Title: SNELL v. JOHNSON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SNELL v. JOHNSON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 12004 WY 1986 P.3d 248Case Number: 03-121, 03-151Decided: 03/08/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

C.A. 
"AL" SNELL; R.M. "BOB" WAGNER;

and 
JOHN TRIERWEILER,

 

Appellants(Defendants) 
,

 

v.

 

JOHNSON 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.1,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

 

WAYNE 
T. VOSS, STAN WOSTENBERG,

JANE  WOSTENBERG and DAVID 
HAMILTON,

 

Petitioners,

 

v.

 

WASHAKIE 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1,

 

Respondent.

 

                                                

 

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants, C.A. "Al" Snell, R.M. "Bob" Wagner, John Trierweiler, 
Wayne 
T. Voss, Stan Wostenberg, Jane Wostenberg and David Hamilton:

            
John R. Hursh of Central Wyoming Law Associates, Riverton, 
Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee Johnson County School District No. 1:

            
Timothy J. Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, Buffalo, 
Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee Washakie County School District No. 1:

            
William R. Shelledy, Jr. and Edward G. Luhm of Scott, Shelledy & 
Luhm, P.C., Worland, 
Wyoming  

 

 

 

Before 
GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.; and STEBNER, DJ.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      These cases 
involve challenges to the use of funds obtained from the sale of bonds to 
construct school facilities and present questions concerning the effect of our 
opinions in State v. Campbell County School District, 2001 WY 19, 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001) (Campbell II) and State v. Campbell County School 
District, 2001 WY 90, 32 P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001) (Campbell III), and the 
resulting statutory changes on pending school bond issues.  The cases were consolidated for purposes 
of argument and the district court in each case certified two questions to this 
Court for resolution.  While those 
questions are slightly different in each case, at bottom they ask 1) whether the 
challengers' claims are barred as untimely, and 2) whether the bond proceeds can 
be used to fund certain school facilities.  
We hold the challengers are not barred from raising issues related to the 
use of the funds.  However, we 
further hold neither the Campbell II nor Campbell III decisions, 
nor the revised statutes, which became effective after the bond elections, have 
any effect upon the school districts' authority to use the proceeds from the 
sale of bonds authorized by the elections.

 

 

CERTIFIED 
QUESTIONS:  

 

[¶2]      Snell v. 
Johnson County School District No. 1, No. 03-121:

 

1.         
Are defendants barred by W.S. § 22-21-107 from initiating in 2003, a 
contest of the November 6, 2001 bond election in Johnson 
County?

 

2.         
Can Johnson County School District No. 1 use the bond proceeds from a 
November 6, 2001 bond election to fund local enhancements in a pipeline 
project?

 

[¶3]      Voss v. 
Washakie County School District No. 1, No. 03-151:

 

1.         
Are Petitioner's claims barred, by initiating in April of 2003, a 
challenge of the November 7, 2000, bond election in Washakie County, by 
application of W.S. § 22-21-107; W.S. § 21-13-706(b)(vi); W.S. § 21-13-706(c); 
by the doctrines of laches, estoppel and waiver or the applicable statute of 
limitations, or by their failure to join necessary and/or proper parties to the 
action?

 

2.         
Can Washakie County School District No. 1 use the bond proceeds from the 
November 7, 2000, bond election to fund local enhancements in a "pipeline 
project"?

 

 

 

[¶4]      From 1995 to the 
present, the state's public school finance system has undergone significant 
change.  This Court has addressed 
problems of inequality in the financing of public schools in three separate 
opinions, Campbell County School District v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 
1995) (Campbell I), Campbell II, and Campbell III. In response to 
those opinions, the legislature enacted many new statutes and changed the manner 
in which school operations and construction are funded.  This process of change has occurred over 
the last nine years and is continuing.  
We think it is safe to say that change will inevitably continue to occur 
into the future as the legislature and the school districts struggle to develop 
the most effective and equitable public school finance system possible.  These cases demonstrate the problems the 
school districts face because their work of providing education to the state's 
children must go on amid these times of change.

 

[¶5]      Historically, 
school construction was financed entirely through property taxes and the funds 
available varied widely from county to county as a result of the differing 
assessed values of property in each county.  Twenty-four years ago, this Court held 
that system violated the state's constitution and mandated "statewide 
availability from total state resources for building construction or 
contribution to school buildings on a parity for all school districts."  Washakie County School District No. 1 
v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 337 (Wyo. 1980).  In Campbell I, we reviewed the 
legislative changes made in response to the Washakie opinion and found 
that combination of loans and grants had not adequately addressed the deficient 
public school facilities identified by the state.  We declared that system 
unconstitutional.  Campbell 
I, 907 P.2d  at 1275.  In 
response to that opinion, the Wyoming Department of Education financed a study 
to score all buildings in each school district based on various categories of 
capital construction needs.  This 
report, generally identified as Wyoming Department of Education Statewide 
Schools Facilities Assessment, identified certain schools in immediate need of 
capital construction.  In 1999, the 
legislature acted to address the constitutional infirmities of the school 
capital construction statutes and enacted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-15-111 (Lexis 
1999), which established a process whereby school districts could receive state 
funding for capital construction of school facilities.  That statute required the districts to 
certify they had used ninety percent of their bonding capacity authorized by 
art. 16, § 5 of the Wyoming constitution before being eligible to receive state 
funding.  In Campbell II, we 
concluded that § 21-15-111 was unconstitutional because it again resulted in 
wealth-based disparities in school construction financing.  Id. at 556-566.  As a result of that decision, in 2002 
the legislature completely overhauled the statutory scheme for capital 
construction of public schools and created a statewide program for funding 
construction of facilities necessary to meet state-determined adequacy 
standards.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
21-15-101 to 121 (LexisNexis 2002). 

 

[¶6]      Throughout all of 
these changes, the local school districts retained constitutional and statutory 
authority to fund school construction through the issuance of bonds.  As part of the 2002 reformation of the 
state capital construction statutes, the legislature provided for specific new 
procedures for school districts to follow should they decide to issue bonds for 
facilities in "excess of the statewide standards for the adequacy of school 
buildings and facilities."1  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-13-701 (LexisNexis 
2002).  Those procedures included 
two public hearings at which the district was to explain the need to provide 
funding for facilities in excess of state standards.  The legislature established March 11, 
2002, as the effective date of that amended statute.  2002 Sp. Sess., Ch. 51 § 
2.

 

[¶7]      Throughout this 
constantly changing landscape of school finance law, individual districts in 
need of funding for deficient facilities faced the proverbial moving target in 
terms of the requirements and procedures.  
Those with pending applications for state funding became known as 
"pipeline" schools, meaning those in the pipeline for funding, but whose funding 
had not yet been approved.  Johnson 
County School District No. 1 and Washakie County School District No. 1 (school 
districts) were such "pipeline" schools.  

 

 

 

[¶8]      The Buffalo high 
school and the Kaycee middle/high school were both identified in Campbell I 
and Campbell II as schools in immediate need of capital 
construction.  In 1999, when the 
district began the process of planning and designing new facilities to replace 
them, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-15-111 was in effect, requiring the district to meet 
the ninety percent of bonded indebtedness limitation.  The process for receiving a state grant 
for construction of the facilities required the district to certify that a bond 
issue, if needed to meet the ninety percent requirement, would be submitted to 
the voters within eighteen (18) months following submission of the application 
for the state grant.  This Court 
issued its opinion in Campbell II on February 23, 2001, holding § 
21-15-111 unconstitutional.  On 
March 20, 2001, we granted a petition for rehearing on limited issues.  In August 2001, the school district 
issued a call for an election pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-21-103 (Lexis 
1998).  Issuance of ballots and 
absentee voting began on September 5, 2001.  On September 27, 2001, the school 
district issued its bond proclamation giving notice of an election on November 
6, 2001, on the question of whether it would be allowed to issue general 
obligation bonds not to exceed $8,500,000 "for the purposes of erecting, 
equipping and furnishing a new high school in Buffalo and a new middle 
school/high school in Kaycee as well as enlarging, improving, remodeling, 
repairing, adding to, equipping and furnishing buildings . . . within and for 
the district."  This Court issued 
its opinion on the rehearing on October 2, 2001, in which it affirmed its 
holding that § 21-15-111 was unconstitutional.  The election on the bond issue was held 
on November 6, 2001, as planned and the parties have stipulated that it complied 
in all respects with the procedural requirements of § 21-13-701.  The bond issue passed with an 
affirmative vote.  No one filed a 
contest of the election within fourteen (14) days as allowed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 22-21-107 (LexisNexis 2003). 

 

[¶9]      On April 14, 
2002, the state approved the school district's application for funding under the 
new statutes governing capital construction of schools.  However, the state denied the portion of 
the application which sought funding for an auditorium and other 
facilities.  The same day, the 
school district approved the use of a portion of the bond issue authorized in 
the November 6, 2001, election for those facilities that the state had rejected, 
including the auditorium.  C.A. "Al" 
Snell, R.M. "Bob" Wagner, and John Trierweiler (challengers) immediately served 
their notice of governmental claim with the school district contesting the use 
of the bond funds for what they deemed were "local enhancements" without 
following the procedures required in the amended statutes.  On April 18, 2003, the school district 
filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the sale of the bonds was 
proper and the funds could be expended for construction of the auditorium and 
the other facilities.  The school 
district also filed an amended complaint seeking to enjoin the challengers from 
contesting the action claiming § 22-21-1072 prevented them from doing so.  The challengers answered and filed a 
counterclaim seeking a declaration that the election was void ab initio. 
 The school district filed a 
motion to dismiss, which was treated as a motion for summary judgment, and 
thereafter the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  The challengers also filed a motion to 
certify the issue to this Court and the district court ultimately certified the 
two questions to this Court, which we agreed to answer.  The bonds have not been sold due to the 
pending litigation.

 

 

 

[¶10]   The state's study of school 
construction needs, as noted in Campbell II, identified the Worland 
middle school, like the Johnson County schools, as being in immediate need of 
capital construction.  The school 
district began discussing how to address that need in May 1998.  On August 24, 2000, it applied for a 
state grant to fund construction of a middle school with an attached auditorium 
under the statute then in place, which required the school district to certify 
it had used ninety percent of its indebtedness capacity.  Simultaneously, the school district 
called for an election on November 7, 2000, pursuant to § 22-21-103, requesting 
the voters' authorization of general obligation bonds not to exceed $6,030,000 
for the purpose of "construction of a new middle school and [a] new 
auditorium."  The election was held 
on November 7, 2000, and the proposal received an affirmative vote.  On February 27, 2001, four days after 
this Court's opinion in Campbell II was issued, the legislature passed an 
appropriation of $10.9 million for the new middle school project and required 
further plans and engineering to be submitted to the Joint Appropriation 
Committee by December 1, 2001.  On 
February 28, 2002, the legislature passed an appropriation for $11.9 million for 
what the state considered an adequate middle school, but which did not include 
an auditorium.  After consulting 
with counsel concerning the impact of Campbell II and III, the 
school district proceeded with selling bonds up to $3.5 million to fund 
construction of the auditorium.  The 
bonds were sold on June 20, 2002, and were included in the 2002 Washakie County 
tax levies.  All payments for 2002 
property taxes included an amount for the bonds in question and on January 15, 
2003, the Washakie County Treasurer paid $147,548.74 on the bonds.  The school district signed a contract 
with its general contractor on January 27, 2003, and bids were opened for 
sub-contractors on March 12, 2003, with construction to commence May 12, 
2003.  Wayne T. Voss, Stan 
Wostenberg, Jane Wostenberg and David Hamilton (challengers) filed a notice of 
claim under the Governmental Claims Act on April 7, 2003, and a petition for 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on April 11, 2003, seeking a 
declaration that the bond proceeds could not be used to fund local enhancements 
and an injunction barring the expenditure or commitment of funds to the project 
until the declaratory judgment had been resolved.  The school district filed a motion to 
dismiss the petition claiming the challengers were barred from challenging the 
bond election by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-21-107, 21-13-706(b)(vi) and (c),3 and the doctrines of laches, 
estoppel, waiver, and failure to join indispensable parties.  The district court held a hearing on May 
8, 2003, on the motion to dismiss and the motion for a temporary restraining 
order, and denied both.  The 
challengers then sought certification of the matter to this Court, and the 
district court did so on July 29, 2003.  
We agreed to accept certification on August 12, 
2003.

 

 

 

 

Are 
Challengers Barred from Objecting to the Use of the Bond Funds By Statute or 
Laches, Estoppel, Waiver, or Failure to Join Necessary and/or Proper 
Parties?

 

[¶11]   The school districts contend the 
challengers are barred from making their claims by § 22-21-107, which allows 
electors to contest bond elections providing they do so within fourteen (14) 
days after the result of the election has been determined, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
21-13-706(b)(vi) and (c), which provide bonds issued under the authority of the 
statute and with the proper recitals "shall be incontestable for any cause 
whatsoever after their delivery for value."  The challengers respond first by arguing 
the election contest statute does not apply to their claims because they do not 
complain about the election procedures.  
Instead, they contend their claims are focused upon the use of the 
proceeds from bonds, which were authorized and issued when the state's 
unconstitutional ninety-percent bonded indebtedness requirement was in 
effect.  With regard to the 
application of § 21-13-706(b)(vi) and (c), the challengers claim these types of 
self-executing bond validation statutes are aimed at barring contests between 
the parties to the bonds and not intended to prevent constitutional challenges 
to the use of funds derived from the sale of the bonds.  We will first consider whether the 
fourteen-day statute of limitations for contesting bond elections applies to the 
challengers' claims.

 

[¶12]   Title 22 of the statutes addresses 
procedures for all elections; Chapter17 establishes the procedures for election 
contests generally; and Chapter 21 sets out the procedures for bond elections 
specifically.  Relevant provisions 
of Title 22 provide: 

 

                        
22-17-105. Grounds for contesting ballot 
propositions.

 

            
A ballot proposition which may by law be submitted to a vote of the 
people of a county, city or town, district, or other political subdivision may 
be contested by a petition of five (5) registered electors of the county, city 
or town, district or other political subdivision filed in the district court of 
the county not later than fifteen (15) days after the results of the election 
have been certified by the canvassing board.  A ballot proposition contest is a civil 
action. 

 

 22-17-106. Grounds for contesting ballot 
propositions

 

            
(a) A ballot proposition may be contested for any of the following 
reasons:

            
(i) Misconduct or material negligence of an election official which 
affected the result of the election;

            
(ii) The election result was influenced by a bribe;

            
(iii) Illegal votes were counted or legal votes were not 
counted.

 

§ 
22-21-107. Contests; procedure

 

            
Any five (5) qualified electors of the political subdivision may contest 
an election on the question of the creation of an indebtedness upon filing in 
the district court of any county in which the political subdivision is wholly or 
partially located, within fourteen (14) days after the result of the election 
shall have been determined, a petition alleging an error that would change the 
result of the election, in like form as in other cases of contested elections in 
the district court.  The political 
subdivision shall be made defendant, and process shall be  served upon  the clerk of  the governing body or other 

chief 
clerical officer as in other civil actions.  No civil action contesting the results 
of such an election or alleging election errors may be commenced after the 
expiration of such fourteen (14) day period.

 

 [¶13]  These provisions must be read in pari 
materia.  Shumway v. 
Worthey, 2001 WY 130, 37 P.3d 361 (Wyo. 2001).  The general contest provision sets forth 
three grounds upon which a ballot proposition can be contested in court:  allegations of misconduct which affected 
the result of the election, bribery, or improper counting of votes.  While the bond election contest statute 
does not proscribe specific grounds, it does specify "no civil action 
contesting the results of such an election or alleging election errors 
may be commenced after" the fourteen day period.  Section 22-21-107.  We believe it reasonable to conclude the 
legislature intended both contest procedures to apply to challenges of election 
procedures.  

 

[¶14]   The challengers concede the 
procedural requirements of the election statutes were met.  However, they imply the voters were 
misled because the elections were conducted at a time when the statutes required 
school districts to use ninety percent of their debt limit, and thus, the public 
must have understood the bond issue was required before state funds could be 
received.  Because Campbell II 
and III held that requirement unconstitutional, the challengers argue 
the voters were misinformed of the need for the bond issue.  To the extent the challengers' claim in 
this regard challenges the election itself, it is barred as untimely because it 
was not filed within the fourteen day limit for election contests.  Even if this claim was not time barred, 
we find no defect in the notice provided the public regarding the bond election. 
The bond questions clearly stated the purpose of the bonds as required by § 
22-21-103.  Johnson County's ballot 
proposition's stated purpose was "erecting, equipping, and furnishing a new high 
school."  The challengers made no 
allegation the proposed auditorium was not part of the new high school.  Washakie County's bond proclamation 
specifically identified a "new auditorium" in conjunction with the new 
school.  The challengers do not 
contend that the use of the funds for construction of auditoriums exceeds the 
statutorily authorized purposes or the description of the facilities contained 
in the ballot propositions.  
Instead, they suggest, without any support in the record, that had the 
public known the statute which required the school districts to bond to 90% of 
their indebtedness limit was unconstitutional, the election result may have been 
different.  Two flaws exist in that 
argument.  First, the Campbell II 
and III opinions were issued prior to the Johnson County election, 
and therefore, these voters were aware funding of facilities necessary to meet 
state standards was the state's responsibility. Second, we have held that an 
allegation that the ballot proposition misled the public, absent fraud, intent 
to mislead or a violation of statute, must be accompanied by evidence the 
election result would have been different.  
Anselmi v. City of Rock Springs, 80 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1938). 
See Johnson v. City of Cheyenne, 504 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1973), 
appeal dismissed sub nom.; Johnson v. Laramie County School District 
No. 1, 414 U.S. 990 (1973).   
The record in these cases contains no such 
evidence.

 

[¶15]   The essence of the challengers' 
claim is that this Court's opinions and statutes adopted after the elections 
call into question the propriety of using the bond proceeds for local 
enhancements without having complied with the new procedures.  However, the challengers themselves 
raised the prospect that the fourteen-day statute of limitations applied when 
they sought a declaration that the election was void ab initio and "a 
legal nullity."  When their 
pleadings are read as a whole, it appears clear the focus of their ire is on the 
use of the funds without following the new statutory procedures, not the conduct 
of the elections that occurred.  

 

[¶16]   This distinction is important to 
our determination of whether the election contest statute applies to the 
challengers' claims.  To the extent 
the election itself is contested, the plain language of the statute commands all 
such contests be filed within fourteen days of the determination of the election 
results.  The obvious purpose of the 
short timeframe within which election contests must be filed is to assure 
finality of the election process.  
We have enforced strict observance of the election contest statutes. 
 Johnson, 504 P.2d  at 
1082.  However, where allegations 
are made of both election procedural errors and constitutional infirmities in 
the manner in which bond funds are proposed to be used, we have entertained the 
latter complaints even though raised after the fourteen-day limit of the 
election contest statutes.  Hyatt 
v. Big Horn District No. 4, 636 P.2d 525 (Wyo. 1981).  The petitioners in the Hyatt case 
complained that the proceeds of a bond election were being applied within the 
district in a discriminatory fashion.  
After dismissal of the claims related to the election irregularities, 
this Court considered the alleged inequitable use of the bond proceeds even 
though it appears clear the challenge was not filed within the fourteen-day 
limit.4  We find a similar approach appropriate 
in this case.  Simply because the 
legislature sought election finality does not mean taxpayers were forever 
foreclosed from challenging the manner in which school districts use the 
proceeds from the bonds authorized by such an election.

 

[¶17]   Courts in other jurisdictions have 
reached similar results.  In 
Shadow v. Rapides Parish School Board, 56 So. 2d 555 (La. 1951), persons 
challenging the consolidation of two school districts, and the assumption by one 
district of the debt of the other, filed after the time required for election 
contests.  However, they made 
multiple claims, some directed at the propriety of the election itself and 
others at constitutional issues involved in the assumption of the debt by the 
one district.  The court held the 
challenges to the election were barred by the time limit in the election contest 
statute, but the claims regarding the sale of the bonds were not barred and, 
finding the claims meritorious, the sale was enjoined.

 

[¶18]   The challengers argue the election 
contest statute does not apply to constitutional claims.  We find that argument misses the 
mark.  If a constitutional claim 
relates to the conduct of the election, we see nothing in the statute to suggest 
such a claim must not also be brought within the fourteen-day period.  Faced with similar arguments, other 
jurisdictions have likewise found election contest statutes must be complied 
with even when the contest is based upon a constitutional claim.  Beatty v. Metropolitan St. Louis 
Sewer Dist., 700 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. 1985); Taxpayers, for Sensible 
Priorities v. City of Dallas, 79 S.W.3d  670 (Tex. App.  2002).

 

[¶19]   With regard to Johnson County 
School District, the challengers claim the school district initiated the 
litigation by filing a declaratory judgment action and that prevents it from 
claiming the election contest applies.  
We fail to see how the school district's action, which was in direct 
response to the challengers filing a notice of claim under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, waived its right to argue the election contest statute 
barred their claim. The challengers filed a cross claim within the declaratory 
judgment action, which represented their contest of the election in the judicial 
forum.  The statute required that 
filing to occur within fourteen days of the election to the extent it challenged 
the election process.  The question 
is not who took the first swing in this fight, but whether the challenge was 
aimed at the use of the funds as well as the conduct of the election.  The former survives, even though it was 
not filed within fourteen days, the latter does not.

 

[¶20]   The certified questions in the 
Washakie County School District case also included whether § 21-13-706(b)(vi) 
and (c) apply to bar the challengers' claims.  Subsection (b)(vi) provides that school 
bonds issued by a district and delivered to a purchaser shall "be incontestable 
as hereafter provided."  Subsection 
(c) then provides "Any resolution of a school district board of trustees 
authorizing bonds may provide that each bond therein authorized shall recite 
that it is issued under the authority of this article.  Such recital shall conclusively impart 
full compliance with all the provisions hereof, and all bonds issued containing 
such recital shall be incontestable for any cause whatsoever after their 
delivery."  The Johnson County bonds 
were not sold, pending the resolution of this litigation, but the Washakie 
County bonds were.  While the record 
does not specifically indicate whether those bonds contained such a recital, we 
will presume they did.  The question 
then becomes whether the fact that those bonds are by statute now uncontestable 
bars the challengers' claim that the proceeds from the sale of those bonds 
cannot be used for the auditorium without compliance with the new statutory 
procedures.  

 

[¶21]   We fail to see how the statute 
which provides that the bonds "delivered to the purchaser," or in other words 
sold, are uncontestable, prevented the challengers from claiming the proceeds 
from that sale cannot be used as proposed by the school district.  A bond is simply evidence of a debt on 
which the governmental body promises to pay the bondholders a specified amount 
of interest for a specified length of time and to repay the loan on the 
expiration date.  Black's Law 
Dictionary, 169 (7th ed. 
1999).  The only effect of 
the statute was to assure that no one could contest that Washakie County School 
District must repay the bondholders as provided by the terms of the bonds.  Whether they had statutory authority to 
use the proceeds from the sale of the bonds as they did, and propose to continue 
to do, is an entirely unrelated question.  
Thus § 21-13-706 (b)(vi) and (c) did not bar the challengers' claims 
regarding the use of the bond proceeds.

 

[¶22]   The Washakie County School District 
also claims the challengers were barred by the doctrines of laches and estoppel 
because they were aware of the Campbell decisions and the amended 
statutes long before they filed their claims.  The challengers respond by arguing they 
raised their objections in the political forum in the hope the school districts 
would decide not to use the funds without following the new statutory 
procedures.  We see nothing in the 
challengers' actions that would justify application of either laches or 
estoppel.  As a further ground for 
its argument that challengers' claims are barred, Washakie County School 
District claims the challengers failed to join the contractors and the 
purchasers of the bonds as indispensable parties under Rule 19, W.R.C.P.  However, they cite no authority and make 
no cogent argument for that proposition and, therefore, we decline to address 
it.  Burnham v. Coffinberry, 
2003 WY 109, 76 P.3d 296 (Wyo. 2003).

 

 

 

[¶23]   Wyoming school districts are 
authorized by § 21-13-701 to incur indebtedness for construction of school 
buildings subject to the constitutional limitation that such debt shall not 
exceed ten (10) percent of the assessed value of the taxable property.  Art. 16, § 5.    At the time both the Johnson 
and Washakie County elections occurred, the statute authorized schools to seek 
voter approval of indebtedness for any facilities "which  . . . enables the district to provide 
facilities which are adequate to provide educational programs required" and 
provided, "the purposes for which an indebtedness may be created shall be 
broadly construed."  Section 
21-13-701(b).  Also at that time, 
school districts obtained most of the funding for school facilities through 
property taxes and the state only stepped in after school districts had reached 
90% of their bonded indebtedness limit.  
Section 21-15-107.  In 2002, 
as part of the changes in state financing of capital construction of school 
facilities made in response to Campbell II and III, the state assumed responsibility for 
funding all facilities which are necessary to meet state standards.  In an effort to continue to authorize 
local districts to incur voter-approved debt to construct school facilities, 
however, the legislature amended § 21-13-701 to provide school districts could 
incur such debt for facilities "in excess of statewide standards for the 
adequacy of school buildings and facilities."  Section 21-13-701(b) (LexisNexis 
2002).  If a district chooses to do 
so, the statute now requires school districts to hold at least two (2) public 
hearings before submitting the issue to the voters at which time the school 
board "provides an explanation of the need to obtain district funding for 
building and facility features that are in excess of state standards for 
building and facilities."  Section 
21-13-701(c) (LexisNexis 2002).  The 
legislature established March 11, 2002 as the effective date of that 
amendment.  2002 Sp. Sess., Ch. 51 § 
2.

 

[¶24]   The challengers' objection to the 
use of the funds as proposed by the districts rests on the premise that somehow 
this Court's decisions in Campbell II and III, which spawned the new statutory 
requirement for two public hearings on bonds proposed for local enhancements, 
prohibited the use of bonds which had been approved by elections held when the 
ninety percent requirement, declared unconstitutional in those decisions, was in 
effect.  They do not claim 
the amended statute applied retroactively which, of course, it could not and, by 
its own terms, did not.   
Instead, they are left with the contention that the effect of the 
Campbell II and III decisions, which were issued after the 
Washakie County election, but prior to the Johnson County election, must be read 
to have invalidated the statutes authorizing those elections.  Leaving aside the question of whether a 
court's decision can retroactively invalidate an election as is suggested in the 
Washakie County situation, we believe the fundamental flaw in the challengers' 
premise is the suggestion that the Campbell II and III decisions 
had any effect upon the authority granted to the school districts by § 
21-13-701.  In Campbell II, 
this Court considered the constitutionality of § 21-15-107 which established the 
criteria for state funding of school construction and we held unconstitutional 
the requirement that local districts bond to ninety (90) percent of their 
capacity before they qualified for state funding.  We held the constitution required equal 
funding for all schools and imposed on the state the responsibility for such 
funding for facilities necessary to provide an adequate education to Wyoming's 
children.  We did not hold § 
21-13-701, which authorized districts to incur debt to fund construction of 
school facilities, unconstitutional.  
Nor did we in any way limit the ability of school districts to perform 
their responsibilities by using funds from any source authorized by 
statute.  Instead, we held 
unconstitutional the statute which withheld state funding until the 90% limit 
was met by districts. 

 

[¶25]   In fact, we explicitly stated in 
the last sentence of Campbell II, "[r]ecognizing the time required to 
remedy the constitutional deficiencies in the statutes, we authorize school 
districts to continue to exercise their statutory authority to raise revenues to 
address capital construction needs in the interim."  We do not know how we could have been 
any clearer.  Id. at 
566.  And yet, we went even further 
in Campbell III to clarify that our ruling had no impact upon school 
districts' authority to fund school construction through authorized means and 
stated: 

 

We 
agree with WEA that we must clarify that, from the date of our opinion, all 
bonds in place remain in effect.  
However, school districts are no longer required to have reached bonded 
indebtedness of ninety percent (90%) or more of their constitutional debt 
limitation imposed under  Wyoming 
Constitution, art. 16, § 5 in order to receive state assistance for those 
capital construction projects identified in the MGT study.  In Campbell II, we held that the 
legislature unconstitutionally relied upon local wealth by requiring local 
school districts to resort first to local resources for capital construction and 
to bond to ninety percent (90%) of their capacity before becoming eligible for 
state funding.  Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 21-15-111(e) (Lexis 
1999).

Our 
decisions have neither eliminated nor reduced "local control" as it exists 
today.  On the contrary, we have 
recognized a school district's right to rely upon some local funding to serve 
the purpose of improving the quality of education delivered to its students 
through innovation or modernization.  
The Wyoming Constitution permits school districts to impose bonded 
indebtedness up to a set limit.  We 
have decided that the State cannot take this money from a local school district 
for any purpose.  

 

Id. 
at 331.

 

[¶26]   We will try here again to make it 
clear.  Our constitution requires 
the state to provide funding to all school districts to provide the facilities 
which the state has deemed necessary to meet state standards.  Local school districts may fund local 
enhancements to those facilities from any source authorized by the 
legislature.5  At the time of the elections in Johnson 
and Washakie counties, the statute authorized districts to incur debt to fund 
facilities without the requirement of public hearings or specific explanation by 
the board of why the facilities were needed.  Our decisions in Campbell II 
and III did nothing to change that.  By its own terms, the amended statute 
governing the procedures school districts must now follow to issue bonds for 
school construction does not apply retroactively.   2002 Sp. Sess., Ch. 51 §§ 1, 
2.

 

[¶27]   In each of the Campbell 
cases, this Court has recognized that time is required by the legislature 
and the school districts to make the constitutionally mandated changes.  We have made every effort to assure the 
least disruption possible to the functioning of our public education system 
while those changes are implemented by making our rulings prospective.  In Campbell County School District v. 
Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275 (Wyo. 2000), we honored the prospective nature of 
Campbell I by rejecting the argument that the statutes declared 
unconstitutional by that decision were unenforceable while the legislature acted 
to replace them.  We do the same 
here.

 

[¶28]   We hold Washakie County School 
District No. 1 has authority to use the bond proceeds from the 2000 bond 
election to fund the auditorium and other local enhancements under construction 
in that school district.  Likewise, 
Johnson County School District No. 1 is authorized to sell the bonds authorized 
by the 2001 election and proceed with its plans to construct the Buffalo high 
school with the auditorium and other proposed local 
enhancements.

 

            

 

FOOTNOTES

1This concept of allowing school districts to use otherwise available 
funding sources to fund facilities or programs in excess of those deemed by the 
state to be adequate was introduced in Campbell I and has become known as 
"local enhancements."

 

2"22-21-107.  Contests; 
procedure.   Any five (5) qualified electors of the political 
subdivision may contest an election on the question of the creation of an 
indebtedness upon filing in the district court of any county in which the 
political subdivision is wholly or partially located, within fourteen (14) days 
after the result of the election shall have been determined, a petition alleging 
an error that would change the result of the election, in like form as in other 
cases of contested elections in the district court. The political subdivision 
shall be made defendant, and process shall be served upon the clerk of the 
governing body or other chief clerical officer as in other civil actions. No 
civil action contesting the results of such an election or alleging election 
errors may be commenced

after the expiration of such fourteen (14) day period."

3"§ 
21-13-706.  Execution, 
form and contents of bonds

* * 
*

(b) A bond delivered to the purchaser thereof in the optional 
statutory form shall:

* * 
*

   (iv) If not paid upon presentation at maturity, 
continue to draw interest until the principal thereof is paid in full;

(c) Any resolution of a school district board of trustees 
authorizing bonds may provide that each bond therein authorized shall recite 
that it is issued under the authority of this article. Such recital shall 
conclusively impart full compliance with all the provisions hereof, and all 
bonds issued  containing such  recital shall  be incontestable  for

any 
cause whatsoever after their delivery for value."

4The 
opinion addresses the issue of laches and notes the district court found 
the petitioners withheld their objections and "allowed the Defendants to proceed 
with plans and the start of construction" which suggests the claims were not 
filed within the then applicable ten day period after the election.  

 

5As 
noted in both Campbell I and II, there may come a time when local 
enhancements become the standard. As we said in Campbell I, "local 
enhancement may also result in substantive innovations which should be available 
to all school districts as part of a proper education.  The definition of a proper education is 
not static and necessarily will change.  
Should that change occur as a result of local innovation, all students 
are entitled to the benefit of that change as part of a cost-based, 
state-financed proper education."