Title: MaineToday Media, Inc. v. State

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2013 ME 100 
Docket: 
Cum-13-155 
Argued: 
September 9, 2013 
Decided: 
November 14, 2013 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
 
MAINETODAY MEDIA, INC. 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  MaineToday Media, Inc., d/b/a Portland Press Herald/Maine Sunday 
Telegram, appeals from a decision of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, 
Cole, J.) upholding the State of Maine’s denial of MaineToday’s request to inspect 
and copy Enhanced 9-1-1 (E-9-1-1) call transcripts.  MaineToday argues that the 
Freedom of Access Act (FOAA), 1 M.R.S. §§ 400-414 (2012), mandates 
disclosure of the transcripts as public records and that no exception to their 
disclosure applies.1  We vacate the judgment. 
                                         
1  The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the New England First Amendment Center, the 
Maine Association of Broadcasters, the Maine Freedom of Information Coalition, the Maine Press 
Association, and the Associated Press have filed a joint amicus curiae brief in support of MaineToday’s 
position. 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The parties stipulated to the following facts.  During 2012, Derrick 
Thompson, his mother Susan Johnson, and his girlfriend Alivia Welch were 
renting an apartment in Biddeford from landlord James Earl Pak.  On 
December 29, 2012, at 6:07 p.m., Thompson placed a call to E-9-1-1 regarding an 
altercation with Pak.  Biddeford police responded to the call and left after speaking 
with Thompson and Pak.  Three minutes after police left the scene, and forty-seven 
minutes after Thompson’s initial E-9-1-1 call, Johnson placed a second call to 
E-9-1-1 to report that Pak had shot her, Thompson, and Welch.2  Eight minutes 
after that, Pak’s wife, Armit Pak, placed a third call to E-9-1-1.  All three calls 
were recorded and transcripts for each have been prepared. 
[¶3]  On January 2, 2013, MaineToday sent the first of a series of requests to 
inspect and copy the three Pak transcripts to the Biddeford Police Department, the 
Maine State Police within the Department of Public Safety (MSP), the Attorney 
General’s Office, and the Bureau of Consolidated Emergency Communications.3  
                                         
2  Pak was charged by criminal complaint on December 31, 2012, and held without bail.  State v. Pak, 
ALFSC-CR-2012-2747 (Me. Super. Ct., York Cty.).  On February 5, 2013, he was indicted on two counts 
of intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2012); one count of aggravated attempted 
murder (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 152-A(1) (2012); one count of elevated aggravated assault (Class A), 
17-A M.R.S. § 208-B(1)(A) (2012); and one count of burglary (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(B)(1) 
(2012).  Pak pleaded not guilty to all charges, is undergoing psychiatric evaluations, and remains in jail 
awaiting his trial.  
 
3  Although MaineToday eventually requested “all E-9-1-1 transcripts in connection with all active 
homicide investigations and all ongoing homicide prosecutions, including but not limited to the three calls 
 
3 
The State4 denied the requests on the ground that the transcripts constituted 
“intelligence and investigative information” in a pending criminal matter, and 
therefore were confidential pursuant to the Criminal History Record Information 
Act (the CHRIA), 16 M.R.S. §§ 611-623 (2012).   
[¶4]  MaineToday petitioned the Superior Court for review of the State’s 
denial pursuant to 1 M.R.S. § 409(1).  In March of 2013, after conducting a 
hearing and an in camera review of the unredacted transcripts and the audio 
recordings of each E-9-1-1 call in the Pak matter, the court affirmed in its entirety 
the State’s denial of MaineToday’s request.  MaineToday appeals. 
II. DISCUSSION 
[¶5]  This case “highlights the conflict that exists between the public interest 
in open access to governmental records, on the one hand, and the public interest in 
protecting the integrity of criminal investigations . . . on the other.”  Lewiston 
Daily Sun v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 619, 622 (Me. 1991).  We consider, for the 
first time, the public disclosure of information transmitted through E-9-1-1 calls by 
evaluating the interplay of three distinct Maine statutes—FOAA; the CHRIA; and 
the emergency services communication statute (the ESC), 25 M.R.S. §§ 2921-2935 
(2012). 
                                                                                                                                   
on the day of the James Pak shooting,” the parties’ argument focuses only on the Pak transcripts, and 
those are the only transcripts we consider in this appeal. 
 
4  The State, as represented by the Attorney General’s office, apparently accepted the ultimate 
responsibility for responding to MaineToday’s requests. 
 
4 
[¶6]  In interpreting these provisions, we first look to the plain language of 
the provisions to determine their meaning.  Anastos v. Town of Brunswick, 
2011 ME 41, ¶ 9, 15 A.3d 1279.  If the language is unambiguous, we interpret the 
provisions according to their unambiguous meaning “unless the result is illogical 
or absurd.”  Cyr v. Madawaska Sch. Dep’t, 2007 ME 28, ¶ 9, 916 A.2d 967.  If the 
plain language of a statute is ambiguous—that is, susceptible of different 
meanings—we will then go on to consider the statute’s meaning in light of its 
legislative history and other indicia of legislative intent.  Anastos, 2011 ME 41, 
¶ 9, 15 A.3d 1279; Competitive Energy Servs. LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 
2003 ME 12, ¶ 15, 818 A.2d 1039. 
[¶7]  Pursuant to 1 M.R.S. § 409(1), the Superior Court conducted “a trial de 
novo” to determine whether the denial of MaineToday’s FOAA request “was not 
for just and proper cause.”  Although the parties filed an agreed-to statement of 
facts, we review any additional findings made by the Superior Court for clear error, 
and consider its legal conclusions, including the interpretation of the relevant 
statutory provisions, de novo.  Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, 
¶ 10, 871 A.2d 523. 
 
5 
A.  Applicable Statutes 
1.  Freedom of Access Act 
[¶8]  Like its federal counterpart, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 
5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-31 approved 8-9-13),5 FOAA’s 
“basic purpose . . . is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a 
democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors 
accountable to the governed.”6  John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 
146, 152 (1989) (quotation marks omitted).  The Legislature has declared that 
“public proceedings exist to aid in the conduct of the people’s business,” and 
enacted FOAA with the express intent that public actions “be taken openly and that 
the records of [public] actions be open to public inspection and [public] 
deliberations be conducted openly.”  1 M.R.S. § 401; see Citizens Commc’ns Co. v. 
Att’y Gen., 2007 ME 114, ¶ 9, 931 A.2d 503.  To that end, FOAA requires 
generally that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a person has the right to 
inspect and copy any public record in accordance with this section within a 
                                         
5  “Cases decided pursuant to FOIA inform our analysis of Maine’s FOAA.”  Blethen Me. 
Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, ¶ 13, 871 A.2d 523. 
 
6  “The generation that made the nation thought secrecy in government one of the instruments of Old 
World tyranny and committed itself to the principle that a democracy cannot function unless the people 
are permitted to know what their government is up to.”  U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772-73 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
6 
reasonable time of making the request to inspect or copy the public record.”7  
1 M.R.S. § 408-A; see S. Portland Police Patrol Ass’n v. City of S. Portland, 
2006 ME 55, ¶ 6, 896 A.2d 960.  To best promote its “underlying purposes and 
policies as contained in the declaration of legislative intent,” FOAA explicitly 
states that it must be “liberally construed and applied.”  1 M.R.S. § 401.  
[¶9]  Excepted from the definition of public records, however, and therefore 
exempt from the general rule of disclosure, are records that fall within any one of 
nineteen categories set out in 1 M.R.S. § 402(3)(A)-(R).  See S. Portland Police 
Patrol Ass’n, 2006 ME 55, ¶ 6, 896 A.2d 960.  “The burden of proof is on the 
agency or political subdivision [from whom the information is sought] to establish 
just and proper cause for the denial of a FOAA request.”8  Anastos, 2011 ME 41, 
¶ 5, 15 A.3d 1279 (quotation marks omitted); see 1 M.R.S. § 408-A(4).  Further, 
the necessary corollary of the directive to liberally construe FOAA is the “strict 
                                         
7  A “public record” is  
any written, printed or graphic matter or any mechanical or electronic data compilation 
from which information can be obtained, directly or after translation into a form 
susceptible of visual or aural comprehension, that is in the possession or custody of an 
agency or public official of this State or any of its political subdivisions, or is in the 
possession or custody of an association, the membership of which is composed 
exclusively of one or more of any of these entities, and has been received or prepared for 
use in connection with the transaction of public or governmental business or contains 
information relating to the transaction of public or governmental business. 
 
1 M.R.S. § 402(3) (2012). 
 
8  To the extent we have suggested that the party who submitted a FOAA request bears the burden of 
establishing a FOAA violation, we clarify now that it is the agency’s burden—in denying the request, 
before the Superior Court, and before us—to show that some exception to FOAA applies.  See, e.g., 
Yusem v. Town of Raymond, 2001 ME 61, ¶ 16, 769 A.2d 865; Chase v. Town of Machiasport, 1998 ME 
260, ¶ 9, 721 A.2d 636. 
 
7 
construction of any exceptions to the required public disclosure,” Citizens 
Commc’ns, 2007 ME 114, ¶ 9, 931 A.2d 503. 
[¶10]  The parties do not dispute that the audio recordings of E-9-1-1 calls 
and documents transcribing those audio recordings are in the possession of one or 
more government agencies—here, the Bureau of 
Emergency Services 
Communication, the Attorney General’s Office, the Biddeford Police Department, 
the Maine State Police, and the Department of Public Safety, at least—and are used 
in connection with public or governmental business, that is, the provision of public 
emergency services.  See 1 M.R.S. § 402(3); Dow v. Caribou Chamber of 
Commerce & Indus., 2005 ME 113, ¶¶ 10-18, 884 A.2d 667 (discussing whether 
an entity is a government agency with reference to its function, source of funding, 
whether the government maintains involvement in or control over the entity, and 
whether it was created by private or legislative action). 
[¶11]  The audio recordings of E-9-1-1 calls and the transcripts of those calls 
therefore are subject to disclosure as public records unless they fall within one of 
the exceptions found in 1 M.R.S. § 402(3)(A)-(R).  Of these, the only exception 
relevant to the present matter is one for “[r]ecords that have been designated 
confidential by statute.”  1 M.R.S. § 402(3)(A).  Whether the transcripts of the Pak 
E-9-1-1 calls do not qualify as public records and are exempt from FOAA because 
 
8 
they are confidential pursuant to a statute first depends on an analysis of the ESC, 
and then on the application of the CHRIA. 
2.  Emergency services communication 
[¶12]  Pursuant to the ESC, it is the duty of the Emergency Services 
Communication Bureau (the Bureau), within the Public Utilities Commission, to 
“implement and manage” the E-9-1-1 system.9  25 M.R.S. § 2926(1).  Pursuant to 
25 M.R.S. § 2926(3), the Bureau has promulgated various rules regarding the 
E-9-1-1 system.  9 C.M.R. 65 625 001 (2007).  These rules provide, inter alia, that 
both sides of the conversation for every incoming E-9-1-1 call must be recorded, 
with the year, date, and time of each call contemporaneously documented.  
9 C.M.R. 65 625 001-4 § 3(4)(B).  Those recordings must be retained for at least 
thirty days, and ideally, for at least sixty days.  9 C.M.R. 65 625 001-4 
§ 3(6)(B)(3).  The statute further provides that “[t]he system databases, wherever 
located or stored, are the property of the bureau and their confidentiality is 
governed by section 2929.”  25 M.R.S. § 2926(6).   
[¶13]  Section 2929, in turn, draws a distinction between the transcripts of 
E-9-1-1 calls and the audio recordings of the calls; it states that although the 
                                         
9  Although MaineToday filed its FOAA request with the Bureau of Consolidated Emergency 
Communications, that agency is part of the Department of Public Safety and provides call-taking and 
dispatching services for municipalities and entities that do not have their own public safety answering 
point.  25 M.R.S. §§ 1533, 2923-A (2012).  It is the Emergency Services Communication Bureau, within 
the Public Utilities Commission, that administers the E-9-1-1 system and maintains E-9-1-1 records.  
25 M.R.S. § 2926(1), (6) (2012). 
 
9 
E-9-1-1 audio recordings are “confidential and may not be disclosed,” the 
“information contained in the audio recordings is public information and must be 
disclosed in transcript form.”  25 M.R.S. § 2929(4). 
[¶14]  When an E-9-1-1 transcript is requested pursuant to section 2929(4), 
however, “confidential information” from that call, as defined in 25 M.R.S. 
§ 2929(1), may not be disclosed.10  For purposes of section 2929, only the names, 
addresses, telephone numbers, and certain medical information of particular people 
qualifies as “confidential information.”  In addition, the statute expressly provides 
that when a transcript contains such “confidential information,” any other 
information from those calls that is not “confidential information” remains subject 
to the disclosure requirements of FOAA.  25 M.R.S. § 2929(3). 
[¶15]  In short, title 25 may be read consistently with FOAA to require that, 
upon request, E-9-1-1 transcripts—but not the audio recordings themselves—must 
be disclosed after any “confidential information” as defined in section 2929(1) is 
removed.11  The next issue, then, is whether, even if redacted pursuant to section 
                                         
10  The statute contains exceptions that allow the disclosure of E-9-1-1 audio recordings, including 
“confidential information” from those recordings, to certain agencies for specific purposes.  25 M.R.S. 
§ 2929(2)(A)-(D), (4)(A)-(D) (2012).  None of these exceptions applies here. 
 
11  The issue of redaction itself is also the subject of some dispute.  The statute requires the excising of 
confidential information from an otherwise public document.  25 M.R.S. § 2929(1)-(3) (2012); see 
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 2000 ME 126, ¶ 11 n.4, 754 A.2d 353.  In some 
instances, however, the information “cannot be dissected into sensitive and nonsensitive information 
because [it is contained in] a single, integrated [document].  Anastos v. Town of Brunswick, 2011 ME 41, 
¶ 12, 15 A.3d 1279.  The Superior Court in this matter determined that redaction was not appropriate: 
“Due to the abstract nature of the danger, redacting the transcripts is not feasible . . . .”  The State does not 
 
10 
2929, the Pak E-9-1-1 transcripts are otherwise “designated confidential by statute” 
such that they do not meet the definition of public records and the disclosure 
generally mandated by FOAA does not apply.  1 M.R.S. § 402(3)(A).  The statute 
on which the State relies in arguing that the E-9-1-1 transcripts are “designated 
confidential by statute” is the CHRIA.    
3.  Criminal History Record Information Act 
[¶16]  The CHRIA dictates whether, when, to whom, and how criminal 
history information may be disclosed.  16 M.R.S. §§ 611-623.  As it applies to the 
present matter, the CHRIA limits the “dissemination of intelligence and 
investigative information” as follows:12   
1. Limitation on dissemination of intelligence and 
investigative information.  Reports or records that contain 
intelligence and investigative information and that are prepared by, 
prepared at the direction of or kept in the custody of a local, county or 
district criminal justice agency; the Bureau of State Police; [or] the 
Department of the Attorney General . . . are confidential and may not 
be disseminated if there is a reasonable possibility that public release 
or inspection of the reports or records would: 
 
A. Interfere with law enforcement proceedings;  
 
B. Result in public dissemination of prejudicial information 
concerning an accused person or concerning the prosecution’s 
                                                                                                                                   
argue that the transcripts here are too integrated with confidential information to redact, but rather that 
“surgical redaction” is too burdensome for it to accomplish.  The statute contains no exception to 
disclosure based on the onerousness of the task, however. 
 
12  The intentional dissemination of confidential intelligence and investigative information is a Class E 
crime.  16 M.R.S. § 614(4) (2012). 
 
11 
evidence that will interfere with the ability of a court to impanel 
an impartial jury; 
 
C. Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 
D. Disclose the identity of a confidential source;  
E. Disclose confidential information furnished only by the 
confidential source;  
F. Disclose trade secrets or other confidential commercial or 
financial information designated as such by the owner or source 
of the information or by the Department of the Attorney 
General;  
G. Disclose investigative techniques and procedures or security 
plans and procedures not generally known by the general 
public;  
H. Endanger the life or physical safety of any individual, 
including law enforcement personnel;  
I. Disclose conduct or statements made or documents submitted 
by any person in the course of any mediation or arbitration 
conducted under the auspices of the Department of the Attorney 
General;  
J. Disclose information designated confidential by some other 
statute; or  
K. Identify the source of complaints made to the Department of 
the Attorney General involving violations of consumer or 
antitrust laws.  
. . . .   
16 M.R.S. § 614(1).  The unambiguous language of section 614 demonstrates the 
Legislature’s intent to shield law enforcement from the obligation to disclose 
 
12 
materials that might compromise its public safety mission.  As we have said, the 
“important policy objectives” of section 614 are those of  
(1) protecting the integrity of criminal prosecutions and the 
constitutional right of those charged with crimes to a fair and 
impartial jury; (2) maintaining individual privacy and avoiding the 
harm that can result from an unjustified disclosure of sensitive 
personal or commercial information; and (3) ensuring the safety of the 
public and law enforcement personnel.  
 
Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc., 2005 ME 56, ¶ 12, 871 A.2d 523 (footnotes 
omitted).   
[¶17]  Despite these important objectives, confidentiality pursuant to the 
CHRIA is afforded only if the record that the government seeks to shield 
(1) contains intelligence or investigative information; (2) was prepared by or at the 
direction of, or is kept in the custody of, a criminal justice agency; and (3) would, 
if disclosed, create a reasonable possibility of one or more of the harms detailed in 
section 614(1)(A)-(K). 
B.  Analysis 
1.  Intelligence or investigative information 
[¶18]  For purposes of section 614, “intelligence and investigative 
information” is defined as  
information collected by criminal justice agencies or at the direction 
of criminal justice agencies in an effort to anticipate, prevent or 
monitor possible criminal activity, including operation plans of the 
collecting agency or another agency, or information compiled in the 
course of investigation of known or suspected crimes, civil violations 
 
13 
and prospective and pending civil actions.  “Intelligence and 
investigative information” does not include information that is 
criminal history record information. 
 
16 M.R.S. §§ 611(8) (emphasis added).  Section 611(8) therefore presents two 
alternatives by which a record could meet this definition—if it is collected by or at 
the direction of a criminal justice agency with regard to criminal activities or if it is 
compiled in the course of investigating a crime. 13   
 
 
a.  Collected by or at the direction of a criminal justice agency 
[¶19]  Because the ESC makes clear that E-9-1-1 transcripts are the property 
of the Bureau no matter where they are located or stored, the entity at issue in 
determining whether E-9-1-1 transcripts are collected by or at the direction of a 
criminal justice agency is the Bureau itself.  25 M.R.S. § 2926(6).  
[¶20]  A “[c]riminal justice agency” is defined as “a federal, state, district, 
county or local government agency or any subunit thereof that performs the 
administration of criminal justice under a statute or executive order, and that 
allocates a substantial part of its annual budget to the administration of criminal 
justice” and includes “[c]ourts and the Department of the Attorney General.”  
16 M.R.S. § 611(4).   
                                         
13  To the extent MaineToday suggests that information compiled in the investigation of a crime only 
qualifies as intelligence or investigative information if it was compiled by a criminal justice agency, it has 
misread the plain terms and structure of the statute, which provides for two distinct alternatives.  
16 M.R.S. § 611(8) (2012). 
 
14 
[¶21]  The Bureau is part of the Public Utilities Commission.  25 M.R.S. 
§ 2926(1).  It “implement[s] and manage[s] E-9-1-1” by developing system 
elements, providing quality assurance, and providing call coverage and technical 
support, and is funded through statewide surcharges on telecommunications 
services.  25 M.R.S. §§ 2926, 2927.  Although the Bureau’s product is certainly 
used for criminal justice purposes on a daily basis, the Bureau manages the 
telecommunications necessary for the provision of emergency services, and does 
not meet the definition of a criminal justice agency. 
 
 
b.  Compiled in investigating a crime 
 
[¶22]  Alternatively, the E-9-1-1 transcripts qualify as intelligence or 
investigative information if they were “compiled” for purposes of investigating 
known or suspected crimes.  16 M.R.S. § 611(8). 
[¶23]  The United States Supreme Court has had occasion to consider the 
meaning of “compile” pursuant to FOIA.   In John Doe Agency, the Supreme Court 
noted that a compilation, “in its ordinary meaning, is something composed of 
materials collected and assembled from various sources or other documents” and 
“seems readily to cover documents already collected by the Government originally 
for non-law-enforcement purposes.”  493 U.S. at 153.  The Supreme Court also 
took pains to note that “compiled” is not synonymous with “originally compiled,” 
and thus includes information gathered from multiple sources, and created at 
 
15 
previous times and for different purposes.  Id. at 154.  In short, the Supreme Court 
held, “information originally compiled for a non-law-enforcement purpose” can 
nevertheless be exempt from disclosure “when it is recompiled at a future date for 
law enforcement purposes.”  Id. at 157. 
 
[¶24]  According to the plain language of this portion of section 614, as 
informed by the analyses in John Doe Agency, the State has established that the 
transcripts are intelligence and investigative information pursuant to this 
alternative.14  Although the audio recordings and transcripts were created by the 
Bureau for administrative purposes, we agree that the Maine State Police, the 
Attorney General’s Office, and/or the Biddeford Police Department have 
“compiled” them for the purpose of investigating the crimes with which Pak was 
charged. 
 
2.  Preparation or custody 
[¶25]  Next, section 614 applies only to that information prepared for or 
maintained by particular government agencies or types of agencies.  Here, the 
E-9-1-1 transcripts, even if not prepared by or at the direction of law enforcement, 
                                         
14  There is no dispute that the information requested by MaineToday does not constitute “criminal 
history record information,” defined as “notations or other written evidence of an arrest, detention, 
complaint, indictment, information or other formal criminal charge relating to an identifiable person,” 
including “the identification or description of the person charged and any disposition of the charge.”  
16 M.R.S. §§ 611(3), (8) (2012). 
 
 
16 
are kept in the custody of the Bureau of State Police or the Department of the 
Attorney General, two entities specifically named in section 614(1).15     
3.  Reasonable possibility 
[¶26]  Finally, it was the State’s burden to establish that disclosing the 
transcripts would create a reasonable possibility of one or more of the harms 
detailed in section 614(1)(A)-(K).16  Because the CHRIA does not define a 
“reasonable possibility” for purposes of determining the scope of a FOAA 
exception, we look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms.  See State v. 
Paradis, 2010 ME 141, ¶ 6, 10 A.3d 695.  “Reasonable” means “the product of a 
rational thought process.”  State v. Estes, 418 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Me. 1980) 
(quotation marks omitted).  It may be defined as “[f]air, proper, or moderate under 
                                         
15  MaineToday suggests that even if the copies of the transcripts in the police and prosecutors’ files 
are confidential pursuant to section 614, the copies in the Bureau files are not, given that the transcripts 
continue to be the property of Bureau no matter where they are stored or how they now are being used, 
see 25 M.R.S. §§ 2926(6), 2929(3) (2012).  This argument is not persuasive.  We have held that the 
“location of the document has no bearing on its status” unless the statute affording confidentiality states 
that such confidentiality depends on where the information is physically kept.  S. Portland Police Patrol 
Ass’n v. City of S. Portland, 2006 ME 55, ¶ 8, 896 A.2d 960; see Cyr v. Madawaska Sch. Dep’t, 2007 ME 
28, ¶ 17, 916 A.2d 967 (Calkins, J., dissenting) (“The physical location of the information is not 
important.”).  Indeed, allowing the dissemination of the Bureau version of a transcript while maintaining 
the statutory confidentiality of the AG’s identical copy of the same transcript would render the purpose of 
that statutory confidentiality a complete nullity.  The danger is not, as MaineToday contends, that law 
enforcement can render confidential any document merely by placing it in a police file, but instead that 
one agency would disclose a document that another agency is entitled to keep confidential.  See Lewiston 
Daily Sun v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 619, 622 (Me. 1991) (“[T]he consequences of an erroneous 
public release are irreversible.”).  In fact, the Legislature clearly intended that the requirements of the 
CHRIA, in conjunction with those of the ESC, be rigorous enough to preclude the sheltering of a public 
document in an unrelated confidential file.  See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 157 
(1989) (stating that “[e]vasional commingling” is prevented by the language of the statute requiring 
consideration of the nature of each document). 
 
16  As a practical matter, this may need to be accomplished through the submission of sealed files or an 
in camera review.  See Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 2000 ME 126, ¶ 14, 754 A.2d 353. 
 
17 
the circumstances,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1379 (9th ed. 2009), or as “not 
absurd,” “not ridiculous,” “not extreme,” or “not excessive,” Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 1892 (2002). 
[¶27]  As we have stated in other contexts, a reasonable possibility is 
different, and less burdensome to prove, than a reasonable probability; it is 
synonymous with a “reasonable likelihood,” and is a lower standard than a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See State v. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 35, 28 A.3d 
1147 (considering the reasonable possibility standard for determining the 
likelihood that a different jury instruction would have led to a more favorable 
verdict); Terry v. T. J. C. Coin & Stamp Co., 447 A.2d 812, 814 (Me. 1982) 
(“Reasonable possibility is a standard less onerous than proof that success is more 
likely than not.” (quotation marks omitted)); Bowman v. Dussault, 425 A.2d 1325, 
1328 (Me. 1981) (evaluating the propriety of an attachment order based on whether 
the underlying claim has a “reasonable possibility of recovery”). 
[¶28]  The State asserted to MaineToday and before the Superior Court that 
disclosing the E-9-1-1 transcripts would create the reasonable possibility of 
interfering with law enforcement proceedings pursuant to 16 M.R.S. § 614(1)(A).17  
                                         
17  The State also asserted that disclosing the transcripts would interfere with its ability to impanel an 
impartial jury pursuant to 16 M.R.S. § 614(1)(B), and would invade the personal privacy of those 
involved pursuant to 16 M.R.S. § 614(1)(C).  The Superior Court determined that the State did not meet 
its burden as to either of these two grounds, and the State did not appeal those portions of the court’s 
decision.  Thus, we do not consider the State’s contentions that it established these two alternative bases 
for maintaining the confidentiality of the Pak transcripts because they are not preserved for appellate 
 
18 
We considered a similar issue in Campbell v. Town of Machias, in which a woman 
sought—and was denied—access to police records regarding a report lodged 
against her by her bank.  661 A.2d 1133, 1134 (Me. 1995).  We discussed the ways 
in which the disclosure of records could interfere with law enforcement 
proceedings—by “prematurely reveal[ing] the scope, nature or direction of the 
government’s case”; “allow[ing] the target of a criminal investigation to construct 
defenses or to fabricate alibis”; “creat[ing] the possibility of harassment or 
intimidation of witnesses”; or “result[ing] in the destruction of evidence.”  Id. at 
1136.  We concluded that the prosecutor’s justification for denying the request on 
grounds that disclosure would “compromise the case by providing discovery prior 
to a formal charged being lodged” against her, and would “interfere with the 
collection of evidence and might result in the harassment of witnesses” was 
sufficient to meet the State’s burden because it was “the kind of showing 
approved” by federal courts in FOIA matters.  Id. at 1136.   
[¶29]  Here, in contrast, the State identified no such specific concerns, but 
instead offered an explanation for the denial that merely reiterated the language of 
the statute itself.  The timing of the charges also affects the comparison of 
Campbell with the present matter.  Whereas the State in Campbell had not yet 
                                                                                                                                   
review.  See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(4); Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2013 ME 55, ¶ 6 n.4, 66 A.3d 585 
(stating that when a party does not cross-appeal, its contentions of error by the trial court are not 
preserved for appellate review); Lyle v. Mangar, 2011 ME 129, ¶ 22, 36 A.3d 867 (same); Millien v. 
Colby Coll., 2005 ME 66, ¶ 9 n.3, 874 A.2d 397 (same). 
 
19 
pursued any charges against the defendant, Pak had already been the subject of an 
initiating criminal complaint when MaineToday first requested the transcripts.18 
Although the State contends that, even while an indictment is pending, the 
investigation remains ongoing, it did not identify any particular investigation yet to 
be completed in the Pak matter or how those portions of the investigation could be 
affected by the availability of the Pak E-9-1-1 transcripts.19  Rather, the State seeks 
a blanket rule that “in any active homicide investigation (including unsolved cases) 
and/or prosecutions, any E-911 recording and transcript constitutes intelligence 
and investigative information subject to 16 M.R.S. § 614,” and that such 
recordings and transcripts fulfill the requirements of section 614 and therefore are 
confidential as a matter of course. 
[¶30]  The United States Supreme Court has rejected such “universal” 
approaches that ask the court to “presume that virtually every [record] is 
confidential” and render these rebuttable presumptions “in practice all but 
irrebuttable.”  U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 175, 177 (1993).  
The Supreme Court instead interpreted FOIA to require a “more particularized 
                                         
18  By the time MaineToday filed its petition with the Superior Court, Pak had already been indicted on 
the five counts. 
 
19  Even the Superior Court was unable to determine any specific evils that disclosure of the transcripts 
would cause, referring to the possibility of any resulting harm as “abstract,” “hypothetical[],” and 
“impossible to conceive.”  Such unidentified and speculative harms are not the types of harm that FOAA 
seeks to prevent.  FOAA’s exceptions are to be narrowly construed to serve its larger purpose of 
transparency in government.  1 M.R.S. § 401; Citizens Commc’ns Co. v. Att’y Gen., 2007 ME 114, ¶ 9, 
931 A.2d 503. 
 
20 
approach” based on the circumstances surrounding each record at issue, which is 
an approach that more closely aligns with the purposes and language of the statute.  
Id. at 180.  If the Maine Legislature had intended to exempt from disclosure all 
E-9-1-1 transcripts, or even all E-9-1-1 transcripts that relate to active homicide 
cases, it could have, as it did with juvenile fire setter records and ambulance 
medical reports, for example.  See 1 M.R.S. § 402(3)(H)-(I); Landano, 508 U.S. at 
178 (noting that there is “no persuasive evidence that Congress intended for [a law 
enforcement agency] to be able to satisfy its burden in every instance simply by 
asserting that [the record was obtained] during the course of a criminal 
investigation”). 
[¶31]  Here, the Attorney General did not present any particularized 
possibility of harm.  For example, there is no suggestion that other witnesses at the 
scene would amend their testimony to be consistent with that of the 9-1-1 callers.  
Given the broad purpose of FOAA and the narrow reach of its exceptions, and 
mindful of the presumptive right of public access to criminal court proceedings, 
see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980), we 
conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing the reasonable 
possibility that disclosure of the Pak E-9-1-1 transcripts would interfere with law 
enforcement proceedings pursuant to section 614(1)(A).  Thus, the Pak E-9-1-1 
 
21 
transcripts, as redacted pursuant to 25 M.R.S. § 2929(2)-(3), are public records 
subject to disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Access Act. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated and remanded to the Superior Court 
with instructions to enter a judgment requiring the State 
to disclose the E-9-1-1 call transcripts associated with the 
Pak matter, as redacted pursuant to 25 M.R.S. 
§ 2929(2)-(3) (2012).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Sigmund D. Schutz, Esq., and Jonathan G. Mermin, Esq., Preti Flaherty 
Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, Portland, for appellant MaineToday Media, Inc.  
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and William R. Stokes, Dep. Atty. Gen., 
Office of Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 
 
Patrick Strawbridge, Esq., Bingham McCutchen LLP, Boston, 
Massachusetts, for amici curiae The Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press, New England First Amendment Center, Maine Association of 
Broadcasters, Maine Freedom of Information Coalition, Maine Press 
Association, and Associated Press 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
 
Sigmund D. Schutz, Esq. for appellant MaineToday Media, Inc.  
 
 
William R. Stokes, Dep. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of Maine  
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number AP-2013-6 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY