Title: State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Talley

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

329 So. 2d 52 (1976) STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Billy Linn TALLEY et al. No. 48561. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 30, 1976. Sharp & Fisher, Corinth, for appellant. *53 Smith, Downs, Coleman & Ross, Price & Krohn, Joe B. Mitchell, Corinth, for appellees. Before INZER, SUGG and WALKER, JJ. WALKER, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal from the Chancery Court of Alcorn County, Mississippi, which found for individual complainants in four suits combined for trial, and which involved Mississippi's uninsured motorist statutes. We affirm. A summary of the pertinent facts shows that a collision occurred in Alcorn County, Mississippi, on September 14, 1968, between an automobile operated by Flora Mae Humes and an automobile operated by William Carroll Mills. Julian W. McLeod, Billy Linn Talley, and Eddie M. Talley were passengers in the Mills' vehicle at the time of the collision. The Mills' vehicle was covered by a policy of insurance including, inter alia, liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage written by State Farm, and the Humes' vehicle was covered at the time of the collision by a liability policy written by Wabash Fire & Casualty Insurance Company. On November 20, 1969, separate suits were instituted by McLeod, Billy Linn Talley and Eddie M. Talley against Mills (the guests' driver) and Humes. All causes were brought in the Circuit Court of Alcorn County. Wabash undertook the defense of Humes under the liability provisions of its policy. After filing a motion to quash process and a separate answer to the declarations, the attorney engaged by Wabash to defend Humes was permitted by the court to withdraw from the case. Wabash did not furnish additional counsel for Humes. Default judgments on writs of inquiry were entered by the Circuit Court of Alcorn County on February 4, 1971, against Flora Mae Humes in favor of Mills ($20,000.00); on May 12, 1971, for McLeod ($8,500.00); on May 13, 1971, for Billy Linn Talley ($13,887.81) and Eddie M. Talley for ($7,000.00). In June and July, 1971, McLeod, Billy Linn Talley and Eddie M. Talley instituted suits in the Chancery Court of Alcorn County respectively against the uninsured motorist carrier of their family owned vehicles, (State Farm for McLeod and Employers Fire Insurance Company for the Talleys). Mills subsequently transferred his cause to the chancery court under similar allegations and all four cases were consolidated for trial. The chancellor found, as matters of fact on a trial de novo, that each appellee sustained extensive and serious injuries exceeding $10,000.00 as a result of the accident; that Wabash by its actions did effectively deny coverage; that Wabash did not properly defend the suit; and, that Flora Mae Humes was an uninsured motorist within the meaning of Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 8285-52 (1956). A decree was entered in favor of appellees. On motion to this Court, Employers was dismissed and a partial satisfaction was entered upon payment to the Talleys of the full amount of the judgment entered against Employers. The only issue raised on this appeal is whether Flora Mae Humes was an uninsured motorist within the meaning of Mississippi's uninsured motorist statute or the provisions of the contract of insurance issued by State Farm. Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 8285-52 defines an uninsured motorist vehicle as a motor vehicle "... as to which... (2) there is such insurance in existence but the insurance company writing the same has legally denied coverage thereunder,..." *54 However, the provision of State Farm's policy which defines an uninsured automobile omits the word "legally" and states as follows: The appellant has addressed itself in its brief to what is meant by the statutory wording "... . but the insurance company writing the same has legally denied coverage... ." (Emphasis added). However, if there is any distinction between the statutory wording "has legally denied coverage" and the provision of the policy which reads "... but the company writing the same denies that there is any coverage thereunder," it is not necessary that we address ourselves to that point since the language of the policy does not violate minimum requirements. In Talbot v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 291 So. 2d 699, 701 (Miss. 1974), this Court said: The provision of State Farm's policy with respect to what constitutes an uninsured automobile does not diminish the coverage required by statute. Therefore, we need only to look to the terms of the contract of insurance to determine whether Flora Mae Humes was an uninsured motorist. As stated earlier, the complainants' policies with State Farm defined an uninsured automobile as "... or there is such applicable ... insurance policy, but the company writing the same denies that there is any coverage thereunder... ." (Emphasis added). This narrows the question to be decided to whether the withdrawal of the attorney representing Flora Mae Humes from the case, and Wabash's failure to provide Humes with further representation as it was required to do under the policy, constituted a denial by Wabash that there was any coverage under its policy with Flora Mae Humes. We are of the opinion that it did. In A. Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage, section 2.32 (1969), the *55 author discusses the history and scope of uninsured motorist coverage: Failure of an insurer to defend a suit against its insured constitutes a denial of coverage in the most meaningful sense. In North River Insurance Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 397, 137 S.E.2d 264, 266 (1964), the Supreme Court of South Carolina quoted with approval State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964), where the Supreme Court of Virginia, when construing a provision of a policy similar to the one now before us, said: In this case, when Wabash failed to provide additional counsel for Flora Mae Humes after initial counsel withdrew, the company's actions spoke louder than words and constituted an effective and complete denial of coverage under its policy with Flora Mae Humes or that they owed her any duty whatsoever. This was sufficient to bring her within the definition of an uninsured motorist under the terms of State Farm's policy with the complainants, which defined an uninsured automobile as being one on which there is an insurance policy, "but the company writing the same denies that there is any coverage thereunder... ." (Emphasis added). It is not necessary that we discuss whether Wabash was insolvent since the appellant has strongly argued throughout that Wabash was not insolvent, and the appellees conceded during oral arguments that there was no proof that Wabash was insolvent. Suffice it to say that our examination of the record does not reveal that Wabash was insolvent at the time of the accident nor within twelve months thereafter nor was it insolvent at the time of trial. The judgment of the lower court on direct appeal is affirmed. On cross-appeal, it is only necessary that we point out that the chancellor erred in not allowing interest on the judgment from the date of the entry of the decree. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (1972). AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL AND ON CROSS-APPEAL DECREE IS MODIFIED TO INCLUDE INTEREST FROM DATE OF ENTRY. GILLESPIE, C.J., PATTERSON and INZER, P. JJ., and SMITH, ROBERTSON, SUGG, BROOM and LEE, JJ., concur.