Title: Corson v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Corson v. State1988 WY 160766 P.2d 1155Case Number: 88-26Decided: 12/27/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
BILL CORSON, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Leonard Munker, 
State Public Defender, Steve Weerts, Senior Asst. Public Defender, Michael 
Cornia (argued), Student Intern, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender 
Aid Program, and Kathleen B. Simon, Student Intern, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John R. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen. Karen A. Byrne, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., and Michele J. Neves (argued), Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.*

* Retired June 30, 
1988.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from 
appellant's burglary conviction by a seventh judicial district court jury. The 
only issue presented for our determination, as stated by appellant, is as 
follows:

"Did the prosecution fail 
to present sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt?"

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On February 5, 1986, 
between 12:15 a.m. and approximately 7:00 a.m., the Hideaway Bar in Mills, 
Wyoming was 
burglarized. Taken in the burglary were 334 quarters from a video machine, 20 
packages of Marlboro cigarettes, 20 packs of Marlboro Lights, 10 packs of 
Winstons, 10 packs of Merit cigarettes, money and a coin box from a cigarette 
machine. The employee who closed the bar testified that after locking the front 
door of the bar from the inside, he left through the back door. The employee 
stated that although it had been snowing heavily earlier, the snowfall had 
subsided as he was leaving the bar.

[¶4.]     At approximately 7:00 
a.m. that morning, the bar owner, Mr. Dale Sterner, entered the Hideaway Bar 
through the back door. He did not recall seeing any footprints near the back 
door. Once inside the bar he noticed that the front door was ajar. Upon further 
examination, he determined that there had been a break-in and notified the Mills 
police department.

[¶5.]     Officer Dan Schirlinger 
of the Mills police department responded to the burglary call. He noted two sets 
of footprints in the heavy wet snow near the front door. One set of footprints 
appeared to be made by a soft-soled shoe, and the other set by a cowboy boot 
with pointed toes. While the footprints led away from the bar, there was 
apparently no evidence of prints leading to the front door. The officer followed 
the footprints from the Hideaway Bar to the front door of appellant's trailer. 
There were no footprints coming away from the front door of the trailer, and 
there were no footprints at the trailer's back door.

[¶6.]     A back-up officer from 
the NatronaCounty sheriff's department 
was summoned, and the two officers made contact with appellant, who invited the 
officers inside. Appellant, his wife and children appeared to have just gotten 
out of bed. Officer Schirlinger told appellant that he was investigating a 
burglary that had occurred at the Hideaway Bar. The back-up deputy noticed a 
pair of wet, flat-soled shoes in front of the stove and pointed them out to 
Officer Schirlinger. Appellant told Officer Schirlinger that those shoes were 
owned by Phillip Tageant who had been staying with appellant. Initially, 
appellant told the officer that Tageant had left the night before at 6:00 p.m., 
but later produced Tageant from a back room. While preparing to go to the Mills 
police department with the officers, appellant brought out what he claimed to be 
his only pair of cowboy boots, which were square toed. The officer detected no 
sign of wetness on appellant's boots.

[¶7.]     Approximately five 
hours later, the Mills police department conducted a search at appellant's 
residence. As a result of this search, officers seized a rusty tire iron, a pry 
bar, a screwdriver wrapped in a pair of gloves and a flashlight. None of the 
stolen items were recovered in the search, although appellant, Tageant, and Mrs. 
Corson all had freshly opened packs of Marlboro cigarettes. Appellant and 
Tageant were arrested for burglary on February 6, 1986. On March 3, 1986, a 
criminal complaint was filed charging appellant with one count of burglary in 
violation of § 6-3-301(a), (b), W.S. 1977. Pursuant to a motion by the State, on 
March 24, 1986, the court consolidated for trial appellant's case with the case 
of Phillip Tageant. Both men were convicted by a jury on June 3, 
1986.

[¶8.]     Appellant contends that 
the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to support a conviction 
and that the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellant's motion for a 
judgment of acquittal. In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, a reviewing court must examine all the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the State to determine if there is sufficient evidence to uphold 
the verdict. Dangel v. State, Wyo., 724 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1986), citing Broom v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 640 (1985). This court does not 
act as a jury for purposes of deciding criminal guilt or innocence, but will 
review the record to determine whether it contains sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict. Wells v. State, Wyo., 613 P.2d 201, 202 (1980). In Capshaw v. 
State, Wyo., 
737 P.2d 740, 744-45 (1987), we explained:

"`It is not our function 
to weigh the evidence for a determination as to whether or not it is sufficient 
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We have consistently held that 
even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence presented, 
it is the responsibility of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence.'" 
(Quoting Broom v. State, 695 P.2d  at 642.)

In the present 
case, drawing all inferences and resolving all evidentiary conflicts in favor of 
the State, we must affirm appellant's conviction.

[¶9.]     Appellant's attack 
focuses on the evidence of bootprints and burglary tools, which provided the 
most damaging links between appellant and the crime. The undisputed weaknesses 
in the bootprint evidence were: (1) no measurements were taken of the prints; 
(2) the prints appeared to be made from pointed-toe boots rather than the 
square-toe boots which appellant owned; (3) the investigating officers did not 
notice any wetness on appellant's boots, although they noticed that Tageant's 
shoes showed signs of wetness; and (4) the investigating officers did not 
recognize any prints leading toward the burglary site, but only away from it. In 
light of this evidence, the jury could 
have drawn inferences which created reasonable doubt that the bootprints 
were left by appellant. Other evidence, however, provided a reasonable basis for 
the jury to conclude that the bootprints were indeed those of appellant. (1) 
Although no measurements were taken, the investigating officer who viewed the 
comparative sizes of the boots and the prints testified that the prints were 
consistent with appellant's boots. (2) Even though the bootprints were 
pointed-toed and appellant's boots were square-toed, the investigating officer 
testified that a person's gait could explain the disparity. The defense did not 
discredit this theory, and we will not conduct our own factual investigation to 
determine its accuracy. (3) The absence of any sign of wetness on appellant's 
boots, in contrast to Tageant's shoes, could easily be attributed to differences 
in composition or finish. The boots and shoes were introduced as exhibits, and 
the jury was free to draw such inferences. (4) Finally, the absence of tracks 
leading to the bar could be the result of significant snowfall while appellant 
and Tageant were inside the bar. Although the bartender testified that the 
snowfall was subsiding when he left the bar, he could not say whether the 
snowfall intensified later that night. In resolving all of these conflicts in 
the evidence, the jury was required to weigh the evidence and draw inferences 
from it. Resolving all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the State, as we must, 
we conclude that the record permitted a reasonable inference that the bootprints 
represented appellant's tracks.

[¶10.]  With respect to the burglary tools, an 
expert from the State crime lab testified that paint found on the pry bar was 
physically and chemically consistent with the paint on the doorjamb at the 
burglary site, and metallic flakes on the tire iron were physically similar to 
the metal of the door's locking mechanism. Thus, the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that the tools were used in the break-in. Although no fingerprints 
were identified on the tools, they were found in a cabinet under appellant's 
kitchen sink, easily within his access. This evidence clearly added strength to 
the State's case against appellant.

[¶11.]  In our opinion affirming the conviction 
of appellant's codefendant, we made the following assessment of the sufficiency 
of the evidence:

"The jury had evidence 
before it of two sets of footprints leading from the bar to the trailer - one of 
flat-soled shoes and one of cowboy boots. There were no other footprints. On the 
morning after the burglary, [Tageant's] soggy, flat-soled shoes were discovered 
in the trailer. Corson owned only a pair of cowboy boots. Both Corson and 
[Tageant] were present in the trailer the morning after the burglary * * *. 
Tools suitable for use in such a burglary were found in the trailer in a place 
accessible to both of the men. The paint chips on the tools were chemically 
similar to the paint chips taken from the bar.

"On the basis of this 
evidence, the jury could have found that the tools were used in the burglary, 
that the footprints were those of [Tageant] and Corson, that Corson attempted to 
cover up the burglary, that [Tageant] was concealed in the trailer, and that 
both [Tageant] and Corson had access to the burglary tools. Applying the 
applicable standard of appellate review, this court finds that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find [Tageant] guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Tageant v. State, Wyo., 737 P.2d 764, 767 
(1987).

These 
observations apply to this case as well.

[¶12.]  In his brief, appellant implies that 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the State's closing argument. Appellant 
did not structure this issue as an independent ground for reversal but made 
reference to it as part of his sufficiency of the evidence argument. We have 
already concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's 
conviction; and consequently, we need not address the prosecutorial misconduct 
argument.

[¶13.]  AFFIRMED.

URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶14.]  There comes a time for some criminal 
proceedings when, if proof beyond a reasonable doubt means anything, 
insufficient evidence exists for submission of a criminal case to the jury or to 
sustain the conviction if rendered. The Constitution of the United States 
prohibits the criminal conviction of any person, except upon proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 
61 L. Ed. 2d 560, reh'g denied 444 U.S. 890, 100 S. Ct. 195, 62 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1979); 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 
1074-1075, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 377-78 (1970). Whatever factors may cause a jury to 
convict without real evidence may be hard to discern, but rationally reviewed, 
hard, persuasive evidence of guilt sometimes simply does not exist. This is such 
a case. Corson was convicted by guilt by association with Phillip Tageant, who 
was himself convicted on, at best, bare-bones or perhaps bare-feet evidence. 
Tageant v. State, 737 P.2d 764 (Wyo. 1987). See United States v. Fredericks, 857 F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1988). 
Corson was convicted by evidence solely related to Tageant, which was wet boots 
and accommodating footprints.

[¶15.]  Even after applying our oft-stated 
appellate rules for criminal case sufficiency of evidence to sustain the burden 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by resolution of conflicts or inferences 
favorable to the State, Corson was not convicted by persuasive evidence. 
Goodwine v. State, 764 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1988). As contemplated by the majority, a 
number of things could have been the cause for the unavailability of persuasive 
evidence, but supposition is not evidence of guilt. Smith v. State, 40 
Wyo. 128, 274 P. 1074 (1929).

[¶16.]  Corson was not in the bar early in the 
evening. Mulligan v. State, 513 P.2d 180 (1973), overruled on other grounds sub 
nom. Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857 (Wyo. 1975). Tracks found did not match his 
boots as obtained upon search of his residence. King v. State, 718 P.2d 452 
(Wyo. 1986). 
The stolen merchandise was not recovered from him. Cf. Downs v. State, 581 P.2d 610 (Wyo. 
1978). Definitive connection of the tire iron or screwdriver physically to the 
building entry incident was not made, except as a possibility. State v. 
Anderson, 229 Neb. 436, 427 N.W.2d 770 (1988); 
Watson v. State, 752 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App. 1988). Connection of these normal 
household tools separately to either the host or the guest was not made, except 
by availability. See also the thoughtful and persuasive dissent of Armstrong, 
D.J., Retired, which more nearly attunes to criteria required by the United 
States Supreme Court in Jackson, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 and In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068 for adequacy of evidence to sustain a conviction for 
a criminal offense. Downs, 581 P.2d  at 618. To 
be repetitive, if Corson had been given a separate trial from his house guest, 
the viability of the prosecution's case would have been de minimis. 
Prosecutorial misconduct on final argument singularly relates to the 
insufficiency of proper evidence. A stated supposition of the prosecutor which 
lacked total evidentiary support offers justification to me that conjecture 
rather than evidence contributed to the verdict of guilt.1 State v. George, 40 Wyo. 95, 275 P. 112 (1929); Gardner v. State, 27 
Wyo. 316, 196 P. 750 (1921); State v. Bay, 529 So. 2d 845 (La. 1988); State v. Bearden, 748 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. App. 1988). Prosecutorial misstatement 
achieves a higher level of concern when evidence of guilt is seriously in 
question. Sanborn v. Com., 754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 
1988); State v. Beuke, 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 526 N.E.2d 274 (1988). As 
Justice Jerome Frank said in his powerful dissent:

"A keen observer has said 
that `next to perjury, prejudice is the main cause of miscarriages of justice.' 
If government counsel in a criminal suit is allowed to inflame the jurors by 
irrelevantly arousing their deepest prejudices, the jury may become in his hands 
a lethal weapon directed against defendants who may be innocent. He should not 
be permitted to summon that thirteenth juror, prejudice."

Beuke, 526 N.E.2d  at 293 (quoting from United States v. Antonelli Fireworks 
Co., 155 F.2d 631, 659 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied 329 U.S. 742, 67 S. Ct. 49, 91 L. Ed. 640, reh'g denied 329 U.S. 826, 67 S. Ct. 182, 91 L. Ed. 701 (1946)). 
Cf.State v. Johnson, 760 P.2d 760 (Mont. 1988), where the 
evidence was direct and compelling, as clearly different from this case. State 
v. Merrill, 428 N.W.2d 361, 372 (Minn. 1988); 
State v. Smith, 755 S.W.2d 757 (Tenn. 1988).

[¶17.]  In recent past, this court has maintained 
its historical responsibility in constitutional diligence to provide fairness 
and due process and to protect the innocent. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 
(Wyo. 1986); Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 
(Wyo. 1986). 
Wildly sprung assumptions and possibilities aside, this decision fails to find a 
level of reliable evidence which should suffice to sustain conviction. 
United States v. Samuels, 801 F.2d 1052 (1986), reh'g denied 808 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir. 1987); Pearson v. State, 
523 N.E.2d 747 (Ind. 1988).

[¶18.]  Reliability as the test is 
comprehensively synthesized in State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305, 1309-10 
(La. 1988) (quoting from Jackson, 443 U.S.  at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 
2789) in application of the Jackson conclusion:

The Jackson v. Virginia doctrine involves more than simply 
applying a fixed standard to measure the simple quantum of the evidence produced 
in a case. Careful study must be given to both the majority and concurring 
opinions to fully understand the precise methodology which must be followed to 
determine objectively whether any rational trier of fact would have had a 
subjective doubt about the defendant's guilt. First, a review of a criminal 
conviction record for sufficiency of evidence does not require a court to "`ask itself 
whether it believes that the evidence 
at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt[.]'" Second, a 
reviewing court must consider the record through the eyes of a hypothetical 
rational trier of fact who interprets all of the evidence as favorably to the 
prosecution as any rational fact finder can. Third, the inquiry requires the 
reviewing court to ask whether such a hypothetical rational trier of fact 
interpreting all of the evidence in this manner could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

[¶19.]  The principal criterion of a Jackson v. Virginia review is rationality. This is because under 
Winship and Jackson Fourteenth Amendment due process demands that in state 
trials, as has been demanded traditionally in federal trials, a criminal 
conviction cannot constitutionally stand if it is based on a record from which 
no rational trier of fact could find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, under the Jackson methodology a 
reviewing court is required to view the evidence from the perspective of a 
hypothetical rational trier of fact 
in determining whether such an unconstitutional conviction has occurred. In 
reviewing the evidence, the whole record must be considered because a rational trier of fact would consider 
all of the evidence, and the actual trier of fact is presumed to have acted rationally until it appears otherwise. 
If rational triers of fact could 
disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier's view of all of the 
evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted. Thus, irrational decisions to convict will be 
overturned, rational decisions to 
convict will be upheld, and the actual fact finder's discretion will be impinged 
upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due 
process of law. [Emphasis in original and footnotes 
omitted.]

[¶20.]  In giving meaning to the Jackson 
standard, the evidence must be "both substantial and sufficient" to support the 
determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Reilly v. State, 496 P.2d 899, 
reh'g denied 498 P.2d 1236 (Wyo. 1972); People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 (1973), and may not be based on guessing, speculation or conjecture. 
Kogan v. People, 756 P.2d 945 (Colo. 1988); 
People v. Urso, 129 Colo. 292, 269 P.2d 709 (1954). A conviction 
cannot be based on evidence which is consistent with both innocence and guilt. 
United 
States v. Ortiz, 445 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied 404 U.S. 993, 92 S. Ct. 541, 30 L. Ed. 2d 545 (1971). Furthermore, 
opportunity alone cannot suffice to provide a basis for a guilt determination. 
In State v. Morris, 41 Wyo. 128, 155, 283 P. 406, 414 (1929) (quoting 
from Burrill, Circumstantial Evidence, § 549), in speaking of opportunity, this 
court discerned that:

"Admitting it proved to 
have existed, it does not necessarily follow that it was actually taken 
advantage of by the party shown to have possessed it; or that it was not taken 
advantage of by another person. In order to give it this effect, where it is 
solely or chiefly relied on, the circumstances tending to show its existence 
must be exclusive in their operation, 
by demonstrating that no other person had, or could have had the opportunity 
possessed by the accused, and that, therefore, by a necessary consequence, none 
but he could have committed the crime."

[¶21.]  Supposition and conjecture aside, this 
court reaches the stature of lacking viable evidence considered by the Indiana 
court required in Cobbs v. State, 528 N.E.2d 62, 64 (Ind. 1988) (quoting from 
Baker v. State, 236 Ind. 55, 62, 138 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1956)), where evidence was 
lacking "`so that no reasonable man could say that this issue had been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.'" See Fredericks, 857 F.2d 733, where no witness 
could actually connect the defendant by real evidence as likewise comparable in 
insufficiency of evidence to convict. If the evidence supports an inference 
rather than guilt, a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not a 
rational finding. Watson v. State, 752 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. App. 1988); Denby v. 
State, 654 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983).

[¶22.]  As here presented, the reconstruction of 
something that might have been proved and the inference of untoward 
participation lacks sufficiency to meet constitutional criteria. King, 718 P.2d 452. This is only conjecture. State v. Rideout, 450 P.2d 452 (Wyo. 1969); State v. Paulas, 74 Wyo. 269, 286 P.2d 1041 (1955); Gardner, 196 P. 750. A 
rational and reasoned examiner could not realistically find substantial, 
credible evidence here sufficient to avoid the jury "arbitrarily convicting of 
crime." Reilly, 496 P.2d  at 905.

[¶23.]  In reality, Corson was convicted in this 
case on unproven conjecture by the prosecutor in final argument, the 
circumstance that Corson exercised a constitutional right not to testify, and by 
wet boots and footprints of a visitor at his mobile home residence. Cf. Gardner, 
196 P. 750.2 This court in past times in the 
greater perspective of Wyoming law has not been unwilling to discard 
guess and conjecture and require more. As initiated in the early case of 
Palmerston v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 333, 23 P. 73 (1890) and more recently quoted in 
dissent by Justice Rose, one of the more informed and thoughtful past jurists of 
this court, in Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201, 205 (Wyo. 
1980):

This court had occasion 
to define the reasonable-doubt standard early in its history. In Palmerston v. 
Territory, 3 Wyo. 333, 23 P. 73, 73 (1890), we took issue 
with a jury instruction which stated in part that

"`. . . The proof is to 
be deemed sufficient when the evidence is sufficient to impress the judgment of 
ordinarily prudent men with a conviction on which they would act in an important 
affair of their own.' . . ." 

We pointed out 
that men of the highest prudence are often forced to choose between alternatives 
on only a preponderance of the evidence. We then defined the 
proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard as:

". . . `[T]he jury must 
be so convinced by the evidence * * * of the defendant's guilt that a prudent 
man would feel safe to act upon that conviction in matters of the highest 
concern and importance to his own dearest personal interests, under 
circumstances where there was no compulsion resting upon him to act at all.' . . 
." Id. at 23 P. 74. [Footnote omitted.]

[¶24.]  In this case, conjecture is substituted 
for certitude about the facts in issue. State v. Osmus, 73 Wyo. 183, 276 P.2d 469 (1954); Morris, 283 P. 406; George, 275 P. 112; Smith, 274 P. 1074; Gardner, 
196 P. 750; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068. As Chief Justice Blume 
considered:

"`[I]t is not enough that 
the evidence in the case goes to show his guilt, but such evidence must be 
entirely inconsistent with a reasonable supposition of innocence. Suspicions, 
however strong, or probabilities, however great, will not be sufficient to 
justify a conviction, but the evidence, to justify a conviction must be 
positive, convincing, establishing the defendant guilty of the charge contained 
in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt, * * *.'"

Osmus, 73 
Wyo. at 220, 
276 P.2d  at 483-84 (quoting from State v. Walser, 318 Mo. 853, 1 S.W.2d 147, 151 
(1927)).

[¶25.]  This conviction lacking that practical, 
rational and constitutional level of proof should be 
reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 As stated by Corson in 
his brief:

In closing arguments the 
State's Attorney claimed that police officers left the trailer at 8:00 a.m., 
leaving it unattended until the search warrant was executed at 1:00 p.m. that 
afternoon. He suggested this gave Corson's family an opportunity to "get rid of 
property." (R.A. Vol. II, p. 206). Examination of testimony fails to reveal any 
evidence concerning police surveillance at the trailer. There was no testimony 
suggesting that other persons left the trailer, nor the presence or absence of 
additional tracks when the officers returned to search. Moreover, there was 
apparently no attempt by the police at the time of arrest to ascertain whether 
there were any other individuals present in the trailer.

2 As similarly stated to 
this case, in Gardner, 27 Wyo. at 325-26, 196 P. at 
752:

The only facts in this 
case that can even throw suspicion on this defendant, if that can be called a 
suspicious circumstances, is that he was employed as a farm hand by Mrs. 
Netterfield, at whose place the stolen wheat was found. It was in evidence that 
a foot-print was seen in the bin at the Chappell place that was larger than 
Chappell's foot, and that there was a small heel track as if made by a 
small-heeled cowboy boot, where the driver of the wagon in which the wheat was 
taken had gone and gotten some gasoline from a truck that was in the road on the 
way to the Netterfield place. But there is nothing in the evidence to show the 
size of defendant's foot, or that he wore or was seen wearing any such boots, or 
to connect him with this evidence in any way. There is nothing in the evidence 
to show that he left the Netterfield ranch on the night of the theft, or that he 
knew what was in the wagon in which the stolen wheat was found at the 
Netterfield place the next morning. No conversation or remarks by the defendant 
that were even suspicious were proven, and no suspicious acts on his part are in 
evidence.