Title: In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Carr

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Carr. 
[Cite as In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Carr (1996),_____Ohio 
St.3d_____.] 
Attorneys at law -- Alleged judicial campaign violations -- Enforcement 
of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and related 
disciplinary procedures in Section 5, Rule II of the Supreme Court 
Rules for the Government of the Judiciary. 
 
(No. 95-2194 -- Submitted May 8, 1996 -- Decided August 14, 1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Order of the Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court. 
 
On October 10, 1995, Raymond Pianka filed a grievance against 
respondent, Cathleen Carr, with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”).  Pianka alleged that Carr, a judicial 
candidate for Cleveland Municipal Court, knowingly misrepresented the 
qualifications of Raymond Pianka, her opponent, in a letter dated September 10, 
1995, in which Carr references her opponent as “never [having] handled a single 
case in housing court as an attorney,” in violation of Canon 7(B)(2)(f) of the 
Code of  Judicial Conduct.  Pianka further alleged that Carr personally solicited 
campaign funds during the course of her campaign by signing a fundraising 
 
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letter postmarked June 4, 1995, thereby personally soliciting campaign funds in 
violation of Canon 7(C)(2)(a). 
 
The board, finding probable cause that a violation had occurred, filed a 
complaint against Carr on Monday, October 16, 1995, and scheduled a hearing 
for Monday, October 23, 1995, at 10:00 a.m. before a panel of three board 
members.  The secretary of the board mailed a copy of the complaint and notice 
of the hearing to both Carr and Pianka on October 16, 1995. 
 
On Friday, October 20, 1995, counsel for Carr filed a motion to continue 
the hearing. Carr claimed that she had not received notice of the complaint until 
approximately 10:00 p.m. on October 18, 1995 and did not have adequate time 
to review the allegations made against her. The motion was denied the same day. 
Carr’s counsel renewed the motion to continue before the hearing began on 
Monday, October 23, 1995. It was again denied and the hearing went forward. 
 
Pianka appeared and testified.  Carr chose not to attend the hearing 
because of a “scheduling conflict” but was represented by counsel. Following 
the hearing, the panel issued a report finding there was clear and convincing 
 
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evidence that Carr had violated Canon 7.  The panel recommended that a cease 
and desist order be issued against Carr and a $1,000 sanction be assessed against 
her. 
 
The Supreme Court appointed a five-member judicial commission that 
reviewed the panel’s determination.  The commission issued its report on 
November 3, 1995, prior to the election on November 7, 1995, which affirmed 
the finding of the panel. 
 
This cause is now before this court on appeal from the order of the 
Judicial Commission.  
 
Brunner & Brunner and Jennifer L. Brunner, for complainant. 
 
Armstrong, Mitchell & Damiani, Louis C. Damiani and Bruce A. 
Zaccagnini, for respondent. 
 
STRATTON, J.  This is the first case in which this court is asked to review 
enforcement of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and related disciplinary 
procedures in Section 5, Rule II of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government 
of the Judiciary. 
 
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Canon 7 was revised as a result of a review of Ohio’s judicial election 
system by the Citizens’ Committee on Judicial Elections established by the 
Supreme Court in 1994.  The committee tackled issues of campaign conduct, 
campaign finance, enforcement and sanctions, and the public’s perception of the 
judicial system in Ohio and proposed what ultimately became Canon 7.  The 
new canon was adopted by the Supreme Court on April 25, 1995 and became 
effective on July 1, 1995. 
 
The court adopted an expedited grievance process to review llegations of 
campaign violations and to promptly resolve complaints. Gov. Jud. R. II(5) was 
intended to enforce Canon 7 within the short time frame of a campaign by 
providing for prompt deadlines for each step of the grievance process through 
the final resolution.  Until the adoption of this expedited procedure, the 
disciplinary procedures of Rule V of the Supreme Court Rules for the 
Government of the Bar applied to all grievances involving the bar and judiciary, 
including grievances involving alleged judicial campaign violations.  Under 
Gov. Bar R. V, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline often 
 
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did not resolve complaints of alleged campaign violations until well after the 
election when the damage had already occurred and any remedy or sanction was 
rendered meaningless.  
 
Carr contends she was deprived of her right to due process of law because 
the panel strictly adhered to the expedited procedures of Gov. Jud. R. II(5) and 
denied her request to continue the hearing.  The board mailed to Carr notice of 
the filing and a copy of the grievance on October 10, 1995, and a copy of the 
complaint on October 16, 1995.  The complaint set forth specific, 
straightforward facts which would not require substantial preparation in order to 
respond. These proceedings were to be conducted on an expedited basis.   
 
The standards of due process in a disciplinary proceeding are not equal to 
those in a criminal matter.  Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Illman (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 
159, 162, 74 O.O.2d 284, 285, 342 N.E.2d 688, 690.  A disciplinary proceeding 
is instituted to safeguard the courts and to protect the public from the 
misconduct of those who are licensed to practice law, and is neither a criminal 
 
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nor a civil proceeding.  Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Weaver (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 
97, 100, 70 O.O.2d 175, 177, 322 N.E.2d 665, 667. 
 
A license to practice law is a privilege to which there are attendant rights 
and duties.  Therefore, an attorney has a duty to cooperate when called upon to 
assist in an investigation or to testify at a hearing in an disciplinary matter.  Gov. 
Bar. R. V(4)(G).  Although the burden may be upon the complainant to prove 
the allegations, the respondent who chooses not to testify or otherwise present 
evidence to refute the allegations made assumes the risk of adverse findings.  
The panel did not abuse its discretion when it refused to continue the hearing in 
light of the expedited nature of the proceeding and Carr’s nebulous reason of a 
“scheduling conflict.”  The panel duly noted that business of the Supreme Court 
of Ohio takes precedence over any other professional commitments. 
 
The court is mindful of the purposes of the time constraints in Gov. Jud. 
R. II(5).  However, because of the severity of the sanctions available for a 
violation of Canon 7, i.e., suspension from the practice of law, removal from 
public office, or disbarment, a respondent’s rights of due process must be 
 
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carefully balanced against the complainant’s need for an expedited hearing on 
alleged violations.  It is necessary that the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline, or the panel appointed by the board, be given 
discretion when handling an expedited matter under Gov. Jud. R. II(5). 
 
In balancing the parties’ rights to a hearing with the parties’ rights of due 
process, the board should take into consideration the immediacy of the alleged 
violation, the complexity of the complaint, when the respondent received notice 
of the hearing, whether a weekend intervenes to shorten the five-day period, and 
the parties’ difficulty in obtaining documentation and/or witnesses to prove a 
case.  Most of these cases can and should be heard within the five-day period 
giving due weight to all of the above considerations. 
 
In this case, by her absence, Carr was unable to refute the evidence 
presented by Pianka.  The issues were straightforward and simple and required 
little preparation.  What did Carr know about her opponent before making her 
claims of his lack of experience?  Did she sign the fundraising letter?  Had she 
honored her duty to cooperate under Rule II(5), she may have been able to refute 
 
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these charges.  But in presenting neither a solid nor credible reason for her 
absence and a need for a continuance, the panel of the board was within its 
discretion to deny her continuance.  Because Carr chose not to cooperate with 
the panel and did not present any evidence on her behalf to refute the allegations 
against her, the panel concluded there was clear and convincing evidence that 
Carr had violated Canon 7.  For these reasons, this court affirms the order of the 
judicial commission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order affirmed.  
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment 
 
RESNICK, J., dissents. 
 
In re Carr. 
 
COOK, J, concurring in judgment.   Although I agree with the judgment of 
the majority to affirm the order of the commission, I think the majority errs in 
not upholding the judicial rule as written. 
 
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This court balanced the process due a respondent against the importance 
of the public’s interest in fair campaigning when we adopted this expedited 
grievance process.  A necessary part of that balancing was consideration of the 
severity of the sanctions that may be imposed.  We assessed the various 
competing interests and concluded that, with five days’ notice and the right to a 
hearing and an appeal, the respondent would have been accorded the 
rudimentary protections of procedural due process, sufficient under the 
circumstances, to withstand a constitutional challenge.  See In re Ruffalo (1968), 
390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct.1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117. 
 
No further “balancing” need be done by judicial panels.  The majority 
provides a laundry list of factors to be considered by such panels which can only 
serve to obviate the letter and the intent of the expedited procedure we adopted.  
In fact, the laundry list of factors includes “tak[ing] into consideration the 
immediacy of the alleged violation,” thereby permitting panels to evaluate 
whether the complaint even deserves “expedited” treatment. 
 
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By enforcing the rule as written, we provide predictability.  A bright-line 
rule affords that predictability; a five-part balancing test does not.   
 
Given the purposes of the expedited hearing process, I would hold that, 
for any hearing scheduled in accordance with Gov. Jud. R. II(5), due process is 
sufficient under the circumstances. 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.  I would dismiss, since I find that the 
allegations of the complaint were not established by clear and convincing 
evidence.