Title: Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement v. Grullon

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12784 
 
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT & another1 
vs.  JOSHUA GRULLON. 
 
 
 
Essex.     January 9, 2020. - June 25, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Child support, Modification of judgment.  
Parent and Child, Child support.  Contempt.  Practice, 
Civil, Contempt, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Essex Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on December 12, 2016. 
 
 
A complaint for contempt, filed on July 11, 2018, was heard 
by Randy J. Kaplan, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Anna S. Richardson (Eve C. Savage Elliott & Catherine 
Fisher also present) for the defendant. 
 
David C. Kravitz, Assistant Attorney General, for 
Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Michael Dsida & Andrew Cohen, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
                     
 
1 Radelis Y. Polanco. 
2 
 
 
 
Martin W. Healy & Thomas J. Carey, Jr., for Massachusetts 
Bar Association & others. 
 
Jamie Sabino & Deborah Harris for Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute. 
 
Harvey Weiner & Lincoln A. Rose for Jewish War Veterans of 
the United States of America, Inc. 
 
Ruth A. Bourquin for American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts, Inc. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Joshua Grullon, appeals from a 
civil contempt order and subsequent judgment by a judge of the 
Probate and Family Court on a complaint for unpaid child support 
filed by the defendant's former wife (mother).  At the hearing 
on the complaint, the defendant and the mother appeared pro se, 
and an attorney represented the child support enforcement 
division of the Department of Revenue (department).  Without 
making findings about the defendant's ability to pay $500 to 
prevent incarceration for contempt (purge amount), the judge 
ordered the defendant to spend ten days in jail.  We granted the 
defendant's application for direct appellate review.   The 
defendant raises the issues whether (1) the judge abused her 
discretion in finding the defendant guilty of civil contempt; 
(2) a right to counsel exists for indigent defendants in civil 
contempt proceedings where the defendant faces a realistic risk 
of incarceration; (3) the department fulfilled its statutory 
obligations to assist the noncustodial parent; and (4) the judge 
erred in not accepting the defendant's counterclaim for 
modification.  We hold that it was an abuse of discretion for 
3 
 
 
the judge to hold the defendant in civil contempt, that the 
department did not fulfill its statutory obligations to assist 
the noncustodial parent, and that the judge erred in not 
accepting the defendant's counterclaim for modification.  
Although this case is moot, we reach the merits of these three 
issues because they are "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review" (citation omitted), Commonwealth v. McCulloch, 450 Mass. 
483, 486 (2008), and are issues of public importance and have 
been briefed by both parties, Commonwealth v. Yameen, 401 Mass. 
331, 333 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008 (1988).  We need 
not answer the question whether there is a right to counsel 
where the procedural safeguards or their equivalent are 
provided.2 
 
Background.  We present the relevant facts and procedure.  
The defendant and the mother divorced in November 2017.  The 
divorce judgment provided that defendant pay $123 per week in 
child support (payments) through the department.  In July 2018, 
the mother filed a pro se complaint for civil contempt 
(complaint) in the Probate and Family Court, alleging that the 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
the defendant by the Massachusetts Bar Association, the Boston 
Bar Association, and Mark Spiegel; and the Jewish War Veterans 
of the United States of America, Inc.; and amicus letters 
submitted by the Committee for Public Counsel Services; the 
Massachusetts Law Reform Institute; and the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
4 
 
 
defendant was $3,690 behind in his payments.  The complaint was 
marked "DOR full service case," meaning that the department was 
providing services in the case. 
 
The department served the complaint and summons on the 
defendant on behalf of the mother.  With assistance from 
Veterans Legal Services, the defendant filed an answer and 
counterclaim for modification.3  In his answer, the defendant 
denied that he had "willfully disobeyed a clear and unequivocal 
court order" as he lacked the ability to make his payments due 
to his past incarceration and subsequent difficulty obtaining 
employment.  In the defendant's counterclaim for modification, 
he requested a reduction in the child support order because his 
income had decreased, resulting in a difference between the 
order in place and the proper amount under child support 
guidelines. 
 
The judge held a hearing on the complaint, at which the 
defendant appeared without counsel.  Counsel for the department 
was present and participated at the hearing.  Before the 
hearing, the defendant completed a financial disclosure form, 
stating that his weekly income was $136.24 and that he had fifty 
dollars in weekly expenses.  At the hearing, the department's 
                     
 
3 The summons instructed the defendant to serve his answer 
on the department on behalf of his former wife, and provided the 
department's address.  The defendant mailed his answer and 
counterclaim to the department. 
5 
 
 
attorney reported that the defendant owed $5,636 in payments to 
the mother.4  The judge reviewed the defendant's answer to the 
complaint, observing that the defendant said that he had been 
incarcerated from December 2017 to March 2018 and from July to 
August 2018.5  The department's attorney did not challenge these 
factual assertions.  The defendant informed the judge that he 
was unemployed at the time of the hearing, but that he was 
enrolled in classes in a tractor trailer driver program, with 
his graduation date a few weeks away.  The defendant informed 
the judge that the classes had been paid for through the United 
States Department of Veterans Affairs. 
 
The judge inquired whether the defendant had filed a 
complaint for modification, and the department attorney stated, 
"Not to my knowledge."  The defendant said he had tried to file 
a complaint for modification at a different court.  When the 
judge explained that he had to file the complaint for 
modification at the court where the hearing was being held, the 
defendant responded that he understood and that "It is crystal 
clear.  I actually have an attorney."  The defendant did not 
                     
 
4 The department also reported that the defendant had paid 
$145 in child support payments since the order had entered. 
 
 
5 The defendant told the judge that he "posted a thousand 
some odd bail" and that he had been released on a bail in the 
amount of $750.  The judge did not inquire into whether he paid 
these amounts from his own resources. 
6 
 
 
inform the judge that he had filed a counterclaim for 
modification with his answer to the complaint. 
 
Counsel for the department requested incarceration, subject 
to a $500 purge amount.  At first, the judge opposed 
incarceration, but then ordered it after having an exchange with 
the defendant, in which the judge stated the defendant had a 
"poor attitude."  The judge ordered the defendant to spend ten 
days in jail or pay the $500 purge amount.  The judge further 
ordered that the defendant's weekly child support payments be 
increased to $153.75 per week, an amount that included $30.75 
toward arrearage.  The defendant was unable to pay his $500 
purge amount and was taken into custody and incarcerated, 
serving his full ten-day sentence. 
 
Insofar as relevant here, through counsel, the defendant 
filed a notice of appeal from the civil contempt order and a 
motion to stay the contempt order pending appeal.  At a hearing, 
the judge found that the defendant had complied with the civil 
contempt order, and therefore denied as moot his request to stay 
further contempt proceedings, and instead entered judgment on 
the complaint for civil contempt.  During this hearing, the 
judge again informed the defendant that he had to file and serve 
a complaint for modification.  The defendant, with assistance of 
counsel, filed a complaint for modification that day. 
7 
 
 
 
After a hearing, the judge entered judgment on the 
defendant's complaint for modification, reducing his ongoing 
child support obligation to his requested amount, effective 
retroactively to the date he filed his answer and counterclaim.  
The defendant filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on the 
complaint for civil contempt and renewed his notice of appeal 
from the civil contempt order. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Legal framework.  "Two important public 
policies are furthered by the Massachusetts child support 
scheme:  (1) providing for the best interests of children, and 
(2) ensuring that the taxpayers are secondary to the parents in 
meeting the financial needs of dependent children."  Department 
of Revenue v. Mason M., 439 Mass. 665, 669 (2003).  See G. L. 
c. 119A, § 1 ("It is the public policy of the commonwealth that 
dependent children shall be maintained, as completely as 
possible, from the resources of their parents, thereby relieving 
or avoiding, at least in part, the burden borne by the citizens 
of the commonwealth"). 
 
The department administers the State child support program 
and is the Commonwealth's sole, so-called IV-D agency.  See 
G. L. c. 119A, § 1; 45 C.F.R. § 302.12(a) (2019).   An IV-D 
agency is the single organizational unit within a State "that 
has the responsibility for administering or supervising the 
administration of the State plan under title IV-D of the [Social 
8 
 
 
Security] Act."  45 C.F.R. § 301.1 (2019) ("State plan means the 
State plan for child and spousal support under section 454 of 
the [Social Security] Act").  The department provides IV-D 
services to children and families, including services for the 
"establishment, modification, or enforcement of child support 
obligations."  G. L. c. 119A, § 1A (defining "IV-D services").  
The services provided also include "the enforcement of support 
orders through civil and criminal proceedings."  G. L. c. 119A, 
§ 2 (a).  In addition to the cases for which it provides 
services by statute, the department also "shall accept 
applications for services from individuals seeking to establish, 
modify, or enforce orders of child support."  Id. 
 
Where a department attorney is involved in a case, his or 
her role is to represent the department's interests, not to 
create an attorney-client relationship with an individual who 
may benefit from the IV-D services provided.  G. L. c. 119A, § 3 
(a). 
 
2.  Civil contempt order.  The defendant and the department 
agree that under the facts of this case, the judge erred in 
finding the defendant in civil contempt.  We agree, given that 
the defendant did not receive adequate procedural due process 
protections. 
 
A Probate and Family Court judge has the power and 
authority to find a person in contempt.  G. L. c. 215, § 34.  
9 
 
 
"[A] civil contempt finding [must] be supported by clear and 
convincing evidence of disobedience of a clear and unequivocal 
command."  Birchall, petitioner, 454 Mass. 837, 838-839 (2009).  
Before finding a defendant in civil contempt, the judge must 
find that the defendant had the ability to pay at the time the 
contempt order or judgment is entered.  Furtado v. Furtado, 380 
Mass. 137, 144 (1980).  We review a judge's ultimate finding of 
contempt for an abuse of discretion and we subject questions of 
law to plenary review.  See Warren Gardens Hous. Coop. v. Clark, 
420 Mass. 699, 701 (1995); Martinez v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 94 
Mass. App. Ct. 702, 705 (2019), citing Massachusetts Comm'n 
Against Discrimination v. Wattendorf, 353 Mass. 315, 317 (1967).  
 
In Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011), the United 
States Supreme Court held that in a civil contempt proceeding 
where both parents were unrepresented by counsel and the 
indigent noncustodial parent potentially faced incarceration, it 
was not a violation of the noncustodial parent's Federal due 
process rights to not provide him with counsel.  However, the 
Court emphasized that "the State must nonetheless have in place 
alternative procedures that ensure a fundamentally fair 
determination of the critical incarceration-related question, 
whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support 
order."  Id.  The safeguards identified in Turner "include (1) 
notice to the defendant that his 'ability to pay' is a critical 
10 
 
 
issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the 
equivalent) to elicit relevant financial information; (3) an 
opportunity at the hearing for the defendant to respond to 
statements and questions about his financial status (e.g., those 
triggered by his responses on the form); and (4) an express 
finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to pay."  
Id. at 447-448. 
 
The Federal regulations related to the enforcement of 
support obligations were updated after Turner and required 
states to "establish guidelines for the use of civil contempt 
citations in IV-D cases."  Department of Health & Human 
Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; 
Administration for Children & Families; Flexibility, Efficiency, 
& Modernization in Child Support Enforcement Programs; Final 
Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93492, 93496 (Dec. 20, 2016) (revising 45 
C.F.R. § 303.6[c][4]).  Title 45 C.F.R. § 303.6(c)(4) (2016) 
provides that the guidelines established by an IV-D agency for 
the use of civil contempt citations in IV-D cases must include 
requirements that the agency "(i) Screen the case for 
information regarding the noncustodial parent's ability to pay 
or otherwise comply with the order; (ii) Provide the court with 
such information regarding the noncustodial parent's ability to 
pay, or otherwise comply with the order . . . ; and (iii) 
Provide clear notice to the noncustodial parent that his or her 
11 
 
 
ability to pay constitutes the critical question in the civil 
contempt action."6 
 
The department has memorialized the Federal guidance in a 
civil contempt policy and procedures (policy) memorandum, dated 
March 17, 2017, which the department represents was circulated 
to all department staff in the department.  The policy states, 
inter alia, that "[i]t is [the department's] obligation to 
ensure that there is sufficient evidence that the parent has a 
present ability to pay before . . . assisting with service of a 
pro se customer's complaint for contempt" and that "[a] parent's 
present ability to pay is the key issue at every step of the 
contempt process -- from screening through court hearings." 
 
The defendant was not provided the Turner procedural 
safeguards, or their equivalent, nor did the department follow 
its own policy, in accordance with the Federal regulations.  
First, there is no indication that he received notice "that his 
                     
 
6 "The revised language in [45 C.F.R. § 303.6(c)(4)] sets 
out minimum requirements that IV–D agencies must meet when 
bringing a civil contempt action involving parties in a IV–D 
case and ensures that contempt is used in appropriate cases 
where evidence exists that the noncustodial parent has the 
income and assets to pay the ordered monthly support obligation, 
but willfully fails to do so, and the purge amount or conditions 
are within the noncustodial parent's ability to pay or meet."  
Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services; Administration for Children & Families; 
Flexibility, Efficiency, & Modernization in Child Support 
Enforcement Programs; Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93492, 93534 
(Dec. 20, 2016). 
12 
 
 
'ability to pay' [was] a critical issue in the contempt 
proceeding."  Turner, 564 U.S. at 447.  The department asserts 
that it could have provided this notice when it served the 
defendant with the mother's complaint.  It states that it 
generally includes a notice, entitled "Important Notice 
Regarding Contempt," with the civil contempt complaint that it 
serves.  The notice states, in bold print:  "Your ability to pay 
child support is a critical issue in determining whether or not 
you will be found in contempt."7  However, there is nothing in 
the record to show that the defendant received this notice, and 
the department does not contend that he did.  The forms that the 
defendant did receive did not provide him with notice that his 
ability to pay would be a critical issue in the contempt 
proceeding, and therefore the first safeguard, or its 
equivalent, was not met. 
 
Second, although the defendant filled out a financial 
disclosure form on the day of the contempt hearing that elicited 
his financial information, it is unclear that the department or 
the judge referred to the information he provided on the form.  
See Turner, 564 U.S. at 447.  For instance, it is not clear from 
                     
 
7 The policy states that "[department] staff must include 
the contempt [notice] with every complaint for contempt that is 
sent out for service.  (Staff should also provide the 
noncustodial parent a copy at each hearing on a contempt 
action)." 
13 
 
 
the record whether, before advising the judge that 
"incarceration would be appropriate," the department followed 
the procedures it set for itself, in accordance with the Federal 
regulations.  See 45 C.F.R. § 303.6(c)(4) (must screen case for 
and provide court with information about noncustodial parent's 
ability to pay, or otherwise comply with order).  The defendant 
stated on the financial disclosure form that his gross weekly 
income was $136.24 and that his weekly expenses were fifty 
dollars.  Therefore, his remaining $86.24 income per week was 
$36.76 under his weekly child support obligation of $123 per 
week.  Therefore, the defendant did not have the present ability 
to pay, and the counsel for the department should not have 
requested incarceration.  See 45 C.F.R. § 303.6(c)(4)(iii) 
(incorporated in department's policy).  See also Furtado, 380 
Mass. at 144.  In addition, it is unclear from the transcript of 
the civil contempt hearing whether the judge considered the 
financial information that the defendant listed on the form.  
Based on the lack of discussion at the hearing of the contents 
of the financial disclosure form and the assertion by the 
counsel for the department that the defendant should be 
incarcerated, it appears the defendant's form, although 
complete, was not used in any meaningful manner, and therefore 
this second safeguard, or its equivalent, was not fulfilled. 
14 
 
 
 
Third, the judge did not provide the defendant with an 
opportunity to "respond to statements and questions about his 
financial status (e.g., those triggered by his responses on the 
form)."  Turner, 564 U.S. at 448.  As discussed supra, it does 
not appear that the defendant's statements on his financial 
disclosure form were used in a meaningful way.  The judge's 
questions to the defendant focused on his incarceration and his 
attempts to file a complaint for modification.  She also 
inquired about his school and how he was paying for it.  After 
the department's attorney recommended a $500 purge amount and 
incarceration, the judge initially stated that she was going "to 
put [the matter] over until December" and encouraged the 
defendant to get a job and begin making child support payments.  
It was not until the defendant responded, "She's fine," that the 
judge stated, "Maybe I'll be rethinking what I am going to do 
today."  Once the judge switched from continuing the case to the 
next month to considering incarceration, she did not then pause 
to inquire into whether the defendant had the present ability to 
pay his child support.  For the reasons stated, the defendant 
was not provided with the benefit of the third Turner safeguard, 
or its equivalent. 
 
Fourth, the record also is void of an indication that the 
judge made an express finding that the defendant had the ability 
to pay.  See Turner, 564 U.S. at 448.  A judge must determine 
15 
 
 
both the defendant's ability to pay the underlying child support 
obligation at the time the payment was due and the defendant's 
present ability to pay the purge amount.  See Caveney v. 
Caveney, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 102, 117-118 (2012) (judge expressly 
found defendant had ability to pay purge amount).  See also 
Turner, 564 U.S. at 442, quoting Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 
633 (1988) (civil contemnor "carr[ies] the keys of [his] prison 
in [his] own pockets").  As discussed supra, the transcript 
reveals that the judge decided to find the defendant in civil 
contempt not because of an assessment of his ability to pay, but 
because of his "poor attitude."  This decision by the judge was 
error, as it disregarded the procedural safeguard of ability to 
pay.  See Turner, 546 U.S. at 448; Sodones v. Sodones, 366 Mass. 
121, 130 (1974).  The judge's decision also blurred the line 
between civil contempt, which is remedial in nature, and 
criminal contempt, which is punitive in nature.  See Birchall, 
petitioner, 454 Mass. at 848, quoting Sodones, 366 Mass. at 129-
130 ("aim [of civil contempt] is to coerce the performance of a 
required act by the disobedient party for the benefit of the 
aggrieved complainant," whereas "aim [of criminal contempt] is 
to vindicate the court's authority and to punish the contemnor 
for doing a forbidden act or for failing to act as ordered").  
Moreover, although not determinative to the case, in the 
contempt order, the box next to "the defendant has the ability 
16 
 
 
to pay this order" is not checked.  Therefore, the defendant was 
not provided with the fourth Turner procedural safeguard, or its 
equivalent, nor did the judge engage in the essential inquiry 
whether the defendant was able to pay at the time of the 
proceeding.8  See Furtado, 380 Mass. at 144. 
 
It is apparent that the judge's decision to find the 
defendant in civil contempt was error.  The failure of the 
department and the Probate and Family Court judge to provide the 
Turner procedural safeguards, or their equivalent, or to follow 
Federal regulations, State law, or the department's own policies 
resulted in the defendant wrongfully being held in civil 
                     
 
8 The purge amount of $500 set for the defendant also was 
not set with a determination of his ability to pay, thus again 
ignoring the purpose of a civil contempt.  See Birchall, 
petitioner, 454 Mass. at 848, quoting International Union, 
United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994) 
(contempt "is civil if 'the contemnor is able to purge the 
contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative 
act, and thus "carries the keys of his prison in his own 
pocket"'"); Caveney v. Caveney, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 102, 117-118 
(2012).  See also Department of Health & Human Servs., Office of 
Child Support Enforcement, AT-12-01, Turner v. Rogers Guidance 
at 14 (June 18, 2012) ("in calculating a purge amount, states 
are discouraged from setting standardized purge amounts -- such 
as a fixed dollar amount, a fixed percentage of arrears, or a 
fixed number of monthly payments -- unrelated to actual, 
individual ability to pay.  A purge amount that the noncustodial 
parent is ordered to pay in order to avoid incarceration should 
take into consideration the actual earnings and income as well 
as the subsistence needs of the noncustodial parent.  In 
addition, purge amounts should be based upon a written 
evidentiary finding that the noncustodial parent has the actual 
means to pay the amount from his or her current income or 
assets"). 
17 
 
 
contempt and spending ten days incarcerated.  As such, we vacate 
the contempt judgment.9 
 
We leave open for another day whether, when an indigent 
noncustodial parent receives the procedural safeguards detailed 
above, he or she must be provided with counsel. 
 
3.  Department's obligation toward noncustodial parent.  
The defendant argues that the department had an obligation to 
assist him in his attempt to seek a modification and that it 
failed to fulfill this obligation.  The department contends that 
this argument is waived, moot, and unsupported by the record.  
We determine that the department did not comply with its 
statutory obligation to assist the defendant in his effort to 
seek modification of his child support order. 
 
The department "shall provide IV-D services to children and 
families . . . to establish, modify, and enforce child support 
                     
 
9 We note that although civil contempt is an available 
remedy, its use may not have the desired effect of enforcing 
child support payments for the benefit of the Commonwealth's 
children.  The United States Office of Child Support 
Enforcement, Division of Policy and Training, noted in its 
memorandum on civil contempt:  "States that have reduced their 
over-reliance on contempt proceedings have found that they 
increased collections and reduced costs at the same time.  There 
is no evidence that the routine use of contempt proceedings 
improves collection rates or consistent support payments to 
families."  Department of Health & Human Servs., Office of Child 
Support Enforcement, Final Rule, Civil Contempt -- Ensuring 
Noncustodial Parents Have the Ability to Pay, https:// 
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/fem_final_rule_
civil_contempt.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UJL-TGFV]. 
18 
 
 
obligations.  Said services shall include, through the use of 
expedited administrative and judicial procedures, . . . the 
establishment, modification, and enforcement of child support 
orders . . ." (emphases added).  G. L. c. 119A, § 2.  See G. L. 
c. 119A, § 3B. 
 
As detailed supra, in his answer, the defendant set forth 
his counterclaim for modification.  Then, at the hearing on the 
complaint for civil contempt, the judge inquired whether the 
defendant had filed a complaint for modification.  The defendant 
stated that he had not filed one but that he attempted to file a 
complaint for modification at a different court near where he 
lives, and that he "tried to reach out to [the department] but I 
left a voicemail, too, but no response."  The counsel for the 
department told the judge that there had not been a complaint 
for modification filed.  On the limited record before us, it 
appears that the department did not fulfill its duty of 
assisting the defendant with his request for modification. 
 
4.  Method for filing modification of child support order.  
The defendant next argues that the judge erred by requiring the 
defendant to file a (new) complaint for modification, rather 
than acting on the counterclaim for modification he had included 
in his answer.  The department contends that this issue also is 
waived and moot.  We agree with the Appeals Court's recent 
explanation of the issue of the Probate and Family Court's power 
19 
 
 
to modify a child support order.  See Feinstein v. Feinstein, 95 
Mass. App. Ct. 230, 234 (2019).  "A Probate Court has power to 
modify a support order in the context of either a complaint for 
contempt or a complaint for modification" (citation omitted).  
Id.  "A modification on a complaint for contempt may occur even 
in the absence of a contempt finding."  Id. 
 
Conclusion.  The record demonstrates that the defendant's 
case should not have reached the civil contempt hearing stage 
and that when his case did reach this stage, the department 
failed to follow the Federal regulations and its own procedures, 
and the judge failed to provide the defendant with sufficient 
procedural safeguards.  Therefore, we vacate the civil contempt 
judgment against the defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (concurring).  The court's opinion ably 
demonstrates that the order of civil contempt in this case, 
which resulted in the unjust imprisonment of defendant Joshua 
Grullon for ten days, was the product of a compendium of errors.  
He was effectively denied every procedural safeguard that he is 
entitled to as a matter of due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution:  (1) he was not 
given the required notice "that his 'ability to pay' is a 
critical issue in the contempt proceeding"; (2) he was provided 
with a financial information form, which he filled out, but it 
appears that neither the judge nor the attorney with the child 
support enforcement division of the Department of Revenue 
(department) reviewed it or in any way considered it; (3) no 
apparent inquiry was made into his ability to pay the amount due 
in child support payments; and (4) the judge made no finding 
that the defendant had the ability to pay the purge amount of 
$500.  See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 447-448 (2011).  The 
court correctly vacates the civil contempt order but does not 
reach the question whether there is a constitutional right to 
counsel for indigent defendants in civil contempt proceedings 
who face a realistic risk of incarceration.  The court declares 
that it need not answer that question "where the procedural 
safeguards or their equivalent are provided."  Ante at    . 
2 
 
 
 
 
I do not quarrel with the court's decision not to reach 
this question in this case.  I write separately, however, to 
raise six points. 
 
First, it is important to emphasize the premise that 
underlies the court's rationale for deferring this question -- 
that the procedural safeguards that were denied the defendant in 
this case will be faithfully provided to future defendants.  The 
record in this case is inadequate to allow us to determine 
whether the denial of the procedural safeguards required under 
the Fourteenth Amendment by the Turner decision is the exception 
or the norm in the so-called "DOR session" of the Probate and 
Family Court.  If it emerges over time that it is the norm, or 
more than an isolated exception, a right to counsel would be 
necessary to ensure that these procedural safeguards are 
faithfully applied.  The Supreme Court in Turner attached "an 
important caveat" to its conclusion that the State need not 
provide counsel to a parent in a civil contempt proceeding for 
failure to provide child support -- "the State must . . . have 
in place alternative procedures that ensure a fundamentally fair 
determination of the critical incarceration-related question, 
whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support 
order" (emphasis added).  Turner, 564 U.S. at 435.  If the 
required procedural safeguards are not, in practice, 
consistently applied in the DOR session to "ensure" that a 
3 
 
 
 
thorough inquiry is made into the defendant's ability to pay and 
that a judge makes a careful finding by clear and convincing 
evidence regarding the defendant's ability to pay, then the 
caveat would not be satisfied and a right to counsel would be 
required under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
Second, because a finding of civil contempt may result in a 
loss of liberty, the standard of proof is a demanding one:  
"clear and convincing evidence of disobedience of a clear and 
unequivocal command."  Birchall, petitioner, 454 Mass. 837, 838-
839 (2009) (Birchall).  The violation of the court's order must 
be wilful, which means there must be clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant had the ability to pay the amount 
ordered.  See Salvesen v. Salvesen, 370 Mass. 608, 611 (1976), 
citing Sodones v. Sodones, Mass. 366 Mass. 121, 130 (1974) ("A 
person judged in civil contempt may not be sentenced to prison 
for failure to pay a compensatory sum of money if he shows that 
he is unable to comply").  See also Commonwealth v. Henry, 475 
Mass. 117, 121 (2016) ("A defendant can be found in violation of 
a probationary condition only where the violation was wilful, 
and the failure to make a restitution payment that the 
probationer is unable to pay is not a wilful violation of 
probation").  In fact, a "jail term is a coercive civil contempt 
sanction rather than a punitive criminal contempt sanction" only 
4 
 
 
 
"because the contemnor retains the ability to obtain his [or 
her] release from custody by paying an amount he [or she] is 
able to pay."  Birchall, 454 Mass. at 849.  Therefore, as here, 
where a purge amount was ordered to be paid forthwith, there 
must be a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant has the ability to pay that purge amount. 
 
Third, the Supreme Court in Turner recognized that "the 
critical question likely at issue in these cases concerns . . . 
the defendant's ability to pay."  Turner, 564 U.S. at 446.  But 
the Court declared that a defendant's ability to pay is "often 
closely related to the question of the defendant's indigence," 
and concluded that, because courts routinely make an indigency 
finding at the beginning of a criminal case to determine whether 
a defendant is entitled to appointed counsel, a finding of 
ability to pay in many cases will be similarly 
"straightforward."  Id.  I believe this analogy is misleading.  
If we were to provide a right to counsel where the department 
seeks incarceration of a noncustodial spouse through an order of 
civil contempt, the right would be limited only to indigent 
defendants, but that would not mean that every defendant who 
would be entitled to counsel would, as a consequence of the 
finding of indigency, be entitled to a finding of not guilty on 
the charge of civil contempt because of his or her inability to 
pay.  The issue of ability to pay in civil contempt cases is far 
5 
 
 
 
more complex than an indigency determination regarding a 
defendant's entitlement to counsel, in part because it may 
include findings regarding a defendant's imputed income, that 
is, the amount he or she could earn but chooses not to earn.  
See C. Kindregan, M. McBrien, & P.A. Kindregan, Family Law and 
Practice § 92:4 (4th ed. 2013) (judge may hold defendant in 
civil contempt not only where judge has determined that 
defendant has sufficient assets to satisfy support obligations, 
but may also consider such matters as whether defendant has 
voluntarily left employment or stripped self of assets). 
 
Fourth, our Massachusetts case law provides a right to 
counsel in circumstances where the Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process clause does not.  Therefore, even if there were no such 
right under the United States Constitution, there may yet be a 
right under Massachusetts law.  For instance, in Massachusetts a 
defendant has a right to counsel in a probation revocation 
proceeding "whenever imprisonment palpably may result from a 
violation of probation."  Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 
125 (2010), citing Williams v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 732, 737 
(1966) ("'simple justice' requires that, absent waiver, a 
probationer is entitled to assistance of counsel").  The Supreme 
Court, however, has declined to recognize a right to counsel in 
probation revocation cases.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778, 790 (1973).  This court has held that indigent parents have 
6 
 
 
 
a "constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in a 
contested proceeding to terminate parental rights."  See 
Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1, 6 (1979).1  
The Supreme Court has found otherwise under the United States 
Constitution.  See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of 
Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (Constitution 
does not require appointment of counsel for indigent parents in 
every parental status termination proceeding). 
 
Fifth, where a defendant faces the risk of incarceration 
for failure to pay a fine, we have declared that an indigent 
defendant has a right to counsel.  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 
407 Mass. 206, 211 (1990).  If a defendant is entitled to 
counsel when he or she faces the risk of incarceration for 
failing to pay a fine, it is fair to ask why the same right 
would not apply where a defendant faces the risk of 
incarceration for failing to pay a court-ordered child support 
payment. 
                     
1 See also L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate & Family 
Court Dep’t, 474 Mass. 231, 242 (2016) ("when an indigent, 
unrepresented parent seeks. . . to remove a guardian for a minor 
child and thereby regain custody of the child, the parent has a 
due process right to counsel to prosecute the petition" where 
parent makes colorable claim for removal); Guardianship of V.V., 
470 Mass. 590, 594 (2015) (indigent parent whose child is 
subject of guardianship petition has right to have counsel 
appointed); Adoption of Meaghan, 461 Mass. 1006, 1007 (2012) 
(indigent parents have right to counsel in termination and 
adoption proceedings initiated by would-be adoptive parents). 
7 
 
 
 
 
The distinction appropriately made in response to this 
question, and one highlighted by the Supreme Court in Turner, is 
that where the party "opposing the defendant at the hearing is 
not the government represented by counsel but the custodial 
parent unrepresented by counsel," (emphasis in original), 
Turner, 564 U.S. at 446, "[a] requirement that the State provide 
counsel to the noncustodial parent in these cases could create 
an asymmetry of representation that would 'alter significantly 
the nature of the proceeding,'"  id. at 447, quoting Gagnon, 411 
U.S. at 787.  I certainly appreciate the risk of such "an 
asymmetry of representation" where the spouse who has failed to 
pay child support, for whatever reason, is granted a right to 
counsel and the custodial spouse who is owed child support 
payments is not.  But this asymmetry only exists where the 
custodial spouse is without the assistance of counsel.  Where 
the attorney for the department is at the contempt hearing 
seeking to enforce a child support order through a finding of 
contempt, the custodial spouse is not the attorney's client (the 
department is the client), but the interests of the custodial 
spouse and the department attorney are closely aligned.  The 
"asymmetry" appropriately feared by the Supreme Court in Turner 
does not exist where the department appears in court seeking a 
finding of contempt to enforce a child support order. 
8 
 
 
 
 
Sixth, the concern about an "asymmetry of representation" 
suggests that civil contempt proceedings regarding child custody 
payments are always a zero-sum game, but that is often not the 
case.  The goal of the hearing should be the provision of child 
support, as ordered by the judge, but incarceration for civil 
contempt may not always be the most effective way to accomplish 
that goal, as illustrated by this case.  Here, the defendant was 
ordered incarcerated when he was just weeks away from graduation 
from the New England Tractor Trailer School, whose tuition was 
being paid by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs 
through its vocational rehabilitation program.  The record does 
not reflect whether his incarceration prevented his graduation 
from that program, but even if it did not, it certainly put his 
graduation at risk and therefore risked diminishing his 
subsequent ability to find stable work in the trucking industry 
that would enable him to make his child support payments. 
 
An appointed attorney would certainly assist a defendant in 
proving that the defendant should not be imprisoned for contempt 
because he or she was unable to pay the amount ordered or any 
designated purge amount.  But a more able appointed attorney, 
with the help of the resources of the Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, might also help a defendant to pay more child 
9 
 
 
 
support in the future.2  For instance, an attorney could help the 
defendant to obtain financial counselling that could enable the 
defendant to increase future income by applying for public 
benefits to which the defendant is entitled or by helping the 
defendant to find job training opportunities.  Or the financial 
counselling may help the defendant to cut expenses, thereby 
freeing up income that can be devoted to pay child support. 
 
I therefore concur with the court's opinion in this case, 
and will await a case that provides a more complete record as to 
whether the constitutionally required procedural safeguards are 
being complied with in DOR sessions throughout the Commonwealth, 
where the question regarding a right to counsel that was 
deferred by this court might need to be answered. 
                     
2 The children and family law division of the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services lists a number of social service 
resources for parents like the defendant.  See http:// 
publiccounsel.net/cafl/professional/social-servicessocial-work/ 
[https://perma.cc/5E5A-96P6].