Title: WILLIS v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WILLIS v. STATE2002 WY 7946 P.3d 890Case Number: 01-74Decided: 05/22/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

FRANKLIN 
S. WILLIS, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Nadine McLeod, Casper, Wyoming  

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General  

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. 

  

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      Franklin Willis 
was convicted of felony larceny by a bailee under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(b) 
(LexisNexis 2001) for selling three horses which were entrusted to his 
care.  He appeals his judgment and 
sentence claiming insufficient evidence and certain evidentiary errors.  Finding no error, we affirm. 

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Mr. Willis 
presents the following issues for our review:

 

I.

 

            
Whether the evidence was insufficient to show a felonious taking as the 
appellant had an honest good faith belief that he had right and title to the 
property[.]

 

II.

 

            
Whether the Appellant was denied his right to a fair trial as 
[g]uaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the United States and the Wyoming 
Constitutions when the trial court erred by its refusal to allow the appellant 
to introduce evidence to show basis for appellant's belief that the horses had 
been given him by Sondeno.

 

III.

 

            
Whether the appellant was denied his right to a fair trial when the trial 
court erred by allowing hearsay testimony by the state to improperly impeach its 
own witness[.]

 

IV.

 

            
Whether the evidence [was] insufficient to find that the property sold on 
the date charged met the felony limit[.]

 

V.

 

            
Was the cumulative effect of the errors discussed above such that the 
appellant was denied his right to a fair trial[?]

 

The State of 
Wyoming phrases the issues as:

 

            
I.  Was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support 
Appellant's conviction?

 

            
II.  Was Appellant denied a fair trial by the district court's 
evidentiary rulings?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Mr. Willis and 
Kelly Sondeno initially met in the 1980s when they were both raising and racing 
thoroughbred horses.  In June 1995, 
Ms. Sondeno experienced difficulties feeding and maintaining the horses she 
owned.  As a result, Mr. Willis 
agreed to lend her $6,500, to be repaid within a year.  In lieu of interest on the executed 
promissory note, Ms. Sondeno gave Mr. Willis two geldings.  Ms. Sondeno insists that, at the same 
time, they also entered into a lease agreement whereby Mr. Willis would care for 
several of her horses, breed them to his paint stallions, and keep the 
foals.  Ms. Sondeno claims she sent 
several horses1 to Mr. Willis, including the three 
mares that are the subject of Mr. Willis' criminal prosecution: Wears Like Iron, 
Miss Pitty Pat, and Hockey Jeans.  
Although he admitted he did not receive a bill of sale, Mr. Willis argues 
Ms. Sondeno gave all the horses to him because she could not afford to 
appropriately care for them.  

 

[¶4]      Over time, Ms. 
Sondeno made several trips to Mr. Willis' property to check on the horses.  In January 1997, Mr. Willis notified her 
that one of the three mares passed away.  
In the summer of 1997, Ms. Sondeno went to check on her horses and 
noticed the other two mares were gone.  
Mr. Willis told her a veterinarian had put them down due to poor 
health.  In February 1999, Ms. 
Sondeno became suspicious and did an inventory of the horses.  She was able to find only eight.  When she confronted Mr. Willis, he 
maintained he owned the horses.

 

[¶5]      In May 1999, a 
search warrant was executed, and the Wyoming Livestock Board seized the eight 
remaining horses.  An ensuing 
investigation revealed the three mares did not die as Mr. Willis previously 
stated but were sold by him for slaughter at the Billings Livestock Commission 
auction (the auction) on August 24, 1996.  
The investigation also disclosed Mr. Willis had listed himself as the 
owner of the horses and he had received a check from the sale in the amount of 
$1,291.24.  

 

[¶6]      As a result of 
his sale of the three mares, Mr. Willis was charged with one count of felony 
larceny by a bailee under § 6-3-402(b), and he pleaded not guilty.  A jury trial commenced on March 13, 
2000, and he was convicted on March 14, 2000.  The trial court sentenced him to five 
years' probation and ordered him to pay $9,500 in restitution and $100 to the 
crime victims' compensation account.  
He appeals from his judgment and sentence.

 

 

 

                                                                  

[¶7]      Mr. Willis 
contends the state did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction 
for felony larceny by a bailee.  
Specifically, he argues he had a good faith belief that Ms. Sondeno gave 
him ownership of the horses; therefore, he could not be guilty of the crime 
charged.  He further asserts the 
state did not present sufficient evidence to establish the horses were worth 
$500 or more, an element necessary to support his conviction.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-402(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2001).

 

[¶8]      When addressing a 
claim that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction for a crime, 
we apply the following standard:  

 

            
This Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is 
adequate enough to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in 
the light most favorable to the State.  
We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are 
applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable 
and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as 
the jury actually did.  

 

Hodges 
v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 1995) (citation omitted); see also Robinson v. State, 
11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001).  This inquiry does not require a court to 
determine whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Broom 
v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 1985).  Rather, the relevant question is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Id.  This standard 
gives the trier of fact the responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the 
testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the 
facts.  Id.  "Once a defendant has been found guilty 
of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is 
preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the 
evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution.'"  Id. (quoting 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

 

[¶9]      The evidence must 
be evaluated in the context of the elements of felony larceny by a bailee, which 
are set forth in § 6-3-402(b):

 

(b)  A bailee, a public 
servant as defined by W.S. 6-5-101(a)(vi) or any person entrusted with the 
control, care or custody of any money or other property who, with intent to 
steal or to deprive the owner of the property, converts the property to his own 
or another's use is guilty of larceny.

 

To 
sustain Mr. Willis' conviction for felony larceny by a bailee, the state had to 
prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

 

1.  On 
or about the 24th day of August, 
1996

 

2.  In 
Big Horn County, Wyoming

 

3.  The 
Defendant, Franklin S. Willis

 

4.  While 
a bailee entrusted with the control, care or custody of any money or 
property

 

5.  With 
intent to steal or deprive the owner of the property

 

6.  Converted 
the money or property to his own use; and

 

7.  The 
value of the money or property converted was $500.00 or 
more.

 

[¶10]   Mr. Willis does not dispute he sold 
the mares and retained the proceeds of that sale.  He does dispute, however, that he was a 
bailee and intended to steal or deprive Ms. Sondeno of her ownership interest in 
the horses.  We conclude sufficient 
evidence was presented at trial to allow a reasonable and rational jury to find 
the essential elements of the crime of felony larceny by a bailee beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  

 

[¶11]   The evidence favorable to the state 
consisted of testimony that in July 1995 Mr. Willis agreed to lend Ms. Sondeno 
$6,500 in exchange for two geldings as interest.  She then agreed to lease him several 
mares to breed with his paint stallions, and, in turn, his care for the horses 
would ease her financial concerns.  
In 1996, Ms. Sondeno sent the three mares that are the subject of Mr. 
Willis' criminal conviction to him without a bill of sale.  She claims she never transferred 
ownership of the horses to Mr. Willis.  
Rather, she maintains they made an oral agreement that Mr. Willis would 
lease the mares for a period of almost four years and she fully expected their 
return at the end of the lease term.

            

[¶12]   Meanwhile, Mr. Willis told Ms. 
Sondeno that the three mares passed away.  
After her suspicions were raised, however, she confronted Mr. Willis and 
learned the three mares were sold at the auction.  Mr. Willis later admitted he sold the 
mares because they were barren and unable to breed with his stallions.  This testimony was corroborated by Duane 
Homewood who stated that, while employed with the Wyoming Livestock Board, he 
performed a brand inspection for three mares that Mr. Willis intended to sell at 
the auction.  Moreover, a sales 
receipt for three mares totaling $1,291.24 was introduced.  

 

[¶13]   Two additional witnesses supported 
Ms. Sodeno's assertion that Mr. Willis was merely a bailee with no ownership 
interest in the horses.  Both 
witnesses testified they had conversations with Mr. Willis, who told them he was 
going to use the horses for breeding purposes until Ms. Sondeno became 
financially secure.  Mr. Willis' 
claim that he in good faith believed he owned the horses and therefore could not 
have committed the crime charged was fully presented to the jury and clearly 
rejected as evidenced by the guilty verdict.

 

[¶14]   Next, Mr. Willis argues the state 
did not meet its burden of proving the amount of $500 or more, a necessary 
element of the crime of felony larceny by a bailee.  However, when the facts are viewed in a 
light most favorable to the state, the evidence reveals Mr. Willis sold the 
three mares on August 24, 1996, at the auction.  He received a payment in the amount of 
$1,291.24, which clearly exceeds the $500 felony limit.  Importantly, Mr. Willis admitted he sold 
three mares on that date, and the brand inspection records revealed three mares 
with the same general description as the mares in question were sent to the 
auction. 

 

[¶15]   Despite this evidence, Mr. Willis 
subsequently vacillated as to whether two of the horses he sold were in fact the 
particular horses underlying the state's criminal charge.  He contends the testimony establishes 
that two of the mares at issue, Miss Pitty Pat and Hockey Jeans, were bred at 
the time of the sale at the auction and therefore he would not have sold them to 
be slaughtered on the date alleged.  
In support of his contention, Mr. Willis points to the introduction of a 
Stallion Breeding Report at trial that indicated the two mares were bred.  He then notes that the sales receipt 
relied upon by the state confirms the remaining mare was sold for only $310, an 
amount less than the requisite $500 or more necessary to support his 
conviction.  Again, Mr. Willis 
presented evidence to the jury to support his version of the events, but the 
jury soundly rejected it upon giving a guilty verdict.

 

            
It is not our function to weigh the evidence for a determination as to 
whether or not it is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  We have consistently held 
that even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence 
presented, it is the responsibility of the jury to resolve conflicts in the 
evidence.  The factfinder--in this 
case, a jury--did that.  The jury is 
entitled to weigh and disregard the evidence intended to discredit the witnesses 
for the State.  Certainly the jury 
is not obligated to believe the defendant's witnesses.  

            

Broom, 695 P.2d  at 642 (citations omitted).  
The evidence could reasonably support the finding that the three mares 
were sold on the date alleged and the value converted was $500 or more.  In sum, we hold that the jury, as a 
reasonable trier of fact, could find felony larceny by a bailee beyond a 
reasonable doubt.

 

 

 

 

[¶16]   We have repeatedly articulated the 
standard of review for evidentiary rulings:

 

Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include 
determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion.  

 

Solis v. 
State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1999) (citation omitted).  We have described the standard of an 
abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial 
court's choice.  Judicial discretion 
is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  "In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination."  [Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, 
¶7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001).]  
The burden is on the defendant to establish such abuse.  

 

Skinner 
v. State, 2001 
WY 102, ¶25, 33 P.3d 758, ¶25 (Wyo. 2001), cert. denied, 2002 WL 205622 
(2002) (some citations omitted).

 

 

[¶17]   Mr. Willis claims the trial court 
incorrectly permitted inadmissible hearsay when it allowed Irene Holland to 
testify concerning statements made by Mr. Willis' daughter-in-law, Dana 
Willis.  In the state's 
case-in-chief, Ms. Willis denied having any knowledge pertaining to the final 
disposition of the three mares at issue.  
She further denied telling Ms. Sondeno and Ms. Holland that Mr. Willis 
took the mares to the auction.  The 
state then called Ms. Holland to testify.  
Over Mr. Willis' hearsay objection, Ms. Holland recalled the discussion 
she and Ms. Sondeno had with Ms. Willis.  
Ms. Holland testified that Ms. Willis stated Mr. Willis was taking the 
three mares to the sale.  Mr. Willis 
claims error resulted when the state improperly impeached its own witness, Ms. 
Willis.  

 [¶18]  First, any party may attack a witness' 
credibility, including the party calling the witness.  W.R.E. 607.  Thus, the fact that the state called Ms. 
Willis is of no import.  Prior 
inconsistent statements are admissible under W.R.E. 613(b) to impeach by 
contradiction a witness' trial testimony.  
W.R.E. 613(b) provides:  
"Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not 
admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the 
same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him 
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require."  This rule applies when two 
statementsone made at trial and one made previouslyare irreconcilably at 
odds.  In such an event, counsel is 
permitted to show the discrepancy by extrinsic evidence, if necessary.  United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 558 (1st Cir. 1999).  The 
purpose of this type of impeachment evidence is to show a witness to be 
generally capable of making errors in his testimony.  3A John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1017 
(Chadbourn rev. 1970).  In doing so, 
counsel can resort to the witness' own prior statements in which that witness 
has given a contrary version.  
Id.  

 

[¶19]   Prior statements made by a witness 
are not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statements.  W.R.E. 801(d)(1).  The use of a prior inconsistent 
statement is not inadmissible hearsay because it is not offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted.  Rather, it is 
used as a tool to compare both statements and conclude that the declarant has 
erred in making one or the other without determining which statement is 
erroneous.  3A John Henry Wigmore, 
Evidence § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).   

 

[¶20]   Ms. Holland's testimony properly 
falls within the scope of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence.  The state asked Ms. Willis whether she 
could recall previously stating the three mares were sent to the auction.  She was afforded an opportunity to 
explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement and denied ever making such a 
statement or knowing what ultimately happened to the horses.  The defense then had full opportunity to 
explore the issue during her cross-examination.  Next, the state used extrinsic 
evidenceMs. Holland's testimonyto impeach Ms. Willis.  Ms. Holland testified that Ms. Willis 
stated the three mares were sent to the auction.  The state was entitled to introduce 
prior statements made by Ms. Willis that were inconsistent with her trial 
testimony.  Therefore, we conclude 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the impeachment 
evidence.

            

 

[¶21]   Next, Mr. Willis claims the trial 
court improperly declined to admit two Jockey Club certificates of foal 
registration.  The first certificate 
he sought to introduce allegedly indicated Ms. Sondeno transferred ownership of 
one of her horsesCherry Labonto him on September 1, 1989.  The state objected to the admission of 
the certificate on relevancy grounds, and the trial court sustained the 
objection.  The second certificate 
indicated Ms. Sondeno transferred ownership of another horseToy Traderto him 
on August 1, 1995.  He asserts the 
introduction of both certificates would have bolstered his theory that Ms. 
Sondeno intended to transfer ownership of all the horses that he took from her 
property over time, including the three mares at issue.  

 

[¶22]   As to the second certificate, the 
record does not reflect whether the trial court overruled or sustained the 
state's relevancy objection.  The 
record only reveals that the certificate was offered at trial, the state 
objected to its admissibility, and, following a recess, the certificate was 
never mentioned again.  We agree 
with the state that the trial court's failure to make a ruling on the record 
precludes this court from determining whether the trial court abused its 
discretion.  As a proponent of the 
evidence, the defense should have asked the trial court to make a ruling on the 
record in order to preserve this issue on appeal.  Therefore, we are left to determine 
whether the trial court improperly denied admission of the first 
certificate.

            

[¶23]   Relevant evidence is defined as 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."  
W.R.E. 401.  "Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible."  
W.R.E. 402.

            
 

[¶24]   Ms. Sondeno transferred the 
certificate to Mr. Willis nearly seven years before he obtained the several 
horses he claims she gave to him and his alleged criminal conduct occurred.  Of primary concern is, the certificate 
does not relate to the three horses underlying Mr. Willis' criminal 
conviction.  Furthermore, the 
remoteness in time of this occurrence does not make her transfer of the 
ownership of her horses to Mr. Willis, including the three mares, more probable 
than if the certificate was not introduced.  The 1989 transfer of ownership was 
unrelated to Mr. Willis' conviction in time, intent, and legal effect.  See McClellan v. State, 933 P.2d 461, 466 (Wyo. 1997).  Therefore, we 
cannot conclude the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying the 
admission of this document.

 

 

[¶25]   Finally, Mr. Willis claims the 
cumulative effect of the claimed errors discussed within this opinion deprived 
him of a fair trial.  Since there 
was no error with respect to any of Mr. Willis' contentions, this court has no 
premise to consider cumulative error.  
Pearson v. State, 12 P.3d 686, 692 (Wyo. 2000).  

 

[¶26]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Ms. Sondeno claims she leased 
forty-seven horses to Mr. Willis.