Title: KENT A. KING v. STATE OF WYOMING ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KENT A. KING v. STATE OF WYOMING ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2007 WY 109161 P.3d 1086Case Number: Nos. 06-114 AND 06-262Decided: 07/12/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
KENT 
A. KING,

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OFWYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION,

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 
 
 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The Honorable Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, Judge (06-114)

The Honorable Peter G. 
Arnold, Judge (06-252)

 
Representing Appellant:

Ronald G. 
Pretty, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Douglas 
J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dana Jill Lent, Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
In this consolidated 
case, Appellant Kent King argues that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305 (LexisNexis 
2005) is unconstitutional.1  He also contends that the Hearing 
Examiner did not have the power to suspend his commercial driver's license.  We affirm in both 
cases.

[¶2]           
We address the following 
issues:

1.   Does Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305(n) (LexisNexis 2005)2 violate equal protection guarantees 
under the Wyoming and federal 
constitutions?

 
 
2.   Did the Hearing Examiner have the 
authority to suspend Mr. King's commercial driver's 
license?

 
 

 
 

[¶3]           
Mr. King is a commercial 
truck driver.  While driving his 
commercial vehicle on October 16, 2004, he was pulled over and arrested for 
driving while under the influence.  
Mr. King later pled guilty in Laramie County Circuit Court in exchange 
for a deferred sentence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301.3  The Department of Transportation, on 
notice of Mr. King's deferral, issued an Order of Disqualification suspending 
his commercial driver's license for one year.4

[¶4]           
Mr. King contested his 
suspension in an administrative proceeding.  He argued that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-7-305(n) violated his equal protection rights by inflicting a greater burden 
on commercial drivers than non-commercial drivers.  He relied on the fact that 
non-commercial drivers could still drive to and from work with a probationary 
license.  Probationary licenses give 
no commercial driving privileges, so commercial drivers cannot work during their 
suspensions.  The Hearing Examiner 
sustained Mr. King's one-year suspension in its Order Upholding One Year 
Commercial Disqualification.

[¶5]           
Mr. King next filed a 
petition for review of agency action in the district court, arguing again that 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305(n) is unconstitutional.  The court dismissed Mr. King's 
petition.  Mr. King then appealed to 
this Court.

[¶6]           
While his direct appeal 
was pending in this Court, Mr. King filed an independent action for declaratory 
judgment in the district court, again attacking the constitutionality of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305(n) on equal protection grounds.  The Department moved for dismissal under 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), and the district court dismissed Mr. King's petition.  The district court based its decision 
primarily on Wilson v. State ex rel. Office of Hearing 
Exam'r, 841 P.2d 90 (Wyo. 1992), in which we upheld the 
constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305.  Mr. King continues this constitutional 
argument on appeal, and also now asserts that the Hearing Examiner lacked 
authority to suspend his license under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-7-305.

[¶7]           
 "Issues of constitutionality are 
questions of law and are reviewed de novo."  Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 22, 30 P.3d 47, 
54 (Wyo. 2001).  We presume all laws 
to be constitutional and resolve any doubts in their favor.  Id.  Unless fundamental constitutional rights 
are involved, the statute's challenger bears the heavy burden of showing it is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 586, 589 (Wyo. 2001).

[¶8]           
Mr. King concedes that we 
upheld the constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305 in Wilson, 841 P.2d 90.  In Wilson, the 
appellant, a commercial truck driver, was arrested for driving his personal 
vehicle while under the influence.  
Id. at 91.  At the administrative hearing, the 
Examiner issued Mr. Wilson a probationary driver's license, but that license did 
not allow commercial driving.  
Id.  Mr. Wilson challenged his suspension in 
this Court, arguing that the statute allowing non-commercial drivers to continue 
employment using a probationary license denied equal protection of the law to 
commercial drivers.  Id. at 
94-95.

[¶9]           
To resolve the issue, we 
applied the four-part equal protection test under the Wyoming 
Constitution:

First, 
what class is harmed by the legislation and has that group been subjected to a 
"tradition of disfavor" by our laws? . . .  Second, what is the public purpose that 
is being served by the law?  Third, 
what is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the 
disparate treatment?  And lastly, 
how are the characteristics used to distinguish people for such disparate 
treatment relevant to the purpose that the challenged laws purportedly intend to 
serve?

Id. at 95 (quoting Johnson v. State, 838 P.2d 158, 166 
(Wyo. 
1992)).

 
 

[¶10]      
After analyzing all four 
factors, we determined that the characteristic of driving dangerous vehicles was 
"highly relevant" to the public safety purposes achieved by a commercial 
driver's suspension.  Id. at 96.  "The Legislature made a policy choice by 
deciding that it was better to ensure public safety during the suspension period 
and not allow commercial employment during that period rather than allow 
commercial operation during the suspension and force risk upon the public."  Id.

[¶11]      
Mr. King, however, urges 
us to revisit the issue and overturn Wilson.  His briefs include no persuasive 
argument for doing so.  We will 
adhere to our prior decision in Wilson and hold 
that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305(n) does not violate Mr. King's equal protection 
rights.5

[¶12]      
In his second argument, 
Mr. King contends that the Hearing Examiner had no power to suspend his driver's 
license under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305(n) because the circuit court's deferral 
order did not explicitly cite Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301.  We refuse to consider this second 
argument.

[¶13]      
Mr. King did not raise 
this issue before the Hearing Examiner, nor did he pursue it on direct review in 
the district court.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(C) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  Instead, he 
admitted that "[h]e entered a plea agreement pursuant to W.S. 7-13-301."  The first time he mentioned the issue 
was in his declaratory judgment action.  
A declaratory judgment action is the proper way to present constitutional 
issues, but not other issues that should have been preserved in the 
administrative proceeding.  See In re State Bank Charter Application of 
Sec. Bank, Buffalo, 606 P.2d 296, 300 (Wyo. 1980); Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, ¶¶ 6-7, 95 P.3d 794, 795-96 (Wyo. 
2004).

[¶14]      
Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Case No. 
06-114 is an appeal from the district court's review of an administrative 
hearing decision revoking Mr. King's commercial driver's license.  Case No. 06-252 is an appeal from the 
district court's dismissal of his petition for declaratory 
judgment.

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-7-305(n) states:

A 
discharge or dismissal under W.S. 7-13-301 shall not limit the authority of the 
department to disqualify a driver from operating a commercial vehicle if the 
discharge or dismissal under W.S. 7-13-301 is from an offense specified in this 
section and the person has been placed on probation as provided in W.S. 
7-13-301(a).

3Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2005) states in part:

(a) If a 
person who has not previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or is 
found guilty of or pleads guilty or no contest to any misdemeanor except any 
second or subsequent violation of W.S. 31-5-233 or any similar provision of law, 
or any second or subsequent violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a) or (b) by a household 
member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 against any other household member or any 
similar provision of law, or any felony except murder, sexual assault in the 
first or second degree, aggravated assault and battery or arson in the first or 
second degree, the court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state 
and without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further 
proceedings and place the person on probation for a term not to exceed five (5) 
years upon terms and conditions set by the court. The terms of probation shall 
include that he:

(i)   Report to the court not less than 
twice in each year at times and places fixed in the order;

(ii)   Conduct himself in a law-abiding 
manner;

(iii)  Not leave the state without the consent 
of the court;

(iv)  Conform his conduct to any other terms of 
probation the court finds proper; and

(v)   Pay restitution to each victim in 
accordance with W.S. 7-9-101 and 7-9-103 through 7-9-112.

(b) If 
the court finds the person has fulfilled the terms of probation and that his 
rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, the court may 
at the end of five (5) years, or at any time after the expiration of one (1) 
year from the date of the original probation, discharge the person and dismiss 
the proceedings against him.

. . 
.

(e) 
There shall be only one (1) discharge and dismissal under this section or under 
any similar section of the probationary statutes of any other 
jurisdiction.

4Mr. 
King's suspension was stayed pending resolution of his administrative 
appeal.

5Because 
Wyoming's equal protection guarantee is broader 
than the equivalent federal right, see 
Wilson, 841 P.2d  at 95, our adherence to 
Wilson 
effectively disposes of Mr. King's federal constitutional claim.