Title: Bergerson v. Salem-Keizer School District

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: September 28, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
KARIN BERGERSON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
SALEM-KEIZER SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent on Review.
(FDA-02-2; CA A118518; SC S51711)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 8, 2005.
Thomas K. Doyle, Bennett, Hartman, Morris & Kaplan LLP,
Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on
the brief was Aruna A. Masih.
Nancy J. Hungerford, The Hungerford Law Firm, Oregon City,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  With her on the brief
was Jennifer L. Hungerford.
Before Carson,** Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz,*** and Balmer, Justices.****
CARSON, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The order
of the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board for further
proceedings.
*Appeal from order of the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board, 194 Or App 301, 95 P3d 215 (2004).
**Chief Justice at the time of argument.
***Chief Justice at the time the decision was issued.
****Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
CARSON, J.
The issues in this administrative law case are whether
the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board (FDAB) correctly interpreted and
applied the terms "unreasonable" and "clearly an excessive
remedy" as they are used in ORS 342.905 and whether the Court of
Appeals applied the correct standard of review to the FDAB's
decision.  Those issues arose out of a decision by the school
board of the Salem-Keizer School District (the district) to
dismiss a teacher (petitioner) on grounds of "immorality" and
"neglect of duty" under ORS 342.865(1)(b) and (d).  The FDAB
reversed the school board's decision, ordering the district to
reinstate petitioner.  The district appealed to the Court of
Appeals.  The Court of Appeals reversed the FDAB's decision and
remanded the case to the FDAB for further proceedings.  Bergerson
v. Salem-Keizer School District, 194 Or App 301, 325-26, 95 P3d
215 (2004).  Petitioner sought this court's review.  We allowed
review and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
We take the facts from the Court of Appeals decision
and from the record.  Petitioner was employed as a contract
school teacher by the district.  She had taught for the district
for approximately 19 years and had not been subject to any prior
disciplinary action.  In 1999, petitioner began having marital
problems and other family difficulties.  Eventually, her husband
moved out of the family home to live with another woman and
initiated marital dissolution proceedings.  
On January 6, 2001, petitioner drove to meet her
estranged husband at his girlfriend's house.  Petitioner and her
husband had an argument, and petitioner returned to her vehicle,
where she attempted to kill herself by taking various
prescription medications.  She then started her vehicle and
rammed it into her husband's vehicle, which was parked in the
driveway.  The impact of the collision pushed her husband's
vehicle into his girlfriend's house, causing significant damage
to the house. 
Petitioner, who was injured in the collision, was taken
to the hospital.  Afterwards, she voluntarily committed herself
for psychiatric treatment.  Two local newspapers reported the
incident, and the district placed petitioner on administrative
leave.  
The district attorney charged petitioner with four
crimes related to the incident, including criminal mischief.  As
part of a plea bargain, petitioner pleaded no contest to the
criminal mischief charge.  In return, the other charges were
dropped.  The plea bargain provided that, if petitioner
successfully completed probation, the case against her would be
dismissed and she would have no criminal record at the end of her
probation term.  However, the plea bargain also provided that, if
petitioner violated the conditions of her probation, the court
automatically would sentence her on her plea of no contest. 
The parents of several students at petitioner's school
and some staff members at the school informed the district that
they did not want petitioner to return to teaching.  At first,
the district transferred petitioner to another school.  Then, in
November 2001, the district superintendent recommended to the
school board that petitioner be dismissed.  The district notified
petitioner of the grounds for the superintendent's recommendation
and conducted an informal hearing before the school board.  The
school board unanimously decided to dismiss petitioner.
Petitioner appealed her dismissal to the FDAB.  At her
hearing before an FDAB panel (the panel), (1) a psychologist
who had examined petitioner testified that her conduct in January
2001 had represented an isolated incident and was unlikely to
reoccur.  In addition, petitioner's treating psychiatrist
submitted a written opinion that petitioner was "emotionally and
mentally fit to return to * * * teaching[.]"  The panel also
heard testimony that, in the past, two other teachers had
attempted suicide and successfully returned to teaching for the
district.  Finally, the panel considered evidence that the
district only issued a letter of warning to another teacher who
had been accused of domestic violence and who had entered into a
diversion agreement on a charge of harassment. 
ORS 342.905(6) provides, in part: 
"[When a dismissed contract teacher appeals to the
FDAB, the FDAB] panel shall determine whether the facts
relied upon to support the statutory grounds cited for
dismissal * * * are true and substantiated.  If the
panel finds these facts true and substantiated, it
shall then consider whether such facts, in light of all
the circumstances and additional facts developed at the
hearing * * *, are adequate to justify the statutory
grounds cited. * * * The panel shall not reverse the
dismissal * * * if it finds the facts relied upon are
true and substantiated unless it determines, in light
of all the evidence and for reasons stated with
specificity in its findings and order, that the
dismissal * * * was unreasonable, arbitrary or clearly
an excessive remedy." 
Following the hearing, the panel found that the following facts,
upon which the school board relied, in part, in dismissing
petitioner, were true and substantiated:  (1) petitioner
intentionally drove her vehicle into her husband's vehicle; (2)
petitioner pleaded no contest to a charge of criminal mischief;
(3) petitioner suffered injuries in the crash and was unable to
work for several days; (4) articles describing petitioner's
conduct appeared in two local newspapers; and (5) parents
expressed concern about petitioner's return to teaching because
of the January 2001 incident.  However, the panel found that the
following facts were not true and substantiated:  (1) petitioner
drove her vehicle at a high rate of speed through a residential
neighborhood before crashing into her husband's vehicle; (2)
petitioner "had difficulty or was otherwise 'compromised' in her
'effectiveness as a teacher'" during the two years preceding the
January 2001 incident; (3) petitioner extensively discussed her
personal problems with staff or other teachers and "required an
unusual amount of coverage from other teachers"; (4) petitioner
failed to obtain "effective mental health treatment" or request
leave; (5) petitioner stated that her conduct during the January
2001 incident was "normal" or "acceptable" and was none of the
district's business; and (6) "parents had specific facts about
which to be concerned regarding [petitioner's] behavior 'prior to
[the January 2001] incident[.]'"   
Based upon the facts that it found to be true and
substantiated, the panel reasoned that the school board had
established two of the statutorily prescribed grounds for
dismissal, "immorality" and "neglect of duty." (2)  First, the
panel concluded that petitioner's conduct constituted "neglect of
duty" because it adversely had affected "positive relations with
parents and the community" and adversely had affected the
"dignity of the profession."  Second, the panel concluded that
petitioner's conduct was "immoral" in that it had harmed innocent
third parties and had violated community standards as expressed
in the criminal law. (3)  Furthermore, the panel held that the
school board's decision to dismiss petitioner was not "arbitrary"
because it was based upon reason or fact, and not "preference,
bias, prejudice, or convenience[.]" (4)  
However, the panel further concluded that, although not
"arbitrary," the school board's decision to dismiss petitioner
was "unreasonable."  At the outset, the panel interpreted the
term "unreasonable," as it is used in ORS 342.905(6), to mean
"lacking justification in fact or circumstance."  The panel then
concluded that the school board's decision to dismiss petitioner
fit within that interpretation of the term "unreasonable" for
three reasons.  First, the panel asserted that petitioner's
reassignment to a new school had addressed parents' concerns
about petitioner continuing to teach their children.  Second, the
panel claimed that the school board "could" have considered its
past success in continuing to employ other teachers who had
attempted suicide.  Third, the panel maintained that the school
board "could" have considered and compared the disciplinary
action taken against another teacher who only had received a
letter of warning after being charged with domestic violence.   
Although failing to interpret explicitly the term
"clearly an excessive remedy," as it is used in ORS 342.905(6),
the panel also concluded that the school board's decision to
dismiss petitioner was "clearly an excessive remedy."  To justify
that conclusion, the panel stated that the school board had
relied upon facts that were untrue and unsubstantiated
(specifically, that petitioner had a long-term performance
problem) and that the school board had overreacted to an isolated
incident.  The panel also suggested that the school board had
misunderstood the legal consequences of petitioner's no contest
plea and had treated petitioner's criminal conduct as more
serious than warranted.  
Because the panel found that the school board's
decision to dismiss petitioner was "unreasonable" and "clearly an
excessive remedy," even though the evidence established two of
the statutory grounds for dismissal, the panel reversed the
school board's decision to dismiss petitioner and ordered her
reinstated.  
Both petitioner and the district sought judicial review
of the panel's decision in the Court of Appeals.  On judicial
review, the district claimed that the panel erred in concluding
that petitioner's dismissal was "unreasonable" and "clearly an
excessive remedy."  The district also assigned as error the
panel's factual findings and the panel's failure to remand the
case for reconsideration by the school board.  For her part,
petitioner assigned error to the panel's findings that she acted
intentionally in crashing into her husband's vehicle, its
conclusion that she had neglected her duty, and its
interpretation of "immorality."  
Although it approved of the panel's interpretation that
the term "unreasonable" meant "lacking justification in fact or
circumstance[,]" the Court of Appeals did not agree with the
panel's application of that interpretation to the facts of the
case.  Bergerson, 194 Or App at 313.  Specifically, the Court of
Appeals held that the panel erred in concluding that petitioner's
dismissal had been "unreasonable" because the panel had relied on
factually distinguishable cases and had failed to explain its
reasoning adequately.  Id. at 313-15.  The Court of Appeals
further held that the panel erred in concluding that petitioner's
dismissal had been "clearly an excessive remedy" because the
panel had failed to interpret the term "clearly an excessive
remedy" and had failed to justify its conclusion adequately. 
Id. at 315-17.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the
panel's determination that petitioner's dismissal had been
"unreasonable" and "clearly an excessive remedy" and remanded the
case to the FDAB for further proceedings.  Id. at 325-26.  The
Court of Appeals rejected the district's and petitioner's
remaining assignments of error.  Id. at 325.  We allowed
petitioner's petition for review. 
Before this court, petitioner first raises the question
of what standard of review applies to school board dismissal
decisions.  Petitioner additionally questions whether the courts
or the FDAB should interpret the statutory terms of ORS 642.905. 
She argues that the standard articulated in an earlier case that
construed ORS 342.905, Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19,
294 Or 357, 363-64, 657 P2d 188 (1982), no longer applies because
this court decided that case prior to deciding its germinal case
on statutory construction, PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries,
317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  Petitioner also asserts
that, even if the Ross standard still applies, it does not apply
equally to the terms "unreasonable," "arbitrary," and "clearly an
excessive remedy," as they are used in ORS 342.905(6). 
Petitioner further maintains that the FDAB correctly interpreted
the terms "unreasonable" and "clearly an excessive remedy," and
that the Court of Appeals improperly substituted its judgment for
that of the FDAB.  We turn first to our standard of review and
then proceed to consider the FDAB's interpretation and
application of the terms in question.  
Petitioner is a contract teacher.  Given that status,
she may be dismissed only upon certain specified grounds,
including:
"(b) Immorality; [or]
"* * * * *
"(d) Neglect of duty, including duties specified
by written rule[.]"
ORS 342.865(1).  "Authority to dismiss * * * a contract teacher
is vested in the district school board subject to" the FDAB
appeal process.  ORS 342.895(2). 
Judicial review of final orders of the FDAB is governed
by the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act (APA).  See ORS
342.905(9) (so stating).  On judicial review under the APA, 
"(a) The court may affirm, reverse or remand the
order.  If the court finds that the agency has
erroneously interpreted a provision of law and that a
correct interpretation compels a particular action, it
shall:
"(A) Set aside or modify the order; or
"(B) Remand the case to the agency for further
action under a correct interpretation of the provision
of law.
"(b) The court shall remand the order to the
agency if it finds the agency's exercise of discretion
to be:
"(A) Outside the range of discretion delegated to
the agency by law[.]"
ORS 183.482(8). 
Here, in response to petitioner's appeal, the panel
found that some of, but not all, the facts relied upon by the
school board were true and substantiated and that those true and
substantiated facts, standing alone, were adequate to justify the
statutory grounds of "immorality" and "neglect of duty." 
However, under the third step of its review function, the panel
concluded that petitioner's dismissal was "unreasonable" and
"clearly an excessive remedy."
Somewhat as an aside, the district argued before the
Court of Appeals that the FDAB had erred in failing to remand
petitioner's case back to the school board upon the finding that
some of the facts relied upon by the school board were not true
and substantiated.  The district asserted that ORS 342.905
required remand to the school board any time that the FDAB found
that some facts were not true or substantiated.  The Court of
Appeals rejected that argument, holding that the FDAB has no
statutory authority to remand a case back to the school board if
the FDAB determines that some of the facts relied upon by the
school district were not true.  Bergerson, 194 Or App at 322-23. 
In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeals examined ORS
342.905 and noted that "the statute provides two options: 
reversal of the dismissal and reinstatement, on the one hand, and
affirmance of the dismissal, on the other.  The statute nowhere
uses the term 'remand.'"  Id. at 321.  The Court of Appeals
further observed that "nothing in the text of ORS 342.905
requires or allows remand to the school board on the ground that
the school board might not have imposed the sanction of dismissal
based on the more limited facts that FDAB finds to be true."  Id.
at 322.  Finally, the Court of Appeals stated:
"We agree with respondent that FDAB's reversal
authority would be hollow indeed were FDAB limited to
remanding each time it found that some of the facts
relied upon by a school board were untrue or
unsubstantiated even if the remaining facts supported
the statutory grounds for dismissal.  The legislature
has not provided such a process. * * * Rather, where at
least some of the facts are true and substantiated and
support the cited statutory grounds for dismissal,
subsection (6) authorizes FDAB to determine whether to
affirm or reverse a school board based on whether the 
dismissal was unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly an
excessive remedy.  That is the only statutory
'consequence' provided when FDAB finds that some facts
are proven and some facts are not proven."
Id. (internal citation and footnote omitted).
We agree with that analysis and conclusion.  In
addition to the lack of express statutory authority to remand a
case to the school board, other factors support the conclusion
that the FDAB has no remand authority.  First, remand for further
factfinding would be inconsistent with the FDAB's role as primary
factfinder.  In Ross, 294 Or at 361-62, this court explained:
"No hearing is required at the school board level. 
The contested case hearing conducted by the FDAB
presents a dismissed teacher with the first opportunity
to rebut the facts and charges brought by the district
superintendent and approved by the school board.  One
of the FDAB's 'review' functions is that of primary
fact-finder." 
Second, ORS 342.905(6) directs the FDAB to "consider whether [the
facts found to be true], in light of all the circumstances and
additional facts developed at the hearing * * *, are adequate to
justify the statutory grounds [for dismissal] cited."  That
statute thus expressly grants to the FDAB the function of
deciding whether a ground for dismissal was satisfied.  See Ross,
294 Or at 362-63 (stating FDAB determines for itself whether
facts found to be true constitute ground for dismissal). 
Finally, under the FDAB's third function, it is required to
determine whether the school board's dismissal decision was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly an excessive remedy.  Each of
those standards clearly authorizes the FDAB to make the final,
binding choice without a remand to the school board.  Therefore,
we agree with the Court of Appeals that the FDAB is not required
(and, indeed, is not even authorized) to remand a case back to
the school board upon a finding that some of the facts that the
school board found were not true and substantiated.     
Returning to the primary issue, determining the meaning
of a statute is a question of law, "ultimately for the court." 
Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 224, 621
P2d 547 (1980).  "When an agency's interpretation or application
of a provision of law is at issue, the reviewing court's standard
of review depends upon whether the phrase at issue is an exact
term, an inexact term, or a delegative term."  Coast Security
Mortgage Corp. v. Real Estate Agency, 331 Or 348, 353, 15 P3d 29
(2000).  Exact terms "impart relatively precise meaning[s]," and
"[t]heir applicability in any particular case depends upon agency
factfinding."  Springfield Education Ass'n., 290 Or at 223-24. 
An appellate court "reviews agency application of exact terms for
substantial evidence."  Coast Security Mortgage Corp., 331 Or at
354 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Inexact terms express a
complete legislative meaning but with less precision.  Id. at
354.  An appellate court must review an agency's interpretation
of inexact terms to ensure that it is consistent with the
legislature's intent.  Id.  "Delegative terms express incomplete
legislative meaning that the agency is authorized to complete." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  An appellate court
reviews an agency's interpretation of delegative terms to ensure
that the interpretation is "within the range of discretion
allowed by the more general policy of the statute."  Id.  
As noted earlier, the statute in question here, ORS
342.905(6), provides, in part:
"[When a dismissed contract teacher appeals to the
FDAB, the FDAB] panel shall determine whether the facts
relied upon to support the statutory grounds cited for
dismissal * * * are true and substantiated.  If the
panel finds these facts true and substantiated, it
shall then consider whether such facts, in light of all
the circumstances and additional facts developed at the
hearing * * *, are adequate to justify the statutory
grounds cited.  * * *  The panel shall not reverse the
dismissal * * * if it finds the facts relied upon are
true and substantiated unless it determines, in light
of all the evidence and for reasons stated with
specificity in its findings and order, that the
dismissal * * * was unreasonable, arbitrary or clearly
an excessive remedy."
As we read the statute, the FDAB review function can be broken
down into three steps.  First, the panel determines whether the
facts upon which the school board relied are true and
substantiated.  Second, the panel determines whether the facts
found to be true and substantiated constitute a statutory basis
for dismissal. (5)  Third, even if the facts constitute a
statutory basis for dismissal, the panel may reverse the school
board's dismissal decision if the decision nonetheless was
"unreasonable, arbitrary[,] or clearly an excessive remedy."      

The Court of Appeals concluded that the panel erred in
interpreting the term "clearly an excessive remedy" and in
applying the terms "unreasonable" and "clearly an excessive
remedy."  Bergerson, 194 Or App at 313-18.  Petitioner disputes
that conclusion.  Thus, this case turns on the interpretation of
the terms "unreasonable" and "clearly an excessive remedy," as
those terms are used in ORS 342.905(6), and on the application of
those terms to the facts of this case. 
Both parties contend that the terms "unreasonable" and
"clearly an excessive remedy" are delegative terms, and we agree. 
As explained in Coast Security Mortgage Corp., 331 Or at 354,
"[d]elegative terms express incomplete legislative meaning that
the agency is authorized to complete."  (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)  Here, ORS 342.905(6) defines neither term, and both
terms are open to multiple interpretations.  See id. at 354
(examining whether term is defined in another part of statute and
whether term is open to various interpretations to determine if
it is delegative); cf. J. R. Simplot Co. v. Dept. of Agriculture,
340 Or 188, 197, 131 P3d 162 (2006) (concluding that term was not
delegative because surrounding text limited meaning of term).  In
addition, the term "unreasonable" is among the examples of
delegative terms this court has noted previously.  See
Springfield Education Ass'n., 290 Or at 228 (describing the terms
"good cause," "fair," "unfair," "undue," and "unreasonable," as
delegative).  We conclude that the terms "unreasonable" and
"clearly an excessive remedy" express incomplete legislative
meaning that the FDAB is authorized to complete; therefore, they
are delegative. 
As noted above, we review the agency's interpretation
of delegative terms to determine whether it is within the range
of discretion allowed by the more general policy of the statute. 
Determining the general policy of a statute is a matter of
statutory construction controlled by the PGE framework.  See
Lombardo v. Warner, 340 Or 264, 270-72, 132 P3d 22 (2006)
(generally following that methodology).  When interpreting a
statute, this court must give effect to the legislature's intent. 
PGE, 317 Or at 610.  To do so, we begin our analysis by
considering the text and context of the statute in question.  Id.
at 610-11.  We give "words of common usage their plain, natural,
and ordinary meaning[s]," and we give words that have well-defined legal meanings those meanings.  Norden v. Water Resources
Dept., 329 Or 641, 645, 996 P2d 958 (2000).  As part of that
first level of analysis, this court considers its prior
interpretations of the statute.  State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 532,
964 P2d 1007 (1998).  If the statute's meaning is clear from an
analysis of its text and context, we proceed no further. (6) 
PGE, 317 Or at 611.          
The terms "unreasonable," "arbitrary," and "clearly an
excessive remedy," as they are used in ORS 342.905(6), define the
FDAB's review authority.  Our task here is to determine the range
of discretion delegated to the FDAB through the use of the
statutory terms "unreasonable" and "clearly an excessive remedy,"
and to evaluate whether the FDAB's action in applying those terms
was within that range of discretion granted. (7) 
We begin with the term "unreasonable."  ORS 342.905(6)
provides no definition of that term, and nothing indicates that
the legislature intended it to have a special legal meaning. 
Thus, we look to its common dictionary definition.  See Massee
and Massee, 328 Or 195, 202, 970 P2d 1203 (1999) (using common
dictionary definition of term where no definition was provided in
statute).  "Unreasonable" is defined as "not governed by or
acting according to reason * * * exceeding the bounds of
reason[.]"  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2507 (unabridged
ed 2002).  "Reason," in turn, is defined as "[a] statement
offered as * * * a justification of an act[;]" "a rational ground
or motive[;]" or "a sufficient ground of explanation or of
logical defense[.]"  Id. at 1891.  Thus, in the present context,
"unreasonable" means acting without a rational or logical
justification for that particular action.  We are aware of no
relevant context that suggests a contrary or different
interpretation.  See Western Generation Agency v. Dept. of Rev.,
327 Or 327, 332-33, 959 P2d 80 (1998) (relying upon dictionary
definition where statute does not define term and context does
not alter dictionary definition of term).  Therefore, a school
board's dismissal of a teacher is "unreasonable" if the dismissal
has no rational or logical justification.  Conversely, dismissal
is reasonable if it is a rational action and it is logically
justified. 
Following petitioner's FDAB appeal hearing, the panel
interpreted the term "unreasonable" to mean "lacking
justification in fact or circumstance."  That interpretation is
similar to the one that we have set out above and is the within
the range of discretion that ORS 342.905(6) grants.  However, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the panel erred in applying
its interpretation to the facts of this case.  To conclude that a
dismissal is "lacking justification in fact or circumstance" and,
thus, is "unreasonable," the FDAB must articulate a rational
connection between the facts and the legal conclusions that it
draws from them.  Ross, 294 Or at 370.  "[A]gencies * * * are
required to demonstrate in their opinions the reasoning that
leads the agency from the facts that it has found to the
conclusions that it draws from those facts."  Drew v. PSRB, 322
Or 491, 500, 909 P2d 1211 (1996) (emphasis in original).  "[An]
agency's failure to connect permissibly its facts and its holding
is fatal to the agency's order."  Id. at 500-01.    
Here, the panel held that petitioner's dismissal was
"lacking justification in fact or circumstance" and, thus,
"unreasonable" because her reassignment had addressed parental
concerns about her, because the school board "could" have
considered "its prior success with teachers engaging in suicide
attempts" and because the school board "could" have considered
"that another teacher with at least the same, if not a stronger
criminal outcome, was given a [l]etter of [w]arning."  (Emphasis
added.)  In its order, the panel failed to provide a rational
connection between the facts of petitioner's case and the panel's
final conclusion that the school board's dismissal decision had
no justification.  The panel should have explained how the facts
of petitioner's conduct and of the school board's response
rationally supported the panel's determination that the school
board acted unreasonably.  
The panel's decision fails to provide that essential
linkage in several respects.  First, the district's initial
reassignment of petitioner does not make the school board's later
dismissal decision necessarily unreasonable, as the school board
is not bound by the district's initial reassignment choice.  See
ORS 342.895(2) (granting school board authority to dismiss
teacher).  Although petitioner's initial reassignment may have
resolved some of the parent concerns about petitioner, the school
board may have felt, for example, that the reassignment did not
address petitioner's criminal conduct.  Additionally, mere
suggestions of what the school board could have done do not
address the limits on what a school board reasonably might decide
to do instead.  
Neither does exclusively focusing on other possible
courses of action that the school board chose not to pursue
necessarily demonstrate that the school board's actual chosen
course was irrational or not logically justified.  The panel
never addressed the facts on which the school board did rely in
dismissing petitioner, such as her suicide attempt, her criminal
conduct, and the related publicity, and did not explain how those
facts relate to the criteria in ORS 342.905(6).  Furthermore, the
panel did not explain how the prior school board decisions that
the panel cited supported its conclusion that the school board
had acted unreasonably in dismissing petitioner in this case. 
Although the panel may look to other board actions, the board's
choice in one instance does not necessarily constrain the board's
discretion thereafter.  
Based upon the foregoing considerations, we conclude
that the panel failed to articulate a rational connection between
the facts that it found and the legal conclusions that it drew
from them.  Thus, remand to the FDAB is necessary for an FDAB
panel rationally to apply its interpretation of the term
"unreasonable" to the facts of this case.   
We note also, that, in finding that petitioner's
dismissal was "clearly an excessive remedy," the FDAB failed to
complete the general policy decision that the term "clearly an
excessive remedy" represents and apply it to the facts of this
case.  The FDAB had a duty to complete the legislative meaning of
the delegative term "clearly an excessive remedy" consistently
with the general policy of ORS 342.905(6).  See Coast Security
Mortgage Corp., 331 Or at 353-54 (so illustrating).  It is
impossible for this court to say whether the FDAB properly
applied the term "clearly an excessive remedy" when the FDAB
order provided no explanation of its application of that term
upon which this court can make its assessment.  For us to perform
our review function, the FDAB must have performed its own
function first.  Here, it did not.  Consequently, remand is
necessary to allow the FDAB to complete the legislative meaning
of the term "clearly an excessive remedy" and to apply that
legislative policy rationally to the facts of this case.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, we conclude that we
must "[r]emand [this] case to the agency for further action under
a correct interpretation of the * * * law."  ORS
183.482(8)(a)(B). 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
order of the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board for further
proceedings.
1. The FDAB hears appeals by a panel of three of its members. 
See ORS 342.905(2)(a) (so providing).
2. ORS 342.865(1) allows school districts to dismiss a teacher
on those grounds, among others.
3. Before this court, neither petitioner nor the district
disputes the panel's determination as to the facts that it found
to be true and substantiated, or its conclusion that those facts
constituted statutory bases for dismissal for "neglect of duty"
and "immorality."  
4. Neither petitioner nor the district appealed the panel's
interpretation of the term "arbitrary" or its application of that
term to the facts of this case.  Therefore, the proper
interpretation and application of the term "arbitrary," as that
term is used in ORS 342.905(6), is not before us. 
5. If the "panel finds that the facts relied on to support the
recommendation of the district superintendent are untrue or
unsubstantiated, or if true and substantiated, are not adequate
to justify the statutory grounds cited as reason for the
dismissal * * *, and so notifies the contract teacher, the
district superintendent, the district school board and the
Superintendent of Public Instruction, the teacher shall be
reinstated[.]"  ORS 342.905(7)(a). 
6. We note that ORS 174.020(3) provides:
"A court may limit its consideration of
legislative history to the information that the parties
provide to the court.  A court shall give the weight to
the legislative history that the court considers to be
appropriate."
7. We reject without further discussion petitioner's
contention that the FDAB must disregard any cases decided by this
court if they predate our decision in PGE.  See, e.g., State v.
Reid, 319 Or 65, 68-69, 872 P2d 416 (1994) (citing and relying
upon pre-PGE case law); State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or
597, 608, 932 P2d 1145 (1997) (same).