Title: Grant County Department of Social Services v. Unified Board of Grant and Iowa Counties

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 106 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP634 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Jane  
E. P.: 
 
Grant County Department of Social Services,  
          Appellant, 
     v. 
Unified Board of Grant and Iowa Counties,  
          Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 153 
Reported at:  275 Wis. 2d 680, 687 N.W.2d 72 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Grant   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert P. VanDeHey   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER, J., joins the concurrence. 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join Part II.   
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
ROGGENSACK, concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins the concurrence/dissent. 
CROOKS, J., joins Part D. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-petitioner there were briefs by Craig R. 
Day and Law Office of Craig R. Day, Lancaster, and oral argument 
by Craig R. Day. 
 
For the appellant there was a brief by Sheila Stuart Kelley 
and Kopp, McKichan, Geyer, Skemp & Stombaugh, LLP, Platteville, 
and oral argument by Sheila Stuart Kelley. 
 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Patricia M. Cavey and 
Tammi, Cohn & Cavey, Milwaukee; and Jeffery R. Myer and Legal 
Action of Wisconsin, Inc., Milwaukee, on behalf of Legal Action 
of Wisconsin, Inc., and oral argument by Jeffery R. Myer. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Edward S. Marion, 
Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy, State 
Bar of Wisconsin Elder Law Section, Elder Law Center of the 
Coalition of Wisconsin Aging Groups, Wisconsin Health Care 
Association and Wisconsin Association of Homes and Services for 
the Aging. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips, 
Evan N. Claditis and Prentice & Phillips LLP, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
 
2005 WI 106 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP634  
(L.C. No. 
02 GN 000029) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Jane  
E. P.: 
 
Grant County Department of Social  
Services,  
 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Unified Board of Grant and Iowa Counties,  
 
 
          Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Vacated. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The petitioner, Unified Board 
of Grant and Iowa Counties, seeks review of a decision of the 
court of appeals reversing a circuit court order that had 
dismissed a petition for guardianship and protective placement 
filed by Grant County Department of Social Services.1  The court 
                                                 
1 Grant County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Unified Bd. of Grant 
and Iowa Counties, 2004 WI App 153, 275 Wis. 2d 680, 687 N.W.2d 
72 (reversing an order of the circuit court of Grant County, 
Robert P. Van De Hey, Judge).    
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
2 
 
of appeals examined Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) (2001-02), which 
requires a petition be filed in the county of residence of the 
person to be protected.2  The petitioner asserts that the court 
of appeals erred in concluding the statute is unconstitutional 
in application because it violates the right to interstate 
travel. 
¶2 
This case presents an opportunity to examine some of 
the current problems associated with the transfer of interstate 
guardianships. Based on principles of comity and the orderly 
administration of justice, we set forth standards for Wisconsin 
courts to follow when confronted with the transfer of interstate 
guardianships.  These standards will protect the integrity of 
the original court's determination of what is in the best 
interests of the ward.  Accordingly, we vacate the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for the 
application of the standards set forth here.3 
I 
¶3 
The facts in this case are brief and undisputed.  Jane 
E.P. is a 47-year-old woman who suffers from Wernicke's 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted.   
3 We do not address the constitutional issue in this 
majority opinion.  For a discussion of the constitutional issue, 
see the concurrence and dissent to this opinion.  Justice 
Crooks's 
concurrence, 
¶¶52-57; 
Justice 
Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, 
¶¶78-87. 
 
Justice 
Crooks's 
concurring 
opinion is the majority opinion on the constitutional issue.  
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
3 
 
encephalopathy.4  Due to this condition, she is substantially 
incapable of managing her personal finances and property and 
cannot care for herself.  Jane currently resides at the Galena 
Stauss Nursing Home in Galena, Illinois, where she has lived the 
past five years.  She was placed there pursuant to an order of 
the court in Jo Daviess County, Illinois.  Jane's guardian is 
her sister, Deborah V. 
 
¶4 
Many of Jane's relatives live in Grant County, 
Wisconsin, just across the Illinois border.  They wanted to move 
Jane to Southwest Health Center Nursing Home, a private facility 
in Cuba City, Wisconsin.  Through its corporation counsel, the 
Grant County Department of Social Services (hereinafter "Grant 
County") petitioned for guardianship and protective placement at 
Southwest Health Center Nursing Home.  The petition nominated 
Deborah V. to remain as Jane's guardian.  
¶5 
As part of its proceedings, the circuit court ordered 
the Unified Board of Grant and Iowa Counties (hereinafter 
"Unified") to make a comprehensive evaluation of Jane.5  Instead, 
                                                 
4 Wernicke's encephalopathy is "a neurological disorder 
characterized by confusion, apathy, drowsiness, ataxia of gait, 
nystagmus, and ophthalmoplegia.  It was first described by 
[German neurologist Karl] Wernicke in 1881 and is now known to 
be due to thiamine deficiency, usually from chronic alcohol 
abuse."  Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 591 (29th ed. 
2000). 
5 The Unified Board of Grant and Iowa Counties was 
established under Wis. Stat. § 51.42(3)(a) to "administer a 
community mental health, developmental disabilities, alcoholism 
and drug abuse program, make appropriations to operate the 
program and authorize the county department of community 
programs to apply for grants-in-aid under s. 51.423." 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
4 
 
Unified moved to dismiss the guardianship and protective 
placement for lack of competency of the court to proceed.  It 
maintained that Jane was a resident of Illinois and Wis. Stat. 
§ 55.06(3)(c) required her to be a Wisconsin resident at the 
time of filing.6  The circuit court agreed with Unified and 
dismissed the matter based upon Jane's non-residency.   
¶6 
The court of appeals reversed the order of the circuit 
court.  It determined that Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c), as applied 
to Jane, violated her constitutional right to interstate travel.  
Grant County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Unified Bd. of Grant and 
Iowa Counties, 2004 WI App 153, ¶22, 275 Wis. 2d 680, 687 N.W.2d 
72.  In doing so, the court of appeals relied on Bethesda 
Lutheran Homes and Services Inc. v. Leean, 122 F.3d 443 (7th 
Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 154 F.3d 716 (1998), which, 
although not binding on state courts, held under similar 
circumstances 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
55.06(3)(c) 
impeded 
the 
constitutional right to travel. 
¶7 
The Bethesda Lutheran court explained, "[s]ince anyone 
who is approved for protective placement is by definition 
incapable of living outside [a facility] it is unclear where in 
Wisconsin the applicant for admission to the [Wisconsin] 
facility is supposed to live while the placement is being 
processed."  Id. at 446.  Following this reasoning, the court of 
appeals concluded, "because Jane is incompetent and cannot first 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) provides that "The petition 
shall be filed in the county of residence of the person to be 
protected." 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
5 
 
move to Wisconsin and have a petition for protective placement 
filed on her behalf, § 55.06(3)(c), as applied to Jane, 
unconstitutionally burdens her right to travel."  Grant County, 
275 Wis. 2d 680, ¶17.  Unified subsequently petitioned this 
court for review. 
II 
¶8 
As noted above, this case presents an opportunity to 
examine some of the current problems associated with the 
transfer of interstate guardianships.  We begin our discussion 
with 
a 
brief 
overview 
of 
the 
emergence 
of 
interstate 
guardianships. 
 
Next, 
we 
address 
some 
of 
the 
questions 
interstate guardianships raise and consider various responses of 
different jurisdictions.  Then, we turn to the arguments of the 
parties in the present case.  Finally, we set forth standards 
for Wisconsin courts to follow when confronted with interstate 
guardianships. 
A 
¶9 
The fact that American society has become increasingly 
mobile should come as no surprise to most observers.  Over 15 
percent of Americans change their residence each year, with 3 
percent of them moving to another state.  Charlene D. Daniel & 
Paula L. Hannaford, Creating the "Portable" Guardianship:  Legal 
and Practical Implications of Probate Court Cooperation in 
Interstate Guardianship Cases, 13 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 351 
(1999).  While the vast majority of these movers are relatively 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
6 
 
young, nearly 5 percent of people age 65 and older also move 
each year.  Id. at 352. 
¶10 Likewise, it is well documented that American society 
is living longer than ever due to advancements in health, 
science, and medicine.  Presently, individuals age 65 and older 
represent 12 percent of the U.S. population, up from 4 percent 
in 1900.  Peggie R. Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work:  The 
Work-Family Issue of the 21st Century, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & 
Lab. L. 351, 352 (2004).  By 2030, that figure is expected to 
increase to 20 percent.  Id.7  Along with this rise in the 
elderly population comes an increase in Alzheimer's, dementia, 
and other incapacitating diseases that interfere with the 
ability to live independently. 
¶11 The convergence of these developments has significant 
implications for the administration of Wisconsin's guardianship 
system.8  As one commentator explained, "[f]requently elderly 
parents choose their adult children as their primary caretakers.  
Therefore, in this age of geographic mobility, children often 
must make arrangements for their parents to relocate to the 
state where the children live."  Ryan Vincent, As America Ages:  
                                                 
7 By 2030, the population of individuals age 65 or older is 
expected to reach 70 million, more than double the number in 
1998.  Erica Wood, Dispute Resolution and Dementia:  Seeking 
Solutions, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 785, 788 (2001). 
8 Although the ward in this case is only 47 years old, these 
developments were not lost upon the parties.  As counsel for 
Grant County observed at oral argument, "we are going to find 
ourselves in these situations more and more frequently as our 
population ages and people are continuing to be mobile."  
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
7 
 
Changing the Domicile of the Incompetent Challenges Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 43 Washburn L.J. 513 (Winter 2004).  As a result, 
the number of interstate guardianships is likely to increase in 
Wisconsin as well as nationwide.9 
B 
¶12 With the increase of interstate guardianships comes a 
host of difficult questions.  The questions surrounding the 
interstate transfer of guardianships are of vital importance to 
Wisconsin families and their loved ones.  In many simple cases 
the conclusion is obvious:  it is in the best interest of the 
ward to be near those who will love, care for, and comfort the 
                                                 
9 Numerous factors contribute to the increase of interstate 
guardianships: 
The ward, his or her guardian, family or assets may be 
located outside of the jurisdiction of the court that 
originally 
established 
the 
guardianship. 
 
Some 
incapacitated adults desire to be closer to family or 
may need to be placed in a different, more suitable 
health care or living arrangement.  Family caregivers 
that relocate for employment reasons reasonably may 
wish to bring the ward with them.  The ward's real or 
personal 
property 
may 
remain 
in 
the 
existing 
jurisdiction, however, even after the ward has moved.  
Interfamily 
conflict 
or 
attempts 
to 
thwart 
jurisdiction may occur less frequently, but still 
cause significant problems for courts.  Guardians and 
family members, for example, may engage in forum 
shopping for Medicaid purposes or for state laws 
governing death and dying that are compatible with 
their views or the views of the ward. 
National Probate Court Standard 3.5, Commission on National 
Probate Court Standards and Advisory Committee on Interstate 
Guardianships, a Project of the National College of Probate 
Judges and the National Center for State Courts. 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
8 
 
ward.  But not all cases are so easily resolved.  Quite the 
contrary.   
¶13 Some jurisdictional questions involving the interstate 
transfer of guardianship pose complex legal and procedural 
issues laden with serious public policy questions.  What happens 
when the relatives are in different states and are fighting over 
which state most appropriately should exercise jurisdiction?  
What happens when the motives are not based on what is in the 
best interest of the ward, but rather on the fortune of the ward 
who has property in several states?  Should wards be transferred 
to states for the purpose of being subject to more favorable 
"right to die" laws or assisted suicide legislation? 
¶14 As case law from other jurisdictions demonstrates, 
courts have struggled mightily with problems associated with 
interstate guardianships.  Indeed, "nowhere are the legal issues 
associated with interstate guardianships more difficult to 
resolve than in cases that raise the question of a court's 
jurisdiction to establish a guardianship or to determine which 
court should hear a guardianship matter when multiple courts 
have 
jurisdiction." 
 
Daniel, 
Creating 
the 
"Portable" 
Guardianship, at 355.  Three cases illustrate this point:  Mack 
v. Mack; In re Guardianship of Margaret Enos; and In re 
Guardianship of Ralph DeCaigny.  We consider each one in turn. 
¶15 In Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744 (Md. 1993), the Maryland 
court of appeals heard a dispute over the guardianship of a man 
left in a persistent vegetative state after an automobile 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
9 
 
accident.  The man's wife was initially appointed guardian for 
her husband in Maryland.  However, after moving to Florida, she 
sought a guardianship appointment from a Florida circuit court 
and a discharge from the Maryland guardianship order, which were 
both granted.  Upon learning that she had petitioned the Florida 
court for permission to withhold nutrition and hydration for the 
man, the man's father filed a petition for appointment as 
guardian in Maryland.  Thus, the court was faced with a 
jurisdictional question, stemming from an intrafamily conflict 
over the continuation of treatment for a loved one. 
¶16 The Maryland court of appeals concluded that "[t]he 
guardian's authority is not derived from the ward, but from the 
appointing 
court 
for 
which 
the 
guardian 
acts 
as 
agent, 
exercising those powers conferred by statute or by the court."  
Mack, 618 A.2d at 750.  Therefore, the man's wife, simply by 
virtue of being his guardian, could not appear in a Florida 
court and consent to the exercise of jurisdiction over him.  Id.  
The court of appeals noted that the man never lived in Florida, 
and that there was no evidence that he ever intended to live 
there.  Id. at 751.  Accordingly, it refused to afford full 
faith and credit to the Florida court judgment appointing the 
wife guardian.  Id.  
¶17 As commentators Charlene D. Daniel and Paula L. 
Hannaford explain, it is difficult to examine the jurisdictional 
question in Mack because the issue is so closely tied to the 
substantive question underlying the dispute:  the appointment of 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
10 
 
a guardian who will act in the best interests of the ward.  
Daniel, Creating the "Portable" Guardianship, at 358.  They note 
that the court of appeals in Mack "conveniently glosses over" 
the fact that a Maryland court had discharged the previous 
guardianship, presumably because it recognized that Florida had 
jurisdiction.  Id.   
 
¶18 A more satisfying analysis of jurisdictional issues 
can be found in In re Guardianship of Margaret Enos, 670 N.E.2d 
967 (Mass. Ct. App. 1996), where the court considered and 
deferred to another court of competing jurisdiction.  There, the 
Massachusetts court of appeals heard a guardianship petition 
filed by the daughter of a Florida woman who had transferred her 
mother from Florida to Massachusetts without the authorization 
of either a Florida court or the not-for-profit charitable 
corporation that had been appointed guardian of the mother.  In 
her petition, the daughter argued, among other things, that the 
Florida guardianship decision was not entitled to full faith and 
credit in Massachusetts.  
¶19 The Massachusetts court of appeals acknowledged that 
it was not obligated to grant full faith and credit to a foreign 
guardianship if the best interests of the ward required 
otherwise.  Enos, 670 N.E.2d at 968.  It concluded, however, 
that there was no reason for not granting full faith and credit 
given the evidence presented.  Id. at 969.  The court also 
emphasized that, regardless of the validity of the daughter's 
claims concerning the mother's alleged mistreatment, she needed 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
11 
 
to pursue her claims in Florida for reasons of full faith and 
credit, interstate comity, and the superior convenience of the 
forum.  Id. 
 
¶20 Finally, In re Guardianship of Ralph DeCaigny, No. C3-
93-1269, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 126 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 1994) 
is another case worth noting for the respect one state court 
afforded another.  There, the Minnesota court of appeals 
considered whether a Minnesota circuit court had jurisdiction to 
remove two guardians appointed to the ward's person by a circuit 
court in New Mexico.  The circuit court, which had previously 
appointed a Minnesota bank as conservator of the ward's property 
located within the state, determined that the out-of-state 
guardians had mismanaged the ward's funds, failed to make the 
necessary reports on the ward's finances, and improperly used 
the ward's property.  After consulting with the New Mexico 
circuit court, the Minnesota circuit court ordered the removal 
of the New Mexico guardians.  
¶21 Although the court of appeals lauded the comity and 
cooperation demonstrated by the two circuit courts, it felt 
compelled to reverse the removal order on grounds that Minnesota 
does not have jurisdiction to remove out-of-state guardians 
appointed 
by 
out-of-state 
courts. 
 
Daniel, 
Creating 
the 
"Portable" Guardianship, at 361 (citing DeCaigny, 1994 Minn. 
App. LEXIS 126 at 3).  Accordingly, the court of appeals 
concluded that any removal of the appointment of the guardians 
from New Mexico was in error.  Id. 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
12 
 
 
¶22 As 
these 
three 
cases 
demonstrate, 
jurisdictional 
questions in the context of interstate guardianship cases can 
present thorny problems for courts.  This is especially true in 
cases like Mack where jurisdiction is used as a procedural 
vehicle to advance the parties' substantive claims concerning 
the continuation of treatment or the right to die.  However, as 
the cases of Enos and DeCaigny reveal, courts can and do 
endeavor to afford respect for the proceedings of another legal 
system.  Encouraging cooperation and consideration among courts 
of different jurisdictions is critical to furthering the dignity 
of the judicial system and promoting the orderly administration 
of justice.   
C 
 
¶23 With the foregoing background in mind, we turn to the 
arguments of the parties in the present case.  Here, Unified 
asserts that Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) is constitutional because 
it does not burden Jane's right to travel and is a bona fide 
residency requirement.  In the alternative, it maintains that 
even if Jane's right to travel is burdened, such a burden is 
justified by the fiscal impact that counties and the State would 
suffer by providing services to nonresidents.  Grant County, 
meanwhile, submits that Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) improperly 
infringes on Jane's constitutional right to interstate travel.  
It declares that the statute acts as a total bar to travel for 
Jane and others similarly situated. 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
13 
 
 
¶24 Lost in these arguments, of course, is the court in Jo 
Daviess County, which is charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring Jane's safety and well-being and has already determined 
that placement at Galena Stauss Nursing Home is in her best 
interests.  If there is to be any comity between Illinois and 
Wisconsin, the analysis should begin there.10   
¶25 Comity is based on respect for the proceedings of 
another system of government.  Teague v. Bad River Chippewa 
Indians, 2003 WI 118, 265 Wis. 2d 64, ¶69, 665 N.W.2d 899 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring for a majority of the court).  The 
doctrine "is neither a matter of absolute obligation nor of mere 
courtesy and good will, but is recognition which one state 
allows within its territory to legislative, executive, or 
judicial acts of another, having due regard to duty and 
convenience and to rights of its own citizens."  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
 
¶26 Given today's aging and mobile society, we believe 
that interstate cooperation between courts is vital.  Such 
cooperation promotes confidence in the judicial system, and 
enhances the efficient use of judicial resources.  Indeed, a 
little cooperation in the present case might have solved the 
problem and avoided the constitutional issue altogether.   
                                                 
10 At oral argument, the parties acknowledged that they did 
not go to the court in Jo Daviess County and ascertain whether 
there would be any objection to transferring the ward to 
Wisconsin. 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
14 
 
 
¶27 The problem in this case and others like it is that 
current laws are generally insufficient to assist courts and 
litigants in resolving multi-jurisdictional issues stemming from 
interstate guardianships.  To be sure, there are exceptions.11  
For 
example, 
Indiana's 
code 
expressly 
extends 
the 
extraterritorial reach of its guardians and gives an Indiana 
guardian the authority to place the ward in another state, with 
court approval.  Ind. Code § 29-3-9-2 (2003).  Moreover, Kansas 
sets forth a highly detailed process to petition the court to 
give full faith and credit to the prior adjudication, appoint a 
guardian or conservator, and terminate the other state's 
proceedings.  Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-3061 (2003).  However, 
neither Wisconsin nor Illinois has comparable provisions. 
¶28 We strongly encourage the legislature to address this 
issue.  In facilitating this end, we direct its attention to the 
work of both the National College of Probate Judges and the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
                                                 
11 According to one commentator, several states have 
established procedures to transfer a case to a new jurisdiction 
where the ward has relocated.  Sally Balch Hurme, Mobile 
Guardianships:  Partial Solutions to Interstate Jurisdiction 
Problems, 17 NAELA Quarterly 6, 10 (Summer 2004) (citing Ala. 
Code § 26-2A-111 (2003), Alaska Stat. § 13.26.155 (2003); Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 14-5313 (2003), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-14-107 
(2003), Idaho Code § 15-5-313 (2003), Ind. Code § 29-3-9-2 
(2003), Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-3061 (2003), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
475.055 (2003), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 464-A:44 (2003), Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 125.540 (2003), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 62-5-313 & -431 
(2003), S.D. Codified Laws §§ 29A-5-109 & -114 (2003), Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 34-11-117 (2003), Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14 § 2923 
(2003), W. Va. Code § 44A-1-7 (2003)). 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
15 
 
referenced later in this opinion.  However, in the absence of 
legislative guidance, we set forth standards for Wisconsin 
courts to follow when confronting cases associated with the 
interstate transfer of guardianships.   
D 
¶29 We determine that principles of comity should be 
applied in this case.  In Teague, 265 Wis. 2d 64, this court 
applied principles of comity to resolve a dispute between two 
courts of competing jurisdiction.  There, a tribal court and a 
circuit court exercised jurisdiction over the same dispute 
between Teague and the Bad River Band about termination of 
Teague's employment with the tribe.  The two courts had reached 
opposite results, and each party wanted this court to give 
effect to the judgment in its favor.   
¶30 To resolve the matter, and provide guidance for future 
cases, we set forth a list of factors for state and tribal 
courts to consider when determining "which of two courts should 
proceed to judgment and which court should abstain and cede its 
jurisdiction."  Id., ¶71. (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring for a 
majority of the court).  The factors stemmed from a number of 
sources discussing comity, allocation of jurisdiction, and 
enforcement of judgment.  Id., ¶71 n.15. 
¶31 Courts must work together in respect and cooperation 
to further the dignity of the judicial system and to promote the 
orderly administration of justice.  Accordingly, as in Teague, 
we set forth standards for Wisconsin courts to follow when 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
16 
 
confronted with interstate guardianships.12  These standards, 
steeped 
in 
a 
spirit 
of 
comity, 
promote 
the 
orderly 
administration of justice.  The standards we provide are not 
made out of whole cloth.  Rather, they stem from an addendum to 
the National Probate Court Standards regarding the subject of 
transfer of interstate guardianships.13  The hallmarks of these 
standards are communication and notice.  First, we briefly 
explain the background of the addendum.  Then, we set forth its 
standards and relevant commentary. 
 
¶32 In the absence of any widely accepted model of 
interstate communication for courts of probate jurisdiction, the 
National College of Probate Judges (NCPJ)14 initiated a research 
project with the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) to 
study the incidence of interstate guardianships and to explore 
                                                 
12 We note that in the context of family law and child 
custody, the legislature has established procedures to follow to 
resolve jurisdictional conflict.  See Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, Wis. Stat. ch. 822; Wis. Stat. § 767.025(1). 
13 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws 
(NCCUSL) has also provided a framework for transferring the 
jurisdiction of guardians.  See Section 107 of the Uniform 
Guardianship and Protective Placement Act (1997) (UGPPA).  Under 
the UGPPA, a foreign guardian may petition for appointment in 
the new state if venue is or will be established.  Id.  To date, 
the UGPPA has been adopted by Alabama, Colorado, Hawaii, 
Minnesota, and Montana.  We note that NCCUSL is beginning the 
process of considering whether a revision to the UGPPA or a 
stand-alone jurisdictional provision should be proposed.    See 
Hurme, Mobile Guardianships, 17 NAELA Quarterly at 12; see also 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/. 
14 Established in 1968, the National College of Probate 
Judges (NCPJ) is composed primarily of judges and probate court 
administrators and includes members from nearly every state. 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
17 
 
avenues 
for 
facilitating 
interstate 
communication 
and 
cooperation.  Final Report of the NCPJ Advisory Committee on 
Interstate Guardianships, Presented to:  National College of 
Probate Judges October 12, 1998, 1.   
¶33 According to the study, difficulties of interstate 
guardianship arose most often in monitoring and enforcement, 
jurisdiction disputes, navigating the laws governing property 
management in other states, obtaining investigatory reports and 
testimony 
from 
persons 
located 
in 
other 
states, 
and 
communications with courts and attorneys in other states.  Id. 
at 2-3.  In response to these concerns, the Advisory Committee 
drafted five standards which address the following items:  (1) 
Communication and Cooperation Between Courts; (2) Screening and 
Review of Petition; (3) Transfer of Guardianship; (4) Receipt 
and Acceptance of a Transferred Guardianship; and (5) Initial 
Hearing in the Court accepting the Transferred Guardianship.  
Id. at 4. 
¶34 Central 
to 
the 
standards 
is 
the 
concept 
of 
"portability," the idea that guardianships should be able to be 
"exported" or "imported" from one state to another absent a 
showing of abuse of the guardianship.  See National Probate 
Court Standard 3.5, Commission on National Probate Court 
Standards and Advisory Committee on Interstate Guardianships, a 
Project of the National College of Probate Judges and the 
National Center for State Courts (hereinafter "National Probate 
Court Standards").  The drafters intended "to facilitate——and 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
18 
 
not impede unnecessarily the movement of [guardianships] across 
state lines" by requiring specific steps to be completed by the 
transferring and accepting courts.  Id.  They reasoned, 
"[s]tandards of access to justice and the principle of comity 
require courts to remove those barriers that impede litigants' 
participation in the legal system even when that participation 
requires the engagement of court systems in different states."  
Id.  We now set forth the National Probate Court Standards 
applicable to the present case, along with selected relevant 
commentary. 
¶35 "STANDARD 3.5.1 COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN 
COURTS.  Probate courts in different jurisdictions and states 
should 
communicate 
and 
cooperate 
to 
resolve 
guardianship 
disputes and related matters. Working in consultation with 
appropriate groups and organizations, probate courts should 
develop and implement rules, codes and standards of ethics, and 
administrative 
procedures 
that 
encourage 
communication 
and 
cooperation between and among courts."  National Probate Court 
Standard 3.5.1.   
¶36 The Commentary to Standard 3.5.1 notes that this 
provision extends the requirement of independence and comity to 
a 
circuit 
court's 
relationship 
with 
courts 
in 
other 
jurisdictions and recognizes that the ends of justice are more 
likely to be met when courts communicate and cooperate to 
resolve guardianship matters that cross state lines.  Id., cmt.  
The Commentary also emphasizes that in matters pertaining to the 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
19 
 
alleged incapacitated person's temporary residence or location 
in another state, as well as in matters in which two or more 
courts have jurisdiction, the courts should communicate among 
themselves to resolve any problems or disputes.  Id.15 
 
¶37 "STANDARD 3.5.3 TRANSFER OF GUARDIANSHIP.  (a) Upon 
receipt of proper 
notice 
of an 
intended 
transfer 
of a 
guardianship, and a satisfactory final report of the guardian, 
and in the absence of meritorious objections by interested 
persons, the probate court should transfer the guardianship to a 
foreign jurisdiction within a reasonable amount of time.  (b) 
The ward and all interested persons should be served with proper 
notice of the intended transfer and be informed of their right 
to file objections and to request a hearing on the petition.  
                                                 
15 Standard 3.5.2 pertains to the recommended screening and 
review process of a petition for guardianship.  Although it is 
not the focus of our discussion in the present case, we set 
forth its text for guidance in future cases. 
STANDARD 3.5.2 SCREENING AND REVIEW OF PETITION.  (a) 
As part of its review and screening of a petition for 
guardianship, the probate court should determine that:  
(1) the proposed guardianship is not a collateral 
attack on an existing or proposed guardianship in 
another jurisdiction or state; and, (2) for cases in 
which multiple states may have jurisdiction, the 
probate court should determine that the petition for 
guardianship has been filed in the court best suited 
to 
consider 
the 
matter. 
 
(b) 
When 
competing 
guardianship petitions are filed in two or more 
different courts with jurisdiction, the probate court 
in which the earliest petition is filed should, upon 
review of the petition, determine the proper venue for 
hearing the case.  
National Probate Court Standard 3.5.2.   
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
20 
 
(c) The final report of the guardian should contain sufficient 
information for the court to determine that the general plans 
for the ward and his or her assets in the foreign jurisdiction 
are reasonable and sufficient."  National Probate Court Standard 
3.5.3.   
 
¶38 The Commentary to Standard 3.5.3 notes that the 
Standard 
is 
consistent 
with 
and 
extends 
to 
interstate 
guardianships the provisions for reports by a guardian, and 
state requirements for annual reports and accountings by the 
guardian.  Id., cmt.  Its intent is to facilitate the transfer 
of guardianships to another state in cases in which the court is 
satisfied that the guardianship is valid and that the guardians 
have performed their duties properly in the interests of the 
ward for the duration of their appointment.  Id.  The Standard 
is based on the presumption that most guardians are acting in 
the interest of the ward and that the notice and reporting 
requirements, and the opportunity to bring objections to the 
transfer to the attention of the court, are sufficient checks on 
the appropriateness of the transfer.  Id.16 
 
¶39 The 
Commentary 
further 
notes 
that, 
in 
general, 
receiving courts should allow the guardianship to be "imported," 
giving full faith and credit to the terms and powers of foreign 
guardianship orders.  Id.  However, enforcement and necessary 
                                                 
16 We emphasize the importance of notice because the 
transfer of a guardianship is ultimately an administrative 
procedure that does not require a determination by the foreign 
court of the ward's incapacity or the appropriateness of the 
guardian's appointment and assigned powers and responsibilities. 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
21 
 
administrative 
changes 
(e.g., 
bond 
requirements, 
periodic 
reporting requirements, appointment of guardian ad litem or 
court visitor) of the guardianship may be made to bring the 
guardianship into compliance with the requirements of the 
receiving jurisdiction.  Id.  Ideally, those changes should be 
made in accordance with the receiving court's monitoring and 
review schedule and requirements.  Id.  However, courts may 
choose to have an expedited review hearing upon receipt and 
acceptance of the foreign guardianship.  Id.  Cooperation and 
communication, and a proper distribution of responsibilities 
among states, should facilitate the movement of guardianships 
and should be such that the parties would see it in their 
interests to comply with the requirements.  Id.  
¶40 In addition, the Commentary recognizes that, as a 
matter of good practice, guardians should always provide the 
court, the ward, and all interested persons advance notice of an 
intended transfer of the guardianship or movement of the ward or 
property from the court's jurisdiction.  Id.  Guardians should 
be familiar with 
the 
laws 
and requirements 
of the new 
jurisdiction.  Id.  No hearing on the transfer is necessary 
unless scheduled by the court sua sponte or requested by the 
ward or interested persons named in the original petition.  
However, the ward and all interested persons should be informed 
of their right to request a hearing.  Id.  After all, the intent 
is not to restrict freedom, or to bar or restrict travel or 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
22 
 
changes in residence, but to encourage the best possible 
treatment of the ward according to their best interests.  Id.   
¶41 Finally, the Commentary states that, in general, a 
guardianship or a ward or the ward's property may be moved to 
another jurisdiction with the approval of the sending court.  
Id.17  The court's approval should be conditioned upon certain 
requirements including the absence of pending disciplinary 
actions against the guardian, approval by the court of a final 
financial accounting, and a satisfactory final report of the 
condition of the ward.  Id.  Bond or other security requirements 
imposed by the exporting court should be discharged only after a 
new bond, if required, has been imposed by the receiving court.  
Id.  Debtor issues also may need to be dealt with in accordance 
with existing state laws.  Id.   
 
¶42 "STANDARD 
3.5.4 
RECEIPT 
AND 
ACCEPTANCE 
OF 
A 
TRANSFERRED GUARDIANSHIP.  Upon receipt of a properly executed 
request for a transfer of a guardianship certified by a foreign 
jurisdiction, and subject to the provisions of Standard 3.5.5, 
the probate court should recognize the appointment and powers of 
the guardian and accept the guardianship under the terms as 
specified in the transferred guardianship order.  Acceptance of 
                                                 
17 This comment, of course, is directly applicable to the 
case at hand.  If the court in Jo Daviess County approves the 
transfer, 
Jane's 
guardian 
could 
then 
seek 
to 
have 
Jane 
protectively placed in Wisconsin.  However, to allow Jane's 
guardian to unilaterally move Jane would severely undermine 
Illinois' guardianship system and create an unnecessary conflict 
between the Wisconsin and Illinois courts.   
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
23 
 
the transferred guardianship can be made without a formal 
hearing unless one is requested by the court sua sponte or by 
motion of the ward or by any interested person named in the 
transfer documents.  The court should notify the foreign court 
of its receipt and acceptance of the transfer."  National 
Probate Court Standard 3.5.4.   
 
¶43 The 
Commentary 
to 
Standard 
3.5.4 
provides 
that, 
subject to the provisions of the Standard, a court should 
recognize and accept the terms of a foreign guardianship that 
has been transferred with the approval of the exporting court. 
Id., cmt.  The receiving court should notify the exporting court 
and acknowledge that it has accepted the guardianship.  Id.  
Receipt of this notice can serve as the basis for the exporting 
court's termination of its guardianship.  Id.  Consistent with 
the Standard, a court should cooperate with the foreign court to 
facilitate the orderly transfer of the guardianship.  Id.  To 
coordinate the transfer, it can delay the effective date of its 
acceptance of the transfer, make its acceptance contingent upon 
the discharge of the guardian by the foreign court, recognize 
concurrent jurisdiction over the guardianship, or make other 
arrangements in the interests of the parties or of justice.  Id.   
 
¶44 "STANDARD 3.5.5 INITIAL HEARING IN THE COURT ACCEPTING 
THE TRANSFERRED GUARDIANSHIP.  (a) No later than ninety (90) 
days after acceptance of a transfer of guardianship, the probate 
court should conduct a review hearing of the guardianship during 
which 
it 
may 
modify 
the 
administrative 
procedures 
or 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
24 
 
requirements of the guardianship in accordance with local and 
state laws and procedures.  (b) Unless a change in the ward's 
circumstances warrants otherwise, the probate court should give 
effect to the determination of incapacity and recognize the 
appointment of the guardian and his or her duties, powers and 
responsibilities as specified in the transferred guardianship."  
National Probate Court Standard 3.5.5.   
 
¶45 The Commentary to Standard 3.5.5 provides that the 
court should schedule a review hearing within 60 days of receipt 
of a foreign guardianship.  Id., cmt.  The review hearing allows 
the court to inform the ward and guardian of any administrative 
changes 
in 
the 
guardianship 
(e.g., 
bond 
requirements 
or 
reporting procedures) that are necessary to bring the foreign 
guardianship into compliance with state or local law.  Id.  
Unless requested to do otherwise by the ward, the guardian, or 
an interested person because of a change of circumstances, the 
court should give full faith and credit to the terms of the 
existing 
guardianship 
concerning 
the 
rights, 
powers, 
and 
responsibilities of the guardian.  Id.   
 
¶46 We recognize that the standards will not solve every 
problem associated with interstate guardianships.18  However, in 
                                                 
18 For example, one of the practical concerns raised by 
Unified at oral argument was how it will be able to complete a 
comprehensive evaluation of someone who is located out-of-state.  
In this case, the close proximity of the ward does not pose a 
problem.  However, in other cases, it might.  
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
25 
 
the spirit of comity and to promote the orderly administration 
of justice, they are to be employed for the interstate transfer 
of guardianships.  These standards will help Wisconsin courts 
facilitate the geographic mobility of those individuals that 
guardianship orders were designed to protect.  In the present 
case, they will protect the integrity of the original court's 
determination of what is in the best interests of Jane, while 
recognizing her ability to change residence as expressed through 
a guardian.   
 
¶47 Accordingly, on remand, Grant County should petition 
the court 
in 
Jo 
Daviess 
County 
for 
transfer 
of 
Jane's 
guardianship.  Likewise, it should petition the court in Grant 
County for the receipt and acceptance of Jane's guardianship.19  
During this process, Grant County shall serve Jane and all 
interested persons with proper notice of the intended transfer 
                                                                                                                                                             
In those cases where the ward's location is of great 
distance, bodies like Unified need not travel to complete a 
comprehensive evaluation.  Rather, they can obtain medical 
information via fax or mail and conduct telephone interviews of 
relevant people, including family members and employees at the 
facility where the ward resides.  As technology increases, 
videoconferencing may be another possibility.  
 
19 For more explicit guidance as to what the petitions and 
notice should include, we refer the parties to the model 
legislation for the interstate transfer of guardianship orders 
with associated forms.  Final Report of the NCPJ Advisory 
Committee on Interstate Guardianships, Presented to:  National 
College of Probate Judges October 12, 1998, Appendix D.  This 
report 
can 
be 
accessed 
at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_CusSup_InterstateG
uardianPub.pdf.   
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
26 
 
and inform them of their right to file objections and to request 
a hearing on the petition.  This requirement is important to 
prevent the transfer of a guardianship for inappropriate 
purposes. 
 
¶48 Assuming that there are no objections and that the 
court in Jo Daviess County approves of the transfer, the court 
in Grant County should allow the guardianship to be "imported," 
giving full faith and credit to the terms and powers of the 
foreign guardianship order.  Administrative changes of the 
guardianship may be necessary to bring the guardianship into 
compliance with the requirements of Wisconsin law.  However, if 
these steps are completed, the court in Grant County will be 
able to place Jane at Southwest Health Center Nursing Home 
without hearing a new petition for protective placement.  This 
will 
avoid 
the 
residency 
requirement 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 55.06(3)(c).  
III 
¶49 In sum, this case presents an opportunity to examine 
some of the current problems associated with the transfer of 
interstate guardianships.  Based on principles of comity and the 
orderly administration of justice, we have set forth standards 
for Wisconsin courts to follow when confronted with the transfer 
of interstate guardianships.  These standards will protect the 
integrity of the original court's determination of what is in 
the best interests of the ward.  Accordingly, we vacate the 
No. 
2003AP634 
   
 
27 
 
decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court 
for the application of the standards set forth here. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
vacated and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No.  2003AP634.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶50 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  
PART I. 
¶51 I join the majority opinion and its adoption of 
standards for Wisconsin courts to follow when presented with 
cases involving the transfer of a guardianship from another 
state.  As such, I agree that the decision of the court of 
appeals should be vacated, and that this case should be remanded 
to the circuit court for the application of those standards.  I 
also join Section D of Justice Patience Drake Roggensack’s 
concurrence/dissent, which states that Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) 
(2001-02) is constitutional as applied to Jane E.P. 
PART II. 
¶52 I write separately to lend further support to her 
conclusion 
as 
to 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 55.06(3)(c), and to distinguish the present case from Bethesda 
Lutheran Homes and Services, Inc. v. Leean, 122 F.3d 443 (7th 
Cir. 1997).20   
¶53 In Bethesda Lutheran, the federal court of appeals 
found Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) was unconstitutional.  While I 
recognize that such a decision is not binding on this court, I 
feel that an analysis of the case is warranted, because the 
decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals relied on that 
                                                 
20 Justices Jon P. Wilcox, David T. Prosser and Patience 
Drake Roggensack join Part II of this opinion, so that this 
opinion is the majority opinion on the constitutional issue.  
Justice David T. Prosser also joins the majority opinion and its 
adoption of standards for Wisconsin courts. 
No.  2003AP634.npc 
 
2 
 
holding in the present case.  In Bethesda Lutheran, four 
nonresidents of Wisconsin filed a civil rights action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 involving Bethesda Lutheran Homes, a private care 
facility located in Watertown, Wisconsin.  That facility was one 
that provided care and treatment for the mentally retarded.21  
All four nonresident plaintiffs were retarded, with IQs between 
10 and 34, and none was considered competent to manage his or 
her own affairs.  Id. at 444.  These plaintiffs alleged that 
that the residency requirement of § 55.06(3)(c) impeded their 
constitutional right to travel by preventing them from moving to 
the care facility from their current out-of-state homes or group 
homes.     
¶54 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
the State of Wisconsin did not establish that there was a 
rational 
basis 
for 
the 
residence 
requirement 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c).  The court held, specifically, that 
"no plausible justification for it has been suggested.  The 
plausible justifications were not argued at all, and the 
implausible ones were abandoned at the end of oral argument."  
Id. at 447 (emphasis added).  This statement resulted from the 
court's view that the State of Wisconsin had failed to provide a 
reasonable 
justification 
for 
the 
residence 
requirement.  
Notably, the court did not say that no plausible explanation for 
                                                 
21 The federal suit was filed by seven plaintiffs——three 
current 
residents 
of 
the 
facility, 
and 
four 
prospective 
residents from out-of-state.  For the purposes of the present 
case, the claims of the out-of-state residents are relevant.   
No.  2003AP634.npc 
 
3 
 
such a requirement existed; rather, the court stated that no 
plausible justification had even been proposed.   
¶55 This case, however, is clearly distinguishable.  The 
Unified Board of Grant and Iowa Counties (Unified) made 
plausible arguments, and provided testimony on the record, to 
justify the residence requirement in Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c).  
It contended, unlike the State of Wisconsin in Bethesda 
Lutheran, 
that 
the 
fiscal 
concerns 
associated 
with 
the 
guardianship and protective placement of patients such as Jane 
E.P. 
provides 
a 
rational 
justification 
for 
residence 
requirements.  The financial burden on Iowa and Grant Counties 
was shown to be a significant one.   
¶56 The record includes substantial evidence in that 
regard.  During testimony at the hearing before the circuit 
court on the motion to dismiss, Neil Blackburn, the director of 
Unified Community Services of Grant and Iowa Counties, stated 
that Unified has a $860,000 annual cost for 21 individuals in 
community based residential facilities (CBRF).  He noted that if 
a person needs to be moved from a nursing home to a CBRF that 
No.  2003AP634.npc 
 
4 
 
there is an obligation to provide such services.22  He testified 
that the total expenditure, annually, for Unified Community 
Services is approximately $8,500,000.  He stated that there are 
currently 76 protectively placed persons that Unified is 
responsible for, that about 60 Wisconsin residents are currently 
on Unified's waiting list for protective placement, and that 
there 
is 
no 
money 
available 
to 
help 
support 
those 
developmentally disabled individuals, since the agency annually 
has a deficit.   
¶57 I am convinced that this record is sufficient to 
establish 
a 
rational 
justification 
for 
the 
residency 
requirement.  I therefore agree that the statute is "rationally 
related to protecting and preserving the county's and the 
State's ability to provide services to its own bona fide 
residents in preference to those persons who reside in other 
states." 
 
Justice 
Patience 
Drake 
Roggensack's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶84.   
                                                 
22 We recognize that the court of appeals noted that Jane 
E.P.'s nursing home expenses in Illinois are currently covered 
by Medicaid, which would similarly cover her expenses at a 
Wisconsin nursing home.  Grant County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. 
Unified Bd. of Grant and Iowa Counties, 2004 WI App 153, ¶15, 
275 Wis. 2d 680, 687 N.W.2d 72.  However, the record reveals 
there has been no comprehensive evaluation of Jane E.P. to 
determine which type of facility would be appropriate for her in 
Wisconsin's protective placement system.  While the state would 
bear a portion of the expense of Jane E.P.'s treatment in a 
nursing home, Wisconsin would likely bear more of the financial 
burden if she were to be placed in, or transferred to, a state 
institution, a community based residential facility, a family 
home, or a supervised apartment.  Once the state begins 
providing 
services 
for 
individuals 
with 
developmental 
disabilities, the arrangement generally continues for life. 
No.  2003AP634.npc 
 
5 
 
PART III. 
¶58 In sum, I conclude that the decision of the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Bethesda is distinguishable for the 
reasons set forth, and, therefore, does not assist us in 
reaching an appropriate outcome in this case.  I also join the 
majority opinion and its adoption of standards for Wisconsin 
courts in cases involving the transfer of a guardianship from 
another state.       
¶59 For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully concur.   
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX, 
DAVID T. PROSSER, AND PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join Part II of 
this concurrence, and Justice DAVID T. PROSSER also joins the 
majority opinion and its adoption of standards for Wisconsin 
courts.   
 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
1 
 
 
¶61 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   The majority opinion sets up an elaborate 
system of steps and requirements, both in regard to time and 
substance, that it directs the circuit court to make in order to 
decide whether the guardianship and protective placement of Jane 
E.P. that were issued in Jo Daviess County, Illinois should be 
transferred to Grant County, Wisconsin.  The majority opinion 
does so in lieu of construing Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) (2003-
04),23 
which 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
was 
an 
unconstitutional restriction on the right to travel.  While the 
majority opinion makes a valiant effort at trying to solve what 
can become problematic when a ward lives in one state and the 
guardian wishes to transfer the ward into Wisconsin, it does so 
without the benefit of legislative input or even the benefit of 
the court's own rulemaking.  It thereby exceeds the court's 
constitutional powers and creates an opinion I cannot join.  
However, I conclude that § 55.06(3)(c) is constitutional, as 
applied to Jane.  Therefore, I, too, would reverse the court of 
appeals decision.  However, I would affirm the circuit court's 
order dismissing the petition for guardianship and protective 
placement. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶62 Deborah V. petitioned the Grant County Circuit Court 
for the appointment of a guardian for Jane E.P. and to have her 
                                                 
23 All further references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
2 
 
protectively placed in Grant County.  Jane has been subject to 
guardianship and protective placement in Jo Daviess County, 
Illinois since 1999.  She resides in a nursing home in Galena, 
Illinois.24  There was no allegation that Jane is or was ever a 
resident of Wisconsin.  There was no allegation that Jane was 
physically present in Wisconsin before or after the petition was 
filed in circuit court.  The petitioner, who is her guardian and 
sister, is a resident of Grant County.  There is nothing in the 
record to show that the court in Jo Daviess County appears to 
have 
exercised 
jurisdiction 
over 
Jane, 
was 
contacted 
or 
consulted regarding Deborah's petition. 
¶63 In response to the petition for protective placement, 
the circuit court ordered Unified Community Services to make a 
comprehensive evaluation of Jane.  After investigating Jane's 
location, Unified Community Services moved to dismiss because 
Jane was neither a resident of Grant County nor present in Grant 
County, as it contended that Wis. Stat. §§ 55.06(3) and 880.03 
require.  After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court 
granted Unified Community Services' motion and Grant County 
Department of Social Services (Social Services) appealed.  The 
court of appeals reversed, concluding that § 55.06(3), as 
applied, unconstitutionally restricts Jane's right to travel.  
Unified Community Services petitioned for review and we granted 
its petition.  
                                                 
24 The record does not contain a copy of the Illinois court 
order appointing Deborah as Jane's guardian, nor does it contain 
a copy of the terms of the Illinois protective placement.  These 
facts are taken from the petition Deborah filed.   
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
3 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Concentration of Power 
¶64 In my view, the majority opinion creates what amounts 
to a statute for the interstate transfer of guardianships and 
protective placements.  While some type of an interstate compact 
may be helpful, that is a task that the constitution set out for 
the legislature.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1.  The legislature has 
experience in devising interstate compacts.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.991 (interstate compact on juveniles).  When it does so, 
it has the ability to consider and address the financial impact 
of 
the 
agreements 
Wisconsin 
makes 
with 
other 
states.  
§ 938.991(10).  The majority opinion has not evaluated the 
financial impact of a transfer of Jane to Wisconsin.25   
¶65 Additionally, concentration of power in one branch of 
government in a tripartite system of government is suspect 
because the system was created to prevent exactly that.  See 
State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).  As 
we 
have 
repeatedly 
explained, 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
envisions a separation of the legislative and judicial powers.  
Id.   
¶66 Notwithstanding our prior statements, this is the 
third time this term that the court has concentrated legislative 
and judicial power in itself.  In March, as a result of a 
rulemaking petition, the court "repealed" the frivolous action 
                                                 
25 The majority opinion cites several states that it asserts 
have addressed out-of-state guardianships.  Majority op., ¶26 
n.11.  However, in each of these states, it was the legislature 
that created a statute to address interstate transfers. 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
4 
 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 814.025, a substantive rule enacted by the 
legislature, which was not unconstitutional.  Supreme Court 
Order No. 03-06, 2005 WI 38, ___ Wis. 2d ___.  And in State v. 
Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __, we 
established parameters for police practices.   
¶67 Here, once again, a majority of the court says it has 
the requisite constitutional power to establish what appears to 
me to be very like a statute.  I dissent because I see this 
process that this court is becoming increasingly enchanted with 
as dangerous precedent.  Even though the goal of the majority 
opinion may be a worthwhile goal, in my view, it is achieved at 
the expense of the balance of power set out in the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Unconstitutional 
actions 
taken 
to 
achieve 
worthwhile goals are still unconstitutional actions.  Therefore, 
I cannot join the majority opinion.  Instead, I interpret the 
relevant statutes and ascertain the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 55.06(3)(c).  
B. 
Standard of Review 
¶68 This case turns in part on questions of statutory 
interpretation to which we apply a de novo standard of review, 
but benefiting from the analyses of both the circuit court and 
the court of appeals.  See State v. Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, 
¶16, 261 Wis. 2d 202, 661 N.W.2d 76.  We also decide the 
constitutional questions presented de novo.  See County of 
Kenosha v. C&S Mgmt., Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 381-83, 588 N.W.2d 
236 (1999).   
 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
5 
 
C. 
Statutory Interpretation 
¶69 Unified Community Services cites to three statutes 
that it asserts impact the decision about whether the Grant 
County Circuit Court correctly dismissed Deborah's petition:  
Wis. Stat. §§ 55.06(3), 880.03 and 880.05.  However, only 
§ 55.06(3) is central to my review.   
¶70 When interpreting statutes, we rely on the criteria of 
statutory interpretation set out in State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  In Kalal, we explained that our focus was to 
determine "statutory meaning."  Id., ¶44.  We explained that: 
[j]udicial deference to the policy choices enacted 
into law by the legislature requires that statutory 
interpretation focus primarily on the language of the 
statute.  We assume that the legislature's intent is 
expressed 
in 
the 
statutory language. 
 
Extrinsic 
evidence of legislative intent may become relevant to 
statutory interpretation in some circumstances, but is 
not the primary focus of inquiry.  It is the enacted 
law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the 
public. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
purpose 
of 
statutory 
interpretation is to determine what the statute means 
so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended 
effect. 
Id.  As we have said many times, we begin with the language used 
in the statute and if that language is plain and clearly 
understood, 
we 
ordinarily 
stop 
our 
inquiry. 
 
Seider 
v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  
Context is also important when determining the plain meaning of 
a statute, as is the purpose of the statute and its scope, if 
those qualities can be ascertained from the language of the 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
6 
 
statute itself.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46-48.  These are all 
intrinsic sources for statutory interpretation.  Id.  
¶71 However, if the meaning of the statute is not plain 
and the statute "is capable of being understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons in two or more senses," then the statute 
is ambiguous.  Id., ¶47.  When a statute is ambiguous, we often 
consult extrinsic "interpretive resources outside the statutory 
text," such as legislative history.  Id., ¶50. 
¶72 No one argues that the meaning of "resident" or 
"residence" is ambiguous.  Rather, all agree that either term 
requires at least Jane's presence in Grant County on the date 
the petition was filed.   
¶73 In interpreting Wis. Stat. §§ 55.06(3), 880.03 and 
880.05, I begin with § 880.05, which sets the statutory 
parameters for venue of a petition for guardianship.  Section 
880.05 provides: 
All petitions for guardianship of residents of the 
state shall be directed to the circuit court of the 
county 
of 
residence 
of 
the 
person 
subject 
to 
guardianship or of the county in which the person is 
physically present.  A petition for guardianship of 
the person or estate of a nonresident may be directed 
to the circuit court of any county where the person 
. . . may be found. 
Social Services does not contend that Jane is a resident of 
Grant County or that she "may be found" in Grant County. 
¶74 Wisconsin Stat. § 880.03 gives additional guidance for 
Wisconsin guardianships.  It states in relevant part: 
All minors, incompetents and spendthrifts are subject 
to guardianship.  The court may appoint a guardian of 
the person of anyone subject to guardianship who is 
also a resident of the county, or of a nonresident 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
7 
 
found in the county, under extraordinary circumstances 
requiring medical aid or the prevention of harm to his 
or her person . . . . 
Once again, Social Services does not contend that Jane is a 
resident or may be "found" in Grant County. 
¶75 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 55.06 speaks to 
petitions for 
protective placements.  It states in relevant part: 
(2) The department, an agency, a guardian or any 
interested person may petition the circuit court to 
provide protective placement for an individual who: 
(a) Has a primary need for residential care and 
custody; 
(b) [H]as . . . been determined to be incompetent 
by a circuit court . . . 
(c) As a result of . . . infirmities of aging, 
chronic mental illness or other like incapacities, is 
so totally incapable of providing for his or her own 
care or custody as to create a substantial risk of 
serious harm to oneself or others.  Serious harm may 
be occasioned by overt acts or acts of omission; and 
(d) Has a disability which is permanent or likely 
to be permanent. 
(3)(a) The 
petition 
shall 
state 
with 
particularity the factual basis for the allegations 
specified in sub. (2). 
(b) The petition under sub. (2) shall be based on 
personal knowledge of the individual alleged to need 
protective placement. 
(c) The petition shall be filed in the county of 
residence of the person to be protected. 
(4) A petition for guardianship if required under 
sub. (2)(b) must be heard prior to the placement under 
this section. 
Once again, Social Services does not contend that Grant County 
is Jane's "county of residence" as § 55.06(3)(c) requires.  
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
8 
 
Instead, it contends that § 55.06(3)(c) is unconstitutional as 
applied to Jane because she is a nonresident and can never 
qualify in any Wisconsin county to have a petition for 
protective placement filed on her behalf.  I will address this 
argument below.   
¶76 However, before I address the constitutional argument, 
I note that an amicus brief filed by Legal Action of Wisconsin, 
Inc. asks us to interpret Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) as a venue 
provision.  It asserts that because venue does not affect a 
court's power to adjudicate a given case, the court had the 
power to adjudicate whether a guardianship and protective 
placement is appropriate for Jane.  Legal Action cites numerous 
cases to support the proposition that placing venue in the wrong 
Wisconsin county does not affect the authority of the court to 
take action.   
¶77 Each case cited by Legal Action assumes that there is 
a Wisconsin county where the case could have been properly 
venued.  Additionally, the county of residence designated in 
Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) is much more than the locus for hearing 
the petition for protective placement and guardianship.  It is 
the county of residence that is obligated to conduct a 
comprehensive evaluation of the proposed ward, § 55.06(8); it is 
the county of residence that becomes responsible for providing 
the least restrictive environment consistent with the needs of 
the ward, § 55.06(9); and it is the county of residence that 
becomes financially responsible, at least in part, for whatever 
placement or treatment the ward requires if the ward is 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
9 
 
indigent, Wis. Stat. § 51.40(1)(e) and (2), to name only a few 
obligations.  Accordingly, I am not persuaded by Legal Action's 
argument that § 55.06(3)(c) is simply a venue statute.   
D. 
Constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) 
¶78 Generally, a challenged statute is presumed to be 
constitutional.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶11, 264 Wis. 2d 
520, 665 N.W.2d 328; Lounge Mgmt., Ltd. v. Town of Trenton, 219 
Wis. 2d 13, 20, 580 N.W.2d 156 (1998); State v. Konrath, 218 
Wis. 2d 290, 302, 577 N.W.2d 601 (1998).  This presumption is 
based on our respect for a co-equal branch of government and is 
meant to promote due deference to legislative acts.  Cole, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, ¶18.  "[E]very presumption must be indulged to 
sustain the law."  Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 853, 578 
N.W.2d 602 (1998).  
¶79 The 
court 
must 
resolve 
any 
doubt 
about 
the 
constitutionality of a statute in favor of upholding its 
constitutionality.  Monroe County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kelli 
B., 2004 WI 48, ¶16, 271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 831; Cole, 264 
Wis. 2d 520, ¶11.  Further, "'[g]iven a choice of reasonable 
interpretations of a statute, this court must select the 
construction which results in constitutionality.'"  American 
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. DOR, 222 Wis. 2d 650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 
872 (1998) (quoting State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 
Wis. 2d 491, 526, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978)).  
¶80 A party challenging a statute's constitutionality 
bears 
a 
heavy 
burden 
to 
overcome 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality.  Dowhower v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
10 
 
73, ¶10, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557.  Therefore, it is 
insufficient for the party challenging the statute to establish 
either that the statute's constitutionality is doubtful or that 
the statute is probably unconstitutional.  Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 
520, ¶11; Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 853.  Instead, a party 
challenging a statute's constitutionality must demonstrate that 
the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶11; Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 853; 
Konrath, 218 Wis. 2d at 302.  While this language implies the 
evidentiary burden of proof most commonly used for factual 
determinations in a criminal case, in this context, the phrase, 
"beyond a reasonable doubt," establishes the force or conviction 
with which a court must conclude, as a matter of law, that a 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional 
before 
the 
statute 
or 
its 
application can be set aside.  See Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., 
Inc., 2001 WI App 21, ¶4 n.3, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776.   
¶81 In order to examine the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 55.06(3)(c) 
and 
its 
claimed 
effect 
on 
Jane's 
constitutional right to interstate travel, we first must 
determine what type of right is at issue.  The right to 
interstate travel is a federal constitutional right that has no 
explicit mention in the United States Constitution.  Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).   
¶82 States have imposed residency requirements that burden 
the right to travel.  If those requirements do not implicate a 
"suspect" classification, the state need show only that there is 
a rational basis for the residency requirement.  See Martinez v. 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
11 
 
Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 n.7 (1983).  However, if the 
requirement implicates a suspect classification, the state must 
show that its regulation is "necessary to promote a compelling 
governmental interest."  Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633-34.  The 
residency requirement at issue here does not impact on any 
suspect classification of residents.  All are treated the same, 
no matter who they are or whence they came.  The definition of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 49.001(6) 
is 
applied 
to 
all 
petitions 
for 
protective placements and guardianships.  Wis. Stat. § 55.06(8).  
Section 49.001(6) provides:  "'Residence' means the voluntary 
concurrence of physical presence with intent to remain in a 
place of fixed habitation.  Physical presence is prima facie 
evidence of intent to remain." 
¶83 There are two general types of residency requirements:  
durational requirements and bona fide requirements.  Martinez, 
461 U.S. at 325.  A durational residency requirement limits the 
rights or services that are available to new residents of the 
state when compared with those residents who have been residents 
for a stated period of time.  A bona fide residency requirement 
"simply requires that the person does establish residence before 
demanding the services that are restricted to residents."  Id. 
at 329.   
¶84 Bona fide residency requirements have often been 
upheld.  See id. (upholding a residency requirement necessary to 
obtaining free public education); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 
330, 343-44 (1972) (concluding that states may require "that 
voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
12 
 
subdivision[s]" in order to be entitled to vote).  Because it 
does not matter how brief a time the proposed ward is a resident 
of a Wisconsin county before a petition for protective placement 
is filed, the requirement of Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) is a bona 
fide residency requirement.  
¶85 The next question we must ask is to what extent does 
the residency requirement interfere with the right to interstate 
travel.  Here, Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3) does not prevent Jane's 
travel to Wisconsin.  She is free to come to her sister's home 
in Grant County.  It may be that the Illinois guardianship and 
protective placement restrict her ability to leave Illinois, but 
the record gives no information in that regard.   
¶86 If we were to assume, arguendo, that the residency 
requirement does burden Jane's right to interstate travel, the 
State may do so if the State has a rational basis for the 
residency requirement.  Martinez, 461 U.S. at 328 n.7.  Here, 
the record is full of testimony about the financial effect a 
protective placement has for the county of residence and for the 
state.  There was testimony that state and county resources are 
so limited that current residents are not being provided with 
the 
services 
they 
have 
requested. 
 
Neal 
Blackburn, 
the 
representative 
from 
Unified 
Community 
Services, 
was 
asked 
whether there was a waiting list of Wisconsin residents who had 
requested services that could not be provided due to a shortage 
of funds and he responded, "We have approximately close to 60 on 
the waiting list and that number grows every day or every 
month."  Blackburn was also asked whether Unified Community 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
13 
 
Services had sought more money from the State.  He said it had, 
but none was forthcoming, and instead he had been told that 
there would be a "significant cut in state funding," due to the 
budget deficit.  The testimony shows that the residency 
requirement is rationally related to protecting and preserving 
the county's and the State's ability to provide services to its 
own bona fide residents in preference to those persons who 
reside in other states.   
¶87 In holding Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) unconstitutional, 
the court of appeals concluded that the only way Jane could come 
to Wisconsin is if a Wisconsin court were to place her here.  
This, the court concluded, was a restriction on her right to 
travel.  There is nothing in the record to support this 
conclusion.  Perhaps it is the order of the Illinois court that 
keeps her in Illinois.  However, aside from being told that she 
was found to be incompetent in Illinois and that she is the 
subject of an Illinois guardianship and protective placement, we 
know nothing of the terms of the Illinois court's order.  
Additionally, without identifying a "suspect classification" 
that was impacted negatively by § 55.06(3)(c), the court of 
appeals concluded that the State had not shown a "compelling 
governmental interest" in restricting Jane's right to travel.  
In so doing, it applied the wrong test.  See Martinez, 461 U.S. 
at 328 n.7.  Here, the State need show only that it has a 
rational basis for the residency requirement.  Id.  It has done 
so.  Accordingly, for all the reasons set out above, I conclude 
that § 55.06(3)(c) passes constitutional muster. 
No.  2003AP634.pdr 
 
14 
 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶88 I 
conclude 
that 
this 
court 
does 
not 
have 
the 
constitutional power it exercises in the majority opinion and 
that Wis. Stat. § 55.06(3)(c) is constitutional, as applied to 
Jane.  Therefore, I would reverse the court of appeals decision.  
However, I would affirm the circuit court's order dismissing the 
petition for guardianship and protective placement.   
¶89 Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent 
in part from the majority opinion. 
¶90 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this concurrence and dissent.  I am also authorized to 
state that Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS joins Section D of this 
concurrence and dissent.   
 
 
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