Title: Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc.

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

399 N.W.2d 308 (1987) Daniel BELLEMARE, Plaintiff, v. GATEWAY BUILDERS, INC., and Anton Rutten, Defendants. Civ. No. 11335. Supreme Court of North Dakota. January 20, 1987. Dosland, Dosland, Nordhougen, Lillehaug & Johnson, Moorhead, for plaintiff; argued by Colleen J. Saande. *309 Greenberg, Colosimo & Patchin, Virginia, for defendant Anton Rutten; argued by John D. Colosimo; Mark Weir present. LEVINE, Justice. We are asked to answer a certified question concerning the duty of care owed by a lessor to a lessee. We decline to do so. Daniel Bellemare leases farm land, including three grain bins, from Anton Rutten. Bellemare fell from a ladder attached to one of the bins and sued Rutten to recover for the injuries he sustained as a result of Rutten's allegedly negligent maintenance of the bin. Rutten moved for summary judgment on the ground that he owed Bellemare no duty of care as a matter of law. Bellemare appears to concede that under the law governing landlord liability, Rutten is entitled to summary judgment. However, Bellemare argues that the law, as set forth in Francis v. Pic, 226 N.W.2d 654 (N.D.1975), is ripe for reversal and should be replaced with the single standard that landowners owe a duty of reasonable care to all who enter their land with permission. The trial court agreed and denied Rutten's motion for summary judgment stating that Rutten owed Bellemare a duty to use reasonable care in maintaining his grain bins and "that the Supreme Court would reverse if this Court held otherwise...." The following question was certified to us pursuant to Rule 47.1 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure: The trial court answered this question in the affirmative. The authority to certify questions of law to this Court is provided by chapter 32-24 of the North Dakota Century Code. Section 32-24-01 provides: Section 32-24-02, NDCC, provides: Historically, we have construed these statutes to require that a certified question will be considered by this Court if the result of the action depends wholly, or at least principally, upon the construction of the law as it will be determined by the answers to the questions certified, regardless of whether answered in the negative or affirmative. Keyes v. Amundson, 359 N.W.2d 857, 859 (N.D.1984); State v. Lebus, 339 N.W.2d 564, 566 (N.D.1983); Bumann v. Maurer, 188 N.W.2d 740, 743 (N.D.1971); Vantine Paint & Glass Co. of Dickinson v. Kudrna, 186 N.W.2d 127, 128 (N.D.1971); Scranton Grain Co. v. Lubbock Machine & Supply Co., 175 N.W.2d 656, 658 (N.D.1970); School Board of Eagle Public School District No. 16 of Richland County v. State Board of Public School Education, 126 N.W.2d 799, 802 (N.D.1964); Meckle v. Hoffman, 78 N.W.2d 166, 170 (N.D.1956). See also Trinity Medical Center v. North Dakota Board of Nursing (Civil No. 11,257, January 8, 1987) *310 ___ N.W.2d ___ (N.D.1987). But see State v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750 (N.D.1981). While a negative answer would dispose of the case, an affirmative answer would not because the issues of liability and damages would remain to be tried. Because our answer would not dispose, wholly or principally, of the issues in this case we would, in effect, be giving an advisory opinion to the trial court. The statutes providing for the certification of questions to this Court do not contemplate our giving advisory opinions. Keyes v. Amundson, supra; State v. Lebus, supra at 567; Bumann v. Maurer, supra; Vantine Paint & Glass Co. of Dickinson, supra; School Board of Eagle Public School District No. 16 of Richland County, supra; Meckle v. Hoffman, supra; Stutsman County v. Dakota Trust Co., 45 N.D. 451, 178 N.W. 725, 726 (1920). Accordingly, the certified question proceeding is dismissed and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and VANDE WALLE, GIERKE and MESCHKE, JJ., concur.