Title: Forlizzi v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11746 
 
DAVID FORLIZZI & another1  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
April 28, 2015. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Practice, Criminal, Interlocutory appeal. 
 
 
 
David Forlizzi and Fred Battista appeal from a judgment of 
a single justice of this court denying their petition pursuant 
to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The petition sought relief from the 
orders of a Superior Court judge denying their motions to 
dismiss indictments and from the judge's decision not to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing on their motions.  The single justice 
denied the petition.  We affirm. 
 
 
Background.  Forlizzi has been indicted on charges of 
obstruction of justice, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B; 
three counts of corruption of a witness, in violation of G. L. 
c. 268A, § 2 (c); three counts of subornation of perjury, in 
violation of G. L. c. 268, § 2; and multiple counts of 
conspiracy to violate those same laws, G. L. c. 274, § 7.  He 
also has been indicted as a habitual offender, in violation of 
G. L. c. 279, § 25.  Battista faces similar charges.  These 
indictments arise out of the petitioners' alleged misconduct in 
connection with a prior trial involving alleged insurance fraud. 
 
 
In the Superior Court, Forlizzi (joined by Battista) moved 
to dismiss the indictments, alleging that, during the 
investigation leading to the indictments, the Commonwealth had 
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct.  They claimed that the 
Commonwealth caused the grand jury to subpoena the bank records 
                                                          
 
1 Fred Battista.  Battista has joined in the memorandum 
filed by David Forlizzi. 
2 
 
 
 
of trial counsel in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (f), 426 
Mass. 1397 (1998), and that the Attorney General improperly 
obtained counsels' tax records though the insurance fraud 
bureau.  A Superior Court judge denied the motion, concluding 
that the proscription of rule 3.8 (f) does not apply to third-
party record holders such as banking institutions, but that the 
mechanism used by the prosecutors to obtain the attorneys' tax 
records constituted overreaching.  The judge determined, 
however, that dismissal of the indictments as a sanction was not 
warranted in the circumstances.  Forlizzi thereafter filed a 
second motion to dismiss, which also was denied.  The judge 
reasoned that Forlizzi "has not demonstrated that the 
Commonwealth engaged in conduct designed to interfere with [his] 
. . . right [under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution] to counsel of choice, nor has he persuaded the 
[c]ourt that an evidentiary hearing would likely produce 
evidence to establish his claim." 
 
 
The petitioners next filed their petition in the county 
court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking interlocutory 
review of those rulings.  A single justice of this court 
concluded that the petitioners had not shown they were entitled 
to extraordinary relief.  She considered the Superior Court 
judge's decision and, "inter alia, for the reasons stated by the 
judge in his detailed written decision," ordered that the 
petition for extraordinary relief be denied. 
 
 
The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as 
amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001).  That rule applies where, as 
here, a single justice has denied relief from challenged 
interlocutory rulings in the trial court, and requires a 
petitioner to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial 
court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any 
final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available 
means."  Id.  In this case, the petitioners contend that relief 
"cannot be obtained after trial because further trial court 
proceedings stand to fatally compromise [the petitioners'] 
constitutional right to counsel of [their] choice." 
 
 
Discussion.  We have said repeatedly that the "denial of a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 13[, as 
appearing in 442 Mass. 1516 (2004),] is not appealable . . . 
until after trial," and that G. L. c. 211, § 3, "may not be used 
to circumvent our rule."  Ventresco v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 
82, 83 (1991).  "[T]he rights of criminal defendants are 
generally fully protected through the regular appellate 
process."  Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 679 
3 
 
 
 
(1978).  In truly extraordinary circumstances, however, where a 
petitioner demonstrates "both a substantial claim of violation 
of his substantive rights and irremediable error, such that he 
cannot be placed in status quo in the regular course of appeal," 
Morrissette v. Commonwealth, 380 Mass. 197, 198 (1980), a single 
justice may exercise the court's power under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
to authorize interlocutory review.  In such a case, the single 
justice may decide the issues presented, report the matter to 
the full court, Ventresco, supra, or authorize an interlocutory 
appeal to be taken to the Appeals Court for a decision on the 
merits.  Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 23 (2011); Fadden 
v. Commonwealth, 376 Mass. 604 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 
961 (1979). 
 
 
Here, we affirm the single justice's denial of the petition 
on the ground that the petitioners failed to demonstrate 
irremediable error, the second Morrissette factor, which 
coincides with the petitioners' obligations under rule 2:21.  
See Cook v. Carlson, 440 Mass. 1025, 1026 n.2 (2003); White v. 
Commonwealth, 439 Mass. 1017, 1017 n.1 (2003).  The fact that 
the single justice considered the substantive merits of the 
interlocutory orders does not require that we do likewise.  
White, supra.  We express no opinion on the substantive merits 
of the petition at this interlocutory stage. 
 
 
The petitioners' claims generally involve due process 
considerations, alleged violations of the attorney-client 
relationship, and infringement on the right to counsel.  They 
have not, as is their burden, demonstrated that those claims 
involve violation of any right that cannot be remedied in a 
direct appeal if and when the petitioners are convicted.  See 
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2002) (due 
process claims); Doe v. Commonwealth, 435 Mass. 1001, 1001 n.1 
(2001) (violation of attorney-client relationship); Barber v. 
Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 236 (1967) (Sixth Amendment rights).  
None of the petitioners' claims implicates "a right not to be 
tried," a right we have protected by according interlocutory 
review.  See Flood v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 1015, 1017 (2013) 
(double jeopardy claims and sexually dangerous persons trials).  
See also Soucy v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 1025, 1025 (2015), and 
cases cited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
Robert M. Goldstein for David Forlizzi.