Title: Biddle v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
JAMIL T. BIDDLE, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 323, 2022 
 
Defendant Below, Appellant, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
I.D. No. 1911015492(N) 
 
Submitted: 
May 17, 2023 
Decided: 
July 31, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and TRAYNOR, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
This 31st day of July 2023, after consideration of the parties’ briefs, the record 
below, and the argument of counsel, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On November 18, 2021, a Superior Court jury convicted defendant below-
appellant Jamil T. Biddle (“Biddle”) of Robbery First Degree, Possession of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), and Conspiracy Second Degree.   
(2) 
On appeal, Biddle claims that the Superior Court:  (i) abused its discretion 
and violated Biddle’s right to a fair trial when it allowed the State to introduce the lay 
opinion of  three police officers that Biddle was one of the suspects in a surveillance video 
shown to the jury; (ii) violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial when it discharged 
a juror without attempting to assess her impartiality; and (iii) abused its discretion by 
allowing a police officer to testify as to the reason for the absence of any alleged victim or 
 
2 
 
eyewitness at trial.  We conclude that each of Biddle’s claims lacks merit.  Therefore, we 
AFFIRM the judgment of the Superior Court. 
(3) 
By way of background, on November 22, 2019, at around 9:56 a.m., 
Wilmington Police Department (“WPD”) detective Joran Merced-Falcon was on patrol 
when a dispatch went out with a “shots fired” incident in the 200 block of North Franklin 
Street in Wilmington.1  Shotspotter also indicated that six shots had been fired very close 
by, at 1216 West Second Street.  Although investigating officers found shell casings and 
one live round in the area, they did not find any potential victims or eyewitnesses to any 
crimes that may have been committed.   
(4) 
While at the police station that same day, Detective Merced viewed 
surveillance video of the area captured by a CitiWatch camera that is located on the corner 
of Second and Franklin Streets (the “CitiWatch Video”).  The CitiWatch Video appeared 
to capture an armed robbery followed shortly thereafter by an exchange of gunfire further 
down the street.  Because Detective Merced was unable to identify anyone in the video 
himself, he disseminated “attempt-to-identify” flyers to all police officers employed by the 
WPD.  The flyers showed a screen capture of the CitiWatch Video.2  As a result, police 
identified two of the suspects:  they identified Joseph Coverdale (“Coverdale”)3 as one 
suspect and Biddle, as the other.  
 
1 App. to Opening Br. at A116 (Merced Trial Test. at 51:12–22), A119 (Merced Trial Test. at 
54:8–10).  Citations in the form of “[Last Name] Trial Test. at [_]” refer to witness testimony from 
the trial transcript. 
2 Id. at A123 (Merced Trial Test. at 58:11–19).  
3 After a joint-trial, Coverdale was convicted of Robbery First Degree, PFDCF, Carrying a 
Concealed Deadly Weapon, Conspiracy Second Degree, and Possession of a Firearm by a Person 
 
3 
 
(5) 
Both Biddle and Coverdale were arrested on November 29, 2019, one week 
after the incident.  Upon his arrest, police officers took a photo of Biddle.  On January 6, 
2020, a New Castle grand jury indicted Biddle and Coverdale.  Biddle was charged with 
Robbery First Degree, PFDCF, Conspiracy Second Degree, two counts of Attempted 
Assault First Degree, and related counts of PFDCF and Conspiracy Second Degree. 
(6) 
After denying Biddle’s motion in limine to exclude police officer testimony 
identifying him in the CitiWatch Video, the Superior Court, before the jury was selected, 
held an evidentiary hearing on November 15, 2021 during which the State attempted to lay 
a foundation for each of the police officers’ identification testimony.4  First, Officer Gaetan 
MacNamara testified that in his capacity as a patrol officer and investigator, he had 
interacted with Biddle and the interactions included face-to-face conversations 
“approximately 25 times.”5  He had seen Biddle in public “approximately 75 times.”6  
Second, Cpl. David Schulz testified that in his capacity as a patrol officer and member of 
the Street Crimes Unit, he had face-to-face, conversational interactions with Biddle 
“anywhere from eight to ten times.”7  He had viewed Biddle in public or on CitiWatch at 
least an additional ten times.8  Finally, Cpl. Leonard Moses testified that in his capacity as 
 
Prohibited.  At the time of the writing of this Order, Coverdale’s appeal was pending before this 
Court.  
4 Id. at A59 (Evidentiary Hearing Tr. at 8:4–5) [hereinafter Evid. Hearing Tr. at [_]].  
5 Id. at A61 (MacNamara Evid. Hearing Test. at 13:16). Citations in the form of “Last Name Evid. 
Hearing Test. at __]” refer to witness testimony from the evidentiary hearing transcript. 
6 Id. (MacNamara Evid. Hearing Test. at 15:4).  
7 Id. at A69 (Schulz Evid. Hearing Test. at 46:3). 
8 Id.  
 
4 
 
a patrol officer and member of the Street Crimes Unit, he had face-to-face conversational 
interactions with Biddle “between 20 and 40 times.”9  He observed Biddle around the west 
side of Wilmington “a lot.”10    
(7) 
Following argument and the trial judge’s review of the relevant caselaw,11 
the trial judge stated that the court was “at the outset mindful and aware and cautious and 
takes heed to the Supreme Court’s caution regarding its reservations about the admission 
of identification testimony by police officers without regard to the instructions identified 
by the court, particularly in Saavedra.”12  The court then concluded: 
The court, adhering to the caution set forth in Saavedra, is convinced that a 
proper foundation was laid to my satisfaction that the witnesses had special 
familiarity with the defendants based under several and numerous and the 
State’s interactions with the defendants.  But the [Saavedra] court didn’t stop 
there.  
 
The court, again laying out its concern and caution to trial courts stated that 
after the foundation is laid, the trial court as a gatekeeper also needs to 
determine whether the witnesses, police officers as a lay witness in this case, 
would be in a better position than a jury not to make the ultimate decision as 
to identification, but to be in a position where it would not be cumulative or 
it would not be superfluous to have them identified because the video or 
photograph at issue is either hopelessly obscure on one end or unmistakably 
clear.  
 
 
9 Id. at A74 (Moses Evid. Hearing Test. at 65:5). 
10 Id. (Moses Evid. Hearing Test. at 65:18–66:2). 
11 The trial court, the State, Biddle’s counsel, and Coverdale’s counsel discussed this Court’s 
decisions in Saavedra v. State, 225 A.3d 364 (Del. 2020), Thomas v. State, 207 A.3d 1124, 2019 
WL 1380051 (Del. 2019) (TABLE), Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948 (1988), and the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Lazo, 34 A.3d 1233 (N.J. 2012), in depth.  
12 App. to Opening Br. at A85 (Evid. Hearing Tr. at 111:4–9).  The court also noted that the 
officers’ interactions with the defendants included “pedestrian stops, traffic stops, and other 
physical interactions.”  Id. (Evid. Hearing Tr. at 112:7–8). 
 
5 
 
I think defense counsel has leaned towards the photograph and video being 
unmistakably clear such that the police officers need not testify and should 
allow the jury to simply look at the video and the photographs and look at 
the defendants’ in-court personas and make an identification or lack of 
identification based on that.  
 
The court finds with respect to Mr. Biddle . . . based on the testimony and 
what I’ve seen from the video as well as the testimony of the officers, his 
appearance in court today is not the same as it was at the time of the alleged 
incident. . . .  
 
Each of the witnesses or proposed witnesses indicated that the defendant at 
the time didn’t wear -- at the time they knew him and at the time of the 
incident didn’t wear glasses and his hair style was not the lengthy braids that 
he has now.  Based on that, the court finds that that [sic] adhering to the 
Supreme Court’s instruction, the court finds that that’s within the buffer zone 
of hopelessly obscure or abundantly clear such that the testimony by the 
officers would not run afoul of the Supreme Court’s instructions.13 
 
(8) 
Further, the trial judge acknowledged Biddle’s argument that the correct 
“measuring stick” was not what Biddle looked like at the time of trial versus what he looked 
like at the time of the incident (i.e., in the CitiWatch Video), but rather, was what Biddle 
looked like at the time of his arrest photograph versus what he looked like at the time of 
the incident.14  However, the trial court clarified that, after its review of Biddle’s cited 
cases, the correct comparison was trial versus the incident.15  He then stated that, “out of 
the cautions set forth by the Supreme Court with respect to this type of testimony,” he 
would include an appropriate instruction with respect to identification.16 
 
13 Id. at A85–86 (Evid. Hearing Tr. at 112:16–114:22). 
14 Id. at A86 (Evid. Hearing Tr. at 113:23). 
15 Id. (Evid. Hearing Tr. at 113–14). 
16 Id. (Evid. Hearing Tr. at 115:14–18).  
 
6 
 
(9) 
Accordingly, at trial, the State introduced testimony from four police officers 
as to the identification of Biddle in the CitiWatch Video.17  The first officer to testify was 
Detective Merced.  As chief investigating officer, Detective Merced testified as to how the 
investigation proceeded, including how he had disseminated the still shot of Biddle from 
the CitiWatch Video to the WPD for identification purposes.  Detective Merced also 
testified that in his experience handling well over 100 cases, victims in the city of 
Wilmington are generally uncooperative,18 as are witnesses.19   
(10) 
The second, third, and forth police officers then testified.20  Each identified 
Biddle in court,21 and in the CitiWatch Video.22  Each testified that Biddle’s appearance in 
court was different than his appearance in the CitiWatch Video, specifically that Biddle 
 
17 The State also presented testimony regarding the shell casings police officers found at the scene 
of the crime.  Because Biddle was acquitted of crimes related to the shooting incident, this evidence 
is not relevant on appeal. 
18 Id. at A125 (Merced Trial Test. at 64:7–10).  
19 App. to Answering Br. at B5–6 (Merced Trial Test. at 68:20–69:1).  
20 Before the second police officer was sworn in, the trial court instructed the jury: 
You’ll be hearing from police officers, and there may be some notation that the 
police officer had some level of interaction with the defendants.  You are not to 
infer what that interaction was or what was involved in any of those conversations, 
just that there was some level of interaction.  Okay? So kind of giving you that 
precursor in framing the testimony that’s anticipated. 
Trial Tr. at 100:2–8, Nov. 16, 2021.  See State v. Norris, 2021 WL 4239665, at *2 (Del. Super. 
Sept. 16, 2021) (“The prejudice [of the fact that the witness is a police officer] may be remediated 
by careful questioning of the police officer and an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury.”) 
(footnotes omitted) (allowing police officer witness to provide lay witness testimony identifying 
defendant in surveillance video).   
21 App. to Opening Br. at A137–38 (Schulz Trial Test. at 103:20–104:2); Id. at A148 (Moses Trial 
Test. at 129:19–22); App. to Answering Br. at B14 (MacNamara Trial Test. at 154:6–8). 
22 App. to Opening Br. at A140 (Schulz Trial Test. at 114:17–21); Id. at A153 (Moses Trial Test. 
at 134:12–16); App. to Answering Br. at B14 (MacNamara Trial Test. at 154:1–5). 
 
7 
 
had changed to a braided hairstyle.  In addition, he had acquired glasses, removed his facial 
hair, and had lost weight.23  
(11) 
After both the State and Coverdale had rested their cases, and after Biddle 
had presented his alibi defense, but before Biddle rested his case, the trial court informed 
counsel during a sidebar that Juror No. 1 believed that she recognized the previous 
witness.24  Juror No. 1 then clarified that, with respect to the man in the screenshot of the  
CitiWatch Video wearing the white sweatshirt and denim jacket (identified by the 
testifying officers as Biddle), there was “someone that looks like him that I might know.”25  
Specifically, Juror No. 1 stated that he was incarcerated and looked like someone that she 
may be working with at her job, to get him into community services following his 
incarceration.26  The trial judge then engaged in the following colloquy with Juror No. 1: 
JUROR NO. 1:  [] I think the picture is someone I recognized.  
 
THE COURT:  Can you bring all the pictures and we will see?  
 
THE STATE:  Sure.  
 
THE COURT:  You just realized that?  
 
JUROR NO. 1:  Yeah. I was trying to figure it out.  And the name popped up on my 
screen this morning when I was working.  And that’s what I was thinking of.  
 
23 App. to Opening Br. at A139 (Schulz Trial Test. at 113:2–10); Id. at A153 (Moses Trial Test. at 
134:4–9); App. to Answering Br. at B14 (MacNamara Trial Test. at 154:9–15).  Biddle presented 
an alibi defense and denied that he was the individual in the CitiWatch Video.  In support of this 
defense, Biddle’s fiancée, Adejah Carter, testified, in part, that Biddle was not the individual in 
the denim jacket in the CitiWatch Video.  App. to Answering Br. at B35–36 (Carter Trial Test. at 
117–18).  
24 App. to Answering Br. at B52 (Trial Tr.at 134).  
25 Id. (Trial Tr. at 134:15–16). 
26 Id. (Trial Tr. at 134:9–16). 
 
8 
 
 
THE COURT:  This picture?  
 
JUROR NO. 1:  This one looks like Shukri Thomas.  
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  But that name hasn’t been used in this trial at all, right?  
 
JUROR NO. 1:  No.  
 
THE COURT:  You are saying this individual looks like someone you know to be 
Shukri Thomas.  
 
JUROR NO. 1:  Yeah.27   
(12) 
Thereafter, the trial judge dismissed Juror No. 1 from the sidebar so that the 
court could discuss the matter with counsel.  The State and Coverdale’s counsel agreed 
with the trial judge that Juror No. 1 had to be excused because there was no way to tell her 
that the individual in the photograph was not the person from her job.28  Specifically, the 
parties stated: 
THE STATE:  It’s clearly an issue, Your Honor.  I wish she never told us that.  I 
think she needs to be excused and an alternate should go in her place.  
 
THE COURT:  Any opposition to that?  
 
COVERDALE’S COUNSEL:  No.  
 
THE COURT:  In all fairness.  
 
BIDDLE’S COUNSEL:  I disagree.  I think she should stay on the jury, absolutely.  
 
COVERDALE’S COUNSEL:  I mean, how would you answer that question?  She 
has a question she might recognize somebody that may or may not be a part of this.  
He can’t answer that question.  Your Honor, I mean, don’t know how you answer 
that question.  
 
27 Id. at B53 (Trial Tr. at 135:3–22). 
28 Id. at B54–55 (Trial Tr. at 136–37).  
 
9 
 
 
THE COURT:  So your position is what?  
 
COVERDALE’S COUNSEL:  She has to be excused.  You can’t tell her it’s not the 
one she thinks it is because of the identity issue.  
 
THE COURT:  Exactly, right.  
 
COVERDALE’S COUNSEL:  I don’t mean to undercut [Biddle’s counsel].  If he 
has another argument, I will defer to him.  This is bizarre.  
 
BIDDLE’S COUNSEL:  The State is trying to prove that that guy is my client.  
 
THE COURT:  Well, if she kept that in her head, that’s one thing.  But she disclosed 
that.  
 
COVERDALE’S COUNSEL:  Right.  That’s unfortunate.  That’s really 
unfortunate.  
 
BIDDLE’S COUNSEL:  Well, I’ve asked the case to be dismissed and the 
prosecutor investigate the other guy that she identified.  
 
THE COURT:  Are you serious? 
BIDDLE’S COUNSEL:  No. I mean, I just feel like --  
THE COURT:  Give me rules or arguments.  Because right now I don’t want 
feelings and -- 
 
BIDDLE’S COUNSEL:  I understand what you are saying.  I’m just trying to think 
of what the best argument is.  If she can be fair and impartial in deciding who that 
person is, I still think perhaps she can say that. I don’t know.  We should ask her if 
she thinks that the State is alleging it’s somebody else, if she thinks she can be fair 
and impartial about who it is based on the answer.  But I think she needs to be asked 
that.  
 
THE COURT:  I disagree.  Again, if she looked at this individual and she’s 
processing this and said to herself and then when she’s in deliberations that this guy 
looks like whoever she just said he was, but she brought that to our attention.  At 
this point, I think she has to be excused.  For the record, I have your argument.  And 
it’s preserved for the record if you need to appeal.  But I think she needs to be 
 
10 
 
excused.  And we’ll move Alternate 1 into that position.  I just want to ask her one 
question, though.29 
 
(13) 
The trial judge then recalled Juror No. 1 to the conversation and confirmed 
with her that she had not shared her belief that the man in the photograph was someone 
that she knew with any other member of the jury.30  The following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT:  Ma’am, I just want to ask:  I’ve given you instructions throughout 
this trial not to discuss this case with any other jurors.  Did you communicate to any 
other juror the fact you said this happened this morning?  
 
JUROR NO. 1:  Yeah, at home when I was working, and I checked the name and 
the services.  And that’s why that picture looked familiar to me.  I didn’t discuss it 
with anyone. 
 
THE COURT:  Thank you.  I’m going to excuse you as a juror.  And I appreciate 
your candor in letting us know that.  Don’t discuss it with anyone.  I’m going to 
excuse you.31   
 
(14) 
Immediately afterwards, Biddle orally moved for a mistrial, twice.  The trial 
judge denied both of Biddle’s motions.32  In his first motion, Biddle argued, “how could 
we ignore the fact that a witness who knows somebody very well, knows what he looks 
 
29 Id. at B54–56 (Trail Tr. at 136:6–138:20). 
30 After the trial court dismissed Juror No. 1, the trial court addressed the issue with the jury.  The 
court stated: 
I just want [sic] make certain that you’ve continued to follow my admonition not 
to discuss this case, do any independent research or any such thing until you’ve 
actually been together to deliberate.  Is that fair?  And you have not discussed this 
case with any third parties and no third parties have contacted you about this case, 
correct?   
Trial Tr. at 8:16–9:1, Nov. 18, 2021.  
31 App. to Answering Br. at B57 (Trial Tr. at 139:3–16).  
32 Id. at B58 (Trial Tr. at 140:18), B62 (Trial Tr. at 144:6).  Biddle moved for a mistrial twice 
within one sidebar conversation with the trial judge.  After the trial judge denied the initial motion, 
Biddle’s counsel continued to argue that the juror issue warranted a mistrial, and he renewed his 
motion for a mistrial.  
 
11 
 
like, and then we just ignore that?  I just think it’s a problem and I’m asking for a mistrial.”33  
The trial court denied the first motion, stating “she didn’t say definitively that that’s the 
person.”34  Biddle renewed his motion.  In rejecting Biddle’s second motion for a mistrial, 
the trial judge explained, in reference to the individual in the denim jacket in the CitiWatch 
Video: 
[Juror No. 1 is excused because] [i]t could be a lot of people.  It could be 
your client.  But that’s what [the members of the jury] get to decide.  Had she 
kept that in her head -- there could be five other people in that jury box that 
says that guys looks [sic] like my neighbor.  I don’t believe its him.  It looks 
like my neighbor.  But the fact that she came forward shows that -- she’s 
demonstrating that she has a conflict.  And like [Coverdale’s counsel] 
rightfully pointed out, what do you ask her, to just disregard it?35 
The trial judge also emphasized that the main reason he was denying the motions for a 
mistrial was because Juror. No 1 did not say that the man in the video was her client.  
Rather, she stated he looked like a client of hers.36   
(15) 
Following trial but prior to sentencing, Biddle filed a Motion for a New 
Trial.37  As he does on appeal, Biddle argued that the trial court’s dismissal of Juror No. 1 
was improper, and, accordingly, a new trial was required.  Specifically, he argued “that 
Juror #1 would have ‘clearly supported the acquittal of Mr. Biddle’ and this fact ‘did not 
 
33 Id. (Trial Tr. at 140:7–11).  
34 Id. (Trial Tr. at 140:12–13).  
35 Id. at B60–61 (Trial Tr. at 142:16–143:3).  
36 Id. at B65 (Trial Tr. at 147:3–5).  
37 App. to Opening Br. at A263–66 (Motion for New Trial, dated Nov. 24, 2021).   
 
12 
 
require her dismissal from the jury.’”38  Further, Biddle contended “that Juror #1 should 
have been asked if she could fairly and impartially decide the case.  Instead, she was 
dismissed.”39  The trial court denied Biddle’s motion.  It ruled: 
Juror conduct that is presumptively prejudicial includes when jurors are 
made aware of information, not introduced at trial, that relates to the facts of 
the case or the character of the defendant.  It is the trial judge who is best 
situated to determine competency for jurors to serve impartially.  When Juror 
#1 came forward with information, it was clear she was no longer impartial 
to the facts of the case. The Court excused Juror #1 to preserve Defendant’s 
right to a fair and impartial jury.40 
 
(16) 
On August 12, 2022, the Superior Court sentenced Biddle to an aggregate of 
ten years incarceration followed by decreasing levels of supervision.41   
(17) 
Biddle challenges each of the foregoing decisions made by the trial judge:  
the decision to admit the testimony of three police officers as to Biddle’s identity in the 
CitiWatch Video; the decision to discharge Juror No. 1 after she communicated to the trial 
court the man in the CitiWatch Video resembled someone she knew; and the decision to 
admit Detective Merced’s testimony that, in his experience, victims and eyewitnesses in 
Wilmington are generally uncooperative.  As discussed below, we find no error in any of 
the Superior Court’s challenged rulings.  
(18) 
Biddle first argues that the officer testimony identifying him in the video is 
inadmissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence (“D.R.E.”) 701, and that even if the 
 
38 State v. Biddle, 2022 WL 102376, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 10, 2022) (quoting Motion for New 
Trial ¶ 5). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
41 Exhibit A to Opening Br. (Sentencing Order).   
 
13 
 
testimony were admissible, at a minimum, the testimony of the third officer amounted to 
improper vouching.  This Court reviews “a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of 
evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.”42  However, Biddle further alleges that 
the erroneous admission of the three officers’ lay opinions invaded the province of the jury 
and led to a violation of Biddle’s right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the 
Delaware and United States Constitutions.  We review “an evidentiary ruling resulting in 
an alleged constitutional violation de novo.”43   
(19) 
Under D.R.E. 701, 
[i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is 
limited to one that is:  
(a)  Rationally based on the witness’s perception; 
(b)  Helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining 
a fact in issue; and  
(c)  Not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the 
scope of Rule 702.44   
This Court recently reviewed a trial court’s admission of police officer video identification 
testimony in Thomas v. State.45  In Thomas, a police detective testified that the defendant, 
Thomas, was the person depicted in a surveillance video.  The State highlighted the video 
as evidence that Thomas retrieved a gun shortly before the murder of which he was 
 
42 Hines v. State, 248 A.3d 92, 99 (Del. 2021) (quoting Rivers v. State, 183 A.3d 1240, 1243 (Del. 
2018)). 
43 Greene v. State, 966 A.2d 824, 827 (Del. 2009) (citing Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 515 
(Del. 2006)).  
44 D.R.E. 701. 
45 2019 WL 1380051, at *2.  
 
14 
 
convicted following the trial.46  On appeal to this Court, Thomas argued that the officer 
testimony was inadmissible under D.R.E. 701.  We explained that: 
Rule 701 “permits a lay witness to testify about his own impressions when 
they are based on personal observation.”  “The ultimate question of the 
identity . . . remains one for the jury to decide, and lay opinion testimony will 
not be helpful to the jury ‘when the jury can readily draw the necessary 
inferences and conclusions without the aid of the opinion.’”47 
We stopped short of finding the admission of the officer’s testimony to be an abuse of 
discretion, and we expressed our “serious reservations about the admission of this type of 
identification testimony.”48  Specifically, we stated that “[i]t is unclear to us how the 
testimony of a police officer—or any other witness without particular expertise in 
comparing a videographic representation of a person with a suspect or defendant—would 
be helpful to the factfinder in resolving an identification issue.”49  We held that “even if 
 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at *3 (citing Cooke v. State, 97 A.3d 513, 547 (Del. 2014)).  In Cooke, this Court ruled that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted lay opinion testimony of a police officer 
identifying the defendant’s voice on phone call recordings.  The defendant argued that the officer 
was “no better suited than the jury to make the judgment at issue” because the jury had listened to 
the recordings, watched a video of the defendant’s post-arrest interview, and heard the defendant 
speak in court.  Cooke, 97 A.3d at 547.  This Court ruled that: 
[b]ecause there was a basis in the record for the Superior Court to find that [the 
officer] was more familiar with Cooke’s voice than the jury because of, among 
other things, his extensive face-to-face interview with Cooke, and thus, that his 
testimony would be helpful, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the testimony.   
Cooke, 97 A.3d at 547. 
48 Thomas, 2019 WL 1380051, at *3.  Among other things, we noted that “it was the defense that 
initially elicited testimony touching upon the investigating officers’ ability to identify individuals 
depicted in the different videos.”  Id.  
49 Id.  
 
15 
 
the detective’s opinion should not have come in, the admission of his testimony was 
harmless and therefore does not warrant reversal.”50 
(20) 
In Saavedra v. State, we reiterated our “concerns about the use of lay opinion 
testimony by police officers to identify defendants from photographic or videographic 
images.”51  There, we urged our trial courts and Bar to be mindful of these concerns and 
we advised that: 
Before a law enforcement witness uses a video clip or photograph to identify 
the defendant, due caution should be exercised to ensure that a proper 
foundation is laid establishing, to the trial court’s satisfaction, that the 
witness has a special familiarity with the defendant that would put him in a 
better position than the jury to make the identification.  And in determining 
whether the witness occupies such a position, the court should also consider 
whether the images from which the identification is to be made ‘are not either 
so unmistakably clear or so hopelessly obscure that the witness is no better 
suited than the jury to make the identification.’”52 
 
(21) 
Heeding our concerns expressed in Thomas and following our guidance set 
forth in Saavedra, the trial court made the required findings during the evidentiary hearing.  
First, the trial court heard testimony from each officer and determined that a proper 
foundation had been laid as to each officer’s “special familiarity” with Biddle at the time.53 
(22) 
Next, the trial judge considered that Biddle’s appearance had changed from 
the incident to the time of trial such that police officer testimony would be helpful to the 
 
50 Id. at *4. 
51 225 A.3d at 380.  
52 Id. at 380–81 (first citing United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 271–72 (7th Cir. 2018) and Lazo, 
34 A.3d at 1241–42; then citing United States v. Jackman, 48 F.3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1995)) 
(emphasis added). 
53 App. to Opening Br. at A85 (Trial Tr. at 112:18–19).  
 
16 
 
jury.  As the trial judge put it, the fact that Biddle’s appearance had changed put the images 
in the “buffer zone” between being “abundantly clear” and “hopelessly obscure,” such that 
the officers’ testimony would not run afoul of this Court’s instructions.54   
(23) 
Biddle argues that the police officer testimony was unhelpful because the 
jury was able to view Biddle’s arrest photo, in which his appearance was unchanged since 
the incident.  This argument is unavailing.  For one, even when directly comparing the 
arrest photo to the CitiWatch Video, the video is not “unmistakably clear.”  Moreover, even 
if it were, Biddle’s changed appearance at trial would still render the officers’ testimony 
helpful to a jury’s determination of the identity of the perpetrator.  Finally, we agree with 
the trial judge that the proper comparison is between the defendant’s appearance at the time 
of the alleged crime versus his appearance at the time of trial.55   
(24) 
Accordingly, we find that the trial court faithfully applied the factors that we 
set forth in Saavedra and did not err in admitting the evidence.  Further, the trial court took 
care “out of cautions set forth by the Supreme Court with respect to this type of testimony 
[to] include . . . an appropriate identification instruction for the jury.”56  
 
54 Id. at A86 (Trial Tr. at 114:20–22).   
55 See, e.g., Saavedra, 225 A.3d at 380–81, 380–81 n.78 (“[W]hen there is no change in a 
defendant’s appearance, juries can decide for themselves—without identification testimony from 
law enforcement—whether the person in the photograph is the defendant sitting before them.” 
(citing Lazo, 34 A.3d at 1241–42)).  As the State put it, the jury was tasked with determining 
whether the defendant in the courtroom was the person in the video committing the crimes, and 
that the defendant in the courtroom was on trial, not the arrest photograph.  
56 App. to Opening Br. at A86 (Trial Tr. at 115:14–17).  The trial court gave the following 
instruction to the jury: 
Identification of defendants. An issue in this case is the identification of the 
defendants. To find the defendants guilty, you must be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendants have been accurately identified[,] that the 
 
17 
 
(25) 
In the alternative, Biddle argues that even if the officers’ testimony had been 
properly admitted under D.R.E. 701, the testimony of the third officer — Officer 
MacNamara — amounted to improper vouching.  “As a general rule, a witness may not 
bolster or vouch for the credibility of another witness by testifying that the other witness is 
telling the truth.”57  “[I]mproper vouching includes testimony that directly or indirectly 
provides an opinion on the veracity of a particular witness.”58  Officer MacNamara’s 
testimony did not reference the testimony of the first two officers or their credibility as 
witnesses.59  Rather, Officer MacNamara testified as to his own familiarity with Biddle, 
based on his approximately 25 face-to-face interactions with him at that time,60 and his 
own belief that Biddle was the man in the CitiWatch Video.  Accordingly, we reject 
Biddle’s argument. 
(26) 
Biddle’s second contention on appeal is that the Superior Court erred as a 
matter of law and abused its discretion in discharging Juror No. 1, and in doing so, violated 
 
wrongful conduct charge in this case actually took place and that the defendants 
were in fact the persons who committed the act. If there is any reasonable doubt 
about the identification of the defendants, you must give the defendants the benefit 
of such doubt and find the defendants not guilty. 
Trial Tr. at 268:22–269:10, Nov. 17, 2021. 
57 Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 595 (Del. 2001); accord Luttrell v. State, 97 A.3d 70, 78 (Del. 
2014). 
58 Capano, 781 A.2d at 595 (citing Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 275 (Del. 1987)) (emphasis in 
original); accord Luttrell, 97 A.3d at 78. 
59 See Thomas, 2019 WL 1380051, at *4 (finding no improper vouching where officer 
identification testimony “was explicitly linked to evidence that the jury viewed during the trial—
the video clips” and officer “did not offer any opinions on the credibility of other prosecution 
witnesses”).  
60 App. to Opening Br. at A61 (MacNamara Evid. Hearing Test. at 13:16). 
 
18 
 
his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict and fair trial.  His argument is two-fold.  
First, Biddle argues that the trial judge erred as a matter of law when he excused Juror 
No.1, over Biddle’s objections at trial, without first conducting “a sufficient inquiry into 
juror bias,” as required by Schwan v. State.61  Second, Biddle argues that the trial court’s 
conclusion that Juror No. 1’s conduct was “presumptively prejudicial” is not supported by 
the record.62 
(27) 
In Schwan v. State, this Court held “that the trial judge erred by failing to 
exclude [a] juror, in the absence of a determination that the juror could render a fair and 
impartial verdict.”63  Although we recognized that, “[a] trial judge’s decision not to remove 
a juror for cause is ordinarily entitled to deference . . . when the trial judge fails to conduct 
a sufficient inquiry into juror bias, we are required to independently evaluate the fairness 
and impartiality of the juror.”64  This review is “more analogous to de novo review.”65  
Following a de novo review of the record in Schwan, we held “that the trial judge 
committed reversible error by not excluding, for cause, a juror who was acquainted with a 
prosecutor, although that same prosecutor was not involved in Schwan’s case.”66   
(28) 
Because the juror in Schwan was never asked whether she could render a fair 
and impartial verdict, notwithstanding her ongoing business relationship with the non-trial 
 
61 Opening Br. at 17, 23 (citing Schwan v. State, 65 A.3d 582, 590 (Del. 2013)).   
62 Opening Br. at 24, 25.  
63 Schwan, 65 A.3d at 585. 
64 Id. at 590 (emphasis added). 
65 Id. (quoting Knox v. State, 29 A.3d 217, 221 (Del. 2011)). 
66 Id. at 585.  
 
19 
 
prosecutor, we found the trial judge’s examination to be incomplete.  We specifically noted 
that there was “no opportunity to assess [the juror’s] credibility” on the issue of her 
impartiality.67  Accordingly, we found that there was “no record to support a determination 
on appeal that Juror 11 had the capacity to render a fair and impartial verdict in Schwan’s 
case.”68  We adhere to our ruling in Schwan where we determined that the trial judge denied 
the application to remove a juror based upon an incomplete record.  Here, by contrast, 
based upon the judge’s colloquy with Juror No. 1, there was a sufficient basis on the record 
for the judge to conclude that Juror No. 1 had engaged in conduct that was presumptively 
prejudicial and that she “was no longer impartial to the facts of the case.”69 
(29) 
Biddle takes issue with the trial court’s explanation, given in its ruling 
denying Biddle’s Motion for a New Trial,70 that Juror No. 1’s conduct was presumptively 
prejudicial.  He argues that there is nothing in the record to support this conclusion.  “[T]he 
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury in a criminal proceeding, that is guaranteed by both 
the United States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution requires that ‘the jury’s 
 
67 Id. at 590. 
68 Id. at 592. 
69 Biddle, 2022 WL 102376, at *1.  Moreover, Biddle was tried jointly with his co-defendant, 
Coverdale.  Because Coverdale’s counsel immediately agreed that “[s]he has to be excused,” the 
trial court’s failure to dismiss her would have, potentially, prejudiced Mr. Coverdale and deprived 
him of his right to a fair trial.  App. to Answering Br. at B54 (Trial Tr. at 136:22). 
70 Biddle takes issue with the fact that the trial judge only gave this explanation in ruling on his 
Motion for New Trial, and not at trial, when he excused the juror.  Opening Br. at 23–24.  Ideally, 
the trial judge would have done so, as the record of the colloquy during trial supports, and is 
entirely consistent with, the later ruling.  
 
20 
 
verdict be based on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources.’”71  
“Conduct that is presumptively prejudicial includes . . . when jurors are made aware of 
information, not introduced at trial, that relates to the facts of the case or the character of 
the defendant.”72  In this case, Juror No. 1 disclosed to the court that she thought that the 
individual in the denim jacket in the CitiWatch Video resembled someone else she knew, 
who was incarcerated.  In response to the trial court’s inquiry, Juror No. 1 explained “at 
home when I was working . . . I checked the name and the services.  And that’s why that 
picture looked familiar to me.”73  Thereafter, the trial judge excused Juror No. 1.74  Juror 
No. 1’s independent investigation into the name of the person she believed resembled the 
person in the video screenshot constitutes conduct that is presumptively prejudicial because 
she based her concern about the identity of one of the perpetrators, at least in part, on 
information from an outside source.  In other words, she expressed doubt as to the 
identification of Biddle based on her independent investigation into the identity of the man 
in the CitiWatch Video screenshot photograph.  Because the key issue in Biddle’s case was 
identity, the potential for prejudice due to Juror No. 1’s belief was significant.   
 
71 Flonnory v. State, 778 A.2d 1044, 1052–53 (Del. 2001) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 360 
U.S. 310, 312–13, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959) (per curiam) and Hughes v. State, 490 
A.2d 1034 (1985)). 
72 State v. Redden, 2010 WL 893685, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 12, 2010) (citing Miller v. State, 884 
A.2d 512, 2005 WL 16653713, at *2 (Del. July 12, 2005) (TABLE)), aff’d, 998 A.2d 851, 2010 
WL 2560041, at *2 (Del. June 25, 2010) (TABLE). 
73 App. to Answering Br. at B57 (Trial Tr. at 139:8–11).  
74 Biddle’s argument that the trial judge’s decision to excuse Juror No. 1 was not based on her 
disclosure that she independently investigated whether the man in the picture was another man she 
knew through work is undercut by the fact that the trial judge only definitively excused Juror No. 
1 after this disclosure.  Id. (Trial Tr. at 139:8–14). 
 
21 
 
(30) 
Finally, Biddle challenges the admission of Detective Merced’s testimony 
that victims and witnesses in Wilmington are generally uncooperative with police 
investigations under D.R.E. 401 and 403.  We review the trial court’s admission of this 
testimony for an abuse of discretion.75  Under D.R.E. 401, evidence is relevant if it “has 
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”76  
This Court has stated that “[t]he definition of relevance encompasses materiality and 
probative value.”77  “Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which 
the evidence is offered and the issues, or ultimate facts, in the case.”78  “Probative value is 
concerned with the tendency of the evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered 
to prove.”79 
(31) 
In this case, during his opening statement, Biddle opened the door to 
Detective Merced’s testimony when his counsel stated that the State would not be offering 
victim or eyewitness testimony.  Specifically, Biddle’s counsel stated that: 
The evidence in this case will be the testimony from the witnesses who take 
the witness stand and any evidence that is submitted when they are on the 
witness stand.  There is a video that shows something occurred.  We’ll find 
out if someone shows up to say what actually occurred.80 
 
75 Hines, 248 A.3d at 99. 
76 D.R.E. 401. 
77 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1060 (Del. 1994) (citing Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 731 (Del. 
1988)).  
78 Getz, 538 A.2d at 731.   
79 Id. 
80 App. to Opening Br. at A103 (Trial Tr. at 38:14–19) (emphasis added).   
 
22 
 
After Biddle’s counsel made the foregoing statement during his opening statement, the 
State called Detective Merced to the stand as its first witness.  In allowing the State to elicit 
testimony regarding victim and eyewitnesses in Wilmington, the trial judge limited the 
prosecutor to a single question as to victims, and a single question as to witnesses, and 
prohibited any follow up.81  Accordingly, the State only elicited the following statements:   
THE STATE:  Okay.  In your experience investigating over 100 cases, are 
victims in the city of Wilmington generally cooperative or uncooperative? 
 
DET. MERCED:  Uncooperative.82 
 
. . .  
 
THE STATE:  Detective Merced, in your experience with your hundreds of 
cases you’ve been assigned at the Wilmington Police Department, are 
witnesses of crimes in the city generally cooperative or uncooperative? 
 
DET. MERCED:  Uncooperative.83 
(32) 
Biddle’s counsel’s opening statement opened the door to the reason for the 
lack of victim and eyewitness testimony.  The State’s questioning of Detective Merced 
elicited an alternative explanation as to why there were no other witnesses.84   
 
81 App. to Answering Br. at B5 (Merced Trial Test. at 68:14–15). 
82 App. to Opening Br. at A125 (Merced Trial Test. at 64:7–10).  
83 App. to Answering Br. at B5–6 (Merced Trial Test. at 68:20–69:1).  
84 One of Biddle’s arguments is that “[t]here was no evidence in the record as to the reason the 
State had no victim or witnesses appear at trial in this case[,]” Opening Br. at 28, and thus, the 
State’s argument was one “based on facts not in evidence.”  Opening Br. at 30.  At oral argument, 
the State expressed its legitimate concern that addressing Biddle’s argument with specific evidence 
may be more prejudicial to the defendant than the generalized statements made by Detective 
Merced.  The State argued: 
The Court: [Defense Counsel]’s argument is that you need to make it more specific 
to this case . . . 
 
23 
 
(33) 
Biddle next argues that even if Detective Merced’s testimony was proper 
under D.R.E. 401, it should have been barred pursuant to D.R.E. 403.  D.R.E. 403 allows 
a trial court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”85  Unfair prejudice is defined as “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an 
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”86 
(34) 
Specifically, Biddle claims that the testimony was improper because it 
“allowed the State to argue that the absence of witnesses was due only to general 
uncooperation” which amounted to “an argument based on facts not in evidence.”87  During 
rebuttal, the State stated: 
Because of a video, you don’t need witnesses to come in and say, hey, I saw 
this.  You heard from Detective Merced.  Witnesses and victims in the City 
 
The State: There are a lot of warnings about making it specific to each case. I think 
when we keep it general and we keep it . . . and a few questions, you have less of a 
. . . less of a possibility of prejudice to the defendant. If you start getting into 
specifics about it, it can be, can very much lean toward, it looks like this person 
isn’t here because the defendant doesn’t want them to be here.  So, I think that’s a 
dangerous line to tread when we’re talking about specifics. I think that the evidence 
has to be pretty clear, and we get instructions about that, it’s a much more in-depth 
analysis. And I think that keeping it at a couple of questions that are very general, 
that are not specific to the defendant because you don’t want to run the risk of the 
prejudice, is fair. And it is especially fair in a case where the defendant himself has 
raised that issue.  
Oral 
Argument 
at 
29:44–30:43, 
Biddle 
v. 
State, 
No. 
323, 
2022, 
available 
at 
https://livestream.com/accounts/5969852/events/10842481/videos/236239224. 
85 D.R.E. 403. 
86 Paikin v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 2013 WL 5488454, at *3 n.7 (Del. Super. Oct. 1, 2013) (quoting 
Advisory Committee’s Note, Fed. R. Evid. 403). 
87 Opening Br. at 30.  
 
24 
 
of Wilmington are generally uncooperative.  They don’t want to talk to the 
police about what they observed.  So we don’t have that today.  But what you 
do have is a video that depicts everything that happened.88 
The State’s statements regarding Detective Merced’s testimony during rebuttal asked the 
jury to focus on the other evidence — the CitiWatch Video — and provided context as to 
why no other witnesses were present at trial to testify.   
(35) 
Moreover, the State only elaborated on Detective Merced’s testimony after 
Biddle heavily emphasized the fact of a lack of victim and eyewitness testimony during his 
closing statement.  In his closing statement, Biddle stated:  
There is no -- the victim didn’t come in here and testify.  We don’t know what 
the victim said.  And if you watch the video enough times you will see, like 
we all did, there is [sic] like ten people standing around.  Whether the police 
could have identified someone, asked somebody what happened there.  There 
is literally, if this is a robbery, as the State contends, it’s like the low key 
robbery because it seems like everybody is just standing around and life is 
normal. 
 
But those are decisions you have to make.   But the bottom line is, there is no 
testimony from the alleged victim.  And I call them alleged because we don’t 
know what happened there.  Earlier in the video at the very beginning he’s 
up walking up the street with these guys.  So we don’t really know.  But the 
bottom line is, there is no victim testimony in this case.  There is [sic] multiple 
witnesses who were standing around in that video.  There is no witness 
testimony in this case.  You can watch the video and determine for yourself 
if people seem to know each other or not.  But nobody who was on the street, 
all, whatever number of people, came in here to testify.  The reaction is sort 
of like what really happened.  I don’t know.  You can watch the video.  But 
I did need to make some general comment on this.89 
 
88 App. to Opening Br. at A256 (Trial Tr. at 239:11–19).  
89 Id. at A249–51 (Trial Tr. at 218:22–220:5) (emphasis added). 
 
25 
 
Thus, Detective Merced’s observations offering an alternative explanation of an issue that 
Biddle raised, and the State’s comments in its rebuttal, were not unfairly prejudicial.90   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
Justice 
 
90 State v. Sullins, 2007 WL 2083657, at *6 n.26 (Del. Super. July 18, 2007) (“Virtually all 
evidence is prejudicial-if the truth be told, that is almost always why the proponent seeks to 
introduce it-but it is only unfair prejudice against which the law protects.”) (quoting United States 
v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997))), aff’d, 945 A.2d 1168, 2008 WL 880166, at *2 (Del. Apr. 
2, 2008) (TABLE).