Title: Harris v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RASHIE HARRIS,  
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 183, 2014  
 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:   
 
  
§ 
  
v.  
§ 
Superior Court of the 
 
 
§  
State of Delaware, in and for 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
New Castle County  
 
§  
  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 1102003278 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  March 4, 2015 
Decided:  April 8, 2015 
 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and VALIHURA, Justices.  
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, Collins & Roop, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant. 
Maria T. Knoll, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
Appellee. 
VALIHURA, Justice: 
 
 
In this appeal, we are asked to consider the constitutionality of a show-up 
identification of a suspect brought back to the scene of the crime shortly after the 
commission of the crime.  This case stems from crimes committed by defendant-
below Rashie Harris (“Harris”) at two barbershops -- Runn Way Unisex 
Barbershop (“Runn Way”) in Southbridge, and Legends Barbershop (“Legends”) 
on Clifford Brown Walk -- on different dates.  The cases were consolidated.  A 
grand jury returned a fifty-count indictment, including charges for Attempted 
Murder, Robbery, Burglary, Unlawful Sexual Contact, Kidnapping, Possession of 
a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Possession of a Deadly Weapon by 
a Person Prohibited, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child, Possession of a Non-Narcotic Schedule I Controlled Substance, 
and Resisting Arrest.  The first nine counts pertained to the Runn Way incident on 
January 30, 2011.  The remaining counts pertained to the Legends incidents on 
February 5, 2011.  The State entered a nolle prosequis prior to trial on all but one 
of the Kidnapping charges and their corresponding firearm charges. 
After a jury trial, Harris was found guilty of the following offenses:  
Attempted Murder First Degree, eight counts of Robbery First Degree, two counts 
of Burglary Second Degree, Unlawful Sexual Contact First Degree, Kidnapping 
Second Degree, eleven counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission 
of a Felony, Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, Endangering the Welfare of a 
1 
Child, Possession of a Non-Narcotic Schedule I Controlled Substance, and 
Resisting Arrest.  The Superior Court also found Harris guilty of two counts of 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited.1  Harris was sentenced as 
a habitual offender pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).  Accordingly, Harris was 
sentenced to Level V incarceration for the balance of his natural life plus 524 years 
for his felony charges, and three years and five days for his misdemeanor charges. 
Prior to trial, the defense filed a Motion to Sever Charges, a Motion to 
Suppress the Photo Lineup Identification, and a Motion to Suppress the Show-up 
Identification.  After conducting a hearing and receiving post-hearing submissions, 
the trial court denied all three motions.  After trial but before the verdict, the 
defense moved for reconsideration of and reargument on the denial of the Motion 
to Suppress the Show-up Identification.  The Superior Court reserved judgment 
until after the verdict.  Following a jury verdict of guilty on all counts, the pending 
Motion for Reargument was converted into a Motion for a New Trial.  After 
hearing oral arguments, the Superior Court denied the motion. 
On appeal, Harris argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his Motion 
for a New Trial.  He contends that the admission into evidence of his show-up 
identification by witnesses to the incident in question violated his Due Process 
1 These charges had been severed and were heard in a simultaneous bench trial. 
2 
                                          
 
rights.  We disagree, and for the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the judgment 
below. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 30, 2011, Harris walked into Runn Way.  Harris asked Jonathan 
Wilson (“Wilson”),2 who operated the barbershop, how much a haircut would cost.  
Before Wilson could respond, Harris pulled out a .38 revolver, and put his hand up 
to his mouth, indicating that everyone in the barbershop should remain quiet.   
Harris turned his attention to one of the patrons, and when he did, Wilson punched 
Harris in the face.  Harris fired his revolver three times and hit Wilson in the chest.   
Harris went through Wilson’s pockets and removed $50.   He then left the 
barbershop. 
On February 5, 2011, Ricky Cook (“Cook”) was working at Legends.  
Deidrick Boyd (“Deidrick”) and Darrel Boyd (“Darrel”) were also working at 
Legends that day.  Around noon, Harris entered the barbershop.  Cook asked 
Harris if he wanted a haircut.  Harris pointed to Darrel, indicating that he was 
waiting for Darrel to cut his hair.  After about a half hour, Harris got up, covered 
his face, locked the door, and took out a .38 revolver.  Harris told everyone to get 
down on the floor and keep his or her eyes down.  Several customers were in the 
2 Wilson changed his name from Jonathan Simmons to Jonathan Wilson in February 2011.  
3 
                                          
 
barbershop at this time, namely, David Lewis (“Lewis”), Heleema Bland 
(“Bland”), Shaun Powell (“Powell”), and Powell’s thirteen-year-old stepson 
(“K. P.”).  Harris directed K. P. to close the blinds, take everyone’s wallets, cash, 
keys, cell phones, and jewelry, and put them in Bland’s purse.  Harris warned K. P. 
that if he did not stay in school and get good grades that Harris was going to come 
back and shoot him.  Harris then went around checking to see whether everyone 
had put his or her belongings into the purse.  When Harris reached Bland, he 
turned her over and groped her breasts to see if she had any money hidden in her 
bra.  Harris told K. P. to take off his clothes and go to the bathroom.  Harris then 
started talking about a barbershop in Southbridge, claiming responsibility for the 
robbery.3  Before leaving Legends, Harris said that he would shoot anyone who got 
up and looked out the window after he left. 
Everyone at Legends had been lying on the ground, but a couple seconds 
after Harris left, everyone got up and looked out the window.4  Deidrick saw Harris 
walk northbound on Clifford Brown Walk and turn onto Sherman Street.  Diedrick 
followed Harris and watched him turn left on Lombard Street, and then turn onto 
3 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A471 (referencing the Southbridge robbery, Harris said 
“the dude . . . shouldn’t have tried me.”).  
4 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A472.  Before Harris left, he opened and closed the door 
two times to see what everyone would do when he left.  When he saw that Deidrick got up the 
first time he threatened to kill someone.  Id. 
4 
                                          
 
11th Street, heading towards Pine Street.  Diedrick hailed a motorist, Jimmie 
Gordon (“Gordon”), at 11th and Pine Streets.  Gordon called 911 and helped 
Diedrick track Harris as the Wilmington Police Department responded to the call. 
Officers Cain and Verna responded to the 911 call.   When Harris saw the 
police officers, he dropped both of the bags he was carrying and began running.  
Officer Verna apprehended Harris while Officer Cain stayed with the two bags 
Harris had dropped.  Officer Reiss arrived at the scene as Harris was being taken 
into custody.  Officer Reiss searched Harris and found a plastic bag in Harris’ front 
right pocket that contained five rounds of silver Winchester .38 special 
ammunition, and found ten clear blue plastic bags in Harris’ rear left pocket that 
contained marijuana. 
Officer Reiss took Harris to central booking.  Sergeant Stevenson, the police 
officer in charge, then ordered Officer Reiss to bring Harris back to Legends for a 
show-up identification.5  Officer Reiss brought Harris back to Clifford Brown 
Walk, arriving twenty or thirty minutes after the arrest.  Officers Verna and Reiss 
each stood on either side of Harris as they brought him up to the window of the 
barbershop.  The handcuffs on Harris were not removed.  A majority of the 
5 Notably, Officer Reiss later testified that he was not involved in the show-up identification and 
had no recollection of it.  He testified that he stood outside the car and let the other officers 
handle the show-up portion of the investigation. 
5 
                                          
 
witnesses were standing at the window.6  They nodded their heads up and down, 
and pointed at Harris when he was brought up to the window of the barbershop. 
That same day Harris made a custodial statement to the police.  He 
explained that he committed the robbery at Legends because he owed money to a 
person named “Willie” who had threatened to kill his mother and sister if Harris 
did not pay his debt.  Harris further explained that he made K. P. take off his 
clothes because he was trying to scare him so he would stay in school.  Harris 
continued to explain that he felt Bland’s breasts because “[a] lot of women keep 
money in they -- in they breast’s area, in the bra.”  However, Harris denied being 
involved in the incident at Runn Way in Southbridge.  He stated, “I didn’t have 
nothing to do with no Southbridge shooting.  This Barber Shop?  Clifford Brown?  
Yes.  But this Southbridge?  That?  No.” 
On February 10, 2011, police interviewed Wilson at the hospital regarding 
the incident at Runn Way.  Wilson was shown two photographic lineups.  He did 
not identify anyone from the first lineup, but identified Harris from the second 
lineup as the person who shot and robbed him at Runn Way. 
6 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A694.  Powell and K. P. were not present for the show up 
identification.  Id. at A501 (“Q.  You left with [K. P.] shortly after this thing happened, right?  A.  
Yes.  Q.  So you didn’t stay behind for the police to arrive and things like that?  A.  No.”).  
6 
                                          
 
On February 17, 2011, police arrested Harris on charges relating to the 
incident at Runn Way.  The delay between the incident and arrest was due to 
Wilson being intubated and unable to speak to officers until February 10, 2011.7 
At trial, Wilson unequivocally testified that Harris was the person who shot 
him.  Specifically, Wilson testified that he was “a thousand percent sure” that 
Harris shot him.  Harris also testified at his trial.  He continued to deny any 
involvement in the Runn Way robbery and shooting.  He explained that he 
encountered an individual who sold him marijuana and offered to sell him a 
handgun.  Harris stated that he grabbed the gun, examined it, and walked into a 
nearby alleyway where he prepared to smoke marijuana.  He was then apprehended 
by police.  Harris explained that he knew a lot about the incident at Legends when 
he gave his custodial statement because he was “absorbing it like a sponge, 
absorbing everything that [the female officer is] telling me and, then, using it when 
I went to the room.”  Harris contended that if he admitted to the robbery, he 
believed he would “get unsecured bail or, later on down the road, get found not 
guilty.”  He further contended that “none of the officers gave [him] information 
about a Southbridge shooting.”  Otherwise, Harris argued that he would have 
falsely admitted to that incident as well. 
7 The bullet lodged in Wilson’s spine and rendered him paralyzed in his legs. 
7 
                                          
 
In addition to the testimony from the witnesses to the incidents at Runn Way 
and Legends, the State presented testimony from expert witnesses.  Carl Rone 
(“Rone”), the State police firearms examiner, testified that a bullet recovered from 
Runn Way was fired from the handgun found in the purple purse recovered after 
the incident at Legends.  Paul Gilbert (“Gilbert”), a DNA analyst at the Office of 
the Chief Medical Examiner, testified that the gun recovered by police after the 
incident at Legends contained a mixed profile of Harris’ and at least one other 
individual’s DNA.  Gilbert also testified that the DNA on the gun matched Harris 
to a “99.9999%” degree of certainty. 
At the close of the evidence, the defense sought reargument of the denial of 
the Motion to Suppress the show-up identifications and subsequent in-court 
identifications.  The basis for the application was the divergence in Sergeant 
Stevenson’s testimony at the motion hearing versus at trial.  The trial court 
reserved its decision until after the jury rendered its verdict.  The defense’s 
challenge to the show-up and in-court identifications then formed the sole basis for 
the Motion for a New Trial -- the denial of which is now the sole issue raised on 
appeal. 
 
 
 
8 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a Motion for a New Trial and 
denial of a Motion to Suppress for an abuse of discretion.8  However, where a 
Motion for a New Trial raises a constitutional violation, we review that issue de 
novo.9 
Harris argues that the show-up identification violated the Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution and that the in-court identifications were 
tainted.  This Court has noted that show-up identifications “generally are 
inherently suspect and widely condemned.”10  But we have also acknowledged that 
“an immediate on-the-scene confrontation between victim and suspect is essential 
both to law enforcement and to fairness toward innocent suspects alike.”11  
8 State v. Abel, 2012 WL 6055799, at *2 (Del. Dec. 5, 2012) (“In general, we review the trial 
judge’s grant of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion.” (citing Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 
956 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Del. 2008))); Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1171 (Del. 1997) 
(“An appeal from a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial is governed by an abuse of 
discretion standard of review.” (citing Strauss v. Biggs, 525 A.2d 992, 996-97 (Del. 1987))). 
9 Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362, 382 (Del. 2011) (citing Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115, 1119 (Del. 
2010)).  
10 Clark v. State, 344 A.2d 231, 237 (Del. 1975).  
11 Harris v. State, 350 A.2d 768, 771 (Del. 1975) (citing Watson v. State, 349 A.2d 738, 740 
(Del. 1975)).  The Harris Court explained its concern “with any police-arranged simultaneous 
viewing of one suspect by more than one victim.”  Id. at 771, n.5.  The Court noted that it agreed 
with the statement by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
United States v. Wilson, namely:  
If it is feasible for each witness, victim or otherwise, to stand alone when asked to 
make the identification, aye nor nay, this is the course that should be followed.  
While the benefit of a prompt on-the-scene confrontation makes acceptable the 
9 
                                          
 
 
Specifically, a show-up identification serves the police, “who should not lose 
valuable time in looking for the offender if an apprehended suspect goes 
unidentified,” and serves the innocent suspect, “who should not suffer undue 
custody awaiting police station identification.”12  Thus, we explained the test used 
for determining the admissibility of an out-of-court identification when it is 
challenged under the Due Process Clause as follows: 
An identification procedure will not pass constitutional muster where 
it is “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”  That a confrontation is 
suggestive, without more, however, cannot amount to a due process 
violation; the unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure must 
also carry with it the increased danger of an irreparable 
misidentification.  In other words, if the Court determines under the 
totality of the circumstances that a line-up is impermissibly 
suggestive, but nonetheless reliable, evidence of the confrontation will 
not be excluded at trial.13 
Essentially, the test for determining whether there was a violation of the Due 
Process Clause has two prongs, namely, whether:  “(1) the confrontation was 
necessary suggestiveness of presentation of a single subject (a “show-up”), there 
is ordinarily no need for the additional element of suggestiveness of identification 
made at the same time by two or more witnesses in each other’s company.   
Id. (citing United States v. Wilson, 435 F.2d 403, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). 
12 Watson v. State, 349 A.2d 738, 740 (Del. 1975). 
13 Richardson v. State, 673 A.2d 144, 147 (Del. 1996) (quoting Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546, 
550 (Del. 1985)).  
10 
                                          
 
unnecessarily suggestive, and (2) there existed a likelihood of [irreparable] 
misidentification.”14 
A. 
The Identification Was Not Unnecessarily Suggestive 
The trial court held that the identification was not unnecessarily suggestive, 
and therefore, the court denied Harris’ Motion for a New Trial.15  We have noted 
that the issue of whether an identification of a suspect is unnecessarily suggestive 
“is invariably fact-driven.”16 
Harris argues that the show-up identification was overly suggestive because 
the show-up was not supervised by police officers, Harris was brought to the 
window at Legends in handcuffs by two uniformed police officers, the group of 
victims stood together, the victims were left to discuss the incident after it had 
occurred, and the process took less than ten seconds.17 
14 Id. (citing Harris, 350 A.2d at 770). 
15 Appellant’s Opening Br. Ex. A. at 15-16 (“The case sub judice is similarly a permissible 
show-up.  Within a half hour after the robbery, the Defendant, who was in police custody, was 
shown to a group of six victims, all of whom identified the Defendant as the robber.  There was 
no indication of any hesitation or doubt by the victims when they made their identification.  The 
officers did not in any way suggest to the victims that they had to make an identification.  
Additionally, the officers did not group the victims together purposefully.  This case is similar to 
Watson in that the show-up could be considered a natural development and was not ‘arranged’ 
by the police.”).  
16 Swan, 28 A.3d at 382 (citing Zebroski, 12 A.3d at 1119). 
17 Harris also urges us to consider the discrepancy of Sergeant Stevenson’s testimony at the 
hearing concerning the Motion to Suppress the Show-up Identification and his testimony at trial.  
At the hearing, Sergeant Stevenson testified that he was inside Legends when Harris was brought 
up to the window for the witnesses to identify.  He testified that each witness was “directed to go 
11 
                                          
 
 
In Richardson v. State, the victim was told prior to the identification that the 
police had the suspect in custody and they needed her to identify the suspect.18  
When she made the identification, the victim was surrounded by her relatives, and 
the suspect was handcuffed and standing next to a uniformed police officer.19  We 
noted that since the show-up identification happened shortly after the offense, it 
weighed in favor of the identification not being unnecessarily suggestive.20  Here, 
Harris was in handcuffs and standing next to uniformed police officers when the 
up one at a time inside of the barber shop looking out of the large pane glass window.”  Sergeant 
Stevenson described that “when each victim made the identification, they were standing by 
themselves viewing the person in police custody by themselves with no one around them to 
basically influence them.”  Sergeant Stevenson indicated that the witnesses were never 
sequestered. 
At trial, however, Sergeant Stevenson testified that he was both inside and outside of Legends 
when Harris was brought back for the show-up identification.  He testified that while he was 
outside, he did not know what identification procedure was followed.  Further, Sergeant 
Stevenson testified that he was outside while certain witnesses identified Harris, but walked in as 
others identified Harris.  He received information from other officers that while he was outside a 
positive identification of Harris had been made.  Sergeant Stevenson maintained that the 
witnesses were never sequestered.  See App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A808 (“Q:  Did you 
make the judgment call that this was one of those cases that you couldn’t sequester the 
witnesses?  A:  Yes.  That was one of my observations once I got to the crime scene, that, 
apparently, the victims and witnesses had been talking prior to and they were not sequestered.  
The barber shop was one big room, so it was not like there was a room that was off that we could 
sequester the witnesses, since there were so many.”). 
Although we acknowledge that Sergeant Stevenson’s testimony is not entirely consistent with his 
earlier testimony, even if we were to interpret the testimony in the light most favorable to Harris, 
it does not persuade us that the show-up identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive as 
discussed further in this decision. 
18 Richardson, 673 A.2d at 147. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 148 (“She viewed him approximately one hour and fifteen minutes after the carjacking.  
The confrontation occurred shortly after the offense while Ludwig’s memory was fresh and 
while Richardson was in the clothing that she stated he wore when he committed the offense.”). 
12 
                                          
 
identification occurred.  Further, the identification occurred between twenty or 
thirty minutes after the incident, which is more quickly than the show-up 
identification that occurred in Richardson. 
In Watson v. State, the defendant robbed a woman in her car while another 
woman was with the victim.21  The victim gave police a description of the 
defendant shortly after the incident.  Approximately thirty minutes after the 
robbery, the defendant was brought to the police car where both the victim and her 
friend were waiting.  The victim, after overhearing a police radio transmission that 
a man who fit the victim’s description had been apprehended, unequivocally 
identified the defendant.  After the victim identified the defendant in front of her 
friend, her friend also made a positive identification by commenting on the 
defendant’s distinctive shirt.  We held that “absent unnecessary and unfair police 
suggestion, prompt on-the-scene confrontations, per se, are not so unnecessarily 
suggestive as to constitute violations of due process rights.”22  The simultaneous 
identification in Watson was not unnecessarily suggestive because it was “a natural 
development under all of the circumstance and was not ‘arranged’ by the police.”23  
21 Watson, 349 A.2d at 739. 
22 Id. at 740. 
23 Id. at 741. 
13 
                                          
 
Rather, the confrontations were “prompt, practically on-the-scene, and of a ‘res 
gestae’ nature.”24 
Here, the victims knew that a suspect was being brought for them to identify.  
Harris was accompanied by two police officers during the identification.  Although 
the witnesses here all saw and identified Harris simultaneously, there was no 
indication that this procedure was purposefully arranged by the police.  Instead, it 
is likely the result of how quickly Harris was brought back for identification.  
Accordingly, the simultaneous identification of Harris followed by individual 
identifications was a natural development under all of the circumstances.  The 
show-up identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive, and thus, the 
identification did not violate Harris’ constitutional rights under the Due Process 
Clause. 
B. 
There Was Not a Likelihood of Irreparable Misidentification 
This Court has used the factors outlined by the United States Supreme Court 
in Manson v. Brathwaite25 to determine the likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.26  In Manson, the Supreme Court set forth the following five 
factors to determine the reliability of the identification:  (1) the opportunity of the 
24 Id.  
25 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). 
26 See Richardson, 673 A.2d at 148. 
14 
                                          
 
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of 
attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal; (4) the 
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the 
length of time between the crime and the confrontation.27  We address each of 
these factors with respect to each witness who identified Harris at the show-up 
identification and in court -- namely, Darrell, Deidrick, and Cook.  The other 
witnesses -- namely, Powell and his stepson K. P., Bland, Lewis, and Collins -- did 
not identify Harris.  Powell and K. P. left before the police arrived, and therefore, 
were not present for the show-up identification and did not identify Harris at the 
trial.28  Bland testified that she did not identify anyone in the show-up 
identification because she could only see the robber’s mask and jacket.29  Lewis 
testified that because he was on his stomach on the ground, he was unable to 
identify Harris.30  Collins did not appear for trial so there was no specific testimony 
regarding any identification by him. 
27 Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
28 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A501  (“Q.  You left with [K. P.] shortly after this thing 
happened, right?  A.  Yes.  Q.  So you didn’t stay behind for the police to arrive and things like 
that?  A.  No.”). 
29 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A491 (“Q.  Once everyone as a group said yes or what 
have you -- well, let me ask you about what you said, did you identify --  A.  No.  Q. You didn’t 
right?  A.  Because all I seen was his jacket and his mask.”). 
30 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A508 (“Q.  And when he’s brought to the window, a 
suspect is brought to the window and you are saying that other people told you he changed his 
clothes from what he had on earlier?  A.  I said hoodie, jacket, whatever.  People were saying it 
15 
                                          
 
 
1. The Witnesses Had Ample Opportunity to View the Suspect 
The trial court noted that the witnesses had “clear opportunity to confront 
and observe the Defendant; the scene of the confrontation was well-lit and small in 
size.”31  Our de novo review of the record supports a finding that the witnesses had 
ample opportunity to view Harris.  The evidence indicated that Harris entered 
Legends around noon. The barbershop was “very small” and was approximately 
150 square feet in size.  When Harris entered the barbershop, Cook asked Harris if 
he wanted a haircut, and Harris pointed to Darrel indicating that he was waiting for 
Darrel to cut his hair.  Harris remained waiting for Darrel for about half an hour, 
without doing anything to hide his appearance.  Harris then stood up and covered 
his face for the first time.  During the time Harris was waiting, the witnesses had 
ample opportunity to observe Harris. 
Darrell testified that he observed Harris for fifteen to twenty minutes before 
Harris put his mask on:  “Funny thing is, he put the mask on when he decided to do 
the robbery.”  In making this comment, Darrell testified that he did in fact see 
was him.  I was saying I don’t know, kind of look like his build, but I wasn’t sure.  Q.  You 
didn’t make an identification of an individual?  A.  Right.”). 
31 Appellant’s Opening Br. Ex. A. at 16. 
16 
                                          
 
Harris’ face.32  Darrell also testified that he had ample opportunity to view Harris 
because Harris “sat down next to [him].” 
Deidrick testified that Harris was about six to seven feet from him while 
Harris was waiting for a haircut.33  Deidrick also testified that he was able to see 
Harris’ face.34  Further, Deidrick followed Harris out of the barbershop, eventually 
hailing a motorist, and calling the police. 
Cook testified that he thought “it was funny because [Harris] was sitting 
there for a whole half an hour, [and he’d] seen [Harris’] face.”  Cook also testified 
that he watches “out for whoever come[s] in [the shop], being[] as though [he’s] 
the owner, so [he] feel[s] like everybody is [his] responsibility.”  He testified 
further that he “notice[d] [Harris] come in and left back out for a couple seconds 
. . . [he] noticed him sitting there like he’s waiting for a haircut.” 
Accordingly, each of the witnesses who identified Harris had ample 
opportunity to view the suspect based on the amount of time Harris was at 
32 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A535 (“Q.  And how much of the individual’s face could 
you see at the time, before the black thing comes up?  A.  His face.”). 
33 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A557 (“Probably about -- I would give him a good seven 
feet, six, seven feet, not that far away from me.”).  
34 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A556 (“Q.  Okay.  So, prior to that, were you able to 
actually see his face?  A.  Yes. . . . Q.  And how long do you think you were able to clearly see 
his face before he put the hood up?  A.  Clearly see his face?  Q.  Yeah.  A.  A good five 
minutes.”).   
17 
                                          
 
Legends, the close physical proximity of each witness to Harris, and the fact that 
Deidrick followed Harris until Harris’ ultimate arrest. 
2. The Witnesses Paid a Sufficient Degree of Attention to Identify the Suspect 
The trial court noted that the witnesses’ “attention was most likely high, as 
they were paying attention to the Defendant who had exposed a gun and threatened 
to use it.”35  Our de novo review of the record supports a finding that the witnesses 
had paid a sufficient degree of attention to identify Harris.  Darrell testified that 
Harris was sitting right next to him for approximately twenty minutes while Harris 
was waiting for a haircut.  Darrell also testified about what Harris was wearing, an 
indication that he paid attention to Harris while he was in the barbershop.36  He 
further testified that he was paying close enough attention to Harris to get a good 
look at his face. 
Deidrick testified that he was looking at Harris intermittently throughout the 
time that Harris was waiting to get a haircut, and that he “clearly” saw Harris’ face 
for “[a] good five minutes.”  Deidrick also testified that he noticed Harris because 
35 Appellant’s Opening Br. Ex. A. at 16. 
36 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A534 (“Q.  Okay.  And can you describe the hoodie that 
the individual was wearing?  A.  It was red, like black and white diamonds, like, blue diamond, 
like -- it just had a bunch of designs on it.”).  
18 
                                          
 
Harris was in very close physical proximity to him.37  He stated further that he was 
paying particularly close attention to Harris because “[he] just wasn’t familiar with 
[Harris].”  Further, Deidrick also described what Harris was wearing during the 
incident.38 
As discussed above, Cook testified with respect to the attention he paid to 
his customers by stating that he watches “out for whoever come[s] in [the shop], 
being[] as though [he’s] the owner, so [he] feel like everybody is [his] 
responsibility.”  He also testified that he “notice[d] [Harris] come in and left back 
out for a couple seconds . . . [he] noticed him sitting there like he’s waiting for a 
haircut.” 
Accordingly, each of the witnesses paid a sufficient degree of attention to 
Harris to identify him as the person who committed the robbery. 
 
 
 
 
37 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A557 (“Q.  So, he was close by, then?  A.  Very close, 
close enough to notice.”).  
38 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A555-56 (“I remember he had on a black-hooded 
sweatshirt.  It had diamond signs and money signs on it.  It had a little bit of green in it, a little 
bit of red in it, but it was basically black with the, you know, accessories on it.”).  
19 
                                          
 
3. The Accuracy of the Witnesses’ Prior Description of the Suspect 
The trial court property noted that “[p]olice confirmed that there was not a 
prior description of the suspect given before the show-up, so this factor does not 
affect the determination.”39  Accordingly, this factor is not at issue on appeal. 
4. The Witnesses Were Certain of Their Identification 
Darrell, Deidrick, and Cook were all certain of their identifications.  Darrell 
testified that he was “1000%” certain that Harris was the person who robbed the 
barbershop.40  Additionally, Deidrick testified that he was “105%” certain of his 
in-court identification of Harris based upon Harris’ nose, lips, and “everything 
about him.  [Deidrick] could never forget his face.”41  Lastly, Cook testified that he 
was “[c]ertain, very certain” that the person who robbed the barbershop was 
Harris.  Accordingly, the certainty of the witnesses’ identification suggests that 
there was little to no likelihood of misidentification. 
 
 
39 Appellant’s Opening Br. Ex. A. at 16. 
40 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A524 (“Q.  Mr. Boyd, how certain are you that that’s the 
person that came in the barber shop on February 5, 2011?  A.  I’m a thousand percent sure.”).  
41 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A567-68 (“Q.  And the person you’ve identified in the 
courtroom today as the person who did all this, how sure are you that that’s him?  A.  About 105 
percent sure.  Q.  And what is that based upon?  A.  Based upon his eyes, based upon his nose -- 
his nose is distinctive.  I can remember his nose -- and the lips.  I remember everything about 
him.  I could never forget his face.”).   
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5. The Length of Time Between the Crime and Identification was Minimal 
The time between the crime and the identification also supports the 
conclusion that there was not a likelihood of irreparable misidentification.  Officer 
Reiss took Harris back to Legends for the show-up identification twenty or thirty 
minutes after the arrest.  Thus, the time between the crime and the identification 
was minimal. 
Accordingly, the opportunity of the witnesses to view Harris at the time of 
the crime, their degree of attention, the level of certainty that they demonstrated 
with respect to their identification, and the length of time between the crime and 
the identification all support the conclusion that there was not a likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification. 
C. 
Harmless Error 
Assuming, arguendo, that the show-up identification was unnecessarily 
suggestive and there existed a likelihood of irreparable misidentification, the 
decision to admit the identification into evidence at trial was harmless error.  
Under the harmless error standard, this Court looks to “whether the State has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
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to the verdict obtained.”42  We explained the harmless error standard in more detail 
by stating: 
[W]hen reviewing claims for harmless error, “[t]he reviewing court 
considers the probability that an error affected the jury’s decision.  To 
do this, it must study the record to ascertain the probable impact of 
error in the context of the entire trial.”  As a result, “‘[a]ny harmless 
error analysis is a case-specific, fact-intensive enterprise.’”  “This 
approach indicates that the reviewing court must consider both the 
importance of the error and the strength of the other evidence 
presented at trial.  An error may be important if, for example, it 
concerned a witness giving significant testimony. . . .”  “Under a 
harmless error analysis, ‘[t]he defendant has the initial burden of 
demonstrating error,’ and then the State has the burden to demonstrate 
that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”43 
Here, the evidence in favor of convicting Harris was overwhelming -- even 
without the identification evidence -- such that admitting the identifications into 
evidence, if by error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Harris gave a custodial statement on February 5, 2011.  During this 
statement, Harris explained that he committed the robbery at Legends because he 
owed money to a person named “Willie” who had threatened to kill his mother and 
sister if he did not pay his debt.  Harris also explained that he had K. P. take off his 
clothes because Harris was trying to scare K. P. so he would stay in school.  Harris 
42 Purnell v. State, 2014 WL 6999040, at *7 (Del. Sept. 24, 2014) (citing Satterwhite v. Texas, 
486 U.S. 249, 258-59 (1988)). 
43 Hansley v. State, 104 A.3d 833, 837 (Del. 2014) (internal citations omitted).  
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continued to explain that he felt Bland’s breasts because “[a] lot of women keep 
money in they -- in they breast’s area, in the bra.” 
At trial, Deidrick testified that he followed Harris out of Legends and 
maintained nearly constant surveillance of Harris.  Deidrick also testified that 
while Deidrick was following Harris, Deidrick saw Harris remove his hooded 
jacket and toss it on the ground.  Deidrick further testified that Harris was “stuffing 
something in his -- in a book bag that he had, also.  He also had the young lady’s 
purse.  I remember him stuffing things in her purse.  So, I’m standing there, 
standing there, watching him.” 
Officer Cain testified that he saw Harris and said, “[c]ome here” and then 
Harris dropped both the bags he was carrying and began running.  Officer Cain 
also testified about the bags Harris was carrying.  Specifically, he stated “[t]he one 
bag was a purple-in-color purse.  The second bag was, like -- it’s a black puffy 
nylon material, black bag.”  Corporal Snyder testified that in the two bags was 
“haircutting equipment, pairs -- numerous pairs of electric clippers.”  Corporal 
Snyder further testified that “there was a handgun inside of the [purple] bag.”  
Additionally, Officer Reiss testified that he searched Harris and found a plastic bag 
in Harris’ front right pocket that contained five rounds of silver Winchester .38 
special ammunition and ten clear blue plastic bags in Harris’ rear left pocket that 
contained marijuana. 
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Rone, the State police firearms examiner, testified that a bullet recovered  
from Runn Way was fired from the handgun found in the purple purse recovered 
after the incident at Legends.  Gilbert, a DNA analyst at the Office of the Chief 
Medical Examiner, testified that the DNA on the gun was a mixed profile of Harris 
and at least one other individual.  Gilbert also testified that the DNA on the gun 
was Harris’ to a “99.9999%” degree of certainty. 
Further, the victim of the attempted murder, Wilson, made a firm in-court 
and out-of-court identification, and did not participate in any show-up 
identification of Harris.  In addition, several of the victims of the Legends incident 
heard Harris discuss his participation in the Runn Way incident. 
Accordingly, even if we were to conclude that the show-up identification 
was unnecessarily suggestive and there existed a likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification, the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby 
AFFIRMED. 
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