Title: KAORI McGUIRE, n/k/a KAORI POWERS, Individually and as Conservator/Guardian/Custodian of LANAYA KAORI HATCH, DOB 9/19/90, AUTUMN DAWN HATCH, DOB 8/18/95, and COLTON DANIEL HATCH, DOB 4/08/99, minors V. MESIAS SOLIS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KAORI McGUIRE, n/k/a KAORI POWERS, Individually and as Conservator/Guardian/Custodian of LANAYA KAORI HATCH, DOB 9/19/90, AUTUMN DAWN HATCH, DOB 8/18/95, and COLTON DANIEL HATCH, DOB 4/08/99, minors V. MESIAS SOLIS2005 WY 129120 P.3d 1020Case Number: 04-253Decided: 10/05/2005
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
KAORI 
McGUIRE, n/k/a KAORI POWERS,

Individually 
and as Conservator/Guardian/

Custodian 
of LANAYA KAORI HATCH,

DOB 
9/19/90, AUTUMN DAWN HATCH,

DOB 8/18/95, andCOLTON DANIEL HATCH,

DOB 
4/08/99, minors,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
MESIAS 
SOLIS,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

William 
L. Combs of Combs Law Office, L.L.C., Evanston, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Loretta 
R. Green of Buchhammer & Kehl, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
After a 
vehicle/pedestrian accident in a Wal-Mart parking lot, Kaori McGuire1 sued Mesias Solis for negligence 
and loss of parental consortium on behalf of all three of her children.  After trial a jury found Solis not 
negligent.  McGuire appeals, 
claiming several prejudicial errors were committed in the proceedings 
below.  Finding no reversible error, 
we affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
McGuire 
presents the following issues for review:

 
 

I.                     
Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Phillips' initial request 
to extend deadlines

 
 

II.                   
Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the Phillips law firm to 
withdraw from representing Ms. Powers [McGuire]

 
 

III.                  
Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in imposing its modified version of Rule 
26, F.R.C.P., to appellants' amended complaint

 
 

IV.               
Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in permitting evidence of investigative 
law enforcement reports at trial

 
 

V.                 
Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing appellants' proffered jury 
instructions regarding motor vehicle statutes

 
 
 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
On 
October 15, 2001, McGuire and Solis were parked next to each other in a Wal-Mart 
parking lot.  Solis was driving a 
pick-up truck with a trailer attached behind it.  As Solis moved his vehicle forward, out 
of his parking space, he inadvertently pinned McGuire between her vehicle and 
his trailer.  Bystanders yelled at 
Solis to stop and then told him to back up.  Solis backed up slowly, releasing 
McGuire.  McGuire allegedly suffered 
physical injuries because of the accident.

[¶4]           
McGuire 
retained the law firm of James E. Phillips, P.C., to represent her.  McGuire, through the Phillips law firm, 
filed suit against Solis for negligence on March 26, 2002.  The first scheduling order, dated 
December 12, 2002, set trial for May 6, 2003.  The cut-off date for expert witness 
designation for McGuire was January 10, 2003.  McGuire filed her expert witness 
designation on January 10 but on February 5 attempted to amend her expert 
designation by adding an additional doctor, Dr. Dennis Wyman, who had examined 
McGuire on January 28, 2003.  Over 
Solis' objection, the trial court allowed McGuire's amendment but specifically 
ruled that McGuire "shall not designate any additional expert witnesses without 
specific leave and order of this Court."2  The trial court also continued the trial 
date from May 6, 2003, until January 13, 2004.  The resulting amended scheduling order 
confirmed the January 2004 trial date, maintained the initial dates for 
designation of experts (January 10, 2003, for McGuire), and set the discovery 
cut-off date as October 17, 2003.

 
 

[¶5]           
On 
November 5, 2003, the Phillips law firm filed a motion to withdraw, alleging 
extraordinary circumstances in that McGuire was dissatisfied with the firm's 
representation and communication between McGuire and the firm had ceased.  The trial court, without hearing, 
granted the motion on November 6, conditioning the withdrawal upon McGuire's 
obtaining substitute counsel.  On 
December 4, the Phillips law firm filed a motion to amend the previous order to 
allow it to withdraw before substitute counsel was obtained, attaching an 
affidavit from McGuire in which she requested the Phillips law firm "be allowed 
to withdraw from my case immediately because I no longer desire their services 
in any capacity."  McGuire also 
stated she had an appointment with potential substitute counsel on December 
16.  Based upon this motion, and 
again without hearing, the trial court allowed the Phillips law firm to 
immediately withdraw.  Ultimately, 
the trial court also vacated the trial date to allow McGuire more time to retain 
an attorney.

 
 

[¶6]           
Substitute 
counsel made his official appearance on behalf of McGuire on February 6, 
2004.  A second amended scheduling 
order set the new trial date for May 4, 2004.  The trial court did not reopen the dates 
for discovery or designation of expert witnesses.  At McGuire's request, on May 12 the 
trial court continued the trial date.  
The trial court permitted McGuire to file an amended complaint, adding 
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of one child who 
had witnessed the accident, and loss of parental consortium on behalf of all 
three of her children.  An attempt 
to add a claim for negligence per se for violating certain traffic statutes was 
rejected.  The trial court allowed 
McGuire ten days from the date of the hearing allowing the amendment to disclose 
witnesses and exhibits in support of her new claims involving the children.  Because McGuire could not adequately 
prepare her case for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the time 
allowed, the trial court dismissed the claim without 
prejudice.

 
 

[¶7]           
After 
more maneuvering, the trial in this matter finally began on July 21, 2004.  After a three day trial, the jury 
returned a verdict finding Solis not negligent.  

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Issues I 
and III - Discovery issues

 
 

[¶8]           
Issues 
one and three are easily disposed as both relate to irrelevant issues.  Both issues allege the trial court 
abused its discretion on certain discovery matters.  As to McGuire's first issue, McGuire's 
only pertinent argument is that the decision of the trial court to enforce its 
pretrial schedule as written and approved by both parties, and not extend the 
deadline for the designation of expert witnesses, was manifestly unjust.  McGuire does not allege any specific 
prejudice she suffered as a result of the ruling.  Looking at the record, the only mention 
by her then current attorney regarding other experts which McGuire might want to add indicated there might 
be a possibility that she would want to add an economic appraisal expert. The 
testimony of an economic appraisal expert would have related solely to the issue 
of damages.  The jury found Solis 
not negligent, therefore any issue relating solely to damages is moot.  We decline to address the matter further 
since "[t]his Court will not consider an appeal when its decision can have no 
practical effect."  Serda v. Dennis, 2004 WY 141, ¶ 6, 100 P.3d 860, 861 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 

[¶9]           
McGuire's 
third issue complains about the strict time frame for additional discovery 
imposed by the trial court after she amended her complaint.  McGuire argues that the trial court 
adopted Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but did not adhere to 
the language of the rule, leading to arbitrary enforcement of the rule.  The record discloses that the trial 
court did not adopt Rule 26.  
Because of the short time frame between the allowed amendment and the 
trial date, the trial court ordered the parties to automatically exchange 
information within ten days, stating that the procedure it was adopting was 
similar to the procedure contemplated by Rule 26.  The trial court specifically disavowed 
adopting Rule 26. The trial court could not have enforced, arbitrarily or 
otherwise, a rule it never adopted.  
There is no error on that ground.  

 
 
 
 
Issue II 
 Withdrawal of the Phillips law firm

 
 

[¶10]       
McGuire 
alleges it was error for the trial court to allow the Phillips law firm to 
withdraw.  This Court reviews 
decisions on motions to withdraw under the abuse of discretion 
standard:

[O]ur review of motions to 
withdraw and for a continuance is the abuse of discretion standard. Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 5, 78 P.3d 671, ¶ 5 (Wyo. 2003). Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising 
sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without 
doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, ¶ 11, 76 P.3d 836, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2003); Vaughn v. 
State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998). "We must ask ourselves whether the 
trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its 
ruling was arbitrary or capricious." Ready, ¶ 11 (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 11 P.3d 948, 950 
(Wyo. 2000)). 

 
 

Sims v. 
Day, 2004 
WY 124, ¶ 9, 99 P.3d 964, 968 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 

[¶11]       
McGuire 
contends that the district court erred in its application of Rule 102(c) of the 
Uniform Rules for District Courts.  
Rule 102(c) provides:

 
 
            
Counsel will not be permitted to withdraw from a case except upon court 
order. Except in the case of extraordinary circumstances, the court shall 
condition withdrawal of counsel upon the substitution of other counsel by 
written appearance. In the alternative, the court shall allow withdrawal upon a 
statement submitted by the client acknowledging the withdrawal of counsel for 
the client, and stating a desire to proceed pro se. An attorney who has entered 
a limited entry of appearance shall be deemed to have withdrawn when the 
attorney has fulfilled the duties of the limited entry of appearance.  

 
 
As this 
Court recently explained:

 
 
The 
Uniform District Court Rules do not require that substitute counsel be obtained 
before the court allows withdrawal of an attorney. . . .  

 
 
            
Requiring substitute counsel remains our preference, and the rule's 
language now mandates it when the client desires it. Therefore, the rule does 
not allow counsel to withdraw except upon court order after the court is 
informed of substitution of counsel or the court is informed by the client of a 
desire to proceed pro se. 

Sims, ¶¶ 
10-11, 99 P.3d  at 968 (citations omitted).

 
 

[¶12]       
The 
first motion to withdraw contended McGuire was dissatisfied with the 
representation she was receiving from the firm, had failed to show up to 
appointments, and communications had ceased between the firm and McGuire.  McGuire was informed of the firm's 
decision to withdraw by letter dated October 31, 2003. The motion was filed 
November 5 and the order was entered November 6.  There is no indication in the record, 
nor does McGuire contend on appeal, that she objected at any time before the 
order allowing withdrawal was entered.  
Under the circumstances, this Court finds no abuse of discretion by the 
trial court in granting the motion to withdraw, conditioned "upon the 
substitution of other counsel by written appearance."

 
 

[¶13]       
The 
second motion by the firm was to allow it to withdraw before the appearance in 
the case of substitute counsel.  
Attached to the motion was an affidavit executed by McGuire, in which she 
declared she was actively seeking new counsel.  In the affidavit McGuire requested the 
firm "be allowed to withdraw from my case immediately because I no longer desire 
their services in any capacity." McGuire's pertinent argument as to the second 
order is that no extraordinary circumstances existed to support the trial 
court's decision.  Extraordinary 
circumstances, however, were not required.  
Pursuant to U.R.D.C. 102(c) "the court shall allow withdrawal upon a statement 
submitted by the client acknowledging the withdrawal of counsel for the client, 
and stating a desire to proceed pro se" (emphasis added).  The explicit use of the term "pro se" is 
not required.  McGuire manifested 
her desire to proceed pro se in her affidavit when she requested the trial court 
allow the immediate withdrawal of the firm, knowing she did not yet have 
substitute counsel.  The trial 
court's order allowing the firm to withdraw was not in 
error.

 
 

[¶14]       
McGuire 
claims a hearing should have been held on the motion to withdraw without 
distinguishing between the first order allowing withdrawal conditioned "upon the 
substitution of other counsel by written appearance" and the second order which 
removes such condition.  No hearing 
was held on either motion.  
Presumably McGuire thinks the result would have been different if the 
trial court had held a hearing(s).  
Given the above circumstances, we disagree.  

 
 

[¶15]       
McGuire 
presents an extended argument that she was prejudiced by events that happened 
after the appearance of substitute counsel.  McGuire might not like the consequences 
of her decision, but such argument is obviously irrelevant to the issue of 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in initially granting the motion 
to withdraw.  McGuire is 
inappropriately questioning her decision to fire the firm in hindsight.  

 
 

[¶16]       
With 
McGuire declaring under oath that she did not want the firm to represent her 
further in any capacity and also declaring that she was actively seeking 
substitute counsel, the trial court was perfectly within its power, and indeed 
compelled, to grant the motion to withdraw.  This Court fails to see how the trial 
court abused its discretion in allowing the firm to 
withdraw.

 
 
 
 
Issue IV 
 Admission of evidence of the contents of investigative law enforcement reports 
at trial

 
 

[¶17]       
McGuire's 
complaint on this issue revolves around the testimony presented by Solis' 
accident reconstruction expert.  As 
part of his testimony, the expert stated he relied in part upon information 
contained in law enforcement reports in reaching his conclusions.  The written law enforcement reports were 
not admitted into evidence.  The sum 
and substance of McGuire's argument on this issue is that the expert's testimony 
should not have been allowed because it violated the strictures of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-9-209 (LexisNexis 2005) which states that law enforcement reports 
shall not be "any evidence of the negligence or due care of either party, at the 
trial of any action at law to recover damages."  

 
 

[¶18]       
Although 
not providing argument on the appropriate standard of review, McGuire presents 
the issue as an evidentiary issue, to be reviewed by this Court under the abuse 
of discretion standard.  She does 
not argue, however, that the testimony was inadmissible under any rule of 
evidence.  Her argument is solely 
that the testimony violated a statute.  
The issue before this Court, then, is strictly limited to whether § 
31-9-209 prohibits the contents of law enforcement reports to be used as 
foundational information by Solis' accident reconstruction expert.  As such, the issue presents a matter of 
law, which this Court reviews de novo.  
Knowles v. Corkill, 2002 WY 
119, ¶ 8, 51 P.3d 859, 863 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

[¶19]       
In her 
brief, McGuire simply makes a bald statement that the contents of the law 
enforcement reports were inadmissible and they were impermissibly used as 
evidence of negligence.  McGuire 
cites to no authority in support of her argument that admitting the testimony of 
the expert, which included conclusions based in part upon information contained 
within law enforcement reports, violates § 31-9-209.  

 
 

[¶20]       
Wyoming 
Statute § 31-9-209 in relevant part states "the reports required by W.S. 
39-5-1106 through 31-5-1108 . . . shall [not] be any evidence of the negligence 
or due care of either party, at the trial of any action at law to recover 
damages."  Even assuming, without 
deciding, that § 31-9-209 encompasses the content of written reports, the 
content would still need to be used as evidence of negligence to run contrary to 
the statute.  In the instant case, 
the content simply was not used as evidence of negligence.  

 
 

[¶21]       
The 
accident reconstruction expert merely mentioned that, in addition to several 
other sources of information, he relied upon information contained in the law 
enforcement reports as foundation upon which he based his ultimate 
conclusions.  His ultimate 
conclusions regarded his reconstruction of the accident, i.e., the location of the vehicles 
before and after impact; McGuire's position in relation to her vehicle and 
Solis' trailer; the speed at impact.  
The expert did not testify as to any specific information contained in 
the reports.  The expert did not 
testify to the ultimate issue of negligence of either party.  Under these circumstances it is far too 
attenuated to claim that contents from the law enforcement reports were used as 
evidence of negligence.  The 
contents of the reports plainly were used solely as foundational information to 
help the expert reconstruct the accident.  
Because the statute was not violated, there is no error as argued by 
McGuire.

 
 
 
 
Issue V 
 Jury instructions

 
 

[¶22]       
McGuire 
offered several jury instructions derived from Wyoming motor vehicle statutes.  McGuire proposed these instructions, 
stating they were pertinent to the issue of the duty of drivers.  The trial court refused to give the 
instructions holding that the statutes are inapplicable to an accident that 
occurred on private property and also that the instructions were 
cumulative.  

 
 

[¶23]       
This 
Court reviews instructions to a jury by determining whether the instructions, 
taken as a whole, adequately and clearly advise the jury of the applicable 
law.  Pauley v. Newman, 2004 WY 76, ¶ 6, 92 P.3d 819, 821-22 (Wyo. 2004); Banks v. 
Crowner, 694 P.2d 101, 105 (Wyo. 1985).  The trial court is not obligated to give 
an instruction offered by a party as long as the jury is adequately instructed 
on the law as it pertains to that case.  
The trial court's ruling on an instruction must be prejudicial to 
constitute reversible error.  Since 
the function of jury instructions is to give guidance regarding the applicable 
law, prejudice results when the instructions confused or misled the jury with 
respect to the proper principles of law.  
Alpine Climate Control, Inc. v. 
DJ's, Inc., 2003 WY 138, ¶ 10, 78 P.3d 685, 688-89 (Wyo. 2003); Sellers v. Dooley Oil Transport, 2001 WY 
44, ¶ 9, 22 P.3d 307, 309 (Wyo. 2001).  
"To measure the degree of prejudice, jury instructions are viewed in the 
light of the entire trial, including the allegations of the complaint, conflict 
in the evidence on critical issues and the arguments of counsel."  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 832 (Wyo. 1994).

 
 

[¶24]       
McGuire 
fails to analyze her jury instruction issue within the above framework.  McGuire makes no argument that the 
instructions given, taken as a whole, failed to adequately and clearly advise 
the jury of the applicable law.  Rather, McGuire's only argument on appeal 
is that the trial court erred in determining that the statutes are not 
applicable to private property.  

 
 

[¶25]       
McGuire's 
argument is misplaced.  Even 
assuming, arguendo, that the statutes apply under the instant circumstances, the 
failure to give the proffered instructions must be prejudicial.  McGuire's only argument as to prejudice 
is one sentence alleging that confusion amongst the jurors on the issue of the 
existence of duty was evidenced by the verdict.  This argument is clearly not 
sufficient.  "Where an appellant 
asserts errors but cites no authority and makes only a perfunctory argument in 
support of the contention, this court will not consider the contention."  Elder v. Jones, 608 P.2d 654, 660 
(Wyo. 
1980).  The trial court determined 
that the accepted jury instructions adequately instructed the jury on the issue 
of duty, and McGuire's proposed instructions would be cumulative.  In the absence of cogent argument 
otherwise, we accept the ruling of the trial court.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶26]       
McGuire 
presents this Court with no good reason to overturn the jury verdict in favor of 
Solis.  Even if any error occurred 
in the pretrial discovery process, such error only potentially effected 
McGuire's presentation of evidence regarding her damages.  Since the issue of damages was never 
reached by the jury, the discovery complaints are moot.  There is, of course, no error by the 
trial court in its non-application of the exact language of a rule it never 
adopted.  

 
 

[¶27]       
The 
withdrawal of the Phillips law firm was allowed based upon McGuire's own request 
that the trial court allow the firm to immediately withdraw, despite the lack of 
appearance by substitute counsel.  
No abuse of discretion is perceived in the decision by the trial court to 
grant McGuire's request in light of her assertion that she did not want the firm 
representing her further in any capacity.

 
 

[¶28]       
The 
testimony of Solis' accident reconstruction expert was not violative of § 
31-9-209.  Solis' expert used law 
enforcement reports as a foundation for his expert opinion.  The expert mentioned the reports as 
foundational documents but did not testify as to the specific contents of the 
documents.  His opinion went 
exclusively to the reconstruction of the accident.  He did not testify as to 
negligence.  McGuire's argument that 
the contents of the law enforcement reports were used as evidence of negligence 
is untenable.

 
 

[¶29]       
Finally, 
McGuire presented no cogent argument to this Court that the trial court 
committed reversible error in denying her proffered jury instructions regarding 
the duty of drivers under Wyoming statutes.  That McGuire lost her case is not 
indicative of jury confusion.  
Because McGuire presents no further claim of prejudice, the decision of 
the trial court denying the proffered instructions is 
upheld.

 
 

[¶30]       
Solis 
requests this Court award him attorneys' fees and damages pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
10.05, claiming that McGuire's appeal lacked merit and was unsupported by cogent 
argument.  Rule 10.05 states, in pertinent part: "If the court certifies there was no reasonable cause for the 
appeal, a reasonable amount for attorneys' fees and damages to the appellee 
shall be fixed by the appellate court and taxed as part of the costs in the 
case."  Only in rare circumstances 
will sanctions be awarded pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.  While McGuire's brief has its failings, 
it is not so deficient as to merit sanctions under W.R.A.P. 10.05.  White v. Allen, 2005 WY 72, ¶ 23, 115 P.3d 8, 14 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

[¶31]       
The 
judgment on the jury verdict in the instant case is affirmed.  Solis' request for attorneys' fees and 
damages is denied.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Subsequent 
to the filing of this action, McGuire married and changed her last name to 
Powers.  For the sake of simplicity, 
we will refer to her by the name under which suit was filed  Kaori 
McGuire.

 
 

2By order 
dated the following day, the trial court ordered that no further expert 
witnesses were to be designated "unless stipulated to by the parties and allowed 
by this Court."