Title: Blash v. People

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

426 P.2d 966 (1967) Edward Thomas BLASH, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 22201. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. May 1, 1967. Rehearing Denied May 15, 1967. Robert W. Caddes, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., James F. Pamp, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error. MOORE, Chief Justice. Edward Thomas Blash, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was convicted of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery and received a sentence of not less than five nor more than ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary on each count, the sentences to run consecutively. On September 29, 1964, one Gerald D. Reynolds, manager of the U-Totem Grocery Store in southeast Denver, was held up by a bandit, armed with a gun, who escaped with $77 taken from the cash drawer. The victim identified pictures of one Michael Ring as that of the person who robbed him. The only evidence which implicated the defendant as a participant in the robbery was his signed confession that he drove the "get away" car. When this confession (Exhibit B) was offered in evidence its admissibility was challenged and a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury. The objections of the defendant that the confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and was the product of duress and coercion of police officers, were overruled by the court. The court ruled that the exhibit was voluntarily given, and it was admitted in evidence. After approximately twenty hours had elapsed following submission of the case to the jury, a note was forwarded from the jury to the court, which was as follows: *967 Thereupon counsel for both parties were summoned and over objection of defendant the trial court gave the following instruction: The verdicts of guilty were returned fifty minutes after the above instruction was read. As grounds for reversal of the judgments entered on the verdicts, it is argued that: In connection with the claim that the defendant's confession was improperly admitted, counsel for defendant relies on Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977. That case is clearly distinguishable on the facts. In the instant action the defendant admitted that he was advised of his right to counsel, and of his right to remain silent. He further admitted that he told the police he did not want a lawyer. On the question as to whether the confession was obtained by duress and coercion, an extended hearing was held by the court outside the presence of the jury and the trial court concluded that the statement was voluntarily given. At even greater length the circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession were inquired into in the presence of the jury. The defendant claimed that he falsely stated, in the confession, *968 that he participated in the robbery in order to secure the release of his wife from custody. She had been arrested on October 2, 1964, in connection with a police investigation of narcotic traffic at the premises in which she and the defendant resided. The defendant testified at the trial that on the night of the robbery his wife went out with his friend Ring and when she returned she told him that she and Ring had robbed the U-Totem Grocery store. Although she was not at any time a suspect in the robbery, in order to secure her release he testified that he gave and signed the statement because the detectives threatened that they would file charges against her and additional charges against him unless he confessed to participation in the robbery. Under this "coercion" he says he "confessed" that he did what was actually done by his wife. The defendant was the only person giving testimony indicating any duress or coercion. The arresting officers explained in detail all that happened at the times referred to by the defendant and emphatically denied the statements of the defendant tending to establish duress. The disputed evidence was resolved against the defendant by the trial judge who ruled that it was admissible in evidence and the jury was therefore entitled to give it such consideration as it deemed proper. With reference to the assignment or error based upon the giving of the additional instruction, which is hereinabove quoted, we direct attention to the opinion of this court in Mills v. People, 146 Colo. 457, 362 P.2d 152, from which we quote the following pertinent language: The cases relied on by defendant, namely, Nieto v. People, Colo., 415 P.2d 531, and Mogan v. People, 157 Colo. 395, 402 P.2d 928, are clearly distinguishable on the facts. In the instant case there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in giving the instruction. The judgments are affirmed. SUTTON, McWILLIAMS and KELLEY, JJ., concur.