Title: Greene County Bd. of Educ. v. Bailey

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

586 So. 2d 893 (1991)
GREENE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
v.
Roland S. BAILEY, et al.
1901316.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 23, 1991.
*894 Carlos A. Williams of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Turner, Williams & Pettaway, Selma, for appellant.
Ray Ward and Thomas W. Powe, Jr. of Ray, Oliver & Ward, Tuscaloosa, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The plaintiff, Greene County Board of Education, appeals from the dismissal of its complaint alleging conversion on the part of the defendants, Roland S. Bailey; Sarah N. Bailey; Pelham E. Brittain; Alabama Institutional Foods, Inc.; Joseph L. Wilson; Shelia G. Holland; and First National Bank of Tuskaloosa d/b/a AmSouth Bank of Tuscaloosa. We reverse and remand.
The plaintiff's complaint reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala.R.Civ.P., on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the defendants argued that the plaintiff had failed to allege that specific money capable of identification had been converted. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, stating, in pertinent part, as follows:
We disagree.
The standard by which the plaintiff's complaint in this case must be reviewed is well established:
Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So. 2d 669, 671 (Ala.1985). (Emphasis in original.)
To constitute conversion, there must be a wrongful taking or wrongful detention or interference, or an illegal assumption of ownership, or an illegal use or misuse of another's property. The gist of the action is the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to the exclusion or in defiance of a plaintiff's rights, where the plaintiff has a general or special title to the property or the immediate right to possession. Ex parte SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A., 523 So. 2d 407 (Ala.1988).
Generally, an action will not lie for the conversion of money. However, if the money at issue is capable of identification, then a claim of conversion may be appropriate. In Lewis v. Fowler, 479 So. 2d 725, 726 (Ala.1985), this Court discussed at length the circumstances under which an action for conversion will lie to recover a sum of money:
(Emphasis added.)
As this Court recognized in Lewis, the evolution of our economic system has resulted in courts' today being asked more often than not to determine whether money traceable to identified or segregated sources or accounts can be the subject of a conversion action. Although Lewis did not involve money that was traceable to a special account,[2] this Court, citing Limbaugh v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 732 F.2d 859 (11th Cir.1984), recognized that money directly traceable to a special account is sufficiently identifiable to support an action for conversion. More recently, in Covington v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 551 So. 2d 935 (Ala.1989), this Court, discussing Lewis, again recognized that money traceable to a special account is sufficiently identifiable to support an action for conversion. In addition, this Court in Covington cited with approval Estate of Jackson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 676 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D.Ala.1987):
551 So. 2d  at 938-39. This Court went on to hold in Covington, as it had in Lewis, that, under the particular facts of that case, the money at issue was not sufficiently identifiable to support a conversion action:
551 So. 2d  at 939.
Applying the applicable standard of review to the present case, we are not persuaded that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for conversion. The allegations of the complaint suggest that the plaintiff may be able to prove that the defendants, through an intricate scheme involving bogus invoices and checks and money orders, converted to their own use funds that had been specifically deposited in the "[Paramount *900 High School] lunchroom account" to pay for the high school's breakfast and lunch programs. Although the defendants cite us to a number of cases in which this Court held that conversion would not lie to recover certain funds, those cases are distinguishable in that they did not involve funds that were directly traceable to a special account.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the plaintiff has stated a claim for conversion and, therefore, that the trial court's order dismissing the plaintiff's complaint is due to be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  The Merchants and Farmers Bank of Greene County was dismissed by a stipulation of the parties and is not a party to this appeal.
[2]  Lewis involved a debtor-creditor relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. That relationship formed the alternative basis for this Court's holding that the plaintiff's conversion action would not lie.