Title: In re Adoption of C.L. video

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 117,723 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF C.L. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
When a natural father assumes his parental responsibilities, the right to raise his 
child is entitled to constitutional protection.  
 
2. 
Adoption statutes are strictly construed in favor of maintaining the natural parents' 
rights when consent to adoption would not be required if those rights are terminated 
under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1). 
 
3. 
K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(C) requires a determination that a father made 
no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the child before his parental rights 
may be terminated under its provisions. 
 
4. 
Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof between a 
preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. It applies when 
particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake. 
 
5. 
When an appellate court reviews a trial court's determination that is required to be 
based upon clear and convincing evidence, it considers whether, after review of all the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the proponent of the finding, it is 
2 
 
 
 
convinced a rational fact-finder could have found the determination to be highly 
probable.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed February 23, 
2018. Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; KATHLEEN M. LYNCH, judge. Opinion filed October 5, 
2018. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district 
court is reversed and case is remanded with directions. 
 
Pantaleon Florez, Jr., of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant natural 
father.  
 
Kevin W. Kenney, of Kevin W. Kenney, P.A., of Prairie Village, argued the cause and was on the 
briefs for appellees adoptive parents. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  When a natural father assumes his parental responsibilities, the right to 
raise his child is entitled to constitutional protection. In re Adoption of G.L.V., 286 Kan. 
1034, 1057, 190 P.3d 245 (2008). Underlying this doctrine is the common sense 
understanding that the natural father must have had a real-world opportunity to take on 
his obligation under the circumstances presented. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl P., 291 
Kan. 424, 433, 242 P.3d 1168 (2010) ("The preservation of a father's relationship with his 
child is the starting point of a termination proceeding, not the finish line that a father 
must labor to reach."). In this appeal from a district court's order terminating a natural 
father's parental rights, that understanding was lost in pursuit of another outcome. 
 
We reverse the lower court rulings and remand to the district court for the purpose 
of conducting proceedings effectuating a change in custody consistent with this opinion. 
We do so fully aware that painful challenges and traumas lie ahead for those involved. 
3 
 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On Tuesday, September 13, 2016, baby boy C.L. was born in Topeka. According 
to his Mother, she did not know she was pregnant until earlier that morning. While in the 
hospital, Mother put the newborn up for adoption through Kansas Children's Service 
League, a not-for-profit agency with an affiliated infant adoption program. Mother signed 
relinquishment papers early Thursday afternoon, September 15. On the same day, KCSL 
placed the infant with a custodial couple who took the infant to their home in the Kansas 
City area. The couple hoped to become the adoptive parents. 
  
Also on September 15, Melinda Kline, a KCSL social work supervisor, began 
trying to contact the person Mother believed was the baby's biological father. She spoke 
with him by phone about 7:49 p.m. Kline told Father about C.L.'s birth and that he was 
believed to be the father. This news shocked him. 
 
Kline said the baby was already "placed" with prospective adoptive parents and 
explained she was asking him to relinquish his parental rights. She said the baby's mother 
wanted a closed adoption, i.e., one in which the natural parents would not have contact 
with the child. She could not recall later whether she clarified what that meant. Father 
asked who the baby's mother was. Kline refused to answer over the phone, preferring 
instead to meet with Father to sign relinquishment papers. Father asked if he would be 
able to meet with the prospective adoptive parents or see the baby. Kline's written log 
indicates she responded, "[T]his is usually dependent on trust with the adoptive family." 
 
According to Kline, Father was initially receptive to signing relinquishment 
papers, but he disputes that. She believed the two would meet the next day to sign the 
papers. Kline's log states she advised Father her agency would provide "a free legal 
4 
 
 
 
consult if he requests." Father later testified that "[a]t no time" did he tell Kline he would 
surrender his rights. 
 
The next day, which was Friday, September 16, Kline spoke to Father by phone at 
about 2:20 p.m. Father's mother joined the conversation. They told Kline that Father had 
an attorney, provided that attorney's contact information, and asked for a paternity test. 
Father's mother said if the baby was Father's, "they" wanted custody. 
 
The dueling court proceedings 
 
On the following Monday, September 19, at 1:14 p.m., the prospective adoptive 
parents filed a petition for adoption in Wyandotte County District Court. The petition also 
sought to terminate Father's parental rights because: 
 
"a. The identified biological father, after having knowledge of the pregnancy, 
failed without reasonable cause to provide support for the biological mother during the 
six months prior to the Child's birth; 
 
"b. The identified biological father abandoned the biological mother after having 
knowledge of the pregnancy; 
 
"c. The identified biological father has made no reasonable efforts to support or 
communicate with the Child after having knowledge of the birth of the Child; 
 
"d. The identified biological father abandoned or neglected the Child after having 
knowledge of the Child's birth; 
 
"e. The identified biological father is unfit; and 
 
"f. Termination of the parental rights of the identified biological father is in the 
best interests of the Child."   
5 
 
 
 
 
These alleged grounds for terminating Father's parental rights were made without 
prior factual investigation. More disturbingly, the termination allegations were 
substantively false when filed because Father had only learned of both the pregnancy and 
the birth barely four days before the filing. Nevertheless, the prospective adoptive parents 
verified these contentions were true under oath and their attorney signed the petition. 
 
The next day, and with no knowledge about the out-of-county adoption action, 
Father filed a petition to establish paternity in Shawnee County District Court. Father 
stated he was "willing and able to meet the financial and emotional needs of the minor 
child" and was "a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and control of the 
minor child." Father did not know the child's present address but believed the baby was 
placed in KCSL's care and custody. Father was "advised that the child has been placed 
with third parties [whose] identity is unknown." Father asked the court to  
 
"enter an order for genetic testing to determine the paternity of the child, if appropriate, 
acknowledging Petitioner as the father of the minor child, establish child support for said 
minor child pursuant to Kansas law, award custody of the minor child to the Petitioner 
and designate the Petitioner as residential parent, establish a parenting time schedule for 
each party with the minor child, an Order for name change and amendment of the birth 
record and for such further relief as the court deems just and equitable." (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
On October 5, Mother filed a motion to stay the Shawnee County case. This was 
filed through counsel who was representing Mother in the Wyandotte County adoption 
case. Mother's counsel was supplied by KCSL, but the record is unclear who paid for the 
legal effort to stay Father's paternity action. The motion asked that the Shawnee County 
case be suspended until the Wyandotte County adoption concluded because that litigation 
was filed first. It further asserted if Father's parental rights were terminated in the 
6 
 
 
 
adoption case, the paternity case would be moot. Mother's motion argued that "any Order 
of custody, support, parenting time or paternity entered in this case will contravene the 
prior, and thus, superior jurisdiction held by the Court in Wyandotte County."  
 
On October 25, the Wyandotte County court ordered a hearing on the adoption 
petition and scheduled it for November 29. It required Father to be notified by personal 
service. For reasons undeveloped in the record, Father was not served until 32 days 
later—Saturday, November 26, at a little after 5 p.m.—for the hearing that Tuesday. We 
note state law requires this notice not include a copy of the adoption petition, so the 
record is silent what Father knew going into the hearing. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-
2133(d). The record also does not reflect that Father's attorney was informed of the 
November 29 hearing, even though he entered his appearance in the adoption 
proceedings on November 4. 
 
At the November 29 hearing, Father appeared in person and by counsel. Father 
objected to the adoption. The court ordered Father to arrange and pay for genetic testing 
with the laboratory to schedule the baby's DNA sample. It also agreed with the 
prospective adoptive parents' request that "[Father] and his attorney have no access to the 
documents in the Court's case file other than a redacted copy of the Petition for 
Adoption."  
 
On December 6, the Shawnee County District Court stayed Father's paternity case. 
The order noted the Wyandotte County court achieved jurisdiction first and had already 
ordered paternity testing, so further hearings would be duplicative of Father's requested 
relief in Shawnee County. 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
The parental rights termination hearing 
 
On December 13, Father complied with the Wyandotte County court's November 
29 order for a DNA sample. The baby was not tested until January 9, 2017. On January 
27, the DNA lab report was filed. The results showed "[t]he alleged father . . . cannot be 
excluded as the biological father of the child . . . since they share genetic markers. . . . 
[T]he probability of paternity is 99.99%, as compared to an untested, unrelated man." 
 
On March 24, just 56 days after the paternity results were filed, the Wyandotte 
County court conducted the evidentiary hearing on Father's parental rights termination. 
The prospective adoptive parents called as their witnesses Mother, Father, Kline, and the 
prospective adoptive father. Father returned to the witness stand in his case in chief and 
also called his mother. 
 
Mother testified she learned she was pregnant the morning she gave birth and that 
she never told anyone she was pregnant before that day. Mother admitted Father 
contacted her while she was in the hospital before he learned about the birth. In a text 
message, Father asked why she was in the hospital. She told him "[t]hey had to cut me 
open" and "[t]hey haven[']t really told me anything as of right now." She said Father 
expressed sincere concern for her and her health. Mother did not tell Father about the 
baby "[b]ecause I wanted to tell him in person because I would think it was inappropriate 
for me, myself to talk to him about it over the phone," but Kline did that before she could. 
 
Mother had an on-again, off-again romantic relationship with Father between 2012 
and December 2015. She broke up with him in the summer of 2014, because she believed 
he had an alcohol abuse problem. After a week, they began dating again until she broke 
up with him in December 2015. She described their relationship after that as more than a 
"casual" friendship because they occasionally slept together. She did not consider it a 
8 
 
 
 
boyfriend/girlfriend situation. Mother said after the birth Father provided her with no 
financial support for the child. 
 
Father testified he learned about the birth from Kline on September 15, 2016. He 
believed the baby was his son all along. He said his purpose in being in court was to seek 
to raise his child.  
 
Father worked in Topeka at the time of the hearing, making a $14.50 hourly wage. 
Most weeks he worked overtime, for which he received time-and-a-half pay. Father lived 
with his mother and 28-year-old brother in a three-bedroom apartment. All three worked 
full time and shared expenses. He had just purchased a 2014 model car, paying $460 per 
month. When asked about the expense of raising a child, Father acknowledged he was 
"[f]ully aware" that it costs money to support a child, although he did not know exactly 
how much or whether it costs "hundreds, perhaps thousands of dollars a month." But he 
testified he "definitely [has] money to support my child, and I make good money." 
 
At the time of the hearing, C.L. was six and a half months old. Father conceded he 
had not provided the child with any financial or material support and had not asked "if or 
how" he could help the prospective adoptive parents nor asked if there were any unpaid 
medical bills. And although Father had not provided financial support yet, he had 
purchased baby toys, clothes, bottles, a car seat, a crib, and a play pen, among other 
things, in preparation of taking custody. He and his mother prepared a room for the baby 
in their home. They made these preparations a couple of weeks earlier. 
 
Father said shortly after the birth he transitioned from his mother's health 
insurance to his own coverage through his employer because he "knew [he] needed health 
insurance to put the baby on . . . ." But he did not tell the prospective adoptive parents, 
their lawyer, or KCSL about this. He never had his own lawyer tell anyone either. The 
9 
 
 
 
record is unclear whether insurance coverage for C.L. was accessible prior to establishing 
paternity and securing appropriate court orders. When asked why he bought the car 
instead of supporting his child, Father responded he needed a reliable and safer car for a 
baby. 
 
Father acknowledged he knew the prospective adoptive parents had been caring 
for the baby since birth. He did not know their identity, although he acknowledged he had 
the opportunity to sit next to the adoptive parents in court on three occasions. Father 
conceded he never asked how C.L. was but clarified he had not spoken to them in any 
context. Father also was unaware of any communication his lawyer may have had with 
opposing counsel about the baby and had not asked his lawyer to initiate any. Father also 
never asked Kline about the child. Father had not sent a letter or card to the baby through 
his lawyer or opposing counsel. 
 
But Father said he was committed to fighting for his baby. He said he told Kline 
 
"that I think  . . . this whole situation is messed up, that this is my kid, and just basically 
the whole situation I talked to her about it, like, it's just messed up like, you know, it's 
messed up to take a baby away from these people, but I told her, you know, that this is 
my kid and I mean, it's messed up to take the baby away from me so . . . I mean, the 
whole situation is really messy." 
 
Kline testified about her conversations with Father and identified her logs of those 
discussions. She explained Father had three ways to contact her:  phone, text, and 
Facebook. She had also given him the adoption agency's name and address. Despite this, 
she said, Father had not provided the child any support through KCSL. Father had not 
asked how the baby was doing and had not provided gifts, letters, photos of himself, or 
anything else to pass along. There is nothing in the record showing KCSL had any such 
10 
 
 
 
pass-along mechanisms for putative parents to use or that Father was advised about them 
if they did exist.  
 
The prospective adoptive father testified next. He said he and his wife took C.L. 
home from the hospital on September 15 and provided for his care ever since. He said 
they neither received support from Father nor had any contact with him or on his behalf. 
 
Father and his mother testified on Father's behalf. Father's mother spoke favorably 
about Father. She described him as a "go-getter" and said he was up for a promotion at 
work. She said Father had never called into work sick and worked Monday through 
Friday and most weekends. She said there was a positive change in Father in the year or 
so he had been working at his present job. 
 
Father testified he filed the paternity suit that sought "to establish child support for 
the child pursuant to Kansas law" but was not specifically intending to force Mother to 
pay child support. Father noted he had asked the Shawnee County court to be allowed to 
meet the child's financial and emotional needs and was willing and able to do so. Father 
said he would be the residential parent. He agreed that, "as far as [he] knew," it was his 
"understanding that [he was] prohibited by Court Order from attempting to make contact 
with the child." 
 
The lower court rulings 
 
On April 26, 2017, the district court terminated Father's parental rights. The court 
limited its consideration to two statutory grounds:  (1) Father abandoned or neglected 
C.L. after having knowledge of the birth; and (2) Father had made no reasonable efforts 
to support or communicate with C.L. after having knowledge of his birth. The court made 
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
11 
 
 
 
 
"K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(A) states the court may terminate the parental rights 
of the natural father if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence the father 
abandoned or neglected the child after having knowledge of the child's birth. Black's Law 
Dictionary, Sixth Edition defines Abandon as, 'to desert, surrender, forsake or cede.' 
Black's page 2. [Father] has never had any contact with the minor child. [Father] did not 
ask the mother to see the child. [Father] did not ask the case manager to see the child. 
Black's also defines neglect as 'May mean to omit, fail or forbear to do a thing that can be 
done, or that is required to be done.' Black's page 1032. There have been no requests from 
[Father's] lawyer to Petitioner's lawyer to have contact with the minor child. Again, it is 
noted by this Court that the stay in the Paternity case did not include any language 
prohibiting contact between the minor child and [Father]. There is no evidence that 
[Father] requested information about  . . . the child's health and welfare after placement 
with the proposed adoptive parents. There is no evidence before the court that [Father] 
requested a picture of the child. The court recognizes that [Father] caused a paternity 
action to be filed. However, that step alone is not enough to support a finding that 
[Father] has 'assumed a sufficient level of parental responsibility under Kansas law to 
entitle his parental rights to constitutional protection.['] Adoption of G.L.V, 286 Kan. at 
1061-62, 190 P.3d 245. The petitioners have proved by clear and convincing evidence 
that [Father] abandoned or neglected the child after he was made aware of the birth of the 
child.  
 
"K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(l)(C) states, 'the father has made no reasonable efforts to support or 
communicate with the child after having knowledge of the child's birth[.]' In the case at 
bar, [Father] testified, 'money is not a problem for me.' Further, he testified as to his 
income and expenses and it is clear he had money to support the child during the 
pendency of this action. In fact the father stated, 'I don't know how much it will cost. I 
have money to raise it.' Despite the father's statements about his money, there is no 
evidence he provided financial support of any kind to the child through the case worker 
or through his lawyer. In fact, [Petitioners] presented evidence that no offers of support 
had been made by [Father]. During his testimony, [Father] claimed he put the child on his 
insurance through his employer. However, he did not communicate this fact to anyone 
and therefore, it has no impact. Had [Father] provided this information to [Petitioners] 
12 
 
 
 
through their lawyer, the birthing expenses of the child would have been covered under 
[Father's] plan. The adoptive parents paid the birthing expenses in the amount of $6500. 
In contrast to the father in Adoption of G.L.V, [Petitioners] presented evidence that 
[Father] gave the child no gifts and made no explicit offers of support concerning the 
child. Furthermore, the [Petitioners] presented evidence that [Father] sent no letters to the 
child; [Father] sent no mementos to the child and sent no Christmas gifts to the child. 
Although [Father] did not have the address of the prospective adoptive parents, he could 
have and should have sent communication and gifts through the lawyers involved. This 
court concludes that the petitioners have met their burden of proof that [Father] made no 
reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the child after having knowledge of 
the child's birth." 
 
Father appealed to the Court of Appeals. He argued the evidence and applicable 
law did not support termination of his rights under either K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-
2136(h)(1)(A) (abandonment or neglect) or K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(C) (no 
reasonable efforts to support or communicate). A Court of Appeals panel affirmed. In re 
Adoption of C.L., No. 117,723, 2018 WL 1022887 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished 
opinion). 
 
The panel concluded Father's "explicit concession" that he did not provide or offer 
direct financial support "on behalf of the child through KCSL, Mother, or petitioners' 
attorney" was fatal. 2018 WL 1022887, at *4. The panel rejected Father's claim that "he 
sought to provide financial, emotional, and other support for his child through the 
paternity action" because "the paternity petition . . . was stayed without any limitation 
upon his ability to provide support through [the adoption] proceedings." 2018 WL 
1022887, at *4. "While [Father] challenged the adoption and termination and filed the 
paternity action, he concededly made no effort to either communicate with or support the 
child in any respect." 2018 WL 1022887, at *5. According to the panel, "while the filing 
of the paternity action . . . may have ultimately afforded Father the opportunity to support 
13 
 
 
 
and communicate with his child, his legal efforts cannot make up for the evidence that he 
made no reasonable effort to support or communicate with C.L. after learning of his 
birth." 2018 WL 1022887, at *5. 
 
As to the district court's alternative basis for termination, the panel held the record 
did not support the conclusion that parental rights termination was justified under K.S.A. 
2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(A) (abandoned or neglected child). After reciting the Black's 
Law definition of abandonment, the panel concluded "[i]t can hardly be said that in this 
limited time frame there was a sufficient opportunity for Father to have engaged as a 
parent or willfully left the child while evidencing no intent to return." 2018 WL 1022887, 
at *6. 
 
Father petitioned this court for review, which we granted. Jurisdiction is proper. 
See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for petitions for review of Court of Appeals decisions); 
K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions 
upon petition for review). 
 
The prospective adoptive parents did not challenge in our court the panel's adverse 
ruling against them concerning their abandonment claim, so that much is settled on 
review. See Ullery v. Othick, 304 Kan. 405, 415, 372 P.3d 1135 (2016). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The only ground for termination before this court is K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-
2136(h)(1)(C):  "[T]he father has made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate 
with the child after having knowledge of the child's birth." (Emphasis added.) In this 
case, the prospective adoptive parents had the burden of proving the termination of 
14 
 
 
 
parental rights is appropriate through clear and convincing evidence. See K.S.A. 2016 
Supp. 59-2136(h)(1). 
 
Standard of review 
 
This court engaged in an extensive review of clear and convincing evidence as a 
standard of proof, as well as an appellate court's review of a trial court's determination 
based on that standard, in In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). That was a 
child in need of care case, but we have applied its holdings governing clear and 
convincing evidence to parental rights terminations in adoption cases. See, e.g., In re 
Adoption of B.B.M., 290 Kan. 236, 243, 224 P.3d 1168 (2010). 
 
Clear and convincing evidence is an "intermediate standard of proof between a 
preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt." B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. at 691. 
It applies when "'"'particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.'"'" 286 
Kan. at 697 (quoting Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 255 Kan. 513, 528, 874 P.2d 1188 [1994]). 
 
"'[A] standard of proof serves to allocate the risk of error [between the litigants] and to 
instruct the factfinder as to the degree of confidence society expects for a particular 
decision. To effectuate those purposes, a standard of proof should operate to set the 
degree to which the factfinder must be persuaded of a particular factual conclusion.'" 
B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. at 696 (quoting Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 481 A.2d 
139, 154 [Me. 1984]). 
 
The B.D.-Y. court adopted a definition of clear and convincing evidence requiring 
that "the factfinder believes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable." 
(Emphasis added.) 286 Kan. at 697; see also Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 
316, 104 S. Ct. 2433, 81 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984) (proponent's factual contentions are highly 
probable "only if the material [the proponent] offered instantly tilted the evidentiary 
15 
 
 
 
scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence [the opponent] offered in 
opposition"). 
 
The B.D.-Y. court then turned to appellate review of factual determinations based 
on that standard. It analyzed then-current Kansas caselaw, as well as that in other 
jurisdictions, and modified the standard of review, explaining: 
 
"When an appellate court reviews a trial court's determination which is required 
to be based upon clear and convincing evidence, it considers whether, after review of all 
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the [proponent of the finding], it is 
convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the determination to be highly 
probable." B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, Syl. ¶ 4. 
 
In conducting this review, an appellate court does not "weigh conflicting evidence, 
pass on the credibility of witnesses, or redetermine factual questions." In re Adoption of 
Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. 424, 430-31, 242 P.3d 1168 (2010). 
 
Discussion 
 
Natural parents who have assumed parental responsibilities have a fundamental 
right to raise their children that is protected by the United States Constitution and the 
Kansas Constitution. Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. at 430. State law expresses our state's public 
policy that the best interests of children are served by fostering their relationships with 
their natural parents when the parents have assumed parental duties toward their children. 
In re Guardianship of Williams, 254 Kan. 814, 822, 869 P.2d 661 (1994); see also In re 
Kailer, 123 Kan. 229, 231, 255 P. 41 (1927) ("[T]he welfare of children is always a 
matter of paramount concern, but the policy of the state proceeds on the theory that their 
welfare can best be attained by leaving them in the custody of their parents and seeing to 
it that the parents' right thereto is not infringed upon or denied.").  
16 
 
 
 
 
Adoption statutes are strictly construed in favor of maintaining the natural parents' 
rights when it is claimed consent to adoption is not required by reason of a parent's 
failure to fulfill statutory parental obligations. Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. at 430. In this case, 
if the district court properly terminated Father's parental rights under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 
59-2136(h)(1), Father's consent to the adoption would not be required. See K.S.A. 2016 
Supp. 59-2129(a). Therefore, the same strict statutory construction is appropriate in this 
case, as it was in Baby Girl P.  
 
In making a finding to terminate parental rights under the statute, a court may 
"[c]onsider and weigh the best interest of the child" and "disregard incidental visitations, 
contacts, communications or contributions." K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(2)(A)-(B). 
But the best interests of the child may not be the sole basis for termination because "to 
hold otherwise would invite courts to seek 'better' families for any number of children 
whose family circumstances are challenging or financially difficult." 291 Kan. at 435-36. 
And it is important to emphasize the district court made no finding that it was in C.L.'s 
best interests to terminate Father's parental rights. We are dealing exclusively with 
K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(C) (no reasonable efforts to support or communicate). 
 
Baby Girl P. has meaningful similarities as to how the protections afforded for the 
natural father's rights were erroneously viewed by the lower courts. And in correcting 
those views, this court set out principles to be observed in future cases. We noted, for 
example, there was no legislative call in the statutory scheme "to make the assertion of 
paternal rights a Herculean task." 291 Kan. at 433. The Baby Girl P. case emphasized 
lower courts must not reward other parties for erecting a "series of hurdles" the natural 
parent must clear before being able to establish his or her protected interest. 291 Kan. at 
433. The only statutory requirement is for the father to make "reasonable" efforts to 
support or communicate with the child. 
17 
 
 
 
 
The Baby Girl P. court also rejected the criticism of the biological father's failure 
to discover the natural mother's deception about a miscarriage. This, the court said, 
suggested "that a father should disregard the mother's warnings that he is to leave her 
alone and instead go to her school or place of work or inquire of her friends to determine 
whether she is pregnant." 291 Kan. at 432-33. And the court went on to explain it would 
not "read into the statute a requirement that a father invade a mother's privacy to 
determine whether she is pregnant when the father has sound reasons to believe that she 
is not." 291 Kan. at 433. 
 
Similarly, the Baby Girl P. court concluded the biological father's actions in 
seeking visitation, offering the custodial parents anything they might need, telling them 
he was prepared to assume his responsibility to provide for his daughter, and providing 
her Christmas gifts were "the actions of a father who is attempting to maintain a 
relationship with his child, not the actions of a father who is neglecting his child." 
(Emphasis added.) 291 Kan. at 434. The court rejected the panel's suggestion "that an all-
encompassing offer of support was not reasonable and that a father must undertake 
additional actions, such as setting up a special bank account for the child whom he is not 
allowed to support directly, to prove his willingness to provide support." 291 Kan. at 434. 
The court found "nothing in the adoption statute requiring that a parent must make 
extraordinary displays of financial support in order to avoid a finding of neglect." 
(Emphasis added.) 291 Kan. at 434. 
  
The Baby Girl P. court then held that biological father's actions were not 
"incidental" activities that could be disregarded. 291 Kan. at 434; see also K.S.A. 2016 
Supp. 59-2136(h)(2)(B). "[I]ncidental means 'casual, of minor importance, insignificant, 
and of little consequence.'" 291 Kan. at 434 (quoting In re Adoption of McMullen, 236 
Kan. 348, Syl. ¶ 1, 691 P.2d 17 [1984]). The father had "retained counsel, he filed court 
18 
 
 
 
actions to obtain visitation, he gave gifts, and he offered to give anything that was needed 
for his daughter's support." Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. at 434. "[Father's] conduct upon 
learning that he had a daughter was scarcely casual or insignificant. It demonstrated a 
commitment to assuming the role of a father." (Emphasis added.) 291 Kan. at 434. 
 
Returning to C.L.'s case, we begin by noting there are some obvious problems 
with the district court's factual recitations. For example, the district court found "[Father] 
did not ask the case manager to see the child." Yet, the record indicates Father "inquired 
if he would be able to . . . see the baby." And Kline advised "this is usually dependent on 
trust with the adoptive family." The point is that Father did ask and was told the visitation 
outcome depended on the adoptive family. 
 
Also, much is made about Father's medical insurance, but the record is less than 
clear on this. Father's testimony was that he did not have insurance through his employer 
when the baby was born because he was on his mother's insurance. But after learning 
about the baby, he initiated health insurance for himself, believing this would allow him 
to add the baby to the plan when the time came. And the record further shows paternity 
was not established until January 2017, so what might have happened after that with the 
insurance is undeveloped and subject to much argumentative conjecture. In other words, 
the district court's conclusions on this subject are not supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.  
 
But more importantly, in reaching its conclusion that Father made no reasonable 
efforts to support or communicate with C.L., the picture the district court selectively 
paints with the established facts is incomplete. Cf. Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. at 430 (to 
terminate under section requiring support during pregnancy, court must consider "all of 
the relevant surrounding circumstances"). The district court's primary focus was that 
Father did not create alternative mechanisms to provide financial or material support 
19 
 
 
 
through third parties, which in a typical case might be meaningful. But this case is not 
typical, and Father's unique circumstances should not have been dismissed by the lower 
courts. After all, Father did attempt to enlist the Shawnee County court to authoritatively 
establish his rights and support obligations through the paternity action. And when the 
focus is placed on Father's action, attention is immediately drawn to the "series of 
hurdles" put in his way in his effort to support his child.  
 
No one disputes Father was unaware Mother was pregnant until after the baby was 
born. Kline informed him of C.L.'s birth on the evening of Thursday, September 15, two 
days after the fact. And he was given this news in a phone conversation with a stranger 
working on someone else's behalf, who was asking him—and expecting him—to 
relinquish his parental rights as soon as the next day. The record also strongly suggests 
that by this time, the prospective adoptive parents had already taken C.L. home from the 
hospital—even though they would later be critical of Father for not visiting C.L. in the 
hospital as evidence supporting their bid to terminate his parental rights. Additionally, 
when asked, Kline refused to tell Father who the mother was, so he was left in the dark 
about that as well. Finally, and as mentioned, Father asked Kline about the possibility of 
seeing the child and was cryptically advised that was "usually dependent on trust with the 
adoptive family."  
 
The record is also undisputed that by the next day—a Friday—Father was acting 
to protect his parental rights. He advised Kline he wanted custody, had retained a lawyer 
to accomplish this, and gave Kline his lawyer's contact information. Notably, instead of 
prompting a cooperative opportunity to work with that attorney to explore Father's 
potential relationship with his child, this news apparently triggered a one-sided, "first 
strike" race to the courthouse to initiate adoption proceedings in another county that 
would preempt any lawsuit by Father to establish his paternity and support obligations. 
 
20 
 
 
 
That tactical move by the prospective adoptive parents had the desired result, but 
they admittedly got there by filing a lawsuit without appropriate factual investigation and 
by alleging false grounds for terminating Father's parental rights. They claimed, for 
example, that Father had failed to support Mother during the six months prior to C.L.'s 
birth and abandoned her after having knowledge of the pregnancy, even though he did 
not learn of the pregnancy and birth until two days after the fact. Worse yet, the 
prospective adoptive parents, under oath, verified these false accusations as being true. 
As Judge Malone observed in his concurrence, "these allegations obviously were untrue" 
given the fact that no one—not even Mother—was aware of the pregnancy. Adoption of 
C.L., 2018 WL 1022887, at *7 (Malone, J., concurring). 
 
And once forced into the Wyandotte County action, the record is unclear why 
Father was not personally served until after 5 p.m., Saturday, November 26—just three 
calendar days before the hearing on the adoption petition. But what is clear is that if 
Father had failed to appear at the November 29 hearing, he would have been even more 
seriously prejudiced in his ability to preserve his parental rights. See Baby Girl P., 291 
Kan. at 437-42 (Luckert, J., concurring) (parental preference doctrine does not apply 
when no person appears claiming parental custodial rights at an adoption hearing, citing 
In re Adoption of A.A.T., 287 Kan. 590, 196 P.3d 1180 [2008]). Yet, Father did appear to 
assert his rights. 
 
In short, throughout the brief period Father knew about his son, a series of 
calculated obstructions were placed between him and his child in what was already a 
difficult circumstance. And each barrier consistently put him in an inferior position that 
required him to strategically or creatively react to avoid forfeiting his parental rights 
without any demonstrated willingness from the prospective adoptive parents or KCSL to 
actually include Father in C.L.'s life. Indeed, the record would reasonably suggest given 
their experience in these matters that KCSL and the attorney representing the prospective 
21 
 
 
 
adoptive parents well understood any facilitation of Father's involvement would stymie 
the adoption outcome they sought. 
 
In its decision, the district court highlighted how no court order prohibited Father 
from having contact with C.L. But framing the evidence as it did in terms of what Father 
legally might or could have done despite the obstacles and circumstances—rather than 
what a reasonable person would do in this same situation—is contrary to the statutory 
dictates that permit termination only when "the father has made no reasonable efforts to 
support or communicate with the child." K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(C). It does not 
appear either lower court ever seriously considered whether what Father did do was a 
reasonable effort in this particular circumstance, especially since Father only learned of 
the pregnancy after C.L. was born and further recognizing that Father was not certain he 
was the biological father until less than 60 days before the termination hearing. 
 
After reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prospective 
adoptive parents, this court cannot be convinced a rational fact-finder could have found it 
highly probable that Father made no reasonable effort to support or communicate with 
C.L. after having knowledge of C.L.'s birth. The Shawnee County action speaks volumes 
to this. And how can we say Father has not "accept[ed] some measure of responsibility 
for the child's future" when he asked the Shawnee County court to declare and delineate 
exactly that responsibility? Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 77 L. 
Ed. 2d 614 (1983). 
 
A putative father need not "undertake additional actions, such as setting up a 
special bank account for the child whom he is not allowed to support directly, to prove 
his willingness to provide support." Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. at 434. The corollary under 
our facts would recognize that Father was not expected to stuff cash in an envelope in 
hopes that it would later be deemed sufficient or even delivered to the right place. See 
22 
 
 
 
K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(2)(B) (incidental activities may be disregarded). And 
nothing in the record reflects he had any other reasonable alternative.  
 
But what Father did do, through the advice of counsel, was to promptly ask a court 
to declare him to be C.L.'s father and issue enforceable orders establishing how support 
and custody should be achieved as appropriate for the child. His failure to more quickly 
adjust after his Shawnee County efforts failed because of the Wyandotte County lawsuit 
is insufficient to "instantly tilt[] the evidentiary scales" in favor of finding he made no 
reasonable efforts to support or communicate with C.L. "when weighed against the 
evidence" of the circumstances and the steps he took. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 
at 316. Notably, those steps included filing a paternity action seeking custody and 
asserting his rights through the court system immediately after learning about both the 
pregnancy and C.L.'s birth from a social worker that enigmatically told him contact with 
the baby would hinge on "trust with" the prospective adoptive parents.  
 
Simply put, these were "the actions of a father who is attempting to maintain a 
relationship with his child, not the actions of a father who is neglecting his child." 
(Emphasis added.) Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. at 434. To hold otherwise would encourage 
those with another interest to place a "series of hurdles" between a putative father and his 
child to increase the likelihood of a successful adoption. 291 Kan. at 433. The record in 
this appeal certainly suggests that possibility. Termination of parental rights should not 
be determined by which side schemes to be shrewder or more strategic. 
 
In that regard, we echo the comments Judge Malone made in his concurrence 
when he observed: 
 
"In light of the preference recognized in the law favoring a biological parent's 
right to raise his or her child, assuming the parent is fit, it seems to me like this case went 
23 
 
 
 
off track from the moment C.L. was born. Only three days later, [Father] expressed his 
desire to assume his parental responsibilities. At that point, instead of rushing to the 
courthouse to file an adoption petition, all parties involved in the case should have at least 
temporarily put the adoption plans on hold. In the meantime, KCSL or some other 
appropriate agency could have conducted an investigation of [Father]'s home and 
background to see if he would have been a suitable placement option for C.L. Assuming 
that [Father] passed the initial investigation and background check, C.L. could have been 
temporarily placed with [Father] for a trial period to be monitored by the appropriate 
agency or the courts. Then, if any evidence developed that [Father] was not properly 
caring for C.L., a petition for termination of parental rights could have been filed with the 
court. Giving [Father] more of a chance to prove his fitness as a father would have been a 
better approach than rushing into an adoption proceeding and finding out later if there 
was any evidence to support it." Adoption of C.L., 2018 WL 1022887, at *8 (Malone, J., 
concurring). 
 
The lower courts erred by failing to focus on all the circumstances when 
determining whether clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that Father made "no 
reasonable efforts" to support or communicate with C.L. after knowledge of his birth. 
K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 59-2136(h)(1)(C). We must reverse their contrary conclusions and 
remand to the district court to initiate proceedings effectuating a change in custody 
consistent with this ruling for the now two-year-old child at the center of these 
unfortunate proceedings. 
 
As was done in Baby Girl P., we acknowledge: 
 
"Years of developing family ties cannot be undone, and a separation at this point 
will doubtless cause considerable pain. Had the mandates of the statutory process been 
followed . . . , much potential anguish might have been avoided, and in any case the law 
cannot be applied so as to automatically 'reward those who obtain custody, whether 
lawfully or otherwise, and maintain it during any ensuing (and protracted) litigation.' 
Matter of Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986). It is not ours to say 
24 
 
 
 
whether the trauma that might result from removing [this child] from [his] adoptive 
family should outweigh the interest of the father—and perhaps the child [himself]—in 
having [him] raised by [his] natural father." Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. at 436-37 (citing 
Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 53-54, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 104 
L. Ed. 2d 29 [1989]). 
 
Due to these obvious concerns, we remand with instructions similar to those given 
in Baby Girl P. for the district court to recognize the potential traumatic impact of a 
sudden, precipitous separation of a child from the only parents he has known. We direct 
the court to expedite the custodial transition process, but we do not specify, as we did in 
Baby Girl P., that this process be completed within 30 days. The court is in the better 
position to effectuate how C.L. and Father are to be united without undue delay. The 
court may in its discretion include the participation of appropriate professional personnel. 
See Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. at 437. 
 
Reversed and remanded with instructions. 
 
BEIER, J., not participating. 
JEFFREY E. GOERING, District Judge, assigned.1 
 
 
                                              
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  District Judge Goering was appointed to hear case No. 117,723 
vice Justice Beier under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) of the 
Kansas Constitution.