Title: Arthur Dennis Rutherford v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC99-150
____________
ARTHUR DENNIS RUTHERFORD,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE,
Respondent.
[October 12, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
Arthur Dennis Rutherford, a prisoner under sentence of death, petitions this
Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla.
Const.  For the reasons that follow, we deny habeas relief.
BACKGROUND
Rutherford was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1985 murder and
armed robbery of sixty-three-year-old Stella Salamon, whose body was found in
the bathtub of her home.  After the first jury convicted Rutherford and
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recommended a sentence of death by a vote of eight to four, the trial court declared
a mistrial due to a discovery violation by the State.  We have previously
summarized the evidence presented during the retrial as follows:
The medical examiner testified that Mrs. Salamon's left arm was
broken at the elbow and the upper part of the arm was bruised, that
there were bruises on her face and cuts on her lip, and that there were
three severe wounds on her head.  Two of these injuries were
consistent with having been made by a blunt instrument or by her head
being struck against a flat surface; another was a puncture wound; and
all were associated with skull fracture.  Cause of death was by
drowning or asphyxiation, evidence of both being present.
Two women testified that Rutherford had asked them to help
him cash a $2,000 check, on which he had forged Mrs. Salamon's
signature.  Two other witnesses testified that before Mrs. Salamon's
death Rutherford had told them that he planned to get some money
from a woman by forcing her to write him a check.  He said he would
then kill her by hitting her in the head and drowning her in the bathtub
to make her death look accidental.  One witness quoted him as saying,
"I can't do the time, but I'm damn sure gonna do the crime."  Another
witness testified that on the day of the murder Rutherford indicated he
might kill Mrs. Salamon, and yet another witness said Rutherford told
him later that day that he had killed "the old lady" by hitting her in the
head with a hammer, and then had put her in the bathtub.  Law
enforcement officers testified that Rutherford's fingerprints and palm
prints were found in the bathroom of Mrs. Salamon's home.
Rutherford v. State, 545 So. 2d 853, 854-55 (Fla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945
(1989) (Rutherford I).
The jury found Rutherford guilty as charged.  During the penalty phase, the
State presented additional evidence including "the testimony of two witnesses that,
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on the day before her murder, the victim told them that she was fearful of
Rutherford and wished he would stop coming by her house."  Rutherford v. State,
727 So. 2d 216, 217-18 (Fla. 1998) (Rutherford II).  In mitigation, defense counsel
presented lay character testimony from Rutherford's family and a
friend regarding his positive character traits such as being a good
father, a hard worker, loyal, respectful, nonviolent, honest and
generous.  Testimony was also presented regarding Rutherford's
meager upbringing, and the fact that his involvement in Vietnam had
changed him in that he had become jittery and nervous, had
nightmares, and experienced night sweats.  Rutherford testified on his
own behalf in the penalty phase that he did not commit the murder in
question.  He also testified regarding his military service, including his
horrifying experiences in Vietnam and his numerous military
commendations.
Id. at 218.
The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of seven to five.  See
Rutherford I, 545 So. 2d at 855.  The judge imposed the death penalty, finding
three aggravating circumstances to be applicable:  (1) the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, and cruel (HAC); (2) the murder was cold, calculated, and
premeditated (CCP); and (3) Rutherford committed the murder during the course
of a robbery and committed the murder for pecuniary gain (merged).  See id.  In
mitigation, the court found only that Rutherford had no significant history of
criminal activity.  See id.  
1The Court found the following claims raised on direct appeal to be without merit:  (1) the second
trial violated Rutherford's constitutional rights by placing him in double jeopardy; (2) the trial court
improperly considered Rutherford's lack of remorse in finding the HAC circumstance to be applicable; (3)
the State did not establish the heightened premeditation necessary to support the CCP aggravating
circumstance; (4) the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence present in the record; (5) the trial
judge impermissibly considered the recommendation of death by the previous jury; (6) the trial court
improperly allowed three witnesses to testify that the victim was afraid of the defendant; (7) Rutherford
should not have been placed in restraints before closing arguments during the penalty phase; and (8) a claim
based on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).  See Rutherford I, 545 So. 2d at 855-57 & n.4.
2Rutherford raised the following claims in his 3.850 petition:
(1) ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) at the guilt phase for failing to investigate,
prepare, and perform sufficiently;  (2) IAC at the penalty phase for failing to investigate,
develop, and present substantial mitigation;  (3) IAC at the penalty phase for failing to
object to hearsay testimony regarding the victim's fear of Rutherford;  (4) improper
penalty-phase jury instructions that shifted the burden of proof to Rutherford;  (5) improper
penalty-phase jury instructions regarding aggravating circumstances;  (6) inapplicability of
CCP;  (7) improper penalty-phase jury instruction on HAC;  (8) untimely imposition of
written death sentence;  (9) trial court's refusal to find mitigators established by the record;
(10) IAC at penalty phase for conflict of interest in revealing confidences and secrets to
the trial court;  (11) admission of inflammatory photographs;  (12) improper introduction
of nonstatutory aggravators at the penalty phase;  (13) IAC at the penalty phase for failing
to obtain mental-health expert;  (14) improper robbery sentence without benefit of
scoresheet;  and (15) double jeopardy bar to retrial.
Rutherford II, 727 So. 2d at 218 n.1.
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On appeal, this Court affirmed Rutherford's convictions and sentences.1  See
id. at 857.  Rutherford then filed a motion for postconviction relief in the trial court
pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, challenging his conviction
and death sentence on fifteen grounds.2  The trial court summarily denied all of
Rutherford's claims except those alleging ineffectiveness of trial counsel. 
See Rutherford II, 727 So. 2d at 218.  After holding an evidentiary hearing on his
3Rutherford raised six issues in his 3.850 appeal:  (1) ineffectiveness during the penalty phase for
failing to object to the hearsay testimony regarding the victim's fear of Rutherford; (2) ineffectiveness for
failing to obtain a mental health expert to offer mitigation evidence during the penalty phase; (3)
ineffectiveness for failing to develop mitigating evidence; (4) the trial court erred in summarily denying
Rutherford's double jeopardy claim as procedurally barred; (5) trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt
phase for failing to investigate, prepare, and perform; (6) the trial court erred in summarily denying several
of Rutherford's claims.  See Rutherford II, 727 So. 2d at 218.  This Court found issues four and six to be
procedurally barred and found no basis to reverse the trial court on the remaining claims.  See id. at 218-26
& n.2.
-5-
ineffectiveness claims, the trial court also denied relief on these claims.  See id. 
This Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief.3  
In the present habeas petition, Rutherford raises eleven claims of
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL
Habeas petitions are the proper vehicle to advance claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.  See Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla.
2000); Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1026 (Fla. 1999).  However, claims
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may not be used to camouflage issues
that should have been raised on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion.  See,
e.g., Thompson, 759 So. 2d 657 n.6; Hardwick v. Dugger, 648 So. 2d 100, 106
(Fla. 1994); Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1992).  
4Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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When analyzing the merits of the claim, "[t]he criteria for proving ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel parallel the Strickland[4] standard for ineffective trial
counsel."  Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1985).  Thus, this
Court's ability to grant habeas relief on the basis of appellate counsel's
ineffectiveness is limited to those situations where the petitioner establishes first,
that appellate counsel's performance was deficient because "the alleged omissions
are of such magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency
falling measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable performance" and
second, that the petitioner was prejudiced because appellate counsel's deficiency
"compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence
in the correctness of the result."  Thompson, 759 So. 2d at 660 (emphasis
supplied)  (quoting Groover v. Singletary, 656 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. 1995)); see,
e.g., Teffeteller, 734 So. 2d at 1027.  If a legal issue "would in all probability have
been found to be without merit" had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the
failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate
counsel's performance ineffective.  Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla.
1994); see, e.g., Kokal v. Dugger, 718 So. 2d 138, 142 (Fla. 1998); Groover, 656
So. 2d at 425.  This is generally true as to issues that would have been found to be
5See Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1222
(2000).
6See, e.g., Elledge v. State, 706 So. 2d 1340, 1347 n.9 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 944
(1998); Foster v. State, 679 So. 2d 747, 751-52 nn. 4-5 (Fla. 1996).
7See Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 837 (1998).
-7-
procedurally barred had they been raised on direct appeal.  See, e.g., Groover, 656
So. 2d at 425; Medina v. Dugger, 586 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 1991).  
With these principles in mind, we turn to Rutherford's claims that his
appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective.  In his first, ninth, and tenth
claims, Rutherford asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal
the denial of numerous pretrial motions and the use of various jury instructions. 
However, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise on appeal the denial of the
pretrial motions because many of the underlying substantive claims are without
merit.  For example, the Court has previously rejected claims that electrocution is
cruel and unusual punishment,5 challenges to the constitutionality of section
921.141, Florida Statutes (1999),6 and claims that section 782.04(1), Florida
Statutes (1999), the felony-murder statute, is unconstitutional.7  Likewise,
Rutherford's claims regarding the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury are
without merit.  This Court has previously rejected similar claims that the standard
jury instructions improperly shift the burden to the defendant to prove that death is
8See, e.g., Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 517 n.5 (Fla. 1999); Demps v. Dugger, 714 So. 2d
365, 368 & n.8 (Fla. 1998).
9See Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 316-17 (Fla. 1997).
10See Thompson, 759 So. 2d at 666 (finding appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to
assert that the jury should have been instructed to merge its consideration of aggravating circumstances
where trial court did not improperly double the aggravating circumstances); Armstrong v. State, 642 So.
2d 730, 738-39 (Fla. 1994) (finding error in failing to instruct the jury not to consider the same facts in
support of different aggravating factors to be harmless).
-8-
inappropriate,8 that the trial court should have instructed the jury not to consider
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances,9 and that the trial court should have
instructed the jury to merge its consideration of the aggravating circumstances that
the murder was committed during the course of a robbery and committed for
pecuniary gain.10  The failure to raise meritless claims does not render appellate
counsel's performance ineffective.  See, e.g., Kokal, 718 So. 2d at 142; Williamson,
651 So. 2d at 86; Groover, 656 So. 2d at 425. 
Rutherford also claims that appellate counsel should have raised the trial
court's failure to give the jury instructions that:  (1) the death penalty is only
intended for the most aggravated and least mitigated of crimes; and (2) jurors
should not use a counting process in determining whether aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.  However, Rutherford cites
no cases establishing that the failure to give these instructions constitutes reversible
-9-
error, and we find that Rutherford has established neither deficiency nor prejudice
with regard to the failure to raise these issues on appeal. 
In addition, Rutherford asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue on appeal that the jury instructions for the HAC and CCP
aggravating circumstances were unconstitutionally vague.  Trial counsel objected to
the applicability of the HAC instruction, but did not specifically object on the basis
that the instruction was unconstitutionally vague.  Although trial counsel did file a
pretrial motion on the basis that the CCP instruction was unconstitutionally vague,
counsel did not renew the objection in the sentencing hearing or submit an
alternative instruction.  Therefore, these claims were not preserved for appellate
review.  See Espinosa v. State, 626 So. 2d 165, 167 (Fla. 1993); see also Downs,
740 So. 2d at 517.  Additionally, the trial court gave the standard jury instructions,
and at the time of Rutherford's direct appeal in 1989, the United States Supreme
Court had not yet decided Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992).  As the
Court stated in Downs, "appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a
claim that would have been rejected on appeal . . . . because the trial court used the
approved standard jury instructions, the error had not been preserved in the court
below, and Espinosa had not yet been decided."  Downs, 740 So. 2d at 518 n.18;
see Thompson, 759 So. 2d at 667; see also Darden v. State, 475 So. 2d 214, 216-
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17 (Fla. 1985) (finding appellate counsel's performance was not deficient for failing
to anticipate a change in the law). 
Finally, Rutherford claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise on appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to conduct individual voir dire. 
The trial judge did not conduct individual voir dire, but instead asked the venire
collectively if they knew the defendant, the victim, anything about the case, or had
read anything about the case in the newspapers.  The assistant state attorney also
asked the venire collectively whether they knew anything about the case or knew
any of the potential witnesses.  No juror responded that he or she knew anything
about the case or any of the people involved in the case.
This Court has explained that the "trial court has broad discretion in deciding
whether prospective jurors must be questioned individually about publicity the case
may have received."  Teffeteller, 734 So. 2d at 1028.  In Teffeteller, this Court
rejected a similar claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel where "even
though there was no individual, sequestered voir dire the judge did question the
venire members individually about their knowledge of the case and ability to
disregard any prior information and render an impartial verdict based solely on the
evidence at the resentencing proceeding."  734 So. 2d at 1029.  In this case,
although the jurors were not questioned individually, the trial court did ask them
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collectively whether they had any knowledge of the case.  We therefore conclude
that Rutherford has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the failure of his
appellate counsel to raise this claim during his direct appeal.  
In his second and eighth claims, Rutherford asserts that his appellate counsel
was ineffective for not convincing the Court to rule in his favor on two issues
actually raised on direct appeal:  (1) that his prosecution violated double jeopardy
because the State goaded the defense into moving for a mistrial; and (2) that
Rutherford should not have been shackled before closing arguments began during
the penalty phase.  When analyzing claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise additional arguments in support of a claim raised on direct appeal,
we have previously observed that 
"petitioner's contention that [the point] was inadequately argued merely
expresses dissatisfaction with the outcome of the argument in that it
did not achieve a favorable result for petitioner."  We therefore decline
petitioner's invitation to utilize the writ of habeas as a vehicle for the
re-argument of issues which have been raised and ruled on by this
Court.
Routly v. Wainwright, 502 So. 2d 901, 903 (Fla. 1987) (quoting Steinhorst v.
Wainwright, 477 So. 2d 537, 540 (Fla. 1985)); see also Grossman v. Dugger, 708
So. 2d 249, 252 (Fla. 1997) (finding claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to make arguments "more convincingly" to be procedurally barred in a
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habeas petition).  Under these precedents, if an issue was actually raised on direct
appeal, the Court will not consider a claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise additional arguments in support of the claim on appeal. 
With regard to his double jeopardy claim, we found on direct appeal that the
retrial in this case did not violate double jeopardy principles because
the prosecutor's motive was to introduce evidence that tended to
convict Rutherford, not to create error that would force a new trial. 
As there was no goading the defense into moving for a mistrial, the
Oregon v. Kennedy, [456 U.S. 667 (1982),] exception does not apply
and it was not error to try Rutherford a second time.
Rutherford I, 545 So. 2d at 855.  In his habeas petition, Rutherford faults his
appellate counsel for failing to discover and present "objective evidence" that he
claims would have shown the State engaged in a pattern of provoking mistrials in
order to shop for a more favorable judge and jury.  However, none of the evidence
Rutherford now relies upon was in the appellate record.  In fact, Rutherford's
current counsel admits that they only recently became aware of the "objective
evidence" that would have allegedly substantiated this claim.  Appellate counsel
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to investigate and present facts in order to
support an issue on appeal.  The appellate record is limited to the record presented
to the trial court.  Cf. Finney v. State, 660 So. 2d 674, 684 (Fla. 1995) ("Without a
proffer it is impossible for the appellate court to determine whether the trial court's
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ruling was erroneous and if erroneous what effect the error may have had on the
result.").  Therefore, we conclude that Rutherford has not demonstrated that his
appellate counsel was deficient with respect to his performance as to issues that
were actually raised on direct appeal.
In his third claim, Rutherford contends that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to assert on appeal that fundamental error occurred when two
allegedly incompetent witnesses, Mary Heaton and Elizabeth Ward, testified.  Trial
counsel did not object to the testimony of either Heaton or Ward on this basis. 
However, counsel did cross-examine Heaton regarding the fact that she had
previously been in a mental institution, had a nervous breakdown, had difficulty
remembering things, and had difficulty distinguishing fact from fiction. 
We have "repeatedly held that appellate counsel cannot be considered
ineffective for failing to raise issues which [were] procedurally barred . . . because
they were not properly raised at trial."  Williamson, 651 So. 2d at 86-87; see, e.g.,
Groover, 656 So. 2d at 425; Medina, 586 So. 2d at 318.  Because this issue was
not preserved for review, if it had been raised on appeal, it would have warranted
reversal only if it constituted fundamental error, which has been defined as an error
that "reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of
guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error." 
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Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 418 n.8 (1998) (quoting Kilgore v. State, 688 So.
2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1996)); see also Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 191 n.5 (Fla.
1997) (describing "fundamental error" as error "so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire
trial"), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1083 (1998).
A witness is incompetent to testify if the trial court determines the witness is
(1) unable to communicate to the jury; (2) unable to understand the duty to tell the
truth; or (3) unable to perceive and remember the events.  See §§ 90.603, .604, Fla.
Stat. (1999).  However, "[a] witness is presumed competent to testify until the
contrary is established."  Hawk v. State, 718 So. 2d 159, 162 (Fla. 1998); see
generally § 90.601, Fla. Stat. (1999).  Rutherford cites no case in support of his
argument that the failure of the trial court to examine witnesses' competency on the
court's own motion constitutes fundamental error that would have resulted in a
reversal had appellate counsel raised this issue on direct appeal.  Therefore, we
deny relief on this claim. 
Rutherford claims in his fourth point that appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise on appeal the improper admission of gruesome photographs, an
issue that was preserved for appellate review.  We have explained that "the
admission of photographic evidence is within the trial judge's discretion and a trial
judge's ruling on this issue will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear
-15-
showing of abuse."  Pangburn v. State, 661 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 1995); Wilson
v. State, 436 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1983).  Photographs are admissible if they are
"relevant and not so shocking in nature as to defeat the value of their relevance." 
Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990); see Zakrzewski v. State, 717 So.
2d 488, 494 (Fla. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1126 (1999).  This Court has
upheld the admission of photographs where they are relevant to "explain a medical
examiner's testimony, to show the manner of death, the location of wounds, and the
identity of the victim."  Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. 1995).  
In this case, two photographs were admitted during the guilt phase showing
the victim at the crime scene.  Rutherford now challenges the additional three
photographs of the victim taken at the morgue that were introduced during the
penalty phase.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these
photographs to be admitted into evidence because they were relevant to show the
circumstances of the crime and the nature and extent of the victim's injuries.  See
id.  Further, the trial court only admitted a total of five photographs of the victim in
this case.  See Wilson, 436 So. 2d at 910 (finding no abuse of discretion in
admitting nine autopsy photographs).  Even where we have found error in the
admission of gory autopsy photographs that were not relevant to any disputed
issue, the error can be considered harmless if the photographs played a minor role
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in the trial.  See Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922, 929-30 (Fla. 1999), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 1221 (2000).  Rutherford has not demonstrated that any deficiency in
appellate counsel's performance "compromised the appellate process to such a
degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the result."  Groover, 656
So. 2d at 425.  Therefore, this claim does not form a basis for habeas relief.
In his fifth point, Rutherford asserts that fundamental error occurred when he
was involuntarily absent from the penalty phase charge conference and his counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal.  To the extent that
Rutherford attempts to raise the substantive issue that his right to be present was
violated, this claim is procedurally barred.  See, e.g., Hardwick, 648 So. 2d at 105. 
This claim would not have constituted error, much less fundamental error.  A
defendant has "a constitutional right to be present at all crucial stages of his trial
where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings."  Garcia v. State,
492 So. 2d 360, 363 (Fla.1986); see Cole v. State, 701 So. 2d 845, 850 (Fla. 1997),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1051 (1998).  The constitutional right to be present does not
extend to bench conferences involving purely legal matters because the defendant's
presence would be of no assistance to counsel.  See Cole, 701 So. 2d at 850. 
Similarly, because the trial judge and attorneys only discussed legal arguments at
the charge conference, Rutherford's absence did not frustrate the fairness of the
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proceedings.  See id.  Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
raise non-meritorious issues.  See, e.g., Williamson, 651 So. 2d at 86.
In claim six, Rutherford argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue on appeal that because his trial counsel informed the trial court that
Rutherford had rejected a plea deal, trial counsel was ineffective and operated
under a conflict of interest.  According to Rutherford, this revelation prejudiced
him because the trial court used his lack of remorse as a nonstatutory aggravating
circumstance.  However, in Rutherford's direct appeal, this Court rejected his claim
that the trial court improperly considered his lack of remorse as an aggravating
circumstance.  See Rutherford I, 545 So. 2d at 855-56.  Moreover, to the extent
that Rutherford attempts to raise substantive claims that trial counsel was ineffective
and that trial counsel had a conflict of interest, these issues are procedurally barred
in this proceeding.  See, e.g., Hardwick, 648 So. 2d at 105. 
The Court has previously explained that appellate counsel does not render
ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim of ineffective trial counsel on direct
appeal:
[I]neffective assistance of trial counsel will not be cognizable on direct
appeal when the issue has not been raised before the trial court.  There
are rare exceptions where appellate counsel may successfully raise the
issue on direct appeal because the ineffectiveness is apparent on the
face of the record and it would be a waste of judicial resources to
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require the trial court to address the issue.  Petitioner asks that we
expand this exception by holding, in effect, that not only may it be
raised on direct appeal but that it must be raised on direct appeal, i.e.,
appellate counsel is ineffective for failing to do so.  We decline to do
so.
Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So. 2d 1377, 1384 (Fla. 1987) (citations omitted). 
Because trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness was not apparent from the record,
we find that appellate counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise
trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal. 
We likewise find to be without merit Rutherford's claim that appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on appeal that trial counsel operated
under a conflict of interest.  Rather than asserting a traditional conflict of interest
claim, such as that trial counsel represented a codefendant, Rutherford contends
that counsel put his own interests before his client when he revealed the plea offer,
thus creating a conflict of interest.  In order for this argument to have succeeded on
direct appeal, appellate counsel would have had to establish "that an actual conflict
of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."  Quince v. State, 732 So.
2d 1059, 1065 (Fla. 1999) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 350 (1980)).  This is not a case where trial counsel "actively represented
conflicting interests."  Id. (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350).  Appellate counsel will
-19-
not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise meritless issues.  See, e.g., Kokal, 718
So. 2d at 142.
In his seventh issue, Rutherford asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to argue on appeal that the trial court should have granted the jury's
request to have the testimony of Rutherford and Johnny Perritt, Jr., read back to
them during deliberations.  The judge instructed the jurors to use their collective
recollections regarding the testimony.  First, this issue was not preserved for review
and "appellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to raise issues
which [were] procedurally barred . . . because they were not properly raised at
trial."  Williamson, 651 So. 2d at 86-87; see, e.g., Groover, 656 So. 2d at 425;
Medina, 586 So. 2d at 318.  Second, Rutherford has not demonstrated prejudice
because this would not have constituted fundamental, reversible error had it been
raised on appeal.  The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to
read back testimony to jurors and Rutherford has not shown fundamental error
occurred here.  See State v. Riechmann, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S163, S170, 25 Fla. L.
Weekly S242 (Fla. Feb. 24, 2000).
Finally, in his eleventh claim, Rutherford argues that his appellate counsel
was ineffective for not arguing on appeal that error occurred when the trial court
failed to properly state reasons for imposing the death penalty during the sentencing
-20-
hearing and then failed to file the written sentencing order for eight days.  In
Rutherford II, this Court affirmed the trial court's finding that this substantive claim
was procedurally barred in his 3.850 motion because it could have been raised on
direct appeal, even though couched in terms of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.  727 So. 2d at 218-19 n.2.  We now reject Rutherford's current claim that
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal
because the underlying issue is without merit.
In Van Royal v. State, 497 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1986), this Court vacated a
death penalty sentence because the trial court overrode the jury's life
recommendation without making any oral findings at the sentencing hearing and
then did not file a written sentencing order for six months, which was after the
record on appeal had been certified to this Court.  We stated that as long as
sentencing orders are filed "on a timely basis before the trial court loses
jurisdiction, we see no problem."  Id.  Then, in Muehleman v. State, 503 So. 2d
310, 317 (Fla. 1987), we declined to vacate a death sentence on the grounds that
the sentencing order had been filed two-and-one-half months after the oral
pronouncement of sentence, but prior to the record being certified to this Court.  
In a subsequent case decided after the direct appeal in Rutherford I, the
Court established a prospective procedural rule "that all written orders imposing a
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death sentence be prepared prior to the oral pronouncement of sentence for filing
concurrent with the pronouncement."  Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 841
(Fla. 1988).  However, this Court has previously rejected arguments that Grossman
applied retrospectively to cases in which the penalty phase occurred before the
decision in Grossman.  See Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 291 (Fla. 1990)
(finding no error where sentencing order was filed two months after the oral
pronouncement and six days after the record was certified).  In this case, the
written sentencing order was filed only eight days after the sentencing order and  
Rutherford does not challenge the sufficiency of the written findings.  This short
lapse would not have constituted error under Van Royal, Muehleman, and Holton. 
Appellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to raise issues on
appeal that would have been found to be meritless.  See, e.g., Kokal, 718 So. 2d at
142; Williamson, 651 So. 2d at 86. 
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we deny habeas relief.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Gregory C. Smith, Capital Collateral Counsel, C. Andrew Thomas, Chief Assistant,
Capital Collateral Counsel and Linda McDermott, Assistant Capital Collateral Counsel,
Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Richard B. Martell, Chief, Capital Appeals
and Barbara J. Yates, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent