Title: WADE TRAVIS KEATS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WADE TRAVIS KEATS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 81115 P.3d 1110Case Number: 04-171Decided: 07/20/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
WADE 
TRAVIS KEATS,

 
 
Petitioner,

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Respondent.

 
 
Petition 
for Writ of Review

Original 
Proceeding

 
 

Representing 
Petitioner:

W. Keith 
Goody, Alpine, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Respondent:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
David L. Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Melissa M. Swearingen, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Swearingen.

 
 
 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Wade Travis 
Keats was convicted of first-degree arson in July of 2001.  This Court affirmed that conviction on 
February 13, 2003.  See 
Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, 64 P.3d 104 (Wyo. 2003) (Keats I).  On November 17, 2003, Keats filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief alleging both his trial and appellate 
counsel were ineffective.  The 
district court denied Keats' petition finding Keats failed to meet the required 
factual burden for showing ineffective assistance of counsel.  Keats then filed a petition for writ of 
review, which we granted.  We 
conclude Keats' trial counsel was ineffective; therefore, we reverse his 
conviction and remand to the district court for a new trial.   

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Keats presents 
two issues for our review:

 
 

I.                     
Was 
defense counsel ineffective for failing to enter a plea of not guilty by reason 
of mental illness and deficiency and by failing to investigate a mental health 
defense? Accordingly, were the petitioner's rights under the 5th, 
6th, and 14th amendments to the UnitedState's [sic] Constitution and the 
applicable provisions of the Wyoming Constitution 
violated?

 
 

II.                   
Was 
appellate counsel ineffective for not raising ineffective assistance of counsel 
on direct appeal?  Therefore, were 
the petitioner's rights under the 5th, 6th and 
14th amendments to the UnitedState's [sic] Constitution and the 
applicable provisions of the Wyoming Constitution 
violated?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues as follows:

 
 

I.                     
Whether 
the district court properly determined that petitioner failed to support his 
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

 
 

II.                   
Whether 
the district court properly determined that petitioner failed to support his 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶3]      We summarized the 
facts of the original incident in Keats I, ¶¶3-6.

 
 
On the 
evening of December 30, 2000, appellant angrily left some friends, stating to 
one friend "if [you don't] want to go to jail, get out of the car . . . ." The 
friend complied. Appellant then returned to his mobile home in the early morning 
hours of December 31, 2000, and, appearing angry and intoxicated, asked his 
roommate to "get [her] stuff and leave, get out of his house." After gathering 
some of her property, and her son, in order to leave the residence, the roommate 
observed appellant break a window and then saw a small fire in the hallway. She 
extinguished the fire, and as she left, appellant "was talking about burning the 
house down with himself in it and he was tired of everybody using him." The 
roommate reported the incident to an emergency dispatcher.

 
 

Campbell 
County 
sheriff's deputies responded to appellant's residence just after 1:00 a.m. on 
December 31, 2000. As they stood outside the mobile home, they observed 
appellant periodically inside the residence, but he did not initially respond to 
their requests to exit the residence or talk to them. Eventually, the officers 
entered the residence and located appellant in the bathroom. A lengthy period of 
interaction and attempted negotiation between appellant, the officers, and, at 
appellant's request, another individual ensued. During this period, appellant's 
unstable demeanor vacillated rapidly between suicidal, threatening, anger, 
laughter, and depression. For example, appellant frequently exited and retreated 
to the bathroom, told the officers to get out of his house, threatened to kill 
himself if they did not do so, displayed three different knives, at times held a 
knife to his abdomen and throat, stabbed knives into the bathroom wall, door, 
and floor while yelling at the officers to "come and get some of this," laughed 
at the officers, and stated that if the officers came through the bathroom door, 
a knife was positioned such that it would harm appellant.

 
 
Appellant 
ultimately proceeded to light several fires at different times and at different 
locations within the residence. The officers, and firemen, were able to 
extinguish and control these fires until at least one fire began to spread, 
filling the mobile home with smoke. At one point, appellant broke a window, but 
upon seeing an officer outside the window pointing a flashlight and firearm at 
him, appellant took two deep breaths of fresh air and returned to the 
smoke-filled residence. Eventually, amidst the smoke, flames and steam, the 
officers subdued appellant, who was proceeding through the mobile home with a 
knife in his hand, and placed him into custody. The mobile home was "damaged 
probably beyond replacement fixing."

 
 
The 
State charged appellant with first-degree arson and possession of a deadly 
weapon with unlawful intent, both felonies. A jury found appellant guilty of 
first-degree arson, but acquitted him of the possession of a deadly weapon 
charge. The district court sentenced appellant to a three- to seven-year prison 
term. He appeals from that judgment and sentence.

 
 
Keats' 
direct appeal was handled by trial counsel's law office, and trial counsel's 
employee provided Keats' appellate representation. On appeal, Keats claimed the 
district court failed to properly instruct the jury on specific intent; 
improperly limited the evidence presented to the jury about his mental 
condition; and improperly refused two of his proposed jury instructions.  Keats I, at ¶2.  We affirmed Keats' conviction, 
concluding the district court did not err in refusing to give Keats' proposed 
jury instructions and that Keats' other arguments were not supported by cogent 
reasoning or pertinent authority.  
Keats I, at ¶36.  

 
 
[¶4]      Keats then filed 
a petition for post-conviction relief asserting trial counsel was ineffective 
and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness on direct appeal.  At an evidentiary hearing concerning 
Keats' petition for post-conviction relief, the parties developed additional 
facts concerning Keats' mental state and trial counsel's strategies.  The main focus of the hearing appears to 
have been trial counsel's decision not to enter a plea of not guilty by reason 
of mental illness (NGMI).  During 
the course of the hearing it was discovered Keats' mother had informed trial 
counsel that Keats had a history of mental health problems and an inability to 
stabilize his moods. Trial counsel admitted he had been told Keats had 
behavioral problems, mood swings, and would often get depressed.  Trial counsel was also aware Keats had 
been on and off medication for these problems during his adult life. 

 
 
[¶5]      Following the 
arson incident, Keats was involuntarily placed in the mental health unit of the 
hospital, and the State initiated a Title 25 action against him.1  Trial counsel met with Keats while he was 
in the mental health unit and was aware of the Title 25 action. The medical 
records from Keats' hospital stay indicate Keats had a major depressive disorder 
and reality distortion. Keats was also diagnosed with many symptoms compatible 
with bipolar disorder. Trial counsel was aware of this diagnosis.  Later, the State dropped the Title 25 
action on the condition that Keats be admitted to a mental health facility. 
Keats was admitted to such a facility, and while there he was diagnosed with a 
substance abuse problem and a bipolar disorder. 

  

[¶6]      Trial counsel 
testified his strategy was to argue that Keats' specific intent was not to burn 
down the house but rather to kill himself and, therefore, he lacked the specific 
intent required for arson. Before trial began, Keats and his mother both 
discussed the option of a NGMI plea with trial counsel.  Trial counsel informed them "that it was 
not possible to do an insanity plea and then attempt a defense of specific 
intent, and he kept saying this is a specific intent case, and he said the two 
were not compatible." Also before trial, the district court ruled through a 
motion in limine that trial counsel could not introduce evidence dealing with 
Keats' mental state because trial counsel did not enter a NGMI plea. 

 
 
[¶7]      Dr. William 
Logan, a psychiatrist, also testified at the hearing for post-conviction 
relief.  He testified Keats "suffers 
from a bipolar disorder and that his judgment and behavioral control, his 
recognition of wrongfulness, was significantly compromised at the time the arson 
occurred." It was Dr. Logan's opinion "with a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, that Mr. Keats suffered from a mental disease, Bipolar Disorder, 
depressed at the time of the offense."  He further opined the "mental disease was 
of sufficient severity that the disease compromised Mr. Keats' cognitive, 
emotional and behavioral stability to the extent that he did not have the 
ability to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to his behavior, or 
to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law." 

 
 
[¶8]      At the hearing, 
appellate counsel testified she was aware Keats was admitted to the mental 
health unit of the hospital after the incident. She stated she understood mental 
illness would be relevant to whether a person could form a specific intent. She 
also recognized that had the NGMI plea been entered it would have been more 
likely the evidence regarding Keats' mental state would have been introduced. 
Nevertheless, she testified she never considered bringing an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court denied the petition finding Keats failed to meet his required factual 
burden for proving his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district 
court stated it was satisfied trial counsel's explanation for pursuing his 
particular strategy was sufficient to show effective assistance.  The district court also found appellate 
counsel was not ineffective because she adequately examined the record, assessed 
the case, and asserted the proper issues on appeal. 

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶10]   Our standard for reviewing claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel is well known.

 
 
When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo. 1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 
(Wyo. 1995) [overruled on other grounds, 
Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686 (Wyo. 
1995)]; Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 1994); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 
(Wyo. 1986). 
The reviewing court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment. Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 1266; 
Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 

 
 
Under 
the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an 
appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, at 1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo. 1991) (Cardine, J., 
dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo. 1986); Frias, 
722 P.2d  at 145. In other words, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to 
"render such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent 
attorney" and that "counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case." 
Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990). "The benchmark for judging any 
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on 
as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 
686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.

 
 

Strickland 
v. State, 2004 
WY 91, ¶17, 94 P.3d 1034, ¶17 (Wyo. 2004) (alterations in 
original).

 
 

 
 
[¶11]   The State argues that because the 
claims that may be presented on a petition for post-conviction relief are 
limited, the primary consideration in this matter is actually Keats' claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as it serves as the only portal 
through which Keats may assert the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. 
Wyoming's 
post-conviction statutes do indeed present limitations on the claims that may be 
asserted.   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-103(a) (LexisNexis 2005) states: 

 
 

(a)   A claim under this act is 
procedurally barred and no court has the jurisdiction to decide the claim if the 
claim:

(i)  Could 
have been raised but was not raised in a direct appeal from the proceeding which 
resulted in the petitioner's conviction;

(ii)  Was 
not raised in the original or an amendment to the original petition under this 
act; or

(iii)  Was 
decided on it merits or on procedural grounds in any previous proceeding which 
has become final.  

 
 
Likewise, 
our case law makes it clear that post-conviction relief is not a substitute for 
direct appeal.  See Murray v. State, 776 P.2d 206, 208 
(Wyo. 
1989).  Any claim that could have 
been raised on direct appeal, but was not raised, is procedurally barred from 
being raised on a petition for post-conviction relief.  Id.   

 
 
[¶12]   However, "claims of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel are statutorily recognized as the portal' 
through which otherwise waived claims of trial-level error may be reached." 
Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶6 105 P.3d 1049, ¶6 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting with 
approval the district court's summary of our jurisprudence regarding 
post-conviction review.)   Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-14-103(b) (LexisNexis 2005) provides:  

 

(b)  Notwithstanding 
paragraph (a)(i) of this section, a court may hear a petition if: 

. . . 
.

 
 
(ii) The 
court makes a finding that the petitioner was denied constitutionally effective 
assistance of counsel on his direct appeal.  This finding may be reviewed by the 
supreme court together with any further action of the district court taken on 
the petition. 

 
 
We have 
explained that generally a petitioner cannot raise the issue of ineffective 
assistance of his trial counsel for the first time in a petition for 
post-conviction relief because that issue could have been raised in the direct 
appeal and is therefore foreclosed by the doctrine of res judicata. Smizer v. 
State, 835 P.2d 334, 337 (Wyo. 1992); 
Murray, 
776 P.2d  at 208.  Despite this 
general "waiver" rule, it is also recognized that a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel cannot be raised on direct appeal and is 
consequently not subject to the "waiver" rule.  Smizer, at 337.  

 
 
[¶13]   Nevertheless, to prevent 
petitioners from circumventing the "waiver" rule altogether by claiming 
ineffective assistance of their appellate counsel, we have adopted a strict test 
for reviewing such a claim.  
Id.  The issue of whether appellate counsel's 
performance was constitutionally ineffective is analyzed in much the same way 
that we analyze the concept of plain error.  Id.  Essentially, a petitioner must clearly 
show what occurred at trial, that an unequivocal rule of law was transgressed in 
a clear and obvious manner, and the alleged error had an adverse effect upon a 
substantial right.  Cutbirth v. 
State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Wyo. 1988).   We therefore agree with the State 
that, even though the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is at the 
heart of this matter, it is only through the ineffectiveness of appellate 
counsel that we may consider it. 

 

[¶14]   The State also points out that, in 
addition to the strict test for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel, we have established counsel is not charged with the 
constitutional obligation to raise every single issue identified to render 
effective assistance.  In 
Cutbirth we noted, "generally, . . . the mere fact that counsel failed to 
recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim 
despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for procedural default."  751 P.2d  at 1263.  It has long been recognized that raising 
every conceivable issue on appeal is not always advantageous as it can lessen 
the impact of more specific issues that offer a better chance of success.  Accordingly, the simple failure to raise 
a issue on appeal, even if it was meritorious, does not necessarily demonstrate 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Id.   Instead, "[i]t must be 
demonstrated that counsel's representation was deficient by showing errors were 
made that were so serious that counsel was not functioning in accordance with 
the constitutional guarantee, and furthermore, the deficient performance 
prejudiced the appellant."  
Id. at 1263-64.  

 
 
[¶15]   The circumstances of the instant 
matter present an additional concern, however. That is, the same law office 
represented Keats both at trial and on appeal.  Certainly, we have never indicated such 
a practice is prohibited or even disfavored.  The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Providing Defense Services §5-6.2, at 81 (3d ed. 1992), states: 

 
 
Counsel 
should be provided at every stage of the proceedings, including sentencing, 
appeal, certiorari and postconviction review.[2]  In 
capital cases, counsel also should be provided in clemency proceedings.  Counsel initially provided should 
continue to represent the defendant throughout the trial court proceedings and 
should preserve the defendant's right to appeal, if necessary. 

 

The 
commentary related to this standard explains: 

 
 
This 
standard is silent on the issue of whether trial counsel should be required to 
provide appellate representation.  
In support of appointing new counsel on appeal, it is argued that a fresh 
lawyer may perceive issues from the transcript which trial counsel may miss, due 
to closeness and familiarity with the case.  It also is suggested that new counsel on 
appeal is necessary in order to assure that arguments regarding ineffective 
assistance of counsel are presented to the appellate court. In addition, the 
brief-writing skills required of appellate counsel may not always be possessed 
by trial attorneys.  On the other 
hand, it is said that familiarity with the case greatly facilitates preparation 
of the brief and oral argument.  
Significantly, the plans adopted by most federal courts pursuant to the 
Criminal Justice Act of 1964 generally provide for continuity of representation 
through appeal.  

 
 

Id. at 
83-84.  Thus, it appears there is no 
general consensus on whether the same attorney (or law office) should represent 
a defendant both at trial and on appeal.  

 
 
[¶16]   There is, however, some indication 
that it is not appropriate or expected for one to raise one's own 
ineffectiveness.3  See, e.g., Nelson v. 
State, 649 So. 2d 1299, 1300 (Ala. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Suarez, 
670 P.2d 1192, 1204 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); People v. Fields, 410 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Bottoson v. State, 674 So. 2d 621, 625 n.5 
(Fla. 1996) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Etienne v. 
State, 716 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. 1999); Bear v. State, 417 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Hill v. State, 749 So. 2d 1143, 1149 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 1999); State v. Hooks, 748 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ohio 2001); 
Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 810-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  We too have identified that such a 
practice is questionable.  Osborn 
v. State, 672 P.2d 777, 795 (Wyo. 1983).  For this very reason, several 
jurisdictions recognize a difference between requests for post-conviction relief 
when the same attorney has represented a defendant both at trial and on appeal 
and when different attorneys have handled each matter.  In general terms, those jurisdictions 
reason that if the same attorney is used both at trial and on appeal then there 
is not a "waiver" of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because 
there has not truly been an opportunity to previously present those claims.  See, e.g., Little v. United 
States, 748 A.2d 920, 923 (D.C. 2000); Jarrett v. State, 580 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Buckman, 613 N.W.2d 463, 473 
(Neb. 2000); State v. Lentz, 639 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 1994); Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1177 (Pa. 1999); State v. Hensley, 585 N.W.2d 683 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).  

 
 
[¶17]   In the circumstances of this case, 
we agree with this reasoning. Although appellate counsel testified that when 
reviewing Keats' case she never identified an ineffective assistance claim, she 
also testified she considered trial counsel to be her "boss." She additionally 
stated, "in this particular instance I did not view myself as independent 
separate counsel doing this . . . . So certainly I was largely doing it as 
somebody who assisted [trial counsel]."  
She also testified, "I am acting on [trial counsel's] behalf on doing 
this appeal, so I don't feel it would have been appropriate to raise ineffective 
[sic] of [trial counsel]." It could therefore be argued that Keats did not truly 
have an opportunity to make an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on 
direct appeal, and for that reason this claim is not a claim that "could have 
been raised but was not raised in a direct appeal."  See § 7-14-103(a)(i).  Like the courts mentioned above, we too 
perceive a reason to recognize a difference in this petition for post-conviction 
relief.  As a result, in this 
instance, we conclude that Keats' claim is not procedurally barred from being 
raised for the first time on a petition for post-conviction review.  Accordingly, we will simply proceed to 
Keats' claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  

 

[¶18]   As noted in our standard of review, 
the standard we use in reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
one of reasonableness.  We interpret 
the right to effective assistance of counsel to mean "not error-less counsel, 
and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely 
to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance."  Jansen v. State, 892 P.2d 1131, 
1143 (Wyo. 
1995) (quoting United States v. Rubin, 433 F.2d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945, 
91 S. Ct. 961, 28 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1971)).   Thus, we must judge whether in 
light of all the circumstances counsel's representation was reasonable.  

 
 
[¶19]   Keats now claims counsel's 
representation was unreasonable, primarily because trial counsel decided not to 
enter a NGMI plea.  Keats asserts 
this decision shows ineffectiveness on several levels, mainly the failure to 
investigate Keats' mental state and the possibility of such a plea.  It is on this ground that we agree that 
counsel was ineffective.  

 
 
[¶20]   We have long recognized that 
failure of counsel to conduct a reasonable investigation may constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  

 
 
Our 
first detailed analysis of counsel's duty to investigate came in Frias v. 
State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986):

 
 
The 
United States Supreme Court has outlined trial counsel's duty to investigate as 
follows:

 
 
"* * * 
[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable 
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the 
limitations on investigation.  In 
other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. 
* * * The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially 
influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are 
usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the 
defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. * * * [W]hat 
investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information. * 
* *' (Emphasis added.) Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066." 

 
 
The 
reasonableness of investigation decisions depends on other evidence as well. 
"[I]n those cases involving claims of inadequate investigation * * * 
consideration [must be given to] the strength of the evidence known to counsel 
that suggested further inquiry was needed." 2 LaFave & Isr[ae]l, Crim.Proc. 
§ 11.10(d) at 25 (1986 Pocket Part).

 
 

Asch v. 
State, 2003 
WY 18, ¶40,  62 P.3d 945, ¶40 (Wyo. 
2003) (alterations in original); see also Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 28, 
¶29, 86 P.3d 851, ¶29 (Wyo. 2004).  
We have also recognized, however, that a failure to investigate or to 
prepare adequately for trial does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel where the failure is appellant's fault.  Asch, at 
¶42.

 
 
[¶21]   The State claims trial counsel made 
a reasonable decision to not enter a NGMI plea, which made further investigation 
into Keats' mental state and such a plea unnecessary.  The State asserts trial counsel made 
this decision because Keats did not want to go to the state hospital and if a 
NGMI plea was entered Keats' history of substance abuse would be introduced into 
evidence. Essentially, the State argues the lack of investigation is Keats' 
fault.  The record of the 
evidentiary hearing does show these were trial counsel's stated reasons for not 
pursuing a NGMI plea.  However, 
regarding Keats' desire not to go to the state mental hospital, trial counsel 
limited this reason by noting "[b]ut I have to say in that regard in talking to 
him about it I probably gave a qualifier as to whether I thought an insanity 
defense was the best way.  I don't 
want to give the impression that he just told me he did not want to go.  I probably advised him that I didn't 
think that was the best course of conduct." Trial counsel also stated he 
discussed a mental illness defense with Keats but advised him such a defense was 
difficult to make. He also acknowledged he understood people with bipolar 
disorder often have substance abuse problems in an effort to deal with the 
symptoms of the disorder. Therefore, it seems likely Keats' substance abuse 
could have been explained along with his bipolar disorder had trial counsel 
entered a NGMI plea.  Accordingly, 
we cannot conclude the failure to investigate a NGMI plea was Keats' fault.  Asch, at ¶42.   

 
 
[¶22]   The question then becomes whether 
trial counsel made a reasonable decision that made further investigation into 
Keats' mental state unnecessary.  
Instead of a NGMI plea, trial counsel's strategy was to argue Keats' 
specific intent was not to burn down the house but to commit suicide. More 
specifically, counsel's strategy was to argue that Keats was depressed at the 
time of the incident and started the fire in an effort to kill himself.  Trial counsel sought to prove his theory 
by introducing general information about Keats' mental health and evidence that 
the State had pursued a Title 25 action against Keats following the 
incident.  In essence, it appears 
trial counsel was trying to make some sort of diminished capacity argument that 
Keats was depressed and suicidal.  
Wyoming 
has not recognized a diminished capacity defense.  We have noted the legislature has set 
forth the standards relating to the mental conditions that will constitute a 
defense to a criminal charge, and it is not our duty to increase or decrease 
those standards.  Price v. 
State, 807 P.2d 909, 915 (Wyo. 1991).  This reasoning applies with equal force 
to a claim that mental condition prevented the accused from forming the 
requisite specific intent.  
Id.  Indeed, the State based its motion in 
limine to exclude evidence related to Keats' mental health, which motion the 
district court granted.  We 
therefore conclude trial counsel's strategy was a trial strategy that did not 
"evince a sound legal foundation."  
deShazer v. State, 2003 WY 98, 
¶31, 74 P.3d 1240, ¶31 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶23]   Additionally, trial counsel 
testified he did not view a NGMI plea as consistent with his theory of the case, 
and for that reason he did not consider a NGMI plea further.4 This view is somewhat 
puzzling.  Trial counsel's argument 
was Keats had the inability to form the specific intent for arson due to his 
mental instability.  This theory 
seems entirely consistent with a NGMI plea.  Under both theories Keats' mental state 
is the central subject of the defense.  
We therefore conclude trial counsel's strategy was not a reasonable 
decision that made further investigation unnecessary.    

 

[¶24]   The facts of the situation actually 
suggest that further investigation was essential.  The record indicates Keats had a long 
history of mental problems, and Keats and his mother informed trial counsel of 
these problems.  The details of the 
incident itself evidenced some sort of mental health issues.  As we described in Keats I, 
"appellant's unstable demeanor vacillated rapidly between suicidal, threatening, 
anger, laughter, and depression."  
Keats I, at ¶4.  After the incident, Keats was held in 
the mental health unit of the hospital on a Title 25 proceeding.  Trial counsel was aware Keats had been 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and the illness distorts a person's sense of 
reality.  Trial counsel himself 
testified that when he was told Keats was bipolar it raised a flag in his mind 
that it might be a possible defense, but he didn't know enough to consider how 
it might all tie in. These facts considered in totality clearly would put 
reasonable trial counsel on notice that additional investigation was 
required.  However, trial counsel 
undertook no additional investigation.  
Trial counsel did not obtain Keats' medical records for thorough review. 
He also did not consult with a mental health professional about the case nor did 
he obtain an opinion about Keats' mental state at the time of the offense. He 
likewise did not consult with a properly qualified expert who could have helped 
determine if Keats' mental illness would have fit the requirements of a NGMI 
defense.5 Consequently, we must conclude that 
trial counsel's failure to investigate constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  

[¶25]   Keats then must also show that 
prejudice resulted from trial counsel's deficient performance.  In this instance we find Keats has made 
such a showing.  Because no one 
contended Keats did not set the fire, the only question for his defense was his 
intent when doing so.  Trial 
counsel's failure to properly investigate the matter and make a NGMI plea 
appears to have deprived Keats of the only true defense available to him.  It also appears this defense had a 
reasonable likelihood of success.  
Indeed, at the evidentiary hearing Keats provided a psychiatrist who 
testified Keats did not have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong 
or conform his behavior to the requirements of the law.  By failing to investigate and therefore 
failing to discover the nature of Keats' bipolar disorder, counsel deprived 
Keats of the only credible defense available to him, thus prejudice 
resulted.  

 
 
 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26]   Because the same law office 
represented Keats at both trial and on appeal we conclude Keats has not had an 
opportunity to make a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He is 
therefore not procedurally barred from making this claim on a motion for 
post-conviction review.  Upon our 
review of his claim and for the reasons stated above, we conclude Keats' trial 
counsel was ineffective.  We reverse 
the district court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and 
remand to the district court for a new trial. 

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1When a law enforcement officer or 
examiner has reasonable cause to believe a person is mentally ill, that person 
may be detained for an evaluation.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 25-10-109 (LexisNexis 2005).  
Mentally ill is defined as "a physical, emotional, mental, or behavioral 
disorder which causes a person to be dangerous to himself or others and which 
requires treatment." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-101(a)(ix) (LexisNexis 2005).  Additionally, an application for the 
involuntary hospitalization of the person may be filed.  If it is found that the person is 
mentally ill, a court has the authority to order the least restrictive and most 
therapeutic alternative to deal with the problem.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-110(j) (LexisNexis 
2005).

2Wyoming law does not go this far.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann §§ 
7-14-104(c), 7-6-104(c)(vi) (LexisNexis 2005); Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 
32, ¶17, 108 P.3d 838, ¶17 (Wyo. 2005) (The Constitution does not require 
counsel for indigent defendants seeking post-conviction relief.). 

 
 

3Although in this instance separate 
lawyers represented Keats, lawyers from the same private law firm are often 
treated as one for conflict-of-interest purposes.  Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 
1173 (10th Cir. 2004).  In truth, when 
both appellate and trial level attorneys are from the same law office, appellate 
counsel may feel restrained from arguing trial attorney error, which creates a 
conflict of interest.  Id.   

4It should be noted W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(1)(B) 
provides, "A plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency' may 
be pleaded orally or in writing by the defendant or the defendant's counsel at 
the time of the defendant's arraignment or at such later time as the court may 
for good cause permit.  Such a plea 
does not deprive the defendant of other defenses and may be coupled with a plea 
of not guilty." 

 
 

5Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304 (LexisNexis 
2005) provides, "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time 
of the criminal conduct, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacked 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. . . 
."