Title: Detheridge v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Detheridge v. State1998 WY 102963 P.2d 233Case Number: 96-334Decided: 08/17/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Charles Edward DETHERIDGE, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Laramie County, 
Edward L. Grant, J.

 

Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Raymond Macchia, 
Student Extern., for Appellant(Defendant).

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance 
Program; and Joseph W. Cole Student Intern., for Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

TAYLOR, Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant entered a conditional plea of nolo 
contendere to a charge of felony stalking while reserving the right to appeal 
alleged procedural errors to this court. Finding merit in his claim that he was 
not afforded a speedy trial pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 48, we 
reverse.

 

                                             
I. ISSUES

 

[¶2] Appellant, Charles 
Edward Detheridge (Detheridge), presents three issues for review. Only two 
issues warrant discussion, and we reiterate those issues 
here:

 

          
ISSUE II

 

          
Did the trial court deny the appellant his constitutionally guaranteed 
right to a speedy trial?

 

          
ISSUE III

 

          
Did the trial court [abuse] its discretion when it denied the appellant's 
motion for relief from sentencing?

 

                                             
II. FACTS

 

[¶3] Detheridge was charged 
with felony stalking on April 7, 1995 in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506(e)(i) 
(1997). Arraigned on May 5, 1995, Detheridge's trial date was initially set for 
July 10, 1995. Shortly after his arraignment, Detheridge filed a demand for 
speedy trial pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 48. At the same time, Detheridge also filed a 
motion to dismiss the charges, challenging the constitutionality of the stalking 
statute. A hearing on his motion to dismiss was set for June 2, 1995, and the 
parties were ordered to submit briefing on the issue.

 

[¶4] While awaiting the 
district court's decision on Detheridge's constitutional challenge, the July 10, 
1995 trial date was allowed to pass without entry of a continuance or a new 
setting. On August 16, 1995, the district court denied the motion to dismiss, 
but did not set a date for trial. Realizing that the speedy trial requirements 
of W.R.Cr.P. 48 appeared in jeopardy, on August 28, 1995, the State filed a 
motion requesting an order setting a trial date. The motion reminded the 
district court that only a few days remained within the 120-day period allotted 
in which to commence a timely trial, but the motion did not include a request 
for a continuance or an explanation for 
the delay. Nothing was done until Detheridge filed a motion to dismiss for lack 
of speedy trial on September 6, 1995.  
The motion was denied, and another trial date was set for September 25, 
1995.

 

[¶5] Detheridge entered a 
conditional plea of nolo contendere on September 29, 1995, conditioned on an 
agreement that this appeal would be forthcoming. He was originally scheduled to 
be sentenced on January 18, 1996. Prior to ruling on sentencing, the district 
court realized it had not ruled on a pending motion to dismiss or remand the 
case. The district court, therefore, continued the sentencing until a future 
time so that it could review the motion and accompanying 
briefs.

 

[¶6] On April 29, 1996, 
Detheridge filed another motion requesting the district court rule on the 
pending motion and/or sentence him.  
With no response forthcoming, Detheridge filed a motion to dismiss or for 
relief from judgment on October 1, 1996. The basis for his motion was the delay 
of over one calendar year since he entered his plea. On October 25, 1996, the 
district court denied Detheridge's motions and sentenced him to one year of 
probation, including the condition that he have no contact with the victim. As 
promised, this appeal timely followed.

 

                                      
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶7] We review a speedy 
trial claim to ensure that the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 48 and constitutional 
guarantees have been met. Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 1995). We 
begin by calculating the time between defendant's arraignment and trial, 
excluding the time periods specified in W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(3). Hogan v. State, 908 P.2d 925, 930 (Wyo. 1995); McDermott v. State, 897 P.2d 1295, 1300 (Wyo. 1995). 
Delays of fewer than 120 days are permissible. Hogan, 908 P.2d  at 930; 
McDermott, 897 P.2d  at 1300. If a delay has exceeded 120 days, we determine 
whether the defendant has made a written demand for a speedy trial or otherwise 
vigorously asserted his rights under 
W.R.Cr.P. 48. Kleinschmidt v. State, 913 P.2d 438, 439-40 (Wyo. 1996); Hall v. 
State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Wyo. 1996). If the defendant has not done so, we 
apply the four-part constitutional test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), and adopted in Cosco v. 
State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 (Wyo. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971, 93 S. Ct. 2164, 36 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1973), to ensure that the defendant's constitutional 
guarantee to a speedy trial has been satisfied.

 

[¶8] We review a challenge 
based on delay of sentencing to determine whether the sentencing court has 
abused its discretion in allowing an unreasonable delay. A delay in sentencing 
in excess of over one year from the establishment of guilt is presumptively 
unreasonable. Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187, 191 (Wyo. 1990). The state bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the delay does not exceed the bounds of reason and 
the court should not be foreclosed from imposing sentence after the one year 
period of time. Id.

 

                                          
IV. DISCUSSION

 

A. W.R.CR.P. 
48(b)

 

[¶9] A criminal defendant's 
right to a speedy trial is grounded in the constitutions of the United States 
and the State of Wyoming. In recognition that W.R.Cr.P. 48 provides criminal 
defendants a procedural mechanism to ensure the protection of this 
constitutional right, we have held that compliance with its terms is mandatory. 
Yung, 906 P.2d  at 1032; McDermott, 897 P.2d  at 1299. In pertinent part, 
W.R.Cr.P. 48 provides:

 

          
(b) Speedy trial.

 

(1) It is the responsibility of the court, counsel 
and the defendant to insure that the defendant is timely 
tried.

 

(2) A criminal charge shall be brought to trial 
within 120 days following arraignment unless continued as provided in this 
rule.

 

          
(3) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for 
trial:

 

          
* * *

 

          
(C) Delay granted by the court pursuant to paragraph (4) or 
(5);

 

          
* * *

 

(4) Continuances not to exceed six months from the 
date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court as 
follows:

 

          (A) On motion of defendant 
supported by affidavit; or

 

          
(B) On motion of the attorney for the state or the court 
if:

 

          
(i) The defendant expressly consents;

 

          
(ii) The state's evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has 
exercised due diligence; or

 

(iii) Required in the due administration of justice 
and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced; 
and

 

(C) If a continuance is proposed by the state or the 
court, the defendant shall be notified. If the defendant objects, the defendant 
must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the defense. * * 
*

 

(6) Any criminal case not tried or continued as 
provided in this rule shall be dismissed 120 days after 
arraignment.

 

          
* * *

 

(8) A dismissal for lack of a speedy trial under this 
rule shall not bar the state from again prosecuting the defendant for the same 
offense unless the defendant made a written demand for a speedy trial or can 
demonstrate prejudice from the delay.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶10] It is uncontested that 
more than 120 days had passed prior to the time Detheridge moved for dismissal 
pursuant to the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 48. It is also clear that no continuance 
was granted on the record nor was a second trial date set during that time. 
However, the district court determined that a de facto continuance had been 
granted, which was "[r]equired in the due administration of justice," during the 
pendency of Detheridge's motion to dismiss. W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(B)(iii). The 
district court found that sufficient notice of the de facto continuance was 
provided through the tacit understanding that trial would not commence on the 
initially scheduled date. We 
disagree.

 

[¶11] The Rules of Criminal 
Procedure "shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in 
administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." 
W.R.Cr.P. 2. The plain language of W.R.Cr.P. 48 places the responsibility of 
ensuring a timely trial equally on the district court, the prosecution and the 
defendant. In Kleinschmidt, 913 P.2d  at 439-40, we held that a period of 123 
days did not violate W.R.Cr.P. 48 when the defendant failed to file a written 
demand for a speedy trial and failed to object to three continuances within the 
120-day period. See also Hall, 911 P.2d  at 1370. Unlike the facts which 
supported our decision in Kleinschmidt, 
Detheridge filed a timely demand for a speedy trial. Despite Detheridge's 
written demand for a speedy trial, neither the district court nor the 
prosecution took any steps to reset the trial date, file a request for 
continuance, state the reasons why a continuance was necessary, or even grant a 
continuance prior to the conclusion of the 120-day period.

 

[¶12] It was incumbent upon 
the State and the district court, after Detheridge's initial demand, to take the 
minimal steps necessary to secure compliance with the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 
48. We find no merit in the State's argument that its complete failure to 
provide any affirmative record of the need for a continuance is excused, while 
at the same time scoring Detheridge for failing to reassert his demand for a 
speedy trial or, in the alternative, for failing to object to a nonexistent 
motion. Equally disingenuous is the suggestion that Detheridge's speedy trial 
demand was insufficient because he proffered such as a "respectful 
request."

 

[¶13] Neither the State nor 
the district court proposed a continuance in the manner provided for by 
W.R.Cr.P. 48, but instead allowed the time period to run until Detheridge filed 
his motion to dismiss, 124 days after his arraignment. This clear violation of 
W.R.Cr.P. 48 vitiates the need to consider the four-part constitutional test 
articulated in Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, and adopted in Cosco, 503 P.2d  at 1405. The denial of Detheridge's motion to dismiss is 
reversed.

 

B. W.R.CR.P. 
32(c)(1)

 

[¶14] While the above issue 
is dispositive of this case, we feel compelled to address Detheridge's claim 
that he was denied due process by the unreasonable delay in sentencing. 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1) provides, in part:

 

Sentence shall be imposed without unnecessary delay, 
but the court may, when there is a factor important to the sentencing 
determination that is not then capable of being resolved, postpone the 
imposition of sentence for a reasonable time until the factor is capable of 
being resolved.

 

[¶15] In Yates, 792 P.2d  at 
191, addressing the predecessor of W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1), we unequivocally stated 
that one year is a reasonable period of time to require the imposition of 
sentence, and that delay in excess of one year is presumptively 
unreasonable.

 

A 
court may not pronounce sentence on a defendant after the expiration of such 
time, unless the record clearly establishes those facts and circumstances that 
excuse the delay, thus making later imposition of the sentence reasonable. The 
State must bear the burden of establishing those facts and 
circumstances.

 

Yates, 792 P.2d  at 191. We 
explained that this rule is meant to prevent the possibility that a greater 
punishment than is deserved will be imposed because of subsequent conduct that 
results in a violation of the probation. In this case, the district court stated 
the following reason for the delay:

 

Well, the reason for the delay, from the Court's 
point of view, is that it was my understanding that Mr. Detheridge was remaining 
away from the young lady in question and that that was a state of affairs that 
everybody was pleased with.  And I 
thought that having sentencing pending would have an effect in that regard. I 
think that was a good reason for the delay, and still think it is. And for all I 
know, it's had the intended effect. It may be that Mr. Detheridge wouldn't have 
any trouble in any case, of course I don't know that, but as I indicated 
earlier, that's been my chief concern in the matter.

 

We disagree with the State 
that Detheridge's capability to stay away from his victim was an issue not 
"capable of being resolved." This is precisely the condition of his one year 
probation, imposed after Detheridge had already complied with this same 
condition for a year. Clearly, had he made any attempt to contact this woman, 
the district court would have imposed a harsher penalty. In other words, 
Detheridge served two terms of probation for the same offense. This is precisely 
the reasoning which renders such delay unreasonable. Having failed to show that 
the delay was reasonable, the district court was foreclosed from imposing 
sentence over one calendar year from the time guilt was 
established.

 

                                        
  V. 
CONCLUSION

 

[¶16] The failure to 
continue or schedule trial during the 120-day period following Detheridge's 
arraignment, after his written demand for speedy trial, violated the 
requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b). His conviction is 
reversed.

 

MACY, Justice, specially 
concurring.

 

[¶17] I agree with the 
result that the majority reaches regarding the speedy trial issue, but I 
disagree with the statement that the clear violation of W.R.Cr.P. 48 vitiates 
the need to consider the four-part constitutional test articulated in Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). I believe that the 
Barker analysis should no longer be utilized by this Court in deciding speedy 
trial issues regardless of whether W.R.Cr.P. 48 has been clearly violated. The 
United States Supreme Court expressly held that states can prescribe a 
reasonable, definable period of time in which trials must be held. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 523, 92 S. Ct. 2182. We adopted W.R.Cr.P. 48 in accordance with that 
holding, intending that we would be allowed to abandon the laborious and 
subjective Barker analysis in favor of a clearer and more concise analysis. It 
is my opinion that W.R.Cr.P. 48 provides the exclusive framework by which we 
should analyze alleged speedy trial violations, and I disagree with the 
implication in the majority opinion that a Barker analysis should be conducted 
if W.R.Cr.P. 48 has not been clearly violated.

 

[¶18] I thoroughly explained 
my position in Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Wyo. 1996) (Macy, J., 
specially concurring), and in Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Wyo. 1995) 
(Macy, J., specially concurring). Those specially concurring opinions continue 
to reflect my ideas on the matter.