Title: Jackson v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: 
Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
JOHN ALLEN JACKSON 
 
 
      OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 070137 
 November 2, 2007 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment from the Court of Appeals, 
we consider whether the Commonwealth proved that the defendant 
violated Code § 18.2-266, a penal statute.  This statute 
states in relevant part: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to drive 
or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train . . . 
(iii) while such person is under the influence of 
any narcotic drug or any other self-administered 
intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature, or any 
combination of such drugs, to a degree which impairs 
his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle, 
engine or train safely." 
 
John Allen Jackson was convicted in the City of Lynchburg 
General District Court of driving under the influence of a 
narcotic drug in violation of Code § 18.2-266.  He appealed 
the conviction to the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg, 
and he was convicted by the court sitting without a jury.  The 
circuit court fixed his punishment at 30 days in jail and 
imposed a fine of $250, which were both suspended.  The 
circuit court also suspended Jackson's driver's license for 12 
months. 
 
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The Court of Appeals affirmed Jackson's conviction in an 
unpublished opinion.  Jackson v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
2120-06-3 (December 22, 2006).  Jackson appeals. 
 
The facts relevant for our disposition of this appeal are 
not in dispute.  Jackson went to the emergency room at 
Lynchburg General Hospital between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on June 
19, 2005, complaining of pain.  After Jackson was examined by 
health care providers, a physician ordered that Jackson 
receive two milligrams of dilaudid and 25 milligrams of 
"phenergen IM." 
 
Dilaudid is a "strong analgesic" that is prescribed "for 
severe pain."  The phenergen was administered to prevent 
Jackson from becoming nauseous, which is a side effect of 
dilaudid.  Dr. James Kuhlman, a forensic toxicologist who 
testified at trial, stated that: 
"Dilautid [sic] is a central nervous system 
depressant.  Its primary manifestation is sedation 
and [it is] a strong drug.  It produces intense 
effects.  Those type of side effects that you might 
expect to see would be someone who is sedated, 
lethargic, sleepy, slow reaction time, 
uncoordinated, probably disoriented.  If they were 
walking and talking, [it is] possible that it could 
affect their balance and speech." 
 
A nurse at the hospital administered the dilaudid, which 
is a narcotic, to Jackson between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m.  The 
nurse told Jackson that the medication would make him drowsy 
and asked Jackson if "he had a ride home and he said that he 
 
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did."  The dosage of dilaudid that Jackson received probably 
affected him for about four hours. 
 
Jackson was discharged from the emergency room after 7:00 
a.m. on June 19, 2005.  Sometime between the time of his 
discharge and 7:30 a.m., Jackson, who was driving a car, 
collided with a telephone pole.  His car incurred significant 
damage.  Jackson "crawled" out of the car, and he was 
transported to Lynchburg General Hospital for treatment.  As a 
result of the accident, Jackson was charged with a violation 
of Code § 18.2-266(iii). 
 
Jackson argued in the circuit court, the Court of 
Appeals, and he argues in this Court, that as a matter of law, 
he did not violate Code § 18.2-266(iii).  Jackson contends 
that this statute prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle 
only when the operator is under the influence of a narcotic 
drug that is self-administered.  Jackson argues that even 
though the Commonwealth presented evidence that he was under 
the influence of a narcotic drug, Code § 18.2-266 requires 
that the narcotic be self-administered.  Continuing, Jackson 
asserts that medical personnel administered the drug to him 
and, hence, the drug he received was not self-administered, 
and he did not violate the statute.  
Responding, the Commonwealth argues that Code § 18.2-
266(iii) prohibits the operator of a motor vehicle from 
 
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driving under the influence of a narcotic drug in two separate 
and distinct situations:  "first, the statute proscribes 
driving under the influence of 'any narcotic drug,' self-
administered or otherwise; second, driving under the influence 
of 'self-administered intoxicant[s] and drug[s] of whatsoever 
nature.' "  We disagree with the Commonwealth's contentions. 
 
The construction of a statute presents a question of law 
that we review de novo upon appeal.  Robinson v. Commonwealth, 
274 Va. 45, 51, 645 S.E.2d 470, 473 (2007); Farrakhan v. 
Commonwealth, 273 Va. 177, 180, 639 S.E.2d 227, 229 (2007); 
Dowling v. Rowan, 270 Va. 510, 519, 621 S.E.2d 397, 401 
(2005).  When a court construes a penal statute, the court 
must not add to the words of that statute, nor ignore the 
statute's actual words, and the court must strictly construe 
the statute and limit its application to cases clearly within 
the scope of that statute.  Robinson, 274 Va. at 51, 645 
S.E.2d at 473; Farrakhan, 273 Va. at 181, 639 S.E.2d at 230; 
Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 
(1983).  Also, "every part of a statute is presumed to have 
some effect and no part will be considered meaningless unless 
absolutely necessary."  Robinson, 274 Va. at 51-52, 645 S.E.2d 
at 473 (quoting Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. Partnership, 255 Va. 
335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998)); accord Sansom v. Board 
of Supervisors, 257 Va. 589, 595, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999); 
 
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Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 251 Va. 398, 405, 
468 S.E.2d 905, 909 (1996); Raven Red Ash Coal Corp. v. 
Absher, 153 Va. 332, 335, 149 S.E. 541, 542 (1929). 
 
Applying these principles, we conclude that the circuit 
court and the Court of Appeals erred by holding that Jackson 
violated Code § 18.2-266.  As we have already stated, this 
penal statute prohibits a person from operating a motor 
vehicle, engine, or train "while such person is under the 
influence of any narcotic drug or any other self-administered 
intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature."  (Emphasis added).  
Applying the plain language of this statutory provision and 
principles of statutory construction, we must give meaning to 
the phrase "under the influence of any narcotic drug or any 
other self-administered intoxicant or drug."  We hold that the 
meaning of this phrase is clear:  the narcotic drug that the 
operator of the motor vehicle is "under the influence of" must 
be self-administered.  The phrase "or any other self-
administered intoxicant or drug" modifies and places a 
limitation upon the phrase "while such person is under the 
influence of any narcotic drug."  Any other conclusion would 
render the statutory phrase "or any other self-administered 
intoxicant or drug" meaningless and superfluous. 
 
We reject the Commonwealth's invitation that this Court 
ignore the phrase "any other self-administered intoxicant or 
 
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drug."  This Court is not free to ignore language contained in 
a statute.  Rather, it is the duty of this Court to apply the 
language in Code § 18.2-266(iii) that the General Assembly 
utilized.  As we have often stated, without equivocation, "we 
must assume that the General Assembly chose, with care, the 
words it used in enacting the statute, and we are bound by 
those words when we apply the statute."  Halifax Corp. v. 
First Union Nat'l Bank, 262 Va. 91, 100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702, 
(2001); accord SIGNAL Corp. v. Keane Federal Systems, Inc., 
265 Va. 38, 46-47, 574 S.E.2d 253, 257 (2003); Barr v. Town & 
Country Properties, Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 
674 (1990). 
 
We note that the Commonwealth's brief contains an 
extensive discussion of the history of Code § 18.2-266(iii) 
and its precursor statutes.  That discussion, while 
interesting, has no legal significance because this Court has 
a duty to apply the plain language contained in Code § 18.2-
266(iii). 
Finding no merit in the Commonwealth's arguments, we will 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we will 
dismiss Jackson's conviction for violation of Code § 18.2-266. 
Reversed and dismissed.