Title: BORKOSKI v YOST GOUAX ST PATR

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14265 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 JEROME F. BORKOSKI, individually, and as the Administrator of the Estate of MARY J. BORKOSKI, deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, ROBERT P. YOST, JAMES E. GOUAX and ST. PATRICK'S HOSPITAL, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Honorable Peter G. Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Knight, Dahood, Mackay and McLean, Anaconda, Montana David M. McLean argued, Anaconda, Montana For Respondents: Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Sherman V. Lohn argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: February 9, 1979 Decided: ~ P R 2 4 1979 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f and appellant Jerome Borkoski f i l e d t h i s medical malpractice and wrongful death a c t i o n on June 17, 1975, i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Missoula County, following t h e death of h i s wife, Mary Jane Borkoski, a s a r e s u l t of an automobile accident. Defendants i n t h e a c t i o n o r i g i n a l l y w e r e S t . P a t r i c k ' s Hospital and D r s . Robert Yost and James Gouax. P r i o r t o t r i a l , however, Borkoski s e t t l e d with S t . P a t r i c k ' s Hospital f o r $90,000. The h o s p i t a l i s not involved i n t h i s appeal. T r i a l commenced on December 12, 1977. On t h a t day, Borkoski argued h i s motion t o permit v o i r d i r e examination of prospective jurors a s t o t h e influence of a national campaign by leading insurance companies with regard t o jury awards. During discovery, it had been determined t h a t t h e insurance companies through which Yost and Gouax c a r r i e d t h e i r malpractice insurance had been very a c t i v e l y involved i n t h i s campaign. The g i s t of t h e advertisements was t h a t l a r g e jury awards would r e s u l t i n everyone paying higher insurance premiums. A f a i r example of these advertisements d e p i c t s a holding jury i n s t r u c t i o n " which states : "When awarding damages i n l i a b i l i t y cases, t h e jury i s cautioned t o be f a i r and t o bear i n mind t h a t money does n o t grow on t r e e s . I t must be paid through insurance premiums from uninvolved p a r t i e s , such a s yourselves." Beneath t h i s p i c t u r e i n l a r g e type i s t h e statement: "Too bad judges can' t read t h i s t o a jury." The advertise- ment then describes several cases which t h e sponsoring insurance company points o u t a s i l l u s t r a t i v e of "windfall" jury awards. The two-page ad then lists s e v e r a l suggestions t o clean up t h e "mess" concluding: "We can ask j u r i e s t o take i n t o account a vic- t i m ' s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s losses. And w e can urge t h a t awards r e a l i s t i c a l l y r e f l e c t t h e a c t u a l l o s s suffered--that they be a f a i r compen- s a t i o n , b u t n o t a reward. "Insurers, lawyers, judges--each of us shares some blame f o r t h i s m e s s . But it i s you, t h e public, who can b e s t begin t o clean it up. Don't underestimate your own influence. U s e it, a s w e a r e t r y i n g t o use ours." The sponsor of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r ad w a s Aetna L i f e and Casualty. D r . Gouax c a r r i e d h i s malpractice insurance with Aetna L i f e and Casualty. Borkoski has presented copies of t h i s and other s i m i l a r ads which appeared i n Time, Newsweek, Sports I l l u s t r a t e d , and Reader's Digest magazines during t h e approximate time of t h e impaneling of t h e jury. I n h i s motion Borkoski asked: "For permission t o examine prospective jurors with a l i n e of inquiry t o determine whether any prospective jurors have been exposed t o , have observed, o r a r e aware of t h e national campaign by leading insurance companies, d i r e c t e d p a r t i - c u l a r l y a t prospective jurors, t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t l a r g e jury v e r d i c t s a r e i n f a c t paid by t h e general public a t l a r g e and c o n s t i t u t e d 'wind- f a l l s ' t o t h e r e c i p i e n t s . " The D i s t r i c t Court denied t h i s motion. According t o t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e argument on t h i s motion, however, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d allow Borkoski t o "inquire a s t o each juror whether o r not they f e e l t h a t doctors a r e unneces- s a r i l y o r professional people a r e unnecessarily oppressed by s u i t s o r l a r g e v e r d i c t s . . ." Further, according t o an a f f i d a v i t f i l e d by t h e attorney f o r defendant doctors, Borkoski d i d i n q u i r e a s t o whether each juror was prejudiced a g a i n s t t h i s type of case and whether prospective jurors had read any a r t i c l e s o r advertisements about t h i s type of case which would a f f e c t t h e i r determination of t h e case. The exact questions asked during v o i r d i r e a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e due t o lack of t r a n s c r i p t . The t r i a l l a s t e d from December 1 2 t o December 19, 1977. ~ f t e r receiving t h e case, t h e jury d e l i b e r a t e d approximately f o r t y minutes before r e t u r n i n g a v e r d i c t i n favor of defen- dants. ~ o r k o s k i moved f o r a new t r i a l on t h e grounds t h a t he had been denied a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l jury when h i s v o i r d i r e motion had been denied and t h a t t h e v e r d i c t w a s n o t sup- ported by t h e evidence. The c o u r t denied h i s motion, and Borkoski appeals. On appeal Borkoski raises two r e l a t e d i s s u e s concerning t h e d e n i a l of h i s v o i r d i r e motion. These may be consoli- dated as follows: Whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r and denied Borkoski h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l jury when it refused t o allow Borkoski t o pursue a l i n e of i n q u i r y on v o i r d i r e t o determine whether any prospective j u r o r s w e r e biased a g a i n s t Borkoski a s t h e d i r e c t r e s u l t of t h e n a t i o n a l a d v e r t i s i n g campaigns by leading insurance c a r r i e r s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t l a r g e jury awards a r e i n f a c t paid by t h e gen- e r a l public and c o n s t i t u t e "windfalls" t o t h e r e c i p i e n t s . By t h i s appeal, Borkoski brings t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h i s Court a matter of increasing concern t o both l a y per- sons and lawyers. See e.g., Time, February 2 0 , 1978, a t 65; Business Week, J u l y 31, 1978, a t 39; 6 4 A.B.A.J. 531 (1978). The p o s s i b i l i t y of s e r i o u s p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t i n g t o personal i n j u r y p l a i n t i f f s as a r e s u l t of t h e a d v e r t i s i n g cam2aign being waged by t h e insurance companies c o n s t r a i n s t h i s Court t o reexamine i t s r u l e s on t h e p r o p r i e t y of t h e mention of insurance by a t t o r n e y s on v o i r d i r e . A s evidence of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of prejudice, see t h e psychological study reported a t 65 A.B.A.J. 68 (1979) which concludes t h a t "even a s i n g l e exposure t o one of t h e s e ads can dramatically lower t h e amount of award a juror i s w i l l i n g t o give." 65 A.B.A.J. I n i t i a l l y , w e agree with Borkoski as t o t h e purpose of v o i r d i r e examination: "The purpose of v o i r d i r e i s simply t o enable counsel t o determine t h e existence of b i a s and p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t of prospective j u r o r s and t o enable counsel t o e x e r c i s e i n t e l l i g e n t l y h i s peremptory challenges." S t a t e ex rel. Stephens v. D i s t r i c t Court (1976), 170 Mont. 22, 27, 550 P.2d 385, 388. "Although t h e t r i a l judge may set reasonable l i m i t s on t h e examination, he should permit ' l i b e r a l and probing examination c a l c u l a t e d t o discover p o s s i b l e b i a s o r preju- d i c e . . . I 1 1 Barton v. Owen (1977), 71 Cal.App.3d 484, 508, 139 Cal.Rptr. 494, 508 ( c i t a t i o n omitted). The reasonable l i m i t s t o be set must have due regard f o r t h e i n t e r e s t s of f a i r n e s s t o both p a r t i e s . Kiernan v. Van Schaik (3rd C i r . 1965)) 347 F.2d 775, 778; Langley v. Turner's Express, I n c . ( 4 t h C i r . 1967), 375 F.2d 296, 297. With t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i n mind, we t u r n t o an examina- t i o n of t h i s C o u r t ' s treatment of t h e mention of insurance during v o i r d i r e . This Court's opinion t h e p r o p r i e t y of i n q u i r y by an a t t o r n e y i n t o a prospective j u r o r ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e i n - surance i n d u s t r y has varied over time. The f i r s t case i n which t h e i s s u e w a s presented w a s Beeler v. Butte & London Copper Development Co. (1910), 4 1 Mont. 465, 1 1 0 P. 528. I n t h a t case, t h e respondents w e r e permitted t o ask each of t h e prospective j u r o r s whether they had any business rela- t i o n s with t h e Casualty Company of America. The Court con- cluded : ". . . Apparently respondents deemed t h i s i n f o r - mation necessary a s an a i d t o t h e i n t e l l i g e n t e x e r c i s e of t h e i r peremptory challenges. It does n o t appear t h a t e i t h e r t h e purpose o r ten- dency of t h e s e questions was t o inform t h e jury t h a t t h e burden of a judgment, i f obtained, would f a l l on an insurance company i n s t e a d of t h e defendant, and t h e company w a s n o t afterward mentioned i n t h e case. The f i r s t time t h e ques- t i o n was asked, no o b j e c t i o n whatever was made, and w e a r e unable t o see how t h e a p p e l l a n t could have been prejudiced by t h e examination." 4 1 Mont. a t 473, 110 P. a t 530. Beginning with t h e very next c a s e on t h e i s s u e , how- ever, t h i s d e c i s i o n began t o be eroded, primarily on t h e b a s i s of t h e timeliness of o b j e c t i o n t o t h e f i r s t question concerning a prospective j u r o r ' s business r e l a t i o n s with an insurance company. Robinson v. F.W. Woolworth Co. (1927), 80 Mont. 431, 261 P. 253, overruled on - o t h e r grounds, Hayward v. Richardson Construction Co. (1959), 136 Mont. 2 4 1 , 347 P.2d 475; Thomas v. Whiteside (1966), 148 Mont. 394, 421 P.2d 449. Beeler was distinguished: ". . . t h e opinion i n t h a t c a s e does n o t say what should have been t h e r u l i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t if o b j e c t i o n had been made t h e f i r s t t i m e t h e question w a s asked and w e say now had t h a t been done i n t h i s c a s e t h e o b j e c t i o n would have been v a l i d and, i n t h a t event, should have been sustained; t o have done otherwise, i n such event, would have c o n s t i t u t e d p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . On t h a t p o i n t , t h e a u t h o r i t i e s a r e divided b u t t h e weight of a u t h o r i t y and, w e b e l i e v e , sound reason a r e a g a i n s t t h e p r i v i l e g e of asking such questions. A venireman's business, occupation and connections can be learned, i n a proper way, on v o i r -- d i r e examination, without bringing i n t o t h e t r i a l such incompetent matter a s t h e carrying by defendant of indemnity insurance." 80 Mont. a t 443, 261 P. a t 257. Although Robinson w a s a c t u a l l y decided t h e same a s B e e l e r because of t h e f a i l u r e t o i n t e r p o s e an o b j e c t i o n t h e f i r s t time t h e question w a s asked, t h e penalty suggested i n Robinson w a s imposed one year l a t e r i n Wilson v. Thurston Co. (1928), 82 Mont. 492, 495-96, 267 P. 801, 801-02. This Court ordered a new t r i a l because of t h e prejudice caused when, over seasonable objection, t h e prospective j u r o r s w e r e asked whether they had any immediate r e l a t i v e s employed by any insurance company. By 1967, t h e type of question permitted i n Beeler w a s completely prohibited: "The f i r s t prospective juror examined by counsel f o r M r s . Avery w a s M r s . Anna Berry. Counsel f o r M r s . Avery inquired: "'Q. Now, I a m going t o ask you i f you o r your husband a r e t h e i n v e s t o r s i n any insurance companies? ' "At t h a t time an o b j e c t i o n was interposed by t h e C i t y and a motion f o r m i s t r i a l presented. The motion was denied and t h e v o i r d i r e continued. "This same question w a s asked of each of t h e twenty prospective jurors. I n some i n s t a n c e s , c o u n s e l ~ f o r ~ ~ r s . ~ v e r ~ would ask t h e question a s t h e l a s t question -- of t h e prospective j u r o r . The purpose of such questioning was obvious, improper and- completely p r e j u d i c i a l . "The law i s w e l l - s e t t l e d i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t t h e a c t i o n of t h e lower c o u r t i n permitting t h i s type of questioning on v o i r d i r e w a s p r e j u d i c i a l and r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . " Avery v. C i t y of Anaconda (1967), 149 Mont. 495, 497, 428 P.2d 465, 466. (Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) Despite t h i s f o r c e f u l pronouncement i n 1967, t h e Court, i n 1973, i n e f f e c t reversed i t s p o s i t i o n , explaining: "As a general r u l e i f counsel a c t s i n good f a i t h , he may question prospective j u r o r s on v o i r d i r e respecting t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n , o r connection with l i a b i l i t y insurance companies. See: Anno. 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 792, e t seq. f o r an exhaustive l i s t i n g of a u t h o r i t i e s i n support. The r a t i o n a l e behind t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e a s i n d i c a t e d by t h e s e c a s e s i s t h a t every l i t i g a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l jury; t h a t t o secure t h i s r i g h t , counsel f o r a l i t i g a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o question prospective jurors f o r t h e purpose of determining any b i a s o r prejudice on t h e i r p a r t ; t h a t one of t h e s e n s i t i v e areas of juror b i a s and prejudice relates t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o r non- e x i s t e n c e of insurance, p a r t i c u l a r l y l i a b i l i t y insurance; and accordingly counsel f o r a liti- g a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o a reasonable l a t i t u d e i n v o i r d i r e examination t o expose any such b i a s o r p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t of a prospective juror and t o enable a l i t i g a n t i n t e l l i g e n t l y t o exer- cise h i s challenges, l i m i t e d only by considera- t i o n s of good f a i t h . " Haynes v. County of M i s - soula (1973)t 163 Mont. 270, 287-88, 517 P.2d 370, 380. The r u l e t h u s adopted enjoys wide, although n o t unani- mous, support among o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have considered t h e q u e s t i o n , Annot., 4 ALR2d 761 and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . A s l i g h t expansion of t h i s r u l e which a l s o enjoys f a i r l y wide support involves asking n o t only whether prospective j u r o r s have a f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t o r connection i n t h e i n s u r - ance business a s stockholders o r employees, b u t a l s o whether they are insurance policyholders i n a p a r t i c u l a r company themselves. E.g., Fowler v. Burks (1974), 52 Ala.App. 14, 288 So.2d 798, 799; Kath v. Brodie (1955), 132 Colo. 338, 287 P.2d 957, 958; Haston v . Hightower (1965), 1 1 1 Ga.App. 87, 140 S.E.2d 525, 526; B a r r e t t v . Morris (Mo. App. 1973), 495 S.W.2d 100, 103. This latter expansion g e n e r a l l y ap- p l i e s only i f t h e insurance company i s a named p a r t y o r i s a mutual insurance company i n which member p o l i c y h o l d e r s ' premiums a r e determined d i r e c t l y by t h e amount of damages paid. The r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e r u l e i n t h e former circumstance i s t h a t i f t h e insurance company i s a named defendant, t h e need t o keep information about insurance coverage from t h e jury disappears; i n t h e l a t t e r circumstance, where t h e insurance premium paid by a prospective j u r o r may be d i r e c t l y determined by t h e amount of damages awarded, t h e p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o l e a r n of t h e j u r o r ' s d i r e c t f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t i n t h e outcome. On t h e more s p e c i f i c i s s u e presented by Borkoski of whether an a t t o r n e y may i n q u i r e on v o i r d i r e i n t o t h e pro- s p e c t i v e j u r o r s ' p o s s i b l e b e l i e f , formed by reading o r hearing insurance company a d v e r t i s i n g , news a r t i c l e s , o r o t h e r o u t s i d e m a t e r i a l , t h a t l a r g e jury v e r d i c t s w i l l r e s u l t i n l a r g e r insurance premiums f o r them, t h e c a s e s are f a r fewer i n number. The c a s e s addressing t h i s i s s u e are a l s o f a r from any s o r t of agreement. The j u r i s d i c t i o n s of C a l i f o r n i a , Kentucky, Hissouri, North Carolina, Texas, and t h e Court of Appeals f o r t h e Third C i r c u i t hold t h a t such i n q u i r y is p r e j u d i c i a l and i f allowed c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Barton v. Owen (1977), 71 Cal.App.3d 484, 508, 139 Cal.Rptr. 494, 508; Murrell v. Spillman (Ky. 1969), 442 S.W.2d 590, 591; Butcher v. Main 19 M.C.App. 386, 198 S.E.2d 752, 753; Brockett v. ice (Tex.Civ.App. 1969), 445 S.W.2d 20, 22; Kiernan v. Van Schaik (3d C i r . 1965), 347 F.2d 775, 782-83. The r a t i o n a l e f o r t h e s e d e c i s i o n s v a r i e s . I n t h e North Carolina, C a l i f o r n i a and Texas cases, t h e r e s p e c t i v e c o u r t s held t h a t t h i s type of i n q u i r y improperly conveyed t h e impression t h a t t h e defendant was covered by l i a b i l i t y insurance. Exemplary of t h e i r reasoning i s t h a t of t h e Texas Court of C i v i l Appeals i n Brockett: ". . . counsel then asked t h e whole panel 'whe- t h e r any of them thought t h a t a v e r d i c t i n t h e c a s e would a f f e c t t h e i r insurance r a t e s . ' The necessary e f f e c t of t h i s w a s t o i n f e r t h a t a p p e l l a n t had insurance because a v e r d i c t could n o t possibly a f f e c t t h e i r r a t e s u n l e s s he had insurance. This was e r r o r . " 445 S.W.2d a t 22. Accord, Maness, 198 S.E.2d a t 753; Barton, 139 Cal.Rptr. a t I n t h e Missouri, Kentucky and Third C i r c u i t Court of Appeals cases, t h e r e s p e c t i v e c o u r t s merely held t h a t exclu- s i o n of t h i s type of questioning lies w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l court. ( P a r e n t h e t i c a l l y , w e note t h a t t h e o t h e r Federal Courts of Appeal which have considered t h e mention of insurance during v o i r d i r e disagree. See, Annot., 40 A.L.R.Fed. 541 (1978); cf.Langley v. Turner's Express, Inc. ( 4 t h C i r . 1967), 375 F.2d 296 (any mention of insurance held p r e j u d i c i a l ) with Wichman v. United Disposal, Inc. ( 8 t h C i r . 1977), 553 F.2d 1104 (inquiry only as t o business involvement with an insurance company is p e r m i s s i b l e ) . Kiernan, supra, r e l i e d on heavily by Borkoski, does support t h i s l a t t e r view. 347 F.2d a t 782.) A t t h e o t h e r extreme, t h e Supreme Court of Arkansas, i n a very r e c e n t case v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o t h e i n s t a n t appeal, has held such i n q u i r y i s proper, s o long a s it is conducted i n good f a i t h . King v. Westlake (1978), Ark. , 572 S.W.2d 841. The s i m i l a r i t y t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e a s well a s t h e d e c i s i o n by t h e Arkansas c o u r t i s contained i n t h e following excerpt: "The record shows t h a t f o r sometime preceding t h e t r i a l d a t e a number of l i a b i l i t y insurance com- panies had run advertisements i n T i m e , The Wall S t r e e t Journal and t h e Smithsonian I n s t i t u t e maga- z i n e aimed a t j u r o r s i n general t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t j u r o r s themselves w e r e a f f e c t e d by t h e v e r d i c t s they rendered i n t h a t such v e r d i c t s r e s u l t e d i n increased premiums. "On v o i r d i r e by a p p e l l e e ' s counsel and i n re- sponse t o questioning a number of p o t e n t i a l j u r o r s responded t h a t they had read - T i m e , -- The W a l l S t r e e t Journal, o r t h e Smithsonian I n s t i t u t e magazine. A l l b u t two of t h e j u r o r s i n d i c a t e d t h a t they had seen one o r more of t h e advertisements. There- a f t e r , a s a b s t r a c t e d by a p p e l l a n t t h e record shows: " ' M r . Eubanks continued: " ' I t i s improper f o r e i t h e r s i d e t o imply o r sug- g e s t t h a t t h e defendant does o r does n o t have i n - surance, and t h e questions I w i l l now d i r e c t t o you have nothing t o do with whether o r n o t t h e defendant has insurance. The questions I w i l l ask concern your insurance premiums, n o t insurance i n t h i s case. H o w many of you b e l i e v e t h a t jury ver- d i c t s a f f e c t insurance premiums? "'Your insurance premiums may n o t be a f f e c t e d g r e a t l y one way or t h e o t h e r , b u t w i l l n o t t h e v e r d i c t s t h a t you render have some e f f e c t on your insurance r a t e s ? "'Venireman Gerald Hudgens responded: Y e s . "'Mr. Eubanks continued: "'The question I have been building up t o i s t h i s : Assuming t h a t t h e v e r d i c t you render could c o s t you a l i t t l e more o r a l i t t l e less money on your insurance premiums, can you l i s t e n t o t h e testimony, t h e statements of counsel, and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and then p u t a s i d e t h e f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t you have i n t h i s c a s e because of your insurance premiums and render a v e r d i c t ? ( A l l j u r o r s r a i s e d t h e i r h a n d s . ) ' "The v o i r d i r e of t h e jury was obviously i n good f a i t h and a s such was proper. See Dedmon v. Thalheimer, 226 Ark. 402, 290 S.W.2d 16 (1956), where w e held t h e purpose of v o i r d i r e examination i s t o enable counsel t o a s c e r t a i n whether t h e r e i s ground f o r a challenge of a juror f o r cause, o r f o r a peremptory challenge and t h a t s o long a s counsel a c t s i n good f a i t h , he may, i n one form o r another question prospective j u r o r s respecting t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n o r connection with l i a b i l i t y insurance companies." 572 S.W.2d a t 843-44. Approaching t h e i s s u e from a d i f f e r e n t angle, t h e Supreme Court of Queens County i n New York held t h a t t h e type of insurance company advertisements a t i s s u e h e r e i n v i o l a t e d a p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o an i m p a r t i a l jury and con- s t i t u t e d jury tampering and t h e r e f o r e could be r e s t r a i n e d . Quinn v. Aetna Insurance Co. (1978), N.Y.Misc.2d I 409 N.Y.S.2d 473. S i m i l a r l y , t h e Commissioners of Insurance i n Kansas and Connecticut have entered i n t o consent decrees with one insurance company whereby t h e company agreed t o s t o p publishing s i m i l a r advertisements i n those s t a t e s . I n re Crum and F o r s t e r Insurance Companies, Kan., Office of t h e Commissioner of Insurance, June 27, 1978; I n r e Crum and F o r s t e r Insurance Companies, Conn., Office of t h e S t a t e Insurance Commissioner, August 1 4 , 1978. Somewhere between t h e above extremes l i e t h e d e c i s i o n s of c o u r t s i n Connecticut, Maryland, and Oregon. Lowell v. Daly (1961)r 148 Conn. 266, 169 A.2d 888; Kujawa v. B a l t i - more T r a n s i t Co. (1961), 2 2 4 Md. 195, 167 A.2d 96; Johnson v. Hansen (1964), 237 Ore. 1, 389 P.2d 330. These t h r e e j u r i s d i c t i o n s held t h a t , on t h e record before t h e Court, t h e i n q u i r y was improper y e t i n d i c a t e t h a t had t h e proper founda- t i o n been l a i d f o r t h e inquiry, it would have been permis- s i b l e . I n t h e words of t h e Oregon Supreme Court: " I n t h e c a s e a t bar t h e r e w a s no preliminary ----- -- showing of any f a c t t h a t might have made r e l e - -- -- vant -- aninquiry concerning b i a s a r i s i n g o u t -- of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of v e r d i c t s and insurance pre- miums. Where a line of questioning obviously i s going t o open up p r e j u d i c i a l speculation, e.g., of a r a c i a l , r e l i g i o u s , p o l i t i c a l o r o t h e r emotionally charged nature, t h e exploration of which w i l l manifestly i n c i t e s i m i l a r speculation upon t h e p a r t of l i s t e n i n g jurors, counsel must be prepared t o show t h e need which might make such an inquiry r e l e v a n t , o r run t h e r i s k of an immediate m i s t r i a l . Insurance matters should be handled with t h e same safeguards. -- I n t h e case before us counsel d i d not advise t h e c o u r t -- - of -- t h e existence of recent i n s t i t u t i o n a l adver- t i s i n g , -- o r of o t h e r c u r r e n t propaganda calculated t o produce b i a s upon t h e p a r t of j u r o r s i n t h e - --- -- l o c a l court. Thus t h e r e w a s n o o c c a s i o n t o open up t h e matter of insurance, whether innocently o r with s c i e n t e r . W e hold t h a t t h e inquiry was improper." Johnson, 389 P.2d a t 331. (Emphasis added. ) Accord, Kujawa, 167 A.2d a t 98; Lowell, 169 A.2d a t 889. The holdings i n these cases a r e important i n our resolu- t i o n of t h e s i t u a t i o n such as t h e one presented i n t h e i n s t a n t appeal. The attorney f o r Borkoski d i d present t o t h e t r i a l court evidence of recent i n s t i t u t i o n a l advertising by t h e very insurance companies involved i n t h e case; adver- t i s i n g c a r r i e d i n popular national magazines a t about t h e t i m e of t h e drawing of t h e jury panel; advertising calcu- l a t e d t o produce b i a s upon t h e p a r t of jurors a g a i n s t award- i n g l a r g e amounts of damages t o personal i n j u r y p l a i n t i f f s such a s Borkoski. Under these circumstances, w e conclude t h a t a l i n e of inquiry designed t o uncover t h i s possible b i a s should be permitted. When insurance companies i n j e c t t h e i s s u e of insurance i n t o t h e consciousness of every p o t e n t i a l juror through a high priced advertising campaign, as has been i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h i s case, they t h r e a t e n every p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o an i m p a r t i a l jury. 1972 Mont. Const. A r t . 11, 526. I n such c a s e s , it is only f a i r t h a t a t t o r n e y s have some means t o s e c u r e t h i s r i g h t f o r t h e i r c l i e n t s . L i b e r a l v o i r d i r e i s t h e b e s t means t o t h i s end. S t a t e ex rel. Stephens v. D i s - t r i c t Court, 170 Mont. a t 27, 550 P.2d a t 388. See a l s o , comments of U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s Law P r o f e s s o r J e f f r e y O'Connell i n Time, February 20, 1978, a t 65. Therefore, w e hold t h a t i n a p p r o p r i a t e c a s e s a n a t t o r - ney upon v o i r d i r e may i n q u i r e of p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s whether they have any business r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h insurance companies and whether they a r e p o l i c y h o l d e r s of an insurance company named a s a defendant o r o f a mutual insurance company i n - volved i n t h e case. W e f u r t h e r hold t h a t , upon a proper showing of p o s s i b l e p r e j u d i c e , an a t t o r n e y may i n q u i r e whether a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r has heard o r r e a d anything t o i n d i c a t e t h a t jury v e r d i c t s f o r p l a i n t i f f s i n personal i n j u r y c a s e s r e s u l t i n higher insurance premiums f o r every- one; i f s o , whether t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r b e l i e v e s such m a t e r i a l s ; and i f s o , whether t h a t b e l i e f w i l l i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e j u r o r ' s a b i l i t y t o render a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l v e r d i c t . Depending upon t h e responses r e c e i v e d t o t h e s e i n q u i r i e s and s u b j e c t t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t , l i m i t e d follow-up i n q u i r i e s may be made. W e d e c l i n e t o hypothesize a s t o t h e p e r m i s s i b l e n a t u r e o r e x t e n t of t h e s e follow-up q u e s t i o n s a t t h i s t i m e . W e do conclude, however, t h a t t h e a l l e g e d p l a n of Borkoski's a t t o r n e y t o c i r c u l a t e among t h e jury panel c o p i e s of t h e insurance companies' advertisements would have been been improper and would have l e d t o t h e very p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t which Borkoski i s now arguing. Liber v. F l o r (1966), 160 Colo. 7, 415 P.2d 332, 339. It i s n o t our i n t e n t t o ignore t h e equal r i g h t of a defendant t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l jury. Therefore, w e f u r t h e r hold t h a t , a s a prelude t o any questions concerning whether a p o t e n t i a l juror has read o r heard anything t o i n d i c a t e t h a t jury v e r d i c t s f o r p l a i n t i f f s i n personal i n j u r y cases r e s u l t i n higher insurance premiums f o r every- one, an a t t o r n e y must ask c e r t a i n g e n e r a l introductory ques- t i o n s . These i n i t i a l questions may be approached from two d i r e c t i o n s : (1) whether t h e prospective juror has heard of o r read anything ( n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e d t o insurance) which might a f f e c t h i s a b i l i t y t o s i t a s an i m p a r t i a l juror ( a s was done by t h e t r i a l judge i n t h i s case); o r ( 2 ) whe- t h e r t h e prospective juror r e g u l a r l y reads any of t h e maga- zines o r newspapers i n which it has been demonstrated t h a t t h e insurance advertisements o r a r t i c l e s had appeared ( a s w a s done i n Westlake). A n a t t o r n e y may u t i l i z e e i t h e r o r both of t h e s e approaches. I f , however, no p o s i t i v e responses a r e received t o t h e s e introductory i n q u i r i e s , t h e r e i s no reason t o pursue f u r t h e r t h e l i n e of i n q u i r y w e have approved above. The foregoing r u l e s a r e a l l s u b j e c t t o a showing t h a t counsel i s a c t i n g i n good f a i t h and is n o t merely attempting t o impress on t h e jury t h e f a c t t h a t t h e defendant may be covered by insurance. Haynes v. County of Missoula, 163 Mont. a t 287, 517 P.2d a t 380. W e f u l l y subscribe t o t h e following procedure and statement adopted by t h e New Mexico Supreme Court i n Canter v. Lowry (1961), 69 N.M. 81, 364 ". . . t h e p r a c t i c e which has developed i n many j u r i s d i c t i o n s of advising t h e t r i a l c o u r t , i n t h e absence of t h e jury, of t h e questions pro- posed t o be asked, t h e purpose t h e r e o f , and making of a showing of good f a i t h , i s d e f i n i t e l y p r e f e r r e d . . . F a i l u r e t o follow such p r e f e r r e d p r a c t i c e has a tendency t o negative a claim of good f a i t h . Contrariwise, t h e following of such p r a c t i c e would minimize t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of any p r e j u d i c e o r i n j u s t i c e t o e i t h e r of t h e p a r t i e s i n many cases, a s well a s being a considerable saving of t r i a l t i m e . " ( C i t a t i o n omitted. ) The question of whether t h e v o i r d i r e i s i n f a c t being conducted i n good f a i t h i s thus l e f t t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t . S t a t e ex r e l . Stephens v. D i s t r i c t Court, 170 Mont. a t 27, 550 P.2d a t 388. For t h e guidance of t h e t r i a l c o u r t s i n t h e s e matters, w e commend t o t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t h e v o i r d i r e approved by t h e Arkansas Supreme Court i n King v. Westlake (1978) t Ark. , 572 S.W.2d 841, 843-44, and quoted above. Unfortunately, t h e foregoing conclusions do n o t a v a i l Borkoski on t h i s appeal. Even though w e accept Borkoski's arguments, it i s undeniable t h a t t h e purpose of t h e adver- tisements was t o reduce t h e amount of - damages awarded by a jury. A t no p o i n t i s it suggested, e i t h e r by Borkoski o r i n t h e advertisements themselves, t h a t j u r i e s should n o t f i n d a p a r t y negligent i n t h e f i r s t place. The ads speak only t o damages, n o t l i a b i l i t y . Here, t h e jury found defendant doctors n o t l i a b l e a t a l l . The jury d i d n o t even reach t h e question of damages. I n such a case, Borkoski's arguments l o s e t h e i r v i t a l i t y , and any e r r o r committed must be viewed as harmless and n o t grounds f o r r e v e r s a l . Rule 61, M . R . C ~ V . P . The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is affirmed. W e concur: 4 d % , g Chief J u s t i c e v e,- u s t i c e s V