Title: Matter of SKJ

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of SKJ1983 WY 130673 P.2d 640Case Number: C-83-4Case Number: C-83-4Decided: 12/13/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
Termination of Parental Rights of SKJ and SLJ, Minor Children, PKJ, Appellant 
(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
JOHNSON COUNTY 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellee 
(Petitioner)

 
 
Hardy H. Tate, 
Sheridan, for Appellant.

 
 
Greg L. Goddard and 
John R. Perry of Goddard & Perry, Buffalo, for Appellee. 

 
 
Before Rooney, C.J., 
and Thomas, Rose, Brown, and Cardine, JJ. 

 
 
BROWN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1.]     Appellant appeals the 
trial court's termination of her parental rights to her two children, SKJ and 
SLJ.  Appellant asserts that the 
evidence that she left her children in the care of another without provision for 
their support was not sufficient to justify terminating her parental rights. 
Appellant also claims that there was insufficient evidence to make a 
determination of neglect.

 
 
[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 
[¶3.]     Appellant is the mother 
of SKJ, born in July, 1977, and SLJ, born in January, 1980.  In October, 1981, appellant told her 
brother that she no longer had funds with which to feed and clothe her two 
children and asked him to take care of them.  The brother went from Sheridan to 
Buffalo and picked the children up from a cold trailer house; they were dirty 
and scantily dressed.

 
 
[¶4.]     After caring for the 
children for several weeks and not hearing from his sister, it became apparent 
to the brother that he was financially unable to support the two children, so he 
called the Johnson County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services 
(hereinafter D-PASS) for help.  
D-PASS, investigating the case, filed a petition with the district court, 
sitting as a juvenile court, asking that the custody of SKJ and SLJ be 
transferred to them.  At a hearing 
on November 24, 1981, appellant admitted neglect and custody was placed in 
D-PASS.  Appellant's brother was 
approved as a foster parent, and the two children remained with 
him.

 
 
[¶5.]     On December 22, 1982, 
D-PASS filed a petition to terminate parental rights alleging that appellant 1) 
had left her minor children in the care of another without making provisions for 
their support and without communication from her for a period in excess of one 
year, and 2) that the children were neglected by appellant and that she had 
refused rehabilitative treatment or that any rehabilitative effort had been 
unsuccessful and the children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized 
by returning them to appellant.

 
 
[¶6.]     The hearing on the 
petition to terminate parental rights was set for January 24, 1983, but was 
continued until February 14, 1983, because of the difficulty in locating 
appellant.  At the conclusion of 
this hearing the trial court found:

 
 
"4. That there is 
sufficient basis for termination of the parental rights of [appellant], 
namely:

 
 
"(a) The children 
have been left in the care of another person (namely, [the brother] and the 
Johnson County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services) without 
provisions for their support and without communication from the natural parents 
for a period in excess of one (1) year.

 
 
"(b) The children 
have been neglected by their natural mother and father who have refused 
rehabilitative treatment and or rehabilitative efforts have been unsuccessful 
and the children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by returning 
them to either their natural mother or father."

 
 
[¶7.]     Based on these findings 
the court terminated the parental rights of both appellant and the natural 
father and placed custody in D-PASS.  
Appellant appeals from the order terminating her parental rights. The 
natural father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and did not appeal 
the court's order terminating parental rights.

 
 
[¶8.]     Again we are called 
upon to balance two important rights or interests.  The fundamental right to associate with 
one's immediate family must be weighed against the State's compelling interest 
in the protection and support of neglected, endangered and abused 
children.

 
 
[¶9.]     The cold record of the 
trial cannot tell the entire story.  
The trial judge has the advantage of witnessing the demeanor of those who 
testify in order to determine their credibility, detect prejudice, motives, 
feelings of revenge and interest in the outcome of the trial.  The trial judge is in a better position 
to judge the intelligence of witnesses.  
Because of these advantages and others we give considerable deference to 
the determination of the trial judge.

 
 
[¶10.]  We have said 
before:

 
 
"'We will examine the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and will resolve all 
conflicts in evidence for the appellee. [Citation.] We will assume the evidence 
in favor of the successful party is true, leave out of consideration entirely 
evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the 
evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may fairly be 
drawn from it.  [Citations.]'" 
Matter of ParentalRights of PP, Wyo., 648 P.2d 512, 514 
(1982).

 
 
[¶11.]  In DS v. Department of Public 
Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911, 918 (1980), we 
said:

 
 
"* * * * The right to 
associate with one's immediate family is a fundamental liberty protected by the 
state and federal constitutions.  
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972) (integrity of the family unit protected by the due-process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969) (implication that liberties guaranteed by 
the federal constitution are fundamental). * * * *"

 
 
[¶12.]  A parent has a fundamental right to have 
custody of his minor child; therefore, in a parental rights termination 
proceeding we must consider the evidence with "strict scrutiny." Matter of 
Parental Rights of PP, supra.

 
 
I

 
 
[¶13.]  Section 14-2-309(a)(i), W.S.1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1983), provides:

 
 
"(a) The parent-child 
legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following 
facts is established by clear and convincing evidence:

 
 
"(i) The child has 
been left in the care of another person without provision for the child's 
support and without communication from the absent parent for a period of at 
least one (1) year.  In making the 
above determination, the court may disregard occasional contributions, or 
incidental contacts and communications."

 
 

[¶14.]  Appellant denies that she left her 
children in the care of another person without provision for their support, but 
rather, contends that she left them with Johnson County D-PASS.1 The record is clear 
and undisputed that appellant left the children with her brother and that it was 
her brother who contacted D-PASS.

 
 
[¶15.]  At the initial hearing on November 24, 
1981, appellant admitted neglect and consented to D-PASS assuming custody of the 
children.  Appellant takes the 
position that by consenting to the continued custody by D-PASS she somehow made 
provision for the children's support.  
We do not agree.  Section 
14-2-309 (a)(i), supra, would be meaningless if appellant's interpretation was 
correct.  In Wyoming if a child is 
left without support, someone or some agency will step in and care for the 
child, be it relative, church, state, county or stranger.  When this occurs, the parent cannot say 
that he or she made the arrangement merely by giving consent to the 
arrangement.

 
 
[¶16.]  Appellant cites In the Matter of 
Parental Rights of SCN and NAN, Wyo., 659 P.2d 568, 573 
(1983):

 
 
"* * * * Under § 
14-2-309(a)(i) the court must determine whether the child has been left without 
provision for support rather than whether a parent has willfully failed to 
support the child."

 
 
The facts in that 
case are easily distinguishable from the case at hand.  In the earlier case we noted that 
appellee (father) had nothing to do with leaving the children with anyone.  The children were placed in appellant's 
home by the court.  The court did 
not need to proceed further because appellant could not get by the "threshold 
question" presented in the statute, that is, whether the children were left in 
the care of another person without provision for their support.  This court stated 
there:

 
 
"* * * * In view of 
those facts, the fact that appellee failed to make all but four (4) monthly 
support payments is not relevant here where the court could not get past the 
threshold question presented in the statute.  Appellee's failure to pay regularly 
would be relevant under an adoption-without-consent proceeding or in an action 
to compel payment, but not here where the children have been placed in one 
parent's custody and the action to terminate parental rights is against the 
non-custodial parent.  To hold 
otherwise would ignore our rule of strict construction in these cases and would 
allow section 14-2-309(a)(i) to be used in a manner for which it was not 
intended." In Matter of Parental Rights of SCN and NAN, supra, at 
574.

 
 
Here, appellant left 
her children in the care of her brother without provision for 
support.

 
 
[¶17.]  Between the initial hearing on November 
24, 1981, and the hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights on 
February 14, 1983, appellant's contacts and communication with her children were 
at best sporadic.  During this 
period of time appellant lived in Oklahoma, South Dakota and several places in 
Wyoming.

 
 
[¶18.]  After D-PASS obtained custody in the 
November, 1981, proceeding, they made arrangements for appellant to contact her 
children by telephone.  Appellant 
had limited contact with the children at first.  There was some visitation at Christmas 
time, 1981, and shortly thereafter.  
Also, appellant gave the children Christmas 
presents.

 
 
[¶19.]  The last visit appellant had with the 
children was in March 1982.  Shortly 
after this visit appellant told Ms. Carrell, a family community service worker 
for D-PASS, that she wanted to relinquish her rights to her children.  Appellant telephoned D-PASS in July 1982 
from Sheridan.  There was talk of 
seeing the children in Buffalo, but appellant said she could not come to 
Buffalo.  In November 1982, D-PASS 
learned that appellant had moved to South Dakota, and both she and the man she 
was living with were unemployed.  
Parental termination proceedings were started in December 
1982.

 
 
[¶20.]  Implicit in the trial court's findings is 
that appellant's support contributions, contacts and communication with her 
children were incidental and should be disregarded.  We agree.  There was sufficient evidence to justify 
the trial court's termination of parental rights under § 14-2-309(a)(i),  supra.

 
 
II

 
 
[¶21.]  As an additional reason for terminating 
appellant's parental rights the court found that § 14-2-309(a)(iii), W.S.1977 
(Cum.Supp.1983), was applicable:

 
 
"(a) The parent-child 
legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following is 
established by clear and convincing evidence:

 
 
"* * * 
*

 
 
"(iii) The child has 
been abused or neglected by the parent and efforts by an authorized agency or 
mental health professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family 
or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the 
child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized  by remaining with or returning to the 
parent."

 
 
[¶22.]  In a 1982 parental rights case we 
considered the requirements of § 14-2-309(a)(iii), supra, and 
stated:

 
 
"Thus we examine the 
evidence to ascertain if it clearly and convincingly establishes the facts: (1) 
that CP has failed or refused to provide adequate care, maintenance, 
supervision, education or medical, surgical, or other care necessary for PP's 
well being; (2) that rehabilitative efforts by authorized agencies have been 
unsuccessful in correcting the situation; and (3) that PP's health and safety 
would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to CP. * * * *" 
Matter of Parental Rights of PP, supra, at 513.

 
 
[¶23.]  Section 14-3-202(a)(vii), W.S.1977, 
defines neglect:

 
 
"Neglect means the 
failure or refusal by those responsible for the child's welfare to provide 
adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or medical, surgical or any 
other care necessary for the child's well-being. * * * *"

 
 
[¶24.]  Succinctly stated, parental rights cannot 
be terminated under § 14-2-309(a)(iii) unless there is the necessary quantum of 
proof to show 1) neglect, 2) a refusal or failure of rehabilitation, and 3) that 
the health and safety of the children will be in jeopardy if left with the 
offending parent.

 
 
[¶25.]  Most of the incidents and circumstances 
referred to in Part I of this opinion show neglect, and we consider them as did 
the trial court in connection with termination under § 14-2-309(a)(iii) 
supra.  In addition to the instances 
of neglect indicated in Part I of this opinion, other incidents occurred.  Before leaving the children with her 
brother in October 1981, appellant had left the children on other occasions to 
look for her husband somewhere in southwest Wyoming.  On or about July 31, 1981, after 
receiving a complaint, the police found that appellant had left her children 
alone in a car behind a bar while she went inside.  There was a similar incident in Washakie 
County, January 23, 1981.  The 
eldest child had some special developmental problems because of environment and 
emotions.  At the November 24, 1981, 
hearing, the county attorney recited for the record these incidents of neglect. 
The court then asked appellant if the allegations were true and she said that 
they were.

 
 
[¶26.]  In summary, appellant left her children 
without provision for support.  She 
went on a frolic of her own to Oklahoma, South Dakota and different cities in 
Wyoming.  She had a transitory 
companionship with several men.  She 
neglected to tell anyone where she could be located.  Her contacts and communication with the 
children were minimal at first and nonexistent later.  She talked of relinquishing her rights 
to her children.  Appellant failed 
to recognize and provide for the special needs of the eldest child, who had 
displayed developmental problems.  
When appellant last had physical custody of the children, they were 
poorly dressed, dirty and in a cold trailer.  Appellant endangered the children by 
leaving them alone in a car on several occasions.

 
 
[¶27.]  The threshold question of neglect having 
been established, we direct our attention to the next question under § 
14-2-309(a)(iii), supra, that is, whether or not an authorized agency or mental 
health professional was unsuccessful in rehabilitating appellant or whether she 
refused rehabilitative treatment.  
Matter of Parental Rights of PP, supra, at 513. After the initial 
appearance hearing, November, 1981, appellant and D-PASS employees talked about 
a program to provide appellant with vocational and psychological counseling. 
Before March 16, 1982, appellant met with the Northern Wyoming Mental Health 
Center and the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, for counseling and 
evaluation.  She made some future 
appointments, but did not keep them.  
When appellant said she wanted to relinquish her children, Ms. Carrell of 
D-PASS thought such action premature and set up an appointment with appellant to 
talk about her problems.  She did 
not keep the appointment.

 
 
[¶28.]  Appellant testified that she went to 
three or four rehabilitative counseling sessions.  She quit because she "didn't like what 
he was trying to do.  He was prying 
into my life too far." (Referring to psychological counseling.) She also dropped 
out of the program because, as she said, "I don't have no 
problems."

 
 
[¶29.]  The final element to be considered with 
regard to § 14-2-309(a)(iii), supra, is whether it was demonstrated that the 
children's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized should they be 
returned to appellant's custody. After testifying concerning her involvement 
with appellant and the children, Ms. Carrell concluded that the children's 
health and safety would be jeopardized by placing them with appellant.  Appellant's brother and the children's 
guardian ad litem testified to the same effect.  The conclusions and recommendations of 
Ms. Carrell, appellant's brother and the guardian ad litem were based upon the 
actions of appellant that have been described in this 
opinion.

 
 
[¶30.]  The evidence produced at the initial 
hearing and the termination hearing met the "strict scrutiny" standard and was 
sufficient to justify the court in terminating appellant's parental rights under 
either § 14-2-309(a)(i) or § 14-2-309(a)(iii) , supra.

 
 
[¶31.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Appellant had a vague recollection of giving small amounts of money to 
third persons for her children.  
Apparently neither the children, appellant's brother, nor D-PASS 
benefited from this money.