Title: Rowell v. Turnage

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

618 So. 2d 81 (1993) Ollan K. ROWELL v. Dr. John N. TURNAGE, Sr. No. 90-CA-0745. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 22, 1993. *82 Michael D. Jonas, Aberdeen, for appellant. Jan P. Patterson, Patterson & Patterson, Aberdeen, for appellee. Before DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and PITTMAN, J. DAN M. LEE, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Rowell sought mandatory and prohibitory injunctive relief in the Chancery Court to protect his and his grantees' use of a 15 foot wide private way of necessity ordered by the Board of Supervisors of Monroe County. He, as the dominant owner, asked the court to order the servient owner, Turnage, to remove three gates across the private way and refrain from "otherwise imposing any obstacles to his or the public's use of the private way, including Rowell's right to access utilities over the private way." The Chancellor found that the locked gates to which Rowell had a key did not constitute an unreasonable interference with Rowell's use of the private way for ingress and egress and that utilities could not be placed on the private way and denied injunctive relief. Rowell appeals raising three issues, only two of which are proper for our discussion:[1] We find no error and affirm. Rowell owns property that is landlocked on three sides by a perpetual flowage easement owned by the United States of America and on the other side by land owned by Turnage. Access to his property is on the south by crossing land owned by Turnage. He has access to his property by: Conveyance by Warranty Deed. The deed from William F. Paine and Thomas F. Paine to Mrs. Christine R. Day contained the following language granting right-of-way: Oral and written permission of Turnage. Paragraph 8 in the Stipulation of Facts provides: Board of Supervisors Order. The order of the Board of Supervisors of Monroe County followed a hearing pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 65-7-201 (1972) which provides: Rowell had petitioned the Board of Supervisors to condemn a sixty foot right-of-way on the West side of the Turnage land and to construct a public road or, alternatively, to establish a private way over the Turnage land for ingress and egress purposes. The Board concluded that the only feasible access to the Rowell property is across the Turnage land and granted a private way fifteen feet in width over the Turnage property over the road "as the same now exists." No appeal of the Board's order was taken. Chancery Court Order. Still attempting to enlarge his right-of-way rights, on May 10, 1989, Rowell filed a complaint in *84 Chancery Court seeking injunctive relief against Turnage. Rowell wanted to prevent alleged obstructions to the private way by three gates and to enjoin Turnage "to remove those gates and to otherwise impose no obstacle to the plaintiff's use of the private way which includes his personal and the public's right of ingress and egress to his property and the plaintiff's right to access utilities to his property over the said private way." Following a hearing in which the parties filed a Stipulation of Fact, the Chancellor granted summary judgment to Turnage and concluded, among other things, as follows: See Map attached as Exhibit "A". Dr. Turnage acquired approximately 97 acres of land by deed dated April 30, 1969. Since purchasing the property, Turnage has maintained fences and gates necessary in his cattle operation; however, at all times he has furnished Rowell and his predecessors in title with keys to the locks on the gates. In addition to his oral permission, Turnage gave Rowell written permission to cross his land on July 3, 1987. Following the Corps of Engineers development of the Tennessee Tombigbee Waterway, portions of Rowell's and Turnage's property were subject to a perpetual flowage easement. The Corps of Engineers flooded most of the tract later acquired by Rowell in 1981 to create Aberdeen Lake. Rowell did not acquire the property until June 28, 1987, by a deed from Weyerhaeuser Company which used the property for timber growth and leased part for agricultural purposes. Rowell, before he acquired the land in 1987, knew it was landlocked because he first visited it by boat. He also knew that Turnage had the gates on his land, and that the only access to the land that he purchased was a 15 foot wide easement. Rowell purchased the land to develop a lakeshore subdivision and contemplated selling over 30 lots at a price of $10,000.00 each. At trial, Rowell claimed he had sold ten options to individuals desiring to purchase lots. Rowell sought through negotiation to acquire greater rights than his way of necessity all to no avail. Turnage insisted that his cattle operation required the fences and the gates and that he would honor the right of access that Rowell had but would not sell the land burdened by it. Because Rowell's property interest in Turnage's land has been referred to interchangeably as "right-of-way" and "easement" some reference here to the basic definitions is in order. The following definitions are found in Black's Law Dictionary, (5th ed. 1974): Right-of-way limited rights were discussed by this Court in Sumrall v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 232 Miss. 141, 148, 97 So. 2d 914, 916 (1957): In McDonald v. Board of Mississippi Levee Commissioners, 646 F. Supp. 449, 466 (N.D.Miss. 1986), aff. 832 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.1987), the Court stated: "While it is true that the owner of an easement obtained by grant or prescription has the implied right to work the land to keep it in a reasonably useable condition for its intended purpose, the easement owner `cannot lawfully take dominant possession and deal with [the land upon which easement exists] as if he were the owner of the land.'" Quin v. Sabine, 183 Miss. 375, 183 So. 701, 702 (1938). By Board of Supervisors Order, Rowell has a statutory private way of necessity. In 1954, this Court construed the statute giving Boards of Supervisors the authority to establish a private road as a way of necessity: Roberts v. Prassenos, 219 Miss. 486, 491-92, 69 So. 2d 215, 217 (1954). More recently, in Broadhead v. Terpening, 611 So. 2d 949 (Miss. 1992), we affirmed the chancery court judgment which recognized the dominant tenant had a right of way of necessity in a private road across land of another. In Broadhead, we stated and recognized the rule that "easements or rights-of-way by necessity last as long as the necessity exists and terminate when other access to the landlocked parcel becomes available." Id. at 953. Treatise writers emphasize that without necessity there is no basis for such an easement and where justified the easement is a limited one: R. Eubanks and R. Bouchard, Harvey Law of Real Property and Title Closing, § 301.02 at p. 177 (1985) relate: R. Powell, The Law of Real Property § 410 (1949 and Supp. 1989) states: Tiffany Real Property § 793 at 179 (3rd ed. Supp. 1990) states: In Lindsey v. Shaw, 210 Miss. 333, 340, 49 So. 2d 580, 584 (1950), this Court held: The chancellor's conclusion that a locked gate did not unreasonably interfere with Rowell's use of the private way is supported by the record and the applicable law. In Board of Trustees of University of Mississippi v. Gotten, 119 Miss. 246, 80 So. 522 (1919), this Court held that erection of a gate is not an unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of a vested right of passage. In Lindsey v. Shaw, 210 Miss. 333, 49 So. 2d 580 (1950), the particular facts supported the chancellor's ruling that a gate across a private way did not have to be removed. However, nailing it shut or keeping it locked was an unreasonable interference. That court recognized "... the weight of authority is that in the case of agricultural land the owner of land burdened with a right of way acquired by prescription may erect gates at the ends thereof even though no gates were erected until after acquisition of such easement by prescription." Id. at 338. Where, as here, the right of way grant in the deed is silent, courts look to the surrounding circumstances to determine the intention of the grantor and the grantee. 1) 25 Am.Jur.2d Easement § 91 (1966) states: 2) 28 C.J.S. Easement § 98 at 781-82 (1941) states: 3) 28 C.J.S. Easement § 98 at 781 (1941) states: 4) Annotation, Right to Maintain Gate or Fence Across Right of Way, 52 A.L.R.3d § 2(a) (1973) provides: The record confirms that Turnage used his land as a cattle farm from the time he purchased it in 1969. Examples of application of this general rule by other courts follow: The West Virginia court in Hoffman v. Smith, 172 W. Va. 698, 310 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1983) stated the general rule that unless there is specific language in the grant of an easement to the contrary, the grantor of a right-of-way over farm land retains a right to erect gates, provided they do not unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement. The very character of the land makes gates essential to the proper and reasonable use of the way. The chancellor correctly restricted the private way of necessity by holding that it could not be used as an easement for water, sewage and electricity. Sumrall v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 232 Miss. 141, 148, 97 So. 2d 914, 916 (1957). A New York court held an easement created by grant of a right-of-way for ingress and egress to defendant's landlocked property does not carry with it by implication an easement to transmit electricity to the property over the right-of-way. McCormick v. Trageser, 24 N.Y.2d 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d 622, 249 N.E.2d 467 (1969). The rights and obligations of Turnage and Rowell governing the private way are reciprocal. However, the division of ownership rights in the private way between the servient owner (Turnage) and dominant owner (Rowell) does not prohibit Turnage from fully exercising and protecting those property rights retained. Rowell failed to prove that Turnage's maintenance and use of a locked gate in his cattle operation since he acquired the land in 1969 was an unreasonable restriction of the private way. Based on our plenary review of the chancellor's application of the law to the stipulated facts, we find no error. AFFIRMED. HAWKINS, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS, McRAE and SMITH, JJ., concur. JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., J., not participating. [1] Issue No. 3 is in the nature of a hypothetical question directed to this Court for an advisory opinion. This Court has consistently held it will not give advisory opinions. See Game and Fish Commission v. Marlar, 206 So. 2d 628, 631 (Miss. 1968).