Title: State v. Williams

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 1.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 95-2572 — Submitted October 9, 1996 — Decided June 11, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 16418. 
 
Defendant-appellant, William J. Williams, Jr., controlled the drug 
trafficking at the Kimmelbrooks housing project in east Youngstown, Ohio.  After 
an extended absence from the area, appellant returned to find that Alfonda R. 
Madison, Sr., William L. Dent, Eric Howard, and others had taken over the drug 
trade at the Kimmelbrooks project.  Appellant wanted to regain control of the drug 
business, so he decided to rob and kill Madison and the others. 
 
Appellant had three juvenile accomplices:  his sixteen-year-old girlfriend, 
Jessica M. Cherry; her sixteen- or seventeen-year-old brother, Dominic M. Cherry; 
and Dominic Cherry’s seventeen-year-old “cousin” (i.e., best friend), Broderick 
Boone.  On August 27, 1991, the appellant bought walkie-talkies at a Radio Shack 
store.  The devices had a combined microphone-earphone earpiece that left the 
user’s hands free.  The appellant also bought batteries and duct tape.  The 
appellant, Dominic, and Broderick later tested the walkie-talkies. 
 
Before the murders, the appellant outlined his plan to his three accomplices.  
During this meeting, the appellant drew interior and exterior diagrams of 
Madison’s house.  The appellant later ordered Dominic to burn these, but Dominic 
burned only one diagram.  In addition, the appellant supplied each accomplice 
with a gun.  The appellant purchased Jessica’s gun from a neighbor. 
 
On September 1, 1991, Jessica met with Madison and discussed a drug deal.  
Later that night, the appellant and his three accomplices arrived at Madison’s 
home by car.  The appellant armed the three juvenile accomplices with guns and a 
 
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walkie-talkie and sent them inside, while he waited outside with a walkie-talkie.  
Once inside, the three accomplices drew their guns on Madison.  Then, after 
receiving word via walkie-talkie that the situation was secure, the appellant, armed 
with a semiautomatic, entered the house carrying a duffel bag containing 
handcuffs, duct tape, and gloves.  Inside, the appellant handcuffed and bound 
Madison and put tape over his mouth. 
 
Thirty to forty-five minutes later, Theodore Wynn, Jr., a recently discharged 
Air Force sergeant, came to the door, looking for Madison and Howard, who were 
roommates.  Jessica answered the door and told Wynn that Madison was not home 
and Howard was asleep.  As Wynn walked back towards his car, the appellant told 
Jessica to call Wynn back into the house because Wynn could identify them.  
Inside the house, the appellant held Wynn at gunpoint and handcuffed him. 
 
Upon the appellant’s orders, Jessica walked to a pay phone and called and 
asked for Dent for the purpose of luring him to the house.  When Dent arrived 
with Howard, the appellant and his accomplices ambushed them and forced them 
to lie down in the bathroom.  The appellant strangled Madison and Wynn, and 
then instructed Jessica to turn up the stereo.  Going from room to room, the 
appellant shot each of the four victims in the head with Madison’s gun. 
 
The group left Madison’s home, but the appellant, according to Jessica,  
went back in “to make sure they were all dead.”  Later, back at the appellant’s 
apartment, he embraced his juvenile accomplices and rewarded them with drugs.  
The appellant warned them not to tell anyone what they had done or he would kill 
them. 
 
The next day, September 2, 1991, the appellant and Jessica were driving to 
pick up appellant’s son in Youngstown when another car rammed theirs and the 
people in the other car shot at them.  Jessica and the appellant fled the scene.  
 
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When Jessica and the appellant returned to the vicinity of the accident, officers 
transported them to the Youngstown Police Department and later released them 
after questioning them about the traffic accident.  Later that night, the appellant, 
Jessica, Dominic, and Broderick fled to Pennsylvania.  The appellant and the three 
juveniles returned to the Youngstown area and parted company. 
 
On September 24, 1991, Dominic turned himself in, and gave a statement 
about the murders.  Later, officers arrested Jessica and Broderick, and the latter 
also gave statements.  Following their arrests, Jessica, Dominic, and Broderick 
were held at the Mahoning County Juvenile Justice Center (“JJC”). 
 
The appellant was arrested in connection with the murders.  Shortly after 
being arrested, he escaped from jail on October 15, 1991.  While the appellant 
remained a fugitive from justice, a Mahoning County Grand Jury indicted him on 
four counts of aggravated murder, four counts of kidnapping, and one count of 
aggravated burglary. 
 
On January 12, 1992, the armed appellant and two other accomplices, Paul 
R. Keiper, Jr., and a juvenile named Eric Fields, appeared at the JJC.  The three 
deceived a receptionist and were permitted to enter.  Once inside, the appellant 
held the receptionist and a deputy sheriff hostage, demanding to see Jessica, 
Dominic, and Broderick.  After lengthy negotiations, the appellant surrendered to 
authorities.  At trial, Keiper testified that the appellant planned to kill the three 
juveniles because he knew that they had made statements to the police regarding 
the murders. 
 
The Mahoning County Grand Jury reindicted the appellant on twelve counts 
of aggravated murder, four counts of kidnapping, and one count of aggravated 
burglary.  In addition, each aggravated murder charge included two felony-murder 
 
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death specifications and one death specification for multiple murder.  On the 
appellant’s motion, the court transferred venue to Summit County. 
 
Jessica, Dominic, and Broderick all entered into plea agreements with the 
Mahoning County Prosecutor’s Office.  All three pled guilty to delinquency by 
reason of complicity to aggravated murder, complicity to aggravated burglary, and 
complicity to kidnapping.  All three testified against the appellant. 
 
A jury convicted the appellant on all counts and specifications.  The trial 
court merged the twelve aggravated murder counts into four and the three  
specifications per count into a single multiple-murder specification.  Following the 
sentencing hearing, the jury recommended death for each aggravated murder.  The 
trial judge sentenced the appellant to death, and the court of appeals affirmed. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
James A. Philomena, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michele 
G. Cerni, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
John Juhasz and Mary Jane Stephens, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  We have reviewed the appellant’s nine 
propositions of law, independently weighed the evidence relating to the death 
sentence, balanced the aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors, 
and compared the sentence to those imposed in similar cases.  As a result, we 
affirm the convictions and sentences of death. 
I 
ALLEGED JUROR MISCONDUCT 
 
In Proposition of Law I, the appellant argues that the conduct of the 
prospective jurors deprived him of his constitutional right to an impartial jury, 
 
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guaranteed by both the United States and Ohio Constitutions.  Thus, the appellant 
argues, the trial court should have granted his motion for mistrial during voir dire.  
The appellant claims that the trial court erred by improperly curtailing inquiry into 
prospective jurors’ misconduct, and by refusing to conduct an investigation or 
allow counsel to investigate.  Included in the appellant’s allegations is that 
prospective jurors concealed prior knowledge of the case, rumors about the case, 
and anxiety concerning court security. 
 
A claim of juror misconduct must focus on the jurors who were actually 
seated and not those excused.  Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 
2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80.  Thus, to establish a constitutional violation in this 
situation, the appellant must demonstrate that one of the jurors seated was not 
impartial.  Further, unless a juror is challenged for cause, he or she is presumed to 
be impartial.  State v. Broom (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 288, 533 N.E.2d 682, 
695. 
 
Appellant claims that two individuals who served on the jury, Joann 
Eddleman and Martha Forsyth, concealed their misconduct on voir dire and 
contends that this court should therefore presume they were biased.  A court may 
infer bias if it finds deliberate concealment; however, if the concealment was 
unintentional, the appellant must show that the juror was actually biased.  Zerka v. 
Green (C.A.6, 1992), 49 F.3d 1181, 1184-1186. 
 
Because appellant did not challenge Forsyth or Eddleman on the ground that 
they had concealed information, appellant waived any errors involved.  State v. 
Greer (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 247, 530 N.E.2d 382, 397.  However, we will 
examine these allegations for plain error. 
 
On voir dire the judge asked Eddleman if she knew anything about the case, 
to which she replied she did not.  However, according to prospective juror Janet 
 
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Parsons, Eddleman told her that a Youngstown resident had informed her that the 
case “involved drugs” and the authorities had been unable to find the defendant.  
However, Eddleman told Parsons that “she [Eddleman] didn’t know if that was 
true.”  Parsons admitted she was only “half listening” and “wasn’t paying that 
much attention” to Eddleman.  The appellant argues that Eddleman concealed her 
alleged conversation with the person from Youngstown.  However, this court does 
not find that Eddleman deliberately concealed the conversation because she had 
previously indicated that she did not know whether those rumors were true.  Thus, 
her voir dire response was truthful — she did not know anything about the case.  
She was not asked whether she had discussed the case with anyone.  Therefore, 
Eddleman’s answers create no presumption of bias. 
 
Appellant claims Forsyth may have concealed a conversation with 
prospective juror John Gombaski.  Gombaski, who was excused for cause, 
allegedly overheard a conversation between court employees about the case.  
Gombaski allegedly told two other prospective jurors what he had heard.  While 
he did not recall which two prospective jurors he told, at that point in voir dire 
there were only four possibilities.  When the judge read the four names, Gombaski 
said Forsyth “might” ring a bell.  The judge asked Forsyth whether she had heard 
any discussion about the case in the courthouse.  She replied that she had not, 
although the venire had speculated about what type of questions would be asked.  
A review of Gombaski’s and Forsyth’s voir dire does not provide a basis for 
finding that Forsyth concealed information.  Therefore, we presume no prejudice 
regarding Forsyth. 
 
Janet Smith was the other possible prospective juror who served on the jury 
and with whom Gombaski may have spoken.  The trial court questioned Smith 
about whether she had heard or seen any pretrial publicity about the case.  She 
 
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replied that she had not.  Further, the trial court asked her whether she had heard 
comments about the case or discussed the case with other jurors.  Again, she 
replied that she had not and that she did not know anything about the case other 
than what the judge told her in the courtroom.  The other two prospective jurors 
who might have spoken with Gombaski did not serve on the jury.  Having 
reviewed for plain error, we find none. 
 
The appellant claims that juror Margaret Rohwedder was biased because she 
allegedly overheard discussion about security and possible retaliation.  When 
questioned on voir dire, Rohwedder indicated that she had heard no such 
discussion.  Because appellant presented no proof that she lied, there is no merit to 
the bias claim.  The remaining jurors who the appellant alleged were biased did 
not sit on the jury. 
 
The appellant also argues that the trial judge did not sufficiently inquire into 
the extent and effect of the alleged juror misconduct.  However, the scope of voir 
dire is within the discretion of the trial court and varies depending on the 
circumstances of each case.  State v. Bedford (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 129, 529 
N.E.2d 913, 920.  The trial judge and counsel questioned all of the jurors allegedly 
involved in the misconduct.  Upon review of the voir dire, we do not find that the 
trial judge unreasonably or arbitrarily restricted examination or investigation into 
the preconceptions of the prospective jurors.  Therefore, the trial court acted 
within its discretion in overruling the appellant’s motion for mistrial.  
Accordingly, we reject Proposition of Law I. 
II 
ALLEGED JUROR PREFERENCE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY 
 
In appellant’s second proposition of law, he claims that the trial court 
wrongly overruled nine challenges for cause concerning alleged pro-death-penalty 
 
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jurors.  The standard for determining whether a prospective juror may be excluded 
for cause due to his or her views on capital punishment is whether that prospective 
juror’s views would “ ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his 
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ”  (Emphasis 
deleted.)  Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 420, 105 S.Ct. 844, 850, 83 
L.Ed.2d 841, 849, quoting Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 
2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589.  This court specifically adopted that standard in 
State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 984, 
paragraph three of the syllabus, vacated and remanded on other grounds (1985), 
474 U.S. 1002, 106 S.Ct. 518, 88 L.Ed.2d 452, where we held that voir dire would 
constitute reversible error only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion.  
Id., 17 Ohio St.3d at 178-179, 17 OBR at 418, 478 N.E.2d at 990. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held in Morgan v. Illinois (1992), 504 
U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229-2230, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, 502-503, that “[a] 
juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in 
good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as 
the instructions require him to do.  Indeed, because such a juror has already 
formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of either aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a juror.  Therefore, based on 
the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any 
prospective juror who maintains such views.  If even one such juror is empaneled 
and the death sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence.”  
The rationale behind this is that “a juror could, in good conscience, swear to 
uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining such dogmatic beliefs about 
the death penalty would prevent him or her from doing so.  A defendant on trial 
 
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for his life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective 
jurors function under such misconception.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Id. at 735-736, 
112 S.Ct. at 2223, 119 L.Ed.2d at 507. 
 
Many times during voir dire in death penalty cases, prospective jurors are 
asked for the first time to face their views about the death penalty.  Often, they 
have not defined in their own minds what their views are, and they are forced to 
define their beliefs amidst extremely leading questioning from both parties.  Some 
have very strongly held views, but have never had to define them within the 
context of following the law.  It is the duty of the trial judge to sort through their 
responses and determine whether the prospective jurors will be able to follow the 
law.  We find that the trial court permitted this appellant to question the 
prospective jurors both before and after the court's questions.  Therefore, we find 
that the trial judge properly complied with the requirements of Morgan v. Illinois. 
 
Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in denying nine 
challenges for cause.  Of the nine challenges, the appellant excused five 
prospective jurors (Frances Scanlon, Magda Subecz, V.F. Allen, Khim Standen, 
and Richard Mains) through peremptory challenges.  The appellant exhausted his 
peremptory challenges.  Of the four prospective jurors remaining, two (Edna 
Lewis and Linda Tanski) were excused for other reasons, and the two remaining 
jurors (Patricia Camp and Joann Eddleman) were seated. 
 
The two allegedly biased prospective jurors who ultimately sat on the jury 
were Camp and Eddleman.  Juror Camp did not automatically favor the death 
penalty, but the appellant argues that she was overly concerned about the 
possibility of parole.  A juror’s impartiality is not impaired simply because that 
juror opposes parole for convicted murderers.  Further, when the trial judge 
explained the death penalty phase and the law involved, Camp stated that she 
 
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could consider all of the possible penalties and return the appropriate verdict.  She 
also stated that she did not think that all murderers should be executed.  Thus, we 
do not find that it was error for the trial judge to overrule the appellant’s challenge 
for cause regarding Camp. 
 
Eddleman was the other juror who was challenged for cause by the 
appellant and who ultimately sat on the jury.  Eddleman vacillated in her responses 
to questions concerning the death penalty.  When questioned by the prosecutor, 
she agreed that she could follow the court’s instructions and that she understood 
that the death penalty was not an automatic punishment.  When questioned by the 
defense, she agreed that even given the three choices of death, life with parole 
eligibility after twenty years, and life with parole eligibility after thirty years, she 
would choose death.  Yet, in response to the judge, she indicated that she 
understood the balancing process for aggravating circumstances and mitigating 
factors and agreed that she could participate in that process, weigh the evidence 
fairly, and make the appropriate recommendation. 
 
The transcript reveals that Eddleman appeared to contradict herself.  It is 
difficult from reading the transcript to determine whether Eddleman was 
overstating her beliefs concerning the death penalty to defense counsel, or 
understating them to the judge and prosecutor. 
 
Morgan held that answers to “general questions of fairness or impartiality” 
cannot negate a statement by the prospective juror that he or she would 
automatically vote for death.  Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735, 112 S.Ct. at 2233, 119 
L.Ed.2d at 506.  However, the trial judge’s questions were more than general 
inquiries regarding a juror’s ability to be fair and impartial.  Instead, the judge 
fully explained the penalty stage, the law of mitigation and aggravation, and the 
corresponding penalties.  By the end of voir dire, Camp and Eddleman fully 
 
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understood that an automatic death penalty vote is inconsistent with the law.  
Thus, when they said they could follow the law, they were not unaware that 
“maintaining [their] dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent  
[them] from doing so.”  Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735, 112 S.Ct. at 2233, 119 L.Ed.2d 
at 507.  Indeed, they had already said they could set their views aside. 
 
Voir dire, like the entire litigation process, is inherently adversarial.  With 
both parties attempting to push a prospective juror into a certain position in order 
to remove him or her from the jury, it is the job of the trial judge to determine 
which statements of the prospective juror reflect that individual’s true state of 
mind and ability to follow the law.  Hence, in the give and take of voir dire, it is 
often necessary for the trial judge to step in and provide some neutral, nonleading 
instructions and questions in an attempt to determine whether the prospective juror 
can actually be fair and impartial.  The transcript reveals only the words spoken in 
the courtroom. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that “deference must be paid to 
the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.” Witt, 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 
853, 83 L.Ed.2d at 853.  Although Witt was a habeas corpus case, the principle is 
equally sound in this case.  A trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly arbitrary and unsupported by 
substantial testimony, so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.  State v. Wilson 
(1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 203, 211, 58 O.O.2d 409, 414, 280 N.E.2d 915, 920.  The 
trial judge had the benefit of observing Eddleman’s demeanor and body language, 
while we do not.  Finding no abuse of discretion, we therefore defer to the trial 
judge’s discretion to determine whether Eddleman could indeed follow the law 
and be fair and impartial. 
 
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The appellant argues that the trial judge improperly overruled his challenges 
for cause regarding seven other prospective jurors, five of whom the appellant 
eventually excused through peremptories.  While it is true, regarding the right to 
an impartial jury, that the proper focus is on the jurors who were seated, see 
Broom, supra, if the defense peremptorily excuses the biased prospective juror, 
but the defense exhausts its peremptory challenges before the full jury is seated, 
the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause in a criminal case may be prejudicial.  
Hartnett v. State (1885), 42 Ohio St. 568, paragraph four of the syllabus; State v. 
Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 30-31, 553 N.E.2d 576, 586-587. 
 
The reason for this rule is that an error by the trial judge in overruling a 
challenge for cause forces the defendant to use a peremptory on a prospective 
juror who should have been excused for cause, giving the defendant fewer 
peremptories than the law provides.  Consequently, this court need not consider 
the challenges to prospective jurors Lewis and Tanski because the appellant did 
not need to use a peremptory challenge on either, as both were excused for other 
reasons. 
 
As for the remaining jurors, the appellant exhausted his peremptories in 
removing them.  We will therefore examine the voir dire of the other five 
prospective jurors (Scanlon, Subecz, Allen, Standen, and Mains).  First, the 
appellant points to Scanlon, who told defense counsel she would automatically 
vote for the death penalty if the appellant “willfully and intentionally” murdered 
someone.  Similarly, Subecz told defense counsel that death is always the 
appropriate penalty for intentional murders lacking “excuse or justification.”  
However, defense counsel did not explain to those prospective jurors the legal 
meaning of the terms “willful,” “intentional,” “excuse,” or “justification.” 
 
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Second, the appellant points to prospective jurors Allen, Standen, and 
Mains, who would require the appellant to show why he should not receive a death 
sentence.  But later, when the law was more fully explained to them, each 
prospective juror stated that he or she could follow the law. 
 
It was the task of the trial judge to observe the prospective jurors and 
determine whether after explanation they could indeed follow the law and be fair 
and impartial.  We find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying 
the appellant’s challenges for cause.  Accordingly, we reject Proposition of Law II. 
III 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
 
In Proposition of Law III, the appellant argues that his convictions were not 
supported by sufficient evidence and that the verdict was against the manifest 
weight of the evidence.  In our review of the evidence, our standard is “whether, 
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 
492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  After a thorough review of the evidence, we 
find it to be sufficient. 
 
The appellant’s accomplices in the murders all testified against him at trial.  
The appellant challenges their testimony as inconsistent, inaccurate, and biased 
due to their plea agreements with the state.  All three testified that they saw the 
appellant shoot Dent and Howard.  None of the accomplices saw the appellant 
shoot Wynn, but all three saw the appellant walk into the bedroom where Wynn 
was held, and all three then heard a shot. 
 
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Jessica testified that she saw the appellant strangling Madison in the 
kitchen.  Later, Jessica heard the appellant say that he was going to kill Madison,  
saw him enter the kitchen where he was restraining Madison, heard the appellant 
say to Madison, “I’ll see you in hell,” and heard a gunshot.  Jessica testified that 
the appellant told her to turn up the stereo to drown out the shots.  During the 
planning stages, Broderick heard the appellant state his plan to kill Madison.  
During the murders, Broderick, who was guarding Wynn in the bedroom, also 
heard the appellant shoot Madison.  Dominic testified that he saw the appellant 
walk into the kitchen area and shoot Madison in the back of the head. 
 
This testimony, if believed, was enough by itself to convict.  Further, the 
events that occurred on the evening of January 12, 1992 at the Mahoning County 
Juvenile Justice Center are strong evidence of the appellant’s guilt.  After the 
appellant escaped from the Mahoning County Jail, he purchased a police uniform, 
armed himself, and used deception to gain entry to the JJC, allegedly with the 
intent to kill his three juvenile accomplices to the murders.  Paul Keiper, one of 
the appellant’s accomplices on January 12, testified that the appellant told him that 
he planned to kill the three juveniles.  Further, Jerome E. Gibson, a fellow prisoner 
while the appellant was awaiting trial at the Summit County Jail, testified that the 
appellant told him he had intended to kill his three juvenile accomplices with 
“explosives and guns” at the JJC. 
 
Physical evidence included duct tape and electrical cord recovered from the 
victims, the recovered murder weapon, slugs removed from the victims, and spent 
shell casings. 
 
While it is true that there were inconsistencies in the testimony of the three 
juvenile witnesses, this evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
state.  This court will not resolve evidentiary conflicts or determine credibility.  
 
15
State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 430, 588 N.E.2d 819, 825.  The jurors 
had the opportunity to fully observe and hear the testimony of each witness.  The 
defense pointed out inconsistencies in their testimony during cross-examination 
and in closing argument.  It was up to the jurors to weigh these inconsistencies and 
assess the witnesses’ credibility.  When all the evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, the jury could reasonably have found the evidence 
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the 
crimes charged.  Accordingly, we reject Proposition of Law III. 
IV 
OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE 
 
The appellant pled guilty before trial to an escape from the Mahoning 
County Jail and to the unlawful entry into the JJC.  At trial, the prosecution 
introduced evidence about the appellant’s armed entry into the JJC.  In Proposition 
of Law IV, the appellant argues that this evidence violated Evid.R. 404(B) because 
the evidence was not needed to prove motive or intent and because it was offered 
solely to inflame the jury and to bolster the credibility of the three juvenile 
witnesses.  Further, the appellant argues that the evidence should have been 
excluded under Evid.R. 403(A) because the prejudicial impact substantially 
outweighed its probative value. 
 
Ohio Evid.R. 404(B) provides: 
 
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident.” 
 
16
 
Other acts may prove identity by “establishing a modus operandi applicable 
to the crime with which a defendant is charged.”  State v. Lowe (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 527, 531, 634 N.E.2d 616, 619.  In this case, the incident at the JJC is 
evidence of modus operandi.  It established a “behavioral fingerprint” linking the 
appellant to the crime due to the common features shared by both events.  Id.  In 
both instances, the appellant sent others into the building first to create a diversion 
and to hold the victims at gunpoint, while the appellant waited outside until his 
accomplices had secured the situation.  In both instances, he used at least one 
juvenile accomplice.  In both instances, the appellant dressed in dark clothing 
from head to toe and wore a mask and gloves.  In both instances, the appellant 
carried automatic firearms.  In both instances, the appellant handcuffed some of 
his victims’ hands behind their backs and confined them in the bathroom.  These 
examples demonstrate a similar method of operation, thereby establishing identity. 
 
Further, we find that the evidence of the appellant’s entry into the JJC 
showed the appellant’s intent to kill the three juvenile witnesses.  Evidence of 
conduct designed to impede or prevent a witness from testifying is admissible as 
showing consciousness of guilt.  See, e.g.,  United States v. Cirillo (C.A. 2, 1972), 
468 F.2d 1233, 1240; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn Rev. 1979) 133,  Section 
278.  The three juveniles were the only eyewitnesses to the crime.  The appellant 
had discovered that the three juveniles had agreed to testify against him.  The 
appellant had told at least two persons, Keiper and Gibson, that he planned to kill 
the juveniles. 
 
Thus, evidence of the incident at the JJC was admissible to show 
consciousness of guilt.  “ ‘It is today universally conceded that the fact of an 
accused’s flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, 
assumption of a false name, and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of 
 
17
consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.’ ”  State v. Eaton (1969), 19 Ohio 
St.2d 145, 160, 48 O.O.2d 188, 196, 249 N.E.2d 897, 906, vacated on other 
grounds (1972), 408 U.S. 935, 92 S.Ct. 2857, 33 L.Ed.2d 750, quoting 2 Wigmore, 
Evidence (3 Ed.) 111, Section 276. 
 
In addition, the appellant argues that it was error for the trial court to refuse 
to give a limiting instruction.  However, because the entry into the JJC presented 
substantive evidence of modus operandi and consciousness of guilt, we do not 
find that the court was required to give a limiting instruction.  Finally, we find that 
the probative value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury pursuant to Evid.R. 403(A) and 
State v. Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 258, 513 N.E.2d 267, 274.  
Accordingly, we reject Proposition of Law IV. 
V 
ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
In Proposition of Law V, the appellant argues that the prosecutor improperly 
vouched for the credibility of the state’s three juvenile eyewitnesses.  The 
appellant claims that the prosecutor specifically elicited from the three juvenile 
witnesses that the Mahoning County Prosecutor's Office could determine the 
truthfulness of the juveniles’ statements to the police in deciding whether to go 
forward with the plea arrangements.  The appellant failed to object to this line of 
questioning by the state.  Therefore, the issue is waived except for plain error, and 
the appellant must demonstrate that but for the error, the outcome of the trial 
clearly would have been otherwise.  State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 
O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
It is improper for an attorney to express his or her personal belief or opinion 
as to the credibility of a witness or as to the guilt of the accused.  State v. Thayer 
 
18
(1931), 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N.E. 656; State v Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14 
OBR 317, 470 N.E.2d 883.  However, the evidence does not establish that the 
prosecutor was “vouching” for the witnesses, but rather that he was exploring the 
basis of the plea arrangements.  In the case at bar, the state asked Jessica about her 
plea bargain at the beginning of her testimony.  She acknowledged, “They gave 
me a plea bargain to testify against Flip Williams; and if I went back on my plea 
bargain, then I would be retried as an adult and sentenced.”  The appellant did not 
object to the elicitation of the terms of the plea agreement.  In fact, it was the 
appellant who on cross-examination first introduced the idea that the truthfulness 
of Jessica’s statements would be determined by the prosecutor’s office.  Jessica 
replied that she could not remember whether part of the agreement required the 
truth of the testimony to be determined by the prosecutor’s office. 
 
When the state questioned Broderick about his plea bargain, the state 
specifically asked whether, as part of the plea, there was a plea agreement that 
Broderick would “give a truthful statement under oath as to what had occurred 
during the kidnappings and killings of William Dent, Eric Howard, Alfonso [sic] 
Madison and Theodore Wynn, Junior, including the entire course of conduct 
involved, [and that] the truthfulness of that statement would be determined by the 
Mahoning County Prosecutor’s Office.”  Again, the appellant did not object.  
Finally, the same questioning occurred with respect to Dominic, and again, the 
appellant did not object. 
 
We find that any error that may have occurred from these questions was not 
outcome-determinative, and therefore not plain error.  While the three juvenile 
witnesses were the only eyewitnesses to the murders, the jury clearly could have 
believed Jessica even if the state had not highlighted her plea bargain.  Similarly, 
the jury could have believed Dominic and Broderick even if it had not heard about 
 
19
the “truthful statement” clauses in their plea agreements.  Indeed, given the 
defense efforts to turn the plea agreements against the state, it is difficult to say 
whether the agreements helped or hurt the witnesses’ credibility.  See United 
States v. Arroyo-Angulo (C.A.2, 1978), 580 F.2d 1137, 1146; People v. Manning 
(1990), 434 Mich. 1, 18, 450 N.W.2d 534, 541.  Moreover, we note that the 
“truthful statement” clauses did not provide that the prosecutor’s office would 
determine the truthfulness of the witnesses’ testimony.  Rather, the clauses 
provided that the plea bargains would fail if the prosecutors did not believe their 
sworn statements.  Therefore, the appellant failed to demonstrate that the outcome 
clearly would have been otherwise if the jury had not learned about the truthful-
statement clauses.  Accordingly, we reject Proposition of Law V. 
VI 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
 
After the murders, on September 2, 1991, the appellant was involved in a 
car crash in Youngstown, Ohio.  Apparently, individuals in the other car shot at 
the appellant and Jessica, and all parties fled the scene.  Shortly thereafter, Jessica 
returned to the scene of the accident.  Jessica told Officer Marvin Hunter that she 
had been a passenger in one of the cars involved in the accident. 
 
Half an hour later, the appellant returned to the scene.  The appellant told 
Hunter that he had been driving a Pontiac when a Cadillac rammed them and the 
people in the Cadillac shot at him.  Appellant told Hunter that he did not shoot 
back, but instead, jumped out of the Pontiac and ran.  Hunter was ready to arrest 
the appellant for leaving the scene of an accident, in violation of R.C. 4549.02, 
when Hunter’s sergeant ordered him to take the appellant to the station for 
questioning.  Hunter advised the appellant that the detectives would like to see 
him relative to a shooting.  Hunter told the appellant that he could arrest him but 
 
20
would not, and asked the appellant if he would go to the police station.  The 
appellant agreed and was driven to the station. 
 
Sometime after arriving at the station, Detective Gerald Maietta and 
Detective William Blanchard read the appellant his Miranda rights, and had the 
appellant sign a copy of the Miranda form.  The appellant agreed to an atomic 
absorption test on his hands to determine whether he had recently fired a gun.  The 
appellant left the station after he signed a summons for leaving the scene of an 
accident.  In Proposition of Law VI, the appellant argues that this detention was 
not supported by probable cause, and, therefore, the positive test result should 
have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.  See, generally, Wong Sun v. 
United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441. 
 
The evidence appears to show that the appellant went voluntarily to the 
police station and agreed to submit to the atomic absorption test.  However, 
because these facts are not entirely clear, even assuming that the appellant had 
actually been arrested, the arrest was justified by probable cause.  R.C. 4549.02 
requires a driver involved in a collision on a public street to stay at the scene until 
he or she has given his or her name, address, and registration number to the other 
driver, to any injured party, or to a police officer.  The appellant told Officer 
Hunter that he had been driving during the collision and had fled.  Despite the fact 
that the appellant was being shot at when he fled, Officer Hunter still had probable 
cause to arrest the appellant for a violation of R.C. 4549.02.  An arrest made on 
probable cause does not become unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution just because police had the ulterior motive of 
investigating another crime for which they lacked probable cause.  Dayton v. 
Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091.  In fact, Officer Hunter 
followed up on his probable cause for leaving the scene of an accident by 
 
21
requiring the appellant to sign a summons charging him with that offense.  
Therefore, under either scenario, the results of the atomic absorption test were 
admissible.  Accordingly, we reject Proposition of Law VI. 
VII 
LIMIT ON CROSS-EXAMINATION 
 
In Proposition of Law VII, the appellant claims that the trial court 
improperly limited his cross-examination of Dominic Cherry.  On cross-
examination, Dominic testified that the police advised him of his Miranda rights 
on September 24 and October 23, 1991, and that he had understood them and 
waived them.  Defense counsel handed Dominic a copy of a motion to suppress, 
filed by Dominic’s attorney in Mahoning County Juvenile Court.  The motion 
sought to suppress all of Dominic’s statements “in connection with his arrest and 
investigation into the crimes which occurred on or about September 2, 1991, in the 
City of Youngstown * * * .”  The motion, as proffered by the appellant, claimed 
that police obtained those statements “in violation of Defendant’s Constitutional 
rights as further set forth in the case of Miranda v. Arizona * * *.”  The trial court 
sustained the state’s objection to the use of the motion by the defense. 
 
Appellant claims this ruling was error.  The appellant claims the evidence 
was admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 608(B), which permits inquiry on cross-
examination of specific instances of a witness’s conduct to attack the witness’s 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 
 
We find that the trial court did not err in sustaining the state’s objection to 
the use of the motion to suppress.  Evid. R. 608(B) permits inquiry on cross-
examination into specific instances of the conduct of a witness for the purpose of 
assessing the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.  The filing of 
the motion was not clearly probative of Dominic’s character for truthfulness or 
 
22
untruthfulness as required by Evid.R. 608(B).  Dominic’s testimony was not 
necessarily inconsistent with the motion.  Dominic testified that he was 
“informed” of, “understood,” and “waived” his Miranda rights.  The motion, as 
proffered by the appellant, claimed that police obtained Dominic’s statements “in 
violation of Defendant’s Constitutional rights as further set forth in the case of 
Miranda v. Arizona.”  There could have been several technical or legal issues 
supporting a motion to suppress beyond the mere fact of whether officers read the 
Miranda warnings to the appellant.  The vague language of the motion does not 
reveal the factual detail necessary to make a determination whether the motion was 
probative of Dominic’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 
 
Moreover, defense counsel was in effect trying to use the motion as a prior 
inconsistent statement by Dominic.  However, it was not Dominic’s statement.  
Dominic did not write it or sign it.  Under Evid.R. 608(B), Dominic could be 
impeached with his own conduct, including his own prior inconsistent statements, 
but not with motions made by his attorney.  Therefore, we find that Dominic’s 
motion to suppress was not admissible under Evid.R. 608(B). 
 
Moreover, we reject the appellant’s argument under Evid.R. 616, which 
permits a party to prove a witness’s “[b]ias, prejudice, interest, or any motive to 
misrepresent.”  The motion had no tendency to show bias on Dominic’s part. 
 
Finally, the appellant claims that the trial court’s ruling violated the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of the right of an accused to confront the witnesses called 
against him.  See Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 
L.Ed.2d 923.  Because the motion was not probative of Dominic’s credibility, we 
reject the appellant’s Sixth Amendment claims.  Accordingly, we overrule 
Proposition of Law VII. 
VIII 
 
23
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
 
Appellant challenges the constitutionality of Ohio’s death penalty statutes in 
his eighth proposition of law.  We summarily reject this challenge.  State v. 
Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus.  Ohio’s death 
penalty scheme is constitutional.  See, e.g., State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 
44, 50, 584 N.E.2d 1192, 1197; State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 92, 109, 26 
OBR 79, 93-94, 497 N.E.2d 55, 69.  Accordingly, we reject Proposition of Law 
VIII. 
IX 
GRAND JURY SELECTION 
 
In Proposition of Law IX, the appellant claims that the trial court should 
have quashed the indictment due to irregularities in the grand jury selection 
process.  The appellant contends that the Mahoning County Jury Commissioners’ 
Office failed to comply with the procedures for jury selection established in R.C. 
2313.08, 2313.12, and 2313.13 as made applicable to grand juries by R.C. 2939.02 
and 2939.03. 
 
R.C. 2313.08 requires the jury commissioners in each county to make up an 
annual jury list, certify it, file it in their office before the beginning of each jury 
year, and certify and file a duplicate list in the office of the clerk of the court of 
common pleas.  R.C. 2313.12 requires jury commissioners to keep a record of all 
proceedings before them or in their office, and of all persons exempted and the 
time and reasons for the exemptions.  R.C. 2323.13 establishes the procedures for 
postponing service, temporarily excusing service, or discharging a juror from 
service. 
 
In the case at bar, the jury commissioners did not file a certified duplicate of 
the jury list with the clerk’s office.  The appellant claims that the indictment was 
 
24
invalid because the grand jury venire was selected from a jury list that was not 
filed with the clerk’s office.  The appellant cites McGill v. State (1877), 34 Ohio 
St. 228, for the proposition that any irregularity that materially affects a substantial 
right of the defendant and prevents him or her from being tried by a legally 
constituted jury requires that the verdict be set aside and that a new trial be 
granted. 
 
The court of appeals found that the failure to follow the procedures 
mandated by R.C. 2313.01 et seq. did not require the court to reverse an otherwise 
valid conviction.  We agree.  This court has recognized that the failure to follow 
the procedure set forth in R.C. 2313.01 et seq. for the selection of grand jury 
venires does not ipso facto invalidate an otherwise valid conviction of a defendant.  
State v. Fulton (1991),  57 Ohio St.3d 120, 124, 566 N.E.2d 1195, 1201. 
 
We find that the irregularity in question did not materially affect a 
substantial right of the appellant.  In State v. Puente (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 136, 23 
O.O.3d 178, 431 N.E.2d 987, one jury commissioner failed to keep a record of 
proceedings as required by R.C. 2313.12 and established his own system for 
independently determining competency of jurors.  The failure to follow the 
statutory jury selection procedures did not automatically require reversal of the 
conviction.  Accordingly, the failure in this instance to follow R.C. 2313.08, 
which was far less serious than the failure in Puente, does not require reversal. 
 
The appellant claims that the commissioners’ failure to keep a record of the 
reasons some potential jurors were deemed unqualified prevented him from 
proving that the state violated the “fair cross-section” requirement of Duren v. 
Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579.  We disagree.  
Equal protection forbids intentional discrimination against any distinct group in 
choosing grand juries.  See Fulton.  However, not every grand jury has to 
 
25
represent a “fair cross-section,” so long as the selection process is 
nondiscriminatory.  Id.; Castaneda v. Partida (1977), 430 U.S. 482, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 
51 L.Ed.2d 498. 
 
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the appellant had to show 
that a recognizable, distinct group was substantially underrepresented in the jury 
pool by comparing its proportion in the population to the proportion called to 
serve as grand jurors over a significant period.  Fulton, 57 Ohio St.3d at 122, 566 
N.E.2d at 1198-1199, quoting Castaneda v. Partida,  430 U.S. at 494-495, 97 
S.Ct. at 1280, 51 L.Ed.2d at 510-511.  To make this statistical showing, the 
appellant did not need to know the ostensible reasons for exemptions and 
disqualifications.  Accordingly, we reject Proposition of Law IX. 
X 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
 
Having considered the appellant’s propositions of law, we must 
independently weigh the aggravating circumstance against the factors presented in 
mitigation as required under R.C. 2929.05(A) and determine whether the sentence 
of death is appropriate. 
 
Aggravating Circumstance 
 
The jury found appellant guilty of three aggravated murder counts as to each 
of his four victims.  However, the trial court merged the twelve counts into four 
(one for each victim).  Each count carried three death specifications:  aggravated 
burglary, kidnapping, and multiple-murder.  Before the penalty phase, the trial 
court merged the felony-murder specifications into the multiple-murder 
specifications and submitted only the multiple-murder specifications to the jury.  
Thus, the aggravating circumstance in this case was multiple murder. 
 
Mitigating Factors 
 
26
 
Against this aggravating circumstance, we must balance several factors 
listed in R.C. 2929.04(B).  We must consider the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the appellant’s history, character, and background.  In addition, we 
must consider the mitigating factors listed in R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) through (7).  The 
mitigating factors in R.C. 2929.04(B)(2), (4), (5), and (6) are not relevant to the 
case at bar. 
 
We find nothing mitigating in the nature of the offense.  The appellant 
planned three of the murders well in advance. The appellant manipulated and used 
juveniles to help carry out his executions.  The appellant kidnapped and restrained 
Madison in his own home.  The appellant ordered Jessica to lure another victim to 
the crime scene, where he kidnapped him and another.  The appellant physically 
and mentally tortured his victims.  Finally, he went from room to room and shot 
each victim in the head, execution-style. 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(B)(1), we must consider whether the victim of the 
offense induced or facilitated it.  Three of the victims were involved in the drug 
trade.  Narcotics is a dangerous trade.  The three chose to participate in criminal 
activity.  However, it cannot be said that the three victims “induced or facilitated” 
the offense.  While participation in criminal activity certainly carries with it an 
element of serious risk, the unlawful taking of a human life cannot be deemed less 
serious simply because the victim was involved in unlawful activity.  Our society’s 
values do not permit such a ranking of the worth of human lives.  Further, Wynn 
was apparently a bystander; there was no evidence connecting him to the narcotics 
trade.  Therefore, we find no mitigation under this factor. 
 
Concerning R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), the appellant presented some evidence of 
mental disease or defect.  Dr. Jeffrey L. Smalldon, a clinical psychologist with 
specialized training in neuropsychological assessment, testified on the appellant’s 
 
27
behalf.  Smalldon examined the appellant three times for a total of eleven hours, 
tested his intelligence, personality, and brain functioning.  Smalldon also read the 
appellant’s educational, medical, prison, and police records and interviewed his 
family. 
 
Smalldon diagnosed the appellant as having a personality disorder not 
fitting any of the specific categories established by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM-III-R) used by psychologists and psychiatrists.  Smalldon 
emphasized that while this disorder had antisocial features, he had not diagnosed 
the appellant with a full-blown antisocial personality disorder.  Smalldon believed 
that the appellant’s disorder was linked to his childhood due to the lack of a father 
figure and an overindulgent and protective mother.  Further, Smalldon diagnosed 
the appellant with a low-grade depression that resulted from the criminal 
proceedings against him.  Nonetheless, Smalldon found that the appellant did well 
in school and had above average intelligence. 
 
While Dr. Smalldon diagnosed the appellant as having a personality 
disorder, he also opined that this disorder did not affect his ability to make 
choices.  Smalldon testified that “[p]eople with the same personality disorder * * * 
could engage in the entire gamut of choices available to human beings.  There’s 
no connection between that diagnosis and any particular behavior.”  (Tr. 3029; 
emphasis added.)  Further, Smalldon opined that the appellant’s mental disorder 
did not rise to the level of a mental disease or defect.  Therefore, we find no 
mitigation under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  
 
Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7), we must consider any other factors that are 
relevant to the issue of whether the appellant should be sentenced to death.  In the 
penalty phase, the appellant made a brief unsworn statement.  The appellant 
accepted responsibility for his chosen life of crime.  However, he denied all guilt 
 
28
for the crimes in question.  The appellant’s mother testified about his childhood 
and lack of a father figure.  His daughter testified that she loves him, will maintain 
contact with him, and does not want anything bad to happen to him.  His trial 
counsel, Jerry Ingram, was present during the JJC incident.  Ingram testified at the 
mitigation hearing after he had withdrawn as counsel for the appellant.  Ingram 
testified about how the appellant ultimately released his hostages and surrendered 
at the JJC.  Ingram also opined that the appellant would be at least seventy-five 
years old before becoming parole eligible and most likely would never be paroled. 
 
Dr. Smalldon also testified about the appellant’s childhood.  Smalldon 
believed that adults had given the appellant mixed messages about obeying the 
law when he was a child.  His mother urged him to stay in school and avoid the 
street life, but she also brewed moonshine and bribed people not to report her.  
The appellant’s grandfather was incarcerated for a period of time for murdering 
his common-law wife.  The appellant’s mother testified that two of her husbands 
abused her and the appellant knew it. 
 
Further, there was testimony that the appellant and his boyhood friends 
aspired to be like local gangsters who personified wealth and status.  In this 
environment, the appellant began a life of crime at age eleven.  This evidence is 
entitled to some mitigating weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  Growing up 
fatherless in a neighborhood where gangsters were heroes, the appellant lacked the 
moral training that equips most people to obey the law.  The set of “values” that 
permitted the appellant to execute competitors was most likely formulated in this 
early environment.  However, this slight evidence of mitigation in the appellant’s 
history, character, and background is insufficient to overcome the aggravating 
circumstance. 
 
29
 
Residual doubt was another factor the appellant argued.  We find it 
insubstantial.  Finally, the appellant argued that he did not kill the JJC hostages 
when he could have.  However, the appellant had nothing to gain and much to lose 
by killing the hostages.  When the appellant murdered Wynn, he demonstrated that 
he is capable of killing a bystander if it will advance his cause. 
 
We find that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt in each case.  Accordingly, we find that all four death 
sentences are appropriate. 
 
Proportionality of the Death Sentence 
 
The death penalty is both appropriate and proportionate when we compare 
the appellant’s case with similar capital cases.  The appellant murdered four 
people.  He experienced an unfortunate childhood with little to no moral guidance.  
However, such experiences do not mitigate the horrible crimes he committed. 
 
Since 1986, this court has reviewed eight death penalty cases where the 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) multiple-murder aggravating circumstance was the only one 
present.  See State v. Brooks (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 144, 25 OBR 190, 495 N.E.2d 
407; Bedford, 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 529 N.E.2d 913; State v. Sowell (1988), 39 Ohio 
St.3d 322, 530 N.E.2d 1294; State v. Lawrence (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 24, 541 
N.E.2d 451; State v. Coleman (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 544 N.E.2d 622; State v. 
Moreland (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 58, 552 N.E.2d 894; State v. Combs (1991), 62 
Ohio St.3d 278, 581 N.E.2d 1071; and State v. Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 
667 N.E.2d 960. 
 
Out of the eight cases, this court has affirmed death penalties in seven.  In 
many of those cases, the defendant was either under significant emotional stress or 
lacked substantial capacity to conform to the law due to mental disease or defect.  
See, e.g., Moreland; Awkal.  In this case, the appellant labored under neither 
 
30
impediment.  In addition, like the appellant, the defendants in Moreland and 
Awkal could point to bad childhoods. 
 
Lawrence was the eighth case where the multiple-murder aggravating 
circumstance was the only aggravating circumstance present.  In Lawrence,  this 
court found that the mitigating factors outweighed a single multiple-murder 
aggravating circumstance and, therefore, vacated the death sentences.  However, 
the mitigating factors in Lawrence included provocation, post-traumatic stress 
disorder rising to the level of a diminished-capacity mitigating factor under R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3), a severe depression following the death of the defendant’s infant 
son, lack of a significant criminal history, the defendant’s voluntary military 
service, and his care for his family.  In comparison, the mitigating factors in this 
case are nearly nonexistent.  Moreover, this court affirmed the death penalty in 
State v. Hawkins (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 339, 612 N.E.2d 1227, a similar case 
involving the murder of two drug dealers.  In Hawkins, there were two aggravating 
circumstances, but there also were only two victims, as compared to four victims 
here. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the death penalty in this case is neither 
excessive nor disproportionate when compared to the penalties approved in the 
above cases.  Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  Upon review of the record and especially the 
transcript in this case, I conclude that the trial court failed to adequately protect 
appellant Williams’s constitutional right to be tried before an impartial jury.  
 
31
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court conviction and sentence, and grant the 
appellant a new trial.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
Williams argues that the trial court impermissibly failed to protect his right to 
an impartial jury from the twin evils of juror misconduct and juror bias in favor of 
the death penalty.  I agree.  I do so acknowledging that the transcript in this case 
reveals a crime as heinous and calculated as any that come before us.  This case 
represents a test for the criminal justice system because, if the right to an impartial 
jury is not protected for the worst among us, it is guaranteed to none of us. 
 
The citizen jury is the bedrock upon which the edifice of American criminal 
justice is constructed.  Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Thomas Paine dated July 11, 
1789, described the institution as “the only anchor, ever yet imagined by man, by 
which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”  15 Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson (1958) 269.  Protection of the integrity of the jury system 
requires our constant vigilance.  Though perfect impartiality is neither a 
requirement nor an attainable goal, it must nevertheless remain the abiding 
objective of the justice system, and all reasonable measures must be taken by trial 
courts to protect the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to a fair and 
impartial jury. 
 
In his first proposition of law, Williams alleges that his jury panel was tainted 
by juror misconduct.  In the second proposition of law, he argues that the jury was 
tainted because it included some jurors who had expressed their bias in favor of the 
death penalty.  Either proposition, if accepted, is sufficient to support a reversal of 
the court of appeals; both have merit. 
I.  Misconduct 
 
“The sixth amendment right to trial by jury is designed to ensure criminal 
defendants a fair trial by a ‘panel of impartial, “indifferent” jurors.’ * * * When 
 
32
possible juror misconduct is brought to the trial judge’s attention [the judge] has a 
duty to investigate and to determine whether there may have been a violation of the 
sixth amendment.”  (Citations omitted.)  United States v. Shackelford (C.A.6, 
1985), 777 F.2d 1141, 1145.  It is self-evident that if even one seated juror is biased 
or improperly influenced, the criminal defendant has not received the impartial jury 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  Morgan v. Illinois (1992), 504 U.S. 719, 729, 
112 S.Ct. 2222, 2230, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, 503; see Parker v. Gladden (1966), 385 
U.S. 363, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420.  Finally, bias will be inferred if a juror is 
found to have deliberately concealed material information.  Zerka v. Green (C.A.6, 
1995), 49 F.3d 1181, 1186. 
 
It is undisputed that if appellant’s case was decided by the full panel of 
impartial jurors to which he is constitutionally entitled, he cannot win a reversal 
based on the composition of the jury.  My review of the record in this case causes 
me to conclude that the trial judge did not discharge his duty to guarantee, to a 
reasonable degree of certainty, that Williams received a fair trial by twelve 
impartial jurors.  As a result, we cannot know whether his panel was impartial.  
Williams’s conviction should therefore be reversed and the case remanded for a 
new trial. 
 
When investigating whether misconduct among seated jurors tainted the trial, 
it may frequently be necessary to question the behavior of unseated venirepersons 
in order to ascertain the effect of their acts on the seated jurors, or the nature of the 
interaction between the unseated and the seated jurors.  This is particularly true 
when the issue is exchange of information among prospective jurors.  Such 
consideration may require the trial judge to engage in further questioning of 
venirepersons beyond simply asking prospective jurors whether they are concealing 
information.  Where there are substantial grounds to believe that a prospective juror 
 
33
is concealing information that bears upon a juror’s impartiality, it is an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to do no more than ask a prospective juror whether he 
or she can render a fair verdict.  See United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d at 1145. 
 
The voir dire transcript in this case suggests that there was some discussion 
— perhaps considerable discussion — among venirepersons regarding the facts of 
the case.  According to the testimony, the alleged topics of discussion included the 
defendant, his family, organized crime, murder, extortion, money laundering, 
prostitution, drugs, security, and fear of reprisal.  Conversations reportedly took 
place near the courthouse building, in the hallways, in the jury room, and in the 
courtroom itself.  The reported statements, and related denials of outside 
knowledge, constitute substantial evidence of possible concealment by prospective 
jurors.  Thus, I would hold that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing 
either to dismiss the challenged jurors or to investigate further. 
 
During individual voir dire, prospective juror Janet Parsons identified juror 
Joann Eddleman as a person who repeated to Parsons, and to an uncertain number 
of other prospective jurors, information and rumors regarding Williams.  Parsons 
reported that Eddleman claimed to have been told the case was from Youngstown, 
that it involved drugs, and that Williams had eluded authorities for some time.  
Parsons also told the trial court she believed Eddleman had obtained her 
information through someone outside the venire who was a Youngstown resident.  
Parsons also reported that there was another woman within earshot of the 
conversation between herself and Eddleman who may have heard what was said.  
This third prospective juror was never identified.  Over objection, the trial court 
declined to inquire further, or to permit appellant’s counsel to do so.  Accordingly, 
there is no way to know who, if anyone, overheard the conversation. 
 
34
 
When Eddleman was questioned by the trial court as to whether she knew 
anything else about the case, she responded, “Just what I’ve heard through you.”  
Because Eddleman appeared for individual voir dire ahead of Parsons, Eddleman 
was not questioned further on her denial.  The trial court did not, however, heed 
defense counsel’s warning that it was necessary later to requestion Eddleman more 
extensively to determine whether she was concealing misconduct from the court.  
Instead, the court responded sarcastically and ignored the request. 
 
I cannot agree with the reasoning of the majority when it attempts to justify 
Eddleman’s response by observing that her answer was in fact truthful because she 
did not know for certain that the information she had been given was accurate.  I 
am not convinced, as the majority apparently is, that this strained and unlikely 
interpretation of Eddleman’s response eliminates legitimate concerns of 
concealment and absolves the trial court of the obligation to investigate further in 
defense of Williams’s constitutional rights. 
 
The questions raised about Eddleman should have been sufficient to arouse 
trial court concern in themselves.  They are not, however, the sole indications that 
extensive discussion of potentially prejudicial information and rumors took place in 
the jury room, possibly tainting other seated jurors and raising issues of further 
possible concealment.  Further indications include statements by, attributed to, or 
about the following prospective jurors:  Aristide, Blackwell, Colledge, Forsyth, 
Gombaski, Hlivko, Lawrence, Rohwedder, Stout, and Tanski.  The subjects of the 
alleged comments include: 
 
Concerns about what appeared to be heightened security in the courthouse 
for this case and fears that security might not be adequate; possible necessity of 
wearing wigs, glasses, or other disguises to avoid retribution from the defendant or 
his family; the rumored allegation that Williams had tried to kill one of the 
 
35
witnesses; the possible involvement of the defendant in organized crime, 
prostitution, money laundering, and extortion; and the rumor that the defendant was 
able to evade police for two years, hence the delay in bringing the case to trial. 
 
In particular, prospective juror John Gombaski raised concerns about 
prejudicial communications and possible concealment among members of the 
venire.  Indeed, Gombaski was excused for cause when he admitted that what he 
heard had caused him to presume Williams was guilty.  Gombaski reported 
overhearing court employees talking about the case and admitted that he told two 
other venirepersons what he remembered of the conversation.  This included 
Gombaski’s perception that the case was from Youngstown, that it involved a 
murder, and that it was related to organized crime (no evidence was offered of any 
connection between Williams and organized crime).  Though the majority chose not 
to discuss the issues presented by Gombaski’s statements, I believe his testimony 
raises serious questions that the trial court should have investigated as required by 
the Ohio and United States Constitutions. 
 
The trial judge here, however, stifled rather than pursued further 
investigation.  Indeed, he instructed Gombaski not to repeat anywhere what he had 
heard — including in the context of individual voir dire — and told Gombaski that 
he did not even want to know the content of the statements. 
 
Later, when defense counsel returned to the issue, Gombaski said he thought 
the name “Forsyth” sounded familiar as that of one of the people who had heard his 
statements about murder, extortion, and organized crime.  Forsyth, a prospective 
juror who was seated, however, had told the court she heard nothing from other 
prospective jurors concerning charges against Williams. 
 
If Gombaski is correct that he talked to Forsyth, then she lied when she said 
she had heard nothing.  If she lied, bias is inferred and a mistrial is appropriate.  
 
36
Zerka v. Green, 49 F.3d at 1186. If, on the other hand, Forsyth is being truthful, it 
was two other prospective jurors who apparently heard Gombaski’s report.  It is 
possible that there was no concealment among seated jurors in this case.  
Unfortunately, it is impossible to conclude with any certainty whether and to what 
extent prospective jurors engaged in discussions or heard discussions about the case 
because the trial judge made no attempt to verify that there were none.  Rather, he 
stifled further inquiry with comments such as, “we’re not going to make a career 
out of this one.” 
 
The transcript contains the following conversation reflecting defense 
counsel’s concern over possible concealment and the apparent indifference of the 
trial court: 
  
“The Court:  John, go ahead. 
 
“[Defense Counsel]:  Judge, we’ve gone over this at lunch, it’s something 
that reared it’s [sic] head yesterday.  [Counsel then gave a factual recitation of the 
various comments of the jurors.] * * * 
 
“I would submit, Your Honor, that we need to do several things, that is, call 
back the jurors that I have indicated and ask them more specific questions about 
whether there were conversations and, if so, what those conversations were.  Of 
course, that would then lead to some inquiry as to whether or not those 
conversation [sic] have left an impression upon them as, if you recall, Mr. 
Gombaski indicated the previous information had left an impression on him.  I also 
think we may need to talk to [the jury commissioners’ office] to find out about the 
seating arrangements, who the ladies —  
 
“The Court:  Why don’t we hire a detective to go up and to [sic, do] this for 
us.  Any statements from the prosecutor?” 
 
Minutes later the following colloquy transpired: 
 
37
 
“[Defense Counsel]:  Well, I can tell you from the research that we have done 
recently * * * when these issues unfortunately arise * * * it triggers an affirmative 
duty not only on the part of counsel — 
 
“The Court:  And the Court will do what it can about it to stop it.  That’s all I 
can do. 
 
“[Defense Counsel]:  Well, we also have to inquire into the past, not only as 
to the future. 
 
“The Court:  True.  We may do that on general voir dire, we might do it 
individually.  But right now we’re going to finish what we are doing.” 
 
No further inquiry was undertaken. 
 
Defense counsel objected to the trial court’s apparent indifference, and 
offered reasonable suggestions to remedy the perceived threats to their client’s 
constitutional right to an impartial jury.  As appellant observes, it would not be 
necessary to “hire a detective” if the trial court had performed its duty by engaging 
in individual questioning of all the prospective jurors.  The constitutional 
requirement does not extend to the trial judge the discretion to decline to take 
protective measures to assure the defendant and the state that the jury will be 
impartial.  On the facts in this record, the trial judge clearly erred when he failed to 
examine prospective jurors to assure defendant and the state that an impartial jury 
was impaneled. 
II.  Bias 
 
I would also reverse this conviction on the ground that Williams was not 
adequately protected from juror bias in favor of the death penalty.  Of the nine 
prospective jurors for whom the trial court denied defense challenges for cause 
based on expression of death penalty bias, five were excused upon the exercise of 
peremptory challenges by defense counsel, another was excused for personal 
 
38
reasons, the number of one of the jurors was not reached, and two, Eddleman and 
Camp, were seated as jurors.  Appellant argues that each of these prospective jurors 
was biased in favor of the death penalty.  With regard to Eddleman, Scanlon, and 
Subecz, I agree. 
 
In Morgan v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the 
importance of voir dire to the right of the defendant to a fair trial.  “Were voir dire 
not available to lay bare the foundation of petitioner’s challenge for cause against 
those prospective jurors who would always impose death following conviction, his 
right not to be tried by such jurors would be rendered as nugatory and meaningless 
as the  State’s right, in the absence of questioning, to strike those who would never 
do so.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 733-734, 112 S.Ct. at 2232, 119 L.Ed.2d at 506. 
 
In Wainright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 
L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852, the United States Supreme Court held that a prospective 
juror should be excused  for cause if his views would “ ‘prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions 
and his oath.’ ”  A prospective juror who will automatically vote for the death 
penalty must be excused for cause.  Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 
2229, 119 L.Ed.2d at 502; see Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 84-85, 108 
S.Ct. 2273, 2276-2277, 101 L.Ed.2d 80, 87-88. 
 
Juror Eddleman again presents the greatest difficulties.  The majority admits 
that Eddleman contradicted herself on voir dire.  Despite her repeated statements 
that she would prefer death and would not consider alternative life sentences, the 
majority concludes that the court’s rehabilitation of Eddleman was successful 
because “the trial judge’s questions were more than general inquiries regarding a 
juror’s ability to be fair and impartial.”  I disagree.  I believe this case represents 
precisely the sort of rehabilitation the United States Supreme Court intended to 
 
39
prohibit in Morgan v. Illinois when it held that general questions to a prospective 
juror by the court relating to fairness or impartiality cannot negate a statement by 
the prospective juror that he or she would automatically vote for death.  504 U.S. at 
735-736, 112 S.Ct. at 2233, 119 L.Ed.2d at 506-507. 
 
Eddleman made many specific statements during the course of voir dire to 
the effect that she would not be impartial in the penalty phase.  Among them she 
stated, “If he was convicted of the murders I would say no, I would not consider 
that with parole.”  She explained further, “Because if the murders were committed I 
don’t — I don’t believe that they should ever be released.”  Again, she remarked, “I 
wouldn’t — I do not believe there should even be parole considered if somebody 
would have committed the murder.  That’s what I mean.”  Yet again, explaining her 
position very specifically, she said, “So I would — well, what I’m saying, I would 
not believe in the parole so therefore I would not be able to, if it was not the death 
sentence, I would not feel comfortable with the 20 year and parole or the 30 year 
and parole.” 
 
Next, Eddleman unambiguously affirmed that her preference for the death 
penalty would be automatic.  Though consistent with her previous responses, such 
statements must arouse profound doubt as to whether impartiality would ever be 
possible for Eddleman.  The exchange was the following: 
 
“[Defense Counsel]:  You understand that you only have those three options 
if you get to the point — 
 
“Juror Eddleman:  Those three options, if it came right down to it, it would 
probably be the death penalty then.  If there was any remote chance of them being 
paroled, I would probably go with the death penalty. 
 
“[Defense Counsel]:  Automatically, just because of the possibility of parole? 
 
“Juror Eddleman:  Yes. 
 
40
 
“[Defense Counsel]:  And are you saying that even though you know that 
these three alternatives should start out even in your mind?  You are being honest 
with me. 
 
“Juror Eddleman:  Yes. 
 
“[Defense Counsel]:  And because of what you are saying about the death 
penalty being automatic, because of the eligibility of parole, you would be unable 
to fairly consider life imprisonment, am I right? 
 
“Juror Eddleman:  If it was without ever a chance of parole, yes. 
 
“[Defense Counsel]:  That’s not the way it is. 
 
“Juror Eddleman:  Since we don’t have a choice[,] I would say the death 
penalty. 
 
“[Defense Counsel]:  And you say that knowing that there are these life 
sentencing options that you should consider? 
 
“Juror Eddleman:  Because whenever I think about it I would think well, 
maybe 30 years down the line somebody may be getting out of prison and might 
meet up with one of my children or something.  That’s what I’m thinking of 
whenever I think of it. 
 
“* * * 
 
“[Defense Counsel]:  Is your bottom line, if I have to determine the sentence 
I’ll vote death because there’s eligibility for parole? 
 
“Juror Eddleman:  Yes.” 
 
In contrast, Eddleman made very few responses suggesting that she could set 
aside her bias.  Following the preceding exchange, the judge elicited a general 
response: 
 
“The Court:  Mrs. Eddleman, do you agree that you can listen to and follow 
the instructions of the Court? 
 
41
 
“Juror Eddleman:  Yes.” 
 
Then, after explaining the two phases of the trial and the sentencing options, 
the court asked, “Can you follow the instructions of law?”  Eddleman answered, 
“Yes.” 
 
The only responses Eddleman gave to the prosecutor indicating that she 
could consider the sentencing options equally were given in general terms: 
 
“[Prosecutor]:  Okay.  And you would follow the court’s instructions? 
 
“Juror Eddleman:  Yes. 
 
“[Prosecutor]:  On the law? 
 
“Juror Eddleman:  Yes. 
 
“[Prosecutor]:  You understand the death penalty is not an automatic 
punishment? 
 
“Juror Eddleman:  Yes, I do. 
 
“[Prosecutor]:  If you determine guilt in the first phase you still have to hear 
all the evidence in the second phase. 
 
“Juror Eddleman:  Yes. 
 
“[Prosecutor]:Thank you very much.” 
 
The majority concludes that though it is “difficult from reading the transcript 
to determine whether Eddleman was overstating her beliefs concerning the death 
penalty to defense counsel, or understating them to the judge and prosecutor,” we 
must defer to the determination of the trial judge, who directly observed 
Eddleman’s responses, that she could be fair and impartial. 
 
In contrast, I would hold that, despite the acknowledged advantage of the 
trial court in observing the demeanor of the juror, on the transcript before us, it is 
not only difficult but impossible to determine whether Eddleman was overstating 
her beliefs to defense counsel or understating them to the judge and prosecutor.  
 
42
The majority holds that we must assume the trial court was able to make the correct 
ruling based on observation of Eddleman’s demeanor.  I believe that in a capital 
case, when a large preponderance of specific answers suggest firmly established 
bias, the Ohio and federal Constitutions require the trial judge to exercise his or her 
discretion to protect the right of the accused to an impartial jury. 
 
According the United States Supreme Court, “Witherspoon and its 
succeeding cases would be in large measure superfluous were this Court convinced 
that such general inquiries could detect those jurors with views preventing or 
substantially impairing their duties in accordance with their instructions and oath.  
But such jurors — whether they be unalterably in favor of, or opposed to, the death 
penalty in every case — by definition are ones who cannot perform their duties in 
accordance with law, their protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.”  Morgan 
v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 734-735, 112 S.Ct. at 2232-2233, 119 L.Ed.2d at 506.  If this 
reasoning applies to require trial courts to afford defense counsel the opportunity to 
question prospective jurors on pro-death-penalty bias, it must apply with equal 
force to cases in which the trial judge permitted only inadequate questioning and 
refused to remove jurors whose answers to specific questions revealed bias. 
 
The argument of the majority that voir dire is an adversarial process is not 
without persuasive force.  Both sides do indeed attempt to nudge the prospective 
juror in the desired direction, and it is the job of the impartial judge to sort the 
wheat from the chaff.  A degree of deference to the trial court is clearly appropriate.  
As in all cases of trial court discretion, however, there are boundaries which it is 
our duty to identify.  I would hold that in the case before us the trial court has 
abused its discretion. 
 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that during voir dire in this case, the adversarial 
nature of the proceeding expressed itself more in the relationship between defense 
 
43
counsel and the judge than in the relationship between defense counsel and 
prosecutor.  The prosecutor engaged in very little rehabilitation, while the trial 
judge played the primary role.  The transcript reveals that, generally, the prosecutor 
would question the prospective juror briefly after the introductory remarks of the 
judge, eliciting responses tending to show that the juror believed he or she could 
vote for the death penalty if need be, and that the juror believed that he or she could 
follow the law and be fair.  Defense counsel would then probe directly into issues 
of bias, misconduct, or prejudgment of the defendant.  Finally, the trial judge would 
then engage in a brief and general rehabilitation of the juror.  In the case of juror 
Eddleman, the prosecutor did not ask her any questions at all following the specific 
statements of bias elicited by defense counsel. 
 
Contrary to the image created by the majority opinion of attorney adversaries 
nudging the juror toward expressions that would serve their client’s interests, the 
prosecutor made no attempt to elicit specific responses from the juror which might 
tend to negate statements suggesting bias against the defendant or predisposition in 
favor of the death penalty.  We should be troubled by the blurring of roles under 
circumstances where the trial judge may appear to have assumed the posture of the 
prosecutor, rather than that of the neutral arbiter, in what is quite naturally, as the 
majority observes, an adversarial proceeding. 
 
The Ohio and federal Constitutions do not allow us to prefer deference to the 
discretion of the trial judge over the right of the accused to a fair and impartial jury.  
When the statements of the juror are ambiguous, we must rely on the observations 
of the trial judge and defer to his or her evaluation of the truthfulness of the juror.  
Where statements suggesting bias predominate in quantity, specificity, and 
certainty, countered by a relatively few general statements that the juror believes he 
 
44
or she can follow the law and be fair, deference to the trial court defies the 
constitutional requirements. 
 
Beyond the example of juror Eddleman, I note without elaboration that of the 
remaining jurors removed by peremptory challenge, both prospective jurors 
Scanlon and Subecz gave answers clearly indicating bias unremedied by their 
general statements that they could follow the instructions of the court and be fair.  
They, too, should have been dismissed for cause. 
 
In 1769, the great English scholar William Blackstone wrote, “[T]he liberties 
of England cannot but subsist, so long as this palladium [the right of trial by jury] 
remains sacred and inviolate; not only from all open attacks, * * * but also from all 
secret machinations, which may sap and undermine it.”  4 Blackstone’s 
Commentaries (1769) 350.  Vigilance is required to protect the integrity of the jury 
from infirmities that may sap and undermine it.  Such infirmity is present in the 
composition of the jury that sentenced Williams to death.  I would therefore vacate 
the conviction and sentence and grant Williams a new trial. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.