Title: Albanese v. Batman

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Albanese v. Batman, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5814.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-5814 
ALBANESE, EXR., APPELLANT, v. BATMAN ET AL., APPELLEES. 
LIPPERMAN, APPELLANT, ET AL. v. BATMAN ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Albanese v. Batman, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5814.] 
Dormant Mineral Act—R.C. 5301.56—Pursuant to Corban v. Chesapeake 
Exploration, L.L.C., 2006 version of Dormant Mineral Act applies—
Failure to comply with notice and affidavit requirements in R.C. 
5301.56(E)—Mineral interests not deemed abandoned. 
(Nos. 2015-0120 and 2015-0121—Submitted January 6, 2016—Decided 
September 15, 2016.) 
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Belmont County, No. 14 BE 22,  
2014-Ohio-5517, and No. 14 BE 2, 2014-Ohio-5500. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
KENNEDY, J. 
I. Introduction 
{¶ 1} In these discretionary appeals from the Seventh District Court of 
Appeals, we address two cases involving the application of the Ohio Dormant 
Mineral Act (“ODMA”), codified in R.C. 5301.56.  Appellant Wayne Lipperman 
owns a parcel of real property in Belmont County, Ohio, and appellant Mark 
Albanese is the executor of the estate of James Albanese III, which owns a 
separate parcel of real property in Belmont County, Ohio.  Appellees Nile and 
Katheryn Batman claim to hold an interest in the minerals underlying the 
properties owned by Lipperman and the estate of James Albanese.  James 
Albanese, Lipperman, and the Batmans all leased their oil and gas rights in the 
properties at issue herein. 
{¶ 2} James Albanese and Lipperman filed separate actions seeking to 
quiet title to their respective properties, asserting that the severed mineral interests 
held by the Batmans had been abandoned.  They also sought to cancel any oil and 
gas leases executed in relation to the Batmans’ interests in their properties.  James 
Albanese died in May 2013, and Mark Albanese, as the executor of the estate, 
was substituted as the plaintiff in that case. 
{¶ 3} Applying this court’s holding in Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, 
L.L.C., ____ Ohio St.3d ____, 2016-Ohio-5796, ___ N.E.3d ___, we hold that the 
2006 version of the ODMA applies in these cases and because neither James 
Albanese nor Lipperman complied with the notice and affidavit requirements in 
R.C. 5301.56(E), the mineral interests are preserved in favor of their holder, the 
Batmans. 
{¶ 4} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in both 
cases, albeit for different reasons than those expressed in the court of appeals’ 
decisions. 
January Term, 2016 
3 
 
 
II. Facts and Procedural History 
A. The Batmans’ Mineral Interest 
{¶ 5} In 1952, Mayme Sulsberger died and left her interest in the mineral 
rights underlying the properties at issue in this case to her daughter, Frances 
Batman (“Frances”).  On September 9, 1981, Frances executed an “Affidavit and 
Notice of Claim of Interest in Land” that referenced mineral interests that she held 
in properties in Belmont County, Ohio, and she recorded the affidavit in the office 
of the Belmont County Recorder that same month.  Shortly thereafter, Frances 
died, and pursuant to the terms of her will, her mineral interests in the Belmont 
County properties passed to her son, Nile Batman. 
{¶ 6} In 1989, almost eight years after her death, Frances’s will was filed 
in both the Belmont County Probate Court and the Belmont County Recorder’s 
Office. 
B. Lipperman’s Property 
{¶ 7} Lipperman owns 41 acres of property in Pultney Township, Belmont 
County, Ohio.  On April 7, 2006, Lipperman leased the oil and gas rights in his 
property to Reserve.  In January 2007, Reserve assigned the Lipperman lease to 
Equity.  In May 2008, Equity assigned its deep-oil-and-gas rights from the lease 
to PC Exploration, Inc., n.k.a. Phillips Exploration, Inc.   
{¶ 8} In November 2008, the Batmans leased their oil and gas rights in 
Lipperman’s property to Reserve.  In January 2009, Reserve assigned the deep-
oil-and-gas rights from that lease to PC Exploration. 
C. The Albanese Property 
{¶ 9} The Albanese estate owns 104 acres of property in Smith Township, 
Belmont County, Ohio.  In 2011, James Albanese leased oil and gas rights 
underlying his property to Hess Ohio Developments, L.L.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 10} In October 2008, the Batmans leased their oil and gas rights from 
their mineral interests that underlie the Albanese property to Mason Dixon 
Energy, Inc.  Mason Dixon Energy subsequently assigned its rights under the 
Batman lease to Hess Ohio Developments. 
D. Litigation 
{¶ 11} On January 20, 2012, James Albanese filed a quiet-title action 
against the Batmans, Mason Dixon Energy, and Hess Ohio Developments.  On 
February 15, 2012, Lipperman filed a quiet-title action against the Batmans, 
Reserve, Equity, PC Exploration, and XTO Energy, Inc. (a parent company of 
Phillips Exploration).  Lipperman and James Albanese sought to have the mineral 
interests underlying their properties that were held by the Batmans deemed 
abandoned and sought the cancellation of oil and gas leases (or assignment of 
those leases) entered into by the Batmans with the energy companies. 
{¶ 12} Hess Ohio Developments filed a motion for summary judgment in 
the Albanese case, and Reserve and Equity filed a motion for summary judgment 
in the Lipperman case.  Holding that the 20-year look-back period under the 1989 
ODMA is a rolling period,1 the trial court held that the 1981 filing of Frances’s 
affidavit and the 1989 filing of Frances’s will in Ohio both qualified as saving 
events under the 1989 ODMA, thereby preserving the Batmans’ mineral interest, 
as well as the leases (and assignment of leases) made therefrom, in both cases.  
                                                 
1 In Albanese v. Batman, the court of appeals described “rolling” versus “fixed” with regard to the 
look-back period in the 1989 version of the ODMA as follows: 
 
There are two views about the look-back period in the 1989 version of the 
[ODMA].  One view is that it is a rolling period.  In generic terms, if the look-back 
period is rolling and there is a 20 year period where there is no savings event then 
the mineral interest is abandoned.  The other view is that the look-back period is 
fixed.  If it is fixed then the look-back period is twenty years preceding the 
enactment of the statute plus the three year grace period.  Under Ohio’s statute this 
would mean from March 22, 1969 (twenty years prior to the date of enactment) to 
March 22, 1992 (the end of the three year grace period). 
 
2014-Ohio-5517, ¶ 23. 
January Term, 2016 
5 
 
Therefore, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the energy 
companies in both cases. 
{¶ 13} Mark Albanese, as executor, and Lipperman appealed from their 
respective cases.  In each appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred 
in holding that the 20-year look-back period is a rolling period.  Instead, the court 
of appeals held that the 20-year look-back period under the 1989 ODMA is a 
fixed period from March 22, 1969, through March 22, 1989 (20 years before the 
effective date of the 1989 ODMA through the effective date of the 1989 ODMA), 
that is extended to March 22, 1992, by the statute’s three-year grace period.  In 
each case, the court of appeals held that the 1981 filing of Frances Batman’s 
affidavit was a saving event under the 1989 ODMA that operated to preserve the 
severed mineral rights in Frances, and subsequently the Batmans, because it 
occurred within the 20 years prior to March 22, 1989.  Consequently, neither 
opinion considered whether the filing of Frances’s will was a saving event under 
the 1989 ODMA. 
{¶ 14} Mark Albanese and Lipperman appealed to this court; Mark 
Albanese’s case was assigned case No. 2015-0120, and Lipperman’s case was 
assigned case No. 2015-0121.  Each argued in his first proposition of law that the 
look-back period of the 1989 ODMA was a rolling period and in his second 
proposition of law that the recording of an out-of-state will is not a saving event.  
Lipperman argued in a third proposition of law that XTO Energy and Phillips 
Exploration have no standing to appear in case No. 2015-0121. 
{¶ 15} We accepted both cases but held proposition of law No. 1 in each 
case for our decision in case No. 2014-0803, Walker v. Shondrick-Nau.  143 Ohio 
St.3d 1403, 2015-Ohio-2747, 34 N.E.3d 131. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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III. Analysis 
A. The 2006 Version of the ODMA Applies 
{¶ 16} Because James Albanese and Lipperman filed their complaints 
after June 30, 2006, our holding in Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 
____ Ohio St.3d ____, 2016-Ohio-5796, __ N.E.3d __, is dispositive of both 
appeals and renders moot the issues raised in proposition of law Nos. 1 and 2. 
{¶ 17} Both James Albanese’s and Lipperman’s complaints were 
predicated upon the 1989 ODMA, and in resolving the matters, both the trial court 
and the court of appeals applied the 1989 ODMA.  In Corban, however, this court 
was presented with the following state-law question certified by a federal court: 
“Does the 2006 version or the 1989 version of the ODMA apply to claims 
asserted after 2006 alleging that the rights to oil, gas, and other minerals 
automatically vested in the surface land holder prior to the 2006 amendments as a 
result of abandonment?”  Id. at ¶ 1.  We answered that the 2006 version of the 
ODMA applies to claims asserted after June 30, 2006, because the 1989 version 
of the ODMA was not self-executing. 
{¶ 18} Under the 1989 version of the ODMA, a severed mineral interest 
was “deemed abandoned and vested in the owner of the surface” if none of the 
following applied: (1) the mineral interest was in coal or was coal-related, (2) the 
mineral interest was held by the United States, the state, or any other political 
body described in the statute, or (3) a saving event occurred within the statutorily 
provided 20-year period.  Sub.S.B. No. 223, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 981, 985-988 
(“S.B. 223”).  Because “deemed” means only that the mineral interest is presumed 
abandoned, judicial action, typically by way of a quiet-title action, was required 
by the surface owner for a conclusive determination that the mineral interest was 
abandoned and vested in the surface owner.  Corban at ¶ 25. 
January Term, 2016 
7 
 
{¶ 19} The 2006 version of the ODMA2 adds additional requirements.  It 
provides, in R.C. 5301.56(E):  
 
Before a mineral interest becomes vested under division (B) 
of this section in the owner of the surface of the lands subject to the 
interest, the owner of the surface of the lands subject to the interest 
shall do both of the following: 
(1) Serve notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
each holder or each holder’s successors or assignees, at the last 
known address of each, of the owner’s intent to declare the mineral 
interest abandoned.  If service of notice cannot be completed to any 
holder, the owner shall publish notice of the owner’s intent to declare 
the mineral interest abandoned at least once in a newspaper of 
general circulation in each county in which the land that is subject to 
the interest is located.  The notice shall contain all of the information 
specified in division (F) of this section. 
(2) At least thirty, but not later than sixty days after the date 
on which the notice required under division (E)(1) of this section is 
served or published, as applicable, file in the office of the county 
recorder of each county in which the surface of the land that is 
subject to the interest is located an affidavit of abandonment that 
contains all of the information specified in division (G) of this 
section. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
2 The ODMA was amended again in 2014, 2013 Sub.H.B. No. 72, but the relevant language 
remains the same.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 20} Therefore, under the 2006 ODMA, in order for a severed mineral 
interest to be deemed abandoned and vested in the surface owner (1) the mineral 
interest cannot be in coal, (2) the mineral interest cannot be held by certain 
entities, (3) no saving event can have occurred during the relevant period, and (4) 
the surface owner “shall” have served notice and filed the required affidavit.  Use 
of the word “shall” means that the notice and affidavit obligations are mandatory, 
so a surface owner’s failure to provide notice to the mineral-rights holder would 
render further analysis under the ODMA unnecessary.  The mineral rights cannot 
be deemed abandoned if the mineral-rights holder has not been provided notice. 
{¶ 21} This result is confirmed by looking at other parts of the ODMA.  
For example, the statutorily provided 20-year period looks back 20 years from the 
date of the service of notice required by R.C. 5301.56(E) to determine whether a 
saving event occurred that would preclude abandonment of the severed mineral 
interest.  R.C. 5301.56(B)(3).  Absent service of the notice, there is no date from 
which the look back can occur.  Also, the 2006 ODMA specifically provides that 
notice and an affidavit are required before the mineral interest becomes “vested” 
in the surface owner.  R.C. 5301.56(E).  Accordingly, the surface owner’s service 
of the notice and filing of the affidavit are required under the 2006 ODMA, and if 
those requirements are not met, the severed mineral interest cannot be deemed 
abandoned and instead remains with the mineral-interest holder. 
{¶ 22} Therefore, because neither Lipperman nor James Albanese 
complied with the statutory notice and affidavit provisions found in R.C. 
5301.56(E), the severed mineral rights never vested in them, but remain with the 
Batmans.  Because the 2006 version of the ODMA applies in these cases and 
Lipperman and James Albanese failed to comply with R.C. 5301.56(B) and (E), 
the first and second propositions of law are moot. 
January Term, 2016 
9 
 
B. Standing 
{¶ 23} Lipperman’s third proposition of law asserts that “XTO Energy, 
Inc. and Phillips Exploration, Inc., have no standing to appear in this case.”  Not 
only does that proposition of law misconstrue the doctrine of standing by 
attempting to apply it to a defendant’s participation in an action, but the argument 
Lipperman makes under that proposition of law in his merit brief is not properly 
before the court, because he did not raise it in his memorandum in support of 
jurisdiction. 
{¶ 24} Standing relates to a party’s right to make a legal claim or seek 
judicial enforcement of a legal duty or right.  Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of 
Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27, citing 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1442 (8th Ed.2004).  Standing to sue is necessary for 
invoking the jurisdiction of the common pleas court.  Fed. Home Loan Mtge. 
Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 
¶ 24.  To have standing, the party bringing the action must assert a personal stake 
in the outcome of the action.  Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 
2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 23.  A plaintiff establishes standing by 
showing that she suffered an injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s 
conduct and that is likely to be redressed by the requested relief.  Moore v. 
Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 25} Lipperman—the plaintiff in one of the quiet-title actions here—
contends that certain named defendants lack “standing to appear in this case.”  
Reserve Energy Exploration Company, Equity Oil & Gas Funds, XTO Energy, 
Inc., and Phillips Exploration, Inc., are parties to this action because Lipperman 
named them as defendants in his quiet-title complaint; they have not asserted a 
claim for affirmative relief.  Accordingly, the doctrine of standing does not apply 
to Reserve, Equity, XTO, and Phillips.  And when Lipperman appealed the trial 
court’s entry of summary judgment, XTO and Phillips became appellees—and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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were entitled to participate in the appellate process—because they were parties in 
the trial court and because they were among the defendants in whose favor the 
trial court granted summary judgment.  See In re Vacation of Twp. Rd. 114, 
Hancock Cty., 6 Ohio App.2d 73, 77, 216 N.E.2d 768 (3d Dist.1966) (“in every 
appeal, unless otherwise prescribed, the adversary parties in the original 
proceedings who are not parties appellant automatically become parties 
appellee”). 
{¶ 26} Furthermore, Lipperman’s third proposition of law fails for another 
reason.  In his merit brief, Lipperman’s argument under his third proposition of 
law differs substantially from the argument he raised in his memorandum in 
support of jurisdiction.  In his memorandum in support of jurisdiction, he simply 
stated that XTO and Phillips lack standing because prior to oral argument in the 
court of appeals, they filed a release of any interest in the lease entered into by 
appellees Nile and Katheryn Batman.  Now Lipperman focuses on Reserve and 
Equity, not on XTO and Phillips.  And instead of relying on the purported release, 
Lipperman now primarily argues that pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B), Reserve and 
Equity were not entitled either to move for summary judgment or to oppose 
Lipperman’s motion for summary judgment in the trial court because “[n]o claim 
was asserted against Reserve Energy or Equity Oil and Gas with regard to the 
ownership of the oil and gas underlying the property.”3  Because Lipperman did 
not raise that argument in his memorandum in support of jurisdiction, it is not 
properly before this court.  See In re Timken Mercy Med. Ctr., 61 Ohio St.3d 81, 
87, 572 N.E.2d 673 (1991).  Therefore, we reject Lipperman’s third proposition of 
law. 
                                                 
3 The final sentence of Lipperman’s argument under his third proposition of law in his merit brief 
does state, “In addition, since the initiation of this litigation, both Reserve Energy and XTO 
released their leasehold interests in the subject real estate before the hearing before the Court of 
Appeals, and failed to disclose that fact to the Court or opposing counsel.”   
January Term, 2016 
11 
 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 27} This court’s decision in Corban, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-
5796, __ N.E.3d __, is controlling in these cases.  James Albanese and Lipperman 
filed their complaints after June 30, 2006, so pursuant to Corban, the 2006 
version of the ODMA applied to their cases.  In order for a severed mineral 
interest to be deemed abandoned and vested in the surface owner under the 2006 
version of the ODMA, the owner of the surface rights must comply with R.C. 
5301.56(E), which requires the surface owner to serve the mineral-interest holder 
with notice of the owner’s intent to declare the mineral interest abandoned and to 
file an affidavit of abandonment in the county recorder’s office in the county in 
which the property is located.  Because neither Lipperman nor James Albanese 
complied with these requirements, the severed interests in the oil and gas that 
underlie their properties held by the Batmans are preserved. 
{¶ 28} Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the court of appeals, albeit 
for different reasons than those stated in the court of appeals’ opinions. 
Judgments affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by O’NEILL, 
J. 
_________________ 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 29} I concur in the judgment of the majority but disagree with how it 
got there.  The majority opinion is based upon this court’s decision in Corban v. 
Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-5796, __ N.E.3d 
__.  I dissented from the portion of the judgment in Corban that the majority 
relies on in this case.  In Corban, I would have held that former R.C. 5301.56, the 
1989 version of the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act, Sub.S.B. No. 223, 142 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 981 (“1989 ODMA”), automatically reunited mineral rights and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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surface rights in the owner of the surface property in the absence of any saving 
event in any 20-year period within the 1989 ODMA’s purview.  The lead opinion 
in Corban states that the ODMA is not self-executing, that instead, “the surface 
holder was required to bring a quiet title action seeking a decree that the mineral 
rights had been abandoned in order to merge those rights into the surface estate.”  
Lead opinion at ¶ 40.  Regardless, even under my interpretation of the 1989 
ODMA, the interests of appellees Nile and Katheryn Batman were preserved by 
two saving events: the 1981 recording of Frances Batman’s “Affidavit and Notice 
of Claim of Interest in Land” and the 1989 filing of Frances Batman’s will in the 
Belmont County Probate Court and the Belmont County Recorder’s Office.  Thus, 
there was no 20-year period during the purview of the 1989 ODMA without some 
preservation of the Batman interest, and therefore, there was no reunification of 
the mineral rights with the surface rights. 
{¶ 30} We learned in oral argument that the root of the Batman interest 
came from bartering undertaken by Nile Batman’s great-great-grandfather, a 
dentist who traded dental care for interests in his patients’ mineral rights; he put 
them in dentures and they gave him indentures.  Hopefully, there were no hard 
fillings.  Now his patience with those mineral rights has paid off for his progeny, 
a crowning achievement, even if the prices for the commodities involved have 
receded somewhat from their crest.  Somewhere, the good doctor is smiling, 
knowing that ancient fees owed for drilling and extractions have been paid many 
times over by fees paid for drilling and extraction.  He wouldn’t care that the 1989 
ODMA has been rendered toothless. 
 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Lancione, Lloyd & Hoffman Law Offices Co., L.P.A., Richard L. 
Lancione, and Tracey Lancione Lloyd, for appellants in both cases. 
January Term, 2016 
13 
 
Geiger, Teeple, Robinson & McElwee, P.L.L.C., and Bruce E. Smith, for 
appellees Nile E. and Katheryn Batman in both cases. 
Kincaid, Taylor & Geyer, Scott D. Eickelberger, William J. Taylor, David 
J. Tarbert, and Ryan H. Linn, for appellee Hess Ohio Developments, L.L.C., in 
case No. 2015-0120. 
Steptoe & Johnson, P.L.L.C., Lyle B. Brown, and J. Kevin West, for 
appellees Equity Oil & Gas Funds, Inc., and Reserve Energy Exploration 
Company, in case No. 2015-0121. 
Zeiger, Tigges & Little, L.L.P., Marion H. Little Jr., and Christopher J. 
Hogan, for appellees XTO Energy, Inc., and Phillips Exploration, Inc., in case No. 
2015-0121. 
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