Title: State v. Nathaniel Harvey

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Garibaldi, J., writing for a majority of the Court. In this appeal, the Supreme Court considers Harvey's claim that his death sentence is disproportionate. Harvey broke into the apartment of Irene Schnaps late at night during the summer of 1985 and brutally murdered her. Schnaps sustained approximately fifteen blows to the head, some of which fractured her skull and caused direct injury to the brain. Schnaps was found naked on the floor, and it appeared that Harvey had attempted to wipe her body clean of blood. Valuables were missing from the apartment, and investigators found Schnaps's open pocketbook containing no money. Harvey confessed to the murder. He also was linked to the murder through a sneaker print and his possession of a watch of the type missing from the apartment. A jury originally convicted Harvey of Irene Schnaps's murder and sentenced him to death in October 1986. The Supreme Court reversed that conviction because of errors in the admission of Harvey's confession and deficiencies in the jury charge. At Harvey's retrial, the State presented new DNA evidence that matched Harvey's blood with blood drops found at the scene. A jury again convicted him of purposeful or knowing murder, and imposed the death penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. Pursuant to statute, Harvey requested proportionality review. HELD: Harvey has not demonstrated that his death sentence is disproportionate, and that sentence is affirmed. 1. In proportionality review, the Court seeks to ensure that the death penalty is being administered in a rational, nonarbitrary and even handed-manner, fairly and with reasonable consistency. A defendant bears the burden of proving that his death sentence is disproportionate. (pp. 10-12) 2. In 1992, the Legislature limited the universe of cases to which a defendant's case is to be compared to those cases in which a death sentence has actually been imposed. The Court has declined to apply that amendment to appeals pending before its enactment. The genesis of this proceeding was Harvey's first conviction, which occurred long before the statute was amended. (pp. 12-15) 3. The AOC maintains the database of the proportionality review universe, and sorts the list into various categories and subcategories. The Court continues to defer to the AOC's expertise, and particularly to its assignment of defendants to only one comparison category and subcategory. The twenty-two cases in Harvey's subcategory (residential forced entry with particular violence/terror) provide a sufficient basis for comparison. It is impractical and unnecessary to perform a comparison with the 126 cases in Harvey's overall category. In addition, the Court refuses Harvey's request to add cases from other subcategories for comparison, as those cases are not factually similar to Harvey's. (pp. 15-24) 4. Frequency analysis involves the application of statistical tests to determine whether a defendant's degree of blameworthiness reasonably supports an expectation that will generally result in a death sentence. In State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 257 (1999) (Loftin II), the Court appointed a Special Master to conduct an extensive review and evaluation of the proportionate methodology. The Special Master has released his report, determining that several aspects of the methodology are faulty and require revision. Pending the Court's decision on those recommendations, the Court will continue to use the existing methodologies and procedures, with the exception of the numerical-preponderance test that was part of the frequency analysis. Although 32 cases have been added to the database since Loftin II, the small sample sizes continue to undermine statistical reliability. (pp. 24-26) 5. The results of Harvey's frequency analysis produce no showing of randomness or aberration. Although for some of the models Harvey's predicted probability of death is low, the Court does not believe that is evidence that his sentence is an aberration. The Court remains wary of the frequency approach because of its noted defects. (pp. 27-36) 6. Under the precedent-seeking approach, the Court engages in a traditional case-by-case review in which it compares similar death-eligible cases, considering those cases individually. The Court has consistently placed greater reliance on precedent-seeking review than on frequency review, and continues to do so. Precedent-seeking divides criminal culpability into three categories: defendant's moral blameworthiness, the degree of victimization, and defendant's character. Harvey is quite blameworthy. He broke into someone's home at night to rob and brutally murdered the occupant to escape apprehension. He also had an extensive prior record involving serious, violent crimes, including rape, kidnapping, and robberies. Harvey's extensive prior record, mature age, and the lack of mitigating factors, make him more blameworthy than most of the other defendants in his subcategory. Harvey's death sentence is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE HANDLER, dissenting, is of the view that the Court should not apply existing methodology to Harvey prior to its consideration of the proposed revisions of the Special Master. Justice Handler predicts that those revisions would have a significant impact on Harvey's proportionality review. In addition, Justice Handler believes the evidence before the Court already demonstrates a constitutionally impermissible risk that race discrimination infects our State's imposition of the death penalty. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER has filed a separate dissenting opinion, which JUSTICE STEIN joins as to Points III, B2 and III, B3. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NATHANIEL HARVEY, Defendant-Appellant. Argued April 28, 1998 -- Decided June 3, 1999 On proportionality review of a death sentence imposed in the Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County. Mordecai D. Garelick and Michael B. Jones, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Nancy A. Hulett, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by GARIBALDI, J. A jury originally convicted defendant Nathaniel Harvey of Irene Schnaps's murder and sentenced him to death in October 1986. This Court reversed that conviction because of errors in the admission of defendant's confession and in the failure of the trial court to give a "Gerald charge."See footnote 1 State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 407 (1990) (Harvey I), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931, 111 S. Ct. 1336, 113 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1991). At defendant's retrial, a jury again convicted defendant of the purposeful or knowing murder of Irene Schnaps, and imposed the death penalty. We affirmed defendant's conviction and death sentence. State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 233 (1997) (Harvey II). We granted defendant's request for proportionality review of his death sentence, see N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e, and now find no disproportionality. We continue to emphasize, however, that "[p]roportionality review seeks to determine only whether a particular death sentence is aberrational, not whether it compares perfectly with other sentences." DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 166 (quoting Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 352) (citing Marshall II, supra, 120 N.J. at 131)). A. Adjustments in Comparison Group The AOC maintains the database on which we base our proportionality review universe. It breaks the list of death-eligible defendants into various categories and subcategories. See CCH Report, tbl. 7. There are thirteen basic categories, each of which contains two to seven subcategories.See footnote 3 As we have done previously, "we defer generally to the AOC's expertise, and particularly to its unique assignment of defendants to only one comparison category: each case in the universe is assigned to only one comparison category, and within that category, to only one subcategory." Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 327 (quoting DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 167 (citations omitted)). The AOC has placed defendant in category E -- designated "Robbery without A-D." That means defendant's case had only one victim who was not a public servant and who was not sexually assaulted and that defendant had no prior murder conviction. The AOC assigned defendant's case to subcategory 1 in category E, designated "residential forced entry with particular violence/terror." The AOC has identified 126 death-eligible cases in the E category, and 22 cases in the E-1 subcategory.See footnote 4 Two of the cases in the E-1 category represent defendant's initial death sentence and subsequent death sentence after reversal of the first. The State has proposed no adjustment to the AOC's classification of defendant's case. Defendant, however, has proposed various adjustments to the AOC's categorization, suggesting that numerous cases should be added to defendant's comparison group. In addition to the E-1 cases, defendant seeks to compare his cases to twenty-four other cases he describes as factually similar. Specifically, defendant seeks to adjust the universe of comparable cases by including in it defendants in three category A cases (multiple victims), two category B cases (prior murders), eleven C-1 cases (sexual assault with particular violence/terror), and two C-2 cases (involving a sexual assault with one or more additional statutory aggravating circumstances). In DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 169, the Court refused to compare the defendant's case to cases in higher blameworthiness categories. We likewise refuse to compare defendant's case to cases in higher blameworthiness categories. Moreover, consistent with this Court's principle of comparing only similar cases, the cases in defendant's suggested comparison group involving sexual assault murders should not be included. Cases of that kind are so dissimilar, both factually and in their levels of blameworthiness, "that they do not offer any insight into the proportionality of defendant's sentencing." Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 79. Defendant also seeks to include six cases in the E-3 category (robbery, with forced entry, but with no particular violence/terror). One case in category E-2 (robbery, with no forced residential entry but with particular violence/terror); and one case in category G-3 (burglary, with no residential forced entry and no particular violence/terror).See footnote 5 Of those eight cases, four proceeded to the penalty phase, but none resulted in a death sentence. A comparison of those eight cases supports the conclusion that the E-1 category is the proper comparison group for defendant and that his death sentence is not disproportionate. The dissent asserts that our decision to limit defendant's comparison group to subcategory E-1 cases rather than to the entire E category is far too restrictive and represents a serious departure from past practices. Post at ___ (slip op. at ___). In prior cases, in applying the salient-factors test and precedent-seeking approach we have used as the comparison group an entire composite category. However, in those cases the subcategory was too small to be statistically productive and the total cases in the chosen category consisted of a much smaller number of cases than the 126 cases in the E category. In Chew II, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 22), for example, we categorized Chew as a pecuniary-motive killer, other pecuniary advantage subcategory I-3. Because only one other defendant remained in that subcategory, we determined that any statistical analysis that consisted only of I-3 subcategory cases would be unproductive. Id. at 23. Accordingly, we compared Chew with the entire group of pecuniary-motive killers that consisted only of sixteen eligible cases. In DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 174, where the defendant had also been placed in the pecuniary-motive, contract-killer subcategory, we compared him to the entire category of pecuniary-motive murderers to be able to have a productive statistical analysis. At the time of the DiFrisco proportionality review, the entire pecuniary motive category consisted of only fourteen eligible I category cases. Id. at 167. In Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 321, we found that the defendant's "essential attribute" was his prior murder conviction. However, because of the "exceedingly small number of cases" in the B-1 subcategory, we compared Loftin's case to all death-eligible cases in the B or prior murder category. Id. at 327. There were only sixteen eligible cases in category B. Here, the twenty-two cases in the E-1 subcategory provide a sufficient basis for both the salient-factors analysis and precedent-seeking review. Moreover, a comparison of all 126 cases in the E category is impractical and would make proportionality review unmanageable. Such a review is also unnecessary. The cases that defendant proposes in the E-2, E-3 and G-3 subcategories are not factually similar to defendant's case. Defendant was forty-four at the time of Schnaps' murder, with an extensive prior record. At the time of the murder, he was not under the influence of any emotional disturbance nor was his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct impaired as a result of a mental disease or defect. Defendant is not distinguished from the E-2, E-3 and G-3 defendants because of differences in the brutality of their crimes, all of which were horrendous, but by the evidence those defendants presented of mitigating factors. Several presented evidence of either mental disease, defect or emotional disturbance. Many also were much younger than defendant and had no significant prior criminal records. Of the eight cases, only Bushy and Huff, like Harvey, were charged with two aggravating factors. Busby, like Harvey, was charged with aggravating factors, c(4)(g), contemporaneous felony and c(4)(f), seeking to escape detention. However, the jury found that Busby, who attempted suicide after the murder, was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act was significantly impaired because of a mental disease or defect, or intoxication. Huff, who was twenty-three at the time of the murder, was charged with both c(4)(c), causing murder by extreme suffering and c(4)(g), contemporaneous felony. However, Huff's jury after hearing psychiatric testimony that Huff had an antisocial disorder, an antisocial personality and mentally was still an adolescent, found that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was significantly impaired as a result of a mental disease or defect, or intoxication. In Busby and Huff, the prosecutor sought the death penalty, but the jury could not agree on a death sentence. Unlike Harvey where the jury found only catch-all mitigating factor, c(5)(h), in Busby and Huff, the jury found in addition to that factor, other mitigating factors. Accordingly, their cases are not factually similar to Harvey's and it is understandable why Harvey was the only one of the three sentenced to death. There also were mitigating factors that distinguished defendant's case from cases of other defendants. Age was a mitigating factor for Dollard, Wolfe and Hart who were all twenty-two years or younger when they committed the murders for which they were charged. Wolfe, who also showed remorse, and Dollard had no significant prior records and Suarez had no prior record. The jury also found that Wolfe and Hart suffered from a mental disease, defect or intoxication that impaired their capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct. In sum, unlike many of the life-sentenced E-2, E-3, and G-3 defendants, Harvey was not mentally or emotionally disturbed when he murdered his victims, nor was he a young man, without a significant prior criminal record. Because of those differences, such cases provide little insight into the propriety of the jury's decision in this case, and are inapplicable to our proportionality review. We therefore refuse defendant's request to expand his comparison cases. As we have previously commented, a "capital defendant is not entitled to a perfect universe of identical cases, but instead only the best that we can achieve." DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 170-71 (quoting Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 31 (citing Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 352, 362)). We find that defendant's comparison group consists of the twenty-two cases in subcategory E-1. . B. The Frequency Approach "The principal inquiry here is whether the degree of blameworthiness in the present case 'reasonably supports an expectation that such a case will generally result in a death sentence.'" DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 171 (quoting Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 30). "Frequency analysis helps us to determine whether defendant is in a category that renders him or her more likely than other killers to receive the death penalty." Ibid. It is divided into two statistical tests to gauge a defendant's relative criminal culpability: the salient-factors test, and the index-of-outcomes test. In Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 266, we appointed Appellate Division Judge David S. Baime, as a Special Master, to conduct an extensive review and evaluation of the proportionate methodology that we have used for the last six years. We directed the Special Master to consider the following: (1) scope of the proportionality review universe of cases; (2) accuracy of the AOC's data-coding techniques; (3) statistical reliability of frequency review results given the small size of the data base; (4) strengths and weaknesses of the index-of-outcomes test; (5) systemic proportionality review (specifically, the development of parsimonious models to measure the possible role of race discrimination in prosecuting and sentencing decisions); (6) possibility of reduction in the number of case classifications in salient-factors test; (7) possible appointment of a panel of judges to perform periodic assessments of penalty-trial outcomes; and (8) maintenance of proportionality review as a separate proceeding. Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 454-56. On April 28, 1999, the Special Master released his report, The Honorable David S. Baime, Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court: Proportionality Review Project at 1-4 (Apr. 28, 1999) (Special Master Report). In that report, the Special Master determined that several aspects of our methodology are faulty and require revision. Special Master Report at 6-7. the Court scheduled oral argument on the Special Master's Report on June 7, 1999. Pending the Court's decision in that proceeding, we have determined that we will continue to analyze defendant's case according to the methodologies and procedures previously utilized, except that we no longer conduct the numerical-preponderance test previously used as part of our frequency approach. Although the AOC has added thirty-two cases to the database since the Loftin Report, and the addition of cases "has had a positive impact on the stability of the models, [the AOC's] view is that the culpability estimate which purports to give a 'predicted probability of death sentence' is often still too soft, and little substantive reliance should be given to this statistic in the Chew, Cooper and Harvey cases." Barraco Memorandum at 4. Consequently, because frequency analysis is statistically based, and because the small sample sizes may undermine statistical reliability, we remain concerned about the statistical reliability of frequency analysis, and continue to place greater emphasis on the results of the precedent-seeking review. Loftin II, supra, at 157, 291-97; DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 171; Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 29; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 351. 1. The Salient-Factors Test The salient-factors test enables us to compare defendant's sentence to sentences in factually similar cases to measure the relative frequency of defendant's sentence. DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. 172; Martini II, supra, 138 N.J. at 33. We first base comparability on the statutory aggravating factors, and then subdivide the group "'according to circumstances that serve either to aggravate or to mitigate the blameworthiness of the defendants in those cases.'" Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 328 (quoting Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 33). Because the salient-factors test compares sentences in cases that are factually similar, we find it the most persuasive of the frequency tests. Ibid.; see also DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 173; Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 33; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 353; Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 168. Harvey has been assigned to category E, designated "robbery killer." Harvey has been further classified in subcategory 1 in category E, designated "residential forced entry with particular violence or terror." CCH Report, tbl. 7. Of the twenty-two death-eligible cases in that group, eight proceeded to the penalty phase. Including defendant's cases, four of those penalty trial cases resulted in death sentences. Thus, the death-sentencing rate for robbery killers is eighteen percent and for those advancing to the penalty trial, it is fifty percent. The overall death-sentencing rate for the death eligible universe is twelve percent and the rate for those in the penalty-trial universe is forty-one percent. Therefore, the figures for E-1 defendants are higher than the overall death-sentencing rates, leading to the conclusion that society views those who commit particular violence or terror in a residential forced entry as significantly blameworthy. See DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 173 (stating that higher sentencing rates for one category indicates society views those within that category as "significantly blameworthy"). Removing defendant's cases from the group lowers the rates somewhat, but still does not indicate that defendant's sentence is disproportionate. Without defendant's cases, the death sentencing rate for E-1 defendants is ten percent, and for those advancing to the penalty phase it is thirty-three percent. That ten percent figure is slightly lower than the general twelve percent rate for all death-eligible cases, but the thirty-three percent rate is slightly higher than the overall thirty-one percent rate for penalty trial cases. Those figures do not support defendant's claim that his sentence is disproportionate. The following table summarizes the outcome of the salient-factors test with respect to the E-1 category: Inc. D. Exc. D. .50 (4/8) .33 (2/6) .18 (4/22) .10 (2/20) .36 (8/22) .30 (6/20) Inc. D. Exc. D. .29 (10/35) .24 (8/33) .8 (10/126) .6 (8/124) .28 (35/126) .27 (33/124) In the first regression, which considers both statutory and nonstatutory factors for cases in the penalty-trial universe, defendant's predicted probability of receiving a death sentence is thirty-five percent. The probability range is eleven percent to sixty-eight percent. In other words, we are ninety-five percent certain that a defendant with characteristics similar to Harvey would have a predicted probability of receiving a death sentence of between eleven percent to sixty-eight percent. Defendant's culpability score places him in culpability level 2. Defendants in that culpability level have received a death sentence twenty-six percent of the time. Defendant's results in that regression are significantly lower than those in Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 43 (eighty-eight percent predicted probability), DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 180 (seventy-four percent predicted probability), Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 362-63 (eighty-one percent predicted probability in Martini Report and seventy-six percent probability in Bey Report), and Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 173 (fifty percent predicted probability). On the other hand, we have upheld a death sentence with a culpability score significantly lower than defendant's. See Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 331 (fourteen percent predicted probability). When the same variables are considered in the full universe, defendant's culpability score falls to thirteen percent and the confidence internal ranges from five percent to thirty-two percent. Accordingly, defendant's case occupies culpability level one, at which five percent of the defendants have been sentenced to death. Although those results are also low, they are within a range that the Court has previously held not disproportionate. See DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 180-81 (eleven percent predicted probability of death); Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 43 (five percent predicted probability); Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 173 (seventeen percent predicted probability). The third regression of the index-of-outcomes test utilizes only statutory aggravating and mitigating factors and is run with data from the penalty-trial universe. In that regression, the predicted probability of receiving a death sentence is forty-three percent, and the confidence interval ranges from twenty-three percent to sixty-five percent. That places defendant in culpability level three. At that culpability level, defendants are sentenced to death forty-five percent of the time. When a regression is run with data from the full universe and with the same variables as in the prior regression, defendant's predicted probability of death is nineteen percent. The confidence interval spans from eight percent to thirty-eight percent. Defendant is in culpability level one, in which, as noted above, defendants are sentenced to death five percent of the time. Defendant argues that the index-of-outcomes frequencies are so low that they prove that defendant's sentence is disproportionate. We disagree. Although defendant's numbers are low in some of the scenarios, in the other scenarios they are within the range that the Court has previously held to be not disproportionate. Moreover, even in the scenarios where defendant's score is lowest, defendant's numbers are not the lowest score of a defendant whose claim of disproportionality we have denied. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the index-of-outcomes test indicates no disproportionality. 3. Frequency Approach Conclusion We are satisfied that defendant's "results produce no showing of randomness or aberration. Defendant has failed to offer reliable evidence of disproportionality, and we do not find that for cases such as his a sentence other than death is generally imposed." DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 183 (quoting Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 46) (citing Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 365; Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 174)). Although in some of the scenarios defendant's predicted probability of death is low, we do not believe that evidences that his sentence is an aberration. We remain wary of the frequency approach because of its noted defects, and therefore continue to place greater emphasis on the precedent-seeking approach. See Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 334-35; DiFrisco, supra, 142 N.J. at 182-83. C. The Precedent-Seeking Approach The precedent-seeking approach is the second component of proportionality review. Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 335; DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 183; Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 46. "Here we engage in traditional case-by-case review in which we compare similar death-eligible cases, considering the cases individually." DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 183; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 366. This approach seeks to determine whether defendant's death sentence is excessive in comparison to other similar life-sentenced and death-sentenced defendants. Id. at 184. Precedent-seeking reviews "complement frequency analysis." Ibid. As we have noted, "[T]he lower the overall rates and the reliability of our frequency analysis, the greater the need for precedent-seeking review." Id. at 183-84. In each of our prior proportionality review cases, we have consistently placed greater reliance on precedent-seeking review than on frequency review. Id. at 184; Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 28-29; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 350; Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 159. We continue to do so. The Special Master has recommended methods by which to select a representative number of cases within the group of similar cases for consideration and comparison to defendant's case. Special Master Report at 68-70. Although some of the Special Master's comments are valid, until the Court has a hearing and issues its opinion regarding the Special Master's Report, we will continue to analyze defendant's case according to the methodologies and procedures previously utilized." Supra at ___ (slip op. at 26). Precedent-seeking review considers statutory and nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating factors that are "'rooted in traditional sentencing guidelines.'" DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 184-85 (quoting Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 159 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1)). That approach divides criminal culpability into three categories: defendant's moral blameworthiness, the degree of victimization, and defendant's character. Id. at 185. We begin application of the precedent-seeking approach by identifying the cases that we will use. They consist of those cases categorized by the AOC as E-1. CHC Report tbl. 7. Including Harvey's two death sentences, the total number of cases is twenty-two. Ibid. By comparing Harvey to those other nineteen defendants in the traditional manner of review, we seek to determine the existence of any aberration in defendant's sentencing. Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 369. The goal is to ensure that defendant has not been unfairly singled out for capital punishment. However, because each case involves different facts, defendants, juries, and legal issues, to be proportionate even closely-similar cases do not require identical verdicts. DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 186; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 369. The components by which we measure defendant's culpability are as follows: 1. Defendant's moral blameworthiness a. Motive b. Premeditation c. Justification or excuse d. Evidence of mental disease, defect or disturbance e. Knowledge of victim's helplessness f. Knowledge of effects on nondecedent victims g. Defendant's age h. Defendant's involvement in planning the murder 2. Degree of victimization a. Violence and brutality of the murder b. Injury to nondecedent victim 3. Character of defendant a. Prior record b. Other unrelated acts of violence c. Cooperation with authorities d. Remorse e. Capacity for rehabilitation. Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 155; accord DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 203. 1. Defendant's Case Late in the evening of June 16, 1985, or in the early morning hours of June 17, 1985, defendant broke into the apartment of Irene Schnaps, a woman whom he did not know, and brutally murdered her. The scene of the attack, Schnaps' bedroom, was left in disarray. Blood was throughout the room. Defendant struck Irene Schnaps fifteen times on the head with such force that her skull was fractured open. Some of the blows lacerated her brain. She suffered numerous lacerations to her head, as well as bruises and contusions to her face, a broken jaw, several broken teeth and pressure marks on her neck. Some of the blows were delivered from the front, but most were from behind. The murder weapon was a blunt instrument: a hammer, which left curving wounds; and an item, such as a tire iron, two-by-four, or a dull axe, which left linear wounds. After he murdered Irene Schnaps, defendant washed the blood off the front of her body and changed the sheets on the bed in an apparent attempt to avoid detection. He then left her lying naked on the floor. At the penalty phase in 1994, the State relied on the relevant guilt phase evidence to prove the c(4)(c), c(4)(g), and c(4)(f) aggravating factors. Defendant alleged one mitigating factor, the catch-all factor under c(5)(h). Within that factor, he itemized the following ten, non-statutory factors: l. defendant's age at the time of the offense; 2. defendant had been traumatized at an early age when he witnessed the tragic death of his older sister; 3. defendant was uprooted from his home and sent to live with grandparents who physically and verbally abused him and resented his presence; 4. defendant suffered feelings of abandonment when his parents did not take him with them as promised, yet continued to have other children; 5. defendant was exposed to domestic violence in the home of his grandparents; 6. defendant was exposed to domestic violence in the home of his parents; 7. defendant is a caring and loving father; 8. defendant's continuing relationship with his children and the financial contribution that he still makes to them; 9. defendant's relationship with his mentally disabled daughter; 10. any other factor that relates to defendant's childhood or family background. At the penalty phase, defendant focused on his childhood, his family background, and his role as a parent. Professor Moran, a criminologist specializing in the correlation between age and crime, testified that if defendant were sentenced to prison rather than death he would not be eligible for parole prior to age sixty-four, and by that time defendant would be of an age group less likely to commit violent crime. Carmetta Alabarus, a forensic social worker, testified about defendant's social history. Albarus had interviewed defendant, as well as some family members. Her testimony focused on the years from defendant's early childhood to adolescence, and on his marriage up to the separation from his wife. Defendant was one of twelve children; defendant and his wife Joyce had four children together. Defendant and Joyce separated, and she later bore a child with another man. Albarus recounted for the jury how, at age four, defendant lit a match to generate heat on kerosene-laden coal in order to keep himself and his five-year-old sister, Mary, warm. Unfortunately, Mary got severely burned when some kerosene splashed on her and ignited. She died a few days later from her burns. Albarus also recounted how defendant was left to live with his grandparents in Georgia in 1956 when his parents left the south to look for work in the north. Albarus said defendant's grandparents were resentful about having to take care of so many children. Albarus further testified that defendant's grandfather was abusive to his wife and to defendant. Defendant eventually ran away and lived with an uncle before reuniting with his parents in New Jersey. Also, Albarus said it was hurtful to defendant that his parents said there was no room for him. Once defendant was reunited with his parents, Albarus stated that defendant acted as a "big brother" to his younger siblings. However, his father was abusive toward defendant's mother and fathered children outside the marriage. Defendant was devoted to his mother, and it pained him to see her suffer at the hands of his father. Albarus also characterized defendant as sharing a "special relationship" with his brother James, who had developed signs of being developmentally disabled. She added that defendant showed sensibility toward his daughter Tanya, who is developmentally disabled. Albarus spoke with defendant's wife, who told her that defendant was "very responsible" as a father and husband at the beginning of their marriage. Even while incarcerated, Albarus said defendant maintained a "close relationship" with his children, sending them money, writing to them and sending them cards. Defendant treats Taliah, Joyce's child with another man, as his own. In addition to the professor and the social historian, members of defendant's family, his father, his brother James, his sister-in-law, his wife, and Taliah testified. Defendant also exercised his right of allocution and made the following, terse statement to the jury: "I'm going to ask you to give me thirty years so I can stay around about [sic] do the best I can, teaching my family and communicate with them. Thank you." On rebuttal, the State produced evidence that in 1994 defendant had no visitors at the jail. On surrebuttal, defendant's wife testified that she did not bring the children to the jail pursuant to defendant's wishes. Each juror deliberated on the non-statutory mitigating factors submitted by defendant. No juror found defendant's age, exposure to domestic violence in his grandparent's home, exposure to domestic violence in his parent's home, defendant's relationship with his brother James and his daughter Taliah, or any other factor relating to defendant's childhood or background to be in mitigation. However, in mitigation, jurors found the following facts: six jurors -- that defendant was traumatized when he witnessed the death of his older sister; one juror - that defendant was sent to live with grandparents who physically and verbally abused him; four jurors -- that defendant suffered feelings of abandonment and that defendant was a loving father; and two jurors -- defendant's relationship with his children. The jurors, however, unanimously found aggravating factors c(4)(f), escape detection, and c(4)(g), contemporaneous felony, to be present and that they outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. They sentenced defendant to death as a result. 2. Analysis of Defendant's Moral Blameworthiness. An analysis of defendant's moral blameworthiness reveals that he is indeed quite blameworthy. He broke into someone's home at night to rob. Clearly, defendant could not have been surprised to find the occupant at home. He then brutally murdered the occupant so he could escape apprehension. Irene Schnaps, a helpless victim, was sleeping in her bedroom. As the medical examiner opined, she was hit mostly from behind. She was attacked with blunt instruments and struck so hard that her skull was fractured, her brain lacerated, and her jaw broken. She was beaten about the face and sustained many bruises in a brutal murder. There is no justification or excuse for the murder. Unlike many of the other E-1 defendants, there is no evidence that defendant suffered from a mental disease, defect or disturbance. With respect to age and maturity, defendant's age was presented as a non-statutory mitigating factor, and all twelve jurors rejected it. Unlike most of the defendants in E-1, defendant was over forty years old at the time of the murder, and he can be categorized only as a mature, full-grown man. Although defendant may not have known specifically that Irene had family and friends, we have previously recognized that "[w]hile a defendant might be unaware of the specific characteristics of his victims or of the particular survivors that the victim will leave behind, it is completely foreseeable that the killing will eliminate a unique person and destroy a web of familial relationships." State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 46 (1996). Moreover, defendant must have realized that Irene had family and friends because there were personal photographs in her apartment and he stole a man's Seiko LaSalle watch. Unquestionably, defendant entered the privacy of Irene Schnaps's bedroom to rob her. He then killed her to avoid detection, and had the cold, calculating presence of mind to wash her body and change the sheets to further avoid detection. 3. Victimization Victimization consists of "the extent of mutilation of the victim and injury to surviving victims." Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 366. In this case, Irene Schnaps was struck repeatedly in the head. Although the medical examiner opined that Schnaps was rendered unconscious, she was conscious when defendant began his brutal assault upon her. Even when the victim is not aware of impending death, as was the case in DiFrisco III, this Court has observed that "at the end of the day there is still a victim, a [woman] who was [brutally] murdered . . . ." DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 205. There were no other victims. 4. Defendant's Character Defendant's character contributes greatly to his moral blameworthiness. Defendant's prior record is extensive and involves convictions for serious, violent crimes. On May 31, 1979, defendant pleaded guilty to rape, atrocious assault and battery. In October 1988, he pleaded guilty to first degree kidnapping and aggravating sexual assault. He also pleaded guilty to second degree attempted kidnaping, second degree burglary, and third degree burglary. He also was convicted of receiving stolen property. Defendant has broken into homes other than Schnaps's: on the day of his arrest he broke into two homes. In one house, he attacked a couple with an ax; in another, he attempted to abduct a teenaged girl. Also, he later confessed to committing a number of burglaries in West Windsor. Harvey II, supra, 151 N.J. at 117. Suffice it to say, Nathaniel Harvey is a very dangerous man who has kidnaped, raped, robbed and killed. With respect to remorse, there is scant, if any, evidence of it. In his statement in allocution, he expressed no remorse for murdering Irene. Nor did he express any shame or humility for the pain and suffering he inflicted on Schnaps's family. Finally, there in little hope of rehabilitation for Harvey. His prior record reveals that he has chosen for himself a life of violent crime. He has multiple convictions for rape, assault and kidnapping. The murder of Irene Schnaps was the culmination of an escalating pattern of violence. Defendant had been paroled in May 1983 for his sentence of fifteen to twenty years for rape. Irene Schnaps was killed a little over two years later. Unfortunately, his four years in prison had little deterrent or rehabilitative effect on defendant. With respect to defendant's moral blameworthiness and character, defendant is highly culpable. In contrast, with respect to defendant's degree of victimization, defendant is moderately culpable. 5. Summaries of Similar Cases The starting point of the comparative-culpability analysis is the comparison group used in the salient-factors test. Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 367 ("Initially, from the universe of all death-eligible cases, we select a class of cases according to their salient factors."); see also DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 186 (using pecuniary-motive murderers to form defendant's comparison group); Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 51 (using same salient-factors comparison group). By using the salient-factors test's comparison group for precedent-seeking review, the Court ensures that the two analyses are complementary, can confirm each other, and can be compared to each other. Chew II, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 39); DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 185; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 366-67. As noted earlier, the AOC placed defendant in the E-1 subcategory. When defendant's case is compared to the others in the E-1 category, summaries of which are set forth in Appendix A, we find that defendant's criminal culpability is high and his death sentence is not disproportionate. Defendant asserts that his level of culpability is more like the life-sentenced cases in his comparison group than the death-sentenced cases. We reject that assertion and observe that "[d]isparity alone does not demonstrate disproportionality." Chew II, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 407) (quoting Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 330). Rather, we search for some impermissible factor or pattern that has been broken. Id. at 40. Aside from Harvey, two defendants in the E-1 category received death sentences: Gerald and Mejia. Defendant argues that Gerald and Mejia are more culpable than he. We disagree. Both Gerald, State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40 (1988), and Mejia, State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475 (1995), were sentenced to death. In Gerald, we reversed the capital murder conviction. The Court concluded that the state constitution precluded the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who purposely or knowingly caused serious bodily injury (SBI) that resulted in death. 113 N.J. at 89. After reviewing the evidence produced at Gerald's trial, this Court was unable to discern whether Gerald purposely or knowingly caused death by his own conduct or whether he caused SBI that resulted in death. Id. at 91-92, 100-101. According to defendant's confession, he hit and "stepped on" the victim, but one of the codefendants "went off" on the victim and threw the TV on him. Id. at 100. Moreover, in Gerald, the jury found several mitigating factors not found here. Defense psychiatrists testified that Gerald was drug dependent and depressed and suffered severe personality disorder. Moreover, one expert claimed that his desire for drugs made Gerald unable to control his behavior. Gerald testified and expressed sorrow for the murder. Gerald's sisters testified about their family life, how their father's death affected Gerald and Gerald's use of alcohol and drugs. Id. at 62-63. The jury found that Gerald was emotionally disturbed and suffered from a mental disease and defect. He also had no significant prior criminal activity. Mejia was a kitchen worker at a hotel caught up in an angry dispute with a co-worker whom the defendant thought was leaving the country without paying Mejia the $750 owed him. Based on Mejia's defense that the shooting was an accident, that his gun fired accidentally and that he never intended to kill, the Court found a rational basis for SBI murder. Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 489-90. In both those cases, the Court found that there was a rational basis for a jury to find that each defendant had not purposely and knowingly intended to kill, but had merely intended to inflict serious bodily injury that resulted in death. In this case, the evidence was clear that defendant purposely and knowingly intended to kill Irene Schnaps by his own conduct. Other cases in the E-1 group contain similar problems of proof. Caviness and his cohorts entered the victim's apartment, tied the victim up, and ransacked the apartment. A codefendant said Caviness killed the victim by hitting him numerous times with a baseball bat. But, Caviness said that this codefendant had the bat, and that he left the codefendant with the victim. Gerald Williams's conviction for felony murder was reversed because the Appellate Division held that the trial court's charge on causation was deficient under State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2 (1990). The Appellate Division concluded that a jury could have found that the burglary and robbery were not the direct cause of the victim's death. Williams had testified that the victim awoke during the burglary and was at the window with his legs dangling outside and that he, Williams, had tried to help the victim, but was unsuccessful. Here, defendant caused Schnaps's death by repeatedly striking her on the head with a blunt instrument. There is no issue that he did not commit the murder by his own conduct or that the killing was accidental. In comparing the relative blameworthiness of defendant and the other E-1 defendants, the dissent focuses on the brutality of the crimes. Undoubtedly, all the murders in the E-1 category are brutal and savage. But, many of those cases involved mitigating factors that are not present in defendant's case. In Reigle, the jury found the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease, or defect, or intoxication. There were facts in Felder, Brown, Mann, Lee, and Britton that also would allow a jury to conclude that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was impaired by mental disease or defect or intoxication. No such evidence is presented here. Defendant's act of breaking into Irene's apartment was not an impulsive act. He previously had committed numerous burglaries. Brunson also elicited substantial mitigating evidence about his abusive early life and his extreme emotional disturbance. As a child he had been treated by psychiatrists and psychologists, often including treatment by psychoactive medications. He had twice attempted suicide. He had been diagnosed as being paranoid and schizophrenic, and as having a conduct disorder. Not surprisingly, the jury found as mitigating factors, that at the time of the crime he was mentally disturbed. Szadorski also had severe mental illness, including substance abuse. Mendez was mentally retarded with learning disabilities and a mental age of six. He does not read, write or speak English. He also had no prior criminal record. Herman Williams viciously shot his victims to death. However, Williams was characterized as "culturally retarded." Harvey suffered from no such infirmities. He was not emotionally disturbed or mentally ill when he killed Schnaps. Moreover, when Harvey committed the murder he was significantly older than several of the other defendants were when they committed their murders. Brunson, Caviness, Felder, Phillips, Ploppert, and Szadorski were all much younger than defendant. Because Harvey was more mature than the other E-1 killers, he is more blameworthy. Finally, Gerald, Brown, Caviness, Felder, Mendez, and Reigle also had no significant history of prior criminal activity. Indeed, aside from Gerald Williams, Harvey's criminal record is more extensive than the other E-1 killers' records. As noted above, see infra at ___ (slip op. at 46-47), Harvey has been convicted of kidnapping and rape. The danger that Harvey poses to society, as evidenced by his violent criminal record, makes him more blameworthy than the other E-1 killers. Defendant is a cold and calculating murderer. He invaded the privacy of Irene Schnaps's home at night and brutally murdered her to escape detection. To conclude, the facts surrounding each of the above cases in the E-1 category demonstrate that they are distinguishable from defendant's case. Moreover, to the extent they are comparable to defendant's case, this Court has not required identical verdicts in all similar cases. State v. Martini (II), supra, 139 N.J. at 47. Defendant was not singled out unfairly for capital punishment. His death sentence cannot be seen as an aberration. Defendant has failed to show that his death sentence is in any way disproportionate. B. Precedent-Seeking Review Conclusion Proportionality review seeks only to assure that defendant's sentence is not an aberration. See DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 166. It is not intended to ensure that one killer's sentence is identical to all other similarly categorized killers. Ibid. Additionally, the mere fact that one or two comparison cases may be more deathworthy than Harvey does not establish that Harvey's sentence is disproportionate. See DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 209. A comparison between defendant's case and other similar cases reveals no disproportionality in defendant's sentence. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER has filed a separate dissenting opinion, which JUSTICE STEIN joins as to Points III, B2 and III, B3. This case is reported at State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40 (1988). John Matusz, eighty-nine years old, lived with his fifty-five year-old son, Paul Matusz. John was disabled as the result of a stroke. Neither John nor Paul were self-sufficient, so two of John's daughters took turns staying at the house to care for them. On August 13, 1982, John's daughter, Lottie, was staying at the house. John retired for the evening at 6:30 p.m. Paul went to his room to watch television, and later retired. Lottie watched television until she went to bed at 9:30. The defendant and his two co-defendants broke into the home. Lottie heard noise from the other first-floor bedroom, and as she opened the door to that room, Lottie was struck in the eye by someone standing behind the door. Lottie was then attacked by two males. One of the intruders had a knife or blade. The intruders threw Lottie to the floor, punched and kicked her and threw her into the bathroom. One of the intruders continued to stomp on her and she was told "shut up or I'll kill you." She suffered a broken nose and contusions of the face, neck, and chest. When asked where her money was kept, she told him the location of her purse. Paul heard the commotion and came down the stairs to investigate. Two of the intruders attacked Paul, and one struck Paul in the face with a television set. Not knowing whether the intruders were still in the house, Lottie telephoned the police and her sister. She then saw Paul lying on the floor with a television overturned on his face. After removing the television set, Lottie found Paul dead. Paul died of blunt force injuries to the head. He suffered contusions and swelling in the brain and he drowned in the blood from his broken nose. Meanwhile, John had been dragged from his bed to the hallway and was left there bleeding profusely. John suffered bruises and lacerations of the face resulting from being hit by a blunt object. Those injuries required continued hospital care and convalescence treatment. John died on October 2, 1982, never having returned home. The intruders stole a new color television set, an old portable black-and-white television set, and Lottie's purse, which contained about $60. The police received a tip that Gerald had committed the murders. They arrested him on outstanding warrants. After failing a polygraph, Gerald confessed. He stated that he, Eddie Walker, and John Bland had entered the Matusz house, intending to steal a television set that they previously had seen from outside the house. Gerald "had" the woman, and admitted striking her a couple of times. Walker "had" the younger man (Paul), while Bland roused the old man (John) from bed. The young man was giving Walker a lot of trouble, so Gerald and Bland went to assist Walker. They beat the younger man with their hands, then left him alone. Gerald went back to the woman, and Bland returned to the older man. Bland beat the older man with a lamp and a cane, or both. Gerald said that Walker "just went off" on the younger man, hitting him with a trophy, punching him, and throwing a television set on his face. Gerald also admitted that, on the way out of the house, he stepped on Paul's face. Walter Gerald was twenty-four years old. He graduated from high school and entered college on an athletic scholarship. He lost the scholarship because of a leg injury. He then completed three semesters at a community college. Gerald suffered from drug addiction. His record reveals one conviction for theft, for which he was sentenced to sixty days in jail and one year probation. Gerald was tried for murder, felony murder and aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit burglary, robbery with bodily injury, aggravated assault, and two counts of aggravated assault. The jury convicted defendant on all counts except aggravated assault. At the penalty trial, the jury found aggravating factor c(4)(c), outrageously vile and c(4)(g), contemporaneous felony. It found mitigating factor c(5)(a), emotional disturbance; c(5)(d), age of defendant; c(5)(f) no significant prior record; and c(5)(h), the catch-all factor. The jury found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced the defendant to death. The court imposed a custodial term for the other convictions. We reversed Gerald's conviction on the capital count on the ground that the State constitution precluded the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who purposely or knowingly caused serious bodily injury (SBI) that resulted in death. After reviewing the evidence, we were unable to determine whether Gerald purposely or knowingly caused death by his own conduct or whether he caused SBI that resulted in death. According to Gerald's confession, he hit and "stepped on" Paul, but one of the co-defendants "went off" on the victim and threw the television set on him. The jury also had not been instructed that it must find that aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court sustained the conviction on the non-capital count. On prosecutor's motion, the capital indictment was dismissed. Defendant was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Comparison of Other E and G Cases that Defendant Asserts Should Be in the E-1 Category On March 31, 1995, Jesus DeJesus entered the apartment of a forty-nine-year-old woman who lived in the apartment below his. DeJesus stabbed the woman to death and set the woman on fire. DeJesus took some jewelry from the apartment. The woman's remains were identified by her dental records. DeJesus's brother informed the police that DeJesus was selling jewelry. The jewelry was subsequently identified as belonging to the victim. When confronted by the police with the jewelry that he had stolen, DeJesus stated that he had not cut the woman. When the police informed him that the cause of death had not been determined, DeJesus put his head down and requested an attorney. DeJesus was charged with murder, felony murder, armed robbery, arson, and armed burglary. He was convicted of all charges and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a thirty year parole bar for murder, a concurrent twenty-year term with a ten year parole bar for armed robbery, a consecutive five-year term with a two-and-one-half year parole bar for arson, and a consecutive ten-year term with a two-and-one-half year parole bar for armed burglary. The AOC has classified DeJesus as having aggravating factor c(4)(g), contemporaneous felony, and mitigating factor c(5)(h), the catch-all. At the time of the murder, DeJesus was forty-four years old and living with one of his two daughters. DeJesus left school after the fourth grade and later attended a printing school to learn to operate a printing press. Although he had worked as a Hi-lo driver in the past, DeJesus had been unemployed for two years prior to the crime. DeJesus admitted drinking alcohol three times a week but denied having a drug problem. He had prior convictions for robbery, theft, criminal trespass, possessing drug paraphernalia, and motor vehicle violations. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 146 September Term 1997 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NATHANIEL HARVEY, Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________________ HANDLER, J., dissenting. In October 1986, on a retrial, Nathaniel Harvey was convicted by a jury for the murder of Irene Schnaps. Schnaps was found alone in her apartment, having been struck on the head several times with a blunt instrument -- killed in an apparent burglary. There were no signs of forced entry and no signs of a struggle in the bedroom where she was discovered. The jury found defendant guilty of purposeful-or-knowing murder, felony murder, first-degree robbery, and second-degree burglary. At the penalty phase, the jurors determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt two statutory aggravating factors: N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(f) (murder committed to escape apprehension for another offense) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g) (murder committed during the course of a robbery and burglary). The jury did not find as an aggravating factor the State's submission that the murder involved aggravated assault of the victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c). Several of the jury members found some of the ten non-statutory mitigating factors presented by defendant pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h), the "catch-all" mitigating factor. See ante at __ (slip op. at 44). Finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the jury sentenced defendant to death for the capital charges. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of life plus sixty-five years with a fifty-seven and one-half-year parole disqualifier for the non-capital counts of first-degree robbery and second-degree burglary. The Court affirmed defendant's convictions and death sentence. State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 233 (1997) (Harvey II). This appeal is based on defendant's request for a proportionality review. In State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253 (1999) (Loftin II), the Court appointed a Special Master to evaluate its proportionality review methodology and make recommendations for improvements.See footnote 7 The Court then proceeded to apply the existing methodology to Loftin's case, stating, "Until we have had the benefit of [the Special Master's] report, . . . we will continue . . . to carry out proportionality review as before." Id. at 266. The Special Master released his report on April 28, 1999. The Honorable David S. Baime, Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court: Proportionality Review Project (Apr. 28, 1999) (Special Master Report). In that report, the Special Master determined that several aspects of our methodology are faulty and require revision. Id. at 6-7. Despite the Special Master's recommendations, the Court goes ahead with defendant Harvey's case, applying existing methodology. This course of action, in addition to its needless inefficiency and unfairness, can only further confuse and undermine the accuracy and integrity of our proportionality review. The Court, in proceeding with this review, makes it pointless to delve into the Special Master Report in detail here. Suffice it to say that the proposed revisions would -- I predict, will -- have a significant impact on defendant's proportionality review. The Court's decision to proceed with defendant's review when oral arguments on a new methodology are scheduled to occur the week of this decision's filing, see ante at __ (slip op. at 26), does a grave disservice to both defendant and this Court's commitment to justice. The Court holds that defendant's sentence is not disproportionate. See ante at __ (slip op. at 2). First, the Court has previously decided not to apply the Legislature's 1992 capital murder statute amendment, which severely limits the universe of cases constituting a basis for comparison among defendants, until the appointed Special Master reviewed the validity of such a limitation. See Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 265-66. In this case, even though the Special Master has spoken on the issue, the majority again defers judgment on the constitutionality of the statutory amendment. See ante at __ (slip op. at 9-10). Further, the Court holds that defendant has not relentlessly documented with adequate evidence that racial discrimination influences this State's imposition of the death penalty. See ante at __ (slip op. at 54-55). Finally, the Court affirms the proportionality of defendant's death sentence, holding that when defendant is compared to other similarly situated death-eligible defendants, defendant's sentence is not disproportionate. See ante at __ (slip op. at 54). I disagree with the Court's holdings regarding systemic issues in the application of the New Jersey capital murder statute. First, I reiterate that consideration of the constitutionality of the 1992 amendment should not be postponed. Accord Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 373 (Handler, J., dissenting). This Court has expressed a strong commitment to meaningful proportionality review and has firmly rejected the possibility that a universe limited to cases in which the death penalty has been imposed could form the basis for such review. See State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 137 (1992) (Marshall II). In light of the Special Master's strong statement that "a universe limited to cases in which the death sentence was imposed cannot support a coherent proportionality review system," Special Master Report, supra, at 10, the Court should act at this time by declaring the 1992 amendment unconstitutional. Second, I believe the statistical evidence before the Court, already presented in Loftin II, supra, demonstrates a constitutionally impermissible risk that race discrimination infects our State's imposition of the death penalty. This risk is especially great in transracial cases like this one, involving black defendants and white victims. Given the startling evidence of race discrimination before us, the Court should declare the death penalty statute unconstitutional or, at the very least, place a moratorium on the imposition of the death penalty until such time as the evidence demonstrates that race is not playing a role in capital prosecuting and sentencing. Accord Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 446 (Handler, J., dissenting). With regard to defendant's individual proportionality review, I object to the majority's novel decision to limit the class of cases to which defendant is compared in precedent-seeking review to his salient-factors subcategory (E-1), a step that renders the Court's proportionality review incomplete. Further, I find the Court's statistical analyses and its precedent-seeking review extremely subjective, arbitrary, and ultimately unreliable. I strongly disagree with the Court's conclusion and find defendant's sentence to be disproportionate. I, therefore, dissent. [State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 247 (quoting Turner v. Murray, supra, 476 U.S. 28, 35, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 1687, 90 L. Ed 2d, 27, 35 (1986)).] Our remedy in Ramseur was to require enhanced protections in death penalty trials in the form of a thorough voir dire, examining the potential racial biases of the jury pool members in cases involving minority defendants or other issues of race. Id. at 246 ; see also State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 428 (1988) (Williams II) ("Racial prejudice may be either blatant and easy to detect or subtle and therefore more difficult to discern. A probing voir dire that elicits more than a yes or no response will aid the trial court in excusing prospective jurors for cause and will assist the defense in exercising its peremptory challenges. When the defendant is a member of a cognizable minority group, a more searching voir dire should be conducted, if requested."). The sharply disproportionate representation of transracial, white-victim cases among those that are capitally prosecuted and result in death sentences seems to reflect a particular societal value placed on white life and a concurrent degradation of minority life. The Court has specifically noted that when the crime is interracial, a more thorough voir dire should be conducted by the trial court. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 245-46; see also State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 237 (1998) (Handler, J., dissenting) (stressing need to delve into both blatant and latent racial bias, particularly in interracial cases and, even more specifically, in one involving a white suburban woman and inner-city, black, male defendant). To this remedy may be added a specific jury instruction admonishing against racial bias to be given in all such cases. See Special Master Report, supra, at 7. The Court's early acknowledgment that protections need to be established to guard against racism bespeaks an understanding that racism is virulent, though not always obvious, and, more crucially, that it is so likely to infect a jury pool that when requested, a potentially time-consuming voir dire must be conducted to try to uncover it. Given that when we decided Ramseur, we had no data from which to gather statistical evidence that race might be a factor in jurors' sentencing of capital defendants, this solution seemed the only viable one for addressing the risk of racial bias that might occur in an individual case. But we must now acknowledge that this remedy is not efficacious to weed out jurors who may be subject to inarticulable and subconscious racial biases. In addition, the remedy cannot, and was never intended to, address the biases of prosecutors. See Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 144 ("[W]e believe . . . that the charging decisions of prosecutors, as well as the sentencing decisions of juries, both representing society's interest in punishing crime, will demonstrate when a death sentence is excessive. . . ."). Because the stakes are so high in death penalty cases, we must be willing to supplement attempts to eradicate racism, such as vigorous voir dires and clear curative jury instructions. These should be combined with our continued efforts to create methodologically sound statistical models and simplified and realistic readings of the resultant data informed by what we know about human nature and have learned from history, see Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 405-10 (Handler, J., dissenting) (recounting history of racially discriminatory laws in New Jersey and around the United States, as well as discriminatory enforcement of racially neutral laws). This comprehensive approach is vital if we are to avoid the risk that individuals will be singled out for death simply because of their race. Our perception, beginning in Ramseur, that racism is likely to take hold without adequate voir dire, has now been augmented and sharpened in ways that strongly suggest that our curative solution for warding off the inevitable has not sufficed. Governor Whitman recently acknowledged that some State Troopers engage in racial profiling on the New Jersey Turnpike -- that is, they single out black and Hispanic drivers based on ostensible traffic violations and subject them to criminal searches. See Iver Peterson, Whitman Says Troopers Used Racial Profiling, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1999, at A1, B8. Are we to assume that racism begins and ends with the New Jersey State Troopers? We must acknowledge that the risk of prosecutorial and jury-based racism is supported by the numbers we have before us and its documentation in all sectors of our society, and that our attempts to keep racial biases out of our capital sentencing scheme may well have failed. In prior cases, in areas of law bearing significantly less risk of injustice than in life and death decisions, we have been willing to look beyond the numbers when they are inadequate to give us conclusive proof of a causal relationship. Most recently, this Court in State v. Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112 (1999), allowed for a flexible standard of knowledge in determining the usefulness of social science evidence as a basis for requiring specific jury instructions in transracial crimes. The Court held that a jury instruction explaining the potential unreliability of transracial identifications was appropriate in a case in which a black defendant was tried for rape based solely on a white victim's identification of him. In spite of the prosecutor's presentation of evidence that some researchers do not subscribe to the idea that cross-racial impairment affects real-life identifications, the Court held that consistent with [various cases]; the Task Force Report; and our review of the professional literature of the behavioral and social sciences, we hold that a cross-racial identification . . . requires a special jury instruction in an appropriate case. . . . We conclude that the empirical data encapsulate much of the ordinary human experience and provide an appropriate frame of reference for requiring [such an] instruction. We must not be reluctant to follow this path in an arena where the stakes are significantly higher -- where the ultimate, irreversible penalty is implicated. See Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 399 (Handler, J., dissenting) ("Nowhere in the law is more at stake or is there a greater need for positing a definitive resolution on a sound and understandable basis than in a capital case, even if that resolution errs by falling on the side of fairness rather than accuracy.") (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976). The Court continues to insist that scientific certainty - statistical significance -- should be required before it will accept the notion that racism plays a role in our capital sentencing scheme. Even as it demands, however, that we must be ninety-five percent sure that race plays a role in death sentencing before it will consider such death sentences to be tainted by racial bias, the Court allows liability to be imposed on tortfeasors in toxic-tort cases when the causal relationship between the alleged harmful conduct and the plaintiff's injury is much less clear. See Rubanik v. Witco Chemical Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 434 (1991) (Because "plaintiffs in toxic-tort litigation, despite strong and indeed compelling indicators that they have been previously harmed by toxic exposure, may never recover if required to await general acceptance by the scientific community of a reasonable, but as of yet uncertain theory of causation," strict scientific standards may be relaxed.); see also Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 400 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citing Rubanik, supra). In juxtaposition, the Court's diametrically opposing views leave it in an irrational and nonsensical posture. The widely accepted standard of ninety-five percent certainty may be appropriate in the scientific community of statisticians, but we should be willing to adjust and modify the norms of that community when our focus is a decidedly non-scientific one and when insistence on near-certainty opens the doors of injustice. Other disciplines question the value of inflexible and arbitrary line-drawing and the use of science to the exclusion of common-sense observations in circumstances less threatening than death. They stress the need to look beyond the hard sciences to non-quantifiable factors when evaluating certain relationships. Economists, for example, are often faced with the almost impossible task of evaluating the likely effects of policy on the economy. Nobel Laureate Robert M. Solow believes that when science is inadequate to make the necessary evaluations, we must broaden our tools of reference for identifying and explaining causal relationships: [Solow] argue[s] against thinking of economics as science with a capital S. 'That is perfectly consistent,' he wr[ites], 'with a strong belief that economics should try very hard to be scientific with a small s. By that I mean only that we should think logically and respect fact.' Fact . . . should be enlarged 'to include, say, the opinions and casual generalizations of experts and market participants, attitudinal surveys, institutional regularities, even our judgments of plausibility. My preferred image is the vacuum cleaner, not the microscope.' [Louis Uchitelle, A Challenge to Scientific Economics, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1999, at B7, B9.] Even in the hard sciences, blind adoption of the scientific certainty threshold has been challenged. Robert J. Levine, Ethics and Regulation of Clinical Research 200-01 (2d ed. 1986) ("We have chosen arbitrarily to say that something is true when probability is less than 0.05 that it could have occurred by chance. . . .") (emphasis added). For example, some have challenged the notion that in order to preserve the value of medical trials, researchers should not disclose the suspected potential benefits of one treatment over another to trial participants until there is statistical certainty (ninety-five percent) that one treatment is superior to the others. See, e.g., ibid. (suggesting that participants be able to choose a less exacting level of certainty in deciding whether clinical trials can be concluded). Here, the Court itself must decide whether the values of the scientific community ought to be employed when the failure to scientifically pinpoint a causal relationship that may be at work results in the unfair execution of an individual. Statistical significance cannot displace all knowledge, or override basic understanding, or be dispositive in all contexts. Mahesh K. B. Parman & David Machin, Survival Analysis, A Practical Approach 15 (1995) (stating that results may be "clinically" significant even though not statistically significant); Michael D. Maltz, Deviating From the Mean: The Declining Significance of Significance, 31 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 434, 440 (Nov. 1994) ("Statistical significance does not imply substantive significance, and most researchers know this--but this does not stop them from implying that it does."). The Court's failure to look not only beyond statistical significance -- which even scientists agree is an arbitrary cut-off point -- but also beyond the statistical results themselves, has the capacity to result in the gravest of injustices. Th[e] ideal of mechanical objectivity, knowledge based completely on explicit rules, is never fully attainable. Even with regard to purely scientific matters, the importance of tacit knowledge is widely recognized. In efforts to solve problems posed from outside the scientific community, informed intuition is all the more crucial. [Theodore M. Porter, Trust in the Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life 7 (1995).] This Court should no longer wait for the optimum statistical model or the statistically ideal number of cases. It has, in fact, rejected such a rigid, mathematical approach to proportionality review in developing its methodology for analyzing frequency analysis results in a defendant's individual claim: Several courts have expressed concern that the application of a strictly quantitative approach to the subject could lead to arbitrary line drawing and limit the legitimate exercise of judicial discretion. More importantly, such an approach may inappropriately suggest that the complex judgments involved in proportionality determinations can be expressed with mathematical precision. [Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 153 (quoting David C. Baldus, Death Penalty Proportionality Review Project: Final Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court, 1, 42-43 (Sept. 24, 1991).]See footnote 11 The crucial question here is not whether we are certain racism plays a role in capital sentencing, but whether there is "a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the . . . capital sentencing process." McCleskey v. Kemp, supra, 481 U.S. at 313, 107 S. Ct. at 1778, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 292. The Special Master himself acknowledges that "[i]t is entirely possible that our efforts will come to naught because the problem [of identifying the role of race discrimination, if any,] may be beyond the reach of the social sciences." Special Master Report, supra, at 108-09. Given that the various models indicate a serious risk of race discrimination, we are adjured to consider all sources of potentially relevant knowledge and information. We should look to other jurisdictions to determine whether these indications have been duplicated elsewhere. We are justified in doing so because defendant is not charged with proving that he alone was the victim of race discrimination, or even that racism on a systemic level is definitely at work. To determine if the diverse and numerous statistical indications of race discrimination form the basis for an unconstitutional risk, it is perfectly appropriate to expand our inquiry to examine the findings of other states given the limitations on our universe. See Note, Easing the Fear of Too Much Justice: A Compromise Proposal to Rinse the Racial Justice Act, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 543, 564 (1995) ("Because the [Racial Justice Act] requires statistical significance, it will have absolutely no effect on jurisdictions where the number of death sentences is so small as to preclude any statistically reliable conclusions."). That inquiry is instructive. A 1990 Government Accounting Office report, based on the examination of twenty-eight state-specific studies on the role of race in death penalty sentencing, reveals alarming consistency across states in racial disparities. In eighty-two percent of the studies, the race of the victim influenced charging and sentencing patterns in capital cases (i.e., white-victim cases were more likely to result in death sentences). Further, more than three-fourths of the studies that identified a race-of-the-defendant effect found that black defendants were more likely to receive the death penalty than white defendants. United States General Accounting Office, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities (Feb. 1990), reprinted in 136 Cong. Rec. S6889-90 (daily ed. May 24, 1990). The Nebraska Legislature recently passed a bill imposing a two-year moratorium on executions until further study on the possible role that the race and/or economic status of defendants and victims is playing in the state's capital sentencing process.See footnote 12 Dirk Johnson, Legislature of Nebraska Votes Pause in Executions, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1999, at A14. Republican Senator Kermit A. Brashear, while still unwilling to say racism has taken hold in Nebraska, notes that "there is clearly a racial component and a socioeconomic component nationwide" in death sentencing. Ibid. Black defendants, who account for thirteen percent of the country's population, occupy forty-two percent of its death row cells. Ibid. We must finally acknowledge that the consistent results of our statistical models are not an aberration, nor can they be explained away by rejecting not only the models themselves, but the common experience of a significant majority of other states that impose capital punishment. We must act now before we execute our first capital defendant under a legislative scheme that has likely been infected with race discrimination. 1. Salient-Factors Test Since the Court's rejection of the numerical-preponderance test, see Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 295, only two tests remain, the salient-factors and index-of-outcomes tests. The majority concludes that the salient-factors test does not establish disproportionality. See ante at __ (slip op. at 29) ("[T]he mere fact that a statistical disparity exists does not establish disproportionality.")(citing Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 352). The Court's methodology in doing so, however, is faulty in two significant ways. The Special Master recommends that the subcategories be eliminated due to their inability to predict deathworthiness, id. at 57, adding that specific changes to defendant's E category should be made.See footnote 14 These changes would clearly have a significant impact on the Court's salient-factors analysis, and while I withhold judgment on whether the Special Master's remedies are appropriate, his finding that the subcategories are not meaningful must be heeded. In all the proportionality reviews conducted by the Court to date, the composite salient-factors category in which the defendant is placed has formed the basis for comparison cases (the broader E category in Harvey's case). The Court set the standard for determining how large the universe of comparison cases should be in its first proportionality review, Marshall II, supra, stating that cases in which there are no striking factual dissimilarities between [them] and [defendant's] should form the basis for the precedent-seeking review comparisons. 130 N.J. at 181; see also State v. Cooper, __ N.J. __, __ (slip op. at __) (1999) (Cooper II) (comparing defendant to all C-category defendants); State v. Chew, __ N.J. __, __ (slip op. at __) (1999) (Chew II) (comparing defendant to all I-category defendants); Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 326-27 (comparing defendant to all B category defendants); DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 186 ( the relevant factor . . . is the statutory factor that [defendant] committed the murder for a pecuniary motive, the I category); Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 51 (comparing defendant to cases involving kidnapping of non-strangers with particular violence or terror, kidnapping of strangers with particular violence or terror, contract-murder principals, contract killers, and other non-robbery pecuniary-advantage killers ); Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 368 (comparing defendant to all other defendants with prior murder conviction). The Court's drastic step to limit its salient-factors review to the E-1 subcategory (and, as a result, its precedent-seeking review, see infra at __-__ (slip op. at 18-19)), is insupportable in light of our established methodology for frequency review and the Special Master's findings. The majority explains its decision to limit its comparison of cases in two ways. First, it contends that in prior proportionality reviews our comparison class has only been extended to a defendant's composite category in order to make up for small sample sizes in the subcategories. See ante at __ (slip op. at 19-20) (stating that in Chew II, Court's comparison extended beyond Chew's I-3 subcategory because group consisted of only one other defendant; that in DiFrisco III defendant was compared to entire I category to provide for "a productive statistical analysis;" and that in Loftin II defendant was compared to all B-category defendants because of "`exceedingly small number of cases'" in his B-1 subcategory). The Court misconstrues our method for selecting a comparison group, as is demonstrated by its glaring failure to note the approach taken in the companion case Cooper, supra, __ N.J. __. In Cooper II, the Court selected the entire composite C category for comparison not on the basis of the size of defendant's C-1 subcategory, which contained an ample forty cases, but because of the essential similarities between the defendant's crime and those of other defendants. In spite of the fact that Cooper did not even specifically request that the C-3 cases be compared to his, the Court stated, We previously have performed the salient-factors test using both the assigned subcategory as well as the composite category . . . and we will do so in this appeal. Id. at __ (slip op. at 21) (citation omitted). The Court proceeded to compare defendant Cooper not only to all C category defendants, but also to two cases proposed by the defendant from other categories. See id. at __ (slip op at 47). The Court's focus was on the fact that Cooper's murder was accompanied by a sexual assault, the defining feature of the C category. Further, the Court here mischaracterizes the approach to defining the universe of comparison cases taken in DiFrisco III, supra, where the rationale for defining the group of comparison cases was similar to that in Cooper II. Although it is indeed correct that DiFrisco's I-1 subcategory contained too few cases (nine) to provide for a meaningful proportionality review alone, see ante at __ (slip op. at 21), the Court did not expand the universe of comparison cases to the composite category solely because of the deficiency in the size of the subcategory. In Difrisco III, the Court examined not only the I-category defendants, but also the possibility of comparing defendant to cases beyond the composite I category, despite the adequate sample size contained in DiFrisco's composite group (fourteen). Although the Court ultimately rejected defendant's recommendations for expanding the comparison, it did so not because it had reached an adequate number of cases to provide for a statistically productive review, but rather because the Court found that the proposed cases were not factually similar enough to defendant's to warrant their inclusion. See DiFrisco III, supra,142 N.J. at 168 (excluding proposed defendants from pecuniary gain category because there appears to be no basis for an allegation that any of those defendants were either paid to commit murder or that they paid another to do so. . . . ). The Court's second reason for excluding E-2 and E-3 cases from its proportionality review is that because of the differences that distinguish the defendants in the E-2, E-3 and G-3 cases from Harvey, "such cases provide little insight into the propriety of the jury's decision in this case, and are inapplicable to our proportionality review. Ante at __ (slip op. at 24). The Court's examination of the cases, however, is both misguided and incomplete. First, the Court bases its restriction of the comparison cases to defendant's subcategory on the fact that the other E-subcategory cases are distinguishable by the number of aggravating factors in their case, the mental problems of the defendants, the reduced age of the defendants, the prior records of the defendants, the level of remorse they demonstrated or their level of intoxication when they committed their crimes. See ante at __ (slip op. at 22-23). These kinds of comparisons, however, are the very heart of our precedent-seeking review, and should be made in the context of examining the actual crimes of the defendants. The initial basis for determining the class of comparison cases should be premised solely on the categorical groupings made by the AOC, which are defined not by any of the above characteristics, but rather, as previously stated, by the essential elements of the defendant's offense. In this case, the essential characteristic of the E category is that the defendant murdered in the course of a robbery. The cases are then broken down into the E-1, E-2, and E-3 subcategories based on the particular violence or terror employed in the robbery and/or whether or not the robbery involved a forced entry. The Court, therefore, can justify its decision to distinguish Harvey from the E-2 and E-3 subcategory defendants for purposes of selecting the comparison group only by determining first that these defendants have been correctly placed in their subcategories, see Cooper II, supra, __ N.J. at __ (slip op. at 22) (examining four defendants whom the State contended were improperly included in defendant's category and excluding two of them based on State's arguments); and second, that the distinctions between the subcategories are meaningful for purposes of our proportionality review, see Chew II, supra, __ N.J. at __ (slip op. at __) (Handler, J., dissenting) (arguing that I-3, "other pecuniary motive" defendants are more similar to some robbery-category defendants than to I-2 and I-3 contract killer defendants). The Court has clearly failed to meet this burden. Second, the Court discusses only five of the seven E-2 and E-3 defendants and only one of the four proposed A- and G-category defendants, see ante at __ (slip op. at 22-24). Notably, the Court fails to distinguish Jesus DeJesus (E-2) and Larry Durden (E-3) from defendant Harvey. Not only are these defendants' crimes factually similar to Harvey's, the measure by which we ought to be determining our universe of comparison cases, see supra at __ (slip op. at 45), the defendants themselves are in many respects indistinguishable from Harvey. Neither DeJesus nor Durden were young enough to claim their age diminished their culpability (DeJesus was thirty-one when he committed his murder and Durden was forty-four); neither had a drug problem; neither suffered from emotional or mental problems; and both had prior criminal histories. The Court's failure to address why these defendants should be excluded from the comparison group, given that they pass even the Court's misplaced test for determining the level of similarity between proposed cases and defendant's, makes one question the Court's basis for exclusion, and, indeed, if one exists. The Court's reasons for limiting the comparison class here are based on selective analysis of precedent and utter disregard for the AOC's method of defining the categories, greatly compromising the completeness of our proportionality review. 2. Index-of-Outcomes Test The index-of-outcomes test is a different attempt to examine the blameworthiness of the defendant: the categories are created not according to similarities between the crimes, but rather similarities between the defendants. Characteristics meant to measure the defendant's culpability, both statutory and non-statutory, are examined regardless of whether the crimes themselves are similar in nature. Each factor is weighted and assigned a coefficient according to how often a death sentence is imposed when the factor is present. Then each case is assigned a culpability score based on the factors present and their weighted coefficients. As the majority correctly points out, there is a persistently wide range in culpability scores assigned to defendants across the four regression models. See ante at __ (slip op. at 31-32) (noting defendant's culpability scores here range from thirteen to forty-three percent; DiFrisco's culpability scores ranged from eleven to seventy-four percent; Martini's culpability scores ranged from five to eighty-eight percent; Bey's culpability scores ranged from twenty-five to seventy-six percent; and Marshall's culpability scores ranged from seventeen to fifty-two percent). This wide range renders the accuracy of the models highly questionable.See footnote 15 See Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 422 n.22 (Handler, J., dissenting). In addition, the wide range of confidence intervals among the cases detracts significantly from the reliability of the test.See footnote 16 See ante at __ (slip op. at 33-35) (detailing results of defendant's four regression models with confidence intervals displaying, at their greatest, fifty-seven percent range between the upper and lower levels for predicted probability of death); accord Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 422 n.21 (Handler, J., dissenting). Beyond the flaws in the test itself, the majority misinterprets its results by relying not on death sentencing rates for the various culpability levels as indicators of proportionality, but on defendant's predicted probability of receiving a death sentence. See ante at __ (slip op. at 33-35). Predicted probabilities are used to place the defendant in a culpability level and are not meant to provide a basis for a finding of proportionality. [T]he Constitutional mandate of individualized consideration in capital sentencing requires that we rely on actual decisions by sentencing juries, and the characteristics of actual felons and their crimes, to determine when a death sentence is generally imposed upon similarly situated defendants. Certainly, we could not point to our surprise at defendant's death sentence as grounds for reversal; nor should our expectation that a certain defendant will receive the death penalty serve as adequate support for a finding of proportionality. [Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 423 (Handler, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Our focus, therefore, should be on sentencing rates for the levels of culpability in which the defendant has been placed for each model (as it is in the salient-factors test for each crime category).See footnote 17 The death sentencing rates for the culpability levels to which defendant was assigned in the four models are thirty-five percent (culpability level 2), thirteen percent (culpability level 1), forty-three percent (culpability level 3), and nineteen percent (culpability level 1). Not one of these rates indicates general imposition of the death penalty and two of the four strongly indicate that, by any standard, defendant's sentence is disproportionate. This conclusion is supported by the fact that defendant's confidence intervals are much lower than those of other defendants. His upper limit for all four models never exceeds sixty-nine percent, while all other defendants examined by the Court for proportionality reviews have at least one confidence interval that reaches ninety-four percent. This suggests that defendant's low numbers are more stable predictions than those of the other defendants. Under the old methodology, both the salient-factors and the index-of-outcomes tests, in my view, suggest that defendant's sentence might be disproportionate. Accordingly, the Court should apply precedent-seeking review in only one way: unless defendant is one of the most culpable defendants in his category, see supra at __ (slip op. at 12), unless we can point to some justification for the break in the pattern of life sentences, see Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 181, we must find Harvey's sentence to be disproportionate. Although these statistical tests have their limitations, they can serve as a useful kaleidoscope through which to examine precedent-seeking review, which is designed to help us identify possible justifications for a defendant's seemingly-arbitrary sentence. Finally, when all is said and done, neither Mejia nor Gerald is on death row. Even, therefore, if their crimes, characters and blameworthiness indicate less culpability than defendant's, for the Court to base its finding of proportionality on these cases is suspect. The fact that less culpable defendants received life sentences does not mean that a more culpable defendant deserves death. The majority reduces its comparison of defendant's case to other E-1 cases to a simple discussion of the characteristics of the defendants, omitting any examination of the crimes themselves. Although these factors are certainly an important part of our analysis, the Court's failure to examine the crimes renders its proportionality review startlingly incomplete.See footnote 28 When, as here, the salient-factors results indicate a low incidence of death, we must do everything we can to ensure defendant has not been unfairly singled out. Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 154. It is especially important, therefore, that we examine and compare the facts of the cases, along with the defendants, however lengthy and gruesome that endeavor might be. The crimes committed by these E-1 defendants are, without question, more heinous than that committed by defendant, and all of the E-1 defendants are currently serving life sentences or less. Will Alexander and his co-defendants gained entry to an apartment in which the victim and his girlfriend were home with two small children. Upon entry, one of the defendants pushed the girlfriend to the floor. When the man attempted to flee, defendant shot him in the lower back, killing him. The defendants then forced the woman and her children into another room and ordered them to stay on the floor while they raided other apartments in the building. Alexander was not capitally prosecuted and was sentenced to life in prison. Jerry Britton, against whom the State did not seek the death penalty, climbed through the window of a young woman's apartment and stabbed her sixteen times with two knives when she began to call the police. The stab wounds were in the head, neck, back and shoulder, and one of the knives was broken off in the victim's neck. The victim also appeared to have been beaten. Britton told a friend that he hoped that he had killed her so that she could not be a witness. Britton had a heroin habit, but no mental health problems. He was sentenced to life in prison. David Brown planned a robbery with two other accomplices for drug and beer money. They went to a drug dealer's apartment to confront and rob him. When an argument ensued, Brown pulled out a knife and stabbed the victim multiple times all over his body. The State did not seek the death penalty in the case, and Brown was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison. Alphonso Brunson broke into an eighty-two-year-old woman's home for the third time on the day she was killed. The woman was found two days later, having received several blows to the head which had caused her death. Brunson was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life and fifty years. Duane Vance Caviness, accompanied by two co-defendants, entered an apartment of a fifty-four-year-old man, tied him up and beat him with a baseball bat. The man was later found dead on his apartment floor with severe head wounds, his hands and feet bound. Caviness was permitted to plead guilty to felony-murder and two counts of burglary/robbery. He was sentenced to life.See footnote 29 Albert Carrow Fains murdered his wheelchair-bound neighbor, Arthur Williams, by striking him in the head thirteen times with a claw hammer. Williams had sent Fains to buy him cigarettes, sandwiches and marijuana, but the following morning the victim was found on the floor with a knife in his back and blood everywhere, including on the chairs and walls. A plastic bag had been pulled over Williams's head. Williams suffered three fractures on the right side of the skull, a wound on the bridge of his nose, and eight other wounds on the side of the head, the combination of which were determined to be the cause of death. Fains was sentenced to life. Carlton Felder rang the bell at his seventy-five-year-old neighbor's apartment. When she opened the door, Felton pushed her inside and started stabbing her repeatedly in the left side of her chest. He then grabbed the gold chains from her neck and proceeded upstairs to look for money. At the time of the murder, the woman was babysitting three small children. The State did not prosecute Felder capitally and he was permitted to plead guilty to aggravated manslaughter, robbery and burglary. He was sentenced to fifty years. Franklin Flowers Hudson entered a home through the basement window and tied up and gagged at knife-point the homeowner who found him. When the owner's sixty-five-year-old boarder returned home, Hudson confronted him, leaving the owner tied up. Even after the boarder gave Hudson his money and keys, Hudson stabbed him multiple times. Not yet dead, the boarder tried to run upstairs, and Hudson chased him and knocked him down by kicking him and repeatedly hitting him over the head with a baseball bat. The boarder did not die from his injuries until over a month later. Hudson was permitted to plead guilty to felony murder and he was sentenced to life. Timothy Paul Lee took a knife and kicked in the back door to the home of a sixty-five-year-old man. When the man woke from the noise, defendant stabbed him in the chest, killing him. Lee was permitted to plead guilty to felony murder and was sentenced to life.See footnote 30 Dwayne Mann and two co-defendants broke into the home of a man with the intention of robbing him. When the man woke up, defendant shot him in the head, killing him. Mann was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life and five years in prison. Incenzio Mendez, attempting a robbery, lay in wait for the approaching ninety-five-year-old woman who owned the farm on which he worked. Coming up behind her, defendant used a stick to knock down the woman with three hits to the head. The victim tried to get up, at which point defendant kneed her in the side and struck her in the neck. The woman died from the injuries. Defendant was capitally prosecuted and was sentenced to consecutive terms of life, twenty years and ten years. Lance Phillips and his accomplices stormed a house armed with guns hoping to steal a kilogram of cocaine that Phillips had seen at the house earlier. During the course of the raid, Phillips and his co-defendant shot everyone in the house (a twenty-year-old man, his girlfriend, a seventeen-year-old-girl, and an eleven-year-old girl). Phillips shot the man five times, killing him. He also shot the seventeen-year-old in the arm. One of the co-defendants shot the eleven-year-old in the chest. The prosecutor did not seek the death penalty against Phillips and he was sentenced to consecutive terms of life and twenty years. Charles Ploppert and a co-defendant knocked on the door of a blind man, whom Ploppert knew, with the intention of immediately hitting him on the head with a baseball bat in order to be able to rob the house. The man forced Ploppert to identify himself before he would open the door. When Ploppert did so, the man let him and his co-defendant in. After chatting amicably with the man, Ploppert attacked him, beating him unconscious by hitting him with his fists and kicking him. Before leaving, Ploppert piled wood on the unconscious victim, spread lighter fluid over him and around the house, and then set a fire. Ploppert was capitally tried and sentenced by the jury to life. Thomas Reigle broke into the apartment of his uncle and aunt to steal money. Hearing his aunt stir in her bed as he was looking through her purse, Reigle beat her with a pipe. She survived. Reigle then went into his uncle's room and beat him to death with the same pipe. The prosecutor sought the death penalty and the jury sentenced Reigle to life. Anthony Szadorski and a co-defendant broke into the home of a seventy-six-year-old woman whom Szadorski had met at an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. When the woman jumped out of bed upon Szadorski's entering her bedroom, he stabbed her several times. He continued to do so as she tried to crawl away. Szadorski then asked his co-defendant for a BB gun that he used to beat the woman over the head. She eventually died from her injuries. The prosecutor did not seek the death penalty against Szadorski and he was sentenced to life. Gerald Williams, a co-defendant and Williams's eight-year-old daughter entered an apartment they happened to be passing through an ajar door. Inside, they found a fifty-one-year-old man who awakened when Williams turned off the television set to steal it. The co-defendant punched the man and Williams threw a cover over the man's head and started beating him against the window sill. The man broke free and yelled for help, at which time Williams picked up the television set and hit the man over the head with it. He then put down the television set and threw the man out of the window. The man fell three stories and died. Unlike the other defendants, Williams had a significant criminal history, having served twelve terms of incarceration as an adult and a juvenile. The prosecutor did not seek the death penalty and Williams was sentenced to life. Herman Williams, armed with a handgun, entered a home planning to rob one of the family members whom he had observed. Upon entering, Williams found six residents there. He hit one in the face with his handgun and then got into a struggle with an older, handicapped man who had an artificial arm. After the man successfully knocked the gun out of Williams's hand, the defendant picked up the gun and shot the man in the chest. The man died seventeen days later in the hospital. The prosecutor did not seek the death penalty against Williams. The defendant was sentenced to life.See footnote 31 In sum, many of these cases involve multiple victims, and those that do not, involve more extensive victimization than Harvey's. With the exception of Franklin Flowers Hudson and Gerald Williams, all of the defendants either knew their victims personally or had observed them enough to know of their vulnerabilities. Many of the victims were even selected, presumably, because of their vulnerabilities: one was in a wheelchair, one was blind, one was handicapped, two were unable to be self-sufficient (one fifty-five and one eighty-five-years old), two were women in their seventies, one was an eighty-two-year-old man, one was a ninety-five-year-old woman, and one was an eleven-year-old girl. The fact that all of the defendants in these cases are serving life sentences and Harvey faces execution boggles the mind. Defendant is most definitely not among the one or two most culpable defendants in his category, as the salient-factors test indicates he should be in order to be sentenced to death. Is the only difference here that Harvey is black and his victim was a white woman?See footnote 32 See data, supra at __ (slip op. at 22) (noting that five of six transracial cases were capitally prosecuted and three of those five resulted in death sentences even though transracial cases account for only twenty-seven percent of the E-1 subcategory). I can only hope that this is not the explanation. The Court provides no other. When the universe of comparison cases is extended to similar cases in the E-2, E-3, G, B and A categories, the Court's holding becomes even more implausible. Jesus DeJesus, an E-2 defendant, entered the apartment of a forty-nine-year-old woman living below him. He stabbed her to death and then set her bed on fire with her body on it. The remains were identified with her dental records. DeJesus stole some jewelry. He was not capitally tried and received consecutive life and fifteen-year sentences. Wayne Busby, an E-3 defendant, should certainly have been classified as an E-1 defendant given the facts of the case. Busby broke into the apartment of a seventy-four-year-old woman who lived behind his residence. He had been watching her prior to the break-in to try to discern when she was home. When the woman came downstairs unexpectedly, half-dressed, the defendant hit her in the face, broke her ribs, and used a broom to strangle her to death. He used enough force to break the broom handle. While being strangulated, the woman tried to fight Busby off by scratching him about the neck. Busby took money, a camera, film and perhaps other items. This case clearly involves particular violence or terror. Busby was sentenced to life in prison. Thomas Dollard and two co-defendants entered an apartment building in search of someone to rob. They encountered two people on a stairwell and forced them to take their pants down so the defendants could search them for drugs. When they found none, defendants made the couple take them around the building to help them gain access to apartments. When a woman behind the door of the first apartment refused to let them in, defendants kicked in the door and brought the couple inside with them. They were confronted by a man in the bedroom, who asked Why are you doing this? There is nothing here. Dollard shot the man immediately in the chest. The man, still alive and expressing incredulity, asked, Why did you do that? You didn't have to do that. He died from the wound shortly afterward. The man from the couple encountered in the hall then jumped out the window from fear of being shot. Dollard was not capitally charged and received a life sentence. Larry Durden ate dinner at the home of a seventy-two-year-old woman who had offered to have him over if he changed the locks on her doors. At some time during the evening, Durden stabbed the woman with a small ax-type object. She died of wounds to the forehead and abdomen. Dollard took the woman's groceries, a television and a radio. Durden was sentenced to life. The gruesome list goes on: Aaron Huff struck his victim's head on a coffee table and then beat him until he stopped moving. He was sentenced to life. Michael Suarez stabbed a man in the neck, back and chest. The victim was found in the fetal position lying between the wall and bed on top of blood-soaked clothes and wearing boxer shorts. The prosecutor did not seek the death penalty and Suarez was sentenced to life. Thomas Wolfe slashed a woman's throat three times and she also suffered from numerous puncture wounds. He was sentenced to life. All of these cases involved a robbery, forced entry and murder of one victim, yet none of them was classified in the E-1 category requiring particular violence or terror. Daniel Hart, who was convicted of both robbery and burglary, but was placed in the G category, is surely more blameworthy than defendant. Hart and a co-defendant formulated a plan to kill a twenty-three-year-old woman they thought was a snitch. When the woman confronted them in the main entrance to her apartment, Hart tried to smother her with a pillow. He then killed her by slashing her throat and stabbing her thirty times in the neck, head and back. He took $25 from her. The prosecutor did not seek the death penalty and Hart was sentenced to fifty years in prison. William Godette, a B-category defendant who was convicted of felony murder and robbery, went to the home of a seventy-nine-year-old man to demand payment for work done earlier in the day. When the man refused to pay, Godette pushed his way inside and pounced on the man. The defendant then tried to strangle his victim and finally killed him by striking him several times in the head with a hammer. Godette was permitted to plead guilty and was sentenced to life. Several robbery cases classified as A-category, multiple murder cases highlight the disproportionality of defendant's sentence as well. Significantly more blameworthy defendants committing murder in the course of a forced-entry robbery were not sentenced to death. Felix Diaz and his co-defendant planned the robbery and murder of an older man who lived with a younger man and an eight-year-old girl. The defendants shot all three victims and burned their bodies. Diaz was given three consecutive life terms. Peter Regan broke into his girlfriend's mother's house and, upon being found by a fifteen-year-old girl, hit her five times over the head with a baseball bat until she stopped screaming. Regan then killed his girlfriend's twelve-year-old sister by hitting her six times over the head with the same bat. He removed the dead girl's clothing from the waist down in order to make it appear as if there had been a sexual assault. He was convicted of robbery and the prosecutor did not seek the death penalty. Regan was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life. Roy Watson broke into the home of an eighty-four and seventy-nine-year-old couple on his street. He went into the bedroom and beat the man to death. The attack was so severe that Watson knocked out the lens of one of the man's eyes. The man's wife woke up during the attack and Watson then beat her to death. The penalty-trial jury sentenced Watson to two consecutive terms of life. Harvey's crime, while certainly brutal, pales in comparison to other similar crimes in terms of victimization, and often in terms of moral blameworthiness given the number of victims who are elderly or handicapped in the aforementioned scenarios and the level of premeditation and knowledge of the helplessness of the victims involved. When other life-sentenced defendants committing robbery in a theoretically more blameworthy category are added to the universe of comparison cases, the Court's finding that defendant's sentence is proportionate seems even more unjustifiable, by any standard. While the Court is correct in pointing out that we do not require identical verdicts in all similar cases, see ante at __ (slip op. at 54), Harvey was placed in one of the least culpable categories and no defendant in that category but he now sits on death row. It is time for the Court to articulate what it means by disproportionate, rather than to continue to insist that it knows only when a sentence is not disproportionate. Only then will it be unable to keep moving the line by adding the very specific facts of each new defendant's case to justify including him or her to the increasingly growing list of proportionately-sentenced defendants. [Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 241 (Handler, J., dissenting).] Here, in spite of the salient-factors groupings indicating that defendant is in a category of defendants who are almost never sentenced to death, the Court has effectively begun with the contention that we would expect defendant to be sentenced to death. It requires defendant to show unusual circumstances warranting a life sentence in order to achieve such a sentence.See footnote 33 While the burden does indeed rest on the defendant's shoulders to prove disproportionality, a presumption in favor of proportionality was never intended to be integral to our method of proportionality review. The Court in Marshall II stated that in recognizing disproportionate sentences, we are looking to see if an identifiable pattern of life sentences has been broken with no explanation. See Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 181 ("That [two other defendants] were spared their lives does not establish a pattern of life-sentencing for such killings."). Here, there is without a doubt a pattern of life sentences that has been broken with Harvey's death verdict. Because there are no defendants in Harvey's salient-factors category who await execution, we would expect that Harvey himself would also receive a life sentence. Although the fact that he is the only one in his category awaiting death cannot alone denote proportionality, see id. at 166 ( [S]imply because Marshall may be the first does not mean that his death will be disproportionate under our statute. ), we must demand some defensible reason to distinguish him from the others -- to single him out for death -- in order to avoid an arbitrary sentence. The Court fails to do so, trampling on the very heart of our Constitution's equal protection clause: A capital sentencing system which results in differential treatment of similarly situated capital felons has effectively classified similar felons differently with respect to their rights to life. . . Where capital sentences cannot be rationally distinguished from a significant number of cases where the result was a life sentence, more is present than the irremediable failure of an imperfect human system. When this occurs, the capital sentencing system has become constitutionally arbitrary. [Id. at 241 (Handler, J., dissenting) (quoting Gary Goodpaster, Judicial Review of Death Sentences, 74 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 786, 788, 802-03 (1983).] This case demonstrates more compellingly than any to date the errant standard by which the Court has chosen to implement our final defense against arbitrariness: a death sentence is disproportionate if other defendants with similar characteristics generally receive sentences other than death for committing factually similar offenses unless the Court concludes through its subjective intuitive examination of precedent that the sentence is fair. Id. at 250 (Handler, J., dissenting). This standard, of course, defies the Court's oft-stated goal of maintaining consistency: [T]here can be no justice without a predictable degree of uniformity in sentencing. Id. at 239 (Handler, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 379 (1984)). In employing its faulty and subjective method of review, the Court has managed to find a clearly disproportionate sentence proportionate. I, therefore, dissent. Justice Stein joins in the conclusions reached in Point III, 2B, and 3 of this opinion, and also dissents. NO. A-146 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. NATHANIEL HARVEY, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED (A) Multiple victims; (B) Prior Murder Conviction without A above; (C) Sexual Assault without A-B above; (D) Victim a Public Servant without A-C above; (E) Robbery without A-D above; (F) Arson without A-E above; (G) Burglary without A-E [sic] above; (H) Kidnapping without A-B above; (I) Pecuniary Motive without A-H above; (J) Torture/aggravated assault without A-I above; (K) Depravity of Mind without A-J above; (L) Grave risk of death as primary statutory aggravating circumstance without A-K above; (M) Escape Detection, etc., as sole factor without A-L above. Although certainly it is true that our review here is not a substantive one, that is, it is not offense-oriented as described by the Court in Marshall II, see 130 N.J. at 127 ( [T]he substantive or offense-oriented proportionality review looks to whether the punishment of death is excessive for a particular offense. ), our procedural review specifically incorporates not only the characteristics of the defendants, but also the circumstances of the crime. Such factors as the particular violence or terror with which the crime was carried out, the premeditation involved, and the defendant's knowledge of non-decedent victims are critical when we are examining the defendants' culpability. See ante at __ (slip op. at 39). The Court harps on these factors in its assessment of Harvey, see ante at __ (slip op. at 44-46), and then fails to discuss them at all with regard to most of the other defendants. Does the Court really mean to suggest that if a murder were carried out with particular torture and depravity against a helpless victim, something so insignificant as the defendant's immaturity would justify a life sentence if the death-sentenced defendant under review carried out his murder with no torture or premeditation but was older? By failing to examine the crimes of the comparison cases here, the majority does exactly that. See ante at __ (slip op. at 53) (citing age as the only difference between Harvey's murder and those of two defendants, Lance Phillips, age 20, and Charles Ploppert, age 24, whose crimes were significantly more brutal than defendant's). Here, the Court has clearly redefined the scope of proportionality review, rendering it a re-examination of the judge or jury's sentence rather than a mere vehicle for quality-control. Accord Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 426 (Handler, J., dissenting); see also Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 223 (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ( Proportionality review is not a second appellate review nor a broad review of due process concerns. . . . It is a narrow concept directed to whether the defendant received a sentence disproportionate to that imposed on other defendants. . . . ). Although the Court and/or the AOC may want to engage in this kind of detailed analysis for the purpose of defining the class of comparison cases, see, e.g., Chew II, supra, __ N.J. at __ (slip op. at __) (Handler, J., dissenting) (arguing that Walter Williams should not be included in group of contract killer defendants because improper trial jury instruction led to jury's finding of contract killer aggravating factor), it is entirely inappropriate to do so as part of its precedent-seeking review once the case has been included in the comparison group.