Title: Commonwealth v. Hardin

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12067 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JAMES C. HARDIN. 
 
 
December 6, 2016. 
 
 
Breaking and Entering.  Larceny.  Practice, Criminal, Complaint, 
Dismissal, Appeal by Commonwealth.  Jurisdiction, Felony. 
 
 
 
In a four-count complaint, James C. Hardin was charged with 
(1) malicious destruction of property having a value over $250, 
(2) breaking and entering a motor vehicle in the daytime with 
intent to commit a felony, (3) larceny of property having a 
value of $250 or less, and (4) possession of a class B 
controlled substance.  A judge in the Boston Municipal Court 
accepted Hardin's guilty plea as to counts 1 and 4, charging 
malicious destruction and drug possession, and dismissed counts 
2 and 3, charging breaking and entering and larceny, for lack of 
probable cause.  The Commonwealth appealed.  In a divided 
opinion, the Appeals Court reversed the dismissal of these 
counts.  Commonwealth v. Hardin, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 681 (2015).  
We allowed Hardin's application for further appellate review.  
We agree that these counts of the complaint should be 
reinstated, but on grounds different from those relied on by the 
Appeals Court. 
 
 
As he did before the Appeals Court, Hardin concedes that 
probable cause existed to support the two counts at issue.  He 
argues, however, that the dismissal should be affirmed on 
alternative grounds.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 
425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997) ("[a]n appellate court is free to 
affirm a ruling on grounds different from those relied on by the 
[plea] judge if the correct or preferred basis for affirmance is 
supported by the record").  Specifically, Hardin argues that the 
challenged counts of the complaint failed to allege a cognizable 
criminal act and that the breaking and entering count failed to 
2 
 
allege an essential element of the offense, namely, that Hardin 
broke and entered into the motor vehicle of another person.  
Instead, the complaint alleges that he "did . . . break and 
enter a . . . motor vehicle . . . , the property of Known to 
Commonwealth."1  Hardin's argument that the complaint fails to 
state a crime raises an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, 
which may be raised at any time, Commonwealth v. Cantres, 405 
Mass. 238, 239-240 (1989), and which cannot be waived.  
Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 547 (2013), citing 
Commonwealth v. Palladino, 358 Mass. 28, 31 (1970).  It is the 
court's duty to consider a challenge to its jurisdiction 
whenever it is raised, and even to consider such an issue on its 
own motion.2  See Commonwealth v. Andler, 247 Mass. 580, 582 
(1924), and cases cited (dismissing complaint sua sponte after 
conviction, where "the complaint set[] forth no crime known to 
the law . . . . No court has jurisdiction to sentence a 
defendant for that which is not a crime"). 
 
 
The complaint was adequate to charge Hardin with each 
offense and to establish jurisdiction in the Boston Municipal 
Court.  "[A] complaint shall contain a caption as provided by 
law, together with a plain, concise description of the act which 
constitutes the crime or an appropriate legal term descriptive 
thereof."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 4 (a), 378 Mass. 849 (1979).  A 
charging instrument must "provide a defendant with fair notice 
of the crime with which he is charged."  Canty, supra at 547, 
citing Commonwealth v. Dixon, 458 Mass. 446, 456 (2010).  "A 
                     
 
1 The larceny count similarly alleges that Hardin "did steal 
the property of Known to Commonwealth."  Hardin concedes that 
this is adequate to allege that the property belonged to another 
person, as implied by the term "steal."  See Commonwealth v. 
Hardin, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 681, 684 (2015) (Rubin, J., dissenting 
in part and concurring in part). 
 
 
2 In this regard, we observe that the malicious destruction 
count, to which Hardin pleaded guilty, also alleges that Hardin 
destroyed the property of "Known to Commonwealth."  If such 
language rendered the breaking and entering count 
jurisdictionally defective, the malicious destruction count 
would suffer from the same defect.  See G. L. c. 266, § 127 
("Whoever destroys or injures the personal property, dwelling 
house or building of another . . . " [emphasis added]).  
Hardin's guilty plea does not waive any jurisdictional defect.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 546-547, 548 
(2013); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 416 (2008) 
(dismissing complaint ten years after guilty plea). 
3 
 
complaint or indictment will not be dismissed . . . 'if the 
offense is charged with sufficient clarity to show a violation 
of law and to permit the defendant to know the nature of the 
accusation against him.'"  Canty, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 430 Mass. 517, 519-520 (1999), cert. denied sub nom. 
Martinez v. Massachusetts, 530 U.S. 1281 (2000).  See G. L. 
c. 277, § 34 ("An indictment shall not be dismissed or be 
considered defective or insufficient if it is sufficient to 
enable the defendant to understand the charge and to prepare his 
defense; nor shall it be considered defective or insufficient 
for lack of any description or information that might be 
obtained by requiring a bill of particulars").3  Read in a 
reasonable, commonsense manner, counts 2 and 3 meet these 
standards by alleging in plain language that Hardin broke and 
entered a motor vehicle with intent to commit a felony and that 
he stole property.4  Each count also refers to the statute Hardin 
allegedly violated, providing further notice of the nature of 
the charges against him.  Moreover, no reasonable person would 
understand count 2 as alleging that Hardin broke and entered his 
                     
 
3 Although G. L. c. 277, § 34, refers only to an 
"indictment," we treat it and like statutes as applying equally 
to a complaint.  See Canty, 466 Mass. at 547, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 430 Mass. 517, 519-520 (1999), cert. 
denied sub nom. Martinez v. Massachusetts, 530 U.S. 1281 (2000) 
("A complaint or indictment will not be dismissed . . . 'if the 
offense is charged with sufficient clarity to show a violation 
of law and to permit the defendant to know the nature of the 
accusation against him'" [emphasis added]).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Palladino, 358 Mass. 28, 30 n.2 (1970) ("While [G. L. c. 277, 
§ 17 (since repealed by St. 1979, c. 344, § 33)], speaks of an 
'indictment[,]' it has been treated as applying equally to a 
complaint"). 
 
 
4 The complaint does not specify either the property that 
was stolen or broken into or the owner of the property.  See 
G. L. c. 277, § 25 ("If an indictment for a crime involving the 
commission . . . of an injury to property describes the property 
with sufficient certainty in other respects to identify the act, 
it need not allege the name of the owner").  The Commonwealth 
urges that the complaint is nonetheless sufficient "to identify 
the act" and thus is in compliance with § 25.  We need not 
resolve this issue.  In the circumstances of this case, any lack 
of specificity does not warrant dismissal, as it could be cured 
by means of a bill of particulars.  G. L. c. 277, § 34.  See 
Canty, 466 Mass. at 548. 
4 
 
own property.  There is no basis to dismiss the complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 416 (2008), is 
not to the contrary.  In that case, the complaint charged that 
the defendant "did, by means of a dangerous weapon, MOTOR 
VEHICLE, assault and beat COMM OF MASS [sic], in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 15A."  Id. at 416.  The complaint was defective 
because the crime of assault and battery, as a crime against the 
person, requires a human victim.  Id. at 417.  The Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts is not capable of being the victim of an 
assault and battery.  The complaint in Wilson did not state a 
crime, as "[t]here is no crime of assault and battery upon the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts."  Id. at 418.  Here, in contrast, 
the offenses in question are crimes against property.  G. L. 
c. 266, §§ 18 and 30.  Any property owner, human or otherwise, 
is capable of being the victim of such an offense.  Each count 
of the complaint, while awkward, is adequate to allege that the 
victim of each offense was a property owner whose identity is 
known to the Commonwealth.5 
 
 
The order dismissing counts 2 and 3 of the complaint is 
reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Boston Municipal 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Timothy St. Lawrence for the defendant. 
 
Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
                     
 
5 Although we conclude that the complaint was adequate in 
this case, the "Known to Commonwealth" language has 
unfortunately resulted in doubt and confusion.  We trust that, 
going forward, the Commonwealth will use more straightforward 
language in its complaints, for example, by using the alleged 
victim's name or a phrase such as "another person."