Title: Davenport v. Little-Bowser

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
KATHERINE ANNE FISHER DAVENPORT, et al. 
 
v.  Record No. 041180  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
April 22, 2005 
DEBORAH LITTLE-BOWSER, et al. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Randall G. Johnson, Judge 
 
This appeal involves the claims of four children and 
three sets of adoptive parents (“Petitioners”) that the 
Commonwealth must issue new birth certificates listing both 
adoptive parents on the certificates for each of the four 
children.  Each of the children was born in Virginia and 
adopted pursuant to judgments issued by courts of competent 
jurisdiction in other states.  The three sets of adoptive 
parents are each "same-sex" adoptive parents.  None of the 
seven petitioners resides in Virginia. 
Petitioners sought the issuance of new birth certificates 
listing both adoptive parents on each certificate pursuant to 
Code § 32.1-261.  Deborah Little-Bowser, Registrar of Vital 
Records and Health Statistics (“Registrar”), refused their 
requests.  Petitioners filed a Bill of Complaint and Petition 
for Writ of Mandamus against the Registrar and Robert B. 
Stroube, State Health Commissioner (“Commissioner”), in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, seeking a declaration 
that the Registrar and the Commissioner must issue such new 
 
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birth certificates and requesting the issuance of a writ of 
mandamus or an injunction to enforce the declaration.  The 
trial court decided the issues on cross-motions for summary 
judgment, granting the motions of the Registrar and 
Commissioner and denying the motions of the Petitioners. 
I.  Proceedings Below 
A.  Background 
Katherine Anne Fisher Davenport was born in Arlington, 
Virginia, on March 26, 1990 and a birth certificate was 
issued.  Timothy M. Fisher is her biological father and has 
not been divested of his parental rights.  The parental rights 
of the biological mother were terminated by order dated April 
13, 1990.  W. Scott Davenport filed a petition to adopt 
Katherine in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia 
and a Decree of Adoption was entered on April 19, 1992.  After 
providing a certified copy of the adoption decree to the 
Registrar and requesting the issuance of a new birth 
certificate, the Registrar issued a new birth certificate that 
listed only Mr. Davenport as Katherine’s father and excluded 
any mention of Mr. Fisher, who is the biological father.  
Efforts to have yet another birth certificate issued have been 
rejected by the Registrar and the Department of Health. 
Cameron Fredrick Fisher Davenport was born on May 18, 
1992, in Arlington, Virginia and a birth certificate was 
 
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issued.  Mr. Fisher is his biological father and has not been 
divested of his parental rights.  The parental rights of the 
biological mother were terminated by order dated May 20, 1992.  
Mr. Davenport filed a petition to adopt Cameron in the 
Superior Court for the District of Columbia and a Decree of 
Adoption was entered on August 6, 1993. 
On March 16, 2000, the Superior Court for the District of 
Columbia issued Amended Final Decrees of Adoption for both 
Katherine and Cameron.  In each decree, the court found that 
the child had been in the “legal care, custody and control of 
the natural father,” and that adoption by Mr. Davenport would 
be “for the best interests of the adoptee.”  Upon receipt of 
the Amended Final Decrees of Adoption, the Registrar issued 
new birth certificates for Katherine and Cameron each 
indicating Mr. Davenport as “father” and excluding Mr. Fisher, 
despite his status as biological father who has not been 
divested of custody or parental rights. Requests to have new 
birth certificates issued to reflect both adoptive parents on 
the certificates have been refused. 
Hillary Anne Dalton-Moffit was born in Arlington, 
Virginia on August 15, 1991 and a birth certificate was 
issued.  On September 19, 1995, the Superior Court for the 
District of Columbia entered a Final Decree of Adoption 
“establishing the relationship of parents and child for all 
 
3
purposes” between Mark M. Dalton, Bruce H. Moffit, and 
Hillary.  After providing proof of the adoption, Mr. Dalton 
requested that the Registrar issue a new birth certificate 
listing both Mr. Moffit and Mr. Dalton as parents.  His 
request was denied. 
John Doe was born on February 27, 1999, in Falls Church, 
Virginia and a birth certificate was issued.  On December 23, 
1999, an order of adoption was entered in the Family Court of 
Dutchess County, New York, decreeing Jean Doe and Jane Doe to 
be the adoptive parents of John Doe.  After providing proof of 
the adoption, Jane Doe requested the issuance of a new birth 
certificate reflecting both adoptive parents' names. Her 
request was denied. 
B.  Proceedings Below 
 
Petitioners filed a bill of complaint and petition for 
writ of mandamus against the Registrar and the Commissioner 
contending that the refusal to provide new birth certificates 
listing the names of both adoptive parents in each case 
violates Code §§ 32.1-261(A) and 8.01-389, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 
(2000), and both the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article 
IV, Section 1, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.  
They sought an injunction or writ of mandamus requiring the 
Commonwealth to issue the requested birth certificates, a 
 
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declaration that the Commonwealth's conduct was unlawful, 
nominal damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a demurrer, which was subsequently 
denied, and then an answer.  After discovery, Petitioners 
moved for summary judgment and the Commonwealth filed a cross-
motion for summary judgment.  Both parties submitted briefs to 
the trial court.  After oral argument, the trial court granted 
the Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment and denied 
Petitioners' motion for summary judgment.  In its final order, 
the trial court held that "there is no issue of material fact" 
and that the Commonwealth was "entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." 
 
Petitioners filed a timely petition for appeal.  We 
granted three assignments of error:  whether the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment violated "the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, Article 4, Section 1 of the United States Constitution 
[sic], and Section 8.01-389 of the Virginia Code [sic]"; 
whether the trial court's grant of summary judgment was 
contrary "to Section 32.1-261(A) of the Virginia Code [sic]"; 
and whether the trial court's denial of the Petitioners' 
"Motion for Summary Judgment Interprets Virginia Law So As to 
Deny [Petitioners] the Equal Protection of the Laws." 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of Review 
 
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The three assignments of error are questions of law which 
we review de novo.  Wilby v. Gostel, 265 Va. 437, 440, 578 
S.E.2d 796, 798 (2003); Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock 
Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631, 561 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2002).  Because 
Petitioners argue that Virginia law requires the Commonwealth 
to issue a new birth certificate listing both adoptive parents 
in each case, we will consider this assignment of error first.  
See Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Smit, 266 Va. 444, 454, 587 
S.E.2d 526, 532 (2003) (it is an "established principle of 
constitutional law that a court will not rule upon the 
constitutionality of a statute unless such a determination is 
absolutely necessary to decide the merits of the case"). 
B.  Issuance of Birth Certificates Under Virginia Law 
 
In its ruling, the trial court gave two reasons for 
granting the Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment.  
First, the trial court held that "under current Virginia law, 
birth certificates can only list the name of a mother and a 
father.  Birth certificates cannot list the names of two 
mothers or the names of two fathers.  It just cannot be done."  
Second, the trial court held that "what [it] is being asked to 
do in directing the registrar to change the birth 
certificates, in spite of the language that the [Petitioners] 
try to couch their argument in, is asking [it] to recognize a 
status that Virginia does not accord to its own citizens."    
 
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In support of this second reason, the trial court stated that 
Petitioners were asking it "to do something which the public 
policy of Virginia just simply does not allow.  Whether that 
is right or whether that is wrong, is not for this [court] to 
determine.  It is something that needs to be addressed by the 
legislature, if it is addressed at all." 
 
At the outset, it is important to state what this case is 
not about.  There was much discussion in the trial court, and 
some before this Court, concerning homosexual marriage.  This 
case is about issuing birth certificates under the provisions 
of Virginia law; it is not about homosexual marriage, nor is 
it about "same-sex" relationships, nor is it about adoption 
policy in Virginia. 
 
The primary statutory provision governing the issuance of 
a new Virginia birth certificate upon proof of adoption, 
legitimation, or determination of paternity is Code § 32.1-
261.  When issuing a new birth certificate, 
 
The State Registrar shall establish a new 
certificate of birth for a person born in this 
Commonwealth upon receipt of the following: 
 
 
An adoption report as provided in § 32.1-262, a 
report of adoption prepared and filed in 
accordance with the laws of another state or 
foreign country, or a certified copy of the 
decree of adoption together with the 
information necessary to identify the original 
certificate of birth and to establish a new 
certificate of birth. 
 
 
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Code § 32.1-261(A)(1).  The relevant Administrative Code 
section promulgated to carry out this statutory provision 
states, 
 
The new certificate of birth prepared after 
adopting . . . shall be on the form in use at 
the time of birth and shall include the 
following items and such other information 
necessary to complete the certificate: 
 
. . . . 
 
 
The names and personal particulars of the 
adoptive parents or of the natural parents, 
whichever is appropriate. 
 
12 § VAC 5-550-330.  In both of these provisions, and in the 
other provisions concerning adoption and the issuance of new 
birth certificates, the term "adoptive parents" or "intended 
parents" is used.  See, e.g., Code § 32.1-261(A)(3); Code 
§ 32.1-261(A)(4); and 12 § VAC 5-550-280.  No definition is 
provided for these terms. 
 
In its brief and in much of its oral argument, the 
Commonwealth argued that "this Court should defer to the 
Executive Branch's interpretation unless that interpretation 
is patently unreasonable and represents an abuse of 
discretion" and that "[i]t is well established that the 
interpretation of the agency entrusted with the administration 
of a statute is entitled to deference by this [C]ourt."  In 
support of these contentions, the Commonwealth cites 
Department of Taxation v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 235 Va. 94, 
 
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366 S.E.2d 78 (1988); Forst v. Rockingham Poultry Mktg. Coop., 
222 Va. 270, 279 S.E.2d 400 (1981); Commonwealth v. Lucky 
Stores, Inc., 217 Va. 121, 225 S.E.2d 870 (1976); Commonwealth 
v. Bluefield Sanitarium, 216 Va. 686, 222 S.E.2d 526 (1976); 
and Commonwealth v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 193 Va. 37, 
68 S.E.2d 122 (1951).   
 
In Westmoreland Coal, a case involving interpretation of 
an assessment, we stated: "The principles that control our 
decision here are well established.  The Department's 
assessment is presumed to be correct and valid, and the 
taxpayer bears the burden to prove the assessment erroneous."  
235 Va. at 99, 366 S.E.2d at 80 (citing Bluefield Sanitarium, 
216 Va. at 689, 222 S.E.2d at 528-29 (1976)).  In Forst, a 
case involving tax assessments, we recognized that the plain 
meaning of the statute and a long-standing Department of 
Taxation interpretation merited judgment in favor of the tax 
assessment levied.  222 Va. at 276-78, 279 S.E.2d at 403-05.   
 
In Lucky Stores, a case involving the methods used for 
income taxation of a multi-state foreign corporation, we held 
that the Department of Taxation neither misapplied the law nor 
abused its discretion.  217 Va. at 131, 225 S.E.2d at 877.  We 
then added, "[f]urthermore, and according the required weight 
to the construction of a statute by a state official charged 
with its administration . . . we find the interpretation . . . 
 
9
to be reasonable and rational."  Id. at 131-32, 225 S.E.2d at 
877 (citing Commonwealth v. Progressive Community Club, 215 
Va. 732, 739, 213 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1975)). 
 
In Bluefield Sanitarium, a case involving a tax 
assessment, we discussed and affirmed the rule that "a tax 
assessment made by the proper authorities is prima facie 
correct and valid and that the burden is on the taxpayer to 
show that such assessment is erroneous."  216 Va. at 689, 222 
S.E.2d at 528-29.  We noted "that the construction of a 
statute by a state official charged with its administration is 
entitled to great weight."  Id.
 
In the final case cited by the Commonwealth, Appalachian 
Elec. Power Co., a case also involving tax assessments, the 
Commonwealth placed great weight on our observation  
 
that the practical construction given to a 
statute by public officials charged with its 
enforcement is entitled to great weight by the 
courts and in doubtful cases will be regarded 
as decisive.  The Legislature is presumed to be 
cognizant of such construction and when long 
continued, in the absence of legislation 
evincing a dissent, the courts will adopt that 
interpretation. 
 
193 Va. at 45-46, 68 S.E.2d at 127 (citations omitted).  
However, the Commonwealth overlooks the immediately preceding 
paragraph, where we stated, 
 
It is of course true, as the brief of the 
Attorney General points out, that 'the doctrine 
 
10
of administrative interpretation will not be 
allowed to change the plain meaning of the 
statute.'  Superior Steel Corp. v. 
Commonwealth, 147 Va. 202, 206, 136 S.E. 666 
[,667 (1927)]. But the disagreement here is as 
to whether the meaning is so plain and 
unambiguous as to require no interpretation. We 
are convinced from a consideration of the 
majority and dissenting opinions and the briefs 
of counsel that it is not. Consequently, we 
apply well-recognized rules for the 
interpretation and application of such 
statutes. 
 
Id. at 45, 68 S.E.2d at 126-27. 
 
In Superior Steel, we gave guidance concerning the weight 
to be accorded to administrative interpretation of statutory 
provisions: 
 
 
The Commonwealth makes the point that the 
interpretation which the Commission places on 
section 43 of the tax law in this case is the 
administrative interpretation which it has 
always placed upon this statute, and should, 
therefore, prevail here.  Courts, in construing 
statutes, where the statute is obscure or its 
meaning doubtful, will give great weight to and 
sometimes follow the interpretation which those 
whose duty it has been to administer it have 
placed upon it.  But the doctrine of 
administrative interpretation will not be 
allowed to change the plain meaning of the 
statute. 
 
 
In Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, [99-100 
(1904),] the majority opinion states the law 
thus: "Contemporaneous construction is a rule 
of interpretation, but is not an absolute one.  
It does not preclude an inquiry by the courts 
as to the original correctness of such 
construction.  A custom of the department, 
however long continued by successive officers, 
must yield to the positive language of the 
statute." 
 
 
11
147 Va. at 206-07, 136 S.E. at 667.  A principal rule of 
statutory interpretation is that courts will give statutory 
language its plain meaning.  See Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit 
Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 901, 904 (2005).  Only when 
the statute is obscure or its meaning doubtful will courts 
defer to an administrative interpretation.  In such 
circumstances, as in the tax cases cited by the Commonwealth, 
courts will generally give great weight to the administrative 
interpretations of statutory provisions. 
 
In this case, we are presented with a statutory scheme 
and regulations promulgated pursuant to that scheme.  Neither 
the statute nor the regulations define "adoptive parents."  
Stated differently, there is nothing in the statutory scheme 
that precludes recognition of same-sex couples as "adoptive 
parents."  The statute does not refer to a listing of a 
"mother" or a "father;" rather, it refers only to the 
undefined term "adoptive parents" and "intended parents."  The 
Commonwealth advances several arguments in support of its 
contention that issuance of a new birth certificate listing 
the names of the adoptive parents in these cases is not 
required or authorized by statute.  For each of the arguments, 
the Commonwealth uses administrative regulations in an attempt 
to interpret Code § 32.1-261. 
 
12
 
The Commonwealth's first statutory interpretation 
argument involves 12 VAC § 5-550-100 involving a certificate 
of live birth and 12 VAC § 5-550-330 concerning the issuance 
of a new certificate after, among other circumstances, 
adoption.  The Commonwealth reasons that a certificate of live 
birth provides for listing of a mother and a father and a new 
certificate "shall be on the form in use at the time of 
birth."  12 VAC § 5-550-330.  The Commonwealth argues that 
Code § 32.1-261(B) provides that "[w]hen a new certificate of 
birth is established pursuant to subsection A of this section 
. . . [i]t shall be substituted for the original certificate 
of birth."  Because the statute requires "substitution" and 
the certificate of live birth provides for a listing of a 
mother and a father, any new certificate "on the same form in 
use at the time of birth" is inadequate to list two same-sex 
adoptive parents. 
 
However, the Commonwealth's restrictive definition is 
undermined by its own administrative regulations.  The 
provisions of 12 VAC § 5-550-330 further require that the new 
certificate of birth "shall include . . . the names and 
personal particulars of the adoptive parents or of the natural 
parents, whichever is appropriate."  Clearly, the statute, 
Code § 32.1-261, anticipates the listing of adoptive parents 
without specific restrictions.  Further, the administrative 
 
13
regulations plainly require the listing of adoptive parents 
without restriction.  The only perceived impediment is the 
Commonwealth's insistence upon utilization of a particular 
form adopted by the agency. 
 
Here, the Commonwealth's reliance upon a restrictive 
interpretation of the word "substitution" or "substitute" is 
misplaced.  The Commonwealth insists on brief that the word 
"substitute" is a verb.  We will treat it as such.  To 
"substitute" means "to put in the place of another; exchange."  
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993).  The 
restrictive use of a particular form by the agency for live 
births and the administrative requirement that such a form 
also be used for new certificates after adoption is contrary 
to the ordinary and plain language of Code § 32.1-261, and the 
agency's own regulations, 12 VAC § 5-550-330.  Nothing in the 
statute requires a particular form and the regulations only 
require that the "names and particulars of the adoptive 
parents" be placed on the form. 
 
Additionally, the Commonwealth argues that its 
restrictive interpretation should be adopted because it is 
consistent with Code § 63.2-1201, which limits the filing of 
an adoption petition to single individuals or to married 
couples.  However, this case does not involve Virginia 
adoptions.  Rather, this case involves out-of-state adoptions 
 
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and the issuance of new certificates of birth for children 
born in the Commonwealth. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
We need not address federal constitutional or statutory 
issues in this case because we hold that a proper 
interpretation of Code § 32.1-261 requires that the Registrar 
issue a new certificate of birth listing both of the adoptive 
parents in each of the cases before us.  The sole issue in 
this case is the enforcement of the directive of the General 
Assembly concerning the issuance of new certificates of birth 
upon receipt of notice of an out-of-state adoption.  Just as 
we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the General 
Assembly, neither can an agency of the executive branch of 
government.  Code § 32.1-261 provides that a new certificate 
of birth shall be given upon application when there has been 
receipt of an out-of-state judgment or decree of adoption of a 
child born in the Commonwealth.  Pursuant to statute, the 
issuance of the new certificate of birth is to include "the 
names of the intended parents."  Pursuant to administrative 
regulation, the new certificate of birth should include "the 
names and personal particulars of the adoptive parents or the 
natural parents, whichever is appropriate."  The trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment to the Registrar.  The 
judgment of the trial court will be reversed and the case will 
 
15
be remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion and for the issuance of appropriate relief to the 
Petitioners herein. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL, with whom SENIOR JUSTICE COMPTON joins, 
dissenting. 
 
I. 
 
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.  
The laws of Virginia simply do not require that the Registrar 
of Vital Records and Health Statistics issue a birth 
certificate that identifies two people of the same gender as 
the parents of a child. 
II. 
Code § 32.1-261 authorizes the Registrar to issue a new 
certificate of birth for a person born in this Commonwealth 
upon the satisfaction of several conditions, including an 
adoption.  The Registrar issued the following regulation 
pursuant to Code § 32.1-269(A).  Regulation 12 VAC 5-550-330 
states: 
"12 VAC 5-550-330.  New certificate.  
 
"The new certificate of birth prepared after 
adopting, legitimation, court determination of 
paternity, or acknowledgement of paternity shall be 
on the form in use at the time of birth and shall 
include the following items and such other 
information necessary to complete the certificate:  
 
 
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"1. The name of the child; 
 
"2. The date and place of birth as transcribed from 
the original certificate;  
 
"3. The names and personal particulars of the 
adoptive parents or of the natural parents, 
whichever is appropriate; 
 
"4. The name of the attendant, printed or typed;  
 
"5. The birth number assigned to the original birth 
certificate;  
 
"6. The original filing date. The information 
necessary to locate the existing certificate and to 
complete the new certificate shall be submitted on 
forms prescribed by the State Registrar." 
 
Among other things, the Regulation requires that the 
Registrar issue the new certificate of birth "on the form in 
use at the time of [the adopted child's] birth," and the form 
must include the names and personal particulars of the 
adoptive parents or of the natural parents, whichever is 
appropriate. 
The form that was in use when the youngest of the adopted 
children in the case before this Court was born is set forth 
below. 
 
 
17
 
 
This form is identical in all pertinent respects to the forms 
that were used when the other adopted children involved in the 
appeal were born. 
There is no designation on the form that will permit the 
Registrar to issue a birth certificate that contains the names 
of two mothers of a child or the names of two fathers of a 
child.  The General Assembly, when it enacted Code § 32.1-
 
18
261(A), never contemplated that it had authorized the 
Registrar to issue a birth certificate that identifies two men 
as the parents of a child or two women as the parents of a 
child.  Additionally, the Regulation does not contemplate such 
result. 
 
Petitioners assert "[t]here is nothing in [the 
Regulation] that precludes the inclusion in the birth 
certificate of information – such as the name of a second 
mother or father – in addition to that specified on the form."  
However, the dispositive question is not whether the 
Regulation bars the issuance of the requested birth 
certificates.  The pertinent inquiry is whether the Regulation 
mandates the issuance of the requested birth certificates. 
 
Petitioners do not, in their assignments of error, 
challenge the validity of the Regulation.  Petitioners do not 
assert that the Registrar lacked the authority to promulgate 
the Regulation.  Therefore, I am compelled to apply this 
Regulation. 
 
The Registrar has opined that the Regulation, which I 
note was properly promulgated, does not require the issuance 
of a birth certificate to two people of the same gender who 
adopted a child outside of the Commonwealth.  This Court has 
consistently held that an administrative agency's decision is 
entitled to great weight and deference.  See Carr v. Forst, 
 
19
249 Va. 66, 69, 453 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1995); Commonwealth v. 
Carter, 198 Va. 141, 146-47, 92 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1956); Lee 
Compton Lines v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 411, 414, 65 S.E.2d 
515, 517 (1951).  Additionally, the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia has stated that 
" 'the interpretation which an administrative agency 
gives its [law] must be accorded great deference.'  
Virginia Real Estate Bd. v. Clay, 9 Va. App. 152, 
159, 384 S.E.2d 622, 626 (1989).  'The trial courts 
may reverse the administrative agency's 
interpretation only if the agency's construction of 
its [law] is arbitrary or capricious or fails to 
fulfill the agency's purpose as defined by its basic 
law.'  Id. at 161, 384 S.E.2d at 627." 
 
Jackson v. W., 14 Va. App. 391, 400-401, 419 S.E.2d 385, 390 
(1992).  Applying the well-established precedent of this Court 
and of the Court of Appeals, I would accord the Registrar's 
interpretation of Code § 32.1-261 the deference to which it is 
entitled, and I would affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court. 
III. 
Furthermore, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that may 
be used to compel a public official, such as the Registrar, to 
perform a duty that is purely ministerial and is imposed upon 
the official by law.  Hertz v. Times-World Corp., 259 Va. 599, 
607, 528 S.E.2d 458, 462 (2000); Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 
365, 369, 514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999); Town of Front Royal v. 
 
20
Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp., 248 Va. 
581, 584, 449 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1994). 
 
In Gannon v. State Corp. Comm'n, 243 Va. 480, 482, 416 
S.E.2d 446, 447 (1992), we stated the following principles 
that are pertinent here: 
" 'A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary 
remedial process, which is not awarded as a matter 
of right but in the exercise of a sound judicial 
discretion.  Due to the drastic character of the 
writ, the law has placed safeguards around it.  
Consideration should be had for the urgency which 
prompts an exercise of the discretion, the interests 
of the public and third persons, the results which 
would follow upon a refusal of the writ, as well as 
the promotion of substantial justice.  In doubtful 
cases the writ will be denied, but where the right 
involved and the duty sought to be enforced are 
clear and certain . . . the writ will issue.' " 
 
Accord Williams v. Matthews, 248 Va. 277, 281, 448 S.E.2d 625, 
627 (1994); Early Used Cars, Inc. v. Province, 218 Va. 605, 
609, 239 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1977); Board of County Supervisors v. 
Hylton Enterprises, Inc., 216 Va. 582, 584, 221 S.E.2d 534, 
536 (1976); Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R.R. v. 
Fugate, 206 Va. 159, 162, 142 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1965); 
Milliner's Adm'r. v. Harrison, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 422, 426 
(1879); Tyler v. Taylor, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 765, 766-67 
(1878). 
 
I conclude, as the circuit court implicitly ruled, that 
awarding a writ of mandamus compelling the Registrar to issue 
a birth certificate identifying the names of two parents of 
 
21
the same gender is contrary to the appropriate use of 
mandamus.  The petitioners do not have a clear and certain 
right to the issuance of such certificates.  Neither Code 
§ 32.1-261 nor the Regulation compels such result. 
 
And, the issuance of a birth certificate that identifies 
two people of the same gender as parents is inconsistent with 
the public policy of this Commonwealth.  See Code § 20-45.2 
(prohibiting recognition of same-sex relationships).  Indeed, 
the General Assembly has not authorized adoptions by two 
people of the same gender in Virginia.  See Code § 63.2-1201.  
Consequently, I do not believe that the petitioners have 
demonstrated an entitlement to this extraordinary remedial 
process. 
I also note that petitioners' constitutional arguments 
lack merit.  Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
 
 
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