijuana, but rarely used 
ecstasy, cocaine, and LSD.  She also testified that Rigterink used prescription pills 
recreationally later in the marriage.  Similarly, Betz testified that she observed 
Rigterink use cocaine, methamphetamine, and mushrooms two times each between 
April and his arrest in October 2003.  She described Rigterink’s use of drugs other 
than marijuana as “sporadic and occasional.”   
Richard and Dezialo testified with respect to the duration of Rigterink’s drug 
use.  Richard stated that the family was concerned about Rigterink’s drug use for 
almost twenty years prior to the murders, and Dezialo testified that Rigterink began 
experimenting with drugs in the early 1990s.  Richard confronted Rigterink in 
person about his drug use after a drug test revealed the presence of amphetamines.  
Additionally, although Dezialo never witnessed Rigterink use any drug other than 
marijuana, she cleaned his condominium after his arrest and found tinfoil and 
 
 
- 36 - 
yogurt lids with burn marks, which, to her knowledge, are associated with use of 
crack cocaine.  She also found a marijuana grow room in the attic.   
Dantzler testified she was never contacted by trial counsel.  She had met 
with Rigterink prior to the murders and determined he suffered from cannabis 
dependence.  During a meeting with Rigterink, Dantzler informed him that he had 
failed to succeed with outpatient rehabilitation and outlined a plan that he would be 
required to follow, or she would refer him for inpatient counseling.   
The above testimony is not dissimilar to what counsel already knew with 
respect to Rigterink’s drug use.  As previously stated, counsel pursued a reasonable 
trial strategy that focused on Rigterink’s positive attributes, and presented evidence 
only of his marijuana use.  Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.  See 
Windom v. State, 886 So. 2d 915, 922 (Fla. 2004) (“A strategic or tactical decision 
is not a valid basis for an ineffective claim unless a defendant is able to show that 
no competent trial counsel would have utilized the tactics employed by trial 
counsel.”).   
Suppression of Pre-Miranda Statements 
 
Prior to his post-Miranda confession, Rigterink provided three different 
versions of events to the police.  First, he explained that he spoke with Jarvis on 
the day of the murders, but did not see him.  Rigterink I, 2 So. 3d at 234.  After he 
was confronted with disbelief, he explained that he did meet with Jarvis, but Jarvis 
 
 
- 37 - 
was alive and well when he left.  Id.  Rigterink was then confronted with further 
disbelief and the bloody fingerprint evidence, which led him to explain that he 
arrived after the murders, saw blood, touched everything in Jarvis’s apartment 
while looking for him, followed the blood trail to the other unit, checked the 
victims’ pulses and determined they were dead, then panicked and fled when he 
realized he was covered in blood.  Id. 
Counsel testified during the evidentiary hearing that they did not believe 
they had a good faith basis to move to suppress the pre-Miranda statements made 
by Rigterink, and decided to concentrate their efforts on the validity of the Miranda 
warning.  Rigterink alleges counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge the 
pre-Miranda statements because he was in custody when the officers informed him 
that they knew he was lying and that his bloody latent fingerprints were discovered 
at the scene of the murders.   
The interview on October 16, 2003, unquestionably began as a voluntary 
interaction.  See Roman v. State, 475 So. 2d 1228, 1230-32 (Fla. 1985) (holding 
that defendant who voluntarily travelled to the police station was not in custody).  
The Miranda warnings are necessary only when a suspect is subject to custodial 
interrogation, or, in other words, when a suspect is questioned by law enforcement 
after being taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom of action 
in a significant way.  See Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 414 (Fla. 2010).  Custody 
 
 
- 38 - 
occurs if a reasonable person would feel he or she were not at liberty to terminate 
the interrogation and leave.  Id.  
 
Rigterink does not identify the precise point at which he alleges custodial 
interrogation began.  To the extent that Rigterink alleges counsel were ineffective 
for failing to move to suppress the second version of events, this claim is without 
merit because Rigterink cannot establish prejudice.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 
(“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to . . . 
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient 
showing on one.”).  With respect to the third version of events, which was 
provided after Rigterink was confronted by bloody fingerprint evidence, we 
conclude counsel were deficient for failing to move to suppress this pre-Miranda 
statement.   
Hileman testified during the evidentiary hearing that during the pre-Miranda 
period, Rigterink 
was confronted with the fingerprint evidence, and that, obviously, did 
upset him, but he did not claim that he was threatened or . . . screamed 
at or coerced in any other way.  He was confronted repeatedly with, we 
think you’re lying, we think you’re involved. . . .  So to that extent, he 
was under some pressure.  But that is normal in a police interrogation.   
 
However, a suspect need not be threatened or coerced to be in custody.  Rigterink 
I, 2 So. 3d at 251 (“The presence of force would certainly indicate custody, but its 
absence does not necessarily—or even often—indicate that a reasonable person 
 
 
- 39 - 
would feel free to simply get up and leave the interview room.”).  In Rigterink I, 
we explained: 
Other than a murder weapon or DNA evidence tying the killer 
to the victims, it is difficult to imagine a more incriminating 
evidentiary item than one’s bloody fingerprints being discovered at 
the scene of the murders.  Along with, and in consideration of, all 
other factors, a reasonable person in Rigterink’s position clearly 
would not have felt free to leave police custody once the detectives 
disclosed this fingerprint match. . . .  [T]his fingerprint match was 
very strong physical, albeit circumstantial, evidence of Rigterink’s 
guilt. . . .  
 
2 So. 3d at 252 (emphasis added).  Thus, we conclude counsel were deficient for 
failing to recognize that custody occurs when a reasonable person would not feel 
free to leave.   
 
Nonetheless, Rigterink is not entitled to relief on this claim because he has 
failed to establish prejudice.  Although this third statement would not be 
admissible as substantive evidence if suppressed, it would be admissible for 
impeachment.  Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).  Additionally, the 
fourth and most inculpatory statement—in which Rigterink admitted to being at 
both warehouse units, holding a knife consistent with the wounds suffered by both 
victims, being covered in blood, and struggling with Jarvis—followed a valid 
Miranda waiver and was admissible as substantive evidence.  See Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1985) (holding that where an initial statement is 
obtained in violation of Miranda, but a later statement is obtained following the 
 
 
- 40 - 
Miranda warnings, the post-Miranda statement is admissible if it was voluntarily 
made).  Thus, counsels’ failure to move to suppress this statement does not 
undermine our confidence in Rigterink’s conviction, and Rigterink is not entitled 
to relief on this claim. 
Suppression of Knife 
 
During trial, the State presented a knife that Betz obtained from Rigterink’s 
condominium.  The knife was not the murder weapon and did not resemble the 
murder weapon.  Rigterink alleges counsel were ineffective for failing to move to 
suppress the knife presented during trial on the basis that it was obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because Betz 
acted as an agent for the State when she removed the knife from Rigterink’s 
condominium.   
 
The circuit court held that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because 
Betz qualified as a co-occupant of Rigterink’s condominium under United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).  In Matlock, the United States Supreme Court held 
that consent to a search could be granted by a third person with common authority 
over, or a sufficient relationship to, the premises searched.  Id. at 171.  The 
Supreme Court explained that “common authority” means  
mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or 
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any 
of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own 
 
 
- 41 - 
right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number 
might permit the common area to be searched.   
 
Id. at 171 n.7.  Additionally, in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990), the 
Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply where consent was 
provided by a person who possessed apparent authority—i.e., a person whom the 
State reasonably believed had the ability to provide consent.   
Here, Rigterink gave Betz a key, she was allowed to go to the condominium 
whenever she wanted, and no restrictions were placed on which parts of the unit 
she could enter.  Betz did not live at the condominium, but spent the night there 
three to five times a week.  The knife was located in the bathroom of a second 
bedroom in the condominium.  Betz testified that she found the knife when she 
went to Rigterink’s condominium to let the dog out.  After Betz saw the knife, she 
called the detective and informed him of it.  The detective met her at the 
condominium and asked if she would bring the knife out, which she did.   
Rigterink relies on State v. Moninger, 957 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), to 
assert that whether Betz was a co-occupant was the incorrect inquiry.  He asserts 
the correct inquiry is whether Betz acted as a state agent.  In Moninger, the 
defendant was accused of sexual battery on his fifteen-year-old daughter.  Id. at 3.  
Detectives responded to the residence and informed the daughter she was being 
removed from the home.  Id.  The detectives asked the daughter if any evidence 
existed to substantiate her claim, and when she responded that she believed there 
 
 
- 42 - 
were condoms in the house, the detectives stated that if she wished to, she could 
retrieve them as she left.  Id.  They provided her with a bag in which to place the 
condoms.  Id.  The Second District Court of Appeal suppressed the condoms on the 
basis that the daughter acted as a government agent when she retrieved them.  Id. at 
4.   
However, Moninger is inapplicable to the current case.  First, Moninger 
involved a minor, and this Court has delineated specific factors that apply to 
determine whether a minor has common authority.  Saavedra v. State, 622 So. 2d 
952, 957 (Fla. 1993).  Additionally, the Second District in Moninger did not 
address the issue of common authority.  Although the State alleged that the 
daughter had joint control over the home, the district court held: (1) that the claim 
was insufficiently briefed, and (2) there was no evidence that the daughter and the 
defendant shared the room where the condoms were located, or that the daughter 
had joint control over the house.  Moninger, 957 So. 2d at 4.  The district court did 
not address either Matlock or Saavedra.  Thus, Rigterink’s assertion that the circuit 
court erred in considering co-occupancy of Rigterink’s condominium on the basis 
of Moninger is misplaced.   
We conclude the ruling of the circuit court is supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.  Additionally, even if Betz did not possess common authority, 
she possessed apparent authority.  Thus, we conclude no Fourth Amendment 
 
 
- 43 - 
violation occurred.  Moreover, even if Betz had lacked the authority to remove the 
knife, the inevitable discovery doctrine would apply, see generally Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), because the police would have located the knife 
when they executed the search warrant for Rigterink’s condominium.  Thus, we 
conclude counsel were not deficient for failing to move to suppress the knife on the 
basis of a Fourth Amendment violation.  Merck, 124 So. 3d at 794.   
Rigterink also alleges counsel were deficient for failing to object to the 
introduction of the knife on the basis that it was irrelevant and constituted improper 
character evidence that demonstrated only that Rigterink was the type of person to 
own dangerous and deadly weapons.  Counsel testified that they believed the 
introduction of the knife supported the theory that the State was reaching to supply 
evidence to connect Rigterink to the crime.   
Regardless of whether the strategy employed by counsel was reasonable, 
Rigterink cannot establish prejudice from the introduction of the knife.  During 
trial, Enriquez testified that throughout their marriage, Rigterink kept a knife with 
a black, eleven-inch blade and curved tip under the mattress.  Jarvis and Sousa 
were stabbed with a knife that had a ten- to eleven-inch blade.  Rigterink I, 2 So. 
3d at 230.  Additionally, Enriquez testified that when she was in the condominium 
after the police searched it, she saw that the mattress was “pretty much taken off 
the box spring” and the knife was not there.  The knife used during the murders 
 
 
- 44 - 
was never recovered by law enforcement.  Id. at 239 n.16.  Finally, in his final 
statement to police, Rigterink admitted to owning such a knife and throwing it over 
a bridge after the murders.  Id. at 234.  Accordingly, there is no reasonable 
possibility that the introduction of the knife Betz obtained from Rigterink’s 
condo—which was not the murder weapon—affected the verdict in this case and 
we deny relief on this claim. 
Suppression of Shoes 
 
During trial, the State introduced a pair of Nike shoes it purchased that had a 
tread pattern consistent with that left in blood at the murder scene.  During the 
investigation, law enforcement found an empty shoe box in Rigterink’s 
condominium, but they did not find the corresponding shoes.  The State purchased 
the model of shoe identified by the empty shoe box.  During trial, a tread expert 
testified that the shoes’ tread was consistent with one left at the scene.  The expert 
also testified that he could not identify the tread at the scene as being left by a 
specific shoe, but could only exclude shoes that did not match.  The expert was 
able to exclude a different pair of Nike shoes that were seized from Rigterink.   
 
Although the shoes constituted circumstantial evidence, they were relevant. 
§ 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2003) (“Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or 
disprove a material fact.”).  Evidence is not irrelevant or inadmissible simply 
because it is circumstantial in nature.  Cannon v. State, 107 So. 360, 363 (Fla. 
 
 
- 45 - 
1926).  Here, the shoes presented matched those described on the empty box found 
in Rigterink’s condominium, and a person could reasonably infer that Rigterink 
owned such shoes.  Rigterink’s ownership and possession of shoes with a tread 
consistent to that found in blood at the murder scene tends to prove that Rigterink 
committed the murders.  Thus, the shoes constituted relevant, circumstantial 
evidence and counsel were not deficient for failing to object to their introduction.  
See Merck, 124 So. 3d at 794 (holding counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to raise a meritless issue).   
Moreover, counsel testified during the evidentiary hearing that they did not 
object to the introduction of the shoes because they believed the use of the shoes 
demonstrated that the State was reaching to present evidence that linked Rigterink 
to the murders.  This strategy was not unreasonable with respect to the shoes.  
Accordingly, Rigterink is not entitled to relief on this claim.  Windom, 886 So. 2d 
at 922 (“A strategic or tactical decision is not a valid basis for an ineffective claim 
unless a defendant is able to show that no competent trial counsel would have 
utilized the tactics employed by trial counsel.”).   
Failure to Object to Prior Criminal Conduct 
Rigterink alleges counsel provided ineffective assistance during the guilt 
phase because they failed to object to evidence that he previously stole from an 
employer.  He also alleges this evidence, as well as evidence that he drove with a 
 
 
- 46 - 
suspended license, prejudiced him during the penalty phase because the trial court 
relied on this information to assign less weight to the mitigating circumstance that 
Rigterink had no significant history of prior criminal activity.   
Approximately one month prior to the murders, Rigterink was terminated 
from his employment because he improperly used a company credit card to 
purchase food, drink, and gas.  The State cross-examined Rigterink with respect to 
these events, based on a theory of the case that Rigterink was experiencing 
financial hardship, went to Jarvis’s to purchase marijuana despite his lack of funds, 
and killed Jarvis to obtain marijuana.  Later, during closing statements, the 
prosecutor stated, “God knows what’s in his heart.  And what’s in his heart is 
nothing but evil. . . .  A man who would steal from his employer, taking a 
paycheck in one hand and stealing from him with the other.”   
Defense counsel were aware prior to trial that the State intended to use this 
evidence because the State filed a motion of their intent to use this evidence.  
Defense counsel did not object when the State cross-examined Rigterink regarding 
the theft.  Carmichael testified that he felt the evidence was appropriate and 
relevant to the theory of the State’s case.  We agree that Rigterink’s financial status 
was relevant to his motive.  See Ballard v. State, 66 So. 3d 912, 917-18 (Fla. 2011) 
(explaining that “relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible if 
the probative value to show motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
 
 
- 47 - 
or absence of mistake or accident outweighs any unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, misleading of the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence”).  
The fact that Rigterink had recently stolen to purchase necessities, then lost his job, 
demonstrates that he may not have been able to pay for the drugs.  Accordingly, 
counsel were not deficient for failing to object. 
Moreover, Rigterink cannot establish prejudice during either the guilt or 
penalty phases.  Rigterink’s testimony that he was not involved in the murders was 
severely impeached by his confession, which was inarguably more significant than 
an uncharged and minor theft.  Additionally, with respect to the remark by the 
State during guilt phase closing statements that the theft demonstrated Rigterink 
was evil, the uncharged theft was not the sole basis for this comment.  The State 
also relied on evidence that Rigterink received financial assistance from his father, 
but still spent money on drugs, and also that Rigterink had a girlfriend while 
married to another woman.  Rigterink does not allege that counsel were deficient 
for failing to object to these remarks.   
With respect to the penalty phase, Rigterink does not claim counsel were 
ineffective for failing to exclude evidence that he used illegal drugs, which was 
one basis for the reduced weight assigned to the mitigating factor of no significant 
prior criminal history.  Additionally, the evidence that Rigterink drove with a 
suspended driver’s license was relevant to Rigterink’s decision to drive his father’s 
 
 
- 48 - 
vehicle on the day of the murders—he explained that he believed he was less likely 
to be stopped by law enforcement if he did not drive his own car.  Further, driving 
with a suspended license is a relatively minor infraction.  See § 322.34, Fla. Stat. 
(2003) (classifying driving with a suspended license as a moving violation, and 
classifying knowingly driving with a suspended license as a second-degree 
misdemeanor if it is the first offense of this type).  In contrast, the State established 
the weighty mitigators of HAC and prior violent felony with respect to both 
victims.  Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that this evidence affected 
Rigterink’s sentences.   
Adequate Communication 
 
Rigterink alleges that counsel failed to adequately communicate with him 
and prepare him for trial, which adversely affected the penalty phase because 
Rigterink’s testimony with respect to prior illegal activities undercut the statutory 
mitigating factors that he had no significant prior criminal history, that his ability 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired, and that he 
was under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murders.  
To support this claim, Rigterink presented Bolin, who testified that she was never 
included or present during any discussion of whether Rigterink should testify, that 
Hileman refused to visit Rigterink in jail, and that Rigterink’s father threatened to 
withhold payment unless Hileman worked on the case.   
 
 
- 49 - 
In contrast, during the evidentiary hearing, Hileman testified that he 
extensively discussed with Rigterink whether Rigterink should testify during trial, 
recommended to Rigterink that he not testify, and specifically informed Rigterink 
that he would be impeached by his prior statements.  Hileman also warned 
Rigterink that his proposed testimony that several people committed the murders 
then threatened Rigterink into confessing would be inconsistent with the testimony 
of the eyewitnesses, who described only one attacker who matched the physical 
description of Rigterink.  Additionally, Hileman advised Rigterink that the 
testimony not only was not an effective defense, but would also negatively impact 
the penalty phase.  Despite this advice, Hileman testified that Rigterink was 
confident he could persuade the jury of his innocence and told Bolin, “give me 20 
minutes with the jury and I can convince them.” 
 
With respect to trial preparation, Hileman testified that prior to trial, he 
discussed the facts of the case with Rigterink and provided him with examples of 
questions he intended to ask.  Although Hileman did not practice a list of specific 
cross-examination questions with Rigterink, he discussed with Rigterink questions 
he believed would be difficult and warned him with regard to potential pitfalls.  
Similarly, Carmichael testified that he discussed the decision of whether to testify 
with Rigterink, as well as what to anticipate if he testified, including during cross-
examination.   
 
 
- 50 - 
 
The circuit court found that counsel were not deficient, and the testimony of 
Hileman and Carmichael is competent, substantial evidence that supports this 
finding.  Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.   
Penalty Phase Closing Statements 
 
During the penalty phase closing statements, the prosecutor described 
Rigterink as evil in connection with his explanation of what the HAC aggravating 
circumstance encompasses.  Specifically, the prosecutor stated: 
[T]here is a second type of evil, and it is an evil that emanates from 
within an individual.  It is an evil that is part of that individual.  It is an 
evil that is within that person. 
. . . . 
 
But it comes from within the individual.  It’s produced by the 
individual.  And its consequences come from the choices that that 
individual makes without being affected by others.   
 
And I would suggest to you that that is the far, far, far more 
disturbing type of evil.  That is the type of evil that we’re talking about 
here.  When they tell you heinous means extremely wicked or 
shockingly evil, that’s what we’re talking about. . . .   
 
The analysis that must be engaged in . . . is to review what 
happened, what took place here . . . and even the more fundamental 
question, why did it happen. . . .   
 
And you have to look prior to September the 24th to understand 
. . . why it happened.  This wasn’t just an explosion of things that 
happened on that day.  There were a series of events which gave you 
an insight, an insight into what’s inside Thomas Rigterink . . . . 
 
There was an insight into the self-centeredness, the lack of 
appreciation for his conduct on others.  There was a—there was 
manipulation—in fact, lies was part of that manipulation—to his 
family, to his wife, his parents, . . . the police, his employer, and he 
attempted to do it to you. 
 
Mr. Rigterink’s behavior goes back in terms of the drug use is—
is just an example of doing what he wants without concern[] about the 
consequences to others. . . .   
 
 
- 51 - 
 
Sort of begs the—or doesn’t really address the issue of what his 
wife was doing that time working two jobs. . . .  You know, she is the 
one that’s making the effort here, and there doesn’t seem to be any 
responsible attitude on his part. . . .  
 
Now, there was more than one letter that was written to you that 
suggested . . . the drugs caused hi[s]—marriage to fail.  That’s 
nonsense.  Infidelity . . . made his marriage fail.  And it’s this . . . same 
self-centeredness that caused it, what I want, how I choose to resolve 
the problems that I perceive.   
 
That’s the self-centeredness that’s at the heart of this case. . . . 
 
The drugs were of no influence to Mr. Rigterink’s behavior.  
Every witness that told you that said they didn’t perceive anything. . . .   
It was an appetite for drugs and the loss of his wife’s financial 
support that caused the theft from [his employer].  It was that simple.  
That’s all it was.  And when that source of revenue ended, he had to 
find another.   
 
He already had an insight on how he chooses to resolve those 
financial problems.  It’s that same self-centered behavior that he 
doesn’t care if somebody else is even giving him a paycheck for his 
work, he’s going to take what he wants.    
 
Rigterink alleges counsel were deficient for failing to object to the description of 
him as evil and shockingly evil.  He also alleges that the remarks were improper 
because aspects of his character do not affect the HAC aggravating circumstance.   
With respect to what may be said during closing statements, we have 
previously explained: 
In Florida, wide latitude is permitted in presenting opening and 
closing statements to a jury, and comments by the prosecutor will merit 
a mistrial only when they deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial 
trial, materially contribute to the conviction, are so harmful or 
fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or are so inflammatory 
they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict than 
it would have otherwise rendered. 
 
 
 
- 52 - 
Miller v. State, 161 So. 3d 354, 382 (Fla. 2015).  Additionally, the use of the term 
evil alone during closing statements does not entitle a defendant to a new trial.  See 
Lugo v. State, 845 So. 2d 74, 107 (Fla. 2003) (holding it was not fundamental error 
for the prosecutor to comment that the behavior of the defendant was “evil” and 
“hell on wheels”).  But see King v. State, 623 So. 2d 486, 488-89 (Fla. 1993) 
(granting new penalty phase based on the prosecutor’s “dissertation on evil” during 
penalty phase closing statements and remarks that a life sentence recommendation 
would constitute cooperation with evil).   
To the extent that the remarks here were used to support the HAC 
aggravating factor, they were improper; this Court has repeatedly stated that HAC 
is evaluated from the perspective of the victim.  See, e.g., Davis v. State, 121 So. 
3d 462, 499 (Fla. 2013).  Nonetheless, Rigterink has failed to establish prejudice.  
The HAC aggravating circumstance was proven by the State with respect to both 
victims, and the prior violent felony circumstance was established by the 
convictions for the contemporaneous murders of Jarvis and Sousa.  These are two 
of the weightiest aggravating circumstances.  See Matthews v. State, 124 So. 3d 
811, 818 (Fla. 2013) (citing Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 542 (Fla. 2010)).  
Therefore, there is no reasonable possibility that the remarks by the State 
contributed to the jury recommendations or sentences.   
 
 
- 53 - 
 
Rigterink also challenges the following remark by the prosecutor, which 
referenced the evidence presented by Rigterink that he could be a good influence 
when free of drugs:  
I would suggest to you that when he sat in this chair right here, right 
there, that chair last week and looked at you dead in the eye and said, 
“God knows what’s in my heart, I did not kill these people,” I heard 
him say it and each one of you heard him say it, no drugs were 
influencing him. . . .  
 
That was not the product of any illegal drugs that he had taken.  
That was the product of what evil that is within him.  It is a product of 
the same motivation that caused the death of Allison Sousa and 
Jeremy Jarvis.   
 
Rigterink alleges this was an improper remark that constituted argument of a 
nonstatutory aggravating circumstance and that characterized him in derogatory 
terms.  He asserts that as a result of this and the previous remark, the advisory 
sentences of the jury were the result of an emotional response.   
 
As previously stated, counsel undertook a reasonable strategy during the 
penalty phase of presenting Rigterink as a good person.  The State is permitted to 
rebut proposed mitigation, and such rebuttal does not constitute argument of a 
nonstatutory aggravating circumstance.  Cf. Tanzi v. State, 964 So. 2d 106, 115 
(Fla. 2007) (holding that the State’s questioning regarding lack of remorse was not 
improper because the defendant opened the door); cf. also Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 
838, 869-70 (Fla. 2009) (holding that presentation of family members to testify 
that Smith had a positive relationship with them would have opened the door to 
 
 
- 54 - 
evidence that the defendant previously had sexual conduct with his thirteen-year-
old sister and was required to leave his home).  Here, Rigterink opened the door to 
rebuttal of his good character, and counsel were not deficient for failing to object 
to these statements.   
 
For the reasons stated above, Rigterink is not entitled to relief on this claim.   
Concession of HAC and Prior Violent Felony Aggravating Circumstances 
 
During penalty phase closing statements, Carmichael conceded that the State 
established two aggravating circumstances: 
You see, there were aggravating factors proven by the State’s 
office.  They indicated to you that there were two that applied for 
Jeremy Jarvis, that there were what I refer to as contemporaneous 
homicides.  There were two homicides.  They happened 
simultaneously, or very close to simultaneously, but two people are 
dead.   
Heinous, atrocious, and cruel.  We believe that you can 
conclude that the State has met their burden regarding that, although I 
have a few remarks in that regard.   
 
Rigterink claims that these concessions resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel 
and denied him the right to adversarial testing.  With respect to the prior violent 
felony aggravating circumstance, we have previously held that counsel is not 
ineffective for conceding this circumstance where the jury convicted the defendant 
of the violent felony during the guilt phase.  See Schwab v. State, 814 So. 2d 402, 
413 (Fla. 2002).   
 
 
- 55 - 
With respect to the HAC aggravating circumstance, during the evidentiary 
hearing, Carmichael testified that he did not believe there was any basis to contest 
this aggravating factor, and conceded it to build credibility with the jury.  This 
Court has previously held that counsel pursued a reasonable strategy when he 
described the murder as brutal, but asserted that the defendant did not intend to 
torture the victim, who died quickly.  See Dillbeck v. State, 964 So. 2d 95, 100-101 
(Fla. 2007).  This Court stated in Dillbeck that it was reasonable for counsel to 
confront the difficult issue instead of ignoring it, and that counsel reasonably 
sought to soften the impact of the evidence that would be presented by the State.  
Id. at 101.   
Additionally, this Court has previously stated that counsel was not 
ineffective for conceding facts that were supported by overwhelming evidence 
because there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have rendered a 
different verdict.  Patton v. State, 784 So. 2d 380, 390 (Fla. 2000).  Similarly, in 
Wade v. State, 156 So. 3d 1004, 1031-32 (Fla. 2014), the Court held that counsel 
was not ineffective when he commented during closing statements that the actions 
of the defendant “were evil itself” and had “no moral justification.”  The Court 
reasoned that although the statements could be understood as a concession of the 
HAC aggravating factor, the defendant did not establish prejudice because he 
provided no explanation as to how counsel could have disputed HAC.  Id. at 1032.    
 
 
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Here, it is undisputable that the murders qualified for the HAC aggravating 
circumstance.  Jarvis was stabbed in his own residence, escaped, and then was 
chased down by Rigterink.  Rigterink I, 2 So. 3d at 227.  When Rigterink 
discovered him, Jarvis fought for his life before being stabbed to death.  Id. at 228.  
He suffered from twenty-two knife wounds.  Id. at 230.  Sousa was working in the 
second unit where Jarvis fled.  Id. at 228.  She heard screaming outside the office 
before Jarvis, visibly wounded and bloody, entered the unit.  Id.  She attempted to 
call 911 before Rigterink entered, and when he was inside the unit she ran, yelling 
“Don’t hurt me.  Don’t hurt me.”  Id. at 229.  The 911 operator heard Sousa saying 
“Oh, my God.  Don’t—don’t hurt me.  No. . . .”  Id.  Sousa suffered from six knife 
wounds.  Id. at 230.  Both Jarvis and Sousa had injuries to their hands and limbs 
consistent with defensive wounds.  Id.  In the direct appeal, the scene was 
described as “bloody” and “vicious” with “[a] veritable trail of blood” down the 
hallway of the second unit, where the victims attempted to flee.  Id.  It is hard to 
imagine an argument that would credibly minimize the application of the HAC 
aggravating circumstance.  Accordingly, Rigterink has failed to establish prejudice 
from the concession of the HAC aggravating circumstance and we deny relief on 
this claim.   
 
 
 
 
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Investigation of Alternative Suspects 
 
Rigterink alleges counsel were ineffective because they failed to adequately 
investigate alternate suspects.  However, Hileman’s testimony during the 
evidentiary hearing directly contradicted this claim.  Moreover, Rigterink has 
presented no evidence demonstrating that the further investigation of alternate 
suspects would have produced any fruitful information.  Indeed, based on the 
testimony of Drs. Buffington and Krop, Rigterink does not continue to assert that 
the murders were committed by others, and has reverted to the snapshot memory 
version of events.  The evidence presented during trial clearly establishes that 
Rigterink committed the murders, and counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to 
find evidence contrary to this after a reasonable investigation.   
 
Rigterink also alleges counsel were ineffective because during trial they 
failed to ask the eyewitnesses to identify the individuals who Rigterink alleged 
committed the crime, did not ask the eyewitnesses to identify the composite sketch 
of the perpetrator, and did not establish the necessary foundation to present the 
testimony of William Farmer (one of the individuals who Rigterink alleged 
committed the murders, or who knew the individuals who committed the murders).  
In Rigterink III, we summarized the proffered testimony of Farmer as follows: 
• Farmer is originally from Chicago, but has lived in the Lakeland and 
Winter Haven areas for the past several years.  He has been in and 
out of jail “pretty much” his entire life. 
 
 
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• He provides security, debt-enforcement, and debt-collection services 
for drug dealers.  He has been accused of, and investigated for, at 
least four homicides. 
• He and Marshall Mark Mullins were merely “acquaintances by 
passing.”  He has never conducted business with Mullins in the drug 
trade.  He simply knew some of the same people as Mullins. 
• He offered his opinion that Mullins was more “off the chain” or 
aggressive with regard to his collection techniques. 
• He denied any role in the Jarvis–Sousa murders, and denied any 
knowledge with regard to Mullins’ alleged involvement with these 
crimes. 
• He does not know Thomas Rigterink. 
 
66 So. 3d at 893-94.  Rigterink first sought to introduce this testimony to 
demonstrate Mullins made statements against penal interest, but it was excluded as 
conflicting hearsay that was not sufficiently corroborated.  Id. at 894.  Based on the 
same proffer, counsel later sought to introduce Farmer’s testimony to show his 
knowledge of the interactions of individuals involved in the drug trade, witnesses 
involved in the case, and the reputation of Mullins.  Id.  This Court noted that the 
testimony was not framed or presented in terms of Mullins’s reputation in the drug 
trade community and held that Farmer’s testimony was based on mere personal 
opinion, fleeting encounters, or rumor, and was insufficient to satisfy the 
admissibility predicate of section 90.405(1), Florida Statutes.  Id. at 895; see also § 
90.405(1) (“When evidence of the character of a person or of a trait of that 
person’s character is admissible, proof may be made by testimony about that 
person’s reputation.”).   
 
 
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Rigterink has provided no evidence that counsel would have been able to 
establish a sufficient predicate to introduce Farmer’s testimony.  Instead, he simply 
asserts that counsel were deficient for failing to adequately interview Farmer, 
conduct adequate legal research, or later recall Farmer to attempt to establish the 
requisite predicate.  Rigterink also does not provide any evidence of what 
testimony Farmer could provide to tie either him or an alternate suspect to the 
murders.  Accordingly, we hold this speculative claim is insufficient to establish a 
claim of ineffective assistance.  See Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 550 (Fla. 2011).   
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court’s order denying 
postconviction relief on all claims.   
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE and CANADY, JJ., concur in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County,  
J. Dale Durrance, Judge - Case No. 532003CF00698201XXXX 
 
Ann Elizabeth Finnell of Finnell, McGuinness, Nezami, & Andux, P.A., 
Jacksonville, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Scott Andrew 
Browne, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee