Title: Winkle v. Foster

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

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4127 Nev., Advance Opinion 4Z
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

HOWARD SKOLNIK, DIRECTOR, JUL 14 201

JESSICA LYNN WINKLE, | No. 56828
Petitioner,
SHERYL FOSTER, WARDEN, JEAN | FILE dD
CONSERVATION CAMP; AND |
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF | sppust
CORRECTIONS,
Respondents

Original petition for a writ of mandamus directing

    
   
    
   
   
  
   
  

respondents to release petitioner to a program for alcohol treatment and
residential confinement pursuant to NRS 209.425 through NRS 209.429,
Pet

 

Law Offices of Freeman & Riggs, L.L.P., and Scott N. Freeman and
Tammy M. Riggs, Reno,
for Petitioner.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Stephen D. Quinn, Chief
Deputy Attorney General, and Clark G. Leslie, Senior Deputy Attorney
General, Carson City,

for Respondents.

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION"

We granted the petition for a writ of mandamus in an unpublished
lorder entered May 27, 2011. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion to
reissue our decision as a published opinion. NRAP 36(). Cause
continued on next page...

fl- 41090

 
By the Court, SAITTA, J.:

Petitioner Jessica Lynn Winkle seeks a writ of mandamus
directing respondents Sheryl Foster, Warden of the Jean Conservation
Camp, and Howard Skolnik, Director of the Nevada Department of
Corrections, to release her to the “305 Program”? for alcohol treatment and
residential confinement pursuant to NRS 209.425 through NRS 209.429.

In 2009, Winkle pleaded guilty to causing the death of another
by driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of NRS 484.3795
(currently codified as NRS 484C.430). Winkle was sentenced to two to five
years in state prison; however, before the expiration of her minimum term,
Winkle was released to the 305 Program for alcohol treatment and
residential confinement. Several months later, the local paper ran a series
of articles reporting that law enforcement and the courts were failing to
enforce the DUI laws—in particular, by improperly releasing several
felony DUI offenders to residential confinement before completion of their
minimum two-year sentences. In response to the articles, Skolnik
determined that 8 of the 40 offenders mentioned, including Winkle, were
still in residential confinement and had not served the minimum two-year

continued

appearing, we grant the motion. Accordingly, we issue this opinion in
place of our prior unpublished order.

“The 305 Program is named after Assembly Bill 305, which
established a post-sentence treatment program for the purpose of
rehabilitating and treating certain DUI offenders with substance abuse
problems. 66th Leg. (Nev. 1991). The 305 Program is currently codified in
NRS 209.426 through NRS 209.429.

 

 
 

term, As a result, Skolnik directed that Winkle be rearrested and
returned to incarceration. Winkle's mandamus petition followed.

In her petition, Winkle seeks a writ of mandamus directing
respondents to release her to the 305 Program. We are persuaded that
writ relief is warranted for two reasons. First, we conclude that the
express language of NRS 209.427 and NRS 209.429 mandates release of
qualified offenders to the program for alcohol treatment and residential
confinement. Second, we conclude that, unlike in State v. District Court

Jackson), 121 Nev. 413, 116 P.3d 834 (2005), the express language of NRS
209.429(4)(a) deems an assignment to the program as “imprisonment” for
purposes of NRS 484C.430 and “not a release on parole.” We therefore
grant the petition for a writ of mandamus. As the parties are familiar
with the facts, we do not recount them further except as necessary to our
disposition.

DISCUSSION
Propriety of writ relief

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and
therefore, the decision to entertain the petition lies within our discretion.
Cheung v, Dist. Ct., 121 Nev. 867, 869, 124 P.3d 560, 552 (2005). Such a
writ is available only “to compel the performance of an act which the law
especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.”
NRS 34.160. A writ of mandamus will not issue if petitioner has “a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” NRS 84.170,
The petitioner bears “the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary
[writ] relief is warranted.” Pan v, Dist. Ct,, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d
840, 844 (2004).

Winkle seeks a writ of mandamus directing respondents to

release her to the 305 Program for alcohol treatment and residential

confinement. She petitions for such relief based on certain duties arising
3

 
 

under NRS 209.425 through NRS 209.429. She therefore seeks to compel
the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from
an office, something for which a writ may be issued. See NRS 34.160.
Neither Skolnik’s decision to return Winkle to incarceration nor his
refusal to release her again to residential confinement for purpose of the
305 Program is appealable; as such, Winkle does not have a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. See NRAP 3A(b); Pan,
120 Nev. at 223, 88 P.3d at 841 ("[AJn appeal is generally an adequate
legal remedy that precludes writ relief”). As a result, Winkle's writ
petition warrants our consideration

Winkle must be released to the 30! ol treatment and
residential confinement

Winkle argues that Skolnik is under a duty as
pursuant to NRS 209.425 through NRS 209.429, to release her to the 305

matter of law,

 

Program for alcohol treatment and residential confinement. She asserts
that the statutes provide for a mandatory release to the program. We
agree,

Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo
review. Butler v. State, 120 Nev. 879, 892, 102 P.3d 71, 81 (2004). When
interpreting a statute, we look to its language, State v. Catanio, 120 Nev.
1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (2004), giving effect to its terms, and avoid
an interpretation that renders its language meaningless or superfluous.
Butler, 120 Nev. at $92.93, 102 P.3d at 81. If the statute's language is
clear and unambiguous, the statute is enforced as written. Sheriff v,
Witzenburg, 122 Nev. 1056, 1061, 145 P.3d 1002, 1005 (2006). Only when
the statute is ambiguous, meaning that it is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation, do we “look beyond the language [of the statute]
to consider its meaning in light of its spirit, subject matter, and public
policy.” Butler, 120 Nev. at 893, 102 P.3d at 81.

 

4

 
om

 

The criminal penalty for conviction of DUI causing death or
substantial bodily harm is a minimum term of “imprisonment in the state
prison” for two years. NRS 484C.430(1). ‘The legislatively created post-
sentence treatment program is available for such offenders for the purpose
of rehabilitating “abuser{s] of alcohol or drugs.” NRS 209.425(1).
Assignment to the alcohol treatment program begins with an evaluation.
NRS 209.427(1). If the evaluation indicates that the “offender is an
abuser of alcohol or drugs and that the offender can be treated successfully

; the Director shall . .. assign the offender to the program.” Id. The
assignment “must be, to the extent that the period reasonably can be
predicted, for the year, or as much thereof as practicable, immediately
preceding the date the offender is due to be released from prison, either on
parole or at the expiration of the offender's term.” Id. The program
“include[s] an initial period of intensive mental and physical rehabilitation
in a facility” of the Department of Corrections. NRS 209.425(1). If the
offender then meets certain requirements, “the Director shall assign” him
lor her “to serve a term of residential confinement.” NRS 209.429(1). ‘The
assignment is deemed

 

[a] continuation of the offender's imprisonment
and not a release on parole,” and for classification purposes is further
deemed to be “an assignment to a facility of the Department [of
Corrections}.” NRS 209.429(4)(a)-(b).

‘The State's argument, if credited, creates a conflict between
NRS 484C.490(1) and NRS 209.427(1) in that, on the one hand, the
Legislature requires a minimum term of imprisonment in the state prison
of two years for those convicted of a third DUI offense or of DUI causing
death or substantial bodily injury, while, on the other hand, it has
simultaneously mandated that qualified offenders be assigned to the

 
on 9

 

program for alcohol treatment and residential confinement one year before
“the offender is due to be released from prison.” NRS 209.427(1).

It is nonetheless evident, given the express language of NRS
209.427(1), that the Legislature chose to qualify the mandatory sentencing
scheme of NRS 484C.430(1) when it created the 305 Program and
‘mandated that qualified offenders be assigned to the program prior to the
expiration of their minimum term for the purpose of rehabilitation; we are
bound to enforce its mandate.

NRS 209.427(1) states that the Director of the Department of
Corrections “shall” assign an offender to the alcohol treatment program
and that “[sJuch an assignment must be ... for the year .. . immediately
preceding the date the offender is due to be released from prison.” NRS
209.427(1). Also, NRS 209.429(1) indicates that the Director “shall assign
an offender to the custody of the Division of Parole and Probation of the
Department of Public Safety to serve a term of residential confinement.”
Even though NRS 209.429(1) is silent as to the timing of such assignment,
when NRS 209.429 is read together with NRS 209.427, the only
construction that gives meaning to the timing of an assignment to
residential confinement is to read NRS 209.429 as requiring the Director
to assign an offender to residential confinement one year before “the
offender is due to be released from prison.” NRS 209.427(1). See, ev.
Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc,, 122 Nev. 409, 418, 422, 132 P.3d
1022, 1028, 1030-31 (2006) (if possible, “this court will interpret a rule or

atute in harmony with other rules and statutes,” especially where one
provision is silent on specifics included in another (internal quotations
lomitted)). A contrary reading puts NRS 209.429 in conflict with NRS
209.427, in that an offender could be assigned to residential confinement
[before that offender is eligible for the alcohol treatment program; clearly,

 
such a construction would frustrate the purpose of these statutes and
render an absurd result. See, e.g., Southern Nev. Homebuilders v. Clark
County, 121 Nev. 446, 449, 117 P.3d 171, 173 (2008) (provisions within a
common statutory scheme must be read “with one another in accordance
with the general purpose of those statutes” and must not produce an
unreasonable or absurd result (internal quotations omitted)).

Moreover, both NRS 484C.430(1) and NRS 209.429(4)(a) use
the same term: “imprisonment.” The former mandates a minimum term of
“imprisonment” in the state prison for two years, while the latter states
that assignment to the 305 Program shall be deemed “imprisonment and
not a release on parole.” NRS 484C.430(1); NRS 209.429(4)(a) (emphasis
added). Citing Jackson, the State argues that, as a matter of policy,
participation in the 305 Program cannot be deemed imprisonment for
purposes of satisfying the minimum term of imprisonment specified in
NRS 484C.430(1). The statute at issue in Jackson, however, did not
equate pretrial confinement with imprisonment as NRS 209.429(4)(a)
expressly does. We cannot extend Jackson to the 305 Program because,
unlike the statute at issue in Jackson, NRS 209.429(4)(a) and (b)
specifically state that

of the offender's imprisonment and not a release on parole,” and for

 

jgnment to the 305 Program is “[a] continuation

classification purposes is “an assignment to a facility of the Department
(of Corrections}.” It may be that, as a matter of policy, participation in the
305 Program should not count against the minimum term of imprisonment
specified in NRS 484C.430(1); however, given the Legislature's decision to
‘equate participation in the 905 Program with imprisonment, we are not at
liberty to revise the plain wording of the statutes,

In sum, we conclude that the express language of NRS
209.427 and NRS 209.429 requires the Director to assign an eligible

 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
      

offender to the 305 Program for alcohol treatment and residential
confinement one year prior to parole eligibility. We further conclude that
NRS 209.429 deems an assignment to the program as “imprisonment” for
purposes of NRS 484C.430 and “not a release on parole.” Because Winkle
is within one year of parole eligibility and is otherwise eligible for the
program, Skolnik must release her to the 305 Program. See NRS 34.160.
We therefore grant the petition and direct the clerk of this
court to issue a writ of mandamus instructing respondents to release
Winkle to the 305 Program for aleohol treatment and residential

confinement.” i)

   

Parraguirre

Given our resolution, we need not reach Winkle's remaining
contentions.