Title: State v. Washington

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Washington, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4982.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4982 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WASHINGTON, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Washington, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4982.] 
Criminal 
law—Sentencing—R.C. 
2941.25—Multiple 
counts—Merger 
at 
sentencing—Court must review entire record, including arguments and 
information presented at sentencing hearing, to determine whether 
offenses were committed separately or with separate animus. 
(No. 2012-1070—Submitted May 7, 2013—Decided November 14, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 11CA010015,  
2012-Ohio-2117. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When deciding whether to merge multiple offenses at sentencing pursuant to R.C. 
2941.25, a court must review the entire record, including arguments and 
information presented at the sentencing hearing, to determine whether the 
offenses were committed separately or with a separate animus. 
____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we consider the impact of our syllabus in State v. 
Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, which instructs 
courts that a defendant’s conduct “must be considered” when determining 
whether multiple offenses merge at sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2941.25. We hold 
that the court of appeals erred by relying on Johnson for the proposition that a 
court may consider a defendant’s conduct only as it was described by the state’s 
“theory” at trial. 
Background 
{¶ 2} In 2009, a jury found defendant-appellee, David Washington, 
guilty of several offenses, including one third-degree-felony count of failure to 
comply with a police officer under R.C. 2921.331(B) and one fifth-degree-felony 
count of obstruction of official business under R.C. 2921.31(A). 
{¶ 3} The evidence at trial established that Washington and his brother 
attacked a woman in a mall parking lot in Lorain County, stole her SUV, and led 
police on a car and foot chase in Lorain and Cuyahoga counties.  Immediately 
after the carjacking, the victim called 9-1-1, and a police dispatch aired a 
description of the SUV.  Within minutes, Avon police spotted the SUV heading 
east on I-90 toward Cuyahoga County.  When police attempted to initiate a traffic 
stop, Washington accelerated the SUV and began weaving in and out of traffic, 
reaching speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour.  Additional units joined the 
pursuit, including the Westlake police, who were waiting near the Cuyahoga 
County border with stop sticks.  Washington drove over the stop sticks, which 
deflated two of the SUV’s tires, causing it to lose control and strike the median.  
Washington then turned the SUV around and headed the wrong way up an exit 
ramp.  He drove toward a police officer, who fired two rounds at the SUV.  
Washington passed the officer, sideswiped a car stopped at an intersection, and 
continued for approximately one mile until the SUV jumped the curb and stopped 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
in a wooded area.  Washington and his brother abandoned the SUV and fled, with 
several police officers in pursuit.  Soon thereafter, police found Washington 
hiding in a drainage ditch. 
{¶ 4} A jury found Washington guilty of several offenses, including 
failure to comply with the order of a police officer and obstruction of official 
business.  The trial court imposed separate sentences for those two offenses, and 
Washington appealed on the ground that they should have merged at sentencing 
as allied offenses of similar import under R.C. 2941.25.  While his appeal was 
pending, this court released Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 
N.E.2d 1061, which overruled the prior standard for determining whether offenses 
merge at sentencing under R.C. 2941.25.  The Ninth District remanded the matter 
for the trial court to determine whether the offenses were allied offenses under 
Johnson.  State v. Washington, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 10CA009767 and 
10CA009768, 2011-Ohio-1149, ¶ 28. 
{¶ 5} At the resentencing hearing, Washington argued that the offenses 
merged under Johnson because his flight from police amounted to one continuous 
act, beginning on the highway and ending in the woods.  Plaintiff-appellant, the 
state of Ohio, countered that each offense was based on separate conduct.  
Specifically, the state maintained that Washington’s flight from police in the 
motor vehicle established the failure-to-comply offense, whereas his subsequent 
flight from police on foot in the woods established the obstruction-of-official-
business offense.  The trial court agreed with the state, determined that the 
offenses were not allied offenses of similar import, and imposed separate and 
consecutive prison terms for the two offenses. 
{¶ 6} In a divided opinion, the court of appeals reversed, concluding that 
Washington’s offenses merged under Johnson because they were based on the 
same conduct.  State v. Washington, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA010015, 2012-
Ohio-2117, ¶ 17.  Although the state argued at resentencing that the car chase and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
the foot chase constituted separate criminal acts, the court of appeals held that 
Johnson prohibited consideration of that argument because the state did not make 
that distinction during trial.  Id. at ¶ 15, 16.  According to the court of appeals, the 
offenses merged because the state’s “theory at trial” was that the car chase formed 
the basis for both offenses.  Id. at ¶ 16.  The dissent countered that the state’s 
theory at trial was not dispositive of whether the offenses were based on the same 
conduct and that the state was not required to address merger during trial.  Id. at 
¶ 24 (Carr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  According to the dissent, 
the offenses did not merge, because the car chase and the foot chase were separate 
criminal acts, each supported by the evidence.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 7} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal to consider the 
following proposition of law: “The Johnson allied offense analysis is only 
triggered subsequent to findings of guilt as to criminal offenses by a judge or 
jury[;] thus the trial court may base its allied offense decision on any grounds 
supported by the evidence.” 
Motion to Dismiss 
{¶ 8} At the outset, we will address the motion to dismiss filed by 
Washington on July 12, 2013.  On August 31, 2012, after the state filed its notice 
of appeal in the present case, the trial court resentenced Washington in response 
to the court of appeals’ remand, merging the two counts at issue.  Washington 
asks this court to dismiss the instant appeal, alleging that the trial court’s 
resentencing renders the appeal moot.  The state responded, arguing that the trial 
court lost jurisdiction to act when the state filed its notice of appeal to this court. 
 
An appeal is perfected upon the filing of a written notice of 
appeal.  R.C. 2505.04.  Once a case has been appealed, the trial 
court loses jurisdiction except to take action in aid of the appeal.  
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common 
Pleas (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97, 9 O.O.3d 88, 378 N.E.2d 162. 
 
 In re S.J., 106 Ohio St.3d 11, 2005-Ohio-3215, 829 N.E.2d 1207, ¶ 9.  Thus, the 
trial court in this case had no jurisdiction to resentence the defendant once the 
state had filed its notice of appeal.  The motion to dismiss is denied. 
Analysis 
{¶ 9} The state asks us to clarify the effect of Johnson on the standard 
for determining whether “the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import” under R.C. 2941.25(A).  
We hold that while Johnson abandoned a portion of the test for determining 
whether offenses share a “similar import,” it did not change the test for 
determining whether those offenses resulted from the “same conduct.” 
Multiple Punishments, Legislative Intent, and R.C. 2941.25 
{¶ 10} The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause “protects only 
against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense, 
* * * and then only when such occurs in successive proceedings * * *.”  
(Emphasis deleted.)  Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 
L.Ed.2d 450 (1997); State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350, 2012-Ohio-5636, 982 
N.E.2d 684, ¶ 24.  Whether multiple punishments imposed in the same 
proceeding are permissible is a question of legislative intent.  Missouri v. Hunter, 
459 U.S. 359, 365, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). 
{¶ 11} Absent a more specific legislative statement, R.C. 2941.25 is the 
primary indication of the General Assembly’s intent to prohibit or allow multiple 
punishments for two or more offenses resulting from the same conduct.  State v. 
Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 561, 728 N.E.2d 379 (2000).  We have described the 
statute as an attempt to codify the judicial doctrine of merger, State v. Logan, 60 
Ohio St.2d 126, 131, 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979), the penal philosophy that “ ‘where 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
one crime necessarily involves another, * * * the offense so involved is merged in 
the offense of which it is a part,’ ”  State v. Botta, 27 Ohio St.2d 196, 201, 271 
N.E.2d 776 (1971), fn. 1, quoting 21 American Jurisprudence 2d 90 (1965).  In its 
entirety, R.C. 2941.25 provides: 
 
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed 
to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 
indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, 
but the defendant may be convicted of only one. 
(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more 
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two 
or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately 
or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information 
may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be 
convicted of all of them. 
 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2941.25(A) identifies two conditions necessary for merger: 
the offenses must (1) result from the “same conduct” and (2) share a “similar 
import.”  R.C. 2941.25(A); see also Logan at 128 (“In addition to the requirement 
of similar import * * *, the defendant, in order to obtain the protection of R.C. 
2941.25(A), must show that the prosecution has relied upon the same conduct to 
support both offenses charged”).  Restated in the negative, offenses do not merge 
if they were “committed separately” or if the offenses have a “dissimilar import.”  
R.C. 2941.25(B).  In addition to these restrictions, R.C. 2941.25(B) identifies 
another bar to merger for offenses committed “with a separate animus as to each.”  
See State v. Bickerstaff, 10 Ohio St.3d 62, 66, 461 N.E.2d 892 (1984) (describing 
the three bars to merger as “disjunctive in nature”). 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
The Two-Prong Test, Rance, and Johnson 
{¶ 13} For decades, Ohio courts have used a two-prong test to assess the 
import, conduct, and animus components in R.C. 2941.25 when a defendant is 
guilty of multiple offenses.  The first prong looks to the import of the offenses and 
requires a comparison of their elements.  State v. Mitchell, 6 Ohio St.3d 416, 418, 
453 N.E.2d 593 (1983).  If the elements “correspond to such a degree that the 
commission of one offense will result in the commission of the other,” the 
offenses share a similar import.  Id., citing Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 397 N.E.2d 
1345.  Only then can the merger analysis proceed to the second prong. State v. 
Blankenship, 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 117, 526 N.E.2d 816 (1988).  The second prong 
looks to the defendant’s conduct and requires a determination whether the 
offenses were committed separately or with a separate animus. Mitchell at 418; 
Blankenship at 117.  If the offenses were committed by the same conduct and 
with a single animus, the offenses merge.  Mitchell at 418; Blankenship at 117. 
{¶ 14} Over the years, confusion surrounded application of the first prong, 
“similar import.”  While it was clear that the prong required a comparison of the 
elements to determine whether the commission of one offense will result in the 
commission of the other (or equivalent language),1 courts became divided as to 
whether the elements should be viewed in the abstract or in light of the particular 
facts of each case.  We resolved this question in State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 
632, 710 N.E.2d 699 (1999), and clarified that courts should compare the 
statutory elements of the offenses “in the abstract” when determining whether the 
offenses share a similar import under the first prong.  (Emphasis deleted.)  Id. at 
638.  We based our preference for an abstract analysis, in large part, on the 
similar-elements comparison established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 
U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).  Rance at 636; see also United States 
                                                          
 
1 See State v. Preston, 23 Ohio St.3d 64, 65, 491 N.E.2d 685 (1986) (“automatically result”); 
Newark v. Vazirani, 48 Ohio St.3d 81, 83, 549 N.E.2d 520 (1990) (“necessarily results”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) (whether 
offenses are the “same” for double jeopardy purposes depends on the Blockburger 
“same elements” test, not a “same conduct” test). 
{¶ 15} In Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 
1061, we revisited Rance and addressed a certified conflict over the question 
whether felony murder and child endangering shared a similar import under the 
first prong of the R.C. 2941.25 analysis.  Id. at ¶ 1.  In a unanimous syllabus, we 
overruled Rance and held that “the conduct of the accused must be considered” 
when determining whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar import 
subject to merger under R.C. 2941.25.  Id. at syllabus. Beyond the syllabus, 
however, we were divided as to how to consider a defendant’s conduct in the first 
prong’s “similar import” analysis. 
Johnson Did Not Change the Conduct Portion of the Analysis 
{¶ 16} Although Johnson abandoned the abstract component of the first 
prong (similar import), it did not change the second prong (conduct), which has 
always required courts to determine whether the offenses were committed 
separately or with a separate animus.  As we have explained since Johnson, “[t]he 
consideration of a defendant’s conduct in an R.C. 2941.25 analysis is nothing new 
* * *.”  State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 
1245, ¶ 21.  Our approach for addressing the questions of conduct and animus has 
been “to analyze the particular facts of each case before us.”  State v. Jones, 78 
Ohio St.3d 12, 14, 676 N.E.2d 80 (1997); see also State v. Cooper, 104 Ohio 
St.3d 293, 2004-Ohio-6553, 819 N.E.2d 657, ¶ 19.  “This court has generally not 
found the presence or absence of any specific factors to be dispositive * * *.”  
Jones at 14. 
{¶ 17} Contrary to the court of appeals’ view, nothing in Johnson requires 
courts to consider only the evidence and arguments presented by the state at trial.  
For one thing, the binding portion of Johnson, contained in the unanimous 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
syllabus, states only that a defendant’s conduct “must be considered” in an R.C. 
2941.25 analysis.  Johnson at syllabus.  As for the divided opinions within 
Johnson, none espoused the view that a court is limited to the state’s theory of the 
case when determining whether the same conduct supported multiple offenses. 
{¶ 18} Merger is a sentencing question, not an additional burden of proof 
shouldered by the state at trial.  We have consistently recognized that “[t]he 
defendant bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to the protection, 
provided by R.C. 2941.25, against multiple punishments for a single criminal 
act.”  State v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67, 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987); see also 
Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d at 128, 397 N.E.2d 1345 (“the defendant * * * must show 
that the prosecution has relied upon the same conduct to support both offenses 
charged”); Cooper at ¶ 20 (“an offender must demonstrate the state’s reliance on 
the same conduct to prove multiple charges before gaining the protection of R.C. 
2941.25”).  As aptly put by the dissenting judge in the court of appeals, Johnson 
did not “shift the burden to the State to neatly frame at the time of trial all issues 
which arise, if at all, only at a sentencing.”  2012-Ohio-2117, at ¶ 24 (Carr, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 19} Granted, the state’s theory at trial may, in some cases, definitively 
support a finding that the offenses at issue arose from the same conduct.  But it 
may be unhelpful in others.  For instance, if the evidence establishes multiple 
criminal offenses, but the state does not attempt to assign separate conduct to each 
offense, it may be unclear whether the same or separate conduct supported each 
offense.  And in the vast majority of cases—that is, cases resolved by entry of a 
guilty plea—there is no evidence, no opening statement, no closing argument, and 
little upon which a court can rely to discern the state’s theory of the case.  See 
Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) 
(“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
convictions are the result of guilty pleas”).  In those cases, the sentencing hearing 
may be the only source of information relating to merger. 
{¶ 20} Nothing in Ohio’s felony-sentencing statutes prohibits the 
litigation of merger at sentencing.  To the contrary, R.C. 2929.19(B)(1) states that 
the trial court “shall consider * * * any information presented” by the defense or 
the prosecution at the sentencing hearing.  (Emphasis added.)  Further, R.C. 
2929.19(A) allows the state and the defendant to “present information relevant to 
the imposition of sentence in the case.”  On appeal from a felony sentence, the 
reviewing court “shall review the record,” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which includes 
more than the evidence and arguments presented at trial.  R.C. 2953.08(F)(3) 
provides that the record to be reviewed shall include “[a]ny oral or written 
statements made to or by the court at the sentencing hearing.”  See also App.R. 
9(A) (defining what constitutes the “record on appeal in all cases”). 
{¶ 21} Washington does not defend the rationale supporting the court of 
appeals’ refusal to consider the merger information presented by the state at the 
resentencing hearing—and for good reason.  It would be equally unfair to bind a 
defendant to the theories presented at trial without allowing the defendant to 
present merger arguments at sentencing.  For example, if the evidence presented 
at trial established two separate criminal acts, but it is unclear whether the 
prosecution relied on the same conduct to prove both, the defendant could never 
satisfy his or her burden of “show[ing] that the prosecution has relied upon the 
same conduct to support both offenses charged.”  Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d at 128, 
397 N.E.2d 1345. 
{¶ 22} Without disputing the state’s right to argue against merger at 
sentencing generally, Washington asserts that the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
prohibited the state from arguing against merger in this case.  However, for that 
doctrine to prohibit a party from raising an argument, the argument in question 
must be inconsistent with one successfully and “unequivocally” asserted by the 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
same party earlier.  State ex rel. Motor Carrier Serv., Inc. v. Rankin, 135 Ohio 
St.3d 395, 2013-Ohio-1505, 987 N.E.2d 670, ¶ 33.  At trial, the state never argued 
that the car chase was the basis for both the failure-to-comply and obstructing-
official-business offenses.  The state presented evidence of both the car chase and 
the foot chase, and it repeatedly referred to both chases during opening statement 
and closing argument.  In fact, the foot chase could not have established the 
failure-to-comply offense, because that offense requires proof that the defendant 
was “operat[ing] a motor vehicle.”  R.C. 2921.331(B).  At best, it is unclear 
whether the state relied on the foot chase to support the obstructing-official-
business count.  It cannot be said that the state’s argument at trial was inconsistent 
with its argument at the resentencing hearing. 
{¶ 23} Nor are we persuaded by Washington’s argument that we must 
summarily affirm the court of appeals’ judgment in light of Williams, 134 Ohio 
St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245.  Williams stands for the 
proposition that “a reviewing court should review the trial court's R.C. 2941.25 
determination de novo,” id. at ¶ 1, not that a reviewing court should—as the court 
of appeals did here—review only the state’s theory at trial.  By refusing to 
consider the state’s arguments at the resentencing hearing, the court of appeals 
misconstrued Johnson and violated its statutory duty to consider the information 
presented at the sentencing hearing.  See R.C. 2953.08(F)(3) and (G)(2). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 24} We hold that when deciding whether to merge multiple offenses at 
sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, a court must review the entire record, 
including arguments and information presented at the sentencing hearing, to 
determine whether the offenses were committed separately or with a separate 
animus.  The court of appeals erred by looking solely to what it perceived as the 
state’s theory of the case at trial and by refusing to consider the information 
presented at the sentencing hearing.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
court of appeals and remand to the court of appeals for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
Dennis P. Will, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary R. 
Slanczka, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
________________________