Title: Meshefski v. Shirnan Corp.

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

385 N.W.2d 474 (1986) Leonard R. MESHEFSKI and Audrey J. Meshefski, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SHIRNAN CORPORATION, a North Dakota corporation, Defendant and Appellee. Civ. No. 11045. Supreme Court of North Dakota. April 10, 1986. *475 Patrick W. Fisher, of McConn, Fisher & Thune, Grand Forks, for plaintiffs and appellants. Patrick R. Morley, of O'Grady, Morley & Morley, Grand Forks, for defendant and appellee. VANDE WALLE, Justice. Leonard R. Meshefski and Audrey J. Meshefski appealed from a judgment dismissing their action against Shirnan Corporation for damages arising out of the death of their son, Paul. They also appealed from an order denying their motion for a new trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial. Meshefski went to the C & D Bar, which is owned and operated by Shirnan Corporation, at approximately 7 p.m. on December 17, 1983. Lorenzo Leal went to the C & D Bar sometime between 8 and 9 p.m. While in the C & D Bar, Meshefski and Leal each consumed an undetermined amount of beer. Leal had also consumed a six-pack of beer in his home between approximately 3:30 and 5 p.m. Shortly after midnight, a fight broke out and Leal stabbed Meshefski in the heart, resulting in his death. There was conflicting testimony as to whether or not Leal and Meshefski were visibly intoxicated. Analysis of blood samples drawn from Leal and Meshefski after the incident indicated that Leal had a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.24 percent and Meshefski had a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.29 percent. There was testimony that Leal may have been intoxicated from the use of drugs. Trial of the Meshefskis' dram-shop action against the Shirnan Corporation resulted in a general verdict and judgment of dismissal. The Meshefskis' motion for a new trial was denied and they filed this appeal in which they raise the following issues: The Meshefskis' action was brought pursuant to our Dram Shop Act, § 5-01-06, N.D.C.C., which, at the time of Paul Meshefski's death, provided:[1] The "contrary to statute" provision is met if there is a violation of § 5-01-09, N.D.C.C., which provides: *476 The Meshefskis assert that the trial court erred in instructing, over objection, that: Section 5-01-06, N.D.C.C., unambiguously provides two grounds for recovery of damages: (1) injury "by any intoxicated person"; or (2) injury "in consequence of intoxication." See Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665, 667 (N.D.1957), where we said: The Meshefskis further assert that in order to recover damages for injuries inflicted "by any intoxicated person" they need not prove that intoxication was the proximate cause of the injury and that the trial court, in instructing that intoxication must have caused the death, improperly allowed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant upon finding that Leal would have stabbed Meshefski even if sober. We agree that the instruction added an element not specified in the statute. In Walton v. Stokes, 270 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Iowa 1978), which also involved injuries sustained in an altercation, the Iowa Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule earlier adopted in Lee v. Hederman, 158 Iowa 719, 722, 138 N.W. 893, 894 (1912): See also, King v. Partridge, 9 Mich.App. 540, 157 N.W.2d 417, 419 (1968), where the court said: Shirnan Corporation's reliance on cases involving injuries "in consequence of intoxication" is misplaced. Also misplaced is reliance on the following statement in Wanna v. Miller, 136 N.W.2d 563, 570 (N.D.1965): The foregoing statement was made only in response to the defendant's assertion that there was no proof that the intoxicated person received his last drink in the defendant's bar. Further, by stating that the proof was "sufficient," we did not mean to imply that such proof is required in all dram-shop actions. See also, Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 923 (1959); 45 Am.Jur.2d Intoxicating Liquors § 583 (1969). We conclude that under the facts of this case the trial court erred in instructing the jury that, unless it found that "such intoxication caused Meshefski's death," it should return a verdict for the defendant. Shirnan Corporation conceded at oral argument that if Meshefski's death need not have *477 been caused by intoxication, the instruction constituted reversible error. We conclude that we must reverse the judgment and the order denying a new trial. Although our determination that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it must decide if "such intoxication caused Meshefski's death" is dispositive of this appeal, we deem it appropriate to consider the trial court's denial of the Meshefskis' request for an instruction about Leal's possible intoxication from the use of drugs because the issue is certain to arise upon remand. In accordance with the Meshefskis' request, the trial court gave the following instruction, based on N.D.J.I. 331: During the course of the trial, however, there was testimony that Leal may have been intoxicated through the use of drugs. Counsel for the Meshefskis then objected to use of the instruction because: The trial court noted the objection and denied "that change." In their brief, the Meshefskis contend that "[t]he instruction should have been changed to read `... these or similar symptoms result from the use of alcoholic beverages, drugs or other chemical substances....'" Shirnan Corporation, on the other hand, contends: Because there was testimony that Leal may have been intoxicated through the use of drugs other than alcohol, we believe that in defining an intoxicated person, the instruction erroneously specified that the person's reasonably discernible symptoms of intoxication "result from the use of alcoholic beverages." Although the symptoms of intoxication in previous dram-shop actions did result from the use of alcoholic beverages, that is not an essential element of § 5-01-09, N.D.C.C., which makes it unlawful to deliver alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person. The statute does not limit the unlawfulness of delivery of alcoholic beverages only to those intoxicated persons whose intoxication resulted from the use of alcoholic beverages. We perceive no functional difference between delivering alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person whose intoxication resulted from the use of alcoholic beverages and delivering alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person whose intoxication resulted from the use of drugs other than alcohol. A vendor of alcoholic beverages should not deliver alcoholic beverages to a person who exhibits "outward manifestation of intoxication" [Jore v. Saturday Night Club, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 889, 895 (N.D.1975), quoting Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 72 N.W.2d 609, 615 (1955)], regardless of the cause of the intoxication. To the extent that many of the visible symptoms of intoxication are the same, regardless of the cause of the intoxication, imposing liability on a vendor of alcoholic beverages for damage caused by an intoxicated person who was sold alcoholic beverages at a time when he exhibited outward manifestations of intoxication *478 caused by the use of drugs will not "impose an unreasonable and impossible standard upon tavern owners." We hold that a vendor of alcoholic beverages may be held liable for damage caused by an intoxicated person who was sold alcoholic beverages at a time when he exhibited outward manifestations of intoxication regardless of the cause of the intoxication. To hold otherwise would neither "suppress the mischief" sought to be suppressed by the Dram Shop Act, nor "advance the remedy" provided. Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665, 667 (N.D.1957). We conclude that the trial court's instruction erroneously specified that an intoxicated person's reasonably discernible symptoms of intoxication result from the use of alcoholic beverages. The Meshefskis contend that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury in accordance with their request for a pattern jury instruction, N.D.J.I. 1009, which states that "[a] fact in dispute may be proved by either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence or by both" and defines the terms "direct evidence" and "circumstantial evidence." Because of our disposition of this appeal, we need not determine this issue. We note, however, that in a case such as this, where much of the evidence is by its nature circumstantial and the testimony is in sharp conflict, it may be preferable to give a circumstantial-evidence instruction. See Wasem v. Laskowski, 274 N.W.2d 219 (N.D.1979); Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675 (N.D.1970). The judgment and the order denying a new trial are reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and LEVINE, MESCHKE and GIERKE, JJ., concur. [1] The statute has since been amended in respects not relevant to our discussion here.