Title: Karl McNeil v. Brandon Hansen

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP423 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Karl McNeil, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Brandon Hansen and Maryland Casualty Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 18, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 13, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Martin J. Donald 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by John A. 
Becker and Becker, French & DeMatthew, Racine, and oral argument 
by John A. Becker. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Edward 
W. Stewart, Danielle R. McCollister, and Lowe & Associates, 
Waukesha, and oral argument by Edward W. Stewart. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, 
Linda S. Schmidt, and LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, on 
behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce. 
 
 
2007 WI 56
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP423  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV10418) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Karl McNeil, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Brandon Hansen and Maryland Casualty Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 18, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, M. Joseph Donald, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case comes to us 
on certification from the court of appeals.  The circuit court 
concluded that Brandon Hansen's (Hansen) action of reaching 
through an automobile's window and attempting to start the 
vehicle by turning the key did not constitute "operation of a 
motor vehicle" as that term is used in an exception to the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act (the 
Act).  Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) (2003-04).1  As a result, the 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2005AP423   
 
2 
 
circuit court concluded that the suit was barred by § 102.03(2), 
and it granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
dismissing Karl McNeil's (McNeil's) complaint. 
¶2 
We conclude that when the action under consideration 
is undertaken to service or repair a vehicle, and the condition 
of the vehicle is such that it could not then be driven on a 
public roadway, the action does not constitute "operation of a 
motor vehicle" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).  
The action at issue here was attempting to start the vehicle 
when it was connected to a machine to flush the radiator.  This 
action was undertaken to service the vehicle while it could not 
be driven on a public roadway.  Therefore, it does not 
constitute the "operation of a motor vehicle" as that term is 
used in § 102.03(2).  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's 
summary judgment dismissing McNeil's claims. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On April 12, 2003, McNeil and Hansen were working at 
Fast Track Oil Change, performing a radiator flush on a 
customer's Jeep Wrangler.  McNeil, Hansen's supervisor, hooked 
the Jeep up to a machine that flushes the radiator.  The Jeep's 
engine had to be started in order for the machine to function, 
so McNeil asked Hansen to start the Jeep's engine while he 
remained in front of the Jeep to determine whether the hoses 
being used to flush the radiator were leaking.  Hansen, while 
standing outside of the Jeep, leaned in through an open window 
and turned the ignition switch.  The Jeep had a manual 
No. 
2005AP423   
 
3 
 
transmission and upon ignition it lurched forward and struck and 
injured McNeil.   
¶4 
McNeil sued Hansen.  Maryland Casualty Company was 
also named as a defendant.  It paid worker's compensation 
benefits to McNeil as a result of the accident, and therefore, 
it has subrogation rights with regard to McNeil's claim, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.29.2  Hansen and Maryland Casualty 
Company moved for summary judgment of dismissal based on Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(2), which provides that the Act is generally the 
exclusive remedy against employers and coemployees for job-
related injuries.  The circuit court granted summary judgment, 
after concluding that Hansen's action did not constitute 
"operation of a motor vehicle" as the term is used in the 
exception to the exclusive remedy provision in §  102.03(2).  
The court concluded that the Act required a "very narrow 
approach" when defining "operation of a motor vehicle" because 
the exceptions to the Act's coemployee immunity provisions are 
to be narrowly construed. 
¶5 
McNeil appealed the circuit court's decision and the 
court of appeals certified the case due to the conflict between 
                                                 
2 The Complaint alleges Maryland Casualty Company paid 
McNeil worker's compensation benefits, and the Answer admits 
that allegation.  We also note that the record contains a letter 
from Susan L. Banahasky of Maryland Casualty Company stating 
"Zurich Insurance Company" made payments to McNeil for worker's 
compensation benefits.  We have not attempted to reconcile these 
two statements, but have relied on the factual assertion and 
admission in the pleadings that Maryland Casualty was the 
worker's compensation carrier.    
No. 
2005AP423   
 
4 
 
(1) its conclusion that the facts could come within existing 
definitions of "operation of a motor vehicle" in other statutes, 
and (2) its conclusion that the Act generally provides the 
exclusive 
remedy 
for 
work-related 
injuries. 
 
We 
granted 
certification.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶6 
We review a grant of summary judgment independently, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  AKG Real 
Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 2006 WI 106, ¶14, 296 Wis. 2d 1, 717 
N.W.2d 835 (citing O'Neill v. Reemer, 2003 WI 13, ¶8, 259 
Wis. 2d 544, 657 N.W.2d 403); Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 
Wis. 2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). 
¶7 
To determine whether summary judgment is appropriate 
in the case before us, we interpret Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).  The 
interpretation and application of a statute to an undisputed set 
of facts are questions of law that we review independently.  
Rocker v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2006 WI 26, ¶23, 289 Wis. 2d 294, 
711 N.W.2d 634; State v. Sostre, 198 Wis. 2d 409, 414, 542 
N.W.2d 774 (1996) (citing Ynocencio v. Fesko, 114 Wis. 2d 391, 
396, 338 N.W.2d 461 (1983)).   
No. 
2005AP423   
 
5 
 
B. 
Operation of a Motor Vehicle 
¶8 
In general, an employee's exclusive remedy for a job-
related injury is under the Act.  Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).  
However, there are three limited exceptions in that statute that 
allow an employee to bring an action against a coemployee.  Id.  
Section 102.03(2) provides: 
Where such conditions exist the right to the 
recovery of compensation under this chapter shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer, any other 
employee of the same employer and the worker's 
compensation insurance carrier.  This section does not 
limit the right of an employee to bring action against 
any coemployee for an assault intended to cause bodily 
harm, or against a coemployee for negligent operation 
of a motor vehicle not owned or leased by the 
employer, or against a coemployee of the same employer 
to the extent that there would be liability of a 
governmental unit to pay judgments against employees 
under a collective bargaining agreement or a local 
ordinance.   
Id.  In this case, we must decide whether Hansen's action of 
reaching through the vehicle's window during service of that 
vehicle and turning the ignition switch while the vehicle could 
not be driven on a public roadway falls within the term 
"operation of a motor vehicle" under the second exception in 
§ 102.03(2).   
¶9 
"[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, 236 Wis. 2d 
211, 232, 612 N.W.2d 659).  The context in which the operative 
No. 
2005AP423   
 
6 
 
language appears is important.  Therefore, the language should 
be "interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole."  Id., ¶46.  If the statutory 
language is unambiguous, extrinsic sources of interpretation 
generally are not consulted.  Id.  A statute is ambiguous "if it 
is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed 
persons in two or more senses."  Id., ¶47.  If a statute is 
ambiguous, a court may turn to external sources, such as 
legislative history, to assist its interpretation.  Id., ¶48. 
¶10 A general rule of statutory construction is that 
exceptions within a statute "should be strictly, and reasonably, 
construed and extend only as far as their language fairly 
warrants."  82 C.J.S. Statutes § 371 (2006).  If a statute is 
liberally construed, "it follows that the exceptions must be 
narrowly construed."  Miller v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 
2003 WI App 58, ¶18, 260 Wis. 2d 581, 659 N.W.2d 494 
(interpreting exceptions to the recreational immunity statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52, narrowly because the statute is liberally 
construed in favor of property owners). 
¶11 The term "operation of a motor vehicle" is not defined 
in the Act.  The word "operation" may have different meanings, 
depending on the context in which it is used.  Hake v. 
Zimmerlee, 178 Wis. 2d 417, 421, 504 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(citing Lukaszewicz v. Concrete Research, Inc., 43 Wis. 2d 335, 
342, 168 N.W.2d 581 (1969)).  For example, depending on the 
context, "operation" could require actually driving a vehicle, 
or it could refer to simply activating any of the controls of a 
No. 
2005AP423   
 
7 
 
vehicle.3  The meaning of "operation of a motor vehicle" in Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(2) is not readily discernable from its context.  
Therefore, we agree with the court of appeals; the term is 
ambiguous 
because 
it 
has 
more 
than 
one 
reasonable 
interpretation.  Id.  Since the term is ambiguous, we turn to 
the legislative history to aid our interpretation.    
¶12 In Hake, the court of appeals reviewed the legislative 
history and examined the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) while 
determining whether an employee's action of closing the door of 
a 
vehicle 
on 
a 
coemployee's 
hand 
constituted 
negligent 
"operation of a motor vehicle" under § 102.03(2).  Id. at 420-
422.  The court stated that one purpose of the Act "is to 
allocate the cost of employment injuries to the industry or 
business in which they occur and, ultimately, to the consuming 
public as part of the price for the goods or services offered."  
Id. at 421-22 (quoting Oliver v. Travelers Ins. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 
644, 648, 309 N.W.2d 383 (Ct. App. 1981)).   
¶13 Hake noted that prior to 1977, the Act precluded suits 
against the employer and the worker's compensation insurance 
carrier, but it did not prohibit suits between coemployees for 
work-related injuries.  Id. at 422.  Consistent with the purpose 
of the Act, in 1977 the Act was revised in accordance with 
recommendations from the Worker's Compensation Advisory Council 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 340.01(41) (defining "operator" as 
"a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a 
vehicle"); Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(b) (defining "operate" as "the 
physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a 
motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion"). 
No. 
2005AP423   
 
8 
 
(the Advisory Council) to prohibit most work-related injury 
suits between coemployees.  Id.  The Advisory Council explained 
the amendment to Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) as follows: 
[The amendment] would permit a suit where there was an 
assault by the co-employe or where there was negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle not owned or leased by 
the employer.  It is a fact that virtually all 
insurance policies issued to employers for public 
liability or for fleet coverage on employer owned or 
leased vehicles exclude payment of damages where the 
claim of an employe is against a co-employe.  The 
result is that the employe who is being sued is left 
without protection and the little person is the one 
who gets hurt.  The attention of the Advisory Council 
has been called to cases where . . . [the co-employe] 
who was sued was placed in a financial position[,] 
because of the cost of defending or because of the 
judgment for damages that was recovered[,] that the 
employe would not be able to recover from financially 
for many years or for the balance of his life. 
Id. at 422-23 (emphasis added).  Since the main concern of the 
Advisory Council was the financial burden coemployee suits could 
impose upon workers, the Advisory Council encouraged the 
legislature "to recreate the statute so that coemployee immunity 
would be the rule, and coemployee liability would be the 
exception to that rule."  Id. at 423.   
¶14 The court further explained the purpose of coemployee 
immunity as follows:  "Injuries caused by a negligent coemployee 
are everyday occurrences.  Such injuries are directly related to 
the employment, and pursuant to the stated purpose or objective 
of the Worker's Compensation Act, the costs should be passed on 
to the consuming public."  Id.  (quoting Oliver, 103 Wis. 2d at 
648).  In examining the exception for the negligent operation of 
No. 
2005AP423   
 
9 
 
a motor vehicle that is not owned or leased by the employer, the 
court presumed the legislature believed such a vehicle would be 
privately insured for its negligent operation.  Id. at 424.  The 
Advisory 
Council 
meeting 
minutes 
from 
December 13, 
1976, 
indicate that the exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision 
were drafted with the intent of limiting coemployee liability to 
instances where some person or entity other than the coemployee 
would satisfy any resulting judgment.  See Keller v. Kraft, 2003 
WI App 212, ¶11, 267 Wis. 2d 444, 671 N.W.2d 361 (interpreting 
the scope of the third exception in Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2), 
which allows a claim against a coemployee when a governmental 
unit will pay any judgment under a collective bargaining 
agreement or a local ordinance).4  Limiting the exception to 
instances where the coemployee will be covered by other 
insurance rectifies the concern the legislature had regarding 
the financial burden that workplace injuries could place on 
workers due to coemployee liability. 
¶15 In accord with the purpose and intent of the Act, to 
make coemployee immunity the rule and coemployee liability the 
exception thereby protecting workers from the financial burden 
of coemployee suits, the court in Hake narrowly construed the 
exception to coemployee immunity due to negligent operation of a 
                                                 
4 The minutes state:  "Discussion was held on the proposed 
co-employe 
exclusion. 
 
Mr. 
Grenell 
inquired 
about 
the 
possibility of drafting a provision that would limit the co-
employe liability but permit recovery against a fellow employe 
in the event that there were auto or other insurance."  Keller 
v. Kraft, 2003 WI App 212, ¶11, 267 Wis. 2d 444, 671 N.W.2d 361.   
No. 
2005AP423   
 
10 
 
vehicle.  Hake, 178 Wis. 2d at 426.5  A narrow construction also 
follows the general rule of statutory interpretation that 
statutory exceptions should be strictly construed.  See 82 
C.J.S. Statutes § 371 (2006); Miller, 260 Wis. 2d 581, ¶18.  To 
do otherwise, would cause the exception to swallow the rule of 
coemployee immunity.   
¶16 While the purpose of the statute and the general rule 
of statutory interpretation instruct us to interpret the 
exception in Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) narrowly, we must more 
specifically define what "operation of a motor vehicle" means to 
determine whether turning the ignition switch of a vehicle under 
the circumstances in this case falls within an exception to 
coemployee immunity.  This task is not easily accomplished 
because other Wisconsin statutes employ the term "operate."  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(b) (relating to prohibition of 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated); Wis. Stat. 
§ 350.01(9r) (relating to snowmobile safety).  However, as 
explained 
below, 
these 
statutes 
differ 
in 
purpose 
from 
§ 102.03(2), 
and 
the 
purpose 
of 
a 
statute 
informs 
our 
interpretation of it.  Klein v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Wis. Sys., 2003 WI App 118, ¶13, 265 Wis. 2d 543, 
                                                 
5 Other states have also narrowly construed exceptions to 
their respective worker's compensation exclusivity provisions.  
See Kuhar v. Phillips, 881 A.2d 554, 555 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005) 
(stating the exception based on fellow "employee's negligence in 
the operation of a motor vehicle" must be narrowly construed); 
Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 888 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004) 
(interpreting the exception to fellow employee immunity narrowly 
under ordinary rules of statutory construction).     
No. 
2005AP423   
 
11 
 
666 N.W.2d 67 (concluding that statutory interpretation that 
contravenes the purpose of a statute is not favored).     
¶17 For example, the statute prohibiting the operation of 
a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OMVWI) differs in two 
important respects.  First, it defines "operate" within the 
statute itself as "the physical manipulation or activation of 
any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in 
motion." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(3)(b).6 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(2) contains no definition of "operation," nor does any 
other provision of worker's compensation law define it.  Second, 
the purpose of the OMVWI statute "is to deter a person who is 
intoxicated from getting behind the wheel of a motor vehicle in 
the first instance, rather than to have a court or jury make a 
fine distinction later [about] whether the person was in a 
position to cause harm."  State v. Modory, 204 Wis. 2d 538, 544, 
555 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Milwaukee County v. 
Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980)).  
Since the purpose of the OMVWI statute is to deter intoxicated 
persons from being in a position where they could enable a motor 
vehicle to cause harm, operation is broadly construed to 
facilitate that purpose. 
                                                 
6 See also Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (1)(c) (defining "operate" 
the same as Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(b) in regard to implied 
consent 
for 
driver 
intoxication 
tests); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.23(1)(c) (defining "operate" the same as § 346.63(3)(b) in 
regard to penalties for operating a vehicle without the owner's 
consent). 
No. 
2005AP423   
 
12 
 
¶18 In 
contrast, 
coemployee 
liability 
for 
negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) is a 
narrow exception to the general rule that worker's compensation 
is the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries.  Therefore, 
the 
definition 
of 
"operate" 
from 
the 
OMVWI 
statutes 
is 
inappropriate for § 102.03(2), given the different purposes of 
the statutes.7 
¶19 Similar to the broad interpretation under the OMVWI 
statute, we interpreted the term "operate" under a snowmobile 
                                                 
7 Since Wis. Stat. § 343.305(1)(c) (the implied consent 
statute) 
defines 
"operate" 
the 
same 
as 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(3)(b), 
relates 
to 
the 
same 
subject 
matter 
as 
§ 346.63(3)(b), and is part of the same statutory scheme, we 
interpret "operate" in § 343.305(1)(c) the same as "operate" in 
§ 346.63(3)(b).  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(stating 
that 
statutory 
language 
is 
interpreted 
"not 
in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results").  Therefore, for the 
reasons 
discussed 
above, 
the 
definition 
of 
"operate" 
in 
§ 343.305(1)(c) does not apply to Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).   
Wisconsin Stat. § 943.23(1)(c) also defines "operate" the 
same 
as 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(3)(b). 
 
The 
purpose 
of 
§ 943.23(1)(c) is to prohibit so-called "joy-riding."  Bass v. 
State, 29 Wis. 2d 201, 207, 138 N.W.2d 154 (1965).  The statute 
is aimed at addressing "evils" resulting from "joy-riding" such 
as:  "(1) the owner is, temporarily at least, deprived of the 
use of his vehicle, (2) the vehicle is frequently abused and 
damaged, and (3) not infrequently the vehicle is used in such a 
manner as to cause danger and injury to other members of the 
public."  Id.  Therefore, as with the OMVWI statute, the purpose 
of § 943.23 is to deter persons from assuming a position where 
they could cause harm with a vehicle.  Due to the purpose of the 
statute and context in which the term "operate" is used, the 
definition of "operate" in § 943.23 also does not apply to Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(2). 
No. 
2005AP423   
 
13 
 
safety statute, Wis. Stat. § 350.09, broadly.  "Operate" is also 
defined in Wis. Stat. ch. 350 as "the exercise of physical 
control over the speed or direction of a snowmobile or the 
physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a 
snowmobile necessary to put it in motion."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 350.01(9r).  This is a different definition from that found in 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(3)(b).  However, we determined the term 
"operate" in regard to a snowmobile was not ambiguous in 
§ 350.09, and relying on Modory, we concluded that a snowmobile 
need not be put in motion in order for it to be operated, but 
some affirmative action must have occurred.  Burg v. Cincinnati 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 76, ¶¶21-22, 254 Wis. 2d 36, 645 N.W.2d 
880.8  However, the definition of the term "operate" under the 
snowmobile safety statute is not appropriate to engraft onto 
Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) because, similar to the OMVWI statute, 
the purpose of § 350.09 is to limit occasions that could lead to 
                                                 
8 We decided the definition of "operate" did require an 
"affirmative physical act of manipulation or activation of the 
snowmobile's controls necessary to put it in motion."  Burg v. 
Cincinnati Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 76, ¶22, 254 Wis. 2d 36, 645 
N.W.2d 880 (concluding that sitting on a parked snowmobile with 
its engine off is not operating the snowmobile under the 
statute).   
No. 
2005AP423   
 
14 
 
harm.  This purpose is facilitated by a broad and inclusive 
construction of the term, operate.9 
¶20 However, some cases do construe the term "operation of 
a motor vehicle" more narrowly than those we discussed above.  
In so doing, they distinguish operation of a vehicle from 
actions associated with the maintenance or repair of a vehicle.  
See Graf v. Bloechl, 36 Wis. 2d 635, 154 N.W.2d 340 (1967); Frye 
v. Angst, 28 Wis. 2d 575, 137 N.W.2d 430 (1965).   
¶21 In Graf, an inoperable vehicle was towed to a service 
station for repairs.  During the course of these repairs, the 
mechanics attempted to start the engine by pouring gasoline into 
the carburetor as the ignition switch was turned.  This caused 
the gasoline in the container to catch fire, and one of the 
workers, Bloechl, threw the burning gasoline over his shoulder 
without knowing that Graf was standing behind him.  Graf was 
injured.  We were asked to determine whether turning the key 
that activated the engine's ignition was operation of a motor 
vehicle, as that term was used in the former direct action 
                                                 
9 See also Wis. Stat. § 23.33(1)(ir) (defining "operate" the 
same as Wis. Stat. § 350.01(9r) for the purposes of all-terrain 
vehicle provisions, including the prohibition of the intoxicated 
operation of an all-terrain vehicle under § 23.33(4c)).  Since 
§ 23.33(1)(ir) 
has 
the 
same 
definition 
of 
operate 
as 
§ 350.01(9r) and the same purposes (to (1) promote safety and 
(2) deter intoxicated operation) as chs. 350 and 346, we 
conclude the term "operate" in § 23.33(1)(ir) is not applicable 
to Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).  We note that "operation" is defined 
in § 23.33(1)(it) the same as operate, but with grammatical word 
choices consistent with the noun, "operation."  
No. 
2005AP423   
 
15 
 
statute.10  Graf, 36 Wis. 2d at 638.  We concluded that Bloechl's 
action did not constitute operation of a motor vehicle because 
Bloechl's "primary intention and purpose in attempting to start 
the car was to finish the repairs."  Id. at 642.  We 
distinguished maintenance from operation and stated: 
'Maintenance' of an automobile has never been 
considered a part of operation, or of management and 
control.  Maintenance connotes a state of physical 
repair; management and control refers to the manner of 
its use.  And even in their dictionary senses these 
words do not readily admit of the inclusion of 
maintenance.  . . .  The attempt to start the motor in 
the case at bar was a part of the process of repair 
and consequently an act of 'maintenance,' not 'use, 
operation, management or control' of the vehicle.   
Id. at 643 (quoting Frye, 28 Wis. 2d at 582).11  We explained 
that maintenance and repair are actions that fall outside of 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 260.11, the direct action statute at 
that time, was repealed by a Supreme Court Order dated 
February 17, 1975, effective on January 1, 1976. 
11 See also Chase v. Dunbar, 185 So.2d 563 (La. Ct. App. 
1966).  In Chase, the court interpreted the term "use" under an 
insurance policy, which the court characterized as embracing and 
including "operation."  Id. at 569.  The court distinguished 
"use" from "maintenance" based on "the intent, purpose and 
objective of the person concerned."  Id. at 570.  Therefore, the 
court concluded that the action of one mechanic starting the car 
while another mechanic poured gasoline into the carburetor was 
maintenance and not use of the vehicle because the mechanics 
were not starting the car with the intent to use the vehicle for 
any purpose other than to repair the vehicle so that it could be 
used later by its owner.  Id. (citing a "nearly analogous" case, 
Wall v. Windmann, 142 So.2d 537 (La. Ct. App. 1962), "wherein 
[the court] held the starting of a truck's motor at the request 
of a mechanic repairing the engine constituted 'maintenance'").  
No. 
2005AP423   
 
16 
 
"use, operation, management or control" of the vehicle.12  Id. at 
643.  We concluded this was so because Bloechl's "primary 
intention and purpose in attempting to start the car was to 
finish the repairs."  Id. at 642.  Therefore, we concluded 
Bloechl's action was not operation of the vehicle.  Id. at 642-
43. 
¶22 Although we cited past decisions that also had 
concluded that maintenance and repairs were not the use or 
operation of a motor vehicle, id. at 642, our decision rested on 
a 
common 
sense 
understanding 
that 
there 
is 
an 
inherent 
difference between repairing a vehicle and operating or using 
it, id.   
¶23  We conclude the distinction between operation and 
maintenance or repairs should apply in the context of the 
exception 
to 
the 
exclusivity 
provision 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 102.03(2).  An interpretation of the term "operation" that 
                                                 
12 "[N]egligent operation, management or control" were the 
words used in then Wis. Stat. § 260.11(1), which we were 
interpreting.  Graf v. Bloechl, 36 Wis. 2d 635, 639, 154 N.W.2d 
340 (1967).  In Graf, we held that the plaintiff's injuries 
arose out of the "maintenance" of a motor vehicle.  Id. at 640-
41.  Hasselstrom v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc., 50 Wis. 2d 487, 184 
N.W.2d 902 (1971) reviewed Graf and Frye v. Angst, 28 Wis. 2d 
575, 137 N.W.2d 430 (1965), in the context of a revision to the 
direct action statute, then Wis. Stat. § 260.11(1).  We noted 
that the revision expanded "the direct-action statute, sec. 
260.11(1), to include actions for damages caused by the 
negligent maintenance, use or defective construction of a motor 
vehicle."  Hasselstrom, 50 Wis. 2d at 497.  Hasselstrom has no 
effect on whether the acts under consideration constitute 
"maintenance" 
or 
"operation" 
of 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
because 
Hasselstrom did not re-examine that question.   
No. 
2005AP423   
 
17 
 
distinguishes between operation and maintenance or repairs is 
consistent with the purposes of the Act:  (1) to allocate the 
cost of workers' injuries to the industry in which they occur 
and (2) to protect workers from the financial burdens of 
coemployee suits.  Injuries to workers caused by negligent 
coemployees while performing maintenance or repairs on a motor 
vehicle that could not then be driven on a public roadway are 
common occurrences for those workers in the vehicle maintenance 
and repair industry.  They are directly related to their 
employment.  Therefore, the costs of these injuries should be 
passed on to the industry and ultimately the consuming public; 
they should not be born by the worker.   
¶24 Furthermore, while a vehicle that is not leased or 
owned by the employer may be privately insured and have 
liability coverage for its negligent operation, which could 
alleviate some of the concern regarding placing a financial 
burden on workers.  In Wisconsin, vehicle insurance is not 
required.13  Therefore, simply because the vehicle is not owned 
or leased by the employer, it does not follow that there will be 
insurance to cover any injury a negligent coemployee inflicts 
upon an employee.  Furthermore, the potential lack of insurance 
by a third-party owner of a motor vehicle is especially 
troubling because the coemployee who has a judgment rendered 
                                                 
13 See Wis. Stat. ch. 344 that requires proof of financial 
responsibility by insurance or bond only after notice of an 
unpaid judgment against the vehicle owner has been presented to 
the Department of Transportation.  
No. 
2005AP423   
 
18 
 
against him for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle 
during the course of his employment cannot sue his employer for 
contribution or indemnification as the Act establishes that it 
is the employer's sole liability for an injured worker.14  Mulder 
v. ACME-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 177, 290 N.W.2d 276 
(1980).  Therefore, under the current statute, any judgment 
against an uninsured coemployee who negligently operates a motor 
vehicle during the course of his employment will remain with the 
worker, 
contrary 
to 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
1977 
statutory 
revisions.15   
¶25 Furthermore, construing the exception to coemployee 
immunity narrowly will not result in leaving an injured employee 
without relief because worker's compensation benefits will be 
paid for the employee's injuries.  In this case, worker's 
compensation benefits have been paid to McNeil.  We recognize 
                                                 
14 Because automobile owners are not required to purchase 
insurance for their vehicles and because many insurance policies 
are for a minimal amount of insurance that may be insufficient 
to cover a severe personal injury, a negligent coemployee who 
causes an injury to a coworker could be saddled with a money 
judgment that he will never be able to satisfy.  Accordingly, 
the legislature may wish to examine "operation of a motor 
vehicle" exception to Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) and determine 
whether it should modify the statute such that a coemployee who 
negligently operates a motor vehicle will be liable only to the 
extent that there is insurance to pay a judgment. 
15 Accordingly, the legislature may wish to revisit the 
second exception to the exclusive remedy provision of Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(2) to determine whether the statute needs further 
revision, in light of its purpose of making coemployee immunity 
the rule and coemployee liability the exception. 
No. 
2005AP423   
 
19 
 
that 
our 
decision 
in 
this 
regard 
requires 
some 
further 
clarification of our discussion in Rocker.   
¶26 In Rocker, a coemployee in a full-service car wash 
drove a customer's automobile into a fellow employee.  Rocker, 
289 Wis. 2d 294, ¶6.  We were called upon to decide whether a 
full-service car wash was a "motor vehicle handler" within the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 632.32(2)(b).  Id., ¶3.  We did so in 
the context of an exclusion in the employer's comprehensive 
policy that purported to exclude coverage for the employee's 
injury.  Id., ¶4.  We concluded that the exclusion was invalid 
because a full-service car wash is a motor vehicle handler 
within § 632.32(2)(b), and accordingly, § 632.32(6)(a) precludes 
a policy provision that excludes coverage for an employee's 
injury.  Id., ¶49.   
¶27 However, we were also asked in Rocker to decide 
whether Gorzalski v. Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Co., 145 
Wis. 2d 794, 429 N.W.2d 537 (Ct. App. 1988) was still good law.  
Rocker, 289 Wis. 2d 294, ¶50.  In Gorzalski, a coemployee had 
driven a customer's car into a fellow employee, causing injury.  
The employer's policy had an exclusion for coemployee injuries 
that the court of appeals upheld, notwithstanding Wis. Stat. 
§ 632.32(6)(a).  Gorzalski, 145 Wis. 2d at 804.  We overruled 
that conclusion.  Rocker, 289 Wis. 2d 294, ¶52.  We then went on 
to opine that the injured employee in Gorzalski had a remedy in 
addition to that provided by the Act because the negligent 
employee was not operating a vehicle owned or leased by the 
employer.  Id., ¶53.  And, while we explained that a negligent 
No. 
2005AP423   
 
20 
 
employee had "potential liability" to a fellow employee, we did 
not attempt to determine whether the employee's conduct in 
Rocker actually fell within the statutory exclusion of Wis. 
Stat. § 102.03(2).  Id.   
¶28 Our decision herein is consistent with our discussion 
in Rocker when we conclude that actions that constitute 
maintenance or repairs of a motor vehicle, while the condition 
of the vehicle is such that it could not then be driven on a 
public roadway, cannot constitute operation of a motor vehicle.  
Here, Hansen was standing outside of the vehicle.  Hansen's 
action in attempting to start the engine was undertaken to 
service the vehicle by finishing the maintenance of its radiator 
when it was connected to a machine and could not be driven on a 
public roadway.  Accordingly, his action did not constitute 
"operation of a motor vehicle" under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶29 We conclude that when the action under consideration 
is undertaken to service or repair a vehicle, and the condition 
of the vehicle is such that it could not then be driven on a 
public roadway, the action does not constitute "operation of a 
motor vehicle" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).  
The action at issue here was attempting to start the vehicle 
when it was connected to a machine to flush the radiator.  This 
action was undertaken to service the vehicle while it could not 
be driven on a public roadway.  Therefore, it does not 
constitute the "operation of a motor vehicle" as that term is 
No. 
2005AP423   
 
21 
 
used in § 102.03(2).  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's 
summary judgment dismissing McNeil's claims. 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2005AP423.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶30 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  The issue 
presented 
is 
whether 
the 
following 
conduct 
constitutes 
"operation of a motor vehicle" under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) when 
the motor vehicle lurches forward on the turn of the ignition 
key and injures a co-employee:  An employee who is outside a 
vehicle turns the ignition key of a vehicle that is connected to 
a machine to flush the radiator and the vehicle cannot be driven 
on a public roadway while attached to the machine.  I agree with 
the majority opinion that the answer to this question is NO. 
¶31 The instant case does not present the only fact 
situation in which the question of whether particular conduct 
constitutes "operation of a motor vehicle" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(2).  The court's decision does not provide the answer 
to other fact situations because the court, like the statute, 
does not define specifically or generally what "operation of a 
motor vehicle" means under Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2).   
¶32 Furthermore, other statutes defining "operation of a 
vehicle" (or a variation of this phrase) are of no assistance in 
defining "operation of a motor vehicle" under Wis. Stat. 
§ 102.03(2).  In many of these other statutes the legislature 
has defined "operation of a vehicle," and in cases coming to 
this court, the court interprets the statutory definition of 
operation of a vehicle.  Furthermore, the meaning of the phrase 
"operation of a vehicle" depends on the purpose of the statute. 
¶33 Today's opinion decides this case.  Different conduct 
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis——not on a standard set 
forth in the instant case. 
No.  2005AP423.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶34 Accordingly, I concur. 
¶35 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2005AP423.ssa 
 
1