Title: Bila v. Accurate Telecom

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bila v. Accurate Telecom1998 WY 128964 P.2d 1270Case Number: 97-347Decided: 10/06/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Michael BILA, Appellant 
(Petitioner/Employee),

v.

ACCURATE TELECOM, Appellee (Respondent/Employer) v. 
STATE of Wyoming ex rel. WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION,

Appellee (Respondent/Objector).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, 
Spangler, J.

 

Susan Maher Guthrie, Casper, 
for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General. 
Argument by Mr. Haggerty for Appellee State of Wyoming ex rel. Workers' 
Compensation Division.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1] Michael Bila appeals from the order of the 
district court which affirmed the dismissal of his petition to reopen his 
worker's compensation case and denied his motion for leave to present additional 
evidence pursuant to WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08. WYO. R. CIV. P. 60(b) does not apply 
to cases where the employee fails to timely file a written request for hearing, 
and WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08 does not permit remand for presentation of additional 
legal theories. We affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶2] Appellant Michael Bila 
presents the following statement of the issues:

 

A. 
Whether the administrative law judge's decision granting the state's motion to 
dismiss was unlawful and should be set aside because the decision was arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.

 

B. 
Whether the district court had authority to remand the case to the 
administrative law judge and erred in denying the motion to do 
so.

 

Appellee State of Wyoming ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division (Division) submits these issues for 
our consideration:

 

The Division denied benefits because the Employer had 
not elected coverage, and the Employee filed an untimely objection. Later, he 
withdrew his request for a hearing on the timeliness of his objection and filed 
a petition to reopen under § 27-14-605(a).

 

A. 
Was the dismissal of the petition to reopen within the Hearing Examiner's 
discretion and in accordance with law?

 

After filing his petition for review, the Employee 
filed a W.R.A.P. 12.08 Motion in the district court, seeking a remand to assert 
W.R.C.P. 60(b) as a new legal theory.

 

          
B. Did the district court properly deny the Employee's W.R.A.P. 12.08 
Motion?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶3] Appellant Michael Bila 
fell from a ladder and broke his leg while installing telephone cable on 
November 22, 1995. Bila subsequently filed an injury report on January 26, 1996. 
The employer, Accurate Telecom, filed its injury report for the accident on 
February 9, 1996. The employer marked the section on the form pertaining to 
compensability under the Workers' Compensation Act in the affirmative. However, 
on January 31, 1996, before receiving the employer's injury report claiming the 
injury was compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, the Division issued 
a final determination letter to Bila.

 

[¶4] The final determination 
letter informed Bila that the Division could not approve payment of benefits 
because "[t]he employee is not employed in an occupation requiring coverage 
under Wyoming Statute 27-14-108(c) and your employer has not elected coverage 
under Wyoming Statute 27-14-108(j)." The letter informed Bila that he could 
object to the determination and request a hearing before a hearing examiner as 
provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. The letter also informed Bila he had 
a right to legal representation and that the Division must receive a written 
request for a hearing by February 27, 1996. Finally, the letter provided "[i]f 
a timely written request for hearing is 
not filed with this division, the final determination by the Division pursuant 
to W.S. 27-14-601(k) shall not be subject to further administrative or judicial 
review."

 

[¶5] Although no copy of 
Bila's response is found in the record, the Division's notice of late response 
to final determination stated that it received a response to its January 31, 
1996, final determination on June 14, 1996. Pursuant to the notice of late 
response, Bila apparently filed a written request for a hearing concerning the 
timeliness of his response. An Internal Hearing Unit proceeding was scheduled 
for August 12, 1996, to consider the timeliness of Bila's response to the final 
determination. However, Bila withdrew his request for a hearing, and the Internal Hearing Unit 
hearing officer dismissed the matter, declaring the final determination dated 
January 31, 1996, binding on the parties.

 

[¶6] On October 30, 1996, 
Bila filed a petition to reopen his case pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605. 
Following a motion for summary disposition from the Division and a response from 
Bila, the office of administrative hearings held a hearing on June 4, 1997.  Relying on a slip opinion issued on May 
19, 1997, Erhart v. Flint Engineering & Construction, 939 P.2d 718 (Wyo. 
1997), the hearing examiner determined that WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605 did not apply 
to Bila because no determination had been made in his favor and granted the division's motion to 
dismiss.

 

[¶7] Bila filed a petition 
for review of the administrative decision in the district court pursuant to WYO. 
R.APP. P. 12. The petition alleged that the administrative decision was 
unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law as set forth in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a), and in excess 
of statutory authority and unsupported by substantial evidence as required by 
WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a). Bila also filed a motion for leave to present 
additional evidence pursuant to WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08, or in the alternative, to remand to the 
hearing examiner. The WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08 motion alleged that Bila filed a 
petition to reopen with the hearing examiner, seeking relief under WYO. R. CIV. 
P. 60. The motion also alleged that pursuant to Erhart v. Flint Engineering 
& Construction, WYO. R. CIV. P. 60 "is the applicable rule for worker's 
compensation cases of this nature to request reopening." Finally, Bila claimed 
that Erhart was not published in time for him to amend his pleadings to proceed 
under WYO. R. CIV. P. 60 before the hearing examiner and prayed for the district 
court to remand the case to the hearing examiner pursuant to WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08, thereby allowing 
the hearing examiner to consider the petition to reopen under WYO. R. CIV. P. 
60.

 

[¶8] The district court 
affirmed the hearing examiner's decision because it was supported by substantial 
evidence in accordance with the law. The district court also found that the 
issue concerning a remand for a determination under WYO. R. CIV. P. 60(b) was 
not raised before the hearing examiner, and the court did not have jurisdiction 
to decide the issue. Bila filed a timely notice of appeal with this 
Court.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

Standard of 
Review

 

[¶9] Judicial review of 
agency action is governed by WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1997). The 
Court

must hold unlawful and set aside agency actions which 
are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law, contrary to constitutional right, in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction or authority, without observance of procedure required by law, or 
unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute. An aggrieved party may obtain a review of 
any final judgment of the district court under the administrative procedure act 
by appeal to the supreme court. In such case, the supreme court reviews the 
agency action as if the appeal came directly to the supreme court from the 
agency and does not give deference to the district court's 
decision.

 

RM v. Dept. of Family 
Services, 953 P.2d 477, 481 (Wyo. 1998) (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶10] Bila claims the 
hearing examiner's order was an abuse of discretion, arbitrary, capricious, and 
not in accordance with the law.  His 
claim is based on the hearing examiner's failure to, sua sponte, consider his 
claim under WYO. R. CIV. P. 60 rather than WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a). Whether 
WYO. R. CIV. P. 60 is applicable to this case is a question of law, which we 
review de novo.

 

[¶11] Bila also argues that 
the district court had authority to remand the case to the hearing examiner for 
further hearing and erred in denying his WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08 motion to remand 
for consideration of additional evidence. Again, whether a rule applies to a 
given set of facts is a question of law, requiring de novo 
review.

 

The Hearing Examiner 
Decision

 

[¶12] The issue before the 
hearing examiner was whether WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a) applied to a case in 
which no determination in favor of or on behalf of an employee had been made. 
With Erhart v. Flint Engineering & Construction, 939 P.2d 718 (Wyo. 1997), 
in hand, the hearing examiner's order was clearly in accordance with the law. In 
Erhart this Court applied the plain language of WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a) and 
determined 

     
Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-605 addresses finality in worker's 
compensation          cases in 
its opening clause and restricts the reopening of cases to those in which 
a      "determination" has been "made in favor of or on 
behalf of an employee * * *." The fact 
that the language in this section only addresses cases in which 
a      determination has been made shows the intent of 
the legislature that cases in      which benefits are 
awarded are the only cases that can be reopened under 
this     section.

 

Erhart, 939 P.2d  at 722. The 
hearing examiner did not err when she ruled Bila was not entitled to relief 
under WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a).

 

[¶13] Bila contends the 
hearing examiner erred when she failed to, sua sponte, amend Bila's petition to 
reopen to a Wyo. R. CIV. P. 60 motion. Bila fails to cite any authority to 
support his contention that a hearing examiner abuses her discretion when she 
fails to determine the proper pleading for a party to an action. We addressed 
the applicability of a WYO. R. CIV. P. 60 motion in Erhart because Erhart pled 
alternative bases for his petition to reopen, including a WYO. R. CIV. P. 60 
motion. Erhart, 939 P.2d  at 720.

 

[¶14] In Erhart, after 
determining that WYO. STAT. § 27-14-605(a) does not apply to cases where the 
employee was never awarded any benefits, 
we proceeded to discuss whether an unsuccessful claimant may reopen his case 
under WYO. R. CIV. P. 60(b). Id. at 722. 
Finding that no specific legislation superseded application of WYO. R. CIV. P. 
60(b) to Erhart's claim, we held "[i]n the absence of other provisions of law, W.R.C.P. 60(b) is 
applicable, and Erhart must be allowed leave to request his case be reopened." 
Id. at 723.

 

[¶15] However, Erhart was 
decided pursuant to the law in effect at the time of his injury, which was 1993. 
In 1994, the legislature amended the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act, 
including WYO. STAT. § 27-14-601(k). At the time of Erhart's injury the statute 
provided:

 

[I]f written objection to any determination or award 
as provided by this section is not filed by the employer or employee with the 
division within ten (10) days from the date of notice, . . . it is presumed the 
employer and employee consent to the determination or award and the division 
shall proceed as required by this act.

 

WYO. STAT. § 27-14-601(k) 
(Cumm.Supp. 1990).

 

[¶16] The statute in effect 
at the time of Erhart's injury merely created a presumption of consent to the 
determination if a written objection to a determination was not timely filed. 
Id. It did not preclude administrative or judicial review. Id. However, Bila was 
injured in 1995. The 1994 amendment to the Act specifically precludes "further 
administrative or judicial review" absent a timely written request for hearing. 
WYO. STAT. § 27-14-601(k)(vi) (1997); see 1994 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 86 § 2. The 
specific preclusion found in the amended statute renders WYO. R. CIV. P. 60(b) 
inapplicable in cases where the employee fails to file a timely written 
objection.  The final determination 
from the Division provided notice of this requirement.

 

The WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08 
Motion

 

[¶17] Bila also claims the 
district court's denial of his WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08 motion was clearly erroneous 
and an abuse of discretion. WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08 provides:

 

Presentation of 
evidence.

 

[¶18] If, before the date set for hearing, 
application is made to the reviewing court for leave to present additional 
evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court the additional 
evidence is material, and good cause for failure to present it in the proceeding 
before the agency existed, the reviewing court, in contested cases, shall order 
the additional evidence to be taken before the agency upon those conditions 
determined by the reviewing court. The agency may adhere to, or modify, its 
findings and decision after receiving such additional evidence, and shall 
supplement the record to reflect the proceedings had and the decision made.  Supplemental evidence may be taken by 
the reviewing court in cases involving fraud, or involving misconduct of some 
person engaged in the administration of the law affecting the decision. In all 
cases other than contested cases, additional material evidence may be presented 
to the reviewing court.

 

[¶19] WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08 
does not authorize a remand for the sole purpose of presenting a new legal 
theory. The plain language of the Rule limits relief to the presentation of 
additional evidence, not arguments. Bila's WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08 motion sought 
remand to permit the hearing examiner to consider his WYO. R. CIV. P. 60(b) 
motion. The district court properly refused to remand the case for consideration 
of a new legal theory. Additionally, as discussed above, Bila would not have 
prevailed even if he had proposed that theory in a timely 
manner.

 

                                           
CONCLUSION

 

[¶20] WYO. R. CIV. P. 60 is 
not available to claimants who fail to file a timely written request for 
administrative hearing when the initial administrative review of entitlement to 
benefits denies benefits. WYO. R.APP. P. 12.08 does not permit remand for the 
presentation of alternative legal theories to the hearing examiner. Therefore, 
we affirm the order of the district court.