Title: State v. Williams

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THEODORE JERRY WILLIAMS
No. 256A08
FILED: 12 DECEMBER 2008
Constitutional Law--right to fair trial--flagrant constitutional violation of rights--
irreparable harm--State’s destruction of evidence
The Court of Appeals did not err by dismissing the charge of felony assault on a
government officer or employee under N.C.G.S. § 15A-954(a)(4) based on the State’s
destruction of evidence of a poster that contained two photographs of defendant placed on a wall
in the offices of the District Attorney for the Twentieth Prosecutorial District depicting
defendant without any injuries as he appeared when processed into the Stanly County Detention
Center on 17 November 2003 with a caption stating  “Before he sued the D.A.’s office,” and a
second photograph depicting the injured defendant as he appeared when processed back into the
Stanly County Detention Center on 20 April 2004 with a caption stating  “After he sued the
D.A.’s office,” because: (1) although the mere making of a poster was not a violation of
defendant’s constitutional rights for purposes of his motion under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), the flagrant violation of defendant’s constitutional rights was found in that on
numerous occasions defendant requested specific items of evidence that were favorable to him
and material to his defense, but the State failed to provide that evidence, destroyed it, and then
stated it could not be produced; (2) the pertinent poster and photographs were relevant to
defendant’s theory of a conspiracy between Stanly and Union County Law Enforcement and
Prosecutors to retaliate against him for the filing of a civil rights complaint, and the evidence
also would have tended to prove the partial or complete defense of self-defense against the
assault charge since proof of the injuries sustained at the Union County Jail would have tended
to show that defendant was not the aggressor; (3) the evidence was material and in its absence it
could not be said that defendant would receive a fair trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence; and (4) defendant met his burden of showing irreparable prejudice to the preparation
of his case by showing defendant could not recreate the evidence, and defendant demonstrated
the futility of relying on witness testimony to prove the contents of the poster.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the
decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 190 N.C.
App. ___, 660 S.E.2d 189 (2008), affirming an order entered 18
January 2007 by Judge James E. Hardin in Superior Court, Union
County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 13 October 2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Richard E. Jester for defendant-appellee.
BRADY, Justice.
This case requires us to decide whether dismissal of a
criminal charge against defendant was appropriate under N.C.G.S.
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§ 15A-954(a)(4).  In a pretrial hearing, the State admitted to
the existence, possession, and destruction of material evidence
favorable to defendant and acknowledged that it was impossible to
produce the evidence at that time or, by implication, at any
future trial.  Based on these circumstances, we conclude that the
State flagrantly violated defendant’s constitutional rights and
irreparably prejudiced the preparation of his defense. 
Accordingly, we find the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-954(a)(4)
satisfied and affirm the Court of Appeals.
BACKGROUND
Theodore Jerry Williams (defendant) was arrested and
placed in the Stanly County Detention Center on 17 November 2003
on charges unrelated to the present matter.  During February and
March 2004 and while in custody in Stanly County, defendant
initiated actions in various courts naming an assistant district
attorney for Stanly County, the Stanly County Sheriff, and the
Stanly County Commissioners for alleged civil rights violations.
After filing these actions, defendant was transferred
to the Union County Jail on 19 April 2004.  Even though defendant
made numerous requests, he received neither the paperwork
authorizing nor an explanation for his transfer.  Less than
twenty-four hours after his arrival at the Union County Jail,
defendant was charged with misdemeanor assault on a government
official at that facility.  The State alleged that defendant
punched Union County Sheriff’s Deputy Brad Moseley when Deputy
Moseley attempted to remove defendant from a holding cell. 
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Defendant denied the allegation and testified that in the early
morning hours of 20 April 2004, he was maced and beaten by
multiple officers at the Union County Jail, where he sustained
severe injuries, including a broken arm.  Defendant testified he
was then transferred back to the Stanly County Detention Center
midday on 20 April 2004, and photographs were taken of him at
that time for reprocessing purposes.  The photographs showed the
bruises and wounds defendant sustained at the Union County Jail.
Defendant further testified that after the events of 20
April 2004 and while he was being held in Stanly County, two
individuals, one of whom was defendant’s attorney, informed
defendant of a poster they had seen on a wall in the offices of
the District Attorney for the Twentieth Prosecutorial District,
which included Stanly and Union Counties at the time.  The poster
contained two photographs of defendant.  The first depicted
defendant without any injuries as he appeared when processed into
the Stanly County Detention Center on 17 November 2003, with a
caption stating:  “Before he sued the D.A.’s office.”  The second
photograph depicted the injured defendant as he appeared when
processed back into the Stanly County Detention Center on 20
April 2004, with a caption stating:  “After he sued the D.A.’s
office.”  Defendant testified that after viewing the poster, his
attorney began making requests and serving subpoenas to obtain
the poster and the photographs used to create the poster. 
However, defendant never received any of the requested items.  At
a pretrial hearing in Stanly County on 11 July 2005 concerning
charges in that jurisdiction, Assistant District Attorney Stephen
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1  Referring to Brady v. Maryland, in which the United
States Supreme Court held “that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment.”  373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
Higdon (ADA Higdon) admitted to the existence of the poster, its
removal and destruction, and the impossibility of producing it or
the original photographs that appeared on the poster.
After defendant was indicted for having attained
habitual felon status, the Union County Grand Jury returned a
superseding true bill of indictment on 30 October 2006, charging
defendant with felony assault on a government officer or
employee.  Proceeding pro se, on 28 November 2006, defendant
filed a Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct and Brady1
Violation, in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 15A-954.  A hearing was
held on the motion on 18 January 2007.  Defendant testified that
he helped fill out and serve the subpoenas and that the poster
existed at the time the initial subpoenas were served.  The State
declined to cross-examine or otherwise rebut defendant’s evidence
and presented no evidence of its own.  Instead, the State opposed
defendant’s motion solely on legal grounds.
The salient portions of the trial judge’s findings of
fact from the hearing include the following:
4) That on April the 19th of 2004 the
Defendant was transported to Union County . .
. .
. . . .
6) The Defendant alleges that he was
assaulted by various officers and members of
the Union County Jail. . . .  That on April
the 20th, 2004, the Defendant was
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photographed by the staff of the Stanly
County Jail . . . .
7) That the photograph of the Defendant
made on April 20th, 2004, showed the
Defendant’s condition during a time relevant
to the subject prosecution.
8) That in May of 2004, Detention
Officer Becky Green of the Stanly County
Sheriff’s Office went on an unrelated matter
to the Stanly County office of the District
Attorney for the 20th Prosecutorial District,
that while in the office Ms. Green saw a
poster which contained two photographs of the
Defendant.  One photograph . . . was made
when the Defendant was processed into the
jail on November 17th of 2003, with a caption
saying, in quotation, “Before suing the
District Attorney’s office,” closed
quotation, and a second photograph . . . that
was made when the Defendant was processed
back into the Stanly County Jail between
April 19th and 20th of 2004, which showed the
Defendant’s injuries and was captioned,
quotation, “After he sued the District
Attorney’s office” . . . .
9) That during proceedings regarding
this case and upon the request of the
Defendant for discovery and disclosure that
[ADA] Higdon stated in open court that the
poster had been destroyed and was not
available, and that the subject photographs
originally taken at the Stanly County Jail
were not available as well.
Based on these findings of fact, the trial judge
concluded the following as a matter of law:
1) That the photographs of the Defendant
made during his processing into the Stanly
County Jail on November 17th of 2003 and
again between April the 19th and 20th of 2004
are relevant and material to the defense of
the subject prosecution.
2) That the poster of the photographs
described herein was willfully destroyed and
not made available to the Defendant although
the Defendant made a valid and timely request
for same.
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3) That the original photographs
described herein have not been made available
and as represented by the State of North
Carolina are unavailable to the Defendant,
even though implicitly requested by the
Defendant.
4) That due to the destruction or
failure of the State to provide this
evidence, which is material and may be
exculpatory in nature, the Defendant’s rights
pursuant to the Constitution of the United
States and the North Carolina Constitution
have been flagrantly violated and there is
such irreparable prejudice to the Defendant’s
preparation of his case that there is no
remedy but to dismiss the prosecution.
The State timely appealed to the Court of Appeals,
where a majority affirmed the trial court’s ruling.  State v.
Williams, __ N.C. App. __, __, 660 S.E.2d 189, 190 (2008).  The
dissenting judge at the Court of Appeals argued that finding of
fact number nine was not supported by competent evidence and that
the trial judge’s conclusions of law were erroneous.  Id. at __,
660 S.E.2d at 196-97 (Tyson, J., dissenting).  The State timely
appealed to this Court based on the dissent.
ANALYSIS
In reviewing a trial judge’s findings of fact, we are
“strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge’s
underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence,
in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and
whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s
ultimate conclusions of law.”  State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134,
291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982) (citations omitted).  Even if
“evidence is conflicting,” the trial judge is in the best
position to “resolve the conflict.”  State v. Smith, 278 N.C. 36,
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41, 178 S.E.2d 597, 601, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934 (1971).  The
decision that defendant has met the statutory requirements of
N.C.G.S. § 15A-954(a)(4) and is entitled to a dismissal of the
charge against him is a conclusion of law.  “Conclusions of law
drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are reviewable
de novo on appeal.”  Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of
Asheville, 358 N.C. 512, 517, 597 S.E.2d 717, 721 (2004) (citing
Humphries v. City of Jacksonville, 300 N.C. 186, 187, 265 S.E.2d
189, 190 (1980)).  “Under a de novo review, the court considers
the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment” for that
of the lower tribunal.  In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen
Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)
(citing Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C.
1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002)).
I.  FINDING OF FACT NUMBER NINE IS SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT
EVIDENCE
The trial judge’s order does not falter on finding of
fact number nine.  That finding of fact states:
That during proceedings regarding this
case and upon the request of the Defendant
for discovery and disclosure that [ADA]
Higdon stated in open court that the poster
had been destroyed and was not available, and
that the subject photographs originally taken
at the Stanly County Jail were not available
as well.
The trial judge found defendant’s testimony to be
credible.  Moreover, defendant’s evidence was uncontroverted in
that the State offered no evidence and no witnesses at the
hearing on 18 January 2007; the State made only a legal argument
against the motion to dismiss.  Although much of the evidence was
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ambiguous and the sequence of events was never entirely
clarified, the trial court’s consideration is limited to the
evidence actually presented and matters as to which the court
takes judicial notice.  Here, an examination of the record shows
that the trial judge had several pieces of competent evidence
before him to support finding of fact number nine.  Defendant
testified that his attorney began requesting copies of the poster
and pictures after first viewing the poster.  Without objection
by the State, defendant stated that the poster existed when
subpoenas were initially served.  One subpoena included in the
record was issued to Assistant District Attorneys Nicholas Vlahos
and Stephen Higdon dated 31 May 2005.  The subpoena ordered ADAs
Vlahos and Higdon to appear and testify on 6 June 2005 and to
produce the poster or the computer hard drive used to create the
poster.  After this subpoena was served, a pretrial hearing was
conducted on 11 July 2005 in Stanly County concerning several
cases against defendant in that jurisdiction.  The transcript
from that hearing was admitted into evidence before the trial
judge in the instant matter.  During the 11 July 2005 hearing,
ADA Higdon confirmed that the poster did exist, but that it had
been “removed” and “destroyed.”  ADA Higdon made this admission
in response to defendant’s request for the evidence.  The State
offered no evidence that the poster was already destroyed before
defendant requested it.
As to the unavailability of the subject photographs,
defendant clearly testified that he did not have the photographs
used in the poster and that he never personally saw the poster. 
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Conversely, the State contended for the first time on appeal that
defendant and his former counsel admitted to possessing copies of
the photographs used in the poster.
On this point, the transcripts reflect that defendant’s
former counsel stated he had a Stanly County Sheriff’s Office
booking report with defendant’s picture on it.  This booking
report, however, was never offered as evidence by either side,
and furthermore, a former officer of the Stanly County Sheriff’s
Office, Becky Green, saw the poster and testified that it was
“like a mug shot from the jail” but “larger than what the mug
shots are.”  Ms. Green testified that each photograph on the
poster was about four by six inches in size.  Additionally, the
State highlights that defendant appears to have possessed a side
view photograph of himself when questioning a witness on 18
January 2007.  However, the poster in question contained a front
view of defendant’s face and not a side view.  The Court of
Appeals majority pointed out that ADA Higdon represented on 11
July 2005 that the actual “photographs” used for the poster “had
been ‘given to [Assistant District Attorney Nicholas] Vlahos’ and
had been ‘destroyed.’”  State v. Williams, __ N.C. App. at __,
660 S.E.2d at 193 (brackets in original).  Regardless,
defendant’s unrebutted testimony to the trial judge was that he
never possessed copies of the photographs.
Based on this evidence, the trial court’s finding of
fact number nine was supported by competent evidence and is
binding on appeal.  See Cooke, 306 N.C. at 134, 291 S.E.2d at
619.
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II.  THERE IS NO REMEDY BUT TO DISMISS THE PROSECUTION
N.C.G.S. § 15A-954(a)(4) requires that upon a
defendant’s motion, the trial court “must dismiss the charges
stated in a criminal pleading if it determines that . . . [a]
defendant’s constitutional rights have been flagrantly violated
and there is such irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s
preparation of his case that there is no remedy but to dismiss
the prosecution.”  As the movant, defendant bears the burden of
showing the flagrant constitutional violation and of showing
irreparable prejudice to the preparation of his case.  This
statutory provision “contemplates drastic relief,” such that “a
motion to dismiss under its terms should be granted sparingly.” 
State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 59, 243 S.E.2d 367, 370 (1978).  
Section 15A-954(a)(4) was “intended to embody the
holding of this Court in State v. Hill.”  Id. (citing Official
Commentary to N.C.G.S. § 15A-954).  In Hill, this Court concluded
that the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss should have been
allowed because the defendant was denied his constitutional
rights to counsel and to obtain witnesses on his behalf.  277
N.C. 547, 552-54, 178 S.E.2d 462, 465-66 (1971).  The denial of
the defendant’s rights to counsel and to obtain witnesses was
particularly egregious because it deprived the defendant in Hill
of the “only opportunity to obtain evidence which might prove his
innocence.”  Id. at 555, 178 S.E.2d at 467.  We share a similar
concern in the instant case regarding defendant’s ability to
secure material and favorable evidence.
A.  Flagrant Violation of Constitutional Rights
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2  After hearing the evidence, the trial judge, the
Honorable James E. Hardin, commented:
I’ve been in the system now in one form or
another since 1979.  I spent more than twenty
years in the D.A.’s office; I filled five
different positions, eleven and a half years
as the [elected] D.A.  Frankly, if I had two
assistants that put together a photographic
array like this and made a poster and posted
it on the wall making fun of a defendant,
even if they can’t stand him, they would have
had a real problem with me.  I got a real
problem with this poster . . . .  There’s no
excuse for that.  We’re going to treat people
with dignity and respect even if they’re
charged with crimes.  That’s the right thing
to do and I think frankly, as prosecutors,
we’re held to that responsibility ethically,
morally and legally.
During oral argument, counsel for the State firmly acknowledged
how “inappropriate” it was that this poster had been made and
displayed.
3  The making and public display of this poster bring to
mind the comments of former United States Attorney General and
former United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson: 
“While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent
forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base
motives, he is one of the worst.”  The Federal Prosecutor at 3. 
The trial judge concluded that the State violated
defendant’s rights under the United States and North Carolina
Constitutions.  The making and public display of this poster was
unprofessional behavior.2  “[T]he citizen’s safety lies in the
prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth
and not victims, who serves the law . . . and who approaches his
task with humility.”  Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor,
in 31 J. Am. Inst. of Crim. L. & Criminology 3, 6 (1940-41)
[hereinafter The Federal Prosecutor] (address delivered by the
then Attorney General of the United States at the Second Annual
Conference of U.S. Attorneys on 1 April 1940 in Washington,
D.C.).3  The mere making of the poster, however, is not a
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A prosecutor “can have no better asset than to have his
profession recognize that his attitude toward those who feel his
power has been dispassionate, reasonable and just.”  Id. at 4.
violation of defendant’s constitutional rights for purposes of
his motion under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The
flagrant violation of defendant’s constitutional rights is found
in that on numerous occasions defendant requested specific items
of evidence that were favorable to him and material to his
defense, but the State failed to provide that evidence, destroyed
it, and then stated it could not be produced.
In Brady, the Supreme Court of the United States
determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution required in state
criminal cases “that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.”  Id. at 87 (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). 
Evidence favorable to an accused can be either impeachment
evidence or exculpatory evidence.  United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 676 (1985).  “Evidence is considered ‘material’ if
there is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result had the
evidence been disclosed.”  State v. Berry, 356 N.C. 490, 517, 573
S.E.2d 132, 149 (2002) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
434 (1995)).  Materiality does not require a “demonstration by a
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would
have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal.”  Kyles,
514 U.S. at 434 (citation omitted).  Rather, defendant must show
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4   While the September 2004, January 2006, and February
2006 subpoenas do not appear to be included as part of the record
in the case sub judice, they are part of the record in another
action arising out of Stanly County.  State v. Williams, 186 N.C.
App. 233, 650 S.E.2d 607 (2007).  We take judicial notice of
these subpoenas in accordance with our practice of taking
“judicial notice of the public records of other courts within the
state judicial system.”  State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 497,
508 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1998) (citing Alpine Motors Corp. v.
Hagwood, 233 N.C. 57, 62 S.E.2d 518 (1950)).     
that the government’s suppression of evidence would “‘undermine[]
confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”  Id. (quoting Bagley,
473 U.S. at 678).
Although Brady does not require that a defendant make a
specific request for favorable and material evidence, see id. at
433 (citing Bagley and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976)), the record indicates that on numerous occasions
preceding the 11 July 2005 hearing, defendant requested specific
items of material evidence favorable to his defense.  Moreover,
public records show subpoenas seeking this evidence dated 20
September 2004, 31 May 2005, 27 January 2006, and 20 February
2006.4  The subpoenas order that the poster or the computer hard
drive used to create the poster be produced.  Yet, defendant
never received the requested evidence because the State destroyed
it.
Additionally, the evidence was favorable to defendant. 
As to the assault charge, the evidence would have been admissible
at trial for impeachment purposes during defendant’s cross-
examination of the State’s witnesses.  Moreover, defendant
alleged in his motion that since 19 April 2004, he had been “the
victim of a vicious conspiracy between Stanly and Union County
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Law Enforcement and Prosecutors . . . to retaliate against [him]
for the filing of a civil rights complaint in Stanly County
Superior Court . . . and a civil rights complaint in the United
States District Court.”  The poster and photographs were
certainly relevant to defendant’s theory of this conspiracy
against him.  The evidence also would have tended to prove the
partial or complete defense of self-defense against the assault
charge, because proof of the injuries sustained at the Union
County Jail would have tended to show that defendant was not the
aggressor.  Therefore, defendant established that the
“constitutional duty” of producing this evidence was “triggered.” 
See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.
Moreover, the evidence was material.  In its absence,
we cannot say that defendant would receive a fair trial
“resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”  Id.  By
demonstrating the value of the evidence for impeachment purposes
and to show self-defense, defendant has raised the reasonable
probability that confidence in the outcome of a guilty verdict at
trial would be undermined because “the favorable evidence could
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different
light.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435; see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678;
Berry, 356 N.C. at 517, 573 S.E.2d at 149.  Thus, “the
constitutional duty” to produce the evidence in the instant
matter was “triggered by the potential impact of favorable but
undisclosed evidence.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.  “[T]he
prosecution’s responsibility for failing to disclose known,
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favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is
inescapable.”  Id. at 438.
Relying on State v. Hunt, 339 N.C. 622, 657, 457 S.E.2d
276, 296 (1994), State v. Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 337, 298 S.E.2d
631, 642 (1983), and State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 127, 235
S.E.2d 828, 841 (1977), the State argues that Brady is inapposite
to the instant matter because Brady only requires the State to
turn over evidence at trial.  We disagree for purposes of the
instant matter.  At its most fundamental level, the due process
principle Brady and its progeny protect is concerned with the
“avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.  Society wins not
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are
fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when
any accused is treated unfairly.”  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 (The prosecutor’s duty is “to disclose
evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”).  The question is
whether in the absence of the suppressed evidence a defendant
receives a fair trial, “understood as a trial resulting in a
verdict worthy of confidence.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.
Every person charged with a crime has an
absolute right to a fair trial.  By this it
is meant that he is entitled to a trial
before an impartial judge and an unprejudiced
jury in keeping with substantive and
procedural due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  It is the duty of both
the court and the prosecuting attorney to see
that this right is sustained.
State v. Britt, 288 N.C. 699, 710, 220 S.E.2d 283, 290 (1975)
(citations omitted).
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5  Ensuring that justice is done is not only the goal of
this Court, but it is ultimately an interest of the State itself. 
See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  The State
of North Carolina “‘wins its point whenever justice is done its
citizens in the courts.’”  See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (quoting an
inscription on the walls of the United States Department of
Justice building).
Here, ADA Higdon stated that the evidence had been
“destroyed” and that he “cannot produce something that does not
exist.”  Accordingly, we conclude that when the State makes a
pretrial admission to the existence and destruction of evidence
requested by the accused which is favorable to him and material
to his guilt or punishment, and when the State further discloses
that it is impossible to produce the evidence at that time or, by
implication, at trial, then in the interest of judicial economy,
the trial judge does not need to await a trial and verdict before
deciding that a due process violation exists.  The violation is
already apparent, and any subsequent trial would be fundamentally
unfair to defendant.  As the Court in Brady recognized,
[a] prosecution that withholds evidence on
demand of an accused which, if made
available, would tend to exculpate him or
reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that
bears heavily on the defendant.  That casts
the prosecutor in the role of an architect of
a proceeding that does not comport with
standards of justice . . . .
373 U.S. at 87-88.  If the architecture of injustice is apparent,
then the trial judge does not need to allow the prosecution to
design the trial any further.5
Indeed, the statute under which we are granting relief
contemplates injuries occurring pretrial, during defendant’s
“preparation of his case.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-954(a)(4) (2007)
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(emphasis added).  The statute is the procedural mechanism that
allows us to give effect to the Brady violation before a trial
begins.  Finally, we note again that section 15A-954(a)(4) was
intended to embody the holding in State v. Hill, in which this
Court held that the trial judge should have allowed the
defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss based on the deprivation
of the defendant’s constitutional rights.  See 277 N.C. at 550,
556, 178 S.E.2d at 464, 467.
In sum, the State’s destruction of material, favorable
evidence to defendant, and its admission that the evidence could
not be produced, warrant the conclusion that any trial commenced
against defendant would not comport with our notions of due
process.  Defendant’s constitutional rights were flagrantly
violated.
B.  Irreparable Prejudice
Besides a flagrant constitutional violation, to grant
defendant relief we must also find “such irreparable prejudice to
the defendant’s preparation of his case that there is no remedy
but to dismiss the prosecution.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-954(a)(4).  This
requirement also derives from State v. Hill, in which the
defendant was charged with drunken driving, but was not allowed
to immediately meet with counsel or witnesses who could have
observed him “with reference to his alleged intoxication.”  277
N.C. at 553, 178 S.E.2d at 466.  This Court’s concern in Hill
regarding the irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s ability to
“obtain evidence which might prove his innocence,” id. at 555,
178 S.E.2d at 467, is analogous to our concern for defendant
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regarding the effect of his being denied material evidence
favorable to his defense.
As the party moving for dismissal, defendant has the
burden of showing irreparable prejudice to the preparation of his
case.  Defendant has met his burden in two ways.  First,
competent evidence supports the trial judge’s conclusion that
defendant never possessed the original photographs from which the
poster was made.  Consequently, we cannot remedy this situation
by ordering or permitting defendant to re-create an item of
evidence he did not originally create and for which he does not
possess the raw materials.  The State ardently contends that
defendant can reproduce the poster, but has offered no evidence
to support this claim.  Based on defendant’s testimony, the
evidence before the trial judge was that defendant could not re-
create the evidence.  Therefore, as this Court said in Hill, we
cannot “[u]nder these circumstances . . . assume that which is
incapable of proof.”  Id. at 554, 178 S.E.2d at 466.
Second, defendant has demonstrated the futility of
relying on witness testimony to prove the contents of the poster. 
Several of defendant’s subpoenas called for ADA Nicholas Vlahos,
an alleged creator of the poster, to appear with the poster and
testify, but Mr. Vlahos never did either.  Additionally,
defendant presented the transcript of a trial in Stanly County on
unrelated charges, during which defendant attempted to question a
witness regarding the existence and contents of the poster.  At
every turn, the State objected to the questions, and the trial
judge sustained the objections.  Thus, the record reflects that
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any attempt to introduce witness testimony about the poster at a
trial in the instant case would likely be similarly unfruitful. 
Based on defendant’s uncontroverted evidence, the unavoidable
conclusion is that he was irreparably prejudiced in the
preparation of his case because of the State’s destruction of
material, favorable evidence.
CONCLUSION
Beyond the unprofessional nature of this poster, we are
satisfied that defendant has met the elements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-
954(a)(4).  We conclude that no other remedy exists but for the
assault charge against defendant to be dismissed.  Accordingly,
we affirm the Court of Appeals.
AFFIRMED.