Title: Ex parte Rock Wool Manufacturing Company.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: 03/18/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1141252
____________________
Ex parte Rock Wool Manufacturing Company
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Palmer Cason and Jessie M. Cason
v.
 Gerald W. Miller et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-14-904387)
PARKER, Justice.
Rock Wool Manufacturing Company ("Rock Wool") petitions
this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson
1141252
Circuit Court ("the circuit court") to vacate its order
denying Rock Wool's motions to dismiss a complaint filed
against it by Palmer Cason and Jessie M. Cason and to enter a
new order dismissing the Casons' complaint.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
At all times relevant to this matter, Palmer Cason
("Palmer") was an employee of Rock Wool.  On July 16, 2014,
Palmer was working as a furnace operator for Rock Wool when he
suffered an injury caused by a furnace explosion.  At some
point before the explosion, Rock Wool had caused certain
safety equipment called "explosion doors" to be removed from
the furnace Palmer was operating.  The "explosion doors" had
the capacity at least to mitigate injury to the operator in
the event of an explosion.
On October 22, 2014, the Casons sued several of Palmer's
coworkers, alleging various claims in regard to the injuries
Palmer suffered as a result of the furnace explosion.  On
January 27, 2015, the Casons filed an amended complaint adding
Rock Wool as a defendant and asserting claims of wantonness,
the tort of outrage, and negligence against Rock Wool.
2
1141252
On February 27, 2015, Rock Wool filed a motion to dismiss
the Casons' amended complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.  In that motion, Rock Wool
argued that the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975, provides the exclusive remedy for
employees who are injured during the course of their
employment.  Specifically, Rock Wool argued that §§ 25-5-52
and -53, Ala. Code 1975, which are commonly referred to as the
exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act,
prevented the Casons from being able to recover against Rock
Wool in tort for the injuries Palmer incurred during the
course of his employment with Rock Wool.  The exclusive-remedy
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act provide, in
relevant part: 
"Except 
as 
provided 
in 
this 
chapter, 
no 
employee
of any employer subject to this chapter ... shall
have a right to any other method, form, or amount of
compensation or damages for an injury or death
occasioned by an accident or occupational disease
proximately resulting from and while engaged in the
actual performance of the duties of his or her
employment and from a cause originating in such
employment or determination thereof."
§ 25-5-52. 
"The rights 
and 
remedies 
granted 
in 
this chapter
to an employee shall exclude all other rights and
3
1141252
remedies of the employee ... at common law, by
statute, or otherwise on account of injury, loss of
services, or death. Except as provided in this
chapter, no employer shall be held civilly liable
for personal injury to or death of the employer's
employee, for purposes of this chapter, whose injury
or death is due to an accident or to an occupational
disease while engaged in the service or business of
the employer, the cause of which accident or
occupational disease originates in the employment.
..."
§ 25-5-53.  Further, § 25-5-14, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"The intent of the Legislature is to provide
complete immunity to employers and limited immunity
to 
officers, 
directors, 
agents, 
servants, 
or
employees of the same employer ... from civil
liability for all causes of action except those
based on willful conduct and such immunity is an
essential aspect of the workers' compensation
scheme.  The Legislature hereby expressly reaffirms
its intent, as set forth in Section 25-5-53, as
amended herein, and Sections 25-5-144 and 25-5-194,
regarding the exclusivity of the rights and remedies
of an injured employee, except as provided for
herein."
On May 1, 2015, the Casons filed a second amended
complaint asserting a claim against Rock Wool under the
Alabama Employer's Liability Act, § 25-6-1 et seq., Ala. Code
1975.  On June 2, 2015, Rock Wool filed a motion to dismiss
the Casons' second amended complaint.  Rock Wool's arguments
largely mirrored those in its first motion to dismiss, with
the additional argument that there could be no recovery under
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1141252
the Employer's Liability Act in a case where the alleged
injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Casons filed a response to this motion on July 23, 2015. 
On July 24, 2015, the circuit court held a hearing on Rock
Wool's motions to dismiss.  On July 29, 2015, the circuit
court entered an order denying Rock Wool's motions to dismiss. 
This petition for mandamus relief followed.
Standard of Review
"'"'The writ of mandamus is
a drastic and extraordinary writ,
to be "issued only when there is:
1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought;
2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent 
to 
perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do
so; 3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and 4) properly
invoked 
jurisdiction 
of 
the
court." Ex parte United Serv.
Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501,
503 (Ala. 1993); see also Ex
parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d 133, 134
(Ala. 1995).' Ex parte Carter,
[807 So. 2d 534,] 536 [(Ala.
2001)]."
"'Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321
(Ala. 2001).
"'"Subject 
to 
certain 
narrow
exceptions ..., we have held that, because
an 'adequate remedy' exists by way of an
appeal, the denial of a motion to dismiss
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1141252
or a motion for a summary judgment is not
reviewable 
by 
petition 
for 
writ 
of
mandamus." Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 825 So. 2d 758, 761–62 (Ala. 2002).'
"Ex parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 78 So. 3d
959, 965–66 (Ala. 2011)."
Ex parte MERSCORP, Inc., 141 So. 3d 984, 990 (Ala. 2013).  One
of the exceptions to the general rule that the denial of a
motion to dismiss is not reviewable by mandamus is where the
motion to dismiss asserts a defense of immunity.  See Ex parte
Haralson, 853 So. 2d 928, 931 n. 2 (Ala. 2003) ("The denial of
a motion to dismiss ... generally is not reviewable by a
petition for writ of mandamus, subject to certain narrow
exceptions, such as the issue of immunity." (citing Ex parte
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d 758, 761–62 (Ala.
2002))).  See also Ex parte McCartney Constr. Co., 720 So. 2d
910, 911 (Ala. 1998)(granting mandamus relief where the trial
court denied a motion to dismiss premised on the immunity
provided by the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act); Ex parte Progress Rail Servs. Corp., 869
So. 2d 459, 473 (Ala. 2003)(ruling "consistent with
McCartney"); and Ex parte Salvation Army, 72 So. 3d 1224, 1228
(Ala. Civ. App. 2011)(holding that denial of a summary-
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1141252
judgment motion grounded on a claim of immunity under the
exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act
is reviewable by mandamus and stating that "whether a claim of
immunity is denied following a motion to dismiss or a summary-
judgment motion appears to be immaterial to ... whether such
a denial may be reviewed by mandamus"). 
In its motions to dismiss, Rock Wool cited Progress Rail
and argued that it was immune from the Casons' action based on
the exclusive-remedy provisions set forth in the Workers'
Compensation Act.  Therefore, Rock Wool, having asserted a
defense of immunity, has properly petitioned this Court for
mandamus review of the circuit court's denial of Rock Wool's
motions to dismiss.
Discussion
Rock Wool argues that all of the Casons' claims are
barred, in one way or another, by the Workers' Compensation
Act. First, Rock Wool argues that the Casons' Employer's
Liability Act claim is barred because, it says, the claim does
not fall within an exception to coverage under the Workers'
Compensation Act.  Second, Rock Wool argues that the Casons'
tort claims are barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions of
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1141252
the Workers' Compensation Act.  Therefore, Rock Wool argues,
the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Rock
Wool's motions to dismiss. 
Rock Wool argues that the Casons' claim against it
premised on the Employer's Liability Act is barred because the
Workers' Compensation Act is presumed to apply in this
situation and the Employer's Liability Act and the Workers'
Compensation Act are mutually exclusive.  The Casons' only
argument in response is that their claim is proper under the
Employer's Liability Act because they allege intentional
tortious conduct on the part of Rock Wool.  The Casons do not
in any way address Rock Wool's argument that the Workers'
Compensation Act and the Employer's Liability Act 
are 
mutually
exclusive, nor do they address the  following holding of this
Court in  Veterans of Foreign Wars Post 7320 v. Sheffield, 398
So. 2d 262, 263 (Ala. 1981):
"Suits brought by an employee against her
employer for injuries sustained in the course of her
employment 
are 
presumed 
to 
fall 
within 
the
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Pound
v. Gaulding, 237 Ala. 387, 187 So. 468 (1939);
Kaplan v. Sertell, 217 Ala. 413, 116 So. 112 (1928).
Because the Workers' Compensation Act and the
Employer's Liability Act are mutually exclusive and
cannot apply to the same set of facts, Jackson v.
United Cigar Stores Co., 228 Ala. 220, 153 So. 422
8
1141252
(1934), an employee who seeks to recover damages
from her employer under the Employer's Liability Act
must bring herself within an exception to the
Workers' Compensation Act by alleging in her
complaint 
facts 
sufficient 
to 
establish 
that
exception. Johnson v. Ralls, 286 Ala. 565, 243 So.
2d 673 (1971); Stanton v. Marsh, 274 Ala. 501, 150
So. 2d 363 (1963); DeArman v. Ingalls Iron Works,
258 Ala. 205, 61 So. 2d 764 (1952). Once the
plaintiff establishes an exception to the Workers'
Compensation Act by alleging sufficient facts, the
burden shifts to the defendant to allege and prove
that the provisions of the [Workers' Compensation]
Act do apply. McCarroll v. City of Bessemer, 289
Ala. 449, 268 So. 2d 731 (1972).
"The complaint in this case alleged by way of
conclusion that the action was 'brought pursuant to
the Employer's Liability Act,' but failed to allege
any facts which would be sufficient to invoke an
exception to the Workers' Compensation Act.
"....
"The Workers' Compensation Act states it does
not apply 
"'to domestic servants, to farm laborers
... or to persons whose employment at the
time of the injury is casual and not in the
usual course of the trade, business,
profession or occupation of the employer or
to any other employer who regularly employs
less than three employees in any one
business ....'
"[Ala.] Code 1975, § 25-5-50."
The Casons did not argue below, nor do they argue on
appeal, that their Employer's Liability Act claim comes under
9
1141252
any of the exemptions from coverage under the Workers'
Compensation Act.  The Casons entirely ignore the mutual
exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act and the
Employer's Liability Act as explained by this Court in
Sheffield.  In this regard, the Casons' claim asserted under
the Employer's Liability Act is barred. 
Although the Casons do argue that they may maintain their
Employer's Liability Act claim against Rock Wool based on this
Court's decision in Birmingham v. Waits, 706 So. 2d 1127 (Ala.
1997), we disagree.  In Waits, an employee of the City of
Birmingham sued the City based on an injury incurred during
the course of his employment.  The employee sued the City
under the Employer's Liability Act, alleging that his injury
was the result of an unsafe workplace created by the City. 
This Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the
employee.  The Casons argue that Rock Wool created an unsafe
workplace in the instant case by removing safety devices from
the furnace; thus, the Casons argue, under Waits, they may
maintain their Employer's Liability Act claim against Rock
Wool.  
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1141252
However, as Rock Wool argues in its reply brief, Waits is
inapplicable.  In fact, the Court did not even discuss or cite
the Workers' Compensation Act in Waits.  It is unclear why the
City of Birmingham did not raise the exclusive-remedy
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act as a defense to
the employee's claims, but it apparently did not.  Rock Wool
speculates that the exclusive-remedy provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act were not discussed in Waits because
the Workers' Compensation Act did not apply by virtue of § 25-
5-13(b), Ala. Code 1975, which provides that the Workers'
Compensation Act does not apply "to any city ... which has a
population of 250,000 or more according to the last or any
subsequent decennial federal census ...."  We need not
speculate, however.  The Workers' Compensation Act was not at
issue in Waits; thus, Waits is not applicable in this case and
does not support the Casons' argument. 
Rock Wool next argues that the Casons' tort claims
against it are barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions of
the Workers' Compensation Act and that the facts of this case
are distinguishable from those in Lowman v. 
Piedmont 
Executive
Shirt Manufacturing Co., 547 So. 2d 90 (Ala. 1989).  Lowman is
11
1141252
best characterized, not as an exception to the immunity
granted by the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act, but rather as a factual scenario in which
the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation
Act simply did not apply because there was no "accident" that
brought the case under the coverage of the Workers'
Compensation Act.  See Ex parte Progress Rail Servs. Corp.,
869 So. 2d at 469 (noting that the Court in Lowman
"[c]onclud[ed] that the tortious conduct of the 
defendants 
did
not qualify as an 'accident' compensable under the [Workers'
Compensation] 
Act," 
and 
that, 
therefore, 
"because 
that 
conduct
was 'not covered' by the Act, the 'exclusivity provisions of
the Act [we]re irrelevant'"). 
In Lowman, an employee sustained a back injury while
working for her employer.   The Court stated the facts forming
the basis of the employee's claims as follows: 
"The facts 
most favorable 
to 
[the employee] 
show
that [the employer] was aware that [the employee]
had been injured on the job, having been advised of
this by [the employee]'s supervisors and by [the
employee] herself on the day the injury occurred.
[The employer], however, refused to process [the
employee]'s claim and, instead, told [the employee]
to fill out another claim form and to state that she
had been injured at home. Several days later,[the
employer] visited a hospitalized [employee] and
12
1141252
'threatened' [the employee] with being 'stuck with
a big [medical] bill' if [the employee] did not file
her disability claim as for an off-the-job injury."
547 So. 2d at 92.  The employee thereafter brought various
tort claims against the employer.  The employee's claims,
however, were predicated, not on her workplace injury itself,
but rather on the employer's actions following the employee's
workplace injury.  Id.
The employer in Lowman argued that the employee's claims
against it were barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions of
the Workers' Compensation Act.  This Court was not persuaded
by the employer's argument, holding that "the exclusive remedy
provisions were not designed to shield an employer or its
insurer from the entire field of tort law. These provisions
apply only to limit the liability of an employer or its
insurer to the statutorily prescribed claims for job-related
injuries."  547 So. 2d at 92.  This Court stated that
"intentional tortious conduct (i.e., intentional fraud)
committed beyond the bounds of the employer's proper role is
actionable."  547 So. 2d at 95.  This holding followed from
the Court's conclusion that "[t]he allegedly tortious conduct
in question occurred while [the employee] was hospitalized as
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a result of the initial injury to her back."  Id. at 93
(emphasis added).  This conduct, this Court held, was "not an
'accident' 
compensable 
under 
workmen's 
compensation" 
and 
could
not therefore provide immunity to the employer.  Id. 
This Court further clarified Lowman in Ex parte Progress
Rail Services Corp., 869 So. 2d at 470, where it noted:
"[T]he 
statement 
in 
Lowman 
that 
'intentional
tortious conduct ... committed beyond the bounds of
the employer's proper role is actionable,' 547 So.
2d at 95 (emphasis supplied), does not support the
different proposition ... that intentional tortious
conduct 
committed 
within 
the 
bounds 
of 
the
employer's proper role is actionable."
The Casons make no argument that this case is analogous
to Lowman,  nor do they make any argument as to why their tort
1
claims are not barred by the Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Casons do argue that "Progress Rail and its progeny
1
recognize exceptions to the harsh exclusivity provisions of
the Workers' Compensation Act," and for that proposition they
cite Progress Rail and Lowman.  The Casons' response brief, at
p. 11.  The Casons also quote Devero v. North American Bus
Industries, 154 So. 3d 131, 136 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), as
follows: "[A] claim asserting an employer's intentional
tortious conduct that has been committed beyond the bounds of
the employer's proper role is not barred by principles of
exclusivity 
endorsed 
by 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
[Workers'
Compensation] Act."  The above quote from Devero refers to a
holding of this Court in Lowman; however, although the Casons
offer a "see also" citation to Lowman, they do not argue that
their case is governed by Lowman or explain its applicability
to this case.
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Instead, the Casons argue simply that Progress Rail is
distinguishable from the present case because 
"Progress Rail constituted an actual workplace
accident; and was not the result of deliberate
actions by the employer. The facts of the instant
case, taken as true[,] show that far from being an
'accident' the injury to Cason was the result of
deliberate, negligent actions taken by Rock Wool in
respect to the furnace operated by [Palmer] Cason." 
The Casons' response brief, at p. 12.   The Casons also argue
2
that Progress Rail is distinguishable because that case
involved multiple defendants and because that case was 
brought
pursuant to § 25–1-1, Ala. Code 1975.   The Casons do not
3
explain how those differences affect the applicability of the
exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act
here.  The Casons' arguments are without merit.  As Rock Wool
correctly argues, the accident forming the basis of the
Casons' complaint occurred "within the bounds of the
The Casons' attempt to distinguish Progress Rail on the
2
ground that it did not involve "deliberate actions by the
employer" is misguided; in fact, the first count of the
complaint in Progress Rail alleged that the employer had
"'intentionally and/or willfully caused the fatal injuries to
the deceased.'" Progress Rail, 869 So. 2d at 461.
Section 25–1-1, Ala. Code 1975, imposes a duty upon
3
employers to provide a safe workplace; that statute is not
part of the Workers' Compensation Act.  Additionally, the
Casons distinguish Progress Rail on the basis that it was not
brought pursuant to the Employer's Liability Act.
15
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employer's proper role," Lowman, 547 So. 2d at 95, and
therefore is properly within the coverage of the Workers'
Compensation Act.  Unlike in Lowman, where the complained-of
conduct took place in a hospital after the accident that
formed the basis of the workers' compensation claim, it is
undisputed that Palmer's accident occurred during the course
of and arose out of his employment with Rock Wool. 
As this Court noted in Lowman: "'[T]he [Workers'
Compensation] Act should not be an impervious barrier,
insulating a wrongdoer from the payment of just and fair
damages for intentional tortious acts only very tenuously
related to workplace accidents.'"  547 So. 2d at 94 (quoting
Carpentino v. Transport Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556, 562 (D.C.
Conn. 1985)).   Although the Casons allege that Rock Wool's
conduct in allegedly removing the "explosion doors" from the
furnace was intentional, even gross and deliberate, they do
not allege that that conduct was only "tenuously related" to
a 
workplace 
accident. 
 
Concerning 
whether 
the 
exclusive-remedy
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act apply to an
employee's claim that intentional conduct on the part of the
employer caused the employee's injury, Judge Terry Moore of
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the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals writes the following in his
treatise on the Workers' Compensation Act:
"[T]he court [in Progress Rail] concluded that the
Legislature intended the exclusivity provisions to
bar any civil action against an employer for a
work-related injury or death covered by the
[Workers' Compensation] Act even if caused by the
willful and intentional conduct of the employer.8
"____________________
" See also Beard v. Mobile Press Register, Inc.,
8
908 So. 2d 932 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) ('... [W]here
a workplace injury to an employee arises from an
accident as defined in the Act, i.e., "an unexpected
or 
unforeseen 
event, 
happening 
suddenly 
and
violently, with or without human fault, and
producing at the time injury to the physical
structure of the body or damage to an artificial
member of the body by accidental means," §
25-5-1(7), Ala. Code 1975, the Act's exclusivity
provisions apply, and merely alleging intentional or
willful conduct cannot surmount those 
provisions.');
Hudson v. Renosol Seating, LLC, 73 So. 3d 1267 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2011) (construing Ex parte Progress Rail
Services at length and holding that exclusivity
provisions cannot be circumvented by allegation that
employer 
injured 
employee 
'willfully' 
or
'intentionally')."
2 Terry A. Moore, Alabama Workers' Compensation § 20:7 (2d ed.
2013).  Even assuming that Rock Wool acted intentionally with
regard to Palmer's workplace accident, it was nonetheless a
workplace accident.  Therefore, the Workers' Compensation Act
applies, and with it the exclusive-remedy provisions.
17
1141252
Therefore, the Casons' tort claims against Rock Wool are
barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act.
Conclusion
Rock Wool persuasively argues that the exclusive-remedy
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act apply here to bar
the Casons' claims against it; thus, Rock Wool has
demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought. 
Therefore, we grant the petition and order that the circuit
court set aside its order denying Rock Wool's motions to
dismiss and to enter a new order consistent with this opinion.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.
18