Title: Architectural Stone, LLC v. Wolcott Center, LLC

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Kinser, Lemons and Agee, JJ., 
and Stephenson and Lacy∗, S.JJ. 
 
ARCHITECTURAL STONE, LLC, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 061797   SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
September 14, 2007 
WOLCOTT CENTER, LLC, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Jerome James, Judge 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether a district court's 
ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment pursuant to 
Code § 8.01-428 is an appealable order under Code § 16.1-106. 
I 
 
On October 20, 2005, the General District Court of the City 
of Norfolk, in an unlawful detainer action, granted a default 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs Wolcott Center, LLC, and Lana 
Wolcott (collectively, Wolcott) and against defendants 
Architectural Stone, LLC, and Tim Watson (collectively, 
Architectural Stone).  The judgment included a writ of 
possession of the subject property pursuant to Code § 8.01-128 
and monetary damages. 
 
On April 5, 2006, Architectural Stone filed in the general 
district court a motion to set aside the default judgment under 
Code § 8.01-428.  On April 14, 2006, the general district court 
                     
 
∗ Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on 
August 16, 2007. 
 
 
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denied the motion to set aside the default judgment.  
Thereafter, Architectural Stone filed a timely appeal to the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
 
Wolcott moved the circuit court to dismiss the appeal, 
arguing that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal because the general district court's ruling was not 
an appealable order.  The circuit court granted Wolcott's motion 
to dismiss, finding that it was without jurisdiction because the 
general district court's ruling on the motion to set aside the 
default judgment did not dispose of the merits of the unlawful 
detainer action. 
II 
 
The statutory law governing civil appeals to circuit courts 
from courts not of record is set forth in Code § 16.1-106, which 
states, in relevant part, the following: 
 
From any order entered or judgment rendered in a 
court not of record in a civil case in which the 
matter in controversy is of greater value than fifty 
dollars, exclusive of interest, any attorney's fees 
contracted for in the instrument, and costs, . . . 
there shall be an appeal of right, if taken within ten 
days after such order or judgment, to a court of 
record. 
 
We interpreted Code § 16.1-106 in Ragan v. Woodcroft 
Village Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 497 S.E.2d 740 (1998), upon 
facts similar to those in the present case.  In Ragan, a 
landlord brought an unlawful detainer action in a general 
 
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district court and obtained a judgment granting him possession 
of the subject property.  The tenant did not appeal the judgment 
to the circuit court.  Instead, the tenant filed a motion for a 
new trial, which the district court denied.  Id. at 324-25, 497 
S.E.2d at 741. 
 
The tenant then appealed the denial of the motion for a new 
trial to the circuit court.  The circuit court assumed, without 
deciding, that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but 
denied the motion for a new trial on the merits.  Id. at 325, 
497 S.E.2d at 741. 
 
On appeal, we said that the phrase, "any order," in Code 
§ 16.1-106 granted appellate jurisdiction to the circuit court 
only over final orders and that "[a] final order or judgment is 
one that disposes of the whole subject of the case and gives all 
relief contemplated."  Id. at 327, 497 S.E.2d at 743.  We held 
that the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial 
was not a final order or judgment because it did not dispose of 
the merits of the unlawful detainer action.  Rather, "the final 
judgment in the unlawful detainer proceeding was the judgment 
awarding [the landlord] possession of the leased premises."  Id. 
 
Architectural Stone seeks to distinguish the present case 
from Ragan.  First, it contends that the phrase, "any order 
entered," in Code § 16.1-106 includes the ruling by the general 
district court to deny the motion to set aside the default 
 
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judgment.  That ruling, according to Architectural Stone, was an 
appealable order from that court to the circuit court.  This 
same claim was made by the tenant in Ragan, and we rejected such 
a broad interpretation of the statute.  We said that "this 
language provides for an appeal only from final orders or 
judgments" and that "[a] final order or judgment is one that 
disposes of the whole subject of the case and gives all relief 
contemplated."  Id. at 327, 497 S.E.2d at 743. 
 
Second, Architectural Stone contends that an appeal of a 
ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment under Code 
§ 8.01-428 is distinct from an appeal of a ruling on a motion 
for a new trial under Code § 16.1-97.1.  Code § 8.01-428(A)  
provides, in part, the following: 
 
Upon motion of the plaintiff or judgment debtor 
and after reasonable notice to the opposite party, his 
attorney of record or other agent, the court may set 
aside a judgment by default or a decree pro confesso 
upon the following grounds:  (i) fraud on the court 
[or] (ii) a void judgment. 
Architectural Stone asserts that the issues of fraud on the 
court and void judgments are "independent and distinct from the 
underlying issues in the unlawful detainer action."  Continuing, 
Architectural Stone says that "[i]t is for this reason that a 
General District Court's ruling pursuant to a Code § 8.01-428 
[m]otion must be considered an appealable [o]rder."  We do not 
agree.  Only final orders and judgments are appealable, and we 
 
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reiterate that a final order in the present case is one that 
disposes of the merits of the unlawful detainer action. 
III 
 
In the present case, the general district court's denial of 
the motion to set aside the default judgment was not an order or 
judgment that disposed of the merits of the unlawful detainer 
action.  Rather, the order that disposed of the merits of the 
unlawful detainer action was the default judgment entered on 
October 20, 2005, and that judgment was not appealed. 
 
We hold, therefore, that the general district court's 
ruling to deny the motion to set aside the default judgment is 
not a final, appealable order or judgment.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the circuit court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of 
Architectural Stone's appeal from the general district court. 
Affirmed.