Title: Mohamed v. Eckelberry

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Mohamed v. Eckelberry, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4585.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4585 
MOHAMED v. ECKELBERRY, SHERIFF. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Mohamed v. Eckelberry, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4585.] 
Habeas corpus—In an original action, an appellate court may permit a habeas 
petitioner to introduce evidence to prove his excessive-bail claim and then 
exercise its own discretion in imposing an appropriate bail amount—Writ 
granted. 
(No. 2020-0638—Submitted September 22, 2020—Decided September 25, 2020.) 
IN HABEAS CORPUS. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Petitioner, Hassan Mohamed, filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus challenging the amount of his pretrial bond.  He is in jail awaiting trial in 
the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas on multiple charges of attempted 
murder and felonious assault.  We allowed the writ and ordered respondent, Seneca 
County Sheriff William Eckelberry, to file a return.  159 Ohio St.3d 1432, 2020-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2
Ohio-3634, 148 N.E.3d 573.  After the sheriff filed his return, we referred the matter 
to a master commissioner to conduct a hearing to determine whether Mohamed is 
being held unlawfully due to an excessive bond and to make a recommendation 
regarding an appropriate bond.  159 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2020-Ohio-4080, 150 N.E.3d 
956. 
{¶ 2} After a hearing, the master commissioner concluded that the 
$1,000,000 cash or surety bond on which Mohamed is being held is excessive and 
recommended modifying the financial conditions of Mohamed’s bail to $200,000, 
secured by the deposit of 10 percent of the amount of the bail bond in cash, a surety 
bond, or property as allowed by law.  The master commissioner recommended that 
the nonfinancial conditions of release imposed by the common pleas court remain 
in place. 
{¶ 3} Mohamed did not file a response to the master commissioner’s 
recommendation.  The sheriff, however, filed a response challenging the master 
commissioner’s conclusion that this court may independently review Mohamed’s 
bond without first holding that the common pleas court abused its discretion.  The 
sheriff also argued that a $1,000,000 bail bond is justified based on the seriousness 
of the crimes Mohamed is charged with, Mohamed’s lack of ties to Seneca County, 
and the evidence of Mohamed’s guilt.  We address the sheriff’s arguments below. 
The standard of review 
{¶ 4} Relying on In re DeFronzo, 49 Ohio St.2d 271, 273-274, 361 N.E.2d 
448 (1977), the master commissioner concluded that in an original action for a writ 
of habeas corpus, an appellate court may receive evidence and exercise its own 
discretion concerning a petitioner’s bail, without according deference to the trial 
court’s determination.  The sheriff does not dispute DeFronzo’s holding but argues 
that more recently, this court endorsed an abuse-of-discretion review in Ahmad v. 
Plummer, 126 Ohio St.3d 262, 2010-Ohio-3757, 933 N.E.2d 256.  The sheriff notes 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
that in Ahmad, this court affirmed a court of appeals’ determination that a trial court 
had not abused its discretion in setting bail.  Id. at ¶ 3-4. 
{¶ 5} To be sure, in Ahmad, we did not expressly repudiate the court of 
appeals’ statement about not finding an abuse of discretion.  But contrary to the 
sheriff’s argument, we did not abandon the rule articulated in DeFronzo.  In fact, 
in Ahmad, we focused on the court of appeals’ “de novo review of the habeas corpus 
claim” and its determination that “Ahmad failed to demonstrate that the pretrial bail 
is excessive.”  Id. at ¶ 4.  Ahmad, therefore, confirms that in an original action, an 
appellate court may permit a habeas petitioner to introduce evidence to prove his 
claim and then exercise its own discretion in imposing an appropriate bail amount. 
The seriousness of the crimes 
{¶ 6} The sheriff next argues that Mohamed’s $1,000,000 bail bond is not 
excessive—and a $200,000 bail bond is inadequate—in view of the fact that 
Mohamed is charged with two counts of attempted murder and two counts of 
felonious assault, all with firearm specifications.  In support, the sheriff again points 
to Ahmad, in which a $3,000,000 bail bond on a charge of conspiracy to commit 
murder was found not to be excessive.  The sheriff thus invites us to compare the 
seriousness of the charge in Ahmad’s case to the seriousness of the charges in 
Mohamed’s case. 
{¶ 7} The nature and circumstances of the crime charged are relevant to any 
bail determination.  Crim.R. 46(C)(1).  But under Crim.R. 46(C), a court also must 
consider many other factors that are specific to the accused, such as the weight of 
the evidence against the defendant and the defendant’s financial resources.  Crim.R. 
46(C)(2) and (4).  Those factors are not nearly as strong here as they were in 
Ahmad’s case.  As explained in the master commissioner’s recommendation, while 
Mohamed presented alibi evidence, not only was there “substantial evidence 
against” Ahmad, but he apparently had no plausible defense.  Ahmad, 126 Ohio 
St.3d 262, 2010-Ohio-3757, 933 N.E.2d 256, at ¶ 11, 17.  And the evidence showed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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that Ahmad and his family had significant resources—likely enough to be able to 
afford a $3,000,000 bond.  Id. at ¶ 15.  In contrast, Mohamed presented evidence 
showing that he is in a very different financial situation and cannot afford a 
$1,000,000 bond. 
{¶ 8} Thus, contrary to what the sheriff argues, our holding in Ahmad does 
not validate the bond imposed by the court of common pleas in Mohamed’s case. 
The lack of ties to Seneca County 
{¶ 9} The sheriff also argues that the master commissioner inappropriately 
gave weight to Mohamed’s family ties in Ohio because those ties are not local to 
Seneca County.  The sheriff refers to Crim.R. 46(C)(4), which directs the court to 
consider the defendant’s “length of residence in the community.” 
{¶ 10} Contrary to what the sheriff suggests, the master commissioner did 
not give weight to any ties between Mohamed and the local community.  In fact, 
the master commissioner noted that Mohamed does not have any connections in 
Seneca County.  We may, however, consider Mohamed’s family ties in Ohio and 
the fact that he would have a place to live in Columbus as “relevant information” 
under Crim.R. 46(C). 
{¶ 11} The sheriff also argues that a $1,000,000 bond is justified because if 
Mohamed lives in Columbus while awaiting trial, it will be harder for the common 
pleas court to monitor him.  We reject this argument because it does not relate to 
the financial conditions of Mohamed’s pretrial release and therefore is not relevant 
to whether Mohamed’s bail is excessive. 
The strength of the state’s case 
{¶ 12} In his final argument, the sheriff reiterates the evidence against 
Mohamed in an attempt to show that the state has, in fact, indicted the right person.  
The sheriff argues that the state’s evidence is “far superior” to and “much more 
reliable” than Mohamed’s alibi evidence. 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
{¶ 13} The master commissioner acknowledged the evidence of 
Mohamed’s guilt, while also recommending that we should give substantial weight 
to the fact that Mohamed has a plausible alibi defense.  The master commissioner 
concluded that based on the evidence presented by both parties, it is an open 
question whether Mohamed is the perpetrator.  That conclusion recognizes our 
limited role in this case when it comes to Mohamed’s guilt or innocence: It is 
appropriate for us to consider the weight of the evidence against Mohamed, Crim.R. 
46(C)(2); but we are not the finders of fact concerning his guilt.  A jury must 
ultimately determine whether the state’s evidence proves beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mohamed is guilty. 
{¶ 14} We reject the sheriff’s final argument because it asks us not to just 
recognize that there are factual disputes related to Mohamed’s guilt, but to actually 
resolve them. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 15} Having reviewed the master commissioner’s recommendation, 
completed an independent review of the record, and considered the sheriff’s 
arguments, we hold that the master commissioner has properly stated the facts and 
applied the law.  We therefore adopt the master commissioner’s recommendation 
but with the following additional nonfinancial conditions: Mohamed shall be 
monitored electronically, he shall surrender his passport if he owns one, he will 
reside with his father in Columbus and nowhere else, he may travel for necessities 
and for reasons related to the care of his father, and he may not leave the state of 
Ohio.  Mohamed’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted and his bail bond is 
reduced to $200,000, secured by the deposit of 10 percent of the amount of the bond 
in cash, a surety bond, or property as allowed by law.  The other nonfinancial 
conditions of release imposed by the court of common pleas shall remain in place. 
Writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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STEWART, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by O’CONNOR, C.J. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, J. 
_________________ 
STEWART, J., concurring. 
{¶ 16} I join the per curiam opinion in full to ensure that petitioner Hassan 
Mohamed’s bail is reduced to an amount that gives him a chance to be released 
from jail during the pretrial period.  Nevertheless, I remain concerned that the 
financial condition of release is still unconstitutionally high and I am skeptical 
about the use of electronic monitoring. 
Relevant Law Concerning Bail 
{¶ 17} As noted in the master commissioner’s report and recommendation: 
 
“Bail is security for the appearance of an accused to appear 
and answer to a specific criminal * * * charge.”  R.C. 2937.22(A).  
That bail is generally available to allow an accused person to be 
released before trial is fundamental to the American system of 
justice.  Pretrial release not only makes it easier for an accused 
person to prepare a defense, it also upholds the presumption of 
innocence by ensuring that a person is not punished before being 
convicted.  Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 
(1951).  Although a court may impose bail conditions to protect an 
individual or the public, the primary function of bail is to allow for 
pretrial release, while also assuring that the accused person will 
appear in court when required.  Id. at 4-5; United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 752-754, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987); 
Bland [v. Holden], 21 Ohio St.2d [238,] 239, 257 N.E.2d 397 
[(1970]). 
January Term, 2020 
 
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Not every accused person has the right to bail.  Carlson v. 
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-546, 72 S.Ct. 525, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952).  
But in Ohio, most criminal defendants are presumed to be bailable.  
Article 1, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution.  To deny bail to 
Mohamed, who is charged with noncapital first- and second-degree 
felonies, the common pleas court would need to hold a hearing at 
which the state would need to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that (1) “the proof is evident or the presumption great” that 
Mohamed committed the offenses, (2) Mohamed “poses a 
substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to the 
community,” and (3) no conditions of release can reasonably 
alleviate that risk. R.C. 2937.222.  See also Crim.R. 46(A).  Nothing 
in this court’s record in this case suggests that the state believes 
Mohamed poses a substantial public-safety risk or that the common 
pleas court held a hearing under R.C. 2937.222.  Indeed, the fact that 
the common pleas court set bail at all shows that Mohamed is 
bailable. 
When a criminal defendant is bailable, a court must release 
him “on the least restrictive conditions” that “will reasonably 
assure” his appearance in court, public safety, and the integrity of 
the criminal-justice process.  Crim.R. 46(B).  Pretrial release may 
involve several conditions, both financial and nonfinancial.  
Financial conditions of release must be “related to the defendant’s 
risk of non-appearance, the seriousness of the offense, and the 
previous criminal record of the defendant. Any financial conditions 
shall be in an amount and type which are least costly to the defendant 
while also sufficient to reasonably assure the defendant’s future 
appearance in court.”  Id.  The Eighth Amendment to the United 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution 
prohibit “[e]xcessive bail.”  A bail bond that is “higher than an 
amount reasonably calculated to” assure the accused’s presence in 
court is “excessive.”  Stack, 342 U.S. at 5, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3.  
Mohamed thus is entitled to bail in an amount that is attainable yet 
high enough to compel him to appear in court when required. 
 
(Ellipsis and fourth set of brackets sic.) 
Release on Least Restrictive Conditions 
{¶ 18} By adopting the master commissioner’s legal analysis, a majority of 
this court necessarily agrees that Mohamed has the constitutional right to pretrial 
release in this case.  It also agrees that it must impose only the least restrictive 
financial and nonfinancial conditions necessary to assure that Mohamed returns to 
court.  But that is not really what this court is doing today when it imposes a 
$200,000 financial condition with the additional requirement that Mohamed submit 
to electronic monitoring. 
{¶ 19} The record simply does not support the imposition of a bail-bond 
amount of $200,000, secured by the deposit of 10 percent of the bail amount in 
cash, a surety bond, or property as allowed by law when the evidence shows that 
Mohamed has been out of work for over a year because he has been sitting in jail 
on an excessive bond.  Furthermore, testimony given on behalf of Mohamed’s 
family shows that the family can afford to post only $5,000.  Again, as the majority 
opinion acknowledges by reference to the master commissioner’s report, the 
purpose of bail is to allow release, not guarantee detention.  I question the reason 
for imposing a financial condition of release that appears to be unattainable for 
Mohamed with the possible end result being that he ends up where he started—in 
jail because of a bail bond he cannot afford. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 20} When a court is considering the imposition of a financial 
condition—which of course, is supposed to both allow for release while also 
inducing reappearance—it is imperative that the court account for what the accused 
can actually afford to pay.  It should go without saying that a wealthy person may 
need a higher financial condition to induce appearance, whereas a person with 
significantly fewer financial resources would require less.  In other words, the 
inducement inherent in financial conditions works only in situations in which 
(1) the accused is able to post the bond and be released and (2) the threat of losing 
the posted bond makes it worthwhile to return to court. 
{¶ 21} Furthermore, I find electronic monitoring, one of Mohamed’s 
nonfinancial conditions of release to be excessive in this case.  The record before 
this court shows that Mohamed is a former nursing student with no criminal record.  
Also, respondent, Seneca County Sheriff William Eckelberry, has submitted no 
evidence that should lead us to think that Mohamed will fail to appear if he is 
released.  Although the charges against Mohamed are serious and carry the 
possibility of significant prison time if he is convicted, that fact alone is not enough 
to presume that he is a flight risk and that he therefore must be electronically 
monitored. 
{¶ 22} Additionally, electronic monitoring comes with its own costs.  
Electronic monitoring may require the accused to pay an upfront installation fee in 
addition to monthly monitoring fees, and there is undoubtedly a social stigma that 
attaches when a person is seen wearing an electronic-monitoring device.  Given the 
already significant financial condition that this court has imposed, which is 
sufficient to induce Mohamed’s return to court assuming that his family has the 
ability to post the bail-bond amount, I do not believe that electronic monitoring 
serves any necessary purpose here. 
{¶ 23} I realize that given Mohamed’s relative success at securing a 
significant reduction in bail through a habeas proceeding in Ohio’s highest court, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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the concerns I raise in this concurrence may seem inordinate.  But this is precisely 
why I am compelled to write separately.  When a trial court is presented with 
information or evidence that a person accused of one or more felony offenses is a 
flight risk or poses a threat to public safety and should not be released from jail 
during the pretrial period, the court can hold a pretrial-detention hearing pursuant 
to R.C. 2937.222(A).  This process allows the trial court to detain a person, without 
bail, during the pretrial period when clear and convincing evidence establishes that 
the accused should not be released.  R.C. 2937.222(A) and (B).  If the trial court 
does deny bail, the accused’s due-process rights are further protected in that he has 
the right to an immediate and expediated appeal of that decision.  R.C. 
2937.222(D).  Unfortunately, what often happens is that a trial court will set a bail 
amount, without regard to an accused’s ability to pay, and in an amount high 
enough that the accused’s pretrial detention is effectively guaranteed.  By doing 
this, the trial court bypasses the due-process protections afforded to the accused in 
R.C. 2937.222.  In this case, the presumedly innocent Mohamed has been in jail for 
over a year on a $1,000,000 bond. 
{¶ 24} I do not mean to suggest that determining a bail amount that satisfies 
all the requirements of Crim.R. 46 is an easy decision to make.  It is not.  However, 
setting a high bail in order to keep someone accused of a crime incarcerated pretrial 
is both statutorily and constitutionally unlawful.  See R.C. 2937.222; State v. 
Bevacqua, 147 Ohio St. 20, 22, 67 N.E.2d 786 (1946) (“Keeping an accused in jail 
by excessive bail is as much a denial of his constitutional rights as refusing to fix 
bail”); Stack, 342 U.S. at 4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3.  Additionally, the practice of 
inflating a bail-bond amount is terribly harmful to our system of justice, resulting 
in bloated jail populations, economic harm, and trauma to individuals, families, and 
communities.  The Vera Institute, Justice Denied: The Harmful and Lasting Effects 
of 
Pretrial 
Detention, 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Justice-
Denied-Evidence-Brief.pdf (accessed Sept. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X2WJ-
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
K5G6].  Boiled down to its essence, setting high bail amounts accomplishes with 
money what courts could not otherwise achieve without following the due-process 
requirements in R.C. 2937.222.  This practice turns the purpose of bail—which is 
to allow an accused to be released pretrial—on its head. 
{¶ 25} This case presented us with a golden opportunity to set a clear 
example of what bail determinations should look like by demonstrating what it 
means to impose the least restrictive conditions necessary to accomplish release 
while assuring an accused’s return to court.  We have squandered that opportunity: 
maybe because we have succumbed to the same fears that motivate trial courts to 
impose excessive bonds in the first place or maybe because this unconstitutional 
practice has gone on for so long that it has simply become a comfortable routine.  
Regardless of the reason, it is incumbent on the judicial system to get it right and 
to impose bail in a constitutional manner.  Stack at 4 (bail is excessive under the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution if it is set at an amount higher 
than reasonably necessary to assure the accused’s presence in court). 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} Because petitioner, Hassan Mohamed, has failed in his burden to 
demonstrate that he is being unlawfully confined based on excessive bail imposed 
by the trial court in his criminal case, I dissent.  Our review in this case is hybrid.  
This is an original action for a writ of habeas corpus, so we review de novo the 
evidence presented in the trial court and any new evidence submitted to this court.  
However, the determination of the amount of bail is committed solely to the trial 
court’s discretion, and the accused is not unlawfully confined (and therefore not 
entitled to habeas relief) when the order setting bail is not an abuse of that 
discretion.  Mohamed has the burden of going forward with evidence and proving 
that the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
12 
otherwise exhibited perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral 
delinquency.  As Mohamed does not prove that the amount of bail set by the trial 
court resulted from an abuse of discretion, the order setting bail is valid, he is 
lawfully confined, and he is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus ordering a 
reduction of bail. 
{¶ 27} The new precedent set today is troubling.  In this watershed case, 
this court has announced that it will exercise its original jurisdiction in habeas 
corpus to review de novo the trial court’s determination of the amount of bail and, 
in the exercise of its sole, unreviewable discretion, substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court.  This new right would now be open to all criminal defendants in 
this state who are dissatisfied with the amount of bail that has been imposed by a 
trial court.  The discretion to set bail, however, is committed to the trial court by 
Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution and Crim.R. 46.  The majority’s 
decision today is nothing more than the usurpation of the trial court’s power to set 
bail in the disguise of the extraordinary remedy, a writ of habeas corpus. 
Mohamed’s Petition Is Fatally Defective 
{¶ 28} As an initial matter, Mohamed’s petition is subject to dismissal 
because it is unverified.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.01(B) requires that all habeas petitions be 
brought pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2725, and pursuant to R.C. 2725.04, all petitions 
must be verified by the petitioner or his or her representative.  Either Mohamed or 
his attorney was required to swear to the truth of the facts contained in the petition.  
See Davis v. Sheldon, 159 Ohio St.3d 147, 2020-Ohio-436, 149 N.E.3d 467, ¶ 8, 
citing Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 327-328, 744 N.E.2d 763 (2001).  Neither 
did so.  Therefore, the unverified petition is “fatally defective and is subject to 
dismissal.”  Watkins v. Collins, 111 Ohio St.3d 425, 2006-Ohio-5082, 857 N.E.2d 
78, ¶ 37.  But because the majority ordered a return of the writ and decides this case 
on the merits, I likewise address the merits of the petition. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
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The Right to Bail 
{¶ 29} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.”  Bail is excessive when it is higher than 
is reasonably necessary calculated to serve the government’s interest in ensuring 
the accused’s appearance at trial.  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753-
755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5, 72 S.Ct. 
1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951).  “[T]he fixing of bail ‘is peculiarly a matter of discretion with 
the trial court.’ ”  United States v. Mitchell, 733 F.2d 327, 331 (4th Cir.1984), 
quoting United States v. Wright, 483 F.2d 1068, 1069 (4th Cir.1973); see also 
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544-545, 72 S.Ct. 525, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952) 
(attorney general did not abuse his discretion in setting bail). 
{¶ 30} Similarly, the Ohio Constitution provides a right to bail.  Article I, 
Section 9 states: 
 
All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for 
a person who is charged with a capital offense where the proof is 
evident or the presumption great, and except for a person who is 
charged with a felony where the proof is evident or the presumption 
great and where the person poses a substantial risk of serious 
physical harm to any person or to the community. Where a person 
is charged with any offense for which the person may be 
incarcerated, the court may determine at any time the type, amount, 
and conditions of bail. Excessive bail shall not be required; nor 
excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
 
The General Assembly shall fix by law standards to 
determine whether a person who is charged with a felony where the 
proof is evident or the presumption great poses a substantial risk of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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serious physical harm to any person or to the community. 
Procedures for establishing the amount and conditions of bail shall 
be established pursuant to Article IV, Section 5(b) of the 
Constitution of the state of Ohio. 
 
{¶ 31} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2937.222, which lays out the 
considerations for a trial court in determining whether to deny bail to an accused.  
Those considerations are not at issue here, however, because the trial court has 
already determined that Mohamed is bailable. 
The Amount of Bail Is Committed to a Trial Court’s Discretion 
{¶ 32} In accordance with Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution, this 
court promulgated Crim.R. 46 to establish the procedures for establishing the 
amount and conditions of bail.  Crim.R. 46(B) provides that if a trial court 
determines that denying bail is not required by statute,  
 
the court shall release the defendant on the least restrictive 
conditions that, in the discretion of the court, will reasonably assure 
the defendant’s appearance in court, the protection or safety of any 
person or the community, and that the defendant will not obstruct 
the criminal justice process.  If the court orders financial conditions 
of release, those financial conditions shall be related to the 
defendant’s risk of non-appearance, the seriousness of the offense, 
and the previous criminal record of the defendant. Any financial 
conditions shall be in an amount and type which are least costly to 
the defendant while also sufficient to reasonably assure the 
defendant’s future appearance in court. 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
Compare R.C. 2937.23(A)(3) (“In all cases, the bail shall be fixed with 
consideration of the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal 
record of the defendant, and the probability of the defendant appearing at the trial 
of the case”). 
{¶ 33} Crim.R. 46(B) expressly commits the amount of bail required to the 
discretion of a trial court.  Therefore, review of the trial court’s determination of 
the amount of bail is for the abuse of discretion.  Jenkins v. Billy, 43 Ohio St.3d 84, 
85, 538 N.E.2d 1045 (1989); Bland v. Holden, 21 Ohio St.2d 238, 239, 257 N.E.2d 
397 (1970) (“The amount of bail is largely within the sound discretion of the 
court”). 
{¶ 34} This accords with the decisions of other courts of last resort that the 
amount of bail is a discretionary determination.  See, e.g., State v. Visintin, 143 
Haw. 143, 162, 426 P.3d 367 (2018); State v. Pratt, 204 Vt. 282, 2017 VT 9, 166 
A.3d 600, ¶ 20; State v. Brown, 2014-NMSC-038, 338 P.3d 1276, ¶ 4; Myers v. St. 
Lawrence, 289 Ga. 240, 241-242, 710 S.E.2d 557 (2011); Querubin v. 
Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 108, 120, 795 N.E.2d 534 (2003), fn. 10.  It also gels 
with our own recognition that when excessive-bail cases are “considered as appeals, 
it is reasonable to require some finding of error or abuse of discretion before 
allowing the writ to issue overturning or modifying the decision of the trial court.”   
In re DeFronzo, 49 Ohio St.2d 271, 273, 361 N.E.2d 448 (1977). 
Review of Bail Decisions 
{¶ 35} However, Ohio law does not permit an interlocutory appeal of a trial 
court’s order setting bail, and we have recognized that a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus is the proper vehicle to raise an excessive-bail claim.  Chari, 91 Ohio St.3d 
at 325, 744 N.E.2d 763; State v. Bevacqua, 147 Ohio St. 20, 67 N.E.2d 786 (1946), 
syllabus. 
{¶ 36} We have suggested that there is a hybrid nature to these types of 
claims, pointing to “the ‘anomaly in original actions which are filed seeking habeas 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
16 
corpus on the grounds of excessive bail because the effect of such cases is an appeal 
from a decision of the trial court; yet, such cases are also considered as original 
actions so as to permit hearings and findings of fact.’ ” Ahmad v. Plummer, 126 
Ohio St.3d 262, 2010-Ohio-3757, 933 N.E.2d 256, ¶ 2, quoting DeFronzo, 49 Ohio 
St.2d at 273, 361 N.E.2d 448.  Relying on Ahmad and DeFronzo, the majority 
decides that the trial court’s determination of the amount of bail is subject to de 
novo review in this court and that we are vested with the discretion to substitute our 
judgment for that of the trial court to determine the amount of bail. 
{¶ 37} In my view, that analysis is incorrect.  This is an original action, and 
we take a de novo review of the evidence presented in the trial court and any new 
evidence submitted to this court.  Ahmad at ¶ 2.  But the focus remains on whether 
the petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, and “ ‘habeas corpus in Ohio is 
generally appropriate in the criminal context only if the petitioner is entitled to 
immediate release from prison or some other type of physical confinement.’ ” Smith 
v. Leis, 106 Ohio St.3d 309, 2005-Ohio-5125, 835 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 13, quoting State ex 
rel. Smirnoff v. Greene, 84 Ohio St.3d 165, 167, 702 N.E.2d 423 (1998). 
{¶ 38} Mohamed therefore bears the burdens of going forward with 
evidence and persuading this court that he is unlawfully confined, Chari, 91 Ohio 
St.3d at 326, 744 N.E.2d 763, and he is not entitled to immediate release on reduced 
bail unless he first demonstrates that the bail set by the trial court is unreasonable 
and excessive.  As explained above, the trial court is vested with discretion to set 
the amount and conditions of bail pursuant to Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio 
Constitution and Crim.R. 46 as well as our caselaw, and it follows that Mohamed 
is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus unless he proves that the trial court abused 
its discretion in setting the amount and conditions of bail—if the trial court did not 
exceed its discretion, then Mohamed is not being unlawfully confined. 
{¶ 39} Because the ultimate standard of review in determining whether 
Mohamed is unlawfully confined on excessive bail is an abuse of discretion, we are 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
not permitted to substitute our judgment for that the trial court’s.  Nor is it the 
function of a habeas proceeding to provide the petitioner a second bail hearing.  
Rather, the habeas remedy is available to protect the accused’s constitutional rights 
against the trial court’s abuse of its discretion in setting an excessive bail.  See 
generally Bevacqua, 147 Ohio St. at 22, 67 N.E.2d 786. 
Review for the Abuse of Discretion 
{¶ 40} Because this matter is an original action, Mohamed must present 
evidence to prove his entitlement to a writ.  But that does not permit this court to 
substitute its judgment for the trial court’s.  Rather, any evidence submitted must 
be relevant to demonstrating that the confinement is unlawful because the trial court 
abused its discretion in setting bail.  An “ ‘ “abuse of discretion” * * * implies that 
the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’ ” (Ellipsis in 
White.)  State v. White, 118 Ohio St.3d 12, 2008-Ohio-1623, 885 N.E.2d 905, ¶ 46, 
quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).  It also 
exists when there is “perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral 
delinquency.” Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 
748 (1993). 
{¶ 41} Here, there is insufficient evidence that the trial court abused its 
discretion.  Mohamed’s complaint is not verified and not supported by an affidavit.  
Although he asserts that the trial court held a bond hearing and an evidentiary 
hearing at which counsel requested a reduction of bail, no transcript of those 
hearings have been submitted to this court.  Nor does he present new evidence in 
this court to prove an abuse of discretion because the trial court set bail based on 
improper considerations, such as passion, prejudice, or bias, which would vitiate 
the trial court’s bail order or because it relied on unlawful factors in reaching its 
decision.  See Stack, 342 U.S. at 7, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (discussing bail that “has 
not been fixed by proper methods”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
{¶ 42} Instead of arguing that the trial court relied on improper factors, 
Mohamed just disagrees with the trial court’s weighing of the evidence.  And 
assuming for the sake of argument that a trial court could ever abuse its discretion 
by failing to consider evidence that was never presented to it, the new evidence 
submitted to this court fails to establish that the bail set was excessive. 
{¶ 43} Mohamed asserts his alibi, but respondent, Seneca County Sheriff 
William Eckelberry counters this with evidence that there is eyewitness testimony 
that Mohamed is the perpetrator.  Mohamed points to evidence of his financial 
condition, but courts have rejected the view that bail is excessive merely because 
the accused cannot afford it.  4 LaFave, Criminal Procedure, Section 12.2(b), 38-
44 (4th Ed.2015) (citing cases).  He submitted testimony that he has family ties in 
Columbus and asserts that he has no criminal record, but sheriff Eckelberry 
responds that Mohamed proved no ties to Seneca County where the trial is being 
held and that the charges are serious—attempted murder and felonious assault with 
a firearm, which, if convicted, carries mandatory prison time. 
{¶ 44} Mohamad bears both the burdens of production and persuasion, but 
he fails to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount of 
bail.  Absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion in setting bail, 
Mohamed’s confinement is not unlawful and a writ of habeas corpus will not lie.  
For these reasons, I dissent and would deny the writ. 
 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Law Office of Eric J. Allen, Ltd., and Eric J. Allen, for petitioner. 
Derek W. DeVine, Seneca County Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
_________________