Title: Knopp v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

233 Ind. 435 (1954)
120 N.E.2d 268
KNOPP
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 29,152.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed June 17, 1954.
Mann, Stohr & Mann, of Terre Haute, for appellant.
*436 Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and Owen S. Boling, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
GILKISON, J.
In the trial court, appellant was charged by affidavit with obtaining money under false pretense. Omitting formal parts and the bank check which is set out therein, the affidavit is as follows:
The affidavit purports to allege an offense under Sec. 10-2103, Burns' 1942 Repl., which so far as material is as follows:
The cause was at issue by plea of not guilty. Trial by the judge without a jury resulted in a finding and judgment of guilty as charged, sentence to 180 days on the Indiana State Farm and fined $50.00 and adjudged to pay the costs.
A motion for new trial for causes (1) that the decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence, (2) the decision is contrary to law, (3, 4 and 5) error in overruling appellant's several objections to questions asked of witnesses by the State. In each instance the question is properly presented, and (6) error in overruling appellant's motion to grant a mistrial because of improper argument by the prosecuting attorney. We shall discuss these alleged errors in reverse order.
It is shown by the record that appellant did not take the witness stand. In his opening argument the prosecutor stated as follows:
*438 "It is no wonder this man did not take the witness - stand. He was afraid to take the witness-stand, because he knew what I would do to him on cross examination."
Defendant immediately moved the court to declare a mistrial because of the prosecutor's prejudicial references to defendant's failure to take the witness stand in his own defense. The court promptly overruled the motion without comment. This was error. Cl. 4, Sec. 9-1603, Burns' 1942 Repl.; Long v. State (1877), 56 Ind. 182, 186; Showalter v. State (1882), 84 Ind. 562, 564.
The record shows that one Harry Adams had sold the house in question to appellant. While Mr. Adams was on the witness stand as a witness for the state, among many questions, the prosecutor asked him as follows:
In a proper manner appellant objected to the question, for the reasons as follows:
The court overruled the objection.
This was error. The objection should have been sustained. 20 Am. Jur.  Evidence 247, 248, pp. 240 *439 to 243. Farris v. People (1889), 129 Ill. 521, 21 N.E. 821, 4 L.R.A. 582, 16 Am. St. Rep. 283.
The prosecutor further asked Mr. Adams:
Appellant immediately objected thus:
The court overruled the objection.
This ruling was error.
The prosecutor further asked Mr. Adams this:
We do not think there was any error in this ruling.
The prosecutor then asked:
The objection was: "To which we object, it was not in the presence of the defendant."
*440 The ruling was: "Objection overruled."
The witness then answered, giving the conversation he had with Mrs. Richardson in the absence of the defendant. The ruling was harmful error. State ex rel. McGuyer v. Huff (1909), 172 Ind. 1, 9, 87 N.E. 141, 139 Am. St. Rep. 355.
The evidence shows that one Harry Adams had for sale three houses, being Nos. 14, 16 and 18 North 14 1/2 Street in Terre Haute, Ind. He advertised them for sale, to be torn down or moved off. Before January 26, 1951, the appellant talked with Mr. Adams about moving the houses and told him he might be able to sell one or more of them for him, and Mr. Adams "quoted him the price."
Appellant took Ethel Jane Richardson out to see the houses on January 24, 1951, and she selected No. 16 as the one she liked best. On January 26, 1951, she bought this house from appellant, paying him $600.00 for it  by the check, which is made a part of the affidavit herein. At that time appellant did not own the house, but the next day, January 27, 1951, he saw Mr. Adams and paid him in full for it, and thereby became its owner.
The prosecuting witness got the house without any dispute and had it moved on her own lot. In the latter part of May, 1951, she learned that appellant did not own the house the day he sold it to her, but that he bought and paid for it the next day. Mrs. Richardson has had complete ownership of the house ever since.
The statute upon which the prosecution is based requires that the person charged must have acted "with intent to defraud another, designedly...." The evidence does not tend to show any such intent or design. Instead it shows the contrary, that is, that appellant on the next day after he received the check for $600.00 bought the *441 house, and that the person whom it is alleged he intended to defraud got possession of the property without controversy thereafter, so that she did not learn until some four months later that appellant did not really own the house until the day after he sold it to her.
To sustain a charge of obtaining property by false pretenses, a felonious intent must be shown. The State v. Fields (1888), 118 Ind. 491, 21 N.E. 252; Harrod v. State (1928), 200 Ind. 24, 26, 161 N.E. 3; Stifel v. State (1904), 163 Ind. 628, 630, 72 N.E. 600; McCrann v. State (1920), 189 Ind. 677, 682, 128 N.E. 848; Crouch v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 326, 334, 97 N.E.2d 860; 22 Am. Jur.  False Pretense § 23, p. 456.
To sustain a conviction on such a charge the evidence must show that the alleged victim was deceived. Crouch v. State, supra, at page 334.
The decision is not sustained by the evidence and is therefore contrary to law.
The judgment is reversed, with instructions to sustain the motion for new trial.
NOTE.  Reported in 120 N.E.2d 268.