Title: Commonwealth v. Hammond

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12096 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  AMANDA L. HAMMOND. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     October 6, 2016. - July 21, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & 
Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Sentence, Sex offender.  Due 
Process of Law, Sentence, Sex offender.  Sex Offender 
Registration and Community Notification Act.  Evidence, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, 
Videotape, Sexual conduct.  Practice, Criminal, Admissions 
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Redaction, 
Argument by prosecutor, Sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 10, 2012. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Richard 
J. Chin, J.; the cases were tried before Cornelius J. Moriarty, 
II, J., and a motion for postverdict relief was heard by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the defendant. 
 
Stacey L. Gauthier, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  The defendant, a twenty-two year old woman, was 
convicted of raping a fourteen year old boy and two thirteen 
year old boys, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23.  On appeal, 
the defendant claims that there were three main defects with her 
prosecution:  (1) the incriminating statements she made to 
police should have been suppressed; (2) the video recording of 
these statements that was shown at trial should have been 
further redacted; and (3) the prosecutor's closing argument was 
improper.  In addition, the defendant contends that the trial 
judge's lack of authority to relieve her from registering as a 
sex offender under G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), constitutes a due 
process violation, as applied to her. 
 
We conclude that there was no reversible error and affirm 
the convictions.  We further conclude that, based upon the 
record before us, there is no as-applied due process violation. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the evidence the Commonwealth 
adduced at trial, reserving further details for discussion of 
the specific issues raised on appeal. 
 
The charges in this case stem from two separate but related 
episodes that took place in June, 2012, in Brockton.  The first 
episode began when the defendant met up with two of the victims, 
3 
 
 
Roy,1 then age thirteen, and David, then age fourteen,2 in a 
park.  The boys, whom she knew before these events, accompanied 
her to a liquor store and waited outside.  When the defendant 
left the store she was with a man named Mike, who was in his 
thirties.  They had purchased beer and "nip" liquor bottles.  
The defendant seemed "relatively intoxicated" and was drinking 
alcohol after leaving the liquor store. 
 
The group made their way into the woods at the park.  Mike 
asked Roy and David if they had ever had sex before.  Roy 
responded with a "snide remark about [Mike] trying to have sex 
with [him]," but Mike said he was talking about them having sex 
with the defendant.  Roy replied, "Oh, okay."  Mike then asked 
the defendant if "she was okay" with performing oral sex on the 
boys.  She responded, "Yeah."  The defendant then performed oral 
sex on each boy, as well as on Mike.  This first episode in the 
woods lasted about ten to fifteen minutes. 
 
Roy, David, and the defendant then went to a friend's house 
that was near the park.  At the house were two other boys, the 
third victim, James, then age thirteen, and Arthur, who was 
twelve.  The group spent about one-half hour at the house.  
                                                          
 
 
1 We refer to all of the underaged boys discussed in this 
opinion by pseudonyms. 
 
 
2 The only evidence in the record of the precise age of 
David and another of the victims is the equivocal testimony of 
Roy.  The defendant does not contest the ages that were 
asserted. 
4 
 
 
During this time, Roy told James about his sexual encounter with 
the defendant.  James asked Roy to "get [the defendant] to do it 
again."  The boys convinced the defendant to go with them to a 
store.  All five walked toward the store via a path through the 
park.  The defendant was stumbling as she walked, aided by two 
of the boys. 
 
The second episode began as the group proceeded down the 
path.  Roy and James coaxed the defendant into having sex with 
them.  The defendant had vaginal intercourse with James, Roy, 
and David.  She also had oral sex with James during the second 
episode.  Arthur did not participate. 
 
As the group left the woods, Arthur's father, who had been 
searching for his son, was waiting.  Arthur told his parents 
what he had observed, and the police were called. 
 
Several weeks after the incidents, Brockton police went to 
the defendant's house, and she agreed to accompany them to the 
police station for an interview.  There, she spoke with two 
detectives who had observed an earlier interview of James.  
During the defendant's interview, she acknowledged that she had 
had oral sex with Roy and David during the first episode and 
vaginal sex with Roy, David, and James during the second 
episode.  At the end of the interview, the defendant was placed 
under arrest.  She was eventually indicted on six counts of 
5 
 
 
statutory rape of Roy, David, and James in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 23. 
 
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress her 
statements to police.  The motion was denied after an 
evidentiary hearing. 
 
Following a jury trial where Roy and Arthur both testified 
under grants of immunity, the defendant was convicted on the 
three indictments charging vaginal intercourse and found not 
guilty on the three indictments charging oral penetration.  The 
judge imposed concurrent three-year probationary sentences with 
several conditions.  The judge also concluded that he could not 
relieve the defendant from registering with the Sex Offender 
Registry Board (SORB), G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), but stayed the 
registration requirement pending an appeal.  We granted the 
defendant's application for direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Voluntariness of confession.  Before 
trial, the defendant moved to suppress statements she made 
during the police interview, alleging they were obtained in 
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-474 (1966), 
and that they were not voluntary.  The judge denied the motion 
in a written memorandum.  On appeal, the defendant argues only 
that this decision was in error because the Commonwealth did not 
meet its burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that her 
confession was voluntary because the police (1) threatened to 
6 
 
 
adversely affect her child custody situation; (2) minimized the 
consequences of confessing to statutory rape; and (3) used false 
and deceptive tactics when they characterized Arthur's 
allegations against her.  Commonwealth v. O'Brian, 445 Mass. 
720, 724, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 898 (2006). 
 
When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we "review 
de novo any findings of the motion judge that were based 
entirely on documentary evidence."  Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 
Mass. 461, 464 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 Mass. 
531, 539 (2014).  Because there is a video recording of the 
defendant's interview with police, "we are in the same position 
as the motion judge to determine what occurred during the 
interview."  Monroe, supra at 464, quoting Thomas, supra at 535 
n.4. 
 
"The test for voluntariness . . . is 'whether, in light of 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
statement, the will of the defendant was overborne to the extent 
that the statement was not the result of a free and voluntary 
act.'"  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 207 (2011), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Souza, 428 Mass. 478, 483-484 (1998).  A 
statement is voluntary when it is "the product of a 'rational 
intellect' and a 'free will,' and not induced by physical or 
psychological coercion."  Monroe, 472 Mass. at 468, quoting 
Tremblay, 460 Mass at 207.  "Under this 'totality of the 
7 
 
 
circumstances' test, we consider all of the relevant 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation and the individual 
characteristics and conduct of the defendant."  Tremblay, 460 
Mass. at 207, quoting Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 663 
(1995).3  The Commonwealth must establish voluntariness beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 256 
(2012). 
 
i.  Alleged coercion relating to defendant's children.  The 
defendant claims that the detectives improperly threatened that 
she might not regain custody of her children if she did not 
cooperate.  Concern for a child or loved one can, in certain 
circumstances, make a statement involuntary.  Monroe, 472 Mass. 
at 469; Commonwealth v. Scott, 430 Mass. 351, 355 (1999).  Those 
circumstances are not present here.  In Monroe, supra, we held 
that the police tactics were improperly coercive in part because 
the interrogation was "rife with threats to the defendant's 
ability to maintain contact with his infant daughter."  There, 
"the detectives threatened the defendant with the loss of 
                                                          
 
 
3 Factors that are relevant to the totality of the 
circumstances inquiry include, but are not limited to, "promises 
or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant's 
age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience 
with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental 
condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency 
(whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the 
interrogation."  Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 663 
(1995), quoting Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413 
(1986).  No one factor is dispositive.  See Commonwealth v. 
Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 256 (2012); Selby, 420 Mass. at 664. 
8 
 
 
contact with his child by repeatedly and falsely claiming that 
if he did not tell them what happened, the child could be taken 
away and raised by strangers."  Id. 
 
The references to the defendant's children in the instant 
case were quite different.  As the detectives urged the 
defendant to confess, the defendant said, "I have children.  I'm 
trying to protect myself."  One of the detectives responded: 
"If that's what's hanging you up is you're afraid if you 
tell us, you're never going to get your kids back, is that 
what you're afraid of?  That's it, isn't it?  Yeah, okay.  
I mean, and I understand that, okay.  But listen, you're 
not doing yourself any good lying to us and we know you're 
lying to us.  I can see it." 
 
This exchange is far from the "barrage" of references to the 
suspect's daughter in Monroe.  See Monroe, 472 Mass. at 467. 
 
ii.  Alleged minimization.  The defendant claims that her 
confession was not voluntary because the detectives improperly 
"minimized" the consequences of confessing to the crime of 
statutory rape.  Specifically, the defendant claims that by 
threatening her with a charge of rape by force,4 her only choice 
was to confess to statutory rape. 
 
Minimization, combined with other factors, may render a 
confession involuntary because it can serve as an implied 
promise that the requested confession will result in leniency.  
                                                          
 
 
4 During the police investigation, James initially said in 
an interview that he had been forcibly raped by the defendant. 
9 
 
 
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 439 (2004).  
Here, the detectives' tactics were not improper.  One of the 
detectives were aware that James had said in his interview that 
the defendant forced him to have sex.  The police were trying to 
understand what happened; they were not improperly minimizing 
the gravity of the crime of statutory rape to elicit a 
confession. 
 
iii.  Alleged false and deceptive tactics.  The defendant 
argues that the detectives' characterization of Arthur's 
allegations was false and deceptive because the detectives 
suggested that the boy had claimed that he was "propositioned" 
by the defendant, and that Arthur had agreed with James's 
characterization of the rapes as forcible. 
 
The use of false and deceptive tactics by police, while not 
strictly forbidden, can cast doubt on the voluntariness of a 
statement.  See DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. at 432-433, and cases 
cited.  Such tactics are inappropriate.  They will not by 
themselves ordinarily render a statement involuntary, as their 
use is one factor in the analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances.  Tremblay, 460 Mass. at 208; Selby, 420 Mass. at 
663-664. 
 
The detectives falsely claimed that Arthur had said the 
defendant "propositioned" him on one occasion, and they never 
explicitly said that Arthur was unsupportive of James's claim of 
10 
 
 
forcible rape.  These statements constituted a fraction of the 
forty-odd minute long interview.  Further, at the time of the 
interview there was a real question whether the rapes were 
forcible based on James's interview.  To the extent that these 
misstatements in the interview could be described as false and 
deceptive, we conclude that the defendant's will was not 
overborne.  See Selby, 420 Mass. at 664-665 (confession 
voluntary even though police improperly used photocopy of random 
handprint to suggest defendant was at crime scene). 
 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the judge was 
correct in ruling that the defendant's confession was voluntary.  
The defendant appeared sober and oriented during the interview.  
She was provided Miranda warnings even though she was not in 
custody, and she was specifically told that she could leave and 
get an attorney if she so chose.  Moreover, the defendant 
demonstrated the ability and mental agility to deny any sexual 
contact with the boys through her initial rendition of what had 
occurred.  We affirm the order denying the defendant's motion to 
suppress.5 
                                                          
 
 
5 The defendant also claims that her poor educational and 
mental health background contributed to her vulnerability to 
coercion.  The defendant does nothing more to support these 
claims than point to her own statements in the interview that 
she was "kind of slow" and suffered from depression and bipolar 
disorder.  On this record, there is nothing indicating that any 
shortcomings in the defendant's educational or mental health 
background rendered her confession involuntary.  See 
11 
 
 
 
b.  Redaction of video recording.  The defendant argues 
that the judge committed prejudicial error by failing to redact 
the following two statements by the detectives from the video 
recording of the defendant's interview with police:  (1) "You're 
talking rape by force or statutory, okay," and (2) "You want to 
know why I know you are telling the truth? . . . You are telling 
[Arthur]'s story verbatim right now.  Other than he knows the 
order.  He remembers the order."  The judge allowed the first 
statement to provide context to what the judge found to be the 
"implied admissions" of the defendant during the interview.6  The 
judge allowed the second statement because it provided context 
for the defendant's statement that she could not recall the 
order in which she had sex with the boys. 
 
"Whether evidence is relevant and whether its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect are 
matters entrusted to the trial judge's broad discretion and are 
not disturbed absent palpable error."  Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 350, 351, 357, cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004) (affirming denial of motion to 
suppress where expert testimony from both defendant and 
Commonwealth showed defendant had intellectual functioning 
between "mildly mentally retarded to borderline"); Commonwealth 
v. Beland, 436 Mass. 273, 282 (2002) (affirming denial of motion 
to suppress where defendant had prior diagnosis of schizophrenia 
and psychosis). 
 
 
6 According to the judge, the "implied admissions" made by 
the defendant were the following statements:  "The way to look 
at it it's bad"; "People mess up"; and "But you still have to 
have the consequences." 
12 
 
 
456 Mass. 182, 192 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 
Mass. 570, 578-579 (2001).  We will conclude that there has been 
an abuse of discretion only if the judge has "made 'a clear 
error of judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the 
decision, . . . such that the decision falls outside the range 
of reasonable alternatives" (citation omitted).  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
 
The judge worked diligently with the attorneys in this case 
to redact any potentially prejudicial statements in the 
recording. The full recording of the defendant's interview with 
police was more than forty minutes, while the recording 
ultimately shown at trial, after careful redaction, was less 
than one-half hour, and there are nearly twenty transcript pages 
describing the discussion between the judge and the attorneys of 
what to redact.  The decision not to redact two statements by 
police to provide context in an interview of more than twenty-
seven minutes was well within the range of reasonable 
alternatives.7 
                                                          
 
 
7 The defendant further complains that the prejudicial 
effect of these two statements was enhanced because the jury had 
access to the recording during deliberations and watched it 
multiple times.  After the jury began deliberations, the 
prosecutor asked the judge if the jury could have the recording.  
The judge stated, "If they request it, sure."  Defense counsel 
did not object to this.   Where evidence is admissible, it is not 
error for the jury to view it during deliberations in its 
admissible form.  It was not an abuse of discretion to allow the 
jury to view during deliberations the defendant's recorded 
13 
 
 
 
c.  Closing argument.  The defendant asserts that the 
prosecutor's closing argument was "rife" with improper arguments 
that warrant the grant of a new trial. 
 
After reviewing the six statements the defendant 
identifies, in light of the prosecutor's entire argument and in 
light of the judge's instructions to the jury and the evidence 
at trial, we conclude that any errors in the prosecutor's 
closing argument did not prejudice the defendant.  Commonwealth 
v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 785 (2011). 
 
Four of the six statements were proper.  First, the 
prosecutor did not improperly shift the burden to the defendant 
when he argued that it was more likely that the defendant would 
have gone to the police after the first episode when Mike was 
involved if she had truly been a victim, rather than returning 
to the woods with two of the same boys.  See Commonwealth v. 
Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 142 (2007) (prosecutor entitled to 
invite jury to draw fair inferences from evidence).  Second, the 
prosecutor urged the jury to decide the case on the facts when 
he asked a rhetorical question that implored the jury to regard 
the case no differently from how they would if the victims were 
female and the defendant male.  See Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
statements that had been admitted in evidence.  Commonwealth v. 
Freiberg, 405 Mass. 282, 305, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989) 
("Because the tapes were admitted in evidence, the jury were 
free to listen to them as often as they pleased during 
deliberations"). 
14 
 
 
Mass. 514, 516 (1987) (proper for prosecutor to argue for 
conviction based on evidence).  Third, the prosecutor did not 
improperly vouch for Roy and Arthur when he mentioned that they 
were immunized, because it is proper to argue that the 
motivation of witnesses is to tell the truth and to mention the 
possibility of perjury charges if a witness testifies 
untruthfully.  Commonwealth v. Webb, 468 Mass. 26, 36 (2014).  
Fourth, the prosecutor's statement regarding the timeline of the 
day of the crimes was a reasonable inference from the evidence. 
 
Two of the prosecutor's statements were improper.  The 
first improper statement was the prosecutor's invocation of his 
oath to suggest his personal belief in the defendant's guilt.8  
Defense counsel objected to this statement, and the trial judge 
agreed that the reference to taking an oath would have been 
"better left unsaid."  The judge gave a curative instruction on 
this issue during his final instructions.9  Although the 
prosecutor's reference to his oath was improper, it was not 
                                                          
 
 
8 The prosecutor said, "Frankly, I have a little bit of 
sympathy for [the defendant].  But I took an oath to the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to faithfully and fairly prosecute 
the laws of the Commonwealth.  And you as jurors took an oath to 
follow the rules of law as explained to you by [the judge]." 
 
 
9 The judge's instruction was:  "[T]here was reference by 
one of the attorneys during the closing arguments that he had 
taken an oath.  Ladies and gentlemen, I suggest to you the mere 
fact that the assistant district attorney may have taken an oath 
does not give him any greater knowledge as to the credibility of 
any witness.  It is for you to determine the credibility of all 
the witnesses in this case." 
15 
 
 
overly prejudicial when viewed in context of the entire argument 
and in conjunction with the judge's effective curative 
instruction.  See Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 162-
163 (2007).  The jury are presumed to have followed the judge's 
instruction.  Id.10 
 
The second improper statement occurred when the prosecutor 
told the jury the purpose of the statute the defendant was 
charged under was to protect minors.11  The judge agreed with the 
defendant that this remark "should not have been stated."   The 
prosecutor's statement was improper.  Jurors decide facts and 
apply those facts to the law.  An appeal to policy reasons for 
the enactment of criminal statutes is inappropriate argument.  
The issue at trial is not whether rape of a child is wrong.  It 
                                                          
 
 
10 The defendant also argues that the prosecutor's reference 
to the jurors' oath was improper.  This was not a call upon the 
jury to do their "job" by convicting the defendant.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 328-329 (2000) (improper 
argument to tell jurors to "do your job" where it implicitly 
meant jury had duty to convict).  Here, the prosecutor was not 
suggesting to the jurors that their oath obliged them to 
convict, rather he was telling the jury to follow the law given 
to them by the judge.  See Commonwealth v. Adams, 434 Mass. 805, 
822 (2001). 
 
 
11 The prosecutor argued, "And I suggest to you that there 
is a darn good reason for this statute.  Because young people 
under the age of sixteen aren't mature enough to make the 
decision to engage in sex.  They don't truly understand the 
potential ramifications, be it unwanted pregnancy or sexually 
transmitted diseases.  It doesn't matter whether the boys wanted 
the sex, enjoyed the sex, or whether they wanted to testify in 
court.  None of that matters.  We as a society have a greater 
interest in protecting minors from themselves in these kind of 
situations." 
16 
 
 
is.  The issue is whether the Commonwealth has proved 
penetration and that the age of the complainant is under sixteen 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The judge, however, gave a corrective instruction.12  Where 
there is an improper argument, "we must and do recognize that 
closing argument is identified as argument, the jury understands 
that, instructions from the judge inform the jury that closing 
argument is not evidence, and instructions may mitigate any 
prejudice in the final argument."  Kozec, 399 Mass. at 517. 
Given the pointed curative instruction and the judge's entire 
charge, including instructing the jury not to decide this case 
on sympathy, we cannot say that this statement by the prosecutor 
was prejudicial. 
 
d.  Due process challenge.  Before imposing the sentence of 
straight probation, the judge ordered the defendant to undergo a 
sex offender evaluation performed by a licensed clinical social 
worker.  The social worker reported that the defendant was not a 
pedophile and not sexually dangerous.  Based on this, the 
defendant asked the judge to stay her obligation to register as 
a sex offender pursuant to G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C to 176P.  The 
                                                          
 
 
12 The judge told the jury, "In [the prosecutor]'s closing 
argument to you he referenced what he believed to be the 
purposes of the statute.  Your focus is upon the evidence.  It 
is not upon the purposes of the statute.  All right?  So to the 
extent that there is some suggestion that you should be 
influenced by the purposes of the statute, and I am not 
suggesting that there was, you should disregard it." 
17 
 
 
judge concluded that he had no authority to relieve the 
defendant of her obligation to register because her offenses 
involved children, see G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), but agreed to 
stay her obligation to register pending appeal. 
 
The defendant now argues that the statute, which 
categorically deprives a sentencing judge of authority to 
relieve a defendant of the obligation to register in any case 
involving a sex offense against a child, is unconstitutional as 
applied to her under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and arts. 1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights. 
 
We begin with an overview of the relevant portion of 
Massachusetts sex offender registry laws to clarify the due 
process issue, and then turn to the particulars of the 
defendant's claim. 
 
i.  Massachusetts sex offender registry scheme.  In 1999, 
the Legislature overhauled the sex offender registry law after 
an earlier version was successfully challenged on due process 
grounds.  See Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 422-423 
(2001).  The 1999 statute requires adults convicted of a sex 
offense (as well as juveniles adjudicated as having committed a 
sex offense) to register with SORB.  G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C, 178E, 
178K.  The registration process essentially involves two stages. 
18 
 
 
 
During the first stage, which occurs shortly after 
sentencing, those who must register submit their information to 
SORB, which then transmits the data to local police and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  See G. L. c. 6, § 178E 
(c); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.06(1) (2016).  A sentencing judge 
has the authority in certain circumstances to relieve the 
offender of this preliminary obligation and thus allow the 
offender to avoid the registration process entirely.  For 
example, a judge who does not sentence an offender to immediate 
confinement has the authority -- and indeed is directed -- to 
determine whether that person should be required to register at 
all.  G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f).13  The judge, however, is precluded 
by the statute from relieving any person who, like the 
defendant, has been convicted of a sex offense with a child from 
registering as a sex offender.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f).  
Those who are not relieved of the obligation to register by the 
sentencing judge will then go through the second stage of the 
process. 
                                                          
 
 
13 "In the case of a sex offender who has been convicted of 
a sex offense . . . and who has not been sentenced to immediate 
confinement, the court shall . . . determine whether the 
circumstances of the offense in conjunction with the offender's 
criminal history indicate that the sex offender does not pose a 
risk of reoffense or a danger to the public.  If the court so 
determines, the court shall relieve such sex offender of the 
obligation to register under sections 178C to 178P, inclusive.  
The court may not make such a determination or finding if the 
sex offender . . . has been convicted of a sex offense involving 
a child . . . ."  G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f). 
19 
 
 
 
During the second stage, SORB prepares an initial 
classification of the offender as a level one, two, or three 
offender, based on the person's dangerousness and the degree of 
risk (from low to high) that the person poses to reoffend.  
G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a)-(c).  Following the initial 
classification, offenders required to register have a right to 
challenge SORB's decision at a de novo administrative hearing.  
G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2).  At this hearing, SORB has the burden to 
prove the appropriateness of its classification by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 
v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 298 (2015).  The 
determination reached after the de novo hearing is considered 
the final classification.  G. L. c. 6, § 178L (2).  Following 
the hearing, the offender has a right to appeal the final 
classification decision to the Superior Court.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178M; G. L. c. 30A, § 14. 
 
For certain sex offenses, SORB, like the sentencing judge, 
has the authority to relieve the offender of the obligation to 
register because his or her circumstances do not indicate a risk 
of reoffense or a danger to the public.  G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) 
(d).14  SORB, like the judge during sentencing, however, is 
                                                          
 
 
14 "The board may, upon making specific written findings 
that the circumstances of the offense in conjunction with the 
offender's criminal history do not indicate a risk of reoffense 
or a danger to the public and the reasons therefor, relieve such 
20 
 
 
precluded from relieving any person who has been convicted of a 
sex offense with a child of his or her registration obligation 
(unless that person has already been registered for ten years).  
Id.  Significantly, if an offender is relieved of the 
registration obligation by the board at the second stage of the 
process, the information received from the offender during the 
first stage and transmitted to the local police and FBI is 
removed from the registry and the police and FBI are so 
notified.  Id. 
 
ii.  The defendant's claim.  When government action 
interferes with a protected liberty or property interest, 
procedural due process concerns arise.  Roe, 434 Mass. at 427 
(2001), citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  
Where there is interference with such an interest, a court must 
look at "the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action . . . the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sex offender of any further obligation to register, shall remove 
such sex offender's registration information from the registry 
and shall so notify the police departments where said sex 
offender lives and works or if in custody intends to live and 
work upon release, and where the offense was committed and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. . . . The provisions of this 
subsection shall . . . not apply if a sex offender has been 
convicted of a sex offense involving a child or a sexually 
violent offense, and such offender has not already registered 
pursuant to this chapter for at least ten years . . . ." G. L. 
c. 6, § 178K (2) (d). 
21 
 
 
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest."  Mathews, 
424 U.S. at 335.  Procedural due process requires a "pragmatic 
and flexible" analysis, as opposed to a "rigid [and] 
hypertechnical" one.  Roe, 434 Mass. at 427.  Due process "calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands."  Id., quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972). 
 
A defendant's due process rights are implicated in 
different ways during the first stage and the second stage of 
the registration process.15 
 
A.  Stage one.  The defendant's case currently resides in 
stage one of the SORB process, where the only recognized 
interest at stake for the defendant is having to send her 
registration information to SORB, which would then transmit that 
information to law enforcement.  Roe, 434 Mass. at 428.  She is 
not being classified at this stage, and, as we explain below, is 
                                                          
 
 
15 We distinguish the issue in this case from the issue in 
Commonwealth v. Dalton, 467 Mass. 555 (2014).  In that case, the 
sentencing judge concluded that the use of "may not" in G. L. 
c. 6, § 178E (f), see supra note 13, gave a judge discretion to 
relieve a defendant convicted of a sex offense involving a child 
and not sentenced to immediate confinement from the obligation 
to register with SORB.  Id. at 555-556.  We held that the plain 
language of the statute precluded such discretion.  Id. at 559.  
Here, the Commonwealth is correct to point out that Dalton 
precludes the defendant from relief from registration based on 
the statute.  That does not mean, however, that the defendant 
may not challenge the statute on constitutional grounds.  See 
Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 442 (2001) (facial validity 
of statute does not preclude as applied due process challenges). 
22 
 
 
not precluded from seeking relief from the registration 
requirement at stage two.  Her information would not be publicly 
disseminated at this stage.  She is only being required to send 
her information to the board.  This requirement infringes to 
some extent on her liberty, see id. ("The mere fact that a 
citizen is being forced to take some action [unconnected from 
the citizen's own desire to engage in a form of regulated 
activity] infringes, to at least some extent, on his liberty"), 
but her interest is slight compared to the considerable 
governmental interest at this stage. 
 
The government interest at stake here is the protection of 
"the vulnerable members of our communities from sexual 
offenders."  St. 1999, c. 74, emergency preamble.  In crafting 
the law, the Legislature found "the danger of recidivism posed 
by sex offenders, especially sexually violent offenders who 
commit predatory acts characterized by repetitive and compulsive 
behavior, to be grave and that the protection of the public from 
these sex offenders is of paramount interest."  St. 1999, c. 74, 
§ 1.  "It also found that 'law enforcement agencies' efforts to 
protect their communities' from sex offenders are 'impaired by 
the existing lack of information known about sex offenders who 
live within their jurisdictions'; that the registration of sex 
offenders is a proper exercise of police powers 'regulating 
present and ongoing conduct, which will provide law enforcement 
23 
 
 
with additional information critical to preventing sexual 
victimization'; and that the 'registration by sex offenders is 
necessary in order to permit classification of such offenders on 
an individualized basis according to their risk of reoffense and 
degree of dangerousness'" (emphases omitted).  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 
780, 789-790 (2008) (Doe No. 8725), quoting St. 1999, c. 74, 
§ 1. 
 
On balance, and on the record before us, we conclude that 
the governmental interest in ensuring that law enforcement has 
accurate information on the defendant, who was convicted of 
three indictments charging child rape, at this preliminary stage 
of the registration process significantly outweighs the 
defendant's liberty interest in not having to mail her 
registration information to SORB.  Roe, 434 Mass. at 430-431.  
There is, in short, no due process violation in the defendant's 
having to send her information to SORB, or in the judge's being 
unable under the statute to relieve her of the obligation to do 
so. 
 
B.  Stage two.  Because we do not find a due process 
violation in the first stage of the sex offender registration 
process, the defendant will have to move forward into the second 
stage.  That is, after she submits her information to SORB she 
will then undergo the SORB classification process.  This stage 
24 
 
 
of the SORB process, which can result in a defendant being 
classified as a sex offender, implicates much more serious 
liberty interests for the defendant that are entitled to strong 
procedural due process protections.  See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 
426 Mass. 136, 143 (1997).  See also Doe No. 8725, 450 Mass. at 
792.  The defendant, however, is not yet at that stage.  The 
only claim she has made so far -- indeed, the only claim she can 
properly make at this time in the context of this direct appeal 
from her convictions -- is her due process challenge to the 
sentencing judge's authority at the first stage, which we have 
already addressed.  In the context of this criminal case it 
would be imprudent for us to attempt to go further and decide 
whether the forthcoming SORB classification process will itself 
result in a due process violation.16 
 
We are not blind to the virtual certainty that the 
defendant will be classified as at least a level one sex 
offender.  The statute does not permit the board to relieve any 
offender who has been convicted of an offense involving a child.  
See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (d).  Nothing we have said, however, 
                                                          
 
 
16 We note that the vast majority of cases that challenge 
various aspects of the sex offender registration scheme on due 
process grounds come to the court in the context of civil 
litigation where SORB is a party and the statutory and 
constitutional challenges have been fully briefed.  Here, the 
challenge is part of a criminal appeal where the bulk of the 
arguments are focused on the defendant's trial, its surrounding 
circumstances, and her sentencing. 
25 
 
 
prevents the defendant from reasserting her as applied due 
process challenge during stage two of the process.  SORB will 
have a fuller record than the sentencing judge on which to 
assess the defendant's dangerousness and risk of reoffense. 
Although SORB as an administrative agency does not have the 
authority to find the statute unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied, Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 628 (2011), there appears 
to be nothing in the statute that would prevent it, when making 
its classification decision, from finding that the defendant 
presents no risk of reoffense or danger to the public, if that 
is the case.  The defendant would be able to present that 
favorable finding (or challenge any adverse finding) in an 
appeal to the Superior Court under G. L. c. 6, § 178M, and G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14, or in a declaratory judgment action, and argue 
that the mandatory registration requirement of G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (d), constitutes a due process violation.  A Superior 
Court judge would then have the benefit not only of the 
sentencing judge's assessment, but also of SORB's insight into 
her risk of recidivism and dangerousness when addressing her due 
process claim. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgments below are affirmed.  We also 
hold that there has been no due process violation in the judge's 
26 
 
 
declining to relieve the defendant of her obligation to register 
as a sex offender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
HINES, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part, with 
whom Lenk and Budd, JJ., join).  Although I agree that the court 
properly rejected the defendant's appeal from the denial of her 
motion to suppress and other alleged errors, I write separately 
to express disagreement with the court's resolution of the 
defendant's claim that G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), is 
unconstitutional as applied to her.  The court spurns the 
defendant's constitutional claim, taking the position that no 
due process right is implicated by the defendant's provision of 
the registration data to the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) 
and SORB's transmission of that information to law enforcement 
authorities.  In my view, this analytical approach fails to take 
the full measure of the liberty interest at stake for this 
defendant who, having been convicted of statutory rape under 
G. L. c. 265, § 23, but determined by the trial judge to present 
no danger to the "vulnerable" population protected by the 
statute, is subject to mandatory registration, with all its 
attendant consequences.  Therefore, I dissent. 
 
Contrary to the court's view, the burden on the defendant's 
liberty interest is not simply in having to provide her 
registration data to SORB and live with the consequences of 
having that information transmitted to law enforcement 
authorities.  That measure for a protected liberty interest may 
be appropriate in circumstances where the outcome of the 
2 
 
 
registration process is not fixed, as where SORB has the 
authority to determine that the defendant presents no risk of 
sexual reoffense and may be relieved of the obligation to 
register at all.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (d) (relief from 
registration based on "risk of reoffense or a danger to the 
public" cannot be granted to a "sex offender [who] has been 
convicted of a sex offense involving a child" and "has not 
already registered . . . for at least ten years"). 
 
Here, of course, the irrebuttable presumption of 
dangerousness compels at least a level one classification which 
imposes certain restraints on the defendant's liberty.  See Doe, 
SORB No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 308 
(2015); G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a).  Where a defendant is forced 
to register, despite posing no danger to the community, this 
"presents an 'importantly distinct kind of constitutional 
danger,' because it 'forces an action on the person required to 
register.  It is a continuing, intrusive, and humiliating 
regulation of the person [her]self.'"  Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 
780, 792 (2008) (Doe No. 8725), quoting Doe v. Attorney Gen., 
426 Mass. 136, 149 (1997) (Fried, J., concurring).  Even though 
registration data is not released publicly, the defendant will 
be "singled out and brought to the attention of the law 
enforcement agencies in the municipalities in which [she] 
3 
 
 
live[s] and work[s]" because SORB immediately shares that 
information with local law enforcement and the FBI (citation 
omitted).  Doe, No. 8725, supra at 791.  G. L. c. 6, § 178E (c).  
The defendant's ability to move from her home, work, or place of 
higher learning is restricted because she must provide SORB ten 
days' notice before moving.  G. L. c. 6, § 178E (h)-(j).  
Further, if she is a homeless person, the defendant must verify 
her registration every thirty days.  G. L. c. 6, § 178F.  The 
police and SORB may release the registration data of level one 
offenders to the Department of Children and Families, which may 
question the safety of the defendant's children.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (a).  See Adoption of Anton, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 667, 
668 (2008).  Thus, the defendant's liberty interest is not de 
minimis. 
 
We have come to this bridge before.  In Doe, No. 8725, 450 
Mass. at 785-786, we acknowledged that, "where the record would 
establish 'that Doe poses no risk at all [of reoffense]' the 
application of the statutory provisions that permanently 
foreclose his being relieved of the duty to register may be 
'constitutionally vulnerable.'"  Id., quoting Doe, Sex Offender 
Registry Bd. No. 1211 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 
750, 762 (2006).  See Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 445 
(2001) ("While the Legislature is justified in providing for the 
dissemination of registration data to law enforcement 
4 
 
 
authorities when the persons the Legislature seeks to regulate 
may be dangerous and at risk of committing another offense, it 
is not justified in doing so with respect to those persons who 
neither the Legislature nor the [SORB] could rationally find 
present a threat to vulnerable persons").  Therefore, I am 
persuaded that the defendant's liberty interest is not so narrow 
as to forgo any consideration of due process protections.  For 
that reason, the court should consider whether the time has come 
to answer the unresolved constitutional question that hangs over 
this case, and provide guidance for similarly situated 
defendants. 
 
As I have noted above, the issue is significant for this 
defendant and others who are able to credibly establish that 
they are not dangerous to vulnerable persons.  And, the issue is 
presented here on a record that has not been challenged as 
lacking in credibility.  Therefore, I see no reason to avoid the 
issue by sending the defendant on a journey where the end will 
be the same as the beginning.  SORB has no authority to relieve 
her of the obligation to register.  Nor does the Superior Court 
have such authority; the limitations on the trial judge in this 
case are the same as those faced by the Superior Court in a 
G. L. c. 30A review of the SORB classification decision.  
Because the issue ultimately will come to this court and the 
defendant has no other means to raise this claim, she is 
5 
 
 
entitled to a determination by this court whether the statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to her.  Instead of sending the 
defendant on this futile quest for relief, this court should 
just decide the issue. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of the issue, it has not 
been properly briefed by the parties, making it unwise to go 
further than a recognition that the nature of the liberty 
interest at stake justifies further consideration by this court.  
Therefore, I would order supplemental briefing by the parties 
and invite amicus briefs by interested parties, including the 
Attorney General, and preserve the option for argument on the 
issue.