Title: State v. McLennan

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

503 S.W.2d 909 (1973) STATE of Tennessee, Petitioner, v. Wallace Lewis McLENNAN, Respondent. Supreme Court of Tennessee. May 7, 1973. David M. Pack, Atty. Gen. of Tenn., Robert H. Roberts, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, John L. Williams, Dist. Atty. Gen., Huntingdon, for petitioner. W. Lee Lackey, Savannah, for respondent. CHATTIN, Justice. Respondent was convicted of carrying burglarious instruments in violation of T.C.A. Section 39-908 and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial by a two-to-one decision. We granted the State's petition for certiorari. The only question involved is whether the Court of Criminal Appeals committed error in finding the trial judge should have sustained respondent's motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the two officers who arrested respondent. At approximately three thirty A.M., on October 17, 1970, two police officers of Savannah, Tennessee: Cannon and Alexander, were making a routine patrol of the business district of the town where a number of business houses and vending machines on the outside had been broken into during recent months. *910 They saw a car with two men in it come out into the street from a service station which had been closed for several hours. At the hearing on the motion of respondent to suppress the evidence, Cannon testified he had seen the car parked in a different part of the town a few hours prior with two persons in it. Both officers testified the car was a strange one and had Tennessee National Guard license plates which did not designate a county of the State. They followed the car a short distance. The car was not being operated in violation of law nor had the officers any evidence of any crime having been committed or about to be committed in the town that night. Nevertheless, the officers stopped the car. Cannon went to the driver's side while Alexander went to the opposite side. Respondent was the driver. Jackie Welch was the other occupant of the car. The officers stated they had been stopping cars which came from a closed business building for identification purposes. They, also, testified they were suspicious of this car because it came from a closed service station; and that they stopped it to ascertain the identity of the persons therein and where they resided. They testified Cannon asked respondent for his driver's license. When he got out of the car to hand his driver's license to Cannon, a light came on in the car. They stated when the light came on in the car they could see a bag with a sledge hammer handle and crowbars protruding from it in the rear floorboard and two walkie-talkie radios on the back seat; and that they arrested respondent and Welch for possession of burglarious instruments. The bag contained four crowbars, a sledge hammer, a hatchet and a chisel. Welch was jointly indicted with respondent but was not put to trial with respondent. Welch testified at the trial. Respondent did not testify in his own behalf. The majority opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, in reversing the trial judge, said a mere general suspicion is not probable cause for a warrantless arrest. That opinion, also, stated the officers arrested respondent by stopping the car. In making this statement, the majority relied on Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947). We are of the opinion Robertson v. State, supra, is not in point. In that case, two highway patrolmen stopped a car they were following on a public highway in daylight. The court said, under the facts of that case, the officers had no substantial reason to be suspicious; and that the stopping of the car was a subterfuge. We think under the facts of this case, the officers had a right to stop the car to ascertain the identity of the occupants and where they resided. One of the officers first saw the car parked in a different section of the town with two men in it a few hours prior to stopping it. It was a strange car with license plates which did not designate a county of the State. It was seen by the officers coming out of a closed service station at an unorthodox hour of the day in a business section where a number of burglaries had occurred in recent months. This Court, in Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn. 6, 423 S.W.2d 857 (1968), stated: The officers saw the criminal evidence prior to the arrest. Such was not a search and seizure as contemplated by the constitution. Batchelor v. State, 213 Tenn. 649, 378 S.W.2d 751 (1964); Armour v. Totty, Tenn., 486 S.W.2d 537 (1972). We are of the opinion the majority opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals is erroneous in holding the stopping of the car and asking the driver to display his driver's license was an illegal arrest. It is clear from the record the officers did not stop the car for the sole purpose of checking the license, if any, of the operator. On the contrary, the car was stopped for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the occupants and where they resided. The arrest occurred after the criminal evidence was in plain view. *912 The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. DYER, C.J., HUMPHREYS and McCANLESS, JJ., and WILSON, Special Justice, concur.