Title: WHITLOCK CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. SOUTH BIG HORN WATER SUPPLY JOINT POWERS BOARD

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WHITLOCK CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. SOUTH BIG HORN WATER SUPPLY JOINT POWERS BOARD2002 WY 3641 P.3d 1261Case Number: 00-45Decided: 03/06/2002

October Term, A.D. 2001

WHITLOCK 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., 

a 
Wyoming corporation,

Appellant(Plaintiff),

v.

SOUTH 
BIG HORN COUNTY WATER

SUPPLY 
JOINT POWERS BOARD;

THE 
WYOMING WATER DEVELOPMENT

COMMISSION, 
STATE OF WYOMING;

and 
ROY PRIOR, individually and in his

official 
capacity as an employee of the

Wyoming 
Water Development Commission,

                                                                                    

Appellees(Defendants).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County

The 
Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Joseph 
E. Darrah and S. Joseph Darrah of Darrah & Darrah, P.C., Powell, WY.  Argument by Mr. S. Joseph 
Darrah.

 Representing 
Appellee South Big Horn County Water Supply Joint Powers Board:

Virgil 
G. Kinnaird, Sheridan, WY.  Argument 
by Mr. Kinnaird.

 Representing 
Appellees Wyoming Water Development Comm'n; State of Wyoming; and Roy 
Prior:

Lou 
Piccioni of Mead & Phillips, Cheyenne, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Piccioni.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.   

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice. 

[¶1]      This is 
an appeal from a district court order dismissing Whitlock Construction's claims 
based upon the finding that no binding contract existed between Whitlock and the 
South Big Horn County Water Supply Joint Powers Board (JPB).  We hold that a contract did exist 
between Whitlock and the JPB but affirm the order dismissing the claims on the 
ground that performance under the contract never became due because a necessary 
condition to performance did not occur.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Whitlock states 
the issues as follow:

1.  Whether the actions of 
the appellee WWDC and their repre­sentative, Roy Prior are in violation of 
competitive bidding requirements and should be declared arbitrary and 
capricious, without authority or discretion and not otherwise in accordance with 
relevant law. 

2.  Whether actions of the 
appellee Joint Powers Board in rescinding its award of a public construction 
contract to appel­lant and then awarding the same contract to a bidder which 
the Joint Powers Board previously rejected as an unresponsive bid­der 
violates contract law and competitive bidding requirements and should be 
declared arbitrary and capricious, without legal authority or discretion, and 
not otherwise in accordance with relevant law.  

3.  Whether the trial 
court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment by failing to 
find that a contract was formed between the appellee JPB and appellant when the 
JPB unconditionally accepted appellant's bid (offer) which contained a 
promissory condition that the JPB would use its best efforts to seek funding 
agency concurrence with the contract award to appellant, but the JPB failed to 
reasonably seek concurrence from the funding agency.  

We 
discern the following issues for our review:

1.  Whether the JPB 
breached its contract by rescinding the award to Whitlock after the funding 
agencies did not concur.

2.  Whether the JPB 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not obtaining 
the concurrence of the funding agencies.

3.  Whether the JPB abused 
its discretion or acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rescinding the award to 
Whitlock and awarding the project to Larry's.

4.  Whether the WWDC or 
Prior committed an abuse of discre­tion or acted unlawfully in not 
concurring in the award to Whitlock and concurring in the award to Larry's, 
Inc.

FACTS

[¶3]      Whitlock 
Construction is located in Powell, Wyoming and is engaged in the business of 
installing underground utilities.  
The South Big Horn County Water Supply Joint Powers Board (JPB) was 
established to oversee installation of a municipal water line from two artesian 
wells near Manderson, Wyoming to provide domestic water supply to the residents 
of Manderson, Basin, and South Big Horn County Water Districts.  The Wyoming Water Development Commission 
(WWDC) is an agency of the State of Wyoming and was one of the primary funding 
agencies for the installation project.1  Roy Prior was employed by the WWDC as a 
water development engineer.

[¶4]      In May of 1997, 
the JPB published a notice of advertisement for bids in the local news­paper 
for the purpose of soliciting competitive sealed bids for the construction of 
one phase of the water line.  In 
preparation for submitting a bid on the project, Whitlock obtained the project 
manual, bid specifications, and plans.  
The project manual provided to all of the bidders on the project 
contained the following provision:

Contract Approval.

1.2 
      Concurrence 
by the FmHA State Director or designee in the award of the CONTRACT is required 
before it is effective and the "FmHA Concurrence" (Section 15), shall be 
attached and made a part of the Agreement.

The 
project manual also contained a concurrence form which 
stated:

This 
CONTRACT shall not be effective unless and until concurred in by the State 
Director of the Farmers Home Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture or a 
delegated representative.

[¶5]      Whitlock does not 
dispute that these provisions were contained in the documents it received prior 
to submitting a bid. Whitlock also does not dispute that it reviewed the 
docu­ments before submitting its bid.  
The notice of claim filed by Whitlock with the State pursuant to the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act acknowledges the "bid and contractual 
requirement that the State and Federal governmental agencies involved are 
required to con­cur at the bid selection." 

[¶6] 
     After reviewing 
the project documents, Whitlock prepared and submitted a bid.  Four other bids were submitted by other 
entities.  One of those bids, 
submitted by Larry's Inc., was lower than Whitlock's bid.  The project engineer analyzed and 
evaluated the bids and submitted a report to the JPB in which he noted problems 
with the low bid submitted by Larry's.  

[¶7]      On July 15, 1997, 
at a special meeting of the JPB, the project engineer's report was discussed, 
and the JPB voted unanimously to accept the Whitlock bid.  Whitlock was notified of the JPB action 
by telephone later that same evening.  
The parties apparently are in agree­ment that the requirement of 
agency concurrence was not mentioned during the telephone call.  

[¶8]      After the special 
meeting, on July 16, the JPB's attorney sent a letter to the JPB stating, among 
other things, that the minutes of the July 15 meeting should be amended to 
reflect that acceptance of Whitlock's bid was contingent upon agency 
approval.  At a regular meeting of 
the JPB on August 6, a motion was made and passed to amend the July 15 
minutes.  The July 15 minutes 
contained in the record state:

Following 
a discussion on the Bid Analysis for the Basin Area Water Supply Project bid 
letting Mel Reid made a motion to accept the bid of Whitlock Construction as 
recommended by Joint Powers Board Attorney Robert Gish and Graham, Dietz and 
Associates.  Lloyd Franks seconded 
and the motion carried with unanimous vote.

Phil 
Julliard made a motion to authorize Chairman Joyce to sign the Notice of Award 
to Whitlock Construction when the bid has received concurrence from the 
funding agencies.  
Seconded by Lloyd Franks and carried unanimously.

(Emphasis 
added.)  The italicized language was 
added by amendment.

[¶9]      On July 16, 1997, 
the attorney for the JPB also wrote a letter to the RUS and WWDC setting forth 
the reasons for the JPB's decision not to accept the low bid submitted by 
Larry's, Inc.  The RUS and WWDC 
asked for more information and, on July 22, the project engineer forwarded 
another letter to them.  

[¶10]   Upon reviewing the information 
provided, Prior, on behalf of the WWDC, notified the JPB that WWDC did not 
concur with the award to Whitlock because Larry's, Inc. was the low bidder and 
it had not been demonstrated to WWDC's satisfaction that Larry's was not a 
responsible bidder.  The next day, 
RUS notified the JPB that it also did not concur in the award to Whitlock.  A special meeting was held August 18, 
1997, at which time the JPB rescinded the award to Whitlock and awarded the bid 
to Larry's, Inc.  The WWDC and RUS 
concurred in that award.

[¶11]   On March 6, 1998, Whitlock filed a 
complaint and petition for review of agency action in the district court against 
the JPB, the WWDC, and Roy Prior alleging violations of the competitive bidding 
statutes, due process, equal protection, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Whitlock also alleged a claim for breach 
of contract and sought declaratory judgment that a binding contract existed 
between Whitlock and the JPB, that any contract between Larry's and the JPB was 
void, that the acts of the JPB and WWDC in rescinding the award to Whitlock and 
awarding the project to Larry's exceeded their authority and were void, and that 
Whitlock was entitled to money damages.  

[¶12]   The JPB answered the complaint on 
April 20, 1998, alleging as an affirmative defense that all parties were aware 
that concurrence in the contract award by the funding agencies was a condition 
precedent to the formation of a contract.  
On April 29, 1998, the WWDC and Prior filed a motion to dismiss or in the 
alternative for a more definite statement.  
The court granted the motion for more definite statement; and, on 
December 3, 1998, Whitlock filed an amended complaint.  The WWDC and Prior filed an answer on 
December 14. The JPB answered on December 16.    

[¶13]   On February 19, 1999, the WWDC and 
Prior moved for summary judgment.  
The JPB likewise moved for summary judgment on May 26, 1999.  After a hearing on December 2, 1999, the 
court granted summary judgment as to all defendants by order dated January 13, 
2000.  In that order, the district 
court held that no binding contract existed between Whitlock and the JPB because 
the requisite contingency to the contract, concurrence by the funding agencies, 
did not occur.  The court further 
held that the actions of the JPB in rescinding the award to Whitlock and 
accepting the bid of Larry's, Inc. were not arbitrary, an abuse of 
dis­cretion, or unreasonable given the funding agencies' refusal to concur 
in the award to Whitlock.  As for 
the claims against WWDC and Prior, the court found that they had a right to 
concur or not concur, and that their actions were reasonable and within the 
bounds of the law.  Whitlock timely 
filed its notice of appeal. 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶14]   The standard of review for summary 
judgment has been stated as follows:

Summary 
judgment is appropriate if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, reveals that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1997); Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 1997); W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A fact is material if it establishes or 
refutes an essential element of a claim or defense.  Tidwell v. HOM, Inc., 896 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Wyo. 1995).  In 
evaluating summary judgment, we apply the same standards as the trial court, 
with­out affording any deference to the trial court's decisions on issues of 
law.  Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994).

Worley 
v. Wyoming Bottling Co., Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 620 (Wyo. 2000).

DISCUSSION

Claims 
against the JPB

            
1.  Existence of a Binding 
Contract

[¶15]   Whitlock claims that when the JPB 
accepted its bid and awarded Whitlock the contract, a binding contract existed 
between itself and the JPB.  
Whitlock characterizes the JPB's acceptance of its bid as an 
unconditional acceptance of a conditional promise.   Once a binding contract existed, 
Whitlock claims, the JPB had an implied contractual duty to use good faith 
efforts to secure the concurrence of the funding agencies.  The JPB breached this duty, Whitlock 
contends, by failing to use good faith to obtain agency concurrence.  

[¶16]   In contrast, the JPB argues (and 
the district court held) that a binding and enforceable contract was not formed 
between the parties because the funding agencies did not concur in the award to 
Whitlock and, therefore, the requisite contingency to a binding contract never 
occurred.  Citing Mad River Boat 
Trips, Inc. v. Jackson Hole Whitewater, Inc., 803 P.2d 366, 368 (Wyo. 1990) 
and Robert W. Anderson Housewrecking & Excavating, Inc. v. Board of 
Trustees, Sch. Dist. No. 25, 681 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Wyo. 1984), the JPB 
characterizes the required concurrence as a condition precedent to the formation 
of a binding contract.  Because 
there was no binding contract, the JPB claims, there was no implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.   

[¶17]   In Robert W. Anderson 
Housewrecking, we were presented with facts similar to those presented in 
this case.  The school board sought 
bids for demolition of a school.  
Gillingham Construction was the low bidder.  Anderson was the next low bidder.  Before the school board met to review 
the bids, Gillingham withdrew its bid.  
At the next board meeting, the board passed a resolution to accept 
Anderson's bid with the condition that a citizens' group be given time to find 
another use for the building.  After 
the meeting, Gillingham renewed its bid.  
The school board accepted Gillingham's bid and advised Anderson that the 
contract had been awarded to Gillingham.  

[¶18]   We were asked to determine whether 
acceptance of Anderson's bid by the school board created a binding contract 
subject to a condition precedent, or an agreement to make a contract in the 
future.  We held that the school 
board resolution to award the project to Anderson created a binding contract 
with Anderson once he had notice of the award.  We said that the contract was created 
with the condition precedent that if the citizens' group found another use for 
the school, the school board would not be bound by the contract.  Because the condition never occurred 
(the citizens' group never found another use), we held that the school board was 
bound by its contract with Anderson and was not free to revoke the contract and 
award the project to Gillingham.  
Implicit in our holding was the conclusion that if the condition had 
occurred, the board would not have been bound by its contract with 
Anderson.

[¶19]   We were faced with similar facts in 
Mad River Boat Trips, Inc. v Jackson Hole Whitewater, Inc., 803 P.2d 366.  The parties entered into a 
contract for the sale of two whitewater rafts and special use permits issued by 
the Forest Service.  The contract 
provided that it was contingent upon the consent of the Forest Service to an 
assignment in trust.  The Forest 
Service did not consent to the assignment in trust, and Mad River revoked the 
con­tract.  Jackson Hole 
Whitewater, Inc. filed a complaint claiming breach of contract.  We held that performance under the 
contract was contingent upon the consent of the Forest Service; and when the 
contingency did not occur, the parties were excused from 
performance.

[¶20]   Anderson and Mad River 
are controlling as to the result in this case.  The project docu­ments provided to 
Whitlock clearly stated that concurrence by FmHA or its designee was required 
before any contract award became effective.  Whitlock concedes that it was aware of 
this requirement when it submitted a bid on the project.  Although a contract existed once 
Whitlock was informed the project was his, performance under the contract never 
became due because the contingencyagency concurrencenever occurred.  When the contingency failed to occur, 
the parties were relieved of performing under the 
contract.

[¶21]   The difference between our holding 
in this case and the holding in Anderson is that we do not utilize the 
"condition precedent" language relied upon by the court in Anderson.  Rather, we adopt the terminology of the 
Restatement, Second, Contracts § 224 which refer­ences simply 
"condition" and defines it as "an event, not certain to occur, which must occur, 
unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a contract 
becomes due."  In discarding the 
phrase "condition precedent," we are persuaded that the term "condition" is 
simpler, no less accurate, and less susceptible to confusion and 
misinterpretation.  See 
dis­cussion at pp. 11-14, 8 Corbin on Contracts, § 30.7 (1999).  

[¶22]   We hold that a binding contract 
existed between the partiesthere was an uncondi­tional acceptance of a 
conditional promise.  However, the 
contract was subject to a condition which had to occur before performance under 
the contract became due:  that is, 
concurrence by the FmHA or its designee. Because the contingency did not occur, 
performance under the contract did not become due.        

            
2.  Breach of the Implied Covenant of 
Good Faith

[¶23]   Whitlock claims that the JPB 
breached an implied duty which existed in the contract to use good faith efforts 
to obtain the concurrence of the funding agencies.  In Scherer Constr., LLC v. Hedquist 
Constr., Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶24, 18 P.3d 645, ¶24 (Wyo. 2001), we adopted § 
205 of the Restatement, Second, Contracts and held that parties to 
a commercial contract may bring a claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing based upon a contract theory.  Because we have said that a valid 
contract existed between Whitlock and the JPB, it follows that a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing is implied in the contract.

[¶24]   The implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing 

requires 
that a party's actions be consistent with the agreed common purpose and 
justified expectations of the other party. . . . The purpose, 
intentions and expectations of the parties should be determined by considering 
the contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the 
parties.  The covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing may not, however, be construed to establish new, 
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties.  In other words, the concept of good 
faith and fair dealing is not a limitless one.  The implied obliga­tion must arise 
from the language used or it must be indispensa­ble to effectuate the 
intention of the parties.  In the 
absence of evidence of self-dealing or breach of community standards of decency, 
fairness and reasonableness, the exercise of contractual rights alone will not 
be considered a breach of the covenant.

Scherer, at 
653-54 (internal quotes and citations omitted).  Although many claims for breach of good 
faith involve questions of fact making summary judgment inappropriate, summary 
judgment may be appropriate where, under the facts in the record, the party's 
actions were in conformity with the clear language of the contract.  Scherer, at 654, 
fn.2.

[¶25]   Applying these standards, we find 
no breach of the implied covenant under the facts presented.  The contract language provided that the 
contract was contingent upon agency concurrence.  The contract language did not place an 
affirmative duty upon the JPB to secure agency concurrence.  Had the parties intended to impose such 
a duty upon the JPB, they were required to expressly state that intention in the 
contract itself.  We are not willing 
to infer that such a duty existed absent clear language in the contract 
indicating that was the parties' intent.

[¶26]   Moreover, were we to conclude that 
such a duty was imposed upon the JPB by express terms of the contract, the facts 
before us suggest that the JPB took reasonable steps to secure the concurrence 
of the funding agencies.  By two 
separate letters, the JPB presented its reasons for awarding the contract to 
Whitlock rather than the low bidder.  
Despite the information provided by the JPB, the funding agencies chose 
not to concur in the award to the second lowest bidder.  We find nothing in the record to support 
Whitlock's claim that the JPB acted unreasonably.     

            
3.  Abuse of Discretion / Arbitrary and Capricious Action 

[¶27]   Whitlock also claims the JPB abused 
its discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rescinding the award to 
Whitlock and awarding the project to Larry's, Inc.  We have said that the JPB acted 
reasonably in attempting to secure the concurrence of the funding agencies.  Despite those efforts, the funding 
agencies apparently were not persuaded that sufficient justification existed to 
depart from the established practice of awarding contracts to the lowest bidder, 
and they withheld their concurrence.  
Thereafter, the JPB had two choices:  stick with the award to Whitlock and 
risk losing federal and state funding or rescind the award to Whitlock and award 
the contract to the lowest bidder.  
Under these cir­cumstances, we do not find an abuse of discretion or 
that the JPB's actions were arbitrary and capricious. 

Claims 
against the WWDC and Prior

[¶28]   Citing provisions of 7 C.F.R. § 
1942.18, Whitlock claims that matters relating to bid­ding and the selection 
process were vested solely in the JPB and not the WWDC or Prior.  None of those provisions, Whitlock 
asserts, authorizes the WWDC, or Prior acting at the behest of the WWDC, to 
withhold concurrence based upon the WWDC's own independent determination of the 
lowest responsible bidder.

[¶29]   Whitlock's claim that the JPB was 
solely authorized to select or reject a bidder ignores subsection (e)(2) of 7 
C.F.R. § 1942.18, which provides in essence that no contract has full force and 
effect until it has been approved by the FmHA or its successor agency (the RUS 
in this case).  The section further 
provides that the agency is responsible for approving construction 
contracts.  Consistent with these 
provisions, the Wyoming Public Works Act expressly recognizes that any public 
works contracts in Wyoming which are funded in part by a federal agency are 
subject to federal law.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-6-108 (LexisNexis 2001).  
Thus, pursuant to federal and state law, the RUS had the authority to 
approve or reject a bidder, and that authority was not vested solely in the JPB 
as Whitlock contends.  

[¶30]   Whitlock's claim also ignores 
Wyoming law which gives the WWDC the authority and the obligation to review bids 
on the project and to concur or not concur in JPB action.  As pointed out by the WWDC and 
acknowledged by Whitlock, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-114(d) (LexisNexis 2001) 
authorizes the WWDC to withhold funds on a water project when it is determined 
that the project is not in the public interest.  Section 41-2-118(a)(xiii) (LexisNexis 
2001) further authorizes the WWDC to represent the State's interests in 
nego­tiation and construction of water projects.  Pursuant to these sections, the WWDC was 
obligated not to concur in the award to Whitlock if it believed that award did 
not serve the interests of the public or the State.  

[¶31]   Additionally, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-1-303(f) (LexisNexis 2001) of the Wyoming Joint Powers Act, which establishes 
the state drinking water revolving loan account applicable to public water 
supplies in Wyoming (including the municipal water line at issue here), requires 
the WWDC to evaluate engineering designs and studies and provide technical and 
adminis­trative management of contracts for projects involving public water 
supplies.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-6-119 (LexisNexis 2001) (Public Works and Contracts) further provides 
that every state board, commission or agency (including the WWDC) is authorized 
to determine quali­fications and responsibilities for bidders on contracts 
for public projects.  Given these 
provisions, it was clearly the legislature's intent that the WWDC be actively 
and directly involved in reviewing bids, determining responsible bidders, and 
withholding funds when necessary in order to ensure that projects involving the 
public water supply serve the best interests of the public and the State of 
Wyoming.  To adopt Whitlock's 
argument that the WWDC has no authority to concur or not concur in contract 
awards of this nature would be contrary to legislative intent as reflected in 
the above statutes and would be to divest the WWDC of any meaningful ability to 
influence public contracts and protect the public inter­est. 

Claims 
against the JPB, WWDC and Prior 

            
1.  Violation of competitive bidding 
requirements

[¶32]   Whitlock next claims the JPB, the 
WWDC, and Prior violated the competitive bidding requirements by awarding the 
contract to a bidder whose bid materially deviated from the invitation to 
bid.  In support of the claim, 
Whitlock cites a number of cases, including State v. Weisz & Sons, 
Inc., 713 P.2d 176 (Wyo. 1986). 

[¶33]   In Weisz, the Department of 
Administration and Fiscal Control (DAFC) rejected the low bidder on a slurry 
injection contract for not being responsive and awarded the contract to the 
second low bidder.  The trial court 
reversed, enjoined DAFC from awarding the contract to anyone but the low bidder, 
and held that DAFC abused its discretion when it decided the low bidder's 
failure to include certain documents was a material variance.  

[¶34]   On appeal to this court, the issue 
in Weisz was whether a trial court has the authority to substitute its 
discretion for that of a state agency and award a contract through an 
injunc­tion.  The court held 
that under the facts presented, the trial court should have deferred to the 
judgment and discretion of DAFC and had no authority to award the contract.  

[¶35]   The court quoted art. II, § 2 
of the Wyoming Constitution which provides:

The 
powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 
departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or 
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these depart­ments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to 
either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted.

Weisz, at 
184.  The court 
said:

The 
judicial department has jurisdiction over acts that are illegally done, but to 
extend its power over acts done in good faith, pursuant to the exercise of an 
honest judgment, and within the jurisdiction of the person or persons performing 
them, would be, in the absence of legislative authorization, judicial 
usurpa­tion inconsistent with the fundamental constitutional principle of 
division of power.

Id. 
(quoting Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Ass'n, 29 Wyo. 461, 476, 215 P. 244, 248 (1923)).  The court went on 
to say that courts are warranted in setting aside action of an administrative 
agency only where its action is arbitrary or fraudulent or where there is an 
illegal exercise of discretion.  
Id.  The court used the 
words dishonesty, bad faith, illegality, and oppressiveness to describe agency 
action warranting judicial intervention.  
The term "abuse of discretion" in its application to agency conduct, the 
court said, carries with it a connotation of illegal and other conduct smacking 
of censurable behavior, justifying judicial intervention.  Id. at 185.

[¶36]   Applying these principles, we are 
unable to find from the statutes, applicable law, rules and regulations, and the 
record on appeal that the procedures followed by the JPB, WWDC, and Prior were 
anything but lawful, reasonable, and in the exercise of honest judg­ment, 
good faith, and accepted competitive bidding practices.  Under these circumstances, we will not 
interfere and substitute our judgment for that of the JPB or the WWDC.2

[¶37]   Whitlock goes on at some length in 
his brief about the deficiencies contained in Larry's bid, including the failure 
to acknowledge addendas to the contract, the failure to list equipment, and the 
listing of only one subcontractor.  
We are satisfied that these are matters of judgment with which the 
judicial branch may not interfere.  
As the court said in Weisz:

It is 
the responsibility of the public agency, which is charged with contracting, to 
accept that bid which, in its judg­ment, would provide the best project for 
the money.  Inherent to its duties, 
presumed superior knowledge, and expertise, the responsible public authority 
must have wide latitude in which to exercise its judgment as to the best means 
of accomplishing that objective, and courts are reluctant to enjoin such 
administrative functions in the absence of dishonesty, fraud, collusion, or lack 
of good faith. 

Weisz at 
185-86.  As the court also 
said:

It is a 
general rule that bids for public contracts must substantially comply with the 
requirements of the specifications for bidding and the directions to prospective 
bidders.  The determination as to 
whether these requirements are satisfied and the awarding of a contract are acts 
of discretion which will be enjoined only if done illegally, arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or unreasonably.

Weisz, at 
186.

[¶38]   Whitlock has presented no evidence 
which persuades us that the acts of the JPB, the WWDC, or Prior were illegal, 
unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, dishonest, fraudulent, in bad faith, or 
collusive. 

CONCLUSION

[¶39]   The district court order granting 
summary judgment for the JPB, WWDC, and Prior and dismissing Whitlock's claims 
is affirmed.  

FOOTNOTES

1The 
Rural Utility Service (RUS) of the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) was the 
other primary funding source for the project but was not named as a party in 
this action.

  2Whitlock also cites Centric Corp. 
v. Barbarossa & Sons, Inc., 521 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1974) in support of the 
claim that the competitive bidding statutes were violated.  There, an agency rejected the lowest bid 
because the bidder failed to file an affirmative action plan with its bid.  The court reversed, holding that the 
failure to file an affirmative action plan was not a material departure from the 
bid requirements. 

In 
Weisz, the court acknowledged Centric but noted that it appeared 
to stand alone in Wyoming jurisprudence and cautioned that its holding must be 
closely confined to its specific facts.  
As in Weisz, we find that Centric furnishes no guidelines 
dispositive of the issues before us in this case.