Title: REITER v YELLOWSTONE COUNTY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-281 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 LEO K. REITER, Plaintiff and Appellant, -vs- YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, MONTANA, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone, The Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Boschert & Boschert, Billings, Montana For Respondents: McNamer, Thompson & Cashmore, Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: December 17, 1980 Decided: b ~ r ~ y -, 4 198% Filed: , 1281 , -- M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Leo Reiter i n i t i a t e d t h i s a c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court s e e k i n g r e i n s t a t e m e n t and back pay a s a r e s u l t of r e s p o n d e n t s 1 f a i l u r e to hold a h e a r i n g p r i o r to t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of h i s employment. Respondents1 motion f o r summary judgment was g r a n t e d o n t h e ground t h a t R e i t e r was not e n t i t l e d to a p r e t e r m i n a t i o n h e a r i n g a s a matter of law. From t h i s summary judgment, Reiter a p p e a l s . A t t h e time of h i s d i s c h a r g e on September 22, 1978, Reiter had been employed f o r n e a r l y 1 8 y e a r s as a c u s t o d i a n a t t h e Yellowstone County Courthouse, and had a t t a i n e d t h e p o s i t i o n of n i g h t s u p e r v i s o r . Following a disagreement w i t h c u s t o d i a n Harry Evans o v e r work t o be performed, Reiter terminated Evans' employment. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , Reiter was informed by h i s s u p e r v i s o r , Paul King, t h a t h i s own employment was t e r m i n a t e d . A t an informal meeting w i t h t h e county commissioners on September 18, 1978, Reiter was informed he would be suspended u n t i l a h e a r i n g was h e l d to d e t e r m i n e t h e f a c t s . In response t o R e i t e r ' s a t t e m p t s t o d i s c u s s t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h e county com- m i s s i o n e r s r e p e a t e d l y promised t h a t a h e a r i n g would be h e l d . Subsequently, Reiter r e c e i v e d a w r i t t e n list of r e a s o n s f o r h i s d i s c h a r g e , i n c l u d i n g t h e unauthorized f i r i n g of Evans, l e a v i n g t h e b u i l d i n g d u r i n g working h o u r s , and l e t t i n g t h e men o f f e a r l y . A p p e l l a n t c o n t e s t s t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e r e a s o n s . The commissioners o f f e r e d to r e i n s t a t e Reiter a s a c u s t o d i a n b u t n o t a s a s u p e r v i s o r . Reiter r e f u s e d t h e o f f e r , a p p a r e n t l y because t h e proposed c o n t r a c t was demeaning i n t o n e . N o hearing was h e l d , and R e i t e r l s d i s c h a r g e became f i n a l . Evans r e p l a c e d R e i t e r a s n i g h t s u p e r v i s o r . I n view of t h e remedy r e q u e s t e d , it is essen- t i a l t o n o t e t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n of n i g h t s u p e r v i s o r was sub- s e q u e n t l y a b o l i s h e d . R e i t e r l s employment was n o t covered by any w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t or c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement or o r d i n a n c e . Based on t h e l o n g e v i t y of h i s s e r v i c e and t h e f a c t t h a t he was a per- manent employee, Reiter claims t h a t he had a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t i n h i s c o n t i n u e d employment and t h a t t h e r e f o r e , he was e n t i t l e d to p r o c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s p r i o r to h i s d i s m i s s a l . I n g r a n t i n g r e s p o n d e n t s ' motion f o r summary judgment, t h e District Court found t h a t s e c t i o n 39-2-503, MCA, p r o v i d i n g t h a t a n employment w i t h no s p e c i f i e d term may be t e r m i n a t e d a t t h e w i l l of e i t h e r p a r t y w a s c o n t r o l l i n g and t h a t Reiter had no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to a h e a r i n g . W e f i n d t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h i s a p p e a l are: 1) Was t h e a p p e l l a n t denied h i s due p r o c e s s r i g h t s when he was d i s c h a r g e d w i t h o u t a p r i o r h e a r i n g to d e t e r m i n e i f t h e r e w a s j u s t cause f o r t h e t e r m i n a t i o n ? 2 ) Was t h e a p p e l l a n t e n t i t l e d to a p r e t e r m i n a t i o n h e a r i n g b y v i r t u e of t h e promise made by t h e commissioners t h a t he would b e g i v e n a h e a r i n g ? I. DUE PROCESS A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t he w a s e n t i t l e d to p r o c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s p r i o r t o h i s t e r m i n a t i o n . H e relies p r i m a r i l y on t h e f o l l o w i n g language from P e r r y v. Sindermann ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 408 U.S. 593, 602, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570: "A t e a c h e r , l i k e t h e r e s p o n d e n t , who h a s h e l d h i s p o s i t i o n f o r a number of y e a r s , might be a b l e to show from t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s service--and from o t h e r r e l e v a n t f a c t s - - t h a t he h a s a l e g i t i m a t e claim of e n t i t l e m e n t t o job t e n u r e . " AS llcircumstancesll and " o t h e r r e l e v a n t f a c t s " he p o i n t s t o h i s l o n g e v i t y of s e r v i c e , h i s s u p e r v i s o r y p o s i t i o n , h i s r e t i r e m e n t and i n s u r a n c e b e n e f i t s , and t h e f a c t t h a t he w a s promised a h e a r i n g . H e asserts t h a t t h e s e f a c t o r s gave him a " l e g i t i m a t e claim of e n t i t l e m e n t to continued employment" which is e n t i t l e d t o due p r o c e s s p r o t e c t i o n a c c o r d i n g to P e r r y and Board of Regents v . Roth ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548. A p p e l l a n t also a r g u e s he possessed a p r o p e r t y r i g h t by v i r t u e of a n implied covenant of good f a i t h . I n o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e whether due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s have been v i o l a t e d i n t h i s case, it must be decided whether a p p e l l a n t had e i t h e r a " l i b e r t y w or a " p r o p e r t y " i n t e r e s t which f a l l s w i t h i n t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment to t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and Article 11, S e c t i o n 17, of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . Board of Regents v. Roth, s u p r a ; Schend v . Thorson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 5, 549 P.2d 809. I f a p p e l l a n t can cross t h i s t h r e s h o l d , t h e a n a l y s i s p r o c e e d s to t h e second q u e s t i o n , i.e., what s p e c i f i c p r o c e d u r e s are due i n t h i s case. I n t h e l e a d i n g case of Roth, a nontenured t e a c h e r claimed t h a t a v i o l a t i o n of h i s due p r o c e s s r i g h t s occurred when he w a s d e n i e d an o p p o r t u n i t y to be heard i n r e g a r d t o h i s d i s m i s s a l a t t h e end of h i s i n i t i a l one-year c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e u n i v e r s i t y . A s t a t u t e provided f o r t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of t e n u r e a f t e r f o u r y e a r s o f year-to-year employment. A f t e r a c q u i r i n g t e n u r e t h e t e a c h e r would be e n t i t l e d by s t a t u t e to c o n t i n u e d employment d u r i n g good b e h a v i o r and s a t i s f a c t o r y performance, w i t h d i s c h a r g e allowed o n l y f o r c a u s e . The Court found t h a t Roth had shown no " l i b e r t y " i n t e r e s t e n t i t l e d to p r o t e c t i o n , s i n c e no s t i g m a had been imposed o n h i s "good name, r e p u t a t i o n , honor or i n t e g r i t y . " Nor d i d Roth have a " p r o p e r t y " i n t e r e s t , f o r : " [ t l o have a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t i n a b e n e f i t , a p e r s o n c l e a r l y must have more t h a n an a b s t r a c t need o r d e s i r e f o r it. H e must have more t h a n a u n i l a t e r a l e x p e c t a t i o n of it. H e must, i n s t e a d , have a l e g i t i m a t e claim of e n t i t l e m e n t to it." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 3 3 L.Ed.2d 548. The employee must be a b l e to p o i n t to an independent s o u r c e such a s state l a w or r u l e s o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g s between t h e employer and h i s employees. The t e r m s of R o t h ' s appointment were c o n t a i n e d i n t h e s t a t u t e and i n h i s c o n t r a c t , i n which t h e r e was no s u p p o r t f o r h i s claim of e n t i t l e m e n t to c o n t i n u e d employment. The e v i d e n c e i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , even when viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o a p p e l l a n t , d o e s n o t show a t r a d i t i o n or an u n w r i t t e n p o l i c y concerning job s e c u r i t y f o r county employees. The e v i d e n c e shows t h a t Reiter went t o t h e county commissioners a f t e r h i s s u p e r v i s o r d i s m i s s e d him, and t h a t i n i t i a l l y t h e com- m i s s i o n e r s promised him a h e a r i n g b u t later decided he was n o t e n t i t l e d to a h e a r i n g . The commissioners, having f i n a l a u t h o r i t y i n county p e r s o n n e l matters, t h e n approved of Reiter's d i s c h a r g e . Although Reiter may have been t r e a t e d u n f a i r l y , he s e e k s t o s t r e t c h t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e beyond its l i m i t s by a s s e r t i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p r o t e c t e d p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t based upon l o n g e v i t y o f s e r v i c e , i n view of s e c t i o n 39-2-503, MCA. That s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s : "An employment having no s p e c i f i e d term may be t e r m i n a t e d a t t h e w i l l of e i t h e r p a r t y on n o t i c e t o t h e o t h e r . . .I1 The United S t a t e s Supreme Court h a s r e c e n t l y r e j e c t e d a claim s i m i l a r t o Reiter's i n Bishop v. Wood ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684. A policeman who had become a permanent employee a f t e r p a s s i n g t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y s t a g e claimed h e w a s e n t i t l e d to a p r e t e r m i n a t i o n h e a r i n g by v i r t u e of a c i t y o r d i n a n c e p r o v i d i n g t h a t permanent employees could be d i s c h a r g e d f o r u n s a t i s f a c t o r y performance, n e g l i g e n c e , i n e f f i c i e n c y or u n f i t n e s s . The C o u r t , r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t could b e c r e a t e d by o r d i n a n c e o r by implied c o n t r a c t , s t a t e d t h a t i n e i t h e r case t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t h e claim u l t i m a t e l y must be d e c i d e d by r e f e r e n c e to s t a t e l a w . Based on state l a w t h e Court found t h a t t h e policeman h e l d h i s job a t t h e w i l l and p l e a s u r e of t h e c i t y . F u r t h e r , t h e policeman had no " l i b e r t y " i n t e r e s t , f o r even assuming h i s d i s c h a r g e w a s u n j u s t i f i e d it is n o t a s i g n i f i - c a n t d e p r i v a t i o n when o n e ' s d i s c h a r g e m e r e l y makes one less a t t r a c t i v e to o t h e r employees. I t is clear from t h e above-discussed cases t h a t p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t s are c r e a t e d and d e f i n e d by state l a w . The Montana s t a t u t e creates no p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t i n employment i f t h e r e is no s p e c i f i e d term. A p p e l l a n t s e e k s t o circumvent t h e s t a t u t e t h r o u g h a t h e o r y of implied c o n t r a c t and implied covenant of good f a i t h and f a i r d e a l i n g . I n e f f e c t h i s argument is t h a t due to h i s l o n g e v i t y of s e r v i c e he had an implied c o n t r a c t of employment, t h a t i n t h e implied c o n t r a c t t h e r e was an implied c o v e n a n t of good f a i t h , and t h a t h i s d i s c h a r g e w a s i n bad f a i t h . A p p e l l a n t does n o t claim a breach of c o n t r a c t , b u t r a t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e implied covenant of good f a i t h c o n s t i t u t e d a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t e n t i t l i n g him t o due p r o c e s s . There is some b a s i s f o r implying c o v e n a n t s of good f a i t h i n c o n t r a c t s . See s e c t i o n 28-1-201, MCA; Foley v. Community O i l C o . , Inc., (D.C.N.H. 1 9 7 4 ) , 64 F.R.D. 561; Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. ( N . H . 1 9 7 4 ) , 316 A. 2d 549; F o r t u n e v. N a t i o n a l Cash R e g i s t e r ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251. A l l of t h e s e cases were b r e a c h of c o n t r a c t a c t i o n s and none involved a s t a t u t e . I n Monue t h e c o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e common-law r u l e of a t - w i l l employment c o n t r a c t s , n o t i n g t h a t it was h a r s h and o u t d a t e d , t h e n modified t h e r u l e by h o l d i n g t h a t t e r m i n a t i o n motivated by bad f a i t h or r e t a l i a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d a breach of c o n t r a c t . A f t e r t h i s m d i f i- c a t i o n of t h e " a t - w i l l " r u l e , t h e N e w Hampshire f e d e r a l c o u r t i n F o l e y a p p l i e d it i n denying t h e e m p l o y e r ' s motion f o r judgment on t h e p l e a d i n g s . The F o l e y case involved an employee of 40 y e a r s s e r v i c e who w a s u n j u s t l y d i s c h a r g e d . The f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t l o n g e v i t y of s e r v i c e might g i v e rise to an implied c o n t r a c t r i g h t , b u t t h e c o u r t was no l o n g e r bound by t h e strict common-law "at-will" r u l e a c c o r d i n g to t h e l a w of t h e state i n which it was s i t t i n g . In Massachusetts, t h e d i s c h a r g e of an employee who had served f o r 25 y e a r s w a s found t o be a breach of t h e implied covenant of good f a i t h because t h e employer w a s a t t e m p t i n g t o avoid payment of a s u b s t a n t i a l commission. I n none o f t h e s e cases was t h e r e a p r o c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s i s s u e . The d o c t r i n e of good f a i t h and f a i r d e a l i n g i n c o n t r a c t s h a s been narrowly a p p l i e d i n cases where unconscionable conduct o n an e m p l o y e r ' s p a r t must be d e t e r r e d . The d o c t r i n e h a s also been used e x t e n s i v e l y i n i n s u r a n c e l a w to p r o t e c t t h e i n s u r e d . See F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard (1979X - Mont . - I 593 P.2d 1040, 36 St.Rep. 854. In Kenneally v. Orgain ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . , 606 P.2d 127, 37 St.Rep. 154, we r e j e c t e d a claim i n t o r t f o r wrongful d i s c h a r g e , a l t h o u g h t h e employee had seven y e a r s of s e r v i c e , because t h e r e was no v i o l a t i o n of p u b l i c p o l i c y . A p p e l l a n t ' s argument on implied c o n t r a c t s cannot success- f u l l y circumvent t h e Montana s t a t u t e which c l e a r l y d e n i e s h i s claim of e n t i t l e m e n t t o continued employment. Even though a p p e l l a n t may have had an implied c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e county by v i r t u e of h i s l o n g e v i t y of s e r v i c e , it would be a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms to s a y t h a t he had an "implied s p e c i f i e d " p e r i o d of employment. A s p e c i f i e d t e r m is one which t h e p a r t i e s e x p r e s s e d , and t h e r e was no e x p r e s s i o n h e r e concerning t h e l e n g t h of t h e employment. S e c t i o n 39-2-503, MCA, o p e r a t e s t o f i l l t h e gap l e f t by t h e p a r t i e s by d e f i n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p as an " a t - w i l l " employment. While t h e r u l e may w e l l be o u t d a t e d , it is u n i q u e l y a p r o v i n c e of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o change it. F u r t h e r , assuming arguendo t h a t a p p e l l a n t had an implied c o n t r a c t w i t h an implied covenant of good f a i t h , t h e employer d i d n o t act i n bad f a i t h because its conduct was s t a t u t o r i l y p e r m i s s i b l e . R e i t e r was n o t employed on a " d i s c h a r g e f o r cause o n l y " b a s i s , a c c o r d i n g to t h e s t a t u t e . I n summary, w e hold t h a t a p p e l l a n t was n o t denied h i s pro- c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s r i g h t s when he was d i s c h a r g e d w i t h o u t a h e a r i n g because s e c t i o n 39-2-503, MCA, n e g a t e s h i s claim of a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t p r o t e c t e d by t h e United S t a t e s and Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s . 11. ENFORCEABLE PROMISE, WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t a t a meeting w i t h t h e com- m i s s i o n e r s on September 18, 1979, Reiter was r e p e a t e d l y promised a h e a r i n g . The commissioner r e f u s e d t o d i s c u s s t h e r e a s o n s f o r h i s d i s c h a r g e , s t a t i n g t h a t a h e a r i n g would be scheduled. Sub- s e q u e n t l y , on October 23, 1978, Reiter r e c e i v e d a l e t t e r from t h e d e p u t y county a t t o r n e y , which s t a t e d i n p a r t : " . . . o u r s t u d i e s have i n d i c a t e d t h a t you are n o t e n t i t l e d to a g r i e v a n c e h e a r i n g , and t h e r e - f o r e none w i l l be scheduled ." The e f f e c t of t h e l e t t e r w a s to deny Reiter t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to r e f u t e t h e c h a r g e s made a g a i n s t him i n t h e list of r e a s o n s f o r h i s d i s c h a r g e . The i s s u e is whether Reiter w a s e n t i t l e d to a h e a r i n g by v i r t u e of t h e commissioners1 promise to hold a h e a r i n g . The promise to hold a h e a r i n g was n o t supported by any i n d e p e n d e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , it w a s n o t an e n f o r c e a b l e promise under c o n t r a c t law, independent of t h e employment c o n t r a c t . N o r could t h e promise be e n f o r c e a b l e a s an implied term of Reiterls implied c o n t r a c t of employment, assuming he had s u c h a c o n t r a c t . When Reiter was employed, t h e p r e d e c e s s o r to s e c t i o n 39-2-503, MCA, was i n e f f e c t . That s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s t h a t a n employment w i t h o u t a s p e c i f i e d l e n g t h may be t e r m i n a t e d a t t h e w i l l of t h e employer, i.e. t h a t no r e a s o n or good cause need be shown. T h i s s t a t u t e was i n e f f e c t a p a r t of t h e employment c o n t r a c t between t h e county and Reiter. A promise t o h o l d a h e a r i n g , g i v e n a t a l a t e r d a t e , c o u l d n o t modify t h a t p a r t of t h e c o n t r a c t w i t h o u t independent c o n s i d e r a t i o n u n l e s s consented to by b o t h p a r t i e s i n w r i t i n g . S e c t i o n 28-1-1601, MCA. Did t h e promise o p e r a t e a s a waiver of t h e c o u n t y l s r i g h t t o f i r e Reiter w i t h o u t a h e a r i n g ? A waiver is d e f i n e d as t h e i n t e n t i o n a l and v o l u n t a r y r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of a known r i g h t , claim or p r i v i l e g e . Farmer's E l e v a t o r Co. of Reserve v. Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 175, 552 P.2d 63. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e commissioners were n o t even aware t h a t Reiter was not e n t i t l e d to a h e a r i n g a t t h e t i m e t h e y promised t h e h e a r i n g . If t h e y d i d n o t know of t h e i r r i g h t to f i r e Reiter w i t h o u t a h e a r i n g , t h e y could n o t have v o l u n t a r i l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y waived t h a t r i g h t . A w a i v e r can also a r i s e by conduct, i n which case it is c a l l e d an "implied waiver." T h i s d o c t r i n e r e q u i r e s a d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e by t h e p a r t y who is l e d by t h e conduct to b e l i e v e a w a i v e r h a s o c c u r r e d . See S t a n o l i n d O i l & Gas Co. v. Guertzgen ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 3 9 ) , 100 F.2d 299; B l a c k l s Law D i c t i o n a r y , p. 1752. Thus t h e d o c t r i n e of "implied waiver" is a k i n to e s t o p p e l . The e l e m e n t s of e s t o p p e l are set f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 26-1-601, MCA. E s s e n t i a l to t h e d o c t r i n e is t h e d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e by t h e i n n o c e n t p a r t y upon t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of t h e o t h e r p a r t y . In t h i s case, t h e r e c o r d shows no e v i d e n c e of r e l i a n c e by Reiter. R e i t e r was promised a h e a r i n g and also o f f e r e d a r e i n s t a t e m e n t as a j a n i t o r r a t h e r t h a n a s u p e r v i s o r . From Reiterts d e p o s i t i o n it is a p p a r e n t t h a t he d i d n o t r e f u s e t h e demotion as a r e s u l t of t h e promise of a h e a r i n g . R a t h e r he r e f used t h e demotion because t h e proposed c o n t r a c t s r e q u i r e d him t o acknowledge t h a t h i s b e h a v i o r was u n s a t i s f a c t o r y and he f e l t t h e s e c o n t r a c t s were demeaning. T h e r e f o r e , s i n c e t h e r e is no e v i d e n c e o f a d e t r i m e n t a l change i n p o s i t i o n due to t h e promise, t h e d o c t r i n e s of e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l and implied waiver d o n o t a p p l y S i n c e Reiter h a s no due p r o c e s s r i g h t to a h e a r i n g and t h e commissioners promise was u n e n f o r c e a b l e , t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s motion f o r summary judgment was p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d . The o r d e r of t h e District Court e n t e r i n g summary judgment i n f a v o r of t h e r e s p o n d e n t s is h e r e b y a f f i r m e d . Chief J u s t i c e T h i s c a u s e was s u b m i t t e d f o r d e c i s i o n p r i o r to J a n u a r y 5, 1981. M r . J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea w i l l f i l e a w r i t t e n d i s s e n t later. Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d i s s e n t i n g : I must d i s s e n t w i t h t h e o p i n i o n of t h e Court on t h e b a s i s of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 28-1-201, MCA. T h i s p r o v i s i o n i n our law, i n my o p i n i o n , can be looked t o i n f a c t s i t u a t i o n s such a s t h i s a s a s t a t u t e t o p r o t e c t p e r s o n s , such t h e p e t i t i o n e r i n t h i s c a s e , who have a long p e r i o d of p u b l i c employment. S e c t i o n 28-1-201 p r o v i d e s : "General d u t y of c a r e . Every person is b o u n d , w i t h o u t c o n t r a c t , t o a b s t a i n f r o m i n j u r i n g t h e person o r p r o p e r t y o f a n o t h e r o r i n f r i n g i n g upon any of h i s r i g h t s . " Developing i n t h e law around t h e United S t a t e s a r e remedies f o r employees who s e r v e under t h e " a t - w i l l " s t a t u t e and r u l e . The more e q u i t a b l e and j u s t r u l e , i n my o p i n i o n , is t h a t an implied c o n t r a c t e x i s t s between t h e employer and t h e employee which g i v e s a d d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o an employee of some e i g h t e e n y e a r s of c o n t i n u o u s employment, a s i n t h i s c a s e . Foley v. Community O i l Company, I n c . (D. N.H. 1 9 7 4 ) , 64 F.R.D. 561; Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. ( N . H . 1 9 7 4 ) , 316 A.2d 549; F o r t u n e v. N a t i o n a l Cash R e g i s t e r Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251. I n Monge t h e c o u r t reviewed t h e common-law r u l e of " a t - w i l l " employment c o n t r a c t s . The Monge c o u r t noted t h a t t h e r u l e was h a r s h and o u t d a t e d , and t h e n modified t h e r u l e by h o l d i n g t h a t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n m o t i v a t e d by bad f a i t h o r r e t a l i a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d a breach o f c o n t r a c t . I t was a modified " a t - w i l l " r u l e t h a t t h e N e w Hampshire F e d e r a l Court a p p l i e d t o deny an employer's motion f o r a judgment on t h e p l e a d i n g s . I n Foley, when an employee of f o r t y y e a r s o f s e r v i c e was u n j u s t l y d i s c h a r g e d , t h e F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t Court s t a t e d t h a t t h e l o n g e v i t y of s e r v i c e should g i v e r i s e t o an implied contract right but that the court was no longer bound by the strict common-law "at-will" rule according to New Hampshire law. The next case, the Massachusetts case of Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., supra, involved an employee who was discharged after working for the company some twenty- five years. The Court found that there was a breach of an implied contract of good faith because the employer was attempting to avoid payment of a substantial commission. While it has not been established that a public employee with longevity has a constitutional right to a continued position, I believe the rule established is that one is entitled to a hearing before he is summarily discharged, as appellant was in this case. I would hold that the summary dismissal of appellant violated a due process right. Slochower v. Board of Education (1956), 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 672. For the above reasons, I would return the matter to the District Court and require that a full hearing be given to appellant in this matter.