Title: State v. Brar

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 73 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1261-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Navdeep S. Brar, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 371 Wis. 2d 564, 884 N.W.2d 535 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 12, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
John W. Markson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
KELLY, J. concurs, joined Part I by R.G. 
BRADLEY, J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Tracey A. Wood, Sarah M. Schmeiser, and Tracey Wood & 
Associates, Madison, and an oral argument by Sarah M. Schmeiser. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief by David H. 
Perlman, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. Schimel, 
attorney general, and an oral argument by David H. Perlman. 
 
 
2017 WI 73
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CT776) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Navdeep S. Brar, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
JUL 6, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the 
conviction 
of 
Navdeep 
Brar 
(Brar) 
for 
operating 
while 
intoxicated, 
third 
offense 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a) (2014-15)2 and an order of the circuit court 
denying Brar's motion to suppress the results of a blood test.3  
                                                 
1 State v. Brar, No. 2015AP1261-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 7, 2016). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The Honorable John W. Markson of Dane County presided.  
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
2 
 
¶2 
Brar moved to suppress the results of a blood test on 
the 
grounds 
that 
it 
was 
an 
unconstitutional 
search.  
Specifically, he argued that he did not consent to having his 
blood drawn, and therefore, the officer was required to obtain a 
warrant.  The circuit court denied Brar's motion and found that 
Brar had consented.  On appeal, Brar argues that, even if he had 
consented, his consent was not given voluntarily.     
¶3 
We conclude that the circuit court's finding that Brar 
consented 
to 
the 
blood 
draw 
was 
not 
clearly 
erroneous.  
Additionally, we conclude that Brar's consent was voluntary.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
A City of Middleton police officer stopped Brar for 
driving over the speed limit.  During the stop, the officer 
conducted field sobriety tests, which Brar failed.  Brar then 
submitted to a preliminary breath test and blew a .19.  As a 
result, Brar was arrested.4  
¶5 
After arresting Brar, the officer transported him to 
the 
police 
department, 
where 
the 
officer 
read 
Brar 
the 
"informing the accused form."  While being read the form, Brar 
repeatedly interrupted the officer with questions or comments 
related to the form.  As part of "informing the accused" 
process, the officer asked Brar to submit to a chemical 
evidentiary test.  The precise words Brar said in response are 
                                                 
4 Brar does not contest the validity of the initial stop or 
his subsequent arrest.   
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
3 
 
disputed.  However, the officer thought Brar provided an 
affirmative response, and therefore believed that Brar agreed to 
submit to a blood draw.   
¶6 
After agreeing to submit to an evidentiary test, Brar 
asked several questions.  One of these questions was what kind 
of test would be conducted, and the officer responded he would 
conduct a blood draw.  Brar then asked the officer if he needed 
a warrant to conduct a blood draw.  In response to this 
question, the officer shook his head as if to respond no, 
indicating that he did not need a warrant.   
¶7 
Brar was taken to a hospital where his blood was 
drawn.  The test results showed that Brar's blood alcohol 
content was .186, well above the legal limit to operate a 
vehicle.  Brar was charged with operating while intoxicated, 
third offense in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and 
operating 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration in violation of § 346.63(1)(b).    
¶8 
Brar moved to suppress the results of the blood test.  
The circuit court held a hearing to determine whether Brar had 
consented to the blood draw.  
¶9 
At the hearing, the officer testified that Brar 
responded "of course" in response to the question "Will you 
submit 
to 
an 
evidentiary 
chemical 
test 
of 
your 
blood?"  
According to the officer, Brar then gave "a statement similar to 
he didn't want to have his license revocated."  As a result, the 
officer believed that Brar had consented to the blood draw. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
4 
 
Moreover, the officer testified that Brar did not resist or 
hesitate to give blood once he was transported to the hospital.   
¶10 The circuit court found that Brar had consented to a 
blood draw.  The circuit court relied on the testimony of the 
officer, which the court found credible.  And, the circuit court 
stated 
that 
nothing 
in 
the 
audiovisual 
recording 
was 
inconsistent with the officer's testimony; specifically, that 
the circuit court heard Brar say "of course," which corroborated 
the officer's testimony.   For these reasons, the circuit court 
denied Brar's motion to suppress.5  After the circuit court 
denied the motion, Brar entered a no contest plea to operating 
while intoxicated, third offense in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a).  
¶11 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
denial of Brar's motion to suppress.  First, the court 
determined that the circuit court's finding that Brar consented 
to have his blood drawn was not clearly erroneous.  Next, the 
court concluded that Brar's consent was voluntary.  The court 
reasoned that the officer was correct in shaking his head no to 
indicate he did not need a warrant because Brar had already 
consented.  
                                                 
5 Brar moved for reconsideration of the circuit court's 
denial of his motion to suppress after having the audiovisual 
recording of his interaction with the officer transcribed.  Brar 
noted that the individual who transcribed the recording did not 
hear Brar say the words "of course."  The circuit court 
concluded that Brar did not meet the criteria for a motion for 
reconsideration, and therefore denied the motion.    
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
5 
 
¶12 This court granted Brar's petition for review, and we 
affirm the court of appeals.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
¶13 "Whether a defendant has consented to a search is 
initially a question of historic fact."  State v. Johnson, 2007 
WI 32, ¶56, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182 (Roggensack, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted).  "We will uphold a circuit 
court's 
finding 
of 
historic 
fact 
unless 
it 
is 
clearly 
erroneous."  Id. (citing State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶12, 279 
Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277).  Next, we "independently apply the 
constitutional principles to the facts as found to determine 
whether the standard of voluntariness has been met."  State v. 
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 195, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).  
¶14 In the present case, we apply this two-step test to 
determine if Brar voluntarily consented to a blood draw.  
B. Fourth Amendment, General Principles 
¶15 "The 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution protect '[[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.'"6  State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶29, 
359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120 (quoting State v. Robinson, 2010 
                                                 
6 "Historically, we have interpreted Article I, Section 11 
of the Wisconsin Constitution in accord with the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment."  State v. Arias, 2008 
WI 84, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
6 
 
WI 80, ¶24, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463).  "The Fourth 
Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and 
seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable."  
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)).  
¶16 "A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable."  
Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶30 (quoting State v. Henderson, 2001 
WI 97, ¶19, 245 Wis. 2d 345, 629 N.W.2d 613).  "But there are 
certain 
'specifically 
established 
and 
well-delineated' 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement."7   
State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶18, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 
N.W.2d 834 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967)).  "One well-established exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is a search conducted 
pursuant to consent."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 196.  And, "it 
is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once 
they have been permitted to do so."  Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250-51 
(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 281, 219 (1973). 
¶17 It is well-established that consent "may be in the 
form of words, gesture, or conduct."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 
¶24; see also State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶37, 254 
Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367; United States v. Hylton, 349 F.3d 
781, 786 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Consent may be inferred from actions 
                                                 
7 "'[T]he taking of a blood sample . . . is a search' under 
the Fourth Amendment."  State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3, ¶40, 373 
Wis. 2d 1, 889 N.W.2d 423. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
7 
 
as well as words.").  Through conduct, an individual may 
impliedly consent to be searched.  United States v. Lakoskey, 
462 F.3d 965, 973 (8th Cir. 2006), as amended on reh'g (Oct. 31, 
2006) ("Voluntary consent may be. . . implied."); United States 
v. Wilson, 914 F. Supp. 2d 550, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Consent 
may be granted either explicitly or implicitly." (citation 
omitted)); see also Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 781 
(9th Cir. 2003) (reasoning, "a warrantless search of a person 
seeking to enter a military base may be deemed reasonable based 
on the implied consent of the person searched"); State v. 
Hanson, 34 P.3d 1, 5 (Haw. 2001), as amended (Nov. 7, 2001) 
("[E]ven in the absence of an express indication, implied 
consent to an airport security search may be imputed from posted 
notices.").  
¶18 Consistent with these principles, "consent to a search 
need not be express but may be fairly inferred from context."  
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016).  
Therefore, "a search may be lawful even if the person giving 
consent does not recite the talismanic phrase:  'You have my 
permission to search.'"  United States v. Buettner-Janusch, 646 
F.2d 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1981). 
¶19 Prior cases from the court of appeals could be read as 
casting doubt on the maxim that a person may consent through 
conduct or by implication.  For example, the court of appeals in 
Padley reasoned that consent that arises under Wisconsin's 
implied consent law is different from consent that is sufficient 
in and of itself under the Fourth Amendment.  State v. Padley, 
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
8 
 
2014 WI App 65, ¶25, 354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 867.  
Specifically, the court reasoned that "actual consent to a blood 
draw is not 'implied consent,' but rather a possible result of 
requiring the driver to choose whether to consent under the 
implied consent law."  Id.  This reasoning implies a distinction 
between implied consent and consent that is sufficient under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Such a distinction is incorrect as a matter 
of law.8  
¶20 Stated more fully, and contrary to the court of 
appeals' reasoning in Padley, consent can manifest itself in a 
number of ways, including through conduct.  Cf. Florida v. 
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013); Marshall v. Barlow's, 
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).  The use of the word "implied" 
in the idiom "implied consent" is merely descriptive of the way 
in which an individual gives consent.  It is no less sufficient 
consent than consent given by other means.  
¶21 An individual's consent given by virtue of driving on 
Wisconsin's roads, often referred to as implied consent, is one 
incarnation of consent by conduct.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2) (An 
                                                 
8 Of 
course, 
other 
constitutional 
rights 
may 
involve 
different considerations.  For example, the United States 
Supreme Court reasoned:  "There is a vast difference between 
those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights 
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.  Nothing, either in the 
purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver 
of trial rights, or in the practical application of such a 
requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the 
constitutional 
guarantee 
against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures."  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973).  
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
9 
 
individual who "drives or operates a motor vehicle upon the 
public highways of this state . . . is deemed to have given 
consent to one or more tests of his or her breath, blood or 
urine."). 
 
"By 
reason 
of 
the 
implied 
consent 
law, 
a 
driver . . . consents to submit to the prescribed chemical 
tests."9  State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 193, 289 N.W.2d 828 
(1980); see also State v. Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d 213, 225, 595 
N.W.2d 646 (1999) ("The implied consent law provides that 
Wisconsin drivers are deemed to have given implied consent to 
chemical testing as a condition of receiving the operating 
privilege.").  And, as a plurality of the Supreme Court 
explained in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013), 
"all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require 
motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within 
the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or 
otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense."  
The "consent" to which this court in Neitzel and the Supreme 
                                                 
9 Our previous cases discussing implied consent clearly 
establish that an individual has already consented at the time 
an officer reads a driver the Informing the Accused form.  See, 
e.g., State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 203, 289 N.W.2d 828 
(1980) 
("The 
entire 
tenor 
of 
the 
implied 
consent 
law 
is . . . that consent has already been given and cannot be 
withdrawn without the imposition of the legislatively imposed 
sanction of mandatory suspension.").  "The specific objective of 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) within the implied consent statutory 
scheme is to 'advise the accused about the nature of the 
driver's implied consent.'"  State v. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, 
¶17, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528 (quoting State v. Reitter, 
227 Wis. 2d 213, 225, 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999)).   
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
10 
 
Court in McNeely refer is consent sufficient under the Fourth 
Amendment——not some amorphous, lesser form of consent.  See, 
e.g., People v. Hyde, 393 P.3d 962, 968 (Colo. 2017) ("Hyde's 
statutory consent also satisfied the consent exception to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.  This conclusion flows 
from recent Supreme Court precedent.").   
¶22 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's assertion that an 
individual's consent to a search under the Fourth Amendment "may 
be fairly inferred from context" was given with specific 
reference to an implied consent law.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 
2185 (reasoning, "consent to a search need not be express but 
may be fairly inferred from context. . . . Our prior opinions 
have referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-
consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary 
consequences on motorists who refuse to comply.").  Of course, 
the "context" to which the Supreme Court was referring was an 
individual driving on the roads of a state that had enacted an 
implied consent law. 
¶23 Therefore, lest there be any doubt, consent by conduct 
or implication is constitutionally sufficient consent under the 
Fourth Amendment.10  We reject the notion that implied consent is 
a lesser form of consent.  Implied consent is not a second-tier 
form of consent; it is well-established that consent under the 
                                                 
10 We do not address if there always must be an opportunity 
to withdraw consent before a blood draw is undertaken such as is 
currently provided in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3).   
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
11 
 
Fourth 
Amendment 
can 
be 
implied 
through 
an 
individual's 
conduct.11   
¶24 When we are asked to affirm a finding that consent was 
given, whether express or implied, we also must determine 
whether the consent was voluntary.  See generally United States 
v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 1976) ("Once the 
existence 
of 
a 
consent 
by 
conduct 
is 
determined, 
its 
voluntariness must be examined.").  Only voluntarily given 
consent will pass constitutional muster.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 222.  "Consent is not voluntary if the state proves 'no more 
than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority,'" State v. 
Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶32, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430 (quoting 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968)), or if 
the consent was the product of duress or coercion by law 
enforcement.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. 
¶25 There is no single fact, the absence or presence of 
which, determines whether consent was voluntarily given.  Id. at 
226.  Rather, in order to determine whether consent was 
voluntarily given, the totality of the circumstances of each 
individual case must be examined.  Id. at 233.  In examining the 
totality of the circumstances, "we look at the circumstances 
                                                 
11 In the present case, Brar was conscious when he was read 
the Informing the Accused form.  And, under Wisconsin's implied 
consent 
law, 
conscious 
drivers 
are 
statutorily 
given 
an 
opportunity to withdraw consent.  However, individuals that 
choose to withdraw their consent are subject to penalties for 
withdrawing consent.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9) & (10). 
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
12 
 
surrounding 
the 
consent 
and 
the 
characteristics 
of 
the 
defendant."12  Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶33 (citing Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d at 197-98).  Even in implied consent cases, we consider 
the totality of the circumstances at the time of the blood draw 
to 
determine 
if 
an 
individual's 
previously-given 
consent 
continues to be voluntary at that time. 
¶26 The State has the burden of proving that the consent 
was freely and voluntarily given.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.  
However, the State need not demonstrate that consent was given 
knowingly or intelligently.  See id. at 241 ("Nothing, either in 
the purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' 
waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application of such 
a requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the 
constitutional 
guarantee 
against 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
                                                 
12 As we explained in State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, 327 
Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430, we consider numerous factors to 
determine whether an individual voluntarily consented:  
(1) whether the police used deception, trickery, or 
misrepresentation in their dialogue with the defendant 
to persuade him to consent; (2) whether the police 
threatened or physically intimidated the defendant or 
"punished" him by the deprivation of something like 
food or sleep; (3) whether the conditions attending 
the request to search were congenial, non-threatening, 
and 
cooperative, 
or 
the 
opposite; 
(4) 
how 
the 
defendant responded to the request to search; (5) what 
characteristics 
the 
defendant 
had 
as 
to 
age, 
intelligence, 
education, 
physical 
and 
emotional 
condition, and prior experience with the police; and 
(6) whether the police informed the defendant that he 
could refuse consent. 
Id., ¶33.  
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
13 
 
seizures."); see also id. at 235 ("Our cases do not reflect an 
uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every 
situation where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional 
protection.").  
¶27 Contrary to Supreme Court precedent, decisions from 
the court of appeals have required the State to prove consent 
was given knowingly and intelligently.  See, e.g., Padley, 354 
Wis. 2d 545, ¶64 (reasoning there must be "clear and positive 
evidence the search was the result of a free, intelligent, 
unequivocal 
and 
specific 
consent" 
(internal 
quotations 
omitted)); State v. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239, ¶12, 297 Wis. 2d 
446, 724 N.W.2d 402; see also Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 201.  The 
Supreme 
Court 
in 
Schneckloth 
rejected 
precisely 
this 
requirement.  As we interpret our constitution consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment, we withdraw any language from these cases 
that requires that consent to a search be given knowingly or 
intelligently. 
C. Application to Brar 
¶28 In the present case, we must determine whether Brar 
consented, and if he did, whether his consent was voluntary.  
¶29 First, 
Brar 
consented 
under 
Wisconsin's 
implied 
consent law.  He availed himself of the roads of Wisconsin, and 
as a result, he consented through his conduct to a blood draw. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(2) (an individual who "drives or 
operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this 
state . . . is deemed to have given consent to one or more tests 
of his or her breath, blood or urine.").  Any analysis of a 
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
14 
 
driver's consent under Wisconsin's implied consent law must 
begin with this presumption.  
¶30 Aside from Brar's consent under the implied consent 
law, the circuit court found that Brar consented by his 
responses to the officer's questions.13  The circuit court 
discussed an audiovisual recording of the officer's interaction 
with Brar as well as the officer's testimony.  The evidence 
supports the circuit court's finding, and we conclude it was not 
clearly erroneous.  
¶31 The officer testified that Brar responded "of course" 
in response to the question "Will you submit to an evidentiary 
chemical test of your blood?"  According to the officer, Brar 
then gave "a statement similar to he didn’t want to have his 
license revocated."  As a result, the officer believed Brar 
affirmatively agreed to the blood draw.   
¶32 The circuit court found the officer's "testimony to be 
credible, that Mr. Brar said, when asked more than once, the 
officer said I need to know, I need you to answer yes or no, 
will you submit to the test?  Mr. Brar said, of course, he would 
submit.  And the officer said that Mr. Brar said, because he 
didn't want to have his license revoked, or words to that 
effect."  A circuit court's finding of fact that is based on the 
credibility of a witness is a persuasive factor in assessing 
whether the finding is clearly erroneous.  See Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
13 The circuit court stated:  "I do find as a matter of fact 
that Mr. Brar did give consent."  
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
15 
 
§ 805.17(2) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses.").  And, we have no reason to question the veracity 
of the officer's testimony in the present case.  
¶33 Moreover, the circuit court found, and we agree, that 
the audiovisual recording of the interaction corroborates the 
testimony of the officer.  Nothing in the recording rebuts the 
officer's testimony as to Brar's statements.  Indeed, the 
officer's testimony that Brar said "of course" and then 
something to the effect of "I do not want my license revoked" is 
supported by the recording.   
¶34 Accordingly, Brar first consented through his conduct; 
specifically, he consented by driving on the roads of Wisconsin.  
The circuit court found he later re-affirmed his consent when he 
was given the statutory opportunity to withdraw consent at the 
officer's reading of the Informing the Accused form to him.  
Based on the officer's testimony as corroborated by the 
recording of the officer's interaction with Brar, the circuit 
court's finding that Brar consented was not clearly erroneous.   
¶35 Having 
concluded 
that 
Brar 
consented, 
we 
must 
determine whether his consent was voluntary.  We conclude that 
Brar voluntarily, albeit impliedly, consented when he chose to 
drive on Wisconsin roads.  And, his subsequent statement to the 
officer, re-affirming his previously-given consent was likewise 
voluntary.  Brar does not argue otherwise; in essence, he 
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
16 
 
contends that the voluntariness of his consent dissipated 
sometime after he had already consented.  
¶36 After consenting to the blood draw, Brar asked the 
officer if he needed to obtain a warrant to draw his blood.  The 
officer shook his head no in response.  However, the officer's 
response did not vitiate the voluntariness of Brar's consent.   
¶37 After all, the officer did not need a warrant because 
Brar already had consented.  And, the officer was not obligated 
to explain further than he did; for example, an individual need 
not be informed of the opportunity to withdraw consent under 
Wis. Stat. §  343.305(3) in order for consent to be voluntary.  
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229 (reasoning, that requiring the 
State to "affirmatively prove that the subject of the search 
knew that he had a right to refuse consent, would, in practice, 
create serious doubt whether consent searches could continue to 
be conducted").  Even if the import of Brar's question was 
unclear to the officer, "an officer need not clarify whether an 
ambiguous statement is meant to withdraw otherwise valid consent 
to search."  See State v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶47, 355 Wis. 2d 
135, 848 N.W.2d 810.  Accordingly, the officer accurately 
responded to Brar's question and had no obligation to supply 
Brar with further information.   
¶38 However, even if the officer's response to Brar's 
questions were unclear, it was insufficient to vitiate Brar's 
previously-given and subsequently re-affirmed voluntary consent.  
The voluntariness of consent is examined under the totality of 
the circumstances.  And, the context in which Brar asked whether 
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
17 
 
the officer needed a warrant suggests that Brar voluntarily 
consented despite the arguably unclear nature of the officer's 
response.  Brar's question about a warrant was not an isolated 
question; Brar asked the officer numerous questions throughout 
the encounter, many of which pertained to aspects of the 
Informing the Accused form.  He also repeatedly lamented his 
guilt.  In the context of his interaction with the officer, 
Brar's one question about the necessity of a warrant was 
insufficient to render his consent involuntary.   
¶39 Moreover, Brar was informed of his opportunity to 
withdraw consent to a blood draw when the officer read him the 
Informing the Accused form.  The officer asked him to provide a 
yes or no answer to the question of whether he would consent to 
a chemical evidentiary test.  Earlier, the officer had explained 
the consequences of refusing a blood draw to Brar.  As a result, 
Brar knew that he had the option of refusing a blood draw, yet 
he did not refuse.  See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 559 (1980) (reasoning, "[because] the officers themselves 
informed the respondent that she was free to withhold her 
consent substantially lessened the probability that their 
conduct could reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive").  
And, at no point did Brar as much as suggest an unwillingness to 
have his blood drawn.   
¶40 Finally, Brar did not merely acquiesce to being 
searched.  The cases in which courts have concluded consent was 
involuntary based on an individual's "mere acquiescence" are of 
no relevance to this case.  "[A]cquiescence causes Fourth 
No.  2015AP1261-CR 
 
18 
 
Amendment problems when the acquiescence is made to claimed 
lawful authority to search, when no such lawful authority 
exists."  Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶69 (Roggensack, J., 
dissenting) (citing Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49).  Brar asked the 
officer a straightforward question:  whether the officer needed 
a warrant to conduct a blood draw.  The officer, at that point, 
answered the question accurately; he did not need a warrant 
because Brar had consented.  In contrast to the cases in which 
courts have concluded an individual merely acquiesced to a 
search, the officer here did not assert that he would conduct a 
blood draw with or without Brar's consent.  See Bumper, 391 U.S. 
at 548 ("The issue thus presented is whether a search can be 
justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that 'consent' 
has been given only after the official conducting the search has 
asserted that he possesses a warrant.").  
¶41 In sum, Brar's "will was [not] overborne" by the 
officer.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.  After examining the 
totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Brar voluntarily 
consented to a blood draw.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶42 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the 
circuit court's finding that Brar consented to the blood draw 
was not clearly erroneous.  Additionally, we conclude that 
Brar's consent was voluntary.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
No.  2015AP1261-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶43 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I concur 
with the court's mandate to affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, 
and 
I 
join 
Part 
I 
of 
Justice 
Daniel 
Kelly's 
concurrence. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
¶44 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I join the court's 
mandate and the opinion to the extent it discusses Mr. Brar's 
express consent to the blood test while he was present in the 
police station.  I cannot join any part of the court's 
discussion of implied consent because it misunderstands how our 
implied consent law functions, it says "consent" implied by law 
is something voluntarily given when such a thing is impossible, 
it 
introduces 
a 
destructive 
new 
doctrine 
that 
reduces 
constitutional guarantees to a matter of legislative grace, and 
it fails to properly distinguish between (a) express consent, 
(b) consent implied by conduct, and (c) "consent" implied by 
law.  And all of this was entirely gratuitous——as the court's 
own opinion demonstrates, implied consent need have no part in 
our resolution of the case.  Because this last point describes 
where the court's opinion should have ended, I will begin there. 
I 
¶45 There was no need to march into the minefield of 
"consent" implied by law.1  Mr. Brar asked us to review his 
conviction for two reasons.  First, he says he did not give 
express consent to chemical testing of his blood.  And second, 
he says he only acquiesced to the blood test because Officer 
Michael Wood said he did not need a warrant to obtain a blood 
                                                 
1 When speaking of the implied consent provided by Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(2), I will refer to "'consent' implied by law."  
I do this to distinguish it from consent implied by conduct.  
And I put "consent" in quotes because, as I discuss infra, 
"consent" implied by law is not actually consent at all, and is 
incapable of authorizing a law enforcement officer to perform a 
blood test. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
2 
 
sample.  The presenting questions, therefore, called for us to 
review what Mr. Brar said and——if it amounted to express 
consent——determine whether his consent was voluntary.  State v. 
Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶30, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430 ("To 
determine if the consent exception is satisfied, we review, 
first, whether consent was given in fact by words, gestures, or 
conduct; and, second whether the consent given was voluntary."). 
¶46 We are not considering Mr. Brar's interaction with 
Officer Wood in the first instance, of course.  We are reviewing 
the circuit court's findings of fact, which we leave undisturbed 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Phelps v. Physicians Ins. 
Co. of Wis., Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶34, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 
N.W.2d 615.  According to the circuit court, Officer Wood asked 
Mr. Brar whether he would submit to an evidentiary chemical test 
of his blood.  The record reflects that Mr. Brar said "of 
course," and that he didn't want to lose his driving privileges.  
Our review revealed nothing clearly erroneous about the circuit 
court's findings, and so we accepted that Mr. Brar expressly 
consented to a blood test. 
¶47 We promptly, and properly, dispatched Mr. Brar's 
argument that his consent was not voluntary.  According to Mr. 
Brar, when Officer Wood told him he did not need a warrant to 
conduct the blood test, he made a misrepresentation of law 
sufficient to negate the voluntariness of his consent.  But 
Officer Wood's statement came after Mr. Brar's consent, which 
made his statement correct——he didn't need a warrant because Mr. 
Brar had consented to the search.  See Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
3 
 
¶29 (One well-established exception to the warrant requirement 
is a search conducted pursuant to consent.).  Thus, there was no 
misrepresentation to cast doubt on the voluntariness of Mr. 
Brar's consent.  Mr. Brar did not argue his consent was 
involuntary for any other reason, so we properly concluded his 
consent was constitutionally valid. 
¶48 That should have been the end of our opinion.  
Traditionally, when the presenting questions resolve the matter, 
we declare our treatment of the case complete at that point.  
See Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI 47, ¶39 n.24, 369 
Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333, cert. denied sub nom. Milwaukee 
Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 137 S. Ct. 538 (2016) ("We do 
not address these issues because they are not necessary to 
resolve this case"); see also State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶37 
n.11, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 ("[A]n appellate court 
should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds." (quoting 
Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. 
Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 
Wis.2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)); Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) ("As a 
general rule, when our resolution of one issue disposes of a 
case, we will not address additional issues.").  Experience has 
taught us it is usually wise to leave peripheral questions to a 
future case in which they return as dispositive issues.  There 
are good reasons to honor that experience.  The process of 
reasoning from premises to conclusion imposes a rigorous 
discipline on our research, deliberation, and analysis that is 
absent when we opine on matters beyond those necessary to our 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
4 
 
judgment.  The court's opinion validates the wisdom of our 
tradition. 
II 
¶49 Not only did we boldly march into the "implied 
consent" minefield, we did it blindfolded.  Our implied consent 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 343.305 (2013-14),2 is not a model of 
clarity.  That should have driven us to a searching, wide-eyed 
perusal of the statute's language to help us through this 
fraught territory.  Instead, with the benefit of just three 
cursory sentences addressing the statute's terms, we announced 
that 
it 
provides 
a 
real-life, 
constitutionally-sufficient, 
consent to a blood test:  "Brar consented under Wisconsin's 
implied consent law. He availed himself of the roads of 
Wisconsin, and as a result, he consented through his conduct to 
a blood draw."  Majority op., ¶29.  That, however, is not what 
the statute does. 
¶50 The question the court answered, but did not analyze, 
is 
whether 
"implied 
consent" 
actually 
authorizes 
a 
law 
enforcement officer to obtain a sample of a driver's blood.  To 
discover whether it does, we must consider three of the 
statute's functional components.  The first addresses itself to 
its eponymous subject——"consent" implied by law (I will call 
this the "Implied Consent Component").  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2).  
The second component governs a law enforcement officer's request 
for a blood test (the "Test Authorization Component").  Wis. 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
5 
 
Stat. § 343.305(3)-(4).3  The third covers the consequences for 
refusing 
an 
officer's 
request 
for 
a 
test 
(the 
"Penalty 
Component").  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)-(10).  With but one 
exception that is not relevant here, there is no operational 
connection between the Implied Consent Component and the Test 
Authorization Component.4 
¶51 By its own terms, the Implied Consent Component 
isolates itself from the authorization the State must obtain to 
collect a sample of the driver's blood.  In relevant part, it 
says this: 
Implied Consent.  Any person who . . . drives or 
operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of 
this state . . . is deemed to have given consent to 
one or more tests of his or her breath, blood or 
urine, for the purpose of determining the presence or 
quantity 
in 
his 
or 
her 
blood 
or 
breath, 
of 
alcohol . . . when requested to do so by a law 
enforcement officer under sub. (3) (a) or (am) or when 
required to do so under sub. (3) (ar) or (b).  Any 
such tests shall be administered upon the request of a 
law enforcement officer. 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2) (emphases added).  This provision 
creates the "implied consent," but it simultaneously forecasts 
its 
operational 
independence 
from 
the 
Test 
Authorization 
                                                 
3 The statute also provides for tests of a driver's breath 
or urine.  But because a blood test is at issue in this case, I 
will refer only to that type of test. 
4 There is a connection between the 
Implied Consent 
Component and Test Authorization Component when the driver is 
unconscious.  Wis. Stat. § 343.304(3)(b).  That exception 
presents issues distinct from those presented by conscious 
drivers.  Because Mr. Brar was conscious, I do not address the 
exception here. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
6 
 
Component:  Operating a motor vehicle gives rise to "deemed" 
consent, but the actual blood test must be requested by the law 
enforcement officer.5 
¶52 What the Implied Consent Component forecasts, the Test 
Authorization Component makes explicit——the officer must ask the 
driver for permission to conduct a blood test:  "Upon arrest of 
a 
person 
for 
[operating 
while 
intoxicated] . . . a 
law 
enforcement officer may request the person to provide one or 
more samples of his or her breath, blood or urine for the 
purpose specified under sub. (2)."  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(a) 
(emphasis added).  When an officer asks a driver for permission 
to conduct a test, he must recite a very specific warning.  The 
provision introducing the warning echoes the fact that he is 
asking permission——not telling:  "At the time that a chemical 
test specimen is requested under sub. (3) (a), (am), or (ar), 
the law enforcement officer shall read the following to the 
person from whom the test specimen is requested . . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(4) (emphases added).  The statutorily-mandated 
warning confirms the officer is asking permission, and the 
driver may say "no" to the officer's request: 
You have either been arrested for an offense that 
involves driving or operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or 
you are the operator of a vehicle that was involved in 
an accident that caused the death of, great bodily 
harm to, or substantial bodily harm to a person, or 
you are suspected of driving or being on duty time 
                                                 
5This subsection also provides for a "required" test when the operator is unconscious.  
But that is part of the exception I mentioned above.  See supra n.4. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
7 
 
with respect to a commercial motor vehicle after 
consuming an intoxicating beverage. 
This law enforcement agency now wants to test one or 
more samples of your breath, blood or urine to 
determine the concentration of alcohol or drugs in 
your system. If any test shows more alcohol in your 
system than the law permits while driving, your 
operating privilege will be suspended. If you refuse 
to take any test that this agency requests, your 
operating privilege will be revoked and you will be 
subject to other penalties. The test results or the 
fact that you refused testing can be used against you 
in court. 
If you take all the requested tests, you may choose to 
take further tests. You may take the alternative test 
that this law enforcement agency provides free of 
charge. You also may have a test conducted by a 
qualified person of your choice at your expense. You, 
however, will have to make your own arrangements for 
that test. 
If you have a commercial driver license or were 
operating 
a 
commercial 
motor 
vehicle, 
other 
consequences may result from positive test results or 
from refusing testing, such as being placed out of 
service or disqualified. 
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4) (emphases added). 
¶53 I'm not going to pretend the meaning of "request" is 
an open question.  We are all fluent English-speakers here, and 
we know it means what it so obviously does——it is a question, a 
seeking of an answer.  And when the request is for a blood 
sample, we know the officer is asking permission to take it.  I 
suppose someone might say the statute's repeated admonition that 
the officer must seek permission to take a sample is a tip of 
the hat to good manners.  I trust the government's agents make 
every effort to be polite in their interactions with Wisconsin's 
residents, so this would be a frivolous mandate to write into a 
statute.  Absent any textual hints that the repeated "request" 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
8 
 
requirement is more about etiquette than a mandate to ask 
permission, we shouldn't read it that way.  See State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ([S]tatutory interpretation 'begins 
with the language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute 
is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'" (quoting Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659)). 
¶54 So what does that mean for "implied consent"?  It is 
axiomatic that if one must ask for something, then one doesn't 
yet have it.  If the statute's "implied consent" really is equal 
to a driver's voluntarily and freely given consent (as the court 
claims), then all of this "request" business is so much 
doubletalk.  If the court is right, then there is no need to ask 
because the law says we may act as though the driver already 
said "yes."  So Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(a) would read:  "Upon 
arrest of a person for [operating while intoxicated] . . . a law 
enforcement officer may request tell the person to provide one 
or more samples of his or her breath, blood or urine for the 
purpose specified under sub. (2)."  And § 343.305(4) would have 
to read:  "At the time that a driver is told to provide a 
chemical test specimen is requested under sub. (3) (a), (am), or 
(ar), the law enforcement officer shall read the following to 
the person told to provide a from whom the test specimen is 
requested . . . ."  The warning required by § 343.305(4) would 
need to be similarly amended to remove the "request" language, 
as well as the confirmation that the subject can tell the 
officer "no."  But the officer does have to ask permission, and 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
9 
 
the driver may indeed refuse his request.  And that means 
"implied consent" and the consent actually necessary to obtain 
the blood sample are quite obviously not the same thing, and do 
not serve the same function. 
¶55 "Implied consent" does, however, have a purpose.  And 
that purpose is to juke the Fourth Amendment.  We know that 
taking a blood sample in the absence of a warrant or exigent 
circumstances is an unconstitutional search.  Birchfield v. 
North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016) ("The 
Amendment thus prohibits "unreasonable searches," and our cases 
establish 
that 
the 
taking 
of 
a 
blood 
sample 
or 
the 
administration of a breath test is a search.").  So, contrary to 
what our opinion says today, the legislature cannot simply 
authorize police officers to take blood samples without asking 
permission.6  Thus, "implied consent" cannot be the same thing as 
consent given pursuant to a police officer's request.  And 
indeed it is not. 
¶56 "Implied consent" has an entirely different function.  
It is part of a mechanism designed to obtain indirectly what it 
                                                 
6 Birchfield arose in the context of an implied consent 
statute (actually, several implied consent statutes, inasmuch as 
this opinion addressed defendants from multiple states).  See 
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 
(2016).  So if the legislatively-provided consent was sufficient 
to authorize a blood test, the Court would not have spent any 
time determining whether such tests are appropriate under the 
"search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment.  
It would have simply noted the existence of an implied consent 
statute and called it a day.  But it didn't, so apparently the 
United States Supreme Court is not willing to trim the Fourth 
Amendment's protections as aggressively as we are. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
10 
 
cannot (and does not) create directly——consent to a blood test.  
The Implied Consent Component works in tandem with the Penalty 
Component to cajole drivers into giving the real consent 
required by the Test Authorization Component.  The Penalty 
Component punishes a driver by revoking his operating privileges 
if he refuses an officer's request for a blood sample.  Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(9)-(10).  But that smacks of punishing someone 
for the exercise of his constitutional right to be free of 
unreasonable searches, upon which we generally frown.  Harman v. 
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965) ("It has long been 
established that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who 
exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution."). 
¶57 It is this consideration that, finally, explains why 
the Implied Consent Component exists and where it slips into 
place.  The idea appears to be that if the driver's Fourth 
Amendment rights have been legislatively waived, there can be no 
punishment consequent upon the exercise of a constitutional 
right because it has already been relinquished, courtesy of Wis. 
Stat. § 343.305(2).  Thus, when a driver refuses to provide a 
blood sample, he is not being punished for exercising a 
constitutional right, but for refusing a statutorily-authorized 
request 
for 
needed 
evidence. 
 
This 
Rube 
Goldberg-like 
convolution may or may not be sufficient to make it past the 
Fourth Amendment, but the purpose of my concurrence is not to 
analyze this contraption's fidelity to the Constitution.  My 
purpose here is only to describe how the statute functions, and 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
11 
 
explain why "implied consent" has nothing to do with the consent 
necessary to obtain a blood sample. 
¶58 In sum, the court's opinion misstates how Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305 operates.  "Implied consent" does not authorize an 
officer to take a blood sample.  It only provides (questionable) 
cover for punishing a driver who refuses to authorize a blood 
test.  To actually perform the test, the officer has to ask the 
driver's permission.  And if the driver says "no," the "implied 
consent" provision does not step in to countermand his answer.  
So the court erred by imputing to this statutorily-deemed 
"consent" the power to authorize a blood test.  It then built on 
that error by claiming this non-operational "consent" is 
constitutionally 
valid 
because 
it 
is 
given 
freely 
and 
voluntarily. 
III 
¶59 It is a metaphysical impossibility for a driver to 
freely and voluntarily give "consent" implied by law.  This is 
necessarily so because "consent" implied by law isn't given by 
the driver.  If it is given by anyone, it is given by the 
legislature through the legal fiction of "deeming":  "Any person 
who . . . drives or operates a motor vehicle upon the public 
highways 
of 
this 
state . . . is 
deemed 
to 
have 
given 
consent . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2).  One only "deems" 
when the thing deemed did not really happen, but you intend to 
act as though it did.  So it makes no sense to ask if the driver 
freely and voluntarily gave something he manifestly did not give 
in the first place. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
12 
 
¶60 And yet, the court asks anyway:  "When we are asked to 
affirm a finding that consent was given, whether express or 
implied, we also must determine whether the consent was 
voluntary."  Majority op., ¶24 (emphasis added).  It is true 
that a person's consent to a search is constitutionally valid 
only if he gives it freely and voluntarily.7  However, even as 
the court asserts that express consent and "consent" implied by 
law are constitutionally fungible, its analysis proves its 
thesis is indefensible.  A brief exploration of how we assay the 
voluntariness 
of 
a 
person's 
consent 
illustrates 
the 
meaninglessness of this standard in the context of "consent" 
implied by law. 
¶61 We analyze a wealth of factors in determining whether 
an expression of consent meets the voluntariness standard.  
Majority op., ¶¶24-26.  We ask, for example, whether the police 
used deception, or trickery, or misrepresentations to produce 
the consent.  Artic, 327 Wis. 2d 392, ¶33.  We explore whether 
the authorities threatened the defendant.  Id.  Or intimidated 
him.  Id.  Or used food or sleep as leverage to prize out his 
consent.  Id.  We ask whether the officer and the circumstances 
were "congenial, non-threatening, and cooperative."  Id.  We 
want to know how the defendant responded to the search request.  
Id.  We factor into our analysis the person's age.  Id.  And 
intelligence.  Id.  And education.  Id.  And his physical and 
                                                 
7 See State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶32, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 
N.W.2d 430 ("The State bears the burden of proving that consent 
was given freely and voluntarily."). 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
13 
 
emotional condition.  Id.  And whether he had prior experience 
with law enforcement.  Id.  And whether the police told him he 
need not consent.  Id.  This is, in full, an exhaustive inquiry 
into 
virtually 
every 
conceivable 
circumstance 
that 
could 
possibly have some bearing on whether the defendant's consent 
was the product of the State's influence, as opposed to the 
defendant's own will. 
¶62 And still we are not done.  A defendant may have said 
"yes," and he may have actually submitted to the search, but we 
still worry that his words and his conduct might not really 
reflect a free and voluntary expression of his will.  So we say 
that just because a person acquiesces to a search doesn't mean 
that he was really consenting.  "Consent is not voluntary if the 
state proves 'no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful 
authority.'"  Id., ¶32 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968)). 
¶63 Now we are almost done determining whether a person's 
express consent is enough to waive his Fourth Amendment rights.  
To ward against inadvertent waivers, we burden the State with 
the obligation to prove the consent was voluntarily and freely 
given.  Id.  All told, then, we test the sufficiency of express 
consent with a searching inquiry into everything that could have 
made the consent anything less than a product of the driver's 
uninhibited will, we disregard a person's actual submission to 
the search if it was nothing more than acquiescence to a claim 
of lawful authority, and we make it the State's responsibility 
to prove the driver gave his consent freely and voluntarily.  So 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
14 
 
much for express consent; now it's time to look at the factors 
we use to determine whether an instance of "consent" implied by 
law meets this standard. 
¶64 For "consent" implied by law, we ask whether the 
driver drove his car. 
¶65 And that's it.  If the court is right about "consent" 
implied by law, then we have no interest in what the driver 
said, thought, experienced, felt, or saw.  Nor do we need 
consider whether the driver acquiesced to a police officer's 
claim of lawful authority.  We aren't interested in any personal 
detail about the driver, such as his age, intelligence, 
circumstances, or emotional state.  The only thing we want to 
know is whether he was in the driver's seat.  And that's exactly 
what the court said:  "We conclude that Brar voluntarily, albeit 
impliedly, consented when he chose to drive on Wisconsin roads." 
¶66 That single sentence comprises the entirety of the 
court's voluntariness analysis as it relates to "consent" 
implied by law.  In truth, that's about as much as it could 
possibly have said because we really aren't interested in the 
driver at all when it comes to this type of consent.  The driver 
is irrelevant to the question because he isn't the one who 
provided the consent——it was the legislature.  If the driver 
drove, the consent inquiry ends before it begins because the 
legislature provided it 48 years ago when it adopted Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305.  There is a vast chasm separating express consent 
from "consent" implied by law, as this brief diversion into the 
voluntariness standard illustrates.  In reality, they have 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
15 
 
literally nothing in common.  Which is understandable because, 
as discussed above, they perform entirely different functions. 
IV 
¶67 The most likely reason the court fell into error is 
that it tangled up the concepts of express consent (that is, 
spoken or written consent), consent implied by conduct, and 
"consent" implied by law.  If we could untie this knot and 
consider the nature and function of each concept independently 
of the others, I believe the errors would correct themselves. 
¶68 The first step to untying a knot is carefully 
observing how it came to be.  I begin, therefore, by identifying 
each time the court confounded the different types of consent.  
The knot began with the threads of express consent and "consent" 
implied by law, which the court started weaving together in its 
discussion of State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, 354 Wis. 2d 545, 
849 N.W.2d 867.  See Majority op., ¶¶19-20.  Rejecting the court 
of appeals' proper attempt to keep the threads separate, the 
court twisted them together into one:  "This reasoning implies a 
distinction 
between 
implied 
consent 
and 
consent 
that 
is 
sufficient under the Fourth Amendment.  Such a distinction is 
incorrect as a matter of law."  Majority op., ¶19 ("Statement 
1").  Still responding to Padley, the court then introduced the 
thread of consent implied by conduct into the growing knot:  
"Stated more fully, and contrary to the court of appeals' 
reasoning in Padley, consent can manifest itself in a number of 
ways, including through conduct."  Majority op., ¶20 ("Statement 
2").  Express consent, of course, is something personal to the 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
16 
 
driver (as opposed to something "deemed" by the legislature), so 
the court's next step was to infuse the personal "granting" 
element of express consent into each of the other threads:  "The 
use of the word 'implied' in the idiom 'implied consent' is 
merely descriptive of the way in which an individual gives 
consent. It is no less sufficient consent than consent given by 
other means."  Id. ("Statement 3").  It then subsumed "consent" 
implied by law into consent implied by conduct by making the 
former just a particular manifestation of the latter:  "An 
individual's consent given by virtue of driving on Wisconsin's 
roads, often referred to as implied consent, is one incarnation 
of consent by conduct."  Id., ¶21 ("Statement 4").  Finally, it 
pointed to the knot and declared it was all one, and the one was 
sufficient to waive Fourth Amendment protections: 
Therefore, lest there be any doubt, consent by conduct 
or implication is constitutionally sufficient consent 
under the Fourth Amendment.  We reject the notion that 
implied consent is a lesser form of consent.  Implied 
consent is not a second-tier form of consent; it is 
well-established 
that 
consent 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment can be implied through an individual's 
conduct. 
Id., ¶23 ("Statement 5").  But it is not all one.   
¶69 The 
second 
step 
to 
the 
untying 
project 
is 
disentangling express consent from "consent" implied by law.  I 
have already done most of the foundational work (supra), and it 
appears this is the loosest strand in the weave.  I will pull 
first on Statement 3:  "The use of the word 'implied' in the 
idiom 'implied consent' is merely descriptive of the way in 
which an individual gives consent. It is no less sufficient 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
17 
 
consent than consent given by other means."  The premise of this 
statement is that, whether we are considering express consent or 
"consent" implied by law, it is the driver giving consent.  
That, however, is not true——between the two, only the first 
comes from the driver.  Which is why we pay such fastidious 
attention to him and the circumstances of his interaction with 
the police officer when we assay the voluntariness of his 
consent.  But with "consent" implied by law, we give scant 
thought to the driver (as the court itself demonstrated) because 
he isn't the one who gives the consent; it is the legislature.  
So it is categorically untrue that "the word 'implied' in the 
idiom 'implied consent' is merely descriptive of the way in 
which an individual gives consent."  The word "implied" is 
important because it tells us it is the legislature, not the 
individual, who is giving consent. 
¶70 With that correction, express consent is almost free 
from the court's knot.  It is held there only by the court's 
rebuke 
in 
Statement 
1: 
 
Padley's 
"reasoning 
implies 
a 
distinction 
between 
implied 
consent 
and 
consent 
that 
is 
sufficient under the Fourth Amendment.  Such a distinction is 
incorrect as a matter of law."  The implied consent statute 
actually makes Padley's distinction explicit.  As described 
above, the Implied Consent Component will never result in 
authorization to perform a blood test on a conscious individual 
because there is no operational connection between it and the 
Test Authorization Component.  A police officer must ask a 
driver's permission to conduct a blood test; the statute's 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
18 
 
"implied consent" cannot supply that authorization, nor was it 
designed to do so.  Thus, the court's statement that the 
"distinction is incorrect as a matter of law" is itself 
incorrect as a matter of law.  And with that, express consent is 
free of the knot. 
¶71 The third step in untying the knot is separating 
consent implied by conduct from "consent" implied by law.  The 
court's discussion bounced between the two as if they were the 
same thing.  They are not.  Consent implied by conduct is a 
recognition of how people interact with each other in real life.  
Sometimes an action, or a gesture, or a circumstance, is 
sufficiently expressive of a person's will that we can derive 
from that conduct definite and certain information.  And when 
that information conveys consent to a search, we accept it for 
its intended meaning, so long as it meets the voluntariness 
standard.  These principles are apparent from the very cases the 
court cited while muddling the two concepts.  I will address 
enough of them to demonstrate there is a real and critical 
difference between the concepts. 
¶72 The court referred to State v. Tomlinson, in which we 
considered whether officers had received consent to enter a 
person's home.  2002 WI 91, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367.  
Two police officers approached the back door and knocked.  A 
teenage girl answered, and the police informed her they were 
searching for the defendant and requested permission to enter.  
She then "turned to enter the house upon the officer's request 
to enter."  Id., ¶37.  We noted that the defendant "was present 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
19 
 
and apparently said nothing when this occurred."  Id.  We 
concluded 
that 
this 
conduct 
"could 
reasonably 
have 
been 
interpreted as an invitation to follow her inside."  Id.  That 
is, we carefully examined the conduct of the girl and the 
defendant to deduce what information it was conveying to the 
officers standing at the door.  Because the conduct sufficiently 
conveyed a message of consent to the officers' entry, we gave it 
that effect and confirmed the search's constitutionality. 
¶73 The court also cited United States v. Lakoskey, 462 
F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2006), as amended on reh'g (Oct. 31, 2006), 
which provides a counterfactual illustration of consent implied 
by conduct.  There, a postal inspector was suspicious of a 
package, and so delivered it personally to the addressee.  Id. 
at 968.  The inspector met Mr. Lakoskey just outside the front 
door, and handed him the package.  Id.  When the inspector asked 
to see what was in the package, Mr. Lakoskey refused and walked 
inside the house.  Id.  After repeated requests, Mr. Lakoskey 
finally said he would open the package, but then turned so the 
inspector could not see it.  Id. at 969.  At that point, the 
inspector entered the house, Mr. Lakoskey opened the envelope, 
and incriminating evidence was disclosed.  Id.  The question 
before the court was whether Mr. Lakoskey's actions could 
reasonably convey the message "you may enter my home" to the 
inspector.  The district court said yes.  Id. at 971.  The Eight 
Circuit disagreed.  While recognizing that consent to a search 
can be implied from conduct, the court observed that "there is 
no indication in the record that he [Thomas Lakoskey] invited 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
20 
 
[Inspector] Hirose's entry, came outside to tell Hirose to 
follow him, left his door open, or motioned for Hirose to come 
in, implying that Hirose should follow him."  Id. at 974.  So 
the court concluded that "the finding of the district court that 
Thomas [Lakoskey]'s actions constituted implied consent for 
Hirose to enter his home was clearly erroneous."  Id. 
¶74 The court also relied on Morgan v. United States, 323 
F.3d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that "a warrantless 
search of a person seeking to enter a military base may be 
deemed reasonable based on the implied consent of the person 
searched."  The Morgan court relied heavily on a Fourth Circuit 
case, 
which 
described 
how 
a 
person's 
conduct 
in 
such 
circumstances can convey the message "I consent to being 
searched": 
[T]he validity of [the defendant's] search [did not] 
turn on whether he gave his express consent to search 
as a condition of entering the base. Consent is 
implied by the totality of all the circumstances. The 
barbed-wire fence, the security guards at the gate, 
the sign warning of the possibility of search, and a 
civilian's common-sense awareness of the nature of a 
military 
base—all 
these 
circumstances 
combine 
to 
puncture any reasonable expectations of privacy for a 
civilian who enters a closed military base. 
Id., 781-82. (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 986 F.2d 76, 79 
(4th Cir. 1993)). 
¶75 Handing over one's luggage to be put through an x-ray 
scanner at an airport is also conduct conveying consent to a 
search, according to State v. Hanson, 34 P.3d 1, 5 (Haw. 2001), 
as amended (Nov. 7, 2001) ("Plainly, the surrender of one's 
effects at airport security checkpoints is to allow inspection 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
21 
 
of such effects for contents that may pose a danger to those on 
the aircraft.").  And when an officer asks to search a bedroom, 
the meaning of the defendant's resulting conduct cannot be 
mistaken when he "opened the door to and walked into his 
bedroom, retrieved a small baggie of marijuana, handed the 
baggie to the agents, and pointed out a number of drug 
paraphernalia items."  State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 
577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).  We concluded the obvious:  "The 
defendant's conduct provides a sufficient basis on which to find 
that the defendant consented to the search of his bedroom."  Id.  
The court relied on both of these cases, too, and yet still did 
not perceive the difference between consent implied by conduct 
and "consent" implied by law. 
¶76 There is a commonality to each of these cases, and 
indeed to all cases that find consent in a person's conduct:  
the 
information-conveying 
dynamic 
inherent 
to 
a 
game 
of 
Charades.  When a defendant is supposed to have manifested his 
consent to a search by his conduct, we carefully watch as the 
State 
recreates 
the 
interaction 
between 
the 
officer 
and 
defendant.  If the defendant's conduct in response to the 
request conveys the message "I agree to be searched," we give it 
that effect.  There is no "deeming" involved.  Just as in a game 
of Charades, we are trying to understand the actual, real-life 
information the person is conveying through his conduct at that 
moment. 
¶77 And that unties the rest of the court's knot.  In 
Statement 4 the court said "consent" implied by law is just a 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
22 
 
type of consent implied by conduct:  "An individual's consent 
given by virtue of driving on Wisconsin's roads, often referred 
to as implied consent, is one incarnation of consent by 
conduct."  If that is true, then there should be enough 
information bundled up in the act of "driving on Wisconsin's 
roads" for us to deduce an expression of the driver's will from 
that conduct. 
¶78 Except there is not.  There are a million things we 
might imagine driving a car might mean, very few that we can 
discern with any certainty, and none that say anything about 
consent to a search.  We might conclude from observing a driver 
on the interstate that he is traveling from point A to point B.  
But even that simple inference is entirely speculative.  Maybe 
he's out for a Sunday drive and he's travelling from Point A 
back to Point A.  If he's traveling quickly we might infer he is 
in a hurry to get to his destination.  But then again, maybe he 
just likes to drive fast.  One could multiply examples without 
end, but in the end it would just emphasize what we already 
know.  And that is that there are only two things we can 
confidently say that driving a car on Wisconsin's roads means:  
The driver is driving his car, and he is in Wisconsin.  In a 
thousand attempts in a thousand games of Charades, no contestant 
will ever guess that driving a car in Wisconsin means "I consent 
to a blood test."  It does no good to say the driver expresses 
such consent because the statute says he does.  If one must 
resort to the statute books to discover the meaning of the 
driver's conduct, then the conduct has utterly failed to convey 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
23 
 
that meaning.  Which is not at all surprising because the 
statute does not purport to describe the meaning of driving on 
Wisconsin's roads, only its consequences. 
¶79 Thus, neither the driver's conduct nor the statute can 
make driving in Wisconsin mean "I consent to a blood test."  And 
that necessarily means that "consent" implied by law is not "one 
incarnation of consent by conduct."  It then follows that 
Statement 2——in which the court said consent can be derived from 
conduct——is true as a standalone description of the law, but 
irrelevant because this is not a "consent implied by conduct" 
case.  Most of Statement 5 is true but irrelevant for the same 
reason——to the extent it says consent implied by conduct can be 
constitutionally sufficient, it is saying something inapplicable 
to this case. 
¶80 Untying the knot isolates the court's error.  In 
Statement 5, the court said "lest there be any doubt, consent 
by . . . implication 
is 
constitutionally 
sufficient 
consent 
under the Fourth Amendment."  But without any support from the 
text of the statute, or the "consent by conduct" or "express 
consent" lines of cases, the statement is just ipse dixit.  It 
is so because we say it is.  And that contributes to an even 
more significant problem. 
V 
¶81 When the court says "consent" implied by law is just 
as constitutionally effective as express consent, it is saying 
something terribly chilling.  It is saying the legislature may 
decide when the people of Wisconsin must surrender their 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
24 
 
constitutional rights.  The court recognized that conducting a 
blood test constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  It also recognized that such searches require a 
warrant or a legitimate exception to the Fourth Amendment.  And 
it further recognized that the exceptions usually will not 
apply.8  The court dispensed with all of this, and announced that 
blood tests are always available when there is probable cause to 
believe someone was driving in Wisconsin while intoxicated.  The 
scythe sharp enough to cut through all of these limitations 
turned out to be really quite simple, but no less surprising for 
that.  The legislature simply had to declare that the people of 
Wisconsin had agreed to it. 
¶82 If this is right, the Birchfield and McNeely9 courts 
should probably feel a little sheepish for all the attention 
they paid to the constitutional niceties.  Especially the 
Birchfield court, which lauded implied consent laws, but somehow 
missed our insight that they dispense with both the warrant 
requirement and the need to consider the known exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment.  "Consent" implied by law, our court says 
today, 
is 
no 
"second-tier 
form 
of 
consent." 
 
It 
is 
"constitutionally 
sufficient 
consent 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment."  The legislature need only say the people of 
                                                 
8 I am quite sure the court recognizes the limitations.  It 
cited 
both 
McNeely 
and 
Birchfield, 
which 
together 
place 
substantial restrictions on when an officer may conduct a blood 
test without a warrant or consent. 
9 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
25 
 
Wisconsin waive their Fourth Amendment rights by driving, and 
immediately it is so. 
¶83 A constitutional doctrine of this magnitude deserves 
considerably more attention than today's opinion gives it.  One 
aspect of a more rigorous consideration would include developing 
and describing some limiting principles.  Today the court says 
the 
legislature 
properly 
suspended 
Wisconsinites' 
Fourth 
Amendment rights when they go for a drive.  What of their Sixth 
Amendment rights?  Perhaps the legislature might decide it would 
be easier to get convictions if they also suspend the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel.  According to our opinion 
today, the legislature could simply declare that driving in 
Wisconsin waives that right, too.  Or the right not to 
incriminate oneself.  Or the right to a jury.  What principle, 
exactly, would prevent any of this? 
¶84 Nor is there anything about this new doctrine that 
necessarily limits it to the context of obtaining blood tests 
from intoxicated drivers.  There are certain parts of the State 
that experience a disproportionate amount of crime.  Perhaps the 
legislature might decide police need greater access to homes and 
other buildings in such areas.  It could, according to our 
opinion today, adopt an "implied consent" statute in which 
recording a property deed comprises consent to a search of one's 
property when the police have probable cause to believe the 
owner has been involved in a crime.  It takes very little 
imagination to see how this new doctrine could eat its way 
through all of our constitutional rights. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.dk 
 
26 
 
¶85 I understand the importance of pursuing intoxicated 
drivers.  But we are deforming our Constitution.  By conferring 
on the legislature the authority to create consent where none 
exists, we are reducing constitutional rights to matters of 
legislative grace.  For all of these reasons, I join the court's 
mandate, but only so much of the opinion as discusses express 
consent. 
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins part I of this concurrence. 
 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶87 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).1  The legal 
principle underlying this drunk-driving case is that a blood 
draw is a search under the Fourth Amendment.2    
                                                 
1 The first opinion, authored by Chief Justice Patience D. 
Roggensack, is a lead opinion. The opinion is referred to as a 
lead opinion because it states the mandate agreed to by the 
majority of the justices but represents the reasoning of less 
than a majority of the participating justices.   
Only Justice Annette K. Ziegler and Justice Michael J. 
Gableman join the lead opinion. 
Writing in concurrence, Justice Rebecca G. Bradley concurs 
with the mandate and joins Part I of Justice Daniel Kelly's 
concurrence.  Justice Daniel Kelly joins the "court's mandate 
and the opinion to the extent it discusses Mr. Brar's express 
consent to the blood test while he was present in the police 
station," but does not "join any part of the court's discussion 
of implied consent . . . ."  Justice Kelly's opinion, ¶1.     
Thus five justices agree with the mandate set forth in the 
lead opinion; the mandate is that the decision of the court of 
appeals is affirmed.   
Disagreeing with the mandate and the reasoning of the lead 
opinion, I write in dissent, joined by Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley.    
As Justice Ann Walsh Bradley recently explained in State v. 
Weber, 2016 WI 96, ¶83 n.1, 372 Wis. 2d 202, 887 N.W.2d 554 (Ann 
Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting), although "the term 'lead' 
opinion . . . is undefined in our Internal Operating Procedures, 
its use here is consistent with past description.  We have said 
'that a lead opinion is one that states (and agrees with) the 
mandate of a majority of the justices, but represents the 
reasoning 
of 
less 
than 
a 
majority 
of 
the 
participating 
justices.'" (quoting State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶143, 371 
Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson & Ann Walsh Bradley, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Hoffer 
Props., 
LLC 
v. 
DOT, 
2016 
WI 
5, 
366 
Wis. 2d 372, 
874 
N.W.2d 533)). 
2 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016); 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68 (1966). 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶88 The lead opinion presents two questions of law that 
this court decides independently of the circuit court and court 
of appeals but benefiting from the analyses of those courts.   
¶89 First, does a driver's "implied consent" under the 
Wisconsin Implied Consent Law constitute, by itself, voluntary 
and free consent to a warrantless blood draw for purposes of the 
Fourth 
Amendment? 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305 
(2015-16) 
(attached).3       
¶90 Second, is the circuit court's finding of consent in 
fact supported by the record, and, if so, has the State met its 
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant, Navdeep S. Brar, voluntarily and freely consented to 
the warrantless blood draw?     
¶91 I conclude that the lead opinion errs in deciding both 
issues.   
¶92 In responding to the first question, which it need not 
address, the lead opinion proffers a muddled interpretation of 
the Implied Consent Law that violates the federal and state 
constitutional protections against unreasonable searches. The 
State asserts that the Fourth Amendment is irrelevant to a blood 
draw undertaken to determine whether the driver is intoxicated.  
¶93 The lead opinion and the State engage in an unsound 
analysis of the text of the Wisconsin Implied Consent Law and 
relevant case law, including State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 65, 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.  The 2015-16 
version of § 343.305 is the same as the 2013-14 version.   
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 867, Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 
1552 (2013), and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 
(2016).  
¶94 In contrast to the lead opinion's and the State's 
positions, I conclude that neither a driver's obtaining a 
Wisconsin operators license nor a driver's operating a motor 
vehicle in Wisconsin is a manifestation of actual consent to a 
later search of the driver's person by a blood draw.  In order 
for a law enforcement officer to draw blood from a driver 
without a warrant, a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment 
must apply at the time of the blood draw, such as the driver's 
free 
and 
voluntary 
consent 
or 
the 
existence 
of 
exigent 
circumstances.  My position is consistent with recent decisions 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
of other state courts involving implied consent laws and 
conscious drivers.4   
¶95 The instant case and the Wisconsin Implied Consent Law 
should be compared with a very recent (April 2017) Colorado 
case, People v. Hyde, 393 P.3d 962 (Colo. 2017).  Hyde holds 
                                                 
 
4 See, e.g., State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609, 613 (Ariz. 2013) 
(holding that "independent of" the implied consent law, "the 
Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee's consent to be voluntary 
to justify a warrantless blood draw."); People v. Mason, 214 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 702 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2016) ("To recap, we 
have concluded that advance 'deemed' consent under the implied 
consent law cannot be considered actual Fourth Amendment 
consent."); Flonnory v. State, 109 A.3d 1060, 1065 (Del. 2015) 
("Here, 
the 
trial 
court 
erred 
when 
it 
concluded 
that 
'Defendant's statutory implied consent exempted the blood draw 
from the warrant requirement . . . .'"); Williams v. State, 771 
S.E.2d 373, 377 (Ga. 2015) (collecting cases) ("cases seem to 
indicate . . . that 
mere 
compliance 
with 
statutory 
implied 
consent requirements does not, per se, equate to actual, and 
therefore voluntary, consent on the part of the suspect so as to 
be an exception to the constitutional mandate of a warrant"); 
State v. Halseth, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (Idaho 2014) ("[W]e hold 
that an implied consent statute . . . does not justify a 
warrantless 
blood 
draw 
from 
a 
driver 
who 
refuses 
to 
consent . . . or objects to the blood draw . . . . Consent to a 
search must be voluntary."); State v. Wulff, 337 P.3d 575, 581 
(Idaho 2014) (same); Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939, 946 (Nev. 
2014) ("The implied consent provision . . . does not allow a 
driver to withdraw consent, thus a driver's so-called consent 
cannot be considered voluntary.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
[the implied consent provision] is unconstitutional."); State v. 
Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 243 (S.D. 2014) (ruling that a Fourth 
Amendment totality of the circumstances analysis must be 
performed to determine whether consent to a blood draw taken 
pursuant to state implied consent law was voluntary); Aviles v. 
State, 443 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that 
implied consent and blood draw statutes are not permissible 
exceptions to the warrant requirement and stating that to hold 
otherwise "flies in the face of McNeely's repeated mandate that 
courts must consider the totality of the circumstances of each 
case").  
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
that the driver's "statutory consent [under the Colorado 
statute] satisfied the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement."  Hyde, 393 ¶.3d at 968.  
¶96 Hyde is based on facts very different from the facts 
in the instant case.  The Colorado Expressed Consent Statute 
governing Hyde is very different from the Wisconsin Implied 
Consent Law with regard to the facts of the Hyde case. 
¶97 The different fact is that the driver in Hyde was 
unconscious when the blood was drawn.   
¶98 The difference between the Colorado and Wisconsin laws 
is that with regard to an unconscious driver, the Colorado law 
provides:  "An unconscious driver, on the other hand, 'shall be 
tested to determine the alcohol or drug content of the person's 
blood.' [Colo. Rev. Stat.] § 42-4-1301.1(8) [2016]. In other 
words, under the Expressed Consent Statute, the police need not 
wait until a drunk-driving suspect returns to consciousness, in 
order to afford that suspect an opportunity to refuse."5    
¶99 In contrast, under Wisconsin's Implied Consent Law, 
unconscious 
drivers 
are 
"presumed 
not 
to 
have 
withdrawn 
consent," but Wisconsin law enforcement officers are not 
directed to conduct a blood draw on an unconscious driver.  The 
                                                 
5 People v. Hyde, 393 P.3d 962, 966 (Colo. 2017). 
With regard to a conscious driver the Colorado Expressed 
Consent Statute is, according to the Colorado Supreme Court, 
similar in language and effect to implied consent laws in other 
states with regard to conscious drivers, even though the statute 
is phrased in terms of expressed consent.  Hyde, 393 P.3d at 966 
n.1.  
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
Wisconsin Implied Consent Law (in contrast with the Colorado 
law) states that a blood draw "may be administered to the 
[unconscious] person."  See Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b) ("[a] 
person 
who 
is 
unconscious 
or 
otherwise 
not 
capable 
of 
withdrawing 
consent 
is 
presumed 
not 
to 
have 
withdrawn 
consent . . . .").  Compare State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18, 373 
Wis. 2d 468, 
893 
N.W.2d 812 
(lead 
opinion) 
(upholding 
a 
warrantless blood draw of an unconscious driver based on exigent 
circumstances rather than the Implied Consent Law). 
¶100 In 
addition 
to 
these 
factual 
and 
statutory 
differences, Hyde is unavailing because Hyde's reasoning relies 
on unpersuasive readings of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 
(2013), and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).   
¶101 Indeed, Hyde has already been rejected by one state 
supreme court.  In North Carolina v. Romano, No. 199PA16, 2017 
WL 2492782 (N.C. June 9, 2017), the North Carolina Supreme Court 
was faced with the question whether drawing blood from an 
unconscious driver on the basis of only the implied consent law, 
without a warrant or exigent circumstances, and violated the 
Fourth Amendment.  
¶102 The 
Romano 
court 
analyzed 
Hyde, 
McNeely 
and 
Birchfield.  It disagreed with the Hyde court.  It declared the 
blood draw unconstitutional:  "Treating [the unconscious driver 
provision of the implied consent law] as an irrevocable rule of 
implied consent does not comport with the consent exception to 
the warrant requirement because such treatment does not require 
an analysis of the voluntariness of consent based on the 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
totality of the circumstances."6  The Romano court interprets 
McNeely and Birchfield substantially the same as I do and as do 
other state courts.    
¶103 In responding to the second question, I conclude the 
lead opinion again errs.  The circuit court's finding of consent 
in fact is not supported by the record, and even if it is, the 
State has failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant voluntarily and freely 
consented to the warrantless blood draw in the instant case.  
¶104 Because the lead opinion errs as a matter of law and 
whittles away constitutional protections for the defendant and 
all of us, I dissent.     
I 
¶105 The lead opinion interprets the Wisconsin Implied 
Consent Law to mean that driving in Wisconsin amounts to 
voluntary and free consent to a blood draw.  According to the 
lead opinion, the statutory "implied consent" given previously 
equates to actual consent at the time of the blood draw.  In the 
lead opinion's view, the Implied Consent Law, standing alone, 
provides "consent sufficient under the Fourth Amendment——not 
some amorphous, lesser form of consent."  Lead op., ¶21. 
                                                 
6 North Carolina v. Romano, No. 199PA16, 2017 WL 2492782, at 
*8 (N.C. June 9, 2017). 
The Romano court cites cases from two other states agreeing 
with its conclusion that the statutory implied consent does not 
satisfy the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment with 
regard to an unconscious driver.  See State v. Havatone, 389 
P.3d 1251, 1253, 1255 (Ariz. 2017); Bailey v. State, 790 
S.E.2d 98, 103 & n.42 (Ga. App. 2016).  
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶106 The lead opinion concludes:  "Brar consented [to the 
blood draw] under Wisconsin's implied consent law.  He availed 
himself of the roads of Wisconsin, and as a result, he consented 
through his conduct to a blood draw."  Lead op., ¶29.   
¶107 The lead opinion recognizes, however, that conscious 
drivers are statutorily given an opportunity to withdraw 
consent, lead op., ¶23 n.11, but does not address whether an 
opportunity to withdraw consent must always be given before a 
blood draw is taken.  Lead op., ¶23 n.10.7  Oddly, and 
inconsistently with the rest of its analysis, the lead opinion 
also recognizes that "[e]ven in implied consent cases, we 
consider the totality of the circumstances at the time of the 
blood draw to determine if an individual's previously-given 
consent continues to be voluntary at that time."  Lead op., ¶25 
(emphasis added).   
¶108 The State takes a position similar to the lead 
opinion's.  The State asserts that the Fourth Amendment is 
                                                 
7 The law is clear, in my opinion, that inherent in the 
requirement of voluntary consent is the right of a person to 
withdraw consent.  See, e.g., United States v. Dyer, 784 
F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1986) ("a person may limit or withdraw 
his [or her] consent to a search, and the police must honor such 
limitations."); Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d 741, 746 (D.C. 
1994) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) and 
Dyer to conclude:  "We think these authorities compel the 
conclusion that when the basis for a warrantless search is 
consent, consent may be withdrawn any time prior to completion 
of the search, and we so hold."); 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., 
Search & Seizure:  A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 8.1(c) 
at 58 (5th ed. 2012) ("consent usually may be withdrawn or 
limited at any time prior to the completion of the search") 
(footnotes omitted).     
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
irrelevant to a blood test requested under the Implied Consent 
Law.  The State argues that when a driver is stopped and is read 
the Informing the Accused Form, which the legislature requires a 
law enforcement officer to read verbatim to a driver, the State 
is not soliciting Fourth Amendment consent to a blood draw.8  The 
State's position is that the question at the Form stage is not 
whether the driver consents to the test, "but rather whether the 
subject will submit to the test he previously agreed to take, or 
recant his consent and face the adverse consequences of a 
refusal."9 
¶109 According to the State, when a driver is stopped and a 
law enforcement officer employs the Implied Consent Law to take 
a warrantless blood draw, the Fourth Amendment is not involved: 
This is not Fourth Amendment consent terrain; it is 
the statutory world of implied consent, a world the 
subject has entered though his own behavior.  The 
injection of Fourth Amendment consent principles into 
the 
Form 
phase 
of 
the 
implied 
consent 
statute 
contradicts Wisconsin and U.S. Supreme Court cases 
dealing with the law and would severely undermine the 
statute's critical role in combating the national 
problem of drunken driving.10         
                                                 
8 The State notes that, under its interpretation of the 
Implied Consent Law, whether consent to the blood draw is deemed 
to occur when a driver applies for an operating license or when 
a driver operates a vehicle is not material.  In either case, 
says the State, the driver has given consent to the blood draw 
under the Implied Consent Law before the driver is pulled over 
on suspicion of drunk driving.   
9 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent (State) at 7.  
10 Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent (State) at 8-9. 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶110 The 
State 
contends 
that 
Fourth 
Amendment 
constitutional rights come into play at the Informing the 
Accused stage only after the driver refuses to allow a blood 
draw and the State seeks a warrant for the blood draw or asserts 
that a Fourth Amendment exception applies, such as exigent 
circumstances.   
¶111 I disagree with the interpretations of the Informed 
Consent Law proffered by the lead opinion and the State.   
¶112 The lead opinion's and the State's interpretation of 
the Implied Consent law contravenes the text of the Law.  By its 
plain terms, the Law does not treat the driver as having 
actually consented to a blood draw.  By its plain terms, the Law 
does not empower law enforcement officers to draw a blood sample 
when the vehicle is stopped.  Rather, the Law directs a law 
enforcement officer to inform the driver that a request is being 
made for a test, that the driver may refuse to take the test, 
and that the driver will face civil legal consequences upon 
refusal to take the test.   
¶113 The text of the Informing the Accused Form, which the 
Law requires to be read to the driver verbatim, advises the 
driver that he or she may refuse to give a blood sample but that 
a refusal has consequences, including revocation of operating 
privileges and use of evidence of the refusal against the driver 
in court.  Wis. Stat. § 343.305(4).  If the Implied Consent Law 
furnishes actual consent to a blood draw, why would the 
legislature require officers to inform drivers when they are 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
stopped that the officer is requesting a test and that the 
driver may refuse the requested test?  
¶114 I conclude that in the context of the Wisconsin 
Implied Consent Law, the conduct that equates to consent valid 
under the United States and Wisconsin constitutions is the 
driver's agreeing to submit to the test after being read the 
Informing the Accused Form.  Were it otherwise, there would be 
no need to read the Form or request a test. 
¶115 I conclude that the court of appeals interpreted the 
Implied Consent Law correctly in State v. Padley, 2014 WI App 
65, 354 Wis. 2d 545, 849 N.W.2d 867:  The "implied consent" 
given by drivers on Wisconsin highways pursuant to the Implied 
Consent Law does not equate to "actual consent" under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Padley, 354 Wis. 2d 545, ¶¶38-39.          
¶116 The Padley court concluded that a driver's actual 
consent occurs after the driver has heard the Informing the 
Accused Form, weighed his or her options (including the refusal 
penalties), and decided whether to give or decline actual 
consent.  Padley, 354 Wis. 2d 545, ¶39.  The Implied Consent Law 
gives a driver a choice whether to give or decline to give 
actual consent when confronted with a request by a law 
enforcement officer for a blood draw:    
[T]he implied consent law is explicitly designed to 
allow the driver, and not the police officer, to make 
the choice as to whether the driver will give or 
decline to give actual consent to a blood draw when 
put to the choice between consent or automatic 
sanctions.  Framed in the terms of "implied consent, " 
choosing the "yes" option affirms the driver's implied 
consent and constitutes actual consent for the blood 
draw.  Choosing the "no" option acts to withdraw the 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
driver's implied consent and establishes that the 
driver does not give actual consent.  Withdrawing 
consent by choosing the "no" option is an unlawful 
action, in that it is penalized by "refusal violation" 
sanctions, even though it is a choice the driver can 
make.   
Padley, 354 Wis. 2d 545, ¶39.   
 
¶117 Both the lead opinion and the State suggest that 
Padley is incorrect as a matter of law, but neither advocates 
expressly overruling the case.11  Padley is binding precedent.  
Wis. Stat. § 752.41.  The lead opinion should abide by Padley, 
overturn it, or distinguish it.  Instead, the lead opinion 
                                                 
11 The defendant asserts that the State has forfeited the 
issues whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the "Form" stage 
of implied consent cases and whether Padley was wrongly decided. 
The defendant argues that at no point in this litigation did the 
State assert this position until its brief in this court. See 
Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 4; Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.62; 
State 
v. 
Denny, 
2017 
WI 
17, 
¶117, 
373 
Wis. 2d 390, 
891 
N.W.2d 144 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
dissenting); 
Michael Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin 
§ 23.8 (7th ed. 2016) ("Failure to raise an issue in the 
petition for review is deemed a waiver of any claim that the 
supreme court should consider the issue.").  
In the court of appeals, the State took the position that 
Padley was correctly decided by relying on it.  See Plaintiff-
Respondent's (State of Wisconsin) Court of Appeals Brief at 3 
("'Consent' is not to be confused with Wisconsin's 'implied 
consent' statute, a law which gives law enforcement the 
authority to require drivers to choose between consenting to a 
blood draw or refusing and facing penalties enacted by the 
legislature.") (citing Padley, 354 Wis. 2d 545, ¶¶27, 33).     
In this court, the State asserts that Padley's view of the 
Implied Consent Law is not correct and that when the Implied 
Consent Law is in play, it "is not Fourth Amendment consent 
terrain; it is the statutory world of implied consent, a world 
the subject has entered through his own behavior."  Brief of 
Plaintiff-Respondent (State of Wisconsin) at 8.   
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
swipes at Padley with clawless paws, unnecessarily leaving 
Padley and the Implied Consent Law in a state of uncertainty.     
¶118 In addition to not adhering to the text of the 
Wisconsin Implied Consent Law or Padley, the lead opinion does 
not, in my opinion, pay acute attention to the United States 
Supreme Court's recent drunk-driving cases.12   
                                                 
12 The lead opinion's reliance on pre-McNeely and pre-
Birchfield Wisconsin drunk-driving cases (such as State v. 
Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980), and State v. 
Piddington, 2001 WI 24, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528), is 
dubious for several reasons.   
Recent United States Supreme Court cases significantly 
changed the constitutional landscape of drunk-driving.  See 
State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶42, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 
N.W.2d 120, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2327 (2015) (McNeely 
"changed 
the 
landscape 
of 
warrantless 
blood 
draws 
in 
Wisconsin . . . .").  
The statutes at issue in those cases are not the same as 
the statute involved in this instant case, and the lead opinion 
fails to explain why these cases should control its analysis.  
The language from these cases upon which the lead opinion 
relies is taken out of context.   
The issue addressed in Neitzel was whether the accused had 
a right to confer with counsel before deciding to take or refuse 
to take a chemical test for intoxication.  The court held that 
Neitzel did not have the right to confer with counsel.  The 
issue in the case did not involve implied consent as such.  
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶119 The United States Supreme Court has not questioned the 
constitutionality 
of 
implied 
consent 
laws 
imposing 
civil 
consequences.  Indeed it has confirmed their constitutionality.13  
The United States Supreme Court has not, however, directly 
decided that the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment is 
satisfied solely by implied consent under a state implied 
consent law.  The Court also has not explicitly decided that 
state implied consent laws do not provide actual consent 
satisfying the Fourth Amendment.  In my opinion, this latter 
proposition is implicit in the Court's recent drunk-driving 
cases.  As Professor LaFave has observed:  "Consent in any 
meaningful sense cannot be said to exist merely because a person 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Piddington, the issue was whether the accused, who was 
profoundly deaf since birth, fully understood the information he 
was given orally by the law enforcement officer pursuant to the 
Implied Consent Law.  The circuit court ruled that the State had 
not met its burden to show that the accused understood the 
information he was given.  The supreme court ruled that whether 
the accused actually comprehended the warnings is not a required 
part of the inquiry.  According to the supreme court, the test 
is whether the law enforcement officer's attempts to communicate 
with the accused were reasonable under all of the circumstances.  
The court did not address whether the accused voluntarily and 
freely consented to a blood draw.       
13 See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013) 
("States 
have 
adopted 
implied 
consent 
laws 
that 
require 
motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within 
the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or 
otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense."); 
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016) ("Our 
prior opinions have referred approvingly to the general concept 
of 
implied-consent 
laws 
that 
impose 
civil 
penalties 
and 
evidentiary 
consequences 
on 
motorists 
who 
refuse 
to 
comply . . . and nothing we say here should be read to cast 
doubt on them.").   
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
(a) knows that an official intrusion into his privacy is 
contemplated if he does a certain thing, and then (b) proceeds 
to do that thing."14     
¶120 In Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) and 
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), the Court 
did not expressly address the issue of implied consent stemming 
from implied consent laws.  But the Court's reasoning derived 
from Schmerber v. California, 377 U.S. 757 (1966), is directly 
applicable to the issue of consent.     
¶121 In McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1566, the driver refused to 
consent to a blood draw.  The Court recognized that valid Fourth 
Amendment consent had to be obtained before blood was validly 
drawn under the Fourth Amendment, unless an exception other than 
consent was in play. 
¶122 The McNeely court (in a plurality opinion) explained: 
"Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is 
reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality 
of the circumstances."  McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1563.15  This 
emphasis on totality of circumstances suggests a broader reading 
of McNeely than limiting McNeely to exigent circumstances. 
                                                 
14 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Search & Seizure:  A Treatise 
on the Fourth Amendment, § 8.2(l) at 164-65 (5th ed. 2012). 
15 The Supreme Court of Georgia has explained:  "To hold 
that the legislature could nonetheless pass laws stating that a 
person 
'impliedly' 
consents 
to 
searches 
under 
certain 
circumstances where a search would otherwise be unlawful would 
be to condone an unconstitutional bypassing of the Fourth 
Amendment."  Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605, 612 (Ga. 2003) 
(quoting Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977, 987 (Ind. App. 2003)).   
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶123 Shortly after the McNeely decision, the United States 
Supreme Court vacated a Texas judgment upholding a forced blood 
draw based solely on consent derived from the Texas implied 
consent statute and remanded the matter to the state court for 
further consideration in light of McNeely.  Aviles v. Texas, 134 
S. Ct. 902, 902 (2014), vacating 385 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2012).  Aviles suggests that McNeely should be read broadly to 
apply to all warrantless blood draws and that the Texas implied 
consent statute was not a per se exception to the Fourth 
Amendment justifying warrantless blood draws.  The Texas court 
so interpreted the United States Supreme Court decision on 
remand.16  
¶124 Birchfield echoes McNeely and Aviles.  The Birchfield 
Court noted that "[o]ur prior opinions have referred approvingly 
to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil 
penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse 
to comply."  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185.  The Court 
characterized implied consent laws as laws "to induce motorists 
to submit to BAC testing."  136 S. Ct. at 2180.  The Birchfield 
Court explained that implied consent laws "provide[] that 
cooperation with BAC testing [is] a condition of the privilege 
of driving on state roads and that the privilege [will] be 
                                                 
16 Aviles v. State, 443 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) 
(holding that implied consent and blood draw statutes are not 
permissible exceptions to the warrant requirement and stating 
that to hold otherwise "flies in the face of McNeely's repeated 
mandate 
that 
courts 
must 
consider 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances of each case"). 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
rescinded if a suspected drunk driver refuse[s] to honor that 
condition."  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2169.     
¶125 One of the petitioners in Birchfield, Michael Beylund, 
complied with a law enforcement officer's demand for a blood 
sample under North Dakota's implied consent law, which imposed 
criminal penalties on a driver for refusal to submit to a blood 
test.17  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172.  Although Beylund 
submitted to the blood draw, the Birchfield court did not rely 
on "implied consent" derived from the implied consent law or 
acquiescence to uphold the constitutionality of the blood draw.  
Rather, the Court remanded the case to the North Dakota state 
court to determine whether Beylund's submission to the blood 
draw under the totality of the circumstances was voluntary 
consent to the search under the Fourth Amendment when he was 
erroneously told that the law required his submission to the 
blood draw and that the State could compel a blood test.  
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186.   
¶126 Considering the text of the Wisconsin Implied Consent 
Law, Padley, the United States Supreme Court language in McNeely 
and Birchfield, the remand of Aviles, and the required totality 
of circumstances analysis to determine voluntary consent (which 
I discuss further below), I conclude that neither a Wisconsin 
                                                 
17 The Birchfield Court noted that "[t]here must be some 
limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to 
have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public 
roads," and "conclude[d] that motorists cannot be deemed to have 
consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a 
criminal offense."  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185-86.     
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
driver's license nor the operation of a motor vehicle in 
Wisconsin is a manifestation of actual consent to a later search 
of the driver's person by means of a blood draw.  To draw blood 
without a warrant or an exception to the Fourth Amendment, the 
driver's valid consent under the Fourth Amendment must be 
obtained at the time of the blood draw.        
II 
¶127 Whether the defendant consented in fact to the blood 
draw and whether the consent was voluntarily and freely given 
under the Fourth Amendment and the Wisconsin constitution are  
questions of law that this court decides independently.   
¶128 I disagree with the lead opinion's analyses and 
conclusions of law.   
¶129 Consent in fact is a question of historical fact.  
This court will uphold a circuit court's finding of fact "if it 
is not contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of 
the evidence."  State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶30, 327 
Wis. 2d 392, 
786 
N.W.2d 430.18 
 
This 
court, 
however, 
independently applies constitutional principles to these facts.19   
                                                 
18 State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 
N.W.2d 463 ("When presented with a question of constitutional 
fact, this court engages in a two-step inquiry.  First, we 
review the circuit court's findings of historical fact under a 
deferential standard, upholding them unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Second, we independently apply constitutional 
principles to those facts.") (internal citations omitted). 
19 State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶8, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 
N.W.2d 634 (citing State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶16, 231 
Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552). 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶130 In 
the 
instant 
case, 
the 
record 
includes 
an 
audiovisual 
recording 
of 
the 
exchange 
during 
which 
the 
defendant's alleged consent took place.  Just as when a case and 
its factual issues are contained solely in written, documentary 
evidence, I can independently analyze the audiovisual evidence 
and need not give special deference to the circuit court's 
findings regarding factual issues, such as consent in fact.20 
                                                 
20 In such circumstances, the trial court's factual findings 
do not carry the same weight because the "trial court's 
customary opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and thus the 
credibility of the witnesses . . . plays only a restricted role 
. . . . "  Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 301-02 
(1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 141 (1966) and citing Jennings v. 
Gen. Med. Corp., 604 F.2d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1979)); Hague v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 F.2d 262, 264 (5th Cir. 1978) 
("Because the case was submitted to the district court in the 
form of documents and transcripts, [the] burden of showing that 
the district court's findings of fact were 'clearly erroneous' 
is somewhat lessened.").   
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶131 The 
audiovisual 
recording 
undermines 
the 
circuit 
court's finding of consent in fact and the lead opinion's 
discussion.  The defendant did utter the words "of course," but 
they are associated with his comment that "I don't want my 
license to be taken.  This is a complicated question."   
¶132 Although the lead opinion finds that "[n]othing in the 
recording 
rebuts 
the 
officer's 
testimony 
as 
to 
Brar's 
statements," lead op., ¶33, the audiovisual recording does 
conflict with the officer's testimony describing the "of course" 
comment.  The lead opinion's affirmation of consent in fact 
based on the recording is rebutted by the audiovisual recording.  
The recording does not support the finding that the defendant 
consented in fact.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Accord Lambrecht v. Estate of Kaczmarczyk, 2001 WI 25, ¶27, 
241 Wis. 2d 804, 623 N.W.2d 751 ("This court and the circuit 
court are equally able to read the written record."); State ex 
rel. Sieloff v. Golz, 80 Wis. 2d 225, 241, 258 N.W.2d 700 (1977) 
(same); Vogt, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 270 Wis. 315, 71 
N.W.2d 359 (1955), on reargument, 270 Wis. 321b, 321i, 74 
N.W.2d 749 (1956) ("[The reason for the clearly erroneous 
standard is that the] appellate court must give weight to the 
findings of a trial court made in a contested matter upon oral 
testimony where the trial judge is in a position to pass on the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their 
testimony.  He has full opportunity to observe the demeanor of 
the witnesses and judge their veracity——the appellate court does 
not.  The reason for the rule disappears, however, when the 
appeal is presented upon no more than pleadings and affidavits, 
as is the case here."); Cohn v. Town of Randall, 2001 WI App 
176, ¶7, 247 Wis. 2d 118, 633 N.W.2d 674 ("We are in just as 
good a position as the trial court to make factual inferences 
based on documentary evidence and we need not defer to the trial 
court's findings."); Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 145 
Wis. 2d 518, 521, 427 N.W.2d 414 (Ct. App. 1988) (same); Pfeifer 
v. World Serv. Life Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 567, 571 n.1, 360 
N.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1984) (same).  
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
¶133 Rather, the audiovisual recording suggests, in my 
opinion, that the defendant was "stalling" to avoid taking the 
test.  The law enforcement officer should have treated the 
defendant's conduct as a refusal to allow the blood test.21 
¶134 In sum, based upon the audiovisual recording, I 
conclude that the defendant did not consent in fact to the blood 
draw.      
 
¶135 Even if the defendant consented in fact, the question 
becomes whether the consent was freely and voluntarily given, 
that is, whether the consent was constitutionally valid.   
¶136 The 
lead 
opinion 
delves 
into 
what 
constitutes 
voluntary consent, attempting to redefine the Fourth Amendment 
consent 
standard. 
 
The 
lead 
opinion 
withdraws 
"any 
language . . . [in the cases] that requires that consent to a 
search be given knowingly and intelligently."  Lead op., ¶27.  
Thus, the lead opinion overrules a number of unnamed cases, 
including 
Gautreaux 
v. 
State, 
52 
Wis. 2d 489, 
492, 
190 
N.W.2d 542 (1971), a longstanding precedent.   
¶137 More than forty years ago in Gautreaux, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court stated the following regarding a defendant's 
consent to a constitutionally protected search:  "[T]he state 
                                                 
21 See 
State 
v. 
Rydeski, 
214 
Wis. 2d 101, 
107, 
571 
N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1997) (driver's conduct in insisting on 
using the restroom after agreeing to take the test in order to 
stall qualified as a "refusal"); Village of Elkhart Lake v. 
Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d 185, 191, 366 N.W.2d 506 (Ct. App. 
1985) 
(driver 
who, 
while 
not 
verbally 
refusing 
to 
take 
breathalyzer 
test, 
engaged 
in 
conduct 
which 
effectively 
prevented officer from obtaining accurate breath sample refused 
to take the test). 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
22 
 
has the burden of proving by clear and positive evidence the 
search was the result of a free, intelligent, unequivocal and 
specific consent . . . ."  Gautreaux v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 489, 
492, 190 N.W.2d 542 (1971) (emphasis added).22  Gautreaux has not 
been overruled.   
¶138 Why 
does 
the 
lead 
opinion 
attempt 
to 
overrule 
Gautreaux now?  Because, according to the lead opinion, "we 
interpret 
our 
constitution 
consistent 
with 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment," and the United States Supreme Court has said that 
"[n]othing, either in the purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' 
and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or in the practical 
application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be 
extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  Lead op., ¶¶19 n.8, 27 (quoting 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973)).   
¶139 This reasoning is unsound.  First, this court need not 
(and does not always) interpret Article I, Section 11 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in tandem with the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Dubose, 
2005 WI 126, ¶41, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582; State v. 
Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶60, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.   
¶140 Second, it seems to me that the substance of the 
"knowing" and "intelligent" standard, even if not precisely the 
same as used in the waiver of constitutional trial rights 
                                                 
22 Citing Holt v. State, 17 Wis. 2d 468, 117 N.W.2d 626 
(1962); United States v. Callahan, 439 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1971); 
United States v. Berkowitz, 429 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1970). 
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
23 
 
discussed in Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 141,23 is implicitly 
required by the totality of the circumstances test that the 
United States Supreme Court and this court have adopted to 
determine the voluntariness of consent under the federal and 
state constitutions.   
¶141 The United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth, upon 
which the lead opinion relies, recognized that "knowing" and 
"intelligent" play a role in determining whether valid consent 
was given under the Fourth Amendment.  The Schneckloth Court 
stated:  
The traditional definition of voluntariness we accept 
today [for Fourth Amendment purposes] has always taken 
into account evidence of minimal schooling, low 
intelligence, and the lack of any effective warnings 
to a person of his rights; and the voluntariness of 
any statement taken under those conditions has been 
carefully scrutinized to determine whether it was in 
fact voluntarily given.   
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.  
¶142 The factors listed in the Wisconsin cases to be 
considered in determining voluntary consent under the Fourth 
Amendment and the Wisconsin Constitution are similar and also 
                                                 
23 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973), 
the United States Supreme Court declared:   
There is a vast difference between those rights that 
protect 
a 
fair 
criminal 
trial 
and 
the 
rights 
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.  Nothing, 
either in the purposes of behind requiring a "knowing" 
and "intelligent" waiver of trial rights, or in the 
practical application of such a requirement suggests 
that it ought to be extended to the constitutional 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.  
No.  2015AP1261-CR.ssa 
 
24 
 
imply 
that 
a 
defendant's 
consent 
must 
be 
knowing 
and 
intelligent.  See State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶¶28-33, 327 
Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430.   
¶143 The Artic case sets forth the following non-exclusive 
list of factors to be considered in the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether consent was freely and 
voluntarily given:  
(1) whether the police used deception, trickery, or 
misrepresentation in their dialogue with the defendant 
to persuade him to consent; (2) whether the police 
threatened or physically intimidated the defendant or 
"punished" him by the deprivation of something like 
food or sleep; (3) whether the conditions attending 
the request to search were congenial, non-threatening, 
and 
cooperative, 
or 
the 
opposite; 
(4) 
how 
the 
defendant responded to the request to search; (5) what 
characteristics 
the 
defendant 
had 
as 
to 
age, 
intelligence, 
education, 
physical 
and 
emotional 
condition, and prior experience with the police; and 
(6) whether the police informed the defendant that he 
could refuse consent.   
State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶33, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430 
(citing State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 198-203, 577 
N.W.2d 794 (1998) (emphasis added). 
¶144 Indeed, the statement in Padley 354 Wis. 2d 545, ¶64, 
that consent requires a showing that a "search was the result of 
a free, intelligent, unequivocal and specific consent without 
any duress or coercion, actual or implied" seems to be a 
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shorthand form for the factors that this court has set forth in 
Artic.24   
 
¶145 With regard to the defendant's consent in the instant 
case, it was obtained by the officer's giving the defendant 
misinformation, namely that the officer did not need a warrant 
to draw blood.25  Advising the defendant, through words or 
conduct, that a warrant was not required for a blood draw was 
either an express or implied "unlawful assertion of police 
authority" to take a blood draw without a warrant.26  Moreover, 
the first factor identified in Artic, "whether the police used 
deception, trickery, or misrepresentation in their dialogue with 
                                                 
24 State v. Padley, 354 Wis. 2d 545, ¶64 (quoting State v. 
Johnson, 177 Wis. 2d 224, 233, 501 N.W.2d 876 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1993) (quoting Gautreaux, 52 Wis. 2d at 492)); accord State v. 
Giebel, 2006 WI App 239, ¶18, 297 Wis. 2d 446, 724 N.W.2d 402 
("Orderly submission to law enforcement officers who, in effect, 
incorrectly represent that they have the authority to search and 
seize property, is not knowing, intelligent and voluntary 
consent under the Fourth Amendment.") (Emphasis added.).   
25 See State v. 
Giebel, 2006 WI App 239, ¶18, 297 
Wis. 2d 446, 724 N.W.2d 402 (citing United States v. Elliot, 210 
F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1962) ("Orderly submission to law 
enforcement officers who, in effect, incorrectly represent that 
they have authority to search and seize property is not knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary consent under the Fourth Amendment.").  
26 State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶16, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 
N.W.2d 182 (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12-13 
(1948); United States v. Morales, 171 F.3d 978, 982-83 (5th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Pena-Saiz, 161 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Baro, 15 F.3d 563, 566-67 (6th Cir. 
1994); State v. Wuest, 190 Wis. 251, 255, 208 N.W. 899 (1926); 
State v. Johnson, 177 Wis. 2d 224, 228, 234, 501 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. 
App. 1993)).   
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the defendant to persuade him to consent," is pertinent in the 
instant case.27   
¶146 I conclude that the defendant did not consent in fact 
and that if he did, the consent was not the result of "an 
essentially free and unconstrained choice," Schneckloth, 412 
U.S. at 225, 227, but merely his acquiescence to an unlawful 
assertion of police authority.  The officer erroneously advised 
the defendant that blood could be drawn without a warrant.  See 
lead op., ¶6.  Accordingly, I conclude that the results of the 
warrantless blood draw should be suppressed.   
¶147 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶148 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
27 State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶33, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 
N.W.2d 430.  See also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 
548 (1968); State v. Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d 102, 349 N.W.2d 453 
(1984) ("Acquiescence to an unlawful assertion of police 
authority is not equivalent to consent.").  
See also Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187 (remanding 
Beylund's case to the state courts to determine whether 
submission 
to 
a 
blood 
draw 
after 
the 
arresting 
officer 
erroneously advised the accused that he was subject to criminal 
penalties if he refused to allow the blood draw). 
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