Title: State v. Ochs

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 104,710 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ERIC OCHS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
Review of prosecutorial misconduct claims involves a two-step process. The 
appellate court first decides whether the comments were outside the wide latitude a 
prosecutor is allowed, e.g., in discussing the evidence. If so, there was misconduct. 
Second, if misconduct is found, the court must determine whether the improper 
comments prejudiced the jury and denied the defendant a fair trial. 
 
2. 
The case of State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 97, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004), identified three 
factors to consider in determining if the prosecutorial misconduct so prejudiced the jury 
against the defendant that a new trial should be granted: (1) whether the misconduct is 
gross and flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct shows ill will on the prosecutor's part; and 
(3) whether the evidence against the defendant is of such a direct and overwhelming 
nature that the misconduct would likely have little weight in the minds of the jurors. 
Under Tosh, none of these three factors is individually controlling. And before the third 
factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that 
the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 
S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), have been met. 
2 
 
 
3. 
Where both the constitutional and nonconstitutional error clearly arise from the 
very same acts and omissions, an appellate court begins with a harmlessness analysis of 
the constitutional error. If the constitutional error is reversible, an appellate court need 
not analyze whether the lower standard for harmlessness under K.S.A. 60-261 also has 
been met. Under both standards, the party benefiting from the error bears the burden of 
demonstrating harmlessness. 
 
4. 
In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was gross and flagrant, among 
the things an appellate court considers are whether the comments were repeated, 
emphasized improper points, were planned or calculated, or violated well-established or 
unequivocal rules. 
 
5. 
In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was motivated by ill will, among 
the things an appellate court considers are whether the conduct was deliberate, repeated, 
or in apparent indifference to a court's ruling. 
 
6. 
A prosecutor's closing argument that the victim witness was protected by the truth 
is error. But given the evidence against the defendant in this case, the error is not 
reversible. 
 
7. 
In this case, under the three prongs of the proportionality test of State v. Freeman, 
223 Kan. 362, 367, 574 P.2d 950 (1978), the defendant's hard 25 life sentence under 
3 
 
Jessica's Law for rape is not disproportional and so is not impermissible under § 9 of the 
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. 
 
Appeal from Douglas District Court, MICHAEL J. MALONE, judge. Opinion filed August 16, 2013. 
Affirmed. 
 
Joanna Labastida, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Shawn E. 
Minihan, of the same office, was with her on the brief for appellant. 
 
Patrick J. Hurley, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Charles E. Branson, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
NUSS, C.J.:  A jury convicted Eric Ochs of the rape of 11-year-old D.T. in 
violation of K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(2) (sexual intercourse with a child who is under 14 years 
of age). Because Ochs was older than 17 years, the crime was an off-grid person felony 
per K.S.A. 21-3502(c). The district court sentenced him to a "hard 25" lifetime prison 
term under K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1)(B). He now directly appeals under K.S.A. 22-3601(b). 
 
The issues on appeal, and our accompanying holdings, are as follows: 
 
1. 
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct during her rebuttal closing 
argument? Yes, but harmless error. 
2. 
Did Ochs' sentence violate § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, 
i.e., cruel or unusual punishment? No. 
 
Consequently, we affirm the district court. 
 
4 
 
FACTS 
 
The parents of 11-year-old D.T. spent the night of February 6, 2009, away from 
their home. Her mother, L.T., asked 21-year-old defendant Eric Ochs and his girlfriend 
Chelsey Hoyt to watch D.T. and D.T.'s older brother and younger sister. Ochs, L.T., and 
D.T. all felt Ochs was like a member of the family. 
 
D.T. and her siblings went to bed that night between 9 and 11 o'clock. Ochs and 
Hoyt stayed up until about 3 a.m. and slept in the family room. At some point, possibly 
around midnight, Ochs and Hoyt had sex there. At another point Ochs initiated contact 
with D.T. in her bedroom that led to the State's charges in this case. 
 
D.T.'s trial testimony 
 
D.T. testified that she went to bed wearing her t-shirt, jeans, and underwear. Ochs 
later entered her room, told her that "her legs need to breathe," and removed her jeans. 
Ochs returned a second time and took off her underwear. According to D.T., Ochs "put 
his finger in my vagina" and later "put his thingy in my vagina." She said that Ochs was 
on top of her and that he "hump[ed]" her. 
 
D.T. also testified she then pushed her arms out because she was in pain. Ochs left 
the room saying that "he didn't mean to hurt [D.T.]" According to her, Ochs left her bed 
wet, and she covered the wet spot with a blanket and went back to bed. D.T. further 
testified that when she used the bathroom the next morning it hurt to urinate, and she saw 
blood on the toilet paper. 
 
5 
 
Officer Jamie Lawson and KBI officials 
 
Officer Jamie Lawson of the Lawrence Police Department testified that he 
investigated D.T.'s allegations. Lawson first met with D.T. Instead of verbally responding 
to Lawson's questions, D.T. wrote many of her answers on several sheets of paper. 
According to Lawson's testimony, D.T. also wrote a separate letter to the officers 
detailing the incident. 
 
D.T.'s written responses and letter are largely consistent with her later trial 
testimony. In each document she explains that Ochs entered her room twice and on the 
second occasion he removed her underwear, put his finger in her vagina, and then had 
intercourse with her. 
 
Lawson testified that he later met with Ochs. According to Lawson, Ochs told 
Lawson that on February 6 he entered D.T.'s room and removed her pants and underwear 
while she was lying in bed. Lawson said Ochs then told him that he had masturbated next 
to her bed. Lawson further testified that Ochs said he touched "the split" of D.T.'s vagina 
and admitted that he had "touch[ed] her on the lips." Per Lawson, Ochs repeated his 
statements on the way to jail after his arrest. 
  
Lawson's interview with Ochs was recorded and eventually played for the jury. On 
the recording, Ochs stated that he first walked in and removed D.T.'s pants. And when he 
took off her pants he saw her vagina and became excited. Per the recording, Ochs said 
that he simultaneously touched her vagina with one hand and masturbated with the other 
hand and that he "touched the inside but did not stick [his] fingers in her." He also 
admitted that he touched "inside the split" but denied sticking his "finger inside the hole." 
 
 
During the investigation, Lawson retrieved several blankets and sheets from D.T.'s 
bed. KBI officials testified that some of these items contained traces of mixed DNA 
6 
 
which was consistent with "DNA profiles of [D.T.] and Eric [Ochs]." Two blankets also 
contained sperm. Per the KBI, the sperm's DNA profile "matche[d] the DNA profile of 
Eric Ochs" so he could not be excluded as the donor. While the KBI official testified that 
he "can't tell you how that DNA got there," he also said mixed DNA profiles can occur 
"from a sexual encounter." 
 
Ochs' trial testimony 
 
 Ochs testified that he entered D.T.'s room around 2 a.m. and removed her jeans so 
that she would be more comfortable. According to his testimony, his admission to 
Lawson that he masturbated was not true. Rather, he told Lawson he masturbated on 
D.T.'s bed because he felt pressured to explain why his DNA was on her bedding. 
 
According to Ochs' testimony, his admission to Lawson that he touched D.T.'s 
vagina was also untrue. Rather, he told Lawson about this contact because Lawson said if 
Ochs admitted touching D.T. he could receive treatment instead of imprisonment. At all 
times Ochs denied having sexual intercourse with D.T. 
 
Other evidence 
 
D.T. takes medication for bipolar disorder and ADHD. Due to behavior problems, 
she previously had been scheduled to begin treatment at Camelot, a psychiatric 
residential treatment facility in Wichita, 3 days after Ochs' episode. Her Camelot 
therapist, Erika Purcell, testified that D.T. was referred there to address a handful of 
behavior issues including lying, mood swings, and hallucinations. According to Purcell, 
L.T. told her that D.T. would "fabricate stories and believe that it's true." 
 
7 
 
D.T. had indeed made a sexual abuse claim against her uncle when she was 5 
years old. But she withdrew the allegations the day before his trial. At Ochs' trial she 
admitted she had lied about the claim against her uncle. 
 
Closing argument, verdict, and sentencing 
 
During closing argument, Ochs' attorney, Kevin Babbit, attacked D.T.'s credibility. 
He referred to D.T.'s prior accusation against her uncle and her testimony admitting she 
had lied about that event. He also discussed the reasons for her referral to Camelot, i.e., 
hallucinations and "excessive lying." He further noted that her testimony about other 
events from that weekend unrelated to the charges, e.g., who accompanied her in the car 
on the way to Camelot, was inconsistent with the testimony of others. He argued these 
comments of D.T. were "untrue" and "false." 
 
Assistant District Attorney Amy McGowan then presented her rebuttal argument. 
McGowan contended that D.T. had "always been consistent about what constitutes the 
elements of these sex crimes." She later argued: 
 
"And when D.T. was in her room that night, all alone, she was defenseless, she 
was scared. . . . She was in pain. All those things happened to her in that room. She had 
no protection at all. 
 
"But, you know, one thing she didn't know is she did have protection. She had 
something that protected her not only from that room, down at Camelot, and she brought 
it right here with her into this courtroom, and that protection she had was the truth. The 
truth that Eric Ochs had sexual intercourse with her, committed the crime of rape in her 
room on that night." 
 
These were the final words of counsel before jury deliberations. 
 
8 
 
The jury rejected the alternative charge of aggravated indecent liberties with a 
child and convicted Ochs of rape under K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(2), an off-grid person felony. 
Ochs then filed a motion under K.S.A. 21-4643(d) requesting a durational departure from 
the minimum sentence of the "hard 25" life sentence mandated under K.S.A. 21-
4643(a)(1)(B). He also filed a motion requesting that the court find Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 
21-4643, to be cruel or unusual punishment under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of 
Rights. The district court denied both motions. 
 
More facts will be added as necessary to the analysis. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Issue 1:  The prosecutor committed misconduct, but the error was harmless. 
 
 
Ochs argues the prosecutor committed misconduct in her rebuttal closing 
argument regarding D.T.'s "protection by the truth" and the error is reversible. The State 
contends the error, if any, was harmless. 
 
 
Standard of review 
 
We have said that review of prosecutorial misconduct claims involves a two-step 
process. The court first decides whether the comments were outside the wide latitude a 
prosecutor is allowed, e.g., in discussing the evidence. If so, there was misconduct. 
Second, if misconduct is found, we have said the court must determine whether the 
improper comments prejudiced the jury and denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. 
Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, 857, 281 P.3d 1112 (2012). 
 
For years we have considered several factors in analyzing this second step: (1) 
whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) whether it was motivated by 
9 
 
prosecutorial ill will; and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct and 
overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds 
of jurors. None of these three factors has been individually controlling. Marshall, 294 
Kan. at 857. 
 
Since 2004, this court has also demanded that any prosecutorial misconduct error 
meet the "dual standard" of both constitutional harmlessness and statutory harmlessness 
to uphold a conviction. See State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 97, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004) ("Before 
the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to 
say that both the K.S.A. 60-261 and Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 
17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967),] harmlessness tests have been met."). 
 
We have said that under the constitutional harmless error analysis defined in 
Chapman v. California  
 
"the error may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the error proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the 
outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the verdict." State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 
256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). 
 
Under the harmless error analysis defined in K.S.A. 60-261, the test is equally 
clear. We have said the court "determine[s] if there is a reasonable probability that the 
error did or will affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record." 292 Kan. 
541, Syl. ¶ 6. 
 
 
Under both standards, the party benefiting from the error—here, allegedly the 
State—bears the burden of demonstrating harmlessness. State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 
299 P.3d 292 (2013). That burden is higher when the error is of constitutional magnitude. 
See Herbel, 296 Kan. at 1109-10 ("Clearly, the party benefiting from the constitutional 
10 
 
error must meet a higher standard to show harmlessness than the standard required in 
nonconstitutional error."). 
 
Discussion 
 
Ochs claims the following comments from the prosecutor's rebuttal closing 
argument were misconduct: 
 
 
"But, you know, one thing she didn't know is she did have protection. She had 
something that protected her not only from that room, down at Camelot, and she brought 
it right here with her into this courtroom, and that protection she had was the truth. The 
truth that Eric Ochs had sexual intercourse with her, committed the crime of rape in her 
room on that night." (Emphasis added.) 
 
More specifically, Ochs claims the prosecutor improperly testified about D.T.'s 
truthfulness, bolstered her testimony, and encouraged the jury to convict him merely to 
protect her. 
 
The State responds that the comments were permissible because the prosecutor (1) 
was simply asking the jury to consider the evidence and (2) was merely responding to 
improper comments made by Ochs' attorney. We disagree with both of the State's 
arguments. 
 
The prosecutor's comments were not an invitation for the jury to consider the 
evidence. Instead they were a prosecutorial declaration that the State's most important 
witness—the victim—was telling the truth. We recently rejected a nearly identical 
argument in State v. Smith, 296 Kan. 111, 293 P.3d 669 (2012). There, we held that the 
"repeated invocation of the 'truth'" during closing argument by the same assistant district 
attorney who prosecuted Ochs was not a proper comment on the evidence. 296 Kan. at 
133. 
11 
 
 
Ochs' case contains striking parallels to Smith because there the prosecutor argued: 
 
"And you know, it is hard work to get to the truth, and there is a lot to sort through. But 
the truth is there, and the truth is here in this courtroom, and the truth was presented to 
you through the course of last week. 
 
 
"And the truth is the only thing that David Boose has right now. He was alone in 
his kitchen. He was surprised by these two people trying to take things that were his. He 
was unprotected, and he was shot. Executed. 
 
 
"But today, in this courtroom, he has the truth. And the truth will give him a 
verdict against Allen Smith for aggravated burglary, and a verdict against Allen Smith 
for shooting David Boose in the head. Those verdicts won't replace David Boose. They 
won't bring him back. They won't fill the hole that is in his family's life, but they will give 
us the truth." (Emphasis added.) 296 Kan. at 133. 
 
We concluded in Smith that "[d]uring closing argument, a prosecutor may not 
claim sole possession of the 'truth.' Doing so repeatedly is error." 296 Kan. 111, Syl. ¶ 7. 
Similarly, in State v. Anderson, 294 Kan. 450, 463, 276 P.3d 200, cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 
529 (2012) we held it improper for the prosecutor to argue that the victim is "not 
defenseless today because he has the criminal justice system with him and he has the 
truth with him. The truth will be his redemption here in this courtroom." See also State v. 
Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 59-60, 105 P.3d 1222 (2005) (improper comment on the credibility 
of the State's evidence for the prosecutor to argue "the truth shows you beyond a 
reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of the crimes with which he is charged"). 
 
As for the State's second argument that the prosecutor was simply responding to 
Ochs' counsel, we acknowledge his counsel arguably made improper comments as he 
walked the perilous line between simply pointing out the inconsistencies in D.T.'s 
testimony and calling her a liar. While he did not expressly call D.T. a liar, he clearly 
12 
 
branded some of her testimony "untrue" and "false." See Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC) 3.4(e) ("[A] lawyer shall not in trial . . . state a personal opinion as to . . . 
the credibility of a witness."). 
 
Nevertheless, we recently rejected the State's identical "merely responding" 
argument in State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. at 861. As we clarified there, a facially improper 
comment by a prosecutor responding to defense counsel's argument is but one factor to 
consider in the overall calculus; it no longer absolutely rinses off possible misconduct. 
"The open-the-door rule does not insulate a prosecutor from a finding of misconduct." 294 
Kan. at 860. In short, improper defense arguments do not absolve the prosecutor of her 
obligations. Elnicki, 279 Kan. at 60. ("'Our rules of conduct clearly and unequivocally say 
that it is improper for a lawyer to comment on a witness' credibility.'"). 
 
Based upon these authorities we conclude that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct, i.e., her comments were error. 
 
With the prosecutorial misconduct established, we turn to the second analytical 
step. See Marshall, 294 Kan. at 857. This includes determining whether the prosecutor's 
improper comments were harmless error under the standards of both K.S.A. 60-261 and 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18. 
 
We recently held that when the constitutional and nonconstitutional error clearly 
arises from the very same acts and omissions, we logically begin with our harmlessness 
analysis of the constitutional error. See Herbel, 296 Kan. at 1111. We reach this 
conclusion because if we decide the constitutional error is not harmless and reverse the 
convictions, there is no point in analyzing whether the State met the lower standard for 
harmlessness under K.S.A. 60-261. Herbel, 296 Kan. at 1111. 
 
13 
 
In turning to our constitutional error analysis, we review the factors upon which 
Ochs relies to argue reversal and remand to the district court. Per State v. Tosh, initially 
these are gross and flagrant conduct and prosecutorial ill will. 
 
In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was gross and flagrant, among 
the things we have considered are whether the comments were repeated, emphasized 
improper points, were planned or calculated, or violated well-established or unequivocal 
rules. State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 214, 284 P.3d 977 (2012). In determining whether 
prosecutorial misconduct was motivated by ill will, among the things we have considered 
are whether the conduct was deliberate or in apparent indifference to a court's ruling. 
Marshall, 294 Kan. at 862; see also Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct § 14.5, pp. 602-
03 (2d ed. 2012) ("Other factors considered by courts in determining harmfulness are 
whether the prosecutor's misconduct was deliberate, related to a crucial issue in the trial, 
or was followed by a prosecutorial apology."); cf. Prosecutorial Misconduct, § 10:51, p. 
458 (a prosecutor's failure to obey court rulings increases the likelihood of reversal). In an 
overlap with determining gross and flagrant conduct, for determining ill will this court has 
also considered whether the conduct was repeated. See Marshall, 294 Kan. at 862. 
 
This case's unique link with State v. Smith, 296 Kan. 111, shows that the 
comments by Ochs' prosecutor were not only gross and flagrant but also suggestive of ill 
will. In Smith, we described the prosecutor's use of "truth" as a "repeated invocation" 
during closing argument. 296 Kan. at 133. We concluded the prosecutor's behavior was 
"perilously close to gross and flagrant and demonstrative of ill will." 296 Kan. at 134. 
 
While here the prosecutor did not repeat the "truth" argument throughout her 
entire rebuttal, she traced "the truth" from D.T.'s bedroom, to D.T.'s first conversations 
with her therapist, and all the way through her testimony at trial. "She brought it [the 
truth] right here with her into this courtroom." And the prosecutor concluded by arguing 
14 
 
that the "truth [is] that Eric Ochs had sexual intercourse with her, committed the crime of 
rape . . . ." 
 
In essence, the prosecutor did not just bolster the victim's testimony but declared 
that "the truth" virtually mandated a guilty verdict for her rape. See State v. Raskie, 293 
Kan. 906, Syl. ¶ 3, 269 P.3d 1268 (2012) (closing argument cannot inflame the jury's 
passions or prejudices or divert the jury from its duty to decide the case based on the 
evidence and controlling law). 
 
As we recognized in Smith, the rule that forbids a prosecutor from claiming the 
truth is on his or her side is a long-standing one. Smith, 296 Kan. at 133 ("Moreover, 
Elnicki was not news on the impropriety of such an invocation."). Elnicki was decided in 
2005, nearly 5 years before the prosecutor uttered her comments in Ochs' trial. Violation 
of a long-standing rule is indicative of gross and flagrant conduct. See Brown, 295 Kan. 
181. 
 
Additionally, the close parallels between the language used by the same 
prosecutor—in Ochs' case and in Smith—suggest that her closing comments here were 
not extemporaneous. See also State v. Anderson, 294 Kan. at 464 (holding that it was a 
close call whether the same prosecutor's similar "truth" comments in closing argument, 
e.g., "the truth will be his redemption here in this courtroom" were gross or flagrant or 
demonstrated ill will). In short, similar closing arguments have been used by the same 
prosecutor in at least three jury trials resulting in convictions appealed to this court the 
last few years. Their continual use by her after Elnicki causes us to seriously doubt 
prosecutorial inadvertence or spontaneity and to instead approach deliberateness. 
Deliberate misconduct is indicative of ill will. See Marshall, 294 Kan. at 862. 
 
 
In continuing our constitutional harmlessness analysis, we address Ochs' ultimate 
argument that the misconduct affected the minds of the jury and therefore requires 
15 
 
reversal and remand. The State essentially responds that there is no reasonable possibility 
the misconduct contributed to the verdict. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 
P.3d 801 (2011). 
 
We begin by acknowledging Ochs frames his case as a credibility contest. He 
argues that the jury had two options: to believe him or to believe D.T. And we further 
acknowledge that during closing argument, Ochs' attorney highlighted some 
discrepancies in D.T.'s testimony. 
 
But no D.T. discrepancies were related to her allegations against Ochs. The 
prosecutor accurately argued in closing that D.T. had been consistent about the sex-
related events of that night. 
 
Ochs, on the other hand, substantially changed his story at trial. He testified that 
he had fabricated two of his critical admissions to Lawson: (1) while masturbating near 
her bed (2) he had touched the "inside" or "inside the split" of D.T.'s vagina. He denied 
any masturbation and any touching whatsoever of her vagina. Additionally, the DNA 
evidence buttresses D.T.'s testimony about her sexual contact with Ochs. The DNA 
profile of the sperm on her blankets matched his profile, and the bedding contained traces 
of mixed DNA consistent with the profiles of both Ochs and D.T. 
 
 
When we balance the prejudice created by the prosecutor's comments against the 
amount of this evidence and Ochs' changing stories, we conclude that the misconduct was 
harmless error. Stated another way, the State has met its burden of proving "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of . . . did not affect the outcome of the trial in 
light of the entire record, i.e., . . . there is no reasonable possibility that the error 
contributed to the verdict." See Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6. Given this holding, we 
need not determine whether the State has met its burden of showing harmless error under 
the lower standard articulated in K.S.A. 60-261. Herbel, 296 Kan. at 1110-11. 
16 
 
 
Issue 2:  Ochs' sentence does not violate § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. 
 
Ochs asks that his hard 25 sentence be vacated and the matter be remanded for 
resentencing because of constitutional violations. While his appellate brief captions this 
sentencing issue as a violation of his right under the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution to be free from a cruel and unusual punishment, his entire argument 
and analysis is limited to alleging a violation of his right to be free from cruel or unusual 
punishment under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. So we will deal 
exclusively with § 9. See State v. Mattox, 280 Kan. 473, 492, 124 P.3d 6 (2005) ("A point 
raised only incidentally in a party's brief but not argued in the brief is deemed 
abandoned."). 
 
Earlier this year we held that the Jessica's Law sentencing scheme under K.S.A. 
21-4643(a)(1)(B) (rape) survives § 9 constitutional scrutiny. State v. Seward, 296 Kan. 
979, 297 P.3d 272 (2013). We affirmed this holding in State v. Newcomb, 296 Kan. 1012, 
298 P.3d 285 (2013). The Seward and Newcomb defendants—like Ochs—were convicted 
of rape of a child under 14 years of age, sentenced under the same statute, and received 
the same sentence—a hard 25. We begin our review against this backdrop. 
 
Standard of review 
 
Recently, we reiterated the standard of review for § 9 constitutional challenges. 
 
"In determining whether a sentence is cruel or unusual, a district court must make 
both legal and factual inquiries. See, e.g., State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 160-
61, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008). These inquiries invoke a bifurcated standard of review: 
without reweighing the evidence, the appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of 
the district court's findings under a substantial competent evidence standard, and the 
district court's ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. 
17 
 
State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76, 80, 201 P.3d 673 (2009); State v. Woolverton, 284 Kan. 59, 
70, 159 P.3d 985 (2007). 
 
"A statute is presumed constitutional and all doubts must be resolved in favor of 
its validity. If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, 
the court has the authority and the duty to do so. State v. Laturner, 289 Kan. 727, 735, 
218 P.3d 23 (2009); see also State ex rel. Six v. Kansas Lottery, 286 Kan. 557, 562, 186 
P.3d 183 (2008) ('It is not the duty of this court to criticize the legislature or to substitute 
its view on economic or social policy; it is the duty of this court to safeguard the 
constitution.')." State v. Woodard, 294 Kan. 717, 720, 280 P.3d 203 (2012). 
 
Discussion 
 
Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides: 
 
 
"All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses, 
where proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted." 
 
 
We elaborated on the infliction of cruel or unusual punishment prohibited by § 9 in 
Seward, 296 Kan. at 982: 
 
 
"'Under § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, a punishment may be 
constitutionally impermissible, although not cruel or unusual in its method, if it is so 
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and 
offends fundamental notions of human dignity.' State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, Syl. ¶ 9, 
235 P.3d 1203 (2010). Whether a sentence is 'cruel or unusual' under § 9 because of its 
length is controlled by a three-part test, first outlined in State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 
367, 574 P.2d 950 (1978). This three-part test weighs the following: 
 
 
'(1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender 
should be examined with particular regard to the degree of danger 
present to society; relevant to this inquiry are the facts of the crime, the 
18 
 
violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the extent of culpability for 
the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the prescribed 
punishment; 
 
 
'(2) A comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed 
in this jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are 
found more serious crimes punished less severely than the offense in 
question the challenged penalty is to that extent suspect; and 
 
 
'(3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other 
jurisdictions for the same offense.' [Citation omitted.] 
 
No single factor under the Freeman test controls the outcome. State v. Berriozabal, 291 
Kan. 568, 591, 243 P.3d 352 (2010)." 
 
"'Ultimately, one consideration may weigh so heavy that it directs the final conclusion,' 
but 'consideration should be given to each prong of the test.'" Woodard, 294 Kan. at 723 
(quoting State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 161, 194 P.3d 1195 [2008]). The first 
Freeman factor is "'inherently factual, requiring examination of the facts of the crime and 
the particular characteristics of the defendant,'" while the two remaining factors depend 
solely upon "legal determinations." State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715, 719, 217 P.3d 443 
(2009); see State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 367, 574 P.2d 950 (1978). 
 
The first Freeman prong: 
 
The first prong of the Freeman three-part test requires us to consider the nature of 
the offense and the character of the offender in light of the facts of the crime. Seward, 
296 Kan. at 986 (citing State v. Britt, 295 Kan. 1018, 1033, 287 P.3d 905 [2012]). 
 
In response to Ochs' motion requesting determination that his sentence was 
unconstitutional, among other things the district court found that D.T. was placed in 
19 
 
Ochs' care, custody, and control and he was responsible for babysitting her while her 
parents were gone. It also found the testimony at trial showed a special relationship 
between Ochs and D.T.'s mother, i.e., mother-son. The court even acknowledged that 
Ochs had had a difficult childhood. These findings are supported by substantial 
competent evidence in the record. 
 
Ochs testified that his mother committed suicide on his 14th birthday and he never 
knew his father. He stated that he suffered sexual abuse before the age of 5 from peers 
and other caretakers. Ochs also said that he had previously been diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder. 
 
The record also reflects Ochs was well aware of the trust placed in him by D.T.'s 
family, as contained in the district court findings. L.T. testified that Ochs was like a son 
to her, D.T. testified that Ochs was like a brother to her, and Ochs himself said he was 
like part of the family. So like the defendants in Woodard, Seward, and Newcomb, Ochs 
"enjoyed a special position of trust" with the victim. Woodard, 294 Kan. at 721 (abuser 
was victim's stepfather); Seward, 296 Kan. 979 (stepfather); Newcomb, 296 Kan. 1012 
(stepfather). And D.T.'s rape occurred at the hands of this family member while he was 
occupying an additional position of trust as her babysitter. 
 
Similar to the defendant in Newcomb, 296 Kan. at 1017, Ochs does not dispute 
any of these matters but mainly argues that his crime was not particularly violent. More 
specifically, similar to the Newcomb defendant, he alleges there is no evidence D.T. 
suffered any physical injuries as a result of the crime or that he used a weapon of any 
kind. But as we held in Seward and Newcomb, rape itself is a violent offense. See K.S.A. 
22-3717(d)(2) (classifying rape under K.S.A. 21-3502 as a "sexually violent crime"). And 
as we held in Newcomb, the rape of a child under 14 is a crime of "extreme sexual 
violence" under K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(2)(F)(i)(c). 
 
20 
 
Additionally, D.T. testified that the sex act itself was painful and she suffered 
physical injury. She testified that it hurt to urinate the next day and that she discharged 
blood in the bathroom. Furthermore, D.T. was a vulnerable victim. She was in need of 
psychiatric or psychological treatment even before the incident, and her mother testified 
at sentencing that the sexual abuse caused D.T.'s problems to get "worse," and that their 
"family is falling apart." 
 
As for Ochs' second argument—that he did not use a weapon—we rejected a 
similar contention in Seward. 
 
 
"Regarding the degree of violence attendant to the offenses, Seward argues that 
the 'State did not present evidence that [he] used a weapon to commit the crimes, that he 
kidnapped or otherwise terrorized R.T.' But this argument does not undercut the sexual 
violence of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy. Simply because Seward could have 
committed these acts more violently does not mean they are not violent in their most 
basic form, particularly when committed against an especially vulnerable victim." 296 
Kan. at 986. 
 
See also Newcomb, 296 Kan. at 1018 ("That a sexually violent crime could have been 
committed more violently is legally insignificant."). 
 
So under these circumstances, we conclude the first prong of the Freeman analysis 
does not favor Ochs' argument that his Jessica's Law sentence for rape is unconstitutional 
under § 9. 
 
The second Freeman prong 
 
Under the second prong of the Freeman analysis, this court compares Ochs' 
sentence for rape with the penalties imposed for "more serious crimes" in Kansas. 
Seward, 296 Kan. at 987 (citing Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367). 
21 
 
 
In support, Ochs presents a familiar argument: he would be better off if he would 
have murdered D.T. instead of raping her. Specifically, Ochs argues that had he been 
convicted of second-degree intentional murder, he would only face a 267-month sentence 
under K.S.A. 21-3402(a). Ochs further notes that a conviction for first-degree murder 
would result in the same hard 25 sentence that he is currently serving.  
 
This court has rejected this argument several times, with the first rejection in 
Woodard in the context of aggravated indecent liberties with a child: 
 
"This argument suffers from several flaws. In the first place, it assumes that 
murderers necessarily receive more lenient sentences in Kansas than violators of Jessica's 
Law. This is not the case. In fact, the Kansas Criminal Code sets out a list of 
transgressions that constitute capital murder, which is an off-grid offense. K.S.A. 21-
3439. Capital murder is subject to punishment by death. K.S.A. 21-4624. The penalty for 
homicide in Kansas may thus be much more severe than the penalties under Jessica's 
Law. See K.S.A. 21-4638; K.S.A. 21-4643. The fact that the penalty for certain 
categories of homicide may be less severe than the penalties for other, nonhomicide 
crimes does not automatically render the penalties for the nonhomicide crimes 
unconstitutional. There is no strict linear order of criminal activity that ranks all 
homicides as the most serious crimes and all nonhomicide crimes as less serious, with the 
corresponding penalties necessarily ranking in diminishing durations of imprisonment. 
 
"Furthermore . . . Jessica's Law is not the only Kansas statute that provides for 
more severe penalties for nonhomicide crimes than for certain categories of homicide. 
Compare, e.g., rape, K.S.A. 21-3502, and aggravated kidnapping, K.S.A. 21-3420, which 
are severity level 1 offenses, with reckless second-degree murder, K.S.A. 21-3402(b), 
which is a severity level 2 offense." Woodard, 294 Kan. at 723-24. 
 
In Seward, 296 Kan. at 988, we recognized the court's conclusion in Woodard that the 
penalty for aggravated indecent liberties was not disproportionately harsh. So we readily 
concluded that the penalties for rape and aggravated criminal sodomy—both of which are 
22 
 
at least as serious as aggravated indecent liberties—were also not disproportionately 
harsh. See also Newcomb, 296 Kan. at 1018-19 (holding Seward controls and stating that 
rape is "undeniably a more invasive and serious crime than aggravated indecent liberties," 
and thus the penalty for rape is not disproportionately harsh when compared with Kansas 
sentences for homicide offenses). 
 
We remain unpersuaded by this argument repeated by Ochs. So it again fails under 
the second prong of the Freeman analysis. 
 
The third Freeman prong: 
 
Under the third prong of the Freeman test, this court compares the penalty under 
Jessica's law for rape with the penalty for the same offenses in other jurisdictions. 
Seward, 296 Kan. at 988 (citing Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367). 
 
In support, Ochs argues that Kansas' Jessica's Law sets out one of the nation's 
harshest penalties for child rape. In Woodard, we surveyed the national statutory 
landscape and concluded that this state's Jessica's Law "sentencing scheme is not out of 
line with other jurisdictions." 294 Kan. at 725; see Seward, 296 Kan. at 989. 
 
In Seward, we again surveyed the national landscape and concluded that "Kansas 
does not have the harshest penalties in the nation for the crime[ ] of rape . . . committed 
by an adult against a child younger than 14." Seward, 296 Kan. at 989-90. As in 
Newcomb, "no productive purposes would be served by repeating that discussion here." 
296 Kan. at 1019. Accordingly, Ochs' argument also fails under this third Freeman 
prong. 
 
23 
 
In short, none of the three steps of the Freeman analysis favors a conclusion that 
the hard 25 life sentence Ochs received for the rape of 11-year-old D.T. is disproportional 
and therefore violative of § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.