Title: Jones v. Williams

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
VIRGINIA S. JONES, 
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF 
PAUL ARBON JONES, JR., DECEASED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 091745 
     
 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    November 4, 2010 
JOHNNY WILLIAMS, AN INFANT, 
WHO SUES BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT 
FRIEND, DOSSHANDRA WILLIAMS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Junius P. Fulton, III, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether Code § 8.01-397 
required corroboration of the testimony of a non-party witness 
in favor of a prevailing plaintiff when the defendant was 
incapable of testifying. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On June 4, 2005, Dosshandra Williams (“Williams”) gave 
birth to Johnny Williams (“Johnny”) at DePaul Medical Center in 
the City of Norfolk.  Williams was under the care of Paul Arbon 
Jones, Jr., M.D. (“Dr. Jones”), an obstetrician.  During the 
delivery, Johnny’s shoulders became obstructed within the birth 
canal, a condition known as shoulder dystocia.  Shoulder 
dystocia is a potentially fatal emergency condition that 
deprives the baby of oxygen.  See Bostic v. About Women OB/GYN, 
P.C., 275 Va. 567, 571 & n.2, 659 S.E.2d 290, 291 & n.2 (2008). 
Martha McGuirt, an obstetric nurse with thirty-three 
years’ experience, assisted with the delivery.  McGuirt 
testified at trial that she initially attempted to resolve the 
shoulder dystocia by pressing Williams’ legs against her chest 
– a medical procedure known as the McRoberts maneuver.  McGuirt 
further testified that when the McRoberts maneuver failed, Dr. 
Jones manually attempted to rotate Johnny’s shoulders inside 
the birth canal.  According to her testimony, Dr. Jones ordered 
McGuirt to apply fundal pressure – that is, to press her 
forearm forcefully on top of Williams’ uterus.  Thereafter 
Johnny was delivered successfully.  However, he had suffered 
severe and permanent damage to the nerves in his right arm, a 
condition known as Erb’s palsy.  See id. at 571 & n.1, 659 
S.E.2d at 291 & n.1. 
Dr. Jones died on October 15, 2005.  His widow, Virginia 
S. Jones (“Jones”), qualified as his personal representative.  
On October 24, 2007, Johnny filed a complaint against Jones as 
personal representative of Dr. Jones’ estate in the circuit 
court through Williams, his next friend.  Johnny alleged in the 
complaint that Dr. Jones had breached the standard of care in 
performing the delivery.1 
At the close of Williams’ case in chief, Jones moved to 
strike the evidence.  Jones argued that the testimony 
concerning fundal pressure was inadmissible under Code § 8.01-
                                                 
1 Dosshandra also sued in her individual capacity to 
recover future medical expenses.  That claim was dismissed and 
is not before us on appeal.   
 
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397.  Jones asserted that McGuirt could not corroborate 
Johnny’s claim because she was an interested party within the 
meaning of the statute.  The circuit court denied the motion.  
Jones later renewed the motion to strike after presenting her 
defense.  The court again denied the motion.  Jones also 
proffered a jury instruction related to Code § 8.01-397, which 
the court refused.  The case was submitted to a jury, which 
found for Johnny and awarded $1,750,000 in damages.  We awarded 
Jones this appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
“On appeal, we generally review evidentiary rulings under 
an abuse of discretion standard.”  Boyce v. Commonwealth, 279 
Va. 644, 649, 691 S.E.2d 782, 784 (2010).  However, the 
admissibility of McGuirt’s testimony in this case requires an 
interpretation of Code § 8.01-397 and “[s]tatutory 
interpretation is a question of law which we review de novo,  
and we determine the legislative intent from the words used in 
the statute, applying the plain meaning of the words unless 
they are ambiguous or would lead to an absurd result.”  Syed v. 
ZH Techs., Inc., 280 Va. 58, 69, 694 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2010) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
The statute provides, in relevant part, that 
[i]n an action by or against a person who, from 
any cause, is incapable of testifying, or by or 
against the committee, trustee, executor, 
 
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administrator, heir, or other representative of 
the person so incapable of testifying, no 
judgment or decree shall be rendered in favor of 
an adverse or interested party founded on his 
uncorroborated testimony. 
 
Code § 8.01-397. 
We have noted that the statute replaced the rigid common 
law rule that barred an adverse party from testifying in his 
own behalf in an action against an incapacitated litigant.  
Virginia Home for Boys & Girls v. Phillips, 279 Va. 279, 286, 
688 S.E.2d 284, 287 (2010).  Under the statute, “testimony is 
subject to the corroboration requirement if it is offered by an 
adverse or interested party and if it presents an essential 
element that, if not corroborated, would be fatal to the 
adverse party's case.”  Johnson v. Raviotta, 264 Va. 27, 32, 
563 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2002).  Moreover, “evidence, to be 
corroborative, must be independent of the surviving witness.  
It must not depend upon his credibility or upon circumstances 
under his control. It may come from any other competent witness 
or legal source, but it must not emanate from him.”  Virginia 
Home, 279 Va. at 286, 688 S.E.2d at 287-88. 
Similarly, the testimony of the adverse party may not be 
corroborated by an interested party, or vice versa.  Ratliff v. 
Jewell, 153 Va. 315, 325, 149 S.E. 409, 411 (1929).  “However, 
that rule only applies when the corroborating witness has a 
pecuniary interest in common with the person whose testimony 
 
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needs corroboration in the judgment or decree sought to be 
entered based on that testimony.”  Johnson, 264 Va. at 38 n.2, 
563 S.E.2d at 734 n.2 (emphasis added). 
In Ratliff, we considered the types of interests in 
litigation that would render a witness an “interested party” 
within the meaning of the statute.  The interests identified 
were (a) being liable for the debt of the party for whom he 
testified, (b) being liable to reimburse such a party, (c) 
having an interest in the property at issue in the action, (d) 
having an interest in the money being recovered, (e) being 
liable for the costs of the suit, or (f) being relieved of 
liability to the party for whom he testified if such party 
recovered from the incapacitated party.  153 Va. at 325-26, 149 
S.E. at 412.  In this case, Jones argues that McGuirt is an 
interested party under the last of these criteria because 
Johnny’s recovery against Dr. Jones relieved her of potential 
liability.  We disagree.2 
We determined in Johnson that a witness whose testimony 
provides the basis for his or her own liability is not an 
“interested party” for purposes of Code § 8.01-397.  Johnson, 
264 Va. at 38 n.2, 563 S.E.2d at 734 n.2.  As Jones conceded at 
                                                 
2 Jones also asserts that the circuit court found McGuirt 
was an interested party and that Johnny failed to assign cross-
error to this finding.  The court made no such finding.  
Rather, the court assumed without deciding that if McGuirt was 
an interested party, her testimony was adequately corroborated. 
 
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oral argument, McGuirt’s testimony may provide a basis for a 
claim of contribution.  While Jones argues that the limitation 
of recovery established by Code § 8.01-581.15 gave McGuirt an 
incentive to maximize Dr. Jones’s liability, Jones also 
conceded at oral argument that the fundamental question for 
establishing his liability was whether fundal pressure was 
applied before or after he had dislodged Johnny’s shoulder.  On 
that question, McGuirt testified that she did not know whether 
Dr. Jones had succeeded in manually rotating Johnny’s shoulders 
clear of the obstruction prior to ordering the application of 
fundal pressure.  Consequently, her testimony is neutral 
regarding the dispositive issue in this case. 
Accordingly, we hold that McGuirt is not an “interested 
party” within the contemplation of Code § 8.01-397.  Thus, 
there is no error in the circuit court’s denial of Jones’ 
motions to strike or its refusal to instruct the jury on the 
statute and we will affirm the judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
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