Title: State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481, 2004-Ohio-5586.] 
  
 
THE STATE EX REL. ESSIG ET AL. v. BLACKWELL, SECY. OF STATE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481, 2004-Ohio-5586.] 
Elections — Mandamus and prohibition — Writs sought to prevent respondent 
from placing proposed constitutional amendment titled “Marriage 
Protection Amendment” on November 2, 2004 ballot — Claim for 
mandamus dismissed for lack of jurisdiction — Writ of prohibition 
denied on bases of Section 1g, Article II of the Ohio Constitution and res 
judicata. 
(No. 2004-1603 ─ Submitted October 18, 2004 ─ Decided October 21, 2004.) 
IN MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
In this case, we must determine relators’ entitlement to writs of 
mandamus and prohibition to prevent the Secretary of State from placing a 
proposed constitutional amendment on Ohio’s November 2, 2004 election ballot.  
Because we lack jurisdiction over relators’ mandamus claim and because Section 
1g, Article II of the Ohio Constitution and res judicata bar relators’ prohibition 
action, we dismiss the mandamus claim and deny the prohibition claim. 
{¶2} 
Initiative petitioners, Reverend K. Z. Smith, Lori A. Viars, and 
Phil Burress, are members of a committee named the Ohio Campaign to Protect 
Marriage.  They proposed by initiative petition that the Ohio Constitution be 
amended by adding the following section to Article XV: 
{¶3} 
“Section 11.  Only a union between one man and one woman may 
be a marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions.  
This state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status 
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for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, 
qualities, significance or effect of marriage.” 
{¶4} 
On April 20, 2004, the petitioners submitted the proposed 
constitutional amendment and a summary of the proposed amendment to the 
Attorney General of Ohio for certification in accordance with R.C. 3519.01(A).  
The summary provided: 
{¶5} 
“The amendment denies the validity and prohibits the legal 
recognition as marriage in Ohio of same-sex relationships and relationships 
comprised of three or more persons, and forbids according non-marital 
relationships a legal status intended to approximate marriage in certain respects.” 
{¶6} 
On April 28, 2004, the Attorney General certified the summary as 
fair and accurate.  On May 28, 2004, in State ex rel. Rankin v. Petro, Franklin 
C.P. No. 04CVH05-4888, Judge Daniel T. Hogan of the Franklin County Court of 
Common Pleas declared that the summary was not a fair and truthful summary of 
the proposed constitutional amendment. 
{¶7} 
By May 21, 2004, before Judge Hogan’s decision, petitioners were 
circulating part-petitions for the proposed constitutional amendment without any 
summary or Attorney General certification contained in the part-petitions.  The 
initiative petition contained the title — “Marriage Protection Amendment” — and 
the text of the proposed constitutional amendment but did not contain the 
summary and certification of the Attorney General as required by R.C. 3519.01 
and 3519.05. 
{¶8} 
On August 3, 2004, petitioners submitted their initiative petition to 
respondent, J. Kenneth Blackwell, the Secretary of State of Ohio.  On August 9, 
2004, the Secretary of State began distributing part-petitions to the appropriate 
boards of elections with instructions for examining them.  The Secretary of State 
ordered the boards of elections to report their findings by August 27.  Between 
August 24 and September 21, 2004, relators, Melanie J. Essig and Sandra Essig, 
January Term, 2004 
3 
residents and registered electors of Ohio, filed protests in 42 counties challenging 
the validity of the initiative petition.  See R.C. 3519.16.  Relators included as a 
claim in each of their protests that the August 3 initiative petition was invalid 
because it did not have the required summary and Attorney General certification.  
Over 20 common pleas courts rendered varying decisions on the protests. 
{¶9} 
On September 15, 2004, relators Melanie J. Essig and Bruce G. 
Kriete, another Ohio resident and registered elector, filed a petition in the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County for writs of mandamus and prohibition.  They 
alleged that the initiative petition submitted to the Secretary of State and the 
boards of elections on August 3, 2004, was invalid because it lacked the required 
summary and Attorney General certification.  On September 20, 2004, following 
a hearing, the court of appeals refused to issue the writs.  In a short entry, the 
court of appeals held that “relators have failed to demonstrate their right to either 
a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition under the particular facts of this 
case.”  State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell (Sept. 20, 2004), Franklin App. No. 04AP-
939. 
{¶10} On September 17, 2004, the Secretary of State notified petitioners 
that the initiative petition contained 280,578 valid signatures, which was 42,321 
signatures short of the constitutional requirement of ten percent of electors for 
placement of the initiative on the ballot.  Section 1a, Article II, Ohio Constitution.  
Pursuant to Section 1g, Article II of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 3519.16, the 
Secretary of State informed the petitioners that they had ten additional days to file 
more signatures. 
{¶11} On that same date, petitioners submitted a supplemental initiative 
petition containing additional signatures to the Secretary of State.  Like the 
previously filed petition, the supplemental initiative petition contained no 
summary or certification by the Attorney General. 
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{¶12} On September 20, 2004, relators submitted a written protest with 
the Secretary of State under R.C. 3501.39, demanding that he reject the 
supplemental initiative petition.  Relators claimed that the petition did not 
“contain a summary of the proposed amendment, nor a certification of a summary 
by the Ohio Attorney General as required by R.C. 3519.01 and 3519.05.”  On 
September 22, a hearing officer from the Secretary of State’s office conducted a 
hearing on relators’ protest at which the parties introduced exhibits and stipulated 
facts and presented oral argument.  On September 23, 2004, the Secretary of State 
adopted the hearing officer’s recommendation and denied relators’ protest.  On 
September 29, 2004, the Secretary of State certified that the original and 
supplementary petitions contained a sufficient number of valid signatures for the 
proposed amendment to be placed on the November 2, 2004 election ballot. 
{¶13} On September 24, 2004, relators filed this expedited election case 
against the Secretary of State.  Relators request a writ of mandamus ordering the 
Secretary of State to declare the supplemental initiative petition legally 
insufficient because the petition did not set forth the summary and Attorney 
General certification required by R.C. 3519.01 and 3519.05.  Relators also request 
a writ of prohibition to prevent the Secretary of State from determining that the 
supplemental initiative petition met the statutory requirements for sufficiency or 
submitting the proposed amendment to electors.  On October 1, 2004, we granted 
petitioners’ motion to intervene as additional respondents.  On October 4, the 
Secretary of State filed an answer and the petitioners filed an amended answer.  
Relators moved for leave to amend their complaint, and the parties filed evidence 
and briefs in accordance with the expedited schedule set forth in S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(9).  On October 18, 2004, the Secretary of State filed a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion for leave to amend. 
{¶14} This cause is now before the court for a consideration of relators’ 
motion for leave to file an amended complaint and on the merits. 
January Term, 2004 
5 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 
{¶15} Relators move for leave to file an amended complaint to allege that 
on September 29 (i.e., five days after the original complaint was filed) the 
Secretary of State certified that the petition, as supplemented, contained a 
sufficient number of valid signatures for the proposed constitutional amendment 
to be placed on the November 2 election ballot. 
{¶16} “Under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(2), original actions other than habeas 
corpus filed in the court ‘shall proceed under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 
unless clearly inapplicable.’ ”  Tatman v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Elections, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 425, 2004-Ohio-3701, 811 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 7.  We have applied Civ.R. 15 in 
expedited election cases on motions to amend complaints.  Campaign to Elect 
Larry Carver Sheriff v. Campaign to Elect Anthony Stankiewicz Sheriff, 101 Ohio 
St.3d 256, 2004-Ohio-812, 804 N.E.2d 419, ¶ 6. 
{¶17} We grant relators’ motion.  “Leave of court shall be freely given 
when justice so requires.”  Civ.R. 15(A).  And Civ.R. 15(E) permits parties, upon 
motion and upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, to “serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which 
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.”  In 
addition, “in determining actions involving extraordinary writs, a court is not 
limited to considering the facts and circumstances at the time that the writ was 
requested but can consider the facts and conditions at the time that entitlement to 
the writ is considered.”  State ex rel. Howard v. Skow, 102 Ohio St.3d 423, 2004-
Ohio-3652, 811 N.E.2d 1128, ¶ 9. 
{¶18} Therefore, because relators seek to amend their complaint to plead 
an event that occurred after the original complaint was filed and the amended 
complaint will not extend the time for briefing and evidence in this expedited 
election case, we grant the motion and treat their complaint as amended instanter. 
Relators’ Claims 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶19} At issue in this expedited election case is relators’ entitlement to 
writs of mandamus and prohibition to prevent the Secretary of State from placing 
the proposed constitutional amendment on Ohio’s November 2, 2004 election 
ballot.  This case is not about the merits of the proposed constitutional amendment 
but whether the petitioners complied with all applicable election laws so as to 
warrant the submission of the proposed amendment to the electorate. 
Mandamus 
{¶20} Relators seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State 
to declare the supplemental petition legally insufficient.  Although relators couch 
their request for extraordinary relief in mandamus in terms of compelling certain 
actions, it is manifest that they actually seek a prohibitory injunction.  For 
example, in relators’ memorandum in support of their complaint, they assert that 
“a writ of mandamus should issue barring [the Secretary of State] from accepting 
these non-compliant supplemental petitions and placing the initiative on the 
ballot.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶21} “ ‘In general, if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a 
prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in 
mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ ”  State ex rel. Phillips 
v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 537, 757 N.E.2d 319, 
quoting State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 
N.E.2d 704. 
{¶22} Therefore, because the true objective of relators’ mandamus claim 
is to prevent the Secretary of State from determining that the supplemental 
petition is sufficient and placing the proposed constitutional amendment on the 
November 2, 2004 election ballot, we lack jurisdiction over the mandamus claim 
and must dismiss it.  Phillips, 93 Ohio St.3d at 537, 757 N.E.2d 319; State ex rel. 
Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 69, 70-71, 
January Term, 2004 
7 
647 N.E.2d 769; see, also, State ex rel. Thurn v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 289, 290-291, 649 N.E.2d 1205 (mandamus will not lie to 
enjoin a board of elections from placing an issue on election ballot when the 
board has conducted a quasi-judicial hearing pursuant to R.C. 3501.39 on protest 
against initiative petition). 
Prohibition:  Section 1g, Article II, Ohio Constitution 
{¶23} In the alternative, relators request a writ of prohibition to prevent 
the Secretary of State from finding the supplemental petition sufficient and 
submitting the proposed constitutional amendment to the electorate.  Respondents 
assert that relators’ claim is barred by Section 1g, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution, res judicata, and laches. 
{¶24} Section 1g provides that for statewide initiative, supplementary, or 
referendum petitions, including initiative petitions for a proposed constitutional 
amendment, the “petition and signatures upon such petitions shall be presumed to 
be in all respects sufficient, unless not later than forty days before the election, it 
shall be otherwise proved and in such event ten additional days shall be allowed 
for the filing of additional signatures to such petition.” 
{¶25} “By the terms of Section 1g, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, 
any claim as to a legal deficiency in the initiative petition, including any claim 
that the ‘summary’ contained therein is in conflict with the text, must be made 
more than 40 days before the election at which such proposal is to be voted on by 
the electorate.”  State ex rel. Schwartz v. Brown (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 4, 61 
O.O.2d 151, 288 N.E.2d 821, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Furthermore, “it 
[is] clear that the 40-day provision is not limited to signatory insufficiency but 
extends to any defect of the petition of such character as would render it 
insufficient to require submission to a vote of the electorate as provided by 
Section 1a, Article II.”  Id., 32 Ohio St.2d at 10, 61 O.O.2d 151, 288 N.E.2d 821. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶26} The alleged legal deficiency that relators raise ─ the absence of a 
summary and Attorney General certification on the petition ─ is a defect that had 
to be proved not later than September 23, 2004, which was 40 days before the 
November 2, 2004 election.  In fact, relator Melanie J. Essig and relators’ counsel 
recognized this when they raised this claim in the court of appeals mandamus and 
prohibition case by arguing that unless the court of appeals expedited the case, 
Essig would “not be able to obtain any meaningful review of the current protests 
and lawsuits before September 23, 2004 ─ the deadline established by Art. II, 
Sec. 1g of the Ohio Constitution after which all signatures and, therefore, part-
petitions, are deemed presumptively valid.” 
{¶27} Relators assert that because this action challenges the sufficiency 
of the supplemental petition rather than the original initiative petition, the 40-day 
provision in Section 1g does not apply.  But the original initiative petition and 
supplemental petition both lacked the summary and certification.  Therefore, once 
the 40-day deadline was reached, the original initiative petition and supplemental 
petition were presumptively valid for this claim.  This is consistent with our 
observation that supplemental part-petitions are part of the initiative petition.  See 
Thurn, 72 Ohio St.3d at 295, 649 N.E.2d 1205. 
{¶28} Relators contend that application of this 40-day provision to 
supplemental petitions “could lead to the perverse result of barring challenge to 
supplemental petitions before they are ever submitted.”  (Emphasis sic.)  But 
adopting relators’ contention would permit persons opposing a proposed 
statewide initiative to either — as relators do in this case — raise an issue with 
regard to a supplemental petition less than 40 days before the election when they 
have previously raised and lost on the same issue with regard to the original 
petition or fail to object to a petition until within 39 days of the election and then 
mount an 11th-hour challenge to a supplemental petition for a defect they could 
have previously raised against the original petition.  We will not sanction either of 
January Term, 2004 
9 
these options.  Castleberry v. Evatt (1946), 147 Ohio St. 30, 33 O.O. 197, 67 
N.E.2d 861, paragraph two of the syllabus (“In the construction of constitutional 
provisions or legislative enactments unreasonable or absurd consequences should, 
if possible, be avoided”).  Notably, relators are not challenging the supplemental 
petition based on alleged defects that were not also contained in the initial 
petition. 
{¶29} Therefore, Section 1g, Article II of the Ohio Constitution bars 
relators’ prohibition claim.  Schwartz, 32 Ohio St.2d 4, 61 O.O.2d 151, 288 
N.E.2d 821, paragraph three of the syllabus; State ex rel. Friedlander v. Myers 
(1934), 128 Ohio St. 568, 569, 1 O.O. 167, 192 N.E. 737. 
Prohibition:  Res Judicata 
{¶30} Moreover, as respondents correctly note, res judicata also bars 
relators from bringing a successive prohibition action.  “ ‘Res judicata bars the 
litigation of all claims that either were or might have been litigated in a first 
lawsuit.’ ”  State ex rel. Commt. for Referendum of Lorain Ordinance No. 77-01 
v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 96 Ohio St.3d 308, 2002-Ohio-4194, 774 N.E.2d 
239, ¶ 32, quoting Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 Ohio St.3d 334, 2002-Ohio-2217, 767 
N.E.2d 725, ¶ 12.  Relators or their privies have already litigated their mandamus 
and prohibition claims in the court of appeals.  Consequently, res judicata bars 
this successive writ action.  State ex rel. Rust v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 100 
Ohio St.3d 214, 2003-Ohio-5643, 797 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 9. 
{¶31} The mere fact that this case involves the September 17 
supplemental petition and the earlier case addressed the August 3 initiative 
petition does not modify this conclusion.  Because the supplemental petition was 
filed on September 17, relators or their privies could have raised their claims 
regarding that petition or the Secretary of State’s September 17 decision 
permitting the petitioners to file additional signatures at the September 20 court of 
appeals hearing but evidently did not.  And because the legal issue was the same 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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for both petitions, i.e., whether the lack of a summary and Attorney General 
certification of the proposed constitutional amendment rendered the petition 
defective, res judicata bars relators’ claims here.  See Brown v. Dayton (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 245, 249, 730 N.E.2d 958 (“Whereas the first action sought to prevent 
a vote on the Ordinance, this action seeks to nullify the Ordinance after it has 
passed.  * * *  The exact same facts are at issue.  * * *  [E]ven though plaintiffs 
are seeking a different remedy, res judicata extinguishes their claim”); see, also, 
State ex rel. Stacy v. Batavia Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 269, 
2002-Ohio-6322, 779 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 16 (“collateral estoppel prevents parties from 
relitigating in a subsequent case facts and issues that were fully litigated in a 
previous case”). 
{¶32} Therefore, even if relators’ prohibition claim would otherwise have 
merit, Section 1g, Article II of the Ohio Constitution and res judicata bar it. 
Remaining Issues 
{¶33} Insofar as the parties raise other issues, e.g., laches and the 
constitutionality of the summary and Attorney General certification requirements 
of R.C. 3519.01 and 3519.05 facially and as applied to the proposed constitutional 
amendment, we need not address them because our holding renders them moot.  
See State ex rel. Becker v. Eastlake (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 502, 507, 756 N.E.2d 
1228 (holding in expedited election case “renders moot the city’s remaining 
defenses, e.g., laches, lack of proper election falsification statement, the 
unconstitutionality of the proposed charter amendment, etc.”); Barton v. Butler 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 291, 292, 530 N.E.2d 871 (in 
expedited election case, because of court’s disposition of case, “we find it 
unnecessary to decide the other issues raised,” including laches). 
{¶34} Moreover, “[c]ourts decide constitutional issues only when 
absolutely necessary.”  State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 7, 
716 N.E.2d 1114.  This is in accordance with our general rule that “we will not 
January Term, 2004 
11 
issue advisory opinions, and this rule applies equally to election cases.”  State ex 
rel. Barletta v. Fersch, 99 Ohio St.3d 295, 2003-Ohio-3629, 791 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 
22. 
Conclusion 
{¶35} Accordingly, we dismiss relators’ claim for a writ of mandamus 
and deny relators’ claim for a writ of prohibition to prevent the proposed 
constitutional amendment from being placed on the November 2, 2004 Ohio 
election ballot.  We lack jurisdiction over relators’ mandamus claim, and Section 
1g, Article II of the Ohio Constitution and res judicata bar relators’ prohibition 
claim. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR 
and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶36} I concur in the majority’s decision to grant leave to file an 
amended complaint and to dismiss the claim for a writ of mandamus. 
{¶37} I dissent from the majority’s decision to deny the writ of 
prohibition based on technical arguments.  I would reach the merits.  It is a 
seductively easy slide from the golden fortress of judicial restraint to the desolate 
valley of judicial indifference.  In this case, this court has been seduced into the 
valley by hypertechnical arguments that cause it to disregard the initiative 
petition’s  clear statutory violations. 
{¶38} Amendments to the Constitution of Ohio ought not to be made 
lightly.  That is why our General Assembly enacted R.C. 3519.01(A), which 
requires petitions to amend the Constitution to include the proposed constitutional 
amendment, a summary of the amendment, and a certification of the Attorney 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
General that the summary accurately reflects the proposed amendment.  A 
summary is especially important in this case because the second sentence of the 
proposed amendment is expansive and susceptible of more than one 
interpretation. 
{¶39} The language of R.C. 3519.01(A) and 3519.05 is crystal clear, yet 
the initiative petitioners did not comply with it.  Despite his obligation to follow 
the law, the Secretary of State also ignored R.C. 3519.01(A) and 3519.05.  He 
certified the original initiative petition and the supplemental initiative petition 
even though they plainly do not comply with R.C. 3519.01(A) and 3519.05.  
Whether the Secretary of State’s overt political interest in the passage of the 
proposed amendment influenced his decision is unknowable; the perception of 
influence is undeniable. 
{¶40} The majority relies on Section 1g, Article II of the Ohio 
Constitution and res judicata to fashion an opinion that undermines the relators’ 
diligent and  extensive efforts to bring to light a blatant disregard for a statutory 
mandate.  The res judicata rationale is borderline ridiculous.  The court of 
appeals’ decision upon which this court relies states in its entirety, “Upon review 
of relators’ petition for a writ of mandamus and petition for a writ of prohibition, 
and after consideration of the issues raised at oral argument, this court finds 
relators have failed to demonstrate their right to either a writ of mandamus or a 
writ of prohibition under the particular facts of this case.”  State ex rel. Essig v. 
Blackwell (Sept. 20, 2004), Franklin App. No. 04AP-939.  We cannot determine 
from this opinion the grounds upon which the court of appeals made its 
determination.  Yet this court determines that it cannot decide the issue because it 
has already been decided.  The highest court in this state should provide a better 
reason to justify overlooking clear statutory violations. 
January Term, 2004 
13 
{¶41} Turning to the majority’s Section 1g, Article II rationale, I am 
equally unimpressed.  As a preliminary matter, the majority opinion never 
explains how Section 1g was violated; it simply concludes that it was. 
{¶42} Based on the following facts, it is possible that Section 1g was 
violated.  The 40th day before the election was September 23.  The Secretary of 
State certified the signatures on the original part-petitions on September 17, 
despite the petitions’ obvious noncompliance with R.C. 3519.01(A) and 3519.05.  
The relators submitted a protest on September 20.  Their protest was denied by 
the Secretary of State, as “not well taken,” on September 23; this response is only 
slightly less informative than the court of appeals’ decision.  The relators filed the 
action before us on September 24. 
{¶43} It is possible to conclude, as the majority apparently does, that the 
relators did not claim a legal deficiency until September 24.  See State ex rel. 
Schwartz v. Brown (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 4, 61 O.O.2d 151, 288 N.E.2d 821.  It is 
more reasonable to conclude that the relators claimed a legal deficiency on 
September 20, before the constitutional deadline. 
{¶44} In determining that the implausible Section 1g violation allows this 
court to disregard the R.C. 3519.01(A) and 3519.05 violations, the court is 
essentially giving the Secretary of State a free pass to ignore clear statutes and to 
use tactics of delay to achieve a result in which he has a blatant political interest.  
I believe that the better course would be to reach the merits and find that R.C. 
3519.01(A) and 3519.05 were violated.  The relators have asserted their rights in a 
timely way at every opportunity.  It is regrettable that today this court vindicates 
the Secretary of State’s tactics and thereby denies the relators  meaningful review 
of their claims.  Three cheers for judicial indifference. 
____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., John P. Gilligan, Daniel M. 
Anderson and Catherine L. Strauss; Law Offices of Donald J. McTigue, and 
Donald J. McTigue, for relators. 
 
Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, L.L.P., Donald C. Brey and Elizabeth J. 
Watters, for respondent. 
 
Jones Day, Michael A. Carvin, Matthew A. Kairis and Chad A. Readler; 
Langdon & Shafer, L.L.C., David R. Langdon and Jeffrey A. Shafer, for 
intervening respondents. 
____________________