Title: State v. Larkin

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 46S04-1711-CR-701 
State of Indiana 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
–v– 
John B. Larkin 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
Argued: December 19, 2017 | Decided: June 27, 2018 
Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court, 
No. 46C01-1212-FA-610 
The Honorable Patrick C. Blankenship, Special Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
No. 46A04-1607-CR-1522 
Opinion by Justice David 
Chief Justice Rush, Justice Massa, Justice Slaughter, and Justice Goff concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jun 27 2018, 2:42 pm
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David, Justice.  
Following the death of his wife, John Larkin was charged with 
voluntary manslaughter. However, this charge was later dismissed 
because both of the lower courts found that: 1) the Criminal Rule 4(C) 
period within which to bring Larkin to trial had expired and the delays in 
bringing him to trial were not attributable to him; and 2) the prosecutorial 
misconduct in this case required dismissal. For reasons discussed herein, 
we disagree with the lower courts on both issues. Accordingly, we reverse 
and remand for the trial court to hold a hearing or proceed to trial 
pursuant to this Court’s holding in State v. Taylor, 49 N.E.3d 1019 (Ind. 
2016).    
Facts and Procedural History 
In December 2012, police were dispatched to the home of John and 
Stacey Larkin for a reported shooting. Stacey Larkin sustained two fatal 
gunshot wounds during a domestic dispute involving her husband, John 
Larkin. Police took Larkin into custody for questioning, and he invoked 
his right to counsel. The police interrogated him anyway. Larkin’s 
statements to police during those sessions were later suppressed.  
While the State’s preliminary charge was murder, Larkin agreed to 
speak with police if the State would consider only charging him with 
manslaughter. The police so charged Larkin, and then conducted a 
recorded interview.  During a break, police left Larkin alone with his 
attorney, but kept the video recording equipment running, capturing 
Larkin and his attorney’s privileged communications. Larkin and his 
attorney discussed various aspects of the case including insurance, 
motivation and motive, possible charges, filing for divorce, the children, 
conditions of bond, the funeral, possible defenses, and the sequence of 
events on the evening of the shooting. Police and prosecutors viewed the 
video and, therefore, saw and heard Larkin’s privileged discussion with 
counsel.  A court reporter even transcribed the discussion and distributed 
it to the prosecutor’s office. Nearly one year later (December 2013), the 
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State disclosed to Larkin that it had eavesdropped on privileged 
communications between him and his attorney.  
In March 2014, following several continuances, the parties stipulated 
that after November 5, 2014, the State would have 90 days to try Larkin 
pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). Thereafter, in July 2014, Larkin 
moved to dismiss the voluntary manslaughter charge, citing police and 
prosecutorial misconduct that deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right 
to effective counsel. He later moved to disqualify the LaPorte County 
Prosecutor’s Office on the same grounds and requested a special 
prosecutor. He also filed another motion to dismiss in September 2014, 
alleging that the State’s lead detective conspired to obstruct justice by 
having another officer change his statement regarding that officer’s prior 
interaction with Stacey Larkin.  In October 2014, the trial court denied 
Larkin’s motions, but it suppressed: 1) statements Larkin made to police 
after he invoked the right to counsel but before counsel arrived; and 2) the 
recorded conversation between Larkin and counsel.  
At Larkin’s request, the trial court certified for interlocutory appeal the 
denial of Larkin’s motion to disqualify the prosecutor’s office, and stayed 
the proceedings pending resolution from the Court of Appeals.  
In September 2015, the Court of Appeals dismissed Larkin’s appeal as 
moot since LaPorte County elected a new prosecutor in November 2014. 
Larkin v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1281, 1286-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The court’s 
opinion explained that it addressed only the LaPorte Prosecutor’s Office 
as a whole and did not evaluate whether individual prosecutors should 
withdraw from the case. Id. at 1287. The court then opined, “if requested 
by Larkin, the trial court should consider whether disqualification of [two 
deputy prosecutors] would be appropriate in this situation.” Id. The Court 
did not certify its decision until November 20, 2015. 
In the six weeks between when the Court of Appeals issued and 
certified its opinion, the State moved to withdraw the two deputy 
prosecutors, Neary and Armstrong, named in the Court of Appeals 
opinion.  The State also moved for the appointment of a special 
prosecutor. The trial court granted all motions. Also during this time (in 
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October 2015), the trial court judge recused himself and the County Clerk 
appointed Judge Thomas Alevizos to preside over the case going forward.  
Thereafter, in December 2015, Larkin moved to disqualify Judge 
Alevizos, alleging the judge had a conflict of interest. Following a hearing, 
Judge Alevizos found no conflict that jeopardized his impartiality, but 
nonetheless recused himself to save the matter from further delays. The 
Clerk sought replacements, but four other judges in the county either 
declined the appointment or recused themselves. On February 29, 2016, 
Pulaski County’s Judge Patrick Blankenship accepted the appointment.  
On March 28, 2016, citing Rule 4(C), Larkin moved for discharge. He 
orally renewed that motion in an April 7, 2016 hearing. During that same 
hearing, the court and parties discussed possible trial dates, should the 
court deny Larkin’s 4(C) motion. The court and State proposed trial dates 
in early May 2016, but Larkin declined those dates. Larkin agreed to a 
June 20, 2016 trial date. The court clarified on the record that Larkin 
waived his 4(C) argument regarding the June trial date to the extent he 
already made a record that he believed the period had run.  
In May 2016, Larkin filed another motion for discharge under Criminal 
Rule 4(C). He also again moved to dismiss the voluntary manslaughter 
charge, this time arguing the police and prosecutorial misconduct made a 
fair trial impossible. The court held a hearing on Larkin’s motion to 
dismiss on June 9, 2016. Due to last-minute scheduling, the State appeared 
via telephone. The State argued against dismissal, citing the denial of 
Larkin’s first motion to dismiss back in 2014.  Alternatively, pursuant to 
this Court’s opinion in Taylor v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1019 (Ind. 2016), the State 
requested another hearing to present evidence to prove Larkin did not 
suffer prejudice from the State’s prior misconduct. The trial court denied 
that request and on the same day and granted Larkin’s motions, 
discharging him pursuant to 4(C) and dismissing the voluntary 
manslaughter charge.  
The State appealed, raising two issues: 1) whether the trial court erred 
in granting Larkin’s 4(C) discharge motion; and 2) whether the trial court 
erred in granting Larkin’s motion to dismiss.  In a split published opinion, 
the Court of Appeals affirmed on both issues. State v. Larkin, 77 N.E.3d 237 
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(Ind. Ct. App.), reh'g denied (Aug. 25, 2017)(“Larkin I”), transfer granted, 
opinion vacated, 94 N.E.3d 700 (Ind. 2017). Judge Barnes dissented; he 
would have reversed and remanded on both issues.  The State sought 
transfer which we granted, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals’ 
opinion.  Indiana Appellate Rule 58(A).  Additional facts are set forth 
below.   
Standards of Review  
When evaluating a Criminal Rule 4 motion for discharge, “in cases 
where the issue is a question of law applied to undisputed facts, the 
standard of review—like for all questions of law—is de novo.”  Austin v. 
State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1039 (Ind. 2013).  However, in cases where a trial 
court makes a factual finding of congestion or emergency based on 
disputed facts, the standard of review for appellate courts is not abuse of 
discretion, but the clearly erroneous standard.  Id. at 1040. 
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a charging 
information for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thakar, 82 N.E.3d 257, 259 
(Ind. 2017).  A trial court abuses its discretion when it misinterprets the 
law. Id.  
Discussion and Decision  
I. 
Discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 
4(C) 
The State bears the burden of bringing the defendant to trial within one 
year. Bowman v. State, 884 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. 
denied. Rule 4(C) provides a defendant may not be held to answer a 
criminal charge for greater than one year, unless the delay is caused by the 
defendant, emergency, or court congestion. Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 
1143, 1148-49 (Ind. 2011). 
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A defendant extends the one-year period by seeking or 
acquiescing in delay resulting in a later trial date. A defendant 
waives his right to be brought to trial within the period by 
failing to raise a timely objection if, during the period, the trial 
court schedules trial beyond the limit. However, a defendant 
has no duty to object to the setting of a belated trial date if the 
setting occurs after the year has expired.  
Pelley v. State, 901 N.E.2d 494, 498-99 (Ind. 2009) (internal citations 
omitted).   
In this case, the parties stipulated that the State would have 3 months 
from November 5, 2014 to try Larkin.  Trial was ultimately set for June 20, 
2016 after an interlocutory appeal and a motion for change of judge. At 
issue is whether the delay as a result of the interlocutory appeal and the 
motion for change of judge are attributable to Larkin or not.   
A. 
  Interlocutory Appeal  
In Pelley, this Court said, “[w]hen trial court proceedings have been 
stayed pending resolution of the . . . interlocutory appeal, the trial court 
loses jurisdiction to try the defendant and has no ability to speed the 
appellate process.” 901 N.E.2d at 500. See also Wood v. State, 999 N.E.2d 
1054, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Pelley for the principle that “in the 
absence of jurisdiction in the trial court, the Criminal Rule 4(C) . . . was 
tolled“).  
As for when the trial court resumes jurisdiction, Indiana Appellate Rule 
65(E), provides in relevant part: “[t]he trial court . . . and parties shall not 
take any action in reliance upon the opinion or memorandum decision 
until the opinion or memorandum decision is certified.”  Case law clarifies 
that if a trial court acts before certification, the action is considered a 
nullity—as if the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Hancock v. State, 786 N.E.2d 
1142, 1143 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that trial court’s action pre-
certification was “premature and should be considered as a nullity”); 
Jallaili v. National Bd. of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 1168, 
1176 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (labeling a motion filed before certification 
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“premature”); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 59 N.E.3d 343, 355 n.8 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2016) (“We remind the parties and the trial court that no action 
should be taken in reliance on [the Court of Appeals] opinion until it is 
certified as final under Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E)”). 
Here, Larkin I was not certified until November 20, 2015, but prior to 
that, the State filed several motions including one for appointment of a 
special prosecutor.  Pursuant to Pelley and App. R. 65, the trial court did 
not yet have jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals majority 
found that the trial court reassumed jurisdiction and the State submitted 
itself to the trial court’s jurisdiction due to a “constructive” lift of the stay 
when the State moved for appointment of a special prosecutor.  It found 
that the purpose of App. R. 65 was satisfied by the trial court and the 
State’s actions; that is, they were acting in accord with the decision being 
final.  But as Judge Barnes noted in his dissent, there are three problems 
with this: 1) any action taken by the court prior to certification was 
potentially voidable; 2) the parties could have petitioned for transfer; and 
3) the majority’s outcome punishes the State for trying to move the case 
forward prior to the stay being lifted. The State further notes that any date 
prior to the date of certification is an inappropriate measure of when the 
clock restarts for 4(C) purposes, as it injects uncertainly and allows for 
potential game-playing by defendants.  
We agree with the State and Judge Barnes that until the interlocutory 
appeal was certified, the trial court did not have jurisdiction.  As such, the 
period of delay during the pendency of Larkin’s interlocutory appeal 
through the time the Court of Appeals opinion was certified is chargeable 
to Larkin.    
B. Motion for Change of Judge  
On November 23, 2015, Larkin moved for a change of Judge.  Judge 
Alevizos took the matter under advisement and later recused himself. 
Then, several special judges declined appointment until finally, on 
February 29, 2016, Judge Blankenship accepted appointment.   
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This Court has held that “a delay occasioned by a defendant’s filing of a 
motion for change of judge is chargeable to him and that the time begins 
to run anew when the new judge qualifies and assumes jurisdiction.”  
State ex rel. Brown v. Hancock County Superior Court, 372 N.E.2d 169, 170 
(Ind. 1978); See also, Wedmore v. State, 143 N.E.2d 649, 650 (Ind. 1957); State v. 
Grow, 263 N.E.2d 277, 278 (Ind. 1970).  As Judge Barnes notes in his dissent, 
the delay between the filing of the motion and appointment of a qualified 
judge in Grow was six months and in Brown, sixteen months; both 
chargeable to the defendant. Thus, under this line of cases, Larkin should be 
charged with the delay from the filing of his motion until Judge Blankenship 
accepted appointment.   
However, the Court of Appeals majority found Harrington v. State, 588 
N.E.2d 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), disapproved by Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 
1064 (Ind. 2004) dispositive. In Harrington, the defendant moved for a 
special prosecutor because the current prosecutor had a conflict of interest 
(the prosecutor had previously represented the defendant). 588 N.E.2d at 
510. A 317-day delay resulted from the defendant’s motion. When the 
defendant moved for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C), the State argued 
the delay should be charged to the defendant, since he made the special 
prosecutor motion. Id. at 510-11. Harrington countered that the delay should 
be charged to Rule 4(C) since the prosecutor knew of the conflict and it 
would be unfair to charge the delay to him. The Court of Appeals concluded 
the delay was attributable to the State because “a defendant should not be 
forced to choose between a speedy trial and a fair trial as a result of the 
prosecutor’s failure to identify and cure his conflicts.” Id. at 511.  
In Cook, this Court disapproved Harrington. We held “delays caused by 
action taken by the defendant are chargeable to the defendant regardless 
of whether a trial date has been set.” 810 N.E.2d at 1067. We also expressly 
disapproved a string of cases (including Harrington) to the extent they 
were inconsistent with that holding. Id.  The Court of Appeals majority 
here relied heavily on Harrington’s language that a defendant should not 
be forced to choose between a fair and speedy trial.  Admittedly, 
Harrington’s language about choosing between a fair and speedy trial was 
not explicitly disapproved in Cook.  
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However, there are a few problems with applying Harrington in this 
case.  First, adopting this approach would allow for a defendant to file for 
change of judge preventing the case from moving forward but allowing 
the 4(C) period to run.  Just as interlocutory appeals toll the 4(C) period 
despite who filed because the case cannot practically move forward, the 
same is true when a motion for change of judge is filed.  
Also, the Court of Appeals majority assumes that Judge Alevizos’ conflict 
that caused his recusal was something he should have just known from the 
outset.  It’s not clear that this is the case.  While he previously presided over 
a matter involving Larkin’s sister and children and the outcome was less 
than desirable for Larkin’s sister, we presume our trial judges are unbiased.  
Patterson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).  Further, practically 
speaking, there are times when it will take time to find a suitable special 
judge depending on the circumstances, and it’s not clear why this delay is 
not akin to court congestion. Accordingly, we apply Cook and find that the 
delay in finding a special judge is attributable to Larkin.  Because the 
delays that occurred as a result of Larkin’s interlocutory appeal and his 
motion for change of judge are attributable to him and he agreed to a June 
2016 trial date in May, prior to expiration of the 4(C) period, he is not 
entitled to discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C). 
II. Motion to dismiss due to inability to get 
a fair trial 
 
A. 
  The State committed misconduct. 
 
In this case, there is no dispute that the State committed misconduct 
and on numerous occasions.   First, police continued to question Larkin 
after he invoked his right to counsel.  Then, Larkin’s private conversation 
with his attorney was recorded and listened to by several individuals at 
the prosecutor’s office.  The situation was compounded when the 
conversation was transcribed and further distributed.  Additionally, there 
is evidence in the record reflecting potential evidence tampering. That is, 
one officer instructed another to change his statement about his prior 
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interaction with Larkin’s wife.   There is also evidence that a piece of 
physical evidence, the safe containing the gun used to shoot Stacey, was 
tampered with while in the State’s custody and prior to allowing Larkin 
an opportunity to examine it.  
It is especially troubling to this Court that one of the prosecuting 
attorneys involved in this matter was also involved in the misconduct in 
Taylor.  However, the discipline of attorneys is a separate matter than the 
matter at hand.   As we noted in Taylor: “what constitutes an effective remedy 
for [defendant] is not necessarily what would constitute a proportionate 
punishment for the State.  Our concern is to ensure the State’s egregious 
misconduct does not actually prejudice [defendant]. . . .” Taylor at 1024.  
Accordingly, here we must decide whether the State’s misconduct is so 
severe that Larkin’s criminal charges should be dismissed over it. Balancing 
Larkin’s rights with the public’s interest in seeking justice for victims and 
applying our precedent, we find that outright dismissal is not the 
appropriate remedy in this case.   
B. The appropriate remedy for the State’s 
misconduct is suppression of the tainted 
evidence for which the State cannot rebut the 
presumption of prejudice pursuant to Taylor.  
 In Taylor, when considering a motion to suppress, this Court 
announced a rule that when the State eavesdrops on a defendant’s 
privileged communications with counsel, there arises a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice.  This Court instructed the State may rebut that 
presumption only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 49 N.E.3d at 1019.  
We noted that it would be a windfall to Taylor if all statements were 
suppressed because this would be disproportionate to the prejudice Taylor 
actually suffered. Id. at 1029.  We further noted that there may be other 
circumstances where the taint would be so pervasive and insidious that no 
remedy short of barring the tainted witnesses would suffice but we did not 
address “that larger question” at that time.  Id. Taylor considered a motion to 
suppress only and not a motion to dismiss.   
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Larkin argues, and the Court of Appeals found that the prosecutorial 
misconduct in this case is more severe than in Taylor and thus, Taylor does 
not apply.  That is, they argue that Taylor only involved eavesdropping1 
whereas here, the misconduct did not end there. Judge Barnes disagreed 
with the majority, believing the facts in Taylor were not so much more 
egregious than the ones here as to require dismissal.    
However, even acknowledging that the prosecutorial misconduct may be 
worse here, we find Taylor is applicable to this case, and as such, outright 
dismissal is not an appropriate remedy.  Pursuant to Taylor, the State must 
be given a chance (even though it may not be possible) to demonstrate by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that some untainted and admissible 
evidence exists. Further, Taylor does not require that the State make an offer 
of proof in order to rebut the presumption of prejudice.    
The trial court already suppressed statements made by Larkin after he 
invoked his right to counsel when the police continued to question him as 
well as his recorded conversation with his attorney.  Testimony or 
portions of testimony from certain officers may also need to be suppressed 
and the safe may need to be excluded from evidence.  However, the State 
cites other evidence which may not be tainted at all.  For instance, Larkin’s 
911 call, a physical description of the shooting scene, pathologist 
testimony and Larkin’s statement to police may be used to bring Larkin to 
trial.  The trial court will need to look at each piece of evidence and 
testimony and determine first, whether it is tainted and next, if so, 
whether the State can rebut prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Finally, we note again that Taylor involved blanket suppression and not 
a motion to dismiss.  Dismissal is an extreme remedy.  As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held, for constitutional violations committed by the 
government, “the remedy characteristically imposed is not to dismiss the 
                                                 
1 Taylor involved more than eavesdropping as well. After eavesdropping, police used 
information gained from what they overheard to go find the murder weapon. Further, police 
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights during their depositions when Taylor sought to learn 
the extent of the prejudice from the eavesdropping.  
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indictment but to suppress the evidence” gained from the violation.  U.S. 
v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981).  To the extent the prosecutorial 
misconduct in this case has caused prejudice which the State cannot rebut 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the appropriate remedy is suppression of the 
tainted evidence, not outright dismissal without taking into account other 
untainted evidence or giving the State an opportunity to rebut the 
presumption of prejudice.  It may be that the State has no case without the  
suppressed evidence.  Regardless, the trial court abused its discretion in 
not applying Taylor to this case.  
Conclusion  
We find that the delays associated with Larkin’s interlocutory appeal 
and motion for change of judge are chargeable to Larkin.  As such, the 
Criminal Rule 4(C) period had not expired before Larkin agreed to a June 
2016 trial date.  Thus, his motion for discharge should have been denied.   
 We further find that Taylor applies to this case and outright dismissal is 
not the appropriate remedy for the State’s misconduct.  Instead, the trial 
court is to assess each piece of evidence to determine whether it is tainted 
by the State’s misconduct.  If it is, the State shall be afforded the 
opportunity to rebut the presumption of prejudice by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Failing that, the testimony or evidence at issue will be 
suppressed.   
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court on both issues and remand.  The 
trial court, at its discretion, may either hold a hearing during which the 
State is given an opportunity to rebut the presumption of prejudice for 
any tainted evidence or proceed to trial at which the State may attempt to 
meet its burden through offers of proof outside the presence of the jury.   
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.  
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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.  
Attorney General of Indiana  
Stephen R. Creason 
Chief Counsel  
Justin F. Roebel 
Supervising Deputy Attorney General  
Indianapolis, Indiana  
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Stacy R. Uliana 
James E. Foster 
Bargersville, Indiana