Title: ANNE UHR WHITE v. SHANE EDEBURN CONSTRUCTION, LLC; PARIS L. EDEBURN; and PAUL B. TOZER, and SHANE EDEBURN; ANNE UHR WHITE v. CONNIE WEBB, SHANE EDEBURN, PARIS L. EDEBURN, and PAUL B. TOZER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ANNE UHR WHITE v. SHANE EDEBURN CONSTRUCTION, LLC; PARIS L. EDEBURN; and PAUL B. TOZER, and SHANE EDEBURN; ANNE UHR WHITE v. CONNIE WEBB, SHANE EDEBURN, PARIS L. EDEBURN, and PAUL B. TOZER2012 WY 118285 P.3d 949Case Number: S-11-0218; S-11-0219Decided: 09/07/2012
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2012 

ANNE UHR 
WHITE,
 
Appellant
(Defendant/Third-Party 
Plaintiff),
 
v.
 
SHANE EDEBURN 
CONSTRUCTION, LLC; PARIS L. EDEBURN; and PAUL B. TOZER,
 
Appellees
(Plaintiffs),
 
and
 
SHANE 
EDEBURN,
 
Appellee
(Third-Party 
Defendant).
As 
well as
 
ANNE UHR 
WHITE,
 
Appellant
(Plaintiff),
 
v.
 
CONNIE WEBB, SHANE 
EDEBURN, PARIS L. EDEBURN, and PAUL B. TOZER,
 
Appellees
(Defendants).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Laramie County
The Honorable Wade E. 
Waldrip, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Pro se.
 
Representing 
Appellee, Connie Webb:
Billie 
LM Addleman and Amanda M. Good, Hirst Applegate, LLP, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellees, Shane Edeburn Construction, LLC, Paris L. 
Edeburn, Paul B. Tozer, and Shane Edeburn:
Karen 
Budd-Falen and Brandon L. Jensen, Budd-Falen Law Offices, LLC, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
The issues presented 
in these appeals involve three parcels of land formerly owned by Appellant, 
Anne Uhr White, in the Table Mountain Ranches (“TMR”) 
subdivision in Laramie County, Wyoming.  In early 
2011, Appellees Shane Edeburn Construction, LLC, Paris 
Edeburn, and Paul Tozer, initiated legal action to terminate 
Ms. White’s lease on Lot 2 and Tract 12 of the TMR 
subdivision.  Ms. White counterclaimed against these parties 
and added Shane Edeburn as a third-party defendant, asserting that 
they had violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in attempting to 
terminate the lease.  Ms. White also filed a separate action 
against Appellees Shane Edeburn, Paris Edeburn, Paul 
Tozer, and real-estate agent, Connie Webb, claiming that they committed 
fraud and wrongfully conspired to deprive her of an opportunity to repurchase 
Lot 11 after she lost the property in foreclosure.  In Docket 
No. S-11-0218, Ms. White challenges the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment declaring the lease on Lot 2 and Tract 12 to be terminated and ordering 
Ms. White to vacate the property.  She also challenges the 
district court’s dismissal of her claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.  In Docket No. S-11-0219, Ms. 
White challenges the dismissal of her claims of fraud and conspiracy to commit 
fraud relating to the sale of Lot 11.1  We 
affirm the decisions of the district court in both appeals.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
In Docket No. 
S-11-0218, Ms. White presents two issues, which we rephrase as 
follows:
 
1.    
Did the district 
court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Edeburns with 
respect to their claim that Ms. White breached the lease 
agreement?
 
2.    
Did the district 
court err in dismissing Ms. White’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing?
 
The Edeburns 
state the issues in a substantially similar manner as above, but present the 
following additional issue:
 
3.    
Is the appeal of the 
termination of the lease agreement moot because the Appellant no longer has an 
interest in the real estate?
 
[¶3]      
In Docket No. 
S-11-0219, Ms. White presents three issues, which can be set forth as a single 
issue:
 
Did the district 
court err in dismissing Ms. White’s claims for fraud and conspiracy to commit 
fraud?
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]        
Prior to the events 
at issue in this appeal, Ms. White sold Lot 2 and Tract 12 in 
the TMR subdivision to Westland Holdings, Inc., which subsequently 
leased the two parcels back to Ms. White.  Ms. White resided 
in a detached camper trailer on Lot 2 and stored some belongings in a shed she 
had constructed on the property.  The lease, which commenced 
on August 19, 2010 and terminated on February 19, 2012, contained the following 
provision: 
 
5. REPAIR AND 
MAINTENANCE.  Lessee shall, at its expense, keep and maintain 
the premises in a clean, [sightly], sanitary order and in good condition 
and repair and in compliance with all local, state and federal 
regulations.  Lessee shall not cause or permit any waste or 
nuisance in or about the leased premises.
 
Westland Holdings 
subsequently sold the properties to the Edeburns on December 21, 
2010.  The properties were purchased subject to the lease 
between Westland Holdings and Ms. White.
 
[¶5]        
On January 31, 2011, 
the Edeburns notified Ms. White that she had violated Paragraph 5 of 
the lease by living in a camper trailer on Lot 2, in violation of county 
regulations, and by accumulating “trash, waste and debris,” including old 
automobiles, on the property.  The Edeburns’ notice 
allowed Ms. White ten days to come into compliance with the lease. 
 Ms. White did not address the alleged lease violations and 
continued to reside on the property after the specified termination 
date.
 
[¶6]        
The Edeburns 
responded by initiating legal action.  They sought a 
declaratory judgment that the lease was terminated and requested an injunction 
forcing Ms. White to forfeit possession of the property.  Ms. 
White filed an “Answer, Counterclaim & Third Party Complaint,” adding 
Shane Edeburn to the suit as a third-party defendant. 
 She asserted that Appellees had breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by inventing lease violations to 
serve as a pretext for their desire to remove her from the property.
 
[¶7]        
The Edeburns 
filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. 
 The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding 
that “Plaintiffs’ attempt to exercise their rights under the Lease simply does 
not constitute a breach of good faith and fair dealing. . . . The covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to force parties to ignore explicit 
provisions in the contract, which is what Ms. White desires.”  
The district court also granted Appellees’ motion for summary 
judgment, finding that Ms. White had breached the lease by failing to “maintain 
the premises in a clean, [sightly], sanitary order” and by living in her 
camper in violation of local regulations.  In Docket No. 
S-11-0218, Ms. White appeals both decisions.
 
[¶8]        
The issues in Docket 
No. S-11-0219 relate to the sale of Lot 11 in the TMR 
subdivision.  Ms. White purchased Lot 11 in 1979 and financed 
the purchase with a bank loan secured by a mortgage.  In 2009, 
Ms. White defaulted on the loan, and the bank foreclosed.  The 
property was offered for sale at auction, and the bank purchased the property 
for $114,249.03.  Ms. White did not redeem the property within 
the statutory redemption period.  The bank subsequently hired 
Connie Webb, a real estate agent, to sell the property. 
 According to Ms. White, she informed Ms. Webb that a third 
party wanted to make an offer to purchase Lot 11 when Ms. Webb was prepared to 
accept offers.  Ms. White alleged that Ms. Webb 
represented to her that the property would not be marketed until it was cleaned 
and appraised.  On February 23, 2010, with the help of 
Ms. Webb, the bank sold Lot 11 to the Edeburns for 
$22,000.00.
 
[¶9]        
Ms. White filed suit 
against Appellees, asserting claims of fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, 
“loss of enjoyment and quality of life,” and “punitive damages.” 
 She sought $3,000,000.00 in compensatory damages, plus 
additional punitive damages.  The district court dismissed the 
complaint on Appellees’ motion, finding that Ms. White had failed to 
allege facts sufficient to support her claims.  In Docket No. 
S-11-0219, Ms. White appeals that decision.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶10]     
When reviewing 
motions to dismiss, we accept the facts stated in the complaint as true and view 
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  We will 
sustain a dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the 
plaintiff cannot assert any fact which would entitle her to relief. 
 Sinclair v. City of Gillette, 2012 WY 19, ¶ 8, 
270 P.3d 644, 646 (Wyo. 2012).  
    With respect to the district court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment, we apply the following standard of 
review: 
We review a district 
court’s summary judgment rulings de novo, using the same materials and 
following the same standards as the district court. The facts are considered 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and 
we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be 
drawn from the record. Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 
126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006); Garcia v. Lawson, 
928 P.2d 1164, 1166 (Wyo. 1996).  Summary judgment 
is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 
56(c). 
Sutherland v. 
Meridian Granite Co., 2012 WY 53, ¶ 7, 
273 P.3d 1092, 1095 (Wyo. 2012). 

DISCUSSION
 
[¶11]     
In Docket No. 
S-11-0218, Ms. White contends that summary judgment was improperly granted to 
the Edeburns on their claim that she breached the lease 
agreement.  She claims the Edeburns impliedly 
consented to her existing use of the property because the Edeburns 
were aware of those conditions at the time they purchased the property. 
 Ms. White contends that residing on the property in a camper 
trailer without an occupancy permit did not constitute a breach of her promise 
to maintain “compliance with all local, state and federal regulations” because 
local regulations relating to occupancy permits do not apply to camper trailers. 
 She also asserts that whether she maintained the property in 
a “clean, sightly, sanitary order” raises a genuine issue of material 
fact.  Further, Ms. White claims that the Edeburns 
are estopped from claiming breach because they accepted the first 
month’s payment under the lease.
 
[¶12]     
The Edeburns 
respond by asserting that Ms. White’s challenge to the lease termination is moot 
because the lease expired on February 19, 2012.  They further 
claim, however, that even if Ms. White’s challenge is not moot, summary judgment 
is proper because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Ms. 
White’s failure to comply with the terms of the lease.  She 
resided on the property in a camper trailer without an occupancy permit and 
allowed various junk and debris to accumulate on the property.  
The Edeburns contend that it is undisputed that Ms. White did 
not keep the property in a clean and sanitary condition.  
Finally, the Edeburns claim that acceptance of a single rent 
payment did not constitute waiver of their right to terminate the lease because 
the lease included a provision specifying that acceptance of rent would not 
operate as a waiver of default.
 
Motion for Summary 
Judgment – Lease Violations
 
[¶13]     
We must first address 
the Edeburns’ claim that this appeal does not raise 
a justiciable controversy because the issues presented are 
moot.  “[A]n issue is moot when it no longer presents a 
live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful 
relief.”  Christian Coalition of Fla., Inc. v. United 
States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011).  
We have set forth basic principles of the mootness doctrine 
as follows: 
 
Our general law 
on justiciability provides that courts should not consider issues 
which have become moot. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Comm’n, 693 P.2d 227, 233 (Wyo. 1985). We do not decide 
cases when a decision will have no effect or pertains only to matters that might 
arise in the future. McLain v. Anderson, 933 P.2d 468, 472 
(Wyo. 1997). A case is moot when the determination of an issue is sought which, 
if provided, will have no practical effect on the existing controversy. 
Id. Therefore, if events occur during the pendency of an appeal that 
cause a case to become moot or make determination of the issues unnecessary, we 
will dismiss it. Id.; see also Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Air 
Freight, Inc., 773 P.2d 911, 924-25 (Wyo. 1989).
 
SNK v. 
State, 2003 WY 141, ¶ 18, 
78 P.3d 1032, 1037 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Wyoming Bd. of 
Outfitters & Prof’l Guides v. Clark, 2002 WY 24, ¶ 9, 
39 P.3d 1106, 1108 (Wyo. 2002)). We have 
further explained that a live controversy must persist throughout the 
duration of the suit in order for the controversy to be 
justiciable:
The doctrine 
of mootness encompasses those circumstances which destroy a 
previously justiciable controversy. This doctrine represents the 
time element of standing by requiring that the interests of the parties which 
were originally sufficient to confer standing persist throughout the duration of 
the suit. Thus, the central question in a mootness case is “whether 
decision of a once living dispute continues to be justified by a sufficient 
prospect that the decision will have an impact on the parties.” Wright & 
Miller § 
3533.            

SNK, ¶ 17, 
78 P.3d  at 1037.  
 
[¶14]     
The Edeburns 
initially raised the issue of mootness by filing a motion to dismiss 
this appeal in its entirety.  In that motion, 
the Edeburns asserted that because the lease agreement expired on 
February 19, 2012, Ms. White no longer had an interest in the property at issue, 
and consequently, any determination by this Court as to the bases upon which the 
lease agreement was terminated “would be wholly ineffectual.” 
 We denied the motion, noting that the motion “does not 
account for Appellant’s claim for damages relating [to] violation of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”  
 
[¶15]     
Although we 
previously refused to dismiss the appeal in light of Ms. White’s claim for 
damages, we note that Ms. White asserts damages only in relation to her 
counterclaim for violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as 
evidenced in her response to the Edeburns’ complaint:
 
27.  
As a result of the Counter Defendants and Shane [Edeburn] having 
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, White has been damaged and 
is entitled to judgment against the Counter Defendants and Shane 
[Edeburn] for $500,000.00 or such greater amount as the trier 
of fact may award.
 
. . .
 
30.  
White is entitled to a judgment against the Counter Defendants and Shane 
[Edeburn] for punitive damages in such amount as the trier of 
fact may award to adequately punish the Counter Defendants and Shane 
[Edeburn], and will deter such wrongful conduct of this type in the 
future.
 
            
WHEREFORE Counter Claimant and Third Party Plaintiff demands judgment 
against the Counter Defendants and Third Party Defendant as follows:
 
            
1.  Count I – Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing – the sum of $500,000.00 or such greater amount as the trier 
of fact may award.
 
            
2.  Count II – Punitive damages in such amount as 
the trier of fact may award.
 
In their brief, 
the Edeburns largely repeat the mootness argument raised 
in their motion to dismiss, but confine that argument to the issue of whether 
the lease was properly terminated, contending Ms. White is no longer entitled to 
possession of the property due to expiration of the lease term.  
While we hold that Ms. White’s claim for breach of the covenant of good 
faith presents a justiciable controversy in light of her assertion 
of damages, we agree that, because Ms. White is no longer entitled to possession 
of the property, the issue of whether the lease was properly terminated is 
moot.
 
[¶16]     
We note initially 
that other jurisdictions have held that a controversy over the right of 
possession under a lease is rendered moot by the expiration of the lease 
term.  E.g., Marshall v. Hous. 
Auth., 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006) 
(“[Appellant’s] lease expired on January 31, 2003, and she presents no basis for 
claiming a right to possession after that date. Thus, there was no live 
controversy between the parties as to the right of current possession after 
January 31, 2003, and the issue of possession was moot as of that date.”); 
Exit Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Airlines Capital Corp., 766 P.2d 129, 131 (Haw. Ct. App. 1988) (“[E]ven if this court vacated the summary 
judgment, Airlines legally cannot regain possession of the leased premises. We 
accordingly hold that the issue on appeal 'has been rendered moot.’”); 
Elliott v. Di Mari, Corp., 411 So. 2d 1088 (La. App. 4 Cir. 
1976) (“[A]s appellant’s lease has expired by its own terms and therefore it 
cannot now be placed in possession, any change in the trial court judgment would 
serve no purpose nor have any practical legal effect. The appeal must be 
dismissed as moot.”). In an analogous context, we have held that the issue of a 
student’s expulsion from school becomes moot after the expulsion period has 
expired.  Bd. of Trs. Fremont County Sch. Dist. #25 
v. BM, 2006 WY 23, ¶ 3, 129 P.3d 317, 319 (Wyo. 2006) (citing 
In re RM v. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2004 WY 162, ¶ 
8, 102 P.3d 868, 871 (Wyo. 2004)). 
        

 
[¶17]     
The Edeburns 
claimed below that they were entitled to relief in the form of a declaratory 
judgment that the lease was terminated due to Appellant’s breach, and an 
injunction requiring Appellant to remove her property from the leased 
premises.  The district court granted summary judgment on the 
requested relief, declaring that “the Lease is lawfully terminated by Plaintiffs 
due to Ms. White’s multiple breaches.”  The court further 
ordered that “Ms. White no longer lawfully possesses the premises and must 
surrender possession to Plaintiffs and must remove herself and her personal 
property from Lot 2 and Tract 12 within 30 days after entry of this Final 
Judgment and Order.”  The sole legal effect of the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment was to prevent Ms. White from maintaining 
possession of the property.  Because it is undisputed that the 
lease expired on February 19, 2012, and that the lease did not contain any right 
of renewal, any change in the district court’s decision with respect to the 
Edeburns’ claim for summary judgment would have no effect on the existing 
controversy.  Ms. White no longer has any claim to possession 
of the property and, accordingly, there is no possibility that our decision as 
to whether the lease was properly terminated will have an impact on the 
parties.  Ms. White’s challenge to the award of summary 
judgment is moot.  
 
Motion to Dismiss – 
Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
 
[¶18]     
We turn next to the 
Edeburns’ motion to dismiss Ms. White’s counterclaim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  In her 
counterclaim, Ms. White essentially alleged that the Edeburns’ 
grounds for termination of the lease agreement were motivated by their desire to 
remove her from the property.  She contends that 
the Edeburns were aware of the conditions when they purchased the 
property, and, as a result, their attempt to terminate the lease on the named 
grounds constitutes bad faith.   
 
[¶19]     
The Edeburns 
contend that termination of the lease was justified by Ms. White’s lease 
violations, and that termination was simply an exercise of their rights under 
the lease.  They note that they took reasonable steps to 
secure Ms. White’s compliance with the terms of the lease, by providing notice 
of default and a ten-day opportunity to correct the default, despite the fact 
that the lease did not require such notice or opportunity to cure.  
The Edeburns assert that their knowledge of the conditions 
existing on the property at the time of purchase does not constitute acceptance 
of those conditions under the lease. They claim that the intent of the parties 
is properly determined from the unambiguous terms of the lease agreement, and 
that the lease did not acknowledge or permit Ms. White’s unlawful or 
unsanitary living conditions.  The Edeburns assert 
that we should not infer that the parties intended to allow Ms. White’s 
non-conforming uses of the property absent an expression of that intent in the 
terms of the lease.
 
[¶20]     
We begin our analysis 
with the basic premise that “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement.”  
Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶ 84, 
226 P.3d 889, 919 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 205 (1981)).  We have stated that this implied 
covenant
 
[R]equires 
that a party’s actions be consistent with the agreed common purpose and 
justified expectations of the other party . . . . The purpose, intentions and 
expectations of the parties should be determined by considering the contract 
language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties. The 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing may not, however, be construed to 
establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties. In 
other words, the concept of good faith and fair dealing is not a limitless one. 
The implied obligation must arise from the language used or it must be 
indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties. In the absence of 
evidence of self-dealing or breach of community standards of decency, fairness 
and reasonableness, the exercise of contractual rights alone will not be 
considered a breach of the covenant.
 
Whitlock Constr., 
Inc. v. South Big Horn County Water Supply Joint Powers Bd., 2002 WY 36, ¶ 24, 
41 P.3d 1261, 1267 (Wyo. 2002) (citation omitted). Although many 
claims for breach of good faith involve questions of fact making summary 
judgment inappropriate, summary judgment may be appropriate where, under the 
facts in the record, the party’s actions were in conformity with the clear 
language of the contract. Id. 
M&M 
Auto Outlet v. Hill Inv. Corp., 2010 WY 56, ¶ 26, 
230 P.3d 1099, 1108-09 (Wyo. 
2010).       

[¶21]     
The district court 
found no merit in Ms. White’s argument that the Edeburns accepted 
Ms. White’s use of the property based on their knowledge of the condition of the 
property at the time of purchase.  The court found that the 
lease, which was attached to Appellees’ complaint, was unambiguous, and 
that Ms. White was bound by its terms:
 
Ms. White has not 
asserted that the Lease is ambiguous.  Indeed, she has 
indicated she understood all provisions of the Lease but believes that several 
provisions “do not exactly apply in this instance.” Further, the Court finds 
that the contract is clear and unambiguous and its plain language is 
applicable.
 
The court determined 
that “The covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to force 
parties to ignore explicit provisions in the contract, which is what Ms. White 
desires,” and concluded that Ms. White had not alleged facts sufficient to raise 
a claim for breach of the covenant.  
 
[¶22]     
We agree with the 
district court’s analysis.  The fact that 
the Edeburns had notice of the conditions existing on the property 
does not operate to incorporate those conditions into the terms of the lease, 
and Ms. White does not present cogent argument or pertinent legal authority 
indicating otherwise.  The language of the lease is 
unambiguous, and, accordingly, we do not venture outside its terms to determine 
the parties’ intent.  Sutherland, ¶ 
8, 273 P.3d  at 1095.  The Edeburns’ 
attempt to terminate the lease simply constitutes an exercise of contractual 
rights, insufficient to raise a claim of breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.2
 
[¶23]     
Further, 
the Edeburns provided Ms. White with notice of the lease violations 
and allowed her ten days to come into compliance with the lease, despite the 
fact that no notice of termination or opportunity to cure was required under the 
lease.  The Edeburns’ actions were in conformity with 
the clear language of the lease, and even exceeded their contractual obligations 
to Ms. White.  The facts of this case, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to Ms. White, do not give rise to a claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the decision of the district court dismissing Ms. White’s 
counterclaim.
 
Motion to Dismiss – 
Fraud and Conspiracy to Commit Fraud
 
[¶24]     
In Docket No. 
S-11-0219, Ms. White challenges the district court’s dismissal of her claims of 
fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud relating to the sale of Lot 11.  
She contends that she has stated sufficient claims of relief to preclude 
dismissal.  Ms. White contends that a realtor owes a duty of 
honesty to a prospective purchaser, and that Ms. Webb breached this duty by 
concealing facts while making arrangements to facilitate a sale of the property 
to the Edeburns.  Ms. White further asserts that 
the Edeburns gave inadequate consideration for the property, and 
that this fact alone is sufficient to raise a presumption of fraud.  
With respect to her claim of conspiracy to commit fraud, Ms. White 
simply asserts that “If the underlying tort has been pleaded sufficiently, 
conspiracy to commit fraud is a valid count.”  She repeats the 
arguments relating to her fraud claim, asserting that the amount paid for the 
property is sufficient to raise a claim of conspiracy to commit 
fraud.
 
[¶25]     
Ms. Webb and 
the Edeburns claim that, after Ms. White lost the property to 
foreclosure, she had no interest in the property that would entitle her to be 
informed of the Edeburns’ intent to purchase the property, or that would 
give her the right to make an offer on the property.  They 
claim that the bank had the right to dispose of the property, and to select a 
prospective purchaser, without any obligation to Ms. White.  
Further, Ms. Webb contends that Ms. White has failed to state a 
claim for fraud or conspiracy to commit fraud because Ms. White has not suffered 
any damage as a result of the alleged fraud or conspiracy.
 
[¶26]     
We have previously 
set forth the elements of fraud, and have explained that the facts supporting 
those elements must be alleged “clearly and distinctly”:
            

            
“The elements of a claim for relief for fraud are a false representation 
made by the defendant which is relied upon by the plaintiff to his damage, the 
asserted false representation must be made to induce action, and the plaintiff 
must reasonably believe the representation to be true. A plaintiff who alleges 
fraud must do so clearly and distinctly, and fraud will not be imputed to any 
party when the facts and circumstances out of which it is alleged to arise are 
consistent with honesty and purity of intention. Fraud must be established by 
clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, and will never be 
presumed.”          

Osborn 
v. Emporium Videos, 870 P.2d 382, 383 (Wyo. 1994) 
(quoting Lavoie v. Safecare Health Service, Inc., 
840 P.2d 239, 252 (Wyo. 1992)); see also Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson 
Real Estate Co., 8 P.3d 324, 330 (Wyo. 
2000); W.R.C.P. 9(b) (requiring that “[i]n all averments of 
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be 
stated with particularity”).        

[¶27]     
We find that Ms. 
White has failed to set forth facts sufficient to state a cause of action for 
fraud against Ms. Webb or the Edeburns.  First, with 
respect to the claim against Ms. Webb, Ms. White asserts that she was falsely 
informed that Lot 11 would not be marketed until it was cleaned and appraised, 
and that this false representation deprived her of an opportunity to submit an 
offer on the property.  However, assuming that Ms. Webb 
made this statement, Ms. White has failed to establish that she relied on the 
statement to her detriment.  Ms. White did not allege that she 
had any right to purchase Lot 11 from the bank.  Indeed, 
neither the bank nor Ms. Webb, as its agent, had any obligation to ensure that 
Ms. White received an opportunity to submit an offer to purchase Lot 
11.  Ms. White had no interest in the property after the 
statutory redemption period expired, and, accordingly, she was not deprived of 
any interest in the property and was not damaged by its sale to the 
Edeburns.  Ms. White has failed to assert a cause of 
action for fraud against Ms. Webb.
 
[¶28]     
Ms. White’s claim 
against the Edeburns must be dismissed for the same 
reasons.  Additionally, however, Ms. White has failed to 
allege that the Edeburns made any false representations to her 
regarding the sale of Lot 11.  In fact, Ms. White’s complaint 
fails to assert that the Edeburns made any representation to her 
before they purchased the property.  Further, Ms. White does 
not assert that the Edeburns had any obligation to inform her of 
their intention to purchase the property or of any details of their purchase 
offer.  Consequently, Ms. White’s allegations against 
the Edeburns have failed to satisfy any of the elements of a claim 
for fraud.
 
[¶29]     
We also conclude that 
Ms. White has failed to state a claim for conspiracy to commit 
fraud.  In the proceedings below, Ms. White did not identify 
the elements of a claim for conspiracy to commit fraud.  In 
her complaint, she alleged that Appellees “by mutual agreement, 
secrecy, and trickery, conspired to sell Lot 11 to Shane [Edeburn] at a 
price well below its current value, with the purpose of preventing the Plaintiff 
from residing on Lot 11.”  The district court found that Ms. 
White’s claim was analogous to a claim of “civil conspiracy,” which, as 
recognized by the Tenth Circuit, consists of the following elements: “(1) two or 
more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the minds in 
the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5) 
damages as the proximate cause 
thereof.”             McKibben 
v. Chubb, 840 F.2d 1525, 1533 (10th Cir. 
1988).  The district court found that Ms. White’s 
complaint could be read to satisfy the first three elements, but that the 
complaint did not satisfy the final two elements, namely, an unlawful act or 
damages resulting from an unlawful act. 
 
[¶30]     
We agree with the 
district court’s analysis.  As we have previously noted, a 
plaintiff cannot claim civil conspiracy or punitive damages without an 
underlying cause of action in tort.  Cent. Wyoming Med. 
Lab., LLC v. Med. Testing Lab, Inc., 2002 WY 47, ¶ 13, 43 P.3d 121, 126 (Wyo. 2002).  In this instance, Ms. White’s 
conspiracy claim fails for the same reasons that are fatal to her claim of 
fraud.  Fundamentally, in order to show that she was entitled 
to relief, Ms. White was obliged to allege that she suffered damages resulting 
from Appellees’ conduct.  In an effort to show that she 
was in fact harmed, Ms. White asserted in her complaint that she “was 
prevented from re-acquiring her residence on Lot 11 and has been forced to live 
elsewhere.”  As in her claim of fraud, however, Ms. White 
failed to allege that she was within the statutory redemption period at the time 
Lot 11 was sold to the Edeburns, or that she otherwise had any interest 
in the property that would entitle her to an opportunity to “re-acquire” the 
property.  Ms. White had no greater interest in Lot 11 than 
any other member of the public after the redemption period expired, and the sale 
of Lot 11 to a party other than herself is not a legally recognizable 
harm.  Construing the allegations in Ms. White’s 
complaint in the light most favorable to her, she has failed to state a cause of 
action for conspiracy to commit 
fraud.         
 
[¶31]     
Finally, Ms. White’s 
claims for loss of enjoyment of life and punitive damages must also 
fail.  As the district court recognized, neither of these 
claims for damages exist as independent causes of action.  
Cook, ¶ 46, 126 P.3d  at 897 (“A claim for punitive 
damages is an element of a cause of action; it does not constitute a separate 
claim or cause of action.”); Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 
11 (Wyo. 1980) (explaining that loss of enjoyment of life is a component of 
general damages).  Accordingly, Ms. White’s claims for loss of 
enjoyment of life and punitive damages must also be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
 
[¶32]     
Affirmed.
 
[¶33]     
FOOTNOTES
1For ease 
of reference, we will refer to Appellees Shane Edeburn 
Construction, LLC, Shane Edeburn, Paris Edeburn, and 
Paul Tozer collectively as “the Edeburns” in our discussion 
of Docket No. S-11-0218.  Likewise, we will refer to Ms. 
Edeburn, Mr. Edeburn, and Mr. Tozer collectively 
as “the Edeburns” in discussing Docket No. S-11-0219.
 
2Without reaching 
the question of whether Ms. White violated the lease by living in a camper 
trailer and by accumulating various items of scrap and personal property around 
her trailer, we note that photos of the property included in an affidavit from 
Shane Edeburn reveal accumulation of various items of property on 
the leased land, including: tires, plastic bins, bottles, ladders, hoses, garden 
implements, fence posts, wood scraps, automobiles, wire fencing, and various 
piles of trash and debris.  Ms. White does not dispute that 
the photographs accurately depicted the condition of the leased 
property.  Further, at the hearing on the Edeburns’ 
motion to dismiss Ms. White’s counterclaim, Ms. White did not contest the 
fact that she was living on the property in violation of county 
regulations.  Rather, Ms. White asserted, as she does on 
appeal, that the Edeburns accepted the condition of the land, and 
the fact of her habitation in a camper trailer, due to their knowledge that 
these conditions existed at the time the property was 
purchased.