Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LANCE ROY NOVAKOVICH:EUGENE JOHN STRINGARI v. DIANE M. TAYLOR

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LANCE ROY NOVAKOVICH:EUGENE JOHN STRINGARI v. DIANE M. TAYLOR2004 WY 158101 P.3d 931Case Number: 03-112Decided: 12/08/2004NOTICE:   This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming  82002 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.


October Term, A.D. 2004

 
                           IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF 

LANCE ROY 
NOVAKOVICH:                               

                                                                                    

EUGENE JOHN 
STRINGARI,                               

                                                                                    

                         
Appellant                                         

               
(Petitioner),                          

                                                                                    

                   
v.                          

                        
                                    

DIANE M. TAYLOR, 
Personal Representative            

of the Estate of Lance 
Roy Novakovich,                     

                                                                                    

                          
Appellee                                          

                         
(Respondent).                    
            

Appeal from theDistrictCourtofSheridanCounty

The Honorable John C. 
Brackley, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Edward G. Luhm of Scott, 
Shelledy and Luhm, PC, Worland, WY.  
Argument by Mr. Luhm.

Representing Appellee:

Kendal R. Hoopes and Jay 
A. Gilbertz of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, WY.  
Argument by Mr. Hoopes.

Before HILL, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Eugene John Stringari (Stringari) appeals a district 
court order denying his petition to reopen the probate proceedings of the estate 
of Lance Roy Novakovich (the decedent).  
Stringari claims that he was a reasonably ascertainable creditor, but 
that he was not given actual notice of the probate proceedings and, therefore, 
he is entitled to make his claims against the estate.  Concluding that the district court 
applied an improper standard, we reverse and remand the district court's order 
denying the petition. 

ISSUES

[¶2]      Stringari sets 
out three issues for review:

1.  Whether the district court erred by 
failing to permit Appellant to conduct discovery pursuant to the Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure prior to its determination that Appellant was not a 
"reasonably ascertainable creditor" of this estate and that Appellant was not 
entitled to equitable relief due to the "peculiar circumstances" of the case, 
pursuant to W.S. § 2-7-703(c)?

2.  Whether the district court erred in 
determining that Appellant was not a "reasonably ascertainable creditor" of said 
estate as intended by W.S. § 2-7-703(c)(ii), to whom actual notice of the 
pending estate should have been supplied pursuant to W.S. § 
2-7-205(a)(ii)?

3.  Whether the district court erred in 
determining that Appellant as creditor of said estate was not entitled to 
equitable relief due to "peculiar circumstances" pursuant to W.S. § 
2-7-703(c)(i)?

Diane M. Taylor (Taylor), personal representative of the 
decedent's estate, phrases the issues as:

I.  Was the Appellant a person authorized 
by the Wyoming Probate Code to reopen the Estate of Lance Roy 
Novakovich?

A.  Whether the district court sitting in 
probate correctly determined that the Appellant was not a "reasonably 
ascertainable" creditor entitled to actual notice of the probate proceedings and 
that the Appellant was barred from bringing a claim against the Estate by the 
nonclaim statute.

B.  Whether the Appellant was entitled to 
equitable relief due to "peculiar circumstances" pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-703(c)(i).

II.  Was the Appellant entitled to 
discovery pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure prior to the 
adversary proceeding?

FACTS

[¶3]      Stringari was 
involved in an automobile accident with the decedent sometime around July 29, 
1999.  The decedent died of causes 
unrelated to the accident on May 14, 2000.  
His will was admitted to probate; and his daughter, Taylor, was appointed 
personal representative.  In her 
final report and petition to distribute the estate, Taylor affirmed that she 
had given proper notice of probate to creditors as required by statute, 
including general notice through publication in a local newspaper of general 
circulation.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-201 
(LexisNexis 2003).  On April 24, 
2001, the district court issued an order approving Taylor's final report and 
decreeing final distribution of the estate.  Taylor was discharged as personal 
representative by court order on May 11, 2001. 

[¶4]      Stringari filed a 
Petition to Reopen Estate on July 9, 2002.  
Stringari claimed that although he was a reasonably ascertainable 
creditor of the estate and entitled to actual notice of probate by the personal 
representative, Taylor did not mail him notice of probate as required by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-205(a)(ii).  He 
asked the court to grant him relief pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-703(c)(i) 
and (c)(ii) and reopen probate, allowing him to file a claim against the estate 
and commence discovery.

[¶5]      Taylor responded with an 
objection that Stringari was not a reasonably ascertainable creditor.  She requested a hearing to determine the 
validity of his claim.  In his 
response to the objection, Stringari claimed that a hearing was premature and 
that in order for the process to have any meaning he was entitled to pursue 
discovery as specified in the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.  Stringari argued that discovery was 
necessary to establish what efforts the personal representative had made to 
ascertain the identity of the estate's creditors.  In an affidavit attached to her pretrial 
brief, Taylor replied that she recalled a conversation she had with her father 
in which he described an automobile accident he had been in as a 
"fender-bender," and that there were no injuries.  Taylor also recalled seeing a broken headlight 
on her father's car at that time but she considered the incident, which took 
place about a year before her father's death, to be minor and had completely 
forgotten it until Stringari's claim was filed.

[¶6]      A hearing on 
Stringari's petition was held before the district court.  The court denied the petition on the 
basis that: (1) Stringari had to make a serious showing of an entitlement to 
actual personal notice of the probate proceedings before the court would allow 
him to engage in discovery prior to a hearing under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-703(c); (2) the fact that the personal representative had knowledge that the 
decedent had been involved in a "fender-bender" approximately one year before 
his death, was not sufficient for the court to conclude that the personal 
representative should have discovered that Stringari may have wanted to bring a 
claim against the estate; (3) Stringari was not a claimant whose identity was 
reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative and he was not entitled 
to actual notice of the probate proceedings; and (4) Stringari was the type of 
claimant for whom notice by publication of the probate proceedings in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county where the probate proceedings 
were located was appropriate.

[¶7]      On appeal, 
Stringari challenges the court's denial of his petition to reopen the estate and 
his request for pre-hearing discovery.

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      The Wyoming 
Probate Code provides a unified procedure that is to be liberally construed and 
applied to:  promote the 
simplification and clarification of the law concerning the affairs of decedents 
and other protected persons; discover and effectuate the intent of a decedent in 
the distribution of his property; promote a speedy and efficient system for 
liquidating a decedent's estate and distributing it to his/her successors; and 
facilitate the use of certain trusts.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-1-102(a)(i) through (iv) (LexisNexis 2003).  The district courts of the state have 
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters relating to the probate and 
contest of wills and testaments, the granting of letters testamentary, and of 
administration, settlement, and distribution of a decedent's estate. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-101 
(LexisNexis 2003).  The district 
courts have the authority to appoint a fiduciary, including a personal 
representative, as an executor to administer the estate.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-301(a)(xv) and 
(xvi); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-3-101 et seq. (LexisNexis 
2003).

[¶9]      The probate code 
establishes the various procedures that must be completed in the administration 
of an estate.  One such procedure 
relates to notifying creditors of the probate proceedings.  Upon admission of a will to probate and 
the issuance of letters, if appointed, a personal representative is required to 
publish a notice of the admission of the will or estate to probate and of their 
appointment as personal representative once a week for three consecutive weeks 
in a daily or weekly newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the 
probate is pending.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-201 
(LexisNexis 2003). The notice is required to be substantially in the form set 
out in the statute and must include language informing creditors that any claims 
against the decedent must be filed with the necessary vouchers within three 
months from the date of the first publication of the notice or be forever 
barred.  Id.  A copy of the notice published in the 
newspaper must be mailed to each creditor of the decedent whose identity is 
"reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative within the time limited 
in the notice to creditors," not later than thirty days prior to the date three 
months after the first publication of the notice in the newspaper. Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 2-7-205(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003). 

[¶10]   
The Wyoming Probate Code then requires a creditor to file any claims it 
may have against an estate with the clerk of court within the time limited in 
the notice to creditors.  Any claim 
not so filed is forever barred.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-703(a) (LexisNexis 2003). The personal representative is 
required to state in writing whether the creditor's claim is allowed or 
rejected.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-712(a) (LexisNexis 2003).  If a 
claim is rejected, in whole or in part, the personal representative must notify 
the creditor by certified mail.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-712(d).  A creditor 
whose claim has been rejected then has the option of bringing suit against the 
personal representative but must do so within thirty days of the date when the 
notice of rejection was mailed or the claim is forever barred.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-718 (LexisNexis 
2003).

[¶11]   
After a personal representative has fully administered an estate by 
collecting all monies due, paying all debts and distributing all assets to the 
entitled parties, he may petition the probate court for a final discharge.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-814 (LexisNexis 
2003).  If the court is satisfied 
that the personal representative has fully performed all acts lawfully required 
of him, then it may issue a decree discharging him from all further 
liability.  Id.  Once all known assets belonging to the 
estate have been fully administered and distributed, the court may enter an 
order closing the estate.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-7-815 (LexisNexis 2003). 

[¶12]   
When an estate has been closed, the probate code allows for reopening in 
only two circumstances.  The first 
allows for the reopening of an estate upon a showing of due cause for the 
purpose of administering after-discovered property or for the correction of the 
description of any property that was administered during the original probate.1  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-8-101, -102 and -103 
(LexisNexis 2003).  The second 
circumstance, which is relevant to this case, applies to creditors' claims that 
were not timely filed with the clerk of court as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-7-703(a) and are otherwise forever barred, as noted above.  Subsection (c) of that statute 
provides:

(c)  This section shall not 
bar:

(i)  Claimants entitled to equitable relief 
due to peculiar circumstances, if so found by the court in adversary 
proceedings; or

(ii)  A claimant to whom no notice was 
mailed pursuant to W.S. 2-7-205(a)(ii), if the court in adversary proceedings 
finds that the identity of the claimant was reasonably ascertainable by the 
personal representative within the time limited in the notice to creditors 
published pursuant to W.S. 2-7-201.

Our concern in this case is with subsection (c)(ii), 
and we are called to interpret this statute.2

[¶13]   
Statutory interpretation is a question of law.

We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with 
the Legislature's intent. We begin by making an "inquiry respecting the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land 
and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 
(Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 
823 (1897)). We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, 
clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari 
materia. 

Wyodak 
Resources Dev. Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 2001 WY 92, ¶7, 32 P.3d 1056, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001) 
(quoting Exxon Corp. v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 987 P.2d 158, 161-62 (Wyo. 1999)).

[¶14]   
In reviewing this statute, we begin by considering the phrase "adversary 
proceeding."  On appeal, Stringari 
argues, as he did in the district court, that the phrase "adversary proceeding" 
contemplates an evidentiary-type hearing encompassing the application of the 
discovery rules set forth in the rules of civil procedure.  Taylor counters by declaring, "once an estate 
has been closed there is no open proceeding in which the discovery provisions of 
the Wyoming Rule[s] of Civil Procedure apply."  

[¶15]   
The phrase "adversary proceeding" is not defined in the probate 
code.  In fact, the phrase itself 
does not appear anywhere else in the Wyoming statutes.  The phrase, however, does have specific 
legal connotations:

Adversary 
proceeding.  One having opposing parties; contested, 
as distinguished from an ex parte hearing or proceeding.  One of which the party seeking relief 
has given legal notice to the other party, and afforded the latter an 
opportunity to contest it.

Black's Law Dictionary, p.52 (6th ed. 1990).  We have used the phrase in our case law 
jurisprudence in different contexts to refer to hearing or trial like 
proceedings. See generally, Mogard v. City of Laramie, 2001 WY 88, 
¶21, 32 P.3d 313, ¶21 (Wyo. 2001) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at 
the time adversary judicial proceedings are initiated against a defendant); 
Billings v. State Bd. of Outfitters & Guides, 2001 WY 81, ¶11, 30 P.3d 557, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001) (disciplinary proceeding before a licensing board is 
an adversary proceeding); Joe Johnson Co. v. State Bd. of Control, 857 P.2d 312, 318 (Wyo. 1993) (traditionally state has relied upon adversary 
proceedings between water users to address claims of abandonment); Diamond 
Hill Inv. Co. v. Shelden, 767 P.2d 1005, 1016 (Wyo. 1989) (reference to 
adversary proceedings within bankruptcy context). 

[¶16]   
The phrase "adversary proceeding" is used to connote a characteristic of 
legal proceedings of varying degrees of formality.  It means that a proceeding is contested 
by opposing parties who have been provided with the appropriate legal notice and 
given an opportunity to present their case.  All trials, for example, are adversary 
proceedings; but not all adversary proceedings are trials.  The same could be said for hearings 
before a court or an administrative agency. The legislature's use of the phrase 
"adversary proceedings" is not, therefore, a reference to any one specific type 
of proceeding, but to a characteristic of a proceeding.

[¶17]   
We think the legislature's intent behind the use of the phrase in § 
2-7-703(c) is connected to the unique nature of an estate after probate has been 
closed.  Upon discharge, a personal 
representative is relieved of all duties, rights, responsibilities, and 
liabilities and can no longer act as representative of the estate. 31 Am.Jur.2d 
Executors and Administrators § 309 (2002).  Arguably, the personal representative 
would have no further interest in the status of the estate.  Indeed, the estate itself ceases to 
exist as a legal entity once it has been fully probated and the personal 
representative has been discharged. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Porter, 
95 F.R.D. 417, 419 (N.D. Ind. 1982).  By using the phrase "adversary 
proceeding," the legislature has indicated an intent to have any petition to 
reopen an estate under § 2-7-703(c) subject to a contested, as opposed to ex 
parte, proceeding.3  The logical, if not only, person to 
assume that role is the former personal representative or administrator of the 
closed estate. Thus, the phrase "adversary proceeding" indicates the nature of 
the proceeding but is not a mandate for any particular type of 
proceeding.

[¶18]   
The question then becomes, what type of proceeding is contemplated for a 
petition to reopen an estate under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-703(c).  Taylor contends that a petition to reopen an 
estate should be treated as equivalent to a motion for relief from judgment 
under W.R.C.P. 60(b), which requires a prima facie demonstration of success on 
the merits before the discovery provisions of the rules of civil procedure are 
applied.  We are persuaded by this argument.  Thus, in order to be entitled to 
discovery, the petitioning party must first make a prima facie showing that he 
is entitled to reopen the estate. 

[¶19]   
In reaching this conclusion, we consider the nature of a final decree of 
distribution and an order closing an estate.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-7-813 through -815 
(LexisNexis 2003) provide for the final distribution, the discharge of the 
personal representative, and the closing of the estate.  The orders generated by this process 
represent the final orders of the probate proceedings.  Although the probate statutes 
specifically provide for probate estates to be reopened under certain 
circumstances, the decree of distribution and the order closing the estate are 
final judgments.  Indeed, the 
probate code provides that a decree of distribution is a final judgment 
adjudicating title to the assets of the estate and the rights of beneficiaries 
and claimants.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-101 
(LexisNexis 2003).  We have held, 
"the decree of distribution is final and res judicata if it is not appealed, 
regardless of any errors in the decree."  
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 238 (Wyo. 1986).  The final orders from a probate 
proceeding are therefore entitled to the same weight as a final judgment in any 
other civil proceeding. 

[¶20]   
We also consider the nature of a motion to reopen a probate estate.  The "law of reopening estates is derived 
from the law of vacating judgments."  
See Pitzer v. Union Bank of California, 9 P.3d 805, 812 (Wash. 2000).  Thus, a party seeking to reopen an 
estate is seeking relief from a final judgment.  As such, it makes sense to treat the 
request to open a probate estate the same as other requests for relief from a 
judgment.

[¶21]   
Outside the probate code, W.R.C.P. 60(b) provides the means for a party 
to seek relief from a final judgment.  
Although this court has never considered the extent of discovery for 
motions seeking relief from final judgment, several federal courts have.  It appears that these courts restrict 
the discovery the party seeking relief is allowed post judgment.  These courts require a prima facie 
demonstration of success on the merits before ordering discovery.  See H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1118-19 (6th Cir. 1976); 
United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 826 F. Supp. 1153, 1154-55 (N.D. 
Ill. 1993); Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626 (N.D. Cal. 
1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1981). 

[¶22]   
In looking at the rationale from these courts, we find their analysis 
equally applicable to motions to reopen probate proceedings.  A party seeking to reopen 
an estate similarly seeks relief from a final judgment but requests discovery to 
assist him in obtaining reconsideration of that final judgment.   H.K. Porter 
involved 
an attempt to overturn a judgment on the basis of fraud.  The party seeking relief argued that the 
opposing party possessed documents that would support the request for relief and 
sought discovery on that basis.  
Even though a party seeking relief on the basis of fraud carries a heavy 
burden of proof, the court of appeals affirmed the decision denying the 
discovery request.  In rendering its 
decision the court stated:

[W]e must recognize that 
a request for discovery for the purpose of attacking a final judgment involves 
considerations not present in pursuing discovery in a pending action prior to a 
judgment.  Primary among these 
considerations is the public interest of the judiciary in protecting the 
finality of judgments.

H.K. 
Porter, 
at 1118.  The court then held that 
in instances where post-judgment discovery is sought, it is within the trial 
court's discretion to require the moving party to make a showing in support of 
its allegations before requiring the prevailing party to submit to 
discovery.  Id. at 1119.  Because the party seeking relief failed 
to make a prima facie showing, the court ruled that there was no right to 
additional discovery.  Id. at 
1118-19.  

[¶23]   In Valerio, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California adopted the 
H.K. Porter reasoning.  
Valerio involved an attempt to set aside a class action settlement 
on the basis of fraud.  Like the 
party seeking relief in H.K. Porter, the parties seeking relief in 
Valerio claimed that they could corroborate their accusations if they 
were permitted discovery.  In 
resolving the matter, the court adopted the rationale from H.K. 
Porter that the public interest in the finality of judgments places 
post-judgment discovery in a different category than pretrial discovery.  The court then found that the plaintiffs 
had not made a prima facie demonstration of success on the merits and denied the 
request for discovery.  
Valerio, at 646-47.  
Interestingly, the court found the finality consideration "even more 
pressing in a class action context" where a large number of litigants would be 
affected by changes to the original decision.  Id. at 647.

[¶24]   The case now before us presents 
similar concerns for finality.  
Indeed, in probate matters there are multiple beneficiaries and creditors 
that may be affected by a change to the original probate decision.  Although H.K. Porter and 
Valerio differ from the instant case because they concerned Rule 60 
claims based on fraud, this distinction does not render the analysis 
inapplicable, because neither holding turned on the fraud issue.4  See Goldy v. Beal, 91 F.R.D. 451, 455 
(M.D. Pa. 1981).  Rather, 
H.K. Porter and Valerio stand for the proposition that 
post-judgment discovery is based on policies different than those considered in 
the period before trial.  Id.  Specifically, the policy of promoting 
the "finality" of judgments must be considered.  

[¶25]   
The probate code specifies:

            
Except as otherwise provided in the Probate Code, the provisions of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to and constitute the rules of 
practice for all 
proceedings, new trials or appeals.  
In all proceedings the party affirming is contestant and the one denying 
or avoiding is contestee.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-2-308 (LexisNexis 2003).  The statute clearly and unambiguously 
requires the application of the rules of civil procedure unless the probate code 
provides otherwise.  However, while 
the rules of civil procedure are applicable to probate proceedings, 
the rules 
governing discovery apply to the period of time between the pleadings and 
trial.  See W.R.C.P. 
26-37.  Post-judgment discovery involves considerations not 
present in discovery prior to a judgment.  
See H.K. Porter Co., at 1118.  As can be seen by the 
text of the discovery rules, in the early stages of litigation the parties are 
permitted broad access to information held by the other side.  This broad access exists even though 
compliance with discovery requests often creates considerable burdens on the 
responding party.  The policy for 
this liberal attitude is the belief that both parties must be permitted to 
scrutinize all relevant evidence so that each will have a fair opportunity to 
present its case at trial, and the flexible provisions contained in the rules 
serve this end.  Goldy, at 
454.  Following a judgment, this 
discovery policy is not equally forceful in the sense that, once judgment is 
obtained, the party has had such an opportunity.  Although a creditor, such as Stringari, 
did not participate in the prior proceedings, he had an opportunity to do so 
through the general publication notice.  

[¶26]   
Furthermore, there is a strong interest in not disturbing the sanctity of 
a closed probate estate.  
Pitzer, at 811 (citing Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 417 
(Tex. 1997) ("the need for finality of probate 
proceedings is well recognized by this and other courts"); In re Williamson's 
Estate, 95 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1957) (it is "public policy 
. . . that the estates of decedents shall be speedily and finally 
determined with dispatch")).  In 
Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855-56, 106 S. Ct. 2234, 90 L. Ed. 2d 858 
(1986), the United States Supreme Court noted the difference between the way an 
"open" probate and a "closed" probate should be treated:  "After an estate has been finally 
distributed, the interest in finality may provide an additional, valid 
justification for barring the belated assertion of claims, even though they may 
be meritorious and even though mistakes of law or fact may have occurred during 
the probate."  Because of these 
concerns, a court should be cautious before reaching back in time to evaluate 
errors made during the administration of a closed probate estate.  Pitzer, at 811.  

[¶27]   
Nevertheless, while the interest of finality is of paramount concern, it 
is not absolute.  Pitzer, at 
811.  Undoubtedly, this is why there 
are procedures for reopening probate estates.  In the limited circumstances where 
probate can be reopened, the interest of finality must yield to other 
concerns.  Id. at 811.  One such concern is due process.  The Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution requires the personal representative of an estate to provide 
actual notice of probate proceedings to known or reasonably ascertainable 
creditors.  Tulsa Professional 
Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 
489-90, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1347, 99 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988).  The personal representative must make 
"reasonably diligent efforts" to uncover the identities of creditors.  Id. (citing Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. 
Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 n.4, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 
2711, 77 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1983)). The "reasonably diligent efforts" required of a 
personal representative have been described as "due diligence to identify the 
decedent's potential creditors from all available sources at hand."  Tulsa Professional Collection 
Services, Inc. v. Pope, 808 P.2d 640, 645-46 (Okla. 1990).  The concept of "due diligence" is not 
foreign to this court.  We have 
defined it as:

Such a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, 
as is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable 
and prudent [person] under the particular circumstances; not measured by any 
absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts of the special 
case.

Pittman v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation 
Div., 917 P.2d 614, 618 (Wyo. 1996) 
(citing Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 
1990) and Olheiser v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 773 (Wyo. 1994)); see also Matter of Adoption of CAM, 861 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Wyo. 1993).  
Accordingly, a creditor of an estate is entitled to personal notice of 
probate if the personal representative knows of the creditor's identity or if, 
through due diligence based on the information available to the personal 
representative, the creditor's identity is reasonably ascertainable.5   

[¶28]   We must then determine how these 
due process considerations coincide with the finality considerations in the form 
of a proceeding.  As discussed 
above, the phrase "adversary proceeding" indicates the nature of the proceeding 
but is not a mandate for any particular type of proceeding.  Given this conclusion, it appears a 
hearing to determine whether the petitioner can make a prima facie showing would 
qualify as an adversary proceeding.  
At the same time, such a hearing takes into consideration the due process 
concerns because it gives a creditor an opportunity to show that he was 
reasonably ascertainable.    

[¶29]   Indeed, the competing due process 
consideration leads us to disagree with the district court's conclusion that 
Stringari was required to make a "serious showing" before being entitled to 
discovery.   In Valerio 
the court reasoned that, had the plaintiffs presented some evidence of their 
claim, the finality considerations might be sufficiently outweighed by the 
countervailing public interest in the integrity of the judicial process, to 
warrant further discovery.  
Valerio, at 647.  
Thus, the Valerio court embraced the idea of a prima facie 
showing, but not some higher standard.  
We similarly conclude that a prima facie showing, rather than a serious 
showing, is the correct standard because it represents the correct balance 
between the policy considerations of finality and due process.  

[¶30]   
We therefore hold that it is within the district court's discretion to 
require the party seeking to reopen the estate to make a prima facie showing to 
support its allegations before requiring the personal representative to submit 
to discovery.  As with Rule 60 
motions, this decision to grant relief is a question that rests within the sound 
discretion of the district court.  
Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996 (Wyo. 1993).  However, because the district court 
applied a "serious showing" standard, which is a stricter standard than the 
prima facie standard we determine is applicable, we reverse and remand so that 
the petition may be considered under the appropriate standard.  On remand, both the district court and 
the parties will be aware of the appropriate standard and will have the 
opportunity to conduct a hearing in conformity with that standard.    

CONCLUSION

[¶31]   
As fully discussed above we reverse and remand the district court's 
order. 

FOOTNOTES

  1In her brief, Taylor argues that 
appellant's Petition to Reopen the estate should be denied because he failed to 
demonstrate that he was a "person interested" in the estate.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-8-102.  However, these statutes clearly and 
unambiguously apply only to claims related to after-discovered property or for 
corrections of property descriptions. Neither scenario is present here, so these 
statutes are not applicable. 

  2The statute is structured so that a 
claimant can obtain a reopening of the estate if he can show either "peculiar 
circumstances" under subsection (c)(i) or if he can show that he 
was a reasonably ascertainable creditor who was not provided with the 
statutorily required notice under subsection (c)(ii). Appellant argued before 
the district court and in his appellate brief that he had demonstrated "peculiar 
circumstances" justifying relief under subsection (c)(i).  However, the facts pled by appellant 
relate only to whether he was a reasonably ascertainable creditor. Accordingly, 
appellant's claim stands or falls on his ability to make the requisite showing 
under subsection (c)(ii), and we need not consider his claim under subsection 
(c)(i).

  3Contrast this with a situation where 
a reopening of the estate affects a specific, identifiable property of an estate 
where a person or entity whose interest would be affected is readily 
ascertainable.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 2-8-101 to -103. The legislature did not use the phrase "adverse 
proceeding" in those statutes.

4In Valerio the plaintiffs 
sought relief through a separate action rather than a Rule 60 motion. However, 
the two remedies are co-extensive.  
See Goldy v. Beal, 91 F.R.D.  at 455 n.8 (citing Wright 
& Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2868 
(1973).

 5In her brief, Taylor suggests that a 
claim based on a personal injury is too speculative or contingent in nature to 
require personal notice. A personal injury claim is not a contingent claim any 
more than any number of other disputed creditor claims filed against an estate. 
Foster v. Cianci, 773 So. 2d 1181, 1182 (Fla.App. 2000).  Indeed, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-301(a)(ix) 
defines "debts" to include the liabilities of the decedent which survive, 
whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise.  The standard for notifying 
creditorsknown or reasonably ascertainableis sufficiently narrow to limit the 
scope of potential claimants against an estate to which legal notice must be 
given to a reasonable degree.  
Taylor's 
argument is not persuasive in view of the statutes governing 
probate.