Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, SUBLETTE COUNTY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, SUBLETTE COUNTY2001 WY 9133 P.3d 107Case Number: 00-248Decided: 10/04/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                             
 

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE BOARD OF

COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS, SUBLETTE

COUNTY, 
WYOMING, SECTION 14

PETITION, 
BEFORE THE STATE BOARD

OF 
EQUALIZATION, Docket Nos. 97-3 and 97-10:

 

STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., SUBLETTE

COUNTY 
BOARD OF COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS 
FOR SUBLETTE

COUNTY, 
WYOMING, 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

                                                                                                

STATE OF 
WYOMING, STATE

BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION,  
and

ROBERTA 
A. COATES and

RON 
ARNOLD, the two acting members

of said 
board,

 Appellees(Respondents).

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
John C. McKinley and Nancy D. Freudenthal of Davis & Cannon, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellees: 

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney 
General; and Harry D. Ivey, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and VOIGT, JJ., and DONNELL, 
D.J.

  
            
VOIGT, Justice.

 [¶1]      The Board of 
County Commissioners for Sublette County (Sublette County) sought a writ of 
mandamus in the district court directing the State Board of Equalization (the 
Board) to utilize contested case procedures in addressing a petition filed under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv) (Michie 1997).  We affirm the district court's denial of 
the writ of mandamus.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Two interrelated 
issues are raised in this appeal:

 

            
1.         
Whether Wyoming law requires that a "careful examination" under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv)now Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-102.1(c)(x) 
(LexisNexis 2001)be conducted by full contested case 
proceedings.

 

            
2.         
Whether the district court's denial of the petition for writ of mandamus 
directing the Board to conduct full contested case proceedings was in accordance 
with Wyoming law.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      This appeal 
constitutes one more chapter in a lengthy tax dispute involving Exxon 
Corporation (Exxon), Sublette County, and the Board.  Sublette County filed a Petition for 
Board Examination pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv) (Section 14) on 
January 23, 1997.  Sublette County 
requested that the Board investigate allegations that a 1989 Settlement 
Agreement,1 as it was administered, resulted in 
illegal, improper, and unequal assessment of the Shute Creek facility production 
for ad valorem tax purposes of all raw gas owned and/or extracted by Exxon in 
Sublette County.  At the center of 
Sublette County's petition were allegations that the use of the "Howell and 
Yates" agreements as comparison values permitted Exxon to make numerous improper 
deductions.  Sublette County 
questioned Exxon's valuations for the 1992-1996 tax years (1991-1995 production 
years).

 

[¶4]      Exxon and the 
Wyoming State Department of Revenue (DOR) subsequently filed a declaratory 
judgment action that challenged Sublette County's authority to continue with its 
Section 14 petition.  The district 
court ruled in Sublette County's favor, and on appeal, this Court ruled that, 
despite the Settlement Agreement, the Board had a duty to "carefully examine" 
the petition.  Exxon Corp. v. 
Board of County Com'rs, Sublette County, 987 P.2d 158, 166-67 (Wyo. 
1999).

 

[¶5]      On September 28, 
1999, the Board entered its Order Setting Hearing to Elicit Parties Input 
Regarding Procedure to be Observed During Board's Investigation Pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv).  The order 
recommended that the parties submit their suggested format for the investigation 
to the Board for consideration.  
Sublette County recommended that the examination be conducted using a 
contested case procedure pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107 (LexisNexis 
2001).  Exxon took the position that 
the Board had complete discretion in determining the conduct of the 
investigation, while the DOR took the position that the Board needed to 
"carefully examine this case."  On 
February 3, 2000, the Board issued its Amended Order Establishing Procedure for 
an Examination Under Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv), Recodified as § 
39-11-102.1(c)(x).  Persuaded by the 
arguments presented by the DOR and Exxon, the Board conducted what it deemed a 
regulatory proceeding rather than a contested case 
proceeding.

 

[¶6]      In order to 
conduct a thorough examination, the Board requested assistance from the DOR and 
the Department of Audit (DOA).  The 
Board directed that two DOR representatives appear before it on April 10, 2000, 
to answer the Board's questions.  
The parties were allowed to attend the proceeding and submit written 
questions to the Board prior to the proceeding, but were not otherwise allowed 
to participate in the proceeding.

 

[¶7]      The Board also 
asked that the DOR compute the value of Exxon's production using various 
mathematical methods for the years 1992-1995.  The DOR presented the Board with four 
different valuation options for the years in question using the proportionate 
profits valuation method and four valuation options using the netback valuation 
method.2  The Board also examined valuations 
derived from the use of the "Howell and Yates" agreement.  Except for one of the scenarios 
presented, the valuation methods produced lower values than those issued by the 
DOR using the methodology set forth by the 1989 Settlement Agreement.  The Settlement Agreement provided that 
"the State agrees that it will recognize the Howell and Yates agreements as a 
comparison value and that the comparison value method may be used in conjunction 
with other recognized appraisal techniques to determine 
value."

 

[¶8]      The Board issued 
its Examination Report on June 28, 2000.  
It concluded that:

 

            
A.        The 
valuation methodology used by the DOR did not result in improper, illegal or 
unequal assessments for production years 1991 through 
1995.

 

            
B.        The 
methodology used reflects fair market value of Exxon's production of gas and 
associated minerals at the LaBarge Wellfield.

 

            
C.        The 
Howell and Yates agreements were entered into by Exxon and Howell and Yates 
after extensive litigation which convinces the SBOE [State Board of 
Equalization] of the arms length nature of these agreements and the nonexistence 
of collusion.

 

            
D.        We 
find no need to continue with this regulatory examination and recognize that the 
parties may litigate Exxon's reported numbers in other contested 
cases.

 

Sublette 
County sought relief from this report via a petition for writ of mandamus in the 
district court, which petition was denied.  
This appeal followed.3

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-30-101 (LexisNexis 2001) provides that "[m]andamus is a writ issued in the 
name of the state to an inferior tribunal . . . board or person commanding the 
performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from 
an office, trust or station."  
Mandamus may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its judgment or to 
proceed to discharge any of its functions, but it cannot control judicial 
discretion and cannot be issued when there is an adequate remedy at law, i.e., a 
right of appeal in some forum.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 1-30-102 and 1-30-104 (LexisNexis 2001).4

 

[¶10]   The function of mandamus is to 
command the performance of a ministerial duty that is plainly defined and 
required by law.  "Mandamus will not 
lie unless the duty itself is absolute and incontrovertible, or clear, certain, 
and indisputable."  State ex rel. 
Epp v. Mayor, 894 P.2d 590, 595 (Wyo. 1995).  If the lower tribunal has the right to 
exercise discretion regarding an issue, mandamus is not an appropriate 
remedy.  State ex rel. Feeney v. 
District Court of Seventh Judicial Dist., 614 P.2d 710, 711 n.1 (Wyo. 
1980).  A public official's duty is ministerial 
when "it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely execution of a 
specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts."  Blacks Law Dictionary 996 (6th ed. 1990).  Interpretation of a statutory duty in 
the context of mandamus is a question of law, reviewed de novo, following 
the general rules of statutory construction.  Basin Elec. Power Co-op. v. 
Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 506 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[T]he 
writ of mandamus will issue only where the duty to be performed is ministerial 
and the obligation is peremptory and plainly defined.  The law must not only authorize the 
demanded action but require it; and the duty must be clear and 
undisputable.  * * 
*

 

* * 
*

 

* * 
*  [I]n order to warrant the 
issuance of mandamus, not only must there be a legal right in the relator, but 
owing to the extraordinary and drastic character of mandamus and the caution 
exercised by courts in awarding it, it is also important that the right sought 
to be enforced be clear and certain, so as not to admit of any reasonable 
controversy.  The writ does not 
issue in cases where the right in question is doubtful.

 

LeBeau 
v. State ex rel. White, 377 P.2d 302, 303 (Wyo. 1963).

 

[¶11]   Whether or not to issue a writ of 
mandamus is left to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court.  State ex rel. Cross v. Board of Land 
Com'rs, 50 Wyo. 181, 58 P.2d 423, 426 (1936).  The denial of a petition for writ of 
mandamus will only be reversed upon a finding of abuse of discretion.  State ex rel. Spriggs v. Shipton, 
74 Wyo. 239, 286 P.2d 601, 602 (1955).  An abuse of discretion occurs when the 
trial court could not reasonably conclude as it did.  Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 
838 (Wyo. 1980).  With respect to judicial discretion, we 
have said that:

 

            
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  
Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985)."

 

Vaughn 
v. State, 
962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting 
Martin v. State, 
720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).  There is a heavy burden placed upon an 
appellant to show such abuse.  
Blake v. 
State, 
933 P.2d 474, 477 (Wyo. 1997).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶12]   Sublette County contends that in 
light of its direct interest in the collection of ad valorem taxes, the Board 
should have "carefully examined" Sublette County's Section 14 petition using the 
contested case procedures found in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act 
(WAPA), rather than the regulatory proceeding utilized by the Board.  According to Sublette County, all 
parties in administrative proceedings are entitled to due process, which 
includes a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to participate in the 
proceedings, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107.  Further, Sublette County cites to 
Basin 
Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. Department of  
Revenue, State of Wyo., 
970 P.2d 841, 849 (Wyo. 1998), 
for the proposition that the Board only has the authority to hear contested 
cases and to promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the WAPA, and cites to 
Antelope 
Valley Imp. and Service Dist. of Gillette v. State Bd. of Equalization for State 
of Wyo., 
4 P.3d 876, 880 (Wyo. 2000) for the proposition that regulatory 
proceedings can be conducted as contested case hearings.  The Board asserts that Sublette County 
did not meet the standard for issuing a writ of mandamus because Sublette County 
did not demonstrate that the Board had a clear, indisputable "ministerial" duty 
to utilize a contested case proceeding in examining Sublette County's 
petition.

 

[¶13]   A contested case is defined in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001) as "a proceeding including, but 
not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing and licensing, in which legal rights, 
duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an 
agency after an opportunity for hearing . . .."  Sublette County asserts that its due 
process rights were violated because the Board did not conduct a contested case 
hearing.  We have interpreted the 
term "hearing" to mean a "trial type hearing."  Scarlett 
v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, Teton County, 
463 P.2d 26, 29 (Wyo. 1969).  Therefore, if a trial type hearing is 
"required by law," the proceeding is a contested case, and the applicable 
procedures in the WAPA must be followed.  
Tri-State 
Generation and Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service 
Com'n, 
735 P.2d 718, 721 (Wyo. 1987).

 

[¶14]   Analysis of this issue requires a 
reading of pertinent portions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-304(a) (emphasis 
added):

 

            
(a)       
The state board of equalization shall perform the duties specified in 
article 15, section 10 of the Wyoming constitution and shall hear appeals from 
county boards of equalization and review final decisions of the department upon 
application of any interested person adversely affected, including boards of 
county commissioners for the purposes of this subsection, under 
the contested case procedures of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act.  Any interested person adversely affected 
by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule pursuant to W.S. 16-3-103(a) 
shall be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before the board.  In 
addition, the board shall:

 

                        
* * *

 

            
(xiv)     
Carefully 
examine 
into all cases wherein it is alleged that property subject to taxation has not 
been assessed or has been fraudulently, improperly, or unequally assessed, or 
the law in any manner evaded or violated, and 
cause to be instituted proceedings which will remedy improper or negligent 
administration of the tax laws of the state[.]

 

[¶15]   This Court has previously stated 
that the language of subsection (a) delineates part of the Board's adjudicatory 
function, while the language of subsection (xiv) delineates part of the Board's 
"broad" regulatory function.  
Exxon 
Corp., 
987 P.2d  at 163.  We have also recognized that the Board's 
power to hear appeals under subsection (a) is separate and distinct from its 
power to examine alleged taxation improprieties under subsection (xiv).  Id.  Further, the statute clearly provides 
that the "contested case procedures of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act" 
are required for proceedings under subsection (a), but makes no such reference 
in subsection (xiv).  The primary 
focus of statutory interpretation, of course, is to effectuate legislative 
intent.  State 
Dept. of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 
872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994); 
Olheiser 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 
866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1994).  This Court is not free to read into 
subsection (xiv) a requirement that is not there.  In re 
Estate of Fosler, 
13 P.3d 686, 692 (Wyo. 2000).  In addition, neither party has suggested 
that the statute is ambiguous, so application of the rules of construction is 
unnecessary, and the plain meaning of the statutory language is simply given 
effect.  Tietema 
v. State, 
926 P.2d 952, 954 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶16]   One measure of a statute's meaning 
is the interpretation placed on it by the agency charged with its 
administration, and this Court will defer to that interpretation where it does 
not conflict with legislative intent.  
General 
Chemical Corp. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 
819 P.2d 418, 422 (Wyo. 1991).  In that regard, the Board has adopted 
procedural rules recognizing various non-contested-case methods for carefully 
examining Section 14 petitions and has conducted such non-contested-case 
examinations.5  However, where the statute is not 
alleged to be ambiguous, and where we have found no ambiguity, resort to such 
interpretive aids is unwarranted.  
Wyoming 
State Tax Com'n v. BHP Petroleum Co., Inc., 
856 P.2d 428, 434 (Wyo. 1993).

 

[¶17]   There is no arguing with the 
proposition that "[p]arties to administrative proceedings are entitled to due 
process of law," or with the proposition that "[t]he procedures outlined in the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act are designed to provide parties in 
administrative proceedings with due process."  Amoco 
Production Co. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 
7 P.3d 900, 905 (Wyo. 2000).  And Basin 
Elec. Power Co-op., Inc., 
970 P.2d  at 849, 
contains language that seems to limit the authority of the Board to contested 
cases and rulemaking, both under the WAPA.  
However, Basin 
Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. 
dealt with a perceived usurpation by the Board of the DOR's statutory functions, 
and not with the appropriate methods for handling a Section 14 petition.6  Since Basin 
Elec. Power Co-op., Inc., 
we have recognized at least five separate duties the Board may perform and we 
have distinguished between the Board's adjudicatory functions and its regulatory 
or administrative functions.  
Antelope 
Valley Imp. and Service Dist. of Gillette, 
4 P.3d  at 882.  Likewise, we have concluded that 
contested case procedures do not necessarily apply to Section 14 petition 
procedures:

 

[T]he 
30-day limit provided by the Board's rules is a limitation on the time a party 
has to file a contested case proceeding with the Board.  Section 14 proceedings, on the other 
hand, are governed by chapter 4 of the Board's rules, which does not limit the 
time in which a party may present allegations pursuant to Section 
14.

 

Exxon 
Corp., 
987 P.2d  at 163-64.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶18]   The plain language of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 39-1-304(a)(xiv) makes it clear, when read in the context of the entire 
statute, that the legislature did not therein impose a "clear, certain, and 
indisputable" duty to utilize a contested case proceeding in "carefully 
examining" Section 14 petitions, although the Board may choose to do so.  We cannot legislate such a duty.  Neither can we say that due process so 
clearly requires a contested case proceeding for Section 14 petitions that a 
writ of mandamus should have issued to that effect.  Rather, we conclude that Section 14 does 
not require a "trial type" hearing and the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the writ of mandamus.  The order of the district court denying 
the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1In January 1989, 
a settlement was reached in another case involving these parties and a 
"Stipulation for Entry of Declaratory Judgment" was filed in the district 
court.  Exxon Corp. v. Board of 
County Com'rs, Sublette County, 987 P.2d 158, 160 (Wyo. 1999).  Exxon, the Wyoming Attorney General, and 
the Sublette County Attorney signed the Agreement.  Id.  Under the terms of the agreement, Exxon 
paid the State and Sublette County twelve million dollars in full satisfaction 
of Exxon's severance and ad valorem tax liability for 1986, 1987, and 1988 
LaBarge Wellfield production.  
Id.  After August 31, 
1991, the agreement provided:

 

[T]he State agrees that it will 
recognize the Howell and Yates agreements as a comparison value and that the 
comparison value method may be used in conjunction with other recognized 
appraisal techniques to determine value.  
If the State uses any method other than the comparison value method based 
on the Howell and Yates agreements, the Parties agree that the question of 
future taxability, for severance and ad valorem purposes, the value of future . 
. . production remain open and are not resolved by this 
Agreement.

 

Id. at 
166.

  2The Board 
understood that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-208(d)(iii) (Michie 1997) precluded the 
use of the netback method when the gas to be valued is processed by the 
producer, but utilized this information only as a baseline 
comparison.

  3A Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus filed in this Court was also denied.  Procedurally, the case is now before 
this Court on the denial of the petition in the district 
court.

   
4Sublette County 
contends that because it had no right to seek judicial review of the Board's 
report, it had no adequate remedy at law, making mandamus appropriate.  Only a "person" aggrieved or adversely 
affected by a final decision of an agency may appeal to a district court.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  The statutory 
definition of "person" expressly excludes an agency, so an agency is not allowed 
to appeal an adverse decision.  
Pritchard v. State Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Dept. of 
Health and Social Services, 540 P.2d 523, 529 (Wyo. 1975).  
The board of county commissioners is a board pursuant to the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act and is within the definition of an agency, which is 
specifically precluded from seeking review of an administrative decision.  It has no standing.  Basin Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue, State of Wyo., 970 P.2d 841, 848 (Wyo. 
1998).  However, an agency may appeal a district 
court ruling to the Wyoming Supreme Court.  
Safety Medical Services, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming, 
724 P.2d 468, 471 (Wyo. 1986).

  5See Rules of 
the Board of Equalization, ch. 4, § 3 (1998) and 
Equalization Quarterly Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, Investigative Report of Rocky 
Mountain Airways, Docket No. 93-160 (May 23, 1995) (the 
Board conducted an inquiry as to why the DOR had changed its initial valuation 
determination when no appeal had been filed).

   
6"With the 
Wyoming Government Reorganization Act, the legislature created two separate 
entities with separate duties and responsibilities.  * * *  The Board simply does not have authority 
to hold an investigative hearing or to submit an Investigative Report' to the 
Department concerning the Department's appraisal methods without the Department 
director's recommendation.  
See Wyo. Stat. § 39-2-102 (Cum.Supp.1993)."  Basin Elec. Power Co-op., Inc., 
970 P.2d  at 849.  The problem being 
addressed in Basin Elec. Power Co-op., Inc. was the DOR's adoption of an 
appraisal method that it believed to be mandated by the Board through its 
Investigative Report, without the Board having followed statutory and due 
process requirements.