Title: Petit v. Lumb

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2014 ME 117 
Docket: 
Yor-14-89 
Submitted 
On Briefs: September 23, 2014 
Decided: 
October 30, 2014 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
CATHERINE DUFFY PETIT 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM LUMB 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
[¶1]  Catherine Duffy Petit appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court 
(York County, Fritzsche, J.) granting William Lumb’s motion to dismiss, M.R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and dismissing her complaint against Lumb in its entirety.  The 
complaint, in sixteen counts, alleged breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, 
and related claims arising out of transactions involving Petit and Lumb described 
in Cimenian v. Lumb, 2008 ME 107, 951 A.2d 817, as well as subsequent events. 
[¶2]  On appeal, Petit contends that the court erred in (1) not accepting her 
opposition to Lumb’s motion to dismiss because the copy she filed with the court 
had a photocopied rather than an original signature, see M.R. Civ. P. 5(f) (“Filings 
that are received but which are not signed . . . , shall be returned by the clerk as 
incomplete.”); see also M.R. Civ. P. 11(a) (“If a pleading or motion is not signed, 
 
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it shall not be accepted for filing.”); and (2) granting the motion to dismiss when, 
she asserts, her complaint sufficiently alleged causes of action to meet our 
notice-pleading standard. 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
[¶3]  Following service of Petit’s complaint, Lumb filed a timely motion to 
dismiss the complaint pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On January 6, 2014, at 
the twenty-one-day deadline for filing an opposition to the motion, see M.R. 
Civ. P. 7(c)(2), the Superior Court received a photocopy of Petit’s opposition to 
Lumb’s motion to dismiss.  The next day, the Clerk of the York County Superior 
Court mailed Petit a notice of incomplete filing, informing Petit that her opposition 
to the motion included a copy of her signature rather than an original signature as 
required by M.R. Civ. P. 5(f), 7(b)(2), and 11(a).  See Fichter v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 
604 A.2d 433, 435 (Me. 1992) (stating that a faxed copy of a notice of appeal did 
not comply with the requirement that pleadings bear an original signature).  The 
Clerk instructed Petit to “[p]lease re-submit with original signatures.”  Petit did not 
respond. 
[¶4]  Because the Clerk could not accept for filing Petit’s opposition to 
Lumb’s motion without an original signature and Petit failed to respond to the 
Clerk’s notice, the twenty-one-day deadline for filing opposition to the motion 
 
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passed without a filed opposition from Petit.  By rule, Petit was “deemed to have 
waived all objections to the motion.”  M.R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3).    
[¶5]  After another month had passed, counsel for Lumb sent a letter to the 
court, with a copy to Petit, “requesting that the [motion to dismiss] be presented to 
a Justice at [the court’s] earliest convenience.”  On February 11, 2014, the court, 
acting without notice or further hearing as authorized by Rule 7(c)(3), granted 
Lumb’s motion to dismiss and dismissed Petit’s complaint.  See Clearwater 
Artesian Well Co. v. LaGrandeur, 2007 ME 11, ¶ 8, 912 A.2d 1252, (stating that 
when a self-represented party fails to properly respond to a motion due to a 
misunderstanding, the motion may be granted because “self-represented litigants 
are afforded no special consideration in procedural matters”). 
[¶6]  The court’s order dismissed Petit’s complaint “with prejudice and with 
costs, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney’s fees and Court costs.”  
Cf. M.R. Civ. P. 11(a) (authorizing award of sanctions, “including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee,” for violation of the requirements or purposes of that Rule, 
including its original signature requirement).   
[¶7]  Petit then brought this appeal. 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
[¶8]  Because Petit’s tendered objection to Lumb’s motion to dismiss did not 
contain an original signature, the attempted filing did not comply with the Maine 
 
4 
Rules of Civil Procedure and did not have legal effect.1 When a motion is 
unopposed, the court need not reach the merits of the motion because, under Rule 
7(c)(3), the adverse party has waived any objection to it.  See Giguere v. Great Atl. 
& Pac. Tea Co., 526 A.2d 1383, 1385 (Me. 1987) (motion to enlarge time for 
response to complaint).  Therefore, in circumstances such as those presented here, 
the trial court was authorized to grant Lumb’s motion because it was unopposed.  
However, the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure did not require the court to grant the 
motion: Rule 7(c)(3) provides only that an adverse party who has not filed an 
opposition has waived any opposition to the motion; it does not obligate the court 
to act favorably on the motion.2  When the court acts on a motion based on a 
procedural default by the non-moving party, the question on appeal is whether the 
court abused its discretion.  
                                         
1  We note that, in some circumstances, the federal courts provide some accommodation to parties who 
submit a court filing without a proper signature, if a properly signed document is refiled reasonably 
promptly, even if the filing deadline has passed.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 
(5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Kasuboski, 834 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (7th Cir. 1987).  Here, even after a 
month had passed after the clerk notified Petit of the defective court filing, Petit had not filed a corrected 
opposition to the motion.  Therefore, any accommodation allowed under that approach is not available to 
Petit. 
2  We have held that when a mortgagee moves for summary judgment on a complaint for foreclosure, a 
defective or deficient opposition to the motion does not relieve the court of its responsibility to address 
the merits of the unopposed motion.  Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. deBree, 2012 ME 34, ¶ 9, 38 A.3d 1257.  
At least in part, this is a consequence of M.R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(d), which obligates a party who moves for 
summary judgment to meet the requirements of M.R. Civ. P. 56, in addition to any other applicable 
requirement.  Thus, as we held in Wells Fargo, the movant for summary judgment must affirmatively 
establish the basis for that relief under Rule 56, and the movant may not rely on any defects in an 
opposition to the motion or on the absence of an opposition altogether.  Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2012 ME 
34, ¶ 9, 38 A.3d 1257.   
 
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[¶9]  Here, considering Petit’s substantial prior experience in litigation as 
reflected in the record, including her complaint, see also Cimenian v. Lumb, 
2008 ME 107, 951 A.2d 817; Petit v. Key Bank of Maine, 688 A.2d 427 
(Me. 1996), and the express opportunity she was given to submit a corrected and 
proper court filing, Petit has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its 
discretion in granting the motion and entering its dismissal order in this case.3 
The entry is: 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Catherine Petit, pro se, and Timothy E. Zerillo, Esq., Zerillo Law, LLC, 
Portland, for appellant Catherine Petit 
 
Joseph L. Goodman, Esq., Goodman Law Firm, P.A., for appellee William 
Lumb 
 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number CV-2013-199 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
3  In appeals in civil actions, the appellant bears the burden of persuasion.  See Bizier v. Town of 
Turner, 2011 ME 116, ¶ 8, 32 A.2d 1048; In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 10, 776 A.2d 1240.