Title: Lucero v. Mathews

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Lucero v. Mathews1995 WY 140901 P.2d 1115Case Number: 94-54Decided: 08/28/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Joseph 
LUCERO, as Sheriff of Fremont County, Wyoming; Joseph Lucero, 
individually,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Larry 
M. MATHEWS, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Hugh 
Kenny, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant in his individual 
capacity.

Mark 
J. White and Jill E. Kucera of White & White, Riverton. Argument presented 
by Ms. Kucera, for appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Joseph 
Lucero appeals from an order and decree denying his motion for summary judgment 
as a matter of law. The district court found that questions of material fact 
existed and that Lucero was not entitled to qualified immunity for three causes 
of actions alleged in appellee Larry Mathews' complaint, to wit: breach of 
contract, deprivation of property without due process, and deprivation of first 
amendment rights. Lucero now appeals.

[¶2]  We affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Lucero presents 
the following issue and subissues for review:

Did 
the district court err when it failed to grant summary judgment to Lucero based 
on immunity?

A. 
Did Mathews receive the process due under the Constitution?

B. 
Did Mathews set out a first amendment claim sufficient to overcome Lucero's 
immunity?

C. 
Is Lucero, as an individual, immune from suit for breach of 
contract?

D. 
Does qualified immunity provide a shield to Lucero?

Mathews 
restates the issue as:

Whether 
the district court correctly decided that Appellant Joseph Lucero was not 
protected by the shield of immunity.

II. 
BACKGROUND

[¶4]      Mathews began his 
employment with the Fremont County Sheriff's Office in 1977. In his tenure, 
Mathews was promoted from patrol deputy, to investigator, to sergeant, then 
finally to captain under Sheriff Tim McKinney, Lucero's predecessor. In November 
1990, Lucero defeated the incumbent sheriff, Tim McKinney, in the general 
election for the position of Fremont County Sheriff. During the election, 
Mathews was an active supporter of incumbent Sheriff McKinney, making posters, 
handing out leaflets and brochures, making radio spots, and writing letters to 
the editors of the local newspapers. Once Lucero took office, he eliminated 
Mathews' position as captain and replaced it with the position of undersheriff. 
Lucero filled the undersheriff position with one of his loyal supporters, and 
Mathews was given a position as a patrol deputy.

[¶5]      To put it mildly, 
Mathews and Lucero and his administration (Undersheriff Coppock and one 
supervisory sergeant) did not get along from the inception of Lucero taking 
office as sheriff. The working environment between the two camps was very 
strained, and there was little or no rapport between them. This resulted in a 
number of conflicts. Letters and memos went back and forth between the two 
parties accusing each other of various incidences of misconduct, each party 
frequently reported on the other, and internal investigations and disciplinary 
actions ensued.

[¶6]      This turbulent 
working environment finally reached a breaking point when Undersheriff Jack 
Coppock recommended to Lucero that Mathews' employment be terminated for 
Mathews' conduct regarding two cases, the Aragon case and the Dobkins case. A 
"minihearing" was held regarding Coppock's recommendation wherein Lucero 
determined that Mathews should be terminated. Pursuant to department policy, 
Mathews requested a termination hearing before the disciplinary board 
(Board).

[¶7]      The Board limited 
the scope of the evidentiary hearing to the Aragon and Dobkins cases, reasoning: 
1) the only charges of misconduct in the Notice of Dismissal involved the Aragon 
and Dobkins cases; and 2) any prior disciplinary action or questioned employment 
activity was already part of Mathews' permanent record and could not be changed 
by the Board. As a result, Mathews was not allowed to respond to any other 
allegations of misconduct.

[¶8]      After a two-day 
hearing, the Board determined that Mathews' performance of duties was deficient 
and recommended a four-day suspension without pay. Lucero, however, did not 
accept the Board's recommendation. Lucero issued his own findings of fact, 
wherein he concluded that based on the Board's finding of inadequate performance 
by Mathews and his prior disciplinary file, termination of Mathews' employment 
was justified. Lucero terminated Mathews' employment on March 18, 
1992.

[¶9]      Mathews filed 
suit against Lucero, both in his official capacity as Fremont County Sheriff and 
as an individual, for termination of employment without due process, for breach 
of contract, and for deprivation of his first amendment rights. The district 
court denied Lucero's motion for summary judgment, and Lucero now appeals. 

III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶10]   While it is generally true that a 
denial of summary judgment is not a final, appealable order, Equality Bank v. 
Suomi, 836 P.2d 325, 330 (Wyo. 1992), this is not the case in the context of 
qualified immunity. The presence or absence of qualified immunity is generally 
determined by either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, and 
denial of such a motion is appealable. Abell v. Dewey, 870 P.2d 363, 367 (Wyo. 
1994) (citing Park County v. Cooney, 845 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1992), cert. denied 
___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 60, 126 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1993) (holding denial of motion to 
dismiss based upon qualified immunity is an appealable order); Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2815-16, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985) 
(holding denial of summary judgment based upon qualified immunity is an 
appealable order)); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. ___, ___, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 
132 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1995).

[¶11]   The presence or absence of 
qualified immunity presents a question of law which is reviewed on appeal de 
novo. Abell, at 367 (citing Langley v. Adams County, 987 F.2d 1473, 1476 (10th 
Cir. 1993)). The appealable issue is a purely legal one: whether the law 
allegedly violated by the defendant was clearly established at the time of the 
challenged action or actions. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.  at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 
2816: see Abell, 870 P.2d  at 367-69.

[An] 
appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant's claim of immunity need 
not consider the correctness of the plaintiff's version of the facts, nor even 
determine whether the plaintiff's allegations actually state a claim. All it 
need determine is a question of law: whether the legal norms allegedly violated 
by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions 
or, in cases where the district court has denied summary judgment for the 
defendant on the ground that even under the defendant's version of the facts the 
defendant's conduct violated clearly established law, whether the law clearly 
proscribed the actions the defendant claims he took.

Johnson 
v. Jones, 515 U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct.  at 2156 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S.  at 528, 
105 S.Ct. at 2816).

[¶12]   Our standard of review, therefore, 
is only applicable to determining whether the law was clearly established and 
whether the defendant's conduct was proscribed by such clearly established law 
without reviewing the merits of the case. This concept of "separability" between 
the legal question of whether the law was clearly established and the merits of 
the action was discussed recently by the United States Supreme Court in Johnson 
v. Jones. There the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant entitled 
to invoke a qualified-immunity defense may not appeal a district court's summary 
judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial 
record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 
at ___, 115 S. Ct.  at 2159. When a district court denies a defendant's summary 
judgment motion, by definition this means that genuine issues of material fact 
exist. Pursuant to Johnson v. Jones, we will not review the record to determine 
whether genuine issues of material fact exist, as this has already been 
determined by the district court and such a determination does not constitute a 
final, appealable order.

IV. 
DISCUSSION

A. 
Clearly Established Law

[¶13]   Qualified immunity generally 
shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability 
for civil damages when their conduct "`does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.'" Abell v. Dewey, 870 P.2d  at 367 (citing Park County v. Cooney, 845 P.2d  
at 351 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 
2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982))). "In order to find qualified immunity, the 
objective legal reasonableness of a government official's conduct is assessed in 
the light of the clearly established statutory or constitutional rights at the 
time of the action." Abell, 870 P.2d  at 368-69 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S.  at 
818-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39). 

The 
operation of this standard, however, depends substantially upon the level of 
generality at which the relevant "legal rule" is to be identified. For example, 
the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process 
Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that Clause 
(no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) 
violates a clearly established right. Much the same could be said of any other 
constitutional or statutory violation. But if the test of "clearly established 
law" were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no 
relationship to the "objective legal reasonableness" that is the touchstone of 
Harlow. Plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that 
our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability 
simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights. * * * It should not 
be surprising, therefore, that our cases establish that the right the official 
is alleged to have violated must have been "clearly established" in a more 
particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right 
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what 
he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that official action is 
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has 
previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of 
pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.

Abell, 
870 P.2d  at 369 (quoting Cooney, 845 P.2d  at 351-52 (quoting Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038-39, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 
(1987))).

[¶14]  We have also stated that a "clearly 
established right" is

one 
recognized by either the highest state court in the state where the case arose, 
a United States Court of Appeals, or the United States Supreme Court. Robinson 
v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1988). To this list, we might add those 
rights expressly provided for by controlling statute or administrative 
regulation. Moreover, the right need not have been previously recognized in the 
exact circumstances of the given case; a reasonable official is required to 
"relate established law to analogous factual settings."

Cooney, 
845 P.2d  at 352. Therefore, we must determine, as a matter of law, whether a 
reasonable public official, in March of 1992, would have understood that a sworn 
nonprobationary, full-time deputy of a sheriff's department had a 
constitutionally protected property interest in his employment.

[¶15]   Property interests in continued 
public employment are created and defined by independent sources such as state 
statutory law, regulations or the terms of employment. Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 
(1972). Most often, finding a legitimate claim of entitlement to public 
employment requires a definitive interpretation of state law, which is the 
function of a state supreme court, or, on occasion, the federal district court 
residing in that state. Abell, 870 P.2d  at 370.

[¶16]   In Wyoming, a property interest in 
continued employment for sworn nonprobationary, full-time deputies of a 
sheriff's department which employs at least twenty sworn, full-time deputies has 
been legislatively created and defined as W.S. 18-3-611 (Cum.Supp. 
1995).

Sec. 
18-3-611. Sheriff's office employees; removal from office; 
hearings.

(a) 
This section applies to sworn nonprobationary, full-time deputies of a sheriff's 
department which employs at least twenty (20) sworn, full-time deputies. Except 
as provided by subsection (d) of this section, this section does not apply to 
any member of the executive staff. As used in this subsection, member of the 
executive staff means a deputy whose primary duties consist of the management of 
the department or a subdivision thereof, who regularly exercises discretionary 
powers as they relate to the employment status of employees and who is directly 
supervised by the sheriff.

(b) 
A deputy sheriff shall not be discharged from employment, reduced in rank or 
suspended without pay except for cause and after notice and opportunity for a 
hearing. The hearing and any appeal shall be conducted in accordance with the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The hearing shall be closed unless both 
the sheriff and the deputy involved agree otherwise.

(c) 
A deputy sheriff accused of a matter for which the sheriff may discharge him may 
be suspended with pay for a reasonable length of time necessary to investigate 
and take final action on the matter, provided the deputy shall not be discharged 
in any final action without the opportunity for a hearing.

(d) 
A sheriff may in his discretion reduce in rank a member of the executive staff 
but shall not terminate him without cause.

(e) 
This section does not prohibit or restrict discharges from employment in order 
of lowest ranking deputies first, for purposes of reorganization of the 
sheriff's office or for the reason of lack of funds.

[¶17]   This statute creates a property 
right in the position of a full-time deputy sheriff by requiring that any 
termination of employment be for cause and after notice and opportunity for a 
hearing. Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, in addition to the statutory 
requirements for notice and opportunity to be heard, there is then a federal 
constitutional right to due process of law that demands notice of the cause for 
termination and a hearing on the existence of the cause prior to terminating 
employment of a full-time deputy sheriff. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985); see Town of Upton v. 
Whisler, 824 P.2d 545 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶18]   Section 18-3-611 has existed since 
1989 and was in force in March 1992. We hold that the law in March of 1992 was 
clearly established that a sworn nonprobationary, full-time deputy of a 
sheriff's department that employed at least twenty full-time deputy sheriffs had 
a statutorily and constitutionally protected property interest in continued 
public employment and that a reasonable sheriff should have known and understood 
this. Thus, Mathews could only be terminated for cause and after notice and 
opportunity to be heard.

B. 
Due Process - Notice and Opportunity to be Heard

[¶19]   Having held that the law was 
clearly established when Lucero terminated Mathews, we now turn our analysis to 
what notice was due, as this is a question of law. Mathews asserts that Lucero 
violated his due process rights when Lucero terminated him. Lucero counters that 
Mathews was given all the process due under the Constitution. Resolution of this 
issue necessarily hinges upon the notice given to Mathews of the cause for his 
termination and the opportunity he was given to respond to the allegations 
contained within the notice.

[¶20]   A nonprobationary, as well as a 
tenured, public employee is entitled to written notice of the charges against 
him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present 
his side of the story. Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 546, 105 S. Ct.  at 1495; Abell, 
870 P.2d  at 372; Whisler, 824 P.2d  at 548; Powell v. Board of Trustees, Crook 
County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 550 P.2d 1112, 1116-17 (Wyo. 1976). This pretermination 
hearing opportunity, which necessarily includes notice and a hearing, is not 
only a by-product of § 18-3-611, but is also a function of constitutional law. 
See Whisler, 824 P.2d  at 548-49. The due process clause of the United States 
Constitution requires such notice and hearing, and we point out that Art. 1, § 6 
of the Wyoming Constitution also affords equivalent protection to the 
nonprobationary public employee. Id., at 549; White v. Board of Trustees, 
Western Wyoming Community College Dist., 648 P.2d 528, 535 (Wyo. 
1982).

[¶21]   The notice of which we speak is the 
same kind of notice that is due any public employee who has a property right in 
continued employment, which includes tenured teachers, municipal judges, and any 
other nonprobationary public employee. The required notice must afford the 
public employee "a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing 
party and to meet them." White, at 535 (quoting Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18, 58 S. Ct. 773, 776, 82 L. Ed. 1129 (1938)). The notice must contain 
adequate and specific notice of the charges for which the employee is being 
terminated. Powell, 550 P.2d  at 1117.

[¶22]   Furthermore, § 18-3-611 states that 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act applies to the hearing and appeal 
regarding the termination of a deputy sheriff. The notice sections of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, W.S. 16-3-107(a) and (b)(iv) (1990), 
provide:

(a) 
In any contested case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing 
after reasonable notice served personally or by mail. * * *

(b) 
The notice shall include a statement of:

* 
* * * * *

(iv) 
A short and plain statement of the matters asserted. If the agency or other 
party is unable to state the matters in detail at the time the notice is served, 
the initial notice may be limited to a statement of the issues involved, and 
thereafter upon application a more definite and detailed statement shall be 
furnished.

[¶23]   The opportunity to be heard before 
a public employee's property interest may be taken away goes hand in hand with 
the notice he must receive. Constitutional due process requires that a public 
employee be afforded a hearing wherein he may respond to the charges that are 
contained within the notice before his constitutionally protected property 
interest may be terminated. (See generally Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 546, 105 
S.Ct. at 1495). This necessarily means that the public employee must be given a 
real and meaningful opportunity to respond to every charge or allegation that is 
being brought against him and which will be used as a cause for his termination. 
If the public employee has not been given an opportunity to respond to every 
allegation which is used against him as a cause for termination of his property 
interest, then he has not been given a real and meaningful opportunity to be 
heard and, thus, he has been deprived of constitutionally protected property 
without due process of law.

[¶24]   We have discussed before what 
notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard means in the context of 
termination of employment. In Powell v. Board of Trustees, Crook County Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, supra, the appellant had been dismissed by the board on charges for 
which he had received no notification. Before the hearing, appellant had been 
charged with violating various policies having to do with student discipline. 
However, after the hearing, the board based its decision on appellant's 
inability to control student conduct. In reversing the board's decision we 
said:

In 
order to satisfy the minimum rights of the appellant he must have had adequate, 
specific notice of those things with which he was being charged. This is a 
due-process guarantee which allows him to prepare for his hearing.

We 
said in Glenn v. Board of County Commissioners, Sheridan County, Wyo., 440 P.2d 1, 4 (1968):

* 
* * The important question is whether or not the parties had fair notice of the 
issues involved * * *.

Did 
Powell have fair notice that he could be found guilty of a student-discipline 
inadequacy (inability to control conduct), concerning which there had been no 
charges made, even though he were to successfully defend against the charge of 
failure to follow student-disciplinary policies of the Board? We hold that he 
did not.

What 
is "fair notice" under Glenn v. Board of County Commissioners, supra, as applied 
to this case? If Mr. Powell was going to be required to defend a 
student-disciplinary charge, it was necessary to specifically inform and notify 
him as contemplated by § 9-276.25(a) and (b)(4) and § 21.1-160(b), supra. He had 
a right to believe that the only student-discipline complaint was embraced in 
the charge of not following the Board's discipline policy. According to the 
manner in which the issues were framed, there is no reason to believe he should 
have guessed that there might be additional dissatisfaction with his 
student-disciplinary methods over and above and outside the charge that he had 
failed to follow the District's student-discipline policy.

Powell, 
550 P.2d  at 1117. The reasoning behind the holding in Powell holds true for this 
case in determining whether Mathews was denied the notice and opportunity due 
him as prescribed by the clearly established law.

[¶25]   We, therefore, hold that at the 
time Lucero terminated Mathews' employment, the law was clearly established that 
Mathews could not be deprived of his constitutionally protected property 
interest without cause and notice and opportunity to be heard. We affirm the 
trial court's holding that Lucero is not entitled to dismissal of Mathews' claim 
of deprivation of property without due process on the basis of qualified 
immunity.

C. 
Political Patronage

[¶26]   Lucero next argues that the trial 
court erred in determining that he was not entitled to dismissal of Mathews' 
claim of violation of first amendment rights on the basis of qualified immunity. 
Mathews brought this claim against Lucero asserting that Lucero did not 
terminate him for cause, but rather terminated his employment because of 
Mathews' avid support of incumbent Sheriff Tim McKinney during the 1990 
election. Thus, Mathews claims that his employment was terminated because of his 
political patronage, in violation of clearly established law. We must determine 
if, at the time Lucero terminated Mathews' employment, the law was clearly 
established regarding this claim.

[¶27]   The law that was clearly 
established when Lucero terminated Mathews is as we held above: W.S. 18-3-611 
gave Mathews a statutorily protected property interest in his continued 
employment, and his property interest could be terminated only for cause 
and after notice and opportunity to be heard. Determination of whether Lucero 
violated this law as to this claim revolves around what is a legally sufficient 
cause under § 18-3-611 and whether Lucero terminated Mathews' employment for a 
cause that is legally impermissible.

[¶28]   In March of 1992, it was clearly 
established what types of causes for termination of public employment were 
included within the definition of "for cause" contained in § 18-3-611. We stated 
in Board of Trustees, Laramie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 
1174 (Wyo. 1976):

The 
contract teacher may not be deprived of employment contract renewal without 
cause. Monahan v. Board of Trustees, [486 P.2d 235, 236-37 (Wyo. 1971)]. Cause 
may not be found in a constitutionally-protected reason. Even nontenured 
teachers cannot be dismissed for exercising constitutional rights. Freedom of 
speech is constitutionally protected under Article 1, Section 20, of the Wyoming 
Constitution and the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.

(Footnotes 
omitted.) In Powell, 550 P.2d  at 1118-19, we stated:

"Good 
cause" cannot be just any reason that the Board deems sufficient for the 
discharge of the teacher. * * * Not only must there be "good cause" and 
substantial evidence in support of the charge, but in order for the facts to 
sustain such a charge they must bear reasonable relationship to the teacher's 
fitness or capacity to perform his duties in that position.

* 
* * * * *

We 
find the test of good cause with respect to public officers generally to be 
facts which are related to the office and affect the administration thereof. 
Guine v. Civil Service Commission, 149 W. Va. 461, 141 S.E.2d 364, 368-369; 63 
Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers, Sec. 202, Note 57, .

Therefore, 
it is the decision of this court that the "good cause" to which the statute 
refers when the term "any other good or just cause" is used in § 21.1-160, W.S. 
1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., or when good cause is contemplated as discussed in 
Monahan, [486 P.2d 235, 236-37 (Wyo. 1971)], these terms assume facts which bear 
a relationship to the teacher's ability and fitness to teach and discharge the 
duties of his or her position.

[¶29]   Powell and Spiegel were tenured 
teacher cases; however, the principles underlying the above quoted text are 
beneficial and applicable to our analysis of Mathews' claim herein. Cause under 
§ 18-3-611 "may not be found in a constitutionally-protected reason." Spiegel, 
549 P.2d  at 1174. We find that "cause," to which § 18-3-611 refers when it 
states that a deputy sheriff may be terminated only "for cause," necessarily 
means a cause or justification which bears a reasonable relationship to the 
deputy sheriff's ability and fitness to perform and discharge the duties of his 
or her position. Powell, 550 P.2d  at 1119. We further find that under § 
18-3-611, political patronage and other expressions of the freedom of 
association and party affiliation are not cause or justification for which a 
deputy sheriff may be terminated.

[¶30]   The First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution gives a person the right to freely express who they support 
in an election and why they support such a person, without fear of retaliation 
for expressing such views by a public employer. Therefore, because political 
patronage is a form of free expression and freedom of association, it is 
protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as 
Art. 1, § 20 of the Wyoming Constitution, and, as such, it may not be used as a 
reason or cause to terminate a public employee's employment under W.S. 18-3-611. 
See Spiegel, 549 P.2d  at 1174.

[¶31]   We hold that in March 1992, a 
sheriff should have known that the law was clearly established that a deputy 
sheriff could be terminated only for cause, and that such a cause did not 
include constitutionally protected rights. Lucero should have known of the 
existence of W.S. 18-3-611 and that it required a legally sufficient cause for 
termination of a deputy. Lucero should have also known, in accordance with 
Wyoming case law, that political patronage could not be such a cause for 
termination under § 18-3-611.

[¶32]   Therefore, we hold that at the time 
Lucero terminated Mathews' employment, the law was clearly established that 
Mathews could be terminated only for cause, that termination for political 
activity was not a legally permissible cause, and such discharge for political 
activity would be in violation of Mathews' First Amendment rights. We affirm the 
trial court's holding that Lucero is not entitled to dismissal of Mathews' claim 
of violation of First Amendment rights on the basis of qualified 
immunity.

D. 
Breach of Contract

[¶33]   Mathews brought a claim against 
Lucero in his official capacity as Fremont County Sheriff for breach of his 
employment contract. This is not a claim against Lucero in his individual 
capacity, and, as such, qualified immunity does not apply. Lucero moved for 
summary judgment on this claim, and the district court denied the motion. 
Because qualified immunity does not apply to this claim, the denial of summary 
judgment by the district court is just like any other denial of summary 
judgment: It is not a final order. Equality Bank v. Suomi, 836 P.2d 325, 330 
(Wyo. 1992). We, therefore, hold that the district court's denial of summary 
judgment as to Mathews' breach of contract claim is not a final, appealable 
order and dismiss this part of Lucero's appeal.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶34]   We affirm the trial court's 
holding that Lucero is not entitled to dismissal of Mathews' claims against him 
on the basis of qualified immunity and remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings.