Title: Blaylock v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc.

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Robert BLAYLOCK, Michael Ibsen, and Steve
Perry v. SHEARSON LEHMAN BROTHERS, INC.

96-1176                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 20, 1997


1.   Civil procedure -- nonsuit -- absolute right prior to submission of case
     to jury -- discretionary after final submission. -- Rule 41(a) of the
     Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure has been interpreted as
     creating an absolute right to a nonsuit prior to submission of
     the case to the jury or to the court; although the rule does
     not provide for it, the supreme court has held that it is
     within the court's discretion to permit a nonsuit without
     prejudice even after final submission of the case.

2.   Civil procedure -- nonsuit -- new action may be filed within one year or
     within limitations period. -- When a nonsuit has been made
     effective, a new action may be filed within one year of the
     nonsuit or within the applicable statute of limitations,
     whichever is longer.

3.   Judgment -- when effective -- "entered" defined. -- A judgment or
     decree must be entered to be effective; under Ark. R. Civ. P.
     58 and Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2, the
     term "entered" means that the judgment or decree must be "set
     forth on a separate document" and filed by the clerk in the
     court's docket book.

4.   Civil procedure -- nonsuit -- court order necessary to grant -- judgment
     or decree must be entered. -- The supreme court held, with respect
     to all dismissals from litigation, including those voluntary
     dismissals without prejudice to which a plaintiff may have an
     absolute right, that a court order is necessary to grant a
     nonsuit and that the judgment or decree must be entered to be
     effective.  

5.   Action -- class action -- commencement tolls statute of limitations. --
     The commencement of a class action tolls the running of the
     statute of limitations as to purported members of the class
     during the pendency of the litigation.

6.   Limitation of actions -- appellants' complaint was erroneously dismissed
     as time barred -- matter reversed and remanded. -- Where no order or
     decree granting a nonsuit in a related action was found in the
     abstract, nor any entry reflecting such action on or before 
     October 17, 1994, when the abstract ended its references to
     the related case with the trial court's granting of summary
     judgment against some plaintiffs and dismissing the action of
     others but not including appellants in either order, the
     supreme court concluded that no nonsuit was effectively
     granted, that appellants were not dismissed from the related
     lawsuit, that the one-year savings statute was never
     activated, and that the general five-year statute of
     limitations applicable to securities fraud continued to be
     tolled as long as appellants were not dismissed from the
     related action; thus, the supreme court held that appellants'
     August 17, 1995, complaint was erroneously dismissed as time
     barred and reversed and remanded the matter for further
     proceedings.


     Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court; John Holland, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Robert R. Cloar, for appellants.
     Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, by: David G. Russell and Nancy
H. Baughan; and Hardin, Dawson & Terry, by: Rex M. Terry, for
appellee.

     Ray Thornton, Justice.
     This case presents the question whether a voluntary dismissal,
or nonsuit, by a plaintiff is automatically effective as soon as it
is filed, or whether a court order or docket entry is required to
dismiss the action without prejudice and start the clock ticking on
the statutory savings period.  The trial court found that a nonsuit
becomes effective upon filing, without any action by the trial
court; the court further found that, as a consequence, the August
17, 1995 complaint filed by appellants Robert Blaylock, Michael
Ibsen, and Steve Perry was time barred.  We disagree and reverse
and remand.
     While it is well settled that a person who files a lawsuit may
voluntarily dismiss that lawsuit and has a statutory right to
refile the action within one year pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.
section 16-56-126 (1987), we have never before addressed the
question whether the nonsuit is effective upon filing or whether
some action by the court is required.  In reaching that issue, we
consider the following rule of civil procedure on voluntary
dismissals:
     Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.  Subject to the
provisions of Rule 23(d) and Rule 66, an action may be
dismissed without prejudice to a future action by the
plaintiff before the final submission of the case to the
jury, or to the court where the trial is by the court,
provided, however, that such dismissal operates as an
adjudication on the merits when filed by a plaintiff who
has once dismissed in any court of the United States or
of any state an action based upon or including the same
claim, unless all parties agree by written stipulation
that such dismissal is without prejudice.  In any case
where a set-off or counterclaim has been previously
presented, the defendant shall have the right of
proceeding to trial on his claim although the plaintiff
may have dismissed the action.
Ark. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (1997).  We have long interpreted this rule
as creating an absolute right to a nonsuit prior to submission of
the case to the jury or to the court.  Whetstone v. Chadduck, 316
Ark. 330,