Title: State v. Roy

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

203 Kan. 606 (1969)
455 P.2d 512
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
ROBERT LEO ROY, Appellant.
No. 45,367

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 14, 1969.
Robert J. Foster, of Kansas City, argued the cause, and was on the brief for the appellant.
Frank D. Menghini, County Attorney, argued the cause, and Kent Frizzell, Attorney General, and Nick Tomasic, Assistant County Attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This appeal stems from a prosecution of defendant as principal in the second degree or accessory before the fact of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree.
The basic facts may be briefly stated. On the 5th day of August, 1965, the wife of the appellant gave birth to a boy child at the Kansas University Medical Center in Kansas City, Kansas. The birth was recorded as not unusual and the baby was released to its parents, the appellant and his wife, on August 10, 1965. When the child was released to its parents, the hospital records showed its condition as heathy and normal.
On or about the 20th day of August, 1965, the child was readmitted to the Kansas University Medical Center in what was described as a battered and beaten condition. It subsequently died of this condition on August 21, 1965.
The appellant was arrested after the doctors at the Kansas University Medical Center alerted the police. The defendant was charged with the crime of principal in the second degree or an accessory before the fact to manslaughter in the first degree.
The defendant was tried and convicted as charged. Hence this appeal.
*607 Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in not discharging him because the state failed to prove venue.
The evidence clearly established the residence of the defendant as 2270 Russell Street, Kansas City, Kansas. The baby was at the residence of the appellant from August 10, to August 20, 1965, during which time the injuries were inflicted which resulted in its death. The baby was born and died in the Kansas University Medical Center, Kansas City, Kansas.
There is no merit in appellant's contention. In State v. Fields, 182 Kan. 180, 318 P.2d 1018, we held:
This court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that the city of Kansas City and the Kansas University Medical Center are in Wyandotte County, Kansas. (K.S.A. 60-409 (b) (4), 60-412.) In State v. Neil, 203 Kan. 473, 454 P.2d 136, we stated:
The appellant next argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict.
It would perhaps be of assistance if we first considered the rules under which this court considers the sufficiency of the evidence.
In considering the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction, this court looks only to the evidence in favor of the verdict, it does not weigh the evidence and if the essential elements of the charge are sustained by any competent evidence the conviction stands. In State v. Dill, 182 Kan. 174, 319 P.2d 172, we stated at page 175 of the opinion:
We will search the record for the purpose of determining if, from the facts and circumstances, a reasonable inference of guilt could be drawn.
Carol Ann Reese, a pediatric resident at the Kansas University Medical Center, testified that when the baby was discharged to its parents on August 10, 1965, "at that time the child was healthy and normal." She described the baby when it was returned on August 20, 1965, as follows:
Another resident physician testified from his notes, which read: "Probably this child has been beaten."
The doctor who performed the autopsy on the child stated:
The mother of the child testified:
"Q. What did you do?
"A. I moved. I got out of the way.
"A. Yes, sir.
*609 "A. He was in a chair with arms on it.
"Q. The baby was?
She further testified that the appellant refused to take the baby to the hospital when he came home from work but they did take it that night. The witness related a conversation between her and the appellant before entering the hospital:
"Q. Relate that conversation.
"Q. Had you had a seizure?
"Q. Your husband agreed to have you say this?
..............
"A. He said he hoped the little bastard died."
The appellant attempted to convince the jury that the baby was injured when he accidentally dropped it on the sofa, but the jury did not see fit to believe him. The nature of the injuries were hardly consistent with injuries resulting from such a fall. The question was for the trier of facts, not this court on appellate review.
The appellant in the court below and in his specifications of error contended  "That the court erred in not instructing on 4th degree manslaughter as requested by the defendant."
Appellant has changed his contention on appeal and now contends  "The court erred in failing to instruct the jury on manslaughter in the third degree."
We pass the procedural question raised by the change in position and consider the contention on its merit.
In State v. McDermott, 202 Kan. 399, 449 P.2d 545, we disposed of this question and we do not propose to extend the discussion further.
*610 In the McDermott case, while considering when an instruction should be given as to a lesser offense, we stated:
Manslaughter in the third degree is defined by K.S.A. 21-413 as 
In the McDermott case we considered the term "heat of passion" in the following language:
In the present case there is no evidence of any provocation stirring appellant to the heat of passion. The evidence would indicate that the injuries were inflicted over a period of time without any legal provocation or heat of passion.
A careful examination of the record discloses no error which would justify the granting of a motion for a new trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.