Title: State v. Howard

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 10–1742 
 
Filed December 21, 2012 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
ROBERT ANTHONY HOWARD, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Mark J. 
Smith and Marlita A. Greve, Judges. 
 
 
Defendant appeals his convictions for second-degree sexual abuse and 
child endangerment, contending his confession was tainted by a promise of 
leniency.  DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS VACATED, JUDGMENT 
OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED FOR NEW 
TRIAL.   
 
 
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis D. Hendrickson 
and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney 
General, and Alan R. Ostergren, County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
 
2 
 
WATERMAN, Justice. 
 
After the police detective questioning him promised treatment and 
implied he would go free if he completed treatment, defendant, Robert Howard, 
confessed to sexually abusing his girlfriend’s son.  Howard contends his 
confession is inadmissible under our caselaw prohibiting the use of confessions 
obtained following a promise of leniency.  The district court denied Howard’s 
motion to suppress his confession, and the jury that heard his confession 
convicted him of second-degree sexual abuse and child endangerment.  A 
divided court of appeals affirmed his convictions and twenty-five-year sentence.  
We granted Howard’s application for further review.   
 
For the reasons explained below, we conclude the detective’s questioning 
crossed the line into an improper promise of leniency under our long-standing 
precedents, rendering Howard’s subsequent confession inadmissible.  The 
exclusionary rule we enforce again today protects the innocent from a police 
tactic that can induce false confessions.  The error in admitting his confession 
was not harmless.  Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, 
reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for a new trial.   
 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings.   
 
On January 14, 2010, Howard and his girlfriend, Jessica, took her then 
seventeen-month-old son, A.E., to the doctor’s office after discovering blood in 
his diaper.  Dr. Colette Hostetler examined the baby.  Howard and Jessica told 
Dr. Hostetler that they believed A.E.’s injuries may have been caused by a hard 
stool.  During her examination of the infant, Dr. Hostetler observed a laceration 
near the top of A.E.’s anus, bruising, swelling, and signs that the blood flow to 
that area had recently increased.  As Dr. Hostetler later testified, she 
determined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the cause of the 
bleeding was blunt penetration trauma to A.E.’s anus.  She also determined 
the injuries occurred within several hours of A.E. being brought to the clinic 
 
3 
 
and that, “[b]ecause of the pattern of bruising, . . . [the penetrating object] was 
bigger than a pencil or a finger but small enough to fit in that area.”   
 
In reaching her conclusions regarding the cause of the injuries, 
Dr. Hostetler specifically rejected the claim that the injuries were caused by a 
hard bowel movement  
[b]ecause of the pattern of the injury being mostly external to the 
anal canal, where stools cause an injury that is in the anus or just 
a little ways beyond that.  And the bruising that was present was 
indicating that there was a blunt force externally.  
Dr. Hostetler also noted that bleeding caused by a hard bowel movement is 
more common with adults than children.   
 
Howard and Jessica had been in a relationship for approximately six 
months.  Howard was spending three to four nights a week at Jessica’s 
parents’ home, where she lived with A.E.  He spent January 13 there, the night 
before they took A.E. to the clinic.  On the morning of January 14, Howard 
went to court for a traffic ticket and then he, Jessica, and A.E. drove to Illinois 
to deliver some clothes to Howard’s cousin.  Before returning home, they 
stopped at a friend’s house and picked up some food and soda.   
 
After running these errands, Howard and Jessica returned with A.E. to 
Jessica’s parents’ home.  No one else was there.  The home’s power went out 
while they were there.  The fuse box was located in a locked room.  Jessica did 
not have a key for this room, so she called her mother, who was working about 
five to six minutes away.  Jessica decided she would go to get her mother’s key.  
About thirty minutes before leaving, Jessica changed A.E. and saw no blood in 
his diaper or anything abnormal.  She put A.E. down for a nap in his crib in 
the living room.   
 
Jessica was away from the house for around twenty minutes.  After she 
arrived at her mother’s workplace, Jessica stayed for about ten minutes talking 
with her mother.  While there, Jessica received a call from Howard.  Howard 
 
4 
 
told Jessica he had discovered blood in A.E.’s diaper while he was changing 
him.  Jessica returned home to find A.E. lying on his stomach, in his crib, 
screaming.  Howard was lying on the floor.   
 
Jessica checked A.E.’s diaper and found blood in it.  Jessica called 
Howard’s mother to ask her what could be the cause of the blood.  Howard’s 
mother indicated that the blood may have been caused by a hard stool, but 
recommended that they contact a doctor.  A.E. had not had any bloody stools 
before this day.  Jessica called the clinic where she usually took A.E. and was 
told to bring him.  Before they left the house together to take the baby to the 
doctor, Howard took a shower and changed his clothes.  On the way to the 
clinic, Howard stopped at a friend’s house for a few minutes.  Jessica and A.E. 
stayed in the truck during this stop.   
 
After Dr. Hostetler finished examining A.E., she contacted the Iowa 
Department of Human Services (IDHS) as a mandatory reporter under Iowa law 
because she suspected A.E.’s anal penetration injuries were caused by child 
abuse.  Dustin Krueger of the IDHS and Detective Tim Hull of the Muscatine 
Police Department responded and arrived at the clinic to investigate the report.  
Detective Hull and Krueger interviewed Jessica and Howard separately.  
Detective Hull did not read Howard his Miranda rights and did not tell Howard 
he was recording their conversation.   
 
Early in their recorded conversation, Howard told Detective Hull he has a 
pending charge for assault that resulted from a physical altercation he had 
with an eighteen-year-old who “told [Howard’s] 13-year-old sister to suck his 
dick.”  In response, Detective Hull said, “You know, I can see how that would 
make you angry because if you have sex with a 13-year-old, it’s actually a 25-
year prison sentence . . . .”   
 
Howard initially told Detective Hull and Krueger that he did not know 
what caused A.E.’s injuries, but suspected it could have been caused by a hard 
 
5 
 
stool.  According to Howard’s initial account, shortly after Jessica left, Howard 
had checked on A.E. and found he was not sleeping, so he took A.E. out of his 
crib and let him run around and play with his toys.  At some point, Howard 
noticed that A.E.’s diaper needed to be changed.  While he was changing A.E., 
Howard found blood and a hard stool in his diaper.  Howard called Jessica to 
tell her.   
 
As Detective Hull and Krueger continued their interview, Howard told 
them he did not see A.E. get hurt, cry, or otherwise suggest that he had been 
hurt at any time that day or while A.E. was up running around.  Howard also 
confirmed that the only people who had come into contact with A.E. between 
noon and 3 p.m. were Jessica, a friend, and himself, and the friend was never 
alone with A.E.  After Howard admitted that he and Jessica were the only two 
people who had been alone with A.E. during that time, the following exchange 
occurred:  
 
MR. KRUEGER: Do you think Jessica would do something 
like this?   
 
[HOWARD]: No.  To be honest, Jessica don’t even yell at that 
kid.  To be honest, she’s one of the most perfect mothers I ever 
seen.   
 
As the interview continued, Detective Hull began discussing the proper 
punishment for someone who abuses a child.  It is the following exchange that 
begins what Howard contends became an improper promise of leniency:1  
 
DETECTIVE HULL: So what do you think should happen to 
somebody if they stuck their finger or stuck some foreign object in 
some kid’s butt?   
                                      
 
1We agree with Howard that this is the point at which Detective Hull began to make 
impermissible promises of leniency.  Accordingly, as we explain below, everything discussed 
after this point, including his confession, is inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief; 
however, everything discussed before the line was crossed remains admissible.  See State v. 
Madsen, 813 N.W.2d 714, 727 (Iowa 2012) (“These statements were properly admitted into 
evidence because Madsen made the statements before the detective’s promise of leniency.”).   
 
6 
 
 
[HOWARD]: I think they should be punished.   
 
DETECTIVE 
HULL: 
What 
do 
you 
think 
should 
be 
punishment?   
 
[HOWARD]: I don’t know.  I’m not a cop.  I don’t know the 
laws are around here.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Well, what do you think?   
 
[HOWARD]: I don’t know.  I just – I don’t think – I don’t 
know.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: What if some guy had kind of like a 
sickness and he couldn’t control himself and he stuck his penis in 
a year-and-a-half-year-old’s butt?  What do you think should 
happen to him?  Do you think he should get the help he needs?  
You know, because, obviously, he’s sick and needs help.   
 
[HOWARD]: He should go to a hospital where they can help 
him or something.  I don’t know.   
 
 DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  How long should he be in the 
hospital, just until he gets treated for his sickness?   
 
[HOWARD]: Yeah.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  How do we get the help, get you 
the help you need?   
 
[HOWARD]: You really think I did it?   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: I’m just asking you.  Do you need help?  
Do you think we should help you?  There’s people out there that 
can help you.   
Howard continued to deny that he had sexually abused A.E.   
 
As Detective Hull continued asking Howard what happened that day, the 
conversation returned to the “help” that is available for people who sexually 
abuse children and about Howard’s future plans:  
 
DETECTIVE HULL: . . . Well, what do you think should 
happen to someone who would do something like this to a child?   
 
[HOWARD]: They should go to a hospital and get help.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  Because, you know, people can be 
helped that have these types of problems.  And they can grow up 
or get older and, you know, get away from these urges and be a 
regular person.   
 
. . . .   
 
[HOWARD]: What happens to people like that, though?  I’ve 
never met someone like that, whatever it is, like with little kids or 
anything.   
 
7 
 
 
DETECTIVE HULL: There’s doctors and nurses that treat 
them and just like any other sickness.   
 
[HOWARD]: I know.  But, like, where do they go?  Do you 
know what I’m trying to say?   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: To a treatment center like people go to 
treatment centers for drug addictions.   
 
[HOWARD]: Yeah.  I’ve been to New Horizons.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: It’s a treatment center for sex addiction.  
Their addiction is, you know, with children.  You know, a lot of 
people don’t want to talk about that stuff; but it happens.  We deal 
with this a lot.  You know, we have dozens of cases like this every 
year.  You know, people go get the treatment they need; and, you 
know, then they can prove they can be around children again.   
 
They have to pass the program and make sure they’re going 
to be safe around kids, and they graduate.  And, you know, then 
they have to slowly prove they can be around kids without doing 
harm to them.   
 
. . . .   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  Do you agree with what happened 
today that that person just needs some help so they don’t do this 
again, they don’t ever harm another child?   
 
[HOWARD]: Yeah.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Because, I mean, there is help out there.  
So what kind of help do you need?   
 
[HOWARD]: Help from there, I guess.   
 
. . . .   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  And if I’m you – Where would you 
like to be five years from now?   
 
[HOWARD]: Five years for me?   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Yeah.   
 
[HOWARD]: Well, five years I wish I could have my school 
under my belt.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Right.   
 
[HOWARD]: And be a nice mechanic and have my own house 
and have a family.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  So you could earn a good living.   
 
[HOWARD]: Yeah.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  And little Alex will be running 
around about that time be six and a half?   
 
[HOWARD]: Have whatever he wants.   
 
8 
 
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Maybe you and Jessica could even have 
another child; and you can be normal, right?   
 
[HOWARD]: Yeah.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  So how do we get from here to 
there?   
 
. . . .   
 
[HOWARD]: Well, I’m looking to go to school.  I’m looking for 
a job, so I am trying.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  The first thing is that we get you 
help, right?   
 
[HOWARD]: Yes.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  So are you ready to tell us what 
happened today or – Because this is the time right now.   
 
I know it’s difficult for you, but I know you love [A.E.] and 
you love Jessica.  And she loves you.  She told us that, okay?  And 
she does want you to be the father figure that [biological father] 
isn’t, okay?  He’s not going to be that person.  She wants you to be 
that person.  She told us so.  Okay?   
 
. . . .   
 
Okay.  So what happened with [A.E.] today?  Come on, I 
really do want to help you.   
 
[HOWARD]: Okay.  Help me.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL:  So how did this happen?   
 
[HOWARD]: Like you guys said.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  How is that?   
 
You’re just sick, Robert.  You need help.   
 
[HOWARD]: I know.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  So how do we get you there, from 
here to there?  How do we do it?  I mean, do you have urges that 
you can’t control?   
 
[HOWARD]: No.  (Crying)   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: No, okay.   
 
[HOWARD]: I don’t know what brought it on.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  What brought what on?   
 
[HOWARD]: Doing that.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Okay.  What did you do?   
 
[HOWARD]: (No response).   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: You know that no matter what you tell 
me today, I’ll give you a ride home, drop you off, wherever you 
want to go as long as we can promise that Jessica and [A.E.] can 
 
9 
 
[be] safe . . . and you’re not going to contact them until we know 
that Jessica and [A.E.] are going to be safe and you get the help 
you need, okay.   
 
I’ll give you a ride wherever you want to go, okay?  Like I say, 
you just got to promise that you’re not going to have contact with 
[A.E.] and Jessica for a couple weeks, okay?  So what happened?   
 
[HOWARD]: I put my penis in.   
 
. . . .   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: How long did you do that for?   
 
[HOWARD]: Just a minute.   
 
DETECTIVE HULL: Just a minute?   
 
[HOWARD]: Yeah.  Just until he started crying.   
 
Detective Hull, as he promised, let Howard go home that evening.  On 
January 20, Howard was charged with second-degree sexual abuse and child 
endangerment causing bodily injury.  Howard moved to suppress his 
confession alleging that the state violated Miranda2 and that his confession was 
involuntary under the totality-of-the-circumstances and evidentiary tests.  
Howard claimed his confession was involuntary because “[Detective] Hull made 
promises of ‘help’ if the Defendant admitted to the crime.”  Howard argued 
these statements amounted to “improper influence, and direct and indirect 
promises of help and leniency,” and that, accordingly, Howard’s confession 
should be suppressed.  The district court denied Howard’s motion to suppress, 
concluding  
statements that an individual needs treatment . . . and a promise 
to get help for the defendant [do] not constitute a promise of 
leniency in that Detective Hull never referred to avoiding 
incarceration, that it would go better for the defendant if he told 
the truth, or that the statements would have any effect on further 
criminal prosecution. 
 
At trial, the jury heard testimony from three state witnesses: Jessica, 
Detective Hull, and Dr. Hostetler.  Howard’s recorded confession was played for 
                                      
 
2Howard does not appeal from the district court’s ruling on his Miranda claim. 
 
10 
 
the jury.  Howard testified and denied having sexual contact with A.E.  Howard 
explained that he confessed during the interview with Detective Hull and 
Krueger because he sought to prevent A.E. from being taken from Jessica.  
Howard claimed he believed that if he did not confess A.E. would not be able to 
go home with Jessica that evening because the cause of A.E.’s injuries would 
still be unknown.  The prosecutor emphasized Howard’s confession in his 
closing argument, asserting that “it buries him.”   
 
The jury found Howard guilty of second-degree sexual abuse and child 
endangerment causing bodily injury.  The district court denied Howard’s 
motion for a new trial and sentenced him to twenty-five years for the second-
degree sexual abuse charge and five years for the child endangerment, with the 
sentences to run concurrently. 
 
Howard appealed, contending the district court erred in admitting his 
confession into evidence because Detective Hull’s statements about getting 
Howard help were impermissible promises of leniency.  We transferred the case 
to the court of appeals.   
 
The appeal was heard by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals, 
which affirmed his convictions, with one judge dissenting.  The majority 
concluded that “[a]lthough we are troubled by Officer Hull’s several statements 
about getting Howard ‘help’ and ‘treatment,’ no promise of leniency in 
prosecution or sentencing was made.”  The majority emphasized that Detective 
“Hull did not state or imply ‘help’ would be in lieu of criminal charges.”  The 
majority, thus, concluded that “[t]he officer never crossed the line to explain 
‘what advantage is to be gained or is likely from making a confession.’ ” 
 
The dissent concluded that Howard’s confession was inadmissible 
because “the accused was repeatedly and deliberately presented with the idea 
that his confession would lead to treatment and not to prosecution.”  The 
dissent further noted that:  
 
11 
 
Howard confessed as a result of the officer’s deliberate ruse which 
implied that treatment in lieu of incarceration would follow, that 
Howard would have the ability to make plans for the next five years 
of his life, that he would be released no matter what he confessed, 
and that he would be permitted to rejoin the family of the child and 
the child’s mother after a short period of no contact with the 
mother and child.  There is no suggestion in this record that 
Officer Hull indicated to Howard that treatment would be merely a 
collateral benefit of incarceration.  Rather, Officer Hull’s tools of 
persuasion were calculated fiction—that a confession would result 
in a ride home, treatment, a short period of no contact with the 
family, followed by a return to unsupervised interaction with 
children and completion of his schooling.   
We granted Howard’s application for further review. 
 
II.  Standard of Review.   
 
Our review of the district court’s ruling on promises of leniency under the 
common law evidentiary test is for corrections of errors at law.  State v. Polk, 
812 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Iowa 2012). 
 
III.  Analysis.   
 
We recently declined the State’s invitation to abandon our common law 
evidentiary rule on promissory leniency in favor of a totality of the 
circumstances test.  State v. Madsen, 813 N.W.2d 714, 726 (Iowa 2012).  We 
directed district courts to “first employ the evidentiary test to determine the 
admissibility of confessions challenged on grounds of a promise of leniency.”  
Id. at 726 n.1.  We also noted that statements made by the defendant during 
the interview before a promise of leniency are not excluded by the evidentiary 
rule.  See id. at 727 (“These statements were properly admitted into evidence 
because Madsen made the statements before the detective’s promise of 
leniency.”). 
 
A.  Promises of Leniency.  In Madsen, we noted “[c]ourts and 
commentators have long recognized promises of leniency can induce false 
confessions leading to wrongful convictions of the innocent.”  Id. at 725.  We 
reiterated that a “confession can never be received in evidence where the 
 
12 
 
prisoner has been influenced by any threat or promise.”  Id. at 724 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  In State v. Mullin, we asked: “Were the 
statements made to the accused strong enough so that it could in reason be 
determined that the prisoner would lie and say he was guilty when he was not, 
so as to gain some special favor?”  249 Iowa 10, 16, 85 N.W.2d 598, 601 
(1957).   
 
We explained the rationale for the promise-of-leniency doctrine as 
follows:  
 
While it is hard to believe that a person would admit false 
facts showing his guilt without greater assurance than is 
sometimes 
held 
sufficient 
to 
make 
inadmissible 
alleged 
confessions, the courts feel compelled to go to the extreme to 
protect the weak or confused innocent party who may feel his 
chances of establishing his innocence are too remote to turn down 
what appears to be an assurance of leniency if he will confess to 
the crime of which he is accused.  It seems more reasonable to 
assume that before an accused would falsify bad conduct for good 
conduct, he would demand some fairly specific assurance or 
promise of leniency, which is the obvious reason for the many 
decisions that a mere statement by an officer that it would be 
better or wiser to tell the truth, is not such an assurance or 
inducement as to make a statement by accused inadmissible.  
However, when the officer or officers go further and explain just 
how it will be better or wiser for the accused to speak, these 
statements may suddenly become more than an admonishment 
and assume the character of an assurance or promise of special 
treatment which may well destroy the voluntary nature of the 
confession in the eyes of the law.   
Id. at 16, 85 N.W.2d at 601–02.   
 
The test “is whether the language used amounts to an inducement which 
is likely to cause the subject to make a false confession.”  Id. at 17, 85 N.W.2d 
at 602.  We find it difficult to believe that an innocent man would falsely 
confess to sodomizing a toddler simply because the interrogating officer 
promises treatment without explicitly promising no other criminal sanctions 
would follow.  But, in Mullin, we also warned, “ ‘the law cannot measure the 
force of the influence used or decide upon its effect on the mind of the 
 
13 
 
prisoner,’ and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence by 
force or other inducement has admittedly been exerted upon him.”  Id. at 14–15, 
85 N.W.2d at 600 (quoting State v. Thomas, 193 Iowa 1004, 1016, 188 N.W. 
689, 694 (1922)).  “The use of a per se exclusionary rule eliminates the need for 
the court to attempt to read the mind of defendant to determine if his 
confession, in fact, was induced by or made in reliance upon the promise of 
leniency.”  Madsen, 813 N.W.2d at 726.  And, as we noted in Polk, “The rule 
suppressing confessions tainted by promises of leniency deters police from 
using a tactic that might induce the innocent to confess falsely.”  Polk, 812 
N.W.2d at 674 (citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.2(b), at 
612–13 (3d ed. 2007) (noting the “exclusionary rule for confessions . . . is also 
intended to deter improper police conduct”)).   
 
The court of appeals majority relied in part on State v. Whitsel, 339 
N.W.2d 149 (Iowa 1983), where we stated, “We do not consider either an offer 
to recommend psychiatric help or an offer to inform the prosecutor of 
defendant’s cooperation to be tantamount to a promise of leniency.”  Id. at 153–
54 (collecting cases).  Whitsel is distinguishable.  In that case, after being given 
a Miranda warning at the police station, “Whitsel volunteered information 
concerning his prior arrest on a sexual abuse charge in New Jersey in which 
the officers offered psychiatric help in exchange for cooperation with the 
police.”  Id. at 153.  The Iowa detectives responded by telling Whitsel they 
would recommend he receive psychiatric treatment. Id.  Here, Detective Hull, 
not Howard, initiated the discussion of treatment.  Importantly, in Whitsel, the 
Iowa detectives “emphasized” to Whitsel “that they could not make any 
promises or give any guarantees and would only relate to the county attorney 
what had been said.”  Id.  Whitsel’s confession followed that disclaimer.  Id.  By 
contrast, Detective Hull, did not Mirandize Howard and never told Howard he 
could not make any promise or guarantee that treatment would be the only 
 
14 
 
consequence, nor did he tell Howard the county attorney would decide whether 
to pursue criminal charges carrying prison sentences.  On the other hand, 
Detective Hull did tell Howard early in the interview that sex with a thirteen-
year old carried a twenty-five year sentence.   
 
It is true, as the court of appeals’ majority noted, Detective Hull never 
overtly told Howard he would receive a lighter sentence if he confessed.  He 
never said an inpatient treatment program would be the only consequence.  He 
stated no quid pro quo out loud.  But, his line of questioning was misleading 
by omission.  As the court of appeals’ well-reasoned dissent aptly observed, 
“Officer Hull’s statements strategically planted in Howard’s mind the idea that 
he would receive treatment, and nothing more, if he confessed.”  See State v. 
McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 28–29 (Iowa 2005) (holding officer’s repeated statement 
to the defendant that “[i]f [he] didn’t pull the trigger, [he] won’t be in any 
trouble” rendered the defendant’s confession inadmissible because it “indicates 
leniency in exchange for defendant’s confession”).  Detective Hull’s repeated 
references to getting help combined with his overt suggestions that after such 
treatment Howard could rejoin Jessica and A.E. conveyed the false impression 
that if Howard admitted to sexually abusing A.E. he merely would be sent to a 
treatment facility similar to that used to treat drug and alcohol addiction in 
lieu of further punishment.  Significantly, Detective Hull did not counter this 
false impression with any disclaimer that he could make no promises or that 
charges would be up to the county attorney.  We hold his interrogation crossed 
the line into an impermissible promise of leniency, rendering the confession 
that followed inadmissible.   
 
B.  Harmless Error.  The State contends we may affirm Howard’s 
convictions because any error in admitting his confession was harmless in light 
of other overwhelming evidence establishing his guilt.  We conclude that, 
although other evidence of Howard’s guilt was strong, we cannot determine the 
 
15 
 
erroneous admission of his confession was harmless.  Howard’s recorded 
confession was played for the jury, and as the prosecutor argued in his final 
summation, “it buries him.”   
 
“ ‘Error . . . predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence’ ” will not provide a defendant with a basis for relief on appeal, 
“ ‘unless a substantial right of the [defendant has been] affected.’ ”  State v. 
Parker, 747 N.W.2d 196, 209 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Iowa R. Evid. 5.103(a)).  We 
presume the defendant’s rights have been prejudiced unless the State can 
affirmatively establish otherwise.  Id.  The State overcomes the presumption of 
prejudice if it can establish that there was overwhelming evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt.  See id. at 210; see also State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700, 705 
(Iowa 1973) (applying the overwhelming evidence standard in assessing 
whether the district court’s error in admitting defendant’s involuntary 
confession was harmless error).   
 
Howard does not argue the evidence was insufficient to convict him 
without the inadmissible confession.  Rather, he argues he is entitled to a new 
trial because the State cannot show the erroneous admission of his confession 
was harmless error.  The remaining evidence against him was largely 
circumstantial.  “Circumstantial evidence is equally probative as direct 
evidence for the State to use to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  State v. Brubaker, 805 N.W.2d 164, 172 (Iowa 2011).   
In contending that allowing the confession into evidence was not 
harmless error, Howard relies heavily on State v. Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d 667 
(Iowa 2005).  In that case, the defendant was charged with operating while 
intoxicated.  Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d at 670.  The district court rejected 
Moorhead’s claim that he was denied a right to consult with a family member 
before submitting to a breath test.  Id.  The test results showed Moorehead’s 
blood alcohol level was .182, over twice the limit for intoxication.  Id.  After the 
 
16 
 
test, when an officer asked if he was okay, he replied, “I’m drunk as hell.”  Id.  
The district court in a nonjury trial convicted him, relying on the breath test.  
Id.  On appeal, the court of appeals held the breath test was inadmissible but 
affirmed his conviction on harmless error grounds, relying on his admission 
that he was drunk as hell, as well as the officer’s observation of his erratic 
driving and poor performance on three field tests for sobriety.  Id. at 672.   
 
On further review, we reversed the conviction, concluding the breath test 
was inadmissible.  We noted  
the test result played a central role in the district court’s decision.  
Because this matter was tried to the court, we have a written 
exposition 
of 
the 
fact 
finder’s 
reasoning 
in 
the 
verdict.  
Moorehead’s high breath test result is the very first fact cited as 
evidence of guilt.  Mindful of a defendant's right to a fair trial and 
just application of our rules, it cannot be fairly said that the breath 
test result did not injuriously affect Moorehead’s rights.  The 
district court’s error in admitting this evidence clearly prejudiced 
Moorehead.  Admission of the breath test result into evidence was 
therefore not harmless error. 
Id. at 673 (citation omitted).  We further held that Moorehead’s statement, “I’m 
drunk as hell,” should also be suppressed, unless it was spontaneous.  Id. at 
675.  We declined to decide whether it was spontaneous because the district 
court had not reached that issue.  Id.  We remanded the case for a new trial.  
Id.  Howard asserts that Moorehead requires a new trial whenever important 
evidence was erroneously admitted. Defendant’s confession is powerful 
evidence in a child sex abuse case with a victim too young to talk, just as the 
breath test result of .182 is powerful proof in an OWI case.   
 
After Moorehead, however, we have continued to hold that a conviction 
may be affirmed when supported by other overwhelming evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt.  For example, in State v. Wells, the State charged Wells with 
third-degree sexual abuse.  738 N.W.2d 214, 217 (Iowa 2007).  Wells was 
accused of having sexual contact with a fourteen-year old girl, L.M.  Id. at 216.  
While at the hospital undergoing an examination, L.M. told the nurse 
 
17 
 
examining her that she had engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with 
Wells, the latest encounter being earlier that evening.  Id.  The nurse conducted 
a gynecological examination and collected DNA evidence implicating Wells.  Id.  
The nurse testified at trial to what L.M. told her, over Wells’s objection.  Id. at 
217.  The jury convicted Wells of third-degree sexual abuse.  Id.  On appeal, we 
did not decide whether the district court erred in admitting the victim’s 
statement through the nurse because “[t]he jury was presented with DNA 
evidence that overwhelmingly established Wells’s guilt.”  Id. at 218.  We also 
noted that, “[b]ecause the admission of the evidence was harmless under the 
standard applied to the claimed constitutional error, it was also harmless 
under the standard applied [for nonconstitutional error].”  Id. at 219;3 see also 
State v. Elliott, 806 N.W.2d 660, 669 n.1 (Iowa 2011) (“Another way to show the 
tainted evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict is to show other overwhelming 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt, making the prejudicial impact of the tainted 
evidence insignificant.”); State v. Redmond, 803 N.W.2d 112, 127 (Iowa 2011) 
                                      
 
3To establish harmless error for a constitutional violation, “ ‘the State must “prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.” ’ ”  State v. Walls, 761 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Iowa 2009) (quoting State v. Peterson, 663 
N.W.2d 417, 431 (Iowa 2003)).  We employ a two-step analysis to determine whether the State 
has met its burden under the constitutional harmless-error standard.  Id.   
First, the court asks what evidence the jury actually considered in reaching its 
verdict.  Second, the court weighs the probative force of that evidence against 
the probative force of the erroneously admitted evidence standing alone.  This 
step requires the court to ask “whether the force of the evidence is so 
overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting 
on that evidence would have been the same without the erroneously admitted 
evidence.”   
Id. at 686–87 (citations omitted) (quoting Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 431). This two-step analysis 
is not required for a nonconstitutional harmless error review.  But even under a constitutional 
analysis, it is possible for the erroneous admission of a confession to be harmless error on a 
particular record.  See id. at 690 (Cady, J., dissenting) (“If the [harmless-error] doctrine is 
inapplicable to improperly admitted confessions, we would not have applied it in Hensley to 
find the trial court error harmless.” (citing State v. Hensley, 534 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Iowa 1995))). 
 
18 
 
(“Past cases have held the erroneous admission of the defendant's prior 
conviction does not violate the defendant's ‘substantial right[s]’ when 
overwhelming evidence supports his conviction.” (quoting Parker, 747 N.W.2d 
at 209)); State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 571 (Iowa 2009) (nonconstitutional 
harmless-error analysis asks whether defendant has been “ ‘injuriously affected 
by the error or . . . has suffered a miscarriage of justice’ ” (quoting State v. 
Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 29 (Iowa 2004))). 
 
Ordinarily, the erroneous admission into evidence of defendant’s 
confession to the unwitnessed sexual assault of a toddler would require a new 
trial in the absence of DNA evidence, reliable eyewitness testimony, video, or 
other compelling proof.  The jury convicted Howard of two counts: sexual abuse 
in the second degree and child endangerment.  We consider whether the court’s 
admission of Howard’s confession was harmless for each count separately.  We 
consider only the admissible evidence presented at trial including the recorded 
statements Howard made to Detective Hull and Krueger before any 
impermissible promise of leniency.  See Madsen, 813 N.W.2d at 728 (noting 
that certain “statements were properly admitted into evidence because [the 
defendant] made the statements before the detective’s promise of leniency”).   
 
1.  Count I: sexual abuse in the second degree.  The State charged 
Howard with second-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code section 
709.3(2) (2009).  Jury instruction No. 19 required the jury to find:  
 
1.  On or about January 14, 2010, the defendant performed 
a sex act with A.E.   
 
2.  The defendant performed the sex act while A.E. was 
under the age of 12 years. 
Iowa Code section 702.17 defines “sex act,” in part, as “any sexual contact 
between two or more persons by: penetration of the penis into the vagina or 
 
19 
 
anus.”4  The jury instructions permitted the jury to consider the type of contact 
and the circumstances surrounding it in determining whether the contact was 
sexual in nature.  See Madsen, 813 N.W.2d at 728 (“[W]hether a ‘sex act’ has 
occurred is a fact question for the jury that can ‘be determined from the type of 
contact and circumstances surrounding it.’ ” (quoting State v. Pearson, 514 
N.W.2d 452, 455–56 (Iowa 1994))).   
Such circumstances certainly include whether the contact was 
made to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of the defendant or the 
victim.  However, the lack of such motivation would not preclude a 
finding of sexual abuse where the context in which the contact 
occurred showed the sexual nature of the contact.  Other relevant 
circumstances include but are not limited to the relationship 
between the defendant and the victim; whether anyone else was 
present; the length of the contact; the purposefulness of the 
contact; whether there was a legitimate, nonsexual purpose for the 
contact; where and when the contact took place; and the conduct 
of the defendant and victim before and after the contact. 
Pearson, 514 N.W.2d at 455 (noting with regard to State v. Phipps, 442 N.W.2d 
611, 612 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989), that “the fact that no nonsexual purpose for the 
contact was discernible also demonstrated the sexual nature of the contact”).  
We need to decide whether overwhelming admissible evidence supports the 
jury’s verdict on this count.   
 
A.E., who was then a seventeen-month-year-old, suffered an injury to his 
anus, which Dr. Hostetler testified, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
was caused by an object penetrating the anus that “was bigger than a pencil or 
a finger but small enough to fit in that area.” Dr. Hostetler also testified that 
A.E.’s injuries were not consistent with that caused by a hard stool because the 
injuries were predominantly external, whereas she would expect injuries 
resulting from a hard stool to be primarily internal.  Dr. Hostetler also testified 
                                      
 
4The definition of “sex act” also includes “sexual contact between two or more persons 
by . . . use of artificial sexual organs or substitutes therefor in contact with the genitalia or 
anus;” however, the jury instructions omitted this facet of the statutory definition.   
 
20 
 
that the injuries had occurred within several hours of the time when A.E. was 
brought to the clinic.   
 
Howard confirmed during the admissible part of his recorded interview 
that the only people with A.E. during that time were Jessica, Howard, and a 
friend of Howard’s, who Howard said was never alone with A.E.  Howard told 
Detective Hull he never saw A.E. get hurt, cry, or otherwise suggest that he had 
been injured throughout the day.  Howard also told Detective Hull that he did 
not think Jessica would hurt her child.   
 
Aside from Jessica, Howard was the only one who spent any time alone 
with A.E. during that time period.  Just thirty minutes before Jessica left A.E. 
alone with Howard while she retrieved her mother’s key, she changed A.E. and 
saw no blood in A.E.’s diaper or any other abnormality.  Howard confirmed in 
the admissible part of his interview that Jessica changed A.E. at that time.  
Thus, the blood first appeared in A.E.’s diaper while Howard was alone with 
A.E. during that twenty-minute period while Jessica was away.  Howard’s claim 
that A.E.’s injuries resulted from a hard stool was rebutted by Dr. Hostetler’s 
testimony.  It is difficult to imagine how a child of A.E.’s age could accidentally 
suffer an anal penetration injury while wearing a diaper.   
 
Not only was no other accidental or nonsexual explanation for A.E.’s 
injuries offered, Howard’s contemporaneous behavior supports the conclusion 
that the contact was sexual.  When Jessica returned home A.E. was in his crib, 
on his stomach, screaming.  Howard was lying on the floor.  After Jessica 
spoke with the clinic and they told her to bring A.E. in to be examined, Howard 
insisted on first taking a shower and changing his clothes.  Then, Howard, 
freshly showered and in clean clothing, further delayed bringing A.E. to the 
clinic when he stopped at a friend’s house on the way to the clinic.  These 
actions show Howard’s consciousness of guilt and intent to eliminate any 
 
21 
 
evidence on his body or on his underwear.  This evidence clearly is sufficient to 
sustain a conviction.   
 
Nevertheless, there was no DNA evidence, video, or eyewitness testimony 
proving Howard’s sexual assault on A.E.  The victim is too young to identify his 
assailant.  Two other adults had been with A.E. in the hours before the blood 
was discovered in his diaper.  Howard’s statement that Jessica is a “good 
mother” who would not hurt her child does not conclusively rule her out as a 
suspect.  It is not uncommon for joint caregivers who are romantically involved 
to cover for each other in the face of allegations of child abuse.  See Paredes, 
775 N.W.2d at 571 (erroneous exclusion of self-incriminating statement by 
mother not harmless in father’s trial for shaken baby syndrome injuries 
because both parents were suspects, despite father’s own confession).  To apply 
the harmless-error rule here would undermine the deterrent value of the 
exclusionary rule for confessions tainted by a promise of leniency.  See Polk, 
812 N.W.2d at 674 (noting exclusionary rule “deters police from using a tactic 
that might induce the innocent to confess falsely”).  
 
We hold the State has failed to establish Howard was not prejudiced by 
the erroneous admission of his confession.  Accordingly, the error was not 
harmless, and Howard is entitled to a new trial on the charge of second-degree 
sexual abuse.   
 
2.  Count II: child endangerment.  The State also charged Howard with 
child endangerment in violation of Iowa Code sections 726.6(1)(a), (b) and 
726.6(6), alleging that while Howard had custody or control over A.E., he acted 
in a manner that created a substantial risk to A.E.’s physical health and safety 
and that he intentionally used unreasonable force against A.E. causing bodily 
injury.  Jury instruction No. 22 required the jury to find:  
 
1.  On or about the 14th day of January, 2010, the 
defendant was the person having custody or control of A.E.   
 
22 
 
 
2.  A.E. was under the age of fourteen years.   
 
3.  The defendant committed an act or a series of acts that 
resulted in physical injury to A.E.   
 
4.  The defendant’s act resulted in bodily injury to A.E.  The 
jury instructions defined “bodily injury” as “physical pain, illness 
or any impairment of physical condition.” 
 
The admissible evidence of Howard’s guilt is strong, as reviewed above, 
and is clearly sufficient to sustain a conviction on this count as well.  Howard 
admitted before the promise of leniency that he had been alone with A.E. that 
day.  A.E. was under the age of fourteen.  Dr. Hostetler testified A.E. suffered a 
penetration injury to his anus within several hours of being brought to the 
clinic.  Dr. Hostetler specifically rejected Howard’s contention that a hard stool 
caused A.E.’s injuries because they were not consistent with the trauma that 
would result from a hard stool. Her medical testimony was unrebutted.  
Nevertheless, on this record, we cannot say with the required confidence that 
the introduction of Howard’s confession was harmless.   
 
We conclude the State has failed to establish Howard was not prejudiced 
by the erroneous admission of his confession.  Accordingly, the error was not 
harmless, and Howard is entitled to a new trial on the charge of child 
endangerment.   
 
IV.  Conclusion.   
 
For these reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse 
the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for a new trial on both 
counts.   
 
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS VACATED, JUDGMENT OF 
DISTRICT COURT REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.