Title: Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 151 
Docket: 
Yor-18-251 
Argued: 
May 15, 2019 
Decided: 
October 3, 2019 
Revised: 
April 9, 2020 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
ROBERT F. ALMEDER et al.  
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF KENNEBUNKPORT et al. 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
 
[¶1]  Goose Rocks Beach is a coastal section of Kennebunkport stretching 
approximately two miles along the Atlantic Ocean and consisting of the beach1 
and upland areas.  Robert F. Almeder and twenty-two other owners of property 
in this area2 appeal from a judgment entered by the Superior Court (York 
County, Douglas, J.) after a bench trial determining that the seaward boundary 
                                         
1  In our case law, “beach” is defined as the land lying between the high and low water marks, see 
infra ¶ 8, and we use the word with that definition in mind.  However, when referring to the general 
Goose Rocks Beach area, which includes land that is not in dispute, we use the capitalized word 
“Beach.” 
 
2  This is the second appeal involving these parties regarding the disputed portions of Goose Rocks 
Beach.  By agreement, the trial court bifurcated the issues, first deciding only claims related to the 
use of those portions of the Beach, and the parties appealed that decision.  Almeder v. Town of 
Kennebunkport, 2014 ME 139, 106 A.3d 1099 (Almeder I).  In Almeder I, we referred to Almeder and 
the other plaintiffs fronting the beach as “the Beachfront Owners,” and for clarity we will continue 
that reference in this decision. 
 
 
2 
of each of their respective properties does not reach the beach, sometimes 
referred to as the wet sand, in front of their property, or the dry sand seaward 
of the “seawall.”  In this appeal, which is complicated by a voluminous historical 
record, we consider whether the Beachfront Owners or the Town of 
Kennebunkport holds title to the disputed portions of the Beach. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. 
Procedural History 
[¶2]  The ownership of property at Goose Rocks Beach has long been in 
dispute.  See Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2014 ME 139, 106 A.3d 1099 
(Almeder I).  In October 2009, the Beachfront Owners filed a complaint against 
the Town of Kennebunkport and anyone else who claimed any title or right to 
use the area of the Beach in front of their properties.  The Beachfront Owners 
sought a declaratory judgment that each of their parcels includes land to the 
mean low water mark—subject to the rights of the public to fish, fowl, and 
navigate in the intertidal zone3—and to quiet title to their claimed beach 
property.  The Town answered and pleaded nine counterclaims, asserting its 
title to the beach and the dry sand above it, and that it and the public at large 
have the right to use those areas.   
                                         
3  Infra ¶ 8. 
 
 
3 
[¶3]  From there, the case burgeoned.  The State was permitted to 
intervene as a defendant; in its answer, the State asserted the public’s right to 
use the beach pursuant to the public trust doctrine.  Other parties who 
intervened or attempted to intervene and counterclaim included a group of 
roughly 200 owners of other property located in the Town’s Goose Rocks Beach 
Zone, not directly on the water (the Backlot Owners); the Surfrider Foundation, 
a nonprofit organization whose members use the beach; and several members 
of the general public who claimed frequent use of the beach.  The parties then 
began a period of significant motion practice consisting of dozens of competing 
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, culminating in several partial 
dismissals and summary judgments.  By agreement, the court scheduled a 
bifurcated trial on the remaining claims in which the court would first address 
only the use-related claims, and then any claims related to deeds or title.    
[¶4]  In August and September 2012, the court (York County, Brennan, J.) 
conducted a twelve-day bench trial on the use claims—i.e., prescription, 
custom, and the public trust doctrine—and determined that (1) “the Town, the 
Backlot Owners, and the public enjoy a public prescriptive easement as well as 
an easement by custom to engage in general recreational activities on both the 
wet and dry sand portions of the entire Beach,” and (2) “the State had 
 
 
4 
established, pursuant to the public trust doctrine, that the public’s right to fish, 
fowl, and navigate included the right to cross the intertidal zone of the Beach to 
engage in ocean-based activities.”  Almeder I, 2014 ME 139, ¶ 12, 106 A.3d 1099 
(quotation marks omitted).  The Beachfront Owners timely appealed.    
[¶5]  We vacated the judgment and remanded the matter for the Superior 
Court to “conduct proceedings and issue a decision on the remaining pending 
causes of action that were the subject of the second portion of the bifurcated 
trial,” and, if the Town so elects, to “determine the boundaries of each specific 
Beachfront Owner’s parcel [and] reanalyze the evidence already in the record 
on a parcel-by-parcel basis to determine if the Town met its burden of 
establishing the elements of a public prescriptive easement as to each 
particular parcel.”  Id. ¶ 37. 
[¶6]  In November and December 2016, the Superior Court held an 
eleven-day bench trial on the parties’ title claims at which experts for both the 
Beachfront Owners and the Town testified and the parties presented nearly 
700 exhibits.4  By judgment dated April 6, 2018, the court (York County, 
                                         
4  Consideration of the remaining use-based claims—the Town’s counterclaims for adverse 
possession, acquiescence, prescription, dedication and acceptance, public easement, and implied 
quasi-easement—was deferred by agreement.  These claims were ultimately mooted by the court’s 
determination that the Town established title to the beach and portions of the dry sand landward of 
the beach.     
 
 
 
5 
Douglas, J.) determined that only one Beachfront Owner (Temerlin) established 
title to a portion of the beach, and concluded that the Town holds title—derived 
from the original Town proprietors’ ownership of common land5—to the dry 
sand and beach in front of the remaining twenty-two properties in dispute.  The 
Beachfront Owners timely appealed.6    
B. 
Factual Findings  
[¶7]  The court made the following findings, which are supported by 
competent record evidence.    
                                         
5  The proprietors were  
 
the original grantees or purchasers of a tract of land, usually a township, which they 
and their heirs, assigns, or successors, together with those whom they chose to admit 
to their number, held in common ownership.  They enjoyed the absolute ownership 
and exclusive control over such tract or tracts of land granted to them and were 
responsible collectively for the improvement of the new plantation.  More specifically, 
they were responsible for inducing and enlisting settlers and new comers, for locating 
home lots and dwelling houses, for building highways and streets . . . .  In other words, 
they constituted the nucleus of the newly settled community and at first they 
controlled the whole machinery of the town's life, both political and economic. 
 
Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 15, 760 A.2d 232 (quoting Roy H. Akagi, Ph.D., The Town 
Proprietors of the New England Colonies at 3 (1924)).  See also Green v. Putnam, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 
21, 25 (1851) (“In the early period of our colonial history, large tracts of land . . . were from time to 
time granted by the provincial government to individuals, constituting a proprietary, who organized 
themselves under the colonial laws, kept records of their proceedings, managed and divided their 
property, and disposed of it by votes of a majority duly recorded on their books of record.”). 
 
6  The Temerlin property is not at issue in this appeal.  The court concluded that the Temerlins 
established title to the beach in front of their property, and the Town does not appeal this ruling.   
 
 
 
6 
1. 
Physical Features of the Disputed Area of the Beach 
[¶8]  The disputed area in this case consists of the intertidal zone and 
upland areas on the seaward side of the Beachfront Owners’ properties.  Before 
unpeeling the complex layers of this appeal any further, an understanding of 
the following features of the Beach may provide some clarity to the discussion: 
• “beach” and “shore.”  These terms are treated synonymously and refer to 
the “land lying between the lines of the high water and low water over which 
the tide ebbs and flows.”7  Hodge v. Boothby, 48 Me. 68, 71 (1861) (defining 
beach); see also Hodgdon v. Campbell, 411 A.2d 667, 672 (Me. 1980) 
(defining shore as “the ground between the ordinary high and low water 
mark”) (quotation marks omitted).  The “beach,” “shore,” and “intertidal 
zone,” defined below, all have their landward boundary at the high water 
line.  However, unlike the “intertidal zone,” the most seaward boundary of 
the beach is the mean low watermark; it does not include the alternative 
“100 rods” measurement element of the intertidal zone. 
 
• “intertidal zone,” also known as “wet sand.”  As the name suggests, the 
intertidal zone consists of the shore and flats affected by tides, and thus 
includes all of the area “between the mean high watermark and either 100 
rods seaward from the high watermark or the mean low watermark, 
whichever is closer to the mean high watermark.”  Flaherty v. Muther, 
2011 ME 32, ¶ 1 n.2, 17 A.3d 640 (quotation marks omitted); see also 
McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 13, 28 A.3d 620; Littlefield v. Maxwell, 
31 Me. 134, 139 (1850). 
 
•  “upland,” which may include areas of dry sand, is the land “above the 
mean high watermark”—that is, landward of the beach.  Flaherty, 
2011 ME 32, ¶ 2 n.3, 17 A.3d 640. 
 
                                         
7  This land between the “high water and low water over which the tide ebbs and flows,” Hodge v. 
Boothby, 48 Me. 68, 71 (1861), is also often referred to as the tidal flats or wet sand.  See Hodgdon v. 
Campbell, 411 A.2d 667, 672 (Me. 1980). 
 
 
7 
• “submerged land.”  This is land located “below the mean low-water 
mark.”  McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 13, 28 A.3d 620.  The dispute in this case 
does not include submerged land; it is defined here merely to make that fact 
clear. 
 
 
 
[¶9]  An additional feature is also important to this discussion.  In the 
Goose Rocks Beach area, landward of the mean high water mark, the land rises 
in elevation, and then descends to a lower elevation where the Beachfront 
Owners’ residences stand.  This feature is a natural seawall that runs along a 
course that is generally in line with that of the manmade seawalls in many 
sections of the Beach.  The Beach has 110 waterfront lots, twenty-three of 
which are owned by the Beachfront Owners.   
 
2. 
History of Land Transactions in the Kennebunkport Area 
 
[¶10]  Original ownership of land in New England derived from royal 
charters issued by the Crown between 1620 and 1639.  In 1639, Charles I issued 
the Charter of the Province of Maine, which granted to Sir Ferdinando Gorges 
territory including land from the Piscataqua River “along the sea coast” to the 
Kennebec river, and inland to a depth of 120 miles (the Gorges Patent).  During 
this period, parcels of land in the Province of Maine were transferred in the 
form of leases or outright grants to individuals who settled the land.  These 
settlements were organized slowly into individual townships—including the 
 
 
8 
Town of Cape Porpus, which was incorporated in 1653 under Massachusetts 
authority.8  See 3 Mass. Col. Rec. 333-39.   
 
[¶11]  In the mid-seventeenth century, the Massachusetts Bay Colony, 
acting through the General Court, enacted a series of laws affecting property 
grants in the colony—including the western portion of Maine to which it had 
laid claim—and decreed that the inhabitants of towns in this area were free to 
govern their own affairs and dispose of “common lands” within the towns.  See, 
e.g., 1 Mass. Col. Rec. 172.  With this authority granted to them by 
Massachusetts, the early settlers of Cape Porpus collectively governed the 
settlement and oversaw the grant of unclaimed land within the bounds of the 
township after its incorporation.  During the early years of the township, public 
grants of common lands were made by vote at town meetings, which were 
recorded in the Kennebunkport Clerks’ Record.   
 
[¶12]  In the 1670s and 1680s, towns throughout the colony—including 
Cape Porpus—were abandoned and resettled following King Philip’s War.  At 
the same time, the new monarchy in England was preparing to reassert its claim 
to the colonial territories.  This led to uncertainty with regard to land 
ownership and resulted in a 1677 decision in England, which declared the 
                                         
8  Cape Porpus was renamed Arundel in 1719 and later became the Town of Kennebunkport.  
 
 
9 
Gorges Patent to be the sole, legitimate claim to the Province of Maine and 
reaffirmed the claims of the successors-in-interest to the Gorges Patent.  In 
March 1678, to reclaim the Province of Maine, Massachusetts orchestrated the 
purchase of the Gorges Patent through its agent, John Usher, who transferred 
those rights to the colony.  In 1681, to resolve any remaining uncertainty 
regarding ownership of those lands, Massachusetts appointed Deputy 
Governor Thomas Danforth, Esq., as President of the Province of Maine and, 
among other things, authorized him to issue “indentures” to confirm title to 
lands.  5 Mass. Col. Rec. 309.   
 
[¶13]  In 1684, Danforth issued indentures pertaining to land in five 
towns in the Province of Maine—Cape Porpus, North Yarmouth, Scarborough, 
Falmouth, and York.9  Relevant here, the indenture pertaining to the Town of 
Cape Porpus (the Danforth Deed) provided that Danforth did  
clearly and absolutely give, grant, and confirm . . .  All that Tract or 
parcell of Land within the Township of Cape Porpus in said 
Province according to the Bounds & Limitts of the said Township 
to them formerly granted by Sir Ferdinando Gorges Knight or by 
any of his Agents or by the General Assembly of the Massachusetts.   
 
(Emphasis added.)  The Danforth Deed named three grantees—John Barret Sr, 
John Burrington, and John Badson—as “Trustees on the behalf and for the sole 
                                         
9  These five indentures were identical except with regard to the named grantees and the property 
described.    
 
 
10 
use and benefit of the Inhabitants of the Town of Cape Porpus,” and included 
the beach in the area now known as Goose Rocks Beach, which was not 
previously granted out.  There is no evidence that Massachusetts granted out 
any land in Cape Porpus after the Danforth Deed.    
 
[¶14]  Records of land transactions in the years immediately following 
the Danforth Deed are scarce.  To clarify ownership throughout the colony, the 
General Court established the Eastern Claims process by which inhabitants 
could register their land claims and confirm their titles; those who failed to do 
so within the stated time risked losing their claims.  In addition, by an Act of 
1692-93, the General Court formally granted to Town proprietors the authority 
to “manage, improve, divide or dispose of” the “undivided and common lands 
in each Town.”  Mass. St. 1692-93, c. 28.  This confirmed the formal role of the 
Town proprietary10 as the entity responsible for granting and confirming tracts 
of land.    
 
[¶15]  In June 1719, Cape Porpus was renamed Arundel.  Around this 
time, the proprietors began to meet formally and conduct business at town 
meetings.  The Clerks’ Record during this period reflects two types of meetings: 
(1) “general,” or “legal,” town meetings, and (2) meetings of “proprietors, 
                                         
10  See supra note 5. 
 
 
 
11 
freeholders and inhabitants.”  In these meetings, the proprietors made grants 
of common and undivided land in the town and confirmed prior land grants 
through layouts.11  The proprietors officially separated their functions from the 
town in 1726 and began to conduct their own meetings and keep separate 
records (Proprietors’ Record); however, Town officials continued to oversee 
activities on common lands such as building and repairing public ways and 
surveying lots.    
 
[¶16]  Around 1785, the proprietors still held some undivided common 
lands in Arundel.  Although there is no record reflecting the formal dissolution 
of the Town proprietary or a final accounting of the lands it granted out or 
confirmed, there is evidence that the proprietors began to wrap up their affairs 
around this time.  The final entry made by Thomas Perkins, the Clerk for the 
proprietors, was recorded on April 3, 1790.  The next entry in the record is 
dated six years later and is signed by William Smith, the Clerk of the Town—
the Town conducted a meeting on April 4, 1796, to resolve ownership of “the 
Pines,” a portion of the upland sections of the western and middle portions of 
the Beach that was known by this name.   
                                         
11  Land relevant to this case was laid out by town lot layers and recorded—e.g., the Downing 
layout in 1720; the Jeffrey layout in 1727; and the Emmons layout in 1777.  Neither the Clerks’ Record 
nor the Proprietors’ Record reflects a grant or layout of land referencing or consisting of the beach 
itself.   
 
 
12 
 
3. 
Sources of Title to the Beachfront Owners’ Properties 
 
[¶17]  Based on geographical location and historical ownership, the 
Beachfront Owners’ properties can be grouped into three sections: the Western 
Section, the Middle Section, and the Eastern Section.   
 
 
a. 
The Western Section 
 
[¶18]  The Almeder, Coughlin, Celi, GRB Holdings, Flynn, and Cooper 
properties are within the Western Section of the Beach.  These properties were 
part of subdivisions created in the early twentieth century by Warren Emmons, 
Ivory Emmons, and George Piper.  Prior to the twentieth century, this area was 
sparsely-settled marshland likely held and granted out by the proprietors.   
 
[¶19]  Title to properties in this section of the Beach traces back to land 
laid out in 1777 to John Emmons based on a 1730 grant to Humphrey Dearing 
and/or land held by Eliakim Emmons.  This layout was likely based on a grant 
of common land from the proprietors.  The 1777 layout describes the boundary 
of the conveyed property as “[b]eginning at a Pitch Pine Tree . . . then South west 
. . . then South East to the sea wall then North East by the sea wall . . . then Nor 
West to the Bounds mentioned.”12  This land, on the face of the earth, was located 
                                         
12  The original deeds do not use bold or italic font; however, we do so here (as did the trial court) 
for emphasis.   
 
 
13 
between the marshes and the beach.  Through a series of deeds, the land was 
transferred and subdivided until it came into its present-day ownership.   
 
 
b. 
The Middle Section 
 
[¶20]  The Gerrish, Vandervoorn, Gray, Rice, and O’Connor/Leahey 
properties are situated in the Middle Section of the Beach.  This section was 
primarily marshland and pine groves—the Pines—with a large open area 
towards the eastern side known as “the opening.”  The dry sand portion of this 
section is narrow and the high water line is closest to the upland lots in this 
section of the Beach.  The properties in this section were originally part of land 
owned and subdivided by Mary (Littlefield) Potter in the late nineteenth 
century.  The parties dispute the chain of title prior to this subdivision; 
regardless, on April 5, 1881, the land was transferred to Mary Potter.  This deed 
conveying land, including the “piece of Marsh” known as the “Beach Lot,” 
described the parcel as follows: 
One lot situate[d] near Goose Rocks in said Kennebunkport and 
being a part of the tract known as the pines . . .  Beginning at John 
Emmon’s corner and running thence to and including the sea 
wall, and thence by the sea-wall to land of Owen Burnham . . . .  
 
This lot was between the marsh road and the natural seawall.  Mary Potter then 
conveyed portions of this land in 1881 and 1882 before she subdivided and 
 
 
14 
conveyed the remaining land, which was eventually transferred to the 
present-day owners.   
 
 
c. 
The Eastern Section 
 
[¶21]  The Zagoren, Gallant, Hastings, Sherman/Kinney, Forrest/Julian, 
Raines, Josselyn-Rose, Sandifer, Lencki, Scribner, Asplundh, and Temerlin 
properties are located along the eastern half of the Beach.  All of these 
properties, except the Temerlin property, were part of the land of George 
Jeffrey, acquired in the mid-seventeenth century.  Eight of the properties derive 
from a portion of Jeffrey’s land acquired and subdivided by Benjamin Fuller and 
Orlando Dow (Fuller/Dow) in the late nineteenth century.  The oldest known 
deed to this land, from 1648, described the property as follows: 
to begine at the south west side of the little River betwixt Cape 
Porpus, & Saco; & ye easternmost River towards Saco to begine at 
the poynt of the groave of pine trees neare unto ye sea 
& adjoyning unto the sd River, & from thence to runne upon a 
streight line to the sea banke southwest, & from thence southwest 
towards Cape porpus . . . .  
 
As in other sections of the Beach, the Eastern Section has a natural seawall 
separating the upland from the beach above the high water line.    
 
4. 
The Court’s Conclusions 
 
[¶22]  After reviewing each of the Beachfront Owners’ twenty-three 
properties, the court concluded that all but one (Temerlin) failed to establish 
 
 
15 
title to the beach.  The court determined that the seaward boundary of these 
twenty-two properties was the seawall, a natural and/or manmade feature 
landward of the intertidal zone of the Beach.  It finally concluded that the Town 
had established title to the land “extending seaward from the seawall or seawall 
vegetation line to the mean low water mark of the Atlantic Ocean,” and that the 
Town’s ownership stems from the proprietors’ interest in the common lands—
including the beach—which passed to the Town “by operation of law” when the 
proprietors ceased operations without granting the property to any other 
owner.    
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶23]  On appeal, the Beachfront Owners argue that the court erred in 
relying on the testimony of the Town’s expert surveyor and in determining that 
the Town holds title to the intertidal zone and a portion of the adjacent upland 
of Goose Rocks Beach.   
A. 
Expert Testimony 
 
[¶24]  The Beachfront Owners challenge the relevance and reliability of 
the testimony of the Town’s expert, a surveyor.  They argue that it was clear 
error for the court to rely on the surveyor’s testimony because he testified 
about matters beyond the scope of his expertise, used an unsupportable and 
 
 
16 
unreliable methodology to identify the seawall, and reached conclusions 
regarding the location of the seawall that were inconsistent with the 
understanding and intent of the original property owners who executed the 
deeds using that term.  “We review a court’s foundational finding that expert 
testimony is sufficiently reliable for clear error.”  See State v. Maine, 
2017 ME 25, ¶ 16, 155 A.3d 871 (quotation marks omitted).    
 
[¶25]  In this case, there is no doubt that the surveyor’s testimony was 
relevant.  He testified extensively about the layout of Goose Rocks Beach, the 
deeds and other documents specific to the Beachfront Owners’ properties, and 
the location of the specified boundaries on the face of the earth.  This testimony 
clearly satisfies the standards of M.R. Evid. 401.  Furthermore, the court’s 
conclusion that the surveyor was qualified to testify as an expert and give his 
opinion—regarding matters other than legal conclusions—is well supported by 
the record: he has been licensed in Maine since 1986; has expertise surveying 
and consulting as a boundary expert with a focus on water boundaries; has 
conducted lectures and presentations on such topics; has experience working 
with and producing historical maps; and has received national recognition for 
his work.  See M.R. Evid. 702.  Moreover, the surveyor’s testimony and the 
exhibits he produced were based on his years of experience and the techniques 
 
 
17 
common to his profession that he applied to the specific facts of this case.  See 
Searles v. Fleetwood Homes of Pa., Inc., 2005 ME 94, ¶¶ 23, 28, 878 A.2d 509.  
Therefore, the court did not err in relying on the testimony of the Town’s 
expert.  Id. ¶ 29; M.R. Evid. 702.   
B. 
The Beachfront Owners’ Title Claims 
 
[¶26]  The Beachfront Owners argue that the court erred in concluding 
that they did not establish title to the beach in front of their residences.  In 
particular, they assert that the court (1) ignored Law Court precedent 
concerning the interpretation of ancient deeds and historical records, (2) erred 
in interpreting the term “seawall,” and (3) erroneously concluded that the 
seawall is the seaward boundary of their properties.  We review de novo “[t]he 
interpretation of a deed and the intent of the parties who created it, including 
whether the deed contains an ambiguity.”  Sleeper v. Loring, 2013 ME 112, ¶ 10, 
83 A.3d 769.  If language in a deed is ambiguous, a court may “consider extrinsic 
evidence to determine the intent of the parties,” including “the circumstances 
existing at the time of the making of the deed or the contemporaneous 
construction of the deed by the grantee or grantor.”  Matteson v. Batchelder, 
2011 ME 134, ¶ 16, 32 A.3d 1059 (quotation marks omitted).  In the absence of 
extrinsic evidence, “the intent of the parties should be ascertained by resort to 
 
 
18 
the rules of construction of deeds, such as the familiar rule that boundaries are 
established in descending order of control by monuments, courses, distances 
and quantity.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Finally, we review a court’s 
factual determination of the location of property boundaries on the face of the 
earth for clear error.  Grondin v. Hanscom, 2014 ME 148, ¶ 8, 106 A.3d 1150. 
 
1. 
Ancient Deeds and Historical Documents 
 
[¶27]  The Beachfront Owners first argue that the court ignored binding 
precedent regarding the interpretation of ancient deeds and historical records 
and disregarded longstanding principles forgiving defects in ancient deeds.  
They argue that the court’s approach established an “impossible burden of 
proof”—which they, and many other property owners in Maine, are unable to 
meet—and will disrupt the title search process in Maine.  In short, the 
Beachfront Owners argue that the court erred in holding the ancient deeds to 
modern interpretation standards, thereby disrupting decades of modern 
ownership.    
 
[¶28]  At the heart of this issue is the inherent tension between two 
principles of deed construction: a grantor may not convey more than what he 
or she owns, see Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 19, 760 A.2d 232, and 
“much is to be presumed in favor of ancient deeds, if accompanied by 
 
 
19 
possession,” Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 94 (1861).  Contrary to the Beachfront 
Owners’ argument, nothing in the court’s approach to this case or its 
articulation of the applicable principles of deed construction misconstrues the 
law or disrupts the way title searches are conducted in Maine.13  The court 
properly understood that the interpretation of a deed is a question of law and 
that its role was to apply the relevant principles of deed construction and 
construe the language of the deed to give effect to the expressed intention of 
the parties.  See Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 19, 760 A.2d 232; McLellan v. McFadden, 
95 A. 1025, 1028 (Me. 1915).  Most importantly, the court recognized that an 
owner of upland oceanfront property presumptively owns to the low water 
mark when a grant of the property includes a reference or call to the water, see 
Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 451, 498 (1857); Storer v. 
Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438-39 (1810), and applied this principle to each 
Beachfront Owners’ chain of title.  In doing so, the court did not, as the 
Beachfront Owners argue, resurrect ancient deeds to disrupt modern 
                                         
13  Although the Beachfront Owners argue that the court should not look past the “resting deed” 
for each property—the most recent warranty deed to the property recorded at least forty years 
before the title search or the most recent quitclaim deed recorded at least sixty years before the title 
search—title standards do not establish ownership; they are simply a benchmark for whether title is 
marketable.  Dowling v. Salewski, 2007 ME 78, ¶ 16, 926 A.2d 193.   
 
 
20 
ownership, but, instead, meticulously reviewed each Beachfront Owner’s title 
chain to determine the boundaries of each property.    
 
2. 
Seawall  
 
[¶29]  The Beachfront Owners next argue that the court erred in defining 
the term “seawall,” although the owners differ among themselves on the 
reasons.  Almeder and the majority of the Beachfront Owners argue that the 
court erred when it applied a universal definition to the term “seawall” and 
failed to assess each deed’s specific language to discern the grantor’s intent in 
using the term.  In contrast, the O’Connor/Leahey owners argue that the term 
“seawall” has a singular definition that includes “at least all the dry sand 
between the upland running to the mean high-water line or the beach,” 
suggesting that the seaward boundary includes the beach.  (Emphasis added.)   
 
[¶30]  When considering the nature and location of the seawall, the court 
concluded that “there is no universally accepted legal definition” of the term 
“seawall,” but that the term is “likely used in reference to a corresponding 
physical feature on the face of the earth that acts as a barrier or wall—either 
man-made or naturally occurring—that acts to impede the flow of the sea.”  The 
court found that there had been and continues to be such an elevated feature 
along the length of the upland lots above the high water mark.   
 
 
21 
 
[¶31]  Although we have had the occasion to define many geographical 
features of a beach,14 we have not explicitly defined the term “seawall” and take 
this opportunity to do so.  As we have previously described, the terms “beach,” 
“shore,” and “wet sand,” which are treated synonymously, refer to the “land 
lying between the lines of the high water and low water over which the tide 
ebbs and flows.”  Hodge, 48 Me. at 71 (defining beach); see also Hodgdon, 
411 A.2d at 672 (defining shore as “the ground between the ordinary high and 
low water mark”) (quotation marks omitted).  Landward of the high water 
mark, there is often a natural and/or manmade embankment.  See, e.g., 
Littlefield v. Littlefield, 28 Me. 180, 186 (1848).  The beach does not include this 
embankment.  See Hodge, 48 Me. at 71; Littlefield, 28 Me. at 186-87; Cutts v. 
Hussey, 15 Me. 237, 241 (1839) (land above the high water mark and within the 
seawall is not the beach).  This embankment is the seawall.  See Hodge, 48 Me. 
at 71; Littlefield, 28 Me. at 186; Cutts, 15 Me. at 241. 
 
[¶32]  The term “seawall,” therefore, refers to an elevated area of land or 
an embankment situated landward of the beach that, as aptly described by the 
trial court, is a “physical feature on the face of the earth that acts as a barrier or 
wall—either man-made or naturally occurring—that acts to impede the flow of 
                                         
14  See supra ¶ 8. 
 
 
 
22 
the sea.”  The seawall does not extend seaward past the high water mark.  
Determining the exact location of the seawall on the face of the earth in relation 
to a parcel of land requires a case-specific inquiry based on the language in 
individual deeds and the physical features of the land in question.   
 
[¶33]  Addressing first O’Connor/Leahey’s contention, the court did not 
err as a matter of law in rejecting their singular definition of seawall—“unless 
specifically described otherwise in a deed, [the seawall] is at least all the dry 
sand between the upland running to the mean high water line or the beach” 
(emphasis added), and possibly all or some portion of the beach—which has no 
basis in our precedent.  We have consistently described the seawall as lying 
somewhere in the area between the uplands and the mean high water line (i.e., 
somewhere on the dry sand), see Sweeney v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 
644 A.2d 483, 483 (Me. 1994); Hodge, 48 Me. at 71; Littlefield, 28 Me. at 186; 
Cutts, 15 Me. at 241, and have not held—and firmly reject—that the seawall 
necessarily includes all of the dry sand or any portion of the intertidal zone.   
 
[¶34]  Second, contrary to the argument of Almeder and the other 
owners, the court did not disregard the specific language of each Beachfront 
Owner’s title chain or apply an erroneous universal definition of “seawall.”  This 
argument mischaracterizes the court’s analysis.  The court searched each title 
 
 
23 
chain for references to the seawall and then assessed the location of the seawall 
on the face of the earth by applying our descriptions of the seawall to the 
specific language of each deed.  After reviewing each chain, the court concluded 
that the Beachfront Owners’ titles did not include “land seaward of the 
[seawall], including without limitation the dry sand portion and intertidal zone 
of Goose Rocks Beach,” see supra ¶ 21, and located that seawall boundary 
landward of the dry sand at either a natural or manmade embankment.  
Therefore, because the court’s interpretation of the term “seawall” accords with 
the word’s use contemporaneous with the drafting of the Beachfront Owners’ 
foundational deeds, reflects our general descriptions of this monument, and is 
specifically applied to each individual deed, the court did not err in interpreting 
the term “seawall.”   
 
3. 
Seaward Boundaries  
 
[¶35]  Finally, the Beachfront Owners argue that the court erred in 
concluding that the seawall is the seaward boundary of each of their properties.  
Specifically, they argue that (1) absent clear evidence to the contrary, the beach 
is conveyed as an “appendance” to the uplands; (2) evidence of several decades 
of record title to the beach defeats evidence that prior grantors may have 
intended to exclude the beach, see generally Dunton v. Parker, 97 Me. 461, 
 
 
24 
54 A. 1115 (1903), and (3) the lack of evidence of a separate chain of title to the 
beach suggests that their properties extend to the low water mark.    
 
[¶36]  The court’s determination that the seawall is the seaward 
boundary of each property was based upon a meticulous review of older deeds 
and the plans incorporated therein that lay out various parcels.  The court 
traced the title to each property back to the early 18th century and concluded 
that the grants in these deeds extended only to the seawall and could not be 
altered by calls to the water included in deeds drafted decades or centuries 
later.  After reviewing these same deeds, we determine, for two reasons, that 
the court did not err in concluding, from the deeds, that the seawall is the 
seaward boundary of each property or, factually, in locating this boundary on 
the face of the earth.   
 
[¶37]  First, the beach did not pass as an appendance to the upland 
properties at issue in this case.  As the court correctly summarized, the owner 
of upland oceanfront property presumptively owns to the low water mark by 
operation of the Colonial Ordinance of 1641.  Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) at 498; 
Storer, 6 Mass. at 438-39.  Because the beach may be conveyed separately from 
the upland, an owner only benefits from this presumption where a grant of 
property specifically includes a call to the water.  Storer, 6 Mass. at 439 (“This 
 
 
25 
rule applies only in cases where the grantor, seised of the upland and flats, in 
conveying his land, bounds the land sold on the sea or salt water, or describes 
other boundaries of equivalent meaning, without any reservation of the flats.”).  
Terms such as “Atlantic Ocean,” “ocean,” “cove,” “sea,” or “river” are calls to the 
water that trigger the presumption, Bell v. Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 172 (Me. 1989); 
Ogunquit Beach Dist. v. Perkins, 21 A.2d 660, 663 (Me. 1941).  However, 
language limiting a grant “to” or “by” the shore, beach, bank, or sea shore may 
defeat the presumption.  See Hodgdon, 411 A.2d at 672 (“As a monument, the 
shore limits the grant to the high-water mark.”); Whitmore v. Brown, 
100 Me. 410, 414, 61 A. 985, 987 (1905); Lapish v. President of Bangor Bank, 
8 Me. 85, 89-90 (1831); Storer, 6 Mass. at 438-39.  
 
[¶38]  The court correctly concluded that the Beachfront Owners do not 
benefit from the Colonial Ordinance presumption because their source deeds 
do not include a call to the water or even to the shore.  As an example, parcels 
in the Western Section of the Beach trace back to land owned by John Emmons.  
In a 1777 layout, the land was described as “Beginning at a Pitch Pine Tree . . . 
then South East to the sea wall then North East by the sea wall . . . .”  When this 
same land was subdivided, each subdivision described the seaward boundary 
as the seawall or the top of the bank, similarly defeating any presumption that 
 
 
26 
the upland owners were granted title to the beach.  Storer, 6 Mass. at 439-40.  
The foundational deeds and incorporated plans in the other title chains 
similarly destroy any presumption that the Beachfront Owners own to the low 
water mark.  In most of the title chains, language referencing the water was 
added to later deeds; these late additions do not resurrect the presumption of 
ownership to the low water mark.  See Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 19, 760 A.2d 232 
(noting that “a person can convey only what is conveyed into them”). 
 
[¶39]  Second, the Beachfront Owners’ argument that evidence of several 
decades of record title to the intertidal zone defeats evidence that prior 
grantors may have intended to exclude the intertidal zone is unpersuasive.  The 
Beachfront Owners point to our decision in Dunton v. Parker, 97 Me. 461, 
54 A. 1115 (1903), to support their position.  In Dunton, we relied on language 
in later deeds describing the boundaries of a property to conclude that the 
property owner’s land included the “shore.”  97 Me. at 465-66, 54 A. at 1117.  
Although this language did not appear in all of the deeds in the title chain, we 
concluded that the property extended to and included the shore because early 
deeds “unquestionably included the shore,” and the owners—and their 
predecessors—maintained “exclusive and uninterrupted possession of the 
 
 
27 
shore” for nearly three decades.  Id. at 465, 470, 54 A. at 1117, 1119.  Dunton is 
not dispositive in this case. 
 
[¶40]  Unlike the property owners in Dunton, the Beachfront Owners’ 
chains of title trace back centuries to deeds that clearly exclude the beach by 
referencing the seawall or bank.  Moreover, the Beachfront Owners conceded 
that they have not retained exclusive and uninterrupted possession of the land 
seaward of the high water mark, and there is no evidence that their 
predecessors-in-interest ever exclusively used the beach.  Therefore, there was 
no basis on which the court could have concluded that modern deeds in the 
Beachfront Owners’ chains of title overcome the express intent of historical 
grantors to convey land only to the seawall.   
 
[¶41]  Furthermore, the Beachfront Owners’ argument that the lack of 
evidence of a separate chain of title to the intertidal zone suggests that their 
properties extend to the low water mark is without merit because the specific 
language in the Beachfront Owners’ titles identifies the seaward boundary of 
each property as the seawall. 
 
[¶42]  In sum, the court understood and applied the correct principles of 
deed construction, navigated the difficulties of piecing together ancient deeds 
and layouts, considered and ruled out the Colonial Ordinance presumption, and 
 
 
28 
did not err in interpreting the seaward boundaries of the Beachfront Owners’ 
properties or in locating those boundaries on the face of the earth.   
C. 
The Town’s Title Claims 
 
[¶43]  Finally, the Beachfront Owners argue that the court erred in 
finding that the Town established title to the disputed portions of the upland 
and the beach.  They first contend that the Danforth Deed did not vest fee 
ownership of all land in Kennebunkport in the proprietors.  In the alternative, 
they argue that any property interest that was conveyed to the proprietors 
through the Danforth Deed did not vest in the Town by “operation of law” or 
otherwise.  We agree with the Beachfront Owners, and the court, that the 
Danforth Deed was not a direct conveyance to the Town in its corporate 
capacity and, therefore, does not, on its own, give the Town title to the disputed 
property, including the beach.  We disagree, however, with the Beachfront 
Owners’ argument that the Town does not today own the disputed property 
and affirm the court’s judgment recognizing the Town’s claim to the portions of 
Goose Rocks Beach seaward of the seawall.   
 
1. 
Historical Land Ownership 
 
[¶44]  “[F]rom the earliest time[,] towns have been in the habit of holding 
and disposing of real estate.”  Commonwealth v. Wilder, 127 Mass. 1, 3 
 
 
29 
(Mass. 1879).  As early as 1636, the Massachusetts General Court empowered 
towns “to grant land within their limits for public uses, with power by vote to 
divide them among their inhabitants, subject to the paramount authority of the 
General Court, which reserved to itself and habitually expressed the power to 
grant lands so held by a town.”  Id.; see 1 Mass. Col. Rec. 172; Rogers v. Goodwin, 
2 Mass. 475, 477 (Mass. 1807).  “Lands within the limits of a town, which had 
not been granted by the government of the Colony either to the town or to 
individuals, were not held by the town as its absolute property, as a private 
person might hold them, but, by virtue of its establishment and existence as a 
municipal corporation, for public uses.”  Lynn v. Nahant, 113 Mass. 433, 448 
(1873).  The General Court authorized the freemen of every town “to dispose of 
their owne lands & woods, with all the privileges & appurtenances of the said 
townes, to grant lotts, & make such orders as may concern the well ordering of 
their owne townes” and to choose their own town officers, surveyors and 
constables, create local laws, and enact penalties for the breach of these orders.  
See 1 Mass. Col. Rec. 172; Lynn, 113 Mass. at 448; Rogers, 2 Mass. at 477.  
 
[¶45]  In an effort to encourage the settlement and population of the 
colony, Massachusetts also exercised its residual authority to grant land within 
 
 
30 
townships, see Lynn, 113 Mass. at 448, and granted portions of undivided land 
to groups of individuals (i.e., proprietors).15   
 
[¶46]  The proprietary was an entity separate from the Town and 
authorized by statute in the early 1690s to divide commonly held undivided 
land.  See Mass. St. 1692-93, c. 28; Green v. Putnam, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 21, 25 
(1851).  This statute authorizing the proprietary to “order, improve, or divide” 
the common and undivided lands in the Town did not itself vest title to such 
land in the proprietors.  Id.  Any ownership or other interest of the proprietors 
in such land came from other sources, including grants from the Massachusetts 
General Court, agents of the colony (e.g., Thomas Danforth), or from the towns.  
The proprietary was a “quasi corporate,” but temporary, body that was always 
“intended to die.”  Bates v. Cohasset, 182 N.E. 284, 287 (Mass. 1932).  The 
proprietaries were “formed for the purpose of dividing the common lands and, 
that having been accomplished, of passing out of existence.”  Id.  They existed 
and were created “solely for the convenience of the tenants in common in the 
management and division of their lands,” id., and were extinguished by statute.  
See Mass. St. 1790, c. 40.16 
                                         
15  Supra note 5. 
 
16  Mass. St. 1790, c. 40 provides in relevant part,  
 
 
 
31 
 
[¶47]  With respect to the Province of Maine specifically, Massachusetts 
authorized commissions to encourage the settlement of towns in remote areas, 
resulting in 1653 in the incorporation of the Township of Cape Porpus and 
several other towns.  See 3 Mass. Col. Rec. 338-39.  Massachusetts later 
authorized Danforth, who had been elected President of the Province of Maine, 
see 5 Mass. Col. Rec. 309, to make large grants of land within the boundaries of 
these townships on its behalf.  During this period, many colonial towns, 
although authorized by statute to manage their own affairs, possessed “limited 
corporate characteristics” and had yet to develop municipal identities separate 
from the inhabitants who lived within their geographic boarders.  Bates, 
182 N.E. at 286. Under these historical circumstances, grants to or for the 
benefit of the inhabitants were common, as was the case with the Danforth 
Deed in this matter.  See id.   
 
2. 
The Danforth Deed  
                                         
 
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that where, after such final 
division of any lands or other real estate, which have been, or shall have been held as 
a proprietary, the proprietors making such division have ordered & delivered, or shall 
order and deliver the record of their proprietary into the custody of the town Clerk, 
in which such land or other real estate, or part thereof, may lay . . . .  
 
Provided nevertheless, that the proprietors aforesaid shall not continue to act in their 
corporate capacity for more than ten years after the final division of their lands or 
other real estate . . . .  
 
 
32 
 
[¶48]  Because it determined that the language of the Danforth Deed was 
ambiguous, the trial court relied on extrinsic evidence of the historical context 
in which the Danforth Deed was drafted to conclude that this document was 
intended to “confirm the validity of prior grants” made during a period of 
political instability and “enable further grants and confirmations of common 
and undivided land” within Cape Porpus.  The court further concluded that this 
indenture was not a grant to the Town itself because it specifically granted the 
land to three individuals as trustees for the inhabitants of Cape Porpus.  We 
agree, and explain as follows.   
 
 
a. 
Nature of the Grant 
 
[¶49]  The plain language of the Danforth Deed provides that Thomas 
Danforth, “by the Govenour & Company of the Massachusetts Colony,” was 
“fully Authorized & impowered to make Legal confirmation unto the 
Inhabitants of the above said Province of Mayne and all their Lands or 
properties to them justly appertaining or belonging within the Limitts or 
Bounds of the said Province [of Maine].”  Acting on behalf of the Massachusetts 
Colony, Danforth “fully clearly & absolutely g[a]ve grant[ed] & confirm[ed]” to 
“John Barret Sen John Burrington & John Badson Trustees on the Behalf and for 
the sole use and benefit of the Inhabitants of the Town of Cape Porpus . . . .  All 
 
 
33 
that Tract or parcell of Land within the Township of Cape Porpus.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  In so doing, Danforth confirmed land already granted out and granted 
the remaining common and undivided land that had not yet been conveyed.  Cf. 
Litchfield v. Inhabitants of Scituate, 136 Mass. 39, 41-43 (1883).  However, the 
Beachfront Owners are correct that this deed was not a conveyance of land at 
that time to the Town outright.   
 
[¶50]  The historical context in which the Danforth Deed was drafted, as 
outlined by the court and supported by competent evidence in the record, 
supports this interpretation.  Throughout the early history of the colony, 
political turmoil in England coupled with sparse record keeping and the 
difficulties inherent in establishing early settlements undermined the security 
of individual titles.  See supra ¶¶ 12-14.  Massachusetts attempted to remedy 
this uncertainty in part by granting towns the authority to divide and manage 
their own lands by vote of the freemen, see 1 Mass. Col. Rec. 172; Lynn, 
113 Mass. at 448; Springfield v. Miller, 12 Mass. 415, 416 (1815), by 
commissioning agents to travel to the Province of Maine to encourage the 
formal incorporation of townships, see, e.g., 3 Mass. Col. Rec. 332-39, and by 
acquiring the Gorges Patent through its agent John Usher.  Massachusetts also 
confirmed titles and granted common and undivided land through specific acts 
 
 
34 
of the General Court, the Eastern Claims Process, and grants from agents such 
as Danforth that resulted in the establishment of proprietaries, as discussed 
above.  See, e.g., 5 Mass. Col. Rec. 9-12.    
 
[¶51]  It is clear that, throughout this period, Massachusetts endeavored 
to settle remote areas of the colony and convey land it had acquired through 
Usher to individuals and townships.  In doing so, it frequently identified 
individuals or groups of individuals (proprietors) who were responsible for 
managing and dividing common lands.  In light of these circumstances, which 
are supported by competent evidence in the historical record of this case, the 
trial court did not err in concluding that the Danforth Deed both confirmed 
existing ownership and granted common and undivided lands.  Cf. Litchfield, 
136 Mass. at 41-43. 
 
 
b. 
Grant to the Trustees 
 
[¶52]  As the court correctly determined, and as the plain language of the 
deed reflects, Danforth granted legal title to the land in Cape Porpus to three 
individuals—Barret, Burrington, and Badson—as trustees for the inhabitants 
of the Town.  They were not agents or officials of the Town.  Although their 
interest in the land was unusual by modern standards, grants of this kind—to 
individuals to hold as tenants in common for the benefit of the inhabitants of a 
 
 
35 
town, rather than to the town outright—were typical during this era, see Bates, 
182 N.E. at 286, and are consistent with the historical intent of the 
Massachusetts Colony to settle the land and transition to the towns and their 
inhabitants the authority to manage local affairs.  Barret, Burrington, and 
Badson held the common and undivided lands in Cape Porpus not as their 
absolute property, as a private person might hold them, but “on the [b]ehalf and 
for the sole use and benefit of the Inhabitants of the Town.”  These individuals 
were among the first town proprietors who would later oversee grants of the 
common and undivided land within Cape Porpus as authorized by statute.  
Mass. St. 1692-93, c. 28.   
 
3. 
Transfer to the Town 
 
[¶53]  The Beachfront Owners argue that, even if the Danforth Deed 
effectively granted the common and undivided land in Cape Porpus to Barret, 
Burrington, and Badson, any interest retained by them did not transfer to the 
Town.  In so arguing, they rely primarily on Eaton v. Town of Wells, 
2000 ME 176, ¶¶ 17, 26, 760 A.2d 232, to support their contention that the 
court erred in concluding that title to the beach and dry sand portion of Goose 
Rocks Beach transferred to the Town in the absence of an express grant.  Their 
reliance on Eaton is, however, misplaced.   
 
 
36 
 
[¶54]  In Eaton, we considered an appeal from a judgment granting the 
public and the Town of Wells an easement over a portion of Wells Beach.  
2000 ME 176, ¶ 1, 760 A.2d 232.  In that case, Wells argued that it held record 
title to the dry sand and intertidal zone through a grant from Ferdinando 
Gorges to the original Wells proprietors because, “as the feudal concept of 
property ownership gave way to fee ownership, this grant of authority . . . had 
the effect of conveying fee title to the land described to the Town of Wells.”  Id. 
¶ 11 (quotation marks omitted).  In short, Wells argued that the grant to the 
proprietors was the equivalent of a grant to Wells itself.  Id.  We determined 
that this argument was unpersuasive because (1) there had been no express 
grant of the disputed land from the proprietors to the Town of Wells and 
(2) this same land was explicitly and specifically granted to the 
predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff property owners.  Id. ¶¶ 17, 26.  In 
contrast, here, the Beachfront Owners cannot show that they hold title to the 
disputed property because their grants extend only to the seawall.  Moreover, 
the Town of Kennebunkport, unlike the Town of Wells, does not claim 
ownership of the disputed areas of Goose Rocks Beach based on the general 
notion that the transition from a feudal property system to a system of fee 
 
 
37 
ownership necessarily means that land held by the proprietors was held by the 
Town.   
 
[¶55]  In this case, contrary to the Beachfront Owners’ argument, the 
court did not err in determining that the historical circumstances of this case—
specific to the anomalies of the settlement of Cape Porpus—were sufficient 
evidence of the transfer of title to the Beach in the absence of a specific grant 
from the proprietors.   
 
[¶56]  Barret, Burrington, and Badson, like other colonial proprietors, 
were empowered by the Massachusetts Colony to “order, improve, or divide” 
the undivided or common lands in the Town.  Mass. St. 1692-93, c. 28.  They and 
other Town proprietors held formal meetings beginning in 1726 and continued 
in their official capacity until the proprietary dissolved and the proprietors 
transferred their records to the Town Clerk pursuant to statute.  See Mass. St. 
1790, c. 40.  As the trial court found, the record does not contain a specific deed 
or grant by vote or other means by the proprietors concerning any remaining 
common land, including the strip of oceanfront property at issue in this case.  
The proprietors, identified by this time in the records as the “Arundel 
 
 
38 
Proprietors,” simply “pass[ed] out of existence” and relinquished their record 
book to the Town Clerk.  Bates, 182 N.E. at 287.17   
 
[¶57]  In this case, we are reminded once again of the inherent difficulties 
in tracing title to colonial origins.  As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
opined in 1948 when considering similarly complex and voluminous historical 
records,  
[t]echnical refinements and common law distinctions as to title are 
not to be given too much weight in determining the origin of the 
ownership of [land], depending as they do upon events which 
occurred more than three centuries ago during the incipient and 
formative stages of a young settlement striving to organize itself 
into a permanent political subdivision; and whether the ownership 
was in the town or in its inhabitants, the latter, in those early days, 
as owners or as freemen, controlled the property, its title and its 
use. . . .  There is great difficulty in applying the strict rules of 
common law conveyancing, to the early acts and votes of 
proprietors, towns and parishes, in the colony and province of 
Massachusetts, without danger of producing some confusion of 
rights; and the fact probably was, that towns, parishes and 
proprietors, often consisted so nearly of the same individuals, that 
a grant or appropriation of one of these bodies to another was little 
more than an appropriation by themselves in one capacity, to the 
use of themselves in another; from which it probably followed, that 
less attention was paid to such acts, than if they had been acts of 
alienation to strangers.  
 
                                         
17  Although it is possible that some proprietaries in Maine existed well into the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, see, e.g., R.S. ch. 85 (1840); R.S. ch. 54 §§ 20-30 (1954), the Cape Porpus 
proprietary dissolved in the late eighteenth century.   
 
 
39 
Lowell v. Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 720-21 (1948)  (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
[¶58]  Despite the lack of a specific accounting of the remaining common 
and undivided land or a grant concerning the same, there is no doubt that the 
Beachfront Owners in this case have not established ownership of the Beach.  It 
is also clear from the Proprietors’ Record and from the deeds in the record of 
this case that the ownership interest in the disputed beach and dry sand 
portions of Goose Rocks Beach had not been transferred to any of the 
Beachfront Owners’ predecessors-in-interest.  It is equally clear from the 
record, the historical context, and the early colonial statutes that title to the 
disputed portions of the Beach was never transferred into any other private 
hands.  Ownership of the Beach passed from the Crown to the colony of 
Massachusetts; and then from Massachusetts, through Danforth, to the 
proprietors Barret, Burrington, and Badson, where it was retained in trust by 
them for the benefit of the Inhabitants of Cape Porpus.  The historical record 
suggests, as the trial court found, that this property remained in trust for the 
benefit of the Inhabitants of the Town until the proprietary dissolved in the late 
eighteenth century.  See Mass. St. 1790, c. 40.  The dissolution of the proprietary 
by statute effectively terminated the trust, its purpose to establish a group of 
 
 
40 
individuals to settle and organize the Town for the benefit of the Inhabitants 
having been accomplished.  Id. 
 
[¶59]  Few courts have been tasked, as we are now, with determining 
who takes title to land once held but never granted out by the proprietors; 
however, the discussions in cases that have had to consider the question 
support the Town’s claim to the disputed property.  See Lynn, 113 Mass. at 448 
(“The lands within the limits of a town, which had not been granted by the 
government of the Colony either to the town or to individuals, were not held by 
the town as its absolute property, as a private person might hold them, but, by 
virtue of its establishment and existence as a municipal corporation, for public 
uses, with power by vote of the freemen of the town to divide them among its 
inhabitants . . . .”); Bates, 182 N.E. at 288 (quoting favorably the land court’s 
findings: “If title did remain in the proprietors, then the land not having been 
set off or granted to any individual, but being held for public purposes, the title 
would vest in the town by virtue of its establishment and existence as a 
municipal corporation.”) (quotation marks omitted); Talbot v. Little Compton, 
160 A. 466, 469 (R.I. 1932) (discussing land that was at one point under the 
jurisdiction of the Plymouth Colony, “If the original proprietors did not allot the 
land in question, we think it was their intention and the intention of the Colony 
 
 
41 
that the town should succeed to all their rights therein.”); see also 3 Tiffany, Law 
of Real Property § 934 (3d ed. 1939) (stating that, as colonial towns developed, 
common lands not granted out by the proprietary came to be “regarded as the 
property of the town, rather than that of the proprietors or their descendants”). 
 
[¶60]  Therefore, on the record before us, and in the absence of any 
evidence suggesting that the disputed land was conveyed into private 
ownership, we affirm the holding of the trial court that in the unique 
circumstances of this case, legal title to the disputed land seaward of the 
seawall, including the beach, is held by the Town of Kennebunkport for the 
benefit of the public. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
Sidney St. F. Thaxter, Esq., David P. Silk, Esq., and Benjamin M. Leoni, Esq. 
(orally), Curtis Thaxter LLC, Portland, for appellants Robert F. Almeder et al. 
 
Gordon R. Smith, Esq. (orally), and Keith E. Glidden, Esq., Verrill Dana, LLP, 
Portland, and Christopher E. Pazar, Esq., Drummond & Drummond, Portland, 
for appellants Terrence O’Connor and Joan Leahey 
 
David M. Kallin, Esq. (orally), Melissa A. Hewey, Esq., and Amy K. Tchao, Esq., 
Drummond Woodsum, Portland, for appellee Town of Kennebunkport 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Lauren E. Parker, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 
 
Gerald F. Petruccelli, Esq., Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland, for 
appellee neighboring landowners 
 
Adam Steinman, Esq., Cape Elizabeth, for appellee Surfrider Foundation 
 
Sandra L. Guay, Esq., Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A., 
Biddeford, for amicus curiae North American Kelp 
 
David A. Soley, Esq., Glenn Israel, Esq., and James G. Monteleone, Esq., Bernstein 
Shur, Portland, for amici curiae Susan D. Howe and John D. Howe 
 
Orlando E. Delogu, amicus curiae pro se 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number RE-2009-111 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY