Title: Matos v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMES V. MATOS, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 50, 2011      
 
              Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 1003000386 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 29, 2011 
 
 
Decided: 
July 13, 2011 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 13th day of July 2011, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and 
the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
James V. Matos (“Matos”), the defendant-below, appeals from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on the charge of 
Reckless Endangering in the First-Degree,1 and from his subsequent conviction of, 
and sentence for, that offense.2  On appeal, Matos claims that the trial court 
erroneously denied his acquittal motion by not applying the statutory definition of 
                                                 
1 11 Del. C. § 604. 
 
2 Matos was also convicted of, and sentenced for, several other offenses, which have not been 
appealed. 
 
2 
the term “building,” as set forth in 11 Del. C. § 222(1).3  We find no error and 
affirm. 
2. 
In September 2009, defendant Matos began living with Joy Breen, her 
two children, and the family dog at Breen’s apartment, located at 47 Norway 
Avenue in Wilmington, Delaware.  At the time, the 47 Norway Avenue building 
was approximately 100 years old.  Over the years, it had been converted into an 
apartment building that contained three apartment units, one on each floor.  
Breen’s apartment was located on the first floor. 
3. 
About a year and a half after Matos moved in with Breen, Breen and 
Matos had a falling out, and Breen asked Matos to move elsewhere.  Matos moved 
to his sister’s house for the next few days, but then returned to Breen’s apartment 
the following weekend, where he spent Sunday night, February 28, 2010. 
4. 
On March 1, 2010, the next day, Matos left Breen’s apartment in the 
early morning without explanation.  Immediately thereafter, Breen asked her 
landlord to have the locks on her apartment changed.  After asking her landlord to 
do that, Breen then left her apartment to go to work.  Her two children left to go to 
school, in accordance with their daily routine, and the family dog remained in the 
apartment in a dog crate. 
                                                 
3 11 Del. C. § 222(1) (“When used in this Criminal Code . . . ‘Building,’ in addition to its 
ordinary meaning, includes any structure, vehicle or watercraft.  Where a building consists of 2 
or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed a separate building.”). 
3 
5. 
At about 9:00 a.m. that same day, Matos returned and let himself into 
Breen’s apartment.  Aware of the dog’s presence in the crate, Matos went into 
Breen’s bedroom and, using his lighter, set Breen’s bedding on fire.  He then stood 
there watching the flames grow before leaving the building.  The fire and smoke 
destroyed Breen’s apartment and killed the family dog. 
6. 
Shortly after 9:00 a.m., Harold Howell, who lived on the third floor, 
noticed smoke coming into his apartment.  Howell went downstairs to investigate, 
and saw smoke coming out of the rear of Breen’s apartment.  Howell immediately 
called the fire department and the building’s owner, and reported that the building 
was on fire.  Although the fire department responded quickly, Breen’s apartment 
had already been destroyed by the excessive heat and smoke damage.  The second 
and third-floor apartments also suffered fire-related damage. 
7. 
Thereafter, Matos was arrested.  He was indicted by a grand jury on 
charges of first-degree arson,4 second-degree burglary,5 first-degree reckless 
                                                 
4 11 Del. C. § 803. 
 
5 11 Del. C. § 825. 
 
4 
endangering,6 cruelty to animals,7 three counts of breach of bond conditions,8 and 
harassment.9  Of particular relevance is the indictment charge for first-degree 
reckless endangering, which read: 
RECKLESS ENDANGERING FIRST DEGREE, in violation of Title 11, 
Section 604 of the Delaware Code of 1974, as amended. 
 
JAMES V. MATOS, on or about the 1st day of March, 2010, in the County 
of New Castle, State of Delaware, did recklessly engage in conduct which 
created a substantial risk of death to Harold Howell, by starting a fire or 
causing an explosion in an occupied building.10 
 
8. 
The Superior Court conducted a three-day trial on November 3-5, 2010.  
At a November 5 prayer conference, the trial judge reduced the arson charge from 
first-degree arson to second-degree arson, because the parties (and the judge) 
agreed that Matos could not be charged with first-degree arson based on the 
statutory definition of the term “building.”  The statute, 11 Del. C. § 803, defines 
first-degree arson as follows: 
                                                 
6 11 Del. C. § 604. 
 
7 11 Del. C. § 1325. 
 
8 11 Del. C. § 2109.  In setting bail, the Justice of the Peace Court issued a “no contact” order 
that prohibited Matos from contacting Breen or her children.  Despite that order, Matos 
continued attempting to contact Breen through numerous phone calls and letters.  For example, 
on the day he was arrested, March 1, 2010, Matos called Breen 21 times in a span of an hour and 
a half while he was in prison. 
 
9 11 Del. C. § 1311. 
 
10 Indictment (emphasis in original). 
 
5 
A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when the person 
intentionally damages a building by starting a fire or causing an 
explosion and when: 
 
 
(1) The person knows that another person not an accomplice is 
present in the building at the time; or 
 
 
(2) The person knows of circumstances which render the 
presence of another person not an accomplice therein a reasonable 
possibility.11 
 
9. 
Under 11 Del. C. § 222(1), the term “building” is defined thusly: 
“Building,” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any structure, 
vehicle or watercraft.  Where a building consists of 2 or more units 
separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed a separate 
building.12 
 
10. Under that statutory definition, Howell resided in a separate “building” 
(i.e., apartment).  The trial judge therefore found, as a matter of law, that Matos 
could not have reasonably known of Mr. Howell’s presence within the “building” 
that he set fire to, i.e., Breen’s apartment. 
 
11. But, with respect to the reckless endangering charge, the trial judge 
concluded that the ordinary definition—and not the statutory definition—applied to 
the term “building” as used in that section of the indictment.  The judge reasoned 
that the term “building” was not an element of the reckless endangering charge, 
because the statute defines reckless endangering in the first-degree as “recklessly 
                                                 
11 11 Del. C. § 803. 
 
12 11 Del. C. § 222(1). 
 
6 
engage[ing] in conduct which creates a substantial risk of death to another 
person.”13  Because the Section 222 statutory definitions apply only where the 
specific defined term is “used in [the] Criminal Code,”14 the statutory definition of 
“building” was inapplicable to the reckless endangering charge.15 
12. Based on that ruling, the trial judge instructed the jury to use the 
ordinary and customary meaning of the term “building” in considering whether 
Matos was guilty of reckless endangering in the first degree.  Specifically, the jury 
was instructed that “[f]or purposes of [the reckless endangering] charge, the term 
‘building’ is not defined and, therefore, you may interpret the term in accordance 
with its usual and customary meaning.” 
13. The jury found Matos guilty of second-degree arson, first-degree 
reckless endangering, cruelty to animals, three counts of breach of bond 
conditions, first-degree criminal trespass (a lesser-included offense of second-
degree burglary), and harassment.  At his sentencing hearing, Matos was declared 
an habitual offender and sentenced as follows:  (i) for arson, 15 years at Level V 
incarceration; (ii) for reckless endangering, 5 years at Level V incarceration; (iii) 
                                                 
13 11 Del. C. § 604. 
 
14 11 Del. C. § 222 (noting that the definitions apply only “[w]hen used in this Criminal Code”). 
 
15 Specifically, the trial judge stated, “I am satisfied, in the scenario where the term is not set 
forth in the statute, that 11 [Del. C. §] 222 does not apply, and that conclusion is based on the 
express terms of that statute.” 
 
7 
for each of the breach of bond conditions, 2 years at Level V incarceration; (iv) for 
criminal trespass, 1 year at Level V incarceration, suspended for 1 year at Level 3 
probation; (v) for harassment, 1 year at Level V incarceration, suspended for 1 year 
at Level 3 probation; and (vi) for animal cruelty, 1 year at Level V incarceration, 
suspended after 6 months for 6 months at Level 3 probation.  This is Matos’ direct 
appeal. 
14. The sole issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying 
Matos’ motion for acquittal on the first-degree reckless endangering charge.  
Matos claims that because the phrase “by starting a fire or causing an explosion in 
an occupied building” was used in the indictment, the term “building” became an 
element of the reckless endangering offense under the Delaware Criminal Code.  
Because that term is defined in Section 222(1) of the Criminal Code, he argues, the 
statutory definition of “building” was applicable.  Therefore, as a matter of law, his 
conduct did not constitute reckless endangering in the first degree.16 
15. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de 
novo “to determine whether any rational finder of fact, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
                                                 
16 The parties agree that if the customary meaning of the term “building” applies, the State has 
adduced sufficient evidence to support the first-degree reckless endangering conviction. 
 
8 
reasonable doubt.”17  Where the claim of error rests on an issue of statutory 
interpretation, we review that claim de novo.18 
16. Section 232 of the Delaware Criminal Code relevantly provides that: 
“Elements of an offense” are those physical acts, attendant 
circumstances, results and states of mind which are specifically 
included within the definition of the offense or, if the definition is 
incomplete, those states of mind which are supplied by the general 
provisions of this Criminal Code.19 
 
17. Under the Criminal Code, “[a] person is guilty of reckless endangering 
in the first degree when the person recklessly engages in conduct which creates a 
substantial risk of death to another person.”20  The Superior Court held that 
because the term “building” is not specifically included within the definition of 
first-degree reckless endangering, that term is not a statutory element of that 
offense.  The only function served by using “building” in the indictment was “. . . 
to provide [the] factual context in which the alleged reckless conduct occurred.”  
We agree. 
                                                 
17 Hoennicke v. State, 13 A.3d 744, 748 (Del. 2010). 
 
18 Dambro v. Meyer, 974 A.2d 121, 129 (Del. 2009). 
 
19 11 Del. C. § 232 (emphasis added). 
 
20 11 Del. C. § 604. 
 
9 
18. The definitions contained in Section 222 are limited to instances where 
those defined terms are explicitly used in the Criminal Code.21  Because “building” 
is not specifically included within the statutory definition of reckless endangering 
in the first degree, the Section 222(1) statutory definition of “building” does not 
apply.  Accordingly, the trial court correctly interpreted “building” in accordance 
with its customary meaning.22 
19. The rationale of Harley v. State23 is instructive.  In Harley, the 
defendant was convicted of second-degree assault and possession of a deadly 
weapon during the commission of a felony.24  As to the assault charge, we held that 
“the exact nature and description of the instrument used during the altercation is 
not an essential element of the crime,” and that “[t]he indictment fairly informed 
the [defendant] of the basic charge of assault.”25  Therefore, it was irrelevant that 
                                                 
21 11 Del. C. § 222 (noting that the definitions apply only “[w]hen used in this Criminal Code.”). 
 
22 See Duncan v. State, 791 A.2d 750 (Table), 2002 WL 243377, at *1 (Del. 2002) (holding that 
“the State has an obligation to prove not only that a defendant committed each element of 
[reckless endangering in the first degree] as listed in the Code, but also that the defendant 
violated those elements in a manner consistent with the facts set forth in the indictment or 
information.  To this end, it is similarly appropriate for a jury to apply the commonly accepted 
meaning to an undefined term appearing in the factual discussion of the information.”); see also  
42 C.J.S. Indictments § 126 (2011) (“[W]ords of common use within an indictment will be 
construed according to their common acceptation . . . unless the context is such as to show that 
the technical use was intended.”). 
 
23 534 A.2d 255 (Del. 1987). 
 
24 Id. at 256. 
 
25 Id. at 257. 
10 
the indictment for assault charged the defendant with hitting the victim using a tire 
iron, even though the evidence showed that the defendant had struck the victim 
with a tire jack.26 
20. Similarly here, Matos was fairly informed of the charge of reckless 
endangering in the first degree.  The indictment clearly informed him that he 
would be required to defend against the charge that he put Harold Howell in 
substantial risk of death by his reckless conduct on March 1, 2010.  The additional 
fact—that the charged conduct consisted of starting a fire in an occupied 
building—merely provided Matos with additional information that enabled him to 
prepare a more specific defense.  That additional factual context did not transform 
the term “building” into an essential element of reckless endangering in the first 
degree.  Therefore, the trial judge properly denied Matos’ motion for acquittal. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
  
 
 
 
 
         Justice 
                                                 
26 Id.