Title: State v. Hunter

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Hunter, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4147.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-4147 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HUNTER, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Hunter, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4147.] 
Criminal law — Penalties — Repeat violent offenders — Former R.C. 
2929.01(DD) — State v. Foster did not eliminate specification for repeat 
violent offenders — Foster eliminated judicial factfinding from former 
R.C. 2929.14(D)(2) — Court does not violate defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights by considering prior conviction that is part of judicial 
record when designating offender as repeat violent offender. 
(No. 2008-0661 — Submitted April 22, 2009 — Decided August 25, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 89456,  
2008-Ohio-794. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, excised 
judicial factfinding from former R.C. 2929.14(D)(2) but did not eliminate 
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the repeat violent offender specification, as defined in former R.C. 
2929.01(DD). 
2.  When designating an offender as a “repeat violent offender” pursuant to 
former R.C. 2929.01(DD), a trial court does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment by considering relevant information about the offender’s 
prior conviction that is part of the judicial record.  (Shepard v. United 
States (2005), 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205, followed.) 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} This case presents two issues for our consideration in connection 
with the statutorily prescribed repeat violent offender specification.  The first is 
whether or not this court’s decision in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-
Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, severed the repeat violent offender specification from 
the Revised Code and precluded trial courts from imposing an enhanced penalty 
for that specification.  The second is whether or not a court engages in improper 
judicial factfinding in violation of the right to a jury trial by designating an 
offender as a “repeat violent offender” pursuant to former R.C. 2929.01(DD). 
{¶ 2} Hugh Hunter appeals from a decision of the Eighth District Court 
of Appeals that affirmed a judgment of the trial court imposing a two-year prison 
term for a repeat violent offender specification, running prior to and consecutive 
with an eight-year prison term for his felonious assault conviction.  He contends 
that the repeat violent offender specification no longer exists after our decision in 
Foster and, further, that the findings necessary for a court to designate an offender 
as a repeat violent offender pursuant to former R.C. 2929.01(DD) violate the 
Sixth Amendment and the holdings in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 
466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and subsequent United States Supreme 
Court decisions. 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
{¶ 3} After consideration, we have concluded that this court did not 
excise the repeat violent offender specification from the Revised Code in Foster.  
Moreover, in this instance, the trial court did not violate Hunter’s right to a jury 
trial when it designated him as a repeat violent offender because he waived his 
jury right, because he stipulated to the facts necessary to designate him as a repeat 
violent offender, and because it is within the purview of the court to determine the 
existence and nature of an offender’s prior conviction.  Thus, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} On September 1, 2004, Hugh Hunter attacked Andrew McAuliffe 
at St. Malachi Church in Cleveland, causing multiple fractures and lacerations.  A 
grand jury indicted Hunter for felonious assault and included in the indictment a 
repeat violent offender specification and notice of a prior conviction resulting 
from his 1990 conviction for felonious assault.  The trial court found Hunter 
competent to stand trial and scheduled the matter for a jury trial to begin on 
October 23, 2006. 
{¶ 5} At trial, Hunter stipulated to McAuliffe’s medical records and to a 
prior conviction for felonious assault in 1990.  He moved to bifurcate the trial, 
trying the felonious assault charge to the jury and the repeat violent offender 
specification to the court.  He waived his right to a jury trial in regard to the 
specification, and asked the court to conduct a bench trial on that issue.  The trial 
court accepted Hunter’s written jury waiver and journalized it prior to 
commencing a jury trial on the felonious assault charge.  The jury returned a 
verdict finding him guilty of felonious assault, and on October 25, 2006, the trial 
court conducted a bench trial on the repeat violent offender specification. 
{¶ 6} Hunter stipulated to a 1990 conviction for felonious assault and 
further stipulated that during the commission of that offense, he had caused 
physical harm to Gregory Rickett.  Hunter also stipulated to a copy of a medical 
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record indicating that Gregory Rickett had suffered a head wound that required 
stitches.  The state then called Jimmy Shields, a Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s 
deputy, who testified that he had investigated an incident in 1989 in which Hunter 
punched Rickett, an employee of the Cuyahoga County Jail, in the face, causing a 
laceration that required more than five stitches.  Hunter did not call any witnesses. 
{¶ 7} The trial court found that the state had proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that “Mr. Gregory Rickett, the named victim * * * suffered physical harm at 
the hand of Mr. Hugh Hunter for which Mr. Hugh Hunter was convicted and I 
believe served a prison sentence.”  Hunter did not object, and thus, the court 
sentenced him to two years for the repeat violent offender specification, to be 
served prior to and consecutively with eight years for his conviction on the 
felonious assault of McAuliffe. 
{¶ 8} Hunter appealed, arguing inter alia that our decision in Foster had 
entirely eliminated the repeat violent offender specification and that it was not 
possible for the trial court to designate him as a repeat violent offender pursuant 
to former R.C. 2929.01(DD) without violating his constitutional right to have a 
jury find all facts that would increase the severity of his sentence.  The appellate 
court rejected his arguments, however, stating that Foster’s severance of R.C. 
2929.01(DD) meant only that judicial factfinding is no longer required before a 
judge imposes an additional penalty on a repeat violent offender, and holding that 
the trial court had properly imposed the additional penalty and had not violated 
Hunter’s constitutional rights in doing so. 
{¶ 9} Hunter has now appealed to this court on the following proposition 
of law:  “The RVO-enhanced sentence imposed on appellant constituted a 
deprivation of his liberty without due process of law and a violation of his 
constitutional right to a trial by jury.”   He contends that the trial court lacked 
authority to impose an enhanced penalty for the repeat violent offender 
specification, asserting that Foster eliminated this specification in its entirety as 
January Term, 2009 
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violative of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have a jury find all facts 
required to designate him as a repeat violent offender pursuant to former R.C. 
2929.01(DD).1 
{¶ 10} In response, the state contends that Foster excised only the 
portions of former R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b) that required judicial factfinding in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment, not the repeat violent offender specification 
itself.  The state argues that the trial court did not violate Hunter’s constitutional 
rights by imposing an enhanced penalty for this specification. 
{¶ 11} Thus, two issues emerge for our consideration: one, whether 
Foster eliminated the repeat violent offender specification and second, whether 
the trial court conducted impermissible factfinding in connection to the enhanced 
penalty it imposed on Hunter in this case. 
The Repeat Violent Offender Specification before Foster 
{¶ 12} At the time we decided Foster, three separate statues pertained to 
repeat violent offender specifications.  Former R.C. 2929.01(DD) identified 
findings that were required to be made by a court to designate an offender as a 
“repeat violent offender.” 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5707, 5719.  R.C. 2941.149(B) 
specifically directs that “[t]he court shall determine the issue of whether an 
offender is a repeat violent offender.”  Former R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b) set forth a 
range of penalty enhancements and listed the judicial findings necessary to 
impose them.  150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5734. Thus, imposition of an enhanced 
penalty for a repeat violent offender specification required a trial court to 
determine first, whether an offender was or was not a repeat violent offender, and 
second, which additional penalty, if any, would be appropriate.  See, e.g., State v. 
Payne, Lake App. No. 2004-L-118, 2005-Ohio-7043. 
                                                          
 
 1.  Former R.C. 2929.01(DD) has since been amended.  It now appears, substantially changed, in 
R.C. 2929.01(CC).  2008 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 130. 
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{¶ 13} With respect to the designation of a repeat violent offender, former 
R.C. 2929.01(DD) provided:  
{¶ 14} “ ‘Repeat violent offender’ means a person about whom both of 
the following apply: 
{¶ 15} “(1) The person has been convicted of or has pleaded guilty to, and 
is being sentenced for committing, for complicity in committing, or for an attempt 
to commit, aggravated murder, murder, involuntary manslaughter, a felony of the 
first degree other than one set forth in Chapter 2925 of the Revised Code, a felony 
of the first degree set forth in Chapter 2925 of the Revised Code that involved an 
attempt to cause serious physical harm to a person or that resulted in serious 
physical harm to a person, or a felony of the second degree that involved an 
attempt to cause serious physical harm to a person or that resulted in serious 
physical harm to a person. 
{¶ 16} “(2) Either of the following applies: 
{¶ 17} “(a) The person previously was convicted of or pleaded guilty to, 
and previously served or, at the time of the offense was serving, a prison term for, 
any of the following: 
{¶ 18} “(i)  Aggravated murder, murder, involuntary manslaughter, rape, 
felonious sexual penetration as it existed under section 2907.12 of the Revised 
Code prior to September 3, 1996, a felony of the first or second degree that 
resulted in the death of a person or in physical harm to a person, or complicity in 
or an attempt to commit any of those offenses; 
{¶ 19} “(ii) An offense under an existing or former law of this state, 
another state, or the United States that is or was substantially equivalent to an 
offense listed under division (DD)(2)(a)(i) of this section and that resulted in the 
death of a person or in physical harm to a person. 
{¶ 20} “(b) The person previously was adjudicated a delinquent child for 
committing an act that if committed by an adult would have been an offense listed 
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in division (DD)(2)(a)(i) or (ii) of this section, the person was committed to the 
department of youth services for that delinquent act.”  150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
5719. 
{¶ 21} Former R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b) set forth circumstances pursuant to 
which a trial court could impose an enhanced penalty on a repeat violent offender:   
{¶ 22} “If the court imposing a prison term on a repeat violent offender 
imposes the longest prison term from the range of terms authorized for the offense 
under division (A) of this section, the court may impose on the offender an 
additional definite prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, 
nine, or ten years if the court finds that both of the following apply * * *: 
{¶ 23} “(i) The terms so imposed are inadequate to punish the offender 
and protect the public from future crime * * *. 
{¶ 24} “(ii) The terms so imposed are demeaning to the seriousness of the 
offense * * *.”  150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5734. 
The Repeat Violent Offender Specification after Foster 
{¶ 25} In Foster, we followed the United States Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 
L.Ed.2d 435, Ring v. Arizona (2002), 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 
556, and Blakely v. Washington (2004), 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 
L.Ed.2d 403, and held that “judicial fact-finding before imposition of a sentence 
greater than the maximum term authorized by a jury verdict or admission of the 
defendant” violates the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 
470, paragraph one of the syllabus, and ¶ 53.  We also specifically declared 
former R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b) unconstitutional, stating that it “requires the court 
to make findings before imposing an additional penalty on repeat violent 
offenders and thus violates Blakely.”  Id. at ¶ 78. 
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{¶ 26} Applying the remedy set forth in United States v. Booker (2005), 
543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621, we severed those parts of the 
sentencing statutes that required unconstitutional factfinding by a court, including 
former R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b).  Foster at paragraphs two, four, and six of the 
syllabus.  We held that “[a]fter the severance, judicial factfinding is not required 
before imposition of additional penalties for repeat-violent-offender and major-
drug-offender specifications.”  Id.  at paragraph six of the syllabus.  Moreover, as 
we subsequently emphasized in State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-
855, 846 N.E.2d 1, “Foster excised the requirement that the court make findings 
of fact before imposing (1) more than the minimum term on an offender who has 
never served a prison term, (2) the maximum term, (3) consecutive terms, and (4) 
penalty enhancements for repeat violent offenders or major drug offenders.”  
(Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.)  Id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 27} Our opinions in Foster and Mathis patently demonstrate our intent 
to excise only the portions of former R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b) that required judicial 
factfinding in violation of the Sixth Amendment and the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Apprendi and Blakely.  We never specifically precluded a 
trial court from imposing enhanced penalties for a repeat violent offender 
specification, nor did we excise the definition of a repeat violent offender as set 
forth in former R.C. 2929.01(DD).  Furthermore, none of our decisions after 
Foster indicate that this specification no longer exists.  Thus, Foster excised 
judicial factfinding from former R.C. 2929.14(D)(2) but did not eliminate the 
repeat violent offender specification, as defined in former R.C. 2929.01(DD).  
Accordingly, Hunter’s argument that Foster eliminated the repeat violent offender 
specification is not well taken. 
Whether the Designation of a Repeat Violent Offender pursuant to 
former R.C. 2929.01(DD) Violates the Sixth Amendment 
January Term, 2009 
9 
 
{¶ 28} In Foster, our analysis of the repeat violent offender specification 
focused on former R.C. 2929.14(D)(2)(b), which set forth the judicial findings 
necessary to determine the propriety of imposing an enhanced penalty on a repeat 
violent offender.  We did not address, however, former R.C. 2929.01(DD), which 
set forth the criteria for designating an offender as a “repeat violent offender.”  
Generally, that statute required the court to find that the offender had a prior 
conviction and served a prison term for “[a]ggravated murder, murder, 
involuntary manslaughter, rape, felonious sexual penetration * * * , [or] a felony 
of the first or second degree that resulted in the death of a person or in physical 
harm to a person.”  Former R.C. 2929.01(DD)(2)(a)(i), 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
5719. 
{¶ 29} In this case, the trial court designated Hunter as a repeat violent 
offender pursuant to former R.C. 2929.01(DD) based on his stipulation that he 
had a prior conviction for felonious assault with a specification of physical harm 
and on a finding that he had served a prison term for that prior conviction.  Hunter 
now contends that he has the right under the Sixth Amendment to have the jury 
make those findings.  For three reasons, however, the trial court did not violate 
Hunter’s right to a jury trial:  first, he waived that right; second, he stipulated to 
the facts required to make the designation; and third, the Sixth Amendment does 
not preclude a sentencing court from considering information in the judicial 
record from the prior conviction. 
Waiver 
{¶ 30} As the court stated in Blakely, “nothing prevents a defendant from 
waiving his Apprendi rights [to a jury determination of every element of the 
charge].  * * *  Even a defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial 
factfinding as to sentence enhancements, which may well be in his interest if 
relevant evidence would prejudice him at trial.”  542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 
159 L.Ed.2d 403.  We recognized this in Foster and explained that while the Sixth 
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Amendment generally prohibits judicial factfinding, there is an “exception for 
prior criminal convictions and the defendant’s consent to judicial fact-finding.”  
(Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)  109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 
N.E.2d 470, ¶ 7.  Furthermore, in State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-
4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, we recognized that Apprendi/Blakely errors may be 
waived, stating that “if Payne had knowingly waived his rights, * * * we would 
conclude our analysis.”  (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶24. 
{¶ 31} In this case, even if we assume that Hunter had a constitutional 
right to have the jury determine his status as a repeat violent offender pursuant to 
former R.C. 2929.01(DD), he chose to submit that determination to the court to 
avoid presenting evidence of his prior conviction for felonious assault to the jury 
at trial.  Therefore, Hunter has waived whatever right he had with respect to the 
repeat violent offender specification.  See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 
2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403; Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 
306, ¶ 24. 
Stipulation 
{¶ 32} In addition, it is noteworthy that Hunter stipulated to all of the 
facts necessary for the trial court to designate him as a repeat violent offender 
pursuant to former R.C. 2929.01(DD).  Specifically, Hunter stipulated to an 
indictment charging him with felonious assault and specifying that he had caused 
physical harm to the victim, that he had pleaded guilty to the offense “as charged 
in the indictment,” and that the trial court had sentenced him to prison.  Neither 
has Hunter challenged the trial court’s finding that he had served a prison term for 
his earlier offense.  The additional testimony and evidence offered by the state to 
prove that Hunter had caused physical harm while committing his prior offense 
was superfluous. 
{¶ 33} Because of Hunter’s stipulations, the trial court had no need to 
conduct factfinding in connection with former R.C. 2929.01(DD), and no Sixth 
January Term, 2009 
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Amendment violation occurred in this case.  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 
2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (defendant may waive Apprendi rights); see also Smith v. 
Petkovich (N.D.Ohio 2006), 562 F.Supp.2d 912, 944 (citing former R.C. 
2929.01(DD) and holding that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred because 
“Smith stipulated as to the truth of all facts necessary to allow the court to find 
that Smith was a repeat violent offender”). 
Judicial factfinding within the province of the court 
{¶ 34} Even if Hunter had not waived his right to a jury trial or stipulated 
to the required facts, the factfinding conducted by the trial court to designate him 
as a repeat violent offender pursuant to former R.C. 2929.01(DD) would not have 
violated the Sixth Amendment. 
{¶ 35} In Oregon v. Ice (2009), __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 711, 714, 172 
L.Ed.2d 517, the Supreme Court reiterated its holdings in Apprendi and Blakely 
that “it is within the jury’s province to determine any fact (other than the 
existence of a prior conviction) that increases the maximum punishment 
authorized for a particular offense.”  (Emphasis added.)  And as the Supreme 
Court noted in Apprendi, the Sixth Amendment does not bar judicial 
consideration of a defendant’s prior convictions at sentencing because “ 
‘recidivism * * * is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing 
court’s increasing an offender’s sentence.’ ”  530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 
L.Ed.2d 435, quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998), 523 U.S. 224, 
244, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350. 
{¶ 36} Significantly, the Sixth Amendment does not limit a sentencing 
court’s consideration to the existence of a prior conviction.  On the contrary, the 
United States Supreme Court has held that courts may consider the information 
contained in court documents that are related to the prior conviction.  In Shepard 
v. United States (2005), 544 U.S. 13, 19-20, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205, the 
court held that a sentencing court, when determining whether a prior conviction 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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warrants an enhanced penalty under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act 
(“ACCA”), may consider “the charging documents, jury instructions, a bench-trial 
judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, the terms of a plea agreement, a 
transcript of the plea colloquy or other comparable judicial records.”  See also 
Taylor v. United States (1990), 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 
607 (holding that for purposes of penalty enhancement, a sentencing court may 
determine the nature of a predicate offense from the statutory elements, charging 
documents, and jury instructions). 
{¶ 37} Relying on the decisions in Apprendi, Blakely, Shepard, and 
Taylor, several of our sister states have also held that sentencing courts may look 
beyond the mere existence of a prior conviction without violating the Sixth 
Amendment.  For example, in Ryle v. State (Ind.2005), 842 N.E.2d 320, the 
Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed an enhanced sentence based on a judicial 
finding from information about a prior offense contained in a presentence 
investigation report.  The court stated that “[t]he presentence investigation report 
relies on ‘judicial record[s]’ that guarantee the conclusive significance that is the 
focus of Apprendi.”  Id. at 325, quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 
161 L.Ed.2d 205.  See also People v. McGee (2006), 38 Cal.4th 682, 687, 42 
Cal.Rptr.3d 899, 133 P.3d 1054 (“the trial court in the present case did not violate 
defendant’s rights by examining the record of the robbery convictions previously 
sustained by defendant in Nevada and by concluding that each of these offenses 
constituted a conviction of a ‘serious felony’ for purposes of the applicable 
California sentencing statute”); State v. Pierce (2006), 188 N.J. 155, 163, 902 
A.2d 1195 (“We find no Sixth Amendment violation in the sentencing court’s 
consideration of objective facts about defendant's prior convictions, such as the 
dates of convictions, his age when the offenses were committed, and the elements 
and degrees of the offenses, in order to determine whether he qualifies as a 
‘persistent offender’ ” for sentence-enhancement purposes); People v. Huber 
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(Colo.2006), 139 P.3d 628, 633 (“Because a defendant's sentence to probation or 
supervision can be found in the judicial record, we conclude that a trial court may 
properly consider this fact without violating the defendant's Blakely rights”); State 
v. Fagan (2006), 280 Conn. 69, 100, 905 A.2d 1101 (“the defendant’s status as to 
whether he lawfully had been on release at the time of the offense for which he 
was convicted * * * was a question that also did not require a jury 
determination”); State v. Jones (2006), 159 Wash.2d 231, 247, 149 P.3d 636 
(“because the community placement sentence determination * * * can be readily 
determined by a limited examination of the record flowing from the prior 
conviction, we conclude that a court, rather than a jury, may, pursuant to 
Almendarez-Torres, make, constitutionally, the * * * community placement 
determination”). 
{¶ 38} Thus, pursuant to Shepard, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 
L.Ed.2d 205, we hold that when designating an offender as a “repeat violent 
offender” pursuant to former R.C. 2929.01(DD), a trial court does not violate the 
Sixth Amendment by considering relevant information about the offender’s prior 
conviction that is part of the judicial record. 
{¶ 39} In this case, in order to declare Hunter a repeat violent offender, 
the court had to determine whether he had a prior conviction and had served a 
prison term for a felony of the first or second degree that resulted in physical 
harm to the victim.  Former R.C. 2929.01(DD)(1) and (2)(a)(i).  These facts may 
be readily determined from the indictment and sentencing entry for his 1990 
conviction for felonious assault with a specification of physical harm and his 
resulting sentence of eight to 15 years’ incarceration.  The trial court did not 
violate Hunter’s constitutional rights by considering these documents, which are 
“judicial record evidence” created in connection with his prior conviction.  
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205.  Moreover, the 
findings required by former R.C. 2929.01(DD) pertain directly to the issue of 
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recidivism, which has traditionally been within the purview of the sentencing 
court, not the jury, Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 
L.Ed.2d 350, and Hunter has not suggested that the trial court’s findings in this 
case are erroneous. 
{¶ 40} Accordingly, the trial court did not violate Hunter’s constitutional 
rights or decisions of this court or the United States Supreme Court by 
designating him a repeat violent offender pursuant to former R.C. 2929.01(DD) 
and by imposing an enhanced penalty.  The court of appeals properly affirmed 
that judgment, and we therefore affirm its decision. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and T. Allan 
Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Cullen Sweeney, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
______________________