Title: Noble v. Kalanges

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Noble v. Kalanges (2004-437); 179 Vt. 1; 886 A.2d 767

2005 VT 101

[Filed 26-Aug-2005]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2005 VT 101

                                No. 2004-437


  Denise A. Noble, et al.	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Chittenden Superior Court


  William C. Kalanges	                         April Term, 2005


  Matthew I. Katz, J.

  Christopher J. Smart, Montpelier, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

  Mark L. Sperry of Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP, Burlington, for
    Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Hayes, Supr. J.
            and Grearson, D.J., Specially Assigned


       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.   In this appeal, we consider whether plaintiffs
  have the right to prevent defendant from developing his property, which at
  one time was designated on a subdivision plat as "reserved" for an
  elementary school.  Plaintiffs argue that because their deeds reference the
  subdivision plat, they acquired an implied easement that limited the use of
  the site to a school.  Alternatively, they argue that through a
  reversionary clause of a 1985 warranty deed, they acquired an equitable
  servitude that required the site to remain open space.  The trial court
  rejected these arguments and granted summary judgment for defendant.  We
  affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  The following facts are undisputed.  Plaintiffs and defendant
  reside in Essex, Vermont.  Defendant owns real property in a subdivision
  called "Countryside," as do some plaintiffs.  The remaining plaintiffs own
  property in an adjoining subdivision called "Essex Park."  

       ¶  3.  The subdivisions were created as follows.  In 1984, Essex
  Housing Partnership (EHP) recorded a plat depicting the Countryside
  subdivision.  The plat designated an approximately fourteen-acre parcel as
  "reserved elementary school site."  EHP also recorded a plat for the Essex
  Park subdivision.  The Essex Park plat depicted an approximately
  twenty-acre parcel of land as "common open space area."  Both plats
  expressly stated that they had been approved by the town's planning
  commission in May 1984 "subject to all requirements and conditions" of the
  commission's resolution of the same date.  As discussed in greater detail
  below, the planning commission approved the plats on the condition that EHP
  deed land to the school district for an elementary school. (FN1)
   
       ¶  4.  Consistent with this agreement, EHP executed two documents in
  favor of the school district. (FN2)  In February 1985, it conveyed the
  Countryside site to the school district by deed subject to the following
  terms and conditions.  If the school district did not begin construction of
  an elementary school building within five years after the completion of the
  Countryside subdivision, EHP could prompt the planning commission and
  zoning board to review the Countryside site.  If both bodies made
  unconditional determinations that the school site should not continue to be
  reserved for public school use, they would notify the school district's
  governing board of their decision in writing and file a certified copy of
  their official resolution in the town's land records.  If the school
  district exercised a purchase option for the Essex site in accordance with
  the terms and conditions of the option (discussed below), then the
  Countryside site would revert to EHP subject to the restriction that it
  would be forever reserved as common open space for the benefit of the Essex
  Park subdivision.

       ¶  5.  As noted above, EHP also provided the school district with a
  purchase option for the Essex site in February 1985.  The option reiterated
  that the planning commission's final approval of the Countryside
  subdivision plat was conditioned on the dedication of a school site, and
  the school district wanted the option of choosing between the Countryside
  site and the Essex site for future construction.  It explained that the
  Countryside site had been conveyed to the school district with restrictions
  by warranty deed but EHP still held title to the Essex site.  Thus, and as
  partial consideration of the final approval of the planning commission, EHP
  granted the school district an exclusive option to purchase the Essex site
  for nominal consideration. 
   
       ¶  6.  The option provided that the grant would revert back to EHP
  and be forever null and void: (1) if the school district had not commenced
  construction of a school building on the Essex site within five years after
  the completion of the Countryside subdivision; or (2) if the school
  district commenced construction of a school building on the Countryside
  site.  In the case of reversion under either of these clauses, the Essex
  site would forever remain common open space "as [was] currently required." 
  The option also provided that if the school district gave timely and proper
  notice of its intent to exercise the option, then EHP must execute and
  deliver a warranty deed conveying the Essex site to the school district. 
  In July 1992, EHP conveyed the Essex site to the school district via
  warranty deed.  Ultimately, the school district did not build on either
  site.  

       ¶  7.  In January 1995, EHP assigned defendant its "right, title and
  interest in and to the reversionary rights" in the property described in
  the February 1985 warranty deed and the February 1985 purchase option.  In
  July 1995, defendant provided formal notice to the school district that the
  Countryside development had been completed.  In May 1996, defendant
  requested that the zoning board make a determination regarding the
  revertible rights of the Countryside site.  The board concluded that
  defendant's request was premature as five years had not yet passed from the
  completion of the Countryside subdivision.  In November 1996, the school
  district executed a quitclaim deed releasing its interest in the
  Countryside site to EHP.  The next day, EHP executed a quitclaim deed
  releasing its interest in the Countryside site to defendant. 

       ¶  8.  In August 1999, defendant requested a zoning permit to
  construct a home on the Countryside site.  His request was denied pending a
  meeting of the planning commission.  At a September 1999 meeting, the
  planning commission determined that the Countryside site would not be used
  for a school and ownership of the site would therefore revert to EHP.  It
  then granted defendant's request for a permit to build a home on the
  Countryside site. 

       ¶  9.  In February 2000, the zoning board and the planning commission
  issued a notice of decision regarding the Countryside site.  The notice
  stated that both boards had agreed that the Countryside site and the Essex
  site were no longer encumbered by the original restrictions contained in
  the February 1985 deed and purchase option.  The notice was intended to
  comply with the original deed restrictions, included in deeds to both
  parcels, which required that a notice of the unconditional resolution of
  the planning commission and the zoning board be recorded in the town's land
  records. 
   
       ¶  10.  In October 2000, defendant obtained an Act 250 permit to
  construct his home.  Defendant began construction on his home in April 2001
  and moved in during June 2002.  In January 2003, the planning commission
  approved defendant's plan to build seven more houses on the site. (FN3)
        
       ¶  11.  In July 2003, plaintiffs filed suit against defendant, seeking
  the removal of his home and an injunction against the construction of any
  additional homes on the site.  Plaintiffs asserted that they possessed an
  implied easement and equitable servitude that were enforceable against
  defendant.  Specifically, the Countryside plaintiffs claimed that because
  the subdivision plat, which was referenced in their deeds, depicted the
  Countryside site as reserved for a school, they had acquired an implied
  easement that barred the construction of anything other than a school on
  the site.  The Essex Park plaintiffs argued that the open space restriction
  in the 1985 deed (conveying the Countryside site to the school district)
  was triggered when the school district received a warranty deed for the
  Essex site, and they had thereby acquired an enforceable equitable
  servitude.
   
       ¶  12.  Both parties moved for summary judgment and the court granted
  defendant's motion.  The court first addressed the Countryside plaintiffs'
  implied easement claim.  It acknowledged that under Clearwater Realty Co.
  v. Bouchard, 146 Vt. 359, 364,