Title: Gambrell v. City of Norfolk

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

P
 
RESENT:  All the Justices 
DANIELL E. GAMBRELL 
 
v.  Record No. 030295   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
                          March 5, 2004 
CITY OF NORFOLK 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Charles D. Griffith, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This appeal is from a judgment in favor of a defendant 
municipal corporation in a personal injury action involving a 
"slip and fall" accident on snow and ice in a city-owned parking 
lot.  The dispositive issue is whether the circuit court erred 
in sustaining the defendant's plea of sovereign immunity.  We 
consider whether, at the time of the plaintiff's fall, the 
municipality was exercising a "governmental function" during 
snow removal operations after a snowstorm and, therefore, was 
immune from liability for the plaintiff's injuries. 
 
The following facts are relevant to this appeal.  Daniell 
E. Gambrell was an employee of Bank of America (the Bank) at one 
of its offices in the City of Norfolk (the City).  The Bank 
leased for its employees' use about 900 out of 1100 available 
parking spaces in a parking lot owned and operated by the City 
(the parking lot).  The Bank paid the City $375,000 per year for 
the lease.  The Bank's employees parked their vehicles in the 
parking lot and traveled to and from their place of employment 
in a "shuttle" bus. 
 
On January 25, 2000, a snowstorm in the City resulted in an 
accumulation of 4.7 inches of snow.  On January 26 and 27, 2000, 
the City closed the parking lot and instructed the Bank's 
employees to park their vehicles at a parking garage in a nearby 
shopping mall. 
 
The following day, January 28, 2000, the City reopened the 
parking lot after informing the Bank that its employees could 
resume parking their vehicles there.  On that date, as Gambrell 
was walking from her parked vehicle in the parking lot to the 
"shuttle bus pick-up area," she allegedly "slipped and fell" on 
"snow and ice" and sustained "serious and permanent injuries." 
 
Gambrell filed a motion for judgment against the City 
alleging that she was injured as a result of the City's 
negligent failure to remove snow and ice from the parking lot 
and its failure to place warning signs "around said area."  The 
City responded by filing, among other things, a "Special Plea of 
Governmental Immunity."  The City contended that it was immune 
from liability for Gambrell's alleged injuries because they 
occurred during the City's exercise of its governmental function 
of "emergency snow and ice removal activities necessitated by a 
severe snowstorm." 
 
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The circuit court conducted a hearing and received evidence 
concerning the City's special plea.  The City introduced into 
evidence meteorological records prepared by the National 
Climatic Data Center, which indicated that on January 25th, 
2000, the high temperature in the City of Norfolk was 36 degrees 
Fahrenheit, the low temperature was 29 degrees Fahrenheit, and 
there was an accumulation of 4.7 inches of snow.  From January 
26 through January 27, 2000, the high temperatures ranged 
between 29 and 31 degrees Fahrenheit, and four inches of snow 
remained on the ground.  On January 28, 2000, the high 
temperature was 33 degrees Fahrenheit, the low temperature was 
19 degrees Fahrenheit, and there were three inches of snow on 
the ground. 
 
John D. Snowden, Jr., the operations manager for the 
Division of Streets and Bridges of the City's Department of 
Public Works, testified regarding the City's snow removal plan.  
He explained that the snow removal plan, found in the City's 
Emergency Operations Manual, is activated when there are snow 
accumulations between one and two inches or whenever there is a 
possibility that the surfaces of the City's roads and bridges 
may freeze.  Snowden stated that the City activated the snow 
removal plan from January 25 through January 28, 2000, and that 
the City's work crews were assigned only to snow and ice removal 
tasks during that entire time period. 
 
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Snowden also testified that the work crews worked 24 hours 
per day in two 12-hour shifts through January 27, 2000.  The 
length of the work crews' shifts was reduced on January 28, 
2000, because the main arteries of the City's roadways were 
clear and the work crews had begun to remove snow from the 
secondary streets.  Snowden stated that no personnel could be 
allocated to remove snow from the City's public parking lots on 
January 28, 2000, because the secondary streets still needed to 
be cleared and freezing temperatures had prevented the snow from 
melting on those streets.  Snowden also stated that the City 
lacked sufficient snow removal equipment to clear all the City's 
streets within a few days after a "major snowstorm," and that he 
considered a snowfall of 4.7 inches to be a "major snowstorm." 
 
Linda C. Davis, administrator of the City's Division of 
Parking, also testified at the hearing on the special plea.  She 
stated that the City and the Bank agreed to reopen the parking 
lot on January 28, 2000, with the "stipulation that all 
employees were [to be] told [that] there [were] still icy spots 
on the lot and that they should exercise caution when parking 
there." 
 
Gambrell testified at the hearing that when she entered the 
parking lot in her vehicle on January 28, 2000, she observed 
that there was "ice and snow everywhere" in the parking lot.  
Gambrell stated, "[A]ll I saw was ice and snow.  I didn't see 
 
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any cleared areas whatsoever."  Gambrell also stated that it was 
daylight outside and that she could see where she was walking. 
 
The circuit court sustained the City's special plea.  In 
explaining its ruling, the circuit court stated that the City's 
"continued effort to dig out from the storm was a governmental 
function and subject to governmental immunity."  Gambrell 
appeals from the circuit court's judgment. 
 
Gambrell argues that the circuit court erred in sustaining 
the special plea.  She asserts that the City's lease of spaces 
in the parking lot for pecuniary benefit and the City's 
maintenance of the lot are proprietary functions that do not 
immunize the City from tort liability.  Gambrell contends that 
the governmental function of snow and ice removal was not the 
proximate cause of her injuries because the City had failed to 
clear the parking lot of snow and ice at the time she was 
injured.  Gambrell further contends that any emergency situation 
that may have existed was no longer present on January 28, 2000. 
 
In response, the City argues that the circuit court 
correctly sustained the special plea because the emergency 
removal of snow from the City's streets and public parking lots 
is a governmental function.  The City contends that emergency 
conditions still existed on January 28, 2000, because three 
inches of snow remained on the ground and temperatures remained 
at or below the point of freezing.  The City also asserts that 
 
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its lease of spaces in the parking lot for a fee did not affect 
the governmental character of its emergency snow removal 
activities.  We agree with the City's arguments. 
 
In considering the issue presented, we are guided by 
established principles.  A plea of sovereign immunity presents 
distinct issues of fact that, if proved, create a bar to a 
party's alleged right of recovery.  Whitley v. Commonwealth, 260 
Va. 482, 493, 538 S.E.2d 296, 302 (2000); Tomlin v. McKenzie, 
251 Va. 478, 480, 468 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1996).  The party 
advancing the sovereign immunity plea bears the burden of 
proving those issues of fact.  Whitley, 260 Va. at 493, 538 
S.E.2d at 302; Tomlin, 251 Va. at 480, 468 S.E.2d at 884. 
 
In Virginia, municipal corporations exercise two types of 
functions, governmental and proprietary.  Harrell v. City of 
Norfolk, 265 Va. 500, 502, 578 S.E.2d 756, 757 (2003); Niese v. 
City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 
(2002); Fenon v. City of Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 555, 125 S.E.2d 
808, 811 (1962).  A function is governmental in nature if it is 
directly related to the general health, safety, and welfare of 
the citizens.  Niese, 264 Va. at 239, 564 S.E.2d at 132; Edwards 
v. City of Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 171, 375 S.E.2d 747, 750 
(1989).  In contrast, a function is proprietary in nature if it 
involves a privilege and power performed primarily for the 
benefit of the municipality.  City of Virginia Beach v. 
 
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Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. 493, 499, 527 S.E.2d 778, 782 
(2000); Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 147-48, 200 
S.E. 610, 611 (1939).  As a general rule, when an allegedly 
negligent act involves the routine maintenance or operation of a 
service being provided by a municipality, the function is 
considered to be a proprietary one.  Carter v. Chesterfield 
County Health Comm'n, 259 Va. 588, 592, 527 S.E.2d 783, 785 
(2000); Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. at 499, 527 S.E.2d at 782; 
Woods v. Town of Marion, 245 Va. 44, 45, 425 S.E.2d 487, 488 
(1993). 
 
A municipality is immune from liability for negligence in 
the exercise of a governmental function, as well as for 
negligence in the failure to exercise a governmental function.  
Harrell, 265 Va. at 502, 578 S.E.2d at 757; Carmichael Dev. Co., 
259 Va. at 499, 527 S.E.2d at 782; Woods, 245 Va. at 45, 425 
S.E.2d at 488.  However, a municipality is liable, in the same 
manner as an individual or a private entity, for injuries 
resulting from negligence in the performance of proprietary 
functions.  Harrell, 265 Va. at 502, 578 S.E.2d at 757; Woods, 
245 Va. at 45, 425 S.E.2d at 488. 
 
Gambrell alleged in her motion for judgment that the City 
"negligently allowed snow and ice to remain on the [parking] 
lot, and negligently failed to place any warning signs or 
markings around said area."  At the hearing on the special plea, 
 
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the City did not dispute Gambrell's contentions that at the time 
of the accident, the parking lot had not been plowed and warning 
signs had not been placed in the lot.  Thus, our consideration 
of the circuit court's ruling on the special plea is limited to 
the question whether the removal of snow and ice from a 
municipal parking lot and the placement of warning signs at the 
location of such snow and ice are governmental or proprietary 
functions. 
 
We previously have considered cases in which a municipality 
was engaged in emergency snow removal operations at the time a 
plaintiff sustained an alleged injury.  In Stanfield v. Peregoy, 
245 Va. 339, 340, 429 S.E.2d 11, 11-12 (1993), the plaintiffs 
allegedly were injured when a bus in which they were riding 
collided with a city-owned truck that was engaged in spreading 
salt during a snowstorm.  We held that the conduct of driving 
and spreading salt in a snowstorm was "an integral part of the 
governmental function of rendering the city streets safe for 
public travel."  Id. at 344, 429 S.E.2d at 13. 
 
Shortly before our decision in Stanfield, we reached the 
same conclusion in our holding in Bialk v. City of Hampton, 242 
Va. 56, 405 S.E.2d 619 (1991).  There, a plaintiff allegedly was 
injured when he was struck by snow propelled from the blade of a 
snowplow that was being operated by an employee of a municipal 
corporation.  Id. at 57, 405 S.E.2d at 620.  We concluded that 
 
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because the municipality's snow removal operations were actions 
taken for the common good in coping with an emergency, those 
actions involved the exercise of a governmental function.  Id. 
at 59, 405 S.E.2d at 621. 
 
The case before us also involves the actions of a 
municipality in the course of emergency snow removal operations.  
The evidence showed that the City activated its emergency snow 
removal plan after a major snowstorm occurred.  Because freezing 
temperatures for three days after the snowstorm prevented the 
snow from melting, the City's work crews had to spend all their 
time clearing snow from the City's streets and were not able to 
remove snow from the City's public parking lots. 
 
The City's decision to restrict its snow removal operations 
to its public streets, and its failure to place emergency 
warning signs in the parking lot, involved the City's exercise 
of a governmental, rather than a proprietary, function.  We 
reach this conclusion because these actions and omissions 
occurred in the context of an extended period of snow emergency 
and dealt with the determination of priorities directly related 
to the general health, safety, and welfare of the citizens.  See 
Niese, 264 Va. at 239, 564 S.E.2d at 132; Edwards, 237 Va. at 
171, 375 S.E.2d at 750.  Thus, those actions and omissions were 
functionally different and unrelated to the City's routine 
maintenance of municipal streets and parking lots, which 
 
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involves the exercise of a proprietary function.  See Carter, 
259 Va. at 592, 527 S.E.2d at 785; Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. 
at 499, 527 S.E.2d at 782; Woods, 245 Va. at 45; 425 S.E.2d at 
488. 
 
Our conclusion that the City was exercising a governmental, 
rather than a proprietary, function at the time of Gambrell's 
fall is not changed by the fact that the City charged the Bank 
fees for use of parking spaces in the parking lot.  The charging 
of fees did not alter the fundamental character of the municipal 
function at issue, because that function was not one of routine 
maintenance but one of implementation of an emergency snow 
removal plan for the general safety and welfare of the 
citizenry.  Thus, the governmental nature of the City's actions 
following the snowstorm is controlling.  See Carter, 259 Va. at 
593, 527 S.E.2d at 786; Edwards, 237 Va. at 172, 375 S.E.2d at 
750.  Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient 
to support the circuit court's ruling sustaining the City's 
special plea of sovereign immunity.* 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court's 
judgment. 
Affirmed. 
                     
 
* Based on our determination that the City was immune from 
liability for the injuries alleged by Gambrell in her motion for 
judgment, we need not consider Gambrell's additional claim that 
 
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the circuit court erred in sustaining the City's demurrer to the 
motion for judgment.