Title: State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 86 Ohio St.3d 575, 1999-Ohio-126.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BAKER, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 575.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission does not abuse its discretion in 
denying claimant’s average-weekly-wage-adjustment request, when. 
(No. 98-459 — Submitted August 25, 1999 — Decided September 22, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD02-296. 
 
Appellant-claimant, David J. Baker, began working for United Dairy 
Farmers (“UDF”) in September 1986.  On February 20, 1987, claimant was injured 
in the course of and arising from his employment, and his workers’ compensation 
claim was allowed. 
 
On April 17, 1987, his average weekly wage (“AWW”) was set at $67.70.  
That amount was determined by dividing his UDF earnings in the year prior to 
injury by fifty-two weeks. 
 
Over nine years later, claimant moved appellee Industrial Commission of 
Ohio to reset his average weekly wage at $153.05.  He based his request on his 
allegation that during the year prior to injury, he also worked for twenty-nine 
weeks at Pizza Hut.  Claimant, however, did not submit any documentation of 
these claimed earnings. 
 
Claimant did not attend the October 25, 1996 district hearing on his motion.  
Lacking any testimony or other corroborative evidence, the district hearing officer 
denied claimant’s motion.  Claimant appealed, but again skipped the hearing.  A 
staff hearing officer affirmed the earlier order. 
 
Claimant appealed to the commission.  The appeal was refused, and claimant 
requested reconsideration.  He apparently submitted, at that time, an undated, 
unsigned form letter from Pizza Hut claiming that it could not access records for 
 
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any employees employed before 1989.  The letter, however, did not identify 
claimant as the employee in question or the employee to whom the letter was 
directed.  Reconsideration was ultimately denied in an order signed by “Attorney 
Rachel Rentas-Pilutti.” 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying 
both his initial motion to reset his AWW and his request for reconsideration.  The 
court of appeals denied the writ. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Phillip J. Fulton & Associates and William A. Thorman III, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Craigg E. Gould, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  AWW is calculated by dividing a claimant’s earnings in the 
year prior to injury by fifty-two.  R.C. 4123.61.  Claimant asserts that the 
commission abused its discretion in excluding his alleged Pizza Hut earnings from 
his preinjury total earnings.  We disagree.  Claimant waited almost ten years before 
alleging that he had other income in the year prior to injury.  He produced no 
evidence to corroborate these earnings.  He also had two opportunities to testify on 
his own behalf, but did not attend either hearing. 
 
Claimant does not explain his failure to testify but does contend that wage 
information was unavailable, citing the Pizza Hut letter as proof.  That letter, 
however, was unsigned, undated, and did not identify claimant as the party to 
whom it was directed.  We also note that Pizza Hut was not the only potential 
source of income verification.  Claimant could have submitted tax records, income 
tax returns, or W-2 forms to substantiate additional income, but he did not. 
 
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We accordingly find that the commission did not abuse its discretion in 
denying claimant’s AWW adjustment request. 
 
Claimant also contends that the commission improperly denied his request 
for reconsideration, requiring a return of the cause to the commission for further 
consideration.  This we decline to do.  We acknowledge that the signer of the order 
denying reconsideration identified herself as an “attorney,” as opposed to a staff 
hearing officer or commission deputy, and that this raises questions as to the 
commission’s compliance with its Resolution R95-1-09.  However, we also note 
that claimant does not dispute the order’s determination that he did not satisfy the 
substantive criteria for granting reconsideration.  As such, we find it pointless to 
return the cause for further consideration. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.