Title: Psychemedics Corp. v. City of Boston

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12903 
 
PSYCHEMEDICS CORPORATION  vs.  CITY OF BOSTON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 9, 2020. - January 29, 2021. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Indemnity.  Contract, Municipality, Indemnity, Construction of 
contract.  Notice.  Practice, Civil, Summary judgment.  
Waiver.  Proximate Cause.  Estoppel.  Judicial Estoppel. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 7, 2017. 
 
 
The case was heard by Mitchell H. Kaplan, J., on a motion 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Thomas S. Fitzpatrick (Courtney Simmons also present) for 
the defendant. 
Peter A. Biagetti (Joel D. Rothman also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
 
                     
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
and authored this opinion prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
  
LENK, J.  For over twenty years, the city of Boston (city) 
has contracted with Psychemedics Corporation (Psychemedics) to 
conduct hair follicle tests for the Boston police department to 
screen for the use of illicit drugs by police officers and 
recruits.  The contracts have included an indemnification clause 
(article 7.3) in which Psychemedics agreed to "assume the 
defense of" the city, and to "hold [it] harmless" from all suits 
and claims arising from "wrongful or negligent" acts by 
Psychemedics.2 
 
Long after a number of officers, who had been terminated in 
connection with positive drug hair tests by Psychemedics, 
brought suit against the city, Psychemedics sought declaratory 
relief on the ground that it had no duty to indemnify the city, 
because the city had not "allowed" it to assume the defense of 
those cases.  The city, however, maintained that it had informed 
Psychemedics repeatedly, both orally and in writing, of its 
contractual obligation to defend and hold the city harmless from 
certain claims arising from Psychemedics's purported negligence.  
The city also brought counterclaims alleging breach of contract 
and seeking declaratory relief. 
                     
 
2 After the events at issue here, the clause was modified to 
provide for indemnification for Psychemedics's "tasks, 
functions, and responsibilities," rather than its "wrongful or 
negligent" conduct or omissions. 
3 
 
 
A Superior Court judge, relying on the substance of 
communications that the parties agreed took place between them,3 
construed these communications as meaning that the city indeed 
had deprived Psychemedics of the opportunity of assuming the 
defense.  On that basis, the judge granted Psychemedics's motion 
for summary judgment.4  The city appealed, and we transferred the 
case to this court on our own motion. 
 
Where, as here, the parties do not specify the proper form 
of notice or what would constitute the opportunity to defend, we 
must decide what constitutes, as a matter of law, the provision 
of such notice and opportunity.  See Browning-Ferris Indus., 
Inc. v. Casella Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 79 Mass. App. Ct. 
300, 312 (2011), quoting Fay, Spofford & Thorndike, Inc. v. 
Massachusetts Port Auth., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 336, 342 (1979) 
("Where the parties to a contract have not agreed with respect 
to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights 
and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances will 
be supplied by the court").  We conclude that, in the absence of 
any specific contractual provisions by the parties, a simple 
                     
 
3 Other key portions of the communications were hotly 
disputed. 
 
 
4 Because of his decision on the duty to defend, the judge 
did not reach Psychemedics's other claims, any one of which, it 
asserted, would have required that summary judgment be entered 
in its favor.  The judge also did not reach the city's 
counterclaims. 
4 
 
statement of claims that are encompassed by the indemnification 
clause is sufficient to trigger the obligation to assume the 
defense; the notice need not be in writing or in any particular 
form of words, and the indemnitee need not explicitly ask for 
the assumption of the defense or to hold the indemnitee 
harmless.  Once notice has been received, the burden shifts to 
the indemnitor proactively to attempt to assume the defense.  To 
attempt proactively to assume the defense entails good faith 
efforts promptly to assume and control the defense of the claims 
asserted.5 
 
Given this, and on the record before us, we conclude that 
Psychemedics did not meet its burden to establish by undisputed 
facts that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Accordingly, the allowance of summary judgment and the entry of 
a declaratory judgment in Psychemedics's favor were incorrect. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Parties' prior course of dealing.  
Beginning in 1998, the city entered into a series of contracts6 
with Psychemedics for hair follicle testing services.7  The tests 
                     
5 If the scope of coverage is contested, this might be done 
under a reservation of rights. 
 
 
6 The contracts generally were renewed annually, although 
the first contract was for eighteen months, and the 2013 and 
2016 contracts each covered a period of three years. 
 
 
7 The city previously had conducted random drug testing of 
officers through urinalysis.  It abandoned that method after 
5 
 
were conducted on recruits and officers of the Boston police 
department.  When a test returned a positive result, as 
indicated by criteria set forth in Psychemedics's standard 
operating procedures, a review process was triggered.  The 
review included a second, "safety net" test.  If that test, too, 
returned a positive result, the employee would be subject to a 
disciplinary hearing.  At the end of the process, the police 
commissioner made the final determination as to the action to be 
taken against the officer, including termination. 
 
Some scientific research at the time the parties entered 
into their first contract had cast doubt upon the efficacy of 
hair follicle tests, and had raised questions as to whether the 
method was racially biased.  Critics noted, inter alia, that 
environmental exposure to drugs could contaminate hair samples, 
and that melanin content in hair, as well as hair texture (often 
associated with race or ethnicity) had a significant impact on 
the test results, leading to potential racial bias.  The city 
sought and obtained assurances from Psychemedics with respect to 
the accuracy of its tests in identifying voluntary ingestion and 
the absence of racial bias. 
                     
this court held in Guiney v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 411 Mass. 
328, 333-334 (1991), that random urinalysis testing constituted 
an unreasonable search and seizure under art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
6 
 
 
b.  Litigation related to the hair follicle tests.  Between 
2001 and 2006, ten Boston police officers challenged their 
terminations (pursuant to positive results from Psychemedics's 
hair drug tests) before the Civil Service Commission 
(commission).  In 2013, six officers succeeded in obtaining 
reversals of their terminations.  See Thompson v. Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 462, 470-471 (2016).  A Superior Court 
judge affirmed the commission's decision that the officers 
should be reinstated, and increased the amount of back pay to be 
awarded to them.  The Appeals Court affirmed.  See id. 
 
Eight officers also joined in a civil rights action against 
the city and its police department, alleging disparate impact 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e et seq.  See Jones v. Boston, 845 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 
2016) (Jones III); Jones v. Boston, 752 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(Jones I); Jones v. Boston, 118 F. Supp. 3d. 425 (D. Mass. 2015) 
(Jones II).  The plaintiffs in the Jones case asserted that 
Psychemedics's hair tests disproportionately yielded false 
positives for people of color, resulting in disparate impact by 
race.  See Jones I, supra at 45.  The parties await a final 
determination in the Jones matter, following a jury-waived trial 
in 2018.  See Jones III, supra at 38 (remanding for further 
proceedings on question whether city refused to adopt testing 
method that would have reduced disparate impact of hair test). 
7 
 
 
The racial bias claims are not themselves before us.  We 
instead examine whether Psychemedics met its burden to establish 
that the city did not "allow" it to assume the defense of 
certain litigation and that Psychemedics thereby was relieved of 
its contractual obligations pursuant to article 7.3. 
 
c.  Contract provisions.  The initial contract, based on 
one of the city's standard agreements for outside contractors, 
was executed in 1998; it has been renewed regularly since then, 
with the most recent three-year agreement signed in 2016.  The 
two clauses at issue here -- articles 7.3 and 8.2 -- were 
largely consistent across the various contracts.8  Article 7.3 
provided: 
                     
 
8 This language remained virtually identical from 1998 to 
2008 (the period of the testing at issue here), when article 7.3 
was revised to provide, "The Contractor shall assume the defense 
of and hold the City, its officers, agents or employees, 
harmless from all suits and claims against them or any of them 
arising from tasks, functions, and responsibilities the 
Contractor is obligated to perform under the contract before 
performance of services is complete and after performance of 
services if the service of work product fails to conform to 
specifications.  This shall include Contractor's obligations to 
conduct testing and convey test results to the designated 
recipient.  The Contractor shall not assume the defense of nor 
hold the City, its officers, agents or employees, harmless from 
suits and claims resulting from tasks or functions the City or 
its agents perform.  The City shall assume the defense of and 
hold the Contractor [its] officers, agents or employees, 
harmless from all suits and claims against them or any of them 
arising from the City's collection, handling and submission by 
the City of test samples, application of the City's personnel 
policies, and the interpretation, use and confidential treatment 
by the City of the test results."  (Emphasis supplied.) 
8 
 
"The Contractor [(Psychemedics)] shall assume the defense 
of and hold the City, its officers, agents or employees, 
harmless from all suits and claims against them or any of 
them arising from any wrongful or negligent act or omission 
of the Contractor, its agents or employees in any way 
connected with performance under this Contract." 
 
Article 8.2 stated:9 
 
 
"If the damages sustained by the City resulting from the 
Contractor's wrongful or negligent acts or omissions exceed 
sums due or to become due, the Contractor shall pay the 
difference to the City." 
 
 
d.  City's requests for assistance.  The parties agree 
that, beginning in 2006, the city communicated with Psychemedics 
regarding the subject of indemnification.  They also agree as to 
the content and nature of certain of these communications, and, 
because it is upon these undisputed communications that the 
judge relied in awarding summary judgment to Psychemedics, we 
begin our analysis by focusing on them as well. 
 
In early 2006, the city orally requested in some form that 
Psychemedics share in the defense costs of the Jones case.  The 
record does not contain details as to the words exchanged during 
this communication.  Psychemedics's letter in response, however, 
                     
 
 
Article 8.2 also was slightly revised to state, "If the 
damages sustained by the City resulting from tasks, functions, 
and responsibilities the Contractor is obligated to perform 
under the contract exceed sums due or to become due, the 
Contractor shall pay the difference to the City upon demand" 
(emphasis supplied). 
 
9 The city relied upon article 8.2 in its counterclaims.  
See discussion, infra. 
9 
 
dated February 15, 2006, indicates that the city requested that 
Psychemedics "share in the out-of-pocket costs to hire an 
outside attorney to represent the [c]ity in the Jones et al. 
case."  Psychemedics declined, but offered to make its 
scientific and legal staff available to assist the city, without 
charge. 
 
On June 9, 2006, the city sent a letter to Psychemedics 
reiterating its request for financial contribution to the 
defense case in Jones I, 752 F.3d at 45.  In that letter, the 
city quoted article 7.3 of the parties' contract, the 
indemnification clause, and stated, "The conduct alleged in the 
[Jones] Complaint is wrongful or negligent conduct on the part 
of Psychemedics Corporation."  The letter suggested that cost 
sharing would be reasonable "in light of the alternative remedy 
provided for in the contract."  Psychemedics replied in writing 
on June 19, 2006, and again declined to contribute financially.  
It asserted that article 7.3 was not applicable because 
Psychemedics had yet to be adjudicated negligent,10 and 
reiterated the offer of technical support. 
 
The parties dispute whether, in 2006, a "cooperation 
agreement" was reached between Psychemedics and the city stating 
that, in lieu of a financial contribution to, or assumption of 
                     
 
10 Psychemedics since has disavowed this argument. 
10 
 
the defense of the ongoing lawsuits, Psychemedics would provide 
free legal and scientific expertise.  In October 2007, the city 
filed a motion in the Jones case, seeking leave to file a third-
party complaint for indemnification and contribution against 
Psychemedics.  The motion was denied. 
 
At that point, there was a lull in the parties' 
communications about indemnification; Psychemedics provided a 
disputed amount of technical and legal assistance at points 
during the more than ten-year period of litigation, in the Jones 
case and the appeals before the commission.  The city continued 
to contract with Psychemedics for drug testing services, and 
also continued its own defense of Psychemedics's testing before 
the commission and in the Jones case.  Although the extent of 
its contribution and the terms under which that contribution was 
made are contested, Psychemedics supported the ongoing 
litigation through its legal and scientific staff. 
 
Ten years passed.  In February 2017, the city orally 
requested that Psychemedics indemnify it for expenses and losses 
connected to the Jones case and the commission appeals.  In July 
of that year, the city reiterated the request in an electronic 
mail message.  The message demanded "indemnification from 
Psychemedics in connection with its liability and costs in [the 
Jones and commission matters], including anticipated settlement 
payments, pursuant to the [c]ity's contracts with 
11 
 
[Psychemedics], which the [c]ity maintains requires 
indemnification for all suits and claims against the [c]ity 
arising from any wrongful or negligent act or omission of 
Psychemedics, its agents, or employees." 
 
In August 2017, Psychemedics filed the instant complaint in 
the Superior Court, seeking a judgment declaring that the city 
is not entitled to indemnification from Psychemedics for 
liability and costs related to the Federal civil rights suit and 
the commission appeals (count one).  The complaint also 
contained claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, quantum meruit, unjust 
enrichment, estoppel, and detrimental reliance. 
 
The city denied liability as to all counts and asserted 
counterclaims for declaratory relief and breach of contract.  
Psychemedics moved for summary judgment on its affirmative 
claims and for declaratory relief on the city's counterclaims.11  
A Superior Court judge granted Psychemedics's motion on count 
one after concluding that "the [c]ity breached the 
indemnification clause by not allowing Psychemedics to assume 
the defense of the civil-rights lawsuits [against the city]."  
The judge stated that, as a result of this determination, there 
                     
 
11 The city did not file a cross motion for summary 
judgment. 
12 
 
was no need to reach Psychemedics's other claims or the city's 
counterclaims, and he did not do so. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The key issue in this case is whether the 
judge erred in allowing Psychemedics's motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that the city had not allowed it to 
assume the defense of the lawsuits, and thus that Psychemedics 
had no obligation under article 7.3 to defend and indemnify the 
city.  We conclude that he did. 
 
We also briefly address the city's counterclaims, and three 
other arguments by Psychemedics in favor of summary judgment, 
that the judge viewed as moot.  Psychemedics had argued that 
(1) the city orally waived its rights to indemnification after 
it and Psychemedics entered into an oral arrangement for 
technical and legal support; (2) Psychemedics was not the 
proximate cause of the city's damages, as the police 
commissioner, and not Psychemedics, made the employment 
decisions; and (3) the city was estopped from claiming 
Psychemedics's tests were flawed after arguing otherwise in 
previous and then-ongoing litigation in State and Federal 
courts.  We conclude that the judge incorrectly decided that 
summary judgment in favor of Psychemedics on count one of its 
complaint effectively disposed of, among other things, the 
city's counterclaims based on article 8.2 of the parties' 
13 
 
contract.  Further, on the record before us, Psychemedics has 
not shown an entitlement to summary judgment on any other basis. 
 
a.  Standard of review.  We review a motion for summary 
judgment de novo.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 
(1974); Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635, 
637 (2012).  In doing so, we must determine "whether, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
all material facts have been established and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Augat, Inc. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991), citing Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002).  We also 
review de novo a judge's "interpretation of the meaning of a 
term in a contract."  See Balles v. Babcock Power Inc., 476 
Mass. 565, 571 (2017), quoting EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness, 473 
Mass. 540, 549 (2016). 
 
b.  Duty to defend under article 7.3.  We must determine 
whether, in this case, the judge erred in concluding that the 
city did not "allow" Psychemedics to assume the defense, and 
that the city therefore was not entitled to indemnification.  
The city maintains that it provided more than adequate notice of 
the need for a defense, it did nothing to prevent Psychemedics 
from assuming the defense, and Psychemedics then failed to 
perform its duty under article 7.3 to defend and indemnify the 
city. 
14 
 
 
To enforce an indemnification clause, the indemnitee first 
must give the indemnitor "notice and an opportunity to defend."  
Trustees of the N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R. v. Tileston & Hollingsworth 
Co., 345 Mass. 727, 732 (1963) (Trustees).  See Pasquale v. 
Shore, 343 Mass. 239, 243-244 (1961).  The indemnitee then must 
allow the indemnitor to take over the defense (if it attempts to 
do so), and must not later block the indemnitor from doing so. 
 
Parties may agree to any reasonable prerequisites for 
providing notice of the need for indemnification and the 
tendering of a defense.  See Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n v. 
Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 422 Mass. 318, 320 (1996), quoting 
Smith v. The Ferncliff, 306 U.S. 444, 450 (1939) ("[t]he general 
rule of our law is freedom of contract").  See, e.g., Cheschi v. 
Boston Edison Co., 39 Mass. App. Ct. 133, 142 (1995) (where 
contract required notice be "prompt," delay relieved indemnitor 
of obligation).  If, on the other hand, the notice procedures 
necessary to invoke indemnification are not explicitly set forth 
in the contract, "no particular form of words is necessary" to 
present notice and the opportunity to assume the defense.  
Bowditch v. E.T. Slattery Co., 263 Mass. 496, 499 (1928). 
 
Once notice and the opportunity to defend are proffered, 
the indemnitor is on the proverbial hook for claims that it has 
promised to indemnify.  "When a person is responsible over to 
another, either by operation of law or by express contract, and 
15 
 
he is duly notified of the pendency of the suit, and requested 
to take upon him the defence of it, he is no longer regarded as 
a stranger, because he has the right to appear and defend the 
action, and has the same means and advantages of controverting 
the claim as if he was the real and nominal party upon the 
record.  In every such case, if due notice is given to such 
person, the judgment, if obtained without fraud or collusion, 
will be conclusive against him, whether he has appeared or not" 
(citation omitted).  Boston v. Worthington, 10 Gray 496, 498–499 
(1858), and cases cited. 
 
For reasons that are unclear, the parties here did not 
specify any requirements to effect notice of a request for 
indemnification or the tendering of a defense.  See, e.g., 
Trustees, 345 Mass. at 732 (contract contained no "demand or 
request").  Article 7.3 provided only that Psychemedics "shall 
assume the defense of and hold the [c]ity . . . harmless" 
(emphasis supplied).  Therefore, a simple statement of the 
existence of allegations of conduct covered by the 
indemnification provision would suffice to provide notice.  See, 
e.g., Trustees, supra; Bowditch, 263 Mass. at 499; Worthington, 
10 Gray at 499. 
 
The judge, however, stated that, while no specific form of 
words was required to establish adequate notice, "the indemnitee 
must make it clear that it is calling upon the indemnitor to 
16 
 
take over the case or be responsible for an adverse outcome," 
and decided that 
"there is simply no evidence that the [c]ity provided 
Psychemedics with either explicit or implicit demands that 
they provide a defense in Jones or the [commission] 
appeals.  Rather, it is undisputed that the [c]ity 
immediately assumed the defense in both matters and there 
is nothing in the summary judgment record indicating that 
the [c]ity discussed Psychemedics'[s] defense obligations 
under [a]rticle 7.3 before doing so." 
 
In so doing, the judge went astray in several respects.  First, 
rather than viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
city, as he was required to do in considering a motion for 
summary judgment, the judge appears to have viewed written 
communications in the record in Psychemedics's favor, and to 
have placed the burden on the city, as the nonmoving party, to 
prove that it did (or did not) do something.  See Ajemian v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., 478 Mass. 169, 171 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 1327 (2018) (on summary judgment, facts are viewed in light 
most favorable to nonmoving party).  In this sense, the judge 
approached the question as though he were the trier of fact, 
making credibility determinations and resolving material 
disputes of fact that appropriately should be resolved at a 
future trial.  Second, in stating that the facts were 
undisputed, the judge disregarded multiple material disputes of 
fact.  This appears to be related to the first error; having 
acted essentially as the trier of fact, the judge concluded that 
17 
 
there were no material factual disputes.  Third, he applied an 
incorrect standard of law to a situation where the parties' 
agreement does not contain explicit notice provisions.  Fourth, 
the judge conflated the legal question of the adequacy of the 
notice provided by the city with the factual questions whether 
the city subsequently thwarted or rejected any efforts by 
Psychemedics to defend, or waived any right to a defense.  We 
address each in turn. 
 
i.  Facts disputed or resolved in favor of Psychemedics.  
In a June 9, 2006, letter, noting as the subject, "Jones, et al. 
v. City of Boston et al., United States District Court, Civil 
Action No. 05-11832-GAO," the city presented its "request that 
Psychemedics Corporation contribute financially to the defense" 
of the Jones lawsuit, and outlined that 
"Article 7.3 of the contract between the [city] and 
[Psychemedics] provides that Psychemedics 'shall assume the 
defense of and hold the [c]ity . . . harmless from all 
suits and claims against [it] arising from any wrongful or 
negligent act or omission of [Psychemedics].'  The conduct 
alleged in the Plaintiff's Complaint is wrongful or 
negligent conduct on the part of [Psychemedics].  The 
[c]ity's request that you share in the cost of . . . 
defending this suit is a reasonable one in light of the 
alternative remedy provided for in the contract." 
 
 
The judge took this to mean that the city was aware that it 
"could but was not demanding that Psychemedics take over the 
18 
 
defense of Jones."12  In so doing, the judge improperly resolved 
the disputed question of waiver in favor of Psychemedics, 
required the city to have met an incorrect legal standard for 
notice, and conflated the questions of notice, opportunity to 
defend, and later efforts to thwart the defense.  Had he instead 
viewed the letter in the light most favorable to the city as 
nonmoving party, it would have established not a lack of notice, 
but the contrary, that the city had, no later than June 2006, 
alerted Psychemedics in writing that claims encompassed by the 
contractual indemnification clause had arisen.  The burden was 
on Psychemedics, not on the city, to show on undisputed facts -- 
or on facts taken in the light most favorable to the city -- 
that the city then did not allow Psychemedics to take on the 
defense.  See part 2.b.ii, infra.  By relying on the letter 
alone, which is all that is contained in the summary judgment 
record, Psychemedics did not meet this burden.  Compare 
Pasquale, 343 Mass. at 243 (oral notice that indemnitee was 
                     
 
12 Notwithstanding the judge's conclusion that there were no 
material disputes of fact, the record indicates that critical 
facts are contested, including with respect to the substance and 
intent of the communications between the city and Psychemedics, 
portions of which are included in the parties' later statements.  
See note 13, infra.  With respect to the city's initial notice, 
for example, it first may have been provided in January of 2006, 
during a telephone call the content of which is in part 
disputed.  See Richstein v. Welch, 197 Mass. 224, 230 (1908) 
("while formal notice in writing, because of the ease and 
accuracy of proof thereby afforded, is desirable, yet it may be 
oral"). 
19 
 
"getting sued," that indemnitor was "liable," and that "it was 
his duty to defend" was sufficient notice to tender defense). 
 
Moreover, in a June 19, 2006, letter discussing the city's 
need for a defense, Psychemedics responded: 
"[N]o reasonable interpretation of the [a]rticle 7.3 
language would sweep in any allegation of negligence or a 
wrongful act with respect to our drug tests. . . .  [The] 
language [of the provision] only applies to instances in 
which an act or omission by Psychemedics is adjudicated to 
be wrongful or negligent, not merely claimed as so." 
 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the city as nonmoving 
party, this letter underscores that, as of at least June 19, 
2006, Psychemedics both was aware of the city's claims and 
foreswore any contractual indemnification obligation, including 
the duty to defend, until such time as a judicial finding of 
liability was obtained.13  See CSX Transp., Inc. vs. 
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 06-40211-
FDS (D. Mass. July 27, 2011), citing Trustees, 345 Mass. at 732 
("once an indemnitor has declined to furnish a defense, an 
indemnitee should be at liberty to weigh the advantages of 
                     
 
13 The parties also dispute whether, as Psychemedics claims, 
they entered into a separate support agreement, and the city 
consequently waived its right to indemnification.  The judge 
appears to have disregarded these contested issues, which 
preclude summary judgment.  Further, the decision apparently 
settled these disputed matters in favor of Psychemedics, the 
moving party, rather than in favor of the city as nonmoving 
party.  See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 478 Mass. 169, 171 (2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1327 (2018). 
20 
 
settlement against the risk of trial, with the certainty that a 
subsequent court will not disturb the outcome"). 
 
ii.  Standard to establish tender of an opportunity to 
defend. The judge also applied an improper standard to determine 
whether the city afforded Psychemedics notice and the 
opportunity to defend.  The judge concluded that the city's June 
2006 "suggestion that it is Psychemedic[s]'s obligation as 
indemnitor to come forward and insist upon the right to assume 
the defense is simply not supported by the Massachusetts case 
law, which although old is nonetheless binding on this court."  
The judge's determination that an explicit call to action had to 
be made by the city, demanding Psychemedics come forward and 
take up the defense, appears to have been based on a 
misapprehension of the notice standard, and a misplaced emphasis 
on Consolidated Hand-Method Lasting Mach. Co. v. Bradley, 171 
Mass. 127 (1898) (Bradley).14  See, e.g., Pasquale, 343 Mass. at 
                     
 
14 In Consolidated Hand-Method Lasting Mach. Co. v. Bradley, 
171 Mass. 127, 132 (1898) (Bradley), a case in which the claims 
sought to be indemnified were, unlike here, not covered by the 
contract between the parties, the court held: 
 
"Whatever may be the form of such a notice, we think that, 
under the circumstances in which it is given, it should 
call upon the person notified to come in and defend the 
suit, or should offer him an opportunity of doing so.  The 
party notifying cannot insist upon retaining control of the 
defence, and yet hold the party notified bound by the 
result of the suit. . . .  [T]he notice must be such in 
substance as to give the person notified the information 
21 
 
243 ("no particular form of words is necessary if it is evident 
that the giver intended to charge the receiver therewith" 
[quotation and citation omitted]). 
 
An indemnitee is "not bound to make any formal and explicit 
demand," beyond providing information alerting the indemnitor to 
the existence of the claim.  See, e.g., Trustees, 345 Mass. 
at 731-733.  In Worthington, 10 Gray at 499, decided in 1858, 
for example, the indemnitors were "informed when [the] writ [of 
the plaintiff in the underlying action] was returnable; that he 
had sued for an injury received on a day named, by a defect in 
the highway, called Congress Square, in a place occupied by [the 
indemnitors]; they were directed to take notice that the 
[indemnitees] would hold those responsible who had the charge 
and custody of the place of the accident; and [the indemnitors] 
were required to govern themselves accordingly.  They were not, 
in terms, requested to take upon themselves the defence of that 
action.  And this was not necessary in order to render the 
judgment conclusive against them as to the facts thereby 
established" (emphasis supplied). 
 
Likewise, in a 1928 decision, we held that "[t]here [was] 
no force in the contention that the notice here given was 
                     
that he is called upon to come in and defend the suit, or 
that he is given an opportunity to do so, and that if he 
does not defend it he will be held responsible for the 
result." 
22 
 
insufficient, because it did not in terms state that the 
[indemnitor] would be held responsible if the result should be 
unfavorable."  Bowditch, 263 Mass. at 499.  Although we agreed 
that notice would be ineffectual "unless it made evident that 
the giver intended to charge the receiver therewith," id., 
citing Bradley, 171 Mass. at 132, we reiterated that "no 
particular form of words is necessary," Bowditch, supra.  In 
that case, "[t]he notice, taken with the words of the 
contract . . . [made] manifest the intent to charge the 
[indemnitor] with the result of the action."  Id. 
 
Otherwise put, the degree of detail required to indicate an 
intent to charge the indemnitor with the defense depends in no 
small part on the relationship between the parties and the 
particular context.  Where the parties have an existing 
contractual relationship -- albeit, as here, one lacking 
specificity as to what constitutes adequate notice of claims 
requiring a defense -- it takes very little on the part of the 
indemnitee to indicate an intent to charge the indemnitor with 
the defense, as the obligation already has been agreed upon.  
"When there is an express agreement of indemnity in a contract, 
a claim for indemnity accrues when there is a breach of that 
provision."  Fall River Hous. Auth. v. H.V. Collins Co., 414 
Mass. 10, 13 (1992).  See id. at 13-14, citing Ryan Stevedoring 
Co. v. Pan–Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 130 (1956) (formal 
23 
 
indemnity bond creates independent contract right to recovery, 
as "if a person were injured due to [the indemnitor's] 
negligence, then a breach of contract would occur when [the 
indemnitee] pays damages to the injured person because [the 
indemnitor] expressly agreed to pay such damages.  Consequently, 
a claim against [the indemnitor] for contractual indemnity would 
accrue from the time the indemnity provision was breached").  
See, e.g., Miller v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. 291 Mass. 
445, 448-449 (1935) (where claims against insured clearly fell 
under insurance policy, notice and opportunity to defend bound 
insurer to indemnify insured, even though insurer refused to 
defend case); Bowditch, 263 Mass. at 498-499 (where real estate 
agreement included indemnification of seller by purchaser, 
notice of suit by broker who later filed claim seeking 
commission that was not part of contract was sufficient even 
where notice "did not in terms state that the [purchaser] would 
be held responsible if the result should be unfavorable"); 
Richstein v. Welch, 197 Mass. 224, 230–231 (1908) (oral notice 
of easement dispute between plaintiff, with covenant of warranty 
from defendant, and third party was sufficient to provide 
warrantor notice and opportunity to defend).15 
                     
15 The same is true in situations where a preexisting duty 
of some kind exists.  See, e.g., Boston v. Worthington, 10 Gray 
496, 498-499 (1858) (tenants were bound by judgment against city 
24 
 
 
Where, unlike here, the putative indemnitor and the 
indemnitee have no existing relationship, and no evident duty,16 
by contrast, the indemnitor must be told explicitly of the need 
for it to defend.  For example, in Bradley, 171 Mass. at 129, 
the plaintiff company had an agreement with the defendants that 
they would furnish lamps and electricity to light the 
plaintiff's premises.  After one of the plaintiff's employees 
was killed by touching a defective lamp, and his next of kin 
successfully sued his employer, the plaintiff commenced an 
action against the defendants seeking to recover the amount of 
the judgment and the defense costs of the previous suit.  Id. 
at 128-129.  The court concluded that the putative notice17 did 
                     
for injury caused by their failure to remedy defect in premises 
even though lease prohibited alterations; although not 
explicitly requested to "take upon him the defence," tenants had 
notice of claims sufficient to render them liable to city); 
Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 32 F.2d 182, 
182-184 (2d Cir. 1929) (gangway installer was liable for costs 
incurred when employee who was injured using gangway sued dry 
dock employer, who subsequently sought indemnification from 
gangway installer; installer had had notice and opportunity to 
defend in prior suit, which determined gangway was defective, 
and thus was on notice of need to defend in suit for 
indemnification). 
 
 
16 Indemnification also "is a common-law right available to 
one who is 'without fault, [and] compelled by operation of law 
to defend himself against the wrongful act of another.'"  Thomas 
v. EDI Specialists, Inc., 437 Mass. 536, 538 n.1 (2002), quoting 
Santos v. Chrysler Corp., 430 Mass. 198, 217 (1999). 
 
 
17 The putative notice in Bradley, 171 Mass. at 129, a 
letter from the plaintiffs to the defendants, stated, 
25 
 
not present an opportunity to defend, because the claims were 
not encompassed by the agreement between the parties, and thus 
could not, as a matter of law, bind the defendants.  Id. at 133.  
The court noted that the defendants' counsel "might well doubt 
whether this suit was one which [they] were required to defend," 
because the defendants' possible liability to the plaintiff, 
under a claim of breach of contract, was obvious, but liability 
to an employee's next of kin was not.  Id. at 132, 134.  Thus, 
where it was unclear if the defendants could be liable for the 
claims, the court held that "[w]hatever may be the form of such 
a notice, we think that, under the circumstances in which it is 
given, it should call upon the person notified to come in and 
defend the suit, or should offer him an opportunity of doing so" 
(emphasis supplied).  Id. at 132.  The court concluded that 
                     
 
"Boston, Mass., May 31, 1893.  Messrs. Bradley & Woodruff, 
234 Congress St., Boston, Mass.  Dear Sir:  The suit of 
Tierney v. Consolidated Hand-Method Lasting Machine Company 
for the death of John Tierney, January 1, 1891, when he was 
killed, the result of touching or holding the electric 
light apparatus in the room occupied by the Machine 
Company, where the electricity was furnished by you, will 
come on for trial on Monday next, in the second session of 
the Superior Court.  We hope and expect to be able to win 
the case and thus relieve the parties from liability.  In 
case, however, we should be beaten, we shall look to you to 
recompense the Machine Company; and we shall expect you to 
assist in the conduct of the defence of the case.  Yours 
truly, Strout & Coolidge, Attorneys for C. H. M. L. Machine 
Co." 
26 
 
notice of the suit by the next of kin was not sufficient, in 
those circumstances, to provide notice and an opportunity to 
defend such that the defendants would be liable.  Id. at 135. 
 
While Bradley is often cited for its seminal statement of 
principal requiring notice and an opportunity to defend, its 
call for explicit language from the indemnitee requiring the 
indemnitor to act is not.  Indeed, an extremely limited number 
of cases have come anywhere close to following Bradley's 
requirement of an explicit demand for action.18  As the court 
explained in Pasquale, 343 Mass. at 243, 
"In [Bradley, 171 Mass. at 132,] this court, with citation 
of earlier cases, said that the notice, whatever its form, 
'should call upon the person notified to come in and defend 
the suit, or should offer him an opportunity of doing so.  
The party notifying cannot insist upon retaining control of 
the defence. . . .  [In substance there must be notice] 
that if he does not defend . . . he will be held 
responsible for the result.'  Although this statement was 
not necessary to the decision, the case 'is a leading case 
on the subject,' Buhl v. Viera, 328 Mass. 201, 203 
[(1952)], and in plain terms it shows the great 
advisability of unequivocal written notice to the party 
sought to be charged.  Nevertheless an oral notice may 
serve ([Richstein, 197 Mass. at 231]; see Chamberlain v. 
Preble, 11 Allen 370, 374 [(1865)]; Bowditch[, 263 Mass. 
at] 499), and no particular form of words is necessary if 
                     
 
18 See Keljikian v. Star Brewing Co., 303 Mass. 53, 54 
(1939) (restaurateur sued by customer who was injured by act of 
third party on premises could not bind third party to judgment 
where third party had no notice at all); Boston & Me. R.R. v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 252 Mass. 432, 438-439 (1925) (applying 
Bradley to hold that notice of claims against insured did not 
bind insurer to undertake defense of case where third party 
alleged injury from fire at insured's property, but did, with 
judgment against insured, render insurer liable to insured 
afterward). 
27 
 
it is 'evident that the giver intended to charge the 
receiver therewith'" (emphasis supplied). 
 
 
The low burden for the provision of notice and an 
opportunity to defend is not inequitable where, as here, a 
contract includes indemnification provisions.  While parties are 
free to negotiate a higher bar by including specific language as 
to what would constitute adequate notice of claims requiring 
defense and indemnification, even a bare-bones indemnification 
provision nonetheless sets forth the types of claims covered.  
In it, the parties prescribe certain occurrences against which 
the indemnitee must be protected, and against which the 
indemnitor agrees to defend and hold the indemnitee harmless.19 
It may fairly be presupposed -- insofar as that is the purpose 
of an indemnification agreement -- that the indemnitor would be 
aware of the type of conduct that would require it to tender a 
defense against claims arising therefrom.  See Pasquale, 343 
Mass. at 243.  Mandating that an indemnitor wait to be asked 
explicitly to defend against an occurrence that it has been 
notified took place, where to do so is the only course of action 
open to it without a breach of the contract, is superfluous and 
serves only to create delay.  By entering into an 
indemnification agreement concerning that specific conduct, the 
                     
19 Here, those claims are described in article 7.3 as 
arising from Psychemedics's "wrongful or negligent" acts. 
28 
 
parties have negotiated their rights and responsibilities in the 
event such an occurrence were to take place, and the only 
appropriate course for the indemnitor upon learning of its 
existence is to act.  See id. at 245-246.  Compare Fireside 
Motors, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 395 Mass. 366, 
371-372 (1985). 
 
Recent decisions in those few courts in other jurisdictions 
to have addressed the issue are consistent with this position.  
In Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 44 Cal. 4th 541, 553-
554 (2008), for example, the Supreme Court of California held 
that notice of claims embraced by an indemnity clause was 
sufficient to transfer the burden to the indemnitor to assume 
the defense.  In that case, the indemnitee (a developer-builder) 
sought declaratory relief against the indemnitor (a 
subcontractor).  The defense was "tendered" through a cross 
complaint.  Id. at 548 & n.2.  The court concluded: 
"A contractual promise to 'defend' another against 
specified claims clearly connotes an obligation of active 
responsibility, from the outset, for the promisee's defense 
against such claims.  The duty promised is to render, or 
fund, the service of providing a defense on the promisee's 
behalf -- a duty that necessarily arises as soon as such 
claims are made against the promisee, and may continue 
until they have been resolved." 
 
Id. at 553-554. 
 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin also has addressed the 
adequacy of a tender of defense and has come to the same 
29 
 
conclusion.  See Towne Realty, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 201 Wis. 
2d 260, 268 (1996).  In that case, the indemnitee -- the 
insured -- sent a letter notifying the insurer of the claim for 
the purposes of "review and discussion," and announcing that the 
insured had retained its own attorney.  Id. at 264-265.  The 
letter did not specifically ask the insurer to assume the 
defense.  The court held that, "if it is unclear or ambiguous 
whether the insured wishes the insurer to defend the suit, it 
becomes the responsibility of the insurer to communicate with 
the insured before the insurer unilaterally forgoes the 
defense."  Id. at 269.  This burden, the court noted, should not 
be too onerous, as a simple letter requesting clarification is 
sufficient, and if "the insured is uncooperative or 
unresponsive, the insurer need not pursue the matter further."  
Id. at 269 n.2. 
 
iii.  Whether the city provided Psychemedics notice and an 
opportunity to defend.  Viewed in the light most favorable to 
the city as nonmoving party, the city informed Psychemedics, in 
its June 2006 letter, that the Jones case stated claims of 
negligence and wrongdoing by Psychemedics with respect to the 
hair follicle tests, claims that necessitated a defense that 
Psychemedics contractually was obligated to provide.  While the 
city did not in so many words call on Psychemedics to "assume 
the defense," "[t]he express requirement of the contract to give 
30 
 
'opportunity to defend' imposed no greater duty in respect of 
notice and tender of defense than do the established rules for 
binding an indemnitor to the result of a pending action."  See 
Pasquale, 343 Mass. at 243; Bowditch, 263 at 499 (there is no 
requirement that notice "in terms state that the defendant would 
be held responsible if the result should be unfavorable," and 
exchange of letters provided notice that claims had been 
raised).  See also Trustees of N.Y., 345 Mass. at 732 ("The 
numerous communications between [the parties], culminating in 
the [indemnitor's] denial of liability, make it clear that 
sufficient 'notice and an opportunity to defend' were given"). 
 
Although the language of the notice in some ways is similar 
to that in Bradley, the key distinction here is the underlying 
contract between the parties:  it explicitly provided for 
indemnification for claims arising from negligent hair testing 
services.  Thus we consider whether "[t]he notice, taken with 
the words of the contract, here makes manifest the intent to 
charge the [the indemnitor] with the result of the action."  
Bowditch, 263 Mass. at 499.  We construe the terms of the 
contract according to their plain meaning.  Balles, 476 Mass. 
at 571. 
 
Article 7.3 states that Psychemedics "shall assume the 
defense of and hold the city . . . harmless" (emphasis 
supplied).  The contract does not specify any preconditions 
31 
 
necessary before Psychemedics is to assume the defense.  See, 
e.g., Trustees of N.Y., 345 Mass. at 732 (no obligation that 
indemnitee make "demand or request" that indemnitor "take over 
the defense"). 
 
Thus, the phrase "shall assume the defense," which appears 
in the clause that defines the conditions under which 
indemnification would be necessary, by its terms created an 
obligation for Psychemedics to act.  See Pasquale, 343 Mass. 
at 241, 245 (indemnification contract that provided that "buyer 
shall indemnify" was explicit and unquestioned); Bowditch, 263 
Mass. at 498 (indemnitor had duty to indemnify and defend upon 
occurrence of damages that contract indemnified).  See, e.g., 
Trustees of N.Y., 345 Mass. at 732-733 (notice, coupled with 
provisions of contract, was sufficient to establish opportunity 
to defend).  Psychemedics's letters to the city on February 15 
and June 19, 2006, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the city as nonmoving party, twice refused the city's 
indemnification requests.  Indeed, Psychemedics's June 19 
response to the city, to the effect that it deemed article 7.3 
inapplicable because a judgment of liability had not then been 
entered, underscores that it understood that it was obliged 
under that article to defend, were the obligation triggered.  
See Bowditch, supra ("The reason given for refusing to act shows 
that the defendant so understood it"). 
32 
 
 
In sum, where, as here, notice has been provided and an 
indemnitor has contracted that it "shall" defend, but the 
contract does not specify procedures for notice or tender of the 
opportunity to defend, the burden shifts to the indemnitor upon 
receiving notice that claims subject to the indemnification 
clause have arisen.  See Trustees of N.Y., 345 Mass. at 731-732.  
The failure of an indemnitee to say "you shall defend" is not 
dispositive where the indemnitor was alerted to its contractual 
duty to do so.  See Pasquale, 343 Mass. at 245 (it "is not 
unfair in the circumstances" to place on indemnitor "the burden 
of asking for the writ and taking over the defense"). 
 
iv.  Whether the city prevented Psychemedics from assuming 
the defense.  At the same time, "once the duty to defend has 
been triggered, the indemnitee must allow the indemnitor to take 
over the defense."  See Riva vs. Ashland, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., 
Nos. 09-CV-12074, 11-CV-12269, 11-CV-12277 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 
2013), citing Bradley, 171 Mass. at 132.  "[A]n indemnitee's 
failure to allow the indemnitor to take charge of the defense 
relieves the indemnitor of its obligation to indemnify if 
liability is established."  See Riva, supra.  Although 
Psychemedics contends that the city "never allowed Psychemedics 
to assume its defense," on the record before us, Psychemedics 
has not shown that the city's request for financial contribution 
from it meant that the city insisted upon keeping control of the 
33 
 
defense, or that the city refused Psychemedics's efforts to 
assume the defense.  The city's June 2006 letter asking that 
Psychemedics share in the defense costs "in light of the 
alternative remedy provided for" in article 7.3 of their 
contract,20 when viewed in the light most favorable to the city, 
as required when deciding a motion for summary judgment,21 is not 
on its face the equivalent of affirmative acts by the city 
thwarting, refusing, or in any way blocking efforts by 
Psychemedics to assume the defense.22 
                     
 
20 As noted supra, the city's June 2006 letter stated that 
the city "request[ed] that [Psychemedics] contribute financially 
to the defense of the . . . lawsuit, currently pending in the 
United States District Court."  Citing article 7.3, the letter 
continued, "[t]he conduct alleged in the [lawsuit] is wrongful 
or negligent conduct on the part of [Psychemedics].  The 
[c]ity's request that you share in the cost of . . . defending 
this suit is a reasonable one in light of the alternative remedy 
provided for in this contract." 
 
 
21 The judge noted that "[t]he letter suggests that the 
[c]ity could but was not demanding that Psychemedics take over 
the defense" and determined that this language "cannot be read 
as an offer to allow Psychemedics to assume the defense."  He 
then determined that Psychemedics was not allowed to do so. 
 
22 The letter was written in the context of prior 
communications between the parties concerning the lawsuits 
against the city challenging the use of the hair follicle tests.  
It was delivered six months after the first conversation between 
the parties in January of 2006, the content of which is 
disputed, see note 12, supra, and Psychemedics's response in 
February of 2006 to what Psychemedics stated was the city's 
request "that [Psychemedics] share in the out-of-pocket costs to 
hire an outside attorney to represent the [c]ity in the Jones et 
al. case." 
34 
 
 
Once it had notice of claims of conduct encompassed by the 
indemnification clause, the burden was on Psychemedics to assume 
the defense.  On the summary judgment record before us, 
Psychemedics has not established that it attempted to assume 
this duty, let alone that the city kept it from doing so.23  See 
Pasquale, 343 Mass. at 243 (while indemnitee attorney "gave no 
indication of expectation that [indemnitor] would take over the 
defense or offer to turn over the defence to him," its 
"attitude . . . [did] not destroy the force of the threshold" 
notice).  Therefore, the determination whether Psychemedics in 
fact did tender a defense that the city rejected should have 
been left to the trier of fact, and the allowance of 
Psychemedics's motion for summary judgment on this ground was 
erroneous. 
 
c.  Remaining claims.  As a result of allowing summary 
judgment in favor of Psychemedics on count one, the judge 
concluded that Psychemedics' other arguments that it was 
entitled to summary judgment, and the city's counterclaims, were 
moot.  This, too, was error. 
                     
23 That the letter, standing alone, does not establish that 
the city insisted on maintaining control, waived its rights to a 
defense, or otherwise rejected Psychemedics's efforts to defend 
does not preclude Psychemedics from demonstrating at trial, by 
use of the letter and other evidence not in the summary judgment 
record, that Psychemedics indeed did attempt to assume the 
defense, and that the city waived its right to a defense, or 
rejected Psychemedics's efforts to defend. 
35 
 
 
i.  City's counterclaims.  Apart from its contention that 
count one was incorrectly decided, the city maintains that its 
counterclaims under article 8.2 should not have been dismissed 
as moot.  It argues that the language of article 8.2 could be 
read as a distinct claim under the contract, and thus unrelated 
to any decision under article 7.3. 
 
Psychemedics contends that the city waived its claim under 
article 8.2 by failing to argue in the Superior Court that the 
claim should survive a finding of no liability under 
article 7.3, and because the city failed adequately to present 
the claims to this court.  This argument is not supported by the 
record.  The city presented the substance of its counterclaims 
on several occasions in the Superior Court.24  Accordingly, the 
city's counterclaims are not precluded on the ground that they 
were waived in that court. 
 
Furthermore, notwithstanding Psychemedics's contentions to 
the contrary, the city also pursued its arguments relating to 
its claims under article 8.2 at several points in its brief 
before this court.  Indeed, the city's brief contains a three-
                     
 
24 In particular, the city cited article 8.2 as precluding 
Psychemedics's claims for declaratory relief and breach of 
contract.  In its counterclaim for declaratory relief, argued at 
a hearing before the same judge, the city maintained that 
Psychemedics was liable "under [a]rticle 8.2 of the Contracts" 
for the costs of the commission appeals and the city's 
liability, if any, as well as the costs in the Jones cases. 
36 
 
page section entitled, "The Superior Court erred by dismissing 
the City's counterclaims under Article 8.2 without analysis or 
consideration of those counterclaims," as well as a nine-page 
section discussing the merits of those claims.  Accordingly, the 
counterclaims, which rest on independent grounds, should be 
reinstated on remand. 
 
ii.  Psychemedics's other arguments.  The judge did not 
reach three of Psychemedics's other arguments25 -- waiver, lack 
of proximate cause, and judicial estoppel, after he concluded 
that Psychemedics had no obligation to indemnify the city and 
granted summary judgment in its favor on count one.  
Psychemedics asserts that it would be entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on each of these other theories.  On the record 
before us, Psychemedics is not entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on any of them.  We discuss each in turn. 
 
A.  Waiver.  Psychemedics argues that, through an oral 
"original cooperation agreement" that modified the parties' 
written contract, the city agreed to accept legal and scientific 
assistance by Psychemedics in lieu of its right to 
indemnification, thereby waiving that right. 
                     
 
25 The claims Psychemedics asserted in the Superior Court 
for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and 
detrimental reliance are not at issue before us. 
37 
 
 
Waiver is the "intentional relinquishment of a known 
right."  Dynamic Mach. Works, Inc. v. Machine & Elec. 
Consultants, Inc., 444 Mass. 768, 771 (2005), quoting Doujotos 
v. Leventhal, 271 Mass. 280, 282 (1930).  "[W]aiver must be 
shown clearly, unmistakably, and unequivocably" (citation 
omitted).  Boston v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 
169, 174 (1999).  Where the facts establishing waiver are 
undisputed, summary judgment is appropriate.  See, e.g., Dynamic 
Mach. Works, Inc., supra at 773. 
 
On this record, Psychemedics has not met its burden to 
show, based on undisputed facts, that the city waived its right 
to indemnification through an unwritten "cooperation 
agreement."26  While Psychemedics contends that this oral waiver 
agreement took place in 2006, it has not shown this to be so on 
undisputed material facts or on disputed ones viewed in the 
light most favorable to the city; in a motion for summary 
judgment, it was for Psychemedics to prove, on undisputed facts, 
                     
 
26 As an initial matter, Psychemedics has not shown by 
undisputed facts in the summary judgment record that the city 
waived the contractual requirement that modifications to the 
contract be in writing.  See First Penn Mtge. Trust v. 
Dorchester Sav. Bank, 395 Mass. 614, 625 (1985).  The record 
contains no evidence of a course of dealing in which the parties 
waived the requirement of a writing.  Indeed, the record 
indicates that the city and Psychemedics completed other 
contract modifications, around the same time, in writings, 
suggesting that the requirement of written modification remained 
in force. 
38 
 
as a matter of law, that the city undisputedly waived its rights 
to indemnification.  The summary judgment record, however, does 
not support Psychemedics's contention.  For example, in 2007, 
the city sought to bring a third-party claim against 
Psychemedics; at that point, more than a year later, the city 
thus appeared to believe that it retained its right to 
indemnification by Psychemedics. 
 
In 2009, as Psychemedics points out, the city acknowledged 
that it had "an agreement" with Psychemedics concerning 
scientific and legal support.  The existence of an agreement, 
without more, does not establish that its provisions included 
that the city had waived its right to indemnification.  
Moreover, the city disputes that the agreement, as described by 
Psychemedics, ever existed.  Because of these disputes of 
material fact, Psychemedics has not shown that it would be 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its claim of waiver. 
 
B.  Proximate cause.  Psychemedics also maintains that its 
conduct did not proximately cause harm to the city, because the 
terminations that resulted in the ligation at issue were as a 
result of the city's own actions. 
 
Proximate cause is the "active efficient cause that sets in 
motion a train of events which brings about a result."  Lynn Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 570, 575 (1893).  
Showing that something was a substantial contributing factor is 
39 
 
sufficient to establish proximate cause, see O'Connor v. Raymark 
Indus., Inc., 401 Mass. 586, 591-592 (1988), where the result 
was reasonably foreseeable, Poskus v. Lombardo's of Randolph, 
Inc., 423 Mass. 637, 640 (1996).  The intervention of an 
independent source may disrupt the causal chain so as to 
eliminate proximate cause.  See Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 
312, 321 (2002). 
 
Psychemedics argues that the police commissioner's final 
review before the employment actions were taken constituted a 
break in the causal chain.  See, e.g., Girardi v. Gabriel, 38 
Mass. App. Ct. 553, 559 (1995) (plaintiff's damages after poor 
investments of late husband's assets that should have passed by 
trust were not proximately caused by lawyer's negligent drafting 
of will).  Psychemedics, however, has not met its burden to 
establish that the commissioner's role indeed disrupted the 
causal chain.  Moreover, "a non-participating indemnitor may 
not, after receiving notice and an opportunity to defend, 
challenge in a subsequent action material facts established in 
the underlying case that bear on the indemnification 
obligation."  CSX Transp., Inc., supra.  See Polaroid Corp. v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., 414 Mass. 747, 763 n.20 (1993); Miller v. 
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 291 Mass. 445, 448-449 (1935). 
 
"Generally, questions of causation, proximate and 
intervening, present issues for the jury to decide."  Solimene 
40 
 
v. B. Grauel & Co., 399 Mass. 790, 794 (1987).  The 
commissioner's role in the employment decisions was a final, 
nonscientific review of a process that ultimately relied heavily 
on Psychemedics's actions.  That the commissioner would 
recommend termination of individuals who wrongly or negligently 
had been flagged by Psychemedics on suspicion of illicit drug 
use was foreseeable and did not break the causal chain.  See, 
e.g., id. at 796 (because it was foreseeable that employee of 
company that purchased defective machine would use machine as 
designed, employer's lack of special instructions or warnings 
were not supervening event of harm caused by machine).  
Therefore, Psychemedics has not shown that it is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law that its actions were not a 
proximate cause of the city's harm. 
 
C.  Estoppel.  Psychemedics argues that the city is 
estopped from obtaining indemnification because, in previous 
litigation in State and Federal court, the city asserted that 
Psychemedics's hair test (upon which the city based its decision 
to terminate an officer's employment) was reliable, and, in this 
case, the city contradicts that assertion. 
 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel "precludes a party from 
asserting a position in one legal proceeding that is contrary to 
a position it had previously asserted in another proceeding."  
Blanchette v. School Comm. of Westwood, 427 Mass. 176, 184 
41 
 
(1998).  To prevail on a motion for summary judgment on this 
claim, Psychemedics would have to demonstrate that (1) "the 
position being asserted . . . [is] directly contrary to the 
position previously asserted," and (2) "the party [had] 
succeeded in convincing the court to accept its prior position."  
Otis v. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co., 443 Mass. 634, 640-641 (2005). 
 
Although the city previously did defend the use of 
Psychemedics's tests, it is not "contrary" to that position for 
the city thereafter to seek indemnification if wrongdoing 
subsequently were uncovered.  There is no inconsistency in 
permitting a plaintiff to recover through indemnification claims 
that were unsuccessful in prior litigation.  Indeed, that is 
precisely the situation that indemnification is designed to 
address.  Compare Otis, 443 Mass. at 648 (judicial estoppel 
might apply where plaintiff would receive verdict "that is 
mutually inconsistent with the judgment [plaintiff] already has 
obtained"). 
 
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that the initial 
defense here was not made in good faith.  See Otis, 443 Mass. 
at 640 (judicial estoppel seeks to "prevent the manipulation of 
the judicial process by litigants" [citation omitted]).  On this 
record, Psychemedics has not shown manipulation by the city of 
directly contrary positions.  Additionally, and contrary to 
Psychemedics's assertions, the record does not support that the 
42 
 
commission and the reviewing courts "accepted" the city's prior 
position that Psychemedics's methods were reliable, see 
Thompson, 90 Mass. App. at 467-468, and the Federal District 
Court judge has yet to render a final ruling after the jury-
waived trial in 2018 in the Jones matter.  Thus, Psychemedics 
has not shown that it would be entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law on this claim. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment allowing Psychemedics's 
motion for summary judgment is vacated and set aside, and the 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.