Title: State v. Sherrie S. Tucker

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2003 WI 12 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-3354-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Sherrie S. Tucker,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 5, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Emily S. Mueller   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
SYKES, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Paul LaZotte, assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Kathleen M. Ptacek, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 12 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-3354-CR  
(L.C. No. 
98-CF-363) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Sherrie S. Tucker,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 5, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Racine 
County, Emily S. Mueller, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed.   
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   We are asked to decide under 
what circumstances a circuit court may restrict the disclosure 
of juror information in a criminal trial, and, if juror 
information is restricted, what precautions must be taken to 
avoid prejudice to the criminal defendant.   
¶2 
The defendant, Sherrie Tucker (Tucker), was convicted 
of possession with intent to deliver cocaine within 1,000 feet 
of 
a 
school 
while 
armed, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm), 939.05 and 961.49 (1999-2000).1  
                                                 
1All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
2 
 
Prior to jury selection, the circuit court judge told counsel 
off the record that "[i]t has been my practice to use numbers 
and not names in this court."  The court proceeded to use 
numbers over defense counsel's objection "because it is a case 
involving sales of drugs."  Although the jurors names were 
withheld from the record, both parties had access to all the 
juror information, including the jurors' names.   
¶3 
Tucker appealed her conviction, arguing that the use 
of numbers instead of the jurors' names constituted prejudicial 
error.  The court of appeals certified the following issues to 
this court: (1) Whether voir dire by number constitutes an 
anonymous jury under State v. Britt, 203 Wis. 2d 25, 553 
N.W.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1996), when the restriction only applies to 
using the jurors' names in open court; and (2) Whether Britt's 
holding that an anonymous jury may be empanelled only if there 
is a strong reason the jury needs protection should continue to 
be the legal standard in Wisconsin.   
¶4 
We 
hold 
that 
in 
accordance 
with 
the 
standard 
articulated in Britt, if a circuit court restricts any juror 
information, the court must make an individualized determination 
that the jury needs protection and take reasonable precautions 
to minimize any prejudicial effect to the defendant.  Therefore, 
we conclude that the circuit court in this case erroneously 
exercised its discretion in withholding the jurors' names from 
the 
record 
because 
it 
failed 
to 
make 
an 
individualized 
determination that the jury needed protection and failed to take 
reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effect to 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
3 
 
Tucker.  Nevertheless, we further conclude that the error was 
harmless based on the overwhelming evidence of Tucker's guilt.   
¶5 
Tucker also raised an issue regarding a ruling of the 
circuit 
court 
that 
denied 
the 
admission 
of 
out-of-court 
statements by an unavailable witness.  We conclude that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by 
refusing to admit the out-of-court statements by an unavailable 
witness since the court reached a reasonable conclusion through 
a rational process based upon the relevant facts.  We further 
conclude that Tucker was not denied her constitutional right to 
present a defense based upon an independent review of the 
record.       
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
In March 1998, law enforcement officers executed a 
search warrant at an apartment shared by Tucker and her 
boyfriend, Damien McCray (McCray).  In the apartment, officers 
found cocaine in a bag marked "Shiree Tucker," a .38 caliber 
revolver, and bullets.  Tucker made a statement to police after 
a Miranda2 warning was given, in which she admitted that the 
cocaine belonged to her and that she had been selling cocaine 
for about a month.  Tucker was tried and convicted of possession 
of cocaine with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school 
while armed with a dangerous weapon, which resulted in a seven-
year prison sentence.  The circuit court judge stayed the prison 
                                                 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.436 (1966). 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
4 
 
sentence and instead ordered seven years of probation for 
Tucker.    
I.  Restriction on Jurors' Names 
¶7 
Prior to jury selection for Tucker's trial, the 
circuit court judge told counsel off the record that "[i]t has 
been my practice to use numbers and not names in this 
court. . . . What I'm prohibiting is the names of jurors being 
stated in the courtroom and for the record when other people may 
be sitting in the audience and using those names for any other 
reason."  When defense counsel objected, the judge explained 
that the use of numbers is appropriate because this was a case 
"involving drugs and an allegation of drug dealing which I think 
raises the bar to some extent in terms of any danger to jurors."  
The judge further explained that "it's the practice of this 
Court simply to use numbers and just go right into using numbers 
as opposed to names, not highlighting the fact that the numbers 
are used and certainly making no statement to jurors about 
numbers being used for safety or anything else."  During the 
trial, the judge corrected defense counsel when he referred to a 
juror by name, stating "it's my practice to refer to the jurors 
by number, so please follow the practice."  There was no other 
statement made in front of the jury regarding the use of numbers 
instead of their names.   
II.  Out-of-Court Statements 
¶8 
In December 1998, McCray was interviewed by defense 
investigator, Cynthia Kollath (Kollath) and Tucker's attorney.  
Kollath prepared a memorandum that summarized the interview.  At 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
5 
 
Tucker's trial, McCray invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, so 
defense counsel sought to introduce McCray's statements through 
Kollath's memorandum.  Defense counsel argued that McCray's 
statements should be admissible as statements against penal 
interest or alternatively, as statements made under the residual 
hearsay exception for unavailable witnesses.  The circuit court 
found that neither of these hearsay exceptions applied in this 
case because the statements lacked the requisite indicia of 
trustworthiness.  Tucker filed a postconviction motion seeking a 
new trial based on two issues: (1) Whether the circuit court 
erred by not admitting McCray's out-of-court statements; and (2) 
Whether she had been denied the right to present a fair defense.  
After 
a 
hearing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Tucker's 
postconviction motion for a new trial.     
¶9 
The court of appeals certified issues regarding the 
definition and use of an anonymous jury in light of the standard 
announced in Britt, and Tucker appealed the circuit court's 
refusal to admit McCray's out-of-court statements under an 
exception to the hearsay rule.   
ANALYSIS 
I.  "Anonymous" Juries 
¶10 Appellate review of a circuit court's decision to use 
an anonymous jury examines whether the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion.  Britt, 203 Wis. 2d at 34.  According 
to the Seventh Circuit, the review of a court's decision 
regarding an anonymous jury is for "abuse of discretion, and 
must 
be 
particularly 
deferential 
to 
the 
trial 
court's 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
6 
 
substantial discretion."  United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 
1204, 1215 (7th Cir. 1992).  The proper exercise of a circuit 
court's discretion requires a reasoning process that considers 
the applicable law and the facts of record, leading to a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  State v. Jeske, 
197 Wis. 2d 905, 912, 541 N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1995).  However, 
a circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it makes 
an error of law.  State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶37, 252 Wis. 
2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777.      
¶11 The issues certified by the court of appeals deal with 
the definition of an "anonymous" jury and the circumstances 
under which an "anonymous" jury may be used.  In this case, it 
may be more appropriate to describe the jury as a "numbers" jury 
instead of an "anonymous" jury since only the jurors' names were 
withheld from the record.  Both parties had access to all the 
juror information, including the jurors' names.  Furthermore, 
the public presumably could have obtained the jurors' names by 
inquiring at the clerk of courts' office.  A jury is typically 
deemed "anonymous" when juror information is withheld from the 
public and the parties themselves.  See, e.g., Crockett, 979 
F.2d at 1215 n.10.  Therefore, the jury in this case was not a 
classic "anonymous" jury.  Notwithstanding whether the jury in 
this case is characterized as an "anonymous" or a "numbers" 
jury, if restrictions are placed on juror identification or 
information, due process concerns are raised regarding a 
defendant's rights to an impartial jury and a presumption of 
innocence.  Accordingly, although this case does not deal with 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
7 
 
the classic "anonymous" jury, the reasoning in cases involving 
anonymous juries is beneficial to our analysis.   
¶12 The empanelling of an anonymous jury is a relatively 
recent phenomenon that was rarely utilized before the Second 
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d 
Cir. 1979)3. The court in Barnes addressed juror anonymity with 
respect to its effect on the practice of voir dire.  Id. at 142.  
In 
Barnes, 
the 
district 
court 
ordered 
that 
the 
jurors' 
identities, 
addresses, 
religious 
affiliations, 
and 
ethnic 
backgrounds remain anonymous, even from the parties themselves.  
Id. at 133.  The court began its analysis by noting a judge's 
broad discretion in conducting voir dire.  Id. at 137.  The 
court then examined each of the restrictions placed on juror 
information and concluded that the jurors' demeanors and 
responses to questions regarding their family, education and 
other matters would provide substantially the same information 
as the juror information that was restricted.  Id. at 142.  
Consequently, the court rejected the argument that the defendant 
was denied the ability to intelligently exercise peremptory 
challenges.  Id.  In sum, the Second Circuit held that the 
circuit court had permitted adequate questioning of the jury and 
had acted in accordance with its responsibility "to protect the 
jury, to assure its privacy, and to avoid all possible mental 
blocks against impartiality."  Id. at 141.  Although not 
                                                 
3 Ephraim Margolin & Gerald F. Uelmen, The Anonymous Jury: 
Jury tampering by another name?, Crim. Just. at 14 (Fall 1994).   
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
8 
 
explicit, the court essentially weighed the need to protect the 
jury, which was prompted by the defendant's ties to the mafia, 
against the rights of the defendant to an impartial jury.   
¶13 A few years later, the Second Circuit addressed a 
different concern with the use of an anonymous jury in United 
States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).  In Thomas, the 
defendants argued that an anonymous jury is an unconstitutional 
infringement on a defendant's presumption of innocence because 
it gives jurors the impression that the defendant is dangerous 
and a threat to the jurors' safety.  Id. at 1363.  The court in 
Thomas acknowledged the fundamental tenet that a defendant is 
presumed 
innocent 
until 
proven 
guilty, 
but 
nevertheless 
determined that an anonymous jury might be permissible if jurors 
are in need of protection.  Id. at 1364-65.  Therefore, the 
court rejected a per se rule against empanelling an anonymous 
jury, but concluded that an anonymous jury is warranted only if 
there is a "strong reason" to believe that the jury needs 
protection and if the court takes "reasonable precaution[s]" to 
minimize the impact of anonymity on the jurors' views of the 
defendant.  Id. at 1365.  The court noted that reasonable 
precautions were taken in that case, in part, because the judge 
gave the jury an "intelligent, reasonable and believable 
explanation for his actions that did not cast the defendants in 
an unfavorable light."  Id. at 1364.  In other words, the 
curative or precautionary instruction served to rebut any notion 
that the use of an anonymous jury was somehow a negative 
reflection on the defendant's guilt or character.  
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
9 
 
¶14 The Second Circuit's approach in Thomas has been 
widely adopted by both federal and state courts, including the 
Seventh Circuit and the Wisconsin court of appeals.  See 
Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204; Britt, 203 Wis. 2d 25.  The court of 
appeals in Britt held that a circuit court may, in its 
discretion, 
take 
reasonable 
steps 
to 
protect 
identifying 
information of jurors in a criminal case.  Britt, 203 Wis. 2d at 
34.  In Britt, the circuit court had ruled that the jurors' 
names, addresses, and places of employment could not be publicly 
revealed in open court or on the record; however, both parties 
had access to all juror information via written questionnaires.   
¶15 Citing the Seventh Circuit's decision in Crockett, the 
Britt court concluded that a circuit court may empanel an 
anonymous jury if two criteria are met: (1) if there is a strong 
reason to believe that the jury needs protection; and (2) if 
reasonable precautions are taken to minimize any prejudicial 
effect to the defendant, so as to protect the defendant's rights 
to a fair and impartial jury.  Id. at 34-36.   
¶16 In Britt, the court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court had satisfied both criteria and therefore properly 
exercised its discretion in empanelling an anonymous jury.  Id. 
at 35, 38.  First, the court cited several episodes of victim 
and witness intimidation prior to trial, and concluded that 
these constituted sufficient grounds to reasonably believe that 
the jury might also be subject to similar tactics, which 
warranted their protection.  Id. at 35.  Second, the court 
reasoned that the restrictions imposed by the circuit court were 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
10 
 
minimal since the parties were allowed to ask certain general 
questions 
regarding 
the 
jurors' 
residences 
and 
types 
of 
employment and were provided with all of the juror information 
via the written questionnaires.  Thus, the court of appeals 
concluded that the circuit court had prudently balanced the 
jury's need for protection against the defendant's right to a 
fair and impartial jury.  Id. at 37.   
¶17 Similar to Britt, where juror information was only 
restricted in open court, the factual situation in this case 
does not involve a truly "anonymous" jury; nevertheless, we find 
the reasoning in Britt persuasive.  Therefore, before a circuit 
court restricts any juror information in an individual case, it 
should determine that the jurors are in need of protection and 
take reasonable precautions to avoid prejudice to the defendant.  
In this case, Tucker concedes that her opportunity for voir dire 
was not impeded since both parties had access to all the juror 
information.  However, Tucker claims that her presumption of 
innocence was eroded by the circuit court's use of numbers 
without an individualized determination that the jury needed 
protection nor a precautionary statement made to the jury 
regarding the use of numbers instead of names.   
¶18 Serious concerns regarding a defendant's presumption 
of innocence are raised when juror information is restricted, as 
in this case.  As observed by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, "[t]he empanelment of an anonymous jury triggers 
due process scrutiny because this practice is likely to taint 
the jurors' opinion of the defendant, thereby burdening the 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
11 
 
presumption of innocence."  Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 
155, 171 (Mass. 1993).  Therefore, courts must attempt to ensure 
that "juror anonymity should not cast any adverse reflection 
upon the defendant . . . ."  United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 
1015, 1025 (3d Cir. 1988).  Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has 
stated,  
Unquestionably, the empanelment of an anonymous 
jury is a drastic measure, one which should be 
undertaken only in limited and carefully delineated 
circumstances. An anonymous jury raises the specter 
that the defendant is a dangerous person from whom the 
jurors must be protected, thereby implicating the 
defendant's constitutional right to a presumption of 
innocence. The presumption of innocence is "undoubted 
law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement 
lies at the foundation of the administration of our 
criminal law."  
United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).  
¶19 As illustrated by these federal and state court 
decisions, the restriction of juror information raises serious 
concerns regarding a defendant's rights to an impartial jury and 
a presumption of innocence.  Accordingly, we uphold the two-
prong test enunciated in Britt and conclude that if a court 
withholds any juror information, it must both: (1) find that a 
jury needs protection; and (2) take reasonable precautions to 
avoid prejudicing the defendant.  We now examine whether the 
circuit court in this case satisfied this two-prong test.     
¶20 The review of a circuit court's decision regarding the 
restriction of juror information is for abuse of discretion.  
Crockett, 979 F.2d at 1215.  However, in order to properly 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
12 
 
exercise its discretion, a circuit court must "apply the correct 
standard of law to the facts at hand."  State v. Margaret H., 
2000 WI 42, ¶32, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475.  This court 
will reverse a discretionary decision if the circuit court's 
exercise of discretion "is based on an error of law."  Marten 
Transp. v. Hartford Specialty, 194 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 533 N.W.2d 452 
(1995).  Thus, despite a deferential standard of review, we hold 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by 
failing to apply the correct standard of law, namely the two-
prong test announced in Britt.   
¶21 First, 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
make 
an 
individualized determination that the jurors needed protection 
based on the specific circumstances present in Tucker's case.  
Rather, the court informed counsel that "it has been my practice 
to use numbers and not names" in drug cases.  The circuit court 
repeatedly referred to its "practice" of using numbers without 
specifically noting any particular factors that warranted the 
use of numbers in Tucker's case.   
¶22 There are various factors that may be taken into 
account in making an individualized determination that a jury 
needs protection.  Such factors may include, but are not limited 
to: (1) the defendant's involvement in organized crime; (2) the 
defendant's participation in a group with the capacity to harm 
jurors; (3) the defendant's past attempts to interfere with the 
judicial process; and (4) extensive publicity that could enhance 
the possibility that jurors' names would become public and 
expose them to intimidation or harassment.  United States v. 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
13 
 
Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1532 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Ross, 33 F.3d at 1520.   
¶23 Second, the circuit court did not take necessary 
precautions to minimize any prejudicial effect to Tucker.  
Although the circuit court explained the use of numbers instead 
of jurors' names to counsel off the record, the court did not 
make any statement to the jurors regarding its use of numbers.  
Rather, the jurors were just referred to by number instead of 
name.  The only statement heard by the jurors regarding the use 
of numbers was when the circuit court corrected defense counsel 
by stating, "it's my practice to refer to the jurors by number, 
so please follow the practice."  The circuit court did instruct 
the jury on Tucker's presumption of innocence and on the State's 
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, we 
conclude that this instruction, by itself, was insufficient.  
When jurors' names are withheld, as in this case, the circuit 
court, at a minimum, must make a precautionary statement to the 
jury that the use of numbers instead of names should in no way 
be interpreted as a reflection of the defendant's guilt or 
innocence.  We recognize that in Britt, the circuit court 
apparently did not give a precautionary instruction to the jury; 
however, due to the potential for prejudice to the defendant, we 
conclude that such an instruction is necessary.   
¶24 Any additional precautionary statements that are made 
to a jury when juror information is restricted should be based 
on factors and influences that may be present in a case, which 
could warrant withholding juror information.  A precautionary 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
14 
 
statement must not mislead a jury, but must be based on factors 
and influences that are relevant in a particular case.  In 
formulating a precautionary statement, a variety of factors and 
influences may be taken into account, as illustrated by 
statements that have been made by courts in other jurisdictions.  
See, e.g., United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(district court may instruct jury that their identities will be 
withheld to ensure that no extrajudicial information is conveyed 
to them); Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (district court may instruct 
jury that their anonymity is a precautionary measure to ensure 
that both sides get a fair trial); State v. Samonte, 928 P.2d 1 
(Haw. 1996) (circuit court may instruct jury that anonymity is 
to protect jurors from contacts by the news media); State v. 
Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1995) (circuit court may instruct 
jury that purpose of anonymity is to shield jurors from media 
harassment and undesirable publicity); State v. McKenzie, 532 
N.W.2d 210 (Minn. 1995) (circuit court may instruct jury that 
they will remain anonymous to shield them from media harassment 
and ward off curiosity that might infringe on their privacy).   
¶25 Courts must ensure that the use of numbers or any 
other restriction on identifying juror information is not 
interpreted as a reflection of a defendant's guilt or character.  
Therefore, in addition to instructing the jury on Tucker's 
presumption of innocence, the circuit court should have also 
given a precautionary instruction to the jury regarding the use 
of numbers instead of their names in order to minimize any 
potential prejudicial effect to Tucker.   
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
15 
 
¶26 Although the circuit court erred by failing to satisfy 
the two-prong test under Britt, the error in this case was 
harmless.  An "error is harmless if it is 'clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error.'"  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, ¶49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (citing Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).  In this case, Tucker admitted 
to police after she was given a Miranda warning that the cocaine 
belonged to her and that she had been selling cocaine for about 
a month.  Tucker told police that she had purchased an "eight-
ball" of cocaine and sold it in amounts of $20, $30, and $50 for 
a $150-$200 profit.  In addition, the cocaine found in Tucker 
and McCray's apartment was in a plastic bag marked "Shiree 
Tucker."  Although the initial focus in a harmless error 
analysis is the error itself, the error itself is evaluated in 
the context of the whole.  In light of the overwhelming evidence 
in this case, we conclude that it is clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a rational jury would have found Tucker guilty 
notwithstanding the circuit court's error. 
¶27 Based on all the above, we hold that when a circuit 
court restricts any juror information, the court must: (1) make 
an individualized determination that the jury needs protection; 
and (2) take reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial 
effect to the defendant, which includes making a precautionary 
statement to the jury so that the restriction does not 
negatively reflect on the defendant's guilt or character.  The 
circuit court in this case failed to satisfy this two-prong 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
16 
 
test; however, the 
error 
was harmless in 
light of the 
overwhelming evidence of Tucker's guilt.  
II.  Admissibility of Out-of-Court Statements 
¶28 Evidentiary 
rulings 
are 
generally 
reviewed 
with 
deference to determine whether the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in accordance with the facts and 
accepted legal standards.  In re Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d 713, 
720, 499 N.W.2d 641 (1993).  This court will sustain an 
evidentiary ruling if "'it finds that the circuit court examined 
the relevant facts; applied a proper standard of law; and using 
a demonstrative rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach.'"  State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 
48, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999) (citing State v. Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d 768, 780, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998)).  However, whether a 
circuit court infringes upon a defendant's right to present a 
defense is a question of constitutional fact that requires 
independent 
appellate 
review. 
 
State 
v. 
Pulizzano, 
155 
Wis. 2d 633, 648, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990). 
¶29 An out-of-court statement or "hearsay" is defined as 
"a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted."  Wis. Stat. § 908.01(3).  In 
general, hearsay evidence is inadmissible; however, there are 
statutory exceptions to this general rule.  Wis. Stat. § 908.02.  
One exception to the hearsay rule is the admission of an 
unavailable declarant's statement against his or her penal 
interest.  Wis. Stat. § 908.045(4).  If a person invokes the 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
17 
 
privilege against self-incrimination, he or she is deemed 
"unavailable" for purposes of the hearsay rule.  State v. Peck, 
143 
Wis. 2d 624, 
644, 
422 
N.W.2d 160 
(Ct. 
App. 
1988).  
Therefore, as an initial matter, McCray was correctly deemed 
unavailable to testify at Tucker's trial since he had invoked 
the privilege against self-incrimination.  Another exception to 
the hearsay rule, known as the "residual exception," permits 
admission of hearsay evidence that is not specifically addressed 
in 
the 
other 
exceptions, 
but 
possesses 
"comparable 
circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness."  
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(6).   
¶30 Tucker claims that McCray's out-of-court statements 
are admissible under the exception regarding statements against 
one's penal interest.  Tucker argues that the following out-of-
court statements made by McCray illustrate that they were 
against his penal 
interest: 
"I'm 
fittin' 
to 
go to the 
penitentiary," his statement that the drugs did not belong to 
Tucker and that she had no involvement with the drugs, and his 
statement of "yeah, right" when asked whether the drugs belonged 
to him.  Tucker also claims that McCray's invocation of his 
Fifth Amendment rights indicates that his statements were 
against his penal interest.   
¶31 Alternatively, Tucker argues that McCray's out-of-
court statements are admissible under the residual exception 
because his statements were corroborated and are therefore 
trustworthy.  Tucker claims that she is entitled to a new trial 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
18 
 
because the circuit court committed prejudicial error by not 
admitting McCray's out-of-court statements. 
¶32 At the postconviction hearing, the circuit court 
upheld its prior ruling that McCray's statements were not 
admissible as either statements against penal interest or under 
the residual exception to the hearsay rule.  The circuit court 
noted that McCray's statements attempted to exculpate Tucker 
without 
inculpating 
himself. 
 
For 
example, 
in 
McCray's 
statements of "I'm fittin' to go to the penitentiary," and that 
Tucker was not involved with the drugs, McCray never actually 
took responsibility for the drugs.  The court noted that nowhere 
in Kollath's memo did McCray ever explicitly state that the 
drugs belonged to him; rather, his statements were only aimed at 
exculpating Tucker.  With respect to McCray's response of "yeah, 
right" when asked whether the drugs belonged to him, the court 
realistically interpreted the statement as meaning "yeah, right, 
as if I would ever admit to that."  This is a reasonable 
interpretation in light of the fact that the overriding concern 
throughout Kollath's memo was that McCray did not want to be 
incarcerated regardless of what happened to Tucker.  Therefore, 
the court concluded that McCray's statements were not clearly 
against 
his 
penal 
interest, 
nor 
were 
they 
sufficiently 
trustworthy to be admissible under the residual exception.   
¶33 The 
circuit 
court 
also 
considered 
whether 
its 
evidentiary ruling that McCray's out-of-court statements were 
inadmissible violated Tucker's constitutional right to a fair 
trial, particularly her right to present a defense.  Upon 
No. 
00-3354-CR   
 
19 
 
reviewing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Chambers 
v. 
Mississippi, 
410 
U.S. 
284 
(1973), 
the 
circuit 
court 
distinguished Tucker's situation from the one in Chambers, where 
the defendant was denied a fair trial due to the cumulative 
impact of various evidentiary rulings.  The court noted that 
Tucker had been allowed to testify to the statements made by 
McCray in order to show why she made her statements to the 
police.  However, the court concluded that McCray's statements 
"were properly excluded for the truth of the matter asserted and 
that the combination of those doesn't rise to a level in which 
she was denied her due process right to a fair trial."   
¶34 Upon independent review of the trial transcripts and 
the postconviction hearing, we agree with the circuit court's 
determination that Tucker was not denied the constitutional 
right to a fair trial.  We conclude that the circuit court 
demonstrated 
a 
rational 
process 
in 
making 
a 
reasonable 
evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of McCray's out-of-court 
statements.  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not 
err by refusing to admit McCray's out-of-court statements under 
either the exception for statements against penal interest or 
the residual exception to the hearsay rule. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  00-3354-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶35 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I agree with both the majority opinion and Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley's concurrence that this is not a typical anonymous jury.  
The circuit court judge merely replaced the name of each 
potential juror with a number during the voir dire process; the 
district attorney and the defendant still had access to each 
juror's name.   
¶36 Even though this is not a typical anonymous jury, this 
court should be concerned about the decision of the circuit 
court to refer to the jurors by number only.  I believe that 
fundamental constitutional rights, namely the right to a 
presumption of innocence and an impartial jury, are potentially 
implicated when a circuit judge deviates from the standard 
practice of full disclosure of juror information.  It is 
therefore imperative that appellate courts properly scrutinize 
the effect that a deviation from the standard practice has on a 
defendant's constitutional rights.   
¶37 I write separately to explain that the majority 
opinion's harmless error analysis misses the mark.  The majority 
focuses only on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict and 
fails to assess whether the fundamental constitutional rights of 
the defendant were violated. 
¶38 The 
majority 
concludes 
that 
a 
circuit 
court's 
erroneous decision to withhold juror information on voir dire is 
subject to the harmless error analysis established in State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  Harvey 
No.  00-3354-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
holds that an error is harmless if it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error.4  In the present case, the 
majority opinion asserts that the evidence of the defendant's 
guilt was so "overwhelming" that no rational jury would have 
failed to convict her.5  Thus, according to the majority opinion, 
juries selected behind closed doors or by blindfolded defendants 
will be acceptable in Wisconsin courts as long as the evidence 
of a defendant's guilt is "overwhelming."   
¶39 In short, the Harvey harmless error standard employed 
by the majority opinion is improper because it assesses for a 
harm unrelated to the alleged error.6  The improper withholding 
of juror information during voir dire does not become harmless 
simply because the evidence against the defendant is strong.     
¶40 In this case the court's task is to determine whether 
the defendant may have been convicted by jurors biased against 
her as a result of a selection process conducted in partial 
secrecy.  The Harvey standard of a rational jury considering the 
evidence is inapplicable because our inquiry is whether the jury 
was rational, that is, whether the jury was impartial and 
unbiased, not whether an error during trial was harmless. 
                                                 
4 State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189. 
5 Majority op., ¶26. 
6 There may be several harmless-error tests depending on the 
nature of the right violated.  In re Jayton S., 2001 WI 110, 
¶40, 
246 
Wis. 2d 1, 
629 
N.W.2d 768 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring) (quoting 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal 
Procedure § 27.6(b), at 938-39 (2d ed. 1999)).  
No.  00-3354-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶41 The United States Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized 
that 
an 
impartial 
judge 
and 
jury 
are 
"basic 
protections" without which "a criminal trial cannot reliably 
serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or 
innocence . . . and no criminal punishment may be regarded as 
fundamentally fair."7  A finding of guilt by a jury biased 
against the defendant is a "defect affecting the framework 
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in 
the trial process itself."8  Justice Bradley's concurrence 
correctly identifies the alleged error in this case as an 
alleged structural defect.  
¶42 Here the alleged error is an alleged structural defect 
because it is in the framework of the trial, the composition of 
the jury, not in a single event during trial.  A defendant has a 
constitutional right to a presumption of innocence and an 
impartial jury.9  The presumption of innocence and an impartial 
jury are cornerstones of our criminal justice system and 
guaranteed by the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution.10  When juror information is withheld during voir 
dire of a criminal trial, violence may be done to a defendant's 
                                                 
7 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999) (quoting 
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)). 
8 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 650 
(7th Cir. 2002).  
10 See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1364 (2d Cir. 
1985) 
("the 
presumption 
of 
innocence 
is 
of 
significant 
importance, and is protected by the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment"). 
No.  00-3354-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
right to an unbiased and impartial jury.11  A natural inference 
jurors selected under secretive circumstances may draw is that 
the defendant is a dangerous person from whom they need 
protection, thereby implicating the defendant's constitutional 
rights.    
¶43 Moreover, 
information 
kept 
from 
defendants 
may 
interfere with their ability to effectively exercise their 
strikes, 
thereby 
further 
jeopardizing 
their 
right 
to 
an 
impartial jury.12  
¶44 Consequently, an appellate court can only conclude 
that the withholding of juror information was "harmless" if it 
determines 
that 
the 
defendant's 
due 
process 
rights 
were 
nevertheless protected.13 
                                                 
11 See Mansoori, 304 F.3d at 650 (citations omitted). 
12 See, e.g., United States v. DiDomenico, 78 F.3d 294, 301 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
13 See Wis. Stat. § 805.18 (2001-02), which provides as 
follows: 
(1) The court shall, in every stage of an action, 
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or 
proceedings 
which 
shall 
not 
affect 
the 
substantial rights of the adverse party. 
(2) No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, 
or improper admission of evidence, or for error 
as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless 
in the opinion of the court to which the 
application is made, after an examination of the 
entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that 
the 
error 
complained 
of 
has 
affected 
the 
substantial rights 
of the 
party 
seeking to 
reverse or set aside the judgment, or to secure a 
new trial. 
No.  00-3354-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶45 In the present case, I am convinced that a structural 
error did not occur.  The defendant was convicted by an unbiased 
and impartial jury and her constitutional rights were protected 
despite the fact that the circuit court withheld information 
about the jurors.  The only information withheld in the present 
case was the names of the potential jurors, and that information 
was only withheld from the public.  The defendant and the State 
had access to juror names because they possessed the juror 
questionnaires.  Indeed, the defendant does not identify any 
information that she or her attorney were unable to obtain from 
the juror questionnaires or through voir dire.  
¶46 More importantly, the defendant in the present case 
was given extensive opportunity to conduct voir dire, including 
asking questions about the presumption of innocence.  The record 
does not indicate that the defendant had any difficulty 
exercising her peremptory challenges, and the defendant does not 
argue that she was forced to accept jurors who indicated an 
inability to presume her innocent until proven guilty during 
voir dire.  Furthermore, the circuit court instructed the jury 
on the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof 
at the end of the trial.   
¶47 Lastly, while it was not a planned instruction, the 
circuit court judge explained to defense counsel in front of the 
venire that it was a regular practice "to refer to the jurors by 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶¶69-82, 245 
Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (holding that whether a conviction 
will be reversed on an alleged error in jury selection focuses 
on whether the jury that actually sat on the case is impartial).  
No.  00-3354-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
number," thereby minimizing the likelihood that jurors would 
infer that their anonymity was required by the defendant's 
character in the present case. 
¶48 If the withholding of juror information had infected 
the defendant's trial by compromising the presumption of 
innocence or jeopardizing the impartiality of the jury, a 
structural error would have occurred and we would be obligated 
to reverse the conviction, regardless of the strength or 
sufficiency of the evidence.  Structural error defies harmless 
error review.14  The Harvey test for harmless error set forth in 
the majority opinion does not apply in the present case. 
However, because I am convinced that none of the harm that can 
be caused by withholding juror information injured the defendant 
here by causing a structural error, no reason exists to overturn 
her conviction. 
¶49 For the foregoing reasons, I concur. 
 
                                                 
14  Neder, 527 U.S. at 8.  See also Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 
¶37. 
No.  00-3354-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶50 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that this is not a true "anonymous jury" case.  
Nevertheless, the majority treats it as an anonymous jury case 
and concludes, inevitably, that the error is harmless. 
¶51 I write separately because I disagree with the 
majority's application of the harmless error rule in this case.  
Even if this were an anonymous jury, and even if harmless error 
applies to anonymous jury cases, the majority incorrectly sets 
forth the circumstances in which the rule can be applied.  
Additionally, I write to emphasize that measures that shield 
juror information not only implicate the defendant's rights, but 
also contradict the presumption of openness that defines the 
American judicial system. 
I 
¶52 By treating this numbers jury as an anonymous jury, 
the majority dodges the threshold certified issue presented to 
us by the court of appeals.  The certified issue inquires:  
"Whether voir dire by number constitutes an anonymous jury under 
State v. Britt, 203 Wis. 2d 25, 553 N.W.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1996), 
when the restriction applies only to using the jurors' names in 
open court but does not prohibit inquiry into any other 
identifying information." 
¶53 The 
State 
argues, 
and 
I 
agree, 
that 
the 
jury 
empanelled in this case is not an anonymous jury.  No 
information was withheld from the parties and no significant 
restriction was placed on questions asked at voir dire.  The 
only restriction here is how jurors are addressed. 
No.  00-3354-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶54 As the court of appeals notes in its certification, 
the restriction on Tucker is less than the restrictions placed 
on the parties in Britt.  In that case, the circuit court 
restricted references on the record to the jurors' names, 
addresses, and employers.  Here the only restriction curtailed 
the use of the jurors' names on the record.  The parties were 
advised to use numbers only, rather than names, in referring to 
the jurors. 
¶55 In 
Britt, 
there 
were 
indications 
of 
witness 
intimidation and harassment, factors that the court considered 
relevant to jury safety.  Here, no such factors existed.  
Instead, the circuit court expressed a policy of conducting voir 
dire by number without making any specific finding that 
anonymity was necessary to protect the jury. 
¶56 Not only are the factors that existed in Britt absent 
from this case, but the record also fails to reveal any other 
factors that would justify empanelling an anonymous jury.  The 
majority sets forth the Thomas test to determine whether an 
anonymous jury is warranted.  United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 
1359 (2d Cir. 1985).  This two-prong test provides that an 
anonymous jury is warranted only if there is a "strong reason" 
to believe that the jury needs protection and if the court takes 
"reasonable precaution[s]" to minimize the impact of anonymity 
on jurors' views of the defendant.  Majority op., ¶13.  It then 
notes that this approach has been widely adopted by both federal 
and state courts, including the Seventh Circuit. 
No.  00-3354-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶57 What the majority fails to acknowledge, however, is 
that the Seventh Circuit and others set a standard requiring 
something more than just assertions or beliefs in order to 
justify anonymity.  The standard requires actual evidence 
indicating that intimidation is likely: 
In short, that the defendants had the ability and 
incentive 
to 
threaten 
jurors, 
without 
additional 
evidence indicating that they were likely to act on 
that ability and incentive, was not enough to justify 
the unusual step of juror anonymity. 
United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 651 (7th Cir. 2002).  
See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1532-1533 (8th 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1520-1521 (11th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 240-241 (2nd 
Cir. 1991). 
¶58 If this were an anonymous jury, then I agree with the 
majority that the circuit court was required to make an 
individualized determination of the need for such a jury.  I 
part ways with the majority because it fails to draw a 
distinction between a numbers jury, as here, and an anonymous 
jury.  The result of this failure is that in concluding that 
harmless error applies in this "numbers only" situation, it 
incorrectly extends harmless error as a remedy in all truly 
anonymous jury cases.  Such a widespread extension is contrary 
to precedent. 
A 
¶59 The majority opinion correctly notes the import of the 
right to an impartial jury.  Yet, after acknowledging the import 
of the right, it diminishes the right by subjecting it to the 
No.  00-3354-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
harmless error rule.  In failing to consider whether there may 
be structural error, the majority commits its own error. 
¶60 The majority departs from well-established precedent 
which recognizes that certain constitutional deprivations are 
structural and therefore defy harmless error analysis.  Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (describing the right to 
counsel and the right to an impartial judge as examples of 
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their 
infraction can never be treated as harmless error); Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (describing a structural 
error as a "defect affecting the framework within which the 
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process 
itself" 
and 
citing 
the 
following 
cases 
as 
involving 
constitutional errors that are not subject to the harmless error 
rule: Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (unlawful 
exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury); 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (the right to self-
representation at trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) 
(right to public trial)). 
¶61 Similar to the rights described above, the improper 
use of an anonymous jury is not simply an error in the trial 
process.  Rather, the improper use of an anonymous jury 
effectively denies an accused of the right to a trial by an 
impartial jury, thereby tainting the entire framework within 
which the trial process occurs.  As such, it is a structural 
error that is not subject to harmless error review. 
No.  00-3354-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
B 
¶62 I recognize, however, that federal courts of appeals 
that 
have 
addressed 
the 
issue 
have 
not 
foreclosed 
the 
possibility that in very limited circumstances the harmless 
error rule could be applied to anonymous jury violations.  The 
federal courts of appeals have imposed a much stricter standard 
in applying the harmless error rule than the majority sets forth 
here. 
¶63 In United States v. Sanchez, 74 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 
1996), the defendant did not know the jurors' names and 
addresses or their spouses' or employers' names.  The Fifth 
Circuit focused on the factors set forth in United States v. 
Krout, 66 F.3d 1420 (5th Cir. 1995), that justify an anonymous 
jury.  Those factors include: "(1) the defendants' involvement 
in organized crime; (2) the defendants' participation in a group 
with the capacity to harm jurors; (3) the defendants' past 
attempts to interfere with the judicial process or witnesses; 
(4) the potential that, if convicted, the defendants will suffer 
a lengthy incarceration and substantial monetary penalties; and 
(5) extensive publicity that could enhance the possibility that 
jurors' 
names 
would 
become 
public 
and 
expose 
them 
to 
intimidation and harassment." Sanchez, 74 F.3d at 564. 
¶64 The court noted that virtually none of the factors 
listed in Krout justified the empanelling of an anonymous jury 
in the case before it.  No one could demonstrate that the 
defendant was involved in organized crime or participated in a 
group that would attempt to harm jurors.  Although the defendant 
No.  00-3354-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
was a renegade policeman, there was no evidence that he had 
attempted to interfere with the judicial process.  Finally, the 
court noted that there was no indication that the jurors would 
be subjected to the type of publicity that would result in 
intimidation and harassment. 
¶65 In finding error, the Sanchez court concluded that 
more than mere speculation or inferences of potential risk was 
needed to justify an anonymous jury.  There must be actual 
evidence that anonymity was warranted before the defendant's 
right to be tried before a panel of identified jurors was 
required to be sacrificed.  Id. at 565. 
¶66 The government argued that even if the Krout criteria 
were lacking, the error was harmless because extensive voir dire 
was conducted that enabled the defendant to pick an unbiased 
jury.  The Sanchez court disagreed.  It concluded that the 
harmless error rule could not apply in anonymous jury cases 
except in very limited circumstances.  It stated: 
Unless the type of circumstances listed in Krout 
exist, where the defendant has essentially compromised 
his right, he should receive a verdict, not from 
anonymous decisionmakers, but from people he can name 
as responsible for their actions.  In closer cases on 
the merits of requiring anonymity, there might be room 
for a harmless error analysis, but this is not such a 
case.  The conviction must be reversed and remanded 
for retrial. 
Id. 
¶67 A recent Seventh Circuit case, United States v. 
Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002), discussed Sanchez and 
endorsed its conclusion that an erroneous decision to empanel an 
anonymous jury is not harmless where almost none of the 
No.  00-3354-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
pertinent factors supported the decision.  It noted, however, 
that the Sanchez court left open the possibility that harmless 
error analysis might be appropriate in limited circumstances.  
It concluded that the case before it constituted such limited 
circumstances. 
¶68 The Mansoori court described the case as a narcotics 
conspiracy that embraced "a large-scale, gang-related operation 
with ready access to firearms."  Id. at 651.  It noted that the 
defendants and their unindicted co-conspirators used weapons and 
violence in furtherance of the conspiracy, that the defendants 
faced very long prison terms, and that there had been some 
pretrial publicity.  The court observed that although the 
circumstances were not, by themselves, sufficient to justify 
empanelling an anonymous jury, the record did support a basis 
for the concern of juror safety.  That basis in the record, 
together with a three and one-half day "searching and thorough" 
voir dire which protected the defendants' right to an unbiased 
jury, justified a harmless error analysis.  Id. at 652. 
¶69 Here we note that none of the pertinent factors 
supports a decision to empanel an anonymous jury.  There is no 
inference of organized crime or suggestion that the defendant is 
involved with a group that has the capacity to harm jurors.  
Likewise, there is no evidence to suggest that the defendant 
previously attempted to interfere with the judicial process or 
that this case received any publicity whatsoever.  It was 
unlikely that the defendant would suffer a lengthy incarceration 
No.  00-3354-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
or substantial monetary penalties.  Indeed, as a result of her 
conviction, the defendant was placed on probation. 
¶70 Regardless of whether use of the harmless error rule 
is precluded because an improper anonymous jury constitutes 
structural error, or whether it is precluded here because none 
of the pertinent factors supports the use of an anonymous jury, 
one thing is clear.  The majority's general application of 
harmless error as a remedy in an anonymous jury case is error, 
and it is hardly harmless. 
¶71 Ultimately, I concur in the mandate of the majority 
because I conclude that there was no error.  The defendant had 
access to all juror information, including their names.  Given 
that the only limitation here was how the jurors were addressed 
and that the judge advised the jury that it was her practice to 
use numbers rather than names, I do not find that the 
defendant's rights were violated. 
II 
¶72 Measures 
to 
shield 
juror 
information 
not 
only 
implicate the defendant's rights, but also contradict the 
presumption of openness that defines the American judicial 
system.  The selection of jurors has always presumptively been a 
public process. 
¶73 Since the sixteenth century jurors have been selected 
in public.  Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 
501, 507 (1984).  It is not surprising that trials in colonial 
America adopted the presumptive openness of the jury selection 
process that developed in England.  Id. at 508.  This openness 
No.  00-3354-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
"enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the 
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the 
system."  Id. at 508. 
¶74 As the majority noted, the empanelling of an anonymous 
jury is a relatively recent phenomenon.  Majority op., ¶12.  
Although courts have recognized that the use of an anonymous 
jury may be appropriate in limited circumstances, they have been 
understandably narrow in defining those circumstances.  "The use 
of 
an 
anonymous 
jury 
will 
remain 
a 
device 
of 
last 
resort . . . ."  Krout, 66 F.3d at 1427.  It is considered to be 
a "drastic measure."  Sanchez, 74 F.3d at 564. 
¶75 A few years ago this court unanimously rejected a 
petition 
for 
an 
administrative 
rule 
governing 
juror 
confidentiality.  The petition provided that jurors be referred 
to only by number and that no personal juror identifying 
information could be elicited during voir dire.  It allowed that 
a party may, after the trial, petition the court for access to 
personal 
juror 
identifying 
information 
for 
purposes 
of 
developing a motion for a new trial. 
¶76 The breadth of such a proposal and its effect on our 
tradition of public trials were apparent to many who appeared in 
opposition to the proposal at the public hearing.  The State Bar 
of Wisconsin was one of the groups that appeared in opposition 
No.  00-3354-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
to the petition.15  It cautioned that an anonymous jury should be 
used only in "an extremely rare circumstance." (Statement of 
State Bar of Wisconsin filed Nov. 16, 1998, at 8.) 
¶77 A trial is a public event and a public trial lies at 
the foundation of our legal tradition.  The public trial is 
rooted in the "principle that justice cannot survive behind 
walls of silence."  Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 
(1966). 
¶78 The 
majority's failure to 
distinguish 
between a 
numbers jury and an anonymous jury serves to dilute the 
jurisprudence on anonymous juries.  It compounds this problem by 
applying an across-the-board "no harm, no foul" analysis of the 
harmless error rule thus serving to make the use of anonymous 
juries more commonplace.   
¶79 The result of the majority's decision will stand in 
stark contrast to the federal courts of appeals decisions that 
have emphasized that use of an anonymous jury is the "last 
resort" and "a drastic measure." 
¶80 It stands in stark contrast to the position of many 
who appeared at our public administrative hearing opposing the 
                                                 
15 Petition No. 98-08, In the Matter of the Amendment of 
Supreme 
Court 
Rules: 
 
(Proposed) 
SCR 
73.04: 
 
Juror 
Confidentiality, Public Hearing November 17, 1998; Order Denying 
Petition January 19, 1999.  Groups that appeared or registered 
in opposition to the proposed rule include the Wisconsin 
District Attorneys Association, the Judges of Milwaukee County, 
the Milwaukee Bar Association, the Wisconsin Association of 
Trial 
Lawyers, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Newspaper 
Association, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Broadcasters 
Association, 
and 
the 
Freedom 
of 
Information Council.   
No.  00-3354-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
proposed rule, noting that if anonymous juries are to be used, 
they should be used only in extremely rare circumstances. 
¶81 But, most importantly, the result of the majority's 
decision lies in stark contrast to the presumption of openness 
that defines our Anglo-American judicial tradition.  The promise 
of a public trial by an impartial jury is a cornerstone of that 
tradition.  The most common rationale for an anonymous jury is 
the protection of the jurors.  A jury that sits in fear may not 
fill the expectation of impartiality.  Yet, the use of an 
anonymous jury is a double-edged sword——it can give a sense of 
security or it can breed and feed fear.  When fear is the 
result, then jury anonymity is a solution that exacerbates the 
problem it was intended to solve. 
 
 
 
No.  00-3354-CR.dss 
 
1 
 
 
¶82 DIANE 
S. 
SYKES, 
J.   (concurring). 
The 
majority 
opinion and Justice Bradley's concurrence conclude that a 
"numbers jury" is not an "anonymous jury" as that term is 
understood in the case law.  Majority op., ¶11; Justice 
Bradley's concurrence, ¶¶50, 53.  I agree.  No juror information 
was withheld from anyone in this case.  The circuit court merely 
instructed the attorneys to refer to the jurors by number rather 
than name during voir dire, consistent with the circuit court's 
standard practice for cases of this type.  The parties and the 
public 
had 
unrestricted 
access 
to 
all 
juror 
identifying 
information.  As such, the anonymous jury case law does not 
apply. 
¶83 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
nevertheless 
applies 
the 
anonymous jury case law, assumes that the presumption of 
innocence 
has 
been 
violated, 
and 
imposes 
the 
procedural 
requirements prescribed by the inapplicable anonymous jury 
cases, thereby prohibiting any voir dire by number in this state 
unless there is 1) an individualized determination of a need for 
juror protection; and 2) a precautionary instruction to protect 
against any negative reflection on the defendant.  Majority op., 
¶¶12-27.  I cannot agree with this approach. 
¶84  Voir dire by number does not implicate the presumption 
of innocence in the same way that the cases have assumed the use 
of an anonymous jury does.  It has not been demonstrated——in 
this case or in the case law——that mere voir dire by number, 
without any restriction on access to juror information, has any 
No.  00-3354-CR.dss 
 
2 
 
serious adverse impact on the presumption of innocence.  Any 
suggestion that it does is pure speculation.  Indeed, the 
majority engages in no evaluation of this point at all, but 
merely extrapolates a presumption of innocence/due process 
violation from cases that involved true anonymous juries rather 
than the far more innocuous practice of voir dire by number. 
¶85  Our courthouses today are equipped with various 
security precautions——metal detectors at courthouse entrances, 
security glass in individual courtrooms, armed deputy sheriffs 
in the courtroom and in the courthouse hallways——all of which 
suggest at least some level of risk to the people who work and 
visit there, including the jurors.  It cannot seriously be 
suggested that the presumption of innocence has necessarily been 
compromised by the use of any of these sorts of generalized 
protections.  Certain special security precautions are sometimes 
taken in individual cases, such as posting extra deputies in the 
courtroom, without encumbering the presumption of innocence or 
requiring particularized due process justifications.  Voir dire 
by number (if a circuit court chooses to use this technique) 
falls within this category of routine security measures, whether 
used as a general practice, in a certain class of cases, or 
case-by-case. 
¶86  In my view, voir dire by number, without any other 
restriction on the scope of voir dire or the parties' or the 
public's access to juror identifying information, does not rise 
to the level of an encumbrance on the presumption of innocence 
so as to implicate the defendant's right to due process.  In 
No.  00-3354-CR.dss 
 
3 
 
answer to the certified questions in this case, I would clarify 
that a "numbers jury" is not an "anonymous jury" within the 
meaning of State v. Britt, 203 Wis. 2d 25, 553 N.W.2d 528 (Ct. 
App. 1996) or the federal case law cited by the majority and 
concurring opinions. 
¶87  Because voir dire by number is not the equivalent of 
an anonymous jury, the presumption of innocence has not been 
undermined and there is no need to impose any particularized due 
process prerequisites upon a decision to conduct voir dire by 
number, either as a general practice or in an individual case.  
Accordingly, there is no error, and therefore no need to inquire 
into the applicability of harmless error analysis.     
 
 
 
 
 
No.  00-3354-CR.dss 
 
 
 
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