Title: Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Ledbetter

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF  
 
 
) 
TEACHERS, et al.,   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) No. SC91766 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
RICHARD LEDBETTER, et al., 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents.  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS CITY 
The Honorable Robert H. Dierker, Judge 
 
Opinion issued November 20, 2012 
 
 
The American Federation of Teachers, its St. Louis affiliate Local 420, and 
individual representatives, Mary Armstrong and Byron Clemens,1 appeal the trial court’s 
summary judgment declaring that the board of education of the Construction Career Center 
Charter School District and the individual members of the board2 have no duty to “meet and 
confer” or to bargain collectively in good faith with the union.  Because article I, section 29 
of the Missouri Constitution provides that all employees, public and private, have a right to 
                                             
 
1 The American Federation of Teachers, Local 420 and the individual representatives are 
referenced collectively as “the union.” 
2 The board of education of the Construction Career Center Charter School District and the 
individual members of the board are collectively referenced as “the board.”   
 
 
organize and to bargain collectively, it necessarily requires the board to meet and confer 
with the union, in good faith, with the present intention to reach an agreement.  The 
judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded. 
Facts and Procedural Background 
 
 
After receiving formal recognition as the collective bargaining representative for all 
teachers and other certified employees, the union met and conferred with the board on 18 
occasions between May 13, 2008, and April 9, 2009, to negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement.  In January 2009, the negotiators reached a tentative agreement for all issues 
except for salaries, but both parties recognized that the agreement was subject to ratification 
by the local union members and the board members.  No agreement was finalized. 
 
 
The board then discussed the labor negotiations and its tentative agreement during 
closed meetings in January, February, and March 2009.  Advance notice of the meetings and 
a tentative agenda were posted 24 hours prior to each meeting at the board’s meeting place.  
During its February 17, 2009, meeting, the board unanimously rejected the tentative labor 
agreement and instructed its negotiators to present a revised proposal to the union.  At the 
March 30, 2009, meeting, the board resolved not to negotiate teacher tenure matters with the 
union and unilaterally adopted teacher salaries for the 2009-2010 academic year.  No 
minutes or votes were recorded from those meetings.   
 
 
The day following the board’s March 30th meeting, the board’s representatives met 
with the union, but it failed to mention salaries for the 2009-2010 school year.  During an 
April 9, 2009, meeting between the board and union representatives, the board proposed 
teachers’ salaries for the 2009-2010 school year and announced that contracts would be 
presented to teachers the next day.  At the end of that meeting, the board agreed to extend its 
deadline by six days to allow the union to respond to its decision.  On April 13, 2009, the 
union offered a counterproposal that the board rejected.   
 
 
The union filed a petition for declaratory judgment asserting that the board violated the 
Missouri “sunshine law,” section 610.010, et seq., RSMo Supp. 2011,3 and failed to satisfy 
its duty to bargain collectively under article I, section 29.  The case was submitted to the 
trial court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.  The trial court held that the 
Missouri Constitution imposes no duty on a public employer to “meet and confer” or to 
bargain in good faith with a collective bargaining representative.  The trial court further 
found that, if there is a duty to bargain in good faith, the board did not bargain in “good 
faith” as that term is understood under federal labor law.  Accordingly, the trial court 
granted summary judgment for the board.  The union appeals. 
Standard of Review 
 
 
The propriety of a grant of summary judgment is an issue of law that this Court 
reviews de novo.  ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid–Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 
S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of 
summary judgment are no different from those that should be employed by the trial court to 
determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially.  Id.  This Court reviews the record 
in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered.  Id.  Summary 
judgment is appropriate when the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to 
                                             
 
3 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 unless otherwise indicated. 
 
 
3
which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 74.04(c)(6); 
Grattan v. Union Elec. Co., 151 S.W.3d 59, 61 (Mo. banc 2004).   
 
 
Because this case concerns a declaratory judgment, the trial court’s decision will be 
affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the 
evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.  Guyer v. City of Kirkwood, 38 
S.W.3d 412, 413 (Mo. banc 2001) (citing McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285, 287 
(Mo. banc 1996); Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)).   
Discussion 
 
 
On appeal, the union claims that the trial court erred in declaring that employers do not 
owe a duty to bargain in good faith under article I, section 29.  The union asserts that 
because it has a constitutional right to bargain collectively with the board, the board has a 
corresponding duty to bargain collectively in good faith with the union.  Contrary to the trial 
court’s judgment, the board concedes that it has an obligation to meet and confer with the 
union but asserts that such duty does not also impose the duty to bargain collectively in 
good faith. 
Article I, section 29 of the Missouri Constitution provides that “employees shall have 
the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing.”  This guarantee applies to both public and private sector employees.  
Independence-Nat. Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131, 133 (Mo. banc 
2007).  Missouri’s public sector labor law, codified in section 105.500, et seq., creates a 
procedural framework for collective bargaining for public employees, but it expressly 
excludes certain professions, including law enforcement officers and teachers.  Section 
 
4
105.510.  When a procedural framework for bargaining is not codified, i.e. for excluded 
employees, the lack of a framework does not excuse the public employer from its 
constitutional duty to bargain collectively with public employees.  See Independence, 223 
S.W.3d at 136.  When bargaining, “proposals are made and either accepted or rejected.”  Id. 
at 138.  While the employer remains free to reject any proposal, id. at 136, the right to 
bargain collectively still requires “‘negotiations between an employer and the 
representatives of organized employees to determine the conditions of employment . . . ,’” 
id. at 138 n.6 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 280 (8th ed. 2004)).   
Unlike most states, Missouri does not have a statutorily imposed duty to bargain 
collectively in good faith.  See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 23.40.110(a)(5); Cal. Gov. Code § 
3543.5; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-153a(a); Del. Code Ann. § 4007(5); Fla. Stat. § 447.309(1).  
The question, then, is whether article I, section 29 requires public employers to bargain in 
good faith.  “Constitutional provisions are subject to the same rules of construction as other 
laws, except that constitutional provisions are given a broader construction due to their more 
permanent character.”  Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. banc 2007), 
overruled on other grounds by King-Willmann v. Webster Groves School Dist., 361 S.W.3d 
414 (Mo. banc 2012).  “Statutory construction is favored that avoids unjust or unreasonable 
results.”  David Ranken, Jr. Tech. Inst. v. Boykins, 816 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Mo. banc 1991), 
overruled on other grounds by Alumax Foils, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 939 S.W.2d 907, 911 
(Mo. banc 1997).  In a constitutional context, “[a] constitutional provision should never be 
construed to work confusion and mischief unless no other reasonable construction is 
possible.”  Theodoro v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 527 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. banc 1975).   
 
5
 
Without an interpretation that imposes a duty to negotiate in good faith, the article I, 
section 29 right to bargain collectively would be nullified or redundant.  Both of those 
results are unreasonable.  The ultimate purpose of bargaining is to reach an agreement.  
Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 138; City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Mo. 
banc 1947), overruled by Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 137 (“Surely the real purpose of 
such bargaining is to reach agreements and to result in binding contracts between unions 
representing employees and their employer.”).  If public employers were not required to 
negotiate in good faith, they could act with the intent to thwart collective bargaining so as 
never to reach an agreement – frustrating the very purpose of bargaining and invalidating 
the right.   
 
Moreover, if the right did not include a duty for the public employer to negotiate in 
good faith, article I, section 29 would be reduced to the right to petition an employer for 
redress of grievances.  In situations in which the employer is a government entity, that 
interpretation would make the right redundant because this goes no further than the limited 
right to petition the government already guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and article I, sections 8 and 9 of the Missouri Constitution.  While 
debating section 29’s application to public employees, delegates to Missouri’s constitutional 
convention noted this distinction, finding that the right to bargain collectively was separate 
and different from rights of speech, petition, and press.  See 9 Debates of the 1943-1944 
Constitutional Convention of Missouri 2546-47 (2008). 4 
                                             
 
4 Referencing the debates over article I, section 29, however, does not clarify what the right 
to collective bargaining entails.  The debates only state that the goal of section 29 was to 
 
6
 
Most importantly, “collective bargaining”, as a technical term, always has been 
construed to include a duty to negotiate in good faith – even when it was not required 
explicitly by statute.  When the constitution employs words that long have had a technical 
meaning, as used in statutes and judicial proceedings, those words are to be understood in 
their technical sense unless there is something to show that they were employed in some 
other way.  Ex parte Bethurum, 66 Mo. 545, 548 (1877).  Section 1.090 (“Words and 
phrases shall be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense, but technical words and 
phrases having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be understood according to 
their technical import.”).   
 
Evidence of this understanding may be found when examining the American history 
of collective bargaining.  The governmental promotion of collective bargaining was born 
out of the economic emergency caused by the First World War.  Russell A. Smith, The 
Evolution of the “Duty to Bargain” Concept in American Law, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1065, 1067 
(1941).  In 1918, the President of the United States organized the War Labor Board in order 
to mediate and adjudicate labor disputes.  Id. at 1068-69.  Official policy at that time 
                                                                                                                                                      
preserve the right from any future attack by the Legislature.  8 Debates of the 1943-1944 
Constitutional Convention of Missouri 2517 (2008) (“If [article I, section 29] is in our 
Constitution we will preclude the possibility and the probability as has happened in the past 
[of], in future sessions of the legislature, many bills being introduced seeking to destroy 
collective bargaining.”).  They do not give any indication as to whether the right imposes an 
affirmative duty, a sword that can compel employers to bargain, or whether it created only a 
negative duty, a shield that prohibits public and private employers from impeding the 
organization of labor unions.  In any case, the debates “neither add to nor subtract from the 
plain meaning of the constitution’s words.”  Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 137.  Therefore, 
this Court must look to the meaning of the words of the constitution as they generally were 
understood because “Missouri voters did not vote on the words used in the deliberations of 
the constitutional convention.  The voters voted for the words in the Constitution . . . .”  Id.   
 
7
favored the collective bargaining process, but little, if any, attempt was made to define the 
extent of an implicit reciprocal duty in employers to bargain with employee representatives.  
Id. at 1069.  Nevertheless, many of the War Labor Board’s findings contained the following, 
or a similar, formula: 
As the right of the workers to bargain collectively through their chosen 
representatives is recognized by this board, the company should recognize 
and deal with such committees of their employees after they have been 
constituted by the employees. 
 We recommend that when such shop committees are elected that the 
company representatives meet with them at an early date to take up 
differences that still exist in an earnest endeavor to reach an agreement on 
all points at issue. . . .” 
 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of Am. v. W. Cold Storage Co., Nat’l War 
Labor Bd. Docket No. 80 (1919) (cited in Smith, The Evolution, supra, at 1069-70) 
(emphasis added).   
 
After World War I, the Transportation Act, passed by Congress, obligated employers 
in the railroad industry to “exert every reasonable effort and adopt every available means to 
avoid any interruption to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between 
the carrier and the employees or subordinate officials.”  Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 
152, 41 Stat. 456, 469 (1920).  That act also did not contain an explicit duty to bargain in 
good faith, but the Railroad Labor Board still found that collective bargaining required more 
than a mere “perfunctory performance of the statute.”  Internat’l Ass’n of Machinists, 2 
R.L.B. 87, 89 (1921).  Indeed, The Railroad Labor Board found that collective bargaining 
“requires an honest effort by the parties to decide in conference.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
 
8
 
The requirement of good faith in collective bargaining was reaffirmed by Congress’ 
adoption of the National Industrial Labor Act.  Pub. L. No. 67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).  Section 
7(a) of that act specifically notes that “employees shall have the right to organize and 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.”  Although this act, once 
again, did not explicitly include a duty to bargain in good faith,  id. at 198, the National 
Labor Board, an administrative board that served as short-lived precursor to the National 
Labor Relations Board, found in 1934 that good faith was implicit to collective bargaining.  
Connecticut Coke Co., 2 N.L.B. 88, 89 (1934).  It found that the statute required more than 
simply “meet[ing] and confer[ring]” with employee representatives because 
[t]rue collective bargaining involves more than the holding of conferences 
and the exchange of pleasantries.  It is not limited to the settlement of 
specific grievances. . . .  While the law does not compel the parties to reach 
agreement, it does contemplate that both parties will approach the 
negotiations with an open mind and will make a reasonable effort to reach 
a common ground of agreement.   
 
Id. (emphasis added).  A short while later, the newly organized National Labor Relations 
Board held that the duty of an employer to bargain collectively requires the employer “to 
negotiate in good faith with his employees’ representatives; to match their proposals, if 
unacceptable, with counter-proposals; and to make every reasonable effort to reach an 
agreement.”  Houde Engineering Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. (old) 35 (1934) (decided by the 
National Labor Relations Board organized under Pub. Res. No. 44, 48 Stat. 1183 (1934)). 
 
By 1935, Congress enacted new labor relations laws through the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, again without adding an explicit obligation to negotiate in “good faith.”  
National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935).  However, the 
 
9
National Labor Relations Board continued to find that good faith was an implicit component 
of collective bargaining.  Atlantic Refining Co., 1 N.L.R.B.  359, 368 (1935) (“Collective 
bargaining means more than the discussion of individual problems and grievances with 
employees or groups of employees.  It means that the employer is obligated to negotiate in 
good faith with his employers as a group, through their representatives . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); Atlas Mills, 3 N.L.R.B. 10, 21 (1937) (“[I]f the obligation of the Act is to produce 
more than a series of empty discussions, bargaining must mean more than mere negotiation.  
It must mean negotiation with a bona fide intent to reach an agreement if agreement is 
possible.”); Globe Cotton Mills, 6 N.L.R.B. 461, 467 (1938) (“The term collective 
bargaining denotes in common usage, as well as in legal terminology, negotiations looking 
toward a collective agreement.”); Inland Steel Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 783, 797 (1938) (“If honest 
and sincere bargaining efforts fail to produce an understanding on terms, nothing in the Act 
makes illegal the employer’s refusal to accept the particular terms submitted to him.” 
(emphasis added)); Highland Park Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1248-49 (1939) (“The duty 
[to bargain collectively] encompasses an obligation to enter into discussion and negotiation 
with a fair mind and with a sincere purpose to find a basis of agreement . . . .” (emphasis 
added)).   
 
By 1945, when article I, section 29 was adopted as part of Missouri’s current 
constitution, the words “bargain collectively” were common usage for negotiations 
conducted in good faith and looking toward a collective agreement.  In fact, national labor 
laws did not explicitly include an employer’s corresponding duty to bargain in good faith 
until 1947, when Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act.  Robert P. Duvin, 
 
10
The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 248, 255-56 (1964) 
(citing Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d), Pub. L. No. 101, 61 
Stat. 136, 142 (1947)). 
 
Furthermore, since the adoption of Missouri’s constitution, courts continue to 
recognize the essential role of good faith in collective bargaining.  In 1951, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized that the “performance of the duty to bargain requires more 
than a willingness to enter upon a sterile discussion of union-management differences.”  
N.L.R.B. v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1951).  Indeed, the Court found 
that, under national labor laws, collective bargaining requires an employer “‘to negotiate in 
good faith with his employees’ representatives; to match their proposals, if unacceptable, 
with counter-proposals; and to make every reasonable effort to reach an agreement.’”  Id. 
(citing Houde Engineering, 1 N.L.R.B. (old) at 35).  Finally, and in a much more modern 
context, the New Jersey Superior Court held that its state’s constitutional guarantee for 
collective bargaining imposes a corresponding duty of good faith on employers: 
To say that [the right to bargain collectively] does not confer upon the 
employer a corresponding duty to likewise bargain is preposterous.  Surely, 
employees do not organize in order to conduct a sewing circle.  Organization 
and collective bargaining, terms of art in the field, imply and impel an 
obligation to sit down at a bargaining table and bargain in good faith.  To hold 
any other way would emasculate the constitutional provision. 
   
Comite Organizador de Trabajadores v. Levin, 515 A.2d 252, 367-68 (N.J. Super. 1985).  
Consequently, because article I, section 29 of Missouri’s constitution imposes on employers 
a duty to meet and confer with collective bargaining representatives, employers must also 
engage in the bargaining process in good faith.   
 
11
 
Under Missouri law, “‘good faith’ is not an abstract thing, but ‘is a concrete quality, 
descriptive of the motivating purpose of one’s act or conduct when challenged or called in 
question.’”5  Krone v. Snapout Forms Co., 230 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. 1950) (quoting 
Municipal Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Bishop’s Harbor Drainage Dist., 17 So.2d 226, 227 
(Fla. 1944)).  Parties act in “good faith” when they act “without simulation or pretense, 
innocently and in an attitude of trust and confidence . . . .”  State ex rel. West v. Diemer, 164 
S.W. 517, 521 (Mo. 1914).  Those parties act “honestly, openly, sincerely, without deceit, 
covin, or any form of fraud.”  Id.  Consequently, the course of a negotiation between parties 
acting in good faith should reflect that both parties sincerely undertook to reach an 
agreement.  While there is an inherent tension between the duty to bargain with a serious 
attempt to resolve differences and the employer’s freedom to reject any proposal, this 
tension serves to strike the balance intended by the voters of Missouri in their adoption of 
article I, section 29.    
 
 
                                             
 
5 The union argues that Missouri’s adoption of article I, section 29 evinces an intent to adopt 
the same duty of good faith in collective bargaining as under settled federal labor law.  In 
support of this assertion, the union points to the fact that the National Labor Relations Act 
predates Missouri’s 1945 constitution and that the language of the Missouri Constitution 
appears to be taken from section 7 of the NLRA.  Compare article I, section 29 with 29 
U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (granting to employees the right “to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing”).  The NLRA, by its own provisions, specifically 
excludes its application to employees of “any State or political subdivision.”  29 U.S.C.       
§ 152(2); Independence-NEA, 223 S.W.3d at 139.  Federal law and cases can give 
guidance to the extent they are consistent with Missouri law, but cases interpreting federal 
statutes are not binding with regard to this Court’s interpretation of Missouri law.  See 
Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818-19 (Mo. banc 2007). 
 
12
 
13
Conclusion 
 
As recognized in Independence, article I, section 29 of the Missouri Constitution 
grants public employees the “right to bargain collectively,” requiring public employers to 
“meet and confer” regarding working conditions, even though it is not required to make an 
agreement with employees.  Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 137.  This requirement in article 
I, section 29 inherently includes the obligation that public employers act in good faith 
because otherwise pubic employers could act with the intent to thwart collective bargaining 
so as never to reach an agreement, frustrating the very purpose of bargaining and 
invalidating the right.  Consequently, the trial court erred in finding that the board had no 
duty to meet and confer with the union and, further, that it had no duty to bargain 
collectively in good faith.  The trial court further erred in its conditional finding that the 
board had not bargained in good faith because that finding considered only “good faith” as 
that term is understood under federal law.  This case must be remanded for adjudication of 
whether the board negotiated in good faith under Missouri law, including a determination of 
whether there are disputed issues of fact under this standard. 
 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
Teitelman, C.J., Russell and Stith, JJ.,  
and Hartenbach, Sr.J., concur;  
Fischer, J., dissents in separate opinion 
filed.  Draper, J., not participating. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
                                
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF   
 
) 
TEACHERS, et al.,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellants,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC91766 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
RICHARD LEDBETTER, et al.,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Respondents.  
) 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion.  The principal opinion holds that, 
under article I, section 29, of the Missouri Constitution, Missouri employers have an 
affirmative duty to collectively bargain that inherently creates a duty to meet and confer 
and negotiate in good faith with the present intention to reach an agreement.  The plain 
language of article I, section 29, does not create these affirmative duties on the part of 
public school boards.  Rather, article I, section 29, serves to guarantee the right of 
Missouri employees to organize and to choose a representative through which they intend 
to bargain; article I, section 29, imposes no affirmative duty on any public employer.1  
                                             
 
1 See also Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 v. City of 
Chesterfield (consolidated with) Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, Fraternal Order of 
Police, Lodge 15 v. City of University City, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Mo. banc 2012) (decided 
November 20, 2012, Nos. SC91736 and SC91737, Judge Fischer dissenting). 
Standard of Review 
This Court's standard of review for a circuit court's grant of summary judgment is 
de novo.  ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Co., 854 S.W.2d 371, 
376 (Mo. banc 1993).  "The propriety of summary judgment is purely an issue of law.  As 
the trial court's judgment is founded on the record submitted and the law, an appellate 
court need not defer to the trial court's order granting summary judgment."  Id.  This 
Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment 
was entered.  Id.  Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party has 
demonstrated that "there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Rule 74.04(c)(6). 
 
 
 
Analysis 
A.  The Affirmative Duty to Meet and Confer and to Negotiate in Good Faith 
The principal opinion holds that Missouri employers have an affirmative duty to 
meet and confer with their employees and to negotiate in good faith with the present 
intention to reach an agreement.  This duty, according to the principal opinion, derives 
from the right to "bargain collectively" created in article I, section 29, of the Missouri 
Constitution.  In order to justify this new interpretation of article I, section 29, the 
principal opinion quotes the often-used rule of construction "a court will read a 
constitutional provision broadly," slip op. at 5, but what is missing from the principal 
opinion's analysis is "the rest of the story," to quote Paul Harvey, when a court is required 
to interpret a constitutional provision.    
 
While a court will read a constitutional provision broadly, it cannot 
ascribe to it a meaning that is contrary to that clearly intended by the 
 
2
drafters.  Rather, a court must undertake to ascribe to the words of a 
constitutional provision the meaning that the people understood them to 
have when the provision was adopted. 
 
Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo. banc 2002). 
The principal opinion holds that section 29 would be "nullified or redundant" if it 
did not impose a duty on employers to meet and confer and negotiate in good faith.  
Because the plain language of this provision, a review of the constitutional debates that 
took place at the time the provision was adopted, and review of this Court's cases do not 
impose an affirmative duty on employers, I do not agree.   
 
The purpose of article I, section 29, "was to declare that such rights of collective 
bargaining were established in this state.  It means that employees have the right to 
organize and function for a special purpose: namely, for the purpose of collective 
bargaining."  Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Mo. banc 1957).  This view is 
supported by the debates over the Missouri Constitution of 1945 in that the supporters of 
article I, section 29, envisioned the provision as guaranteeing that the right to organize 
and bargain collectively would be free from legislative interference.  See 8 Debates of the 
1943-1944 Constitutional Convention of Missouri 2517 (1943-1944).  The Honorable 
R.T. Wood, one of the provision's main supporters, stated, "If [article I, section 29] is in 
our Constitution we will preclude the possibility and the probability as has happened in 
the past [of], in future sessions of the Legislature, many bills being introduced seeking to 
destroy collective bargaining."  Id.  Wood argued that article I, section 29, would be a 
"measure of protection" that members of organized labor would "have the same right to 
organize and bargain collectively in our own interest as every other organization and 
 
3
every other group."  Id.   It is perplexing, to say the least, that the principal opinion is 
willing to look to no fewer than four federal statutes to seek guidance as to what article I, 
section 29, meant when it was adopted rather than the actual discussion by the people 
who adopted the provision when it was adopted. 
 
The principal opinion greatly expands the clear and express language of article I, 
section 29, into a "labor relations act."  This Court has consistently held that article I, 
section 29, "is not a labor relations act, specifying rights, duties, practices and obligations 
of employers and labor organizations."  Quinn, 298 S.W.2d at 418.  "[T]he constitutional 
provision provides for no required affirmative duties concerning this right . . . ."  Id. at 
419.  Article I, section 29, was adopted as part of the Missouri Constitution to guarantee 
the right of employees "to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing."  In this role, article I, section 29, has been understood to protect 
employees from coercion by their employer, undesired unions, or other entities that may 
attempt to coerce them into, or out of, union activity.  See Quinn, 298 S.W.2d at 419 
(enjoining an employer from engaging in activity designed to prevent its employees from 
organizing); Bellerive Country Club v. McVey, 284 S.W.2d 492, 501 (Mo. banc 1955) 
(enjoining union picketing designed to force an employer to coerce its employees into 
joining the union).  Article I, section 29, has never been found to require any affirmative 
duty on the part of an employer, either public or private.  Quinn, 298 S.W.2d at 419.  This 
Court held, "It is evident that the constitutional provision guaranteeing employees 
the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing does not cast upon all employers a correlative obligation."  Id.  
 
4
The principal opinion's new interpretation of article I, section 29, to require 
employers to meet and confer and negotiate in good faith with the present intention to 
reach an agreement, goes beyond the plain language of the provision and imposes an 
affirmative duty where one has never before existed.  Article I, section 29, does not 
impose a duty on employees to "bargain collectively in good faith" as the principal 
opinion holds.2  "While a court will read a constitutional provision broadly, it cannot 
ascribe to it a meaning that is contrary to that clearly intended by the drafters.  Rather, a 
court must undertake to ascribe to the words of a constitutional provision the meaning 
that the people understood them to have when the provision was adopted."  Farmer v. 
Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo. banc 2002).   
In my view, the plain language of article I, section 29, does not require employers 
to negotiate at all.  The provision reads: "employees shall have the right to organize and 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."  The provision 
does not include the words, "meet and confer."  Nor does it include the words "duty to 
negotiate," "good faith," or any other phrase imposing an affirmative duty on employers.  
The principal opinion asserts that collective bargaining "always has been 
construed to include a duty to negotiate in good faith;" thus, article I, section 29, must 
include a requirement to meet and confer and negotiate in good faith.  Slip op. at 7.  To 
support this proposition, the principal opinion relies on a number of federal laws and 
agency decisions, including the Transportation Act of 1920, the National Industrial Labor 
                                             
 
2 In fact, the public sector law that sets out the procedural framework, including meet and confer 
procedures for most public employers, does not expressly include a "good faith" requirement. 
 
5
Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and decisions of the National War Labor Board 
and the National Labor Relations Board.  There is a fundamental difference, however, 
between these federal acts and agency decisions relied on by the principal opinion and 
article I, section 29, of the Missouri Constitution.  The federal authority quoted by the 
principal opinion was put in place by Congress to facilitate the process of collective 
bargaining.  In facilitating bargaining, the federal government made a policy choice to 
require good faith negotiations.  It did so either expressly through statute or through 
agency decision – not by judicial mandate based on a judicial philosophy that changes the 
meaning of a state constitutional provision over time.   
But article I, section 29, was not, and is not, designed to facilitate the process of 
collective bargaining.  As noted previously, article I, section 29, was designed to protect 
from legislative or employer interference the right of employees to organize and bargain 
through a representative of their own choosing.  It was not included in the constitution to 
establish a process to resolve all the labor relations issues of public school teachers.  It is 
not appropriate for this Court to ascribe a new meaning that is contrary to what was 
intended by the drafters and those who approved its adoption.  Farmer, 89 S.W.3d at 452.  
Further, the longstanding understanding of article I, section 29, does not render it a 
nullity because it serves to protect the right to bargain collectively rather than to set out 
the scheme through which such bargaining should occur.  Quinn, 298 S.W.2d at 417. 
 
The plain language of article I, section 29, protects employees' rights to organize 
and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.  Neither the 
state, nor any labor union, nor any employer may infringe on these rights.  This 
 
6
constitutional provision was never intended to actually facilitate a collective bargaining 
process as does the National Labor Relations Act or Missouri's public sector labor law.  
While requiring employers to meet and confer and negotiate in good faith may, or may 
not, be good policy, "[t]there is no authority for this Court to read into the Constitution 
words that are not there."  Independence-Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 
223 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Mo. banc 2007).  The principal opinion's redefining of our state 
constitutional provision, which was adopted to authorize an employee to choose a 
representative to collectively bargain, to now create an affirmative duty on all employers 
to "meet and confer with the union, in good faith, with the present intention to reach an 
agreement" fails to consider all of the practical ramifications now placed on statewide 
private employers, in addition to public employers.  American Federation of Teachers v. 
Ledbetter, slip op. at 2, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Mo. banc 2012) (decided November 20, 2012, 
No. SC91766).  See also Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, Fraternal Order of 
Police, Lodge 15 v. City of Chesterfield (consolidated with) Eastern Missouri Coalition 
of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 v. City of University City, slip op. at 2, 
___ S.W.3d ___ (Mo. banc 2012) (decided November 20, 2012, Nos. SC91736 and 
SC91737). 
 
This Court's precedent demonstrates that article I, section 29, had, and continues to 
have, meaning and utility without the requirement of good faith bargaining.  Employees 
in Missouri are free to organize and to choose a representative through whom to bargain.  
In this role, article I, section 29, serves to protect employees from coercion by employers 
and by undesired unions.  It also serves to protect from legislative interference the right to 
 
7
organize.  This is so because "[t]he constitutional provision was shaped as a shield; the 
union seeks to use it as a sword."  Quinn, 298 S.W.2d at 419.  
In Quinn v. Buchanan,3 this Court held that article I, section 29, protected a 
handful of employees after they were terminated for engaging with a union.  Quinn, 298 
S.W.2d at 419.  The employer was enjoined from "coercing his employees into 
withdrawing from the union and rescinding their authorization to it to act as their 
collective bargaining representative and also from otherwise interfering with these 
employees' rights to freely choose the union as their collective bargaining representative."  
Id.  The Court held that the employees were not entitled to requested relief that would 
"require defendant to recognize and bargain with the union."  Id.  The Court specifically 
stated, "It is evident that the constitutional provision guaranteeing employees the 
right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing does not cast upon all employers a correlative obligation."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  Quinn indicates that article I, section 29, is intended to protect employees from 
                                             
 
3 The principal opinion in Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, 
Lodge 15 v. City of Chesterfield, __ S.W.3d __ (Mo. banc 2012) (decided November 20, 2012, 
Nos. SC91736 and SC91737), issued contemporaneously with this opinion, found it necessary to 
overrule Quinn to get to its desired result.  For reasons more fully detailed in the dissent to that 
opinion, I do not agree that Quinn should be overruled.  The principal opinion found that Quinn 
relied on the erroneous assertion that because article I, section 29 was found in the "Declaration 
of Rights" of the Missouri Constitution, it could not create any affirmative rights.   But Quinn 
held that individuals could enforce any right granted by article I, section 29, through any 
common law or code remedy.  The principal opinion merely disagreed with Quinn's assertion 
that article I, section 29 did not impose any affirmative duties on an employer to bargain with its 
employees.  Quinn did not base this holding solely on article I, section 29's placement in the 
Declaration of Rights, but also on the provision's clear intent to guarantee a right rather than to 
establish a labor relations act.  Quinn also relied on what the framers of article I, section 29, 
intended when the provision was adopted, which is, of course, sound judicial reasoning.  Farmer, 
89 S.W.3d at 452. 
 
8
coercion, but explicitly states that employers need not bargain.  Quinn specifically held, 
"Thus implementation of the right to require any affirmative duties of an employer 
concerning [the right to bargain collectively] is a matter for the legislature."  Id. at 419.  
In Quinn, this Court held the employer's actions in attempting to prevent its 
employees from organizing violated article I, section 29, but the employer's refusal to 
bargain did not.  Id. at 419.  In a rare speaking order to ensure there was no 
misunderstanding or confusion created by this Court's opinion, the order overruling the 
motion for rehearing stated: 
 Sec. 29, Art. I of our Constitution . . . does not purport to require 
collective bargaining by either employees or employers.  The right it 
gives to employees is the right to organize for the purpose of collective 
bargaining through representatives of their own choosing.  Whether or 
not employers and organized employees can bargain or reach an 
agreement depends upon the willingness of both just as in the case of 
bargaining for any kind of contract between other persons who have 
the right to make contracts. Perhaps modern industrial conditions 
make desirable more than that for best labor relations but that is a 
matter for the Legislature. 
 
Id. at 420 (internal citations omitted).  There is nothing in the text of article I, section 29, 
the debates concerning the adoption of article I, section 29, or this Court's prior 
interpretation of article I, section 29, that suggests this Court should not continue to 
follow Quinn.  Quinn was not overruled nor modified in any way by this Court's holding 
in Independence-Nat'l Edu. Ass'n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W.3d 131 (Mo. banc 
2007).      
 
Moreover, cases both before and after Quinn demonstrate the same understanding 
of the right.  In Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home, the Court, citing Quinn, held if 
 
9
an employer discharges an employee for engaging in union activities, that is a wrongful 
discharge under article I, section 29, and the employee is entitled to damages.  370 
S.W.2d 249, 254 (Mo. 1963).  This was so because the employee has a constitutional 
right "to choose collective bargaining representatives to bargain for him concerning his 
employment."  Id.  In Bellerive Country Club v. McVey, this Court enjoined union 
picketing where it found that the picketing was designed to force an employer to coerce 
non-union employees of a private country club to join the union.  284 S.W.2d 492, 501 
(Mo. banc 1955).  In that case, this Court stated, "We think it is clear that the right 
guaranteed to employees by [article I, section 29], 'to organize and to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing' is a free choice, uncoerced by 
management, union, or any other group or organization."  Id. at 500.     
 
Nothing in Independence-National Education Ass'n v. Independence School 
District serves to alter this understanding of article I, section 29.  In Independence, this 
Court held that public employees were protected by article I, section 29, to the same 
extent that private employees were protected.  223 S.W.3d 131, 139 (Mo. banc 2007).  
Independence does not hold, however, that article I, section 29, requires employers to 
bargain with their employees.   
The Independence Court discussed three points in reaching the conclusion that 
article I, section 29, extends to public employees.  First, the Court found that extending 
article I, section 29, to public employees does not constitute legislative delegation 
 
10
because employers are not required to agree to any proposals made by employees. 4  Id. at 
135-36.  If the public entity can reject all proposals, it can "use its governing authority to 
prescribe wages and working conditions," and "none of the public entity's legislative or 
governing authority is being delegated."  Id. at 136.  This finding is completely consistent 
with Quinn and with the concept of article I, section 29, that it supports–employers need 
not bargain with employees.  It is difficult to understand how an employer who is "free to 
reject any and all proposals made by the employees" must comply with all of the 
mandates of the principal opinion.  Id. at 138. 
 
The Court then evaluated the plain meaning of article I, section 29.  Id. at 137-39.  
It concluded that "'[e]mployees' plainly means employees . . . there are no words to limit 
'employees' to private sector employees."  Id. at 138.  The Court then noted that it did not 
have the authority to read words into the Constitution when the meaning is clear, id., 
which is exactly what the principal opinion in this case does by requiring public entities 
to meet and confer and bargain in good faith.  In my view, this Court still does not have 
the authority to read words into the Constitution and particularly to read words into the 
Constitution that drastically redefine the long established meaning of its actual words.    
 
The Court in Independence discussed the extent of the constitutional right.  Id. at 
139.  It attempted to define "collective bargaining" using, in part, the public sector labor 
                                             
 
4 The proposals discussed in Independence were proposals required by the public sector labor 
law found at section 105.500, et seq., RSMo 2000.  Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 136.  Section 
105.510 allows public employees to present proposals to their employer, and section 105.520 
requires a public entity to meet and confer with its employees after such proposals are presented.  
Article I, section 29, does not, by its plain language, require an employer to entertain the 
proposals of its employees. 
 
11
law, but found neither that law, nor the cases interpreting it, defined "collective 
bargaining."  Id.  The Court noted that "the point of bargaining, of course, is to reach 
agreement," but stopped short of holding that article I, section 29, requires an employer to 
bargain with employees.  Id.  The Court then noted, again, that an employer need not 
agree with any employees–whether collective or individual–before leaving the question 
of what "collective bargaining" means unanswered.  Id.  138-39.   
 
The Independence Court's single holding on the issue was: "In any event, article 
I, section 29 applies to 'employees,' regardless of whether they are in the private or 
public sector, and nothing in this constitutional provision requires public employers 
to reach agreements with their employee associations."  Id. at 139.  This express 
holding in Independence in no way requires employers to bargain with their employees.  
Rather, it extends the rights guaranteed by article I, section 29, to public employers.  No 
more, no less.   
Moreover, the language from Independence cited in the principal opinion relating 
to procedural frameworks for bargaining, the duty to bargain, and the need to "meet and 
confer," slip op. 4-5, 13, comes from the Independence Court's discussion of the public 
sector labor law, as interpreted in State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35 
(Mo. banc 1969).  The duty to "meet and confer" comes from section 105.520, RSMo 
2000, not from article I, section 29.  The Independence Court discussed this section in 
attempting to define "collective bargaining," but it never held that the duty to "meet and 
confer" is found in, or required by, article I, section 29.  Any affirmative duty placed on 
 
12
public school boards to meet and confer in good faith with a present intention to reach an 
agreement is entirely a new creation by the principal opinion in this case.   
 
This Court's prior cases demonstrate that article I, section 29, is not nullified or 
redundant if it does not impose a duty to negotiate in good faith as the principal opinion 
asserts.  Slip op. at 6.  Quinn demonstrates that the provision guarantees employees the 
right to be free from coercion in their choice to organize and bargain.  And it serves to 
prevent legislative interference with this right.  It is also significant that collective 
bargaining, and organization for that purpose, was unlawful before it was authorized by 
labor regulations or constitutional provisions.  Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 139.  Article 
I, section 29, serves an important role in legalizing collective bargaining and in keeping 
that right protected.  These rights are certainly more than, and different from, the right to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.  Slip op. at 6.  The mere fact that 
"union-busting" activities, such as those discussed in Quinn, may not be as prevalent in 
2012 does not render article I, section 29, a redundant nullity, and it does not justify this 
Court ascribing a meaning to the provision it does not have.    
B.  Separation of Powers 
The principal opinion's decision raises serious separation of powers concerns.  
Article II, section 1, of the Missouri Constitution codifies the separation of powers 
doctrine in Missouri.  The provision states:  
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments--
the legislative, executive and judicial--each of which shall be confided to a 
separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons, charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, 
 
13
shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except 
in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
 
 
The role of this Court in reviewing the constitutional validity of legislative or 
executive action traditionally has been to declare whether or not the legislature's or 
executive's action is constitutional.  This function derives from the Court's duty to make 
final determinations of questions of law.  Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Mo. 
banc 1993) ("The quintessential power of the judiciary is the power to make final 
determinations of questions of law.").  If a legislative or executive action conflicts with a 
constitutional provision, this Court must hold the action invalid.  State ex inf. Nixon v. 
Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Mo. banc 2002).  In many cases, the declaration of this 
Court will render a statute or an action void, leaving it up to the legislature to decide 
whether or not to attempt to pass a similar, but constitutionally acceptable, replacement 
statute.  Similarly, when legislative inaction is declared unconstitutional, it is the role of 
the legislature to decide the best way to comply with the constitution.  This is true 
because the legislature is the proper branch of government to make policy decisions.  
Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Mo. banc 2009).  
When there are multiple answers to a question, the legislature is the appropriate branch to 
choose the best one.   
 
The principal opinion goes beyond its authority by requiring public schools to 
meet and confer and negotiate in good faith with the present intention to reach an 
 
14
agreement.5  Arguably, this mandate requires more of the school boards than is required 
under the public sector labor law of all other public employers.6  In the second instance, 
it is for the local school boards to decide, as a matter of policy, if, and when, they desire 
to negotiate with the representative selected by the teachers to collectively bargain.  This 
Court does not have the authority to mandate the creation of procedures to facilitate 
collective bargaining.7      
Conclusion      
The principal opinion treads on the legislative role of public school boards and 
violates the separation of powers principles embodied by article II, section 1.  In 
Independence a majority of this Court reversed decades of this Court's jurisprudence by 
interpreting article I, section 29, to recognize the right of public employees to collectively 
                                             
 
5 In my view, the principal opinion may have failed to consider all of the existing statutory 
obligations imposed on public schools that may limit a school board's ability to bargain in the 
same fashion as private employers.  For instance, section 168.126, RSMo, provides that public 
schools must notify any public school teacher who will not be retained of his or her termination 
by April 15th.  If the school board fails to timely notify the teacher of his or her termination, then 
that teacher is deemed to be appointed for the next school year.  Section 168.126 also requires 
public school boards to tender a contract to all probationary teachers by May 15th.  Public 
entities must also prepare an annual budget that estimates all revenues and expenditures for the 
coming year.  Section 67.010, RSMo 2000.  The estimated expenditures may not exceed the total 
estimated revenues.  Id.  The need for public entities to comply with these and other similar 
statutory obligations may limit the bargaining opportunities of governmental bodies or explain 
perceived refusals to bargain by public entities. 
6 The public sector labor law does not contain an express "good faith" provision.   
7 Article I, section 29, of the Missouri Constitution creates a legally enforceable duty by a public 
employer "to bargain collectively with those employees and, when necessary, adopt procedures 
to participate in that process."  Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, 
Lodge 15 v. City of Chesterfield (consolidated with) Eastern Missouri Coalition of Police, 
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 15 v. City of University City, slip op. at 7, ___ S.W.3d ___ 
(Mo. banc 2012) (decided November 20, 2012, Nos. SC91736 and SC91737, Judge Fischer 
dissenting). 
 
 
15
 
16
rgain.   
                                             
bargain.8  That right guarantees public employees the freedom of choice in whether or 
not to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining and who they want to represent 
them in the process.  Article I, section 29, does not impose any affirmative duty on 
Missouri public schools, but, rather, requires only that they recognize their employees' 
right to collectively ba
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
8 Even though the learned Judge Price foreshadowed that it would be hard to predict how a 
majority of this Court would apply "giving public employees a new constitutional right to 
'collective bargaining' that the majority does not define," it is surprising that a majority of this 
Court would reverse years of precedent to now hold that every local government that has public 
employees must establish its own version of the public sector labor law to establish a framework 
to negotiate with its public employees.  Independence, 223 S.W.3d at 148 (Price, J., dissenting).