Title: State of New Jersey v. Alturik Francis

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

In this capital murder case, the prosecution in its initial presentation to the grand jury subpoenaed four family members of defendant Alturik Francis and questioned them about Francis upbringing, history of substance abuse, history of violence and psychological background as well as the facts of the crimes. The State also questioned Francis mother about her discussions with a social worker employed by a mitigation firm that was to assist Francis during the penalty phase of his capital murder trial. A month later, the prosecutor instructed the grand jury to disregard the earlier testimony and focus instead on the testimony presented that day by law enforcement officers. The grand jury then indicted Francis for the sexual assault and brutal murder of Majuly Collins, the murder of her two small children and an assault on her cousin. Francis moved to dismiss the indictment alleging that the State s questioning of his four family members before the grand jury was improper. The trial court first concluded that there had been an abuse of the grand jury s function and it barred the State from using the grand jury testimony of Francis family members in any proceeding. On reconsideration, the trial court said the State could use the testimony in question that specifically related to the issue of guilt, but was precluded from using such testimony in the penalty phase. Whether such grand jury testimony could be used for impeachment purposes, the trial court ruled, would be determined not in the abstract but in the context of the trial. The State s motion for leave to appeal was granted by the Appellate Division. In a published opinion, the panel adopted the dominant purpose test and concluded that the prosecutor used the grand jury process for the dominant purpose of preparing the case for the penalty phase of Francis capital trial and that this was a misuse of the grand jury. The panel, however, modified the trial court s order to permit the use of the grand jury record to impeach any family member s statements in the guilt phase of the trial. State v. Francis, 385 N.J. Super 350 (App. Div. 2006). Adopting the trial court s distinction, it also allowed the State to use grand jury testimony of family members regarding inculpatory statements made by defendant. The Supreme Court granted the defendant s motion for leave to appeal and the State s cross-motion, as well as the Attorney General leave to appear amicus curiae. HELD: Because the misuse of grand jury occurred before Francis indictment, the inquiry should have been whether the testimony of the family members was relevant to the crimes under investigation and not whether the grand jury was used for the sole or dominant purpose of securing additional evidence against the defendant for use in the upcoming trial. The trial court is to determine whether the testimony of Francis family members is relevant to the charges against Francis. 1. The grand jury is entrusted with expansive powers and it must be free to pursue its investigations unhindered. The prosecutor cannot impinge on a grand jury s independence or improperly influence its determination. A defendant bears the burden of proving that the prosecutor misused the grand jury for an improper purpose. (pp. 15-18) 2. Francis argues that R. 3:13-4 protects his mitigation evidence from premature disclosure. Pursuant to this Rule, the State is required to provide the defense with a list of the aggravating factors on which it intends to rely to seek the imposition of the death penalty and a defendant is required to provide the prosecuting attorney with an itemization of the mitigating factors on which the defendant intends to rely on at the sentencing hearing. Given its express language, efforts by the State to secure in advance information that Francis eventually will be duty-bound to disclose does not amount to improper conduct. The question, however, remains whether the State s use of the grand jury as a means to secure mitigation testimony was proper. (pp. 19-20) 3. Nationally, courts have distinguished between pre- and post-indictment grand jury proceedings in determining what standard is to be applied to grand jury abuse claims. After an indictment has been returned, a prosecutor may not use a grand jury s investigatory powers for the sole or dominant purpose of securing additional evidence against the defendant for use in the upcoming trial. This is known as the dominant purpose test. In contrast, before an indictment has been returned, the applicable standard is whether the evidence sought by the State via the grand jury was relevant to the crimes under investigation, that is, did the evidence sought have a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. (pp. 20-25) 4. The State s challenged use of the grand jury occurred before the indictment against Francis was returned. Thus, the Appellate Division applied an incorrect standard of review. It should have inquired whether the evidence the State sought was relevant to the crimes under investigation. As a result, the Court cannot sustain a presumptive bar against use of the Francis family members grand jury testimony in the guilt phase of his trial. (pp. 25-27) 5. The Court remands to the trial court for a determination of the relevance issues. The trial court may determine that some of the testimony of Francis family members was not relevant to the charges against him, and any improperly garnered proofs should be suppressed. Irrelevant grand jury evidence may be used for impeachment, unless the suppressed statement is not otherwise trustworthy and reliable. (pp. 27-29) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE and HOENS join in JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO's opinion. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-31/ 63 September Term 2006 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ALTURIK FRANCIS, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. Argued March 6, 2007 Decided June 27, 2007 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 385 N.J. Super. 350 (2006). David B. Glazer argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent (Carl J. Herman and Glazer & Luciano, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Glazer and Mr. Herman, on the brief). Steven J. Kaflowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant (Theodore J. Romankow, Union County Prosecutor, attorney). Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney). JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO delivered the opinion of the Court. In this appeal, we address the related issues of the standard to be applied in respect of the presentation of evidence before a grand jury and what remedy is appropriate in the event that standard is violated. During its initial presentation of a capital murder case to the grand jury, the prosecution subpoenaed four family members of defendant Alturik Francis and questioned them concerning defendant s upbringing, history of substance abuse, history of violence, and psychological background, as well as the factual underpinnings of the crimes for which defendant eventually was charged. The State also questioned one of those family members -- defendant s mother -- about her discussions with a social worker employed by a mitigation firm retained to assist during the penalty phase of defendant s capital murder trial. At a grand jury proceeding almost a month later, the prosecutor instructed the grand jury to disregard that earlier testimony and to focus instead on the testimony presented that day by law enforcement officers. It was on that latter testimony that the grand jury returned an indictment against defendant. Advocating the adoption of the dominant purpose test for all allegations of grand jury abuse, defendant asserts that the State overstepped proper boundaries when it questioned defendant s family members. Specifically, it is defendant s view that, in addition to using the grand jury for proper investigatory and charging purposes, the State misused the grand jury to secure evidence in respect of defendant s mitigation case; that such use of the grand jury violates the dominant purpose test; and that the appropriate remedy for that violation is the suppression - for all purposes - of any proofs secured in violation of the dominant purpose test. The State rejoins that the proper test to determine the propriety of a pre-indictment grand jury inquiry is whether the evidence procured is relevant to the grand jury s inquiry, and that all of the grand jury questioning was relevant. We reject defendant s invitation to apply the dominant purpose test to pre-indictment grand jury proceedings. Instead, we hold that the standard to be applied to determine the proper scope of a grand jury s pre-indictment inquiry is whether the evidence sought is relevant to the grand jury s task; the dominant purpose test applies only to claims of post-indictment grand jury abuse. You re going to be presented with the entire case today for your consideration. And your deliberations, your considerations, your votes, should be limited and based on the evidence that you hear today. . . . So your consideration is based on the evidence that you hear today. When one of the grand jurors explained that he had been absent for the earlier presentation and asked if he could hear the case[,] the State explained: Yes. The entire case is going to be presented today. So if you were not here the last time, you re in the same shoes as everyone else, because everyone else should disregard [the testimony presented on January 31, 2003]. At the close of the State s presentation, the grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with three counts of first-degree murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2); three counts of first-degree felony murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3); first-degree attempted murder of Susan Vargas, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a and 2C:5-1; second-degree burglary, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; first-degree robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; first-degree aggravated sexual assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(3) and (4); two counts of third-degree possession of a knife with a purpose to use it unlawfully against others, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d; and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a knife under circumstances not manifestly appropriate, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d. See footnote 1 On April 15, 2003, defendant filed two notices stating that he would assert the defenses of diminished capacity, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, and intoxication, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8d. See footnote 2 Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment. He alleged that the State s questioning of his family members before the grand jury was improper. Defendant also asserted that the trial court had the authority to fashion a proper remedy, be it dismissal of the prosecution; barring the State from seeking the death penalty; or suppressing the testimony of his family members and recusing the Union County Prosecutor s Office from prosecuting defendant. The State opposed defendant s application. In a written decision, the trial court noted that defendant s state of mind[,] which is an element of the crimes charged[,] is a proper area for grand jury inquiry. It explained that [t]he question [] the grand jury must confront [i]s whether [] defendant possessed the mental capacity to perform acts knowingly or purposely. According to the trial court, the grand jury must be able to make inquiry of information related to possible affirmative defense[s] such as intoxication or insanity. That said, the trial court reasoned that [t]he clear purpose of the prosecutor s questions [of defendant s family members] was to obtain medical and psychological information about [] defendant that would not usually be available to the State until the penalty phase. Eschewing any applicable relevance analysis, the trial court concluded that [t]here can be no doubt that the dominant purpose of the State in issuing subpoenas to defendant s family was to advance the discovery process related to a possible penalty phase of this case. It noted that [t]he questions posed to [] defendant s relatives only tangentially related to his mental state at the time of the offense and that [t]he questioning of the witnesses regarding childhood behavior and prior crimes was an attempt to circumvent the restrictions of Rule 3:13-4 and obtain penalty mitigation evidence prior to trial. Once it concluded that there had been an abuse of the grand jury s function, the trial court addressed the remedy to be fashioned. In the trial court s view, defendant s requests to dismiss the indictment, disqualify the Union County Prosecutor s Office or prohibit the State from seeking the death penalty are remedies which are not related to the improper use of the grand jury. Instead, the trial court ruled that [t]he remedy for the State s transgression can easily be addressed by restricting the use of the information obtained. It barred the State from utilizing the testimony of any of the witnesses before the January 31, 2003 grand jury in any proceeding in this case. The State sought reconsideration or clarification of the trial court s ruling. Responding to that application, the trial court reaffirmed its reliance on the dominant purpose test in determining the propriety of the State s actions before the grand jury on January 31, 2003, and recognized a defendant s right to protect mitigation information during the guilt phase of the proceedings. The trial court explained, however, that the ruling of the court does not preclude the [S]tate from using at trial evidence of defendant s guilt[,] noting that testimony before the grand jury on January 31, 2003, which specifically relates to the issue of guilt, may be utilized by the [S]tate. Conversely, the trial court held that to the extent [] the [S]tate obtained evidence regarding defendant s background relevant to mitigation issues, the [S]tate is precluded from the use of that information during the presentation of its case. The trial court did express one caveat applicable to that holding: The possibility that the [S]tate may seek to use grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes does exist. The decision to allow or disallow such use of the testimony cannot be addressed in the abstract, but must be considered in the context of the trial. See footnote 3 The State moved for leave to appeal from that interlocutory ruling, which the Appellate Division granted. State v. Francis, 385 N.J. Super. 350 (App. Div. 2006). Relying on a decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and an unreported summary order for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the panel adopted the dominant purpose test as the one applicable to grand jury proceedings, and concluded that it is not proper to use a grand jury for the sole or dominant purpose of preparing a case for the penalty phase of a defendant s capital trial. Such use is violative of the dominant purpose test and constitutes a misuse of the grand jury. Id. at 353. It held that the dominant purpose test was correctly utilized and applied by the trial judge in determining whether the [State] misused the pre-indictment grand jury by obtaining mitigation evidence to be used at the penalty phase of defendant s trial. Ibid. The panel, however, modif[ied] the July 13, 2005 order to permit the [State] to use the grand jury record to impeach any family member s testimony or expert testimony based on family member s statements that are offered by defendant at the guilt phase of defendant s trial. Ibid. Adopting the distinction enunciated by the trial court, the Appellate Division also concluded that the State may also utilize at trial any inculpatory statements made by defendant to a family member. Ibid. Defendant sought reconsideration of the Appellate Division s decision in respect of the permitted yet limited use of the January 31, 2003 grand jury material for impeachment purposes only; the panel denied that application. We granted both defendant s motion for leave to appeal, 188 N.J. 344 (2006), and the State s cross-motion, 188 N.J. 570 (2006). We also granted the Attorney General leave to appear amicus curiae. Once a defendant has been indicted the government is precluded from using the grand jury for the sole or dominant purpose of obtaining additional evidence against him. The dominating purpose test presupposes that the government can have more than one purpose in calling a witness before the grand jury. For example, the government may properly use the grand jury to identify or investigate other individuals involved in criminal schemes, or to prepare superseding indictments against persons already charged. The grand jury also may inquire into possible affirmative defenses and the like in order to determine whether a prosecution should proceed. Proof that the government derived an incidental benefit at trial from the disputed grand jury testimony is insufficient to establish that prosecutors have abused the grand jury. The law presumes, absent a showing to the contrary, that a grand jury acts within the legitimate scope of its authority. Accordingly, [d]efendant bears the burden of demonstrating that an abuse has occurred. [United States v. Furrow, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1172-73 (D. Cal. 2000) (citations, internal quotation marks, editing marks, and footnotes omitted).] In contrast, a different analysis obtains when the question at issue is the use of the grand jury process before an indictment has been returned. We have stress[ed] the need for broad power in . . . the grand jury to probe widely for evidence of crime. In re Addonizio, supra, 53 N.J. at 134. We also have explained that [t]he court may not hamstring a prosecuting official in his marshalling of evidence before a grand jury on any fine-spun distinctions between what evidence is sufficient to return a valid indictment and what is necessary to convict. In re Petition to Compel Testimony of Tuso, 73 N.J. 575, 580 (1977). Our distillation of those fundamental concepts leads to the conclusion that the standard applicable to claims of pre-indictment grand jury abuse must be whether the evidence sought by the State via the grand jury was relevant to the crimes under investigation, that is, did the evidence sought have a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. N.J.R.E. 401; see State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 122-23 (2007) (explaining that [r]elevant evidence is defined as any evidence that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action[,] that [i]n relevance determinations, the analysis focuses on the logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue[,] and that [t]he standard for the requisite connection is generous: if the evidence makes a desired inference more probable than it would be if the evidence were not admitted, then the required logical connection has been satisfied (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). For those reasons, we recognize that, based on whether the State s challenged use of the grand jury occurred pre- or post-indictment, different rules apply in respect of grand jury abuse claims. In the pre-indictment setting, the inquiry must focus on whether the evidence the State sought was relevant to the crimes under investigation. If the claims of grand jury abuse arise in respect of the use of the grand jury after an indictment has been returned, we join the unbroken line of authority that holds that such use of the grand jury is permitted unless the dominant purpose of that use was to buttress an indictment already returned by the grand jury. Post-indictment, the State may continue to use the grand jury to investigate additional or new charges against a defendant. However, once an indictment is returned, the State may not use the grand jury to gather evidence solely in respect of the charges already filed. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-31/63 SEPTEMBER TERM 2006 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ALTURIK FRANCIS, Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Respondent. DECIDED June 27, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY State courts likewise apply the dominant purpose test only in respect of post-indictment grand jury proceedings. See, e.g., Florida - Agrella v. Rivkind, 404 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Illinois - Illinois v. DeLaire, 610 N.E.2d 1277, 1288 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 616 N.E.2d 340 (Ill. 1993); Kentucky - Bishop v. Caudill, 87 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Ky. 2002); Maryland - Erman v. Maryland, 434 A.2d 1030, 1044 (Md. 1981), cert. denied sub nom., Brent v. Maryland, 456 U.S. 908, 102 S. Ct. 1756, 72 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1982); New York - Haynes v. Lerner, 376 N.E.2d 1294, 1296 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 888, 99 S. Ct. 243, 58 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1978); Pennsylvania - Pennsylvania v. Melson, 556 A.2d 836, 839 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 575 A.2d 111 (Pa. 1990). Similarly, in Fulton, supra, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an unpublished summary order, held that the defendant s contention that the government improperly subpoenaed two grand jury witnesses in order to prepare for his trial is without factual merit. 1 997 U.S. App. LEXIS 654 at *3. The court explained that [o]ne of those witnesses was subpoenaed prior to the return of the indictment against [defendant]; the other provided testimony in connection with an ongoing investigation of other matters relating to [defendant]. Id. at *3-*4. Thus, although the Fulton court spoke in terms of see[ing] no error in the court s finding that neither witness was subpoenaed for the sole or dominant purpose of trial preparation in the present matter[,] id. at *4, it is obvious that the court considered both challenged witnesses under a relevance standard and, in the final analysis, refused to bar the testimony of either.