Title: State v. Cunningham

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Jodi Kathryn Stein 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
Steven E. Ripstra 
Ripstra Law Office 
Jasper, Indiana 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
No. 19S05-1409-CR-599 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellant,  
V. 
MICHAEL E. CUNNINGHAM, 
 
Appellee.  
_________________________________ 
Appeal from the Dubois Superior Court, No. 19D01-1305-FD-460 
The Honorable Mark R. McConnell, Judge 
_________________________________ 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 19A05-1310-CR-489 
_________________________________ 
March 2, 2015 
Rush, Chief Justice. 
Unless police have reasonable suspicion that a subject is armed and dangerous, they may 
generally conduct a pat-down for officer safety only with the subject’s voluntary consent. Here, 
Defendant asked to step out of his truck during a traffic stop, and police made their permission 
conditional on a pat-down. Defendant argues that choice was inherently coercive and rendered his 
consent involuntary, but we disagree. Police could simply have required Defendant to remain in 
the truck, with no option of getting out, as part of their authority to control the scene of a traffic stop. 
Therefore, they could also make permission to exit conditional on consent to a pat-down, since 
Defendant had the option of staying in the truck and thus avoiding the search. We granted transfer 
Mar 02 2015, 10:36 am
2 
 
after oral argument, and now reverse the trial court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to suppress evi-
dence obtained as a result of the pat-down. 
Facts and Procedural History 
At about midnight on May 17, 2013, police pulled over Defendant Michael Cunningham 
for a traffic stop. One of his taillights was broken, “emitting a glaring or blinding light” because 
the red lens was completely gone. The officer described the broken taillight to Defendant, who 
said that “he knew the . . . lens had been cracked, but he didn’t realize . . . it was missing,” and he 
“asked if he could exit the vehicle to look at it.” The officer told Defendant “that was fine but I 
would pat him down for any weapons just for officer safety issue [sic],” and Defendant “said that 
was fine” and exited the vehicle.  
At that point, Defendant submitted to a pat-down. He had no weapons, but the officer recog-
nized by feel that there was a pill bottle in Defendant’s right front pocket. The officer asked what 
was in the bottle, and Defendant admitted that it contained marijuana and took the bottle out of his 
pocket. The officer then asked Defendant about “anything else on his person,” and Defendant admit-
ted he had a pipe in his truck and offered to go get it. After giving Defendant his Miranda warnings, 
the officer asked him to retrieve the pipe. But in response to further questions about the source of the 
marijuana, Defendant’s “reply was if he was going to jail tonight, he wasn’t going to answer any 
further questions.” Nevertheless, Defendant was “very much” cooperative during the traffic stop. 
Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana and possession of para-
phernalia as Class A misdemeanors, as well as Class D felony enhancements of each offense based 
on his prior convictions. He then moved to suppress both the pill bottle and the pipe on two 
grounds: first, the traffic stop was invalid because even with the missing lens, both taillights had 
working bulbs and thus served their purpose of signaling when the truck was slowing down; and 
second, even if the stop was valid, the pat-down was not because Defendant consented only to a 
search for weapons, and the officer knew by feel that the object in Defendant’s pocket was merely 
a pill bottle. The trial court granted suppression, reading Indiana Code section 9-19-6-4 to require 
only one red taillight, finding no requirement that “only red light” be visible—thus holding the traffic 
stop invalid without considering whether consent was valid. The State appealed. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds in a published deci-
sion. State v. Cunningham, 4 N.E.3d 800 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The panel unanimously reversed the 
3 
 
trial court’s analysis of the taillight statute, because under Indiana Code section 9-19-6-4(c) (2010), 
vehicles manufactured after 1956, like Defendant’s truck, must have two red taillights, not just one.1 
Id. at 804, 807. But the majority accepted Defendant’s alternative argument on appeal that his consent 
to the pat-down “was invalid because it was merely acquiescence to police actions and directions.” 
Id. at 805 (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority reasoned that because a non-consensual 
pat-down requires particularized “reasonable suspicion” of danger, and the officer had no such 
suspicion here, he could not require a pat-down as a condition of allowing Defendant to leave his 
truck. Id. at 805–06. Instead, the majority concluded, if the officer “believed it was more dangerous 
for [Defendant] to be outside of his vehicle than inside of it, he could have taken the less-invasive 
step of ordering him to stay inside” instead of “g[iving] an ultimatum” that leaving the truck would 
require a pat-down. Id. at 806. 
But Judge Brown dissented on this point, reasoning that since police may order occupants to 
stay in a vehicle during a traffic stop, they could properly give conditional permission to get out. 
And because there was no need to exit the truck in that moment—Defendant could have inspected 
the taillight after the stop was complete—his statement that a pat-down was “fine,” and his choice 
to get out knowing that a pat-down would result, were voluntary and not coerced. Id. at 807. 
The State sought transfer, arguing that a choice between being patted down as a condition of 
exiting one’s vehicle, or else remaining in the vehicle unsearched, is not coercive. We agree. 
Standard of Review 
Whether consent to a search was given voluntarily “is a question of fact to be determined 
from the totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
We “consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling,” Campos v. State, 885 
N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008) (citing State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006)), as well as 
undisputed evidence favorable to the defendant, see Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 434 (Ind. 1993). 
It is the State’s burden to prove that consent to a search “was in fact voluntarily given, and not the 
result of duress or coercion, express or implied.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248. And when the State 
appeals from a matter on which it bore the burden of proof, the negative judgment applies and 
                                                 
1 On this point, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). 
4 
 
requires the State to show that the prior court’s ruling was contrary to law. State v. Washington, 
898 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind. 2008) (citing State v. Estep, 753 N.E.2d 22, 24–25 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2001)).  
Discussion 
“Many search and seizure issues are resolved in the same manner under both the Indiana 
and Federal Constitutions,” Campos, 885 N.E.2d at 596, and this case falls within that category. 
Under both Constitutions, it is axiomatic that a search requires a warrant unless certain narrow 
exceptions apply—one of which “is an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 
597 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) and Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 
(Ind. 1999)). Another such exception is consent, since a “search based on lawful consent is 
consistent with both the Indiana and Federal Constitutions.” Campos, 885 N.E.2d at 600.  
The essence of Defendant’s argument on transfer, is that his consent was not given 
voluntarily—reasoning that it is inherently coercive to make a pat-down a condition of getting out 
of a stopped vehicle when police have no reasonable suspicion to independently justify a pat-down. 
The tacit premise of Defendant’s view, though, is that he had a right to exit the car while the traffic 
stop was in progress, which is inconsistent with law enforcement’s well-established authority to 
require stopped motorists to stay in the car until the stop is complete. We therefore reject 
Defendant’s position.  
I. It Is Not Inherently Coercive to Choose Whether to Get Out of a Car and Be Frisked, or 
to Stay Inside Unsearched. 
A routine traffic stop presents enough “concern for officer safety” that it “may justify the 
‘minimal’ additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car”—even though a 
stop does not automatically justify a non-consensual pat-down without reasonable suspicion that 
the subject may be armed and dangerous. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117–18 (1998) (citing 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) and Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). But if ordering occu-
pants out of a car is only a “minimal additional intrusion” under the Fourth Amendment, Knowles, 
525 U.S. at 117 (emphasis added), ordering them to remain in the car until the end of the stop is 
necessarily a lesser intrusion, and therefore permissible. Likewise, we have held that Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution likewise “permits police to stop and briefly detain a motorist 
if the officer reasonably suspects that the motorist is engaged in, or about to engage in, illegal 
5 
 
activity,” including a traffic violation. Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 787 (Ind. 2001) (citing 
Baldwin, 715 N.E.2d at 340). Indeed, Defendant’s transfer brief concedes as much by arguing that 
police could simply have told him, “No, you cannot leave the car.” Without a doubt, then, police 
needed no particularized suspicion to order Defendant to stay in the car—either by an express 
order to stay in, or by denying permission to get out. 
The logical conclusion of Defendant’s argument, then, is that if a motorist asks to get out of 
the car during a traffic stop, police have no choice but to either forbid it entirely or permit it uncon-
ditionally. We cannot agree. The practical result of such a rule would almost certainly be that police 
would err on the side of caution and never allow drivers out of the car during a stop, thus increasing 
the adversarial nature of traffic stops and restricting drivers’ liberty more than would otherwise be 
the case. Giving police a measure of discretion in their interactions with motorists will give motorists 
greater freedom as well. That discretion is surely not limitless—for example, we might find it inher-
ently coercive to ask permission to search the inside of a car as a condition of letting the driver get 
out,  since that condition would not be the “least intrusive means” of accommodating the motorist’s 
request. See Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 500 (1983)). But we find no inherent coercion in the choice between remaining in the car, or 
being patted down as a condition of getting out. 
Nor does Jett v. State, on which Defendant relies, suggest otherwise. 716 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1999). There, a driver got out of his car as soon as police pulled him over, but immediately got 
back in when ordered and made no furtive or threatening movements. Id. at 70–71. Yet police then 
ordered him back out of the car and performed a pat-down, discovering marijuana in his pocket. The 
Court of Appeals held even though the driver’s initial conduct “was unusual and could be seen as a 
sign of hostility toward the officer,” his subsequent behavior “alleviated” any reasonable fear for 
officer safety and made the pat-down search unreasonable. Id. at 70–71. But Jett holds only that if a 
driver complies with an order to stay in his car during a traffic stop, police may not perform a pat-
down just because he had initially exited the car without permission. It does not forbid police to 
offer a free choice between a pat-down to get out of the car, or else staying in the car unsearched.  
II. Defendant’s Right to Refuse Consent to Search Was Implicit in His Choice to Get Out of 
the Vehicle or Stay In. 
6 
 
Defendant also claims that police implied he “had no choice but to submit to the pat-down 
when he exited the vehicle, despite the absence of reasonable suspicion that he was armed and 
dangerous.” 4 N.E.3d at 806 (emphasis added). But “when he exited the vehicle” begs the question. 
Defendant freely chose to check his taillight during the stop rather than wait until the stop was 
over—and thus freely chose to be searched.  
Consent to search is invalid when police imply that the subject has no option for refusing 
the search. For example, in Campos, a driver who had been asked for consent to search asked 
police, “Is it really necessary?” and the officer answered, “Yes.” 885 N.E.2d at 595. We held that 
by telling the driver the search was “necessary,” the officer “announced, in effect, that [the driver] 
had ‘no right to resist the search’” so that his purported consent was invalid. Id. at 600 (quoting 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968)). That is, the context of the driver’s dialogue 
with police suggested he did not really have a choice about whether the search would happen. 
By contrast here, the very fact that Defendant asked permission to get out of his truck 
implies that he knew he was expected to stay in the truck unless he had specific permission to do 
otherwise. As Judge Brown’s dissent recognized, “the police were neither acting nor directing but 
rather responding to [Defendant]’s request to get out of his vehicle.” 4 N.E.3d at 807 (Brown, J., 
dissenting). In that context, telling him “that was fine but I would pat him down for any weapons,” 
id. at 803 (majority opinion) did not “announce[], in effect, that [he] had no right to resist” the pat-
down, Campos, 885 N.E.2d at 600. Rather, it must be understood against Defendant’s recognition 
that he could choose (or even be required) not to get out of the truck—and thus not be patted down.  
Defendant having a truly free choice also defeats his related argument that his consent was 
not valid because police never told him he could refuse consent. “[V]oluntariness is a question of 
fact to be determined from all the circumstances.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248–49. “While know-
ledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account,” it is not “the sine qua 
non of an effective consent.” Id. at 227. And as we have explained, the circumstances of 
Defendant’s request, and the officer’s response, reflect Defendant’s knowledge that he could avoid 
an unwanted search simply by choosing not to get out of his truck. It may have been preferable in 
retrospect if the officer had stated that choice explicitly. But regardless of any imprecision in the 
officer’s language, Defendant recognized from the circumstances that he could refuse the search 
7 
 
simply by changing his mind about inspecting the taillight. Accordingly, his choice to step out of 
the truck and submit to the pat-down it entailed was free and voluntary. 
III. Defendant Was Not Coerced Into Broadening the Scope of His Consent to Search. 
Finally, Defendant argues that he consented, at most, to a weapons search, and because 
police knew the object in his pocket was merely a pill bottle and not a weapon, any further inquiry 
about the bottle or its contents exceeded the scope of his consent. As we recently reiterated, “a 
consensual search allows a suspect to limit or restrict the search as he or she chooses” and “the 
scope of a consent search [is] generally defined by the object of the search.” McIlquham v. State, 
10 N.E.3d 506, 513 (Ind. 2014) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 918 (Ind. 2003) and Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 964 (Ind. 
2001)). But those principles limit only “where police may look, not what they actually find.” 
McIlquham at 513. Here, consenting to a pat-down “for any weapons” permitted police to pat-down 
any part of Defendant’s clothing where a weapon might be found, including the pocket that contained 
the pill bottle. Thus, the issue is not whether the pill bottle itself was improperly discovered, but 
whether the officer’s question about its contents coerced Defendant into expanding the scope of 
the consent he initially gave. 
We have recognized that repeated requests and accusatory questions can contribute to a 
coercive environment that negates consent. In Sellmer v. State, police essentially badgered the owner 
of a car into giving consent to search. 842 N.E.2d 358, 364-65 (Ind. 2006). They asked her for 
consent “between three and five times” before she relented and asked a string of pointed and 
potentially incriminating questions—telling her they had received a tip “that there was a large 
amount of illegal drugs in” her car and asking, “Do you know of any drugs that might be in your 
vehicle? Are there any drugs in this car? Do you know of any drugs that might be in the car or why 
our dispatcher would have received this call?” Id. at 364. We held that conduct, together with 
several other coercive tactics, combined to invalidate the subject’s consent—though we also 
recognized that no one (nor even several) of those tactics in isolation would have made that steep 
showing. Id. at 364–65. 
But the police conduct here was far less confrontational than in Sellmer. Upon identifying 
the pill bottle by feel, the officer did not engage in aggressive or badgering questions, but asked 
8 
 
only a single, open-ended question about its contents—“expecting [Defendant] to say it was his 
medication,” not to volunteer an incriminating answer. Instead, Defendant volunteered that the 
bottle contained marijuana, then without prompting took the bottle out of his own pocket and 
showed it to the officer. Then and only then, the officer asked a followup question, which was still 
consistent with a pat-down—whether “there was anything else on his person that . . . I needed to be 
aware of” (emphasis added)—to which Defendant volunteered, “I’ve got a pipe in the truck” and 
offered “to go get it.” At that point, the officer advised Defendant of his rights before the 
investigation went any further.  
Thus, even though the scope of Defendant’s encounter with law enforcement broadened 
from his initial consent to a simple pat-down for weapons, that expansion resulted from informa-
tion he volunteered, without coercion from (or even leading by) the investigating officer. Just as 
Defendant could consent to the initial patdown, he could—and did—consent to its expansion. We 
find no violation of his constitutional rights. 
Conclusion  
Police always have the right to require a driver to remain inside the vehicle during a traffic 
stop, even without particularized officer-safety concerns. Accordingly, it is not inherently coercive 
for police to give conditional permission to step out of the vehicle, subject to the motorist’s consent 
to a pat-down. Such a situation offers the motorist a free choice to remain unsearched by staying 
inside the vehicle—so stepping out signifies consent, not coercion. And here, any expansion of the 
search from Defendant’s initial consent was the product of his subsequent consent, and not of 
improper police conduct. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to 
suppress, and remand for further proceedings. 
Dickson, David, and Massa, JJ., concur. 
Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
RUCKER, J., dissenting. 
 
In my view the State has failed to establish Cunningham’s purported consent to the pat-down 
was constitutionally valid.  Therefore I respectfully dissent. 
 
The Fourth Amendment requires officers to have more than an “inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or ‘hunch’” that the person stopped is armed and dangerous in order to justify a pat-down 
search.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).  The requirement that an officer has reasonable 
suspicion to search an individual in a vehicle not only applies to the driver but extends to protect 
passengers as well.  Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009).  The requirement also applies 
when the person has been ordered out of the vehicle by police officers, Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 
113, 117-18 (1998), or when a person steps out on his own volition.  Jett v. State, 716 N.E.2d 69, 70-
71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 
 
Law enforcement officers do face significant risks in performing traffic stops and it is for this 
reason the Fourth Amendment allows an individual’s privacy interests to be balanced against officer 
safety interests.  
 
However, to subject the stopped motorist to a frisk for weapons is 
permissible only if a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances 
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was 
in danger.  Police may not frisk for weapons on less than reasonable 
belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked.  An officer’s 
authority to conduct a pat-down search is dependent upon the nature 
and extent of his particularized concern for his safety and that of 
others.  
 
Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted).  The State 
concedes here, as it must, that no reasonable suspicion existed to pat down Cunningham.  There was 
no indication to Officer Hammock that Cunningham was a threat to his safety.  Indeed, in describing 
the interaction with Cunningham, Officer Hammock testified that Cunningham had been “very” 
cooperative throughout.  Tr. at 14.  Thus the State advances the argument that the search was 
2 
 
acceptable under the Fourth Amendment based on consent—which is a well-recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement.  Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind. 2001).  
 
The State has the burden of proving consent to a search was freely and voluntary given.  
Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 600 (Ind. 2008).  Whether consent was freely given is determined 
from the totality of the circumstances.  Garcia-Torres v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1229, 1237 (Ind. 2011).  
Acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is not sufficient for the State to meet this burden.  
Bumper v. N. Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).   
 
The majority relies on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte for the proposition that “‘[w]hile 
knowledge of the right to refuse is one factor to be taken into account,’ it is not ‘the sine qua non of 
an effective consent.’”  Slip op. at *6 (citation omitted).  Like Justice Marshall,   
 
I would have thought that the capacity to choose necessarily depends 
upon knowledge that there is a choice to be made.  But today the 
Court reaches the curious result that one can choose to relinquish a 
constitutional right—the right to be free of unreasonable searches—
without knowing that he has the alternative of refusing to accede to a 
police request to search.  
 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218, 277 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).  For the same 
reason, here Cunningham’s consent to this search was not voluntarily given.  
 
It is of course the case that police officers have the authority to maintain control of a traffic 
stop, including ordering someone to either stay in or exit a vehicle.  However, it goes too far to 
permit a police officer to be able to barter an individual’s constitutional right to be free from 
warrantless, unreasonable searches in exchange for the individual to verify he in fact was committing 
a minor traffic infraction as the officer alleged.  Up to the point when Cunningham asked to step out 
of the vehicle, the officer had no safety concerns.  The officer also had not instructed Cunningham to 
remain in the vehicle.  If instead of asking permission Cunningham simply had gotten out of the 
vehicle, inspected the light in the same calm demeanor, then immediately got back in his vehicle—
whether or not Officer Hammock in the meantime had ordered him back in—Cunningham would not 
have done anything to warrant a search.  See Jett v. State, 716 N.E.2d at 71.  Unlike the majority, it 
3 
 
appears to me Office Hammock was not seeking Cunningham’s permission to search in telling 
Cunningham he “would pat him down.”  Tr. at 6 (emphasis added).  Instead it is apparent the officer 
was merely asserting that he had that right.  Cunningham’s response of “that was fine,” id., only 
served as verbal acknowledgement of his submission to the claimed authority.   
 
I agree with my colleagues on the Court of Appeals that the “pat-down search of Cunningham 
violated the Fourth Amendment and the resulting fruits of that search must be suppressed.”  State v. 
Cunningham, 4 N.E.3d 800, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).  Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s 
grant of Cunningham’s motion to suppress.