Title: Sunseri v. State

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

Sone ae

487 Nev., Advance Opinion 5 &
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

 

KEVIN SUNSERI, No. 81551
Appellant, FILE
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA, :

Respondent. SEP 23 2021 2)

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea,
of robbery and ownership or possession of firearm by prohibited person.
Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michael Villani, Judge.

Vacated and remanded with instructions.

Nevada Defense Group and Damian Robert Sheets and Kelsey L. Bernstein,
Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

 

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
Attorney, Alexander G. Chen, Chief Deputy District Attorney, John T.
Niman, Deputy District Attorney, and Christopher J. Lalli, Assistant
District Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent.

 

 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, CADISH, PICKERING, and
HERNDON, JJ.
OPINION

By the Court, HERNDON, J.:
Appellant Kevin Sunseri was incarcerated in Nevada when a

warrant for his arrest was issued, but the warrant was not executed for 25,

Ul- 27503

 

 
months. until he was set to be released from prison. Sunseri entered into a
guilty plea agreement based on the new charges and then suffered a mental
breakdown. When he regained competency, he obtained new counsel and
sought to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his right to a speedy trial
had been violated and his former counsel had not advised him of the

iolation prior to his acceptance of the guilty plea offer. The district court

 

denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, denied Sunseri’s subsequent
motion to dismiss the charges, and entered a judgment of conviction based
on the guilty plea. We conclude the district court erred in denying the
motion to withdraw the guilty piea because withdrawal was just and fair,
‘as Sunseri had a strong argument that his right to a speedy trial had been
violated and a colorable claim that his counsel was ineffective. Therefore,
we vacate the judgment of conviction, reverse the denial of the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea, and remand with instructions to reconsider the
motion to dismiss the charges ir light of this opinion.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

‘On December 10, 2015. Sunseri robbed a man at gunpoint. On

May 25, 2076, Sunseri began serving a two-to-five-year sentence in the

‘Nevada Department of Corrections for an unrelated crime. A warrant for

 

Sunseri’s arrest concerning the robbery was issued roughly two months
later, on July 28, 2016, while Sunseri was incarcerated, but the warrant
was not immediately executed,

Meanwhile, while in prison, Sunseri received his high school

diploma, earned -a college degree, published a book, and earned a

 

certification-in personal training. Sunseri worked with a caseworker before
his scheduled release on August 27, 2018. to ensure there was no rei
hold him, He learned that he had a charge pending against him in Florida

 

on to

 

 
for driving under a revoked license and entered into an agreement to have
that charge vacated in exchange for a payment of $10,000 in restitution
Sunseri was unaware of any other warrants against him that would
jeopardize his release or that there was ever an investigation into the
underlying crimes. Instead cf being released as anticipated on August 27,
however, the 2016 arrest warrant was executed, and Sunseri was
transferred to the jail.

Sunseri agreed to plead guilty to robbery and ownership or

possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, Before sentencing, Sunseri

 

became suicidal, required mental health treatment, was deemed
incompetent, and was transferred to a mental health facility to receive
treatment. When Sunseri regained competency, he obtained new counsel
and filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea agreement on the grounds
that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated and his previous
counsel never advised him that the charges could potentially have been
dismissed as a result of the violation.

At the evidentiary hearing on the motion, Lae Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department's records technician testified that her
search through the records did not show any attempt to locate Sunseri

before his anticipated release from prison or to execute the arrest warrant.

 

‘Sunseri testified that his previous counsel never discussed any violation to
his right to a speedy tral or filing a motion to dismiss the charges. He
further stated that at the time he entered the guilty plea, he was unaware
that his right to a speedy trial may have already been violated. Finally, he
testified that his memory of the facts surrounding the underlying crime was
not as clear as it would have been if the warrant had been execnited in 2016.

Sunseri's former counsel did not testify.

 

 
ome ae

The district court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty
plea. Sunseri then filed a motion to dismiss the case because of his violated
speedy-trial right, which the district court denied, concluding that he
waived this argument by entering into the plea agreement. Sunseri was
convicted and sentenced to 66 to 180 months under the guilty plea.

DISCUSSION

“{Al district court may grant a defendant's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea before sentencing for any reason where permitting
withdrawal would be fair and just...” Stevenson v. State, 131 Nev. 598,
604, 354 P.8d 1277, 1281 (2015); NRS 176.165 (permitting withdrawal of a
guilty plea before sentencing). Courts should not focus exclusively on
whether the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleaded,
Stevenson, 131 Nev. at 603, 354 P.3d at 1281, nor should courts consider the
guilt or innocence of the defendant, Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 503,
686 P.2d 222, 226 (1984). In determining whether withdrawal of a guilty
plea would be fair and just, courts should “consider the totality of the
circumstances.” Stevenson, 181 Nev. at 603, 354 P.3d at 1281

In reviewing a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, this
court gives deference to the district court's factual findings as long as they
are supported by the record. Id. at 604, 354 P.3d at 1281. Because Sunseri’s
claim that the district court should have permitted him to withdraw his
guilty plea is based on his argument that his speedy-trial right was violated,
we must start our analysis there before also considering the issue of
whether his counsel was ineffective.

‘The Berker-Doggett speedy tria! test
‘The United States Supreme Court set out a four:

 

test for determining if a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy

 

 
 

 

trial has been violated: “{1| whether delay before trial was uncommonly
long, [2] whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame
for that delay, [3] whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right
to a speedy trial, and [4] whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.”
Doggett v. United States, 505 US. 647, 651 (1992) (citing Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 614, 530-33 (1972)). This court adopted the four-factor test, noting.
that ne factor was determinative and that each must be considered together,
along with all the relevant circumstances of the case. State v. Inzunza, 135
Nev. 513, 516, 454 P.3d 727, 731 (2019)

In regard to the first factor, in order to trigger the Barker-
Doggett speedy-trial analysis, the delay must be presumptively prejudicial,
which occurs around the one-year mark. Id. Here, the underlying warrant
was executed 25 months after it was isstied. ‘Thus, the first factor has been
met, as the delay was uncommonly long.

“The second factor, the reason for the delay. focuses on whether
the government is responsible for the delay and is the focal inquiry in #
speedy trial challenge.” Id. at 617, 454 P.3d at 731 (internal quotations
omitted). If the delay results from the government's negligence, that is
weighted less heavily than if it is the result of a deliberate delay to hamper
the defense, but it is still relevant because “the ultimate responsibility for
such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the
defendant.” Id. at 517, 454 P.3d at 732 (internal quotations omitted).
of negligence varies inversely with the
length of the delay that the negligence causes.” Id. (quoting United States
, Oliva, 909 F.3d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir, 2018)). In Inzunza, the 26-month
delay was caused by the government's “gross negligence.” as the police knew
of the defendant's whereabouts in New Jersey but did nothing to contact.

Additionally, this court's “toleratis

 

 

 

 

 
yes

him or arrest him. Jd. at 518, 454 P.3d at 732. This case is more egregious
than Inzunza because Sunseri was in the government's custody. A simple

search would have found him. Thus, the delay here was caused by the

 

State's gross negligence.

‘The third factor looks at whether the defendant asserted his
rright to a speedy trial in due course. In considering this factor, courts are
warned to only consider the time in which the defendant knew of the
charges. Id. at 518, 454 P.3d at 732. If the defendant had no knowledge of
the charges until the tardy arrest, the court cannot hold that against the
defendant. Id. While Sunseri did not have knowledge of the charges until
two years after the warrant was issued, when he learned of the charges he
entered a plea agreement. Thereafter Sunseri did not raise the issue of a
speedy trial for eight months.’ While we recognize this factor would
generally weigh against Sunseri in determining whether his speedy-trial
right was violated, as discussed further below, because Sunseri has a
colorable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and may not have been
aware that his right had been violated, this factor does not weigh strongly
against him

‘The last factor considers the prejudice of the delay to the
defendant and specifically considers “oppressive pretrial incarceration,
anxiety and concern of the accused, and the possibility that the defense will
be impaired.”* Id. (internal quotations omitted). Sunseri demonstrated

1We recognize Sunseri was committed and deemed incompetent for a
portion of those eight months, so the entirety of the delay may not be
appropriately held against him.

2While Sunseri argues that he need not show actual prejudice because
the delay was more than one year so prejudice is assumed, he is incorrect

 

 
actual prejudice when he testified that he suffered a mental breakdown
upon learning that he would not be released from prison because of the
State's dilatory execution of the underlying warrant. He became suicidal
and required mental health treatment. ‘Thus, Sunseri met his burden of
showing the delay prejudiced him by causing him anxiety and concern.
Further, Sunseri testified that his recollection of the underlying crime was
not as clear as it would have been earlier. While this alone likely does not
show an impairment of his defense, it does provide further support for his
claim of prejudice.

Considering all four factors, Sunseri made a strong argument
that his right to a speedy trial had been violated and the charges against
him should be dismissed. The fact that he entered into the guilty plea is
the only factual circumstance potentially weighing against him, but he
asserts that he did s0 as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus,
we must next consider whether his counsel was ineffective in failing to
advise him regarding the possible violation of his speedy trial right.
Ineffective assistance of counsel

As an initial matter, the State argues that Sunseri can only
make an argument that his counsel was ineffective in a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus and cannot make such an allegation in a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea. While we recognize that we have never specifically
stated that ineffective assistance of counsel can be grounds for withdrawal
of a guilty plea, we reaffirm that the consideration for when a guilty plea
can be withdrawn before sentencing is when withdrawal is fair and just.
Stevenson, 131 Nev. at 604, 364 P.3d at 1281. Thus, if ineffective assistance

because prejudice is only presumed for this factor if the delay is five years
or more. Inzunza, 135 Nev. at 519, 454 P.3d at 733.

 

 
om

of counsel resulted in a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty plea before
sentencing, doing so would be appropriate. See id. (considering whether
counsel's alleged lies and coercion provided grounds for withdrawing a
guilty plea prior to sentencing).

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to

 

invalidate a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea, a defendant must
show counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and prejudice resulted in that, but for counsel's
errors, there is a reasonable probability the defendant would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart,
474 US. 52, 58-59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 987-88, 923 P.2d
1102, 1107 (1996).

As discussed above, Sunseri has demonstrated prejudice
because, if not for the guilty plea, he had a probable chance that the charges
against him would be dismissed under Barker-Doggett. Regarding whether
Sunseri’s former counsel's performance was below an objective standard of
reasonableness, the record is underdeveloped because the district court did
not fully consider Sunseri’s claim that his counsel was ineffective and did
not hear evidence from Sunseri’s former counsel regarding his
conversations with Sunseri or the advice he provided to Sunseri.
Nevertheless, based on the record before us, Sunseri testified that his
counsel never discussed with him whether his speedy-trial right had been
violated before he agreed to the guilty plea agreement. While a criminal
defendant may be aware that a waiver of his statutory speedy-trial right
waives the right to have a trial in 60 days, the average, uneducated criminal
defendant cannot be expected to understand or know that a delay in
executing an arrest warrant can constitute a constitutional violation of his

 

 
right to a speedy trial, A defendant may only be aware of such a violation
if informed by his or her counsel. Sunseri’s former counsel, however, did
not testify at the hearing. Thus, the State failed to rebut Sunseri's claim

that his former counsel's performance was unreasonable?

 

Accordingly, while we are unable to fully address Sunseri’s
ineffective-assistance-of:counsel claim because of the insufficient record on
this isoue, we conclude that Sunseri made at least a colorable claim that his
counsel was ineffective. This colorable claim, coupled with Sunseri’s strong
argument that his right to a speedy trial was violated, demonstrates a fair
and just reason for the withdrawal of Sunseri’s guilty plea. Accordingly, we
conclude the district court erred in denying Sunseri’s motion to withdraw
the guilty plea.

CONCLUSION

The Barker-Doggett factors weigh in favor of Sunseri’s
argument that hie right to a epeedy trial was violated. Sunseri’s strong
argument in that regard, coupled with his colorable claim that his counsel
was ineffective by not advising him that his right to a speedy trial had
potentially been violated before he entered the guilty plea agreement,
prevent a just and fair reason to grant Sunseri's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of conviction, reverse the

district court's denial of Sunseri’s motion te withdraw his guilty plea, and

 

2While the State argues Sunseri's former counsel did not have to
inform Sunseri that his speedy trial right may have been violated because
this court had yet to issue its opinion in State v. Inzunza, 135 Nev. 513, 454
P.3d 727 (2019), as the United States Supreme Court had already laid out,
the test for determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial had
been violated and numerous other jurisdictions had applied that test, the
State's argument lacks merit.

 

 
remand this matter. Additionally, because the district court denied
Sunseri’s motion to dismiss the charges on the ground that he had waived
his right to a speedy trial in his guilty plea, and because the guilty plea has
now been withdrawn, we direct the district court to reconsider that motion

on remand.

 

 

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