Title: Commonwealth v. Barry

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-08635 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTHONY BARRY  
(and nine companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 5, 2018. - February 12, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Proximate Cause.  Evidence, Exculpatory, Police 
report, Disclosure of evidence.  Deoxyribonucleic Acid.  
Constitutional Law, Fair trial, Confrontation of witnesses. 
Due Process of Law, Fair trial.  Fair Trial.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, New trial, Discovery, Fair trial, 
Confrontation of witnesses, Disclosure of identity of 
informer. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 23, 1999. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Robert A. Barton, J.; a motion 
for a new trial, filed on May 17, 2002, was heard by Elizabeth 
Butler, J.; and a second motion for a new trial, filed on 
November 20, 2014, was heard by Robert B. Gordon, J. 
 
 
 
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio (Jillise McDonough also present) 
for Anthony Barry. 
 
Claudia Leis Bolgen for Brian Cahill. 
 
Casey E. Silvia, Assistant District Attorney (Timothy 
Ferriter, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
                     
 
1 Four against Anthony Barry and five against Brian Cahill. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Shortly after midnight on April 17, 1999, Kevin 
McCormack and Brian Porreca were part of a group leaving a bar 
in Malden with plans to continue their night at a club in 
Boston.  They never made it.  As the group prepared to leave, 
Porreca saw two longtime friends, Anthony Barry and Brian 
Cahill, run up to the vehicle that the group was entering.  
While Cahill stayed on the passenger side of the vehicle, 
shooting an Uzi at it, Barry fired a handgun into the back of 
McCormack's head as he sat in the driver's seat.  Porreca and 
one of the women in their group were also shot, and Porreca 
retreated into the bar.  Based largely on Porreca's testimony, 
Barry and Cahill were convicted of murder in the first degree.2 
 
The defendants each filed two motions for a new trial, each 
of which was denied.  Their direct appeal is consolidated with 
their appeal from the denial of those motions, and they argue 
that multiple reversible errors occurred both during and after 
trial.  We consider whether (1) there was sufficient evidence to 
support each defendant's murder conviction; (2) the Commonwealth 
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 
                     
 
2 Each defendant was also convicted of armed assault with 
intent to murder, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); two counts of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15A (b); and unlawful possession of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a). 
3 
 
 
373 U.S. 83 (1963); (3) newly discovered evidence warranted a 
new trial; (4) expert testimony regarding deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) violated the defendants' rights to confrontation and due 
process; (5) the defendants' right to a public trial was 
violated; (6) discovery violations implicated the confrontation 
clause; and (7) a motion for the disclosure of a confidential 
informant's identity was erroneously denied.  We affirm. 
 
Background.  1.  The shooting.  We recite facts that the 
jury could have found and that are necessary to resolve the 
defendants' appeal, reserving some facts for later discussion.  
Porreca met some friends, including McCormack, at a bar in 
Malden on the night of April 16, 1999.  While there, Porreca 
drank four or five beers before he, McCormack, Lindsay Cremone, 
Kristen Terfry, Stephen Almeida, and John Whitson decided to go 
to a club in Boston.  The group left the bar at 12:15 A.M. on 
April 17 and proceeded to Cremone's sister's car.  McCormack sat 
in the driver's seat, Terfry sat in the front passenger seat, 
Cremone sat in the rear driver's side seat, and Porreca was 
preparing to enter the rear seat on the passenger's side3 when he 
heard voices in the parking lot and looked up to see Barry and 
Cahill running in their direction.  The men wore dark hoods that 
covered their ears, hair, and heads, but left their faces 
                     
 
3 Stephen Almeida had gone back into the bar to get John 
Whitson. 
4 
 
 
exposed.  Cahill ran toward the passenger's side of the vehicle 
and fired a nine millimeter Uzi-type semiautomatic weapon into 
it, striking McCormack several times and shooting Porreca and 
Cremone twice each.  Porreca had seen Barry running toward the 
driver's side of the car, and Cremone testified that a man ran 
to the driver's side of the vehicle, put a gun to McCormack's 
head, and shot him. 
 
After being shot, Porreca observed Cahill turning toward 
the vehicle and heard "a lot of gunshots" as he retreated into 
the bar.  From the back seat, Cremone heard "two different types 
of firing."  As Porreca entered the bar, he yelled "call 9-1-1" 
and approached Whitson, with whom the group had been socializing 
earlier.  Porreca exclaimed, "Fuck'n Barry and Cahill" to 
Whitson, and approached Gene Giangrande's4 girlfriend and told 
her to "[t]ell Gene I'm going to blow his fuck'n head off."  
Porreca explained that he said this because "[i]t was Gene 
Giangrande's crew, his friends who had just shot me, and I was 
mad at him." 
 
A .40 caliber pistol was found on the ground next to the 
driver's side of the vehicle.  The Uzi used in the attack was 
found by two teenagers walking home at approximately 2:30 A.M. 
                     
 
4 Gene Giangrande was a local bookmaker and drug dealer for 
whom Brian Porreca collected debts and who was best friends with 
Anthony Barry.  Both defendants were part of Giangrande's 
"crew." 
5 
 
 
on April 17 on the sidewalk of Whitman Street, close to the bar.  
One of the teenagers who found the Uzi took it home, unloaded 
it, and hid it in the basement of his house before turning it in 
to the Malden police the following day. 
 
2.  Porreca's background.  Porreca grew up in Medford and 
was friends with each of the defendants.  Porreca introduced the 
defendants to each other in 1994 or 1995, after which the 
defendants became "close."  Porreca was also friends with 
Giangrande, an area bookmaker and drug dealer; William 
Angelesco, a friend of Giangrande's who was known to be 
connected with organized crime; and McCormack, the victim.  
Porreca was a former professional boxer and collected debts owed 
to Giangrande, who would pay him in cash or with Percocet pills.  
Porreca had a lengthy criminal history.  The jury also heard 
evidence of Porreca's substance abuse.  He admitted to being 
addicted to opiates and having consumed two or three Percocet 
pills on the morning of the shooting. 
 
At the time of the murder, Porreca was under Federal 
investigation for his involvement in the kidnapping of an area 
drug dealer that took place in 1995 (kidnapping).  Allegedly, 
Porreca and another man, in an attempt to determine the location 
of a shipment of marijuana from Mexico, kidnapped the drug 
dealer and brought him to a house in Medford.  The man was tied 
up, sprayed with lighter fluid, and questioned as Porreca held a 
6 
 
 
gun and another man held a lighter.  After approximately one 
hour, Porreca and the other man released the kidnapped party.  
In early April 1999, Porreca received a summons to appear before 
a Federal grand jury, and met with several members of law 
enforcement to discuss the likely charges against him.  Porreca 
left that meeting believing that he was facing fifteen or more 
years in prison if he did not cooperate with law enforcement; 
and if he did, his likely sentence would be reduced to 
approximately five years. 
3.  Additional trial evidence.  The jury also heard 
testimony of the police investigation into the shooting.  
Porreca was interviewed by police at the hospital and was 
initially uncooperative.  He first said that "two white guys" 
whom he knew had conducted the shooting, but later stated that 
it was actually "two black guys."  Eventually, Porreca told a 
State police trooper investigating the shooting that he would 
identify the shooters in exchange for a promise that he would 
not go to prison for his involvement in the kidnapping.  Porreca 
received such an assurance from the United States Attorney's 
office, agreed to cooperate, and identified the defendants to 
the police. 
Pursuant to search warrants, police searched Cahill's 
residence in Randolph and recovered an ammunition can with a 
sticker from an army-navy style surplus store in Malden with a 
7 
 
 
large pair of Hatch-brand leather gloves.  A search of Barry's 
apartment in Melrose also yielded two Nomex hoods5 and an extra-
large pair of Hatch gloves in a box with two bulletproof vests.  
The owner of the surplus store testified that two young men 
loosely matching the defendants' descriptions had purchased two 
pairs of Hatch gloves (one large and one extra-large), two Nomex 
hoods, and a can of .30 caliber ammunition one week before the 
shooting.  A DNA expert testified that a saliva sample found on 
one of the Nomex hoods found in Barry's apartment matched 
Cahill's DNA. 
A medical examiner testified about the autopsy he performed 
on McCormack.  Detailing McCormack's injuries, he first 
described the gunshot wound to McCormack's head and offered his 
opinion that that wound alone was lethal.  He further testified 
about a separate, independently lethal gunshot wound to 
McCormack's back.  The bullet removed from McCormack's head was 
a .40 caliber bullet that matched the pistol left on the scene, 
while the second lethal wound was caused by an undetermined, but 
different, caliber bullet.  One .40 caliber shell casing was 
recovered from the crime scene, found in the backseat of the 
car, and fourteen nine millimeter shell casings were found on 
                     
 
5 Nomex hoods were described as similar to those worn by 
football players or law enforcement in cold weather; they adhere 
tightly to the head but reveal much of the wearer's face, 
including the eyes, nose, and cheeks. 
8 
 
 
the scene -- thirteen on or around the car and one on the floor 
of the car. 
 
4.  First motion for a new trial.  In 2002, approximately 
two years after trial, the defendants filed their first motion 
for a new trial.6  After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the 
motion was denied.7  The primary arguments in the first motion 
centered on evidence discovered after trial that the defendants 
contended would have assisted their attack on Porreca's 
credibility.  They also presented evidence that suggested that 
Giangrande and Angelesco had admitted to others that they, 
rather than the defendants, were the shooters. 
 
The defendants maintained that the Commonwealth 
intentionally withheld evidence that Porreca was brought by 
police to Saints Memorial Hospital in Lowell on April 21, 1999, 
four days after the shooting, where he complained that he was in 
heroin withdrawal.  In those records, medical staff noted that 
Porreca stated to them to be "drug sick" and that one of the 
police officers accompanying him indicated that he had been 
vomiting for most of the previous night.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, two doctors opined about Porreca's medical records.  
                     
 
6 We limit our discussion of the decision on the first 
motion for a new trial to the lone portion that the defendants 
assert was erroneous. 
 
 
7 The trial judge did not preside over the motion for a new 
trial. 
9 
 
 
One of the doctors described the effects of opiate withdrawal 
and indicated that Porreca's behavior at the hospital was 
consistent with being in withdrawal, and that Porreca's actions 
immediately after the shooting were consistent with being 
intoxicated at the time.  In contrast, the doctor who treated 
Porreca testified that, although he did not remember treating 
Porreca, he also did not document any symptoms of withdrawal.  
The treating doctor also testified that the records suggested 
that Porreca was not in withdrawal during the visit.  The judge 
who heard the first motion for a new trial (first motion judge) 
credited the testimony of the doctor who had treated Porreca. 
 
The defendants contended that the Commonwealth withheld 
these medical records in violation of Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 
which requires that the Commonwealth disclose to defendants all 
exculpatory evidence in its control.  The first motion judge 
ultimately held that, although the medical records were 
exculpatory and were in the Commonwealth's possession, the 
defendants were not prejudiced by the Commonwealth's failure to 
produce the records because they were cumulative of other 
evidence presented at trial and did not "carry a measure of 
strength in support of the defendant."  Commonwealth v. Bregoli, 
431 Mass. 265, 272 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 
Mass. 401, 414 (1992). 
10 
 
 
 
5.  Second motion for a new trial.  The defendants filed a 
second motion for a new trial in November 2014, raising several 
issues, including an argument that the Commonwealth withheld 
newly discovered pieces of exculpatory evidence.  The motion was 
denied following a nonevidentiary hearing, the judge (second 
motion judge)8 having deemed an evidentiary hearing unnecessary 
because the defendants did not raise a serious question under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), 
and the briefs, transcripts, and supporting documents were 
sufficient to allow the second motion judge to make an informed 
decision. 
 
The defendants maintained that police reports discovered 
after trial constituted Brady violations, and that six pieces of 
newly discovered evidence cast doubt on the convictions and 
warranted a new trial.  As the defendants now assert error in 
the denial of this motion for each of these pieces of evidence, 
we briefly detail each piece in turn. 
 
a.  Orlando reports.  The defendants discovered two reports 
authored after the trial by Sergeant Nunzio Orlando of the State 
police (Orlando reports), one dated July 17, 2001, and the other 
dated July 25, 2001.  The July 17 report was heavily redacted 
                     
 
8 The judge who decided the second motion for new trial was 
neither the trial judge nor the judge who decided the first 
motion for a new trial. 
11 
 
 
and described information gleaned from a confidential informant, 
who stated in part that "Angelesco 'got straightened out' 
because he shot and killed 'Mucka' McCormack in Malden."  The 
July 25 report indicated that Angelesco had become a "made 
member" in the Boston mafia and that he had "'earned his bones' 
by killing 'Mucka' McCormack."  The informant also stated that 
"Anthony Barry was not the shooter in the McCormack murder.  
Barry was behind the scenes as far as orchestrating McCormack's 
assassination, but Angelesco and Cahill were the actual 
shooters.  In addition, Gene Giangrande allegedly drove the 
getaway vehicle."  The second motion judge analyzed these two 
reports under Brady and determined that they were not possessed 
by the Commonwealth, were not exculpatory because they would not 
have been admissible at trial, and were not prejudicial because 
they would not have had an impact on the jury's conclusion. 
 
b.  Montana report.  A report written by Sergeant David 
Montana of the Medford police department (Montana report) 
relayed a conversation he had with an individual who implicated 
a third party, Robert Rennell, as the shooter in McCormack's 
murder.  This individual further stated that "there was no way 
that Anthony Barry" was the shooter, and that Porreca had 
contacted him indicating that he was willing to alter his 
testimony in exchange for $100,000.  The second motion judge 
concluded that the Montana report had not been possessed by the 
12 
 
 
prosecution, was inculpatory despite appearing exculpatory on 
its face because of the fruits of subsequent police 
investigation, and was not prejudicial because it was unlikely 
to have had an impact on the jury's conclusion. 
 
c.  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
report.  The final asserted Brady violation raised in the second 
motion for a new trial concerned an unredacted version of a 
report from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF report) detailing an interview of Porreca 
conducted on April 21, 1999.  In the redacted version of the 
report, which the defense possessed at the time of trial, 
Porreca stated that he had spoken to a friend of McCormack, 
Johnnie Decologero, at the bar on the night of the shooting and 
that Barry did not get along with Decologero's brother, Paul.  
The unredacted version indicated, among other things, that Paul 
Decologero had initiated the 1995 kidnapping for which Porreca 
was under Federal investigation in 1999. 
 
The second motion judge determined that neither version of 
the ATF report was exculpatory, particularly because even the 
redacted version named the defendants as the shooters.  He 
further concluded that the defendants had not established that 
the unredacted version of the report, created by a Federal 
agency, was ever in the possession of the Commonwealth.  
Finally, the judge determined that the defendants did not 
13 
 
 
establish that they were prejudiced by not possessing the 
unredacted ATF report. 
 
d.  Newly discovered evidence.  The second motion judge 
also considered the defendants' argument that six pieces of 
newly discovered evidence would have had an impact on the jury's 
verdicts.  Those pieces of evidence include a third report 
authored by Orlando on July 26, 2001,9 additional evidence of 
Porreca's drug use, an affidavit from Whitson, an affidavit from 
Brittany Cahill, evidence that Angelesco had committed a 
different murder, and evidence that police intimidated potential 
witnesses prior to the hearing on the first motion for a new 
trial.  The motion was denied, and the judge reached the 
following conclusions:  (1) the absence of the July 26 Orlando 
report did not undermine the denial of the first motion for a 
new trial; (2) the evidence regarding Porreca's drug use was 
cumulative, not newly discovered, and insufficient to warrant a 
new trial as it went merely to credibility; (3) Whitson's 
affidavit, which contradicted Porreca's testimony that he had 
cursed Barry's and Cahill's names to Whitson after retreating 
into the bar following the shooting, was reasonably discoverable 
                     
 
9 The only evidence in the July 26 Orlando report that was 
not included in the first two Orlando reports was a discussion 
of a dispute at a strip club in Rhode Island where Angelesco 
allegedly attempted to calm the situation by telling a Rhode 
Island man involved in the same organized crime syndicate that 
they were "with the same people." 
14 
 
 
at the time of trial and cumulative of other testimony 
undercutting Porreca's recollection; (4) Brittany Cahill's 
affidavit, in which she recanted portions of her testimony 
against her brother, was inconsequential to the jury's verdicts; 
(5)  evidence that Angelesco was indicted for and acquitted of a 
different murder with loose factual similarities to McCormack's 
death would not have been admissible at the defendants' trial as 
evidence of a third-party culprit; and (6) the defendants' 
argument that law enforcement targeted potential witnesses with 
search and arrest warrants to discourage them from testifying at 
the hearing on the first motion for a new trial was meritless 
because the actions of the police were the result of a long 
investigation. 
 
e.  DNA expert.  The defendants' second motion for a new 
trial also challenged the DNA testimony at trial, asserting that 
their constitutional right to confrontation had been violated 
because the DNA expert had not conducted the testing.  The 
second motion judge determined that the expert, who was the 
director of the laboratory where the DNA was analyzed, discussed 
his laboratory's procedures and then opined that the DNA found 
in saliva on the Nomex hood was a near certain match to Cahill's 
DNA.  The judge held that, because the expert was referring to 
his own conclusions based on a report that he was involved in 
creating, he was not a substitute expert and the defendants' 
15 
 
 
right to confrontation was not implicated.  The judge further 
concluded that the defendants' challenge to the reliability of 
the DNA testing itself, which was based on testing of only eight 
DNA loci, was unfounded.  The judge noted the expert's testimony 
that using eight loci was an accepted method in the scientific 
community and observed that the defendants failed to establish 
that the method was unreliable. 
 
f.  Court room closure.  The defendants asserted that the 
trial judge's practice of conducting a hardship inquiry of 
jurors outside the presence of the defendants and their counsel, 
as well as the exclusion of members of the defendants' families 
during jury selection, constituted constitutional violations 
warranting a new trial.  The second motion judge concluded that 
the hardship inquiry was not a critical stage of the proceedings 
and therefore did not implicate the defendants' constitutional 
rights.  Additionally, the judge found that the argument 
regarding the exclusion of family members from jury selection 
was waived because it had neither been preserved at trial nor 
raised in the first motion for a new trial, and that the 
defendants failed to establish that it created a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
Discussion.  The defendants' appeals from the denial of 
their motions for a new trial have been consolidated with their 
direct appeals from their convictions of murder in the first 
16 
 
 
degree.  We review both under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and consider 
asserted errors in the motions for a new trial "to determine 
whether there has been a significant error of law or other abuse 
of discretion, . . . and whether any such error creates a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 355 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lally, 473 Mass. 693, 698 (2016). 
 
1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendants maintain 
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
establish which gunshot wound was fatal, and that the trial 
judge's denial of their motions for a required finding of not 
guilty was therefore error because they were both tried as 
principals rather than on a joint venture theory.10  We review 
the denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty to 
determine "whether the evidence offered by the Commonwealth, 
together with reasonable inferences therefrom, when viewed in 
its light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to 
persuade a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
existence of every element of the crime charged."  Commonwealth 
v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 416 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) and 
                     
 
10 The defendants' trial took place before this court's 
decision in Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449 (2009), which 
the Commonwealth notes changed its practice in pursuing a theory 
of joint venture liability in cases like this. 
17 
 
 
460 Mass. 12 (2011).  See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 
671, 677-678 (1979). 
 
The defendants challenge only the Commonwealth's proof of 
causation.  "It is well established that there may be more than 
one proximate cause of a victim's death."  Commonwealth v. 
Maynard, 436 Mass. 558, 563 (2002).  The conduct of two or more 
persons is each a proximate cause of death if the conduct 
concurrently contributes to the death.  Id. at 564.  Such "[a] 
cause is concurrent if it was operative at the moment of death 
and acted with another cause to produce the death."  Id. 
 
We conclude that the evidence and the reasonable inferences 
that stem from it, when considered in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, were sufficient to convict both defendants.  
The medical examiner determined that two separate gunshot 
wounds, one to the head and one to the back, were each "in and 
of [themselves] lethal."  The medical examiner noted McCormack's 
cause of death as "multiple gunshot wounds."  The two gunshots 
were fired from two different weapons.  The gunshot to the head 
was from a .40 caliber firearm.  The gunshot to the back was 
from a different firearm of an undetermined caliber.  The 
witness described the two defendants as the only two shooters. 
 
We find support in several past decisions of this court.  
The Maynard case and Commonwealth v. Perry, 432 Mass. 214 
(2000), involved a victim who was subjected to numerous blunt 
18 
 
 
force injuries and starvation over several months by the 
respective defendants.  Maynard, 436 Mass. at 559-561.  Perry, 
432 Mass. at 215-219.  In those cases, which each considered the 
same murder, the medical examiner testified that he could not 
determine which act was fatal, but that "the cumulative effect 
of the beatings and starvation led to the victim's death."  
Perry, supra at 220-221.  See Maynard, supra at 563.  We 
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict the 
defendants under both principal and joint venture theories of 
liability.  Id. at 565.  Perry, supra at 221.  In this case, the 
evidence that the defendants caused McCormack's death is much 
stronger than it was in the Perry and Maynard cases.  The 
judge's denial of the defendants' motion for a required finding 
of not guilty was proper. 
 
2.  First motion for a new trial.  The defendants maintain 
that the Commonwealth intentionally withheld hospital records 
from a visit Porreca made to Saints Memorial Hospital on April 
21, 1999.  Porreca complained that he was in heroin withdrawal 
and requested methadone, and the defendants argue that the 
temporal proximity of this withdrawal to the shooting would have 
undermined Porreca's testimony that he was not influenced by 
drugs at the time of the shooting.  This, the defendants 
contend, prejudiced their defense in such a way that their first 
motion for a new trial should have been allowed. 
19 
 
 
"Evidence is exculpatory if it 'provides some significant 
aid to the defendant's case, whether it furnishes corroboration 
of the defendant's story, calls into question a material, 
although not indispensable, element of the prosecution's version 
of the events, or challenges the credibility of a key 
prosecution witness.'"  Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 
231 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392, 401-
402 (2005).  "To obtain a new trial on the basis of nondisclosed 
exculpatory evidence, a defendant must establish (1) that 'the 
evidence [was] in the possession, custody, or control of the 
prosecutor or a person subject to the prosecutor's control'; (2) 
'that the evidence is exculpatory'; and (3) 'prejudice.'"  
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 380 (2017), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Murray, 461 Mass. 10, 19, 21 (2011).  The first 
motion judge determined, and we agree, that the defense did not 
make a specific discovery request that encompassed Porreca's 
medical records.11  Where no specific request for a particular 
                     
 
11 The defendants maintain that we should depart from the 
first motion judge's determination and conclude that one portion 
of their 1999 discovery motion should be considered a specific 
request for documents including records of Porreca's visit to 
Saints Memorial Hospital on April 21.  That request was made as 
follows:  "Any material relating to the witness' mental or 
physical history that tends to impair or reflect adversely on 
his reliability as a witness, including but not limited to any 
information that would tend to affect the witness' motive to 
testify or ability to perceive, recall, or understand events."  
The defendants' discovery motion was amended, and the section in 
question was edited to state:  "Any material [that] would tend 
20 
 
 
piece of evidence is made, we determine prejudice using the same 
standard "used to assess the impact of newly discovered 
evidence, that is, 'whether there is a substantial risk that the 
jury would have reached a different conclusion if the evidence 
had been admitted at trial.'"  Murray, supra at 21, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 413 (1992).  "Newly 
discovered evidence that tends merely to impeach the credibility 
of a witness will not ordinarily be the basis of a new trial."  
Sullivan, supra at 383, quoting Commonwealth v. Lo, 428 Mass. 
45, 53 (1998). 
Because we agree with the first motion judge that there is 
no substantial risk of an impact on the verdicts had evidence of 
Porreca's trip to Saints Memorial Hospital been before the jury, 
we need not address the other two factors underlying a new trial 
motion on the basis of nondisclosed exculpatory evidence.  See 
Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 380.  Porreca was extensively cross-
examined over the course of two days, during which he admitted 
that he was addicted to opiates, had often been paid in Percocet 
                     
to affect the witness' motive to testify or ability to perceive, 
recall, or understand events."  We agree with the judge that 
Porreca's medical records were not specifically requested, in 
either the original or amended motion, as a specific request 
puts the prosecutor on "notice of exactly what the defense 
desired."  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Healy, 438 Mass. 672, 680 n.9 (2003) 
(defendant's request for "'reports of mental or physical 
examinations and of scientific tests' qualifies as a 'specific 
request'" for "postmortem report"). 
21 
 
 
pills by Giangrande, had consumed two or three Percocet pills on 
the day of the shooting, and had consumed five or six beers 
while at the bar immediately before the shooting.  He denied 
having been under the influence, at the time of the shooting, of 
the Percocet pills that he had consumed earlier in the day, 
reasoning that he had consumed only two or three pills and that 
he would have needed to consume approximately five pills to feel 
any effect "because [his] system had been used to them."  
Porreca also testified that he had been given Percocet while in 
the hospital after the shooting, and was prescribed an 
additional ten Percocet pills on his discharge from the hospital 
on April 19. 
 
Given this testimony, the exculpatory nature of the 
evidence of Porreca's complaint of heroin withdrawal four days 
after the shooting was cumulative of evidence already before the 
jury, and we are not persuaded that it would have had an impact 
on the jury's verdicts.  Porreca's drug use was well 
established, and he admitted that he consumed Percocet pills and 
drank several beers on the day of the shooting.  His credibility 
was called into question extensively on cross-examination on 
several grounds, not limited to his drug use, and the jury 
nonetheless convicted the defendants.  See Commonwealth v. 
Dubois, 451 Mass. 20, 28 (2008) ("The weight and credibility of 
the evidence is the province of the jury").  The Saints Memorial 
22 
 
 
Hospital records, at most, would have provided additional 
grounds to impeach Porreca on the truthfulness of his testimony 
regarding his sobriety on the night of the shooting.  
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 326 (2008) (evidence 
cumulative of that "admitted at the trial will carry little 
weight").  See Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 380.  Had those records 
been available to the defense, there would not have been an 
impact on the jury's verdicts. 
 
3.  Second motion for a new trial.  The defendants raise 
several arguments stemming from the denial of their second 
motion for a new trial.  We address each in turn. 
 
a.  Decision not to hold evidentiary hearing.  We first 
address the defendants' contention that the second motion 
judge's decision to proceed without an evidentiary hearing was 
error.  We disagree.  Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), a judge must determine 
whether the defendants' motion presents a "substantial issue" in 
deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary.  
Commonwealth v. Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 628 (2004).  "Although the 
motions and supporting materials filed by a defendant need not 
prove the issue raised therein, they must at least contain 
sufficient credible information to cast doubt on the issue" in 
order to create a substantial issue.  Id. at 629.  In 
determining whether a substantial issue exists, "a judge 
23 
 
 
considers the seriousness of the issues raised and the adequacy 
of the defendant's showing on those issues."  Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 469 Mass. 398, 402-403 (2014).  Whether to hold an 
evidentiary hearing is a decision squarely within the judge's 
discretion, and we review the decision for an abuse of 
discretion.  Denis, supra at 628. 
 
The second motion judge determined that an evidentiary 
hearing was unnecessary because the defendants did not raise a 
serious question and because the briefs, supporting documents, 
and trial transcripts were sufficient to allow him to reach an 
informed decision.  We conclude that the record before the judge 
and the contents of the reports and affidavits that formed the 
basis for the legal arguments raised in the second motion for a 
new trial did not require an evidentiary hearing, and that the 
judge's decision that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted 
was a proper exercise of his discretion.  See Commonwealth v. 
McWilliams, 473 Mass. 606, 622-623 (2016). 
 
b.  Police reports.  We next address the defendants' 
argument that the judge erred in declining to find a Brady 
violation.  The defendants, having discovered additional law 
enforcement reports after their first motion for a new trial had 
been decided, presented three claimed new Brady violations based 
on those reports.  The judge did not err in concluding that 
there were no Brady violations. 
24 
 
 
 
i.  Montana report.  The Montana report detailed an 
interview conducted by a member of the Medford police department 
during which an individual implicated a third party as the 
shooter in McCormack's murder, indicated that "there was no way" 
that Barry was the shooter, and stated that Porreca had told the 
individual that he was willing to change his testimony in 
exchange for $100,000.  As there was no specific discovery 
request that encompassed this report, we analyze any error to 
determine "whether there is a substantial risk that the jury 
would have reached a different conclusion if the evidence had 
been admitted at trial."  Murray, 461 Mass. at 21, quoting 
Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 413.  Assuming without deciding that the 
Montana report satisfies the first two prongs of Brady, we 
conclude that there was no prejudice because the defendants 
cannot establish that the Montana report creates a substantial 
risk that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had 
it been admitted.  See Murray, supra at 19-21. 
 
The Montana report implicates a potential third-party 
culprit who had not otherwise been considered in the 
investigation.  However, the report does not indicate the basis 
for the statement that Barry could not have been the shooter.  
See Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 414 (if evidence "does not carry a 
measure of strength in support of the defendant, the failure to 
disclose that evidence does not warrant the granting of a new 
25 
 
 
trial").  Finally, to the extent that evidence of Porreca's 
willingness to alter his testimony in exchange for money could 
have been used to impeach his credibility, "evidence that tends 
merely to impeach the credibility of a witness will not 
ordinarily be the basis of a new trial."  Sullivan, 478 Mass. at 
383, quoting Lo, 428 Mass. at 53.  Moreover, any additional 
impeachment evidence, unsupported by details and uncorroborated 
by additional evidence, would not have influenced the jury's 
conclusion because Porreca's credibility was already very much 
called into question on cross-examination.  We therefore 
conclude that there was no prejudice. 
We further note that the individual who provided the 
information in the Montana report wrote an affidavit that 
undermines the exculpatory nature of the Montana report and led 
to an investigation that further inculpates the defendants.  
That person stated that he did not remember telling Sergeant 
Montana that Rennell shot McCormack or that Porreca stated that 
he was willing to change his story and that neither of those 
things is true.  He further discussed his relationship with an 
area drug dealer who had tried to sell him stolen guns from New 
Hampshire, and eventually sold Barry a .40 caliber pistol.  The 
pistol left at the scene of the shooting that was used to shoot 
McCormack in the head was confirmed to be a gun that had been 
stolen from a person in Derry, New Hampshire. 
26 
 
 
A motion for a new trial may be granted "if it appears that 
justice may not have been done."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b).  The 
exculpatory nature of the Montana report has since been recanted 
and prompted police investigation that directly tied Barry to 
one of the murder weapons.  As we are considering whether 
substantial justice was done, we see no reason that we cannot 
consider additional evidence that stemmed from that police 
investigation.12  With the fruits of that investigation in mind, 
any argument that this report would warrant a new trial in the 
interests of justice is disingenuous. 
 
ii.  ATF report.  The defendants' asserted Brady violation 
stemming from the unredacted ATF report also fails, because the 
ATF report was not exculpatory.  The report's only mention of 
McCormack's murder is that Porreca stated, "Anthony Barry, one 
of the shooters along with Brian Cahill, didn't get along with 
Paul A. Decologero."  The defendants, however, maintain that 
Porreca's cooperation with law enforcement and the ATF report's 
                     
 
12 The defendants contend that the second motion judge 
violated their right to due process by relying on evidence that 
the Commonwealth obtained after the defendants' convictions.  
The Montana report led police to discover, among other things, 
evidence that Barry had purchased the .40 caliber pistol that 
was left in the bar's parking lot and matched the bullet 
recovered from McCormack's skull.  Because we have concluded, 
without considering that evidence, that there was no Brady 
violation stemming from the Montana report, any error by the 
judge in relying on later discovered evidence implicating Barry 
would be harmless.  See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 
649 (1997). 
27 
 
 
discussion of the involvement of Decologero in the kidnapping 
provide for the possibility of a third-party defense, because 
the ATF report could arguably indicate that Decologero had 
motive to kill Porreca.  But the ATF report inculpates the 
defendants by saying that they were the shooters.  Any motive 
that could be gleaned from the ATF report would not be a 
significant enough aid to the defense to be deemed exculpatory. 
 
iii.  Orlando reports.  Lastly, we address the three 
Orlando reports.  Although the second motion judge treated the 
July 26, 2001, Orlando report as newly discovered evidence and 
reviewed the July 17 and July 25 reports under Brady, we review 
all three Orlando reports as newly discovered evidence because 
they were all created after trial.  "A defendant seeking a new 
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence must establish 
both that the evidence is newly discovered and that it casts 
real doubt on the justice of the conviction."  Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305 (1986).  As a threshold matter, newly 
discovered evidence "must be material and credible."  Id.  We 
conclude that the contents of the Orlando reports are not 
credible and therefore cast no doubt on the convictions. 
 
The confidential informant in the Orlando reports told 
Trooper Orlando that he did not have firsthand knowledge of who 
the shooters were, that he was not present at the time of the 
murder, and that his information that Angelesco was the shooter 
28 
 
 
and Giangrande the getaway driver was based on "word on the 
street."  "'[W]ord on the street' carries no indicia of 
reliability by itself, and defense counsel did not bolster it by 
showing that the 'word' came from a percipient witness to the 
shooting."  Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 804-
805 (2009).13  Because unsubstantiated rumors pointing to 
Angelesco and Giangrande as the true culprits do not cast doubt 
on the justice of the convictions, the existence of the Orlando 
reports does not require a new trial. 
 
c.  Additional newly discovered evidence.  In their second 
motion for a new trial, the defendants also relied on five 
additional pieces of purportedly newly discovered evidence:  (1) 
additional evidence of Porreca's drug use14; (2) an affidavit 
from Whitson; (3) an affidavit from Brittany Cahill; (4) 
evidence that Angelesco had committed a different murder; and 
(5) evidence of intimidation of potential witnesses before the 
hearing on the first motion for a new trial.  Evidence is newly 
discovered if it was "unknown to the defendant or his counsel 
                     
13 The standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. 782 (2009), regarding the standard of 
admissibility for evidence offered in support of a defense under 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980), was 
recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 809 
n.9 (2018).  Otherwise, the Silva-Santiago decision remains 
binding. 
 
14 The defendants do not contest the second motion judge's 
ruling relating to Porreca's intoxication. 
29 
 
 
and not reasonably discoverable by them at the time of trial (or 
at the time of the presentation of an earlier motion for a new 
trial)."  Grace, 397 Mass. at 306.  Newly discovered evidence 
"must [also] carry a measure of strength in support of the 
defendant's position," and will carry less weight if it "is 
cumulative of evidence admitted at the trial."  Id. at 305-306. 
 
i.  Whitson affidavit.  Whitson's affidavit indicates that 
he was inside the bar when the shooting took place outside, that 
he spoke to Porreca after Porreca had been shot, and that 
Porreca "did not mention the names of Anthony Barry and Brian 
Cahill" to him.  Whitson's affidavit directly contradicts a key 
portion of Porreca's testimony at trial, where Porreca stated 
that he ran into the bar after being shot and said "Fuck'n Barry 
and Cahill" to Whitson.  However, the defendants have failed to 
establish that the contents of Whitson's affidavit were unknown 
to their counsel at the time of trial.  When Porreca was about 
to testify that he had implicated the defendants to Whitson 
after being shot, Barry's counsel was heard at a sidebar 
conference.  Counsel told the trial judge that "Whitson was 
interviewed by the grand jury and by police, he has denied that 
this statement was made . . . by Porreca to him."  Because 
defense counsel knew before trial that Whitson had said Porreca 
never implicated the defendants, Whitson's affidavit is not 
"newly discovered."  See Grace, 397 Mass. at 306. 
30 
 
 
 
ii.  Brittany Cahill affidavit.  Brittany Cahill testified 
against her brother and Barry at trial when she was fourteen 
years old.  Her testimony indicated that Cahill and Barry 
planned to be together the night of the shooting, that Cahill 
laughed when reading a newspaper article about the shooting, 
that Cahill talked to himself while laughing as he drove by the 
bar three days after the shooting, that Cahill was counting $900 
in cash three days after the shooting at a time in which he was 
unemployed, and that Cahill told her, in a telephone call from 
jail several weeks after the shooting, not to give information 
to the police. 
 
Her 2009 affidavit recanted portions of her testimony, in 
particular denying that Cahill had laughed while reading the 
newspaper, that he had laughed and talked to himself while 
driving past the bar, or that he had stated that the $900 he was 
counting was from "doing his business."  She further indicated 
that her false testimony was the result of pressure from Trooper 
Manning, whom she claims said to her, among other things, that 
she would get in trouble if she did not testify against her 
brother.  Assuming without deciding that Brittany Cahill's 
affidavit constitutes newly discovered evidence, her recantation 
is ultimately inconsequential to the outcome of the trial.  
There was significant evidence pointing to the defendants as the 
shooters, and although Brittany Cahill's testimony did have some 
31 
 
 
corroborative value to the Commonwealth's case, "the absence of 
[her recanted] testimony at trial would not have changed the 
verdict[s]."  Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 472 (2014).  
See Grace, 397 Mass. at 306 ("The strength of the case against a 
criminal defendant . . . may weaken the effect of [newly 
discovered] evidence"). 
 
iii.  Evidence that Angelesco committed a different murder.  
The defendants next contend that they were entitled to a new 
trial because of evidence that Angelesco was indicted for a 
different murder that had similar facts to McCormack's murder.  
In that unrelated murder, of which Angelesco was acquitted, a 
gun was left at the scene, as was the case in McCormack's 
murder.  Evidence of this separate murder is irrelevant to any 
third-party culprit defense the defendants may have raised at 
trial and would not have been admissible.  "[I]n order to be 
admitted, third-party culprit evidence 'must have a rational 
tendency to prove the issue the defense raises, and [it] cannot 
be too remote or speculative.'"  Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 
Mass. 320, 327 (2014), quoting Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 801.  
See Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 406 Mass. 501, 506 (1990) (modus 
operandi evidence only admissible if there is "a uniqueness of 
technique, a distinctiveness, or a particularly distinguishing 
pattern of conduct common to the current and former incidents").  
This evidence does not warrant a new trial. 
32 
 
 
 
iv.  Witness intimidation.  The defendants' final argument 
from their second motion for a new trial stems from their first 
motion for a new trial, as they allege that members of the State 
police intimidated five witnesses the defendants intended to 
call at the hearing on the first motion by executing search and 
arrest warrants against them.  There is nothing in the record to 
suggest that those warrants were illegitimate, and the arrest 
reports note that they were the product of a "lengthy 
investigation."  The criminal complaints against these five 
potential witnesses detail ongoing narcotics activity, and the 
defendants have provided no evidence to support their claims 
that law enforcement used these arrests as a means to dissuade 
the potential witnesses from testifying at the hearing on the 
first motion for a new trial.15  The burden was on the defendants 
to prove the facts underlying their motion; as they failed to do 
so regarding their witness intimidation claim, their argument 
regarding the second motion for a new trial fails.  See 
Commonwealth v. Marinho, 464 Mass. 115, 123 (2013) ("A defendant 
bears the burden of proof on a motion for new trial"). 
 
v.  Court room closure.  Cahill maintains that his right to 
a public trial was violated when the trial judge conducted the 
hardship voir dire in the jury room without counsel or 
                     
 
15 One of the men did, in fact, testify at the hearing on 
the first motion for a new trial. 
33 
 
 
defendants present, and when the defendants' family members were 
excluded from the court room during jury selection.  Because 
Cahill failed to object to either alleged error at trial, the 
claims are procedurally waived.  See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
480 Mass. 146, 152 (2018) ("where a defendant fails to 
contemporaneously object to an improper court room closure at 
trial, we have steadfastly held that the defendant's claim is 
procedurally waived").16  Therefore, we review any error for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, and having 
found nothing that calls into question the legitimacy of the 
jury's verdicts, we conclude that the defendants' motion for a 
new trial was properly denied on these grounds.  See id. at 154-
155. 
 
vi.  DNA.  The defendants challenge the second motion 
judge's determination that the DNA expert who testified at trial 
                     
 
16 Cahill urges us to revisit our waiver rules in light of 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Weaver v. 
Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017).  He argues that, under 
Weaver, a failure to make a public trial objection at trial 
constitutes waiver only for defendants who raise the issue for 
the first time on appeal as part of an ineffective assistance 
claim rather than as a public trial claim.  But in Commonwealth 
v. Robinson, 480 Mass. 146, 154 (2018), a case decided after 
Weaver, we observed that this is a distinction without a 
difference:  "For purposes of determining whether the 
defendant's claim was properly preserved at trial, it is . . . 
legally irrelevant that [the defendant] now presents the claim 
as a Sixth Amendment violation rather than a claim that his 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to perceive 
and object to the closure." 
34 
 
 
was not a substitute expert and that their claim that the method 
of testing was unreliable was unfounded.  The defendants did not 
object to the DNA expert's testimony at trial, so we review 
their claim to determine whether there was error in allowing him 
to testify and, if so, whether that error created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  We conclude that there 
was no error. 
 
The expert was the director and vice-president of the 
laboratory where the testing took place, he detailed the 
procedure that would have taken place to test the samples, and 
he testified that, after reviewing the DNA samples, he had 
determined that the DNA found on the Nomex hood matched Cahill's 
DNA profile.  He observed that "the probability of drawing at 
random a DNA pattern like that of Mr. Cahill's is one in [181] 
billion [among Caucasians]." 
 
"The critical issue with respect to an expert, including in 
particular a DNA analyst, is whether the defendant is able to 
cross-examine the expert in a meaningful way regarding possible 
flaws relating to the underlying data that forms the basis of 
his or her opinion."  Commonwealth v. Chappell, 473 Mass. 191, 
201 (2015).  The defendants' rights were protected in this case, 
because the DNA expert participated in the analysis of the 
samples and testified about a report detailing his conclusions 
that he personally submitted to the prosecution.  He was not a 
35 
 
 
substitute expert, and his testimony did not implicate the 
confrontation clause.  See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 
647, 652 (2011) ("The accused's right is to be confronted with 
the analyst who made the certification . . .").  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 Mass. 391, 399 (2014) ("our common 
law of evidence requires that the defendant have a meaningful 
opportunity to cross-examine the expert about her opinion and 
the reliability of the facts or data that underlie her 
opinion").  Even if he were considered a substitute expert, his 
testimony would have been admissible because there is no 
requirement that the person who physically tested DNA samples 
testify, and it is well established that an expert can testify 
to his own opinions after interpreting data and reaching his own 
conclusions.  See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 476 Mass. 725, 733 
(2017); Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 601-602, cert. 
denied, 571 U.S. 865 (2013); Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 
773, 791 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011).  Cf. 
Chappell, supra at 202 ("under Massachusetts law, an expert 
witness is not permitted to testify on direct examination to 
facts or data that another, nontestifying expert has generated, 
or to the nontestifying expert's own opinion, even though this 
information may be an important part of the basis of the 
testifying expert's opinion"). 
36 
 
 
 
The defendants further assert that the DNA testing, which 
compared Cahill's blood sample and the DNA sample from the Nomex 
hood using eight loci, was unreliable when considered in light 
of subsequent scientific advancements.  The defendants contend 
that because testing involving thirteen loci would "offer[] a 
material improvement in accuracy," there was a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Donald, 468 Mass. 37, 45-46 (2014) (analysis using thirteen loci 
reduced probability of random match to one in several trillion 
or quadrillion).  However, the defendants have not called into 
question the legitimacy of the expert's conclusion that the 
probability of a random match was one in 181 billion.  That 
another method of testing may have yielded an even more reliable 
result does not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice. 
 
vii.  Pretrial disclosure and the confrontation clause.  
The defendants asserted in their second motion for a new trial 
that the failure to turn over medical evidence regarding 
Porreca's drug use violated their right to confrontation.  The 
second motion judge gave little credence to this argument, 
because it is well established that the right to confrontation 
is a trial right and is inapplicable to pretrial discovery under 
both art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See 
37 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 389, 400 (2011), 
quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987).  The 
defendants now ask us to depart from precedent and extend the 
right to confrontation.  We decline to do so. 
"[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was 
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and 
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence 
against the accused."  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 
(2004).  "A witness's testimony against a defendant is thus 
inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the 
witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination."  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 
U.S. 305, 309 (2009), citing Crawford, supra at 54.  The right 
to confrontation, under both art. 12 and the Sixth Amendment, 
has been considered to be a trial right.  Figueroa, 79 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 400.  There was no error in the second motion 
judge's treatment of the right to confrontation as such, and we 
conclude that there is no reason to depart from that 
interpretation. 
 
4.  Identity of confidential informant.  In December 2015, 
the defendants filed a discovery motion seeking, in part, the 
disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant 
discussed in the Orlando reports.  The motion was denied.  The 
second motion judge determined that the Commonwealth had 
38 
 
 
established that disclosing the informant's identity would 
endanger the informant, and that the defendant failed to show 
that the "informant privilege" interfered with a fair defense.  
The defendants now contend that the judge erred in denying the 
motion.  We conclude that there was no error. 
The defendants contend that the Orlando reports indicate 
that the confidential informant had firsthand knowledge that 
Angelesco, not the defendants, murdered McCormack, and that 
Giangrande "drove the getaway vehicle."  As discussed supra, the 
Commonwealth filed an affidavit by Sergeant Orlando clarifying 
that the confidential informant did not have firsthand 
knowledge, was not a percipient witness, and did not hear the 
information from Angelesco or Giangrande, but rather learned it 
through "word on the street."  The Commonwealth withheld the 
confidential informant's identity under the "informant 
privilege."  The informant privilege "may be asserted where the 
Commonwealth otherwise would be required to provide an 
informant's identity to a defendant as part of its discovery 
obligations."17  Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 827, 846 
(2015).  The privilege's rationale "is the need to encourage 
'citizens to communicate their knowledge of the commission of 
                     
 
17 There is apparently no disagreement that, absent 
assertion of the informant privilege, the identity of the 
confidential informant would be discoverable under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004). 
39 
 
 
crimes to law-enforcement officials.'"  Id., quoting Roviaro v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). 
 
Determining whether an informant's identity was properly 
withheld requires a two-step inquiry.  In the first stage, we 
must determine "(a) whether the Commonwealth has properly 
asserted an informant privilege, and (b) whether the defendant 
has adequately challenged the assertion of the privilege as an 
impermissible interference with his or her right to present a 
defense."  Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 846.  The Commonwealth may 
assert the privilege only where "disclosure would endanger the 
informant or otherwise impede law enforcement efforts."  Id. at 
847.  If the Commonwealth has properly asserted the privilege, 
"the defendant may request that the privilege be set aside on 
the grounds that it 'interferes with a fair defence.'"  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Mass. 534, 544 (1974).  In 
so requesting, a defendant must "present 'some offering so that 
the trial judge may assess the materiality and relevancy of the 
disclosure to the defense,'" but only if it "is not apparent 
from the nature of the case and the defense offered thereto."  
Bonnett, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 
323 (2013). 
 
If the Commonwealth properly invoked the privilege and the 
defendants adequately challenged the assertion of the privilege, 
then we move to the second step and balance "the public interest 
40 
 
 
in protecting the flow of information against the [defendant]'s 
right to prepare his defense."  Commonwealth v. Dias, 451 Mass. 
463, 468 (2008).  In doing so, we consider "the crime charged, 
the possible defenses, the possible significance of the 
[privileged] testimony, and other relevant factors."  Id. at 
468-469, quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62. 
 
We agree with the second motion judge that the Commonwealth 
properly invoked the informant privilege.  As the Commonwealth 
noted, the individuals identified in the Orlando reports have a 
history of violent crimes, including against witnesses in this 
case.18  The threat of violence against witnesses posed by these 
individuals has been so great that a single justice of this 
court ordered the deposition of Porreca before trial, out of 
concern that he would be killed before testifying.  Porreca 
remained in hiding for at least eighteen months before the 
defendants' trial, in part out of fear of retribution by 
Angelesco and Giangrande. 
 
We also agree with the second motion judge that the 
defendants failed to challenge adequately the assertion of the 
privilege.  While the confidential informant's identity and the 
                     
 
18 Angelesco pleaded guilty to the 2006 stabbing of a 
witness who, at the hearing on the defendants' first motion for 
a new trial, had accused Angelesco of committing the murder.  
The State police have also received reports that Angelesco and 
Giangrande were seeking retribution against another witness who 
implicated them in the killing. 
41 
 
 
information that might be gained from the informant was 
certainly relevant to the defendants' theory, the defendants 
failed to establish its materiality.  The confidential informant 
provided no details "beyond a threadbare rumor" to support his 
allegation that Angelesco and Giangrande committed the murder.  
Bonnett, 472 Mass. at 849.  The confidential informant was also 
not a percipient witness and had not learned the information 
from a percipient witness or the alleged killers.  Contrast id. 
("At a minimum, the question whether the informant was a 
percipient witness to the shooting, or whether he had spoken to 
a percipient witness, should have been explored").  Rather, the 
confidential informant was merely relaying inadmissible, 
immaterial "word on the street" information about the killing.  
We conclude that the judge properly denied the defendants' 
motion for disclosure of the confidential informant's identity.19 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having carefully 
reviewed the entire record pursuant to our duty under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, we discern no reason to order a new trial or to 
reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
                     
 
19 Because we agree that the defendants failed to establish 
the materiality of the confidential informant's identity, we do 
not reach the balancing test that constitutes the second stage 
of the analysis.