Title: Patterson v. Padilla

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
JESSICA MILLAN PATTERSON et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
ALEX PADILLA,  
as Secretary of State, etc., 
Respondent.  
 
S257302 
 
 
November 21, 2019 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger  
and Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Cuéllar filed a concurring opinion. 
 
1 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
S257302 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
We must decide in this case whether portions of the 
recently 
enacted 
Presidential 
Tax 
Transparency 
and 
Accountability Act (Elec. Code, § 6880 et seq.) (the Act) conflict 
with article II, section 5, subdivision (c) of the California 
Constitution (article II, section 5(c)) and are therefore invalid.  
At issue are the Act’s provisions that prohibit the Secretary of 
State from printing on a primary election ballot the name of a 
candidate for President of the United States who has not filed 
with the Secretary of State the candidate’s federal income tax 
returns for the five most recent taxable years.  Because of the 
important and time-sensitive nature of this controversy, we 
have exercised our original jurisdiction to entertain an 
emergency petition for a writ of mandate that would forbid the 
Secretary of State from enforcing the pertinent sections of the 
Act.  Upon issuing an order to show cause, we directed the 
parties to submit briefing on an expedited basis to ensure the 
matter would be decided ahead of the November 26, 2019 
statutory deadline for candidates to disclose their tax returns to 
appear on the March 3, 2020 primary ballot.1   
                                        
1  
Several lawsuits pending in federal court assert that the 
provisions of the Act that are at issue here also violate federal 
law.  Last month, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California issued an order granting the 
federal plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction that 
 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
The dispute before us turns on the interpretation of 
article II, section 5(c), which states:  “The Legislature shall 
provide for partisan elections for presidential candidates, and 
political party and party central committees, including an open 
presidential primary whereby the candidates on the ballot are 
those found by the Secretary of State to be recognized candidates 
throughout the nation or throughout California for the office of 
President of the United States, and those whose names are 
placed on the ballot by petition, but excluding any candidate 
who has withdrawn by filing an affidavit of noncandidacy.”  
(Italics added.)   
In requesting a writ of mandate, petitioners Jessica Millan 
Patterson and the California Republican Party (petitioners) 
assert that article II, section 5(c) requires a presidential primary 
                                        
prohibits the Secretary of State from enforcing these provisions.  
(Griffin v. Padilla (E.D.Cal., Oct. 2, 2019, No. 2:19-cv-01477-
MCE-DB, No. 2:19-cv-01501-MCE-DB, No. 2:19-cv-01506-MCE-
DB, No. 2:19-cv-01507-MCE-DB, No. 2:19-cv-01659-MCE-DB) 
__ F.Supp.3d __, __ [2019 WL 4863447, p. *1].)  In so ruling, the 
federal court determined that the federal plaintiffs were likely 
to demonstrate that the challenged sections of the Elections 
Code violate the qualifications clause of the United States 
Constitution (U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, cl. 5), the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution; and that the provisions of the Act are 
preempted by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.A. 
Appen. 4, § 101 et seq).  (Griffin, at p. __ [2019 WL 4863447, 
pp. *8, *10, *11, *12].)  The Secretary of State has appealed this 
ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.   
No federal claims are raised in the present case; 
petitioners’ sole argument is that the Act conflicts with article 
II, section 5(c).  
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
in which the names of all “recognized candidates throughout the 
nation or throughout California for the office of President of the 
United States” appear on the ballot.  Petitioners cast the Act as 
unconstitutional because it imposes an additional disclosure 
requirement for appearing on a presidential primary ballot.  In 
petitioners’ view, this additional prerequisite undermines the 
primary process contemplated by article II, section 5(c), and 
cannot lawfully be enforced.   
Secretary of State Alex Padilla, named as respondent, 
counters that article II, section 5(c) does not prevent the 
Legislature from prescribing disclosure prerequisites that even 
“recognized candidates throughout the nation or throughout 
California for the office of President of the United States” must 
satisfy if they are to appear on a presidential primary ballot.  In 
respondent’s view, by stating that “[t]he Legislature shall 
provide for . . . an open presidential primary,” article II, section 
5(c) confirms that branch’s long-recognized, expansive authority 
to devise reasonable rules for primary elections, including 
presidential primaries.  And subsumed within this power, 
respondent argues, is the authority to enact neutral disclosure 
laws that provide relevant information to voters and thus enable 
the electorate to make a more informed choice among 
presidential candidates.  
Upon careful consideration of the parties’ briefing and 
arguments, as well as the submission by amicus curiae, we 
conclude that petitioners are entitled to a writ of mandate.  We 
direct the Secretary of State to refrain from enforcing Elections 
Code sections 6883 and 6884, the relevant provisions of the Act, 
insofar as enforcement of these sections would keep the name of 
a “recognized candidate[] throughout the nation or throughout 
California for the office of President of the United States” from 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
being printed on the ballot of a political party that has qualified 
to participate in the primary election.   
As we shall explain, article II, section 5(c) is properly read 
as including a requirement that all persons found to be 
“recognized candidates” in the relevant sense must appear on 
the appropriate primary ballot, except when an affidavit of 
noncandidacy has been filed.  This interpretation reflects the 
most natural reading of article II, section 5(c), and it vindicates 
the intent behind this provision.  The language within article II, 
section 5(c) providing for the inclusion of “recognized” 
candidates on the primary ballot was added to the state 
Constitution through a June 1972 ballot measure, Proposition 
4.  As the history of Proposition 4 makes clear, its purpose was 
to ensure that the voters at future California presidential 
primary elections would have the opportunity, within each 
qualifying political party, to choose among a complete array of 
candidates found to be “recognized candidates throughout the 
nation or throughout California for the office of President of the 
United States,” who had not filed affidavits of noncandidacy to 
remove themselves from the ballot.  
Elections Code sections 6883 and 6884 purport to make 
the appearance of a “recognized” candidate for president on a 
primary ballot contingent on whether the candidate has made 
the disclosures specified by the Act.  This additional 
requirement, however, is in conflict with the Constitution’s 
specification of an inclusive open presidential primary ballot.  
The Legislature may well be correct that a presidential 
candidate’s income tax returns could provide California voters 
with important information.  But article II, section 5(c) embeds 
in the state Constitution the principle that, ultimately, it is the 
voters who must decide whether the refusal of a “recognized 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
candidate[] throughout the nation or throughout California for 
the office of President of the United States” to make such 
information available to the public will have consequences at the 
ballot box.   
We therefore issue the writ of mandate. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
We begin by describing the Act, and then review analyses 
of the measure that were prepared while it was still under 
consideration 
by 
the 
Legislature. 
 
We 
then 
discuss 
contemporaneous legislation that was enacted earlier this year 
as Senate Bill No. 505 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 
No. 505).  The latter statute is not directly at issue, but it is 
nevertheless relevant to the dispute before the court.  The last 
portion of this background section will relate the brief history of 
this writ proceeding.  
A.  The Presidential Tax Transparency and 
Accountability Act 
1. Senate Bill No. 27 
The Assembly and the Senate passed the Act in July 2019 
as Senate Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 27), 
and the Governor signed the measure into law.  As an urgency 
statute, the Act went into effect immediately “[i]n order to 
ensure that the protections” it affords “are in place for the 2020 
primary election.”  (Stats. 2019, ch. 121, § 3.)2   
The Act directs the Secretary of State not to print on a 
primary ballot the names of candidates for President of the 
                                        
2  
The Act was not the Legislature’s first attempt to enact an 
income tax return disclosure requirement for presidential 
candidates.  Senate Bill No. 149 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), 
 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
United States or for Governor of California who have not filed 
their federal income tax returns with the Secretary of State.  
(Elec. Code, §§ 6883-6884, 8902-8903.)  Because article II, 
section 5(c) relates only to the presidential primary ballot, only 
the provisions of the Act relating to candidates for president are 
implicated in this proceeding.   
Regarding candidates for president, the Act provides, 
“Notwithstanding any other law, the Secretary of State shall not 
print the name of a candidate for President of the United States 
on a primary election ballot, unless the candidate, no less than 
98 days before the presidential primary election, files with the 
Secretary of State copies of every income tax return the 
candidate filed with the Internal Revenue Service in the five 
most recent taxable years . . . .”  (Elec. Code, § 6883, subd. (a).)3  
The candidate must file with the Secretary of State both 
unredacted and redacted versions of these returns, removing 
                                        
introduced in 2017, also would have required candidates for 
president to release their tax returns in order to be included on 
the primary ballot.  (Id., as enrolled Sept. 20, 2017, § 1.)  Both 
houses of the Legislature passed this measure, but as discussed 
post, the bill was vetoed by then-Governor Jerry Brown. 
3  
The statute addresses the possibility that a candidate may 
not have filed federal income tax returns for all five of the most 
recent taxable years.  It provides, “If the candidate has not filed 
the candidate’s income tax return with the Internal Revenue 
Service for the tax year immediately preceding the primary 
election, the candidate shall submit a copy of the income tax 
return to the Secretary of State within five days of filing the 
return with the Internal Revenue Service” (Elec. Code, § 6883, 
subd. (b)), and, “The [disclosure] requirement . . . does not apply 
to any year in which the candidate was not required to file the 
candidate’s income tax return with the Internal Revenue 
Service” (id., subd. (c)). 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
certain personal information such as social security numbers, 
home addresses, and medical information from the latter 
version.  (Id., § 6884, subd. (a)(1).)  The candidate also must file 
with the Secretary of State a signed written consent form that 
grants the Secretary of State permission to make a redacted 
version of the tax returns publicly available.  (Id., subd. (a)(2).)   
Upon receiving the income tax returns, the Secretary of 
State is to review them to confirm that only the information 
identified by statute as subject to redaction has been removed.  
(Elec. Code, § 6884, subd. (b).)  If additional redactions have 
been made to a tax return, “the Secretary of State shall prepare 
a new version of the tax return with only the redactions 
permitted by” statute.  (Ibid.)  Within five days of receiving a 
candidate’s tax returns, the Secretary of State shall make 
appropriately redacted versions of the returns available to the 
public on the Secretary’s website.  (Id., subd. (c)(1), (2).)  These 
versions “shall be continuously posted until the official canvass 
for the presidential primary election is completed.”  (Id., subd. 
(c)(3); see also id., subd. (c)(4).)   
The Act includes the following findings and declarations 
regarding the income tax return disclosure requirement for 
presidential candidates:  “The . . . State of California has a 
strong interest in ensuring that its voters make informed, 
educated choices in the voting booth.  To this end, the state has 
mandated that extensive amounts of information be provided to 
voters, including county and state voter information guides.  
The Legislature also finds and declares that a Presidential 
candidate’s income tax returns provide voters with essential 
information regarding the candidate’s potential conflicts of 
interest, business dealings, financial status, and charitable 
donations.  The information in tax returns therefore helps voters 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
to make a more informed decision.  The Legislature further finds 
and declares that as one of the largest centers of economic 
activity in the world, the State of California has a special 
interest in the President refraining from corrupt or self-
enriching behaviors while in office.  The people of California can 
better estimate the risks of any given Presidential candidate 
engaging in corruption or the appearance of corruption if they 
have access to candidates’ tax returns.  Finally, the State of 
California has an interest in ensuring that any violations of the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause of the United States Constitution 
or statutory prohibitions on behavior such as insider trading are 
detected and punished.  Mandated disclosure of Presidential 
candidates’ tax returns will enable enforcement of the laws 
against whichever candidate is elected President.  The 
Legislature finds and declares that compliance costs with this 
requirement will be trivial.”  (Elec. Code, § 6881.)   
2. Legislative History 
The 
analyses 
prepared 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
Legislature’s consideration of Senate Bill No. 27 detailed the 
reasoning behind the measure.  A Senate floor analysis 
explained, “In 1973, the Providence Journal-Bulletin obtained 
and published data showing that President Richard Nixon had 
paid an astonishingly low amount in taxes in 1969 given his 
income for that year.  After initially resisting calls for him to do 
so, Nixon eventually released his taxes and underwent an IRS 
audit.  It turned out he had improperly claimed an exemption of 
$500,000 for papers he donated to the National Archives.  [¶]  
Ever since this incident, it has been customary — though never 
required by law — for U.S. Presidential candidates to release 
their tax returns.  Prior to 2016, only one candidate, President 
Gerald Ford in 1976, did not do so.  Ford released a summary of 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
his return instead.  [¶]  During the 2016 campaign for U.S. 
President, Donald Trump broke with this longstanding tradition 
and refused to release his tax returns.  Though prompted by 
Trump’s break with the customary practice, this bill is not 
retroactive and would only apply to future presidential 
candidates.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analysis, 
Unfinished Business Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 
Reg. Sess.) as amended June 27, 2019, pp. 4-5.)4 
Several of these analyses also considered constitutional 
issues that might be implicated by the tax return disclosure 
requirement.5  However, these assessments concentrated on 
                                        
4  
Other analyses of Senate Bill No. 27 prepared while the 
bill was under consideration by the Legislature included similar 
background discussions.  (Sen. 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 27, 2019, p. 2; 
Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis 
of Sen. Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 10, 
2019, pp. 4-7; Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 29, 2019, 
p. 2; Assem. Com. on Elections and Redistricting, Analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 29, 
2019, p. 4; Sen. Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27 
(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 11, 2019, pp. 4-5; Sen. 
Com. on Elections and Const. Amends., Analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 11, 2019, p. 3.) 
5  
These analyses commonly expressed some uncertainty 
regarding whether courts would find the measure consistent 
with the United States Constitution.  (E.g., Assem. Com. on 
Elections and Redistricting, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27 (2019-
2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 29, 2019, pp. 4-6; Sen. 
Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Mar. 11, 2019, pp. 5-14; Sen. Com. on 
Elections and Const. Amends., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27 
(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 11, 2019, pp. 3-4.)  
 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
whether the disclosure requirement comported with the federal 
Constitution.  The only analysis of Senate Bill No. 27 that 
mentioned the California Constitution was prepared for the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, and this evaluation discussed only 
the right to privacy conferred by the state charter (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 1) — not article II, section 5(c).  (Sen. Judiciary Com., 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 27, supra, p. 12, fn. 15.)6   
The analysis prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee 
recognized that Senate Bill No. 149 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), a 
similar proposal that also would have conditioned access to the 
presidential primary ballot on a candidate’s disclosure of federal 
income tax returns, had been vetoed in 2017 by then-Governor 
Jerry Brown.  The analysis recited a series of rhetorical 
questions Brown had posed in his veto message: “ ‘Today we 
require tax returns, but what would be next?  Five years of 
health records?  A certified birth certificate?  High school report 
cards?  And will these requirements vary depending on which 
political party is in power?  A qualified candidate’s ability to 
appear on the ballot is fundamental to our democratic system.  
For that reason, I hesitate to start down a road that well might 
                                        
6  
A Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of the earlier 
Senate Bill No. 149 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) discussed how that 
measure had been amended while under consideration by the 
Legislature to avoid a potential conflict with article II, section 5, 
subdivision (d) of the state Constitution, which concerns the 
inclusion of candidates on the general election ballot.  (Sen. 
Judiciary Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 149 (2017-2018 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Mar. 20, 2017, p. 11 [concluding the 
amendment “appears to eliminate the state constitutional 
concern”].)  But that analysis did not recognize, much less 
address, the separate state constitutional issue presented by 
article II, section 5(c). 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
lead to an ever escalating set of differing state requirements for 
presidential candidates.’ ”  (Sen. Judiciary Com., Analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 27, supra, at p. 14.)  The committee analysis 
acknowledged that “[t]here is, in fact, some precedent for this 
[that is, conditioning ballot access upon some disclosure by a 
presidential candidate].  In 2011, for example, the Arizona 
legislature passed a bill that would have required presidential 
candidates to submit a birth certificate in order to appear on the 
state’s election ballot.  The bill was vetoed by Governor Jan 
Brewer.  According to a senior fellow with the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 14 other states considered 
similar legislation.”  (Ibid.)  But, the analysis continued, “In 
response to this line of concern, the authors assert their belief 
that democratically elected legislatures are equipped to make 
reasoned assessments about what information is sufficiently 
important to their constituents to warrant a disclosure 
requirement and what information is not.  If legislators go too 
far in demanding disclosures of presidential candidates, their 
fully 
informed 
constituents 
can 
always 
elect 
other 
representatives who will retract the requirement.”  (Id., at 
p. 15.) 
B.  Senate Bill No. 505 
The Governor signed a separate measure, Senate Bill 
No. 505, into law on the same day he signed the Act.  Senate Bill 
No. 505 codified several criteria to be applied by the Secretary 
of State in determining who is to be placed on the appropriate 
presidential primary ballot as (i) a “recognized candidate[] 
throughout the nation or throughout California for the office of 
President of the United States” under article II, section 5(c), or 
(ii) a “generally advocated for or recognized” candidate for that 
office, in the phrasing of statutes that prescribe rules for the 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
presidential primaries of specific political parties.  (Elec. Code, 
§§ 6041, 6340, subd. (a), 6520, subd. (a), 6720, 6851.) 
Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 505, the only 
elaboration within the Elections Code of what it means to be a 
“recognized” 
candidate 
for 
president 
appeared 
in 
the 
aforementioned statutes, each specifically tailored to an 
individual party that has qualified to participate in the state 
primary election.  (See Elec. Code, § 5100 [setting forth the 
criteria for party qualification for the primary election].)  The 
earliest precursors of the current laws to this effect were enacted 
in the 1970s, shortly after Proposition 4 was approved by the 
voters.  (See Elec. Code, former § 6010, added by Stats. 1975, 
ch. 1048, § 2, p. 2468; Elec. Code, former § 6210, added by Stats. 
1975, ch. 1056, § 3, p. 2509; Elec. Code, former § 6110, added by 
Stats. 1975, ch. 1060, § 3, p. 2569; Elec. Code, former § 6310, 
added by Stats. 1974, ch. 1184, § 2, p. 2537.)   
The terms of the current statutes vary somewhat from 
party to party.  They presently provide that a candidate for 
president is to be placed on the appropriate presidential primary 
ballot when the Secretary of State finds the person to be, with 
regard to the Democratic Party, “generally advocated for or 
recognized throughout the United States or California as 
actively seeking the nomination of the Democratic Party for 
President of the United States,” with the Secretary of State to 
“include as criteria for selecting [such] candidates the fact of 
qualifying for funding under the Federal Elections Campaign 
Act of 1974, as amended” (Elec. Code, § 6041); with regard to the 
Republican Party, “generally advocated for or recognized 
throughout the United States or California as a candidate for 
the nomination of the Republican Party for President of the 
United States” (id., § 6340, subd. (a)); with regard to the 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
American Independent Party, “generally advocated for or 
recognized in the news media throughout the United States or 
California as actively seeking the nomination of the American 
Independent Party for President of the United States” (id., 
§ 6520, subd. (a)); with regard to the Peace and Freedom Party, 
“generally advocated for or recognized throughout the United 
States or California as actively seeking the presidential 
nomination of the Peace and Freedom Party or the national 
party with which the Peace and Freedom Party is affiliated” (id., 
§ 6720); and, with regard to the Green Party, “generally 
advocated for or recognized throughout the United States or 
California as actively seeking the presidential nomination of the 
Green Party or the national political party with which the Green 
Party is affiliated” (id., § 6851). 
The available historical materials indicate that prior to 
the approval of Senate Bill No. 505, the Secretary of State relied 
on various criteria or factors in identifying “recognized” or 
“generally advocated for or recognized” candidates for president.  
In 1976, then-Secretary of State March Fong Eu explained that 
in developing an initial list of “active presidential candidates for 
California,” she had “taken into consideration a number of 
factors, including the fact that the persons are announced 
candidates, appear to be actively campaigning, have qualified 
for matching federal funds under the 1974 amendments to the 
Federal Elections Campaign Act, and are slated to appear on 
other states’ primary ballots.”  (Sect. of State, News Release, 
Secretary of State Eu Selects Presidential Candidates (Jan. 30, 
1976) p. 1 (hereafter Secretary of State 1976 Presidential 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
Candidate Announcement).)  Similar criteria have been 
articulated by Eu’s successors as Secretary of State.7   
Senate Bill No. 505 added sections 6000.1 and 6000.2 to 
the Elections Code.  Section 6000.1 sets forth criteria for being 
identified as a “generally advocated for or recognized” or 
“recognized” candidate for president.  These criteria overlap to 
some extent with the factors applied by former Secretary of 
State Eu.  (Elec. Code, § 6000.1, subds. (a)-(e).)  Section 6000.2 
further provides that on or before the 98th day prior to the 
presidential primary election, a candidate for president is to file 
a form with the Secretary of State, together with any supporting 
documentation, establishing that the candidate is a “generally 
advocated for or recognized” candidate under the standard set 
forth in section 6000.1.  (Id., § 6000.2, subds. (a), (b).) 
With this action, petitioners challenge only the income tax 
return disclosure requirement for presidential candidates that 
was adopted through Senate Bill No. 27.  Our analysis here 
                                        
7  
For the 2008 California presidential primary, for example, 
then-Secretary of State Debra Bowen stated that the 
determination of whether a person would appear on the primary 
ballot as a candidate for president “is based on a number of 
factors, including whether a candidate:  [¶]  . . . [p]articipates in 
candidate debates; . . . [a]ctively campaigns in California; . . . 
[a]ppears in public opinion polls; and/or  [¶]  . . . [q]ualifies for 
federal campaign matching funds.  [¶]  Additionally, Secretary 
Bowen asked each of the six California political parties to 
submit a list of candidates whom they recognize as seeking their 
party’s nomination.”  (Sect. of State, News Release, Secretary of 
State Releases List of Presidential Candidates for February 
2008 Presidential Primary (Oct. 5, 2007) p. 1 (hereafter 
Secretary 
of 
State 
2008 
Presidential 
Candidate 
Announcement).) 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
therefore need not, and does not, address the constitutionality 
of Elections Code sections 6000.1 and 6000.2. 
C.  Procedural History 
On August 6, 2019, petitioners filed an emergency petition 
for writ of mandate or other extraordinary or immediate relief 
with this court.  The petition identifies Patterson as “an 
individual California voter, a registered Republican, and 
current Chairperson of the Petitioner California Republican 
Party.”  She alleges that she “desires to participate as a voter 
and to lead her state political party by supporting the inclusion 
of all qualified Republican Presidential candidates in the open 
Presidential primary.”  The petition for writ of mandate also 
alleges that Patterson “fears that a large number of Republican 
voters will be suppressed and discouraged from voting at the 
primary election as a result of the Secretary of State’s 
implementation of [Senate Bill No. 27], if qualified Republican 
candidates 
are 
excluded 
from 
the 
Republican 
Party’s 
Presidential primary ballot.”  The California Republican Party 
is identified as “the ballot-qualified statewide political party 
representing more than 4.7 million registered Republican 
voters,” and the petition states that the party and “its adherents 
participate in the partisan Presidential primary,” among other 
electoral contests.   
Petitioners assert that the Act’s income tax return 
disclosure requirement “plainly conflicts with the constitutional 
provision of [a]rticle II, section 5(c) guaranteeing an open 
Presidential primary.”  They request a writ of mandate that 
would prohibit respondent “from enforcing Elections Code 
sections 6883 and 6884 . . . as fundamentally inconsistent and 
in conflict with [a]rticle II, section 5(c).”  Petitioners seek this 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
relief on an emergency basis because the Act’s deadline for 
submission of tax returns to the Secretary of State is November 
26, 2019 (98 days before the March 3, 2020 primary election; see 
Elec. Code, § 6883, subd. (a)), and “the sitting President of the 
United States who has announced that he is a Presidential 
candidate for the 2020 election has in the past declined to 
release his federal tax returns.”   
After requesting and receiving preliminary opposition 
from respondent, we ordered him to show cause why a writ of 
mandate should not issue.  To ensure the timely disposition of 
the cause, we directed expedited briefing in which the parties 
would address, among other subjects, the history of Proposition 
4 and related legislation, and any guidelines, including internal 
measures and protocols, that the Secretary of State has used to 
determine who are “recognized candidates throughout the 
nation or throughout California for the office of President of the 
United States.”  
II.  DISCUSSION 
Petitioners 
and 
respondent 
advance 
divergent 
constructions of article II, section 5(c), which carry different 
implications for the constitutionality of Elections Code sections 
6883 and 6884.   
As has been explained, petitioners regard article II, 
section 5(c) as specifying a rule of inclusivity for presidential 
primary contests that cannot be infringed through legislation 
such as the Act.  According to petitioners, article II, section 5(c) 
requires all individuals who are found to be “recognized 
candidates throughout the nation or throughout California for 
the office of President of the United States” to be named on the 
appropriate primary ballot, unless an affidavit of noncandidacy 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
is filed.  And, their argument continues, even if one assumes 
that the Legislature may play a role in defining what it means 
to be “recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout 
California” as a candidate “for the office of President of the 
United States,” noncompliance with the Act’s disclosure 
provisions cannot provide a basis for excluding a candidate from 
the ballot because a candidate’s failure to file income tax returns 
with the Secretary of State is not a reasonable measure of 
whether a candidate is so recognized.  
Respondent interprets article II, section 5(c) differently.  
He emphasizes the Legislature’s expansive authority to adopt 
legislation concerning primary elections — as recognized both 
before and after the approval of Proposition 4 (e.g., Libertarian 
Party v. Eu (1980) 28 Cal.3d 535, 540; Communist Party v. Peek 
(1942) 20 Cal.2d 536, 544) — and argues that in amending the 
state Constitution to add the relevant text now found in article 
II, section 5(c), voters “did not vitiate the Legislature’s ability to 
regulate [primary] elections and pass laws that, for instance, 
limit candidates to those within recognized parties, require 
forms to be filed, or require information to be disclosed to better 
educate California’s voters.”  Respondent thus reads article II, 
section 5(c) as recognizing, rather than constraining, the 
Legislature’s power to prescribe rules governing presidential 
primary elections.  Pursuant to this authority, the Legislature 
may, in respondent’s words, “enact laws regulating the process 
by which particular candidates appear on a party’s primary 
ballot, even if they are nationally recognized.”  (Italics added.)  
From this perspective, the Act’s income tax return disclosure 
requirement for presidential candidates, including its directive 
to the Secretary of State not to place the names of noncompliant 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
candidates on the primary ballot, represents an appropriate 
exercise of the Legislature’s authority.   
To summarize the analysis that follows, we agree with 
petitioners that whatever authority the Legislature may have in 
defining how presidential primaries are to occur in this state, 
the challenged sections of the Act exceed such authority and are 
unenforceable.  These provisions purport to exclude from the 
California presidential primary ballot any candidate who does 
not comply with the income tax return disclosure requirement 
— even someone who is incontestably “recognized . . . 
throughout the nation or throughout California” as a candidate 
“for the office of President of the United States” under any 
reasonable construction of that phrasing.  But as explained 
below, article II, section 5(c) is most naturally read as conveying 
a rule of inclusivity for presidential primary elections that the 
Legislature cannot contravene.  This reading is strongly 
supported by the history of the constitutional text that now 
appears in article II, section 5(c).  This history establishes 
beyond fair dispute that this language was adopted to ensure 
that the ballots for parties participating in the presidential 
primary election would include all persons within said parties 
deemed to be “recognized candidates throughout the nation or 
throughout California for the office of President of the United 
States,” except for those candidates who filed affidavits of 
noncandidacy, so that voters in the primary election would have 
a direct opportunity to vote for or against these candidates.   
Because the relevant provisions of the Act condition a 
presidential candidate’s placement on the primary ballot on 
compliance with an additional requirement that is concededly 
not a reasonable measure of whether the candidate is 
“recognized” as such throughout the nation or California, it 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
conflicts with the rule specified by article II, section 5(c), and is 
for that reason invalid.  (People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248, 
260 [when a statute conflicts with the Constitution, “the latter 
must prevail”].)8  
A.  Article II, Section 5(c) 
Our interpretive task begins with the language of article 
II, section 5(c).  (See Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 249-250; cf. Santos v. Brown 
(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 398, 409.)  To reiterate, this provision 
states as follows:  “The Legislature shall provide for partisan 
elections for presidential candidates, and political party and 
party central committees, including an open presidential 
primary whereby the candidates on the ballot are those found 
by the Secretary of State to be recognized candidates throughout 
the nation or throughout California for the office of President of 
the United States, and those whose names are placed on the 
ballot by petition, but excluding any candidate who has 
withdrawn by filing an affidavit of noncandidacy.”   
Respondent has not sought to justify the Act’s income tax 
disclosure requirement on the ground that it represents a 
reasonable measure of whether someone is “recognized . . . 
throughout the nation or throughout California” as a candidate 
“for the office of President of the United States.”  At oral 
argument, counsel for respondent conceded that whether a 
                                        
8  
Because the issue is not before us, we need not decide here 
whether the tax return disclosure requirement can properly be 
applied to candidates for president who would qualify for the 
primary election ballot through the petition process articulated 
in article II, section 5(c).   
 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
candidate for president has filed recent tax returns with the 
Secretary of State is not indicative of whether the candidate is 
so “recognized.”9 
                                        
9  
Even apart from this concession, under any reasonable 
interpretation of the “recognized” language within article II, 
section 5(c), a candidate’s failure to disclose tax returns to the 
Secretary of State would not establish that the candidate is not 
“recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout California” 
as a candidate “for the office of President of the United States.”   
The word “recognized” is susceptible to somewhat 
different meanings.  (Compare, e.g., Black’s Law Dict. (4th ed. 
1968) p. 1436, col. 2 [defining “recognized” as “[a]ctual and 
publicly known”] with Random House Dict. of the English 
Language (1973) p. 1199, col. 3 [defining “recognize” as, among 
other things, “to acknowledge or treat as valid”].)  The repeated 
use of the word “throughout” within article II, section 5(c) 
suggests that the “recognized” language is concerned (although 
perhaps not exclusively) with a candidacy’s prominence or 
pervasiveness.  (See Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1971) p. 
2385, col. 1 [defining “throughout” as “in . . . every part of”].)  If 
this meaning applies, it seems plain that whether a candidate 
has disclosed tax returns to the Secretary of State cannot, by 
itself, be determinative of whether the candidate is “recognized.”  
Such disclosure has, at most, a highly attenuated relationship 
to public awareness of a candidacy throughout the nation or 
California — or, for that matter, to whether someone is an 
“[a]ctual” candidate for the presidency.  (Black’s Law Dict., at 
p. 1436, col. 2.)  
The disjunctive “throughout the nation or throughout 
California” language in article II, section 5(c) also suggests that 
nondisclosure of tax returns under the Act could not supply a 
basis for keeping a presidential candidate off the primary ballot 
even if the “recognized” phrasing were to be construed as being 
to some extent concerned with a candidacy’s validity.  For even 
in that case, a failure to comply with the Act’s tax return 
disclosure requirement would establish only that someone is not 
“recognized,” i.e., not regarded as valid, as a presidential 
 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
Instead, as noted, respondent posits that the legislative 
authority envisioned by article II, section 5(c)’s directive that 
“[t]he Legislature shall provide for . . . an open presidential 
primary” includes the power to adopt additional prerequisites 
for appearing on the primary ballot that even a “recognized” 
candidate for president must satisfy.10   
                                        
candidate in or by California.  It would not mean that the 
candidate is not “recognized . . . throughout the nation,” because 
a failure to satisfy this requirement would not make a candidacy 
invalid throughout the nation.   
10  
Respondent’s interpretation emphasizes language within 
article II, section 5(c) that acknowledges the Legislature’s broad 
authority to provide for primary elections, a power that was 
already well-established at the time of the 1972 primary election 
at which Proposition 4 passed.   
When the electorate approved Proposition 4, the state 
Constitution specifically described the Legislature’s authority 
over primary elections as follows:  “The Legislature shall have 
the power to enact laws relative to the election of delegates to 
conventions of political parties; and the Legislature shall enact 
laws providing for the direct nomination of candidates for public 
office, by electors, political parties, or organizations of electors 
without conventions, at elections to be known and designated as 
primary elections; also to determine the tests and conditions 
upon which electors, political parties, or organizations of 
electors may participate in any such primary election. . . .”  (Cal. 
Const., art. II, former § 2.5.) 
“The purpose of this [provision] was to give the Legislature 
a free hand in dealing with the evils which had formerly been 
prevalent in primary elections, even to the extent of excluding 
parties 
and 
individuals 
from 
participation 
therein.”  
(Communist Party v. Peek, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 544.)  This 
authority included the power to “determine the tests and 
conditions upon which participation in a primary election may 
be had either by electors as voters thereat or by electors as 
candidates thereunder.”  (Socialist Party v. Uhl (1909) 155 Cal. 
 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
But article II, section 5(c) is more readily construed as 
both recognizing the Legislature’s authority to provide for 
primary elections and imposing a specific constraint on this 
power.  This provision begins, “The Legislature shall provide for 
partisan elections for presidential candidates, and political 
party and party central committees” — language that, as 
respondent emphasizes, conveys the Legislature’s responsibility 
to develop a primary election scheme.  Immediately thereafter, 
however, 
the 
provision 
continues, 
“including 
an 
open 
presidential primary whereby the candidates on the ballot are 
those found by the Secretary of State to be recognized 
candidates throughout the nation or throughout California for 
the office of President of the United States . . . .”  (Italics added.) 
This language appears to convey an absolute requirement of a 
presidential primary ballot for each qualifying party that 
includes all persons seeking the party’s presidential nomination 
who have been found to be “recognized candidates throughout 
the nation or throughout California for the office of President of 
the United States.”  In other words, the presidential primary 
that the Legislature must “provide for” is one in which all 
persons deemed to be “recognized candidates throughout the 
nation or throughout California for the office of President of the 
                                        
776, 792.)  In an early decision by this court construing article 
II, section 2½ of the Constitution (later renumbered section 2.5), 
we observed that “[t]he right is thus conferred to prescribe any 
reasonable test and it is the duty of the [L]egislature to prescribe 
one.”  (Socialist Party, at p. 792.)   
Article II, section 2.5 of the California Constitution was 
repealed upon the approval of Proposition 7 by the electorate at 
the November 1972 general election.  Today, the various 
subdivisions of article II, section 5 of the Constitution address 
how primary elections are to occur. 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
United States” are to appear on the appropriate primary ballot 
(along with presidential candidates who qualify for the ballot 
through the petition process), except for those candidates who 
file affidavits of noncandidacy pursuant to the final clause of 
article II, section 5(c).  Under this interpretation, the 
Constitution prohibits the Legislature from adopting disclosure 
requirements that a presidential candidate identified as so 
recognized also must satisfy to appear on the primary ballot.   
The text of article II, section 5(c), therefore, does not 
support respondent’s view that the Legislature may adopt an 
income tax return disclosure requirement that could exclude 
“recognized candidates throughout the nation or throughout 
California for the office of President of the United States” from 
a presidential primary ballot.  We now turn to the history of this 
provision, which removes any doubt regarding the intent behind 
article II, section 5(c).  
B.  Historical Background 
As approved by the electorate in 1972, Proposition 4 
changed how candidates for the office of President of the United 
States qualify to be named on a primary ballot in this state.  
Before this measure came into effect, candidates for president 
had to take affirmative steps to enter the California primary.  
Advocates for ballot reform perceived that this system 
frustrated voters’ ability to choose among a comprehensive 
array of candidates at presidential primary elections and 
diminished the state’s influence in the national presidential 
nomination process.  Proposition 4 responded to these concerns 
by requiring that all nationally or California-recognized 
candidates be included on the ballot, unless a person deemed to 
be such a candidate submits an affidavit of noncandidacy.  
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
Because of this change to the presidential primary ballot, 
California voters now have the ability to express their 
preferences among candidates for their parties’ presidential 
nominations more directly and meaningfully than had 
previously been the case.    
1.  The Prior “Opt-in” Approach to the Primary Ballot  
The statutory scheme for primary elections that was in 
place in this state prior to Proposition 4 did not guarantee that 
even the most prominent presidential candidates would appear 
on a primary ballot.  To appear on the ballot, a person had to 
submit to the Secretary of State written permission for delegate 
candidates to pledge themselves to that person.  (Elec. Code, 
former § 6055.)  The candidate for president would appear on 
the primary ballot if these candidates for delegates received 
enough signatures on nomination papers.  (Id., former §§ 6057, 
6058, 6080-6088, 6804, 10261; see also Review of Selected 1975 
California Legislation (1976) 7 Pacific L.J. 237, 439 [“Prior to 
1974, presidential primary ballots for the major political parties 
in California listed only those candidates who petitioned to 
appear on the election ballot”].)   
Under this regime, some noteworthy candidates for 
president avoided the California primary.  In 1960, John F. 
Kennedy, who was elected president that November, was not 
among the candidates listed on the ballot for the Democratic 
Party primary contest.  Instead, the only persons named on that 
ballot were then-Governor Pat Brown and activist George 
McLain.  (Rarick, California Rising: The Life and Times of Pat 
Brown (2005) p. 182 (Rarick).)  Similarly, in 1968 the eventual 
Republican Party nominee, Richard Nixon, did not appear on his 
party’s California primary ballot.  The only name printed on 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
that ballot was that of Ronald Reagan, the governor at that time.  
(Owens et al., California Politics and Parties (1970) p. 88 
(Owens).)  Hubert Humphrey, Nixon’s rival as the Democratic 
Party nominee that autumn, did not directly participate in the 
1968 California presidential primary, either.  The Democratic 
Party primary ballot that year named only Senators Eugene 
McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, and then-Attorney General 
Thomas Lynch.  (Id., at p. 84; Ross & Stone, California’s Political 
Processes (1973) p. 37 (Ross & Stone).) 
The candidacies of Brown in 1960 and Reagan in 1968 
involved “favorite son” campaigns for president.  “As a favorite 
son, a governor or senator entered his state’s primary . . . even 
though he had no real hope of becoming president.  Assuming 
that he won, the state’s delegates would go to the convention 
pledged to him.  On the convention floor favorite sons had two 
alternative strategies, which often overlapped.  Sometimes they 
dreamed of snatching the nomination if none of the serious 
candidates could find a majority and the convention deadlocked.  
If not — and this was the more common outcome — they used 
their delegations as bargaining chips in dealing with potential 
nominees.  Once the favorite son withdrew, the delegates were 
not legally obligated to follow his lead in voting for another 
candidate, but often, through a combination of intimidation or 
affection, a favorite son could lead his followers to one camp or 
another.”  (Rarick, supra, at p. 182; see also Davis, Presidential 
Primaries (2d ed. 1980) pp. 189-194 (Davis).)   
Although the presence of a “favorite son” in a California 
presidential primary did not create a legal impediment to other 
candidates entering the fray, the presence of such a candidate 
could discourage national politicians from contesting the race.  
(Owens, supra, at pp. 87-88.)  As one commentator observed in 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
1970, “Recent experience suggests that despite all the reasons 
for entering the California [primary] race, some active 
presidential aspirants decline to enter.”  (Id., at p. 87.)  With a 
favorite son in the mix, “National candidates, out of courtesy, 
refrain[ed] from creating delegations in their own names.”  (Ross 
& Stone, supra, at p. 37.)  An out-of-state candidate wading into 
a primary already populated by a favorite son not only invited 
an embarrassing loss to a more locally well-known contestant; 
he or she also risked “alienating party leadership in the state or 
damaging party unity, perhaps beyond repair, just prior to a 
general election campaign.”  (Owens, at p. 88).  Meanwhile, the 
fact that a favorite son candidate was unlikely to secure a 
party’s nomination for president “mean[t] that the voter voting 
for a favorite son in reality [did] not know what national 
candidate [would] be supported” by the delegates, who were 
initially pledged to the local candidate but became free to vote 
for other candidates once the favorite son withdrew from the 
race.  (Ross & Stone, at p. 37; see Rarick, supra, at p. 182.)   
Although favorite son candidacies were a longtime feature 
of the presidential primary landscape (see Davis, supra, at 
p. 90), as the 1960s progressed criticisms of these candidacies 
mounted in California.  Critics attacked favorite son candidacies 
as hindering the ability of California voters to effectively express 
their preferences at the ballot box, and as limiting this state’s 
relevance in the national presidential primary process.  In an 
editorial following the failed Reagan candidacy in 1968, the Los 
Angeles Times newspaper opined, “Governor Reagan froze out 
all other Republican contenders by heading up a ‘favorite son’ 
delegation . . .  [¶]  The favorite son device is not new, here or 
elsewhere.  It has been used in the past by both Democrats and 
Republicans.  Yet the temper of the times is such that it should 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
now be discarded in favor of giving the voters a more direct and 
meaningful voice in the selection of their nominees.”  (Toward 
Better Elections, L.A. Times (Aug. 28, 1968) p. A4; see also 
Governor’s Veto of Primary Bill, S.F. Chronicle (Sept. 3, 1968) 
p. 38 [editorial]; Open Primary More Vital Than Ever, San Jose 
Mercury News (Feb. 27, 1969) p. 2 [editorial].)  Communicating 
a similar view among the electorate, one poll conducted in 1968 
reported that 77 percent of those surveyed would have preferred 
a choice among candidates in the 1968 Republican Party 
primary, instead of only a delegate slate pledged to Governor 
Reagan.  (Field Research Corp., The Field Poll, California Poll 
68-03 (May 15-18, 1968).) 
2.  Earlier Attempts To Enact Responsive Statutes  
The 
constitutional 
amendment 
adopted 
through 
Proposition 4 was approved by the voters in 1972 after repeated 
failures to enact statutes that would have made similar changes 
to the presidential primary ballot.  
In 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1971, bills were introduced 
in the Legislature that, had they become law, would have 
replaced the existing “opt-in” scheme for presidential primary 
candidates with a more inclusive approach.11  These proposals 
drew from an Oregon law (1961 Or. Laws, ch. 170, § 1, p. 181) 
that had made such a change to the presidential primary system 
in that state.  (See Assem. Com. on Elections and 
Reapportionment, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 145 (1968 Reg. Sess.) 
p. 1 [“Senate Bill 145 is an act to create for California a 
                                        
11  
The bill introduced in 1965 applied only to the presidential 
primary of a party for which there were fewer than 3.5 million 
registered voters in the state.  (Assem. Bill No. 1414 (1965 Reg. 
Sess.), supra, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6300].) 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
Presidential Primary system similar to the system now used in 
Oregon”].)   
Each of the ballot reform measures introduced in the 
Legislature provided that the Secretary of State “shall place the 
name” of a candidate for president upon the presidential 
primary ballot when that state officer “shall have determined in 
his sole discretion that such a candidate” (or, in some versions 
of the proposed legislation, “such candidate’s candidacy”) “is 
generally advocated for or recognized in” the “news media 
throughout the United States.”12  (Sen. Bill. No. 3 (1971 Reg. 
Sess.) as introduced Jan. 4, 1971, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, 
§ 6052]; Sen. Bill. No. 3 (1969 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 7, 
1969, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6052]; Sen. Bill No. 145 (1968 
Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 30, 1968, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, 
§ 6052]; Sen. Bill No. 586 (1967 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Mar. 
14, 1967, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6051]; Assem. Bill No. 1414 
(1965 Reg. Sess.) as introduced February 24, 1965, § 2 [proposed 
Elec. Code, § 6351].)13  All of these bills would have allowed a 
candidate to avoid being placed on the ballot by executing an 
                                        
12  
The proposed legislation introduced in 1971 would have 
added “or California” after “United States.”  (Sen. Bill. No. 3 
(1971 Reg. Sess.), supra, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6052].)   
13  
Each of these measures also made provision for the 
inclusion of additional candidates on the primary ballot when 
petitions on behalf of their candidacy had collected a sufficient 
number of signatures.  (Sen. Bill No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.), supra, 
§ 2 [proposed Elec. Code, §§ 6053-6059]; Sen. Bill No. 3 (1969 
Reg. Sess.), supra, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, §§ 6053-6059]; Sen. 
Bill No. 145 (1968 Reg. Sess.), supra, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, 
§§ 6053-6056]; Sen. Bill No. 586 (1967 Reg. Sess.), supra, § 2 
[proposed Elec. Code, § 6051]; Assem. Bill No. 1414 (1965 Reg. 
Sess.), supra, § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6351].) 
 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
affidavit stating that the person was not, and did not intend to 
become, a candidate for president in the forthcoming election.14   
The bills that were introduced in 1965 and 1967 died 
without a floor vote in either chamber of the Legislature.  (Cal. 
Legis., Final Calendar of Legislative Business (1965 Reg. Sess.) 
p. 458; Sen. Final Hist. (1967 Reg. Sess.) p. 171.)  The Assembly 
and the Senate passed the 1968, 1969, and 1971 bills,15 but in 
each instance the legislation was vetoed by then-Governor 
Reagan.  In his veto message rejecting Senate Bill No. 145 (1968 
Reg. Sess.), Reagan wrote that this measure “adds nothing to 
                                        
14  
As with the other proposed statutory reforms to the 
primary ballot discussed in the text, the bills would have 
incorporated this requirement into the Elections Code.  (Sen. 
Bill No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.) § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, § 6061]; 
Sen. Bill No. 3 (1969 Reg. Sess.) § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, 
§ 6061]; Sen. Bill No. 145 (1968 Reg. Sess.) § 2 [proposed Elec. 
Code, § 6058]; Sen. Bill No. 586 (1967 Reg. Sess.) § 2 [proposed 
Elec. Code, §§ 6051, 6052]; Assem. Bill No. 1414 (1965 Reg. 
Sess.) § 2 [proposed Elec. Code, §§ 6351, 6352].)  
15  
The Assembly and Senate passed versions of the 1968, 
1969, and 1971 bills that had been amended in the legislative 
process.  These amendments are generally immaterial to the 
issues before the court, with the possible exception of one change 
made to the 1971 measure, Senate Bill No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.).  
That bill was amended in the Assembly to add the italicized 
language that appears below:  “The Secretary of State shall 
place the name of a candidate upon the presidential primary 
ballot when the Secretary of State shall have determined in his 
sole discretion that such a candidate is generally advocated for 
or recognized in the news media throughout the United States 
or California as actively seeking his party’s nomination for 
President of the United States and that such a candidate has 
formed a delegation in conformity with the applicable provisions 
of this division.”  (Sen. Bill. No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Nov. 24, 1971, § 1, italics added [proposed Elec. Code, § 6066].) 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
the democratic process.  It is, in fact, an infringement on the 
rights of certain individuals.  It limits the people’s responsibility 
by placing the responsibility for putting names on the California 
presidential ballot on the shoulders of one man.  This is 
considerably less desirable than California’s open primary 
method which requires a significant number of persons to show 
an interest in a man’s candidacy before his name can be placed 
on the ballot.”  (Governor’s Veto Message to Sen. on Sen. Bill 
No. 145 (Aug. 22, 1968) 1969 Sen. J. (1968 Reg. Sess.) p. 4959.)  
Reagan issued similar veto messages in rejecting Senate Bill No. 
3 (1969 Reg. Sess.), the ballot reform measure approved by the 
Legislature in its 1969 Regular Session (Governor’s Veto 
Message to Sen. on Sen. Bill No. 3 (Sept. 4, 1969) 1969 Sen. J. 
(1969 Reg. Sess.) p. 5695 (hereafter 1969 Veto Message)), and 
the Senate Bill No. 3 that was approved by the Legislature in its 
1971 Regular Session (Governor’s Veto Message to Sen. on Sen. 
Bill No. 3 (Dec. 30, 1971) 1972 Sen. J. (1972 Reg. Sess.) p. 9939).  
In vetoing the 1969 measure, Reagan added, “If a candidate is, 
indeed, ‘generally recognized’ as a serious presidential 
contender, his supporters should have no difficulty in gathering 
sufficient signatures to place his name on the California ballot.”  
(1969 Veto Message, supra, at p. 5696.) 
3.  The Electorate’s Approval of Proposition 4 as a 
Constitutional Amendment, Creating an “Open 
Presidential Primary”  
In 1970, after several attempts at making changes to the 
presidential primary election by statute had failed, a 
constitutional amendment with a similar goal (Sen. Const. 
Amend. No. 3 (1970 Reg. Sess.)) was introduced in the 
Legislature.  This proposal would have added section 7 to article 
II of the state Constitution, with the text, “The Legislature shall 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
provide for an open presidential primary whereby the 
candidates on the ballot are those found by the Secretary of 
State to be recognized candidates throughout the nation or 
throughout California for the office of President of the United 
States, and those whose names are placed on the ballot by 
petition, but excluding any candidate who has withdrawn by 
filing an affidavit that he is not a candidate.”  (Sen. Const. 
Amend. No. 3 (1970 Reg. Sess.).)  The Senate approved this 
proposed amendment, but it was tabled in the Assembly and 
never came before the electorate for approval.  (Cal. Legis., Final 
Calendar of Legislative Business (1970 Reg. Sess.) p. 362.) 
The next year, both chambers of the Legislature approved 
a similar proposal, Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 3 
(1971 Reg. Sess.).  (Sen. Final Hist. (1971 Reg. Sess.) p. 501.)  
This 
measure 
represented 
an 
alternative 
method 
of 
accomplishing the goals of the aforementioned Senate Bill No. 3 
(1971 Reg. Sess.), in the event Governor Reagan vetoed the bill.  
(See letter from Sen. Alfred E. Alquist to Governor Ronald 
Reagan (Dec. 8, 1971) p. 1 [explaining that, should the Governor 
approve Sen. Bill No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.), the bill’s sponsor 
would “utilize the appropriate legislative provisions for the 
removal of [the proposed constitutional amendment] from the 
June, 1972, ballot”].)  After Governor Reagan vetoed Senate Bill 
No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.), Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 
3 appeared on the ballot as Proposition 4 at the June 1972 
primary election, at which time it was approved by the voters. 
Proposition 4 added article II, section 8 to the state 
Constitution, providing, “The Legislature shall provide for an 
open presidential primary whereby the candidates on the ballot 
are those found by the Secretary of State to be recognized 
candidates throughout the nation or throughout California for 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
the office of President of the United States, and those whose 
names are placed on the ballot by petition, but excluding any 
candidate who has withdrawn by filing an affidavit that he is 
not a candidate.”  Subsequent amendments to the state 
Constitution have altered this phrasing somewhat and moved 
the pertinent text to article II, section 5(c), but have not made 
any changes fundamental to the issue before the court.16   
The analysis and arguments regarding Proposition 4 that 
appeared within the ballot materials before the voters at the 
1972 primary election provide substantial insight into the intent 
behind this measure.  (See People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 
858, 881 [describing ballot materials as “a useful source of 
ascertaining voter intent”]; Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. 
v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
431, 445.)  These materials situate the amendment in the 
historical context summarized above (see Robert L. v. Superior 
Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 904; Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. 
City of San Jose (2000) 24 Cal.4th 537, 542, 560) and manifest 
an intent, through the measure, to require all “recognized” 
candidates for president to be placed on the appropriate party’s 
primary ballot, in order to avoid the candidate participation 
problems associated with the then-existing primary process. 
                                        
16  
Most recently, Proposition 14, which the electorate 
adopted in 2010 to create a new “top-two candidates open 
primary election” procedure for state and congressional primary 
elections, redesignated the presidential primary provision as 
subdivision (c) of section 5, article II, and slightly revised the 
opening passage of that subdivision to indicate that partisan 
elections are to be retained for presidential candidates and 
political party and party central committees.  
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
Within the relevant ballot materials, the Legislative 
Counsel’s general analysis of the measure explained, “A ‘Yes’ 
vote on this measure is a vote to require the placement on the 
presidential primary ballot of the names of all recognized 
candidates for president and all candidates qualified by virtue 
of nominating petitions, unless such a candidate withdraws.  [¶]  
A ‘No’ vote is a vote to reject this requirement.”  (Ballot Pamp., 
Primary Elec. (June 6, 1972) general analysis of Prop. 4 by 
Legis. Counsel, p. 9, italics added (hereafter June 1972 Ballot 
Pamphlet).)  The Legislative Counsel’s detailed analysis added, 
in relevant part, “This measure would add Section 8 to article II 
of the California Constitution and direct the Legislature to 
provide for an open presidential primary.  It would require the 
Secretary of State to place upon the presidential primary ballot 
of the appropriate political party as its candidates for the office 
of President of the United States, the names of those persons 
who he determined to be either (a) recognized as candidates 
throughout the nation or (b) recognized as candidates 
throughout California.”  (Id., detailed analysis of Prop 4. by 
Legis. Counsel, p. 10, italics added.)   
The arguments in favor of Proposition 4 within the official 
ballot pamphlet also described how the measure would function, 
and explained why it was being proposed.  Proponents stated, in 
pertinent part, “This Constitutional Amendment is designed to 
give voters a meaningful voice in choosing their party’s 
presidential nominee.  It requires the Legislature to provide for 
an open presidential primary in which the Secretary of State 
places on the ballot the names of recognized candidates for the 
office of President of the United States.”  (June 1972 Ballot 
Pamp., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 4, p. 10.)  The 
argument in favor of Proposition 4 later continued, “The present 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
system of selecting presidential candidates often leaves the 
voter without a direct voice in the decision.  The ‘favorite son’ 
device has been used by Governors from both parties to prevent 
a contested primary, depriving the voters of a chance to vote for 
the candidate of his choice.  [¶]  In the last presidential primary 
election, California voters were denied the opportunity of voting 
for or against either of the men who eventually became the 
presidential nominees.  [¶]  Opponents claim an open primary 
would impair ‘party unity’ and would require costly election 
campaigns.  But who wants ‘party unity’ at the expense of party 
members?  And why shouldn’t the candidates campaign in 
California as well as in New Hampshire, Indiana, and Oregon?  
[¶]  The open primary plan would make California the key state 
every presidential election.  As the most populous state in the 
union, it should be.  It is time the voters have a say in 
nominating their party’s candidate for the highest office in the 
land.”  (Ibid.)  Later, in rebutting the arguments advanced 
against Proposition 4, its advocates stated, “By placing the 
names of all recognized candidates on the ballot the Secretary of 
State can help ensure that Californians have a chance to choose 
which candidate they wish to represent their party.  California 
is the most populous state in the Union and serves as a cross 
section of the entire nation.  It is only fitting that our 
presidential primary should be important in the selection of 
presidential nominees.  [¶]  The open presidential primary will 
free the voters of California to choose their own candidates for 
President of the United States and take the decision out of the 
smoke-filled rooms.”  (June 1972 Ballot Pamp., supra, rebuttal 
to argument against Prop. 4, p. 11, italics added.) 
The opponents of Proposition 4, meanwhile, argued in 
their statements to voters within the ballot materials that the 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
existing regime did not meaningfully impede the ability of 
leading candidates for president to appear on the primary ballot.  
They explained that “[t]o appear on the ballot, a candidate and 
his supporters need only gather a reasonable number of 
signatures of registered voters who wish to have the candidate’s 
name placed on the ballot.”  (June 1972 Ballot Pamp., supra, 
argument against Prop. 4, p. 11.)  Thus, with regard to Richard 
Nixon and Hubert Humphrey, the Republican and Democratic 
Party nominees in 1968 who had not participated in that 
spring’s California primary, “if one or both of those men had 
desired to place their name before their own party members in 
California in June 1968, they could have done so.  There is 
absolutely nothing in present law which prevented them from 
entering the primary.  For their own reasons, they chose not to 
do so.”  (Id., rebuttal to argument in favor of Proposition 4, 
p. 10.)   
The opponents of Proposition 4 characterized the measure 
as objectionable because it would deny future presidential 
candidates the right to similarly choose whether to participate 
in the state primary.  They asserted, “Proposition 4 forces a 
candidate to enter the California primary.  This means that he 
must commit an immense amount of time and money to a 
campaign here, even though he may feel that his chances for the 
nomination might better be served by using that time and 
money elsewhere.”  (June 1972 Ballot Pamp., supra, argument 
against Prop. 4, at p. 11.)  The opponents maintained that “each 
presidential candidate should be free to decide which primaries 
he will enter, and Proposition 4 will deny such candidates their 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
freedom of decision.”  (Id., rebuttal to argument in favor of 
Prop. 4, p. 10.)17 
The consistent characterizations of Proposition 4 within 
the ballot materials provided to voters at the June 1972 primary 
election illuminate the intent behind this measure.  They 
establish that this legislative constitutional amendment 
responded to concerns that voters in previous California 
presidential primary elections had not consistently been 
provided with an adequate choice among candidates for 
president.  To address this problem, the proposition upended the 
preexisting system, in which all candidates had to take 
affirmative steps to appear on the primary election ballot, and 
                                        
17  
Analyses of Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 3 
(1971 Reg. Sess.) that were prepared before Proposition 4 came 
before 
the 
electorate 
for 
approval 
reflect 
a 
similar 
understanding of the ballot measure.  An analysis by the 
Assembly Committee on Elections and Reapportionment stated 
that the measure “would place on the . . . ballot the question 
whether California should have an ‘open’ Presidential primary.  
Under the measure the Secretary of State would be required to 
place all publicly recognized candidates for President on the 
primary ballot.  Other candidates could qualify by petition.  
A candidate could withdraw by filing an affidavit that he is not 
a candidate.”  (Assem. Com. on Elections and Reapportionment, 
Analysis of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.) p. 1, 
italics added.)  A summary by the Legislature’s Constitutional 
Amendments Committee similarly explained that the measure 
“[r]equires [the] Secretary of State to place all publicly recognized 
candidates for President on the primary ballot.  Other 
candidates could qualify by petition.  Any candidate could 
withdraw his name by filing an affidavit with the Secretary of 
State stating that he is not a candidate.”  (Const. Amends. Com., 
Final Summary of Selected Legislation Relating to Amending 
the Cal. Const. (1971 Reg. Sess.) p. 7, italics added.) 
 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
had sometimes declined to do so.  That paradigm was replaced 
by one in which the Secretary of State must place on the ballot 
all persons found to be “recognized . . . throughout the nation or 
throughout California” as candidates for president within 
parties that qualify for the primary election (along with 
candidates who qualify through the petition process), except for 
candidates who file affidavits of noncandidacy.18  
C.  Subsequent Developments 
The foregoing establishes that when Proposition 4 was 
approved by voters, it was understood to require that all persons 
identified as “recognized candidates throughout the nation or 
throughout California for the office of President of the United 
States” be included on the appropriate primary ballot, absent an 
affidavit of noncandidacy.  The subsequent affirmation and 
implementation of the ballot reform effected by Proposition 4 
manifest a similar understanding.   
First, at the November 1972 general election, voters 
approved Proposition 7.  This proposition adopted several 
recommendations of the Constitutional Revision Commission 
                                        
18  
These ballot materials also clarify that the affidavit of 
noncandidacy that would remove a “recognized” candidate for 
president from the ballot must do more than merely disavow 
participation in the California primary.  The argument in favor 
of Proposition 4 stated, “Persons placed on the ballot and 
wishing to be removed may withdraw simply by filing an 
affidavit that they are not a candidate for President.”  (June 1972 
Ballot Pamp., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 4, p. 10, italics 
added.)  The arguments made by the measure’s opponents in the 
ballot materials, such as their assertion that it would deny 
presidential candidates their “freedom of decision” regarding 
“which primaries [to] enter” (id., rebuttal to argument in favor 
of Prop. 4, p. 10), carry similar connotations.   
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
regarding article II of the state Constitution, relating to 
elections.  Among its provisions, Proposition 7 renumbered 
article II, section 8 of the state Constitution as article II, section 
4, and revised the introductory language of this section to 
provide (the italicized language being added through the 
proposition), “[t]he Legislature shall provide for primary 
elections for partisan offices, including an open presidential 
primary whereby the candidates on the ballot are those found 
by the Secretary of State to be recognized candidates throughout 
the nation or throughout California for the office of President of 
the United States, and those whose names are placed on the 
ballot by petition, but excluding any candidate who has 
withdrawn by filing an affidavit that he is not a candidate.”  
(Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) text of Prop. 7, appen. 
p. 9, 
italics 
added 
(hereafter 
November 
1972 
Ballot 
Pamphlet).)19  
Concerning this provision, opponents of Proposition 7 
revived an argument that had been made against Proposition 4 
at the preceding June 1972 primary election, asserting that the 
electorate should vote against the later measure because voters 
should not allow “the Secretary of State in his judgment and his 
judgment alone [to] pass[] on the candidate’s ‘recognition,’ and 
thus decid[e] as a practical matter which candidates will be 
voted on by the people.  This is too important a matter to be left 
to the judgment of any one person.”  (Nov. 1972 Ballot Pamp., 
                                        
19  
A subsequent amendment to the Constitution, approved 
by the voters as Proposition 14 in June 1976, shifted this text 
(with its language regarding the affidavit of noncandidacy 
having been made gender-neutral through the intervening 
passage of Prop. 11 in November 1974) to article II, section 5 of 
the Constitution.  
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
supra, argument against Prop. 7, p. 20.)  The proponents of 
Proposition 7 cast the issue as already settled by Proposition 4, 
explaining, “The open presidential primary was added to the 
Constitution by the people in June 1972.  A ‘Yes’ vote merely 
renumbers that provision to conform to other language in Article 
II.”  (Nov. 1972 Ballot Pamp., supra, rebuttal to argument 
against Prop. 7, p. 20.)  Nothing associated with this back-and-
forth, which implicitly equated a candidate’s “ ‘recognition’ ” 
(id., argument against Prop. 7, p. 20) with that candidate’s 
appearance on the primary ballot, suggests a view that under 
the Constitution as amended earlier that year through 
Proposition 4, the Legislature retained the authority to adopt 
disclosure requirements for presidential candidates that could 
function to exclude from the ballot even “recognized candidates 
throughout the nation or throughout California for the office of 
President of the United States.”  
Actions taken to implement Proposition 4 shortly after its 
approval also offer no indication of such an understanding.  Two 
years after Proposition 4 passed, the Legislature enacted the 
Alquist Open Presidential Primary Act (Stats. 1974, ch. 1184).  
This statute revamped the procedures applicable to the 
Democratic Party presidential primary.  As enacted, the sole 
requirement within this statute for inclusion on a presidential 
primary ballot was that a candidate be deemed “generally 
advocated for or recognized in the news media throughout the 
United States or California as actively seeking the nomination 
of the Democratic Party for President of the United States.”  (See 
Stats. 1974, ch. 1184, § 2, p. 2537 [Elec. Code, former § 6310].)  
Substantively similar language was included in other 
presidential primary laws, applicable to other political parties, 
passed by the Legislature shortly thereafter.  (See Elec. Code, 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
former § 6010, added by Stats. 1975, ch. 1048, § 2, p. 2468; Elec. 
Code, former § 6210, added by Stats. 1975, ch. 1056, § 3, p. 2509; 
Elec. Code, former § 6110, added by Stats. 1975, ch. 1060, § 3, 
p. 2569.)   
By contemplating that a presidential candidate would 
appear on the appropriate primary ballot when found to be 
“generally advocated for or recognized” in the specified manner, 
these statutes and their present-day counterparts (Elec. Code, 
§§ 6041, 6340, subd. (a), 6520, subd. (a), 6720, 6851) convey a 
conception of article II, section 5(c) that is consistent with the 
one we adopt.  As with the approval of Proposition 7 by the 
electorate, nothing within these laws implies a view that the 
Legislature can adopt disclosure requirements for presidential 
candidates that, if not complied with, would keep persons 
determined to be “recognized candidates throughout the nation 
or throughout California for the office of President of the United 
States” from appearing on a primary ballot.    
Similarly, there is no indication that the Secretary of State 
has traditionally construed article II, section 5(c) or its 
predecessor 
provisions 
as 
contemplating 
additional 
requirements for appearing on a presidential primary ballot, 
unrelated to whether someone is a “recognized candidate[] 
throughout the nation or throughout California for the office of 
President of the United States.”  As discussed ante, when 
Secretaries of State have disclosed the factors they took into 
account in deciding whether a person qualified to appear as a 
candidate on a presidential primary ballot, these considerations 
all have had a reasonable relationship to whether a candidate 
was known throughout the nation or California, or was actively 
participating in the presidential race.  (E.g., Sect. of State 2008 
Presidential Candidate Announcement, supra, at p. 1; Sect. of 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
State 1976 Presidential Candidate Announcement, supra, at 
p. 1.)   
Last, although as has been explained there was no 
discussion of article II, section 5(c) in connection with legislative 
deliberations over Senate Bill No. 27 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), 
such a conversation did occur when the Legislature debated 
Senate Bill No. 505, which was enrolled and signed by the 
Governor on the same days as Senate Bill No. 27.  Committee 
analyses of Senate Bill No. 505 reflect a common understanding 
that under article II, section 5(c), all presidential candidates 
found to be “recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout 
California” must appear on the appropriate qualifying party’s 
ballot unless an affidavit of noncandidacy is filed.  Two of these 
analyses state that Proposition 4 “placed on the 1972 primary 
ballot the question whether California should have a 
Presidential primary that required the SOS [Secretary of State] 
to place all publicly recognized candidates for President on the 
primary ballot.”  (Sen. Com. on Elections and Const. Amends., 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 505 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
March 25, 2019, p. 5; Sen. Rules Com., Office of Floor Analyses, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 505 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
May 30, 2019, at p. 6.)  
In short, by all available indications, for more than four 
decades after Proposition 4’s approval in 1972, the electorate, 
the executive, and the Legislature all interpreted the 
constitutional text now found at article II, section 5(c) similarly 
to how we construe it, i.e., as requiring an open presidential 
primary in which all persons within qualifying parties found to 
be “recognized candidates throughout the nation or throughout 
California for the office of President of the United States” are to 
be included on the appropriate presidential primary ballot.   
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
D.  The Act’s Income Tax Return Disclosure 
Requirement Conflicts with Article II, Section 
5(c) and Cannot Be Enforced 
It follows from the discussion above that insofar as 
sections 6883 and 6884 of the Elections Code make a 
presidential candidate’s disclosure of income tax returns an 
absolute prerequisite for having the Secretary of State print the 
candidate’s name on a primary ballot, this requirement conflicts 
with the more inclusive presidential primary that the electorate 
endorsed when it approved Proposition 4.20     
                                        
20  
In his preliminary opposition, respondent argued that 
petitioners lack standing to pursue a writ of mandate, and that 
section 13314 of the Elections Code makes the Superior Court 
for the County of Sacramento the exclusive venue for this action.  
(Elec. Code, § 13314, subds. (a)(1), (b).)  His response to our 
order to show cause stated that it incorporated by reference the 
arguments made in the preliminary opposition, but respondent 
did not otherwise renew these arguments in responding to our 
order to show cause — even as he advanced other reasons why 
no writ should issue.   
Assuming these arguments remain before us, they lack 
merit.  We perceive no standing issue that keeps us from 
deciding the important issues presented in the petition.  (See 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; Elec. Code, § 13314, subd. (a)(1); Save 
the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 155, 166, 170, fn. 5; Weatherford v. City of San Rafael 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1247-1248.)  Meanwhile, article VI, 
section 10 of the California Constitution vests this court with 
“original jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in 
the nature of mandamus.”  Although Elections Code section 
13314, subdivision (b) states that “[v]enue for a proceeding 
under this section shall be exclusively in Sacramento County 
[when]:  [¶]  (1) The Secretary of State is named as a real party 
in interest or as a respondent,” we do not read this provision as 
depriving this court of its original jurisdiction to entertain 
 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
As has been explained, Proposition 4 was approved by the 
electorate after voters had been denied the opportunity in 
previous California primary elections to vote for or against 
leading candidates for president, with several prominent 
candidates for that office having declined to take the steps 
necessary to qualify for the primary ballot.  To avoid a 
recurrence in future primaries, Proposition 4 instituted a 
system whereby all persons within qualifying parties who are 
found to be “recognized candidates throughout the nation or 
throughout California for the office of President of the United 
States” must be included on the appropriate presidential 
primary ballot, unless they file an affidavit of noncandidacy, 
along with candidates who qualify for the ballot through the 
petition process.  This reform advanced the interest of California 
voters in more consistently having direct and substantial 
influence in the primary process.   
Allowing the income tax return disclosure requirement 
before us to stand could effectively revoke article II, section 
5(c)’s guarantee to voters of a choice among all “recognized” 
candidates for president who do not file affidavits of 
noncandidacy.  The statutory prerequisite, if not complied with, 
would exclude from the ballot even someone who is actively 
seeking the presidential nomination of a political party that 
participates in the primary election, and is widely regarded as 
a leading contender for that nomination — precisely the sort of 
presidential candidate that article II, section 5(c) specifies must 
                                        
petitions such as the one at bar.  (See Vandermost v. Bowen 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 421, 451; California Redevelopment Assn. v. 
Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 252-253.) 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
appear on the ballot, absent the filing of an affidavit of 
noncandidacy.   
In arguing that the Legislature may properly condition a 
presidential candidate’s access to the primary ballot on 
compliance with the Act’s disclosure requirement, respondent 
emphasizes the Legislature’s broad authority to provide for a 
system of primary elections, including presidential primaries.  
(E.g., Libertarian Party v. Eu, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 540.)  Prior 
to the adoption of Proposition 4, we recognized that this 
authority includes the ability to enact reasonable rules that may 
operate to exclude some candidates from the primary ballot.  
(E.g., Communist Party v. Peek, supra, 20 Cal.2d at pp. 542-
545.)  But as discussed ante, the language and history of article 
II, section 5(c) establish that this general authority does not 
include the more specific power to exclude persons found to be 
“recognized candidates throughout the nation or throughout 
California for the office of President of the United States” from 
appearing on the ballot of a party that participates in the 
primary election.  Whatever the Legislature’s authority may be 
to define ground rules for presidential primary elections, article 
II, section 5(c) also includes a requirement of an inclusive ballot 
that such legislation must respect and embrace.   
Respondent further asserts that the Legislature’s general 
power to provide for primary elections makes it both inevitable 
and appropriate that it will have some role in defining, directly 
or indirectly, who will appear on the primary ballot as a 
candidate for president.  Making this point, respondent states 
in his briefing that “[t]he Legislature has already permissibly 
acted to define who may be a ‘recognized candidate’ through 
laws that only allow candidates identified with qualified parties 
to appear on ballots.”   
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
It is true that under current law, individuals who compete 
for the presidential nominations of parties that have not 
qualified to participate in the state primary election (see Elec. 
Code, § 5100) will not have their names printed on the primary 
election ballot, because with these candidates, there is no party 
ballot to appear on.  This is true regardless of whether such a 
candidate might meet generic criteria for being “recognized . . . 
throughout the nation or throughout California” as a candidate 
“for the office of President of the United States.”  We have no 
need here, however, to decide whether the presidential primary 
laws of this state relating to subjects such as the necessary 
qualifications of participating political parties also may 
implicate article II, section 5(c).21  Respondent’s observation 
regarding the exclusion of candidates from nonparticipating 
parties is adequately addressed by observing that whatever 
questions may exist about the intent behind Proposition 4, this 
measure manifestly sought to provide California voters eligible 
to vote for a political party that participates in the primary 
election with the opportunity to choose among all “recognized” 
candidates seeking the presidential nomination of that party — 
except, again, for those candidates who have filed affidavits of 
noncandidacy.  Insofar as the Act would make such a candidate’s 
disclosure of income tax returns a requirement for inclusion on 
a qualifying party’s primary ballot, its provisions conflict with 
this intent, and are therefore unconstitutional. 
                                        
21  
Nor, given the limited ambit of article II, section 5(c), do 
we have occasion to opine on conditions for appearing on the 
primary ballot that may be placed on candidates for political 
offices other than President of the United States.   
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
Finally, respondent observes that Proposition 4 omitted 
language found in the earlier proposed legislation relating to the 
presidential primary ballot, discussed ante, that was introduced 
between 1965 and 1971 but failed to become law.  These 
unsuccessful measures all had provided that the Secretary of 
State would determine “in his sole discretion” whether a 
candidate was sufficiently “recognized” to be included on the 
primary ballot.  (Sen. Bill. No. 3 (1971 Reg. Sess.) as introduced 
Jan. 4, 1971, § 2; Sen. Bill. No. 3 (1969 Reg. Sess.) as introduced 
Jan. 7, 1969, § 2; Sen. Bill No. 145 (1968 Reg. Sess.) as 
introduced Jan. 30, 1968, § 2; Sen. Bill No. 586 (1967 Reg. Sess.) 
as introduced Mar. 14, 1967, § 2; Assem. Bill No. 1414 (1965 
Reg. Sess.) § 2.)   
Respondent would have us infer from the absence of this 
“sole discretion” language in Proposition 4 that voters, in 
approving this measure, intended for the Legislature to have the 
authority to exclude even “recognized” candidates for president 
from the primary ballot.  This argument reads far too much into 
this shift in phrasing.  In light of the text and history of article 
II, section 5(c), the most that can be said is that the Legislature 
might properly claim some role in defining when someone is 
“recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout California” 
as a candidate “for the office of President of the United States,” 
with the precise parameters of any such authority to be defined 
another day, in another case.  Yet article II, section 5(c) also 
clearly prohibits the Legislature from imposing prerequisites 
such as the income tax return disclosure requirement before us 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
that a presidential candidate who is so recognized also must 
satisfy in order to appear on a primary ballot.22  
E.  Petitioners Are Entitled to a Writ of Mandate 
Respondent argues that no writ of mandate should issue 
because the Secretary of State has some discretion in 
determining who is “recognized . . . throughout the nation or 
throughout California” as a candidate “for the office of President 
of the United States,” and therefore, according to respondent, 
“there is no purely ministerial duty that can be mandated by 
this Court.”  But “a writ of mandate is available, in the absence 
of a ‘plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course 
of law’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086), against the implementation of 
an invalid statute.”  (Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees 
Internat. Union v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 590.)  We have 
in the past issued writs of mandate directing state officers not 
to enforce statutes we found unconstitutional.  (Hardie v. Eu 
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 371, 380; Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 
                                        
22  
Moreover, it is debatable at best whether this difference in 
phrasing between the unsuccessful earlier measures and 
Proposition 4 is even material to the interpretative question 
before the court.  This distinction was not brought before the 
electorate in the ballot materials associated with this 
proposition.  In fact, voters were told by the opponents of 
Proposition 4 that, in this respect, the amendment would 
function similarly to the scheme envisioned by the earlier 
measures.  (June 1972 Ballot Pamp., supra, argument against 
Prop. 4, p. 11 [asserting that the proposition would “give[] just 
one man, the California Secretary of State, the right to 
determine which names will be placed on the ballot for the 
highest office in this country”].)   
 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
5 Cal.3d 1, 22; see also Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de 
Kamp (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 263 [“[p]rohibitory mandate 
has also been used to restrain state officials from enforcing 
ministerial statutory provisions found to be unconstitutional”].)  
This case is similar, and we perceive no limitation on the writ 
that would prevent it from being issued here. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We hold that Elections Code sections 6883 and 6884 are 
invalid under article II, section 5(c) of the California 
Constitution insofar as they purport to require someone who is 
“recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout California” 
as a candidate for the office of President of the United States to 
file with the Secretary of State federal income tax returns as a 
necessary condition for appearing on the primary election ballot 
of a political party that has qualified to participate in that 
election.  In accordance with this holding, let a peremptory writ 
of mandate issue that directs the Secretary of State to refrain 
from enforcing Elections Code sections 6883 and 6884 as to such 
candidates.  Our judgment is final forthwith.  (See Vandermost 
v. Bowen, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 486; California Redevelopment 
Assn. v. Matosantos, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 276.) 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.  
 
We Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
1 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
S257302 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Cuéllar 
 
Our holding in this case is narrow.  The Legislature cannot 
bar from the presidential primary election ballot a candidate 
“found by the Secretary of State to be recognized . . . throughout 
the nation or throughout California” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 5, 
subd. (c)), even if that candidate fails to disclose five years’ worth 
of federal tax returns as required by Elections Code section 
6883.  The limited scope of this holding leaves intact key 
portions 
of 
the 
Presidential 
Tax 
Transparency 
and 
Accountability Act.  (Stats. 2019, ch. 121.)   
Nothing in the court’s decision, for example, prohibits the 
Legislature from finding that “as one of the largest centers of 
economic activity in the world, the State of California has a 
special interest in the President refraining from corrupt or self-
enriching behavior while in office.”  (Elec. Code, § 6881.)  And no 
party to this case disputed the fact that voters “can better 
estimate the risks of any given Presidential candidate engaging 
in corruption or the appearance of corruption if they have access 
to candidates’ tax returns,” given how a “Presidential 
candidate’s income tax returns provide voters with essential 
information regarding the candidate’s potential conflicts of 
interest, business dealings, financial status, and charitable 
donations.”  (Ibid.)   
Nor does our holding prohibit the Legislature from 
encouraging or seeking such information from a presidential 
PATTERSON v. PADILLA 
Cuéllar, J., concurring 
 
2 
candidate, so long as provision of that information is not a 
condition for the recognized candidate’s name to appear on 
California’s primary election ballot.  But it’s worth noting, too, 
that an interest in the financial transparency of those seeking 
to become the Chief Executive of the United States is not one of 
those attributes distinctive to California.  Indeed, it’s quite easy 
to find the tax returns disclosed by our nation’s Presidents, with 
only a few exceptions, dating back to 1932 on various news and 
stand-alone websites, as well as the tax returns disclosed by 
many of the unsuccessful candidates over the past 40 years.  The 
general availability of this information reflects an ongoing 
public and historical interest in the financial honesty and 
competence of those seeking the highest office in the land.   
That the public, through moral suasion or a legal 
requirement crafted by its elected representatives, has so often 
succeeded in forcing disclosure of essential financial information 
about political candidates would not have come as a surprise to 
our nation’s founders.  As Thomas Jefferson cautioned in the 
first years after independence, “[t]he time to guard against 
corruption and tyranny is before they shall have gotten their 
hold on us.  It is better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to 
trust to drawing his teeth and talons after he shall have 
entered.” 
 
(Jefferson, 
The 
Jefferson 
Cyclopedia: 
 
A 
Comprehensive Collection of the Views of Thomas Jefferson 
(Foley ed. 1900) p. 210.)  The force of that warning remains 
undiluted by today’s decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
              
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Patterson v. Padilla 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXXX 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No.  S257302 
Date Filed: November 21, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Bell, McAndrews & Hiltachk, Charles H. Bell, Thomas W. Hiltachk and Terry J. Martin for Petitioners. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony R. Hakl, Jay 
C. Russell and Chad A. Stegeman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent. 
 
Boies Schiller Flexner, David Boies, Maxwell V. Pritt and Alexander J. Holtzman for Dean Erwin 
Chemerinsky as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Thomas W. Hiltachk 
Bell, McAndrews & Hiltachk 
455 Capitol Mall, Suite 600 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 442-7757 
 
Jay C. Russell 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 
(415) 510-3617