Title: Boyer v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
TIMOTHY BOYER, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 286, 2008 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID No. 0703017222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  October 14, 2009 
Decided:  November 16, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 16th day of November 2009, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Timothy Boyer appeals his conviction for several drug-related 
charges1 following a three-day jury trial during which he represented himself with 
standby counsel.  Boyer contends the Superior Court judge erred by failing to 
inquire adequately whether he knowingly and intelligently requested to proceed 
pro se.  Because we find insufficient evidence in the record to establish that Boyer 
waived counsel knowingly and intelligently, we REVERSE and REMAND for 
further proceedings.  
                                                 
1   
Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Maintaining a 
Dwelling for the purpose of Distributing Cocaine, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. 
 
2 
(2) 
During Boyer’s fast-track appearances in April and May 2007, he 
made several requests for court-appointed counsel but refused interviews with the 
Public Defender’s office.  At the final case review hearing, the court granted a two-
week continuance so that Boyer could obtain Public Defender services.  After 
receiving court-appointed counsel, Boyer filed several motions pro se.  Shortly 
thereafter, the appointed counsel moved to withdraw.  On the eve of trial, a 
Superior Court judge heard counsel’s motion.  At the hearing, Boyer expressed his 
dissatisfaction with his counsel and articulated a desire to represent himself.  The 
trial judge advised Boyer of trial expectations, found Boyer’s waiver of counsel to 
be knowingly and intelligently made and granted the motion to withdraw. 
(3) 
It is well-established law that criminal defendants have a 
constitutional, Sixth Amendment right to waive counsel and continue pro se if they 
do so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.2  We review an asserted denial of 
that constitutional right de novo.3   
(4) 
Before the trial judge allows a defendant to exercise his right to waive 
counsel, he must conduct a hearing to inquire into the defendant’s decision, warn 
the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and establish 
                                                 
2   
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
3   
Hartman v. State, 918 A.2d 1138, 1140 (Del. 2007). 
 
3 
a record that the defendant “knows what he is doing and his choice is made with 
eyes open.”4   
(5) 
The evidentiary hearing allows the defendant to establish on the 
record that he waives intelligently and voluntarily.5  Determining whether a 
defendant has successfully demonstrated a proper waiver of counsel depends on 
several factors unique to each defendant.6  To assist the trial judge in making that 
determination, we look to the federal guidelines enunciated in United States v. 
Welty.7  The trial court should advise the defendant that:  
(1)  
he will have to conduct his defense in accordance with the rules of 
evidence and criminal procedure, rules with which he may not be familiar;  
 
(2)  
he may be hampered in presenting his best defense by his lack of 
knowledge of the law;  
 
(3) 
the effectiveness of his defense may well be diminished by his dual 
role as attorney and accused;  
 
(4)  
the nature of the charges;  
 
(5) 
the statutory offenses included within them;  
 
(6) 
the range of allowable punishments thereunder;  
 
                                                 
4   
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. 
5   
Watson v. State, 564 A.2d 1107, 1109 (Del. 1989). 
6   
Briscoe v. State, 606 A.2d 103, 107 (Del. 1992). 
7   
United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 
4 
(7) 
possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation 
thereof; and 
 
(8) 
all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.8 
 
The trial judge should also consider the defendant’s background, experience, and 
conduct.9   
(6) 
The record clearly shows that the short dialogue between the Superior 
Court judge and Boyer did not adequately and thoroughly advise Boyer of the risks 
associated with proceeding pro se:   
Q: 
Mr. Edinger told me that you told him that you would like to represent 
 
yourself at a trial which is scheduled for tomorrow. 
A. 
Yes 
Q. 
I just want to be sure you understand you have been through a trial 
before? 
A. 
No, I have not. 
Q. 
Have not.  Even though you had some other convictions.  Do you 
understand you are going to have to adhere to the rules of the court?  You 
may not be in the best position to do that because you are not legally 
trained? 
A. 
I understand that. . . . 
Q: 
[I] want to be sure you understand the consequences of your decision.  
You will go to trial representing yourself.  You will have to comply with the 
rules of evidence and the rules of the court, all those things. 
                                                 
8   
Briscoe, 606 A.2d at 108. 
9   
Id. at 107. 
 
5 
A. 
I understand that. 
(7) 
We have found proper waivers of counsel where the trial judge 
conducted an evidentiary hearing and advised the defendant of several of the Welty 
principles.10  Rather than conducting a similarly comprehensive hearing, the pro se 
colloquy in Boyer’s case consisted of the trial judge warning Boyer of only two 
Welty elements.  The judge only advised Boyer that he would have to adhere to the 
rules of the court, the rules of evidence, and “all those things.”    
(8) 
Despite an incomplete inquiry, the State submits that the trial judge 
had no choice but to allow Boyer to exercise his constitutional right to represent 
himself at trial.  The State’s submission is partially accurate.  Although an accused 
has a right to represent himself, the exercise cannot occur at the expense of an 
accused’s right to counsel, which the accused must waive knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily.   
(9) 
The State also argues that Boyer made it quite clear that he wished to 
conduct his defense in his own way.  This argument seems to suggest that a 
defendant’s passion, fervent desire or insistence that he represent himself somehow 
substitutes for a knowing, intelligent and voluntary relinquishment of the right to 
counsel or somehow cures an ineffective waiver of counsel.  We recognize that a 
                                                 
10   
Hartman, 918 A.2d at 1141.  The trial judge advised the defendant on trial expectations, 
trial prohibitions, disadvantages of proceeding pro se, the seriousness of the charges, the 
sentence ranges, the elements of the charges, and the defendant’s lack of legal training. 
 
6 
judge may face a defendant who adamantly states that he is aware of his right to 
counsel and wishes to waive that right; however, those statements do not alleviate 
the judge’s responsibility to conduct a comprehensive evidentiary hearing to 
explore and explain the defendant’s options.11  
(10) The State further contends that the judge conducted a lengthy 
colloquy advising Boyer of the nature of the charges, rights waived, and sentencing 
consequences.  The colloquy to which the State refers, however, did not take place 
during a hearing advising Boyer of the dangers associated with proceeding pro se; 
rather, that colloquy took place during the final case review phase where Boyer 
pleaded guilty.12  The Court’s responsibility to advise of charges, rights, and 
consequences while accepting a plea does not satisfy the judge’s duty to conduct a 
“penetrating and comprehensive examination”13 warning an accused of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation.     
(11) Permitting Boyer to proceed pro se without adequately advising him 
of the dangers prevented Boyer from knowingly and intelligently waiving his right 
to counsel.   
                                                 
11   
Briscoe, 606 A.2d at 107. 
12   
Boyer withdrew his guilty plea during the sentencing phase. 
13   
Briscoe, 606 A.2d at 107. 
 
7 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with 
this Order.   
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice