Title: People v. Ceja

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89553-Agenda 6-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								RAUL CEJA, Appellant.
Opinion filed April 17, 2003.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Du Page County,
defendant, Raul Ceja, was convicted of the first degree murder of
Alfredo Garcia and Richard Sanchez (see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)
(West 1998)) and of the unlawful possession of a stolen or
converted motor vehicle (see 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West
1998)). At a separate sentencing hearing, the court, sitting without
a jury, found defendant eligible for the death penalty and further
determined that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient
to preclude imposition of that sentence.
	Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to death on the
murder convictions and to a seven-year prison term on the stolen-vehicle conviction. The death sentence has been stayed pending
direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill.
2d Rs. 603, 609(a).
	Defendant raises issues pertaining both to the guilt phase of
the trial and to the aggravation and mitigation phase of the death
sentencing hearing. Subsequent to the filing of defendant's appeal,
former Governor George Ryan commuted defendant's death
sentence to natural life imprisonment without possibility of parole
or mandatory supervised release.
	An appellate issue is moot when it is abstract or presents no
controversy. People v. Blaylock, 202 Ill. 2d 319, 325 (2002). An
issue can become moot if circumstances change during the
pendency of an appeal that prevent the reviewing court from being
able to render effectual relief. People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286,
294 (2002). Commutation removes a judicially imposed sentence
and replaces it with a lesser, executively imposed sentence. People
ex rel. Johnson v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 566 (1913); see Black's
Law Dictionary 274 (7th ed. 1999).
	Therefore, the commutation rendered defendant's sentencing
issues moot. See, e.g., Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38,
235 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1977); State v. Mitchell, 239 Or. 87, 88, 396 P.2d 572, 573 (1964).(1) We exercise our discretion to retain
jurisdiction of the nonsentencing issues in this case. See, e.g.,
McGill v. Illinois Power Co., 18 Ill. 2d 242, 244 (1959).
Addressing only the viable, nonsentencing issues, we now affirm
defendant's convictions.

BACKGROUND
	Defendant and Rene Soto were separately charged with
possession of a stolen motor vehicle and first degree murder. The
charges arose, respectively, from the July 24, 1998, theft of a
Chevrolet Tahoe, a sports utility vehicle, from an automobile
dealership, and the July 26, 1998, fatal shooting of Garcia and
Sanchez by the occupants of that stolen vehicle. Soto was tried
separately.
	The State's theory of the case, as explained in its opening
statement, was that defendant, Soto, and a third unknown
individual were members of the Maywood Latin Kings street gang.
They killed the victims, who were suspected members of the rival
Franklin Park Imperial Gangsters street gang, in an act of gang
retaliation. Although the evidence did not establish which
particular shooter killed which particular victim, defendant was
criminally accountable for the murders.
	The State's case was essentially as follows. On Friday, July
24, 1998, Elizabeth Camacho was a salesperson at Team
Chevrolet at 720 Kingery Highway in Westmont. The dealership
building had glass walls. From inside the dealership one could see
the inventory parked outside.
	As Camacho drove into the dealership's parking lot at
approximately 9:30 a.m., she saw two Hispanic males looking at
a new, dark-red Chevrolet Tahoe. Camacho believed that the two
men were either porters, i.e., dealership employees, or a porter
with a customer who was waiting for a salesperson. Camacho
entered the building. Camacho then saw other porters outside the
building. She walked outside and asked them who the two men
were. They responded that the two men did not work at the
dealership.
	Camacho reentered the dealership building and stepped onto
a high podium located in the middle of the sales floor. The podium
afforded a general view of the inventory parked outside and,
specifically, an unobstructed view of the Chevrolet Tahoe parked
in front of the dealership. The podium was approximately 30 to 60
feet away from the Tahoe.
	On the podium, Camacho saw the two men enter the Tahoe
and drive it away at high speed. The men did not have permission
to take the Tahoe from the dealership. Camacho subsequently
identified defendant as the man who drove the Tahoe from the
dealership.
	Melrose Park police officer Patrick Scavone testified that he
responded to a report of gunshots at defendant's home on July 24,
1998, at 11:05 p.m. Scavone spoke with defendant's mother, who
was upset. Scavone saw a bullet hole in the front of the house. The
bullet had pierced the wall and had lodged in a chair. He did not
attempt to recover the bullet because he did not want to destroy the
chair. There were several persons in the house at the time of the
shooting, including a small child, but defendant was not present.
	Another State's witness, Refugio Reyna, was a member of
defendant's gang. Reyna recounted that in the early morning of
July 25, Soto approached him and asked for a Smith & Wesson.
After they spoke, Soto walked toward where the guns were kept.
	On Sunday, July 26, 1998, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Kevin
Oldaker, Stephanie Alfano, and their eight-month-old son were
driving in the west-bound lanes on Grand Avenue in Elmhurst.
They halted at a red traffic light at the intersection of Grand and
Oak Lawn Avenues.
	A red Lincoln with two men inside pulled up to the
intersection on Oldaker's left side. When the traffic light turned
green, a Chevrolet Tahoe sped up in the left-turn lane, to the left
of the Lincoln. The maroon Tahoe had three occupants: the driver,
a front seat passenger and a back seat passenger. The passengers
began shooting at the occupants of the Lincoln. Approximately
nine shots were fired.
	To avoid crossfire, Oldaker drove about 20 feet forward into
the intersection and stopped. The Tahoe made a fast U-turn into
the east-bound side of Grand Avenue and stopped alongside the
Lincoln. The driver of the Tahoe shot at the Lincoln approximately
five times, and then sped east on Grand Avenue. The Lincoln
made a U-turn and tried to follow the Tahoe. However, a short
distance from the intersection, the Lincoln veered off the street and
crashed into a sign.
	Oldaker also made a U-turn and followed the Tahoe and the
Lincoln. He intended to chase the Tahoe, but stopped to aid the
occupants of the crashed Lincoln.
	Both Oldaker and Alfano described the driver of the Tahoe
and the Tahoe's front passenger as being two Hispanic males
wearing hooded sweatshirts, with the driver being heavyset.
Oldaker and Alfano did not see the face of the back seat passenger.
Neither Oldaker nor Alfano identified defendant as being in the
Tahoe.
	That evening, Elmhurst police officer Kenneth Lafin was in
his patrol car when he heard a radio dispatch regarding the
shooting. The dispatch described a dark-red, Suburban-type
vehicle traveling east on Grand Avenue. Lafin proceeded to
Interstate 290. As Lafin entered the highway, he observed, several
car lengths ahead, a dark-colored Chevrolet Tahoe also entering
the highway. Lafin followed the Tahoe. At one point Lafin
maneuvered to the right side of the Tahoe. He observed that the
Tahoe's right-rear passenger window was either rolled down or
broken out. He saw two persons sitting in front and one person
sitting in the rear. The only face Lafin observed was that of the
driver, whom Lafin described as a heavyset Hispanic male.
	Lafin followed the Tahoe as it exited the highway and
proceeded north on Mannheim Road. The Tahoe accelerated. After
the Tahoe sped through a restaurant parking lot, Lafin activated his
emergency siren and lights. A high-speed chase ensued on narrow
residential streets, with Lafin in pursuit one or two car lengths
behind the Tahoe.
	The Tahoe turned into an alley and stopped. Lafin saw two
persons exit the vehicle; one from the driver's side, who ran east,
and one from the passenger side, who ran west. Lafin continued
driving in an unsuccessful attempt to intercept the person who ran
east. Lafin was eventually directed to return to the abandoned
Tahoe and secure it for evidence. Its engine was still running and
glass was in the rear seat of the vehicle. He remained there until
other police officers arrived to process the vehicle.
	That evening, Michael Heiberger was hosting a party at his
home at 614 Marshall Avenue in Bellwood. Heiberger was sitting
with visitors in his backyard, facing the alley. His backyard had a
view of his carport and of the alley. Among those with Heiberger
was Richard Deveris and his family.
	At approximately 9:35 p.m., Heiberger heard an emergency
siren and squealing tires. A Chevrolet Tahoe sped down the alley
and came to an abrupt halt at his property. Three individuals fled
the Tahoe and ran in different directions. The driver, a heavyset
man, ran through the carport and towards the gate of Heiberger's
backyard fence. Heiberger, joined by his guests, approached the
gate and shouted at the driver, "Don't even think about it." The
driver then turned and ran down the alley. Heiberger could not
identify defendant as one of the persons who fled from the vehicle.
	Police from several nearby communities established a
perimeter around the area. At approximately 9:45 p.m., a police
dog barked at a large bush near a house at 620 Frederick Street in
Bellwood, two blocks from where the Tahoe had been abandoned.
Police officers shone their flashlights into the bush and saw
defendant crouched therein. With defendant inside the bush was
Rene Soto, whom officers described as a heavyset Hispanic male.
Both defendant and Soto were sweating and breathing heavily.
	Franklin Park police officer Michael Jones was one of the law
enforcement officials at the scene of defendant's arrest. Jones
knew that a shooting had occurred. He patted defendant for
weapons following his arrest, but found none. Jones took
defendant aside, away from Soto, and asked him a series of
questions. Jones asked defendant how many guns were involved
in the shooting, and defendant responded "one." Jones asked
defendant where the gun was; defendant replied that he did not
know. Jones asked defendant who had the gun; defendant
responded that he did not know. Jones asked defendant to describe
the gun; defendant repeated that he did not know. Jones then
exhorted defendant to reveal the location of the gun, because a
child might find it and get hurt. Defendant responded that the gun
was in a backyard.
	Defendant was placed in the squad car of Elmhurst police
officer James Pokyfke, who immediately read defendant his
Miranda warnings. Pokyfke drove defendant to the police station.
En route, defendant initiated a conversation with Pokyfke.
Defendant stated, "Well, I guess it's going to be a long couple of
years." Defendant then asked Pokyfke "if the people were all
right." Pokyfke responded that he did not know and that he was
there only to transport defendant to the police station. Defendant
then asked Pokyfke if he was a traffic officer and Pokyfke
answered that he was. Defendant replied, "Well, maybe you will
be a detective by the time I get out."
	The vehicle identification number of the abandoned Chevrolet
Tahoe matched that of the vehicle stolen from the automobile
dealership. Police recovered several items from the Tahoe. A
plastic surgical glove was found in the glove compartment. An
empty box of Speer nine-millimeter bullets and a pair of black
gloves were found under the driver's seat. A spent cartridge was
found on the rear floor and another in the rear cargo area. The
right-rear passenger window was broken; shards of glass were
inside and outside the vehicle.
	In a yard near the abandoned Tahoe, police found a navy-blue
hooded sweatshirt. Police found nearby a Smith & Wesson 9-millimeter handgun wedged in the branches of a bush. The gun
had one live round in the chamber and four remaining in the
magazine. Next door to the house where defendant and Soto were
arrested, police found a grey hooded sweatshirt. Police
subsequently recovered a Ruger 9-millimeter handgun from under
a bush at a nearby house.
	The victims suffered fatal gunshot wounds to the back.
According to the testimony of the medical examiner, their wounds
were consistent with their leaning forward and twisting to the
right, exposing their backs.
	Ballistics analysis revealed the following. One of the spent
cartridges found inside the Tahoe had been fired from the Ruger
and the other spent cartridge found in the Tahoe had been fired
from the Smith & Wesson. Also, testing established that the two
handguns fired the bullets that were recovered from the Lincoln.
The Smith & Wesson fired the single bullet recovered from the
body of Garcia and also fired the single bullet recovered from the
body of Sanchez.
	Fingerprint evidence revealed the following. Soto's left
thumbprint was found on the empty box of bullets. Also, Soto's
handprints were found at various locations on the exterior of the
Tahoe. Defendant's handprints were not found on the exterior or
interior of the Tahoe, or on any object inside the vehicle. However,
a partial palm print found on the magazine inside the Ruger
handgun matched defendant's left palm.
	Alfred Luckas, was a forensic scientist employed by the
Du Page County sheriff's crime laboratory. He received a sample
of tempered glass fragments from the broken window of the stolen
Tahoe and a sample of tempered glass fragments recovered from
the intersection of Grand and Oak Lawn Avenues. His analysis
could not distinguish between the two samples. He determined that
there was an "association" between the samples, meaning that they
could have originated from the same source. Further, after
referring to an Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory database of
glass samples, Luckas opined that there was a "good probability
of common origin" between the glass from the Tahoe window and
the glass found at the intersection of Grand and Oak Lawn
Avenues.
	Luckas also removed glass fragments from the shoes of
defendant and Soto. Based on his analysis, Luckas concluded that
the glass taken from those shoes and the glass from the Tahoe
window "could have originated from the same source." Referring
again to the Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory database,
Luckas opined that there was a "good probability of common
origin" between the glass from the Tahoe and the glass from the
shoes of defendant and Soto.
	Also, witnesses testified regarding a gang-related motive for
the crimes. Defendant and Soto were members of the Maywood
Latin Kings. Defendant knew that one of the victims, Sanchez,
was a member of the Franklin Park Imperial Gangsters, a rival
gang, and that Sanchez's gang nickname was "Boxer." The
Imperial Gangsters were headquartered in an area of Franklin Park
known as "the Jungle." The two handguns that police recovered in
the area of defendant's arrest belonged to defendant's gang. Every
gang member knew where those guns were hidden. It would not
have been unusual for defendant to have handled one or both of
them.
	The State also introduced evidence of statements made by
defendant and Soto in the detention area of the Elmhurst police
station. Elmhurst police detective Raymond Bradford, Bensenville
police officer Gonzalez Gomez, and Du Page County Assistant
State's Attorney Jeffrey Kendall testified as to the statements they
heard through an intercom system. The intercom allowed a person
in the front desk area of the station to hear and speak with a person
in any of the cells in the detention area.
	After their arrest on the night of July 26, 1998, defendant and
Soto were placed in separate cells. On July 28, at approximately
9:30 p.m., Kendall heard defendant say to Soto, "They got the
guns." The three listeners heard Soto say, "Yea, two, they showed
me one," or "They have got two, they showed me one." Defendant
then said, in Spanish, "Hey, they can hear what we are saying."
Soto then said, in English, "Hey, we are innocent." Then they both
laughed.
	At approximately 9:45 p.m., Gomez heard one person say,
"That guy shot up our town." Another person responded, in
Spanish, "We found them." Gomez then heard laughter.
	During that time, Bradford heard defendant say, "My parents
are sending my brother away." Soto responded, "Oh, yeah."
Defendant then said, "They think that they will come after him. I
hope the brothers don't get popped. They don't have guns
anymore." Soto again responded, "Yeah." Defendant then said,
"The fat one," and he laughed. Defendant continued, "He was my
sister's boyfriend, Boxer." According to Bradford, defendant said
that Boxer "is from the jungle or lives in the jungle. He wasn't
even banging." Then defendant and Soto laughed.
	Kendall's testimony as to defendant's statements resembled
that of Gomez and Bradford. In addition to the above-mentioned
statements, Kendall heard defendant say, "The police have my
shoes. I want them back, but there is something with the glass in
the car."
	The defense called Elmhurst police service officer Jodi Bellis;
Griselda Ceja, defendant's mother; Dr. Ross Firestone, an expert
in ceramics and glass; and Robert Hostick, a fingerprint examiner.
The defense case, as reflected in its closing argument, was
essentially to identify deficiencies in the State's case.
	The defense pointed to discrepancies in Camacho's
identification of defendant as the person who drove the Tahoe
from the dealership. The defense stressed to the jury that no one
identified defendant as being in the Tahoe at the time of the
shooting, and that defendant's handprints were not found on the
Tahoe or on any object therein. The defense also reminded the jury
that, although defendant handled a magazine of one of the
handguns, there was no evidence that he handled that gun on the
night of the shooting.
	Also, the defense attacked Luckas' expert opinion that there
was a "good probability" that the glass from the soles of
defendant's shoes came from the broken window of the Tahoe.
The defense posited that such a conclusion is nonscientific and
built on a false premise.
	The defense also questioned the reliability of the testimony of
Bradford, Gomez, and Kendall regarding the overheard statements
of defendant and Soto in jail. The defense offered noninculpatory
interpretations of defendant's statements.
	At the close of the evidence, the trial court refused
defendant's tendered jury instruction regarding conspiracy to
commit first degree murder as an included offense of first degree
murder based on accountability. The jury returned general verdicts
of guilty of the first degree murders of Garcia and Sanchez. The
jury also returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of unlawful
possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle.
	Defendant waived a sentencing jury. At the first stage of the
death sentencing hearing, the parties stipulated that the trial court
could consider all of the evidence presented at trial. The court
found beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of three statutory
aggravating factors: defendant had been convicted of murdering
two or more individuals; the murder was committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner, pursuant to a preconceived
plan, scheme, or design to take a human life by unlawful means,
and the conduct of defendant created a reasonable expectation that
a death of a human being would result therefrom; and the murder
was committed as a result of the intentional discharge of a firearm
by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not
present within the motor vehicle. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(3),
(b)(11), (b)(15) (West 1998). Thus, the trial court found that
defendant was eligible for the death penalty.
	At the second stage of the death sentencing hearing, after
considering evidence in aggravation and mitigation, including the
evidence heard at the previous phases of the trial, the court found
that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude
imposition of the death penalty. The trial court accordingly
sentenced defendant to death on the first degree murder
convictions. The court also sentenced defendant to a seven-year
prison term on the stolen vehicle conviction.
	Defendant appeals. Additional pertinent facts will be
discussed in the context of the issues raised on appeal.

ANALYSIS
I. Suppression of Statements: Eavesdropping
	Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to bar the
admission of the conversation between defendant and Soto
overheard in the detention area of the Elmhurst police station.
Defendant claimed that law enforcement officials obtained the
statements in violation of, inter alia, the eavesdropping statute
contained in the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/14-1 through
14-9 (West 1998)). Defendant assigns error to the trial court's
denial of his motion and asks us for a new trial.
	We note that defendant does not claim a violation of any
constitutional right. Rather, he claims that his conversation with
Soto was overheard in violation of, and therefore precluded by, the
eavesdropping provisions of the Criminal Code. Section 14-2 of
the Criminal Code provides that a person commits eavesdropping
when that person: "(a) Uses an eavesdropping device to hear or
record all or any part of any conversation unless he does so (1)
with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation." 720
ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1) (West 1998). Further, any evidence obtained in
violation of the eavesdropping statute is inadmissible. 720 ILCS
5/14-5 (West 1998).
	Defendant assigns error to the trial court's conclusion that he
impliedly consented to the monitoring of his conversation with
Soto. Defendant argues that he was not given sufficient notice of
the monitoring so as to establish consent.
	We first address defendant's argument that we should review
this contention de novo. At a hearing on a motion to suppress, it is
the function of the trial court to determine the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d 153, 163 (1989). Accordingly, the trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress generally will not be overturned unless it is
manifestly erroneous. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d  at 162; People v. Evans,
125 Ill. 2d 50, 78 (1988). "Manifestly erroneous means arbitrary,
unreasonable and not based on the evidence." People v. Wells, 182 Ill. 2d 471, 481 (1998). However, de novo review is appropriate
when neither the facts nor the credibility of witnesses is
questioned. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 309 (1998).
	Defendant argues that we should review this contention de
novo because he does not now challenge any of the facts found by
the trial court. We disagree. The only pure legal question involved
in this issue is whether the doctrine of implied consent applies to
the Illinois eavesdropping statute. If this were the sole issue
presented, our review of this question would be de novo, and our
answer would be "yes." See People v. Ardella, 49 Ill. 2d 517, 522
(1971). However, this is not defendant's argument. Defendant
argues that he did not impliedly consent. This is a factual question,
which turns on the credibility of witnesses. We must defer to the
trial court, which was able to observe witnesses and draw
inferences and conclusions of what defendant knew and, thus,
whether he impliedly consented. Therefore, we will reverse the
trial court on this issue only if its conclusion is manifestly
erroneous. See Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 309; United States v. Van
Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 n.11 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that question
of implied consent turned on credibility of witnesses, and trial
court's determination thereof given deference on review).
	Testimony at the suppression hearing showed the following
facts. Defendant and Soto were in the detention area of the
Elmhurst police station. Each was held in a separate cell at
opposite ends of the detention area, approximately 35 feet apart.
The cells are constructed of cinder blocks. Each cell has a steel
door with a plexiglass window; each window has a small
perforated area for communication. The police station has a two-way speaker system through which a person sitting in the front
desk reception area can monitor each cell in the detention area. A
speaker is clearly visible in each cell. Whenever the monitoring
system in a particular cell is switched on, a loud pinging tone
comes from the speaker in that cell every 9 to 10 seconds to notify
the person in that cell that he or she is being monitored. A person
in the front desk reception area of the jail can speak into a
particular cell by pushing a button when the monitoring system is
on in that cell. The front desk is approximately 35 feet from one
door to the cell area and approximately 55 feet from the other door
to the cell area. Consequently, it is not possible to hear any
conversation in the cell from the reception area without the use of
the monitoring system.(2)
	On July 28, 1998, service officer Jodi Bellis worked at the
front desk of the Elmhurst police station from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m.
When she entered the desk area that morning, the monitoring
device was operating and pinging, and Bellis heard a conversation
in Spanish in the detention area. The conversation continued
through her shift. Defendant and Soto were the only persons in
custody in the detention area.
	At various times throughout that morning, Bellis advised
defendant and Soto to be quiet. She told them to be quiet through
the monitoring system. They paused, then continued speaking.
	Also, every 30 minutes, Bellis was required to go to the
detention area and check on those in custody. During several of
those checks that morning, Bellis told defendant and Soto to be
quiet. During one such visit, according to Bellis, she explained to
defendant and Soto that they "had to be quiet even when I am not
in the room, because I can monitor the conversation at the front
desk." Defendant responded by flashing gang signs and continuing
to talk loudly in Spanish.
	Bradford, Gomez, and Kendall then testified, as recited
earlier, that defendant said, in Spanish, "Hey, they can hear what
we are saying." Soto then said, in English, "Hey, we are innocent."
Then they both laughed.
	Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found that
defendant and Soto were aware that their statements were being
monitored. According to the trial court, they acquiesced in and
impliedly consented to that monitoring when they continued to
talk loudly to each other despite their knowledge that they were
being monitored.
	The controlling principles are widely recognized. The element
of consent under the eavesdropping statute "may be satisfied
without a showing of the type of informed consent necessary for
a defendant to waive a fourth amendment right." People v.
Fredrics, 76 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1049 (1979); accord 34 Ill. L. &
Prac. Telecommunications §39, at 391 (2001).
	Consent in this context may be either express or implied.
United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1996).
Consent exists where a person's behavior manifests acquiescence
or a comparable voluntary diminution of his or her otherwise
protected rights. Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir.
1990). Implied consent is consent in fact, which is inferred from
the surrounding circumstances indicating that the party knowingly
agreed to the surveillance. Thus, implied consent may be deduced
from the prevailing circumstances in a given situation. The
circumstances relevant to an implication of consent will vary from
case to case, but will ordinarily include language or acts that tend
to prove that a party knows of, or assents to, encroachments on the
routine expectation that conversations are private. Griggs-Ryan,
904 F.2d  at 117.
	In this case, the record shows that speakers were visible in
each cell. The monitoring system emitted a clearly audible pinging
sound when, and only when, it was activated in a particular cell.
	Further, Bellis repeatedly told defendant and Soto to be quiet.
Bellis warned them not only in person, but also through the
monitoring system itself. These intercom warnings reasonably
notified defendant and Soto that their conversation was being
monitored. Indeed, in giving a face-to-face warning, Bellis told
defendant and Soto that she could monitor their conversation from
the front desk of the police station. Defendant himself admitted,
"Hey, they can hear what we are saying." In our view, this
establishes conclusively that defendant was aware of the situation
and, nevertheless, knowingly engaged in conversation.
	Although not controlling, we note that federal courts have
similarly applied the principle of implied consent in the context of
title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18
U.S.C. §2511(2)(c) (2000)). For example, in Workman, 80 F.3d  at
693, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that implied consent existed to record a state prison inmate's
telephone conversations for use in criminal prosecutions, even
though the inmate was never told that use of the telephone system
constituted consent to be recorded, where the inmate received
repeated notice that telephone calls were subject to surveillance,
and the evidence indicated that he was in fact aware of the
monitoring system but nevertheless used the telephone.
	Based on all the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court
manifestly erred in concluding that defendant was aware that his
statements were electronically monitored and, by continuing to
loudly talk to Soto, acquiesced therein. "Such acquiescence
constitutes consent for the purpose of the eavesdropping statute."
Ardella, 49 Ill. 2d  at 522; accord In re Conservatorship of the
Estate of Stevenson, 44 Ill. 2d 525, 532 (1970).

II. Glass-Comparison Evidence
	Defendant next claims that the State's use of glass-comparison evidence denied him a fair trial. He contends that: (A)
Luckas' expert opinion lacked a reasonable scientific basis, and
(B) the State improperly argued the evidence to the jury.
Defendant seeks a new trial.

A. Admissibility
	Defendant challenges Luckas' opinion that there was a "good
probability" that the glass fragment from defendant's shoe came
from the broken window of the Tahoe. Luckas explained his
analysis as follows.
	Luckas analyzed four glass samples. One came from the
broken window of the Tahoe; one came from the intersection of
Grand and Oak Lawn Avenues. Luckas removed the other two
samples from the shoes of defendant and Soto. Luckas compared
the glass from defendant's shoe with glass from the Tahoe.
Because the sample from defendant's shoe was so small-the size
of a pinhead-Luckas was unable to make a visual comparison. Nor
could he compare the two samples as to type, thickness, or density.
	The only method of comparison available was the refractive
index, which is a measure of how light passes through glass. To
measure the refractive index of a piece of glass, it is ground up and
placed on a microscopic slide. The slide is then placed inside an
oven, which measures the refractive index of the glass at three
different wavelengths of light. Using these measurements, an
analyst can then compare the data from two glass samples to see
if they are consistent. This means that the analyst can determine if
the two samples either did not come from the same source, or they
could have come from the same source. Regarding the samples
from defendant's shoe and the Tahoe, the refractive index
indicated an "association." In other words, the glass from the
shoes of defendant and Soto "could have originated" from the
Tahoe.
	Luckas then explained that there existed a means "to try and
get a handle on what value to place [on] that association.
According to Luckas, the Illinois State Police Crime Laboratory
compiled a database containing 2,087 glass samples "randomly
collected through criminal investigations throughout the entire
State of Illinois over approximately the past 20 years and we can
compare that data to see how common, for instance, a glass sample
is or how rare it is." Luckas explained that a database finding falls
in one of three ranges: "high probability of common origin,"
"good probability of common origin," or "common glass," i.e.,
there exists only the bare association. Referring to the database,
Luckas found that the glass from defendant's shoe had a frequency
of occurrence of 1 in 21 to 100, which was the middle range.
Based on this finding, Luckas opined that there was a "good
probability of common origin" between the glass from the Tahoe
and the glass from the shoes of defendant and Soto.
	Defendant presented his own expert, Dr. Ross Firestone, who
challenged Luckas' opinion that there was a "good probability"
that the glass from defendant's shoe came from the Tahoe.
Firestone opined that there was "nothing scientific" about referring
a refractive index to a database to determine a frequency of
occurrence.
	Before this court, defendant expressly does not challenge
Luckas' testimony regarding the refractive index of the glass
fragments. Also, defendant does not challenge Luckas' testimony
regarding the "frequency of occurrence" of the refractive index of
the glass from defendant's shoe in the database. Rather, defendant
contends that Luckas' opinion, based on the database, that there
was a "good probability" that the glass from defendant's shoe
came from the Tahoe "had no reasonably valid scientific basis, and
should not have been allowed into evidence."
	The record shows that defendant neither objected to this
testimony nor included the issue in his post-trial motion.
Therefore, the issue is waived. People v. Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540,
555 (1989); People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 188 (1988).
	However, defendant asks us to consider this issue under the
plain error doctrine of Supreme Court Rule 615(a). Plain error is
a limited and narrow exception to the general waiver rule, to be
invoked only where the evidence is closely balanced or the alleged
error is so substantial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100 (1992).
	The plain error exception to the waiver rule does not save this
issue. First, the evidence was not closely balanced. The State
presented a strong circumstantial case against defendant.
	The State's evidence against defendant included the
following. Defendant was positively identified as one of the two
men who, two days before the killings, stole the Tahoe from which
the fatal shots were fired. Defendant and Sanchez, who was one of
the victims, belonged to rival street gangs. Defendant's home was
the target of a drive-by shooting on the day before the murders.
Defendant's gang kept the two handguns used in the murders on
their turf so that gang members could have access to them. Shortly
prior to the murders, Soto asked another gang member for the guns
and then walked off in the direction of where the guns were
hidden. Defendant's palm print was on the magazine of one of
those guns. Soto's fingerprint was on an empty box of bullets in
the Tahoe. Soto's fingerprints were also found at several places on
the outside of the Tahoe.
	According to the eyewitnesses to the shooting, all three
occupants of the Tahoe shot at the victims' car. The driver and
front passenger of the Tahoe were described as two Hispanic
males wearing hooded sweatshirts. After the shooting, a police car
chased the Tahoe, which pulled into an alley and all three
occupants jumped out and ran. Less than 10 minutes later,
defendant and Soto were found hiding together in a bush two
blocks from where the Tahoe had been abandoned. They were
sweating and nearly out of breath. Police found nearby two hooded
sweatshirts and the two handguns which had been used in the
murders. Defendant told a police officer that one gun had been
used and that it had been discarded in a backyard. En route to the
police station, defendant arguably reflected on the fact that he was
likely to be in prison for a long time. He also asked "if the people
were all right."
	In their police station conversation, defendant and Soto made
several incriminating statements. Soto mocked, "Hey, we are
innocent," which caused them both to laugh. One of them said,
"That guy shot up our town," to which the other responded, "We
found them." This again prompted both to laugh. We note that
defendant does not now contend that the evidence was insufficient
to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v.
Jackson, 84 Ill. 2d 350, 360 (1981). The evidence, therefore, was
not closely balanced.
	Further, this alleged error was not so substantial that it
deprived defendant of a fair trial. "This second prong of the plain
error exception is to be invoked only where the possible error is so
serious that its consideration is 'necessary to preserve the integrity
and reputation of the judicial process.' " Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d  at
102, quoting People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 214 (1990). After
reviewing the challenged testimony, we conclude that its allegedly
erroneous admission is not of such a character.
	Regardless of how skilled or experienced an expert may be,
the expert may not state a judgment or opinion based on
conjecture. However, "an expert opinion couched in terms of
probabilities or possibilities based upon certain assumed facts is
not improper or inadmissible." Rodrian v. Seiber, 194 Ill. App. 3d
504, 507 (1990); see People v. Columbo, 118 Ill. App. 3d 882,
962-63 (1983); J. Corkery, Illinois Civil and Criminal Evidence
§702.105, at 388 (2000) ("The expert need not give an opinion as
to what actually did happen, but he or she can testify as to what
probably did happen or what might or could have happened").
	Notwithstanding the above principle, defendant relies on
People v. Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d 497, 512-13 (1986), in which this
court held that it had been improper for an expert to testify, as
Luckas did here, that there was a "good probability" that two
pieces of glass had a common source. This court stated, "There
was no foundation presented for testimony regarding the frequency
of the occurrence of this type of glass, much less a statement
concerning the likelihood that the pieces had a common source."
Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d  at 513.
	Bryant, however, is distinguishable. In Bryant, there was no
foundation presented for that expert's testimony regarding the
frequency of occurrence, much less his ultimate opinion. Also, that
defendant presented no evidence. Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d  at 501, 513.
	In the present case, Luckas thoroughly explained the process
by which he reached his ultimate opinion that there was a "good
probability" that the glass from defendant's shoe came from the
Tahoe. Also, defendant presented his own expert to challenge
Luckas' opinion. Thus, "[t]he jury was fully aware of any
'infirmities' in the expert's opinion, and it was for the jury to
determine his credibility." Rodrian, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 507-08. We
find no error; thus, there can be no plain error. People v. Keene,
169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995). Consequently, defendant's procedural
default of this issue is not excused.

B. Prosecutor's Closing Argument
	Defendant further contends that the prosecutor, in closing
argument, overstated Luckas' testimony. Defendant complains of
the following three italicized statements:
			"What the glass does is it [sic] puts this defendant in
the Tahoe where the broken glass is after the window is
broken, and we know the window is broken at Grand and
Oak Lawn, right, because that's where glass that also
matches the Tahoe was found.
			So the broken glass in the street matches the Tahoe.
You know the Tahoe is at Grand and Oak Lawn, you
know that's where the window broke. And the glass in the
defendant's shoes puts him in the car right when the
window breaks. *** [T]he glass is one piece of evidence.
One piece to consider. But it fits in, and it describes the
defendant as being in the car because the glass from the
Tahoe was in his shoes." (Emphases added.)
Defendant contends that these remarks denied him a fair trial.
	However, the record shows that defendant failed to object to
these remarks at trial, and failed to raise the issue in his post-trial
motion. The issue is, therefore, waived. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186;
Jackson, 84 Ill. 2d  at 358-59.
	Defendant, however, asks us to review this issue under the
plain error doctrine. As already discussed, the evidence here is not
closely balanced. Thus, one of the two limited circumstances
under which we apply the plain error doctrine is not present.
Therefore, we consider only whether the second limited
circumstance justifying application of the plain error doctrine is
present, i.e., whether the alleged errors are of such magnitude that
defendant was denied a fair trial, and remedying such errors is
necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. People
v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 344 (2000); People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 99 (1996).
	In People v. Linscott, 142 Ill. 2d 22 (1991), this court reversed
a murder conviction based on prosecutorial comments that
misrepresented two of three pieces of the State's evidence against
the defendant. In closing argument, the prosecutor commented that
the defendant's hair had been found at the crime scene. The
Linscott court found that the prosecutor's comment was improper
because the evidence merely showed that the defendant was in a
class of possible donors of the hair and not that the hair
conclusively belonged to the defendant. Linscott, 142 Ill. 2d  at 28-34. Because the evidence in Linscott was closely balanced
(Linscott, 142 Ill. 2d at 40), this court concluded that the improper
comment amounted to plain error (Linscott, 142 Ill. 2d at 33-34).
	As in Linscott, we find that the prosecutor's above-quoted
comments in this case overstated the evidence. However, the
prosecutor's comments did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.
Comments in closing argument must be considered in context of
the entire closing argument of both the State and the defendant.
People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 507 (1993). The challenged
remarks are only three brief statements contained in two
paragraphs of the State's entire closing argument, which,
transcribed, consists of 32 record pages. Also, we note that the
trial court instructed the jury to disregard statements made in
closing argument not based on the evidence. See Moore, 171 Ill. 2d  at 100.
	Considering the challenged comments in the context of the
State's entire closing argument, as we must (see Cloutier, 156 Ill.
2d at 507), we hold that they did not prejudice defendant such as
to deny defendant a fair trial or threaten deterioration of the
judicial process. Accordingly, defendant's procedural default of
this issue is not excused.
	Defendant alternatively asserts that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to
preserve this issue for review. To demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that: (1) the
attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) the attorney's deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant. Because the defendant must satisfy both
prongs of this test, the failure to establish either is fatal to the
claim. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 699, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2069 (1984).
	In this case, we can dispose of defendant's assertion of
ineffective assistance of counsel on the "prejudice" prong alone.
We earlier concluded that Luckas' testimony was not erroneous.
Thus, the trial court would have rightfully overruled any defense
objection thereto. Consequently, had defense counsel objected, the
result would have been no different from the effect of his failure
to object. This purportedly ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel did not prejudice defendant. See, e.g., People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 330-32 (1998). Also, we earlier concluded that the
prosecutor's comments did not prejudice defendant such that he
was denied a fair trial. Thus, defendant was not prejudiced in
terms of Strickland. See, e.g., Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 322-26.

III. Lesser-Included Offense
	Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in refusing his
tendered jury instruction regarding conspiracy to commit first
degree murder as an included offense of first degree murder based
on accountability. Defendant notes the following. A person is
criminally accountable when he or she, inter alia, agrees to aid
another in the planning or commission of an offense. 720 ILCS
5/5-2(c) (West 1998). A person is guilty of conspiracy when he or
she agrees with another to commit an offense and one of the
conspirators performs an act in furtherance of that agreement. 720
ILCS 5/8-2(a) (West 1998). First degree murder based on
accountability is potentially a capital offense (People v. Ruiz, 94 Ill. 2d 245, 260 (1982)), while conspiracy to commit first degree
murder is not (720 ILCS 5/8-2(c) (West 1998)).
	In this case, defendant contends:
		"where the State relies on evidence of the defendant's
'agreement' to aid in the planning or commission of the
offense to establish guilt of murder-by-accountability, the
defense should be able to rely on the same evidence to
argue that the defendant merely 'agreed' that the offense
should be committed by others, and is therefore guilty
only of conspiracy to commit murder."
The trial court ruled that conspiracy to commit first degree murder
was not available as an included offense because the indictment
did not contain any allegation that defendant agreed with another
in the planning or commission of the murders.
	We agree with the trial court. The controlling principles are
quite settled. A defendant generally may not be convicted of an
offense for which the defendant has not been charged. However,
in an appropriate case, the defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed on less serious offenses that are included in the charged
offense. Such a practice provides an important third option to a
jury. If a jury believes that a defendant is guilty of something, but
uncertain whether the charged offense has been proved, the jury
might convict the defendant of the lesser offense rather than
convict or acquit the defendant of the greater offense. See People
v. Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d 319, 323-24 (1997); People v. Landwer,
166 Ill. 2d 475, 485-86 (1995); People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93,
105 (1994).
	An included offense "[i]s established by proof of the same or
less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both),
than that which is required to establish the commission of the
offense." 720 ILCS 5/2-9(a) (West 1998). In applying this
statutory definition, this court has repeatedly expressed its
preference for the charging instrument approach to determine
whether a particular offense is included in a charged offense.
Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d  at 324, 326-27; People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 135 (1997).
	The charging instrument approach is two tiered. First a court
must determine whether the charging instrument describes the
lesser offense. At a minimum, the instrument charging the greater
offense must contain a broad foundation or main outline of the
lesser offense. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d  at 135; Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d  at
486; Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 107.
	"Second, if the charging instrument identifies a lesser-included offense, evidence adduced at trial must rationally support
the conviction on the lesser-included offense." People v. Baldwin,
199 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2002). A court must examine the evidence
presented and determine whether the evidence would permit a jury
to rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included
offense, but acquit the defendant of the greater offense. Hamilton,
179 Ill. 2d  at 324; Jones, 175 Ill. 2d  at 135; Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d 
at 486.
	"Whether the facts alleged in the charging instrument set forth
a broad foundation or main outline of the lesser-included offense
is a separate inquiry from whether the facts adduced at trial
supported a conviction on the lesser-included charge." Baldwin,
199 Ill. 2d  at 11. As this court in Baldwin explained:
		"First, is the convicted offense indeed a lesser-included
offense at all? To answer that question, we must examine
the charging instrument and determine whether it sets
forth a broad foundation or main outline of the lesser-included offense. Second, was it proper to find defendant
guilty of this lesser-included offense? To answer that
question, we must examine the evidence adduced at trial
and determine whether it rationally supports a guilty
finding. We cannot reach the second question without an
affirmative answer to the first question." (Emphases in
original.) Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d  at 14-15.
We must "cautiously avoid" eroding the charging instrument
approach or converting it into something else. See Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d  at 15.
	In the present case, the indictment did not charge defendant
with first degree murder as an accomplice and made no reference
to a theory of accountability. Rather, the murder counts in the
indictment charged defendant with first degree murder as a
principal. This was not incorrect. It is proper to charge a defendant
as a principal even though the proof is that the defendant was only
an accomplice. People v. Nicholls, 42 Ill. 2d 91, 100 (1969);
People v. Nelson, 33 Ill. 2d 48, 51-52 (1965). Courts permit this
pleading practice because accountability is not a separate offense,
but merely an alternative manner of proving a defendant guilty of
the substantive offense. See People v. Doss, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1026,
1029 (1981); People v. Williams, 28 Ill. App. 3d 402, 404 (1975).
A defendant charged as a principal can be convicted on a theory of
accountability if supported by the evidence. People v. Carlson,
224 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1045 (1992); People v. Whitlock, 174 Ill.
App. 3d 749, 780-81 (1988); Doss, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 1029.
	In this case, although the State prosecuted defendant under a
theory of accountability, the indictment charged him as a principal.
Thus, the charging instrument did not contain any reference to an
"agreement" that might describe the offense of conspiracy. This
ends our inquiry. See Baldwin, 199 Ill. 2d at 14-15; People v.
Williams, 315 Ill. App. 3d 22, 33 (2000) (stating that court need
not discuss second prong of analysis if charging instrument does
not describe a lesser-included offense).
	Defendant concedes that "the State had the legal prerogative
to proceed in that manner." However, defendant asks us to expand
the charging instrument approach to include jury instructions
offered by the State. We decline defendant's request. As jury
instructions are based on the evidence presented at trial, this is
simply another form of the evidence approach to determining
lesser-included offenses, which this court rejected in favor of the
charging instrument approach. See Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 107, 110.
	Defendant complains that it is unfair to allow the prosecution
to control the availability of lesser-included offense instructions
through the language of the charging instrument. Rejecting such
criticism, this court has explained that the State's Attorney is
vested with exclusive discretion in the initiation and management
of a criminal prosecution. That discretion includes the choice of
which charges shall be brought. A criminal defendant does not
have the right to choose his or her prosecution or punishment. This
court views the charging instrument approach as being consistent
with these principles. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 113 (and cases cited
therein). We uphold the trial court's refusal of defendant's
tendered jury instruction.
	We have found no reversible error entitling defendant to a
new trial. Accordingly, we uphold defendant's convictions.


CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, we have found no reversible error
entitling defendant to a new trial. The commutation of defendant's
death sentence rendered his sentencing issues moot. Accordingly,
the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
 



 



1.      1We took with the case defendant's motion to withdraw certain
sentencing issues. We now deny that motion as moot.

2.      2We note that the record included live testimony and a videotape
showing the detention area and recording the clearly audible pinging
tone.