Title: State of New Jersey v. Kendall J. Jenkins

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). On May 8, 2000, Kendall Jenkins sold drugs to Arthur Thomas at the Lexington Courts housing complex in Atlantic City. After completing the drug buy and as Thomas was walking away, Jenkins recognized Thomas as the man who had testified against him when he was on trial for the murder of Mark Cotton. Although a jury had acquitted Jenkins of the Thomas killing, Jenkins went after Thomas, picking up a brick and hitting Thomas over the back of the head, causing Thomas to fall down a flight of stairs, landing headfirst on the pavement. Autopsy evidence indicated that being hit by the brick likely caused Thomas to lose consciousness, but that he ultimately died from skull and brain injuries suffered from the fall to the pavement. LaVerne Garland lived in a nearby apartment. After hearing her niece, Adrian Bouldin, scream, LaVerne stepped onto her balcony in time to see Thomas fall and Jenkins run away. She called police, described what she observed, and identified Jenkins as the perpetrator. Another witness to the attack, Chevon Faulkner, told police that a brick had hit the man. Police found Thomas dead in a pool of blood. After the attack, Jenkins went to the apartment of Jane Dunbar, the mother of one of his friends. When the police arrived in response to LaVerne Garland s call, Dunbar went to speak with them, whereupon she learned that Jenkins had allegedly killed someone. Dunbar returned to her home and order Jenkins to leave. Shortly thereafter, Jenkins was apprehended by police in another apartment. Jenkins was placed in county jail. Subsequently, his fellow inmate, Edmond Garland, LaVerne s nephew, contacted police and told them that Jenkins had admitted that after selling drugs to Thomas, he had recognized Thomas as the man who had testified against him, so he bashed Thomas in the head. According to Edmond Garland, Jenkins also stated that one of his friends said, You ve done it again. I don t believe this. You done it again. LaVerne Garland, Bouldin, and Faulkner gave formal statements to the police. Before trial, these witnesses recanted. Faulkner told police that she had made up her story to collect a reward. However, Faulkner had contacted police earlier, about a month after the killing, claiming that she had received threats because of her cooperation with the investigation. Bouldin, in withdrawing her formal statement, claimed she was under the influence of drugs when she first spoke with police. LaVerne Garland recanted her statement at trial after having received threats about cooperating with the prosecution. Edmond Garland also attempted to retract his statement, apparently after another inmate threatened him. Nonetheless, at trial he stood by his original statement to the police. Jenkins was tried for murder; third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose; fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon; and fourth-degree witness retaliation. In addition to the witnesses directly implicating Jenkins in the Thomas killing, the prosecution presented evidence indication that Jenkins attacked Thomas in retaliation for his testimony against Jenkins in the Cotton murder trial. That evidence included testimony from Detective DeShields that: immediately prior to Cotton s death in 1997, Thomas had seen Jenkins with a gun; Thomas had identified Jenkins as Cotton s killer from a photographic array; and Thomas had testified against Jenkins in the Cotton murder trial in 1999. Jenkins did not object to this testimony. Jenkins did object to the introduction of an excerpted videotape recording of Thomas testimony at the Cotton trial. The trial court overruled that objection and the jury was permitted to view the tape. The prosecutor also adduced, without objection by the defense, additional information regarding Jenkins s conduct and the Cotton murder from the testimony of Terry McClain, Bouldin s parole officer. At the charging conference, Jenkins argued against instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses pertaining to homicide, preferring to gamble with an all-or-nothing approach to the murder charge. The State argued that the evidence presented at trial required instructions on reckless manslaughter and aggravated manslaughter, as well as murder. The trial court determined that because there was no doubt that Jenkins struck Thomas either knowingly, purposefully, or intentionally, the facts did not support a charge on lesser-included offenses. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts, including conviction for first-degree murder. The court merged the weapons offenses into the murder conviction and sentenced Jenkins to life with thirty years of parole ineligibility and a concurrent term of eighteen months on the witness retaliation charge. On appeal to the Appellate Division, Jenkins reversed his position, arguing that the court erred in failing to instruct on lesser-included offenses of reckless manslaughter and aggravated manslaughter. He also claimed the court committed reversible error in admitting other crimes evidence and in failing to offer necessary limiting instructions for evidence that the trial court otherwise properly admitted. The Appellate Division agreed with Jenkins, vacating his convictions. The panel reasoned that, based on the evidence presented, a jury could have reasonably concluded Jenkins intentionally struck Thomas without being practically certain that the attack would kill but, nevertheless, in reckless disregard for the probability or possibility that death might result. Accordingly, the trial court had a duty, irrespective of Jenkins s wishes, to instruct on manslaughter and aggravated manslaughter. In addition the appellate panel found that the cumulative effect of the other-crimes evidence admitted at trial without clear and complete limiting instructions deprived Jenkins of a fair trial. The Supreme Court granted the State s petition and Jenkins s cross-petition for certification. HELD: The trial court s failure to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter warrants reversal of Kendall Jenkins s conviction for the murder of Arthur Thomas. In addition, the introduction of other-crimes evidence deprived Jenkins of a fair trial. 1. The doctrine of invited error precludes a defendant from taking a position at trial and then, after embracing that approach to his ultimate disadvantage, changing course and alleging error on appeal. The criminal analog of invited error is designed to prevent defendants from manipulating the system and is only implicated when a defendant in some way has led the court into error. Thus, some measure of reliance by the court is necessary for the invited-error doctrine to come into play. Here, the trial court s reasons for deciding not to charge on the lesser-included homicide defenses make clear that the court reached its decision independently of any encouragement or request by the defense. Thus, the doctrine of invited error is inapplicable. (Pp. 8-12) 2. To be guilty of serious bodily injury murder, the defendant must have knowingly or purposefully inflicted serious bodily injury with the actual knowledge that the injury created a substantial risk of death and that it was highly probable that death would result. In aggravated manslaughter, the defendant must have caused death with an awareness and conscious disregard of the probability of death. If the defendant disregarded only a possibility of death, the result is reckless manslaughter. The trial court focused on the purposeful, knowing, and intentional nature of Jenkins s alleged striking of Thomas. Instead, the court should have inquired as to Jenkins s state of mind regarding the risk of death. Because the facts indicate that jurors could have found that Jenkins consciously disregarded a known risk that created the possibility or probability that death would result from his actions, the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter. (Pp. 12-17) 3. The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that, in admitting the other-crimes evidence, the trial court did not provide adequate limiting instructions. The Court also finds that, as a threshold matter, the trial court erred in admitting the videotape. In combination with the additional other-crimes evidence presented to the jury, the admission of the tape amounted to reversible error. The State was entitled to show that Jenkins held a grudge against Thomas for his role in accusing Jenkins of killing Mark Cotton; however, less prejudicial evidence exists to prove that motive. Informing the jury that Jenkins had once been accused of another unrelated killing ran the serious risk that at least some of the jurors would determine that Jenkins had a propensity to kill. Thus, Jenkins is entitled to a new trial. (Pp. 17-25) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED. JUSTICE VERNIERO, concurring in part and dissenting in part, joins in the Court s reversal of Jenkins s conviction in all but one narrow aspect. Regarding Jenkins s retrial, Justice Verniero would permit the State to play the videotaped excerpt of Arthur Thomas s testimony from Jenkins s previous murder trial. The fact that that testimony constitutes the entire reason that Jenkins allegedly attacked Thomas renders the tape highly relevant and probative. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI S opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. JUSTICE WALLACE did not participate. Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. KENDALL J. JENKINS, Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant. Argued November 5, 2003 Decided February 4, 2004 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 356 N.J. Super. 413 (2003). Jeanne Screen, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant and cross respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Donald T. Thelander, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent and cross appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Stephen P. Hunter, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel). Justice ZAZZALI delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal involves two issues. The first is whether the trial court s failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses warrants reversal; the second centers on whether the introduction of evidence of other crimes deprived defendant of a fair trial. Because each inquiry leads us to conclude that defendant is entitled to relief, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the matter for a new trial. [A]lthough the Prosecutor points out, the Court is - is obligated to charge included offenses whether or not the defendant wants them and the Court does not have to simply accede to the position of the defendant. In this case I think the defendant is - is - he may - he may have his tactical reasons but I think that on the law, his position is correct. Although the trial court acceded to defendant s request, those comments make clear that the court arrived at the decision not to instruct on lesser-included offenses independently of any invitation or encouragement by defendant. As such, the doctrine of invited error does not apply. However, because defendant did not object to the lack of such an instruction, we will review the decision not to instruct on lesser-included offenses under a plain-error standard. Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. KENDALL J. JENKINS, Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant. JUSTICE VERNIERO, concurring and dissenting. I join the Court in reversing defendant s conviction and concur in all but one narrow aspect of its opinion. Regarding defendant s retrial, I would permit the State to play the videotaped excerpt of Arthur Thomas s testimony from defendant s previous murder trial. In a real sense, that testimony constitutes the entire reason that defendant allegedly attacked Thomas. From that perspective it is highly relevant, highly probative evidence that should be admitted consistent with N.J.R.E. 403 and 404(b). The tape presents Thomas testifying that he observed defendant waive a gun, that he heard a bang, and that he then saw defendant run from the scene. It does not contain the word murder or offer any opinion on defendant s alleged guilt, and it runs less than two minutes in length. Given that the State s theory concerning defendant s motive focuses almost completely on the testimony captured on that tape, I find no adequate substitute for playing it before the jury. If defendant s retrial is to be a search for the truth, then the jury should not be blindfolded but instead should be permitted to see the alleged victim exactly as defendant saw him, namely, as an adverse witness at the prior proceeding. In view of the foregoing, I agree completely with the succinct analysis articulated by Judge (now Justice) Wallace, who stated on behalf of the unanimous Appellate Division panel in this case: Here, the evidence that Thomas testified against defendant at a prior trial was offered to prove an element of the retaliation against a witness charge and to establish a motive for the murder charge. The motive evidence was highly relevant in this case. A wider range of evidence is admissible to establish motive or intent than is permitted in support of other issues. State v. Crumb, 277 N.J. Super. 311, 317, 649 A.2d 879 (App. Div. 1994). [T]he trial court permitted, over defendant s objection, the playing of a videotaped excerpt of Thomas s testimony at the prior murder trial which identified defendant as the suspect and cautioned the jury that the evidence was not being admitted for the truth of what Thomas testified, but merely to prove that he was a witness against defendant. We are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. Whether under a Rule 404(b) analysis, or a Rule 403 analysis, the evidence was highly relevant and not unduly prejudicial to warrant exclusion. Although not requested to do so, we are convinced that if the court had been requested to undertake a 404(b) analysis, the court would have found the other crimes evidence of Thomas s testimony against defendant satisfied the four-prong [test under State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992)]. [State v. Jenkins, 356 N.J. Super. 413, 429-30 (2003).] In sum, the videotape is critical for the purpose of explaining defendant s alleged motive. The tape, which we viewed as part of the record, shows Thomas placidly testifying to what he had observed without any trace of emotionalism. I am not convinced that its brief playing, within the context of a whole trial, would be so inflammatory as to distract the jurors from performing their jobs fairly and in a deliberate fashion. State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 487 (2001). To the contrary, excluding it will prevent the jury from considering evidence that is highly probative, highly relevant, and unique. Accordingly, I would permit jurors at defendant s retrial to see and hear the videotape with an appropriate limiting instruction, and I respectfully dissent from the majority s contrary conclusion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. KENDALL J. JENKINS, Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant. DECIDED February 4, 2004 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Verniero DISSENTING OPINION BY