Title: Lake v. Severson

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lake v. Severson1999 WY 172993 P.2d 309Case Number: 99-11Decided: 12/17/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
LOTTIE LAKE, RANDY ENGLAND, JAMES R. LAKE and DONALD E. 
LAKE, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

BRIAN SEVERSON and MARION 
SEVERSON, Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County, The Honorable Edward L. Grant, 
Judge.

Bernard Q. 
Phelan of Phelan-Watson Law Office, Cheyenne, WY., Representing 
Appellants.

Alexander Z. 
Davison of Patton & Davison, Cheyenne, WY., Representing 
Appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      The only issue to 
be resolved in this case is whether the district court properly found that the 
fence between the parties' properties constituted a fence of convenience, rather 
than a boundary fence. Because we conclude the district court's finding is not 
clearly erroneous, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      We adopt the 
statement of the issue presented by appellees:

Whether the 
finding that the fence is a fence of convenience is supported by substantial 
evidence and therefore not clearly erroneous.

FACTS

[¶3]      In 1964, the 
Redding family acquired property in eastern Laramie County. Because only part of 
the land was suitable for farming, the Reddings, in 1968, built a fence to 
divide the grazing and farming land and to keep livestock off the farm land. 
Later, they conveyed the parcel of land located north of the fence, parcel A, to 
the Murdochs. Appellees, the Seversons, took title by warranty deed on July 18, 
1996, from the Murdochs. The Reddings also conveyed a second parcel located 
south of the fence, parcel B, to appellants, W.A. and Lottie May Lake, on March 
22, 1982. The Lakes subsequently conveyed portions of parcel B to Carolyn Venne 
and James Lake. Sections of parcel B were also conveyed to several other 
individuals, and one portion is currently owned by appellant Randy England. Both 
the Lakes and the Murdochs knew the fence, which was north of the property line, 
did not represent the actual boundary between the two properties. The legal 
description of the southern property does not include any of the disputed 
property.

[¶4]      Upon receiving 
the property, the Lakes and their successors in interest used the land for 
grazing livestock. To enclose their horses and other livestock, the Lakes built 
a fence at their southern boundary and, admitting it was easier than building a 
new one, used the north fence already in existence. They also maintained the 
fence and mowed grass next to the fence to retard fire danger. As noted above, 
the Lakes knew the fence was not on the legal boundary. Prior to purchasing the 
property from the Murdochs, the Seversons surveyed the land and also learned 
that the fence was not on the property line. Murdoch told the Seversons they 
could move the fence and place it on the boundary line.

[¶5]      The dispute 
before us arose in the fall of 1996 when Brian Severson planned to erect a new 
fence along the legal boundary line. At the same time, England was placing 
stakes for a new barn. Severson testified he told England he was building a 
fence on the property line and did not want a barn on his property. England 
responded that he would move the barn if it were in the way. In May of 1997, 
Severson's wife informed Lottie Lake and England that they were constructing a 
fence. After the Seversons erected a temporary barbed wire fence on the record 
boundary line placed by the surveyors, England drove by and asked how it looked. 
Severson replied that "it looks like I own part of your barn." After Severson 
had completed nearly half of the fence, the Lakes, knowing the fence would run 
through England's barn, asked the Seversons to stop, and legal proceedings 
began.

[¶6]      The Lakes and 
England ultimately brought an action to quiet title claiming the property by 
adverse possession. They also sought a Writ of Ejectment, as well as a temporary 
restraining order and permanent injunction. The Seversons counterclaimed to 
quiet title in themselves. After a bench trial, the district court concluded the 
Lakes failed to establish a prima facie case of adverse possession and 
determined the fence in question was one of convenience, making possession of 
the disputed land permissive rather than hostile, and quieted title in the 
Seversons. This appeal timely followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7]      Recently in 
Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 304-306 (Wyo. 1999), we 
stated:

Whether a fence is a 
boundary fence or merely one of convenience is a question of fact. Hillard v. 
Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo. 1995). This court will not set aside a 
district court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous or 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Id.; Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 301 (Wyo. 1983); Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961 P.2d 977, 978 (Wyo. 1998). 
When reviewing the record, we keep in mind the following 
principles:

The judge who presided at 
the trial heard and saw the witnesses. He is in the best position to determine 
questions of credibility and weigh and judge the evidence, both expert and 
non-expert. Thus, on appeal, it is a firmly established and oft-stated rule that 
we must accept the evidence of the successful party as true, leave out of 
consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict 
therewith, and give to the evidence of the successful party every favorable 
inference that may fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.

We review a 
district court's conclusions of law de novo. Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961 P.2d 977, 
978 (Wyo. 1998).

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      We begin our 
discussion by extensively quoting Kimball:

To establish 
adverse possession, the claiming party must show actual, open, notorious, 
exclusive and continuous possession of another's property which is hostile and 
under claim of right or color of title. Possession must be for the statutory 
period, ten years. Where there is no clear showing to the contrary, a person who 
has occupied the land for the statutory period, in a manner plainly indicating 
that he has acted as the owner thereof, is entitled to a presumption of adverse 
possession; and the burden shifts to the opposing party to explain such 
possession. However, if a claimant's use of the property is shown to be 
permissive, he cannot acquire title by adverse possession.

In some 
circumstances, enclosing land in a fence is sufficient to "raise the flag" of an 
adverse claimant. However, a fence kept simply for convenience has no effect 
upon the true boundary between tracts of land. This is so because a fence of 
convenience creates a permissive use, and a permissive 
user

cannot change his 
possession into adverse title no matter how long possession may be continued, in 
the absence of a clear, positive and continuous disclaimer and disavowal of the 
title of the true owner brought home to the latter's knowledge; there must be 
either actual notice of the hostile claim or acts or declarations of hostility 
so manifest and notorious that actual notice will be presumed in order to change 
a permissive or otherwise non-hostile possession into one that is 
hostile.

Kimball v. 
Turner, slip op. 98-165 at 3-4, ___ P.2d at ___ (citations 
omitted).

[¶9]      After a bench 
trial, the district court found the fence initially erected by the Reddings was 
a fence of convenience and ruled the Lakes had not established their claim for 
adverse possession. The district court summarized its findings in this 
fashion:

The facts which 
negate such a claim [that when the land changed hands, the nature of the fence 
changed], and ultimately resolve this controversy, are that at the time the land 
left the Reddings' hands both the Plaintiffs' and Defendants' successors in 
interest knew that the fence did not represent the true boundary. Both the Lakes 
and the Murdochs were aware that the fence was constructed merely for purposes 
of convenience. The fact that the Murdochs never moved the fence only shows that 
the fence fulfilled its designated purpose. It was a convenient barrier between 
the Murdochs' farm land and the Lakes' grazing land. Therefore, use of the land 
by the Lakes was permissive from the beginning.

In order to 
change the use from permissive to hostile, the Lakes would have had to give the 
Murdochs actual notice or do or make such "acts or declarations of hostility so 
manifest and notorious that actual notice will be presumed." No actual notice 
was ever given to the Murdochs, nor did the Lakes perform any actions that were 
so obviously hostile as to put the Murdochs on constructive notice. In fact, the 
testimony elicited at trial was that neither party ever discussed the 
issue.

The court 
concluded that "[o]ne cannot adversely possess that which he has permission to 
use."

[¶10]   Testimony by the Lakes, Seversons, 
and other parties supports the conclusion that the fence was merely one of 
convenience. Lottie Lake testified that although she knew from the Reddings that 
the property line on the north was not the fence, Lake used the fence and 
property up to it because it was easier than building a new fence. Murdoch, who 
knew the fence was not aligned with the property line, testified he did not 
consider moving the fence because the land immediately south of the fence was 
not very good for farming. In essence, it provided a convenient barrier. This 
was also supported by testimony of an adjacent landowner who recalled that the 
fence in question was originally erected in the 1930s, removed when farming was 
attempted, and later restored in 1968 when farming proved unsuccessful on that 
portion of the land. Randy England testified that he knew there was a property 
line dispute when he began constructing his barn. In addition, when Severson 
mentioned the fence was not on the property line, Murdoch told him to straighten 
up the fence. Viewing this evidence as true, as we must, we conclude that it 
amply supports the district court's finding that the fence was one of 
convenience.

[¶11]   Furthermore, there is nothing in 
the record to indicate use prior to 1996 was anything other than permissive. 
Neither the Lakes' pasturing their livestock nor occasionally mowing a fire lane 
along the fence to reduce fire danger was sufficient to alter the use of the 
property or to place the Seversons on notice. See Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 297 (Wyo. 1983) The only hostile use of the land came in 1996 when England 
began to erect a barn on the disputed property. Assuming this provided Severson 
with the required actual or constructive notice of England's hostile claim, this 
action was nevertheless insufficient to establish adverse possession because it 
failed to satisfy the statutory ten-year period. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-103 
(Lexis 1999). 

CONCLUSION

[¶12]   As we concluded in Kimball, 
"[t]here is a critical distinction between a fence which establishes a boundary 
line, and a fence that merely separates one side of the fence from the other. 
The former is a monument as well as a fence, while the latter is merely a 
fence." Kimball, 993 P.2d at 309 (quoting Pilgrim v. Kuipers, 679 P.2d 787, 
790 (Mont. 1984)). In this case, the district court's finding that the fence 
constitutes a fence of convenience is not clearly erroneous, and we therefore 
affirm.