Title: Christian Voice of Cent. Ohio v. Testa

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Christian Voice of Cent. Ohio v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-1527.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-1527 
CHRISTIAN VOICE OF CENTRAL OHIO, APPELLANT, v. TESTA, TAX COMMR.,  
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Christian Voice of Cent. Ohio v. Testa, Slip Opinion  
No. 2016-Ohio-1527.] 
Real-property taxation—Exemption for houses of public worship under R.C. 
5709.07(A)(2)—Exemption allowed for property used to operate Christian 
radio station because primary use of property is for public worship—
Decision of Board of Tax Appeals reversed. 
(No. 2014-1626—Submitted October 14, 2015—Decided April 14, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2011-1446. 
____________________ 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 
(“BTA”) that affirmed the tax commissioner’s denial in 2011 of an exemption for 
real property located in Gahanna from which appellant, Christian Voice of Central 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Ohio, operates a radio station.  Until 2007, Christian Voice operated the station 
from offices located in New Albany.  In 1991, the tax commissioner had granted 
an exemption for that property, reasoning that it was being “used for church 
purposes * * * under R.C. 5709.07.”  In 2007, following the relocation of Christian 
Voice’s offices to Gahanna, a complaint was filed challenging the continued 
exemption of Christian Voice’s New Albany property.  In a final determination 
issued in 2013, the tax commissioner denied the complaint, similarly reasoning that 
the property was “being used for church facilities.” 
{¶ 2} Meanwhile, in 2008, Christian Voice applied for the same exemption 
for its Gahanna property that its New Albany property had enjoyed for 17 years.  
According to the application, a building constructed on the Gahanna property 
contains “production studios used for the origination of certain religious 
programming, offices, assembly rooms and a chapel.”  Christian Voice again 
sought exemption under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), which relieves “[h]ouses used 
exclusively for public worship” and attendant lands from taxation.  On this 
occasion, the tax commissioner denied the exemption, finding “no evidence that 
people assemble to worship together on the subject property” and reasoning that 
the exemption applies only “where people gather to profess their faith or to observe 
and participate in religious rituals or ceremonies.” 
{¶ 3} On appeal from the BTA’s affirmance of the tax commissioner’s final 
determination, Christian Voice advances three arguments:  the decision to deny the 
exemption is unreasonable and unlawful when the primary use of the property is 
for public worship; the decision to ignore a property owner’s prior tax exemption 
violates the doctrine of collateral estoppel when no material facts or circumstances 
changed since the prior determination; and the decision to completely deny the 
exemption is unreasonable and unlawful because R.C. 5713.04 permits real 
property to be split into exempt and nonexempt parts if the part used in the exempt 
manner can be precisely delineated. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 4} We agree with Christian Voice’s first argument—that the primary use 
of the property is for public worship—and therefore reverse the decision of the 
BTA.  Because we conclude that the BTA should have allowed the exemption under 
R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), the public-worship exemption, for the entire property, 
regardless of past determinations, we do not examine the second and third 
arguments asserted by Christian Voice. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 5} According to testimony presented at the BTA hearing on May 29, 
2013, Christian Voice operates several1 radio stations, including most prominently 
WCVO 104.9 FM, “The River.”  The property at issue was acquired in May 2007 
to replace Christian Voice’s prior New Albany offices. 
{¶ 6} Christian Voice has had 501(c)(3) status since it was established in 
1964.  There are no stockholders.  According to Christian Voice’s 2008 exemption 
application, the Gahanna property is used to produce radio programming for the 
purpose of “furthering the gospel of Jesus Christ through Contemporary Christian 
Music and Preaching and Teaching radio programs.” 
{¶ 7} The property is a 2.184-acre parcel improved with a 16,783-square-
foot building built in 1998.  Diagrams furnished by Christian Voice to the tax 
commissioner show two floors plus a basement.  The basement consists primarily 
of a meeting room, the first floor contains a chapel and offices for administrative 
and program staff, and the second floor contains additional offices. 
{¶ 8} According to testimony and recent financial statements introduced at 
the BTA hearing, Christian Voice’s primary sources of revenue are (1) funds 
received from underwriters in exchange for advertising and (2) donations.  The 
former relates to the sale of airtime on The River.  Bill Montgomery, The River’s 
                                                 
1 According to Christian Voice’s 2008 exemption application, programming originating on the 
property at that time aired on nine radio stations.  By the time of the BTA hearing in May 2013, 
Christian Voice was operating only three stations. 
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chief sales officer, testified that the sale of advertising is vital to the ministry of the 
station.  Daniel Baughman, president and chief executive officer, testified that the 
station has “to generate that revenue ourselves.  It takes money to do what we do to 
get the Gospel out there.” 
{¶ 9} The advertising is limited by Federal Communications Commission 
regulations to mentions of the supporting business’ names and telephone numbers; 
advertisements may not state the prices of their services or products.  Montgomery 
testified that the station does not air advertisements that promote alcohol, lotteries, 
casinos, or adult businesses such as nightclubs.  Additionally, the content of 
advertising is monitored to ensure that it is appropriate for children to hear. 
{¶ 10} About 95 percent of Christian Voice’s programming consists of 
Christian music and 5 percent of “talk.”  Todd Stach, chief creative officer, 
described the music as “bible verses put to music,” explaining that artists convert 
old hymns into contemporary songs.  He also stated that most of the songs 
“encourag[e] a vertical relationship with God.” 
{¶ 11} The River’s talk segments consist of pastoral programming.  John 
Moriarty—the station’s full-time pastor, known as Pastor John—records one-
minute devotional spots with contact information, inviting listeners to contact him 
for prayer or support.  The River’s DJs also promote Pastor John’s counseling 
services on the air.  In addition, on Sunday mornings, The River airs a three-hour 
syndicated program called “Keep the Faith.”  Although it includes music, the 
program is, according to Baughman’s testimony, as “close to preaching and 
teaching as you can be,” helping listeners “get through life[’s] struggles.” 
{¶ 12} Christian Voice’s chapel features a collection of Christian books as 
well as stained-glass artwork depicting the life of Jesus Christ.  Pastor John leads a 
prayer devotional with Christian Voice staff in the chapel every Monday, Tuesday, 
Thursday, and Friday morning to pray for intentions that listeners have submitted 
via Christian Voice’s website.  On Wednesdays, he holds a Bible study in the chapel 
January Term, 2016 
 
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for the staff.  In addition, the pastor of Epic Church, a church located nearby, 
utilizes the chapel for pastoral counseling.  The River airs regular announcements 
informing listeners that the chapel is open to them daily for private prayer. 
{¶ 13} Christian Voice’s basement meeting room is used regularly by 
groups and organizations with a religious focus, regardless of denomination.  Epic 
Church uses the meeting room for several regular worship services, including a 
Sunday evening discipleship service, a Wednesday youth service, and a monthly 
service for the church’s leadership team.  Alpha, a group described as an 
introduction to the Christian faith, also utilizes the meeting room.  Boy Scout 
meetings are also held in this space.  Christian Voice does not charge any of these 
organizations for their use of its chapel or meeting room. 
{¶ 14} The River is active in community outreach.  Pastor John testified that 
part of The River’s ministry is doing work for the homeless—for example, by 
coordinating groups of volunteers at local food pantries.  DJ Mary Harris testified 
that her off-air duties involve community outreach with various nonprofit 
organizations and individuals in need.  She shared stories of locating a refrigerator 
and delivering it to a listener’s friend, collecting donations for a schoolteacher 
whose students needed clothes and shoes and delivering supplies to them, and 
collecting items for a family whose home had been destroyed by a fire.  She also 
discussed the station’s involvement with an organization that assists women 
recovering from sexual trauma and drug addiction.  David Baker, The River’s chief 
administrative finance officer, discussed the station’s material assistance to local 
crisis-pregnancy centers. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 15} Christian Voice filed its application for exemption for tax year 2008 
on June 17, 2008.  After the filing and the submission of requested supplemental 
information, the tax commissioner issued his determination on May 18, 2011.  The 
commissioner cited BTA decisions holding that radio stations that broadcast 
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religious programming do not equate to “[h]ouses used exclusively for public 
worship” under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2).  He also found that there was “no evidence 
that people assemble to worship together on the subject property used exclusively 
as a radio station.”  The commissioner denied the exemption claim, and Christian 
Voice appealed to the BTA. 
{¶ 16} The BTA held a hearing at which Christian Voice presented ten 
witnesses and six exhibits, and the tax commissioner offered no witnesses and 
introduced exhibits consisting mostly of financial statements and tax filings. 
{¶ 17} The BTA issued its decision on August 22, 2014.  The BTA 
acknowledged Christian Voice’s reliance on World Evangelistic Ent. Corp. v. 
Tracy, 96 Ohio App.3d 78, 644 N.E.2d 678 (1994), but distinguished that case as 
involving a station that was supported fully by donations without 
“advertising/underwriting” and that featured preaching and religious teaching on 
the air.  BTA No. 2011-1446, 2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 3942, 7-10 (Aug. 22, 2014).  
Under the circumstances, the BTA concluded that “the activities that occur at the 
subject property do not rise to [the] level” of “ ‘the open and free celebration or 
observance of the rites and ordinances of a religious organization.’ ”  Id. at 11-12, 
quoting Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach, 32 Ohio St.3d 432, 435, 513 
N.E.2d 1340 (1987), and citing Jimmy Swaggart Evangelistic Assn. v. Kinney, 6th 
Dist. Wood No. WD-82-64, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 5732 (Mar. 18, 1983).  The 
BTA therefore affirmed the commissioner’s denial of the application. 
{¶ 18} Christian Voice has appealed. 
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 19} In reviewing a BTA decision, this court considers whether the 
decision was “reasonable and lawful.”  R.C. 5717.04.  Under this standard, we 
acknowledge that “ ‘[t]he BTA is responsible for determining factual issues and, if 
the record contains reliable and probative support for these BTA determinations,’ 
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” we will affirm them.  (Brackets sic.)  Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-
Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14, quoting Am. Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy, 72 Ohio 
St.3d 150, 152, 648 N.E.2d 483 (1995).  On the other hand, we “ ‘will not hesitate 
to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.’ ”  Id., 
quoting Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 93 Ohio St.3d 
231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789 (2001). 
{¶ 20} The dispute between Christian Voice and the tax commissioner 
concerns not the underlying facts but whether those undisputed facts indicate that 
the property and attendant lands are a “[h]ous[e] used exclusively for public 
worship” and thus entitled to the property-tax exemption under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2).  
Therefore, this appeal presents a question of law, Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 70 Ohio 
St.3d 460, 466, 639 N.E.2d 425 (1994), and our review is not deferential but de 
novo, State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691,  
¶ 9. 
Public-Worship Exemption 
{¶ 21} R.C. 5709.07(A)(2) exempts from real-property taxation “[h]ouses 
used exclusively for public worship, the books and furniture in them, and the 
ground attached to them that is not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit 
and that is necessary for their proper occupancy, use, and enjoyment.” 
{¶ 22} We have previously held that for purposes of R.C. 5709.07, “ ‘public 
worship’ means the open and free celebration or observance of the rites and 
ordinances of a religious organization.”  Faith Fellowship, 32 Ohio St.3d at 435, 
513 N.E.2d 1340.  In Faith Fellowship, three justices agreed that the Ohio 
Constitution, the basis from which the exemption originates, “contemplate[s] that 
the worship be a celebration of a religious rite in an open and free place and not the 
everyday activities of an individual which express devotion to his or her God.”  Id. 
at 436.  To qualify under the public-worship exemption of R.C. 5709.07, the real 
property “must be used in a principal, primary, and essential way to facilitate the 
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public worship.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  While Justice Lanzinger’s 
dissenting opinion may not be able to accept that “exclusively” means “primarily,” 
this is the interpretation of R.C. 5709.07 established by this court and applied for 
almost 30 years.  See also Full Gospel Apostolic Church v. Limbach, 46 Ohio St.3d 
195, 196, 546 N.E.2d 403 (1989); Grace Cathedral, Inc. v. Testa, 143 Ohio St.3d 
212, 2015-Ohio-2067, 36 N.E.3d 136, ¶ 30.  This interpretation is also applied by 
the tax commissioner and the BTA to determine whether property is exempt 
pursuant to R.C. 5709.07.  See Grace Cathedral, Inc. v. Testa, BTA No. 2012-2168, 
2014 Ohio Tax LEXIS 963, 4-5 (Feb. 12, 2014).  Although Justice Lanzinger seeks 
to limit the application of the syllabus language in Faith Fellowship “to those 
auxiliary buildings or portions of buildings * * * when there existed a primary 
building used exclusively for public worship,” dissenting opinion at ¶ 95, the 
holding is devoid of any such limiting language.  Had the Faith Fellowship court 
intended “principal, primary, and essential” to apply only to the determination of 
whether auxiliary buildings or portions of buildings qualified for exemption 
pursuant to R.C. 5709.07, it could have easily added this qualifying language.  But, 
it did not. 
{¶ 23} Christian Voice relies on World Evangelistic, 96 Ohio App.3d 78, 
644 N.E.2d 678, and the tax commissioner relies on Jimmy Swaggart, 6th Dist. 
Wood No. WD-82-64, in support of their respective positions.  We conclude that 
neither decision adequately resolves the instant matter. 
{¶ 24} Guidance for whether Christian Voice’s Gahanna property qualifies 
under the public-worship exemption of R.C. 5709.07(A)(2) is instead found in 
Maumee Valley Broadcasting Assn. v. Porterfield, 29 Ohio St.2d 95, 279 N.E.2d 
863 (1972).  The Maumee Valley Broadcasting Association was a nonprofit 
religious corporation that owned land upon which a broadcasting studio and 120-
person auditorium were located.  The tax commissioner argued that Maumee was 
not entitled to an exemption from sales and use taxes under R.C. 5739.02 because 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
it was a radio station and not a “church” within the meaning of that statute.  We 
disagreed and advanced a holistic approach to determining whether an organization 
qualifies as a church:   
 
With a view to substance, we are of the opinion that the [tax 
commissioner]’s isolation of the radio station from the total picture 
is unwarranted by the evidence in this case.  The evidence amply 
shows that this facility merely implements the religious objectives 
of the organization.  The character of any nonprofit corporation must 
be found in its motives, its charter, its purposes, its methods, and its 
operation.  Here, the appellee, like most churches, has dedicated all 
its land and buildings to charity and religion, and the operation of 
the radio station is not alone sufficient to change the underlying 
foundation of the corporation.  Within the scope of common 
understanding, the appellee has demonstrated by evidence the 
necessary attributes of a church. 
 
Id. at 97-98.  While Maumee involved sales and use taxes, its analysis is applicable 
to real-property-tax exemptions. 
{¶ 25} After our decision in Faith Fellowship, the General Assembly 
amended R.C. 5709.07, adopting a definition of “church” that embodied our prior 
case law.  See Am.S.B. No. 71, 117 Ohio Laws, Part I, 147, 148.  That definition 
remains the same today:  a “church” is “a fellowship of believers, congregation, 
society, corporation, convention, or association that is formed primarily or 
exclusively for religious purposes and that is not formed for the private profit of 
any person.”  R.C. 5709.07(D)(1).  In enacting this definition, effective after Faith 
Fellowship, the General Assembly recognized that in modern society, “public 
worship involves more than formal religious rites and ordinances.”  Id. at 438 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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(Locher, J., joined by Wright and Brown, JJ., concurring and dissenting in part).  
As Justice Locher stated, “[t]he life style of the people of Ohio has changed a great 
deal over the years, and the nature of public worship has changed with it.  Formal 
church services today constitute only a portion of the worship experience, which 
now encompasses religious retreats, camps, athletics, and other social and 
recreational activities.”  Id. at 438-439. 
{¶ 26} As a church is but one type of house of public worship, the definition 
of church in R.C. 5709.07(D)(1) and the related case law must be considered when 
determining whether Christian Voice qualifies under the public-worship exemption 
of R.C. 5709.07(A)(2).  To find that an organization embodies the attributes of a 
church sufficiently to satisfy R.C. 5709.07(D)(1) but to conclude that that 
organization does not operate as  a “[h]ous[e] used exclusively for public worship” 
for purposes of R.C. 5709.07(A)(2) is incongruous. 
{¶ 27} Christian Voice is a corporation with 501(c)(3) status that conducts 
nondenominational religious activities through its broadcasts and on its premises.  
Devotional spots are aired throughout the day on The River, and a three-hour 
program that preaches a Christian message of hope and encouragement is 
broadcasted on Sunday mornings.  DJs inform listeners of the availability of 
pastoral counseling and that the chapel is open to the public for private prayer. 
{¶ 28} The majority of Christian Voice’s broadcasts on The River are 
devoted to contemporary Christian music.  The fact that Christian music makes up 
the majority of the broadcasting strengthens, not weakens, Christian Voice’s 
argument that its purpose is religious.  “[M]usic is a vital means of expressing and 
celebrating those beliefs which a religious community holds most sacred.  [It] is an 
integral part of many different religious traditions.”  Equal Emp. Opportunity 
Comm. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir.2000).  
“[T]he inspirational appeal of religion in the * * * guis[e] [of music] is often 
stronger than in forthright sermon.”  Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. School Dist. No. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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71 Board of Edn., 333 U.S. 203, 236, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
{¶ 29} Christian Voice employs Pastor John as a full-time minister.  He and 
other Christian Voice staff members gather on a regular basis in the on-site chapel 
to pray for intentions that listeners have submitted.  He also leads Bible study on a 
weekly basis in the chapel, and counseling services are available there to anyone 
who is in need. 
{¶ 30} Christian Voice is also active in the community, performing acts of 
charity.  It partners with a number of charitable organizations to provide assistance 
to the less fortunate.  It also works directly with listeners who contact its station 
seeking assistance. 
{¶ 31} Finally, Christian Voice provides its chapel and basement meeting 
room to the public regardless of denomination and without seeking compensation.  
The meeting room is used regularly by religious and charitable groups for worship 
services and religious discussion as well as for Boy Scout meetings. 
{¶ 32} Christian Voice has presented evidence demonstrating that it is a 
corporation that was formed primarily or exclusively for religious purposes and not 
for the private profit of any person.  See R.C. 5709.07(D)(1).  Similar to Maumee 
Valley, Christian Voice “has dedicated all its land and buildings to charity and 
religion, and the operation of the radio station is not alone sufficient to change the 
underlying foundation of the corporation. * * *  [It has] the necessary attributes of 
a church.” Maumee, 29 Ohio St.2d at 98, 279 N.E.2d 863.  Accordingly, it follows 
that Christian Voice operates as a “[h]ous[e] used exclusively for public worship” 
under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2). 
{¶ 33} In previously exempting Christian Voice’s New Albany property 
under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), the tax commissioner relied upon the fact that Christian 
Voice has the attributes of a church.  In 1991, the tax commissioner granted the 
exemption, “find[ing] that the real property * * * is used for church purposes.”  
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(Emphasis added.)  In 2013, almost two years after denying the exemption for the 
Gahanna parcel, the tax commissioner approved the continued exemption for the 
New Albany parcel, finding that that property “satisfies the requirements for 
exemption by reason of being used for church facilities.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 34} Even if true, the tax commissioner’s position that a physical 
assemblage of persons does not engage in worship activity on Christian Voice’s 
Gahanna property would not preclude the conclusion that Christian Voice is a 
church within the meaning of the statute.  R.C. 5709.07(D)(1) does not require a 
congregation or worship activity; instead, its concern is whether the organization 
has a primarily religious purpose and is not for profit.  We have also rejected the 
requirement that an organization must have a united body of communicants to be a 
church when the organization exhibits the essential qualities of a church.  Maumee 
at 98. 
{¶ 35} Finally, the BTA stated in its decision that even if Christian Voice’s 
broadcasts and other activities could be considered “public worship,” the sale of 
on-air advertising is not public worship but part of a commercial radio enterprise’s 
operations.  The BTA’s focus on the sale of advertising is without support in R.C. 
5709.07, which prohibits exemption for property being used “with a view to profit,” 
R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), (3), and (4), and for a church that was “formed for the private 
profit of any person,” R.C. 5709.07(D)(1).  Christian Voice is a nonprofit 
corporation that sells on-air advertising to continue its ministry.  It was not formed 
for private profit and its property is not being used to generate a profit.  To the 
contrary, the revenue that is generated is for the religious mission of the 
corporation.  In this respect, Christian Voice is no different from a church that sells 
advertising on weekly bulletins or on banners at church functions to raise revenue 
that allows the church to continue its religious ministry.  The BTA’s position on 
revenue erodes the standing of traditional religious institutions as churches and 
houses of public worship. 
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{¶ 36} The Chief Justice’s dissenting opinion contends that we “ignor[e] 
the well established rule in Ohio that ‘it is the use of the property and not the use 
of the proceeds derived therefrom’ that determines whether a tax exemption is 
conferred.”  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 77, quoting Columbus Youth League v. Cty. 
Bd. of Revision, 172 Ohio St. 156, 158, 174 N.E.2d 110 (1961).  However, we have 
only applied this rule in the context of the charitable-use exemption under R.C. 
5709.12—not the public-worship exemption under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2).  The 
dissent’s attempt to extrapolate this rule into the public-worship exemption lacks 
support in our case law.  The Ohio cases referenced by the dissent are neither 
factually similar—none involved a Christian radio station that exhibited the 
attributes of a church—nor present the current legal issue—application of the 
public-worship exemption.  See Columbus Youth League, 172 Ohio St. 156, 174 
N.E.2d 110 (affirming denial of charitable-use exemption for baseball stadium 
owned by charitable institution and leased to professional baseball club because the 
property was not used exclusively, or even primarily, for charitable purposes); 
Incorporated Trustees of Gospel Worker Soc. v. Evatt, 140 Ohio St. 185, 188, 42 
N.E.2d 900 (1942) (affirming denial of charitable-use exemption for the part of 
charitable institution’s property that was used as living quarters for employees of 
religious printing and publishing establishment); Lutheran Book Shop v. Bowers, 
164 Ohio St. 359, 361, 131 N.E.2d 219 (1955) (to qualify for charitable-use 
exemption under R.C. 5709.12, the test is the present use of the property rather than 
the ultimate use of proceeds received from the property); Zindorf v. Otterbein 
Press, 138 Ohio St. 287, 34 N.E.2d 748 (1941) (holding that not-for-profit 
publishing corporation’s use of property was not exclusively for charitable 
purposes when more than 40 percent of total revenues came from commercial 
printing).  Notably, there are no Ohio cases in which we have applied this rule in 
the context of R.C. 5709.07(A)(2).  The Chief Justice’s reliance in her dissent on 
out-of-state authorities is also unavailing as those decisions interpret Illinois and 
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14 
Alaska statutes, each of which has different language from R.C. 5709.07(A)(2).  
See dissenting opinion at ¶ 78, citing Three Angels Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. 
Dept. of Revenue, 381 Ill.App.3d 679, 697, 885 N.E.2d 554 (2008), and Nome v. 
Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska, 707 P.2d 870, 879 (Alaska 1985). 
{¶ 37} Moreover, our analysis focuses on the exclusive use of the property.  
In other words, we have considered how the property is primarily used.  See Grace 
Cathedral, 143 Ohio St.3d 212, 2015-Ohio-2067, 36 N.E.3d 136, at ¶ 18 (resolution 
of an exemption claim pursuant to R.C. 5709.07(A)(2) focuses on whether the 
primary use of the property is public worship).  As detailed above, the record clearly 
demonstrates that the primary use of Christian Voice’s land and building is for 
church purposes.  Accordingly, Christian Voice uses its property “exclusively for 
public worship” under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2). 
{¶ 38} In reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice’s dissent accuses us of 
blatant activism.  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 47.  However, the charge of activism is 
misdirected and gratuitous as our conclusion gives entire effect to R.C. 
5709.07(A)(2), is supported by relevant case law, and reaches the same conclusion 
that the tax commissioner reached in two separate final determinations issued 21 
years apart, one of which was issued after the determination at issue in this appeal. 
{¶ 39} The tax commissioner’s failure to consider whether Christian Voice 
exhibits the essential qualities of a church in determining whether it is a “[h]ous[e] 
used exclusively for public worship” resulted in an overly narrow construction 
based on an incorrect legal conclusion.  We agree with Christian Voice’s first 
argument—namely, that the primary use of its property is for public worship.  
Because we allow the exemption under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), we do not address 
Christian Voice’s remaining arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 40} Christian Voice’s Gahanna property qualifies for the property-tax 
exemption for “[h]ouses used exclusively for public worship” under R.C. 
January Term, 2016 
 
15
5709.07(A)(2).  The decision of the BTA is reversed, and the exemption is allowed 
for tax year 2008 in accordance with the application filed in this case in that year. 
Decision reversed. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents with an opinion that LANZINGER, J., joins. 
LANZINGER, J., dissents with an opinion that O’NEILL, J., joins in part. 
_________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 41} In this appeal, appellant, Christian Voice of Central Ohio, asserts 
that it established that its real property, which is located in Gahanna and serves 
primarily as a radio broadcast station, satisfies the “exclusive use” requirement to 
qualify for tax-exempt status for “[h]ouses used exclusively for public worship” 
under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2). 
{¶ 42} The majority frames the issue before us as whether appellant’s 
broadcast of “adult contemporary Christian” music mystically transforms its radio 
station into a tax-exempt house of worship.  If that framing were proper, we would 
face a church-state issue that poses complex constitutional conundrums.  See Young 
Life Campaign v. Patino, 122 Cal.App.3d 559, 565, 176 Cal.Rptr. 23 (1981).  But 
the question before us is far more simple and mundane:  Is appellant entitled to a 
tax exemption on real property that contains a radio broadcast station that produces 
millions of dollars in revenue?  That question should be answered according to this 
state’s law of taxation, which is meant to apply equally to all Ohioans. 
{¶ 43} The principle underlying Ohio tax law is that all Ohioans must 
equally bear the burdens of taxation and, therefore, that all real property is subject 
to taxation except in the limited circumstances in which the General Assembly has 
granted tax exemptions.  R.C. 5709.01; Seven Hills Schools v. Kinney, 28 Ohio 
St.3d 186, 503 N.E.2d 163 (1986); Kroger Co. v. Schneider, 9 Ohio St.2d 80, 83, 
223 N.E.2d 606 (1967), citing Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
15 (1853).  The property owner bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an 
exemption, which is conferred by statute, and exemption provisions are construed 
strictly to ensure fairness to all.  Natl. Tube Co. v. Glander, 157 Ohio St. 407, 105 
N.E.2d 648 (1952), paragraph two of the syllabus; Cincinnati College v. State, 19 
Ohio 110, 115 (1850).  In all doubtful cases, exemptions must be denied.  A. 
Schulman, Inc. v. Levin, 116 Ohio St.3d 105, 2007-Ohio-5585, 876 N.E.2d 928,  
¶ 7.  These basic rules are designed to ensure that all Ohioans are burdened equally 
by taxation.  Lutheran Book Shop v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 359, 362, 131 N.E.2d 
219 (1955); Watterson v. Halliday, 77 Ohio St. 150, 171, 82 N.E. 962 (1907). 
{¶ 44} Appellant seeks the statutory exemption provided to “[h]ouses used 
exclusively for public worship * * * and the ground attached to them that is not 
* * * used with a view to profit.”  R.C. 5709.07(A)(2). 
{¶ 45} Based on a careful review of the record in this case, measured against 
our legal precedent, the Board of Tax Appeals found that the property in question 
is not tax-exempt as a house used exclusively for public worship.  Instead, it 
concluded, quite unremarkably, that the property was used to operate a radio station 
and thus was not exempt under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2). 
{¶ 46} Our task is a limited one:  We are to review the BTA’s decision and 
uphold it if it is reasonable and lawful.  R.C. 5717.04; Seven Hills Schools, 28 Ohio 
St.3d at 186-187, 503 N.E.2d 163.  In doing so, the law requires that “we indulge 
no presumption favorable to [tax] exemptions,” Incorporated Trustees of Gospel 
Worker Soc. v. Evatt, 140 Ohio St. 185, 188, 42 N.E.2d 900 (1942), and demands 
that even if we are sympathetic to “appellant’s desire to acquire tax exempt status 
for a radio station which provides inspiration to so many,” we may not “create new 
categories for tax exemption; that is the job more properly left to the legislature,” 
Jimmy Swaggart Evangelistic Assn. v. Kinney, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-82-64, 
1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 5732, 6 (Mar. 18, 1983). 
January Term, 2016 
 
17
{¶ 47} Nevertheless, the majority here announces a new and overly broad 
interpretation of the exemption provision in R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), with an analysis 
that hints at dispensation for perceived religious freedoms, majority opinion at  
¶ 35-36, but which is ultimately based on inapposite case law flown in on a wing 
and a prayer.  I dissent from that blatant activism, which reaches a result favorable 
to this appellant, to the burden of every other Ohio taxpayer. 
{¶ 48} I would hold that the tax commissioner properly denied tax-exempt 
status under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2).  I would also deny on the merits appellant’s 
argument based on collateral estoppel and reject as waived appellant’s partial-
exemption claim. 
ANALYSIS 
Appellant 
{¶ 49} Let us first consider appellant. 
{¶ 50} Appellant operates on a multimillion-dollar annual budget. 
{¶ 51} The property for which it seeks a tax exemption includes a building 
that encompasses nearly 17,000 square feet and contains “production studios used 
for the origination of certain religious programming, offices, assembly rooms and 
a chapel.”  The religious programming offered by appellant is almost entirely “adult 
contemporary Christian” music that appellant obtains from music-industry sources 
and monitors carefully for ratings.  Appellant does not broadcast prayer or church 
services.  Other than music (and advertisements), listeners are offered only a 60-
second devotional “spot,” which is run “cyclically throughout the day,” and 
appellant’s DJs’ attempts to “shar[e] their lives spiritually” on the air. 
{¶ 52} The chapel occupies a minute portion of the facility, a 25-by-15-foot 
room, which is approximately 375 square feet—two percent of the total square 
footage of the structure.  Although appellant’s listeners are invited to use the chapel, 
there are no regular worship services in it, and its use by those seeking religious 
guidance is rare.  Indeed, appellant has conceded that the use of the chapel is de 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
minimis.  And although the majority makes a point of noting the work of “Pastor 
John,” a minister and DJ employed by appellant, there is absolutely nothing in the 
record establishing that he uses the chapel to lead religious services for the public. 
{¶ 53} Appellant emphasizes that a meeting room in the basement is open 
to churches and other organizations for use, free of charge.  For example, a local 
church uses the room for a weekly youth-group meeting and for Sunday evening 
services.  But the record is devoid of any showing that other groups use the building 
for religious purposes.  In fact, many of those who visit, including members of the 
Boy Scouts of America and children who are home-schooled, tour the building for 
educational purposes rather than for religious ones. 
{¶ 54} To the extent that appellant has a flock, that flock is its on-air 
audience, which includes those who tune in from their homes, motor vehicles, or 
workplaces.  Though the flock numbers about a quarter of a million people, the 
great majority of appellant’s income—about two-thirds—is derived from 
advertising revenue and the rental of appellant’s broadcasting towers.2  It is not a 
bad business, evidently; appellant secures approximately two million dollars in 
annual revenue from the advertisements that it broadcasts between the faith-based 
songs on its playlist. 
{¶ 55} Appellant nevertheless asserts that its use of the property is for the 
purpose of “furthering the gospel of Jesus Christ through Contemporary Christian 
Music and Preaching and Teaching radio programs.”  The chief sales officer of the 
broadcasting corporation contends that the sale of advertising is “vital to the 
furtherance of the ministry of the radio station.”  And appellant’s chief executive 
officer explains, “It takes money to do what we do to get the Gospel out there.” 
                                                 
2 Listeners apparently contribute about one-third of appellant’s income.  Appellant also allows a 
local church to use the property twice weekly for services.  Although appellant does not charge that 
church for rent, the church makes weekly contributions to appellant. 
January Term, 2016 
 
19
{¶ 56} As far as economic principles go, those statements may be truthful.  
But they neither equate with the law of taxation, nor are they unassailable religious 
principles.  Quite the contrary.  Even assuming that appellant’s programming is 
“bible verses put to music,” majority opinion at ¶ 10, appellant is not unique in that 
regard.  As the majority admits, music is integral to many religious traditions.  Id. 
at ¶ 28, citing Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 802 (4th Cir.2000). 
{¶ 57} References to music, including singing and the use of musical 
instruments, appear throughout the Bible.  See, e.g., Isaiah 12:5; Psalms 9:2, 11; 1 
Chronicles 13:8.  And references to the Bible and other religious texts are often the 
bases of great works by musical artists, even those considered outside the 
contemporary Christian music genre.  Consider, for example, Pete Seeger’s Turn! 
Turn! Turn! (To Everything There Is A Season), which was made famous by The 
Byrds in the 1960s but is, essentially, a restatement of the Book of Ecclesiastes.  
Cohn, The Byrds’ Turn! Turn! Turn! TURNS 50 (Dec. 4, 2015), 
http://www.biography.com/news/the-byrds-turn-turn-turn-facts-anniversary 
(accessed Mar. 4, 2016). Similarly, other great musicians have found comfort, 
solace, and faith in music they created based on their own interpretations of 
religious texts,3 as Andrew Lloyd Webber did with Joseph and the Amazing 
Technicolor Dreamcoat and Jesus Christ Superstar.  See Coulson, They’re Playing 
Our Song! The Promise and the Perils of Music Copyright Litigation, 13 J. Marshall 
Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 555, 563 (2014); http://www.jesuschristsuperstar.com/about/ 
                                                 
3 The majority relies, in part, on Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in McCollum, which forbade 
the states from utilizing tax-supported public school systems “in aid of religious instruction,” Illinois 
ex rel. McCollum v. School Dist. No. 71 Bd. of Edn., 333 U.S. 203, 204-205, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 
649 (1948).  Properly understood, Justice Jackson’s opinion recognized that many subjects taught 
in schools, not just music, could carry “the inspirational appeal of religion.”  Id. at 235-236 (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
(accessed Mar. 4, 2016).  And who could argue that Handel’s Messiah is not one 
of the world’s greatest pieces of music inspired by religious teachings?  
{¶ 58} But as both Christians and taxpayers will recognize and understand, 
the mere fact that those songs are transmitted over radio airwaves does not 
transmogrify the broadcaster into a tax-exempt house of worship under the Revised 
Code any more than a television or cable station comes closer to tax-exemption 
eligibility every time it airs a religiously inspired song or movie.  And the mere fact 
that one might receive the broadcast in his home or even spend a portion of his 
week humming, whistling, or singing some of the great hymns or “bible verses set 
to music” does not transform one’s abode or vehicle into a tax-exempt house of 
worship. 
The Majority’s Opinion 
The majority uses incorrect standards of review and inapposite law 
{¶ 59} To carve out an improper tax exemption here, the majority chooses 
to ignore legislation and the law on church taxation cited by the parties and instead 
relies on inapposite law, Maumee Valley Broadcasting Assn. v. Porterfield, 29 Ohio 
St.2d 95, 279 N.E.2d 863 (1972). 
{¶ 60} Maumee Valley presented a discrete question:  whether a nonprofit 
religious corporation was a tax-exempt “church” within the meaning of Ohio’s 
sales-tax statute, R.C. 5739.02(B)(12).  Contrary to the majority’s suggestion that 
Maumee Valley provides guidance here, that summary decision offers little to assist 
us in determining whether appellant is a “[h]ous[e] used exclusively for public 
worship” under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2).  And to the extent that Maumee Valley has any 
import here, it is of no help to appellant.  To the contrary, Maumee Valley supports 
the tax commissioner’s determination. 
{¶ 61} At the outset, it is important to recognize that Maumee Valley clearly 
mandates a different standard of review than that used by the majority.  Maumee 
Valley holds that the determination of whether an organization is a church is a 
January Term, 2016 
 
21
factual determination, not a legal one.  Id. at 98 (describing the “factual 
determination” of the Board of Tax Appeals in deciding whether the corporation 
was a church for purposes of the sales-tax statute).  The majority ignores that part 
of the holding, which it must do in order to employ de novo review rather than the 
deferential review that should apply—and that would require our affirmance of the 
tax commissioner’s decision in this case.  See Seven Hills Schools, 28 Ohio St.3d 
at 186-187, 503 N.E.2d 163.  The court’s decision today, however, ignores but does 
not change our clear precedent that “ ‘[t]he BTA is responsible for determining 
factual issues and, if the record contains reliable and probative support for these 
BTA determinations,’ ” we will affirm them.  Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 
399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14, quoting Am. Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy, 
72 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 648 N.E.2d 483 (1995).  When engaging in appellate 
review of tax decisions, every member of the court should remember the 
commandment that we do not intrude on determinations that are sound and 
supported by the record. 
 
It is not our province to be a “super board” and thereby render a 
different decision because we have interpreted the facts differently 
than has the board.  While we have the ultimate authority, we should 
always remember that we are not final because we are infallible—
we are only infallible because we are final. 
 
(Emphasis sic.) Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach, 32 Ohio St.3d 432, 
439-440, 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987) (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
{¶ 62} Even assuming that the majority could find some way around the 
standard of review, the facts and law make Maumee Valley inapplicable here. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
{¶ 63} The majority’s analysis of Maumee Valley omits two critical facts:  
Maumee Valley involved a nonprofit religious organization that conducted church 
services on its premises for members of the public, and the organization’s only 
source of revenue was “donations, gifts, and contributions.”  Id. at 95-97.  In fact, 
about 80 percent of the organization’s gross receipts came from approximately 500 
people called “faith partners,” who contributed financial support on a monthly 
basis.  Id. at 96-97.  With the millions in advertising revenue that it secures, 
appellant is, of course, quite different from the organization in Maumee Valley and 
quite different from the many traditional churches that receive modest revenue from 
advertising in their weekly bulletins or on banners at church functions.  See majority 
opinion at ¶ 32. 
{¶ 64} Even if the cases were not distinguishable on the facts, they would 
remain distinguishable on the law because the organization in Maumee Valley and 
the radio station here rely on different exemptions from different taxes. 
{¶ 65} The syllabus in Maumee Valley is limited expressly to R.C.  
5739.02(B)(12)—a statute not at issue here.  For this reason, the BTA found 
appellant’s reliance on Maumee Valley to be misplaced because the standards 
applicable there are not applicable to the exemption for “[h]ouses used exclusively 
for public worship.” 
{¶ 66} Moreover, although Maumee Valley states that a nonprofit religious 
corporation may not be denied tax-exempt status “for the reason that it operates a 
radio facility in conjunction with and in furtherance of its religious and charitable 
activities,” id. at syllabus, it does not say that the taxing authorities—or this court—
must grant an exemption to a radio facility.  Its holding is of no import here. 
{¶ 67} Properly understood, Maumee Valley stands for the proposition that 
a nondenominational church, which was relatively uncommon in 1972,4 is eligible 
                                                 
4 The percentage of Protestants claiming “no denomination or non-denominational” rose from 
roughly four percent in the 1970s to 15 percent in 2006.  Thumma, A Report on the 2010 National 
January Term, 2016 
 
23
for exemption on the same grounds as a more traditional house of worship.5   The 
majority in Maumee Valley clarified that even if a nonprofit religious corporation 
“is not without some unique features” and “cannot, in a traditional sense, claim a 
certain congregation,” it can be considered a church under R.C. 5739.02(B)(12).  
29 Ohio St.2d at 98, 279 N.E.2d 863. 
{¶ 68} Indeed, the opinion pointedly states, albeit without proper attribution 
to the great 19th-century agnostic orator Robert Green Ingersoll, that it was 
referring to nondenominational churches:  “In other words, a church of the type 
‘that finds with joy the grain of gold in every creed, and floods with light and love 
the germs of good in every soul’ cannot reasonably be denied exempt status for that 
reason alone.”  Id. 
{¶ 69} In any event, the fact that appellant is nondenominational is not an 
issue in this case and plays no role in the legal analysis of its tax liability.  Thus, 
Maumee Valley is neither applicable nor compellingly illustrative on either fact or 
law.  And to the extent that Maumee Valley has any proper application here, the 
majority ignores it. 
{¶ 70} But those are not the only analytical sins committed by the majority. 
The majority incorrectly concludes that appellant’s property is used 
exclusively for public worship 
{¶ 71} The majority’s effort to bless appellant with a tax exemption 
purportedly relies on this court’s lead opinion in Faith Fellowship Ministries, 32 
                                                 
Profile 
of 
U.S. 
Nondenominational 
and 
Independent 
Churches, 
http://www.hartfordinstitute.org/cong/nondenominational-churches-national-profile-2010.html 
(accessed Mar. 10, 2016), citing National Opinion Research Center, The General Social Survey, 
http://gss.norc.org/, and Bader et al., The Ties that Bind: Network Overlap among Independent 
Congregations, 30 Social Science Computer Rev. 259 (2012). 
 
5 At that time, there appears to have been some debate in the courts over whether nondenominational 
churches were constitutionally exempt from taxation.  See, e.g., Young Life Campaign, 122 
Cal.App.3d at 571-572, 176 Cal.Rptr. 23, citing Vic Coburn Evangelistic Assn. v. Emp. Div., 35 
Or.App. 655, 582 P.2d 51 (1978), and Chapman v. Commr. of Internal Revenue, 48 T.C. 358 (1967).    
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
Ohio St.3d 432, 513 N.E.2d 1340.  It bears mention, however, that in that case, 
three justices would have gone so far as to exempt from taxation, along with an 
applicant’s sanctuary, its cafeteria, gymnasium, swimming pool, “playfield,” and 
nature trails.  Id. at 439 (Locher, J., joined by Wright and Brown, JJ., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  But common sense prevailed, and four justices rejected 
that overly generous view of the exemption, id. at 437 (lead opinion); id. at 439 
(Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), holding that only the 
portions of property that are used in a principal, primary, and essential way to 
facilitate public worship are exempt from real estate taxes, id. at paragraph two of 
the syllabus.  See also Christ Church Pentecostal v. Tennessee State Bd. of 
Equalization, 428 S.W.3d 800, 808, 814 (Tenn.Ct.App.2013) (affirming the denial 
of a property-tax exemption for a bookstore café operated by a church, in part for 
outreach efforts). 
{¶ 72} Properly understood, the holding in Faith Fellowship stands for the 
proposition that public worship means the “open and free celebration or observance 
of the rites and ordinances of a religious organization.”   Id. at paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  As Chief Justice Moyer explained in Faith Fellowship, public worship 
must be public: 
 
The everyday expression of one’s relationship with a supernatural 
power may be considered by that individual as worship.  This court 
certainly does not intend to discourage such activity.  However, the 
Constitution, which incorporates the exemption, and the statute, by 
which it is established, contemplate that the worship be a 
celebration of a religious rite in an open and free place and not the 
everyday activities of an individual which express devotion to his or 
her God. 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
25
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 436 (lead opinion). 
{¶ 73} The majority’s suggestion here that the General Assembly amended 
the statute in the wake of Faith Fellowship in order to make the statute applicable 
to radio broadcast listeners is not an accurate understanding of the decision or the 
amendment.  It simply evidences the majority’s attempt to impose its logic on a 
statutory scheme and to create an unlimited tax exemption beyond the scope of the 
express statutory language.  See Clayton v. Ohio Bd. of Nursing, __ Ohio St.3d __, 
2016-Ohio-643, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 74} The amendment made clear that a “church” can be any number of 
believers that formed primarily or exclusively for a religious purpose and who did 
not form for the private profit of any person.  R.C. 5709.07(D)(1).  Even assuming 
that the majority is correct in that the legislature intended to expand the definition 
of a “[h]ous[e] used exclusively for public worship” to mean more than a physical 
structure, see, e.g., World Evangelistic Ent. Corp. v. Tracy, 96 Ohio App.3d 78, 83, 
644 N.E.2d 678 (2d Dist.1994),6 nothing in any of the General Assembly’s 
amendments to R.C. 5709.07 shows that the legislature intended to alter the 
fundamental premise of Faith Fellowship, i.e., the necessity of public worship.  And 
even if we assume that listening to music is worship, nothing in the record before 
us establishes that appellant’s property is used exclusively for public worship.  “For 
                                                 
6 As the Second District Court of Appeals explained:  
 
A “house used exclusively for public worship,” as used in R.C. 5709.07, 
must accommodate a structure or facility that is used exclusively or primarily to 
propagate a religious message to persons who receive that message for a 
worshipful purpose.  Those who engage in that activity constitute a form of 
religious society, whether they are gathered where the religious message 
originates or are dispersed elsewhere. 
 
Thus, there is some nonbinding precedent for the notion that a broadcasting corporation can be a 
“[h]ous[e] used exclusively for public worship” for purposes of R.C. 5709.07(A)(12).  Notably, 
however, the World Evangelistic Enterprise Corporation was fully supported by listener donations 
and the contributions of churches and radio-program producers, rather than by advertising revenue.  
World Evangelistic Ent. at 79-80. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
the purposes of [R.C. 5709.07(A)(2),] ‘public worship’ means the open and free 
celebration or observance of the rites and ordinances of a religious organization; it 
does not include everyday activities that express devotion to God.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  86 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Taxation, Section 539, at 650 (2009). 
{¶ 75} And, even if we assume appellant had adduced sufficient evidence 
that it is a house of public worship, it is still unable to establish that the exemption 
is proper. 
{¶ 76} Appellant is a radio station.  The fact that it broadcasts religious 
songs or does charitable deeds does not change that fact.  Even if bears the indicia 
of incidental aspects of a ministry, it is not entitled to an exemption because it is 
not used exclusively for public worship.  See, e.g., Watterson, 77 Ohio St. at 173, 
82 N.E. 962. 
{¶ 77} The statutory term “exclusive” means just that—exclusive.  Here, 
even accepting the argument that appellant uses its programming to evangelize, it 
admittedly also uses its radio stations to generate income.  The majority makes 
much of the fact that appellant’s purported use of that income is not for profit but 
for the benefit of the station’s charitable and religious works.  But in doing so, the 
majority ignores the well established rule in Ohio that “it is the use of the property 
and not the use of the proceeds derived therefrom” that determines whether a tax 
exemption is conferred.  Columbus Youth League v. Cty. Bd. of Revision, 172 Ohio 
St. 156, 158, 174 N.E.2d 110 (1961).  “Any right of exemption is lost if the property 
is used to produce income, regardless of the fact that the income is exclusively used 
for a purpose that is of such a nature that if the property itself, rather than its income, 
were so used the property would be exempt.”  86 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Taxation, 
Section 539, at 649-650 (2009), citing Incorporated Trustees of Gospel Worker 
Soc., 140 Ohio St. 185, 42 N.E.2d 900.  “[T]he test is the present use of the property 
rather than the ultimate use of [the] proceeds,” Gospel Worker Soc. at paragraph 
January Term, 2016 
 
27
two of the syllabus, even when the owner of the property is a not-for-profit 
corporation organized for charitable purposes: 
 
“Where a substantial portion of the gross income of a corporation is 
received for work done in competition with commercial concerns in 
the same line, the property of such corporation may not be exempted 
from taxation under Section 5353, General Code [Section 5709.12, 
Revised Code], even though such corporation be one formed not for 
profit and owned by a religious institution, for whose use, benefit 
and behoof the property of the corporation is held.” 
 
(Brackets sic.)  Lutheran Book Shop, 164 Ohio St. at 361-362, 131 N.E.2d 219, 
quoting Zindorf v. Otterbein Press, 138 Ohio St. 287, 34 N.E.2d 748 (1941), 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 78} “ ‘When money is made by the use of [a] building, that is profit, no 
matter to what purpose that money is applied.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  Three Angels 
Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 381 Ill.App.3d 679, 697, 885 
N.E.2d 554 (2008), quoting People ex rel. Baldwin v. Jessamine Withers Home, 
312 Ill. 136, 141, 143 N.E. 414 (1924).  “Thus, property used by a charitable 
organization to raise money for that group’s charitable activities is not exempt since 
the property’s direct and primary use is fund-raising and not charity itself.”  Nome 
v. Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska, 707 P.2d 870, 879 (Alaska 1985). 
{¶ 79} Having concluded that appellant fails to establish that the BTA’s 
decision is not entitled to our deference or even to show that the property in question 
is a house of worship used exclusively for public worship, I would affirm the BTA’s 
decision.  I therefore address two other points raised by appellant in its appeal to 
this court but not addressed by the majority. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
The tax commissioner was not collaterally estopped from denying the 
exemption 
{¶ 80} Appellant asserts that the tax commissioner was collaterally 
estopped from denying it the exemption because it previously conferred one to 
appellant in 1991. 
{¶ 81} This court has acknowledged “a narrow range of applicability for the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel in tax proceedings.”  Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 122 Ohio St.3d 134, 2009-Ohio-2461, 909 N.E.2d 
597, ¶ 17.  The doctrine “ ‘precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue 
that has been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action.’ ”  
Progressive Plastics, Inc. v. Testa, 133 Ohio St.3d 490, 2012-Ohio-4759, 979 
N.E.2d 280, ¶ 17, quoting Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 112, 254 
N.E.2d 10 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio 
St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995).  Accord Am. Soc. for Metals v. Limbach, 59 
Ohio St.3d 38, 39, 569 N.E.2d 1065 (1991) (identifying as “basic elements” of 
collateral estoppel “(1) an administrative proceeding of a judicial nature, (2) an 
identity of the parties, and (3) an identity of the issues”).  Appellant’s assertion of 
collateral estoppel fails at the most basic level:  there was no previous 
administrative proceeding of a judicial nature, and the issue here was not actually 
and necessarily litigated previously. 
{¶ 82} Appellant relies on a 1991 final determination of the tax 
commissioner granting appellant the exemption at a former address, but that 
proceeding before the tax commissioner was the initial process by which the 
administrative determination of taxable status occurs.  Thus, in no sense is the final 
determination in 1991 a “judgment” rendered after issues were litigated between 
contending parties. 
January Term, 2016 
 
29
{¶ 83} Moreover, the 1991 decision determined that the exemption was 
justified, so there was no need to litigate.  Nor does the record establish that any 
litigation ensued. 
{¶ 84} The same is true of the more recent determination by the tax 
commissioner regarding the taxable status of part of the same property that 
appellant previously owned.  There can be no requisite “identity of issues” because 
the current exemption claim involves a different parcel in a different tax year.  See 
Hubbard Press v. Tracy, 67 Ohio St.3d 564, 565, 621 N.E.3d 396 (1993) (collateral 
estoppel did not apply despite continuous exemption of printing house associated 
with Presbyterian Church from 1950 until its return to the taxable list in 1983 
because 1983 was a different year, hence a different issue).  Thus, appellant’s 
collateral estoppel argument fails. 
Appellant is barred from arguing for a “split-listing” because it did not 
raise that claim in its notice of appeal to the BTA 
{¶ 85} Former R.C. 5717.02 required that a notice of appeal to the BTA 
from a determination of the tax commissioner have a copy of the determination 
attached and “specify the errors therein complained of.”  2011 Sub.H.B. No. 225.7  
It is well settled that “the BTA lacks jurisdiction to grant relief from a final 
determination based on * * * alleged errors that were not sufficiently specified in 
the notice of appeal.”  Brown v. Levin, 119 Ohio St.3d 335, 2008-Ohio-4081, 894 
N.E.2d 35, ¶ 17; see also Global Knowledge Training, L.L.C. v. Levin, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 34, 2010-Ohio-4411, 936 N.E.2d 463, ¶ 15 (specification requirement of R.C. 
5717.02 constitutes a “jurisdictional prerequisit[e] to the exercise of authority by 
the BTA or this court on appeal”). 
                                                 
7 In 2013, the operative language of R.C. 5717.02 was changed; the statute now requires a “short 
and plain statement of the claimed errors in the determination,” while granting an option to amend 
the notice later in the proceedings.  R.C. 5717.02(C).  Because the notice of appeal to the BTA in 
this case was filed before the enactment of the 2013 legislation, we apply the earlier version of the 
statute. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
{¶ 86} The tax commissioner’s determination specifically finds that 
“[t]here is no evidence that people assemble to worship together on the subject 
property used exclusively as a radio station.”   The record suggests that that 
determination may not be accurate, and in its brief to this court, appellant asserts 
that the BTA erred in failing to consider whether the property should be split into 
exempt and taxable parts. 
{¶ 87} But even if the claim has merit, it is jurisdictionally barred because 
it was not raised at the BTA.  Nothing in appellant’s notice of appeal to the BTA 
asserted that the commissioner erred by not considering actual on-site worship 
services at the broadcasting facility or otherwise suggested that the nature of this 
case might justify split-listing portions of the property as exempt. 
{¶ 88} A taxpayer is required to challenge a specific finding of the tax 
commissioner in order to preserve the issue before the BTA.  Ellwood Engineered 
Castings Co. v. Zaino, 98 Ohio St.3d 424, 2003-Ohio-1812, 786 N.E.2d 458, ¶ 23.  
Appellant did not do so, and its failure bars it from raising the issue before this 
court.  See Osborne Bros. Welding Supply, Inc. v. Limbach, 40 Ohio St.3d 175, 178, 
532 N.E.2d 739 (1988). 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 89} I would hold that the tax commissioner properly denied tax-exempt 
status under R.C. 5709.02(A)(2).  I would also deny on the merits appellant’s 
argument based on collateral estoppel, and I would reject as waived appellant’s 
partial-exemption claim. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
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LANZINGER J., dissenting. 
{¶ 90} Property-tax exemptions are to be strictly construed because they are 
in derogation of equal rights.  Cincinnati College v. State, 19 Ohio 110, 115 (1850).  
The exemption for a house of public worship, R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), exempts 
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“[h]ouses used exclusively for public worship * * * and the ground attached to them 
that is not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit and that is necessary for 
their property occupancy, use, and enjoyment.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 91} I cannot accept that interpreting the word “exclusively” to mean 
“primarily” in this case is a strict construction of this property-tax exemption.  More 
than a century ago, this court interpreted language virtually identical to that 
contained in R.C. 5709.07(A)(2) as standing for the principle that “[t]he exemption 
is not of such houses as may be used for the support of public worship; but of houses 
used exclusively as places of public worship.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Watterson v. 
Halliday, 77 Ohio St. 150, 173, 82 N.E. 962 (1907). 
{¶ 92} The word “exclusively” as used in the statute has to mean something.  
The origin of the “primary use” test applied by the majority can be traced to our 
decision in In re Bond Hill-Roselawn Hebrew School, 151 Ohio St. 70, 84 N.E.2d 
270 (1949), in which we considered whether the public-worship exemption applied 
to a building where the first floor was “used exclusively for public worship” and 
the second floor was used as living quarters for a caretaker’s family.  Id. at 71.  We 
first observed that an overly literal construction of the exemption could prevent 
every application of the exemption, since “[i]t would not be difficult to show some 
slight use of any church building for a purpose other than public worship,” for 
example, when a room of the church was used to entertain children during church 
services, when part of the church building was used for Boy Scout meetings, or 
when part of the church was used to prepare a church supper.  Id. at 72-73.  We 
reversed the Board of Tax Appeals’ (“BTA”) holding denying the exemption as an 
unreasonable interpretation of its application to the church building.  Id. at 78. 
{¶ 93} In a later case, the question was whether the parish hall in the 
basement of a building housing a church qualified for the R.C. 5709.07 exemption.  
Bishop v. Kinney, 2 Ohio St.3d 52, 442 N.E.2d 764 (1982).  The BTA had found 
that the primary use of the parish hall, which was used in part as classrooms for 
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religious education, retreats, a summer Bible school, and post-worship breakfasts, 
“was religious in nature” but not used “exclusively for public worship” because it 
was also used for social gatherings and bingo games.  Id. at 52.  We held that a tax 
exemption for the parish hall was proper because the BTA found that the primary 
use of the parish hall was religious in nature and the tax commissioner had 
conceded that the primary use constituted “public worship” within the meaning of 
R.C. 5709.07.  Id. at 54. 
{¶ 94} Thus, we applied the primary-use test in both Bond Hill and Bishop 
to determine whether an auxiliary use of a building otherwise used exclusively for 
public worship affected the tax-exempt status of those buildings.  See Summit 
United Methodist Church v. Kinney, 7 Ohio St.3d 13, 15, 455 N.E.2d 669 (1983) 
(the educational wing of a parish center used as Sunday school classrooms and 
leased to a public university, which used the space as a day-care center during the 
week, was not primarily religious in nature and not entitled to an exemption under 
R.C. 5709.07).  We have also applied the primary-use test to determine whether 
buildings or land surrounding buildings used exclusively as churches defeated tax-
exempt status.  Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach, 32 Ohio St.3d 432, 
436-438, 513 N.E.2d 1340 (1987) (lead opinion) (a chapel in a church complex 
used for children’s church services in the summer and adult church services in the 
winter was exempt from taxation; a building used as a boiler building was necessary 
for the operation of exempt buildings on the church complex and consequently 
exempt under the primary-purpose test; buildings used as a cafeteria, sleeping 
rooms, a gymnasium, and a retreat house were merely supportive of or incidental 
to the public-worship function and not exempt from taxation; and a building used 
for storage and a vacant building were not exempt from taxation); Full Gospel 
Apostolic Church v. Limbach, 46 Ohio St.3d 195, 196, 546 N.E.2d 403 (1989) (the 
sporadic use of 47 acres surrounding a church sanctuary and associated buildings 
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for outdoor revivals and congregational services did not satisfy the primary-purpose 
test as applied to surrounding areas). 
{¶ 95} In each of the cases cited by appellant and the majority in support of 
the primary-purpose test, that test was applied to determine whether the exemption 
applied to buildings or portions of buildings auxiliary to traditional church 
buildings or in other words, to buildings used exclusively for public worship.  See 
majority opinion at ¶ 22.  In other words, we have applied the primary-purpose test 
to those auxiliary buildings or portions of buildings only when there existed a 
primary building used exclusively for public worship.  Never before have we 
expanded the exemption, which again must be strictly construed, to property like 
the one in the present case—a radio station, which is so clearly unlike the traditional 
church buildings exclusively used for public worship to which we have applied the 
exemption in the past. 
{¶ 96} There is no church here. 
{¶ 97} I accordingly dissent and join Chief Justice O’Connor’s dissent in 
full. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in all but the final sentence of the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor, L.L.C., and Brian M. Zets, for appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Daniel G. Kim, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Tax Commissioner. 
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