Title: State v. Ajak

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
)
)
Respondent, 
)
)
v.  
) 
No. SC96333 
) 
DANIEL D. AJAK, 
)
)
Appellant. 
) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY 
The Honorable Keith Marquart, Judge 
Defendant Daniel Ajak was charged with three counts of domestic assault.  He was 
also charged with resisting arrest at the time of his arrest on those charges under section 
575.150.1  The jury acquitted him of two of the domestic assault charges and the State 
dismissed the third charge after the jury was unable to reach a verdict.  The jury convicted 
Mr. Ajak of the charge of resisting arrest.  He appeals, alleging the circuit court erred by 
(1) overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal of resisting arrest because the relevant
conduct occurred after his arrest was effected and (2) by submitting a jury instruction which 
allowed the jury to convict him of resisting arrest if he used “physical interference” rather 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2014, unless otherwise noted. 
Opinion issued April 3, 2018
2 
 
than requiring he actually resist the arrest.  This Court reverses.  Mr. Ajak’s arrest was 
already effected and he was in police custody by the time any resistance occurred.  Any 
resistance could not have been for the purpose of resisting an arrest which already had been 
accomplished.  Accordingly, the judgment is reversed.  
I. 
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On February 15, 2015, Mr. Ajak and his girlfriend, Shanna McMackin were at home 
in the house they shared.2  Ms. McMackin’s two adult children, Sean and Courtney Elder, 
also were in the house that night when Courtney and Mr. Ajak got into a fight after 
Mr. Ajak refused to allow Courtney’s boyfriend to come over to drink.  Various witnesses 
testified Courtney was the aggressor, yelling at Mr. Ajak, hitting him, and pulling on his 
dreadlocks as he kept trying to push her away.  When Courtney’s brother Sean thought the 
argument had gone too far, he intervened and took Mr. Ajak to the ground.  Mr. Ajak got 
back up and picked up a knife in the kitchen (he said to protect himself) as Courtney 
continued to yell and scream at him.  Although Mr. Ajak did not use the knife, 
Ms. McMackin believed the fight had escalated too far and called the police.  Courtney left 
before the police arrived shortly thereafter, at about 8:45 or 9:00 p.m.  Upon their arrival, 
Mr. Ajak placed the knife in the sink and went toward the front door. 
                                              
2 “This Court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Elliot v. State, 
215 S.W.3d 88, 90 n. 4 (Mo. banc 2007), citing, State v. Gill, 167 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo. 
banc 2005).  The jury acquitted Mr. Ajak of the two domestic abuse charges that were not 
dismissed but convicted him of resisting arrest. 
3 
 
Meanwhile, Ms. McMackin and Sean, who were on the front porch, told the arriving 
officers Mr. Ajak was inside.  The officers went in the open front door and saw Mr. Ajak 
approaching them from the kitchen.  They ordered him to put his hands up and stop moving 
because they previously had been advised the disturbance involved a knife.  Mr. Ajak put 
his hands in front of him but at first continued moving toward the officers.  Once he stopped 
moving forward, an officer immediately detained him and placed him in handcuffs.  
Mr. Ajak yelled he was the victim, angry he had been placed in handcuffs.  The officer 
walked Mr. Ajak to the kitchen and put Mr. Ajak in a chair at the kitchen table, where 
Mr. Ajak continued to yell and scream.   
At some point, two more officers arrived, so there was a total of six officers at the 
residence.  One officer stood over Mr. Ajak as he sat in the kitchen chair, while the other 
five officers spent some time moving between the kitchen and other areas of the house and 
speaking with each of the other individuals present about the alleged domestic disturbance.   
After speaking with the witnesses and while Mr. Ajak still was handcuffed in a chair 
in the kitchen, one of the officers advised him he was under arrest and would be transported 
to jail.  One of the officers later testified Mr. Ajak “knew at that point that he was under 
arrest.”  Mr. Ajak continued screaming and yelling he was the victim and he was not going 
to jail while one of the officers left the residence to go pull the patrol car in front of the 
house.  While that officer was walking to and retrieving the patrol car, because the weather 
was cold an officer “[g]rabbed some shoes and a shirt and a jacket to cover [Mr. Ajak] up” 
and “tried to get him to put on the clothing for a couple minutes.”  He refused the clothes.   
4 
 
It was at this point Mr. Ajak, restrained in handcuffs, was escorted out of the 
residence by two officers, one on each arm, with a third officer following behind.  As the 
four walked to the patrol car that had been moved right outside the residence, Mr. Ajak 
“kind of was jerking back and forth trying to break [the officers’] grip.”  This caused one 
of the officer’s name tags to fall from his uniform.  Mr. Ajak continued yelling and 
screaming, and “in doing so spit on the side” of one officer’s face just before he was placed 
inside the patrol car.  That officer testified, “As I was opening the patrol vehicle door to 
place him in the backseat, he began to fight back a little bit and jerk and pull back away 
from us.”  Mr. Ajak did not break free from the officers’ hold, however, and was secured 
in the patrol car and transported to the jail.  
The State charged Mr. Ajak with three counts of domestic assault and one count of 
resisting arrest.  The jury acquitted Mr. Ajak of two counts of domestic assault but was 
unable to reach a verdict on the third count of domestic assault; the State ultimately 
dismissed that charge.  The jury found Mr. Ajak guilty only of the one count of resisting 
arrest, and Mr. Ajak was sentenced to 280 days in jail.  Mr. Ajak appealed.  This Court 
granted transfer after opinion by the court of appeals.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the evidence supporting the resisting arrest conviction, this Court’s 
“review of sufficiency of the evidence is limited to whether the State has introduced 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found each element of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Hunt, 451 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Mo. banc 2014).  
“To determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction and 
5 
 
to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court does not weigh the evidence” 
but, instead, “‘accept[s] as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all 
reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignore[s] all contrary evidence and 
inferences.’”  State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Mo. banc 2016), quoting, State 
v. Holmes, 399 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Mo. banc 2013) (alterations in original).  But the “Court 
will not supply missing evidence or grant the State unreasonable, speculative, or forced 
inferences.”  State v. Lammers, 479 S.W.3d 624, 632 (Mo. banc 2016) (citation omitted).  
III. 
MR. AJAK’S ARREST WAS EFFECTED BEFORE HIS RESISTANCE 
BEGAN  
 
Mr. Ajak was charged and found guilty of misdemeanor resisting arrest under 
section 575.150, which provides:  
1.  A person commits the crime of resisting or interfering with arrest, 
detention, or stop if, knowing that a law enforcement officer is making an 
arrest, or attempting to lawfully detain or stop an individual or vehicle, … 
for the purpose of preventing the officer from effecting the arrest, stop or 
detention, the person: 
 
(1)  Resists the arrest, stop or detention of such person by using or 
threatening the use of violence or physical force or by fleeing from such 
officer; 
 
(Emphasis added).3  In order to prove resisting arrest, the statute thus requires proof of 
three elements: (1) knowledge that the law enforcement officer is making an arrest; 
(2) purpose on the part of the defendant to prevent the officer from effecting the arrest; and 
                                              
3  The case involves only an arrest, not a stop or detention.  
6 
 
(3) resisting the arrest by threatening the use of violence or physical force or by fleeing 
from such officer.  § 575.150.1.   
The parties disagree as to whether Mr. Ajak’s arrest was completed while he was in 
the kitchen with the officers.  Mr. Ajak does not claim he submitted to the custody of the 
officers, but rather argues he was under actual physical restraint while in the kitchen, 
handcuffed, and surrounded by officers who told him he was under arrest and kept him 
there under their control.  The State argues that being confined in the kitchen was 
inadequate and Mr. Ajak had to be placed in the patrol car to be under arrest. 
The resolution to the parties’ disagreement depends on the statutory meaning of the 
term “arrest.”  The State acknowledges that section 544.180, RSMo 2000, defines arrest as 
“an actual restraint of the person of the defendant, or by his submission to the custody of 
the officer, under authority of a warrant or otherwise,” but it and the dissent nonetheless 
argue this definition does not apply to the resisting arrest statute, section 575.150.  They 
do not identify any specific alternative definition of “arrest” they believe is controlling but 
rather say that because the criminal code in effect in 2015, chapters 556 to 579 of Title 38,4 
did not specifically adopt or reference section 544.180, that section’s definition of arrest 
simply should be held to provide “guidance” comparable to guidance provided by common 
law interpretations of the term arrest.  The dissent simply ignores the statute’s definition, 
                                              
4  A new criminal code went into effect January 1, 2017.  See chapters 556 to 579 of Title 
38, RSMo 2017.  It similarly does not contain a definition of arrest.   
7 
 
and the definition of “arrest” in Missouri cases, and turns to non-Missouri cases which 
apparently are more to its liking than Missouri precedent. 
 
This Court disagrees that section 544.180 does not set out the definition of “arrest” 
applicable in determining whether Mr. Ajak “resisted arrest” under section 575.150.  
Section 544.180 and its predecessors have defined “arrest” in an identical manner since at 
least 1879.  See, e.g., RSMo 1879 § 1826; RSMo 1939, § 3959.  Nothing in the criminal 
code or in Missouri law suggests the adoption of the revised criminal code in 1979, without 
more and without any indication in the code the legislature thereby intended to change the 
definition of the term “arrest,” could be said to have sub silencio changed the meaning of 
the term “arrest” under Missouri law.  
In any event, the definition of arrest in section 544.180 and its predecessors is 
perfectly consistent with the meaning of “arrest” in Missouri case law.  In fact, Missouri’s 
courts repeatedly have relied on the definition of “arrest” in section 544.180 in resolving 
cases involving resisting arrest or escape from custody.  For example, this Court relied on 
section 544.180’s definition of arrest in Smither v. Director of Revenue, 136 S.W.3d 797, 
798-99 (Mo. banc 2004), in determining that Mr. Smither was under arrest even though not 
physically restrained by the officer, stating “The term ‘arrest’ is defined as the ‘actual 
restraint of the person of the defendant, or ... submission to the custody of the officer, under 
authority of a warrant or otherwise.’ Sec. 544.180, RSMo 2000” (alteration in original).  
Smither held where defendant was injured and in the emergency room with the officer 
present, he was under arrest because the officer placed defendant within his control to the 
8 
 
extent defendant’s condition allowed by telling defendant he was under arrest, reading him 
his rights, and staying with him while he tried to contact his lawyer.  Id.  
State v. Sampson, 408 S.W.2d 84, 86-87 (Mo. 1966), similarly held, citing the 
statute: “A person may be said to be under arrest from the moment the police officer takes 
control of his movements. [§] 544.180, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.”  Other cases have used 
similar language.  See, e.g., State v. Stokes, 387 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Mo. 1965) (“We agree 
with the finding of the trial court that defendant was under arrest from the time the officer 
took control of his movements and directed him to ‘stand up.’ Section 544.180.”);  cf. State 
v. Nicholson, 839 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Mo. App. 1992) (citing section 544.180 in holding that 
a man was not yet under arrest when he fled the police because an “arrest is made by either 
the ‘actual restraint of the person of the defendant, or by his submission to the custody of 
the officer....’ § 544.180, RSMo 1986”).   
Of course, the legislature can choose to adopt a special definition of a term when 
enacting a statute, as it did in adopting a specific definition of “custody” in the criminal 
code that went into effect in 1979.  § 556.061(6), RSMo 1978.  That definition remains 
today.  § 556.061(17), RSMo 2017.  But the legislature did not adopt a special meaning for 
the word “arrest” in adopting the criminal code and nothing in the code suggests the 
legislature intended to change the century-long meaning of the term “arrest.”   
Indeed, if the meaning of the term “arrest” in chapter 544 does not govern use of the 
term in the succeeding chapters of the Missouri statutes setting out substantive crimes, then 
it is unclear for what purpose the legislature enacted that definition, for chapter 544 does 
not itself set out substantive crimes.  Rather, it is devoted to providing general definitions 
9 
 
and preliminary procedural rules concerning issuing warrants, bail, how arrests are to be 
conducted, where the arrestee is taken after an arrest, and preliminary hearing procedures 
that govern the handling of the substantive crimes set out in the criminal code sections that 
follow it.  See § 544.020, RSMo 2000 (issuance of warrant upon complaint); § 544.040, 
RSMo 2000 (bail, associate circuit judge may grant, when); § 544.190, RSMo 2000 (rights 
of officer in making arrests); § 544.216, RSMo 2000 (powers of arrest, arrest without 
warrant on suspicion persons violating any laws of state including infractions, 
misdemeanors and ordinances, exception – power of municipal officer in unincorporated 
area); § 544.260, RSMo 2000 (arrest of person, where tried); § 544.250, RSMo 2000 
(preliminary hearing, when required – release, when, what conditions).  The legislature 
does not adopt “guidance” but rather law.  These definitions and procedures set out in 
chapter 544 would have little or no purpose unless it was to govern prosecution of the 
crimes set out in the criminal code that follows.  
It is well-settled that, “When the legislature enacts a statute referring to terms that 
have had other judicial or legislative meaning attached to them, the legislature is presumed 
to have acted with knowledge of that judicial or legislative action.”  Balloons Over the 
Rainbow, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 427 S.W.3d 815, 825-26 (Mo. banc 2014) (citation and 
quotation omitted).  It is the meaning of arrest as set out in section 544.180 and as 
interpreted in prior case law that governs here. 
No one disputes Mr. Ajak was restrained in handcuffs in the kitchen of his home, 
with at least one and at times four to six officers present, and was told he was under arrest.  
The only issue is whether, on these facts, the arrest was complete before he was moved 
10 
 
from the kitchen to the patrol car, because if so, then the State failed to show “for the 
purpose of preventing the officer from effecting the arrest, stop or detention, the person … 
(1) Resists the arrest.”  § 575.150 (emphasis added).  
Not surprisingly, the cases indicate that what is sufficient restraint is highly 
dependent on the particular facts and circumstances, but the key factor this Court has 
identified is whether the evidence showed “actual restraint of the person of the defendant,” 
Smither, 136 S.W.3d at 798, or otherwise showed control of the defendant’s movements by 
the officer, Sampson, 408 S.W.2d at 87.  
And while, as the State notes, such restraint often is most easily shown when the 
defendant has been placed in a police car or brought to the police station,5 these cases do 
not support the State’s narrow reading that an arrest requires the defendant to be put in the 
patrol car or at least within a specific physical boundary.  They could not so require, for 
the statute requires only restraint by the officer or submission to the officer’s control.  This 
could occur in many circumstances other than in a patrol car (indeed, arrests were effected 
long before patrol cars existed) and in circumstances where physical boundaries are not 
available or utilized. 
In Smither, for instance, an arrest was completed when the defendant was told he 
was under arrest and placed in a room to receive treatment while the officer stood guard 
outside where the defendant was severely injured.  136 S.W.3d at 799.  And State v. 
                                              
5 See, e.g., State v. Shanks, 809 S.W.2d 413, 418 (Mo. App. 1991), overruled on other 
grounds by Joy v. Morrison, 254 S.W.3d 885 (Mo. banc 2008); State v. Ondo, 231 S.W.3d 
314, 316 (Mo. App. 2007); State v. Belton, 108 S.W.3d 171, 175-76 (Mo. App. 2003).  
11 
 
Jackson, 645 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Mo. App. 1982), held defendant’s arrest had been 
effectuated once the officer “placed defendant under arrest for carrying a concealed 
weapon, checked the x-ray room, and waited outside while a technician x-rayed 
defendant.”  When defendant then escaped the x-ray room, he was not found to have 
resisted arrest but rather to have escaped from custody, for the arrest already had been 
completed.  Id.   
Similarly, in Sampson, defendant was under arrest once the officers grabbed his arm 
on the street to prevent him from reaching for a weapon and searched him.  408 S.W.2d at 
86-87.  The Court did not mention whether a patrol car was nearby, for that was not relevant 
to whether they could search him incident to the arrest.  Id at 87.  In Stokes, the Court 
rejected a claim that defendant was not yet under arrest when he was searched after being 
found hiding in the weeds near where a burglary had occurred and told to stand up.  387 
S.W.2d at 522.  The Court found “that defendant was under arrest from the time the officer 
took control of his movements and directed him to ‘stand up.’”  Id.   
By contrast, if the defendant is not actually under the officer’s restraint or control, 
the arrest has not been effectuated.  For example, a defendant was guilty of resisting arrest 
where, after being awakened in his bed and informed he was under arrest, he had a verbal 
altercation and “resisted arrest by threatening violence and using physical force in 
stiffening his arms and requiring the officers to coerce him by force.”  State v. Feagan, 835 
S.W.2d 448, 450 (Mo. App. 1992);  accord, Ondo, 231 S.W.3d at 315-16 (defendant not yet 
under arrest where although handcuffed and read his Miranda warnings, the officer still 
was attempting to remove the defendant’s personal items when defendant began to move 
12 
 
toward the door and had to be subdued with a Taser before he ceased resistance);  Belton, 
108 S.W.3d at 176 (defendant not yet arrested because the officer “obviously did not have 
Belton restrained” where, although handcuffed and told he was under arrest, defendant was 
still sitting in his wife’s car and she drove off).   
In each of these cases, the critical element in determining whether the arrest had 
been effected is whether the officer had control over the defendant’s movements.  As the 
State notes, in many cases it is easy to find an arrest effected where the defendant has been 
placed in a patrol car, for in that situation the person clearly is subject to the officer’s actual 
restraint.  But what is necessary to constitute restraint depends on the specific 
circumstances of each case.  And this Court and the court of appeals have recognized a 
person may be subject to actual restraint in many different types of situations.  Each case 
requires a fact-specific inquiry to determine at what point the arrest is complete.  Indeed, a 
defendant who is not under the officer’s restraint or control has been held to be not yet 
arrested even if the defendant is in the police station or patrol car.  See, e.g., Nicholson, 
839 S.W.2d at 597 (where defendant jumped up and ran out of the police station upon being 
told that he was being arrested, he had not yet been arrested as the officer had not yet 
“physically restrained” him nor had defendant’s “ability to absent himself been impaired”).   
Here, Mr. Ajak was actually restrained in his kitchen, before his walk to the patrol 
car.  The record reveals Mr. Ajak was handcuffed immediately after the officers entered 
the house.  He remained handcuffed as he sat in the kitchen with one or more officers 
standing over him while the officers were at the residence.  After speaking with other 
witnesses present, and as Mr. Ajak remained in handcuffs sitting at the kitchen table, the 
13 
 
officers surrounded Mr. Ajak within the enclosed space of the kitchen and told him he was 
under arrest.  At that point, Mr. Ajak’s movements were completely under the officers’ 
control; he was handcuffed and not free to leave, the officers attempted to dress Mr. Ajak 
for the walk to the patrol car, and they took his arms in their hands and escorted him in 
handcuffs, at which point he resisted.  His resistance, however, came only after the arrest 
was previously effected while in the officers’ control within the kitchen.    
The dissent argues “arrest” is a continuing process that may still be being “effected” 
even after the arrestee is restrained and in the officer’s control and custody.  Not only is 
this (as the dissent acknowledges) inconsistent with section 544.180, it also is inconsistent 
with the definition of “custody” under Missouri’s criminal code and with the interpretation 
and application of the term “arrest” in Missouri case law, as discussed in detail above.  
Indeed, the dissent relies entirely on three cases decided under the law of Kentucky, 
Arizona, and New Hampshire.6  This case, however, must be decided under Missouri law.  
As noted, section 544.180 says arrest occurs when there is “an actual restraint of the person 
of the defendant,” which this Court has interpreted to mean: “A person may be said to be 
under arrest from the moment the police officer takes control of his movements”  Sampson, 
408 S.W.2d at 86-87.  Consistent with this definition, numerous Missouri cases specifically 
hold “the arrest must be in progress when the ‘resistance’ occurs.  Once the arrest has been 
fully effectuated a defendant should be considered to be in custody.”  Shanks, 809 S.W.2d 
                                              
6 In each of these cases, the resistance occurred within moments of when the person was 
placed in handcuffs, and the court noted that in such cases it can be hard to determine when 
the arrest was completed.  That was not the fact situation here.   
14 
 
at 418; accord, Belton, 108 S.W.3d at 175; Feagan, 835 S.W.2d at 449; Ondo, 231 S.W.3d 
at 316.   
In fact, section 556.061 defines custody as occurring only once the person has been 
arrested: “a person is in custody when the person has been arrested but has not been 
delivered to a place of confinement.”  § 556.061(7) (emphasis added).  Similarly, section 
575.200 provides that custody occurs after arrest and that evading police at that point is 
escape from custody rather than resisting arrest: “A person commits the crime of escape 
from custody or attempted escape from custody if, while being held in custody after arrest 
for any crime, he escapes or attempts to escape from custody.”  (Emphasis added).   
As such, under Missouri law, Mr. Ajak could not have had the specific purpose of 
preventing an arrest while being walked to the car, because his arrest had been previously 
effected when he was actually restrained by the officers and under their control in the 
kitchen.  He was already under arrest and in custody when his alleged resistance occurred.  
Because arrest and custody are chronologically and legally separate events under the 
statutory and common law framework, if Mr. Ajak committed any crime, it would have 
been attempt to escape from custody, not resisting arrest.  For reasons not revealed by the 
record, the State chose not to charge Mr. Ajak with an attempt to escape from custody.  The 
evidence did not support the submission of resisting arrest, and the judgment finding 
Mr. Ajak guilty of that crime must be reversed. 
15 
 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because Mr. Ajak’s arrest had already been effected he could not have been guilty 
of resisting arrest.  The judgment is reversed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
Draper, Russell and Breckenridge, JJ., concur;  
Powell, J., dissents in separate opinion filed;  
Fischer, C.J. and Wilson, J., concur in opinion of Powell, J. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
No.  SC96333 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
DANIEL D. AJAK,  
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  “When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, 
this Court must determine whether sufficient evidence permits a reasonable juror to find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Belton, 153 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. banc 2005).  
“The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict.”  
Id.  “This is not an assessment of whether the Court believes that the evidence at trial 
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of whether, in light of the 
evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Miller, 372 S.W.3d 455, 463 
(Mo. banc 2012).  “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal 
2 
 
conviction, the Court does not act as a ‘super juror’ with veto powers” but “gives great 
deference to the trier of fact.” Id.  
The principal opinion properly states the defendant must: (1) have knowledge the 
law enforcement officer is making an arrest; (2) act with the purpose of preventing the 
officer from effecting the arrest; and (3) resist the arrest using or threatening violence or 
physical force or by fleeing from the officer.  Section 575.150.1, RSMo (2016).  The issue 
in this case is when an arrest is complete or “effected” for the purposes of resisting arrest.  
The principal opinion holds no rational fact-finder could have found the arrest was ongoing 
at the time of Ajak’s resistance because he was restrained in the kitchen and his arrest was 
complete when he was escorted to the patrol car.  This holding fails to account for the 
continuous and ongoing nature of an arrest and is contrary to this Court’s standard of 
review.   
“This Court’s primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue.”  State v. Johnson, 524 
S.W.3d 505, 510 (Mo. banc 2017) (internal quotations omitted); see also § 1.090, RSMo 
(2016).  (“Words and phrases shall be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense”).  
The plain meaning of “effect” means “to bring about.”  Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 724 (2002).  The term “effecting the arrest” in § 575.150, therefore means 
bringing about an arrest.  See § 575.150.1 (providing the offense is committed when “a law 
enforcement officer is making an arrest”) (emphasis added).  Effecting or bringing about 
an arrest is not an instantaneous act; it is a process continuing through a series of 
overlapping steps such as stopping and controlling the person’s movements, handcuffing 
3 
 
the person, searching for weapons and contraband, and placing the person in a police car 
for transport to a place of confinement.1  When the arrest process is interrupted by the use 
of physical force, a defendant has resisted arrest.     
Several states have also concluded an arrest is a process.  The Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire interpreted the New Hampshire resisting arrest statute in State v. Lindsey, 
973 A.2d 314, 316-18 (N.H. 2009). The Lindsey court held an officer “seek[s] to effect an 
arrest or detention” throughout “the entire course of events during which law enforcement 
officers seek to secure and maintain physical control of an individual, attendant to 
accomplishing the intended law enforcement duty.”  Id. at 317.  In analyzing the 
legislature’s intent in regard to the statute, the Lindsey court stated the resisting arrest 
statute “reflects the policy that individuals follow the commands of law enforcement 
officials, because doing so fosters the effective administration of justice, discourages self-
help, and provides for the safety of officers.”  Id.  (Internal quotations omitted). 
 
Similarly, the Arizona court of appeals analyzed the state’s resisting arrest statute 
in State v. Mitchell, 62 P.3d 616, 618-20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).  In Mitchell, the defendant 
                                              
1  The principal opinion does not rely on the plain meaning of “effecting the arrest” to 
recognize an arrest as a process.  Rather, the principal opinion cites cases interpreting the 
term “arrest” as used in 4th Amendment analysis and in other statutes unrelated to resisting 
arrest, and ultimately relies on the definition of “arrest” set out in § 544.180.  But § 544.180 
is not part of the criminal code, and as this Court has recognized, the term “arrest” as used 
in criminal cases is subject to more than one definition depending upon the statute and facts 
of a particular case.  MAI-CR 333.00 Definition – Specific.  Neither the criminal code nor 
§ 575.150 define “arrest.”  This Court instructs, “In the absence of a statutory definition, 
words will be given their plain and ordinary meaning as derived from the dictionary.”  State 
v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Mo. banc 2009). The plain meaning of “arrest” is “the 
taking or detaining of a person in custody by authority of law.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 121 (2002).         
4 
 
argued his arrest was complete when he had been handcuffed, and, therefore, he could not 
be convicted of resisting arrest.  Id. at 618.  The court considered the plain meaning of the 
statute to interpret the legislature’s intent and the meaning of “effecting an arrest,” turning 
to Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Dictionary.  Id.  The court stated: 
Based on the language of A.R.S. § 13–2508 and the common meaning of the 
verb “effect,” we construe the term “effecting” in § 13–2508 to mean an on-
going [sic] process toward achieving, producing, making, or bringing about, 
an arrest.  See Lewis v. State, 30 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App. 2000) 
(“effecting an arrest” entails a process or transaction and the conduct alleged 
to be resisting arrest must occur after the arrest process begins but before the 
process ends); see also State v. Bay, 130 Ohio App.3d 772, 721 N.E.2d 421, 
422 (1998) (resisting arrest charge arose from incident 15 to 30 minutes after 
police handcuffed defendant.)  Until the arrest has been “effected,” the arrest 
process remains ongoing and the resisting arrest statute is applicable.   
 
Id. 
 
The Mitchell court considered the legislature’s intent and determined the “purpose 
of the resisting arrest statute is to protect peace officers and citizens from substantial risk 
of physical injury.”  Id. at 619.  The court held, if an arrest ends the moment a defendant is 
handcuffed, the protection provided by the resisting arrest statute would be limited, 
contrary to the legislature’s intent.  Id.  The court held a reasonable jury could find the 
police officers were still effecting Mitchell’s arrest when he began struggling against the 
officers.  Id.  
 
 In Perdue v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.3d 786, 790-93 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013), the 
Kentucky court of appeals adopted the reasoning of the New Hampshire and Arizona courts 
in determining that “effecting an arrest is a process that does not necessarily end when a 
defendant has been handcuffed.”  (Internal quotations omitted).  In Perdue, the defendant 
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moved for a directed verdict, arguing he could not be guilty of resisting arrest because he 
had already been arrested when he spit on a police officer, headbutted the officer, and tried 
to kick the doors when the officer was trying to place him in the back of a police car while 
he was handcuffed.  Id. at 789-90.  The Perdue court determined reasonable jurors could 
have found the defendant’s violent acts were an attempt to prevent the officer from 
effecting his arrest and upheld the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a 
directed verdict on the resisting arrest charge.  Id. at 793. 
A bright-line test for determining when an arrest has been effected is impractical 
because encounters between police and individuals suspected of criminal activity vary 
significantly.  Accordingly, I agree with the principal opinion that whether an arrest has 
been effected “depends on the specific circumstances of each case” and “[e]ach case 
requires a fact-specific inquiry to determine at what point the arrest is complete.”  It is the 
duty of the jury to look at the facts of each case and determine whether an arrest was 
effected.   
In this case, Ajak was yelling and screaming while being placed in handcuffs and 
while being advised he was under arrest.  He refused the officer’s request to put on 
additional clothing and shoes before transport.  While walking to the police cruiser, Ajak 
was “pulling and jerking and just trying to get away[,] trying to break [the officers’] grip,” 
knocking off the officer’s name badge in the process.  Once at the vehicle, Ajak continued 
to yell and scream and even spit on the officer.  A reasonable juror could infer the arrest 
was still ongoing, i.e., the officers were still effecting the arrest at the time of Ajak’s 
resistance.  Although a reasonable juror could also infer, as the principal opinion does, that 
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the officers effected the arrest in the kitchen, this Court must ignore all inferences contrary 
to the verdict.  Belton, 153 S.W.3d at 309.   
Because there was evidence upon which a rational jury could have found Ajak’s 
arrest was not complete when he became violent with the police officers, I would affirm 
the judgement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  W. Brent Powell, Judge