Title: Rathbun v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WARREN WAYNE RATHBUN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 116Case Number: No. S-10-0245Decided: 08/08/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

WARREN 
WAYNE RATHBUN,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge 

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Olson.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. 
Daraie, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Daraie.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant was 
convicted of attempted kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison.  He appeals the denial of two pre-trial 
motions to dismiss, and raises two issues concerning sentencing.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.    Was the appellant's 
prosecution for attempted kidnapping barred by the doctrine of double jeopardy 
due to his earlier guilty plea to battery?

 

            
2.    Was the State 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
from refiling the attempted kidnapping charge and seeking a second 
preliminary hearing after that charge was dismissed following a preliminary 
hearing where the circuit court judge found a lack of probable 
cause?

 
 
            
3.    Did the 
district court apply the proper penalty range in imposing 
sentence?

 
 
            
4.    Did the 
district court's determination of the penalty range in imposing sentence violate 
the appellant's right to trial by jury?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On August 3, 
2009, the appellant accosted a woman near her car in the State of Wyoming 
employee parking garage, and struck her on the head.  He was charged with attempted 
kidnapping, a felony, and battery, a misdemeanor.  After a preliminary hearing in circuit 
court, the attempted kidnapping charge was dismissed without prejudice.  Although the reason for the dismissal 
does not appear in the court order, questions and comments of the circuit court 
judge during the preliminary hearing indicated a concern that the State had 
failed to prove probable cause as to all the elements of the charged 
crime.

 
 
[¶4]      After the felony 
was dismissed, the misdemeanor battery case proceeded in circuit court.  The appellant pled guilty and was 
sentenced to 180 days in jail.  
Subsequently, the appellant was charged anew with attempted kidnapping, 
and a second preliminary hearing took place, before a different circuit court 
judge.  This time, the appellant was 
bound over to district court for trial, where he was convicted and sentenced as 
noted above.

 
 
  
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Was 
the appellant's prosecution for attemptedkidnapping barred by the doctrine 
of double jeopardydue to his earlier guilty plea to 
battery?

 
 
[¶5]      "This Court 
reviews de novo the question of 
whether a defendant's constitutional protection against double jeopardy has been 
violated."  Daniel v. State, 2008 WY 87, ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 859, 862 (Wyo. 2008).  In that 
review, we consider the protections provided by the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and by article 1, section 11 of the Wyoming 
Constitution to be equivalent.  Id. at ¶ 8, at 862.  Of particular relevance to the present 
discussion is the precept that the "double jeopardy clause prohibits prosecution 
of a defendant for a greater offense when he has been previously convicted of 
the lesser included offense."  Id.

 
 
[¶6]      The 
constitutional principle, on its face, is simple: no person may be placed in 
jeopardy more than once for the same criminal offense.  The word "jeopardy" refers to "the risk 
of conviction and punishment."  Black's Law Dictionary 912 (9th ed. 
2009).  This simplicity, however, 
has been illusory; see, e.g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 81 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1984); Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977); and Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970).  
Federal double jeopardy law appears to have been settled in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 
696, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856, 125 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1993), with the Supreme Court's 
holding that "[i]n both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution 
contexts, this Court has concluded that where the two offenses for which the 
defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the same-elements' test, the 
double jeopardy bar applies."  The 
inquiry under the same-elements test is "whether each offense contains an 
element not contained in the other; if not, they are the same offence' and 
double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution."  Id.  Like the United States Supreme Court, 
this Court recognizes and follows the same-elements test.  See, e.g., Granzer v. State, 2010 WY 130, ¶ 13, 239 P.3d 640, 645 (Wyo. 2010); Snow v. 
State, 2009 WY 117, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 505, 510 (Wyo. 2009); and Najera v. State, 2009 WY 105, ¶ 11, 214 P.3d 990, 994 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶7]      The two offenses 
at issue in the present case are misdemeanor battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-501(b) (LexisNexis 2011) and attempted kidnapping, a felony, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301(a) and 6-2-201(a)(iii) and (d) 
(LexisNexis 2011).  The statutory 
elements of battery, as charged in this case, are:

 
 
1.    On or about August 3, 
2009.

 
 
2.    In Laramie County, 
Wyoming.

 
 
3.    The 
appellant.

 
 
4.    
Intentionally.

 
 
5.    Caused bodily injury to the 
victim.

 
 
6.    By use of physical 
force.

 
 
On 
the other hand, the statutory elements of attempted kidnapping, as charged in 
this case, are:

 
 
1.    On or about August 3, 
2009.

 
 
2.    In Laramie County, 
Wyoming.

 
 
3.    The 
appellant.

 
 
4.    With the intent to commit the 
crime of kidnapping.

 
 
5.    Did an act which is a 
substantial step towards commission of the crime of 
kidnapping.

 
 
[¶8]      It is clear that 
each of these statutes contains an element not contained in the other.  Battery requires both the use of 
physical force and resultant bodily injury, neither of which element is 
contained in the crime of attempted kidnapping.  Attempted kidnapping requires the intent 
to commit the crime of kidnapping, and a substantial step toward commission of 
that crimewhich substantial step logically may or may not involve physical 
force or bodily injuryneither of which element is contained in the crime of 
battery.  In cases such as this, 
where two crimes each contain elements not contained in the other, there is no 
preclusive effect, and the subsequent prosecution does not violate double 
jeopardy.  Dixon, 509 U.S.  at 704-09, 113 S.Ct. at 
2860-63; Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S.  at 501-02, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2542; State v. King, 2002 WY 93, 
¶¶ 18-20, 48 P.3d 396, 404-05 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
Was 
the State barred by the doctrine of res judicata from re-filing the attempted 
kidnapping charge and seeking a second preliminary hearing after that charge was 
dismissed following a preliminary hearing where the circuit court judge found a 
lack of probable cause?

 
 
[¶9]      "The application 
of the doctrine of res judicata is a 
question of law that we review de 
novo."  Osborn v. Kilts, 2006 WY 142, ¶ 6, 145 P.3d 1264, 1266 (Wyo. 2006); see also 
Willis v. Davis, 2010 WY 149, ¶ 10, 243 P.3d 568, 570 (Wyo. 2010).  Before we address the issue as it has 
been presented in this case, we believe it may be helpful to state some general 
rules about res judicata and its 
juridical cousin, collateral estoppel.

 
 

            
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are related but distinct 
concepts.  Res judicata bars the 
relitigation of previously litigated claims 
or causes 
of action.  Slavens v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 854 P.2d 683, 686 (Wyo. 1993).  Four factors are examined to determine 
whether the doctrine of res judicata applies: (1) identity in parties; (2) 
identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the 
subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference 
to both the subject matter and the issues between them.  Id.  Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of 
previously litigated issues 
and involves an analysis of four similar factors: (1)  whether the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2) 
whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether 
the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against whom 
collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issue in the prior proceeding.  Id.

 
 

Eklund 
v. PRI Envtl., Inc., 
2001 WY 55, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d 511, 517 (Wyo. 2001) (emphasis in original).  A "claim" is "[t]he aggregate of 
operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court[.]"  Black's Law Dictionary 281 (9th ed. 
2009).  An "issue," on the other 
hand, is "[a] point in dispute between two or more parties . . . [that] may take 
the form of a separate and discrete question of law or fact, or a combination of 
both."  Id. at 907.

 
 
[¶10]   The two doctrinesres judicata and collateral estoppelare 
not always distinguished or readily distinguishable.  That confusion is exacerbated in the 
present case because, not only is there an element of collateral estoppel 
intertwined with the concept of double jeopardy just discussed, but some of the 
cases cited by the parties in regard to this issue were actually determined not 
on the basis of res judicata or 
collateral estoppel, but upon the basis of constitutional due process, or upon 
the existence of a rule of criminal procedure, or upon particular state law 
governing preliminary hearings.  We 
will do our best to unmuddy those waters.

 
 
[¶11]   First, we will discuss a few of the 
United States Supreme Court cases in which the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
has arisen in a case primarily involving double jeopardy.  In Ashe v. Swenson, the appellant was 
charged with six counts of armed robbery for allegedly robbing six participants 
in a poker game, with each count to be tried separately, seriatim.  The first jury found the appellant not 
guilty, with the only issue in dispute being the identity of the appellant as 
one of the robbers.  The United 
States Supreme Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as part of 
the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, prohibited the State of 
Missouri from bringing the appellant to trial for the robbery of another 
participant, because the issue of identity had been determined against the 
State.  Ashe, 397 U.S.  at 443-46, 90 S. Ct.  at 
1194-96.  Though not at issue, the 
collateral estoppel rationale of Ashe 
was noted in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.  at 166 n.6, 97 S. Ct.  at 2226 n.6, as another "standard for determining 
whether successive prosecutions impermissibly involve the same 
offense."

 
 
[¶12]   Fourteen years after publishing Ashe, the Supreme Court rejected the 
application of its collateral estoppel analysis in a case where there was no 
attempt by the State to prosecute charges serially, and where a guilty plea, 
rather than a trial, had resolved the first go-round.  Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S.  at 500 n.9, 
104 S. Ct.  at 2541 n.9.  The Court 
stated that "the taking of a guilty plea is not the same as an adjudication on 
the merits after full trial . . . ."  
Id.  Lastly, because United States v. Dixon is now the 
leading case on federal double jeopardy analysis, we will note obiter dictum from the majority opinion 
in that case to the effect that while collateral estoppel "may bar a later 
prosecution for a separate offense where the Government has lost an earlier prosecution involving 
the same facts . . . this does not establish that the Government must . . . 
bring its prosecutions . . . together.'"  
509 U.S.  at 705, 113 S. Ct.  at 2860 (emphasis in 
original).

 
 
[¶13]   We have cited these cases primarily 
to distinguish the concept of collateral estoppel as a double jeopardy theorem, 
where the full merits of the case are at issue, from the concept of res judicata or collateral estoppel as a 
bar to the relitigation of more limited matters.  For the latter purpose, we will review 
some of our own cases.  For example, 
in Martinez v. State, 2007 WY 164, ¶¶ 
11-18, 169 P.3d 89, 91-93 (Wyo. 2007), we restated our holding that res judicata applies to motions under 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) to correct an illegal sentence, barring both matters that 
previously have been raised and matters that previously could have been 
raised.  See also, e.g., Gould v. State, 2006 WY 157, ¶¶ 14-17, 
151 P.3d 261, 266 (Wyo. 2006); and Lacey 
v. State, 2003 WY 148, ¶ 10, 79 P.3d 493, 495 (Wyo. 2003).  Similarly, in Beck v. State, 2005 WY 56, ¶ 10, 110 P.3d 898, 901 (Wyo. 2005), we held that the doctrine of res judicata prevented the appellant 
from asserting double jeopardy, where that issue was, or could have been 
previously asserted.  Res judicata also prohibits an appellant 
from pursuing credit for time served via a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
after that issue has been determined in a prior appeal.  McCarty v. State, 929 P.2d 524, 524-25 
(Wyo. 1996).  Lastly, both the 
doctrine of res judicata and specific 
statutory restrictions forbid raising matters in a post-conviction relief 
petition that were, or could have been, raised on appeal.  Hauck v. State, 2007 WY 113, ¶ 10, 162 P.3d 512, 515 (Wyo. 2007); Kallas v. 
State, 776 P.2d 198, 200 (Wyo. 1989); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(a)(i), 
(iii) (LexisNexis 2011).

 
 
[¶14]   Twice recently, we have considered 
the effect of collateral estoppel, rather than res judicata, where the same issue arose 
in related criminal and administrative proceedings.  In Elliott v. State, 2011 WY 32, ¶ 4, 247 P.3d 501, 503 (Wyo. 2011), the appellant contended that the State was 
collaterally estopped from pursuing a conviction for driving while under the 
influence where, in a related driver's license suspension proceeding, an 
administrative hearing examiner found that the arresting officer lacked probable 
cause to make the arrest.  We 
concluded that collateral estoppel did not bar subsequent criminal prosecution 
because the last two elements of the doctrine were not met: privity does not 
exist between local prosecutors pursuing criminal convictions and state 
transportation department officials seeking license suspensions, and prosecutors 
are denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the criminal case in the 
administrative proceedings.  Id. at ¶¶ 8-9, at 
504.

 
 
[¶15]   Only about a month before Elliott was published, we reached a 
contrary result in a case where the order of proceedings was reversed, as were 
the positions of the parties in regard to collateral estoppel.  In Bowen v. State, 2011 WY 1, ¶ 2, 245 P.3d 827, 828 (Wyo. 2011), the State contended that the appellant was collaterally 
estopped from relitigating the issue of the admissibility of breath test results 
in his administrative driver's license suspension hearing, where the circuit 
court judge had previously ruled in the related criminal case that the breath 
test results were admissible.  Of 
focal significance to our conclusion in Bowen that collateral estoppel applied 
were the fact that the appellant was the same party in both proceedings and the 
fact that he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the admissibility issue 
in the criminal case.  Id. at ¶ 11, at 
830-31.

 
 
[¶16]   Our purpose in journeying through 
these cases is to present the context in which the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are 
applied in criminal cases such as the one before us.  To broaden that endeavor, we will now 
mention a few cases from other states to see how the issue sub judice is treated elsewhere.  In California, for instance, neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel 
apply to orders dismissing criminal charges following a preliminary 
hearing.  Newton v. Superior Court of  California, 803 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th 
Cir. 1986); People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 667-68, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 660, 511 P.2d 609, 612 (Cal. 
1973).  South Dakota agrees, 
stressing the fact that jeopardy has not attached during a preliminary hearing, 
and the fact that no adjudication on the merits occurs.  State v. Fahey, 275 N.W.2d 870, 871 
(S.D. 1979).  Similarly, Arizona 
holds that the determination of a preliminary hearing is not a final judgment, 
and that dismissal of a charge at a preliminary hearing "is not an absolute bar 
to further proceedings."  State v. Elling, 19 Ariz. App. 317, 318, 
506 P.2d 1102, 1103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).  
The phrase "not an absolute bar" leaves open the possibility that a 
preliminary hearing determination may be given preclusive effect if it is based 
upon a factual conclusion that the defendant did not commit the crime, or if the 
subsequent proceedings evidence the "shuttling" of a case from magistrate to 
magistrate seeking a favorable order.  
Id. at 1103-04.  See also Painter v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. 
App. 225, 236, 623 S.E.2d 408, 413-14 (Va. App. 2005); and Highsmith v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 
434, 439-443, 489 S.E.2d 239, 241-43 (Va. App. 1997) (res judicata and collateral estoppel 
available in criminal cases, may preclude further prosecution after 
determination on the merits, but do not apply to finding of no probable cause at 
a preliminary hearing).

 
 
[¶17]   The contrary viewthat the state 
should not be allowed to refile a criminal charge dismissed at the preliminary 
hearing for lack of probable cause, except in certain circumstancesis shared by 
several states.  Interestingly, 
however, this contrary view is not grounded in res judicata or collateral estoppel, but 
in due process.  The patron saint of 
this line of reasoning appears to be Jones v. State, 1971 OK CR 27, 481 P.2d 169, 171-72 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971), where the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals declared that the state could not refile a dismissed charge absent new 
or previously unavailable evidence, or other good cause, and that the matter 
must be refiled before the same magistrate who earlier found a lack of probable 
cause.1  This approach has also been adopted in 
Utah and North Dakota.  See State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 
647-48 (Utah 1986); and Walker v. 
Schneider, 477 N.W.2d 167, 171-74 (N.D. 1991).2

 
 
[¶18]   The state of the law in regard to 
the issue of refiling a criminal charge that has been dismissed at preliminary 
hearing because the state failed to prove probable cause was recently summarized 
in 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 14.3(c), at 333-34 
(3d ed. 2007):

 
 

            
As discussed below, a handful of state courts have concluded that 
refiling undermines the magistrate's authority and therefore should not be 
permitted unless the prosecution offers substantial additional evidence.  A few others have adopted provisions 
that preclude refiling, but give the trial court authority to allow the filing 
of an information notwithstanding the magistrate's rejection of a bindover, upon 
a factually supported allegation of sufficient evidence.  The 
vast majority, however, permit refiling at will, including refiling on the same 
evidence before a different magistrate, absent proof that the prosecutor's 
purpose is to harass the defendant. 
 Although 
rulings sustaining such authority commonly point to the prosecution's lack of 
authority to appeal the dismissal in the particular state,marker1fn0the 
authority to refile without new evidence is also recognized in some of the 
states that allow a prosecution appeal.  
In many jurisdictions, support for unlimited refiling also is found in 
preliminary hearing provisions which specifically state that a dismissal "shall 
not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense."marker1fn0marker1fn0(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶19]   With this background, we turn our 
attention to two of our previous cases and to a rule of criminal procedure.  In Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217, 1221 
(Wyo. 1976), admittedly without reference either to res judicata or collateral estoppel, we 
held that "one preliminary hearing, unproductive for the State, does not 
prohibit another."  In reaching that 
conclusion, we specifically rejected Jones v. State, the Oklahoma case cited 
above, see supra ¶ 17, and we 
interpreted the language of F.R.Cr.P. 5.1 indicating that the discharge of a 
defendant at a preliminary hearing does not preclude subsequent prosecution as 
being a clarification of existing law, rather than a new rule.  Id. at 1221-22.  We also cited Thomas v. Justice Court of Washakie 
County, 538 P.2d 42, 48 (Wyo. 1975), for the proposition that "the finding 
of no probable cause does not constitute an acquittal and there will be no bar 
to another proceeding before another justice of the peace or for a proceeding by 
indictment."  Richmond, 554 P.2d  at 
1222-23.

 
 
[¶20]   When we authored Richmond, Wyoming had not adopted the 
equivalent of F.R.Cr.P. 5.1.  Today, 
however, W.R.Cr.P. 5.1(c) provides as follows:

 
 

            
(c)  Discharge of defendant. --  If from the evidence it appears that 
there is no probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed or that 
the defendant committed it, the judicial officer shall dismiss the information 
and discharge the defendant.  
The 
discharge of the defendant shall not preclude the state from instituting a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Clearly, Wyoming's existing 
law does not recognize a res judicata 
or collateral estoppel bar to further prosecution under these circumstances.3  Further, we have never required that a 
subsequent preliminary hearing take place before a judge other than the judge 
originally presiding, nor have we ever required the production of additional or 
different evidence at the subsequent proceeding.            
  Such appears to continue to 
be the majority rule in this country and we have not been persuaded to abandon 
it.

 
 
[¶21]   The limited role of the preliminary 
hearing in Wyoming lends itself to application of the majority rule noted in the 
above quotation from Criminal 
Procedure, see supra 
¶ 18.  See, e.g., Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 303 (Wyo. 
1999) ("[T]he true constitutional purpose of the preliminary hearing . . . is to 
obtain a determination by a neutral, detached fact finder that there is probable 
cause to believe a crime has been committed and that the defendant committed 
it." (quoting Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148, 1154 (Wyo. 1983))); Trujillo 
v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 581 (Wyo. 1994) ("[T]he only legal justification for 
[a preliminary hearing] is to protect innocent persons from languishing in jail 
on totally baseless accusations." (quoting Haight v. State, 654 P.2d 1232, 1235 
(Wyo. 1982))); Wilson v. State, 655 P.2d 1246, 1253 (Wyo. 1982) ("It is in no sense a trial.  The finding of probable cause determines 
only the propriety of a trial . . . and it does not place the accused in 
jeopardy."); and Thomas, 538 P.2d  at 
50 (preliminary hearing does not determine guilt or innocence, does not 
constitute a verdict of acquittal, and does not protect against further 
prosecution).4

 
 
[¶22]   We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata neither bars the refiling 
of charges nor a subsequent preliminary hearing on those charges, where there 
has been a dismissal of those charges based upon a failure of proof of probable 
cause at a preliminary hearing.  
Further, Wyoming law does not require the production of new or different 
evidence at the subsequent hearing, or that the subsequent hearing take place 
before the same circuit court judge or magistrate.  Constitutional due process 
considerations are not presently at issue.

 
 
Did 
the district court apply the proper penaltyrange in imposing 
sentence?

 
 
[¶23]   The question before us is not 
whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing a particular 
sentence upon the appellant.  
Rather, the question before us is whether the district court sentenced 
the appellant under the proper statutory subsection.  The latter is a question of law that we 
review de novo because, if the 
appellant was sentenced under the wrong statute, his sentence is illegal.  Robison v. State, 2011 WY 4, ¶ 10, 
246 P.3d 259, 263 (Wyo. 2011).  This 
is also a question of law because it involves statutory construction.  Johnson v. City of Laramie, 2008 WY 73, 
¶ 7, 187 P.3d 355, 356 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶24]   Three statutes are relevant.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2011) defines the effect of an attempt to commit a crime as 
applicable in this case:

 
 
(a)   A person is guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime if:

 
 
(i)    With the intent to commit the 
crime, he does any act which is a substantial step towards commission of the 
crime.  A "substantial step" is 
conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's 
intention to complete the commission of the crime[.]

 
 
In 
turn, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-304 (LexisNexis 2011) establishes how punishment is 
to be determined for attempt crimes:

 
 
            
The penalty for attempt, solicitation or conspiracy is the same as the 
penalty for the most serious crime which is attempted, solicited or is an object 
of the conspiracy except that an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit a 
capital crime is not punishable by the death penalty if the capital crime is not 
committed.

 
 
Finally, 
the crime of kidnapping is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201 (LexisNexis 
2011):

 
 
(a)    A person is guilty of 
kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or 
business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the removal, or if he 
unlawfully confines another person, with the intent to:

 
 
(i)      Hold for ransom 
or reward, or as a shield or hostage;

 
 
(ii)     Facilitate the 
commission of a felony; or

 
 
(iii)    Inflict bodily injury on or 
to terrorize the victim or another.

 
 
(b)    A removal or confinement is 
unlawful if it is accomplished:

 
 
(i)      By force, threat 
or deception; or

 
 
(ii)     Without the consent of 
a parent, guardian or other person responsible for the general supervision of an 
individual who is under the age of fourteen (14) or who is adjudicated 
incompetent.

 
 
(c)     If the defendant 
voluntarily releases the victim substantially unharmed and in a safe place prior 
to trial, kidnapping is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
twenty (20) years.

 
 
(d)    If the defendant does not 
voluntarily release the victim substantially unharmed and in a safe place prior 
to trial, kidnapping is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than 
twenty (20) years or for life except as provided in W.S. 
6-2-101.

 
 
[¶25]   We have previously held that 
kidnapping is a single crime described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(a) and (b), 
and that subsection (c), rather than defining a lesser-included offense, 
describes mitigating conduct subsequent to the kidnapping that may allow for a 
reduced sentence.  Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 
(Wyo. 1989).  The appellant bears 
the burden of proving such mitigating conduct and, if competent evidence of such 
is produced, the question must be presented to the jury.  Id. at 1047.  It logically follows that, where there 
has not been a completed kidnapping, but instead an attempted kidnapping, the 
mitigating circumstances described in subsection (c) cannot occur.  See, e.g., Rainwater v. State, 189 Ariz. 367, 368, 
943 P.2d 727, 728 (Ariz. 1997) ("[A]s a matter of law, the reduction presupposes 
that all elements of a completed kidnapping have been established such that the 
victim has in fact been restrained."); and Laraby v. State, 710 P.2d 427, 428 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (The legislature's hope of encouraging the release of 
kidnap victims unharmed is unnecessary in the case of attempted kidnapping.).5

 
 
[¶26]   We recognize the potential 
"anomaly" in the statute that a person who completes a kidnapping but releases 
the victim unharmed could be subject to a lesser penalty than a person who 
merely attempts a kidnapping, but anomalies created by statute are not to be 
corrected by the court.  Rainwater, 943 P.2d  at 728 n.2.  In regard to this statute, such judicial 
"meddling" would violate two principles.  
First, the legislature has exclusive authority over criminal punishment 
and sentencing.  See, e.g., Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 416 (Wyo. 
1990); Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754, 
756 (Wyo. 1986); and Stambaugh v. 
State, 613 P.2d 1237, 1243 (Wyo. 1980).  And second, it is not our role, because 
it violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers, to supply what 
appear to us to be omissions in a statute, or to correct what appear to us to be 
defects in a statute.  See, e.g., Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 29, 86 P.3d 270, 285 (Wyo. 2004); State ex rel. 
Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Mahoney, 798 P.2d 836, 838 (Wyo. 1990); In re TR, 777 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Wyo. 
1989); State ex rel. Albany County Weed 
& Pest Dist. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Albany County, 592 P.2d 1154, 
1157 (Wyo. 1979); and In re Adoption of 
Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 484-85 (Wyo. 1976).

 
 
[¶27]   The district court correctly 
applied the sentencing provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(d) after the 
appellant was convicted of attempted kidnapping.

 
 
Did 
the district court's determination of the penalty range in imposing sentence 
violatethe appellant's right to trial by 
jury?

 
 
[¶28]   Once again, this is not a 
contention that the district court abused its discretion in the particular 
sentence it imposed upon the appellant.  
Instead, it is a contention that the district court violated the 
appellant's right to trial by jury by determining which sentencing rangewhich 
statutory subsectionwas applicable in sentencing the appellant.  Because this constitutional issue was 
not raised below, we review for plain error.  Zumberge v. State, 2010 WY 111, ¶ 4, 236 P.3d 1028, 1030 (Wyo. 2010).

 
 
Even 
when constitutional error is alleged, each criterion must be satisfied or a 
claim for review under the plain-error doctrine will fail.  To establish plain error, the appellant 
must prove (1) the record clearly reflects the alleged error; (2) the existence 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; (3) a clear and obvious transgression of 
that rule of law; and (4) the error adversely affected a substantial right 
resulting in material prejudice to him.

 
 

Id. 
(quoting Snow, 2009 WY 117, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d  at 509 (citations, quotation marks, and footnotes 
omitted)).

 
 
[¶29]   The parties' positions in regard to 
this issue are clear and straightforward.  
The appellant argues that, by sentencing him under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-201(d), rather than § 6-2-201(c), the district court violated the holding of 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234-35, 125 S. Ct. 738, 751, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), that a sentencing judge 
may not find facts that take a sentence beyond the sentencing range supported by 
the jury's verdict alone.  To the 
contrary, the State argues that Booker has not changed the law of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
490 n.16, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363 n.16, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), wherein it was held 
that, while facts in aggravation of sentence must be found by a jury, facts in 
mitigation of sentence may be found by the judge.6  The point of Apprendi is this: if a required finding 
of fact exposes the defendant to a greater penalty than that authorized by the 
jury's guilty verdict, that finding must be made by the jury.  Id. at 530 U.S.  at 494, 120 S. Ct.  at 
2365.

 
 
[¶30]   We conclude that the sentencing 
structure of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(c) and (d), as previously interpreted by 
this Court in Loomer, is a structure 
that is authorized by Apprendi.7  There is one crimekidnappingfor which 
the maximum sentence is as stated in Subsection (d).  Where there has been a completed 
kidnapping, the defendant is at liberty to produce evidence to prove, in 
mitigation of sentence, that he or she voluntarily released the victim 
substantially unharmed.  If that is 
not accomplished, the sentencing range remains as it is stated in Subsection 
(d).  Of even more significance to 
the instant case is the inescapable conclusion, from the clear language of the 
statute, that any evidence in mitigation can only be evidence of post-kidnapping 
conduct, meaning that Subsection (c) does not apply to attempted kidnapping. 
 Thus, there was no constitutional 
violation in the procedure by which the appellant was 
sentenced.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶31]   The appellant's prosecution for 
attempted kidnapping was not barred by the doctrine of double jeopardy because 
battery is not a lesser-included offense to attempted kidnapping under the 
same-elements test.  Neither the 
doctrine of res judicata nor the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the refiling of a criminal charge and a 
subsequent preliminary hearing after a charge has been dismissed following a 
preliminary hearing where a lack of probable cause was found.  The district court applied the proper 
punishment range in sentencing the appellant, and the district court's 
determination of the appropriate punishment range did not violate the 
appellant's right to trial by jury.

 
 
[¶32]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
holding in Jones has been 
emasculated, or at least seriously undermined, by Harper v. District Court of Oklahoma 
County, 1971 OK CR 182, 484 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971), wherein 
it was stated that "good cause" could be shown where a prosecutor innocently 
miscalculated the quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover.  Further, Oklahoma now has a court rule 
allowing the state to appeal from an adverse ruling at a preliminary hearing, 
which creates an alternative to a second hearing.  See State ex rel. Fallis v. Caldwell, 
1972 OK CR 158, 498 P.2d 426, 428-29 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1972).

 
 

2Pennsylvania 
also appears to follow this reasoning, although its most recent case is so 
dependent upon the interpretation of a court rule allowing the bindover of 
"cognate" offenses not specifically alleged in the original charging document 
that it is difficult to determine the precise basis of the decision.  What is clear is that the court was 
considerably influenced by the fact that the state had the option of appealing 
the preliminary hearing decision but chose not to do so.  Commonwealth v. Weigle, 606 Pa. 234, 997 A.2d 306, 
315-16 (Pa. 2010).

 
 

3While 
it would appear that collateral estoppel, rather than res judicata, is the appropriate 
doctrine, were one of the two to be applied, we need not answer that question to 
resolve the present matter.

 
 

4The 
four separate opinions in State v. 
Faltynowicz, 660 P.2d 368 (Wyo. 1983), provide an interesting discussion of 
issues related to preliminary hearings, dismissal of criminal charges with 
prejudice, the bill of exceptions, and the constitutional separation of 
powers.

 
 

5The 
rationale of these cases applies here, even though the statutory schemes in both 
states are slightly different than Wyoming's.  

 
 

6These 
limitations are not referencing the judge's traditional role in determining what 
sentence to impose out of a prescribed sentencing range.  These sentencing limitations simply 
prohibit the judge from imposing a sentence provided in a higher or enhanced 
sentencing range, based upon facts found by the judge, rather than by the 
jury.

 
 

7In 
fact, as interpreted by Loomer, 
Wyoming's statutory scheme exceeds that which is required by Apprendi because we said in Loomer that mitigating circumstances 
were to be submitted to the jury.  
Loomer, 768 P.2d  at 1047.  Because a jury's guilty verdict in a 
kidnapping case subjects the defendant to the full punishment of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-201(d), Apprendi would not 
require the jury to consider mitigating circumstances that could reduce the 
punishment range.  Similarly, it is 
not unconstitutional to assign to a defendant the burden of proving an 
affirmative defense, or the burden of proving mitigating circumstances at 
sentencing.  Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 169-75, 
126 S. Ct. 2516, 2522-26, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2006); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 
205, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2324, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977); United States v. Contreras, 536 F.3d 1167, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 2008); State v. 
Drej, 2010 UT 35, 233 P.3d 476, 479, 481, 483 (Utah 2010); State v. Ray, 290 Conn. 602, 966 A.2d 148, 161 (Conn. 2009); State v. 
Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 994 P.2d 395, 399 (Ariz. 2000).