Title: Andre Deshaun McDaniel v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 06-65 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION ANDRE DESHAUN McDANIEL Petitioner v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Respondent Opinion Delivered February 23, 2006 PRO SE MOTIONS FOR BELATED APPEAL AND TO ADD EVIDENCE TO MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL [CIRCUIT COURT OF FAULKNER COUNTY, CR 2002-306, HON. DAVID LEE REYNOLDS, JUDGE] MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL DENIED; MOTION TO ADD EVIDENCE TO MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL MOOT PER CURIAM Andre Deshaun McDaniel was convicted of simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, felon in possession of a firearm, possession of marijuana, maintaining a drug premises and possession of drug paraphernalia and sentenced to a total of 180 months' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. McDaniel v. State, CACR 04-1219 (Ark. App. May 4, 2005). The clerk issued the mandate on May 24, 2005. According to the partial record lodged in this court, McDaniel filed a motion for "belated appeal for Rule 37" on October 18, 2005, and that motion was denied by order entered November 7, 2005. McDaniel has now lodged the partial record in this court, and brings this motion requesting belated appeal of that order. The allegations in petitioner McDaniel's motion filed in the trial court are that he submitted a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 within the sixty-day period as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c), but that the petition was submitted to the wrong court, petitioner having mailed it to the district court clerk, rather than the circuit court clerk. The motion requested relief through an extension of time to file the Rule 37.1 petition. Petitioner argued that he should be held to a less strict standard because he was proceeding pro se. Petitioner contends the trial court did not promptly notify him of the order denying his motion as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3(d), and that we should therefore hear his belated appeal of the order. Whether petitioner's motion to file a belated appeal fell within the perimeter of Rule 37.3(d) or not, we must decline to hear petitioner's appeal because it is clear that petitioner cannot prevail. This court has consistently held that an appeal of the denial of postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198 (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam); Harris v. State, 318 Ark. 599, 887 S.W.2d 514 (1994) (per curiam); Reed v. State, 317 Ark. 286, 878 S.W.2d 376 (1994) (per curiam). Here, petitioner has admitted that his Rule 37.1 petition was untimely, and he also failed to file his petition in the circuit court within sixty days of the mandate. It is clear that the trial court had no jurisdiction to provide petitioner an extension of time to file his Rule 37.1 petition, as the time limitations imposed in Rule 37.2(c) are jurisdictional in nature, and the circuit court may not grant relief on a petition for postconviction relief which is not properly filed. Benton v. State, 325 Ark. 246, 925 S.W.2d 401 (1996) (per curiam). That petitioner was proceeding pro se does not excuse the requirement to comply with the limitations of Rule 37.2(c) and to file the petition in the proper court. All litigants, including those who proceed pro se, must bear responsibility for conforming to the rules of procedure. Peterson v. State, 289 Ark. 452, 711 S.W.2d 830 (1986) (per curiam); Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (1984) (per curiam); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 163, 655 S.W.2d 424 (1983) (per curiam). See also Tarry v. State, 353 Ark. 158, 114 S.W.3d 161 (2003) (per curiam). Because we are required to deny petitioner's motion for belated appeal, his motion to add evidence is moot. Motion for belated appeal denied; motion to add evidence to motion for belated appeal moot.