Title: State v. Parker

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Parker, 113 Ohio St.3d 207, 2007-Ohio-1534.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PARKER, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Parker, 113 Ohio St.3d 207, 2007-Ohio-1534.] 
Criminal law — Speedy-trial right under R.C. 2945.71 — Triple count applies to 
pretrial incarceration on multiple related charges under jurisdiction of 
separate state courts. 
(No. 2006-0236—Submitted December 12, 2006—Decided April 18, 2007.) 
APPEAL from Court of Appeals for Ashtabula County,  
No. 2004-A-004, 2005-Ohio-6908. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  
When multiple charges arise from a criminal incident and share a common 
litigation history, pretrial incarceration on the multiple charges constitutes 
incarceration on the “pending charge” for the purposes of the triple-count 
provision of the speedy-trial statute, R.C. 2945.71(E). 
2.  
Criminal charges arising out of the same criminal incident and brought 
simultaneously will always be deemed to have a “common litigation 
history” for the purposes of establishing incarceration solely on the 
“pending charge” within the meaning of R.C. 2945.71(E), even if they are 
prosecuted in separate jurisdictions. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶1} 
In this case, we are called upon to determine whether the triple-
count provision in R.C. 2945.71(E) applies when an incarcerated accused is 
initially arraigned on multiple charges in municipal court, but on some of those 
charges the defendant is bound over to the common pleas court. 
I. Background 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶2} 
Jeremy Parker, appellee, was arrested on November 6, 2002, in 
connection with the discovery of a methamphetamine lab in Ashtabula County. 
As a result of his arrest, Parker was incarcerated and three separate complaints 
were filed in the Ashtabula Municipal Court, charging Parker with illegal 
manufacture of drugs, possession of drugs, and carrying a concealed weapon. 
{¶3} 
The Ashtabula Municipal Court set bond for each of the three 
charges. A lower bond was set for the charge of carrying a concealed weapon, a 
misdemeanor, than for the two felony drug charges. After a November 15, 2002 
preliminary hearing, Parker was bound over to the Ashtabula County Court of 
Common Pleas on the felony drug charges. The misdemeanor charge remained 
pending in the municipal court. 
{¶4} 
On December 3, 2002, the state filed a motion in the common 
pleas court requesting that Parker’s bond on the felony drug charges be modified 
to a personal recognizance bond. The motion was granted, but for unspecified 
reasons, Parker did not execute his recognizance bond until January 24, 2003.  He 
then remained jailed on the misdemeanor charge, which still required bail in the 
form of cash or a surety bond. 
{¶5} 
Parker was eventually indicted by the Ashtabula County Grand 
Jury on the felonies on January 23, 2003. According to the parties’ briefs, on 
January 28, 2003, Parker posted the required bond on the concealed-weapon 
charge and was released, and, on motion of the city solicitor, the municipal court 
dismissed the concealed-weapon charge the next day. 
{¶6} 
Parker was thus incarcerated on the felony charges from November 
6, 2002, until January 24, 2003, when he posted the personal recognizance bond. 
This is a total of 79 days, and is the disputed time for the purposes of the R.C. 
2945.71(E) triple-count provision. 
{¶7} 
The trial court denied Parker’s motion to dismiss on speedy-trial 
grounds. Parker pleaded no contest on September 23, 2003. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶8} 
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed, finding that 
because the triple-count provision applied, Parker must be given credit for 302 
days before being brought to trial, 32 more than allowed by R.C. 2945.71. 
{¶9} 
If the triple-count provision does not apply, Parker had credit for 
only 144 days and was not entitled to dismissal on the basis of a speedy-trial 
violation. 
II. Analysis 
{¶10} The question presented requires this court to clarify the rule 
announced in State v. MacDonald (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 2 O.O.3d 219, 357 
N.E.2d 40. In MacDonald, we held that the triple-count provision applies “only to 
those defendants held in jail in lieu of bail solely on the pending charge.” Id. at 
syllabus. The question now is, after a defendant is charged with two felonies and a 
misdemeanor arising from the same criminal incident, and the felonies are 
transferred to another jurisdiction that grants a personal recognizance bond, but 
the misdemeanor is subject to a cash or surety bond in the original jurisdiction, 
does the defendant remain incarcerated “solely on the pending charge”?  
{¶11} We begin by noting our lengthy history of Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, including the application of R.C. 2945.71. “The right to a speedy 
trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees an accused this same 
right. State v. MacDonald (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 68, 2 O.O.3d 219, 220, 357 
N.E.2d 40, 42. Although the United States Supreme Court declined to establish 
the exact number of days within which a trial must be held, it recognized that 
states may prescribe a reasonable period of time consistent with constitutional 
requirements. Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 
L.Ed.2d 101, 113. In response to this authority, Ohio enacted R.C. 2945.71, which 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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designates specific time requirements for the state to bring an accused to trial.” 
State v. Hughes (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 425, 715 N.E.2d 540. 
{¶12} As Chief Justice Moyer wrote in Brecksville v. Cook (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 53, 55-56, 661 N.E.2d 706: 
{¶13} “Ohio's speedy trial statute was implemented to incorporate the 
constitutional protection of the right to a speedy trial provided for in the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Section 10, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution. State v. Broughton (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 253, 256, 581 N.E.2d 
541, 544; see Columbus v. Bonner (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 34, 36, 2 OBR 37, 39, 
440 N.E.2d 606, 608. The constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial was originally 
considered necessary to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, to minimize the 
anxiety of the accused, and to limit the possibility that the defense will be 
impaired. State ex rel. Jones v. Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas (1978), 55 
Ohio St.2d 130, 131, 9 O.O.3d 108, 109, 378 N.E.2d 471, 472. 
{¶14} “Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees to the 
party accused in any court ‘a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.’ 
‘Throughout the long history of litigation involving application of the speedy trial 
statutes, this court has repeatedly announced that the trial courts are to strictly 
enforce the legislative mandates evident in these statutes. This court's announced 
position of strict enforcement has been grounded in the conclusion that the speedy 
trial statutes implement the constitutional guarantee of a public speedy trial.’ 
(Citations omitted.) State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 221, 18 O.O.3d 
427, 429, 416 N.E.2d 589, 591. We are acutely conscious of the magnitude of the 
rights we interpret today. We have also previously explained, however, that ‘the 
prescribed times for trial set forth in R.C. 2945.71 are not absolute in all 
circumstances, but a certain measure of flexibility was intended by the General 
Assembly by the enactment of R.C. 2945.72, wherein discretionary authority is 
granted to extend the trial date beyond the R.C. 2945.71 time prescriptions.’ State 
January Term, 2007 
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v. Wentworth (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 171, 173, 8 O.O.3d 162, 163-164, 375 N.E.2d 
424, 426. It is against these principles that we analyze the issues now before us.” 
{¶15} We have long held that the statutory speedy-trial limitations are 
mandatory and that the state must strictly comply with them. Hughes, 86 Ohio 
St.3d at 427, 715 N.E.2d 540. Further, “the fundamental right to a speedy trial 
cannot be sacrificed for judicial economy or presumed legislative goals.” Id. 
{¶16} In situations like the one before us, some lower courts have not 
applied the broad language in MacDonald literally, holding that “[w]here more 
than one charge has arisen from a single transaction and the multiple charges 
share a common litigation history from arrest onward, incarceration on the 
multiple charges will be considered incarceration on the ‘pending charge’ for the 
purposes of R.C. 2945.71(E).” State v. Parsley (1993), 82 Ohio App.3d 567, 571, 
612 N.E.2d 813; see, also, State v. Dach, Trumbull App. Nos. 2005-T-0048 and 
2005-T-0054, 2006-Ohio-3428; State v. Madden, Franklin App. No. 04AP-1228, 
2005-Ohio-4281; State v. Eldridge, Scioto App. No. 02CA2842, 2003-Ohio-1198; 
State v. Carroll (Oct. 17, 2000), Franklin App. No. 00AP-219, 2000 WL 1528622. 
{¶17} The state does not challenge the application of the Parsley rule; 
indeed, it suggests only that the case is distinguishable. 
{¶18} This court has not yet expressly adopted the rule in Parsley.  We 
have, however, made related rulings that intimated the correctness of the ruling in 
Parsley.  In State v. Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 67, 68, 538 N.E.2d 1025, we 
adopted the rule established in State v. Clay (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 216, 218, 9 
OBR 366, 459 N.E.2d 609, that “when new and additional charges arise from the 
same facts as did the original charge and the state knew of such facts at the time 
of the initial indictment, the time within which trial is to begin on the additional 
charge is subject to the same statutory limitations period that is applied to the 
original charge.” 
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{¶19} Additionally, in State v. Baker (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 108, 112, 676 
N.E.2d 883, we acknowledged an exception to the speedy-trial timetable for 
subsequent indictments: “When additional criminal charges arise from facts 
distinct from those supporting an original charge, or the state was unaware of such 
facts at that time, the state is not required to bring the accused to trial within the 
same statutory period as the original charge under R.C. 2945.71 et seq.” Baker 
involved subsequent indictments, all of which were the result of the same 
investigation, but the charges were the direct result of different events on different 
dates. We held that “in issuing a subsequent indictment, the state is not subject to 
the speedy-trial timetable of the initial indictment, when * * * the state did not 
know of these facts at the time of the initial indictment.” Id. at 110, 676 N.E.2d 
883. 
{¶20} The Parsley rule comports well with the holdings of Baker and 
Adams, which, combined, stand for the proposition that speedy-trial time is not 
tolled for the filing of later charges that arose from the facts of the criminal 
incident that led to the first charge. There should be no difference if all the 
charges are filed at the same time, even in different courts. 
{¶21} We therefore adopt the Parsley ruling and hold that when multiple 
charges arise from a criminal incident and share a common litigation history, 
pretrial incarceration on the multiple charges constitutes incarceration on the 
“pending charge” for the purposes of the triple-count provision of the speedy-trial 
statute, R.C. 2945.71(E). 
{¶22} As mentioned, the state does not contest adoption of the Parsley 
rule, but instead argues that the charges did not share a common litigation history. 
This argument is belied both factually and logically. 
{¶23} Parker was arraigned on three separate complaints in the municipal 
court on November 7, all related to the same occurrence that resulted in his arrest. 
January Term, 2007 
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From this point forward, he had no control over the commonality of the litigation 
or the courts in which the complaints were prosecuted. 
{¶24} Despite their eventual separation, the charges at the time of the 
complaints could have proceeded together in one jurisdiction. Parker had no 
control over the decision to refer only the drug charges to the grand jury. The state 
cannot reasonably argue that it has a mechanism at its disposal whereby after 
bringing both misdemeanor and felony charges based on a single criminal 
incident, and retaining the misdemeanor as a pending action in the municipal 
court, it can obviate any triple-count concerns. 
{¶25} Criminal charges arising out of the same criminal incident and 
brought simultaneously will always be deemed to have a “common litigation 
history” for the purposes of establishing incarceration solely on the “pending 
charge” within the meaning of R.C. 2945.71(E), even if they are prosecuted in 
separate jurisdictions. 
{¶26} At oral argument, counsel for both the state and Parker indicated 
that one of the reasons this situation has been exacerbated in Ashtabula County is 
the refusal of the common pleas court to adjudicate misdemeanor cases. As a 
result, defendants are often left with charges pending in two jurisdictions: either 
the county court or the municipal court for a misdemeanor, and the common pleas 
court for the felony counts. 
{¶27} The problem here arose from the speedy-trial time running at the 
triple count due to Parker’s actual incarceration. The continuation of incarceration 
was the product of the conflicting bonds imposed upon him. There was no 
coordination of bonds, because the municipal court had jurisdiction over the bond 
in effect for the concealed-weapon charge and the common pleas court had 
jurisdiction over the bond in effect for the drug charges. 
{¶28} This practice, according to counsel for both parties, was born of 
necessity. The county prosecutor is unwilling to present misdemeanor charges to 
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the grand jury arising out of the same set of circumstances giving rise to the 
felony charges (which would consolidate the prosecutions) because the common 
pleas judges disfavor misdemeanor prosecutions in their court. 
{¶29} This is not an acceptable practice, and we express our concern over 
judges’ refusing to accept a charge properly brought by indictment. Judges, as 
members of the judiciary, are obligated to fairly adjudicate any matter properly 
presented to them. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., FRENCH, PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
 
JUDITH L. FRENCH, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, was assigned to sit 
for RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
 
CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶30} I respectfully dissent from today’s decision, which represents a 
departure from a longstanding, well-understood rule that a person charged with an 
offense is not entitled to the triple-count provision of R.C. 2945.71 unless the 
person is held in jail solely on that pending charge. 
{¶31} R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) requires that a person against whom a felony 
charge is pending “be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after the 
person's arrest.”  R.C. 2945.71(E) provides, “For purposes of computing time 
under division[] * * * (C)(2) * * *, each day during which the accused is held in 
jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as three days.”  
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶32} Our jurisprudence with respect to speedy trial has been 
consistently developed as applicable only to defendants held in jail in lieu of bail 
January Term, 2007 
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solely on the pending charge and has functioned effectively.  Though the majority 
cites State v. MacDonald (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 2 O.O.3d 219, 357 N.E.2d 40, 
it does not conduct any analysis of that case in reaching today’s holding.  There, 
MacDonald remained incarcerated as a result of a federal criminal conviction 
while awaiting trial on a state charge, which he sought to have dismissed on 
speedy-trial grounds.  Id. at 67, 2 O.O.3d 219, 357 N.E.2d 40..  We rejected his 
speedy-trial challenge, holding that the triple-count provision of R.C. 2945.71 “is 
applicable only to those defendants held in jail in lieu of bail solely on the 
pending charge.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., paragraph one of the syllabus.  In so 
holding, we reasoned that MacDonald was not incarcerated solely on the pending 
charge, because “[h]ad the Cuyahoga County prosecutor decided to drop his 
charges, [MacDonald] would not have been released because he was serving a 
two-year federal prison sentence.”  Id. at 71, 2 O.O.3d 219, 357 N.E.2d 40.  Thus, 
if a defendant were to remain incarcerated on a separate charge despite posting 
bond on the primary charge, the triple-count provision of R.C. 2945.71 would not 
apply. 
{¶33} In State v. Ladd (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 197, 203, 10 O.O.3d 363, 
383 N.E.2d 579, we rejected a speedy-trial challenge in a case involving separate 
state charges, rape and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.  We stated, “The fact 
that in MacDonald one charge was federal and the other state, whereas here both 
charges were by the state, does not justify our deviating from the rule at this 
time.”  Id.  There, we acknowledged the holding in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 
U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, and recognized that the “determination 
of whether this right has been afforded an individual must be the product of 
balancing the reasons for, and length of, prosecutorial delay, against the 
defendant’s assertion of this right to a speedy trial and prejudice to the defendant 
by its denial.”  Ladd, 56 Ohio St.2d at 200, 10 O.O.3d 363, 383 N.E.2d 579..  We 
further stated our understanding that the MacDonald rule was not immutable and 
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that it would not apply where it would “permit conduct intended to achieve delay 
within the judicial system” (emphasis added), id. at 202, 10 O.O.3d 363, 383 
N.E.2d 579, such as where “a prosecutor [adds] a frivolous charge to a 
meritorious one,” id. at 203, 10 O.O.3d 363, 383 N.E.2d 579, fn. 4. 
{¶34} The Ladd analysis, in my view, should apply here.  Parker was not 
held in jail solely on the pending felony charges.  He posted bond on the felony 
charges pending in the court of common pleas on January 24, 2003, but remained 
incarcerated until January 28, 2003, when he posted bond for the concealed-
weapon charge pending in municipal court.  Therefore, as in MacDonald, even if 
the prosecutor had nolled the felony charges prior to Parker’s release on January 
28, 2003, Parker would nonetheless have remained incarcerated on the pending 
concealed-weapon offense because his continued incarceration resulted from a 
separate charge, and where incarceration on one charge occurs independently of 
incarceration regarding another, MacDonald holds that the triple-count provision 
of R.C. 2945.71(E) does not apply.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that the 
prosecutor pursued the concealed-weapons charge with the intent to “achieve 
delay within the judicial system.”  Ladd, 56 Ohio St.2d at 202, 10 O.O.3d 363, 
383 N.E.2d 579.  Absent such an invidious motive, I do not believe there is any 
reason to stray from the holding of MacDonald. 
{¶35} We followed MacDonald in State v. Coleman (1989), 45 Ohio 
St.3d 298, 304, 544 N.E.2d 622, in which we rejected Coleman’s speedy-trial 
challenge and upheld his death sentence, again holding that “[t]he ninety-day 
period of R.C. 2945.71 does not apply when a defendant is being held on multiple 
charges pending separate trials.”  Thus, “[s]ince [Coleman] was not being held in 
jail in lieu of bail solely on the pending charge, the ninety-day period of R.C. 
2945.71 was inapplicable.”  Id. 
{¶36} Parker faced both felony and misdemeanor charges before different 
tribunals.  That the multiple counts arose from the same transaction or occurrence 
January Term, 2007 
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does not alter the application of the MacDonald rule.  Accordingly, I would 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals, follow MacDonald, and hold that the 
triple-count provision of R.C. 2945.71(E) applies only to those situations in which 
a defendant is held in jail solely on the pending charge.  Here, in my view, 
because Parker remained incarcerated on separate charges filed before different 
tribunals, the trial court correctly denied his motion for a speedy-trial dismissal. 
{¶37} The majority’s analysis using the origin of the offenses as the basis 
for determining application of the triple-count provision is an unnecessary 
departure from our jurisprudence.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Shelley 
M. Pratt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Ashtabula County Public Defender, Inc. and Marie Lane, for appellee. 
 
Charles B. Clovis, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
______________________