Title: People v. Bracey

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 97664-Agenda 17-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							ERNEST BRACEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 2, 2004. 
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	The single issue presented in this appeal is whether defendant's
fundamental right to a jury trial was violated when the circuit court,
relying on a jury waiver executed by defendant in conjunction with his
first trial, retried defendant on a charge of aggravated battery in a
bench trial without first ascertaining whether, for his new trial,
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.
For reasons that follow, we reverse defendant's conviction for
aggravated battery and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND
	On November 30, 2000, defendant, Ernest Bracey, while an
inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center, threw a cup of juice at another
inmate as that inmate was being escorted past defendant's cell by a
correctional officer. Some of the juice splashed onto the arm of the
correctional officer. Based on this incident, defendant was indicted on
a charge of aggravated battery, i.e., that he knowingly made physical
contact of an insulting or provoking nature with a correctional officer
engaged in the execution of his official duties, in violation of section
12-4(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(6)
(West 2000)).
	On March 20, 2002, defendant appeared before Judge Frobish in
the circuit court of Livingston County. Defendant executed a written
jury waiver and the court, after duly admonishing defendant of his
right to a jury trial, accepted the waiver, ruling that defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. A bench trial
was then held on April 25, 2002. The defense presented no evidence
and defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery. After a
sentencing date was selected, the court asked defendant if he had
anything he wished to say. In reply, defendant asked why he had not
been given an opportunity to speak during trial. Upon further inquiry
by the court, it became clear that defendant had wanted to testify on
his own behalf. Defense counsel admitted that he had not spoken to
defendant that day about whether defendant wanted to testify. The
trial court also acknowledged its own error in failing to independently
inquire whether defendant wished to testify. Accordingly, the court
ruled that defendant had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to testify. The court vacated its judgment and granted defendant
a new trial. Explaining this to defendant, the court stated:
		"[M]y finding here is vacated. You are going to get another
chance with another judge. And at that time if you want to
testify, you will be able to testify. So this other judge won't
know anything about the case."
	During a discussion on scheduling the new trial date, the court
clerk announced, "We are changing the date of the bench trial."
	On July 17, 2002, defendant appeared before Judge Frank for his
new trial. When Judge Frank called defendant's case, he made the
following opening remarks:
		"Cause comes on for bench trial. I just verified to be sure that
there was a jury waiver taken, and I see that there was by
Judge Frobish back on March 20 of 2002. So anything,
[prosecutor], before we start with the evidence?"
	Neither the prosecutor, nor defense counsel, raised any
preliminary matters. Defendant's second bench trial commenced. After
hearing all of the evidence, the circuit court found defendant guilty of
aggravated battery and subsequently sentenced defendant to two years
imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the sentence defendant
was already serving.
	Defendant appealed his conviction to the appellate court. He
argued, for the first time, that his March 20, 2002, jury waiver,
executed prior to his first trial, was not a valid jury waiver with
respect to his second trial and that the circuit court erred when, prior
to his second trial, it failed to ascertain whether he wished to waive
that right. In a split decision, the appellate court affirmed defendant's
conviction. 345 Ill. App. 3d 314. Two justices found that the waiver
of a jury trial was made with defendant's knowledge and consent
because he never sought to withdraw his earlier written waiver and
"silently acquiesced in the court's and counsel's statements [regarding
the earlier jury waiver] made in his presence on the day of trial."
Justice Knecht dissented, holding that defendant's reassertion of a jury
waiver should not be inferred because our justice system requires a
defendant to "affirmatively and knowingly waive his right to a jury
trial."
	We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315.

ANALYSIS
	The right to a trial by jury is a fundamental right guaranteed by
our federal and state constitutions. In People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce,
126 Ill. 2d 209, 212-13 (1988), we discussed the right to trial by jury,
stating, "We are dealing here with one of the most revered of all rights
acquired by a people to protect themselves from the arbitrary use of
power by the State."  
	A defendant may, of course, waive the right to a jury trial, but
any such waiver, to be valid, must be knowingly and understandingly
made. 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 2002) ("Every person accused of an
offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless ***
understandingly waived by defendant in open court"); In re R.A.B.,
197 Ill. 2d 358, 364 (2001); People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327, 332
(1984). Whether a jury waiver is valid cannot be determined by
application of a precise formula, but rather turns on the particular
facts and circumstances of each case. In re R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d  at 364;
Frey, 103 Ill. 2d  at 332. A written waiver, as required by section
115-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 ("All prosecutions
*** shall be tried by the court and a jury unless the defendant waives
a jury trial in writing" (emphasis added) (725 ILCS 5/115-1 (West
2002))), is one means by which a defendant's intent may be
established. However, adherence to this provision, while
recommended, is not always dispositive of a valid waiver. See People
v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283 (1999). Nor is the lack of a written waiver
fatal, if it can be ascertained that the defendant understandingly
waived his right to a jury trial. See People v. Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d 462
(1997). For a waiver to be effective, the court need not impart to
defendant any set admonition or advice. People v. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d 327, 334 (1985). Generally, a jury waiver is valid if it is made by
defense counsel in defendant's presence in open court, without an
objection by defendant. See People v. Murrell, 60 Ill. 2d 287 (1975);
People v. Sailor, 43 Ill. 2d 256 (1969). However, as noted by this
court in People v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283, 285 (1999), "We have never
found a valid jury waiver where the defendant was not present in open
court when a jury waiver, written or otherwise, was at least
discussed."
	Whether defendant knowingly and understandingly waived his
fundamental right to a jury trial when he was retried on the charge of
aggravated battery is the issue in the case at bar. Because the facts of
this case are not in dispute, the question is a legal one and our review
is de novo. In re R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d 358 (2001). We note, too, that in
this case, as in In re R.A.B., defendant's failure to question the validity
of the jury waiver in the circuit court, either by objection or in a
posttrial motion, does not mean that he has forfeited the alleged error
on review. See In re R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d  at 362-63. Whether a
defendant's fundamental right to a jury trial has been violated is a
matter that may be considered under the plain error rule. In re R.A.B.,
197 Ill. 2d  at 363. See also People v. Owens, 336 Ill. App. 3d 807
(2002); People v. Williamson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 54, 57 (1999).
	In the case at bar, it is undisputed that defendant executed a
written jury waiver and, in addition, was admonished with regard to
his right to a jury trial. This took place, however, on March 20, 2002,
prior to his first bench trial before Judge Frobish. The question here
is whether the admonishments received and the written jury waiver
given in conjunction with defendant's first trial, considered in light of
defendant's acquiescence to a second bench trial, are enough to show
that defendant knowingly and understandingly waived his right to a
jury trial when he was retried on the charge of aggravated battery
before Judge Frank. We find that the evidence does not support a
finding that defendant knowingly consented to a jury waiver at his
retrial.
	The written waiver and admonishments which occurred on March
20, 2002, were no longer of any effect once defendant's first trial
terminated. In People v. Mixon, 271 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1002 (1994),
our appellate court noted, "[t]he importance of the right to a jury trial
as it relates to retrials was recognized very early in Illinois." Quoting
Town of Carthage v. Buckner, 8 Ill. App. 152, 154 (1880), the Mixon
court held that the well-established rule is that " 'a waiver of a jury on
one trial, is expended by that trial.' " Mixon, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 1002.
See also People v. Schwartz, 3 Ill. 2d 520, 524 (1954) (a defendant's
jury waiver is "set aside" by a remand for a new trial de novo); People
v. Johnson, 222 Ill. App. 248 (1921) (trial court erred in conducting
a second trial as a bench trial because the written waiver executed
before the first trial expired after that trial had ended and a new trial
was awarded); United States v. Lee, 539 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1976) (the
right to a jury trial is a fundamental right and a waiver should not be
presumed to include second trial); Burnham v. North Chicago St. Ry.
Co., 88 F. 627, 629 (7th Cir. 1898) (the waiver of the "high and
sacred constitutional right" of trial by jury should be strictly construed
in favor of the preservation of the right).
	In light of such strong and well-settled precedent, we are
compelled to conclude that the circuit court's ruling on March 20,
2002, that defendant knowingly and understandingly waived his right
to a jury trial, which was based on the written waiver and oral
statements made by defendant in open court that day, is of little
evidentiary value and no legal effect with regard to the issue of
whether defendant knowledgeably consented to give up his right to
trial by jury at his new trial. The question, then, is whether statements
made in defendant's presence prior to his second trial provide a
sufficient basis for finding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to a jury at his retrial. Again, we find the evidence
insufficient to support such a finding.
	It is clear from the record that when Judge Frobish vacated his
judgment after defendant's first bench trial, he assumed that retrial
would also be a bench trial. Nothing in the record indicates that
defendant was ever advised that upon retrial he would again have the
choice to be tried by a jury. To the contrary, everything in the record
indicates that defendant was led to believe that his jury waiver,
executed on March 20, 2002, obligated him to a bench trial once
again. Judge Frobish told defendant that he was "going to get another
chance with another judge." The discussion that followed the vacature
of the judgment after defendant's first trial shows that the new trial
was automatically scheduled for a new bench trial.
	The record shows that defendant did not appear in court again
until he appeared before Judge Frank for his new trial. At that time,
Judge Frank never ascertained whether defendant intended to waive
his right to a jury trial. Instead, the court simply relied upon the fact
that the March 20, 2002, written waiver was in the record-again
leading defendant to believe that his earlier choice to forgo a jury trial
was still binding on him.
	Given the fact that defendant's written waiver was no longer
effective and given the fact that, prior to defendant's second trial,
defense counsel made no statements in defendant's presence indicating
that defendant was electing, once again, to give up his right to trial by
jury, defendant's silent acquiescence to a second bench trial is
insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly and voluntarily
relinquished his fundamental right to trial by jury. For this reason,
defendant's conviction must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
	The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed
and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.