Title: Com. v. Stark

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

526 Pa. 1 (1990) 584 A.2d 289 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Lawrence E. STARK, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted September 25, 1990. Decided December 21, 1990. *2 Shelley Stark, Chief-Appellate Div., Mitchell A. Kaufman, Appellate Counsel, Office of the Public Defender, Pittsburgh, for appellant. Robert E. Colville, Dist. Atty., Claire C. Capristo, Deputy Dist. Atty., Sandra Preuhs, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for appellee. Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ. LARSEN, Justice. In this appeal we are presented with the issue of whether a trial court may, during sentencing, change a previously rendered verdict of guilty to one of not guilty. *3 Appellant, Lawrence Stark, was charged with the crimes of terroristic threats and simple assault.[1] At the close of the evidence at appellant's bench trial, the following exchange took place: As this transcript shows, the verdict of guilty of terroristic threats was changed, during appellant's sentencing, *5 to one of not guilty. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1102(a), provides: "When a defendant waives a jury trial, the trial judge shall determine all questions of law and fact and render a verdict which shall have the same force and effect as a verdict of a jury." This rule restricts the trial judge's authority over the verdict in a nonjury trial to one which is no greater than his or her authority over a jury verdict, Commonwealth v. Meadows, 471 Pa. 201, 369 A.2d 1266 (1977), and the authority of a trial judge over a jury verdict is limited to consideration of postverdict motions in arrest of judgment or the granting of a new trial. (The grant of a new trial is not at issue herein). Commonwealth v. Parker, 305 Pa.Super. 516, 451 A.2d 767 (1982).[2] Both the trial court and Superior Court characterized the trial court's decision to change appellant's verdict as a sua sponte grant of a motion in arrest of judgment. It is well settled that only causes appearing on the face of the record or insufficiency of the evidence will justify the grant of a motion in arrest of judgment. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 223 Pa.Super. 497, 302 A.2d 420 (1973). Causes appearing on the face of the record include such fundamental defects as lack of jurisdiction, former jeopardy or failure of an indictment or information to charge an offense. Commonwealth v. Schomaker, 293 Pa.Super. 78, 437 A.2d 999 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 501 Pa. 404, 461 A.2d 1220 (1983). Since the record reveals that the trial judge changed this verdict for reasons unrelated to the sufficiency of the evidence or causes appearing on the face of the record, it is clear that this decision by the trial court was not a grant of a motion in arrest of judgment.[3] In changing appellant's *6 verdict, the trial judge went beyond the authority which a trial judge may properly exercise over a verdict. Discomfort by a trial judge during a sentencing proceeding over the prospect of ordering confinement does not form a basis for any authorized action by that trial judge. The verdict of not guilty, therefore, was a legal nullity.[4] Accordingly, the order of Superior Court, 389 Pa.Super. 654, 560 A.2d 830, reinstating the original verdict and remanding the case for sentencing is affirmed. Order affirmed. [1] 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706 and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1), respectively. [2] Although the instant verdict was changed before it was recorded, for present purposes, we deem the unrecorded verdict of guilty to have the effect of a recorded verdict since the trial court impliedly accorded the guilty verdict the status of a recorded verdict when it permitted appellant to waive his postverdict motions (which can only be filed after the verdict is recorded) and to proceed directly to sentencing. [3] We do agree, however, with Superior Court that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty. [4] Since the verdict of not guilty was a legal nullity, the absolute finality afforded a verdict of not guilty under the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply in this situation.