Title: Dellapenta v. Dellapenta

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dellapenta v. Dellapenta1992 WY 104838 P.2d 1153Case Number: 91-8Decided: 08/26/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Louis DELLAPENTA, as 
personal representative of Nicholas Dellapenta, deceased, and on behalf of Louis 
Dellapenta, as guardian and guardian ad litem for Bianca Dellapenta; and on 
behalf of Louis Dellapenta,

 Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Donetta 
DELLAPENTA,

 Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, TetonCounty, D. Terry Rogers, 
J.

Jeffrey A. 
Tennyson, Jackson, for appellant.

Robert W. Brown 
and Jeffrey J. Gonda of Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, for 
appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT,* and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at the 
time of oral argument.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      In this appeal we 
consider the issues of parent-child immunity in negligence actions and the 
admissibility of evidence of seat belt nonuse. Appellant Louis Dellapenta 
appeals the trial court's denial of his Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict or New Trial and Judgment on the Verdict as the result of a jury 
decision finding his wife, Donetta, not negligent in an automobile accident 
involving their children. Appellant initiated personal injury and wrongful death 
actions on behalf of himself, his deceased son and his daughter who survived the 
accident.

[¶2]      We hold that 
parental immunity is abrogated for injuries resulting from simple negligence in 
the operation of a motor vehicle and that parents have a duty to buckle the seat 
belts of their minor passengers. We reverse and remand the trial court's denial 
of admission of seat belt evidence for injuries sustained by Nicholas 
Dellapenta. We find substantial evidence to support the jury verdict and affirm 
the trial court's denials of a new trial motion, a jury instruction on the 
theory of res ipsa loquitur and admission of evidence of liability 
insurance.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant raises 
the following issues:

I. Is appellant entitled 
to a new trial where the jury's verdict is not supported by substantial 
evidence?

II. Did the district 
court commit a reversible error of law when it refused to allow appellant to 
introduce evidence of the appellee's failure to restrain her minor children with 
available seat belts?

III. Did the district 
court commit a reversible error of law when it refused to instruct the jury on 
the theory of res ipsa loquitur?

IV. Did the district 
court commit an error of law in refusing to allow the appellant to introduce 
evidence of the appellee's liability insurance coverage?

FACTS

[¶4]      On November 18, 
1987, Donetta Dellapenta traveled from Jackson, 
Wyoming, south through the Snake RiverCanyon on Highway 89 with her two minor 
children, Bianca and Nicholas. Mrs. Dellapenta encountered a patch of snow on a 
curved portion of the roadway and lost control of the vehicle. The automobile 
slid off the side of the road, rolled several times and came to rest on the bank 
of the Snake River. None of the occupants were 
wearing seat belts and all were ejected from the vehicle. Mrs. Dellapenta and 
Bianca were injured and Nicholas died of drowning and hypothermia.

[¶5]      Appellant, father 
of Bianca and Nicholas, brought suit on his own behalf and as personal 
representative and administrator of the estate of Nicholas Dellapenta and as 
guardian and guardian ad litem of the person and estate of Bianca Dellapenta. 
The estate of Nicholas claimed damages for the last illness, funeral and burial 
expenses. Bianca, through her guardian, claimed damages for loss of 
companionship, care, comfort, advice and society as well as pecuniary loss and 
emotional distress for the death of her brother, Nicholas. For her own injuries, 
Bianca claimed past and future medical expenses, pain and suffering, scarring, 
loss of enjoyment of life, emotional distress and disability and disfigurement. 
Appellant Louis Dellapenta claimed damages for loss of companionship, care, 
comfort, advice and society for the death of his son and the injuries to his 
daughter; pecuniary loss for his son's death; and emotional distress resulting 
from the death of Nicholas and injuries to Bianca.

DISCUSSION

[¶6]      Appellant's 
issues will be addressed out of sequence for discussion of this appeal. We have 
added to these issues a threshold question: May a child sue his or her parent 
for injuries or death resulting from negligence in the operation of a motor 
vehicle or failure to buckle the child in a seat belt? We begin with this query 
and discussion of appellant's seat belt issue and follow with the remaining 
issues raised by this appeal.

I. Parent-Child 
Immunity in Negligence Actions

[¶7]      This case 
presents a threshold question that was neither briefed by the parties to this 
appeal nor addressed by the trial court. That question is: May a child sue his 
or her parent for injuries or death resulting from negligence in the operation 
of a motor vehicle or failure to buckle the child in a seat belt? For the 
reasons that follow we must answer this question in the affirmative. We discuss 
first the issue of parental immunity to tort action in terms of automobile 
negligence and follow with our analysis of the seat belt issue.

[¶8]      Louis Dellapenta, 
on behalf of his daughter, deceased son and himself, sought damages for personal 
injury to Bianca and the wrongful death of Nicholas through his wife's acts of 
negligence. A jury found Mrs. Dellapenta not negligent in the vehicular 
accident.

[¶9]      The action 
brought by appellant against his wife for damages as a result of injury to 
Bianca and the death of Nicholas is an interspousal action in negligence. This 
court previously abrogated interspousal tort immunity in Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 1987). In that case a wife sued her 
husband in negligence for injuries resulting from an automobile accident. In our 
deliberations on the immunity issue, we considered the discussion of numerous 
cases abrogating interspousal immunity and found:

     The age-old 
contentions of invoked family disharmony and conjectural insurance fraud weigh 
no greater with this court than with a present significant majority of other 
jurisdictions where also rejected.

Tader, at 1068. 
Appellant's action against his wife falls squarely within Tader and is 
sustained.

[¶10]   The doctrine of parental immunity, 
prohibiting suits by children for personal injuries or death sustained as a 
result of their parent's tortious actions, was judicially created by the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi in Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). In 
order to promote family harmony by reinforcing continued guidance and control by 
parents and the child's "reciprocal obligation to aid, comfort and obey," the 
court prohibited a suit for false imprisonment by a minor child against his 
parent. Hewellette, 9 So.  at 887.

[¶11]   Additional arguments in support of 
parental immunity have developed since Hewellette. They include the effect on 
family finances, particularly upon other children in the family; interference 
with parental discipline; and the possibility of fraud and collusion where 
liability insurance exists. 1 J.D. Lee and Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law: 
Liability and Litigation § 18.01 (Rev. ed. 1988).

[¶12]   The doctrine has seen partial and 
total abrogation in recent years. 6 Marilyn Minzer et al., Damages in Tort 
Actions § 49.34[1] (1989). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G (1979) lends 
support for changes in the rule: "A parent or child is not immune from tort 
liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship." This break from 
insulation based on mere parental status alone has prompted total abrogation in 
some cases and a shift of focus to parental duty of care. Stamboulis v. 
Stamboulis, 401 Mass. 762, 519 N.E.2d 1299 (1988).

[¶13]   Many courts, while refusing to 
totally abrogate the doctrine, have carved out exceptions to the immunity rule. 
Suit may be brought upon the death of either child or parent on the theory that 
the family relationship has been dissolved. 1 J.D. Lee, supra, § 18.02. Parental 
acts of wanton or willful misconduct or those committed within the course of the 
parent's business have also been subject to suit. Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 
796 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Colo. 1990); Trevarton v. 
Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640, 642 
(1963); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971).

[¶14]   Parental negligence resulting in 
vehicular accidents has provided the greatest area for erosion of the doctrine 
in recent years. We are aware of at least thirty states that now recognize an 
action by an unemancipated minor against a parent for automobile negligence. 
Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671, 673 n. 1 (Tex. 1988).1 This type of tort elicits specific 
grounds for abrogation of the rule. Arguments to maintain immunity for the 
preservation of family harmony become specious when the child's injury itself is 
viewed as the most disruptive act. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109, 
111 (1980). Particularly in light of the widespread prevalence of liability 
insurance, the domestic tranquility argument rings hollow. Streenz v. Streenz, 
106 Ariz. 86, 
471 P.2d 282, 283, 41 A.L.R.3d 891 (1970). The action is more likely to ease the 
family's financial difficulties stemming from the child's injury through the 
infusion of insurance funds and thereby repair the family unit. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d  at 674. Abrogation in negligence cases is also reinforced by recognition 
that children's property and contract actions against parents often cause bitter 
family disputes but have never been subject to parental immunity. Streenz, 471 P.2d  at 283; Falco, 282 A.2d  at 353. The possibility of fraud and collusion in 
negligence claims is seen by some courts as insufficient to deny recovery to 
minor children as an entire class when recovery is permitted by all others. 
Elam, 268 S.E.2d  at 111; Jilani, 767 S.W.2d  at 674 (Mauzy, J., concurring). Any potential danger is seen to be within 
the power of the justice system to deal with and should not outweigh the benefit 
of compensation to the child. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G, comment 
c.

[¶15]   This court first addressed the 
issue of parental immunity in tort in Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 
(1954). There, a minor child brought suit in simple negligence against his 
father for injuries received when the plane his father was piloting crashed. The 
child, through his mother, did not allege willful or malicious conduct or that 
the tort was committed in the course of the father's business. This court 
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the child's action, remarking on its 
reluctance to "encourage actions as maintainable between children and their 
parents unless sanctioned by the statute law or where they disclose so clear an 
invasion of the rights of the child as tending to bring discord into the family 
and to disorganize its proper government." Ball, 73 Wyo. at 57, 269 P.2d  at 
314.

[¶16]   In Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 
(Wyo. 1971), a minor child's estate sued the father's estate alleging willful 
and wanton disregard as a result of the father's drunk driving which killed them 
both. Finding that the parent's conduct was not intentional, the trial court 
granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We reversed, holding 
that "it is possible that willful and wanton disregard of the wellbeing of a 
child, resulting in injury, could so invade his rights that discord and 
disorganization would result in the family unit." Oldman, at 101.

[¶17]   Now in Dellapenta we must decide if 
the negligence action brought on behalf of the Dellapenta children should be 
retained. We hold that the doctrine of parental immunity is abrogated in an 
action for ordinary negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle. In doing so, 
we apply the logic of Tader to the present case. However, two factors 
distinguish this decision from Tader, specifically, the influence of parental 
authority and discretion.

[¶18]   Some courts, electing not to 
completely abrogate the doctrine, have chosen instead to delineate areas where 
immunity would be maintained. The rule is invoked, "(1) where the negligent act 
relied on for a recovery involves the reasonable exercise of parental authority 
over the child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of 
ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision for the care and 
necessities of the child." Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. 1971). See also, 
Jilani, 767 S.W.2d  at 672; Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d  at 933; Goller v. White, 20 
Wis.2d 402, 413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963).

[¶19]   This approach follows the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G(2):

Repudiation of general 
tort immunity does not establish liability for an act or omission that, because 
of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not 
tortious.

[¶20]   The Felderhoff court reasoned that 
parental duties of providing for the care and necessities of children could be 
"seriously impaired and retarded if parents were to be held liable to lawsuits 
by their unemancipated minor children for unintentional errors or ordinary 
negligence occurring while in the discharge of such parental duties and 
responsibilities." Felderhoff, at 933.

[¶21]   The question now becomes whether 
driving an automobile may be deemed an act of parental authority or discretion 
and thus under the parental immunity umbrella. The Jilani court in considering 
this same issue stated:

The familial obligations 
and duties imposed by law and nature are quite different from the general 
obligation the law imposes upon every driver of an automobile. * * * The 
immunity is limited to transactions that are essentially parental. In the 
present action, the essence of the alleged negligence was the improper operation 
of a motor vehicle - an activity not essentially parental. In Schnieder v. Coe, 
405 A.2d 682 [684] (Del. 1979), the Supreme Court of Delaware 
reasoned:

     "Unlike driving an 
automobile, supervision of one's children involves issues of parental control, 
authority, and discretion that are uniquely matters of a very personal type of 
judgment. The freedom to exercise such judgment has constitutional underpinning 
and contrasts sharply with the state's supervision and regulation of the 
judgment one must exercise while driving an automobile."

Jilani, 767 S.W.2d  at 673.

[¶22]   We agree with the determination 
that operating a motor vehicle is not essentially a parental activity and hold 
that an action in automobile negligence by an unemancipated minor child against 
a parent will be recognized in Wyoming.

II. Evidence of Seat 
Belt Nonuse

[¶23]   We approach the issue of seat belt 
nonuse by considering two distinct sub-issues in our analysis: the role of 
parental immunity for failure to buckle children and the admissibility of seat 
belt nonuse.

A. Parental 
Immunity

[¶24]   A jury found Mrs. Dellapenta not 
negligent in the operation of her motor vehicle and, therefore, not 
negligent in causing the accident. Appellant appeals the trial court's 
denial of his motion to admit evidence of seat belt nonuse by the children of 
Mrs. Dellapenta, but makes no contention that failure to use seat belts was the 
proximate cause of the accident itself. The question now becomes whether failure 
to buckle the children's seat belts was a negligent act and the proximate cause 
of their injuries. These injuries are known as second collision or enhanced 
injuries that could possibly have been prevented by seat belt use. Waterson v. 
General Motors Corp., 111 N.J. 238, 544 A.2d 357, 364 (1988).

[¶25]   Statistics on the use and nonuse of 
seat belts or restraint systems in motor vehicle accidents have been well 
documented and recorded by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration of 
the United States Department of Transportation, and in Wyoming by the Accident 
Data Analysis Unit, Highway Safety Branch, Wyoming Transportation Department. 
The data compiled by these governmental agencies reflect the level of seat belt 
usage by motor vehicle occupants compared to the severity of injuries 
sustained.

[¶26]   In 1987, the year of the Dellapenta 
accident, Wyoming had a total of 11,715 traffic accidents involving motor 
vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles and pedestrians, resulting in 111 fatal 
accidents and 129 deaths, 3,068 injury accidents and 8,536 in which only 
property damage occurred.2 Wyoming's Comprehensive Report on Traffic 
Accidents 1987, Accident Data Management Section, Wyoming Highway Department at 
1. In the fatal accident category, 119 persons were fatally injured in motor 
vehicle accidents where safety restraint equipment was available, but not in use 
by 86 persons who died; 64 persons involved in a fatal accident where a death 
occurred experienced incapacitating injuries of whom 49 were not using 
restraints. Id. at 38, 39. In the injury accident 
category, 915 persons reported receiving incapacitating injuries of whom 662 
were not using available restraint equipment. Id. at 41. Statistics on ejection of the 
vehicle occupant compared to injury severity show that of the 119 persons 
fatally injured, 68 were either totally or partially ejected; of 4,034 receiving 
non-fatal injuries, 3,712 were not ejected. Id. at 45.

[¶27]   National statistics for that same 
year show that 63,726 persons were involved in motor vehicle accidents across 
the country; 17,821 used a passenger restraint system, 35,799 used no restraint, 
and for 10,106 use of restraints could not be determined. Of those restrained at 
the time of the accident, 4,500 were fatally injured compared with 17,189 who 
died sitting on their seat belts; 3,220 received incapacitating injuries though 
wearing seat belts and 8,511 received the same type of injuries while not 
wearing seat belts. Fatal Accident Reporting System 1987, National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 
ch. 2 at 21. Of 17,821 people known to have used restraint systems, only 191 
were totally or partially ejected from the vehicle. Id. at 26.

[¶28]   The statistics available for 1990 
in Wyoming 
evidence less death and injury among vehicle occupants using safety devices.3 Wyoming state accident statistics are 
supported by similar data at the national level.4

[¶29]   It is within this court's 
prerogative to take judicial notice of the official reports of state agencies. 
Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 322 n. 16, cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (Wyo. 1980); Sweetwater Co. Plan. Com. for Org. of Sch. Dists. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Wyo. 1971). In light of available national and 
state statistics, both automobile collisions and second collisions are 
foreseeable. Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 453 (Fla. 
1984); Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201, (Fla. 1976); Lowe v. Estate 
Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706, 715 (1987). Definite and substantial 
evidence exists to support the effectiveness of seat belts in preventing death 
and reducing injuries. Wyoming's Comprehensive Report on Traffic 
Accidents 1990, supra; A Decade of Progress, Transportation Fatalities 1989, 
supra. In Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164, 169, 
80 A.L.R.3d 1025 (1974), the court stated that studies of seat belt use showed 
great reduction in the "likelihood of ejection and [use] frequently prevents 
`the second collision' of the occupant with the interior of the 
vehicle."

[¶30]   Mrs. Dellapenta admitted through 
her answer to the initial complaint that she owed a duty to her children to "act 
in a manner which did not amount to negligence." We find sound public policy in 
light of the fore mentioned statistics to impose on parents a duty to buckle the 
seat belts of their minor passengers who are dependent on adult care and 
supervision for their well being and safety.

[¶31]   Negligence as defined by this court 
is "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another 
person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance, which the circumstances 
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 73 (Wyo. 1978) (citing Hildebrand v. 
Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 44 Wyo. 488, 13 P.2d 1081, (1932)). This court 
has recognized that the "duty of exercising care to protect another person 
against injury may either have existed at common law or be imposed by statute." 
Culver v. Sekulich, 80 Wyo. 437, 344 P.2d 146, 156 
(1959).

[¶32]   Wyoming enacted Wyo. Stat. § 
31-5-1402 on June 8, 1989, which requires the use of seat belts by the driver 
and front seat passenger of a passenger vehicle and also prohibits in a civil 
action the admissibility of evidence of failure to wear a seat belt. The 
accident here in question occurred in November, 1987 before the enactment of 
Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-1402. It is well settled that retroactive application of 
statutes is not favored and will not occur absent clear legislative intent. 
Wyoming Refining Co. v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647, 
650 (Wyo. 1985); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908, 914 (Wyo. 1977); Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 400 P.2d 529, 530 (1965). Finding no statute in place at the time of the accident to 
require seat belt use, and in light of the foregoing public policy discussion, 
we hold, as did a Wisconsin court, "there is a 
duty, based on the common law standard of ordinary care, to use available seat 
belts independent of any statutory mandate." Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis.2d 362, 
149 N.W.2d 626, 639 (1967).

[¶33]   We now consider whether failure to 
buckle a child's seat belt is an exercise of parental authority or discretion 
falling within the exceptions to parental immunity abrogation. In doing so, we 
weigh competing policies: the duty of parents to buckle the seat belts of their 
minor passengers in light of state and national statistics confirming the often 
dire results for failure to do so and the interest in preserving parental 
authority and discretion to raise the child as the parents see fit.

[¶34]   Numerous courts considering 
parental immunity have reviewed a variety of factual situations to determine if 
particular circumstances fell within the broad exceptions. Reviewed mainly under 
the guise of parental supervision and frequently involving third-party claims 
for contribution, decisions reached have been varied. Wright v. Wright, 134 
Mich. App. 800, 351 N.W.2d 868 (1984), father's act of leaving loaded revolver 
where child could find it and child shot herself found to be within exception; 
Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis.2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968), where child was struck 
by motor vehicle upon exiting from bus, parental immunity barred third-party 
claim against parents' failure to instruct child to safely cross highway; Miller 
v. Leljedal, 71 Pa. Commw. 372, 455 A.2d 256 (1983), where third-party 
counterclaim permitted against parent on theory of negligent supervision of 
child struck by defendant's car. See also 6 Minzer, supra, § 49.34[2][b] n. 
3.

[¶35]   In determining whether an action 
for negligent supervision was barred by parental immunity, a New Jersey court 
stated:

     There are certain 
areas of activities within the family sphere involving parental discipline, care 
and control that should and must remain free from judicial intrusion. Parents 
should be free to determine how the physical, moral, emotional, and intellectual 
growth of their children can best be promoted. That is both their duty and their 
privilege. Indeed, every parent has a unique philosophy of the rearing of 
children. That philosophy is an outgrowth of the parent's own economic, 
educational, cultural, ethical, and religious background, all of which affect 
the parent's judgment on how his or her children should be prepared for the 
responsibilities of adulthood. Such philosophical considerations come directly 
to the fore in matters of parental supervision.

Foldi v. 
Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 461 A.2d 1145, 1152 (1983). Though finding parental 
immunity a bar to an action based on the parent's simple negligent supervision 
that permitted a young child to wander away from her mother and be bit by a 
neighbor's dog, the Foldi court noted that situations that may invoke the 
parental immunity exceptions are many and varied and should be decided on a case 
by case basis. Foldi, at 1152.

[¶36]   Though recognizing that the 
exercise of parental authority and discretion must be afforded some latitude, we 
cannot license the disregard of known life-saving precautions through the 
failure to restrain children with seat belts by encompassing this dereliction as 
an exception to the abrogation of parental immunity.

[¶37]   Though we have defined the duty as 
a matter of law and determined that the exceptions to parental immunity 
abrogation do not apply, it is a question of fact for the jury to determine if 
the breach of the duty was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1283 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶38]   "The duty or standard of care 
required of one to avoid risk of injury to another is that which is required of 
a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances." Ely v. Kirk, 707 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1985) (citing Cervelli v. 
Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Wyo. 1983)). The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
in considering reasonableness states:

Where an act is one which 
a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm to another, the 
risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude 
as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the 
particular manner in which it is done.

Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 291 (1965). "[S]uch conduct may be found to be unreasonable 
if the magnitude of the risk of harm created * * * is greater than the burden of 
adequate precautions or the utility of the conduct in question." Lowe, 410 N.W.2d  at 715 (citing United 
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 
(2d Cir. 1947)).

[¶39]   This standard of care or conduct is 
determined by using a risk-benefit analysis to balance "the risk, in the light 
of the social value of the interest threatened, and the probability and extent 
of the harm, against the value of the interest which the actor is seeking to 
protect, and the expedience of the course pursued." W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 42, at 173 (5th ed. 1984). This theory 
was made well-known through Judge Learned Hand's decision in Carroll Towing Co. 
Whether nonuse of seat belts amounts to failure to exercise reasonable care 
depends on the particular circumstances of the case. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d  at 
454. The risk-benefit analysis becomes the province of the jury to apply to the 
facts surrounding the resulting injuries in determining the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of Mrs. Dellapenta's failure to buckle her children's seat 
belts.

B. 
Admissibility

[¶40]   Nonuse of available seat belts has 
been allowed as a defense to actions in products liability and comparative or 
contributory negligence by permitting juries to mitigate damages by determining 
the percentage of injury sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the second 
collision. 7 American Law of Products Liability § 95:11, at 21 (Wayne F. Foster 
et al. eds., 3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991); Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 
1199 (Alaska 
1986); Lowe, 410 N.W.2d  at 713; Waterson, 544 A.2d  at 364, 365. The propriety of 
the application of the seat belt defense in negligence actions has been 
discussed extensively. See e.g., Terri Stein, Note, The Seat Belt Issue: 
Judicial Disregard for Legislative Action, 4 Alaska L.Rev. 387 (1987); David A. Westenberg, 
Buckle Up or Pay: The Emerging Safety Belt Defense, 20 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 868 
(1986); Michelle R. Mangrum, Note, The Seat Belt Defense: Must a Reasonable Man 
Wear a Seat Belt?, 50 Mo. L.Rev. 968 (1985); Michael B. Gallub, Note, A 
Compromise Between Mitigation and Comparative Fault?: A Critical Assessment of 
the Seat Belt Controversy and a Proposal for Reform, 14 Hofstra L.Rev. 319 
(1986); Robert M. Ackerman, The Seat Belt Defense Reconsidered: A Return to 
Accountability in Tort Law?, 16 N.M.L.Rev. 221 (1986).

[¶41]   Only one prior case has presented 
this court with a seat belt evidence issue; lacking an offer of proof at the 
trial court level, we declined to give it consideration. Chrysler Corp. v. 
Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1135 (1978). In the case at bar, we have a single 
vehicle rollover; this is a simple negligence case and does not involve the 
application of Wyoming's comparative negligence statute. 
Wyo. Stat. § 
1-1-109 (1988). Therefore, we decline to discuss the "seat belt defense" as 
such. Though appellant presents this question of admissibility as an evidentiary 
issue, our analysis of this claim will place it in the light of a second 
negligence claim or action against Mrs. Dellapenta. We will not apply the 
Wyoming 
statute retroactively to prohibit the introduction of seat belt evidence in this 
case since the failure to use the seat belts occurred before the current 
statute. Wyo. 
Stat. § 31-5-1402. See, Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 745 F. Supp. 288, 294 
(E.D.Pa., 1990) (where court applying Pennsylvania law refused to apply statute 
prohibiting the introduction of seat belt evidence retroactively where doing so 
would alter the substantive rights of the litigants).

[¶42]   On the issue of trial admissibility 
of evidence of seat belt nonuse, the Pasakarnis court stated that:

[T]he failure to expend 
the minimal effort required to fasten an available safety device which has been 
put there specifically in order to reduce or avoid injuries from a subsequent 
accident is, on the very face of the matter, obviously pertinent and thus should 
be deemed admissible in an action for damages, part of which would not have been 
sustained if the seat belt had been used.

Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d  at 453 (quoting Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Pasakarnis, 425 So. 2d 1141, 
1143 (Fla.App. 1982) (Schwartz, J., dissenting)).

[¶43]   Courts allowing evidence of seat 
belt nonuse have required that competent evidence be presented to establish a 
causal relationship between nonuse and plaintiff's injuries before the issue may 
be submitted to the jury. Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 142, 755 P.2d 1130, 1132, 1134 (1986); Wemyss v. 
Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 178 (Ky. 1987); Dunn v. Durso, 219 N.J. Super. 383, 
530 A.2d 387, 389, 390 (1986). More specifically, a Wisconsin court stated:

     We therefore conclude 
that, in those cases where seat belts are available and there is evidence before 
the jury indicating causal relationship between the injuries sustained and the 
failure to use seat belts, it is proper and necessary to instruct the jury in 
that regard.

* * * * * *

In the absence of 
credible evidence by one qualified to express the opinion of how the use or 
nonuse of seat belts would have affected the particular injuries, it is improper 
for the court to permit the jury to speculate on the effect that seat belts 
would have had.

Bentzler, 149 N.W.2d  at 640, 641.

[¶44]   We agree with those courts that 
would allow the introduction of evidence of seat belt nonuse where an offer of 
proof is made to show a causal relationship between nonuse and injuries to the 
occupant. In this case such an offer was made through the testimony of Officer 
Schofield, a fifteen year veteran of the Wyoming Highway Patrol trained in 
accident investigation with experience in investigating over 700 accidents. 
Officer Schofield testified that Nicholas died from drowning and hypothermia as 
a result of being ejected from the vehicle. The Wyoming Rules of Evidence 
provide through Rule 402 for the admission of relevant evidence. Rule 401 
defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Officer 
Schofield's testimony is relevant evidence under Wyo.R.Evid. 402 and provides a 
causal relationship between nonuse of the seat belt and Nicholas' 
injuries.

[¶45]   However, the record is void of any 
offer of proof made on behalf of the injuries incurred to Bianca. We hold that 
the trial court erred only in denying admission of evidence of nonuse of seat 
belts by Nicholas and find no error in the trial court's denial of seat belt 
evidence for Bianca.

III. 
Substantial Evidence

[¶46]   Appellant filed a Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial under Wyo.R.Civ.P. 50(b) and 
59. Appellant appeals the denial of the new trial motion, arguing that the jury 
verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence. Our standard of review for 
determining whether substantial evidence exists to support a jury verdict 
requires us to assume that the evidence of the prevailing party is true. We give 
this evidence every favorable inference and leave out of consideration any 
conflicting evidence of the other party. Rivermeadows, Inc. v. Zwaanshoek 
Holding, 761 P.2d 662, 665 (Wyo. 1988) (citing 
Crown Cork & Seal v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 
(Wyo. 1982)). 
The trial court's findings are presumed to be correct and will not be disturbed 
absent a showing that they are clearly erroneous, inconsistent, or contrary to 
the great weight of the evidence. Western Utility Contractors v. City of 
Casper, 731 P.2d 24, 28 (1986).

[¶47]   In this case, substantial evidence 
was presented for the jury to determine that Mrs. Dellapenta was not negligent 
in the operation of her vehicle. Appellee's expert in accident reconstruction 
testified that had Mrs. Dellapenta been inattentive she would have lost control 
of her vehicle sooner on the snow packed curve of the roadway. In his opinion, 
she lost control after traveling 546 feet on the snow pack because of a change 
in the road conditions at that point. Based on review of photographs taken at 
the scene, the accident investigation report, and the statement given by 
appellee, this expert testified that Mrs. Dellapenta used reasonable care, was 
not negligent, and that this was an accident without fault. Additional evidence 
revealed dry and favorable conditions leading up to the patch of ice and no 
warning signs marking the icy area. Mrs. Dellapenta was estimated to be 
traveling below the speed limit at 50 miles per hour or less and was 
decelerating throughout the accident. She had not completely locked her brakes 
and was steering to regain control of the vehicle.

[¶48]   Absent an abuse of discretion, this 
court will not overturn the trial court's decision to deny a new trial motion. 
Our standard of review has been:

Trial courts have always 
been clothed with a large discretion in the matter of granting a new trial, and 
their action will not be disturbed in the appellate court unless that court can 
clearly and conclusively say that there was an abuse of that 
discretion.

Cody v. Atkins, 
658 P.2d 59, 64 (Wyo. 1983) (citing Brasel and Sims Constr. Co. v. Neuman 
Transit Co., 378 P.2d 501, 503 (1963), quoting Elliott v. Sloan, 38 Wyo. 276, 
266 P. 1059, 1061 (1928)).

[¶49]   Appellee presented sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's finding of no negligence. The district court, in 
its discretion, denied the new trial motion and upheld the jury verdict. We find 
sufficient evidence to uphold the trial court's decision and appellant presents 
no other arguments to sustain his claim of abuse of discretion.

IV. Res Ipsa 
Loquiter

[¶50]   Appellant next contends error in 
the trial court's refusal to give an instruction to the jury on res ipsa 
loquitur. Our rule governs objections to jury instructions and states in 
pertinent part:

No party may assign as 
error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter 
to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.

Wyo.R.Civ.P. 
51.

[¶51]   Though appellant's counsel objected 
at the instruction conference to the court's refusal to give several of 
appellant's proposed instructions, no objection was made on the record for the 
refusal of the res ipsa loquitur 
instruction. Appellant argues that he has met the "spirit and purpose" of Rule 
51 by objecting to the court's refusal to give the instruction in a post-trial 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for JNOV or New Trial. Appellant contends that 
the trial court's response to that motion indicating that the issue had been 
previously ruled on demonstrated awareness by the trial court of appellant's 
purpose for the instruction and presented an opportunity for the court to make 
corrections prior to submission to the jury. Alternatively, lacking a finding of 
formal objection to the instruction, appellant argues that this court should 
apply a plain error standard of review under Wyo.R.App.P. 7.05.

[¶52]   This court's previous application 
of Wyo.R.Civ.P. 51 permits us to consider only properly raised objections to 
jury instructions. Triton Coal Co. v. Mobil Coal Producing, 800 P.2d 505, 510 
(Wyo. 1990); Bigley v. Craven, 769 P.2d 892, 
898 (Wyo. 
1989). We do not find appellant's notation of error in a post-trial motion or 
the trial court's response to that motion sufficient to constitute a proper 
objection under Rule 51. In Triton, where counsel failed to object on the record 
to the giving of an instruction, we stated the following, which is equally 
appropriate here:

Triton had the 
opportunity and the obligation to make its objections to undesirable or 
unfavorable or improper jury instructions, on the record, during the formal jury 
instruction conference prior to submission of the instructions to the jury. It 
did not do so. The burden for that failure is properly placed upon the party at 
trial. We refuse to shift that burden to the trial judge and, furthermore, we do 
not perceive it as our role to assume that burden.

Triton, at 510 
(citing Cullen v. State, 565 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 1977)).

[¶53]   It is clear here, as in Triton, 
appellant had opportunity and obligation to object on the record at the 
instruction conference to the failure to give the res ipsa loquitur instruction. 
It is apparent that no such objection was made and we look now to the contention 
that the plain error standard should be applied. The rule states: "Plain errors 
or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not 
brought to the attention of the court." Wyo.R.App.P. 7.05.

[¶54]   This court has applied the plain 
error rule infrequently where a proper objection to a jury instruction has not 
been found. Triton, 800 P.2d  at 511. Four factors are considered before the 
plain error doctrine will be applied:

(1) that the record 
reflects clear and unequivocally the fact complained of; (2) that the facts 
prove a transgression of a clear rule of law; (3) that the error affects a 
substantial right of the accused; and (4) that the defendant has been materially 
prejudiced by that violation.

Triton, at 511 
(citing Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Wyo. 1985)).

[¶55]   This court has stated the theory of 
res ipsa loquitur as such:

The doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is predicated upon plaintiff's inability to specify the act of 
negligence which caused his injury; he is therefore permitted to rely on the 
doctrine as a substitute for specific proof.

* * * * * *

[I]f the circumstances do 
not show or suggest that defendant should have superior knowledge, or if the 
plaintiff himself possesses equal or superior means of explaining the 
occurrence, the rule may not properly be invoked.

Goedert v. 
Newcastle Equipment Co., 802 P.2d 157, 160 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Hall v. Cody Gas Co., 477 P.2d 585, 
586 (Wyo. 
1970)).

[¶56]   Applying the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur to this case would permit appellant to substitute an inference 
of negligence for direct evidence of Mrs. Dellapenta's negligence. Goedert, 802 P.2d  at 158. Yet appellant argued at trial and continues to argue on appeal that 
specific acts by Mrs. Dellapenta constituted negligence. Evidence of 
inattentiveness, excessive speed, and loss of control through driver error are 
presented as proof of her negligent driving. 

[¶57]   Operation of the doctrine would 
imply negligence by Mrs. Dellapenta as a "more probable cause of injury in the 
absence of other as-plausible explanations by witnesses found credible." 
Toussant v. Guice, 414 So. 2d 850, 853 (La. App. 1982). But, if "an inference that the 
accident was due to a cause other than defendant's negligence could be drawn as 
reasonably as one that it was due to his negligence" then the doctrine cannot be 
applied. Toussant, at 854.

[¶58]   We have held that automobile 
accidents may happen without negligence of the parties. Cody, 658 P.2d  at 62. 
The mere occurrence of an accident does not alone indicate that negligence must 
have been a factor. It is just as plausible to conclude that a change in road 
conditions occurred at the point where Mrs. Dellapenta lost control and, as a 
result, this accident occurred without fault.

[¶59]   Since specific evidence of 
presumably negligent acts was presented, and equal evidence exists to imply that 
Mrs. Dellapenta's acts were not negligent, appellant is not entitled to a res ipsa loquitur instruction. The 
doctrine does not apply to these facts, and appellant cannot show transgression 
of a clear rule of law under the plain error standard. Therefore, appellant's 
claim must fail.

V. Liability 
Insurance

[¶60]   Appellant's motion to admit 
evidence of Mrs. Dellapenta's liability insurance was denied. Appellant argues 
that, in this particular instance, evidence of liability insurance should have 
been admitted to inform the jury of a real party in interest, the insurance 
company.

[¶61]   The admission of liability 
insurance evidence is governed by Wyo.R.Evid. 411:

Evidence that a person 
was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue 
whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require 
the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for 
another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or 
prejudice of a witness.

[¶62]   Appellant argues that the 
exclusions under the rule are not exclusive and should include the situation in 
this case involving an inter-family tort. We reject this notion. It is apparent 
that the introduction of liability insurance in this case would not satisfy the 
recognized exclusions of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of 
a witness. It is also clear from our past decisions that liability insurance 
evidence is not admissible on the issue of negligence. Carlson v. BMW Indus. 
Service, Inc., 744 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Wyo. 1987). The insurance carrier is not a 
party to this action and "the interests of defendant and insurer are in no way 
relevant to a determination of issues of fact by the jury." Miller v. City of 
Lander, 453 P.2d 889, 892 (1969). We find no support to expand the exclusions under Wyo.R.Evid. 
411 to make exception for the admission of liability insurance evidence in an 
inter-family negligence action.

CONCLUSION

[¶63]   Parental immunity does not prohibit 
a child from suing a parent for injuries or death resulting from simple 
automobile negligence in the state of Wyoming. We hold that parents have a duty to 
buckle the seat belts of their minor passengers and that failure to do so cannot 
be considered an act of parental authority or discretion and is, therefore, an 
exception to parental immunity. This case is remanded to the trial court to 
allow evidence of seat belt nonuse by Nicholas Dellapenta to be submitted to the 
jury where a causal connection exists between nonuse and the injuries 
sustained.

[¶64]   We find substantial evidence to 
support the jury verdict and affirm the trial court's denial of a new trial 
motion. Appellant is not entitled to a res ipsa loquitur instruction, and 
no error was committed as a result of the trial court's denial of this 
instruction or admission of liability insurance.

[¶65]   We remand this case to the trial 
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

THOMAS and 
CARDINE, 
JJ., filed dissenting opinions.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶66]   I must dissent from the opinion of 
the Court in this case. I find that I agree with much of what Justice Cardine 
has written, but I am not clear as to why he concurred in the result. I cannot 
agree to concur in the result. My position is that before the Court seizes upon 
a case to change a policy position, such as the doctrine of parental immunity, 
it should have a case in which liability would be clear absent that doctrine. In 
this instance, a new theory of liability is adopted for parents, which then 
serves as the vehicle for abolition of the doctrine of parental immunity. 
Furthermore, I am not satisfied that the theory of liability should accuse only 
the parent who was driving at the time of the tragic accident. If children are 
to be required to wear seat belts, both parents must share the responsibility 
for that failure.

[¶67]   I confess that I have sincere 
reservations about the abolition of the doctrine of parental immunity, even as 
the rule has been limited by the majority. While the tent may be large enough to 
accommodate this intrusion, I am not satisfied that the tent will be large 
enough to suit the entire camel. Many of what I have come to regard as frivolous 
lawsuits founded upon a theory of negligent parenting depend absolutely upon the 
abolition of the doctrine of parental immunity, and that abolition commenced in 
some fashion that was perceived as innocuous.

[¶68]   In any event, if the abolition is 
to be accomplished it should not occur upon a fulcrum of a creative theory of 
liability. As Justice Cardine notes, this jurisdiction has not yet agreed that 
the failure of a plaintiff to wear a seat belt can be invoked by a defendant as 
a theory to limit or avoid the recovery of damages. Yet, the Court here has 
decided that the failure to require the wearing of seat belts can serve as a 
ground for liability. While I do not agree with this application of 
jurisprudence, I am satisfied that the theory of liability is the primary issue 
in the case, and only after that question is resolved is there any justification 
for considering the abolition of the doctrine of parental immunity.

[¶69]   I understand that the facts of this 
case are not controlled by Wyo. Stat. § 31-5-1402 (1991) because the tragic 
accident antedated the adoption of the statute. I note, however, that the rule 
adopted by the Court is antithetical to the statute, particularly subsection 
(f), which provides:

     (f) Evidence of a 
person's failure to wear a safety belt as required by this act shall not be 
admissible in any civil action.

Indeed, this 
statute seems to confirm the absence of the seat belt defense in Wyoming, and hardly seems 
consistent with a theory of liability that depends upon requiring children to 
wear seat belts. I even wonder what the reaction of the Court would be to a 
statute that created a classification of only parents and children if a 
constitutional attack were made upon such a statute. Yet the judicial 
classification is accomplished without comment as to the duties of adults other 
than parents.

[¶70]   Finally, I believe that Justice 
Cardine makes a telling point when he discusses the difficulties in implementing 
the Court's rule. I would find it hard to believe that this was the first time 
the Dellapenta children had ridden in a vehicle without wearing seat belts. The 
Court is demanding a life style adjustment for Wyoming families. If the rule is to be 
satisfied, parents must inculcate in their children, from the time they are 
infants, the demand that seat belts be worn at all times. This must be a shared 
parental responsibility, and it is not just that it be assigned only to the 
parent who happens to be driving the vehicle when the accident happens. The 
father should also be a party defendant in this case, instead of simply 
representing his interests and those of the children against the mother. 
Marriages have a difficult time surviving a tragedy such as this without the 
judicial branch of government creating another reason for separation of the 
interests of the parents.

[¶71]   Requiring both parents to be 
defendants would not diminish the policy argument of family harmony that has 
been a traditional argument in favor of parental immunity. It might make more 
clear, however, that the real thrust of the rule is to find a funding source for 
expenses rather than simply an insistence upon enhancing the safety of 
Wyoming 
children.

[¶72]   I cannot subscribe to the creation 
of a novel theory of liability that is contrary to Wyoming legislative 
policy to set aside a traditional doctrine of parental immunity. I dissent from 
the decision of the Court in this case.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶73]   A wise and old judge of a court of 
limited jurisdiction in one of our sparsely populated rural communities was once 
asked, "Do judges make law?" His response was: "Of course they do, I made some 
myself today." And so today our court assumes a position of extreme judicial 
activism in derogation of constitutional powers given to 90 elected legislators 
by enacting for the people of the state of Wyoming, retroactively, a seat belt 
law.

[¶74]   Bad cases make bad law. Sadly, this 
is one of those bad cases. It is a case in which members of this court cannot 
accept a jury finding of no negligence, thus denying recovery for the death of 
this minor child. But, instead of confronting the issue honestly and 
forthrightly, by reversing the judgment as not supported by the evidence and 
granting a new trial in accordance with W.R.C.P. 50(d), which 
provides:

If the appellate court 
reverses the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that 
the appellee is entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to 
determine whether a new trial shall be granted[,]

the court 
legislates for Wyoming a seat belt law that the 
Wyoming 
legislature has consistently refused to adopt, although lobbied heavily in every 
session. Finally on March 14, 1989, the legislature adopted our present seat 
belt law, W.S. 31-5-1402, which provides:

     (a) Each driver and 
front seat passenger of a passenger vehicle operated in this state shall wear, 
and each driver of a passenger car shall require that a front seat passenger 
shall wear, a properly adjusted and fastened safety belt when the passenger 
vehicle is in motion on public streets and highways.

     (b) Subsection (a) of 
this section does not apply to:

     (i) Any person who has 
a written statement from a physician that it is not advisable for the person to 
wear a safety belt for physical or medical reasons;

     (ii) Any passenger 
vehicle which is not required to be equipped with safety belts under federal 
law;

     (iii) A carrier of the 
United 
States postal service performing duties as a 
postal carrier;

     (iv) Any person 
properly secured in a child safety restraint system in accordance with W.S. 
31-5-1301 through 31-5-1305; or

     (v) Any person 
occupying the front seat in a vehicle in which all operable safety restraints 
are being used by the driver or passengers.

     (c) No violation of 
this section shall:

     (i) Be counted as a 
moving violation for the purpose of suspending a driver's license under W.S. 
31-7-129;

     (ii) Be grounds for 
increasing insurance premiums or made a part of the abstracts kept by the 
department pursuant to W.S. 31-5-1214.

     (d) No motor vehicle 
shall be halted for and no driver or passenger shall be cited for a violation of 
this section.

     (e) All citations for 
violations of the motor vehicle laws of this state and for violations of traffic 
ordinances or traffic regulations of a local authority shall contain a notation 
by the issuing officer indicating whether the licensee complied with this 
section. Compliance with this section shall entitle a licensee to a five dollar 
($5.00) reduction in the fine otherwise imposed by any court having jurisdiction 
over the alleged offense.

     (f) Evidence of a 
person's failure to wear a safety belt as required by this act shall not be 
admissible in any civil action.

Approved March 
14, 1989, effective June 8, 1989; amended February 15, 1991, effective July 1, 
1991.

[¶75]   The legislation adopted 
demonstrates the detail necessary to know what is required for compliance and is 
illustrative of the problems created by court meddling in an area of this kind 
which more properly is suited to legislative consideration. The court goes 
outside the record and recites in detail all of the statistics which they claim 
support the benefits that accrue from wearing seat belts. All of those 
statistics and more were presented over and over again to legislative committees 
and to legislators during hearings on the seat belt question. For me, it is 
entirely inappropriate that this court, without the power or authority to take 
evidence, conduct hearings, assemble data and statistics, and enact legislation, 
undertakes this kind of judicial activism.

[¶76]   We have not previously recognized a 
duty that would require the wearing of seat belts. In Chrysler Corp. v. 
Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978), the trial court sustained an 
objection to the admission of evidence of failure to wear seat belts, and that 
was affirmed on appeal. I have a problem with what purports to be the new law 
now enacted for the people of the state of Wyoming. As stated in the court's opinion, it 
is this:

We find sound public 
policy in light of the fore mentioned statistics to impose on parents a duty to 
buckle the seat belts of their minor passengers who are dependent on adult care 
and supervision for their well being and safety.

Maj. op. at 
1160. And why will this now be the rule of law? As said in McCullough v. Golden 
Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 865 (Wyo. 1990) (Golden, J., 
dissenting):

"This 
`it-is-so-because-we-say-so' jurisprudence constitutes nothing other than an 
attempted exercise of brute force; reason, much less persuasion, has no 
place."

(quoting from 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 552, 
109 S. Ct. 3040, 3075, 106 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)).

[¶77]   The purported new rule finds a duty 
never before articulated by any other court. Added to that is that the purported 
duty, in many cases, may be almost impossible with which to comply. Who will 
agree that a four- or five-year-old child can be strapped in a seat belt for a 
three-to-five hour trip across country on a family vacation? Children are so 
full of energy that is impossible that they sit strapped to a seat for any 
substantial period of time. And what of the fifteen year old who unbuckles his 
seat belt 40 miles from any city or town? Does the parent beat him or put him 
out of the car to walk to the next town if he refuses? If he does neither, is he 
negligent for continuing the trip? Or, must he just helplessly sit in his car? 
How can one know what course of action should be chosen?

[¶78]   There is a flip side to the rule 
now adopted. Failure to wear a seat belt has generally been called the "seat 
belt defense." The defense (contributory negligence) is asserted against the 
injured persons seeking to recover damages for personal injuries. Traditionally 
failure to wear seat belts could defeat a claim of damage for personal injury. 
If it is thought that the recently enacted statute prevents that result, think 
again about the propensity of this court for declaring legislative enactments 
unconstitutional. See e.g., Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988) (holding unconstitutional the Wyoming Medical 
Review Panel Act); Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1992) (

[¶79]   Nos. 89-193 and -195, published 
July 20, 1992) (Mills II) (holding unconstitutional a worker's compensation 
statute which granted immunity from suits by coemployees to employees who acted 
within the scope of their employment); Johnson v. State of Wyoming Hearing 
Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1992) (holding unconstitutional a statute 
which provided for driver's license suspension for persons under 19 after 
conviction of any alcohol-related offense). Once declared unconstitutional, the 
seat belt defense will again be in effect.

[¶80]   Cases cited for support of this 
newly discovered and claimed always-existing rule in Wyoming involve leaving a 
loaded revolver where a child could find it, a child exiting a vehicle 
unsupervised and injured, and a child crossing a street. I seriously question 
that these cases support the far-out duty of a parent to force a minor to be 
seat belted at all times while in the vehicle being driven.

[¶81]   I have no doubt that seat belts 
save lives. But are we, as judges, constitutionally vested with the power and 
authority to adopt this kind of vague, incomprehensible legislation? We know we 
are not, and we do a disservice to separation of powers and the orderly, 
efficient functioning of our form of government when we do. I would prefer to 
face head on what we perceive as an incorrect and unjust verdict by a jury. The 
jury system is not perfect, although it is right most of the time. We have the 
power and duty to supervise the jury and correct an injustice when reasonable 
minds would not differ that the jury was wrong, and we should do so.

[¶82]   Accordingly, I concur in the result 
only but dissent otherwise from the opinion of the court.

 

 FOOTNOTES

1 See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Sandoval v. Sandoval, 128 
Ariz. 11, 623 P.2d 800 (1981); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 
(1971); Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 
(Fla. 1982); Farmers Ins. Group v. Reed, 109 Idaho 849, 712 P.2d 550 (1985); 
Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 
758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970); Black v. 
Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 6 A.L.R.4th 1054 (Me. 1979); Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 
401 Mass. 762, 519 N.E.2d 1299 (1988); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625 (1978); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980); Transamerica 
Ins. Co. v. Royle, 202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 820 (1983); Briere v. Briere, 107 
N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 461 A.2d 1145 
(1983); Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 27, 627 P.2d 869 (1981); Holodook v. 
Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974); Nuelle v. Wells, 
154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St.3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984); Unah By and Through Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984); Winn 
v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 681 P.2d 776 (1984); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982); Elam v. Elam, 275 
S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980); Wright v. Wright, 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223 
(1972); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wn.2d 411, 610 P.2d 891 (1980); Lee v. Comer, 
159 W. Va. 585, 224 S.E.2d 721 (1976).

2

1. Fatal Accident - A 
motor vehicle traffic accident involving one or more persons 
killed.

     2. Injury Accident - A 
motor vehicle traffic accident involving one or more persons that 
were physically harmed but not killed.

     3. Property Damage 
Only Accident - A motor vehicle traffic accident involving property damage of 
$500 or more and no persons injured or 
killed.

     4. Fatal Injury - An 
injury that results in death.

     5. Incapacitating 
Injury - Visible signs of physical harm, such as bleeding or 
distorted portions of the body, and usually transported from the accident 
scene requiring medical attention. A person with this injury cannot 
perform normally at the accident scene.

     6. Non-incapacitating 
injury - Visible signs of physical harm such as bruises, abrasions, 
swelling or limping.

Wyoming's Comprehensive Report 
on Traffic Accidents 1987, Accident Data Management Section, Wyoming Highway 
Department at 182.

3 Wyoming had a total of 
12,687 traffic accidents involving motor vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles and 
pedestrians in 1990, resulting in 125 fatalities. Wyoming's Comprehensive 
Report on Traffic Accidents 1990, Accident Data Management Section, Wyoming 
Highway Department at 1. Of those fatalities, 101 persons were occupants of 
motor vehicles, 64 persons were known to be drivers of the vehicle, of whom 52 
did not use available safety equipment. Id. at 42. Fatalities to those known to be 
passengers amounted to 37, 29 of whom were not wearing seat belts. Id. In 1990, a total of 
5,216 persons were injured in traffic accidents. Id. at 1. Of those persons injured in motor 
vehicle accidents, 3,928 were known to be drivers, of whom 466 sustained 
incapacitating injuries and 294 did not use a safety device. Id. at 43. A total of 
2,813 persons who were known to be passengers in a motor vehicle were injured in 
1990. Of those, 272 sustained incapacitating injuries, of whom 206 were not 
wearing seat belts. Id. at 43. Statistics on occupant ejection 
from motor vehicles show that 93.6 percent of those who remained in the vehicle 
did not suffer fatal injuries, compared with 42.5 percent of those who were 
either totally or partially ejected and died as a result. Id. at 48.

4 For 1989, the latest 
year on record, 45,555 people died in the United 
States in traffic accidents. Motor vehicle 
accident statistics reveal:

Of the passenger car 
occupants in fatal crashes who were reported as restrained, 26.9% (5,537) were 
fatally injured. Of the occupants who were reported as unrestrained, 50.1% 
(16,759) were fatally injured.

While 28.8% of the 
restrained occupants in passenger cars involved in fatal crashes suffered no 
reported injuries, only 9.0% of the unrestrained occupants were not 
injured.

Less than 1 percent of 
the passenger car occupants reported as restrained were totally ejected, while 
17.3% of the unrestrained occupants were totally ejected. Almost three quarters 
(72.4%) of the occupants who were totally ejected were killed.

A 
Decade of Progress: Transportation Fatalities 1989, 1989 Traffic Fatality Facts, 
National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. 
Department of Transportation.