Title: REHAN BHUTTO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

REHAN BHUTTO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 78114 P.3d 1252Case Number: 04-89Decided: 07/13/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
REHAN 
BHUTTO,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Kenneth Koski, Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and 
Megan L. Hayes.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dee Morgan, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant was 
convicted of premeditated first-degree murder for killing Valerie McCarthy.  The appellant raises numerous issues 
concerning the proceedings that led to his conviction, the constitutionality of 
the sentence imposed upon him, and the delay in docketing this appeal.  We affirm.

 
 

 
 
            
1.         
Did the district court err in not suppressing statements the appellant 
made to law enforcement officers?

 
 
            
2.         
Did the district court err in admitting certain uncharged misconduct 
evidence?

 
 
            
3.         
Did the district court err in admitting certain photographs into 
evidence?

 
 
            
4.         
Did cumulative error occur?

 
 
            
5.         
Is the life imprisonment without parole provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-101(c) (LexisNexis 2003) unconstitutional?

 
 
            
6.         
Did delay in docketing this appeal deprive the appellant of his right to 
meaningful appellate review?

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      At about 6:15 
a.m., on April 25, 2001, Casper police officers responding to 
appellant's 911 emergency call found Valerie McCarthy dead on the couple's 
bed.1  She had been shot in the head, and a 
pistol was found underneath a pillow on the bed.  The appellant told the officers that he 
had last seen Ms. McCarthy when she went to bed around 9:00 the previous 
evening.  He stated that he had 
fallen asleep on the couch watching television, and that he had discovered Ms. 
McCarthy in the morning after showering and getting ready for work.  He then called 911 and told the police 
that Ms. McCarthy had committed suicide.

 
 
[¶3]      At approximately 
7:00 a.m., the appellant agreed to accompany the officers to the police 
station.  Once there, he waited in 
an interview room for investigators to arrive.  Detective Dietz began interviewing the 
appellant at about 7:40 a.m., after telling the appellant that he was not in 
custody and was free to leave.  
Detective Kirkendall joined the interview at 8:00 a.m.  During the interview, the appellant 
stated his belief that Ms. McCarthy was "involved" with someone else.  This statement, coupled with information 
from the crime scene, led the detectives to believe that the appellant may have 
killed Ms. McCarthy.  Consequently, 
at about 9:15 a.m., they advised him of his Miranda rights.2

 
 
[¶4]      Despite being 
"Mirandized," the appellant indicated his willingness to continue talking to the 
detectives.  In fact, he interrupted 
the advisement of his rights to say, "let me finish this first, I want to tell 
you about this."  He then continued 
to discuss with the detectives his relationship with Ms. McCarthy and a 
timetable of recent events.  When 
the detectives informed him around 10:00 a.m. that the evidence in the case did 
not seem to support what he was telling them, the appellant replied, "I will pay 
elsewhere, I'll pay with my God."  
In a statement that Detective Dietz characterized as being "a little out 
of context," the appellant then said that Ms. McCarthy put the pistol under her 
pillow to protect herself because she was afraid of him.

 
 
[¶5]      The detectives 
attempted to follow up on their interview with the appellant by asking him 
specific questions.  After several 
minutes of what Detective Dietz later described as the appellant answering 
questions with questions and trying to lead the interview in different 
directions, the appellant stated, "I think I want my attorney here now."  Upon clarifying that this was an 
unequivocal request for counsel, the detectives ceased the interrogation.  However, the appellant asked the 
detectives how he could re-contact them if he changed his mind.  In response, Detective Kirkendall gave 
the appellant a "re-initiation of contact" form.

 
 
[¶6]      Detectives Dietz 
and Kirkendall left to conduct further investigation, including interviews and 
the preparation of search warrant affidavits, one of the latter intended to 
obtain a warrant to search the appellant's person for evidence.  The appellant remained in the interview 
room, now under the supervision of Detective Freel, with whom the appellant was 
personally acquainted.  Knowing of 
the appellant's request for counsel, Detective Freel did not question the 
appellant.  However, while the 
detective was escorting the appellant to the restroom, the appellant asked what 
he should do, and Detective Freel responded that he could not give him legal 
advice, but the appellant should tell the detectives the truth.  When the appellant told Detective Freel 
that is what he wanted to do, the detective went and informed Detectives Dietz 
and Kirkendall of that fact.  The 
latter two then went back into the interview room, but left without further 
questioning the appellant because he would not sign the form to re-initiate 
contact.

 
 
[¶7]      Soon after the 
aborted re-contact, the appellant asked for another restroom break.  Detective Freel again responded, and the 
appellant again asked what he should do.  
Detective Freel pointed out the failed re-contact and asked what the 
appellant would like him to do.  The 
appellant said that he did not trust the other detectives, but that he would 
like to talk to Detective Freel.  
Detective Freel then obtained a tape recorder, another re-contact form, 
and a Miranda-rights form.  
What followed was a two-hour interview, during which the appellant 
admitted killing Ms. McCarthy because of her disclosure of 
unfaithfulness.

 
 
[¶8]      Additional facts 
will be noted as they pertain to particular issues.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
Motion to Suppress

 
 
[¶9]      The appellant 
remained in the police station interview room from approximately 7:00 a.m. to 
4:30 p.m., with only a few restroom breaks.  He was not provided with lunch, and he 
complained frequently of a headache.  
The officers testified that, although the appellant had voluntarily 
accompanied them to the station, he was not free to leave after his 
constitutional rights were explained to him at about 9:15 a.m.  He requested counsel an hour later, and 
the interview ended.  The appellant 
was not allowed to leave, however, and, after signing a re-contact form, he 
eventually confessed to killing Ms. McCarthy.

 
 
[¶10]   With these facts in mind, the 
appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress his statement to Detective 
Freel.  The district court heard 
that and other motions on August 31 and September 4, 2001.  The motion was denied.  In its decision letter, the district 
court identified three issues surrounding the April 25th statement:  (1) whether the statement was obtained 
during custodial interrogation; (2) whether the statement was voluntary; and (3) 
whether the appellant re-initiated contact with the detectives after requesting 
counsel.

 
 

[¶11]   We set forth our standard for 
reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress as it concerns these issues in Gunn v. State, 2003 WY 24, ¶¶ 5-12, 64 P.3d 716, 719-21 (Wyo. 2003):

 
 
"When 
we review a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not 
interfere with the findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  When the district court has not made 
specific findings of fact, we will uphold its general ruling if the ruling is 
supportable by any reasonable view of the evidence.  We consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the district court's ruling because of the district court's 
ability to assess "the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and 
make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions" at the hearing on 
the motion.'"

 
 

Meek v. 
State, 2002 WY 
1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Wyo.2002) (quoting   Frederick  v. State, 981 P.2d 494, 497 
(Wyo.1999)).  Voluntariness, 
however, is a question of law; thus, it is reviewed de novo.  Lewis v. State, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d 1063, 1068 (Wyo.2002).

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
Statements made by a suspect during custodial interrogation are 
admissible into evidence, providing certain advisements are made.  Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  Statements made 
during custodial interrogation must be excluded upon a showing that the 
defendant was not advised of his Miranda 
rights.  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 1106, 122 S. Ct. 2315, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1069 (2002).  In Dickerson, 530 U.S.  at 
435, 120 S. Ct. 2326, the United States Supreme Court 
stated:

 
 
"Accordingly, 
we laid down concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies 
and courts to follow.'  . . .  Those guidelines established that the 
admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial interrogation 
of a suspect would depend on whether the police provided the suspect with four 
warnings.  These warnings (which 
have come to be known colloquially as Miranda rights') are:  a suspect has the right to remain 
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he 
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an 
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so 
desires.'"

 
 
            
Custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way."  
Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 
444, 86 S. Ct. 1602.  See also Glass v. State, 853 P.2d 972, 
976 (Wyo.1993) and Wunder v. State, 
705 P.2d 333, 334 (Wyo.1985).  
Neither general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime 
nor statements volunteered freely without compelling influences are considered 
to fall within this definition.  Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 
477-78, 86 S. Ct. 1602.

 
 
            
The totality of the circumstances must be considered in determining 
whether a suspect is in custody when questioned.  In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976), the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that a 
person who is the "focus" of a criminal investigation is, by that fact, "in 
custody."  The United States Supreme 
Court made clear that "Miranda 
implicitly defined focus,' for its purposes, as questioning initiated by 
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way.'"  Id. at 347, 96 S. Ct. 1612 
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 
444, 86 S.Ct. 1602) (emphasis in original).  The proper inquiry is to ask "whether a 
reasonable man in Appellant's position would have considered himself to be in 
police custody."  Glass, 853 P.2d  at 
976.

 
 
            
Several factors are relevant to be considered in determining whether a 
restraint is "custodial" for Miranda 
purposes.  Among these are:  (1) whether a suspect is questioned in 
familiar or neutral surroundings; (2) the number of police officers present; (3) 
the degree of physical restraint and whether it is comparable to those 
associated with a formal arrest; and (4) the duration and character of the 
interrogation.  See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel 
and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure 
§ 6.6(c) at 527 (2nd ed.1999); see 
also Wunder, 705 P.2d  at 335.  
The nature of the interrogator, the nature of the suspect, the time and 
place of the interrogation, the progress of the investigation at the time of the 
interrogation, whether the suspect is informed that his detention would not be 
temporary, and the elapsed amount of time between questioning and the arrest may 
be important factors as well.  Wunder, 705 P.2d  at 335; J.F. Ghent, 
Annotation, What Constitutes "Custodial 
Interrogation" Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect be 
Informed of His Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation, 
31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).  No one 
factor alone will necessarily establish custody for Miranda purposes, and not all factors 
will be relevant to a given case.

 
 
            
The giving of Miranda 
warnings, by itself, does not suffice to render a statement admissible.  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United 
States 
Constitution, and Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6 and 11, require that 
statements also must be voluntary.  
Lewis, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d  at 1068; Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 721 (Wyo.1999); Doyle v. State, 
954 P.2d 969, 971-72 (Wyo.1998).

 
 
"To be 
voluntary, the defendant's statements must result from "free and deliberate 
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception."  Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1344 
(Wyo.1996).  Because we presume a 
defendant's statements to be involuntary, the burden rests on the State to show, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's statements were 
voluntary.  [State v.] Evans, 944 P.2d [1120] at 1126-27 
[(Wyo.1997)].  Once the State has 
met its burden and rebutted the presumption of involuntariness, the defendant 
may be required to present evidence demonstrating the involuntariness of his 
statements.  Id. at 
1126.  If such statements resulted from coercion, then 
the statements are inadmissible at trial for any purpose because their validity 
is suspect.  Id. at 1125.'"

 
 

Lewis, 
2002 WY 
92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d  at 1068 (quoting 
Mitchell, 982 P.2d at 721).  We 
look to the totality of the circumstances to determine if the defendant's 
statements were voluntary.  Lewis, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d  at 1068 
(quoting Mitchell, 982 P.2d at 
721).

 
 
            
Factors a trial court may consider in determining whether statements were 
made voluntarily include:

 
 
"[T]he 
atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the 
use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, 
the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the 
defendant's mental condition at the time the statement is made[,] . . . whether 
the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and was aware of the 
situation; whether Miranda warnings 
were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and 
waived Miranda rights; whether the 
defendant had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to the 
interrogation; whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an 
interrogation or instead was volunteered; whether any overt or implied threat or 
promise was directed to the defendant; the method and style employed by the 
interrogator in questioning the defendant and the length and place of the 
interrogation; and the defendant's mental and physical condition immediately 
prior to and during the interrogation, as well as educational background, 
employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system.'"

 
 

Simmers 
v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1195-96 (Wyo.1997) (quoting State 
v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Wyo.1997); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 845 (Colo.1991); and People v. Pearson, 725 P.2d 782, 783 
(Colo.1986)).

 
 

[¶12]   Two inquiries are required in 
determining whether an accused was in custody during an interrogation:  first, what were 
the circumstances, and second, would a reasonable person have felt at liberty to 
terminate the interrogation and leave.  Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1243 
(Wyo. 1996).  The fact of custody is not determined by the 
subjective intent of the law enforcement officer, or the subjective belief of 
the accused.

 
 
            
An officer testified that he felt that, after the marijuana was found, 
Appellant was not free to leave; however, he never told Appellant that he was 
not free to leave, nor did he hear anyone else tell Appellant that he was not 
free to leave.  
"A policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether 
a suspect was "in custody" at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is 
how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his 
situation.'"  
Wunder [v. 
State], 705 P.2d [333] at 335 [(Wyo.1985)] (quoting Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 
104 S. Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)).

 
 
""It was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, 
and not the strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time the 
questioning was conducted, which led the Court to impose the Miranda 
requirements with regard to custodial questioning."'  
. . .  United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d 471, 473 (CA2 1969) [, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 [90 S. Ct. 1358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 650] (1970)]  
[A]n objective, reasonable-man test is appropriate because, unlike a 
subjective test, it is not solely dependent either on the self-serving 
declarations of the police officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the 
police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every 
person whom they question[.'  People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 230, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (N.Y.1967).]"

 
 

Id. (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S.  at 442 n. 35, 104 S. Ct.  at 3151 n. 35).

 
 

Southworth v. State, 913 P.2d 444, 450-51 (Wyo. 1996).  The giving of Miranda rights may 
be indicative of, but is not necessarily determinative of, custodial 
interrogation.  
Eckenrod v. 
State, 2003 WY 51, ¶ 20, 67 P.3d 635, 641 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 

[¶13]   In its decision letter in the instant 
case, the district court began its analysis of these issues by quoting a portion 
of the following passage from Houghton v. State, 6 P.3d 643, 648 (Wyo. 
2000):

 
 
            
In Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), the United 
States Supreme Court held that an accused person in custody who has expressed 
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to 
further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available 
to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication with the 
police.  451 U.S.  at 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 
at 1885.  The 
Court further held that when an accused has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to 
have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that 
right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further 
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his 
rights.  451 U.S.  at 484, 101 S. Ct.  at 
1885.

 
 
[¶14]   The district court then noted several 
circumstances leading to its conclusion that the appellant was not in custody 
during the interview with Detective Freel on April 25th:  (1) the appellant 
voluntarily went to the police station upon request; (2) he was told at the 
outset of the interview that he was free to leave; (3) he was never formally 
arrested, handcuffed, or incarcerated; (4) he never asked to leave; and (5) he 
was watched by the officers because of a pending warrant for the search of his 
person.  While 
we agree that these circumstances existed, and giving due deference to the 
district court's findings of fact in this regard, we are forced to conclude 
that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the 
appellant's situation would not have felt at liberty to leave.

 
 

[¶15]   The appellant arrived at the police 
station voluntarily early in the morning.  After a couple of hours of questioning, he 
was given his Miranda warnings.  Although their subjective intent is not 
controlling, it should be noted that Detectives Dietz, Kirkendall and Freel all 
consider the appellant to have been in custody from that point forward.3  From mid-morning until he was formally 
arrested late in the afternoon, the appellant was not allowed to leave the 
interview room unescorted, he was not allowed to have contact with third 
persons, and he was not allowed out of the eyesight of a law enforcement 
officer.  To 
gain attention, he had to knock on the closed door of the interview room and 
wait for an officer's response.  Despite the fact that no officer had directly 
told the appellant that he was no longer free to go, the situation had changed 
to such a degree that it must have been obvious to everyone, including the 
appellant, that he could not leave.  The appellant was, in fact, in custody.  Because "custody" 
requires only that an accused be "deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way,'" being placed in "custody" for Miranda purposes 
can occur before actual arrest.  Martinez v. State, 943 P.2d 1178, 1181 
(Wyo. 1997) (quoting Southworth, 
913 P.2d at 449); Eckenrod, 2003 WY 
51, ¶ 20, 67 P.3d  at 641.

 
 
[¶16]   The determination that the appellant 
was in custody during the interrogation by Detective Freel on April 25th does 
little, however, to answer the questions before this Court.  No issue exists as 
to the necessity of giving the Miranda warnings because the appellant does not deny 
that he was Mirandized twice before that interview nor does he challenge the 
sufficiency of those advisements.  The relevance of the custody factor, 
therefore, is limited to its role in determining the voluntariness of the 
appellant's statements, and his initiation of re-contact with the 
detectives.

 
 

[¶17]   The two-part test for determining the 
validity of an accused's statement to law enforcement officials after he has 
requested counsel is to inquire, first, whether he initiated the contact, and 
second, whether, under the totality of the circumstances, he waived his right 
against self-incrimination.  Wells v. State, 846 P.2d 589, 594 
(Wyo. 1992).  The district court found that the appellant 
voluntarily initiated the re-contact with the detectives that resulted in the 
statement he gave Detective Freel.  We agree.  Not once, but twice, the appellant approached 
Detective Freel with questions as to what he should do.  Those contacts were 
"initiated" by the appellant, as that word is ordinarily understood.  See Wells, 846 P.2d  
at 594.4  There is no suggestion in the record that any 
of the detectives, or any other law enforcement officials, spoke to or 
questioned the appellant after he requested counsel.  In fact, the 
appellant's first attempt to initiate re-contact with the detectives failed 
because Detectives Dietz and Kirkendall would not speak with him unless he 
signed a Request for Contact Form, which he was reluctant to do.  His refusal to 
speak to those detectives shows that he was aware that silence was an 
option.  
Furthermore, Detective Freel did not agree to the later interview with 
the appellant until he had once again advised him of his Miranda rights, and 
the appellant had read and signed the Request for Contact Form, which contained 
the following language:

 
 
I Rehan Bhutto, DID/DO HEREBY REQUEST THAT DETECTIVE[] 
FREEL COME TO THE 201 N. DAVID ST. FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTERVIEWING ME IN REGARDS 
TO A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION FOR WHICH I WAS INVOLVED IN OR HAVE PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE OF . . .

 
 
I DO THIS OF MY OWN FREE WILL WITHOUT COUNSEL BEING 
PRESENT.  NO 
PROMISES HAVE BEEN MADE TO ME FOR LENIENCY IN EXCHANGE FOR MY STATEMENT OR 
COOPERATION IN THE CASE . . .

 
 
I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE CONDITIONS AND THAT IT WAS I THAT INITIATED THE CONTACT WITH DETECTIVES. . .

 
 
[¶18]   The evidence is clear that the 
appellant, not the detectives, initiated the contact that led to his 
confession.  
The remaining question is whether that contact was a voluntary waiver of 
his right against self-incrimination.  We have already herein delineated the factors 
that are to be considered in determining voluntariness.  Having reviewed the 
entire record, and having considered the applicable factors, we agree with the 
district court's succinct analysis and conclusion that the appellant's 
statements to Detective Freel were voluntarily made:

 
 
            
Finally, the Court would find that the statement given by the Defendant 
to Detective Freel on April 25th was voluntarily given.  While the Defendant 
did complain of a headache, it cannot be said that his physical condition was 
such to conclude that the statement was involuntarily given.  Jansen v. State, 892 P.2d 1131, 1140 
(Wyo. 1995).  The testimony 
presented in the case at hand unanimously supports the findings that the 
Defendant, during the time in question, was oriented to time and place, 
responsive to inquiries made of him, and able to clearly express himself.  It must also be 
noted that in the almost two hours that he talked with Detective Freel, the 
Defendant clearly communicated his desire to talk and discuss the matters at 
issue without any reservation on his part.  Therefore, given the totality of the 
circumstances, there can be no question but that the prosecution met its burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant's statement to 
Detective Freel on April 25, 2001, was given voluntarily.  State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1127 
(Wyo. 1997).

 
 

We would add only that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the appellant's confinement to the interview room for the better 
part of the day was for legitimate purposes during a murder investigation, was 
minimally intrusive given the situation, and cannot be characterized as 
"coercive state action, such as trickery, psychological pressure, or 
mistreatment.'"  
State v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1125 
(Wyo. 1997) (quoting Withrow v. 
Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 708, 
113 S. Ct. 1745, 1762, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring)).  Neither can it be said that the appellant's 
"will was overborne by the police and that [his] capacity for self-determination 
was seriously impaired."  Evans, 944 P.2d  at 1125.

 
 
            
Uncharged Misconduct 
Evidence

 
 
[¶19]   The admissibility of what has come to 
be called uncharged misconduct evidence is determined under W.R.E. 404(b):

 
 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident.

 
 

Such evidence is also subject to the mandates of W.R.E. 402 
and 403 that it be relevant and that its probative value not be "substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  W.R.E. 403.  Because uncharged misconduct evidence may be 
admitted only for these limited purposes, this Court has adopted a stringent 
test for determining admissibility.  See Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶¶ 16-18, 
26-33, 57 P.3d 332, 339-40, 
342-44 (Wyo. 2002).  Admissibility determinations are reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion.  Id. at ¶ 18, 57 P.3d  
at 340.

 
 
[¶20]   The specific evidence to which the 
appellant objected in the district court and which is the subject of this 
appellate issue consisted of the testimony of seven people describing various 
incidents of threats and violence between the appellant and Ms. McCarthy during 
the six-year period prior to her death.5  It is the 
appellant's contention that these incidents were too remote in time to be 
relevant to any matter at issue in the present case, and that the evidence was, 
therefore, substantially more prejudicial than probative.

 
 
[¶21]   Prior to trial, the appellant filed a 
demand for notice of the State's intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b).  In its 
response, the State identified the witnesses who eventually testified at trial, 
as well as other potential "404(b)" witnesses, and specified proof of motive, 
intent, malice, and lack of accident as justification for the testimony.  The matter was 
heard along with other pretrial motions.  The appellant challenged the proffered 
evidence on three grounds:  that it was too remote in time, that it was 
uncorroborated, and that the witnesses were biased against him.  The State's 
position was that the evidence tended to prove a pattern in the relationship 
between the appellant and Ms. McCarthy, that the incidents were not too remote 
in time to be relevant, and that they specifically tended to prove intent, 
motive, malice, and lack of accident.

 
 
[¶22]   The district court ruled from the bench 
at the motion hearing, allowing the State to introduce the uncharged misconduct 
evidence now at issue.  The district court found the evidence to be 
probative of motive, intent, malice, and lack of accident.  It also held that 
the relationship between the appellant and Ms. McCarthy was relevant, and that 
none of the alleged incidents of prior violence was so remote in time as to lose 
its relevance.  
Finally, the district court concluded that the probative value of the 
evidence was not outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice.

 
 
[¶23]   In this appeal, the appellant argues 
that the alleged prior acts of domestic abuse were remote in time and were 
dissimilar to the alleged crime, thereby rendering them more unfairly 
prejudicial than probative.  In response, the State contends that the 
defense at trial was not "I didn't do it," but was that the appellant was guilty 
only of manslaughter.  
Consequently, questions of motive, malice, intent and lack of accident 
had to be resolved by the jury, making the evidence relevant.

 
 

[¶24]   We agree with the district court that 
the State's uncharged misconduct evidence was admissible.  Evidence of prior 
threats and assaults may be admissible to prove motive and intent.  Longfellow v. State, 
803 P.2d 848, 853 (Wyo. 
1990); Smizer v. State, 752 P.2d 406, 409-10 (Wyo. 
1988); Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1264 (Wyo. 
1988).  As the district court held, such evidence may 
also be admissible because it helps the jury understand the relationship between 
the parties.  
Solis v. 
State, 981 P.2d 28, 31 
(Wyo. 1999).  Likewise, evidence of prior abuse may be 
admissible to counter a defense, such as accident or lack of intent.  Kenyon v. State, 2004 WY 100, ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 1016, 1026 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1389 
(2005).  Therefore, the evidence was offered for a 
proper purpose.

 
 

[¶25]   As to remoteness in time, this Court 
has repeatedly refused to set a particular time limit for uncharged misconduct 
evidence, has said that the matter is left to the discretion of the trial court, 
and has said that remoteness affects weight rather than admissibility.  Hart v. State, 2002 WY 163, ¶ 23, 57 P.3d 348, 356 (Wyo. 2002); Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 926 (Wyo. 
1999); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 583 (Wyo.), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006 (1972).  The standard is reasonableness, considering 
the context of, and the theory supporting admission of, the evidence.  Hart, 2002 WY 163, ¶ 24, 57 P.3d  
at 356.

 
 

[¶26]   We conclude that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.  The alleged 
incidents were all within five or six years of the charged crime, which period 
of time is not unreasonable under the circumstances, and is, indeed, much 
shorter than others that have been allowed.  See Hart, 2002 WY 
163, ¶ 19, 57 P.3d at 355 (28-29 years); Griswold, 994 P.2d 
at 926 (16-17 years); and Britton v. State, 
845 P.2d 1374, 1376 
(Wyo. 1992) (8-13 years).  And finally, the district court appropriately 
instructed the jury as to the limited purposes for which the evidence was 
admitted.6

 
 
[¶27]   We will affirm the district court's 
admission of the challenged uncharged misconduct evidence because the district 
court followed the appropriate procedures in determining its admissibility, 
because the district court considered the appropriate factors in reaching its 
decision, and because the record sufficiently evidences that process.

 
 
            
Photographs

 
 
[¶28]   Numerous photographs were taken during 
the investigation into Ms. McCarthy's death.  Prior to trial, the appellant filed a motion 
in limine seeking to prevent the State from introducing into evidence 
photographs of Ms. McCarthy's body at the scene or during autopsy.  When the motion was 
heard, the appellant took the position that, understanding the need for a 
limited number of photographs showing manner and cause of death, the district 
court should exercise its discretion to prevent the unduly prejudicial effect of 
a presentation of cumulative gruesome photographs.  The State contended 
that the photographs were necessary to prove such things as premeditation and 
malice, that they were necessary adjuncts to certain testimony, and that 
physical evidence such as photographs convey more information than words 
alone.  The 
district court denied the motion in limine, leaving it to defense counsel to 
object at trial to proferred exhibits.

 
 

[¶29]   The question of whether to admit 
photographs into evidence, like other evidentiary decisions, is left to the 
reasonable discretion of the trial court.  Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 13, 49 P.3d 975, 982 (Wyo. 
2002) (quoting 
Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969, 972 (Wyo. 
1973)); Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 527 
(Wyo. 1993).  That discretion is not, however, 
unguided.  To 
be admissible, photographs, like other evidence, must be relevant and 
probative.  
W.R.E. 401, 402; Barnes, 858 P.2d  at 526; Reeder, 515 P.2d  at 972.  Further, even relevant photographs may be 
excluded if their probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.  
W.R.E. 403; Barnes, 858 P.2d  at 526-27.  The appellant bears the burden of 
establishing an abuse of discretion in the admission of photographs.  Barnes, 858 P.2d  at 527.  The trial court's decision is entitled to 
considerable deference and will not be reversed if there is any legitimate basis 
for the ruling.  
Id.  Furthermore, we 
have recognized that photographs may have special significance in assisting 
juries to reach tough decisions:

 
 
            
Appellant's position is that, conceding the nature, extent and severity 
of the injuries as necessary and relevant, the pathologist could orally testify 
to facts that would describe the injuries sufficiently for the jury to 
comprehend their magnitude.  We trust juries to decide cases involving 
gory, gruesome killings and decide questions of life and death.  It is inconsistent 
that we must sanitize the case by withholding fair evidence of the crime and its 
results.  It 
was said that "a photograph is worth a thousand words," and we know that is 
so.  The 
photographs are admissible for that reason in this case and in all cases in 
which the injuries have special significance and can be more readily perceived, 
understood and known by use of photographs or visual aids than if conveyed by 
words alone.  
To state in words that an abrasion is 15 centimeters in diameter or a 
bruise is black and blue cannot adequately convey to the jury a comprehension 
and knowledge of the degree and kind of actual abrasion or bruise.

 
 

Id. at 528.

 
 

[¶30]   In the instant case, the appellant 
conceded the manner and cause of deathhe admitted that he shot Ms. McCarthy in 
the head.  We 
have said, however, that such admissions do not make relevant photographs 
inadmissible.  
Id. at 526; Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1084 
(Wyo. 1978).  That is because, despite any admissions, the 
State still has the burden of proving all the elements of the crime.  Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 13, 49 P.3d  
at 983.  In that regard, photographs depicting the 
nature and extent of injuries may be relevant to issues such as motive, intent, 
malice, and premeditation.  Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 663 (Wyo. 
2000); Barnes, 858 P.2d  at 529; Shaffer v. State, 640 P.2d 88, 98 
(Wyo. 1982).

 
 
[¶31]   A total of nineteen photographs were 
introduced into evidence at the appellant's trial.7  Five of those 
photographs were admitted during the testimony of the police department's 
evidence technician to assist her in describing the crime scene.  Prior to admitting 
the photographs, the district court heard, out of the jury's presence, the 
State's proffer of relevance and the appellant's objection that the evidence was 
cumulative and unduly prejudicial.  The district court concluded:

 
 
Okay.  Well, as to these five photographs, it looks 
like any objection as to its being cumulative or prejudicial as to 119 is 
withdrawn.  
That narrows it down to the four.  My observation is that they are from 
different angles, they are different views of the body.  As [the prosecutor] 
mentions, one of them does show where the firearm was located.  One of the 
photographs, as I see it, would have a better view of the shoulder area, any 
marks on the arm that there may be or be testified about.

 
 
            
Another of the photographs better shows where the bullet hole that's 
referred to may have been.  So I don't see any problem with this number 
of photographs of the body at the scene causing a prejudicial effect or being 
overly cumulative in any way.

 
 
[¶32]   We can find no abuse of discretion in 
the district court's procedures or decision and we will, therefore, affirm the 
admission of these five photographs.  We turn then to four photographs introduced 
during the testimony of another of the police department's crime scene 
technicians.  
These photographs showed the position of Ms. McCarthy's body on the bed, 
a pillow and the gun underneath it, a close up of a shell casing, and the 
blood-soaked sheets showing that the body had been moved.  Given these 
different depictions, the district court found that the photographs were not 
cumulative and were not unfairly prejudicial, and admitted them over the 
appellant's objections.

 
 
[¶33]   As with the first group of photographs, 
the appellant has not met his burden of proving an abuse of discretion in the 
admission of these photographs.  The State provided reasonable justification 
for their admission, and the district court carefully reviewed the photographs 
and considered the parties' arguments.  We affirm admission of these four 
photographs.

 
 

[¶34]   Finally, the forensic pathologist who 
performed the autopsy relied during his testimony upon ten photographs taken 
during that autopsy.  
The appellant objected to most of the photographs as being cumulative, 
unfairly prejudicial, and relevant only to matters that had been conceded.  The district court 
allowed the photographs to be admitted because they helped the witness explain 
his conclusions as to how the injury and death occurred, and that the death was 
not a suicide, but a staged suicide.  We will affirm the district court because it 
carefully exercised it discretion and admitted the photographs for legitimate 
purposes.  We 
have previously held that "[r]eversal is required for the admission of a 
photograph only if the photograph has little or no probative value and is 
extremely inflammatory or introduced merely to inflame the jury."  Phillips v. State, 
835 P.2d 1062, 1071 
(Wyo. 1992) (citing Shaffer, 640 P.2d at 97).  That does not describe the present case.

 
 
            
Cumulative Error

 
 

[¶35]   Where, as here, there is no 
underlying error, a claim of cumulative error must fail.  Springfield v. State, 
860 P.2d 435, 453 
(Wyo. 1993) (quoting Young v. 
State, 849 P.2d 754, 767 
(Wyo. 1993)).

 
 
            
Life Imprisonment 
Without Parole

 
 
[¶36]   The defendant was sentenced to 
life imprisonment without parole under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(c), which reads 
as follows:

 
 
A person convicted of murder in the first degree in a case 
in which the state seeks the death penalty shall be sentenced in accordance with 
the provisions of W.S. 6-2-102.  In all other cases, including any case in 
which the state has determined not to seek the death penalty at any stage of the 
proceeding, the judge shall determine the sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole or life imprisonment taking into consideration any negotiated plea 
agreement and any evidence relevant to a determination of sentence which the 
court deems to have probative value.

 
 
[¶37]   The appellant contends on appeal, 
although he did not raise the issue in the district court, that the absence of 
guidelines in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(c) leads to the arbitrary imposition of 
life imprisonment without parole sentences, in violation of the due process 
clauses of both the federal and state constitutions.8  In addition, he 
alleges that the statute violates Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 7, which forbids 
"arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen[.]"

 
 

[¶38]   This issue comes to us very nearly 
exactly as it did in Kenyon, 2004 WY 
100, ¶ 12, 96 P.3d  at 1022, where we refused to consider the matter because it was 
not raised below.  
We will continue to adhere to the ruling of that case:

 
 
            
Kenyon concedes that he raises the issues of guidelines and notice for 
the first time on appeal but contends that these due process protections are of 
such a fundamental nature that the Court should take cognizance.  In a non-capital 
sentencing context, when our review demonstrates that the sentencing judge has 
met the due process standards stated above, an argument that the manner in which 
an additional non-capital penalty has been applied is not so fundamental in 
nature that we will address the statute's constitutionality when there has been 
a failure to raise the issues before the sentencing court and preserve them for 
our review.

 
 

Id.; see also Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22, ¶ 11, 18 P.3d 641, 644 (Wyo. 
2001).  That being the law, we will not further 
consider the appellant's argument that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(c) is 
unconstitutional.9

 
 
            
Delay in Docketing the 
Appeal

 
 
[¶39]   The appellant was tried in January 2002 
and sentenced in May 2002.  His Notice of Appeal was filed in the 
district court on May 17, 2002.  On the same date, the appellant designated as 
the record on appeal "the transcript of all court records," and sent a letter to 
the official court reporter asking for preparation of "all pre-trial 
proceedings, pre-trial motions, changes of plea hearing, trial, and the 
sentencing hearing."  
On May 22, 2002, the official court reporter certified completion of the 
requested transcripts, with the exception of one from the July 3, 2001, 
scheduling conference, which conference had been covered by another court 
reporter.  
Attached to the certification was a copy of a letter to the substitute 
court reporter seeking that transcript.

 
 
[¶40]   The next item in the district court 
file concerning transcripts is a copy of a January 26, 2004, letter from defense 
counsel to the substitute court reporter confirming the latter's completion of 
the transcript from the scheduling conference, as well as a transcript from a 
May 30, 2002, post-trial hearing.  Following that letter in the district court 
file is the appellant's February 17, 2004, motion for order to show cause why 
the substitute court reporter should not be found in contempt of court for 
failing to produce the missing transcripts.  That motion was scheduled for hearing on 
March 19, 2004, but the hearing was continued due to defense counsel's 
unavailability on that date.  The transcript from the scheduling conference 
was filed on March 22, 2004.  On April 8, 2004, the clerk of the district 
court sent a letter to the official court reporter, enclosing the stenographic 
notes from the May 30, 2002, post-trial hearing.  The transcript from the post-trial motion 
hearing was filed on April 27, 2004, and on the same date the clerk of the 
district court certified that the record was complete for purposes of 
appeal.  The 
appeal was docketed in this Court on April 29, 2004.10

 
 

[¶41]   The appellant contends that the 
"inordinate delay" in docketing his appeal deprived him of his due process right 
to a speedy appeal.  
In Daniel v. 
State, 2003 WY 132, ¶¶ 43-44, 78 P.3d 205, 218-19 (Wyo. 
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1205 (2004), we set forth in detail the process we will follow in 
reviewing such allegations:

 
 
            
To determine whether an inordinate delay denies due process, most courts 
have adopted a modified version of the test formulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), analogizing to the violation of speedy trial 
rights.  Harris [v. Champion], 15 
F.3d [1538] at 1558-59 [(10th Cir.1994)]; Rheuark [v. Shaw], 628 F.2d [297] at 303 [(5th Cir.1980)]; Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 783 (Ind.1997).  The four-prong test examines the length of 
the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's diligence in pursuing the 
right to appeal, and the prejudice to the defendant.  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2192; Coe v. 
Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 531-32 (9th Cir.1990); Rheuark, 628 F.2d  
at 303 n. 8.  
The length of the delay acts as a triggering mechanism, meaning that 
unless the delay is unreasonable under the circumstances, there is no necessity 
to inquire further.  
Doggett v. 
United 
States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 
2690-91, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992); Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2192.  In 
extreme circumstances, an inordinate delay may give rise to a presumption of 
prejudice.  Doggett, 505 U.S.  at 
755-57, 112 S. Ct.  at 2692-93 (cited in [United 
States v.] Smith, 94 F.3d 
[204] at 209 [(6th Cir.1996)].

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
. . .  The fourth Barker factor, 
prejudice, is to be assessed in light of the interests that the right to a 
speedy disposition of an appeal is intended to protect.  These interests 
are:  (1) 
preventing oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) minimizing anxiety and 
concern of a convicted person awaiting the outcome of an appeal; and (3) 
limiting the possibility that the grounds for appeal or defenses in case of 
reversal and retrial might be impaired.  Harris, 15 F.3d  at 1559; Rheuark, 628 F.2d  
at 303 n. 8.

 
 

[¶42]   The appellant contends that the length 
of the delay in this casetwo years to docket the appeal and nearly three years 
to resolve itis, like the equivalent delay in Daniel, 
presumptively excessive, thereby necessitating inquiry into the remaining Barker 
factors.  
See Daniel, 
2003 WY 132, ¶ 46, 78 P.3d 
at 219 and Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1556 (10th Cir. 1994).  With respect to the second Barker factor, the 
appellant asserts that court reporter failures are attributable to the 
State.  See Coe v. Thurman, 
922 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1990) and State v. Moore, 87 N.M. 412, 534 P.2d 1124, 1125-26 
(1975).  As to the third Barker factor, the 
appellant contends that he diligently pursued his right to an appeal by filing a 
timely notice of appeal and by not authorizing any extensions of time for filing 
the delinquent transcripts.  Finally, as to the fourth Barker 
factorprejudicethe appellant's only factual allegations are, first, that 
the uncharged misconduct evidence that was admitted at trial will now be even 
more remote in time if there is a retrial, and, second, that he suffered from 
the "oppressiveness of incarceration" during the delay.

 
 
[¶43]   Having reviewed all of what the record 
reveals that transpired in regard to the delay in docketing this appeal, we 
conclude that the appellant's right to the due process of law has not been 
abridged.  Even 
if we assume that the first and second Barker factors have been met because the delay in this 
case was unreasonable and because the delay was the State's fault, we are unable 
to find that the appellant has met his burden of proving the last two factors.11  The record simply does not show due diligence 
by the appellant.  
W.R.A.P. 2.06 allows court reporters sixty days from the date the notice 
of appeal was filed to file the transcripts that were ordered for the 
appeal.  The 
notice of appeal in this case was filed on May 17, 2002, meaning the transcripts 
were due July 17, 2002.  The transcripts were not filed by that date, 
yet the appellant did nothing until January 26, 2004over eighteen months 
later.  Filing 
a timely notice of appeal does not equal due diligence in pursuing that appeal 
in the face of delay.  
While due diligence is certainly not the only factor to be considered, an 
appellant may not sit on his hands for eighteen months and then complain that 
nothing has been done.

 
 
[¶44]   The fourth Barker factor that 
must be proved by an appellant is prejudice.  As mentioned above, the appellant's first 
allegation of prejudice is that the State's uncharged misconduct evidence will 
now be even more remote in time in the event of a retrial.  The most obvious 
problem with that contention is that, inasmuch as there will not be a retrial, 
there can be no such prejudice.  Beyond that, however, we note that even if 
this case were remanded for another trial, that trial would no doubt take place 
within such time that the uncharged misconduct would still be well within the 
time periods that this Court has previously found as being not too remote.  Furthermore, the 
appellant has simply lumped together all of the uncharged misconduct evidence 
and has given no detailed analysis of particular facts or witnesses that likely 
would become problematic.  Bald assertions are not evidence.

 
 

[¶45]   The appellant next identifies the 
"oppressiveness of incarceration" as prejudice he has suffered as a result of 
the delay in this appeal.  That statement is contained in his appellate 
brief, which was, of course, written by counsel.  Unfortunately, there is simply nothing 
factual in the record to support the allegation.  Perhaps we can assume that all incarceration 
is oppressive, but we have not been shown how the appellant's incarceration in 
this situation is so oppressive as to violate his right to the due process of 
law.  
Furthermore, his jury conviction has been affirmed on appeal, meaning 
that he was not wrongly incarcerated during the delay.  See Daniel, 2003 WY 132, ¶ 49, 78 P.3d 
at 220 and Harris, 15 F.3d  at 1564-65.

 
 
[¶46]   We affirm.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1Ms. McCarthy is 
alternatively described in the parties' briefs as the appellant's "wife" or 
"girlfriend."  
The two were married in a religious ceremony, but did not obtain a civil 
marriage certificate.

  2Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474-79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

  3The fact of 
custody is determined under an objective standard to avoid the self-serving 
statements of the participants.  One fear is that officers might describe 
truly custodial situations as non-custodial.  That has not happened here, where the 
officers all agree the appellant was in custody.

4"Initiate" 
means "to cause or facilitate the beginning of: set going . . .."  Merriam-Webster's Ninth 
New Collegiate Dictionary 622 (9th ed. 1986).

  5Michael 
Concepcion testified that on April 
17, 1997, he overheard Ms. McCarthy tell the appellant, "this is the last time 
you'll hit me," and that he observed Ms. McCarthy to have a bloodied, swollen 
lip.  Michael 
McCarthy and Trisha McCarthy testified that the appellant physically assaulted 
Ms. McCarthy in Texas in 1995.  Cheryl McFarland 
testified that on April 9, 1999, the appellant physically assaulted Ms. McCarthy 
by "slapp[ing] her around," and that sometime in 1994 she overheard the 
appellant threaten to kill Ms. McCarthy if he ever "caught her with someone 
else."  Heather 
Frisby testified to a violent incident "three or four years ago."  Angel Wheeler 
testified that on Halloween of 1998, she witnessed the appellant drag Ms. 
McCarthy out of a bar.  Cynthia Burton testified that "three or four 
years ago" she witnessed the appellant shove and be physically abusive toward 
Ms. McCarthy.

  6Instruction No. 
25 stated:

 
 
Generally, evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
his character may not be used to prove that he acted in conformity with his 
trait or character on a particular occasion.  Likewise, evidence of prior wrongs or acts 
may not be used to show that a person has a particular character or that he 
acted in conformity with such character.

 
 
The Court has admitted the testimony of Jason Ujvary, 
William MacFarland, Cheryl MacFarland, Duanne Swanson, Trish MacFarland, Mike 
McCarthy, Mike Concepcion, Tanya Buss, Rob Frisby, Heather Frisby, Angel 
Wheeler, Cynthia Burton, and Amy Herman regarding prior wrongs or acts alleged 
to have been committed by the Defendant for the limited purpose of establishing 
motive, intent, preparation, plan or knowledge, and not at all to show that the 
Defendant acted in conformity with a particular character trait on any 
particular occasion.

 
 
You must not consider this evidence for any purpose except 
the limited purpose or purposes for which it was admitted as set forth in this 
instruction.

 
 

  7Coincidentally, 
nineteen photographs out of hundreds taken were admitted in Barnes, 858 P.2d  at 
527.

  8Amendments 5 
and 14 to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution.

  9The "notice" 
issue referred to in the quotation from Kenyon was Kenyon's allegation that the State did not 
give him notice that it would be seeking the penalty of life imprisonment 
without parole until just before sentencing.  That separate issue was not raised in this 
appeal.

  10Pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 6.01, this Court acquires jurisdiction over the appeal when the case is 
docketed, and docketing does not occur until the clerk of the district court 
certifies completion of the record.  A briefing schedule is determined after the 
case is docketed.

  11That 
assumption may go too far.  While we know that the appellate delay was 
occasioned by the court reporter's lateness in producing two minor transcripts, 
we do not know the reasons for that lateness.  Neutral reasons for delay are not weighted as 
heavily against the State as are deliberate attempts to delay, and innocent 
causes for delay may not factor against the State at all.  Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 36, 93 P.3d 222, 232 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 112-13 
(Wyo. 1992)).