Title: GEORGE CREECY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GEORGE CREECY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 89210 P.3d 1089Case Number: No. S-08-0211Decided: 07/10/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 

GEORGE 
CREECY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]  A jury convicted George Creecy of 
aggravated assault for intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury to Dale 
Chavez with a knife.  Mr. Creecy 
appealed, claiming the district court erred when it instructed the jury that he 
had a duty to retreat before using deadly force in self defense.  We affirm.  

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]  Mr. Creecy presents the issue for our 
determination as:

 
 
Did 
the district court err when it instructed the jury on a defendant's duty to 
retreat before the use of deadly force is justified, when such instruction is 
not applicable in the case and only serves to confuse or mislead the 
jury?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issue as:

 
 
Is 
Instruction No. 18 a proper statement of Wyoming law and, if it is not objected 
to at trial, did it become the law of the case and a question of fact for the 
jury?        

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  In March of 2008, the Uinta County 
Attorney's office filed an information charging Mr. Creecy with one count of 
aggravated assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) and (b) 
(LexisNexis 2007).  In her affidavit 
supporting the information, police officer Kathryn M. Adams stated that she was 
dispatched to John's Bar in Lyman, Wyoming on February 20, 2008, at 
approximately 2:00 a.m. in response to a reported stabbing.  She found Dale Chavez sitting in a 
vehicle parked in front of the bar with a woman who was applying pressure to his 
chest with her hands.  The woman 
told Officer Adams that Mr. Chavez was bleeding profusely from his chest.  Another woman standing next to the 
vehicle said that Mr. Creecy had stabbed Mr. Chavez and was inside the bar.  

 
 
[¶4]  Officer Adams found Mr. Creecy seated on 
a stool next to the bar.  His left 
eye was swollen and black and blue and he had blood around his mouth.  Witnesses informed the officer that Mr. 
Creecy and Mr. Chavez had gotten into a fight earlier in the evening.  At approximately 1:30 a.m. they got into 
another fight during which Mr. Chavez punched Mr. Creecy in the face with his 
fist a couple of times.  One witness 
said Mr. Creecy pulled a knife and she grabbed it from him.  Mr. Chavez left the bar but returned and 
the two men began fighting again.  
Mr. Creecy had another knife and stabbed Mr. 
Chavez.

 
 
[¶5]  An ambulance crew called to the scene 
advised Officer Adams that Mr. Chavez had three stab wounds, one in the upper 
right chest and two in the left upper abdomen.  Officers found two 4 1/2" folding pocket 
knives in Mr. Creecy's pockets.  One 
of the knives had what appeared to be blood on it.

 
 
[¶6]  Officer Adams arrested Mr. Creecy for 
aggravated assault.  Because of the 
significant injuries to his face, she directed that he be taken to the hospital 
for treatment before being transported to jail.  At the hospital, it was determined that 
he had a broken nose and his left orbit was fractured.  Cuts inside his lip and underneath his 
eye required stitches and he had multiple lumps and abrasions on his forehead 
and face. 

 
 
[¶7]  Mr. Creecy pleaded not guilty to the 
aggravated assault charge and the district court convened a trial.  The witnesses who had been present at 
the bar on the night of the fight gave differing accounts of what happened.  Mr. Chavez testified that he confronted 
Mr. Creecy shortly after he arrived at the bar because he had been told Mr. 
Creecy had been making derogatory racial comments.  Mr. Chavez grabbed Mr. Creecy by the 
shirt collar and told him he did not want to hear any more such comments.  The bartender intervened, separated them 
and later persuaded Mr. Chavez to apologize to Mr. Creecy. 

 
 
[¶8]  Mr. Chavez testified that later in the 
evening the bartender left and he went behind the bar to get another beer.  He said Mr. Creecy grabbed him and told 
him that he was in charge while the bartender was gone.  Mr. Chavez testified the next thing he 
remembered was the woman he was with breaking him and Mr. Creecy apart after a 
fight. He said a man he was with at the bar persuaded him to go home.  He testified that he was leaving the bar 
when Mr. Creecy lunged at him and another fight broke out.  Someone broke up the fight and Mr. 
Chavez left the bar.  He realized he 
was bleeding as he was walking down the road.

 
 
[¶9]  Mr. Creecy testified that soon after he 
arrived at the bar that night Mr. Chavez asked if he could talk with him.  They went into a separate room and Mr. 
Chavez asked Mr. Creecy if he had a problem with Mexicans.  Mr. Creecy tried to explain that he did 
not, but Mr. Chavez grabbed him by the collar and told him he did not appreciate 
his comments.  The bartender came 
into the room and broke up the confrontation.  Later, the bartender brought Mr. Chavez 
over to Mr. Creecy to apologize.  

 
 
[¶10]  Mr. Creecy testified that the bartender 
left later in the evening to take someone home and asked him to watch the 
bar.  As soon as the bartender left, 
Mr. Chavez went behind the bar toward the beer cooler.  Mr. Creecy asked him where he was going 
and Mr. Chavez punched him.  Mr. 
Creecy testified that Mr. Chavez "pummeled" him until someone pulled Mr. Chavez 
off of him.  As Mr. Chavez was being 
pulled away, he kicked Mr. Creecy in the chin.  

 
 
[¶11]  Mr. Creecy testified that after the 
fight was broken up, he took two knives out of his jacket pocket because he 
"knew [Mr. Chavez] was coming back."  
Two women were trying to persuade him to put the knives away when 
suddenly Mr. Chavez was "on him."  
The knives were still in his hands, he moved his arms to defend himself 
and then Mr. Chavez was gone.

 
 
[¶12]  Rosalie Mansir testified that she was at 
the bar with a friend on the night of the fight.  She testified Mr. Chavez was being very 
loud, banging his fists on the bar and swearing a lot.  She said Mr. Chavez came across the bar 
behind her and jumped on Mr. Creecy.  
Mr. Creecy was down on the ground, both men were hitting each other and 
other bar patrons tried to separate them.  
Someone escorted Mr. Chavez out of the bar.  She testified that Mr. Creecy was "a 
bloody mess" and she got him a wet towel for his face.  Mr. Creecy showed her two knives and she 
told him to put them away.  A few 
minutes later Mr. Chavez rushed through the door and headed for Mr. Creecy.  The two men lunged at each other and 
began to fight again.  Other patrons 
managed to separate them and Mr. Chavez left.

 
 
[¶13]  Adriana Castle testified that she went 
to the bar with Mr. Chavez that night.  
She was in the back room playing pool when the fight broke out.  She saw the men pushing each other and 
arguing and ran to stop them.  When 
she got to them, Mr. Creecy was on the floor on his back and Mr. Chavez was over 
the top of him.  They were punching 
each other.  She pulled Mr. Chavez 
off Mr. Creecy and pushed him away.  
She told Mr. Creecy to stop and tried to calm him down.  As she was talking to him he pulled out 
a knife and held it up.  She grabbed 
it from him and tossed it on the bar.  
She turned to check on Mr. Chavez and Mr. Creecy pulled another knife 
from his coat pocket.   Mr. 
Chavez was already moving toward them, he pushed her out of the way and the two 
men began fighting again.  She 
grabbed Mr. Chavez and pushed him toward the door.  Outside, she told him to go 
home.

 
 
[¶14]  Colby Gertsch testified that he went to 
the bar to meet friends, including Mr. Chavez.  He did not see the fight break out but 
heard the commotion and turned to see Mr. Chavez standing over Mr. Creecy, 
hitting him.  He testified that Mr. 
Chavez was getting in some pretty good blows and Mr. Creecy was not really 
fighting but in more of a defensive position.  Ms. Castle broke up the fight and Mr. 
Chavez came and sat next to him.  
Mr. Gertsch tried to calm him down and convince him to go home.  He and Mr. Chavez started to leave but 
when they reached the end of the bar Mr. Creecy came after Mr. Chavez.  Another fight broke out with Mr. Creecy 
ending up back on the floor.  Mr. 
Chavez grabbed a bar stool, went to swing it at Mr. Creecy, but hit Mr. Gertsch 
with it instead.  Mr. Gertsch put 
his arms around Mr. Chavez and got him outside.  

 
 
[¶15]  Mr. Creecy's defense at the trial was 
that his actions were necessary and reasonable to defend himself.  Defense counsel submitted four jury 
instructions related to his self defense claim:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. O

 
 
            
One who has reasonable grounds to believe that another will attack him, 
and that the anticipated attack will be of such a character as to endanger his 
life or limb, or to cause him serious bodily harm, has a right to arm himself 
for the purpose of resisting such attack.

 
 
            
If the defendant armed himself in reasonable anticipation of such an 
attack, that fact alone does not make the defendant the aggressor or deprive the 
defendant of the right of self-defense.

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. P

 
 
            
It is lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend himself from 
attack if he has reasonable grounds for believing and does believe that bodily 
injury is about to be inflicted upon him.  
In doing so he may use all force which would appear to a reasonable 
person, in the same or similar circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the 
injury which appears to be imminent.

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. Q

 
 
            
To justify acting in self-defense, it is not necessary that the danger 
was real, or that the danger was impending and immediate, so long as the 
defendant had reasonable cause to believe and did believe these facts.  If these two requirements are met, 
acting in self-defense is justified even though there is no intention on the 
part of the other person to do the defendant harm, nor any impending and 
immediate danger, nor the actual necessity for acting in 
self-defense.

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. R

 
 
            
Self-defense is an issue in this case.  The burden is on the State to prove that 
the defendant did not act in self-defense.  
Unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did 
not act in self-defense, you shall find the defendant not guilty of the crime of 
Aggravated Assault and Battery.

 
 
The 
district court gave instructions O and R exactly as the defense submitted 
them.  The district court did not 
give instructions P and Q but gave the following 
instruction:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 15

 
 
            
If the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that 
he was in imminent danger of serious bodily harm from which the defendant could 
be saved only by using deadly force against an assailant, the defendant had the 
right to use deadly force in self-defense.  
"Deadly force" means force which is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily harm.

 
 
            
The circumstances under which the defendant acted must have been such as 
to produce in the mind of a reasonably prudent person, similarly situated, the 
reasonable belief that the assailant was about to do serious bodily harm to the 
defendant.  The danger must have 
been apparent, present and imminent or must have appeared to be so under the 
circumstances.

 
 
            
If the defendant believed that he was in imminent danger of serious 
bodily harm, and that deadly force was necessary to repel such danger, and if a 
reasonable person in a similar situation seeing and knowing the same facts would 
be justified in believing that he was in similar danger, the defendant would be 
justified in using deadly force in self-defense.  The defendant would be justified even 
though the appearance of danger later proved to be false and there was actually 
neither purpose on the part of the assailant to do the defendant serious bodily 
harm nor imminent danger that it would be done, nor actual necessity that deadly 
force be used in self-defense.  If 
the person so confronted acts in self-defense upon such appearance of danger 
from honest belief, the right of self-defense is the same whether the danger is 
real or merely apparent.

 
 
[¶16]  The jury found Mr. Creecy guilty of 
aggravated assault.  The district 
court sentenced him to a term of 12 to 18 months in prison with credit for the 
33 days he served while awaiting trial.             

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶17]  Mr. Creecy asserts the district court 
erred in instructing the jury concerning the applicable law.  He did not object during trial to the 
manner in which the district court instructed the jury; therefore, we review his 
claim for plain error.  Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶ 18, 
193 P.3d 266, 272 (Wyo. 2008).  
Under the plain error standard, Mr. Creecy must show a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated, the violation clearly appears in the 
record, and it denied him a substantial right to his material prejudice.  Id., ¶ 19, 193 P.3d  at 272.  When claimed error is not preserved by 
proper objection, the appellant has the burden to establish that he was 
prejudiced.  Id.  

 
 
[¶18]  Although our review is for plain error, 
we also apply the following standards:

 
 
            
When reviewing questions involving jury instructions, we afford the trial 
court significant deference.  Jury 
"[i]nstructions must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, or 
parts of them, should not be singled out and considered in isolation."  We confine our review to a "search for 
prejudicial error." "[A]s long as the instructions correctly state the law and 
the entire charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error will not be 
found."   

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
"[A] 
defendant has the right to have instructions on his theory of the case or his 
theory of defense presented to the jury if the instructions sufficiently inform 
the jury of the theory or defense and if competent evidence exists which 
supports the law expressed in the instructions."  However, we have also noted that "[n]ot 
every instruction must be given simply because there is a claim that it 
incorporates a theory of the case."  
A trial court may properly refuse to give a proposed instruction if it is 
erroneous, confusing, argumentative, or if the instruction unduly emphasizes one 
aspect of the case, the law, or the defendant's version of the events.  Additionally, "instructions not based on 
the evidence can be properly refused."  

 
 

Farmer 
v. State, 
2005 WY 162, ¶¶ 20, 23, 124 P.3d 699, 706-07 (Wyo. 2005) (citations 
omitted).  

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶19]  Mr. Creecy contends the district court 
improperly instructed the jury concerning Wyoming law when it gave the following 
instruction:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 18

 
 
            
 Even if the defendant had 
reasonable ground to believe and actually did believe that he was in imminent 
danger of death or serious bodily harm, the defendant was justified in using 
deadly force to repel the danger only if he retreated as far as he safely could 
do before using deadly force.  The 
law requires a person to retreat rather than to use deadly force in self-defense 
if there was a convenient mode of retreat without increasing his actual or 
apparent peril.  To excuse a failure 
to retreat, it is necessary that the defendant's peril would be increased, or 
that it reasonably appeared that it would be increased, by retreat.  If you find that the defendant could 
have safely retreated but failed to do so, the defendant cannot rely on the 
justification of self-defense.

 
 
Mr. 
Creecy argues this instruction misinformed the jury that in order to claim self 
defense, Wyoming law required him to prove either that he retreated as far as he 
safely could or there was not a convenient mode of retreat after the first 
physical altercation.  Mr. Creecy 
contends that is not the law in Wyoming; rather, under Wyoming law, a person is 
not required to flee a location where he has a legal right to be in order to 
claim self defense.  

 
 
[¶20]  The State responds that Instruction 18 
is an accurate statement of the law.  
The State asserts that rather than requiring a defendant to retreat, the 
instruction properly informed the jury that a defendant must retreat when 
retreat is reasonable under the circumstances. The State further contends that 
the instruction did not tell the jury that the law required Mr. Creecy to leave 
the bar, but only that he must back away from the fight or move to another part 
of the bar.

 
 
[¶21]  Reviewing Mr. Creecy's claim for plain 
error, we find that although the record clearly reflects that the district court 
gave Instruction 18 to the jury, Mr. Creecy has not shown that the instruction 
violated a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law or that giving it denied him a substantial right to his material 
prejudice.  Instruction 18 is found 
in the Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions.  W.Cr.P.J.I. 8.08 (2004).  The same instruction was given and 
approved in Harries v. State, 650 P.2d 273, 275-76 (Wyo. 1982); Garcia v. 
State, 667 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Wyo. 1983); and Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 423 (Wyo. 
1984).

 
 
[¶22]  In Harries, a fight broke out in a bar and 
moved out onto the street.  Someone 
hit the defendant as he went through the door and he ran to his friend's truck 
where he found a gun under the seat.  
He cocked the gun, pointed it at another patron's chest and ordered him 
back into the bar.  That person 
stepped aside and grabbed the gun and it went off.  A jury convicted the defendant of 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, rejecting his claim of self 
defense.  He did not directly 
challenge the jury instructions but claimed the evidence was not sufficient to 
support the verdict.  This Court 
reviewed the self defense instructions given to the jury, including one 
identical to Instruction 18 at issue in the present case, and concluded in 
relevant part:

 
 

The 
jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant could have 
then left the scene or that he could have just sat in the pickup.  Even if the jury found that defendant 
properly armed himself in reasonable anticipation of an attack upon him, it 
could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that he failed to retreat "as 
far as he safely could" before using force in self-defense.

 
 

Harries, 
650 P.2d  at 276.    

 
 
[¶23]  In Garcia, 667 P.2d  at 1151, the defendant 
stabbed the victim after an evening of altercations between the two.  At the defendant's trial on charges of 
second degree murder, the district court gave the same instruction.  The defendant had objected and offered 
the following alternative instruction:

 
 
The 
defendant has a right to go where he will.  
If the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe and actually did 
believe that he was in imminent danger of serious bodily harm, and that deadly 
force was necessary to repel such danger, he was not required to retreat from a 
place where he is legally entitled to be.  
He was entitled to stand his ground and use such force as was reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances to save his life or protect himself from 
serious bodily harm.

 
 
The 
defendant had no duty to retreat if he had even the slightest doubt that he 
could retreat in complete safety.  
Even the slightest doubt, if reasonable, was enough to justify his 
standing his ground.  In determining 
whether the defendant's doubt was reasonable you may make every allowance for 
the situation in which Steve Garcia was placed by [the 
victim].

 
 

Id.  This Court found no error in the 
district court's ruling on the instructions, stating:

 
 
            
This court has addressed the so-called "duty to retreat" on several 
occasions.  In general, it can be 
concluded from these prior discussions that an individual who is without fault 
in bringing about the incident in which he kills his assailant need not restrict 
his freedom of movement to go where he has a right to be.  The "duty to retreat," where it 
prevails, is applied in cases of actual assault.  Under the circumstances of this case the 
following comment is instructive:

 
 
 "* * * [A] person who provokes or brings 
on the difficulty in which he kills his assailant cannot invoke the right of 
self-defense, unless he in good faith retreats as far as he safely can, making 
that fact manifest to his adversary. * * *" State v. Flory, [40 Wyo. 199, 276 P. 458, 462 (Wyo. 1929)].

 
 
            
Given these prior adjudications with respect to self-defense, the law in 
the State of Wyoming requires that prior to resorting to deadly force a 
defendant has a duty to pursue reasonable alternatives under the 
circumstances.  Among those 
reasonable alternatives may be the duty to retreat.

 
 

Id. 
at 1153 (citations omitted). 

 
 
[¶24]  In Small, 689 P.2d 420, the victim and a 
third party fought and the victim was badly beaten.  The third party left the scene and the 
defendant approached the victim.  A 
fight erupted between them and the defendant got on top of the victim and kicked 
him in the head and face.  The fight 
subsided but the defendant remained at the scene quarreling with the 
victim.  The two resumed fighting 
and the defendant threw the victim to the ground, causing him to hit his head on 
the pavement.  He did not move after 
that and died as a result of massive head trauma induced by a blunt object.  

 
 
[¶25]  The district court gave the same 
instruction given in Garcia and Mr. 
Creecy's case.  The defendant 
objected and offered the following substitute instruction, which the court 
refused:  

 
 
You 
are instructed that a person who provokes or brings about an incident in which 
he kills his assailant cannot invoke the right of self-defense, unless he, in 
good faith, retreats as far as he safely can, and making that fact manifest to 
his adversary.  

 
 
However, 
an individual who is without fault in bringing about the incident in which he 
kills his assailant need not restrict his freedom of movement to be where he has 
a right to be, and he need not retreat.  

 
 
Prior 
to resorting to deadly force a defendant, if he is the instigator of a fight, 
has a duty to pursue reasonable alternatives under the circumstances, one of 
which may be the duty to retreat.  

 
 
If 
you find that Benjamin Small was the instigator of a fight with [the victim], 
then Benjamin Small had a duty to retreat as he safely could before using deadly 
force in self-defense.  

 
 
On 
the other hand, if you find that Benjamin Small was not the instigator of a 
fight with [the victim], Benjamin Small had no duty to retreat before resorting 
to deadly force in self-defense provided that the other elements of the right of 
self-defense existed at the time as stated in previous instructions. 

 
 

Id. 
at 424.  On appeal, Mr. Small relied 
on Garcia as support for his proposed 
instruction.  This Court held that 
the proposed instruction was not appropriate because no evidence was presented 
at trial indicating that the victim instigated the fight; rather, the evidence 
pointed to Mr. Small as having been the aggressor.  Id.

 
 
[¶26]  Given this precedent, Mr. Creecy cannot 
show that the district court's decision to give Instruction 18 violated a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law.  To the 
contrary, Wyoming law clearly establishes that the instruction may be 
appropriate in cases in which the defendant claims that he acted in 
self-defense.  We find nothing in 
the record supporting Mr. Creecy's claim that the instruction was not 
appropriate under the particular circumstances of his 
case.

 
 
[¶27]  Despite the established precedent, Mr. 
Creecy argues that it was plain error to give the instruction in his case 
because the evidence clearly showed that he was not the aggressor and he did 
not, therefore, have a duty to leave.  
Mr. Creecy contends that he was prejudiced because the instruction 
erroneously conveyed to the jury that he did have a duty to leave the bar after 
Mr. Chavez pummeled him and that he was not within his rights to stay and 
prepare to defend himself.  He 
asserts the prosecutor furthered the instructional prejudice by telling the jury 
in closing argument that he had a duty to leave the bar and, failing that duty, 
could not claim that he acted in self-defense.  He points to the following comments made 
by the prosecutor:

 
 
The 
right to use force ends when a reasonably prudent person would no longer 
perceive that danger.  [Mr. Creecy] 
had a duty to retreat.  In the 
testimony that we heard, he had somewhere between two and fifteen minutes 
between the first altercation and the second.

 
 
            
I've just paused for fifteen seconds.  In that time, he had an opportunity to 
leave the bar.  He had an 
opportunity to call for help.  He 
had an opportunity to ask someone for help.

. 
. . .

 
 
When 
the danger ceased, when the immediate danger ceased, he had a duty to not use 
self-defense any longer; and, in fact, he had a duty to 
retreat.

 
 
[¶28]  The difficulty with Mr. Creecy's 
argument is that evidence was presented from which the jury reasonably could 
have concluded that after Mr. Chavez pummeled him, he armed himself with a knife 
and attacked Mr. Chavez as he was leaving the bar.  Both Mr. Chavez and Mr. Gertsch 
testified that is what happened.  
While there was contrary evidence indicating that the stabbing occurred 
after Mr. Chavez attacked Mr. Creecy, it is not this Court's function to second 
guess jury determinations as to credibility.  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury's responsibility to weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and resolve conflicts in the evidence, and we will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the jury.  Magallanes v. State, 2006 WY 119, ¶ 11, 
142 P.3d 1147, 1151 (Wyo. 2006).   

 
 
[¶29]  Mr. Creecy has failed to establish that 
plain error occurred when the district court gave Instruction 18 concerning the 
"duty to retreat."  Given Wyoming 
precedent, he has not shown that the instruction violated a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law.  Given the 
conflicting evidence as to who the aggressor was when Mr. Chavez was stabbed, 
Mr. Creecy also has failed to show that giving the instruction denied him a 
substantial right to his material prejudice.  

 
 
[¶30]  Affirmed.