Title: Sleeper and Sleeper

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  May 20, 1999

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Marriage of

ROYAL MELVIN SLEEPER,

	Respondent on Review,

		and

ROSE MISTYCA SLEEPER,

nka Rose Mistyca Madris,

	Petitioner on Review.

(CC 9403-62065; CA A89844; SC S43959)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted September 8, 1997.

	George W. Kelly, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
petition for petitioner on review.

	Philip F. Schuster, II, of Dierking & Schuster, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief on the merits for respondent
on review.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	KULONGOSKI, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.

*	Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, 

	Elizabeth Welch, Judge.

	145 Or App 165, 929 P2d 1028 (1997). 

**	Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		KULONGOSKI, J.

		In this marital dissolution action, the circuit court
awarded custody of the parties' two children to husband.  Wife
appealed, assigning error to that award of custody.  She denied
that husband was the biological father of the children and argued
that, because the custody dispute involved a biological parent
and a person who is not a biological parent, the "compelling
reasons" standard announced in Hruby and Hruby, 304 Or 500, 516,
748 P2d 57 (1987), discussed infra, should be used in determining
custody.  Husband argued that the Hruby standard was not
applicable, because wife was estopped from denying husband's
paternity.  In the alternative, husband argued that, given the
child-parent relationship that he has with both children, ORS
109.119 confers on him substantive custodial rights as a
stepparent and requires use of the "best interests of the child"
standard, ORS 107.137, in determining custody.  

		The Court of Appeals agreed with husband that wife was
estopped from denying husband's paternity.  Accordingly, that
court applied the "best interests of the child" standard and
affirmed the circuit court's award of custody to father.  Sleeper
and Sleeper, 145 Or App 165, 929 P2d 1028 (1997).  As we explain
infra, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on other
grounds and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

		The Court of Appeals reviewed this case de novo, as
required by former ORS 19.125 (1995), renumbered as ORS 19.415
(1997).  Pursuant to that statute, this court may review de novo
or it may limit its review to questions of law.  The facts
relevant to the resolution of the issues before us are not in
dispute, although their legal significance is.  Accordingly,
there is no reason to review de novo.  See Denton and Denton, 326
Or 236, 238, 951 P2d 693 (1998) (so stating under analogous
circumstances).  We therefore limit our review to questions of
law.  We take the following undisputed facts from the opinion of
the Court of Appeals and from the record.

		Husband had a vasectomy in 1977.  Husband and wife
married in 1980.  Both parties worked outside the home until
1987, excluding a period of time in 1982 when wife did not work
outside the home because she was recuperating from an accident. 
In 1987, husband suffered a heart attack and stopped working. 
Wife continued to work outside the home except for a brief period
immediately after the birth of each of the two children.

		Husband is not the biological father of either child. 
After failed attempts at artificial insemination, wife had a
brief extra-marital relationship that produced a child in April
1989.  About one year later, husband and wife separated.  Wife
went to California, leaving the child with husband.  While in
California, wife had another extra-marital relationship that
produced a child in August 1991.  Wife then returned from
California, and the parties again began living together.

		Husband was the primary caretaker of both children
throughout the marriage.  He provided for the physical and
emotional needs of both children on a daily basis.  Wife had only
sporadic contact with the children.  The Court of Appeals, on de
novo review, found that husband "has established emotional ties
creating a child-parent relationship with the minor children and
is their psychological father having provided them with their
physical and emotional needs on a daily basis since their birth." 
Sleeper, 145 Or App at 168.

		The parties continued to live together until August
1993, when wife left the family home.  Husband petitioned for
dissolution of the marriage and for custody of the children.  The
circuit court awarded husband temporary custody of both children.
Later, the court awarded him permanent custody.  Wife appealed,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  We allowed wife's petition
for review.

		ORS 109.119 provides, in part:

		"(1)  Any person, including but not limited to a
related or nonrelated foster parent, stepparent or
relative by blood or marriage who has established
emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship or
an ongoing personal relationship with a child, or any
legal grandparent may petition or file a motion for
intervention with the court having jurisdiction over
the custody, placement, guardianship or wardship of
that child, or if no such proceedings are pending, may
petition the court for the county in which the minor
child resides for an order providing for relief under
subsection (2) of this section.

		"(2)(a)  If the court determines that a child-parent 
relationship exists and if the court determines
by a preponderance of the evidence that custody,
guardianship, right of visitation, or other generally
recognized right of a parent or person in loco
parentis, is appropriate in the case, the court shall
grant such custody, guardianship, right of visitation
or other right to the person, if to do so is in the
best interest of the child.  The court may determine
temporary custody of the child or temporary visitation
rights under this paragraph pending a final order.

		"* * * * *

		"(3)  In addition to the rights granted under
subsection (1) or (2) of this section, a stepparent
with a child-parent relationship who is a party in a
dissolution proceeding may petition the court having
jurisdiction for custody or visitation or may petition
the court for the county in which the minor child
resides for adoption of the child.  The stepparent may
also file for post decree modification of a decree
relating to child custody.

		"(4)(a)  A motion for intervention filed by a
person other than a legal grandparent may be denied or
a petition may be dismissed on the motion of any party
or on the court's own motion if the petition does not
state a prima facie case of emotional ties creating a
child-parent relationship or ongoing personal
relationship or does not allege facts that the
intervention is in the best interests of the child.

		"* * * * *

		"(5)  As used in this section:

		"(a) 'Child-parent relationship' means a
relationship that exists or did exist, in whole or in
part, within the six months preceding the filing of an
action under this section, and in which relationship a
person having physical custody of a child or residing
in the same household as the child supplied, or
otherwise made available to the child, food, clothing,
shelter and incidental necessaries and provided the
child with necessary care, education and discipline,
and which relationship continued on a day-to-day basis,
through interaction, companionship, interplay and
mutuality, that fulfilled the child's psychological
needs for a parent as well as the child's physical
needs. * * *"(1)

Husband argues that, although he is not a biological parent of
either child, he is a stepparent with a child-parent relationship
with those children.  Husband further argues that ORS 109.119
governs child custody disputes between a biological parent and a
stepparent having a child-parent relationship with the subject
minor children.  Resolution of the issues presented for decision
in this case requires that we construe ORS 109.119.

		In interpreting the wording of a statute, this court's
task is to discern the intent of the legislature.  ORS 174.020;
PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d
1143 (1993).  We discern that intent by first examining the text
and context of the statute.  PGE, 317 Or at 610-11.  Effect
should be given to all provisions of the statute where possible. 
ORS 174.010; Nolan v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 317 Or 328, 333, 856
P2d 305 (1993).  The context of a statute includes "other
provisions of the same statute and other related statutes," PGE,
317 Or at 611, as well as relevant judicial construction of those
statutes.  See Owens v. Maass, 323 Or 430, 435, 918 P2d 808
(1996) (context includes judicial constructions of earlier
versions of relevant statutes).  If the legislature's intent is
clear from the inquiry into text and context, further inquiry is
unnecessary.  PGE, 317 Or at 611.  Applying the foregoing
principles, we conclude that the text and context of ORS 109.119
demonstrate clearly that the legislature intended that courts
shall use the "best interests of the child" standard in
determining custody of minor children in custody disputes between
a biological parent and a stepparent with a child-parent
relationship with the subject minor child.(2)

		The threshold requirement for application of ORS
109.119 to a custody dispute is a child-parent relationship
between a non-biological parent and the subject child.  ORS
109.119(5).  Without that child-parent relationship, the
procedural and substantive rights conferred by the statute are
not available to the non-biological parent.  ORS 109.119(1)-(3). 
As noted, the Court of Appeals found that husband had established
a child-parent relationship with the minor children and is their
psychological father.  Sleeper, 145 Or App at 168.  It follows
that, under the statute, husband has the right to seek custody.

		Having concluded that ORS 109.119(3) allowed husband to
petition for custody, we turn to the issue of the standard that
the circuit court should use in determining custody of the
subject children.  Hruby, decided by this court in 1985, directs
that 

	"courts will deprive natural [i.e., biological] parents
of the custody of their children only in order to
protect the children from some compelling threat to
their present or future well-being."  304 Or at 509.

However, it is critical to note the constraints that this court
placed on the Hruby decision.  The court noted: 

	"ORS 109.119 was enacted in 1985 and amended in 1987. 
Or Laws 1985, ch 516, § 2; Or Laws 1987, ch 810, § 1. 
Because the 1987 amendments did not take effect until
after this case was on appeal, they do not drive our
decision."  304 Or at 511 (emphasis added).

		The 1987 amendments to ORS 109.119 added the following
sentence to section (1):

	"If the court determines that custody, guardianship,
right of visitation, or other generally recognized
right of a parent or person in loco parentis, is
appropriate in the case, the court shall grant such
custody, guardianship, right of visitation or other
right to the person having the child-parent
relationship, if to do so is in the best interest of
the child."  Or Laws 1987, ch 810, § 1 (emphasis
added).

		We hold that the phrase "is appropriate in the case" in
the 1987 amendments to ORS 109.119 did not import the Hruby
"compelling reasons" standard into the statute, contrary to the
Court of Appeals' conclusion in Shofner and Shofner, 137 Or App
543, 550-51, 905 P2d 268 (1995).  Rather, addition of the phrase
"is appropriate in the case" to ORS 109.119(1) requires the court
to examine the circumstances surrounding the custody dispute and
to determine whether the best interests of the child call for an
award of custody to the non-biological parent.  If the best
interests of the child call for custody to the non-biological
parent, then the court must make such award, unless to do so
would violate some supervening right belonging to the biological
parent.  In this case, mother relies solely on her assertion that
the Hruby "compelling reasons" standard applies to this custody
dispute.  That assertion is incorrect, as discussed supra.

		The circuit court found that it was in the best
interests of the children to remain in the custody of the
husband.  The Court of Appeals decided, on de novo review, that
it was in the best interests of the children to remain in
husband's custody.  Sleeper, 145 Or App at 174.  That was the
appropriate legal standard, and the record supports the Court of
Appeals' factual determinations under that standard.  It follows
that, although the legal rationale given by that court is not the
one that we follow in our analysis, the court's conclusion
nonetheless was correct.  

		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.

1. 	We quote the 1997 version of ORS 109.119.  That statute
was enacted in 1985 and amended in 1987, 1993 and 1997.  The
dispositive sentence of ORS 109.119, what is now the first
sentence of subsection (2)(a), originally was added to subsection
(1) of ORS 109.119, in 1987.  That sentence has remained
unchanged since that time, including throughout these
proceedings.

2. 	In Hruby and Hruby, 304 Or 500, 748 P2d 57 (1987), this
court interpreted ORS 109.119 (1985).  That version of the
statute provided, in part:

		"(1)  Any person including but not limited to a
foster parent, stepparent, grandparent or relative by
blood or marriage who has established emotional ties
creating a child-parent relationship with a child may
petition or file a motion for intervention with the
court having jurisdiction over the custody, placement
or guardianship of that child, or if no such
proceedings are pending, may petition the circuit court
for the county in which the minor child resides for an
order providing for custody or placement of the child
or visitation rights or other generally recognized
rights of a parent or person in loco parentis.  This
subsection does not grant any right to petition or file
a motion for intervention in any proceeding involving
the dissolution of marriage.

		"(2)  In addition to the rights granted under
subsection (1) of this section, a stepparent with a
child-parent relationship, as defined in subsection (5)
of this section, who is a party in a dissolution
proceeding may petition the court having jurisdiction
for custody or visitation or may petition the circuit
court for the county in which the minor child resides
for adoption of the child. * * *"

The Hruby court rejected the argument that ORS 109.119 (1985)
applied the "best interests of the child" standard to custody
disputes between biological parents and other persons with a
child-parent relationship with the subject child.  Instead, the
court concluded that ORS 109.119 (1985) was a procedural statute
only and that it conferred no substantive custodial rights on
psychological parents.  Hruby, 304 Or at 512-16.  The Hruby court
held that

	"a natural [i.e., biological] parent has the right to
the custody of his or her children, absent a compelling
reason for placing the children in the custody of
another; the 'best interests of the child' standard
applicable to custody disputes between natural parents
in a marriage dissolution proceeding is not applicable
to custody disputes between natural parents and other
persons."  Id. at 510.