Title: Lancelot Uriley Armstrong v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
__________________________
Nos. SC01-1874 & SC02-1122
__________________________
LANCELOT URILEY ARMSTRONG,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
___________________________________
LANCELOT URILEY ARMSTRONG,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc.,
Respondent.
[October 30, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
Lancelot Uriley Armstrong appeals an order of the circuit court denying his
motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. 
Armstrong also files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction. 
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part
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and reverse in part the circuit court’s denial of postconviction relief, vacate the
death sentence, and remand for resentencing before a new jury.  We also deny the
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
BACKGROUND
Armstrong was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder of a law
enforcement officer, and armed robbery.  The facts of Armstrong’s crimes are
more fully discussed in this Court’s opinion in Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730
(Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1085 (1995).  Briefly, they are as follows. 
Around two o’clock in the morning of February 17, 1990, Armstrong and another
man, Michael Coleman, arrived at a Church’s Fried Chicken restaurant of which
Armstrong’s former girlfriend, Kay Allen, was the assistant manager.  Coleman and
Armstrong ordered Allen to get the restaurant’s money from the safe.  Before doing
so, she managed to activate the silent alarm.  Shortly thereafter, Armstrong returned
to his car while Coleman remained inside with Allen to collect the money.  Due to
the alarm, Deputy Sheriffs Robert Sallustio and John Greeney were dispatched to
the restaurant, where they found Armstrong sitting in his vehicle.  While Greeney
was performing a “pat down” of Armstrong, shots were fired from the restaurant. 
Armstrong then retrieved his gun from the vehicle and fired at the officers.  Deputy
Sallustio was shot three times but survived.  Deputy Greeney died instantly from
1.  See Armstrong, 642 So. 2d at 734 n.2 (listing direct appeal claims).
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close-range gunshot wounds.
The jury convicted Armstrong of the first-degree murder of Deputy Greeney,
attempted murder of Deputy Sallustio, and robbery.  The jury also recommended
death by a nine-to-three vote.  The trial court found no statutory mitigating
circumstances and four aggravating circumstances:  (1) Armstrong had a prior
conviction for a violent felony; (2) the murder was committed while Armstrong was
engaged in the commission of a robbery or flight therefrom; (3) the murder was
committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest or effecting an escape from custody;
and (4) Armstrong murdered a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance
of his official duties.  The trial court sentenced Armstrong to death for the murder
conviction and to life imprisonment for the attempted murder of a law enforcement
officer and armed robbery convictions.
On direct appeal, Armstrong raised twenty-four issues.1  This Court affirmed
the convictions and sentences, finding error in the improper doubling of two
aggravating circumstances—committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest and
murder of a law enforcement officer—but concluded that the improper doubling
was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 738-40.
On April 24, 2000, Armstrong filed an amended motion for postconviction
2.  Armstrong’s claims in that motion were as follows:  (1) he lacked funding
for effective representation; (2) he was denied access to public records; (3) there
was a lack of adversarial testing due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
withholding of exculpatory or impeachment material, newly discovered evidence,
and improper trial court rulings; (4) newly discovered evidence existed; (5) his trial
counsel was ineffective during voir dire; (6) he had an Ake claim regarding mental
health; (7) there was cumulative error; (8) he had ineffective assistance of trial
counsel regarding mitigation; (9) he was innocent of first-degree murder; (10) he
was innocent of the death penalty; (11) he was absent from a critical stage of the
trial; (12) there was improper burden-shifting in the penalty-phase jury instructions;
(13) an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor of avoiding or preventing lawful
arrest was considered; (14) an inaccurate, vague, and overly broad instruction was
given on the aggravating factor of murder during the commission of a felony; (15)
nonstatutory aggravating factors were introduced; (16) the jury was misled
regarding a sense of sentencing responsibility; (17) his rights were denied by the
rule prohibiting lawyers from interviewing jurors; (18) Florida’s death penalty
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (19) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme
is arbitrary and capricious; (20) there was prejudicial pretrial publicity and a failure
to change venue; (21) inadmissible victim impact evidence was considered; (22) the
trial court refused to find or consider mitigating circumstances; (23) there were
record omissions that denied him a proper direct appeal; (24) inadequate harmless
error analysis was utilized on direct appeal; (25) an invalid prior conviction was
used; (26) there was a lack of testing of scientific evidence under Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (DC. Cir. 1923); (27) the jury was misled regarding the
instruction that a majority vote was required to recommend life or death; (28) his
sentence was predicated upon an automatic aggravating circumstance; (29) jurors
were stricken on an impermissible basis; (30) there was a systematic exclusion of
eligible prospective jurors by the use of peremptory challenges in violation of
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); (31) a sufficient level of intent and
participation to warrant imposition of the death penalty did not exist; (32) he is
incompetent to be executed; (33) the conviction and sentence were illegally
imposed in violation of international law; and (34) he received inadequate notice of
a crime due to charges of both premeditated and felony murder.
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relief, raising thirty-four claims.2  The circuit court below (postconviction court)
3.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993).
4.  Those claims are:  (1) Armstrong’s sentence was based on a since-
vacated prior felony conviction; (2) trial counsel was ineffective in investigating and
presenting mitigation; (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance regarding (a)
the failure to challenge in-court identification, (b) the failure to invoke the rule of
sequestration, (c) the failure to request a Frye hearing, (d) the failure to adequately
challenge the qualifications of State witnesses, (e) the failure to object to improper
bolstering of State witnesses, (f) the failure to object to opinion testimony from
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held a Huff3 hearing, thereafter summarily denied most of Armstrong’s claims, and
scheduled a limited evidentiary hearing on two claims:  (1) his death sentence was
predicated upon a since-vacated prior felony conviction; and (2) ineffective
assistance of trial counsel was rendered with regard to the investigation and
presentation of mitigating evidence for the penalty phase.  See State v. Armstrong,
No. 90-5417CF10B (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. order filed Jan. 2, 2001) (prehearing order). 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court entered a final order
denying all relief.  See State v. Armstrong, No. 90-5417CF10B (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct.
order filed May 25, 2001) (posthearing order).  Armstrong now appeals the
postconviction court’s denial of his rule 3.850 motion.  He also petitions this Court
for a writ of habeas corpus.
RULE 3.850 APPEAL
In this appeal, Armstrong asserts the postconviction court erred in denying
postconviction relief on the basis of numerous claims.4  We will first address those
unqualified witnesses, and (g) jury selection; (4) there was a lack of specific intent
to kill, thus rendering the death penalty inappropriate; (5) exculpatory or
impeachment material was withheld; (6) there was newly discovered evidence
relevant to both guilt and penalty phases; (7) his public records requests were
denied; (8) he was innocent of first-degree murder and the death penalty; (9)
unconstitutional jury instructions were used in the penalty phase; (10) nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances were improperly introduced; (11) he was absent from
critical stages of the trial; (12) his conviction and sentence were illegally imposed in
violation of international law; (13) Florida’s death penalty constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment; (14) his rights were denied by the rule prohibiting lawyers from
interviewing jurors; (15) he is incompetent to be executed; and (16) cumulative error
exists.
5.  Those issues are claims (3)(a)-(g), (5), and (11).
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issues relating solely to the guilt phase of Armstrong’s trial5 and then turn to
Armstrong’s first issue, alleging entitlement to postconviction relief on the basis of
the invalidation of a prior felony conviction that was introduced at his penalty-phase
hearing, which we find dispositive of all remaining penalty-phase issues.
Guilt Phase
Armstrong raises three claims relating solely to the guilt phase of his trial, the
first of which involves seven subclaims.
In his first guilt-phase claim, Armstrong asserts that the postconviction court
erred in summarily denying his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
regarding seven aspects of his trial.  Under the standard announced in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), to prevail on a claim that counsel provided
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constitutionally ineffective assistance, a defendant must demonstrate specific acts
or omissions of counsel that are “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Second, the
defendant must demonstrate prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 694.  A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  This Court’s
standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on an ineffective assistance claim also is
two-pronged:  (1) appellate courts must defer to trial courts’ findings on factual
issues but (2) must review de novo ultimate conclusions on the performance and
prejudice prongs.  Bruno v. State, 807 So. 2d 55, 61-62 (Fla. 2001).
In his first ineffective assistance subclaim, Armstrong asserts his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to unreliable identification
testimony by witness Bobby Norton.  The postconviction court summarily denied
this claim on the following basis:
The defense developed a consistent theme that witness identification
may have been influenced by photographs of Defendant displayed on
television and in the newspapers.  This theme was also brought out on
cross examination of Bobby Norton.  However, this Court finds the
record reflects that there is no reasonable probability that Norton’s
identification of the Defendant would have been suppressed had a
motion been filed.
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Norton was one of five eyewitnesses identifying the Defendant
as having been present at Church’s Fried Chicken.  Norton witnessed
the Defendant talking with the night manager . . . Kay Allen.  Although
Norton was initially unsure whether he could identify the Defendant,
Norton was able to pick the Defendant out of a photo lineup shortly
after the murder.  Norton subsequently made an in-court identification
of the Defendant.  The jury was well aware of Norton’s initial
uncertainty.  All relevant facts necessary to assess the credibility of
Norton were presented.  Using the [Strickland] standard . . . this Court
finds that the outcome of the case would not have been different had
[Armstrong’s counsel] objected to the identification made of the
Defendant by Norton.  This claim is without merit.
Prehearing order at 4-5.  We find no error in this conclusion.  Given that Norton’s
identification was tested on cross-examination, four other eyewitnesses placed
Armstrong at the scene, and Armstrong conceded in closing argument that he was
present, Armstrong failed to sufficiently allege prejudice under Strickland.
In his second subclaim, Armstrong asserts that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to invoke the Rule of Sequestration until after some
State witnesses had already testified.  The postconviction court summarily denied
this claim, concluding that it was legally insufficient as pled.  We find no error in
this conclusion, as Armstrong made the mere conclusory allegation that prejudice
resulted from the witnesses’ opportunity to listen to each other’s testimony without
any degree of specificity as to what facts were testified to prior to invocation of the
rule and without any allegation that certain witnesses’ testimonies differed, after
6.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923).  Under Florida law, a
Frye hearing is utilized in order to determine if expert scientific opinion is
admissible.  See Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 1993).  Such opinion
must be based on techniques that have been "general[ly] accept[ed]" by the relevant
community and found to be reliable.  Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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hearing other witnesses testify, from their prior statements or depositions.  See
Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000) (“The defendant bears the
burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim.  Mere
conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden.”).
In his third and fourth subclaims, Armstrong asserts that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a Frye6 hearing regarding DNA
evidence presented through the testimony of George Duncan, a DNA serologist
with the Broward Sheriff’s Office, and Dr. Martin Tracey, a forensic expert court-
appointed to Armstrong’s case, and by failing to adequately challenge those
witnesses’ qualifications as DNA experts.  At Armstrong’s trial, Duncan and
Tracey’s consistent findings were that blood taken from the front seat of
Armstrong’s car matched the murder victim’s blood.  In summarily denying
Armstrong’s claims of ineffective assistance regarding DNA testimony, the
postconviction court stated:
This claim is conclusively rebutted by the record.  A forensic
expert was authorized by the court.  [Armstrong’s counsel] asked for
a proffer of the State’s DNA evidence and an objection was renewed
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prior to Dr. Tracey’s testimony.  Dr. Tracey satisfied the Frye test. 
He testified that DNA testing has been accepted in the scientific
community since the mid-seventies. 
George Duncan, the DNA serologist with the Broward Sheriff’s
Office, testified that he had previously testified as an expert in DNA
extraction, but never in DNA profiling.  Over [Armstrong’s counsel’s]
objection, the Court qualified Duncan as an expert in DNA profiling. 
The only blood sample of value was removed from the front seat of
the Defendant’s car.  Duncan found that the sample matched the
blood of the deceased victim, Deputy Greeney.  This Court finds that
the requirements of Frye were met.  This Court further agrees with the
State that “any refinements or additions to the Frye analysis” which
have evolved since the trial, sub judice, cannot be applied in evaluating
the effectiveness of trial counsel’s performance.  [Armstrong’s
counsel] handled those issues concerning scientific evidence with
“such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial
testing process.”
Prehearing order at 5-6 (citations omitted).  Noting that the DNA evidence was
offered solely to show that Greeney’s blood was found in Armstrong’s vehicle, the
postconviction court further concluded that there was no reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the DNA evidence been
excluded, because the DNA evidence was cumulative.
We agree with the postconviction court that Armstrong failed to sufficiently
allege prejudice.  The only relevancy of the DNA evidence was the proximity of
Greeney to Armstrong and Armstrong’s vehicle when Greeney was shot.  The
record supports the court’s conclusion that, absent Duncan and Tracey’s DNA
testimony, ample other evidence established that Greeney was standing next to
7.  We further note the error in Armstrong’s assertion that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge more specific elements of
DNA testing, such as autoradiograms and population substructuring, through a
Frye hearing.  This trial occurred in 1991, six years prior to this Court’s
clarification of the Frye test in Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997), that each
stage of the DNA process, i.e., the methodology for determining DNA profiles, as
well as the statistical calculations used to report the test results, are subject to the
Frye test.  Armstrong’s trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for not demanding
the satisfaction of a more complex test than was required by the law at the time of
trial.
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Armstrong when he was fatally shot:  testimony indicated that Greeney was
conducting a “pat down” on Armstrong when the first shots were fired; and
ballistics evidence indicated Greeney was shot from close range.  See Armstrong,
642 So. 2d at 733.  We therefore find no error in the summary denial of these
claims.7
In his fifth and sixth subclaims, Armstrong asserts that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to improper bolstering of the
State witnesses’ credibility and by failing to object to the opinion testimony of State
witness Detective Kammerer regarding the “Coomassie blue” method of detecting
latent fingerprints.  The State, however, correctly notes that these issues were
presented and argued in Armstrong’s postconviction motion as “judicial error”
rather than ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  For that reason, we agree with the
postconviction court that these claims were procedurally barred as they could have
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been raised on direct appeal as trial error.  This Court will only review those claims
actually presented to the court below and thus will not consider the modified
versions of these claims under ineffective assistance analysis.
In his final subclaim, Armstrong asserts his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance during jury selection by failing to ensure that a reader was present to
assist Armstrong, who has dyslexia, and by failing to adequately question or strike
juror Deborah Baker.  We agree with the postconviction court that Armstrong’s
claim regarding a reader at voir dire was legally insufficient as pled and factually
rebutted by the record.  Armstrong failed to explain how a reader would have aided
in his ability to consult with his attorney during voir dire.  The record also indicates
that Armstrong conferred with his counsel on several occasions during voir dire. 
We also find that Armstrong’s claim regarding juror Baker is clearly refuted by the
record.  Armstrong alleged that the prosecutor’s questioning of juror Baker
indicated an apparent familiarity with her.  However, the voir dire record reveals that
the prosecutor did not indicate he knew juror Baker but, rather, that he
presupposed what her answers to certain questions would be since he was
employing a questioning method designed to condition the jury to follow the
requirements of the law rather than to reveal facts of the jurors’s lives.  The
prosecutor engaged in similar questioning of other jurors.  Armstrong’s contention
8.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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that additional questioning of Baker “likely” would have revealed a bias is merely a
conclusory allegation that is refuted by the record, which indicates Baker, together
with the majority of the panel, answered “no” when asked whether anyone knew the
prosecutor.
We therefore find no merit to Armstrong’s first guilt-phase claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
In his second guilt-phase claim, Armstrong asserts that the postconviction
court erred in summarily denying his claim of a Brady8 violation, in which he
asserted that the State had or knew of material exculpatory evidence, in the form of
two statements by Officer Ronnie Noriega taken as part of an internal affairs
investigation, and failed to provide that evidence to Armstrong.  The
postconviction court held as follows with regard to this Brady issue:
The alleged exculpatory evidence in this case are statements of Officer
Ronnie Noriega, an alleged eyewitness to the crime.  As a result of the
public records productions, the Defendant received internal affairs
records from the Plantation Police Department, Noriega’s employer at
the time of the crime in issue.  These records contained statements by
Noriega as to where he was at the time of the shooting at Church’s
Fried Chicken.
The Defendant contends that Noriega’s statements which were
given to internal affairs are substantially different from those Noriega
gave at trial.  The Defendant asserts that the statements given to
internal affairs support and corroborate co-defendant Coleman’s
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alleged confession that he (Coleman) shot Deputy Greeney from the
restaurant door.
This Court finds that there was no Brady violation.  The State
did not withhold information regarding Noriega who was listed by the
state as a witness and who was deposed by defense counsel.  As with
the State, the Defendant had equal access to Noreiga.  Further, this
Court finds that Noriega’s statements given to internal affairs do not
inculpate Coleman nor do the statements contradict the State’s theory.
Prehearing order at 7-8.
We find Armstrong’s Brady claim conclusively refuted by the record. 
Armstrong asserts that he was prejudiced by the fact that he did not receive copies
of Noriega’s two investigation statements.  Importantly, Armstrong bases his
prejudice argument on the differences between Noriega’s version of events, as told
in his investigation statements, and the State’s trial theory, rather than any alleged
materiality of the fact that an internal affairs investigation was conducted.  However,
the content of those statements does not materially differ from Noriega’s
deposition testimony, which was given in the presence of Armstrong’s counsel.  In
both his investigation statements and his deposition, Noriega gave the following
statement of events:  he was driving near the Church’s Fried Chicken restaurant
when he heard shots; he then noticed two black men standing next to a car in front
of Church’s; he looked in another direction and then heard additional shots, which
caused him to duck and put on his brakes quickly to prevent an accident; and after
9.  A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
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his car came to a stop, he again looked toward Church’s and no longer saw the
two men or their car but did see officers arrive on the scene and run to and then
kneel at a place where he assumed a man was down.  Because Armstrong’s
counsel was present at Noriega’s deposition, Armstrong was in fact in possession
of the same information he would have had if he had received the actual transcripts
of Noreiga’s investigation statements.  Therefore, Armstrong has failed to satisfy
the Brady test as he has not shown a reasonable probability9 that the outcome of
the proceedings would have been different had he been in possession of the internal
affairs investigation statements by Noriega.
In his third and final guilt-phase claim, Armstrong asserts that the
postconviction court erred in summarily denying his claim that because a reader did
not assist him during voir dire, Armstrong was rendered effectively absent during a
critical stage of the proceedings.  As we have already discussed, Armstrong’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this point was correctly denied. 
However, Armstrong also asserts that fundamental error resulted.  We conclude
that the postconviction court correctly found this claim procedurally barred.  This
claim could have been raised on direct appeal.
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Finding no error in the postconviction court’s summary denial of
Armstrong’s claims relating solely to the guilt phase, we affirm the denial of his
motion for postconviction relief as that denial relates to all guilt-phase issues.
Penalty Phase
Regarding the penalty phase of Armstrong’s trial, we find that his first issue,
alleging entitlement to postconviction relief on the basis of the invalidation of a prior
felony conviction that was introduced at his penalty phase, necessitates
resentencing before a new jury and thus renders moot all remaining penalty-phase
issues.
At Armstrong’s penalty phase, the State presented two witnesses to testify
regarding Armstrong’s 1985 Massachusetts conviction of indecent assault and
battery on a child of the age of fourteen.  A records custodian for the
Massachusetts district court in which the conviction was obtained testified that the
offense was a felony and provided a certified copy of the conviction and sentence. 
The State then called the victim of that crime, who was fourteen at the time of the
crime and twenty at the time of Armstrong’s trial.  She testified that she met
Armstrong in Massachusetts, where they both lived at the time, through a close
family friend, Angela, to whom Armstrong was married.  Regarding the events of
the crime, she gave the following testimony:
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Q.  What happened on January 12th, do you remember
what—’85—do you remember what day of the week that was?
A.  It was a Saturday.
Q.  Okay.  What happened?  Tell us what happened.
A.  Angela had asked us to come over to her house . . . .
. . . .
A.  And we went over to her house Saturday night and I had to
go to church for A.J.S., church program and Angela and Lance was to
take us, but he didn’t want her to go because she was sick because
she was pregnant.  So he said he will take me.
. . . .
A.  He said he would take me.  So as we was driving to the
church, he asked if I minded if he stopped somewhere so we could
talk.  So I told him fine.  You know, I figured he’d pull off the side of
the road or something.  But he drove to some park.  A park I have
never seen before.
. . . .
A.  We went to the park.   He pulled up in the parking space
and we were sitting there and he was talking.  I don’t know what—it
was so long.  I don’t know what we were talking about.  He asked me
to get over into the driver’s seat.  So I got over into the driver’s seat
and was playing with the wheel like I was driving.
Q.  Had you ever driven a car before?
A.  No. I was just playing around with the wheel and he just
took me by my shoulder and laid me down on the seat and got on top
of me and he started moving up and down on me.  I was just lying
there.  I was telling him to stop.
. . . .
A.  . . . And a car came and pulled up beside us and parked like
a couple of parking spaces beside us and he kept his head low and I
told him to get off me.  He told me not to make any noises because he
didn’t want them to know we were there.  And they left after a couple
of minutes and then he just got up off of me and reached into the
glove compartment and took out some tissue and started wiping
himself.  I saw this white stuff all over his hand.
Q.  Did you ever see anything like that, that white stuff before?
A.  No.
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Q.  Okay.
A.  And then he started, tried to lift up my dress.  I said what
you doing.  He said I want to make sure you are okay.  I just told him
leave me alone and I wanted to go home.
Q.  Okay.
A.  And then we drove.  He drove back to his apartment.
. . . .
Q.  Okay.  What happened when you got back in the
apartment?
A.   . . . So I went and sat on the couch and turned on the TV
and started to study my homework.
. . . .
Q.  So what happens?  You’re sitting in the living room.  What
happens?
A.  Then Lance comes in and he sits on the couch across from
where I was sitting and he just was asking me about what I was
studying, what I was doing.  And then he came over to where I was
sitting on the couch and I just sat there looking at the TV and then he
just grabbed me by my shoulders and pushed me down on the couch
and got on top of me and I was about to scream and he told me not to
scream.  He said you better not scream because Angela’s in the other
room and you don’t want to wake her up because you know she’s
sick.  And I just stayed there not knowing what to do because I was
scared because I figured she probably would be upset and if I made
any noises—
Q.  What were you doing while he was on top of you?
A.  I was trying to push him off of me and, you know, trying to
make some kind of noise but he just kept telling me stop.  Don’t make
any noises.  Don’t make any noises because she would get upset. 
Then he just lifted up my night gown and he put his penis in my
vagina.
He pushed my panties over the side and put his penis in my
vagina and I wanted to—started to scream a little and he just stopped
and he just laid on top of me and I was—what is he doing and he got
up and went over to her room and I ran into the bathroom and locked
the door and then he came knocking on the door and I wouldn’t leave
and then after a while when I thought he was gone, I went into her,
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Angela’s, room and I just went to sleep on the floor.
The victim’s testimony then continued regarding how she was upset by these
events and eventually told her grandmother what had happened.
In closing penalty-phase arguments, the State urged the jury to find the
aggravating circumstance that Armstrong had “previously been convicted of a
violent felony” on the basis of Armstrong’s two contemporaneous convictions of
attempted murder and robbery and this prior Massachusetts conviction.  The jury
recommended a death sentence, and the trial court based its finding of that
aggravating circumstance, in part, on the Massachusetts conviction.
After Armstrong’s direct appeal to this Court, he filed a motion for new trial
with the Massachusetts court regarding his 1985 conviction.  In 1999, that court
vacated Armstrong’s conviction of indecent assault and battery on a child of the
age of fourteen, finding it constitutionally invalid.  Therefore, Armstrong asserted in
his subsequent 3.850 motion for postconviction relief that he was entitled to a new
penalty-phase proceeding.  The postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing
on the issue but denied relief, concluding that error under Johnson v. Mississippi,
486 U.S. 578 (1988), had been shown but was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
in light of an armed robbery conviction obtained against Armstrong after his penalty
phase that would be admissible upon resentencing as evidence of another valid,
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prior violent felony conviction to be considered in lieu of the vacated conviction.
In this appeal, Armstrong asserts, on the basis of Johnson, that the
postconviction court erred in denying relief as to this issue.  We agree.  This Court
has previously discussed the Johnson decision:
In Johnson, the petitioner’s death sentence was predicated, in
part, on a previous conviction which was vacated after the trial and
direct appeal.  486 U.S. at 580.  During the sentencing phase of the
petitioner’s trial, the previous conviction was argued to the jury and
used to support Mississippi’s prior violent felony aggravating factor. 
Id. at 581.  The Supreme Court reversed the death sentence, holding
that the consideration of a subsequently vacated conviction to support
an aggravating factor violates the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 590.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reiterated its previous
holding that capital sentencing decisions cannot be based on “mere
‘caprice’ or on ‘factors that are constitutionally impermissible or
totally irrelevant to the sentencing process.’”  Id. at 585 (quoting Zant
v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983)).  The Court stated, “the error
here extended beyond the mere invalidation of an aggravating
circumstance supported by evidence that was otherwise admissible.
Here the jury was allowed to consider evidence that has been revealed
to be materially inaccurate.”  Id. 486 U.S. at 590.
Rivera v. Dugger, 629 So. 2d 105, 108 (Fla. 1993).  In Armstrong’s case, the jury
considered, in support of an aggravating factor, evidence of a conviction that has
since been revealed to be materially inaccurate as that conviction has been vacated. 
It is now clear that reliance upon that conviction to support Armstrong’s sentence
was erroneous under Johnson.  Given the nature of the crime underlying the
vacated conviction—a sexual offense upon a child—and the detailed testimony
10.  Armstrong alleges the following: (1) his appellate counsel provided
ineffective assistance regarding (a) the failure to appeal the denial of Armstrong’s
motion for change of venue, (b) the failure to appeal the improper qualification of
the State’s witnesses as experts, (c) the failure to appeal the admission of certain
photographs, (d) the failure to ensure a complete record, and (e) the failure to raise
a cumulative-error argument; (2) there was an incorrect harmless error analysis on
direct appeal regarding the improper doubling of aggravating circumstances in light
of Armstrong’s vacated prior felony conviction; (3) he was denied a proper direct
appeal due to omissions in the record; and (4) Florida’s death penalty scheme is
unconstitutional.
11.  Those issues are claims (1)(a)-(d) and (3).
-21-
given by the young victim of that crime at Armstrong’s penalty phase, we cannot
say that the consideration of Armstrong’s prior felony conviction of indecent
assault and battery on a child of the age of fourteen constituted harmless error
beyond a reasonable doubt.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Armstrong raises four claims.10 
We will address in turn each issue relating solely to the guilt phase of Armstrong’s
trial.11  All remaining claims are now moot as we have ordered resentencing before
a new jury.
In his first claim, Armstrong alleges ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel regarding four aspects of the guilt phase of his trial.  We initially note that
habeas relief on the basis of appellate counsel's ineffectiveness is limited to those
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situations where the petitioner establishes, first, that appellate counsel's
performance was deficient because the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as
to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the
range of professionally acceptable performance; and second, that the petitioner was
prejudiced because appellate counsel's deficiency compromised the appellate
process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the
result.  Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000).  If a legal issue
would in all probability have been found to be without merit had counsel raised it
on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not
render appellate counsel's performance ineffective.  Id.
In his first subclaim, Armstrong asserts that his appellate counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to raise on direct appeal the trial court’s denial of a
motion for change of venue.  We find no merit to this argument.  First, we note that
Armstrong’s motion for change of venue was prematurely filed before an attempt
to select an impartial jury.  The test for determining a change of venue is whether
the general state of mind of the inhabitants of a community is so infected by
knowledge of the incident and accompanying prejudice, bias, and preconceived
opinions that jurors could not possibly put these matters out of their minds in order
to try the case solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom.  McCaskill v.
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State, 344 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 1977).  Thus, trial courts are encouraged to
attempt to impanel a jury before ruling on a motion for change of venue because
this provides an opportunity to determine through voir dire whether individuals who
have not been seriously infected by the publicity can be found.  See Davis v. State,
461 So. 2d 67, 69 n.1 (Fla. 1984) (stating motion for change of venue should not
be ruled upon prior to jury selection because an impartial jury may be seated if
court finds credible the assurances of prospective jurors that they can set aside
extrinsic knowledge and decide the case on the evidence); Manning v. State, 378
So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. 1979) (approving procedure where ruling on defendant's
motion for change of venue is delayed until attempt has been made to select jury). 
For that same reason, a motion for change of venue should be renewed at the
conclusion of jury selection or be considered waived.  See Martin v. State, 816 So.
2d 187, 188 (Fla. 2d DCA) (“Jury selection issues are deemed waived after
acceptance of the jury, unless the objection is renewed, or the jury is accepted
subject to an earlier objection.”), review dismissed, 835 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 2002).  A
review of the record in this case indicates Armstrong did not renew his motion for
change of venue upon the selection of the jury and thus did not preserve this issue
for appellate review.  
Furthermore, the mere fact that jurors were exposed to pretrial publicity is
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not enough to raise the presumption of unfairness.  See Castro v. State, 644 So. 2d
987, 990 (Fla. 1994).  It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his or her opinion or
impression and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.  See id.;
Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 19 (Fla. 1985).  Armstrong acknowledged in his brief
to this Court that those jurors who were exposed to pretrial publicity and selected
for the jury also stated that they could set aside their pretrial knowledge and feelings
about the victims.  Therefore, we conclude that there existed insufficient grounds
for appellate counsel to successfully argue fundamental error regarding this issue. 
In the absence of preservation or fundamental error, this issue would have been
nonmeritorious on direct appeal.
In his second subclaim, Armstrong asserts that his appellate counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise on direct appeal the improper
qualification of three State witnesses as experts.  We find no merit to this claim with
regard to two of those witnesses, George Duncan and Dr. Martin Tracey, for the
same reasons we found no merit to Armstrong’s 3.850 appeal claim that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance regarding these witnesses.  As to the third
witness, Armstrong alleges that Charles Edel was unqualified to testify about
“searing” on Deputy Greeney’s clothing and that appellate counsel should have
appealed the trial court’s denial of Armstrong’s objection to the admission of his
-25-
testimony.  We disagree.  Edel was found to be a firearms operations expert after
he testified that he had fired hundreds of different styles of weapons and had been
a firearms instructor for approximately eight years, which included the testing of fire
weapons “for court presentation to show operability.”  When asked about the
mechanics of a “handgun flame,” Edel testified that a flame results from the
expulsion of the exploding gunpowder within the casing, that it can go up to twelve
inches from a handgun, and that searing results from such flames.  Although Edel
admitted that he had not attended any school specifically regarding searing, he also
testified that he did not believe there was a “searing school” or, as Armstrong’s
counsel had argued, a “field of searing” separate from the field of firearms
operation.  Given the entirety of this testimony, it appears clear that Edel was
sufficiently qualified to testify in regard to the searing on Greeney’s clothing, and
appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this nonmeritorious claim.
In his third subclaim, Armstrong asserts that his appellate counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to raise on direct appeal the admission of three
photographs of Officer Sallustio’s uniform and wounds, specifically State’s
Exhibits T, Q, and S.  However, the record reveals that, of those three exhibits,
Armstrong’s trial counsel objected only to Exhibit S, arguing that it was both
cumulative of other photographs that would “better describe the wound” and
-26-
inflammatory.  We find no merit to Armstrong’s claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel.  If this issue had been raised on direct appeal, appellate counsel
would have faced two very high standards of review:  (1) fundamental error
regarding Exhibits T and Q; and (2) abuse of discretion regarding Exhibit S.  On
the basis of this record, we do not conclude that Armstrong has demonstrated a
reasonable probability that this issue would have been found meritorious and
resulted in a reversal of his conviction.
In his fourth and final subclaim, Armstrong asserts that his appellate counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to ensure that “critically material
depositions and proceedings” were included in the record on appeal.  However,
Armstrong only specifically cites to the absence of certain strike conferences from
the record, stating that answers by some jurors to voir dire questions went
unrecorded.  The alleged error here is unclear.  If the alleged error is the failure to
ensure the recording of portions of voir dire strike conferences, then it would be
trial counsel error rather than appellate counsel error and not properly raised in this
petition.  To the extent that Armstrong is alleging that his appellate counsel was
ineffective, he would need to show not only that his appellate counsel failed to
include available transcripts in the appellate record but also that those portions of
the record that were missing were material to a potentially meritorious issue on
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direct appeal.  Armstrong has not shown the former since he has stated that the
missing portions went unrecorded, which indicates they were not available for
appellate counsel to include in the appellate record.  As for the latter, Armstrong
alleges that the incomplete record deprived him of a potentially meritorious
argument that prospective juror Coffie was struck for cause without proper
justification and on the basis of race.  Yet, the record indicates that there was a
race-neutral reason for striking Coffie, who stated in voir dire that both his brother
and his good friend had been arrested by the Broward Sheriff’s Office and that he
himself had been harassed in his neighborhood by Broward Sheriff’s officers three
or four times.  The victims of Armstrong’s crimes were Broward Sheriff’s officers. 
Thus, the allegedly incomplete record did not deprive Armstrong of a potentially
meritorious argument.
We therefore find no merit to Armstrong’s first habeas claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.
A second habeas claim that relates solely to the guilt phase of Armstrong’s
trial is closely related to his last ineffective assistance of appellate counsel subclaim. 
Citing Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357 (1993), Armstrong asserts that full appellate
review of capital cases must be done on the basis of a complete record.  As well,
citing section 921.141(4), Florida Statutes (1985), Armstrong notes that Florida law
-28-
requires review of capital cases by this Court “of the entire record.”  He therefore
alleges that he was denied a proper direct appeal due to record omissions and,
citing Delap v. State, 350 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1977), claims entitlement to habeas relief. 
However, Armstrong does not allege that this or any other court refused, in
violation of its duty, to examine any portion of the record.  And, with the exception
of voir dire strike conferences, he has failed to specifically allege what “critical
depositions and proceedings” were absent from the record or, in the absence of
knowing specifics about unrecorded events, how he is even aware that such events
went unrecorded.  Bare allegations of unrecorded depositions and proceedings are
legally insufficient to entitle him to relief.  As for the voir dire strike conferences,
Armstrong has failed to link a meritorious appellate issue to the allegedly missing
record and thus cannot establish that he was prejudiced by its absence. 
Furthermore, while this Court did require a new trial on the basis of missing record
in Delap, the record that was missing in Delap was far more significant than that
allegedly missing here.  See id. at 463 (record missing transcript of the jury charge
conferences, charge to the jury in both the trial and penalty phases, voir dire of the
jury, and closing arguments of counsel in both the trial and penalty phases). 
Therefore, Delap is inapplicable to the present case.
Having found no merit to Armstrong’s habeas claims that relate solely to the
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guilt phase of his trial and having ordered resentencing on the basis of a 3.850
appeal issue, thereby rendering penalty-phase issues moot, we deny the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.
CONCLUSION
We hold that Armstrong is entitled to postconviction relief on the basis of his
first claim.  Accordingly, we affirm as to all issues relating solely to the guilt phase
of Armstrong’s trial but vacate the death sentence and remand for resentencing
before a new jury on the first-degree murder conviction.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs with an opinion, in which CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J.,
concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., concurring.
I concur fully with the decision in this case.  I write only to point out that I
believe that the use of term “error” in the admission of the prior conviction is not
accurate in the sense that it connotes error by the trial judge in admitting the prior
conviction and testimony in respect to it at the time that it was admitted.  The trial
-30-
judge did not err in that admission.  I believe a more accurate analysis is that the
vacation of the prior conviction has now caused us to conclude that our confidence
in the death sentence in this case has been sufficiently undermined that a new
penalty phase is required as a matter of law.  I join this conclusion because of the
extensive testimony admitted during the penalty-phase trial concerning the facts
underlying the vacated prior conviction.  However, I expressly state my view that
not every post-trial reversal of a conviction which is part of an aggravating
circumstance is prejudicial.  Prejudice in this type of situation requires a case-by-
case analysis, as recognized by this Court in the cases which have found the
postconviction vacation of a conviction to be harmless error.
CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., specially concurring.
I concur in the majority decision.  However, in light of the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003), I feel
compelled to write separately to note my concerns with Armstrong's separate claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to adequately investigate mitigation to
be presented in the penalty phase.  The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed the importance of thorough investigation by defense counsel into
12.  Likewise, this Court has recognized the importance of trial counsel's
investigation into mitigating factors and has not hesitated to reverse sentences
where such investigations have been deemed deficient and prejudice has resulted. 
See, e.g., Ragsdale v. State, 798 So. 2d 713, 720 (Fla. 2001); Rose v. State, 675
So. 2d 567, 570-74 (Fla. 1996); Stevens v. State, 552 So. 2d 1082, 1085-87 (Fla.
1989).
-31-
mitigating factors to be presented in the penalty phase of capital cases.  See, e.g.,
id. at 2537; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394-99 (2000); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984).12  Wiggins contains a detailed
explanation of how the standard established for evaluating the performance of
counsel set out in the landmark decision in Strickland should be interpreted and
applied.
In Wiggins, the Court stressed that defense counsel's investigations "should
comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and
evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the
prosecutor."  Id. at 2537 (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1(C), at 93 (1989) (hereinafter
1989 ABA Guidelines)).  Referring to ABA Guidelines, the Court noted that among
those topics that should be considered for presentation are "medical history,
educational history, employment and training history, family and social history,
prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural
-32-
influences."  Id. (citing 1989 ABA Guidelines 11.8.6, at 133).  In concluding that
defense counsel's investigation was unreasonably deficient, the Court relied heavily
on the ABA standards for capital defense, noting that such standards had long been
referred to as "guides to determining what is reasonable."  Id. (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688).
In Wiggins, collateral counsel's investigation discovered a wealth of
mitigation that trial counsel had not presented or investigated.  Id. at 2533.  The
mitigation included in Wiggins' "bleak life history" indicated that he had suffered
severe physical and sexual abuse from multiple individuals growing up.  Id. 
Additionally, his mother was a chronic alcoholic who frequently left him and his
siblings at home alone for days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips
and garbage.  Id.  Further, despite the fact that funds were available for retaining a
forensic social worker in order to prepare a detailed social history, Wiggins' trial
attorneys had not done so.  Id.  In collateral proceedings, Wiggins' trial counsel
defended the lack of investigation or presentation of mitigating evidence, in effect
arguing that these decisions were a matter of strategy and that trial counsel "decided
to focus their efforts on 'retry[ing] the factual case' and disputing Wiggins' direct
responsibility for the murder."  Id.  However, after reflecting on the standards that
should guide counsel's actions in investigating mitigation, the Supreme Court
-33-
concluded that Wiggins' defense team, who had presented none of the extensive
mitigation that existed in the case during the penalty phase of the trial, had not
performed the level of investigation that would allow them to make a reasonably
informed decision not to present such mitigation.  Id.   
Determining that the decision not to pursue mitigation was made based on a
prematurely truncated investigation, the Court stated:
In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's investigation,
however, a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence
already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would
lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.  Even assuming
[Wiggins' trial counsel] limited the scope of their investigation for
strategic reasons, Strickland does not establish that a cursory
investigation automatically justifies a tactical decision with respect to
sentencing strategy.  Rather, a reviewing court must consider the
reasonableness of the investigation said to support that strategy.
Id. at 2538 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).  The Court rejected arguments that
Wiggins' defense team made a strategic decision based on the limited investigation
they had conducted not to introduce mitigation, commenting that "the 'strategic
decision' the state courts and respondents all invoke to justify counsel's limited
pursuit of mitigating evidence resembles more a post-hoc rationalization of
counsel's conduct than an accurate description of their deliberations prior to
sentencing."  Id. at 2538.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that trial
counsel's investigation into Wiggins' background did not meet the professional
13.  The 1989 ABA Guidelines were recently superseded by a February 2003
revision.  Nevertheless, the 1989 version of the guidelines provided the prevailing
norms at the time of both Wiggins' and Armstrong's trial.
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norms that prevailed at the time of trial, noting that "[d]espite these well-defined
norms, however, counsel abandoned their investigation of petitioner's background
after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set
of sources."  Id. at 2537.  Hence, Wiggins' "counsel chose to abandon their
investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with
respect to sentencing strategy impossible."  Id. at 2538. 
In the instant case, similar observations can be made.  The 1989 ABA
Guidelines that the Supreme Court concluded should have guided counsel's
investigation in Wiggins should have provided similar guidance to Armstrong's
counsel. 13  These standards underscore not only the importance of defense
counsel's investigation into mitigating factors, but also the understanding that often
strategy shifts between the penalty and guilt phases of a capital trial.  In general,
preparation for both the penalty and guilt phases is essential, and counsel should be
aware that "the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial is constitutionally different
from sentencing proceedings in other criminal cases." 1989 ABA Guidelines 11.8.1,
14.  In commentary to guideline 11.8.6, the authors explained that sentencing
proceedings in capital cases are a unique area of criminal practice:
Sentencing proceedings in a capital case resemble a separate trial more
than they resemble non-capital sentencing proceedings.  The
Constitutional due process right to present evidence, as well as the
right to counsel, to confront the witnesses against the defendant, and
to not be placed twice in jeopardy, adhere to capital sentencing
proceedings.  Experienced criminal counsel familiar with sentencing
practices in non-capital cases may not recognize the different form of
advocacy required at a death penalty sentencing trial.  The evidence to
be presented by the defense -- indeed, the whole theory of proceeding
-- at the sentencing phase stands outside normal criminal trial practice. 
Attorneys skilled in narrowing the focus of trial to exclude irrelevant
references to the life and character of a client may find themselves
unprepared for the sentencing phase of a capital case where the life
and character of the client may have to be revealed in detail.  The
assistance of one or more experts (e.g. social worker, psychologist,
psychiatrist, investigator, etc.) may be determinative as to outcome . . .
.
(Footnotes omitted.)
-35-
at 123.14  "If inconsistencies between the guilt/innocence and the penalty phase
defenses arise, counsel should seek to minimize them by procedural or substantive
tactics."  1989 ABA Guidelines 11.7.1(B), at 115.  In conducting the investigation
into those individuals who might present testimony at the penalty phase, counsel is
required to seek out witnesses who are "familiar with aspects of the client's life
history that might affect . . . possible mitigating reasons for the offense(s), and/or
mitigating evidence to show why the client should not be sentenced to death."  Id.
15.  In addition to investigating potential lay witnesses, in preparing for the
penalty phase counsel should consider retaining "[e]xpert witnesses to provide
medical, psychological, sociological or other explanations for the offense(s) for
which the client is being sentenced, to give a favorable opinion as to the client's
capacity for rehabilitation, etc. and/or to rebut expert testimony presented by the
prosecutor."  Id. 11.8.3(F)(2), at 129.
16.  It is not necessary to repeat all of the mitigation presented at the
evidentiary hearing here, or detail how it differed in quantity or quality from that
which was introduced at the penalty phase.  Nevertheless, while this case might be
distinguished from Wiggins somewhat by the fact that limited mitigation was
introduced during the penalty phase, it suffices to say that the evidentiary hearing
demonstrated that there was a large amount of mitigation from family members and
from expert witnesses that was never uncovered or presented at the penalty phase. 
The evidence introduced at the evidentiary hearing included but was not limited to
the following: (1) that Armstrong suffered from a seizure disorder; (2) that he
suffered from extreme poverty while growing up in Jamaica; (3) that he suffered
from "pica," an eating disorder frequently seen in abused or neglected children,
which caused him to eat lead paint, chicken excrement, and dirt; (4) that the
accidental amputation of his fingers in a sugar cane accident led to Armstrong being
hospitalized for five months and afterwards he kept his hand hidden to avoid being
harassed by other children; (5) that Armstrong was routinely and severely
physically abused by his binge-drinking stepfather; (6) that he suffered from a
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11.4.1(D)(3)(B), at 95.15
In the instant case, although trial counsel, who had taken one other case to
the penalty phase prior to Armstrong's trial, undoubtedly performed some
investigation into Armstrong's past and presented some mitigation during the
penalty phase, he conceded, and it was clear from the evidentiary hearing, that his
investigation had failed to uncover substantial important mitigation regarding
Armstrong's family and social history.16  Nevertheless, trial counsel claimed and the
learning disability and was often beaten at school for failing to understand his
schoolwork; (7) that Armstrong was living in Jamaica during a time when political
and social conditions were marked by extreme violence, and Armstrong
experienced these conditions first hand; and (8) that Armstrong was arrested by
Jamaican police and was brutally tortured before he was released.
-37-
trial court accepted that much of the negative information associated with
Armstrong's formative years would have conflicted with trial counsel's strategy to
"humanize" Armstrong.  Moreover, relying on mental health evaluations done for
competency before trial, trial counsel and the court below determined that trial
counsel's failure to put on any expert testimony regarding Armstrong's mental
health did not amount to a deficient performance.
However, here, as in Wiggins, and even presuming that the pretrial
evaluations revealed some mitigation evidence, it is clear that during his
investigation trial counsel did not discover mitigation of the same quantity or quality
of that which actually existed and was later introduced at the postconviction
evidentiary hearing.  Hence, it would be difficult to conclude that counsel's
knowledge of the available mitigation was sufficient to make an informed strategic
choice on these matters.  Without having uncovered the information regarding
Armstrong's troubled background, any " 'strategic choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable' only to the extent that 'reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.' "  Wiggins, 123 S.
-38-
Ct. at 2541 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91).  In fact, any attempt to
distinguish the difference between the limited mitigation presented at Armstrong's
penalty phase and that presented at the evidentiary hearing is strikingly similar to the
type of post-hoc rationalization that the Supreme Court rejected in Wiggins.  Id. at
2538.
Because we are remanding on separate grounds, there is no need to reach the
issue of trial counsel's investigation in this case under a Wiggins analysis. 
However, my hope is that judges and lawyers will heed the message of Wiggins.  In
order to avoid uneven dispensation of the death sentence, it is essential for counsel
to fully investigate the available mitigation so that any decision on whether or not to
present such information is made on a reasonable basis.
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
Two Cases:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County, 
James I. Cohn, Judge - Case No. 90-5417CF-B
and An Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
-39-
Terri L. Backhus, Assistant CCRC and Rachel L. Day, Assistant CCRC, Office of
the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Celia A. Terenzio, Assistant Attorney
General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent