Title: Commonwealth v. Collins

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11710  
 
 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL COLLINS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 2, 2014. - December 17, 2014. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Armed Assault with Intent to Murder.  Firearms.  
Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Identification, 
Search and seizure, Public trial.  Practice, Criminal, 
Assistance of counsel, Failure to object, Identification of 
defendant in courtroom, Agreement between prosecutor and 
witness, Conduct of prosecutor, Disclosure of evidence, 
Witness, Sequestration of witnesses, Public trial, 
Empanelment of jury.  Evidence, Identification, 
Exculpatory, Disclosure of evidence, Impeachment of 
credibility.  Witness, Credibility, Impeachment.  Cellular 
Telephone.  Search and Seizure, Warrant.  Jury and jurors. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 20, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Raymond J. Brassard, J., and a 
motion for a new trial was heard by him.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ruth Greenberg for the defendant. 
 
Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
2 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  A jury in the Superior Court convicted the 
defendant of murder in the second degree for the killing of 
Myles Lawton.  The defendant also was convicted of armed assault 
with intent to murder for the shooting of Pierre Laguerre, and 
of possession of an unlicensed firearm.1  Represented by new 
counsel, the defendant moved for a new trial.  The trial judge 
denied the motion in part on the papers, and denied the 
remaining part of the motion following an evidentiary hearing 
regarding the defendant's allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  The defendant appealed both the convictions and the 
denial of the motion for a new trial, and we granted direct 
appellate review. 
 
On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) he was denied his 
right to the effective assistance of counsel because of his 
attorney's failure to object to the in-court identification of 
the defendant by an eyewitness who previously had been unable to 
make a positive identification of the defendant when the police 
showed her a photographic array; (2) the prosecutor withheld 
exculpatory evidence of the promises, rewards, and inducements 
the Commonwealth provided to Laguerre in return for his 
testimony at trial regarding his pending drug distribution case; 
                                                 
 
1 The defendant had been indicted for murder in the first 
degree, and was found guilty of the lesser offense.  He was 
found not guilty on an indictment alleging the armed robbery of 
Pierre Laguerre.  
3 
 
(3) the trial judge erred in admitting cellular telephone 
records that revealed the switching stations that handled 
cellular telephone calls allegedly made by the defendant and 
thereby revealed the location of the telephone within a radius 
of approximately one hundred miles, where those records were 
obtained by court order rather than with a search warrant; (4) 
he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel 
when his attorney failed to object to the enforcement of a 
sequestration order during jury selection; and (5) his Federal 
constitutional rights were violated by his conviction of 
possession of an unlicensed firearm, where the Commonwealth did 
not prove that the defendant lacked a license to carry firearms.  
Based on these claims, the defendant asks us to vacate the 
convictions, dismiss the indictment for possession of an 
unlicensed firearm, and order a new trial on the remaining two 
indictments.  We affirm the defendant's convictions and the 
denial of his motion for a new trial. 
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence at trial, reserving 
discussion of the evidence that pertains to the issues on 
appeal.  Laguerre testified that, before December 5, 2006, he 
and the defendant, whom Laguerre knew only by the name "Goodie," 
agreed that Laguerre would purchase two kilograms of cocaine 
4 
 
from the defendant at a price of $38,000.2  On December 5, Lawton 
drove Laguerre to meet the defendant, who was wearing a New York 
Mets jacket and driving a white Mercury Mountaineer sport 
utility vehicle (SUV) with Rhode Island license plates.  The 
three went to a second-floor apartment in the Dorchester section 
of Boston that was rented by Teresa Jones, who was Lawton's girl 
friend, where Laguerre showed the defendant the bag containing 
the cash.  The defendant left the apartment and said he would be 
back.  The defendant returned that evening, driving the same SUV 
and wearing the same jacket.  Lawton went down to the first 
floor to let him in the building.  When they entered the second-
floor apartment, Lawton told Laguerre, "[H]e's bullshitting.  He 
want[s] the money."  The defendant then "pulled the gun out," 
and asked Laguerre for the money.  Laguerre refused.  When 
Lawton ran "at [Laguerre] to give the money" to the defendant, 
the defendant "smacked [Lawton] in the back of his head and shot 
him."  Laguerre broke a window in the apartment with his elbow 
so he could call for help, and the defendant fired a shot at 
him, missing his head by inches.  The defendant fired three more 
shots at Laguerre, striking him twice in the chest and once in 
the elbow.  The defendant then took the bag containing the money 
and left.  The wounded Laguerre walked down the stairs and left 
                                                 
 
2 Laguerre testified that he thought it was such a "good 
deal" that he decided to give the defendant an extra $2,000, for 
a total of $40,000, at the time of the exchange.  
5 
 
the apartment building.  In front of the building, a police 
officer asked him who had shot him.  He answered, "Goodie."3  
 
The only other people in the apartment at the time of the 
shooting were Jones and her one year old grandson, who were 
lying in bed in the bedroom, with the door closed, watching 
television.  Jones testified that, before any shots were fired, 
the bedroom door opened and a man whom Jones had never seen 
before stood in the doorway "for a second" and looked at her.  
When he closed the door, Jones got up to see who the man was, 
but then heard shooting.  She "peeked out" of the door "for a 
second"; heard the man say "get the money"; and saw him shooting 
into the living room and hitting Lawton over the head with the 
firearm.  She closed the door and heard more shooting.  
 
Jones's downstairs neighbors, Desmond and Melissa Sheets, 
heard banging noises upstairs at approximately 9:30 P.M., and 
Melissa asked her husband to go upstairs and tell them to keep 
the noise down.  When Desmond arrived at the top of the landing, 
he saw a man wearing a Mets jacket with a semiautomatic firearm 
                                                 
 
3 A Boston police officer testified that Laguerre said that 
"Goldie" had shot him.  But Laguerre testified that he did not 
know anyone named "Goldie," and that the mistake might be 
attributable to Laguerre's thick accent.  When the police later 
showed him an array of photographs at the hospital, Laguerre 
identified a photograph of the defendant as the shooter and 
wrote on the back of the photograph:  "That's him, Goodie.  He 
shot me and [Myles Lawton]."  At the time of the shooting, 
Laguerre had known the defendant for eighteen months from a 
strip club where they were both regular customers.  
6 
 
in his right hand emerge from the second-floor apartment.  The 
man said, "Dude, I got a gun," and proceeded downstairs at a 
fast pace.  When Desmond was shown a photographic array, he said 
that a photograph of the defendant "could pass for" the man he 
saw, based on similarities in their facial features and facial 
hair.  Asked by the police to state his degree of certainty in 
the identification, Desmond said he was seventy-five per cent 
sure that the photograph of the defendant showed the man.  
 
On December 6, the defendant accompanied Tiffany Lanides, 
with whom he had a romantic relationship, to an automobile 
rental agency, where she returned a white Mercury Mountaineer 
SUV with Rhode Island license plates that she had rented.4  
Lanides knew the defendant by the name "Goodie," and testified 
that the defendant drove the vehicles that she rented.  
    The defendant was arrested in Washington, D.C., on December 
21.  A New York Mets jacket was retrieved from the vehicle he 
was in when he was arrested.  In the defendant's pocket were 
business cards with the name "Goodie" in the upper left-hand 
corner, above the letters "CEO."  
The defendant also was implicated in a double shooting in 
Chelsea that occurred on July 28, 2006.  One of the victims, 
                                                 
 
4 Tiffany Lanides had just renewed the rental agreement for 
the sport utility vehicle on December 5, 2006.  She testified 
that she returned the vehicle because "something was wrong with 
it." 
 
7 
 
John Arnold, told police that "Goodie" had shot him, and was 
later shown a photographic array where he identified the 
defendant as the shooter.5  Spent shell casings collected from 
Jones's Dorchester apartment were compared with spent shell 
casings collected from the Chelsea shooting, and with the spent 
shell casings collected from the test-firing of a firearm that 
had been recovered near a highway on-ramp in Boston.  Detectives 
from the Boston police department firearms analysis unit 
testified that in their opinion the Chelsea casings, the 
Dorchester casings, and the test-fired casings were fired from 
the same firearm, and that there was only a "small" probability 
that they were fired from different weapons.   
 
Discussion.  1.  Jones's in-court identification of the 
defendant.  On January 5, 2007, Boston police Detective Juan 
Tores showed Jones a photographic array consisting of eight 
photographs.  Detective Tores had not been involved in the 
investigation of this homicide and did not know which photograph 
depicted the defendant.  The photographic array was sequential 
rather than simultaneous, that is, Jones was shown only one 
photograph at a time, and was allowed to take as much time as 
she wanted to view the photographs.  The defendant's photograph 
                                                 
 
5 During his testimony at the defendant's trial for the 
shooting of Lawton and Laguerre, John Arnold claimed not to 
remember the photographic array, and denied having told police 
that Goodie had shot him.  He also stated, "I'm not a snitch."  
8 
 
was the fourth shown to her.  Detective Tores testified that 
Jones said "no" after viewing each of the eight photographs.6  
When she saw the eighth photograph, the last one shown to her, 
she "held [it] a lot longer than any of the other photos," and 
"stated that it was between" no. eight and no. four.7  She then 
asked the detective if she could see the individuals depicted in 
the photographs "from a side view," and the detective told her 
he could not provide that.  
 
During her direct examination at trial more than two years 
later in May, 2009, Jones was not asked to make an in-court 
identification of the defendant, but she testified about her 
earlier viewing of the photographic array.  She said that she 
had pointed out photographs no. four and no. eight to the 
police, and testified that photograph no. four looked more like 
the person at her bedroom door.  After defense counsel had 
questioned her on cross-examination about the discrepancy 
between her trial testimony and Detective Tores's police report 
regarding whether she previously had ever stated that photograph 
no. four looked more like the person than photograph no. eight 
did, Jones said on redirect examination that the reason she was 
                                                 
 
6 During her cross-examination at trial, Teresa Jones 
claimed she said, "I don't know," rather than  
"no," when she saw photograph no. four.   
 
 
7 In her testimony at trial, Jones said that, when she 
viewed the photographic array, she stopped and pointed out to 
the police photographs no. four and no. eight.  
9 
 
unable to make a positive identification from the photographic 
array was that she only saw the man at her bedroom door "from 
the side."  The prosecutor asked, "Do you see the person in the 
court room today who you saw in your apartment that night?"  
Without objection, Jones answered, "Yes, I do," and pointed to 
the defendant.    
The defendant contends that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel by his attorney's failure to object to the 
in-court identification, which he claims was inadmissible as "a 
one-man showup without advance notice to counsel."  In 
Commonwealth v. Crayton, ante    (2014), which we issued today, 
we considered whether a judge erred in admitting, over 
objection, an in-court identification of the defendant by a 
witness who had not participated in any pretrial identification 
procedure.  We explained in Crayton: 
"Although we have adopted a 'rule of per se exclusion' 
for unnecessarily suggestive out-of-court identifications, 
we have not adopted such a rule for in-court 
identifications, despite their comparable suggestiveness. 
. . .  Instead, we have excluded an in-court identification 
only where it is tainted by an out-of-court confrontation 
. . . that is so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise 
to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification. . . .  In essence, we have excluded in-
court identifications only where their inherent 
suggestiveness is magnified by the impermissible 
suggestiveness of an out-of-court identification.  
Therefore, here, where there had been no out-of-court 
identification to taint the in-court identification, the 
judge's admission of the in-court identification conformed 
to our case law." 
 
10 
 
 
Id. at    (quotations and citations omitted).  Here, the witness 
had participated in a pretrial identification procedure that is 
not alleged to have been suggestive, and failed to make a 
positive identification of the defendant, although she did 
identify his photograph as one of two that looked like the 
person she saw at her bedroom door.  As in Crayton, the judge's 
admission of the in-court identification conformed to our case 
law, and we conclude that defense counsel was not ineffective 
for failing to make an objection that would have been futile 
under the prevailing case law.  See Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 
388 Mass. 255, 264 (1983) ("It is not ineffective assistance of 
counsel when trial counsel declines to file a motion with a 
minimal chance of success").  Cf. Minkina v. Frankl, 86 Mass. 
App. Ct. 282, 289 (2014) ("[I]t is not malpractice to fail to 
advocate for or anticipate a substantial change in law requiring 
the overruling of a controlling precedent").  However, as in 
Crayton, we revisit the wisdom of our case law regarding the 
admission of in-court identifications in the circumstances 
reflected in this case.   
In Crayton, we concluded that an "in-court identification 
is comparable in its suggestiveness to a showup identification," 
supra at    , and may even be more suggestive because "where the 
prosecutor asks the eyewitness if the person who committed the 
11 
 
crime is in the court room, the eyewitness knows that the 
defendant has been charged and is being tried for that crime." 
Id. at    .  We declared: 
"Where an eyewitness has not participated before trial 
in an identification procedure, we shall treat the in-court 
identification as an in-court showup, and shall admit it in 
evidence only where there is 'good reason' for its 
admission.  The new rule we declare today shall apply 
prospectively to trials that commence after issuance of 
this opinion, and shall apply only to in-court 
identifications of the defendant by eyewitnesses who were 
present during the commission of the crime."  (Footnote 
omitted.) 
 
Id. at    .  We consider here whether to adopt that rule where 
the eyewitness did participate before trial in a nonsuggestive 
identification procedure and made something less than an 
unequivocal positive identification of the defendant.8  For the 
reasons described below, we conclude that the new rule also 
applies in these circumstances.  
The danger posed by admitting in evidence an in-court 
identification where there has been no pretrial identification 
procedure is somewhat different from the danger posed by the 
admission in evidence of an in-court identification where there 
has been an earlier identification procedure that produced 
something less than an unequivocal positive identification.  
With the former, the danger is that the jury must evaluate the 
                                                 
 
8 We do not address the admissibility of an in-court 
identification where there has been a suggestive pretrial 
identification procedure. 
 
12 
 
accuracy of the in-court identification without the benefit of a 
nonsuggestive pretrial identification procedure.  With the 
latter, the danger is that the jury may disregard or minimize 
the earlier failure to make a positive identification during a 
nonsuggestive identification procedure, and give undue weight to 
the unnecessarily suggestive in-court identification.9   
The danger of unfairness arising from an in-court showup in 
these circumstances is considerable.  Where eyewitnesses before 
trial were unable to make a positive identification of the 
defendant or lacked confidence in their identification, they are 
likely to regard the defendant’s prosecution as confirmation 
that the defendant is the "right" person and, as a result, may 
develop an artificially inflated level of confidence in their 
in-court identification.  See Supreme Judicial Court Study Group 
on Eyewitness Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the 
                                                 
 
9 In addition, an in-court identification that follows an 
out-of-court identification procedure where the witness failed 
to make a positive identification of the defendant poses the 
danger that occurs whenever an eyewitness participates in 
multiple identification procedures:  the danger of confusion of 
source memory.  An eyewitness may recall the defendant's face, 
but not recall that the source of the eyewitness's memory was 
the defendant's presence in a pretrial lineup or photographic 
array rather than the defendant's presence at the scene of the 
crime.  See Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness 
Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the Justices 78-79 
(July 25, 2013) (SJC Study Group Report), citing State v. 
Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 255-256 (2011), and Deffenbacher, 
Bornstein, & Penrod, Mugshot Exposure Effects:  Retroactive 
Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, and 
Unconscious Transference, 30 Law & Hum. Behav. 287, 299 (2006). 
 
13 
 
Justices 69 (July 25, 2013) (SJC Study Group Report).10,11  Where 
confirmatory feedback artificially inflates an eyewitness’s 
level of confidence in his or her identification, there is also 
a substantial risk that the eyewitness's memory of the crime at 
trial will "improve."  As studies have shown, an eyewitness, now 
certain that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime she 
                                                 
 
10 As explained in the SJC Study Group Report, "[w]itnesses 
who receive confirming feedback[,] i.e., are told or otherwise 
made aware that they made a correct identification -- report 
higher levels of retrospective confidence than witnesses who 
receive either no feedback or disconfirming feedback. . . .  
[Moreover,] confirming feedback may inflate confidence to a 
greater degree in mistaken identifications than in correct 
identifications."  Id. at 69, citing Wells & Bradfield, "Good, 
You Identified the Suspect":  Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts 
Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied 
Psychology 360 (1998) (Wells & Bradfield), and Bradfield, Wells, 
& Olson, The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the 
Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification 
Accuracy, 87 J. Applied Psychology 112, 115 (2002). 
 
 
We also note that a recently released report from the 
National Research Council of the National Academies recognizes 
that "[i]n-court confidence statements may . . . be less 
reliable than confidence judgments made at the time of an 
initial out-of-court identification . . . .  The confidence of 
an eyewitness may increase by the time of the trial as a result 
of learning more information about the case, participating in 
trial preparation, and experiencing the pressures of being 
placed on the stand."  Identifying the Culprit:  Assessing 
Eyewitness Identification 75 (2014) (pending publication). 
 
11 Because "a witness's confidence in the accuracy of his 
identification grows once he learns that the police believe he 
made the correct identification," we have previously announced 
that we "expect" police to use protocols for photographic arrays 
that include a "procedure requir[ing] the administrator to ask 
the witness to state, in his or her own words, how certain he or 
she is of any identification."  Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 
453 Mass. 782, 791, 798 (2009). 
 
14 
 
observed, may recall that she saw the perpetrator more clearly, 
and saw more details of his appearance, than the witness had 
recalled during the nonsuggestive out-of-court identification 
procedure where she was unable to make a positive 
identification.  See SJC Study Group Report, supra at 82-83.12  
This enhancement of memory makes it more difficult for juries to 
assess the accuracy of an in-court identification.13  As a 
result, not only is an eyewitness likely to have an inflated 
level of confidence in an in-court showup identification, but a 
jury may give more weight to it than to the nonsuggestive 
                                                 
12 The SJC Study Group Report describes one frequently cited 
experimental study "in which witnesses, after making an 
incorrect identification from a target-absent lineup, were told 
either, 'Good, you identified the suspect,' 'Actually, the 
suspect was number ____,' or given no feedback at all. . . .  
The study found that the witnesses who received confirming 
feedback were not only more certain in the accuracy of their 
identification, but also reported having had a better view of 
the perpetrator, noticing more details of the perpetrator's 
face, paying closer attention to the event they witnessed, and 
making their identifications quicker and with greater ease than 
participants who were given no feedback or disconfirming 
feedback."  SJC Study Group Report, supra at 82-83, citing Wells & 
Bradfield, supra. 
 
13  Thus, a recent experimental study found that where 
witnesses were not given confirming feedback, fact finders could 
significantly discriminate between accurate and mistaken 
testimony, but where witnesses were given confirming feedback, 
the fact finders' ability to discriminate between accurate and 
mistaken testimony was "totally eliminated," because mistaken 
eyewitnesses delivered testimony that was just as credible as 
accurate eyewitness testimony.  See Smalarz & Wells, Post-
Identification Feedback to Eyewitnesses Impairs Evaluators’ 
Abilities to Discriminate Between Accurate and Mistaken 
Testimony, 38 Law & Hum. Behav. 194, 199-200 (2014).  
 
15 
 
pretrial identification that yielded something less than a 
positive identification.14 
We previously have concluded that a witness's in-court 
identification is admissible where it "demonstrated greater 
certitude than did his [pretrial] photographic identifications," 
and left it to defense counsel on cross-examination to elicit 
evidence of the witness's "previous reservations" to diminish 
the weight of the in-court identification.  See Commonwealth v. 
Paszko, 391 Mass. 164, 172 (1984), citing Commonwealth v. 
Correia, 381 Mass. 65, 79 (1980).  But cross-examination cannot 
always be expected to reveal an inaccurate in-court 
identification where "most jurors are unaware of the weak 
correlation between confidence and accuracy and of witness 
susceptibility to 'manipulation by suggestive procedures or 
confirming feedback.'"  SJC Study Group Report, supra at 20, 
quoting State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 778 (2012).  Nor do we in 
other circumstances rely on cross-examination to cure the 
dangers arising from an unnecessarily suggestive identification 
                                                 
14 "Studies show that eyewitness confidence is the single 
most influential factor in juror determinations regarding the 
accuracy of an eyewitness identification."  SJC Study Group 
Report, supra at 20, quoting State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 778 
(2012).  See Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, Juror Sensitivity to 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 185, 
189-190 (1990) (out of ten criteria correlated with accuracy of 
eyewitness identifications, only eyewitness confidence had 
statistically significant influence on mock-jurors' guilty 
verdicts). 
16 
 
procedure.  If the police, after an eyewitness failed to make a 
positive identification from a nonsuggestive lineup or 
photographic array, had conducted a showup outside the court 
room on the eve of trial, we would not admit the showup in 
evidence and rely on defense counsel in cross-examination to 
show that a positive identification arising from the showup 
should be given no weight in light of the earlier failure to 
make a positive identification.  In light of the considerable 
danger that a jury may give undue and unfair weight to an 
unnecessarily suggestive showup identification, we shall not 
admit such an identification in evidence simply because it 
occurred in the court room rather than out of court.  Therefore, 
where a witness before trial has made something less than an 
unequivocal positive identification of the defendant during a 
nonsuggestive identification procedure, we shall apply the new 
rule declared in Crayton, supra at 1, and admit the witness's 
in-court showup identification of the defendant only where there 
is "good reason" for it.  Also, as in Crayton, this new rule 
shall apply prospectively to trials that commence after issuance 
of this opinion, and the rule shall apply only to in-court 
identifications of the defendant by eyewitnesses who were 
present during the commission of the crime.15 
                                                 
15 As in Crayton, we do not address whether this new rule 
should apply to in-court identifications of the defendant by 
17 
 
 
In Crayton, where there had been no pretrial identification 
procedure, we noted that there may be "good reason" to conduct 
an in-court showup if a witness was familiar with the defendant 
before the commission of the crime, and therefore the risk of 
misidentification arising from the in-court showup is minimal.  
Id. at    .   But this "good reason" will not often exist where 
a witness has earlier failed to make a positive identification.  
In these circumstances, for an in-court showup to be admissible, 
it would need to be justified by some other "good reason" for 
permitting a suggestive identification procedure, which usually 
would require a showing that the in-court identification is more 
reliable than the witness's earlier failure to make a positive 
identification and that it poses little risk of 
misidentification despite its suggestiveness.16     
 
Because the defendant did not object to the admission of 
the in-court identification and because the new rule we declare 
                                                                                                                                                             
eyewitnesses who were not present during the commission of the 
crime but who may have observed the defendant before or after 
the commission of the crime, such as where an eyewitness 
identifies the defendant as the person he or she saw inside a 
store near the crime scene a short time before or after the 
commission of the crime. 
 
16 For instance, there may be "good reason" for an in-court 
showup identification where the victim was familiar with the 
defendant (as in a domestic violence case) and only failed to 
identify the defendant in the earlier identification procedure 
because of fear or an unwillingness to cooperate with the police 
at the time. 
 
18 
 
here is prospective in its application, we need not determine 
whether there was "good reason" for the unnecessarily suggestive 
in-court showup here.  It suffices that we conclude that no 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice arose from its 
admission in view of the partial identification that Jones made 
during the nonsuggestive pretrial identification procedure, 
considered together with the compelling evidence of the 
defendant's guilt.17 
 
In the future, where an eyewitness to a crime has not made 
an unequivocal positive identification of the defendant before 
trial but the prosecutor nonetheless intends to ask the 
eyewitness to make an in-court identification of the defendant, 
we impose the same burden on the prosecutor as we did in Crayton 
to move in limine to admit the in-court identification, 
                                                 
17 If the defendant had objected to the admission of the in-
court showup identification, a judge could have evaluated the 
likelihood that Jones's earlier failure to make a positive 
identification resulted from the absence of a lineup or 
photographic array that provided a side view of the faces in the 
array, and the practicability of the police conducting such a 
side-profile lineup or photographic array.  An in-court showup 
identification should not be admitted unless "good reason" is 
shown for not conducting a nonsuggestive identification 
procedure correcting the reason for the witness's earlier 
inability to make a positive identification.  In the 
circumstances of this case, that would require "good reason" for 
not conducting an out-of-court lineup or photographic array that 
permitted the witness to view the defendant in profile alongside 
other profile views of individuals matching the witness's 
description of the shooter. 
19 
 
preferably before trial.18  See id. at    .  Once the motion is 
made, the defendant would continue to bear the burden of showing 
that the in-court showup would be unnecessarily suggestive and 
that there is not "good reason" for it.  Id. at    .  Unless 
there is "good reason" for the suggestive in-court 
identification of the defendant -- and in the circumstances 
described earlier in this paragraph there rarely will be -- the 
identification evidence at trial from that eyewitness will be 
limited to the less suggestive (and therefore perhaps less 
positive) out-of-court identifications.   
 
2.  Prosecutorial misconduct.  In his motion for a new 
trial, the defendant argued that he did not receive a fair trial 
because, among other things, the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct by failing to disclose an alleged deal with Laguerre 
in exchange for Laguerre's testimony.  At the time of trial, 
                                                 
18 The Commonwealth argues that Jones's in-court 
identification should be admissible as rebuttal evidence because 
the prosecution had elicited the in-court identification only on 
redirect examination, after doubts had been raised during cross-
examination about Jones’s pretrial identification.  But where 
the strength of an eyewitness’s pretrial identification is 
successfully called into question during cross-examination, 
appropriate rebuttal evidence would demonstrate the strength of 
the witness’s pretrial identification of the defendant, rather 
than the confidence with which the witness might identify the 
defendant at trial in a highly suggestive showup identification.  
Therefore, where a witness before trial did not make an 
unequivocal positive identification, an in-court identification 
will not be admissible on either direct or redirect examination 
unless a motion in limine by the prosecution has been granted.  
 
20 
 
drug distribution charges were pending against Laguerre in the 
Boston Municipal Court (BMC case).19  On the day the defendant's 
case was submitted to the jury, the Commonwealth reduced the 
distribution charge to possession of cocaine, and Laguerre 
admitted to sufficient facts for a finding of guilty on that 
lesser offense and was sentenced to a continuance without a 
finding for nine months.20  According to the defendant, the 
prosecutor previously had caused the BMC case to be continued 
until after Laguerre testified at the defendant's trial so that 
the prosecutor could influence the outcome of Laguerre's case 
depending on Laguerre’s testimony.  Furthermore, the defendant 
argues, the prosecutor kept this information secret from the 
defense and the jury.  After an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue, the judge, in a thorough written decision, rejected the 
defendant's argument.   
The Commonwealth is required to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to the defendant, including, as is relevant here, 
evidence that would tend to impeach the credibility of a key 
prosecution witness.  See Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 Mass. 704, 
                                                 
 
19 The criminal complaint against Laguerre issued on July 9, 
2007, after the December 5, 2006, incident that led to the 
charges against the defendant, and after Laguerre testified 
before the grand jury.  Laguerre was charged with distribution 
of cocaine, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c), and with 
committing a drug violation in a school zone, in violation of 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. 
 
 
20 The school zone charge was dismissed. 
21 
 
715 (2000).  Such evidence clearly includes "[u]nderstandings, 
agreements, promises, or any similar arrangements between the 
government and a significant government witness."  Id. at 715-
716, citing Commonwealth v. Gilday, 382 Mass. 166, 175 (1980).  
Had there been any such deal with Laguerre in this case, the 
Commonwealth would have been required to disclose it.  The 
judge, however, found that there was no such deal, and we 
conclude that his finding was not clearly erroneous.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 469 (2002) (judge's 
findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly 
erroneous).   
 
On the first day of trial, before the jury were empaneled, 
the prosecutor, Assistant District Attorney David Fredette, told 
the judge and defense counsel that Laguerre's BMC case was 
proceeding without any promises, rewards, or inducements.  
Fredette also noted, however, that Laguerre's attorney in that 
case, Scott Curtis, had been in touch with him about a deal and 
that the district attorney's office was considering whether to 
enter a nolle prosequi in the case but no decision had yet been 
made.   
 
After an evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new trial, 
the judge found that the district attorney's office ultimately 
decided not to enter a nolle prosequi in Laguerre's case or to 
give Laguerre any considerations in exchange for his testimony 
22 
 
in the defendant's case.  Fredette, whose testimony the judge 
credited, testified that the primary reason for deciding not to 
enter a nolle prosequi in Laguerre's case was that Curtis had 
told Fredette that Laguerre was going to cooperate regardless of 
whether the Commonwealth offered him a deal in the BMC case, and 
Fredette did not want to provide defense counsel with the 
argument that Laguerre was not credible because he was 
testifying in exchange for a deal from the Commonwealth in the 
BMC case.  Curtis also testified at the defendant's trial that 
no promises had been made regarding how Laguerre's case would be 
resolved.  Laguerre testified similarly, answering "No" when 
Fredette asked him, "[A]re you getting anything in exchange for 
your testimony here today?"      
In addition to Fredette’s testimony, the judge also 
credited the testimony of Assistant District Attorney Laura 
Montgomery, who was handling the BMC case at its conclusion.  
Montgomery testified that Fredette told her to handle Laguerre’s 
case as she normally would and to document what she did.  She 
also testified that on the date that Laguerre’s BMC case was 
resolved, she did not know that Laguerre had already testified 
at the defendant’s trial.   
We conclude that the evidence adequately supported the 
judge's finding that "Laguerre was not given a deal on his BMC 
drug case in exchange for his testimony at [the defendant's] 
23 
 
trial."  The evidence also adequately supported the judge's 
finding that Fredette disclosed to the judge, defense counsel, 
and the defendant that he wanted to enter a nolle prosequi in 
Laguerre's case but needed approval from his superiors, that 
Laguerre would likely testify at the defendant's trial before 
his own trial was scheduled, and that it was possible that 
Laguerre would receive an entry of nolle prosequi in exchange 
for his testimony.  In addition, the evidence adequately 
supported the judge's finding that the potential for Laguerre to 
receive a favorable disposition in his BMC case in exchange for 
his testimony at the defendant’s trial was fully presented to 
the jury.  In short, the judge’s findings were fully supported 
by the record, and there was no abuse of discretion in his 
denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  
 
3.  Admissibility of cellular telephone records.  Evidence 
was offered at trial that, at the relevant time, the defendant 
regularly used a cellular telephone registered to Lanides.  
During its investigation of the defendant, the Commonwealth 
sought and received a court order pursuant to the Federal Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012), directing Sprint 
Nextel to disclose certain information associated with this 
cellular telephone number.  Those records, with accompanying 
24 
 
testimony from a Sprint Nextel records custodian were admitted 
in evidence at trial.  
 
The records included call detail records for the period 
from December 1, 2006, to December 15, 2006, which provided 
information about the telephone numbers from which the cellular 
telephone received incoming calls and the telephone numbers to 
which outgoing calls were made from the cellular telephone.  The 
records also included information about "repoll" numbers that 
identify the mobile switching center through which a call is 
routed.  The records custodian testified that a repoll number 
reveals the general area where the cellular telephone is at the 
time of a call, but does not provide a pinpoint location; that a 
repolling site can cover an area of up to 100 miles; and that a 
repoll number from the Washington, D.C., area would indicate 
that the cellular telephone for that call was "more likely" in 
Virginia, Maryland, or Washington, D.C., and "definitely not the 
Boston area."  Taken together, the evidence indicated that the 
cellular telephone that the defendant was regularly using was in 
the Washington, D.C., area after December 7, 2006, which the 
Commonwealth suggested reflected that he fled Massachusetts for 
Washington, D.C., shortly after the killing, showing his 
consciousness of guilt. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge erred in admitting the 
records in evidence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective 
25 
 
for failing to object to their admission.  He contends that the 
location information revealed from the repoll numbers could be 
obtained lawfully under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution only with a search warrant based on probable cause.  
We disagree. 
 
The defendant equates the repoll numbers at issue here with 
cell site location information (CSLI).  In Commonwealth v. 
Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 (2014), we concluded that government-
compelled production of CSLI records that allowed the 
Commonwealth to track the defendant's movements for a two-week 
period "constituted a search in the constitutional sense to 
which the warrant requirement of art. 14 applied."  Id. at 254-
255.  The repoll information provided in this case, however, is 
not comparable with CSLI, which, as we noted in Augustine, 
tracks the location of a cellular telephone user with such 
precision that it "implicates the same nature of privacy 
concerns as a [global positioning system] tracking device" and 
"may yield a treasure trove of very detailed and extensive 
information about the individual's 'comings and goings' in both 
public and private places."  Id. at 248, 251.  In sharp 
contrast, the repoll numbers merely reveal switching center 
information that identifies a general area -- perhaps as large 
as 100 miles -- where a cellular telephone was in use.  That 
26 
 
information does not trigger anything close to the privacy 
concerns raised by the detailed CSLI information that we 
considered in Augustine.  See id. at 250-251.   
 
Where telephone records reveal repoll numbers rather than 
CSLI, a search warrant is not required for their production.  To 
obtain such records, it is sufficient that the Commonwealth 
obtain a court order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), which 
requires "specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of . . . the 
records . . . sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation."  Because the telephone records in this 
case were obtained through such a court order, the Commonwealth 
did not violate the defendant’s rights, under either art. 14 or 
the Fourth Amendment, and the judge did not err in admitting the 
call detail records in evidence.  Where the records were not 
admitted in error, there is no basis for the defendant’s claim 
that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to their 
admission.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406 Mass. 135, 140 
(1989). 
 
4.  Court room closure.  There is, similarly, no basis for 
the defendant's claim that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to a purported closure of the court room.  
During the course of jury empanelment, it came to counsels' and 
the judge's attention that some of the defendant's family 
27 
 
members and friends who were also potential witnesses were in 
the court room.  There was, additionally, some indication that a 
family member or friend had spoken with a prospective juror, and 
that, in the court room, the potential witnesses had been 
speaking with each other in front of the jurors.21  Upon learning 
that potential witnesses were in the court room, the prosecutor 
asked that they be sequestered.  Defense counsel did not object, 
and the judge so ordered.  The defendant argues that barring 
potential witnesses from the court room during jury empanelment 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and, 
further, that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
understand that applying the sequestration order during jury 
selection was a violation of the defendant's rights.  
 
Because a defendant has a right to a public trial, a judge 
may not permit even a partial closure of the court room at any 
time during the trial, including during jury selection 
proceedings, without first making specific findings that closure 
is necessary.  See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 
106-107 (2010), and cases cited.  It is plain that, after the 
jury are sworn, a sequestration order that excludes from the 
court room all persons whom the parties have identified as 
potential witnesses at trial does not constitute a partial 
                                                 
 
21 It is unclear whether the individual or individuals who 
had spoken with the prospective juror were the same family or 
friends who were potential witnesses.   
28 
 
closure and therefore requires no specific findings that the 
sequestration is necessary.  See Commonwealth v. Buckman, 461 
Mass. 24, 29 n.2 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2781 (2012) 
("The exclusion from the court room, pursuant to a sequestration 
order, of persons identified by the parties as witnesses is 
generally not considered to be a partial closure of the court 
room").  The issue presented here is whether excluding potential 
witnesses from the court room before the jury are sworn, 
specifically during jury selection, constitutes a partial 
closure that can be accomplished only with specific findings 
that closure is necessary. 
  
 
A usual reason for the sequestration of potential witnesses 
is to prevent them from hearing the testimony of other 
witnesses, or from learning the content of such testimony during 
opening statements.  See Reporters' Notes to Rule 21, Mass. Ann. 
Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1649 
(LexisNexis 2014-2015) ("The process of sequestration consists 
merely in preventing one prospective witness from being taught 
by hearing another's testimony").  See also Commonwealth v. 
Bianco, 388 Mass. 358, 369, S.C., 390 Mass. 254 (1983).  Where 
this is the sole reason to sequester, a sequestration order 
"ordinarily would not include the exclusion of such witnesses 
from the jury empanelment portion of the trial proceedings."  
Commonwealth v. Buckman, supra.  But that does not mean that a 
29 
 
judge is prohibited from including jury empanelment within the 
scope of a sequestration order.   
 
The criminal rule of procedure governing the sequestration 
of witnesses, Mass. R. Crim. P. 21, 378 Mass. 892 (1979), 
imposes no such limitation, providing, "[u]pon his own motion or 
the motion of either party, the judge may, prior to or during 
the examination of a witness, order any witness or witnesses 
other than the defendant to be excluded from the court room."  
The reporters' notes to this rule recognize that "[t]he power of 
a judge to control the progress and, within the limits of the 
adversary system, the shape of a trial, is universally held to 
include the broad discretionary power to sequester witnesses 
before, during, and after their testimony."  Reporters' Notes to 
Rule 21, supra at 1649, and cases cited.  We conclude that the 
sequestration of potential witnesses at any time during the 
trial, including jury empanelment, is not a partial closure of 
the court room, because a defendant's right to a public trial 
does not include a right to have potential witnesses in the 
court room at any time during a trial.  See Cohen (No. 1), 456 
Mass. at 101 & n.10 (excluding potential witness from scope of 
defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge to alleged partial closure 
of court room during jury empanelment because potential witness 
"would not have been allowed in the court room for empanelment 
in any event because of a witness sequestration order in the 
30 
 
case").  See also Nicely v. State, 291 Ga. 788, 793-794 (2012), 
and cases cited (collecting "case upon case in which courts have 
held that the rule of sequestration ordinarily does not even 
implicate the right to public trial, much less infringe upon 
it").  Furthermore, the purpose of witness sequestration and the 
right to a public trial serve entirely different ends.  The 
latter allows the public to see that a defendant "is fairly 
dealt with and not unjustly condemned."  Waller v. Georgia, 467 
U.S. 39, 46 (1984), quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 
368, 380 (1979).  The former "exercises a restraint on witnesses 
'tailoring' their testimony to that of earlier witnesses; and it 
aids in detecting testimony that is less than candid."  Geders 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976).  If the right to a 
public trial entitled the defendant to have potential witnesses 
in the court room at any time, the broad discretion granted to 
judges to sequester witnesses would be as limited as a judge's 
power to order a partial closure of the court room, and would 
require the same specific findings as are required to determine 
that a partial closure is necessary.  See Cohen (No. 1), 456 
Mass. at 107 (judge must make "case-specific determination that 
closure is necessary").  Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (sequestration of witnesses 
is alternative to court room closure).  We decline to so 
31 
 
severely limit a judge's discretion to sequester potential 
witnesses.   
 
Nor do we discern any abuse here of the judge's 
considerable discretion to sequester.  The judge reasonably was 
concerned that potential witnesses were speaking with and in 
front of prospective jurors.  He acted within his discretion to 
exclude the potential witnesses from jury empanelment, and that 
exclusion, as we have explained, did not amount to a partial 
closure of the court room.  Because there was no court room 
closure, and the decision to sequester the potential witnesses 
from jury empanelment was within the judge’s discretion, defense 
counsel was not ineffective for agreeing that the potential 
witnesses should be excluded from jury empanelment. 
 
5.  Firearm conviction.  The defendant also argues that his 
conviction of the unlicensed possession of a firearm, in 
violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), violated his rights under 
both the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he 
did not have a license to carry the firearm.  We rejected this 
same argument in Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 582 
(2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1739 (2012), and reject it here 
for the same reasons. 
32 
 
 
6.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, the judgments of 
conviction and the denial of the motion for a new trial are 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.