Title: Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-13407 
 
RUSSELL METCALF & another1  vs.  BSC GROUP, INC., & others;2 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, third-party defendant. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 3, 2023. - August 21, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Massachusetts Wage Act.  Public Works, Wage determination.  
Contract, For services.  Labor, Public works, Wages.  
Statute, Construction.  Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 14, 2017. 
 
The case was heard by Christine M. Roach, J., on motions 
for summary judgment. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Kristie A. LaSalle (Lou Saban also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
Jonathan C. Burwood for BSC Group, Inc., & others. 
Kate Isley, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of 
Transportation. 
 
 
1 Steven Theurer. 
 
 
2 BSC Companies, Inc.; and David Hayes. 
2 
 
Jon C. Cowen & Michael Robertson, for American Council of 
Engineering Companies of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  Like the idiomatic "square peg in a round 
hole,"3 we conclude that the Prevailing Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, 
§§ 26-27H (Prevailing Wage Act or Act), which governs contracts 
for the construction of certain public works projects, does not 
"fit" the two professional engineering services contracts at 
issue in the present case.  These professional services 
contracts, which the third-party defendant, the Department of 
Transportation (MassDOT), awarded to the defendants, BSC Group, 
Inc., and BSC Companies, Inc. (collectively, together with the 
companies' president, the defendant David Hayes, BSC), were 
untethered to a particular public works construction project and 
were awarded based on BSC's qualifications to provide expert 
professional consulting services to MassDOT over the course of 
years, consistent with or pursuant to G. L. c. 7C, § 58 (§ 58). 
 
 
3 S. Smith, On the Conduct of the Understanding, Lecture IX, 
in Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy, Delivered at the 
Royal Institution, in the Years 1804, 1805 and 1806, at 109-110 
(1850) ("If you choose to represent the various parts in life by 
holes upon a table, of different shapes, -- some circular, some 
triangular, some square, some oblong, -- and the persons acting 
these parts by bits of wood of similar shapes, we shall 
generally find that the triangular person has got into the 
square hole, the oblong into the triangular, and a square person 
has squeezed himself into the round hole"). 
3 
 
 
Unlike contracts for public works construction projects 
governed by the Act, these contracts were not competitively bid 
and were not awarded to the lowest bidder; indeed, the 
compensation MassDOT would pay for BSC's professional services 
was not considered by MassDOT until after the agency had 
selected BSC in view of its expertise.  Rather than specifying 
that BSC's employees would be paid at least a prevailing wage 
determined by the Department of Labor Standards (DLS), as is 
required for contracts covered by the Act, the BSC contracts -- 
the second of which expressly was issued pursuant to § 58 -- 
specified only the hourly rate and maximum total compensation 
that MassDOT would pay to BSC, based on MassDOT's own 
determination as to what was fair and reasonable in view of 
BSC's credentials and experience. 
 
Concluding that the contracts are not governed by the Act 
and that BSC was not required to pay its employees a prevailing 
wage pursuant to the contracts, we affirm the Superior Court 
judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of BSC on the 
4 
 
Prevailing Wage Act claims of its former employees, the 
plaintiffs, Russell Metcalf and Steven Theurer.4,5 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  "The following facts are 
either undisputed 'or viewed in the light most favorable to 
. . . the party against [whom] summary judgment entered.'"  HSBC 
Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 323 (2022), quoting 
Berry v. Commerce Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 633, 634 (2021).6 
 
This case centers on two requests for responses (RFRs) 
issued by MassDOT.  MassDOT released the first in June 2011, 
seeking proposals from prequalified professional services firms 
to provide engineering field surveying services "on general 
highway and bridge projects or as directed as needed," "under 
the direction of the MassDOT Survey Supervisor" on an on-call 
basis.  The selected consultant also would share responsibility 
with MassDOT employees for "general supervision of Survey Crews 
assigned to construction operations."  In connection with the 
 
 
4 For the same reasons, we affirm the Superior Court judge's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the third-party defendant, 
MassDOT, on BSC's third-party claims for indemnification and 
unjust enrichment. 
 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Council of Engineering Companies of Massachusetts. 
 
 
6 The parties have supplied a fully developed record on 
summary judgment.  Contrast Marsh v. Massachusetts Coastal R.R., 
492 Mass. 641, 643 (2023) (motion to dismiss stage). 
5 
 
RFR process, MassDOT did not ask the DLS7 to determine the 
prevailing wage rates for the anticipated work; no prevailing 
wage rate schedule was provided to firms responding to the RFR. 
 
Responding firms were to submit their qualifications for 
the work and were to be selected exclusively on that basis.8  The 
firms were not asked to submit, and did not submit, information 
regarding the financial aspects of their proposals, including 
any proposed compensation to the firm or any proposed wage rates 
for the firm's employees to perform the anticipated work.  The 
contracts thus could not be -- and were not -- awarded on a low-
bid basis. 
 
 
7 The programs and responsibilities of the Department of 
Labor Standards, prior to a reorganization of the Executive 
Office of Labor and Workforce Development in 2011, were housed 
in other divisions.  See Lighthouse Masonry, Inc. v. Division of 
Administrative Law Appeals, 466 Mass. 692, 693 n.3 (2013).  For 
convenience, we use "DLS" when referring to these other 
divisions prior to the 2011 reorganization. 
 
 
8 Responses were to include the "qualifications of [the] 
[pro]spective consultant's personnel," "experience on similar 
projects," and "general understanding of the scope of services," 
along with a list of references, a list of potential conflicts, 
an approved affirmative action certificate, evidence of 
prequalification, audit data, and a brief statement as to 
insurance and risk management.  Responses would be evaluated and 
scored on the basis of personnel, equipment, experience in 
performing similar work, demonstrated understanding of the scope 
of services and completeness of responses to the RFR, 
performance on previous municipal or governmental contracts 
(including references), and capacity to work within the outlined 
areas. 
6 
 
 
Following presentation of BSC's qualifications, MassDOT 
selected BSC to provide the requested specialized consultant 
services to the agency; the financial terms of the deal, 
including proposed compensation rates to be paid to BSC, were 
negotiated thereafter, based on a consideration of BSC's 
qualifications and MassDOT's determination of reasonableness and 
fairness.9  The parties then executed the first contract, which 
governed their relationship from 2012 to 2014.10 
 
In June 2014, before the end of the first contract, MassDOT 
released the second RFR, seeking proposals from prequalified 
firms to provide essentially the same type of engineering field 
surveying services as sought under the first RFR.  The process 
was, in all relevant respects, the same.  As with the first RFR, 
MassDOT did not ask DLS for a prevailing wage schedule, and none 
was provided to firms responding to the RFR.  Again, MassDOT 
selected BSC for the work based on its qualifications, 
negotiating BSC's compensation thereafter following the same 
process.  The parties then executed the second contract, which 
governed their relationship from 2015 to 2017. 
 
 
9 BSC provided MassDOT with its rates of pay for employees 
to be assigned to the contract, and MassDOT calculated the price 
it determined was reasonable and fair to pay BSC by adding "a 
blended rate of pay per type of employee to an audited overhead 
rate calculated for BSC by MassDOT." 
 
10 The original contract, which ran until 2013, was extended 
through 2014. 
7 
 
 
Neither contract specified that the services were to be 
rendered in connection with a particular public works 
construction project; instead, BSC agreed to provide its 
engineering field surveying services on "general highway and 
bridge projects or as directed as needed" in "District Three" 
over a period of years.11  The contracts did not set forth a 
prevailing wage schedule and did not include an agreement by BSC 
to pay its employees based on prevailing wage rates determined 
by DLS; instead, the contracts specified hourly rates, and the 
maximum total compensation, that MassDOT would pay to BSC for 
its engineering field surveying services.  No provision 
prescribed the wage amount that BSC was to pay to its 
employees.12 
 
Pursuant to the contracts, BSC provided two- and three-
person crews of professional engineering field surveyors 
directly to MassDOT to perform field surveying services on 
various public works projects as directed by MassDOT -- one such 
crew comprised the plaintiffs, Metcalf and Theurer.13  The 
 
 
11 District Three comprises towns and cities in western 
Middlesex and Worcester counties. 
 
 
12 Rather than setting forth a minimum wage for BSC's 
employees, the contracts set limits on labor costs on a not-to-
exceed basis.  These limits were also set forth in sample 
contract provisions attached to the RFRs. 
 
 
13 From January 2012 through June 2017, BSC employed Metcalf 
as a survey party crew chief.  From April 2013 through 
8 
 
plaintiffs performed engineering field surveying services on 
about thirty bridge- and roadway-construction projects in 
District Three. 
 
While the plaintiffs "worked under MassDOT's supervision, 
they often performed surveys requested by the on-site general 
contractor," after receiving MassDOT's "approv[al]," and their 
work "directly aided in the construction process."  According to 
one of their MassDOT supervisors, the plaintiffs' role at many 
project sites was "[t]o support construction operations with 
construction layout."  Field surveyors employed by contractors 
at some of these project sites were paid prevailing wages, as 
set by DLS, for performing the same or similar work.14 
 
b.  Procedural history.  The plaintiffs filed an amended 
complaint against BSC, alleging that it violated the Prevailing 
Wage Act by paying them less than the prevailing wage for the 
work they performed.  BSC filed a third-party complaint against 
MassDOT, essentially seeking indemnification should BSC be held 
liable to the plaintiffs under the Act.  A Superior Court judge 
granted summary judgment in favor of BSC and MassDOT, on the 
 
December 2016, BSC employed Theurer as a survey instrument 
operator. 
 
 
14 After Theurer resigned from BSC, he worked for another 
company, earning a prevailing wage for performing "the same 
exact work" he had performed for BSC on one of the same 
projects. 
9 
 
ground that BSC was not liable under the Prevailing Wage Act 
because MassDOT neither sought a prevailing wage rate 
determination from DLS nor incorporated a prevailing wage rate 
schedule into the contracts.15 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "Our review of a 
decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo."  HSBC 
Bank USA, N.A., 490 Mass. at 326, quoting Berry, 488 Mass. at 
636.  Viewing "the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party against whom summary judgment entered," HSBC Bank USA, 
N.A., supra at 326-327, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where 
there is no material issue of fact in dispute and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Id. at 326.  
"An appellate court may affirm a correct result based on reasons 
that are different from those articulated by the judge below."  
Clair v. Clair, 464 Mass. 205, 214 (2013). 
 
Where, as here, we are called to construe the terms of a 
statute and its applicability, we begin with the statute's plain 
language.  See Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489 Mass. 356, 362 
(2022), quoting Tze-Kit Mui v Massachusetts Port Auth., 478 
Mass. 710, 712 (2018) ("our analysis begins with 'the principal 
source of insight into legislative intent' -- the plain language 
 
 
15 The judge did not reach the alternate argument raised by 
the parties that the Prevailing Wage Act did not apply to the 
professional services contracts, which instead were subject to 
the provisions of § 58. 
10 
 
of the statute").  "[C]ourts must look to the statutory scheme 
as a whole . . . so as to produce an internal consistency within 
the statute" (citation and quotation omitted).  Plymouth 
Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 
600, 605 (2019).  Our aim when construing a statute is to 
construe it "in harmony with prior enactments to give rise to a 
consistent body of law," if possible.  Alves's Case, 451 Mass. 
171, 178 (2008), quoting Hadley v. Amherst, 372 Mass. 46, 51 
(1977).  We give deference to agency interpretations in areas 
where the Legislature has delegated decision-making authority to 
the agency when the "interpretation is not contrary to the plain 
language of the statutes or their underlying purposes."  
Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 533 (2008) 
(opinion letter issued by DLS's predecessor was entitled to 
deference). 
 
b.  Contract for professional services.  There can be no 
doubt that the two RFRs and subsequent contracts were issued 
consistent with or expressly pursuant to the procedures set 
forth in § 58.  Section 58, which was enacted and became 
effective during the term of the first contract, sets forth the 
procedures by which certain State agencies, including MassDOT, 
are to procure "architectural, engineering[,] or related 
professional services," defined to include, as relevant to the 
present case, "land surveying" professional services that are 
11 
 
"required to be performed or approved by a person licensed, 
registered[,] or certified to provide such services," and other 
professional services of an architectural or engineering nature 
or "incidental services, which members of the related 
professions . . . may logically or justifiably perform," 
including "construction phase services."  G. L. c. 7C, § 58 (a). 
 
Section 58 delineates that the agency seeking such services 
must publish, as MassDOT did in connection with each RFR, a 
bulletin requesting that interested firms16 "submit a statement 
of qualifications," and then select the firm "on the basis of 
qualifications for the type of professional services required."  
G. L. c. 7C, § 58 (c)-(e).  As required by § 58, MassDOT 
solicited pricing information "to determine consultant 
compensation only after the agency . . . selected a firm and 
initiated negotiations with the selected firm" (emphasis added).  
G. L. c. 7C, § 58 (e) (1).  And as also required by § 58, 
MassDOT "negotiate[d] conditions including, but not limited to, 
compensation level" payable to BSC and that MassDOT, in its sole 
discretion determined to be "reasonable and fair . . . tak[ing] 
into account the estimated value of the services to be rendered 
 
 
16 "Firm" under § 58 includes an entity "authorized by law 
to practice the profession[] of . . . land surveying."  G. L. 
c. 7C, § 58 (a). 
12 
 
and the scope, complexity[,] and professional nature thereof."  
G. L. c. 7C, § 58 (f) (1). 
 
The plaintiffs do not dispute that the second contract 
specifically was issued pursuant to § 58; nor do they 
meaningfully claim that the first contract was different in 
scope or procured in a different manner.17  Instead, the 
plaintiffs contend that because they performed jobs identical to 
those performed by "laborers in the construction of public 
works," see G. L. c. 149, § 26,18 BSC's § 58 contracts with 
MassDOT are governed by the Prevailing Wage Act.  We disagree. 
 
By its plain terms, the Prevailing Wage Act applies to "a 
contract for the construction of public works."  G. L. c. 149, 
§ 27.  See Construction Indus. of Mass. v. Commissioner of Labor 
& Indus., 406 Mass. 162, 170 (1989) ("The scheme of G. L. 
c. 149, § 27, quite clearly requires that the commissioner set 
wage rates for each public works job.  Any time that any public 
official or public agency plans to award a public works 
contract, the commissioner will set the wage rates applicable to 
 
 
17 MassDOT contends, and the plaintiffs do not dispute, that 
it has been MassDOT's long-standing practice to hire consultants 
through professional services contracts based on their 
qualifications, including prior to the enactment of § 58. 
 
 
18 General Laws c. 149, § 26, provides that "[t]he rate per 
hour of the wages paid to . . . laborers in the construction of 
public works shall not be less than the rate or rates of wages 
to be determined by the commissioner [of DLS] as hereinafter 
provided." 
13 
 
that project").  By contrast, the BSC contracts were untethered 
to a specific public works construction project, specifying only 
that the professional engineering field surveying services would 
be provided on "general highway and bridge projects or as 
directed as needed" in "District Three" over a period of years. 
 
More importantly, the Legislature set forth a procedure for 
the selection of firms to provide professional services to 
agencies, like MassDOT, under § 58 that is incompatible with the 
procedures under the Prevailing Wage Act.  Under the latter, 
"[p]rior to awarding a contract for the construction of public 
works," the public official responsible for causing the public 
works to be constructed must provide to DLS a list of the 
specific jobs to be employed on the construction project; in 
turn, DLS then sets the prevailing wage rate for each job based 
on market conditions, and the agency attaches the resulting 
schedule to its call for bids.  G. L. c. 149, § 27. 
 
Public works construction contracts covered by the Act are 
publicly advertised and generally are awarded to the lowest 
bidder.  See G. L. c. 30, § 39M (a) (contracts for construction 
of public works "shall be awarded to the lowest eligible 
responsible bidder on the basis of competitive bids").  See also 
Associated Subcontractors of Mass., Inc. v. University of Mass. 
Bldg. Auth., 442 Mass. 159, 160 (2004) ("By statute, most public 
construction projects in the Commonwealth are subject to a 
14 
 
statutory competitive bidding process").  Because of the 
pressure inherent in a low bid contest and the attendant 
incentive to pay employees less than market wages in order to 
submit the lowest bid, the Act requires that contractors bidding 
on a public works construction project be provided with the 
prevailing wage rate schedule prior to submitting their bids. 
 
The Act further ensures that the contractors use the 
schedule in submitting their budget proposals by holding them 
liable to pay their employees according to the prevailing wage 
rates.19  In this manner, "[t]he Act is designed to avoid 
rewarding a contractor that submits an artificially low bid on 
public works projects by paying its employees less than the 
prevailing wage."  Marsh v. Massachusetts Coastal R.R., 492 
Mass. 641, 642 (2023).  See Donis v. American Waste Servs., LLC, 
485 Mass. 257, 263-364 (2020), quoting Mullally, 452 Mass. at 
533 (Act "prevents a contractor from 'offer[ing] its services 
 
 
19 The plaintiffs' contention that the determination whether 
the Act applies involves a retrospective, fact-intensive inquiry 
into the work performed by each employee is unworkable as a 
practical matter and unsupported by the Act, which anticipates 
prevailing wage rates to be set "[p]rior" to the award of the 
contract at issue and that contractors will use those rates in 
determining the labor costs portion of their proposed bids.  
G. L. c. 149, § 27.  See In re:  Wage Determination Appeal; 
Central Artery/Tunnel Project; Engineering Field Survey Services 
Contract (MO25V), at 8 (Dep't of Labor & Indus. July 11, 1995) 
("Based on the nature and purpose of the work to be performed 
under the Survey Contract, the individuals to be employed 
thereunder will not be engaged 'in the construction of public 
works'" [emphasis added]). 
15 
 
[to the Commonwealth] for less than what is customarily charged 
by its competitors for nonpublic works contracts'").  Indeed, 
the Commonwealth, by ensuring that the low bid contractor's 
proposal includes labor costs calculated using the prevailing 
wage, itself pays a premium to ensure that laborers on the 
Commonwealth's public construction projects are paid the 
prevailing wage.  See Marsh, supra at 653. 
 
By contrast, professional services firms under § 58 are 
selected by the agency based on the qualifications of the 
firms.20  The firms submit proposals that delineate the firms' 
expertise and experience; no information about costs is required 
or considered by the agency in its selection process.  See G. L. 
c. 7C, § 58 (e) (1) ("An agency may solicit or use pricing 
policies and proposals or other pricing information to determine 
consultant compensation only after the agency has selected a 
firm and initiated negotiations with the selected firm").  
Rather than having DLS set prevailing wage rates "[p]rior to 
awarding a contract," G. L. c. 149, § 27, § 58 requires 
 
 
20 See G. L. c. 7C, § 58 (d) ("An agency shall evaluate the 
firms submitting statements of qualifications, taking into 
account qualifications, letters of interest and technical 
proposals, and the agency may consider, but shall not be limited 
to, considering, ability of professional personnel, past record 
and experience, performance data on file, willingness to meet 
time requirements, location, workload of the firm and any other 
qualifications based on factors that the agency may determine in 
writing are applicable"). 
16 
 
agencies, like MassDOT, to select professional services firms 
solely on the basis of their qualifications, without any "formal 
or informal submission of verbal or written estimates of costs 
or proposals in terms of dollars, hours required, percentage of 
construction cost or any other measure of compensation."  G. L. 
c. 7C, § 58 (d). 
 
After a firm is selected based on its qualifications, the 
agency determines the costs it will pay to this most qualified 
firm based on the agency's sole determination of reasonableness 
and fairness.  See G. L. c. 7C, § 58 (f) (1).  Section 58 does 
not require that wages for the firm's employees be set forth in, 
appended to, or included by reference in the resulting contract.  
That the Legislature crafted the § 58 procedures to be 
incompatible with the Prevailing Wage Act procedures thus 
buttresses our conclusion that these types of contracts are not 
governed by the Act.  Indeed, § 58 contracts, because they are 
not awarded on a low-bid basis, do not trigger the same 
legislative concern that drives the Prevailing Wage Act.  See 
Marsh, 492 Mass. at 646-648. 
 
The plaintiffs suggest reading § 58 and the Act to require 
an agency to select a professional services firm based upon its 
qualifications and then to use prevailing wage rates to 
determine the firm's compensation.  This construction is 
unsupported by the aforementioned process set forth in the Act.  
17 
 
Indeed, as discussed supra, § 58 allows the agency to determine 
the amount it is willing to pay the consultant based on its (not 
DLS's) determination, in its sole discretion as to what is 
reasonable and fair; nothing in § 58 discusses the minimum wages 
the consultant must pay to its employees or permits a consultant 
to pass any prevailing wage obligation along to the 
Commonwealth.  Given these divergent statutory schemes, the 
plaintiffs' reading is unsupported. 
 
Thus, while field surveying work performed under a contract 
for the construction of a public works project requires payment 
of a prevailing wage,21 such work, when performed under a 
contract for professional services, does not.  As DLS has 
concluded, "it is often the case that the prevailing wage 
requirements will apply to only one of two employees performing 
similar or identical tasks yet working under different types of 
contracts" (emphasis added).  In re:  Wage Determination Appeal; 
Central Artery/Tunnel Project; Engineering Field Survey Services 
Contract (MO25V), at 13 (Dep't of Labor & Indus. July 11, 1995).  
 
 
21 The "long-standing administrative interpretation" of DLS, 
as summarized in a 2011 opinion letter, "reflects that the work 
of field engineers (surveying) performed under construction 
contracts let by awarding authorities in the Commonwealth is 
'construction work' within the meaning of [G. L.] c. 149, 
§ 27D[,] and, therefore, is subject to the prevailing wage law" 
(emphasis added). 
18 
 
The plaintiffs were not entitled to a prevailing wage for their 
work under the professional services contracts.22,23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
22 For this reason, we also affirm the grant of summary 
judgment in MassDOT's favor on BSC's third-party claims. 
 
 
23 Because nothing in the record supports the plaintiffs' 
thinly veiled suggestion that MassDOT colluded with BSC to avoid 
paying employees a prevailing wage, we need not reach the 
plaintiffs' posited scenario.  And because we conclude that the 
contracts were not governed by the Prevailing Wage Act, we do 
not reach the question whether, if the Act governed the 
contracts, BSC would be liable, even though MassDOT did not ask 
DLS to set a prevailing wage rate and did not include a 
prevailing wage rate schedule in the contracts.