Title: JOSHUA KELLEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOSHUA KELLEY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 3199 P.3d 521Case Number: S-08-0123Decided: 01/14/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
JOSHUA 
KELLEY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.  

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court; Hill, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
contends that his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws was 
violated when the district court arbitrarily and capriciously did not grant him 
first-offender status under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2007).  Alternatively, he argues that the 
district court's denial of first-offender status was an abuse of 
discretion.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The appellant 
states the issues substantially as follows:

 
 
           
1.   Was the appellant 
treated arbitrarily and capriciously when he was denied the benefit of 
disposition of his case under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301?

 
 
           
2.   Did the denial of 
first-offender status violate the equal protection clauses of the United States 
Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution?

 
 
           
3.   Did the district 
court abuse its discretion in its application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 
in sentencing the appellant?

 
 
[¶3]      The issue that we 
will address, however, because it is mandated by our standard of review when 
there has been no objection below, is whether the district court committed plain 
error in denying first-offender status to the appellant.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      A Felony 
Information was filed on November 5, 2007, in the Circuit Court of Albany 
County, Wyoming, charging the appellant with one count of burglary and one count 
of buying, receiving, concealing or disposing of property obtained in violation 
of the law.  The appellant waived 
his right to a preliminary examination and his case was bound over to district 
court for trial.  At arraignment, 
the appellant pled guilty to burglary pursuant to the following plea agreement, 
which was set forth verbally on the record by the 
prosecutor:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Mr. [Prosecutor], I 
understand there is a plea agreement.  
Would you state that for the record, please?

 
 
MR. 
[PROSECUTOR]:  I will, Your 
Honor.  Thank you.  The plea agreement and recommendation is 
the defendant will plead guilty to Count I, burglary.  The State will dismiss Count No. 
II.  The defendant's agreed to full 
restitution to both counts, Counts I and II.  And [Victim] has already given a victim 
impact statement wherein they requested restitution in the amount of 
$5,620.  And that includes a $5,000 
reward, which, to be quite blunt, under the restitution statutes may or may not 
be granted by the Court.  That would 
be a matter for the Court, if it went to hearing.

 
 
            
The defendant has agreed to pay that full amount, the $5,620, as in his 
words, he has said he wants to take full responsibility for this situation.  Simon Contractors has not yet contacted 
our office.  The amount of their 
restitution will be determined before their [sic] 
sentencing.

 
 
            
The State, in return for this, will consent to the defendant being 
treated as a first offender under Wyoming Statute 7-13-301, and the State will, 
in fact, recommend that the defendant be treated as a first offender, due in 
large part to his willingness to stand up and pay the $5,000 reward.  "My attorneys explained to me that I may 
be able to fight that at restitution hearing, but I deserve to pay it.  I'm going to take care of that."  And so the State at his sentencing, will 
recommend first offender, as he took responsibility.

 
 
[¶5]      In recognition of 
the plea agreement, the district court withheld adjudication and ordered a 
presentence investigation report.  That report quoted the plea agreement and 
the State's recommendation for first-offender treatment, and included a 
recommendation for probation.  The 
district court did not, however, grant the appellant first-offender status.  Instead, the district court entered an 
adjudication of guilt and sentenced the appellant to incarceration for a period 
of three to five years.  That 
sentence was suspended and the appellant was placed on supervised probation for 
a period of four years.

 
 
WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 7-13-301

 
 
[¶6]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-301 provides in relevant part as follows:

 
 
(a)  If a person who has not previously been 
convicted of any felony is charged with or is found guilty of or pleads guilty 
or no contest to any misdemeanor except any second or subsequent violation of 
W.S. 31-5-233 or any similar provision of law, or any second or subsequent 
violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a) or (b) by a household member as defined by W.S. 
35-21-102 against any other household member or any similar provision of law, or 
any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree, 
aggravated assault and battery or arson in the first or second degree, the court 
may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a 
judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person 
on probation for a term not to exceed five (5) years upon terms and conditions 
set by the court. . . .

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      Sentencing 
decisions generally are subject to review for an abuse of discretion.  Smith v. State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 
(Wyo. 
1997).  This sentencing discretion 
extends to the decision of whether to grant first-offender status under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301.  Rawson v. State, 900 P.2d 1136, 1138 
(Wyo. 
1995).  In exercising its sentencing 
discretion, the district court may consider a wide variety of factors and 
circumstances.  Gorseth v. State, 2006 WY 109, ¶ 15, 141 P.3d 698, 703 (Wyo. 2006); Cohee v. 
State, 2005 WY 50, ¶ 4, 110 P.3d 267, 269 (Wyo. 2005).  The appellant bears the burden of 
proving that the sentencing court abused its discretion by resting the sentence 
on "false or improper premises."  Peden v. State, 2006 WY 26, ¶ 10, 129 P.3d 869, 872 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
"However, 
when no objection is made concerning the consideration of a particular factor, 
review is necessarily confined to a search for plain error.  Plain error, as we have often stated, 
occurs when the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a substantial 
right."

 
 

Hirsch 
v. State, 
2006 WY 66, ¶ 31, 135 P.3d 586, 598 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 2004)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      The appellant 
presents multiple arguments in this appeal, none of which get him past the plain 
error requirement that he show an error that violated a clear and unequivocal 
rule of law.  First, in his 
constitutional argument, he quotes Small 
v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 425 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 262, 602 P.2d 914, 922 (1979)), for the proposition that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause 
mandates that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike, both in the 
privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed."  In Small, this Court held that the habitual 
criminal statute did not violate equal protection principles in applying to 
involuntary manslaughter, but not to aggravated vehicular homicide.  Id. 
at 429.  Nevertheless, the appellant 
contends that the general principle espoused in Small was violated by the district court 
in his case when it denied to him first-offender treatment that would have been 
offered to others similarly situated.  
That argument is based upon the following comments by the judge at 
sentencing:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  . . . 
.

 
 
            
It's interesting that when [Victim] is robbed, burglarized again, where 
do they post the reward fliers?  All 
over town?  Huh-uh.  Wyo Tech.  Because those seem to be the people that 
like to victimize that particular business again and again and again.  And I'll tell you what, Mr. Kelley, I am 
sick of it.  I am sick of having 
people come to town that don't live here and victimize the people that do live 
here and try to make an honest living.

 
 
[¶9]      The appellant 
contends that this passage shows that, had he not been an out-of-town student 
attending the local automotive technical school, but instead had been a local 
resident, he would have received first-offender treatment, and that this 
disparity is a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of the 
laws.  To get the full flavor of the 
sentencing decision, however, the above passage must be read in the context of 
additional comments made by the court during the sentencing 
hearing:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  So what is it you 
were thinking here when you were over breaking into businesses in the middle of 
the night stealing extremely valuable property, packing it up, and I assume 
getting ready to sell it?  And this 
was no accident.  This wasn't a 
spur-of-the-moment thing.  You 
clearly planned this, carried it out, kept this stuff for quite a while.  What?  You think you can just walk away from 
that?

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
            
THE COURT:  What I wanted to 
look at was what happened to [the appellant's accomplice], because I knew he had 
been here, and I couldn't remember exactly what that disposition was.  And he's got three felony convictions 
and is off to the state pen.

 
 
            
It's interesting that when [Victim] is robbed, burglarized again, where 
do they post the reward fliers?  All 
over town?  Huh-uh.  Wyo Tech.  Because those seem to be the people that 
like to victimize that particular business again and again and again.  And I'll tell you what, Mr. Kelley, I am 
sick of it.  I am sick of having 
people come to town that don't live here and victimize the people that do live 
here and try to make an honest living.

 
 
            
First offender is on the table and I have given first offender treatment 
here a great deal of consideration in your case.  And it is the kind of thing that is 
normally used for younger people like yourself when they go out and do something 
impetuous, spur-of-the-moment, stupid, and they really don't have the time to 
think about it or take it back afterwards, spray paint property, something like 
that.  That's not what happened with 
you.  You planned this.  You and your friend went out and 
executed it.  You rented a storage 
locker to store the stolen property.  
It stayed there for a long time.  
There was nothing impetuous about this.  There was every opportunity in the world 
to, if not make it right, at least make it easier.  You didn't do any of those things.  And at the end of the day, it's time to 
send the message to Wyo Tech that when you victimize people here like you did, 
you can expect to go home with a felony conviction on your record, and that's 
what we are going to do today.

 
 
            
The only reason you are not going to prison, like your friend, is because 
you don't have any record, and because you have made some effort to show some 
remorse, if not accept responsibility.  
But I am just done with it.  
Time and time and time again.  
Enough is enough, Mr. Kelly [sic].  
This is not first offender stuff.  
This was felony, middle-of-the-night burglary, entry of property.  You knew what you were doing.  You made your choices, and there are 
consequences to that.  I'm sorry you 
didn't think more about it at the time.

 
 
[¶10]   Clearly, the district court denied 
first-offender status to the appellant for two reasons:  to punish the appellant for a 
premeditated night-time burglary, and to deter Wyo. Tech students from further 
such acts.  The appellant has 
provided no cogent argument, and has presented no authority, in support of the 
theory that a judge abuses his or her discretion or violates the equal 
protection doctrine by considering as a sentencing factor the premeditated and 
invasive nature of the crime.  
Neither has the appellant shown that general deterrencethe deterrence of 
othersis an inappropriate sentencing factor.  See Cohee, 2005 WY 50, ¶ 20, 110 P.3d  at 
274; Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 
1093 (Wyo. 
1983).  Furthermore, the appellant 
presented no evidence below, and does not even suggest to this Court, that the 
district court's comments about burglaries by Wyo. Tech students were factually 
incorrect.

 
 
[¶11]   For the most part, the appellant's 
contentions that the district court's denial of first-offender status was either 
arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion are subsumed in his 
constitutional arguments.  He makes 
a separate abuse of discretion argument, however, to the effect that by refusing 
to grant first-offender status to a defendant convicted of a premeditated crime, 
while being amenable to granting such status to a defendant convicted of an 
"impetuous" crime, the district court applied a criterion not found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301.  We find this 
argument just short of nonsense.  
First, as mentioned above, the law is clear that a sentencing court has 
broad discretion in considering many factors about both the defendant and the 
crime.  See supra ¶ 7.  Second, the appellant's position would 
replace the statutory word "may" with the word "shall."  In short, the appellant's interpretation 
would require the sentencing judge, for any crime covered by the statute, and 
where the State has consented, to grant first-offender status.  The prosecutor's decision, and the 
sentencing judge's decision, however, are clearly distinct, and neither may 
impose its will upon the other in the application of the statute.  See Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 
434-35 (Wyo. 
1990); Wright, 670 P.2d  at 
1095.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion and did not violate the appellant's right to equal protection of 
the laws by declining to grant the appellant first-offender status under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301.

 
 
[¶13]   We affirm.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 

[¶14]   I agree with the majority that 
Kelley has not adequately demonstrated that his substantial right to be 
sentenced for his 
crime was adversely affected by the district court in the process of imposing 
sentence.  Furthermore, I agree that 
the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in imposing the sentence 
it ultimately did impose, despite the plea agreement and the State's unequivocal 
recommendation of that plea agreement:

 
 
            
Sentencing decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial 
court.  Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358 
(Wyo.1997).  "A sentence will not be 
disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an 
abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and circumstances 
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the 
public sense of fair play."  Smith v. State, 941 P.2d 749, 750 
(Wyo.1997).  "An error warrants 
reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial 
rights.  The party who is appealing 
bears the burden to establish that an error was prejudicial."  Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 
439-40 (Wyo.1995) (citations omitted) [overruled in part on other grounds by Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, 43 P.3d 551 
(Wyo.2002)]; see also Robinson v. 
Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 155 (Wyo.1996).

 
 

Carothers 
v. State, 
2008 WY 58, ¶ 23, 185 P.3d 1, 14-15 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Lee v. State, 2001 WY 129, ¶ 10, 36 P.3d 1133, 1138 (Wyo. 2001)).

 
 
[¶15]   However, I am unable to agree that 
the language employed by the district court, which was directed to those who are 
students at Wyo Tech and who are from places outside Wyoming, can be 
condoned.  24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1997 at 24-25 
(2006).  I consider it an improper 
factor to have been considered under the circumstances of this case, and I think 
we need to say that.

 
 
[¶16]   As an aside, I think the majority's 
reliance on the case Wright v. State, 
670 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Wyo. 1983) is ill-advised.  The Wright case had a long history in this 
Court, but the final decision, splintered as it was, was to step back from our 
initial decision.  In Wright v. State, 707 P.2d 153, 157 
(Wyo. 1985) we 
held:

 
 
We 
conclude that the denial of probation to Grant Alan Wright was a departure from 
the trial judge's own practice which was not supported by any articulable valid 
reason in the record.  Although a 
majority of the court concluded that the sentence analyzed in isolation does not 
demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion, a different majority is equally 
satisfied that the denial of probation to Grant Alan Wright in this instance 
manifests a substantial failure of justice, and it must be 
corrected.

 
 
            
The decision of this court is that this case is to be remanded to the 
district court with instruction that the judgment and sentence shall be adjusted 
to reflect that the execution of the sentence to a term of two to four years 
(which incidentally Wright has not attacked) be suspended, and he is to be 
placed on probation for four years, in accordance with the usual conditions of 
probation imposed in similar cases, with the term of probation to commence on 
January 21, 1983.

 
 
            
CARDINE, Justice, specially concurring, with whom ROSE, Justice, 
joins.

 
 
            
I concur in the opinion of the court which holds that upon review after 
granting certiorari there was a failure of justice and that appellant should be 
granted probation.  Were the matter 
before us on appeal, I would also hold the sentence reviewable for an abuse of 
discretion and in this case, based upon the record and facts articulated by the 
court, find an abuse of discretion and grant probation to 
appellant.

 
 
[¶17]   I concur in the result, but I 
conclude that the district court improperly fashioned Kelley's sentence, at 
least in part, so as to send a message to out-of-state students who attend Wyo 
Tech, and who commit crimes in Laramie, that they are not likely to be 
considered eligible for probation.