Title: Ex parte Gilbert Lee Littrell. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Gilbert Lee Littrell et al. v. Doris Thrasher, individually and as the parent and next friend of Gary Marcus Matlock, and RLI Insurance Company)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:04/01/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1100344
_________________________
Ex parte Gilbert Lee Littrell
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Gilbert Lee Littrell et al.
v.
Doris Thrasher, individually and as the parent and next
friend of Gary Marcus Matlock, and RLI Insurance Company)
(Colbert Circuit Court, CV-06-323)
BOLIN, Justice.
Gilbert Lee Littrell petitions this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Colbert Circuit Court to vacate its
1100344
A wrongful-death case styled Misty Marlar, individually,
1
mother, and as administrator of the estate of Austin Blake
Miller v. Gilbert Lee Littrell, as individual, and Edwards Oil
Company of Lawrenceburg, Inc. (CV-05-0237), and based on the
same motor-vehicle accident was consolidated with this case
below.
2
order of November 10, 2010, denying Littrell's motion to
require RLI Insurance Company, the underinsured-motorist
carrier, to be bound by its decision to opt out of
participation in the trial of this case and to prevent any
appearance and participation by RLI's counsel Bert P. Taylor
as additional counsel for the defendant, Doris Thrasher, or,
alternatively, to allow Littrell in the trial of this case to
reveal Taylor's representation of RLI, RLI's identity, and the
reason for RLI's involvement in the case.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ.
Littrell 
was 
employed 
by 
Edwards 
Oil 
Company 
of
Lawrenceburg, Inc.  On May 26, 2005, a vehicle being operated
by Littrell was involved in a motor-vehicle accident with a
vehicle being operated by Matlock, who was a minor at the time
of the accident.  Subsequently, Littrell sued Thrasher,
individually and as the parent and next friend of Gary Marcus
Matlock, and RLI, the underinsured-motorist carrier for
Edwards Oil.   
1
1100344
3
On February 12, 2007, RLI gave notice that it was
exercising its right to reject a settlement offer made by
Thrasher of $25,000, the limits of a liability policy issued
by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; that it was
maintaining its subrogation interests against Thrasher; and
that it was advancing the policy limits of $25,000 in
compliance with the procedure set forth in Lambert v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 576 So. 2d 160 (Ala.
1991).  RLI also elected to "opt out" of the case and withdraw
from active participation in the litigation of the case
pursuant to Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So. 2d 1309
(Ala. 1988).  RLI stipulated that it would be bound by any
judgment against Thrasher in excess of Thrasher's policy
limits up to the limits of coverage available to Littrell
under the underinsured-motorist policy. 
At all times during prosecution of this action, RLI was
represented by LaBella Alvis of Christian & Small, LLP.
However, on April 23, 2009, Bert P. Taylor of Taylor Ritter,
P.C., entered an appearance on behalf of RLI as an additional
attorney of record. Thereafter, Taylor participated in the
depositions of Littrell, Matlock, and Dr. Johnny Stephen
1100344
Thrasher has not presented this Court with a statement
2
of facts.  Rather, Thrasher has expressly adopted the
4
Howell, Littrell's treating physician.  In addition to
participating in discovery, Taylor also enlisted expert
witnesses on behalf of RLI.  
On June 21, 2010, Taylor entered an appearance as
cocounsel of record on behalf of the defendant Thrasher.
Thrasher was already being represented by counsel apparently
provided by her liability insurer State Farm.  On June 23,
2010, Littrell objected to Taylor's notice of appearance as
cocounsel of record for Thrasher, arguing that Taylor, as
counsel of record for RLI, is precluded from participating in
the trial of this case because RLI had chosen to opt out and
to withdraw from active participation in the case pursuant to
Lowe, supra.  Littrell requested that the trial court deny any
appearance or participation by Taylor as counsel for Thrasher
in the trial of this matter and require RLI to be bound by its
previous decision to opt out.   
On June 29, 2010, Taylor moved the trial court to allow
him to withdraw as counsel of record for RLI. Littrell states
that Taylor is not being compensated by Thrasher or her
insurer and, according to Littrell, is still employed by RLI.2
1100344
statement of facts presented by Littrell.  Thrasher states in
brief that it is irrelevant whether RLI is paying her legal
fees and that that fact does not alter Taylor's obligations to
Thrasher as her counsel.  
5
On November 10, 2010, the trial court entered an order denying
Littrell's request to disqualify Taylor from participating in
this matter as Thrasher's counsel of record.  This timely
petition for a writ of mandamus followed.
Standard of Review
This Court has stated:
"'Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ,
to be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'"
Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 309-10 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499
(Ala. 1995)). In reviewing a trial court's application of the
law to undisputed facts, we apply a de novo standard of
review. Ex parte J.E., 1 So. 3d 1002, 1008 (Ala. 2008).
Discussion
This Court set forth in Lowe, supra, the following
procedure now applied in cases when the defendant motorist is
1100344
6
either 
uninsured 
or 
underinsured 
and 
a 
uninsured/underinsured-
motorist claim is made:
"A plaintiff is allowed either to join as a party
defendant his own liability insurer in a suit
against the underinsured motorist or merely to give
it notice of the filing of the action against the
motorist and of the possibility of a claim under the
underinsured motorist coverage at the conclusion of
the trial. If the insurer is named as a party, it
would have the right, within a reasonable time after
service of process, to elect either to participate
in the trial (in which case its identity and the
reason for its being involved are proper information
for the jury), or not to participate in the trial
(in which case no mention of it or its potential
involvement is permitted by the trial court). Under
either election, the insurer would be bound by the
factfinder's decisions on the issues of liability
and damages. If the insurer is not joined but merely
is given notice of the filing of the action, it can
decide either to intervene or to stay out of the
case. The results of either choice parallel those
set out above--where the insurer is joined as a
party defendant. Whether the choice is timely made
is left to the discretion of the trial court, to be
judged according to the posture of the case. In
either event, the trial court could then fashion its
judgment accordingly."
521 So. 2d at 1310.  As this Court noted, three essential
considerations 
are 
accommodated 
by 
the 
above-quoted 
procedure:
(1) the right of the liability insurer to know of and to
participate in the suit; (2) the right of the insured to
litigate all aspects of his or her claim in a single suit,
avoiding costly and time-consuming separate trials of the same
1100344
7
issues and facts; and (3) protection from the introduction of
extraneous and corrupting influences, namely evidence of
insurance coverage, during the liability phase of a trial.
Lowe, supra.  
Littrell argues that Taylor's entry of an appearance as
additional counsel of record for Thrasher and his withdrawal
as counsel for RLI, after RLI had "opted out" of the
proceedings pursuant to Lowe, violates the procedure set forth
in Lowe.  Littrell contends that Taylor's appearance is a
procedural move designed to insulate RLI from being introduced
in any way at trial, while permitting RLI to actively
participate at trial.  Littrell cites Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.
2d 682 (Ala. 1989), in support of his position.  
In Ex parte Edgar, the plaintiff sued the defendant
seeking damages for injuries she sustained as the result of an
automobile accident.  She also asserted a claim against her
insurer, Alfa Mutual Insurance Company, seeking underinsured-
motorist benefits.  Alfa filed a motion pursuant to Lowe
seeking to exercise its right not to participate in the trial
of the claims asserted by the plaintiff against the defendant.
However, Alfa also sought in the motion the right to
1100344
8
participate in discovery.  Subsequently, Alfa amended the
motion by stating that it was also reserving the right to
intervene in the case at a later date.  The plaintiff objected
to Alfa's motion to opt out of the case, stating that, if it
did opt out, there was no authority to grant Alfa's requests
to participate in discovery and to reserve the right to join
the litigation at a later date.  The trial court denied Alfa's
request to withdraw from the case.  Ex parte Edgar.
Alfa petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.  In
denying the petition and concluding that Alfa had made an
improper election to withdraw from the case, this Court
stated:
"[I]f the insurer is joined as a defendant by its
insured, it is afforded the option under Lowe, if it
acts timely, of being dismissed as a party to the
case. Consequently, the insurer's withdrawal from
the case under Lowe terminates its right to
participate in discovery. Rule 26, [Ala.] R. Civ. P.
"....
"Alfa had the right under Lowe to withdraw from
the present case at the time that it filed its
motion on May 2, 1988. However, Alfa sought
permission in that motion to continue to participate
in discovery and, in addition, sought in its August
29, 1988, amended motion to reserve the right to
intervene, if it determined that it would be in its
best interest to later reenter the case. This is
just the opposite of the procedure that was
1100344
9
sanctioned in Lowe. Although Alfa argues that its
request to participate in discovery was in the
nature of a request for additional relief and,
therefore, that its inclusion in the motion is not
a ground upon which the trial court could have based
its ruling, we view Alfa's request to withdraw as
being conditioned on its also being allowed to
participate in discovery. The clear import of Alfa's
motion, as amended, is that Alfa wanted out of the
case, but only if it could monitor the progression
of the case through the discovery process and then
intervene if it deemed it necessary in order to
protect its interest. Construing Alfa's motion in
this manner, the trial court had no authority to
grant it."
Ex parte Edgar, 543 So. 2d at 684-85.
Littrell argues that RLI, like Alfa in Ex parte Edgar,
withdrew from the case pursuant to Lowe in order to prevent a
jury from learning of the existence of insurance coverage and
yet, at the same time, wanted to participate in discovery and
at trial through its attorney Taylor.  Littrell states that by
substituting Thrasher as his client, Taylor is attempting to
participate in the litigation of this matter on behalf of RLI
without allowing Littrell the opportunity to reveal the
identity of RLI and the reason for its being involved in the
case.  Thrasher relies upon the decisions in Driver v.
National Security Fire & Casualty  Co., 658 So. 2d 390 (Ala.
1995), and Ex parte State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
1100344
10
Co., 674 So. 2d 75 (Ala. 1995), in support of her position
that Taylor may serve as an additional counsel of record for
her.
The plaintiff in Driver was a passenger in a vehicle that
was involved in a collision with another vehicle being
operated by the defendant, an uninsured motorist.  The
defendant died of injuries sustained in the accident.  The
plaintiff was insured by a liability-insurance policy issued
by National Security Fire & Casualty Company ("National
Security"), which contained an uninsured-motorist provision
inuring to the benefit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued
the uninsured defendant and included a claim against National
Security 
seeking 
uninsured-motorist 
benefits 
under 
the 
policy.
After the action was filed, the probate court appointed an
attorney as the administrator ad litem for the defendant's
estate.  The same attorney who was appointed administrator ad
litem also represented the defendant's estate in the pending
litigation.  Thereafter, National Security opted out of the
trial of the case, pursuant to the procedure established in
Lowe.  On the eve of trial, the attorney for the defendant's
estate requested that National Security's former counsel enter
1100344
11
an appearance for the defendant's estate and assist in the
trial. Over objection by the plaintiff, National Security's
former counsel entered an appearance for the defendant's
estate as cocounsel. The jury ultimately rendered a verdict in
favor of the defendant's estate, and the trial court entered
a judgment on that verdict.  
The plaintiff argued on appeal that the trial court
committed reversible error in allowing National Security's
former counsel to act as cocounsel for the defendant's estate
at trial.  In affirming the judgment, this Court stated:
"National Security opted out under Lowe, to prevent
the jury's knowing that insurance was involved in
the case. In order to avoid any conflict, National
Security agreed to waive any subrogation rights it
might have against the estate of [the defendant] in
the 
event 
there 
was 
a 
verdict 
for 
Driver.
Furthermore, National Security agreed, as required
by Lowe, to be bound by the jury's decision as to
liability and damages and to satisfy any judgment
for [the plaintiff], up to the policy limits. Lowe,
[521 So. 2d] at 1310.
"....
"In Ex parte Edgar, 543 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1989),
the insured sued an alleged tort-feasor to recover
damages arising out of an automobile accident and
sued Alfa Mutual Insurance Company to recover
underinsured motorist benefits. Alfa sought to
exercise its option not to participate in the trial
of the driver's claims against the tort-feasor. Alfa
did, however, seek to participate in discovery and
1100344
12
then to intervene, if necessary, in order to protect
its interest. The trial court denied Alfa's motion
to withdraw, stating that the motion was not timely.
This Court held that Alfa had the right under Lowe
to withdraw from the case, i.e., that the election
was timely, but held that its withdrawal from the
case 
terminated 
its 
right 
to 
participate 
in
discovery. Ex parte Edgar, supra, at 685.
"The plaintiff cites Lowe and Edgar for the
proposition that if an insurance company opts out of
the trial in an uninsured motorist case it cannot
'participate' in the trial by hiring an attorney for
the uninsured defendant motorist. We disagree.
"Both Lowe and Edgar involved a situation where
the defendant motorist was allegedly underinsured.
In such a situation, where the defendant motorist
has liability insurance but the limits may not be
sufficient to fully satisfy the potential judgment
against him, the defendant motorist has an attorney
retained by the carrier to defend him. When the
underinsured carrier is named as a defendant, and
chooses to opt out of the trial of the case, there
is an attorney defending the interest of the
underinsured motorist. As this Court acknowledged in
Lowe, the underinsured motorist carrier, in opting
out of the case, is essentially placing its fate in
the hands of an attorney chosen by someone else. 521
So. 2d at 1310.
"A different situation is created when the
defendant motorist has no liability coverage: If the
uninsured motorist carrier opts out of the trial of
the case and there is no defense counsel already in
place to represent the defendant motorist, then
there is no mechanism to protect the interests of
the insurer if the defendant motorist fails to, or
chooses not to, defend his case. Understanding the
need for the uninsured motorist insurance carrier to
protect its interests, we hold that once the carrier
opts out of the trial under Lowe, it may, in its
1100344
13
discretion, hire an attorney to represent the
uninsured motorist defendant."
Driver, 658 So. 2d at 394-95.
In Ex parte State Farm, the plaintiff was involved in an
automobile accident with an uninsured motorist.  The plaintiff
had an automobile-liability policy with State Farm.  The
plaintiff sued the defendant and joined a claim against State
Farm, seeking uninsured-motorist benefits.  State Farm chose
to opt out of the trial, relying on the procedures set forth
in Lowe.  State Farm then petitioned the trial court to allow
it to hire an additional attorney to help represent at trial
the defendant, who had already retained his own attorney. The
trial court denied State Farm's request.  State Farm then
petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
trial court to allow it to hire additional trial counsel for
the defendant.  
In granting State Farm's petition, this Court relied on
the decision in Driver, supra, and stated:
"Even when an uninsured motorist can afford to
hire a defense attorney, the interests of the
insurance 
company 
providing 
uninsured 
motorist
benefits may not always be adequately represented at
trial by that attorney, because the uninsured
motorist's interests may not always be squarely
aligned with those of the insurance carrier.
1100344
14
Obviously, 
there are also potential collusion
problems. 'Understanding the need for the uninsured
motorist 
insurance 
carrier 
to 
protect 
its
interests,' we held in Driver, supra, 'that once the
carrier opts out of the trial under Lowe, it may, in
its discretion, hire an [additional] attorney to
represent the uninsured motorist defendant.' 658 So.
2d at 395."
Ex parte State Farm, 674 So. 2d at 77.
 
Thrasher argues that this case is similar to cases
involving an uninsured motorist because RLI has advanced the
$25,000 in policy limits and that RLI, like an uninsured
carrier in the uninsured scenario, must now bear the full
brunt of potential liability.  Thus, Thrasher contends, the
holdings in Driver and Ex parte State Farm are applicable in
this case and RLI has the right to appoint counsel to
represent her.
Initially we note that, applying this Court's holding in
Ex parte Edgar, supra, to the facts of this case, it is clear
that RLI and its attorney Taylor were without authority to
participate in discovery after RLI had elected to opt out of
the case pursuant to Lowe, supra.  However, it does not appear
from the materials presently before this Court that Littrell
objected to RLI's and Taylor's participation in discovery.  It
was not until Taylor entered a notice of appearance on behalf
1100344
The dissent states that it "cannot discern what concern
3
it is of a plaintiff what counsel the alleged tortfeasor (and
his or her liability carrier, where applicable) has chosen or
agreed to (as has occurred here with respect to Taylor) or who
pays counsel's fees." ___ So. 3d at ___.  The plaintiff's
concern, at least in this case, is the fact that the defendant
RLI, who has chosen to opt out of the proceeding pursuant to
Lowe, nevertheless continues to have a representative presence
in the proceeding in the form of its former counsel, who
potentially would be free to present evidence generated by RLI
15
of Thrasher that Littrell raised any objection in this case.
Accordingly, any issue as to RLI's and Taylor's participation
in discovery has been waived.
 Secondly, Littrell argues that because this case
involves 
underinsured-motorist 
benefits, 
as 
opposed 
to
uninsured-motorist benefits, and State Farm has provided
Thrasher with competent and experienced counsel, who has
represented Thrasher since the beginning of the action, the
holdings in Driver and Ex parte State Farm are not applicable
and RLI cannot retain Taylor to represent Thrasher.  We agree.
The holdings in Driver and Ex parte State Farm are limited to
the uninsured scenario.  The precarious situation in which an
insurer might find itself in the uninsured scenario, as
thoroughly explained in Driver and Ex parte State, is simply
not present here, where the underinsured Thrasher has been
provided counsel by State Farm since the outset of the case.3
1100344
for the benefit of RLI while Littrell would be prohibited from
discussing the identity of RLI and its reasons for being
involved in the case.  The dissent would allow RLI to have the
"best of both worlds" by allowing it to participate in the
proceeding, all the while enjoying the protection of its
anonymity.  This is not what is contemplated by this Court's
decision in Lowe.  For over 20 years the bench and bar have
had a reliable mechanism in the underinsured scenario in Lowe.
If an underinsured carrier were permitted to opt out and then
allowed to provide the alleged tortfeasor representation in
the form of its counsel, the mechanism provided in Lowe and
concerns underlying the adoption of that mechanism would be
rendered meaningless.  
The purpose of the procedures adopted by this Court in
4
Lambert was to reduce the conflict that may arise between an
underinsured carrier and its insured. 
16
Further, Thrasher's contention that this case is similar
to the uninsured scenario because RLI has advanced the policy
limits in this case and must bear the full brunt of any
potential liability is not well taken.  Although RLI has
advanced the policy limits in this case, it also expressly
preserved its subrogation interests against Thrasher pursuant
to the procedures set forth in Lambert, supra.   Thus, RLI
4
does not bear the full brunt of the potential liability alone.
Both RLI and Thrasher have a mutual interest in limiting their
exposure to potential liability.  We also note that State Farm
does not become a disinterested party simply because RLI has
advanced the policy limits under State Farm's liability policy
1100344
17
covering Matlock.  This Court stated in Lambert that "the
tort-feasor's liability insurer has a higher duty than that of
merely offering to pay the limits of its insured's liability
policy. This Court has held that the insurer's duty to defend
is more extensive than its duty to pay." Lambert, 576 So. 2d
at 167.  Therefore, this is not a situation, as discussed in
Ex parte State Farm, where the interests of the parties are
not "squarely aligned."  Ex parte State Farm, 674 So. 2d at
77.  
Conclusion
We conclude that Littrell has demonstrated a clear legal
right to the relief sought.  Accordingly, we grant the
petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the Colbert Circuit
Court to vacate its order of November 10, 2010, denying
Littrell's motion to require RLI to be bound by its decision
to opt out of participation in the trial of this cause and to
prevent any appearance and participation by RLI's counsel Bert
P. Taylor as additional counsel for the defendant Thrasher. 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, Parker, Shaw, Main, and
Wise, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., dissents.
1100344
18
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
The procedure described in Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance
Co., 521 So. 2d 1309 (Ala. 1988), was suggested to the Court
by both parties to that appeal, and agreed to by the Court,
under circumstances where there were no "problems of
confidence in defense counsel['s]" ability to protect the
interests 
of 
the 
underinsured-motorist-insurance 
carrier. 
 
521
So. 2d at 1310.  Specifically, in Lowe, the same insurance
company provided both liability coverage to the alleged
tortfeasor 
and 
underinsured-motorist 
coverage 
to 
the
plaintiff.  As the Court explained:
"[T]he alleged tort-feasor's liability insurer and
the plaintiff's underinsured motorist insurer are
the same company.  The problems of confidence in
defense counsel and the knowledge of applicable
limits do not exist.  The suggested procedure seems
unimpeachable under the circumstances, as well as
being 
readily 
adaptable to other underinsured
motorist claims."
Lowe, 521 So. 2d at 1310. Thus, Lowe was not concerned with
the issue whether the plaintiff's underinsured-motorist
insurer would be permitted to pay for counsel other than, or
in addition to, whatever counsel might otherwise represent the
alleged tortfeasor.  
Subsequently, however, in Driver v. National Security
Fire & Casualty Co., 658 So. 2d 390 (Ala. 1995), this Court
1100344
19
was concerned with such a situation.  The Court in Driver held
that an uninsured-motorist-insurance carrier could hire an
attorney to represent an uninsured-motorist defendant, even
after the carrier had opted out of the trial under the
procedure described in Lowe, because of "the need for the
uninsured motorist insurance carrier to protect its interests"
with an attorney in whom it had "confidence."  Driver, 658 So.
2d at 395.  
This Court was again confronted with a situation in which
"confidence in defense counsel" might be an issue in Ex parte
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 674 So. 2d 75
(Ala. 1995).  The Court held that an uninsured-motorist-
insurance carrier may hire an additional attorney to represent
an uninsured-motorist defendant who already had hired an
attorney using his or her own funds.  674 So. 2d at 77.
The above-emphasized rationale of Driver logically
applies (1) to the situation where an uninsured motorist has
not been able to hire an attorney using his or her own funds
and the interests of the alleged tortfeasor and of the
uninsured-motorist-insurance 
carrier 
would 
be 
better 
protected
if the alleged tortfeasor were to be represented by counsel
proposed by the carrier, i.e., the situation presented in
1100344
20
Driver, (2) to the situation where an uninsured motorist has
hired an attorney using his or her own funds but the alleged
tortfeasor and the uninsured-motorist-insurance carrier agree
that their respective interests would be better protected if
different or additional counsel were to represent the alleged
tortfeasor, i.e., the situation presented in State Farm, and
(3) to the situation where an underinsured motorist is
represented by an attorney paid for by his or her own
liability insurance company, but the alleged tortfeasor, his
or her liability carrier, and the underinsured-motorist-
insurance carrier agree that their respective interests would
better protected if the alleged tortfeasor were to be
represented by different or additional counsel proposed by the
carrier, i.e., the situation presented in the present case.
I fail to see a principled distinction between any of these
three situations.  In all three, the reason articulated by
this Court for its holdings in Driver and State Farm is
present:  the insurance carrier's need to protect its interest
by insuring that the alleged tortfeasor, whose potential
liability it insures, is represented by defense counsel in
whom the carrier has confidence.  
1100344
21
Further, absent a conflict of interest or similar concern
involving the plaintiff (e.g., where proposed counsel for the
alleged tortfeasor previously has represented the plaintiff in
the same litigation), I cannot discern what concern it is of
a plaintiff what counsel the alleged tortfeasor (and his or
her liability carrier, where applicable) has chosen or agreed
to (as has occurred here with respect to Taylor) or who pays
counsel's fees.  Lowe was concerned with accommodating three
specific, competing considerations:
"1) that of protecting the right of the insurer to
know of, and participate in, the suit; 2) that of
protecting the right of the insured to litigate all
aspects of his claim in a single suit ('Separate
trials of the same issues and facts are a waste of
time and money, and should be avoided if possible,'
Wall v. Hodges, 465 So. 2d 359 (Ala. 1984)); and 3)
that of protecting the liability phase of the trial
from the introduction of extraneous and corrupting
influences, namely, evidence of insurance. Robins
Engineering, Inc. v. Cockrell, 354 So. 2d 1 (Ala.
1977)."
521 So. 2d at 1309.  Only one of these considerations is a
concern of the plaintiff, i.e., protecting the right of the
plaintiff to litigate both its claim against the alleged
tortfeasor and its claim against the uninsured/underinsured-
motorist carrier in the same proceeding.  The Lowe Court
adopted an arrangement that fully addressed this concern,
giving to plaintiffs the initial right to choose, in every
1100344
22
case, whether they will litigate both their claims in the same
proceeding.  Once the plaintiff makes that choice, the concern
of the plaintiff identified in Lowe will have been addressed.
Assuming the plaintiff chooses to litigate both of its claims
in the same proceeding, the concerns that remain are those of
the uninsured/underinsured-motorist carrier.  Thus, the Lowe
Court left it to the insurance carrier to choose whether to
accept the risk of the "extraneous and corrupting influence"
that would attend its appearance before the jury in the single
proceeding chosen by the plaintiff.  I fail to see how the
manner in which the alleged tortfeasor's counsel is selected
disrupts or otherwise has any bearing upon the arrangement
adopted in Lowe, including in particular the manner in which
the Lowe Court accommodated the plaintiff's right to litigate
both its claims in the same proceeding.
It is true that in Driver the Court did make note of the
fact that the uninsured-motorist carrier in that case had
waived its subrogation rights against the alleged tortfeasor
"in order to avoid any conflict [of interest]," 658 So. 2d at
394;  RLI has not waived its subrogation rights against the
alleged tortfeasor here.  Nowhere, however, does the Court in
Driver state that the uninsured-motorist carrier's waiver of
1100344
23
subrogation rights was necessary to its holding that the
tortfeasor could be represented by the same counsel that
previously had represented the uninsured-motorist carrier.
There was no mention of any such waiver in State Farm.
Further, the potential conflict referenced by the Court is one
that would be between the uninsured/underinsured-motorist
carrier and the alleged tortfeasor.  (If anything, a less than
zealous representation of the alleged tortfeasor resulting
from counsel's knowledge that the insurer with whom he or she
maintains a relationship maintains a right of subrogation
against the alleged tortfeasor would tend to work to the
plaintiff's advantage.)  Again, I fail to see how, in a case
where the alleged tortfeasor (and his or her liability carrier
if applicable) chooses to be represented by an attorney
proposed by the uninsured/underinsured-motorist carrier, and
accordingly waives any possible conflict relating to such
representation, the plaintiff has any "standing" to complain
as to whom the alleged tortfeasor chooses to have represent
him or her.  Insofar as I can see, the alleged tortfeasor's
choice of attorney does not disrupt the arrangement adopted in
Lowe or, more specifically, deprive the plaintiff of the
1100344
Given the duties of loyalty and of zealous representation
5
owed the tortfeasor by whatever counsel represents the
tortfeasor, I do not believe this Court can assume that an
underinsured-motorist carrier will have a "representative
presence" or will be "participat[ing] in the proceeding" in
the manner referenced in note 3 of the main opinion.  ___
So. 3d at ___ n.3.  In any event, the three concerns
identified in Lowe as informing the Court's decision are no
less met where a tortfeasor chooses to be represented by
counsel who previously represented an uninsured/underinsured-
motorist carrier in connection with the case.
24
"benefit" intended for the plaintiff by that arrangement,
i.e., litigating all its claims in one proceeding.5