Title: Latham v. State

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
DAVID GLENN LATHAM, 
  ) 
  ) 
Appellant, 
  ) 
  ) 
v. 
  ) 
No.  SC96315 
  ) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
  ) 
  ) 
Respondent. 
  ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JASPER COUNTY 
The Honorable Gayle L. Crane, Judge  
David Latham appeals from the motion court’s judgment overruling his motion for 
postconviction relief.  Mr. Latham timely filed his pro se Rule 24.0351 motion after 
revocation of his probation and execution of his sentence for the class A felony of 
trafficking drugs in the second degree, section 195.223,2 for possessing six grams or more 
of cocaine base.  On appeal, Mr. Latham asserts he was abandoned because his 
postconviction counsel filed a statement in lieu of an amended motion beyond the 60-day 
deadline in Rule 24.035(g) for filing an amended motion.  Alternatively, he contends his 
pro se pleading filed in reply to the statement in lieu of an amended motion filed by his 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all rule citations are to the Missouri Court Rules (2014). 
2 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to RSMo Supp. 2010. 
Opinion issued September 11, 2018
2 
 
counsel should be treated as a timely amended motion, and the motion court erred by 
concluding his plea counsel was not ineffective.  He asserts he would not have pleaded 
guilty had plea counsel noticed and explained that the laboratory report showed the state 
had insufficient evidence to convict him of the class A felony of trafficking cocaine base.   
Although Mr. Latham’s postconviction counsel filed a statement in lieu of an 
amended motion, it was not filed within the 60-day deadline in Rule 24.035(g) for filing 
an amended motion.  The purpose of a statement in lieu of an amended motion is to make 
a record that postconviction counsel has performed the responsibilities imposed by Rule 
24.035(e) so a presumption of abandonment does not arise when no amended motion is 
filed by Rule 24.035(g)’s 60-day deadline.  That purpose is not satisfied when a statement 
in lieu of an amended motion is filed after the 60-day deadline.  Accordingly, to fulfill its 
purpose, a statement in lieu of an amended motion must be filed by the date on which an 
amended motion is due. 
The failure of Mr. Latham’s postconviction counsel to file either an amended motion 
or a statement in lieu of an amended motion within the 60-day deadline in Rule 24.035(g) 
created the presumption his postconviction counsel failed to comply with the 
postconviction rules and, thereby, abandoned Mr. Latham.  Because a presumption of 
abandonment arose, Mr. Latham is entitled to an abandonment hearing to determine 
whether his postconviction counsel’s lack of performance was the result of Mr. Latham’s 
action or inaction.  The motion court’s judgment, therefore, is reversed, and the case is 
remanded.   
3 
 
On remand, if the motion court finds Mr. Latham’s postconviction counsel 
abandoned him and postconviction counsel failed to act on his behalf, the motion court 
shall appoint new counsel and allow time for new counsel to perform the responsibilities 
required by Rule 24.035(e).  If postconviction counsel acted on Mr. Latham’s behalf but 
did so untimely under the postconviction rules, the motion court shall treat the statement 
in lieu of an amended motion as timely and consider Mr. Latham’s subsequent pro se 
pleading as his reply to counsel’s statement in lieu of amended motion.  The motion court 
shall then determine whether Mr. Latham’s initial pro se motion could have been made 
legally sufficient by amendment or whether there were other grounds for relief known to 
Mr. Latham not included in his initial pro se motion.  If so, the motion court must direct 
postconviction counsel to file an amended motion within the time allotted by the motion 
court.   
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
In 2010, the state filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Latham alleging he 
possessed six or more grams of cocaine base on June 6, 2010.  In 2011, Mr. Latham was 
charged with the class A felony of trafficking drugs in the second degree, section 195.223.  
The information charged that Mr. Latham “possessed 6 grams or more of a mixture or 
substance containing a cocaine base, a controlled substance, knowing of its presence and 
nature.”  Mr. Latham subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.  
The plea court suspended execution of his sentence and imposed a five-year term of 
supervised probation.  On August 12, 2013, the plea court found Mr. Latham violated his 
probation and ordered execution of his 15-year sentence.  
4 
 
 
On November 20, 2013, Mr. Latham timely filed his pro se Rule 24.035 motion for 
postconviction relief.  His pro se motion alleged three claims: (1) counsel was ineffective 
for failing to investigate why his preliminary hearing3 was waived; (2) counsel was 
ineffective for failing to spend sufficient time with him to defend him at the revocation 
hearing; and (3) counsel was ineffective in that she misled him into believing she would 
request long-term drug treatment at his sentencing hearing.  On December 11, 2013, the 
motion court appointed the public defender’s office4 to represent Mr. Latham.  Because the 
transcript of his guilty plea was filed on March 25, 2014, Mr. Latham’s amended motion 
was due May 27, 2014.5 
Mr. Latham’s postconviction counsel did not file an amended motion by the 60-day 
deadline in Rule 24.035(g).  Instead, on June 20, 2014, postconviction counsel filed a 
statement in lieu of an amended motion.  In the statement, postconviction counsel said he 
had requested all pertinent documents for review, including transcripts, motions, and case 
files.  He further stated his associate interviewed Mr. Latham by phone on May 21, 2014.  
Counsel concluded by stating, although he originally believed Mr. Latham might have an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding “the elements of the crime charged,” 
                                              
3 From the record, it appears Mr. Latham is referencing waiver of his section 217.722 
preliminary hearing following his probation violation.  
4 The record reflects that, on January 9, 2014, the public defender’s office contracted with 
a private attorney to represent Mr. Latham.  The private attorney did not enter his 
appearance in the case until February 17, 2014.    
5 The 60-day period for filing the amended motion ended Saturday, May 24, 2014.  The 
following Monday, May 26, 2014, was Memorial Day.  Pursuant to Rule 20.01(a) and Rule 
44.01(a), the 60-day period was extended until Tuesday, May 27, 2014.   
5 
 
further research proved Mr. Latham “was sentenced under the old law prior to the change 
becoming effective.”   
Three days later, on June 23, 2014, Mr. Latham filed a pro se pleading titled 
“Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment and Sentence and Request 
for Evidentiary Hearing.”  In the pleading, Mr. Latham stated he filed the pleading 
“because counsel refused to amend said motion” and alleged “[c]ounsel did not send 
movant a statement allowing him the opportunity to reply to it, so in the alternative, movant 
has filed this Amended Motion Pro Se.”  The pro se pleading alleged 16 claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, including plea “counsel failed to investigate and prove, 
for the sake of instructing [him] to offer a Guilty Plea, both the Possession prong and the 
Knowledge prong in this case for Trafficking.”   
The motion court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the claims alleged in both 
Mr. Latham’s initial pro se motion and his subsequent pro se pleading.6  At the hearing, 
Mr. Latham’s plea counsel was asked whether she discussed with him that the laboratory 
report showed the substance in his possession was cocaine salt but he was charged with 
trafficking cocaine base and did not possess enough cocaine salt to be charged with a class 
A trafficking felony under section 195.223.7  Mr. Latham’s plea counsel testified she would 
                                              
6 Mr. Latham was represented at the evidentiary hearing by his postconviction counsel who 
filed the statement in lieu of an amended motion.   
7 At the time of Mr. Latham’s offense, possession of cocaine salt constituted a class A 
felony of trafficking drugs in the second degree if the person possessed more than 450 
grams.  Section 195.223.2(2).  Possession of cocaine base, however, constituted a class A 
felony of trafficking drugs in the second degree if the person possessed more than six 
grams.  Section 195.223.3(2).  The laboratory report identifies the substance in Mr. 
Latham’s possession as six grams of cocaine salt.  Mr. Latham, therefore, did not possess 
6 
 
have discussed that with him and advised him to plead guilty because the state could have 
charged him as a prior and persistent offender and added a weapons charge for the gun 
found with the drugs.  Mr. Latham testified plea counsel never informed him he was 
improperly charged or that there are different thresholds and penalties for trafficking 
cocaine base versus cocaine salt.8 
The motion court found the claims in Mr. Latham’s initial pro se motion were not 
cognizable in a Rule 24.035 proceeding.  The motion court also overruled the claims raised 
in his subsequent pro se pleading.  Mr. Latham appealed.  After an opinion by the court of 
appeals, the case was transferred to this Court.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.   
Standard of Review 
 
This Court’s review of a motion court’s ruling on a Rule 24.035 motion for 
postconviction relief is “limited to a determination of whether the findings and 
conclusions of the [motion] court are clearly erroneous.”  Rule 24.035(k).  A motion 
court’s findings and conclusions “are clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire 
record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been 
made.”  Gittemeier v. State, 527 S.W.3d 64, 67-68 (Mo. banc 2017) (internal quotation 
omitted).  
 
                                              
any cocaine base and possessed an insufficient amount of cocaine salt to be charged with 
a class A felony of second degree drug trafficking.  The laboratory report would have 
supported only a class B felony of possession with intent to distribute, section 195.211, or 
a class C felony of possession of a controlled substance, section 195.202. 
8 Since Mr. Latham was charged, the thresholds and penalties for the offense of trafficking 
in the second degree have been amended.  See Section 579.068, RSMo 2016. 
7 
 
Presumption of Abandonment 
 
On appeal, Mr. Latham raises issues concerning his postconviction counsel’s 
untimely filing of the statement in lieu of an amended motion and the timeliness of his 
subsequent pro se pleading.  Mr. Latham asserts his postconviction counsel’s failure to file 
a statement in lieu of an amended motion within 60 days of the transcript being filed created 
a presumption of abandonment.  The state counters that no presumption of abandonment 
arose because the time requirements for filing an amended motion in Rule 24.035(g) do 
not apply to the filing of a statement in lieu of an amended motion.  But the purpose for 
requiring the filing of a statement in lieu of an amended motion necessitates application of 
the 60-day time limitation in Rule 24.035(g).   
 
Rule 24.035(e) sets forth postconviction counsel’s responsibilities following a 
movant’s filing of a pro se motion and provides: 
When an indigent movant files a pro se motion, the court shall cause counsel 
to be appointed for the movant.  Counsel shall ascertain whether sufficient 
facts supporting the claims are asserted in the motion and whether the movant 
has included all claims known to the movant as a basis for attacking the 
judgment and sentence.  If the motion does not assert sufficient facts or 
include all claims known to the movant, counsel shall file an amended motion 
that sufficiently alleges the additional facts and claims.  If counsel determines 
that no amended motion shall be filed, counsel shall file a statement setting 
out facts demonstrating what actions were taken to ensure that (1) all facts 
supporting the claims are asserted in the pro se motion and (2) all claims 
known to the movant are alleged in the pro se motion.  The statement shall 
be presented to the movant prior to filing.  The movant may file a reply to 
the statement not later than ten days after the statement is filed. 
 
Rule 24.035(e), therefore, requires postconviction counsel to determine whether a 
movant’s pro se motion asserts sufficient facts and includes all claims known to the movant 
for attacking the judgment and sentence.  Upon making that determination, Rule 24.035(e) 
8 
 
requires postconviction counsel to file either an amended motion or a statement in lieu of 
an amended motion. 
 
If postconviction counsel determines a statement in lieu of an amended motion is 
the appropriate course of action, Rule 24.035(e) requires postconviction counsel to detail, 
in the statement, the actions counsel took to ensure all facts and claims known to the 
movant were asserted in the pro se motion.  Accordingly, under the rule’s plain language, 
the statement in lieu of an amended motion is the mechanism by which postconviction 
counsel informs the motion court of counsel’s determination that an amended motion is 
unnecessary because, through counsel’s actions, postconviction counsel believes all facts 
and claims known to the movant are included in the pro se motion.   
 
The requirement of making a record of whether postconviction counsel acted to 
fulfill counsel’s responsibilities under the postconviction rules in the absence of a timely 
filed amended motion was first articulated by this Court in Luleff v. State, 807 S.W.2d 495 
(Mo. banc 1991).  In Luleff, the Court found the movant’s pro se motion failed to comply 
with the requirements of Rule 29.15 and, “[a]bsent some performance by appointed 
counsel, the motion court cannot determine whether the pro se pleading can be made 
legally sufficient by amendment or whether there are other grounds for relief known to 
movant but not included in the pro se motion.”  Id. at 498.  The Court held: 
A record that does not indicate whether appointed counsel made the 
determinations required by Rule 29.15(e) creates a presumption that counsel 
failed to comply with the rule.  Where counsel determines that filing an 
amended motion is not warranted, counsel should make that determination 
a part of the record.  At such time as the motion court may proceed to rule a 
postconviction motion and there is no record of any activity by counsel on 
movant’s negligence or intentional failure to act, movant is entitled to no 
9 
 
relief other than that which may be afforded upon the pro se motion.  If the 
court determines, on the other hand, that counsel has failed to act on behalf 
of the movant, the court shall appoint new counsel, allowing time to amend 
the pro se motion, if necessary, as permitted under Rule 29.15(f). 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
After Luleff, this Court amended the postconviction rules9 to include the 
requirement of a statement in lieu of an amended motion detailing the actions taken by 
postconviction counsel to ensure all facts and claims known to the movant were included 
in the pro se motion.  In other words, the rule was amended to require postconviction 
counsel to file a statement with the motion court detailing the actions that establish 
postconviction counsel performed counsel’s responsibilities under the rule and, thereby, 
did not abandon the movant.  The purpose of a statement in lieu of an amended motion, 
therefore, is to show that postconviction counsel complied with the requirements of Rule 
24.035(e) so that a presumption of abandonment by postconviction counsel does not arise 
in the absence of an amended motion.  It follows that, under the rule, postconviction 
counsel must file either an amended motion or a statement in lieu of an amended motion 
or a presumption of abandonment will arise.   
In light of this purpose, a statement in lieu of an amended motion must be filed by 
the same deadline for filing an amended motion.  At the time Mr. Latham filed his 
postconviction motion, Rule 24.035(g) provided:10  
                                              
9 In 1995, Rule 24.035(e) and Rule 29.15(e) were amended to include the option of filing 
a statement in lieu of an amended motion.  The amended rules became effective in 1996.  
See Rule 24.035(e) (1996); Rule 29.15(e) (1996).  
10 In 2017, Rule 24.035(g) was amended to expressly require that a statement in lieu of an 
amended motion be filed within the 60-day deadline.   
10 
 
If no appeal of the judgment sought to be vacated, set aside, or corrected is 
taken, the amended motion shall be filed within 60 days of the earlier of the 
date both a complete transcript consisting of the guilty plea and sentencing 
hearing has been filed in the trial court and:  
 
(1) Counsel is appointed; or  
 
(2) An entry of appearance is filed by any counsel that is not appointed 
but enters an appearance on behalf of movant.  
 
Rule 24.035(g), therefore, expressly set forth time limitations for the filing of amended 
motions but was silent as to the filing of a statement in lieu of an amended motion.   
The state avers Rule 24.035(g)’s silence as to a statement in lieu of an amended 
motion means such statement was not required to be filed within the 60-day deadline.  But 
the purpose of requiring a statement in lieu of an amended motion is to prevent the 
presumption of abandonment from arising.  A presumption of abandonment arises when 
postconviction counsel fails to file an amended motion by Rule 24.035(g)’s 60-day 
deadline.  See Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Mo. banc 2015).  If postconviction 
counsel does not file the statement in lieu of an amended motion by the 60-day deadline 
for filing an amended motion, then a presumption of abandonment arises and the purpose 
of the statement is defeated.  Accordingly, either an amended motion or a statement in lieu 
of an amended motion must be filed by Rule 24.035(g)’s 60-day deadline to prevent a 
presumption of abandonment from arising.  
Consistent with such rationale, this Court has held: “Failure to file either a timely 
amended motion or a statement in lieu of an amended motion explaining why an amended 
motion was unnecessary raises a presumption of abandonment by appointed counsel.”  
Watson v. State, 536 S.W.3d 716, 718 (Mo. banc 2018).  This Court has further held “a 
11 
 
motion court must conduct a sufficient independent inquiry of a post-conviction movant’s 
claim of abandonment” when postconviction counsel has failed to timely file an amended 
motion or “a statement setting out facts that demonstrate counsel’s actions to ensure no 
amended motion is needed.”  Vogl v. State, 437 S.W.3d 218, 228 (Mo. banc 2014).   
 
Furthermore, the state’s position that there is no deadline for filing a statement in 
lieu of an amended motion would render the mandatory deadline for filing an amended 
motion meaningless.  This Court has repeatedly held the time limitations on postconviction 
relief motions are mandatory and cannot be extended by the motion court.  Gittemeier, 527 
S.W.3d at 68.  This is because a postconviction proceeding “is a collateral attack on the 
final judgment of a court.”  Stanley v. State, 420 S.W.3d 532, 541 (Mo. banc 2014).  Courts, 
therefore, must strictly enforce Rule 24.035’s time limitations “to prevent duplicative and 
unending challenges to the finality of a judgment.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).   
A mandatory deadline for a statement in lieu of an amended motion is also necessary 
because Rule 24.035(e) requires the statement to be presented to the movant prior to filing 
and gives the movant 10 days to file a reply.  Requiring the statement in lieu of an amended 
motion to be presented to the movant ensures the movant is provided notice of 
postconviction counsel’s determination that an amended motion is unnecessary.  Such 
notice is also a prerequisite to providing the movant a chance to file a reply.  The reply 
gives the movant an opportunity to respond to postconviction counsel’s assertions that all 
facts and claims known to the movant are included in the pro se motion.  Inherent in giving 
a movant the opportunity to respond to the statement in lieu of an amended motion is the 
possibility the movant has additional facts or claims that would necessitate the filing of an 
12 
 
amended motion.  Therefore, the purpose of the reply is to ensure no amended motion is 
actually necessary.   
The lack of a deadline for filing a statement in lieu of an amended motion would 
delay the movant’s time for responding and the motion court’s determination regarding 
whether the filing of an amended motion is necessary.  Such delays would only lengthen 
postconviction proceedings and needlessly extend the time period for collateral attacks on 
a final criminal judgment.   
In sum, both the purpose of requiring postconviction counsel to file a statement in 
lieu of an amended motion and the process outlined for a movant’s reply thereafter support 
the imposition of Rule 24.035(g)’s 60-day deadline on statements in lieu of amended 
motions.  The failure of postconviction counsel to file either an amended motion or a 
statement in lieu of an amended motion within the 60-day deadline creates a presumption 
of abandonment.11     
Mr. Latham’s Remedy 
Having determined a statement in lieu of an amended motion must be filed by the 
deadline for filing an amended motion or a presumption of abandonment arises, this Court 
must consider whether a presumption of abandonment arose in this case and, if so, what 
remedies are available to Mr. Latham.   
                                              
11 To the extent Mason v. State, 488 S.W.3d 135 (Mo. App. 2016), Scott v. State, 472 
S.W.3d 593 (Mo. App. 2015), and Pennell v. State, 467 S.W.3d 367 (Mo. App. 2015), are 
inconsistent with such a presumption, they should no longer be followed.   
13 
 
The record reflects Mr. Latham’s postconviction counsel entered his appearance on 
February 17, 2014, and his guilty plea transcript was filed on March 25, 2014.  The record 
shows no further action by postconviction counsel until June 20, 2014, when he filed the 
statement in lieu of an amended motion.  Accordingly, when the 60-day deadline passed 
for the filing of the amended motion on May 27, 2014, there was no performance by 
postconviction counsel on the record with respect to Mr. Latham’s pro se motion.  Because 
postconviction counsel failed to file either an amended motion or a statement in lieu of an 
amended motion within the 60-day deadline, a presumption of abandonment arose.  The 
motion court’s judgment, therefore, must be reversed, and the case remanded.   
On remand, the motion court must conduct an independent inquiry to determine 
whether Mr. Latham was actually abandoned.  Moore, 458 S.W.3d at 825.  In determining 
whether Mr. Latham was abandoned, the inquiry must center on whether postconviction 
counsel’s failure to file a timely amended motion or statement in lieu of an amended motion 
was due to Mr. Latham’s negligence or intentional failure to act.  Milner v. State, SC96909, 
2018 WL 3432653, at *3 (Mo. banc July 17, 2018).  This is because a “movant is entitled 
to no additional relief” if the untimely filing of an amended motion or statement in lieu of 
an amended motion is the result of a movant’s actions or inactions.  Id.     
If postconviction counsel’s failure to timely file an amended motion or a statement 
in lieu of an amended motion was the result of Mr. Latham’s action or inaction, Mr. Latham 
was not abandoned, and the motion court must proceed to adjudicate only Mr. Latham’s 
pro se motion.  See id.  If, however, Mr. Latham’s actions or inactions did not cause 
14 
 
postconviction counsel’s lack of performance, the motion court must find that Mr. Latham 
was abandoned.  See id. 
If the motion court determines Mr. Latham was abandoned, it must then consider 
the available remedies.  In remedying abandonment, motion courts look to whether counsel 
has failed to act on the movant’s behalf – i.e. whether postconviction counsel failed to file 
either an amended motion or a statement in lieu of an amended motion on the movant’s 
behalf.  See Barton v. State, 486 S.W.3d 332, 338 (Mo. banc 2016); Moore, 458 S.W.3d at 
825; Gehrke v. State, 280 S.W.3d 54, 57 (Mo. banc 2009); Barnett v. State, 103 S.W.3d 
765, 774 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. White, 873 S.W.2d 590, 599 (Mo. banc 1994).  If 
postconviction counsel has failed to act on movant’s behalf by failing to file any amended 
motion or statement in lieu of an amended motion, the motion court should appoint new 
postconviction counsel and allow new counsel time to file either an amended motion or a 
statement in lieu of an amended motion.  See Luleff, 807 S.W.2d at 498.  If, however, 
postconviction acted on movant’s behalf but did so untimely under the postconviction 
rules, the motion court should treat the late-filed amended motion or statement in lieu of 
an amended motion as timely.  See Sanders v. State, 807 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Mo. banc 1991). 
 
If the motion court treats the statement in lieu of an amended motion as timely filed, 
the motion court must also consider Mr. Latham’s reply to postconviction counsel’s 
statement in lieu of an amended motion.  Mr. Latham filed what he titled a pro se amended 
motion.  But Rule 24.035(e) gives a movant 10 days to file a reply to a statement in lieu of 
an amended motion.  In evaluating pleadings, “Missouri courts have looked not to the 
nomenclature employed by the parties, but to the actual relief requested in the motion.”  
15 
 
Berger v. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co., 173 S.W.3d 639, 641 (Mo. banc 2005).  Missouri courts 
do not concern themselves “with the title of the pleading or with a party’s citation to a 
particular Rule, but . . . look instead to the substance of the pleading.”  Pate v. State, 
SD34672, 2017 WL 4856782, at *2 (Mo. App. Oct. 27, 2017). 
Here, Mr. Latham states he filed the pro se pleading “because counsel refused to 
amend said motion.”  He goes on to state that, under Rule 24.035(e), a movant has 10 days 
to reply to the statement.  He contends “[c]ounsel did not send [him] a statement allowing 
him the opportunity to reply to it, so in the alternative, [he] has filed this Amended Motion 
Pro Se.”  He then went on to list ineffective assistance of counsel claims that were not 
included in his pro se motion.  The substance of Mr. Latham’s “amended motion,” 
therefore, establishes it is in reply to postconviction counsel’s filing of the statement in lieu 
of an amended motion.  Accordingly, Mr. Latham’s subsequent pro se pleading should be 
treated as a reply to postconviction counsel’s statement in lieu of the amended motion.   
 
After considering the statement in of lieu of the amended motion and Mr. Latham’s 
reply, the motion court must determine whether Mr. Latham’s pro se motion could have 
been made legally sufficient by amendment or whether there were other grounds for relief 
known to Mr. Latham not included in his initial pro se motion.  If so, the motion court must 
direct postconviction counsel to file an amended motion within the time allotted by the 
motion court.12 
 
                                              
12 Because Mr. Latham’s assertions regarding abandonment are dispositive of this appeal, 
this Court need not address the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
16 
 
Conclusion 
 
A presumption of abandonment arose when Mr. Latham’s postconviction counsel 
failed to file either an amended motion or a statement in lieu of an amended motion within 
Rule 24.035(g)’s 60-day deadline.  The motion court’s judgment is reversed, and the case 
is remanded.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
 
All concur.