Title: Rennels v. Rennels

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

127 Nev., Advance Opinion 44
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

AUDREY RENNELS, No. 53872
Appellant, FIL
10d RENNELS AND SBNNIFER ED
RENNELS, 5
Respondents. 48 O 20tt

 

wy
Appeal from a district court order granting respondents’
motion to terminate grandparent visitation with respondents’ minor child.
Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County;
Steven E. Jones, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.

Hutchison & Steffen, LLC, and Michael K. Wall, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Law Office of Daniel Marks and Daniel Marks, Las Vegas,
for Respondents.

BEFORE SAITTA, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

OPINION:

By the Court, HARDESTY, J.

Grandparents and other nonparents are typically not entitled
to visitation with a minor child as a matter of right because there is a
recognized presumption that a parent's desire to deny visitation is in the
best interest of the child. However, pursuant to NRS 125C.050, a

MA 393

 
grandparent or other nonparent may be granted judicially approved

visitation rights in some instances. The first issue presented in this

 

appeal is whether the stipulated visitation order between a parent and a
grandmother was a final decreo entitled to res judicata protections. We

conclude that it was, so we must noxt examine whether the parental

 

presumption continues to apply when a parent seeks to modify or
terminate a nonparent's judicially approved visitation rights with a minor
child, We conclude that the p
the court’

 

‘ental presumption applies at the time of

initial determination of a nonparent's visitation rights.

 

However, when, as in this case,

   

parent secks to modify or terminate the
judicially approved visitation rights of a nonparent, the parental
presumption is no longer controlling.

In 50 concluding, we adopt the two-prong test enunciated in
Ellis_v, Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 150, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007), in
circumstances where a party seeks to modify or terminate a nonparent’s
judicially approved visitation rights with a minor child, and we now hold
that modification or termination of a nonparent’s judicially approved
visitation rights is only warranted upon a showing of a substantial change
in circumstances that affects a child’s welfare such that it is in the child's
best interest to modify the existing visitation arrangement. Id. Applying
the test to this case, we conclude that the district court failed to articulate
any substantial change in circumstances before it terminated appellant's
nonparent visitation rights with her granddaughter and, therefore, it is
not in the best interests of the child to terminate visitation. Thus, we

reverse,

FACTS
Respondent Roger Rennels and Martha Contreras were
married in 1994 and had a child, Martina, in 1999. In 2001, the couple

 

 
divorced, and Roger received sole custody of Martina, Approximately two
months after Roger and Martha divorced, Roger and Martina resided with
Roger’s mother, appellant Audrey Rennels, in northern California, They
lived with Audrey for five months, during which time Martina and Audrey
enjoyed a close relationship. After living with Audrey, Roger and Martina

moved to Texas, Martina and Audrey remained close after the move.

 

Audrey also visited Roger and Martina in Texas several times, and
Martina visited Audrey for several weeks in 2002. In July 2003, Roger
and Martina moved to Las Vegas. Thereafter, Roger married his current
wife, respondent Jennifer Rennels, and Jennifer adopted Martina in June
2006.

According to Audrey, Roger disapproved of the frequent
contact between Martina and Audrey, and he stopped allowing Martina to
see Audrey in June 2004. In response, Audrey sought court-ordered

 

nonparental visitation pursuant to NRS 125C.050, which allows a
nonparent to seek visitation rights. Roger opposed Audrey's petition and
also filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

‘The district court conducted a hearing in December 2005 and
denied the motion to dismiss, noting that an evidentiary hearing was
required because there is a rebuttable presumption that granting
nonparental visitation over a parent's objection is not in the child’s best
interest. Before the evidentiary hearing occurred, however, the parties
reached a settlement of the visitation issues. Pursuant to this settlement,
the parties prepared and submitted to the court a stipulation and order in

which they agreed that “all pending issues” between them were resolved
and specified a detailed visitation schedule for Audrey. The district court

 

 
approved the stipulation and issued a visitation order effecting its
provisions.
‘The visitation order included the appointment of a guardian

ad litem and allowed Audrey to have four supervised visits with Martina

 

per year, The guardian ad litem was instructed to select a psychologist,
and Audrey, Roger, and Martina were required to undergo counseling with
the selected psychologist, The supervised visitation requirement was to be
reviewed every six months by the guardian ad litem and the psychologist
to determine whether supervision was still necessary. Under the
visitation order, if the guardian ad litem and the psychologist concluded
that Audrey could have unsupervised visits, Roger would abide by that
determination. ‘The order also provided that, before involving the district
court again, the parties would attempt to mediate any visitation disputes
with the guardian ad litem.

‘The parties apparently followed the visitation order until
2008. During this time, the psychologist, Dr. John Paglini, gave generally
favorable reports regarding Audrey and Martina’s visits, and he
ultimately recommended unsupervised visitation. However, Roger refused
to allow unsupervised visits. In December 2008, three months after Dr.
Paglini recommended unsupervised visits, Audrey filed a motion to compel
Roger to comply with the visitation order. In her motion, Audrey asserted
that she was entitled to unsupervised visits based on the visitation order
and Dr. Paglini’s recommendation. Roger and Jennifer opposed Audrey's

motion and, concurrently, filed a countermotion to terminate Audrey's
visitation rights altogether. They argued that the district court failed to

comply with Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion),
which held that parents have a due process right to make child rearing

 

 
decisions, and this creates a presumption that a parent's wishes are in the
best interests of the child. Id, at 69-70. In reply, Audrey argued that the
district court complied with Troxel, and that the parties stipulated to a
visitation schedule. She further contended that the stipulated visitation
order was a final judgment and therefore res judicata principles applied.

After hearing the parties’ arguments on the motions, the
district court denied Audrey's motion to compel Roger's compliance with
the stipulated visitation order and terminated her visitation rights. ‘The
district court reasoned, in relevant part, that: (1) Audrey had no
fundamental rights to visitation in light of the presumption that fit
parents act in the best interest of the child, even with a prior visitation
order in place; (2) acrimony between the parties had increased; and (3)
continued visitation was not in Martina’s best interest. This appeal
followed.

DISCUSSION

In resolving this appeal, we must first determine whether the
stipulated visitation order is a final order that precluded relitigation of
Audrey's right to visitation with Martina, We then consider the proper
standard for determining whether modification or termination of Audrey's
judicially approved nonparental visitation rights was warranted,
Standard of review

Generally, “[tJhis court reviews the district court's decisions
regarding custody, including visitation schedules, for an abuse of
discretion,” Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 428, 216 P.3d 213, 226 (2009),

because child custody matters rest in the trial court’s sound discretion.
Wallace v. Wallace, 112 Nev. 1015, 1019, 922 P.2d 541, 543 (1996). The
district court’s factual findings will not be set aside if supported by
substantial evidence. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239,

 

 
 

oe

 

242 (2007). However, “we will review a purely legal question .. . de novo.”
Waldman _v. Maini, 124 Nev. 1121, 1128, 195 P.3d 850, 855 (2008).
Determining whether a stipulated visitation order is final is a question of
law subject to de novo review.

‘There is strong public policy favoring the prompt agreement
and resolution of matters related to the custody, care, and visitation of
minor children. See Rivero, 125 Nev. at 429, 216 P.3d at 226.27
(recognizing that parties are free to contract regarding child custody and
such agreements are generally enforceable); Ellis, 123 Nev. at 161, 161
P.3d at 243 (same). Therefore, we encourage voluntary resolution of these
matters, and we will generally recognize the preclusive effect of such
agreements if they are deemed final. See Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev.
98, 105, 86 P.3d 1042, 1047 (2004) (explaining that the “changed
circumstances” factor, which is required to modify a primary physical
custody arrangement, is based on res judicata principles); see also Hopper
v. Hopper, 113 Nev. 1188, 1143-44, 946 P.2d 171, 174-75 (1997); Mosley v.
Figliuzzi, 113 Nev. 51, 58, 930 P.2d 1110, 1114 (1997).

‘An order is final if it “disposes of the issues presented in the
case... and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court.”
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 445, 874 P.2d 729, 733
(1994) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). Finality is

We recognize an exception to this rule when the moving party seeks

to introduce evidence of domestic violence of which it was unaware at the

time of the original custody decree. Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 105,
86 P.3d 1042, 1047 (2004). However, domestic violence is not at issue in
this case.

 
determined based on what the order “actually does, not what it is called.”
Id, In the family law context, the California Supreme Court has held that

a “stipulated custody order is a final judicial custody determination .. . if

 

there is a clear, affirmative indication the parties intended such a result.”
Montenegro v. Diaz, 27 P.3d 289, 295 (Cal. 2001). It is irrelevant whether

the order is the result of a stipulated agreement between the parties that

 

is later judicially approved or it is achieved through litigation. Id, at 204.
Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the order fully resolved the issues
between the parties

Once a final judgment is entered in a nonparental visitation
matter, whether in a contested hearing or by stipulation, it has a
preclusive effect on later litigation, Ingram v. Knippers, 72 P.3d 17, 22
(Okla, 2003) (“A consent judgment is entitled to the same preclusive
treatment as a contested judgment”). This serves to prevent parties from
relitigating the same issues. Id,; accord Rivero, 125 Nev. at 431, 216 P.3d
at 228 ; Ellis, 123 Nev. at 151, 161 P.3d at 243; Castle, 120 Nev. at 105, 86
P.3d at 1047; Hopper, 113 Nev. at 1143-44, 946 P.2d at 174-75; Mosley,
118 Nev. at 58, 930 P.2d at 114

Audrey's and Roger's actions, along with the specific language
in the order, clearly demonstrate that they intended the stipulated
visitation order to be final with regard to Audrey's visitation with
Martina. The document signed by the parties and approved by the district
court shows that the parties intended to resolve their visitation dispute
through the order. For example, the parties introduced the terms of the
stipulation by stating that “this matter, as well as all pending issues, shall
be resolved with the following stipulations and agreements.” The order

memorializes the parties’ agreement, sets forth the specific parameters for

 

 
Audrey's visitation with Martina, and provides for modification of the
visitation arrangements with the approval of the guardian ad litem and
Dr. Paglini.

‘There is no indication that the parties intended the stipulated
visitation order to be anything other than a final judgment, and neither

 

party challenged the order for over two years. ‘The parties also expressly
intended to avoid further involvement with the district court as they
stipulated to mediate any future disputes with the guardian ad litem.

Only if they were unable to resolve the dispute through mediation with

 

the guardian ad litem would the matter come back to the district court.
Furthermore, as part of their stipulation, the parties vacated the
evidentiary hearing that had been scheduled to resolve Audrey's visitation
rights, Therefore, we conclude that the stipulated visitation order is a
final judgment.

Because the stipulated visitation order in this case is a final
judgment, it precludes relitigation of Audrey's right to visitation with
Martina based on the same set of facts the district court already
considered. ‘Thus, we must next determine under what circumstances a
nonparent’s judicially approved visitation rights can be modified or

terminated? Specifically, we examine whether parents are entitled to the

*Roger maintains that there are differences between the nonparent
visitation rights of grandparents and those of nongrandparents who have
established a meaningful relationship with the child. However, all
nonparents are similarly situated regarding custody and/or visitation
because Nevada does not distinguish grandparents from other nonparents.
See NRS 125C.050(2) (allowing any nonparent with whom a child has
resided and has established a meaningful relationship to petition for
reasonable visitation with the child),

 

 
continued presumption that their desire to restrict visitation with a
nonparent is in the best interest of the child when they seek to modify or
terminate the judicially approved visitation rights of a nonparent. We
conclude that parents are not entitled to this presumption when they seek
to modify or terminate a judicially approved visitation arrangement, and
we adopt the two-prong test from Ellis for assessing whether modifying or
terminating court-ordered visitation is appropriate. 123 Nev. at 150, 161
P.3d at 242.
‘The parental presumption

‘The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that
“there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their
children.” Troxel v, Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (plurality opinion),
‘Therefore, when a nonparent requests visitation with a child, courts “must
accord at least some special weight” to the fit parents’ wishes. Id, at 70.
Nevada's nonparent visitation statute also provides such deference to the
parent, providing that after a parent has “denied or unreasonably
restricted visits with the child, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
[nonparent’s] right to visitation... is not in the best interests of the
child.” NRS 125C.050(4). NRS_125C.050(6) lists the threshold
requirements for overcoming this presumption. The statute is silent on
whether the same presumption applies when a parent seeks to modify or
terminate visitation rights that the distriet court previously granted to a
nonparent, but this court has previously determined that parents do not
get the benefit of the presumption when nonparents obtain court-ordered
custody of a child. See Hudson v. Jones, 122 Nev. 708, 713, 138 P.3d 429,
432 (2006). We now extend this holding to judicially approved nonparent
visitation arrangements.

oe 9

one
aS ee

 
In Hudson, a grandmother obtained joint legal and primary
physical custody of her grandchild after the child's mother was killed in a
drive-by shooting related to the father's gang involvement. Id, at 709-10,
138 P.8d at 430, The court determined that the father was “an unfit
parent and that sufficient extraordinary circumstances existed to
overcome the parental preference.” Id, at 710, 138 P.8d at 430. Ten years
later, the father sought to modify the district court's order granting
custody to the grandmother, contending that he had turned his life around
and was fit to be a parent to his child. Id. The district court found that
the father had indeed significantly changed his lifestyle. Id, ‘Thus, the
district court felt “bound to apply the parental preference presumption,”
and it granted the father’s request to modify the custody arrangement
‘with the child so that he would have sole legal and physical custody. Id,
We reversed the district court, holding that the parental
presumption does not apply to a previously “litigated custody dispute”
because “applying the parental preference to modifications would only
‘weaken the substantial change requirement.”* Id, at 713, 198 P.3d at 432
(quoting C.R.B.v, C.C,, 959 P.2d 375, 380 (Alaska 1998), disagreed with
on_other grounds as stated in Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1085
(Alaska 2004)). We recognized that when there is a court-ordered custody
arrangement, the nonparent has effectively rebutted the parental
presumption, after which the child's need for stability becomes a

 

‘However, we held that the parental presumption continued to apply
to temporary nonparent custody situations, such as temporary
guardianships. Hudson v. Jones, 122 Nev. 708, 711-12, 138 P.3d 429, 431-
32 (2006).

10

 
7

 

Paramount concern, Id. at 713-14, 138 P.3d at 432-33. Thus, we
concluded that the same test should apply to requests to modify court-
ordered parent-nonparent custody arrangements as to proposed
‘modifications of parent-parent arrangements. Id, at 713, 198 P.3d at 432.
We are persuaded that this rationale also applies to requests

 

to modify or terminate judicially approved nonparent visitation. When a
nonparent obtains visitation through a court order or judicial approval

they have successfully overcome the parental presumption and are in the
same position as a parent seeking to modify or terminate visitation,
Declining to apply the parental presumption once the court has approved
nonparental visitation not only gives deference to a court's order, but it
also promotes the important policy goal of stability for the child. Ellis, 123
Nev. at 151, 161 P.3d at 243 (recognizing that stability is an important
concern in making custody and visitation determinations); Ine V.L.K., 24
S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. 2000) (stating that “modification suits raise
additional policy concerns such as stability for the child and the need to
prevent constant litigation in child custody cases”), If parents can
unilaterally modify or terminate visitation with nonparents, with whom a
child has had an ongoing relationship, and which exists because the court
has adjudicated and approved a visitation schedule, the order would serve
no legal or policy purpose. Thus, we adopt the test we enunciated in Ellis
for modifying custody arrangements among parents and apply it to

‘Pursuant to NRS 125A.045, child custody determinations include
visitation and modifications of visitation.

u

 
modifying or terminating judicially approved nonparent visitation rights.
In Ellis, we concluded that “modification of primary physical custody is
warranted only when (1) there has been a substantial change in
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best
interest is served by the modification.” 123 Nev. at 150, 161 P.3d at 242,
In applying this test, the district court should evaluate the two prongs

without regard to the parental preference,®

Other jurisdictions generally agree that Troxel’s parental
presumption applies to the initial determination regarding visitation but
not to a request to modify or terminate that agreement, In Albert v.
Ramirez, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that a “judicially
sanctioned consent decree” setting forth custody and visitation for a
nonparent gave the nonparent rights that are not subject to the Troxel
parental best interest presumption. 613 S.E.2d 865, 869-70 (Va. Ct. App.
2005). Therefore, a parent who wishes to change or terminate a judicially
approved agreement must first demonstrate a material change in
circumstances. Id, at 870. To hold otherwise, the court noted, “would
render all such custody decrees void and unenforceable.” Id. at 869-70.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico held that “Troxel does not
shift the burden [of establishing cause] away from a parent who seeks to
modify an existing order granting grandparent visitation.” Deem_v.
Lobato, 96 P.3d 1186, 1191 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004); see_also Ingram _v.
Knippers, 72 P.3d 17, 22 (Okla. 2003) (‘While a fit parent contesting
grandparental visitation is entitled to a presumption that the parent will
act in the best interest of the child,...a court will not modify a valid
visitation order without the moving party first showing a substantial
change of circumstances.” (internal citation omitted)); In Interest of
Ferguson, 927 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. App. 1996) (“[Whatever effect [the
parental] presumption may have in an original custody action, it cannot
control a suit to change custody.” (quoting Taylor v. Meek, 276 8.W.2d
787, 790 (Tex. 1955)))

 

oon we
os

 
 

 

‘The requirement that a party requesting modification or

termination of a judicially approved visitation arrangement demonstrate a
substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child “is
based on the principle of res judicata’ and ‘prevents “persons dissatisfied
with custody decrees {from filing] immediate, repetitive, serial motions
until the right circumstances or the right judge allows them to achieve a
different result, based on essentially the same facts.”” Ellis, 123 Nev. at
151, 161 P.3d at 243 (alteration in original) (quoting Castle v. Simmons,
120 Nev, 98, 103-04, 86 P.3d 1042, 1046 (2004) (quoting Mosley _v.
Figliuzzi, 113 Nev. 51, 58, 930 P.2d 1110, 1114 (1997). In assessing
whether circumstances have sufficiently changed to modify visitation,
“courts should not take the [analysis of this] prong lightly.” Id, While we

 

do not address what constitutes changed circumstances sufficient enough
to modify or terminate a nonparent's visitation rights, we note that the
existence of some hostility between the parent and nonparent is
insufficient because obviously some animosity exists between a nonparent
and a parent when one party must resort to litigation to settle visitation
issues. See Mosley, 113 Nev. at 68, 930 P.2d at 1114 (concluding generally
that the fact that parents cannot get along will not justify modifying
custody); Poppe _v. Ruocco, 869 N.Y.S.2d 767, 773 (Fam. Ct. 2008)
(recognizing that it is obvious that animosity between the parties exists
when a grandparent must seek legal means to obtain visitation rights)

 

Here, neither the parties nor the district court addressed
changed circumstances before the court terminated Audrey's visitation

rights. Nowhere in Roger's countermotion did he contend that any change

13,

 
nen

 

in circumstances had occurred since the district court entered its
stipulated visitation order that justified reevaluating Audrey's visitation
with Martina, Similarly, the district court never made specific findings

regarding changed circumstances, but instead afforded deference to the

 

parental presumption pursuant to Troxel and found that continued
visitation with Audrey would not be in Martina’s best interest. The court
failed to explain what circumstances had changed and instead summarily
stated that “acrimony between the parties ... remains and rather than
diminish it appears said acrimony has increased.” Such acrimony between
parent and a nonparent, by itself, is insufficient to demonstrate changed
circumstances.
The best interests of the child

‘The second prong of the test follows the statutory requirement
that, in child custody determinations, “‘the sole consideration of the court
is the best interest of the child.” Ellis, 123 Nev. at 151-52, 161 P.3d at 243,
(quoting NRS 125.480(1)); NRS 125A.045(1), (2). In evaluating whether a
parent's request to modify or terminate a nonparent's judicially approved
visitation is in the best interest of the child, courts should consider “the
factors set forth in NRS 125.480(4) as well as any other relevant
considerations.” Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 243. In applying
these factors, the district court must consider that “custodial stability
is... of significant concern when considering a child's best interest.” Id.

"We recognize that the factors in NRS 125.480(4) apply specifically
to custody of a minor child. ‘These factors also provide guidelines for
assessing the best interest of a child in the context of nonparent visitation,
and the district court should apply them accordingly.

4

 
at 161, 161 P.3d at 243. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order
granting Roger's motion to terminate Audrey's visitation rights and
remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. The stipulated visitation order shall remain in full force
and effect until such time as the district court modifi

 

or terminates it in
a manner consistent with this opinion. Pursuant to the stipulated

visitation order, visitation was not to be altered without input from both

 

the psychologist and the guardian ad litem. It appears from the record
that the appointed guardian ad litem was not involved in this matter after
her initial selection of Dr. Paglini as the psychologist who would counsel
the parties.” On remand, the district court shall appoint a new guardian
ad litem before evaluating whether Audrey’s supervised nonparental
visitation rights should be modified based on the stipulated order entered
by the district court or terminated under the two-prong test we have

a

Hardesty

‘enunciated in this opinion.

    

Parraguirre

“In a September 2008 letter, Dr. Paglini noted that there was no
guardian ad litem with whom he could consult regarding his assessment of
the parties.