Title: In the Matter of Leonid G. Garth v. Board of Assessment Review for Town of Richmond

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 129  
In the Matter of Leonid G. Garth,
            Appellant, 
        v. 
Board of Assessment Review for 
Town of Richmond, 
            Respondent.
Sean T. Hanna, for appellant.
Michael A. Jones, Jr., for respondent.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
Petitioner pro se commenced this RPTL article 7 tax
proceeding to challenge the 2006 assessment of his real property
located in the Town of Richmond by filing and serving on
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No. 129
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respondent Board of Assessment Review for the Town of Richmond a
petition with a notice of petition that contained no return date. 
The Board promptly moved to dismiss the petition for lack of
personal jurisdiction based upon petitioner's failure to include
a hearing date and time as required by CPLR 403 (a).  In
opposition, petitioner submitted a sworn affidavit in which he
stated that the Ontario County Clerk instructed him to "leave the
date blank" because of a judicial vacancy that prevented the
Clerk from scheduling hearings.  In addition, the Clerk informed
petitioner that once the Supreme Court Justice vacancy was
filled, the return date would be set by the court and notices of
the return date would be mailed to the parties.  The Town
acknowledged that the Clerk subsequently informed it of the
scheduled return date.  
Supreme Court denied the Board's motion to dismiss.  A
unanimous panel of the Appellate Division reversed, granted the
Board's motion, and dismissed the petition, concluding that "the
filing and service of a notice of petition in a tax certiorari
proceeding lacking a return date is jurisdictionally defective"
(52 AD3d 1261 [internal quotation marks, citations and brackets
omitted]).  We granted petitioner's motion for leave to appeal
and now reverse.  
Pursuant to RPTL 704 (1), a real property owner may
commence a special proceeding to challenge a tax assessment by
filing a petition along with a notice of petition returnable not
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No. 129
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less than 20 nor more than 90 days after the service of the
petition and notice of petition.  CPLR 403 (a) provides that a
"notice of petition shall specify the time and place of the
hearing on the petition."  In practice, it is sometimes difficult
for a litigant to set a proper return date prior to service of
the petition and notice of petition because the judge -- whose
calendar preferences normally dictate the choice of the return
date -- may not yet have been assigned to the case (see Siegel,
NY Prac § 553, at 952 [4th ed]).  Adding to this practical
difficulty is the short, 30-day statute of limitations in RPTL
article 7 proceedings (see RPTL 702 [2]).  Thus, a petitioner
attempting to commence a tax certiorari proceeding may face a
procedural dilemma -- timely file the petition and notice of
petition without knowledge of an actual return date, or wait
until the assignment of a judge and return date and risk the
expiration of the limitations period.    
The existence of these procedural obstacles in tax
certiorari proceedings has resulted in a number of cases in which
the respondent taxing authority has challenged the notice of
petition as jurisdictionally defective for the failure to include
an accurate return date (Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp v
Town of Tonawanda Assessor, 309 AD2d 1251 [2003], lv granted 1
NY3d 507 [2004], appeal withdrawn 3 NY3d 635 [2004]; Matter of
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Board of Assessors, 182 AD2d 970 [3d Dept
1992]; Matter of Batavia Enters. v Assessor of Town of Batavia,
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No. 129
1  Although Ballard did not involve a tax certiorari
proceeding, its analysis is relevant inasmuch as an Executive Law
§ 298 proceeding is commenced, in the same manner as an RPTL
article 7 proceeding, by "the filing of a notice of petition and
petition" in Supreme Court.  
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72 AD2d 912 [4th Dept 1979]).  We faced the issue in Matter of
National Gypsum Co. v Assessor of Town of Tonawanda (4 NY3d 680
[2005]), an RPTL article 7 proceeding where the petitioner's
counsel chose a return date that complied with CPLR 403 (a), but
court personnel later changed the date.  We rejected the
respondent's argument that the notice of petition containing this
"fictitious hearing date" (4 NY3d at 683) was jurisdictionally
defective, recognizing that an accurate return date could not be
chosen before a judge had been assigned to the action.  "Any
other interpretation of the statute," we concluded, "would be
patently unfair to a party attempting to commence such a
proceeding" (id. at 684 [internal quotation marks and citation]). 
We faced a slightly different question in Matter of
Ballard v HSBC Bank USA (6 NY3d 658 [2006]), a proceeding
pursuant to Executive Law § 2981 where the petitioner left the
return date on the notice of petition blank because a Supreme
Court Justice had not yet been assigned to the case.  We held
that the failure to include a return date did not implicate the
court's subject matter jurisdiction, but did not expressly pass
on whether personal jurisdiction was absent, as the petitioner
had failed to raise the issue at the first available opportunity,
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No. 129
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thereby waiving that defense (id. at 664).  Here, however, where
the Board did timely interpose this defense, the issue is
squarely presented for our review.  
It is settled that personal jurisdiction may be absent
where a party improperly commences a proceeding or action (Matter
of Fry v Village of Tarrytown, 89 NY2d 714 [1997]; see Ballard, 6
NY3d at 664).  Not all defects in the commencement process,
however, result in a loss of personal jurisdiction.  Our decision
in Matter of Great E. Mall v Con-don (36 NY2d 544 [1975]) is
instructive.  There, the petitioners in the RPTL article 7
proceeding named only one of the Town's three assessors, thereby
failing to comply with RPTL 704 (2), which requires the
proceeding to be commenced against "the assessors either by
naming them individually or by using the official name of the
assessing unit."  Taking into account the "dual legal concepts
that mere technical defects in pleadings should not defeat
otherwise meritorious claims, and that substance should be
preferred over form" (id. at 548), this Court held that the
petitioners' failure to comply with the technical pleading
requirement of RPTL 704 (2) did not render the petitions
jurisdictionally defective.  Notably, the technical defect in
Great E. Mall was the absence of statutorily mandated information
from the petition, a document that must be filed to commence the
proceeding.  Likewise, the defect here was the omission of
information required in the notice of petition, a document
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No. 129
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essential to the commencement of a tax certiorari proceeding.     
Critical to the analysis in Great E. Mall was our long-
standing view that the law regarding real property assessment
proceedings is "remedial in character and should be liberally
construed to the end that the taxpayer's right to have his
assessment reviewed should not be defeated by a technicality" (36
NY2d at 548, quoting People ex rel. New York City Ominbus Corp. v
Miller, 282 NY 5, 9 [1939] [internal quotation marks omitted]). 
Our consideration was also informed by the circumstance that the
respondent had failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from
the pleading infirmity (see id. at 549).  Specifically, we noted
that the purpose of the petition in a special proceeding-- to
advise the respondent of the commencement of the action -- had
been met by service of the petition on one, but not all, of the
assessors.  Accordingly, we disregarded the technical defect and
denied the respondents' motion to dismiss the petition.    
Similar to the respondents in Great E. Mall, the Board
here has failed to allege any prejudice that resulted from the
failure to include a return date in the notice of petition.  The
return date undoubtedly serves a necessary purpose in special
proceedings -- to put the respondent on notice as to the date
before which the responsive papers should be served.  This
concern, however, is not so compelling in RPTL article 7
proceedings where the allegations contained in the petition are
deemed denied if the respondent fails to timely serve an answer
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No. 129
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(see RPTL 712 [1]), thereby precluding entry of a judgment
against the respondent in the case of a default.  Thus, in the
context of a tax certiorari proceeding, we are hard-pressed to
see how the assessing authority will suffer any prejudice as a
result of the failure to include a return date.  Indeed, the
notice of petition in National Gypsum, which contained an
admittedly fabricated but plausible return date, failed to advise
the respondent of the time and place of the hearing.  In that
regard, it was no more useful or informative than the notice of
petition here, which omitted a return date.  It would be
incongruous for us to approve of a fictitious return date yet
condemn an absent one.  
We therefore conclude that personal jurisdiction is not
lacking in an RPTL article 7 proceeding where the petitioner
omits the return date from the notice of petition.  This
conclusion is entirely consistent with the view in Great E. Mall
that mere technical irregularities in the commencement process
should be disregarded if a substantial right of a party is not
prejudiced.  Further, it is a natural extension of National
Gypsum, which, in recognition of the practical difficulties that
arise when commencing these types of proceedings, forgave the
pleading infirmity.  To require strict compliance with CPLR 403
(a) in this context would mean that, under certain circumstances,
petitioners would be foreclosed from judicial review of their tax
assessments through no fault of their own.  We find that approach
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No. 129
2    In the future, it would be advisable for petitioners to
serve an amended notice of petition once the court sets the
return date.
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unduly harsh and contrary to our historically liberal
construction of pleading and procedure in tax certiorari
proceedings.2  While our conclusion applies in RPTL article 7
proceedings where petitioner is unable to designate a return
date, we have no occasion to address the rules applicable to
other types of special proceedings.  
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, with costs, and the motion to dismiss denied.  
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Order reversed, with costs, and motion to dismiss the petition
denied.  Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided October 15, 2009