Title: Murphy v. Norfolk Community Services Board

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
JOHN MURPHY 
 
v.  Record No. 992764   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
September 15, 2000 
NORFOLK COMMUNITY SERVICES BOARD 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
William F. Rutherford, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment entered on a petition for 
review of the dismissal of an employee grievance, we consider 
whether the trial court erred in holding that the employer 
properly terminated the grievance based on the employee's 
failure to comply with certain filing deadlines. 
 
The evidence presented to the chancellor showed that in 
January 1999, John H. Murphy was terminated from his employment 
as a case manager with the Norfolk Community Services Board 
(NCSB).  In accordance with the grievance procedure enacted by 
the City of Norfolk (City) pursuant to Code §§ 15.2-1506 and -
1507,1 and made applicable to the NCSB by City ordinance,2 Murphy 
timely filed a written grievance with Brenda Wise, the Director 
of Administration for NCSB. 
 
On February 10, 1999, Murphy received a letter from Sharon 
Lucas, a human resources coordinator with NCSB, advising him 
                     
 
1See Norfolk, Va. Ordinance No. 36,558 (Sept. 10, 1991) 
(adopting the revised grievance procedure at issue in this 
action). 
that a panel would hear his grievance.  The letter directed 
Murphy to identify, by February 26, 1999, his employee 
representative to serve on the grievance panel and the witnesses 
he intended to present at the panel hearing.  The letter 
informed Murphy that "failure to observe the February 26, 1999 
time limit may result in the grievance being terminated." 
 
On Friday, February 26, 1999, Murphy mailed to NCSB a 
letter containing the requested information.  On the next 
business day, Monday, March 1, 1999, he personally delivered a 
copy of the letter to Brenda Wise.  Wise concluded that Murphy 
had not met the February 26, 1999 deadline, and that "there was 
nothing else for the community services board to do."  On March 
30, 1999, Wise gave Murphy written notification that his 
grievance would not be processed further. 
 
Murphy filed a petition for review in the trial court under 
the NCSB grievance procedure provision mandated by Code § 15.2-
1507(A)(7)(b).  He alleged that his initial noncompliance with 
the February 26, 1999 deadline constituted noncompliance with a 
"substantial procedural requirement" under the grievance 
procedure provisions, but that he cured his noncompliance within 
the time period allowed under the procedure.  Murphy further 
alleged that NCSB had failed, without just cause, to comply with 
the grievance procedure by failing to convene a panel to hear 
                                                                  
 
2See Norfolk, Va. Ordinance No. 35,929 (March 20, 1990). 
 
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his grievance.  He sought a declaration that he was entitled to 
the relief requested in his grievance based on NCSB's 
noncompliance with the grievance procedure or, in the 
alternative, that he was entitled to a grievance hearing. 
 
After the chancellor heard Murphy's evidence, NCSB moved to 
strike the evidence, arguing that NCSB properly terminated his 
grievance since he had not obtained an extension of the February 
26, 1999 deadline in accordance with the provisions of the 
grievance procedure.  The chancellor granted NCSB's motion to 
strike, ruling that Murphy had failed to obtain an extension of 
the filing deadline, and that the provision in the grievance 
procedure for curing noncompliance with a "substantial 
procedural requirement" within five days of a violation was 
inapplicable to filing deadlines.  The final decree stated that 
because Murphy had failed to meet the filing deadline and did 
not obtain an extension of time to make his required 
submissions, "the Director of Human Resources had no authority 
to unilaterally extend the deadline and was compelled to suspend 
processing of the grievance."  In the decree, the chancellor 
dismissed the petition and awarded final judgment in favor of 
NCSB. 
 
On appeal, we first review the provisions of the NCSB 
grievance procedure that are relevant to the issue before us.  
The grievance procedure requires that an employee who has filed 
 
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a grievance that will be heard by a three-person grievance panel 
designate another employee to serve on the panel.  Within ten 
business days of receipt of the Administration Department's 
request for the designation, the employee must forward the name 
of his choice to the Department.  The grievance procedure 
further provides that along with the Administration Department's 
request for designation of a panel member, the Department shall 
issue a corresponding request that the employee and the 
employee's "department head" submit, within ten business days, a 
list of the witnesses that they intend to present at the 
hearing. 
 
The grievance procedure also states, in relevant part: 
E. Time Limitations
 
. . . . 
 
 
2.  Any time limitation specified by this 
procedure may be extended by mutual agreement of the 
parties, or, when justified by unusual circumstances 
constituting just cause, by the [Director of 
Administration], provided that such extension must be 
in writing accompanied by a clear explanation of the 
Director of his reasons for authorizing the extension.  
Examples of unusual circumstances which will justify 
an extension of time are the sickness or disability of 
an employee or of a supervisor to whom a grievance 
must be presented. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
4.  After the initial filing of a written 
grievance, the failure of either party to comply with 
all substantial procedural requirements of the 
grievance procedure, without just cause, will result 
in a decision in favor of the other party on any 
 
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grievable issue, providing that the party not in 
compliance fails to correct the noncompliance within 
five (5) work days of receipt of written notification 
by the other party of the compliance violation.  Such 
written notification by the grievant shall be made to 
the [Executive Director].  The failure of either 
party, without just cause, to comply with all 
substantial procedural requirements at the panel 
hearing shall result in a decision in favor of the 
other party.  [Citation omitted.] 
 
 
Murphy argues that the chancellor erred in concluding that 
the curative provisions of Section E(4) are inapplicable to a 
failure to meet a filing deadline for the designation of a panel 
representative and witnesses.  He contends that Section E(4) 
permits a party to correct any noncompliance with "substantial 
procedural requirements" within five days of receiving a 
mandatory written notification of his noncompliance from the 
other party to the grievance.  Murphy contends that the February 
26, 1999 deadline was a "substantial procedural requirement," 
and that since he personally delivered the required designations 
one business day after the deadline, he cured his noncompliance 
and was entitled to proceed with his grievance. 
 
In response, NCSB argues that Section E(2) is the only 
provision of the grievance procedure that permits an extension 
of time beyond a deadline established in the procedure, and that 
Murphy failed to comply with either prescribed method in that 
section for extension of a time limitation.  NCSB contends that 
the curative provisions of Section E(4), on which Murphy relies, 
 
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apply to procedural requirements other than time limitations.  
Thus, NCSB asserts that since Murphy failed to establish that he 
obtained an extension of the February 26, 1999 deadline under 
the provisions of Section E(2), the chancellor correctly 
concluded that NCSB was required to cease processing his 
grievance.  We disagree with NCSB. 
 
Under Code § 15.2-1507, grievance procedures adopted by a 
local governing body must include certain components of the 
state grievance procedure.  See Zicca v. City of Hampton, 240 
Va. 468, 470, 397 S.E.2d 882, 883 (1990).  One required 
component is a provision that "[t]ime frames may be extended by 
mutual agreement of the local government and the grievant."  
Code § 15.2-1507(A)(6)(d).  The statute also requires a curative 
provision that enables parties to a grievance, within five 
business days, to correct noncompliance with "all substantial 
procedural requirements" that occur after the timely filing of 
an initial grievance.  Code § 15.2-1507(A)(7)(a).  These two 
components were incorporated into the City's grievance procedure 
in Sections E(2) and E(4). 
 
The term "substantial procedural requirement" is not 
defined specifically in either the Code or the City's ordinance.  
When a statute or an ordinance does not expressly define a 
particular term, the general rule of construction is to infer 
the legislative body's intent from the plain meaning of the 
 
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language used.  Sansom v. Board of Supervisors, 257 Va. 589, 
594, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999); Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. 
Partnership, 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998); City 
of Virginia Beach v. Flippen, 251 Va. 358, 362, 467 S.E.2d 471, 
473 (1996). 
 
An undefined term must be given its ordinary meaning, 
considered in the context in which the term is used.  Sansom, 
257 Va. at 594-95, 514 S.E.2d at 349; Stevenson v. City of Falls 
Church, 243 Va. 434, 437, 416 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1992); 
Commonwealth, Dep't of Taxation v. Orange-Madison Coop. Farm 
Serv., 220 Va. 655, 658, 261 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (1980).  The 
context of the term includes the other language used in the 
particular statute or ordinance at issue.  Sansom, 257 Va. at 
595, 514 S.E.2d at 349; City of Virginia Beach v. Board of 
Supervisors, 246 Va. 233, 236-37, 435 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1993). 
 
Applying these principles, we consider the plain language 
of Sections E(2) and E(4).  While Section E(2) allows the 
parties to a grievance to extend any time limitation specified 
in the procedure by mutual agreement or by permission of the 
Director of Administration, that provision does not authorize 
the termination of a grievance against a party who has failed to 
comply with a time limitation imposed after the initial filing 
of a grievance. 
 
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In contrast, Section E(4) allows the termination of a 
grievance based on a party's ultimate noncompliance with any 
"substantial procedural requirement."  This section provides 
that the failure of a party to cure his noncompliance, within 
five business days of receipt of written notification by the 
other party of the compliance violation, will result in a 
decision in favor of that other party.  Although the term 
"substantial procedural requirement" is not defined in Section 
E(4), the context in which the term is used indicates that it 
encompasses time limitations and other procedural requirements 
that are so essential to the grievance procedure that the 
uncorrected failure to comply with them will prevent a grievance 
from being heard and necessarily result in a decision in favor 
of the opposing party. 
 
Under this construction of Section E(4), Murphy's failure 
to comply with the February 26, 1999 deadline constituted 
noncompliance with a "substantial procedural requirement," which 
was subject to the curative provisions of that section.  Since 
Murphy personally delivered the required submissions to Brenda 
Wise one business day after they were due, he cured his 
noncompliance under the terms of Section E(4).  Thus, we hold 
that upon delivery of his submissions on March 1, 1999, Murphy 
was entitled to proceed with his grievance, and the chancellor 
erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. 
 
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For these reasons, we will reverse the chancellor's decree 
and remand the case with direction that it be remanded to NCSB 
for the processing of Murphy's written grievance filed with NCSB 
on February 2, 1999.3
Reversed and remanded.
                     
 
3We do not consider Murphy's assignment of error that the 
trial court erred in finding that NCSB was in compliance with 
the notification requirements of its grievance procedure.  As 
Murphy conceded in his written exceptions to the chancellor's 
final decree, the chancellor did not rule on this issue.  
Further, we note that Murphy's argument that he is entitled to 
prevail on the merits of his grievance due to NCSB's alleged 
noncompliance with its grievance procedure is not the subject of 
any assignment of error before this Court; thus, we do not 
consider the argument. 
 
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