Title: Thompson v. Dale

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

283 P.2d 623 (1955) 59 N.M. 290 Roy THOMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lillard DALE and Thurman Dale, Co-Partners, d/b/a Dale Bros., Defendants-Appellees. No. 5867. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 4, 1955. Rehearing Denied May 31, 1955. Jack Underwood, Lovington, Whatley & Oman, Las Cruces, for appellant. Robert W. Ward, Lovington, Neal & Girand, Hobbs, for appellees. SADLER, Justice. The appellant, who was plaintiff below, sought damages for personal injuries suffered while working as a farm hand for the defendants. At the close of his case, the trial court sustained a motion by defendants for a directed verdict in their favor and rendered judgment accordingly. It is to review such judgment that plaintiff prosecutes this appeal. The parties will be designated as they were below. The defendants are brothers and at all material times were engaged as partners in farming and ranching in Lea County, New Mexico, under the firm name of Dale Brothers. The plaintiff, a farm and ranch laborer, was employed by them as a general farm hand at $40 per week, plus a house, utilities and a cow. While so employed on December 29, 1953, and engaged in performing the duties of his employment, namely, the grinding of alfalfa in a hammermill, he either slipped or fell thrusting his right arm into the moving blades of the hammermill completely severing the three large fingers of the right hand, and the tip of the thumb and of the little finger. It was the plaintiff's contention that the fall and resultant thrusting of his right arm into the blades of the machine was *624 due to the negligence of defendants in failing to provide him a safe place to work in that the platform on which he was required to work in feeding the hammermill was rough and uneven, containing loose boards and was covered with loose feed; that the platform lacked guards for plaintiff's protection and the hammermill was located near a leaky hydrant by reason whereof the platform and surrounding terrain became wet and muddy, slick and dangerous. On the occasion in question, the plaintiff was engaged in grinding alfalfa for calf feed. He was using a John Deere Tractor for power and a Wetmore Clipper hammermill to do the grinding. The hammermill was located or mounted on skids and boards. It was placed only a small distance from a granary. Plaintiff was taking the hay from another workman standing on a nearby truck who clipped the baling wire and passed the hay to plaintiff who fed it into the mill. The blades then ground it and discharged it through the chute into the barn. There was also a pumphouse close by from which a drainage ditch ran and a hydrant protruding from the pumphouse from which water was leaking from time to time. Cotton pickers at work on the farm used this hydrant for their water which created a somewhat wet and muddy condition around the mill, so much so in fact that the plaintiff was compelled to wear overshoes while at work. The slightly elevated platform on which the mill was located was made of loose boards of uneven length and rough from the hammermill being dragged around from place to place. But to give the picture as plaintiff described it in his testimony on direct examination. He testified: Continuing his testimony relative to conditions surrounding the place where he was working, the plaintiff had the following to say on cross examination: And, again, the plaintiff dwelt upon conditions around the place where he worked: The foregoing affords a fair picture of the evidence as it appeared when counsel for defendants interposed the motion for a directed verdict following plaintiff's announcement that he rested. The evidence touching the extent of plaintiff's disability from the injury suffered is omitted from the recitation of the facts. It is not disputed that the disability suffered by one with the limited education of plaintiff, who is confined to manual labor for his earnings, is extensive and far reaching. Thus it is that we are called upon to decide whether the plaintiff, in his middle forties, and an experienced farm laborer, established in the evidence a prima facie case which entitled him to take his case to the jury. If he did, it is on a single ground of negligence, namely, failure on the part of defendants to provide him a reasonably safe place to work. True enough, negligence was alleged in respect of an omission to provide proper guards for the hammermill. The plaintiff, himself, however, says he never saw one so equipped and the implication from his testimony is that any effort to supply guards would interfere with and handicap due operation of the machine. As to the one ground of negligence, however, the omission and failure on defendants' part to provide plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work, we think evidence of primary negligence on the part of defendants was sufficient to take the case to the jury. Furthermore, we are not able to say, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's cause of action is barred, either by reason of contributory negligence, or assumed risk. We think it was a facts issue to be resolved by the jury; (a) whether the defendants were primarily negligent in the respect mentioned which contributed proximately to cause his injury; and (b) whether he either assumed the risk consequent on such negligence; or (c) was himself contributorily negligent in respect to defendants' omission to provide him a safe place to work. Perhaps, before proceeding further, we should dispose of a contention made by plaintiff that defendants are denied the right to rely upon the common law defenses of assumed risk, contributory negligence and fellow servant by a certain section of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Of course, the one last mentioned, that of fellow servant, is excluded from consideration since there is nothing in the evidence to warrant that defense. The only occasion for even mentioning it is that it is listed along with the other two defenses which counsel for plaintiff say are denied to defendants under the language of 1953 Comp. § 59-10-5. It reads as follows: The language of the foregoing section, if read apart from its context, might very well yield to the construction plaintiff's counsel would put upon it. It would then apply at large to all actions for damages for personal injuries by an employee suffered in the line of duty, if based upon a want of ordinary care. The use of the word "damages," whereas recoveries under Workmen's Compensation Act are usually designated "compensation," and are so referred to in the Act, is pointed out. Likewise, they show us that "negligence," or "want of ordinary care" are factors of no importance in an action for workmen's compensation. Hence, counsel conclude: This line of argument is very intriguing and even persuasive. It might be accepted but for the fact that it is overcome by other compelling considerations. In the first place, we are not permitted to consider this particular section apart from the context in which it is found. Indeed, the very section relied upon, in the concluding paragraph thereof, establishes indubitably that it refers to "compensation" as provided for in the "Workmen's Compensation Act." Hence, if another plausible reason for presence in the Act of this particular section is to be found, and we shall demonstrate later there is such a reason, then we must reject the construction plaintiff would have us accept. We have never had occasion to construe this section of the Act, or, perhaps better said, we have not heretofore found it necessary to do so. However, in Sena v. Sanders, 54 N.M. 83, 214 P.2d 226, the statute was invoked by defendants, and passed for consideration by us because we found the three defenses mentioned in it had not been pleaded below. In the case at bar, however, the defenses proscribed by the statute, if applicable, were pleaded below and set up as separate grounds, among others, of the motion for directed verdict, interposed by defendants when the plaintiff rested his case. The matter being thus squarely presented, we are neither disposed nor privileged to postpone a decision. While counsel for plaintiff speak of the section as if first introduced into the Act by L. 1937, c. 92, § 3, even with the adoption of the first Workmen's Compensation Act, L. 1917, c. 83, § 6, we find a provision very similar to this one, as in the case also with the second enactment by L. 1929, c. 113, § 6. In these two Acts, the section mentioned reads, as follows: It could scarcely be contended for these sections as they appeared in the 1917 and 1929 Act that they carry the meaning contended for by the plaintiff. They are to be read in pari materia with the same section as it appears in the 1937 Act, 1953 Comp. § 59-10-5. We are inclined to agree with the construction advanced by counsel for defendant when they say: It seems clear to us that the questioned section can have no application to an occupation that is excepted from the Act. We have held it does not apply to employers of farm and ranch labor. Koger v. A.T. Woods, Inc., 38 N.M. 241, 31 P.2d 255. The statute, 1953 Comp. § 59-10-4, expressly excepts from its provisions certain employers. It reads: Decided cases under similar provisions in the Workmen's Compensation laws of other states support the conclusions we have reached on this subject. See 58 A.J. 607, § 46 (Workmen's Compensation). Page v. New York Realty Co., 59 Mont. 305, 196 P. 871; Hoffman v. Broadway Hazelwood, 139 Or. 519, 10 P.2d 349, 11 P.2d 814, 83 A.L.R. 1008; Palmer v. Inhabitants of Town of Sumner, 133 Me. 337, 177 A. 711, 97 A.L.R. 1292; Armburg v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 276 Mass. 418, 177 N.E. 665, 80 A.L.R. 1408; Price v. Railway Express Agency, 322 Mass. 476, 78 N.E.2d 13; Morris v. Timmer, 243 Mich. 512, 220 N.W. 794; Dietz v. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co., 263 Ill. 480, 105 N.E. 289. Having concluded that the defendants are not barred by the questioned language of the Workmen's Compensation Act from relying on the common law defenses of contributory negligence and assumed risk, the question remains whether under the evidence as it stood when the plaintiff rested, the trial court erred in taking the case from the jury and directing a verdict for the defendants. We think it did. It is well established, as counsel for the plaintiff remind us, citing a wealth of New Mexico decisions to sustain them, that in ruling upon a motion of this kind the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, indulging in his favor every legitimate inference that may be drawn therefrom and ignoring conflicts in the evidence unfavorable to him. Hepp v. Quickel Auto & Supply Co., 37 N.M. 525, 25 P.2d 197; Sandoval County Board of Education v. Young, 43 N.M. 397, 94 P.2d 508; Mesich v. Board of Commissioners of McKinley County, 46 N.M. 412, 129 P.2d 974; Michelson v. House, 54 N.M. 197, 218 P.2d 861; Miera v. George, 55 N.M. 535, 237 P.2d 102. So viewed, let us see if the trial court was warranted in ruling upon all issues interposed as a defense, as a matter of law, and denying the jury an opportunity to pass its judgment on the facts. We shall spend little time on the question of primary negligence on defendants' part. Certainly, they were obligated to furnish the plaintiff a reasonably safe place to perform the duties of the particular task on which he was engaged. We do not hesitate to give it as our opinion that it was for the jury to say whether the loblolly surrounding the hammermill and extending over the loose, uneven boards constituting plaintiff's base of *631 operations was a reasonably safe place to work. If the jury should find it was not, then the further question, did the plaintiff assume the risk incident to working there and was he contributorily negligent in doing so? These questions are to be answered by us, provisionally only, and not in any sense as a finding, but merely to announce whether we think there was enough evidence to permit the jury to make a finding as respects each of them, if it so chose. In our opinion, the trial court erred in declining to permit the jury to pass upon primary negligence of the defendants. Whether the court erred in declaring as a matter of law that plaintiff assumed the risks incident to working under the conditions he did and in further ruling, as a matter of law, that he was contributorily negligent in so doing, are queries presenting closer questions than that of defendants' primary negligence. After full consideration, however, we are constrained to hold that, under the situation here disclosed, it was the peculiar province of the jury to sift, weigh and find whether the plaintiff, under all the circumstances, assumed the risk to which he was exposed and was contributorily negligent in so doing. One can not read the plaintiff's testimony and fail to be impressed by his complete frankness and sincerity in answering every question put to him. He was an unlettered man, having very little education. It was, no doubt, a recognition on his part of his shortcoming in this behalf that had accustomed him to performing whatever duties were assigned him, without complaint, and without asking questions. Note the frank answer as to his appreciation of danger from the blades when he replied that practically the only way one could get hurt by the whirling blades was to have his arm thrust down the shaft "by falling into it." Here, however, is the significance of that answer, or might have been, had the jury been permitted to consider it. That is the precise thing that did happen. Wearing heavy, slick overshoes to protect his feet from the mud and slime, when he crossed to the opposite side of the low board platform to keep the dust and chaff from blowing in his face from a strong wind, he, literally, did what he said was the only way he could get his hand cut by the blades, he "fell into the machine." Remote likelihood that he would suffer the very mishap that befell him was a factor which a jury might give considerable weight in deciding whether the plaintiff assumed the risks, whatever they were, of working under the conditions he did, and whether he was contributorily negligent in doing so. We think it was a question for the jury, one on which under the evidence different opinions might not unreasonably be formed, as to whether as a matter of fact the plaintiff did actually assume the risk of working where he did and under the conditions he did at the time of suffering the injury which befell him. Singer v. Swartz, 22 N.M. 84, 159 P. 745; Leyba v. Albuquerque & Cerrillos Coal Co., 22 N.M. 455, 164 P. 823; Maestas v. Alameda Cattle Co., 36 N.M. 323, 14 P.2d 733. The cases of Singer v. Swartz and Maestas v. Alameda Cattle Co., supra, are not unlike the present in that both were common law actions for damages for injuries to a hand suffered in a machine and assumption of risk was relied upon as one of the defenses. In the Singer case, the court said [22 N.M. 84, 159 P. 748]: Again, in the Maestas case, the court held the issue was properly to be submitted to the jury. There, as here, the injury was to the hand of the plaintiff and there, as here, the injury to his hand in a machine resulted when plaintiff [36 N.M. 323, 14 P.2d 735] "was struck by a gust of wind * * * and made to slip on the floor, and stumble against the unguarded, uncovered and unprotected * * * pump jack." Quoting approvingly from Crawford v. Western Clay & Gypsum Products Co., 20 N.M. 555, 151 P. 238, this excerpt, to-wit: we held the question of assumed risk was one for the jury. As to the immediate occasion of the injury, the court, in an opinion on motion for rehearing, said: There is a peculiar situation existing in this case touching the defense of assumed risk. Once it is accepted as an established fact that there was primary negligence on the part of defendants in the failure to provide a reasonably safe place for plaintiff to work, all argument to the contrary by defendants designed to absolve them from negligence, a want of due care, merely tends to emphasize the issuable character of the defenses mentioned before a jury. We feel much the same way about the defense of contributory negligence as a jury question as we do about that of assumed risk. Indeed, much of what has been said as to issuable character before the jury of the defense of assumed risk applies with equal force in the case of contributory negligence. Ordinarily, contributory negligence is for the jury to decide as a facts question. Maestas v. Alameda Cattle Co., supra; Olguin v. Thygesen, 47 N.M. 377, 143 P.2d 585; Lucero v. Harshey, 50 N.M. 1, 165 P.2d 587. So it is here. Truly, reasonable minds could readily form opposite opinions on whether the negligence, if any, on plaintiff's part contributed proximately to cause the injury he suffered. Such being the case, the trial court should have permitted the case to go to the jury. It follows from what has been said that the judgment of the district court should be reversed and the cause remanded with a direction that the judgment reviewed be set aside and a new trial granted unto plaintiff, who shall recover costs of this appeal. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and LUJAN and KIKER, JJ., concur. McGHEE, Justice (dissenting). I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendants. Without question, according to the testimony of the plaintiff himself, he knew and appreciated all of the hazards and dangerous conditions present at the feed grinder; he made no complaint to the employer, and could not say for sure the employer actually knew of the dangers and defective condition of the platform; but I say the employer must have known of them. The platform on which the hammermill rested was patched and rough. When asked why he did not repair the platform, the plaintiff answered that the employer did not say fix the platform, he said grind the feed. I class the risk in this case as an extraordinary one; that is, one created or allowed to exist by the employer, and there is no question the employer did not furnish the servant a safe place to work. *633 The majority opinion cites the case of Singer v. Swartz, 1916, 22 N.M. 84, 159 P. 745, 747, for support. That was a laundry mangle case where the safety guard was not properly adjusted and the thirteen year old girl who had worked on the mangle only a few days testified she did not know it was improperly adjusted. In that case it is stated: This case, in my opinion, is strong authority for the action of the court in directing a verdict here, in view of the testimony of the plaintiff that he knew and appreciated all dangers. We said only recently in Jones v. Adams, 1952, 56 N.M. 510, 245 P.2d 843, 844, in quoting approvingly from Van Kirk v. Butler, 1914, 19 N.M. 597, 145 P. 129, where we in turn quoted approvingly from Labatt's Master & Servant, § 1186a: In the Van Kirk case it is said [19 N.M. 597, 145 P. 133]: In Thayer v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 1916, 21 N.M. 330, 363, 154 P. 691, 701, it is stated: The opinion goes on to say the plaintiff was employed as a laborer icing cars and he was not a brakeman; that it could not be contended with any degree of logic that he assumed the risk of a defective brake shoe on the car he was told to ride down the track and set the brakes on, unless it appeared he was an experienced brakeman. In the case under consideration the plaintiff testified he had had long experience grinding feed in a hammermill; that he knew the muddy condition around the mill had existed for a considerable period of time; that he also knew his overshoes were muddy and slick; that the platform was rough and patched; and that he knew the knives in the mill were unguarded and dangerous. "One who knows of a danger from the negligence of another, and understands and appreciates the risk therefrom, and voluntarily exposes himself to it, is precluded from recovering for an injury which results from the exposure." Fitzgerald v. Connecticut River Paper Co., 1891, 155 Mass. 155, 29 N.E. 464, 465. See also: O'Maley v. South Boston Gas Light Co., 1893, 158 Mass. 135, 32 N.E. 1119, 47 L.R.A. 161; Indiana Nat. Gas & Oil Co. v. O'Brien, 1903, 160 Ind. 266, 65 N.E. 918, 66 N.E. 742. In 2 Shearman and Redfield on Negligence (Rev.Ed., 1941), § 231, it is said: Generally the question of contributory negligence should be submitted to the jury, but more often than not the question of assumption of risk is a matter of law, as shown by the following quotation from 2 Shearman and Redfield, op.cit. supra, at § 229: All of the testimony on the points here discussed came from the lips of the plaintiff. The majority opinion also relies on the case of Maestas v. Alameda Cattle Co., 1932, 36 N.M. 323, 14 P.2d 733, for support. As I analyze that case the facts are materially different there and here and its rationale supports the action of the trial court. There the servant was attempting to oil an unguarded pump jack with an ordinary tomato can instead of an oil can with a long neck. There was a gust of wind when the servant got his hand in the cog wheels, but there the similarity of the cases ends. In that case the servant was inexperienced and had poor eyesight; he had complained of the lack of a guard and the employer had promised to equip the pump with a guard to protect the plaintiff from the cog wheels, but had not done so the foreman had told the servant he need not be afraid, to continue work and he, the foreman, would fix it right away. I believe admiration for Thompson because he told the truth on the witness stand has caused a majority to see jury questions on the assumed risk and contributory negligence issues where none in fact exist; therefore, I dissent.