Title: Commonwealth v. Orbin O.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12314 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ORBIN O., a juvenile. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     November 7, 2017. - February 5, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Delinquent Child.  Probable Cause.  Juvenile Court, Delinquent 
child.  Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency 
proceeding, Complaint, Show cause hearing, Dismissal. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Berkshire County 
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on April 14, 2016. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Judith A. Locke, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kyle G. Christensen, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph A. 
Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Afton M. Templin for the juvenile. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Miriam H. Ruttenberg, Jennifer Honig, & Phillip Kassel for 
Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee & others. 
 
Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & 
Joseph N. Schneiderman for Youth Advocacy Division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney for the Suffolk 
District, & John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for 
2 
 
District Attorney for the Suffolk District. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In Commonwealth v. Newton N., 478 Mass.    ,     
(2018), also decided today, in which a police officer applied 
for and obtained a delinquency complaint, we held that, "where a 
prosecutor exercises his or her discretion to proceed to 
arraignment on a delinquency complaint supported by probable 
cause, the judge may not dismiss the complaint before 
arraignment on the grounds that dismissal of the complaint is in 
the best interests of the child and in the interests of 
justice."  We consider here whether that same limitation on 
judicial authority in deciding a motion to dismiss applies to a 
delinquency complaint brought by a private party under G. L. 
c. 218, § 35A, where a clerk-magistrate issued the complaint 
after finding probable cause.  We conclude that this same 
limitation applies only where the prosecutor has affirmatively 
adopted the private party's complaint by moving for arraignment.  
In cases where the prosecutor has not so moved, a judge 
considering a juvenile's motion to dismiss prior to arraignment 
may consider whether the clerk-magistrate abused his or her 
discretion in issuing the complaint and, in doing so, may 
3 
 
consider whether dismissal is in the best interests of the child 
and in the interests of justice.1 
 
Background.  On March 24, 2016, the vice-principal of the 
juvenile's charter school filed an application under G. L. 
c. 218, § 35A, for a delinquency complaint, alleging that the 
juvenile committed an assault and battery in the classroom 
against a paraprofessional instructor, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 13A (a).  Following a show cause hearing, the clerk-
magistrate issued a delinquency complaint, along with a written 
summary of the testimony presented at the hearing.  The juvenile 
then moved to dismiss the complaint before arraignment. 
 
On May 5, 2016, a hearing was held on the motion to 
dismiss.  The Juvenile Court judge, based on the documents 
attached to the application for the complaint and the relevant 
evidence presented at the show cause hearing, allowed the 
juvenile's motion to dismiss and subsequently issued written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
 
We summarize the judge's material findings, supplemented by 
other information in the record before the judge.  On March 11, 
2016, the fourteen year old juvenile was in class at the charter 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the district 
attorney for the Suffolk district; by the youth advocacy 
division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services; and by 
the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, on behalf of the 
Center for Public Representation, Massachusetts Advocates for 
Children, Strategies for Youth, Citizens for Juvenile Justice, 
and the Center for Civil Rights Remedies. 
4 
 
school he attended.  The juvenile became frustrated during a 
classroom interaction with the paraprofessional instructor 
assigned to the class, prompting the instructor to tell the 
juvenile to take a break, which was in keeping with the 
juvenile's individualized education program (IEP) and an 
accommodation granted to the juvenile at the school.  The 
juvenile swore at the instructor, and when the instructor told 
the juvenile he needed to go to the office, the juvenile 
replied, "Fight me."  The instructor told the other students to 
go into the hallway and then stood in front of the classroom 
door while the juvenile remained in the classroom.  When the 
juvenile "shouldered" into the instructor in an attempt to leave 
the classroom, the instructor placed the juvenile in a "basket 
hold" for approximately thirty seconds as a safety maneuver.  As 
the juvenile struggled against the basket hold, he elbowed the 
instructor in the face. 
 
The judge noted that the juvenile's IEP "specifically 
discouraged the school staff from engaging in power struggles 
with him and encouraged him to leave situations so as to 
deescalate them."  She found that the instructor "caused the 
touching" by physically blocking the juvenile from leaving the 
classroom when "[the juvenile] was trying to deescalate a 
situation using steps the [school] incorporated into his [IEP]."  
The judge concluded that, under these circumstances, there was 
5 
 
not probable cause to believe that the juvenile acted 
intentionally or recklessly "in an altercation in which there 
was physical contact between [him and the instructor]."  The 
Commonwealth appealed, and we granted the juvenile's application 
for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  The Commonwealth argues that the judge erred 
in granting the juvenile's prearraignment motion to dismiss 
because the evidence in the record before her established 
probable cause that the juvenile committed an assault and 
battery.  The Commonwealth further claims that the judge erred 
by considering as part of the probable cause analysis an 
"affirmative defense," insofar as the argument that the juvenile 
acted in conformance with his IEP by seeking to leave the 
classroom after the instructor blocked the exit could be 
construed as an affirmative defense. 
 
"[A] motion to dismiss a complaint [for lack of probable 
cause] 'is decided from the four corners of the complaint 
application, without evidentiary hearing.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 565 (2013), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Huggins, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 111 (2013).  "To establish 
probable cause, the complaint application must set forth 
'reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a 
reasonable or prudent person in believing that the defendant has 
committed the offense.'"  Humberto H., supra, 
6 
 
quoting Commonwealth v. Roman, 414 Mass. 642, 643 (1993).  "The 
complaint application must include information to support 
probable cause as to each essential element of the 
offense."  Humberto H., supra at 565-566.  Probable cause 
requires "more than mere suspicion," id. at 565, 
quoting Roman, supra, but "considerably less than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, so evidence that is insufficient to support a 
guilty verdict might be more than sufficient to establish 
probable cause."  Humberto H., supra.  See Commonwealth 
v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 451 (1984), quoting K.B. Smith, 
Criminal Practice and Procedure § 104 (1983) ("Probable cause 
does not require the same type of specific evidence of each 
element of the offense as would be needed to support a 
conviction").  Because the sufficiency of the evidence to 
establish probable cause is a question of law, we review the 
judge's probable cause determination de novo.  See Humberto 
H., supra at 566. 
 
Under the common law, an intentional assault and battery is 
"the intentional and unjustified use of force upon the person of 
another, however slight."  Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 
529 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 203 
(1931).2  Here, the judge essentially found that the juvenile's 
                                                          
 
2 We do not address the second theory of assault and 
battery, reckless assault and battery, because it "is committed 
7 
 
shouldering was an unconsented-to touching that was intended to 
push the instructor away from the classroom door so that the 
juvenile could leave the classroom.  In finding that the 
juvenile intended to shoulder the instructor, but ultimately 
holding that there was insufficient evidence of intent, we 
understand the judge to have concluded that the juvenile's act 
of shouldering into the instructor was legally justified by the 
juvenile's desire to leave the classroom, which was permitted as 
a deescalation strategy in his IEP.  We reject the notion that a 
child is justified in committing a battery against an instructor 
who is blocking his or her egress from a classroom because the 
child's IEP permits the child to leave the classroom when he or 
she becomes agitated.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 
596, 601 (1983) ("in the absence of excessive or unnecessary 
force by an arresting officer, a person may not use force to 
resist an arrest by one who he knows or has good reason to 
believe is an authorized police officer, engaged in the 
performance of his duties, regardless of whether the arrest was 
unlawful in the circumstances").  Consequently, we conclude that 
the judge erred in finding that there was not probable cause to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
when an individual engages in reckless conduct that results in a 
touching producing physical injury to another person."  
Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526, 529 (2010).  There was no 
evidence in the record before the judge that the instructor 
sustained any physical injury. 
8 
 
believe that the juvenile acted intentionally in shouldering 
into his instructor. 
 
In Newton N., 478 Mass. at    , where a police officer 
applied for and obtained a delinquency complaint, and where the 
complaint was supported by probable cause, we held that the 
Juvenile Court judge could not dismiss the complaint before 
arraignment on the grounds that dismissal of the complaint was 
in the best interests of the child and in the interests of 
justice.  Here, however, the complainant was a civilian, not a 
police officer, and the civilian obtained the delinquency 
complaint after a show cause hearing under G. L. c. 218, § 35A. 
 
The Legislature's enactment of G. L. c. 218, § 35A, "has 
allowed private parties to seek criminal complaints in the case 
of misdemeanors."  Bradford v. Knights, 427 Mass. 748, 751 
(1998).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 4 (b), 378 Mass. 849 (1979) ("An 
application for issuance of [criminal complaints] may be 
subscribed by . . . a private person").  Section 35A provides 
that, if a complaint is received by a "district court," which 
includes the Juvenile Court Department, against a person who is 
not under arrest, the court shall notify the person against whom 
the complaint was made and give the person an opportunity to be 
heard, and "may upon consideration of the evidence, obtained by 
hearing or otherwise, cause process to be issued[,] unless there 
is no probable cause to believe that the person who is the 
9 
 
object of the complaint has committed the offense charged."  
When a person who is not a police officer applies for a 
misdemeanor criminal or delinquency complaint, a judge or clerk-
magistrate conducts a "show cause" hearing to determine whether 
probable cause exists for the commencement of criminal 
proceedings.  See Matter of Powers, 465 Mass. 63, 66 (2013).  
"[A] show cause hearing . . . will often be used by a clerk-
magistrate in an effort to bring about an informal settlement of 
grievances, typically relating to minor matters involving 'the 
frictions and altercations of daily life.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Clerk–Magistrate of the W. Roxbury Div. of the Dist. Court 
Dep't, 439 Mass. 352, 356 (2003), quoting Bradford, supra. 
 
While a judge or clerk-magistrate may issue a criminal or 
delinquency complaint under § 35A only where the complaint is 
supported by probable cause, it is within his or her prerogative 
to decline to issue a complaint, even where there is probable 
cause.  Victory Distribs., Inc. v. Ayer Div. of the Dist. Court 
Dep't, 435 Mass. 136, 142 (2001).  "General Laws c. 218, § 35A, 
provides that the District Court, or an officer thereof, 'may 
upon consideration of the evidence cause [a complaint] to be 
issued' (emphasis added).  Use of the word 'may' is recognition 
that circumstances will exist when, notwithstanding the 
existence of probable cause, a complaint should not issue and 
that, in such circumstances, a clerk-magistrate has discretion 
10 
 
to refuse to issue complaints."  Id.  Where a clerk-magistrate 
declines to issue a complaint, the civilian may seek a rehearing 
before a judge, see Bradford, 427 Mass. at 752, or may request 
that the Attorney General or a district attorney prosecute the 
matter.  See Victory Distribs., Inc., supra at 143.  "Should one 
of these authorities decide to prosecute, neither a judge of the 
District Court nor a clerk-magistrate may bar the prosecution, 
as long as the complaint is legally valid."  Id. 
 
Where a clerk-magistrate, as here, finds probable cause and 
issues a delinquency complaint against a juvenile, the juvenile 
may not seek a second show cause hearing before a judge; "the 
[juvenile's] remedy is a motion to dismiss the 
complaint."  Commonwealth v. DiBennadetto, 436 Mass. 310, 313 
(2002).  "After the issuance of a complaint, a motion to dismiss 
will lie for a failure to present sufficient evidence to the 
clerk-magistrate (or judge), . . . for a violation of the 
integrity of the proceeding . . . , or for any other challenge 
to the validity of the complaint."  Id. 
 
The scope of a Juvenile Court judge's authority to dismiss 
a delinquency complaint at a motion to dismiss hearing, however, 
depends on whether the prosecutor has affirmatively adopted the 
complaint as a matter that he or she wishes to prosecute by 
moving for an arraignment, or whether the prosecutor simply 
appears at the scheduled arraignment.  Where a prosecutor 
11 
 
exercises his or her prosecutorial discretion by moving to 
arraign the juvenile, the separation of powers doctrine in art. 
30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights bars a judge, in 
the absence of statutory authority, from dismissing a valid 
delinquency complaint -- even where the judge believes that 
dismissal of the complaint is in the best interests of the child 
and in the interests of justice.  See Newton N., 478 Mass. 
at    .  But where a prosecutor has not affirmatively moved for 
arraignment and simply appears at the scheduled arraignment, the 
delinquency complaint remains a complaint brought by a private 
party and the separation of powers doctrine does not apply.  
See Victory Distribs., Inc., 435 Mass. at 142 ("the right to 
pursue a criminal prosecution belongs not to a private party but 
to the Commonwealth"); Whitley v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 961, 
962 (1975) (rights to pursue criminal prosecution "are not 
private but are in fact lodged in the Commonwealth as it may 
proceed to enforce its laws"). 
 
We recognize that prosecutors have the authority to nol 
pros a complaint issued under G. L. c. 218, § 35A, before 
arraignment.  See Carroll, petitioner, 453 Mass. 1006, 1006 
(2009) (district attorney's authority to nol pros criminal 
complaint may be exercised before arraignment).  However, we 
will not construe the mere failure to nol pros a delinquency 
complaint prior to arraignment to signify the affirmative 
12 
 
adoption by a prosecutor of a private party's complaint.  As to 
these § 35A delinquency complaints, we require the affirmative 
step of moving for arraignment to ensure that prosecutorial 
judgment has been exercised in deciding whether to proceed.  By 
requiring prosecutors to affirmatively decide whether to move 
for arraignment in these cases, we give prosecutors the 
opportunity to decide whether a juvenile is eligible for (and 
appropriate for) a diversion program prior to arraignment as an 
alternative to prosecution.  We note that the vast majority of 
district attorneys have established such juvenile pretrial 
diversion programs.  See Newton N., 478 Mass. at    n.6 
(describing district attorneys' efforts to provide pretrial 
diversion programs to juvenile defendants). 
 
We have noted that "[t]he right of a citizen to obtain a 
criminal complaint is itself something of an anomaly, because in 
modern times[,] the formal initiation and prosecution of 
criminal offenses is usually the domain of public officials.  
Accordingly, even where the Legislature has given a private 
party the opportunity to seek a criminal complaint, we have 
uniformly held that the denial of a complaint creates no 
judicially cognizable wrong."  Bradford, 427 Mass. at 751.  
See Victory Distribs., Inc., 435 Mass. at 142 ("a private party 
suffers no judicially cognizable wrong when its application for 
a criminal complaint is denied"); Taylor v. Newton Div. of the 
13 
 
Dist. Court Dep't, 416 Mass. 1006, 1006 (1993) ("it is settled 
beyond cavil that a private citizen has no judicially cognizable 
interest in the prosecution of another").  Because a private 
party has no right to the issuance of a criminal complaint where 
there is probable cause, and because the issuance of such a 
complaint is within the sound discretion of the clerk-magistrate 
following a show cause hearing, a judge deciding a motion to 
dismiss a civilian complaint issued pursuant to § 35A may 
consider whether the clerk-magistrate abused his or her 
discretion in issuing the complaint, and, in doing so, may 
consider whether dismissal of the complaint is in the best 
interests of the child and in the interests of justice.  This 
does not extend the reach of a motion to dismiss beyond a 
determination of the validity of the complaint.  We simply 
recognize that, where a complaint was initiated by a private 
party and has not been adopted by the prosecutor, the validity 
of the complaint must include a review of the clerk-magistrate's 
exercise of discretion. 
 
The wise exercise of discretion is especially important in 
private delinquency complaints, where sound judgment must be 
applied in deciding whether a child's misbehavior that is 
legally within the ambit of the criminal law is so serious that 
it should be treated as a delinquency complaint in Juvenile 
Court, rather than as a disciplinary matter that is best 
14 
 
resolved within a school, family, or clinical mental health 
setting.  Where a prosecutor has not made an affirmative 
discretionary decision to bring such a complaint to arraignment, 
a Juvenile Court judge may review whether the clerk-magistrate 
appropriately exercised sound discretion, as opposed to simply 
having issued the complaint because it was supported by probable 
cause. 
 
Conclusion.  We vacate the order of dismissal of the 
delinquency complaint and remand the matter to the Juvenile 
Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.