Title: Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP2019 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Tetra Tech EC, Inc., and Lower Fox River 
Remediation LLC, 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 373 Wis. 2d 287, 890 N.W.2d 598 
PDC No:  2017 WI App 4 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
Marc A. Hammer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., concurs, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs.  ROGGENSACK, C.J., joins 
Part I (opinion filed). 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs, joined by ROGGENSACK, 
C.J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
petitioners-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Barret V. Van Sicklen, Frederic J. Brouner, 
Donald Leo Bach, and DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Madison.  There 
was an oral argument by Barret Van Sicklen. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, with whom on the brief were 
Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Kevin M. LeRoy, deputy 
 
 
2 
solicitor general.  There was an oral argument by Misha 
Tseytlin. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Institute for Law & Liberty, Inc. by Richard M. Esenberg, Thomas 
C. Kamenick, and Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, 
Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Utilities Association by James E. Goldschmidt, Bradley Jackson, 
and Quarles & Brady LLP, Madison and Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers 
and 
Commerce, 
Inc., 
Midwest 
Food 
Products 
Association, Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce, 
Wisconsin 
Bankers 
Association, 
Wisconsin 
Cheese 
Makers 
Association, 
Wisconsin 
Paper 
Council, 
Dairy 
Business 
Association, Inc., Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. 
(Wisconsin Chapter), Wisconsin Potato and Vegetable Growers 
Association, Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation, and Wisconsin 
Corn Growers Association by Robert I. Fassbender and Great Lakes 
Legal Foundation, Madison. 
 
 
2018 WI 75
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP2019 
(L.C. No. 
2015CV132) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Tetra Tech EC, Inc. and Lower Fox River 
Remediation LLC, 
 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   The Wisconsin Department of Revenue 
(the "Department") imposed a tax on the petitioners pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)11. (2007-08) for the "processing" of 
river sediments into waste sludge, reusable sand, and water.  
The petitioners say the statutory term "processing" is not 
expansive enough to cover the separation of river sediment into 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
2 
 
its component parts, and so they asked us to reject the 
Department's interpretation of that term.1 
¶2 
Because 
resolving 
this 
question 
implicates 
the 
authoritativeness of an administrative agency's interpretation 
and application of a statute, we asked the parties to also 
address this issue:  "Does the practice of deferring to agency 
interpretations of statutes comport with Article VII, Section 2 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, which vests the judicial power in 
the unified court system?"2 
¶3 
We conclude that the term "processing" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11. includes the separation of river sediment into 
its component parts.  Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals.  
We have also decided to end our practice of deferring to 
                                                 
1 This is a review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals, Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2017 WI App 4, 373 
Wis. 2d 287, 890 N.W.2d 598, which affirmed an order of the 
Brown County Circuit Court, the Honorable Marc A. Hammer 
presiding, that affirmed an order of the Wisconsin Tax Appeals 
Commission ("Commission"). 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes with respect to 
the question of whether we defer to an administrative agency's 
interpretation of a statute are to the 2015-16 version unless 
otherwise indicated. 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes with respect to 
the meaning of "processing," as that term is used in Wis. Stat. 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11., are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise 
indicated.  We cite this version, as the court of appeals did, 
because the relevant tax years for the case are 2007-09 and 
because the 2005-06 version of the Wisconsin Statutes, which 
would govern the 2007 tax year, is not materially different from 
the 2007-08 version.  See Tetra Tech EC, Inc., 373 Wis. 2d 287, 
¶1 n.1. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
3 
 
administrative agencies' conclusions of law.3  However, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10), we will give "due weight" to the 
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of 
an administrative agency as we consider its arguments.4 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
On November 13, 2007, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") ordered several paper companies to 
remediate the environmental impact of polychlorinated biphenyls 
("PCBs") they had released into the Fox River as part of their 
manufacturing activities.  The paper companies created Lower Fox 
River Remediation, LLC ("LFR Remediation") to carry out the 
EPA's order.  LFR Remediation hired Tetra Tech EC, Inc. ("Tetra 
Tech") to perform the actual remediation activities.  Tetra Tech 
subcontracted a portion of the work to Stuyvesant Dredging, Inc. 
("Stuyvesant Dredging").5  Stuyvesant Dredging's responsibilities 
                                                 
3 Although a majority of the court agrees we should no 
longer defer to administrative agencies' conclusions of law, 
there is disagreement with respect to why we should end the 
practice.  This opinion describes one rationale; other opinions 
will contain alternative bases for our conclusion. 
4 Justice Rebecca Bradley joins the opinion in toto.  Chief 
Justice Roggensack joins Sections I., II.A.1., II.A.2., II.B., 
and III.  Justice Gableman joins Paragraphs 1-3, Sections I., 
II. (introduction), II.A. (introduction), II.A.1., II.A.2., 
II.A.6., II.B., and III., and the mandate, although he does not 
join Section II.A.6. to the extent that the first sentence of 
Paragraph 84 implies a holding on constitutional grounds.  
Therefore, this opinion announces the opinion of the court with 
respect to Sections I., II.A.1., II.A.2., II.B., and III. 
5 Stuyvesant Dredging is now known as Stuyvesant Projects 
Realization, Inc. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
4 
 
included receiving sediment dredged from the Fox River, and then 
using membrane filter presses to separate it into its component 
parts:  water, sand, and PCB-containing sludge.  Part of the 
purpose of Stuyvesant Dredging's work was to "provide a supply 
of relatively clean sand that could be sold for off-site use or 
used beneficially on site." 
¶5 
In 2010, the Department conducted a field audit of 
both Tetra Tech and LFR Remediation (collectively, "Taxpayers").  
During that same year, the Department issued a Notice of Field 
Audit Action that assessed a use tax on LFR Remediation's 
purchase of the portion of Tetra Tech's remediation services 
that represented Stuyvesant Dredging's work.  The Department 
also issued a Notice of Field Audit Action that assessed a sales 
tax on the portion of Tetra Tech's sale of remediation services 
to LFR Remediation (to the extent it reflected Stuyvesant 
Dredging's work).  In both notices, the Department said 
Stuyvesant 
Dredging's 
activities 
constituted 
the 
"repair, 
service, 
alteration, 
fitting, 
cleaning, 
painting, 
coating, 
towing, 
inspection 
and 
maintenance 
of 
tangible 
personal 
property," and so were taxable under Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)10. 
¶6 
Tetra 
Tech 
and 
LFR 
Remediation 
petitioned 
the 
Department for redetermination of the assessed taxes.  The 
Department denied the petitions, concluding that Stuyvesant 
Dredging's "dewatering and desanding of dredged, contaminated 
sediment that is not returned to the river is a service to 
tangible personal property" that was taxable under Wis. Stat. 
§ 77.52(2)(a)10.  Tetra Tech and LFR Remediation then filed 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
5 
 
petitions with the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission (the 
"Commission") requesting review of the Department's denial of 
their reassessment requests.  In its presentation to the 
Commission, the Department argued that Stuyvesant Dredging's 
activities 
were 
taxable 
under 
§ 77.52(2)(a)10., 
or 
alternatively, 
under 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11. 
as 
"processing" 
of 
tangible personal property.  The Commission issued a Ruling and 
Order in favor of the Department.6  Upholding the sales and use 
taxes, the Commission concluded that "what SDI [Stuyvesant 
Dredging] does with the sediment is 'processing . . . for a 
consideration for consumers [Tetra Tech] who furnish directly or 
indirectly 
the 
materials 
[sediment] 
used 
in 
the . . . processing' 
under 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11." 
 
The 
Commission 
reasoned 
that 
"[t]he 
dictionary definition of 'processing' is 'to put through the 
steps of a prescribed procedure; or, to prepare, treat, or 
convert by subjecting to a special process.' SDI's activities 
certainly fall within that definition."7 
¶7 
Tetra Tech and LFR Remediation timely filed a petition 
for judicial review, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.52, in the 
                                                 
6 Tetra Tech and LFR Remediation's petitions received 
separate docket numbers (12-S-192 and 12-S-193, respectively), 
but the Commission decided the cases together. 
7 See Processing, The American Heritage Dictionary 1444 (3d 
ed. 1992) (defining "processing" in relevant part:  "1. To put 
through the steps of a prescribed procedure," and as "2. To 
prepare, treat, or convert by subjecting to a special process"). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
6 
 
Brown County Circuit Court.  The petition requested the circuit 
court to set aside the Commission's Ruling and Order that 
Stuyvesant 
Dredging's 
work 
subjected 
Tetra 
Tech 
and 
LFR 
Remediation to sales and use taxes.  The circuit court affirmed, 
relying on the same definition of "processing" the Commission 
had used.  LFR Remediation and Tetra Tech appealed.  The court 
of appeals, using a dictionary definition of "processing" 
similar to the one used by the circuit court and the Commission, 
affirmed.  Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2017 WI App 4, ¶¶2, 17, 
373 Wis. 2d 287, 890 N.W.2d 598.  We granted Tetra Tech and LFR 
Remediation's petition for review, and now affirm. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶8 
The ultimate question we must answer in this case is 
whether the petitioners are subject to the tax levied on them by 
the 
Department 
of 
Revenue 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11.  The Commission says they are, and urges us to 
agree with its interpretation and application of that statute. 
¶9 
Before we may answer that question, however, there is 
a predicate matter we must address:  When we review an 
administrative agency's decision, are there circumstances in 
which 
we 
must 
defer 
to 
the 
agency's 
interpretation 
and 
application of the law?  Our current jurisprudence says there 
are.  And ever since 
Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 
Wis. 2d 650, 659, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995), we have treated that 
deference as a "standard of review."  Therefore, because 
identifying the appropriate standard of review is an appellate 
court's first task, we will begin there.  Once we resolve that 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
7 
 
issue, we will address the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11. and how it applies to Tetra Tech and LFR 
Remediation. 
A.  Deference to Administrative Agencies 
¶10 Our assessment of the deference doctrine begins in the 
following section with a brief overview of its current contours.  
To truly understand its function, however, we need to search out 
its roots, the results of which we discuss in the second 
section.  As preparation for our comparison of the deference 
doctrine to our constitutional responsibilities, we examine in 
the third section the nature of the judiciary's powers and how 
they relate to the other governmental branches.  In the fourth 
and fifth sections, we separately assess "great weight" and "due 
weight" deference in light of the constitutional provisions and 
principles that govern our work. 
 
1.  Current Standard for Reviewing Administrative Agency 
Decisions 
¶11 We generally review administrative agency decisions in 
accordance with chapter 227 of our statutes.8  As relevant here, 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57 contains two specific directions regarding 
how we are to conduct those reviews.  First, it instructs a 
court to "set aside or modify the agency action if it finds that 
                                                 
8 This 
decision 
applies 
to 
judicial 
review 
of 
all 
administrative agency decisions.  While chapter 227 applies to 
judicial review of most administrative decisions, it does not 
apply to all.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 102.23 (establishing 
procedures for judicial review of workers compensation orders). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
8 
 
the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a 
correct interpretation compels a particular action, or it shall 
remand the case to the agency for further action under a correct 
interpretation of the provision of law."  § 227.57(5).  And 
second, it instructs that, "[s]ubject to sub. (11), upon such 
review due weight shall be accorded the experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency involved, as 
well 
as 
discretionary 
authority 
conferred 
upon 
it."9  
§ 227.57(10). 
¶12 We 
have 
developed, 
over 
time, 
a 
contextualized 
methodology of reviewing administrative agency decisions.10  The 
provenance of this methodology lies partly with the preceding 
statute, and partly with our own doctrinal developments.  In its 
modern iteration, this method begins with the principle that 
"statutory interpretation is a question of law which courts 
decide de novo."  See Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 659.  And we 
recognize 
that 
"a 
court 
is 
not 
bound 
by 
an 
agency's 
interpretation of a statute."  Id.  But then we wrap those 
principles within another, one we have said is of equal gravity:  
                                                 
9 Subsection 11 does not apply to the case before us today, 
but it will play a small part in our discussion below.  This 
subsection provides that "[u]pon review of an agency action or 
decision affecting a property owner's use of the property 
owner's property, the court shall accord no deference to the 
agency's interpretation of law if the agency action or decision 
restricts the property owner's free use of the property owner's 
property."  Wis. Stat. § 227.57(11). 
10 Whether, or how closely, our practice comports with the 
preceding statutory instructions will be addressed below. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
9 
 
"As important, however, is the principle that courts should 
defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute 
in certain situations."  Id. 
¶13 Calibrating 
this 
"deference 
principle" 
to 
those 
"certain situations" resulted in our contextualized, three-
tiered treatment of an administrative agency's conclusions 
regarding the interpretation and application of statutory 
provisions.  When reviewing those conclusions, we give them 
(1) great weight deference; (2) due weight deference; or (3) no 
deference at all.  See id. at 659–60 & n.4. 
¶14 We 
have 
said 
the 
first 
of 
these——great 
weight 
deference——is appropriate upon concluding that: 
(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the 
duty 
of 
administering 
the 
statute; 
(2) . . . the 
interpretation of the agency is one of long-standing; 
(3) . . . the 
agency 
employed 
its 
expertise 
or 
specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation; 
and (4) . . . the agency's interpretation will provide 
uniformity and consistency in the application of the 
statute. 
Id. at 660.  Giving "great weight" to an administrative agency's 
interpretation means the court must adopt it so long as it is 
reasonable.  Id. at 661 ("[W]e have repeatedly held that an 
agency's interpretation must then merely be reasonable for it to 
be sustained.").  An interpretation is reasonable if it does not 
"directly contravene[] the words of the statute," is not 
"clearly contrary to legislative intent," and is not "without 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
10 
 
rational basis."  See id. at 662.11  Deference is required even 
when the court has a more reasonable interpretation of the law.  
Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Wis. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 
2006 WI 86, ¶17, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184 (stating that 
under great weight deference, a reviewing court must accept "an 
agency's reasonable statutory interpretation, even if the court 
concludes that another interpretation is equally reasonable, or 
even more reasonable, than that of the agency"); Crystal Lake 
Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106, ¶24, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 
N.W.2d 651 ("This [the need to defer] is true even if the court 
were 
to 
conclude 
that 
another 
interpretation 
was 
more 
reasonable.").  These principles also apply to the agency's 
application of the statute to undisputed facts, which is itself 
a question of law.12  See, e.g., Crystal Lake Cheese Factory, 264 
Wis. 2d 200, 
¶30 
("LIRC's 
interpretations, 
including 
its 
determination of reasonable accommodation in this case, should 
be given 'great weight' deference."). 
¶15 The second tier of review, "due weight" deference, is 
appropriate when "the statute is one that the agency was charged 
                                                 
11 In the context of an ambiguous statute, "an agency's 
interpretation cannot, by definition, be found to directly 
contravene it."  Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 
662, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995). 
12 See DOR v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 713, 281 
N.W.2d 94 (1979) ("The question of whether the facts fulfill a 
particular legal standard is itself a question of law."). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
11 
 
with administering,"13 and "the agency has some experience in an 
area, but has not developed the expertise which necessarily 
places it in a better position to make judgments regarding the 
interpretation of the statute than a court."14  Under this 
standard, 
"the 
fact 
that 
the 
agency's 
interpretation 
is 
reasonable 
does 
not 
mean 
that 
its 
interpretation 
will 
necessarily be upheld."  UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 287, 
548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).  Instead, "[i]f a court finds an 
alternative interpretation more reasonable, it need not adopt 
the agency's interpretation."  Id.  In effect, this creates a 
"tie goes to the agency" rule in which deference is required 
unless the court's interpretation is more reasonable than that 
of the agency.  ABKA Ltd. P'ship v. DNR, 2002 WI 106, ¶116, 255 
Wis. 2d 486, 648 N.W.2d 854 (Sykes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 
agency's legal interpretation will be upheld even if there is a 
different, equally reasonable interpretation——in other words, a 
tie goes to the agency."); see also Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting 
Wisconsin 
Administrative 
Law 
at 
7 
(August 
23, 
2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3025085 ("Due weight might be called 
'tie goes to the agency' deference.").  The agency's application 
of a statute to undisputed facts is also entitled to due weight 
                                                 
13 Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, ¶20, 375 Wis. 2d 1, 894 
N.W.2d 426 (quoting Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Wis. Div. of 
Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶107, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 
N.W.2d 184 (Roggensack, J., concurring)). 
14 UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 286, 548 N.W.2d 57 
(1996). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
12 
 
deference when it satisfies the Harnischfeger preconditions.  
See DOR v. A. O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 60, 
65-66, 240 N.W.2d 357 (1976) ("Due deference must be accorded 
the agency's application of the law to the found facts when the 
agency has particular competence or expertise in the matter at 
hand." (citing Wis. Stat. § 227.20(2) (1973))). 
¶16 When conditions support neither great weight nor due 
weight deference, we give the administrative agency's statutory 
interpretation no deference at all.  See Racine Harley-Davidson, 
Inc., 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶19.  In those circumstances, "the 
reviewing court merely benefits from the agency's determination 
and may reverse the agency's interpretation even when an 
alternative statutory interpretation is equally reasonable to 
the interpretation of the agency."  Id., ¶20.  This is the same 
method we use in reviewing questions of law decided by our 
circuit courts and court of appeals.  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, 
¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 ("The interpretation and 
application of a statute present questions of law that this 
court reviews de novo while benefitting from the analyses of the 
court of appeals and circuit court."). 
2.  History of the Deference Doctrine 
¶17 Although we often speak of the deference doctrine in a 
manner that suggests it started and developed as a cohesive 
whole, it did not.  It is actually a portmanteau, derived from 
two different sources, the pieces of which developed over two 
different timelines, until they reached their fullest expression 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
13 
 
in Harnischfeger.  For purposes of clarity and ease of access, 
we will rehearse their histories separately. 
i.  A Brief History of "Great Weight" Deference 
¶18 The road to Harnischfeger's "great weight deference" 
is a long one (it reaches as far back as Harrington v. Smith, 28 
Wis. 43, 59-70 (1871)), but it is not an entirely clear one.  As 
originally conceived, the doctrine did not contemplate deference 
at all, and it certainly did not purport to command the court's 
obedience.  But with time it developed into a decision-avoidance 
doctrine that left to the administrative agencies the job of 
statutory interpretation and application when the doctrine's 
preconditions were satisfied.  A dozen years ago, now-Chief 
Justice Patience Drake Roggensack did yeoman's work in tracing 
the development and effect of this doctrine.  See The Honorable 
Patience Drake Roggensack, Elected to Decide:  Is the Decision-
Avoidance Doctrine of Great Weight Deference Appropriate in This 
Court of Last Resort?, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 541, 548-60 (2006).  The 
following history relies heavily on that scholarship. 
¶19 In Harrington, we discussed some of the canons of 
construction we used in discerning the proper meaning of an 
ambiguous statute.  One of those canons says that an agency's 
understanding of the statute could be probative of its meaning:  
"Long and uninterrupted practice under a statute, especially by 
the officers whose duty it was to execute it, is good evidence 
of its construction, and such practical construction will be 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
14 
 
adhered to, even though, were it res integra,[15] it might be 
difficult to maintain it."  Harrington, 28 Wis. at 68.  The 
practice of executive branch employees "extending through a 
period of so many years, ought, it would seem, to be some 
evidence of what the law is; and some persons might be disposed, 
perhaps, to think, evidence equal to a decision of this court."  
Id. at 69.  "Great weight," we concluded, "is undoubtedly to be 
attached to a construction which has thus been given."  Id. 
¶20 This is not the language of deference, but of 
persuasion.  In a search for the proper meaning of an ambiguous 
statute, we said we could properly have recourse to the views of 
others and treat them as pieces of evidence for use in the 
process of statutory construction in which we ourselves were 
engaged.  In support of our statement about the evidentiary 
nature of the executive employees' views, we cited Edwards' 
Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827).  There, 
the United States Supreme Court said that "[i]n the construction 
of 
a 
doubtful 
and 
ambiguous 
law, 
the 
contemporaneous 
construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, 
and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is 
                                                 
15 "Res integra" means, literally, "an entire thing."  Res 
Integra, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (citing Res 
Nova, id.).  Typically, the phrase refers to a matter of first 
impression.  See Res Integra, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014); see also Res Nova, id. (stating that res nova is also 
termed res integra, and defining res nova as a "case of first 
impression"). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
15 
 
entitled to very great respect."  Id.  One may respect an 
interpretation, even greatly, without deferring to it. 
¶21 Nor 
was 
Harrington 
expressing 
deference 
to 
an 
administrative agency when it said we would adhere to the 
executive branch's long-standing interpretation of a statute.  
Instead, we were acknowledging that a change in an ancient 
practice could have unacceptably disruptive consequences.  For 
this principle we cited Rogers v. Goodwin, in which the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts said: 
Were the Court now to decide that this construction is 
not to be supported, very great mischief would follow.  
And although, if it were now res integra,[16] it might 
be very difficult to maintain such a construction, yet 
at this day the argumentum ab inconvenienti[17] applies 
with great weight.  We cannot shake a principle which 
in practice has so long and so extensively prevailed.  
If the practice originated in error, yet the error is 
now so common that it must have the force of law. 
2 Mass. (2 Tyng) 475, 477–78 (Mass. 1807). 
¶22 Harrington cast a long shadow.  The court was content 
for many years to repeat and apply its formulation without 
reading deference into its language.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 111, 151 N.W. 331 (1915) (quoting 
Harrington, and stating long practice is evidence of meaning); 
State ex rel. State Ass'n of Y.M.C.A. of Wis. v. Richardson, 197 
                                                 
16 See supra n.15. 
17 "Argumentum ab inconvenienti" means "[a]n argument from 
inconvenience; 
an 
argument 
that 
emphasizes 
the 
harmful 
consequences of failing to follow the position advocated."  
Argumentum, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
16 
 
Wis. 390, 393, 222 N.W. 222 (1928) ("If we were in doubt as to 
the proper construction to be placed upon the statute, we should 
have to give much weight to the practical construction which has 
been placed upon the statute ever since its enactment."); Wis. 
Axle Div. (Timken-Detroit Axle Co.) v. Indus. Comm'n, 263 
Wis. 529, 537b, 60 N.W.2d 383 (1953) (per curiam) ("This court 
has held that where there is any obscurity in the meaning of a 
statute, practical construction given by the administrative 
agency charged with administering such law is entitled to great 
weight."); Trczyniewski v. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 2d 236, 
240, 112 N.W.2d 725 (1961) (same).  As Justice Rebecca Bradley 
recently observed, "[b]y recognizing the value of executive 
interpretations without entirely ceding interpretive authority 
to the executive, these older cases reflect a more nuanced 
appreciation 
for 
judicial 
interaction 
with 
agency 
interpretation . . . ."  Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, ¶78, 375 
Wis. 2d 1, 894 N.W.2d 426 (R. Grassl Bradley, J., concurring). 
¶23 But then came Pabst v. Wisconsin Department of 
Taxation, 19 Wis. 2d 313, 120 N.W.2d 77 (1963).  There, we 
started our analysis of an agency's statutory interpretation 
with the proposition that "[e]rrors of law are always reviewable 
by the reviewing court."  Id. at 322.  But in our extended 
discussion of the nature of that review, we did something new.  
We imported the concept of deference.  Federal courts, we noted, 
afforded deference to an administrative agency's application of 
a statute to undisputed facts under certain circumstances.  See 
id. at 322-24.  In determining "whether the administrative 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
17 
 
agency has correctly applied a statute to certain facts," the 
federal courts would employ either the "analytical approach" or 
the "practical approach."  See id. at 322. 
¶24 Under the analytical approach, "the court decides 
which part of the agency's determination presents a question of 
fact and which part a question of law."  Id.  As Professor 
Kenneth Culp Davis described this methodology, the court upholds 
the agency's factual findings if they have a reasonable basis.  
4 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 30.01 
(1958).  But with respect to questions of law, the court 
substitutes its judgment for that of the agency.  
Id.  
Essentially, this creates a de novo standard for reviewing 
questions of law. 
¶25 The practical approach treats the agency's decision 
more like legislation than adjudication.  It avoids any attempt 
to distinguish between facts and law, and instead holds that 
"[t]he judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be 
a 
rational 
basis 
for 
the 
conclusions 
approved 
by 
the 
administrative body."  Pabst, 19 Wis. 2d at 323 (quoting 
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 146 
(1939)).18 
                                                 
18 The practical approach is very similar to the "rational 
basis" standard of review we apply to legislation.  See Blake v. 
Jossart, 
2016 
WI 57, 
¶31, 
370 
Wis. 2d 1, 
884 
N.W.2d 484 
(indicating that under rational basis review, "[i]n cases where 
a statutory classification does not involve a suspect class or a 
fundamental interest, the classification will be upheld if there 
is any rational basis to support it" (quoting State v. Burgess, 
2003 WI 71, ¶10, 262 Wis. 2d 354, 665 N.W.2d 124)). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
18 
 
¶26 Pabst observed that the method of review chosen by the 
court would be outcome-determinative with respect to whose 
application of the statute would control the case:  "[Professor 
Davis] concludes that the court applies the analytical approach 
when it does not wish to be bound by the agency's application of 
a statute to a set of facts, and the practical approach when it 
believes the agency's application of the law should be deferred 
to."  Pabst, 19 Wis. 2d at 323.  The primary factor driving the 
selection of the review method, Professor Davis believed, was 
the agency's expertise: 
Davis believes that one of the most-important factors 
which influences the court's choice of approach in 
this field is the comparative qualification of court 
and agency to decide the particular issue.  The court 
often deems agencies and their staffs to be expert 
within 
their 
own 
specialized 
fields. 
 
In 
such 
situations, the practical approach is likely to be 
employed rather than the analytical in determining the 
scope of review to be applied. 
Id. (citing Davis, supra ¶24, at § 30.01 et seq. (Professor 
Kenneth Culp Davis, University of Chicago School of Law and 
University of San Diego School of Law)).  The "practical 
approach" bears a close resemblance to the "great weight 
deference" formulation.  It also reaches the same result, to 
wit, preference for the agency's conclusion of law over that of 
the court. 
¶27 We concluded in Pabst that the statutes as they 
existed at the time bound us to use the analytical approach.  
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
19 
 
"We believe that pars. (b) and (d) of sec. 227.20(1), Stats.,[19] 
require Wisconsin courts to employ the analytical approach when 
reviewing agency decisions."  Pabst, 19 Wis. 2d at 323.  But we 
also said that dividing the facts from the law would not 
necessarily 
prevent 
us 
from 
deferring 
to 
the 
agency's 
application of the statute (i.e., the practical approach): 
Nevertheless, in fields in which an agency has 
particular competence or expertise, the courts should 
not 
substitute 
their 
judgment 
for 
the 
agency's 
application of a particular statute to the found facts 
if a rational basis exists in law for the agency's 
interpretation and it does not conflict with the 
statute's legislative history, prior decisions of this 
court, or constitutional prohibitions. 
Id. at 323-24. 
                                                 
19 At the time, Wis. Stat. § 227.20(1) (1961) provided, in 
part: 
The court may affirm the decision of the agency, or 
may reverse or modify it if the substantial rights of 
the appellant have been prejudiced as a result of the 
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or 
decisions being: 
 . . . . 
(b) 
In 
excess 
of 
the 
statutory 
authority 
or 
jurisdiction of the agency, or affected by other error 
of law; or 
 . . . . 
(d) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the 
entire record as submitted; . . . . 
§ 227.20(1)(b), (d) (1961). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
20 
 
¶28 We 
used 
the 
analytical 
approach 
in 
Pabst, 
in 
accordance with statutory requirements,20 but only because we did 
not "deem the board more competent than this court to decide a 
question of law involving trust administration."  See id. at 
324.  Subsequent cases confirm that our commitment to the 
analytical approach has always been more nominal than real.  For 
example, in DOR v. Exxon Corp., we said: 
While this court has held that ch. 227, Stats. 
requires that courts employ the "analytical" approach 
when reviewing agency decisions, this court will give 
deference to agency determinations, where the agency 
has particular expertise, rational basis exists in law 
for the agency's interpretation, and it does not 
conflict with the statute's legislative history, prior 
decisions 
of 
this 
court, 
or 
constitutional 
prohibitions. 
90 Wis. 2d 700, 713, 281 N.W.2d 94 (1979) (citing Pabst, 19 
Wis. 2d at 323-24), aff'd, 447 U.S. 207 (1980).  So although the 
statutes require a de novo review of questions of law (the 
analytical approach), we have deferred to an administrative 
agency (the practical approach) when circumstances satisfied our 
criteria. 
¶29 Where we once treated an agency's interpretation of a 
statute as evidence of its meaning (Harrington), Pabst put us in 
a posture of deference to administrative agencies.  The shift 
was not a comfortable one, as evidenced by a sporadic, but 
short-lived, return to a more Harrington-like understanding of 
"great weight."  See Mednis v. Indus. Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 439, 
                                                 
20 Wis. Stat. § 227.20(1)(b), (d) (1961). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
21 
 
444, 134 N.W.2d 416 (1965) ("The construction and interpretation 
adopted by the administrative agency charged with the duty of 
applying the law is entitled to great weight in the courts."); 
see also Cook v. Indus. Comm'n, 31 Wis. 2d 232, 240, 142 
N.W.2d 827 (1966) (same).  Each of these cases relied on pre-
Pabst 
authorities, 
such 
as 
Wisconsin 
Axle 
Division 
and 
Trczyniewski,21 in which the agencies' understanding of the law 
assisted, but did not supplant, our own application of the 
statutes. 
¶30 When 
we 
eventually 
circled 
back 
to 
Pabst's 
understanding of "great weight," we granted administrative 
agencies even broader deference than they had enjoyed before.  
See Roggensack, supra ¶18, at 558-59.  Whereas Pabst called for 
deference only to an agency's application of a statute to 
undisputed facts, we extended that deference to the construction 
of the statute itself in Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. DILHR, 90 
Wis. 2d 408, 417, 280 N.W.2d 142 (1979).  There, we acknowledged 
that "questions of law are always reviewable by the court," and 
that "[t]he construction of a statute or the application of a 
statute to a particular set of facts is such a question of law."  
Id.  But when we applied the Pabst deference principle, we made 
no distinction between interpreting a statute and applying it.  
                                                 
21 Trczyniewski v. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 2d 236, 240, 
112 N.W.2d 725 (1961); Wis. Axle Div. (Timken-Detroit Axle Co.) 
v. Indus. Comm'n, 263 Wis. 529, 537b, 60 N.W.2d 383 (1953) (per 
curiam). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
22 
 
We acknowledged the case "involve[d] the interpretation and 
application of certain statutory provisions," but then said: 
The court will hesitate to substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency on a question of law if " . . . a 
rational 
basis 
exists 
in 
law 
for 
the 
agency's 
interpretation and it does not conflict with the 
statute's legislative history, prior decisions of this 
court, or constitutional prohibitions." 
Bucyrus-Erie Co., 90 Wis. 2d at 411, 417 (quoting Pabst, 19 
Wis. 2d at 323-24).  After Bucyrus-Erie Co., we never returned 
to Harrington's formulation that an administrative agency's 
application of a statute was evidence of its meaning that the 
court could accept or reject in the process of authoritatively 
resolving questions of law.  By expanding the reach of the 
deference principle, "the court continued a trend of applying 
great weight deference more and more often, thereby construing 
statutes less and less frequently."  Roggensack, supra ¶18, at 
556. 
¶31 Only one transformation remains before we reach the 
current expression of the deference doctrine.  Prior to 
Harnischfeger, we treated deference to administrative agencies 
as a choice, something the courts could do in the process of 
interpreting and applying a statute, but were not required to 
do.  Just a few years before we decided Harnischfeger, we said:  
"The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, and 
the 'blackletter' rule is that a court is not bound by an 
agency's interpretation.  Courts, however, frequently refrain 
from substituting their interpretation of a statute for that of 
the agency charged with the administration of a law."  Lisney v. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
23 
 
LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 493 N.W.2d 14 (1992).  "Frequently 
refrain" describes something episodic, not a rule of uniform 
application.  It implies the court will decide, on a case-by-
case basis, whether to defer to the administrative agency as it 
resolves questions of law. 
¶32 Harnischfeger, however, made the deference doctrine a 
systematic requirement upon satisfaction of its preconditions.  
See Roggensack, supra ¶18, at 553.  It accomplished this feat by 
promoting deference from a canon of construction to a standard 
of review:  "Whether or not a court agrees or disagrees with 
LIRC's methodology, however, is not the issue in this case.  
Instead, the central question is what standard of review the 
courts of this state should apply when called upon to evaluate 
an agency's interpretation of a statute."  Harnischfeger, 196 
Wis. 2d at 659.22  We then identified "great weight" deference, 
"due weight" deference, and no deference as the available 
options.  Id. at 659-60.  Determining the correct standard of 
review, of course, is something an appellate court does at the 
                                                 
22 "In setting the frame for broad deference to agencies, 
the court [in Harnischfeger] described the legal issue before 
the court as deciding what level of deference it should accord 
LIRC's decision.  It did not characterize the legal issue as the 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute."  The Honorable Patience 
Drake Roggensack, Elected to Decide:  Is the Decision-Avoidance 
Doctrine of Great Weight Deference Appropriate in This Court of 
Last Resort?, 89 Marq. L. Rev. 541, 553 (2006). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
24 
 
very beginning of its work, and it definitively controls how we 
address questions of both fact and law.23 
¶33 Enshrining this doctrine as a standard of review bakes 
deference into the structure of our analysis as a controlling 
principle.  By the time we reach the questions of law we are 
supposed to review, that structure leaves us with no choice but 
to defer if the preconditions are met.  Id. at 663 ("When, as in 
this case, great weight deference is appropriate and the 
agency's interpretation is not otherwise unreasonable, 'the 
court of appeals and this court should refrain from substituting 
their interpretation of [a] statute for the long-standing 
interpretation of the agency charged with its administration.'" 
(quoted source omitted) (emphasis omitted)).  Harnischfeger made 
good on this premise by reversing the court of appeals for 
failing to defer to the administrative agency.  Our subsequent 
cases make it clear we understand the mandatory nature of the 
deference doctrine.  See, e.g., Crystal Lake Cheese Factory, 264 
Wis. 2d 200, ¶52 ("As we have determined LIRC's interpretation 
to be reasonable, under the 'great weight' standard of review, 
                                                 
23 Utah v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 (Utah 1993) ("It 
is widely agreed that the primary function of a standard of 
review is to apportion power and, consequently, responsibility 
between trial and appellate courts for determining an issue or a 
class of issues. . . .  In determining the appropriateness of a 
particular allocation of responsibility for deciding an issue or 
a class of issues, account should be taken of the relative 
capabilities of each level of the court system to take evidence 
and make findings of fact in the face of conflicting evidence, 
on the one hand, and to set binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on 
the other." (internal citations omitted)). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
25 
 
we must, therefore, defer to LIRC's conclusion." (emphasis 
added)). 
ii.  A Brief History of "Due Weight" Deference 
¶34 "Due weight deference" is of a much younger vintage 
than "great weight deference."  It also has a different source.  
Whereas the latter developed as a home-grown doctrine within the 
judiciary, the former has its roots in our statutes.  In 1943, 
our legislature adopted Wis. Stat. § 227.20(2) (subsequently 
renumbered to § 227.57(10)), which read:  "Upon such review due 
weight shall be accorded the experience, technical competence, 
and specialized knowledge of the agency involved, as well as 
discretionary authority conferred upon it."24 
¶35 Our first opportunity to engage with that language 
came in Ray-O-Vac Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 
249 Wis. 112, 119, 23 N.W.2d 489 (1946).  There, the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Board asserted: 
[O]n a review of the board's findings, the court has 
no jurisdiction to determine the factual issues anew 
if there is some evidence before the board reasonably 
tending to support a finding, and "the court may not 
weigh 
the 
evidence 
to 
ascertain 
whether 
it 
preponderates in favor of the finding" . . . ; or 
substitute its judgment for that of the board even 
though the court might have decided the question 
differently had it been before the court de novo. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
                                                 
24 Wis. Stat. § 227.20(2) (1943); see § 1, ch. 375, Laws of 
1943 (creating § 227.20(2)); see also § 24, ch. 414, Laws of 
1975 (renumbering); 1985 Wis. Act 182, § 41 (renumbering again). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
26 
 
¶36 We agreed with the Board, noting that "[i]n relation 
to a court review of the board's findings and orders it must be 
noted that there is applicable thereto" the terms of Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.20(2) (1943).  Ray-O-Vac Co., 249 Wis. at 119-20.  The 
court's reference to the Board's orders (in addition to its 
findings) suggests the court gave "due weight . . . [to] the 
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of 
the agency involved," see § 227.20(2) (1943), as it reviewed the 
Board's conclusions of law as well.  This is probable because 
the court relied on a separate source of authority for the 
proposition that it must defer to the Board's findings of fact.  
It cited Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Fred Rueping Leather 
Co., which held: 
[I]f th[e] evidence supports the finding of the 
industrial commission, the finding must stand.  The 
Wisconsin Labor Relations Act in sec. 111.10 (5), Wis. 
Stats., provides what is lacking in the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, namely, an implied authorization to 
the courts to review the facts, coupled with the 
express provision that the findings, "if supported by 
evidence in the record," shall be conclusive. 
228 Wis. 473, 494, 279 N.W. 673 (1938).25 
                                                 
25 We were, perhaps, even more enigmatic with respect to the 
doctrine's application to questions of law in Milwaukee Electric 
Railway & Transport Co. v. Public Service Commission, 261 
Wis. 299, 302–03, 52 N.W.2d 876 (1952).  There, we said "[t]he 
court must also recognize that the commission has expert 
knowledge, that such knowledge may be applied by it, and that 
even though we might differ with the commission, we are without 
power to substitute our views of what may be reasonable."  Id.  
In the next sentence, however, we said only that "[w]e may not 
disturb the commission's findings," which is a reference only to 
the facts that the agency found.  See id. at 303. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
27 
 
¶37 We were not any more specific about how "due weight" 
consideration affects conclusions of law when we decided 
Muskego-Norway Consolidated Schools Joint School District No. 9 
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 35 Wis. 2d 540, 151 
N.W.2d 617 (1967).  But we did frame the statute's provision in 
terms of "deference": 
[I]n this court's judicial review we are not required 
to agree in every detail with the WERB as to its 
findings, 
conclusions 
and 
order. . . . Sec[tion] 
227.20 (2), Stats., requires that upon such review due 
weight shall be accorded the experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency 
involved.  In short, this means the court must make 
some deference to the expertise of the agency. 
Muskego-Norway Consol. Sch. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 9, 35 Wis. 2d 
at 562.  We applied the statute's "due weight" mandate to the 
Board's findings and conclusions of law without differentiation.  
"Some deference" was due, we said, but we did not say how that 
should be applied or quantified. 
¶38 We were a little more direct on this topic in Vivian 
v. Examining Board of Architects, Professional Engineers, 
Designers and Land Surveyors, in which we reviewed the Board's 
determination of whether the defendant's conduct could satisfy a 
"gross 
negligence" 
standard. 
 
61 
Wis. 2d 627, 
638, 
213 
N.W.2d 359 (1974).  We strongly implied that the Board was 
qualified not just to apply that standard, but to define it as 
well: 
The legislative command that due weight is to be given 
to 
"the 
experience, 
technical 
competence, 
and 
specialized knowledge of the agency involved," in 
determining what is gross negligence, indicates the 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
28 
 
determination of the grossness of the negligence is to 
be made by those knowledgeable as to the particular 
profession involved. 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wis. Stat. § 227.20(2) (1971)). 
¶39 A few years later, we stated explicitly that Wis. 
Stat. § 227.20(2) (1973) applies to an administrative agency's 
legal conclusions.  And we described deference as a requirement 
when its preconditions were met.  In A. O. Smith Harvestore 
Products, Inc., we acknowledged that "[t]his court has uniformly 
held that whether or not the facts found fulfill a particular 
legal standard is a question of law, not a question of fact."  
72 Wis. 2d at 65.  And then we said that under § 227.20(2) 
(1973), 
"[d]ue 
deference 
must 
be 
accorded 
the 
agency's 
application of the law to the found facts when the agency has 
particular competence or expertise in the matter at hand."  
A. O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 72 Wis. 2d at 65-66 
(emphasis added) (citing § 227.20(2) (1973)). 
¶40 As we mentioned above, Harnischfeger elevated the 
deference doctrine from a canon of construction to a standard of 
review.  "Whether or not a court agrees or disagrees with LIRC's 
methodology, however, is not the issue in this case.  Instead, 
the central question is what standard of review the courts of 
this state should apply when called upon to evaluate an agency's 
interpretation of a statute."  Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 
659.  So, just like "great weight" deference, "due weight" 
deference has become an integral, and therefore unavoidable, 
part of the framework within which we review an administrative 
agency's conclusions of law. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
29 
 
¶41 Fortified 
by 
this 
history 
of 
our 
deference 
jurisprudence, we can now determine whether the doctrine is 
consistent with the judiciary's constitutional responsibility.26 
3.  The Judiciary's Constitutional Responsibilities 
¶42 As the deference doctrine developed, we recognized 
that its operation allowed the executive branch of government to 
authoritatively decide questions of law in specific cases 
brought to our courts for resolution.  But nowhere in the 
journey from Harrington to Harnischfeger did we determine 
whether this was consistent with the allocation of governmental 
power amongst the three branches.  So, as a matter of first 
impression, we consider whether our deference doctrine is 
compatible with our constitution's grant of power to the 
judiciary: 
The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a 
unified court system consisting of one supreme court, 
a court of appeals, a circuit court, such trial courts 
of general uniform statewide jurisdiction as the 
legislature may create by law, and a municipal court 
if authorized by the legislature under section 14. 
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2.  It is, perhaps, tautological to say 
that the judicial power should reside in the judiciary.  But the 
                                                 
26 Roggensack, supra n.22, at 542 ("[B]ecause the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court's members were elected to decide what the law is, 
and because the court restricts its own docket in order to 
maintain its law-declaring status, it [is] appropriate for the 
court to re-examine whether decision-avoidance is too often 
replacing the court's full consideration of the issues raised on 
appeal, at least in regard to state agency decisions to which 
the highest level of deference, great weight deference, is 
accorded."). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
30 
 
constitution does not define what that term comprises, nor does 
it explicitly describe how that power relates to the other 
branches of government.27 
¶43 Allowing an administrative agency to authoritatively 
interpret the law raises the possibility that our deference 
doctrine has allowed some part of the state's judicial power to 
take up residence in the executive branch of government.  To 
discover whether it did, we must first get our bearings on the 
nature and extent of judicial power.  We had occasion to dwell 
on this subject at some length just last term.  See generally 
Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 
897 N.W.2d 384.  There is no need to recreate Gabler's thorough 
analysis, so we will content ourselves with referencing only 
those parts that illuminate our work here. 
¶44 The "separation of powers" doctrine informs our 
understanding of how the constitution allocates governmental 
power amongst its constituent branches.28  This fundamental 
principle of American constitutional government was "established 
at the founding of our nation and enshrined in the structure of 
                                                 
27 "This 
court 
has 
recognized, 
however, 
that 
the 
constitution does not define legislative, executive or judicial 
power . . . ."  State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42–43, 315 
N.W.2d 703 (1982). 
28 The executive and legislative branches have their own 
explicit grants of power under our constitution.  Wis. Const. 
art. V, § 1 (providing that "[t]he executive power shall be 
vested in a governor"); Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1 (stating that 
"[t]he legislative power shall be vested in a senate and 
assembly"). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
31 
 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution," 
and 
"inform[s] 
our 
understanding of the separation of powers under the Wisconsin 
Constitution."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶11; Flynn v. DOA, 216 
Wis. 2d 521, 545, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998) ("The doctrine of 
separation of powers is implicitly found in the tripartite 
division of government [among] the judicial, legislative and 
executive branches."); Goodland v. Zimmerman, 243 Wis. 459, 466-
67, 10 N.W.2d 180 (1943) ("It must always be remembered that one 
of the fundamental principles of the American constitutional 
system is that governmental powers are divided among the three 
departments of government, the legislative, the executive, and 
judicial, and that each of these departments is separate and 
independent from the others except as otherwise provided by the 
constitution."); Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501, 503, 236 
N.W. 717 (1931) ("It is, of course, elementary that we are 
committed by constitution to the doctrine of separation of 
powers."). 
¶45 We must be assiduous in patrolling the borders between 
the branches.  This is not just a practical matter of efficient 
and effective government.  We maintain this separation because 
it provides structural protection against depredations on our 
liberties.  The Framers of the United States Constitution 
understood that "[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, 
executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few 
or many, . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny."  The Federalist No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob 
Cooke ed., 1961).  Consequently, "[a]s Madison explained when 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
32 
 
advocating 
for 
the 
Constitution's 
adoption, 
neither 
the 
legislature nor the executive nor the judiciary 'ought to 
possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over 
the others in the administration of their respective powers.'"  
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶4 (quoting The Federalist No. 48, at 
305 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).  "The purpose 
of the separation and equilibration of powers in general," said 
Justice Antonin Scalia, "was not merely to assure effective 
government but to preserve individual freedom."29  Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  To 
this day, "[a]fter more than two hundred years of constitutional 
governance, 
th[is] 
tripartite 
separation 
of 
independent 
governmental power remains the bedrock of the structure by which 
we secure liberty in both Wisconsin and the United States."  
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶3.  As United States Supreme Court 
Justice 
Joseph 
Story 
said, 
"the 
three 
great 
powers 
of 
government . . . should for ever be kept separate and distinct."  
Id. (quoting 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of 
the United States § 519, at 2-3 (Boston:  Hilliard, Gray, & Co., 
1833)). 
                                                 
29 See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that "the 
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty").  
Centuries earlier, the French writer Montesquieu said "there is 
no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the 
legislative and executive."  Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, 
The Spirit of Laws bk. XI, at 152 (Thomas Nugent trans., The 
Colonial Press rev. ed. 1900) (1748). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
33 
 
¶46 The constitution does not, however, hermetically seal 
the branches from each other.  The separation of powers doctrine 
"envisions a system of separate branches sharing many powers 
while 
jealously 
guarding 
certain 
others, 
a 
system 
of 
'separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.'"  
State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 192 
Wis. 2d 1, 14, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring)).  "The constitutional powers of each branch of 
government fall into two categories:  exclusive powers and 
shared powers."  State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 
N.W.2d 772 (1999).  "Shared powers lie at the intersections of 
these exclusive core constitutional powers," and 
"[t]hese 
'[g]reat borderlands of power' are not exclusive to any one 
branch."  Id. at 643-44 (quoting Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14); 
see also State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42–43, 315 N.W.2d 703 
(1982).  Although the "branches may exercise [shared] power 
within these borderlands," they "may [not] unduly burden or 
substantially interfere with another branch."  Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 
at 644. 
¶47 Core powers, however, are not for sharing.  "Each 
branch has exclusive core constitutional powers, into which the 
other branches may not intrude."  Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 545.  
"For more than a century, this court has been called upon to 
resist attempts by other branches of government to exercise 
authority in an exclusively judicial area."  In re Complaint 
Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 778, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984).  
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
34 
 
These "[c]ore zones of authority are to be 'jealously guarded' 
by each branch of government, . . . ."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 
¶31 (quoting Barland v. Eau Claire Cty., 216 Wis. 2d 560, 573, 
575 N.W.2d 691 (1998)).  The importance of constitutional 
limitations, Chief Justice Marshall once said, is that they 
compel restraint when restraint is not desired:  "To what 
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that 
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any 
time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?"  Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
¶48 The separation of powers prevents us from abdicating 
core power just as much as it protects the judiciary from 
encroachment by other branches.  "It is . . . fundamental and 
undeniable that no one of the three branches of government can 
effectively delegate any of the powers which peculiarly and 
intrinsically belong to that branch."  Rules of Court Case, 204 
Wis. at 503; see also id. (stating that "any attempt to abdicate 
[a core power] in any particular field, though valid in form, 
must, necessarily, be held void" (internal quotation mark 
omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 
Wis. 488, 491-92, 137 N.W. 20 (1912))).  Even if we truly wished 
to abandon some aspect of our core power, no other branch may 
take it up and use it as its own.  "As to these areas of 
authority, . . . any exercise of authority by another branch of 
government is unconstitutional."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶31 
(internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Fiedler 
v. Wis. Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 100, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990)) 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
35 
 
(emphasis in original); see also Town of Holland v. Vill. of 
Cedar Grove, 230 Wis. 177, 190, 282 N.W. 111 (1938) ("This court 
has repeatedly held that the judicial power vested by the 
constitution in the courts cannot be exercised by administrative 
or executive agencies."). 
¶49 The propriety of our deference doctrine, therefore, 
depends on whether it transfers to a coordinate branch of 
government a quantum of our core powers.  To make that 
determination, we need to describe those powers well enough 
that, if they are present in our deference doctrine, we will 
recognize them. 
¶50 From the earliest days of our country, we have 
understood 
that 
the 
judiciary's 
first 
and 
irreducible 
responsibility is to proclaim the law:  "It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is."  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.  The process of interpreting the 
law in a specific case is part of that central duty:  "Those who 
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound 
and interpret that rule."  Id.  We agreed with Marbury just a 
few years ago when we described our judicial power as "the 
ultimate adjudicative authority of courts to finally decide 
rights and responsibilities as between individuals."  State v. 
Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶36, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460. 
¶51 It is fair to say that exercising judgment in the 
interpretation and application of the law in a particular case 
is the very thing that distinguishes the judiciary from the 
other branches: 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
36 
 
The judiciary . . . has no influence over either the 
sword or the purse, no direction either of the 
strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take 
no active resolution whatever.  It may truly be said 
to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; 
and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the 
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. 
The Federalist No. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke 
ed., 1961).  We, too, have said as much:  "By vesting the 
judicial power in a unified court system, the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
entrusts 
the 
judiciary 
with 
the 
duty 
of 
interpreting and applying laws made and enforced by coordinate 
branches of state government."  Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶37; 
see also State v. Van Brocklin, 194 Wis. 441, 443, 217 N.W. 277 
(1927) ("Judicial power is that power which adjudicates and 
protects the rights and interests of individual citizens, and to 
that end construes and applies the laws." (quoted source 
omitted)). 
¶52 Some would argue that the judiciary's law-declaring 
and law-applying power lies not at the core of what it means to 
be a court, but somewhere out on the periphery of our powers 
where we share it with the executive branch.  Some of our older 
cases have spoken in terms that lend this proposition at least 
some superficial plausibility.  For example, in State ex rel. 
Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman we said: 
Every executive officer in the execution of the law 
must of necessity interpret it in order to find out 
what it is he is required to do.  While his 
interpretation is not final, yet in the vast majority 
of cases it is the only interpretation placed upon it, 
and as long as it is acquiesced in it becomes the 
official interpretation which the courts heed and in 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
37 
 
which 
they 
oftentimes 
acquiesce 
as 
a 
practical 
construction. 
196 Wis. 472, 497, 220 N.W. 929 (1928); see also Rules of Court 
Case, 204 Wis. at 504 (same) (quoting this portion of Whitman).  
And even earlier, we had noted the quasi-judicial nature of some 
administrative bodies: 
We do not consider the Industrial Commission a court, 
nor do we construe the act as vesting in the 
Commission judicial powers within the meaning of the 
constitution.  It is an administrative body or arm of 
the 
government 
which 
in 
the 
course 
of 
its 
administration of a law is empowered to ascertain some 
questions of fact and apply the existing law thereto, 
and in so doing acts quasi-judicially, but it is not 
thereby 
vested 
with 
judicial 
power 
in 
the 
constitutional sense. 
Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 358, 133 N.W. 209 (1911) 
(emphasis in original). 
¶53 But 
these 
cases 
cannot 
bear 
the 
weight 
their 
proponents assign them.  The executive must certainly interpret 
and apply the law; it would be impossible to perform his duties 
if he did not.  After all, he must determine for himself what 
the law requires (interpretation) so that he may carry it into 
effect (application).  Our constitution not only does not forbid 
this, it requires it.  Wis. Const. art. V, § 1 ("The executive 
power shall be vested in a governor, . . . ."); Perez v. Mortg. 
Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) ("It is undoubtedly true that the other branches of 
Government have the authority and obligation to interpret the 
law, . . . ."). 
 
But 
this 
comprises 
interpretation 
and 
application within the executive branch.  We are here concerned 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
38 
 
with the authoritative interpretation and application of the law 
as applied to a particular case within the judicial branch.  
"[O]nly 
the 
judicial 
interpretation 
[as 
opposed 
to 
interpretations 
offered 
by 
the 
other 
branches] 
would 
be 
considered authoritative in a judicial proceeding."  Perez, 135 
S. Ct. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Even Rules of Court 
Case and Whitman recognize that the executive's understanding of 
the law is provisional, and that it gains a measure of 
permanence only through habit and inertia.  See Rules of Court 
Case, 204 Wis. at 504; Whitman, 196 Wis. at 497 ("While [the 
executive's] interpretation is not final, yet in the vast 
majority of cases it is the only interpretation placed upon 
it, . . . in which [the courts] oftentimes acquiesce as a 
practical construction.").  We do not understand Borgnis to say 
anything different.  There, we recognized that the work of some 
administrative agencies looks very similar to that of the 
courts.  We described the power they exercised as "quasi 
judicial," but it was "quasi" rather than simply "judicial" 
because they had no power to impose their understanding of the 
law on the judiciary's resolution of a particular case.30 
                                                 
30 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley suggests we have committed 
"legal error" and ignored "controlling precedent."  Justice Ann 
Walsh Bradley's concurrence, ¶¶111, 115.  Presumably, she is 
referring to the observation in Borgnis that "a board may 
lawfully be endowed with very broad powers, and its conclusions 
may be given great dignity and force, so that courts may not 
reverse them unless the proof be clear and satisfactory that 
they are wrong."  See Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 359, 
133 N.W. 209 (1911).  As an initial matter, it is not clear 
whether Borgnis was here referring to findings of fact or 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
39 
 
¶54 When we distill our cases and two centuries of 
constitutional history to their essence, the result is a 
lodestar that leads us directly to the most central of our 
powers:  "No aspect of the judicial power is more fundamental 
than the judiciary's exclusive responsibility to exercise 
judgment in cases and controversies arising under the law."  
Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶37; see also Operton, 375 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶73 (R. Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (indicating that "the 
court's duty to say what the law is" constitutes a "core 
judicial function"); In re Appointment of Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 
598, 124 N.W. 670 (1910) (stating that "it is the exclusive 
function of the courts to expound the laws").  Judgment, of 
course, encompasses interpreting and applying the law to the 
case sub judice.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 ("Those who apply the 
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and 
interpret that rule."); The Federalist No. 78, at 525 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) ("The interpretation of the 
laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts."); 
                                                                                                                                                             
conclusions of law.  If the former, this opinion does not tread 
on those grounds.  If the latter, then Borgnis would be counted 
amongst those cases with which we treat today.  If we choose to 
overrule it we risk aspersions on our wisdom, but not legal 
error.  Nor would we be ignoring controlling precedent.  The 
doctrine the case espouses is our own, and is, therefore, 
unquestionably within our remit to accept or reject without 
committing legal error.  And because the case itself is our own, 
it is impossible for it to control our decision.  Stare decisis 
is a critical rule that promotes stability by ensuring we do not 
abandon precedent for light or transient reasons.  But it is not 
a limitation on our authority. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
40 
 
Roggensack, supra ¶18, at 547 (stating that "[d]eclaring what a 
statute means is a core function of the courts").  We conclude 
that only the judiciary may authoritatively interpret and apply 
the law in cases before our courts.  The executive may not 
intrude on this duty, and the judiciary may not cede it.  If our 
deference doctrine allows either, we must reject it. 
4.  "Great Weight" Deference Considered 
¶55 We see our core judicial powers lying at the heart of 
"great weight" deference.  When the doctrine's preconditions are 
satisfied, that is, when an administrative agency meets the four 
Harnischfeger criteria, we cede to the agency the power to 
authoritatively interpret the law ("an agency's interpretation 
must then merely be reasonable for it to be sustained,"  
Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 661), and apply the law to the 
case before us ("the courts should not substitute their judgment 
for the agency's application of a particular statute to the 
found facts," Pabst, 19 Wis. 2d at 323-24 (emphasis added)).  
Because Harnischfeger made this a structural piece of the 
standard by which we review an agency's decision, we arrive at 
the legal issues involved in the case with an a priori 
commitment to letting the agency decide them.  But Marbury and 
Gabler say the power to interpret and apply the law in the case 
at bar is an exclusively judicial power.  Therefore, because 
that power belongs to the judiciary——and the judiciary alone——we 
may not allow an administrative agency to exercise it. 
¶56 We provide guardrails for an administrative agency's 
exercise of our power, to be sure, but they are minimal.  Under 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
41 
 
great weight deference, we simply require that the agency's 
judgment on the law not overrule our precedents, violate the 
constitution, 
contradict 
legislative 
history, 
or 
be 
unreasonable.31  Within those expansive boundaries, however, the 
agency is the master of statutory construction and application, 
and it occupies the field to the exclusion of the judiciary.32  
We reserve a sufficient quantum of judicial power to set the 
guardrails, but that gives no good answer to the charge that 
this doctrine cedes something that belongs exclusively to the 
judiciary.  We are concerned here with categories of power, not 
quantity.  Regardless of the circumscriptions we put in place, 
when we defer we are allowing the agency to exercise what is 
unmistakably core judicial power. 
¶57 Chief 
Justice 
Roggensack 
has 
been 
particularly 
incisive in describing the practical problems this deference 
causes.  She has observed that "[w]hat decision-avoidance 
doctrines accomplish is to relieve the court of the real work of 
judicial review, what has been described as the 'burden of 
                                                 
31 We will defer if "a rational basis exists in law for the 
agency's interpretation and it does not conflict with the 
statute's legislative history, prior decisions of this court, or 
constitutional prohibitions."  Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. DILHR, 90 
Wis. 2d 408, 417, 280 N.W.2d 142 (1979) (quoting Pabst v. Wis. 
Dep't of Taxation, 19 Wis. 2d 313, 324, 120 N.W.2d 77 (1963)). 
32 When great weight deference applies, a reviewing court 
must accept "an agency's reasonable statutory interpretation, 
even if the court concludes that another interpretation is 
equally reasonable, or even more reasonable, than that of the 
agency."  Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Wis. Div. of Hearings 
& Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶17, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
42 
 
reasoned decisionmaking.'"  Roggensack, supra ¶18, at 546 
(quoted source omitted).  And it privileges unelected executive-
branch employees over those the people of Wisconsin elected to 
resolve questions of law. 
When the court employs judicially created doctrines 
that limit the scope of its review instead of applying 
the collective knowledge that the seven justices were 
elected to exercise, it avoids the real work of 
appellate decision making:  explaining to the public 
why the application of the law to the facts of the 
case resulted in the court's decision and why that 
result is fair under the law. 
Roggensack, supra ¶18, at 560. 
¶58 The abdication of core judicial power to the executive 
is a concern not just of our court, but of the federal judiciary 
as well.  Wisconsin's separation of powers is a reflection of 
that found in the United States Constitution, which provides (in 
relevant part) that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish."  U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.33  Whereas our decision 
in 
Harnischfeger 
made 
us 
structurally 
deferential 
to 
administrative 
agencies, 
Chevron 
U.S.A., 
Inc. 
v. 
Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. accomplished something very 
similar for the federal courts.  467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  In 
                                                 
33 "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America."  U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate 
and House of Representatives."  U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
43 
 
reviewing 
an 
administrative 
agency's 
interpretation 
and 
application of a statute, the Supreme Court said: 
[T]he 
court 
does 
not 
simply 
impose 
its 
own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in 
the 
absence 
of 
an 
administrative 
interpretation.  
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  The Court, it observed, "ha[s] long 
recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is 
entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to 
administrative interpretations has been consistently followed by 
this Court . . . ."  Id. at 844 (footnote omitted) (internal 
mark and quoted source omitted). 
¶59 Jurists in federal courts have expressed the same 
concern with Chevron deference as we have with Harnischfeger 
deference.  Justice Clarence Thomas directly questioned the 
constitutionality of deferring to an administrative agency's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
law 
in 
Michigan 
v. 
Environmental 
Protection Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  The EPA's request for deference, he said, "raises 
serious questions about the constitutionality of our broader 
practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal 
statutes."  Id.  He was concerned that this deference allowed 
the judiciary to escape its responsibility to independently 
resolve questions of law:  "[T]he judicial power, as originally 
understood, requires a court to exercise its independent 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
44 
 
judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws."  Id. 
(quoting Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring)) 
(alteration in original).  Yet, "Chevron deference precludes 
judges from exercising that judgment, forcing them to abandon 
what they believe is 'the best reading of an ambiguous statute' 
in favor of an agency's construction."  Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 
2712 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. 
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)).  
This "wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative authority 
to 'say what the law is,' Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 
2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), and hands it over to the Executive."  
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Such a 
transfer of power, he concluded, "is in tension with Article 
III's Vesting Clause, which vests the judicial power exclusively 
in Article III courts, not administrative agencies."  Id. 
(citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 1). 
¶60 Justice Antonin Scalia was equally concerned with the 
possible abandonment of judicial power to the executive branch.  
Although he supported Chevron's imprimatur on the executive's 
authority 
to 
adopt 
policy-making 
regulations 
to 
fill 
up 
interstitial statutory silences, his approval did not extend to 
an agency's authority to make binding pronouncements on the law: 
I suppose it is harmless enough to speak about "giving 
deference to the views of the Executive" concerning 
the meaning of a statute, just as we speak of "giving 
deference to the views of the Congress" concerning the 
constitutionality 
of 
particular 
legislation——the 
mealy-mouthed word "deference" not necessarily meaning 
anything more than considering those views with 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
45 
 
attentiveness and profound respect, before we reject 
them.  But to say that those views, if at least 
reasonable, will ever be binding——that is, seemingly, 
a striking abdication of judicial responsibility. 
The 
Honorable 
Antonin 
Scalia, 
Judicial 
Deference 
to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 513–
14 (1989).  Chevron deference eventually spawned Auer deference, 
which 
requires 
federal 
courts 
to 
prefer 
an 
agency's 
interpretation 
of 
its 
regulations 
over 
the 
court's 
own 
interpretation.34  This, Justice Scalia believed, was a mistake 
because of its effect on a court's authority to decide questions 
of law: 
I would therefore restore the balance originally 
struck by the APA with respect to an agency's 
interpretation 
of 
its 
own 
regulations, 
not 
by 
rewriting the Act in order to make up for Auer, but by 
abandoning Auer and applying the Act as written.  The 
agency is free to interpret its own regulations with 
or without notice and comment; but courts will decide—
—with 
no 
deference 
to 
the 
agency——whether 
that 
interpretation is correct. 
Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring).  And he 
understood that Chevron was what made it possible:  "The problem 
is bad enough, and perhaps insoluble if Chevron is not to be 
uprooted, with respect to interpretive rules setting forth 
agency interpretation of statutes."  Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212. 
¶61 Justice Neil Gorsuch, when he was on the Tenth Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals, 
elegantly 
summarized 
how 
deference 
to 
administrative agencies hollows out a court's judicial power: 
                                                 
34 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
46 
 
Yet, 
rather 
than 
completing 
the 
task 
expressly 
assigned 
to 
us, 
rather 
than 
"interpret[ing] . . . statutory provisions," [5 U.S.C. 
§ 706] declaring what the law is, and overturning 
inconsistent agency action, Chevron step two tells us 
we must allow an executive agency to resolve the 
meaning of any ambiguous statutory provision.  In this 
way, Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine 
for the abdication of the judicial duty.  Of course, 
some role remains for judges even under Chevron.  At 
Chevron step one, judges decide whether the statute is 
"ambiguous," and at step two they decide whether the 
agency's view is "reasonable." 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151–52 (10th Cir. 
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (brackets in original).  What he 
said of Chevron is equally true of Harnischfeger:  "But where in 
all this does a court interpret the law and say what it is?  
When does a court independently decide what the statute means 
and whether it has or has not vested a legal right in a person?  
Where Chevron applies that job seems to have gone extinct."  
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).35 
                                                 
35 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley does not believe our deference 
doctrine cedes our core judicial power to administrative 
agencies:  "[C]ontrary to the majority/lead opinion's assertion, 
agency deference does not remove from the court its interpretive 
role and cede it to the agency."  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's 
concurrence, ¶119.  She says we still must engage in the 
exercise of statutory construction so that we may compare our 
interpretation to the agency's because "[o]nly reasonable 
interpretations are worthy of deference."  See id.  Yes, but 
that says nothing about 
whose 
"reasonable interpretation" 
controls the case.  If we interpret a statute for ourselves, but 
then set it aside in favor of the agency's interpretation, we 
have ceded our authority.  The point of the interpretive 
exercise is not to see if we are as good at it as an 
administrative agency; it is to apply the results of our efforts 
to the case before us.  If we fail to do that, then we have 
failed to act as a court. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
47 
 
¶62 Indeed, it has.  And that presents a related, and 
equally serious problem. 
* 
¶63 Ceding judicial power to an administrative agency is, 
from 
a 
separation 
of 
powers 
perspective, 
unacceptably 
problematic; it is problematic along a different axis when that 
agency appears in our courts as a party.  The non-agency party 
may reasonably ask whether our deference doctrine will deprive 
him of an impartial decisionmaker's exercise of independent 
judgment, and, thereby, the due process of law.36 
¶64 The United States Supreme Court says that a "fair 
trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."  
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).  We have remarked 
that this proposition is so plain as to be axiomatic.  State v. 
Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, ¶25, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d 772.  But 
there cannot be a fair trial without a constitutionally 
acceptable decisionmaker:  "It is, of course, undisputable that 
a minimal rudiment of due process is a fair and impartial 
decisionmaker."  Guthrie v. WERC, 111 Wis. 2d 447, 454, 331 
N.W.2d 331 (1983).  Our commitment to this principle is such 
that we do not accept even the appearance of bias:  "[W]hen 
                                                 
36 "Procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution protect against government actions that 
deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of the law."  Adams v. Northland Equip. Co., 2014 WI 79, 
¶64, 356 Wis. 2d 529, 850 N.W.2d 272. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
48 
 
determining whether a defendant's right to an objectively 
impartial decisionmaker has been violated we consider the 
appearance of bias in addition to actual bias.  When the 
appearance of bias reveals a great risk of actual bias, the 
presumption of impartiality is rebutted, and a due process 
violation occurs."  Herrmann, 364 Wis. 2d 336, ¶46.  Therefore, 
a 
biased 
decisionmaker 
is 
"constitutionally 
unacceptable."  
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).37 
¶65 We have already concluded that our deference doctrine 
cedes to administrative agencies some of our exclusive judicial 
powers.  It necessarily follows that when that agency comes to 
us as a party in a case, it——not the court——controls some part 
of the litigation.  When questions of law arise, the court 
serves 
as 
a 
gatekeeper 
to 
adjudge 
compliance 
with 
the 
Harnischfeger prerequisites.  But once the court completes that 
task, it receives instruction from the governmental party on how 
to interpret and apply the rule of decision. 
¶66 When a court defers to the governmental party, simply 
because it is the government, the opposing party is unlikely to 
                                                 
37 Our Code of Judicial Conduct reflects the foundational 
importance of keeping core judicial power in the hands of an 
independent judiciary:  "Our legal system is based on the 
principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will 
interpret and apply the laws that govern us."  SCR ch. 60, 
Preamble.  The comment to the first rule (SCR 60.02) says that 
our 
institutional 
legitimacy 
depends 
on 
this 
principle.  
"Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon 
public confidence in the integrity and independence of the 
judges."  SCR 60.02 cmt. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
49 
 
be mollified with assurances that the court bears him no 
personal animus as it does so.38  The injury arises not from the 
reason the court favors one party over another, but from the 
fact that the court has a favorite at all.39  As Professor 
Phillip 
Hamburger 
observed, 
"when 
judges 
defer 
to 
the 
executive's view of the law, they display systematic bias toward 
one of the parties."  Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1187, 1212 (2016).  Harnischfeger deference, like 
Chevron deference, "is an institutionally declared and thus 
systematic precommitment in favor of the government."  Cf. 
Hamburger, supra ¶66, at 1211. 
¶67 This systematic favor deprives the non-governmental 
party of an independent and impartial tribunal.  Justice David 
Prosser sounded the alarm on this issue in Hilton ex rel. Pages 
Homeowners' Association v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶¶54-55, 293 
Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166 (Prosser, J., concurring).  When great 
weight deference applies, he said, "[t]he supreme court and 
other 
Wisconsin 
courts 
are 
expected 
to 
rationalize 
and 
rubberstamp the agency's decision unless the agency's legal 
                                                 
38 "The danger to independent judgment arises whenever 
judges relinquish their judgment in any degree, and the danger 
of systematic bias arises whenever judges show greater respect 
for the legal position of one party than that of the other."  
Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187, 1202 
(2016). 
39 "Of course, the bias arises from institutional precedent 
rather than individual prejudice, but this makes the bias 
especially systematic and the Fifth Amendment due process 
problem especially serious."  Id. at 1189. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
50 
 
interpretation is plainly wrong.  The result is that many 
litigants have lost their right to a decision by an independent 
judiciary."  Id.; see also Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶39 
(indicating that "[i]f the judiciary passively permits [the 
executive] branch to arrogate judicial power unto itself, 
however estimable the professed purpose for asserting this 
prerogative, the people inevitably suffer" because they lose 
"their independent arbiters of the law"); Roggensack, supra ¶18, 
at 546 ("Indeed, some writers who have examined judicially 
created decision-avoidance doctrines have stated that when 'the 
scope of review is too limited, the right to review itself 
becomes meaningless.'" (quoted source omitted)). 
¶68 The situation appears no better when considered from 
the agency's perspective.  When an administrative agency 
interprets and applies the law in a case to which it is a party, 
it is to that extent acting as judge of its own cause.  By the 
time the Framers condemned such an arrangement, the rationale 
had already been a part of our wisdom literature for centuries: 
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; 
because 
his 
interest 
would 
certainly 
bias 
his 
judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.  
With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men, 
are unfit to be both judges and parties, at the same 
time; . . . . 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
51 
 
The Federalist No. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 
1961).40  Echoing Madison, the United States Supreme Court said 
that "no man can be a judge in his own case[,] and no man is 
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome."  
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. 
¶69 An administrative agency has an obvious interest in 
the outcome of a case to which it is a party.  Yet, our 
deference doctrine commits the rule of decision to its hands 
anyway.  It is entirely unrealistic to expect the agency to 
function 
as 
a 
"fair 
and 
impartial 
decisionmaker" 
as 
it 
authoritatively tells the court how to interpret and apply the 
law that will decide its case.  Because it cannot do so, 
deference threatens the most elemental aspect of a fair trial.41  
Guthrie, 111 Wis. 2d at 454 ("[A] minimal rudiment of due 
process is a fair and impartial decisionmaker.").  This is not 
to question the agency's good faith, which we presume.  It is 
                                                 
40 Sir Edward Coke said "it is a maxime in law, aliquis non 
debet esse judex in propria causa."  1 Edward Coke, Institutes 
of the Laws of England § 212 (James & Luke G. Hansard & Sons 
19th ed. 1832) (1628).  He said so in English, too:  "[I]t is 
against reason, that if wrong be done any man, that he thereof 
should be his own judge."  Id.; see also Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 
Eng. Rep. 646, 652, 8 Co. Rep. 113 (1610) (in which Sir Coke 
applied this maxim). 
41 This is not to say an administrative agency cannot 
satisfy 
the 
due 
process 
requirement 
of 
an 
impartial 
decisionmaker as it decides contested cases within the executive 
branch.  And nothing in our opinion today should be understood 
to question that. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
52 
 
merely to join with the ancients in recognizing that no one can 
be impartial in his own cause. 
* 
¶70 As a postscript to this issue, it is worth recalling 
that great weight deference is a creature of our own making——
that is, nothing in our statutes called it into being.  If 
anything, the relevant provision under which we normally review 
agency decisions militates against it.  Subsection 227.57(5) 
says: 
The court shall set aside or modify the agency action 
if 
it 
finds 
that 
the 
agency 
has 
erroneously 
interpreted 
a 
provision 
of 
law 
and 
a 
correct 
interpretation compels a particular action, or it 
shall remand the case to the agency for further action 
under a correct interpretation of the provision of 
law. 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(5).  This says nothing about comparing our 
interpretation of the law to that of the agency, or gatekeeping, 
or reasonableness.  Instead, the statute says the court is to 
decide whether the agency has "erroneously interpreted a 
provision of law."  Id.  And the court is to determine the 
"correct interpretation of the provision of law."  Id.  This 
formulation recognizes the proper residence of our core judicial 
powers. 
5.  "Due Weight" Deference Considered 
¶71 "Due 
weight," 
as 
a 
principle, 
entered 
our 
jurisprudence through a statute, but over time our cases grafted 
it into the administrative deference doctrine.  The original 
statutory foundation, however, is still there, and is just as 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
53 
 
viable as it was before.  Today, we restore the principle of 
"due weight" to its original form by removing the patina of 
"deference" with which our cases have covered it. 
¶72 It is true that due weight deference presents a threat 
to our core powers that is less extensive than that presented by 
great weight deference.  It has been said that "in most 
situations, applying due weight deference will lead to the same 
result as would applying no deference at all."  MercyCare Ins. 
Co. v. Wis. Comm'r of Ins., 2010 WI 87, ¶37, 328 Wis. 2d 110, 
786 N.W.2d 785; see also Operton, 375 Wis. 2d 1, ¶22 ("We note 
here that there is little difference between due weight 
deference and no deference, since both situations require us to 
construe the statute ourselves." 
(internal quotation mark 
omitted) (quoting Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶19, 315 
Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571)). 
¶73 The threat presented by due weight deference is less, 
however, only in the sense that the preconditions that justify 
the agency's exercise of our exclusive power are fulfilled more 
rarely.  When the "due weight" preconditions are satisfied,42 we 
must defer to the agency when our respective views of the law, 
                                                 
42 The preconditions are that:  (1) "the statute is one that 
the agency was charged with administering"; and (2) "the agency 
has at least some expertise in the interpretation of the statute 
in question."  Operton, 375 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20 (quoting Racine 
Harley-Davidson, Inc., 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶107 (Roggensack, J., 
concurring) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
54 
 
while different, are equally reasonable.43  When there is 
equipoise, the court cedes its core judicial power just as 
surely as if great weight deference had applied.  Infrequency 
does not make the cession appropriate. 
¶74 Nor does cession become acceptable because the agency 
has less latitude in exercising our power under due weight 
deference than it does under great weight deference.  In Racine 
Harley-Davidson, Inc., 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶¶14-15, we suggested 
that granting deference did not abandon our judicial power 
because we retained the authority to establish the guardrails 
within which the agency exercised that power.  See id. 
(emphasizing that the court decides "whether deference is due," 
"what level of deference is due," and "the reasonableness of the 
agency interpretation").  But providing the agency with even the 
most exacting tutelage on how to exercise our power does not 
change the fact that it is exercising our power.  It is the fact 
of cession, not its frequency or latitude, that implicates 
separation of powers and due process concerns.  The power within 
the guardrails is part of our core, and so we may not parcel it 
out in even the smallest of doses.  Therefore, due weight 
deference and great weight deference are structurally unsound 
for the same reasons. 
* 
                                                 
43 See UFE Inc., 201 Wis. 2d at 287 n.3 (stating that under 
due weight deference, "an equally reasonable interpretation of a 
statute should not be chosen over the agency's interpretation"). 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
55 
 
¶75 On the other hand, "due weight"——in its statutory 
form——presents no such concerns.  There are five provisions in 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57 that address how we handle questions of law 
in reviewing an agency's decision: 
(3) The court shall separately treat disputed issues 
of 
agency 
procedure, 
interpretations 
of 
law, 
determinations of fact or policy within the agency's 
exercise of delegated discretion. 
 . . . . 
(5) The court shall set aside or modify the agency 
action if it finds that the agency has erroneously 
interpreted 
a 
provision 
of 
law 
and 
a 
correct 
interpretation compels a particular action, or it 
shall remand the case to the agency for further action 
under a correct interpretation of the provision of 
law. 
 . . . . 
(8) The court shall reverse or remand the case to the 
agency if it finds that the agency's exercise of 
discretion is . . . in violation of a constitutional 
or statutory provision; . . . . 
 . . . . 
(10) Subject to sub. (11), upon such review due weight 
shall 
be 
accorded 
the 
experience, 
technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency 
involved, as well as discretionary authority conferred 
upon it. 
(11) Upon review of an agency action or decision 
affecting a property owner's use of the property 
owner's property, the court shall accord no deference 
to the agency's interpretation of law if the agency 
action or decision restricts the property owner's free 
use of the property owner's property. 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(3), (5), (8), (10)-(11). 
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¶76 None of these provisions direct us to defer to an 
agency's interpretation or application of the law.  To the 
contrary, subsection (3) tells us to treat questions of law 
separately from all other matters in the case (reminiscent of 
the analytical approach mentioned in Pabst); subsection (5) 
recognizes the court, not the agency, as the law-declaring body; 
and subsection (8) calls for us to test an agency's exercise of 
discretion 
against 
relevant 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
provisions (without any suggestion that the agency is to decide 
what those provisions mean). 
¶77 We 
find 
the 
legislature's 
commendation 
of 
administrative agencies in subsection (10).  There, we learn we 
are to give "due weight" (subject to subsection (11)——more about 
that later) to the "experience, technical competence, and 
specialized knowledge of the agency involved."  From our 
earliest days we have recognized that the state's agencies 
develop a valuable perspective, unique to them, as they 
administer the laws within their portfolios.  See Harrington, 28 
Wis. at 69 (finding it significant that "the office of attorney 
general ha[d] been filled by nine different individuals, all of 
them 
gentlemen 
of 
learning 
and 
accomplishment 
in 
their 
profession"); see also Motor Transp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 
263 Wis. 31, 43, 56 N.W.2d 548 (1953) (recognizing that "the 
Public Service Commission possesses wide experience and much 
technical knowledge in the field of regulation of motor-carrier 
transportation of property").  It was, in fact, our appreciation 
for that collected wisdom that originally led to our deference 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
57 
 
doctrine.  See Roggensack, supra ¶18, at 557 (referring to the 
"oft-cited 
foundation 
for 
deferring 
to 
agency 
decisions, 
administrative expertise"). 
¶78 Recognizing that administrative agencies can sometimes 
bring unique insights to the matters for which they are 
responsible, however, does not mean we should defer to them.  
And there is nothing in Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10) that suggests we 
should.  We believe the Department accurately described the 
meaning and effect of this provision.  It acknowledged that 
giving "due weight" to an agency's experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge will not "oust the court 
as the ultimate authority or final arbiter" of the law.  
Instead, it said, "due weight" means giving "respectful, 
appropriate consideration to the agency's views" while the court 
exercises its independent judgment in deciding questions of law.  
We agree.  "Due weight" is a matter of persuasion, not 
deference. 
¶79 But "due weight" is not a talisman that automatically 
grants its bearer additional rhetorical power.  If an agency 
brings to court nothing but a rote recitation of its background 
with the subject matter, it should not expect the statutory 
directive to give its argument extra heft.  The agency should be 
prepared to explain how its experience, technical competence, 
and 
specialized 
knowledge 
give 
its 
view 
of 
the 
law 
a 
significance or perspective unique amongst the parties, and why 
that background should make the agency's view of the law more 
persuasive than others.  As we assess the persuasiveness of the 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
58 
 
agency's perspective, we will consider the same types of factors 
that 
formerly 
informed 
our 
deference 
doctrine, 
to 
wit:  
(1) whether the legislature made the agency responsible for 
administering the statute in question; (2) the length of time 
the administrative agency's interpretation has stood; (3) the 
extent to which the agency used its expertise or specialized 
knowledge in developing its position; and (4) whether the 
agency's perspective would enhance uniformity and consistency of 
the law. 
¶80 Before concluding our "due weight" analysis, we must 
still account for the effect of Wis. Stat. § 227.57(11).  This 
provision says that "[u]pon review of an agency action or 
decision affecting a property owner's use of the property 
owner's property, the court shall accord no deference to the 
agency's interpretation of law if the agency action or decision 
restricts the property owner's free use of the property owner's 
property."  § 227.57(11).  The plain meaning of this subsection 
is that the court should forswear deference to an agency's 
interpretation of the law in the identified circumstances.  The 
legislature added this subsection in 2015, and simultaneously 
made subsection (10) subject to its provisions.  2015 Wis. 
Act 391, §§ 30, 31.  By doing so, the legislature necessarily 
implied that it understood subsection (10) as allowing the court 
to defer to an agency's interpretation of law.  Even though the 
text of that subsection says nothing about deference, there was 
good 
reason 
to 
understand 
it 
that 
way. 
 
By 
the 
time 
subsection (11) entered the statutes, our treatment of both 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
59 
 
"great weight" and "due weight" had long since matured into our 
current deference doctrine.  Adding subsection (11), therefore, 
exempted the identified circumstances not from a statutory 
command, 
but 
from 
the 
decision-avoidance 
effects 
of 
our 
deference doctrine.  Consequently, we understand subsection (11) 
as a partial dismantling of our deference doctrine.  Our 
decision today completes the process. 
¶81 By returning "due weight" to its statutory roots, and 
ending our erstwhile deference, we honor the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10), the separation of powers, and the 
parties' due process interests.  We agree with now-Justice 
Gorsuch's observations about the benefits of rejecting decision-
avoidance doctrines like ours: 
[D]e novo judicial review of the law's meaning would 
limit the ability of any agency to alter and amend 
existing law.  It would avoid the due process and 
equal protection problems of the kind documented in 
our decisions.  It would promote reliance interests by 
allowing citizens to organize their affairs with some 
assurance that the rug will not be pulled from under 
them tomorrow, the next day, or after the next 
election. 
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1158 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
6.  Standard of Review 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
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¶82 We are mindful that our decision today represents a 
significant break with the way we have reviewed agency decisions 
since at least Harnischfeger, and in some respects, since Pabst.  
The principle of stare decisis counsels that we depart from our 
precedents only when circumstances unavoidably superannuate our 
commitment to them.  Typically, that occurs when: 
(1) [c]hanges 
or 
developments 
in 
the 
law 
have 
undermined the rationale behind a decision; (2) there 
is a need to make a decision correspond to newly 
ascertained facts; (3) there is a showing that the 
precedent has become detrimental to coherence and 
consistency in the law; (4) the prior decision is 
"unsound in principle;" or (5) the prior decision is 
"unworkable in practice." 
Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 293 
Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 (quoted source omitted). 
¶83 We are leaving our deference doctrine behind because 
it is unsound in principle.  It does not respect the separation 
of powers, gives insufficient consideration to the parties' due 
process interest in a neutral and independent judiciary, and 
"risks 
perpetuating 
erroneous 
declarations 
of 
the 
law."  
Operton, 375 Wis. 2d 1, ¶73 (R. Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  
Although persistency of our precedents normally protects the 
rule of law, sometimes "[w]e do more damage to the rule of law 
by obstinately refusing to admit errors, thereby perpetuating 
injustice, than by overturning an erroneous decision."  See 
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, 
¶¶97, 100, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
61 
 
¶84 Today, the core judicial power ceded by our deference 
doctrine returns to its constitutionally-assigned residence.  
Henceforth, 
we 
will 
review 
an 
administrative 
agency's 
conclusions of law under the same standard we apply to a circuit 
court's conclusions of law——de novo.  See Mitchell Bank v. 
Schanke, 2004 WI 13, ¶24, 268 Wis. 2d 571, 676 N.W.2d 849 ("We 
review legal conclusions of the circuit court de novo.").  As 
with judicial opinions, we will benefit from the administrative 
agency's analysis, particularly when they are supplemented by 
the "due weight" considerations discussed above.  Cf. Megal Dev. 
Corp. 
v. 
Shadof, 
2005 
WI 151, 
¶8, 
286 
Wis. 2d 105, 
705 
N.W.2d 645 ("While the review is de novo, this court benefits 
from the analyses of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.").  And, as always, we review the administrative 
agency's decision, not that of the circuit court.  Ho-Chunk 
Nation v. DOR, 2009 WI 48, ¶12, 317 Wis. 2d 553, 766 N.W.2d 738 
("In a case that involves a ruling by the Commission, we review 
the Commission's decision rather than the decision of the 
circuit court.").  The facts in this case are undisputed, so we 
address only questions of law.  See Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette 
Elec. Co-op., 201 Wis. 2d 416, 422, 548 N.W.2d 829 (1996) 
("Whether the facts of a particular case fulfill a legal 
standard is a question of law we review de novo."). 
7.  Discontinuing Deference for Administrative Reasons 
¶85 We created our deference doctrine ex nihilo, and so it 
is within our power to end it simply by declaring it at an end.  
Some members of the court prefer that option——discard the 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
62 
 
doctrine not because the constitutional problems require its 
abandonment, but merely because we have chosen to drop it.  
However, just because we can do this does not make it wise.  
Indeed, stare decisis exists as a principle for the sole purpose 
of counseling against that option. 
¶86 Justice Gableman provided a thoughtful account of why 
he would end the deference doctrine on non-constitutional 
grounds.  Ultimately, however, his rationale still depends on 
the 
separation 
of 
powers——sotto 
voce, 
to 
be 
sure, 
but 
undeniably.  Thus, for example, he says our deference doctrine 
is unsound in principle because "deference (especially great 
weight deference), if correctly and honestly applied, leads to 
the 
perverse 
outcome 
of 
courts 
often 
affirming 
inferior 
interpretations of statutes."  Justice Gableman's concurrence, 
¶166.  That is indubitably true.  But it is true only if one 
already subscribes to the proposition that our interpretation 
enjoys pride of place over that of the administrative agency.  
We should not be surprised to learn, however, that an 
administrative agency might believe its own interpretation is 
superior to ours.  Indeed, we should expect no less from an 
agency engaged in a good faith effort to do its job.  From the 
agency's perspective, therefore, our deference doctrine creates 
no perversity at all; instead, it gives the statute the best 
possible interpretation:  Its own.  So when Justice Gableman 
says that "[i]n our role as court of last resort, we should 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
63 
 
ensure 
that 
erroneous-but-reasonable 
legal 
conclusions 
are 
corrected,"44 he is making a separation of powers assertion——to 
wit, the court is the authoritative arbiter of the law in the 
case before us, and our opinion must prevail over that of the 
other branches.  Without that constitutional impetus, there is 
no fuel for his "unsound in principle" analysis. 
¶87 Justice Gableman also says newly-ascertained facts 
provide a non-constitutional basis for ending deference.45  
Specifically, he notes that part of the justification for the 
doctrine was the assumed subject-matter expertise of the agency 
decision-makers.  He questions whether they really do have such 
expertise, and then concludes:  "We may say that it is only a 
matter of speculation that agency decision-makers possess less 
expertise than courts when it comes to interpreting various 
statutes.  Importantly, it is equally a matter of speculation 
that they possess more."46  So as Justice Gableman acknowledges, 
these 
are 
not 
newly-ascertained 
facts, 
they 
are 
newly-
ascertained speculations.  Our deference doctrine has defined 
the 
relationship 
between 
administrative 
agencies 
and 
the 
judiciary for over two decades now.  Speculation about a hearing 
                                                 
44 Justice Gableman's concurrence, ¶166. 
45 Id., ¶167. 
46 Id. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
64 
 
examiner's 
expertise 
seems 
an 
especially 
diaphanous 
justification for upending this settled history.47 
¶88 The members of the court who would end our deference 
doctrine for administrative reasons do so out of a desire to 
avoid a constitutional analysis.  But as Justice Gableman's 
concurrence demonstrates, it is impossible to describe a 
substantive reason for ending the doctrine without at least an 
unspoken appeal to constitutional principles.  We do no good 
service by avoiding an analysis that so obviously demands our 
attention. 
* 
¶89 Justice Ziegler would also prefer dispensing with our 
deference doctrine for administrative reasons because she is 
concerned about how our decision will affect the finality of 
past cases.  The source of her concern is not entirely clear——
this decision is incapable of reopening cases that have already 
been decided.48  If they were final upon release of this opinion, 
their finality will go on undisturbed by our decision today.  
Relief from the judgment of a case is governed by Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
47 Justice Gableman also says our deference doctrine has not 
delivered on promised gains in judicial efficiency.  Id., ¶165.  
But the court has not been made aware of any study performing a 
differential analysis of litigative effort before and after 
Harnischfeger.  So this, too, is a matter of speculation. 
48 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley shares Justice Ziegler's 
concern about the effect of our decision on the finality of 
previously decided cases.  See Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's 
concurrence, ¶131. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
65 
 
§ 806.07.  Justice Ziegler thinks our rationale would allow a 
party to successfully reopen a case for several of the reasons 
mentioned in that statute, including "[m]istake" (para. (a)), or 
because "[t]he judgment is void" (para. (d)), or because "[a] 
prior judgment upon which the judgment is based has been 
reversed" (para. (f)), or for "[a]ny other reasons justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment" (para. (h)).  Justice 
Ziegler's concurrence, ¶139 n.3.  She cites no authority for 
this proposition, nor could she. 
¶90 Justice Ziegler's concern cannot be realized here for 
the same reason it has never been realized when we overrule one 
of our prior decisions.  That has never occurred because 
overruling a case does not expose to collateral attack any of 
the intervening decisions that were based on the overruled case.  
"To the contrary," Justice Ziegler says, "overruling one of our 
prior decisions[] can quite obviously have significant impact on 
other cases."  Id.  But for over twenty years the impossibility 
of her concern has been black-letter law:  "The statute 
[§ 806.07] does not authorize relief from a judgment on the 
ground that the law applied by the court in making its 
adjudication has been subsequently overruled in an unrelated 
proceeding."  Schauer v. DeNeveu Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 194 
Wis. 2d 62, 75, 533 N.W.2d 470 (1995).49  True, as Justice 
Ziegler 
observed, 
Schauer 
specifically 
addressed 
the 
                                                 
49 By "black-letter law," we mean that Schauer appears in 
the annotations for Wis. Stat. § 806.07. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
66 
 
circumstance in which "[a] prior judgment upon which the 
judgment is based has been reversed."  
See Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(f); Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶139 n.3.  But 
that's why the case is so instructive.  The whole point of 
Schauer's analysis was that when a court enters judgment in 
reliance on specific case precedent, the judgment's finality is 
entirely unaffected if the precedent is subsequently reversed.  
That's exactly the concern that Justice Ziegler expressed, and 
Schauer says "don't worry." 
¶91 The other provisions of Wis. Stat. § 806.07 provide no 
cause for worry either.  If a reversed precedent cannot stand in 
for a prior reversed judgment, there is no logical process——no 
matter how much it might resemble a Rube Goldberg machine——by 
which 
it 
could 
stand 
in 
for 
a 
"void 
judgment" 
under 
paragraph (d). 
 
And 
the 
catch-all 
"[a]ny 
other 
reasons 
justifying relief" is not worry-inducing because "[t]he general 
rule is that 'a change in the judicial view of an established 
rule of law is not an extraordinary circumstance which justifies 
relief 
from 
a 
final 
judgment 
under 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(h)].'"  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 2007 
WI App 221, ¶7, 305 Wis. 2d 400, 740 N.W.2d 888 (alteration in 
original) (quoted source omitted) (capitalization omitted); 
accord Schwochert v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d 97, 
103, 479 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 172 Wis. 2d 628, 494 
N.W.2d 201 (1993) (same).  Finally, the "[m]istake" provision of 
§ 806.07(1)(a) can raise no alarm because it is never a mistake 
(within the meaning of this statute) for a court to rely on our 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
67 
 
precedent.  Subsequently overruling the precedent cannot, to a 
metaphysical certainty, make an intervening court's reliance on 
the precedent a "mistake"——unless, that is, we are to presume 
the intervening court's ability to look forward in time to espy 
our change before we make it. 
¶92 Justice Ziegler's concern is unknown to the law.  And 
she has identified no mechanism by which this unrealizable fear 
could possibly come to pass. 
¶93 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice Ziegler are also 
concerned about whether our decision will adversely affect the 
precedential authority of cases decided pursuant to our now-
discarded deference doctrine.  To the extent a court favored an 
agency's conclusion of law over its own, that conclusion is now 
part of the judgment of the case and an inextricable part of the 
opinion.  Consequently, its precedential and controlling effect 
will be the same as if the court had based the decision on its 
own interpretation.  The only future effect of our decision is 
that courts, rather than administrative agencies, will decide 
questions of law.  If that prospect is sufficient to raise an 
alarm 
against 
impending 
"tumult" 
(see 
Justice 
Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley's concurrence, ¶120), then we have more to worry about 
than a deference doctrine. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
68 
 
B.  "Processing" River Sediments 
¶94 Now that we have identified the proper standard of 
review, we can address the petitioners' argument that they are 
not subject to the tax imposed by Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2).  This 
statute provides that: 
For the privilege of selling, performing or furnishing 
the services described under par. (a) at retail in 
this state to consumers or users, a tax is imposed 
upon all persons selling, performing or furnishing the 
services at the rate of 5% of the gross receipts from 
the sale, performance or furnishing of the services. 
§ 77.52(2).  The services to which this provision refers include 
the following: 
The producing, fabricating, processing, printing or 
imprinting 
of 
tangible 
personal 
property 
for 
a 
consideration for consumers who furnish directly or 
indirectly the materials used in the producing, 
fabricating, processing, printing or imprinting.  This 
subdivision 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
the 
printing 
or 
imprinting of tangible personal property that results 
in printed material, catalogs, or envelopes that are 
exempt under s. 77.54(25) or (25m). 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11. 
¶95 The parties agree that, in this case, the petitioners 
are liable for the tax imposed by the Department only if 
Stuyvesant 
Dredging 
received 
compensation 
for 
"processing" 
tangible personal property it received (directly or indirectly) 
from the petitioners.  The parties also agree that the river 
sediment comprised tangible personal property, that Stuyvesant 
Dredging received compensation for the work it performed on the 
river sediment, and that the river sediment was furnished by the 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
69 
 
petitioners.50 
 
Therefore, 
the 
only 
question 
is 
whether 
Stuyvesant Dredging's work constituted "processing." 
¶96 Because this case turns on the meaning of the term 
"processing" in Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)11., our task involves 
discerning the meaning of statutory text.  We discover a 
statute's 
meaning 
in 
its 
text, 
context, 
and 
structure.  
"[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute," and we give that language its "common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45-46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(internal mark and quoted source omitted) ("Context is important 
to meaning.  So, too, is the structure of the statute in which 
the operative language appears.  Therefore, statutory language 
is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes; . . . ."). 
 
In 
performing this analysis, we carefully avoid ascribing an 
unreasonable meaning to the text.  See id., ¶46 ("[S]tatutory 
language is interpreted . . . reasonably, to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results.").  If we determine the statute's plain 
meaning through this methodology, we go no further.  Id., ¶¶45-
46 ("If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop 
the inquiry." (internal mark and quoted source omitted)).  See 
                                                 
50 Tetra Tech engaged J.F. Brennan Co., Inc. to dredge the 
contaminated sediments and deliver them to Stuyvesant Dredging 
for separation. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
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generally Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 
Marq. L. Rev. 969 (2017). 
¶97 Our statutes do not define the term "processing."  
Consequently, the Commission turned to a dictionary to assist 
its 
analysis, 
stating 
"[t]he 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
'processing' is 'to put through the steps of a prescribed 
procedure; or, to prepare, treat, or convert by subjecting to a 
special process.'"  The petitioners reject this definition, 
arguing that it is so broad it transforms a narrow and selective 
tax statute into a general tax on all services related to 
tangible personal property.  They would instead have us find the 
term's meaning in the Administrative Code.  Specifically, they 
propose Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.38(2) (June 1993), which 
provides: 
Fabricating and processing services, where materials 
are furnished directly or indirectly by the customer, 
that are subject to Wisconsin sales or use tax 
include, except as provided in sub. (1)(a) through 
(c): 
(a) Application of coating to pipe. 
(b) Assembling kits to produce a completed product. 
(c) Bending glass tubing into neon signs. 
(d) Bookbinding. 
(e) Caterer's preparation of food for consumption on 
or off the caterer's premises. 
(f) Cleaning used oil. 
(g) Cutting lumber to specifications and producing 
cabinets, counter tops or other items from lumber for 
customers, often called "millending." 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
71 
 
(h) Cutting or crushing stones, gravel or other 
construction materials. 
(i) Drying, planing or ripping lumber. 
(j) Dyeing or fireproofing fabric. 
(k) Fabricating steel which may involve cutting the 
steel to length and size, bending and drilling holes 
in the steel to specifications of a particular 
construction job. 
(L) Firing of ceramics or china. 
(m) Heat treating or plating. 
(n) Laminating identification cards. 
(o) Making a fur coat from pelts, gloves or a jacket 
from a hide. 
(p) Making curtains, drapes, slip covers or other 
household furnishings. 
(q) Production of a sound recording or motion picture. 
(r) Retreading tires. 
(s) Tailoring a suit. 
(t) Threading pipe or welding pipe. 
Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 11.38(2)(a)-(t). 
¶98 Although 
we 
conclude 
that 
Stuyvesant 
Dredging 
"processed" the river sediment into its constituent parts, we do 
not believe either party provided a satisfactory definition of 
the term.  The petitioners rely on Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 
11.38(2) as an exhaustive recitation of "processing" services 
subject to Wisconsin's sales and use tax.  Because the 
separation of river sediment does not appear in this list, they 
conclude that the principle expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius excludes Stuyvesant Dredging's services from the 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
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statute's reach.  This canon of statutory construction would be 
helpful if the list of services were meant to be exhaustive, 
rather than illustrative.  But this is a tool of elucidation 
only——it has no power to contradict the code's text.  And by its 
own terms, § Tax 11.38(2) contains an illustrative list, not a 
comprehensive one.  The operative language says:  "Fabricating 
and processing services, . . . that are subject to Wisconsin 
sales or use tax include, . . . ."  Id. (emphasis added).  The 
term "include" tells us that what follows is not exhaustive.  
See State v. James P., 2005 WI 80, ¶26, 281 Wis. 2d 685, 698 
N.W.2d 95 ("[G]enerally, the word 'includes' is to be given an 
expansive meaning, indicating that which follows is but a part 
of the whole." (quoting Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & 
Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶17 n.11, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 
N.W.2d 612)).  Further, even if it wished to, it is doubtful 
that the Department could restrict the scope of Wis. Stat. 
§ 77.52(2) through the promulgation of § Tax 11.38(2).  The 
petitioners identify no authority giving the Department power to 
either broaden or constrict the types of services subject to 
sales and use taxes.  So it does not appear there is any way in 
which we could read § Tax 11.38(2) as a complete definition of 
"processing." 
¶99 As an illustrative list, Wis. Admin. Code § Tax 
11.38(2) is similarly unhelpful to the petitioners' cause.  The 
petitioners say they purchased services that involved nothing 
more than "separating" tangible personal property into its 
components.  But this could be said of cleaning used oil, too, 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
73 
 
which presumably involves separating contaminants from the oil.  
See § Tax 11.38(2)(f).  The petitioners also say that Stuyvesant 
Dredging's work cannot be understood as "processing" because it 
neither added nor subtracted anything from the personal property 
on which it performed its services.  This could be said with 
equal accuracy of those who crush stones, and yet that service 
is part of the Department's illustrative list.  See § Tax 
11.38(2)(h). 
 
So 
§ Tax 
11.38(2) 
does 
not 
advance 
the 
petitioners' argument because it is not an exclusive list of 
"processing" activities, and because, as an illustrative list, 
it describes activity analogous to Stuyvesant Dredging's work. 
¶100 But the petitioners have a legitimate concern about 
the breadth of the Commission's definition of "processing."  
That term stands cheek by jowl with "producing," "fabricating," 
"printing," and "imprinting" in Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)11.  If 
"processing" really comprehends everything that puts tangible 
physical property "through the steps of a prescribed procedure," 
or applies a "special process" to "prepare, treat, or convert" 
it, then the term swallows all of its sentence-mates.  For 
example, "producing" means "to make or manufacture (a product or 
commodity) from components or raw materials."  Producing, The 
Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (definition 3.e.).  
Manufacturing something would certainly involve putting tangible 
property 
through 
the 
steps 
of 
a 
prescribed 
procedure.  
Similarly, "fabricating" means "[t]o make anything that requires 
skill; to construct, manufacture."  Fabricating, The Oxford 
English 
Dictionary 
(2d 
ed. 
1989) 
(definition 
1.a.).  
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
74 
 
Fabricating, like producing, puts property through a prescribed 
procedure.  And "printing" means "[t]o make or produce (text, a 
book, a picture, etc.) by a mechanical process involving the 
transfer of characters or designs on to paper, vellum, etc."  
Printing, 
The 
Oxford 
English 
Dictionary 
(2d 
ed. 
1989) 
(definition II.8.a.).  And finally, "imprinting" means "[t]o 
mark by pressure; to impress, stamp," "[t]o impress (letters or 
characters) on paper or the like by means of type," and "[t]o 
make an impression or impressed figure upon; to stamp or impress 
(something) with a figure, etc."  Imprinting, The Oxford English 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (definitions 1.a., 2., and 4.a., 
respectively).  Each of these companion terms could fairly be 
understood as specific examples of the Commission's definition 
of "processing."  But ascribing such a broad meaning to that 
word would make surplusage of all the companion terms.  Whenever 
possible, we avoid reading statutory language in a fashion that 
leaves some of it with no work to do.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46 ("Statutory language is read where possible to give 
reasonable 
effect 
to 
every 
word, 
in 
order 
to 
avoid 
surplusage."). 
¶101 Therefore, we must understand "processing" to bear a 
meaning that does not displace all of the other descriptors in 
Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)11.  We begin with the purpose of 
subdivision 11., which is to identify categories of services 
performed on tangible personal property that are subject to 
Wisconsin's sales and use tax.  As we pursue the proper meaning 
of 
"processing," 
its 
companion 
terms 
provide 
invaluable 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
75 
 
assistance.  The noscitur a sociis canon of construction 
(literally, "it is known from its associates") instructs that 
"[w]hen two or more words or phrases are listed together, the 
general terms . . . may be defined by the other words and 
understood in the same general sense."  Schill v. Wis. Rapids 
Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶66, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177; 
accord State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶35, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 
N.W.2d 447 ("[A]n unclear statutory term should be understood in 
the same sense as the words immediately surrounding or coupled 
with it." (quoted source omitted)).  Because the structure of 
the text indicates that the terms are of equal dignity, we will 
not read any one of them to swallow the others.  Although the 
types of services may share some (and even many) common 
characteristics, each will retain an independent meaning so long 
as it has at least one attribute distinct from the others.  With 
these principles in mind, we can discern a meaning for 
"processing" that is informed by, and consistent with, its 
associates. 
¶102 Based 
on 
the 
definitions 
above, 
we 
see 
that 
"fabricating" is distinct from its associates in that it 
requires skill in the construction or manufacture of a final 
product.  "Producing" contemplates the creation of a final 
product from the combination of components or raw materials, a 
characteristic 
that 
is 
not 
necessarily 
encompassed 
by 
"fabricating," which could describe the manufacture of a product 
out of a single resource.  "Printing" differs from the other 
categories in that it involves "the transfer of characters or 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
76 
 
designs" onto a medium.  And finally, "imprinting" is unique 
even from "printing" in that characters or designs are impressed 
on a medium through pressure (as, for example, metal stamping in 
which the medium is deformed to depict the character or 
design).51 
                                                 
51 Justice Ziegler's concurrence, to the extent it addresses 
whether "processing" encompasses the activity at issue here, is 
based in large part on a mistaken impression that the 
legislature defined "printing" and "imprinting."  It did not.  
She refers to Wis. Stat. § 77.51(11), which says (in full):  
"'Printing' 
and 
'imprinting' 
include 
lithography, 
photolithography, rotogravure, gravure, letterpress, silk screen 
printing, 
multilithing, 
multigraphing, 
mimeographing, 
photostating, steel die engraving and similar processes."  This 
is not a definition.  It is an incomplete list of examples.  It 
is not a definition for the same reason we do not consider Wis. 
Admin. Code § Tax 11.38(2) a definition of "processing," which 
similarly contains an incomplete list of examples. 
Nonetheless, Justice Ziegler finds significance in the 
title of section 77.51, "Definitions."  But this means, quite 
literally, nothing:  "The titles to subchapters, sections, 
subsections, paragraphs and subdivisions of the statutes and 
history notes are not part of the statutes."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(6). 
And the fact that the legislature did not feel the need to 
say which category encompasses which activities does not mean 
printing and imprinting are the same thing (as Justice Ziegler 
suggests).  See Justice Ziegler's, concurrence, ¶143.  It means 
the legislature did not care to separate them into their proper 
categories, a fact from which no useful information can be 
drawn.  It is theoretically possible to use this illustrative 
list to develop a definition of "printing" or "imprinting."  But 
that would involve first defining each of the listed activities, 
and 
then 
extrapolating 
the 
constituent 
elements 
into 
a 
definition for the two terms.  Even at that, the result would be 
uncertain because there is no way to identify the category to 
which each listed activity belongs.  Consequently, recourse to 
Wis. Stat. § 77.51(11) simply isn't helpful in discovering a 
definition for "printing" or "imprinting." 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
77 
 
¶103 Turning now to the proper meaning of "processing," we 
know it must contain at least one attribute that is distinct 
from those described above if it is not to displace its 
neighbors.  The Oxford English Dictionary says "processing" 
means, in pertinent part, "[t]o subject to or treat by a special 
process; to operate on mechanically or chemically."  Processing, 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (definition 3.a.).  
It is poor form to use the defined word in its own definition, 
mostly 
because 
such 
a 
construct 
provides 
little 
to 
no 
information.  Here, this infraction means the first clause tells 
us nothing but that processing is "special," which is entirely 
unhelpful. 
 
The 
second 
clause, 
however, 
is 
instructive.  
Applying that material to the term "processing" as it appears in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11. 
yields 
a 
meaning 
with 
a 
characteristic distinct from its companions.  We conclude that 
"processing" encompasses the performance of a mechanical or 
chemical operation on tangible personal property, a task that 
can be completed without transforming the property into a new 
product, or adding anything to it that was not already there.52  
"Fabricating" and "producing" both necessarily contemplate the 
creation of a new product, which makes them distinct from 
                                                 
52 Our opinion should not be interpreted as an attempt to 
comprehensively define "processing," "fabricating," "producing," 
"printing," or "imprinting."  With respect to "processing," we 
conclude the term is at least as broad as we have described.  
Whether it is more extensive than this is a question we need not 
answer to resolve this case. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
78 
 
"processing."  And both "printing" and "imprinting" require the 
addition of something to the property that was not there before, 
which is not a requirement of "processing."  Therefore, because 
we are able to identify a characteristic of "processing" that is 
distinct from its companions, we have confirmed that it is 
capable of carrying a meaning that cannot subsume or be subsumed 
by the others.53 
¶104 Understood in this fashion, "processing" encompasses 
Stuyvesant Dredging's separation of river sediment into its 
component parts.  The Commission's Ruling and Order described 
how this was accomplished.  After going through scalping 
screens, slurry holding tanks, and slurry thickener tanks, the 
                                                 
53 Justice Ziegler would adopt a definition of "processing" 
without reference to the other terms in the statute, and 
apparently without much concern for whether this creates 
surplusage or results in an extraordinarily broad definition.  
See Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶¶146-53.  This loose 
approach to statutory construction might be acceptable in other 
contexts, but it is entirely inappropriate when addressing a tax 
statute, especially this one.  Section 77.52 of our statutes 
covers the sale of both goods and services.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 77.52(1) (goods), (2) (services).  With respect to the former, 
the statute is all-encompassing; in contrast, this statute taxes 
services only if they are listed.  Compare § 77.52(1), with 
§ 77.52(2)(a) ("The tax imposed herein applies to the following 
types of services:  . . . .").  We must make our best effort at 
determining the specific meaning of the listed types of service 
because, as we have said before, "a tax cannot be imposed 
without clear and express language for that purpose, . . . ."  
DOR v. Milwaukee Ref. Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 44, 48, 257 N.W.2d 855 
(1977).  Justice Ziegler dispenses with those restrictions and 
safeguards by accepting any definition that might encompass 
Tetra Tech's activities.  Perhaps the legislature will one day 
adopt that approach, but this is not that day. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
79 
 
sediment enters the coarse and fine sand separation operations.  
The coarse separation operation physically separates, washes, 
and dewaters sand particles larger than 150 microns from the 
sludge.  The fine sand separation operation does the same for 
sand particles between 63 and 150 microns.  The petitioners 
confirm that everything Stuyvesant Dredging receives from them 
is returned.  The only difference is that the property is 
separated into its components.  No new product has been created; 
no chemical transformation has occurred; and the property is 
still just as contaminated as when Stuyvesant Dredging received 
it.  The work described by the Commission reflects the 
performance of a mechanical operation on the river sediments.  
Therefore, petitioners are subject to the sales and use tax of 
Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2) because Stuyvesant Dredging received 
compensation for "processing" river sediment received from the 
petitioners. 
¶105 It is unlikely that our definition of "processing" 
will upset the petitioners' reasonable expectations.  The 
Commission said that Tetra Tech's vice-president of project 
engineering testified that Stuyvesant Dredging "processed" the 
river sediment.  Similarly, an operations manager who oversaw 
LFR 
Remediation's 
work 
on 
the 
Fox 
River 
testified 
that 
Stuyvesant Dredging "processed" the river sediment.  And the 
Commission observed that, "[a]t various points in the affidavits 
and depositions of Petitioner's general manager and experts, 
they refer to what SDI [Stuyvesant Dredging] does as a 'process' 
or as 'processing.'  That language is also used in many of the 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
80 
 
contracts between Tetra Tech and SDI."  Although we do not 
derive the meaning of a statutory term from a party's subjective 
understanding, we recount this history as confirmation that our 
analysis has not ventured outside the realm of what those 
subject to the statute might reasonably anticipate. 
¶106 As is apparent from this analysis, we gave little 
weight 
to 
the 
Commission's 
understanding 
of 
the 
term 
"processing." 
 
We 
recognize 
the 
legislature 
charged 
the 
Commission with the duty to decide contested cases involving the 
application of Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2).  However, there is no 
indication the Commission has a long-standing interpretation of 
what "processing" means for purposes of § 77.52(2)(a)11.  Nor 
does the record intimate that it used any particular experience, 
technical competence, or specialized knowledge to develop an 
understanding of that term——it relied on a dictionary.  It 
necessarily follows that the Commission did not bring a unique 
perspective or significance to the meaning of "processing."  
Consequently, 
the 
"due 
weight" 
calculus 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.57(10) 
did 
not 
increase 
the 
persuasiveness 
of 
the 
Commission's conclusion of law. 
No. 
2015AP2019   
 
81 
 
III.  Conclusion 
¶107 The petitioners paid Stuyvesant Dredging to process 
river 
sediment 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11., so they are liable for the sales and use tax 
imposed by § 77.52(2).  Therefore, we affirm the court of 
appeals. 
¶108 We have also decided to end our practice of deferring 
to administrative agencies' conclusions of law.  However, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10), we will give "due weight" 
to 
the 
experience, 
technical 
competence, 
and 
specialized 
knowledge of an administrative agency as we consider its 
arguments. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP2019.awb 
 
1 
 
¶109 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I concur in the 
mandate of the court because I agree that the term "processing" 
as 
used 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11. 
encompasses 
the 
separation of river sediment into its component parts.  See 
majority/lead op., ¶3.1  Such a result is compelled whether we 
                                                 
1 I refer to Justice Kelly's opinion as a "majority/lead" 
opinion to assist litigants and courts in understanding its 
precedential value.  Justice Kelly's opinion is a majority 
opinion with regard to the statutory analysis of the term 
"processing" presented in Section II.B of the majority/lead 
opinion and the conclusions presented in Section III.  See State 
v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 685, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995) (explaining 
that "a majority of the participating judges must have agreed on 
a particular point for it to be considered the opinion of the 
court.").  As set forth in footnote 4 of the majority/lead 
opinion, it also constitutes a majority in: 
 Section I, setting forth the facts (which are not in 
issue), 
 Section II.A.1., providing a review of the current standard 
for review of agency decisions (which is not subject to 
reasonable dispute), and 
 Section II.A.2., going through the history of the deference 
doctrine (which is, again, not in issue). 
In contrast, "a lead opinion is one that states (and agrees 
with) the mandate of a majority of the justices, but represents 
the reasoning of less than a majority of the participating 
justices."  State v. Lynch, 2016 WI 66, ¶143, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 
N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson & Ann Walsh Bradley, J.J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (citing Hoffer Props., LLC v. State, 
Dep't of Transp., 2016 WI 5, 366 Wis. 2d 372, 874 N.W.2d 553); 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Riley, 2016 WI 70, ¶¶92-
95, 
371 
Wis. 2d 311, 
882 
N.W.2d 820 
(Abrahamson, 
J., 
concurring). 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP2019.awb 
 
2 
 
give the agency's interpretation great weight, due weight, or no 
weight at all. 
¶110 Further, I agree with the concurrences of Justices 
Ziegler and Gableman that, consistent with our doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance, the court need not reach the issue of 
whether 
our 
deference 
framework 
violates 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶111 I write separately, however, for two reasons.  First, 
the majority/lead opinion ignores controlling precedent to reach 
a 
result 
that 
upends 
decades 
of 
administrative 
law 
jurisprudence.  Similarly, the concurrences of Justices Ziegler 
and Gableman, while not reaching the constitutional issue, would 
toss away a framework that has served courts well for decades.  
Second, the court's misguided wholesale changes create possible 
unintended consequences and a great deal of uncertainty. 
¶112 The court should not so cavalierly discard our past 
practice.  Additionally, its apparent lack of concern for what 
will become of the jurisprudence that has arisen through 
deference gives rise to more questions than it answers.  Are 
cases 
in 
which 
courts 
afforded 
deference 
to 
an 
agency 
interpretation still good law?  Or do some of these issues need 
to be relitigated under the new standard of review the court 
                                                                                                                                                             
A majority of justices do not embrace the reasoning or 
constitutional analysis set forth in Sections II.A.3 through 
II.A.6 of the majority/lead opinion.  See majority/lead op., ¶3 
n.4.  The reasoning the majority/lead opinion presents for 
dispatching with our deference doctrine represents the reasoning 
of Justices Rebecca Grassl Bradley and Daniel Kelly only. 
No.  2015AP2019.awb 
 
3 
 
announces today?  The majority/lead opinion's assurances are of 
little comfort.  See Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶139 n.3. 
¶113 Because I would not jettison a past practice that has 
served us well, I respectfully concur. 
I 
¶114 At the outset, I observe that the impetus for 
dismantling years of administrative law jurisprudence did not 
come from any party, but from this court.  The issue of whether 
our 
agency 
deference 
doctrine 
violates 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution was not raised by any party to this case before the 
circuit court, court of appeals, or in the petition for review 
here.  It was this court, sua sponte, that asked that the issue 
be addressed in the first instance. 
¶115 Having raised the issue, the majority/lead opinion 
fails to follow established precedent when addressing it.  Had 
the majority/lead opinion adhered to our precedent, it would not 
have arrived at a result that creates such uncertainty.  To the 
contrary, it would have reached the conclusion that our 
deference doctrine comports with the Wisconsin Constitution.  By 
concluding that our deference doctrine removes the interpretive 
role of the judiciary, the majority/lead opinion commits legal 
error. 
¶116 Indeed, this court previously examined a very similar 
question.  In Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 358, 133 
N.W. 209 (1911), the court addressed an argument that the 
workers' compensation law "is unconstitutional because it vests 
judicial power in a body which is not a court and is not 
No.  2015AP2019.awb 
 
4 
 
composed of men elected by the people, in violation of those 
clauses of the state Constitution which vest the judicial power 
in certain courts and provide for the election of judges by the 
people . . . ." 
¶117 Rejecting the argument, the Borgnis court stated that 
the commission is "an administrative body or arm of the 
government which in the course of its administration of a law is 
empowered to ascertain some questions of fact and apply the 
existing law thereto, and in so doing acts quasi-judicially, but 
it 
is 
not 
thereby 
vested 
with 
judicial 
power 
in 
the 
constitutional sense."  Id. (second emphasis added).  The court 
added: 
While acting within the scope of its duty, or its 
jurisdiction, as it is sometimes called, such a board 
may lawfully be endowed with very broad powers, and 
its conclusions may be given great dignity and force, 
so that courts may not reverse them unless the proof 
be clear and satisfactory that they are wrong. 
Id. at 359. 
¶118 Borgnis is on point here.  In response to the argument 
made over a century ago, the Borgnis court suggested that only 
clear violations of law, i.e. unreasonable interpretations, are 
outside the jurisdiction of an agency.  This is the same 
foundation underlying our deference framework.  Although Borgnis 
addressed certiorari review, the same principle would apply to 
review of any administrative decision. 
¶119 Further, 
contrary 
to 
the 
majority/lead 
opinion's 
assertion, agency deference does not remove from the court its 
interpretive role and cede it to the agency.  In its 
No.  2015AP2019.awb 
 
5 
 
application, deference does not mean accepting an agency's 
interpretation without a critical eye.  Racine Harley-Davidson, 
Inc. v. State, Div. of Hearings and Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶15, 
292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184.  Rather, "[t]he court itself 
must 
always 
interpret 
the 
statute 
to 
determine 
the 
reasonableness of the agency interpretation."  Id.  Only 
reasonable interpretations are worthy of deference.  Id. 
¶120 Not only does the majority/lead opinion throw tumult 
into a previously well-settled area of the law, but it does so 
based on a legal error.  I would not upset the finality and 
consistency of our past decisions. 
II 
¶121 I write next to call attention to the unknown 
consequences of the court's decision.  The court's result 
represents a tectonic shift in the administrative law landscape.  
See Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, ¶71, 375 Wis. 2d 1, 894 
N.W.2d 426 (Ziegler, J., concurring) ("There is little doubt 
that ending the court's practice of according deference to 
agency interpretations of statutes would constitute a sea change 
in Wisconsin law[.]").  But on the topic of what this vast and 
sweeping change means for our prior cases, the majority/lead 
opinion provides precious little guidance. 
¶122 Compounding 
its 
error, 
the 
majority/lead 
opinion 
unwinds our three-tiered system of deference by declaring it 
unconstitutional where, as Justices Ziegler and Gableman aptly 
observe, the use of the court's administrative powers would 
suffice.  In doing so, the majority/lead opinion ignores our 
No.  2015AP2019.awb 
 
6 
 
usual practice of constitutional avoidance.  See State v. Hale, 
2005 WI 7, ¶42, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637 ("Normally this 
court will not address a constitutional issue if the case can be 
disposed of on other grounds.").  Again, the majority/lead 
opinion is silent as to the ramifications of constitutionalizing 
the question.  However, even making a decision on administrative 
grounds, we must consider the ramifications of such a decision. 
¶123 The principle of stare decisis militates against the 
court's conclusion.  Stare decisis is based in part on "the 
desirability that the law furnish a clear guide for conduct of 
individuals, to enable them to plan their affairs with assurance 
against untoward surprise[.]"  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. 
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶95, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 
N.W.2d 257 (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 
U.S. 375, 403 (1970)).  Parties appearing before agencies and 
those appealing agency decisions now enter uncharted waters.  
With no guide, they could be subject to conflicting statutory 
interpretations that will make it nearly impossible to plan 
their affairs with any certainty. 
¶124 This court, the court of appeals, and circuit courts 
throughout the state have applied great weight deference and due 
weight deference going back decades.  What is the precedential 
value of these cases now?  Are the principles they divine still 
good law even though they were reached through the application 
of a deference doctrine the court eschews today? 
¶125 As an example, let's examine a case involving a 
question of statutory interpretation similar to that at issue 
No.  2015AP2019.awb 
 
7 
 
here.  In Zip Sort, Inc. v. Wis. DOR, 2001 WI App 185, ¶1, 247 
Wis. 2d 295, 634 N.W.2d 99, the court of appeals addressed an 
agency interpretation of the term "manufacturing property" as 
used in Wis. Stat. § 70.995.2 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 70.995 (1993-94) provides in relevant part: 
(1) APPLICABILITY. (a) 
In 
this 
section 
"manufacturing 
property" 
includes 
all 
lands, 
buildings, structures and other real property 
used in manufacturing, assembling, processing, 
fabricating, making or milling tangible personal 
property for profit . . .  
 . . .  
(d) Except for the activities under sub. 
(2), 
activities 
not 
classified 
as 
manufacturing in the standard industrial 
classification 
manual, 
1987 
edition, 
published by the U.S. office of management 
and budget are not manufacturing for this 
section. 
(2) FURTHER CLASSIFICATION. In addition to the 
criteria set forth in sub. (1), property shall be 
deemed prima facie manufacturing property and 
eligible for assessment under this section if it 
is included in one of the following major group 
classifications 
set 
forth 
in 
the 
standard 
industrial classification manual, 1987 edition, 
published by the U.S. office of management and 
budget. . . . : 
 . . .  
j) 
27—Printing, 
publishing 
and 
allied 
industries. 
 . . .  
(v) 39—Miscellaneous manufacturing industries. 
No.  2015AP2019.awb 
 
8 
 
¶126 The 
question 
presented 
was 
whether 
Zip 
Sort's 
activities entitled it to a "manufacturing property" designation 
for tax purposes.  Zip Sort's primary business was to make mail 
machine-sortable through the addition of a bar code.  Id., ¶3. 
¶127 The 
Department 
of 
Revenue 
determined 
that 
such 
activity 
did 
not 
entitle 
Zip 
Sort 
to 
a 
manufacturing 
classification for its property, and the Tax Appeals Commission 
agreed.  Id., ¶10.  In examining this determination, the court 
of appeals initially set about to determine the proper level of 
deference to accord to the Department's interpretation of the 
term "manufacturing property."  Id., ¶¶11-22.  The court 
declined to "determine whether the proper standard of review is 
due weight deference or great weight deference because [it] 
conclude[d] that the commission's conclusions under § 70.995 at 
least met the due weight deference standard."  Id., ¶22. 
¶128 Pursuant to such a standard, the court of appeals 
determined that the commission's interpretation was reasonable, 
and that Zip Sort's interpretation was "no more reasonable."  
Id., ¶34.  Accordingly, it affirmed the commission's decision. 
Id.  Whether the commission's interpretation was correct did not 
enter the analysis. 
¶129 If it applied a de novo standard of review, would the 
Zip Sort court reach the same result?  I do not know.  However, 
the Zip Sort decision was reached through the methodology that a 
majority of this court now disowns (and that several members 
suggest is contrary to the Wisconsin Constitution).  Is what was 
a settled point of law since 2001 now unsettled?  Can businesses 
No.  2015AP2019.awb 
 
9 
 
and agencies rely on our past decisions in planning their future 
activities?  The majority/lead opinion's assurances that they 
can provide little comfort and are thinly supported.  See 
Justice Ziegler's concurrence, ¶139 n.3. 
¶130 Zip Sort is not the only case where an appellate court 
has applied our three-tiered deference methodology.  It serves 
as but one example of the myriad cases where courts have 
faithfully applied the deference jurisprudence as set forth by 
this court. 
¶131 The court has significantly upset the finality of our 
past cases.  "[F]requent and careless departure from prior case 
precedent undermines confidence in the reliability of court 
decisions."  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶95.  "When legal 
standards 'are open to revision in every case, deciding cases 
becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and 
unpredictable results.'"  State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, 
¶55 n.27, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526 (citations omitted). 
¶132 Our three-tiered deference scheme has suited us well 
over the past decades.  In unnecessarily disowning our well-
developed jurisprudence, the court should at least provide 
guidance for the future.  Litigants, circuit courts and the 
court of appeals should not be left adrift to redefine what has 
previously been well-settled. 
¶133 For the above stated reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶134 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
1 
 
¶135 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the result the court reaches.  I concur and write 
separately because the analysis that the lead opinion employs to 
reach its conclusions is concerning.  First, in my view, it is 
both unnecessary and inadvisable to rely on constitutional 
grounds for ending our practice of deferring to administrative 
agencies' conclusions of law.  Deference to administrative 
agencies was a court-created doctrine and, thus, is one that can 
be court eliminated.  We need not reach for the constitution to 
so act.   
¶136 Second, in interpreting the statute here, the court1 
relies on ordinary meaning to define all of five terms, even 
though two of them have statutory definitions.  Additionally, 
the court relies on the surplusage canon as grounds for 
selectively defining necessarily broad terms, even though the 
complete overlap between the two statutorily-defined terms 
indicates that the legislature may well have intended for 
overlap among the undefined terms as well.   
¶137 Nevertheless, I agree that "'processing' encompasses 
Stuyvesant Dredging's separation of river sediment into its 
component 
parts." 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶104. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully concur. 
 
                                                 
1 We refer to the opinion as a lead opinion in Part I 
because its constitutional analysis has not garnered the support 
of a majority of the court.  We refer to the opinion as that of 
"the court" or as the "majority opinion" in Part II because its 
statutory analysis does have the support of a majority of the 
court. 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
2 
 
I.  INTERPRETING AND APPLYING THE LAW  
¶138 The 
lead 
opinion 
reaches 
for 
the 
constitution 
unnecessarily.  It states as follows:   
 
As the deference doctrine developed . . . [we did 
not] determine whether this was consistent with the 
allocation of governmental power amongst the three 
branches.  So, as a matter of first impression, we 
consider whether our deference doctrine is compatible 
with 
our 
constitution's 
grant 
of 
power 
to 
the 
judiciary . . . . 
Lead op., ¶42.  As the lead opinion acknowledges, our deference 
doctrine was a policy of judicial administration,2 and, as such, 
it is not essential to draw on constitutional principles to 
overturn it.  See State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 
N.W.2d 44 (1997) ("An appellate court should decide cases on the 
narrowest possible grounds."); Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights 
Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶¶51-53, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384 ("This 
court does not normally decide constitutional questions if the 
case can be resolved on other grounds.").  I depart with the 
lead opinion because the doctrine of constitutional avoidance 
requires that we act with restraint.  In accordance with this 
principle, I would not rely on the constitution to overturn our 
judicially-created administrative deference doctrine.   
                                                 
2 See, e.g., lead op., ¶34 ("[Great weight deference] 
developed 
as 
a 
home-grown 
doctrine 
within 
the 
judiciary . . . ."); id., ¶70 ("[G]reat weight deference is a 
creature of our own making . . . ."); id., ¶40 ("[J]ust like 
'great weight' deference, 'due weight' deference has become an 
integral, and therefore unavoidable, part of the framework 
within which we review an administrative agency's conclusions of 
law."); id., ¶3 ("We have [] decided to end our practice of 
deferring to administrative agencies' conclusions of law."). 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
3 
 
¶139 Moreover, departing from deference on the basis of 
judicial administration would not call into question the 
continuing validity of the decades of cases that have relied on 
the deference doctrine.  In this regard, I disagree with the 
lead opinion's assertions that "[i]f [a decision] [was] final 
upon release of this opinion, [its] finality will go on 
undisturbed by our decision today";3 and that "[c]onsequently 
                                                 
3 The lead opinion cites Wis. Stat. § 806.07 in support of 
this assertion, concluding that no paragraph of that statute 
would allow a party to reopen a final judgment based on this 
decision.  Lead op., ¶¶89-91.  To the contrary, the lead 
opinion's conclusion that deference is unconstitutional could 
support an argument for relief from a final judgment under 
§ 806.07(1)(a), on the basis of "mistake"; under para. (1)(d), 
on the basis that "[t]he judgment is void"; under para. (1)(f), 
on the basis that "[a] prior judgment upon which the judgment is 
based has been reversed"; or under para. (1)(h), on the basis 
that "[a]ny other reasons justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment."  § 806.07(1)(a), (d), (f), (h).   
The lead opinion attempts to bolster its interpretation of 
§ 806.07 by quoting Schauer v. DeNeveu Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 
194 Wis. 2d 62, 75, 533 N.W.2d 470 (1995), for the proposition 
that "'[§ 806.07] does not authorize relief from a judgment on 
the ground that the law applied by the court in making its 
adjudication has been subsequently overruled in an unrelated 
proceeding.'"  Lead op., ¶90 (alteration in original).  To the 
contrary, the court in Schauer concluded that "sec. 806.07(1)(f) 
does not authorize relief from a judgment on the ground that the 
law applied by the court in making its adjudication has been 
subsequently overruled in an unrelated proceeding."  Schauer, 
194 Wis. 2d at 66.  Thus, the lead opinion's implication-by-
alteration that this case interpreted § 806.07 broadly is error.  
Moreover, Schauer was a case where the parties had reached a 
settlement regarding the scope of an easement wherein they 
allegedly relied on later-overruled case law in reaching the 
settlement. 
 
Thus, 
while 
arguably 
Schauer 
decided 
the 
application of § 806.07(1)(f) under those circumstances, it does 
not address other subsections of the statute, nor does it 
address every possible application of § 806.07(1)(f).   
(continued) 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
4 
 
[the] precedential and controlling effect [of past cases] will 
be the same as if the court had based the decision on its own 
interpretation."  Lead op., ¶¶89, 93.  The lead opinion provides 
no support for these assertions and the constitutional tenor of 
its analysis suggests exactly the opposite.  Accordingly, I 
agree with Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's concurrence that the lead 
opinion fails to adequately account for the effect its analysis 
will have on prior decisions.  
¶140 Additionally, it is inadvisable to turn to the 
constitution and address the "core powers" of the judiciary in 
this case.  The lead opinion's "core powers" analysis proceeds 
as follows: judicial power is vested in the judiciary;4 the 
doctrine of separation of powers is fundamental to government;5 
the powers of each branch of government fall into one of two 
categories——shared 
powers 
or 
exclusive/core 
powers;6 
the 
judiciary 
has 
the 
"'exclusive 
responsibility 
to 
exercise 
judgment in cases and controversies arising under the law'";7 
                                                                                                                                                             
Additionally, the lead opinion's assertion that "overruling 
a case does not expose to collateral attack any of the 
intervening decisions that were based on the overruled case" is 
subject to question.  Lead op., ¶90.  To the contrary, 
overruling one of our prior decisions, can quite obviously have 
significant impact on other cases.   
4 See lead op., ¶42 (citing Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2). 
5 See lead op., ¶44 (citing Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights 
Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶11, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384). 
6 See lead op., ¶46 (citing State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 
643, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999)). 
7 Lead op., ¶54 (quoting Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶37). 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
5 
 
exercising judgment "encompasses interpreting and applying the 
law to the case . . . ";8 therefore, "only the judiciary may 
authoritatively interpret and apply the law in cases before our 
courts."9  In other words, the judiciary has constitutionally-
conveyed jurisdiction to interpret and apply the law in cases 
and controversies before the courts. 
¶141 This conclusion is either quite remarkable or quite 
unremarkable; that is, if the lead opinion is breaking new 
ground in defining the power of the judiciary, that is 
remarkable, but if it is not, there is no need to remark on the 
court's role here because it is not disputed.  Given that the 
lead opinion feels the need to so-remark, however, I feel 
compelled to caution that its comments should not be read more 
broadly for the proposition that the judiciary possesses 
exclusive authority to interpret and apply the law generally in 
all arenas.  Although the lead opinion appears to agree that the 
power to interpret and apply the law more generally is shared 
among the branches,10 its definition of the judiciary's "core 
                                                 
8 Lead op., ¶54. 
9 Id. 
10 For example, the lead opinion states as follows: 
The executive must certainly interpret and apply the 
law; it would be impossible to perform his duties if 
he did not.  After all, he must determine for himself 
what the law requires (interpretation) so that he may 
carry it into effect (application).  Our constitution 
not only does not forbid this, it requires it.  Wis. 
Const. art. V, § 1 ("The executive power shall be 
vested in a governor . . . ."); 
Perez v. Mortg. 
Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
6 
 
power," see supra ¶140, is applied more broadly at times such 
that it could be read to abrogate the shared nature of the power 
to interpret and apply the law.11  This lead opinion is not to be 
read so broadly. 
¶142 In sum, I would not reach the constitutional issue 
because reversal on judicial administration grounds is more 
appropriate: that which the court administratively gives, the 
court can administratively take away, and doing so on the basis 
of judicial administration would not require undermining the 
decades of cases that did rely on the deference doctrine 
because, at the time, it was our policy to do so.  Additionally, 
the lead opinion's conclusions on constitutional grounds——
regarding the judiciary's core powers——should be read as limited 
to the unremarkable reiteration of our responsibility to 
interpret and apply the law in cases and controversies before 
the courts.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
J., concurring) ("It is undoubtedly true that the 
other branches of Government have the authority and 
obligation to interpret the law . . . ."). 
Lead op., ¶53. 
11 See, e.g., lead op., ¶54 (citing Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 
46, ¶73, 375 Wis. 2d 1, 894 N.W.2d 426 (R. Grassl Bradley, J., 
concurring)) ("'[T]he court's duty to say what the law is' 
constitutes a 'core judicial function.'"); id., ¶70 (citing Wis. 
Stat. § 227.57(5)) ("[T]he statute says the court is to decide 
whether the agency has 'erroneously interpreted a provision of 
law.'  And the court is to determine the 'correct interpretation 
of the provision of law.'  This formulation recognizes the 
proper residence of our core judicial powers."); id., ¶¶73-74 
(implying that an agency's interpretation and application of the 
law is an exercise of "our power."). 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
7 
 
II.  INTERPRETING AND APPLYING WIS. STAT. § 77.52(2)(a)11. 
¶143 I also write because I do not agree with the court's 
redefining terms that the legislature has statutorily defined.  
Specifically, 
the 
legislature 
defines 
"printing" 
and 
"imprinting." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 77.51(11). 
 
Without 
acknowledging 
or 
attempting 
to 
incorporate 
these 
two 
statutorily-defined terms into its analysis, the court first 
turns to ordinary meaning (i.e., dictionaries) in interpreting 
and applying Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2)(a)11.  While it is not 
improper for the court to turn to the dictionary for the 
undefined terms, I take issue with the court turning to the 
dictionary to redefine "printing" and "imprinting"——the two 
statutory terms.  In so doing, the court also overstates the 
necessity of avoiding surplusage because the legislature here 
has defined at least some terms——printing and imprinting——to 
entirely overlap.  In the end, this is a taxation statute; it 
could very well be that the legislature wanted to leave little 
room for exclusion from taxation.   
 
A.  Specially-Defined Terms:  Printing and Imprinting 
¶144 The legislature provided definitions for two of the 
five terms at issue——printing and imprinting——and those two 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
8 
 
statutorily-defined terms completely overlap.12  However, in an 
effort to ensure that each term "retain[s] an independent 
meaning," that is, "has at least one attribute distinct from the 
others," majority op., ¶101, the court makes no mention of the 
legislatively-provided 
definitions, 
but 
instead 
selects 
dictionary definitions that support its analysis.  Majority op., 
¶100.  I find that to be contrary to our prescribed method of 
statutory interpretation. 
¶145 To start, Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) provides:  "All words 
and phrases shall be construed according to common and approved 
usage; but technical words and phrases and others that have a 
peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed according to such 
meaning."  Similarly, State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane County states:  "Statutory language is given its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special 
definitional 
meaning." 
 
2004 
WI 
58, 
¶45, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110; see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
                                                 
12 The five terms at issue are "processing," "producing," 
"fabricating," "printing," and "imprinting."  "Printing" and 
"imprinting" are defined by statute, see Wis. Stat. § 77.51(11); 
"processing," "producing," and "fabricating" are not.  The court 
argues that § 77.51(11), despite being a subsection of the 
"Definitions" section of the statute, does not provide a 
definition 
because 
it 
provides 
no 
"useful 
information."  
Majority op., ¶102 n.51.  As noted below, see infra ¶145, note 
14, the fact that the court finds the statutory definition 
unhelpful in conducting its preferred analysis is not a reason 
to ignore it.  Moreover, to the contrary, § 77.51(11) does 
provide 
useful 
information, 
namely, 
a 
measure 
of 
the 
legislature's comfort with overlap.  See infra ¶149. 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
9 
 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 69-77 
(2012) ("Ordinary-Meaning Canon") ("Words are to be understood 
in 
their 
ordinary, 
everyday 
meanings——unless 
the 
context 
indicates that they bear a technical sense."). 
¶146 Under the statute, "printing" and "imprinting" are 
specially 
defined: 
"'Printing' 
and 
'imprinting' 
include 
lithography, 
photo-lithography, 
rotogravure, 
gravure, 
letterpress, silk screen printing, multilithing, multigraphing, 
mimeographing, photostating, steel die engraving and similar 
processes."  Wis. Stat. 77.51(11) (2007-08).13  Nevertheless, the 
court states as follows: 
"[P]rinting" means "[t]o make or produce (text, a 
book, a picture, etc.) by a mechanical process 
involving the transfer of characters or designs on to 
paper, vellum, etc."  Printing, The Oxford English 
Dictionary 
(2d 
ed. 
1989) 
(definition 
II.8.a.). . . . "[I]mprinting" means "[t]o mark by 
pressure; to impress, stamp," "[t]o impress (letters 
or characters) on paper or the like by means of type," 
and "[t]o make an impression or impressed figure upon; 
to stamp or impress (something) with a figure, etc."  
Imprinting, The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 
1989) (definitions 1.a., 2., and 4.a., respectively). 
Majority op., ¶100.  This reliance on ordinary meaning (i.e., 
dictionaries) is contrary to statute and to the common law 
because "printing" and "imprinting" are specially defined.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1); Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  But, 
despite the clarity of the law in this area, the court gives no 
consideration to the synonymous, statutory definition and 
                                                 
13 "Printing" and "imprinting" are also specially defined in 
this manner in the 2005-06 version of the statute.  See majority 
op., ¶2 n.2. 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
10 
 
instead favors dual dictionary definitions.  Doing so does aid 
its analysis in at least two ways,14 but the legislatively 
defined terms cannot be ignored for the sake of convenience.  
Moreover, 
further 
analysis 
reveals 
that 
relying 
on 
the 
synonymous statutory definitions is not fatal to the court's 
result because such overlap is likely what the legislature 
intended.   
 
B.  Surplusage  
¶147 The court understandably struggles with distinguishing 
"processing," "producing," and "fabricating."  As an initial 
matter, these terms are not statutorily defined.  And, although 
normally this would not present great difficulty——as resort to 
dictionaries for ordinary meaning is appropriate where terms are 
not statutorily defined——here, even the dictionary definitions 
have significant overlap.  (How would one produce or fabricate 
something without putting it through a process?)  But instead of 
acknowledging this overlap, the court reaches to distinguish 
these terms in order to avoid surplusage.  Such artifice is 
unnecessary in my view.  First, surplusage need not be avoided 
                                                 
14 First, the statutory definition is illustrative rather 
than descriptive.  Thus, reliance on the statutory definition 
would impair the court's analysis because it would not provide a 
useful 
comparison 
to 
the 
court's 
descriptive 
dictionary 
definitions of "producing" and "fabricating."  See majority op., 
¶100.  Second, the statute defines "printing" and "imprinting" 
as synonyms, that is, their statutory definition overlaps in its 
entirety.  Thus, reliance on the statutory definition would 
impair the court's analysis because it would contravene the 
court's conclusion that each term "retain[s] an independent 
meaning" because "it has at least one attribute distinct from 
the others."  Majority op., ¶101. 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
11 
 
at all costs.  Second, not all overlap is surplusage, 
particularly where, as here, the plain meaning of the terms and 
the synonymous nature of coordinate, legislatively-defined terms 
invites overlapping interpretations.  Third, regardless of the 
amount of overlap, Stuyvesant Dredging's actions fall within the 
definition of "processing."  Again, in a taxation statute, where 
generally the legislature is trying to include, not exclude, 
those who will be subject to taxation, such a broad sweep is 
unsurprising.  
¶148 While 
avoiding 
surplusage 
is 
generally 
favored, 
surplusage need not be avoided at all costs.  Kalal states: 
"Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (emphasis added); see also Scalia & Garner, 
supra ¶144 at 174-79 ("Surplusage Canon") ("If possible, every 
word and every provision is to be given effect . . . .") 
(emphasis added).  Thus, it is not true that "we must understand 
'processing' to bear a meaning that does not displace all of the 
other 
descriptors . . . ." 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶101 
(emphasis 
added).15 
¶149 Additionally, in my view, it may not be possible to 
avoid complete overlap among "processing," "producing," and 
                                                 
15 In this regard, I do not disagree that "[w]e must make 
our best effort at determining the specific meaning," majority 
op., ¶103 n.51 (emphasis added); rather, in my view, no effort——
other than one to rewrite the statute——can overcome the plain 
and broad meaning of the terms used by the legislature here.  
See infra ¶¶148, 150-153. 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
12 
 
"fabricating," because the ordinary meaning of "processing" is 
so broad.16  But the fact that an abstract definition of 
"processing" could encompass the abstract definitions of the 
other statutory terms does not necessarily displace them, as 
their use might be more appropriate in certain contexts.  For 
example, on the one hand, we think of films as being "produced" 
and some stories as being "fabricated," even though no one would 
dispute that making a film or making up a story is a process.  
On the other hand, we think of some foods——American cheese 
slices, for example——as being "processed."   
¶150 In other words, surplusage is not to be assumed merely 
because the legislature has used a broad term.  See Pawlowski v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI 105, ¶22, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 
N.W.2d 67 ("The use of different words joined by the disjunctive 
connector 'or' normally broadens the coverage of the statute to 
reach distinct, although potentially overlapping sets.")  This 
is perhaps particularly true where, as here, the legislature has 
invited 
such 
overlapping 
interpretations 
by 
specifically 
defining two of the terms as synonyms.  See Georgina G. v. Terry 
M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 540, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994) (Bablitch, J., 
dissenting) ("The legislature at times, as here, deliberately 
                                                 
16 In this regard, I note that the court's conclusion that 
"processing" 
is 
"a 
task 
that 
can 
be 
completed 
without 
transforming the property into a new product, or adding anything 
to it that was not already there" does not avoid displacing 
"producing" and "fabricating."  Majority op., ¶103.  Just 
because "processing" encompasses tasks that are not "producing" 
or 
"fabricating" 
does 
not 
mean 
that 
"producing" 
and 
"fabricating" are not subordinate forms of "processing." 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
13 
 
paints with a very broad . . . brush."); see also Scalia & 
Garner, supra ¶144 at 174 ("[I]t is no more the court's function 
to revise by subtraction than by addition."). 
¶151 Regardless of the amount of overlap, under a plain 
meaning 
analysis 
Stuyvesant 
Dredging's 
work 
constituted 
"processing," 
as 
that 
term 
is 
used 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11.  We begin with the language of the statute.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  The statute states in relevant 
part as follows: 
 
(2)  For the privilege of selling, performing or 
furnishing the services described under par. (a) at 
retail in this state to consumers or users, a tax is 
imposed upon all persons selling, performing or 
furnishing the services at the rate of 5% of the gross 
receipts from the sale, performance or furnishing of 
the services. 
 
(a)  The tax imposed herein applies to the 
following types of services: . . . 
 
11.  The producing, fabricating, processing, 
printing or imprinting of tangible personal property 
for a consideration for consumers who furnish directly 
or indirectly the materials used in the producing, 
fabricating, processing, printing or imprinting.  This 
subdivision 
does 
not 
apply 
to 
the 
printing 
or 
imprinting of tangible personal property that results 
in printed material, catalogs, or envelopes that are 
exempt under s. 77.54 (25) or (25m). 
§ 77.52(2)(a)11.   
¶152 "Processing" is not defined in the statute, thus, 
resort to dictionary definitions is not inappropriate.  See 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 ("Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning . . . .").  "Processing" 
is defined in dictionaries as follows: (1) "to subject to a 
special process or treatment"; "to subject to or handle through 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
14 
 
and established usually routine set of procedures";17 (2) "to put 
through the steps of a prescribed procedure"; "to prepare, 
treat, or convert by subjecting to a special process";18 (3) 
"[t]o subject to or treat by a special process; to operate on 
mechanically or chemically."19  
¶153 In my view, 
Stuyvesant Dredging's 
separation of 
dredged materials plainly falls under any of these definitions 
of "processing."  "If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  And 
I would reiterate that the fact that the definition of 
"processing" is broad does not mean that it is ambiguous, nor 
does it render the statute meaningless.  See Kernz v. J. L. 
French Corp., 2003 WI App 140, ¶16, 266 Wis. 2d 124, 667 
N.W.2d 751 ("[A] phrase is not ambiguous simply because it is 
general or broad."); see also Zarnstorff v. Neenah Creek Custom 
Trucking, 2010 WI App 147, ¶21, 330 Wis. 2d 174, 792 N.W.2d 594 
(quoting Lawver v. Boling, 71 Wis. 2d 408, 422, 238 N.W.2d 514 
(1976)) ("[A]n otherwise unambiguous provision is not rendered 
ambiguous simply because it is difficult to apply to the facts 
of a particular case."). 
                                                 
17 Process merriam-webster.com, (search "processing") (verb) 
(last visited May 11, 2018). 
18 Process ahdictionary.com, (search "processing") (tr. v.) 
(last visited May 11, 2018). 
19 Majority op., ¶103 (quoting Processing The Oxford English 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (definition 3.a.)). 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
15 
 
¶154 In sum, the plain language of the statute compels the 
conclusion 
that, 
in 
the 
Venn 
diagram 
of 
definitions, 
"processing" is the paper on which overlapping circles for 
"producing" and "fabricating" are drawn.  This, however, does 
not mean that Stuyvesant Dredging's work cannot be understood as 
falling within the plain meaning of "processing." 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶155 I agree with the result the court reaches.  I concur 
and write separately because the analysis that the lead opinion 
employs to reach its conclusions is concerning.  First, in my 
view, it is both unnecessary and inadvisable to rely on 
constitutional grounds for ending our practice of deferring to 
administrative agencies' conclusions of law.  Deference to 
administrative agencies was a court-created doctrine and, thus, 
is one that can be court eliminated.  We need not reach for the 
constitution to so act.   
¶156 Second, in interpreting the statute here, the court 
relies on ordinary meaning to define all of five terms, even 
though two of them have statutory definitions.  Additionally, 
the court relies on the surplusage canon as grounds for 
selectively defining necessarily broad terms, even though the 
complete overlap between the two statutorily-defined terms 
indicates that the legislature may well have intended for 
overlap among the undefined terms as well.   
¶157 Nevertheless, I agree that "'processing' encompasses 
Stuyvesant Dredging's separation of river sediment into its 
No.  2015AP2019.akz 
 
16 
 
component 
parts." 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶104. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully concur. 
¶158 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins Part I of this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2015AP2019.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶159 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (concurring).  I agree that 
we should no longer give deference to administrative agency 
conclusions of law and that the services provided by Stuyvesant 
Dredging constitute "processing" under Wis. Stat. § 77.52(2).  
However, unlike the lead opinion, I would apply the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance and eliminate deference by withdrawing 
the language in Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 
539 N.W.2d 98 (1995), that indicated deference is mandatory.  
Specifically, I would withdraw the following two sentences:  (1) 
"courts 
should 
defer 
to 
an 
administrative 
agency's 
interpretation of a statute in certain situations," id. at 660; 
and (2) "[o]nce it is determined under Lisney that great weight 
deference is appropriate, we have repeatedly held that an 
agency's interpretation must then merely be reasonable for it to 
be sustained,"  id. at 661.1  I would withdraw this language 
because the Harnischfeger court's use of the word "should" in 
the first sentence did not expose the mandatory nature of 
deference, which does not appear until the second sentence with 
its use of the word "must."  In so doing, I would thereby avoid 
addressing the issue on constitutional grounds.2   
                                                 
1 By implication, which I now make express, my analysis and 
conclusion apply just as strongly to due weight deference.   
2 Accordingly, I join the following parts of the majority 
opinion:  ¶¶1-3, I, II (intro), II.A. (intro), II.A.1., II.A.2., 
II.A.6., II.B., III, and the mandate.  To the extent the first 
sentence of ¶84 implies a holding on constitutional grounds, I 
do not join it. 
 
No.  2015AP2019.mjg 
 
2 
 
¶160 Constitutional avoidance is a subset of the axiom that 
"[a]n appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest 
possible grounds."  State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 
N.W.2d 44 (1997).  "Consistent with this rule is the recognition 
that a court will not reach constitutional issues where the 
resolution of other issues disposes of an appeal."  Id.  In the 
present case, we need not determine whether our constitution 
prohibits deference because deference is nothing more than a 
judicial construct based on our misreading of Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.57(10).  See lead op., ¶¶27-32. 
¶161 As the lead opinion aptly explains, the deference 
doctrine is a beast of our creation——neither the legislature nor 
executive purported to require that we apply deference.  See 
lead op., ¶¶18-33.  Therefore, we are free to dispense with 
deference as simply as we adopted it.  See Holytz v. Milwaukee, 
17 Wis. 2d 26, 37, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), superseded by statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80.   
¶162 We created deference through a continued misreading of 
Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10), which culminated in our holding in 
Harnischfeger, 196 Wis. 2d at 661, that deference is required, 
not merely an aid in statutory interpretation.  See lead op., 
¶¶27-33.  We can (and therefore should) remedy this misreading 
without invoking the constitution.  Johnson Controls, Inc. v. 
Emplrs. Ins., 2003 WI 108, ¶99, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257; 
see also lead op., ¶¶82-83.   
¶163 The lead opinion briefly states the five traditional 
factors we use when deciding whether to overrule one of our 
 
No.  2015AP2019.mjg 
 
3 
 
prior decisions, lead op., ¶82, and then just as briefly 
concludes that our prior decisions regarding deference must be 
overruled based solely on their unconstitutional holdings, id., 
¶83.  Our authority to withdraw language from our prior 
decisions alone is sufficient to the task and the lead opinion's 
invocation of the constitution in this context is an unnecessary 
and imprudent addition to its substantive analysis. 
I.  THE TRADITIONAL FIVE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR OVERTURNING PRECEDENT 
¶164 We are "more likely to overturn a prior decision when 
one or more of the following circumstances is present": 
(1) Changes or developments in the law have undermined 
the rationale behind a decision;  
(2) There is a need to make a decision correspond to 
newly ascertained facts;  
(3) There is a showing that the precedent has become 
detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law;  
(4) The prior decision is "unsound in principle;" or  
(5) The prior decision is "unworkable in practice." 
Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶33, 293 
Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216 (quoting 
Johnson Controls, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, ¶¶98-99).  I discuss these five "circumstances" in 
order of how strongly they apply to deference. 
A.  The Prior Decision is "Unsound in Principle" 
¶165 The fourth circumstance is especially present with 
regard to deference and strongly supports our decision to 
eliminate it.  Deference is simply unsound in principle.  In 
theory, deference should make courts' decision-making easier and 
more efficient.  See The Honorable Patience Drake Roggensack, 
 
No.  2015AP2019.mjg 
 
4 
 
Elected to Decide: Is the Decision-Avoidance Doctrine of Great 
Weight Deference Appropriate in This Court of Last Resort?, 89 
Marq. L. Rev. 541, 544 (2006).  In practice, however, deference 
does not save significant court resources.  Because the level of 
deference afforded is often outcome-determinative, id. at 559, 
parties and courts often expend just as much effort arguing and 
deciding the proper level of deference as they would the merits, 
see, e.g., Emmpak Foods, Inc. v. LIRC, 2007 WI App 164, ¶¶3-8, 
303 Wis. 2d 771, 737 N.W.2d 60.  Thus, deference often hinders 
rather than helps meaningful judicial review while providing no 
corresponding benefit.  See generally Brown v. LIRC, 2003 WI 
142, ¶¶10-19, 267 Wis. 2d 31, 671 N.W.2d 279 ("Our analysis in 
this case centers around the standard of review.").   
¶166 Importantly, 
deference 
(especially 
great 
weight 
deference), if correctly and honestly applied, leads to the 
perverse 
outcome 
of 
courts 
often 
affirming 
inferior 
interpretations of statutes.  See, e.g., id., ¶44 ("Were this 
court reviewing the order of LIRC de novo, the result might very 
well be different.").  In our role as court of last resort, we 
should ensure that erroneous-but-reasonable legal conclusions 
are corrected.  See Hilton v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶54, 293 
Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 166 (Prosser, J., concurring).  Any 
doctrine that allows erroneous legal conclusions to survive 
unscathed is unsound in principle. 
 
B.  The Need to Make a Decision Correspond to Newly Ascertained 
Facts 
¶167 The second circumstance also applies in this case, 
though to a lesser extent.  Deference is based on the theory 
 
No.  2015AP2019.mjg 
 
5 
 
that administrative agencies develop expertise in their realm.  
Barron Elec. Coop. v. PSC, 212 Wis. 2d 752, 759, 569 N.W.2d 726 
(Ct. 
App. 
1997) 
("[A]n . . . important 
principle 
of 
administrative law is that, in recognition of the expertise and 
experience possessed by agencies, courts will defer to their 
interpretation of statutes in certain situations."); see also 
DOR v. Menasha Corp., 2008 WI 8, ¶¶48-50, 311 Wis. 2d 579, 754 
N.W.2d 95.  However, we do not scrutinize whether agency 
decision-makers actually possess any expertise.  For example, 
some agency decisions are made by a single hearing examiner——of 
unknown expertise or experience.  Roggensack, supra ¶7, at 557.  
Further, under the erstwhile deference construct, it is possible 
for multi-member agency review boards to lack substantial 
experience or expertise.  Id. at 558 (questioning whether LIRC 
commissioners who served, on average, 3.7 years each between 
1979 and 2004 possessed more expertise in interpreting statutes 
than courts).  We may say that it is only a matter of 
speculation that agency decision-makers possess less expertise 
than courts when it comes to interpreting various statutes.  
Importantly, it is equally a matter of speculation that they 
possess more.  Such is not the kind of foundation upon which 
sound judicial doctrines are built. 
C.  The Other Circumstances 
¶168 The first, third, and fifth circumstances do not 
substantially apply in this case.  Though, for purposes of the 
first circumstance, we may be able to infer that the legislature 
disapproves of deference based on its enactment of Wis. Stat. 
 
No.  2015AP2019.mjg 
 
6 
 
§ 227.57(11), 
such 
an 
inference 
is 
too 
weak 
to 
support 
overruling decades of prior decisions.  As to the third 
circumstance, deference is intended to maintain consistency in 
the law, though it is a matter of reasonable debate as to 
whether it achieves that goal.  Hilton, 293 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶64-65 
(Prosser, J., concurring).  Finally, despite its many flaws, 
deference is certainly workable in practice for purposes of the 
fifth circumstance. 
II.  CONCLUSION 
¶169 Clearly, "one or more of the [listed] circumstances is 
present" such that we can and should end our practice of 
deferring to administrative agency conclusions of law without 
invoking the constitution.  Bartholomew, 293 Wis. 2d 38, ¶33.  I 
would, therefore, follow the law and apply the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance in order to decide this case on the 
narrowest possible grounds.  For the foregoing reasons, I 
respectfully concur.  
¶170 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP2019.mjg 
 
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