Title: Spurgeon v. Board of Commissioners

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

181 Kan. 1008 (1957)
317 P.2d 798
ORION RALPH SPURGEON and ADELINE MAY SPURGEON, Appellants,
v.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF SHAWNEE COUNTY, KANSAS, DEAN E. YINGLING, ROBERT R. JONES and PAUL MADDEN, Commissioners; SHAWNEE COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, CHRIS ARMSTRONG, J.H. DEURMYER, JAY SHIDLER, CLIF WATSON, P.G. BAIRD, WALTER KING, members of the Commission; BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF SHAWNEE COUNTY, KANSAS, ELROY VILT, J.H. DEURMYER, PERRY C. WAYMAN, ED H. GRUNDEMAN and KELLY LEWIS, members of the Board; JOSEPH M. BENSON, Secretary of the Shawnee County Planning Commission; JOSEPH M. BENSON, Secretary of the Board of Zoning Appeals of Shawnee County, Kansas, Appellees.
No. 40,648

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 9, 1957.
David H. Fisher, of Topeka, argued the cause and Donald Patterson, of Topeka, was with him on the briefs for the appellants.
Maurice D. Freidberg, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HALL, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the district court of Shawnee County affirming the enforcement of a Shawnee County zoning resolution as it applies to appellants and permanently enjoining *1009 appellants from using their property in violation of the resolution.
Pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 1955 Supp., 19-2927 through 19-2936 the Board of County Commissioners of Shawnee County caused to be adopted on August 7, 1953, a zoning resolution recommended by the Shawnee County Planning Commission and the Board of Zoning Appeals of Shawnee County.
This resolution was entitled "Shawnee County Zoning Plan." Under the provisions of the statute this resolution provided for zoning regulation within the unincorporated territory lying within three miles of the city of Topeka, a city of the first class in Shawnee County.
The resolution divided the area into six districts, to wit: two classes of residential, local shopping, commercial, light industrial and heavy industrial. It declared auto wrecking yards and the storing or locating of trailers as nonconforming uses in residential districts. The resolution further provided that auto wrecking yards and trailers shall be discontinued or removed within two years from the effective date of the resolution. It then provided that the Board of County Commissioners may, by special permit, authorize the location of certain buildings or uses in any district from which they are otherwise prohibited by the resolution. Trailers were included in the list eligible for special permits, but not auto wrecking yards.
The appellants are the owners of a tract of land purchased in 1950 which lies in the three mile zone and is designated by the resolution as within a residential district.
On this land the appellants are engaged in the business of auto sales, repair and wrecking. After acquiring it, they made a number of valuable improvements in addition to the general value of the business.
Upon publication of the notice to discontinue the nonconforming uses of junk yards, auto wrecking and trailers, as provided by the resolution, the appellants made application for a change in zoning from "residential" to "heavy industrial" which would have permitted the continuance of their business. The application was denied, and in due course the matter was tried to the district court of Shawnee County.
The court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
..............
The appellants make six specifications of error.
The regularity of the adoption of the resolution is not questioned.
Appellants first raise the question as to whether the Board of County Commissioners selected the proper statute for zoning property within the county and urge that the county should have selected another statute which did not provide for the elimination of nonconforming uses.
The power to zone within the counties of Kansas is a relatively new one. The laws are found in Article 29, Chapter 19, General Statutes of Kansas of 1949 as amended. Prior to 1953 the legislature had provided two plans for county zoning. Sections 19-2901 to 19-2913 incl., provide a plan for zoning within any township in a county which lies outside the limits of any incorporated city. This law now applies to all counties over 75,000 population. Sections 19-2914 to 19-2926 incl., provide for a county wide plan of zoning. Under recent amendments this plan may be used in counties between 10,000 and 200,000 population.
In 1951 the legislature added a third plan, sections 19-2927 to 19-2936 incl., which provide for zoning of any county having first or second class cities and not operating under the provisions of the county zoning law (19-2914, et seq.). Under this law the zoning regulations are limited to the unincorporated territories lying within three miles of the city. This law also provides in 19-2930:
The other two plans do not provide for the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses. Section 19-2919 did so provide until amended in 1953.
Each of these three plans has distinguishing features and is independent of each other. Any county may choose the plan most suitable to its particular need.
In this case the Board of County Commissioners of Shawnee County chose the plan provided in 19-2927, et seq. Appellants cannot be heard to complain another should have been chosen notwithstanding the fact the plan so chosen was the only one which provided for the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses.
*1013 It is the next contention of the appellants that the Board of County Commissioners acted in an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable manner in failing and refusing the appellants the right to continue their business on real estate which they had owned prior to the enactment of the zoning resolution and, particularly, in discriminating against auto wrecking yards by refusing them any right to special permit.
These and similar objections to zoning ordinances have been previously before this court. Most of the cases have arisen under the city zoning laws but the same principles are involved and the law of these cases would be applicable to the more recent county zoning resolutions.
The leading case is Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99. The facts of that case were somewhat similar to the case at bar. The court held that cities may create reasonable zoning districts and prohibit the construction of certain classes of buildings within the districts. Such ordinances are a valid exercise of the police power and do not violate any provision of state or federal constitutions.
This case has been followed and quoted in many subsequent cases and it would serve no purpose to quote it at length here. (Armourdale State Bank v. Kansas City, 131 Kan. 419, 292 Pac. 745; Hoel v. Kansas City, 131 Kan. 290, 291 Pac. 780; Ford v. City of Hutchinson, 140 Kan. 307, 37 P.2d 39.)
In a later case, West v. City of Wichita, 118 Kan. 265, 234 Pac. 978, the court said:
See, also, City of Norton v. Hutson, 142 Kan. 305, 46 P.2d 630.
Notwithstanding that zoning is a valid use of the police power, subsequent cases made it clear, as appellants contend, that the courts do have authority in a proper proceeding to inquire into the facts of a specific case to determine whether, as to specific property, the ordinance is reasonable. (City of Wichita v. Schwertner, 130 Kan. 397, 286 Pac. 266.)
*1014 In making this inquiry it is not enough to avoid the ordinance because the use of property for a desired purpose is forbidden. Furthermore, the court may not substitute its judicial judgment for the legislative judgment of the city, rather the court is obliged to find facts which demonstrated that the city's conduct departed from the realm of the reasonable and passed over into the realm of the arbitrary and capricious (Heckman v. City of Independence, 127 Kan. 658, 274 Pac. 732).
Also, whether or not a certain place constitutes a nuisance is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence. If there is evidence sufficient to support the finding that finding will not be disturbed. (State, ex rel., v. Wade, 128 Kan. 646, 278 Pac. 1067; Simmonds v. Meyn, 134 Kan. 419, 7 P.2d 506.)
On the matter of nonconforming uses this court said in City of Norton v. Hutson, supra, Syllabus 1:
In the case at bar there is evidence sufficient to sustain the court's findings that the Board of County Commissioners did not act arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in adopting the resolution or in its application to the appellants. Under these circumstances we cannot substitute our judgment and hold contrariwise.
As harsh as the effect may be on the appellants' business there is no unlawful discrimination against them. The fact is that the resolution treated all auto wrecking businesses alike within the three mile area. Thus the classification was reasonable and well within the rules laid down by the above authorities.
Appellants state that the failure to provide for special permits to auto wrecking yards is equivalent to "spot zoning" and, therefore, unreasonable. In Duggins v. Board of County Commissioners, 179 Kan. 101, 293 P.2d 258, this court held that such special permits under the county zone plan did not constitute "spot zoning."
Appellants call our attention to many other cases including a recent one decided by this court (Hudson Properties, Inc. v. City *1015 of Westwood, 181 Kan. 320, 310 P.2d 936) wherein an examination was made as to the validity of a city ordinance. The case is distinguishable. The ordinance in question was invalid because it failed to establish a uniform standard for its application. The court held the ordinance was an attempt to confer arbitrary power on the governing body of the city. The standard here is uniform in its application to all businesses coming within the various classifications.
The most important point raised by appellants, and one of first impression here, is the reasonableness of the resolution eliminating appellants' business within a two year period. Appellants state the question:
In this connection they contend the resolution violates the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution of the United States.
The fifth amendment is really not involved. It is a limitation upon powers of the federal government but is not a limitation upon the powers of the states. (State, ex rel., v. Kansas City, 125 Kan. 88, 262 Pac. 1032, and authorities cited therein.) It is the fourteenth amendment with the due process clause which is the basis for the claim of unconstitutionality.
Although zoning measures generally were upheld throughout the country it was 1926 before final judgment was rendered by the United States Supreme Court on the applicability of the federal constitution to zone legislation. In Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. Ct. 114, 54 A.L.R. 1016, the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance was challenged on the grounds that it violated the fourteenth amendment and was unreasonable and confiscatory. The court upheld zoning legislation on the grounds that it was an exercise of the police power of the state designated to promote safety, health and public welfare.
In 1923 our court in Ware v. City of Wichita, supra, had sustained a zoning ordinance on the same grounds. Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, was cited and followed in City of Norton v. Hutson, supra.
Another leading federal case was Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 60 L. Ed. 348, 36 S. Ct. 143.
The constitutionality of zoning laws has long been a settled question as far as the fourteenth amendment is concerned.
The first zoning regulations throughout the country did not provide *1016 for the mandatory elimination of nonconforming uses. There was usually a restriction on expansion of nonconforming uses. The underlying theory was that these nonconforming uses would eventually disappear.
In recent years regulations providing for the amortization or gradual elimination of nonconforming uses have been passed in a number of cities and states and have been upheld by state and federal courts.
In 1929 two cases were decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana involving the constitutionality of a provision requiring the elimination of existing nonconforming uses. In both cases the court had under consideration a zoning ordinance of the city of New Orleans which contained a provision that all businesses in operation within a certain area must be liquidated within one year from the passage of the ordinance. The court upheld the ordinance in both cases (State v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613; State v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314).
An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court in the McDonald case and certiorari was denied (280 U.S. 556, 74 L. Ed. 612, 50 S.Ct. 16).
A leading case is City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 C.A.2d 442, 274 P.2d 34. There the zoning ordinance was changed and a provision adopted requiring certain nonconforming uses to be discontinued within five years. The court said:
See, also, Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 181 F.2d 410. Certiorari denied (340 U.S. 892, 95 L. Ed. 647, 71 S.Ct. 208).
The cases are collected in a recent annotation, 42 A.L.R.2d 1146. 58 Am. Jur., Zoning, § 148.
There is a lack of accord among state decisions on the power to gradually eliminate nonconforming uses. We believe the statute enacted in 1951, Section 19-2930, controls our direction in Kansas.
In an early case (City of Norton v. Hutson, supra) this court indicated its disapproval of the elimination of all nonconforming uses. The court said:
This case was decided in 1935. In 1939 the legislature provided for the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses in the county plan of zoning (Section 19-2919). In 1953 this provision was deleted from Section 19-2919 but was made a part of the new county zoning plan in Section 19-2930.
Early doubts such as those expressed in the Hutson case are *1018 unjustified when considered in the light of subsequent development of the law. The constitutionality of provisions such as Section 19-2930 as a proper exercise of the police power has been determined insofar as the fourteenth amendment is concerned.
No question is raised in this appeal as to whether or not the provision contravenes any section of the Kansas constitution.
The remaining question before us is the reasonableness of that part of the regulation which provided that the appellants' business is to be eliminated within two years.
The authorities cited above are in point. The determination of reasonableness varies according to the facts and circumstances of the individual case. (Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra; Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, supra; State v. McDonald, supra; State v. Jacoby, supra; Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, supra; and the annotation 42 A.L.R.2d 1146.)
In the case at bar the district court found that "two years is a reasonable length of time within which to require a discontinuance of the prohibited uses mentioned in sub-section C of Section 10 of the Shawnee County Zoning Resolution considering the nature of the use, and the appellants' investment in improvements devoted to those uses." There is evidence sufficient to support this finding. We may not substitute our judicial judgment for that of the county on the two year period of limitation unless we find facts which demonstrate that the county departed from the realm of the reasonable and passed over into the realm of the arbitrary and capricious (Heckman v. City of Independence, supra). An examination of the record here does not show facts sufficient for that purpose.
The judgment is affirmed.