Title: STATE v GRANT

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 54-356 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1985 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- CLIFFORD GRANT, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL F R O M : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , In and f o r t h e County of Chouteau, The Honorable J o e l G. Roth, Judge presiding. C O U N S E L O F RECORD: For Appellant: C l i f f o r d Grant, pro set Havre, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana A l l i n Cheetham, Choteau County Attorney, F o r t Benton, Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : June 19, 1985 Decided: August 2 2 , 1985 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Frank R. Morrison, Jr. d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Following a non-jury t r i a l i n t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s - t r i c t Court, County o f Choteau, defendant C l i f f o r d Grant was convicted o f t h e o f f e n s e o f o p e r a t i n g a motor v e h i c l e while designated an h a b i t u a l t r a f f i c o f f e n d e r , i n v i o l a t i o n o f 5 61-11-213, MCA. Grant was sentenced t o one y e a r i n t h e Choteau County J a i l , w i t h s i x months suspended and given c r e d i t f o r 16 days a l r e a d y s p e n t i n t h e j a i l . Defendant appeals. Choteau County Deputy S h e r i f f David Baker observed a small red c a r leave t h e high.way, t u r n o n t o a road and proceed underneath a r a i l r o a d b r i d g e o u t s i d e of Loma, Montana, on t h e evening o f January 2 5 , 1984. Since it seemed unusual for a c a r t o be i n t h a t l n c t a i o n , Deputy Baker a l s o p u l l e d o f f t h e road t o observe t h e v e h i c l e and i t s occupants. Once t h e dome l i g h t i n t h e c a r came on, t h e deputy observed t h e occupants w i t h h i s f i e l d g l a s s e s , n o t i n g both t h e h a i r c o l o r and c l o t h i n g o f each i n d i v i d u a l . When t h e occupants lit a p i p e , Deputy Baker approached t h e c a r and asked t h e passenger, William Buerkle, t o r o l l down h i s window. The smell o f marijuana was p r e v a l e n t and a p i p e l a y on t h e c a r s e a t . Both occupants w e r e immediately a r r e s t e d f o r possession o f drug parapherna 1 i a . A d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e check revealed t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e d r i v e r ' s s e a t , defendant Grant, had been d e c l a r e d an h a b i t u a l t r a f f i c o f f e n d e r i n August o f 1983. Deputy Baker informed Grant t h a t he would be issued a n o t i c e t o appear f o r o p e r a t i n g a v e h i c l e while designated an habitua 1 t r a f f i c offender. The two w e r e t h e n e s c o r t e d t o t h e S h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e and "booked. " An a f f i d a v i t and motion f o r leave t o f i l e an information charging defendant with t h e t r a f f i c o f f e n s e was f i l e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court on February 8 , 1984. The information was issued. That same day, defendant made h i s i n i t i a l appearance i n c o u r t on t h a t charge. Defendant requested a court-appointed a t t o r n e y and t h e proceeding was continued. The t r i a l judge a l s o set b a i l a t $500, n o t i n g t h a t defendant was p r e s e n t l y " s e r v i n g some kind o f a sentence o u t o f t h e J u s t i c e Court h e r e i n F o r t Benton," b u t t h a t once t h a t sentence was s e r v e d , defendant could p o s t h i s b a i l . Defendant's a t t o r n e y e n t e r e d a plea o f n o t g u i l t y f o r him a t h i s arraignment on March 1 4 , 1984, and a non-jury t r i a l was held A p r i l 11, 1984. A t t r i a l , Deputy Baker testi- f i e d t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l s he had observed through h i s f i e l d g l a s s e s occupied t h e same s e a t s when he a r r i v e d a t t h e c a r ; t h a t he had n o t n o t i c e d any switching o f p l a c e s ; and t h a t he had n o t observed t h e opening of any c a r door. Defendant1 s f a t h e r , Charles Grant, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he requested h i s son and William Buerkle t o d r i v e t h e c a r from Havre t o Great F a l l s on January 25, 1984, and t o a t t e m p t t o t r a d e t h e c a r f o r another. H e requested Buerkle t o d r i v e t h e automobile a s h i s son no longer had a v a l i d d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . William Buerkle t e s t i f i e d t h a t he drove t h e c a r from Havre t o Great F a l l s and from Great F a l l s t o t h e t u r n o f f n e a r Loma. The c a r t h e n became s t u c k i n t h e mud and defendant took over t h e d r i v e r ' s s e a t i n an e f f o r t t o f r e e t h e c a r . Upon cross-examination o f Buerkle, t h e S t a t e introduced an a f f i d a v i t signed by Buerkle on February 8 , 1984, s t a t i n g t h a t defendant had d r i v e n t h e automobile from Great F a l l s t o Loma. The defendant' s testimony was g e n e r a l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h a t o f William Buerkle. The t r i a l judge found t h ~ February 8 , 1984, statement o f William Buerkle t o be more c r e d i b l e t h a n h i s testimony a t t r i a l . Relying on B u e r k l e ' s a f f i d a v i t and Deputy Baker's testimony, t h e judge found t h e defendant g u i l t y o f o p e r a t i n g a motor v e h i c l e while being adjudged an h a b i t u a l t r a f f i c of fender. Defendant r a i s e s eleven i s s u e s i n a p r o se appeal of h i s conviction. The S t a t e condenses t h o s e i s s u e s i n t o t h r e e major c a t e g o r i e s . With some a m p l i f i c a t i o n , w e f i n d t h e S t a t e ' s i s s u e s t o be adequate. 1. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y a c t e d w i t h i n t h e range of competence demanded o f a t t o r n e y s i n c r i m i n a l c a s e s ? 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y admitted t h e statement signed by Buerkle? 3. Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s due p r o c e s s r i g h t s were v i o l a t e d ? I n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel r e q u i r e s s p e c i f i c a c t s o r omissions by counsel which p r e j u d i c e d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e and resu1.t i n t h e d e n i a l o f a f a i r t r i a l . S t a t e v. Boyer (Mont. 1985), 695 P.2d 829, 831, 4 2 St.Rep. 247, 250. I n Boyer, we adopted t h e t e s t set f o r t h by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court f o r determining when i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel has occurred. " F i r s t , t h e defendant must show t h a t c o u n s e l ' s performance was d e f i c i e n t . This r e q u i r e s showing t h a t counsel made e r r o r s s o s e r i o u s t h a t counsel was n o t f u n c t i o n i n g a s t h e ' c o u n s e l ' guaranteed t h e defendant by t h e S i x t h Amendment. Second, t h e defendant must show t h a t t h e d e f i c i e n t performance prejudiced t h e defense. This r e q u i r e s showing t h a t c o u n s e l ' s e r r o r s w e r e s o s e r i o u s a s t o d e p r i v e t h e defendant o f a f a i r t r i a l , a t r i a l whose r e s u l t is re7 i a b l e . " S t r i c k l a n d v. Washington (1984) , U.S. I - , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 6 9 3 . Defendant p o i n t s u s t o no evidence i n support o f h i s a1 l e g a t i o n t h a t h i s c o u n s e l ' s performance was d e f i c i e n t . Furthermore, he has f a i l e d t o prove h i s c o u n s e l ' s e r r o r deprived him o f a f a i r t r i a l . Therefore, w e f i n d no m e r i t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s claim o f i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel. 11. Defendant contends that t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o i n c l u d e a r e f e r e n c e t o William B u e r k l e ' s February 8 , 1984, sworn s t a t e - m e n t i n i t s a f f i d a v i t and motion f o r leave t o f i l e t h e information against defendant imposed ex post facto law on - defendant. Defendant misunderstands ex post facto law. - "[Alny statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available accord- ing to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto." Beazell v. Ohio (1925). 269 U.S. 167, 169-170, 46 S.Ct. 68, 68, 70 L.Ed. 216, 217. Buerkle's prior statement has none of these effects. The law controlling the operation of a motor vehicle while designated an habitual traffic offender was the same when defendant performed the offense as it was when defendant was tried. There is no ex post facto problem. - In addition, pursuant to 5 26-1-302(7), MCA, and Rule 613, Mont.R.Evid., the February 8, 1984, statement was admis- sible as a prior inconsistent statement. Buerkel was given the opportunity to explain the statement. Once the opposing statements were admitted, it was within the province of the fact finder, in this case the trial judge, to determine which statement was more credible. F l e find no error in the trial court's reliance on the prior inconsistent statement. Defendant's due process rights have not been violated. Defendant contends that failure to file until February 8, 1984, the information charging him with the traffic of- fense prejudiced him and violated SS 46-7-1.01 through -103, MCA . Defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we will not consider it. The judge did not err in ordering a presentence investi- gation. Pursuant to 5 46-18-111, MCA, the judge, in his discretion, may order a presentence investigation when the potential penalty is less than one year in prison. The judge explained his reasons for the investigation, stating: "Now, because t h e r e is a s u b s t a n t i a l p e n a l t y i n - volved h e r e i n t h i s c a s e , I d o n ' t want t o s e n t e n c e you a t t h i s t i m e . I d o want t o o b t a i n a r e c o r d o f your t r a f f i c v i o l a t i o n s , and I do want t o o r d e r a p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t h e r e t o b e prepared by t h e p r o b a t i o n office b e f o r e I s e n t e n c e you on t h i s c h a r g e . . . ." Tr. p. 61. Defendant h a s f a i l e d t o show how spending one week a t Hi1.1 Top Recovery C e n t e r , from May 31, 1984 u n t i l June 6 , 1984, p r e j u d i c e d h i s a p p e a l . H i s i n i t i a l b r i e f was n o t f i l e d u n t i l February 21, 1985. Punishment o f d e f e n d a n t a t t h i s t i m e i s n o t c o n t r a r y t o t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . Defendant c r e a t e d t h e d e l a y when he chose t o p o s t b a i l pending t h i s a p p e a l . The c o n v i c t i o n and s e n t e n c e o f d e f e n d a n t i s a f f i r m e d . W e concur: /