Title: Dennis Cameron v. State of Arkansas

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT No. CR 07-44 DENNIS CAMERON Appellant v. STATE OF ARKANSAS Appellee Opinion Delivered September 27, 2007 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GARLAND COUNTY, CR 2002-631, HON. CHARLES H. EDDY, JUDGE; MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED. PER CURIAM In 2005, a jury found appellant Dennis Cameron guilty of two counts of theft of property and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 240 months’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Cameron v. State, 94 Ark. App. 58, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006). Appellant filed a timely pro se petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 and the trial court appointed Mr. Jonathan Lane to represent appellant in that proceeding. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order that dismissed the petition. After lodging an appeal of that order in this court, Mr. Lane has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief that asserted that any appeal of the denial of postconviction relief would be wholly without merit. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4- 3(j)(1) set requirements for the withdrawal of counsel for a defendant in a criminal case after a notice of appeal has been filed on the basis that an appeal is without merit. While a “no-merit” brief is -2- typically filed in a direct appeal from a judgment, this court permits the filing of no-merit briefs in postconviction appeals. See Hewitt v. State, 362 Ark. 369, 208 S.W.3d 185 (2005) (per curiam); Brady v. State, 346 Ark. 298, 57 S.W.3d 691 (2001) (per curiam). Under Rule 4-3, an attorney who wishes to withdraw from an appeal must abstract and brief all of the rulings that were adverse to his client, listing those rulings in his argument. While Mr. Lane has failed to include such a list in his brief, he has addressed what is clearly the sole issue in this case. On review of an order entered in a Rule 37.1 proceeding, we need only consider preliminary procedural matters, any denial of an evidentiary hearing, and those rulings contained within the order denying postconviction relief, as an appellant has an obligation to obtain a ruling on any issue to be preserved for appeal. See Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006); Beshears v. State, 340 Ark. 70, 8 S.W.3d 32 (2000). In this instance, the trial court did not reach the merits of appellant’s claims and dismissed the petition before any evidence was presented, finding that appellant asserted attorney-client privilege concerning his consultation with trial counsel and would not waive that privilege. As appellant’s petition was both timely and verified, his success in this appeal is solely dependent upon that finding and whether the decision to dismiss the petition on that basis was appropriate. This court does not reverse a denial of postconviction relief unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. See Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002). At the hearing, the prosecution requested that the court have appellant take the stand and -3- verify that he was waiving the privilege before calling his first witness. There was some discussion about appellant’s concern that information could be disclosed that might potentially result in additional unrelated charges being filed and how to possibly address those concerns through restrictions by the court on the scope of the evidence that would be allowed. However, after the trial court instructed Mr. Lane to consult with his client, who was an attorney, Mr. Lane ultimately advised that his client understood the issues and had instructed him to refuse to waive any aspect of the attorney-client privilege. The State then moved to dismiss the petition, and the court granted the motion and entered a written order to that effect. In his brief, Mr. Lane noted that appellant refused to waive attorney-client privilege and argued that trial counsel was not obligated to maintain confidentiality in instances where ineffective assistance of counsel claims were raised. Based upon the transcript of the proceedings and the clear statement that appellant would not waive attorney-client privilege, we agree that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that appellant refused to waive the privilege for the proceeding. The only remaining question is whether such a refusal provided sufficient cause to dismiss the petition. We hold that it does. A refusal to waive the privilege, or acknowledge appropriate restrictions on application of the privilege as determined by the court, under the circumstances presented here, acts as a request by the petitioner to withdraw his petition. Dismissal was therefore appropriate. Appellant’s petition for postconviction relief raised a number of issues, but the majority of those issues were claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Other courts, interpreting their own rules of evidence, have consistently recognized the concept that attorney-client privilege is waived when a client places the attorney’s performance at issue during the course of litigation, typically through an implied waiver that applies an “automatic waiver” rule or, more commonly, the “at issue” -4- doctrine. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.12.4(b) (2002). Our own rules of evidence embrace the concept by exempting this type of communication from the definition of privileged information. Attorney-client privilege is defined in Ark. R. Evid. 502. Subsection (a) of the rule defines specific terms, subsection (b) sets forth the general rule of privilege, and subsection (d) is captioned “Exceptions.” Rule 502(d) provides that “[t]here is no privilege under this rule ... [a]s to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client.” Arkansas Rule of Evidence 510 further provides for waiver of the privilege where the holder consents to disclosure. But, where an attorney’s client has initiated the proceedings through a pleading that raises issues of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is clear from the language in Rule 502 that no privilege exists to be waived. In keeping with that rule, we have held that an attorney is not bound by an obligation of secrecy when he is accused of a breach of duty to the client. Corzine v. Forsythe, 263 Ark. 161, 563 S.W.2d 439 (1978). Circumstances such as those here, where the attorney’s client has accused him of a breach of duty, in this case, ineffective assistance of counsel, call for application of a “waiver” unlike that contemplated by Rule 510. Whether appellant agreed to waive the privilege or not, subsection (b)(5) of Rule 1.6 lifts the restriction upon the attorney not to reveal this type of communications “to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client.” The waiver under the circumstances presented was an implied waiver by claim assertion that arose from the filing of appellant’s petition, not an express waiver under Rule 510. An implied waiver may act to nullify an existing privilege under circumstances where, if recognized, the result would be unfair to an opposing litigant. Developments in the Law - Privileged -5- Communications, 889 Harv. L. Rev. 1529 (1985). Unlike the doctrine of express waiver, the doctrine of implied waiver allocates control of the privilege between the judicial system and the party holding the privilege, rather than between the parties to the communication. Id. The trial court here correctly determined that appellant could not call his trial attorneys to present evidence if he was unwilling to permit their testimony without application of the privilege. Appellant would only be permitted to present that evidence by accepting the waiver required by the court and producing the previously privileged materials he declined to release. Appellant, in filing the Rule 37.1 petition, had triggered application of the implied waiver doctrine under the rules by raising issues of ineffective assistance of counsel. While there was some discussion at the hearing concerning the possibility of limiting the scope of the evidence allowed, appellant’s response indicated that he was not willing to permit the court to set those limits or otherwise relinquish control of the previously privileged information. We agree with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9 Cir. 2003), that a th court imposing an implied waiver does not order disclosure of the materials categorically, but directs the party holding the privilege to produce the materials if it wishes to go forward with its claims, that the court is in effect striking a bargain with the holder of the privilege by letting him know how much of the privilege he must waive in order to proceed with his claim. Appellant clearly indicated that he was not willing to accept any bargain proposed by the court, that he was unwilling, as the holder of the privilege, to consider whatever waiver was proposed by the judicial system. As appellant was unwilling to produce the materials necessary to proceed with his claim, he in effect requested that he be permitted to withdraw his petition for Rule 37.1 postconviction relief and the trial court was correct to dismiss the petition. We agree that the appeal has no merit, and -6- accordingly it is dismissed. Because there is no merit to the appeal, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Appeal dismissed; motion to withdraw granted.