Title: ECKENROD v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ECKENROD v. STATE2003 WY 5167 P.3d 635Case Number: 02-10Decided: 04/25/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

SEAN 
ROBERT ECKENROD,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, Wyoming State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; 
Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. Kerin. 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Sean W. Scoggin and Julie 
Nye Tiedeken, Special Assistant Attorneys General.  Argument by Ms. 
Tiedeken.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
During 
an investigation of illegal narcotics trafficking, Appellant Sean Eckenrod 
confessed to investigators the location of a large quantity of marijuana he 
intended to sell.  His motion to 
suppress this evidence was denied, and he entered a conditional guilty plea that 
resulted in a 180-day jail sentence followed by an eight-year probation 
sentence.  He appealed the denial to 
suppress, contending that he was arrested without probable cause during the 
investigation when an officer approached him with a drawn gun, he was escorted 
across the street and questioned after being read his Miranda rights, 
confessed involvement, and was then handcuffed and transported to the sheriff's 
office.    

 

[¶2]           
We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Eckenrod 
presents this statement of the issues for our review:

 

I.  Whether the trial court erred in denying 
the motion to suppress statements and evidence?

 

II.  Whether the trial court erred in denying 
the motion to suppress search and seizure, as the seizure of Appellant violated 
Appellant's constitutional rights?

 

The 
State rephrases the issues as:

 

I.  Did the trial court correctly find that 
the detention of Appellant was proper and was not an unreasonable seizure in 
violation of his constitutional rights?

 

II.  Did the trial court properly find 
Appellant's statements to be voluntarily made after he was properly given 
Miranda warnings?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
The 
Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) had received information that 
Eckenrod was involved with the distribution of twenty pounds of marijuana 
provided earlier in the year by Moises Banda Rascon.  On March 17, 2001, Eckenrod was believed 
to have still possessed sixteen pounds and owed the original source 
$8,000.00.  DCI had identified that 
source as a Hispanic male named Elon. The information indicated that, in a 
conversation with Cory Morrison, Eckenrod referred to a pound of marijuana as a 
"cookie."  

  

[¶5]           
Working 
with DCI as an undercover agent, Gillete Police Department Officer Adam 
Edmondson went to Eckenrod's home at about 10:00 p.m. on March 17, 2001, on the 
pretense of collecting the $8,000.00 for Elon.  The officer wore a tape-recorder which 
failed to capture the events that night.  
Two other agents, Peters and Wasson, were to observe from a distance and, 
if Officer Edmondson "had trouble" or "something had gone wrong," he was to 
remove his baseball cap. 

 

[¶6]           
A 
party was underway at Eckenrod's home that night, and about twenty people were 
in and around the home.  Officer 
Edmondson and Eckenrod met outside the home by the driveway under a streetlight, 
and Edmondson tried to convince Eckenrod that he had been sent by Elon.  Eckenrod stated that he did not know 
what he was talking about and began to question the officer.  Believing that Eckenrod knew Edmondson 
was a police officer, Edmondson raised his baseball cap.  Agents Peters and Wasson ran up on foot 
to the pair.  Agent Peters 
approached with his gun drawn, identified himself as a DCI agent, grabbed 
Eckenrod's arm, and patted him down for weapons.  None were found, and he released 
Eckenrod and immediately "walked Eckenrod across the street and conducted an 
interview with him." 

 

[¶7]           
Eckenrod 
was moved across the street and placed under another street light.  Agent Peters testified he told Eckenrod 
that they knew he had been dealing with Moises Banda Rascon, had spoken with 
Cory Morrison about marijuana still in Eckenrod's possession, Eckenrod was 
expecting Elon to come and collect money, and the agents wanted to speak with 
Eckenrod about it.  Agent Peters 
testified that he then advised Eckenrod of his Miranda rights, and 
Eckenrod agreed to talk with officers.  
Eckenrod told them that he knew what they were talking about, used the 
term "cookie," knew Moises Banda Rascon, and asked "[h]ypothetically what 
happens if I tell you where the marijuana is?" 

 

[¶8]           
Eckenrod 
testified that he was questioned for about fifteen minutes before he was read 
his Miranda rights, and did not agree to talk with officers, but did ask 
some "hypothetical" questions.  
Eckenrod agreed that he then did admit his involvement because he thought 
he was under arrest and was assured his cooperation would help him.  The agents testified that while they 
talked with Eckonrod on the street for about ten to fifteen minutes, the 
partygoers were milling about, yelling at the officers, and some had called them 
names. Eckenrod was then handcuffed and taken to the sheriff's office where the 
interview was continued.  He 
consented to searches of his wallet, home, vehicles and a storage shed.  The storage shed contained sixteen 
pounds of marijuana.  

 

[¶9]           
Eckenrod 
agreed to cooperate with agents and was not formally arrested until May 8, 
2001.  Eckenrod filed a motion to 
suppress his statements and evidence on grounds that he had been arrested 
without probable cause.  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that Eckenrod's initial 
encounter with the undercover officer, Edmondson, was a consensual encounter 
that did not involve the Fourth Amendment.  
The trial court then ruled in relevant part:

 

When 
[Officer Edmondson] took off his ball cap and Agent Peters came up to the 
Defendant with his gun drawn, this changed the encounter to a detention.  The initial detention represents a 
seizure of the person which does implicate the Fourth Amendment requiring the 
presence of specific, articulable facts and rational inferences giving rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or maybe committed a 
crime.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  It is clear that the 
Defendant, at this point, was seized; "In view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was 
not free to leave."  U.S. v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980).  
The Defendant was moved across the street and even the agent knew that 
this was a "custodial" detention as he immediately read to the Defendant his 
Miranda rights.  The Defendant 
agreed that he understood his rights and agreed to talk with the officers.  In looking at the reasonableness of this 
investigatory detention, it appears that the officers' actions were justified at 
the inception and were related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.  
Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 637 (Wyo. 2000).  

 

[¶10]      
The 
motion to suppress was denied, and Eckenrod entered a conditional guilty plea to 
two counts and received a 180-day jail sentence followed by an eight-year 
probation term.  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Standard of Review  

 

[¶11]      
Generally, 
we do not disturb a trial court's evidentiary rulings unless the court has 
clearly abused its discretion.  
Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994).  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo. 1998).  We give deference 
to the trial court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress unless they are 
clearly erroneous, recognizing that court has had the opportunity to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence and make the necessary inferences, 
deductions and conclusions.  
Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo. 1995) (citing 
Wilson, 874 P.2d at 218).   
Whether an unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of 
constitutional rights presents a question of law that we review de novo.  Wilson, at 
218.

 

[¶12]      
Warrantless 
searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under both the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 4, of the Wyoming 
Constitution; however, an arrest without a warrant is reasonable if there is 
probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and it was committed by the 
suspect.  Ostrowski 
v. State, 
665 P.2d 471, 476 (Wyo. 1983) (citing Michigan 
v. DeFillippo, 
443 U.S. 31, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979)); see 
also Dickeson v. State, 
843 P.2d 606, 611 (Wyo. 1992).  A 
person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, "in view 
of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave."  Wilson, 
874 P.2d  at 220 (quoting United 
States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 554-55, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980)).  This test "is an objective one:  not whether the citizen perceived that 
he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer's words 
and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person."  McChesney 
v. State, 
988 P.2d 1071, 1074-75 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting California 
v. Hodari D., 
499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991)).  

 

[¶13]      
In 
evaluating whether police-citizen encounters are constitutionally valid, we have 
identified three categories or tiers of interaction between police and 
citizen:

 

[1] 
The most intrusive encounter, an arrest, requires justification by probable 
cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime.  [2] The investigatory stop represents a 
seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment safeguards, but, by its less intrusive 
character, requires only the presence of specific and articulable facts and 
rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has 
committed or may be committing a crime. [3] The least intrusive police-citizen 
contact, a consensual encounter, involves no restraint of liberty and elicits 
the citizen's voluntary cooperation with non-coercive 
questioning.

 

Wilson, 
874 P.2d  at 220 (citations omitted).  

 

 

Validity 
of Detention

 

[¶14]      
Although 
Eckenrod does not agree that the initial encounter between himself and Officer 
Edmundson was consensual, he raises no issue concerning it on grounds that it 
should be considered an arrest requiring probable cause, or that it was an 
investigative detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion, and we agree that 
the officer's initial contact with Eckenrod by appearing at the door of his home 
in an undercover capacity is not at issue.  
We, thus, focus on the intrusiveness of the agents' actions at three 
other discrete times where it appears the nature of the encounter changed.  First, we examine the nature of the 
encounter when Agent Peters approached Eckenrod with a drawn gun, grabbed him, 
and conducted a weapons search; second, we consider the circumstances present 
that caused the agents to move Eckenrod across the street and advise him of his 
Miranda rights; and, lastly, we consider the nature of the encounter that 
resulted when Eckenrod was handcuffed and transported  to the sheriff's 
office.

 

[¶15]      
The 
district court ruled, and the State agrees, that the nature of the encounter 
remained a valid seizure under Terry after Agent Peters arrived on the 
scene with a drawn weapon.  We 
disagree with the assessment that the entirety of the encounter was a Terry 
seizure for the purpose of investigating Eckenrod's criminal involvement in 
a drug conspiracy.  We nevertheless 
believe that, as the nature of the encounter changed, the totality of the 
circumstances indicate that Eckenrod was not arrested without probable 
cause.

 

[¶16]      
Agent 
Peters testified that, in response to seeing Edmondson signal that he was in 
trouble and something had gone wrong, Agent Peters approached Eckenrod with a 
drawn gun, grabbed him, and conducted a weapons search.  These facts require that we examine 
whether the agent's use of force for safety reasons transformed the encounter 
into an arrest requiring probable cause.  
We have previously considered the use of intrusive measures in making 
Terry stops and held that police officers may draw their weapons without 
transforming an otherwise valid Terry stop into an arrest.  Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168 
(Wyo. 1997).  Brown agreed 
with the following statement:

 

While 
Terry stops generally must be fairly nonintrusive, officers may take 
necessary steps to protect themselves if the circumstances reasonably warrant 
such measures.  "[T]he use of guns 
in connection with a stop is permissible where the police reasonably believe 
[the weapons] are necessary for their protection."  United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S. Ct. 1898, 77 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1983).

 

* 
* * *

 

This 
holding is consistent with the recent trend allowing police to use handcuffs or 
place suspects on the ground during a Terry stop.  Nine courts of appeals, including the 
Tenth Circuit, have determined that such intrusive precautionary measures do not 
necessarily turn a lawful Terry stop into an arrest under the Fourth 
Amendment.

 

Id. 
at 1172 (quoting United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462-63 
(10th Cir. 1993)).

 

[¶17]      
We 
examine whether the seizure by Agent Peters was justified at the inception, and 
whether articulable facts existed to demonstrate that Agent Peters had a 
reasonable suspicion to justify the intrusive measures used to ensure his and 
the other agents' safety.  
Brown, 944 P.2d  at 1171.  
We recently summarized our review:

 

[W]e 
have a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory 
stop:  (1) whether the officer's 
actions were justified at the inception;  
and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
that justified the interference in the first instance.  An officer's conduct is judged by an 
objective standard which takes into account the totality of the 
circumstances.  In applying this 
test, the Court has consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing 
the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry. The government has the 
burden of demonstrating that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a 
reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy 
the conditions of an investigative seizure.

 

Damato 
v. State, 2003 
WY 13, ¶9, 64 P.3d 700, ¶9 (Wyo. 2003) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).

 

[¶18]      
Based 
on seeing the prearranged signal of trouble or that something had gone wrong, 
Agent Peters had an objectively reasonable basis to suspect that Eckenrod was 
threatening the safety of Officer Edmundson who had represented himself as a 
member of the drug conspiracy.  
Although Edmundson gave the signal for reasons other than to indicate 
that his safety was jeopardized, Agent Peters acted appropriately in light of 
the information he possessed.  The 
facts show that Agent Peters feared for Officer Edmundson's safety, and this 
fact justified the display of some force and was not unreasonable under the 
circumstances.

 

[¶19]      
The 
district court concluded that a custodial seizure occurred when the agents moved 
Eckenrod across the street and advised him of his Miranda rights.  The district court determined the 
seizure to be an investigative detention supported by reasonable suspicion; 
presumably, the reasonable suspicion was the information that Eckenrod was 
involved in a marijuana trafficking conspiracy.   Eckenrod contends that having been 
approached by an agent with a drawn weapon, grabbed, searched, moved across the 
street, and then advised of his Miranda rights, he justifiably assumed 
that he was under arrest and not free to leave.  He contends that the district court 
erred in failing to conclude that he had been arrested without probable 
cause.

 

[¶20]      
Because 
the district court concluded that the agents moved Eckenrod across the street, 
we must examine whether this forcible move was an arrest.  The record shows that Eckenrod was moved 
after Agent Peters learned that Eckenrod was not carrying a weapon and safety 
concerns were no longer an issue to any of the agents because all three law 
enforcement agents had encircled an unarmed Eckenrod.  However, the record shows that another 
safety issue factor had arisen which justified this intrusive measure as a 
reasonably necessary precaution and did not change the lawful Terry stop 
into an unlawful arrest without probable cause.  Agent Peters testified that he believed 
that it was his idea to move across the street, because persons attending the 
party had begun to yell insults at the three agents and were calling them names 
like "pig," etc.  Both agents 
testified that it seemed appropriate to move away from the hostile crowd and 
place some distance between the men and the crowd.  Courts generally accept that, although 
rare, factual situations do occur that permit a "transport" detention without 
transforming a Terry stop into an arrest requiring probable cause.  People v. Harris, 540 P.2d 632, 
636 (Cal. 1975); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §9.2(g) at 84 (3d 
ed. 1996).   Harris 
stated that when an investigating officer is confronted by a hostile crowd, 
the Fourth Amendment does not mandate that an investigating officer choose 
between continuing the investigation at the risk of personal safety or 
abandoning his investigation. Harris, at 636.  We agree that the agents' 
precautionary measure here was justified.  
We also find that the trial court properly concluded that the officers' 
advising Eckenrod of his Miranda rights indicated that he was a criminal 
suspect being subjected to custodial interrogation; however, being placed in 
police "custody" for purposes of Miranda can occur before a suspect has 
been arrested.  Perdue, 8 F.3d  at 1464.  We hold the trial 
court properly concluded that this part of the encounter was a valid Terry 
stop.

 

[¶21]      
Finally, 
the district court did not make findings or conclusions about the agents' 
handcuffing and transporting Eckenrod to the sheriff's office for further 
interrogation.  The State contends 
that this was part of the investigative detention; however, handcuffing and 
transporting a suspect is an arrest if no circumstances otherwise justify the 
removal.  Harris, 532 P.2d  at 
635-36.  After receiving advice of 
his Miranda rights, Eckenrod agreed to speak with the agents and 
confirmed the information the agents had concerning his involvement in the drug 
conspiracy.  The question is whether 
Eckenrod was arrested with probable cause when he was handcuffed and transported 
to the sheriff's office.  In 
deciding whether probable cause is sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest, 
it must be determined that "the facts and circumstances within the peace 
officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information were 
sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man to believe that the 
person arrested has committed * * * an offense."  Ostrowski, 665 P.2d  at 476.  

 

[¶22]      
Here, 
the agents were investigating Eckenrod's involvement in a drug conspiracy based 
upon information from a recorded telephone conversation and a confidential 
informant.  The agents had probable 
cause to arrest Eckenrod when he confirmed the agents' information and indicated 
that he would show them where the marijuana was being stored, and we find no 
constitutional violation occurred by the agents' handcuffing him and 
transporting him to the sheriff's office.  

 

[¶23]      
Having 
examined the nature of the encounter at each point where it changed, we conclude 
that Eckenrod's seizure was a constitutionally valid investigative detention 
until his statements provided probable cause for his warrantless arrest.  We affirm the district court's order 
denying the motion to suppress on grounds that he had been unlawfully arrested. 

 

[¶24]      
Eckenrod 
contends that this Court has indicated that the Wyoming Constitution may provide 
greater protection when the question is one of a person's seizure, and because 
the record does not show that at the suppression hearing any actual, articulable 
reasons were given for his detention, his convictions should be reversed.  The record does not support this 
assertion, and as Eckenrod does not make any other argument, we decline to 
consider the lawfulness of his detention and arrest under the state 
constitution.

 

 

Voluntariness

 

[¶25]      
Eckenrod 
contends that although he was provided with his Miranda rights, the 
agents' aggressiveness created a coercive atmosphere that frightened him and 
further induced his confession by promising to help him if he cooperated.  He claims that these circumstances 
render his statements involuntary.  
Our standard of review for involuntariness claims states 
that:

 

[t]o 
comply with Miranda, law enforcement must advise an accused of his rights 
before any of the accused's statements, made during custodial interrogation, can 
be used against the accused at trial.  
Failure to comply with these procedural safeguards requires the court to 
suppress such statements.  We review 
the record to determine whether the trial court could conclude, given the 
totality of the circumstances, that the police sufficiently followed 
Miranda. 

Moreover, 
even when Miranda has been complied with, the United States Constitution, 
amendments V and XIV, as well as the Wyoming Constitution, art. 1, §§ 6 and 11, 
require admissions and statements to be voluntary.  To be voluntary, the defendant's 
statements must result from "free and deliberate choice rather than 
intimidation, coercion, or deception."  
Because we presume a defendant's statements to be involuntary, the burden 
rests on the State to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
defendant's statements were voluntary.  
Once the State has met its burden and rebutted the presumption of 
involuntariness, the defendant may be required to present evidence demonstrating 
the involuntariness of his statements.  
If such statements resulted from coercion, then the statements are 
inadmissible at trial for any purpose because their validity is suspect.  

Voluntariness 
is a legal question; thus, we review the ultimate issue, whether a defendant's 
statements were voluntary, de novo. On review, however, we will not disturb the 
trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. We look to the totality 
of the circumstances to determine if the defendant's statements were 
voluntary.  

 

Mitchell 
v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 720-21 (Wyo. 1999) (citations omitted).

 

[¶26]      
In 
considering the totality of the circumstances, we 
consider:

 

[T]he 
atmosphere and events surrounding the elicitation of the statement, such as the 
use of violence, threats, promises, improper influence or official misconduct, 
the conduct of the defendant before and during the interrogation and the 
defendant's mental condition at the time the statement is made.  

 

* 
* * *

 

[A] 
confession offends due process if the suspect's will was overborne by the police 
and the suspect's capacity for self-determination was seriously impaired.   

 

State 
v. Evans, 944 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Wyo. 1997).  The 
district court concluded that Eckenrod was immediately read his Miranda 
rights and agreed that he understood his rights and agreed to talk with the 
officers.  In reviewing the record, 
we believe that the district court properly characterized Eckenrod's actions as 
agreement.  Although he disputed 
that he voluntarily made statements, the record indicates that Eckenrod agreed 
that the agents explained the information they had concerning his involvement, 
had been advised of his right to remain silent, and Eckenrod asked hypothetical 
questions concerning whether it would help if he cooperated with the officers, 
apparently being not so scared as to prevent him from exploring his 
options.  Eckenrod does not claim 
that he did not understand his rights or the significance of confessing or did 
not have the mental capacity to understand his right to remain silent.  The agents testified that Eckenrod was 
told that his cooperation would be reported to the prosecution and this did 
occur.  We have previously rejected 
that this "report-of-cooperation" statement is improper inducement that shows 
one's will was overborne.  Vena 
v. State, 941 P.2d 33, 37-38 (Wyo. 1997).   We hold that Eckenrod's statements were 
voluntary.   We affirm the 
order denying the motion to suppress.