Title: Eugene Nichols v. Jon Litscher

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 119 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0853-W 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Eugene Nichols,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Jon Litscher, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of 
Corrections and Rick Hudson, Warden, North Fork 
Correctional Facility,  
 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 6, 2001   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 14, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
 
 
COUNTY: 
 
 
JUDGE: 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner there were briefs by Jeffrey O. Davis, 
Daniel J. La Fave and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Daniel J. La Fave. 
 
For the respondents the cause was argued by James M. 
Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2001 WI 119 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports.   
No.  00-0853-W  
(L.C. No. 
96 CF 693) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Eugene  
Nichols,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Jon Litscher, Secretary, Wisconsin  
Department of Corrections and Rick  
Hudson, Warden, North Fork Correctional  
Facility,  
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 6, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
PETITION for writ of habeas corpus.  Writ granted; rights 
declared.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Eugene 
Nichols, seeks reinstatement of his petition for review that was 
previously dismissed as untimely filed.  He asserts that his 
petition should be deemed "filed" as of the date that he 
delivered it to prison authorities for mailing to this court.  
Although we do not adopt Nichols' definition of "filed," we 
nevertheless determine that the 30-day deadline for receipt of a 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
2 
 
petition for review is tolled on the date that a pro se prisoner 
delivers a correctly addressed petition to the proper prison 
authorities for mailing.  Accordingly, we grant Nichols' 
requested relief and reinstate his petition for review. 
I 
¶2 
The parties have agreed to the facts necessary to our 
decision in this case.  Nichols is a prisoner convicted in 
Wisconsin who is incarcerated in the North Fork Correctional 
Facility ("North Fork") in Sayre, Oklahoma.  On January 26, 
2000, the court of appeals in an unpublished decision affirmed 
his conviction for battery by a prisoner.  Nichols received a 
copy 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision 
on 
January 
28.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 808.10 (1999-2000)1 states that a petition for 
review must be "filed in the supreme court within 30 days of the 
date of the decision of the court of appeals," making Nichols' 
petition for review due on February 25, 2000. 
¶3 
Nichols gave his petition for review to the North Fork 
librarian for copying on February 15, 2000, ten days before the 
petition's due date.  In an affidavit, the librarian stated that 
prisoner copy requests normally take "between three and seven 
days" to fill because the prison must first verify whether the 
prisoner has sufficient funds to pay for the copies. 
¶4 
The librarian returned copies of the petition for 
review to Nichols in the afternoon of Friday, February 18, 2000.  
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
3 
 
In his habeas petition, Nichols averred that it was too late to 
mail the petition for review that day because "mail only leaves 
the institution in the morning."  He was unable to mail the 
petition on Saturday, February 19, because the prison mailroom 
was not open on Saturdays.  Thus, on February 21, a Monday, 
Nichols delivered his petition for review, properly addressed, 
to the North Fork mailroom.  A North Fork corrections officer 
processed Nichols' petition for priority mailing.  It appears 
that the petition may not have been mailed until the following 
day.  In an affidavit, the corrections officer that processed 
Nichols' petition stated that "mail leaving this institution 
typically does not arrive at its destination before four to ten 
days have elapsed." 
¶5 
The clerk of this court received Nichols' petition for 
review on February 28, 2000, one business day late.  His 
petition was dismissed as untimely in a February 29 order.  On 
March 24, 2000, Nichols filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in this court, asking that we consider his petition for 
review on its merits because he had acted "diligently and 
swiftly" in attempting to file the petition.  He noted that his 
petition was mailed early enough that it should have arrived 
with time to spare. 
¶6 
We initially denied Nichols' habeas petition.  He 
moved for reconsideration, arguing that any delay in the filing 
of his petition for review was due to prison officials' 
inadvertence or to prison policies and practices.  Under such 
circumstances, Nichols argued, a petition should be considered 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
4 
 
"filed" when it is turned over to prison authorities for 
mailing.  In his motion for reconsideration, Nichols referred 
this court to a then recently issued court of appeals decision, 
State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle, 2000 WI App 238, 239 Wis. 2d 
327, 620 N.W.2d 409.  In Shimkus, the court determined that when 
a prison inmate deposits a certiorari petition in a prison mail 
receptacle, the 45-day time limit to file the certiorari action 
must be tolled.  Id. at ¶14.  We granted Nichols' motion for 
reconsideration. 
II 
¶7 
The question before us is whether this court may 
consider a pro se prisoner's petition for review when the 
petition was received by the clerk more than 30 days after the 
date of the court of appeals decision from which the prisoner 
sought review.  In addressing this question, we initially 
examine both a statute enacted by the legislature and a rule 
promulgated 
under 
this 
court's 
rule-making 
authority.  
Ultimately, however, our determination is rooted in a review of 
the rationales and conclusions of prior cases. 
III 
¶8 
Nichols argues that this court should adopt a "prison 
mailbox" rule with regard to the deadline to file a petition for 
review 
under 
§ 808.10 
and 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1).  
Section 808.10 states: 
 
Review by the supreme court.  A decision of the 
court of appeals is reviewable by the supreme court 
only upon a petition for review granted by the supreme 
court. The petition for review shall be filed in the 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
5 
 
supreme court within 30 days of the date of the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
Section (Rule) 809.62(1) states in relevant part: 
 
A party may file with the supreme court a 
petition for review of an adverse decision of the 
court of appeals pursuant to s. 808.10 within 30 days 
of the date of the decision of the court of appeals. 
In asking that we adopt a "prison mailbox" rule, Nichols argues 
that his petition for review should be considered "filed" for 
purposes of § 808.10 and § (Rule) 809.62(1) at the time that he 
delivered his petition to prison authorities for mailing. 
¶9 
As an alternative argument, Nichols asserts that this 
court should conclude that § 808.10 and § (Rule) 809.62(1) are 
unconstitutional as applied.  He asserts that the State has 
effectively deprived him of his statutory 30-day filing period, 
and that this deprivation violates his constitutional rights to 
equal protection and due process.2 
¶10 The State disagrees with Nichols that a prison mailbox 
rule is necessary to save § 808.10 and § (Rule) 809.62(1) from 
constitutional infirmity.  It asserts that the 30-day period is 
long 
enough 
to 
mitigate 
any 
differential 
impact 
that 
incarceration may have on pro se prisoners.  However, the State 
agrees with Nichols that § 808.10 and § (Rule) 809.62(1) could 
"reasonably be construed to encompass a 'prison mailbox rule.'"  
                                                 
2 Because we determine that the 30-day deadline for receipt 
of Nichols' petition for review was tolled when he delivered the 
petition to prison authorities for mailing, we need not address 
his constitutional arguments. 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
6 
 
Nevertheless, both the State and Nichols acknowledge that on its 
face, such an interpretation may be strained. 
¶11 We decline to interpret the term "file" in § 808.10 
and § 809.62(1) to mean "deposit in a prison mailbox."  We agree 
that such an interpretation may strain the plain language of 
both the statute and the rule.  In addition, such a construction 
of the word "file" seemingly conflicts with language in our 
prior decisions. 
¶12 As both parties acknowledge, we have in the past 
concluded that "[i]f the clerk of this court does not receive 
the petition for review for filing within that 30 days, this 
court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction to review [a 
court of appeals] decision."  St. John's Home v. Continental 
Cas. Co., 150 Wis. 2d 37, 43, 441 N.W.2d 219 (1989) (emphasis 
added); see also First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Nicholaou, 87 Wis. 2d 
360, 362, 274 N.W.2d 704 (1979).  We have explained: 
 
The clerk of this court has been designated to receive 
petitions for review as well as other documents for 
filing.  These documents can either be hand delivered 
to the clerk's office . . . or mailed to [the clerk's 
address].  Whatever method of delivery is used, a 
petition for review must be physically received in the 
clerk's office within 30 days of the filing of the 
court of appeals' decision that is to be reviewed. 
St. John's, 150 Wis. 2d at 42-43 (citations omitted).  In 
Gunderson v. DOT, 106 Wis. 2d 611, 615, 318 N.W.2d 779 (1982), 
we reiterated that "the filing of a petition does not occur upon 
its mailing." 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
7 
 
¶13 We reaffirm the general vitality of the petition for 
review filing requirements as outlined in Nicholaou, Gunderson, 
and St. John's.  However, this does not mean that Nichols is 
without relief. 
¶14 In a recent court of appeals decision, Shimkus, 2000 
WI App 238, a pro se prisoner, Mark Shimkus, sought circuit 
court certiorari review of a prison disciplinary committee 
decision pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.735.3  Under § 893.735, a 
prisoner seeking such review generally has 45 days from the date 
of a final administrative decision to file an action in circuit 
court for review.  Although Shimkus placed his petition for a 
writ of certiorari in prison mail 12 days prior to the 45-day 
deadline, the clerk of court did not receive his petition until 
three days after the deadline.  Id. at ¶3.  The circuit court 
dismissed Shimkus's petition as untimely filed.  Id. 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.735 states, in part: 
(2)  An action seeking a remedy available by 
certiorari made on behalf of a prisoner is barred 
unless commenced within 45 days after the cause of 
action accrues.  The 45-day period shall begin on the 
date of the decision or disposition, except that the 
court may extend the period by as many days as the 
prisoner proves have elapsed between the decision or 
disposition and the prisoner's actual notice of the 
decision or disposition. . . . 
(3)  In this section, an action seeking a remedy 
available by certiorari is commenced at the time that 
the prisoner files a petition seeking a writ of 
certiorari with a court. 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
8 
 
¶15 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that when a 
prison inmate deposits a certiorari petition in a prison mail 
receptacle, the 45-day time limit to file the certiorari action 
must be tolled.  Shimkus, 2000 WI App 238, ¶14.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the rationale in 
the Supreme Court's decision in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 
(1988).   
¶16 In Houston, 487 U.S. at 270-71, the Supreme Court 
explained the obstacles that pro se prisoner litigants face in 
filing documents.  The Court stated: 
 
Such prisoners cannot take the steps other litigants 
can take to monitor the processing of their notices of 
appeal and to ensure that the court clerk receives and 
stamps their notices of appeal before the 30-day 
deadline.  Unlike other litigants, pro se prisoners 
cannot personally travel to the courthouse to see that 
the notice is stamped "filed" or to establish the date 
on which the court received the notice.  Other 
litigants may choose to entrust their appeals to the 
vagaries of the mail and the clerk's process for 
stamping incoming papers, but only the pro se prisoner 
is forced to do so by his situation. 
 
¶17 The Court in Houston emphasized the lack of control 
and certainty pro se prisoners have with regard to the filing of 
documents: 
 
[T]he pro se prisoner has no choice but to entrust the 
forwarding 
of 
his 
notice 
of 
appeal 
to 
prison 
authorities whom he cannot control or supervise and 
who may have every incentive to delay.  No matter how 
far in advance the pro se prisoner delivers his notice 
to the prison authorities, he can never be sure that 
it will ultimately get stamped "filed" on time.   
Houston, 487 U.S. at 271 (emphasis in original).  The Houston 
Court concluded that a pro se prisoner's notice of appeal from 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
9 
 
the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition was "filed at 
the time [he] delivered it to the prison authorities for 
forwarding to the court clerk."  Id. at 276. 
¶18 The Houston court grounded its holding not in the 
United States Constitution, but in an interpretation of the 
definition of the word "filed" in Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(1).  See Houston, 487 U.S. at 268, 272; see also 
Shimkus, 2000 WI App 238, ¶8.4  Nevertheless, a number of state 
supreme courts have adopted Houston's rationale in concluding 
that a petition for review or other document is "filed" at the 
time that a pro se prisoner delivers it to the proper prison 
authorities for mailing.  See, e.g., Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 
614, 617 (Fla. 1992); Woody v. State, 833 P.2d 257, 259-60 
(Okla. 1992); Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 425-26 (Pa. 
1997).  Other state supreme courts have rejected Houston and 
concluded that the word "file" may not be interpreted to 
encompass any such rule.  See, e.g., Carr v. State, 554 A.2d 
778, 780 (Del. 1989); State ex rel. Tyler v. Alexander, 555 
N.E.2d 966 (Ohio 1990). 
                                                 
4 Because it is not based in the United States Constitution, 
the Houston decision is not binding on this court.  However, as 
this court and the court of appeals have noted, it is not 
uncommon for Wisconsin appellate courts to follow the reasoning 
of federal court decisions that we consider persuasive on a 
particular point of law.  See American Med. Transp. v. Curtis-
Universal, Inc., 154 Wis. 2d 135, 152, 452 N.W.2d 575 (1990); 
State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle, 2000 WI App 238, ¶8, 239 Wis. 
2d 327, 620 N.W.2d 409. 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
10 
 
¶19 In Shimkus, 2000 WI App 238, ¶9, the court of appeals 
concluded that the rationale in Houston was "equally applicable" 
to the facts before it.  However, the court of appeals declined 
to adopt the Houston Court's holding insofar as Houston 
concluded that the deposit of a pleading or notice in a prison 
mail receptacle constituted "filing" within the meaning of a 
time-limit statute.  Id.  The court of appeals reasoned that the 
procedures for commencing an action under § 893.735 are more 
complex than the procedures for filing a notice of appeal in 
federal court.  Id. 
¶20 In declining to adopt the Houston mailbox rule, the 
court of appeals seemed to recognize that an interpretation of 
"file" to mean "deposit in the prison mail receptacle" might 
prove problematic.  See Shimkus, 2000 WI App 238, ¶9.  The court 
noted that there is a difference in the filing procedures for 
the federal rule discussed in Houston and the Wisconsin rules at 
issue in Shimkus's case.  Id.  The federal rule related to the 
"simple act of filing a notice of appeal."  The court of appeals 
emphasized that "nothing more is required for institution of the 
appeal proceedings."  Id. 
¶21 The court in Shimkus contrasted this "simple act" with 
the more involved process in Wisconsin for the commencement of a 
civil action by a pro se prisoner under § 893.735(2).  2000 WI 
App 238, ¶9.  A civil action is not commenced until a filing fee 
is paid "unless payment is waived by the court for cause shown."  
Id.; see also Wis. Stat. §§ 801.02(6) and 814.29(1).  In order 
to commence a certiorari action without full prepayment of the 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
11 
 
required fees, the prisoner must submit to the circuit court an 
affidavit of indigency and a trust fund account statement for 
the preceding six-month period.  Shimkus, 2000 WI App 238, ¶9.  
Thus, the Shimkus court concluded, the proper course was to toll 
the statutory 45-day time limit between the time the prisoner 
deposited 
the 
appropriate 
documents 
in 
the 
prison 
mail 
receptacle and the time of their receipt by the clerk of court.  
Id. 
¶22 Wisconsin cases have since built upon the Shimkus 
tolling rule in the context of pro se prisoner certiorari 
actions under § 893.735.  In State ex rel. Locklear v. Schwarz, 
2001 WI App 74, ¶¶5, 26, 242 Wis. 2d 327, 629 N.W.2d 30, the 
court of appeals concluded that the § 893.735 45-day time limit 
should also toll where a pro se prisoner has requested a "three-
strikes" certification from the Department of Justice.5  The 
court reasoned that pro se prisoners have no choice but to 
entrust their papers to prison officials who they "cannot 
control or supervise" and who "may have every incentive to 
delay."  Id. at ¶26 (quoting State ex rel. Steldt v. McCaughtry, 
2000 WI App 176, ¶8, 238 Wis. 2d 393, 617 N.W.2d 201.) 
                                                 
5 Under Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(d), a circuit court must 
dismiss an action by a prisoner seeking to waive the prepayment 
of filing fees where that prisoner: 
has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while he or she was 
incarcerated, imprisoned, confined or detained in a 
jail or prison, brought an appeal, writ of error, 
action or special proceeding, including a petition for 
a common law writ of certiorari, that was dismissed by 
a state or federal court for any of the reasons listed 
in s. 802.05(3)(b) 1. to 4. 
No. 
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12 
 
¶23 Likewise, in State ex rel. Walker v. McCaughtry, 2001 
WI App 110, ¶16, 244 Wis. 2d 177, 629 N.W.2d 17, the court of 
appeals concluded that the 45-day time limit could also toll 
where a prisoner has requested a trust account statement from 
the Department of Corrections as proof of indigency.  The court 
explained the combined effect of its tolling rules, again based 
on the Houston rationale:  "[T]he tolling begins when the 
documents over which prisoners have control have been mailed, 
and all of the documents over which prisoners have no control 
have been requested."  Id. at ¶18.  Referring to the 45-day 
statutory deadline, the court explained that "[b]y requiring 
prisoners to submit documents under their control within a 
designated period, the prisoner is treated equitably and the 
legislative intent is fulfilled."  Id. 
¶24 We are persuaded by the rationale in Houston and by 
the approach in Shimkus and its progeny.  Accordingly, we apply 
a similar tolling rule to pro se prisoners who file petitions 
for review in this court. 
¶25 While the procedures for commencing a civil action as 
discussed in Shimkus are not the same as those for filing a 
petition for review, both require filing fees and establish a 
separate 
procedure 
for 
waiver 
of 
those 
fees. 
 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(2)(a)1., the clerk of court "shall 
charge" $150 for the filing of a petition for review.  However, 
a petitioner may seek a waiver of the fee by supplying this 
court with an affidavit of indigency.  Wis. S. Ct. IOP II.L.2. 
(Mar. 16, 2000).  Thus, as in Shimkus, a definition of "file" as 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
13 
 
"deposit in the prison mail receptacle" may be problematic in 
light of these procedures.   
¶26 In 
addition, 
a 
tolling 
rule 
will 
avoid 
vexing 
questions as to the proper course of action where it appears 
that a pro se prisoner's petition is untimely because of prison 
authorities' failure to promptly mail or forward it.  See 
Houston, 487 U.S. at 276; Shimkus, 2000 WI App 238, ¶6 n.4.  We 
recognize that a tolling rule will not eliminate the potential 
for all factual disputes.  Nevertheless, we are convinced that 
this potential is small, particularly when considered in light 
of an alternative such as case-by-case inquiries into whether 
prison officials improperly delayed the mailing. 
¶27 While we do not mandate any particular procedure that 
litigants must follow, we note that both Nichols and the State 
agree that the factual question of the proper tolling date could 
be relatively easily resolved in most cases by the use of a 
certificate of service or affidavit of mailing.  Such a 
certificate or affidavit may be desirable in that, as the State 
avers, many prisons do not have a general "log-in" system that 
identifies the date on which a prisoner submits outgoing mail.  
A certificate or affidavit would create a rebuttable presumption 
that the prisoner had delivered his or her petition to the 
proper prison authorities on the particular day certified.  We 
note, however, that a tolling rule will not excuse a pro se 
prisoner who ultimately fails to pay filing fees, address the 
petition properly, or otherwise comply with filing requirements. 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
14 
 
¶28 The tolling rule will ensure the proper treatment of 
pro se prisoners who file petitions for review.  When pro se 
prisoners seek to file petitions, their control over the filing 
process is circumscribed by prison rules and procedures.  Pro se 
prisoners' choice in method of filing is no choice at all.  They 
must rely on the "vagaries of the mail."  Other petitioners may 
personally deliver their petitions to the clerk of court's 
office, even at the last possible moment.  We discern no 
convincing reason why pro se prisoners who act more promptly and 
otherwise comply with filing requirements should be placed at a 
disadvantage. 
¶29 Finally, we turn to the question of whether the 
tolling rule we adopt today should receive prospective or 
retroactive application.  In its brief, the State argues that to 
the extent this court grants relief, the rule should apply to 
Nichols, but should otherwise be prospective.  In his reply 
brief, Nichols states that he takes no position on whether a 
prison mailbox rule should apply retroactively to others 
similarly situated, so long as he receives the benefit of the 
rule. 
¶30 The State acknowledges that with respect to litigants 
other than Nichols, the proper retroactivity doctrine to apply 
is not immediately apparent.  It recognizes that a holding in 
this case could be viewed as a rule of criminal procedure, 
applying retroactively to all cases pending on direct review or 
not yet final.  See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).  
Yet, because § 808.10 applies to all petitions for review, both 
No. 
00-0853-W   
 
15 
 
civil and criminal, it is unclear if the retroactivity analysis 
used in civil cases should govern.  See Chevron Oil Co. v. 
Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). 
¶31 Given this uncertainty, we decline to decide whether 
the rule should be prospective or retroactive.  Such a 
determination should be made with the benefit of briefs and 
argument on the merits by parties who take adverse positions.  
See Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 230 Wis. 2d 212, 
244, 601 N.W.2d 627 (1999). 
¶32 In sum, we conclude that the 30-day deadline for 
receipt of a petition for review is tolled on the date that a 
pro se prisoner delivers a correctly addressed petition to the 
proper prison authorities for mailing.6  Here, Nichols delivered 
his correctly addressed petition on the 26th day.  Therefore, we 
determine that this court may consider Nichols' pro se petition 
for review even though it was received in the clerk's office 
more than 30 days after the date of the court of appeals 
decision. 
                                                 
6 In Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 268 (1988), the Supreme 
Court described "delivery to prison authorities" as the act that 
constituted filing, whereas in Shimkus, 2000 WI App 238, ¶1, the 
court of appeals described "deposited in the prison mail 
receptacle" as the act that triggered tolling.  Consistent with 
the 
facts 
in 
this 
case, 
we 
have 
used 
the 
phrase 
"delivers . . . to prison authorities" as the act that triggers 
our tolling rule.  We recognize that different prisons may have 
different procedures for outgoing prisoner mail.  The important 
point is that in order to trigger tolling, the pro se prisoner 
must follow prison rules or practices as to outgoing mail 
whether they require placing the mail in the hands of certain 
prison authorities, depositing mail in a designated receptacle, 
or some other procedure. 
No. 
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16 
 
By the Court.—The petition for habeas corpus is granted; 
rights declared. 
 
 
No. 
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1