Title: TERRY v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TERRY v. STATE2002 WY 16256 P.3d 636Case Number: 00-265Decided: 10/28/2002
October Term, A.D. 2002

 

CODY 
D. TERRY,

Appellant(Defendant) ,

 
 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff) .

 
 

The Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
    

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
            
    

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
           
     

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

*Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
     

LEHMAN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      Appellant 
Cody D. Terry (Terry) was convicted by jury of aggravated assault on a pregnant 
female.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Terry sets forth 
a single issue on appeal:

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
Appellant's Motion for New Trial Based Upon Newly Discovered 
Evidence. 

Appellee 
State of Wyoming (State) raises two issues on appeal:

I.  Should this appeal be dismissed for lack of a notice of 
appeal from the district court's Order Denying Appellant's Motion for a New 
Trial?

II.  Did the district court properly deny Appellant's 
Motion for a New Trial?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Just prior to the 
trial commencing in this action on June 19, 2000, both Terry and the State 
issued subpoenas for a witness, Francis "Frankie" Miranda (Miranda), a minor, to 
appear and testify at the trial. The State's subpoena was returned without 
service, but Terry's subpoena was served upon Miranda.  Nevertheless, Miranda failed to appear 
at trial to testify as required.  
Trial in this matter took place on June 19 through 21, 2000.  On June 20, 2000, counsel for Terry 
twice requested a continuance of the trial based upon Miranda's failure to 
appear as a subpoenaed witness.  The 
district court denied these motions but issued a bench warrant for Miranda's 
arrest.  On June 21, 2000, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict against Terry for aggravated assault on a pregnant 
female pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2001).  

 

[¶4]      On June 21, 2000, 
Miranda was arrested on the issued bench warrant.  Ultimately, upon hearing, Miranda was 
found guilty of contempt and sentenced.  
On June 28, 2000, Terry filed a pro se Motion For A New 
Trial.  On July 17, 2000, Terry, 
through counsel, filed a Motion For New Trial Based Upon Newly Discovered 
Evidence and/or in the alternative Motion To Take Deposition Of Francis Miranda 
(Motion For New Trial).  In the 
motion, Terry argued that if Miranda had testified at trial, her testimony would 
have been material, sufficient to provide evidence which may have changed the 
ultimate verdict rendered in this action, and not cumulative.  

 

[¶5]      On August 11, 
2000, Terry was sentenced to serve a penitentiary sentence of 42 to 108 months 
with credit for 175 days of presentence incarceration.  The Judgment and Sentence in this matter 
was entered on August 29, 2000.   
On September 8, 2000, Terry filed a pleading entitled Additional Briefing 
And Authority In Support Of Defendant's Motion For New Trial Based Upon Newly 
Discovered Evidence.  

 

[¶6]      On September 14, 
2000, Terry filed his Notice of Appeal indicating that he was appealing from the 
Judgment and Sentence entered by the district court.  On October 9, 2000, a hearing was held 
on the Motion for New Trial.  
However, the district court realized at the hearing that the case had 
been appealed to this court.  The 
district court therefore concluded that it could take no action on the motion 
without remand from this court pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 33(c).  Thus, on November 28, 2000, we remanded 
this case to the district court for a 30-day period to allow the district court 
to consider and rule on the motion for new trial.  This period of time was later extended 
by this court until January 12, 2001.  

 

[¶7]      On January 4, 
2001, a hearing on the motion for new trial was held, and the district court 
denied the motion.  Terry 
did not timely file any notice of appeal from this ruling or amend his prior 
filed notice of appeal to include such ruling.

 
   
              
       

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      This court "has 
the inherent power, and the duty, to address jurisdictional defects on 
appeal."  CRB v. State, Dep't of 
Family Servs., 974 P.2d 931, 934 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Robbins v. South 
Cheyenne Water & Sewage Dist., 792 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Wyo. 1990)).  "The first and fundamental question on 
every appeal is that of jurisdiction; this question cannot be waived; it is open 
for consideration by the reviewing court whenever it is raised by any party, or 
it may be raised by the court of its own motion."  CRB, at 934 (quoting Gardner 
v. Walker, 373 P.2d 598, 599 (Wyo. 1962)).  

 

[¶9]      Further, the 
standard of review with respect to entitlement to a new trial upon newly 
discovered evidence is well established.  
The requirements that must be satisfied in order to gain a new trial on 
the basis of newly discovered evidence are (1) the evidence has come to the 
moving party's knowledge since the trial; (2) it was not owing to the want of 
due diligence by the moving party that this evidence did not become known 
sooner; (3) the evidence is so material that it would probably produce a 
different verdict, if the new trial were granted; and (4) the evidence it is not 
cumulative, viz., speaking to facts in relation to which there was evidence at 
the trial.  Griswold v. 
State, 2001 WY 14 ¶8, 17 P.3d 728, ¶8 (Wyo. 2001); Baumgartner v. 
State, 7 P.3d 912, 915 (Wyo. 2000); Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 659 (Wyo. 
1993).

 
  
 

[¶10]   A motion for a new trial on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence is not favored by the courts and is viewed 
with great caution.  
Griswold, at ¶8 (citing Hopkinson v. State, 679 P.2d 1008, 
1012 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S. Ct. 228, 83 L. Ed. 2d 157 
(1984)).  All four factors must be 
met for entitlement to a new trial; and, if any one factor is not satisfied, 
there is no error in the denial of the new trial motion.  Griswold, at ¶8 (citing Grable 
v. State, 664 P.2d 531, 535 (Wyo. 1983)).  Hence, it is not essential that we 
address each and every factor if an appellant fails in his burden to satisfy 
even one of the four factors.  
Griswold, at ¶8.  We have also set forth that the decision of 
the district court on a motion for new trial will be upheld absent an abuse of 
discretion:

 
 
                
        

            
It is clearly within the sound discretion of a trial court to either 
grant or deny a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, and 
the ruling by the trial court will not be a basis for reversal of the conviction 
unless an abuse of discretion by the trial court is affirmatively shown. 
Grable v. State, 664 P.2d 531, 532 (Wyo. 1983).  It is the appellant's burden to 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the denial of his new trial motion.  Kavanaugh v. State, 769 P.2d 908, 
913 (Wyo. 1989).  We recently 
described the standard of an abuse of discretion as "reaching the question of 
reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo. 1998).  In Vaughn, 
id.  (quoting Martin v. 
State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)), we confirmed the following 
definition:

      
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means [exercising] sound judgment 
. . . with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without 
doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  

            
See also Shryack v. Carr Construction Company, Inc., 3 P.3d 850, 855 (Wyo. 2000).  In the 
absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination.  Taul v. 
State, 862 P.2d 649, 659 (Wyo. 
1993).

 
   

Griswold, at ¶7.

 
 
 

DISCUSSION

 

Request 
for Dismissal Based Upon Lack of a Second Notice of Appeal

 

[¶11]   The State asserts this appeal 
should be dismissed because Terry did not file a notice of appeal from the 
district court's order denying his motion for new trial.  Relying on this lack of a second notice 
of appeal, as well as the fact that the sole issue raised in this appeal attacks 
the denial of the motion for new trial, the State contends this appeal is 
improper because Terry appealed from only the judgment and sentence entered by 
the district court.  We 
disagree.  Because this matter was 
remanded to the district court to facilitate resolution of Terry's motion for 
new trial and because this court retained jurisdiction over this appeal, we 
conclude Terry was not required to file a second notice of appeal to challenge 
the order denying the motion for new trial.     

 

[¶12]   While his appeal was pending, Terry 
filed a motion for new trial in the district court.  Although the district court heard 
Terry's motion, it did not rule on the motion.  Instead, it ordered that "any hearing on 
[Terry's] motion for a new trial is . . . continued until such time as the 
Wyoming Supreme Court may remand the case to this Court."  Faced with this ruling, Terry then 
filed, in this court, a motion to stay briefing and a motion for limited remand 
to the district court.  This court 
granted both the remand and the stay.  

 

[¶13]   We first note that, as it turns 
out, the motion for remand should not have been granted.  In interpreting a virtually identical 
federal rule governing motions for new trial,1 the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit has written:  

Rule 
33 of the Criminal Rules, 18 U.S.C.A., provides, as to motions for new trial 
based on the ground of newly discovered evidence: ". . . but if an 
appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case." 
The Advisory Committee explained in its notes that "Under the proposed rule a 
motion for a new trial could be made without securing a remand. If, however, the 
trial court decides to grant the motion then, prior to the entry of the order 
granting it, a remand will have to be obtained. This course will eliminate the 
need of a remand in those cases in which the trial court determines to deny a 
motion for a new trial."  In 
criminal cases, therefore, the procedure is that, when a new trial is sought 
because of newly discovered evidence in a case pending in the appellate court, a 
motion for the new trial is made in the District Court, and the District Court 
may then deny the motion or indicate that it will grant the motion. If that 
court indicates that it is inclined to grant the motion, a motion for remand is 
made in the appellate court.[2]    

 

Smith 
v. Pollin, 
194 F.2d 349, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (emphasis added, footnote omitted).  As applied to this case, a remand was 
improper because the district court did not indicate it intended to grant the 
motion for new trial.  The district 
court's order hints that it was concerned about ruling without having access to 
the record, which was in the possession of the Public Defender Appellate Counsel 
(the motion for new trial was made by Terry's trial counsel).  However, under such circumstances, there 
are alternatives short of remand available.  For example, a request for a stay of the 
appeal could have been made.3  

 

[¶14]   Nevertheless, having granted the 
motion for remand, the question is whether Terry was required to file a second 
notice of appeal, i.e., a notice of appeal challenging the order denying 
motion for new trial.  This issue 
turns on the nature of the remand ordered by this court.  Bell v. U.S., 676 A.2d 37, 41 (D.C. 1996).

 
     
 

[¶15]   Here, this court's remand was for a 
specific purpose: to permit the district court to consider the motion for new 
trial.  The case was not returned to 
the district court for all purposes.  
Instead, this court retained jurisdiction over the case.  Under these circumstances, we conclude 
Terry was not required to file a second notice of appeal to challenge the order 
denying motion for new trial.  
See Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 692 (Wyo. 1993) (no 
second notice of appeal required following remand to develop claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel).  
At the same time, this case points out the 
importance of these procedural matters and the importance of counsel maintaining 
vigilance with respect to these matters.

 
             
           
  

Motion 
For New Trial

 

[¶16]   Terry argues the district court 
committed an abuse of discretion when it denied his motion for new trial.  Namely, Terry asserts that an adequate 
showing was made that  Miranda's 
purported testimony met each of the four factors enunciated in Griswold, 
¶8 as set forth above and, therefore, a new trial should have been 
provided.  In opposition, the State 
contends Terry failed to establish that Miranda could not have been located 
earlier through due diligence, that Miranda's alleged testimony would have 
proven to be material with respect to the ultimate outcome of the trial, and 
that Miranda's testimony would not have been simply cumulative.  After hearing, the district court denied 
the motion for new trial finding that the proposed evidence was not so material 
that it would produce a different verdict and that such evidence was 
cumulative.  Upon our review, we hold that the district 
court did not commit an abuse of discretion in denying Terry's Motion For New 
Trial.

 
    
              
    

[¶17]   At trial, Terry's defense suggested 
that the injuries to April White, the involved victim, could have been the 
result of a scuffle between White and Miranda earlier that evening as opposed to 
an assault by Terry.  Given this 
asserted defense, Terry contends that the alleged testimony of Miranda that 
White had been drinking on the night in question and that the day prior to trial 
White suggested to Miranda that "they had not gotten into a fight on the night 
in question" with White simultaneously directing an "O.K." sign with her hands 
toward Miranda is so material so as to produce a different verdict and that such 
evidence was not cumulative.4

 

[¶18]   Beginning with Miranda's alleged 
testimony that White had been drinking on the evening in question, we frankly 
cannot see how this testimony may be characterized as anything other than 
cumulative.  During trial, testimony 
was elicited from Sarah Stowe, Brenda Ehrler, and Terry, himself, that White was 
drinking that night although White denied doing so during her testimony.  Further, Dr. Michael Bruno, the 
emergency room doctor who treated White for her injuries that evening, testified 
that he did not identify that White had been drinking earlier that night nor did 
any other medical person at that time make any notation that White may have been 
drinking earlier that evening.  In 
addition, Officer James Wetzel, the officer that interviewed White that evening, 
testified that White did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol.  Clearly, therefore, the issue of whether 
White had or had not been drinking on the evening in question was substantially 
put before the jury.

 
      
              
   

[¶19]   Moreover, Miranda's alleged 
testimony with respect to White's drinking that evening goes only to the 
veracity of White's testimony at trial.  
As recognized and admitted by Terry, this court has long established that 
a motion for new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence shall not be 
granted where the evidence is solely to impeach a witness.  Grable v. State, 664 P.2d 531, 533-34 (Wyo. 
1983).

 
 
  

The newly 
discovered evidence must be more than impeaching or cumulative; it must be 
material to the issues involved; it must be such as would probably produce an 
acquittal; and a new trial is not warranted by evidence which, with reasonable 
diligence, could have been discovered and produced at trial.  

 

Id., 
at 533 (quoting United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 403 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied 434 U.S. 836, 98 S. Ct. 124, 54 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1977)).  See also Baumgartner v. State, 7 P.3d  at 916; Taul v. State, 862 P.2d  at 659; and Keser v. State, 
737 P.2d 756, 760 (Wyo. 
1987).

 
   

[¶20]   Next with respect to the alleged 
incident that occurred between White and Miranda wherein White suggested to 
Miranda that "they had not gotten into a fight on the night in question" with 
White simultaneously directing an "O.K." sign with her hands toward Miranda, 
Terry asserts that this testimony goes directly to his defense that the injuries 
to White could have been the result of an earlier scuffle between White and 
Miranda rather than an assault by Terry.  
Thus, Terry contends that this testimony must be considered 
material.  

 

[¶21]   The record in this case clearly 
evidences that White, Stowe, Ehrler, and Terry each testified about whether 
White and Miranda physically interacted with each other and the extent of such 
interaction.  Specifically, White 
testified that she did not have a fight with Miranda that evening but that she 
tried to keep Miranda within her apartment to keep Miranda from getting hurt 
given her state of intoxication.  In 
contradiction to this testimony, Stowe, Ehrler, and Terry all testified White 
and Miranda had physical interaction with one another in varying degrees from 
embracing each other, to wrestling short of any actual striking with their 
fists, to a specific incident where Miranda placed her feet on White's chest and 
pushed away from White.  Further, 
the testimony of Stowe showed Stowe did not recognize that White had been hurt 
by her struggles with Miranda, and the testimony of White indicates she was not 
physically hurt by Miranda and that any physical injuries to her body occurred 
as a result of the assault by Terry.  
Further, Terry stated that he did not recognize that White was physically 
injured before the assault occurred and that during this time period, White 
suddenly crouched in pain regarding her ankle although Terry did not know 
specifically why White reacted this way.  

 

[¶22]   Again, the issue concerning any 
fracas that occurred between White and Miranda was put before the jury to 
consider.  Therefore, we find that 
any alleged testimony by Miranda would have simply been cumulative.  Further, as again even recognized by 
Terry, insofar as the alleged statements and actions of White toward Miranda the 
day prior to trial are concerned as they may solicit evidence of possible 
witness tampering, such evidence is again explicitly only related to the 
credibility of White's testimony.  
As indicated previously, such a basis, in and of itself, is not adequate 
to demand the granting of a new trial.  
Grable, 664 P.2d  at 533; Baumgartner, 7 P.3d  at 916; 
Taul, 862 P.2d  at 659; and Keser, 737 P.2d  at 760.

 
     

[¶23]   Finally, in support of his argument 
Terry relies heavily upon the decision rendered in the case of Beintema v. 
Everett, United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, Case No. 
99-CV-35-J, 2001 WL 630512 (D.Wyo. April 23, 2001) (unpublished), and 
strenuously argues that this decision demands that Terry be afforded a new 
trial.  Particularly, Terry asserts 
that because the subject trial was dependent almost entirely upon the testimony 
of a single witness, White, and without such testimony the charge levied against 
Terry would not lie, any impeachment evidence such as that allegedly would be 
elicited from the testimony of Miranda must be considered to be very material 
and very relevant so as to require a new trial.  However, the facts in Beintema v. 
Everett are distinguishable from those facts that exist in this case.   

 

[¶24]   In Beintema v. Everett, that 
court ruled that a state prosecutor violated Beintema's right to a fair trial 
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 
(1963) by withholding relevant, material, exculpatory, and impeachment evidence 
which inhibited full cross-examination of the state's single key prosecution 
witness.  The evidence that was 
withheld involved threats from a police detective to prosecute other members of 
the family of the prosecution's star witness if he did not cooperate in 
testifying in the prosecution of Beintema.  
In this case, no withholding of exculpatory evidence in violation of the 
tenets set forth in Brady v. Maryland are involved.  In addition, the bulk of the purported 
evidence that allegedly would be presented by Miranda's testimony is not 
material to the charged offense but only regards collateral issues already 
addressed through many other witnesses.5

 

[¶25]   Accordingly, we hold that Terry has 
not met his burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion by the district court 
when it denied his motion for new trial.  
Under our established precedent, in the absence of a showing of an abuse 
of discretion by the district court, we will not disturb its determination in 
this case.     

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶26]   For the foregoing reasons, the 
conviction of appellant for aggravated assault on a pregnant woman is 
affirmed.

 
     
           

FOOTNOTES

1The 
Wyoming rule governing motions for new trial, W.R.Cr.P. 33, provides in 
part:

(c) 
Newly Discovered Evidence.A motion for a new trial based on the grounds 
of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after 
final judgment but if an appeal is pending, the court may grant the motion only 
on remand of the case.

2Because 
a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is not the subject 
of the appeal, the district court retains jurisdiction to hear the motion 
without remand.  The granting of the 
motion only on remand is a matter of judicial efficiency and economy to avoid 
the continuation of the appeal.  Any 
remand for a new trial which is granted will usually be followed by an order 
dismissing that appeal.

3Of 
course, depending on the circumstances, this court may not grant such a 
request.  In addition, as explained 
below, had this court merely stayed (and not remanded) this matter, Terry would 
have been required to appeal from the order denying the motion for new 
trial.  This, of course, would 
create two appeals.  Under such 
circumstances, this court would endeavor to consolidate the two appeals, if 
feasible and appropriate. 

4It 
should be recognized that Miranda never gave any actual testimony or even 
submitted her own affidavit with respect to the Motion For New Trial.  Rather, the sole affidavit submitted by 
Terry was that of Bernard Foster, an investigator, which detailed what Miranda 
told Foster on various occasions after having been arrested for failing to 
appear to testify at the trial as required. 

5It 
is also of interest to note that the credibility of Miranda's testimony could 
also be highly placed in question as many witnesses testified that Miranda was 
extremely intoxicated during the date in question and was later found by the 
police that evening lying in some bushes without her shoes or a coat on although 
it was a snowy, very cold night.  In 
addition, Miranda was completely incoherent and was unable to identify who she 
was, where she was, or give any other helpful information to the police officers 
that found her. Given her condition, Miranda was transported to the emergency 
room for medical care.