Title: Brown v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

327 S.W.2d 252 (1959)
Lillian B. BROWN, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 47373.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
July 13, 1959.
Rehearing Denied September 14, 1959.
*253 Sherman Landau, St. Louis, for respondent.
Fordyce, Mayne, Hartman, Renard & Stribling, William W. Sleater, Jr., Robert P. Stanislaw, St. Louis, for appellant.
WESTHUES, Judge.
On January 14, 1935, the defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company issued a policy of insurance in the amount of $2,000 upon the life of Joseph M. Brown. The policy provided for an additional payment of $2,000 as accidental benefits payable upon "due proof of the death of the insured, as the result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries sustained through external, violent and accidental means, provided * * * (5) that death shall not have been the result of self-destruction, while sane or insane, or caused by or contributed to, directly or indirectly, or wholly or partly, by disease, or by bodily or mental infirmity; * * *."
The insured died on September 12, 1955. The defendant paid $2,000 to Lillian B. Brown, insured's widow, the beneficiary and plaintiff herein. Defendant refused to pay the additional $2,000 under the accidental death provision of the policy. Plaintiff filed this suit to collect that amount. A trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for $2,000 and $220 as interest. The defendant appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals which court reversed the judgment on the theory that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding that Brown's death was the result of accidental means. See 317 S.W.2d 651. On application of the plaintiff, we ordered the case transferred to this court.
The only question for determination here, as it was in the Court of Appeals, is whether the evidence justified a finding by a jury that death was the result of external violence or accidental means.
The evidence showed that Brown, when he died, was 54 years of age. He was a lawyer but was also engaged in the manufacturing business. He had an office on the second floor of the International Building, St. Louis, Missouri. In January, 1952, he was injured in an automobile accident. Thereafter, he did not overexert himself and as his widow expressed it, "He observed a very sedentary routine. We wouldn't go out of an evening anymore, used to retire early, and he was very careful of his diet." On the afternoon of September 12, 1955, at about 4:20 o'clock, Brown entered the International Building followed by a man named Byrnes. The evidence was that Byrnes was threatening Brown saying, "You put me away once. I will put you away for good." As Brown went to the elevator, Byrnes followed and continued to use language too vile to mention or print. This abuse continued while the two went up in the elevator. At the second floor, Brown left the elevator and Byrnes followed and continued to abuse him. As Brown walked to his office, Byrnes was seen to grab Brown's hat and at the same time either struck Brown in the back or pushed him. A witness said, "I described it as a hard pushing motion, as a blow." This pushing or blow caused Brown to stumble. Brown entered his office and in a short while, when attendants of the office building attracted by the disturbance went to Brown's office which was locked, they found him lying dead on the floor. A pool of blood was by his head.
Witnesses described Brown's condition as he passed through the lobby to the elevator and thence to his office as very nervous. Note the evidence of a witness:
"A. Well, in the elevator when I came in and this loud talking started, I looked at Mr. Brown. I observed his *254 face was white and that his hands were trembling, and then when they were on the second floor and walked by me at that time, again, I noticed his face and it was very, very white, and he seemed to be nervous."
Dr. Herman Blumenthal, a pathologist, testified that he made a postmortem examination of Brown. We quote the following from the doctor's evidence:
In answer to a hypothetical question embracing the events preceding Brown's death, Dr. Blumenthal stated, "I think with reasonable medical certainty, it can be concluded that these events precipitated the occlusion of the artery which led to Mr. Brown's death." The doctor further testified as follows:
On cross-examination, Dr. Blumenthal testified as follows:
"Q. And it wasn't necessary that the other man put his hand on him, would it, to bring about his death? A. *255 It could happen without his touching him, yes.
Dr. John J. Connor, a specialist in pathology, testified for the defendant that the cause of Brown's death "(1) was coronary occlusion, (2) coronary sclerosis, and (3) old myocardial infarction." He further testified that, in his opinion, the blow Brown received had nothing to do with his death. On cross-examination, Dr. Connor gave the following testimony:
Other facts which we are taking into consideration, though not here stated, appear in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, after summarizing the evidence, made the following conclusions, 317 S.W.2d loc. cit. 654(3-5): "The doctor (meaning Dr. Blumenthal, plaintiff's witness) further stated that, excluding the physical violence, the emotional disturbance alone caused by the arguing and cursing could have caused the heart failure. This testimony did no more than present evidence that any one of three things was the possible cause of Brown's death. The blow could have been the cause, the argument could have been the cause, or the combination of both could have been the cause. The burden was upon the plaintiff to show the cause of death. * * * Without some showing as to which of the possible causes did produce death, there is no basis upon which the jury could conclude that it was one cause or another." It is our opinion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding that a combination of the vile language of Byrnes and the assault or blow caused Brown's death. The jury may have concluded that the vile language and the threats caused Brown to be in fear of an assault and caused high excitement, but had no assault occurred, Brown may have survived; further, that the blow by Byrnes which occurred just before Brown entered his office was "the last feather that (broke) the horse's back." Dr. Blumenthal so testified, as stated above, when he said, "I think with reasonable medical certainty, it can be concluded that these events precipitated the occlusion of the artery which led to Mr. Brown's death." If that be true, then the defendant is liable under the insurance contract sued on.
The Court of Appeals ruled, and we think correctly, that Brown's heart condition may have been a remote and predisposing cause but not the proximate cause of death and that such fact, that is, the heart condition, would not exempt the defendant from liability. Beckerleg v. Locomotive Engineers' Mut. Life and Accident Ins. Ass'n, Mo.App., 274 S.W. 917, loc. cit. 922 *256 (10, 11). In the case of Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n v. Francis, 148 F.2d 590, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (8 Cir.), in applying Missouri law, ruled that the evidence in that case justified a submission to a jury whether the accident caused death. The evidence of the doctors was of no more probative force in that case than the evidence in the case before us. See 148 F.2d loc. cit. 594(5, 6). In that opinion, on page 594(3, 4), the court said, "The Missouri appellate courts have held that if an accident sets in motion agencies that result in death, such injury is regarded as the sole, direct and proximate cause of death, even though the injured person were suffering from physical infirmity or disease. An injury which causes the death of a person in impaired health or suffering from disease is the cause of his death even though he would not have died if his health had not been impaired." Cases from other jurisdictions support the Missouri rule. Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 2d 305, 163 P.2d 689, loc. cit. 691(5) (6, 7); Pierce v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, Wash., 109 P.2d 322, loc. cit. 327, 328(5) (6) (7); Emergency Aid Ins. Co. v. Connell, 258 Ala. 521, 63 So. 2d 603; Inter-Ocean Casualty Company v. Scott, 91 Ga.App. 311, 85 S.E.2d 452; Kilgore v. Reserve Life Insurance Company, 231 S.C. 111, 97 S.E.2d 392, loc. cit. 395(3); Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n v. Webber, 299 Ky. 846, 187 S.W.2d 273; North American Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 37 Tenn.App. 546, 267 S.W.2d 115; see also 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 776c, pp. 811, 812, and cases cited under Notes 52, 53, 54, and 55.
It is our opinion that the trial court did not err in submitting this case to a jury for determination.
The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
All concur except EAGER, J., who dissents feeling that the case was correctly decided by the Court of Appeals.