Title: Matter of Discipline Proceeding Against Petersen

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

120 Wn.2d 833 (1993) 846 P.2d 1330 In the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceeding Against RICHARD A. PETERSEN, an Attorney at Law. No. 10313. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. February 25, 1993. Richard A. Petersen, pro se. Maria S. Regimbal, for Bar Association. SMITH, J. This matter is before the court upon its direction to Respondent Richard A. Petersen, an attorney at law, to show cause why he should not be disbarred, contrary to a recommendation by a majority of the Disciplinary Board of the Washington State Bar Association for a suspension for 2 years followed by probation for 2 years. We disagree with the recommendation of the Disciplinary Board and order that respondent be disbarred. The sole question in this case is whether the appropriate sanction for Respondent Petersen should be disbarment instead of the 2-year suspension and 2-year probation recommended by the Disciplinary Board. Respondent Richard A. Petersen (Respondent) graduated from Gonzaga University Law School in 1975. He was admitted to the Washington State Bar in 1978.[1] In February 1986, he was appointed by the Clark County Superior Court to represent defendant James Michael Dykgraaf in a capital case, State v. Dykgraaf.[2] After the trial, Respondent prepared *835 a motion for payment of criminal defense costs. The Superior Court issued an order authorizing payment in the amount of $6,827.25.[3] A claims warrant was issued to Respondent on January 21, 1987.[4] He did not deposit the funds into a trust account and instead kept the draft for about a week.[5] He testified that he cashed the warrant, that he was overdrawn at his bank, that $1,600 from the warrant was used to cover the overdraft, and that he kept the remaining $5,200. He said he does not know what he did with the money and that he kept no records. He testified that he was fairly certain he used the money to pay his answering service, telephone bill, and other business expenses. He further testified that some of the cash was used for personal expenses. He claims that some of the defense vendors in the Dykgraaf case were paid from the cash, although he has no records of payment and does not remember how the vendors were paid.[6] In February or March 1987, Arthur Curtis, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, was contacted by several of the Dykgraaf defense vendors inquiring about payment of their fees.[7] He contacted Respondent Petersen by telephone and *836 letter and was told by him in mid-March that the matter had been taken care of.[8] In April 1987, the prosecuting attorney referred the matter to Gregory P. Canova, senior assistant attorney general for the State of Washington and chief of the Criminal Division. Mr. Canova testified that records subpoenaed from Respondent Petersen's bank showed that the Clark County claims warrant was deposited in his account, which was not designated as a trust account. Mr. Canova said the activity in the account during that period was for Respondent Petersen's personal and business expenses, such as rent, payment of office telephone bills and bar expenses.[9] Mr. Canova said no checks were issued to the Dykgraaf defense vendors.[10] In 1987 and 1988, Respondent Petersen filed false declarations of compliance with the Washington State Bar Association (Bar Association) concerning his trust account.[11] In February 1989, Respondent Petersen contacted the Bar Association and informed it that he was under criminal investigation for his conduct relating to payment of the Dykgraaf defense vendors.[12] He was instructed by Ms. Maria S. Regimbal, bar counsel, to provide the Bar Association with his records relating to the Dykgraaf funds. Correspondence from the Bar Association to Respondent during the *837 following 10 months repeatedly made the same request, but he failed to provide any records.[13] In April 1990, Respondent met with the Bar Association. He had prepared several checks, but was instructed to pay the vendors direct pursuant to Bar Association policy. Ms. Regimbal had received no evidence that the vendors had been paid.[14] At the time of Respondent's hearing before the hearing officer on July 12, 1990, the vendors still had not been paid. He stated that he had mailed a check to one of them on July 11, 1990.[15] At the time of his hearing before the Disciplinary Board in December 1990, he still had not paid all amounts owed to the Dykgraaf vendors.[16] In mid-1986, Respondent was appointed by the Clark County Superior Court to represent Glenn H. Budd, who was charged with unlawful issuance of checks to Fred Meyer, Inc., in State v. Budd.[17] In July 1986, Mr. Budd delivered $530 to Respondent's office for restitution to Fred Meyer, Inc.[18] Respondent did not deposit the money in his trust account until October 20, 1987.[19] He said he had kept the money in his files.[20] He received repeated reminders from the Clark County Prosecuting Attorney about the Fred Meyer restitution. Respondent did not pay the restitution to Fred Meyer until November 1988.[21] This matter was also referred for investigation to Assistant Attorney General Canova by the Clark County Prosecuting Attorney. *838 On November 10, 1987, Respondent was appointed by the Clark County Superior Court to represent Kenneth Steiger in an appeal of a vehicular homicide and assault conviction in Clark County in State v. Steiger.[22] Despite repeated reminders from the clerk of the Court of Appeals, Respondent failed to perfect Mr. Steiger's appeal. He did not respond to telephone calls from Mr. Steiger's parents and failed to keep a scheduled appointment with them. When they telephoned the Court of Appeals, they were told that the case had been remanded to the Superior Court because counsel (Respondent Petersen) had failed to follow through on the appeal.[23] Respondent Petersen claims he was depressed during the period covering his conduct in those matters. He consulted with Richard S. Keyser, a nurse practitioner in psychiatry and mental health at the Vancouver Guidance Clinic in Vancouver, Washington.[24] Mr. Keyser first started seeing Respondent in October 1988, at which time Mr. Petersen informed Mr. Keyser that he was having legal difficulties.[25] Mr. Keyser testified that he believed that, at the time of the conversion of the Clark County claims warrant, Respondent was suffering *839 from serious depression brought on by the death of his father, a heavy work load, financial difficulties and his divorce.[26] He testified that the depression started to subside in May 1987.[27] He further testified that Respondent Petersen understood that the funds did not belong to him and that he appreciated that it was wrong to take the funds.[28] According to Mr. Keyser, Respondent recognizes his obligation to make restitution, but harbors some ambivalence concerning it.[29] In August 1989, Respondent Petersen was charged in the Clark County Superior Court with first degree theft of the Dykgraaf claims warrant and second degree theft of the Budd restitution.[30] In September 1989, he entered into a 2-year diversion agreement with the Clark County Prosecuting Attorney. It provided that Respondent would make restitution to all the Dykgraaf vendors and would see a mental health counselor twice a month for at least 1 year.[31] Respondent has not fully complied with the agreement. He has been slow making restitution and has not fully complied with his scheduled appointments with his diversion counselor or therapist.[32] *840 In February 1990, a formal complaint was filed by the Bar Association charging the following (as summarized by the hearing officer): Findings of fact and conclusions of law, at 1-4. A hearing was held on July 12 and 13, 1990, before Dennis R. Colwell, hearing officer. Respondent Petersen appeared without counsel and represented himself. The hearing officer considered ABA Standards[33] 4.11, 5.11, 4.14 and 4.44 and aggravating and mitigating factors in the case, and entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: The hearing officer applied the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards and recommended that Respondent Petersen be suspended from the practice of law for 6 months and then placed on supervised probation for 2 years on the conditions (1) that he comply with the terms and conditions of his diversion program, (2) that he continue mental health counseling for the entire period of his suspension and probation, and (3) that he complete at least 30 hours of Bar Association-approved law office management Continuing Legal Education before he could again engage in the practice of law. The Disciplinary Board on January 11, 1991, heard oral arguments on the matter and affirmed the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, by a vote of 9 to 2, it determined the recommended sanction to be inadequate and instead recommended a 2-year suspension followed by 2 years of supervised probation. Board member Henry Haas dissented, contending that the case should be remanded for determination of Respondent Petersen's mental state during the time of the claimed misconduct and for additional findings concerning the existence of a clinically diagnosed state of depression. Board member C.C. Bridgewater dissented, contending that the appropriate sanction for the handling of the Dykgraaf and Budd matters should be disbarment because there were no extraordinary mitigating factors in the case. Respondent Petersen did not appeal the ruling of the Disciplinary Board. The Board of Governors denied Bar Association counsel's request for authorization to file a petition for discretionary review. The matter was referred to this court for entry of a final order. On April 5, 1991, this court issued an order to show cause why Respondent should not be disbarred. [1] In determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction, this court applies the analytical framework provided by the American Bar Ass'n, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Std. 3.0 (1986) (ABA Standards).[36] Under the ABA Standards, three basic factors are considered in determining the presumptive sanction: (1) the ethical duty violated by the lawyer, (2) the mental state of the lawyer, and (3) the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct. To determine the actual sanction, we consider the further question whether there are any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.[37] Bar counsel contends that the proper sanction in this case should be disbarment because Respondent Petersen's depression is not an "extraordinary mitigating factor" which would overcome the presumptive sanction of disbarment. Respondent contends that the suspension and probationary period imposed by the Disciplinary Board is the proper sanction because his depression is a "mitigating factor". He further contends that the sanctions imposed are sufficient to protect the public and deter other attorneys from similar conduct and that the sanctions imposed are proportional to other cases. In following the ABA Standards, the presumptive sanction must first be determined. The hearing officer found that Petersen violated the following ethical duties: The hearing officer found that Respondent's mental state during the Clark County claims warrant conversion in the Dykgraaf case was to knowingly commit the offense; that his failure to promptly pay Mr. Budd's restitution to Fred Meyer, Inc., to ensure prompt dismissal of the criminal charges was knowingly done; that in failing to deposit Mr. Budd's restitution funds into a trust account, Respondent acted negligently; that in failing to perfect Mr. Steiger's appeal, he acted negligently; that in filing a false declaration of compliance with the Bar Association in 1987, he acted knowingly; and that in filing a false declaration of compliance with the Bar Association in 1988, he acted negligently. The hearing officer found that the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by Respondent Petersen's violations was serious with respect to the Clark County claims warrant conversion and the Steiger representation. However, he *854 found little or no injury or potential injury in the Glenn Budd matter or in the false declaration of compliance filing.[38] [2, 3] The presumptive sanctions the hearing officer found applicable were disbarment as to the Clark County claims warrant conversion,[39] admonition as to the Glenn Budd matter,[40] admonition as to the Steiger appeal,[41] and reprimand as to the filing of false declarations of compliance.[42] Although the ABA Standards do not directly address the sanction for multiple charges of misconduct (other than to consider it an aggravating factor), they state that the "ultimate sanction imposed should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct among a number of violations; it might well be and generally should be greater than the sanction for the most serious misconduct."[43] The most serious presumptive sanction found applicable by the *855 hearing officer, disbarment, is supported by case law, as well as by the ABA Standards.[44] After determining the presumptive sanction of disbarment, any aggravating or mitigating circumstances which would affect the presumptive sanction must be considered.[45] The ABA Standards consider the following as aggravating factors: (Italics ours.) ABA Standard 9.22. Of these, the hearing officer found factors (b), (i) and (j) present in this case. In addition to these aggravating factors, the record shows that Respondent Petersen engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses.[46] Respondent's conduct included his mismanagement of the Clark County claims warrant, the Glenn Budd restitution, and the Steiger appeal, as well as the filing of false declarations of compliance with the Bar Association. He also failed to promptly respond to bar counsel's request for production of his records. Although the hearing officer stated that Petersen could not produce what he did not have, financial records were available because bar counsel later obtained the records *856 from Assistant Attorney General Canova. These aggravating factors support the presumptive sanction of disbarment. The ABA Standards list the following as mitigating factors: (Italics ours.) ABA Standard 9.32. The hearing officer found factors (a), (c), (g), (h), (k) and (l) in this case. Although Respondent Petersen does not have a prior disciplinary record, he has had complaints filed against him. In 1985 or 1986, he was admonished by the Maine Bar Association.[47] In 1987, he met with the Washington State Bar Association to discuss other complaints which were pending against him. These were later set aside.[48] Of the remaining factors found, those bearing the most weight are (c) personal or emotional problems and (h) physical or mental disability or impairment. The failure of a lawyer to preserve the integrity of client funds leads to disbarment absent "extraordinary mitigating circumstances."[49] The question becomes then whether Respondent's depression was an "extraordinary *857 mitigating circumstance" to warrant departure from the presumptive sanction of disbarment. Evidence in the record concerning Respondent's depression is based upon the testimony of Mr. Keyser, upon questioning by Respondent, before the hearing officer. Because of its significance to the determination of this case, it is included here: Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 103-18 (July 12, 1990). [4] A comparison with recent similar cases suggests that Respondent's depression is not an "extraordinary mitigating circumstance" which would affect the presumptive sanction of disbarment. *865 In In re Johnson,[50] the respondent converted $21,051.16 of client trust funds while he suffered from depression and chronic alcoholism. The Disciplinary Board recommended suspension followed by probation. A physician who was board certified in addiction medicine testified that a chronic alcoholic's moral judgment may be affected. The respondent participated in the Lawyers' Assistance Program. However, this court considered alcoholism to be only a mitigating factor, and not an extraordinary mitigating one, and determined that the proper sanction was disbarment. In In re McGough,[51] the respondent converted $18,657.50 of client funds, failed to file criminal appeals and neglected probate matters. The Disciplinary Board recommended suspension followed by probation, but this court determined that the proper sanction was disbarment. A clinical psychologist testified that the respondent was suffering from clinical depression, that the misconduct occurred while he was depressed and that the misconduct continued after the depression began to subside. The respondent did not demonstrate that he did everything necessary to recover, and his depression was not given significant weight as a mitigating factor. In In re Rentel,[52] the respondent misappropriated over $26,000 of client funds while addicted to cocaine and alcohol and while experiencing depression. The Disciplinary Board recommended that the respondent be disbarred, despite the fact that he underwent treatment for his addiction. This court agreed and determined disbarment was the proper sanction. The respondent's addiction was considered a mitigating factor, but not an extraordinary mitigating one. Respondent Petersen asserts that Johnson and McGough are distinguishable from his case because in those cases repeated thefts and acts of concealment occurred. In Johnson, the multiple invasions of his trust account were documented *866 each time the respondent wrote a check drawn on that account. Here, because Respondent cashed and used the bulk of the funds from the claims warrant, it was impossible to trace the number of times he invaded his "client trust funds". In both Johnson and McGough, active acts of concealment occurred. Here, Respondent Petersen did not contact the Bar Association concerning his conversion of funds until 1989, 2 years after he knew that a criminal investigation was under way; he did not promptly respond to the subsequent disciplinary investigations; and he did not advise Glenn Budd that he had not deposited the restitution funds into his trust account nor paid Fred Meyer, Inc., as prosecutor Meyers had requested and reminded him to do. Cases in which disbarment was determined not to be the appropriate sanction can be distinguished from this case. In In re Burtch,[53] the respondent cited depression and emotional and personal problems (bankruptcy and marital separation) as reasons for his lack of diligence, failure to timely file trust account declarations and failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation. The Disciplinary Board recommended a 90-day suspension followed by probation. This court decreased the sanction to a 45-day suspension followed by probation. The court concluded that respondent's reputation in the legal community and his long years of practice without client complaint justified the leniency of the sanction. In In re Kumbera,[54] the respondent commingled client funds with his own funds and converted trust funds. The Disciplinary Board recommended a 3-year suspension. This court concluded that the respondent's alcoholism and acts of restitution constituted mitigating circumstances and suspended him for 1 year. In In re Noble,[55] the respondent misappropriated client funds for which the Disciplinary Board recommended a 3-month *867 suspension. The court considered the respondent's alcoholism as a mitigating factor and approved the sanction of a suspension. In In re Malone,[56] the respondent misappropriated client funds. The Disciplinary Board recommended a 60-day suspension. However, this court set aside the suspension and placed the respondent on probation. Not following the ABA Standards, but relying on the Noble factors,[57] this court found that respondent's lack of criminal intent and the lack of harm to any client justified its sanction. In re Burtch, supra, is further distinguishable from this case because the respondent there did not knowingly convert and use client trust funds. In re Kumbera, supra, In re Noble, supra, and In re Malone, supra, are also further distinguishable from this case because the court's decision was not based on the ABA Standards. Recent cases decided under the ABA Standards do not consider depression or alcoholism to be extraordinary mitigating factors which warrant variance from the presumptive sanction of disbarment.[58] Although comparison to other cases is difficult because of the specificity of facts involved, the fact that Respondent Petersen knowingly converted the claims warrant places his case within the ambit of Johnson and Rentel. In both cases, the respondents converted client funds, claimed depression and substance abuse as mitigating factors, had expert testimony to support their claims, and entered rehabilitation programs. In both cases the court focused on the respondents' knowledge of their wrongdoing at the time the conversions occurred. Both respondents were disbarred. Respondent Petersen relies on the testimony of Richard S. Keyser, a licensed nurse practitioner specializing in mental *868 health psychopharmacology, to medically substantiate his claim of depression. Strong professional evidence usually is required to substantiate claims of depression or substance abuse: In re Johnson, supra (a physician, board certified in addiction medicine); In re McGough, supra, and In re Hankin[59] (clinical psychologists with the Lawyers' Assistance Program); In re Rentel, supra (a psychiatrist). The Disciplinary Board noted that there was not strong medical evidence to substantiate Respondent's claim.[60] Both Respondent's testimony and Mr. Keyser's testimony support the hearing officer's conclusion that Respondent Petersen knowingly converted and used client trust funds.[61] Even giving full weight to Mr. Keyser's testimony concerning Respondent's depression, under Johnson and Rentel it would not be considered an extraordinary mitigating circumstance to justify departure from the presumptive sanction of disbarment. Disciplinary proceedings where a respondent attorney pleads "physical or mental disability or impairment"[62] as a mitigating factor should be supported by credible expert evidence. The Rules for Lawyer Discipline provide for the use of experts on petitions for reinstatement from disability to active status. RLD 10.3(b) states: *869 Experts have been used in recent disciplinary cases: In re Hankin[63] (a clinical psychologist with the Lawyers' Assistance Program); In re Johnson[64] (a physician board certified in addiction medicine); In re McGough[65] (a clinical psychologist with the Lawyers' Assistance Program); and In re Rentel[66] (a psychiatrist). Experts must meet the requirements of Rule of Evidence 702, which provides: Admissibility of expert testimony under ER 702 requires that the witness qualify as an expert, that the opinion be based on an explanatory theory generally accepted in the scientific community and that the testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact.[67] Expert testimony is generally required when an essential element in the case is best established by an opinion which is beyond the expertise of a layperson.[68] "Medical facts in particular must be proven by expert testimony unless they are `observable by [a layperson's] senses and describable without medical training.'"[69] In an industrial insurance case, this court stated that "medical testimony is required to establish disability ... [t]his comports with the recognition that diagnosis and prognosis are medical matters which *870 require medical testimony and cannot be evaluated by the observation of lay witnesses."[70] Expert testimony regarding depression has been used in both civil and criminal cases.[71] Depression is included as a mood disorder under the American Psychiatric Association's reference, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III).[72] The diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode involves the determination that five out of nine symptoms[73] are present for a 2-week period, that the symptoms represent a change from previous functioning and that one of the symptoms is either depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure in daily activities. Once a determination of the symptoms is made, the diagnostic criteria require a negative finding that the episode was initiated by an organic factor, was a normal reaction to the death of a loved one, was accompanied by delusions or hallucinations, or was superimposed on schizophrenia, delusional disorder, or psychotic disorder which is not otherwise specified. Following this negative finding, the severity of the depression is determined. *871 The diagnosis of depression is not a simple process of encyclopedic reference. Although some symptoms may be observable by lay witnesses, the entire diagnostic process involves medical matters which cannot be evaluated by the observation of lay witnesses. Expert testimony must therefore be used to determine whether a respondent attorney in a disciplinary proceeding had a mental disability if the attorney claims mental disability as a mitigating circumstance. Richard S. Keyser qualifies as an expert under ER 702 for his testimony in this case. [5] The recommendation of the Disciplinary Board will usually be adopted by this court unless, based on one or more of the following "Noble" factors,[74] the court is clearly persuaded that the sanction recommended by the Disciplinary Board is inappropriate: Respondent Petersen argues that the sanctions recommended by the Disciplinary Board should not be disturbed because they are sufficient to maintain the purposes of lawyer discipline and are proportional to other similar cases. This latter contention is not supported by Johnson, McGough, and Rentel. The purposes of attorney discipline are protection of the public, deterrence of other attorneys from similar conduct, *872 and preservation of confidence in the legal system.[76] Respondent Petersen claims that the public is protected because he will not be able to practice law "in the immediate future" and that he must complete a period of probation after his suspension. In In re Noble, supra,[77] a pre-ABA Standards case, this court found that an attorney held in high esteem by his peers did not pose a future threat to clients where he had no disciplinary problems prior to his problem with alcoholism, but committed violations prior to his successful treatment for alcoholism. Respondent Petersen's work as a trial lawyer has been praised, but he has had a pattern of client complaints since 1985, 2 years prior to the claimed onset of his depression. Considering his procrastination and ambivalence in making restitution, his occasional noncompliance with his diversion agreement, and the hearing officer's finding that he is unfit to practice law,[78] there is a strong and reasonable probability that he would be a continuing threat to future clients. Respondent Petersen's conversion of the claims warrant violated Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(b), (c) and (d). He violated practice norms and conduct directly relevant to the practice of law. He did not notify the Bar Association until a felony charge against him was imminent. Since "violations of the law by lawyers contribute to the erosion of respect for legal institutions and the law",[79] imposing the presumptive sanction of disbarment would preserve public confidence in the legal system, as well as act as a deterrent to other attorneys from similar conduct. These factors support departure from the Disciplinary Board's recommendation and *873 imposition of the sanction of disbarment, the usual sanction for conversion of client funds. Disciplinary Board member C.C. Bridgewater, in his dissenting opinion to the Board's recommendation of suspension and probation for Respondent Petersen, suggested that ABA Standard 6.21 would provide another basis for disbarment because Respondent had used moneys "payable by court order to the vendors." ABA Standard 6.21 states: Respondent Petersen obtained an order from the Clark County Superior Court authorizing payment to the defense vendors in the Dykgraaf case. The Clark County Treasurer issued a check to him pursuant to the order. Respondent deposited a portion of the proceeds from the check in his general account and took the remainder of the check in cash with full knowledge that it was in violation of the court order authorizing payment. While ABA Standard 6.21 might reinforce the sanction of disbarment, our conclusion instead relies upon ABA Standards 4.11 and 5.11. Under the facts determined in this case, the presumptive sanction under ABA Standards 4.11 and 5.11 is disbarment, after weighing relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. We conclude that Richard A. Petersen should be disbarred for his conversion of the Clark County claims warrant in the amount of $6,827.25. The other violations (Glenn Budd restitution, Steiger appeal and false declarations of compliance) would not merit the sanction of disbarment, but they are merged into the more serious sanction of disbarment. DORE, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, ANDERSEN, DURHAM, and GUY, JJ., concur. *874 UTTER, J. (dissenting) I dissent because the record in this case is insufficiently developed on the question of Petersen's mental state at the time of the acts with which he is charged to justify disbarment. To justify this most severe sanction we should be persuaded Petersen was essentially responsible for his misdeeds. On the record before us, that conclusion cannot be definitively ascertained. The majority correctly indicates that disbarment is the presumptive sanction for conversion of client funds. Majority, at 854 (citing American Bar Ass'n, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Stds. 4.11, 5.11 (1986)). Although that is true, it is important to remember the ABA Standards do not purport to recommend the type of discipline to be imposed in any particular case. Indeed, the ABA Standards emphasize the discipline imposed "must reflect the circumstances of each individual lawyer, and therefore provide for consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each case." ABA Standards, Std. 1.3 Commentary, at 19. The majority correctly notes the ABA Standards provide that behavior normally justifying disbarment may receive a lesser sanction if mitigating circumstances are present. Of the mitigating factors listed in the ABA Standards, the majority identifies the most relevant as Standard 9.32(c) personal or emotional problems and (h) physical or mental disability or impairment. I agree. The question then becomes, as the majority indicates, whether respondent's depression is an "extraordinary mitigating circumstance" warranting disbarment. Majority, at 856-57. It is here that I diverge from the majority's otherwise sound analysis. The majority properly adheres to the analytical framework provided by the ABA, according to which the following factors are evaluated to determine the appropriate sanction: (1) the ethical duty breached; (2) the mental state of the actor; and (3) the extent of the injury. See ABA Standards, at 5. My reservation with the majority's disposition of this case is that the record points in different directions with respect *875 to Petersen's mental state at the time he committed the acts charged. On the one hand, the record includes findings by the hearing examiner that the conversion of funds was "knowing". See majority, at 847, 847-50. On the other, the record contains findings that it was Petersen's serious depression that permitted the misdeeds to occur: "Respondent Petersen's misconduct occurred in 1987 and early 1988 as the result of a major depression." (Italics mine.) Hearing Officer's Letter Opinion, at 5; "Richard Petersen suffered a major depression during which he committed all of the acts for which he is now subject to discipline." Hearing Officer's Letter Opinion, at 7; see also majority, at 847-48 (quoting finding of fact 81). The transcript of the proceedings before the hearing examiner included the following testimony about Petersen's depression from the licensed nurse practitioner in psychiatry and mental health who treated him: (Italics mine.) Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 124-25. At the very least then there is ambivalence in the record regarding Petersen's mental state at the time of the relevant acts. Nevertheless, the majority concludes "[a] comparison with recent similar cases suggests that Respondent's depression is not an `extraordinary mitigating circumstance' which would affect the presumptive sanction of disbarment." Majority, at 864. The majority relies principally on two cases for this holding, In re Rentel, 107 Wn.2d 276, 729 P.2d 615 (1986) and In re Johnson, 114 Wn.2d 737, 790 P.2d 1227 (1990). The majority explains: Majority, at 867. In my view the test we set forth in Rentel and Johnson, and on which the majority relies, is insufficiently precise to permit a fair disposition of this case on the record before us. In those cases we asked whether the acts were committed "knowingly". The record here reveals the difficulty inherent in our present application of the "knowing" standard. As discussed earlier, the hearing examiner expressed two potentially incompatible conclusions: (1) Petersen's misappropriation of funds was knowing; and (2) the conduct was the product of his depressed mental state. Hearing Officer's Letter Opinion, at 5, 7. Indeed, there is uncontroverted expert testimony in the record that Petersen was considering suicide at the time of the relevant acts, and that he is unlikely to engage in such acts again because he has learned to manage his mental health. The majority cites this portion of the record: (Italics mine.) Majority, at 859-61 (quoting Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 109-12 (July 12, 1990)). If Petersen's misconduct was the consequence of a state of clinical depression a question at least possible on this record it seems both unfair and gratuitous to disbar Petersen, both because his acts are less culpable if the product of illness, and because the public would not be vulnerable to similar acts in the future if he obtains effective treatment and maintains sound mental health. See In re Noble, 100 Wn.2d 88, 96, 667 P.2d 608 (1983) (the primary purpose of sanctions is not punishment (although they may have a punitive effect, see, e.g., In re Rentel, 107 Wn.2d at 282); their primary purpose is to protect the public, deter misconduct, and protect public confidence in our bar). See In re McLendon, 120 Wn.2d 761, 774, 845 P.2d 1006 (1993) (citing In re Noble, 100 Wn.2d at 95). To the extent our previous cases suggest the severity of the sanction for conversion of client funds should turn solely on whether the conduct at issue was "knowing", I believe the inquiry should be further refined. The mere fact that *878 Petersen was aware of his conduct should be insufficient to justify disbarment. Instead, we should ask whether the conduct, even if knowing, was the product of mental illness over which the respondent had no meaningful control, and for which he can be treated. Only if the answer is yes should the most severe of sanctions, disbarment, be imposed. This court tacitly expressed a similar concern in the recent case of In re McLendon, supra, in which we overturned the Disciplinary Board's decision to disbar for conversion of funds because we considered the acts at issue to be the product of mental illness. The board concluded McLendon acted knowingly in converting the funds. The ABA Standards state that to act with "knowledge" one must have "the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct ...". American Bar Ass'n, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 17 (1986), cited in McLendon, at 770; see also Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Stds. 4.11, 4.12. The expert testimony indicated McLendon's judgment was severely impaired by the "biochemical, physiologic" nature of his disorder. McLendon, at 770. We overturned the board's finding as to McLendon's knowing mental state, relying in part on the following uncontroverted testimony from his doctor: (Italics added in McLendon.) McLendon, at 765-66 (citing Transcript of Proceedings, at 151). We explained that we departed from the Disciplinary Board's recommendation because it treated the respondent "exactly as if he never suffered from bipolar disorder" and because we were "fairly persuaded the sanction of disbarment *879 is not fairly supported by the record." McLendon, at 774 (citing Noble, at 96). In effect in McLendon, we declined to accept the board's characterization of the conduct as "knowing" because the uncontroverted medical testimony indicated that the respondent's judgment was so impaired that it would be unfair to hold him accountable for his wrongdoing. See McLendon, at 772 ("The record reflects that, while McLendon could act or function, his mental state and his judgment as to his actions, in all aspects of his life, were beyond his control in both phases of the illness"). The record in the instant case does not permit a conclusion one way or the other as to whether Petersen's behavior was knowing in the sense that it would be both sensible and fair to hold him accountable for his actions. I would therefore remand to the hearing examiner for further findings regarding the nature of Petersen's mental state during the period in question, specifically whether he was suffering from a state of clinical depression, and if so, how it affected his judgment. I would then have the hearing examiner who has had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of Petersen and the other witnesses and is thus in a better position to fashion a sentence modify the sentence accordingly. DOLLIVER and JOHNSON, JJ., concur with UTTER, J. [1] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 57-59 (July 12, 1990). [2] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 57-59 (July 12, 1990). State v. Dykgraaf, Clark Cy. cause XX-X-XXXXX-X (Oct. 30, 1986). [3] State v. Dykgraaf, supra. [4] The claims warrant was to pay the following providers for their services: Clark College, Dr. Nathan Cogan, Dr. Edward Colbach, Dr. Linda Conaway, Ms. Mary Jadwisiak, Kaiser Permanente, William Kittleson, Dr. Kevin McGovern, Dr. Guy Parvaresh, Richard Petersen and Ms. Barbara White-Davis. [5] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 64 (July 12, 1990). Petersen knew the funds were not his. "Q: [MS. REGIMBAL, BAR COUNSEL] At the time you received it, did you understand that this Claims Warrant was for the Dykgraaf expert witnesses? "A: [MR. PETERSEN] Sure. "Q: What did you do with the draft? "A: I kept it for a week or so. I don't recall how long, but about that, and then I took it and cashed it at my bank." [6] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 68-69 (July 12, 1990). [7] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 134 (July 12, 1990). [8] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 136 (July 12, 1990). [9] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 16-17 (July 12, 1990). [10] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 18 (July 12, 1990). On October 19, 1988, Mr. Canova received two cashier's checks from Petersen's attorney, Steven Thayer. Mr. Thayer indicated that Respondent Petersen found the checks in his files and was giving them to Mr. Canova as evidence of his attempt to pay the defense vendors. [11] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 73 (July 12, 1990); vol. II, at 240 (July 13, 1990). [12] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 34-35 (July 12, 1990). Generally, a dispute concerning nonpayment of expert witness fees by an attorney should not be resolved in an attorney discipline proceeding. In re Witteman, 108 Wn.2d 281, 737 P.2d 1268, 108 A.L.R.4th 677 (1987). This case involves not merely a fee dispute, but criminal conversion by an attorney of a court authorized claims warrant issued to pay defense vendors. [13] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 42 (July 12, 1990). [14] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 44 (July 12, 1990). [15] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 71 (July 12, 1990). [16] Transcript of Proceedings, at 5 (Jan. 11, 1991). [17] Clark Cy. cause XX-X-XXXXX-X. [18] Findings of fact, at 36. [19] Findings of fact, at 42. [20] Transcript of Proceedings vol. II, at 201 (July 13, 1990). [21] Transcript of Proceedings vol. II, at 205 (July 13, 1990). [22] Clark Cy. cause XX-X-XXXXX-X (Nov. 10, 1987). [23] State v. Steiger, slip op. at 93. [24] Richard S. Keyser has been in practice for 18 years. He has a bachelor's degree in nursing and has had postgraduate training in psychiatry and mental health psychopharmacology. He is licensed in Oregon as a registered nurse, in Washington as a registered nurse and advanced registered nurse practitioner. He is certified by the American Nurses Association in psychiatry and mental health. He has 18 years' experience in the field of mental health. From 1980 to 1987 he was employed as a mental health professional at the Community Mental Health Center in Vancouver. In that capacity, he evaluated individuals believed to be dangerous or gravely disabled under the involuntary treatment act, petitioned for court hearings, testified as an expert witness in those matters, did evaluations for sanity and competency under RCW 10.77, and other evaluations for courts and court agencies. Since 1987 he has been in private practice, has continued to work for the courts, and also sees individuals for medication and psychotherapy. He is licensed by the State to prescribe medication within the area of psychiatry and mental health. Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 101-03 (July 12, 1990). [25] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 103, 105 (July 12, 1990). [26] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 111, 123 (July 12, 1990). Mr. Keyser defined "major depression" as a condition of five of nine specific symptoms which occur almost every day for at least 2 weeks and which has a significant effect on normal functioning. He stated that the symptoms are depressed mood, a 5 percent increase or decrease in body weight, hyperinsomnia, agitation or psychomotor retardation, loss of interest or pleasure in normal activities, fatigue, excessive guilt, and thoughts of suicide. Although not referred to as authority, American Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d rev. ed. 1987) (DSM-III) defines the condition similarly. [27] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 130 (July 12, 1990). [28] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 119 (July 12, 1990). [29] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 121 (July 12, 1990). [30] State v. Petersen, Clark Cy. cause XX-X-XXXXX-X. [31] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 83 (July 12, 1990). [32] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 81-84 (July 12, 1990). [33] American Bar Ass'n, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986). [34] Findings of fact, at 4-18. Respondent Petersen has not challenged any of the findings of fact, nor does his brief contain a statement of facts. [35] Conclusions of law, at 19-26. [36] In re Johnson, 114 Wn.2d 737, 790 P.2d 1227 (1990); In re Lynch, 114 Wn.2d 598, 789 P.2d 752 (1990); In re McGough, 115 Wn.2d 1, 793 P.2d 430 (1990); In re Curran, 115 Wn.2d 747, 801 P.2d 962 (1990). [37] In re Johnson, supra; In re Lynch, supra; In re McGough, supra; In re Curran, supra. [38] The potential for injury in these two matters seems at least probable. "People involved in a ... lawsuit often are in a period of emotional and financial turmoil.... "... Those clients do not need the added agitation of a neglectful, undiligent lawyer with concomitant ... lack of information, [and] lack of reasonable progress ...". In re Burtch, 112 Wn.2d 19, 26-27, 770 P.2d 174 (1989). [39] ABA Standard 4.11 states "[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client." ABA Standard 5.11 states "[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when: (a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes ... misappropriation, or theft ...". [40] ABA Standard 4.14 states "[a]dmonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client." ABA Standard 4.44 states "[a]dmonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client." [41] ABA Standard 4.44. [42] ABA Standard 5.13 states "[r]eprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law." [43] ABA Standards, at 6. [44] See In re McGough, 115 Wn.2d 1, 793 P.2d 430 (1990); In re Johnson, 114 Wn.2d 737, 790 P.2d 1227 (1990); In re Rentel, 107 Wn.2d 276, 729 P.2d 615 (1986); In re Rosellini, 97 Wn.2d 373, 646 P.2d 122 (1982) (listing pre-ABA Standards cases in which trust account violations have led to disbarment). [45] In re Johnson, at 746. [46] See In re McGough, at 15. [47] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 56 (July 12, 1990). Respondent Petersen was a member of the Maine Bar. He received a letter of admonishment concerning a client's dissatisfaction with Respondent's representation of him in a Maine action when Respondent was in the state of Washington. [48] Transcript of Proceedings vol. I, at 47 (July 12, 1990). The record does not indicate the nature of these complaints. [49] In re Rentel, 107 Wn.2d 276, 286, 729 P.2d 615 (1986). [50] 114 Wn.2d 737, 790 P.2d 1227 (1990). [51] 115 Wn.2d 1, 793 P.2d 430 (1990). [52] 107 Wn.2d 276, 729 P.2d 615 (1986). [53] 112 Wn.2d 19, 770 P.2d 174 (1989). [54] 91 Wn.2d 401, 588 P.2d 1167 (1979). [55] 100 Wn.2d 88, 667 P.2d 608 (1983). [56] 107 Wn.2d 263, 728 P.2d 1029 (1986). [57] In re Noble, 100 Wn.2d 88, 667 P.2d 608 (1983). [58] See In re Johnson, 114 Wn.2d 737, 790 P.2d 1227 (1990); In re McGough, 115 Wn.2d 1, 793 P.2d 430 (1990); In re Rentel, 107 Wn.2d 276, 729 P.2d 615 (1986). These cases also do not give substantial weight to a respondent's remorse or acts of cooperation or restitution. [59] 116 Wn.2d 293, 804 P.2d 30 (1991). [60] Transcript of Disciplinary Board Proceedings, at 30, 47. [61] Compare In re McGough, 115 Wn.2d 1, 793 P.2d 430 (1990) (disbarment for conversion of trust funds even though the hearing officer did not make a finding as to respondent McGough's mental state). [62] ABA Standard 9.32(h). [63] 116 Wn.2d 293, 804 P.2d 30 (1991). [64] 114 Wn.2d 737, 790 P.2d 1227 (1990). [65] 115 Wn.2d 1, 793 P.2d 430 (1990). [66] 107 Wn.2d 276, 729 P.2d 615 (1986). [67] State v. Ciskie, 110 Wn.2d 263, 271, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988). [68] Harris v. Groth, 99 Wn.2d 438, 449, 663 P.2d 113 (1983); Young v. Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). [69] (Citation omitted.) Harris, at 449. [70] Ravsten v. Department of Labor & Indus., 108 Wn.2d 143, 153, 736 P.2d 265 (1987). [71] In Kirk v. WSU, 109 Wn.2d 448, 746 P.2d 285 (1987), calculations of damages were based on information from a clinical psychologist regarding plaintiff's depression. In State v. Allert, 117 Wn.2d 156, 815 P.2d 752 (1991), testimony of a psychiatrist was used in a sentencing proceeding to establish the defendant's depression, compulsive personality and alcohol addiction. [72] American Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d rev. ed. 1987). [73] DSM-III. The symptoms are (1) depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, (2) markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every day, (3) significant weight loss or weight gain when not dieting, or decrease or increase in appetite nearly every day, (4) insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day, (5) psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day, (6) fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day, (7) feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt nearly every day, (8) diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day, and (9) recurrent thoughts of death, recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing suicide. DSM-III, at 218-24. [74] See In re Noble, 100 Wn.2d 88, 667 P.2d 608 (1983). [75] In re Hankin, 116 Wn.2d 293, 296, 804 P.2d 30 (1991). [76] In re McGough, 115 Wn.2d 1, 8, 793 P.2d 430 (1990); In re Hankin, 116 Wn.2d 293, 298, 804 P.2d 30 (1991); In re Curran, 115 Wn.2d 747, 762, 801 P.2d 962 (1990). [77] 100 Wn.2d 88, 667 P.2d 608 (1983). [78] Conclusions of law, at 97. [79] In re Curran, at 762.