Title: State v. Peekema

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  March 25, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

		Plaintiff-Relator,

	v.

GEORGE THOMAS PEEKEMA,

	Defendant-Adverse Party.

STATE OF OREGON,

			Plaintiff-Relator,

      v.

STEVENS EQUIPMENT COMPANY,

	Defendant-Adverse Party.

(CC 96C-21139; CC 96C-21145; SC S44997)

	Original proceeding in mandamus.*

	Argued and submitted November 3, 1998.

	Kaye E. Sunderland, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for plaintiff-relator.  With
her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael
D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.

	Joseph D. Robertson, Garrett, Hemann, Robertson,
Paulus, Jennings & Comstock, P.C., Salem, argued the cause and
filed the brief for defendants-adverse parties.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van
Hoomissen, Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.**  

	LEESON, J.

	Peremptory writ to issue.

	*On petition for a writ of mandamus from an order of
Marion County Circuit Court, Don A. Dickey, Judge.

	**Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.

	LEESON, J.

	A jury convicted defendants-adverse parties
(defendants) of the misdemeanor offenses of unlawful disposal of
hazardous waste in the second degree and unlawful storage of
hazardous waste in the second degree.  The issue in this original
proceeding in mandamus is whether the trial court erred in
granting defendants' post-verdict motion to dismiss those
charges.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial
court lacked authority to dismiss the charges.  

	Defendant Peekema is an employee of defendant Stevens
Equipment Company.  Defendants were charged in separate
indictments with two counts of unlawful disposal of hazardous
waste in the first degree, ORS 468.926,(1) two counts of unlawful
storage of hazardous waste in the first degree, ORS 468.926, and
two counts of unlawful water pollution in the first degree, ORS
468.946.(2)  All of those crimes are felonies.  The cases were
consolidated for trial.

	The statutes under which defendants were charged were
enacted in 1993.  There were no uniform jury instructions to
guide the parties.  At the state's request, the parties submitted
most of their proposed jury instructions about a week before
trial, and the trial court ruled on those proposed instructions. 
Nonetheless, after all the evidence but before closing arguments,
the state, for the first time, requested that the jury also be
instructed on the lesser-included misdemeanor offenses of
unlawful disposal of hazardous waste in the second degree and
unlawful storage of hazardous waste in the second degree. 
Defendants objected, arguing that they had pursued an "all or
nothing" strategy during trial based on the state's pretrial
submission of jury instructions on only felony charges.  

	The trial court found that defendants had relied to
their detriment on the state's jury instructions.  However, the
trial court agreed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included
offenses in order "to give the District Attorney an opportunity
to appeal this."  The court also stated that, if the jury
returned guilty verdicts on the misdemeanor charges, it would
"consider fixing this in some appropriate way."

	 The jury found defendant Stevens Equipment Company
guilty of one felony count of unlawful storage of hazardous waste
and two misdemeanor counts of unlawful disposal of hazardous
waste and found defendant Peekema guilty of two misdemeanor
counts of unlawful storage of hazardous waste.  After the jury
returned the verdicts, the trial court stated:

		"The verdicts are received and placed in the Court
file.  I anticipate before we get the judgments in
place that there may be some motions.  I'll look for
something from the defendant[s] probably within the
next what?  Five days?"

		Defendants later filed motions for a new trial, in
arrest of judgment, and to dismiss the misdemeanor charges.  The
trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and this mandamus
proceeding followed.  

		Before turning to the merits, we address defendants'
contention that relator State of Oregon's (the state's) petition
for a writ of mandamus was not filed timely.  The trial court
signed the order of dismissal on December 31, 1997, and the clerk
entered the order in the register on January 9, 1998.  The state
filed its petition for a writ of mandamus on February 9, 1998,
which was within 30 days of entry of the order in the register. 
See ORAP 1.25 (computation of time).  The state relies on ORS
138.071(1), which provides:

		"Except as provided in subsections (2), (3) and
(4) of this section, the notice of appeal shall be
served and filed not later than 30 days after the
judgment or order appealed from was entered in the
register."

Defendants contend that the state's petition was not filed timely
because a motion to dismiss is like a motion for a new trial or a
motion in arrest of judgment, and, therefore, ORS 138.071(2) is
the relevant subsection.  It provides:

		"If a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of
judgment is served and filed the notice of appeal shall
be served and filed within 30 days from the earlier of
the following dates:

		"(a)  The date of entry of the order disposing of
the motion; or

		"(b)  The date on which the motion is deemed
denied, as provided in ORS 136.535."

Defendants argue that a trial court's signature on an order is
equivalent to the entry of that order under ORS 138.071(2)(a), so
the state had 30 days from December 31, 1997, to file its
petition.

		The time period within which a party must file a
petition for mandamus relief is governed by laches, not by
statute.  State ex rel Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or 607, 620-21, 956
P2d 202 (1998); State ex rel Fidanque v. Paulus, 297 Or 
711, 717-18, 688 P2d 1303 (1984).  Nonetheless, laches generally requires
that a mandamus proceeding be filed within the statutory time
limitation required for the filing of an appeal.  See State ex
rel Redden v. Van Hoomissen, 281 Or 647, 649-50, 576 P2d 355,
reh'g den 282 Or 415 (1978) (reasons for limiting time to 30 days
for filing an appeal relevant in determining whether application
for writ of mandamus is timely).  In determining whether a
petition for a writ of mandamus is barred by laches, the court
considers whether any delay prejudiced the adverse party.  See
Paulus, 297 Or at 717-18 (unless satisfactorily explained, delay
in application for writ may provide basis for denial,
particularly if prejudice to respondent is shown).

		A pretrial order of dismissal is one of the orders that
the state may appeal from the circuit court to the Court of
Appeals.  ORS 138.060(1).  In this case, the trial court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss made after the jury had returned
its verdict.  The court denied defendants' motion for a new trial
and motion in arrest of judgment.  Nonetheless, defendants
contend that the motion to dismiss in this case should be treated
like a motion for a new trial or a motion in arrest of judgment. 
We disagree.  ORS 138.071(1) provides that notices of appeal
except those governed by ORS 138.071(2), (3), and (4) are
governed by the 30-day period provided for in ORS 138.071(1). 
Although the motion to dismiss in this case was made post-verdict
rather than pretrial, ORS 138.071(1) is the statute that would
prescribe the time limit for an appeal after a pretrial order of
dismissal.  We see no reason, and defendants provide none, for
holding that, because defendants' motion to dismiss was made
post-verdict, the state should have treated the motion to dismiss
in this case as something other than a motion to dismiss in
determining how much time it had to file its petition for a writ
of mandamus.  Consequently, we need not address defendants'
argument that, under ORS 138.071(2), the date on which a trial
court signs an order is the date on which the order is entered. 
Moreover, defendants have not alleged or shown that they suffered
prejudice by the amount of time that passed before the state
filed its petition for a writ of mandamus.  We hold that the
state's petition for a writ of mandamus was filed timely.

		We turn to the merits.  The state argues that the trial
court erred in granting defendants' post-verdict motion to
dismiss the misdemeanor charges.  In State ex rel Penn v.
Norblad, 323 Or 464, 469-70, 918 P2d 426 (1996), this court held
that the only post-verdict motions authorized by statute in
criminal cases are a motion for a new trial and a motion in
arrest of judgment.  Defendants respond that Norblad is
distinguishable, because the state's "last minute demand" that
the trial court instruct the jury on the lesser-included
misdemeanor offenses -- and the trial court's acquiescence to
that demand --  violated defendants' rights to due process of law
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, and their right to a fair and impartial trial under
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. 

		In Norblad, the jury convicted the defendant in the
underlying criminal case of multiple criminal charges.  The
defendant made two post-verdict motions.  The first was for a new
trial, and the second was to dismiss the case on the ground that
he was denied due process of law and did not receive a fair
trial.  The trial court concluded that it improperly had denied
the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence and that the
defendant had not received a fair trial, because he had not
received materials that the city attorney's office had developed. 
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss,
relying on ORS 135.755, which provides:

		"The court may, either of its own motion or upon
the application of the district attorney, and in
furtherance of justice, order the proceedings to be
dismissed.  The reasons for the dismissal shall be set
forth in the order, which shall be entered in the
register."  

This court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the
trial court to vacate the judgment of dismissal and to enter
judgment on the convictions.  The court held that the only 
post-verdict motions authorized by statute in criminal cases are a
motion for a new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment.  323
Or at 469-70; see also State v. Metcalfe, 328 Or 309, 314, ___
P2d ___ (1999) (post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal not
authorized by statute); State ex rel Redden v. Davis, 288 Or 283,
291, 604 P2d 879 (1980) (court not authorized to grant judgment
of acquittal after jury has returned verdict even when trial
court finds insufficient evidence to support verdict).  

		As noted above, defendants contend that Norblad does
not control here because of the trial court's "improper"
instructions on the lesser-included offenses.  We disagree.  The
defendant in Norblad argued that he was entitled to have the
charges dismissed post-verdict because he "did not receive a fair
trial and was not afforded due process."  323 Or at 466. 
Defendants make the same argument here.  The trial court in
Norblad dismissed the charges post-verdict in part because the
court believed that it had erred in denying the defendant's
pretrial motion to suppress.  Similarly, the trial court in this
case granted defendants' motion to dismiss because it believed
that the lesser-included-offense jury instructions rendered the
jury's verdicts invalid. 

		Whether the trial court erred in giving the 
lesser-included-offense jury instructions is a matter that defendants
may assign as error on appeal.  See State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132,
167-68, 786 P2d 161 (1990) (addressing the defendant's claim that
the trial court erred as a matter of law in refusing to give the
defendant's requested instructions on a lesser-included offense). 
Defendants must pursue their ordinary appellate remedies for an
asserted error regarding jury instructions.  Defendants' attempt
to attack the validity of the jury's verdict in this proceeding
is unavailing in light of the availability of appellate review of
the alleged error in jury instructions.

		We conclude that defendants' attempt to distinguish
Norblad is unavailing.  The trial court lacked authority to grant
defendants' motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charges after the
jury had returned guilty verdicts on those charges.  

		A peremptory writ of mandamus shall issue, directing
the circuit court to vacate the order granting defendants' motion
to dismiss the misdemeanor charges, to enter judgments on the
jury verdicts, and to sentence defendants accordingly.

		Peremptory writ to issue.

1. 	ORS 468.926 provides, in part:

		"(1) A person commits the crime of unlawful
disposal, storage or treatment of hazardous waste in
the first degree if the person, in violation of ORS
466.095 or 466.100 or any rule, standard, license,
permit or order adopted or issued under ORS 466.020,
466.095 or 466.100, knowingly disposes of, stores or
treats hazardous waste and:

		"(a) As a result, recklessly causes substantial
harm to human health or the environment; or

		"(b) Knowingly disregards the law in committing
the violation."

2. 	ORS 468.946 provides, in part:

		"(1) A person commits the crime of unlawful water
pollution in the first degree if the person, in
violation of ORS chapter 468B or any rule, standard,
license, permit or order adopted or issued under ORS
chapter 468B, knowingly discharges, places or causes to
be placed any waste into the waters of the state or in
a location where the waste is likely to escape or be
carried into the waters of the state and:

		"(a) As a result, recklessly causes substantial
harm to human health or the environment; or

		"(b) Knowingly disregards the law in committing
the violation."