Title: Jack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los Angeles

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Jack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los Angeles1995 WY 125899 P.2d 891Case Number: 94-230Decided: 08/04/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Charles 
A. JACK and Victory M. Jack, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

ENTERPRISE 
RENT-A-CAR CO. OF LOS ANGELES; and Donald Pfister,

 Appellees (Defendants).

James 
A. Raymond of Brown & Raymond, P.C., Casper, for 
appellants.

Peter 
S. Dusbabek of Montgomery, Green, Jarvis, Kolodny & Markusson, P.C., Fort 
Collins, CO, for appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants 
Charles Jack and Victory Jack appeal from the district court's order which 
granted a summary judgment in favor of Appellee Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los 
Angeles and which dismissed the claims against Appellee Donald Pfister for lack 
of personal jurisdiction.

[¶2]  We affirm.

Issues

[¶3]      The Jacks present 
the following issues for our review:

Was 
summary judgment properly entered in favor of Appellee Enterprise Rent-A-Car 
Company of Los Angeles?

A. 
Should Wyoming recognize automobiles as dangerous instrumentalities for which 
commercial owners bear liability when the automobile is negligently driven 
and/or should other public policy issues require similar liability?

B. 
Does the California statute imposing a statutory liability upon automobile 
owners for damages caused by their automobiles apply to an accident in 
Wyoming?

Facts

[¶4]      The facts in this 
case are not disputed. On October 6, 1993, Rungsak Intarab rented a vehicle from 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car in Los Angeles, California, through its agent, Donald 
Pfister. The rental agreement prohibited operation of the vehicle outside the 
State of California and also prohibited anyone other than Intarab from driving 
the vehicle.

[¶5]      Intarab took the 
rented vehicle out of California and allowed Surachate Promkiree to drive it. 
While Promkiree was driving the vehicle in Johnson County, Wyoming, on October 
8, 1993, the car crossed over from its lane of traffic and collided head on with 
the automobile driven by Charles Jack. Victory Jack was a passenger in the Jack 
vehicle. Intarab was killed in the accident, and the Jacks were injured. The 
policeman who investigated the accident reported that it had been snowing, that 
the bridge was icy, and that Promkiree had been driving too fast for the 
conditions.

[¶6]      The Jacks filed a 
complaint and thereafter an amended complaint in which they alleged, among other 
things, that Promkiree was negligent in operating the vehicle; that Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car was liable for Promkiree's negligent acts or omissions; that the 
automobile was a dangerous instrumentality; that Enterprise Rent-A-Car, as the 
owner of the vehicle, was liable for the injuries caused by the negligent 
operation of the vehicle; and that Enterprise Rent-A-Car negligently entrusted 
its vehicle to Intarab or Promkiree.

[¶7]      Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car moved to dismiss the Jacks' claims. The district court treated 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car's motion as being one for a summary judgment and granted 
it. Pfister filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which 
the district court also granted.1 This appeal followed.

Standard 
of Review

[¶8]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Makinen v. 
PM P.C., 893 P.2d 1149, 1153 (Wyo. 1995); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine 
the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may 
fairly be drawn from the record. Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 130 (Wyo. 
1995). We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same 
standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower 
court. Id.

[¶9]      No genuine issues 
as to any material fact were presented in this case; therefore, we must 
determine whether Enterprise Rent-A-Car was entitled to have a judgment as a 
matter of law. Christensen v. Oedekoven, 888 P.2d 228, 229 (Wyo. 
1995).

Discussion

[¶10]   The Jacks contend that Wyoming 
should recognize automobiles as being dangerous instrumentalities and hold 
commercial owners/renters liable when their vehicles are negligently operated. 
The Jacks claim that public policy considerations support their contention. 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car argues that Wyoming should not adopt the dangerous 
instrumentality theory in the context of automobile liability. We agree with 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car.

[¶11]   We have previously considered the 
issue of whether an automobile should be viewed as being a dangerous 
instrumentality so as to make the owner vicariously liable for its negligent 
operation.

"When 
the automobile was new and strange, and was regarded with some wonder and 
considerable fear, there was a tendency to look upon it as a dangerous thing, 
fraught with such possibility for harm that the owner should always be held 
responsible for its use. When it commenced to take the place of the family 
horse, this view had to be abandoned. The notion, however, of general liability 
on the part of the owner for use of his car having been planted in the mind, it 
lingered there like a superstition. Courts were reluctant to ignore it, and as a 
result, an adaptation of the law of master and servant, and principal and agent, 
was resorted to, to explain the liability."

Sare 
v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55, 63-64, 214 P.2d 486 (1950) (quoting Watkins v. Clark, 103 
Kan. 629, 176 P. 131, 131 (1918)). We also stated:

"An 
automobile is not so dangerous an agency as to make the owner liable for 
injuries caused by it to travelers on the highway, regardless of the agency of 
the driver. The owner of an automobile who merely permits another to use it for 
his own purposes is not liable for the negligence of the borrower in the use of 
the machine."

67 
Wyo. at 64, 214 P.2d 486 (quoting Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, 123 N.E. 30, 31 
(1919) (citations omitted)).

[¶12]   We considered the dangerous 
instrumentality argument again in Wyrulec Company v. Schutt, 866 P.2d 756 (Wyo. 
1993). In that case, we stated that a party who brings a dangerous 
instrumentality claim must still prove that the defendant was negligent. 866 P.2d  at 761. In rejecting the notion that absolute liability should be imposed, 
we said:

[T]he 
standard of care is ordinary care under all of the circumstances.

This 
is the standard of care regardless of whether a dangerous instrumentality is 
involved.

866 P.2d  at 762 (emphasis in original). What constitutes ordinary care, however, 
increases as the danger increases. Id.

[¶13]   An automobile is not a dangerous 
instrumentality, and, unless the automobile's owner is negligent, we refuse to 
hold the owner vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the people who have 
been permitted to drive the vehicle. If public policy considerations support 
imposing responsibility on the automobile's owner for the carelessness of the 
persons who have been permitted to use the vehicle in pursuing their own 
affairs, "it is properly for the Legislature to determine that policy, and not 
for the courts to do so." Sare, 67 Wyo. at 72, 214 P.2d 486. See also Finch v. 
Canaday, 75 Wyo. 472, 491, 297 P.2d 594 (1956).

[¶14]   Since we have concluded that an 
automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality, we must now ascertain whether the 
Jacks can establish a prima facie case of negligence against Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car. See Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 202 (Wyo. 1990). The recognized 
elements in a claimant's prima facie case of negligence are: (1) a duty of 
reasonable care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate causation, and (4) 
damages. Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533, 541 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶15]   In these types of situations, we 
have historically applied the law of negligent entrustment as articulated in the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.

"1. 
`One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of 
another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of 
his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving 
unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier 
should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability 
for physical harm resulting to them.' (Rest.Torts 2d, § 390.)"

Moore 
v. Kiljander, 604 P.2d 204, 206 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶16]   In Wyoming, to maintain a claim for 
negligent entrustment, factual evidence must exist which proves that the 
entruster knew, or should have known, of the user's incompetence to operate a 
vehicle. Id.; Finch, 75 Wyo. at 486, 297 P.2d 594. No such evidence exists here. 
The driver in the case at bar was not the person to whom Enterprise Rent-A-Car 
entrusted its vehicle. It is undisputed that it was Intarab who entrusted the 
vehicle to Promkiree. Enterprise Rent-A-Car had no reason to believe that 
Intarab was incapable of operating the vehicle safely, nor did Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car have any reason to believe that anyone other than Intarab would be 
driving the car. Indeed, if anyone was negligent in entrusting the vehicle to 
another, it was Intarab - not Enterprise Rent-A-Car. Because Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car did not owe a legal duty to the Jacks, a prima facie case of 
negligence could not be made. Brooks, 792 P.2d  at 201. The trial court 
appropriately granted a summary judgment in favor of Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car.

[¶17]   The Jacks ask us to apply a 
California statute to this accident which imposes statutory liability upon 
automobile owners for damages caused by their automobiles. Enterprise Rent-A-Car 
argues that the California statute has no application in Wyoming.

"It 
is thoroughly established as a general rule that the lex loci delicti, or the 
law of the place where the tort or wrong has been committed, is the law that 
governs and is to be applied with respect to the substantive phases of torts or 
the actions therefor, and determines the question of whether or not an act or 
omission gives rise to a right of action or civil liability for tort. . . 
."

Ball 
v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 37, 269 P.2d 302 (1954) (quoting 15 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws 
§ 12 at 897). See also Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979). 

[¶18]   The accident occurred in Wyoming. 
In addition, the Jacks resided in Wyoming, the negligent operation of the 
vehicle occurred in Wyoming, and the damages were sustained in Wyoming. Wyoming 
law, therefore, was the governing substantive law which applied to this 
situation. The district court properly applied Wyoming law in this 
case.

Conclusion

[¶19]   We hold that the district court did 
not err when it granted a summary judgment in favor of Enterprise 
Rent-A-Car.

[¶20]  Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 
The Jacks do not contend that the district court erred when it granted Pfister's 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.