Title: State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. Brunner

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. Brunner, Slip Opinion No. 
2010-Ohio-1873.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1873 
THE STATE EX REL. LUCAS COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE v. BRUNNER, SECY. OF STATE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. 
Brunner, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1873.] 
Elections — Mandamus — County boards of elections — R.C. 3501.07 — Party’s 
recommendation of new member of county board of elections to secretary 
of state — R.C. 3517.05 — State party’s executive committee has duty to 
resolve dispute between entities when both claim to be rightful county 
executive committee — Writ to compel secretary of state to appoint person 
recommended by one of two competing entities claiming to be county 
executive committee — Secretary of state lacks authority to appoint 
recommended appointee when entity making recommendation has not 
been certified by state central committee as rightful executive committee 
for county — Secretary of state, in absence of state committee’s resolution 
of dispute or final judicial determination, shall make appointment — Writ 
denied. 
(No. 2010-0435 — Submitted April 27, 2010 — Decided April 30, 2010.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
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__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of mandamus to compel 
respondent, Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, to appoint Jon Stainbrook to the 
Lucas County Board of Elections as recommended by relator, one of two 
competing groups claiming to be the Lucas County Republican Party Executive 
Committee.  Because the secretary of state did not abuse her discretion or clearly 
disregard applicable law in rejecting the recommendations of the two competing 
groups, we deny the writ. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} On January 9, 2010, the faction that claims to be the Lucas County 
Republican Party Executive Committee with Jon Stainbrook as its chairperson 
(“Stainbrook faction”) recommended that Secretary of State Brunner appoint 
Stainbrook to the Lucas County Board of Elections for the four-year term 
beginning March 1, 2010.  The secretary of state received the recommendation on 
January 11. 
{¶ 3} On January 15, 2010, the faction with Jeffrey Simpson as its 
chairperson that also claims to be the Lucas County Republican Party Executive 
Committee (“Simpson faction”) recommended that Secretary of State Brunner 
appoint David W. Dmytryka to the Lucas County Board of Elections for the same 
four-year term.  The secretary of state received this recommendation on January 
19. 
{¶ 4} By letter dated January 25, the Stainbrook faction requested that 
the secretary of state respond to certain legal questions concerning the two 
factions and stated that the secretary could not permit the board of elections to 
continue acknowledging the Simpson faction as a lawfully organized group.  An 
elections counsel for the secretary of state replied that the secretary would not 
give an advisory opinion because R.C. 3517.05 places the duty on the state central 
January Term, 2010 
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committee of the Ohio Republican Party to resolve the dispute between the two 
rival factions, and the issue was the subject of litigation pending in the Lucas 
County Court of Common Pleas.  The board of elections had certified to the Ohio 
Republican Party Central Committee the lists of the officers and members of the 
rival factions on January 12. 
{¶ 5} On February 18, 2010, in Gallagher v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
Lucas C.P. No. CI-0201001192-00, the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas 
held that neither competing group had complied with the applicable requirements 
of R.C. 3517.04 for organizing and ordered the state central committee to resolve 
the matter. 
{¶ 6} On March 1, the secretary of state rejected both factions’ 
recommended appointees for the board of elections.  The secretary of state 
determined that she was unable to accept either recommendation “[u]ntil either 
the Lucas County Republican Central and Executive Committee is able to 
organize according to law, or until one of the factions or some other configuration 
of members is recognized by either a court or the Ohio Republican Party State 
Central Committee as the duly organized committee.”  The secretary of state 
specified that she took no position on which faction was the rightful committee 
because by statute, that was the responsibility of the Ohio Republican Party State 
Central Committee.  On that same date, the secretary of state appointed Benjamin 
F. Marsh to the board of elections for the four-year term beginning that day. 
{¶ 7} On March 9, the Stainbrook faction filed this action for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the secretary of state to appoint Stainbrook to the board of 
elections and for a writ of prohibition to invalidate the secretary’s appointment of 
Marsh to the board.  The Stainbrook faction also requested a peremptory other 
writ, including an emergency other writ, precluding the appointment of Marsh.  A 
few days later, we granted an alternative writ on the mandamus claim, dismissed 
the prohibition claim, and denied the requests for an emergency other writ and 
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emergency alternative writ.  State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive 
Commt. v. Brunner, 124 Ohio St.3d 1513, 2010-Ohio-930, 923 N.E.2d 156.  The 
secretary of state filed an answer, and the parties submitted evidence and briefs. 
{¶ 8} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
Legal Analysis 
{¶ 9} The Stainbrook faction requests a writ of mandamus to compel the 
secretary of state to appoint Stainbrook to the board of elections.  “To be entitled 
to the requested relief, relator[] must establish a clear legal right to the requested 
relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the secretary of state to 
provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”  
State ex rel. Heffelfinger v. Brunner, 116 Ohio St.3d 172, 2007-Ohio-5838, 876 
N.E.2d 1231, ¶ 13.  In extraordinary-writ actions challenging a decision of the 
secretary of state, the standard is whether the secretary engaged in fraud, 
corruption, or abuse of discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable law.  
State ex rel. Owens v. Brunner, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2010-Ohio-1374, __ N.E.2d __, 
¶ 26.  There is no evidence or argument of fraud or corruption here, so the 
dispositive issue is whether the secretary of state abused her discretion or clearly 
disregarded applicable law by rejecting the Stainbrook faction’s recommended 
appointee and appointing her own selection. 
{¶ 10} The Stainbrook faction asserts that the secretary of state abused her 
discretion and clearly disregarded R.C. 3501.07 by rejecting its recommended 
appointee, Stainbrook, for the four-year term on the board of elections 
commencing March 1, 2010.  The pertinent portions of the relevant statutes, R.C. 
3501.07 and 3517.05, provide: 
{¶ 11} “3501.07 Party recommendations; appointment 
{¶ 12} “At a meeting held not more than sixty nor less than fifteen days 
before the expiration date of the term of office of a member of the board of 
January Term, 2010 
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elections, or within fifteen days after a vacancy occurs in the board, the county 
executive committee of the major political party entitled to the appointment may 
make and file a recommendation with the secretary of state for the appointment of 
a qualified elector.  The secretary of state shall appoint such elector, unless he 
has reason to believe that the elector would not be a competent member of such 
board.  In such cases the secretary of state shall so state in writing to the chairman 
of such county executive committee, with the reasons therefor, and such 
committee may either recommend another elector or may apply for a writ of 
mandamus to the supreme court to compel the secretary of state to appoint the 
elector so recommended.  In such action the burden of proof to show the 
qualifications of the person so recommended shall be on the committee making 
the recommendation.  If no such recommendation is made, the secretary of state 
shall make the appointment.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 13} “3517.05 Term of committee members; vacancies; rightful county 
central or executive committee 
{¶ 14} “All party committees, the selection of which is provided for in 
sections 3517.02 and 3517.03 of the Revised Code, shall, except as otherwise 
provided in this section, serve until the date of the organizational meeting 
provided for in section 3517.04 of the Revised Code.  * * * 
{¶ 15} “If more than one organized group claims to be the rightful county 
central or executive committee, each such group shall file a list of its officers and 
members as provided in section 3517.06 of the Revised Code, and the board of 
elections with which such lists are filed shall certify them to the state central 
committee of the party concerned.  The state central committee shall meet within 
thirty days after receipt of such certification and forthwith determine and certify 
which committee shall be recognized as the rightful county central or executive 
committee.”  (Emphasis added.) 
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{¶ 16} “Our paramount concern in construing statutes is legislative 
intent.”  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grace, 123 Ohio St.3d 471, 2009-
Ohio-5934, 918 N.E.2d 135, ¶ 25.  “To discern this intent, we must ‘read words 
and phrases in context according to the rules of grammar and common usage.’ ”  
State ex rel. Mager v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio, 123 Ohio St.3d 
195, 2009-Ohio-4908, 915 N.E.2d 320, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 
103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2009-Ohio-5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, ¶ 23.  Under the standard 
for construing statutes in pari materia, statutes relating to the same subject matter 
must be construed together to give full effect to the provisions.  State ex rel. 
Colvin v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 46. 
{¶ 17} “The statutory framework [governing appointments to county 
boards of elections] establishes a bipartisan composition of the state’s boards of 
elections, which provides county executive committees of the two major political 
parties with the right to recommend appointees who shall be appointed by the 
secretary of state.  [Under R.C. 3501.07,] [t]he Secretary may reject the 
recommended appointee if she has reason to believe that an elector would not be a 
competent member of the board.”  State ex rel. Summit Cty. Republican Party 
Executive Commt. v. Brunner, 118 Ohio St.3d 515, 2008-Ohio-2824, 890 N.E.2d 
888, ¶ 2. 
{¶ 18} The Stainbrook faction claims that because its recommended 
appointee was not rejected for incompetence, the secretary of state had a duty 
under R.C. 3501.07 to appoint Stainbrook.  But this claim ignores R.C. 3517.05, 
which must be read in pari materia with R.C. 3501.07 in cases where, as here, the 
secretary of state receives conflicting recommendations from rival organized 
groups claiming to be the rightful county executive committee of the major 
political party entitled to the appointment.  When so construed, we conclude that 
the General Assembly manifestly intended that the state central committee of the 
applicable major political party determine the issue.  See R.C. 3517.05.  There is 
January Term, 2010 
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nothing in R.C. 3501.07 and 3517.05 that imposes any duty on the secretary of 
state to make this determination. 
{¶ 19} We reached a similar conclusion in State ex rel. O’Neil v. Griffith 
(1940), 136 Ohio St. 526, 17 O.O. 160, 27 N.E.2d 142, paragraph two of the 
syllabus, in which we construed different, predecessor versions of R.C. 3501.07 
and 3517.05.  We held that “when conflicting recommendations are made by 
more than one committee, each claiming to be the rightful executive committee, * 
* * the Secretary of State is authorized and required to call upon the state central 
committee of such party to determine and certify which is the rightful county 
executive committee of such party.”  In O’Neil, the applicable version of the 
predecessor statute to R.C. 3501.07 included the following language, which is no 
longer in the statute: 
{¶ 20} “If recommendations are made by more than one committee, each 
claiming to be the rightful executive committee, the secretary of state, before 
making any such appointment, shall notify the chairman of the state central 
committee of such political party, which state central committee shall certify 
which is the rightful committee of such party, and such committee so certified 
shall be recognized by the secretary of state.  If the state central committee fails to 
make such certification within ten days after the giving of such notice, the 
Secretary of State shall determine which of the contesting committees is the 
rightful executive committee, and shall make the appointments as provided in the 
preceding section.”  (Emphasis added.)  G.C. 4785-9, 118 Ohio Laws 223. 
{¶ 21} This entire paragraph was deleted from the statute in 1941.  119 
Ohio Laws 741, 741-742.  But the state central committee retains the authority 
granted in the predecessor to R.C. 3517.05 to determine which of the competing 
groups shall be recognized as the rightful county executive committee.  The 
secretary of state’s authority to make that determination was eliminated long ago.  
“ ‘It is axiomatic that in mandamus proceedings, the creation of the legal duty that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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a relator seeks to enforce is the distinct function of the legislative branch of 
government, and courts are not authorized to create the legal duty.’ ”  State ex rel. 
Gessner v. Vore, 123 Ohio St.3d 96, 2009-Ohio-4150, 914 N.E.2d 376, ¶ 4, 
quoting State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 
2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 18.  Without any specific authorization for 
the secretary of state to make this determination and the express imposition of the 
duty on the state central committee to do so, the Stainbrook faction cannot 
establish that the secretary owed any duty to resolve the matter when confronted 
with conflicting recommendations from more than one faction of the Lucas 
County Republican Party Executive Committee. 
{¶ 22} We will not adopt the construction advocated by the Stainbrook 
faction, which would allow the secretary of state to usurp the state central 
committee’s authority to resolve the conflicting claims.  Instead, as the Stainbrook 
faction itself readily acknowledges, “[t]he Secretary of State is not concerned with 
the affairs of any political party or organization and has no part as such official in 
the political management or control of any party.  [The secretary] is concerned 
only in the functions to be performed by them through their duly constituted 
committees pursuant to the provisions of the statute in relation to the election 
machinery of the state.”  (Emphasis added.)  O’Neil, 136 Ohio St. at 530, 17 O.O. 
160, 27 N.E.2d 142.  It was unclear which, if any, of the rival executive 
committees was duly established at the time the secretary had to appoint a person 
to the board of elections. 
{¶ 23} Moreover, when the secretary of state rejected the two competing 
groups’ recommended appointees, the common pleas court had expressly held 
that neither group had complied with the applicable requirements of R.C. 3517.04 
and ordered the state central committee to resolve the matter.  Notwithstanding 
the court order and the board’s certification of each group’s list of officers and 
members to the state central committee, there is no evidence that the state central 
January Term, 2010 
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committee resolved the dispute before March 1, when the secretary of state had a 
duty to appoint a qualifying elector to the board of elections for the four-year term 
beginning on that date.  See R.C. 3501.06. 
{¶ 24} Therefore, the secretary of state was authorized to select a different 
person than those recommended by the competing groups, and she exercised this 
authority by appointing Marsh to the board of elections.  See R.C. 3501.07 (“If no 
such recommendation is made, the secretary of state shall make the 
appointment”).  The conflicting recommendations, which the secretary of state 
lacked authority to resolve, in effect left the secretary with no viable 
recommendation in the absence of either a resolution of the dispute by the state 
central committee or a final judicial determination. 
{¶ 25} Finally, insofar as the Stainbrook faction claims that the secretary 
of state had a duty to appoint Stainbrook because it is the de facto executive 
committee of the Lucas County Republican Party, it cites no pertinent authority 
for this proposition.  Instead, it relies primarily on those cases in which the 
secretary of state was not confronted with conflicting recommendations from 
competing groups.  See Summit Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt., 118 
Ohio St.3d 515, 2008-Ohio-2824, 890 N.E.2d 888.  At a minimum, the secretary’s 
interpretation of the pertinent provisions – R.C. 3501.07, 3517.05, and 3501.06 – 
is a reasonable one and is thus entitled to judicial deference.  See State ex rel. 
Skaggs v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio-6333, 900 N.E.2d 982, ¶ 56, 
quoting Colvin, 120 Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 57 (“ 
‘The secretary of state’s construction is reasonably supported by the pertinent 
provisions, and in accordance with well-settled precedent, the court must defer to 
that reasonable interpretation’ ”). 
{¶ 26} Therefore, based on the plain language of the pertinent statutes and 
the applicable precedent, the secretary of state neither abused her discretion nor 
clearly disregarded applicable law by denying the Stainbrook faction’s 
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recommended appointment of Stainbrook and by appointing Marsh to the board 
of elections. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 27} The Stainbrook faction has not established its entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  Moreover, insofar as it still requests 
relief in the form of an other writ, this relief is inappropriate, and we have 
previously denied it.  See State ex rel. Scioto Downs, Inc. v. Brunner, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 24, 2009-Ohio-3761, 913 N.E.2d 967, ¶ 24 (denying request for an other 
writ under R.C. 2503.40 when requested as a substitute for a writ of mandamus); 
Lucas Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt., 124 Ohio St.3d 1513, 2010-
Ohio-930, 923 N.E.2d 156.  Therefore, we deny the writ. 
Writ denied. 
 
PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, FARMER, O’DONNELL, 
FRENCH, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
SHEILA G. FARMER, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for 
O’CONNOR, J. 
 
JUDITH L. FRENCH, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for 
LANZINGER, J. 
 
The late CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS J. MOYER did not participate in the 
decision in this case. 
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Anthony J. DeGidio; and Ciolek Ltd. and Scott A. Ciolek, for relator. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Aaron D. Epstein, Richard N. 
Coglianese, Damian W. Sikora, Pearl M. Chin, Erick D. Gale, and Michael J. 
Schuler, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent. 
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