Title: The People v. Jose Fuentes

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 35  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Jose Fuentes, 
            Appellant.
Charles T. Glaws, for appellant.
Anne C. Feigus, for respondent.
CIPARICK, J.:
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the
People committed a constitutional violation (see Brady v
Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]) by their non-disclosure to defendant
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of a “record of consultation” prepared by a hospital psychiatrist
who interviewed a rape victim and noted her feelings of
depression and minimal marijuana use.  Because the undisclosed
document is not material, the People’s non-disclosure, while ill-
advised, does not constitute a Brady violation.  
  I
The 22-year old female victim testified that in the
early morning hours of January 27, 2002, she, her friend and her
friend’s mother and sister together boarded a Brooklyn-bound
train at Times Square, in Manhattan, to return home, after
spending the evening at an arcade.  The victim, who resided in a
different neighborhood than her friends, switched trains and
continued her journey alone.  As she walked home, she noticed
defendant walking closely behind her.  He entered the building
and while inside the elevator, he placed a knife to her neck and
threatened to cut her if she resisted.  He then led her to the
roof of the building, where he sodomized and raped her.  
 
The victim further testified that, after the rape,
defendant forced her to walk with him to the subway.  During the
walk, he casually conversed with her.  Before boarding the train,
he took the victim’s cell phone, turned it off and wiped it with
his shirt sleeve, while also warning her not to call anyone or to
report the crime.  Out of fear, she did not call the police at
that time, nor tell her mother of the rape when she returned
home.  However, several hours later, the victim went to her
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friend’s apartment –- the same friend she had been with the night
before –- and told her and her mother about the rape.  She then
sought medical attention at a local hospital.  Hospital staff
performed both a physical and psychiatric examination and
prepared a “rape kit,” which yielded a male DNA sample. 
 The police were notified and they interviewed the
victim, who provided details about the rape and a description of
the perpetrator.  It was not until January 2004, however --
nearly two years after the rape occurred –- that the medical
examiner issued a report stating that the sample taken from the
victim matched defendant’s DNA.  Further DNA samples taken from
defendant confirmed that his DNA matched the DNA extracted from
the victim.  
Defendant was arrested and indicted for rape in the
first degree and sodomy in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 130.35
[1], 130.50 [1]) and the case proceeded to a jury trial.  The
victim, along with her friend, testified at the trial, describing
the January 27th visit to Times Square and the return trip home. 
The friend testified that the group did not meet defendant that
night, either at the arcade or on the subway ride to Brooklyn.    
The victim’s medical records had been disclosed to
defense counsel under the People’s open file discovery agreement
and were admitted into evidence by the People during their direct
case.  The records noted that there was no external or internal
trauma on the victim’s body, but a sexual assault forensic
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examiner from the treating hospital explained that the absence of
such physical trauma in rape cases is common.  Included with the
medical records admitted into evidence –- but not in the copy
previously made available to defense counsel –- was a one-page
record of consultation by a hospital psychiatrist who interviewed
the victim as a matter of hospital protocol.  Unaware of its
existence, defense counsel did not cross-examine any of the
People’s witnesses regarding the information contained in the
consultation note. 
Defendant testified at trial that he met the victim in
an arcade in Times Square, where he was socializing with two of
his friends, and that she led him on a train ride to her
neighborhood in Brooklyn.  Upon reaching the victim’s apartment
building, defendant claimed that she led him up to the roof. 
According to defendant, the victim was sexually aggressive and
they had consensual sexual intercourse.  Afterwards, defendant
testified that the victim voluntarily escorted him to the subway. 
According to defendant, she became enraged when he told her that
he was not interested in seeing her again and she threatened him,
saying he would come to regret it.  He denied turning the
victim’s cell phone off, wiping it clean or threatening her. 
 
A private investigator testified for defendant that the
victim had previously corroborated defendant’s version of events
preceding the alleged rape.  According to the investigator, he
questioned the victim in her apartment for five to ten minutes
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and she told him that she met defendant in an arcade in
Manhattan, left with him voluntarily and did not mention that she
was raped.  The investigator admitted that he did not make any
record of the interview.    
During summation, defense counsel, while leafing
through the medical records in evidence, discovered the
undisclosed one-page consultation note that had never been turned
over to him pursuant to the parties’ open file discovery
agreement.  Defense counsel demanded a mistrial.  The People
responded that they did not turn over the document because they
believed it to be privileged.  At defense counsel’s request, the
court removed the document from the medical records, neither side
mentioned it to the jury during closing arguments, and the jury
never learned of the document.  The court reserved decision on
defendant’s motion for a mistrial. 
The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree rape
and first-degree sodomy.  Defendant filed a written motion to set
aside the verdict (see CPL 330.30 [1],[3]).  Supreme Court denied
the motion, opining that the contents of the document would not
have changed the outcome of the trial as the document did not
materially bear on defendant’s guilt or innocence.  The court
also noted that defendant received the document during trial and
had an opportunity to utilize it.        
The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that there was
no Brady violation because defendant was given a meaningful
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opportunity to use the document during the trial.  A Judge of
this Court granted defendant leave to appeal, and we now affirm,
employing a different rationale.   
II
 
The Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State
Constitutions both guarantee a criminal defendant the right to
discover favorable evidence in the People’s possession material
to guilt or punishment (see Brady, 373 US at 87-88; People v
Bryce, 88 NY2d 124, 128 [1996]).  Impeachment evidence falls
within the ambit of a prosecutor’s Brady obligation (see Giglio v
United States, 405 US 150, 154-155 [1972]).  To establish a Brady
violation, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence is
favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or
impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the
prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the suppressed
evidence was material (see Strickler v Green, 527 US 263, 281-282
[1999]). 
 
 
In New York, where a defendant makes a specific request
for a document, the materiality element is established provided
there exists a “reasonable possibility” that it would have
changed the result of the proceedings (see People v Vilardi, 76
NY2d 67, 77 [1990]).  Absent a specific request by defendant for
the document, materiality can only be demonstrated by a showing
that there is a “reasonable probability” that it would have
changed the outcome of the proceedings (see Bryce, 88 NY2d at
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No. 35
*    Contrary to the dissent (see dissenting op at 2), we do
not engage in a selective marshaling of the evidence.  We
evaluate the trial testimony as a whole in determining that the
non-disclosure of the record of consultation did not meet the
materiality standard required for a reversal.   
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128; People v Hunter, 11 NY3d 1, 5 [2008]).
Assuming, here, but without deciding whether the claim
should be evaluated under a “reasonable possibility” standard, we
turn to the substance of the undisclosed document.  In doing so,
we agree with Supreme Court that disclosure of this one-page
document would not have altered the outcome of the case.*
Significantly, the document notes that the victim was upset
because she placed herself in danger when she walked home from
the train by herself in the early morning hours preceding her
attack.  That information would have undoubtedly strengthened the
People’s case by corroborating the victim’s testimony that she
walked home alone when defendant accosted her at knifepoint.  
 
 
Although the document notes that the victim had
experienced suicidal thoughts, it is unclear whether these
thoughts were the result of having been raped only hours earlier,
or due to more general feelings of depression, stemming from a
strained relationship with her mother.  Further, the record of
consultation does not note that the victim was suffering from any
serious psychiatric conditions creating hallucinations or
delusions; in fact it indicates that the victim had no previous
psychiatric history.  Thus, contrary to the dissent, this case
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differs from other cases where the non-disclosure of a witness’s
mental illness constituted reversible error (see cf. People v
Rensing, 14 NY2d 210, 212-214 [1964] [sole witness implicating
defendant was mentally ill]; People v Dudley, 167 AD2d 317, 319-
321 [1st Dept 1990] [the People’s case rested on the sole
eyewitness who had a long history of mental illness]).     
Defendant argues that the statement in the document
noting the victim’s “cannabis abuse” would have changed the
outcome of the case.  The report explains that the victim only
used marijuana twice during the past year, and nowhere does it
state that she took any other substances that could have
seriously impacted or impaired her perceptions of reality. 
Therefore, in the context of this case, the value of the
undisclosed information as admissible impeachment evidence would
have been, at best, minimal.  
Moreover, defendant’s version of events was
contradicted in several key respects.  The friend’s testimony
refuted defendant’s version because she testified that the victim
left Manhattan and boarded a train with her and her family
without defendant ever being present.  Further, the victim
testified in specific detail regarding how defendant took steps
to avoid apprehension, including turning her cell phone off and
wiping it clean of fingerprints.  It is also contrary to common
sense to believe that the victim would have invented a rape and
subjected herself to an invasive hospital examination in the hope
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of getting revenge for defendant’s supposed refusal of her
advances.  She did not have a way of leading the police to
defendant, or any reason to be confident he would ever be caught;
he was not identified until the DNA match was found years later.  
 
In reaching our conclusion that the undisclosed
consultation note was immaterial and would not have changed the
outcome of the trial, we do not condone the People’s decision to
withhold the document from defendant or their failure to, at a
minimum, inform the trial judge about it and request an in camera
inspection to determine its admissibility.  Indeed, defense
counsel should be able to assume that a medical record is
complete in a case, such as this, of open file discovery. 
Nevertheless, given this document’s extremely limited utility as
impeachment evidence and the strength of the People’s case, in
conjunction with the implausibility of defendant’s version of
events, the non-disclosed document does not meet the materiality
standard –- the third prong required to establish a Brady
violation (see Strickler, 527 US at 281-282) -- and the non-
disclosure thus does not require reversal. 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
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People of the State of New York v Jose Fuentes
No. 35 
JONES, J.(dissenting) :
The defendant by this appeal raises the question of
whether his conviction was obtained in violation of Brady v
Maryland (373 US 83 [1963]).  The majority holds that no Brady
violation occurred because the information contained in a non-
disclosed medical record of a psychiatric consultation was not
"material" and therefore did not constitute Brady material.  I
disagree and respectfully dissent.
I agree that in order to qualify as Brady material, a
document must meet the three pronged test outlined in Strickler v
Green (527 US 263 [1999]).  Strickler holds that one of the tests
in determining whether or not a document qualifies under Brady is
that the document must be "material."  A document is deemed to be
material if there is "a reasonable possibility" that its
disclosure would have affected the outcome of the trial (People v
Vilardi, 76 NY2d 67 [1990]).  The record of psychiatric
consultation at issue in this case contained information
concerning the condition of the victim during her examination at
Woodhull Hospital following the incident.  The victim expressed
feelings of depression, suicide, family problems, mistreatment by
her mother, withdrawal and substance abuse.  There is no question
that defense counsel would have been obliged to conduct a follow-
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up investigation of these conditions to determine the extent of
the victim's psychological infirmities.  Non-disclosure of
psychiatric problems has been held to be a material violation of
Brady and has resulted in reversal (see People v Rensing, 14 NY2d
210 [1964]; People v Dudley, 167 AD2d 317 [1990]).  In
determining whether the document which was deliberately excluded
by the Assistant District Attorney was material, the court
engages in a selective marshaling of the trial testimony and
arrives at the conclusion that disclosure of this document would
not have altered the outcome of the case and is therefore not
material.  I disagree.
The disputed allegations of this case while unusual are
straight forward.  The defendant concedes that he engaged in
sexual intercourse with the victim on the roof of the building in
which she resided.  He testified that the encounter was
consensual and that the victim was a willing and aggressive
participant.  The victim testified that she was forcibly
assaulted at knife-point.  Her version is partially corroborated
by a witness who was with her earlier in the evening and to whom
the rape was reported nearly seven hours later.  The defendant's
account was partially corroborated by the testimony of a private
investigator retained by the defense who said that the victim
made a statement consistent with defendant's version of events. 
In my evaluation of the trial testimony as a whole, I adhere to
my position that there are facts which support each side.
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With the sharply divergent evidence on the question of
consent, the issue of credibility was central to the jury's
consideration of the case.  It is within this context that the
actions of the Assistant District Attorney in unilaterally
removing the record of psychiatric consultation must be
evaluated.  Although the majority points out that the
"defendant's version of events was contradicted in several key
respects" and that . . ." it is contrary to common sense to
believe that the victim would have invented a rape . . . . ",
there is other evidence which weighs in favor of the defendant,
such as the victim walking with the defendant to the subway
station after the assault and failing to report the rape until
the afternoon.  In light of the contradictory evidence in this
case, it cannot be said that the removal of the record of
psychiatric consultation from the hospital records, which were
turned over to defendant pursuant to open file discovery, did not
affect the outcome of the trial.  Indeed, the fact that the jury
deliberated for almost two full days before returning a verdict
suggests that serious consideration may have been given to both
versions of events.  Credibility was clearly at issue.
The majority determines that the impeachment value of
this evidence would be limited, but this analysis fails to
account for the probability that disclosure of the record of
consultation would have likely resulted in a more intense
investigation of the victim's psychological background and
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history.  Such investigation was foreclosed when defendant was
misled into thinking that he had a complete record pursuant to
the open file discovery process.  It is an unfortunate fact that
the removal of this document by the People was done without
notice to the court or defense counsel.  
Open file discovery, admirably adopted by the District
Attorney, is intended to streamline the discovery process and
ensure a fair trial by eliminating the inappropriate exclusion of
evidence to which the defendant is entitled.  At the heart of
this procedure is a good faith reliance on the fact that nothing
has been removed, altered or redacted without court approval and
notice to the defendant.  The deliberate and unilateral removal
of this document undermines the letter and spirit of open file
discovery and must not be condoned.
Because I am convinced that a significant Brady
violation occurred, I would reverse the order of the Appellate
Division and remand for a new trial.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Ciparick.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Graffeo, Smith and Pigott concur.  Judge Jones
dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judge Read
concurs.
Decided April 7, 2009