Title: JOHN EDWARD MONJARAS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOHN EDWARD MONJARAS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 71136 P.3d 162Case Number: 05-147Decided: 06/08/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JOHN 
EDWARD MONJARAS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ronald 
G. Pretty, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Director, 
Jonathan Haidsiak, Student Director, and Nathan Wilson, Student Intern, of the 
Prosecution Assistance Program.  
Argument by Mr. Johnson.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, JJ., and KAUTZ, 
D.J.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      John Monjaras 
pled guilty to two counts of third-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to 
concurrent terms of imprisonment of four to five years.  Monjaras now appeals, claiming that the 
district court abused its discretion by imposing a prison sentence instead of 
probation.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Monjaras presents 
the following issue for our review:

 
 
Did the 
court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Appellant to 
prison[?]

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In the Spring of 
2004, A.M., who was then forty-four years old, reported to the Cheyenne Police 
Department that she had been sexually abused by her sixth-grade teacher, John 
Monjaras.  According to A.M., 
Monjaras first engaged her in sexual intercourse when she was twelve years 
old.  The sexual abuse occurred 
while A.M. was babysitting for Monjaras' infant daughter and continued for a 
period of time until A.M. discontinued contact with Monjaras.  A.M. reported that Monjaras also had 
sexually abused another student, R.W., during the same time period and that R.W. 
had become pregnant as a result of the abuse.  

 
 
[¶4]      R.W. confirmed 
that Monjaras had engaged in sexual intercourse with her starting in 
approximately June of 1973, when she was twelve years old.  As with A.M., the sexual abuse occurred 
while R.W. was babysitting Monjaras' daughter.  R.W. eventually became pregnant with 
Monjaras' child at the age of thirteen and gave birth in August of 1975.1  When questioned by police, Monjaras 
acknowledged his sexual relationship with R.W. but denied having any type of 
sexual relationship with A.M.  

 
 
[¶5]      On May 25, 2004, 
the State charged Monjaras with four counts of third-degree sexual assault 
against A.M. and two counts of third-degree sexual assault against R.W., in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003).2  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Monjaras 
pled guilty to one count of third-degree sexual assault involving A.M. and one 
count of third-degree sexual assault involving R.W.  In providing a factual basis for his 
pleas, Monjaras admitted to having sexual intercourse with A.M. and R.W., whom 
he claimed were fourteen years of age at the time.  In exchange for Monjaras' guilty pleas, 
the State dismissed the remaining counts and agreed to remain silent with 
respect to sentencing.  

 
 
[¶6]      Prior to 
sentencing, the district court received a Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) 
from the Department of Corrections and a document entitled "Defendants Filings 
in Aid of the Court." The latter document disputed A.M.'s allegations regarding 
his criminal conduct and included numerous letters and petitions supporting 
Monjaras and urging leniency in sentencing.  Monjaras appeared before the district 
court for sentencing on March 24, 2005.  
The district court noted it had received the PSI and provided Monjaras an 
opportunity to comment on the report.  
The district court heard statements from Monjaras, his children and 
numerous friends, arguments by defense counsel in mitigation of sentencing, and 
entertained a statement by the victim, A.M.  

 
 
[¶7]      At the conclusion 
of the hearing, and without comment, the district court sentenced Monjaras to a 
prison term of four to five years on each count, with the two sentences to run 
concurrently.  The court entered a 
written judgment and sentence confirming its oral pronouncement.  The judgment and sentence expressly 
states that "probation is inappropriate," but contains no further indication as 
to how the district court arrived at its sentencing decision.   This appeal 
followed.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      Sentencing 
decisions are within the broad discretion of the trial court.  This Court will not set aside a sentence 
that is within the statutory limits absent a finding of a clear abuse of 
discretion.  Watters v. State, 2004 WY 155, ¶ 32, 101 P.3d 908, 920 (Wyo. 2004); Sampsell v. 
State, 2001 WY 12, ¶ 6, 17 P.3d 724, 726 (Wyo. 2001).  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily and capriciously."  Martinez v. State, 2002 WY 10, ¶ 7, 39 P.3d 394, 
396 (Wyo. 2002).  Under the 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review, our core inquiry is the reasonableness 
of the trial court's choice.  
Id.

 
 

DISCUSSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Monjaras attacks 
his sentences from various angles.  
Primarily, Monjaras presents a global complaint concerning the district 
court's failure to provide an explanation for the sentences it imposed.  He claims that this failure by the 
district court has prejudicially inhibited his ability to obtain meaningful 
appellate review of the reasonableness of the court's sentencing decision.  Apparently conceding that the current 
state of the law does not require a trial court to render specific findings in 
sentencing matters, Monjaras declares that, as a matter of policy, this Court 
should direct trial courts to enter into the record the reasons supporting the 
sentences imposed or face an automatic reversal of their sentencing 
decisions.  Monjaras, predictably, 
wants this Court to apply this new policy to the instant appeal, effectively 
granting him a new sentencing hearing.  
Monjaras, however, supports his policy argument with nothing more than 
his personal preference.  
Unfortunately for Monjaras, such an argument is wholly insufficient to 
persuade this Court to alter its longstanding precedent.

 
 
[¶10]   Monjaras also presents more 
specific complaints regarding his sentences.  He claims that the district court did 
not adequately consider the possibility of a probationary sentence.  Although Monjaras acknowledges that the 
district court, in its written judgment, stated that "the Court finds that 
probation is inappropriate,"3 he points to the absence of 
specific findings as evidence that the court did not consider probation in 
determining an appropriate sentencing disposition.

 
 
[¶11]   The decision whether or not to 
grant probation is discretionary.  
Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 56, ¶ 6, 44 P.3d 943, 
945 (Wyo. 2002).  While the trial 
court is not obligated to grant probation to a criminal defendant, it must 
consider an application for probation and, if such is not granted, include a 
statement in the written sentence expressly acknowledging that it considered the 
application.  Martinez, ¶ 10, 
39 P.3d  at 396; W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(D).  
We have stated that no particular amount of consideration of probation is 
required as long as the record discloses that the court considered it, however 
slightly.  Beaulieu v. State, 608 P.2d 275 
(Wyo. 1980); see also Martinez, ¶ 11, 39 P.3d  at 
396; Volz v. State, 707 P.2d 179, 183 
(Wyo. 
1985).

 
 
[¶12]   After reviewing the record in this 
case, we are convinced that the district court considered and rejected the 
option of placing Monjaras on probation.  
The PSI discussed probation as a sentencing option and provided a 
detailed probation plan.  Although 
the PSI did not include an explicit recommendation as to whether or not 
probation was appropriate, it cited Monjaras' stable residence and steady income 
as indicators that Monjaras was appropriately situated for a probationary 
sentence.  The PSI contained 
twenty-one conditions which the PSI's author considered necessary in the event 
the district court granted probation. 

 
 
[¶13]   The issue of probation was also 
brought to the attention of the district court by witnesses who testified on 
Monjaras' behalf at the sentencing hearing and through Monjaras' statements and 
defense counsel's argument in mitigation of sentencing.  The record also contains letters of 
support and a twenty-four-page petition in which friends of Monjaras advocated 
for a sentence of probation.  On the 
other hand, A.M. urged the court, in both her oral and written statements, not 
to impose a probationary sentence.  
The facts of this case resemble those in which we have previously found a 
sufficient consideration of probation.  
See Martinez, ¶¶ 12-15, 39 P.3d  at 396-97 
(finding that trial court considered probation where defendant's family members 
urged the probation officer to recommend probation and testified that they would 
suffer financially if defendant sent to prison); Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225, 236 (Wyo. 
1993) (arguments at sentencing about suitability of probation demonstrated that 
probation had been considered); Beaulieu, 608 P.2d  at 275-76 (fact that 
probation was requested and presentence investigation report contained probation 
plan leads to no other conclusion that trial court considered probation). We 
have no trouble concluding in this case that the issue of probation was squarely 
before the district court, and the court considered and rejected that sentencing 
option.

 
 
[¶14]   Monjaras also takes issue with the 
concurrent four-to-five-year prison sentences imposed by the district 
court.  Monjaras contends that the 
prison sentences are unreasonable given the age of the crimes, the lack of a 
prior criminal history and his exemplary behavior and community service over the 
last thirty years.  We 
disagree.  After reviewing the 
record, we find that the sentences are remarkably lenient.

 
 
[¶15]   When assessing the reasonableness 
of a sentence, consideration must be given to the crime, its attendant 
circumstances and the character of the defendant.  Watters, ¶ 33, 101 P.3d  at 921; Volz, 707 P.2d  at 184.  When Monjaras pled guilty, he admitted 
to engaging in a sexual relationship with two fourteen-year-old girls.  Monjaras used his position as a teacher 
to establish a trusting relationship with the girls and then used that 
relationship to sexually abuse them.  
His surreptitious exploitation of these girls is reprehensible.  The fact that he escaped detection for 
over thirty years does not diminish in any way his heinous criminal 
conduct.

 
 
[¶16]   Each offense upon which Monjaras 
was convicted, third degree sexual assault, provides for a maximum prison term 
of fifteen years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-306(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003).  
Consequently, being convicted on two counts, Monjaras faced a possible 
maximum prison sentence of thirty years.4  The concurrent four-to-five-year 
sentences received by Monjaras are obviously on the low end of the 
spectrum.  It is obvious to this 
Court that, in imposing the sentences, the district court did take into account 
Monjaras' particular mitigating circumstances, including the letters, petitions 
and statements presented on his behalf.  
Therefore, not only do Monjaras' protestations fall on deaf ears, we are 
incredulous that Monjaras is even challenging his sentences in light of the 
egregious nature of his crimes.  
Under the circumstances, we will not disturb the sentences imposed by the 
district court.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
 [¶17]  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in sentencing Monjaras to prison.  The sentences are extremely reasonable 
given the facts of this case.  
Affirmed.  

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Monjaras 
married R.W. in 1977.  The marriage 
ended in divorce in 1991.  

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-304(a)(i) provides:

(a)  An actor commits sexual assault in the 
third degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the 
first or second degree:

(i)  The actor is at least four (4) years 
older than the victim and inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of 
sixteen (16) years[.]

 
 
Monjaras has 
never challenged the State's decision to charge him under § 6-2-304(a)(i) rather 
than the statute in effect at the time he committed the crimes, Wyo. Stat. § 
6-63(B) (Michie 1975 Cum. Supp.).

 
 

3This 
statement has since been lined out in the written judgment and sentence.  We cannot discern when it was done or by 
whom.  Because the parties have not 
made an issue of the lineout, neither will we.

 
 

4The statute 
in effect when Monjaras committed the crimes, Wyo. Stat. § 6-63(B) (Michie 1975 
Cum. Supp.), provided for a maximum prison sentence of fifty years on each 
count, for a total potential penalty of one hundred 
years.