Title: PETER V. STEIGER and SYLVIA STEIGER v. HAPPY VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PETER V. STEIGER and SYLVIA STEIGER v. HAPPY VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION2010 WY 158Case Number: No. S-07-0260, S-09-0081Decided: 12/07/2010NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

PETER 
B. STEIGER and SYLVIA STEIGER,Appellants 
(Defendants),v.HAPPY VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Peter 
B. Steiger and Sylvia Steiger, pro 
se.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

William 
D. Bagley of Frontier Law Center, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
C.J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., 
files a specially concurring opinion; HILL, J., files a dissenting opinion, 
in which GOLDEN, J., joins.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Peter B. and 
Sylvia Steiger (the Steigers) owned a tract of land in a subdivision governed by 
restrictive covenants.  The Happy 
Valley Homeowners Association (the Association) filed a complaint against them 
alleging that they were violating one of the covenants.  The district court granted summary 
judgment for the Association and the Steigers appealed.  This Court reversed the summary judgment 
and remanded the case to the district court after concluding that by failing to 
timely respond to a request for admission, the Association was deemed to have 
admitted it lacked the authority to bring the legal action.  Steiger v. Happy Valley Homeowners 
Ass'n, 2007 WY 5, 149 P.3d 735 (Wyo. 2007) (Steiger I).  

 
 
[¶2]  On remand, the district court entered an 
order allowing the Association to withdraw the admission and submit a 
response.  The district court also 
entered an order awarding the Steigers costs for the appeal in Steiger I.  The Steigers appealed both orders to 
this Court.  We dismissed the appeal 
from the order allowing withdrawal of the admission as an improper interlocutory 
appeal.  We stayed the appeal from 
the order awarding costs because a trial had been held in the interim and 
another appeal from the district court judgment seemed likely.  As anticipated, the Steigers appealed 
the district court's judgment enforcing the covenant and dismissing their 
counterclaims.  We affirm the 
district court order and judgment.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      The Steigers, 
appearing pro se as they have 
throughout these proceedings, present four issues which we rephrase as 
follows:

 
 

1.            
Whether 
the district court erred in allowing the Association to withdraw its admission 
and respond to the discovery request.

 
 

2.            
Whether 
the district court's findings were supported by the 
evidence.

 
 

3.            
Whether 
the district court was prejudiced or biased against them or unfairly failed to 
require the Association to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

 
 
 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶4]  Happy Valley is a subdivision located 
along Happy Jack Road west of Cheyenne.  
The subdivision is governed by restrictive covenants recorded in 
1977.  In 2000, the Steigers 
purchased a tract of land in Happy Valley.  
They placed a mobile home on the lot which, by their own admission, did 
not have a permanent foundation.  In 
2004, the Association filed a complaint alleging the Steigers were in violation 
of a covenant prohibiting homeowners in Happy Valley from occupying a modular or 
mobile home without a permanent foundation.  The Steigers denied the Association's 
claims and filed a counterclaim seeking judgment in their favor finding that the 
Association had not duly authorized the legal action filed against them and the 
Association, by its failure to enforce other violations, had waived any right to 
enforce the covenants.  

 
 
[¶5]  In discovery, the Steigers served the 
Association with eighty-eight requests for admission, one of which asked the 
Association to admit that it was not legally constituted and the action it filed 
against them was invalid.  The 
Association did not respond to the requests for admission within thirty days as 
required by W.R.C.P. 36.  The 
Association filed its responses the following week and then filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  Concluding there 
were no genuine issues of material fact, the district court found the Steigers 
had violated the covenant and granted the motion.  In the Steigers' first appeal to this 
Court, we held the Association was deemed to have admitted that it did not have 
the authority to bring the action and reversed the summary judgment order.  Steiger I, ¶ 4, 149 P.3d  at 
736.

 
 
[¶6]  On remand to the district court, the 
Steigers sought payment of the costs they incurred in Steiger I.  The district court entered an order 
awarding costs.  The Association 
filed a motion for an order allowing it to withdraw its admissions and serve 
responses to the requests for admission.  
The Steigers objected and, after a hearing, the district court granted 
the motion.  The Association then 
filed a response to the request for admission denying that it was not legally 
constituted and the legal action filed against the Steigers was invalid. 

 
 
[¶7]  The Steigers appealed both the order 
awarding costs and the order allowing the Association to withdraw the deemed 
admissions.  Meanwhile, the district 
court scheduled the remaining matters for trial.  At the conclusion of the trial, the 
district court issued oral findings and a written judgment in which it concluded 
the Steigers took title of their tract subject to the covenants, the covenants 
had not been abandoned, the Steigers were in violation of the covenants because 
their mobile home was not on a permanent foundation, the Association was duly 
authorized to bring the action against the Steigers, and the Steigers failed to 
meet their burden of proving their claim that the covenants had been 
abandoned.  The district court 
dismissed the Steigers' counterclaims with prejudice, restrained them from 
further violation of the covenants and enjoined them from occupying their home 
until they brought it into compliance with the covenants.  The Steigers appealed the judgment to 
this Court. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶8]      The Steigers 
contend the Association should not have been allowed to withdraw its admissions 
and file responses.  They assert the 
Association did not request an order allowing withdrawal for over two years and 
then did so after this Court held in Steiger I that the admission was 
conclusively established.  They 
contend the district court's order allowing the Association to withdraw the 
admissions violated W.R.C.P. 6(b), which allows a court to enlarge the time for 
filing motions only when the request is made before the time expires or, when a 
motion is made after the time has expired, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect.  Because the Association 
did not request an order allowing it to withdraw the admissions before the time 
for responding expired and did not show excusable neglect for its late request, 
the Steigers maintain the district court did not have the authority to allow the 
withdrawal.  The Steigers further 
assert this Court's ruling in Steiger 
I that the admissions were conclusively established prevented the district 
court from reopening the issue by allowing the Association to withdraw the 
admissions.   They argue Hodges v. Lewis & Lewis, Inc., 2005 
WY 134, 121 P.3d 138 (Wyo. 2005), the case the Association relied upon in 
requesting the withdrawal, does not support allowing the withdrawal in this case 
because the party seeking the withdrawal in Hodges acted promptly and not, as in 
this case, over two years later and after an appeal.  

 
 
[¶9]  District courts have broad discretion to 
manage pretrial discovery matters.  
Id., ¶ 11, 121 P.3d  at 
142.  Therefore, we review a 
district court's decision on a motion to withdraw or amend admissions under 
W.R.C.P. 36(b) for abuse of discretion.  
Id.  An abuse of discretion occurs when a 
court acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances.  Id., ¶ 11, 121 P.3d  at 143.  
In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the 
ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it 
did.  Id.

 
 
[¶10]  W.R.C.P. 36(a), governing requests for 
admission, provides in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
            
(a)  Request for admission.  A party may 
serve upon any other party a written request for the admission . . . of the 
truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)1 . . . .  

 
 
The 
matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or 
within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the 
request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written 
answer or objection addressed to the matter . . . .

 
 
            
(b)  Effect of admission.  Any matter 
admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion 
permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.  . . . [T]he court may permit withdrawal 
or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that 
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party in maintaining the action or 
defense on the merits.  

 
 
(Footnote 
added.)

 
 
[¶11]  The Steigers served their request for 
admissions on August 19, 2004.  The 
Association did not serve written answers to the requests until September 24, 
2004, and there is no indication the district court allowed the Association 
additional time to serve its answers.  
Thus, in Steiger I, ¶ 4, 149 P.3d  at 736, this Court held,

 
 
[T]he 
[Association] has admitted, and it is therefore conclusively established, that 
any action the Board might have taken to authorize this suit was invalid.  Without proper authorization, the 
[Association] lacked capacity to prosecute the instant suit.  

 
 
[¶12]  On remand to the district court, the 
Association filed its motion for an order allowing it to withdraw its admissions 
and serve responses.  The motion was 
filed on March 27, 2007, two and a half years after the Steigers served the 
request for admissions.  In its 
motion, the Association cited the provision in W.R.C.P. 36(b) allowing the court 
to permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions and asserted that its original 
responses to the eighty-eight requests for admission, which it served within a 
week after the thirty day time period, were late because of the volume of the 
Steigers' discovery requests.  After 
considering the parties' respective arguments, the district court granted the 
motion, allowing the Association to withdraw its admissions and serve 
responses.             

 
 
[¶13]  The Steigers contend the order allowing 
the withdrawal is contrary to the authorization in W.R.C.P. 6(b) allowing the 
district court to enlarge the time prescribed in other rules only when the 
request is made before expiration of the period prescribed or when the request 
is made after expiration of the time and excusable neglect is shown for the 
failure to act within the time prescribed.  
By permitting the Association to respond to the requests when they did 
not request more time within the thirty day period or show excusable neglect, 
the Steigers assert the district court's order effectively enlarging the time 
for serving responses violated Rule 6.  
 

 
 
[¶14]  The difficulty with the Steigers' 
argument is that it requires us to limit the language in Rule 36(b) expressly 
authorizing the district court to permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions 
"when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved" and "the 
party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or 
amendment will prejudice" them.  
Given that Rule 36(b) expressly authorizes the district court to permit 
withdrawal under specified circumstances, we will not read language from Rule 6 
to limit the authority granted under Rule 36(b).

 
 
[¶15]  The Steigers also contend that Hodges does not support the district 
court's order.  In that case, Ms. 
Hodges served requests asking Lewis to admit that she did not contribute to her 
personal injuries.  Lewis missed the 
deadline for responding and was deemed to have admitted the request.  Prior to trial, the district court 
allowed Lewis to amend its admissions to deny the request.  

 
 
[¶16] 
On appeal, Ms. Hodges claimed the district court erred in allowing the 
amendment.  We applied the two-part 
test for withdrawing or amending admissions under Rule 36(b) requiring, first, 
that the moving party show that allowing the withdrawal will promote 
presentation of the merits of the case and, second, that the objecting party 
show that withdrawal will prejudice him in maintaining his defense.  Addressing the first prong, we 
said:

 
 
The 
purpose of Rule 36 is "to expedite the trial and to relieve the parties of the 
cost of proving facts that will not be disputed at trial."  Perez v. Miami-Dade County, 297 F.3d 1255, 1265 (11th Cir. 2002) quoting 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller 
& Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2252 (2d 
ed.1994).  The first factor of the 
Rule 36(b) test emphasizes the importance of having actions resolved on the 
merits rather than as a result of a technical error.  Raiser, 409 F.3d  at 1246; Perez, 297 F.3d  at 1266.  This requirement [for establishing that 
withdrawal should be permitted] is satisfied when it is shown that upholding the 
admissions would practically eliminate any presentation of the merits of the 
case.  Id. Thus, there is a distinct preference 
in the rule for ascertaining the truth and deciding the case on its merits.  Perez, 297 F.3d  at 
1266.

 
 

Hodges, 
¶ 12, 121 P.3d  at 143.  We further 
quoted the  Eleventh Circuit for the 
following principles:

 
 
 
 
When 
a party uses the rule to establish uncontested facts and to narrow the issues 
for trial, then the rule functions properly.  When a party like Perez, however, uses 
the rule to harass the other side or, as in this case, with the wild-eyed hope 
that the other side will fail to answer and therefore admit essential elements 
(that the party has already denied in its answer), the rule's time-saving 
function ceases; the rule instead becomes a weapon, dragging out the litigation 
and wasting valuable resources.  

 
 

Id., 
¶ 13, 121 P.3d  at 143, quoting Perez, 
297 F.3d  at 1268.

 
 
[¶17]  Applying the first part of the test in 
Hodges, we concluded that allowing 
Lewis to amend its response to the request asking it to admit that Ms. Hodges 
did not contribute to her injuries furthered presentation of the merits of the 
controversy.  Id.  Noting that Lewis had filed an answer 
denying Ms. Hodges' claim that it was negligent and expressly alleging that she 
was more than fifty percent at fault for her injuries, we concluded that 
allowing the admission to stand essentially would have decided that Lewis 
breached a duty owed to Ms. Hodges, a key element of her negligence claim, while 
permitting the parties to present evidence of fault "advanced the search for the 
truth and promoted a correct legal ruling."  Id.

 
 
[¶18]  Addressing the second part of the Rule 
36(b) test, we said the prejudice contemplated by the rule is not simply that a 
party who obtained the admission now has to convince the jury of its truth.  Rather, the party must show that it will 
have difficulty proving its case if withdrawal is allowed.  We cited as an example a situation where 
key witnesses are unavailable to testify about the matter initially deemed 
admitted.  We also said the amount 
of time the party seeking to uphold the admission has relied upon it may be 
important in determining prejudice.  
Id., ¶ 14, 121 P.3d  at 
143.  

 
 
[¶19]  Applying the prejudice prong of the rule 
in Hodges, we concluded Ms. Hodges 
had not shown the required prejudice.  
We said:  

 
 
Allowing 
Lewis to withdraw its admission simply replaced the burden of proof upon the 
plaintiff  where, in the pursuit of truth, it belonged. Ms. Hodges did not rely 
on the admission for a substantial period of time. . . .  Moreover, the district court remedied any 
prejudice which inured to Ms. Hodges as a result of relying on the admission 
when it granted her request for a continuance of the trial to allow her 
additional time to prepare.

 
 

Id., 
¶ 15, 121 P.3d  at 144.  

 
 
[¶20]  As in Hodges, we conclude that allowing the 
Association to withdraw its admission and serve its response promoted 
presentation of the merits of the controversy. Denying the motion would have 
prevented presentation of the case.  
Allowing the withdrawal simply placed the burden back where it belonged 
on the Association to prove it was authorized to bring the enforcement 
action.  

 
 
[¶21]  The Steigers maintain their case is 
distinguishable from Hodges in that 
they relied on the admission for two and a half years and the amount of time a 
party relies on an admission is a key factor in showing prejudice.  We said in Hodges that the amount of time a party 
relies on an admission may be an important factor in determining prejudice.  Under the facts of this case, however, 
we are not persuaded that the reliance factor outweighs the preference for 
deciding a controversy on its merits.  
Much of the time that passed between the deemed admission and the 
Association's request to withdraw it resulted from the Steigers' appeal to this 
Court from the district court's summary judgment order, time that is not 
attributable to any action or inaction on the Association's part.  Within two months of this Court's 
February 1, 2007, mandate in Steiger 
I, the Association filed its motion to withdraw its admission.  The district court ruled on the motion 
two and a half months before trial and it does not appear from the record that 
the Steigers sought a continuance of the trial date on the basis that they had 
relied on the admission and needed more time to prepare as a result.2  Even if the Steigers did seek a 
continuance on those grounds, the record does not indicate any such reliance 
left them unprepared for trial.  To 
the contrary, the record suggests the Steigers were well prepared for trial and 
had spent untold hours preparing to defend against the Association's claim.  The district court could reasonably have 
concluded as it did that allowing withdrawal of the admission would further 
resolution of the controversy on the merits and not prejudice the Steigers.  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
order granting the motion.       

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶22] 
The Steigers contend the district court's findings were not supported by the 
evidence presented at trial.  The 
trial held on remand was to the district court sitting without a jury.  We, therefore, apply the following 
standard of review:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.

 
 

Gasstop 
Two, LLC v. Seatwo, LLC, 
2010 WY 24, ¶ 6, 225 P.3d 1072, 1075 (Wyo. 2010).

 
 
[¶23]  The first finding the Steigers assert is 
not supported by the evidence is the finding that the Association's action was 
duly authorized by its members.  
Specifically, the district court found: 

 
 
7.  Based upon the testimony of Mr. Tucker, 
Mr. Rudy and Ms. Tozier the Court finds this action by the [Association] was 
duly authorized by its Members, the [Association] was duly authorized by its 
Members, the [Association] has standing to bring this suit and it is a 
reasonable response to the refusal of [the Steigers] to comply with the 
covenants.

 
 
[¶24]  At trial, Tim Rudy testified that an 
annual meeting of Association members was held in January of 2004.  He was president of the Association at 
the time.  He testified that all of 
the homeowners were notified of the meeting and approximately twenty people 
attended, including board members and other homeowners.  In response to the district court's 
questioning, he testified the issue of the Steigers' violation was discussed at 
the meeting and the members were asked to vote on whether to let the violation 
go or pursue compliance by involving an attorney.  Mr. Rudy testified that members were 
asked to raise their hands if they were in favor of enforcing the covenant 
against the Steigers.  He testified 
the vote was unanimous in favor of enforcement; to his recollection, no one 
voted against enforcement.  He 
further testified that the quorum required for annual meetings was ten percent 
of voting members and he believed more than a tenth of the members attended the 
January 2004 meeting.  To have a 
quorum, he testified, nine of the ninety-three lot owners would have had to have 
been present.   

 
 
[¶25]  Ross Tucker, who served as president of 
the Association after 2004, also testified that a quorum was present at the 2004 
annual meeting.  He testified he did 
not remember anyone voting in opposition to taking legal action against the 
Steigers to enforce the covenant.  
On cross-examination by Ms. Steiger, with the aid of the January 2004 
annual meeting minutes, Mr. Tucker testified that thirteen people were present, 
including three board members.  He 
testified that there are ninety-three lots and ten percent of the lot owners 
were required for a quorum.  Mr. 
Tucker conceded that if only thirteen people were present, and most of them were 
husband and wife, that would not constitute a quorum.  

 
 
[¶26]  Pat Tozier, vice president of the 
Association at the time of the January 2004 meeting, testified that she was 
present at the meeting, there was a quorum, and the members voted to proceed 
with any legal action necessary to enforce the covenants.  The Steigers did not challenge Ms. 
Tozier's testimony that a quorum was present.   Bob Cook, the Association 
treasurer, testified that members sometimes carry proxies allowing them to cast 
votes at meetings for members who cannot attend.  He testified that he was not present at 
the January 2004 meeting but had on other occasions carried proxies for three, 
sometimes four people.    

 
 
[¶27]  From this evidence, we are not left with 
the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a mistake in 
finding that legal action against the Steigers was duly authorized by the 
Association members.  Three past or 
current board members testified that they believed a quorum was present, and the 
testimony of one of those witnesses went unchallenged.  Although the Steigers were able to raise 
a doubt on cross-examination of Mr. Tucker about whether ten percent of the lot 
owners were present, we cannot say that doubt was sufficient to overcome the 
other testimony.  In light of the 
other testimony and the fact that the district court had the opportunity to 
observe the witnesses and assess their credibility, we are not willing to 
conclude its finding was clearly erroneous.    

 
 
[¶28]  The Steigers also contend the district 
court's finding that the Association did not abandon the covenants by failing to 
uniformly enforce them was clearly erroneous.  The challenged finding appears in the 
judgment as follows:

 
 
5.         
The Court, based upon a personal visit to the development finds the 
assertion by the [Steigers] that the covenants as a whole or in pertinent part 
have been abandoned or ignored is not supported by the Court's observation of 
the tracts in the development.  
While there may be several tracts which do not comply with the covenants 
in some minor respects, the overwhelming majority of the tracts do comply with 
the covenants.  The Court 
specifically finds, based upon its personal inspection of the tracts in the 
development that the violations are insubstantial and fail to support a finding 
that the usefulness of the covenants has been destroyed or that covenants have 
become valueless or onerous to property owners.  The above cited covenants are reasonable 
and have not been abandoned or waived and remain entitled to enforcement to 
restrain violations or to recover damages or both.  Based upon the testimony of Ross Tucker, 
the past and current president of the [Association], the Court accepts as 
accurate the [Association]'s assertion that it has in the past sought 
appropriate legal measures to enforce the covenants.  For example, the [Association] has 
forced a homeowner to move a foundation and the [Association] has initiated 
legal action to collect unpaid or underpaid dues.  The court accepts as accurate Mr. 
Tucker's testimony that there are no other mobile or modular homes in the 
subdivision which are non-compliant with the covenants.3

 
 
Contrary 
to this finding, the Steigers assert that they provided evidence of numerous 
violations by other lot owners that the Association allowed to go uncorrected, 
thereby proving the covenants were abandoned.

 
 
[¶29]  A protective covenant is abandoned by 
failure to enforce it when it is violated, the violations are ignored or 
acquiesced to, and the violations are "so great, or so fundamental or radical as 
to neutralize the benefits of the restriction to the point of defeating the 
purpose of the covenant.  In other 
words, the violations must be so substantial as to support a finding that the 
usefulness of the covenant has been destroyed, or that the covenant has become 
valueless and onerous to the property owners."  Hammons v. Table Mountain Ranches Owners 
Ass'n, Inc., 2003 WY 85, ¶ 14, 72 P.3d 1153, 1156 (Wyo. 2003), quoting Keller v. Branton, 667 P.2d 650, 654 
(Wyo. 1983).  The evidence presented 
in this case does not support the Steigers' contention that the other violations 
were so substantial that the Association effectively had abandoned the 
covenants.  

 
 
[¶30]  Mr. Rudy testified that during his term 
as president of the Association, which included 2004, the members voted 
unanimously to enforce major violations of the covenants.  One of those violations involved the 
Steigers' failure to place their mobile home on a permanent foundation.  Mr. Rudy testified that safety was one 
of the reasons for the covenant requiring a permanent foundation because in one 
instance high winds blew over a trailer that was not on a permanent 
foundation.  He also testified that 
the Association wanted permanent homes in the subdivision, not camping trailers 
and the like that could be moved in and out at any time.  He testified that as president of the 
Association, he was charged with enforcing the covenants.  He testified that while he did not 
nitpick about what he felt were minor violations he tried to address complaints 
about particular violations.  He 
testified there were other violations and they were taken care of without having 
to take legal action.  

 
 
[¶31]  Mr. Tucker testified that he has lived 
in Happy Valley since 1995 and has served on the board in one capacity or 
another since then.  He testified 
that on one occasion he wrote a letter to a resident who built a $5,000 concrete 
foundation within sixty feet of the property line in violation of the 
covenants.  In response to the 
letter, she rebuilt the foundation ten feet further away from the property line 
in compliance with the covenants.  
He also testified about writing letters to residents about junk piles and 
having the county notify them they would be charged if they failed to clean them 
up.  He testified that requiring a 
permanent foundation on homes in Happy Valley enhances the property, protects 
plumbing and electrical systems and keeps homes from blowing apart in the wind 
and debris ending up on other people's property.  Mr. Tucker also testified that at the 
January 2004 meeting the discussion was about wanting all residents to comply 
with the covenants.  Ms. Tozier 
likewise testified that enforcement of the covenants was discussed at the 
January 2004 meeting, including taking legal action if necessary to do so.  She testified that it was the 
Association president's job to enforce the covenants. She testified that one of 
the board's priorities was enforcing the covenants and maintaining the 
neighborhood.             

 
 
[¶32]  In an effort to show that the 
Association abandoned the covenants, the Steigers cross-examined Mr. Rudy, Mr. 
Tucker and Ms. Tozier concerning instances in which the covenants allegedly were 
not enforced.  In most cases, the 
witnesses either did not agree that there was a violation or testified that, 
after notification of the violation, the homeowner had or was attempting to 
bring the property into compliance.  
The fact that in some instances the witnesses conceded that a violation 
occurred and was not acted upon does not leave us with the definite and firm 
conviction that the district court committed a mistake in finding that the 
covenants were not abandoned.  Given 
the entirety of the testimony, we do not conclude the district court's finding 
was clearly erroneous.   

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶33]  The Steigers contend the district court 
displayed bias and prejudice against them, decided every issue in favor of the 
Association and required them to comply with the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure while not requiring the Association to do so.  Prejudice is prejudgment or the forming 
of an opinion without sufficient knowledge or examination; bias is a leaning of 
the mind or an inclination toward one person over another.   Reichert v. State, 2006 WY 62, ¶ 37, 134 P.3d 268, 278 (Wyo. 2006).    
Mere allegations will not suffice to show bias or prejudice; the party 
alleging a claim of bias or prejudice must present specific facts showing 
prejudgment or a leaning of the mind to the extent that the district court's 
decision was based on grounds other than the evidence before it.  Id.; TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Wyo. 1990).  The 
fair meaning of any remark made by the trial judge must be interpreted in light 
of the context in which it was made.  
Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 20, 
61 P.3d 383, 389 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶34]  In support of their claim that the 
district court was biased or prejudiced, the Steigers reference the court's 
inquiry at the scheduling conference as to whether they would have been better 
off financially simply to have built a permanent foundation than to defend a 
lawsuit.  They further cite the 
district court's comment at the beginning of trial that "the paperwork presents 
a very simple case.  Covenants 
exist, the property is encumbered by covenants, there are violations."  The Steigers also point to "unsupported 
assumptions" in the district court's findings that there were aesthetic and 
safety reasons for the permanent foundation requirement, the lack of a permanent 
foundation adversely affected property values, the benefits to other homeowners 
from compliance outweighed the Steigers' cost of compliance, the relative 
hardship doctrine did not apply and the Steigers were attempting to save money 
by not constructing a permanent foundation.  They also cite the district court's 
statement in reference to evidence of their refusal to pay Association 
assessment fees that the Association was "simply trying to get you to be 
cooperative to pay whatever everybody else was paying, and you elected to 
quibble about $65 a year."  
Additionally, they point to the district court's failure to sanction the 
Association for what they assert were repeated violations of the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure, denial of their summary judgment and determination to 
subject them to trial and award of costs in an amount less than the amount they 
sought.  

 
 
[¶35]  Having reviewed the entire record 
designated in this case, and the comments of the district court in the context 
in which they were made, we conclude the Steigers have not shown the district 
court was biased or prejudiced.  
That is, they have not shown the district court formed an opinion about 
the claims without sufficient knowledge or information, or had leanings in favor 
of the Association and against them.  
They have not shown the district court's findings were based on grounds 
other than the evidence before it.  
While it is clear from the record that the district court was frustrated 
at times with both parties, it is equally clear that the court went out of its 
way to allow the parties, and particularly the Steigers, to present their 
evidence and defend fully against the claim that they violated the 
covenant.

 
 
[¶36]  The district court's query during the 
scheduling conference about whether it would have cost less to build the 
foundation than defend the lawsuit was made in the context of apprising the 
Steigers of the risk involved in continuing with litigation rather than simply 
fixing the problem.  The district 
court's comment about the case being a simple one was said in the context of a 
four volume court file, one completed appeal and the likely prospect of a second 
appeal.  The "unsupported 
assumptions" were not unsupported but were findings based on evidence presented 
at trial.  The district court's 
comment about the Steigers' refusal to pay the Association assessment fee was 
made after evidence was presented that they were the only lot owners in Happy 
Valley who did not pay the $65 yearly fee which was used for maintaining areas 
used by all of the members, including the Steigers.  Although the district court declined to 
accept the Steigers' invitation to dismiss the complaint as a sanction for the 
Association's lack of compliance with court rules, the court discussed with 
counsel for the Association, as it did with the Steigers, the importance of 
compliance.  With regard to the 
Steigers' assertion that the district court showed prejudice or bias in holding 
a trial rather than granting their motion for summary judgment, the issue for 
our determination at this point is whether the evidence presented at trial 
supported the ultimate findings. We have concluded it did.  Finally, we see nothing in the record 
supporting a claim that the district court was biased or prejudiced when it 
awarded the Steigers the costs of appeal.  
To the contrary, the district court awarded costs in accordance with 
W.R.A.P. 10.044 even though the Steigers did not 
file their motion for costs within the time provided in W.R.A.P. 10.06.5  Although they contend they were entitled 
to $1,270.00, rather than the $985.00 the district court awarded, they have not 
shown why they were entitled to the difference.                 

 
 
[¶37]  Affirmed.

 
 
 
 
  
 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 
[¶38]   I concur in the result reached by 
the majority, but I write separately because, although I agree with the 
majority's treatment of the district court's granting of the Association's 
motion to withdraw the admission, I have a concern with something not even 
mentioned in the opinion.  W.R.A.P. 
3.05(b) reads as follows:

 
 
            
(b)    Appellant 
shall, contemporaneously with the filing of its brief in the appellate court and 
service of that brief upon appellee, serve on appellee, file with the clerk of 
the trial court a designation for transmission to the appellate court of all 
parts of the record, without unnecessary duplication, to which appellant intends 
to direct the particular attention of the appellate court in its brief.

 
 
In 
particular as to transcripts, W.R.A.P. 3.02(b) provides in relevant part as 
follows:

 
 
(b)    In all cases other than 
criminal and juvenile matters, if the proceedings in the trial court were 
stenographically reported by an official court reporter, appellant shall, 
contemporaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal, file and serve on 
appellee a description of the parts of the transcript which appellant intends to 
include in the record and unless the entire transcript is to be included, a 
statement of the issues appellant intends to present on appeal.  If an appellant intends to assert on 
appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or contrary 
to the evidence, appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all 
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. . . .   At the time of ordering, a party 
must make arrangements satisfactory to the reporter for payment of the cost of 
the transcript.

 
 
[¶39]   We have had occasion to inform 
appellants what happens when an appropriate record is not made available to this 
Court:

 
 
            
We begin our discussion of these issues by noting that the appellant has 
provided neither a transcript of the trial testimony pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.02 
nor a statement of the evidence pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.03.  There also does not appear to have been 
a request for special findings of fact and conclusions of law under W.R.C.P. 
52(a).  It is the appellant's burden 
to bring a complete record to this Court.  
Erhart v. Evans, 2001 WY 79, ¶ 
18, 30 P.3d 542, 547 (Wyo. 2001); Wood v. 
Wood, 865 P.2d 616, 617 (Wyo. 1993).  
Where a proper record is not provided, an appeal may be dismissed or 
review may be limited to those issues not requiring inspection of the 
record.  Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Matter of 
Manning's Estate, 646 P.2d 175, 176 (Wyo. 1982)); Wood, 865 P.2d  at 618.

 
 
            
Without a sufficient record, we must

 
 
"accept 
the trial court's findings as being the only basis for deciding the issues 
which pertain to the evidence.'  Willowbrook Ranch, Inc. v. Nugget 
Exploration, Inc., 896 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1995).  In the absence of anything to refute 
them, we will sustain the trial court's findings, and we assume that the 
evidence presented was sufficient to support those findings.'  896 P.2d  at 771-72."

 
 

Williams 
v. Dietz, 
999 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting 
Weiss v. Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 498 (Wyo. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by White v. 
Allen, 2003 WY 39, 65 P.3d 395 (Wyo. 2003)).  Furthermore, pro se litigants are held to the same 
standards as those represented by counsel.  
Dewey v. Dewey, 2001 WY 107, ¶ 
17, 33 P.3d 1143, 1147 (Wyo. 2001); In 
Interest of KMM, 957 P.2d 296, 298 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 

Smith 
v. Smith, 
2003 WY 87, ¶ 11, 72 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Wyo. 2003).  We said much the same thing a bit more 
recently in Johnson v. Sikorski, 2004 
WY 137, ¶ 16, 100 P.3d 420, 424 (Wyo. 2004):

 
 
            
Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 3.05(b), Mr. Befumo was required to file a 
designation "of all parts of the record . . . to which appellant intends to 
direct the particular attention of the appellate court in its brief."  Although Mr. Befumo quotes portions of 
the trial transcript in his appellate brief, he did not designate the transcript 
as part of the record on appeal.  As 
the appellant, Mr. Befumo had the burden of providing this Court with a complete 
record on which to base a decision.  
Orcutt v. Shober Inv., Inc., 
2003 WY 60, ¶ 9, 69 P.3d 386, ¶ 9(Wyo. 2003).  Having no other means to review the 
district court's decision, we must assume the decision was in accord with the 
law.  Id.

 
 
(Footnote 
omitted.)

 
 
[¶40]   In the instant case, the appellants 
lamented in their Notice of Appeal that they could not afford to pay for a copy 
of the entire transcript, but noted that they had sent funds to the official 
court reporter to obtain a copy of the trial testimony of a particular 
witness.  While these statements, 
coupled with the listing of particular orders and judgments being appealed, 
might be considered minimal compliance with W.R.A.P. 3.02(b), the appellants 
clearly violated that rule and W.R.A.P. 3.05(b) when, in filing their 
Designation of Records for Transmittal on Appeal, they included no portion of 
the trial transcript.  That bears 
repeating more simply: there is no transcript of the trial evidence in the 
record.6

 
 
[¶41]   This case cannot be distinguished 
from the cases wherein we have required appellants to comply with the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure.  Without a 
trial transcript, there is nothing before us from which we can ascertain that a 
factual finding of the district court is or is not clearly erroneous.  I would summarily affirm for that 
reason.

 
 
  
 
 

HILL, 
Justice, 
dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, 
Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶42]   I dissent because I am convinced 
the majority fails to rely on the "best evidence" available to the Court, in 
resolving the only thorny issue in this case.  From the outset, the Steigers contended 
that the Association did not have the legal authority to pursue this 
action.  As is often the case with 
such associations, it is sometimes difficult to get out "the base" when it comes 
time to vote.  However, the 
Association only needed 10% of the lot owners in order to constitute a 
quorum.  There were 95 lots, so 
rounding off (and upward) it took 10 lot owners to constitute a quorum.  The best evidence of attendance was the 
minutes of the critical meeting and those minutes reflected that 13 "persons" 
were present, not 15, not 20  13.  
The president of the Association testified that most were couples who 
represented only a single lot.  The 
president agreed that that would not amount to 10 lots, which is the absolute 
minimum needed to conduct such serious business.  Despite "memory" testimony somewhat to 
the contrary, I believe the Steigers were entitled to rely on the official 
records of the Association since such records existed, rather than on the 
vagaries of memory.

 
 
[¶43]   I would reverse and remand this 
case to the district court with instructions that the complaint be 
dismissed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.C.P. 26(b) defines the scope of discovery generally as including "any 
matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any party 
"

 
 

2The Steigers did file a motion to vacate the bench trial in part on the 
grounds that they had appealed to this Court from the orders awarding costs and 
allowing withdrawal of the admission; therefore, the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to proceed.  The 
Steigers also asserted the Association had failed to provide them with a copy of 
its pretrial memorandum, leaving them "unequipped to counter the charges."  The motion to vacate does not appear to 
request a continuance on the basis of reliance.      

 
 

3As 
reflected in its findings, the district court, along with the parties, drove to 
and viewed Happy Valley in the course of the trial.  Neither party objected then, nor do they 
claim on appeal that the viewing was improper.  Since neither party raised the issue we 
do not address it beyond noting that while this Court has held such inspections 
are within the district court's discretion, Henderson v. Kirby Ditch Co., 373 P.2d 591, 594 (Wyo. 1962), we wonder about the viewing in this case and the district 
court's reliance in its findings on what it observed given that three years had 
passed since the alleged violations.           

410.04. 
Costs on reversal.

            
When a judgment or appealable order is reversed, appellant shall recover 
costs . . .; and there shall be taxed as part of such costs the cost of making 
the transcript of the evidence in the case and for typewriting and reproducing 
briefs, such costs to be computed at the rate allowed by law for making the 
transcript of such evidence; 

 
 

510.06.  Time for filing costs 
and fees.

            
Any motions for costs or fees shall be filed with the court within 15 
days after the final written opinion or order is 
filed.

 
 

6This Court obtained a copy of the transcript directly from the Clerk of 
District Court.  While, on a rare 
occasion, extreme circumstances may dictate that we obtain something omitted 
from the record, there is nothing that has been shown about this case that 
indicates a compelling reason to take that extreme 
measure.