Title: Long v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 129
September Term, 1995
_____________________________________
STEVEN BLAINE LONG
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
____________________________________
   * Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker,
JJ.
____________________________________
OPINION BY MURPHY, C.J.
____________________________________
       Filed:  November 7, 1996
* Murphy, C.J., participated in the 
  hearing of the case, in the       
  conference in regard to its       
  decision and in the adoption of the
  opinion, but he had retired from  
  the Court prior to the filing of  
  the opinion.  
In this case we decide whether a circuit court may reconsider
a pretrial ruling in which it granted a motion to suppress evidence
that the defendant had claimed came from an unlawful search and
seizure.  We conclude that it may not.
I
A
Maryland Rule 4-252 governs the filing of motions in criminal
cases in Maryland's circuit courts.   Subsection (h)(2) of Rule 4-
252 specifies the results that follow when a circuit court grants
or denies a defendant's motion to suppress evidence.  That
subsection provides as follows:
If the court grants a motion to suppress evidence, the
evidence shall not be offered by the State at trial,
except that suppressed evidence may be used in accordance
with law for impeachment purposes.  If the court denies
a motion to suppress evidence, the ruling is binding at
the trial unless the court, on the motion of a party and
in the exercise of its discretion, grants a supplemental
hearing or a hearing de novo and rules otherwise.  A
pretrial ruling denying the motion to suppress is
reviewable on a motion for a new trial or on appeal of a
conviction.
Maryland Rule 4-252(h)(2).  Rule 4-252, therefore, explicitly
allows the circuit court to reconsider its denial of a motion to
suppress evidence if either party requests such a reconsideration.
The rule does not mention whether the circuit court may reconsider
its decision to grant a motion to suppress.
B
On October 29, 1993, Steven Blaine Long was arrested by
Officer Matthew Trageser in the Elk's Lodge parking lot in
2
Frederick City.  Charges were subsequently brought in the Circuit
Court for Frederick County, accusing Long of possession of a
controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute.  Alleging
that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him, Long filed a
pretrial motion to suppress all evidence seized incident to his
arrest.
The circuit court (Rollins, J.) held a suppression hearing to
decide Long's motion.  At the hearing, Officer Trageser testified
that on the night of Long's arrest, he had received a radio
transmission from Officer Charlie Davis.  Officer Trageser
testified that Officer Davis stated in his radio transmission that
he had witnessed a purchase of suspected crack cocaine by a
confidential informant.  Officer Trageser also testified that he
went to the parking lot with the purpose of arresting the
perpetrator described by Officer Davis.  Officer Trageser stated
that when he arrived at the parking lot and approached Long, he
observed Long making a throwing motion with his hands.  Officer
Trageser told the court that while he was twenty to thirty feet
away from Long, he observed Long apparently throw what appeared to
be a baggie containing cocaine.  Officer Trageser testified that he
identified himself as a police officer and ordered Long to the
ground.  
The baggie was recovered by the police and was found to
contain six tenths of a gram of cocaine.  Officer David Armstrong,
who was assigned to process, fingerprint, and photograph Long,
3
testified at the suppression hearing that Long had told him at the
police station that "he was only selling the stuff to pay his
mother's phone bill."  
Following the suppression hearing, the circuit court granted
Long's motion, stating that there was insufficient evidence by the
arresting officer about Officer Davis's observations.  The court
also noted that there was no evidence that the arrest had taken
place in a high-crime or drug area or that Long had tried to flee.
As a result of its ruling, the circuit court prohibited the State
from using either the cocaine or the statements made to Officer
Armstrong as evidence.
The State filed a motion to reconsider, which Long opposed and
the circuit court granted.  A second suppression hearing was held,
at which Officer Trageser testified that he had worked with Officer
Davis on previous assignments and had found the information
provided by Officer Davis on those occasions to be reliable and
trustworthy.  Officer Trageser testified that Officer Davis had
described the person selling crack cocaine to him, and that Long
fit this description.  Officer Trageser also testified that he
announced himself as an officer and ordered Long to the ground
before he observed the throwing motion.
Following the second hearing, the circuit court denied Long's
motion to suppress.  At trial, the court found Long guilty of
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, based upon the
evidence that Long sought to exclude.  Long sought review by the
     "[T]he expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
1
Black's Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990).
4
Court of Special Appeals.  We issued a writ of certiorari before
the intermediate appellate court rendered a decision.
C
Long asserts that under Rule 4-252, the circuit court was
precluded from reconsidering its decision to grant Long's motion to
suppress.  Long's argument is based upon the fact that Rule 4-252
explicitly provides for reconsideration of a court's denial of a
suppression motion, but has no complementary provision that would
apply when such a motion is granted.  Applying the legal maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,  Long claims that the lack
1
of an express provision for reconsideration when a suppression
motion is granted signifies that the circuit court did not have the
authority to reconsider its ruling.
The State counters by arguing that Rule 4-252 was amended to
allow both the State and the defendant to request reconsideration
of the denial of a suppression motion.  Under the previous rule
only the defendant could make such a request.  This goal of
treating the State and defendant equally, the State argues,
mandates that the State be allowed to seek reconsideration when a
suppression motion is granted.
II
A
We apply the same principles of interpretation in construing
5
our procedural rules that we apply in construing statutes:
We have repeatedly stated that the canons and principles
we follow in construing statutes apply equally to an
interpretation of our rules. . . .  When construing a
rule, we must first look to the words of the rule, giving
them their ordinary and natural meaning. . . .  If the
words of the rules are clear and unambiguous, our
analysis ordinarily ends. . . .  Generally, it is only
when the words of the rule are ambiguous that we must
look toward other sources to glean the intent of the
rule. . . .  Furthermore, we must give effect to the
entire rule, neither adding, nor deleting, words in order
to give it a meaning not otherwise evident by the words
actually used. . . .  Our mission is to give the rule a
reasonable interpretation in tune with logic and common
sense.
In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646 A.2d 1012 (1994) (citing New
Jersey v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270, 627 A.2d 1055 (1993) and Beales
v. State, 329 Md. 263, 619 A.2d 105 (1993)) (citations and
quotations omitted).  Long asks us to apply these principles to
Rule 4-252, and to conclude that the rule's provision for
reconsidering a suppression motion when that motion is denied
necessarily implies that no such reconsideration is allowed if the
motion has been granted.
We look to the rule's history to aid us in discerning the
reasonable intendment of the language used in the light of the
purpose to be effectuated.  Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 29, 41, 333
A.2d 37 (1975); Brown v. State, 237 Md. 492, 504, 207 A.2d 103
(1965).  The language presently embodied in Maryland Rule 4-
252(h)(2) was drafted more than thirty years ago in response to
this Court's desire that evidentiary rulings on the suppression of
evidence be made before trial.
6
In 1963, this Court reversed a conviction for burglary because
the record was insufficient to determine whether or not the
arresting officers possessed probable cause for the arrest and
subsequent search.  Edwardsen v. State, 231 Md. 332, 336-37, 190
A.2d 84 (1963).  In that case, the officers arrested the appellant
on the basis of information told them by his employer.  Id. at 334.
The specifics of the information were unknown because the State had
admonished the testifying officer not to repeat the employer's
words.  Id.  Although the officers might, indeed, have had probable
cause to arrest the appellant, the record was "devoid of any such
showing."  Id. at 336.  Since the record contained only the "bare
fact that the officers 'received certain information,'" this Court
concluded that there was an insufficient showing of probable cause
for the arrest, and any evidence discovered as a result of the
arrest should have been excluded.  Id. at 336-37.
The following year, this Court revisited the same issues in
Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526, 197 A.2d 434 (1964).  We upheld the
warrantless arrest and subsequent search in that case and discussed
at length the State's need at times to introduce hearsay statements
to demonstrate that the police possessed probable cause at the time
of the arrest: 
[I]n many cases coming before this Court where the
lawfulness of an arrest and of a search incidental
thereto are in issue, direct evidence to show the basis
upon which the arresting officers acted either is not
offered at all, or is alluded to guardedly as
"information received" or in some other and equally
uninformative manner (doubtless designed to avoid an
7
objection that it is hearsay), or is actually excluded as
hearsay.  On the question of the guilt or innocence of
the defendant it clearly is hearsay and hence is
inadmissible; but on the issues of probable cause and the
lawfulness of arrest and of the admissibility of evidence
obtained through any search made in connection with the
arrest, such testimony, even if hearsay, is directly
relevant and is admissible.
Id. at 532-33.  The Court suggested that the question of probable
cause should be determined as a preliminary motion, out of the
jury's presence:
[T]he determination of the admissibility of evidence
which is dependent upon the lawfulness of an arrest
should be made by the trial judge as a preliminary matter
quite apart, of course, from the question of the guilt or
innocence of the accused; and if the case is being tried
before a jury, such a matter should be heard out of the
presence of the jury.  Such a question may be raised[]
before trial by a motion to exclude any evidence claimed
to have been improperly obtained.
Id. at 533.
On February 21, 1964, the Court of Appeals Standing Committee
On Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules Committee) considered "a
problem arising out of the recent case of Farrow v. State."  Rules
Committee Minutes, Feb. 21, 1964, at 5.  The committee discussed
the portions of Farrow quoted above.  See id. (quoting the sections
from Farrow discussing the determination of suppression issues
through a preliminary hearing).  The committee determined that the
contents of a rule regulating motions to suppress evidence
resulting from an illegal search or seizure should be referred to
     The Subcommittee on Chapter 700 derived its name from the
2
fact that rules relating to criminal procedure were at that time
codified as Chapter 700 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure.
8
the Subcommittee on Chapter 700.  Id. at 6.   In referring the
2
issue, the committee asked the subcommittee "whether or not the
rule should prohibit reconsideration of a motion on the same
grounds by the trial judge after [a] pre-trial ruling by another
judge."  Id. at 7.
On May 22, 1964, the Rules Committee considered the
subcommittee's first report on the "[p]roposed rule relating to
motions to suppress evidence illegally obtained."  It agreed upon
several matters of policy, and decided to refer the draft rule back
to the subcommittee "for further study and report . . . ."  One of
the matters of policy agreed upon by the committee was 
[t]hat the trial judge[,] contrary to the general rule,
should be bound by the preliminary determination of a
motion to suppress evidence illegally obtained, except
that it should be made clear that the ruling is not
binding for purposes of appeal or in connection with a
motion for a new trial.
Id.
The subcommittee issued its second report on June 29, 1964.
With some amendments not relevant here, the Rules Committee
approved the subcommittee's draft rule as Rule 729.  In April 1965,
the Rules Committee issued its 24th Report, in which it proposed
that Rule 729 be adopted by the Court of Appeals.  See Twenty-
Fourth Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, at 2-3, 17-21 (1965).  This Court initially declined to
9
adopt Rule 729, and the Rules Committee decided to resubmit it in
1966.  See Rules Committee Minutes, April 29, 1966, at 6.  The Rule
was adopted without change in 1967.  See Thirtieth Report of the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at 2, 13A-17
(1967). 
In the form drafted by the subcommittee, proposed by the
committee, 
and 
adopted 
by 
this 
Court, 
Rule 
729 
clearly
distinguished between the results following the grant of a motion
to suppress, and the denial of such a motion.  Subsection (g) of
Rule 729 described the effect to be given to a pretrial ruling on
a motion to suppress:
g.
Binding effect of Pre-trial Ruling
1.
Where Granted
If such motion or petition is granted prior to
trial, the property shall be delivered to the
person entitled thereto and shall not be
offered in evidence by the State at the trial
on the merits in the criminal proceeding.
2.
Where Denied
If such motion or petition is denied prior to
trial of the criminal case, the pre-trial
ruling shall be binding at the trial unless
the trial judge, in the exercise of his
discretion grants a hearing de novo on the
defendant's 
renewal 
of 
his 
motion 
or
objection.  A pre-trial ruling, denying a
motion or petition to suppress, exclude or
return property seized, shall in any event be
reviewable on appeal to the appropriate
appellate court or on a hearing on a motion
for a new trial.
Maryland Rule 729 (1967).  Reading Rule 729 in context, we conclude
that the rule embodied the Rules Committee's May 22, 1964 statement
10
of policy that a trial court's ruling on a suppression motion
should be binding, with the limited exception that a court may use
its discretion whether to reconsider a previously denied
suppression motion, if the motion is renewed.
The relevant language originally adopted as Rule 729(g) is
embodied in current rule 4-252(h)(2) with relatively little change.
In 1977, Rule 729 was replaced by Rule 736.  See Fifty-Third Report
of the Rules Committee, 3 Md. Reg. 8, 17 (1976) (proposing Rule
736); Rules Order dated January 31, 1977, 4 Md. Reg. 235 (1977)
(adopting Rule 736).  Rule 736 compressed Rule 729(g)(1) and Rule
729(g)(2) into a single subsection, and eliminated the requirement
that the State return property when a motion to suppress is
granted:
If the court grants a motion to suppress evidence,
the evidence shall be excluded and not be offered by the
State at trial, except that suppressed evidence may be
used in accordance with law for impeachment purposes.  If
the court denies a motion to suppress evidence, the
ruling is binding at the trial unless the court, in the
exercise of its discretion, grants a hearing de novo on
a renewal of the motion.  A pretrial ruling denying the
motion to suppress is reviewable on a motion for a new
trial or on appeal of a conviction.
Maryland Rules of Procedure, Rule 736(f)(2) (1978).  Rule
736(f)(2), however, preserved the distinction between the effects
following a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence
and the effects following the grant of such a motion.
In 1985, Rule 4-252 replaced Rule 736, and Rule 736(f)(2)
became Rule 4-252(g)(2).  See Eighty-Seventh Report of the Rules
     As adopted in 1984, Rule 4-252(g)(2) provided:
3
If the court grants a motion to suppress evidence, the
evidence shall not be offered by the State at trial,
except that suppressed evidence may be used in accordance
with law for impeachment purposes.  If the court denies
a motion to suppress evidence, the ruling is binding at
the trial unless the court, in the exercise of its
discretion, grants a hearing de novo on a renewal of the
motion.  A pretrial ruling denying the motion to suppress
is reviewable on a motion for a new trial or on appeal of
a conviction.
11
Committee, 10 Md. Reg., Supp. to Issue 25, at S-1, S-23 (1983)
(proposing Rule 4-252); Rules Order dated April 6, 1984, 11 Md.
Reg., Supp. to Issue 9, at S-1, S-98 (1984) (adopting Rule 4-252).
No significant alterations were made to Rule 4-252(g)(2).3
In 1988, Rule 4-252(g)(2) was amended to provide that " . . .
[i]f the court denies a motion to suppress evidence, the ruling is
binding at the trial unless the court, on the motion of a party and
in the exercise of its discretion, grants a supplemental hearing or
a hearing de novo . . . and rules otherwise."  Rules Order of
December 21, 1988, 16 Md. Reg. 59 (1989) (emphasis in original).
This alteration made it possible for the State to reopen a
suppression hearing following the denial of a defendant's motion to
suppress.  See Rules Committee Minutes, January 15, 1988, 9-11.
Thus, the State is now able to supplement the suppression hearing's
record in order to prevent a favorable ruling from being overturned
on appeal.  Id.  No changes were made, however, to the provisions
in Rule 4-252(g)(2) that specified the effects following a court's
grant of a motion to suppress.  In 1995, subsection (g)(2) of Rule
12
4-252 was moved to subsection (h)(2) without change.
Our review of the history of Rule 4-252(h)(2) leads us to
conclude that Long is correct.  The express provision allowing a
court to use its discretion as to whether it should reconsider its
denial of a motion to suppress must be interpreted in light of the
background goal that rulings on suppression motions be binding at
trial.  In this context, the absence of a similar provision
allowing for reconsideration of a court's grant of a motion to
suppress necessarily implies that the trial court lacks the
authority to undertake such a reconsideration.
B
The State contends that our previous holdings support its
position that a trial court may reconsider its grant of a motion to
suppress evidence.  Specifically, the State cites Waugh v. State,
275 Md. 22, 338 A.2d 268 (1975) and Logue v. State, 282 Md. 625,
386 A.2d 780 (1978).  Both those cases, however, dealt with a
court's authority to reconsider a previously denied suppression
motion.  In Waugh, supra, 275 Md. at 35, we concluded that the
trial court should have exercised its discretion and granted a
second suppression hearing when the defendant renewed his
previously denied motion and set forth allegations that the
testimony at the first suppression hearing had been inaccurate.  In
Logue, supra, 282 Md. at 628, we concluded that when a defendant's
first motion to suppress had been denied and the defendant was
later granted a new trial and renewed his motion to suppress, the
13
trial court sitting in the second trial could exercise its
discretion to be bound by the ruling on the first motion to
suppress where there was no new evidence and the first motion had
been fully considered.  In both Waugh and Logue, we relied on the
provisions of the applicable rules that explicitly gave trial
courts the discretion to reconsider their previous denials of the
defendants' suppression motions.  Waugh, supra, 275 Md. at 34-35;
Logue, supra, 282 Md. at 628.  Accordingly, these cases do not
support the State's theory that a trial court has the discretion to
reconsider its grant of a suppression motion.
The State's reliance on Cook v. State, 281 Md. 665, 381 A.2d
671 (1977) is similarly misplaced.  In Cook, we stated that a
ruling on an evidentiary issue is "typically only one of many made
during the course of a trial and does not become final until the
proceeding as a whole has concluded."  Id. at 670.  We determined,
therefore, that when the defendant's motion to suppress had been
granted but the trial had ended in a mistrial, no final judgment
had been rendered and the defendant could not use collateral
estoppel to prevent the State from seeking to introduce the same
evidence in a different trial on different charges.  Id. at 670-71.
While Cook states the general rule that a court may typically
reconsider its evidentiary rulings, the history of Rule 4-252, as
well as the rule's language, demonstrates that subsection (h)(2)
was intended to alter this general rule with respect to a court's
grant of a suppression motion and its effect on the subsequent
     We expressly disapprove of the one decision that does
4
directly support the State's position.  In Matthews v. State, 59
Md. App. 15, 21-22, 474 A.2d 530 (1984), the Court of Special
Appeals concluded that a trial court could reconsider its previous
decision to grant a suppression motion.  First, the court cited
Cook, supra, 281 Md. at 670, for the general proposition that an
evidentiary ruling is non-final and can be reconsidered.  To the
extent that Rule 4-252 does not mandate a contrary result, we agree
that Cook provides the general rule.  The court also concluded,
however, that Rule 736(g)(2) (the procedural rule containing the
language currently embodied in Rule 4-252(h)(2)) did not change
this general rule because "no limitation [was] set forth in that
rule on the court's discretion to grant a review of an order . . .
previously granting a motion to suppress evidence."  Matthews,
supra, 59 Md. App. at 22 (emphasis in original).  In reaching this
decision, the Court of Special Appeals did not examine the history
behind the drafting of Rule 736 and its predecessors.  Having
examined this history, we reach a contrary conclusion.
The State asserts that we "endorsed" the Matthews holding in
Christian v. State, 309 Md. 114, 522 A.2d 945 (1987).  In
Christian, we held that a trial court was authorized to reconsider
its order granting a new trial prior to the entry of a final
judgment.  Id. at 121-22.  In a discussion of cases from other
jurisdictions, we cited a Colorado decision that drew an analogy
between a rehearing on the grant of a new trial and a rehearing on
a suppression motion.  Id. at 120.  We appended a footnote to this
citation in which we noted the Matthews holding.  Id. at 120 n.4.
Christian, however, did not address the issue of whether the State
could seek reconsideration of a trial court's grant of a
suppression motion, and the predecessor to Rule 4-252 was not in
issue in that case.  Having examined this issue in detail, we
conclude Matthews is in error.
14
trial.  Cook did not address this issue, but instead addressed the
effect of a court's suppression order on a collateral proceeding.
See Cook, supra, 281 Md. at 671.  The cases cited by the State,
therefore, do not address the question before us.4
C
Finally, the State contends that even if Rule 4-252(h)(2)
precluded the State from seeking reconsideration of a granted
suppression motion before 1988, the 1988 amendment to the rule was
15
intended to alter this result.  The 1988 amendments were triggered
by this Court's decision in Buie v. State, 314 Md. 151, 550 A.2d 79
(1988), vacated, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).  In that case, we held that
when a motion to suppress has been denied, the record of a
suppression hearing could only be reopened if there was a "renewal
of the motion."  Id. at 155 n.2 (citing the pre-1988 version of
Rule 4-252).  Presumably on the grounds that only the defendant
could "renew" his motion, we held that the State could not request
that the record be reopened in order to provide additional evidence
to bolster the favorable ruling that it had already received.  Id.
Following this decision, we amended Rule 4-252 to specifically
allow the State to do what had been forbidden in Buie: to reopen
the suppression hearing after the defendant's motion to suppress
had been denied.  See Rules Order dated December 21, 1988, 16 Md.
Reg. 59 (1989) (referring to Buie, and amending Rule 4-252 to allow
for reconsideration or a supplemental hearing "on motion of a
party" after a motion to suppress has been denied).
The 1988 amendment to Rule 4-252, however, does not provide
evidence that the State should be able to move for reconsideration
after the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress has been granted.
That amendment was specifically tailored to allow the State to
bolster suppression hearing testimony in order to protect a
favorable ruling, and thereby avoid an unnecessary appeal and
remand.  See Rules Committee Minutes, January 15, 1988, at 11
(recording approval of the proposed changes to Rule 4-252 and
     Buie v. State, 72 Md. App. 562, 531 A.2d 1290 (1987), rev'd
5
on other grounds, 314 Md. 151, 550 A.2d 79 (1988), vacated, 494
U.S. 325 (1990) 
      We recognize that there may be reasons why trial judges
6
should have authority to reconsider decisions to suppress evidence
if the reconsideration can be accomplished prior to trial without
undue delay or inconvenience.  Accordingly, we shall refer the
issue to our Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
for a prompt report.
16
discussion referring to the decision of the Court of Special
Appeals in Buie v. State  and recognizing that changes were
5
needed).  Rather than evidencing a general policy of allowing the
State to seek reconsideration in all circumstances, the 1988
amendment only allows the State to seek a supplemental suppression
hearing after the court has denied a motion to suppress.
We are constrained to give effect to Rule 4-252 as it is
presently enacted.  Nothing in Rule 4-252's 1988 amendment
indicates a change in the effects that follow when a circuit court
grants a defendant's motion to suppress evidence.  Until such a
change occurs, a trial court has the discretion under Rule 4-
252(h)(2) to reconsider a previous ruling that denies a defendant's
motion to suppress evidence, but it cannot reconsider a previous
ruling that grants a motion to suppress.   The circuit court in
6
this case erred in reconsidering its ruling and holding the second
suppression hearing, and the court's first order should have
remained in effect, unless the State had successfully availed
itself of the means by which such orders may be appealed.  See
Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol.) § 12-302 of the Courts and
     Because of our conclusion in this case, we do not consider
7
whether the circuit court's ruling at the second suppression
hearing was correct.  In addition, the court's ruling at the first
suppression hearing, where Long's motion was granted, is not before
us.  We, therefore, express no opinion on the issue of whether
probable cause existed to justify Officer Trageser's arrest and
subsequent search of Long.
17
Judicial Proceedings Article (providing for interlocutory appellate
review of judicial orders suppressing evidence in certain types of
prosecutions).7
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
FREDERICK COUNTY REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL; COSTS TO
BE PAID BY THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF FREDERICK COUNTY.