Title: State v. Butts

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 54 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1769-CR, 2012AP1770-CR, 2012AP1863-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Martin P. O'Brien, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
----------------------------------------------   
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Kathleen M. O'Brien, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
---------------------------------------------- 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Charles E. Butts, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 349 Wis. 2d 667, 836 N.W.2d 840 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI 97  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 14, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit/Circuit/Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth/Walworth/Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
John R. Race/James L. Carlson/Anthony G. 
Milisauskas 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner Charles E. Butts, 
there were briefs by Terry W. Rose and Rose & Rose, Kenosha, and 
oral argument by Terry W. Rose. 
 
 
 
2 
 
For the defendants-appellants-petitioners Martin P. O’Brien 
and Kathleen M. O’Brien, there were briefs by Jerome F. Buting 
and Buting, Williams & Stilling, S.C., Brookfield; and Kathleen 
M. Quinn, Milwaukee. Oral argument by Jerome F. Buting. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Marcus J. Berghahn and 
Hurley, Burish & Stanton, S.C., Madison; and Devon M. Lee, 
assistant state public defender, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Wisconsin Office of 
the State Public Defender.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 54
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, 2012AP1863 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF00229, 2012CF000230, 2012CF000466) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Martin P. O'Brien, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
_________________________________________ 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Kathleen O'Brien, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
_________________________________________ 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Charles E. Butts, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
No. 
2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, & 2012AP1863   
 
2 
 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The petitioners, Martin and 
Kathleen O'Brien and Charles Butts, seek review of a published 
court of appeals decision that affirmed the circuit courts' 
determinations that the use of hearsay at the petitioners' 
preliminary examinations was constitutionally permissible.1 
¶2 
On review, petitioners assert that the newly enacted 
Wis. Stat. § 970.038 (2011-12),2 which permits hearsay evidence 
at 
preliminary 
examinations, 
violates 
their 
constitutional 
rights. 
 
Specifically, 
they 
argue 
that 
the 
rights 
to 
confrontation, 
compulsory 
process, 
effective 
assistance 
of 
counsel, and due process are violated by the application of Wis. 
Stat. § 970.038 in preliminary examinations. 
¶3 
We determine that petitioners have failed to meet the 
heavy burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that Wis. 
Stat. § 970.038 is unconstitutional.  The scope of preliminary 
examinations is limited to determining whether there is probable 
cause to believe that a defendant has committed a felony.  
Following precedent, we conclude that there is no constitutional 
right to confrontation at a preliminary examination.  Further, 
due to the limited scope of preliminary examinations, we 
                                                 
1 The circuit court orders were consolidated on appeal. 
State v. O'Brien, 2013 WI App 97, 349 Wis. 2d 667, 836 N.W.2d 
840 (affirming orders of the circuit court for Walworth County, 
John R. Race, Judge, and James L. Carlson, Judge, and the 
circuit court for Kenosha County, Anthony G. Milisaukas, Judge). 
 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, & 2012AP1863   
 
3 
 
determine that the admission of hearsay evidence does not 
violate petitioners' rights to compulsory process, effective 
assistance of counsel, or due process. 
¶4 
Finally, we decline petitioners' invitation to impose 
new rules limiting the admissibility of hearsay at preliminary 
examinations.  Wisconsin Stat. § 970.038 does not set forth a 
blanket rule that all hearsay be admitted.  Circuit courts 
remain the evidentiary gatekeepers.  They must still consider, 
on a case-by-case basis, the reliability of the State's hearsay 
evidence in determining whether it is admissible and assessing 
whether the State has made a plausible showing of probable 
cause.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  
I 
¶5 
The facts and history in these consolidated cases 
differ, but they share common issues.   
¶6 
The complaint against the O'Briens alleges ten counts 
of child abuse and seven counts of disorderly conduct.  It 
identifies six adopted children, four of whom were siblings the 
O'Briens adopted from Russia.  According to the complaint the 
allegations were based on the children's reports of various 
incidents with the O'Briens.  The complaint further indicates 
that some of the allegations were corroborated by statements in 
Kathleen O'Brien's journal and others were corroborated by the 
O'Briens' biological daughter.   
¶7 
Martin O'Brien filed a motion to preclude hearsay   
evidence at the preliminary examination and Kathleen O'Brien 
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4 
 
joined in the motion.  It challenged the constitutionality of 
Wis. Stat. § 970.038, which permits hearsay at a preliminary 
examination.  The circuit court denied the motion. 
¶8 
At the O'Briens' preliminary examination the State 
presented the testimony of Investigator Domino, who had signed 
the complaint next to a statement that she was swearing to its 
accuracy.  She had no personal knowledge of the allegations in 
the complaint.  According to her testimony, Domino reviewed the 
complaint and compared it with police reports and her memory 
before signing it.  She stated that she was present while Ms. 
Hocking, a social worker from the Walworth County Department of 
Health and Human Services, interviewed some of the children and 
that she viewed the other interviews on videotape.  Domino also 
had the opportunity to speak directly with one of the children, 
S.M.O., in a follow-up interview.  After she testified to the 
basis for the statements in the complaint, the court received 
the complaint into evidence. 
¶9 
On cross-examination, Domino clarified that one of the 
children named in the complaint was not interviewed at all.  She 
acknowledged that the complaint did not contain the complete 
statement from S.M.O. that provided the factual basis for count 
one, but was a summary.  The other counts were based on the 
interviews she reviewed.  Domino stated that she also reviewed 
Kathleen O'Brien's journal before testifying in order to 
determine the dates of various incidents.  Although she provided 
some additional detail during cross-examination, Domino could 
No. 
2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, & 2012AP1863   
 
5 
 
not remember enough about the interviews to respond to many of 
counsels' questions. 
¶10 After the State rested, the O'Briens sought to present 
the testimony of S.M.O., whom they had subpoenaed as a witness.  
The State objected, arguing that the O'Briens needed to provide 
an offer of proof before introducing the witness.  The O'Briens 
responded that S.M.O.'s testimony was relevant because it would 
fill in the gaps in Investigator Domino's story.  They explained 
that if the complete story was disclosed, it may appear that the 
actions were accidental as opposed to intentional.  However, 
they were not sure what S.M.O. would actually say.  The circuit 
court determined that a claim of accident is a defense, and thus 
not relevant to a preliminary examination.  Accordingly, it 
sustained the objection.  The O'Briens were bound over for 
trial. 
¶11 The complaint against Butts contains four counts of 
sexual assault of a child as a persistent repeater and two 
counts of child enticement as a persistent repeater.  The first 
four counts involved two incidents with A.V.  The complaint 
indicates that the probable cause for those counts was provided 
by statements from A.V., her mother, and Butts regarding the 
incident.  Counts four and five involved incidents with A.R.E. 
and her brother.  The complaint indicates that the probable 
cause for those counts was based on statements from A.R.E., her 
stepmother, A.R.E.'s mother, and A.R.E.'s stepfather.   
¶12 Butts submitted a motion to preclude hearsay at his 
preliminary examination, arguing that Wis. Stat. § 908.038 
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6 
 
violated his constitutional rights.  At the motion hearing, the 
State acknowledged that it intended to rely on the statute and 
to present a police officer at the preliminary examination who 
would testify about the children's statements.  The children 
would not be present.  The circuit court denied Butts' motion.   
¶13 At Butts' preliminary examination the State moved into 
evidence a transcript from a prior preliminary hearing regarding 
A.R.E.'s allegations.  The State also presented the testimony of 
Detective Barfoth.  She testified that she had been assigned to 
investigate the case involving A.R.E.  Barfoth spoke with A.R.E. 
who told her about the alleged incident.  After Barfoth 
presented her with a photo lineup, A.R.E. identified Butts. 
Barfoth also identified a statement given by A.V. and then read 
it into the record.  On cross-examination, Barfoth testified 
that she was not sure who took the statement from A.V. and that 
she was not present when the statement was taken.   
¶14 The State then moved A.V.'s statement into evidence, 
rested its case, and asked that Butts be bound over for trial.  
In response, Butts moved for a dismissal.  The court determined 
that there was probable cause to believe that a felony or 
felonies were committed and that Butts committed a felony and 
bound Butts over for trial. 
¶15  The court of appeals accepted and consolidated 
interlocutory appeals from Butts and the O'Briens challenging 
the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 970.038 on various 
grounds.  In its decision, the court of appeals emphasized the 
circuit court's duty "to consider the apparent reliability of 
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7 
 
the State's evidence."  State v. O'Brien, 2013 WI App 97, ¶2, 
349 Wis. 2d 667, 836 N.W.2d 840.  Observing that the probable 
cause determination is made on a case-by-case basis, it 
acknowledged that "the hearsay nature of evidence may, in an 
appropriate case, undermine the plausibility of the State's 
case."  Id.  Ultimately, however, it concluded that the 
admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 970.038 
presents no blanket constitutional problems. 
II 
¶16 In 
this 
case 
we 
are 
asked 
to 
review 
the 
constitutionality of newly enacted Wis. Stat. § 970.038 which 
permits 
the 
use 
of 
hearsay 
evidence 
at 
a 
preliminary 
examination.  Although evidentiary rulings are generally deemed 
a matter for the circuit court's discretion, a constitutional 
challenge 
presents 
a 
question 
of 
law 
which 
we 
review 
independently of the decisions rendered by the circuit court and 
the court of appeals.  State v. Muckerheide, 2007 WI 5, ¶17, 298 
Wis. 2d 553, 725 N.W.2d 930; State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶12, 
308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447.   
¶17 A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute 
bears the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
statute violates the constitution.  State v. Williams, 2012 WI 
59, ¶11, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460.  This is a heavy 
burden as statutes are presumed constitutional and we resolve 
any reasonable doubt in favor of upholding a challenged statute.  
Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2013 WI 78, ¶76, 
350 Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160. 
No. 
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8 
 
III 
¶18 Our 
analysis 
begins 
with 
a 
brief 
overview 
of 
preliminary examinations.  We then address in turn each of the 
constitutional 
challenges 
that 
the 
petitioners 
present, 
beginning with their challenge based on the Confrontation 
Clause, followed by their challenges alleging violations of the 
right to compulsory process, the right to effective assistance 
of counsel, and the right to due process.  Finally, we discuss 
the petitioners' request that we impose new rules limiting the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence at preliminary examinations. 
A 
¶19 A defendant charged with a felony is entitled to a 
hearing pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 970.03 to determine whether 
there is probable cause to believe that a felony has been 
committed by that defendant.  This hearing is referred to as a 
preliminary examination.  The right to a preliminary examination 
is not constitutionally guaranteed and is solely a statutory 
right.  State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, ¶84, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 
N.W.2d 457; State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 393, 359 N.W.2d 151 
(1984); State v. Camara, 28 Wis. 2d 365, 370, 137 N.W.2d 1 
(1965).  
¶20 Traditionally, Wisconsin's rules of evidence, set 
forth in chs. 901 to 911, Stats., have applied to preliminary 
examinations.  State v. Moats, 156 Wis. 2d 74, 85, 457 N.W.2d 
299 (1990).  Under those rules hearsay is inadmissible unless 
permitted by rule or statute.  Wis. Stat. § 908.02.  The 
legislature recently enacted Wis. Stat. § 970.038 permitting the 
No. 
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9 
 
admission of hearsay evidence at a preliminary examination and 
permitting a court to make the probable cause determination "in 
whole or in part" based on hearsay evidence.  It provides: 
 
(1) Notwithstanding s. 908.02, hearsay is admissible 
in 
a 
preliminary 
examination 
under 
ss. 
970.03, 
970.032, and 970.035.  
 
 (2) A court may base its finding of probable cause 
under s. 970.03(7) or (8), 970.032(2), or 970.035 in 
whole or in part on hearsay admitted under sub. (1). 
Wis. Stat. § 970.038. 
  
¶21 The court has often referred to the important purpose 
preliminary examinations serve in protecting defendants and the 
public from unwarranted prosecution.  In essence, they serve as 
a check on prosecutorial discretion.  For example, as far back 
as 1922, the court stated: 
The object or purpose of the preliminary investigation  
is to prevent hasty, malicious, improvident, and 
oppressive prosecutions, to protect the person charged 
from open and public accusations of crime, to avoid 
both for the defendant and the public the expense of a 
public trial, and to save the defendant from the 
humiliation 
and 
anxiety 
involved 
in 
public 
prosecution, and to discover whether or not there are 
substantial grounds upon which a prosecution may be 
based. 
Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 189 N.W. 539 (1922).   
¶22 More 
recently, 
the 
court 
reiterated 
this 
point 
explaining that "[r]equiring a finding of probable cause 
protects the defendant's due process rights and guards against 
undue deprivations of the defendant's liberty."  State v. 
Richer, 174 Wis. 2d 231, 240, 496 N.W.2d 66 (1993); see also 
State v. Hooper, 101 Wis. 2d 517, 544-45, 305 N.W.2d 110 (1981) 
No. 
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10 
 
(it is the purpose of a preliminary examination to determine 
whether 
there 
is 
"a 
substantial 
basis 
for 
bringing 
the 
prosecution and further denying the accused his right to 
liberty."). 
¶23 Highlighting the importance of these proceedings, we 
have referred to them as a "critical stage" in the criminal 
process.  Schaefer, 308 Wis. 2d 279, ¶84; State v. Wolverton, 
193 Wis. 2d 234, 252, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995) (citing Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970)); see also Gates v. State, 91 Wis. 
2d 512, 522, 283 N.W.2d 474 (Ct. App. 1979).   
¶24 The scope of preliminary examinations is narrow.  It 
is limited to determining whether the account presented by the 
State, if believed, has a plausible basis supporting a probable 
cause determination.  State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 423-24, 
329 N.W.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1982); see also Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d at 
398 ("probable cause at a preliminary hearing is satisfied when 
there 
exists 
a 
believable 
or 
plausible 
account 
of 
the 
defendant's commission of a felony.").  These examinations are 
intended to be summary in nature and not mini-trials.  Schaefer, 
308 Wis. 2d 279, ¶34; Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d at 396-97; Hooper, 101 
Wis. 2d at 544-45.  
¶25 The fact that Wisconsin has preliminary examinations 
at all exceeds the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  The 
United States Supreme Court has concluded that although the 
Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable 
cause as a prerequisite to the extended restraint on liberty, 
adversary proceedings are not necessary.  Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
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11 
 
U.S. 103, 120 (1975).  Due to the limited scope of probable 
cause determinations, informal proceedings are sufficient.  Id.   
¶26 The Gerstein Court further opined that the probable 
cause determination may be made "on hearsay and written 
testimony."  Id.  It explained that the value of confrontation 
and cross-examination "would be too slight to justify holding, 
as a matter of constitutional principle, that these formalities 
and safeguards designed for trial must also be employed in 
making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable cause."  
Id. at 122. 
¶27 With 
this 
background, 
we 
turn 
to 
petitioners' 
arguments. 
B 
¶28 The petitioners assert that by permitting the use of 
hearsay 
evidence 
at 
preliminary 
examinations, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 970.038 violates their rights under the Confrontation Clause.  
This 
argument 
is 
premised 
upon 
the 
assumption 
that 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
applies 
to 
preliminary 
examinations.  
Because we conclude that this underlying assumption is flawed, 
we must reject petitioners' argument. 
¶29 The right to confront one's accuser is found in the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  It provides 
that: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence. 
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12 
 
U.S. Const., Amend. VI.  In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
68 (2004), the Supreme Court determined that the Confrontation 
Clause prohibits the use of testimonial hearsay at a criminal 
trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has 
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  The issue in 
Crawford was presented in the context of a criminal trial and, 
accordingly, the court did not address whether the Confrontation 
Clause applied to preliminary hearings. 
¶30 However, that issue has been addressed by Wisconsin 
courts.  Our caselaw establishes that the Confrontation Clause 
does not apply to preliminary examinations.  State ex rel. 
Funmaker v. Klamm, 106 Wis. 2d 624, 634, 317 N.W.2d 458 (1982) 
(citing Mitchell v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 325, 336, 267 N.W.2d 349 
(1978)) ("There is no constitutional right to confront adverse 
witnesses at a preliminary examination."); State v. Oliver, 161 
Wis. 2d 140, 146, 467 N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1991) ("[Defendant] 
did not have a constitutional right of 'confrontation' at his 
preliminary examination."); Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d at 422 ("Of 
course, there is no constitutional right to confront a witness 
at a preliminary examination.").   
¶31 Our precedent is consistent with that of other 
jurisdictions which have determined that a defendant's right to 
confront accusers is a trial right that does not apply to 
preliminary examinations.  See, e.g., Peterson v. California, 
604 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010); State v. Lopez, 314 P.3d 
236, 241-42 (N.M. 2013); Leitch v. Fleming, 732 S.E.2d 401, 404 
(Ga. 2012); State v. Timmerman, 218 P.3d 590, 594 (Utah 2009); 
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13 
 
Sheriff v. Witzenburg, 145 P.3d 1002, 1005 (Nev. 2006); Whitman 
v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 262, 270 (Cal. 1991); Commonwealth 
v. Tyler, 587 A.2d 326, 328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Blevins v. 
Tihonovich, 728 P.2d 732, 734 (Colo. 1986); State v. Sherry, 667 
P.2d 367, 376 (Kan. 1983); Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1250 
(Wyo. 1982); People v. Blackman, 414 N.E.2d 246, 247-48 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1980). 
¶32 Petitioners 
contend 
that 
even 
if 
there 
is 
no 
constitutional right to confront witnesses at a preliminary 
hearing, they have a statutory confrontation right preserved in 
Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5).  That statute provides that "[t]he 
defendant may cross-examine witnesses against the defendant."  
Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5).   
¶33 Contrary to petitioners' assertions the statute does 
not create a confrontation right.  As the Padilla court 
explained, Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5) does not require the State to 
present 
a 
defendant 
with 
hearsay 
declarants 
for 
cross-
examination, rather it "permits cross-examination of only those 
people actually called to the stand."  110 Wis. 2d at 424.  This 
interpretation is supported by the Judicial Council Note (1990) 
to Wis. Stat. § 970.03 which states "[t]he right to confront 
one's accusers does not apply to the preliminary examination."  
Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioners have failed to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Wis. Stat. § 970.038 
violates any constitutional or statutory right to confrontation. 
C 
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¶34 We turn next to petitioners' assertion that Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.038 violates their right to call witnesses pursuant to the 
compulsory process clause.  We acknowledge that defendants have 
a 
right 
to 
compulsory 
process 
at 
preliminary 
hearings.  
Schaefer, 308 Wis. 2d 279, ¶35.  However, we determine that this 
right is not violated by Wis. Stat. § 970.038.   
¶35 As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 970.038 permits the use 
of hearsay at a preliminary examination.  However, it does not 
address or alter the provisions in Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5) 
authorizing defendants to call witnesses, nor does it prevent 
them from doing so.3 
 
¶36 The O'Briens specifically allege that the circuit 
court applied Wis. Stat. § 970.038 to justify its narrow view of 
relevancy 
and 
quash 
their 
subpoena 
for 
S.M.O., 
thereby 
infringing on their compulsory process rights.  We are not 
convinced.   
¶37 A defendant's right to call witnesses at a preliminary 
examination is not an unrestricted right.  State v. Knudson, 51 
Wis. 2d 270, 280, 187 N.W.2d 321 (1971).  To overcome a motion 
to quash a subpoena at a preliminary examination, the defendant 
must be able to show that the evidence is relevant to the 
probable cause determination. 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 970.03(5) states: "All witnesses shall 
be sworn and their testimony reported by a phonographic 
reporter. The defendant may cross-examine witnesses against the 
defendant, and may call witnesses on the defendant's own behalf 
who then are subject to cross-examination." 
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15 
 
[A]lthough a defendant may subpoena witnesses and 
evidence for the preliminary examination, his subpoena 
may be quashed, a witness may not be allowed to 
testify, or evidence may be excluded if the defendant 
is unable to show the relevance of the testimony or 
evidence to the rebut probable cause.   
Schaefer, 308 Wis. 2d 279, ¶37.  Issues relating to weight and 
credibility are outside the scope of a preliminary examination.  
Id. at ¶36; Klamm, 106 Wis. 2d at 630.  It is not intended to 
serve a discovery function.  Knudson, 51 Wis. 2d at 281. 
¶38 Counsel's statements at the preliminary examination 
reveal that Martin O'Brien sought to subpoena S.M.O., a child 
witness, for purposes of discovery.  When asked for a proffer as 
to what S.M.O. would testify about, counsel for Martin O'Brien 
responded that Investigator Domino's statements were a summary 
and did not necessarily tell the whole story.  Counsel suggested 
that the victim's statements could have been taken out of 
context.  She explained that the complete story could reveal 
that certain actions were not intentional.  However, she 
indicated that the victim may not contradict Investigator 
Domino's testimony, stating "I don't really know."  Absent any 
idea what S.M.O. would testify to, counsel's proffer was 
insufficient to show that S.M.O.'s testimony would be relevant 
to the probable cause inquiry.  
¶39 Thus, the circuit court quashed the O'Briens' subpoena 
for the testimony of S.M.O. because the O'Briens were unable to 
establish that it would be relevant to the probable cause 
inquiry.  The court's narrow view of admissibility was not based 
on Wis. Stat. § 970.038.  Rather, it was based on the narrow 
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16 
 
scope of the examination: determining whether there is probable 
cause to believe that the defendant has committed a felony.  See 
Schaefer, 308 Wis. 2d 279, ¶85.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the petitioners failed to carry their burden of showing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Wis. Stat. § 970.038 on its face or in its 
application violates the right to compulsory process. 
D 
¶40 We turn now to the impact of Wis. Stat. § 970.038 on a 
defendant's right to assistance of counsel.  It is well 
established that a preliminary examination is a critical stage 
of the prosecution at which the defendant is entitled to 
counsel.  Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10 (1970) ("[T]he 
Alabama preliminary hearing is a 'critical stage' of the State's 
criminal process at which the accused is 'as much entitled to 
such aid [of counsel] . . . as at the trial itself.'"); 
Schaefer, 308 Wis. 2d 279, ¶84 ("[A] preliminary hearing is a 
critical stage in the criminal process. Consequently, every 
defendant charged with a felony in Wisconsin is constitutionally 
entitled 
to 
the 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
at 
a 
preliminary 
hearing."); Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 253 ("[T]he Wisconsin 
preliminary hearing is undoubtedly a 'critical stage' of the 
Wisconsin criminal process. Hence, every defendant charged with 
a felony in Wisconsin is constitutionally entitled to the 
assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing.").   
¶41 Petitioners assert that the use of hearsay evidence at 
a preliminary hearing necessarily precludes the effective 
assistance of counsel.  They contend that where the only 
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17 
 
evidence the State presents is hearsay, counsel has no ability 
to effectively argue before the court. 
¶42 A similar challenge was addressed in Schaefer, 308 
Wis. 2d 279.  There, the court considered whether the inability 
of counsel to access police reports and other investigatory 
materials violated a defendant's right to assistance of counsel 
at a preliminary hearing.  Id. at ¶83.  It explained that the 
nature of the proceedings shapes the determination of what 
constitutes effective assistance of counsel: 
In 
considering 
[defendant's] 
right 
to 
effective 
assistance of counsel at a preliminary examination, we 
must keep in mind the narrow purpose of the hearing. 
"[T]he limited scope of the preliminary hearing 
compresses the contours of the sixth amendment." "In 
particular, the defendant's right to present evidence 
and cross-examine the state's witnesses is severely 
limited by the summary nature of the preliminary 
hearing."  
Id. at ¶85 (internal citations omitted).  Given the limited 
scope of preliminary examinations, the court determined that the 
inability of counsel to obtain the evidence at issue prior to 
the preliminary examination did not render him ineffective.  Id. 
at ¶91. 
¶43 Likewise, here we determine that the admission of 
hearsay 
at 
a 
preliminary 
hearing 
does 
not 
infringe 
on 
defendants' right to assistance of counsel.  "[T]he constitution 
does not require that counsel be allowed to play the same role 
[at a preliminary examination] as counsel at trial.  A counsel's 
role is necessarily limited by the limited scope of the 
preliminary examination."  Klamm, 106 Wis. 2d at 634.  Contrary 
No. 
2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, & 2012AP1863   
 
18 
 
to petitioners' assertions, the admission of hearsay does not 
eliminate 
counsel's 
ability 
to 
provide 
assistance 
at 
a 
preliminary examination.  Counsel retains the ability to cross-
examine the witnesses presented by the State, challenge the 
plausibility of the charges against the defendant, argue that 
elements are not met, and present witnesses on behalf of the 
defendant.  Wis. Stat. § 970.03. 
¶44 The record here reveals that Wis. Stat. § 970.038 did 
not render counsel ineffective at the preliminary examinations.  
At the O'Briens' preliminary examination, counsel cross-examined 
Investigator Domino.  They asked probing questions aimed at 
whether the complaint accurately reflected the reports and 
interviews Investigator Domino had reviewed.  They also made 
closing arguments about the complainants' failure to identify 
the defendants, the failure to show injury, and the hearsay 
declarants' inability to observe all of the alleged abuse.  In 
addition, they objected to the broad timespan alleged in the 
complaint.  These actions demonstrate that the O'Briens' counsel 
assisted the O'Briens at the preliminary examination and were 
not ineffective due to the admission of hearsay. 
¶45 Likewise, Butts' counsel was not prevented from 
assisting Butts at his preliminary examination.  She cross-
examined Detective Barfoth, asking who took the statement from 
the alleged victim.  She also presented the argument that the 
statement introduced into evidence was insufficient because it 
did not identify defendant as the person in the statement.  She 
further argued that there was an insufficient basis for 
No. 
2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, & 2012AP1863   
 
19 
 
establishing venue.  Indeed, the circuit court agreed that venue 
had not been established for one of the counts, but bound Butts 
over for trial because it had to determine probable cause on 
only one of the felony counts.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the petitioners have failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the introduction of hearsay evidence violated a right 
to effective assistance of counsel. 
E 
¶46 We address next the petitioners' argument that the 
introduction of hearsay at preliminary examinations violates the 
right to due process.  A due process challenge concerns the 
fairness of governmental action or proceedings.  State ex rel. 
Lyons v. De Valk, 47 Wis. 2d 200, 205, 177 N.W.2d 106 (1970).  
The United States Supreme Court has determined that informal 
proceedings are sufficient for probable cause determinations and 
that states have discretion in establishing the procedures for 
such determinations.  Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121.  Thus, the 
right to a preliminary examination is solely a statutory right.  
Schaefer, 308 Wis. 2d 279, ¶84; Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 393; 
Camara, 28 Wis. 2d 365, 370.   
¶47 Although a defendant is entitled to due process at 
hearings created by statute, that does not mean that every time 
a statute creates a right to a hearing, a party is entitled to 
the full panoply of rights available at a criminal trial.  To 
the contrary, we have repeatedly held that a preliminary hearing 
is not a preliminary trial or a mini-trial.  Schaefer, 308 Wis. 
No. 
2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, & 2012AP1863   
 
20 
 
2d 279, ¶34; State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶30, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 
695 N.W.2d 259; Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d at 396-97.   
¶48 Thus, not all the procedural rights available in a 
criminal trial are available at a preliminary examination.  See, 
e.g., Mitchell, 84 Wis. 2d at 336 (there is no confrontation 
right at a preliminary examination); State v. White, 2008 WI App 
96, ¶13, 312 Wis. 2d 799, 754 N.W.2d 214 (limiting the scope of 
cross-examination); Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d at 424 (limiting the 
right to cross-examination to only those witnesses called to the 
stand).  As noted above, preliminary examinations are limited in 
scope to determining whether there is probable cause to believe 
that a defendant committed a felony.  They are not an 
opportunity to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence.   
¶49 Due to this narrow scope, we conclude that the use of 
hearsay evidence at preliminary examinations pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 970.038 does not violate due process rights.  Defendants 
retain the ability to challenge the plausibility of hearsay and 
other evidence presented by the State through cross-examination, 
the presentation of evidence, and argument to the court.  Wis. 
Stat. § 970.03(5).  We agree with the court of appeals that 
these means are sufficient to address the plausibility of the 
allegations.  
¶50 In the cases at hand, both Butts and the O'Briens had 
a sufficient opportunity to challenge the probable cause of the 
charges against them.  In their preliminary hearings, they both 
cross-examined the State's witnesses.  Although they did not do 
so, both Butts and the O'Briens had the opportunity to introduce 
No. 
2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, & 2012AP1863   
 
21 
 
evidence relevant to the probable cause inquiry.  Further, they 
both made numerous arguments challenging the probable cause for 
the charges.  Because preliminary examinations are limited to 
determining whether there is a plausible basis to support 
probable cause, we determine that the examinations they received 
comported with due process.  Accordingly, we determine that the 
petitioners have failed to show that Wis. Stat. § 970.038 is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
IV  
¶51  Finally, we decline petitioners' invitation to modify 
Wis. Stat. § 970.038 by imposing specific rules limiting the 
admissibility of hearsay at preliminary examinations.  Having 
determined 
that 
the 
petitioners 
have 
failed 
in 
their 
constitutional challenges, we conclude that the proper forum for 
the requested changes lies with the legislature. 
¶52 The petitioners contend that Wis. Stat. § 970.038 
strips the defense of the ability to effectuate the purpose of a 
preliminary examination, which is to safeguard the accused and 
the public against unwarranted prosecutions.  Although Wis. 
Stat. § 970.038 in a particular case may make the task of the 
defense more difficult, we are not convinced that the newly 
enacted statute renders a preliminary hearing a sham, as the 
petitioners 
contend. 
 
Several 
procedural 
and 
evidentiary 
safeguards remain unaffected by the passage of the legislation. 
¶53 Testing the plausibility of the witness's statement 
still 
implicates 
adversarial 
testing. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 970.03(5) 
remains 
unchanged. 
 
It 
provides 
that 
at 
a 
No. 
2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, & 2012AP1863   
 
22 
 
preliminary hearing "the defendant may cross-examine witnesses 
against the defendant, and may call witnesses on the defendant's 
own behalf . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5).  Like the court of 
appeals, "[w]e reject any implication in the prosecution's 
arguments before the trial court that the enactment of 970.038 
somehow limited the defense's ability to call or cross-examine 
witnesses at the preliminary examination."  O'Brien, 349 Wis. 2d 
667, ¶21.  As discussed above, the right to present witnesses in 
the O'Briens' case was limited by their inability to show 
relevancy, not by the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 970.038.  See 
¶¶37-39, infra. 
¶54 The focus of the circuit court's determination remains 
the same:  whether the State has made a plausible showing of the 
probable cause necessary to support a bindover for trial.  This 
determination is made on a case-by-case basis. 
¶55 Our caselaw regarding the level of a probable cause 
determination remains unaltered.  "Probable cause is not an 
unvarying standard because each decision at the various stages 
of the proceedings is an independent determination with the 
varying burdens of proof."  County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 
Wis. 2d 293, 308, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999).  The degree of probable 
cause required for a bindover is greater than that required to 
support a criminal complaint.  See T.R.B. v. State, 109 Wis. 2d 
179, 188, 325 N.W.2d 329 (1982); Taylor v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 
168, 173, 197 N.W.2d 805 (1972).   
¶56 Newly enacted Wis. Stat. § 970.038 allows a court to 
make its probable cause determination "in whole or in part" 
No. 
2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, & 2012AP1863   
 
23 
 
based on hearsay.  As the court of appeals observed, however, 
"[i]t remains the duty of the trial court to consider the 
apparent reliability of the State's evidence at the preliminary 
examination in determining whether the State has made a 
plausible showing of probable cause . . . ."  O'Brien, 349 Wis. 
2d 667, ¶2. 
¶57 Reliability is the hallmark of admissible hearsay.  
Traditionally, the rule against hearsay views out-of-court 
statements as inherently unreliable.  Despite this mistrust, 
numerous exemptions and exceptions have developed under the 
common law that allow for the admission of hearsay into 
evidence.  Subsequently the common law was codified as the 
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, Wis. Stat. §§ 901.01-911.02.4  
¶58 The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence contain 23 exceptions 
from hearsay for a variety of out-of-court statements that are 
considered reliable due to the circumstances in which the 
statements were made.  For example, the circumstances of 
sufficient reliability exist when the speaker is describing an 
event while seeing it (present sense impression, Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.03(1)) or when describing a startling event while under 
the 
stress 
of 
the 
event 
(excited 
utterance, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 908.03(2)).  Sufficient reliability exists when considering 
the motivation of the speaker to tell the truth (statements made 
for purposes of medical treatment Wis. Stat. § 908.03(4)).  The 
regular records exception is grounded on the belief that the 
                                                 
4 The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1973.  See 
Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1 (1973).   
No. 
2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, & 2012AP1863   
 
24 
 
records are sufficiently reliable because of the need of the 
maker 
to 
keep 
accurate 
records 
and 
reports 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 908.03(6)).  Likewise, property records and family records are 
exceptions from hearsay because they are considered sufficiently 
reliable (Wis. Stat. § 908.03(13)-(15)). 
¶59 The 
criminal 
complaint 
may 
rely 
on 
hearsay 
to 
demonstrate probable cause, but the hearsay must be sufficiently 
reliable to make a plausible showing of probable cause to 
support a bindover for trial.  Knudson, 51 Wis. 2d 270.  We 
agree with the court of appeals that "the hearsay nature of 
evidence may, in an appropriate case, undermine the plausibility 
of the State's case."  O'Brien, 349 Wis. 2d 667, ¶2.  
¶60 The court has discretion in determining what evidence 
is sufficiently reliable.  Although newly enacted Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.038 allows for greater use of hearsay at preliminary 
examinations, it does not eliminate the court's obligation to 
exercise its judgment.  It is the circuit court's role to act as 
the evidentiary gatekeeper.   Vivid, Inc. v. Fiedler, 219 Wis. 
2d 764, 803, 580 N.W.2d 644 (1998).   
V 
 
¶61 In sum, we determine that petitioners have failed to 
meet the heavy burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Wis. Stat. § 970.038 is unconstitutional.  The scope of 
preliminary examinations is limited to determining whether there 
is probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed a 
felony.  Following precedent, we conclude that there is no 
constitutional 
right 
to 
confrontation 
at 
a 
preliminary 
No. 
2012AP1769, 2012AP1770, & 2012AP1863   
 
25 
 
examination.  Further, due to the limited scope of preliminary 
examinations, we determine that the admission of hearsay 
evidence does not violate petitioners' rights to compulsory 
process, effective assistance of counsel, or due process. 
¶62 Finally, we decline petitioners' invitation to impose 
new rules limiting the admissibility of hearsay at preliminary 
examinations.  Wisconsin Stat. § 970.038 does not set forth a 
blanket rule that all hearsay be admitted.  Circuit courts 
remain the evidentiary gatekeepers.  They must still consider, 
on a case-by-case basis, the reliability of the State's hearsay 
evidence in determining whether it is admissible and assessing 
whether the State has made a plausible showing of probable 
cause.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP1769, 2012AP1770 & 2012AP1863.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶63 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority opinion and the parties focus on the constitutionality 
of Wis. Stat. § 970.038, which was enacted in 2011.1  They 
address whether § 970.038 violates the defendant's confrontation 
rights under the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  The 
majority opinion and the parties recognize, however, that the 
legislature has accorded defendants rights in preliminary 
examinations under Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5).  This statute was 
enacted in its current form in 1969.2   
¶64 I conclude that the admission of hearsay evidence 
under new Wis. Stat. § 970.038 should be interpreted in light of 
the longstanding text of § 970.03(5), which affords defendants 
statutory rights in preliminary examinations.  This court 
typically decides cases on non-constitutional grounds before it 
addresses constitutional issues.3  I conclude the two statutes 
should be harmonized.  
                                                 
1 2011 Wis. Act 285. 
2 Ch. 255, Laws of 1969. 
3 See Adams Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. v. City of Madison, 
2006 WI 104, ¶91, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803. 
Nevertheless, I note that the United States Supreme Court 
has recognized that certain Sixth Amendment rights, such as the 
right to counsel, apply to pretrial stages.  I am not so quick 
to 
conclude, 
as 
does 
the 
majority 
opinion, 
that 
"the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
preliminary 
examinations."  Majority op., ¶30. 
The United States Supreme Court has begun to take into 
account that most criminal cases do not go to trial and that 
constitutional rights traditionally restricted to trial may be 
applicable to critical pretrial stages: 
No.  2012AP1769, 2012AP1770 & 2012AP1863.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶65 Recently adopted Wis. Stat. § 970.038 declares that 
hearsay is generally admissible in preliminary examinations and 
that a circuit court may base its finding of probable cause in 
whole or in part on admitted hearsay.  This new statute reads in 
full as follows: 
(1) Notwithstanding s. 908.02, hearsay is admissible 
in 
a 
preliminary 
examination 
under 
ss. 
970.03, 
970.032, and 970.035. 
(2) A court may base its finding of probable cause 
under s. 970.03(7) or (8), 970.032(2), or 970.035 in 
whole or in part on hearsay admitted under sub. (1).  
¶66 Prior to the recent enactment of Wis. Stat. § 970.038, 
hearsay evidence was admissible at the preliminary examination 
only if it fit within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule 
enumerated in the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence.  See majority 
op., ¶20. 
¶67 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 970.03 
governs 
preliminary 
examinations.  Subsection (5) accords defendants two different 
                                                                                                                                                             
The reality is that plea bargains have become so 
central to the administration of the criminal justice 
system that defense counsel have responsibilities in 
the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must 
be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel 
that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal 
process at critical stages. Because ours is for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials, 
it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of 
a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors 
in the pretrial process. 
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  
No.  2012AP1769, 2012AP1770 & 2012AP1863.ssa 
 
3 
 
rights: to cross-examine witnesses against them and to call 
witnesses on their behalf.4   
¶68 Wisconsin Stat. § 970.03(5) reads as follows: 
(5) All witnesses shall be sworn and their testimony 
reported by a phonographic reporter. The defendant may 
cross-examine witnesses against the defendant, and may 
call witnesses on the defendant's own behalf who then 
are subject to cross-examination. 
¶69 When the legislature recently enacted Wis. Stat 
§ 970.038, it left § 970.03(5) unchanged.5 
¶70 In interpreting multiple statutes, a court interprets 
them together and harmonizes them to avoid conflict if at all 
possible.6  This court attempts to harmonize statutes in a way 
that will give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting 
both statutes.7   
                                                 
4 "[T]he defendant must have compulsory process to assure 
the appearance of his witnesses and their relevant evidence." 
State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, ¶35, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 
N.W.2d 457.  The defendant "is by statute given the right to 
confront witnesses . . . ."  Mitchell v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 325, 
354, 267 N.W.2d 349 (1978). 
5 2011 Wisconsin Act 285.  See also Drafting File for 2011 
S.B. 399, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 2011 
S.B. 399, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. (noting 
that 
"hearsay 
evidence 
is 
admissible 
at 
a 
preliminary 
examination" without any reference to Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5)). 
6 State v. Ray, 166 Wis. 2d 855, 873, 481 N.W.2d 288 (Ct. 
App. 1992) (citing State v. Duffy, 54 Wis. 2d 61, 64, 194 
N.W.2d 624 (1972)). 
7 City of Madison v. DWD, Equal Rights Div., 2003 WI 76, 
¶11, 262 Wis. 2d 652, 664 N.W.2d 584; Byers v. LIRC, 208 
Wis. 2d 388, 395, 561 N.W.2d 678 (1997); City of Milwaukee v. 
Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 184, 532 N.W.2d 690 (1995). 
No.  2012AP1769, 2012AP1770 & 2012AP1863.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶71 Additional statutory tools of interpretation aid in 
interpreting the two statutes at issue in the present cases.  
Statutes are interpreted to give effect to each word and to 
avoid redundant and surplus language.8  Moreover, words are given 
meaning to avoid absurd, unreasonable, or implausible results 
and results that are clearly at odds with the legislature's 
purpose.9  Statutes are interpreted in view of their purpose.10 
¶72 The purpose of preliminary examinations under Wis. 
Stat. § 970.03 is to "protect[] defendants and the public from 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Klemm v. Am. Transmission Co., 2011 WI 37, ¶18, 
333 Wis. 2d 580, 798 N.W.2d 223; Pawlowski v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶22 n.14, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 N.W.2d 67 
(citing Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 N.W.2d 817 
(1980) ("A statute should be construed so that no word or clause 
shall be rendered surplusage and every word if possible should 
be given effect.")). 
9 Alberte v. Anew Health Care Servs., Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶10, 
232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515; Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 
76, ¶32, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659; Teschendorf v. State 
Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶¶15, 18, 32, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 
N.W.2d 258.  
10 State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶16, 338 Wis. 2d 243, 255, 
808 N.W.2d 390, 396 ("Context and [statutory] purpose are 
important in discerning the plain meaning of a statute.  We 
favor an interpretation that fulfills the statute's purpose.") 
(internal quotation marks & citations omitted); Klemm, 333 
Wis. 2d 580, ¶18 ("An interpretation that fulfills the purpose 
of the statute is favored over one that undermines the 
purpose."); Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth Hosp.-Mayo Health System, 
2005 WI 124, ¶51, 285 Wis. 2d 1, 700 N.W.2d 201 (examining 
"legislative goals" to interpret a statute); Alberte, 232 
Wis. 2d 587, ¶10 (courts need not adopt a literal or usual 
meaning of a word when acceptance of that meaning would thwart 
the obvious purpose of the statute); United Wis. Ins. Co. v. 
LIRC, 229 Wis. 2d 416, 425-26, 600 N.W.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1999) 
("Fundamental to an analysis of any statutory interpretation is 
the ascertainment and advancement of the legislative purpose."). 
No.  2012AP1769, 2012AP1770 & 2012AP1863.ssa 
 
5 
 
unwarranted prosecution," and to function "as a check on 
prosecutorial discretion."  Majority op., ¶21.11   
¶73 Thus, the new statute allowing hearsay evidence at the 
preliminary examination, Wis. Stat. § 970.038, must be read to 
meet the statutory purpose of protecting defendants and the 
public from unwarranted prosecutions and to give continued 
vitality to Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5).  Section 970.03(5), which 
grants rights to defendants, is not to be treated as surplusage. 
¶74 I agree with the majority opinion that the State is 
not required under either statute to call witnesses just so a 
defendant may cross-examine them.  Majority op., ¶33.12 
¶75 I also agree with the majority opinion that the recent 
enactment of Wis. Stat. § 970.038 does not limit a defendant's 
ability under § 973.03(5) to call witnesses at the preliminary 
examination.  Majority op., ¶34.  A defendant's right to call 
witnesses is subject to the limits placed upon the trial right 
to call witnesses and is constrained by the limited purpose of 
the preliminary examination.   
¶76 The preliminary examination has a narrow focus.13 
Probable cause that a felony was committed, probable cause that 
                                                 
11 A preliminary examination exists "to protect the accused 
from hasty, improvident, or malicious prosecution and to 
discover whether there is a substantial basis for bringing the 
prosecution and further denying the accused his right to 
liberty."  State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶55, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 
N.W.2d 144 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
12 See 
State 
v. 
Oliver, 
161 
Wis. 2d 140, 
148-49 
467 
N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 
424, 329 N.W.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1982). 
No.  2012AP1769, 2012AP1770 & 2012AP1863.ssa 
 
6 
 
the defendant committed the felony, and plausibility are the 
sole issues at a preliminary examination.  Defense counsel is 
therefore limited to present evidence14 at the preliminary 
examination relevant to probable cause and plausibility (not 
credibility).15 
¶77 At some point, plausibility and credibility elide.  
"[T]he line between plausibility and credibility may be fine; 
the distinction is one of degree."16  
¶78 In 
O'Brien, 
defense 
counsel 
asserted 
that 
the 
defendants wanted to call the hearsay declarant, S.M.O., to test 
the plausibility of the hearsay statements admitted through the 
officer's testimony: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  . . . . 
For example, one of the allegations in this case is 
that, um, [the victim hearsay declarant] states that 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Schaefer, 308 Wis. 2d 279, ¶34.  "[I]ts purpose is merely 
to determine whether there is sufficient evidence that charges 
against a defendant should go forward."     
14 "[T]he 
defense 
right 
to 
call 
witnesses 
is 
subject . . . to a broad discretion of the magistrate to 
restrict preliminary hearing presentations in accordance with 
the limited purposes of that hearing."  4 Wayne R. LaFave et 
al., Criminal Procedure § 14.4(d), at 359 (3d ed. 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
15 A defendant "may call witnesses to rebut the plausibility 
of a witness's story and the probability that a felony was 
committed.  In this regard, the defendant must have compulsory 
process to assure the appearance of his witnesses and their 
relevant evidence."  Schaefer, 308 Wis. 2d 279, ¶35 (citation 
omitted). 
16 State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 397, 359 N.W.2d 151 
(1984); see also County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 
322, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999) (citing Dunn). 
No.  2012AP1769, 2012AP1770 & 2012AP1863.ssa 
 
7 
 
he was hit by his father with a flashlight.  What if 
the rest of the part of that story was . . . his 
father sprouted wings and flew around the room like a 
bat and then hit him with a flashlight?  The whole 
story would sound absolutely incredible, unbelievable, 
and implausible. 
¶79 The majority opinion criticizes defense counsel's 
proffer regarding the relevance of the witnesses the defendant 
wishes to call.  The majority opinion declares that "[a]bsent 
any idea what S.M.O. would testify to, counsel's proffer was 
insufficient to show that S.M.O.'s testimony would be relevant 
to the probable cause inquiry."17   
¶80 Such a proffer, however, will often be limited.  
Defense counsel rarely knows at the preliminary examination 
exactly what a witness (who will testify for the State at trial) 
will say before the witness takes the stand.  When a defendant 
has no way of knowing exactly what a witness knows or will 
testify to at the preliminary examination, the law does not 
place a significant burden on the defendant to demonstrate 
relevance.18  Tools of discovery are limited in pretrial criminal 
proceedings.19   
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶38. 
18 For example, when defendants seek in camera review to 
determine whether disclosure of a confidential informant's 
identity is appropriate, this court has stated that the burden 
on the defendant is "not significant" and that "[t]he showing 
need only be one of a possibility that the informer could supply 
testimony necessary to a fair determination."  See State v. 
Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶24 n.7, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298 
(quoting State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d 112, 125, 321 N.W.2d 145 
(1982)). 
No.  2012AP1769, 2012AP1770 & 2012AP1863.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶81 Considering these difficulties, I would not hold the 
bar for the proffer as high as the majority opinion does.  The 
proffer here is weak.  Nonetheless, the majority opinion's 
requiring a specific proffer of exactly how a witness will 
specifically 
rebut 
a 
prosecution 
claim 
undermines 
the 
preliminary examination's purpose of putting the State to its 
burden and undermines the statutory rights accorded by Wis. 
Stat. § 970.03(5).   
¶82 Under the majority opinion's holding, and with the 
limited tools of criminal discovery available in pretrial 
proceedings, how can a defendant ever challenge double or triple 
hearsay in a police report read by an individual who has never 
interviewed the hearsay declarant?  Does a wrongly accused 
person, under the majority opinion's reasoning, have any 
                                                                                                                                                             
Similarly, if a defendant seeks to admit evidence in 
connection with a defense theory, the threshold for admitting 
such evidence is low, even if the theory itself is "thoroughly 
discredited."  See State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶115, 255 
Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413 ("[I]f, before trial, the defendant 
proffers 'some' evidence to support her defense theory and if 
that evidence, viewed most favorably to her, would allow a jury 
to conclude that her theory was not disproved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the factual basis for her defense theory has 
been satisfied."). 
19 See State v. Bowser, 2009 WI App 114, ¶21, 321 
Wis. 2d 221, 772 N.W.2d 666 (noting that despite the broad right 
to pretrial discovery granted by Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1), "the 
right to pretrial discovery is tempered by the circuit court's 
discretion under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(6) to deny, restrict, 
defer, 'or make other appropriate orders' concerning discovery 
upon a showing of good cause"); see also Schaefer, 308 
Wis. 2d 279, ¶77 n.17 ("In Wisconsin, criminal 'discovery' is 
not entirely the parties' procedure because the scope of 
discoverable materials is set out in statute and compliance with 
the statute will be enforced by the court."). 
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opportunity short of a trial to challenge the plausibility of 
the State's case?   
¶83 I conclude that under the circumstances of O'Brien, 
the offer of proof, although admittedly weak, sufficed to allow 
the defendant to call the declarant.  Of course, the State has 
the right to object to and argue against the admissibility of 
any portion of the testimony of witnesses called by the 
defendant if the testimony is not relevant to plausibility and 
probable cause.   
¶84 If preliminary examinations are to serve as effective 
roadblocks to frivolous and fraudulent prosecutions, and if they 
are truly to be a "critical stage" of trial, the preliminary 
examination cannot be reduced to a farce, in which a defendant 
has no ability to challenge or rebut the narrative advanced by 
the State's proffered double and triple hearsay testimony.   
¶85 Other 
states' 
approaches 
to 
this 
issue 
are 
instructive.  Colorado has a rule identical to Wis. Stat. 
§ 970.03(5); it does not have a rule identical to § 970.038, but 
Colorado allows the use of hearsay evidence at the preliminary 
examination.   
¶86 The Colorado Supreme Court determined that it was 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to prohibit a defendant 
from calling a prosecution hearsay declarant as a witness, when 
the witness was available and the probable cause determination 
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rested entirely on the witness's identification and story.  See 
McDonald v. District Court, 576 P.2d 169 (Colo. 1978).20   
¶87 California has provisions similar to the two Wisconsin 
statutes at issue in the instant cases.  Interpreting the 
California law, a California court declared that the trial court 
did not err in allowing a defendant to call hearsay declarants 
as defense witnesses.21   
¶88 In cases such as the instant cases, in which the 
prosecution relies on double or triple hearsay for which the 
defendants' cross-examination of the State's witnesses is 
meaningless, the plausibility of the State's case cannot be 
tested without allowing the defendant to call witnesses——either 
the hearsay declarant or an individual with personal knowledge 
of the hearsay statement.   
¶89 In the instant cases, the State's witnesses were 
presenting single, double, and triple hearsay.  In O'Brien, the 
sole 
witness 
of 
the 
prosecution, 
a 
police 
investigator, 
testified to hearsay statements of declarants she personally 
interviewed but also testified to statements made by declarants 
to a third party while the investigator was in the room, as well 
as videotaped hearsay statements made by declarants to an third 
party.   
                                                 
20 See also Rex v. Sullivan, 575 P.2d 408, 411 (Colo. 1978) 
(holding that "the judge cannot completely curtail cross-
examination on testimony vital to the issue of probable 
cause . . . by refusing to allow the defense counsel to probe 
the strength of the eyewitness identifications on cross-
examination of the [witness]"). 
21 People v. Erwin, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1542, 1551 (1993). 
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¶90 In the Butts case, the preliminary examination never 
took place.  The complaint contained statements from multiple 
hearsay declarants made either in writing or to different police 
officers.  The State averred in Butts that it intended to call a 
police officer to read the hearsay statements given to the 
officer by the hearsay declarants.  In short, the plausibility 
of the hearsay statements could not have been tested without the 
defendant's 
ability 
to 
call 
the 
declarant 
or 
others 
as 
witnesses.   
¶91 By failing to value sufficiently the statutory right 
of the defendant to compel witnesses in his or her defense, the 
majority opinion renders Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5) surplusage and 
undermines the statutory purpose of allowing a defendant to test 
the plausibility of the prosecution's case.   
¶92 The texts, the context, and the statutory purposes of 
both statutes dictate the conclusion that the defendant has the 
statutory 
right 
to 
cross-examine 
witnesses 
to 
test 
the 
plausibility of their testimony and the statutory right to call 
witnesses, including hearsay declarants, to challenge the 
plausibility of the State's evidence.   
¶93 Accordingly, I dissent.  
 
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