Title: P. v. Crayton

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 7/8/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S085780
v.
)
)
Ct. App. 2/4 B125826/B136548
TIMOTHY CRAYTON,
)
)
Los Angeles  County
Defendant and Appellant;
)
Super. Ct. No. SA030131
)
In re TIMOTHY CRAYTON
)
On Habeas Corpus.
)
__________________________________ )
In People v. Sohrab (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 89, 95-102, the Court of Appeal
held that in a felony proceeding a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel in the
municipal court did not encompass waiver of that right in proceedings
subsequently conducted in the superior court, and that a trial court’s error in
failing to readvise the defendant and obtain a new waiver in the superior court was
reversible per se.  In the present case, by contrast, another Court of Appeal held
under somewhat similar circumstances that a trial court’s error in failing to
readvise a defendant of his right to counsel and to obtain a new waiver at his
superior court arraignment was not reversible per se, but instead required that its
prejudicial effect be analyzed under the harmless error standard set forth in
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson), that applies to most state
law errors.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
2
We granted review to resolve the conflict in the decisions of the Courts of
Appeal.
As we shall explain more fully below, we agree with the holding of the
Court of Appeal in the present case that when a defendant charged with a felony
has been fully and adequately advised at the municipal court stage of the
proceeding (or now at the equivalent stage in a unified superior court) of his or her
right to counsel throughout the proceedings (including trial) and the defendant has
waived counsel under circumstances that demonstrate an intention to represent
himself or herself both at the preliminary hearing and at trial, a superior court’s
failure to readvise the defendant and obtain a new waiver of counsel at the
defendant’s arraignment on the information in superior court, although erroneous
under the governing California statute, does not automatically require reversal of
the ensuing judgment of conviction.  We also agree with the Court of Appeal that
the prejudicial effect of such error must be evaluated under the harmless error
standard set forth in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, and further agree that,
under the Watson standard, the superior court’s error in the present case was
nonprejudicial.1  Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, upholding defendant’s conviction, should be affirmed.
                                                
1 
The relevant trial court proceedings in this case occurred prior to the
unification of the municipal and superior courts.  Since unification, the
proceedings that formerly were held in municipal court now are held in superior
court, but the relevant procedural steps in a felony proceeding  the filing of a
complaint before a magistrate, followed by a preliminary examination and, if the
defendant is held to answer, the filing of an information and arraignment of the
defendant on the information before a superior court judge  remain the same.
(See generally Recommendation: Trial Court Unification: Revision of Codes (July
1998) 28 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1998) pp. 66-68.)  Because the relevant
proceedings in this case preceded unification, our opinion discusses and analyzes
the issue here with reference to the events that occurred in the municipal and
(footnote continued on following page)
3
I
A.  The Crimes
A detailed description of the facts supporting the conviction of defendant
Timothy Crayton is not essential to the resolution of the issues before us.  Instead,
we recite the brief factual summary set forth in the opinion rendered by the Court
of Appeal:  “[D]efendant accosted Ms. H. on the early morning of August 21,
1997, as she entered her car after purchasing rock cocaine in Venice.  Ms. H.
remained in his custody or under his control until the next day.  Defendant ordered
Ms. H. to drive as he directed, twice ordered her to withdraw money from
automatic teller machines, beat her, and forced her to orally copulate him while he
smoked the drugs that she had purchased.  Defendant moved Ms. H. to several
locations, the last of which was a house in Santa Monica where Irwin Campbell
and Chanta Payne were present.  They too became victims of defendant.  After
sharing rock cocaine with them and Ms. H., defendant became enraged at the three
individuals.  He accused all of them of stealing Ms. H.’s bank card and claimed
that they all owed him money.  Defendant pointed a shotgun at them, beat them,
and threatened to kill all of them.  Finally, he ordered the three to disrobe and lie
in a pile, covered them with a blanket and chair, poured a liquid on them, and
flicked a lighter.  Defendant then sat down and fell asleep.  Police were summoned
and arrested defendant.”
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from preceding page)
superior courts.  Our holding, however, applies as well to felony proceedings in a
unified superior court — i.e., a superior court’s failure, at the arraignment on the
felony information, to readvise an unrepresented defendant of his or her right to
counsel, as required by statute, is subject to the Watson prejudicial error standard.
4
A jury convicted defendant of forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 288a,
subd. (c)),2 kidnapping for the purpose of robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)), two counts of
first degree robbery (§ 211), assault with intent to commit a felony (§ 220),
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), three counts of assault
with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and three counts of making terrorist threats.  (§ 422.) 3
Additionally, the jury found true the allegations that defendant was armed with a
firearm on one robbery count (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and personally used a firearm
on the three assault-with-a-firearm counts (§ 12022.5, subds. (a) and (d)).
The jury also found that defendant had suffered three prior convictions of
the serious felony of robbery (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and found true the special
allegations that defendant had suffered six prior serious and violent felony
convictions of robbery and one of assault with a deadly weapon, within the
meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions
(b) through (i).
The trial court imposed a sentence pursuant to the Three Strikes law, added
prison time for the special allegations and prior convictions, and ordered that the
sentences be served consecutively.  As a result, defendant’s state prison sentence
amounted to a total term of 510 years to life.  The trial court also ordered that
defendant pay a restitution fine in the amount of $10,000.
B.  Defendant’s Self-representation
Defendant represented himself at his preliminary hearing and at trial.  He
contends that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to readvise him
                                                
2 
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise
indicated.
3 
The jury acquitted defendant of certain other charges not pertinent here.
5
of his right to counsel and in not obtaining a new waiver of that right at his
arraignment in superior court.  The pertinent circumstances relating to defendant’s
claim are as follows.
1.
The September 4, 1997, arraignment in municipal court
On September 4, 1997, defendant was arraigned in the Municipal Court of
the Santa Monica Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, before the Honorable
Hiroshi Fujisaki, a superior court judge sitting as magistrate.  Defendant informed
the court that he desired to represent himself.  The court responded that “you’re
risking a lot if you don’t have guidance of counsel.”  The court thereafter asked
defendant whether he would permit the public defender’s office to represent him.
Defendant declined the court’s offer, commenting:  “I will stand on my Faretta [v.
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806] rights and represent myself.  I don’t need the
services of the public defender’s office.”  The court informed defendant:
“[Y]ou’re entitled to have a lawyer represent you at all stages of the proceedings.
If you don’t have the money for a lawyer, the Court will appoint a lawyer to
represent you at no charge to you.”  (Italics added.)  Defendant replied:  “I’ve
elected to represent myself in pro per, your Honor.”  The court asked:  “Do you
wish to be your own attorney?”  Defendant responded affirmatively.
The court thereafter inquired:  “Do you understand if you choose to
represent yourself, you are required to do everything that a lawyer would be
required to do in representing you[?]  That would include preparation of your
defense, the cross examination of witnesses who would be called to testify against
you.  [¶]  It would require the preparation of all the motions that you may need to
make in writing, those that must be made in writing.  You’re going to be required
to prepare subpoenas and to subpoena witnesses to appear in court on your behalf
if you wish to offer any evidence.  [¶]  You will have to  be responsible for the
selection of a jury, selection of the jury instructions that will be presented to the
6
jury.  You’d be responsible for the examination of witnesses, cross-examination of
witnesses[,] making opening and closing statements.  [¶] And if you should be
convicted, [self-representation] would require you to prepare your own requests
such as they may be with regard to your sentencing.”  (Italics added.)  Defendant
stated that he understood the court’s admonitions.4
The court reiterated:  “You understand that you’re not required to be your
own attorney, that the Court will appoint a lawyer to represent you at public
expense.  That will be made available to you immediately if you wish to have the
services of a lawyer.  Do you understand that, sir?”
Defendant responded:  “Yes, and I thank you for it, but I elect to stand on
my [Faretta] rights at this time.  I don’t see any competent public defenders, you
know, that I’ve met.  Just don’t strike me as, you know, able to go the whole road.
So I can go to the penitentiary on my own.  I don’t need any help to go to prison.”
The court observed:  “Mr. Crayton, you seem to be knowledgeable about
the law.  You know something about the law?”
Defendant replied:  “I know that justice requires truth, your Honor, and I
intend to lay the truth out before the jury and before the trier of fact in case we
don’t get to a jury.”  (Italics added.)  Defendant reiterated his familiarity with
Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806.
The court asked the prosecutor to recite the list of constitutional rights that
defendant intended to waive.  The following colloquy ensued:
                                                
4 
The trial court had observed that defendant was sitting in a wheelchair and
that “you appear to be suffering from tremors.”  Defendant informed the court that
his medical condition stemmed from “[t]oo many bullets.  I have bullets in my
spine.  I’ve been shot up. . . .  They’re old gunshot wounds.”  He affirmed that he
was not taking any medications.
7
Prosecutor:  “Mr. Crayton, again, you have a right to have an attorney at all
stages of the proceeding.  Do you understand that?”
Defendant:  “Yes, I do.”
Prosecutor:  “Do you give up the right to have a counsel, and you wish to
assert your [Faretta] rights and represent yourself?”
Defendant:  “That is correct.”
Prosecutor:  “You have a right to confront and cross-examine all the
witnesses that would testify against you in this matter.  Do you understand that?”
Defendant:  “Yes, I do.”
[¶] . . . [¶]
Prosecutor:  “If you don’t have the money for an attorney, the Court will
appoint you one.  You understand that?”
Defendant:  “Yes, I do.”
Prosecutor:  “And you still don’t want an attorney?”
Defendant:  “I have one.”
Prosecutor:  “Yourself.”
Defendant:  “Yes.  Timothy Crayton is my attorney.”
Prosecutor:  “I’ll just go through all the Miranda rights if he’s going to
make statements.  Is that all right?”
The Court:  “Yes.”
Prosecutor:  “Okay.  You have the right to confront and cross-examine all
the witnesses who would testify against you in any of these matters, be it at the
preliminary hearing or at the trial.  You understand that?”
Defendant:  “Yes.”
Prosecutor:  “And you have the right to remain silent and the privilege
against self-incrimination.  Do you understand that?”
Defendant:  “Yes.”
8
The court thereafter gave defendant the following additional admonitions.
“You have the right to a trial by jury on this matter.  At this stage, you are
being arraigned, and you will be given a preliminary hearing, at which time, at the
preliminary hearing, you have the right to be confronted by the witnesses, either
directly or through the police officers testifying according to the Penal Code
provisions allowing their testimony in lieu of the appearance of certain witnesses.
“At that preliminary hearing, you have the right to ask questions of the
witnesses who are called, and you have the right to require that the prosecutor
prove to the judge at the preliminary hearing that there is sufficient evidence to
believe that you committed any of these offenses before you could be held to
answer to stand trial in the superior court.
“If they cannot prove that you are the person who is charged in these
offenses and that these offenses did occur, then the complaint must be dismissed.
If the prosecutor proves these things, then you would be held to answer.  Then you
would be bought to the superior court within two weeks, 14 days, for arraignment
again in the superior court, and then when you are arraigned in the superior court,
you would be entitled to be brought to trial within 60 days from that arraignment
date.
“If you’re not brought to trial within that time, you have the right to have
the case dismissed, unless you agree or you request a postponement that carries the
case beyond that time.
“At the trial  as I said before, you have the right to trial by jury, if you
wish it.  The jury consists of 12 citizens selected by you and the prosecutor and the
judge in a process called voir dire examination.
“The jury will listen to the evidence presented to it by the prosecutor and
any evidence that you may wish to offer, if you wish to offer any evidence.
9
“During that trial process, you’re going to have the obligation to protect
yourself with regard to [r]ules of [e]vidence and the competency of witnesses.
Since you’re not a lawyer, I caution you that those rules are technical, and if you
don’t raise the objections, you may have given up the rights you may have under
the [r]ules of [e]vidence, and evidence may come out at the trial that ordinarily a
lawyer could keep out, but you would not have kept out because you may not have
understood the [r]ules of [e]vidence.
“And you would not be able to later complain that you were . . .
inadequately represented by yourself because you chose to represent yourself.
That’s the problem with the Faretta right, you understand.  If you choose to
represent yourself and you do a bad job or an inadequate job, you can’t ask for a
new trial because you did an inadequate job.
“I’m not saying that you’re going to do an inadequate job.  I’m just saying
that you’re going to be stuck with what you do or don’t do.  Do you understand
that, sir?”  (Italics added.)
Defendant:  “Yes I do.  I understand.  I might have a fool for a client, but in
this case, I’d like to do that. . . .  I don’t need no help to go to prison.  I can go to
prison by myself. . . .  I don’t need assistance to go to prison.”
The court thereafter provided further admonitions, as follows.
“Now, after we get to that point of the trial where you’re presenting
evidence if you want to and the prosecutor has presented the evidence, at the end
of the case, you have the right to submit jury instructions.
“Jury instructions are basically rules of law that you’re asking the judge to
present to the jury to use in deciding your case.  You would have the obligation on
your side to prepare the instructions you want and to object to any of the
instructions the prosecutor submits if you don’t feel that they are proper
10
instructions.  Okay.  And if you don’t object, you’ve given up the right to appeal
that.
“When the verdict comes down, if it’s adverse to you and you are convicted,
you have the right to be sentenced within 21 days.  You also have the right to the
preparation of a probation report in the sentencing.
“If  after a probation report is ordered, you have the right to present to
the probation department any information that would be helpful with regard to
your sentencing, whatever they’re going to recommend.  You . . . have the right to
input into the probation report.”  (Italics added.)
Defendant:  “Yes, sir.”
2. The October 7, 1997, hearing
At a hearing conducted on October 7, 1997, before the Honorable Bernard
Kamins (a superior court judge who served as the magistrate presiding over
defendant’s preliminary hearing and as the judge who presided over defendant’s
trial in superior court), defendant raised a number of issues unrelated to the subject
of the present appeal.5  During this hearing, the court again offered to provide
defendant with legal representation, as follows:  “Mr. Crayton, you have chosen to
represent yourself.   [¶]  . . .  [¶]  If you wish to have a lawyer appointed, . . . let me
appoint a lawyer for you.  And you have denied that request to me to assist you.
[¶] . . .  If you have the chance to have an excellent lawyer represent you, and
                                                
5 
These issues involved defendant’s contentions that (1) he improperly had
been denied access to a voice-activated computer or paralegal services that he
claimed to need in view of his pro se status and his alleged physical disabilities,
(2) the charges against him were subject to demurrer, and (3) he was entitled to a
hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.  With regard to the
latter issue, the court aptly characterized defendant’s request for a Marsden
hearing as “absurd”:  “That’s for somebody who wants to fire their own
lawyer . . . .  Do you want to fire your lawyer?  Your lawyer is you.”
11
you’re denying that request, or at least throwing it aside and now complaining it’s
too hard for you to represent yourself, that’s really patently absurd, when you have
the ability to have a lawyer helping you.  [¶]  So, you don’t want that.  [¶]  I would
even consider a court advisory lawyer for you, someone to assist you, and you
[have] turned that down.”  In response, defendant reiterated his request for the
“tools that I need” (i.e., a voice-activated computer or paralegal services); “when I
get the tools, I’m fine.”
3. 
The October 14-15, 1997, felony preliminary hearing
The preliminary hearing in this case was conducted on October 14-15,
1997, before Judge Kamins, sitting in the capacity of a magistrate.  At the
conclusion of the People’s presentation at the preliminary hearing, the court
informed defendant:  “The court has offered to have a lawyer represent you; if not,
an advisory counsel; if not that, then legal runners.  And you have not availed
yourself of those items.  [¶]  Also if you would like an investigator, I would be
glad to appoint an investigator for you at the court’s expense.  [¶] So right now, do
you have any defense you wish to put on at this time?”  Defendant responded:
“My defense to the court’s comments is too little too late.”
4.
The October 29, 1997, arraignment in superior court
At defendant’s arraignment on October 29, 1997, held before Judge Kamins
acting in his capacity as a superior court judge, the court invited defendant to enter
a plea, to which defendant responded with a challenge to the proceedings, on the
ground that “the court doesn’t have jurisdiction.”  The court thereafter entered a
plea of not guilty on defendant’s behalf, set a trial date, and observed:  “I would
state that even though you are representing yourself and represent that you have
handicaps that slow you up, you’re one of the . . . most naturally bright defendants
that’s been in front of me in many, many years.  [¶]  So, in spite of whatever
handicaps you feel you have, your ability to address the court, write papers, argue
12
your own motions, say the right things is good.  [¶]  And I would say that nothing
is slowing you up from your ability to handle your own case.  In fact, you’re
probably better than a lot of lawyers I’ve seen.”  The court did not provide any
further advisement to defendant at that time regarding his right to counsel, nor did
the court seek to obtain a new waiver of that right.
5.
The December 16, 1997, scheduled commencement of trial
Defendant’s trial was scheduled to commence on December 16, 1997.  On
that date, he sought and obtained a continuance.  As to defendant’s self-
representation, the trial court observed:  “The court . . . asked you if you wanted
any advisory counsel, and you turned that down.”  Defendant replied:  “Advisory
counsel can’t help me, your honor.”
6.
The April 20, 1998, actual commencement of trial
On April 20, 1998, the trial court informed defendant that, based on the
court’s concern that defendant would not participate meaningfully at trial, it had
appointed standby counsel, William Windon.  Defendant objected, stating:  “It
won’t be necessary. I’ve got a real good lawyer representing me, Timothy
Crayton.  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  I object to any standby counsel, because you’re trying to
take my pro per status.  And that, that’s not right, that’s unfair.  [¶]  . . .  [¶]  I’m
defending Timothy Crayton the best way I can.  And I think I’m doing a good job.
And so I don’t see where standby counsel would come in.”
Although the trial court agreed as to defendant’s competency to represent
himself, it was not persuaded to withdraw its appointment of standby counsel to
assist defendant should the need arise:  “I know that you’re a bright fellow.  I’ve
seen your legal work.  And I do agree that you’ve done more than most lawyers
would do, and phrased your legal motions in appropriate form, and been very
competent.  [¶]  . . .  And I want you to have the best representation.”
13
Defendant reaffirmed his desire and willingness to represent himself:
“Your Honor, I represented myself at four jury trials.  I have never lost a jury
trial.  I’ve won all four jury trials.  [¶]  . . .  I know how to conduct myself at a
trial.  I have a duty to my client to represent him to the best of my ability.”  (Italics
added.)  Defendant then moved to dismiss the charges “based on the grounds
[among other reasons] that I’ve been denied the right of self-representation and
effective meaningful self-representation . . . .”  Defendant added:  “I’m speaking
under duress, under the threat of having my pro per status taken.”
The trial court disagreed with defendant’s characterization:  “Mr. Crayton,
I’ve not threatened to take away your pro per status, only to have an attorney come
in to take over the case if you don’t represent your client to the best of your ability.
[¶] If you’re going to tune out, then I want a lawyer to step in.  If you wish, and
it’s your conscious choice not to participate, and to just sit there, you know you
may be right, and maybe I wouldn’t bring in standby counsel at that point.  But I’ll
ask you if you want me to bring in counsel.”  Defendant replied:  “No I do not.”6
                                                
6 
The record indicates that on April 20, 1998, defendant also filed a motion
to disqualify the trial court judge that included, among other assertions, an
allegation that “[a]s a result of a direct telephone call from Chief Justice George of
the California Supreme Court to Hon. Bernard J. Kamins the trial court has
alternated from refusal to provide ‘reasonable accommodations’ to falsely
posturing on the record appearing to issue (meaningless bad faith) orders for
‘reasonable accommodations’. . . .”  At the April 20 proceeding, the trial court
denied the motion and responded on the record in part: “I have not received a call
from Justice George on this case, nor any case, nor for any reason at any time has
Judge George [seen] fit to give me a buzz either at home or at court.”  Defendant
has not questioned the accuracy of the trial court’s statement in this regard, and
has not raised any issue on appeal relating to this allegation.
14
C.
Defendant’s Trial
At trial, defendant represented himself capably, repeatedly drawing praise
from the trial court regarding the quality of his self-representation.  Throughout
the trial, defendant refrained from relinquishing his defense to standby counsel,
even after being reminded by the trial court that if, for some reason, defendant was
unable to represent himself, standby counsel was available to take over the
defense.  After the jury returned its verdicts finding defendant guilty of most of the
charged offenses, defendant stated that he desired to retain his pro per status.  As
noted, the trial court entered judgment against defendant, sentencing him to a total
term of 510 years to life in state prison.
D.
Defendant’s Appeal
Defendant filed a timely appeal, and the Court of Appeal corrected the
sentence to reduce its length by 50 years, made other modifications not relevant
here, and otherwise affirmed the judgment for reasons more fully set forth in the
discussion below. 7
Defendant thereafter filed a petition for review, which we granted, directing
the parties to limit their briefing and argument to the issue “whether the trial court
erred in failing to obtain an express waiver of the right to counsel in superior court
when defendant expressly waived the right to counsel in municipal court and, if
so, what prejudicial standard applies.”
                                                
7 
At the same time, the Court of Appeal also denied defendant’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus.
15
II
A.
The Governing Statutory Procedure
In the present case, the trial court proceedings occurred prior to the
unification of the municipal and superior courts.  After unification, the
proceedings in the early stages of a felony prosecution that formerly were held in
municipal court now are held in superior court, but the basic procedural steps 
the filing of a complaint before a magistrate, the holding of a preliminary
examination before a magistrate, and the filing of an information and arraignment
on the information before a superior court judge  remain the same.  Because the
relevant proceedings in this case preceded unification, we discuss the statutory
provisions with reference to the functional division between the municipal and
superior courts that existed at that time.  (See also Stats. 1998, ch. 931, §§ 359,
360 [amending Pen. Code, §§ 806, 808, to conform to unification of trial courts].)
Prior to unification, unless the prosecution elected to seek an indictment
before a grand jury, felony proceedings were commenced with the filing of a
complaint in municipal court before a magistrate.  (§ 806.)  Although the
complaint was filed in municipal court, the magistrate could be either a municipal
court or superior court judge.  (§ 808.)8  When a complaint was filed, section 859
directed that the defendant be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary
delay, and that the magistrate inform the defendant of his or her right to counsel.
The magistrate then was required to set a date for the preliminary examination.
(§ 859b.)  At the conclusion of the preliminary examination, the magistrate
determined whether there was sufficient cause to hold the defendant to answer on
                                                
8 
Under section 808, a judge of any court of record, including justices of the
Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court, also may serve as magistrates.
16
a felony charge.  (§ 872.)  If the defendant was held to answer on a felony charge
following the preliminary examination, the prosecution filed an accusatory
pleading — an information — in superior court, charging the defendant with the
felony offense.  When the information was filed, the defendant was arraigned on
the charges in superior court.  (§ 976.)  Section 987 provides that if a defendant
appears for arraignment without counsel, the court shall inform the defendant of
his or her right to counsel and shall ask the defendant whether he or she desires the
assistance of counsel.9
In sum, the governing statutes provided (and continue to provide) that a
defendant in felony proceedings shall be advised of the right to counsel on at least
two distinct occasions prior to trial:  first, when the defendant is brought before a
magistrate and advised of the filing of the complaint (§ 859), and second, after the
preliminary examination, when the defendant is arraigned in superior court on the
information (§ 987).  Because, however, the same superior court judge sometimes
served both as magistrate during the municipal court proceedings and also as the
trial judge in superior court, the duty under section 987 to readvise the defendant
of the right to counsel occasionally has been overlooked.  Thus, when a superior
court judge, sitting as a magistrate, already had conducted a lengthy exchange with
                                                
9 
Section 987, subdivision (a), currently provides:  “In a noncapital case, if
the defendant appears for arraignment without counsel, he or she shall be informed
by the court that it is his or her right to have counsel before being arraigned, and
shall be asked if he or she desires the assistance of counsel.  If he or she desires
and is unable to employ counsel the court shall assign counsel to defend him or
her.”  (See also section 859 [setting forth similar requirements that apply after the
filing of the complaint].)  Although the version of section 987 in effect at the time
of trial was repealed and replaced in 1998 (Stats. 1998, ch. 587, §§ 3, 4), the
provisions relevant to the issue in this case are identical in both versions of the
statute.
17
the defendant in which the judge had explained to the defendant the defendant’s
right to counsel and had cautioned the defendant about the pitfalls of self-
representation both at the preliminary hearing and at trial, and the defendant had
expressed an understanding of the risks and a desire nonetheless to proceed
without counsel throughout the proceedings, the judge inadvertently might fail to
readvise the defendant when the defendant appeared before the same judge for
arraignment on the felony information.  That appears to be what occurred here.
Prior decisions of this court have held that under section 987, the superior
court is required to advise a defendant of his or her right to counsel in superior
court whenever the defendant appears without counsel at the arraignment, even
when the defendant previously has been advised of the right to counsel and has
expressed an intention to waive counsel throughout the proceedings.  (People v.
Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 858, fn. 5; see also People v. McKenzie (1983) 34
Cal.3d 616, 635 [observing that “[t]he People concede that defendant’s waiver of
the right to counsel in municipal court did not continue in effect in superior court”
(italics added)].)  Because the language of section 987 sets forth no exceptions,
this rule applies even when, as in the case at bar, the same judge presides in the
municipal court and at trial in the superior court.
Despite some equivocation at oral argument, and a belated reference to In
re Connor (1940) 15 Cal.2d 161, the People concede in their briefing that in view
of our decisions in People v. Crandell and People v. McKenzie, the superior court
in the present case erred in failing to readvise defendant of his right to counsel and
in failing to obtain a new waiver of that right when defendant was arraigned on the
felony information in superior court.  The question presented here is whether the
superior court’s error was prejudicial under either federal or state law.  To answer
this question, we employ the analytical framework relied upon by the Court of
Appeal.  As that court explained: “Defendants enjoy two distinct rights:  (1) a
18
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment,
which may be waived, and (2) a statutory right under section 987, subdivision (a),
to be informed at arraignment in superior court of the right to counsel and to have
counsel appointed.  Although both provisions protect the right to counsel, they
derive from different sources and are not coterminous.”  (Original italics.)
B.
Whether, Under the Federal Constitution, the Superior Court’s
Failure to Readvise Defendant of His Right to Counsel was Error
Turning first to the question whether the Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel requires that the superior court readvise a defendant of his or
her right to counsel and obtain a waiver, we observe that the weight of federal
authority concludes that it does not.
The Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel applies at all
critical stages of a criminal proceeding in which the substantial rights of a
defendant are at stake.  (Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 389 U.S. 128, 134.)  The right to
counsel may be waived by a defendant who wishes to proceed in propria persona.
(Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 807.)  By such waiver, a defendant
surrenders “many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.”
(Id., at p. 835.)  In view of these consequences, a knowing and intelligent waiver
of the right to counsel is required before a criminal defendant is permitted to
proceed in propria persona.  (Ibid.)
Federal authority holds that once a defendant gives a valid waiver, it
continues through the duration of the proceedings unless it is withdrawn or is
limited to a particular phase of the case.  “While it is true that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies at all critical stages of the prosecution,
including the sentencing stage, it does not follow that once the assistance of
counsel in court has been competently waived, a new waiver must be obtained at
every subsequent court appearance by the defendant.  A competent election by the
19
defendant to represent himself and to decline the assistance of counsel once made
before the court carries forward through all further proceedings in that case unless
appointment of counsel for subsequent proceedings is expressly requested by the
defendant or there are circumstances which suggest that the waiver was limited to
a particular stage of the proceedings.”  (Arnold v. United States (9th Cir. 1969)
414 F.2d 1056, 1059.)
In federal practice, a waiver of counsel has been held to remain in effect
despite various breaks in the proceedings.  In U.S. v. Springer (9th Cir. 1995) 51
F.3d 861, for example, the court held that a defendant’s waiver of the right to
counsel carried over from a first trial, which ended in a mistrial, to a retrial of the
same matter.  (Id., at pp. 864-865.)  “The retrial was obviously a continuation of
the criminal prosecution, and the waiver was obviously intended to stand absent an
attempt to withdraw it.  The matter of representation was in [the defendant’s]
hands alone.  After his earnest and insistent request, he had been granted the right
to represent himself.  If he found himself wavering in his resolve so to do, he or
his advisory counsel could have so informed the court.”  (Id., at p. 865.)  White v.
United States (9th Cir. 1965) 354 F.2d 22 similarly held that a waiver remained
effective when a defendant continued to represent himself at resentencing
following the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.  Although the court at the
resentencing did not ask defendant whether he wished to continue representing
himself, the reviewing court concluded that the trial court had no sua sponte
obligation to readvise the defendant of his right to counsel.  (Id., at pp. 22-23; see
also U.S. v. Unger (1st Cir. 1990) 915 F.2d 759, 761-762 [waiver at arraignment in
state juvenile court continued through two subsequent dispositional and sentencing
hearings]; U.S. v. Fazzini (7th Cir. 1989) 871 F.2d 635, 641-644 [waiver before
trial extended through sentencing, and court had no duty to re-inquire absent
“substantial change in circumstances”].)
20
Defendant contends that the present case does not resemble the federal
decisions, cited above, in which substantial breaks in the proceedings were
deemed insufficient to eliminate the continuing validity of a defendant’s waiver,
but is more akin to those decisions in which a court completely fails to advise a
defendant of the risks of self-representation.  The court in Sohrab drew a similar
distinction.  (See People v. Sohrab, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 89, 100-102 [citing and
relying upon People v. Hall (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1108-1109].)
We find defendant’s contention unpersuasive.  Unlike the cases relied upon
by defendant, the instant matter involves a defendant who was clearly and fully
admonished of the risks involved in representing himself at both the preliminary
hearing and trial stages and who nonetheless elected to represent himself
throughout the proceedings; the only error that occurred was the superior court’s
failure to readvise defendant of such risks prior to the commencement of trial.
Under these circumstances we conclude that the trial court’s error was not of
federal constitutional magnitude, and that the prejudicial error standard applicable
to federal constitutional error does not apply.
C.
Whether, Under California Law, the Superior Court’s Failure to
Readvise Defendant of His Right to Counsel was Prejudicial
As noted above, the People concede that under section 987, subdivision (a),
the superior court was obligated to inform defendant of his right to appointed
counsel and to obtain a waiver of that right at the time defendant was arraigned on
the felony information, notwithstanding the admonitions given to  and waivers
taken from  defendant under section 859 during the municipal court
proceedings, and that the court erred in failing to do so.  The question is what
prejudicial error standard applies.
Relying upon familiar authority, the Court of Appeal reiterated that all trial
court error under California law is governed by article VI, section 13 of the
21
California Constitution:  “No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in
any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission
or rejection of evidence, . . . or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless,
after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be
of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.”  (See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 483, fn. 10; People v. Cahill
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 500, 503.)  As this court long has held, under the
“miscarriage of justice” standard of article VI, section 13, a trial court error
generally is not reversible unless there is a reasonable probability that the
defendant was prejudiced as a result of the error.  (People v. Flood, supra, 18
Cal.4th at p. 483; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
Although a reversible per se rule may apply under article VI, section 13,
when a defendant erroneously is denied the right to counsel or never has
knowingly or voluntarily waived that right (see People v. Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th
478, 501 [recognizing that “in some instances an error may result in a ‘miscarriage
of justice’ within the meaning of the California provision” without a showing of
actual prejudice]), we agree with the Court of Appeal that the Watson standard
applies to the superior court’s error in failing to follow the statutory command that
the court, at the arraignment in superior court, readvise a defendant of his or her
right to counsel and obtain a renewed waiver of that right.  As discussed above,
and as interpreted in People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d 833, 858, footnote 5,
and People v. McKenzie, supra, 34 Cal.3d 616, 635, section 987 requires that a
defendant who appears at the arraignment in superior court without counsel be
advised of his or her right to counsel, even when the defendant in the municipal
court knowingly waived counsel and expressed a desire to represent himself or
herself.  Although section 987 requires this additional advice and inquiry at the
arraignment on the felony information as a prophylactic safeguard, nothing in the
22
language of the statute provides that when a defendant previously has been
informed of his or her right to counsel at trial and has been adequately warned of
the pitfalls of representing oneself at trial, the defendant’s prior waiver of counsel
and exercise of the constitutional right to represent himself or herself shall not
“carry over” or be legally “effective” in the absence of a renewed warning and
waiver.
To the extent that language in our prior decisions conveys such an
impression (see, e.g., People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d 833, 858, fn. 5
[“neither an appointment . . . nor a waiver of counsel in municipal court carries
over into superior court” (italics added)]; People v. McKenzie, supra, 34 Cal.3d
616, 635 [“[t]he People concede that defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel in
municipal court did not continue in effect in superior court” (italics added)]), we
conclude that such language misleadingly overstates the effect of section 987.
When a defendant has been fully informed of his or her right to counsel at all
stages of the proceedings (including trial), and voluntarily and knowingly has
invoked the right to represent himself or herself throughout all the proceedings,
the trial court’s failure to provide a new advisement and obtain a renewed waiver
at the arraignment (as required by section 987) does not operate to terminate or
revoke the defendant’s validly invoked constitutional right to represent himself or
herself at trial.
Furthermore, contrary to defendant’s claim, we believe that a trial court’s
error in failing to comply with section 987 clearly is susceptible to harmless error
analysis.  The complete record of the trial court proceedings often will shed light
upon whether a defendant, despite the absence of an explicit readvisement by the
superior court at arraignment, nonetheless was aware that he or she had the right to
appointed counsel at the subsequent proceedings and whether an explicit
advisement at the arraignment would have been likely to lead the defendant to
23
reconsider the decision to represent himself or herself and request that counsel be
appointed.  (Accord United States v. Vonn (2002) 535 U.S. ___ [122 S.Ct. ___,
152 L.Ed.2d 90, 109-110].)
In some cases, the exchange between the magistrate and the defendant
during the initial advisement and waiver may raise questions as to whether the
defendant voluntarily and knowingly intended to waive his or her right to counsel
throughout the entire proceedings or only at the preliminary hearing.  In People v.
Sohrab, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 89, for example, the defendant, unlike defendant
here, expressed equivocation in the municipal court proceedings as to whether he
desired to represent himself and, if so, at what stages of the proceedings.  (Id., at
pp. 92-95.)  Under such circumstances, a superior court’s failure to obtain a new
and clear indication that the defendant desired to represent himself or herself at
trial might well be prejudicial under the Watson standard.
Because of the circumstances attending the present case, however, we agree
with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the error was not prejudicial under the
Watson standard, there being no reasonable probability that defendant was
unaware of his right to be represented by appointed counsel at trial or that he
would have accepted the appointment of counsel had the court made the statutorily
required inquiry at arraignment.  As we have seen, the advisements that defendant
received at the outset of the proceedings explicitly informed defendant of his right
to counsel at all stages of the proceedings, including trial, and warned him of the
risks of representing himself at trial.  Although the court apprised defendant
repeatedly of the risks of self-representation, defendant’s desire to represent
himself was unwavering throughout the proceedings.  In light of the entire record
(see People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1178), there can be no doubt that
defendant was aware of his right to appointed counsel at all stages of the
proceedings and knowingly and voluntarily waived that right, insisting upon
24
exercising his constitutional right to represent himself.  Thus, we conclude that the
Court of Appeal properly determined that there is no reasonable probability that
the superior court’s error in failing to readvise defendant of his right to counsel at
the arraignment affected defendant’s decision to represent himself throughout the
course of the proceedings.  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)10
III
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
GEORGE, C. J.
WE CONCUR:
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
                                                
10 
To the extent it is contrary to the views expressed herein, People v. Sohrab,
supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 89, is disapproved.
25
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Crayton
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 77 Cal.App.4th 307
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S085780
Date Filed: July 8, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Bernard J. Kamins
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Gregory R. Ellis, under appointment by the Supreme Court; Wolff & Ellis, Wolff, Ellis & Clausen, Joan
Wolff and Gerald Clausen for Defendant and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin
Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Jamie L. Fuster, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
26
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Gregory R. Ellis
Wolff, Ellis & Clausen
300 Montgomery Street, Suite 825
San Francisco, CA  94104
(415) 391-4475
Jaime L. Fuster
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA  90013
(213) 897-2354