Title: State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

23982 
THE STATE EX REL. MILLER, APPELLANT, V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, 
APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm. (1996), ____ Ohio St.3d ____.] 
Workers’ compensation -- Industrial Commission’s denial of 
permanent total disability compensation not an abuse of 
discretion when supported by “some evidence” and in 
compliance with State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. 
 
(No. 94-2015--Submitted July 10, 1996,--Decided October 2, 1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 
93APD09-1223. 
 
Appellant-claimant, Allen Miller, was injured in 1981 in the course of 
and arising from his employment with C. Schmidt Company.  Appellee, 
Industrial Commission of Ohio, allowed his workers’ compensation claim for 
“twisted lower back; post traumatic depression and anxiety; lumbar herniated 
disc.”  In 1989, claimant, not having returned to work, applied to the 
commission for permanent total disability compensation.  When no 
administrative action occurred, claimant refiled his application two years 
later. 
 
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Commission specialist Dr. Clarence J. Louis assessed a fifty-five 
percent physical impairment for claimant.  Dr. Louis reported that claimant 
was precluded from his former position of employment as a sheet metal 
worker, but could do sedentary work.  A second commission specialist, Dr. 
Michael T. Farrell, Ph.D., found a fifteen to twenty percent 
psychological/psychiatric impairment, which he felt was not work-
prohibitive.  Dr. Paul H. Dillahunt’s medical review of numerous reports in 
the file prompted him to assess a fifty-four percent combined effects 
impairment that permitted sedentary work. 
 
The commission’s rehabilitation division issued a seemingly 
contradictory report.  At one point, the report states that claimant “does not 
have re-employment potential.”  Four paragraphs later, it states “prognosis 
for future vocational rehabilitation services appear[s] to be fair at this time.” 
 
Claimant’s first mandamus action concerning the initial denial of 
permanent total disability compensation prompted a return for further 
consideration and amended order pursuant to State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. 
Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203,567 N.E.2d 245.  [State ex rel.] Miller v. 
Indus. Comm. (Jan. 6, 1993), Franklin App. No. 92AP-261, unreported.  The 
 
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commission then issued a second order denying permanent total disability 
compensation which read: 
 
“*** The order is based particularly upon the reports of Doctor(s) 
Farrel [sic] and Louis, evidence in the file and/or evidence adduced at the 
hearing. 
 
“The claimant is 53 [sic 52], has an 8th grade education with two 
further years of joint vocational school training in a sheet metal program and 
has worked as a telegram delivery person and a sheet metal foreman.  Dr. 
Farrell did an independent psychiatric examination.  He has provided a long 
report that is much more detailed than that of Dr. Alwis.  Dr. Farrell’s report 
is found persuasive.  While he finds some ongoing symptoms, he concludes 
the allowed psychiatric conditions are not work prohibitive and do not 
preclude the claimant from returning to his former job.  Dr. Louis did an 
independent physical examination.  He provided a detailed narrative report 
and his report is found persuasive.  He concludes the claimant has physical 
restrictions of no bending or stooping, no lifting over 10 pounds and no 
prolonged sitting over 25 minutes without a 5 to 10 minute allowance to 
stand and stretch.  He indicates a sedentary work employment activity is 
 
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recommended.  Based on the reports of Drs. Farrrell and Louis it is found the 
claimant is capable of sedentary work with no psychiatric restrictions.  The 
claimant has prior work experience as a telegram delivery person.  Such a job 
would appear to fit within the sedentary restrictions found by Dr. Louis and it 
thus appears the claimant could return to such work.  Also, such a job 
indicates the claimant is able to drive, a skill which would be transferable.  
Further, the claimant has supervisory experience as a foreman.  He would be 
capable of doing supervisory work which didn’t require much physical labor.  
Such experience indicates superviosry [sic] skills which would be 
transferable to sedentary work.  Further, his ability to do these jobs shows he 
has the ability to learn different skills and jobs.  While the claimant has only 
an eighth grade education, his further vocational training indicates he has the 
educational skills needed to learn jobs and thus to retrain.  These findings are 
supported by the 12/3/90 rehabilitation evaluation report which found the 
claimant to have a fair prognosis for vocational rehabilitation.  Based on 
these factors it is found the claimant has the education, skills and intelligence 
needed to do, or retrain to, sedentary work.  Finally, the claimant was only 43 
when he last worked.  He has now had ten years in which to further educate 
 
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or retrain.  There is no evidence such has occurred.  At age 53 he still has 
approximately 12 working years left in which to further educate or retrain.  
Based on these factors his age is not found to be a factor supporting 
disability.  ***  The claimant has not submitted any vocational evidence to 
show his age, education, work history or other disability factors prevent him 
from performing the sedentary level of work the reports of [D]octors Louis 
and Farrell indicate he is capable of.  Based on all the above stated factors[,] 
it is found the claimant is not permanently and totally disabled ***.” 
 
Claimant filed a second complaint in mandamus in the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its 
discretion in denying permanent total disability compensation.  The appellate 
court found that the order met Noll’s minimum requirements and was 
supported by “some evidence.”  It accordingly denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Finkelmeier & Finkelmeier and William T. Farrell, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and William L. McDonald, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
 
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Per Curiam.  We are once again asked to review the commission’s 
denial of permanent total disability compensation for both “some evidence” 
in support and compliance with Noll, supra.  For the reasons to follow, we 
find that both requirements have been minimally satisfied, and affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
The claimant has a medical capacity for sedentary work--a point with 
which claimant does not really disagree.  Permanent total disability 
compensation eligibility, therefore, hinges on the interpretation given to 
claimant’s nonmedical disability factors.   
 
The commission’s favorable assessment of claimant’s age is consistent 
with State ex rel. Ellis v. McGraw Edison Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 92, 609 
N.E.2d 164.  There, we upheld the commission’s prerogative to classify as an 
asset the age of a claimant who was only one to two years younger than the 
claimant at bar. 
 
The commission’s positive characterization of claimant’s education, on 
the other hand, is not supported by the record.  While the tenor of the 
commission’s order suggests that the commission recognized the limitations 
imposed by claimant’s eighth grade education, it also implies that claimant’s 
 
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educational deficit was overcome by his two years of vocational training.  
This reasoning, however, ignores that claimant’s training prepared him for 
sheet metal labor--a job now beyond his physical abilities. 
 
The pivotal factor in the commission’s decision appears to have been 
claimant’s work history.  We note initially that the commission’s favorable 
assessment of claimant’s telegram delivery job is an abuse of discretion.  
Claimant delivered telegrams by bicycle in the late 1950s while in his teens.  
Even assuming that such a job exists today, we find that this particular 
occupational experience is so remote--both vocationally and chronologically-
-as to make the experience of negligible re-employment value. 
 
Much more relevant is the commission’s assessment of claimant’s 
sheet metal experience.  Claimant’s sheet metal experience was mainly as a 
foreman.  The commission focused on this experience and concluded that 
claimant possessed skills that made him amenable to supervisory work of a 
less strenuous nature. 
 
We do not find this determination to be an abuse of discretion.  While 
we recognize that claimant’s supervisory duties were not exclusively 
sedentary, other responsibilities included the assignment of work duties, 
 
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training of new employees, hiring and firing of workers, and assisting the 
engineering department with product design.  The commission interpreted 
these personnel duties as providing experience transferable to other work.  
Thus, at a minimum, the commission did not view claimant’s work history as 
an insurmountable barrier to re-employment or retraining.  Finding no 
evidence that the amount of time spent on physical duties was vastly 
disproportionate to that spent on managerial tasks, we cannot characterize 
this finding as error. 
 
Viewing the commission’s analysis in its totality, we find that it is 
supported by “some evidence” and adequately sets forth the reasoning upon 
which it rests. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only.