Title: In re Thompson

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Thompson  (96-175); 166 Vt. 471; 697 A.2d 1111

[Filed 6-Jun-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-175

In re Warren Thompson                        Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             Chittenden Superior Court

                                             January Term, 1997

Alden T. Bryan, J.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for petitioner-appellant

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for respondent-appellee

PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Allen, C.J.
          (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       ALLEN, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.   Petitioner, who is seeking
  post-conviction relief from two sexual assault convictions on the grounds
  that the trial court accepted his no-contest pleas without first informing
  him of the nature of the crimes charged and the range of potential
  penalties, appeals the superior court's order granting the State summary
  judgment.  We affirm.

       In August 1990, petitioner was accused of brutally and repeatedly
  raping a woman that he had encountered in the early hours of the morning in
  front of her apartment.  The State's informations set forth the elements
  and penalties associated with the charged offenses -- sexual assault,
  aggravated sexual assault, and kidnapping.  Two experienced members of the
  Defender General's Office were assigned to represent petitioner.

       A little more than a year after petitioner's arrest, defense counsel
  moved to determine his competency to stand trial.  The court found
  petitioner to be competent and set a trial date. During jury selection, the
  parties announced that they had reached a plea agreement under which

 

  (1) the State would dismiss the kidnapping charge; (2) petitioner would
  plead no contest to the two remaining charges; (3) the State would
  recommend a sentence of thirty-five to forty-nine years to serve for the
  aggravated sexual assault and fifteen to twenty years to serve concurrently
  for the sexual assault; (4) petitioner would not be permitted to argue for
  a lesser sentence; (5) petitioner would waive his right to sentence
  reconsideration; (6) the parties would ask the court to recommend that
  petitioner receive mental health treatment; and (7) petitioner would be
  permitted to appeal the court's ruling that he was competent to stand
  trial.  These conditions were set forth in three forms signed by petitioner
  and defense counsel.  The forms were presented to and signed by the trial
  court judge, who referred to them during the ensuing colloquy regarding the
  plea.

       The trial court began the colloquy by addressing defense counsel in
  open court with petitioner present.  Responding to the court's questions,
  defense counsel indicated that he and his client had reviewed the evidence
  in the case as it related to the aggravated sexual assault and sexual
  assault charges and were convinced that the State could make out a prima
  facie showing of the elements of each offense.  At the court's request, the
  prosecutor then stated the facts that formed the basis for each offense. 
  Next, the court addressed petitioner personally, confirming that (1) he was
  not impaired or under the influence of any drug; (2) he had had an
  opportunity to discuss the case with his attorneys; (3) his attorneys had
  answered all his questions; (4) he was aware that he could ask the court
  questions at any time; (5) he knew that he had a right to a jury trial in
  which he could call his own witnesses; (6) he understood that he would be
  giving up that right if the court accepted his no-contest pleas; (7) he had
  signed the three plea-agreement forms that the court was showing him; (8)
  he understood that he could still withdraw the plea, go to trial, and make
  the State prove its case; and (9) it was his decision, after discussing the
  case with his two attorneys, to plead no contest to the charges.  At the
  end of the colloquy, petitioner then informed the court that he wished to
  plead no contest to charges of sexual assault and aggravated sexual
  assault.

 

       On direct appeal, in addition to challenging the district court's
  competency determination, petitioner argued for the first time that the
  court violated V.R.Cr.P. 11(c)(1) and (2) by accepting his no-contest plea
  without first determining that he understood the nature of the crimes
  charged and the range of the penalties that could be imposed for those
  crimes.  We affirmed the competency ruling and rejected the latter
  argument, finding no plain error.  See State v. Thompson, 162 Vt. 532, 533,