Title: Harvey v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Harvey v. State1989 WY 96774 P.2d 87Case Number: 87-274Decided: 05/05/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
JETTY LEE HARVEY, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 

Steven E. Weerts, Sr. 
Asst. Public Defender, for 
appellant.

 
 

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, and Hugh Kenny, 
Asst. Attys. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Jetty Lee 
Harvey appeals from his convictions of kidnapping and first-degree sexual 
assault.1 Although appellant presents several issues 
for our consideration, the fundamental and dispositive issue in this case, as in 
the companion case of Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 1989), is whether, 
under the circumstances of the case, a delay of over one and one-half years 
between the filing of the criminal complaint and the subsequent trial violated 
appellant's constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial.

 
 

[¶2.]     We reverse.

 
 

[¶3.]     In Stuebgen v. State, 
548 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1976), this Court reversed two felony drug convictions and 
dismissed the informations where there had been a delay, largely attributable to 
the State and the trial court, of eighteen months between the defendants' 
arrests and their trial. Three years later, in Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464, 470 (Wyo. 
1979), although we declined to dismiss the defendants' felony convictions on 
speedy trial grounds, we issued a stern warning admonishing

 
 

law enforcement officials 
throughout Wyoming that this must not happen again, and 
all persons - whether they be prisoners or whomsoever - will be given their 
Rule-5 and speedy-trial rights, failing which the supervisory authority of this 
court will be brought into play to address such negligent conduct.

 
 

Even though we have 
reviewed a number of cases since Cherniwchan in which a speedy trial violation 
has been alleged, we have not, in these cases, encountered a clear violation 
necessitating reversal and dismissal. It was perhaps inevitable, however, that 
this Court would eventually be confronted with a case wherein the result in 
Stuebgen and the warning in Cherniwchan would not have been heeded. This is that 
case.

 
 

[¶4.]     The crimes involved in 
this case are serious. Appellant, Everett Phillips (whose appeal comprises the 
companion case of Phillips, 774 P.2d 118), and David Swazo were arrested in 
January 1986 in connection with the January 5, 1986, abduction and rape of a 
Rock Springs woman. Although at trial the prosecution and the defendants 
presented conflicting versions of the significant events, the jury was entitled 
to and did accept the evidence presented by the State, which is summarized 
briefly as follows.

 
 

[¶5.]     The State's evidence 
indicated that appellant, Phillips, and Swazo abducted the victim from a 
Rock Springs 
street on the evening of January 5, 1986, forced her into Phillips' crew cab 
pickup, and drove away. Thereafter, as the vehicle proceeded to drive to the 
outskirts of the city, Swazo sexually assaulted the victim in the back seat, 
with encouragement from appellant and Phillips. Phillips drove the pickup to an 
isolated trailer court and parked, indicating that he intended to join in and 
continue the assault. Unbeknownst to the men, however, the abduction had been 
witnessed by an individual in a nearby vehicle. This witness followed the pickup 
to the trailer court entrance and then contacted law enforcement authorities. 
The police responded quickly and intercepted Phillips' pickup as it was leaving 
the vicinity, the men having seen the police. The police rescued the victim and 
arrested appellant and Swazo on the spot. Phillips was arrested later upon 
further investigation. The State's evidence indicated that the police 
intervention very likely saved the victim from further violence, at least in the 
form of further sexual assault.

 
 

[¶6.]     On January 9, 1986, a 
criminal complaint was filed in Sweetwater County Court, charging appellant 
with kidnapping and sexual assault in the first degree or aiding and abetting in 
those crimes. Appellant was appointed counsel, and a preliminary hearing was 
held on January 29, 1986, at which appellant was bound over to the district 
court.

 
 

[¶7.]     On February 5, 1986, an 
information was filed in district court charging appellant identically with the 
county court complaint. An arraignment was also held on February 5, at which 
time appellant entered a plea of not guilty, and his bond was continued. At this 
arraignment, the district court advised appellant that, if he pleaded not 
guilty, he was entitled to a jury trial within 120 days. On February 18, 1986, 
appellant filed a motion for discovery and a motion to dismiss. The record does 
not indicate whether the district court ever ruled on these motions.

 
 

[¶8.]     At this point the 
record becomes totally silent as to any further proceedings for a period of 
nearly ten months. The next entry in the record occurs on December 5, 1986, when 
a letter from the court to counsel was filed notifying the parties that the 
court had consolidated appellant's case with that of his co-defendants, Phillips 
and Swazo, and that trial was set for January 6, 1987. On December 9, 1986, the 
State obtained a continuance of the trial. This fact is not reflected in the 
record on appeal, as there is no record of any motion for a continuance, of any 
order granting the continuance, or of any indication that appellant had any 
prior notice and opportunity to object to this continuance. The fact that the 
State obtained this continuance, however, is acknowledged by the State in its 
brief, and we therefore accept it as a conceded point. Absent the State's 
concession on this matter, we would be without any explanation of why trial was 
not held on January 6, 1987, as scheduled.

 
 

[¶9.]     The record next 
reflects that on December 15, 1986, appellant's retained private counsel made an 
entry of appearance. Correspondingly, on January 22, 1987, appellant's appointed 
counsel submitted a motion to withdraw as counsel, which was granted by the 
court on that same date.

 
 

[¶10.]  In January 1987, another lapse in the 
record occurs. On January 16, 1987, appellant's retained counsel submitted to 
the district court a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. This motion 
was not filed, for reasons that remain unknown, but again the State has conceded 
in brief and in oral argument that the motion was submitted on that date. On 
April 27, 1987, counsel for appellant filed what was designated as a duplicate 
motion to dismiss, again on the basis of a speedy trial violation, with an 
accompanying certificate stating that the January 16 motion had been submitted. 
Standing alone, we would not accept this representation of counsel as to the 
earlier speedy trial motion absent record support, but in consideration of the 
State's concession that it in fact was made, we will credit appellant with 
having made the earlier assertion of his right.2

 
 

[¶11.]  On February 4, 1987, the district court 
ordered a presentence investigation, indicating in the order that the 
investigation had been requested by both parties. The next event of record was 
appellant's July 2, 1987, motion to disqualify the district judge. This motion 
was promptly denied. On July 13, 1987, the district court ordered, pursuant to 
the application of appellant, that a subpoena be issued for Swazo to appear and 
testify at trial. Swazo, upon a guilty plea, had previously been sentenced to 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary. On July 20, 1987, appellant adopted and joined 
in the "BRIEF OF DEFENDANT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SPEEDY 
TRIAL" filed by his co-defendant, Phillips.

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellant's trial began on July 21, 1987. 
In a pretrial chambers conference, the district court denied appellant's speedy 
trial motion. The jury, after a three-day trial, found appellant guilty on both 
charges. Appellant was sentenced to not less than twenty years nor more than 
thirty years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary on each count, the sentences to 
run concurrently. This appeal followed.

 
 

[¶13.]  The right to a speedy trial is found in 
both the United States3 and the Wyoming4 Constitutions. In Wyoming, additional speedy trial protections are provided 
by W.R.Cr.P. 45(b)5 and Rule 204 of the Uniform Rules for the 
District Courts of the State of Wyoming. The specific time constraints of Rule 
204, and the exceptions thereto, will be discussed infra in connection with the 
length of delay analysis.

 
 

[¶14.]  The United States Supreme Court, in 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S. Ct. 988, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1967), held 
that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Cherniwchan, 594 P.2d  at 467, we quoted the 
following passage from Klopfer, 386 U.S.  at 223, 87 S.Ct. at 
993:

 
 

     "We hold here that the 
right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the 
Sixth Amendment. That right has its roots at the very foundation of our English 
law heritage. Its first articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have 
been made in Magna Carta (1215), wherein it was written, `We will sell to no 
man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right'; . . 
."

 
 

[¶15.]  The Supreme Court, in Klopfer, traced the 
evolution of the right to a speedy trial from its origin in the Magna Carta 
through Sir Edward Coke's The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of 
England to George Mason's bill of rights for the colony of Virginia and 
thereafter to its prominent position in the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 386 U.S.  at 223-26, 87 S. Ct.  at 993-95. 
See also United States v. 
Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D.Md.), aff'd 350 U.S. 857, 76 S. Ct. 101, 100 L. Ed. 761 (1955) (influence of speedy trial aspects of British 
Habeas Corpus Act upon the Bill of Rights); and Poulos and Coleman, Speedy 
Trial, Slow Implementation: The ABA Standards in Search of a Statehouse, 28 
Hastings L.J. 357 (1976) (tracing the right from Magna Carta to the Sixth 
Amendment). Thus, the Supreme Court, in Klopfer, 386 U.S.  at 226, 87 S. Ct.  at 995, concluded that the right to a speedy trial "is one of the most 
basic rights preserved by our Constitution."

 
 

[¶16.]  In Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37-38, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 
1568-1569, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1970), Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, 
said:

 
 

The right to a speedy 
trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality in 
the need to have charges promptly exposed. If the case for the prosecution calls 
on the accused to meet charges rather than rest on the infirmities of the 
prosecution's case, as is the defendant's right, the time to meet them is when 
the case is fresh. Stale claims have never been favored by the law, and far less 
so in criminal cases. Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the 
confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal 
charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a 
prompt trial.

 
 

(Footnote 
omitted.)

 
 

In Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403 (Wyo. 1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 971, 93 S. Ct. 2164, 36 L. Ed. 2d 693 
(1973), this Court adopted the balancing test for evaluating speedy trial 
challenges enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). We have applied this test in a 
long line of cases since Cosco, including Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 
(Wyo. 1986); Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663 
(Wyo. 1982); Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168 
(Wyo. 1981); and Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456 (Wyo. 
1979). The balancing test requires that we look at: (1) the length of the delay; 
(2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and 
(4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182; Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Wyo. 1985); Estrada v. State, 611 P.2d 850, 852 (Wyo. 1980). These four factors must be 
considered together and balanced in relation to all relevant circumstances. 
Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 94 S. Ct. 188, 38 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1973); 
Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641 (Wyo. 1981).

 
 

LENGTH OF 
DELAY

 
 

[¶17.]  There is not a precise length of delay 
that automatically constitutes a violation of the right to a speedy trial. 
Caton, 709 P.2d  at 1264; Phillips, 597 P.2d 456. In Phillips, id. at 460, 
however, we noted that,

 
 

when the delay is so 
protracted as to be presumptively prejudicial, it is a triggering mechanism, 
which requires "inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Barker 
v. Wingo, supra, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192.

 
 

In Barker, 407 U.S.  at 523, 92 S. Ct.  at 2188, the 
Supreme Court stated that, although the constitution does not require the speedy 
trial right to be quantified into a specific number of days or months, the 
states are free to establish a reasonable period in accordance with 
constitutional standards. See also United States v. Taylor, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2421 n. 12, 101 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1988) (Barker did not specify a time 
period, leaving that kind of legislative or rule-making activity to others in a 
better position to do so).

 
 

[¶18.]  Some states have set mandatory time 
limits for bringing a defendant to trial requiring dismissal when the statute or 
rule has been violated, with exclusions and extensions provided for certain 
delays, such as those caused by the defendant or necessitated by competency 
proceedings, et cetera. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 111 Wn.2d 239, 759 P.2d 1183 
(1988) (applying procedural rule requiring trial within sixty days of 
arraignment); Miller v. State, 706 P.2d 336 (Alaska App. 1985) (reversing and 
dismissing charges upon violation of Alaska R.Crim.P. 45 requiring trial within 
120 days of arrest); People v. Bell, 669 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1983) (affirming trial 
court's dismissal of criminal charges where the defendant was not brought to 
trial within six months of entry of not guilty plea in accordance with § 
18-1-405(1) of the Colorado Revised Statutes (1973 and 1978 Repl. Vol. 
8)).

 
 

[¶19.]  Similarly, Congress has enacted the 
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161-3174 (1982), which decrees that a 
defendant in the federal courts must be tried within seventy days of the 
information or indictment, again with exceptions for specified delays, or the 
charges will be dismissed. Section 3162(a)(2) of the Act provides that, in 
considering whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice, the court 
shall consider the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of 
the case that led to the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution. The 
federal courts, however, have recognized that, while review of compliance with 
the Act is a matter of statutory interpretation, the inquiry into whether a 
constitutional speedy trial violation has occurred continues to be guided by 
Barker. United States v. 
Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 456 U.S. 994, 102 S. Ct. 2279, 
73 L. Ed. 2d 1291 (1982); United 
States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
granted 444 U.S. 1070, 100 S. Ct. 1012, 62 L. Ed. 2d 751, rev'd on other grounds 449 U.S. 117, 101 S. Ct. 426, 66 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1980).

 
 

[¶20.]  In Wyoming, Rule 204 (formerly Rule 22) of the Uniform Rules 
for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming fixes a deadline of 120 days after the 
filing of the information or indictment for bringing a defendant to trial, with 
certain delays excluded from the time computation.6 We have held, however, that Rule 204 is 
not an exclusive or mandatory test but rather that it is advisory in nature, and 
it is another factor to be considered in the balancing test from Barker. Caton, 
709 P.2d 1260; Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5 (Wyo. 1981); Robinson, 627 P.2d 168.

 
 

[¶21.]  Rule 204 provides a convenient and 
logical starting point for the analysis of the length of delay in the instant 
case. Under Rule 204(b), the measuring period for speedy trial purposes 
commences at the date of filing the information or indictment.7 Here, the information was filed on 
February 5, 1986. Appellant's trial began on July 21, 1987, 531 days after the 
information was filed. Rule 204 requires that trial be held within 120 days 
after the filing of the information. Although Rule 204 delineates certain 
periods that are to be excluded from the count, the record in this case does not 
reflect any delays properly excludable under the rule. See the discussion 
regarding the reason for the delay, infra. Thus, even though we consider Rule 
204 to be advisory only, i.e., a touchstone for analysis, the delay in this case 
of 531 days, which is in excess of four times greater than the period prescribed 
by the rule, is more than sufficient to trigger further analysis into the other 
factors. See Caton, 709 P.2d  at 1265; and Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192. Additionally, under constitutional analysis, the speedy trial 
clock starts to run upon arrest or when the complaint is filed. 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971); Caton, 709 P.2d 1260; Estrada, 611 P.2d 850. Appellant was arrested 
on January 5, 1986, and the complaint was filed on January 9, 1986. Thus, from 
the date of his arrest, 562 days elapsed before appellant was brought to trial. 
Although, as we have said, no precise length of delay will automatically 
constitute a speedy trial violation, the excessive and appalling delay involved 
in this case is presumptively prejudicial and must be weighed heavily in favor 
of appellant in the balancing test analysis. See Caton, 709 P.2d  at 1265; and 
Phillips, 597 P.2d  at 460.

 
 

REASON FOR 
DELAY

 
 

[¶22.]  The State, in its brief, concedes that 
there is nothing in the record justifying or even explaining the delay from the 
initiation of the case until December 1986, a period of approximately eleven 
months from appellant's arrest and ten months from the filing of the 
information. We agree. The State argues, however, that the delay encompassing 
the period from December 10, 1986, to the date of trial is equally attributable 
to both appellant and the prosecution. This assertion, however, is not borne out 
in the record, absent resort to speculation.

 
 

[¶23.]  Unquestionably, delays attributable to a 
defendant may disentitle him to speedy trial safeguards. Phillips, 597 P.2d  at 
461; Cherniwchan, 594 P.2d  at 468. Rule 204 embraces this principle in its 
provisions for excluding certain periods from the 120-day count. Periods 
excluded from the Rule 204 computation include proceedings regarding the 
defendant's mental condition, proceedings on other charges, delay resulting from 
the defendant's change of counsel or application therefor, delay for 
continuances granted to the defendant, and delay for continuances granted to the 
prosecution when the defendant expressly consents or the prosecution's evidence 
is unavailable despite the exercise of due diligence or when required in the due 
administration of justice. Rule 204(c) and (d).

 
 

[¶24.]  The State contends that appellant's 
December 10, 1986, change of counsel (the entry of appearance is dated December 
10, but it was not filed until December 15) is a delay factor attributable to 
appellant. It does not appear on the record, however, that this change caused 
any delay in the proceedings. Appellant did not request a continuance of the 
previously set January 6, 1987, trial date. The State argues, though, that 
appellant did not object to the continuance obtained by the State on December 9, 
1986, thereby apparently implying that appellant agreed to the continuance as a 
fortuitous event giving appellant's new counsel additional time for trial 
preparation. As mentioned earlier, the record is totally silent as to this 
continuance, containing neither a motion requesting the continuance nor an order 
granting the continuance. Were it not for the State's acknowledgment in briefing 
that it obtained this continuance, our only clue that a continuance occurred, 
other than appellant's assertion to that effect, would have been the fact that 
trial was not held on January 6, 1987, as scheduled. No reason for the 
continuance is apparent. Similarly, on this record, we cannot assume that 
appellant agreed to a continuance or even that appellant had any prior notice 
and opportunity to object to it. Thus, this continuance obtained by the State 
does not qualify for exclusion under Rule 204, and we attribute the delay caused 
by this continuance solely to the State. Correspondingly, we cannot connect the 
delay occasioned by this continuance, inexplicable on the record, to appellant's 
change of counsel, and we find no delay attributable to that change.

 
 

[¶25.]  The State also attempts to justify the 
post-December 1986 delay upon assertions that appellant was involved in plea 
negotiations much of this time, that the State was negotiating a plea agreement 
with Swazo so that it could obtain his testimony against appellant, and that the 
docket was crowded. We initially note that there is no record support for any of 
these purported justifications, except for inferences, and also we observe that 
the State never sought a continuance upon any of these grounds. With respect to 
plea negotiations involving appellant, the only record evidence supporting this 
assertion is the February 4, 1987, order requesting a presentence investigation 
and a December 26, 1986, letter to counsel from the trial court requesting the 
parties to confer regarding a plea bargain. This letter is found in the record 
attached to an affidavit of appellant's counsel, as it was not formally filed in 
the record by the district court. Although we would probably be safe in assuming 
that some plea negotiations took place, it would be sheer speculation to 
attribute, much less justify, any of the delay to plea negotiations without 
record support. Similarly, with respect to any delay occasioned by the State's 
plea negotiations with Swazo in return for his testimony, the only record 
support for such delay is in the fact that Swazo was convicted upon a guilty 
plea prior to appellant's trial and the fact that he testified for the State 
against appellant. At what point the plea bargain with Swazo was reached and how 
much time was spent in reaching that agreement simply cannot be ascertained from 
the record. The Supreme Court, in Barker, 407 U.S.  at 534, 92 S. Ct.  at 2194, stated that some delay is perhaps permissible for the prosecution 
to obtain the testimony of a co-defendant. While we agree with that principle, 
on the record before us we cannot determine how much, if any, of the delay is 
attributable to the State's attempt to obtain Swazo's testimony. Finally, 
regarding the crowded docket as a reason for delay, there is no evidence in the 
record to support that contention.

 
 

[¶26.]  We conclude that none of the cause for 
the delay can be attributed to appellant. The burden is upon the State to prove 
that delays in bringing a defendant to trial are reasonable and necessary. 
Estrada, 611 P.2d  at 854; Stuebgen, 548 P.2d  at 875; W.R.Cr.P. 45(b). The State 
has failed in meeting its burden in this case. While it is recognized that 
neutral or innocent unnecessary delay should be weighed less heavily against the 
State than deliberate unnecessary delay, Caton, 709 P.2d  at 1265; Estrada, 611 P.2d 850; Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, it is also recognized that such 
delay must nevertheless be considered, because the government, rather than the 
defendant, bears the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances. Estrada, 
611 P.2d  at 854; Barker, 407 U.S.  at 531, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192. Here, 
we are unable to determine whether the delay was in fact neutral as opposed to 
deliberate, although nothing in the record indicates any sinister motive on 
behalf of the State. What we do find in this case, however, is simply no reason 
or justification for the delay, and we cannot say that the State made a good 
faith effort to bring appellant to trial as quickly as possible. See Heinrich, 
638 P.2d  at 644. Thus, the reason for delay factor weighs substantially in 
appellant's favor.

 
 

DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION OF 
HIS RIGHTS

 
 

[¶27.]  Although it is not absolutely necessary 
that a defendant assert his right to a speedy trial as a prerequisite to an 
ultimate conclusion that a speedy trial violation has occurred, it is a relevant 
and proper factor to consider. Estrada, 611 P.2d  at 854; Cherniwchan, 594 P.2d  
at 469 n. 4; Barker, 407 U.S.  at 531-32, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2192-93.8 In the 
instant case, appellant moved for dismissal on January 16, 1987, and again on 
April 27, 1987, and joined in his co-defendant's speedy trial brief before 
trial. It is noteworthy that appellant's initial assertion of his speedy trial 
right in January 1987 occurred shortly after he retained private counsel and 
shortly after the State obtained a continuance postponing the original January 
6, 1987, trial date. We have observed a distinction in the instance of an 
uncounseled failure to assert the right as opposed to a counseled failure to do 
so. Estrada, 611 P.2d  at 854-55. See also Barker, 407 U.S.  at 529, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2191 (court may "attach a different weight to a situation in which the defendant 
knowingly fails to object from a situation in which his attorney acquiesces in 
long delay without adequately informing his client, or from a situation in which 
no counsel is appointed"). In this respect it is sufficient to note that, once 
appellant retained private counsel, his speedy trial right was promptly 
asserted.

 
 

[¶28.]  The State argues, however, that appellant 
did not vigorously press the issue despite the two motions. It is true that on 
the record appellant limited his speedy trial challenges to the two motions and 
the pretrial brief. It is also axiomatic, however, that a defendant has no duty 
to bring himself to trial. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 527, 92 S. Ct.  at 2190; Dickey, 398 U.S.  at 38, 90 S. Ct.  at 1569. Under 
the circumstances of this case, we conclude that appellant adequately asserted 
his right to a speedy trial and that this factor also weighs in appellant's 
favor in the balancing test.

 
 

PREJUDICE TO 
DEFENDANT

 
 

[¶29.]  The final factor in the Barker balancing 
test is prejudice to the defendant. It is not necessary that prejudice be shown 
in order to prove a speedy trial violation. Caton, 709 P.2d  at 1266; Heinrich, 
638 P.2d  at 644. In Moore, 414 U.S.  at 26, 94 S. Ct.  at 189, the 
Supreme Court said, "Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an 
affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial." Although prejudice need not be shown, 
it should be considered as a factor in the balancing test. Grable, 649 P.2d  at 
671. In Barker, 407 U.S.  at 532, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193, the 
Supreme Court observed that prejudice to a defendant may consist of (1) lengthy 
pretrial incarceration; (2) pretrial anxiety; and (3) impairment of the defense. 
See also Heinrich, 638 P.2d 641; and Estrada, 611 P.2d 850.

 
 

[¶30.]  In both the Caton and Cherniwchan cases, 
we cited with approval Justice Brennan's discussion of prejudice to the 
defendant in Dickey, 398 U.S.  at 39, 90 S. Ct.  at 1569 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
In Caton, 709 P.2d 1260, we adopted Justice Brennan's analysis in Dickey, and we 
held that, in the case of excessive delay, prejudice should be presumed. We 
stated:

 
 

[T]he kinds of prejudice 
produced by long delays may be substantial even if the defendant's ability to 
defend himself is not impaired. The defendant's social relations, freedom of 
movement, and anxiety over public accusation are seriously affected when the 
delay is prolonged. These effects are precisely the kinds of prejudice that 
would be difficult for a defendant to demonstrate if he had the burden of 
proving prejudice.

 
 

709 P.2d  at 1266. We 
further noted in Caton, however, that short delays do not ordinarily produce 
these types of impacts and, if there is prejudice from a short delay, it 
normally consists of impairment of the defense, which can affirmatively be 
proven by the defendant. Thus, we held in Caton that, "until delay exceeds a 
point where there is a `probability of substantial prejudice,' the burden of 
proving prejudice should remain with the accused." Id. at 1266 (quoting from Dickey, 398 U.S.  at 55, 90 S. Ct.  at 1577 (Brennan, J., concurring)). In Caton, we determined that a delay 
of slightly more than six months did not reach the point at which substantial 
prejudice became probable. In the instant case, however, the delay of 
approximately eighteen months is sufficiently long to be presumptively 
prejudicial with respect to pretrial anxiety and related concerns. Caton, 709 P.2d  at 1266. Although this prejudice to appellant may have been minimal, it 
cannot be overlooked. In Moore, the Supreme Court said:

 
 

[P]rejudice to a 
defendant caused by delay in bringing him to trial is not confined to the 
possible prejudice to his defense in those proceedings. Inordinate 
delay,

 
 

"wholly aside from 
possible prejudice to a defense on the merits, may `seriously interfere with the 
defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and . . . may disrupt 
his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject 
him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.' 
These factors are more serious for some than for others, but they are inevitably 
present in every case to some extent, for every defendant will either be 
incarcerated pending trial or on bail subject to substantial restrictions on his 
liberty."

 
 

414 U.S.  at 26-27, 94 S. Ct.  at 190 (quoting from 
Barker, 407 U.S.  at 537, 92 S. Ct.  at 2195 (White, 
J., concurring)) (citation and footnote omitted).

 
 

[¶31.]  The other two elements of prejudice 
identified by the Supreme Court in Barker, however, do not appear to be present 
in this case. Appellant was not subjected to lengthy pretrial incarceration, 
apparently spending only seven days in jail after his arrest. Further, we do not 
see, nor does appellant contend, that the delay impaired his trial defense. Of 
course, the delay enabled the State to obtain Swazo's testimony against 
appellant, but we do not perceive that this is the type of prejudice properly 
contemplated in considerations of impairment of defense. Thus, with respect to 
the factor of prejudice, we conclude that appellant was presumptively prejudiced 
by the lengthy delay, but only minimally, so that, as to this factor, the 
balance is tipped only slightly in appellant's favor in the overall balancing 
test.

 
 

BALANCING THE 
FACTORS

 
 

[¶32.]  A balancing of the four factors from 
Barker leads us to the inescapable conclusion that a speedy trial violation has 
occurred in this case. The first three factors - length of delay, reason for 
delay, and assertion of the right - all weigh substantially in appellant's favor 
as far as establishing a speedy trial violation. The final factor of prejudice 
to the defendant is less conclusive, but it again leans slightly in favor of 
appellant. The case is not even particularly close. The delay in this case of 
one and one-half years between appellant's arrest and his trial was not only 
unnecessary, it was inexcusable. In Cherniwchan, the concurring opinion made the 
following comments, which are equally pertinent in the instant case:

 
 

Not only have those 
responsible for the prosecution of this case violated the rights of these 
defendants, but they also have failed to perform the responsibilities, which by 
virtue of their offices, they have assumed. Public officials should not casually 
or designedly hazard the interest of the people in enforcement of the laws of 
the State. Those who do should expect to account to their constituencies for 
such failures for they have not accomplished the obligations of the offices 
which they hold.

 
 

594 P.2d  at 470 (Thomas, 
J., specially concurring).

 
 

[¶33.]  The remedy for a violation of the right 
to a speedy trial is reversal and dismissal of the information. Strunk v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 434, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 37 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1973); Stuebgen, 548 P.2d 870. Dismissal is indeed a drastic remedy, but, as 
the Supreme Court said in Barker, "it is the only possible remedy." 407 U.S.  at 522, 92 S. Ct.  at 2188. The 
denial of the speedy trial right is different than violations of other 
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused, such as the failure to 
provide a public trial or an impartial jury or the admission of evidence 
obtained in an unconstitutional search, because those violations can generally 
be corrected by providing another trial in which the defendant's rights are 
observed. The denial of a speedy trial, however, cannot be remedied by a further 
trial. It is for this reason that courts are understandably hesitant in finding 
a failure to provide a speedy trial. Strunk, 412 U.S.  at 438, 93 S. Ct.  at 2263.

 
 

[¶34.]  In the case at bar, therefore, where the 
violation is clear, the fundamental determination is reduced to this: Either 
there is a right to a speedy trial or there is not - and either Rule 204 has 
some meaning or it is simply an empty gesture of no substance. If the right to a 
speedy trial has vitality, and we believe that it does, then it must be observed 
in this case, if ever. The temptation certainly exists in a case such as this, 
where the crime involved is deplorable, to gloss over the constitutional 
violation and affirm the conviction, thereby obtaining the popular result. That 
is a dangerous business. The constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial exists 
for all of us, and its preservation would be seriously jeopardized if it were to 
be honored only in those cases where the defendants evoked our sympathy or the 
crimes were minor in nature. We perceive that the right should apply with equal 
or greater force when a major crime is involved, because the detriment to the 
accused of pending unresolved charges and the interests of society in a prompt 
and decisive response to criminal activity are magnified in cases of serious 
crime.

 
 

[¶35.]  It is regrettable, nevertheless, that, in 
order to preserve this fundamental right, a convicted defendant must slip 
through virtually unpunished. Guilt or innocence, however, is not the issue. The 
constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial, as with other constitutional 
protections for the accused, exists to protect every citizen from oppressive 
governmental prosecution, and an innocent man facing criminal charges would be 
little comforted to know that this Court has chosen to overlook constitutional 
violations in order to uphold the conviction of an obviously guilty man. A 
constitutional guarantee cannot be selectively observed, with exceptions carved 
out in the tough cases, without threatening the very existence of the right. 
Once exceptions are made, the guarantee becomes shallow and meaningless, and its 
further erosion is inevitable. Former Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas 
once commented, regarding the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights:

 
 

But that guarantee is not 
self-executing. As nightfall does not come all at once, neither does oppression. 
In both instances, there is a twilight when everything remains seemingly 
unchanged. And it is in such twilight that we all must be most aware of change 
in the air - however slight - lest we become unwitting victims of the 
darkness.

 
 

The Douglas Letters: 
Selections from the Private Papers of Justice William O. Douglas at 162 (M. 
Urofsky ed. 1987). We will not relegate the speedy trial right to that uncertain 
twilight.

 
 

[¶36.]  For the foregoing reasons, we reverse 
appellant's convictions and remand to the district court with instructions to 
dismiss the information.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion.

 
 

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which GOLDEN, J., 
joined.

 
 

GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which THOMAS, J., 
joined.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Appellant was charged alternatively 
on both crimes as either a principal or an aider and abettor. Wyo. Stat. § 
6-1-201(b) (1977) provides that an accessory before the fact, i.e., an aider and 
abettor, may be charged, tried, convicted, and punished as if he were a 
principal. Although the jury was instructed as to aiding and abetting, the 
verdict form provided to the jury did not distinguish aiding and abetting from 
the principal crime, and the verdict indicates appellant was convicted as a 
principal on both crimes. The judgment and sentence, however, indicates 
appellant was convicted alternatively as either a principal or an aider and 
abettor as to each crime. This discrepancy is not raised as an issue, however, 
and it is immaterial to our disposition in this case.

 
 

2 Although acknowledging the January 
16 speedy trial motion, at oral argument counsel for appellee characterized both 
that motion and the April motion as being "pro forma."

 
 

3 The Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides in pertinent part:

 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial * * 
*.

 
 

4 Similarly, article 1, section 10 of 
the Wyoming Constitution states:

 
 
In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right * * * to a speedy trial * * 
*.

 
 

5 W.R.Cr.P. 45(b) provides in 
relevant part that, "if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to 
trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information or 
complaint."

 
 

6 Rule 204 
provides:

 
 
(a) It is the responsibility of 
court and counsel to insure to each person charged with crime a speedy 
trial.

 
 
(b) A criminal charge shall be 
brought to trial within 120 days following the filing of information or 
indictment.

 
 
(c) The following periods shall be 
excluded in computing the time for trial:

 
 
(1) All proceedings related to the 
mental illness or deficiency of the defendant.

 
 
(2) Proceedings on another 
charge.

 
 
(3) Delay granted by the court 
pursuant to Section (d).

 
 
(4) The time between the dismissal 
and the refiling of the same charge.

 
 
(5) Delay occasioned by defendant's 
change of counsel or application therefor.

 
 
(d) Continuances may be granted as 
follows:

 
 
(1) On motion of defendant supported 
by affidavit of defendant and defendant's counsel.

 
 
(2) On motion of the prosecuting 
attorney or the court if:

 
 
(i) The defendant expressly 
consents; or

 
 
(ii) The state's evidence is 
unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; 
or

 
 
(iii) Required in the due 
administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially 
prejudiced.

 
 
(e) Upon receiving notice of 
possible delay the defendant shall show in writing how the delay may prejudice 
his defense.

 
 
(f) If the defendant is unavailable 
for any proceeding at which his presence is required, the time period shall 
begin anew upon defendant's being available.

 
 

7 The date of the information or 
indictment is not the controlling starting date under a constitutional analysis 
of speedy trial. United 
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S. Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971). See discussion in body of opinion, 
infra.

 
 

8 In Barker, 407 U.S.  at 524-28, 92 S. Ct.  at 2189-91, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the demand-waiver 
doctrine, as then applied by some lower federal courts, which provided that a 
defendant waives any speedy trial consideration for any period prior to a demand 
for trial.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring.

 
 

On July 28, 1957, in a 
meadow beside the Thames, west of London, between 
Staines and Windsor, the American Bar Association dedicated 
a memorial to the Magna Carta. The Magna Carta was exacted from King John at the 
old council ground called Runnymede in June of 
1215 by means which would have been called extortionate if done by lesser men 
for lesser gain. Its fortieth article provided: "To no one will we sell, to no 
one will we deny or delay right or justice."

 
 

More than 560 years after 
the Magna Carta was written, a virtually uneducated Virginia planter with 
little legal training sat in his room in Raleigh Tavern and wrote the first 
draft of what was to become the Virginia Declaration of Rights. The eighth 
article of George Mason's draft provided: "That in all capital or criminal 
prosecutions a man hath a right to . . . a speedy trial by an impartial jury of 
his vicinage. . . ."

 
 

Thus, in Mason's parlance 
the Magna Carta's pledge not to delay justice was affirmatively stated as its 
correlative, the right to a speedy trial.

 
 

Poulos and Coleman, 
Speedy Trial, Slow Implementation: The ABA Standards in Search of a Statehouse, 
28 Hastings L.J. 357, 357-58 (1976) (footnotes omitted).

 
 

[¶37.]  The preeminence of the speedy trial right 
in the basic history of our society was most expressively related by federal 
court Judge Thomsen in United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 196 (D.Md.), 
aff'd 350 U.S. 857, 76 S. Ct. 101, 100 L. Ed. 761 (1955):

 
 

The right to a speedy 
trial is of long standing and has been jealously guarded over the centuries. 
Magna Carta states: "To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay, right or 
justice." This provision was implemented by special writs of jail delivery, and 
later by commissions of general jail delivery, under which special judges 
cleared the jails twice a year. In 1679 Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act, 
31 Car II, ch. 2, which required that prisoners indicted for treason or felony 
be tried at the next sessions or released on bail, "unless it appear to the 
Judges and Justices upon Oath made, that the Witnesses for the King could not be 
produced the same Term, Sessions, or General Gaol Delivery; (2) and if any 
Person or Persons committed as aforesaid, upon his Prayer or Petition in open 
Court the first Week of the Term or first Day of the Sessions * * *, to be 
brought to his Trial, shall not be indicted and tried the second Term, Sessions 
* * * or General Gaol-delivery, after his Commitment, or upon his trial shall be 
acquitted, he shall be discharged from his imprisonment." That Act, which 
Blackstone called "the Bulwark of the British Constitution", was still cherished 
by the British people at the time our Constitution was adopted, and by American 
patriots and lawyers, nurtured on Blackstone. Some thought the right of speedy 
trial and similar rights were so clearly a part of our "liberty" that no Bill of 
Rights was necessary. But the American people wanted to be sure, and gave the 
right of speedy trial first place in the Sixth Amendment * * *. [Footnotes 
omitted.]

 
 

[¶38.]  Rights of Americans to a speedy trial 
were confirmed to be a singular essence of our heritage from this constitutional 
history. The United States Constitution spells out this right through the Sixth 
Amendment as does the Wyoming Constitution by inclusion in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
10.

 
 

[¶39.]  Many, many years more recent than 1215 at 
Runnymede, in continued concern about another 
of our foundational constitutional rights, Judge Learned Hand 
warned:

 
 

If the prosecution of 
crime is to be conducted with so little regard for that protection which 
centuries of English law have given to the individual, we are indeed at the dawn 
of a new era; and much that we have deemed vital to our liberties, is a 
delusion.

 
 

United 
States v. Di Re, 159 F.2d 818, 
820 (2d Cir.), cert. granted 331 U.S. 800, 67 S. Ct. 1348, 91 L. Ed. 1824 (1947), 
judgment aff'd 332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210 
(1948).

 
 

[¶40.]  If there is a thesis in the hysterical 
anguish pervading discussion by the separate dissents in this case, it can only 
be historically contrasted to my recognition of why the United States Congress' 
dissatisfaction with the Barker rule, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), lead to the enactment of the Speedy Trial Act of 
1974, as with passage of defining state statutes or adoption of court rules by 
the highest tribunals of individual states. Wyoming was not without similar concern as our 
state justice delivery system searched for justification and compliance with the 
constitutional criteria of speedy trial. In recognition that the confines of 
Barker were not necessarily sufficient without more protection, the Wyoming 
Judicial Conference answered judicially perceived necessity and responsibility 
by adopting what is now Rule 204, Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the 
State of Wyoming.

 
 

[¶41.]  Practical as well as academic criticism 
of Barker was, from the date of its publication, immediate and continuing. 
Amsterdam, 
Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 Stan.L.Rev. 525 (1975); Erickson, 
The Right to a Speedy Trial: Standards for Its Implementation, 10 Hous.L. Rev. 
237 (1973); Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 
Colum.L.Rev. 1376 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law - Standards for the Right to 
Speedy Trial, 51 N.C.L.Rev. 310 (1972); Recent Development, Constitutional Law - 
Sixth Amendment - Right to a Speedy Trial - A Balancing Test, 58 Cornell L.Rev. 
399 (1973).1

 
 

[¶42.]  Responsive to the obvious deficiencies in 
the ad hoc application demonstrated by Barker, which served primarily to avoid 
constitutional protection and absolve prosecutorial delay in the conviction 
process, the United States Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 
U.S.C. § 3161-3174 (1982 ed. & Supp. IV 1986).2

 
 

The failure of previous 
judicial attempts to ameliorate the problem drew congressional attention to the 
need for a speedy trial act. Many states had already adopted their own versions 
of such an act. Congress focused particularly on the barriers to winning a 
dismissal and on the lack of interest in accelerating the trial process on the 
part of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, many of whom had come to 
rely on delay in order to deal with heavy caseloads. The rising crime rate in 
the 1960's, and the concomitant increase in the backlog in the federal courts, 
heightened the legislature's interest in solving the speedy trial problem. This 
concern over the failure of previous judicial attempts to cure the increasingly 
lengthy delays in federal criminal trials culminated in the Speedy Trial Act of 
1974.

 
 

Note, Determination of 
Dismissal Sanctions Under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, LVI Fordham L. Rev. 509, 
514-15 (1987) (footnotes omitted). Many states3 either enacted ameliorative statutes or adopted rules to meet 
practical obligations and assure workable remedies for speedy trials. The 
American Bar Association, in recognition of the insufficiency of Barker, 
provided scholastic and moralistic leadership by proposals for judicially 
adopted rules and legislative enacted statutes to establish defined time 
limitations. Among the examples of states responding were South Dakota, New Jersey, 
and North 
Carolina. State v. Reekes, 59 N.C. App. 672, 297 S.E.2d 763, review denied 307 N.C. 472, 298 S.E.2d 693 (1982). Cf. State v. Pippin, 72 
N.C. App. 387, 324 S.E.2d 900, 908, review denied 313 N.C. 609, 330 S.E.2d 615 
(1985). Included in decision was the determination that the protection of the 
Speedy Trial Acts or court rules created or confirmed new rights that were to be 
supplementary to the Barker enunciated federal constitutional right to a speedy 
trial and that a showing of prejudice was not always necessary before the rights 
for constitutional compliance could mature to justify relief. State v. Williams, 
85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (1975).

 
 

[¶43.]  In introduction, it is noted that 
Wyoming, in 
early territorial legislation, anticipated what is today the modern trend by 
about one hundred years.4 How far we are called by some to regress 
from that heritage today. Comment, The Speedy Trial Guarantee: Criteria and 
Confusion in Interpreting Its Violation, 22 De Paul L.Rev. 839 (1973); Comment, 
Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial: The Element of Prejudice and the Burden 
of Proof, 44 Temp.L.Q. 310 (1971); Note, Speedy Trials: Recent Developments 
Concerning a Vital Right, 4 Fordham Urb.L.J. 351 (1976); Note, Speedy Trial: A 
Constitutional Right in Search of Definition, 61 Geo.L.J. 657 (1973); Note, 
Speedy Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice Delay, 57 Cornell L.Rev. 794 (1972); 
Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va.L.Rev. 1587 (1965); Note, The 
Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 Colum.L.Rev. 846 (1957); Recent 
Development, Constitutional Law - Criminal Procedure - Right to a Speedy Trial - 
Where There Has Been a Substantial Delay and Claimant Raises a Prima Facie 
Showing of Resultant Harm, Burden of Proving Absence of Prejudice Held to be on 
Commonwealth, 17 Vill.L. Rev. 365 (1971).5 See also Annotation, Continuances at 
Instance of State Public Defender or Appointed Counsel Over Defendant's 
Objections as Excuse for Denial of Speedy Trial, 16 A.L.R.4th 1283 (1982) and 
Annotation, Accused's Right to Speedy Trial Under Federal Constitution - Supreme 
Court Cases, 21 L. Ed. 2d 905 (1969). Cf. Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 
Cr.App. 1987), where the Texas speedy trial act was declared 
unconstitutional under the state separation of powers concept. Assurance of a 
speedy trial remained a prosecutorial and judicial responsibility. Branscum v. 
State, 750 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App. 1988). See likewise State v. Kolb, 
755 S.W.2d 472 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1988).

 
 

[¶44.]  Realistic impairment of defense is a 
causity of extended delay with which the presumption of prejudice is logically 
related. State v. Langone, 127 N.H. 49, 498 A.2d 731 (1985). But likewise, a 
singular public interest is involved. State v. Striker, 87 Wn.2d 870, 557 P.2d 847, 851 (1976) states:

 
 

A speedy trial in 
criminal cases is not only a personal right protected by the federal and state 
constitutions (Const. art. 1, § 22), it is also an objective in which the public 
has an important interest. Some of the considerations which affect the interests 
of society generally are mentioned in a Note, Speedy Trials, Recent Developments 
Concerning a Vital Right, 4 Ford.Urb.L.J. 351, 353 (1976). The author 
states:

 
 

"A defendant in a 
criminal case can achieve definite advantages through delay. Once trial starts, 
stale cases are more easily challenged by defense attorneys on cross 
examination. Juries are often disenchanted with offenses that have occurred in 
the remote past. If prosecution witnesses become unavailable over long periods 
of time or prosecutorial ardor should wane, the guilty benefit at society's 
expense.

 
 

Aside from affecting the 
probabilities of obtaining a conviction, the speedy trial right has significant 
impacts upon the quality of judicial action and the possibilities of future 
criminal conduct. The tendency to postpone trials adds to court congestion and 
the backlog of cases. To dispose of such backlog, plea bargaining is frequently 
utilized. In the interest of expediting matters accused persons receive lighter 
sentences than those they actually may have deserved. A second impact of delay 
is to weaken the deterrent effect that the criminal justice system should have 
on would-be criminals.

 
 

Finally, the speedy trial 
right is intricately related to the needs of a well ordered society in several 
other respects. Guilty persons released on bail for too long tend to commit 
other crimes or flee the jurisdiction of the courts altogether. Defendants who 
are not bailed must spend "dead" time in local jails exposed to conditions 
destructive of human character. For those who are eventually found innocent, 
their potential to be contributing members of society through any kind of 
employment is lost during pre-trial incarceration. On the other hand, the 
possibility of rehabilitating those who are eventually found guilty is 
diminished since correction procedures cannot be started until after trial. 
These nonproductive conditions are achieved at a great financial expense to 
society."

 
 

[¶45.]  If a scholar from outer space or afar, as 
unlearned in the warp and woof of the American justice delivery system and 
constitutional law decisional processes, was asked to critique the meaning and 
interpretation of the speedy trial litigation, the person would likely opine 
that it often is a process of saying what clearly is not, must be. The 
substantive thrust of these hundreds or thousands of cases invokes balancing of 
constitutional protection against structural bending and explicating 
constitutional protection. How little is the most we will require in 
constitutional compliance and how much is the least we will accept in denial 
becomes the legalistic dilemma for applied constitutional protection in 
providing speedy trials within our society.

 
 

[¶46.]  This case and Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 
1989) pose that rational and moralistic test for this court without regard for 
the histrionics inculcated in dissents. Our constitutional oath as Wyoming jurists is not to 
guaranty the success of every prosecution or assure the approval of every 
conviction. Quite to the contrary, it is stated for us to support, obey and 
defend the constitution of the United States and of this state. 
Wyo. Const. 
art. 6, § 20. Among those rights for which we are charged to defend in 
supervisory responsibility for the operation of the justice delivery system is 
the guaranty of a speedy trial for those criminally charged. In Glasgow v. State, 469 P.2d 682, 686 n. 6 (Alaska 1970), in 
abandoning a blind adherence only to the federal approach, that court 
commented:

 
 

This interpretation 
unreasonably restricts the power of the members of this court to fulfill their 
obligation to uphold the constitution of this state. As such, it must be 
discarded.

 
 

See Comment, Right to 
Speedy Trial: Maintaining a Proper Balance Between the Interests of Society and 
the Rights of the Accused, 4 UCLA-Alaska L.Rev. 242 (1974). 

 
 

[¶47.]  It is time to reassess the state 
constitution without diminution from the morass of Barker related pre-speedy 
trial act federal law. In that direction, the least, as provided by the 
result-oriented decisions of another tribunal, should not confine the most that 
we are called to expect from this state's constitution. When the Wyoming system of justice 
is not constitutionally called to provide what is promised by rules of court and 
neither the constitution nor rule is accomplished, something is wrong in 
attitude of constitutional responsibility for this appellate court and for the 
trial judges.

 
 

[¶48.]  Perhaps, philosophically, this court 
should step back and learn something from history. Evisceration of 
constitutional rights is a quantum of gradual erosion. The guaranty of speedy 
criminal trials was a very meaningful concern in the foundation of this nation 
and remained a principal interest when the Wyoming Constitution was written 
during that hot and uncomfortable summer of 1889. Clearly, the criteria for 
justice through a speedy trial right was not an aimless admonition to society; 
it was a defined and specific prerequisite and obligation. Its 
institutionalization at Runnymede nearly 600 
years ago as a standard for justice provides scant authority for the 
vituperation with which its authenticity is attacked by some members of this 
court in these cases today.

 
 

[¶49.]  Fourteen years before statehood, as 
included in Wyo.Comp.Laws ch. 14 at 158 (1876), the substance of speedy trials 
was established for the new frontier territory:

 
 

SEC. 150. If any person 
indicted for any offense and committed to prison, shall not be brought to trial 
before the end of the second term of the court having jurisdiction of the 
offense, which shall be held after such indictment found, he shall be entitled 
to be discharged so far as relates to the offense for which he was committed, 
unless the delay shall happen on the application of the prisoner.

 
 

SEC. 151. If any person 
indicted for any offense, who has given bail for his appearance, shall not be 
brought to trial before the end of the third term of the court in which the 
cause is pending, held after such indictment is found, he shall be entitled to 
be discharged, so far as relates to such offense, unless the delay happens on 
his application, or be occasioned by the want of time to try such cause at such 
third term.

 
 

SEC. 152. If, when 
application is made for the discharge of a defendant under either of the last 
two sections, the court shall be satisfied there is material evidence on the 
part of the Territory, which cannot then be had, that reasonable exertions have 
been made to procure the same, and that there is just ground to believe that 
such evidence can be had at the succeeding term, the cause may be continued and 
the prisoner remanded or admitted to bail, as the case may require.

 
 

For further discussion of 
this provision, see: Casper, City of, v. Wagner, 
74 Wyo. 115, 284 P.2d 409 (1955); State v. 
Levand, 37 Wyo. 372, 262 P. 24 (1927); State v. 
Keefe, 17 Wyo. 
227, 98 P. 122 (1908); and Note, The Obligation of Securing a Speedy Trial, 11 
Wyo.L.J. 44 (1956).

 
 

[¶50.]  This constitutional protection and system 
prescription was first applied dispositively in Keefe, 17 Wyo. at 245, 98 P. 122. 
Chief Justice Potter, writing for the court, recognized that "[t]he Legislature 
of this state has determined for us, not unreasonably it seems, what, in certain 
cases at least, is to be regarded as a speedy trial within the meaning of the 
constitutional requirement." Id. at 245, 98 P. 122.

 
 

[¶51.]  That court recognized:

 
 

That an accused should be 
granted a trial without unnecessary or unreasonable delay is not a new idea in 
criminal jurisprudence. In theory, at least, the right may be said to have been 
recognized at common law. Under a commission to the judges of general goal 
delivery they were empowered to try and deliver every prisoner, whereby the 
jails were generally cleared at least twice in each year. * * * And by the 
habeas corpus act of 31 Car. II c. 2 (1680), it was provided, among other 
things, "that every person committed for treason or felony shall, if he requires 
it at the first week of the next term, or the first day of the next session of 
oyer and terminer, be indicted in that term or session, or else admitted to 
bail, unless the King's witnesses cannot be produced at that time; and if 
acquitted, or if not indicted and tried in the second term, or session, he shall 
be discharged from his imprisonment for such imputed offense." * * *

 
 

The term "speedy trial" 
as it occurs in the constitution has been judicially interpreted as meaning 
generally a trial as soon after indictment as the prosecution can with 
reasonable diligence prepare for, regard being had to the terms of court. * * * 
A trial "conducted according to fixed rules, regulations and proceedings of law, 
free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays." (6 Ency.L., 2nd Ed., 
993.) "A trial regulated and conducted by fixed rules of law, and any delay 
created by the operation of those rules does not work prejudice to any 
constitutional right of the defendant." (Church on Hab.Corp., sec. 254; Sample 
v. State, 138 Ala. 259 [36 So. 367 (1903)]).

 
 

Id. at 244, 98 P. 122 
(emphasis in original). This court further espoused:

 
 

[T]he questions here 
reserved are clearly constitutional, for they involve the constitutional right 
of an accused in a criminal prosecution to a speedy trial, which right is 
claimed to have been violated in this case. The statute supplements the 
constitutional provision and secures or provides a method for securing the right 
thereby declared. It is to be regarded as enacted for the purpose of rendering 
the constitutional guaranty effective, and as a legislative declaration of what 
is and what is not, under the circumstances named, a reasonable and proper delay 
in bringing an accused to trial in respect of his constitutional right 
aforesaid. The authorities uniformly hold that such statutes are enacted for the 
purpose of enforcing the constitutional right, and that they constitute a 
legislative construction or definition of the constitutional provision - a 
provision incorporated in most of the state constitutions as well as in the 
constitution of the United 
States.

 
 

Id. at 243, 98 P. 122.

 
 

[¶52.]  In 1969, as amended in 1971, this court 
adopted the present rules of criminal procedure. Included was W.R.Cr.P. 52, 
which provides:

 
 

Rules governing practice 
in district courts.

 
 

The Wyoming Judicial 
Conference may from time to time make and amend rules governing practice in the 
district courts not inconsistent with the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure or 
applicable statutes. Copies of rules and amendments so made shall, upon their 
promulgation, be furnished to the Supreme Court.

 
 

In W.R.Cr.P. 56, "Laws 
superseded," it was specifically stated that the derivation from territorial 
days of the speedy trial statutes, then most recently found in Revised Statutes 
of 1957, §§ 7-234 and 7-235, were "superseded." Surprisingly, W.S. 7-236 (1957), 
as the third territorial statute, was not included in the supersession section 
when the criminal rules were adopted. These rules of criminal procedure, in 
themselves, provided no substitute for the previous statutory limitation. Having 
at least intended to supersede the historical statutes existent before statehood 
which provide the substance for constitutional guaranty of speedy trials, no 
matter what antipathy the constitutional right may have been engendered in rule 
composition, it cannot rationally be construed that this court intended just to 
leave the bare constitutional right hanging out without protection or ancillary 
support. Consequently, in converse attribution, without regard for any inquiry 
of the appropriateness of constitutional delegation of the primary 
responsibility of this court for the judicial system and operation of the 
justice delivery system pursuant to Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 2, the adoption by the 
Wyoming Judicial Conference of the uniform rules pursuant to the enabling rule 
of this court, has specific and definable meaning. Consequently, I ascribe to 
Rule 204 in real substance; not just bland, non-binding philosophic hope. Even 
if Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 14 (1876) is repealed by present rule (which is 
questioned if no alternative is provided), its actual replacement, Rule 204, 
cannot be denied substance and meaning until this court provides a further 
superseding rule within the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure.

 
 

[¶53.]  Wyoming, 
except for Rhode Island6 which adopted and then rescinded a court 
rule, is the only state which dissected the rule by aberration through a course 
of decisions after adoption of a state rule or statutes. In denying the desired 
effect for enforced speedy trials, Wyoming found justification in the excusatory 
expletives derived from Barker. Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1986); Binger v. State, 712 P.2d 349 (Wyo. 1986); Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5 (Wyo. 1981); Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168 (Wyo. 1981). The 
initiative process in the adoption of a Wyoming rule, present Rule 204 can be 
discerned from the publicized hand wringing of this court in Cherniwchan v. 
State, 594 P.2d 464, 469 (Wyo. 1979):

 
 

Because of the mercurial 
characteristics attendant upon the proof of prejudice, and because speedy trial 
is a fundamental right, Justice Brennan, in Dickey v. Florida, supra [398 U.S. 30, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1970)], was forced to conclude:

 
 

". . . When the Sixth 
Amendment right to speedy trial is at stake, it may be equally realistic and 
necessary to assume the prejudice once the accused shows that he was denied a 
rapid prosecution."

 
 

But, how long must 
prosecution be delayed before courts are warranted in assuming prejudice? There 
are as many answers as there are courts that have attempted to answer this 
question.

 
 

We speak at length to 
these issues out of shock and concern, and in the hope that the Bar of this 
state will know that we recoil in disbelief from a set of facts which reveals 
that 107 days after arrest have been permitted to pass before the officials 
responsible have seen fit to bring the accused before a magistrate as required 
by law - thus delaying their trial accordingly. The question is not whether 
these defendants have been wronged, but only, are their wrongs prejudicial in a 
constitutional sense?

 
 

[¶54.]  Rule 204, formerly numbered Rule 22, was 
adopted by express rule authority given by this court to the Wyoming Judicial 
Conference after considerable analysis and effort by the involved district 
judges.7 

 
 

[¶55.]  This evaluation was even more deathly in 
constitutional conception and justice system development since it considered 
Rule 204, as adopted on September 14, 1979, not applicable to Estrada v. State, 
611 P.2d 850 (Wyo. 1980) as published May 28, 1980. Consequently, this court, at 
that time by intimation is debited with a supersession of what was not even 
considered.

 
 

[¶56.]  We presently demean our courts and 
responsibility to justice if this court does not either abolish Rule 204 so that 
citizens are no longer able to rely on it, or, conversely, follow it, which is 
clearly not unachievable. See People v. Beyah, 67 Ill. 2d 423, 10 Ill. Dec. 568, 
367 N.E.2d 1334 (1977); State v. Brown, 61 Md. App. 411, 486 A.2d 813, cert. 
granted 303 Md. 115, 492 A.2d 616, rev'd 307 Md. 651, 516 A.2d 965 (1986); 
Vickery v. State, 535 So. 2d 1371 (Miss. 1988); Bailey v. State, 463 So. 2d 1059 
(Miss. 1985); State v. Hoffman, 409 N.W.2d 373 (S.D. 1987); and Rudstein, Speedy 
Trial in Illinois: The Statutory Right, 25 De Paul L. Rev. 317 
(1976).

 
 

[¶57.]  In Glasgow, 469 P.2d  at 688 n. 9, the Alaska 
Supreme Court recognized:

 
 

Virtually all of the 
leading authorities who have studied the matter, however, agree that the right 
to speedy trial should be fixed in terms of days or months running from a 
specified event, excluding certain periods of necessary delay or delays at the 
instance of the defendant, which should also be identified precisely. See 
Standards Relating to Speedy Trial, § 2.1, Approved Draft, A.B.A. Project on 
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice (1968).

 
 

See State v. Cleary, 3 Conn. App. 349, 488 A.2d 831 (1985), where 
five continuances were enough and that court did not need to consider 
constitutional issues. Furthermore, the integrity of the system demands that the 
rules are strictly enforced. Striker, 557 P.2d 847. See also State v. Mack, 89 Wn.2d 788, 576 P.2d 44 (1978). The Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
Barker established only a minimum standard as had the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
establishing a supervisory rule:

 
 

"Nothing we have said 
should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in 
the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period 
within which cases must normally be brought."

 
 

State v. Stitzel, 351 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Minn. App. 1984) (quoting from Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530 n. 
29, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192 n. 29). Cf.State v. Bean, 236 Kan. 389, 691 P.2d 30 
(1984).

 
 

[¶58.]  Peering beyond the flower and fervor of 
the writings of all justices in this case, the essential message that this 
author seeks to have this court and our citizens acknowledge as this state's 
obligation is that timely disposition, as demanded by our constitution, does 
mean something. I grow weary of rules that are to be applied in society only to 
others but never to the enforcers. Any application of situational ethics and 
denigrated constitutional concept is unacceptable. Consequently, I write to 
concur most strongly with the thoughtful and persuasive majority opinion. Words 
of anguish and attack for the system's failure of performance cannot absolve a 
lack of compliance with our own rules, written and required in constitutional 
responsibility.

 
 

[¶59.]  A speedy trial means what it says, a 
speedy trial. The Wyoming district judges, through the Wyoming 
Judicial Conference, understood what it was. Answering that responsibility, the 
constitutional interest was to be supported and nurtured through the adoption of 
the uniform rules. Justice William H. Erickson of the Colorado Supreme Court, as 
a scholar and activist within the American Bar Association and as a proponent 
for effectuation of rule rights to speedy trial, recognized a decade and a half 
ago that:

 
 

The sixth amendment 
guarantee of a speedy trial has been long recognized as one of the key 
constitutional provisions in our criminal procedure.

 
 

* * * * * *

 
 

The United States Supreme 
Court in Barker propounded an ad hoc balancing approach to determine whether a 
defendant has been denied his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. This 
approach creates problems of implementation. If the boundaries of the right are 
to be developed case by case, a protracted period of problem solving will 
result. State legislatures should consider solving many of these problems at 
once by enacting statutory standards. Although the ABA standards will not 
answer all the questions that will arise, their adoption by statute or court 
rule is a desirable solution.

 
 

Erickson, supra, 10 
Hous.L.Rev. at 237-50.

 
 

[¶60.]  It was in answer to this philosophic 
responsibility that Rule 204 was developed by the Wyoming judiciary. 
Unfortunately, once adopted, its parentage and respectability have been 
regularly challenged by this court without acceptance of a replaceable standard 
of judicial responsibility. It is easy to see why the legislature invades these 
perceived vacuums of ignored responsibility by the judiciary for the actual 
performance of the justice delivery system. State v. Geraldo, 13 Ohio App.3d 27, 468 N.E.2d 328 (1983). That rational relationship of territorial statutes, Wyo.Comp. 
Laws ch. 14 at 158 (1876), to the present court rule cannot logically or 
ethically be disregarded if the constitutional prerequisite to conviction 
remains to be a speedy trial.

 
 

[¶61.]  What does this mean to Harvey in his criminal 
proceedings?8 On January 9, 1986, a criminal complaint 
was issued and the warrant executed by arrest. On January 29, 1986, he was bound 
over to district court following county court preliminary hearing and an 
information was subsequently filed on February 5, 1986 in the district court, 
with arraignment accomplished on that same date.

 
 

[¶62.]  Without benefit of explanation or 
justification, Harvey's case, as consolidated with the case of 
Phillips and the principal actor in the offenses, David L. Swasso, was first set 
for trial on January 6, 1987. Even at the time of this first setting, the Rule 
204 time limitation for trial from date of information had expired. The 
limitation should have expired in early June, or half a year before the case was 
even first scheduled for trial. A speedy trial motion was filed when the January 
1987 trial date did not stand and, by undisclosed assignment, the trial was 
further delayed to July 21, 1987. Consequently, the time from filing the 
information to the date of trial exceeded the speedy trial rule by 292 
days.

 
 

[¶63.]  We are called upon to look at this case 
on its facts in application of our constitutional responsibility. Factually, 
delay, as definable in this record, cannot be charged to Harvey from prosecutorial 
request for extension of time. Absolutely nothing is presented in this case in 
delay justification if the "flag all litigants seek to capture is * * * the 
reason for delay." United 
States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315, 106 S. Ct. 648, 656, 88 L. Ed. 2d 640, 654, reh'g denied 475 U.S. 1061, 106 S. Ct. 1289, 89 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1986). See also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 94 S. Ct. 188, 38 L. Ed. 2d 183 
(1973); Hayes v. State, 487 So. 2d 987 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986); State v. Larson, 369 N.W.2d 323 (Minn.App. 1985); Vickery, 535 So. 2d 1371; Perry v. State, 419 So. 2d 194 (Miss. 1982); State v. Forsyth, 761 P.2d 363, 369 (Mont. 1988); State v. 
Britton, 213 Mont. 155, 689 P.2d 1256 (1984); Geraldo, 468 N.E.2d 328; State v. 
Wheaton, 528 A.2d 1109 (R.I. 1987); and Williams, 530 P.2d 225. The reason for 
delay, if given, should be appropriately examined on appeal and each period 
assigned to the responsibility of the state unless the defendant caused the 
delay. People v. Ross, 145 Mich. App. 483, 378 N.W.2d 517 (1985), appeal 
denied 1/28/86; State v. Brooke, 381 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.App. 1986).

 
 

[¶64.]  Following arraignment on February 5, 
1986, Harvey promptly filed an amended motion for discovery and inspection on 
February 18, 1986 along with a motion to dismiss on the basis that sufficient 
evidence had not been presented at preliminary hearing through the then 
departing counsel. The next entry found demonstrating any action in the case was 
a letter from the trial court dated December 5, 1986, or ten months thereafter, 
which first set the cases for trial on January 6, 1987 and, secondly, 
consolidated the three cases. No evidence of a motion by the prosecution for 
consolidation is of record. Additional counsel entered an appearance for 
Harvey on 
December 15, 1986, and prior counsel withdrew on January 22, 1987. Most 
curiously then, on February 4, 1987, the trial court entered an order for 
presentence investigation which included a statement that has no other support 
in record or documentation: "THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the 4th 
day of February, 1987, and the State and Counsel for the Defendant having both 
requested a presentence investigation." The speedy trial motion was made April 
27, 1987.9

 
 

[¶65.]  The State filed a motion for discovery on 
July 2, 1987, received an apparent ex parte order for discovery on July 2, 1987, 
and then first filed some compliance with the nearly year-and-a-half-old 
discovery request of Harvey by a witness and exhibit list filed July 
2, 1987. This is post-indictment delay that does not require the showing of 
prejudice - it is presumed. People v. Archerd, 3 Cal. 3d 615, 91 Cal. Rptr. 397, 
477 P.2d 421 (1970). For Harvey, justification for the delay is simply 
non-existent in this record. People v. Hill, 37 Cal. 3d 491, 209 Cal. Rptr. 323, 
691 P.2d 989 (1984); People v. Vila, 162 Cal. App. 3d 76, 208 Cal. Rptr. 364 
(1984). When the delay by passage of time is presumptively prejudicial, adequate 
justification by the state is required. State v. Haskins, 220 Mont. 199, 714 P.2d 119 
(1986); Britton, 689 P.2d 1256.

 
 

[¶66.]  Simplistically, what is presented is a 
criminal arrest on January 5, 1986 and a convened trial July 21, 1987, without 
any explanation in the record for the delay or any events justifying extension 
or chargeability of time to Harvey's activity. If we are going to disregard 
the constitutional mandate and the clear limitation of the rules adopted for 
implementation where not only no adequate but no justification at all is 
afforded, then no delay, whether five years or fifteen years, has any greater 
call for criticism. A record that is silent will not overcome the presumption 
against forfeiture by a defendant of a constitutionally guaranteed protection. 
Com. v. Moore, 20 Mass. App. 1, 477 N.E.2d 1033, review denied 395 
Mass. 1103, 
481 N.E.2d 197 (1985); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61, 459 N.E.2d 170 (1983). If the dissents' views are true, we simply write out of our 
constitution and criminal practice any rights to require a speedy trial in 
criminal proceedings. This is the "how much is only a little evil" syndrome. 
This case comes within the well-established principles of thoughtful persuasion 
that the delay is presumptively improper unless justified. Lacking a semblance 
of justification, the constitution cannot properly be ignored or the conviction 
permitted to stand.10

 
 

[¶67.]  In first analysis, we should consider 
whether the time which exceeds the time limitation established by our court rule 
creates a violation requirement to demand justification. DeSpain v. State, 774 P.2d 77 (Wyo. 
1989); Serna v. Superior Court (People), 40 Cal. 3d 239, 219 Cal. Rptr. 420, 707 P.2d 793 (1985), reh'g denied and opinion modified 12/19/85, cert. denied 475 U.S. 1096, 106 S. Ct. 1493, 89 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1986). It is to be answered that first, in essence, we decide if there is a 
delay. Second, the delay can be presumptively prejudicial. Serna, 219 Cal. Rptr. 420, 707 P.2d 793; State v. Fairchild, 108 Idaho 225, 697 P.2d 1239 (1985).

 
 

In short the standards 
governing the statutory right to a speedy trial, which we have long observed, 
still apply, and the defendant is not obliged to show prejudice or affirmatively 
demand that his rights be observed. This is not to say, of course, that these 
factors are completely irrelevant. At times they must be considered, 
particularly where the defendant's constitutional right is asserted. If for 
instance a short delay is involved * * * or the People can show good cause * * * 
the defendant might still be entitled to a dismissal if he can demonstrate 
actual prejudice or a consistent demand for a speedy trial. * * * But when the 
delay is unreasonably long and the People have not shown good cause, the 
defendant may rely on his statutory rights without proving more.

 
 

People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 86, 335 N.E.2d 303 (1975). In application of this 
principle, "[t]he speedy trial provision of the Idaho Constitution is further 
distinguished by its close nexus to other Idaho laws establishing specific time 
frames for criminal proceedings." Fairchild, 697 P.2d  at 1241. The Fairchild 
court held:

 
 

The proper appellate 
response to an infringement of the right to a speedy trial is to set aside the 
conviction. We do not take such action lightly but believe it to be our duty 
under the unique circumstances presented here. Accordingly, the judgment of 
conviction in this case is reversed.

 
 

Id. at 1244.

 
 

[¶68.]  Absent any evidence from which waiver or 
forfeiture11 can be adduced, in concurrence, I follow 
the principle enunciated by the California Supreme Court in People v. Wilson, 60 Cal. 2d 139, 32 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48, 383 P.2d 452, 456 (1963) (quoting from People 
v. Godlewski, 22 Cal. 2d 677, 682(3), 140 P.2d 381(1943)), that statutes (or 
rules) "are `supplementary to and a construction of' the Constitution." 
Consequently, Rule 204, as long as it remains unrepealed, requires a 
constitutional function in its application. In other words, ad hoc violation of 
an implementing rule to assure constitutional protection results in a violation 
of due process, equal protection and Sixth Amendment constitutional 
guarantees.

 
 

Criminal defendants are 
constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy public trial. * * * The sixth 
amendment guarantee is a fundamental right, made binding on the states by the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. * * * The Idaho Constitution 
also affords the party accused in a criminal prosecution the right to a speedy 
trial. * * * However, the right to a speedy trial under the Idaho Constitution 
is not identical to the right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. * * 
* While inquiries into speedy trial claims under the federal constitution 
involve ad hoc determinations under guidelines established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 
(1972), the Idaho constitutional provision has been supplemented by 
legislation.

 
 

State v. Hobson, 99 
Idaho 200, 579 P.2d 697, 698 (1978) (emphasis in original). See also State v. Russell, 108 
Idaho 58, 696 P.2d 909 (1985), where delay was factually justified.

 
 

[¶69.]  To accomplish a desired conviction in 
contravention of constitutional protections, we cannot ethically engage in an 
"exercise in strained logic and judicial illusion." United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 102 S. Ct. 1497, 1510, 71 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting). I will not partake in "allowing 
doctrinaire concepts * * * to submerge the practical demands of the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial." Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 381, 
89 S. Ct. 575, 579, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1969).

 
 

[¶70.]  The constitutional mandate that "a 
defendant is entitled to a speedy trial," Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 86, 25 S. Ct. 573, 575, 49 L. Ed. 950 (1905), only acquires real meaning in application to the justice 
delivery system. Otherwise, the constitutional provision and perhaps the entire 
constitution mean nothing if it is to be so casually disregarded.

 
 

Suffice it to remember 
that this constitutional guarantee has universally been thought essential to 
protect at least three basic demands of criminal justice in the Anglo-American 
legal system: "[1] to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, 
[2] to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and [3] to 
limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to 
defend himself."

 
 

Hooey, 393 U.S.  at 
377-78, 89 S. Ct.  at 577 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S. Ct. 773, 776, 15 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1966)) (footnote omitted).

 
 

[¶71.]  In Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946 
(Alaska 1971) and Glasgow, 469 P.2d 682, the Alaska Supreme Court, addressing 
both a constitutional mandate and a rule requirement, recognized the morality 
and the integrity constituents of the court system in operation. Comment, supra, 
4 UCLA-Alaska L.Rev. 242. Likewise, we are faced here in basic fundamentals with 
the morality and integrity of the Wyoming 
judiciary as charged with the responsibility of enforcing the constitutions of 
the United 
States and of this state. Hitler's ascension to 
the totalitarian control of the Third Reich came not solely from successful 
elections of the political party, but also from result oriented abandonment of 
the operational substance of the constitution of the prior short-lived Weimar 
Republic of Germany. It is to be recognized that the hands of totalitarianism 
are only separated from any democratic system by a thin veneer provided by the 
armor of constitutional responsibility and responsiveness.

 
 

[¶72.]  In admonition and application, this court 
should in all basic constitutional interests, including attainment of speedy 
trials, follow the philosophic responsibility enunciated by Chief Justice Warren 
in Klopfer v. State of N.C., 386 U.S. 213, 223-26, 87 S. Ct. 988, 993-95, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1967):

 
 

We hold here that the 
right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the 
Sixth Amendment. That right has its roots at the very foundation of our English 
law heritage. Its first articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have 
been made in Magna Carta (1215), wherein it was written, "We will sell to no 
man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right"; but evidence 
of recognition of the right to speedy justice in even earlier times is found in 
the Assize of Clarendon (1166). By the late thirteenth century, justices, armed 
with commissions of gaol delivery and/or oyer and terminer were visiting the 
countryside three times a year. These justices, Sir Edward Coke wrote in Part II 
of his Institutes, "have not suffered the prisoner to be long detained, but at 
their next coming have given the prisoner full and speedy justice, . . . without 
detaining him long in prison." To Coke, prolonged detention without trial would 
have been contrary to the law and custom of England; but he 
also believed that the delay in trial, by itself, would be an improper denial of 
justice. In his explication of Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta, he wrote that the 
words "We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either 
justice or right" had the following effect:

 
 

"And therefore, every 
subject of this realme, for injury done to him in bonis, terris, vel persona, by any 
other subject, be he ecclesiasticall, or temporall, free, or bond, man, or 
woman, old, or young, or be he outlawed, excommunicated, or any other without 
exception, may take his remedy by the course of the law, and have justice, and 
right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any 
deniall, and speedily without delay."

 
 

Coke's Institutes were 
read in the American Colonies by virtually every student of the law. Indeed, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote that at the time he studied law (1762-1767), "Coke 
Lyttleton was the universal elementary book of law students." And to John 
Rutledge of South 
Carolina, the Institutes seemed "to be almost the 
foundation of our law." To Coke, in turn, Magna Carta was one of the fundamental 
bases of English liberty. Thus, it is not surprising that when George Mason 
drafted the first of the colonial bills of rights, he set forth a principle of 
Magna Carta, using phraseology similar to that of Coke's explication: "[I]n all 
capital or criminal prosecutions," the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 
provided, "a man hath a right . . . to a speedy trial. . . ." That this right 
was considered fundamental at this early period in our history is evidenced by 
its guarantee in the constitutions of several of the States of the new nation, 
as well as by its prominent position in the Sixth Amendment. Today, each of the 
50 States guarantees the right to a speedy trial to its citizens.

 
 

The history of the right 
to a speedy trial and its reception in this country clearly establish that it is 
one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution. [Emphasis in 
original and footnotes omitted.]

 
 

[¶73.]  My premise in special concurrence is to 
assure that Wyoming is not now left out somehow in 
accomplishment of this historical responsibility. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 37 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1973); 
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1970).

 
 

[¶74.]  I decline to strain - unconstitutionally 
- to affirm.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 It is interesting to compare the 
comprehensive analysis of Circuit Court Judge John C. Godbold in Godbold, Speedy 
Trial - Major Surgery for a National Ill, 24 Ala.L.Rev. 265 (1972), which was at 
the printers when the Barker case was determined. In his conclusion, Judge 
Godbold stated:

 
 
Without attempting to cover all 
aspects of the impact of the ABA Standards and the Second Circuit Rules upon the 
problems of speedy trial, it should be noted that they strike directly at some 
of the more difficult areas. Of great importance is the removal of the focus of 
responsibility from the defendant to the court and public prosecutor. In this 
vein, the necessity for demand by the accused is eliminated, except in the 
procedural sense of moving for discharge before trial or plea of guilty. Also, 
the ABA Standards provide for and the Second Circuit Rules both provide for and 
fix, definite time periods. The necessity for the existence and proof of 
individual prejudice is thus eliminated.

 
 

Id. at 293 (footnote 
omitted).

 
 
Obviously, his concerns were not 
answered by the ad hoc subjective balancing thesis then provided by the Barker 
decision where the length of delay is actually only considered as a triggering 
mechanism before consideration of any substantive contemplation of the 
constitutional interest. Project, Sixteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: 
United 
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 
1985-1986, 75 Geo. L.J. 713, 953 (1987).

 
 

2 See United States v. Taylor, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 101 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1988); 
United 
States v. Pollock, 726 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 
1984); Annotation, Excludable Periods of Delay Under Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161-3174), 46 A.L.R.Fed. 358 (1980); and Note, Speedy Trial Act of 1974 - 
Dismissal Sanction for Noncompliance with the Act: Defining the Range of District Courts' Discretion to Dismiss 
Cases with Prejudice, 79 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 997 
(1988).

 
 

3 Note, supra, LVI Fordham L.Rev. at 
514 n. 40 states:

 
 
See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1382 
(West 1982) (enacted 1872); Ill. Ann. Stat.Ch. 38, ¶ 103-5 (Smith-Hurd 1980) 
(enacted 1963); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 178.556 (1987) (enacted 1967); see also 
Constitutional Right, supra note 21, at 697-98. Congress sometimes referred to 
the state speedy trial acts during legislative debates. See S.Rep. No. 1021, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 14-17, 21-22 (1974); 119 Cong. Rec. 3264 (1973) (remarks of Sen. 
Ervin).

 
 
Similarly, see Iowa - Dunahoo and 
Sullins, Speedy Justice, 22 Drake L.Rev. 266, 291 (1973), which 
states:

 
 
The first and best speedy trial 
protection afforded a defendant is pursuant to a fixed-time dismissal statute 
with criteria of dismissal being demand, lapse of the fixed-time, motion to 
dismiss, and no showing of good cause for delay by the 
state.

 
 
See also South Dakota - State v. 
Hoffman, 409 N.W.2d 373 (S.D. 1987); Note, State v. Hoffman: The 180-Day Rule 
and a Lack of Balance, 33 S.D.L.Rev. 165 (1988) and New Jersey - Wice, The 
Speedy-Trial Dilemma: A Handbook on Reform, 23 Crim.L.Bull. 323 
(1987).

 
 

4 See review of the prior Wyoming statute, State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 P. 122 
(1908) and Note, The Obligation of Securing a Speedy Trial, 11 Wyo.L.J. 44 
(1956).

 
 

5 The author of Note, supra, 61 
Geo.L.J. at 657, by introduction, quotes from U.S. Const. amend. VI and C. 
Dickens, Oliver Twist 333 (Chas. Scribner & Sons, New York 
1901):

 
 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial. . . ." "`If the law 
supposes that,' said Mr. Bumble, `the law is an ass.'" [Footnotes 
omitted.]

 
 

6 Topical Survey, Annual Survey of 
Rhode Island Law for the 1987-1988 Term, 22 
Suffolk U.L.Rev. 
431, 447 (1988). SeeState v. Wheaton, 528 A.2d 1109 (R.I. 
1987).

 
 

7 The Wyoming Judicial Conference was 
initially created by order of the Wyoming Supreme Court to consist of members of 
the district bench and the justices of the Supreme Court. Under its aegis, 
twenty-six uniform rules have been adopted. The present status of the conference 
is undefined by current action of this court. Contrary to any other observed 
jurisdiction, these rules are not separately approved or adopted by action of 
the Wyoming Supreme Court and their efficacy is consequently not clarified, 
except authority for adoption is clearly granted by W.R.Cr.P. 52. Generally, 
this court has given effect to all uniform rules except the Rule 204 speedy 
trial rule. This curious treatment may be explained where the court, after 
analysis of prejudice and the balancing test as previously pursued in Estrada v. 
State, 611 P.2d 850 (Wyo. 1980), considered what was Rule 22, which now is Rule 
204.

 
 
However, our inquiry does not yet 
end. Before the Estrada opinion was handed down on May 28, 1980, the Wyoming 
Judicial Conference adopted Rule 22 on September 14, 1979. Rule 22 was not an 
issue in that case and was not considered by this court in the decision. 
Authority for promulgation of district court rules is found in Rule 52, 
W.R.Cr.P., which provides that:

 
 
"The Wyoming Judicial Conference may 
from time to time make and amend rules governing practice in the district courts 
not inconsistent with the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure or applicable 
statutes. Copies of rules and amendments so made shall, upon their promulgation, 
be furnished to the Supreme Court."

 
 
There has been no showing in this 
case that proper procedures for the promulgation of Rule 22 were not followed. 
This court does not approve or disapprove district court rules upon receipt of a 
copy as provided by Rule 52, supra. The adoption of Rule 22 by the Judicial 
Conference was obviously to set guidelines to encourage and motivate prompt 
disposition of criminal cases and to avoid a constitutional violation with 
respect to speedy trial requirements. It should be noted particularly that no 
sanction of dismissal is provided by the rule. To so provide would have caused 
it to be inconsistent with Rule 45(b), W.R.Cr.P. by defining "unnecessary 
delay," which this court has decided must be determined on a case-to-case basis 
following standards and the tests set out in Estrada. Its adoption was 
accordingly admirable but the fixing of an absolute deadline by Rule 22(d), 
Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming was in conflict 
with, superseded and modified by Estrada.

 
 
Robinson, 627 P.2d  at 171-72 
(footnote omitted).

 
 
If I were to agree that this was a 
valid conclusion, which I do not, it would follow that the territorial statute 
must remain in effect. We cannot amend the constitution by rule recision of a 
legislative enactment without at least providing an effective and working 
replacement.

 
 

8 Speedy trial was not the only issue 
presented on appeal. Matters of considerable substance are stated 
as:

 
 
Whether or not the trial court erred 
by failure to grant Appellant's Motion in Limine regarding evidence of uncharged 
wrongs or acts. Whether or not the trial court erred by imposing an illegal 
sentence and by an abuse of discretion when sentencing 
Appellant.

 
 
Whether or not the trial court erred 
by instructing the jury on flight as evidence of guilt when there was no 
evidence of flight against Appellant.

 
 
Additionally, of particular concern 
to me is the non-responsive challenge to the trial court for prejudice. See 
footnote 9, infra and Smallwood v. State, 771 P.2d 798 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., 
dissenting).

 
 

9 In July 1987, predating the 
scheduled trial which "however scheduled" occurred on July 21, 1987, Harvey, through retained 
counsel, filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge on the basis of prejudice 
as supported by affidavit and an attached letter. This letter was written by the 
trial court to counsel which, in addition to comments about other cases, stated 
with relevance to this case:

 
 
I have been requested by the 
prosecution to set the above cases [including 6. State v. Jeddy Lee Harvey and 
8. State v. Everett William Phillips] and on checking each file find that in 
Item 7 above [David L. Swasso], Swazo [sic] confessed and incriminated both 
Harvey and Phillips in Items 6 and 8. There were also other witnesses plus the 
victim. * * *

 
 
In view of the strength of all of 
these cases, I hate wasting time and money trying them and I would appreciate it 
if you could make some kind of satisfactory plea bargain. Some might be entitled 
to probation and others could get prison time. I want the prosecution and the 
defense to confer in each case, and let me know by January 19 what you want to 
do.

 
 
The letter showed a copy to the 
prior counsel for Harvey, Patrick S. Werner, who has since been disbarred by 
this court, but no copy to present counsel who entered an appearance in the case 
December 15, 1986. Counsel followed the disqualification motion with a letter to 
the trial court requesting a decision:

 
 
Please advise me of your ruling at 
your earliest convenience. This is not intended to delay the trial of the matter 
and, if the Court's ruling is in favor of recusal, I would request the trial not 
be delayed any further.

 
 
His denial is recorded by 
handwritten notation on a copy of the letter as filed July 6, 
1987.

 
 

10 A California case, in reversing conviction 
because of a denial of speedy trial where delay was not explained in either the 
brief or at oral argument, summarized:

 
 
We long ago learned, from our 
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudential history, that the crown does not win or lose a case, 
it merely sees that justice is done.

 
 
The primary function of the office 
of prosecutor is to diligently and vigilantly pursue those who are believed to 
have violated the criminal codes of the state.

 
 
In that regard, the guiding light of 
due process illuminates the field of combat and defines the depth of the duty to 
be obeyed.

 
 
While hard blows may be struck 
against an opponent, the strike may not be withheld without warrant until such 
time as occasions an adversarial disability.

 
 
The combination of circumstances 
chronicled here violated fundamental fairness, the touchstone of due 
process.

 
 
People v. Hartman, 170 Cal. App. 3d 572, 216 Cal. Rptr. 641, 648-49 (1985), review denied 
10/28/85.

 
 

11 There is a difference. See Westen, 
Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in 
Criminal Procedure, 75 Mich.L.Rev. 1214 (1977).

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom GOLDEN, J., 
joins.

 
 

Dear Lady:

 
 

The Supreme Court of 
Wyoming has elected to reverse the convictions of two of those who abducted and 
sexually assaulted you. We are persuaded that they were denied the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial. Since that right cannot be reinstated at 
this time, these individuals must go free. 

 
 

The Court had to be most 
concerned about the anxiety your tormentors experienced while they were awaiting 
trial. We assume they must have been distraught because of the uncertainty of 
what the future might hold for them. The pending charges well may have affected 
adversely their social relations, inhibited their freedom of movement, and 
caused them to suffer anxiety because of the public accusation. Possibly, they 
had some difficulty in obtaining employment, and it is likely there was a cloud 
of suspicion surrounding them.

 
 

It is true that no one 
threatened to wreak his will on them and then kill them but, on balance, these 
concerns must be afforded more significance on the scales of justice than the 
terror and trauma inflicted upon you. These factors have far more societal and 
legal significance than what these men did to you. The court can do nothing to 
change your experience, but it can address the right to a speedy 
trial.

 
 

We hope that you can 
understand and accept the decision of this court. Remember how important the 
right to a speedy trial will be to you when you commit some crime. Certainly, 
that right is equally important to all of us when we are involved in criminal 
misconduct.

 
 
Very truly yours, 

 
 
THE SUPREME COURT OF 

 
 

THE STATE OF WYOMING

 
 

What a tragic letter! 
Unfortunately, it captures the essence of the opinion of the court. I vehemently 
dissent.

 
 

[¶75.]  The majority decision in this case is not 
necessary. The thesis that the reversal of this conviction and the conviction in 
the companion case is mandated by constitutional principles is not correct. 
Justice Golden has ably summarized the law in this area in the companion case of 
Phillips, and I am pleased to join in his opinion in this case. In terms of 
constitutional requirements, these facts fit well within established 
limits.

 
 

[¶76.]  Since the reversal of these convictions 
is not required by constitutional precepts, the court's decision simply 
manifests an exercise of its supervisory authority over the trial courts. I have 
no fundamental objection to the exercise of such supervisory authority when it 
is appropriate. Doing so in this case is not a wise choice. For me, the 
propriety of invoking the supervisory authority would depend upon showing actual 
prejudice to the accused which interfered with a fair trial.

 
 

[¶77.]  While I agree that the majority approach 
is not an accurate application of constitutional requirements, I also have a 
deep philosophical difference with what the court has done. My analysis of this 
decision is based upon the premise that the application of constitutional 
principles is not an end in itself but a means to an end. Invoking 
constitutional principles as an end in itself is a purely academic approach. 
Those principles, however, evolved out of a desire to promote the well-being of 
the citizens of a fledgling nation and to secure for each of them those ideals 
articulated in the Declaration of Independence:

 
 

"* * * [T]hey are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted 
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, * * 
*."

 
 

It is in the light of 
these claims that I borrow from Handler, Jurisprudence and Prudential Justice, 
16 Seton Hall L.Rev. 571, 572 (1986), this statement, somewhat out of 
context:

 
 

"* * * Indeed, as a 
constituent and vital part of representative democratic government, the 
judiciary must be highly attuned to the needs and feelings of its citizens; it 
should be acutely aware of the public's perception of its general performance, 
as well as its particular decisions. In short, the judiciary cannot be oblivious 
to the reactions that its own actions have engendered or the effects that its 
adjudications have created within the society it serves."

 
 

My perception of the 
reaction of the society this court serves to this decision is best captured by 
parody.

 
 

[¶78.]  With all due respect to Lewis Carroll, 
one of the episodes that could be encompassed in his marvelous classic Alice's Adventures in 
Wonderland might well unfold like this:

 
 

[¶79.]  Alice was following her guide, White Rabbit, 
through a busy street in Wonderland. White Rabbit pointed to a man and said, 
"Alice, that man 
used to be a rapist."

 
 

[¶80.]  Alice, her interest piqued, replied innocently, 
"That is interesting. When did he stop being a rapist?"

 
 

[¶81.]  White Rabbit responded, "Well, you see, 
he didn't do it."

 
 

[¶82.]  This puzzled Alice, who asked, "Well, if 
he didn't do it, how can you say he used to be a rapist?"

 
 

[¶83.]  White Rabbit answered very patiently, 
"Alice, you must 
realize that he didn't do it, not because he didn't do it, but because it took 
us too long to say he did it."

 
 

[¶84.]  Alice was amused. She said, "Well, I suppose 
that does make good sense. I do wonder, however, how we knew it took us too long 
to say he did it so that it was clear that he didn't do it."

 
 

[¶85.]  White Rabbit was becoming a bit 
exasperated, but he explained, "Alice, some of our rule makers went to a private 
place and voted, and they decided that 531 days is too long to say that he did 
it. They pointed out that there is a general rule requiring us to say that he 
did it in 120 days and, therefore, if we don't say he did it in at least sooner 
than 531 days, then he didn't do it."

 
 

[¶86.]  "Oh," said Alice, "I suppose that is an appropriate thing 
for our rule makers to do, but I wonder if there was someone who was a victim 
when he used to be a rapist."

 
 

[¶87.]  White Rabbit pondered that question for a 
moment and then said, "I'm sure there must have been a victim because he could 
not have been a rapist without a victim."

 
 

[¶88.]  Alice frowned, but then her face brightened, 
and she said, "Oh, then, I would understand that, after 531 days, the person who 
was a victim isn't a victim anymore because the rapist isn't a rapist any 
more."

 
 

[¶89.]  White Rabbit applauded. "Alice," he said, "I think 
you are beginning to appreciate the wonder of Wonderland."

 
 

[¶90.]  It is appropriate to consider some of the 
wisdom of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his address entitled The Spiritual 
Exhaustion of the West delivered at commencement exercises at HarvardUniversity. In the course of those 
remarks, Solzhenitsyn said:

 
 

"* * * The defense of 
individual rights has reached such extremes as to make society as a whole 
defenseless against certain individuals. It is time, in the West, to defend not 
so much human rights as human obligations.

 
 

"Destructive and 
irresponsible freedom has been granted boundless space. Society appears to have 
little defense against the abyss of human decadence, such as, for example, 
misuse of liberty for moral violence against young people, motion pictures full 
of pornography, crime and horror. It is considered to be part of freedom and 
theoretically counterbalanced by the young people's right not to look or not to 
accept. Life organized legalistically has 
thus shown its inability to defend itself against evil.

 
 

"And what shall we say 
about the dark realm of criminality as such? Legal frames (especially in the 
United 
States) are broad enough to encourage not only 
individual freedom but also certain individual crimes. The culprit can go 
unpunished or obtain undeserved leniency with the support of thousands of public 
defenders. When a government starts an earnest fight against terrorism, public 
opinion immediately accuses it of violating the terrorists' civil rights. There 
are many such cases.

 
 

"Such a tilt of freedom 
in the direction of evil has come about gradually, but it was evidently born 
primarily out of a humanistic and benevolent concept according to which there is 
no evil inherent to human nature; the world belongs to mankind, and all the 
defects of life are caused by wrong social systems which must be corrected. 
Strangely enough, though the best social conditions have been achieved in the 
West, there still is criminality and there even is considerably more of it than 
in the pauper and lawless Soviet society. There is a huge number of prisoners in 
our camps who are termed criminals, but most of them never committed any crime; 
they merely tried to defend themselves against a lawless state resorting to 
means outside of a legal framework." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶91.]  My understanding is that people in this 
country and people in the State of Wyoming are essentially dissatisfied with the 
release of criminals based upon what they perceive to be technicalities. I know 
the immediate response is that this is not a technicality but is a significant 
constitutional principle.

 
 

[¶92.]  In applying constitutional principles 
such as the right to speedy trial, however, it is interesting to note that the 
true beneficiaries are the lawless individuals. What has occurred in the United 
States, as Solzhenitsyn so perceptively has noted, is that we have taken 
principles designed for the benefit of all the people and invoked them only to 
encourage those who commit crime with the result that they have been forged into 
shackles inhibiting the lives of most other people.

 
 

[¶93.]  It is appropriate then to contemplate the 
constitutional principle in its historical setting. I do not understand that 
there is much empirical data to support the notion that, in pre-revolutionary 
times in the United States of 
America, murderers, rapists, and other common 
criminals had any particular difficulty in having their cases resolved. Instead, 
there were people like those alluded to by Solzhenitsyn, political prisoners who 
were simply trying to defend themselves against the lawlessness of the king. Our 
forefathers deemed it important to inhibit the incarceration without trial of 
individuals who were not being brought to trial because there was a serious 
question as to whether they had committed any crime. The right to a speedy trial 
demands that such accusations be addressed with dispatch so that political 
enemies of the government cannot be disenfranchised by the imposition of 
questionable charges followed by incarceration without trial.

 
 

[¶94.]  I have no difficulty in supporting the 
constitutional principle. I even have no difficulty extending it to any criminal 
case. The difficulty that I have is with invoking the right to a speedy trial 
when it is not necessary to prevent actual prejudice, but its application, 
instead, is premised only upon an assumption of prejudice. In this instance, no 
one is able to suggest that Harvey suffered actual prejudice in defending 
the case. There is no indication that any evidence which might have been helpful 
to him has been lost in the process. Harvey was not incarcerated while awaiting 
trial. Consequently, the only prejudice that can be identified, which might 
support the invocation of this drastic remedy, is the assumption that he 
suffered personal anxiety over the public accusation, suffered inhibition of his 
freedom of movement, incurred an adverse effect on his social relations, had 
some possible difficulty in obtaining employment, and perhaps lived under a 
cloud of suspicion. I doubt that a cloud of suspicion is very troublesome to the 
guilty, and we don't have any question that Harvey is guilty. Harvey didn't even tell us 
that he was anxious or suffered any other aspect of the assumed prejudice; we 
simply presume those effects.

 
 

[¶95.]  The majority opinion appears to 
faithfully follow the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), which has been adopted by this court in other 
cases. It does so only in appearance because, properly applied, the balancing 
test does not mandate a reversal in this instance. I am not persuaded, however, 
that the balancing test which has been articulated by the Supreme Court of the 
United 
States really addresses the interests which are 
involved. Scrutiny of Barker, and the cases which have followed the balancing 
test, demonstrates that the concern of the court was a balancing of the 
interests of the prosecution in trying the case against the interest of the 
accused in preserving his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Articulated in 
this fashion, the balancing test assumes an independent interest of the 
prosecution which seems to be a superficial assumption. The State has an 
interest, it is true, but its interest is derived from the common interest of 
the citizens. On their behalf, the State is charged with protecting them from 
criminal conduct on the part of others and with enforcing the criminal statutes 
adopted to that end. The logical consideration is a balancing of this interest 
of society against the interest of the accused in preserving the constitutional 
right to a speedy trial, and I perceive that to be a far broader interest than 
the interest of the prosecution in having an opportunity to effectively try the 
case.

 
 

[¶96.]  The interest which must be balanced 
against the interest of the accused in preserving a constitutional right to a 
speedy trial is the interest which society has in protecting its collective 
members from criminal acts. Society has a particular interest, again 
representing the interest of its collective members, in seeing to the punishment 
of malefactors in an appropriate fashion. This interest is sacrificed by the 
majority opinion in this instance simply for the purpose of demonstrating the 
supervisory authority of this court and, in a sense, articulating a maximum time 
frame for bringing defendants like these rapists to trial.

 
 

[¶97.]  I am not unfamiliar with the argument 
that it is necessary to protect the constitutional rights of an individual such 
as Harvey in 
order to secure those constitutional rights for the rest of the people. My 
response simply is: of what moment are constitutional rights to those innocent 
victims of gang warfare and hooliganism that have erupted in one of our major 
cities? More specifically, of what moment are the constitutional rights of this 
victim of Harvey and his cohorts if she cannot 
walk the streets of Rock 
Springs without having this style of outrage inflicted 
upon her? Why is it necessary to set Harvey free in order to establish a 
constitutional principle that is well recognized when, in order to do so, 
prejudice to Harvey can only be perceived by speculation, not by the examination 
of a physician in a hospital emergency room nor by the perceptions of police 
officers who interrupted a crime that had the potential to be much more serious 
than it was? I have come to understand that those constitutional rights did not 
receive recognition in the context of a society in which crime was rampant. The 
motive for adopting those statements of rights was to protect citizens from 
excesses of government, and they were not influenced by the need to protect 
citizens from individuals who were out of control.

 
 

[¶98.]  It does indeed seem a fair comment that 
the individual freedoms articulated in the Bill of Rights have been applied in 
this country for the benefit only of those who themselves choose to deprive 
others of life, liberty, or property without any concern for due process of law. 
This philosophy, instead of protecting citizens, has contributed to the 
widespread lawlessness that we witness in this country. It is part and parcel of 
a loss of freedom on the part of those good citizens who now must double lock 
their doors and who are fearful of going abroad on the streets of our cities and 
towns, not only in the darkness of night but in the brightness of day. Those of 
us who serve in the judicial department need to understand that decisions such 
as this, in many subtle ways, have influenced the level of crime in our society. 
The criminals among us perceive permissiveness in results like this, and they 
are encouraged to further depredations.

 
 

[¶99.]  If these constitutional principles have 
justification in American society, shouldn't they somehow be interpreted and 
construed to the end that the interests of society are balanced against 
individual interests and not simply for the academic purpose of defining the 
specifics of broad constitutional principles. Indeed, it may be true, as 
Solzhenitsyn suggests, that Western society has lost its capacity to protect 
itself from lawlessness. I know that there will be many who will say but, of 
course, that includes lawlessness on the part of the government. Unfortunately, 
I am not able to perceive lawlessness on the part of the government in this 
instance. I can perceive negligence. I can perceive a failure to establish, as a 
matter of court records, all of the reasons that these trials were delayed. I 
can perceive an earnest effort by prosecutors to bring to the bar of justice all 
three of the perpetrators of this outrage upon this lady. But lawlessness in any 
way comparable to the conduct of these defendants is simply absent, and there is 
really nothing to balance in that regard.

 
 

[¶100.]            
In the interest of academic consideration of the constitutional right to 
a speedy trial, we have structured a bogeyman of governmental lawlessness. We 
then destroy that bogeyman in the interests, we say, of the citizens. That is 
not necessary. Perhaps we can deal with one problem at a time. The problem 
present in this instance was the commission of a vicious crime by Harvey. My judgment and my 
reason lead me to conclude that society should assure Harvey his just desserts 
for his criminal conduct. When, and if, governmental lawlessness becomes 
present, we can address that as the occasion demands. The evil which cries out 
to be addressed in our time is crime in society.

 
 

[¶101.]            
The judiciary in this country has come to be criticized because it 
releases those guilty of crime based upon technicalities. When I witness the 
product of this case, I cannot deny that claim. The majority, for the sole 
purpose of achieving an academic articulation of the constitutional concept of a 
right to a speedy trial, has deprived a citizen of Wyoming of the protection 
that our judicial system should afford her. It has set free two clearly guilty 
perpetrators of a sexual assault. I perceive that as constitutional imbalance, 
and the product of this application of constitutional principles designed to 
protect the freedom of all citizens has been to set free the guilty and leave 
the victim without recourse.

 
 

[¶102.]            
The next act already is being played in some places around this country. 
Citizens, having lost confidence in the ability or willingness of the 
constitutional system to protect them from crime, have begun to pursue vigilante 
approaches. Given the ingenious capacity of judges to find reasons to set the 
guilty free, perhaps the citizens should not be severely blamed. On the other 
hand, the "Oxbow Incident" was not a happy story, and it is far better that the 
criminal justice system be invoked and pursued than individual or mob response. 
If that is to happen, however, then the criminal justice system must have an 
accurate vision of its role, and the attempts to satisfy the innovative and 
ingenious arguments of academicians perhaps must yield to more pragmatic 
solutions.

 
 

[¶103.]            
I recognize that dissenting opinions have no force in establishing the 
rules of law. My philosophical response simply is designed to make it plain that 
the tender feelings of rapists, murderers, and other common criminals should not 
be the primary concern of the judiciary. If society is to make any progress in 
developing a stance which will offer some prospect that law-abiding citizens 
will enjoy freedom from the fear that has its genesis in the unconscionable 
criminal conduct of others, then society needs to forge justice. Justice should 
have priority over the unnecessary effort to elucidate constitutional 
principles.

 
 

[¶104.]            
I would affirm the conviction.

 
 

GOLDEN, Justice, with whom THOMAS, J., joins.

 
 

[¶105.]            
I envision your attention would be captured if the headline on tomorrow's 
newspaper screamed, "Children Devour Parent." That headline may become a reality 
because of the majority's decisions in this case and its companion case of 
Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 1989). These two decisions are the 
delinquent children of the parent case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). With the majority's help these two children have just devoured their 
parent. In the same gruesome meal, they have also devoured the doctrine of stare 
decisis. Here is how this cannibalistic parricidium happened.

 
 

[¶106.]            
In the parent case of Barker the United States Supreme Court established 
a four-part balancing test for appellate review of alleged speedy trial 
violations. In applying that test to Willie Barker's factual situation, the 
primary facts of consequence of which were nearly five years' delay from 
criminal complaint to trial and several pro forma assertions of his speedy trial 
right and nearly ten months of pretrial incarceration, the nation's highest 
court found that Willie Barker's speedy trial right had not been violated. 
Barker's conviction of murder and his resulting life sentence were not reversed, 
and he was not freed.

 
 

[¶107.]            
Mr. Harvey and Mr. Phillips, acting together, committed their kidnapping 
sexual assault in Wyoming. They were convicted by a jury of 
their peers after what they essentially admit was a fair trial. They, like 
Willie Barker, claimed their speedy trial rights were violated. They, unlike 
Willie Barker, are now free.

 
 

[¶108.]            
In applying to Mr. Harvey's and Mr. Phillips' facts of consequence the 
same balancing test used to analyze Willie Barker's predicament, the majority 
has achieved what can only be described as an inspired application of the 
doctrine of stare decisis. This latin term means that like cases should be 
decided alike. Of course, Mr. Harvey's and Mr. Phillips' facts of consequence 
were not quite the same as Willie Barker's. Willie Barker's trial was delayed 
nearly five years, Mr. Harvey's and Mr. Phillips' only eighteen months. Willie 
Barker suffered nearly ten months' pretrial incarceration; Mr. Harvey and Mr. 
Phillips suffered none. Willie Barker made several pro forma pretrial speedy 
trial assertions, as did Mr. Harvey; Mr. Phillips made none. Mr. Barker's 
conviction was affirmed and he is now serving his life sentence. Mr. Harvey's 
and Mr. Phillips' convictions were reversed and they are now roaming the streets 
of Wyoming as 
free men. Since Willie Barker's facts of consequence to the balancing test, by 
any objective measurement, were conspicuously worse than Mr. Harvey's and Mr. 
Phillips', you would naturally think these cases would be decided alike. But the 
majority of this court in Mr. Harvey's and Mr. Phillips' cases invokes a 
judicial presumption, or fiction, to hold otherwise.

 
 

[¶109.]            
Mindful of the differences between the United States Supreme Court's 
holding in Barker and this majority's holdings in Harvey and Phillips, one can 
only logically conclude the majority's inspired, yet creative, application of 
the Willie Barker balancing test dictates an absurd result: were the majority 
deciding a Willie Barker-like case today, the majority would reverse Willie 
Barker's conviction on speedy trial grounds. Thus, the very case which gave 
birth to the balancing test would be destroyed by that same test. The newspaper 
headline could then scream, "Twin Brother Devours Parent."

 
 

[¶110.]            
Although not an identical twin to its companion case of Phillips v. 
State, this case is virtually the same as that one. Whatever factual difference 
exists between the two is, for all practical intents and purposes, legally 
meaningless. To be precise, the only factual difference is this: Unlike 
Phillips' lawyer who did not assert his client's speedy trial right until 
nineteen days before trial, Mr. Harvey's lawyer made two pro forma assertions 
earlier in the litigation. Placing these assertions in proper perspective, the 
record shows he did not assert the right during the one-year period from the 
date on which the criminal complaint was filed, January 9, 1986, until January 
16, 1987. On the latter date, he filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial 
grounds, but chose not to request a hearing on that motion. After sixty days, 
that motion is deemed denied. Rule 301, Uniform Rules for the District Courts of 
the State of Wyoming. On February 14, 1987, Mr. Harvey 
joined with the prosecution in requesting a presentence investigation. On April 
24, 1987, he filed a second speedy trial motion to dismiss, but again chose not 
to request a hearing. After sixty days, that motion is deemed denied. Rule 301, 
Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming. Finally, on the 
day before trial, he joined with Mr. Phillips' brief in support of the latter's 
pro forma motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. In my view, based upon my 
reading of Barker, Mr. Harvey's speedy trial assertions are pure pro forma. Mr. 
Harvey and Mr. Phillips are two peas from the same pod.

 
 

[¶111.]            
Perhaps most disturbing is that the analysis and result in this case, and 
in its companion case Phillips, indicate to me that the majority is trying to 
use these opinions to send a message to the district judge who presided over the 
trial. They apparently want that district judge and his colleagues on the 
district court bench in Wyoming, to know that a slim majority of this court is 
willing to arbitrarily invoke its supervisory powers to free a pair of men who 
admit they were fairly convicted of kidnapping and sexual assault, and turn them 
loose on the people of Wyoming as a kind of "appellate penalty" for the delays 
in these prosecutions. What the majority is really saying here is that its ends 
justify the extreme and unwarranted means with which it has chosen to castigate 
the district court. That type of action is not proper under the applicable law 
of Barker in these cases, and is not generally befitting of the highest court of 
the State of Wyoming.

 
 

[¶112.]            
I fear that the majority has suddenly lost sight of what is really before 
it in this case and in Phillips. There is no question that excessive pretrial 
delay is undesirable. None of the justices on this court condone excessive 
pretrial delay in any sense; it was never meant to be a part of our criminal 
justice system. The abstract merit of excessive pretrial delay, however, is not 
the issue in this appeal nor was it the issue in Phillips. Also not at issue in 
these appeals is the effect of the 120-day limit imposed by Uniform District 
Court Rule 204. In fact, according to Barker,1 this is probably an issue for the people 
of Wyoming 
speaking through their legislature. The only issue before us in these cases is 
whether we will give substantive analysis to the factors identified in Barker in 
the same way the United 
States Supreme Court did in that case. I am 
convinced the majority has failed to do that.

 
 

[¶113.]            
What I said in my dissent in the Phillips case applies equally well to 
Mr. Harvey. By this reference I incorporate the Phillips dissent here. If Willie 
Barker ever reads these majority decisions, he will sure wish he had lived in 
Wyoming.

 
 

[¶114.]            
I respectfully dissent.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 "We find no constitutional basis 
for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified 
number of days or months. The states, of course, are free to prescribe a 
reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach 
must be less precise." Barker, 407 U.S.  at 523, 92 S. Ct.  at 2188, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 113.