Title: Toledo Bar Assn. v. Rehkopf

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Toledo Bar Assn. v. Rehkopf, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3907.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3907 
TOLEDO BAR ASSOCIATION v. REHKOPF. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Toledo Bar Assn. v. Rehkopf, Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-3907.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including continuing to represent a client when a conflict of interest may be 
created, even with client consent, if the representation would involve the 
assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the 
lawyer in the same proceeding and communicating about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer—Public reprimand. 
(No. 2018-0539—Submitted May 8, 2018—Decided September 27, 2018.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2017-053. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Brandon Rehkopf, of Toledo, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0089374, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2012.  In 
October 2017, relator, Toledo Bar Association, charged him with violating multiple 
professional-conduct rules for representing two clients with conflicting interests.  
The Board of Professional Conduct considered the case on the parties’ consent-to-
discipline agreement.  See Gov.Bar R. V(16). 
{¶ 2} In the agreement, Rehkopf admitted that in August 2014, he agreed to 
represent Althea Hemmert and her ex-husband, Anthony Collins, in a tax-
foreclosure lawsuit.  Rehkopf later discovered, however, that another attorney had 
already entered an appearance on Hemmert’s behalf.  Rehkopf therefore advised 
Hemmert that he could represent only Collins and not her.  Nevertheless, over the 
next two years, Rehkopf met with Hemmert and Collins on several occasions, 
counseled them regarding the tax-foreclosure case, and regularly communicated 
with Hemmert by phone and e-mail. 
{¶ 3} At one point, Hemmert and Collins met with Rehkopf, and Collins 
directed Rehkopf to prepare a deed transferring the foreclosed property from 
Collins to Hemmert.  Both Collins and Hemmert signed an agreement waiving any 
conflict of interest resulting from Rehkopf’s joint representation of them for 
purposes of the property transfer.  Rehkopf thereafter prepared a deed and a transfer 
agreement.  However, he made no attempt to determine whether Hemmert was still 
represented by other counsel or to obtain consent from that attorney before drafting 
the documents.  Nor did he attempt to discern whether Hemmert wished to speak 
to another attorney before entering into the transaction. 
{¶ 4} Later in the foreclosure proceeding, Collins directed Rehkopf to settle 
all claims against him.  On behalf of Collins only, Rehkopf agreed to a consent 
entry, which eventually resulted in the court concluding that the deed transferring 
January Term, 2018 
 
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the property to Hemmert was void.  Rehkopf neither consulted with nor advised 
Hemmert about the consent entry. 
{¶ 5} Based on this conduct, the parties stipulated that Rehkopf engaged in 
improper dual representation of Collins and Hemmert—or, at the very least, that he 
created the appearance of dual representation—and therefore violated Prof.Cond.R. 
1.7(a) (providing that a lawyer’s representation of a client creates a conflict of 
interest if the representation will be directly adverse to another current client or if 
there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to represent the client will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client), 1.7(b) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from accepting or continuing the representation of a client if 
the representation would create a conflict of interest, unless the lawyer would be 
able to provide competent, diligent representation to each affected client, each 
affected client gives informed consent in writing, and the representation is not 
prohibited by law or would not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against 
another in the same proceeding), and 1.7(c)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
continuing a representation if a conflict of interest is created, even with client 
consent, if the representation would involve the assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same proceeding).  The 
parties also stipulated that by giving Hemmert advice in the foreclosure proceeding, 
Rehkopf violated Prof.Cond.R. 4.2 (prohibiting a lawyer from communicating 
about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer 
or is authorized to do so by law or court order). 
{¶ 6} The parties agreed that no aggravating factors are present and that in 
mitigation, Rehkopf has no prior disciplinary record, he lacked a dishonest or 
selfish motive, he made timely restitution by refunding Hemmert’s $500 retainer, 
he cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings, and he submitted evidence of his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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good character and reputation.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1) through (5).  As a 
sanction, the parties jointly recommended a public reprimand. 
{¶ 7} The board found that the consent-to-discipline agreement conforms to 
the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(16) and recommends that we adopt the 
agreement in its entirety.  To support the recommended sanction, the board cited a 
number of cases imposing public reprimands for similar violations of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.7 or 4.2—or the corresponding disciplinary rule under the former Code of 
Professional Responsibility—and with comparable mitigating factors.  See, e.g., 
Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Reid, 102 Ohio St.3d 402, 2004-Ohio-3121, 811 N.E.2d 
542; Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Leiken, 143 Ohio St.3d 21, 2014-Ohio-5220, 
34 N.E.3d 73; Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Wick, 116 Ohio St.3d 193, 2007-Ohio-6042, 
877 N.E.2d 660; Disciplinary Counsel v. Sartini & Tarighati, 114 Ohio St.3d 205, 
2007-Ohio-3601, 871 N.E.2d 543; and Toledo Bar Assn. v. Mansour-Ismail, 86 
Ohio St.3d 27, 711 N.E.2d 223 (1999). 
{¶ 8} Upon our review of the record, we agree that Rehkopf engaged in the 
stipulated misconduct.  “Lawyers must avoid all actual and potential conflicts of 
interest so as not to dilute their independent loyalty to each client.”  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Jacobs, 109 Ohio St.3d 252, 2006-Ohio-2292, 846 N.E.2d 1260, ¶ 8.  
We also agree that consistent with our precedent, the circumstances here warrant a 
public reprimand.  We therefore adopt the parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement. 
{¶ 9} Brandon Rehkopf is hereby publicly reprimanded for violating 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.7(a), 1.7(b), 1.7(c), and 4.2.  Costs are taxed to Rehkopf. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, 
and DEGENARO, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2018 
 
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Joseph P. Dawson, Bar Counsel; Bugbee & Conkle, L.L.P., and Janell M. 
Matuszak; and Goranson, Parker & Bella Co., L.P.A., and Christopher F. Parker, 
for relator. 
Gallagher Sharp, L.L.P., Monica Sansalone, and Kevin Marchaza, for 
respondent. 
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