Title: State of Idaho v. Joshua Allen Rose Appeal from the district courts order revoking probation

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 33637 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,                 
                                
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
                                
v.                              
                                
JOSHUA ALLEN ROSE,              
                                
          Defendant-Appellant.  
                                
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Boise, September 2007 Term 
 
2007 Opinion No.  107 
 
Filed:  October 19, 2007 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County.  The Honorable Thomas F. Neville, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sara 
Thomas, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, argued. 
 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, Daniel Bower, Deputy Attorney 
General, argued. 
 
 
 
JONES, W., Justice. 
Joshua Rose appeals from the district court’s order revoking probation.  Rose claims he 
was denied an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses because the district court admitted 
hearsay at the evidentiary hearing on whether he violated the terms of his probation.  The Court 
of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation as set forth in 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) does not apply to probation revocation 
proceedings, and that the lesser confrontation right afforded as a matter of due process under 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) was not 
violated.  This Court granted review as to whether Crawford applies to a probationer’s due 
process right of confrontation. 
 
In 2002 Rose was convicted of one felony and two misdemeanors.  He received a 
suspended sentence of six years with one year fixed and was placed on probation for six years.  
In August 2004 Rose was found to have violated his probation.1  The district court ordered some 
additional jail time and reinstated probation.  Rose was released from jail in September 2004. 
 
Upon his release, Rose went to live in a home for persons recovering from drug and 
alcohol addiction.  On October 28 or 29, 2004 Rose was evicted from the home after he tested 
positive for methamphetamines, marijuana, and cocaine in a urinalysis administered by the 
housing coordinator.  Rose then moved into his grandmother’s home. 
 
In January 2005 the state filed a motion alleging that Rose had violated the terms of his 
probation by changing residences without permission, using methamphetamine, using cocaine, 
and absconding from supervision.  After an evidentiary hearing the district court found that Rose 
had committed several violations.  The district court revoked Rose’s probation and ordered his 
original sentence into execution.  This appeal concerns evidence admitted at the evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Rose’s probation officer testified that she began supervising 
Rose in December 2004 after the previous probation officer was deployed to the war in Iraq.  She 
testified at length regarding the contents of the previous officer’s notes in the probation file.  
According to her testimony, the notes reflected that Rose did not immediately contact his 
probation officer following his eviction from the recovery home.  Rose objected, asserting that 
the probation officer’s testimony regarding the prior officer’s notes violated his right to 
confrontation under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The district court overruled the objection, 
finding that the notes were reliable and that the right of confrontation does not apply to a 
probation revocation proceeding.  On cross-examination, Rose requested to review the notes.  
The district court suggested that if Rose had questions about what was reflected in the notes he 
could simply ask the probation officer. 
                                                 
1 Documents relating to August 2004 probation violation, which is not part of this appeal, were 
submitted as a confidential exhibit.  There are no exhibits relating to the proceedings under 
review. 
2 
 
The Probation officer also testified about her own experience supervising Rose.  She first 
met Rose on December 23, 2004 when he was living with his grandmother and was under a 
10:00 p.m. curfew.  On January 7, 2005 she received an email bulletin from the police 
department stating that Rose had been seen waiting for a taxi to take him to a motel.  According 
to the probation officer, she contacted Rose’s grandmother, who stated she had not seen Rose for 
three days, and Rose’s girlfriend and her mother, who both stated they did not know Rose’s 
whereabouts.  Rose objected, and the district court again overruled, finding that any concerns 
about hearsay went to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility.  The probation officer 
testified that she then went to the motel and was informed by the front desk attendant that Rose 
had been staying there several days previously.  The probation officer testified she was never 
informed by Rose that he was not staying at his grandmother’s house. 
 
The housing coordinator testified that he administered a urinalysis pursuant to standard 
procedure after he was informed by staff members that Rose was not observing the recovery 
home’s curfew.  When Rose stated he had not used any controlled substances, the housing 
coordinator administered a second urinalysis which yielded the same positive result.  On cross-
examination, Rose questioned the housing coordinator whether Rose had informed the 
coordinator he was taking Zyprexa, an antipsychotic medication.  The housing coordinator 
testified that he always asked test subjects whether they have taken any medications, and that he 
would call a pharmacist if he was unsure whether a particular substance might cause a false 
positive.  According to the housing coordinator, his notes did not indicate that Rose had 
mentioned taking any medications or that he had called a pharmacist. 
 
Rose testified that he had used neither methamphetamine nor cocaine after his release, 
but that he had been taking Zyprexa during that period.  According to Rose, the housing 
coordinator never asked about medications when he administered the urinalyses. 
 
Rose also testified that he stayed at his grandmother’s house every night from the time he 
moved in until he was arrested on January 21, 2005.  Rose’s grandmother testified that, on the 
day she was contacted by the probation officer, Rose had gotten angry and left without his 
belongings.  She did not think he had moved out, but after that date she could not recall whether 
Rose was ever in the house before she went to bed. 
 
The state recalled the probation officer, who testified about a telephone call she had 
placed to a laboratory that processed urinalyses for the Department of Probation and Parole.  She 
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testified that, according to the laboratory technician she spoke with, Zyprexa would not affect the 
results of a urinalysis for methamphetamine or cocaine.  Rose objected based on the right to 
confrontation, and the district court overruled. 
 
At the close of the evidence the state dropped its allegation that Rose failed to obtain 
permission to change residences when he was evicted from the recovery home, and proceeded on 
the remaining allegations.  After both sides presented argument, the district court found that Rose 
had committed the violations alleged by the state.  With respect to the allegations of 
methamphetamine and cocaine use, the district court found that the urinalyses results were valid 
and that Zyprexa was not likely to have interfered with the result.  The district court also found 
that Rose had absconded from supervision on or about January 7, 2005 by failing to remain at his 
grandmother’s house.  After another hearing the district court revoked probation and ordered 
Rose’s original sentence into execution. 
 
Rose appealed, arguing that he was denied an opportunity to confront the witnesses 
against him because the probation officer was allowed to testify as to the contents of the previous 
officer’s notes, the email bulletin, the statements of Rose’s grandmother, girlfriend, and 
girlfriend’s mother, and the opinion of the laboratory technician.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, 
concluding that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation as set forth in Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) does not apply to probation revocation proceedings, and that the 
lesser confrontation right afforded as a matter of due process under Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) was not violated.  This Court 
granted review as to whether the decision in Crawford applies to a probationer’s right to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses in a revocation hearing. 
 
On review of a case decided by the Court of Appeals, this Court gives serious 
consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the trial court’s decision.  
State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 495-96, 148 P.3d 1240, 1241-42 (2006); State v. Russell, 122 
Idaho 488, 490, 835 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1992). 
 
A court may not revoke probation without a finding that the probationer violated the 
terms of probation.  State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 243, 985 P.2d 117, 123 (1999); see I.C. §§ 19-
2603, 20-222.  The state bears the burden of providing satisfactory proof of a violation though 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required.  State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314, 766 P.2d 
781, 784 (1988).  Once a probation violation has been proven, the decision of whether to revoke 
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probation is within the sound discretion of the court.  Blake, 133 Idaho at 243, 985 P.2d at 123; 
State v. Done, 139 Idaho 635, 636, 84 P.3d 571, 572 (Ct. App. 2003).  The finding of a probation 
violation must be on verified facts and the trial court’s exercise of discretion must be informed 
by an accurate knowledge of the probationer’s behavior.  State v. Tracy, 119 Idaho 1027, 1028, 
812 P.2d 741, 742 (1991).   
 
The trial court’s factual findings in a probation revocation proceeding, including a 
finding that a violation has been proven, will be upheld if they are supported by substantial 
evidence.  Russell, 122 Idaho at 490, 835 P.2d at 1301; State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 
P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003).  The decision to admit evidence at a probation revocation 
proceeding is within the trial court’s discretion, and will not be overturned absent an abuse of 
that discretion.  See State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 75-76, 57 P.3d 782, 786-87 (2002) 
(admission of evidence at sentencing hearing is discretionary).  However, the determination 
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied is subject to free review.  Klingler, 143 
Idaho at 496, 148 P.3d at 1242.   
The first issue is whether Crawford v. Washington altered the rule in Morrissey v. Brewer 
that a probationer’s right of confrontation may be denied for good cause.  Rose claims he did not 
receive due process at the evidentiary hearing because he was denied an opportunity to confront 
the witnesses against him.  According to Rose, the admission of his probation officer’s hearsay 
testimony violated the rule announced in Crawford and rendered the proceeding fundamentally 
unfair.   
 
Probationers do not enjoy the full panoply of constitutional protections afforded criminal 
defendants.  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); State v. Edelblute, 91 Idaho 469, 
475, 424 P.2d 739, 745 (1967); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (applying 
Morrissey to probationers).  A motion to revoke probation is not a criminal prosecution.  
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782, 93 S.Ct. at 1759-60; State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 112, 952 P.2d 
1245, 1248 (1998).  Consequently, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, which grants 
to criminal defendants the right to confront adverse witnesses, does not apply to probationers.  
U.S. v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480); see State v. 
Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 17, 454 P.2d 51, 54 (1969) (recognizing circumstances under which a 
probationer may be denied confrontation).  Likewise, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, including the 
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rule against hearsay, do not apply to probation revocation proceedings.  I.R.E. 101(e)(3); Tracy, 
119 Idaho at 1028 n.1, 812 P.2d at 742 n.1.   
 
Still, a probationer has a protected liberty interest in continuing probation, and is 
therefore entitled to due process before probation may be revoked.  Blake, 133 Idaho at 243, 985 
P.2d at 123; Kelsey, 115 Idaho at 314, 766 P.2d at 784.  In Morrissey v. Brewer the Court 
established minimum due process requirements for probation and parole revocation proceedings 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  408 U.S. at 489; see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 
782 (1973) (applying Morrissey to probationers).  Among other protections, a probationer has 
the “right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses” unless the district court “specifically 
finds good cause for not allowing confrontation.”  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489; State v. Chapman, 
111 Idaho 149, 151, 721 P.2d 1248, 1250 (1986). 
 
Rose argues that the good cause exception recognized in Morrissey is no longer valid 
after the Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington, which held that a criminal defendant 
may not be denied the right to confront an out-of-court declarant whose statement is 
“testimonial” in nature, even if the statement is deemed reliable.  541 U.S. at 68-69.  In 
Crawford, the Court rejected the rationale of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), which 
suggested that confrontation could be denied so long as the challenged hearsay bore “adequate 
indicia of reliability.”  Id. at 66.  The Court explained that the concept of reliability was so 
amorphous and its application so unpredictable that even “core confrontation violations” could 
meet with approval under the old standard.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62-63.  The Court stated: 
 
[W]e do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection 
to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 
“reliability.”  Certainly none of the authorities discussed above acknowledges any 
general reliability exception to the common-law rule.  Admitting statements 
deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of 
confrontation.  To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of 
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.  It commands, 
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.  The Clause thus reflects 
a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which 
there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined. 
 
. . . 
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Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to 
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.  This is not 
what the Sixth Amendment prescribes. 
 
Id. at 61.  The Court rejected the possibility of an “open-ended exception from the confrontation 
requirement to be developed by the courts,” id. at 54, holding that the Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation applies to every testimonial statement admitted against a criminal defendant, 
regardless of whether the statement is deemed reliable.  Id. at 61. 
 
According to Rose, Crawford’s rejection of Roberts forecloses the notion that 
confrontation may be denied based on a judicial determination as to how important confrontation 
would be to the defendant.  Rose concedes that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation does 
not apply to probation revocation proceedings, but argues that the holding of Crawford applies 
with equal force to a probationer’s due process right of confrontation.  According to Rose, the 
Due Process Clause, like the Confrontation Clause, is a procedural rather than a substantive 
guarantee, and the judicial determination of reliability necessary to evaluate good cause is no 
substitute for the procedural protections guaranteed by the Constitution.  Thus, argues Rose, a 
probationer’s confrontation rights as a matter of due process are necessarily coextensive with 
those of a criminal defendant under the Sixth Amendment.   
 
Rose’s argument misconceives the basis of the Court’s holding in Crawford.  As the 
passage set forth above demonstrates, the holding was explicitly grounded in the text of the Sixth 
Amendment.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 (“The text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest 
any open-ended exceptions . . . .”); id. at 69 (“[T]he only indicium of reliability sufficient to 
satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”).  
The Court noted that the uncertainty inherent in a reliability-based standard “vindicates the 
Framers’ wisdom” in imposing a procedural, rather than a substantive, requirement in the Sixth 
Amendment.  Id. at 62-63.  But to say that it was wise in one context does not establish that it is 
mandated in another.  Due process does not require that probationers be granted an absolute right 
of confrontation, but only a limited right, subject to denial for good cause.  Morrissey, 408 U.S. 
at 489.  Nothing in Crawford indicates that the due process standard set out in Morrissey is no 
longer valid.   
 
On the contrary, “due process is flexible in scope, and the reliability it demands 
necessarily invites inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the evidence sought to be admitted 
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and whether it possesses enough earmarks of reliability.”  Young v. United States, 863 A.2d 804, 
808 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481) (internal quotations omitted).  A probation 
decision involves an individualized evaluation of the probationer’s personality and 
circumstances.  State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 488, 491, 835 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992) (quoting 
Moore, 93 Idaho at 17, 454 P.2d at 54).  The process must be flexible enough to consider 
evidence that might not be admissible in a criminal prosecution.  State v. Farmer, 131 Idaho 803, 
806, 964 P.2d 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998).  A court is presumed to be able to ascertain the 
relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and material presented to it and to 
disregard the irrelevant and unreliable.  State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 75, 57 P.3d 782, 786 
(2002) (citing State v. Pierce, 100 Idaho 57, 593 P.2d 392 (1979)).   
 
Other jurisdictions that have decided the question appear to be unanimous that Crawford 
does not change the due process standard for confrontation in a probation revocation hearing.  
See United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 45 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 
688, 691 (7th Cir. 2006); Ash v. Reilly, 431 F.3d 826, 829-30 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 985-86 (9th 
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 838 (2005); United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 627-28 (6th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 844 n.4 (8th Cir. 2004); Young v. United 
States, 863 A.2d 804, 807-08 (D.C. 2004); Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 440 n.1 (Ind. 2007); 
Com. v. Wilcox, 841 N.E.2d 1240, 1247-48 (Mass. 2006); State v. Divan, 724 N.W.2d 865, 870 
(S.D. 2006); State v. Abd-Rahmaan, 111 P.3d 1157, 1160-61 (Wash. 2005); see also People v. 
Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); People v. Turley, 109 P.3d 1025, 1026 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Jackson v. State, 931 So.2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); State v. 
Palmer, 158 P.3d 363, 367 (Kan. App. 2007); State v. Michael, 891 So.2d 109, 114-15 (La. App. 
2 Cir. 2005); State v. Gonzalez, 157 P.3d 266, 267 (Or. App. 2007); State v. Pauling, 639 S.E.2d 
680, 682 (S.C. App. 2006); Trevino v. State, 218 S.W.3d 234, 238-39 (Tex. App. 2007).  The 
only contrary authority cited by Rose, Ash v. Reilly, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004), has since 
been reversed.  431 F.3d 826 (D.C. Cir. 2005).   
 
Crawford may be said to apply to probation revocation proceedings in the sense that it 
defines what confrontation is.  See Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 232 (stating that Sixth 
Amendment cases may provide “helpful examples” in determining the scope of a probationer’s 
more limited due process right of confrontation).  But it says nothing about whether, or when, 
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confrontation may be denied.  The minimum due process requirements announced by the Court 
in Morrissey are still good law.  A probationer may be denied confrontation upon a specific 
finding of good cause.  In the present case, the evidence supports the findings of the trial court 
under the Morrissey standard. 
 
The district court did not commit reversible error by allowing hearsay evidence at the 
parole revocation hearing.  The district court’s decision is affirmed. 
 
 
 
    Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and TROUT, J. Pro Tem CONCUR. 
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