Title: Denton v. Chittenden Bank

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

DENTON_V_CHITTENDEN_BANK.93-247; 163 Vt 62; 655 A.2d 703

[Filed:  09-Dec-1994]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                              No. 93-247


Bernard A. Denton, Sandra                    Supreme Court
Denton, and their minor
children
                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      Chittenden Superior Court

Chittenden Bank                              January Term, 1994
and Christopher Bishop

Matthew I. Katz, J.

John J. Collins and Michael J. Harris of Sutherland & Collins, Inc.,
 Burlington, for plaintiffs- appellants 

Heather Briggs and Patricia M. Sabalis of Downs Rachlin & Martin, and Philip
 D. Saxer and Julie E. Singleton of Saxer, Anderson, Wolinsky & Sunshine,
 Burlington, for defendant-appellee Chittenden Bank 

Robert R. McKearin of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp, and Philip D. Saxer and Julie
 E. Singleton of Saxer, Anderson, Wolinsky & Sunshine, Burlington, for
 defendant-appellee Bishop 

PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
 Specially Assigned 


     MORSE, J. Plaintiffs Bernard and Sandra Denton, and their children Marc
and Sara, appeal a summary judgment ruling in favor of defendants Chittenden
Bank and Christopher Bishop dismissing their claims of (1) intentional
infliction of emotional distress by Bishop; (2) invasion of privacy by
Bishop; (3) breach of employment contract by the bank; (4) breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by the bank; and (5) loss of
consortium against both defendants.  We affirm. 

 

     Plaintiffs allege that the facts of this case support the inference that
Bishop embarked on an insulting, demeaning, and vindictive course of conduct
toward Denton that included ridicule, invasions of privacy, intentional
interference with ability to car pool, competitiveness in after- work sports,
and an unreasonable workload, all of which so affected Denton's physical and
mental state that he was forced to leave work on permanent disability. 
Because plaintiffs appeal from summary judgment, we recite the facts most
favorably to plaintiffs, giving plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable
inferences. 

     Bernard Denton began working at Chittenden Bank as a maintenance
employee in 1971. In 1981, the bank promoted him to assistant vice-president
in charge of buildings and grounds. His supervisor during this time was
Richard Fletcher, who regarded Denton as a valuable employee and with whom
Denton got along well.  In early 1987, Fletcher left the bank, and
Christopher Bishop assumed Fletcher's duties as part of a newly created
supervisory position. 

     Before Fletcher left the bank, he apprised Bishop of Denton's strengths
and weaknesses as an employee.  He told Bishop that Denton was a "hands-on"
supervisor who did not function well in areas requiring concentration of
figures such as the production of reports, budgets, and forecasts. Fletcher
cautioned Bishop not to "push" Denton, that Denton required careful
supervision because he was so hardworking, and that it was difficult to get
Denton to "slow down" and to take vacations.   Under Fletcher's supervision,
Denton set a demanding pace for himself, often working nights and weekends to
finish projects.  Fletcher described Denton as able to handle the stress of
his job extremely well. 

     Bishop directly supervised Denton from April 1987 until October 1988. 
Bishop's management style did not agree with Denton.  During that period,
Bishop asked Denton to make 

 

reports and required him to meet deadlines. Denton worked more nights and
weekends, including one Easter Sunday afternoon to complete his projects on
time.  Bishop at times shut off Denton's office telephone, telling him that
he need not take calls because he needed to get work done.  Bishop presented
Denton with a dictaphone and suggested he use it to dictate memoranda while
jogging so that he could get his work done quicker.  Bishop also scheduled
early morning meetings over Denton's objection that it would be difficult for
him to attend as the Denton family had only one car.  Bishop asked Denton to
continue to work on and improve memoranda that Denton submitted in final
form.  Bank management praised only Bishop for a project that he, Denton, and
members of other departments had worked on. 

     Not long after Bishop became Denton's supervisor, the growth of other
departments in their building required the bank to move Bishop and Denton
from private offices on the fourth floor to offices separated by sliding
wooden doors on the fifth floor.  Denton wanted these doors closed; Bishop
wanted them open with their desks facing each other.  As part of what Denton
called a childish game, Denton repeatedly closed the doors and Bishop
repeatedly opened them. Bishop also opened Denton's files and desk drawers
while Denton was on two-month sick leave, on one occasion asked Denton to
empty his brief case, and occasionally interrupted Denton's business meetings
without knocking. 

     In this office, as well as after work, Bishop explained to Denton his
dissatisfaction with other employees' job performance, and his hiring and
firing decisions.  Bishop made it abundantly clear that he weighed college
degrees heavily in making these decisions. He explained that someone in
Denton's position should have a degree and that people now being hired for
like positions were required to have one.  He made comments like, "It's too
bad you 

 

don't have a degree," and "I hope we can work on one."  Bishop went so far as
to tell Denton that the Bank had done Denton an injustice in giving him his
position. 

     Bishop also imposed himself on the Denton family during nonworking
hours.  He invited Denton to play basketball and volleyball, and changed into
his athletic clothes at the Denton home.  Denton did not feel comfortable
turning down the invitations, and although he thought the request strange,
permitted Bishop to change clothes at his home with no objection.  Bishop was
competitive during these games, often pairing off against Denton, and
sometimes calling Denton "old man" in front of Denton's son, Marc, who came
to watch his father play.  On one occasion, Bishop happened upon Denton and
his daughter at a ski resort, invited himself to ride the chair lift with
them, told Denton he planned to fire one of Denton's coworkers, and
challenged Denton to a race. 

     Early in April 1988, Denton told Bishop, his coworkers, and members of
his family that he had the flu and left work on sick leave which ultimately
lasted two months.  In truth, Denton was feeling stressed about all the
responsibilities Bishop assigned and fearful that he might lose his job.  
Bishop called the Denton home, as did other employees, approximately twenty
times during that two-month period, either to ask Denton a question or to see
how he was feeling. Bishop never spoke directly with Denton because the
family members who answered the phone kept the conversations short. 

     On April 10, a Sunday, Bishop and his fiancé visited the Denton
home.  Mrs. Denton answered the door, and Bishop stepped inside.  When Denton
came over to the door, Bishop asked him about his health and whether he was
on medication and seeing a doctor.  The Dentons happened to be celebrating
their daughter Sara's birthday, and although Bishop stayed near the 

 

front door while speaking with Denton, some guests overheard Bishop's
questions. 

     Denton returned to work at the end of May 1988.  He worked four months,
taking short- term disability leave in October of 1988 and eventually
long-term disability in October of 1989, claiming work-related stress.  The
bank terminated his employment shortly thereafter, although it paid his
disability claims.  This action followed. 

     The moving party on a motion for summary judgment must demonstrate that
no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. V.R.C.P. 56(c).  In ruling on the motion, a
trial court will give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable
doubts and inferences, and will regard the allegations in opposition to the
motion as true, so long as those allegations are supported by "affidavits or
other evidentiary material."  Messier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 154 Vt.
406, 409, 578 A.2d 98, 100 (1990). We review according to the same standards.
 Id.  We include, however, hearsay information garnered from affidavits
submitted by plaintiffs in support of their claims.  This inclusion is
harmless given our disposition.  Cf. Levy v. Town of St. Albans, 152 Vt. 139,
145-46, 564 A.2d 1361, 1365 (1989) (affidavit must be based on personal
knowledge to raise genuine issue of material fact). 

            I. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

     To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a
plaintiff must show extreme and outrageous conduct, done intentionally or
with reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress,
that has resulted in the suffering of extreme emotional distress. Crump v. P
& C Food Markets, Inc., 154 Vt. 284, 296, 576 A.2d 441, 448 (1990); Demag v.
American Ins. Cos., 146 Vt. 608, 611,