Title: In re Trust Estate of Flynn

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-129


 In re Trust Estate of John J. Flynn          Supreme Court

 (Patrick Robins, Katherine Pond,             On Appeal from
 John J. Boylan, Jr. and Kathleen             Chittenden Superior Court
 C. Boylan, Appellants)
                                              February Term, 1992


 Frank G. Mahady, J.


 John J. Boylan, Burlington, for appellants Boylan

 Gerald R. Tarrant, Montpelier, for appellants Robins and Pond

 Clarke A. Gravel and Dennis R. Pearson of Gravel and Shea, Burlington, for
   Appellee Fanny Allen Hospital

 Spencer R. Knapp of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp and John W. O'Donnell,
   Burlington, for appellee Medical Center Hospital

 Paul D. Sheehey of Sheehey, Brue, Gray & Furlong, Burlington, for appellee
   Vermont Catholic Charities

 Carl H. Lisman of Lisman & Lisman, Burlington, for appellee Chittenden Trust
   Company



 PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.), Specially
           Assigned



      GIBSON, J.   Appellants, who lease summer cottage sites from the trust
 estate of John J. Flynn, seek review of the superior court's decision to
 vacate orders of the probate court, which had allowed appellants to
 intervene in a proceeding brought by the trustee of the estate to amend
 another trust estate lease, and which required the appointment of two new
 trustees to replace the existing trustee.  Appellants argue that the
 superior court erred (1) by assuming jurisdiction of the appeal from the
 probate court, (2) by ruling that appellants did not have a sufficient legal
 interest to justify their intervention in the probate proceeding, and (3)
 even if it had jurisdiction, by failing to conduct a de novo hearing on all
 issues raised by the appeal.  We reverse and remand the case to the superior
 court for a further hearing on the trustee's appeal from the probate court
 and for review of the appointment of new trustees.
                                     I.
      In 1989, the Chittenden Trust Company, trustee of the Flynn estate,
 sought (1) a declaratory ruling that the grantor's will permitted the
 trustee to enter into perpetually renewing leases of certain estate lands,
 and (2) a license to amend an existing lease by extending its duration to
 perpetually renewing 92-year terms.  The probate court allowed appellants to
 intervene pursuant to V.R.P.P. 24(b)(2), and then denied the trustee's
 motion for a license to amend the lease.  Approximately eight months later,
 in response to appellants' motion, the probate court ordered the appointment
 of two new trustees and the removal of the Chittenden Trust Company as
 trustee upon the appointment of the new trustees.  The Chittenden Trust
 Company and the beneficiaries of the estate sought de novo review of the
 probate court orders in superior court, which ruled that it had jurisdiction
 over the matter, and that the probate court had abused its discretion by
 allowing appellants to intervene.  Rather than rule on other issues raised
 by the appeal, the superior court vacated the probate orders and remanded
 the case for the probate court to reconsider the trustee's petition in light
 of the superior court's decision to deny party status to appellants.  The
 summer camp tenants now seek review of that order.
                                     II.
      Appellants argue that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to
 consider the issues raised by appellees because appellees were not "injured"
 by the probate court orders, and because the issues raised before the
 superior court were strictly legal issues over which the Vermont Supreme
 Court has exclusive jurisdiction.  See 12 V.S.A. { 2551 ("supreme court
 shall have jurisdiction of questions of law arising in the course of the
 proceedings of the county and probate courts in probate matters"); but cf.
 id. { 2553 ("county court shall have appellate jurisdiction of matters
 originally within the jurisdiction of the probate court"); id. { 2555
 ("person interested in an order, sentence, decree or denial of a probate
 court, who considers himself injured thereby, may appeal therefrom to the
 county court").
      The first component of this argument requires little discussion.
 Persons entitled to appeal an order of the probate court must have some
 legal interest that may be enlarged or diminished by the court's order.
 Lyons v. Field, 106 Vt. 474, 477, 175 A. 11, 12 (1934).  There is no doubt
 that the trustee and the beneficiaries in this matter have legal interests
 that may be enlarged or diminished by orders removing the trustee and
 denying a petition brought by the trustee that arguably could increase the
 estate's assets.  See In re Estate of Bove, 127 Vt. 25, 26,