Title: Branch v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-190 
____________ 
 
ERIC SCOTT BRANCH, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-218 
____________ 
 
ERIC SCOTT BRANCH, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[February 15, 2018] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Eric Scott Branch, a prisoner under sentence of death with an active death 
warrant, appeals a circuit court order summarily denying his second successive 
motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
 
 
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Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the following reasons, we 
affirm the circuit court’s denial of the motion and deny the habeas petition. 
FACTS AND RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Branch was convicted of first-degree murder, sexual battery, and grand theft 
in connection with the killing of Susan Morris.  Branch v. State (Branch I), 685 So. 
2d 1250 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1218 (1997).  We described the facts of 
the murder on direct appeal as follows: 
Eric Branch was wanted by police in Indiana and because the 
car he was driving, a Pontiac, could be traced to him, he decided to 
steal a car from the campus of the University of West Florida 
[(UWF)] in Pensacola.  When Susan Morris, a young college student, 
approached her car after attending an evening class [on] January 11, 
1993, Branch accosted her and stole her red Toyota.  Morris’s nude 
body was found later in nearby woods; she had been beaten, stomped, 
sexually assaulted and strangled.  She bore numerous bruises and 
lacerations, both eyes were swollen shut, and a wooden stick was 
broken off in her vagina. 
 
 
Id. at 1251-52.  The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of ten to two, 
and the trial court followed that recommendation.  Id. at 1252.  The trial court 
found the existence of three aggravating factors1 and four mitigating 
                                          
 
 
1.  The murder was committed during a sexual battery; Branch had been 
convicted of a prior violent felony in the State of Indiana; and the murder was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  Branch I, 685 So. 2d at 1252 n.1. 
 
 
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circumstances.2  Id. at 1252.  On direct appeal, we affirmed Branch’s convictions 
and sentences.  Id. at 1253.  In 2006, we affirmed the circuit court’s denial of 
Branch’s initial motion for postconviction relief and denied his initial petition for 
writ of habeas corpus.  Branch v. State (Branch II), 952 So. 2d 470, 473 (Fla. 
2006). 
Branch subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.  Branch v. McDonough 
(Branch III), 779 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (N.D. Fla. 2010).  The federal district court 
denied the petition, but issued a limited certificate of appealability.  Id. at 1330.  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment 
denying federal habeas corpus relief.  Branch v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. (Branch 
IV), 638 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 
In 2016, we affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Branch’s motion for 
postconviction DNA testing filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.853 and section 925.11, Florida Statutes (2015).  Branch v. State (Branch V), No. 
SC15-1869, 2016 WL 4182823 (Fla. Aug. 8, 2016).  On January 22, 2018, we 
affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Branch’s first successive motion for 
                                          
 
 
2.  Branch had an unstable childhood; Branch possessed positive personality 
traits; Branch behaved acceptably during trial; and Branch was remorseful.  Id. at 
n.2. 
 
 
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postconviction relief.  Branch v. State (Branch VI), No. SC17-1509, 2018 WL 
495024 (Fla. Jan. 22, 2018). 
 
On January 19, 2018, Governor Rick Scott signed a death warrant for 
Branch and scheduled his execution for February 22, 2018.  On January 29, 2018, 
Branch filed his second successive motion for postconviction relief, raising two 
claims.  First, Branch contended that because he was twenty-one years old at the 
time of the murder,3 executing him would violate the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution based upon Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  In 
Roper, the United States Supreme Court held that executing individuals who were 
under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes is prohibited by the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 578-79.  Branch asserted (1) there is an emerging 
consensus in the medical community that the brain continues to develop through 
the mid-twenties, such that young adults are cognitively comparable to juveniles, 
and this consensus constitutes newly discovered evidence; (2) a national consensus 
has developed that individuals who were in their late teens and early twenties at the 
time of their crimes should not be executed; and (3) the criminal laws of other 
states and international law generally reflect that offenders who were in their late 
teens and early twenties at the time of their crimes are treated differently than older 
                                          
 
 
3.  Branch turned twenty-two less than one month after the murder. 
 
 
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offenders.  Branch additionally contended that the physical, emotional, and sexual 
trauma he suffered during his childhood and young adulthood, coupled with 
substance abuse, further impaired and delayed his brain development.  Branch’s 
second claim was that the length of time he has spent on death row constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
On February 1, 2018, the circuit court denied Branch’s motion without an 
evidentiary hearing and denied Branch’s application for stay of execution.  This 
appeal follows.  Branch also filed with this Court a motion for stay of execution 
and a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the prior violent 
felony aggravating factor found by the trial court. 
ANALYSIS 
Public Records Requests 
 
Branch first challenges the circuit court’s denial of his requests for public 
records pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852.  We have explained: 
[The] denial of public records requests are reviewed under the abuse 
of discretion standard.  See Dennis v. State, 109 So. 3d 680, 698 (Fla. 
2012); Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1149 (Fla. 2006).  “Discretion 
is abused only when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused 
only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the 
trial court.”  State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003) (quoting 
White v. State, 817 So. 2d 799, 806 (2002)).  The Court has long 
acknowledged that the public records procedure under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.852 “is not intended to be a procedure 
authorizing a fishing expedition for records unrelated to a colorable 
claim for postconviction relief.”  Valle [v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 549 
 
 
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(Fla. 2011)] (quoting Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199, 204 (Fla. 2002) 
(quoting Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243, 253 (Fla. 2001))). 
Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 200 (Fla. 2013).  A defendant “bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the records sought relate to a colorable claim for 
postconviction relief.”  Chavez v. State, 132 So. 3d 826, 829 (Fla. 2014) (citing 
Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1163 (Fla. 2013)). 
 
Branch initially sought extensive records from multiple entities, but later 
narrowed the requests to records relating to the expiration dates of the drugs the 
Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) plans to use during his execution and 
records relating to the autopsy of Patrick Charles Hannon, the last inmate to be 
executed under Florida’s current lethal injection protocol.  We have previously 
held that these types of requests are unlikely to lead to a colorable claim for 
postconviction relief.  See, e.g., Hannon v. State, 228 So. 3d 505, 511 (Fla. 2017); 
Chavez, 132 So. 3d at 830; Muhammad, 132 So. 3d at 203, 206.  Specifically, with 
respect to Branch’s assertion that the DOC’s supply of execution drugs may be 
expired, this Court has stated that it will presume “the DOC will act in accordance 
with its protocol and carry out its duties properly.  This same presumption would 
extend to presume that the DOC will obtain viable versions of the drugs it intends 
to use and confirm before use that the drugs are still viable, as the protocol 
 
 
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requires.”  Muhammad, 132 So. 3d at 206 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).4  
Similarly, we have explained that autopsy records are not likely to lead to a 
colorable claim because they “would not establish when the inmates became 
unconscious or whether they experienced pain during their executions.”  Chavez, 
132 So. 3d at 830.  Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied these requests, and we reject this claim. 
Eligibility for the Death Penalty 
Branch next contends that the circuit court erred when it summarily denied 
his claim that he is ineligible for the death penalty.  However, the Supreme Court 
in Roper designated eighteen as the critical age for determining death eligibility, 
stating: 
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the 
objections always raised against categorical rules.  The qualities that 
distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual 
turns 18.  By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a 
level of maturity some adults will never reach. . . .  [H]owever, a line 
must be drawn.  . . .  The age of 18 is the point where society draws 
the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.  It is, 
we conclude, the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to 
rest. 
                                          
 
 
4.  The current DOC lethal injection protocol provides that “[a] designated 
execution team member will purchase, and at all times ensure a sufficient supply 
of, the chemicals to be used in the lethal injection process.  The designated team 
member will ensure that the lethal chemicals have not reached or surpassed their 
expiration dates.”  Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Execution by Lethal Injection Procedures 4 
(2017), http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/lethal-injection-procedures-as-
of_01-04-17.pdf (emphasis added). 
 
 
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543 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).  Branch argues for an expansion of Roper on 
the basis that newly discovered evidence—in the form of scientific research with 
respect to development of the human brain, as well as the evolution of state and 
international law—mandates that individuals who committed murder in their late 
teens and early twenties be treated like juveniles.5  The circuit court properly 
denied this claim without an evidentiary hearing. 
First, this issue is procedurally barred.  The trial court’s order sentencing 
Branch to death found that Branch’s age was not a mitigating circumstance: 
The defendant was twenty-one years of age at the time of this offense.  
There was testimony from the defendant’s brother and grandfather 
that he was not particularly mature for his age, and that he frequently 
requested the assistance of relatives, primarily his grandfather, in 
making important decisions.  The defendant did not, however, appear 
to be mentally deficient in any way.  He assisted his counsel 
throughout trial, and testified at trial with great specificity and detail.  
The defendant’s age at the time of the crime is not a mitigating factor. 
                                          
 
 
5.  Branch further relies upon American Bar Association Resolution 111 
which “urges each jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment to prohibit the 
imposition of a death sentence on or execution of any individual who was 21 years 
old or younger at the time of the offense.”  ABA House of Delegates Resolution 
111 (adopted Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/mym2018res/111.
pdf.  The resolution is based on the same considerations as those presented by 
Branch in these proceedings.  See, e.g., A.B.A. Death Penalty Due Process Rev. 
Project & Sec. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just., Report to the House of Delegates 3 (2018) 
(“The newly-understood similarities between juvenile and late adolescent brains, 
as well as the evolution of death penalty law and relevant standards under the 
Eighth Amendment lead to the clear conclusion that individuals in late adolescence 
should be exempted from capital punishment.”). 
 
 
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On direct appeal, Branch did not challenge the trial court’s rejection of age as a 
mitigating circumstance.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court decided Roper on 
March 1, 2005.  Branch filed the habeas petition in Branch II on August 31, 2005, 
and he did not assert that he was ineligible for execution pursuant to Roper.  
Accordingly, this claim is waived as it could have been raised previously. 
Second, we have rejected similar claims on the basis that scientific research 
with respect to brain development does not qualify as newly discovered evidence.  
For example, in Morton v. State, 995 So. 2d 233, 245 (Fla. 2008), the defendant 
claimed that a 2004 brain mapping study established that sections of the human 
brain are not fully developed until the age of twenty-five.  He argued this 
constituted newly discovered evidence which required a reweighing of his age—
nineteen-and-a-half years old at the time of the murder—as a mitigating 
circumstance.  Id.  In rejecting this claim, we stated: 
We have previously rejected recognizing “new research studies” as 
newly discovered evidence if based on previously available data.  See 
Schwab [v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 (Fla. 2007)] (citing Diaz v. 
State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1144 (Fla. 2006) (concluding doctor’s letter 
addressing lethal injection research was not newly discovered 
evidence because conclusions in letter were based on old data)).  
Although this 2004 brain mapping study had not yet been published at 
the time of Morton’s trials, Morton or his counsel could have 
discovered similar research at that time that stated that the human 
brain was not fully developed until early adulthood.  See Jay D. 
Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 
13 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 115, 120 (2007) (“In the past few 
decades . . . neuroscientists have discovered that two key 
developmental processes, myelination . . . and pruning of neural 
 
 
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connections, continue to take place during adolescence and well into 
adulthood . . . .  [B]rain regions responsible for basic life processes 
and sensory perception tend to mature fastest, whereas the regions 
responsible for behavioral inhibition and control, risk assessment, 
decision making, and emotion maturing take longer (Yakovlev & 
Lecours, 1967).”).  Therefore, the 2004 study would not constitute 
newly discovered evidence and the trial court correctly denied this 
claim without an evidentiary hearing. 
Id. at 245-46 (some alterations in original).  We further rejected on the merits 
Morton’s claim that he was entitled to relief pursuant to Roper: 
Roper has no application here where the facts are undisputed that 
Morton’s chronological age was above nineteen at the time he 
committed the crimes.  Because it is impossible for Morton to 
demonstrate that he falls within the ages of exemption, his claim is 
facially insufficient and it was proper for the court to deny Morton a 
hearing on this claim. 
Id. at 245. 
 
Similarly, in Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 2014), the defendant—who 
was under an active death warrant—contended that he was not eligible for the 
death penalty because, despite his chronological age of twenty-five at the time of 
the murder, he was the “functional equivalent of a child.”  Id. at 870.  The 
defendant relied upon “allegedly newly discovered evidence regarding the effects 
of alcoholism and sexual abuse on brain development in children, and . . . Roper.”  
Id. at 874.  This Court concluded that the evidence presented by the defendant was 
not newly discovered and, even if it was, the claim would still fail on the merits: 
The studies cited by Davis, addressing the effects of alcoholism 
and sexual abuse on brain development, do not constitute newly 
 
 
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discovered evidence.  This Court has previously stated that it “has not 
recognized ‘new opinions’ or ‘new research studies’ as newly 
discovered evidence.”  Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 (Fla. 
2007).  The articles that Davis relies upon fall squarely within this 
subject area and therefore do not constitute newly discovered 
evidence.  See Farina v. State, 992 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2008) (table 
decision) (holding that a “study on brain mapping is not newly 
discovered evidence”); Schwab, 969 So. 2d at 325 (concluding that 
“two recent scientific articles regarding brain anatomy and sexual 
offense” did not constitute newly discovered evidence). 
Further, as explained above, even if these recently published 
articles were considered newly discovered evidence, Davis still fails 
to put forth a cognizable claim.  The United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roper prohibits the execution of those individuals “who 
were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”  543 
U.S. at 578, 125 S. Ct. 1183.  In interpreting the Supreme Court’s 
decision, this Court has previously stated that “Roper only prohibits 
the execution of those defendants whose chronological age is below 
eighteen.”  Hill [v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 2006)].  Therefore, 
because Davis was over the age of eighteen when he committed 
murder, Roper does not apply, and his claim is without merit. 
 
Id. at 875-76. 
 
Finally, the United States Supreme Court has continued to identify eighteen 
as the critical age for purposes of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  See Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory sentences of life 
without parole for homicide offenders who committed their crimes before the age 
of eighteen); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74-75 (2010) (prohibiting sentences 
of life without parole for nonhomicide offenders who committed their crimes 
before the age of eighteen).  Therefore, unless the United States Supreme Court 
 
 
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determines that the age of ineligibility for the death penalty should be extended, we 
will continue to adhere to Roper. 
 
Accordingly, Branch is eligible for execution because he was not under the 
age of eighteen at the time he murdered Morris, and the circuit court properly 
denied this claim without an evidentiary hearing. 
Length of Time on Death Row 
 
Next, Branch contends that the length of time he has spent on death row—
almost twenty-four years—amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment.  We rejected a similar claim in Correll v. State, 184 So. 3d 
478 (Fla. 2015), where the inmate had been on death row for over twenty-nine 
years: 
[T]his Court has repeatedly rejected such challenges.  See, e.g., Pardo 
v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 569 (Fla. 2012) (twenty-four years); 
Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 27 (Fla. 2010) (almost twenty-five 
years); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1085 (Fla. 2008) (twenty-
three years); Booker v. State, 969 So. 2d 186, 200 (Fla. 2007) (almost 
thirty years).  Further, executions of inmates who have been on death 
row as long as, or longer than, Correll have been permitted.  See, e.g., 
Ferguson v. State, 101 So. 3d 362, 366 (Fla. 2012) (more than thirty 
years); Waterhouse v. State, 82 So. 3d 84, 87 (Fla. 2012) (more than 
thirty-one years); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 552 (Fla. 2011) 
(thirty-three years). 
Id. at 486.  We decline to recede from our longstanding precedent, and we affirm 
the denial of this claim. 
 
 
 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Branch has repeatedly challenged the validity of the prior violent felony 
aggravating factor, which was based upon his Indiana conviction for the crime of 
sexual battery.  In his habeas petition, Branch again challenges this aggravating 
factor.  In brief, he argues that his Indiana conviction for sexual battery was not a 
violent felony under Florida law, the trial court should not have instructed the jury 
that sexual battery is a crime of violence, and the trial court improperly relied on 
the Indiana conviction to establish the prior violent felony aggravating factor.  
These claims should have been or were raised on direct appeal and are, therefore, 
procedurally barred.  See Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1992) 
(“Habeas corpus is not a second appeal and cannot be used to litigate or relitigate 
issues which could have been, should have been, or were raised on direct appeal.”); 
see also id. (“Using different grounds to reargue the same issue is also improper.”). 
Moreover, we concluded in Branch II that even if the Indiana conviction did 
not qualify as a prior violent felony, any error was harmless: 
Here, the trial court found two other significant aggravators: the 
murder was committed in the course of a sexual battery and was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  The trial court determined that 
the mitigating evidence was marginal.  Moreover, contrary to 
Branch’s assertions, the mitigating evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing adds little more to what was previously presented. 
 
952 So. 2d at 482.  We have previously stated that the heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
aggravating factor is “qualitatively among the weightiest aggravating 
 
 
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circumstances.”  Kaczmar v. State, 228 So. 3d 1, 15 (Fla. 2017).  With respect to 
this aggravating factor, the trial court found: 
 
The victim in this case was attacked in a parking lot at [UWF] 
following an evening class.  She was carried or dragged from the 
parking lot to a remote wooded area.  Her clothes were removed and 
she was both beaten and strangled, in addition to being sexually 
battered.  She sustained multiple bruises and abrasions of the face and 
head.  There were also abrasions and contusions corresponding to the 
sock which was tied around her neck.  Injuries to the internal portions 
of her neck include fractures of the larynx and hyoid bone.  The 
medical examiner stated that these internal injuries were commonly 
seen either from a manual compression of the neck or from an injury 
in which the assailant stamps on the victim’s neck with his foot while 
the victim, in a supine position, has her head and face against a firm 
surface such as the earth.  The medical examiner testified that the 
victim had injuries to her forearms and hands which were 
characterized as defensive in nature.  He testified that such injuries are 
commonly seen in victims who are receiving a beating, and who 
attempt to ward off the blows by raising their hands and arms up to 
the face.  The medical examiner testified he could not be certain 
whether death was caused by the multiple blows to the head or by 
strangulation. . . .  The medical examiner testified that out of more 
than three thousand autopsies which he has performed, this one will 
stand out in his mind as a result of the brutality of the injuries. 
 
. . . . 
 
. . .  [I]t is clear that the injuries inflicted on the victim which 
led to her death were committed with the intent to inflict extreme 
pain. 
 
Because Branch’s habeas claims are both procedurally barred and without merit, 
he is not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Branch’s 
second successive postconviction motion and deny his successive petition for writ 
 
 
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of habeas corpus.  Because Branch is not entitled to relief, we deny his motion for 
stay of execution.  No oral argument is necessary, and no rehearing will be 
entertained by this Court.  The mandate shall issue immediately. 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and LAWSON, JJ., concur.  
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County,  
Edward P. Nickinson, III, Judge - Case No. 171993CF000870XXXAXX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Robert S. Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Stacy Biggart and 
Kathleen Pafford, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern Region, 
Tallahassee, Florida; Billy H. Nolas, Chief, and Kimberly Sharkey, Attorney, 
Capital Habeas Unit, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Northern District of 
Florida, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Charmaine M. Millsaps, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, and Lisa A. Hopkins, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent