Title: Progressive Specialty Insurance Company v. Gerald Gore and Jeanette Gore

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel 06/27/08 Progressive Specialty Insurance Company
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1070491
_________________________
Progressive Specialty Insurance Company
v.
Gerald Gore and Jeanette Gore
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-05-1280)
PER CURIAM.
Progressive Specialty Insurance Company ("Progressive")
appeals from a summary judgment in favor of Gerald Gore and
his wife, Jeanette Gore, in a declaratory-judgment action
commenced by Progressive to determine its obligation, if any,
1070491
2
to pay uninsured-motorist benefits under an automobile policy
issued to Gerald Gore.  We affirm.
I. Factual Background
The dispositive facts are undisputed.  On November 13,
2002, Jeanette Gore completed an application to purchase
automobile insurance from Progressive.  The application
contemplated that the policy would be issued solely in the
name of Gerald Gore, who was not present during the
application process. 
During the application process, Jeanette was presented
with the following document (hereinafter referred to as "the
rejection form"):
"REJECTION OF UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
"I have been offered Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist
Coverage and I reject the option to purchase any
Uninsured/Underinsured 
Motorist 
Coverage. 
 
I
understand 
that 
Uninsured/Underinsured 
Motorist
Coverage would have protected me, my resident
relatives, and occupants of a covered vehicle if any
of us sustain bodily injury, including any resulting
death, in an accident in which the owner or operator
of a motor vehicle who is legally liable does not
have insurance (an uninsured motorist) or does not
have enough insurance (an underinsured motorist).
"I understand and agree that this rejection of
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage shall be
binding on all persons insured under the policy, and
that this rejection shall also apply to any renewal,
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3
reinstatement, 
substitute, 
amended, 
altered,
modified, or replacement policy with this company or
any affiliated company, unless a named insured
submits a request to add the coverage and pays the
additional premium."
The rejection form included a space for the "signature of the
named insured."  In that space, however, Jeanette signed her
own name.  
On November 15, 2002, Progressive issued a policy to
Gerald as the only named insured.  Both Gerald and Jeanette
were listed on the policy as "drivers."  The declarations
stated that uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage had been
"rejected."  The policy was in force on August 12, 2005.  
On that date, Jeanette was injured when the automobile
she was operating was struck by an uninsured driver.  The
Gores filed a claim with Progressive for uninsured-motorist
("UM") benefits based on Jeanette's injuries.  Subsequently,
Progressive 
commenced 
this action, seeking a judgment
declaring that "Jeanette Gore validly executed the UM
rejection in her individual capacity and as the agent for her
husband in procuring the policy" and, consequently, that
Progressive was not liable for UM benefits.
1070491
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Progressive moved for a summary judgment.  In their
response to Progressive's motion, the Gores argued: 
"The law in Alabama which applies to UM coverage
mandates that only a named insured can reject [UM]
coverage under a policy of automobile liability
insurance.  [Progressive] can offer no proof
whatsoever, that Gerald Gore, the only named insured
under the policy issued by Progressive, rejected
said coverage.  Therefore, Gerald Gore is entitled
to [UM] coverage under the policy, and [Jeanette
Gore] is entitled to  coverage as his spouse and as
a listed driver under the policy."
The Gores requested that the trial court "deny the relief
[sought] by Progressive, and ... enter an Order holding that
[they] are entitled to [UM] coverage and benefits under the
policy."  The trial court entered a summary judgment so
holding, and Progressive appealed.  
The resolution of this appeal turns on the application of
the Uninsured Motorist Statute, Ala. Code 1975, § 32-7-23(a),
to the undisputed facts of this case.  Section 32-7-23(a)
provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) No automobile liability or motor vehicle
liability policy insuring against loss resulting
from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or
death suffered by any person arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this
state with respect to any motor vehicle registered
or principally garaged in this state unless coverage
is provided therein or supplemental thereto, ... for
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5
the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death,
resulting 
therefrom; provided, that the named
insured shall have the right to reject such coverage
...."
(Emphasis added.) 
II. Standard of Review
"Our standard of review is de novo. That is the standard
by which we review the trial court's grant or denial of a
summary-judgment motion, as well as the standard by which we
review questions of law regarding statutory construction."
Bishop v. Chilton County, [Ms. 1061153, January 18, 2008] ___
So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008).  See Pinigis v. Regions Bank, 977
So. 2d 446 (Ala. 2007); Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 952 So. 2d 342 (Ala. 2006). 
III. Discussion
"The Uninsured Motorist Statute ..., absent rejection by
the named insured, mandates uninsured motorist coverage for
the protection of persons insured under a motor vehicle
liability policy."  Holloway v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 376
So. 2d 690, 694 (Ala. 1979) (emphasis added).  Under this
statute and well-established Alabama caselaw, any purported
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6
rejection or waiver of UM coverage by one who is not the named
insured is invalid.  Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 961
So. 2d 816, 819 (Ala. 2007) ("[I]f the named insured does not
reject UM coverage, the insurer must provide UM coverage not
only to the named insured, but also to any additional
insureds."); Continental Cas. Co. v. Pinkston, 941 So. 2d 926,
929 (Ala. 2006) ("[Section] 32-7-23, Ala. Code 1975, requires
that every automobile-liability-insurance policy issued or
delivered in Alabama provide uninsured/underinsured-motorist
coverage with limits for bodily injury or death of at least
$20,000 per person, unless the coverage is specifically
rejected in writing by the named insured."); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 292 Ala. 103, 289 So. 2d 606 (1974)
(written rejection of UM coverage by the spouse of the named
insured was ineffective to waive coverage for the named
insured or for the couple's daughter, who was injured by an
uninsured motorist); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 868 So.
2d 457 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (written rejection of UM coverage
by one spouse, who was a named insured, was ineffective to
waive coverage for the other spouse, who was also a named
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insured, or for the couple's son, who was killed by an
uninsured motorist).  
Progressive 
acknowledges, 
as 
it 
must, 
this 
well-
established principle.  However, relying on that portion of
the rejection clause in which Jeanette purported to "agree
that [her] rejection of [UM] Coverage [would] be binding on
all persons insured under the policy," Progressive invites
this Court to adopt an exception to this principle by
construing the statute to allow a person who is not a named
insured to reject coverage for the named insured as the
latter's "agent."  For that proposition, it cites cases from
lower appellate courts in Kansas and Louisiana, namely,
Ridgway v. Shelter Ins. Cos., 22 Kan. App. 2d 218, 913 P.2d
1231 (1996), and Soileau v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
182 So. 2d 76 (La. Ct. App. 1966).  Citing authority for
general principles of agency, Progressive argues that "[i]f
Jeanette Gore had the authority to bind her husband into a
policy of insurance with Progressive, [then she must have had]
the authority to bind him on one particular term of the
contract."  Progressive's brief, at 14.
1070491
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We need not decide whether, under our caselaw, general
principles of agency would allow an individual to waive UM
coverage by signing a rejection form as an agent for another,
because Jeanette signed the rejection form in her own name,
not in the name of the named insured.  Our statute makes no
provision for waiver by anyone other than the named insured.
Section 32-7-23(a) flatly declares "that the named insured
shall have the right to reject such coverage."  (Emphasis
added.)  The purposes of 32-7-23(a) are to "assure that a
person injured by an uninsured motorist will be able to
recover the total amount of [her] damages and that the insurer
will not be allowed to insert provisions in the policy
limiting the insured's recovery."  Star Freight, Inc. v.
Sheffield, 587 So. 2d 946, 957 (Ala. 1991) (some emphasis
added; some emphasis omitted).  "'[A] person relying on
another to make him or her a named insured may reasonably
expect that the coverages obtained will be those mandated by
law.'"  Nichols, 868 So. 2d at 462 (quoting Preferred Risk
Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 638 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 2002)).  What
Jeanette signed does not purport to be a waiver of UM coverage
by the named insured.  Instead, it merely purports to be a
1070491
9
rejection of UM coverage by Jeanette herself, acting only in
her individual capacity. 
IV. Conclusion  
Jeanette's execution of the rejection form was a nullity,
and the purported waiver of UM coverage was void. For these
reasons, the trial court did not err in entering a summary
judgment holding that the Gores are entitled to UM coverage
and benefits under the policy.  That judgment is, therefore,
affirmed.   
AFFIRMED. 
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and
Parker, JJ., concur.
See, J., concurs specially.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
1070491
10
SEE, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur fully in the main opinion.  I write specially
simply to note why I do not believe that Gerald Gore "signed"
the 
uninsured/underinsured-motorist 
insurance-coverage 
waiver.
The pertinent portion of § 32-7-23, Ala. Code 1975,
Alabama's Uninsured Motorist statute, provides:
"No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability
policy 
insuring 
against 
loss 
resulting 
from
liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death
suffered by any person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be
delivered or issued for delivery in this state with
respect 
to 
any 
motor 
vehicle 
registered 
or
principally garaged in this state unless coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto ... under
provisions approved by the Commissioner of Insurance
for the protection of persons insured thereunder who
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners
or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death,
resulting therefrom; provided, that the named
insured shall have the right to reject such coverage
...."
(Emphasis added.)  This Court has interpreted this statute to
"require[] that every automobile-liability-insurance policy
issued 
or 
delivered 
in 
Alabama 
provide
uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage with limits for
bodily injury or death of at least $20,000 per person, unless
the coverage is specifically rejected in writing by the named
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insured." Continental Cas. Co. v. Pinkston, 941 So. 2d 926,
929 (Ala. 2006).  As the main opinion states, "[u]nder this
statute and well-established Alabama caselaw, any purported
rejection or waiver of [uninsured-motorist] coverage by one
who is not the named insured is invalid." ___ So. 2d at ___.
Similarly, the main opinion notes that "[o]ur statute makes no
provision for waiver by anyone other than the named insured."
___ So. 2d at ___.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island recently discussed what
constitutes a "signature." Carrozza v. Carrozza, 944 A.2d 161
(R.I. 2008).  In that case, the question was the validity of
a grantor's "signature" on a deed when the "signature" "was
printed on the [deed] in separate block letters, rather than
in cursive adjoining letters."  Carrozza, 944 A.2d at 165. The
court noted:
"Black's Law Dictionary defines the term
'signature' as 'A person's name or mark written by
that person or at that person's direction.' Black's
Law Dictionary 1415 (8th ed. 2004). We are further
persuaded by the more explicit entry in the
dictionary's sixth edition, in which the term
'signature' was defined quite broadly. 'A signature
may 
be 
written 
by 
hand, 
printed, 
stamped,
typewritten, engraved, photographed, or cut from one
instrument and attached to another ....' Black's Law
Dictionary 1381 (6th ed. 1990). The validity of a
signature, therefore, does not turn on the form of
1070491
12
the mark; indeed any mark will suffice, as long as
that mark is adopted as one's own."
944 A.2d at 195.  See also Guam Election Comm'n v. Responsible
Choices for All Adults Coal., 2007 Guam 20 ¶ 68 (2007) ("A
'signature' is '1. A person's name or mark written by that
person or at the person's direction ....' (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 1387 (7th ed. 1999))).  This Court has reached
similar conclusions with respect to a signature on a deed.
See Loyd v. Oates, 143 Ala. 231, 233, 38 So. 1022, 1023 (1905)
("Moreover, this court has held ... that, if a husband and
wife 
appear 
before 
an 
officer 
and 
acknowledge 
their 
signatures
to a conveyance, the conveyance is valid, although neither of
them actually signed their names.");  Lewis v. Watson, 98 Ala.
479, 483, 13 So. 570, 572 (1893) ("It follows ... that if the
jury believed that Fletcher signed the sheriff's name to the
deed ... at the instance and in the presence of the latter ...
Holley acquired a perfect title to the land in question ...
when that deed was executed.").
In the case before us, it is undisputed that the only
name (or mark) that appears on the waiver is that of Jeanette
Gore.  Because Gerald Gore's name (or mark) does not appear on
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the waiver, he did not waive the uninsured/underinsured-
motorist coverage.