Title: Cohen v. Cohen

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11594 
 
M. DAVID COHEN  vs.  SHELLEY COHEN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 9, 2014. - February 23, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.  Contempt.  Divorce and 
Separation, Foreign judgment, Child support, Attorney's fees.  
Probate Court, Jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction, Child support, 
Probate Court.  Parent and Child, Child support. 
 
 
 
 
Registration 
for 
enforcement 
of 
a 
foreign 
order 
of 
support 
filed 
in 
the 
Middlesex 
Division 
of 
the 
Probate 
and 
Family 
Court 
Department 
on March 31, 2004. 
 
 
A complaint for contempt was heard by Randy J. Kaplan, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court 
granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Anna S. Richardson for the father. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  This case requires that we resolve the extent to 
which the Probate and Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction 
to enforce or modify a support order issued by a California court 
in connection with proceedings dissolving the marriage of M. David 
 
 
2 
Cohen (father) and Shelley Cohen (mother).  After the parties 
separated in 1999, a Los Angeles County Superior Court entered a 
judgment establishing monthly child and spousal support payments 
payable by the father to the mother.  The father moved to 
Massachusetts in 2002.  In 2004, the California support order was 
registered in the Probate and Family Court, upon request of the Los 
Angeles County Department of Child Services (California CSSD).  
Pursuant 
to 
the 
Uniform 
Interstate 
Family 
Support 
Act 
(UIFSA), 
which 
has 
been 
adopted 
by 
both 
California 
and 
Massachusetts, 
Massachusetts 
courts 
thus 
acquired 
jurisdiction 
to 
enforce 
the 
support 
order.  See 
Cal. Fam. Code, §§ 4900, 4950, 4951 (West 2013); G. L. c. 209D, 
§§ 6-601, 6-602.  The child support division of the Massachusetts 
Department of Revenue (DOR), acting on behalf of the mother, 
initiated 
contempt 
proceedings 
against 
the 
father 
in 
the 
Probate 
and 
Family Court, and a Probate and Family Court judge subsequently 
issued 
multiple 
orders 
that 
sought 
to 
enforce 
the 
California 
support 
order.  The 
orders 
incorporated 
the 
parties' 
stipulated 
agreements, 
which, 
inter 
alia, 
obligated 
the 
father 
to 
pay 
the 
child's 
uninsured 
medical expenses and to contribute to her college education costs; 
neither of these items had been included in the order of the 
California court.  In 2010, a Probate and Family Court judge found 
the father in contempt for having failed to make payments in the 
amounts agreed toward support arrears, to pay the agreed share of 
 
 
3 
the child's college costs and her uninsured medical expenses, and 
to pay previously-awarded attorney's fees and costs incurred by the 
mother in seeking enforcement.  The father challenges the 
jurisdiction of the court to enter this judgment. 
 
We conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, the 
jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court was limited to 
enforcement of the California support order, and that the parties' 
stipulated 
agreements 
did 
not 
extend 
the 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
Probate 
and Family Court to modify the California support order.  To the 
extent the Probate and Family Court orders modify the California 
support order, they are therefore void, and the court accordingly 
had no authority to enforce these orders or to find the father in 
contempt for failing to comply with them.  The Probate and Family 
Court nonetheless retained jurisdiction to continue to enforce the 
California child support and spousal support order, at least until 
the father returned to live in California and California resumed 
enforcement.  The Probate and Family Court judge therefore had 
authority to hold the father in contempt for failing to comply with 
orders that he pay the mother's attorney's fees and costs incurred 
in connection with enforcement of the California order. 
 
Background and prior proceedings.  1.  California 
proceedings.  The father and the mother lived in Los Angeles with 
their 
daughter.  After 
a 
lengthy 
marriage, 
the 
parties 
separated 
in 
 
 
4 
1999, and a Los Angeles County Superior Court ordered the father to 
pay 
the 
mother 
monthly 
payments 
for 
child 
and 
spousal 
support.1  The 
father 
relocated 
to 
the 
Boston 
area 
in 
January, 
2002, 
while 
the 
mother 
and child remained in California.  Arrearages accumulated, and, in 
February, 
2003, 
the 
California 
CSSD 
transmitted 
to 
the 
child 
support 
enforcement division of the DOR the first of two requests for 
registration of the California support order.  This transmittal 
sought enforcement in Massachusetts through income withholding, 
pursuant 
to 
G. 
L. 
c. 
209D, 
§ 6-602 (a).2  In 
June, 
2003, 
a 
"judgment 
of dissolution of marriage" entered in the Los Angeles County 
Superior Court that increased the father's monthly child support 
obligation to $1,035, and his spousal support to $600; the judgment 
also reserved jurisdiction over arrearages. 
 
In March, 2004, on request of the California CSSD, the 2003 
California support order was registered in the Probate and Family 
Court, giving the Massachusetts court authority to enforce the 
                                                 
 
1 The order obligated David Cohen (father) to pay monthly to 
Shelley Cohen (mother) $178 in child support, $280 for the child's 
special education therapy, and $477 in spousal support. 
 
 
2 The record does not indicate whether the father's wages were 
attached.  The 
record 
on 
appeal 
includes 
a 
copy 
of 
an 
"audit" 
created 
by the Los Angeles County Department of Child Services (California 
CSSD), setting forth the monthly support obligation and the amounts 
paid toward that obligation.  This document reflects that no 
payments 
for 
child 
support 
or 
spousal 
support 
were 
made 
for 
the 
period 
from 
February, 
2001, 
through 
July, 
2004, 
and 
that 
payments 
were 
made 
only sporadically prior to and after that period. 
 
 
5 
California 
support 
order.  See 
G. 
L. 
c. 
209D, 
§§ 6-601 
to 
6-603.  The 
child support enforcement transmittal document stated that 
registration was "for enforcement only" and for "collection of 
arrears." 
 
2.  Massachusetts proceedings.  On March 31, 2004, the DOR 
initiated contempt proceedings on behalf of the mother against the 
father 
in 
the 
Probate 
and 
Family 
Court.  Each 
represented 
by 
counsel, 
the parties reached an agreement and, in June, 2005, a Probate and 
Family Court judge issued a stipulated order reflecting that 
agreement.  The stipulated order required the father to make a lump 
sum payment and further weekly payments to reduce all spousal and 
child 
support 
arrears; 
to 
pay 
one-third 
of 
the 
child's 
college 
costs; 
and to pay the mother's attorney's fees.3  The stipulation included 
the father's "acknowledge[ment] that he is earning less than he is 
capable [of] and will forthwith commence a job search to obtain 
employment commensurate with his education and experience." 
 
In October, 2006, the mother filed another complaint for 
contempt.4  In 
December, 
2006, 
the 
father 
was 
found 
in 
contempt 
for, 
                                                 
3 The 
record 
does 
not 
indicate 
the 
method 
used 
to 
determine 
the 
amount in arrears, but the amount appears to include arrears 
accumulated after the father relocated to Massachusetts. 
 
 
4 According to the Probate and Family Court docket sheet, the 
mother also had filed a complaint for contempt in September, 2005; 
the parties entered into stipulations on that complaint in November 
and 
December, 
2005; 
and 
a 
judgment 
of 
contempt 
entered 
in 
April, 
2006.  
 
 
6 
among other things, his failure to pay his agreed contribution to 
the child's college expenses and uninsured medical expenses.5  
Another 
order 
issued 
in 
May, 
2007, 
incorporating 
a 
four-page 
written 
stipulation 
of 
the 
parties.  In 
that 
stipulation, the 
father 
agreed 
that he was guilty of contempt for having failed to pay "child 
support."  The order required, among other things, that the father 
"continue to pay $150 per week toward the child support arrears," 
and that he reimburse the mother for attorney's fees and costs, 
"including 
travel 
incurred 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
hearing" 
that 
day.6  The 
written 
stipulation 
provided 
that 
the 
father 
would 
"focus 
his 
efforts 
on his new employment," and resign from involvement in all but one 
specific nonprofit organization. 
 
In February, 2009, the DOR informed the father that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Copies of these documents are not included in the record submitted 
by 
the 
father, 
and 
the 
mother 
neither 
submitted 
a 
brief 
nor 
appeared 
at argument before us.  The Probate and Family Court judge's 
decisions, however, provide detail concerning the facts at issue, 
including the judge's findings on the amounts of arrears and the 
father's ability to make the stipulated payments to reduce those 
arrears. 
 
 
5 The December, 2006, order finds the father in contempt for 
having failed to pay $26,230 for the child's medical expenses 
incurred in 2006.  While the record does not include an order 
requiring the father to pay health care costs, in a memorandum in 
support 
of 
the 
father's 
motion 
for 
relief 
from 
judgment, 
the 
father's 
attorney states that "healthcare costs were added to the agreement 
by stipulation of the parties." 
 
 
6 The costs were $1,750.  The amount of attorney's fees was to 
be established at a later hearing. 
 
 
7 
California CSSD had requested that the DOR close its case against 
him, because the California CSSD was then garnishing the father's 
Social Security payments.7  In June, 2009, the mother filed another 
complaint 
for 
contempt.  Nothing 
in 
the 
record 
suggests 
that, 
prior 
to the filing of the mother's complaint in 2009, the Probate and 
Family Court was notified of the request by the California CSSD to 
DOR, or asked by any party, agency, or California court to cease 
enforcement efforts.8  A Probate and Family Court judge found the 
father in contempt for failure to pay $26,940.60 in child support, 
$54,432 in spousal support, $24,000 towards the child's college 
education, the child's uninsured medical expenses in the amount of 
                                                 
 
7 In a February, 2009, letter to the father, the Massachusetts 
Department of Revenue (DOR) stated that it had "end-dated [his] 
support 
obligation" 
and 
"purged 
[his] 
arrears 
balance."  The 
letter 
noted, 
"For 
as 
long 
as 
you live 
in 
the 
Commonwealth, 
there 
is 
always 
the possibility that we may become involved in your CCS case in the 
future."  In 
a 
September, 
2009, 
letter 
responding 
to 
an 
inquiry 
from 
the father, the DOR explained that, although it had closed the 
father's child support case, "[a]ny and all existing court orders 
remained in place . . . . Closing our case just meant that DOR was 
no longer taking action to enforce or collect the debt." 
 
 
8 Indeed, in June, 2011, a Los Angeles County Superior Court 
judge ruled: 
 
"[The father] has twice been found guilty of contempt for 
failure to pay spousal and child support [in Massachusetts] 
. . . , substantial arrears still exist and, therefore, . . . 
the 
convicted 
defendant 
cannot 
seek 
modification 
of 
the 
spousal 
support award until the contempt is purged. . . . California's 
assumption of jurisdiction regarding spousal support is not 
intended to and does not deprive Massachusetts of ongoing 
jurisdiction to enforce its own orders." 
 
 
 
8 
$26,230, 
and 
the 
mother's 
legal 
fees 
and 
costs 
incurred 
in 
connection 
with 
prior 
and 
then-pending 
enforcement 
proceedings.  A 
judgment 
of 
contempt entered on September 22, 2010, dated May 26, 2010,9 
established a schedule of monthly payments to be made toward these 
arrears.  In August, 2010, the father sought relief from that 
judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (4), 365 Mass. 828 
(1974).10  The motion was denied later that month.  In December, 
2010, the father returned to California. 
 
Discussion.  We note as a preliminary matter that the father 
did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court 
concerning the support orders, nor its authority to hold him in 
contempt for violation of those orders, prior to this appeal.  
Nonetheless, "a party has the right to raise subject matter 
                                                 
 
9 The father also was found in contempt for his continued 
involvement 
in 
nonprofit 
organizations 
and 
was 
ordered 
to 
resign 
from 
his 
membership 
in 
several 
of 
those 
organizations.  The 
father 
makes 
no claim that this portion of the judgment was not within the 
jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court, and we do not address 
his 
other 
claim, 
raised 
for 
the 
first 
time 
on 
appeal, 
regarding 
this 
portion of the order. 
 
 
10 Also in June, 2010, the Los Angeles County Superior Court 
notified 
the 
parties 
that 
it 
would 
hold 
a 
hearing 
for 
a 
"determination 
of 
arrears."  The 
parties 
informed 
the 
Probate 
and 
Family 
Court 
judge 
who had issued the judgment of that pending hearing, and on August 
23, 
2010, 
the 
judge 
issued 
an 
order 
stating 
that 
"Massachusetts 
will 
assume sole jurisdiction over this matter."  In June, 2011, a Los 
Angeles County Superior Court judge ruled, "As both the initiating 
[S]tate and now both parties' [S]tate of residence, California has 
jurisdiction to issue spousal support orders.  The Massachusetts 
court cannot preclude otherwise appropriate jurisdiction by court 
order." 
 
 
9 
jurisdiction at any time."  ROPT, Ltd. Partnership v. Katin, 431 
Mass. 601, 607 (2000).  A claim that a court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction 
cannot 
be 
waived.  See 
Harker 
v. 
Holyoke, 
390 
Mass. 
555, 
559 
(1983), 
quoting 
Litton 
Business 
Sys. 
v. 
Commissioner 
of 
Revenue, 
383 Mass. 619, 622 (1981) ("Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be 
conferred by consent, conduct or waiver"); Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) 
(4). 
 
1.  Uniform 
Interstate 
Family 
Support 
Act.  "UIFSA 
aims 
to 
cure 
the 
problem 
of 
conflicting 
support 
orders 
entered 
by 
multiple 
courts, 
and 
provides 
for 
the 
exercise 
of 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
by one tribunal over support orders."  Child Support Enforcement 
Div. of Alaska v. Brenckle, 424 Mass. 214, 218 (1997) (Brenckle).  
UIFSA establishes continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the State 
issuing a support order, so as to ensure that the issuing State is 
the only State with jurisdiction to modify its order absent 
specified, narrow circumstances.  G. L. c. 209D, § 6-611 (a) 
(1)-(2).  Every 
State 
appears 
to 
have 
adopted 
some 
version 
of 
UIFSA.  
See Annot., Construction and Application of Uniform Interstate 
Family Support Act, 90 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2001).  Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) 
(2012) (requiring States to adopt UIFSA in order to access Federal 
funding for child support enforcement). 
 
"Under UIFSA, once one court enters a support order, no other 
court may modify that order for as long as the obligee, obligor, or 
 
 
10 
child for whose benefit the order is entered continues to reside 
within the jurisdiction of that court unless each party consents in 
writing to another jurisdiction."   Brenckle, supra at 218.  See 
G. L. 
c. 209D, 
§§ 2-205 
(a),11 6-611 (a) 
(1)-(2).12  See 
also 
Draper 
                                                 
 
11 General 
Laws 
c. 
209D, 
§ 2-205 
(a), 
provides 
that 
the 
issuing 
State retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction: 
 
"(1) as long as [the State issuing the order] remains the 
residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child 
for whose benefit the support order is issued; or 
 
"(2) until [each party has] filed written consents . . . 
with the tribunal of [the issuing State] for a tribunal of 
another [S]tate to modify the order and assume continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction." 
 
See Cal. Fam. Code § 4909 (West 2013), which contains virtually 
identical language. 
 
 
12 General Laws c. 209D, § 6-611 (a) (1)-(2), provides: 
 
"After 
a 
child 
support 
order 
issued 
in 
another 
[S]tate 
has 
been 
registered 
in 
the 
[C]ommonwealth, 
the 
responding 
tribunal 
of the [C]ommonwealth may modify that order only if . . . it 
finds that . . . 
 
"(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor 
do not reside in the issuing [S]tate; 
 
"(ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of the 
[C]ommonwealth seeks modification; and 
 
"(iii) the respondent is subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of the tribunal of the [C]ommonwealth; or 
 
". . . each of the parties who are individuals has filed 
a 
written 
consent 
in 
the 
issuing 
tribunal 
for 
a 
tribunal 
of 
the 
[C]ommonwealth to modify the support order and assume 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over such order." 
 
 
 
11 
v. 
Burke, 
450 
Mass. 
676, 
679 
(2008); Peddar 
v. 
Peddar, 
43 
Mass. 
App. 
Ct. 192, 194-195 (1997); C.P. Kindregan, M. McBrien, & P.A. 
Kindregan, Family Law and Practice, § 30.6, at 255 (4th ed. 2013).  
The written consent must be filed in the issuing tribunal.  G. L. 
c. 209D, § 6-611 (a) (1)-(2). 
 
Here, 
California 
issued 
the 
original 
support 
order.  The 
mother 
and child remained residents of California throughout the 
Massachusetts proceedings, and there is no indication that the 
parents filed with the California court their written consent to 
grant a Massachusetts court authority to modify the order issued by 
the California court.  In these circumstances, California remains 
the State of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and accordingly is 
the only State with jurisdiction to modify its support order.  See 
Klingel v. Reill, 446 Mass. 80, 84 (2006), citing G. L. c. 209D, 
§ 2-205 (c) (responding tribunal can modify support order only if 
issuing State "has, for some reason, lost its exclusive 
jurisdiction"); C.P. Kindregan & P.A. Kindregan, Massachusetts 
Domestic 
Relations 
Rules 
and 
Statutes 
Annot., § 7.6(11), 
Comment 
to 
G. L. c. 209D, § 6-611 (2014) (discussing "UIFSA philosophy that no 
other [S]tate should modify an order of another [S]tate which has 
                                                                                                                                                             
See Cal. Fam. Code § 4960 (West 2013), which contains virtually 
identical language. 
 
 
 
12 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction").13 
 
a.  Enforcement of California's order.  To enforce judgments 
against a party who has moved from an issuing State that has 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to a second State, an issuing 
State 
may 
register 
an 
order 
for 
enforcement 
in 
the 
second 
State.  See 
G. L. c. 209D, § 6-601.  Once such an order is registered in the 
Probate and Family Court, that court becomes the "responding 
tribunal," and is "limited to recognizing and enforcing the order 
of the other [S]tate [because] under UIFSA[,] conceptually, the 
responding [S]tate is enforcing the law of another [S]tate" 
(quotations 
and 
citation 
omitted).  C.P. 
Kindregan 
& 
P.A. 
Kindregan, 
Massachusetts Domestic Relations Rules and Statutes Annotated, 
                                                 
 
13 The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1738B(e) (2012), likewise does not extend the 
jurisdiction of the Probate and Family Court to modification of a 
California court's support order.  In relevant part, that statute 
provides: 
 
"A 
court 
of 
a 
State 
may 
modify 
a 
child 
support 
order 
issued 
by a court of another State if -- 
 
"(1) the court has jurisdiction to make such a child 
support order pursuant to subsection (i); and 
 
"(2)(A) the court of the other State no longer has 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the child support order 
because that State no longer is the child's State or the 
residence of any individual contestant; or 
 
"(B) 
each 
individual 
contestant 
has 
filed 
written 
consent 
with 
the 
State 
of 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
for 
a 
court 
of another State to modify the order and assume continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction over the order." 
 
 
13 
§ 7.6(3), Comment to G. L. c. 209D, § 6-603 (2014). 
 
Thus, although the Probate and Family Court did not have 
jurisdiction to modify the California court's support order, it did 
retain jurisdiction to enforce that order.14  California's support 
order was registered for enforcement in the Commonwealth when the 
California 
CSSD 
transmitted 
a 
request 
to 
the 
DOR 
that 
was 
then 
entered 
on the Probate and Family Court docket.  The transmittal specified 
that the Probate and Family Court could exercise jurisdiction over 
the California court's order "for enforcement only."  See G. L. 
c. 209D, § 6-602. 
 
b.  Modification of California's order.  The judgment entered 
on 
September 
22, 
2010, 
dated 
May 
26, 
2010, 
held 
the 
father 
in 
contempt 
for 
his 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
earlier 
orders 
and 
judgments 
that 
had 
entered in the Probate and Family Court beginning in 2009.  The 
father contends that portions of the orders constituted 
modifications of the California order, and that the Probate and 
Family Court did not have jurisdiction to modify the California 
                                                 
 
14 Although the Probate and Family Court judge could, in the 
absence of any motion to dismiss brought during the proceedings, 
exercise 
jurisdiction 
as 
the 
judge 
did 
here, 
we 
note 
that 
where 
orders 
of 
the 
Probate 
and 
Family 
Court 
and 
a 
California 
court 
conflict, 
the 
California court's orders control.  G. L. c. 209D, § 2-207 (b) ("If 
a proceeding is brought under this chapter and two or more child 
support orders have been issued by tribunals of the [C]ommonwealth 
or another [S]tate . . . [1] if only one of the tribunals would have 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction 
under 
this 
chapter, 
the 
order 
of 
such tribunal shall control and be so recognized"). 
 
 
14 
support order.  UIFSA does not define "modification," but, "where 
UIFSA 
is 
silent, 
the 
[Full 
Faith 
and 
Credit 
for 
Child 
Support 
Orders 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2012),] may help fill any gaps."  Spencer 
v. Spencer, 10 N.Y.3d 60, 66 (2008).  Section 1738B(b) of that 
statute defines modification as "a change in a child support order 
that 
affects 
the 
amount, 
scope, 
or 
duration 
of 
the 
order 
and 
modifies, 
replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to the child 
support order." 
 
In this case, the California support order provided that the 
father's child support obligations would end essentially when the 
child 
completed 
twelfth 
grade 
or 
attained 
the 
age 
of 
nineteen,15 and 
was 
silent 
on 
the 
issue 
of 
the 
costs 
of 
the 
child's 
college 
education 
and her uninsured medical expenses.  The California Legislature, 
however, has expressly limited child support to minor children, or 
through 
the 
completion 
of 
high 
school 
for 
a 
child 
under 
age 
nineteen 
who 
is 
residing 
with 
a 
parent 
and 
attending 
school 
full-time.16  The 
                                                 
 
15 The 
order 
stated 
that 
child 
support 
payments 
were 
to 
continue 
"until the minor child reaches majority, dies, marries, becomes 
self-supported, emancipates or until further order of Court, 
whichever first occurs." 
 
 
16 The California legislature "expressly contemplated that 
Civil 
Code 
[§] 196 
would 
only 
apply to 
minors 
and 
that 
to 
the 
extent 
that an obligation devolves upon a parent to provide education to 
an adult child, it is limited to the completion of a high school 
education."  Jones 
v. 
Jones, 
179 
Cal. 
App. 
3d 
1011, 
1017 
(1986).  The 
California support order provides that, "Pursuant to Civil Code 
[§] 196.5, 
child 
support 
shall 
continue 
as 
set 
forth 
above 
and 
extend 
 
 
15 
Probate and Family Court judgment of contempt appears to have 
required the father to continue to pay child support beyond the 
child's 
attaining 
the 
age 
of 
nineteen, 
thereby 
affecting 
the 
duration 
of child support.  The judgment also required the father to pay 
$24,000 
toward 
the 
child's 
college 
education 
costs 
and 
$26,230 
toward 
the 
child's 
uninsured 
medical 
expenses; 
these 
obligations 
constitute 
modifications of the California court's support order because they 
affected the amount, scope, and duration of support and were made 
subsequent to the order.  These impermissible modifications of the 
California 
order 
exceeded 
the 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
Probate 
and 
Family 
Court. 
 
c.  Effect 
of 
impermissible 
modification.  As 
stated, 
prior 
to 
this appeal, the father had not challenged the jurisdiction of the 
Probate and Family Court to issue such orders, nor its authority to 
hold him in contempt for violation of those orders. Nonetheless, 
"[w]here a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the judgment is 
void and time limitations for raising the issue are inapplicable."  
ROPT, 
Ltd. 
Partnership 
v. 
Katin, 
431 
Mass. 
at 
605.  See 
Mass. 
R. 
Civ. 
P. 60 (b) (4). 
                                                                                                                                                             
as to any unmarried child who has attained the age of [eighteen], 
is a full-time high-school student, and resides with a parent until 
such time as he or she completes the [twelfth] grade or attains the 
age of [nineteen,] whichever first occurs."  Although California 
Civil Code § 196.5 has been repealed, essentially the same language 
appears in Cal. Fam. Code § 3901 (West 2013). 
 
 
16 
 
Rule 60 (b) "strikes a balance between serving the ends of 
justice and preserving the finality of judgments," and "may not be 
used 
as 
a 
substitute 
for 
a 
timely 
appeal" 
(citation 
omitted).  Harris 
v. Sannella, 400 Mass. 392, 395 (1987).  See Harker v. Holyoke, 390 
Mass. 
at 
558 
("If 
we 
were 
to 
permit 
such 
an 
attack 
as 
a 
general 
rule, 
the finality of judgments would be substantially impaired").  
Therefore, "when a court has rendered final judgment in a contested 
action, a party may not litigate that court's subject matter 
jurisdiction 
except 
in 
certain 
circumstances."  Matter 
of 
Dugan, 
418 
Mass. 185, 186 (1994).  One such circumstance is when "[a]llowing 
the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of 
another 
tribunal 
or 
agency 
of 
government."  Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Judgments § 12 (1982). 
 
Permitting enforcement of those portions of the Probate and 
Family 
Court's 
orders 
that 
modify 
the 
California 
order 
not 
only 
would 
infringe on the authority of the California courts, which have 
continuing, 
exclusive 
jurisdiction, 
but 
also 
would 
upset 
a 
carefully 
constructed uniform set of laws adopted in all fifty States.  See 
Scanlon v. Witrak, 110 Wash. App. 682, 686 (2002) (allowing rule 60 
[b] motion where Georgia had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction 
under UIFSA and Washington State court had modified Georgia child 
support order).  Cf. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 
174-176 (1998) (erroneous order that expressed child support 
 
 
17 
payments as percentage of income was in violation of statute, but 
was voidable, not void, in part because it was purely State matter 
and did not "implicate the authority of another tribunal" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
Because the Probate and Family Court had no jurisdiction to 
modify 
the 
California 
support 
order, 
the 
portions 
of 
the 
orders 
that 
required the father to pay child support for a period beyond that 
established by the California court, part of the child's college 
education costs, and the child's uninsured medical expenses were 
void.  The father, therefore, could not be found in contempt for 
violating 
the 
void 
portions 
of 
those 
orders.  Cf. 
Kendall 
v. 
Kendall, 
340 S.W.3d 483, 501, 503-504 (Tex. App. 2011) (when reviewing 
collateral attack, court will limit "review to determining whether 
the record affirmatively and conclusively negates existence of 
jurisdiction" to modify support order of State that had continuing, 
exclusive jurisdiction, and will not consider "whether court 
otherwise erred in rendering its judgment").  The judgment of 
contempt 
is 
enforceable 
insofar 
as 
it 
concerns 
portions 
of 
the 
orders 
that enforced the terms of the California support order. 
 
2.  Attorney's fees and costs.  The father also was adjudged 
in contempt for his failure to pay attorney's fees of $6,930 that 
had been awarded to the mother, and costs of $2,370 that had been 
incurred in connection with the mother's travel to Massachusetts to 
 
 
18 
attend 
court 
proceedings.  The 
father 
apparently 
has 
not 
paid 
these 
fees and costs.  The judgment also ordered the father to pay 
additional attorney's fees and costs incurred by the mother in 
pursuing the 2009 complaint for contempt. 
 
Under 
UIFSA, 
the 
responding 
tribunal 
may 
award 
attorney's 
fees 
and costs against an obligor if "an obligee prevails."  See G. L. 
c. 209D, § 3-313 (b).17  Cf. Arnell v. Arnell, 416 S.W.3d 188, 201 
(Tex. 
App. 
2013) 
(affirming 
award 
of 
attorney's 
fees 
to 
obligee 
under 
UIFSA where court registered and enforced foreign judgment).  The 
imposition of attorney's fees and costs is an appropriate mechanism 
for 
enforcement 
of 
the 
California 
order, 
and 
part 
of 
the 
enforcement 
power of the Probate and Family Court as the responding tribunal. 
 
The father does not argue that the Probate and Family Court 
lacked 
jurisdiction 
to 
award 
attorney's 
fees, 
but 
only 
that 
the 
Court 
erred in awarding fees in this case.  The father contends, without 
record support and, indeed, without pointing to any purportedly 
improper fee, that the attorney's fees and costs awarded were 
                                                 
 
17 An 
order 
registered 
in 
the 
Commonwealth 
that 
issued 
in 
another 
State "is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same 
procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of the [C]ommonwealth."  
G. L. c. 209D, § 6-603 (b).  Because the father did not contest the 
validity or enforcement of California's order, as he was entitled 
to do under G. L. c. 209D, § 6-607 (a), the registered order could 
"be enforced by all remedies available under the laws of the 
[C]ommonwealth."  G. L. c. 209D, § 6-607 (b).  See also G. L. 
c. 209D, § 3-305 (a)-(e) (setting forth duties and powers of 
responding tribunal including power to award reasonable attorney's 
fees as well as other fees and costs). 
 
 
19 
incurred 
in 
connection 
with 
improper 
efforts 
to 
modify 
the 
California 
support order.  We analyze this claim pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 
60 (b) (6), which permits granting relief from a judgment for "any 
other reason justifying relief."  Relief under this provision is 
available only in "extraordinary circumstances."  Sahin v. Sahin, 
435 Mass. 396, 406 (2001).   Because the Probate and Family Court's 
enforcement powers under UIFSA include the authority to award 
attorney's fees and costs, and because the father has not included 
in the record anything that indicates how the judge arrived at the 
fee award, the components of that award, or that any portion of the 
fee award pertains to fees incurred in conjunction with efforts 
directed 
toward 
the 
impermissible 
modifications, 
the 
father 
has 
not 
established 
the 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
that 
would 
justify 
such 
relief.18 
 
Conclusion.  The judgment of contempt is vacated.  The matter 
is remanded for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion, 
holding the father in contempt and obligating payment only for his 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
such 
portions 
of 
the 
Probate 
and 
Family 
Court's 
orders 
that 
enforced 
the 
California 
child 
and 
spousal 
support 
order, 
                                                 
 
18 We note that the extensive litigation in this case arose as 
a result of the father's chronic nonpayment of his support 
obligations, and that, in her efforts to obtain child and spousal 
support payments owed, the mother apparently was required to expend 
significant amounts on private investigators and travel to 
Massachusetts. 
 
 
20 
and the fees and costs associated with such enforcement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.