Title: Kale v. Forrest

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

178 S.E.2d 622 (1971)
Thomas L. KALE
v.
Frances Kale FORREST and Richard B. Kale, Sr., Individually and as Executors of the Last Will and Testament of Russell H. Kale, Sr., Russell H. Kale, Jr., Trudy Lee Kale, Theresa Lynn Kale, Tina Louise Kale, Tracey Kale, Taren Leigh Kale, Richard B. Kale, Jr., Marjorie Sym Kale and Joseph Turner Forrest, Jr., and John H. Vernon, Guardian ad litem.
No. 58.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
January 29, 1971.
*624 Ross, Wood & Dodge, by Harold T. Dodge, Graham, for plaintiff-appellant.
Hofler, Mount & White, by Lillard H. Mount and Richard M. Hutson, III, Durham for defendant-appellee Frances Kale Forrest.
Aycock, LaRoque, Allen, Cheek & Hines by C. B. Aycock, Kinston, for defendant-appellee Russell H. Kale, Jr.
BRANCH, Justice.
We first consider plaintiff appellant's contention that the trial court erred in determining that the $25,000 used to fund the educational bequest for testator's granddaughters shall be taken from the one-fourth share of Thomas L. Kale in the estate of Russell Henderson Kale, Sr.
This question involves specifically that portion of testator's will which states: "* * * $25,000.00 shall be taken from my estate for the college education of daughters of Thomas Kale, Trudy Lee Kale, Teresa Lyn Kale, Tina Louise Kale, Tracey Kale and Taren Leigh Kale. Any moneys not used for their education shall be held and earnings given to Thomas L. Kale."
We quote the trial judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the portion of the judgment pertinent to this question:
Appellant contends that the words "shall be taken from my estate" clearly created a general legacy chargeable upon the testator's personal estate. He argues that this language is so plain and obvious that the words must be taken to mean exactly what they say and that there is therefore no necessity for judicial construction. Elmore *625 v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205. However, an examination of this item of the will reveals that the language does not clearly express testator's intent and purpose as to whether the $25,000.00 educational bequest should be taken from the share of plaintiff Thomas L. Kale or from the general funds of the estate. We must therefore ascertain the intent of the testator when he made the will. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 243 N.C. 469, 91 S.E.2d 246.
The intent of the testator is his will, and such intent as gathered from its four corners must be given effect unless it is contrary to some rule of law or is in conflict with public policy. McCain v. Womble, 265 N.C. 640, 144 S.E.2d 857; In re Will of Wilson, 260 N.C. 482, 133 S.E.2d 189; Poindexter v. Trust Co., 258 N.C. 371, 128 S.E.2d 867.
The intent is ascertained, if possible, from the testator's language and in light of conditions and circumstances existing at the time the will was made. Thomas v. Thomas, 258 N.C. 590, 129 S.E.2d 239. In considering the language used, technical words will be presumed to have been used in their technical sense unless the other language of the will evidences a contrary intent; however, when testator obviously does not intend to use words in their technical sense, they will be given their ordinary and popular meaning. Elledge v. Parrish, 224 N.C. 397, 30 S.E.2d 314. In any event, the use of particular words, clauses or sentences must yield to the purpose and intent of the testator as found in the whole will. Moore v. Langston, 251 N.C. 439, 111 S.E.2d 627; Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N.C. 611, 36 S.E.2d 17.
The bequest under consideration was made after testator had disposed of three "shares" or "parts" of his estate. Thomas L. Kale was the only remaining child, and the first share had been denominated a 1/4 part. We think the language of the will shows a paramount intent to divide his estate into four equal parts or shares for the benefit of testator's four children or their representatives. There is nothing in the language of the will that indicates that the testator intended to shift the primary responsibility to educate his children from Thomas L. Kale to the other beneficiaries of the will. The provision that any moneys not used for educational purposes should be held and given to Thomas L. Kale runs counter to appellant's contention that the bequest should be satisfied from the general fund. In addition to putting a burden on all the beneficiaries to educate Thomas L. Kale's children, the testator would be destroying the equal division of the corpus of the shares of his estate by giving Thomas L. Kale the benefit of any unused moneys in the bequest. The provision in the will allowing Thomas L. Kale to invade the principal of the trust created for his benefit infers a recognition by the testator that Thomas L. Kale's share might be depleted by the educational bequest. Further, if we place ourselves in the position of the testator at the time he made his will, it is understandable that the unskilled writer of his "homemade" will would consider money taken from any one of the allotted shares of his estate to be synonymous with money taken "from my estate."
Plaintiff complains of the failure of the Court of Appeals to classify the legacy as general, specific or demonstrative.
See Shepard v. Bryan, 195 N.C. 822, 143 S.E. 835, for a full discussion of the classification of legacies and for distinctions between general, demonstrative and specific legacies.
In the Lifetime Edition of Page on Wills, Volume 4, Sec. 1392, page 102, it is stated:
We do not attach importance to the failure of the Court of Appeals to classify this legacy since the facts of this case do not present questions of ademption, abatement or accretion. The only question presented is the source from which the fund is to be satisfied.
We think that the language of the entire will shows that it was the intent of the testator that the educational bequest for his grandchildren be taken from the share of their father, Thomas L. Kale, and that it was the intent of the testator to burden only the share of Thomas L. Kale with the payment of this bequest.
The Court of Appeals correctly found no error in the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment entered as to testator's educational bequest.
Appellant contends that the trial judge erred in concluding as a matter of law that Russell Henderson Kale, Jr. had a vested remainder in all accumulated income from his trust so that if he died before reaching age 60 such accumulated income would be paid to his estate.
The specific provision of the will pertinent to this question is as follows: "Russell Henderson Kale's share shall be put in trust for him and he shall get interest from this when he reaches 60 years of age. At his death the balance shall be given to my surviving heirs."
The conclusions of law and portions of the judgment relating to this question are:
In the case of Wachovia Bank & Trust Company v. Grubb, 233 N.C. 22, 62 S.E.2d 719, the testator devised the residue of his estate in trust, providing that the "entire net income * * * be paid monthly, or quarterly, after expiration of three years from the date of my death" to named beneficiaries. This Court, in construing this portion of the will, stated:
In the case of Robinson v. Robinson, 227 N.C. 155, 41 S.E.2d 282, the testator's will, in part, provided:
One of the grandchildren, Charles Robinson Hanes, died before the youngest grandchild reached majority and left a widow surviving who was the sole beneficiary of his will. After the youngest grandchild became twenty-one years old, the trustees sought advice of the court as to whether the widow of Charles R. Hanes should share equally with the other grandchildren. The court, holding that Charles R. Hanes became vested with his interest in the trust property prior to his death, and that his widow was entitled to receive his interest, stated:
We find in Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205, the following statement: "The law favors the construction of a will which gives to the devisee a vested interest at the earliest possible moment that the testator's language will permit," and in Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899, it is stated: "An estate is vested when there is either an immediate right of present enjoyment or a present fixed right of future enjoyment." (Emphasis supplied) See also Patrick v. Beatty, 202 N.C. 454, 163 S.E. 572; Pridgen v. Tyson, 234 N.C. 199, 66 S.E.2d 682; Johnson v. Baker, 7 N.C. 318; Priddy & Co. v. Sanderford, 221 N.C. 422, 20 S.E.2d 341.
Appellant, in support of his contention, cites and relies upon the case of Giles v. Frank, 17 N.C. 521, which held the following provision passed a contingent interest: "I give to Edward S. Giles one horse, saddle and bridle, worth $80, `when he shall arrive at age of twenty-one years.'"
Giles v. Frank, supra, is distinguishable from instant case in that there, the only part of the will before the court was the above quoted sentence, which expressly and unmistakably made the gift effective when beneficiary reached the age of twenty-one. In instant case the language, standing alone, seems to immediately place the fund in trustee's hands upon death of testator. Further, the whole will is before the court and lends itself to an interpretation of immediate vesting.
Appellant also relies upon that portion of Carter v. Kempton, 233 N.C. 1, 62 S.E.2d 713, which states:
Instant case does not come within the rule stated in Carter v. Kempton, supra, which is relied upon by appellant. In the case before us there was an immediate gift conveyance to the trustee and there was a provision for distribution prior to the termination of the trust. Thus, the `when' in instant case is not a condition precedent marking the time of vesting.
We think that the words "Russell Henderson Kale's share shall be put in trust for him and he shall get the interest from this when he reaches 60 years of age," when considered with the language of the entire will and the circumstances existing when the will was executed, manifest an intent on the part of the testator that the "share" should immediately vest in the trustee for the benefit of Russell Henderson Kale, Jr., during his lifetime and that benefit of the full enjoyment of the "share" was only postponed until he reached the age of sixty. Upon testator's death Russell Henderson Kale, Jr. had a present fixed right of enjoyment in all properties constituting his trust estate, and it is so vested that in event of his death before age sixty any accumulated income from his trust estate shall be paid to the representative of his estate.
Finally, we must determine whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the surviving heirs of Russell Henderson Kale, Sr. should be determined as if testator "had died immediately following the death of Russell Henderson Kale, Jr." We quote the portion of the will relevant to this question: "Russell Henderson Kale's share shall be put in trust for him and he shall get interest from this when he reaches 60 years of age. At his death the balance shall be given to my surviving heirs." (Emphasis ours)
The portion of the judgment and the conclusions of law pertinent to this question are:
In Central Carolina Bank & Trust Company v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 143 S.E.2d 689, it is stated:
This general rule is bottomed on the reasoning that the law favors early vesting of estates and that it generally operates so as to give the words of description their ordinary and natural meaning; however, the rule is one of construction used in ascertaining the testator's intent, and must give way when an examination of the entire will discloses a different meaning. Jenkins v. Lambeth, 172 N.C. 466, 90 S.E. 513; Central Carolina Trust Co. v. Bass, supra.
In instant case other portions of the will shed little light upon our search for testator's intent as to whether the surviving heirs of testator are determined at the death of testator or upon the death of Russell H. Kale, Jr. Our interpretation must therefore focus on the words "At his death the balance shall be given to my surviving heirs."
We again try to place ourselves in the position of the testator, a writer untrained in the law, and determine his intent from the language used in the will.
Webster's New International Dictionary defines the word "heir" as one who inherits or is entitled to succeed to the possession of property after the death of the owner. This is, we think, the natural and ordinary meaning of the word. This Court has held that "An heir is a person on whom the law casts an estate upon the death of the owner of the property, and therefore a living person, strictly speaking, can have no heir." Strong, N.C.Index, 2d Ed., Vol. 7, Wills, Sec. 43, p. 646; Whitley v. Arenson, 219 N.C. 121, 12 S.E.2d 906. Thus, when we consider the word "heir" either in its ordinary and common meaning or as construed by the court, it must have been apparent to testator that any of his heirs must of necessity survive him.
It is a recognized rule of construction that every word of a will must have a meaning imputed to it, if it is capable of a meaning without violation of the general intent or of any other provision in the will with which it may appear inconsistent. Lee v. Baird, 132 N.C. 755, 44 S.E. 605. Thus, in ascertaining testator's intent we must give some meaning to the word "surviving."
Webster's New International Dictionary defines "surviving": "remaining alive or in existence."
We are unable to find a North Carolina case containing an interpretation of the exact language here used. We do find cases which we deem helpful in interpreting the testator's intent.
In the case of Freeman v. Freeman, 141 N.C. 97, 53 S.E. 620, the testator gave to his wife sole use of all his property for her life, and provided: "That the real and personal property, at the death of my wife, Elizabeth Freeman, shall be sold to the highest bidder, (graveyard excepted) and the proceeds equally divided between all my children that appears personally and claims their part, and this will shall disinherit all of said children that applies through an agent." The Court, holding that only children of the testator who were living at the death of his widow were entitled to share in the estate, stated:
We find the following in the case of Mercer v. Downs, 191 N.C. 203, 131 S.E. 575:
This Court has held that a devise for life and at death of life tenant to children "then living" conveys a contingent remainder to the children, which would determine the class at the death of the life tenant, Woody v. Cates, 213 N.C. 792, 197 S.E. 561, and that where a will provides that a remainder shall go to persons alive at the termination of a trust or a life estate, that the remainder is contingent, and the persons who take are determined at the termination of the trust or at the time of the death of the holder of the life estate. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235 N.C. 446, 70 S.E.2d 578; First Security Trust Co. v. Henderson, 225 N.C. 567, 35 S.E.2d 694; Knox v. Knox, 208 N.C. 141, 179 S.E. 610.
The case of Witty v. Witty, 184 N.C. 375, 114 S.E. 482, in part states:
In the case of Johnston v. Herrin, 383 Ill. 598, 50 N.E.2d 720, testator devised his estate to his wife in trust so as to give her full use and power of disposition of all the property in the trust, and at her death provided that the remainder should be "equally divided among my surviving descendants" in the same manner as provided by intestate laws of the State of Illinois. The court held that the class was to be determined at the death of the life tenant, and stated:
See Annotations 114 A.L.R. 4; 20 A.L.R.2d 830.
Here, the language of the will clearly refers to the death of the first taker as the time when the fund will be distributed. This is the time when the persons who finally take will be definitely and *632 finally determined. We think it is clear that when the testator used the words "my surviving heirs" he was speaking of persons who would be living or surviving at the death of Russell Henderson Kale, Jr. We hold that the heirs of Russell Henderson Kale, Sr. who will take the balance of the trust fund devised to Russell Henderson Kale, Jr., will be the heirs surviving at the death of Russell Henderson Kale, Jr.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
MOORE, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.