Title: Commonwealth v. Imbert

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-10222 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LUDNER IMBERT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 9, 2018. - May 18, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Armed Assault with Intent to Murder.  Firearms.  
Evidence, Spontaneous utterance, Exculpatory, Firearm.  
Practice, Criminal, Transcript of evidence, Argument by 
prosecutor, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 23, 2004. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Thomas E. Connolly, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on February 6, 2015, was heard by 
Christine M. Roach, J. 
 
 
 
Robert S. Sinsheimer (Lisa A. Parlagreco also present) for 
the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  In the early morning hours of April 3, 2004, 
Vaughn Skinner, Jr., was shot and killed.  The defendant, Ludner 
Imbert, was identified as the shooter and convicted by a jury of 
2 
 
 
murder in the first degree, as well as armed assault with intent 
to murder1 and carrying a firearm without a license. 
 
In this consolidated appeal, the defendant argues that 
several errors at trial require a reversal of his convictions 
and that the trial record is insufficient to permit adequate and 
effective appellate review.  He also claims that his motion for 
a new trial based on the Commonwealth's failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence was improperly denied.  We affirm the 
defendant's convictions and the judge's order denying his motion 
for a new trial.  After a review of the entire record, we also 
decline to reduce or set aside the defendant's convictions under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for 
discussion of specific issues. 
 
Sometime after midnight on April 3, 2004, the victim and 
the defendant were at a nightclub in Revere.  The defendant 
arrived with several friends, including Jeff Jean Charles, who 
drove the defendant's vehicle.  While in the club, the victim 
and the defendant had a physical altercation:  the victim 
stepped on Charles's foot, and the defendant in turn punched the 
victim in the face.  The victim fell to the ground, and the 
                     
1 This charge was in connection with the shooting of another 
individual, Corey Crump, who was shot in the back but survived. 
3 
 
 
fight spread to involve several other patrons.  The manager 
closed the club, and security guards ushered patrons out to the 
parking lot. 
 
The defendant left through the front door of the club; the 
victim, who was bleeding, left through a side door.  A witness 
saw a man hand a firearm to another man matching the defendant's 
description.  Shortly thereafter, shots were fired and the 
victim was seen falling to the ground.  After the initial 
gunshots, Kehonia Vick, who knew the defendant, saw him stand 
over the victim and shoot him.  After the shooting, another 
witness and friend of the defendant, Shane Clayton, saw the 
defendant with a snub-nosed revolver in his hand. 
 
After the shooting, the defendant left the area on foot, 
leaving his vehicle behind.  He was picked up by three young 
women who also had been at the club, one of whom was his girl 
friend.  He told his girl friend that the fight started because 
someone had looked at one of his friends, and that "he had to do 
what he had to do."  The defendant's cellular telephone records 
indicate that the cellular plan was terminated on the day after 
the murder. 
4 
 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Reconstructed transcript.  Portions of the 
testimony of Vick and Clayton were not transcribed.2  As a 
result, pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 8 (e), as amended, 378 Mass. 
932 (1979), the defendant moved to reconstruct the missing 
portion of the record "to the extent possible, on the basis of 
notes prepared by the trial judge and trial attorneys."  Because 
the defendant failed to file a statement of the evidence as 
called for by Mass. R. A. P. 8 (c), as amended, 430 Mass. 1601 
(1999), the judge reconstructed Vick's missing testimony based 
on the "extensive" notes he took at trial, resulting in five 
typewritten pages that he provided to each of the parties.3 
The prosecutor agreed with the judge's reconstruction.  
However, defense counsel made handwritten annotations to the 
document indicating where he disagreed with the judge's 
recollection of the testimony.  The judge rejected the defense's 
annotations as inaccurate and declined to insert objections made 
                     
2 It is unclear from the record the reasons for the lack of 
transcription of the testimony of Vick and Clayton, but it does 
not appear to be the fault of any party. 
 
3 The trial judge also reconstructed the missing portion of 
Clayton's testimony, amounting to approximately two typewritten 
pages.  The defendant moved to amend this portion of Clayton's 
testimony, noting that trial counsel made numerous objections 
during the testimony that were not accounted for.  The motion 
judge denied the motion.  Because on appeal the defendant does 
not raise any claims of error regarding Clayton's testimony, 
whether trial counsel preserved errors by objecting is 
immaterial. 
5 
 
 
by the defense, as trial counsel was unable to recall their 
substance.4 
The defendant argues that his due process and equal 
protection rights have been violated because a complete record 
is necessary for effective appellate review and the 
reconstructed trial transcript was not an adequate substitute.  
We disagree.  The reconstruction was adequate and conforms to 
the procedure established in Commonwealth v. Harris, 376 Mass. 
74, 78-80 (1978). 
 
It is well established that a defendant is entitled to a 
"record of sufficient completeness to permit proper 
consideration of his claims."  Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 
194 (1971), quoting Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499 
(1963).  However, this does not "translate automatically into a 
complete verbatim transcript."  Mayer, supra at 194. 
 
In Harris, 376 Mass. at 75, we addressed the issue of a 
trial transcript that is incomplete or missing by no fault of 
either party.  In such a case, "'rough accommodations' in the 
method in which an appeal is presented are constitutionally 
permissible."  Id. at 77, quoting Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 
420, 424 (1963).  A new trial will not be granted "unless the 
trial proceedings cannot be reconstructed sufficiently to 
                     
 
4 However, at the hearing concerning reconstructing the 
record, the judge did make an oblique reference to the fact that 
defense counsel made frequent objections generally. 
6 
 
 
present the defendant's claims."  Harris, supra at 78.  We held 
that 
"alternative methods of reporting the trial proceedings, 
such as a statement of agreed facts, a bill of exceptions, 
or a narrative statement based on the judge's notes, are 
constitutionally adequate if they bring before the 
appellate court an account of the events sufficient to 
allow it to evaluate the defendant's contentions" (emphasis 
added). 
 
Id. at 77, and cases cited. 
 
Here, the judge determined that the record could be 
reconstructed based on the notes he took of the testimony 
missing from the transcript.  Although defense counsel contended 
that the defense made objections at trial that were not 
recorded, he could not recall their substance.  Counsel 
suggested corrections and notes to the judge's proposed 
reconstruction, but the judge found them to be inaccurate based 
on the judge's own notes.  Without any articulable claim of 
error, the defendant's argument fails.5,6 
                     
 
5 The defendant relies on Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 
20 (1956), for the proposition that in order to ensure an 
"adequate and effective" appeal, indigent criminal appellants 
must be provided with a transcript of the trial court 
proceedings as a prerequisite to a decision on the merits of an 
appeal.  However, in Griffin, the United States Supreme Court 
used that phrase to describe alternatives to a "stenographer's 
transcript," such as "bystanders' bills of exceptions or other 
methods of reporting trial proceedings."  Id.  The Court 
explained that a bill of exceptions is a document prepared from 
someone's memory in condensed and narrative form and certified 
by the trial judge.  Id. at 14 n.4, 20.  Griffin stands for the 
rule that, as a matter of equal protection, a lack of means may 
not act as an effective bar for a criminal defendant's ability 
7 
 
 
 
The defendant contends that Harris should be distinguished 
because it did not require plenary review per G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  "[I]t is our duty to review the entire record pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 
615 n.11 (2001).  Where, as here, the reconstructed record is 
constitutionally permissible and the defendant does not present 
a specific dispute over its contents relating to any claim of 
error, the reconstructed record itself is what is subject to 
§ 33E review.  See Mass. R. A. P. 8 (e) (describing method for 
correcting record). 
 
2.  Admission of Charles's statement.  Clayton, who was in 
the vehicle that Charles entered after the shooting, testified 
that when Charles got into the vehicle, Charles declared, "Drive 
off, drive off, [the defendant] just popped that dude!"  The 
judge admitted the statement as an excited utterance.  The 
defendant claims that the statement was inadmissible hearsay and 
violated his right to confrontation.  Because the defendant 
                                                                  
to exercise his appellate opportunities.  It does not guarantee 
access to a transcript on judicial review of a trial, especially 
where incidents leading to the loss of a transcript are just as 
likely to have occurred regardless of whether the defendant is 
poor or rich. 
 
 
6 The judge also offered to make a copy of his trial notes 
available to the defendant's attorney, but she refused the 
offer, indicating that she was concerned not with the substance 
of the witness testimony but with the constitutionality of the 
Massachusetts rules of appellate procedure placing the burden of 
reconstructing the record on the defendant.  See Mass. R. A. P. 
8 (e), as amended, 378 Mass. 932 (1979). 
8 
 
 
objected to the statement at trial, we review for prejudicial 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 475 Mass. 775, 787 (2016); 
Commonwealth v. Mulgrave, 472 Mass. 170, 176 (2015). 
 
The party seeking to admit a statement as an excited 
utterance must show that "[1] there [was] an occurrence or event 
sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal 
reflective thought processes of the observer, and [2] the 
declarant's statement was a spontaneous reaction to the 
occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought."  
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 672 (2017), quoting 
Mass. G. Evid. § 803(2) (2017).  The defendant focuses on the 
second prong,7 arguing that the time that lapsed between the 
shooting and Charles's statement gave Charles time for 
reflective thought and an opportunity to fabricate his 
statement.  We disagree. 
 
The evidence presented to the jury was that Charles ran to 
the vehicle soon after the gunshots.  Further, the jury heard 
that when Charles made the statement he was "anxious," 
"breathing heavy," and "looking [to] both sides."  See Mulgrave, 
477 Mass. at 177 (second prong considers "circumstances of the 
statement, including . . . the tone and manner of the 
                     
 
7 Witnessing a shooting is "sufficiently startling to impede 
normal reflective thought processes," and thus satisfies the 
first prong.  Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600, 607, cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 968 (2012). 
9 
 
 
declarant").  Compare Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600, 607, 
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 968 (2012) (utterance admissible where it 
occurred immediately after traumatic event); Commonwealth v. 
Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 549 (2010) (utterance admissible where it 
occurred at least twenty minutes after traumatic event); 
Commonwealth v. Grant, 418 Mass. 76, 81-82 (1994) (utterance 
admissible where it occurred sixty minutes after traumatic 
event), with Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 239-240 
(1998) (utterance inadmissible where it occurred at least eight 
and one-half hours after traumatic event).  Given the short time 
between the shooting and Charles's statement, the statement 
clearly qualifies as an excited utterance.8 
 
"[S]tatements admissible as spontaneous utterances must 
also satisfy the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, [which] bars the admission of 
testimonial out-of-court statements by a witness who does not 
appear at trial unless the witness is unavailable to testify and 
the defendant had an earlier opportunity for cross-examination" 
(quotations and citation omitted).  Mulgrave, 472 Mass. at 180. 
The defendant argues that the admission of Charles's statement 
violated the confrontation clause, as the statement was 
                     
 
8 The defendant's claim that modern science shows that 
people can invent lies in an instant despite having experienced 
trauma is essentially an argument for abandoning the excited 
utterance exception to the hearsay rule.  We decline to do so. 
10 
 
 
testimonial and the defendant had no opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.  Upon review, we conclude that the 
statement was not testimonial; thus, there was no error on this 
ground. 
 
A statement is testimonial where its primary purpose is 
"creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony."  
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011).  The inquiry is 
objective, asking not what that particular declarant intended, 
but rather "the primary purpose that a reasonable person would 
have ascribed to the statement, taking into account all of the 
surrounding circumstances."  Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 
84 (2012) (opinion of Alito, J.).  Charles made his statement to 
fellow club patrons in the context of urging them to flee from a 
shooting.  The argument that a reasonable person in his 
situation would have intended his statement to be used at a 
later trial strains credulity.  See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 
445 Mass. 1, 34 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006).  
Therefore, the judge did not err in admitting Charles's 
statement.9 
                     
 
9 The defendant also argues that the statement's admission 
violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, claiming that the 
statement's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.  
For evidence to be unfairly prejudicial, it must "suggest 
decision on an improper basis" such as a defendant's bad 
character.  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 
(1997), quoting Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 
11 
 
 
3.  Exculpatory evidence.  The defendant moved for a new 
trial based on the Commonwealth's failure to produce exculpatory 
evidence that, the defendant argued, supports his claim of 
innocence.10  He claims error in the motion judge's denial of 
that motion after a nonevidentiary hearing.  "The decision to 
deny a motion for a new trial lies within the sound discretion 
of the judge and will not be reversed unless it is manifestly 
unjust or the trial was infected with prejudicial constitutional 
error."  Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 803 (2011), 
citing Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 669-670 (2004).  
We find no abuse of discretion. 
The defendant filed a motion for posttrial discovery, 
seeking records pertaining to interviews of witnesses Corey 
Crump, who had been shot in the incident, see note 1, supra, and 
                                                                  
403, 28 U.S.C. App., at 860.  The defendant has pointed to no 
such improper suggestion here, and we see none.  Moreover, 
properly admitted hearsay evidence does not violate due process.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. 858, 866 (2010), 
cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1230 (2011); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 
Mass. 108, 118-119 (1990). 
 
10 The defendant also argued that he should be granted a new 
trial because of interactions between the judge and defense 
counsel, and because of improperly admitted hearsay.  The motion 
judge declined to reach those issues on the grounds that they 
are pure issues of law to be addressed on direct appeal and that 
this court grants no deference to a motion judge who was not the 
trial judge.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Weichell, 446 Mass. 
785, 799 (2006).  However, "[t]he trial judge upon a motion in 
writing may grant a new trial at any time if it appears that 
justice may not have been done."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  We have already addressed 
the hearsay issue, and we address the other issue infra. 
12 
 
 
Krystal Owen.  In response, the Commonwealth disclosed discovery 
not previously provided to the defense.  The new discovery 
included notes from a police interview with Owen, indicating 
that she was unable to identify the defendant from a 
photographic array despite having testified before the grand 
jury that she saw the shooting.  As for Crump, although there 
were no police notes indicating that he had viewed a 
photographic array, the defendant's investigator submitted an 
affidavit stating that Crump told the investigator by telephone 
that Crump had been shown an array and had been unable to 
identify anyone. 
The Commonwealth has a duty to disclose material, 
exculpatory evidence over which the prosecution has control in a 
timely manner.11  See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 
380 (2017); Mass. R. Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 
(2004).  The failure to do so was error.  See Commonwealth v. 
Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 292 (2013) (prosecutor's failure to 
disclose key witness's inability to identify defendant was 
"failure of constitutional dimension"). 
 
A defendant seeking a new trial based on undisclosed 
evidence has the burden to show that he or she was prejudiced by 
                     
11 Although the material was in the possession of the State 
police and was never provided to the prosecutor, the 
Commonwealth is responsible for the failure to provide the 
information to the defense.  Commonwealth v. Beal, 429 Mass. 
530, 531 (1999). 
13 
 
 
the nondisclosure.  See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 
231 (2015).  Where, as the motion judge found here, a defendant 
filed a specific request for exculpatory evidence prior to 
trial, "the defendant must demonstrate . . . the existence of a 
substantial basis for claiming prejudice."12  Id. at 231.  The 
defendant can meet his burden "with record support for the 
conclusion that the jury would have been influenced by timely 
disclosure of the evidence in question."  Commonwealth v. Bly, 
448 Mass. 473, 486 (2007).  "Put differently, we must decide 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the nondisclosed 
evidence would have made a difference."  Commonwealth v. Laguer, 
448 Mass. 585, 594 (2007).  Here the defendant falls short. 
 
Owen's testimony at trial was brief:  she testified that 
she witnessed the shooting and generally described the shooter, 
the clothing he wore, and the color of the gun he fired.  Owen 
did not identify the defendant as the shooter prior to trial or 
during her testimony.  Thus, the fact that she was unable to 
identify the defendant from a photographic array prior to trial 
was cumulative of information that the jury had already heard in 
her testimony.  "[N]ewly discovered evidence that is cumulative 
of evidence admitted at the trial tends to carry less weight 
                     
12 "Where, on the other hand, a defendant's pretrial motion 
was merely a general request for exculpatory evidence, the 
defendant must show that the withheld evidence 'would probably 
have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations'" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 231 (2015). 
14 
 
 
than new evidence that is different in kind."  Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305-306 (1986).  See Commonwealth v. 
Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 326 (2008).  Thus, the defendant has 
failed to show a "substantial basis for claiming prejudice."  
Watkins, 473 Mass. at 231. 
 
The defendant has made even less of a showing with regard 
to the posttrial information regarding Crump.  Assuming that 
Crump was unable to identify the defendant from a photographic 
array, and that the Commonwealth failed to inform the defendant 
of this fact prior to trial, the defendant nevertheless has not 
demonstrated prejudice.13  Like Owen, Crump never identified the 
defendant as the shooter prior to trial.  He testified at the 
proceeding before the grand jury, providing only a general 
description of the shooter, but did not testify at trial.  
Although he was summonsed as a witness, he did not appear and 
the Commonwealth was unable to locate him. 
                     
 
13 It is not at all clear that the information that the 
defendant's investigator gathered was accurate.  Although the 
investigator averred that Crump said he had failed to identify 
the defendant as the shooter from a photographic array, the 
Commonwealth has no record that the event happened.  The 
investigator's notes stated that Crump claimed to have appeared 
at trial, and that he had not recognized anyone from the 
shooting incident.  In fact, the record shows that Crump was 
summonsed but did not appear at trial.  The motion judge 
concluded that, even if Crump had in fact failed to identify the 
defendant from a photographic array, any prejudice was 
negligible in light of other evidence at trial. 
15 
 
 
 
The defendant claims that had he known about Crump's 
failure to identify him in a photographic array, he would have 
called Crump as a trial witness.  However, as the motion judge 
noted, whether the defendant would have succeeded in locating 
Crump where the Commonwealth failed, and further, whether Crump 
would have cooperated with the defense, is no more than "pure 
speculation."  Moreover, just as in the case of Owen, even if 
Crump had testified at trial, and the jury had learned that he 
had failed to pick the defendant out of a photographic array, it 
would have been cumulative evidence, thus carrying little 
weight.  Grace, 397 Mass. at 305-306. 
 
In determining whether the defendant has shown a 
substantial basis for prejudice, "the judge must consider the 
strength of the case against the defendant."  Lykus, 451 Mass. 
at 326.  We agree with the motion judge that the great weight of 
the evidence inculpated the defendant, such that any effect of 
introducing the failure of Crump or Owen to identify the 
defendant in a photographic array would not have influenced the 
jury. 
 
At trial the jury heard from Vick, who knew the defendant 
as well as the victim, and who unequivocally identified the 
defendant as the person who shot the victim.  Her testimony was 
corroborated when Clayton testified that within moments of 
hearing gunshots, he saw the defendant with a handgun.  Further, 
16 
 
 
Clayton testified that Charles exclaimed that the defendant 
"just popped that dude!" 
 
Vick also testified that just after the shooting, she 
received a telephone call from the defendant in which he told 
her, "You don't know me.  I don't know you."  When Vick asked 
him why he had done "this," noting that the victim had children, 
the defendant responded, "He was coming at me, I had to do what 
I had to do." 
 
Immediately after the shooting, the defendant left the area 
without his vehicle, and asked others to retrieve it for him.  
Moreover, he did not return to his apartment that night, opting 
instead to check into a hotel.  Later, the defendant refused to 
return Charles's gun, explaining that he (the defendant) could 
no longer use his own gun. 
 
Given the strong case against the defendant, we conclude 
that the defendant has failed to carry his burden of 
demonstrating a "substantial basis for claiming prejudice."  
Watkins, 473 Mass. at 231.  See Lykus, 451 Mass. at 328-329 
(undisclosed report that concluded it could not identify 
recording as defendant's voice did not establish prejudice where 
witnesses who knew defendant positively identified his voice). 
 
4.  Admission of firearm evidence.  At trial, the jury were 
presented with evidence of a nine millimeter firearm that was 
found in the defendant's possession, but that was not alleged to 
17 
 
 
have been used in the shooting.  On appeal, the defendant claims 
that the firearm was not relevant to show that the defendant 
committed the crime, and that the prejudicial impact of the 
firearm evidence substantially outweighed its probative value.  
For its part, the Commonwealth contends that the firearm 
evidence was properly admitted because it was relevant to show 
the defendant's consciousness of guilt.  We agree with the 
Commonwealth. 
 
The firearm evidence consisted of a photograph of the 
weapon and witness testimony.14  Clayton testified that, after 
the shooting, Charles gave him a firearm to hide.  The firearm 
was found under the defendant's pillow on the day he was 
arrested.  Another girl friend of the defendant testified that, 
days after the shooting, she overheard the defendant tell 
Charles that he (the defendant) would not return the firearm 
because the defendant could not use his own firearm any longer. 
 
"Where a weapon definitively could not have been used in 
the commission of the crime, we have generally cautioned against 
admission of evidence related to it."  Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 
                     
14 As the defendant objected to the admission of the 
photograph, it is subject to review for prejudicial error.  
Commonwealth v. Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 627, 631 (2013).  Because 
the defendant did not object to the witness testimony about the 
firearm, we review that testimony for a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 478 Mass. 
443, 448 (2017).  For the reasons discussed infra, we conclude 
that the firearm evidence was properly admitted under either 
standard. 
18 
 
 
463 Mass. 116, 122 (2012).  However, where firearm-related 
evidence is relevant, and where its prejudicial effect does not 
substantially outweigh its probative value, the evidence is 
admissible.  See Commonwealth v. Valentin, 474 Mass. 301, 306 
(2016). 
 
Here, although the firearm at issue was not used in the 
shooting, the evidence presented linked the weapon to the crime 
scene and to the defendant.  Additionally, and significantly, 
the defendant's statement about this firearm was relevant as 
incriminating evidence of the defendant's consciousness of 
guilt, i.e., it suggested that he had disposed of, or concealed, 
his own firearm because it was associated with a crime.  See 
Commonwealth v. Brousseau, 421 Mass. 647, 651 (1996) ("the 
defendant's concern that the weapon could be traced to her . . . 
evidenced consciousness of guilt").  Because the firearm 
evidence was not admitted either for bad character or propensity 
purposes, but instead to corroborate the testimony of two 
witnesses and to demonstrate the defendant's consciousness of 
guilt, the evidence was admissible.  See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 
475 Mass. 445, 456 (2016). 
Finally, any arguable prejudicial effect of the evidence 
was mitigated by the judge's limiting instructions.  See 
Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 478 Mass. 443, 449-450 (2017).  The 
judge twice instructed the jury not to consider the defendant's 
19 
 
 
possession of the gun as evidence of the defendant's bad 
character or propensity to commit a crime, and reminded the jury 
that the Commonwealth was not contending that the firearm was 
the murder weapon.  There was no error. 
 
5.  Closing argument.  The defendant also claims that the 
Commonwealth misstated evidence during the closing argument, 
resulting in reversible error. 
 
Although prosecutors are entitled to argue "based on 
evidence and on inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence," they may not "misstate the evidence or refer to facts 
not in evidence."  Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 
(1987).  Here, the jury heard testimony from a witness that 
Charles told her that "he had to break the [defendant's vehicle] 
window [because] the guns were inside the car."15  She clarified 
later in the testimony that, in using the pronoun "he," she was 
referring to Charles.  In its closing argument, the Commonwealth 
stated that it was the defendant who broke the vehicle window.  
The defendant objected at trial, and so we review for prejudicial 
                     
 
15 The parties do not address whether this statement may 
have been hearsay and therefore improperly admitted in evidence.  
The defendant objected to part of this testimony at trial, but 
not on hearsay grounds.  Assuming, arguendo, that this statement 
was admitted in error, it did not create a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice for essentially the same 
reasons we set forth infra in concluding that there was no 
prejudice to the defendant in the Commonwealth's statement in 
closing that the defendant, not Charles, was the one who broke 
the window on the vehicle. 
20 
 
 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350-351 
(1998). 
 
We need not reach whether it was error for the Commonwealth 
to argue that the defendant broke the window, however, because 
we conclude that it was not prejudicial in any event.  We 
consider several factors in determining whether an error was 
prejudicial: 
"(1) whether the defendant seasonably objected; (2) whether 
the error was limited to collateral issues or went to the 
heart of the case; (3) what specific or general 
instructions the judge gave the jury which might have 
mitigated the mistake; and (4) whether the error, in the 
circumstances, possibly made a difference in the jury's 
conclusions." 
 
Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 422-423 (2000).  We 
conclude that any error was harmless. 
 
First, the question who broke the vehicle window did not go 
to the heart of the case.  See Commonwealth v. Loguidice, 420 
Mass. 453, 457 (1995) (collateral matter is one that "do[es] not 
bear directly on the defendant's guilt," as opposed to central 
matters, which "directly bear[] on an element of a crime to be 
proved").  Contrast Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 131 
(2013), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933 (1964). 
In addition, the judge's instructions mitigated any error.  
The judge instructed the jury that closing arguments are not 
evidence and that it is the jury's recollection of the evidence 
that controls.  He also twice instructed the jury, once during 
21 
 
 
the precharge and again in his final charge, that the only facts 
they could consider were evidence from witnesses.  Such 
instructions are sufficient to put the jury on notice that the 
evidence comes from the witnesses and not the lawyers.  See 
Commonwealth v. Pearce, 427 Mass. 642, 645 (1998) (citing cases 
where "[w]e have affirmed convictions . . . on the basis of much 
more general instructions than in this case").  Juries are 
presumed to follow the judge's instructions.  Commonwealth v. 
Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 228 (1986). 
 
Finally, the question who broke the vehicle window likely 
did not matter to the jury's verdict.  That is, even if the jury 
believed that the defendant broke the window, that detail would 
not make it any more likely that he committed the murder where 
the jury heard evidence that a firearm was handed to someone 
matching the defendant's description before the defendant shot 
the victim.  Instead, it was the testimony from two witnesses, 
including an eyewitness who knew the defendant and testified 
that the defendant was the shooter, along with evidence of his 
actions and statements after the shooting that likely led to his 
conviction.  Regardless of who broke the window, the jury were 
presented with eyewitness testimony that the defendant was the 
shooter.  We therefore cannot say that the purported error made 
a difference to the jury.  See Commonwealth v. Daley, 439 Mass. 
558, 567 (2003); Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 703 
22 
 
 
(2001).  Thus, even assuming that the Commonwealth improperly 
argued that the defendant broke the vehicle window, we conclude 
that the defendant was not prejudiced by the error. 
 
6.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  "Our duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is to consider broadly the whole case on 
the law and the facts to determine whether the verdict is 
'consonant with justice.'"  Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 
672, 680 (1980), quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 380 Mass. 1, 15 
n.20 (1980).  We may order a new trial, or reduce the verdict, 
"for any . . . reason that justice may require."  G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  The defendant calls our attention to repeated disputes 
between the trial judge and defense counsel that, the defendant 
claims, deprived him of a fair trial, and requests that we 
exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
The difficult dynamic between defense counsel and the judge 
is readily apparent from the trial transcript.  Throughout the 
course of the trial, the defense attorney failed to adhere to 
the judge's court room rules, made inappropriate comments in the 
presence of the jury, and interrupted the judge on multiple 
occasions.  In response, the judge reprimanded defense counsel 
several times, including reminding counsel to conduct 
questioning from the podium, cautioning him against extraneous 
comments, insisting that counsel come to sidebar if he wished to 
discuss something further, and instructing counsel to sit down.  
23 
 
 
These admonishments, although sometimes sharply worded, were 
well within the judge's authority.  Trial judges are authorized 
and, indeed, expected "to maintain order in court proceedings so 
that the administration of the criminal law will be fair and 
just," Commonwealth v. Bohmer, 374 Mass. 368, 380 (1978), and so 
that proceedings maintain their "dignity, order, and decorum," 
Sussman v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 692, 695 (1978).  See S.J.C. 
Rule 3:09, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, Rule 2.8 (A).  "It 
would be a reproach to the administration of justice if a 
defendant, through his counsel, could pollute the atmosphere of 
a trial and then turn this to his own advantage on appeal."  
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 346 Mass. 373, 379 (1963), cert. denied, 
376 U.S. 933 (1964). 
Moreover, the judge gave instructions that mitigated any 
potential prejudice that might have resulted from the jury 
observing the disputes.  The judge informed the jury that he did 
not have an opinion regarding the case, and instructed them to 
disregard any tone, inflection, or facial expression that he 
might have had.  See Helfant, 398 Mass. at 228-229.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 388 Mass. 749, 750-752 (1983) 
(reversible error where, even though defendant counsel's conduct 
was not inept or antagonistic to trial judge, judge made 
repeated, often personal attacks on her in presence of jury). 
24 
 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we decline to exercise our § 33E 
power based on friction generated as a result of a judge having 
to rein in defense counsel's inappropriate court room conduct.  
See Commonwealth v. Schnopps, 390 Mass. 722, 726 (1984) (court's 
power under § 33E are to be used sparingly).  Additionally, we 
have reviewed the entire record and discern no other reason to 
reduce the degree of guilt or grant a new trial pursuant to our 
power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
Order denying motion for 
a new trial affirmed.