Title: Commonwealth v. Martin

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-08768 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAMES ANTHONY MARTIN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 5, 2019. - May 5, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Constitutional Law, Assistance 
of counsel, Retroactivity of judicial holding.  
Retroactivity of Judicial Holding.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Assistance of counsel, Retroactivity of 
judicial holding, Request for jury instructions. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 14, 1976. 
 
 
The case was tried before Robert A. Mulligan, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on February 18, 2016, was heard by 
Merita A. Hopkins, J. 
 
 
 
Claudia Leis Bolgen for the defendant. 
 
Timothy Ferriter, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  On the evening of September 9, 1976, the 
defendant, James Anthony Martin, attempted to steal the cash 
that Richard Paulsen and his older brother, Edward, brought to 
2 
 
 
purchase drugs from Gordon Kent Brown in Brown's apartment in 
Cambridge.  In doing so, the defendant shot and killed Edward1 
with a single gunshot in the chest.  The defendant then fled to 
Canada, where he was apprehended late in 1999.  On May 10, 2001, 
a Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in 
the first degree on the theory of felony-murder.  He 
subsequently moved for a new trial, which motion was denied by a 
judge other than the trial judge, who had retired.  We 
consolidated the defendant's direct appeal from his conviction 
with his appeal from the denial of the motion for a new trial. 
The defendant makes three arguments on appeal.  First, he 
contends that his motion for a new trial was wrongly denied 
because he was deprived of his constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel, especially in light of 
strategic errors his attorney made in his opening statement, 
which resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Second, the defendant claims that we should extend the 
reach of our holding in Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 
807 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), to his case, 
where the appeal was pending when Brown was decided, even though 
we limited that holding to cases where trial commenced after the 
date of the opinion, which would exclude this case.  Third, the 
                                                          
 
 
1 To avoid confusion, we refer to Richard by his first name 
and Edward as the victim. 
3 
 
 
defendant argues that the trial judge committed prejudicial 
error when he declined the defendant's request that the jury be 
instructed on the elements of voluntary and involuntary 
manslaughter. 
The defendant also asks that we exercise our extraordinary 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and order a new trial or 
reduce the defendant's conviction to murder in the second 
degree, because his conviction of murder in the first degree is 
not consonant with justice.  We affirm the defendant's 
conviction of murder in the first degree and the denial of his 
motion for a new trial, and after plenary review of the entirety 
of the record, we decline to exercise our authority under § 33E. 
Background.  We recite the facts as the jury could have 
found them in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
reserving certain details for later discussion. 
In 1976, the victim introduced Richard to a drug dealer, 
Brown, who could supply Richard with drugs.  Richard's first 
purchase from Brown took place outside Symphony Hall in Boston.  
The victim accompanied Richard, who paid cash to Brown in 
exchange for the drugs.  As testified to by Richard, the 
transaction went "very smoothly" and was a "friendly" 
interaction. 
Richard's second purchase from Brown took place at Brown's 
apartment on the second floor of a three-story house in 
4 
 
 
Cambridge.  The victim again accompanied Richard to the 
transaction, and in the living room of the apartment, Brown 
handed Richard the drugs in exchange for cash.  During these 
first two transactions, Richard purchased an amount of marijuana 
for $150 and one pound of hashish for $900.2 
For the third purchase, the victim arranged for Richard to 
buy one kilogram of hashish from Brown for $1,600 at Brown's 
apartment.  On September 9, 1976, the victim and Richard arrived 
at the apartment between 9 P.M. and 9:30 P.M.  Richard carried 
with him a box with a scale inside to weigh the hashish and 
$1,600 for the purchase.  When they entered the apartment, Brown 
appeared to be agitated and uneasy, which was completely 
different from his "happy-go-lucky" demeanor during the first 
two transactions.  Brown told Richard and the victim that the 
person bringing the drugs had not yet arrived.  Brown said he 
was going to step out and buy some beer but would be right back. 
Uncomfortable with Brown's behavior, the victim and Richard 
decided to leave the apartment.  As they walked downstairs, they 
passed two people ascending the stairs -- a woman and a man -- 
later identified as Meredith Weiss and the defendant, who 
carried a paper bag.  Once the victim and Richard were outside, 
Richard could see that the defendant and Weiss were inside 
                                                          
 
 
2 Richard testified that he could not recall which of the 
two transactions involved hashish and which involved marijuana. 
5 
 
 
Brown's apartment.  The victim and Richard returned to the 
apartment and asked Brown, who had since returned, whether those 
two individuals were the people with the drugs.  Brown said that 
they were not, so the victim and Richard left again and drove 
around for fifteen minutes before returning to the apartment, 
with Richard still carrying the box containing the scale and the 
money.  Brown, his demeanor still uneasy, let the brothers into 
the apartment and brought them into a bedroom.  Brown then left 
them alone in the bedroom, telling them that he had to speak 
with his landlord. 
Immediately after Brown left, the defendant entered the 
bedroom from an adjoining room.  The defendant pointed a gun at 
Richard and the victim and asked them where the money was.  The 
victim raised his hands in the air, palms wide open, and told 
the defendant to "wait a minute."  The defendant then shot the 
victim in the chest from a distance of approximately five feet.  
The victim fell backwards, and Richard ran to him, guiding him 
to the floor.  The defendant again asked where the money was, 
and Richard told him that the money was in their car.  The 
defendant searched the victim's pockets and left. 
After the defendant left the bedroom, Richard went out the 
window onto the porch and dropped to the ground.  He saw people 
playing softball at a field across the street, so he ran over, 
screaming for help.  Richard then led some ball players back to 
6 
 
 
the apartment, and two individuals performed cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation on the victim until emergency services arrived.  
The victim died that night of a single gunshot wound to the left 
chest. 
Weiss, who was the defendant's girlfriend at the time, 
testified that she had driven the defendant to the apartment 
that evening.  The defendant told her that he needed to go to 
Brown's apartment for a drug deal, although Weiss did not see 
any drugs that day.  The defendant also told Weiss that he was 
carrying a gun for protection because he was concerned about 
selling drugs to individuals he did not know.  Weiss and the 
defendant passed two men as they went up the stairs to Brown's 
apartment.  After Brown spoke privately with the defendant, the 
defendant asked Weiss to wait downstairs, so she returned to the 
vehicle.  She had waited there about ten to twenty minutes when 
she heard a bang. 
Five minutes later, Brown entered Weiss's car, followed 
shortly by the defendant.  Both men appeared panicked, and the 
defendant told Weiss, "Let's get out of here."  Weiss drove 
Brown and the defendant to the apartment in Somerville that she 
shared with the defendant and then to Medford, where they stayed 
for two nights at a friend's apartment.3  After learning that the 
                                                          
 
 
3 Weiss testified that she could not recall if Brown was 
still with them when she and the defendant went to Medford. 
7 
 
 
victim had died, Weiss drove the defendant and Brown to a 
Boston-area bridge, where the firearm was thrown into the water, 
and continued on to the Port Authority bus station in New York 
City, where she dropped off the defendant and Brown.  Weiss 
continued on to her parents' home in New Jersey, where she was 
arrested and charged with being an accessory after the fact to 
murder.4 
Brown and the defendant traveled by bus to California, 
where the defendant telephoned his cousin, Douglas Nesbitt, late 
one night and asked if they could stay with him.  Less than an 
hour later, the defendant and Brown appeared at Nesbitt's 
apartment.  Nesbitt testified that the defendant explained that 
he was in California because he had been involved in a drug deal 
in Cambridge involving "two white guys" that had "gone bad."5  
The defendant told Nesbitt that, while he was negotiating the 
drug deal, one of the white guys pulled out a gun and "tried to 
stick them up."  He and one of the white guys wrestled over the 
gun, and the older white guy got shot.  When Nesbitt returned 
home the next day, the defendant and Brown had left. 
                                                          
 
 
4 This charge was dismissed without prejudice in 1977.  In 
1982 Weiss entered into an agreement with the Commonwealth in 
which the Commonwealth agreed not to renew charges against her 
if she agreed to testify against Brown at his 1982 trial and 
against the defendant if and when he was arrested and tried. 
 
 
5 The victim and Richard are Caucasian; the defendant is 
black. 
8 
 
 
The defendant remained a fugitive for many years.  In 
December 1999, he was apprehended by Canadian authorities in 
Montreal, where he lived under a different name, and was brought 
to Massachusetts to be tried for murder. 
Richard Kaufman, a forensic chemist at the State police 
crime laboratory, analyzed the victim's jacket for gunpowder 
residue in the area where the bullet penetrated the victim's 
chest and did not detect any nitrate particles or partially 
burned gunpowder particles around the hole in the jacket.  He 
testified that if the weapon had been fired close to the 
garment, there would be gunpowder residue in that area. 
William Duke, a State police ballistician, attended the 
victim's autopsy and offered the opinion that, in light of the 
lack of evidence of any surrounding tissue damage or powder on 
the skin, the wound was not a contact wound, that is, the muzzle 
of the weapon was not touching or very close to the victim or to 
the victim's clothing when it was fired.  Duke further opined 
that, if the firearm had been shot within one foot of the 
victim, he would expect to see plainly visible gunshot residue 
particles on the jacket; if the firearm had been shot within six 
inches, he would expect to see a heavier concentration of 
gunshot residue with less spread; and if the firearm had been 
pressing up against the jacket when it was fired, he would 
expect to see an entrance wound almost the size of a golf ball, 
9 
 
 
with heavy black singe and burn marks plainly visible on the 
jacket. 
Discussion.  1.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The 
defendant gives three reasons why he was deprived of his 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.  
First, defense counsel in his opening statement told the jury 
that Brown would testify that "this was an armed robbery and not 
a drug deal," even though the prosecutor had not expressly 
promised to call Brown as a witness, and defense counsel did not 
intend to call him; Brown ultimately did not testify at trial.  
Second, defense counsel promised in his opening statement to 
elicit through cross-examination of the testifying police 
officers "how drug deals are handled," but never elicited that 
testimony at trial.  Third, defense counsel visited the 
defendant only six times before trial and failed adequately to 
prepare for trial.  We address each claim in turn. 
a.  Describing Brown's anticipated trial testimony in 
opening statement.  Before jury empanelment, at a motion in 
limine hearing, the judge asked the prosecutor, "Is Mr. Brown 
going to be a witness in this case?"  The Commonwealth replied 
that Brown would be brought into court and that his attorney had 
indicated that he would testify if called.  But the prosecutor 
added, "Strategically, I don't know. . . .  [H]e will be 
available to testify.  I'm not promising him to the jury."  In 
10 
 
 
his opening statement, the prosecutor did not promise the jury 
that Brown would be a witness or describe evidence that only 
Brown would have known.  But in defense counsel's opening 
statement, he declared: 
"You will hear from Gordon Brown during the course of this 
case, Gordon Kent Brown.  And Gordon Kent Brown has been in 
jail for a substantial period of time.  And in 1999 he had 
a parole hearing, and he was turned down for parole.  The 
police came to see Gordon Kent Brown shortly after he was 
turned down for parole and asked him about [the defendant], 
asked him if he knew where he was, wanted information about 
him, so that they could arrest [the defendant].  Mr. 
Brown's response to that was in the negative initially, but 
there was a second visit shortly after the first during 
which Mr. Brown began negotiations for [the defendant's] 
whereabouts.  That is, he wanted money in exchange for 
bringing information that he could provide him about [the 
defendant]. 
 
"A year after the first parole hearing there was a second 
parole hearing.  Mr. Brown who had been turned down for 
parole previously wanted to get this parole this time, and, 
so, during the course of the parole hearing he agreed to 
assist the police, to help the government in this 
prosecution against [the defendant] who had by that time 
been arrested, and based at least in part upon the 
representations that he made, that he was going to help, he 
was granted parole.  At the time he was granted parole he 
knew [Richard] Paulsen's story.  He knew that [Richard] 
Paulsen had told the police that this was an armed robbery 
and not a drug deal, and he knew that he had to agree with 
that story in order to get parole.  And, so, he did." 
 
At a sidebar conference after defense counsel's opening 
statement, the prosecutor stated, "I just want to be clear.  I 
never promised the jury Gordon Brown," and "on the record I said 
that I was -- I don't want to say ambivalent, but I didn't know 
whether I was going to call Mr. Brown."  The prosecutor asked 
11 
 
 
that the jury be reinstructed that opening statements are not 
evidence; the judge declined to do so.  Neither the Commonwealth 
nor defense counsel called Brown to testify during the course of 
trial. 
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new trial on 
October 5, 2018, defense counsel testified that he never 
intended to call Brown as a witness but expected from his 
experience as a defense attorney that the Commonwealth would 
call Brown to testify because Brown was on the witness list, had 
entered into a "plea agreement" with the Commonwealth, and was 
still in custody.  Based on his understanding of the research on 
opening statements "and the concepts of primacy and recency in 
persuading jurors," he wanted the jury to know of "Brown's 
baggage . . . from the get go, and not after he'd been 
introduced by the prosecutor," who, on direct examination, would 
make "an effort to diminish the import of what his prior life 
had been."  He conceded, "[H]indsight being 20/20, I might not 
have done that today." 
"Where, as here, the defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is based on a tactical or strategic decision, the 
test is whether the decision was 'manifestly unreasonable when 
made'" (quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 
Mass. 664, 674 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 442 (2006).  In making 
12 
 
 
this determination, we "focus on the point in time when counsel 
made the challenged strategic decision," not with the benefit of 
hindsight, and decide whether "lawyers of ordinary training and 
skill in the criminal law" would consider the strategic or 
tactical decision to be "competent" (citation omitted).  
Kolenovic, supra.  "The manifestly unreasonable test, therefore, 
is essentially a search for rationality in counsel's strategic 
decisions, taking into account all the circumstances known or 
that should have been known to counsel in the exercise of his 
[or her] duty to provide effective representation to the client 
and not whether counsel could have made alternative choices."  
Id. at 674-675. 
The thrust of the defense, as articulated by defense 
counsel in opening statement, was that "this was a drug deal 
gone bad during the course of which the gun was flashed, a 
struggle ensued, the gun went off accidentally, and [the victim] 
was killed."  We conclude that, where defense counsel did not 
intend to call Brown as a witness, where the prosecutor earlier 
that day had told the judge in the presence of defense counsel 
that, strategically, he was not sure he would call Brown, and 
where the prosecutor did not tell the jury that Brown would 
testify or describe any evidence that only Brown could testify 
to, it was manifestly unreasonable to tell the jury that Brown 
would testify that what had occurred here was an armed robbery.  
13 
 
 
To be sure, if Brown were to have testified, it would have been 
reasonable for defense counsel to discuss Brown's anticipated 
testimony in opening statement and his motivation for giving 
that testimony with the goal of influencing the jury's first 
impression of the credibility of that testimony.  But where the 
prosecutor had told the judge that he had yet to decide whether 
to call Brown, defense counsel relied on an informed guess as to 
whether Brown actually would testify.  The risk of telling the 
jury that Brown would testify and corroborate Richard's version 
of events far exceeded the benefit of influencing the jury's 
first impression of Brown if he were to testify.  No competent 
attorney would have taken this risk and made this choice. 
Counsel's ineffective assistance, however, requires a new 
trial only if it created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice, that is, only if it was reasonably 
likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Field, 477 Mass. 553, 556 (2017); Commonwealth 
v. Brown, 462 Mass. 620, 630 (2012).  We conclude that it was 
not reasonably likely in this case.  The overwhelming evidence 
at trial was that Richard and the victim thought this was to be 
a drug deal, but the defendant and Brown knew it was to be a 
drug "rip-off" (to steal the cash), i.e., an armed robbery.  The 
only evidence that supported the defense theory that Richard or 
the victim had brought the firearm to the drug deal to conduct 
14 
 
 
their own drug rip-off to steal the drugs and that the victim 
was killed during a struggle over the gun came from the 
defendant's description of events to Nesbitt.  That self-serving 
story, told to a distant cousin whose help the defendant sought 
while "on the lam," is inconsistent with Richard's testimony 
(and with his conduct immediately after the shooting), 
inconsistent with Weiss's testimony that the defendant brought a 
gun to the apartment, and inconsistent with the forensic 
evidence, which suggests that this was not a contact wound fired 
at close range, as one would expect if it were an accidental 
shooting during a struggle for the gun.  Defense counsel's 
characterization of Brown's anticipated testimony was never 
mentioned again during the presentation of evidence at trial or 
in closing argument.  In short, where the prosecutor had not 
decided to call Brown as a witness and defense counsel did not 
intend to, it was manifestly unreasonable for defense counsel in 
opening statement to have told the jury that Brown would 
characterize what happened as an armed robbery, but it 
reasonably could not have influenced the jury in reaching their 
verdict. 
b.  Promising to elicit from testifying police officers 
about "how drug deals are handled."  In his opening statement, 
defense counsel told the jury: 
15 
 
 
"There's an alternative scenario that we would suggest to 
you that this was in fact a drug deal . . . and through the 
cross-examination of the police officers we suggest that we 
will show you how drug deals are handled.  The drugs and 
the money are not generally in the same place at the same 
time.  And in this circumstance that a sample of drugs was 
taken to the premises, a gun was carried in order to 
protect the individual from people he didn't know that were 
supposedly buying from him, that this was a drug deal gone 
bad during the course of which the gun was flashed, a 
struggle ensued, the gun went off accidentally, and [the 
victim] was killed." 
 
The defendant correctly notes that, at trial, defense counsel 
never did elicit during his cross-examination of the testifying 
police officers "how drug deals are handled," or that "[t]he 
drugs and the money are not generally in the same place at the 
same time" during a typical drug deal.  Nor, pragmatically, 
could defense counsel have expected to elicit such testimony, 
where none of the testifying police officers had substantial 
experience investigating drug deals.  But we need not dwell long 
on this claim of ineffective assistance because, in the context 
of this case, it amounts to nothing. 
The Commonwealth's theory of this case, amply supported by 
Richard's testimony, was that this armed robbery occurred during 
what Richard and the victim intended to be a drug deal.  Richard 
testified that he and the victim came to the apartment to buy 
drugs, and the defendant attempted to rob them of the money they 
had brought to pay for the drugs.  There was no need for defense 
counsel to cross-examine the police officers to elicit from them 
16 
 
 
that this was meant to be a drug deal, because that was never in 
dispute.  What was disputed is whether the defendant sought to 
negotiate a drug deal, as the defendant told Nesbitt in 
California, or whether the defendant simply used Richard and the 
victim's belief that they were going to purchase drugs from 
Brown as an opportunity for an armed robbery, as Richard 
testified.  There is no risk that this assertion in opening 
statement, or defense counsel's failure to elicit the promised 
testimony, in any way influenced the jury's verdict. 
c.  Defense counsel's failure to visit the defendant in 
jail more than six times before trial.  Between the date of 
arraignment and the commencement of trial on May 8, 2001, 
defense counsel visited the defendant six times while he was in 
jail awaiting trial:  on January 12, 2000; March 23, 2000; June 
17, 2000; April 26, 2001; May 1, 2001; and May 2, 2001.  The 
defendant also contends that he received discovery from defense 
counsel that counsel and the defendant never had the opportunity 
to discuss; that they did not agree about trial strategy; that 
he tried to telephone defense counsel numerous times between 
January 2000 and April 26, 2001, but was never able to speak 
with him; and that they never engaged in any written dialogue 
about the case.  The defendant, however, has failed to 
articulate how his defense would have been materially different 
if defense counsel had visited him more often or been more 
17 
 
 
responsive to his attempts to contact defense counsel.  At the 
close of the evidence at trial, the judge asked the defendant if 
he felt satisfied with defense counsel's representation of him; 
the defendant answered "yes."  There is nothing in the 
defendant's briefs and nothing we can discern from the record 
that suggests that more or better communication between the 
defendant and defense counsel would have yielded anything likely 
to influence the jury's verdict in this case. 
2.  Retroactive application of Brown.  The defendant argues 
that we should extend the reach of our holding in Brown to his 
case, even though we limited that holding to cases tried after 
the opinion was issued.  In Brown, 477 Mass. at 807, we revised 
our common law of murder by declaring that, "in trials that 
commence[d] after the date of the opinion in [that] case," 
felony-murder would no longer be an independent theory of 
liability for murder but simply an aggravating element under 
G. L. c. 265, § 1, permitting a verdict of murder in the first 
degree where the jury found one of the three prongs of malice 
but did not find deliberate premeditation or extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  In doing so, we abandoned "the fiction of constructive 
malice -- that where a killing occurs in the commission of a 
felony, the intent to commit the felony is sufficient alone to 
establish malice."  Id. at 825 (Gants, C.J., concurring).  The 
defendant contends that, as a matter of due process, equal 
18 
 
 
protection, and basic fairness, we should extend our holding in 
Brown to his case, even though it was tried before our opinion 
in Brown and the appeal was pending when Brown was decided.  We 
have declined to do so in other cases.  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Bin, 480 Mass. 665, 681 (2018); Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 
480 Mass. 113, 120, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 (2018).  We 
decline to do so here. 
We made clear in Brown that "[f]elony-murder is a common-
law crime"; we determine its elements.  Brown, 477 Mass. at 822.  
We declared that, in future trials, the element of malice would 
no longer be satisfied simply by proof of intent to commit the 
underlying crime:  one of the three prongs of malice would have 
to be proved.  Id. at 807.  This was not a clarification of 
existing common law; it constituted a change to our common law.  
Nor was it a change to our law of criminal procedure; it was a 
change to our substantive criminal law.  We made equally clear 
that our earlier felony-murder rule, which substituted the 
intent to commit the underlying felony for the malice required 
for murder, was not unconstitutional.  Id. at 823.  Our decision 
in Brown therefore did not announce a new constitutional rule.  
Id. 
Because Brown neither established a new Federal 
constitutional rule nor a new Federal rule of criminal 
procedure, the United States Supreme Court precedent on which 
19 
 
 
the defendant relies is inapplicable.  See Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (Federal Constitution requires Federal 
and State courts to retroactively apply new Federal 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure to direct appeals 
from convictions); Commonwealth v. Waters, 400 Mass. 1006, 1007 
(1987) ("Griffith does not require this court to give 
retroactive application to rules that are not based on the 
Federal Constitution").  Nor do Supreme Court precedents that 
provide that subsequent clarifications of existing substantive 
criminal law have retroactive effect apply here, because Brown 
clearly involved a change in the common law of felony-murder and 
not a mere clarification.  See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 
228-229 (2001) (because Pennsylvania Supreme Court "clarified" 
that crime of operating hazardous waste facility without permit 
did not apply to someone who had permit but deviated from its 
terms, defendant's conviction ran afoul of due process because 
defendant had permit and therefore never violated statute).  See 
also Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 840 (2003) ("[t]he proper 
question under Fiore is not whether the law has changed," but 
rather what law required at time of defendant's conviction).  
Thus, where we revise our substantive common law of murder, we 
are free to declare that our new substantive law shall be 
applied prospectively, much like the Legislature may do when it 
revises substantive criminal statutes.  See Commonwealth v. 
20 
 
 
Dagley, 442 Mass. 713, 721 n.10 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 
930 (2005) ("When announcing a new common-law rule . . . there 
is no constitutional requirement that the new rule or new 
interpretation be applied retroactively, and we are therefore 
free to determine whether it should be applied only 
prospectively").  Cf. Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 Mass. 286, 290 
(2013), quoting G. L. c. 4, § 6, Second ("a newly enacted 
[penal] statute is presumptively prospective, and '[t]he repeal 
of a statute shall not affect any punishment, penalty or 
forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect'"). 
In fact, this case illustrates the wisdom of prospective 
application of our new common law of felony-murder.  The 
Commonwealth chose here to proceed on only one theory of murder 
in the first degree, felony-murder, which at the time of trial 
did not require the jury to find one of the three prongs of 
malice -- that is, that the defendant shot the victim with an 
intent to kill, or with an intent to cause grievous bodily harm, 
or intended to do an act that, in the circumstances known to the 
defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a plain 
and strong likelihood that death would result.  See Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 15-19 (1999).  Our decision in Brown 
would have permitted the Commonwealth to obtain a verdict of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, but 
only if the jury were to find one of the three prongs of malice.  
21 
 
 
See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 59-60 (2018).  If we had 
applied our new common law of felony-murder retroactively, we 
would have been required to order a new trial in this case 
because the jury were not instructed that they had to find one 
of the three prongs of malice in order to find the defendant 
guilty of felony-murder in the first degree.  But this would 
have been unfair to the Commonwealth because, had the jury been 
so instructed, it likely would have found that the defendant 
acted with malice in shooting the victim, and that he did so 
during the commission of an attempted armed robbery, which would 
have resulted in a verdict of murder in the first degree on the 
theory of felony-murder.6 
3.  Request for jury instruction on voluntary and 
involuntary manslaughter.  The defendant argues that the judge 
committed prejudicial error in declining the defendant's request 
that the jury be instructed on voluntary and involuntary 
manslaughter.  We agree that the judge erred, but we conclude 
that the error was not prejudicial in the context of his other 
instructions. 
Although the Commonwealth proceeded solely on the theory of 
felony-murder, the judge, in accordance with our guidance at the 
                                                          
 
 
6 The jury, had they been so instructed, might also have 
found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the 
theory of deliberate premeditation. 
22 
 
 
time of trial, also instructed the jury regarding murder in the 
second degree, setting forth the three prongs of malice.7  Where 
an instruction was to be given regarding murder in the second 
degree based on a finding of malice, defense counsel asked for 
jury instructions regarding the lesser included offenses of 
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.  "A manslaughter 
instruction is required if the evidence, considered in the light 
most favorable to a defendant, would permit a verdict of 
manslaughter . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 422 
(2019).  Here, viewing the evidence in that most favorable 
light, a reasonable jury could have credited the defendant's 
description of what occurred as related to Nesbitt and concluded 
that the killing occurred after Richard or the victim displayed 
                                                          
 
 
7 In Commonwealth v. Brown, 392 Mass. 632, 645 (1984), an 
appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree on the 
theory of felony-murder, we held that "G. L. c. 265, § 1, 
requires a trial judge to instruct on murder in the first and 
second degrees if there is evidence of murder in the first 
degree, even though there appears to be no hypothesis in the 
evidence to support a verdict of murder in the second degree."  
See Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 372 Mass. 783, 795-796 (1977).  
Where the judge had denied that defendant's request for an 
instruction on murder in the second degree, we exercised our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to direct the entry of a 
verdict of murder in the second degree.  Brown, supra at 643-
644.  However, in Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1, 10 
(2002), decided one year after the trial in the instant case, we 
changed course and held that a judge need not instruct the jury 
on murder in the second degree where the Commonwealth proceeds 
only on the theory of felony-murder and there is no evidence of 
malice that would support a verdict of murder in the second 
degree. 
23 
 
 
a gun while they were negotiating a drug deal and the victim 
either was accidentally killed during the struggle or shot in a 
heat of passion arising from reasonable provocation or sudden 
combat.  Therefore, the judge erred in declining the defendant's 
request for these instructions. 
Where the defendant requested such instructions and 
objected to their absence, we must determine whether the error 
was prejudicial.  Pina, 481 Mass. at 422.  "An error is not 
prejudicial only if the Commonwealth can show 'with fair 
assurance . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed' 
by it."  Commonwealth v. Rosado, 428 Mass. 76, 79 (1998), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).  We 
conclude, with fair assurance, that the defendant suffered no 
prejudice from this error. 
The judge instructed the jury that, to find the defendant 
guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-
murder, they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant brought the gun to the room in the apartment where the 
brothers were waiting, took it and displayed it in a threatening 
way, and did so with the intent to rob Richard and the victim of 
the money they had brought.  The judge also instructed that, to 
find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, they 
must find that he came into the room with a gun and 
intentionally pointed it at one of the brothers.  The judge 
24 
 
 
further instructed that, to find the defendant guilty of murder 
in the first or second degree, the jury must find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that "there was an intentional act, that [the 
defendant] shot the gun, that it wasn't an accident," and "that 
he pulled the trigger intentionally."8  As a result, if the jury 
had a reasonable doubt whether the events had occurred as 
described by the defendant to Nesbitt (which itself is 
extraordinarily unlikely), they were required to find the 
defendant not guilty.  In view of these instructions and the 
feeble evidence supporting a finding of manslaughter, it is 
plain that the defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to 
instruct the jury regarding the law governing voluntary and 
involuntary manslaughter. 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  As part of our 
plenary review, we have examined the record and conclude that a 
                                                          
 
 
8 With respect to the charge of murder in the first degree 
on the theory of felony-murder, the accident instruction was far 
more favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to under 
the law.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 831 (2017), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018) (Gants, C.J., concurring) 
(under felony-murder rule "a defendant who participates in an 
armed robbery is guilty of felony-murder in the first degree if 
the defendant or an accomplice commits any act that results in 
death, even if the act is accidental and unintended"); 
Commonwealth v. Evans, 390 Mass. 144, 151–152 (1983) ("A 
defendant who kills a victim in the commission or attempted 
commission of a robbery, while the defendant is armed with a 
gun, is guilty of murder by application of the felony-murder 
rule. . . .  The fact that, according to the defendant, the gun 
was discharged accidently is of no consequence"). 
25 
 
 
conviction of murder in the first degree is consonant with 
justice.  We therefore decline the defendant's request to order 
a new trial or to reduce the verdict to murder in the second 
degree. 
 
We specifically address only one claim of error that was 
not raised in the briefs but emerged in oral argument and was 
argued by the defendant in a letter submitted under Mass. R. A. 
P. 16 (l), as amended, 386 Mass. 1247 (1982):  that the judge 
erred in failing to give an instruction on felony-murder in the 
second degree, based on the uncharged offenses of (1) conspiracy 
to violate the drug laws, G. L. c. 94C, § 40; (2) unlicensed 
carrying of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and (3) armed 
assault with intent to rob, G. L. c. 265, § 18. 
 
We have previously held "that the felony on which a charge 
of felony-murder is premised may be uncharged, so long as the 
evidence supports it."  Commonwealth v. Stokes, 460 Mass. 311, 
315 (2011).  The defendant is correct that the evidence would 
support at least the last two of the three uncharged felonies he 
identifies.  "But where the felony later advanced by a defendant 
as the predicate for an instruction on felony-murder in the 
second degree is not itself the subject of a separate 
indictment, no error occurs if the trial judge does not charge 
the jury on it even though there may be sufficient evidence 
supporting such a charge -- at least where, as here, no party 
26 
 
 
requested such an instruction or even brought the issue to the 
judge's attention at trial."  Id.  We reasoned: 
"A contrary rule has an obvious potential to undermine the 
policy of finality of criminal convictions.  It is likely 
that in almost every case where a defendant has been 
convicted of felony-murder in the first degree predicated 
on a felony punishable by life imprisonment, an argument 
can later be made that the trial evidence also supported 
the existence of one or more uncharged felonies not 
punishable by life imprisonment, and that therefore the 
jury should have been instructed on felony-murder in the 
second degree.  Limiting the availability of such a claim 
to cases where the felony later advanced as presenting a 
basis for a charge of felony-murder in the second degree 
was the subject of a separate indictment may strike an 
appropriate balance.  The existence of the indictment puts 
the Commonwealth (as well as the trial judge) on notice 
that at least there is a theoretical possibility of 
conviction of felony-murder in the second degree." 
 
Id. at 316.  Applying that reasoning here, we conclude that 
there was no error.  Nor do we find a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice arising from the absence of an 
instruction regarding felony-murder in the second degree 
premised on other felonies that were not punishable by life in 
prison.  The overwhelming evidence in this case was that the 
defendant committed an attempted armed robbery. 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the defendant's conviction of 
felony-murder in the first degree and the denial of his motion 
for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.