Title: CLINTON DECKERT v. JOHN A. LANG, Individually and in his official capacity as Secretary of the Board of Parole, DUANE SHILLINGER, Individually and in his official capacity as Warden of the Wyoming State Penitentiary, and THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CLINTON DECKERT v. JOHN A. LANG, Individually and in his official capacity as Secretary of the Board of Parole, DUANE SHILLINGER, Individually and in his official capacity as Warden of the Wyoming State Penitentiary, and THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 116774 P.2d 1285Case Number: 88-194Decided: 05/23/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming

CLINTON DECKERT, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

JOHN A. LANG, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
DUANE SHILLINGER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS WARDEN OF THE 
WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY, AND THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Dwight F. Hurich 
of Preuit, Sowada & Hurich, Gillette, for appellant.

Richard E. Day 
and Stuart R. Day of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for appellee John A. 
Lang.

Terry L. 
Armitage, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee 
Duane Shillinger.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and KALOKATHIS, District Judge.

KALOKATHIS, District 
Judge.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from the 
order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claim. Appellant, Clinton Deckert, asserts error in the finding that appellees, 
John Lang and Duane Shillinger, were entitled to qualified immunity when they 
continued to hold Deckert at the Wyoming State Penitentiary after a commutation 
order signed by the Governor was delivered.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶3.]     On September 16, 1985, 
in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Clinton Deckert was found guilty on one 
count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and eight counts of 
delivery of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. On December 26, 1985, 
Deckert was sentenced to a term of one year to two and one-half years and fined 
$1,000 on Count II. On each of Counts III through X the sentence was also one 
year to two and one-half years and $1,000 fines. The court ordered "that the 
sentence in Count II shall run concurrently with the sentence in Count III, and 
all other sentences shall be deemed to run consecutively."

[¶4.]     In November 1986, the 
Public Defender for Deckert requested the Probation and Parole Board to consider 
granting early parole to several prisoners, including Clinton Deckert, a 
twenty-three year old who had no prior convictions and faced a minimum of eight 
years.

[¶5.]     On or about December 2, 
1986, John Lang, then Secretary of the Board of Parole, was directed by Governor 
Herschler to prepare and submit a commutation of Deckert's sentence on Counts II 
and III. The sentences on Counts II and III ran concurrently while his other 
sentences ran consecutively. This order, along with a number of others, was 
reviewed and signed by Governor Herschler on December 5, 1986. The document was 
processed and mailed to the records manager of the state penitentiary and was 
received by Deckert shortly after December 5, 1986, according to his 
affidavit.

[¶6.]     That order referred 
to

a commutation of his 
sentence of one (1) year to two and one-half (2 1/2) years concurrent. 
THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as the Governor of the State of 
Wyoming, I do hereby commute the sentence of the said Clinton Deckert (WSP No. 
13986) to a term of time served and if special good time is earned and allowed 
his sentence to expire December 5, 1986 upon order of final discharge by the 
Governor.

The order did 
not mention that Deckert was also serving consecutive terms for the remainder of 
his sentences.

[¶7.]     Lang submitted an 
affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment. Paragraph 7 
stated:

[O]n or about December 
11, 1986, it came to my attention that the commutation issued to Clinton Deckert 
could be read to state that all sentences, including both the concurrent and 
consecutive sentences imposed upon Clinton Deckert, were being commuted to time 
served.

That affidavit 
expressed Lang's belief that Governor Herschler's intention was to commute the 
concurrent sentences of Counts II and III only, with the remaining consecutive 
sentences to be served. Lang's affidavit referred to his request that the state 
penitentiary records manager retrieve the commutation previously issued to 
Deckert "to alter said commutation to reflect what I believed to be Governor 
Herschler's intention that only Counts II and III of Clinton Deckert's sentences 
be commuted to time served." Lang received notice on January 30, 1987, that 
Clinton Deckert refused to return his commutation documents. Deckert was not 
released at that time.

[¶8.]     Duane Shillinger, the 
warden of the penitentiary, submitted an affidavit in support of his motion for 
summary judgment. He stated:

When the original 
commutation document was received, the penitentiary was immediately notified by 
John Lang, Parole and Probation Department, that an error existed on the 
original commutation document. The penitentiary was instructed to retrieve the 
document and to advise Mr. Deckert that an amended commutation document would be 
issued.

[¶9.]     Shillinger's affidavit 
continues: 

That on or about December 
15, 1986, an amended commutation document was received from the Wyoming 
Probation and Parole Department. The amended document, again dated December 5, 
1986, and signed by Governor Herschler stated that ". . . a commutation of his 
sentence of one (1) year to two and one-half (2 1/2) years concurrent (Counts II 
and III) . . . hereby commute . . . to a term of time served (Counts II and 
III)[.]"

The warden 
believed he did not have authority to release an inmate unless official 
documents specified release, and he had been instructed "that the Governor of 
Wyoming would sign an amended commutation document." The record does not contain 
a document purporting to be the official amended commutation order or a copy of 
it. The only evidence pertaining to the amended order appears in the Shillinger 
affidavit as quoted above. The statement concerning the amended order stands 
uncontroverted.

[¶10.]  The record is not clear about whether, 
when, and how an amended order came about. It is clear that Shillinger and Lang 
believed an amended order would issue. Based upon that belief, Deckert was not 
released.

[¶11.]  Confusion about the amended order was 
addressed in Deckert's affidavit opposing the motion for summary judgment. He 
relied on exhibits, including copies of letters he received and affidavits from 
his prior hearing for a writ of habeas corpus. The affidavit incorporated by 
reference copies of correspondence between John Lang and former Governor 
Herschler. The correspondence with Governor Herschler was generated before 
Deckert was released by habeas corpus and after Herschler had retired as 
governor.1

[¶12.]  Deckert's affidavit stated that after he 
received the original commutation, his counsel, the public defender, wrote the 
Board of Charities and Reform to inquire about the status of the commutation. 
That affidavit stated John Lang replied to Deckert's counsel in a letter dated 
January 30, 1987:

As concerns Mr. Deckert, 
* * * [t]he sentence provides that Count II and III run concurrently, * * * and 
* * * the Governor's action was intended only to commute Counts II and III to 
time served with the remaining sentences (Counts IV thru X) still in effect and 
running consecutively.

[¶13.]  On February 24, 1987, Lang formally 
requested Mr. Deckert to forward the original commutation order issued December 
5, 1986, explaining that items were inadvertently omitted and needed to be 
inserted to clarify application of the commutation, even though it did "not 
effect [sic] the intent of the commutation."

[¶14.]  Deckert responded to Lang's request in a 
letter March 2, 1987, suggesting "it would be easier, and far more concise, if 
you would make the intended alterations on the copy of the commutation I've 
included, and return it to me. This would allow me to view the changes before 
they are made."

[¶15.]  Lang acknowledged Deckert's inquiry on 
March 4, 1987, and attached "the commutation showing the items (in red) that 
need to be adjusted."

[¶16.]  Deckert's supplemental affidavit (in 
response to Shillinger's affidavit), stated that he "never received an original 
commutation, signed by Ed Herschler, December 5, 1986, that had any 
modifications to it."

[¶17.]  On May 5, 1987, Deckert filed a writ of 
habeas corpus in the Second Judicial District Court, after an improper filing in 
the Wyoming Supreme Court was denied. Following a hearing, Deckert was ordered 
discharged from the penitentiary on June 16, 1987, by District Judge Robert Hill 
whose Order Directing Release stated: 

[O]n December 5, 1986, 
Governor Herschler executed a commutation of the sentence against Mr. Deckert to 
time served. This commutation on its face operates to reduce Petitioner's 
sentence to time served as of December 5, 1986. Accordingly, the State has no 
legal cause to detain Petitioner and hold him as a prisoner at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary. Petitioner must be discharged forthwith.

[¶18.]  The present action ensued in the First 
Judicial District Court on December 1, 1987, when Deckert filed a complaint 
requesting damages and attorney fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, from Lang, 
Shillinger, and the State of Wyoming. Deckert alleged that he was unlawfully 
confined at the Wyoming State Penitentiary from December 5, 1986, when the 
Governor's original commutation order was received, until his release in June 
1987. He claimed deprivation of his liberty and right to due process of law in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.

[¶19.]  Appellees filed a motion for summary 
judgment asserting the defense of qualified immunity. The motion was granted and 
Deckert filed this appeal June 8, 1988.

DISCUSSION

[¶20.]  Deckert states the issue on appeal as 
follows:

Did the District Court 
err in finding that the Defendants, Lang and Shillinger, were engaged in a 
discretionary function and that the rights of the Plaintiff were not clearly 
established, so that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from 
liability from section 1983 civil rights laws as a matter of 
law?

[¶21.]  Deckert's brief requests the court to 
decide:

1. Were the Defendants 
performing ministerial or discretionary functions in failing to release Clinton 
Deckert after they received the commutation of sentence[?]

2. In their failing to 
release Clinton Deckert, did Defendants violate the clearly established 
statutory or constitutional right of Clinton Deckert which they, as reasonable 
people involved in the functioning of prisons should have 
known[?]

[¶22.]  We have consistently adhered to the 
proposition that this court will not ordinarily develop issues other than those 
presented on appeal. "It should be equally clear that we do not ordinarily 
consider matters that have not been briefed or argued before this Court." 
Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132, 1140 (Wyo. 1986). Concerning the conduct of Lang, 
Deckert's brief goes no further than asserting that Lang had an absolute duty to 
release Deckert upon receipt of the original order of commutation.2

[¶23.]  Moreover, in reviewing a summary judgment 
on appeal,

we first consider whether 
or not there is a genuine issue of material fact underlying the granting of the 
summary judgment. If there is no issue of material fact, we then decide whether 
the substantive law was correctly applied by the trial 
court.

Sutherland v. 
Bock, 688 P.2d 157, 158 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶24.]  "[W]e review the judgment in the same 
light as the district court, using the same information." Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 410 (Wyo. 1985). When the party opposing the motion 
presents materials on which he intends to rely, these materials "`should be as 
carefully tailored and professionally correct as any evidence which is 
admissible to the court at the time of trial.'" Matthews v. Wyoming Department 
of Agriculture, 719 P.2d 216, 221 (Wyo. 1986) 
(quoting Lane Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 662 P.2d 419, 426 (Wyo. 
1983)).

[¶25.]  W.R.C.P. 56(e), and cases decided 
thereunder, hold that affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge and based 
on evidence about which the affiant is competent to testify. Harris v. Grizzle, 
625 P.2d 747 (Wyo. 1981). Accordingly, we cannot and do not 
consider certain correspondence executed by former Governor Herschler because it 
lacked sworn authentication. In addition, we will not consider what conduct Lang 
may have engaged in, other than that shown by the 
affidavits.

[¶26.]  With these principles as guides, we 
embark upon our discussion of the applicable legal principles in this case. 
Appellant Deckert claims that upon receipt of the commutation order dated 
December 5, 1986, Lang and Shillinger were obligated to release him or at least 
to hold a hearing on the matter, and their failure to do so deprived him of his 
liberty interest without due process of law.

[¶27.]  Lang and Shillinger do not contest the 
fact that a hearing was not held, but rather rely upon the defense of qualified 
immunity. This defense is set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982), as follows:

We therefore hold that 
government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.

[¶28.]  Accordingly, this appeal presents three 
questions for resolution:

1. Were the actions of 
Lang and Shillinger discretionary?

2. At the time of the 
delivery of the commutation order, did the law of Wyoming "clearly 
establish" liberty interest rights for Deckert?

3. Was the conduct of 
Lang and Shillinger objectively reasonable?

[¶29.]  Deckert claims the duties of Lang and 
Shillinger in regard to the commutation order were purely ministerial, and 
therefore the defense of qualified immunity would not be available to them. 
Harlow, 457 U.S.  at 818, 102 S. Ct.  at 2738. 
However, we determine that the tasks performed by Lang and Shillinger involved 
an element of discretion. Both Lang and Shillinger had a duty to protect the 
executive by examining the commutation order for errors or omissions. It was 
particularly important here, because the executive had signed the original 
commutation order. Corrections were suggested as soon as a problem became 
apparent.3

[¶30.]  When a law does not specify the precise 
action an official must take, that official retains discretionary authority. See 
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 n. 
14, 104 S. Ct. 3012, 3020 n. 14, 82 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1984). We cannot say that, with 
the delivery of the commutation order, nothing remained for judgment or 
discretion. Lang was faced with an order of commutation which he understood did 
not accurately reflect the will of the executive. Whether that order ever was 
amended by the executive or whether the executive had the power to amend a 
commutation order is not the issue. The issue is whether Lang's actions met the 
elements set forth above pertaining to the qualified immunity defense. Because 
the law never prescribed the specific procedure to be followed in regard to 
orders of commutation, the task of the prison officials who received such an 
order was not tantamount to an imperative. Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 
1048-49 (Wyo. 
1980). Nor did the law prescribe a fixed or ascertainable standard concerning 
the procedure to be followed by the prison officials. Nietert v. Overby, 816 F.2d 1464, 1467 (10th Cir. 1987). We cannot say that the law unambiguously 
precluded Lang from withholding execution of the commutation order while he 
sought to obtain a clarification of its ambiguity. Therefore, we cannot agree 
with Deckert that the responsibilities of Lang and Shillinger were purely 
ministerial. Thus, Lang and Shillinger have surmounted the threshold barrier to 
the availability of the defense of qualified immunity. We hold their actions 
were discretionary.

[¶31.]  Concerning the second issue, Harlow states that: "If the law was clearly established, 
the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public 
official should know the law governing his conduct." 457 U.S.  at 818-19, 
102 S. Ct.  at 2738.4

[¶32.]  Wyoming law is rather skimpy concerning the 
effect of a commutation order. The Wyoming Constitution empowers the governor 
"to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, for all offenses 
except treason and cases of impeachment." Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 5. Case law holds this 
power to be exclusive. Stanton v. State, 686 P.2d 587, 588-89 (Wyo. 1984); Kennedy v. State, 595 P.2d 577, 578 (Wyo. 1979); State ex rel. 
Chatterton v. Grant, 12 Wyo. 1, 73 P. 470, 471 
(1903); In re Moore, 4 Wyo. 98, 31 P. 980, 981-82 
(1893).

[¶33.]  We have been unable to uncover any 
Wyoming 
statutes or cases which outline the method of granting a commutation or its 
legal effect; nor has Deckert in his brief provided any such authority. To be 
clearly established, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear 
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 
right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987), quoted in Garrett v. Rader, 831 F.2d 202, 204 (10th Cir. 
1987). With regard to this second question, Deckert argues that general legal 
principles are implicated which Lang and Shillinger should have understood and 
applied. However, Deckert cites no general legal principles dealing with the 
specific procedure which a prison official is bound to follow under the 
circumstances present here. Instead, Deckert refers to a "universal rule in the 
interpretation of pardons" as being an act of grace and, therefore, any 
limitation upon its operation should be strictly construed. 59 Am.Jur.2d, Pardon 
and Parole § 44 at 38 (1987). In addition, Deckert refers to another rule to the 
effect that if a pardon is obtained by fraud, the resolution of such a matter 
involves issues of fact which should be decided by a judicial tribunal. Ex parte 
Bess, 152 S.C. 410, 150 S.E. 54 (1929).

[¶34.]  These general principles do not define 
the contours of Deckert's liberty interest rights with sufficient clarity so 
that Lang and Shillinger, as measured by an objective standard of 
reasonableness, should have understood that the continued detention of Deckert 
violated any of his rights.5 This is particularly true because 
of their belief that the commutation order contained a clerical 
error.

[¶35.]  We note that Tate v. Alexander, 527 F. Supp. 796 (M.D.Tenn. 1981),6 demonstrates a view which supports 
Lang and Shillinger. While we do not ground our decision on this opinion, we 
note that the defense of qualified immunity was made available to Governor 
Alexander when he rescinded former Governor Blanton's commutation order and 
ordered state officials not to release the plaintiff. Several inmates in 
Tennessee 
obtained habeas corpus relief in state courts. Id. at 798-99. 

[¶36.]  Since the law of Wyoming, and for that 
matter the general law, contains no well-developed legal principles defining the 
obligations or procedures to be followed by prison officials in matters 
involving commutations, we hold that Deckert had no clearly established rights 
which were violated. We also hold that, in view of the record, Lang and 
Shillinger could not have originally known, by application of the objectively 
reasonable standard, what the law required of them. Consequently, they are both 
entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, and the district court properly 
granted summary judgment in their behalf.

[¶37.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Such materials do not 
meet the requirements of W.R.C.P. 56(e):

Form of affidavits; 
further testimony; defense required. - Supporting and opposing affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or 
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. [Emphasis added.]

2 The essence of Deckert's 
theory is expressed in his brief as follows:

Just as when an official 
receives an order from the court, when the Appellees received the commutation 
signed by Governor Herschler and delivered to them, their's was not to question 
how the order was to be put into effect, but to act on the order no matter 
whether the commutation was clear on its face, as was found by the District 
Court in the hab[ea]s corpus hearing, or it was ambiguous as will be discussed 
later.

3 The Second Judicial 
District Court granted a writ of habeas corpus directing release of Deckert long 
after the delivery of the commutation order. The habeas corpus order was silent 
on the questions presented here and did not discuss the nature of any rights 
vested in Deckert at the time of delivery of a commutation 
order.

4 Without reiterating the 
general standard concerning summary judgment, we note that in cases of this 
nature Harlow observed: "On summary judgment, 
the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, 
but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred." 
457 U.S.  at 818, 102 S. Ct.  at 
2738.

5 We make this statement 
by strictly adhering to the record presented to the district court at summary 
judgment. While there may have arisen a set of conditions which would have 
compelled us to conclude that Lang should have known that he was violating 
Deckert's rights, we would, by necessity, be relying upon materials which would 
not meet the requirements of W.R.C.P. 56(e).

6 Affirmed in part and 
reversed in part on other grounds sub nom, Alexander v. Alexander, 706 F.2d 751 
(6th Cir. 1983); on remand, 573 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.Tenn. 1983), and affirmed 751 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1984) (unpublished opinion).

URBIGKIT, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶38.]  On December 5, 1986, Clinton Deckert 
(Deckert), following a sentence for variant drug charges in Campbell County, Wyoming during the preceding year, was given a 
commutation. This document, executed under the constitutional power of the 
Wyoming Governor, duly signed and attested to by the Secretary of State on 
December 5, 1986 and thereafter delivered to the penitentiary inmate, stated a 
commutation to be effective immediately. Subsequently, as required by Wyo. 
Const. art. 4, § 5,1 which provides the power of 
commutation, a report to the legislature in early 1987 also listed the Deckert 
commutation.

[¶39.]  Deckert was not released from the 
penitentiary where he was incarcerated. Shortly after the commutation instrument 
had been delivered to the prisoner, Warden Duane Shillinger (Shillinger) was 
advised by John A. Lang (Lang), who serves as ex-officio Secretary of the 
Wyoming Board of Parole and as the Director of the Department of Probation and 
Parole, that an error existed because the commutation for Deckert's two 
concurrent and seven consecutive sentences was unintended.2

[¶40.]  Lang, as either or both the Secretary of 
the Wyoming Board of Parole or as the Director of the Department of Probation 
and Parole, requested that Deckert return the original document "for 
correction." Lacking compliance, Lang edited a copy of the signed and issued 
commutation by inserting in red additional restrictive conditions which reduced 
the effect of the commutation. The exchange of correspondence between Lang and 
Deckert is informative. In communication with a representative of the public 
defender's office dated January 30, 1987, Lang stated that "[a]gain, the 
commutation document perhaps does not reflect the intent too clearly and I will 
request that the document be corrected to show the 
intent."

[¶41.]  The record reflects correspondence 
between Lang to both the then retired Governor Ed Herschler and the succeeding 
Governor Mike Sullivan in further efforts to get the commutation amended "for 
correction." Neither did.

[¶42.]  During this period of extended 
communications, Deckert remained in the penitentiary as shown by Shillinger's 
affidavit:

5. That on or about 
December 5, 1986, the penitentiary received an Executive Department Commutation 
of Mr. Deckert's sentence. When the original commutation document was received, 
the penitentiary was immediately notified by John Lang, Parole and Probation 
Department, that an error existed on the original commutation document. The 
penitentiary was instructed to retrieve the document and to advise Mr. Deckert 
that an amended commutation document would be issued. Mr. Deckert was advised 
that the Governor's intent was to commute only one (1) of the consecutive 
sentences so that Mr. Deckert could begin serving the next consecutive 
sentence;

6. That on or about 
December 15, 1986, an amended commutation document was received from the Wyoming 
Probation and Parole Department. The amended document, again dated December 5, 
1986, and signed by Governor Herschler stated that ". . . a commutation of his 
sentence of one (1) year to two and one-half (2 1/2) years concurrent (Counts II 
and III) . . . hereby commute . . . to a term of time served (Counts II and 
III)";

7. That the Warden of the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary does not have the authority to release inmates unless 
official documents specify the release of the inmate. In Mr. Deckert's case, the 
Warden of the Wyoming State Penitentiary did receive a commutation document that 
was judged by the Wyoming Parole Department to be in error. The Warden, then 
with no document that specified Mr. Deckert's release, could not release Mr. 
Deckert. Specifically, the Warden had no authority to release Mr. Deckert per a 
document that had been judged to be in error by the originator of the document. 
Further, the original December 5, 198[6], commutation document made no mention 
of the remaining consecutive sentences and how those sentences were to be 
processed. Again, based on instructions received from the Wyoming Parole and 
Probation Department, the original commutation document was processed as being a 
faulty document. Too, the penitentiary Warden was well advised by the Parole and 
Probation Department that Governor Herschler would be submitting a signed, 
amended commutation document. Again, the Warden had no authority to release Mr. 
Deckert.

[¶43.]  The document to which Shillinger made 
reference in his affidavit was apparently the edited copy of a copy of the 
executed commutation which was changed after delivery of the original 
instrument. No other instrument of a changed commutation character for Deckert 
was ever produced.

[¶44.]  Deckert was finally released on June 18, 
1987 or more than six months after the effective date for commutation. This 
release was secured by a writ of habeas corpus in the district court which 
stated:

[A]nd the Court being 
fully advised in the premises hereby finds that on December 5, 1986, Governor 
Herschler executed a commutation of the sentence against Mr. Deckert to time 
served. This commutation on its face operates to reduce Petitioner's sentence to 
time served as of December 5, 1986. Accordingly, the State has no legal cause to 
detain Petitioner and hold him as a prisoner at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. 
Petitioner must be discharged forthwith.

[¶45.]  The litigative history of the release of 
Deckert from the penitentiary as well as Robert W. Heggie, who was similarly 
affected by incarceration and commutation, through their habeas corpus releases 
is informative. Two prior proceedings in this court have occurred. Following 
receipt of the commutations dated December 5, 1986 and stated to be effective 
December 5, 1986 with sentences reduced to "time served," neither Heggie nor 
Deckert were released from confinement. Correspondence followed by the public 
defender to attempt to accomplish that result and lacking success for 
negotiation, both individuals filed a joint petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
in this court. The attorney general objected and also included a petition to 
disqualify the public defender. On the basis of the State's objections, the 
petition was denied since "the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus should have 
been filed in the first instance with the court or judge most convenient in 
point of distance to the applicants * * *."

[¶46.]  The two incarcerated individuals then 
filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Carbon County District Court where 
again the attorney general moved for summary adjudication. In that proceeding, 
Deckert succeeded and Heggie lost. The difference was that in the early stages 
of these events, after Lang had requested that the two individuals return their 
commutation documents "for correction," Heggie complied and Deckert refused.3

[¶47.]  Since Heggie did return his commutation, 
it was edited by Lang to restrict its scope. There is absolutely no evidence in this 
record that the alteration of either commutation document was done with the 
approval or by the direction of Governor Herschler while he continued in office 
through the end of the year or his successor, Governor Sullivan. In fact, 
correspondence clearly demonstrates a contrary factual 
situation.

[¶48.]  It was this status where Lang had altered 
one of the original commutation documents and had been foreclosed the 
opportunity to do the same thing to the other that the district court habeas 
corpus proceeding came before the district judge for decision. Attached to this 
opinion as appendices are copies of the original Deckert commutation ("A"), 
followed with a copy to which handwritten delineations were made by Lang or 
someone else at his direction ("B"), and the Heggie commutation as originally 
issued ("C") and as altered ("D").

[¶49.]  Conversely, as to Heggie, the petition 
for writ of habeas corpus was dismissed when the court found "that the petition 
should be dismissed because the original commutation was surrendered and a 
corrected version returned to Petitioner." For final historical perspective, 
Heggie refiled a petition in this court and was released by order which accorded 
him the same relief in commutation as had been granted to Deckert.4 

[¶50.]  The redlined "adjustments" which were 
submitted to Deckert with the March 4 letter were not productive of the results 
desired by Lang. Lang then corresponded with both ex-Governor Herschler and 
Governor Sullivan with unsuccessful efforts to "adjust" the Deckert commutation 
document. In the meantime, Governor Sullivan, under the requirements of Wyo. 
Const. art. 4, § 5 in addressing a report to the legislature concerning pardons 
and commutations, reported that both sentences had been commuted to time served 
effective December 5, 1986.5

[¶51.]  I am particularly disturbed by a 
statement in Lang's brief which is unsupported in this record and may be 
reflective in some part by the posture adopted by this 
court:

Thereafter, Appellee Lang 
received notice from the Wyoming State Penitentiary that Appellant Deckert had 
refused to return his commutation documents. In addition, on or about December 
15, 1986, an amended commutation document was forwarded to the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary, dated December 15, 1986, and signed by Governor Herschler, stating 
that ". . . a commutation of his sentence of one (1) year to two and one-half (2 
1/2) years concurrent (Counts II and III) . . . hereby commute . . . to a term 
of time served (Counts II and III).

[¶52.]  The Heggie document was not corrected 
until approximately February 15, 1987 and the redlined, corrected document 
submitted by Lang to Deckert was enclosed with the letter of March 4, 1987. The 
statement in the brief is unfounded in every material regard, except that 
Deckert refused to return his commutation.

[¶53.]  Conversely, in regard to what he did, one 
of Lang's affidavits reflects:

7. That on or about 
December 11, 1986, it came to my attention that the commutation issued to 
Clinton Deckert could be read to state that all sentences, including both the 
concurrent and consecutive sentences imposed upon Clinton Deckert, were being 
commuted to time served.

8. That I believed that 
Governor Herschler's intention was to only commute the concurrent sentences of 
Counts II and III, and that the remaining consecutive sentences imposed on 
Clinton Deckert remained to be served by Clinton Deckert.

9. That I then requested 
the Records Manager at the Wyoming State Penitentiary to retrieve the 
commutation papers previously issued to Clinton Deckert to alter said 
commutation to reflect what I believed to be Governor Herschler's intention that 
only Counts II and III of Clinton Deckert's sentences be commuted to time 
served.

10. That on or about 
January 30, 1987, I received notice from the Records Manager at the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary that Clinton Deckert refused to return his commutation 
documents.

[¶54.]  Actually, unless there is another altered 
copy of the commutation which existed somewhere, the only document available 
other than the original instrument is the redlined copy. This was, of course, 
the reason for Deckert's release by writ of habeas corpus in the district court. 
The alteration of a public document is further substantiated by the defensive 
posture of Lang:

13. That my actions taken 
with regard to Clinton Deckert and his commutation forms were done with no 
malicious motivation or intent to ward [sic] Clinton Deckert and were simply a 
good faith effort to correctly follow Governor Herschler's criterion for 
commutations.

14. That I have checked 
with Governor Herschler since this controversy has arisen and Governor Herschler 
confirmed that it was his general practice not to commute more than one sentence 
at a time for a particular inmate.

[¶55.]  Separated from all of the hyperbole with 
which this case seems to have become engendered, Lang first altered Heggie's 
original commutation and secondly, Deckert's copy of his commutation. On this 
basis, by asserting his knowledge orally of the written intent of the Governor 
who exercised the constitutional power, Lang created himself the incarcerating 
authority. He undertook to exercise either the arguable right, if it does exist, 
of the Governor to amend or of the courts to construe. Unquestionably, the 
Governor did not amend and the courts were not given an appropriate early 
opportunity to construe by determinative petition which could have been 
requested by Lang.

[¶56.]  Summary judgment on this resulting 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights proceeding was differently presented by the three 
defendants, Shillinger, Lang, and the State of Wyoming. This divergence developed because 
Lang was represented by private counsel, whereas Shillinger and the State were 
represented by the office of the attorney general.

[¶57.]  By affidavit, Lang contended that the 
text of the commutation was a mistake in execution:

8. That I believed that 
Governor Herschler's intention was to only commute the concurrent sentences of 
Counts II and III, and that the remaining consecutive sentences imposed on 
Clinton Deckert remained to be served by Clinton Deckert.

* * * * * 
*

11. That during my tenure 
as Secretary to the Board of Parole, it was not uncommon to correct errors made, 
which errors were contrary to Governor Herschler's instructions and intentions, 
especially in the instance where a good time release date was not accurately 
established.

Shillinger 
related:

5. That on or about 
December 5, 1986, the penitentiary received an Executive Department Commutation 
of Mr. Deckert's sentence. When the original commutation document was received, 
the penitentiary was immediately notified by John Lang, Parole and Probation 
Department, that an error existed on the original commutation document. The 
penitentiary was instructed to retrieve the document and to advise Mr. Deckert 
that an amended commutation document would be issued. Mr. Deckert was advised 
that the Governor's intent was to commute only one (1) of the consecutive 
sentences so that Mr. Deckert could begin serving the next consecutive 
sentence;

* * * * * 
*

7. That the Warden of the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary does not have the authority to release inmates unless 
official documents specify the release of the inmate. In Mr. Deckert's case, the 
Warden of the Wyoming State Penitentiary did receive a commutation document that 
was judged by the Wyoming Parole Department to be in error. The Warden, then 
with no document that specified Mr. Deckert's release, could not release Mr. 
Deckert. Specifically, the Warden had no authority to release Mr. Deckert per a 
document that had been judged to be in error by the originator of the document. 
Further, the original December 5, 198[6], commutation document made no mention 
of the remaining consecutive sentences and how those sentences were to be 
processed. Again, based on instructions received from the Wyoming Parole and 
Probation Department, the original commutation document was processed as being a 
faulty document. Too, the penitentiary Warden was well advised by the Parole and 
Probation Department that Governor Herschler would be submitting a signed, 
amended commutation document. Again, the Warden had no authority to release Mr. 
Deckert;

8. That the amended 
commutation document did specify that only Count II and III of the total 
consecutive sentences were to be commuted. The penitentiary Warden did act 
according to the information described on the amended commutation 
document;

9. That Mr. Deckert did 
file a Writ of Habeas Corpus regarding the conflict between the original and the 
amended commutation documents. The Warden of the Wyoming State Penitentiary did 
abide with the district judge's decision regarding the 
commutations;

10. That, in summary, the 
Warden did not refuse to recognize the commutation issued by the governor. The 
Warden was instructed that the original commutation document was in error. 
Further, the penitentiary Warden did not alter any commutation document: the 
Warden was instructed that the original document was in error and that an 
amended document to be signed by the governor, would be served upon the 
penitentiary. Again, the Warden has no authority to release any inmate without 
specific authorization. When the Warden was specifically instructed that the 
original commutation was in error, the Warden had no authority to release Mr. 
Deckert and/or to even amend any of the consecutive 
sentences.

[¶58.]  I differ from the majority because I do 
not find that Shillinger and Lang stand in a common relationship to exposed 
liability for unconstitutional confinement of a person. The only question with 
which Shillinger was faced was his reliance on the direction given by Lang. I do 
not ascribe a duty to Shillinger to investigate what Lang was doing to an 
official document. I concur in the result affirming summary judgment for 
Shillinger, but not for the reasons stated by the majority. My basis for 
affirmation is that he was only "taking orders" from an invested 
authority.

[¶59.]  However, I must dissent to the 
affirmation of summary judgment for Lang. The elemental issue is whether a state 
official can alter an officially executed state document signed by a superior in 
order to correct what he may consider to have been his mistake with action taken 
illegally and improperly after execution and delivery of the original document. 
Further inquiry is whether by this conduct he can escape liability for 
confinement retention of the individual against whom his document changing 
activities are pursued. In plain language, Lang, without a scintilla of 
authority, changed action taken by the Governor exercising his constitutional 
power to retain Deckert in the penitentiary. What kept Deckert in the 
penitentiary was the affirmative action taken by a state official to alter an 
official document. The issue remains whether a state official can manicure a 
state record to keep someone in confinement without liability for imprisonment 
when that state official feels that his faulty draftsmanship may have originally 
created an error and especially where, as in this case, neither the prior 
Governor nor the succeeding Governor ever did anything to correct the official 
document.

[¶60.]  I cannot agree factually or by 
application of case precedent that this action of the state official in changing 
a government document is discretionary. No case is found which affords qualified 
immunity to state officials for altering official records. Compare within the 
criminal code, W.S. 6-3-604, fraud against testamentary instruments and 
government records; penalties; government record defined and W.S. 6-5-108, 
issuing false certificate; penalties.

[¶61.]  The direction to Shillinger to 
incarcerate and hold in confinement comes from the judicial sentence and issued 
mittimus. His obligation to release comes from the expiration of time, an order 
from the Wyoming Board of Parole or a court of this state. It was by the 
post-delivery editing process of the document signed by the Governor and 
attested to by the Secretary of State that Lang created a new obligation for 
Shillinger to continue to confine the prisoner in the penitentiary. To that 
clearly illegal conduct, no discretionary authority can be 
appended.

[¶62.]  I reluctantly respond to the 
philosophical inquiry of the majority that the objective standard of 
reasonableness of a public official can include changing or forging a 
governmental document even when stated to be done to correct a prior mistake in 
composition. This is no different than if the attorney-at-law or law clerk, 
feeling that the judge made a "clerical" mistake, changed a document after it 
had been signed and filed to authenticate accomplishment of a different court 
result.

[¶63.]  It is my perception that we do not get to 
the discretionary or ministerial dichotomy since we are foreclosed by 
demonstrated illegality. I premise my review in affirming the summary judgment 
for Shillinger on the basis that no issue upon which liability could be premised 
was presented within the record. However, I would reverse for further 
proceedings as to Lang to determine liability through a proper trial. No 
character of immunity can be imputed to Lang's conduct which absolves proper 
consideration of liability under the United States Constitution in protection of 
the liberty interest of the incarcerated individual for whom the commutation had 
been granted.

[¶64.]  Here, without question, a constitutional 
officer, the Governor, exercised his constitutional power for the commutation of 
a penal sentence. That official document was duly written, signed, sealed, 
authenticated by the Secretary of State, and delivered to the beneficiary as the 
exercise of that power provided in Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 5. The propriety and 
effectiveness of that gubernatorial act has been settled in this state since In 
re Moore, 4 Wyo. 98, 31 P. 340 (1892). See likewise, 
Thomas v. Morris, 844 F.2d 1337 (8th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied (6/9/88), cert. 
granted ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 781, 102 L. Ed. 2d 773 (1989), which applies the plain language of the commutation. Lang took it 
upon himself to change the document in order to keep the beneficiary of the 
commutation in confinement. This conduct produces no proper basis for 
application of a qualified immunity to avoid liability under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.

[¶65.]  This was not a Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. [1 Cranch] 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 
(1803) executive action undelivered commission. Conversely, in the exercise of 
clearly stated constitutional authority, the Governor executed and delivered 
Deckert's commutation. Thereafter, Lang abjured either litigative construction 
or gubernatorial re-examination in making the confinement decision himself. 
Instead, he chose to change the document to redefine a supposed intent and then 
directed Shillinger to retain the incarcerated prisoner based on his 
change.

[¶66.]  Changing a gubernatorial document is not 
a discretionary attribute of public employment. Consequently, when we look at 
what Lang did, it is clear that it was not discretionary, and qualified immunity 
cannot be applied from the totally dissimilar authorities of Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987); Davis v. 
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S. Ct. 3012, 82 L. Ed. 2d 139, reh'g denied 468 U.S. 1226, 105 S. Ct. 26, 82 L. Ed. 2d 919 (1984); and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). Those guiding authorities do not 
relate to these facts. Likewise, this was not a discretionary parole release 
consideration addressed in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1979). 
Furthermore, the issues presented in Tate v. Alexander, 527 F. Supp. 796 
(M.D.Tenn. 1981) and Alexander v. Alexander, 706 F.2d 751 (6th Cir. 1983), where 
gubernatorial action was taken in regard to commutation given in conjunction 
with bribery by a predecessor, cannot be factually compared to this case where 
no alternative nor amendatory action from the office of the Governor occurred. 
Actually, Tennessee Governor Blanton's "bizarre episode in Tennessee history" as 
related in Tate and its appellate version in Alexander is precedent that Lang, 
even if he might have been Governor, could not necessarily substantively 
re-write the executed and delivered commutation. Tate, 527 F. Supp.  at 
798.

[¶67.]  Unfortunately, in this case, any 
discovery to develop an adequate record was initially decided by motions for 
protective orders on behalf of each appellee. For reasons undisclosed in this 
record, an order granting the relief was entered which indicated approval of all 
counsel pending resolution of the motion for summary judgment. In result, 
Deckert never obtained discovery to explore what Lang did, when and why, as an 
asserted cause for the public official to alter the formal government documents 
which granted sentence commutation.

[¶68.]  I would reverse for trial as to Lang, 
including adequate examination and cross-examination of the participants to 
examine exactly what steps were taken and why Deckert was retained in the state 
penitentiary after receipt of his commutation.

[¶69.]  The thesis of my dissent is effectively 
stated in Justice Powell's majority opinion in Harlow, 457 U.S.  at 819, 102 S. Ct.  at 2738, which correctly recognized that we are not tested with lawfully 
accomplished discretionary conduct in what Lang did to keep Deckert in the 
penitentiary:

Nevertheless, if the 
official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove 
that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the 
defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on 
objective factors.

By defining the limits of 
qualified immunity essentially in objective terms, we provide no license to 
lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in 
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the 
objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts. Where an official could be 
expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional 
rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by 
such conduct may have a cause of action.

[¶70.]  It is not unlikely that a jury might find 
that what Lang did was not objectively reasonable as measured by reference to 
clearly established law. Id. at 818, 102 S. Ct.  at 2738. See also Wolff 
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974). The burden of proof rested with Lang to plead and provide a defense 
of qualified immunity. Alexander, 706 F.2d 751. Considering the summary judgment 
status of this case disposition, I remain unconvinced that the action of Lang of 
altering a government document justified court established approbation of an 
immunity defense as a matter of law or an issue of fact. Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 
1986). I fear when this character of conduct is immunized, we write in real 
blood.

[¶71.]  Consequently, I concur in part and 
dissent in part. 

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 5 
states:

The governor shall have 
power to remit fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commutations and 
pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of 
impeachment; but the legislature may by law regulate the manner in which the 
remission of fines, pardons, commutations and reprieves may be applied for. Upon 
conviction for treason he shall have power to suspend the execution of sentence 
until the case is reported to the legislature at its next regular session, when 
the legislature shall either pardon, or commute the sentence, direct the 
execution of the sentence or grant further reprieve. He shall communicate to the 
legislature at each regular session each case of remission of fine, reprieve, 
commutation or pardon granted by him, stating the name of the convict, the crime 
for which he was convicted, the sentence and its date, and the date of the 
remission, commutation, pardon or reprieve with his reasons for granting the 
same.

2 For general background 
on the events leading to the style of sentencing, see the historical development 
in the Campbell County grand jury cases: Sword v. State, 746 P.2d 423 (Wyo. 
1987) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) and Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360 (Wyo. 1987) 
(Urbigkit, J., dissenting). See also Gist v. State, 766 P.2d 1149 (Wyo. 1988); Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852 (Wyo. 1987); Kortz v. State, 746 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1987); and Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 
1987).

3 In answer to Deckert's 
request about what changes were intended to be made to his commutation, Lang 
redlined a copy with his alterations which then apparently became the document 
to which both Shillinger and Lang refer in affidavits. After seeing what would 
happen to the document if altered, Deckert continued to refuse to release the 
original instrument.

4 In pursuit of his effort 
to get the original commutation returned, Lang had written to Deckert on 
February 24, 1987:

We are hereby requesting 
that you take some time out of your 
schedule and forward to us (through the records office of the penitentiary) 
the original of the commutation issued to you by Governor Herschler on December 
5, 1986.

As you know, we 
inadvertently omitted several items on the form that need to be inserted in 
order to clarify the precise application of the commutation, even though the same does not effect [sic] 
the intent of the commutation. [Emphasis added.]

Deckert answered 
on March 2:

Thank you for your letter 
of February 24, wherein you asked me to return the commutation I received on 
December 5, 1986. I have some questions regarding your 
request.

You state in your letter 
". . . the same does not effect (sic) the intent of the commutation." What 
items, exactly, are you referring to? And what effect, exactly, will the changes 
have in the commutation I received?

Perhaps it would be 
easier, and far more concise, if you would make the intended alterations on the 
copy of the commutation I've included, and return it to me. This would allow me 
to view the changes before they are made.

Are you aware that an 
officer of the Wyoming State Penitentiary, Randy Baunach, has threatened me with 
revocation of my commutation if I did not relinquish it to him? Was this threat 
made under the direction or with the knowledge of your office? This is a matter 
of some concern to me, and I would appreciate a response by you. I suspect Mr. 
Baunach was acting without direction in his threat.

Your answers to my 
questions would be greatly appreciated. I assure you of my continued cooperation 
in this matter.

Lang wrote again 
on March 4:

Thank you for your letter 
dated March 2, 1987, inquiring about the specifics relating to your commutation 
of sentence. I'm attaching the commutation showing the items (in red) that need 
to be adjusted.

As you know, you were 
convicted on nine (9) counts, one (1) count of "Conspiracy to Deliver a 
Controlled Substance" and eight (8) counts of "Delivery of a Controlled 
Substance." The Court Order makes reference to Counts II through 
X.

The Order provides that 
Counts II and III are to run concurrently, and Counts IV through X all run 
consecutively. The commutation applies only to Counts II and III and leaves 
Counts IV through X untouched, and this needs to be reflected on the commutation 
as that was the Governor's intent.

Perhaps I am not 
correctly "reading" you, but I get the distinct feeling you believe we are 
somehow trying to mislead and deprive you of something. However, look at it 
realistically. Do you honestly believe the Governor would wipe out all those 
sentences with one stroke of the pen?

As concerns your 
counselor, I don't know how this matter was presented to you, but do know that 
Governor's [sic] in the past have cancelled commutations. This is not to imply 
that such would be done in your case, although I believe the matter would 
eventually be discussed with the Governor.

I need to impress upon 
you that nobody is trying to cheat you out of something or present distorted 
facts to you. After all, I'm the guy who presented the majority of cases to the 
Governor for commutations, discussed the merits of each case with him, and 
watched as he signed them. And I can assure you that there is no hanky-panky 
going on with your case, just a need to define the application of it to the 
individual sentences.

I trust you understand 
this; however, should you have further questions concerning this matter, please 
do not hesitate to write me.

5 On March 16, 1987, as 
part of the course of correspondence, when contacted, ex-Governor Ed Herschler 
wrote to Lang as Secretary of the Wyoming Board of Parole, including in his 
letter: "If the commutation instrument is not adequate, I doubt if I could give 
you any advice. I do not believe that I would have the authority to issue an 
amended commutation."