Title: Gutale v. Oregon

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

502	
February 28, 2019	
No. 13
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
ABDALLA DAHIR GUTALE,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review.
(CC C131617CV) (CA A155474) (SC S065136)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 7, 2018.
Jason Weber, O’Connor Weber LLC, Portland, filed the 
briefs and argued the cause for petitioner on review.
Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on 
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Nakamoto, 
and Nelson, Justices, and Kistler, Senior Justice pro tem­
pore, and Roger DeHoog, Judge of the Court of Appeals, 
Justice pro tempore.**
NELSON, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The 
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is 
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Balmer, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which 
Kistler, S.J., joined.
______________
	
**  On appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Charles Bailey, Jr., 
Judge. 285 Or App 39, 395 P3d 942 (2017).
	
**  Flynn, Duncan, and Garrett, JJ., did not participate in the consideration 
or decision of this case.
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
503
Case Summary: In a petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleged 
that his trial counsel failed to inform him that there may be immigration conse­
quences to his guilty plea. Based on that allegation, petitioner asserted that his 
trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate and ineffective under the state and 
federal constitutions. The petition was filed outside the two-year statute of lim­
itations under ORS 138.510(3). Petitioner alleged that his petition fell within the 
escape clause because he learned of counsel’s inadequacy only when he was placed 
in deportation proceedings, after the statute of limitations. The post-conviction 
court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rely­
ing on Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 839 P2d 217 (1992). Held: (1) The 
inquiry under the escape clause to the statute of limitations is whether a peti­
tioner reasonably could have raised a ground for relief within the limitations 
period; (2) Unlike the petitioner in Bartz, petitioner’s conviction may not have put 
him on notice of the need to investigate existence of a ground for relief, because 
petitioner alleged that it was the consequences of his conviction—namely, the 
immigration consequences—that caused him to conduct such an investigation.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the cir­
cuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.
504	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
	
NELSON, J.
	
A petition for post-conviction relief “must be filed 
within two years” of the conviction becoming final, unless 
the petition falls within the escape clause. ORS 138.510(3). 
A petition falls within the escape clause if the “grounds for 
relief asserted * 
* 
* could not reasonably have been raised” 
within the limitation period. Id. This case concerns the 
meaning of the escape clause.
	
Here, petitioner alleged in a petition for post-
conviction relief that his trial counsel had failed to inform 
him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea to a 
class A misdemeanor and, through that omission, led peti­
tioner to believe that there would be no immigration conse­
quences. Based on that alleged failure, petitioner asserted 
that his trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate and 
ineffective under the state and federal constitutions. See 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 US 356, 369, 130 S Ct 1473, 176 L 
Ed 2d 284 (2010) (requiring counsel to inform a criminal 
defendant of clear immigration consequences of a plea and, 
where consequences are not clear, to advise that plea may 
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences).
	
The petition was filed outside the two-year lim­
itations period. But petitioner alleged that his petition fell 
within the escape clause because he could not reasonably 
have known of his grounds for post-conviction relief within 
the limitations period. He based that allegation on the fact 
that neither trial counsel nor the sentencing court gave him 
any indication that his plea could carry immigration conse­
quences, even when petitioner stated, on the record, that he 
was pleading guilty in part because he wished to travel and 
become a United States citizen. Petitioner alleged that he 
learned of counsel’s inadequacy only when he was placed in 
deportation proceedings, after the statute of limitations had 
run.
	
The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as 
time-barred under ORS 138.510(3). The Court of Appeals 
affirmed, based on the principle that “persons are assumed 
to know laws that are publicly available and relevant to 
them,” including relevant immigration law. Gutale v. State of 
Oregon, 285 Or App 39, 42, 395 P3d 942 (2017) (citing Bartz 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
505
v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 839 P2d 217 (1992); Benitez-
Chacon v. State of Oregon, 178 Or App 352, 37 P3d 1035 
(2001)). We allowed review to determine the proper meaning 
and scope of the escape clause. For the reasons set out below, 
we reverse the decisions of the post-conviction court and the 
Court of Appeals.
I.  BACKGROUND
	
We take the historical facts from the allegations 
in petitioner’s pleadings and attachments, including peti­
tioner’s response to the state’s motion to dismiss. See 
Verduzco v. State of Oregon, 357 Or 553, 555 n 1, 355 P3d 
902 (2015) (taking undisputed facts from petitioner’s plead­
ings and attachments). Petitioner is a refugee from Somalia 
who arrived in the United States in 2003, when he was in 
his early teens. In April 2010, at the age of 20, petitioner 
was charged with various crimes after he was discovered in 
a car having sex with a 16-year-old girl. Petitioner pleaded 
guilty to one count of sex abuse in the third degree, a class 
A misdemeanor, and the remaining charges were dismissed.
	
At the sentencing hearing that followed, petitioner 
stated that he was pleading guilty in part because he “really 
wan[ted to] travel” and to obtain his United States citizen­
ship. The court sentenced petitioner to two years of proba­
tion and seven days in custody with credit for time served. 
The court ordered petitioner to register as a sex offender, 
but told him that if he successfully completed probation, it 
would “remove that requirement.”
	
Petitioner’s trial counsel was required under 
Padilla to provide petitioner with information regarding 
the potential immigration consequences of his plea. Padilla 
was decided by the United States Supreme Court a couple 
of months before petitioner’s sentencing. And, under ORS 
135.385(2)(d), trial courts are required to inform nonciti­
zen defendants who plead guilty that “conviction of a crime 
may result * 
* 
* in deportation, exclusion from admission 
to the United States or denial of naturalization.” Despite 
petitioner’s statement at sentencing that he was pleading 
guilty so that he could travel and become a United States 
citizen, neither trial counsel nor the court gave petitioner 
any indication that his plea subjected him to immigration 
506	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
consequences. Petitioner’s judgment of conviction was 
entered on June 3, 2010.
	
Just over two years later, on June 4, 2012, Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents detained 
petitioner. In March 2013, petitioner filed for post-conviction 
relief, alleging that his trial counsel had been ineffective 
for failing to advise him of the immigration consequences 
of his plea. In an affidavit attached to his petition for post-
conviction relief, he stated that his trial counsel had never 
discussed with him the immigration consequences of his 
guilty plea. At the time of his plea, petitioner was “unaware 
that [he] could be deported as a result of [his] sex abuse con­
viction.” He remained “unaware that [he] could be deported 
until [he] was taken into ICE custody on June 4, 2012.” He 
added, “I certainly would have filed within the two-year 
statute of limitations had I been informed that I could be 
deported as a result of my sex abuse conviction.”
	
The state moved to dismiss, arguing that the peti­
tion was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 
Petitioner responded that he did not know that counsel had 
been ineffective until he was placed in deportation proceed­
ings and learned, at that time, that he had pleaded to an 
offense that made him deportable. He further argued that, 
based on the actions of his counsel and the trial court, he 
had no reason to suspect either that he would suffer immi­
gration consequences or that his counsel had failed to pro­
vide him with legally-required advice.
	
At a hearing on the state’s motion to dismiss, the post-
conviction court made clear its view that, if petitioner’s allega­
tions were true, then he would have a strong claim for ineffec­
tive assistance of counsel under Padilla. The court nevertheless 
granted the state’s motion, concluding that the information 
underlying petitioner’s claim “would have been available” to 
petitioner because Padilla “already had been decided.”1
	
1  The post-conviction court also “assume[d] there was certain information” 
about the immigration consequences of criminal convictions that would have 
been available to petitioner when he received his green card. Regardless of 
whether that assumption was correct, there was nothing in the pleadings and 
record before the post-conviction court on that issue. And, on review in this court, 
the state does not argue the post-conviction court’s judgment should be affirmed 
on that ground.
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
507
	
Petitioner appealed. In considering petitioner’s 
argument that he could not reasonably have known about 
his trial counsel’s failings before being taken into ICE cus­
tody, the Court of Appeals relied on this court’s decision 
in Bartz and the Court of Appeals’ application of Bartz in 
Benitez-Chacon. In Bartz, the petitioner filed an untimely 
petition alleging that his trial counsel had been ineffective 
for “fail[ing] to advise him of an available statutory defense.” 
314 Or at 357. The petitioner further alleged that, based 
on his trial counsel’s failure, he could not reasonably have 
known of that defense within the limitations period. This 
court rejected that argument. The court held that, because 
“it is a basic assumption of the legal system that the ordi­
nary means by which the legislature publishes and makes 
available its enactments are sufficient to inform persons of 
statutes that are relevant to them,” the statutes pertaining 
to the petitioner’s crime of conviction “were reasonably avail­
able to [the petitioner] when his conviction became final.” 
Id. at 359-60 (citing Dungey v. Fairview Farms, Inc., 205 Or 
615, 621, 290 P2d 181 (1955) for proposition that “every per­
son is presumed to know the law”).
	
The petitioner in Benitez-Chacon filed an untimely 
petition alleging that her trial counsel had “failed to inform 
her fully and adequately of the immigration consequences 
of a no contest plea.” 178 Or App at 354. She alleged as well 
that, because her counsel had not fully informed her, she 
could not reasonably have known of the immigration conse­
quences within the limitations period. The Court of Appeals 
relied on Bartz and rejected that argument. According to 
the Court of Appeals, “If the petitioner in Bartz was pre­
sumed to know the law based on the public nature of legisla­
tive enactments, so must petitioner in this case be presumed 
to have had knowledge of the relevant immigration statutes 
and rules.” Id. at 357.
	
In this case, petitioner is in essentially the same 
position as the petitioner in Benitez-Chacon, and he argued 
to the Court of Appeals that it should overrule its decision 
in that case. The court declined to so, concluding that the 
result in Benitez-Chacon was dictated by this court’s deci­
sion Bartz. Gutale, 285 Or App at 44. The court held that 
508	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
petitioner could not obtain relief from the statute of limita­
tions because he was presumed to know the immigration 
law and United States Supreme Court case law that was 
relevant to his claim. Id. at 42-43. As a result, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s dismissal. 
Id. at 44 (“[W]e adhere to Benitez-Chacon and affirm the 
post-conviction court’s ruling that the grounds for relief 
asserted in the petition do not fall within the escape 
clause.”). Petitioner then sought review in this court, which 
we allowed.
II.  ANALYSIS
	
Under Oregon’s Post-Conviction Hearing Act 
(PCHA), a petitioner who has been convicted of a crime 
may obtain collateral relief by establishing “[a] substan­
tial denial in proceedings resulting in petitioner’s convic­
tion * 
* 
* under the Constitution of the United States, or 
under the Constitution of the State of Oregon, or both, and 
which denial rendered the conviction void.” ORS 138.530(1)
(a). Post-conviction relief provides the primary mechanism 
by which a person who has been convicted of a crime may 
allege constitutional errors that were not, and could not 
have been, raised during the underlying criminal proceed­
ing or on direct appeal. Those errors frequently involve alle­
gations that counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective and 
inadequate in his or her handling of the criminal case.
	
The PCHA generally requires that a post-conviction 
petitioner file a petition within two years of the date that the 
conviction becomes final. ORS 138.510(3). That statute of 
limitations, however, is subject to an escape clause. Under 
the escape clause, a petitioner may file an untimely petition 
by asserting “grounds for relief * 
* 
* which could not rea­
sonably have been raised” within the two-year limitations 
period. Id.
	
The parties dispute the meaning of that text and 
how that text was applied in Bartz. Petitioner reads Bartz as 
establishing a factual presumption that people know the law. 
According to petitioner, even if such a presumption applies, 
it is a presumption that may be overcome by a petitioner 
who establishes facts demonstrating that, within the lim­
itations period, he or she could not reasonably have known 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
509
the law that provided the basis for the claim. And petitioner 
maintains that whether a petitioner reasonably should have 
known the law that provides the basis for a claim turns on a 
fact-intensive consideration of the totality of circumstances, 
such as whether the petitioner had access to legal sources or 
whether the legal basis for the claim was complicated.
	
The state argues that petitioner’s position is pre­
cluded by Bartz. According to the state, the standard is 
whether the bases for the claim—both the facts and the 
law—were reasonably available to the petitioner. And the 
state reads Bartz as holding that settled law is always rea­
sonably available to a petitioner. Thus, under the state’s 
reading, when the law that provides the basis for claim is 
settled, it is never a fact question whether that legal basis 
was reasonably available to a petitioner.
	
Neither party gets it exactly right. As we explain 
below, the state is correct that the appropriate standard 
focuses on whether the grounds for relief were known or rea­
sonably available to a petitioner. However, we do not read 
Bartz as narrowing the escape clause as much as the state 
maintains. We instead conclude that, when a petitioner’s 
claim is premised on a trial counsel’s failure to advise on 
the immigration consequences of a conviction, fact questions 
may still be relevant to determining whether the petitioner 
should have known about those immigration consequences.
	
As an initial matter, we have made clear that a 
ground for relief reasonably could have been raised under 
one of two circumstances: (1) when the ground for relief was 
known or (2) when the ground for relief was reasonably avail­
able, despite not being known. See Verduzco, 357 Or at 566 
(providing textual analysis of the phrase “could not reason­
ably have raised”); id. at 573 (concluding that a ground for 
relief was reasonably available to the petitioner because he 
had previously asserted that same ground for relief). Thus, 
a ground for relief could not reasonably have been raised 
earlier if the ground for relief was not known and was not 
reasonably available. That is true for both the factual and 
legal basis for a ground of relief. See Eklof v. Steward, 360 
Or 717, 734, 385 P3d 1074 (2016) (considering whether the 
factual predicate of a petitioner’s claim “reasonably should 
510	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
have [been] discovered”); Verduzco, 357 Or at 571 (consider­
ing whether a legal claim could have been reasonably antic­
ipated even before the legal basis for that claim was settled 
by the courts).
	
Within that framework—which turns on whether 
the ground for relief was known or reasonably available—
petitioner understands Bartz as addressing whether the 
ground for relief was known. Petitioner reads Bartz as 
holding that the petitioner was presumed to know the legal 
basis for his claim because people are presumed to know 
the law. To be sure, in a parenthetical citation, the court in 
Bartz cited Dungey for the proposition that “every person is 
presumed to know the law.” Bartz, 314 Or at 360. And, in 
Benitez-Chacon, the Court of Appeals applied Bartz as pre­
suming that people know the law: “If the petitioner in Bartz 
was presumed to know the law based on the public nature 
of legislative enactments, so must petitioner in this case be 
presumed to have had knowledge of the relevant immigra­
tion statutes and rules.” Benitez-Chacon, 178 Or App at 357.
	
But, notwithstanding the citation to Dungey, this 
court’s analysis in Bartz did not turn on a presumption that 
people know the law. Instead of presuming that the peti­
tioner knew the law, the court in Bartz concluded that the 
legal basis for the petitioner’s claim was reasonably available 
to the petitioner. The court reached that conclusion because, 
if the petitioner had looked, the law could have been found 
in publicly available sources. As noted above, the court held 
that, because “it is a basic assumption of the legal system 
that the ordinary means by which the legislature publishes 
and makes available its enactments are sufficient to inform 
persons of statutes that are relevant to them,” the statutes 
pertaining to the petitioner’s crime of conviction “were rea­
sonably available to [the petitioner] when his conviction 
became final.” 314 Or at 359-60 (emphasis added). Thus, 
consistent with our other decisions interpreting the escape 
clause, the court’s analysis in Bartz turned on whether the 
legal basis for the petitioner’s claim was reasonably avail­
able to him. And the court concluded that it was.
	
Nevertheless, Bartz does not control the outcome 
of this case in the manner that the state maintains. Being 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
511
reasonably available means more than just that a petitioner 
could have found the law if he or she had looked. Instead, a 
ground for relief is reasonably available only if there was a 
reason for the petitioner to look for it.
	
For example, in cases where petitioners have 
asserted grounds for relief based on newly discovered facts, 
this court has considered whether “the facts on which their 
new grounds for relief depended could not reasonably have 
been discovered sooner.” Verduzco, 357 Or at 566. In one 
such case, Eklof, the petitioner brought an untimely and 
successive petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that 
the prosecutor had withheld favorable evidence during the 
underlying criminal proceedings and that the fact of that 
withholding came to light only after the petitioner’s first 
petition. 360 Or at 719. Specifically, after the first petition, 
the petitioner obtained the case file from her accomplice’s 
trial counsel containing evidence that could have been used 
to impeach a witness that the state presented against the 
petitioner in her criminal trial. The petitioner alleged that 
the state violated her constitutional rights when it failed to 
turn over that impeachment evidence before the criminal 
trial. Id. at 722.
	
The state argued in Eklof that, as a matter of law, 
the petitioner could not take advantage of the escape clause 
for either untimely or successive petitions because the peti­
tioner’s first post-conviction counsel had failed to request 
and review the case file at issue.2 This court rejected that 
argument and held that whether the petitioner’s first post-
conviction counsel should have requested and reviewed the 
case file turned on whether there was information providing 
a reason to request and review the case file. See 360 Or at 
734 (“Did petitioner’s first post-conviction counsel have any 
information that would have revealed that the state had the 
evidence at issue during petitioner’s criminal prosecution?”); 
id. at 733 (stating that the question of “[w]hether a petitioner 
‘reasonably could have been expected’ to raise her claim in 
a timely initial post-conviction action often will depend on 
	
2  Like untimely petitions, successive petitions are barred unless they assert 
grounds for relief that “could not reasonably have been raised” in the original 
petition. ORS 138.550(3).
512	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
who knew what, and when”). Thus, the petitioner’s ground 
for relief was not barred because, although the evidence may 
have been available to her counsel on request, her counsel 
may have had no reason to suspect that the state had pos­
session of evidence that it failed to produce.
	
The resulting standard, therefore, requires assess­
ing both whether the petitioner reasonably could have 
accessed the ground for relief and whether a reasonable per­
son in the petitioner’s situation would have thought to inves­
tigate the existence of that ground for relief. That standard 
is very similar to the standard for a discovery rule, which is 
used in other contexts. In negligence cases, for example, the 
statute of limitations does not begin until at least “the ear­
lier of two possible events: (1) the date of the plaintiff’s actual 
discovery of injury; or (2) the date when a person exercising 
reasonable care should have discovered the injury, including 
learning facts that an inquiry would have disclosed.” Greene 
v. Legacy Emanuel Hospital, 335 Or 115, 123, 60 P3d 535 
(2002) (emphasis in original); see also Johnson v. Mult. Co. 
Dept. Justice, 344 Or 111, 119, 178 P3d 210 (2008) (“[T]he 
discovery rule does not protect plaintiffs who fail to make a 
further inquiry when a reasonable person would do so.”).
	
What distinguishes the petitioner in Bartz and peti­
tioner in this case is whether they had a reason to look for 
the existence of legal grounds for relief. For the petitioner 
in Bartz, the conviction itself put him on notice of the need 
to investigate the existence of a ground for relief. He was, 
of course, aware of that conviction at the time it occurred. 
It was, therefore, incumbent on the petitioner to look for 
legal challenges to his conviction. And the court concluded 
in Bartz that, given the public nature of legislative enact­
ments, the legal grounds for the petitioner’s challenge would 
have been accessible to a reasonable person looking for such 
a legal challenge.
	
For petitioner in this case, however, his conviction 
may not have put him on notice of the need to investigate. 
Instead, petitioner alleges that it was the consequences of 
that conviction that caused him to conduct such an investiga­
tion. And those consequences are not always obvious, even to 
lawyers. See Padilla, 559 US at 369 (“There will, therefore, 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
513
undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deporta­
tion consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncer­
tain.”). Petitioner alleges that, until he was detained by ICE 
after the limitations period had run, he was unaware that 
his counsel had caused him harm that might arise in the 
future. In support, petitioner alleges that, at his sentencing 
hearing, neither his trial counsel nor the trial court raised 
the possibility of immigration consequences even when peti­
tioner stated that he was pleading guilty so that he could 
travel and become a citizen of the United States. Based on 
those allegations, petitioner’s claim is akin to a latent physi­
cal injury in a negligence case. He might have found the inef­
fective assistance of his counsel if he had looked for it, but he 
had no reason to look for it before being detained by ICE.
	
Our prior decisions interpret the escape clause in 
ORS 138.510(3) in a manner consistent with that under­
standing. As noted, the text at issue is the phrase “could 
not reasonably have raised.” ORS 138.510(3). We observed 
in Verduzco that the legislature’s use of the adverb “reason­
ably” to modify the phrase “could not have raised” requires 
an inquiry beyond what is merely possible, calling instead 
“for a judgment about what is ‘reasonable’ under the circum­
stances.” 357 Or at 566.
	
When it was enacted in 1989, ORS 138.510(3) orig­
inally required a post-conviction petitioner to file within 
120 days of the conviction becoming final.3 The legisla­
ture’s primary purpose for the statute of limitations was 
to reduce the costs of indigent defense by limiting frivo­
lous post-conviction claims. See Bartz, 314 Or at 358 (1989 
amendments to PCHA were intended to reduce indigent 
defense costs); Tape Recording, House Judiciary Crime and 
Corrections Subcommittee, HB 2796, Mar 9, 1989, Tape 
44, Side A (statement of Representative Baum). The escape 
clause creates an exception to the bar imposed by that stat­
ute of limitations. According to the court in Bartz, the pur­
pose of the escape clause was “to give persons extra time 
to file petitions for post-conviction relief in extraordinary 
circumstances.” 314 Or at 358. And, as a result, the court 
	
3  In 1993, the legislature expanded the time for filing a post-conviction peti­
tion from 120 days to two years. Or Laws 1993, ch 517, § 1.
514	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
said that the escape clause should be “construed narrowly.” 

Id. at 359. The court did not, however, attempt to identify 
the boundaries of what counts as extraordinary or to define 
just how narrowly to construe the escape clause.
	
We understand the court in Bartz to have been 
appropriately concerned with reading the escape clause 
in a manner that would not allow the exception to swal­
low the rule. The facts presented by the petitioner in Bartz 
were unexceptional. It is not unusual for a petitioner to be 
unaware of the law pertaining to the crime of conviction. 
If that fact, without further qualification, were sufficient 
to bring a claim within the escape clause, then it is likely 
that most claims—and certainly most claims for ineffective 
assistance of counsel—would fall within the escape clause. 
That result would defeat the goal that the legislature was 
attempting to advance by passing the statute of limitations 
in the first place.
	
This case does not present those same concerns. 
Whereas the petitioner in Bartz was aware of his conviction 
and could have either researched whether his trial counsel 
was ineffective, or sought help from an attorney to make that 
determination, petitioner in this case did not know about 
the immigration consequences that form the basis for his 
claim until he was later detained by ICE. Further, petition­
ers who were unaware of the immigration consequences of 
their convictions are a narrow class of petitioners. Allowing 
petitioner’s claim in this case to fall within the escape clause 
does not run the risk of having the escape clause swallow 
the statute of limitations.
	
The court in Bartz additionally reviewed specific 
types of claims discussed during the legislative hearings 
that led to the statute of limitations and escape clause of 
ORS 138.510(3). The court understood those discussions as 
identifying representative examples of claims that might fall 
within the escape clause. The state points out that claims 
based on a trial counsel’s failure to advise on the immigra­
tion consequences of conviction is not among those claims 
identified during those hearings:
“Discussion of the scope of the ‘escape clause’ took place 
in two subcommittees of the House Committee on the 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
515
Judiciary. In the Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, 
a representative of the Justice Department noted the 
importance of such a provision in cases where evidence 
is newly discovered after the expiration of the limitation 
period. A representative of the Oregon Criminal Defense 
Lawyers Association testified to the Subcommittee on Civil 
and Judicial Administration that he would support the 
120-day time limitation if an exception were made where 
‘extraordinary circumstances’ were shown. As examples, 
he mentioned convictions procured by collusion between a 
prosecutor and a defense lawyer, but coming to light after 
the limitation period, and situations in which the statute 
under which the conviction was obtained is later declared 
facially unconstitutional.”
Id. at 359 (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
	
We do not interpret that legislative history as 
defining the scope of the escape clause. As an initial mat­
ter, the Justice Department representative that the court 
referred to was not discussing how the text of the escape 
clause would be applied. Instead, she was discussing the 
original version of the proposed statute of limitations, which 
contained no escape clause at all. She acknowledged that, 
under that original version, a petitioner who discovered evi­
dence of a claim after the limitations period would be unable 
to bring a state claim for post-conviction relief. She proposed 
addressing that issue, not by adding an escape clause, but by 
extending the statute of limitations from the 120 days being 
proposed to 180 days or one year. Minutes, Subcommittee 
on Crime and Corrections, Mar 9, 1989, Ex D (statement of 
Assistant Attorney General Brenda Peterson). As a result, 
testimony by that witness says little about the scope of the 
escape clause that the legislature later enacted.
	
And, similarly, the testimony from the representa­
tive of the Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association 
makes no attempt to define the scope of the escape clause 
that the legislature enacted. That witness was discussing a 
proposed escape clause that would have required a petitioner 
to establish “manifest injustice.” Tape Recording, Senate 
Judiciary Committee, SB 284, Apr 12, 1989, Tape 123, Side 
A (statement of Ross Shepard). That is, however, not the 
standard that the legislature ultimately passed. Instead of 
516	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
requiring a petitioner to establish “manifest injustice,” the 
escape clause passed by the legislature applies if the peti­
tioner establishes that his or her claim “could not reasonably 
have been raised” within the limitation period. Because the 
legislature did not adopt the standard discussed by that wit­
ness, we do not understand that witness as discussing rep­
resentative cases that would fall under separate standard 
that the legislature did adopt.
	
Additional analysis of the legislative history tells us 
little about the intended scope of the escape clause. During 
the 1989 legislative session, the legislature heard testimony 
that most petitions, and in particular “most stronger cases,” 
would be filed within the statute of limitations, and that 
the effect of the statute of limitations would be to “take[ 
] 
away the opportunity for defendants with a little time on 
their hands to file in periods of time that are quite extended 
from when they were convicted.” Tape Recording, Senate 
Judiciary Committee, SB 284, June 12, 1989, Tape 121, Side 
B (statement of Bill Linden).
	
By adding the escape clause to the statute of lim­
itations, the legislature expressed an intent that some 
untimely claims for post-conviction relief would be permit­
ted, notwithstanding the statute of limitations. The escape 
clause in ORS 138.510(3) is closely related to a parallel pro­
vision in ORS 138.550(3), which prohibits a petitioner who 
already has filed a post-conviction petition from later filing 
a successive petition. Under ORS 138.550(3),
“all grounds [for relief] must be asserted in [the] original 
or amended petition, and any grounds not so asserted are 
deemed waived unless the court on hearing a subsequent 
petition finds grounds for relief asserted therein which could 
not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended 
petition.”
(Emphasis added.) That provision codifies claim preclusion 
principles: It addresses the question of whether a petitioner 
who already has litigated a petition for post-conviction 
relief may return to court and litigate a second time, and 
it provides that a petitioner may not do so where counsel 
raised, or reasonably could have raised, the grounds at issue 
in that prior litigation. See Verduzco, 357 Or at 565 (citing 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
517
Johnson v. Premo, 355 Or 866, 874-75, 399 P3d 431 (2014) 
for proposition that ORS 138.550(3) codifies claim preclu­
sion principles).
	
The 1989 legislative history makes clear, and our 
case law also has recognized, that the text of the escape 
clause contained in ORS 138.510(3) is derived from its ORS 
138.550(3) counterpart. State Court Administrator Bill 
Linden recommended the addition of the escape clause to 
the proposed 120-day statute of limitations to clarify “how 
[the statute barring successive petitions] might come into 
play both when a [petition for post-conviction relief] is 
timely filed within 120 days and when it is not.” He wrote: 
“Our suggestion is that an amendment may be necessary 
to the current bill to allow the issues brought up on [post-
conviction relief] past 120 days if they could not reasonably 
have been raised before that time.” Linden warned that, 
“without such an amendment, there is a greater chance 
of litigation[.]” Exhibit G, House Judiciary Crime and 
Corrections Subcommittee, HB 2796, Mar 9, 1989 (accom­
panying statement of Bill Linden).4
	
We take Linden’s concern to be that a 120-day stat­
ute of limitations without exception could give rise to liti­
gation concerning the relationship between ORS 138.510(3) 
and ORS 138.550(3), where a successive petition alleging a 
ground that could not reasonably have been raised would be 
permitted under ORS 138.550(3), but barred under the stat­
ute of limitations. The 1989 Legislative Assembly adopted 
the text proposed by Linden and enacted it into law without 
	
4  Linden’s full statement concerning the escape clause language is as follows:
	
“ORS 138.550, which is not amended by this bill, allows that PCR 
grounds for relief that were not raised in the original or amended petition 
‘are deemed waived unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds 
grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the 
original or amended petition.’ (Emphasis added). The question we have is how 
this statute might come into play both when a PCR is timely filed within 120 
days and when it is not. Our suggestion is that an amendment may be neces­
sary to the current bill to allow the issues brought up on a PCR past 120 days 
if they could not reasonably have been raised before that time. On the other 
hand, everyone who misses the 120 days SOL may raise the issue that their 
issues could not have reasonably been raised earlier and the court would have 
to review that issue. Without such an amendment, however, there is a greater 
chance of litigation as long as postconviction relief is available in some form.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
518	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
modification. It thus appears that the 1989 Legislative 
Assembly intended the escape clause to provide consistency 
in the treatment of successive petitions that are timely and 
untimely: If a successive petition is permitted under ORS 
138.550(3) because it raises a ground for relief that could 
not reasonably have been raised, then generally it also is 
permitted under ORS 138.510(3), even if it is filed outside 
the 120-day limitations period.
	
Although that legislative history suggests that 
timely and untimely successive petitions will frequently be 
treated the same, it does not directly address what to do with 
petitions that are untimely but not successive. The escape 
clause to the statute of limitations differs from the escape 
clause to the bar on successive petitions in one important 
respect. In Verduzco, Eklof, and our other cases applying 
the escape clause to the bar on successive petitions, we have 
considered whether a ground for relief reasonably could have 
been raised from the point of view of counsel. See Eklof, 360 
Or at 733 (“[A] common issue in successive post-conviction 
actions is whether counsel in an earlier post-conviction 
action reasonably could have been expected to raise a claim 
that later appellate case law demonstrated would have been 
viable.” (Emphasis added.)). As noted, ORS 138.550(3) cod­
ifies claim preclusion principles: It addresses the question 
of whether a petitioner who already has litigated a petition 
for post-conviction relief may return to court and litigate a 
second time, and it provides that a petitioner may not do 
so where counsel reasonably could have raised the grounds 
at issue in that prior litigation.5 By contrast, when the bar 
	
5  In Bogle v. State, 363 Or 455, 423 P3d 455 (2018), we noted that, when the 
legislature enacted the Post-Conviction Hearing Act in 1959, it intended that 
claim preclusion provisions would apply when a post-conviction petitioner was 
represented by counsel. The legislature did that by providing indigent petition­
ers with counsel. ORS 138.590(4); see Bogle, 363 Or at 466-67 (noting that one 
intended purpose of court-appointed counsel was to “ensure that [a] petitioner 
did not inadvertently waive any grounds for relief” in view of strict res judicata 
provisions; those provisions “apply ‘only to the effect of prior post-convictions pro­
ceedings under the act, when appointed counsel will always have been available 
in the first proceeding’ 
”) (quoting Jack G. Collins and Carl R. Neil, The Oregon 
Postconviction Hearing Act, 39 Or L Rev 337, 358 (1960) (emphasis omitted)).
	
Additionally, the legislature determined that the ban on successive claims 
should apply differently depending on whether the petitioner was represented by 
counsel on direct appeal. See ORS 138.550(2) (“If petitioner was not represented 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
519
on successive petitions does not apply, the inquiry under 
the escape clause to the statute of limitations is whether a 
petitioner reasonably could have raised a ground for relief 
before any litigation has occurred. The focus of the reason­
ableness inquiry is therefore the petitioner, rather than an 
attorney representing the petitioner.6 See Bartz, 314 Or at 
360 (inquiry was whether the petitioner himself reasonably 
could have known of the statutes pertaining to his offense 
of conviction).
	
Our conclusion that the subject of the reasonable­
ness inquiry in ORS 138.510(3) is an unrepresented peti­
tioner, rather than counsel, is significant. Although counsel 
may be responsible for knowing that there may be immigra­
tion consequences to a criminal conviction, we do not pre­
sume that to be the case for an individual petitioner, unless 
there is a factual basis for concluding that the petitioner 
knew that there may be immigration consequences to his or 
her conviction.
by counsel in the direct appellate review proceeding, due to lack of funds to retain 
such counsel and the failure of the court to appoint counsel for that proceeding, 
any ground for relief under ORS 138.510 to 138.680 which was not specifically 
decided by the appellate court may be asserted in the first petition for relief under 
ORS 138.510 to 138.680, unless otherwise provided in this section.”). The reason 
for that distinction was because “a layman cannot fairly be held responsible for 
failure to proceed and raise legal issues when he is without legal assistance.” 
Collins and Neil, The Oregon Postconviction Hearing Act, 39 Or L Rev at 357.
	
6  The state argues that, because the escape clause asks whether the “grounds 
for relief” in an untimely petition “could * 
* 
* reasonably have been raised,” it 
intended the reasonableness inquiry to focus exclusively on the grounds, rather 
than on whether it would have been reasonable for a petitioner to raise those 
grounds. As we explained in Alfieri v. Solomon, 358 Or 383, 399, 365 P3d 99 
(2015), although the legislature often uses the passive voice, “its significance for 
statutory interpretation varies.” In some instances, it may convey intent that 
a statute applies broadly; at other times it “adds nothing to the meaning of a 
provision and instead generates ambiguity as to how the law should be applied.” 

Id. at 399-400. The passive voice does not, as the state suggests, necessarily 
render the actor inconsequential to our analysis. Here, the plain text of ORS 
138.510(3) asks whether the “grounds for relief asserted * 
* 
* could * 
* 
* reasonably 
have been raised.” The question is not whether the grounds are reasonable, but 
rather, whether an unspecified actor reasonably could have raised them. Although 
the legislature used the passive voice, it is difficult to consider the reasonableness 
inquiry in ORS 138.510(3) from the point of view of the “grounds” alone; “reason­
ably” modifies the verb “raised,” and grounds do not raise themselves. Turning to 
the context of ORS 138.510(3), we conclude that it is the petitioner who reasonably 
must have raised the grounds. The statutes governing post-conviction relief refer 
to the person who files a petition as the “petitioner.” See ORS 138.530(1) (stating 
grounds for relief that the petitioner must establish). 
520	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
	
There was no such factual basis alleged in this 
case. Here, petitioner alleged that, at sentencing, he stated 
that he was pleading guilty so that he could still travel and 
become an United States citizen. Neither his trial counsel 
nor the sentencing court informed him that his conviction 
might affect his ability to travel or become a citizen. He 
alleged that, as a result, he did not know that his conviction 
could affect his immigration status and that he remained 
unaware of that fact until he was detained by ICE after the 
limitations period expired. It may be that the factual record 
will ultimately reveal that petitioner had information about 
the immigration consequences of his conviction sooner. But, 
because we credit petitioner’s allegations in reviewing the 
post-conviction court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, we con­
clude that the post-conviction erred in granting the state’s 
motion to dismiss.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case 
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	
BALMER, J., dissenting.
	
Statutes of limitations, by their nature, can block 
good claims. In criminal law, they may protect the guilty. 
In the tort system, they may deprive the injured of a rem­
edy. And in post-conviction proceedings, they can deny relief 
from constitutionally unsound convictions.
	
Why accept that? Because statutes of limitations 
also play an important, and sometimes essential, role in our 
legal system. They press parties to bring their claims in a 
timely matter, they prevent disputes from being adjudicated 
long after the most probative evidence has gone stale, and 
they provide certainty to potential defendants who once the 
statute of limitations has run can live their lives without 
the fear that they will be subject to a lawsuit or to criminal 
charges. In the post-conviction context, a statute of limita­
tions may provide crime victims with assurance that the 
criminal justice system has finally reached a definitive con­
clusion. A statute of limitations may also make it more likely 
that post-conviction claims are brought in a timeframe 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
521
where, if a conviction is set aside, it still may be practica­
ble for the state to retry the petitioner, should doing so be 
in the interests of justice. Yet those advantages come at an 
unavoidable cost: Any statute of limitations will necessarily, 
but hopefully rarely, block some good claims.
	
The legislature recognized this essential fact about 
statutes of limitations when drafting Oregon’s system of 
post-conviction review, and for that reason initially declined 
to include one. Jack G. Collins & Carl R. Neil, The Oregon 
Postconviction Hearing Act, 39 Or L Rev 337, 361 (1960) (“A 
layman convicted of a crime may be unaware of legal rem­
edies for procedural defects in his conviction until the lim­
ited time has expired.”). In 1989, however, the legislature 
reevaluated the costs and benefits of statutes of limitations 
and added a statute of limitations to post-conviction pro­
ceedings. Or Laws 1989, ch 1053, § 18. Although the leg­
islature limited the time within which a post-conviction 
claim must be brought, it also included an “escape clause,” 
defining circumstances where the statute of limitations 
would not apply. In Bartz v. State of Oregon, 314 Or 353, 
839 P2d 217 (1992), this court held that the escape clause 
contained in ORS 138.510(3) was narrow, and that it did 
not include claims that were untimely filed because of a 
petitioner’s ignorance of the law relevant to the claim. Now, 
the majority interprets ORS 138.510(3) to, in effect, carve 
out a new exception to Bartz—a petitioner’s ignorance of 
immigration consequences of his or her conviction can be 
a basis for invoking the escape clause. I sympathize with 
the majority’s effort to provide a path to relief for petitioner, 
who faces harsh immigration consequences that he did not 
anticipate when he made the decision to plead guilty. But 
the distinction that the majority draws between petitioner’s 
claim and that of any other post-conviction petitioner who 
was unaware of the law pertaining to his or her challenge 
has no basis in the text, context, or legislative history of 
the escape clause. The best reading of the escape clause, 
considering both its text and the legislature’s intent, is that 
it does not provide relief in this case, where petitioner’s only 
reason for his late filing was ignorance of the law. Therefore, 
I respectfully dissent.
522	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
	
Petitioner is an immigrant who pleaded guilty to 
the crime of sex abuse in the third degree, ORS 163.315. 
In his petition, he alleged that this conviction makes him 
deportable and that his attorney failed to inform him of this 
fact before he pleaded guilty to the offense. That allegation, 
if true, would likely entitle petitioner to relief under Padilla 
v. Kentucky, 559 US 356, 130 S Ct 1473, 176 L Ed 2d 284 
(2010), which held that criminal defense attorneys must 
inform immigrant clients of the immigration consequences 
of a conviction.
	
Although petitioner appears to have a meritori­
ous claim, there is a roadblock, the statute of limitations. 
ORS 138.510(3) states that “[a] petition [for post-conviction 
relief] must be filed within two years of the following, unless 
the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for 
relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised 
in the original or amended petition” (emphasis added), and 
then sets out the date on which the limitations period begins 
to run in several different circumstances. There is no dis­
pute that petitioner did not file his petition within two years 
of the required date—in his case, the date that his convic­
tion was entered in the record. Therefore, his petition must 
be dismissed, whatever its merits, unless his “grounds for 
relief asserted * 
* 
* could not reasonably have been raised in 
the original or amended petition.” Id.
	
Petitioner does not dispute that he knew most facts 
relevant to his claim. He knew that he had entered a plea to 
the crime of sex abuse in the third degree, and he knew the 
matters that his trial lawyer had informed him about before 
he entered that plea—and that they did not include possible 
immigration consequences of his plea. He knew, or at least 
he now alleges, that he would not have pleaded guilty to a 
crime that made him deportable. He alleges neither that he 
was unaware of Padilla v. Kentucky, the principal case that 
his claim for relief relies upon, nor that he was unaware 
that criminal convictions, as a general matter, might have 
immigration consequences. He states, however, that he did 
not learn that his specific conviction could make him deport­
able until after the statute of limitations had run. That 
piece of legal information is the only thing that petitioner 
states that he did not know during the statute of limitations 

Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
523
period.1 Is ignorance of that point of law, and nothing else, 
sufficient to support a finding that his grounds for relief 
“could not reasonably have been raised” within two years of 
his conviction? ORS 138.510(3).
	
This court has addressed that question before. In 
Bartz, 314 Or 353, a post-conviction petitioner alleged that 
his trial counsel had been inadequate because he had failed 
to inform the petitioner of a possible defense before the peti­
tioner entered a guilty plea.2 The petitioner, Bartz, argued 
that because he was unaware of the existence of the defense 
until after the statute of limitations had run and was there­
fore unable to bring his inadequate assistance of counsel 
claim earlier, the escape clause should apply to his claim. 
Id. This court examined the legislative history of ORS 
138.510(3) and concluded that the legislature intended the 
escape clause “to be construed narrowly.” Bartz, 314 Or at 
359. Consistent with that understanding, the court framed 
the question as “whether the extant statutes pertaining to 
a particular criminal offense constitute information that 
is reasonably available to a defendant convicted of that 
offense.” Id. The court then answered that question in the 
affirmative:
“It is a basic assumption of the legal system that the ordi­
nary means by which the legislature publishes and makes 
available its enactments are sufficient to inform persons 
of statutes that are relevant to them. Accordingly, we hold 
that the relevant statutes were reasonably available to 
Bartz when his conviction became final.”
Id. at 359-60 (internal citation removed).
	
1  Petitioner also states that he did not know that there was a two-year stat­
ute of limitations on postconviction relief in Oregon, but he does not argue that 
that ignorance is relevant to whether his claim falls within the escape clause.
	
2  Bartz had been charged with two counts of third-degree and one count of 
first-degree rape. ORS 163.355; ORS 163.375. The defense in question was that: 
“In any prosecution under ORS 163.355, ORS 163.365, ORS 163.385 or ORS 
163.395 in which the victim’s lack of consent was due solely to incapacity 
to consent by reason of being less than a specified age, it is a defense that 
the actor was less than three years older than the victim at the time of the 
alleged offense.” 
Bartz v. State, 110 Or App 614, 617 n 2, 825 P2d 657, aff’d, 314 Or 353 (1992) 
(quoting ORS 163.345). Bartz did not claim that he was unaware of any fact rel­
evant to this defense, only of its existence. Id.
524	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
	
In this case, petitioner had all the information 
needed to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
in a petition for post-conviction review, except for the legal 
effect of his conviction on his immigration status. If the rel­
evant law was available to him, as Bartz held, this is an 
easy case: Petitioner either had or reasonably could have 
had all the information necessary to file a petition for post-
conviction review within two years of his conviction, and 
thus reasonably could have done so.
	
The majority’s resolution of this case, and its break 
from Bartz, rests on two new conclusions about the escape 
clause. The majority holds that “the subject of the reason­
ableness inquiry in ORS 138.510(3) is an unrepresented 
petitioner, rather than counsel * 
* 
*.” 364 Or at ___. Second, 
the majority draws a distinction between the availability of 
the law to a petitioner and that petitioner’s motivation to 
consult the law, holding that “a ground for relief is reason­
ably available only if there was a reason for the petitioner to 
look for it.” 364 Or at ___. The majority then holds that this 
case differs from Bartz in that the petitioner was unaware 
of any “need to investigate,” 364 Or at ___, because “until he 
was detained by ICE after the limitations period had run, 
he was unaware that his counsel had caused him harm that 
might arise in the future,” 364 Or at ___. Both conclusions 
are incorrect.
	
I begin with the question of whether the legal igno­
rance of a previously unrepresented petitioner is sufficient to 
allow invocation of the escape clause. The text of the escape 
clause refers to “grounds for relief asserted which could not 
reasonably have been raised in the original or amended 
petition.” ORS 138.510(3). As we recognized in Bartz, that 
text, standing on its own, is ambiguous. Bartz, 314 Or at 
357 (“ORS 138.510(2) does not explain precisely what kinds 
of circumstances fulfill the statutory requirement that an 
untimely petition assert a ground for relief that ‘could not 
reasonably have been raised’ in a timely petition.”). The con­
text, however, substantially clarifies its meaning.
	
When it was added, the text of the escape clause mir­
rored that found in two existing provisions of Oregon post-
conviction law. ORS 138.550(2) bars petitioners who have 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
525
obtained “direct appellate review” of their conviction from 
raising any ground in their petition “unless such ground was 
not asserted and could not reasonably have been asserted in 
the direct appellate review proceeding.” And petitioners who 
have already filed one petition for post-conviction review are 
barred from filing another by ORS 138.550(3), “unless the 
court finds grounds for relief asserted therein which could 
not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended 
petition.” Both of those provisions—the direct review escape 
clause and the successive petitions escape clause—have been 
present in Oregon law since 1959. Or Laws 1959, ch 636, 
§ 15(3).3
	
As a general presumption, when the legislature 
uses the same text in multiple places within the same set 
of statutes, that text should be given the same meaning 
throughout. State v. Shaw, 338 Or 586, 603, 113 P3d 898 
(2005). Here, the legislature used existing text to define a 
new exception. The most reasonable inference is that the 
legislature wanted that text to have the same meaning, not 
a wholly different application.
	
In the context of the original act, ORS 138.550(2) 
and (3) served an important purpose: codifying res judicata, 
or claim preclusion, principles. See Bogle v. State of Oregon, 
363 Or 455, 467, __ P3d __ (2018) (“ORS 138.550(3) is one 
of the res judicata provisions of the PCHA.”); Freeman v. 
Gladden, 236 Or 137, 139, 387 P2d 360 (1963) (“[ORS 
138.550(2)] was intended to state the principle of res judi­
cata in post-conviction appeals.”). We have previously recog­
nized that
“The res judicata provisions were among ‘the most import­
ant [provisions of] the act.’ They were intended to ‘provide 
a clear and workable basis for reducing the tide of post-
conviction litigation to manageable proportions, while 
maintaining standards of fairness.’ 
”
	
3  It is impossible to understand the statute of limitations escape clause with­
out recognizing this fact, because the escape clause contains a puzzling reference 
to “the original or amended petition.” ORS 138.510(3). We have previously recog­
nized that that was a drafting error, and that the legislature did not mean for the 
statute of limitations to apply only to situations in which a previous petition had 
been filed. Verduzco v. State, 357 Or 553, 564, 355 P3d 902 (2015); Bartz, 314 Or 
at 358. The existence of that error further confirms the derivation of the escape 
clause text in ORS 138.510(3).
526	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
Bogle, 363 Or at 467 (quoting Collins & Neil, 39 Or L Rev 
at 356) (alteration in Bogle; citations omitted). Those provi­
sions were a response to a significant problem:
“It is well known that a few ‘prisoner-lawyers’ have taken 
advantage of inadequate res judicata doctrines applicable 
in postconviction cases to flood the courts with petition 
after petition, each raising a different ground of attack on 
their convictions.”
Collins & Neil, 39 Or L Rev at 356. In line with that restric­
tive purpose, the exception to the res judicata provisions for 
grounds that “could not reasonably have been raised” was 
not intended to be particularly broad, or to undermine the 
restrictions themselves.
	
The label of res judicata, the structure of those 
provisions, and the commentary to them indicate that the 
provisions operated to require that claims must be brought 
at the first available proceeding, regardless of whether the 
law was known to the petitioner and his or her attorney. 
But what if an unrepresented petitioner failed to bring the 
claim in an earlier proceeding because of legal ignorance? 
The structure of the res judicata provisions makes clear 
that that was not a basis for invoking their escape clauses. 
ORS 138.550(2) contains res judicata provisions applicable 
when there had already been a direct appeal as well as the 
direct appeal escape clause. However, the drafters under­
stood that not all petitioners would have had access to coun­
sel on direct appeal and felt “that a layman cannot fairly 
be held responsible for failure to proceed and raise legal 
issues when he is without legal assistance.” Collins & Neil, 
39 Or L Rev at 357. The legislature did not understand the 
direct appeal escape clause to solve that problem. To protect 
unrepresented petitioners, the legislature added a second 
exception: The direct appeal res judicata provisions do not 
apply “[i]f petitioner was not represented by counsel in the 
direct appellate review proceeding, due to his lack of funds 
to retain such counsel and the failure of the court to appoint 
counsel for that proceeding.” ORS 138.550(2). Because the 
second exception was necessary to avoid barring claims that 
had not been raised because of legal ignorance, the legisla­
ture clearly did not understand the escape clause, standing 
alone, to forgive an unrepresented nonlawyer’s ignorance of 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
527
the law. If the direct appeal escape clause allowed petition­
ers to bring claims that they would have raised on appeal 
but for their legal ignorance, the second exception would be 
redundant.
	
In addition, “[c]ourt decisions that existed at the 
time that the legislature enacted a statute—and that, as 
a result, it could have been aware of—may be consulted 
in determining what the legislature intended in enacting 
the law as part of the context for the legislature’s deci­
sion.” OR-OSHA v. CBI Services, Inc., 356 Or 577, 593, 341 
P3d 701 (2014). Shortly before the legislature enacted the 
post-conviction statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals 
held that the successive petitions escape clause, contained 
in ORS 138.550(3), operated on a presumption that post-
conviction petitioners knew the law. The issue came up in 
the case of a petitioner who claimed that he had grounds 
that he “could not reasonably have been raised in the ear­
lier [post-conviction] proceeding, because his counsel in that 
proceeding was ineffective.” Page v. Cupp, 78 Or App 520, 
524, 717 P2d 1183 (1986). When a post-conviction petitioner 
wished to raise a claim that counsel did not, this court had 
outlined procedures, in Church v. Gladden, 244 Or 308, 
417 P2d 993 (1966), for raising the claim in the first post-
conviction hearing and held that the petitioner could not 
save the claim for a subsequent post-conviction petition. But 
Church had concerned grounds that the petitioner had tried 
to raise, and therefore of which the petitioner was neces­
sarily aware. In Page, the petitioner claimed that he could 
not have raised the grounds in the first hearing because his 
counsel was ineffective, although he conceded that “the fac­
tual basis underlying his * * * claims for relief was revealed 
during his first post-conviction proceeding.” Page, 78 Or App 
at 525. There, as here, the question was whether petitioner’s 
own legal ignorance and understandable reliance on coun­
sel could excuse a failure to bring claims under the escape 
clause. The Court of Appeals held that ORS 138.550(3), in 
combination with Church, “presumes that the petitioner has 
knowledge of all grounds for relief that were, or should have 
been, discovered before the close of the original proceeding” 
and affirmed the dismissal of his petition. Page, 78 Or App 
at 525 (emphasis added).
528	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
	
As outlined above, the escape clauses in the res 
judicata provisions were understood to be narrow and could 
not be invoked based on legal ignorance. Because the legis­
lature copied the escape clause from the existing res judi­
cata provisions, it is appropriate to infer that the legislature 
wanted it to operate in the same way. If the legislature had 
wished to create a different or more generous exception, one 
that would forgive the legal ignorance of the typical peti­
tioner, it surely would have used different words. And, as 
the majority describes, the legislative history supports the 
conclusion that the legislature wanted the statute of limita­
tions escape clause to mirror the res judicata provision in 
ORS 138.510(3). 364 Or at ___.
	
Having reviewed that history, I have no difficulty 
in concluding that Bartz was correctly decided and that a 
ground could “reasonably have been raised” during the stat­
ute of limitations period if the petitioner was aware of all 
necessary facts, but unaware of a point of law relevant to 
his claim.4 The legislature adopted the escape clause with 
full knowledge that it was a res judicata provision that had 
previously been interpreted not to excuse legal ignorance. 
That rule resolves this case against petitioner.
	
As the majority recognizes, allowing the escape 
clause to be invoked based on a claim of legal ignorance 
“would allow the exception to swallow the rule,” 364 Or at 
___. Yet the majority nevertheless holds that the escape 
clause “requires assessing both whether the petitioner 
reasonably could have accessed the ground for relief and 
whether a reasonable person in the petitioner’s situation 
would have thought to investigate the existence of that 
ground for relief.” 364 Or at ___.
	
That approach was raised and rejected in Bartz, 
where the petitioner argued that,
“If an innocent criminal defendant takes his case to trial 
and is convicted, he knows something went wrong. He will 
be prompted to dig for the reasons of what went wrong and 
	
4  I would leave for another day the question of how the escape clause would 
apply in an extraordinary circumstance where the petitioner was denied access 
to the laws, or where the state’s actions were responsible for petitioner’s igno­
rance. No such circumstances are alleged here.
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
529
how he can undo that wrong immediately following the con­
viction. A person, like the petitioner, who is convicted based 
upon a plea of guilty pursuant to plea negotiations upon the 
advice of trial counsel, would not similarly know something 
went wrong.”
Petition for Review at 6-7, Bartz, 314 Or 353 (emphasis in 
original). This court clearly understood what it wrote in 
Bartz to be responsive to that argument, and it is not hard 
to see why. Because the grounds of relief were available to 
Bartz, they could reasonably have been raised during the 
statute of limitations period, even if he was not particularly 
motivated to overturn his conviction until later. The major­
ity agrees that Bartz reached the correct result even under 
its new formulation of the test:
“For the petitioner in Bartz, the conviction itself put him on 
notice of the need to investigate the existence of a ground 
for relief. He was, of course, aware of that conviction at the 
time it occurred. It was, therefore, incumbent on the peti­
tioner to look for legal challenges to his conviction.”
364 Or at ___. The majority also suggests that other, simi­
larly “unexceptional” facts should be treated the same way. 
364 Or at ___.
	
The majority thus faces the difficult task of distin­
guishing Bartz from this case. Bartz, like this case, involved 
as “grounds for relief,” a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.5 That claim has two prongs. A petitioner “must 
show that counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness’ and that he was prejudiced 
as a result.” Lee v. United States, __ US __, __, 137 S Ct 
1958, 1964, 198 L Ed 2d 476 (2017) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 US 668, 688, 104 S Ct 205, 280 L Ed 2d 
674 (1984)). In many ineffective assistance of counsel cases, 
particularly those involving a decision to plead guilty, the 
deficient performance takes the form of counsel providing a 
defendant with erroneous advice, or of counsel failing to pro­
vide a defendant with the advice that a reasonable attorney 
would have provided. In cases where the petitioner entered a 
	
5  Ineffective or inadequate assistance of counsel is a claim under both state 
and federal constitutions, and in most respects is analyzed similarly under each. 
Petitioner’s claim, however, is made only under the United States Constitution.
530	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
plea, a category that includes both Bartz and this case, prej­
udice may be shown by demonstrating a “ 
‘reasonable prob­
ability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the petitioner] would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going 
to trial.’ 
” Lee, __ US at __, 137 S Ct at 1965 (quoting Hill 
v. Lockhart, 474 US 52, 59, 106 S Ct 366, 88 L Ed 2d 203 
(1985)).
	
In Bartz, the petitioner alleged that his lawyer had 
performed deficiently by failing to inform him that he had 
a viable defense to third-degree rape, the charge to which 
he ultimately entered a guilty plea. In this case, petitioner 
alleges that counsel performed deficiently by failing to 
inform him that the crime to which he entered a guilty plea 
might have immigration consequences. In both cases, the 
petitioners claimed prejudice, in that they would not have 
entered the plea if they had received the required advice. 
The claims made in each case are structurally identical. 
They differ only in the type of advice that the attorney failed 
to provide. The basis for petitioner’s claim is not the immi­
gration consequences themselves, but his lawyer’s failure to 
advise him concerning immigration consequences. Equally, 
his challenge is, like Bartz’s, to his conviction, not to the 
immigration consequences that it may trigger under federal 
law.
	
The majority attempts to distinguish the two situa­
tions as follows:
“Whereas the petitioner in Bartz was aware of his convic­
tion and could have either researched whether his trial 
counsel was ineffective, or sought help from an attorney 
to make that determination, petitioner in this case did not 
know about the immigration consequences that form the 
basis for his claim until he was later detained by ICE.”
364 Or at ___. Yet the majority reaches different answers 
only by asking different questions. Was Bartz aware of his 
conviction? Of course, but petitioner also was aware of his 
conviction. Did petitioner know of the immigration conse­
quences that form the basis for his claim?6 No, but neither 
	
6  It would be more accurate to say that the lack of advice concerning immigra­
tion consequences forms the basis of petitioner’s claim. Petitioner’s actual immi­
gration status is only somewhat related to his post-conviction claim. Petitioner 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
531
was Bartz aware of the neglected defense that formed the 
basis of his claim. The real question, to which the majority 
does not supply an answer, is why the two cases should be 
analyzed differently. The result is an unexplained holding 
that Bartz’s awareness of his conviction made it “incumbent 
on [him] to look for legal challenges to his conviction,” 364 
Or at ___, including ineffective assistance of counsel, yet 
that in this case petitioner had “no reason to look for [inef­
fective assistance of counsel] before being detained by ICE,” 
364 Or at ___.
	
As a result, the only fact that the majority points 
to that distinguishes this case from Bartz, and from most 
other untimely post-conviction claims, is that petitioner’s 
claim was based on his lawyer’s failure to advise him on 
immigration consequences. The majority suggests that its 
holding is limited to those facts:
“[P]etitioners who were unaware of the immigration conse­
quences of their convictions are a narrow class of petition­
ers. Allowing petitioner’s claim in this case to fall within 
the escape clause does not run the risk of having the escape 
clause swallow the statute of limitations.”
364 Or at ___. That focus may narrow a rule that the major­
ity recognizes would otherwise be too broad, but the major­
ity points to nothing in the text, context, or legislative his­
tory of the escape clause that suggests an intent to treat 
that class of petitioners differently from all the others.
	
Although it is not explained that way, the majori­
ty’s distinction between this case and Bartz may be better 
understood as rooted in fundamentally practical concerns. 
As the Supreme Court has observed,
“The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral chal­
lenge to a guilty plea—an opportunity to withdraw the plea 
and proceed to trial—imposes its own significant limiting 
may be deportable for reasons besides this conviction; conversely, he may have 
valid defenses against removal irrespective of this conviction. Moreover, the true 
immigration consequences of his conviction may turn on law that trial counsel 
was not constitutionally required to advise him on, or on changes in the law 
subsequent to his conviction, among several possible scenarios. See Esquivel-
Quintana v. Sessions, __ US __, 137 S Ct 1562, 198 L Ed 2d 22 (2017) (limiting 
the immigration consequences of state statutory rape offenses that do not require 
the victim to be under 16).
532	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
principle: Those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas 
lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the 
plea. Thus, a different calculus informs whether it is wise 
to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas proceeding because, 
ultimately, the challenge may result in a less favorable out­
come for the defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to a 
conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar down­
side potential.”
Padilla, 559 US at 372-73 (emphasis in original). As Padilla 
recognized, that difference between challenges to guilty 
pleas and challenges to convictions after trial would likely 
reduce the number of challenges under its new rule. In that 
sense, the majority is likely correct in observing that “[peti­
tioner] had no reason to look for [his claim] before being 
detained by ICE.” 364 Or at ___. But that is equally true in 
most ineffective assistance of counsel cases involving guilty 
pleas. A petitioner is likely to view her plea, and the under­
lying plea bargain, as something other than an injury—and 
perhaps to see it as a boon, given the alternatives—and 
thus will have no reason to seek to challenge it until she 
discovers that the advice that informed her decision to enter 
the plea was incorrect or incomplete. But there is no special 
connection between that fact and unforeseen immigration 
consequences. There are many reasons why an individual 
might come to regret a guilty plea and seek to undo it—
an unknown defense, an overlooked motion to suppress, an 
obscure constitutional challenge to the law—so an exception 
to the statute of limitations crafted to accommodate this con­
cern would have to either be very broad or very arbitrary.7
	
Another practical dimension to this case is the 
ease of locating and discerning the point of law of which the 
petitioner was unaware. For an individual looking to chal­
lenge a criminal conviction, the elements of the crime and 
the available defenses are an intuitive place to begin the 
search—and, in Bartz, such an investigation would have 
	
7  There is also no necessary connection between the reasons that an indi­
vidual might wish to overturn a conviction and the legal basis for doing so. In 
this case, the two are apparently aligned, but that will not be so in all cases. 
For example, a petitioner might wish to undo her plea principally because of the 
deleterious effect that her conviction has upon her employment opportunities, 
but raise as grounds for relief that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
uncover exculpatory evidence. 
Cite as 364 Or 502 (2019)	
533
sufficed to uncover the attorney’s error. The immigration 
consequences of petitioner’s conviction might be less intu­
itive or more complex. But, again, there is nothing unique 
about immigration consequences in this regard. Many of the 
other topics on which a constitutionally deficient attorney 
could have failed to provide advice are no less obscure to the 
nonlawyer than immigration consequences—merger rules, 
search and seizure law, hearsay exceptions—and crimi­
nal cases with some frequency turn on aspects of the law 
that are removed from quotidian criminal practice, such as 
free speech rights or property law. There is no principled or 
workable basis on which to distinguish advice about immi­
gration consequences from all other types of advice—and 
the majority does not offer one. The majority’s exception will 
thus prove to be very broad or very arbitrary.
	
Of course, the legislature is entitled to carve out 
exceptions to the statute of limitations that are broad, seem­
ingly arbitrary, or both. But the legislature intended to cre­
ate neither a broad exception to the statute of limitations in 
ORS 138.510(3) for all types of legal ignorance nor a special 
exception for claims with some connection to immigration 
consequences. The majority agrees that the former exception 
would be contrary to the legislature’s intentions and points 
to nothing to suggest that the legislature intended the lat­
ter exception. The majority’s rule is, in essence, a judicial 
creation. In articulating the common law or constitutional 
requirements we may have a freer hand, but since 1959 the 
post-conviction process has been statutorily defined, and 
our role is to interpret what the legislature has written. 
See Dillard v. Premo, 362 Or 41, 48-49, 403 P3d 746 (2017) 
(Balmer, C. J., dissenting).
	
Strict statutes of limitations have their advantages, 
but their price is that they occasionally produce harsh results 
and unfairness. Even a claim that, as far as I can tell at this 
stage, is meritorious, and would likely have succeeded had 
it been filed a year earlier, must be dismissed. It may be the 
case that the escape clause, which has not been amended 
since Padilla was decided, should be modified to be more for­
giving of immigration-related claims like petitioner’s. The 
legislature is entitled to engage in the delicate balancing of 
competing policy objectives as is necessary in crafting any 
534	
Gutale v. State of Oregon
statute of limitations. Here, they did so, and I cannot give 
their words any fair reading other than that outlined above. 
For those reasons, I would affirm the judgment below, and 
therefore I respectfully dissent.
	
Kistler, S. J., joins in this dissent.