Title: State in the Interest of T.M.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue raised by this appeal is whether the juvenile's delinquency proceeding resulted in a guilty plea that must be reversed because it lacked the necessary procedural safeguards. The facts of the case were uncontested. The delinquency complaint charged that T.M., a mildly retarded juvenile, committed an act of criminal sexual contact on a six-year-old girl. T.M. was twelve at the time, but functioning at the level of a nine-year-old. The State's witnesses appeared in court at the delinquency proceeding and were available to testify, but the prosecutor made a proffer in lieu of testimony. The prosecutor informed the trial court that the defense did not oppose the proffer and would accept it as the factual basis for the charge. In return, the State recommended a disposition to the court in accordance with the parties' discussion. The prosecutor then placed on the record that the State's witnesses would testify that T.M. had taken the girl to a shed, locked the door, removed her clothing, and touched and kissed the girl's private area. T.M.'s counsel then made a statement expressing T.M.'s decision not to oppose the State's proffer. According to counsel, T.M. indicated that he had no memory of the event, but agreed that the court could make a finding based on the State's representation. The court questioned T.M. and T.M.'s mother, who confirmed this. Afterward, the court found the facts presented by the State to be true, and determined that T.M.'s conduct did constitute criminal sexual contact, fourth degree. The court sentenced T.M. to one-year probation and ordered him placed under the care and supervision of the Department of Human Services. Three years later, T.M. moved to vacate his guilty plea when his mother learned that he would be required to register as a sex offender under Megan's Law. T.M. maintained that the plea was entered without an adequate factual basis, and that the plea was not voluntary or knowing. At the hearing on the motion, T.M.'s mother testified that T.M. had repeatedly asserted his innocence to her, but that she thought it best for T.M. to plead guilty because she believed he would receive a lesser charge and avoid placement in a detention center. She also testified that she was not sure T.M. understood the delinquency proceeding, and that he continually asked her what she meant when she tried to explain it to him. The motion court denied T.M.'s motion to vacate. It found that T.M.'s limited mental abilities were relevant to the voluntariness of the plea and that T.M. did not provide a factual basis for the plea, but rather the State had recited the evidence. Nonetheless, the motion court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe and determine T.M.'s ability to know and understand the proceedings. The Appellate Division affirmed. It acknowledged that the trial court presiding over the delinquency proceeding had not inquired of T.M. concerning his guilt of the offense or concerning his voluntary and knowing acquiescence to the proceeding. It observed, however, that this was not a guilty plea, but a trial on a set of uncontroverted facts. Implicit in that conclusion was a determination that the trial court need not have adhered to the provisions of Rule 3:9-2 that govern the entry of guilty pleas. This Court granted T.M.'s petition for certification. HELD: T.M. effectively entered a guilty plea, and the procedural safeguards that must attend such a plea were not observed. His plea of guilty must be vacated. 2. The Appellate Division decision regarded the delinquency proceeding as a trial on uncontroverted facts. The concept of a trial on stipulated facts has been found useful in many jurisdictions, although the procedures that should attend them have been the focus of some debate. Although New Jersey's court Rules do not foreclose the possibility of trials on stipulated facts, the careful codification of the principals of R. 3:9-2 reflects a preference for heightened judicial supervision of any process in which a defendant concedes guilt and effectively waives fundamental constitutional protections. A trial on stipulated facts must be limited to situations in which there is an initial demonstration on the record that the defendant is engaging in the stipulated-facts trial voluntarily and knowingly. (Pp. 10-14) 3. On this record, the Court is convinced that from the first comments of the prosecution, the essence of this delinquency proceeding was redolent of a guilty plea. The Court understands that the abbreviated proceeding was adopted to minimize the suffering for everyone concerned. However, neither the statements of T.M. nor the larger context of the plea colloquy provided a factual basis for the charged crime. Nowhere is there an admission or acknowledgment from T.M. that he engaged in sexual contact with the victim. Even the prosecutor's factual proffer was insufficient because an element of the offense was missing. The definition of criminal sexual contact requires that the contact be for the purpose of degrading the victim or for the offender's sexual arousal or gratification. The factual basis for that element was entirely absent from the State's factual proffer. A trial court cannot infer a defendant's purpose simply from the contact with the victim. Additionally, the trial court never specifically made sure that T.M. understood, and voluntarily and knowingly accepted, all material terms and consequences of his plea. Nor was T.M. advised of the rights he was waiving. (Pp. 14-26) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Family Part. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, IN THE INTEREST OF T.M. ____________________ Argued November 8, 2000 -- Decided February 6, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Cecelia Urban, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant T.M. (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Linda K. Danielson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LaVECCHIA, J. On April 26, 1995, T.M., a mildly retarded juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent based on acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute fourth-degree criminal sexual contact under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3b. Three years later, he moved to vacate the guilty plea when he learned that he would have to register as a sex offender under New Jersey's Registration and Community Notification Laws, N.J.S.A. 2:7-1 to -11 (generally referred to as Megan's Law). T.M. alleged that he did not enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that the plea lacked an adequate factual basis. The motion court upheld the plea, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the delinquency hearing actually had proceeded as a trial on stipulated facts, not as a guilty plea. We granted certification, 163 N.J. 397 (2000), and now reverse. Upon questioning by the court, the State indicated that T.H. had given that version of events, substantially contemporaneously with the incident, and that all persons named in the proffer were in court and ready to testify to the facts stated in the record. T.M.'s counsel then made a statement expressing T.M.'s decision not to oppose the State's proffer of facts: I've discussed this with my client, [T.M.], and with his mother. And we've _ I've explained to him that the State was going to make its proffer and he has agreed _ well, he's indicated he has no memory at this point of that day, which was approximately two years ago, but he has no opposition to the Court making a finding based upon the representation of the State. Both defense counsel and the court questioned T.M. on the record, and the court also questioned T.M.'s mother regarding the decision not to oppose the State's proffer of facts. The court recited the State's proffer of facts, finding [t]hat [T.M.] has taken the position today that he does not have any memory or any opposition to present the Court with regard to these facts. The Court will deem these facts to be true, to be unrebutted. Therefore, as a basis _ as a result of those statements as spread over the record, for which there is no opposition, the Court's determination that such conduct did in fact constitute criminal sexual contact under 2C:14-3b. That being a fourth degree offense. The Court will therefore enter an adjudication of guilty against [T.M.]. The court sentenced T.M. to one-year probation, ordered him placed under the care and supervision of the Department of Human Services so he could receive services from the Division of Developmental Disabilities, and prohibited him from having any contact with T.H. or her family when she visited her great- grandmother in New Jersey. Three years later, T.M. moved to vacate his guilty plea when his mother learned that he would be required to register as a sex offender under Megan's Law. T.M. maintained that the plea was entered without an adequate factual basis because the trial court never questioned him concerning his guilt of the criminal sexual contact offense underlying the delinquency charge. T.M. also argued that his plea was not voluntary or knowing, noting that the trial court did not make any inquiry concerning promises, inducements, or threats not disclosed by the record and that T.M. did not have an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. At the hearing, the motion court heard testimony from T.M.'s mother regarding T.M.'s decision to plead guilty in the delinquency proceeding. The mother testified that T.M. had repeatedly asserted his innocence to her, but that she thought it best for T.M. to plead guilty because she believed he would receive a lesser charge and avoid being placed in a detention center. T.M.'s mother also testified that she was not sure that T.M. had understood the nature of the delinquency proceeding, stating that T.M. kept asking [her], 'what do you mean, what do you mean,' when she tried to explain the proceeding to him. The mother finally testified that T.M.'s retardation affected his comprehension. The motion court denied T.M.'s motion to vacate the plea. The court found that T.M.'s limited mental abilities were relevant to the voluntariness of the plea and that T.M. really did not provide a factual basis for the plea, but rather that the State had recited the evidence. Nonetheless, the motion court declined to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe T.M. and determine his ability to know and understand the proceedings. The Appellate Division affirmed. The panel acknowledged that the trial court presiding over the delinquency proceeding had not inquired of T.M. concerning his guilt of the criminal sexual offense or concerning his voluntary and knowing acquiescence to the proceeding. The panel observed, however, that the trial court made no such inquiries for a good reason: This was not a guilty plea, but rather a trial on a set of uncontroverted facts. Implicit in that conclusion was a determination that the trial court need not have adhered to the provisions of Rule 3:9-2 that govern the entry of guilty pleas. The Appellate Division characterized the delinquency proceeding as a trial on a set of uncontroverted facts : T.M.'s position at the hearing was that he had no memory of the events of April 18, 1993. After hearing the factual proffer that was presented, with the witnesses present in court ready and willing to testify, [the trial court] was satisfied that the State established that the juvenile committed the acts underlying the complaint, and all of the elements of the criminal sexual contact were proven. The procedure that was followed was appropriate under the circumstances. The Appellate Division held that the motion court properly denied T.M.'s motion to vacate, no matter how it is characterized. We disagree. We are compelled to conclude that this delinquency proceeding resulted in a guilty plea that lacked the procedural safeguards that should have attended it. The specificity and rigor embodied in Rule 3:9-2 manifest a systemic awareness that a defendant waives significant constitutional rights when pleading guilty, which places an affirmative obligation on a court to reject a plea of guilty when that court is not independently satisfied that the Rule's prerequisites are met. State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 415 (1990). Under Rule 3:9-2, a court taking a plea, except in a capital case, must satisfy itself through inquiry of the defendant and others, in its discretion, that an adequate factual basis exists for the plea. That rule applies to juvenile proceedings, so that a juvenile, just as an adult, must acknowledge or offer a factual basis for his or her guilty plea. In re J.R., 244 N.J. Super. 630, 632 (App. Div. 1990). The requirement that a court elicit a factual basis for a plea serves a variety of purposes. The factual-basis requirement, among other things, protects a defendant who voluntarily and knowingly pleads, but without recognition that his or her conduct does not fall within the charge. It also provides a record for appellate review if the plea is later challenged and gives a court the opportunity to evaluate the conditions under which a plea is made. Barboza, supra, 115 N.J. at 421. Because of the constitutional values at stake, we have been very sensitive to the requirement that there be an adequate factual basis for a plea of criminal guilt. Smullen, supra, 118 N.J. at 414. We have adopted the shorthand expression that the trial court must be 'satisfied from the lips of the defendant that he committed the acts which constitute the crime.' Barboza, supra, 115 N.J. at 422 (quoting State v. Stefanelli, 78 N.J. 418, 439 (1979) (Schreiber, J., concurring)). That does not mean that a court must follow a prescribed or artificial ritual. To the contrary, because different criminal charges and different defendants require courts to act flexibly to achieve constitutional ends, a factual basis, established either through inquiry of others, which a defendant acknowledges, or through direct admission by the defendant, should be examined in light of all surrounding circumstances and in the context of an entire plea colloquy. Smullen, supra, 118 N.J. at 415; Barboza, supra, 115 N.J. at 422; see also In re J.R., supra, 244 N.J. Super. at 637-39. Furthermore, a court may accept a guilty plea only when that court is convinced that the defendant has entered into it knowingly and voluntarily and with an understanding of its consequences. Warren, supra, 115 N.J. at 447; see also Taylor, supra, 80 N.J. at 353. A guilty plea that is not voluntary and knowing violates due process and thus is constitutionally defective. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 425 (1969); Barboza, supra, 115 N.J. at 421 n.1. NO. A-95 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, IN THE INTEREST OF T.M. DECIDED February 6, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz