Title: Pamela R. Obey v. Thomas J. Halloin, M.D.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 8 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Noah Filppula-McArthur, a minor, by his Guardian 
ad Litem, Janet S. Angus and Lori McArthur, 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
James T. Ball, 
 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Thomas Halloin, M.D., Bellin Memorial Hospital, 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, The 
Medical Protective Company, St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Insurance Company, Physicians Insurance 
of Wisconsin and Green Bay Area Public Schools, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
________________________________________________ 
 
Pamela R. Obey and Tara Cribb, a minor, by her 
Guardian ad Litem, Janet S. Angus,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
James T. Ball,  
 
Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Thomas J. Halloin, M.D., Thomas J. Gallagher, 
M.D., Medical Center Ob-Gyn Associates, 
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund and 
Wisconsin Physician Services,  
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Unknown Insurance Company "ABC", Unknown 
Insurance Company "DEF" and Unknown Insurance 
Company "HIJ",  
 
Defendants.  
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 79 
Reported at:  234 Wis. 2d 245, 610 N.W.2d 201 
2000 WI App 99 
Reported at:  235 Wis. 2d 118, 612 N.W.2d 361 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 13, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
 
2 
Oral Argument: 
November 29, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGES: 
John D. McKay and William M. Atkinson 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating: WILCOX, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Daniel W. Hildebrand, Joseph A. Ranney and DeWitt Ross & Stevens 
S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Daniel W. Hildebrand. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by James R. Gutglass, Sharon R. Long and Gutglass, Erickson & 
Bonville, S.C., Milwaukee, and Steven J. Caulum and Bell, 
Gierhart & Moore, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by James R. 
Gutglass and Robert McCracken. 
 
2001 WI 8 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Noah Filppula-McArthur, a minor, by his  
Guardian ad Litem, Janet S. Angus and  
Lori McArthur,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
James T. Ball,  
 
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Thomas Halloin, M.D., Bellin Memorial  
Hospital, Wisconsin Patients Compensation  
Fund, The Medical Protective Company, St.  
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company,  
Physicians Insurance of Wisconsin and  
Green Bay Area Public Schools,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
_____________________________________________ 
 
Pamela R. Obey and Tara Cribb, a minor by  
her Guardian ad Litem, Janet S. Angus,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
James T. Ball,  
 
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Thomas J. Halloin, M.D., Thomas J.  
Gallagher, M.D., Medical Center Ob-Gyn  
Associates, Wisconsin Patients  
Compensation Fund and Wisconsin Physician  
FILED 
 
FEB 13, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
2 
Services,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Unknown Insurance Company "ABC", Unknown  
Insurance Company "DEF" and Unknown  
Insurance Company "HIJ",  
 
          Defendants. 
 
 
REVIEW of decisions of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Attorney James 
T. Ball (Ball), seeks review in these consolidated actions of 
two published court of appeals decisions, each affirming an 
order revoking his admission to appear pro hac vice before a 
branch of the Brown County Circuit Court.1  Ball also seeks 
review of an order assessing costs and fees against him.  The 
court of appeals concluded that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in revoking Ball's pro hac 
vice admission in either case and also determined that the 
assessment of costs and fees was not an erroneous exercise of 
                     
1 Filppula-McArthur v. Halloin, 2000 WI App 79, 234 Wis. 2d 
245, 610 N.W.2d 201 (affirming the order of the Circuit Court 
for Brown County, John D. McKay, Judge); Obey v. Halloin, 2000 
WI App 99, 235 Wis. 2d 118, 612 N.W.2d 361 (affirming the order 
of the Circuit Court for Brown County, William M. Atkinson, 
Judge).   
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
3 
discretion.2  We agree and accordingly affirm both decisions of 
the court of appeals.   
I 
¶2 
The issues presented arise from two separate medical 
malpractice actions consolidated for our review.  Attorney Ball, 
who is not licensed to practice law in Wisconsin, represented 
the plaintiffs in both cases.  In each case, the circuit court 
admitted Ball to practice before the court pro hac vice,3 but 
subsequently revoked that privilege.  We begin by explaining the 
facts and procedural history of the two cases in turn. 
Filppula-McArthur v. Halloin 
¶3 
Plaintiffs, Noah Filppula-McArthur, a minor, and his 
mother, Lori McArthur, brought this medical malpractice action 
                     
2 After the court of appeals' affirmance of the circuit 
court's orders in both cases, the plaintiffs sought leave to 
proceed in the circuit court under new counsel.  This court 
granted such leave.  Thus, Attorney Ball is the only petitioner 
before this court in both cases.   
3 The term "pro hac vice" describes the temporary permission 
granted to counsel who has not been admitted to practice in a 
particular jurisdiction to appear before the courts of that 
jurisdiction for the purpose of participating in a particular 
case.  Black's Law Dictionary 1227 (7th ed. 1999).  In 
Wisconsin, pro hac vice admission and revocation are controlled 
by Supreme Court Rule 10.03(4) (1998).  The practice has existed 
in Wisconsin since the nineteenth century.  See In re Mosness, 
39 Wis. 509, 510 (1876).  However, only relatively recently has 
this court used the term to describe Wisconsin's practice.  See 
State v. Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 81, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987).   
All subsequent references to the Supreme Court Rules are to 
the 1998 version. 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
4 
against several health care providers and insurers, including 
Thomas 
Halloin, 
M.D., 
the 
obstetrician-gynecologist 
who 
delivered Noah.  The plaintiffs alleged that Noah suffered brain 
damage as a consequence of Dr. Halloin's negligence at the time 
of Noah's delivery.  
¶4 
The complaint was filed in Brown County Circuit Court 
in June 1997, and the case was assigned to Judge John D. McKay. 
 Noah's interests were represented by his guardian ad litem, 
Wisconsin 
attorney 
Janet 
Angus. 
 
Soon 
after 
filing 
the 
complaint, Attorney Angus moved to have Attorney Ball appear pro 
hac vice.  Upon an affidavit of Attorney Ball, in which he 
stated that he was in good standing with the Illinois bar and 
desirous of representing the plaintiffs, Judge McKay admitted 
him to appear pro hac vice in September 1997.  Thereafter Ball 
assumed the role of plaintiffs' lead counsel in the case.4  
¶5 
The record demonstrates several instances of Attorney 
Ball's failure to comply with Judge McKay's orders during the 
discovery and pre-trial phases of the litigation.  In these 
instances Ball's compliance was achieved only by court orders 
issued after defense motions to compel.   
¶6 
Of relevance here is Judge McKay's scheduling order 
which required plaintiffs' expert witnesses to be identified by 
                     
4  Judge McKay later admitted Illinois attorney Ann Herbert, 
a member of Ball's firm, pro hac vice.   
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
5 
April 1, 1998 and deposed by June 1.  The order also required 
discovery to be complete by October 1, with the start of trial 
scheduled for November 2.  However, Ball noticed the deposition 
of Christopher Inglese, M.D., one of Noah's treating physicians, 
to be conducted six days before the scheduled start of trial.  
Dr. Inglese was retained as a treating physician and not as an 
expert witness.  
¶7 
The defendants moved to quash the notice of deposition 
of Dr. Inglese arguing that the scheduling order did not allow 
for depositions to be conducted after October 1.  The circuit 
court agreed and issued an order that reiterated that the 
scheduling order was still in force and disallowed the Inglese 
deposition.5   
¶8 
In addition to reinforcing the scheduling order, the 
court ordered Ball's compliance with an August 1998 order to 
provide defense counsel with a contemplated order of witnesses 
                     
5  Ball also named two experts to be brought in rebuttal and 
noticed their depositions for late October.  These included a 
deposition in California to be conducted twelve days before 
trial and another in Chicago to be conducted three days before 
trial.  The circuit court disallowed these depositions following 
a defense motion to strike.  The defendants argued that the 
scheduling order did not contemplate rebuttal experts, and the 
circuit court reaffirmed the scheduling order.  The circuit 
court also denied Ball's oral motion to amend the scheduling 
order to allow for rebuttal experts and a subsequent motion for 
reconsideration brought by Ball.  Following the mistrial Ball 
again moved for reconsideration of the ruling on rebuttal 
experts.   
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
6 
to be presented at trial.  Ball had failed to comply with that 
order as late as October, explaining to defendants' counsel that 
because the defendants knew when their case-in-chief would begin 
"there is no need for you to know the order of my witnesses."  
Upon a defense motion to compel, the court ordered Ball to 
promptly provide "opposing counsel with specificity, and in good 
faith, the contemplated order of presentation of witnesses."   
¶9 
The ensuing trial began as scheduled on November 2.  
On the first day of trial, Attorney Ball's conduct led the 
court, in Judge McKay's words, to "admonish" Ball on several 
occasions.  During Ball's opening statement to the jury, Judge 
McKay sustained numerous defense objections relating to the 
argumentative nature of Ball's statement and also admonished 
Ball sua sponte at several points.  The court denied a motion 
for mistrial brought by the defendants following Ball's opening 
statement, but expressed its concern that the statement was 
"almost pure argument" in contravention of the court's orders.  
¶10 Although Attorney Ball and his clients avoided a 
mistrial on day one, his conduct on the third day of trial 
brought what was expected to be a three-week trial to an end 
through a mistrial.  The mistrial arose from Attorney Ball's 
questioning of Dr. Christopher Inglese.   
¶11 During his opening statement, Ball stated that Dr. 
Inglese would "testify that Noah's problems are due to hypoxic 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
7 
ishchemic encephalopathy."  Concerned that Attorney Ball would 
attempt to elicit expert testimony regarding the ultimate issues 
in the case from Dr. Inglese, defense counsel brought the matter 
to the court's attention outside of the presence of the jury 
before the witness took the stand.  Statements by the court and 
counsel reveal that Dr. Inglese's testimony was the subject of 
at least one pretrial discussion.   
¶12 Attorney Ball explained to the court that Dr. Inglese 
was not testifying as an expert.  Rather, he was testifying as a 
treating physician:  
ATTY. BALL: I can say that we have not retained Dr. 
Inglese as an expert.  We haven't provided him with 
anything.  He's going to testify as to his treatment 
and his conclusions and his diagnosis now.   
 
The court clarified the allowable bounds of such a witness's 
testimony: 
THE COURT: All right.  And to that extent then, he's 
not entitled to express an opinion regarding the 
liability issues, the causation issues or the damage 
issues.  He's here to offer testimony regarding his 
treatment, and his treatment obviously would include 
his diagnosis.   
¶13 After Attorney Ball made it clear that Dr. Inglese 
might testify to the cause of Noah's condition while explaining 
his diagnoses, the court allowed defense counsel to voir dire 
the witness.  Dr. Inglese explained that he had two diagnoses: 
an anatomic diagnosis and an etiological diagnosis.  The witness 
understood that testimony relating to the etiology, i.e., cause, 
of Noah's condition was to be avoided: 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
8 
 
DR. INGLESE:  If what you'd like me to do is I can 
avoid talking about etiology.  
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  That would be fine, and you would be 
comfortable in doing that and sticking to whatever 
treatment you rendered and the diagnoses that you had. 
  
ATTY. BALL:  I'm not comfortable in doing that, Your 
Honor.  I want to ask him his etiologic diagnosis.   
THE COURT:  Well, his etiological diagnosis, Mr. Ball, 
goes to the very question that is being objected to 
here.   
ATTY. BALL:  That doesn't –- 
THE COURT:  He's not been disclosed as an expert who's 
going to establish liability, cause or damages. 
¶14 After several rounds of questioning of the witness and 
argument by counsel, the following exchange occurred: 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Ball, I've seen this.  We have visited 
this in detail regarding the pretrial of this matter 
and the motions that were made.  This doctor can 
testify as to his diagnosis, his prognosis.  He cannot 
testify as to the ultimate issues in this case being 
liability, cause, or damages.  It's that simple.  
ATTY. BALL:  So he can testify as to his etiologic 
diagnosis only? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: No. 
ATTY. BALL:  That's what he just said.   
THE COURT:  He cannot testify as to the ultimate 
issues in this case; that being liability, cause and 
damages.   
ATTY. BALL:  Understood.  
THE COURT:  To the extent that his etiological 
diagnosis does not address any of those three issues, 
he can testify, but based on what he has indicated in 
voir dire, his etiological diagnosis directly affects 
one of -– at least one of those issues, and he can't 
testify to that.   
¶15 In subsequent argument Attorney Ball attempted to 
persuade the court to allow him to treat Dr. Inglese as an 
expert, even suggesting postponement of his testimony so as to 
provide defense counsel with opportunity to depose the witness. 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
9 
 The court maintained its original position on the permissible 
scope of Dr. Inglese's testimony. 
¶16 Dr. Inglese then took the stand before the jury.  
During the course of direct examination, Attorney Ball proceeded 
to ask a number of prohibited questions relating the cause of 
Noah's injuries.  The first two questions regarding cause faced 
objections that were sustained.  Near the end of his direct 
examination, Ball asked the following series of questions: 
 
ATTY. BALL: I think you indicated that you ruled out 
genetics as a cause for his problems, is that correct? 
DR. INGLESE:  Correct.  
ATTY. BALL:  Were you also able to rule out the 
metabolic cause? 
DR. INGLESE:  We investigated that thoroughly.  We 
found no explanation. 
ATTY. BALL:  Were you also able to rule out infection? 
¶17 At this point defense counsel objected and a sidebar 
was held.  Ball withdrew the last question.  At the conclusion 
of Dr. Inglese's testimony, the defense moved for a mistrial.   
¶18 The following day, after hearing arguments of counsel 
recounting the events of the Inglese testimony, the court 
granted a mistrial.  The court explained that the questions 
eliciting testimony from Dr. Inglese relating to cause were in 
violation of the court's order.  The court noted that Attorney 
Ball's questions as to cause came after at least three sidebars 
and the two occasions in which the court defined the parameters 
of Dr. Inglese's testimony.  In the court's opinion, Ball's 
questioning rendered the case "beyond salvaging." 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
10
¶19 Two months later the court heard the many post-
mistrial motions brought by both sides.  Attorney Ball sought 
reconsideration of substantially every ruling made by the court 
during the course of the trial.  The defendants moved for 
revocation of Attorney Ball's pro hac vice status and for an 
assessment of costs and fees against him for his conduct leading 
to the mistrial.  In response, the court assessed against 
Attorney Ball, personally, costs and reasonable attorney's fees, 
incurred as a result of the mistrial.   
¶20 The circuit court then revoked Attorney Ball's pro hac 
vice status.  In doing so Judge McKay explained that Ball's pro 
hac vice standing was a privilege extended by authority of the 
supreme 
court 
and 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
bears 
the  
"responsibility to ensure professional conduct and compliance 
with the rules of this courtroom."  Judge McKay explained the 
grounds for revocation as follows: 
 
What concerns me is your unwillingness to abide by the 
rules of this Court, your insistence on revisiting ad 
nauseaum virtually every decision that this Court 
renders, your apparent unfamiliarity or disregard for 
the procedural rules of this jurisdiction, and your 
continued failure to heed the admonitions from this 
Court regarding your conduct.   
All of that, sir, has resulted in a mistrial.  It 
has placed your client's cause in . . . potential 
jeopardy.  I cannot –- more importantly, I will not -– 
permit that to continue, nor will I permit it to 
reoccur.  You have abused your privilege before this 
Court.  I therefore revoke that privilege.   
¶21 Attorney Ball and his clients subsequently appealed 
the revocation of his pro hac vice status and the assessment of 
costs.  The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
11
circuit court properly exercised its discretion in revoking 
Ball's pro hac vice admission and in assessing costs against 
him.  Filppula-McArthur v. Halloin, 2000 WI App 79, ¶¶13, 17, 
234 Wis. 2d 245, 610 N.W.2d 201.  The court of appeals found 
that the circuit court reasonably concluded that Ball's "blatant 
failure" to follow the court's orders evinced an unwillingness 
to abide by the rules of professional conduct for attorneys, and 
thus was a valid basis for revocation of pro hac vice under SCR 
10.03(4).  Id. at ¶13. 
Obey v. Halloin 
¶22 The second action is in many ways similar to Filppula-
McArthur.  It too was a medical malpractice action brought in 
Brown County Circuit Court by a mother and child against certain 
medical providers, including Dr. Halloin.  Attorney Janet Angus, 
who again represented the interests of the minor-plaintiff as 
guardian ad litem, began the action in December 1997.  This case 
was assigned to Judge William Atkinson.   
¶23 In September 1998, Attorney Angus moved to have 
Attorney Ball admitted pro hac vice, and upon that motion and an 
affidavit of Ball, Judge Atkinson granted that request.  Ball 
then assumed an active role in the litigation.   
¶24 Several months later, Attorney Ball moved for an order 
"confirming" his pro hac vice status.  Apparently, defendants' 
counsel had suggested that as a result of the revocation in 
Filppula-McArthur, they would contest Ball's pro hac vice 
privilege in Obey.  In response to Ball's preemptive motion, the 
defendants filed an affidavit of Dr. Halloin objecting to 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
12
Attorney Ball's continued involvement in Obey, a copy of Judge 
McKay's order revoking Ball's pro hac vice privilege in 
Filppula-McArthur, and the transcript of the hearing at which 
Judge McKay made his ruling.  At an ensuing hearing the 
defendants explicitly moved for revocation of Ball's status. 
¶25 After hearing argument on the motions, Judge Atkinson 
postponed his ruling.  Judge Atkinson did, however, express his 
concerns about allowing Ball to proceed in his courtroom when 
his conduct in another branch of the same circuit court was 
sufficient to cause revocation of the privilege to appear.  
Judge Atkinson said that he did not want to "submit these 
defendants [and] future Wisconsin jurors, Brown County jurors, 
in this case to the possibility of a mistrial, as was granted by 
[Judge McKay]." 
¶26 Several weeks later, Judge Atkinson issued his order 
revoking Attorney Ball's pro hac vice admission.  Judge Atkinson 
stated that he had reviewed a partial transcript of Filppula-
McArthur, which he noted was a medical malpractice action with 
nearly identical defendants as before him in Obey.  After 
enumerating the reasons given by Judge McKay for revoking Ball's 
privilege, Judge Atkinson undertook consideration of several 
other factors.  First, he noted that Attorney Ball's clients had 
an interest in representation by counsel of their choice.  
Second, he considered the countervailing interest in the 
integrity 
of 
the 
judicial 
system, 
which 
dictated 
"due 
consideration" of Judge McKay's comments.   
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
13
¶27 Third, Judge Atkinson focused on Attorney Ball's 
competence to practice law in a Wisconsin court: 
 
Wisconsin has the benefit of extremely competent 
counsel in all facets of law, including medical 
malpractice cases.  Clearly, there are other attorneys 
who can competently handle this case and represent the 
best interests of the Plaintiffs. 
Attorney 
Ball's 
Illinois 
residence 
does 
not 
preclude him from obtaining a license to practice law 
in the state of Wisconsin.  Mr. Ball can apply for 
Wisconsin licensure and become a member of this 
state's 
bar. . . . Wisconsin's 
continuing 
legal 
education requirements can be utilized by Attorney 
Ball to address practice concerns noted by Judge 
McKay.   
Weighing these factors, Judge Atkinson concluded it was proper 
to revoke Ball's pro hac vice admission.   
¶28 Ball and his clients appealed and the court of appeals 
affirmed.  It concluded that the circuit court had properly 
exercised its discretion by applying the relevant facts to the 
appropriate standard, i.e., SCR 10.03(4), and reaching a 
reasonable conclusion in revoking Ball's pro hac vice admission. 
Obey v. Halloin, 2000 WI App 99, ¶20, 235 Wis. 2d 118, 612 
N.W.2d 361.  In doing so the court of appeals rejected, among 
other arguments, Ball's contention that under SCR 10.03(4) a 
circuit court may not consider conduct that occurred before 
another court.  Id. at ¶10.  The court of appeals noted that  
because SCR 10.03(4) allows revocation of pro hac vice status 
for "'incompetency to represent a client in a Wisconsin court,'" 
the rule "by its terms also applies to conduct that has not 
occurred before the court withdrawing admission."  Id. at ¶¶8-9. 
  
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
14
II 
¶29 This 
case 
presents 
us 
with 
questions 
of 
first 
impression involving the interpretation and application of SCR 
10.03(4), in particular the provisions of the rule controlling 
the revocation of pro hac vice admission to Wisconsin courts.  
The rule reads, in pertinent part: 
 
A judge in this state may allow a nonresident counsel 
to appear in his or her court and participate in a 
particular action or proceeding in association with an 
active member of the state bar of Wisconsin who 
appears and participates in the action or proceeding. 
 Permission to the nonresident lawyer may be withdrawn 
by the judge granting it if the lawyer by his or her 
conduct manifests incompetency to represent a client 
in a Wisconsin court or by his or her unwillingness to 
abide by the rules of professional conduct for 
attorneys and the rules of decorum of the court.   
 
SCR 10.03(4) (emphasis added).6   
¶30 While the parties agree on the standard of review to 
be applied in reviewing a circuit court's decision to revoke an 
attorney's pro hac vice admission under SCR 10.03(4), this court 
has never addressed the issue.  The parties share the opinion 
that the decision is a matter within the circuit court's 
discretion.  We agree.  
¶31 This court has described the power to admit an 
attorney pro hac vice under SCR 10.03(4) as discretionary.  
                     
6 The procedural protections required when a circuit court 
revokes counsel's pro hac vice admission are addressed by this 
court in Jensen v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2001 WI 9, 
_____ Wis. 2d _____, _____ N.W.2d ______. 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
15
State v. Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 82, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987); see 
also State v. Mosley, 201 Wis. 2d 36, 49, 547 N.W.2d 806 (Ct. 
App. 1996).  The power to revoke is likewise a matter within the 
circuit court's discretion and will be upheld absent an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.   
¶32 We will find no erroneous exercise of discretion if 
the record shows that the circuit court reached a reasonable 
conclusion after application of the law to the relevant facts.  
Ness v. Digital Dial Communications, Inc., 227 Wis. 2d 592, 600, 
596 N.W.2d 365 (1999).  Questions regarding the interpretation 
of SCR 10.03(4) that arise during our review of the circuit 
court's exercise of discretion in the actions before us are 
questions of law subject to our independent review.  City of 
West Allis v. Sheedy, 211 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 564 N.W.2d 708 (1997). 
A 
¶33 To provide context, we begin our discussion with a 
review of the history, nature, and purpose of pro hac vice 
admissions.  The privilege to appear in a Wisconsin court pro hac 
vice has been recognized in Wisconsin for more than a century.  
See In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509, 510 (1876); see also State v. 
Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441 (1892) ("A foreign counsel may, 
by special favor, be permitted to appear for his clients in our 
courts.").  The nature of pro hac vice admission to practice 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
16
before Wisconsin courts has not changed since we described it in 
1925: 
As a matter of comity the courts of this state have 
practically 
always . . . cheerfully 
conceded 
the 
privilege to attorneys of sister states to engage in 
the conduct of trials in this state.  But such has 
always been recognized as a privilege extended to such 
outside counsel and not as a right to be claimed on 
their part.   
 
In re Pierce, 189 Wis. 441, 450, 207 N.W. 966 (1926) (citations 
omitted).  Following integration of the state bar, the privilege 
to appear pro hac vice was incorporated into the State Bar Rules 
and their progeny, today's Supreme Court Rules.7   
¶34 When a circuit court grants this privilege, both client 
and counsel benefit.  The client will be represented by counsel 
of his or her choice.  The attorney is excused from the normal 
prerequisites to Wisconsin practice, such as the requisite 
knowledge of Wisconsin law and procedure (as ensured by a bar 
examination or the diploma privilege), character and fitness 
evaluations, and continuing legal education.   
                     
7 Originally, the controlling rule stated: 
Any court in this state may by special permission 
granted by it allow non-resident counsel to appear and 
participate in a particular action or proceeding in 
association with an active member of the State Bar of 
Wisconsin who appears and participates in such action 
or proceeding. 
 
State Bar R. 2, § 4 (1956) (reprinted in Wis. Bar. Bull., Oct. 
1956, at 19).   
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
17
¶35 However, these prerequisites to practice are safeguards 
that ensure ethical and competent representation.  By allowing 
counsel to appear pro hac vice, we have removed the safeguards 
that ensure their clients the same ethical and competent 
representation required of Wisconsin attorneys.  In lieu of such 
safeguards, 
we 
have 
entrusted 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
the 
discretionary power to terminate pro hac vice representation.   
¶36 Today the power to grant and revoke pro hac vice 
admissions is embodied at SCR 10.03(4).  As we explained in 
State v. Lehman, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 81, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987), 
"[t]he purpose of SCR 10.03(4) is to control the unauthorized 
practice of law and assure that the public 'is not put upon or 
damaged by inadequate or unethical counsel.'" 
With 
these 
principles in mind we proceed to review the circuit court's 
discretionary decision to revoke Attorney Ball's pro hac vice 
admission in the cases before us. 
¶37 Under the plain language of SCR 10.03(4), there are 
three bases for revocation of an attorney's pro hac vice status: 
(1) manifestation of incompetency to represent a client in a 
Wisconsin court; (2) unwillingness to abide by the rules of 
professional conduct for attorneys; and (3) unwillingness to 
abide by the rules of decorum.  In light of the plain meaning of 
SCR 10.03(4) and our deferential review of discretionary 
determinations, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
18
erroneously exercise its discretion in revoking Attorney Ball's 
pro hac vice admission in either Filppula-McArthur or Obey.  
¶38 In Filppula-McArthur, the circuit court delineated the 
reasons underlying its decision to revoke Attorney Ball's pro hac 
vice admission.  Judge McKay cited Ball's unwillingness to abide 
by the rules of the court, his insistence on revisiting 
repeatedly the court's decisions, his continued failure to heed 
the admonitions of the court regarding his conduct, and Ball's 
unfamiliarity or disregard for Wisconsin procedural rules.  These 
factors implicate two of the express grounds for revocation under 
SCR 10.03(4); namely an unwillingness to abide by the rules of 
professional conduct for attorneys and the manifestation of 
incompetency to represent a client in a Wisconsin court.  The 
record supports revocation on both grounds.   
¶39 It is professional misconduct for an attorney to 
violate the attorney's oath.  SCR 20:8.4(g); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 12, 22, 510 N.W.2d 129 
(1994).  As part of the attorney's oath an attorney swears that 
he or she "will maintain the respect due to courts of justice and 
judicial officers."  SCR 40.15.  Thus, a failure to maintain due 
respect to the courts may constitute a violation of the rules of 
professional conduct.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Pangman, 216 Wis. 2d 440, 442-43, 574 N.W.2d 232 (1998).   
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
19
¶40 To our knowledge Attorney Ball has never taken 
Wisconsin's attorney's oath.  Nevertheless he is required to 
abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys and is 
 bound by the oath.  See SCR 10.03(4); SCR 20:4.8(g).  Judge 
McKay identified conduct by which Attorney Ball repeatedly 
transgressed this oath.   
¶41 With his pretrial maneuverings, Ball evinced a lack of 
respect for the court and its orders.  However, Attorney Ball's 
disrespect for the court and its rulings was more pronounced 
during the trial.  Rather than heed Judge McKay's admonishments 
during the opening statement, Ball persisted.  Similarly, Ball 
demonstrated intransigence in the face of the court's repeated 
evidentiary rulings regarding the allowable scope of Dr. 
Inglese's testimony.  Rather than preserving his objections on 
the record and proceeding in compliance with the court's 
directives, Ball repeatedly ignored the court's ruling.  Judge 
McKay explained to Ball multiple times that Dr. Inglese was not 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
20
to testify as to cause, yet Ball explicitly asked Dr. Inglese 
questions relating to cause on three separate occasions.8  
¶42 In addition to Ball's unwillingness to abide by the 
rules of professional conduct, the circuit court's decision in 
Filppula-McArthur relied on Ball's "incompetency to represent a 
client in a Wisconsin court."  SCR 10.03(4).  The circuit court 
noted Ball's "unfamiliarity" with Wisconsin's procedural rules.  
The record bears out Judge McKay's determination.  If Attorney 
Ball's transgressions were not the result of willful disregard of 
the procedural rules, most of those mishaps could only be 
explained by an unfamiliarity with the procedural rules.  For 
example, his conduct evinced a lack of familiarity with Wis. 
Stat. § 802.10, which describes the circuit court's prerogative 
in setting deadlines through its scheduling order.  Because 
competency entails "the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation," SCR 
20:1.1, we are satisfied that unfamiliarity with the rules of 
                     
8  In considering Ball's conduct, the court of appeals in 
Filppula-McArthur concluded that Attorney Ball was in violation 
of SCR 20:3.4(c).  As part of the rule entitled "Fairness to 
opposing party and counsel," SCR 20:3.4(c) provides that an 
attorney shall not "knowingly disobey an obligation under the 
rules of the tribunal except for an open refusal based on an 
assertion that no valid obligation exists."  SCR 20:3.4(c).  
Although we agree with the conclusion of the court of appeals 
that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion, we do not base our analysis on this alleged 
violation. 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
21
procedure amounts to incompetence, and this is a reasonable basis 
for pro hac vice revocation.   
¶43 We next turn to our review of Judge Atkinson's exercise 
of discretion in Obey.  Judge Atkinson's decision rests to a 
large extent on Attorney Ball's conduct in Filppula-McArthur and 
Judge McKay's determinations in that case.  However, Judge 
Atkinson engaged in his own review of a partial transcript of 
Filppula-McArthur and then provided his own, more extensive 
ruling explaining his decision to revoke Ball's pro hac vice 
admission. 
 
Because 
Judge 
Atkinson 
reached 
a 
reasonable 
conclusion after applying the appropriate standards to the 
relevant facts we cannot conclude that the decision to revoke in 
Obey was an erroneous exercise of discretion.   
¶44 In Obey Judge Atkinson discussed Judge McKay's ruling 
in Filppula-McArthur, which implicates both an unwillingness to 
abide by the rules of professional conduct and incompetence.  
Thereafter, Judge Atkinson emphasized the latter, demonstrating a 
concern about Attorney Ball's competence to represent clients in 
a Wisconsin court.  As we have stated above, the record 
reasonably supports the conclusion that Attorney Ball manifested 
incompetence in Filppula-McArthur, a case sharing parties, 
subject matter, counsel and closeness in time with the case 
before Judge Atkinson.  As such, there was a reasonable basis for 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
22
Judge Atkinson's discretionary decision to revoke Ball's pro hac 
vice admission.  
¶45 In 
challenging 
the 
circuit 
court's 
exercise 
of 
discretion in Obey, Attorney Ball argues that a circuit court is 
without power to revoke pro hac vice privileges for conduct 
occurring before a different court. Ball also argues that neither 
the doctrine of inherent powers nor the power to disqualify 
counsel allows a circuit court to discipline an attorney for 
conduct occurring before a different court.  He claims that a 
circuit court that does so is disciplining an attorney and is 
usurping the power of the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility (BAPR)9 to investigate and initiate disciplinary 
proceedings against pro hac vice attorneys.   
¶46 Attorney Ball ignores the plain text of the rule 
establishing a circuit court's power to revoke pro hac vice 
admissions.  As the court of appeals explained in Obey, SCR 
10.03(4) allows a circuit court to revoke pro hac vice admission 
when an attorney "manifests incompetency to represent a client in 
a Wisconsin court."  SCR 10.03(4) (emphasis added).  On its face 
SCR 10.03(4) allows a circuit court to consider an attorney's 
                     
9 
 
Effective 
October 
1, 
2000, 
Wisconsin's 
attorney 
disciplinary process was restructured.  The name of the body 
responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases involving 
attorney misconduct was changed from the Board of Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility to the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR).   
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
23
performance in the courts of this state when deciding whether to 
revoke pro hac vice admission.  Judge Atkinson was thus well 
within the bounds of SCR 10.03(4) when he considered the conduct 
that occurred, not merely in a Wisconsin court, but in a 
courtroom across the hall.  
¶47 Attorney Ball also misconstrues the nature of the power 
exercised by the circuit court when revoking pro hac vice 
admission.  Revocation of pro hac vice admission is not a 
function of attorney discipline.  Attorney Ball correctly cites 
SCR 20:8.5(a) for the proposition that BAPR (now OLR) has the 
power to discipline attorneys admitted pro hac vice.10  However, 
the disciplinary authority over pro hac vice counsel is quite 
another matter from the granting and withdrawing of the right to 
appear before a particular court.  The circuit court is the sole 
holder of that power.  Ball incorrectly looks to the doctrine of 
                     
10 Supreme Court Rule 20:8.5, reads in pertinent part:  
(a) Disciplinary Authority.  A lawyer admitted to the 
bar of this state is subject to the disciplinary 
authority of this state regardless of where the 
lawyer's conduct occurs.  A lawyer allowed by a court 
of 
this 
state 
to 
appear 
and 
participate 
in 
a 
proceeding 
in 
that 
court 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
disciplinary authority of this state for conduct that 
occurs in connection with that proceeding.  For the 
same 
conduct, 
a 
lawyer 
may 
be 
subject 
to 
the 
disciplinary authority of both this state and another 
jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted to the bar 
or allowed to appear in a court proceeding. 
 
SCR 20:8.5(a) (emphasis added).   
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
24
inherent powers and the power to disqualify for the source of 
such power, because one need look no further than SCR 10.03(4).   
B 
¶48 While we conclude that the plain language of SCR 
10.03(4) controls the revocation of pro hac vice admissions and 
that under those standards the circuit court properly exercised 
its discretion in both Filppula-McArthur and Obey, we must 
address 
the 
several 
alternatives 
to 
a 
plain 
language 
interpretation of SCR 10.03(4) suggested by Attorney Ball.  Ball 
proposes two substantive standards to be applied under SCR 
10.03(4), and also argues that policy reasons dictate against 
any differential treatment of out-of-state and in-state counsel. 
¶49 First, Ball contends that the pro hac vice revocation 
provisions of SCR 10.03(4) should be read to require revocation 
of pro hac vice admission only for conduct that is "egregious" 
and is "likely to infect future proceedings."  In support of this 
proposition he cites a smattering of case law from various 
jurisdictions which apply this standard.11  
¶50 Ball's proposed standard conflicts with the plain 
language of SCR 10.03(4).  He points to no ambiguity in SCR 
                     
11  Attorney Ball cites the following cases: Koller v. 
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 737 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1984) rev'd on 
other grounds, 472 U.S. 424 (1985); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 
590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979); Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. v. 
Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 660 (D. Kan. 1998); Speer v. Donfeld, 
969 P.2d 193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).   
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
25
10.03(4), and Ball offers no other compelling reason why we 
should open the rule to such a broad interpretation.  Also, the 
case law applying the proposed egregiousness standard is readily 
distinguishable.  In jurisdictions adopting the standard of 
egregiousness, the rules for pro hac vice revocation do not set 
forth the same express standard as SCR 10.03(4).  See, e.g., 
Speer v. Donfeld, 969 P.2d 193, 200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (noting 
lack of standard controlling revocation in applicable rule). 
¶51 Attorney Ball's second proposed standard is that under 
SCR 10.03(4) a court must consider the client's interest in 
representation by the attorney of his or her choice before 
revoking an attorney's pro hac vice admission under SCR 10.03(4). 
 Again, he offers a sampling of extra-jurisdictional case law in 
support of this proposition.12   
¶52 While 
consideration 
of the 
client's 
interest is 
praiseworthy and desirable, there is simply no room to construe 
SCR 10.03(4) as requiring such a consideration.  We note that 
Judge Atkinson specifically considered Attorney Ball's clients' 
interests in the counsel of their choice before making his 
revocation decision in Obey.  We also note that Judge McKay 
                     
12 Attorney Ball cites the following cases in support of 
this proposition: Koller, 737 F.2d 1038, Nuri v. PRC, Inc., 5 
F. Supp. 2d 1299 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 
181 F.R.D. 660; Nault's Auto Sales, Inc., v. American Honda 
Motor Co., 148 F.R.D. 25 (D.N.H. 1993); Matter of Abrams, 465 
N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1984). 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
26
referenced the clients' interests.  We believe it to be a 
desired practice for the court to weigh the interests of the 
client in making its revocation determination, but given the 
plain language of SCR 10.03(4), it cannot be said to be an 
erroneous exercise of discretion to fail to do so. 
¶53 The last of Ball's contentions is that policy reasons 
dictate that a non-Wisconsin attorney's pro hac vice status 
should not be revoked for conduct that would not warrant removal 
of a Wisconsin attorney.  Citing federal precedent for the 
proposition of equal grounds for disqualification, Ball argues 
that subjecting pro hac vice counsel to a "higher standard of 
conduct" will temper the zeal with which they advocate and thus 
lead to a disparity in the quality of representation.13 
¶54 We find numerous flaws in Attorney Ball's position and 
argument.  First and foremost, this argument ignores SCR 
10.03(4).  Attorney Ball offers no suggestion as to how the rule 
comes into play and does not attempt to reconcile his position 
with its plain language.  The existence of the revocation 
provision of SCR 10.03(4) simply belies any contention that 
                     
13 In support of his argument against differential treatment 
Ball cites United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 626 (10th 
Cir. 
1990); Koller 
737 
F.2d 
at 
1054-55; 
and 
Cooper v. 
Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1950).  We note that not 
all federal courts follow this approach.  See, e.g., Mruz v. 
Caring, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing 
local rule allowing revocation of pro hac vice admission for 
failure to abide by scheduled court dates). 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
27
regularly admitted members of the Wisconsin bar and non-Wisconsin 
counsel should be subject to revocation of their admission on 
equal grounds.  
¶55 Attorney Ball's argument against differential treatment 
necessarily implies that we are to read SCR 10.03(4) out of our 
rules.  While we have the power to change the rule, such change 
is generally best accomplished through the rule-making process.  
Our authority to create and amend the Supreme Court Rules is a 
function of our regulatory jurisdiction.  A change in those rules 
is properly achieved through a petition initiating the procedures 
established by our published internal operating procedures and 
SCR Chapter 98.   
¶56 Most problematic with Ball's position is that it 
ignores the fundamental difference between regularly admitted 
counsel and attorneys admitted pro hac vice.  On the one hand, 
members of the Wisconsin bar are, by the very nature of that 
membership, authorized to appear before a Wisconsin court.  On 
the other hand, the long line of case law establishing pro hac 
vice admission in Wisconsin explain that counsel appearing pro 
hac vice are the recipients of a privilege conferred by this 
court.  As our discussion of the history and purpose of pro hac 
vice admission above explains, we are satisfied that the 
differences between pro hac vice counsel and licensed Wisconsin 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
28
attorneys require differential treatment in order to protect the 
public.  
¶57 Ball asserts that differential treatment of pro hac 
vice counsel is tantamount to subjecting them to a heightened 
"standard of conduct."  However, the revocation provisions of 
SCR 10.03(4) do not set the standard of conduct expected of pro 
hac vice counsel at a level higher than that expected of 
regularly admitted counsel.  The standards of conduct expected 
of all attorneys practicing before a Wisconsin court are set by 
SCR Chapters 20 and 62.  While the implications of a violation 
of those standards may be more immediate for attorneys admitted 
pro hac vice, the substantive provisions dictating the conduct 
expected of counsel are the same as those controlling the 
conduct of licensed Wisconsin attorneys.   
¶58 Lastly, Attorney Ball would have us focus on the 
"chilling effect" and the alleged disparity in quality of 
representation that results from the difference in treatment.  
Even if we were to assume that such a disparity exists, it would 
not be an appropriate remedy to lessen the degree of competence 
and ethical integrity we expect of pro hac vice counsel.  The 
appropriate remedy is earnest enforcement of the rules and 
regulations governing Wisconsin attorneys.   
¶59 We conclude our discussion of SCR 10.03(4) by noting 
that we have rejected Ball's arguments regarding heightened 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
29
standards for pro hac vice revocation not only because they lack 
support in the text and history of the rule, but also because 
they would shackle the circuit court's discretionary power which 
serves to protect the public under that rule.  Our courts cannot 
counteract unprofessional conduct by wavering when forced to 
respond to it.  If the rules are infrequently enforced, they will 
be frequently violated. 
III 
¶60 Attorney Ball also challenges the assessment of costs 
against him arising from the mistrial in Filppula-McArthur.  A 
circuit court may impose costs on an attorney whose actions have 
resulted in a mistrial, and we will not disturb that decision 
absent an 
erroneous exercise 
of 
discretion. 
 
Schultz v. 
Darlington Mut. Ins. Co., 181 Wis. 2d 646, 656, 511 N.W.2d 879 
(1994).  Ball's sole challenge to the assessment of costs is that 
the evidentiary ruling regarding Dr. Inglese's testimony was 
erroneous 
and 
therefore 
the 
mistrial 
and 
the 
subsequent 
assessment of costs are premised on an error of law.   
¶61 Essentially, Attorney Ball asks us to revisit the 
granting of the mistrial.  Ball may not challenge the assessment 
of costs on these grounds.  The order granting the mistrial has 
never been appealed, and when seeking review at the court of 
appeals Ball did not argue that the erroneous evidentiary rulings 
undermined the assessment of costs.  Rather, he argued to the 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
30
court of appeals that his conduct was not of the type deserving 
sanctions.  While Ball's clients appealed the evidentiary 
rulings, these arguments were unrelated to assessment of costs. 
Now that his clients are no longer party to the appeal, he seeks 
to bootstrap his clients' evidentiary issue to his personal 
challenge to the assessment of costs.  We will not allow him to 
do so, and we will not revisit the evidentiary ruling or the 
granting of the mistrial.14   
¶62 In the absence of any other challenge to the circuit 
court's discretionary assessment of costs, we note that the 
circuit court attributed the mistrial to Ball's misconduct, the 
same conduct justifying revocation of Ball's pro hac vice status. 
Because the record reveals that the circuit court made a reasoned 
determination that Ball's misconduct precipitated the mistrial, 
we cannot conclude that it erroneously exercised its discretion. 
See Schultz, 181 Wis. 2d at 656-58.   
IV 
¶63 In sum, we conclude that in both Filppula-McArthur and 
Obey, the circuit court properly exercised its discretion under 
                     
14  We do not suggest that the clients in a case such as 
this must accompany their attorney up the appellate ladder so 
the attorney may challenge the order granting a mistrial upon 
which the assessment of costs is premised.  After all, where the 
costs have been assessed against counsel personally, only the 
attorney has an interest in the assessment of costs.  However, 
we require that the attorney properly preserve the basis for his 
challenge to the assessment of costs. 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
31
SCR 10.03(4) in revoking Ball's pro hac vice admission on the 
grounds that he manifested an unwillingness to abide by the 
rules of professional conduct and incompetency to represent a 
client in a Wisconsin court.  In reaching this conclusion we 
reject the various arguments put forth by Ball in support of a 
heightened standard of pro hac vice revocation.  We also 
conclude that the assessment of costs and fees arising from the 
mistrial 
was 
not 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion.  
Accordingly, we affirm both decisions of the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decisions of the court of appeals are 
affirmed. 
¶64 JON P. WILCOX, J. did not participate. 
 
No. 
99-0895 & 99-1103 
 
 
1