Title: Richardson v. Richardson

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

478 S.W.2d 423 (1972) William Glenn RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. Linda Kathleen RICHARDSON, Appellee. No. 5-5833. Supreme Court of Arkansas. April 3, 1972. *424 Warner, Warner, Ragon & Smith, Ft. Smith, for appellant. Jack Rose, Ft. Smith, for appellee. HARRIS, Chief Justice. Two issues are raised in this litigation, the first concerning a determination of the paternity of a female child born on January 4, 1971, to Linda Kathleen Richardson, appellee herein, and the second relating to the custody of Julie Ann Richardson, born November 1, 1969. On trial, the court held that William Glenn Richardson, appellant herein and husband of appellee, was the father of the daughter born in January 1971, and held that appellee should also have custody of the older child, Julie Ann, admittedly the daughter of the parties, with the right of visitation to the appellant of three weeks each third month, such visitation to commence July 1, 1971. The court directed that appellant pay $15.00 per week for the support of the children. From the decree so entered, appellant brings this appeal. The background relating to the first issue is found in paragraph 7 of the court's decree, which reads as follows: However, the court found that the parties lived together until about May 15, 1970; that the divorce action was filed on behalf of Mrs. Richardson on June 16, 1970, and at the time of the hearing on August 18, 1970, appellee was five months pregnant. It was further found that appellant made no claim or offered no proof of impotency or non-access to appellee "to overcome the strong presumption of legitimacy and paternity of said minor child, and this court, therefore, finds that this defendant and cross-complainant is the father of the second daughter born on January 4, 1971. This court finds that this defendant and cross-complainant is as a matter of fact and as a matter of law the father of the newly born child". Though with natural and understandable reluctance, we are compelled to find that the court erred in its determination that appellant was the father of the second child. The trend over the nation within the last several years has been to recognize the value and accuracy of blood tests to determine paternity. In Wigmore on Evidence, section 165a p. 610, it is stated: In 9 Uniform Laws Annotated, p. 102, there is a discussion on the subject of "Blood tests to disprove Paternity", in which it is stated: In the New York case of Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1 A.D.2d 312, 150 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department), the court held that even though the husband had lived with the wife for five years after the birth of his putative children (twins) before discovering *426 evidence of adultery the husband was entitled to blood grouping tests of himself, his wife, and the children, for purposes of excluding his paternity of these children. This holding was rendered despite the fact that the husband had lived with the wife during the gestation period and for the five years mentioned. A discovery of correspondence from a third party to the wife contained significant remarks to indicate intimate relations between the wife and the writer. This precipitated the action for divorce. It was argued by the wife that the husband and wife had continuously lived together during the period of gestation of the twins and for more than five years afterward, and that the husband had accepted the children as his own and had never questioned his paternity. The wife stated that the letters were a manufactured fabrication. The court commented: In the Nebraska case of Houghton v. Houghton, 179 Neb. 275, 137 N.W.2d 861 (1965), the wife sued the husband for divorce. After filing her petition, she filed a supplementary petition, alleging that the parties had resumed the marriage relationship and were expecting the birth of a second child, but acts of cruelty had again occurred, and she therefore sought a divorce. The husband answered, admitting he was the father of the first-born child, and also admitting that he had subsequently had sexual relations with his wife, but he denied being the father of the expected child. This child was born on October 1, 1963, and the trial court found the husband to be the father and awarded a decree of divorce to the mother, along with the custody of the two minor children. The husband appealed, alleging inter alia that the trial court had erred in its finding that he was the father of this second child; further, that the court had erred in not finding that the results of blood tests of the mother, husband and the infant were conclusive in showing that he could not be the father; that such evidence overcame the presumption that the child was his. The Supreme Court of Nebraska said: Having determined that no defect in the testing methods appear from the evidence concerning the blood tests in the case before us, the next question presented is what consideration and weight should be given to the results disclosed *427 by them. Various statutes have been passed providing for blood tests in cases where paternity is an issue. Plaintiff contends that in the absence of a statute specifically authorizing such blood tests this court should not consider them in the present case at all. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N.H. 481, 103 A.2d 188, 46 A.L.R.2d 994, a case which had been decided in the trial court before the passage in that state of such a statute, held that judicial recognition should be accorded the accuracy and reliability of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity. See, also, State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7, 104 A.L.R. 441, where the court corrected and clarified its original holding of 3 years before, stating: `We therefore say, without further elaboration or discussion, that it is our considered opinion that the reliability of the blood test is definitely, and indeed unanimously, established as a matter of expert scientific opinion entertained by authorities in the field, and we think the time has undoubtedly arrived when the results of such tests, made by competent persons and properly offered in evidence, should be deemed admissible in a court of justice whenever paternity is in issue.' Many authorities are thereafter cited. We hold this court should likewise take judicial notice of the scientific accuracy and reliability of such tests." In the Colorado case of Beck v. Beck, 153 Colo. 90, 384 P.2d 731 (1963), the evidence was conflicting as to whether the husband had access to the wife during the possible period of conception. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the wife and the husband filed a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto attaching thereto a blood test taken by agreement, said blood test finding that the child could not be the son of the husband because the child possessed antigen "E", a factor or element not possessed by either the husband or the wife. The trial court granted the husband's motion, and the appeal followed. The Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Sutton, affirmed the action of the trial court in granting the motion non obstante veredicto stating: In Commonwealth v. D'Avella, 339 Mass. 642, 162 N.E.2d 19, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said: Numerous other cases from other jurisdictions hold similarly. *428 The Arkansas General Assembly has recognized this trend, and in 1955 passed an Act which is presently codified as Ark. Stat.Ann. § 34-705.1 (Repl. 1962) et seq.[2] This section is included in the chapter on "Bastardy" and appellee argues that it only relates to bastardy proceedings and has no application to divorce actions (it is not explained why the words "husband" and "wife" are used). Such argument is really of no moment here, for scientific advances would support the offering of this evidence, even though no statute authorized it. Some jurisdictions have held the blood test excluding paternity to be conclusive, while others have only considered it as strong evidence, to be considered in conjunction with other evidence. In the case before us, it is not necessary that we determine whether the results of these tests are always conclusive, for, together with the other proof in this case, we think the result establishes conclusively that appellant is not the father of the second daughter. While Mrs. Richardson denied acts of adultery, the weight of evidence is contrary to her testimony. No good point would be served in detailing this evidence; it is enough to say that it is convincing, and when the blood grouping tests of Dr. Landrum are added to it, the evidence is certain and conclusive. Let it be remembered that both husband and wife consented to go to the laboratory of Dr. Landrum, together with the baby, to have the necessary blood tests completed, and, though given the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Landrum with regard to her qualifications and the integrity of the blood tests, appellee declined to do so. No question whatsoever has been raised about the competence of the doctor to conduct the tests, nor has any objection been made to the manner in which it was conducted. As stated, we hold that it has been established that William Glenn Richardson is not the father of the second daughter.[3] Despite this holding, we are of the view that the chancellor's order as to custody should not be disturbed. Appellee lives with her parents, who appear to be substantial citizens of Fort Smith, and there is no evidence of misconduct since she has been living with the parents. Appellee does not work, and is accordingly able to look after the children, and the facilities for taking care of them are more than adequate. The husband lives with his parents in White House, Tennessee, and of course, his mother would have to look after the child, while appellant is at work. Perhaps our view is somewhat influenced by the fact that we are hesitant to separate these two little girls. Should that become necessary, the chancellor has full authority to make any changes in his order of custody, and, in fact, the chancellor's order finds that the children should be awarded *429 to appellee "at this time for so long as said plaintiff and cross-defendant continues to reside in the home of her parents." Nor do we deem it proper to change the amount of money ordered for support of the children. The court directed appellant to pay $15.00 per week, and, though appellant is not liable for the support of the second daughter, we certainly cannot find that the $15.00 per week is in excess of the amount required for the support and maintenance of the older daughter, Julie Ann. In accordance with with what has been said, the decree is reversed as to the first point, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree not inconsistent with this opinion. FOGLEMAN, J., would reduce the amount for child support. [1] The words "the second daughter" are used instead of the name of this child, and will be so used throughout this opinion. [2] "Whenever it shall be relevant to the prosecution or the defense in an illegitimacy action, the trial court may direct that the husband, wife and child submit to one [1] or more blood tests to determine whether or not the defendant can be excluded as being the father of the child. The results of the tests shall be receivable in evidence, but only in cases where definite exclusion is established. The tests shall be made by a duly qualified physician, or physicians, or by another duly qualified person, or persons, not to exceed three [3], to be appointed by the court. The costs of the test shall be taxed as other costs in the case or, in the court's discretion, may be taxed against the county. Such experts shall be subject to cross-examination by both parties after the court has caused them to disclose their findings. Whenever the court orders such blood tests to be taken and one of the parties shall refuse to submit to such tests, such fact shall be disclosed upon the trial unless good cause is shown to the contrary." [3] The cases of Martin v. Martin, 212 Ark. 204, 205 S.W.2d 189; West v. King, et al, 222 Ark. 809, 262 S.W.2d 897; Thomas v. Barnett, 228 Ark. 658, 210 S.W.2d 248, relied on by the appellee, are not in point. No blood grouping tests were given in any of these cases, and in fact, the putative father was dead.