Title: State v. Lester

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Lester, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5204.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-5204 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. LESTER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Lester, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-5204.] 
Criminal procedure—Crim.R. 32(C)—Requirements for a judgment entry of 
conviction—Entry corrected as to formal requirement not subject to new 
appeal. 
(Nos. 2010-1007 and 2010-1372—Submitted April 6, 2011—Decided  
October 13, 2011. 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Auglaize County,  
No. 2-10-20. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  A judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 
when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the 
judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the 
journal by the clerk.  (Crim.R. 32(C), explained; State v. Baker, 119 Ohio 
St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, modified.)    
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2.  A nunc pro tunc judgment entry issued for the sole purpose of complying with 
Crim.R. 32(C) to correct a clerical omission in a final judgment entry is 
not a new final order from which a new appeal may be taken. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} We are asked to determine this question:  Is a nunc pro tunc 
judgment entry that is issued for the sole purpose of complying with Crim.R. 
32(C) to correct a clerical omission in a prior final judgment entry a new final 
order from which a new appeal may be taken?  We conclude that no new right of 
appeal is created by such an entry, and we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} In 2006, a jury found appellant, Steven Lester, guilty of various 
crimes.  Appellant was sentenced to prison, and he was advised at the sentencing 
hearing that he would be subject to postrelease control after completing his prison 
term.  In accordance with Crim.R. 32(C), the judgment entry of conviction stated, 
“The Court finds the Defendant has been convicted of [abduction, theft, attempted 
felonious assault, and aggravated menacing],” but the judgment entry did not set 
out whether the conviction was based upon a guilty or no-contest plea or upon a 
bench trial or jury trial.  Appellant appealed, and the court of appeals vacated part 
of the sentence and remanded the cause for resentencing because of an error in the 
sentence regarding postrelease control.  Third Dist. No. 2-06-31, 2007-Ohio-4239.  
Appellant meanwhile filed a motion for postconviction relief, which was 
dismissed by the trial court.  The dismissal was affirmed by the appellate court, 
and this court declined further discretionary review.  Third Dist. No. 2-07-23, 
2007-Ohio-5627; 117 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2008-Ohio-1279, 883 N.E.2d 457. 
{¶ 3} On remand, the trial court resentenced appellant to the same prison 
term to which it had originally sentenced him, and it corrected the postrelease-
January Term, 2011 
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control portion of the sentence.  Again, the sentencing entry stated, “The Court 
finds the Defendant has been convicted of [abduction, theft, attempted felonious 
assault, and aggravated menacing],” but the judgment entry did not set out how 
appellant’s original convictions were effected, that is, whether they were based 
upon a guilty or no-contest plea or findings after a bench trial or a verdict after a 
jury trial. 
{¶ 4} Appellant again appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s sentence.  Third Dist. No. 2-07-34, 2008-Ohio-1148.  This court declined 
to accept a discretionary appeal.  119 Ohio St.3d 1413, 2008-Ohio-3880, 891 
N.E.2d 771.  Appellant then filed a second motion for postconviction relief, which 
the trial court also denied.  The denial was affirmed by the appellate court, and 
this court declined further review.  (May 11, 2009) Third Dist. No. 2-08-24; 122 
Ohio St.3d 1524, 2009-Ohio-4776, 913 N.E.2d 459. 
{¶ 5} On April 5, 2010, the trial court sua sponte filed a nunc pro tunc 
judgment entry.  The nunc pro tunc entry supplemented the wording of the 
original resentencing judgment entry by adding the following sentence to the 
existing text: “The Court finds the Defendant has been convicted, pursuant to a 
verdict at Jury Trial returned May 16, 2006, of [abduction, theft, attempted 
felonious assault, and aggravated menacing].”  (Emphasis sic.)  Appellant filed a 
notice of appeal from this nunc pro tunc entry in the Third District Court of 
Appeals.  Before the matter was set for briefing, the appellate court sua sponte 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  (May 12, 2010) Third Dist. App. 
No. 2-10-20.  The court concluded that the nunc pro tunc entry had been issued 
“for the sole purpose of retrospectively correcting a clerical omission in the prior 
sentencing judgment to comply with Crim.R. 32.  No new or substantial right was 
affected under R.C. 2505.02(A)(1) [the final-order statute] by correction of the 
sentencing judgment to reflect what actually occurred and what clearly was 
evident throughout the record and, especially, to appellant.  Appellant exhausted 
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the appellate process when the resentencing judgment was reviewed and affirmed 
on appeal, and the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept it on further appeal.”  
The court held that the April 5, 2010 nunc pro tunc entry, consequently, was not a 
final order subject to appeal. 
{¶ 6} Thereafter, appellant obtained a certification of a conflict of the 
decision in this case with that of State v. Lampkin, Lucas App. No. L-09-1270, 
2010-Ohio-1971. We recognized the conflict and accepted appellant’s 
discretionary appeal.  126 Ohio St.3d 1579 and 1581, 2010-Ohio-4542, 934 
N.E.2d 353 and 354. 
II. Crim.R. 32(C) and State v. Baker 
{¶ 7} As a threshold matter to the question presented in this appeal, we 
must address a separate issue: whether a judgment entry of conviction that states 
the fact of defendant’s conviction but does not state how the conviction was 
effected is nevertheless a final order from which an appeal may be taken.  This 
issue arises because the judgment entry of conviction prior to the nunc pro tunc 
entry in the case now before us stated the fact of defendant’s conviction but did 
not state whether the defendant was convicted through a guilty plea, a no-contest 
plea upon which the court made a finding of guilt, a finding of guilt based upon a 
bench trial, or a guilty verdict resulting from a jury trial.  Resolution of this 
foregoing issue requires a discussion of Crim.R. 32(C) and our decision in State v. 
Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163. 
{¶ 8} Crim.R. 32(C) specifies what a judgment entry of conviction must 
contain: “A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict, or 
findings, upon which each conviction is based, and the sentence.”1  In State v. 
                                                 
1  {¶ a} The remainder of Crim.R. 32(C) provides: 
    {¶ b} “Multiple judgments of conviction may be addressed in one judgment entry.  If the 
defendant is found not guilty or for any other reason is entitled to be discharged, the court shall 
render judgment accordingly.  The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall enter it on the 
journal.  A judgment is effective only when entered on the journal by the clerk.”   
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Baker, we confirmed that a judgment entry of conviction must contain the 
Crim.R. 32(C) elements to be final and subject to appeal: “A judgment of 
conviction is a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the 
guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding of the court upon which the conviction 
is based; (2) the sentence; (3) the signature of the judge; and (4) entry on the 
journal by the clerk of court.”  119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 
163, syllabus. 
{¶ 9} In Baker, we also stated that Crim.R. 32 only requires a trial court 
“to sign and journalize a document memorializing the sentence and the manner of 
the conviction:  a guilty plea, a no contest plea upon which the court has made a 
finding of guilt, a finding of guilt based upon a bench trial, or a guilty verdict 
resulting from a jury trial.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at ¶ 14.  However, this 
foregoing sentence appears to have created confusion and generated litigation 
regarding whether a trial court’s inadvertent omission of a defendant’s “manner of 
conviction” affects the finality of a judgment entry of conviction.  See, e.g., State 
v. Lampkin, Lucas App. No. L-09-1270, 2010-Ohio-5988, certified conflict and 
discretionary appeal accepted, 127 Ohio St.3d 1544, 1546, 2011-Ohio-647, 941 
N.E.2d 802, 803 (holding that a judgment of conviction that does not comply with 
Baker is not a final, appealable order); State v. Tuggle, Lucas App. No. L-09-
1317, 2010-Ohio-4162, ¶ 4, discretionary appeal and cross-appeal not accepted, 
128 Ohio St.3d 1411, 2011-Ohio-828, 942 N.E.2d 384 (finding that the 
appellant’s original appeal was a legal nullity and that the appeal following 
resentencing was the appellant's first appeal as of right); State v. Hooper, 
Montgomery App. No. 22883, 2010-Ohio-4041, discretionary appeal accepted, 
128 Ohio St.3d 1499, 2011-Ohio-2420, 947 N.E.2d 683 (rejecting the argument 
that an entry that omitted the manner of the conviction was not a final, appealable 
order); State v. Heft (June 4, 2010), Logan App. No. 8-10-05, discretionary appeal 
accepted, 127 Ohio St.3d 1449, 2010-Ohio-5762, 937 N.E.2d 1038 (holding that a 
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nunc pro tunc judgment issued to correct a clerical error in the prior sentencing 
judgment to comply with Crim.R. 32 did not create a new right of appeal); State v. 
Mitchell, 187 Ohio App.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1766, 931 N.E.2d 1157 (holding that 
a judgment of conviction that does not comply with Baker is not a final, 
appealable order). 
{¶ 10} Accordingly, we begin by observing that the purpose of Crim.R. 
32(C) is to ensure that a defendant is on notice concerning when a final judgment 
has been entered and the time for filing an appeal has begun to run.  State v. 
Tripodo (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 124, 127, 4 O.O.3d 280, 363 N.E.2d 719; App.R. 
4(A). 
{¶ 11} We further observe that Crim.R. 32(C) clearly specifies the 
substantive requirements that must be included within a judgment entry of 
conviction to make it final for purposes of appeal and that the rule states that 
those requirements “shall” be included in the judgment entry of conviction.  
These requirements are the fact of the conviction, the sentence, the judge’s 
signature, and the entry on the journal by the clerk.  All of these requirements 
relate to the essence of the act of entering a judgment of conviction and are a 
matter of substance, and their inclusion in the judgment entry of conviction is 
therefore required.  Without these substantive provisions, the judgment entry of 
conviction cannot be a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02.  A 
judgment entry of conviction that includes the substantive provisions places a 
defendant on notice that a final judgment has been entered and the time for the 
filing of any appeal has begun.  Tripodo, 50 Ohio St.2d at 127, 4 O.O.3d 280, 363 
N.E.2d 719; App.R. 4(A). 
{¶ 12} In contrast, when the substantive provisions of Crim.R. 32(C) are 
contained in the judgment of conviction, the trial court’s omission of how the 
defendant’s conviction was effected, i.e., the “manner of conviction,” does not 
prevent the judgment of conviction from being an order that is final and subject to 
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appeal.  Crim.R. 32(C) does not require a judgment entry of conviction to recite 
the manner of conviction as a matter of substance, but it does require the 
judgment entry of conviction to recite the manner of conviction as a matter of 
form.  In this regard, the identification of the particular method by which a 
defendant was convicted is merely a matter of orderly procedure rather than of 
substance.  A guilty plea, a no-contest plea upon which the court has made a 
finding of guilt, a finding of guilt based upon a bench trial, or a guilty verdict 
resulting from a jury trial explains how the fact of a conviction was effected.  
Consequently, the finality of a judgment entry of conviction is not affected by a 
trial court’s failure to include a provision that indicates the manner by which the 
conviction was effected, because that language is required by Crim.R. 32(C) only 
as a matter of form, provided the entry includes all the substantive provisions of 
Crim.R. 32(C). 
{¶ 13} This analysis is not contrary to Baker.  The circumstances and 
question presented in this case are distinguishable from those presented in Baker, 
which asked whether the term “the plea” in Crim.R. 32(C) means a plea entered 
by the defendant at arraignment or a plea that is the basis of a conviction.  Our 
specific holding was that the term “the plea” in Crim.R. 32(C) means a plea of 
guilty upon which the court bases the conviction and not the plea at arraignment 
that is not a basis for the defendant’s conviction.  Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 
2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, at ¶ 2, 19.  The phrase “manner of conviction,” 
which is not included within the text of Crim.R. 32(C), was used in Baker to 
contrast the initial plea at arraignment, which was not the basis of a conviction, 
with the term “the plea” as used in Crim.R. 32(C), which specifies that the 
relevant plea is the one or ones “upon which each conviction is based.”  Baker, at 
¶ 19.  Moreover, there is no detriment to a defendant if the particular method by 
which a conviction was effected is not set out in the judgment entry.  The manner 
by which a defendant is convicted would be evident throughout the record and 
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apparent to the defendant, particularly when a defendant challenges the validity of 
a judgment entry of conviction in a postconviction motion after the exhaustion of 
the appellate process. 
{¶ 14} Nevertheless, to the extent that Baker implies, or has been 
interpreted to require, that more than the fact of conviction and the substantive 
provisions of Crim.R. 32(C) must be set out in the judgment entry of conviction 
before it becomes a final order, we modify the holding in Baker.  We hold that a 
judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when 
the judgment entry sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) 
the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal 
by the clerk. 
{¶ 15} Notwithstanding the foregoing, because a statement of how a 
defendant’s conviction was effected is language that is required by Crim.R. 32(C) 
within a judgment entry of conviction as a matter of form, a defendant is entitled 
to an order that conforms to Crim.R. 32(C).  We observed in Baker that Crim.R. 
32(C) specifies that a trial court is to state the method by which a defendant’s 
conviction was effected in “an order that sets forth the manner of conviction and 
the sentence.”  119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, at ¶ 18.  
See also State ex rel. Alicea v. Krichbaum, 126 Ohio St.3d 194, 2010-Ohio-3234, 
931 N.E.2d 1079, ¶ 2 (judgment entry complied with Crim.R. 32(C) by stating 
that the defendant was convicted after a jury trial); State ex rel. Barr v. Sutula, 
126 Ohio St.3d 193, 2010-Ohio-3213, 931 N.E.2d 1078, ¶ 2; State ex rel. Culgan 
v. Medina Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 119 Ohio St.3d 535, 2008-Ohio-4609, 
895 N.E.2d 805, ¶ 10 (judgment entry of conviction did not comply with Crim.R. 
32(C), because only the general phrase “has been convicted” was included, with 
no indication of the “manner of conviction”); Dunn v. Smith, 119 Ohio St.3d 364, 
2008-Ohio-4565, 894 N.E.2d 312, ¶ 7 (same). 
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{¶ 16} Consequently, if a judgment entry of conviction does not indicate 
how a defendant’s conviction was effected, whether it was by a guilty plea, a no-
contest plea upon which the court has made a finding of guilt, a finding of guilt 
based upon a bench trial, or a guilty verdict resulting from a jury trial, and if it is 
not corrected by the court sua sponte, as was done in this case, a party may obtain 
a correction to the judgment entry by a motion filed with the trial court to correct 
the judgment of conviction.  See Crim.R. 36, in conjunction with Crim.R. 57(B) 
and 47 and Civ.R. 7(B).  But the fact that a defendant may be entitled to a revised 
order setting forth an inadvertently omitted term that is required by Crim.R. 32(C) 
as a matter of form does not prevent an original order that conforms to the 
substantive requirements of Crim.R. 32(C) from being final. 
III.  Nunc pro tunc entries 
{¶ 17} R.C. 2505.02 sets forth the conditions under which an order is final 
and may be reviewed, affirmed, or modified, with or without retrial.  Crim.R. 
32(C) specifies the substantive requirements that are to be included within a 
judgment of conviction that make it final for purposes of appeal.  We find that 
appellant’s original judgment entry of conviction meets the Crim.R. 32(C) 
requirements because it contained the fact of the conviction, the sentence, the 
judge’s signature, and the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the 
clerk.  Therefore, the original judgment entry of conviction was a final order 
subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02.  Moreover, the absence of the language 
required by Crim.R. 32(C) as a matter of form indicating how appellant’s 
conviction was effected has not deprived appellant of any opportunity to appeal 
his conviction or sentence, as he has appealed numerous times, and in none of 
those previous direct appeals or collateral procedures did appellant raise any 
arguments regarding the lack of finality of the judgment of conviction.  Lester, 
2007-Ohio-4239; 2008-Ohio-1148; 2007-Ohio-5627; and (May 11, 2009) Third 
Dist. No. 2-08-24.  Only after the trial court sua sponte corrected appellant’s 
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judgment entry of conviction and resentencing entry to include the manner by 
which appellant’s conviction was effected did appellant challenge the finality of 
his judgment entry of conviction. 
{¶ 18} The remaining question is whether appellant may appeal from the 
nunc pro tunc entry.  It is well settled that courts possess the authority to correct 
errors in judgment entries so that the record speaks the truth.  State ex rel. Fogle 
v. Steiner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 163-164, 656 N.E.2d 1288; Crim.R. 36.  
Errors subject to correction by the court include a clerical error, mistake, or 
omission that is mechanical in nature and apparent on the record and does not 
involve a legal decision or judgment.  State v. Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-
Ohio-5705, 940 N.E.2d 924, ¶ 15; Crim.R. 36.  Nunc pro tunc entries are used to 
make the record reflect what the court actually decided and not what the court 
might or should have decided or what the court intended to decide.  Miller at ¶ 15; 
Fogle at 164. 
{¶ 19} “Nunc pro tunc” means “now for then” and is commonly defined as 
“Having retroactive legal effect through a court’s inherent power.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary (9th Ed.2009) 1174.  Therefore, a nunc pro tunc entry by its very 
nature applies retrospectively to the judgment it corrects.  See, e.g., Miller at ¶ 14, 
15; Fogle at 163-164.  Appellate courts throughout the state have consistently 
applied these principles.  See, e.g., State v. Harrison, Butler App. Nos. CA2009-
10-272 and CA2010-01-019, 2010-Ohio-2709, ¶ 24, citing State v. Battle, Summit 
App. No. 23404, 2007-Ohio-2475, ¶ 6 (“generally, [a] nunc pro tunc entry relates 
back to the date of the journal entry it corrects”); State v. Yeaples (3d Dist.), 180 
Ohio App.3d 720, 2009-Ohio-184, 907 N.E.2d 333, ¶ 15 (“A nunc pro tunc entry 
is the procedure used to correct clerical errors in a judgment entry, but the entry 
does not extend the time within which to file an appeal, as it relates back to the 
original judgment entry”); State v. Breedlove (1st Dist.1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 78, 
81, 546 N.E.2d 420, quoting Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. Kohn (1937), 133 Ohio St. 111, 
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113, 20 O.O. 122, 11 N.E.2d 1020 (“ ‘The power to make nunc pro tunc entries is 
restricted ordinarily to the subsequent recording of judicial action previously and 
actually taken. It is a simple device by which a court may make its journal speak 
the truth.’  It ‘speaks the truth’ by correcting a judicial record that fails to show an 
order or a judgment of the court because the order or judgment was not recorded 
at all in the first instance”). 
{¶ 20} In the case now before us, the original resentencing order complied 
with the substantive requirements of Crim.R. 32(C), was a final order for 
purposes of R.C. 2505.02, and was appealed by appellant.  The sole purpose of 
the nunc pro tunc entry was to correctly state that appellant’s original conviction 
was based on a jury verdict, a fact that was obvious to the court and all the parties.  
It is apparent, then, that the nunc pro tunc entry merely corrected a clerical 
omission in the resentencing order and made the entry reflect what had already 
happened, which was appellant’s conviction by jury verdict.  The trial court’s 
addition indicating how appellant’s conviction was effected affected only the 
form of the entry and made no substantive changes.  Accordingly, we hold that a 
nunc pro tunc judgment entry issued for the sole purpose of complying with 
Crim.R. 32(C) to correct a clerical omission in a final judgment entry is not a new 
final order from which a new appeal may be taken.  The judgment of the court of 
appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in part and dissent in 
part. 
LANZINGER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
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{¶ 21} I concur in the majority’s decision that the original judgment of 
conviction entered in this case constituted a final appealable order, 
notwithstanding the sentencing court’s failure to specify the “manner of 
conviction.” 
{¶ 22} However, I dissent from the majority’s suggestion that “Crim.R. 
32(C) does not require a judgment entry of conviction to recite the manner of 
conviction as a matter of substance, but it does require the judgment entry of 
conviction to recite the manner of conviction as a matter of form.”  Majority 
opinion at ¶ 12.  The plain language of Crim.R. 32(C) requires only that “[a] 
judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict, or findings, upon 
which each conviction is based, and the sentence”;  it does not direct a sentencing 
court to specify the manner of conviction. 
{¶ 23} Rather, our decision in State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-
Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, inadvertently added the requirement to specify the 
manner of conviction to Crim.R. 32(C).  The majority makes an effort to sidestep 
this problem but unnecessarily complicates and compounds the error introduced 
in Baker by retaining a duty on the part of the sentencing court to specify the 
manner of conviction as a formal requirement.  In my view, we should strike that 
part of Baker requiring sentencing courts to indicate the manner of conviction in 
the judgment of conviction and bring an end to the needless and meaningless 
litigation that it has spawned, requiring appeals and rehearings all over the state.  I 
therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s suggestion that the trial court in 
this case had any duty to correct the judgment of conviction entered in 2006 to 
indicate the manner of conviction as a matter of form.  The court had no such 
duty. 
Crim.R. 32(C) 
{¶ 24} Prior to the adoption of Crim.R. 32(C), Ohio jurisprudence 
required a finding of guilt and a sentence in order for a conviction to be 
January Term, 2011 
13 
 
considered a final appealable order.  See State v. Thomas (1964), 175 Ohio St. 
563, 26 O.O.2d 253, 197 N.E.2d 197, syllabus; State v. Chamberlain (1964), 177 
Ohio St. 104, 106-107, 29 O.O.2d 268, 202 N.E.2d 695. 
{¶ 25} In accord with this precedent, the court adopted Crim.R. 32 (B) 
(now (C)), effective July 1, 1973, and as amended, it now provides: “A judgment 
of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict, or findings, upon which each 
conviction is based, and the sentence. Multiple judgments of conviction may be 
addressed in one judgment entry. If the defendant is found not guilty or for any 
other reason is entitled to be discharged, the court shall render judgment 
accordingly. The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall enter it on the 
journal. A judgment is effective only when entered on the journal by the clerk.”  
This rule contains plain, unambiguous language and has been easily understood 
and followed for decades. 
{¶ 26} In cases decided after the adoption of this rule, we have continued 
to recognize that a judgment of conviction is composed of two essential elements: 
the adjudication of guilt and the sentence.  E.g., State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 
Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 520 N.E.2d 568 (“ ‘conviction’ includes both the guilt 
determination and the penalty imposition” [emphasis sic]); State v. Whitfield, 124 
Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 24 (“a ‘conviction’ consists of a 
guilty verdict and the imposition of a sentence or penalty” [emphasis sic]). Cf. 
State v. Tuomala, 104 Ohio St.3d 93, 2004-Ohio-6239, 818 N.E.2d 272, ¶ 14-15 
(explaining that no judgment of conviction is entered when a defendant is found 
not guilty by reason of insanity). 
{¶ 27} The Crim.R. 32(C) directive that “[a] judgment of conviction shall 
set forth the plea, the verdict, or findings, upon which each conviction is based, 
and the sentence” does not require a trial court to specify the “manner of 
conviction.”  Rather, that notion crept into Ohio jurisprudence recently, through 
Baker, in which we attempted to explain the meaning of that rule. 
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{¶ 28} For purposes of the finality of a judgment of conviction, however, 
the manner of conviction is not a requirement; rather, Crim.R. 32(C) requires the 
judgment of conviction to set forth the plea, the verdict, or findings, upon which 
each conviction is based—i.e., the fact of conviction—and the sentence.  Nothing 
more. 
State v. Baker 
{¶ 29} In State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 
N.E.2d 163, we declared that “[a] judgment of conviction is a final appealable 
order under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or 
the finding of the court upon which the conviction is based; (2) the sentence; (3) 
the signature of the judge; and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of court.”  Id. 
at syllabus. 
{¶ 30} Explaining that language in Baker, we further stated that “a trial 
court is required to sign and journalize a document memorializing the sentence 
and the manner of the conviction:  a guilty plea, a no contest plea upon which the 
court has made a finding of guilt, a finding of guilt based upon a bench trial, or a 
guilty verdict resulting from a jury trial.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 31} In an attempt to guide trial judges in their efforts to comply with 
Crim.R. 32(C), Baker used the phrases “the manner of conviction,” “a finding of 
guilt based upon a bench trial,” and “a guilty verdict resulting from a jury trial,” 
which appeared to be additional requirements for the entry of a final order; in fact, 
setting forth the manner of conviction in a judgment of conviction is not a 
Crim.R. 32(C) requirement.  Baker thus has inadvertently spawned litigation 
regarding the finality of a judgment of conviction.  See, e.g.,  State v. Mitchell, 
187 Ohio App.3d 315, 2010-Ohio-1766, 931 N.E.2d 1157 (holding that a 
judgment of conviction that does not comply with Baker is not a final appealable 
order); State v. Tuggle, Lucas App. No. L-09-1317, 2010-Ohio-4162, ¶ 4 
January Term, 2011 
15 
 
(“appellant’s original appeal is a legal nullity, and this appeal following 
resentencing is appellant's first appeal as of right”). 
{¶ 32} According to the plain language of the rule, sentencing courts do 
not need to indicate the manner of conviction in a judgment of conviction.  
Rather, Crim.R. 32(C) requires courts to include the plea, the verdict, or findings, 
upon which each conviction is based, and the sentence.  Today’s opinion seems to 
recognize this, but nonetheless complicates the problem by adding this manner of 
conviction language to the rule as a matter of form, which is both confusing and 
unnecessary. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s holding that Crim.R. 32(C) 
does not require the judgment of conviction to indicate the manner of conviction 
in order to constitute a final appealable order.  Thus, Lester’s 2006 judgment of 
conviction is final, and new challenges to it are barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
{¶ 34} Despite holding that specifying the manner of conviction is not a 
“substantive” requirement of Crim.R. 32(C), the majority nonetheless requires it 
as a matter of form.  In my view, Crim.R. 32(C) imposes no such duty, and to the 
extent that the majority suggests that courts must engage in the vain act of 
correcting a judgment of conviction to specify the manner of conviction as a 
matter of form, I respectfully dissent. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 35} Crim.R. 32(C) states what a judge shall do to enter a judgment of 
conviction that is subject to appeal.  We explained this rule and held pursuant to 
its clear wording: “A judgment of conviction is a final appealable order under 
R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the guilty plea, the jury verdict, or the finding 
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of the court upon which the conviction is based; (2) the sentence; (3) the signature 
of the judge; and (4) entry on the journal by the clerk of court.”  State v. Baker, 
119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, syllabus.  Because the 
majority opinion amends Crim.R. 32(C) by misinterpreting it, I respectfully 
dissent. 
{¶ 36} Contrary to the statement that Baker has been “modified,” the 
majority now rewrites Crim.R. 32(C).  In Baker, we agreed that the criminal rule 
did not require a defendant’s not-guilty plea entered at arraignment to be reflected 
in the judgment of conviction.  Id. at ¶ 16, 19.  But, pursuant to the rule, we held 
that a judgment entry of conviction must contain its four elements. 
{¶ 37} Lester’s sentencing entry did not contain the first required element.  
His judgment entry did not state the manner of his conviction—whether obtained 
through “a guilty plea, a no contest plea upon which the court has made a finding 
of guilt, a finding of guilt based upon a bench trial, or a guilty verdict resulting 
from a jury trial,” which Baker clearly holds is required under Crim.R. 32(C).  Id. 
at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 38} We have consistently cited Baker and have held that a judgment of 
conviction complies with Crim.R. 32(C) when it sets forth the plea, the verdict, or 
the findings upon which each conviction is based.  State ex rel. Alicea v. 
Krichbaum, 126 Ohio St.3d 194, 2010-Ohio-3234, 931 N.E.2d 1079, ¶ 2; State ex 
rel. Barr v. Sutula, 126 Ohio St.3d 193, 2010-Ohio-3213, 931 N.E.2d 1078, ¶ 2; 
State ex rel. Culgan v. Medina Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 119 Ohio St.3d 535, 
2008-Ohio-4609, 895 N.E.2d 805, ¶ 10; Dunn v. Smith, 119 Ohio St.3d 364, 
2008-Ohio-4565, 894 N.E.2d 312, ¶ 7.  Instead of following this precedent, the 
majority ignores these cases by minimizing this requirement.  The words “the 
plea, the verdict, or findings, upon which each conviction is based” are now 
compressed into “the fact of the conviction” and are characterized as a mere 
“matter of form.” 
January Term, 2011 
17 
 
{¶ 39} In essence, the majority rewrites one of the rule’s requirements for 
a final, appealable order.  It deletes the words “the plea, the verdict, or findings, 
upon which each conviction is based,” which, as Baker explained, require that the 
judgment specify the manner of the conviction, and it substitutes the words “the 
fact of the conviction.”  If an entry does not state the manner of conviction, we 
have said it is not a final order subject to appeal.  Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 
2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, at ¶ 14; Dunn, 119 Ohio St.3d 364, 2008-Ohio-
4565, 894 N.E.2d 312, at ¶ 7.  Rather than modify Baker, the majority opinion 
overrules precedent. 
{¶ 40} The problem, of course, is what is to be done in cases in which a 
sentencing entry is defective, at least according to the current rule.  Should there 
be a right to appeal from an order that is corrected so that it is made subject to 
appeal?  The majority resolves the issue by denying a defendant the right to 
appeal from an order that is corrected to conform to Crim.R. 32(C). 
{¶ 41} Nevertheless, unless Crim.R. 32(C) is amended to change “the 
plea, the verdict, or findings, upon which each conviction is based” to “the fact of 
the conviction,” the majority’s conclusion that the current phrase is a merely “a 
matter of form” contradicts the rule.  Plainly, it is as much of a requirement as the 
other elements.  Either Crim.R. 32(C) means what it says or it does not. 
{¶ 42} The sentencing entry before us was not final and appealable until it 
was corrected to meet the requirements set forth in Crim.R. 32(C).  If an entry 
need set forth only the “fact” of conviction to make it final and appealable, then 
Crim.R. 32(C) should be rewritten to say so.  I respectfully dissent from the 
judgment of the court, since it not only misinterprets Crim.R. 32(C) but also fails 
to respect precedent. 
__________________ 
 
Amy Otley Beckett, Auglaize County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for 
appellee. 
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Tucker, Ellis, & West, L.L.P., and Jon W. Oebker, for appellant. 
 
E. Kelly Mihocik, Assistant Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Public Defender. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General of Ohio, Alexandra T. Schimmer, 
Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott M. 
Heenan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
______________________