Title: Smith v. Nugget Exploration, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Smith v. Nugget Exploration, Inc.1993 WY 105857 P.2d 320Case Number: 92-153Decided: 08/04/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Stevan J. SMITH and 
Patricia K. Smith, husband and wife; 

and Willowbrook Ranch, 
Inc., a Wyoming corporation, 

Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

NUGGET EXPLORATION, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Fremont County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

James J. 
Dufficy, Denver, CO, and Paul Thomas Glause of James and Glause, Rock Springs, 
for appellants Stevan J. Smith and Patricia K. Smith.

John T. Pappas, 
Western Law Associates, P.C., Lander, for appellant 
Willowbrook.

Dennis M. "Joe" 
Hand of Hand & Hand, P.C., Casper, Richard D. Gist, Lander, for 
appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      This case 
concerns the district court's grant of summary judgment and interpretation of a 
1966 quit claim deed as unambiguous. We reverse the grant of summary judgment 
and remand this case for trial.

[¶2]      Appellant 
presents the following arguments on appeal:

A. The standard for 
review by Supreme Court of an order of summary judgment is as if the motion for 
summary judgment is originally before it.

B. Under proper rules of 
deed construction, when all parts of the quit claim deed are construed together, 
the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that Willowbrook was the 
grantee of only a limited grazing right in the property rather than the entire 
surface estate.

C. Construing the facts 
in appellant's favor, the quit claim deed is at worst for appellants ambiguous 
as to the extent of the interest in the surface estate conveyed, and the deed 
must be construed in light of the surrounding circumstances.

D. The judgment errs in 
not recognizing the judicial estoppel effect of the 1968 judgment obtained 
jointly by Timba-Bah and Willowbrook.

E. Appellants should have 
been allowed to assert claims for adverse possession and 
reformation.

F. Even if not reversed, 
the judgment must be clarified to protect appellants' grazing rights in the 
surface from interference or destruction by plaintiff.

[¶3]      Appellee responds 
with the following issues:

I. Was the grant of 
summary judgment proper in this case?

II. Did the trial court 
properly deny appellants' eleventh hour attempts to assert defenses of adverse 
possession and reformation?

III. Is there a need for 
further proceedings to delineate appellants' rights?

FACTS

[¶4]      This case 
involves a dispute over certain rights to property located in Fremont County, 
Wyoming.1 On June 9, 1966, a quit claim deed 
was executed between Timba-Bah Mining Company and Willowbrook Ranch, Inc., both 
Wyoming corporations, conveying all of the "surface grazing rights, including 
B.L.M. rights" to Willowbrook, while Timba-Bah reserved the mineral rights in 
the property. On May 28, 1968, Willowbrook as owner of the surface rights and 
Timba-Bah as owner of the mineral rights jointly brought action to quiet title 
in the property against several defendants. The defendants in the action 
defaulted and the court granted the rights sought by Willowbrook and Timba-Bah 
on August 12, 1968. On June 15, 1981, Timba-Bah conveyed its mineral rights in 
the property to Nuggett Exploration, Inc., a Nevada corporation authorized to do 
business in Wyoming. On June 7, 1989, Willowbrook executed to Stevan J. Smith, 
with consent of his wife, Patricia K. Smith, a mortgage deed, conveying all of 
Willowbrook's surface rights in the property. Then on June 13, 1989, Willowbrook 
recorded a quit claim deed, conveying the surface rights and excepting the 
mineral rights to the property to Smith.

[¶5]      On November 14, 
1991, Nuggett filed an action for declaratory judgment against Smith and 
Willowbrook seeking to have the respective rights of the parties determined 
according to the quit claim deed executed between Willowbrook and Timba-Bah in 
1966. At issue is the right to rock, dredge and sand tailings, as well as 
gravel, stock piles, residue and overburden on the property. Willowbrook and 
Smith counterclaimed seeking to quiet title in the surface rights of the 
property. Both parties moved for summary judgment and on March 23, 1992, the 
trial court granted summary judgment to Nuggett. The court found the 1966 deed 
to be unambiguous on its face and Nuggett to be

the record owner of the 
entire fee simple estate * * * subject only to surface grazing rights, including 
B.L.M. rights, conveyed to Defendant Willowbrook Ranch, Inc., by virtue of that 
certain quitclaim deed * * * recorded on June 9, 1966 * * *.

The court found 
Nuggett to have the "sole and exclusive right, title and interest in and to any 
and all of the rock tailings, dredge tailings, sand tailings, gravel, sand, 
stock piles, residue, and overburden." Appellants' motions for reconsideration, 
to amend pleadings to include claims for adverse possession and reformation and 
to supplement the evidentiary record were denied. Smith and Willowbrook now 
appeal the denial of these motions and the grant of summary judgment to 
Nuggett.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard 
of review

Our review of a summary 
judgment must be made from the viewpoint favorable to the party opposing it and 
with examination of the material upon which it is based from the same standpoint 
as did the district judge.

Knadler v. 
Adams, 661 P.2d 1052, 1053 (Wyo. 1983) (citations omitted).

2. Rules of 
deed construction

[¶6]      At the heart of 
the controversy is the interpretation of the 1966 quit claim deed between 
Timba-Bah and Willowbrook. The granting clause of the deed states 
that:

NOW THEREFORE * * * 
[Timba-bah] * * * does quit claim and convey, unto [Willowbrook] its successors 
and assigns, forever, all of the surface grazing rights, including B.L.M. 
rights, * * * excepting and reserving to [Timba-bah] its successors and assigns, 
all the fossil or mineral coal, fire clay, iron and other ores, and all mineral 
deposits and gold, silver and oil and gas, that may be found under or on the 
surface of the earth * * * with the entire and exclusive right undiminished 
by this deed to mine * * * and to pass into and through the land in all 
directions * * * as fully and as freely as if this grant had not been made, and 
as if [Timba-bah] its successors, or assigns remained the owner of the surface 
or right of soil * * *.

(Emphasis 
added).

The habendum 
clause recites:

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD, all 
and singular, the hereditaments and premises hereby granted or mentioned, and 
intended so to be, with the appurtenances, including B.L.M. grazing rights, 
(excepting and reserving as herein excepted and reserved, and subject to all and 
singular the conditions and covenants herein expressed and contained) * * 
*.

[¶7]      The deed 
continues to mention in additional covenants "the surface or right of soil 
hereby conveyed."

[¶8]      Appellants argue 
that: 1) the trial court should have looked at the various parts of the deed for 
evidence of the grantor's intent, specifically the title, "Quit Claim Deed of 
Surface Rights Except Minerals and Mining Rights"; 2) the word "grazing" in the 
granting clause is descriptive of a purpose behind the grant and not a 
limitation on its scope, or at the least, creates reasonable doubt as to what 
was intended; 3) the grantor is explicit in the mineral interests retained and 
discusses its right to damage or use of the surface for mining "as if it still 
owned the surface and right of soil" indicating that it is granting away these 
specific interests; 4) "right of soil" means a conveyance of the entire surface 
estate; 5) if the intention was to convey only grazing rights, a lease or 
easement would have been preferable; 6) the habendum clause must be construed 
with the entire instrument; and 7) the trial court erred in resolving all doubts 
against appellant in its summary judgment review.

[¶9]      In a recent 
decision in which an appellant sought to quiet title to property described by 
deed we said:

Whether the grant of 
summary judgment is proper depends on the grantor's intent as ascertained from 
specific language of the deed. To determine the intent of parties to the 
conveyance we begin by looking to the instrument itself. "The deed must be 
considered as a whole and the intent of the parties gathered from the plain and 
unambiguous language contained therein." Gasaway v. Reiter, 736 P.2d 749, 751 
(Wyo. 1987) (citing Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15 (Wyo. 1973)). If intent of the 
parties can be gathered in this manner, it should be done so as a matter of 
law.

Glover v. 
Giraldo, 824 P.2d 552, 554 (Wyo. 1992) (citations omitted).

[¶10]   We have said:

Our relevant general 
standards for interpreting a written instrument are that, if it is free from 
ambiguity, the intention of the parties is to be secured from the words of the 
instrument, and that the interpretation of an instrument to determine whether an 
ambiguity exists is a question of law for the courts to decide.

Miller Land 
& Mineral Co. v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 757 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Wyo. 1988) 
(citations omitted). Where no ambiguity exists, the court must determine intent 
without resorting to extrinsic evidence. Knadler, 661 P.2d  at 1053.

[¶11]   If possible, all parts and every 
word should be given effect, though no one clause, phrase or sentence should be 
determinative of intent. Sunburst Exploration, Inc. v. Jensen, 635 P.2d 822, 825 
(Wyo. 1981); Warren-Boynton State Bank v. Wallbaum, 123 Ill. 2d 429, 123 Ill.Dec. 
936, 940, 528 N.E.2d 640, 644 (1988).

[¶12]   The question before us is whether 
the entire surface estate or something less than that called "surface grazing 
rights" was conveyed in the 1966 deed. The terms "surface" and "surface grazing 
rights" as well as "right of soil" and "B.L.M. rights" are used in the 
conveyance. The resultant ambiguity cannot be resolved by looking to the four 
corners of the deed. The deed could be read to convey only the right to graze 
animals on the surface of the estate, or else fee title to the surface, absent 
the express mineral reservations in the deed.2 

[¶13]   Willowbrook argues that the 
language of the habendum enlarges the surface rights conveyed in the granting 
clause and thus must be construed together with the entire deed. We agree that 
our focus must be on the entire document in ascertaining the grantor's intent. 
Gasaway v. Reiter, 736 P.2d 749, 751 (Wyo. 1987). This includes the title as 
well as all parts of the deed and its terms. We refuse in this case to recognize 
the doctrine of repugnancy which would give priority to the granting clause if 
it and the habendum cannot be reconciled. Frye v. Arrington, 58 N.C. App. 180, 
292 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1982).

[¶14]   Considering interpretation of the 
habendum clause, we recognize that it is "not determinative of the issue, for 
the intention of the parties, as expressed in a deed, is to be determined from 
the entire instrument without undue preference given to any part." Barber v. 
Flynn, 628 P.2d 1151, 1154 (Okla. 1980).

[¶15]   We determine that, as a matter of 
law, the 1966 deed is ambiguous. We agree that "an ambiguity in a written 
instrument precludes the trial court from awarding a summary judgment because 
there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the intent of the 
parties." Metropolitan Mortgage & Securities Co., Inc., v. Belgarde, 816 P.2d 868, 873 (Wyo. 1991). It may be necessary to determine the intention of the 
parties from other evidence from which the "interpretation becomes a mixed 
question of law and fact." Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 
706 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Goodman v. Kelly, 390 P.2d 244, 247 (Wyo. 1964)). In 
that case, the intention of the parties may be ascertained by circumstances 
surrounding the language. Knadler, 661 P.2d  at 1053.

3. Other 
issues

[¶16]   Appellants also assert claims of 
adverse possession, reformation and judicial estoppel. Since we reverse the 
grant of summary judgment on the basis of ambiguity in the deed, we need not 
address these other issues. Appellants are provided an opportunity to raise 
these issues on remand.

DISPOSITION

[¶17]   We reverse the district court's 
grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this decision.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶18]   I would affirm the grant of summary 
judgment by the trial court and therefore dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 A. Elizabeth Placer 
Mining Claim described as the S 1/2 SW 1/4, Section 17, NE 1/4 NW 1/4, NW 1/4 NE 
1/4, Section 20, Township 29 North, Range 99 West, 6th P.M.

B. 
Atlantic Placer Mining Claim described as the S 1/2 SW 1/4, Section 7, N 1/2 NW 
1/4, Section 18, Township 29 North, Range 99 West, 6th P.M.

C. 
Rock Creek Placer Mining Claim described as the E 1/2 S.E. 1/4 NW 1/4, SW 1/4 NE 
1/4, N 1/2 S.E. 1/4, N 1/ 2 S.E. 1/4 S.E. 1/4, Section 18, Township 29 North, 
Range 99 West, 6th P.M.

D. 
Jacquemart Placer Mining Claim described as the NW 1/4 SW 1/4, Section 27, SE 
1/4 NE 1/4, N 1/2 S.E. 1/4, Section 28, Township 29 North, Range 99 West, 6th 
P.M.

E. 
Matchless Placer Mining Claim described as the S 1/2 NE 1/4 NE 1/4, SE 1/4 NE 
1/4, N 1/2 NE 1/4 S.E. 1/4 Section 20, S 1/2 SW 1/4 NW 1/4, NW 1/4 SW 1/4, W 1/2 
NE 1/4 SW 1/4, Section 21, Township 29 North, Range 99 West, 6th 
P.M.

F. 
Emile and Heloise Placer Mining Claim described as the E 1/2 NW 1/4, W 1/2 NE 
1/4, Section 28, Township 29 North, Range 99 West, 6th P.M.

G. 
Juncker Placer Mining Claim described as the S 1/2 SW 1/4, SW 1/4 S.E. 1/4, S 
1/2 NW 1/4 S.E. 1/4, E 1/2 NE 1/4 SW 1/4, Section 21, Township 29 North, Range 
99 West, 6th P.M.

H. 
Big Deposit Placer Mining Claim described as the SE 1/4, Section 7, Township 29 
North, Range 99 West, 6th P.M.

2 We anticipate that the 
parties may next be concerned with whether the elements at issue, gravel, etc., 
are considered to be minerals and thus fall within the grantor's reservation. We 
refer the parties to Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Hwy. Comm'n, 757 P.2d 1001 (Wyo. 1988).