Title: Hyland v. Raytheon Technical Servs.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Millette JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
CYNTHIA HYLAND 
 
v.   Record No. 080157 
 
 
    OPINION BY 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
                 January 16, 2009 
RAYTHEON TECHNICAL SERVICES 
COMPANY, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Arthur B. Vieregg, Jr., Judge 
 
In this defamation action, we consider whether the circuit 
court, upon our remand of the case, erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants after considering isolated 
factual segments of two allegedly defamatory statements. 
In 2003, Cynthia L. Hyland brought several claims against 
her former employer, Raytheon Technical Services Company 
(Raytheon) and its president, Bryan J. Even.  In the claims 
involved in this appeal, Hyland asserted that her supervisor, 
Even, made certain defamatory statements concerning Hyland’s job 
performance.  Raytheon and Even filed grounds of defense 
asserting, among other things, that Hyland was not entitled to 
damages because the alleged statements were true. 
The case proceeded to a jury trial.  At the trial, the 
evidence showed that Hyland worked for Raytheon for about 21 
years and eventually became senior vice president and general 
manager of a certain division in the company. 
In 2000, Hyland’s division lost its bid for a large 
government contract.  Despite this loss, Even provided Hyland 
with a positive job performance evaluation. 
In 2002, Hyland’s division lost another large government 
contract bid.  After this loss, Even reorganized Raytheon and 
appointed Hyland as senior vice president and general manager of 
a larger business unit, which was comprised of Hyland’s former 
division and two additional units. 
Raytheon later hired a consulting firm to conduct 
assessments of the job performance of certain executive-level 
employees.  As part of these assessments, Hyland provided both 
positive and negative comments about Even’s leadership skills.  
Although the consulting firm had assured Hyland that her comments 
would be kept confidential, Even later learned about Hyland’s 
critical remarks.  At the time of Hyland’s next performance 
evaluation, Even for the first time rendered a negative 
assessment of Hyland’s job performance.  Even later terminated 
Hyland’s employment. 
During the trial, the circuit court denied the motions to 
strike raised by Raytheon and Even (collectively, Raytheon) and 
submitted Hyland’s defamation claim to the jury on five allegedly 
defamatory statements.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Hyland, and the circuit court later entered final judgment 
 
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awarding Hyland $1,850,000, which included $350,000 in punitive 
damages.1 
In Raytheon’s appeal of that judgment (the first appeal), we 
held that only two of the five statements submitted to the jury 
were actionable for defamation, and that the remaining three 
statements were not actionable because they were statements of 
opinion that could not be proved true or false.  Raytheon Tech. 
Servs. Co. v. Hyland, 273 Va. 292, 641 S.E.2d 84 (2007).  We 
concluded that a new trial was required because the jury 
instructions permitted a verdict in favor of Hyland on any one of 
the five statements, and we were unable to determine whether the 
jury based its award in part or in whole on the non-actionable 
statements of opinion that it erroneously was permitted to 
consider.  Id. at 306, 641 S.E.2d at 92. 
The first statement that we held actionable (the first 
statement) was: 
Cynthia lead [sic] [Raytheon] in the protest of the FAA’s 
evaluation selection process for the TSSC contract and 
through a difficult procurement for the TSA, both of which 
demanded her constant attention.  These visible losses 
created significant gaps in our strategic plans and in her 
business unit financial performance. 
 
                     
1 The jury also considered and ruled in favor of Hyland on 
her claims of actual fraud and tortious interference with 
business expectancy.  However, the circuit court later entered 
an order vacating those verdicts, and none of the parties 
challenged that ruling in the first appeal. 
 
3 
 
Id. at 304, 641 S.E.2d at 91.  We concluded that this statement 
was actionable for defamation because it was subject to empirical 
proof.  Id.  We explained that although the adjective 
“significant” may be a matter of opinion, the operative part of 
the statement addressed Hyland’s responsibility for the losses, 
not the size of the losses.  Id. at 305, 641 S.E.2d at 91. 
The second statement that we held actionable (the second 
statement) was: 
Cynthia and her team met their cash goals, but were 
significantly off plan on all other financial targets 
including Bookings by 25%, Sales by 11.5%, and profit by 
24%. 
 
Id. at 304, 641 S.E.2d at 91.  With regard to this statement, 
we explained that “[w]hether the business unit missed its goals 
by the stated percentages is a fact that may be proved true or 
false.”  Id.  We also stated that the word “significantly” in 
the first phrase is defined by certain percentages and is “not 
merely the view of the writer.”  Id.  Accordingly, we set aside 
the jury verdict and remanded the case to the circuit court for 
a new trial on the claim of defamation limited to consideration 
of these two statements in their entirety.  Id. at 306, 641 
S.E.2d at 92. 
 
On remand in the circuit court, Raytheon filed a motion for 
summary judgment, asserting that the two statements that were the 
subject of our remand were not defamatory because they were true.  
 
4 
 
Raytheon argued that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding those statements, because Hyland had acknowledged the 
truth of the statements before the first trial in her response to 
Raytheon’s request for admission. 
 
Hyland opposed the motion for summary judgment and argued 
that several portions of the two statements at issue were false 
and were sufficiently misleading to constitute defamation.  She 
also contended that in remanding the case for a new trial, this 
Court necessarily had rejected Raytheon’s contention that she had 
admitted the truth of the statements. 
 
The circuit court granted Raytheon’s motion for summary 
judgment.  In a letter opinion, which was incorporated by 
reference in the circuit court’s final judgment order, the 
circuit court held that the two statements were true as a matter 
of law. 
 
With regard to the first allegedly defamatory statement, the 
circuit court held that the “first factual component” of that 
allegedly defamatory statement is “[w]hether Hyland led the 
protest of the TSS contract award and the TSA procurement and was 
responsible for ‘these visible losses.’”  The circuit court 
concluded that this “first factual component” was true based on 
Hyland’s admission in her response to Raytheon’s request for 
admissions that she “oversaw the efforts of the proposal team’s 
support to the [TSS] protest,” and that she was the “Proposal 
 
5 
 
Manager” in charge of acquiring the TSA contract.  The circuit 
court concluded that “[a]s the senior executive on both projects, 
she is ultimately responsible for the company’s failure to 
acquire the contracts.” 
 
The circuit court then addressed what it referred to as the 
“second factual connotation” of the first allegedly defamatory 
statement.  The circuit court identified this segment of the 
statement as being whether “losses from those projects created 
gaps in the company’s plans and the financial performance of 
business units which she oversaw.”  The circuit court concluded 
that Hyland admitted in her responses to Raytheon’s request for 
admission that the loss of the TSS contract “created a financial 
shortfall,” that the TSA contract “would have reduced the 
financial challenge,” and that the loss of the TSA contract “left 
a gap in sales revenue.”  Thus, the circuit court held that “the 
second factual component of the first allegedly defamatory 
statement is true.”  The circuit court further held that the 
question whether this “gap” was “significant” was a matter of 
opinion as defined by this Court in the first appeal. 
The circuit court next identified “the factual component of 
the second allegedly defamatory statement” as “[w]hether the 
business unit missed its goals by the stated percentages.”  The 
circuit court held that the “factual component of the statement 
is not whether Ms. Hyland was to blame for all of the division’s 
 
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losses for 2002,” but was “whether the division, in fact, 
incurred losses to the extent Mr. Even indicated.”  Referring to 
Hyland’s counsel’s argument before this Court in the first 
appeal, the circuit court held that Hyland conceded that Even’s 
characterization of the extent of the losses for 2002 was 
correct.  Thus, the circuit court held that “[t]he second 
allegedly defamatory statement is true.” 
Hyland appeals from the circuit court’s award of summary 
judgment in favor of Raytheon.  She contends that the circuit 
court erred by failing to consider each allegedly defamatory 
statement as a whole.  Hyland contends that this error resulted 
from the circuit court’s misinterpretation of our opinion in the 
first appeal, which resulted in the circuit court removing from 
consideration any words in the statements that manifested an 
opinion and any inferences or implications arising from each 
statement considered as a whole. 
 
In response, Raytheon contends that the circuit court 
accurately applied our directives regarding the allegedly 
defamatory statements that we remanded for further proceedings.  
Raytheon argues that Hyland admitted “the limited factual 
portions” of the two allegedly defamatory statements and that, 
therefore, the circuit court properly awarded summary judgment in 
Raytheon’s favor.  We disagree with Raytheon’s arguments. 
 
7 
 
 
Generally, under our common law, a private individual 
asserting a claim of defamation first must show that a defendant 
has published a false factual statement that concerns and harms 
the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s reputation.  See WJLA-TV v. 
Levin, 264 Va. 140, 152-54, 564 S.E.2d 383, 390-91 (2002); The 
Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 15, 37, 325 S.E.2d 713, 725, 
738 (1985).  The plaintiff also must show that the defendant knew 
that the statement was false or, believing that the statement was 
true, lacked a reasonable basis for such belief, or acted 
negligently in failing to determine the facts on which the 
publication was based.  WJLA-TV, 264 Va. at 154, 564 S.E.2d at 
391; Food Lion, Inc. v. Melton, 250 Va. 144, 150, 458 S.E.2d 580, 
584 (1995); The Gazette, 229 Va. at 15, 325 S.E.2d at 724-25.  
When a plaintiff asserts that the defendant acted negligently, 
the plaintiff further must prove that the defamatory statement 
made apparent a substantial danger to the plaintiff’s reputation.  
Union of Needletrades v. Jones, 268 Va. 512, 519, 603 S.E.2d 920, 
924 (2004); WJLA-TV, 264 Va. at 154, 564 S.E.2d at 391; The 
Gazette, 229 Va. at 15, 325 S.E.2d at 724-25. 
 
Defamatory words that cause prejudice to a person in her 
profession are actionable as defamation per se.  Fuste v. 
Riverside Healthcare Ass’n, 265 Va. 127, 132, 575 S.E.2d 858, 861 
(2003); Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 196 Va. 1, 7, 82 
S.E.2d 588, 591 (1954).  Defamatory statements may include 
 
8 
 
statements made by inference, implication, or insinuation.  Union 
of Needletrades, 268 Va. at 519, 603 S.E.2d at 924; Fuste, 265 
Va. at 132, 575 S.E.2d at 861; Perk v. Vector Resources Group, 
253 Va. 310, 316, 485 S.E.2d 140, 144 (1997); Carwile, 196 Va. 
at 7, 82 S.E.2d at 592. 
 
Expressions of opinion, however, are constitutionally 
protected and are not actionable as defamation.  Raytheon Tech. 
Servs., 273 Va. at 303, 641 S.E.2d at 90; Williams v. Garraghty, 
249 Va. 224, 233, 455 S.E.2d 209, 215 (1995).  Therefore, before 
submitting a defamation claim to a jury, a trial judge must 
determine as a matter of law whether the allegedly defamatory 
statements contain provably false factual statements or are 
merely statements of opinion.  See Government Micro Res., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 271 Va. 29, 40, 624 S.E.2d 63, 69 (2006); Tronfeld v. 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709, 714, 636 S.E.2d 447, 450 
(2006); Fuste, 265 Va. at 132-33, 575 S.E.2d at 861-62; American 
Communications Network, Inc. v. Williams, 264 Va. 336, 340, 568 
S.E.2d 683, 686 (2002). 
 
When a statement is relative in nature and depends largely 
on a speaker’s viewpoint, that statement is an expression of 
opinion.  Raytheon Tech. Servs., 273 Va. at 303, 641 S.E.2d at 
90; Tronfeld, 272 Va. at 714, 636 S.E.2d at 450; Fuste, 265 Va. 
at 132, 575 S.E.2d at 861; Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 119, 
335 S.E.2d 97, 101 (1985).  Factual statements made in support of 
 
9 
 
an opinion, however, can form the basis for a defamation action.  
Raytheon Tech. Servs., 273 Va. at 303, 641 S.E.2d at 90; WJLA-TV, 
264 Va. at 156, 564 S.E.2d at 393; American Communications 
Network, 264 Va. at 340, 568 S.E.2d at 686; Williams, 249 Va. at 
233, 455 S.E.2d at 215. 
 
In determining whether a statement is one of fact or 
opinion, a court may not isolate one portion of the statement at 
issue from another portion of the statement.  Raytheon Tech. 
Servs., 273 Va. at 303, 641 S.E.2d at 91; Government Micro Res., 
271 Va. at 40, 624 S.E.2d at 69; American Communications Network, 
264 Va. at 341-42, 568 S.E.2d at 686.  Rather, a court must 
consider the statement as a whole.  Government Micro Res., 271 
Va. at 40, 624 S.E.2d at 69. 
 
The requirement that an allegedly defamatory statement be 
considered as a whole also is vital to a determination of the 
truth or falsity of a defamation claim, because defamatory 
statements may be made by implication, inference, or 
insinuation.  See Union of Needletrades, 268 Va. at 519, 603 
S.E.2d at 924; Fuste, 265 Va. at 132, 575 S.E.2d at 861; Perk, 
253 Va. at 316, 485 S.E.2d at 144; Carwile, 196 Va. at 7, 82 
S.E.2d at 592.  Thus, the factual portions of an allegedly 
defamatory statement may not be evaluated for truth or falsity 
in isolation, but must be considered in view of any 
accompanying opinion and other stated facts.  See Raytheon Tech. 
 
10 
 
Servs., 273 Va. at 303, 641 S.E.2d at 91; WJLA-TV, 264 Va. at 
156, 564 S.E.2d at 393; American Communications Network, 264 Va. 
at 340, 568 S.E.2d at 686; Williams, 249 Va. at 233, 455 S.E.2d 
at 215. 
 
The circuit court improperly limited its analysis to the 
separate factual portions of the alleged defamatory statements 
and excluded the necessary consideration of each statement as a 
whole, including any implications, inferences, or insinuations 
that reasonably could be drawn from each statement.  In 
addition, when considering the truth or falsity of the 
allegedly defamatory statements, the circuit court improperly 
removed from the statements those portions imparting an 
opinion. 
 
Unlike the determination whether an allegedly defamatory 
statement is one of fact or opinion, which presents a legal 
question to be decided by a trial judge, the determination 
whether an allegedly defamatory statement is false ordinarily 
presents a factual question to be resolved by a jury.  Thus, 
once a trial judge has determined that an allegedly defamatory 
statement is capable of being proved false, the jury’s function 
is to evaluate the evidence presented and to determine whether 
the plaintiff has met her burden of proving that the allegedly 
defamatory statement is false.  Only if a plaintiff 
unequivocally has admitted the truth of an allegedly defamatory 
 
11 
 
statement, including the fair inferences, implications, and 
insinuations that can be drawn from that statement, may the 
trial judge award summary judgment to the defendant on the 
basis that the statement is true.  See Shutler v. Augusta 
Health Care For Women, 272 Va. 87, 91, 630 S.E.2d 313, 315 
(2006) (summary judgment available only when no material facts 
are in dispute); Stockbridge v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., 269 Va. 
609, 618, 611 S.E.2d 600, 604 (2005) (same). 
 
In the present case, however, Hyland did not admit the 
truth of the two allegedly defamatory statements.  As we 
observed in our opinion in the first appeal in this case, the 
stated and implied import of the first statement in Hyland’s 
job performance evaluation is that Hyland was responsible for 
the losses of the two contract bids, and that those losses 
created gaps in the company’s plans and in the business units 
that she directed.  Raytheon Tech. Servs., 273 Va. at 304-05, 
641 S.E.2d at 91.  Hyland did not concede in her responses to 
Raytheon’s request for admission that this was true.  She also 
did not concede in those responses that she failed to meet her 
team’s financial targets by the percentages stated in the 
second allegedly defamatory statement. 
 
By awarding summary judgment to Raytheon in the absence of 
such admissions, the circuit court deprived Hyland of the 
opportunity to present evidence to a jury to establish the 
 
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13 
 
falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements.  The circuit 
court’s judgment also denied Hyland the right to have a jury 
consider each allegedly defamatory statement as a whole.  
Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in awarding 
Raytheon summary judgment, and that Hyland is entitled to a 
jury trial on the two allegedly defamatory statements discussed 
in this opinion.2 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment and remand the case for a jury trial consistent with 
the principles expressed in this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
2 Based on this holding, we do not address Hyland’s 
remaining assignments of error.