Title: BARCH v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BARCH v. STATE2004 WY 7992 P.3d 828Case Number: 03-185Decided: 06/30/2004
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

ALEX 
DOUGLAS BARCH,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
P. LaBuda and Stephen K. Palmer of Palmer & LaBuda, P.C., Rock Springs, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Palmer.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Tibbetts.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]           
The 
sole issue presented by this appeal is whether reasonable suspicion existed to 
permit the continued detention of Appellant Alex Douglas Barch for a dog sniff 
of the exterior of his vehicle after state troopers had concluded a routine 
traffic stop.  After issuing Barch a 
warning ticket for a missing front license plate and telling him that he was 
free to leave, state troopers conducted a dog sniff of the exterior of Barch's 
vehicle and discovered one and a half pounds of marijuana and one pound of 
psilocybin mushrooms.  After his 
motion to suppress was denied, Barch entered a conditional guilty plea to one 
count of possession with intent to deliver a controlled 
substance.

 

[¶2]           
We 
hold that the state troopers' continued detention of Barch was not based upon 
reasonable suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  The order denying the 
suppression motion is reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court, 
where Barch shall be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty.     

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Barch 
presents this statement of the issue presented for review:

 

The 
continued detention of Appellant was not justified by reasonable and articulable 
suspicion of illegal activity and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment of 
the Wyoming and United States Constitutions.

 

The 
State rephrases the issue as:

 

Did 
the District Court err in denying Appellant's motion to 
suppress?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
On 
December 7, 2002, Trooper Matthew Brackin executed a traffic stop of Barch's 
vehicle on I-80 for failure to display a front license plate.  Upon approaching the vehicle, Trooper 
Brackin asked Barch for his driver's license, registration, and proof of 
insurance.  While Barch was getting 
the requested information, Trooper Brackin asked Barch about his travel 
plans.  Barch responded that he was 
on his way from Portland to Denver to visit some friends.  Trooper Brackin asked Barch if his 
friends lived in Denver or a suburb and Barch replied that he was not sure and 
specified south Denver.  The trooper 
also noticed that Barch appeared hurried.  
Barch retrieved the front plate from his trunk, and Trooper Brackin 
noticed several Rubbermaid containers in the trunk, some of which contained 
dried foods.  Trooper Brackin 
returned to his patrol car to run a driver's license check and to prepare a 
warning ticket and noticed Trooper Tippy driving by and radioed him to come to 
the scene.  Trooper Brackin returned 
Barch's driver's license, registration, and insurance card, issued the warning 
ticket, and told Barch that he was free to leave.  Trooper Tippy arrived and parked behind 
Brackin's patrol car.  As Barch 
approached his driver's door to leave, Trooper Brackin asked if he could ask a 
few more questions, and Barch consented.  
Trooper Brackin asked Barch additional questions regarding his trip, 
employment in Portland, the amount of cash he had and whether drugs were inside 
the vehicle.  Trooper Brackin asked 
Barch for permission to search his vehicle, and Barch refused.  Brackin then told Barch that he was 
going to have Trooper Tippy walk his drug dog around Barch's car and if the dog 
did not alert to anything in the car, they would let him go. At the suppression 
hearing, Trooper Brackin agreed that Barch had not consented to the search.  

 

[¶5]           
The 
drug dog alerted to the rear wheel area at first and, after being taken around 
again, alerted on the front license plate and the left side of the trunk 
area.  Inside the Rubbermaid 
containers in the trunk, Trooper Brackin discovered about one and a half pounds 
of marijuana and a pound of psilocybin mushrooms.  Barch was arrested and filed a motion to 
suppress.  Following a hearing, his 
motion to suppress was denied, Barch entered a conditional guilty plea, and this 
appeal followed.  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Standard of 
Review

 

[¶6]           
On 
appeal, findings on factual issues made by the district court considering a 
motion to suppress are not disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.  In conducting the hearing on the motion 
to suppress, the district court has the opportunity to assess the credibility of 
the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, 
deductions, and conclusions; we will, therefore, view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the district court's determination.  Whether an unreasonable search or 
seizure has occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a question 
of law which we review de novo.  
Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶7, 64 P.3d 700, ¶7 (Wyo. 2003).  Barch limits his analysis to the Fourth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.  
Without a state constitutional analysis, we decide a search and seizure 
issue solely under the Federal Constitution.  Id. (citing Vasquez v. 
State, 990 P.2d 476, 485 (Wyo. 1999)).  
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures."   U.S. Const. Amend. 
IV.

 

 

Reasonable Suspicion Analysis

 

[¶7]           
The 
touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the 
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion 
of a citizen's personal security.  
Reasonableness, of course, depends on a balance between the public 
interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary 
interference by law officers.  
Damato, ¶8 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S. Ct. 330, 332, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (per curiam) (quotation 
marks and citations omitted)); see also, Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-32, 121 S. Ct. 946, 950, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001).  A traffic stop is a "seizure" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "even though the purpose of the stop is limited 
and the resulting detention quite brief."  
Damato, ¶9; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979).  
However, a routine traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative 
detention than a custodial arrest and such stops are analyzed under the 
principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  Damato, ¶9.

  

The 
investigatory stop represents a seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment 
safeguards, but, by its less intrusive character, requires only the presence of 
specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a 
crime.

 

Id; 
Wilson, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682, 683 (Wyo.1982)); see also Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 637 
(Wyo. 2000); and McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 
1999).  

 

[¶8]           
We 
have a dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory 
stop:  (1) whether the officer's 
actions were justified at the inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the 
first instance.  Damato, 
¶9; Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 223 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.  at 20, 88 
S.Ct. at 1879); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985).  
The conduct of an officer is judged by an objective standard which takes 
into account the totality of the circumstances.  Damato, ¶9; Putnam, 995 P.2d  at 637; Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-81; United 
States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 965 (10th Cir. 1996); Martindale v. 
State, 2001 WY 52, ¶11, 24 P.3d 1138, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001).  In applying this test, the Court has 
"consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific 
nature of the reasonableness inquiry."  
Damato, ¶9; Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996).  
"The government has the burden of demonstrating that the seizure it seeks 
to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in 
scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure."  Damato, ¶9 (quoting United 
States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir.1993)).  

 

[¶9]           
Here, 
Barch does not dispute that the initial stop was valid, and the State concedes 
that Barch's detention after the completion of the traffic stop was not 
consensual and required reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  We, therefore, must examine the second 
prong of Terry, "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."  392 U.S.  at 20, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879.  "In the course of making a routine 
traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may: request a driver's license and 
vehicle registration; run a computer check; and issue a citation."  Damato, ¶13; Burgos-Seberos v. 
State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo. 1998) (citing United States v. 
Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1997)); see also, 
Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 224.  
Generally, the driver must be allowed to proceed without further delay 
once the officer determines that the driver has a valid license and is entitled 
to operate the vehicle.  
Damato, ¶13; Burgos-Seberos, 969 P.2d  at 1133.  "In the absence of the particular 
individual's valid consent, an officer may expand an investigative detention 
only if there exists an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion' that 
criminal activity has occurred or is occurring."  Damato, ¶13; United States v. 
Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
535 U.S. 1019, 122 S. Ct. 1610, 152 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2002) (citing United States 
v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir.1998)).  "[I]n justifying the particular 
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable 
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion."  
Damato, ¶13 (citing Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 
1880).  Damato determined 
that this Court will determine if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates 
the existence of objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.  Damato, ¶16.  

 

[¶10]      The 
State contends that, under the totality of the circumstances, the detention was 
justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and points to the 
following factors:

 

1.                  
Barch 
was unable to identify specifically his destination in the Denver 
area;

2.                  
Barch 
was carrying a larger quantity of food than was necessary for his travel 
plans.

3.                  
Barch 
was nervous and hurried;

4.                  
Barch 
had been unemployed for two months making it unlikely he could afford a 
vacation.

5.                  
Barch 
was from Portland, a known drug source area.

 

The 
State concedes that some of these factors are innocuous when considered in 
isolation, but contends that viewed in totality through the eyes of a reasonable 
law enforcement officer, they were sufficient to give rise to the necessary 
reasonable suspicion to justify a brief detention since the dog was present at 
the scene and the sniff took only a minute or two.  

 

[¶11]      In 
Damato, we determined that factors three and five are of little 
significance in raising reasonable suspicion because the average citizen is 
usually nervous when stopped by law enforcement for a routine traffic violation 
and because nearly all large areas can be called known drug hubs.  Damato, ¶¶23, 24.  Without further facts to distinguish 
these factors in this situation, these factors must be deemed consistent with 
innocent conduct.  Trooper Brackin 
testified that his suspicions were aroused because Barch could not specify the 
precise Denver suburb where his friends lived; however, cross-examination 
revealed that Trooper Brackin had once flown into Denver's airport known as 
Stapleton and thought it was in south Denver without realizing that the airport 
was actually in Commerce City, Colorado.  
From this, Barch contends that it is not unusual to specify south Denver 
instead of the specific suburb and, without evidence of lying, misrepresentation 
or discrepancies, this lack of knowledge is consistent with innocent conduct and 
insufficiently suspicious.  The 
State contends generally that contradictory, implausible or vague travel plans 
can give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity but makes no 
argument that this specific statement is any or all of those factors.  We agree that Barch established that 
specifying south Denver rather than a particular suburb is common to many 
travelers and not evidence of contradictory, implausible or vague travel plans 
that should give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  In Damato, we considered the 
presence of food and said that factor described "a very large category of 
presumably innocent travelers and any suspicion associated with these items is 
virtually nonexistent."  Damato, 
¶25 (quoting United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 947 
(10th Cir. 1997)).  
Finally, Trooper Brackin found it suspicious that Barch could travel 
based on the trooper's belief that an unemployed person would not be able to 
afford to travel while unemployed.  
However, Trooper Brackin's belief is an unjustified assumption on his 
part and traveling while unemployed is innocent conduct that generally should 
not arouse suspicion.  United 
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1520 (1988), overruled on other 
grounds, 71 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 1995).  Under our totality of the circumstances 
test, however, individually innocent factors can, in combination, rise to create 
reasonable suspicion.  
Damato, ¶26.  Here, 
Trooper Brackin stopped a young male traveling alone from a drug hub, Portland, 
to an unknown suburb in south Denver for the claimed purpose of seeing friends 
although he had been unemployed for two months and possessed dried food in 
containers.  When considered 
together, these factors do not provide reasonable suspicion for illegal 
conduct.  

 

[¶12]      
We 
make this determination after a comparison with our decision in Meadows v. 
State, 2003 WY 37, 65 P.3d 33 (Wyo. 2003).  There, we held that the trooper had 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying continued detention of 
defendants after traffic citations were issued because there was a lack of 
identification of the vehicle and defendant who was driver of the car, there was 
no proof of insurance or registration on the car, defendant who was a passenger 
of the car supplied officers with false identification, defendants' actions were 
not consistent with their claims of traveling to Ohio for a funeral when their 
itineraries disagreed and were traveling without cash or an ATM card, and these 
facts combined with weighted trunk and defendant's abnormal nervousness gave 
rise to reasonable suspicion that they had committed or were committing a 
crime.  Meadows, ¶¶20, 
21.  The degree of suspicion aroused 
by defendant's conduct in Meadows sufficient to permit a detention is 
lacking in this case and cannot justify Barch's continued detention once the 
traffic stop was concluded and Barch was free to leave the scene.  The order denying the motion to suppress 
is reversed.  The matter is remanded 
to district court for withdrawal of Barch's guilty plea.