Title: Woodruff v. City of Tuscaloosa

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 08/17/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2012
____________________
1110355
____________________
John Woodruff
v.
City of Tuscaloosa et al.
Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court
(CV-11-0001)
STUART, Justice.
John Woodruff appeals the order of the Tuscaloosa Circuit
Court 
dismissing 
his 
malicious-prosecution, 
false-
imprisonment, and tort-of-outrage claims against the City of
1110355
Tuscaloosa ("the City") and several of its employees.  We
affirm.
I.
On October 16, 2006, Woodruff went to the Tuscaloosa
Police Department headquarters to resolve a warrant that had
been sworn against him for harassing communications.  See §
13A-11-8, Ala. Code 1975 (describing what constitutes the
Class C misdemeanor offense of harassing communications). 
After 
presenting 
himself, 
Woodruff 
was 
arrested 
and 
handcuffed
by Tuscaloosa police officer Brian Canterbury and told to wait
until another officer could arrive to complete the booking
process.  
While waiting in the public lobby of police headquarters,
Woodruff became involved in a verbal altercation with Carrie
Summers, an off-duty Tuscaloosa police officer, and he was
subsequently charged by Officer Canterbury with disorderly
conduct, another Class C misdemeanor.  See § 13A-11-7, Ala.
Code 1975.  Woodruff was thereafter booked and transported to
the county jail, where he was released on bond later that
night.  On October 19, 2006, Woodruff returned to the
Tuscaloosa Police Department to file a written complaint
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regarding the events surrounding his arrest and booking on
October 16.  The Tuscaloosa Police Department ultimately
determined that Woodruff's complaint was without merit. 
On November 15, 2006, Woodruff was convicted of
disorderly conduct in the Tuscaloosa Municipal Court. 
Woodruff thereafter sought a trial de novo on the charge in
the Tuscaloosa 
Circuit Court; however, in December 
2008, 
while
the matter was still pending, Woodruff and the City apparently
reached an agreement to nol-pros the charge if Woodruff would
undergo counseling.  On January 2, 2009, the disorderly-
conduct charge was formally dropped.
On January 3, 2011, Woodruff filed the instant action
alleging malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and the
tort of outrage against the City, Officers Canterbury and
Summers, eight other Tuscaloosa police officers who either
were present during his arrest and booking on October 16,
2006, or were involved in the subsequent investigation of his
complaint stemming from those events, and three other
municipal employees of the City whose specific involvement is
unclear (the City and the individual defendants are
hereinafter referred to collectively as the "the City
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defendants").  On January 25, 2011, Officer Canterbury filed
a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against him, and the
other individual defendants jointly filed a separate 
motion 
to
dismiss the claims asserted against them.  On January 31,
2011, the City filed its own motion to dismiss.  However, the
City did not serve Woodruff with a copy of its motion to
dismiss, apparently as the result of an oversight based on the
fact that Woodruff was proceeding pro se and was not
registered to receive electronic copies of court filings.  On
March 30, 2011, Woodruff moved the trial court to enter a
default judgment against the City based on its failure to
serve him with any pleadings or motions since the inception of
the action.  The next day the City filed a response opposing
that motion, which it served by mail on Woodruff, along with
a copy of its original motion to dismiss.
On May 31, 2011, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the City defendants' motions to dismiss and Woodruff's motion
seeking a default judgment against the City, along with
another motion filed by Woodruff objecting to filings made by
the City defendants that, Woodruff alleged, improperly
contained personal information about him such as his Social
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Security number, date of birth, and driver's license number. 
On October 12, 2011, the trial court entered an order granting
the City defendants' motions to dismiss and declaring all
other pending motions moot.  Woodruff filed his notice of
appeal to this Court on November 23, 2011.
II.
We explained the standard of review applicable to an
appeal of a trial court's judgment granting a motion to
dismiss in Crosslin v. Health Care Authority of Huntsville, 5
So. 3d 1193, 1195 (Ala. 2008):
"In 
considering 
whether 
a 
complaint 
is
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., a court 'must accept
the allegations of the complaint as true.'  Creola
Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828
So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002) (emphasis omitted). 
'"The appropriate standard of review under Rule
12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the
allegations of the complaint are viewed most
strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the
pleader could prove any set of circumstances that
would entitle [it] to relief."'  Smith v. National
Sec. Ins. Co., 860 So. 2d 343, 345 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299
(Ala. 1993)).  In determining whether this is true,
a court considers only whether the plaintiff may
possibly prevail, not whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail.  Id.  Put another way, '"a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of the claim that would entitle the
plaintiff to relief."'  Id. (emphasis added)." 
5
1110355
III.
Woodruff argues that the City defendants' motions to
dismiss lacked merit and should have been denied for that
reason; however, he further argues that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to even consider the City's motion to dismiss,
and we first consider this jurisdictional argument.  Citing
Nichols v. Pate, 992 So. 2d 734 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008),
Woodruff argues that the City's failure to serve him with its
motion to dismiss deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to
consider that motion.  We disagree.  In Nichols, the Court of
Civil Appeals held that "[t]he failure to effect proper
service under Rule 4, Ala. R. Civ. P., deprives the trial
court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant ...."  992
So. 2d at 736.  However, in this case, personal jurisdiction
over the parties is not an issue –– Woodruff initiated the
lawsuit, and there is no question that he properly served the
City.  Personal jurisdiction over the parties was thus
established, and the trial court had jurisdiction to consider
timely filed motions in the action.  See also McConico v.
McKibben, 581 So. 2d 829, 829 (Ala. 1991) (affirming the trial
court's judgment of dismissal where the plaintiff had failed
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1110355
to cite any authority to support his argument that he had a
valid cause of action based on the defendant's alleged failure
to serve him with a copy of a summary-judgment motion in a
previous action between the parties).
Of course, pursuant to Rule 5(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., "every
written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte"
must be served upon the opposing party, and due-process
requirements could prevent a trial court from ruling on a
motion that had not been properly served in accordance with
Rule 5, even though personal jurisdiction over the parties had
been established.  See, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 856 So. 2d 766,
782 (Ala. 2002) (stating that a person already made a party to
litigation could, "on some critical motion or for some
critical proceeding within that litigation," be deprived of
the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution if he or she is not provided with
"notice, a hearing according to that notice, and a judgment
entered in accordance with such notice and hearing").  In this
case, however, although the City unquestionably erred in not
serving its motion to dismiss upon Woodruff when it was filed
on January 31, 2011, it subsequently remedied that error by
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1110355
mailing Woodruff a copy of the motion on March 31, 2011, when
it became aware of the error.  The trial court did not
thereafter hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss until May
31, 2011, and Woodruff has not, and cannot, maintain that he
did not receive adequate time to consider and respond to the
arguments made by the City in its motion to dismiss in light
of that two-month interval.   The trial court acted within its
1
authority in considering the City's motion to dismiss.
We thus turn to Woodruff's argument that the trial court
erred in granting the City defendants' motions to dismiss
because, he alleges, those motions lacked merit.  Woodruff
asserted three 
claims against the City defendants 
–– 
malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment, and the tort of outrage.  The
City defendants argue that, even when Woodruff's allegations
are viewed in the light most favorable to him, it would be
For 
comparison, 
10 
days is 
considered 
sufficient 
time 
for
1
a party to have a meaningful opportunity to respond to a
summary-judgment motion.  See, e.g., Hill v. Chambless, 757
So. 2d 409, 411 (Ala. 2000) ("Rule 56(c)(2)[, Ala. R. Civ.
P.,] establishes the notice requirement for summary-judgment
motions.  In order to ensure that an opposing party has a
meaningful opportunity to respond, this rule requires 
that the
trial court must allow a minimum of 10 days to pass between
the date the hearing is set and the date of the actual
hearing, unless the parties agree otherwise.").
8
1110355
impossible for him to prevail on any of these claims.  For the
reasons that follow, we agree.
In order to succeed on his malicious-prosecution claim,
Woodruff ultimately needed to prove that the City defendants
instigated his prosecution for disorderly conduct "without
probable cause and with malice; that the prior proceeding
ended in favor of [Woodruff]; and that [he] was damaged
thereby."  Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Hood, 621 So. 2d 253, 256
(Ala. 1993).  In Gunter v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 646 So. 2d
1332, 1333 (Ala. 1994), this Court considered an appeal based
on facts similar to those of the present case:  the appellant
had been convicted of disorderly conduct in a municipal court,
appealed that conviction to the circuit court, and then the
charge against him was nol-prossed before the circuit court
conducted a trial de novo on the charge.  The appellant
subsequently initiated a malicious-prosecution action that
ultimately resulted in a summary judgment being entered
against him.  Id.  In affirming that summary judgment, this
Court held that the appellant would be unable to show that the
proceedings on the disorderly-conduct charge had been
instigated without probable cause because "[his] conviction
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1110355
[in the municipal court] is prima facie evidence of probable
cause for instituting the prosecution, even though the
conviction was later vacated."  646 So. 2d at 1333 (citing
Brown v. Parnell, 386 So. 2d 1137, 1139 (Ala. 1980)).  The
reasoning behind this proposition was explained in Ex parte
Kemp, 202 Ala. 425, 425-26, 80 So. 809, 809-10 (1919):
"'The true and logical reason why a conviction
reversed on appeal and the defendant discharged is
relevant evidence on the issue of probable cause is,
not that the judgment imports absolute verity; for
after the reversal and discharge there is in fact
and law no judgment.  The true reason, as stated in
the case of Nehr v. Dobbs, 47 Neb. 863, 66 N.W. 864
[(1896)], is the fact that ordinarily, if a court
having jurisdiction has upon a full and fair trial
proceeded to conviction, it must have had before it
such evidence as would convince a prudent and
reasonable man of the guilt of the accused. 
Therefore, while a subsequent reversal may show that
the accused was in fact innocent, yet it does not
show that there was no probable cause for believing
him guilty.'"
(Quoting Skeffington v. Eylward, 97 Minn. 244, 247, 105 N.W.
638, 639 (1906).)  Although Woodruff makes the generic
statement in his brief that the conviction in the municipal
court was plainly in error, he does not allege or argue that
that conviction does not establish probable cause.  Based on
the undisputed facts of the case, Woodruff could not prevail
on the malicious-prosecution claim he asserted against the
10
1110355
City defendants, and the trial court's dismissal of that claim
was accordingly proper.2
The facts alleged by Woodruff in support of his false-
imprisonment claim similarly indicate that he could not
prevail on that claim.  The gravamen of Woodruff's false-
imprisonment claim is that he was falsely imprisoned as a
result of the disorderly-conduct charge because, he alleges,
that charge was unwarranted.  Regardless of the basis for the
disorderly-conduct charge, however, it is undisputed that
Woodruff went to the Tuscaloosa Police Department to resolve
a warrant that had been sworn against him for harassing
communications and that, after presenting himself, he was
arrested and handcuffed by Officer Canterbury.  While waiting
to complete the booking process, he thereafter 
became 
involved
in a verbal altercation, which led to his being charged with
disorderly conduct as well.  Importantly, however, at the time
Woodruff was charged with disorderly conduct he was already
In their brief, the City defendants argue that the trial
2
court's dismissal of the malicious-prosecution claim, as well
as Woodruff's other claims, was proper for additional reasons
not discussed in this opinion.  However, the correctness of
the trial court's 
dismissal of these claims being established,
we need not address those other arguments, regardless of their
possible merit.
11
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under arrest and in custody based on the harassing-
communications warrant.  Although Woodruff disputes the basis
for his disorderly-conduct charge, he has not argued that the
harassing-communications warrant was invalid, and "[t]he law
in Alabama is clear that a plaintiff is not entitled to
recover for false arrest or imprisonment where he or she is
arrested pursuant to a valid warrant issued by a lawfully
authorized person."  Ennis v. Beason, 537 So. 2d 17, 19 (Ala.
1988) (citing Blake v. Barton Williams, Inc., 361 So. 2d 376
(Ala. Civ. App. 1978)).  Woodruff therefore was not deprived
of his personal liberty as a result of the disorderly-conduct
charge because he was already under arrest and in custody at
the time he was charged with disorderly conduct; accordingly,
the trial court's dismissal of Woodruff's false-imprisonment
claim against the City defendants was proper.  See also
Crutcher v. Wendy's of North Alabama, Inc., 857 So. 2d 82, 91
(Ala. 2003) ("Section 6-5-170[, Ala. Code 1975,] provides:
'False imprisonment consists in the unlawful detention of the
person of another for any length of time whereby he is
deprived of his personal liberty.'").
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Finally, Woodruff argues that the trial court erred by
dismissing his tort-of-outrage claim.  This claim is not
directly based on Woodruff's prosecution for disorderly
conduct; rather, Woodruff bases it on the "outrage" he alleges
the entire community feels toward the City and the Tuscaloosa
Police Department as a result of what he says is their pattern
and practice of failing to properly investigate complaints of
misconduct committed by Tuscaloosa police officers, including
their alleged misconduct surrounding his own complaint
regarding his treatment on October 16, 2006.  Citing Callens
v. Jefferson County Nursing Home, 769 So. 2d 273 (Ala. 2000),
Woodruff acknowledges that this Court has not recognized the
tort of outrage in this context, but he nevertheless argues
that, because this Court judicially created the tort-of-
outrage cause of action –– as opposed to the legislature's
creating it by statute –– this Court could expand it to
encompass the facts presented here.  Accordingly, he argues,
the trial court erred by dismissing his claim.
Woodruff is correct in noting that the fact this Court
has recognized the tort of outrage in only certain limited
circumstances does not foreclose us from recognizing it in
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other circumstances.  However, this fact does not require
every trial court to systematically refrain from dismissing
any tort-of-outrage claim so that we may judge it in the first
instance.  Indeed, it is generally the duty of a trial court
to first consider all issues raised by the parties, and only
after the trial court has done so is review by an appellate
court possible.  Accordingly, trial courts are empowered to
dismiss tort-of-outrage claims where appropriate, and both
this Court and the Court of Civil Appeals have affirmed their
judgments doing so.  See, e.g., Gibson v. Abbott, 529 So. 2d
939, 942 (Ala. 1988) (affirming the trial court's dismissal of
the appellant's slander and "outrageous conduct" claims), and
Thomas v. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1234, 1240 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)
("[W]e agree with [the appellee] that, with regard to [the
appellant's] tort-of-outrage claim, [she] failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, and we affirm the
trial court's dismissal of that claim.").  
3
Of course, a party aggrieved by a trial court's decision
to dismiss his or her tort-of-outrage claim may, like
These cases also refute Woodruff's argument that all
3
tort-of-outrage cases require findings of fact and should
therefore be decided by a jury.
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Woodruff, seek appellate review of that decision, and the
appropriate appellate court will then determine whether, when
the appellant's allegations are viewed in the most favorable
light possible, he or she could possibly prevail on that tort-
of-outrage claim.  It is apparent in this case that Woodruff
could not.  In Callens, we explained that a plaintiff alleging
the tort of outrage must prove:
"(1) that the defendants either intended to inflict
emotional distress, or knew or should have known
that emotional distress was likely to result from
their conduct; (2) that the defendants' conduct was
extreme and outrageous; and (3) that the defendants'
conduct caused emotional distress so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it."
769 So. 2d at 281.  However, when, at the hearing conducted by
the trial court on May 31, 2011, the attorney for the
individual defendants argued that they were entitled to
discover Woodruff's medical records based on his claim,
inherent in his tort-of-outrage claim, that he had suffered
extreme emotional distress, Woodruff was adamant that he had
neither claimed nor suffered extreme emotional distress,
stating:
"I would like [the individual defendants'
attorney] to go ahead and provide the court with a
single paragraph in my complaint that alleges
emotional distress or mental anguish.  I will give
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1110355
him a chance to find that while I am responding. ... 
I don't claim that was the infliction on me of
severe emotional distress. ...  It's not that I was
personally beat down and broken to the point I
couldn't get out of bed in the morning because of
the  depression.  It's an outrage and anger at the
City's policies.  That's not severe emotional
anguish nor is it the intent of this individual. ... 
Again, I am waiting for the city to come up with a
paragraph where I allege emotional distress or
mental anguish. ...  It is [the City's] custom and
practice, not so much that I personally suffered
some type of emotional anguish or severe emotional
distress, it is the fact they won't investigate it."
In light of the fact that Woodruff has taken the clear
position that he did not suffer emotional distress, he cannot
prevail on his tort-of-outrage claim because the tort of
outrage cannot exist in the absence of extreme emotional
distress.  Indeed, a tort-of-outrage claim is alternately
referred to as a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.  Ex 
parte 
Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance, 662 So.
2d 1133, 1134 (Ala. 1995).  Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in dismissing Woodruff's tort-of-outrage claim.
IV.
Woodruff sued the City and several of its police officers
and 
employees, 
alleging 
malicious 
prosecution, 
false
imprisonment, and the tort of outrage.  The trial court
entered a judgment dismissing his claims and, because it is
16
1110355
evident that he has not stated against any of the City
defendants a claim upon which relief could be granted, we
affirm that judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
Malone, C.J., recuses himself.
17