Title: El-Abbadi v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TAHA EL-ABBADI 
, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below, 
 
 
§ 
No. 364, 2022 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
v.  
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
I.D. No. 1908013052(N) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  October 25, 2023 
Decided:  January 2, 2024 
 
 
 
Before VALIHURA, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
On appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire (argued), Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, Office of the Public 
Defender, Wilmington, Delaware. 
 
Kathryn J. Garrison, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VALIHURA, J. 
2 
 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Defendant Below, Appellant Taha El-Abbadi (“El-Abbadi”), seeks to overturn his 
conviction after a jury found him guilty of Murder by Abuse or Neglect in the First Degree 
(“MBAN, First Degree”) for the death of three-year-old Julian Cepeda (“Julian”).  The 
Superior Court denied his request for lesser-included offense (“LIO”) jury instructions and 
sustained objections by the State to his cross-examination and testimony regarding a prior 
involvement of the victim’s mother with the Division of Family Services (“DFS”).  El-
Abbadi challenges both rulings on appeal.  For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the 
Superior Court’s rulings.     
II. 
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 
A. The Weekend and Morning Prior to Julian’s Injury 
On August 19, 2019, El-Abbadi had been dating Meagan Alvarez (“Alvarez”), 
Julian’s mother, for approximately five months.  He had been living with Alvarez and her 
two young children, Julian and J.C.,2  for several months in the Castle Brook Apartments 
in New Castle.  Alvarez had been working on potty-training Julian and had encountered 
difficulty in potty-training him during the weekend of August 17 and 18 of 2019.3  She 
testified that she “spanked [Julian’s] butt with his diaper on[,]” because Julian had an 
 
1 The facts, except as otherwise noted, are taken from the transcript of trial testimony.  See App. to 
Opening Br. at A12–772 (Trial Transcript [hereinafter “Trial Tr. at [_]”]).  
2 J.C. is a minor and thus we refer to her by her initials. 
3 Id. at A425–26, A430 (Meagan Alvarez Testimony [hereinafter “Alvarez Test. at [_]”] at 73:21–
74:18, 78:6–21); Id. at A517–18 (Taha El-Abbadi Testimony [hereinafter “El-Abbadi Test. at [_]” 
at 28:18–29:8).   
3 
 
accident.4  El-Abbadi testified that around 7:00 a.m. on August 19, 2019, he woke to 
screaming and yelling because Julian had wet the bed.  Instead of taking Julian and J.C. to 
daycare that day, Alvarez brought J.C. with her to work at Great Clips, and left Julian with 
El-Abbadi.  When she left, Julian was acting normally and had no visible marks or bruises.5  
Surveillance footage shows Alvarez leaving with J.C. at 7:35 a.m.  She did not come back 
until later in the day and did not reenter her apartment until 5:24 p.m. 
At around 8:34 a.m., Cristian Cabrerra (“Cabrerra”), a friend of El-Abbadi, visited 
the apartment.6  The two men smoked marijuana outside and ate food that they had 
ordered.7  Meanwhile, Julian played inside on an iPad.  El-Abbadi sent a picture of Julian 
to Alvarez around 10:23 a.m.8  Alvarez asked if Julian had been crying.  El-Abbadi testified 
that he sent the picture because he was concerned about a mark on Julian’s left cheek.  
Alvarez did not see any mark on Julian’s cheek.9  At 10:54 a.m., El-Abbadi and Julian 
appear on surveillance footage exiting the apartment to head to the Casanova Auto Repair 
 
4 Id. at A430 (Alvarez Test. at 78:13–15, 78:19–20). 
5 Id. at A430–31 (Alvarez Test. at 78:22–79:1).   
6 Id. at A262 (Detective Christopher Phillips Testimony [hereinafter “Phillips Test. at [_]”] at 
106:2–5).  
7 Id. at A342 (Cristian Cabrerra Testimony at 26:9–19); Id at A577, A581–82 (El-Abbadi Test. 
88:17–20, 92:19–93:12). 
8 Id. at A405 (Detective Austin Jenkins Testimony at 53:3–12).  
9 The State introduced the picture as Exhibit 59, and it was shown to the jury.  App. to Answering 
Br. at B29 (State’s Ex. 59).  See also App. to Opening Br. at A437–39 (Alvarez Test. at 87:17–22).   
4 
 
shop, where El-Abbadi was employed.10  They returned at 11:34 am.11  Surveillance 
footage showed Julian walking outside the apartment complex at 11:46 a.m.   
B. Julian’s Changed Behavior 
 
Around 12:00 p.m., El-Abbadi called his friend Lisa Velez.  Although El-Abbadi 
testified that they discussed automobile parts, Ms. Velez testified that El-Abbadi told her 
that Julian fell while playing at a friend’s house and would not wake up.12  Alvarez testified 
that on a Facetime call with El-Abbadi around 1:30 p.m., Julian was awake but neither 
spoke nor responded to her questions.  Both El-Abbadi and Julian were lying on the floor 
during the call.  El-Abbadi testified that he told Alvarez to come get Julian due to marks 
on his face and buttocks.  
Between 2:41 and 5:24 p.m., Alvarez ran errands between leaving work and coming 
home.13   According to El-Abbadi, he went to work at the autobody shop at about 3:00 p.m.  
Surveillance video from the apartment complex showed El-Abbadi carrying a limp Julian 
to the car around 3:00 p.m.  Julian remained in the car with the air conditioning on while 
El-Abbadi worked.  Cabrerra testified that he saw Julian in the car at the autobody shop 
around 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., and that Julian appeared to be asleep and had purple marks on 
 
10 App. to Answering Br. at B7–10 (State’s Ex. 43–44).  El-Abbadi testified that he dropped off a 
dealer tag that morning.  App. to Opening Br. at A523 (El-Abbadi Test. at 34:3–18).  El-Abbadi 
worked for the autobody shop, and also used the facility to conduct his own business of buying 
and selling cars.  Id. at A512–13 (El-Abbadi Test. at 23:13–24:9). 
11 App. to Opening Br. at A262, A264 (Phillips Test. at 106:14–16, 108:2–10). 
12 Id. at A326–29 (Lisa Velez Testimony at 10:16–13:1). 
13 Alvarez stopped by the rental office for a copy of her lease, registered J.C. for school, and 
stopped to see her sister-in-law to pick up some clothes for Julian.  Id. at A445–46 (Alvarez Test. 
93:16–94:23).  See generally id. at A370–80 (Andrea Alvarez Testimony).  
5 
 
his face.  When Alvarez arrived home, she called El-Abbadi because he and Julian were 
not there.  According to Alvarez, El-Abbadi told her that Julian had an accident at the shop 
and that he would tell her about it when he got home.   
El-Abbadi testified that he told Alvarez that Julian fell asleep in the car and would 
not wake up.  El-Abbadi returned with Julian at 6:15 p.m. and put him in Julian’s bed.  A 
neighbor, Kaitlyn Seese, testified that she saw El-Abbadi carrying a limp and sick-looking 
Julian into the building.14  Despite Alvarez’s attempts to wake her son, Julian would not 
wake up.  Alvarez testified that El-Abbadi told her that Julian had hit his head on a car lift.  
She testified that she thought Julian was sleeping because El-Abbadi had told her that he 
had given Julian some medicine after he hit his head.  El-Abbadi testified that he urged 
Alvarez to call 911 rather than make the call himself because he had warrants for his arrest 
for pending cases.  He also testified that Alvarez had created the car lift story to hide the 
fact that she was the person who hit and injured Julian.  At around 7:51 p.m., after 
consulting her friend, Krista Hsu, Alvarez contacted an on-call doctor who connected her 
to 911.  Alvarez testified that El-Abbadi begged her not to tell anyone his name because of 
his outstanding warrants.  El-Abbadi left the apartment again around 7:44 p.m.   
C. Julian’s Medical Treatment and Death 
 
Paramedics arrived at the apartment around 8:00-8:05 p.m.  Keely Warrick, the 
paramedic responding that evening, testified to observing Julian’s pale, unresponsive 
 
14 Id. at A272–73 (Kaitlyn Seese Testimony at 116:11–13, 117:7–8).  See also App. to Answering 
Br. at B25–28 (State’s Ex. 52–53). 
6 
 
appearance, slow breathing, and low heart rate.15  Julian’s eyes were open but unresponsive.  
Given the gravity of Julian’s injury, Corporal Samantha Parsons, a State Trooper 
paramedic, flew with Julian to Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children (“A.I. duPont”) in a 
helicopter.16  She testified that Julian’s pupils were large and unreactive, which was 
indicative of brain swelling.  He was exhibiting symptoms of brain injury and intracranial 
pressure.   
 
When Julian arrived at the hospital, he was categorized as an “alert,” indicating to 
the hospital staff that surgeons and extra resources would be needed.17  The Emergency 
Room personnel quickly raised him from an “alert” to a “code,” indicating the existence of 
a “life or limb threatening,” situation.  When describing how Julian appeared in the trauma 
bay, Dr. Erin Teeple, the emergency room pediatric trauma surgeon on duty that night, 
testified that Julian was very severely brain injured.  His “pupils were fixed and dilated,” 
he had high blood pressure, and a low heart rate.  He had only the most minimal spinal 
reflexes remaining and his brain was swelling and herniating out of the bottom of his skull.  
Dr. Teeple asked Alvarez to call El-Abbadi to obtain more information about how Julian 
had been injured.  Dr. Teeple testified that El-Abbadi told her that he and Julian “were at 
 
15 App. to Opening Br. at A62 (Keely Warrick Testimony [hereinafter “Warrick Test. at [_]”] at 
53:5–9).  The paramedics were dispatched at 7:55 p.m. and arrived at 8:05 p.m.  Julian’s heart rate 
was at 56 to 62 when it should have been between 90 and 150, his oxygen level was only eighty-
one percent, and his respirations were sixteen respirations per minute when they should have been 
twenty or thirty respirations per minute.  Id at A63–64 (Warrick Test. at 54:17–55:15). 
16 Id. at A164–65, A171–72 (Corporal Samantha Parsons Testimony [hereinafter “Parsons Test. at 
[_]”] at 8:9–9:13, 15:23–16:7).  The hospital changed its name in 2021 to Nemours Children’s 
Hospital.   
17 Id. at A95 (Dr. Erin Teeple Testimony [hereinafter “Teeple Test. at [_]”] at 86:19–87:4). 
7 
 
the auto body shop, maybe he turned to help a customer, was in some way distracted, hit 
his head on something metal[.]”18  El-Abbadi’s story did not make sense to Dr. Teeple 
because it did not explain the severity of Julian’s injuries. 
 
In the trauma room, while doctors were examining Julian, Bernadette Clagg, a 
Forensic Registered Nurse in A.I. duPont’s pediatric ICU unit, photographed the bruises 
and marks on the left side of Julian’s face, on his forehead, on his cheeks, and on both 
buttocks.19   Julian was intubated with a breathing tube to aid his breathing, and required a 
C-collar to maintain the position of his spine and protect his spinal cord. 
 
Pediatric neurosurgeon, Dr. Jeffery Campbell, was on call the evening of August 19, 
2019 at A.I. duPont and attended to Julian when he was brought into the trauma bay by 
helicopter.  Dr. Campbell testified as to his assessment and treatment of Julian.  He stated 
that Julian had only a tiny bit of brain stem function and that had he survived, he likely 
would have been in a vegetative state.   
 
Dr. Campbell testified about Julian’s Glasgow Coma Score.  The Glasgow Coma 
Score provides a means to assess head injuries in terms of severity.  It calculates a score 
based upon whether a patient’s eyes open, if the patient can follow commands, if the patient 
is verbal, has motor skills, and can respond to pain.20  A three is the lowest a patient can 
score on the Glasgow Coma chart (meaning that a patient has no neurologic function), and 
 
18 Id. at A103 (Teeple Test. at 94:19–22). 
19 Id. at A82–85 (Forensic Nurse Bernadette Clagg Testimony at 73:13–76:1).  See also App. to 
Answering Br. at B1–6 (State’s Ex. 10, 11, and 13). 
20 App. to Opening Br. at A117 (Dr. Jeffrey Campbell Testimony [hereinafter “Campbell Test. at 
[_]”] at 108:3–18). 
8 
 
a fifteen is the highest.  Julian scored a four out of fifteen21 and exhibited signs of “a 
devastating irrecoverable brain injury.”22  The CAT scan showed a very large pan-
hemispheric midline shift, where the brain swelling pushed the middle of his brain over 
significantly.  Dr. Campbell also testified that it was one of the worst CAT scans and brain 
injuries he had seen in twenty-two years of practice.  He testified that a larger hemorrhage 
is generally associated “with a higher, a worse trauma, more force applied to that.”23  Dr. 
Campbell operated on Julian and removed a piece of his skull bone in an attempt to drain 
the bleeding and relieve pressure.  Prior to operating, Dr. Campbell shaved Julian’s head 
and noted additional bruising around the top of his head.   
Julian survived the surgery but most of his brain was dead.  Eventually, he met the 
criteria for brain death after he had regressed to having no brain function at all.  Dr. 
Campbell testified that had Julian received prompt medical treatment after the initial 
injuries had been inflicted, he could have survived.  By the time Julian arrived at the 
hospital, his brain had been too damaged by the secondary injury caused by his brain 
swelling and bleeding.   
Julian was pronounced brain dead at 6:35 p.m. on August 21, 2019, and then 
deceased.  The State medical examiner, Dr. John Krolikowski, determined that Julian’s 
cause of death was blunt force injury, and the manner of death was homicide.   
 
 
 
21 Id. at A119–20 (Campbell Test. at 110:23–111:1). 
22 Id. at A120 (Campbell Test. at 111:5–6).   
23 Id. at A130 (Campbell Test. at 121:21–23).   
9 
 
 
D. El-Abbadi’s Interrogation by the Police 
 
El-Abbadi went to the police station on his own volition around 3:00 a.m. on August 
20, 2019.  During the investigation, El-Abbadi told the police at least four different stories 
to explain how Julian had been injured.  The chief investigating officer, Homicide 
Detective Jennifer Escheman (“Detective Escheman”) began interviewing El-Abbadi in the 
early morning hours of August 20, 2019.24  The first story El-Abbadi told Detective 
Escheman was that Julian hit his head on a chassis machine at the autobody shop.  El-
Abbadi said that he and Alvarez had spanked Julian early that morning because Julian had 
wet the bed.25  Later that day, around 4:30 or 5:00 p.m., El-Abbadi took Julian with him to 
the autobody shop to get money from a customer.  El-Abbadi and the customer had a 
disagreement, during which the customer threatened El-Abbadi.  The two men had a 
physical altercation.  El-Abbadi saw Julian run into the chassis machine and fall to the 
ground, hitting his head on both the chassis and the ground.  Although Julian did not stand 
up immediately, he did cry, and was able to walk and talk.  El-Abbadi took Julian to Wawa, 
where he purchased and gave Julian 250 mg of ibuprofen pills.  El-Abbadi and Julian 
returned to the shop, where Julian remained in the car as El-Abbadi locked up.  When El-
 
24 App. to Answering Br. at B43 (Detective Jennifer Escheman Video Deposition [hereinafter 
“Escheman Test. at [_]” at 18:19–23).  Due to medical reasons, Detective Escheman testified by a 
videotaped deposition.  At the time of her deposition, Detective Escheman had been promoted to 
Sergeant. 
25 State’s Ex. 2 at 03:15:56–16:07 (Interview of El-Abbadi by Detective Escheman).  State’s Ex. 2 
(the first part of El-Abbadi’s interview) was played for the jury.  App. to Opening Br. at A337 (Trial 
Tr. at 21:7–15). 
10 
 
Abbadi returned to the car, Julian was sleeping.  El-Abbadi said he did not know how 
serious Julian’s injury was.   
El-Abbadi’s initial interview lasted over an hour and a half.  He then agreed to go 
to the autobody shop with police to re-enact what happened.  After he repeated this story 
during a reenactment of the incident at the autobody shop,26 Detective Escheman 
interviewed him again on August 20 beginning at about 1:17 p.m.  First, El-Abbadi 
recounted the initial version of the autobody shop story.27  The only variation was that he 
stated that a friend went to Wawa and purchased the juice and ibuprofen instead of him.   
At that point, Detective Escheman suggested that El-Abbadi’s story was inconsistent 
with other evidence the police collected that day.  El-Abbadi then pivoted to a completely 
different story.  He stated, “I dropped [Julian] off to somebody for a little bit ‘cause [sic] I 
had to go do my run-arounds.”28  He claimed that he dropped Julian off in Claymont with 
a woman named Brittany, and that Julian was injured when he picked him up.  He did not 
know Brittany’s last name.  He dropped Julian off because a man was threatening him and 
accusing him of stealing the man’s gun.   
El-Abbadi gave another variation in which the man, “Hefea,” called him and 
threatened him.  When they left the house, the man saw him and followed him.  The men 
 
26 State’s Ex. 3.  State’s Ex. 3 (the autobody reenactment) was played for the jury.  App. to Opening 
Br. at A338 (Trial Tr. at 22:13–16).  See also App. to Answering Br. at B52–55 (Escheman Test. at 
27:19–30:21); App. to Opening Br. at A644 (El-Abbadi Test. at 155:10–15). 
27 State’s Ex. 4 (the second part of El-Abbadi’s interview) was played for the jury.  App. to Opening 
Br. at A338 (Trial Tr. at 22:17–19).   
28 State’s Ex. 4 at 13:29:29–35. 
11 
 
had a physical altercation in which the man swung and hit Julian.  Detective Escheman 
stated that the injury was not from being punched.  El-Abbadi then stated that this man hit 
Julian with his car.  El-Abbadi admitted at least twice during this segment that Julian’s 
“bruises on his butt is [sic] from me but everything else is not.”29  
 
Detective Escheman commented that the previous stories about dropping Julian off 
with “Brittany” and Julian getting hit by a car could not be true.  El-Abbadi pivoted again.  
He admitted that he got mad and spanked Julian that morning and again stated that the 
“bruises on his butt is [sic] from me.”30  Then, El-Abbadi and Julian were playing with 
pillows.  El-Abbadi said that he hit Julian “kinda hard” with a pillow, and that Julian lay 
on the bed, not moving.  He tried to wake Julian up by putting him in the shower but that 
did not work.  Detective Escheman told El-Abbadi that this was not a pillow injury.  Then, 
El-Abbadi stated that when he hit Julian with the pillow Julian went flying across the floor.  
He took Julian to the shop when Alvarez was coming home because Julian would not wake 
up.  When pressed for details, El-Abbadi told a different version stating that he hit Julian 
three times with the pillow.  The first time, Julian slid off the bed in El-Abbadi’s room but 
was laughing.  The pillow fight continued into Julian’s room, where El-Abbadi hit Julian 
too hard, and Julian hit his head on the carpeted floor.  El-Abbadi said, “it’s my fault” 
several times.  He said he put ice and lotion on Julian’s buttocks after he spanked him.   
 
29 Id. at 13:40:48–55.   
30 Id. at 13:44:25–28, 13:45:35–40. 
12 
 
Detective Escheman again said that Julian was not injured by a pillow, and that this 
was not just a pillow fight.  El-Abbadi admitted that he had been lying to Detective 
Escheman earlier in the interview.  After Detective Escheman said that there were injuries 
on Julian’s face.  El-Abbadi then said that he “smacked” Julian’s face with his hand because 
Julian was not listening during potty-training.  Julian fell to the floor and started crying.  
He put cream on Julian’s face.  Then, the pillow fight occurred.  El-Abbadi stated that when 
he hit Julian too hard with the pillow, Julian said “I’m ok” but then closed his eyes halfway 
and would not wake up.  El-Abbadi then said he “freaked out” and left around 3:00 p.m. 
and carried Julian out. 
Using a doll, Detective Escheman had El-Abbadi reenact how forcefully he hit 
Julian.  El-Abbadi said he smacked Julian twice in the face with the pillow.  The first smack 
was not hard because Julian was standing.  But Julian hit the television and the television 
moved.  The second smack was hard and Julian hit the floor.  Julian lay in the floor and 
closed his eyes.  El-Abbadi said at the end of the interview, “it’s my fault.  I deserve 
whatever punishment you give me.”31  He asked what his charges would be.  Following 
this second interview, Detective Escheman placed El-Abbadi under arrest. 
E. The Proceedings in Superior Court  
 
1. Indictment  
 
The Grand Jury indicted El-Abbadi for MBAN, First Degree.  Originally, he was 
charged with assault rather than murder, however, the charges were amended to reflect 
 
31 Id. at 14:26:25–30. 
13 
 
Julian’s death.   
2.  Trial 
The jury trial began on February 11, 2022 and more than two dozen witnesses 
testified over five days.  El-Abbadi also testified in his own defense.  In addition to the 
testimony referenced in the chronology above, other testimony relevant to the two issues 
on appeal is summarized below.  
a. Testimony Pertaining to El-Abbadi’s Argument that Lesser Included Offense 
Jury Instructions Were Warranted 
 
1. The Medical Testimony 
 
Dr. Campbell and Dr. Stephanie Ann Deutsch testified about their assessment of 
Julian’s injuries.  Dr. Campbell testified that in his training and experience, the type of 
subdural hematoma Julian suffered occurs because of high velocity force,32 such as an adult 
man hitting a child “with something hard.”33 Subdural hematomas may result when 
children are involved in high speed automobile accidents and are not wearing seat belts, or 
when children fall several stories out of a building.  Multiple areas of bruising indicated 
that Julian was struck multiple times.  Julian’s injuries were inconsistent with a three-year-
old child running into a structure, falling on a carpeted floor, or being in a pillow fight.  
Julian’s body weight (thirty-three pounds) would not have been able to generate enough 
force in these circumstances to have caused his injuries.   
 
32 App. to Opening Br. at A131 (Campbell Test. at 122:10–21). 
33 Id. at A132 (Campbell Test. at 123:2–3).  Dr. Campbell observed that “in professional boxing 
every once in a while someone will get a subdural, it’s that kind of force that you are talking about.”  
Id. (Campbell Test. at 123:3–5).   
14 
 
Due to the severity of his head injuries, it was likely that Julian would have become 
immediately unconscious and unresponsive.  He would not have been able to walk, talk, or 
eat.  When shown the 11:41 a.m. surveillance footage of Julian and El-Abbadi walking 
outside the apartment, Dr. Campbell testified that someone with such a subdural hematoma 
would not be able to walk independently.  Dr. Campbell opined that a child who had 
sustained such an injury would need to be carried in a way consistent with the 6:15 p.m. 
apartment surveillance footage.  Dr. Campbell testified that Julian’s initial traumatic injury 
would worsen over time as the brain swelling further damaged his brain.  Julian’s 
presentation at the hospital, at around 8:00 p.m., was consistent with the injury having 
occurred between 12:00 and 3:00 p.m.  According to Dr. Campbell, had Julian received 
medical intervention soon after his injury, he may have survived.   
Dr. Deutsch testified about her observations of Julian the morning of August 20, 
2019.34  Her team investigated whether Julian had experienced “child physical abuse” 
given the trauma to his face and buttocks.  Julian had presented as a trauma code due to 
concerns raised by his CT scan which showed a very large intracranial hemorrhage 
accompanied by herniation of the brain tissue.  These observations were inconsistent with 
a simple accidental trauma such as a fall or head strike.  She opined that the pattern of 
bruising on his buttocks indicated that force was “highly specific for inflicted trauma.”35   
 
34 Id. at A180, A181, A185 (Dr. Stephanie Ann Deutsch [hereinafter “Deutsch Test. at [_]”] 24:6–
12, 25:21–26:12, 29:3–30:1).  See generally id at A189–194 (Deutsch Test. at 32:8–38:3). 
35 Id. at A190 (Deutsch Test. at 34:13–14). 
15 
 
She further testified that there were extensive hemorrhages to Julian’s retinas in both 
eyes, and most notably a “thesis cavity formation,” which indicated the severity of force 
applied to his head.  This sort of injury occurs when there is “really extraordinary 
acceleration-deceleration, plus-minus some blunt impact component,”36 such as a high-
speed vehicle crash, a fatal crush injury, or a fall from a significant height.  Julian’s injury, 
according to Dr. Deutsch, was inconsistent with accidental trauma, such as hitting one’s 
head at an autobody shop.  Dr. Deutsch ultimately diagnosed Julian with abusive head 
trauma and opined that someone had physically abused Julian.   
2. El-Abbadi’s Trial Testimony 
 
Contrary to what El-Abbadi told Detective Escheman during his interrogation, El-
Abbadi testified at trial to another variation of what occurred on August 19, 2019.  When 
El-Abbadi woke to screaming and yelling at around 7:00 a.m., Julian’s face was red and he 
did not have a diaper on because he had wet the bed.  El-Abbadi testified that he told 
Alvarez “whatever you did, just stop doing it, it takes time and patience for the child”37 and 
he put Julian on the toilet.  He testified that he told Alvarez to take the children to day care, 
but she left Julian with him, and told him she would be back by 3:00 p.m.  El-Abbadi also 
testified that he went to drop a dealer tag off from about 11:00 to 11:20 a.m.   
El-Abbadi testified that when Alvarez and El-Abbadi communicated by FaceTime, 
he asked her to pick up Julian because Julian had marks on his face and buttocks.  He took 
 
36 Id. at A194 (Deutsch Test. at 38:7–9).  
37 Id. at A519 (El-Abbadi Test. 30:12–14). 
16 
 
Julian with him to the shop because Alvarez had not yet returned home.  That afternoon, 
Julian was tired, and El-Abbadi carried him because Julian did not want to walk.  Julian 
stayed in the car watching videos while El-Abbadi worked at the shop from about 3:30 to 
about 5:30 or 5:40 p.m.  El-Abbadi testified that Julian fell asleep on the way home from 
the shop, and El-Abbadi carried him inside because he would not wake up.  El-Abbadi 
denied knowing that Julian was severely injured.   
 
Upon arriving home, El-Abbadi put Julian to bed.  He testified that he told Alvarez 
that “I don’t know what you did that morning or weekend, you know, but you got to fix 
your situations,”38 and that Alvarez created the autobody shop story.  El-Abbadi testified 
that when she did call 911, he asked her not to give his name because of his warrants.  
Almost two hours passed between the time when he brought Julian home and when Alvarez 
called 911.  El-Abbadi went to Cabrerra’s house, where he smoked marijuana and drank.  
Early the next morning, after speaking to Detective Escheman on the phone, he went to the 
police station.  He testified that he made up the stories during his interrogation because he 
did not know what to say to avoid getting into trouble.  He denied injuring Julian and stated 
that had he known what his condition was, he would have taken Julian to the emergency 
room. 
 
The State cross-examined El-Abbadi regarding his relationship with Alvarez.  He 
testified that it was “somewhat bad” and that he was going to move out.39  The State also 
 
38 Id. at A530 (El-Abbadi Test. at 41:6–8). 
39 Id. at A556–57 (El Abbadi Test. at 67:19–68:2).   
17 
 
cross-examined El-Abbadi in depth about his statements to Detective Escheman.  El-
Abbadi admitted to lying multiple times during his police interviews, but he said he was 
covering for Alvarez.40  El-Abbadi also admitted to leaving Julian alone in the apartment 
to retrieve drug paraphernalia from his car, and to smoking marijuana while Julian was in 
his care.  He testified that he also smoked marijuana before his interrogation.  At trial, El-
Abbadi denied causing the marks on Julian’s buttocks, and generally denied causing any 
injuries to Julian.   
3. Limitation of Cross-Examination and Testimony Regarding Alverez’s 
Prior Conviction 
 
Dr. Deutsch’s testimony is also relevant to El-Abbadi’s second issue on appeal 
regarding limitations to her cross-examination about Alvarez’s prior involvement with 
DFS.  On direct examination, the State asked Dr. Deutsch “[s]o prior to your examination 
of Julian what information specific to him did you learn?”41  Dr. Deutsch responded:  
 
40  For example, the State asked El-Abbadi “So you are lying to Detective Escheman because you 
are covering for [Alvarez]?” and El-Abbadi responded “Yes.” Id. at A570 (El-Abbadi Test. at 81:4–
6).  Next, the State asked, “you lied about being angry and you lied about spanking him?” Id. at 
A570 (El-Abbadi Test. at 81:20–22).  El-Abbadi stated, “Yes.” Id. The State followed up by asking 
why he would lie about being angry, and El-Abbadi stated “Like I said, I had worked that day and 
I got stuck with Julian so I had to reschedule my whole work.” Id. at A571 (El-Abbadi Test. at 
82:3–7).  The State asked “do you agree when you told the police that August 20th, that when 
[Alvarez] left you spanked Julian?” and El-Abbadi responded “By looking at the police report, 
yes, I said that.” Id. at A573–74 (El-Abbadi Test. at 84:20-85:1).  In another instance, El-Abbadi 
testified that he had lied about spanking Julian.  Id. at A596 (El-Abbadi Test. at 107:5–11).  The 
State asked El-Abbadi, “And you are saying here today that [the autobody shop story] was a 
complete lie?” to which El-Abbadi responded, “Yes, I made multiple statements at the police 
station.” Id. at A642 (El-Abbadi Test. at 153:19–22).  The State asked the same question regarding 
the story about the woman in Claymont, that El-Abbadi confirmed was a lie, stating: “Yes, it was.  
As you see, everything I said to the cops that’s not what happened, that’s me making multiple, 
multiple, multiple statements.”  Id. at A645 (El-Abbadi Test. at 156:1–156:3). 
41 Id. at A184 (Deutsch Test. at 28:4–5).  
18 
 
So I had some familiarity with Julian, as I had actually previously two years 
prior assessed him independently in the general pediatric setting.  I was 
Julian’s pediatrician, was part of a practice at Nemours where I was called as 
a general pediatric patient, so I was familiar with some of his past medical 
history.  
 
I reviewed what was available in the Nemours medical record in the interim 
time period between my assessment of Julian which was age two and his 
presentation to Nemours, which notably included a hospital presentation in 
February of 2019 related to flu symptoms and concern for supervisory 
neglect, so I reviewed that information.  
 
In addition, the emergency department records had been documented by the 
clinician history that was provided by his mother upon presentation to the 
hospital.42  
 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked, “[a]nd this wasn’t the first time 
you’ve had interaction with Julian, correct?”43  She responded, “that’s correct,”44 at which 
point the State objected.  During the sidebar conversation that followed, the State objected 
on the grounds of relevance.  The defense responded that Dr. Deutsch had brought up 
Alvarez’s previous supervisory neglect charges in her direct testimony.  The State informed 
the trial court that Alvarez had been charged with endangering the welfare of a child and 
had received probation before judgment for an April 2019 incident.  Alvarez had left the 
children alone while she went to a club in Philadelphia.  According to the State, DFS was 
actively involved in Alvarez’s life when Julian was murdered.   
Defense counsel argued that the mother denied having caused Julian’s injuries and, 
therefore, it would be relevant if the mother had a pattern of neglect.  It was also important 
 
42 Id. at A184 (Deutsch Test. at 28:6–23) (emphasis added). 
43 Id. at A201 (Deutsch Test. at 45:10–11). 
44 Id. (Deutsch Test. at 45:12). 
19 
 
to clarify that El-Abbadi had no role in the prior supervisory neglect allegation.  The State 
sought to distinguish Alvarez’s prior neglect charge from the abuse alleged at trial.  In 
sustaining the State’s objection, the trial court based its ruling on Delaware Rules of 
Evidence Rule 401 and Rule 403 (“Rule 401” and “Rule 403”): 
 [T]o now inject not physical abuse by the mother in February 19th but 
simply that she was neglectful because she left the children, not minimizing 
left the children and went to a club, have that before the jury to sort of 
extrapolate from that that she could have, one, struck Julian to cause bruising, 
or two, obviously cause his brain injury when she wasn’t present at the time, 
I think creates an unnecessary level of confusion in 403.  
 
401 relevance is so broad that arguably you could say it gets in but as I do an 
analysis under 403, I think it creates more—that it’s probative value is less 
than its – its prejudicial effect is outweighed by any probative value, and 
again, just for the record, because of the fact that there was an admission in 
the record by your client that he’s responsible for the physical bruising, he’s 
really fighting, as I see it, to say I didn’t cause this other trauma, the chassis 
or engine block, whatever it was that caused the brain injury, so I’m going to 
sustain that objection.45 
 
The trial court also gave the following curative instruction to clarify that Alvarez’s DFS 
involvement did not involve El-Abbadi:  
“Just quickly before we continue, you heard prior testimony from Dr. 
Deutsch and she had mentioned a prior involvement between herself and 
Julian Cepeda.  That involvement, just to make clear for you and your 
understanding, had nothing to do with the defendant and the defendant had 
no responsibility or role in her interaction with Julian Cepeda at that time, 
that prior incident, ok?  All right.”46 
 
The issue of Alvarez’s prior DFS involvement surfaced a second time during El-
Abbadi’s trial testimony.  Counsel for El-Abbadi asked, “so does [Alvarez] ever call, are 
 
45 Id. at A208–09 (Deutsch Test. at 52:3–53:1).  
46 Id. at A232–33 (Trial Tr. at 76:22–77:7). 
20 
 
you aware when she calls 911?”47  El-Abbadi testified, “[n]o, she was hesitant to call 911 
because she was on probation for a prior conviction with the kids and stuff.”48  The trial 
court, sua sponte, interrupted, “[o]ne second, sir,”49 at which point the State objected.   
At sidebar, the State argued that it had asked defense counsel to instruct El-Abbadi 
to refrain from testifying about this topic.  Defense counsel stated that he told El-Abbadi 
“the issue is done unless [Alvarez] opens the door and I didn’t bring it up.  In good faith, I 
didn’t think [Alvarez] had opened the door, so I didn’t bring it up.”50  The trial court then 
took a recess and informed El-Abbadi not to testify about Alvarez’s prior DFS encounter.  
In response, El-Abbadi stated “[w]hat do you call it, I didn’t bring this prior neglect or 
abuse up, Dr. Teeple [sic] did.”51  The trial court responded that it had already ruled on the 
issue, and that the neglect in that case and the facts in this case were distinct.  After the 
recess, the court asked the jury not to consider that last statement, stating “[a]ll right, ladies 
and gentlemen, I am going to instruct you to disregard Mr. El-Abaddi’s last statement, it 
has no bearing or is not germane to the issues in this case.”52  
4. El-Abbadi’s Request for LIO Jury Instructions 
After both sides closed their cases, El-Abbadi, having been indicted for MBAN, 
First Degree, requested LIO instructions for the following offenses:  Murder by Abuse or 
 
47 Id. at A530 (El-Abbadi Test. at 41:13–14). 
48 Id. (El-Abbadi Test. at 41:15–17). 
49 Id. (El-Abbadi Test. at 41:18). 
50 Id. at A532–33 (El-Abbadi Test. at 43:21–44:1). 
51 Id. at A534 (El-Abbadi Test. at 45:12–14). 
52 Id. at A537 (El-Abbadi Test. at 48:13–16).  
21 
 
Neglect Second Degree (“MBAN, Second Degree”), Manslaughter, and Criminally 
Negligent Homicide.  The State agreed to, and the trial court provided, only the instruction 
on MBAN, Second Degree.  
 
The State objected to LIO instructions for Manslaughter and Criminally Negligent 
Homicide.  The State argued that there was no evidentiary basis upon which a jury 
rationally could find El-Abbadi not guilty of MBAN, First Degree, and guilty of 
Manslaughter, or a basis on which a jury rationally could find him guilty of Criminally 
Negligent Homicide, but not guilty of MBAN, Second Degree.     
 
El-Abbadi argued that because abuse and neglect are specifically defined within the 
MBAN, First Degree and MBAN, Second Degree statutes to include particular acts, it 
would be possible for a jury to find that one of the enumerated acts was not committed, but 
that he had, nonetheless, committed some reckless or criminally negligent act that would 
support a finding of guilt for Manslaughter or Criminally Negligent Homicide.  When 
asked to point to a possible scenario in the record, defense counsel argued: 
I think there’s the scenario where the jury could believe that the defendant 
went to discipline the child for a legitimate reason, however had engaged in 
a reckless or criminally negligent way, like the point of it wasn’t abuse of the 
child.53 
 
Defense counsel then stated: 
 
I am thinking of a scenario where they believe it’s possible for them to 
believe that he caused injury to the child through more of an accident, you 
know, let’s say if there was good faith intention to discipline but then 
 
53 Id. at A667 (Trial Tr. at 178:10–15). 
22 
 
something goes awry as opposed to an abuse case where the point is to abuse 
the kid, like unlawfully or unjustifiably.54 
 
When pressed further by the court, defense counsel suggested the following:  
I think he wouldn’t listen so I struck him.  Then at least one of the doctors 
did testify that the severity of the brain injury that caused the death could 
have been one blow.  And there’s other testimony that he’s never – he doesn’t 
have his own children, he hasn’t been around kids and so the argument would 
be made that he went to discipline the child but was negligent and the point 
of it wasn’t the abuse that he hit the child for the sake of abuse, but more of 
negligence. 
 
. . . . 
 
[Manslaughter] would be the same except he was reckless in the actions he 
took to do something lawful, or I mean, it wasn’t for the point of abuse but 
to discipline the child but he was reckless that caused the death.55  
 
The State argued that there was no evidence supporting such scenarios, and even if 
there were, then it would still be abuse or neglect.  After hearing argument from both sides, 
the court declined to give the Criminally Negligent Homicide and Manslaughter LIO jury 
instructions.  The trial court ruled:  
The defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense if the 
evidence would permit the jury rationally to find him guilty of a lesser 
included offense and acquit him of a greater.  As to the lesser included offense 
of criminal [sic] negligent homicide and manslaughter, I find that there’s no 
racial [sic] basis in the record to support these two LIOs.  The LIO of murder 
by abuse or neglect second contains the mens rea of criminal negligence.  
Thus, the only difference between that charge and criminally negligent 
homicide would be the absence of a finding of abuse or neglect.  
 
Abuse under Title 11, Section 1100 of the Delaware Code is defined as 
causing injury to a child through unjustified force as defined in Section 468, 
 
54 Id. at A669 (Trial Tr. at 180:13–20).  El-Abbadi’s counsel provided different scenarios in the 
briefing on appeal.  See Opening Br. at 19; Reply Br. at 4–5. 
55 App. to Opening Br. at A672, A673 (Trial Tr. at 183:10–21, 184:3–13). 
23 
 
Subsection 1 of the code which includes any act that is likely to cause or does 
cause physical injury.  
 
Based on the evidence in the record, the jury could either find that the 
defendant did not commit the alleged act at all, or his actions that lead to 
Julian Cepeda’s injury which was serious physical injury was abuse.  
 
As a result, I am not including the lesser included, the request for the lesser 
included offense of criminal negligent homicide.  
 
As to manslaughter, the only difference between that charge and murder by 
abuse first is the component of the victim being a child in murder by abuse 
first; hence, a finding of murder by abuse first would cover that charge.56  
 
 
The jury began deliberations at about 11:43 a.m. on February 14, 2022, and returned 
a verdict at about 11:30 a.m. on February 15, 2022.  The jury found El-Abbadi guilty of 
MBAN, First Degree, under the Neglect theory.  He was acquitted of the alternate theory 
of Murder by Abuse, First Degree.  On September 23, 2022, the Superior Court sentenced 
El-Abbadi to thirty years of incarceration at Level V, followed by two years at Level III.57  
This appeal followed. 
 
 
 
 
56 Id. at A695–96 (Trial Tr. at 3:13–4:21).  El-Abbadi argues that the trial court erred when it 
concluded that the age of the victim “was the only distinction between the instructed offenses and 
either Manslaughter or Criminally Negligent Homicide.”  Opening Br. at 17.  Instead, he contends 
that “[t]he distinction is the breadth of the ‘neglect’ in which [he] engaged.”  Id.  We note that the 
trial court did acknowledge the additional distinction regarding the breadth of “neglect” as to 
Criminally Negligent Homicide.  The State also acknowledges that “criminally negligent homicide 
is not limited to acts of abuse or neglect.”  Answering Br. at 24.  And it also acknowledges that 
“the amount of behavior that [Manslaughter] encompasses is broader than murder by abuse or 
neglect; it is not limited to acts of abuse or neglect.”  Id. at 23–24.  As explained below, we have 
considered these points and the elements of the relevant statutes, and we affirm after examining 
the issues and the record de novo.    
57 The first fifteen years of the sentence are mandatory.   
24 
 
III. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL 
El-Abbadi raises two issues on appeal.  First, El-Abbadi contends that trial court 
erred as a matter of law by denying his request for instructions on the LIOs of Manslaughter 
and Criminally Negligent Homicide.  Second, he contends that the trial court violated his 
rights to confrontation, cross-examination, and to present a complete defense when it 
precluded cross-examination and testimony regarding Alvarez’s prior neglect case.   
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
 
A. Whether Trial Court Erred by Refusing to Provide Manslaughter and Criminally 
Negligent Homicide Jury Instructions 
 
 
El-Abbadi argues that there was a rational basis for the jury to convict him of the 
lesser included offenses and not the offense charged.  We explained in Wright v. State,58 
that where a trial court is asked to give a jury instruction in a criminal case, the trial court 
must determine:  
(1) that the defense or lesser included offense for which the instruction is 
requested could apply as matter of law;  (2) that the evidence presented meets 
the statutory requirements to entitle the defendant to the requested 
instruction;  and (3) whether the particular form, content, or language of the 
instruction proposed by the defendant represents a correct statement of the 
law.”59 
 
“To perform the first two steps of the analysis, a trial court must look at the relevant 
statutory provisions governing the availability of the instructions.”60  Where a trial court 
 
58 953 A.2d 144 (Del. 2008).   
59 Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 144, 147 (Del. 2008).  See also Cseh v. State, 947 A.2d 1112, 1113–14 
(Del. 2008). 
60 Wright, 953 A.2d at 147.  
25 
 
has held that the requested instruction is unavailable under the relevant statute, this Court 
analyzes whether the trial court properly applied the relevant statutory provision to the facts 
at hand.61  We analyze a refusal to provide a LIO instruction de novo.62  
1. When a Trial Court May Issue a LIO Instruction Under Delaware Law 
 
 
We turn to El-Abbadi’s specific contention that the trial court erred when it declined 
to give the LIO jury instructions for Manslaughter and Criminally Negligent Homicide.  11 
Del. C. § 206(b) defines an offense as a LIO of another offense when:  
(1) It is established by the proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or  
 
(2) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an 
offense otherwise included therein; or 
 
(3) It involves the same result but differs from the offense charged only in 
the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, 
property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to 
establish its commission.63 
 
Under 11 Del. C. § 206(c), trial courts must provide an LIO instruction when the 
evidence supports such a charge: 
(c) The court is not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the 
included offense.64 
 
 
61 Id. at 148. 
62 Cseh, 947 A.2d at 1113. 
63 11 Del. C. § 206(b).   
64 11 Del. C. § 206(c) (emphasis added). 
26 
 
In construing this statutory provision, this Court has observed that as a matter of Due 
Process under the United States Constitution and Delaware law, “the court must instruct 
the jury on an included offense if ‘there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the 
included offense.’”65 
In Cseh v. State, we stated that a trial judge should grant the request for the LIO 
instructions if the defendant meets the following four criteria:  
(1) the defendant makes a proper request; (2) the lesser included offense 
contains some but not all of the elements of the charged offense; (3) the 
elements differentiating the two offenses must be in dispute; and (4) there 
must be some evidence that would allow the jury rationally to acquit the 
defendant on the greater charge and convict on the lesser charge.66  
 
 
If this test is satisfied, then the second step of Wright is also satisfied.67  The parties 
have agreed as a general matter, in their briefing and argument before this Court, that 
Manslaughter and Criminally Negligent Homicide could be LIOs of MBAN, First Degree 
and MBAN, Second Degree.  Therefore, we focus on their more narrowly centered 
dispute—whether there was some evidence that would have allowed the jury rationally to 
 
65 Cseh, 947 A.2d at 1114 (quoting 11 Del. C. § 206(c)); see also Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 
633–34 (Del. 2001) (“The relevant Delaware statute simply states that the trial judge ‘is not 
obligated’ to charge on lesser included offenses unless the rational basis test is met.”).  We have 
recognized that providing the jury with the option of convicting on a lesser included offense 
ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard.  
Bentley v. State, 930 A.2d 866, 875 (Del. 2007) (citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 634 (1980)).     
66 Cseh, 947 A.2d at 1114 (citing Henry v. State, 805 A.2d 860, 864 (Del. 2002) and Bentley, 930 
A.2d at 875). 
67 Cseh, 947 A.2d at 1114.   
27 
 
acquit El-Abbadi of MBAN, First Degree and MBAN, Second Degree, and instead, to 
convict him of Manslaughter or Criminally Negligent Homicide.     
Under this “rational basis” test, “some evidence” is construed broadly.  This Court 
has held that defendants are entitled to LIO instructions where there is “any evidence fairly 
tending to bear upon the lesser included offense, however weak that evidence may be.”68  
To put the evidence in the proper framework, we next review the elements of the relevant 
criminal statutes.     
2. Elements of the Relevant Charges 
 
The elements of MBAN, First Degree, a class A felony, are set forth in 11 Del. C.   
§ 634.  They are: (1) a person recklessly causes the death of a child through (2) an act of 
abuse and/or neglect; or when the person has engaged in a previous pattern of abuse and/or 
neglect of such child.69  A person acts “recklessly” when a person:  
[I]s aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the element exists or will result from the conduct.  The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the 
situation.  A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by 
reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.70 
 
Both “abuse” and “neglect” are defined terms.  “Abuse” “means causing any 
physical injury to a child through unjustified force as defined in § 468(1)(c) of this title, 
 
68 Henry, 805 A.2d at 865 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
69 11 Del. C. § 634(a). 
70 11 Del. C. § 231(e).   
28 
 
torture, negligent treatment, sexual abuse, exploitation, maltreatment, mistreatment or any 
means other than accident.”71  “Neglect” occurs when a person:  
a. Is responsible for the care, custody, and/or control of the child; and 
 
b. Has the ability and financial means to provide for the care of the child; 
and 
 
1.  Fails to provide necessary care with regard to: food, clothing, 
shelter, education, health, medical or other care necessary for the 
child's emotional, physical, or mental health, or safety and general 
well-being; or  
 
2.  Chronically and severely abuses alcohol or a controlled substance, 
is not active in treatment for such abuse, and the abuse threatens the 
child's ability to receive care necessary for that child’s safety and 
general well-being; or 
 
3.  Fails to provide necessary supervision appropriate for a child when 
the child is unable to care for that child’s own basic needs or safety, 
after considering such factors as the child’s age, mental ability, 
physical condition, the length of the caretaker’s absence, and the 
context of the child’s environment.72 
 
 
In order to find El-Abbadi guilty of MBAN, First Degree, the jury was required to 
unanimously agree on the method, abuse, neglect, or both, by which this statute was 
 
71 11 Del. C. § 1100(1).  “Unjustified force” under 11 Del. C. § 468(1)(c) includes, but is not 
limited to, any of the following:  
Throwing the child, kicking, burning, cutting, striking with a closed fist, interfering 
with breathing, use of or threatened use of a deadly weapon, prolonged deprivation 
of sustenance or medication, or doing any other act that is likely to cause or does 
cause physical injury, disfigurement, mental distress, unnecessary degradation or 
substantial risk of serious physical injury or death[.] 
11 Del. C. § 468(1)(c).  
72 10 Del. C. § 901(18).  The State relies primarily on 10 Del. C. § 901(18)(b)(1). 
29 
 
violated.  In this case, the jury convicted El-Abbadi of Murder by Neglect, First Degree 
and acquitted him of Murder by Abuse, First Degree.   
The only difference between MBAN, First Degree and MBAN, Second Degree, a 
class B felony, is the requisite mens rea.  MBAN, Second Degree, defined in 11 Del. C.     
§ 633, provides that a person is guilty of this offense when with criminal negligence, the 
person causes the death of a child through an act of abuse and/or neglect of such child; or 
when the person has engaged in a previous pattern of abuse and/or neglect of such child.73   
Criminal negligence occurs when a person “fails to perceive a risk that the element 
exists or will result from the conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and degree that 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
reasonable person would observe in the situation.”74  Criminal negligence is distinct from 
ordinary negligence, which requires that a person “fails to exercise the standard of care 
which a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”75   
 
Manslaughter, a class B felony, defined in 11 Del. C. § 632(1), requires that a person 
recklessly causes the death of another person.76  This statute does not contain abuse or 
neglect as an element, and it does not require that the victim be a child.  Similarly, 
Criminally Negligent Homicide, a class D felony, is defined in 11 Del. C. § 631 and 
 
73 11 Del. C. § 633(a). 
74 11 Del. C. § 231(a).  
75 11 Del. C. § 231(d). 
76 11 Del. C. § 632(1). 
30 
 
provides that a person is guilty of this offense when, with criminal negligence, the person 
causes the death of another person.77   
 
As noted above, the parties have agreed that Manslaughter and Criminally Negligent 
Homicide could be LIOs of MBAN, First Degree or MBAN, Second Degree.78  All four of 
these charges require that a defendant cause the death of another person.  MBAN, First 
Degree and Manslaughter require that the death is caused by reckless conduct.  MBAN, 
Second Degree and Criminally Negligent Homicide require that the death is caused by 
criminally negligent conduct.  The charges differ in that MBAN, First Degree and MBAN, 
Second Degree require that victim to be a child and both more narrowly define the requisite 
reckless or criminal negligent conduct as “abuse” or “neglect.”   
 
In order to satisfy the test for an LIO, there must be some evidence that El-Abbadi 
engaged in some reckless or criminally negligent conduct that is outside the boundaries of 
 
77 11 Del. C. § 631. 
78 At Oral Argument, the Court asked:  
Q.  To confirm, you’re you’re [sic] not arguing that these charges could never be 
lesser included offenses of the indicted charge of murder by abuse or neglect first 
degree?  
A.  That’s correct.  I, um, struggle to come up with a situation where that might be 
the case, you know, maybe like a car accident or, um, I know in the Handy case 
there was the, um, caregiver who gave the child, uh, Benadryl and he overdosed on 
Benadryl.  Um, but that, I mean that issue and there were the lesser included charges 
given in that case, but that case is distinguishable from this one.  
Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, 2023-10-5 364, 2022 El-Abbadi v. State, Vimeo, at 25:35–
26:18 (Oct. 25, 2023, 11:52 a.m.), https://vimeo.com/877929345.  See also State v. Handy, 2019 
WL 3976583, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2019) (MBAN, First Degree case in which the state 
alleges a day care caretaker worker caused a child to overdose on Benadryl; manslaughter, MBAN, 
Second Degree, and Criminally Negligent Homicide lesser included offense instructions were 
given.).     
31 
 
the more narrowly defined “abuse” or “neglect” categories.  We are mindful that “it is well 
settled that “‘the jury is the sole judge of [the] credibility of the witnesses and responsible 
for resolving conflicts in the testimony.’”79 
3. There is No Evidence that Would Allow a Jury Rationally to Acquit El-Abbadi of 
Murder by Abuse or Neglect and Convict El-Abbadi of Manslaughter or 
Criminally Negligent Homicide 
 
We now turn to the question of whether there was any evidence that would allow 
the jury rationally to acquit El-Abbadi of MBAN, First Degree or MBAN, Second Degree, 
and instead convict him of Manslaughter or Criminally Negligent Homicide.  We agree 
with the trial court’s conclusion that there was no evidence that showed reckless or 
criminally negligent conduct that did not also constitute abuse or neglect.   
 
The State’s theory was that El-Abbadi acted recklessly and caused Julian’s death 
either by injuring Julian in a manner that constituted abuse, or alternatively, that El-Abbadi 
was responsible for Julian’s care, had the ability and financial means to care for him, and 
failed to provide the necessary care with regard to his physical health or safety and general 
well-being.  The LIO instruction of MBAN, Second Degree allowed the jury to consider 
whether El-Abbadi acted in accordance with either of these two theories but acted with 
criminal negligence rather than recklessness. 
The State argues further that on the facts and evidence presented in this case, there 
was no “set of circumstances pursuant to which a rational jury could have found that El-
 
79 Rivera v. State, 292 A.3d 111, 2023 WL 1978878, at *8 (Del. Feb. 13, 2023) (quoting Tyre v. 
State, 412 A.2d 326, 330 (Del. 1980)).  See also Henry, 805 A.2d at 865 (stating that “[i]n ruling 
upon a request to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, the trial judge ‘must give full 
credence to [the] defendant’s testimony.’” (citation omitted)).  
32 
 
Abbadi did not commit an act of abuse or neglect but was still guilty of criminally negligent 
homicide or manslaughter.”80  This is because, according to the State:  
If the jury accepted any one of El-Abbadi’s versions of events—that Julian 
ran into a chassis machine in the autobody shop; that another person (the 
woman in Claymont, “Jeffe [sic],” or Alvarez) caused the head injury; that 
someone he knew hit Julian with a car; or that he accidentally hit Julian too 
hard with a pillow, causing him to fly across the room and hit his head—it 
would have had to either find him guilty of murder by abuse or neglect or not 
guilty of any crime.  If the jurors believed that someone else caused Julian’s 
head injury or that Julian was accidentally injured when he ran into the chassis 
machine, they would have had to have found El-Abbadi guilty of either 
murder by neglect first or second degree or acquitted him of any crime.81 
 
 
In response El-Abbadi offered into evidence his testimony regarding his conduct 
that day.  His theories at trial were that 1) the injury occurred during Alvarez’s care before 
he took care of Julian and he simply did not know the extent of his injury required 
significant and emergent medical attention and 2) any injury exacerbated by the delay of 
care occurred during the hour and a half during which Alvarez delayed calling for medical 
assistance immediately upon his return with Julian.82  At trial, he denied hitting and 
 
80 Answering Br. at 24. 
81 Id. at 24–25 (emphasis in original). 
82 Opening Br. at 19.  This theory was elaborated in El-Abbadi’s Reply Brief on appeal:  
[G]iven the evidence regarding Alverez [sic]’s conduct and anger towards Julian 
over the weekend and on the morning before she left him with El-Abbadi, a jury 
could have rationally concluded, for example, either: 1) Julian’s injuries occurred 
prior to or while he was in Alverez’s [sic] care, custody and/or control and that El-
Abbadi was unaware that the injuries, leading to the progressively worsening 
condition, required more medical attention than his administration of ibuprofen or 
other medicine to Julian; or 2) any delay in treatment that doctors testified 
contributed to Julian’s death was the result of Alverez’s [sic] neglect after El-
Abbadi returned Julian to her care, custody and/or control.  In either of these cases, 
a jury could find that El-Abbadi’s conduct did not fit the “narrow” definition of 
negligence [sic] but that he did not exercise the standard of care which a reasonable 
person would observe in the situation or that he failed to perceive a risk “that the 
33 
 
otherwise abusing or neglecting Julian and denied having the knowledge and ability to 
know the extent of Julian’s injuries while in his care.   
By arguing that he did not hit Julian and that Alvarez caused Julian’s injuries, El-
Abbadi denies committing abuse.  By arguing that he could not have known the extent of 
the injuries, El-Abbadi argues that he could not have acted recklessly because he did not 
consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk.  By denying that the delay of care 
for Julian was his fault, El-Abbadi denies that he failed to provide the necessary care for 
Julian who was in his control, and therefore he argues he did not neglect Julian.  By arguing 
that he did not know that Julian required immediate medical attention, he also argues that 
he was not criminally negligent.  According to El-Abbadi, his lack of perception of the risk 
regarding Julian’s injuries was not a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
reasonable person would observe in the situation, and thus, he argues that he was not 
criminally negligent.  
 
To find El-Abbadi guilty of Manslaughter instead of MBAN, First Degree, there 
would need to be some evidence fairly showing that El-Abbadi engaged in reckless 
behavior that did not constitute abuse or neglect as those terms have been defined.  
However, El-Abbadi denies hitting Julian and he denies having knowledge of his condition 
and consciously disregarding it.  Therefore, El-Abbadi argues that he did not act recklessly 
 
element exists or will result from his conduct” and that failure was a gross deviation 
from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the 
situation. 
Reply Br. at 4–5. 
34 
 
at all.  Rather, he claims that he was not aware of, and did not consciously disregard a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk.  If the jury were to believe his testimony, they would have 
to reject the mens rea of recklessness and find him not guilty.  If the jury rejects the mens 
rea of recklessness, they reject the requisite mens rea for both MBAN, First Degree, and 
Manslaughter. 
 
Similarly, in order to find that El-Abbadi was guilty of Criminally Negligent 
Homicide instead of Murder by Abuse or Neglect Second Degree, there would need to be 
some evidence fairly showing that El-Abbadi engaged in criminally negligent behavior that 
did not rise to the conduct statutorily-defined as abuse or neglect.  Here, El-Abbadi denies 
that he committed any of the acts constituting neglect or abuse because he denies hitting 
Julian and he denies having any knowledge of the Julian’s deteriorating medical condition.  
According to El-Abbadi, because Alvarez herself was unaware of the extent of the injury 
and delayed care when El-Abbadi returned with Julian, his failure to perceive the risk does 
not constitute a gross deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would 
have observed in his situation.  Because he denies that he was criminally negligent, if the 
jury were to believe him, they would reject the mens rea of criminal negligence.  By doing 
so, the jury would reject the requisite mens rea for both MBAN, Second Degree and 
Criminally Negligent Homicide.  
But then there are the various stories El-Abbadi told during his police interviews.  
The State entered El-Abbadi’s recorded interrogations into evidence, allowing the jury to 
consider El-Abbadi’s alternative theories about how Julian sustained his injuries:  Julian 
hit his head at the autobody shop, Julian got hurt at a friend’s house, Julian was injured at 
35 
 
a confrontation with another person, and Julian was injured in a pillow fight by hitting his 
head on the floor.  At trial, El-Abbadi admitted that these stories were lies.  If the jury, 
nonetheless, decided that one of these theories was the truth, any one of these theories 
would still constitute a failure to provide supervision or medical care for Julian’s general 
safety, health, and well-being.  In other words, El-Abbadi’s behavior constituted neglect.  
A jury rationally could have found abuse if they had believed any version in which El-
Abbadi struck Julian, including in a pillow fight causing Julian to fly across the room and 
hit his head.83  There was no dispute that Julian suffered a severe head injury inflicted by a 
large amount of force.  Thus, the only issue in dispute was whether El-Abbadi hit Julian 
with recklessness or criminal negligence.   
If the jurors believed that someone else caused Julian’s head injury or that Julian 
was injured accidentally when he ran into the chassis machine, they would have had to 
have found El-Abbadi guilty of either Murder by Neglect (First or Second Degree) or 
would have to have acquitted him of any crime.  Even crediting his various stories, there 
was no dispute that El-Abbadi was “responsible for the care, custody and/or control” of 
Julian, that he had the ability and means to provide for Julian, and that he did not provide 
the necessary medical care for him.84   
 
83 As noted above, the definition of “abuse” includes “causing any physical injury to a child 
through unjustified force as defined in § 468(1)(c) of this title . . . or any means other than 
accident.”  11 Del. C. § 1100(1).   
84 10 Del. C. § 901(18) (definition of “Neglect”).   
36 
 
 
In conclusion, there was no evidence that would have allowed the jury rationally to 
find El-Abbadi not guilty of the instructed charges, MBAN, First Degree and MBAN, 
Second Degree, and instead, guilty of Manslaughter or Criminally Negligent Homicide.  In 
other words, there was no evidence that rationally allowed the jury to find that El-Abbadi 
acted recklessly or with criminal negligence but not with abuse or neglect.  Accordingly, 
the trial court did not err in declining to provide the requested LIO instructions for 
Manslaughter and Criminally Negligent Homicide.  
B. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Limiting Cross-Examination and Testimony 
Regarding Alvarez’s Prior Neglect Case 
 
1. Contentions on Appeal 
 
El-Abbadi argues that the trial court erred by improperly limiting his cross-
examination of Dr. Deutsch and his testimony, and as a result, he was unable to explain 
why Alvarez delayed obtaining treatment for Julian once he arrived home on the evening 
of August 19.  He argues that Alvarez hesitated to call 911 because of her prior involvement 
with DFS, and that the jury rationally could have concluded that Alvarez’s delay after El-
Abbadi returned Julian to her care, deprived Julian of the medical treatment he needed.85  
Thus, by not permitting him to present this testimony, he asserts that the court violated his 
Due Process rights by compromising his right to present a complete defense.86     
 
85 He argues that his two arguments on appeal must be read in pari materia and that “[h]ad the 
proper lesser included offense instructions been provided, a rational trier of fact could have 
acquitted El-Abbadi of Murder by Neglect First or Second and, instead, convicted him of 
Manslaughter or Criminally Negligent Homicide based on a reduced level of mens rea.”  Reply 
Br. at 8.   
86 See, e.g., Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 509 (2013) (observing that the Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, but also 
37 
 
 
In framing his argument on appeal, El-Abbadi argues that his Confrontation Clause 
rights were violated when the trial court restricted this testimony.  He cites to the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware 
Constitution for Confrontation Clause protections.87  The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment provides the accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him,”88 and it requires an adequate opportunity to examine adverse witnesses.89     
The State counters that the trial court correctly applied Rules 401 and 403 in 
concluding that the prior neglect and abuse before the court were distinct and that the 
testimony had the potential to confuse the jury.  The State also argues that El-Abbadi did 
not raise his constitutional arguments below and that he cannot demonstrate that the trial 
court committed plain error.    
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion or Commit Plain Error 
 
The trial court initially addressed this issue by applying Rules 401 and 403 because 
that is how the issue was framed by the parties at the time.  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it sustained the State’s objection to the cross-examination of Dr. Deutsch 
 
recognizing that state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to 
establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials) (citations and quotations omitted). 
87 El-Abbadi makes no argument pertaining to Article I, § 7, and thus, this Opinion does not address 
Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution.  
88 U.S. Const. amend. VI.  See also McCrary v. State, 290 A.3d 442, 451 (Del. 2023) (admission 
of out-of-court testimonial statements into evidence does not violate Confrontation Clause when 
minor victim was available for cross-examination despite her limited recall).    
89 See, e.g., McCrary, 290 A.3d at 451–53.   
38 
 
regarding Alverez’s prior conviction.  Nor did it abuse its discretion by restricting El-
Abbadi’s testimony on the same topic.90   
Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence 
in determining the action.”91  Under Rule 403, a court “may exclude relevant evidence if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”92 
El-Abbadi acknowledges in his opening brief that his trial counsel had no intention 
of delving into Alvarez’s record.93  When the issue first arose during Dr. Deutsch’s direct 
examination, he did not argue below, as he now argues on appeal, that the testimony was 
relevant to show that he had urged Alvarez to call 911 but that she hesitated due to her prior 
 
90 Any challenge to the trial judge’s application of Rules 401 and 403 would be reviewed under 
our abuse of discretion standard.  See Harris v. State, 301 A.3d 1175, 1180 (Del. 2023) (“This 
Court reviews ‘a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion 
standard.’”) (citations omitted); Brown v. State, 117 A.3d 568, 578–79 (Del. 2015) (“We review 
trial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion”).  We will not overturn 
a defendant’s conviction under the abuse of discretion standard unless the trial court affected a 
substantial right of the defendant by acting in “an arbitrary and capricious manner.”  McGee v. 
State, 586 A.2d 1202, 1990 WL 254349, at *1 (Del. Dec. 11, 1990) (TABLE).  See also Wright v. 
State, 25 A.3d 747, 752 (Del. 2011) (“‘An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has exceeded 
the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances, or so ignored recognized rules of law or practice 
to produce injustice.’” (quoting Floudiotis v. State, 726 A.2d 1196, 1202 (Del.1999))). 
91 D.R.E. 401. 
92 D.R.E. 403.  
93 Opening Br. at 22 (stating that “Defense counsel explained that he had no intention of delving 
into Alvarez’s record,” and that “[r]ather, the State opened the door as to Deutsch’s prior 
assessment of Julian and he sought to cross examine her on that specific testimony.”).   
39 
 
involvement with DFS.  Rather, he argued to the trial court that the testimony would be 
relevant if Alvarez had a “pattern of neglect” because she had denied causing Julian’s 
injuries.  At this point in the trial, the court, after hearing from both sides, addressed the 
matter.  The trial court properly ruled that the probative value was less than the potential 
prejudice that might arise from having the “jury to sort of extrapolate from that that she 
could have one, struck Julian to cause bruising, or two, obviously cause his brain injury 
when she wasn’t present at the time.”94  The court later gave a limiting instruction to clarify 
that the prior involvement with DFS referenced in Dr. Deutsch’s earlier testimony “had 
nothing to do with the defendant and the defendant had no responsibility or role in her 
interaction with Julian Cepeda at that time.”95  In discussing the instruction with counsel 
before it was given, El-Abbadi’s counsel said he was “good with that.”96  No further 
objections were raised.   
The issue arose again during El-Abbadi’s testimony when El-Abbadi testified that 
Alvarez was hesitant to call 911 because she was on probation.  Although the court 
previously had ruled on the issue based upon his other theories of relevance asserted during 
Dr. Deutsch’s testimony, this was arguably a different theory.  Nevertheless, his counsel 
did not assert a new objection, but rather, stated, “the issue is done unless [Alvarez] opens 
 
94 App. to Opening Br. at A208–09 (Deutsch Test. at 52:7–10).   
95 Id. at A233 (Trial Tr. at 77:3–6).   
96 Id. at A232 (Trial Tr. at 76:2).   
40 
 
the door and I didn’t bring it up,”97 and that he did not think Alvarez had brought it up.  
Counsel did not press it further.   
The trial court did not err in adhering to its prior ruling that although it may have 
been relevant, cross-examination and testimony from Dr. Deutsch and El-Abbadi regarding 
Alvarez’s prior conviction was more prejudicial than it was probative.  El-Abbadi had other 
ways and other opportunities to establish that Alvarez delayed calling 911 that did not 
require confusing the issues between Alvarez’s prior neglect charge and the alleged abuse 
and neglect in the case before the jury.  He did cross-examine Alvarez about the hour and 
a half delay between the time she returned home and the time she called 911.  For example, 
El-Abbadi’s counsel engaged in the following exchange with Alvarez during his cross-
examination of her: 
Q.  If you had been aware of his condition, how severe his condition was, 
you would have called 911, correct? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  But from — when did you eventually get on the line with 911? 
 
A.  It might have been an hour later.98 
 
. . . .  
 
Q.  Was it more like around 8 o’clock correct? 
 
A.  Well, that, about that. 
 
Q.  It was about 8 o’clock and Julian came home about 6:20? 
 
 
97 Id. at A532–33 (El-Abbadi Test. at 43:21–44:1). 
98 Id. at A480 (Alvarez Test. at 128:9–15).   
41 
 
A.  Yes.99 
 
The State followed-up on the subject of Alvarez’s delay during her re-direct 
examination: 
Q.  Mr. Wilkinson asked you about why it was that you didn’t call 911 right 
away, did you believe what Taha told you about what happened with Julian? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  And did you believe at that time that he had been given sleeping 
medicine? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
. . . . 
 
Q.  The phone call you placed to Krista Hsu, your friend Krista Hsu, that was 
before you spoke to the pediatrician? 
 
A.  Yes.   
 
Q.  In fact, you tried to call the pediatrician several times before you were 
ultimately able to get a live person on the phone, isn’t that correct? 
 
A.  Yes.100 
El-Abbadi’s counsel did not follow-up with any re-cross examination.  His counsel 
also examined Alvarez about her phone call with Ms. Hsu.  Alvarez said that Hsu advised 
her to call the pediatrician and so Alvarez decided to do that.  She discussed her intentions 
with El-Abbadi who told her that Julian would be fine and that he did not want her to call 
the doctor “[b]ecause he thought he was going to get into trouble.”101  But Alvarez decided 
 
99 Id. (Alvarez Test. at 128:18–22).   
100 Id. at A485–86 (Alvarez Test. at 133:9–16; 133:20–134:4).   
101 Id. at A458 (Alvarez Test. at 106:12–13).   
42 
 
to call anyway.  As the State points out, El-Abbadi has not argued on appeal that the trial 
court improperly restricted his examination of Alvarez.102   
During the trial, El-Abbadi testified that “almost two hours” elapsed between the 
time he returned with Julian and when Alvarez called 911.103  He denied that he told Alvarez 
not to seek medical care.104  He testified that he told her to call the hospital and 911.  When 
asked why he did not call 911, he said that he “had [a] warrant for [his] arrest for a drug 
case pending and warrants for car tickets.”105  He said that had he known Julian’s condition 
was that severe, he would have taken Julian “to the hospital from the shop.”106  He also 
admitted to lying to the trauma surgeon about how Julian was injured but said that Alvarez 
had told him to lie.  He said that she made up that story because she did not “want to get in 
trouble.”107  He said that he made up all of the lies during his interview to save Alvarez.  
Thus, El-Abbadi was not prevented from testifying about Alvarez’s delay in calling 911 or 
from asserting that she was responsible for Julian’s death.     
Based upon our review of the record, we are satisfied that the exclusion of testimony 
regarding Alvarez’s prior neglect charge was neither an abuse of discretion, nor plain error.  
 
102 El-Abbadi responds in his reply brief that the trial court, three days earlier, had prevented him 
from cross examining Dr. Deutsch.  Thus, the court had already ruled on this before Alvarez 
testified.  Reply Br. at 8–9.   
103 App. to Opening Br. at A539 (El-Abbadi Test. at 50:15).  As noted above, the record shows that 
on August 19, 2019, El-Abbadi was responsible for the care of Julian and that Alvarez was not 
physically with Julian from 7:40 a.m. to 6:15 p.m.   
104 Id. at A543 (El-Abbadi Test. at 54:14–16).   
105 Id. at A634 (El-Abbadi Test. at 145:5–6).   
106 Id. (El-Abbadi Test. at 145:22–23).   
107 Id. at A642 (El-Abbadi Test. at 153:9).   
43 
 
A plain error is “[‘]so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness 
and integrity of the trial process . . . [and is a] material defec[t] which [is] apparent on the 
face of the record [and is] basic, serious and fundamental. . . .’”108  Although cross-
examination is an integral part of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment is not unbounded.109  For example, the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that “it does not follow . . . that the Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense 
counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness.”110  Rather, “trial judges 
retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable 
limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, 
harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is 
repetitive or only marginally relevant.”111  Moreover, “‘the Confrontation Clause 
 
108 Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1284 (Del. 2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Wainwright 
v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)). 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d 109, 119–120 (3d Cir. 2003).  In Lawrence, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed:   
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant’s right to confront witnesses.  Cross-
examination is an integral part of that right and concomitantly, it is an important 
ingredient in the fact-finding process.  Accordingly, significant restrictions on a 
defendant’s cross-examination of witnesses can amount to a violation of rights 
guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment.  However, the right to cross-examine is 
neither absolute nor unbounded.  Rather, it is tempered by the practical aspects of 
conducting a criminal trial and a reasonable limitation on cross-examination will 
[therefore] not necessarily violate the Sixth Amendment.   
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).   
110 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).   
111 Id.  See also Government of Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1992) (observing 
that “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires more than a mere showing by the accused that some relevant 
44 
 
guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that 
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’”112 
The State claims that the challenged limitations do not rise to a Due Process or 
Confrontation Clause violation because the excluded testimony was neither exculpatory 
nor material.  It contends that El-Abbadi’s theory that the prior incident exhibited a pattern 
of neglect, and that Alvarez caused the injury, was “simply too far removed from the facts 
of the case.”113  The State asserts the “crux” of El-Abbadi’s defense was that Alvarez caused 
the injury before leaving Julian with El-Abbadi and that the injury was not obvious.  
Therefore, the State claims that her prior neglect charge was immaterial to the defense.    
We are satisfied that the trial court’s exclusion of the challenged cross-examination 
does not constitute plain error.  Alvarez’s prior DFS involvement was distinct from the facts 
presented.  Further, the witnesses were questioned about the delay and the impact that delay 
had on Julian’s condition.  El-Abbadi’s counsel did cross-examine Alvarez about the hour 
and a half period in which she did not call for medical assistance.  Counsel also examined 
Ms. Hsu about Alvarez’s delay, and the medical staff about the impact of any such delay.  
 
evidence was excluded from his trial.  Rather, the accused must show how the testimony would 
have been both material and favorable to his defense.”) (emphasis in original).   
112 McCrary, 290 A.3d at 452 (emphasis in original) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 
20 (1985) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 72 n.12 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)).  As we observed in Banther v. State, “Crawford restricts the 
use of prior ‘testimonial’ out-of-court statements of unavailable declarants.”  977 A.2d 870, 888 
(Del. 2009).  In so holding, Crawford abrogated Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) with regard 
to “testimonial” out-of-court statements of non-appearing declarants.  Nevertheless, we continue 
to adhere to the general proposition quoted above as indicated by our reference to it recently in 
McCrary which notes the abrogation of Roberts by Crawford.  See McCrary, 290 A.3d at 452, 
n.58.   
113 Answering Br. at 32. 
45 
 
El-Abbadi testified that Alvarez delayed seeking medical care and he argued that the delay 
injured Julian.  El-Abbadi was not prevented from testifying and arguing that Alvarez was 
responsible for Julian’s death.  Preventing him from eliciting a specific reason as to why 
Alvarez might have been reluctant to call 911 does not rise to the level of plain error on the 
record before us.          
Thus, we reject El-Abbadi’s new argument on appeal that his inability to elicit 
testimony about Alvarez’s prior neglect charge deprived him of his Sixth Amendment and 
Due Process rights.  Even if the limitation were error, it was not so clearly prejudicial as to 
jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.       
V. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the conviction.