Title: Roeser v. Anne Arundel

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Richard Roeser Professional Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland
No. 79, September Term, 2001
Headnote:
The Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals denied petitioner’s application
for variances from a Critical Area buffer zone and zoning provisions of Anne
Arundel County.  The Board found that the conditions surrounding petitioner’s
application had been self-created because the zoning regulations were in
existence when petitioner purchased the property.  The Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County reversed the Board and the Court of Special Appeals reversed
the Circuit Court.  We reverse the Court of Special Appeals and hold that the
Board’s application of self-created hardship, based upon the purchase of
property, was an erroneous conclusion of law.
Circuit Court for Anne A rundel Co unty
Case # C-1999-58456
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 79
September Term, 2001
RICHARD ROESER PROFESSIONAL
BUILDER, INC.
v.
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:   March 7, 2002
Anne Arundel County, Maryland, respondent, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals
from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.  The Circuit Court had found
that the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals (hereinafter Board) had made an error of law
and had also used an erroneous standard in respect to the Board’s denial of a request for
certain variances made by Richard Roeser Professional Builder, Inc., petitioner.  The Court
of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and directed the Circuit Court
to reinstate the decision of the Board.  Upon petitioner’s request, we granted its Petition for
Writ of Certiorari.  Roeser v. Anne Arundel County, 366 Md. 246, 783 A.2d 221 (2001).
Petitioner presents three questions for our review:
“1.  Did the Circuit Court correctly determine that the Anne Arundel
County Board of Appeals’ decision to deny critical area variances was based on
the application of an erroneous legal standard which had been specifically
overruled by the Court of Appeals, and was reversible error as a matter of law?
“2.  Did the Circuit Court correctly determine that the Anne Arundel
County Board of Appeals’ finding of ‘self-created hardship’ was reversible
error as a matter of law?
“3.  Is the Court of Special Appeals’ decision reversing the Circuit Court
and ruling that acquisition of title to land knowing that a critical area’s buffer
variance will be applied for constitutes a ‘self-created hardship’ reversible error
as a matter of law?”
We answer affirmatively to questions two and three.  Accordingly, we shall reverse.  We shall
address question one only to affirm that the standards set out in Belvoir Farms Homeowners
Association v. North, 355 Md. 259, 734 A.2d 227 (1999), and in White v. North, 356 Md. 31,
736 A.2d 1072 (1999), and reiterated and explained in Mastandrea v. North, 361 Md. 107,
1 The present case was heard by the Board and voted on prior to the filing of the first two of
the above cited cases, but the written decision was rendered subsequently. It is not altogether clear
what standard was actually used by the Board. We were informed at oral argument that the Board
has since been applying the Belvoir Farms/White standard. We presume it will apply the appropriate
standard upon remand. We do not have to determine which standard it actually used in this case as
the case must be reheard in any event because of the Board’s erroneous interpretation of “self-created
hardship.” 
2 For explanations of “Critical Area,” “buffer zones,” etc., see Belvoir Farms, White, and
Mastandrea, supra.
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760 A.2d 677 (2000), are the correct standards to apply upon remand to the Board.1    
Facts
Petitioner was the contract purchaser of two lots near Annapolis in Anne Arundel
County.  Only one lot is part of this appeal and part of the lot is located in the Critical Area
“buffer” zone adjacent to wetlands.2  At the time it contracted to purchase the property,
petitioner knew that variances from the “Critical Area” and zoning provisions of Anne
Arundel County would be required in order for it to be able to build a house of the size it
desired.  It applied for those variances and, as we have indicated, the Board denied its request.
In relevant part, the Board found:
“The conditions surrounding the Petitioners’ request for a variance have
been self-created.  The co-petitioner . . . purchased the subject property . . . on
February 23, 1999.  The wetlands existed on the property at that time.  Indeed,
it appears from the purchase price of the two lots ($62,000 total) that both seller
and buyer were well aware of potential development issues with the land.  The
buyer apparently elected to purchase the property and now seeks to maximize
the investment.  Any applicant for a variance, however, must exercise proper
diligence in ascertaining the setback requirements prior to the acquisition of
property.  If such diligence is not exercised, any resulting hardship to the
property owner is regarded as self-created.  See, Wilson v. Elkton, 35 Md. App.
3 It is a relatively common practice throughout the State, and has been so for decades, that
buyers contract to buy properties with contingencies that make consummation of the contract
conditioned on the granting of variances. So far as we have discovered, in cases involving “area”
variances, this Court has never disapproved the practice. Additionally, in such instances in respect
to “area” variances, we have never held that such a practice, by itself, constitutes a “self-created”
hardship. In Wilson, infra, a predecessor in title to the current landowner modified a structure, which
put the structure in violation of the existing zoning code. Therefore, the hardship was “self-created”
by the applicant’s predecessor in title.  It was not created by the regulation.  Likewise, in Ad. + Soil,
Inc. v. Queen Anne’s County, 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d 893 (1986), the applicant had built into a
setback, and, after the fact, sought a variance of the setback requirements. The issue of the effect of
a purchase was not addressed in a variance context in either opinion, and both involved requests for
“area” variances, not “use” variances.
We also note that in this country it is not considered inappropriate to “maximize”
investments.     
-3-
417, 371 A.2d 443 (1977).” [3]  [Some citations omitted.]
Judge Manck, of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, in correctly rejecting the
position of the Board, stated:
“[Little] deference, however, is appropriate when the agency’s decision
is predicated soley on an error of law.  White v. North, 356 Md. 31 (1999);
Washington National Arena Ltd. Partnership v. Controller, 308 Md. 370
(1987). . . .
.     .     .
“Lastly, the Board found the need for the variances had been self-
created; hence, pursuant to Wilson v. Elkton, 35 Md. App. 417 (1977) and
Ad+Soil, Inc. v. Queen Anne’s County, 307 Md. 307 (1986), the variances
must fail.
“Taking the latter argument first, the Court is unconvinced that the
hardship was self-created.  Hardships of this type are normally those which are
created by the owners of the property and not by the property itself.  Cromwell
v. Ward, 102 Md. App. 691 (1995); Randolph Hills, Inc. v. Montgomery
County Council, 264 Md. 78 (1972); Salisbury Board of Zoning Appeals v.
Bounds, 240 Md. 547 (1965); Wilson v. Elkton, 35 Md. App. 417 (1977).  The
topography and placement of the property is not a self-inflicted or self-created
4 The position taken by Anne Arundel County does not indicate what would happen if a
property was conveyed by testamentary devise, or by operation of law.  This points out another
problem with the concept.  Such a new owner would, apparently, not be subject to the self-created
hardship rule if he or she obtained property by devise after the regulation was enacted.  Under the
County’s theory, the Board would have to determine and distinguish between matters of title, i.e.,
how an owner acquired title.  Such matters are not within a board’s areas of expertise.  Zoning
regulations regulate the land, impact the land – not ownership, and not title.  For further comment
on this issue, see the discussion, infra, from Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 121 S. Ct.
2448, 150 L. Ed. 2d 592 (2001).
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hardship and there is no evidence of testimony which would lend support to
the Board’s finding that in some fashion the Petitioner created this hardship.
  
“The Court is aware the scope of review ‘is limited to whether a
reasoning mind could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.’
Bulluck v. Pellham Woods Apartments, 283 Md. 505 (1974), and further, an
agency’s decision may not be upheld unless it is sustainable on the agency’s
actual findings and for reasons advanced by the agency in support of its
decision.  United Steel Workers of America Local #2610 v. Bethlehem Steel,
298 Md. 665 (1984).  In this case, the Board’s decision as to the self-created
hardship is not fairly debatable based on the evidence the Board had before it.
The Court finds, therefore, the Board’s action as to this finding was arbitrary
and capricious and, more importantly, was an error of law.” 
The Court of Special Appeals, in reversing the Circuit Court, stated, as relevant here:
“In Gleason v. Keswick Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 197 Md. 46, 78 A.2d 164
(1951), the Court of Appeals, citing CHARLES A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING, § 23, at 262 (2d ed. 1949), stated:
Where a person purchases property with the intention to
apply to the board of appeals for a variance from the restrictions
imposed by the ordinance he cannot contend that such
restrictions cause him such a peculiar hardship that entitles him
to the special privileges which he seeks.” [4]
Discussion
Gleason v. Keswick Improvement Association, 197 Md. 46, 78 A.2d 164 (1951), was
5 Ordinarily, a “variance” is couched in terms of “variances” from the provisions of the
ordinance, and generally do not involve reclassifications or alternate classifications of property use.
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not an application for an “area” variance.  The request was designed to permit commercial
use (a grocery store) in a residentially zoned area; accordingly, it concerned “uses,” not
“area.”  Indeed, it was not really an application for a “use” variance either.  It was sought
under a peculiar Baltimore statutory provision providing that a person desiring to use his
property contrary to the uses permitted as of right in a particular district could apply for the
particular other use if “within one hundred feet of a boundary line between two use districts,
any use permitted in that one of such use districts which has the lower classification,
provided such one hundred foot measurement shall not extend across a street.”  Id. at 50, 78
A.2d at 165.5  In other words, it was an alternate classification possibility, built into the
statute itself, for property within certain distances of certain district boundaries.  In essence,
we treated it as a reclassification and in later cases made that distinction.  In Gleason, we
noted that the applicants had, in the five or six years since their purchase, been using the
structure as a dwelling unit.  We further opined that since they had purchased the property,
the applicants had
“allowed the residence to deteriorate, and the only repairs made to the house
were made by the tenants themselves. . . .  They claim that in view of the
properties surrounding this lot, and that it is not fit for residential purposes, it
would be a hardship not to grant them an exception to the general rule. . . .  We
think it a fair inference that the appellants bought this property with the
intention to change its classification so as to permit its use as a store, and they
cannot claim now that they suffer a peculiar hardship that entitles them to the
special privilege which they seek.”
-6-
Id. at 50-51, 78 A.2d at 166 (emphasis added).  In other words, we were asserting that the
hardship that existed when the property was purchased was not a reason to reclassify (rezone)
the specific property.  The issue was not treated as a variance application, in spite of our
reference to Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning (a reference that Rathkopf has
since largely disowned, see infra at pages 8 through 10).
Shortly afterwards, in a case in which we upheld the Board’s denial of an “exception,”
we explained what we thought we had done in Gleason:
“On the facts the instant case is the converse of Gleason v. Keswick
Imp. Ass’n, 197 Md. 46, 78 A.2d 164.  In that case the property in question had
originally been zoned, reasonably we held, as residential, in accordance with
actual use.  It is still so used, and we set aside an order of the Board in effect
re-zoning it as commercial.  In that case time had confirmed the
reasonableness of the original zoning, instead of demonstrating the contrary
or a contrary change.”
Hoffman v. City of Baltimore, 197 Md. 294, 308, 79 A.2d 367, 373 (1951). The language in
Hoffman, describing what we had done in Gleason, was classic change/mistake language
usually associated with Euclidian reclassifications, not variances.
In City of Baltimore v. Weinberg, 204 Md. 257, 103 A.2d 567 (1954), a case involving
a denial of a non-conforming use status, we continued to treat Gleason as a re-classification
case rather than a variance (we had never treated it as a variance) and emphasized that the
owners in Gleason had permitted dwelling structures on their property to deteriorate and thus
were, in that fashion, creating a situation where residential use was a hardship.  We said in
Weinberg:  “The appellants also rely on Gleason v. Keswick Improvement Association, 197
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Md. 46, 50, 51, where this Court held that because the residence in question had been
allowed to deteriorate, it was evident that the residence was bought with a view to changing
its [zoning] classification.” Id. at 263-64, 103 A.2d at 569.
In any event, ultimately, we have distinguished, if not overruled, Gleason.  In
Zengerle v. Board of County Commissioners for Frederick County, 262 Md. 1, 276 A.2d 646
(1971), we noted that Frederick County bought the farm for the purpose of building and
operating a landfill.  It was known to the County at the time it purchased the property that in
order to operate a landfill, the County would need to obtain substantial setback variances
(area variances).  The opinion we adopted distinguished the Gleason case, making its ruling,
at the least, inapplicable to area variance cases.  We referred to the trial judge’s opinion, and
said: “[W]e shall adopt his opinion as follows . . . .” Id. at 3, 276 A.2d at 648.  The opinion
we adopted as our own distinguished the Gleason case, making its ruling inapplicable to area
variance cases.  Through the trial judge’s opinion, we held:
“Appellants make the further contention that where one purchases realty
intending to apply for a variance from zoning restrictions, he cannot contend
that such restrictions cause him the undue hardships that would entitle him to
such variance, citing Gleason v. Keswick Improvement Association, 197 Md.
46.  This same rule has been relaxed where there has been an application for
area variance such as here, as distinguished from a use variance as in Keswick,
the Court of Appeals pointing out that a use variance is customarily concerned
with unusual hardship where the land cannot yield a reasonable return without
a variance whereas an area variance is primarily concerned with practical
difficulties.  Loyola Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Buschman, 227 Md.
243.
“Section 40-145 permits a variance where practical difficulty or
unnecessary hardship is present.  Since this is an application for an area
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variance and since there was testimony of practical difficulty in the absence of
the grant of a variance, the rule announced in Keswick does not apply.  
“Moreover, in Stacy v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 189, an area
variance was approved by the Court of Appeals where a party had purchased
a property intending to apply for a special exception.  The need for an area
variance was not determined until after the special exception had been granted.
That is substantially what happened in the present case and Stacy is further
authority for holding that the rule in Keswick does not here apply.”  
Id. at 21-22, 276 A.2d at 656.
As important, is the fact that Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, upon which
we spoke in Gleason, and in turn the Court of Special Appeals relied on in the case at bar,
has abandoned the position upon which the Court of Special Appeals relied.  The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine noted the change in its relatively recent case of Twigg v. Town of
Kennebunk, 662 A.2d 914, 916 (Me. 1995), saying:
“The Board ruled there was self-created hardship because ‘the applicant
knew, prior to his purchase, of the complications and prohibitions attached to
this property and its use . . . .’  The Board’s concluson that knowledge of
zoning restrictions prior to the purchase of property is tantamount to self-
created hardship is an error of law.  While it was the general rule at one time
‘that one who purchases property with actual or constructive knowledge of the
restrictions of a zoning ordinance was barred from securing a variance,’ the
rule has since been ‘altogether abandoned or modified into nonexistence’ in
most jurisdictions. n3 3 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning § 38.06(2)
(1988). . . .  The modern rule provides that a purchase with knowledge does
not preclude the granting of a variance and, at most, is considered a
nondeterminative factor in consideration of a variance.  Rathkopf at § 38.06.”
[Some citations omitted.]  
Rathkopf, now provides: 
“While this rule may still be applicable in a few jurisdictions, it has
been altogether abandoned, or modified into nonexistence, in others.  Two
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basic faults in the old rule have been recognized, and these faults are the
reasons behind its demise.  First, since hardship can neither be measured by the
cost of the property to the owner nor by the difference between the value the
land has as restricted and the value it would have if the variance were granted,
there is no danger that a knowledgeable purchaser could create evidence of
hardship by paying an excessive price for property that is restricted.  Second,
the old rule failed to acknowledge that if the prior owner would have been
entitled to a variance at the time of the zoning ordinance restriction was
enacted, the right is not lost to a purchaser simply because he bought with
knowledge of the regulation.  In other words, because a purchaser of property
acquires no greater right to a variance than his predecessor, he should not be
held to acquire less.  
“The ‘current trend’ in the rule, that purchase with knowledge of
restrictions either does not prohibit the granting of a variance, or is at most a
nondeterminative factor to consider in the granting of variance, has had
proponents at least as early 1957 when the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
rejected the notion that purchase with knowledge of restrictions, in itself,
constituted self-created hardship.  The ‘traditional rule,’ has been relaxed to
leave the decision of whether a purchaser with knowledge of restrictions
should receive a variance up to the discretion of the board of appeals.
“It should not be within the discretion of a board of appeals to deny a
variance solely because a purchaser bought with knowledge of zoning
restrictions. . . .
 
“The evolution and development of the rule took two slightly different
paths.  Originally, purchase with knowledge of restriction had its greatest
application where a use variance was sought.  When the rule was being
modified so as to be less harsh, nonuse variances were first to be granted even
when there was knowledge.” 
Arden H. Rathkopf & Daren A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning § 58.22, 141-48
(Edward H. Ziegler, Jr. revision, vol. 3, West 1991) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Robert M. Anderson, in his American Law of Zoning § 20.44, 566 (Kenneth H. Young
revisions, 4th ed., CBC 1996) discusses the application of the rule in New Jersey, saying: 
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“Although a number of earlier cases . . . repeated a more restrictive rule, the
more recent decisions seem clearly to say that the right to a variance is not
affected by a sale of land.  One decision . . . said the following: ‘The hardship
criteria of (c) are expressly stated in terms of the objective physical
characteristics of the property itself.  The hardship thus entailed is not
ordinarily mitigated by mere transfer of title to property . . . .  Where an
original owner would be entitled to a variance under a specific set of facts,
any successor in title is ordinarily also entitled to such a variance, providing
that no owner in the chain of title since the adoption of the zoning restriction
has done anything to create the condition for which relief by variance is
sought.
“The Supreme Court of New Jersey has applied the same rule to the
granting of variances for ‘special reasons.’ It said: ‘We wish to make it clear
that if a prior owner would be entitled to such relief, that right is not lost to a
purchaser simply because he bought with knowledge of the zoning regulation
involved. . . .’” [Emphasis added.] [Footnotes omitted.] 
Anderson then describes, favorably, the position of Delaware courts:
“A Delaware court described the diverse views and elected the more
permissive one, explaining: ‘We are inclined to regard the property itself as a
permanent entity and the current ownership merely as a passing phase.  We
hesitate to lay down a rule that Darling’s property, by his purchase of it,
became positively ineligible for a variance. . . .’
“. . . Courts which permit relief, but also permit the board of adjustment
to consider the fact of self-created hardship, fix their attention on the fact that
hardship must relate to the property itself, and they see little relevance in a
change of ownership.” 
Id. at 568-69 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer and
Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Control Law § 5.17, 211 (West 1998), state:
“When one purchases property and then applies for a variance on the
grounds of unnecessary hardship, a difference of opinion exists as to whether
the variance should be denied on the ground of self-induced hardship.  Most
courts consider the transfer of title irrelevant, but some cases contain contrary
suggestions. . . .  However, since ownership is normally irrelevant to zoning,
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the transfer of title ought not affect the issue.  If the land suffers the requisite
hardship, in that the owner can make no reasonable return from its use as
zoned, then the board ought to grant a variance.  If not, the land becomes
permanently zoned in a useless state.
“The reasons used to deny a variance to one who violates the law and
then seeks relief are not applicable to one who purchases with knowledge.  In
the former, the owner created the hardship; in the latter, the zoning created
the hardship, which pre-existed the purchaser’s acquisition of title. . . .  [B]ut
it is not an affront to the law to grant relief to one who purchases land where
unique circumstances have already zoned the land into a state of uselessness.
“. . . A windfall may result, but it is not an unjustifiable one vis-s-vis the
public, since the situation assumes that land deserves the variance.  It is simply
a question of which owner gets the variance, the prior owner or the new
owner.” [Emphasis added.] [Footnotes omitted.]
Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 6.50, 259-60 (4 th ed., Lexis 1997), as to this issue,
states:  
“A more complicated problem is presented when self-created hardship
is claimed because the land owner purchased a lot with knowledge of the
zoning restrictions.  The rule that hardship is self-created in this situation
stems from early New York cases and is followed in some states. . . .
 
“The present status of the New York rule is in doubt.  The New York
courts adopted the rule in use variance cases in which there were other reasons
for denying the variance.  In the area variance cases they hold that self-created
hardship based on purchase with knowledge of existing zoning is only one
factor to consider.
“The cases that reject the rule that purchase with knowledge of existing
zoning in self-created hardship are correct.  The rule is fair in cases where a
prior owner created a hardship through some action relating to the land.
Purchase should not relieve a subsequent owner of this infirmity.  To hold that
mere purchase with knowledge of existing zoning is self-created hardship
improperly makes the purchase of land a basis for denying a variance.”
[Footnotes omitted.]
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Several jurisdictions have held similarly to both our cases distinguishing Gleason in
respect to area variances, and the Maine court’s overruling of the prior position taken by
Rathkopf, and Rathkopf’s disavowal of his previous position.  They include Minnesota,
where the Court of Appeals of Minnesota in Myron v. City of Plymouth, 562 N.W.2d 21
(Minn. App. 1997), first noted that the property owner had been denied his request for a
variance because the city found that the “appellant was aware at the time he purchased the
property that a variance would be necessary to make the property buildable.”  Id. at 22.  The
intermediate appellate court then held:
“In short, these cases have interpreted the phrase ‘created by the landowner,’
. . . to include circumstances in which a landowner purchased property with
knowledge (actual or constructive) that the property was subject to a zoning
ordinance restricting development.
“The problem with such a reading of the statute is that – by backspin –
it places an unreasonable limitation on the power of cities to grant variances,
for although the statute provides authority to grant variances when certain
prerequisites are met, it also creates a mirror image limitation on the authority
to grant a variance whenever the stated prerequisites are not met.  One of those
prerequisites is that the need for the variance not be ‘created by the
landowner.’  If that includes mere purchase with knowledge, a [city] would,
in effect, be prohibited from granting a variance to every subsequent owner
who purchased with knowledge that a variance would be required for
development.
.     .     .
“More significantly, such a reading is also inconsistent with the general
property-law goal to preserve alienability.  An owner who did not self-create
a hardship is eligible for a variance.  But that owner would, in effect, be
barred from selling to someone else without, as a consequence of the sale,
destroying the eligibility to receive a variance.  We see no reason why an
owner who sells should not be able to convey to a buyer the eligibility for a
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variance along with the land itself.
“We therefore hold that actual or constructive knowledge of a zoning
ordinance before a purchase of land is not a bar to granting a variance.  We
overrule Hedlund and its progeny to the extent that they conflict with our
holding.” 
Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals of Indiana first noted the issue in Reinking v. Metropolitan
Board of Zoning Appeals of Marion County, 671 N.E.2d 137, 139 (Ind. App. 1996), as:
“Whether knowledge of a restrictive zoning ordinance prior to the acquisition of property
waives the right to argue undue hardship . . . .”  The court opined:
“The dwelling district ordinance in question was adopted in 1989, after the
construction of I-465.  Uncontested testimony in the record supports the fact
that the Reinkings purchased lot 244 after 1989.  After purchasing the property
from a tax sale buyer, the Reinkings petitioned the MBZA for a variance of
developmental standards. . . .
.     .     .
 
“We next determine whether knowledge of a restrictive zoning
ordinance prior to the acquisition of property is sufficient grounds to bar [a]
variance petition. . . .  The MBZA argues that the purchase of property which
does not meet zoning specifications is a self-imposed burden. . . .  However,
where an unnecessary hardship is shown to exist based upon the terms of an
ordinance, as they apply to the land, the ability to claim hardship is available
to subsequent purchasers as well as to the original owner.  
“. . . [S]ubsequent decisions have made it clear that the purchase of
property with knowledge of use restrictions does not prohibit a purchaser from
claiming a special or unnecessary hardship, regardless of who owned the
property at the time it was burdened. . . .  Whether they met their burden of
proving an undue hardship is yet another issue.”
Id. at 139-42 (footnotes omitted) (some citations omitted).
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In the New Jersey case of Somol v. Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Morris
Plains, 277 N. J. Super. 220, 231, 649 A.2d 422, 428 (1994), the court noted: “The Board’s
finding that plaintiff showed no undue hardship, in part, was based on the constructive
knowledge of the plaintiff’s family that the lot was nonconforming at the time of purchase
back in 1963 . . . .”  The court held:
“The law is clear that if an owner who is entitled to a lot size variance on
hardship grounds sells to a buyer who has knowledge of the non-conformity,
the right to a variance is not lost as a result of the buyer’s knowledge.
However, if a prior owner created the hardship, the purchaser . . . would not
be entitled to a variance on the basis that the hardship was self-imposed.  An
examination of the chain of title and the record shows that the lot was zoned
into a substandard condition and that the hardship alleged, notwithstanding the
constructive knowledge of the substandard condition, is not self imposed by
any action of the plaintiff or predecessor in title.”
Id. at 232, 649 A.2d at 428 (citations omitted); see Huebner v. Waukesha County Zoning
Board of Adjustment, 180 Wis.2d 469, 514 N.W.2d 54 (1993) (“Here, Steiner was not
engaged in any reckless conduct or unauthorized activity.  He merely purchased an existing
nonconforming building.  We have recognized that a purchaser should not be precluded from
securing a variance in such a situation.  ‘“A purchaser of property acquires no greater right
to a variance than his predecessor and he should not be held to acquire less.”’ Id.  (quoting
3 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 39.022, at 39-16 (1987)).”);
see also In re Gregor, 156 Pa. Commw. 418, 426, 627 A.2d. 308, 312 (1993) (“The right to
develop a nonconforming lot is not personal to the owner of property at the time of
enactment of the zoning ordinance but runs with the land, and a purchaser’s knowledge of
6 E. C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 21-6, 321 (vol. 3, 4th ed., Michie 1979), describes
the difference between “use” and “area” variances as:
“A use variance is one that permits a use other than that prescribed by the zoning
ordinance in a particular district. An area variance has no relationship to a change
of use. It is primarily a grant to erect, alter, or use a structure for a permitted use in
a manner other than that prescribed by the restrictions of a zoning ordinance.”
Anderson’s American Law of Zoning, supra, at § 20.48, 578, distinguishes the two,
as:
“A use variance authorizes a use of land which otherwise is proscribed by the
zoning regulations. An area variance authorizes deviation from restrictions upon the
construction and placement 
of buildings and structures which are employed to house
or otherwise serve permitted uses. . . . More specifically, area variances include
those relating to setback, yard, lot-area, lot-coverage, floor-area, frontage, height,
and similar restrictions. [Footnote omitted.]  
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zoning restrictions alone is insufficient to preclude the grant of a variance unless the
purchase itself gives rise to the hardship.”)
Even in those jurisdictions that still, to a degree, adhere to the older Rathkopf
standard, more often than not the standard has been greatly relaxed where area, as opposed
to use, variances are at issue.  The Court of Special Appeals in a case in which it reversed the
granting of a variance, described the differences between “area” variances and “use”
variances, as:
 “‘[A]rea variance’ (a variance from area, height, density, setback, or sideline
restrictions, such as a variance from the distance required between buildings)
and not a ‘use variance’ (a variance which permits a use other than that
permitted in the particular district by the ordinance, such as a variance for an
office or commercial use in a zone restricted to residential uses).”
Anderson v. Board of Appeals, 22 Md. App. 28, 37-38, 322 A.2d 220, 225-26 (1974).6      
Subsequent to Zengerle v. Board of County Commissioners for Frederick County, 262
-16-
Md. 1, 276 A.2d 646 (1971), we reiterated its holding in McLean v. Soley, 270 Md. 208, 215,
310 A.2d 783, 787 (1973), where we also distinguished between area and use variances,
saying:
“It is also contended by McLean that Soley is precluded from asserting
‘practical difficulty’ because he was charged with knowledge of the sideyard
requirements when he purchased this property.  We see no merit in this
argument.  We noted in Zengerle v. Bd. of Co. Comm’rs, 262 Md.1, 21, 276
A.2d 646 (1971), citing Loyola, supra, that this ‘rule’ is more strictly applied
in ‘use variance’ cases than in cases of ‘area variances,’ such as the one at
bar.”   
There has also been a federal “takings” case, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
121 S. Ct. 2448, 150 L. Ed. 2d 592 (2001), that in a taking context addresses the effect of
purchase of property with knowledge of restrictions, doing so with language that may well
be relevant to the issue now before this Court. The land use treatise writers had assumed
“takings” cases, where the issue of compensation was involved, would be subject to the
harsher rule, that a purchaser who takes property with environmental restrictions could not
then challenge the restrictions.  Juergensmeyer, when putting forward the less harsh rule for
variances, notes:
“A different question is presented when one who purchases with
knowledge of an existing restriction seeks to recover just compensation on the
basis that the zoning restriction effects a taking under the Fifth Amendment.
In such a case, courts may treat the personal right to compensation as waived.
Thus, a board may grant a variance under state law to permit land to be used
according to traditional zoning principles, but if the board denies the variance
the courts might not allow an action for compensation. Under variance law, the
land is the focus; under constitutional law, the person is.”
Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Control Law
7 Dale R. Cathell, Some Thoughts on Investment-Backed Expectations - Sword or Petard?
(MICPEL 1994 modified 1998).  Addressing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1987),  the writer remarked:
“What he states is this: If one expects governmental authorities, via the permitting
process, to extort from [him] one of the incidents of real property ownership, he does
not expect to retain that which is extorted, thus he has no expectation of having it in
the first instance. Thus, under Justice Brennan’s theory of investment-backed
expectations there is no taking. . . .
.     .     .
 
“Thus, according to the dissent, if one is aware of a regulation which
incorporates an unconstitutional taking scheme, he could not possibly have expected
to be permitted to do that [which] the ‘taking’ takes and thus there is no interference
with an investment-backed expectation upon which to base an unconstitutional
taking.”  
The writer warned that some authorities would accept the reasoning of Justice Brennan’s dissent.
(continued...)
-17-
§ 5.17, 212 (West 1998) (footnotes omitted).  Juergensmeyer’s speculation, with the decision
in Palazzolo has, apparently, been rejected. 
 Before addressing Palazzolo, and in order to “set the stage” in which the Palazzolo
opinion becomes most relevant to the instant case, we note that with the advent of the use of
the term “investment-backed expectations,” there was some concern expressed in the land
use community as to whether when a purchaser obtained title to property already subject to
environmental restrictions, he could not have “expected” to be able to use the property free
of the restrictions.  Accordingly, it was thought that some courts might hold that such a
purchaser could not assert “taking” claims, even if the restrictions denied him all viable
economic use.7 
7(...continued)
Thereafter, in the “taking” context, in Anello v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 89 N.Y.2d 535,
678 N.E.2d 870, 656 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1997), the New York court held that a property owner who
acquired property after the passage of a “steep-slope” ordinance was not deprived of an interest in
the property because:
“[I]f property owners were permitted to assert compensatory takings claims based on
enforcement of preexisting regulations, the traditional takings analysis . . . and its
inquiry into ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations,’ would be rendered hopelessly circular.”
Id. at 540-41, 678 N.E.2d at 871, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
Additionally, in Basile v. Town of Southampton, 89 N.Y.2d 974, 976, 678 N.E.2d 489, 491,
655 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879 (1997), that court stated: “Since claimant took title to her property subject
to . . . regulations . . . she cannot claim the value of the property without such restrictions.”  But, the
New Jersey courts went the other way in East Cape May Association v. State of New Jersey, A-4852-
95T5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. April 29, 1997), where that court held that successive owners have
all the rights of their predecessors in title. The dispute, at least in taking issues, has been resolved
by the Supreme Court in Palazzolo, supra.   
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The Supreme Court has now answered the questions raised. Palazzolo became the
owner of property by conveyances that occurred after the environmental law at issue was
passed.  It was argued that because he took title subsequent to the statutory enactment, he
could not assert “takings” claims in respect to the statute’s effect upon his property. The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island agreed with the State in 
Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 716
(R.I. 2000), applying one of its cases that had adopted the “investment-backed expectations”
theory, saying:
“Under his [Palazzolo’s] reasoning, if a regulation deprives an owner of all
beneficial use, it is immaterial whether the regulation predates the claimant’s
ownership of the land. However, Palazzolo was unable to cite a single case in
which a court has ordered compensation for a regulatory taking when the
claimant became the owner of the property after the regulation became
effective. . . . Here, when Palazzolo became the owner of this land in 1978,
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state laws and regulations already substantially limited his right to fill
wetlands. Hence, the right to fill wetlands was not part of the title he
acquired.”
The United States Supreme Court rejected the position, and the reasoning of the
Rhode Island court. 
“The theory underlying the argument that post-enactment purchasers
cannot challenge a regulation under the Takings Clause seems to run on these
lines: Property rights are created by the State. So, the argument goes, by
prospective legislation the State can shape and define property rights and
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and subsequent owners cannot
claim any injury from lost value. After all, they purchased or took title with
notice of the limitation.
“The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean
bundle. The right to improve property, of course, is subject to the reasonable
exercise of state authority, including the enforcement of valid zoning and land-
use restrictions. . . . .Were we to accept the State’s rule, the post enactment
transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action
restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. . . . 
“Nor does the justification of notice take into account the effect on
owners at the time of the enactment, who are prejudiced as well. Should an
owner attempt to challenge a new regulation, but not survive the process of
ripening his or her claim (which, as this case demonstrates, will often take
years), under the proposed rule the right to compensation may not b[e] asserted
by an heir or successor, and so may not be asserted at all. The State’s rule
would work a critical alteration to the nature of property, as the newly
regulated landowner is stripped of the ability to transfer the interest which was
possessed prior to the regulation. The State may not by this means secure a
windfall for itself. . . .  The proposed rule is, furthermore, capricious in effect.
The young owner contrasted with the older owner, the owner with the
resources to hold contrasted with the owner with the need to sell, would be in
different positions. . . . 
.     .     .
“There is controlling precedent for our conclusion.  Nollan v. California
-20-
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) . .
. .  The principal dissenting opinion observed . . . the Nollans . . . were ‘on
notice that new developments would be approved only if provisions were made
for lateral beach access.’ A majority of the Court rejected the proposition. ‘So
long as the Commission could not have deprived the prior owners of the
easement without compensating them,’ the Court reasoned, ‘the prior owners
must be understood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying
the lot.’”
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at ___, 121 S. Ct. at 2462-64, 150 L. Ed. 2d at 613-14 (some citations
omitted).
The types of hardships that are normally considered to be self-created in cases of this
type do not arise from purchase, but from those actions of the landowner, himself or herself,
that create the hardship, rather than the hardship impact, if any, of the zoning ordinance on
the property.  Our courts have spoken to these types of actions on several occasions.
Relatively recently in Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Commissioners of Queen Anne’s County, 307
Md. 307, 316, 513 A.2d 893, 897-98 (1986), the Board found that “‘The only extraordinary
circumstances which would seem to exist in this case are self inflicted and a result of [Ad +
Soil’s] construction of the facilities on the site without conforming to the Ordinance’s
required setbacks.’” (Alteration in original.)  We concurred that such a “hardship” was self-
imposed.  
In Salisbury Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bounds, 240 Md. 547, 214 A.2d 810 (1965),
an earlier, but seminal case, a property owner had constructed a building without a valid
building permit (although he thought a valid permit existed).  The building was in violation
of the zoning code.  After it was discovered, the property owner, much as Ad + Soil would
8 There was an issue of appealability also raised in Bounds.  As it is not relevant to the case
sub judice, we do not address that issue.
9 If mere purchase was sufficient by itself to create a hardship, our citation to Rathkopf, with
its distinction that hardships can be self-created by a predecessor in title, would be of little
importance.
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do twenty-one years later, sought a variance to legalize what he had already done.  The Board
declined to grant the variance on the grounds that it was Bounds’ responsibility to obtain a
valid permit, and thus the resulting hardship resulted from his failures.  The trial court
reversed the Board’s denial of the variance,8 and we held that in doing so the trial court erred.
We cited to Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning in reversing the trial court:
“‘§ 1.  Hardship Caused by Affirmative Acts of Commission.
‘Where property, due to unique circumstances applicable to it, cannot
reasonably be adopted to use in conformity with the restrictions of the zoning
ordinance, hardship arises which is capable of being relieved through the grant
of a variance. . . .  If the peculiar circumstances which render the property
incapable of being used in accordance with the restrictions contained in the
ordinance have been themselves caused or created by the property owner or his
predecessor in title,[9] the essential basis of a variance, i.e., that the hardship be
caused solely through the manner of operation of the ordinance upon the
particular property, is lacking.  In such case, a variance will not be granted . .
. .
.     .     .
  
‘There is a uniform application of the rule in those cases in which there
has been an act on the part of the property owner or his predecessor which has
physically so affected the property as to create a unique circumstance or which
in itself created either a practical difficulty or hardship in conforming to the
restrictions of the ordinance.’”        
Id. at 554-55, 214 A.2d at 814 (some emphasis added).  We then held that the Bounds case
-22-
“fits squarely within the above general rule.” Id. at 555, 214 A.2d at 814.  As can be seen, the
self-created hardship in Bounds was the actual structural modification of a building by the
current owner that put the building into violation of the ordinance.  In other words, it was the
owner’s act of commission that created the claimed hardship.
In Randolph Hills, Inc. v. Montgomery County Council, 264 Md. 78, 285 A.2d 620
(1972), the property owner subdivided a much larger tract of land into lots.  In the process,
the owner left one parcel in a character where, according to the owner, it had no reasonable
or beneficial use in its then classification.  The owner then sought to have the parcel
reclassified, asserting that it was a hardship for the parcel to remain in its present
classification.  Although it was a reclassification case, and not a variance case, we applied
the same act of commission principle.  We noted that the trial court had found:
“For engineering reasons, economic reasons, or for some other reason
the applicant, in laying out the subdivision, left as an outlot the particular
ground which is the subject of this rezoning application.
.     .     .
  
“Its use for R-60 residences is precluded at this time because the
applicant chose to lay out its subdivision in the particular manner that it did.
“. . . What is important is that the use of the particular ground in
question is restricted because the applicant chose to develop as it did.”
.     .     .
“The applicant has said, in effect, that although it was entitled to use
this ground in question under the zoning code for R-60 development it chose
not to do so, it now wants the County to permit the use of this land for some
other purpose.”
10 The Court of Special Appeals opined further: “Were we to hold that self-inflicted hardships
in and of themselves justified variances, we would, effectively not only generate a plethora of such
hardships but we would also emasculate zoning ordinances.”  Cromwell, 102 Md. App. at 722, 651
A.2d at 439-40. 
-23-
Id. at 81-82, 285 A.2d at 621-22.  We then agreed with the trial court, noting favorably its
reliance on the Bounds case, supra.
In Evans v. Shore Communications, 112 Md. App. 284, 309, 685 A.2d 454, 466
(1996), the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the “Board” that “[t]he needs of SCI’s
customers have nothing to do with the peculiarity of the property in question.  Thus, any
hardship claimed by SCI – the second prong of the test – is self-inflicted, and thus not a
ground for a variance.” The hardship complained of in the Court of Special Appeals’ case
of Cromwell v. Ward, 102 Md. App. 691, 651 A.2d 424 (1995), was also self-created.  The
current property owner erected a structure that exceeded the height limitation on structures
in Baltimore County.  The court held that the activity of the owner had been self-imposed.10
Similarly, in Wilson v. Mayor and Commissioners of the Town of Elkton, 35 Md. App. 417,
371 A.2d 443 (1977), the Court of Special Appeals found a self-created hardship where an
owner, albeit a predecessor owner, had illegally transformed a two-unit non-conforming
apartment building into a three-unit non-conforming apartment building, and her successor
owner was attempting to obtain a variance from set-back requirements to permit an exterior
fire escape, necessitated by the change in the number of units, to be built in a required side
yard.  That court noted: “The finding of the Board of Appeals that the circumstances
-24-
requiring the variance are not the result of actions on the applicant’s part must be read to
mean the applicant, or his predecessor.  When so read, the finding is directly contrary to the
evidence, and must be rejected.”  Id. at 428, 371 A.2d at 449. 
This typical type of self-created hardship (an act of commission by the owner) is also
the law in other jurisdictions.  Martin v. Board of Adjustment, 464 So.2d 123 (Ala. Civ. App.
1985) (illegally building a carport in a setback, pursuant to a permit application that stated
the carport would not be in the setback deemed self-imposed); Board of Zoning Appeals v.
Kempf, 656 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. App. 1995) (the paving over of a required green space deemed
to be self-created); CDK Restaurant, Inc. v. Krucklin, 118 A.D.2d 851, 500 N.Y.S.2d 339
(1986) ( the illegal enclosure around a walkway was deemed self-inflicted); Midgett v.
Schermerhorn, 24 A.D.2d 572, 262 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1965) (disregard of conditions imposed
on prior grant of a variance held to be self-imposed); Pittsburgh v. Zoning Board of
Adjustment, 522 Pa. 44, 559 A.2d 896 (1989) (reliance on city permits that had been obtained
on false information in permit applications held to be self-created hardship); In re
Cumberland Farms, 151 Vt. 59, 557 A.2d 486 (1989) (failure to procure permits self-
created); In re Fecteau, 149 Vt. 319, 543 A.2d 693 (1988) (reliance on his surveyor’s
measurements held to be self-created).      
    
Conclusion
The variance at issue in the case sub judice is an “area” variance, not a “use” variance.
Gleason, cited by the Court of Special Appeals, never applied to “area” variances, and, as
-25-
we have indicated in the several cases we have cited, we made that distinction long ago.
Moreover, there is a serious question of whether it is, or ever was, viable in any variance, as
opposed to a “classification,” situation.
As we failed to discern, or at least to discuss, in Gleason, zoning constitutes
restrictions on land, not on title.  Both the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantee rights to property owners.  Property
owners start out with the unrestricted right to use their land as they see fit.  Under the
common-law, those rights are limited only by a restriction as to uses that create traditional
nuisances.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120
L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992).  Our cases, however, and the cases of the Supreme Court of the United
States, see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926),
and its progeny, have held that reasonable regulation is constitutional.  That said, it must,
nonetheless, be recognized that regulation of land, including zoning regulations, are
limitations on the full exercise of a property owner’s constitutional rights as well as his or
her rights under the common-law.
In Aspen Hill Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 265 Md. 303, 313-14, 289
A.2d 303, 308 (1972), we quoted from our earlier case of Landay v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 173 Md. 460, 466, 196 A. 293, 296 (1938):
“In such a situation we must not forget the underlying principle that, ‘Such
ordinances [zoning ordinances] are in derogation of the common law right to
so use private property as to realize its highest utility, and while they should
be liberally construed to accomplish their plain purpose and intent, they should
11 It may not actually have been before us even in Gleason.  As we have indicated, Gleason
appears to have been a reclassification case.
-26-
not be extended by implication to cases not clearly within the scope of the
purpose and intent manifest in their language.’” [Alteration in original.]
In that respect, reasonable zoning limitations are always directed to the property, itself, and
its uses and structures, not to the completely separate matter of title to property, which is
another whole field of law.  In zoning, it is the property that is regulated, not the title.
In Maryland, when title is transferred, it takes with it all the encumbrances and
burdens that attach to title; but it also takes with it all the benefits and rights inherent in
ownership.  If a predecessor in title was subject to a claim that he had created his own
hardship, that burden, for variance purposes, passes with the title.  But, at the same time, if
the prior owner has not self-created a hardship, a self-created hardship is not immaculately
conceived merely because the new owner obtains title.  
To the extent that any vestige of Gleason, supra, has survived the cases in which we
have distinguished it, it is, as to any application in cases of “area” variances, overruled.  We
do not resolve its application, if any, in “use” variance cases only because that issue is not
squarely before us.11    
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  Upon remand, the Anne
Arundel County Board of Appeals will, in addition to complying with this opinion and the
opinion of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, apply the standards of Belvoir
Farms, our White, and Mastandrea.
-27-
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED
TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH
DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY REMANDING THE CASE TO THE
ANNE 
ARUNDEL 
COUNTY 
BOARD 
OF
APPEALS 
FOR 
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THE OPINION OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT AND CONSISTENT WITH
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT; COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY.