Title: HAYNES v COUNTY OF MISSOULA

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12140 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1973 BILL AND F A Y HAYNES, P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, COUNTY O F MISSOUWl e t a l . , Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : Christian, McCurdy, Ingraham and Wold, Polson, Montana Douglas J. Wold argued, Polson, Montana Stanley M. Doyle, Polson, Montana For Respondents: Garnaas, Hall and Riley, Missoula, Montana J. Robert Riley argued, Missoula , Montana Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Sherman V. Lohn argued, Missoula, Montana Robert L. Deschamps, 111 argued, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana . , F i l e d : D E C I ~ ~ Submitted: September 13, 1973 Decided 'B)rElo m M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court, P l a i n t i f f s secured a jury verdict i n the amount of $80,650 f o r the l o s s of two horses i n a f i r e a t the Missoula County f a i r - grounds i n August 1967, and judgment was entered thereon. Sub- sequently the d i s t r i c t court of Missoula County, the Honorable Jack L. Green, d i s t r i c t judge, granted defendants Missoula County and i t s Fair Board a new t r i a l . From the order granting defendants a new t r i a l , p l a i n t i f f s appeal. P l a i n t i f f s a r e B i l l and Fay Haynes, the owners of two registered quarter horses destroyed i n t h e f i r e and American Livestock Insurance Company, a material damage c a r r i e r . American paid the Hayneses $5,000 f o r the l o s s of one of the two horses involved and became subrogated t o the Hayneses' claims against defendants t o the extent of such payment. Defendants a r e Missoula County and i t s F a i r Board, the operators of the Western Montana Fair. The fairgrounds b e the f i r e occurred a r e owned by Mis- soula County and located within t h e Missoula c i t y l i m i t s . A general f a c t u a l background of t h i s action i s necessary f o r an understanding of the issues involved i n t h i s appeal. Defendant Missoula County Fair Board has operated t h e Western Montana F a i r a s agent of Missoula County f o r a number of years. I n 1967 the f a i r was held August 23 through August 26. Sometime p r i o r t o the f a i r date, the Board sent by mail t o prospective exhibitors a l e t t e r , a premium book, and an entry blank containing a general release. The Hayneses completed the entry blank and M r s . Haynes signed the general release form and returned the form t o the F a i r Board. The premium book a l s o con- tained a general release clause purporting t o release the Missoula County F a i r Board from l i a b i l i t y f o r l o s s o r damage t o exhibits. The Hayneses had exhibited horses a t the Missoula County f a i r i n previous years, and i n 1967 they exhibited two horses---Jule Bar, a s t a l l i o n , and h i s yearling son, J u l e ' s Dandy. Both were registered quarter horses. The ~ a y n e s e s ' horses were assigned s t a l l space i n barn number two and pursuant t o the premium book regulations the feeding, watering and grooming was l e f t t o the exhibitor. One of the ~ a y n e s e s ' horses was entered i n the h a l t e r classes and the b a r r e l racing event. B i l l Haynes had been hired by the F a i r Board t o work a s arena d i r e c t o r f o r the 1967 f a i r . The tasks of arena d i r e c t o r required the use of a saddle horse. A t approximately 4:00 a.m. the morning of August 24, 1967, a f i r e of unknown causes erupted i n barn number two which resulted i n the death of both the ~ a y n e s e s ' horses. Hayneses f i l e d s u i t against defendants on October 24, 1967, t o recover damages f o r the l o s s of t h e i r two quarter horses, Jule Bar and ~ u l e ' s Dandy. Considerable time elapsed and two substitu- tions of judges occurred before t r i a l . During t h a t time, the American Livestock Insurance Company, material damage c a r r i e r on one of the horses, was added a s party p l a i n t i f f . This insurer had paid the Hayneses $5,000, the face of the policy, f o r the l o s s of one of the two horses. A complex and extended jury t r i a l began i n the d i s t r i c t court of Missoula County i n May 1971, before Judge Jack L. Green. On May 27, 1971, the jury returned a general verdict f o r plain- t i f f s and awarded damages i n the amount of $80,650; $1,000 of which was f o r the l o s s of the horse J u l e ' s Dandy and the remainder f o r the l o s s of the horse J u l e Bar. The jury a l s o returned a special interrogatory i n which it found t h a t the care, custody and control of the two horses was i n the Missoula County Fair Board. A f l u r r y of p o s t - t r i a l a c t i v i t y occurred, culminating i n the granting of defendants' amended motion f o r a new t r i a l on June 18, 1971. From the order granting defendants a new t r i a l , p l a i n t i f f s appeal. The basic theory of p l a i n t i f f s ' case was t h a t defendants breached t h e i r duty of ordinary care owing t o p l a i n t i f f s , thereby rendering them negligent; t h a t such negligence on defendants' part was the proximate cause of the destruction of p l a i n t i f f s ' horses and the r e s u l t i n g monetary damages represented the value of the two horses a t the time of loss. Specific a c t s of negligence alleged covered both a c t s of commission and omission on the part of defendants and involved the hazardous condition of the building, a fireworks display and f a i l u r e t o provide adequate f i r e protec- tion. Evidence a t the t r i a l discloses many c o n f l i c t s . Principal c o n f l i c t s involved the cause of the f i r e ; i n whose care, custody and control the horses were a t the time of loss; and the value of the horses a t the time of loss. O n the evening of August 23, 1967, Rich Company, a f i r e - works display company under contract t o the Fair Board, exploded fireworks. Several witnesses t e s t i f i e d concerning small grass f i r e s which were ignited by the fireworks. P l a i n t i f f s ' witness, Meredith E. F i t e , the Missoula F i r e Marshal, t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n h i s opinion "the probable cause of t h i s f i r e would have been the fireworks." M r . F i t e s t a t e d t h a t during t h e testimony of the p l a i n t i f f s ' other witnesses he had formed the opinion the f i r e had s t a r t e d i n the sawdust accumulated outside the building, had slowly burned under the s i l l , and erupted inside the building a t 4 : 0 0 a.m. ~ e f e n d a n t s ' witness, Thor Fladwed, a professional f i r e in- vestigator with experience i n insurance cases, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had performed t e s t s on material samples taken from barn number one and from the f i r e area. He s t a t e d t h a t i n h i s opinion the chain of causation s t a t e d by M r . F i t e was p r a c t i c a l l y impossible. One witness f o r defendants s t a t e d t h a t he saw a bright blue f l a s h on the morning of t h e f i r e which could have been an e l e c t r i - c a l f a i l u r e , but p l a i n t i f f s produced a Montana Power Company em- ployee who t e s t i f i e d there had been no transformer power surge o r similar malfunction t h e night of the f i r e . Witnesses f o r the defendants a l s o suggested the p o s s i b i l i t y of arson, accident, o r a nearby t r a s h b a r r e l a s possible causes of the f i r e . p l a i n t i f f s ' expert F i t e s t a t e d he had ruled out these various possible causes of the f i r e . The Fair Board kept no f i r e trucks within t h e premises of the fairgrounds. Three night watchmen were on duty i n the f a i r - grounds on the night of the f i r e . A t about 4:00 a.m. watchman Cassidy observed smoke coming from barn number two. He and watchman Cambridge went t o barn number two and commenced releasing horses from t h e i r s t a l l s . Watchman Brennan called the c i t y f i r e department. Persons who were sleeping i n campers and t r a i l e r s adjacent t o barn number two awoke and took p a r t i n attempting t o release horses from the barn. Some horses had been padlocked i n t h e i r s t a l l s . The f i r e swept through the barn very rapidly and several horses, including those owned by the Hayneses were k i l l e d i n the f i r e . The Hayneses were not on the fairgrounds the night of the f i r e . p l a i n t i f f s ' f i v e witnesses who t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e market value of the horse J u l e Bar varied i n t h e i r opinions between $30,000 and $105,000. P l a i n t i f f B i l l Haynes t e s t i f i e d the value of the horse ~ u l e ' s Dandy was $1,000. A defense value witness valued J u l e Bar a t $7,500. The jury returned a verdict awarding damages of $79,650 f o r the loss of J u l e Bar, and $1,000 f o r the l o s s of J u l e ' s Dandy. Following entry of judgment f o r p l a i n t i f f s , the t r i a l court granted an amended motion f o r a new t r i a l f i l e d by defendants. The amended motion l i s t e d s i x of the eight s t a t u t o r y grounds provided i n section 93-5603, R.C.M. 1947, upon which a new t r i a l may be granted: (1) I r r e g u l a r i t y i n the proceedings and abuse of discretion by the t r i a l court which prevented defendants from having a f a i r t r i a l . (2) Accident o r surprise which could not be guarded against. (3) Excessive damages given under the influence of passion o r prejudice. (4) Insufficiency of the evidence t o j u s t i f y the verdict. (5) Error a t law occurring a t t r i a l . (6) Misconduct of the jury. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s order granting the amended motion was general and did not specify on which of these enumerated grounds the new t r i a l was granted. O n appeal t h i s Court rendered an opinion on May 31, 1973, affirming the t r i a l c o u r t ' s order granting defendants a new t r i a l which was subsequently withdrawn and a rehearing granted. The present opinion follows. The underlying issue i n t h i s appeal i s whether the t r i a l court abused i t s discretion i n granting defendants' amended motion f o r a new t r i a l . A t the outset we observe t h a t t h e granting of a new t r i a l is within the sound discretion of the t r i a l court and its order granting a new t r i a l w i l l be reversed only f o r manifest abuse of t h a t discretion. Garrison v. Trowbridge, 119 Mont. 505, 177 P.2d 464; Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 7 P.2d 228. A n order, general i n its terms, granting a new t r i a l w i l l be upheld i f i t can be sustained on any ground s t a t e d i n the motion therefor. Tigh v. College Park Realty Co., 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d 57. The f i r s t ground enumerated i n defendants' motion f o r a new t r i a l i s i r r e g u l a r i t y of the proceedings andabuseof discretion by the t r i a l court whereby defendants were prevented from having a f a i r t r i a l . Defendants contend the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s p r e t r i a l order suppressing p l a i n t i f f s ' general r e l e a s e i n the Western Montana Fair entry blank i s reversible e r r o r . Specifically de- fendants argue t h a t t h i s release i s a valid and enforceable con- t r a c t absolving defendants from l i a b i l i t y . The release a t the bottom of the entry blank provided: I t I hereby release the Missoula County Fair Board from any l i a b i l i t y by l o s s , damage o r injury t o livestock o r other pro e r t while said property i s on the Fairgrounds. R Y 9 According t o the deposition of p l a i n t i f f Fay Haynes, she signed the entry blank f o r both p l a i n t i f f s and was authorized t o do so. Prior t o t r i a l , the d i s t r i c t court f i r s t denied p l a i n t i f f s ' motion t o suppress the release, but subsequently granted the motion and suppressed the release. W e hold the d i s t r i c t court was correct i n suppressing the release. I n our view the release i s i l l e g a l and unenforceable because it i s contrary t o t h e public policy of t h i s s t a t e and against the public i n t e r e s t . I n i t i a l l y we note the general proposition t h a t even though a p a r t i c u l a r exculpatory agreement i s not invalidated by s t a t u t e , i t s enforcement may be contrary t o public policy o r t o the "public i n t e r e s t " and such agreement i s often invalidated thereby. See: 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence, 524, p. 368; Anno. 175 A.L.R. 8 , 53, pp. 14,15; Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441, 6 ALR3d 693. A good statement of t h i s general proposition and i t s scope i s found i n Anno. 6 ALR.3d "The general r u l e i s t h a t persons may not contract against the e f f e c t of t h e i r own negligence and t h a t agreements which attempt t o do so a r e invalid. However, it i s not t r u e t h a t anp agreement of t h i s kind i s void a s against public policy. Whether a person can r e l i e v e himself by agreement from the duties attaching a s a matter of law t o a l e g a l r e l a - tionship created by contract between himself and another person, i s a matter of some d i f f i - culty. The conclusion has been reached t h a t even under the view t h a t a person may, under some circumstances, contract against t h e per- formance of such duties, he cannot do so where e i t h e r (1) the i n t e r e s t of the public requires the performance of such d u t i e s , o r (2) because the p a r t i e s do not stand upon a footing of equal- i t y , the weaker Earty i s compelled t o submit t o the stipulation. Attempts by f a i r associations t o deny responsibility o r l i a b i l i t y f o r damages t o o r loss of a r t i c l e s delivered f o r exhi- b i t i o n on the basis of exculpatory clauses i n contracts o r f a i r regulations have consistently been denied effectiveness a s against a showing of negligence. Anno. 139 A L R 931; Kay County Free Fair Asso. v. Martin, 190 Okla. 225, 122 P.2d 393; French Republic v. world's Columbian Exposition, 83 F. 109, reversed on other grounds 91 F. 64. This applies equally t o i n j u r y t o animals, Moeran v. New York Poultry, Pigeon and Pet Stock Asso.(loss of c a t entered i n a pet show) 59 N.Y.S. 584; Coltart v. Winnipeg I n d u s t r i a l Exhibition (loss of dog by disease contracted from other e n t r i e s i n dog show) 17 Western Law Reporter 372, appeal denied i n 4 Dominion Law Reports 108. Directing our a t t e n t i o n t o Montana law, we note an express public policy of t h i s s t a t e t o f i x responsibility f o r damage t o person o r property upon those who f a i l t o exercise ordinary care o r s k i l l . Section 58-607, R.C,M. 1947, provides: I I Every one i s responsible, not only f o r the r e s u l t of h i s w i l l f u l a c t s , but a l s o f o r an injury occasioned t o another by h i s want of ordinary c a r e or s k i l l i n the management of h i s property o r person, except so f a r a s the l a t t e r has, w i l l f u l l y or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. The extent of l i a b i l i t y i n such cases i s defined by the t i t l e on compensatory r e l i e f . I I The purpose of t h i s s t a t u t e i s twofold: (1) To f i x primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and l i a b i l i t y on the t o r t f e a s o r whose conduct occasioned the l o s s o r injury, and (2) t o make the victim whole. Section 13-801(2), R.C.M. 1947, defines i l l e g a l contracts a s those: "Contrary t o the policy of express law, though not expressly prohibited." Section 49-105, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Any one may waive the advantage of a law in- tended solely f o r h i s benefit. But a law es- tablished f o r a public reason cannot be contra- vened by a private agreement. I I I n our view the foregoing s t a t u t e s a r e broad enough t o render i l l e g a l any exculpatory clause o r release relieving a p o t e n t i a l tortfeasor from a l l l i a b i l i t y f o r future negligent conduct where such clause o r release i s contrary t o public policy o r against the public i n t e r e s t . A d i s t i n c t i o n must be observed btween exculpatory clauses, releases, o r disclaimers of l i a b i l i t y i n contracts on the one hand; and indemnity agreements, "hold harmless'' agreements, indemnity bonds or insurance on the other. The former deny the victim any redress by cancelling liability altogether, while the latter leave liability unimpaired but shift the ultimate incidence of the loss to others. The public policy distinctions between the two types are illustrated in this excerpt from Diamond Crystal Salt Company v, Thielman, (CCA 5 1968), 395 F.2d 62, 65: 11 I Appellants seek to compare the release' here involved to a contract of liability insurance. There is obviously no comparison. The law allows one to purchase liability insurance as a matter of sound public policy. Such insurance is a con- tract of indemnity whereby a person may be indemni- fied for liability arising from his own negligence. The first and most obvious distinction is that such contracts involve the legal relations of three persons rather than just two. The significant -- - - dis- - tinction however, is that such contracts attempt - - - J - - to guarantee that the person injured as a proximate result of the -negligence of the insured will be com- pensated for such injuries, whereas enforcement of the contract in the instant case would have just the - - - . . . - - - opposite result - - - - of denying an injured person the right - to - - - - be compensated for injuries proximate1 caused by anotheFs negligence. " (Emphasis addez) . -- For an extensive discussion of the differences and dis- tinctions between exculpatory clauses and indemnity agreements see Jamison v . Ellwood Consoltdated Water Company, (CCA 3, 1970) Unlike exculpatory clauses and releases, ordinarily 1 I Contracts of indemnity purporting to relieve one from the results of his failure to exercise ordinary care are not contrary to public policy." General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Smith & Oby Co., (CCA 6 1959) 272 F.2d 581, 77 ALR2d 1134,1139. The case of Ryan Mercantile Co. v . Great Northern Ry. Co., (D.C. Mont. 1960) 186 F.Supp. 660, aff'd (CCA 9, 1961), 294 F.2d 629, furnishes an example of a valid indemnity agreement between land- lord and tenant concerning injuries to third persons on the leased premises, including a requirement that the tenant carry liability insurance for the landlord's protection. Ryan is clearly dis- tinguishable from the instant case on this basis, among others. t 11 Our ultimate inquiry here then is whether the release" is contrary to public policy or against the public interest and accordingly invalid and unenforceable. We hold the County is precluded from disclaiming liability by virtue of the r e h e when performing an act in the public interest. This principle is recognized in Restatement, Contracts, $575, providing in pertinent part: " ( 1 ) A bargain for exemption from liability for the consequences * +C * of negligence is illegal if " ( b ) one of the parties is charged with a duty of public service, and the bargain re- lates to negligence in the performance of any part of its duty to the public, for which it has received or been promised compensation. I I This rule is also recognized as the majority holding in the United States in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of Cali- fornia, 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441, 6 ALR3d 693, where a more definitive test of "public interest" was propounded. There a contract was signed by a patient upon admission to de- fendant's nonprofit charitable hospital which purported to release the hospital from liability for negligent acts of its employees. The California Supreme Court held the contract invalid because it affected the public interest. The Court went on to state that the "public interest" factor will invalidate an exculpatory clause where some or all of the following characteristics are present: 1. It concerns a business of a type generally suitable for public regulations; 2 . The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public; 3. The party holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards; 4 . As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party in invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks h i s services; 5. I n exercising a superior bargaining power, the party confronts the public with a standarized adhesion contract of exculpation and makes no provision whereby a person may pay ad- d i t i o n a l reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence; and 6. A s a r e s u l t of the transaction, the person o r property of the purchaser is placed under t h e control of the party t o be exculpated, subject t o the r i s k of carelessness by the l a t t e r . A majority, and arguably a l l , of these t e s t s a r e m e t i n the i n s t a n t case. Where, a s here, the County i s performing a public service, underwritten i n p a r t by public funds, it i s charge- a b l e with using ordinary care i n the i n t e r e s t of public s a f e t y and a r e l e a s e clause exempting it from l i a b i l i t y f o r negligence i s contrary t o public policy, against t h e public i n t e r e s t and therefore invalid and unenforceable. In our view the f a c t t h a t p l a i n t i f f s here w e r e exhibitors r a t h e r than spectators renders t h i s principle no l e s s applicable. Directing our a t t e n t i o n t o the second ground contained i n defendants' amended motion f o r a new t r i a l , viz. accident o r sur- p r i s e which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against, defendants have two contentions : (1) t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ' proof i n midtrial tending t o show t h a t care, custody, and control of the horses was i n the county, suddenly placed the attorney f o r one of the County's insurers i n a position adverse t o the County, e f f e c t i v e l y depriving the County of i t s substantial r i g h t t o representation by counsel, and (2) the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s denial of admission i n evidence of defendants' premium book containing the r u l e s and regulations of the f a i r prevented defendants from having the complete transaction between the p a r t i e s with respect t o custody and respon- s i b i l i t y f o r the horses placed before the jury. I n analyzing the County's f i r s t contention, the background and events must be understood. The controlling circumstances a r e reasonably c l e a r : A t the time of the loss the County was insured with two c a r r i e r s , Phoenix and Northwestern. The Phoenix policy did not cover losses t o I I property i n the care, custody and control of the named insured". The Northwestern policy had no such exclusion, but did have a $25,000 deductible provision, From the inception of the l o s s each company had a separate attorney providing a defense t o Missoula County f o r claims a r i s i n g from the fairgrounds f i r e of August 24, 1967. O n October 4, 1968, the County was n o t i f i e d by Phoenix t h a t i t s policy might not provide coverage f o r the l o s s because of exclusion from coverage of property "in the care, custody and control of the insured". Through the pleading stage and a l l pre- t r i a l discovery a s well a s the t r i a l i t s e l f , the County was aware t h a t the Phoenix policy might not provide coverage f o r the l o s s but chose not t o associate other counsel t o represent i t s i n t e r e s t s i n t h i s potential c o n f l i c t . In the middle of the t r i a l , testimony was introduced on behalf of p l a i n t i f f s tending t o prove t h a t care, custody and control of p l a i n t i f f s ' horses was i n f a c t i n the County thereby bringing t h e Phoenix policy exclusion i n t o play. Hence the l e t t e r of May 19, 1971, from Phoenix t o t h e County I I advising of the new development", i . e . introduction of evidence indicating the County's custody of the horses and bringing the Phoenix exclusion i n t o operation. This was no surprise t h a t reasonable prudence could not have guarded against. The County was warned of the exclusion and the p o s s i b i l i t y of noncoverage almost two and one-half years before t r i a l . The issue was presented i n the pleadings and p r e t r i a l order, The County was a l s o represented throughout by counsel f o r North- western, which had no such exclusion i n i t s policy. Defendants' second contention i s likewise without merit. The significance of the premium book t o defendants l i e s i n the r u l e s and regulations therein with respect t o possession and custody of the horses stabled on the fairgrounds and on the issue of bailment. The premium book also contained exculpatory disclaimers of liability for losses to animals by the County. The disclaimers were repeatedly refused admission in evidence on the same basis that the release in the entry blank was denied admission in evi- dence. At no time did the County offer in evidence the rules and regulations of the fair without the inadmissible exculpatory disclaimers. As the offered exhibit as a whole was inadmissible because of the tainted exculpatory disclaimers therein, the dis- trict court was correct in refusing its admission. How this ruling could surprise defendants in midtrial and affect their defense of contributory negligence which was pleaded and sovereign immunity which was not escapes us. The third ground for granting a new trial contained in defendants' amended motion alleges excessive damages awarded by the jury by reason of passion and prejudice. Defendants argue the testimony of plaintiffs' value witnesses is all tainted by personal acquaintance and interest in the outcome of the litigation. The various witnesses who testified concerning the value of the horse Jule Bar expressed opinions ranging from a high of $105,000 to a low of $7,500. The jury brought in an award of $79,650 for Jule Bar. The amount of this verdict is not so grossly out of proportion to the loss as to shock the conscience and authorize our intervention. On the contrary, it is supported by substantial credible evidence of a number of witnesses giving the basis and reasons for their respective valuations. Any interest some of them may have had in the outcome of the litigation by reason of personal relationships, prior ownership, or otherwise, was fully brought out on cross-examination. Under such circum- stances the amount to be awarded as damages was properly left to the jury. Franck v . Hudson, 140 Mont. 480, 373 P.2d 951; Panisko v . Dreibelbis, 113 Mont. 310, 124 P. 2d 997. The fourth ground assigned by defendants as authorizing a new trial was insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. Defendants contend t h a t t h e testimony of F i r e Marshal F i t e t h a t the f i r e was caused by a fireworks display a t the fairgrounds was based on conjecture and suspicion r a t h e r than s u b s t a n t i a l evidence. W e have examined h i s testimony and find t h a t it con- t a i n s substantial credible evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o support a finding by the jury t h a t t h e f i r e was caused by the fireworks. The f i f t h ground on which defendants sought a new t r i a l was e r r o r s i n law occurring a t the t r i a l and excepted t o by de- fendan t s . Defendants f i r s t contend t h a t t h e i r motion f o r summary judgment a t the commencement of t h e t r i a l was erroneously denied i n t h a t p l a i n t i f f s admitted they were not aware of the exact cause of the f i r e and p l a i n t i f f s ' pleadings did not bring the case within the doctrine of r e s ipsa loquitur. Suffice it t o say t h a t whether nor not p l a i n t i f f s knew the exact cause of the f i r e i s immaterial t o t h e i r allegation t h a t the County was negligent i n f a i l i n g t o provide adequate f i r e protection. Second, defendants contend the d i s t r i c t court committed reversible e r r o r i n refusing t o declare a m i s t r i a l during v o i r d i r e examination of prospective jurors by p l a i n t i f f s ' counsel. Tvo questions were asked of the panel. The f i r s t question in- quired a s t o whether any of the panel were stockholders, o f f i c e r s , agents o r employees "of an insurance company engaged i n the casualty insurance business". There was no objection t o t h i s question by defendants; no prospective .juror indicated he was. The second question simply broadened the scope of the o r i g i n a l question t o include members of t h e prospective jurors' immediate families. A t t h i s point defendants moved f o r a m i s t r i a l on the basis of both questions, contending t h a t the questions were not limited t o the p a r t i c u l a r insurance company t h a t was a party p l a i n t i f f i n the case and t h a t particular insurance company was not a casualty insurance company but a material damage c a r r i e r . The t r i a l court denied the motion f o r m i s t r i a l but advised counsel "that there can be no more general questions on insurance" but that "if you want to ask questions concerning the specific company which is a party plaintiff, I will permit it." The record discloses no further questions concerning insurance. As a general rule if counsel acts in good faith, he may question prospective jurors on voir dire respecting their interest in, or connection with liability insurance companies. See: Anno. 4 ALR2d 761,792, et.seq. for an exhaustive listing of authorities in support. The rationale behind this general rule as indicated by these cases is that every litigant is entitled to a fair and impartial jury; that to secure this right, counsel for a litigant is entitled to question prospective jurors for the purpose of determining any bias or prejudice on their part; that one of the sensitive areas of juror bias and prejudice relates to the existence or nonexistence of insurance, particularly liability insurance; and accordingly counsel for a litigant is entitled to a reasonable latitude in voir dire examination to expose any such bias or pre- judice on the part of a prospective juror and to enable a litigant intelligently to exercise his challenges, limited only by considera- tions of good faith. Such rule and its rationale become compelling in a case where an insurance company is a named party to the litigation. Montana, inferentially at least, observes the distinction with respect to voir dire examination of prospective jurors in cases involving an insurance company as a party and those cases in which it is not. See: Meinecke v . Intermountain Transp, Co., 101 Mont. 315, 55 P.2d 680; Wilson v . Thurston Co,, 82 Mont. 492, 267 P. 801. The cases cited and quoted by defendants (Avery v. City of Anaconda, 149 Mont. 495, 428 P.2d 465; ~ ' ~ o o d g e v. McCann, 151 Mont. 353, 443 P.2d 747) are distinguishable on this basis and accordingly inapplicable to the instant case. The fact that the two questions were not limited to plaintiff insurance company, but covered any insurance company engaged in the casualty insurance business is not significant in this case. Although technical usage within the insurance industry may distinguish between a casualty insurance company and a material damage c a r r i e r , the term i n common usage has a generic meaning encompassing both. Where the reference t o insurance leaves i n doubt whether the reference i s to l i a b i l i t y insurance or t o p l a i n t i f f ' s or defendant's insurance, courts are inclined t o regard the reference t o insurance a s relatively harmless. 4 ALR2d 819 and cases cited therein. In our opinion the circumstances of t h i s case simply indicate a good f a i t h e f f o r t by counsel for plaintiffs to inquire into a legitimate area of concern by two general questions t o the panel a s a whole. A s such t h i s matter furnishes no ground for a new t r i a l . Defendants next contend the t r i a l court's ruling permitting Fire Marshal Fite t o t e s t i f y as an expert witness on the cause of the f i r e a f t e r repeated assurances by p l a i n t i f f s ' counsel that they had no expert witness on the cause of the f i r e was error, which was not cured by the continuance granted defendants t o m e e t t h i s proof. The t r i a l judge adequately protected the rights of the County by granting it a recess from M a y 18 to M a y 26 for the purpose of securing rebuttal testimony and preparing for cross- examination of Fire Marshal Fite. Plaintiffs' expert was deposed by both counsel for the County; their cross-examination of plain- t i f f s ' expert was thorough and complete; they obtained a rebuttal witness with outstanding qualifications who contradicted p l a i n t i f f s ' expert as t o the cause of the f i r e ; and, the County did not further complain t o the court. Accordingly the t r i a l judge did not abuse h i s discretion i n permitting Fire Marshal Fite t o t e s t i f y as an expert witness on the cause of the f i r e . Wolfe v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 147 Mont. 29, 409 P.2d 528. Next defendants contend the d i s t r i c t court erred i n ruling that defendants could not inquire of p l a i n t i f f 3 value witness Parker as t o the price he paid for Sugar Bars, the s i r e of Jule Bar. The d i s t r i c t court refused the testimony a f t e r determining that the Sugar Bars sale was not a comparable market sale. W e find no error here. Defendants assign the trial court's permitting Fire Marshal Fite to testify as an expert witness on the possible or probable cause of the sawdust fire was error. An expert witness may be qualified by professional, scientific or technical training, or have practical experience in some field or activity conferring upon him a special knowledge not shared by mankind in general, and one who has been engaged for a reasonable time in a particular profession, trade, or calling will be assumed to have the ordinary knowledge common to persons so engaged. Nesbitt v . City of Butte, 118 Mont. 84, 163 P.2d 251. The opinion of a witness on a material question of science, art or trade in which he is skilled is admis- sible in evidence. Section 93-401-27, R.C.M. 1947. The determina- tion of the qualification of a skilled or expert witness is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and in the absence of a showing of abuse, ordinarily will not be disturbed. Graham v . Rolandson, 150 Mont. 270, 435 P.2d 263; Nesbitt v . City of Butte, supra. In the instant case Fire Marshal Fite testified he had served a total of 17 years as a fireman in the Missoula fire department, 4 as fire marshal, 4 as assistant fire marshal and 4 years as fire inspector; that he had attended 6 seminars on fire and arson investigation; he had completed a 100 hour fire and arson investigation course from Investigating Institute in Chicago; that he had assisted in planning the state of Montana Arson School in 1970. In the schools he had attended he studied fire investi- gation, arson, explosions, evidence, interviewing witnesses, photo- graphy, collection and preservation of evidence anddetermination of origin of fires. His duties included the investigation of all fires in which the Missoula fire department had been involved during his term of employment. During that time he investigated two saw- dust fires. Although his experience with regard to fires relating to sawdust and shavings was quite limited, we consider it hyper- technical to require classification of an expert to that extent. Certainly he had general experience and specialized training a s an expert investigator of f i r e origins t h a t s e t him apa,rt from t h e layman. O n t h i s b a s i s he was qualified t o t e s t i f y and the t r i a l judge correctly permitted him t o do so. The degree of h i s qualifications and the weight t o be given h i s opinions a r e f o r t h e jury. Graham v. Rolandson, supra, Defendants next contend the d i s t r i c t court committed e r r o r i n permitting p l a i n t i f f s t o reopen t h e i r case i n chief f o r the purpose of establishing the value of the second horse J u l e ' s Dandy a f t e r dismissing the count r e l a t i n g t o t h a t horse. The t r a n s c r i p t shows the following ruling: " T H E COURT: Well, I w i l l grant the motion t o dismiss the count seeking damages f o r Jules Dandy f o r the reasons s t a t e d , and I w i l l a l s o grant the p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r leave t o reopen t h e i r case i n chief a s t o damages f o r Jules Dandy. 1 I P l a i n t i f f s then c a l l e d p l a i n t i f f B i l l Haynes who t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e market value of ~ u l e ' s Dandyat the time of loss was $1,000; the defense then presented P4r. Peltz a s a r e b u t t a l witness. The jury returned a verdict of $1,000 f o r J u l e ' s Dandy. W e observe the e r r o r of which defendants complain was a t most a technical e r r o r not affecting the substantial r i g h t s of the p a r t i e s and therefore harmless. The t r i a l judge's intention t o permit p l a i n t i f f s t o reopen t h e i r case t o supply an element of proof they had overlooked was c l e a r and within h i s discretion, notwithstanding h i s f a i l u r e t o s p e c i f i c a l l y r e i n s t a t e the count seeking damages f o r J u l e ' s Dandy. Had the t r i a l judge not intended t o r e i n s t a t e the count, there would be no purpose i n permitting reopening and proof of value of J u l e ' s Dandy. I n any event it furnishes no b a s i s f o r granting a new t r i a l . Defendants contend t h a t the c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l on three occasions t o admit the "premium book'' containing the r u l e s and regulations was reversible error. They argue t h a t the e n t i r e premium book should have been admitted i n evidence t o show the complete trans- action between p l a i n t i f f s and defendants e n t i r e l y aside from the admissibility of the exculpatory disclaimer of l i a - b i l i t y contained therein. They point out t h a t the r u l e s and regulations i n the premium book disclose t h a t there i s no require- ment t h a t exhibitors must apply f o r s t a l l space o r s t a b l e t h e i r horses on the fairgrounds; t h a t the owners of the horses and not t h e F a i r Board were responsible f o r the care, feeding and safety of the horses; and t h a t there was no delivery of possession of the horses and no acceptance thereof by the Fair Board and con- sequently no bailment. This issue has been previously answered herein under defendants' contention of surprise. W e simply repeat t h a t a t no time did defendants o f f e r the r u l e s and regulations contained i n the premium book without the inadmissible exculpatory dis- claimer of l i a b i l i t y so the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ruling thereon was correct. The f i n a l ground contained i n defendants' amended motion f o r a new t r i a l r e l a t e s t o alleged misconduct of the jurors. Defendants argue t h a t the jury adopted the forbidden "quotient method" i n arriving a t i t s verdict and point t o the a f f i d a v i t of juror Charles Johnson i n support. This a f f i d a v i t f a l l s f a r short of establishing a quotient verdict. The vice of a quotient verdict i s an agreement i n advance by the jurors t o e s t a b l i s h the amount of the verdict by taking individual juror's views a s t o the correct amount, adding them together, and dividing by twelve. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Benjamin, 51 Mont. 167, 149 P. 968. The verdict i s not objectionable where there i s no previous agreement t o be bound by the quotient process. Bracy v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 136 Mont. 65, 343 P.2d 848, cert.den. 361 U.S. 949, 80 S.Ct. 403, 4 L ed 2d 381. Here, t h e a f f i d a v i t contains no statement of an advance agreement nor of averaging the individual j u r o r ' s figures. For the foregoing reasons none of the grounds enumerated i n defendants' amended motion f o r a new t r i a l authorizes the granting of a new t r i a l . Accordingly, the order of the t r i a l court granting defendants a new t r i a l i s vacated and s e t aside and the jury verdict i n favor of p l a i n t i f f s i n the t o t a l amount of $80,650.00, and the judgment entered therein are reinstated. Justice 1 I \ ' +8 ~ es ** - * L \ $4 , , Hon. L. C : Gulbrandson, District Judge, #tting for Justice Wesley Castles.