Title: Hineman v. Imber

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSEPH HINEMAN, 
§ 
 
§ 
No. 229, 2015 
 
Plaintiff Below-Appellant, 
§ 
 
  
 
  
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
v.  
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
 
 
§  
 
PAUL IMBER, D.O. and, 
§ 
C.A. No. N10C-03-014 
EAR, NOSE, THROAT, AND 
§ 
 
ALLERGY ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
§ 
a Delaware company, 
§ 
 
§ 
Defendants Below-Appellees. 
§ 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:   April 27, 2016 
Decided:   April 28, 2016 
 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND and SEITZ, Justices. 
O R D E R 
This 28th day of April 2016, having considered this matter on the briefs filed 
by the parties and after oral argument, we find it evident that:  
In this case, the plaintiff-appellant, Joseph Hineman, argues that the Superior 
Court erred by allowing certain evidence to be introduced at trial on his claim for 
medical malpractice.  After a careful examination of the record, we find no abuse 
of discretion on the part of the trial court.1  As to Hineman‟s use of marijuana on 
                                          
 
1 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Adams, 541 A.2d 567, 570 (Del. 1988) (“The determination of 
whether proffered evidence is relevant is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will 
not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Also within the discretion of the trial court are 
determinations of whether or not the probative value of a particular piece of evidence is 
 
2 
 
the day in question, Hineman‟s own counsel referred to that fact in a loose way 
during trial.2  More important, this evidence was plainly relevant to Hineman‟s 
perception of his injury at the time that the defendant, Paul M. Imber, D.O., 
examined him, and there was no basis to conclude that relevance was outweighed 
by any improper prejudicial effect, such that its exclusion was warranted under 
Delaware Rule of Evidence 403.3  As important, Hineman did not object when 
there was use of the marijuana evidence for a purpose not clearly addressed in his 
prior objection.  This failure to object makes our standard of review that of plain 
                                                                                                                                        
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the opposing party.” (citing 
Lampkins v. State, 465 A.2d 785, 790 (Del. 1983))). 
2 Hineman‟s trial counsel stated in opening argument: “You‟re going to be hearing mention made 
that earlier that morning [Hineman] and his employee had smoked pot.  We don‟t know how 
much.  We don‟t know whether it was, when it was, but you‟re going to be hearing that.”  App. 
to Answering Br. at 369–70 (Jury Trial Proceedings, Hineman v. Imber, C.A. No. N10C-03-014, 
at 73–74 (Del. Super. Apr. 20, 2015)). 
3 See D.R.E. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible . . . .”); D.R.E. 401 (“„Relevant evidence‟ 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.”); D.R.E. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”); see also Laws v. Webb, 658 A.2d 1000, 1010 (Del. 1995) (finding the 
plaintiff‟s alcohol consumption relevant, partly because “[it] could assist in the jury‟s 
determination of her perceptive abilities around the time of the accident”), overruled on other 
grounds by Lagola v. Thomas, 867 A.2d 891 (Del. 2005); Scott v. Ritterson, 2004 WL 1790134, 
at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 9, 2004) (“The jury must assess the credibility of the parties in making its 
determination of liability.  The ability of the parties to perceive and react to the auto accident is 
relevant to the jury‟s determination of liability.”); Rachko v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 1997 WL 
817860, at *1 (Del. Super. Oct. 17, 1997) (finding that “[e]vidence of alcohol consumption is 
admissible to show plaintiff‟s ability to perceive and react” during and after a car accident). 
 
3 
 
error, and no error of any kind, much less of that blatant kind, occurred.4  Likewise, 
because of the relevance of Hineman‟s credibility to the case, it was proper to 
admit evidence that he brought lawsuits against his own father, and his friend and 
employee, making what he later admitted to be false allegations against both of 
them in order to seek to hold them accountable for his injuries.  That Hineman was 
willing to lodge false claims in order to recover for his injuries was relevant to the 
jury‟s assessment of whether his rendition of what he told Dr. Imber was accurate.5  
For these reasons, we find no reversible error in the trial court‟s rulings. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Superior Court‟s June 20, 
2012 order granting the defendants‟ motion in limine to introduce evidence of 
                                          
 
4 See Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 342, 355 (Del. 2003) (“Objectionable statements that were not 
objected to at trial are reviewed for plain error.  To be plain, the error must affect substantial 
rights, generally meaning that it must have affected the outcome of the trial.  Under plain error 
review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights so as to 
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial.” (citations omitted)). 
5 See D.R.E. 607 (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party . . . .”); Stickel v. 
State, 975 A.2d 780, 783 (Del. 2009) (“Evidence has probative value if it affects the probability 
that the fact is as the party offering the evidence asserts it to be.” (citation omitted)); Jackson v. 
State, 770 A.2d 506, 515 (Del. 2001) (“Under Delaware law, the jury is the sole trier of fact, 
responsible for determining witness credibility and resolving conflicts in testimony.  Jurors 
should have every opportunity to hear impeachment evidence that may undermine a witness‟ 
credibility.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also WEINSTEIN‟S 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 401.04[4][b], at 401-40 to 401-41  (2d ed. 2015) (“If a person‟s activities 
reflect on that person‟s credibility, then evidence of the conduct is relevant and admissible.” 
(citing federal case law)). 
 
4 
 
Hineman‟s marijuana use,6 and April 20, 2015 bench ruling denying Hineman‟s 
motion to preclude reference to the prior lawsuit,7 are AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice  
 
                                          
 
6 See Hineman v. Imber, 2012 WL 2353682 (Del. Super. June 20, 2012). 
7 See App. to Opening Br. at 95–105 (Jury Trial Proceedings, Hineman v. Imber, C.A. No. 
N10C-03-014, at 1–11 (Del. Super. Apr. 20, 2015)).