Title: Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of Edn.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of Edn., 88 Ohio St.3d 14, 2000-Ohio-260.] 
 
 
 
 
 
HUBBARD ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CANTON CITY SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of Edn. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 14.] 
Appeal dismissed as improvidently allowed — Certification of conflict dismissed as 
improvidently certified — Court of appeals’ opinion vacated for lack of a final 
appealable order. 
(Nos. 98-2577 and 98-2667 — Submitted November 3, 1999 — Decided February 9, 
2000.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 
1998CA00089. 
__________________ 
 
Edward L. Gilbert Co., L.P.A., and Edward L. Gilbert, for appellees. 
 
Kirk E. Roman, for appellants. 
__________________ 
 
The cause is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently allowed in case 
No. 98-2577. 
 
The certification of conflict is dismissed, sua sponte, as having been improvidently 
certified in case No. 98-2667.  Appellants asserted final appealable order status in the 
court of appeals pursuant to R.C. 2501.02 and 2744.02(C).  R.C. 2501.02 was amended 
 
 
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and R.C. 2744.02(C) was enacted by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, which were declared 
unconstitutional in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062. 
 
The opinion of the court of appeals is vacated for the reason that the court of 
appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction for lack of a final appealable order.  See, e.g., 
Burger v. Cleveland Hts. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 188, 718 N.E.2d 912; Estate of Weitzel v. 
Cuyahoga Falls (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 200, 718 N.E.2d 921; Braden v. Cleveland Bd. of 
Edn. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 206, 718 N.E.2d 924. 
 
Therefore, the cause is remanded to the trial court for determination of plaintiffs’ 
remaining claims. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I would not dismiss this case as improvidently 
allowed.  Our Rules of Practice provide that one of two conditions should be met 
prior to this court’s sua sponte dismissal of an appeal on the basis that it was 
improvidently allowed.  S.Ct.Prac.R. XII.  Before taking this step we should find 
either (1) that there is no substantial constitutional question or question of public or 
great general interest, or (2) that the same question has been raised and passed 
 
 
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upon in a prior appeal.  Id.  Neither of these conditions is met here.  Instead, the 
majority initiates this dismissal, finding that the order appealed from is not final. 
 
Whether the judgment of the trial court denying immunity is final and 
appealable depends on whether R.C. 2744.02(C) was validly reenacted by the 
General Assembly in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215, given that R.C. 2744.02(C) was 
declared unconstitutional as being part of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350.  That is, if 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215 validly reenacted this section, then the trial court’s decision 
denying immunity to the board of education would be final, and the jurisdiction of 
the court of appeals would not be questioned by this court. 
 
I thus would not dismiss the case sua sponte, but rather would have the 
parties brief the jurisdictional issue. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.