Title: State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation v. Hull

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation v. Hull1988 WY 23751 P.2d 351Case Number: 87-178Decided: 03/02/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF 
REVENUE AND TAXATION, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT),

v.

MICHAEL ALAN HULL, 
APPELLEE (PETITIONER).

Appeal from the State 
Department of Revenue and Taxation.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mark Quiner, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
for appellant 
(respondent).

Norman E. Young 
of Hill, Young & Barton, Riverton, for appellee 
(petitioner).

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     A motor vehicle driver, 
stopped by a police officer for observed erratic driving, refused to take a 
blood-alcohol test. Suspension under the Wyoming implied-consent law as confirmed by an 
administrative hearing based on the state department implied-consent form as 
evidence, was reversed on appeal to the district court as insufficiently 
justified by the form as hearsay evidence. We reverse for reinstatement of the 
suspension.

[¶2.]     Appellant, State of 
Wyoming, 
Department of Revenue and Taxation, phrases the issues as whether the district 
court erred in:

1. "RULING THAT THE 
HEARING EXAMINER'S DECISION WAS BASED SOLELY UPON HEARSAY WHEN THIS ISSUE WAS 
FIRST PRESENTED BY APPELLEEON APPEAL TO THE DISTRICT 
COURT;"

2. "FINDING THE HEARING 
EXAMINER'S DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE;"

3. "APPELLEE WAIVED HIS 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FAILING TO SUBPOENA 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER."

FACTS

[¶3.]     In September 1986, at 
2:30 a.m., appellee Michael Alan Hull, when driving home, was stopped for a 
suspected driving-while-under-the-influence violation. The police officer became 
suspicious, and effectuated the stop when appellee failed to start up 
immediately from a flashing red traffic light and demonstrated a somewhat 
erratic driving pattern ending in failure to yield to the officer's police car 
operating with its emergency lights on. Hull admitted he had been drinking that day, 
but contended that it was sometime earlier.1 Evidence supporting suspension is 
solely derived from the Department of Revenue and Taxation's form used to report 
implied-consent violations to the department. The procedure followed by the 
department is to send a notice of suspension and temporary Wyoming driver's license 
form FSFR-6(4/86) to the licensee, which form advises of right to hearing, and 
further:

"If you want to have the 
Peace Officer at the hearing, YOU MUST specifically request the Officer be 
Subpoenaed and YOU will be liable for any expenses incurred because of the 
Subpoena. This request may be made at the time you request the 
hearing."

[¶4.]     A hearing was requested 
in this case and was convened October 21, 1986, involving the hearing officer, 
Hull and his 
attorney, but without subpoena for the arresting officer. The hearing examiner 
accepted the completed state report in evidence without objection, and read its 
text to the attorney and license-suspended driver.

[¶5.]     Modest conflict existed 
between the text of the report and the subsequent testimony of the driver about 
the swerving in his driving, but the principal conflict arose wherein the driver 
said that he started to take the first alcohol-influence test as a heel-to-toe 
observation, and then refused to take other tests, as compared to the report 
which recited that four other tests, horizontal gaze nystagmus, one-leg stand, 
alphabet, and finger count, were given, all of which demonstrated 
insobriety.

[¶6.]     Hull presented two defenses at the suspension hearing, 
those being insufficient evidence to establish probable cause, and that the City 
of Riverton ordinance under which Hull was charged did not 
incorporate the state statutory implied-consent law. Argument was presented to 
the court that this latter issue was pending before a district judge of that 
judicial district and that a decision would be forthcoming before the end of the 
year. As a consequence of the diligence of that argument and the absolute 
conflict between the statement and the testimony about the tests given, by 
stipulation and request of Hull the hearing was continued until January, 
1987. A hearing officer specifically asked counsel for the driver: "Do I have 
your word that you would request a subpoena of the officer?" to which the 
response was given, "Oh yeah, yeah. We'll get him here." Further inquiry later 
substantiated that the attorney would get the police officer by subpoena to the 
continued January hearing date.

[¶7.]     When the hearing was 
reconvened on January 20, 1987, the police officer was again not present, the 
explanation by driver's counsel for his absence being that he had "overlooked 
doing it." At this juncture, for the first time the argument was made that the 
report form alone was not sufficient to establish the burden of proof and 
persuasion required on the four issues necessary to be demonstrated to uphold 
the validity of the suspension upon refusal to take the implied-consent tests. 
Those criteria had at the first hearing been enunciated by the hearing examiner 
as (1) driving under the influence; (2) arrested; (3) advised to submit, or the 
consequence being suspension; and (4) refusal to take the test, all of which are 
consistent with the scope of the revocation hearing provided by § 31-6-103(b), 
W.S. 1977, 1987 Cum.Supp.

[¶8.]     The only issue 
addressed in the second hearing was the factual basis of the contention of 
driving under the influence, focusing on the dispute between the report and 
Hull as to 
whether a number of tests were taken, or whether he simply discontinued the 
first test and refused to take any others.

[¶9.]     The generic substantive 
question of this proceeding is whether the Department of Revenue and Taxation 
can impress the burden of subpoenaing the arresting officer on the driver, or 
whether the department in the first instance is obligated to undertake that 
burden by subpoenaing the arresting officer to be available to testify at each 
administrative hearing. The procedural problems portrayed are: first, the 
failure to object to the introduction of the evidence;2 second, the assumption of 
responsibility by the driver to request the arresting officer's presence at the 
second hearing, an assumption which was not fulfilled; and third, that the 
record presented to this court on appeal does not include a written 
transcription of the hearing tape recordings as is required by our case of 
recent vintage of Lindsey v. State, Wyo., 725 P.2d 649 
(1986).

[¶10.]  We are going to surmount the disaffinity 
of all of these procedural imbroglios in the interest of judicial economy and 
the immediate operation of the implied-consent process within the Wyoming 
Department of Revenue and Taxation by addressing the principal issue: whether 
the use of this implied-consent report form alone is sufficient to support a 
license suspension.

[¶11.]  The parameters of this question involve 
two aspects: admissibility of this document, and due-process considerations. 
This implied consent form3 required by § 31-6-102(g), W.S. 
1977, 1987 Cum.Supp. is a public record4 and falls within Rule 803(8), 
W.R.E. as a hearsay exception:

"The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness:

* * * * * 
*

"(8) Public records and 
reports. - Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of 
public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or 
agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant 
to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and 
other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and 
against the state in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an 
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness; * * *." 
(Emphasis added.)

Further, the 
legislature has provided that the form shall be treated like any other document 
executed under oath, by providing in § 31-6-102(g), W.S. 1977, 1987 Cum. 
Supp.:

"(g) For the purposes of 
this section, the signed statement submitted by the peace officer shall be 
deemed a sworn statement and shall be subject to penalties for 
perjury."

[¶12.]  We would answer the first inquiry by 
recognizing that § 31-6-102(g) provides a basis for admissibility and for our 
conclusion that the legislature intended that the statement could be used as 
dispositive evidence although subject to contest by other available evidence 
with weight to be given by the factfinder.

[¶13.]  Additionally, the department's form 
provides places, as does the National Safety Council's Alcohol Influence Report 
Form, Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal/Civil, § 7.09, (Figures 
7-4, 7-4A), for the officer to list the specific reasons causing the officer to 
suspect the individual is under the influence. Thus, the department's form is 
not just a bare affidavit that some jurisdictions have struck down as too 
conclusory when the officer only swears in the form to have had "reasonable 
grounds" for stopping the vehicle and requesting the test. Jaubert v. Department 
of Public Safety, La. App., 323 So. 2d 212 
(1975).

[¶14.]  The second aspect of the form is a 
due-process inquiry of a right to cross-examination and a right of confrontation 
as guaranteed by the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions. This second 
issue has been currently addressed by other jurisdictions which have found, as 
we now agree, that the right can be derived by the availability of the police 
officer, provided that the subpoena responsibility remains with the driver. Hull 
relies primarily on a Colorado Court of Appeals decision, Kirke v. Colorado 
Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, Colo. App., 724 P.2d 77 (1986), 
as the foundational basis of his constitutional attack. The court in Kirke held 
that the licensee's due-process rights were violated when only hearsay evidence 
was used to prove one of the elements in the revocation hearing. However, the 
Colorado Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' due-process holding of 
Kirke. Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division v. Kirke, Colo., 743 P.2d 16 (1987). Furthermore, the 
Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in four similar cases that relied on 
the due-process holding in Kirke, and reversed and remanded each of the four 
based on the Court of Appeals' erroneous due-process holding in Kirke. Clearly, 
Colorado has 
now adopted a view that hearsay evidence alone can be used to establish a 
revocation element because the licensee is not denied due process if the hearsay 
is sufficiently reliable and trustworthy, and "the evidence possesses probative 
value commonly accepted by reasonable and prudent persons in the conduct of 
their affairs." Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division v. Kirke, 
supra, 743 P.2d  at 21; Colorado Division of Revenue v. Lounsbury, Colo., 743 P.2d 23 (1987); Charnes v. Lobato, Colo., 743 P.2d 27 (1987); Heller v. 
Velasquez, Colo., 743 P.2d 34 (1987); Charnes v. Olona, Colo., 743 P.2d 36 
(1987).

[¶15.]  California recently has been faced with a 
situation nearly identical to the instant case in Snelgrove v. Department of 
Motor Vehicles, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1364, 240 Cal. Rptr. 281, 282 (1987), where the 
court held that the arresting officer's sworn statement from a drunk-driving 
stop can supply sufficient proof, in an administrative hearing before the 
Department of Motor Vehicles, to suspend or revoke the motorist's license even 
if the officer does not personally testify and the motorist offers contrary 
proof.

[¶16.]  The court in Snelgrove also was 
confronted with the issue of who must subpoena the officer. The issue in that 
case, as in the case at bar, became a question not necessarily of what process 
is due, but one of who has to pay for it. That court held that due-process 
concerns were satisfied if the licensee is offered the chance to subpoena the 
officer and fails to do so. Id. at 289. In concurrence with those 
carefully reasoned opinions, we would find that due process is available if the 
hearing officer affords the driver an opportunity to secure the attendance of 
the police officer, if he wishes, and that, if necessary, a continuance will be 
granted if impedance to the presence of the desired witness should otherwise 
occur in a fashion uncontrolled by action of the contesting driver. 

[¶17.]  Experienced trial counsel come to 
recognize that the best evidence that will ever be available in a general way as 
to what happened in an automobile accident or arrest situation is the 
immediately-inscribed motor vehicle report of the available officer. Assiduous 
cross-examination of its author as to the text of the report may generally only 
serve to solidify confirmation of the included facts for fact-finding emphasis. 
To the contrary, however, in the interest of the right to cross-examine and 
challenge, the opportunity should be afforded. Here the licensee was properly 
afforded that opportunity which he simply neglected to exercise. Thus, we will 
not reject a process authenticated by the statutory scheme and specifically 
provided for in the rules, regulations, and forms of the department, because of 
defense attorney decision or indecision. It will be the driver and not the State 
that will bear the responsibility of challenging the validity of the 
implied-consent suspension action through subpoenaing the officer to testify 
when the decision is made to challenge the veracity or validity of the filed 
form.

[¶18.]  Hull off-handedly questions the standard of 
probable cause to be applied to the license revocation hearing in contending 
that the probable cause must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to stop and 
request the test. Clearly, § 31-6-102(a)(i)(C), W.S. 1977, 1987 Cum.Supp., 
requires the peace officer to have "probable cause" that the licensee was 
driving while under the influence. However, a license revocation hearing is 
civil in nature and the probable cause must only be proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Price v. Reed, Okla., 725 P.2d 1254, 1258 (1986); State v. 
Nordness, 128 Wis.2d 15, 381 N.W.2d 300, 308 (1986); 2 Nichols, Drinking/Driving 
Litigation: Criminal and Civil § 20.23.

"* * * An implied consent 
violation is purely administrative and separate from any traffic or criminal 
drinking/driving infraction even though the implied consent law and the law 
defining drinking/driving offenses may be contained in the same statute." 2 
Nichols, Drinking/Driving Litigation: Criminal and Civil § 20.01, 
Ch. 20 at 3.

Thus it is not 
required to apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the 
officer's probable-cause decision as considered at the revocation hearing. The 
officer's probable cause must be derived from what he perceived at the scene of 
the stop from the totality of the circumstances constituting specific, 
articulable facts which supported the decision. With a defined responsibility 
for public safety, did the officer have cause for question and consequent reason 
for action? State v. Nordness, supra; Nicholls, supra, § 
20.09.

"`The terms "reasonable 
grounds" and "probable cause" are substantially the equivalent, and probable 
cause is held to exist where the facts and circumstances within the officer's 
knowledge and of which he has reasonably 
trustworthy information are sufficient to cause a reasonably cautious police 
officer to believe that an offense has been committed.' People v. Nanes, 174 
Colo. 294, 
298-99, 483 P.2d 958, 961 (1971) (emphasis added). This probable cause approach 
has been adopted in the analysis of license revocation hearing issues, and 
requires case-by-case evaluation of the relevant facts and circumstances. 
Zamora v. Department of Rev., 616 P.2d 1003 
(Colo. App. 
1980)." Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division v. Kirke, supra, 
743 P.2d  at 18.

See also Annot., 
88 A.L.R.2d 1064.

[¶19.]  Little need be said further in this case 
to find substantial evidence and justification from the terms of the report and 
the detail of the statements of this driver to find an adequate factual basis to 
sustain the order of suspension and hold that the officer had reasonable grounds 
to stop the driver and request that he submit to the test. It is unquestioned 
that the police officer, early in the morning, saw the driver doing something 
which caused his inquiry and concern and caused him to stop the vehicle. It is 
furthermore not disputed that, at the least, upon alighting the driver started 
to take a test and then refused to take further tests for no stated reason, or, 
conversely, took and failed four tests. Unquestionably, upon being advised of 
the obligation under the implied-consent law, the driver refused to submit to a 
test. 

[¶20.]  The philosophic basis of implied-consent 
laws was to move the inquiry from the subjective opinions and the objective 
observations and conclusions of the arresting officer to a circumstance of more 
mathematical certainty by chemical-analysis determination. Society has moved far 
too specifically in this direction for this court now to question the 
philosophic parameter or the legislative prerequisites in addressing one of the 
most socially pervasive difficulties of contemporary society.5

[¶21.]  We determine that the arresting officer 
form as prepared by the State of Wyoming is properly admissible as a public 
record and official document as an exception to the hearsay rule, pursuant to 
Rule 803(8), W.R.E., and that the right to confrontation and due process is 
protected and sustained provided that the accused driver is afforded an 
opportunity at his election and expense to subpoena the arresting officer for 
cross-examination. Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 
supra.

[¶22.]  Reversed and 
remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1 Leaving Riverton at 2:30 
a.m. to return home in the country, a driver could not have been in immediately 
prior attendance at a movie theatre or bingo parlor. Public places at that hour 
are somewhat restricted to bars with a 2:00 a.m. closing time, or restaurants, 
some of which also have bars. At that morning hour, police-officer heightened 
scrutiny might occur shortly after bar closing time.

2 Since Hull never objected to the 
report initially read into evidence, this court would not need to reach the more 
substantive issue. Failure to make a contemporaneous objection or raise the 
issue at trial amounts to a waiver of the issue on appeal. United States v. 
Kragness, 830 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1987). For an article on the nuts and bolts of 
how to prepare for an implied-consent hearing, see Hanewich, How to Handle 
Implied Consent Hearings, Vol. 1 No. 3 DWI Journal: Law & Science 17 
(1986).

3 The implied consent form 
provides:

"STATE OF 
WYOMING ) 
                
Agency __________ ) 

COUNTY OF ______ 
) ss.               
Citation No. ____ 

"SWORN 
STATEMENT

"I, 
______________________, a peace officer in the State of Wyoming do solemnly 
swear, That on _______, I had probable cause to believe [Name] [Drivers license 
#] [DOB] [SSN if available] [present address] [City] [State] [Zip] hereinafter 
called Driver, had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle upon a public street or highway while under the influence of alcohol or 
a controlled substance to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely 
driving such vehicle, for the following reasons:

"INITIAL 
CONTACT:

"DRIVER'S 
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: (Describe)

Odor of Alcohol 
____________________________ 

Speech 
_____________________________________ 

Balance 
____________________________________ 

Signs of Complaints of 
Injury ______________

"PRE-ARREST 
STATEMENTS:

"FIELD SOBRIETY 
TESTS: (Describe test, and driver's performance)

1.

2.

3.

"DID DRIVER TAKE 
MORE THAN ONE (1) CHEMICAL TEST? _______________

If yes, 
why?

"ADDITIONAL 
INFORMATION:

"that the Driver was 
arrested for an offense as defined by Wyoming Statute 
31-5-233.

"That I advised the 
Driver that his failure to submit to all required chemical tests requested of 
his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol content of 
his blood shall result in the suspension for six (6) months of his Wyoming 
Driver's license and his privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle.

"That I advised the 
Driver if a test is taken and the results indicate he is under the influence of 
alcohol, he may be subject to criminal penalties and his Wyoming drivers license 
and his privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for ninety (90) 
days.

"That I advised the 
Driver he may be taken to the nearest hospital or clinic and secure any or all 
required tests at his own expense or he could have the tests administered by a 
person at a place and in a manner prescribed by and at the expense of the agency 
employing me.

"(Check box 
indicating applicable paragraph below)

[] That I 
requested the Driver to submit to the chemical tests prescribed by my agency or 
secure the tests at his own expense but he refused to do 
either.

[] That the 
Driver did submit to the requested tests and the result indicated he was under 
the influence of alcohol by a blood alcohol content of ____ 
%.

"I, 
______________________, Badge # ____ am a duly authorized and sworn Peace 
Officer in the State of Wyoming. I hereby certify that this statement 
was prepared following the arrest of the named driver and during the normal 
course of my employment as a Peace Officer. I further certify that the 
information it contains is true and correct.

_________________________ 

Peace Officer's 
Signature"

Form 

FSFR-5(5/85).

4 The peace officer under 
§ 31-6-102(d), W.S. 1977, 1987 Cum.Supp. is required to submit his signed 
statement to the department if a person under arrest refuses to submit to 
chemical test.

5 See Reese and Borgel, 
Summary Suspension of Drunken Drivers' Licenses - A Preliminary Constitutional 
Inquiry, 35 Admin.L.Rev. 313 (1983). For an analysis of Wyoming's 1985 amendments 
in this area, see Comment, The New Implied Consent Amendments: A Step in the 
Right Direction, XXI Land & Water L.Rev. 165 (1986).