Title: Elmore v. Van Horn

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Elmore v. Van Horn1992 WY 191844 P.2d 1078Case Number: 92-12Decided: 12/31/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Michael J. 
ELMORE, as an individual and Michael J. Elmore as next friend and on behalf of 
Michael John Elmore, minor child, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
Gailene VAN 
HORN, as an individual, and Fleming Associates, a private association, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal from 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty, Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, J.

 
 
Carol 
Seeger (argued) and Michael A. Maycock of Maycock Law Offices, Gillette, for appellant.

 
 
Rebecca A. 
Lewis (argued) of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellee.

 
 
Before THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT,* and GOLDEN, JJ., and PATRICK, 
D.J.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal involves a 
claim for damages against a licensed professional counselor for her evaluation 
of and conclusion that a minor child had been the victim of sexual abuse. The 
counselor interviewed the child, reported her suspicions to law enforcement, 
signed an affidavit, and testified in a subsequent custody hearing. The district 
court determined that the counselor had immunity for her actions and granted her 
motion for summary judgment.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellants present the 
following issues for our review:

 
 
            
1. Did the District Court err in finding that as a matter of law the 
appellee mental health care providers were immune from suit for their negligence 
and intentional acts in their professional capacities in their diagnosis, 
evaluation and counseling of the appellant based on case law immunity which 
grants immunity to witnesses and actions of those witnesses in the course of 
judicial proceedings because the appellees later testify in a judicial 
proceeding.

 
 
            
2. Did the District Court err in finding that as a matter of law the 
appellee mental health care providers were immune from suit for their negligence 
and intentional acts in their professional capacities in their diagnosis, 
evaluation and counseling of the appellant based on statutory immunity which 
provides immunity to those who, with reasonable cause and in good faith, report 
suspected child abuse. 

 
 
            
3. Did the District Court err in finding that the appellees owed no duty 
to the appellant Michael John Elmore with whom they a had a professional 
psychological relationship.

 
 
            
4. Did the District Court err in finding that the appellees did not owe a 
duty to the appellant, Michael J. Elmore, the father.

 
 
            
5. Did the District Court err in finding that the appellants' claims are 
barred by the statute of limitations.

 
 
            
6. Did the District Court err in finding that the appellee acted within 
the applicable standards of care, therefore, as a matter of law the appellants' 
claims must fail.

 
 
            
7. Did the District Court err in finding that as a matter of law the 
appellants have no claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under 
Wyoming Law.

 
 
In 
contrast, appellees present this issue:

 
 
            
Was summary judgment appropriately rendered in favor of 
defendants/appellees Gay Van Horn and Fleming Associates?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellee Michael J. 
Elmore (the father) was divorced from Mary Margaret Ostlund (the mother) in 
1985. The original divorce decree provided for the mother to have custody of 
their minor son (MJ), and allowed the father to have visitation 
rights.

 
 

[¶5.]     After returning home 
from visiting his father in Gillette sometime in November of 1987, MJ allegedly 
complained of pain in his buttocks area. His mother took him to a physician. The 
physician determined that there was some redness in the anus area that could 
have been caused by several things including abuse or even constipation. During 
the visit on December 15, 1987, the physician recommended psychotherapy for MJ 
since he was exhibiting "bizarre" behavior by hitting his mother, tearing the 
exam room apart and acting "totally out of control." The mother took MJ to the 
physician again in January and March of 1988. The physician again spoke with the 
mother at the end of April and noted that he felt "very strongly" that MJ should 
get counseling.

 
 

[¶6.]     On May 5, 1988, the 
mother took MJ to Gailene Van Horn, a licensed professional counselor employed 
by Fleming Associates, a counseling firm. The mother informed Van Horn that she 
was concerned about MJ's behavioral problems and about potential sexual abuse 
that might be occurring while MJ was visiting his father in 
Gillette.

 
 

[¶7.]     Van Horn began therapy 
sessions with MJ. Van Horn conducted approximately fourteen sessions with MJ. 
The dates of the sessions include: May 5, May 9, May 13, May 18, May 25, June 2, 
June 10, June 24, June 30, July 7, July 21, and August 3, 1988. As the sessions 
progressed, Van Horn began to have concerns that abuse was indeed occurring. On 
June 14, 1988, she contacted Mr. Steinberg of DPASS (now Department of Family 
Services). She asked Mr. Steinberg about the procedure for reporting child abuse 
when the parents live in different cities. After speaking with Mr. Steinberg, 
Van Horn recommended to the mother that she should report the potential problem 
to Laramie County DPASS. Van Horn did not make a report to DPASS 
herself.

 
 

[¶8.]     On July 18, 1988, an 
attorney representing the mother in the custody dispute brought an affidavit to 
Van Horn's office. The affidavit, which Van Horn signed, stated that "[MJ] has 
revealed information to me which supports the conclusion that sexual abuse has 
been occurring to him during visits to his father in Gillette, Wyoming."

 
 

[¶9.]     As Van Horn began 
having more concerns about MJ, she contacted Detective Owen from the Cheyenne 
Police Department and asked Detective Owen to observe a session with MJ. 
Detective Owen observed the July 21 and August 3, 1988 sessions with MJ at Van 
Horn's office. According to Van Horn, MJ related specific details of sexual 
abuse to her during their session. Van Horn understood that Detective Owen was 
going to refer the matter to Campbell County DPASS for further 
investigation.

 
 

[¶10.]  The affidavit that Van Horn signed on 
July 18, 1988, was used in a show cause hearing, and the father was denied 
visitation with his son until October 10, 1988. When the court allowed 
visitation to resume, it could only occur under supervised conditions. In 
February 1989, a trial was conducted on the issue of custody. The district judge 
who presided over the custody trial concluded that "Gay Van Horn lied to the 
Court under oath either in her affidavit of July 18, 1988, or today (February 22 
[1989]). Because of that and because there is no independent corroboration of 
her testimony, the Court finds it to be entirely without merit and disregards it 
entirely." Van Horn later admitted that she did not read the affidavit as 
closely as she should have. After the custody trial, the father was awarded 
custody of MJ.

 
 

[¶11.]  After winning custody, the father 
(appellant) filed this action against Gailene Van Horn and Fleming Associates 
(appellees) for her handling of the allegations of sexual abuse of MJ. The 
action was brought by the father, Michael Elmore, and on behalf of MJ, a minor 
child (his son). Appellants' amended complaint contained the following 
allegations and counts: 1) negligence in failing to read the affidavit; 2) 
negligence in diagnosing MJ by failing to obtain sufficient information; 3) 
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and 4) negligently inflicting 
severe emotional distress. Appellants also sought punitive damages of 
$7,635,000.00. Appellees filed an answer to the amended complaint and also filed 
a motion for summary judgment. Appellees argued that the motion for summary 
judgment should be granted because the appellees had statutory immunity under 
W.S. 14-3-205 and W.S. 14-3-209 for reporting child abuse. Appellees also 
argued, inter alia, that summary judgment should be granted because they had 
witness immunity regarding the affidavit.

 
 

[¶12.]  On April 3, 1991, the district court 
entered an order granting partial summary judgment to appellees. The district 
court granted summary judgment on all remaining counts on November 18, 1991. 
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
            
We review summary judgments in the same light as the district court, 
using the same materials and following the same standards. Summary judgment is 
proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 
 
Stalkup v. 
State Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 838 P.2d 705, 708 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Zmijewski v. Wright, 809 P.2d 280, 282 
(Wyo. 1991)). 
See also American Holidays, Inc. v. Foxtail Owners Ass'n, 821 P.2d 577, 578 
(Wyo. 1991). 
In addition, "[s]ummary judgment eliminates the expense and burden of a formal 
trial when only questions of law are involved; however, this court must be 
persuaded that no material facts are in dispute and the trial court's judgment 
was correct as a matter of law." Powder River Oil Co. v. Powder River Petroleum 
Corp., 830 P.2d 403, 407 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield, 773 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1989)). See also Carroll By and Through Miller v. Wyoming 
Production Credit Ass'n, 755 P.2d 869, 871 (Wyo. 1988). Under the record presented, if 
this court can uphold summary judgment under any proper legal theory, it will do 
so. Century Ready-Mix Co. v. CampbellCountySch. Dist., 816 P.2d 795, 799 (Wyo. 1991) (citing Reeves v. Boatman, 769 P.2d 917, 918 
(Wyo. 
1989)).

 
 

[¶13.]  A review of the record indicates that the 
question of immunity for reporting child abuse was foremost in the district 
judge's mind when he granted summary judgment. During the final summary judgment 
hearing, the district court remarked:

 
 
            
I really think that there's a very important policy question here that 
must be decided by our supreme court before I force this case to trial, and that 
is that we are always sympathetic with people wrongfully charged. On the other 
hand, this question of child abuse is so pervasive in our society that there has 
to be some semblance of immunity, otherwise everybody will be afraid to do 
anything. And if I were not to grant summary judgment, it would have a chilling 
effect on those individuals of the respective communities in the state who have 
the very difficult task, in what I consider to be the distasteful task of trying 
to see if a child has been abused by an adult. It is very difficult to do 
that.

 
 
STATUTORY 
"REPORTING" IMMUNITY

 
 

[¶14.]  In order to determine whether Van Horn 
can claim reporting immunity, we must examine our statutes. In examining our 
statutes, we keep in mind the following rule of statutory 
construction:

 
 
            
"[i]t is our duty to ascertain the intention of the legislature as 
completely as possible from the language used in the statute itself," State, 
Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. Andrews, Wyo., 671 P.2d 1239, 1246 (1983), and "if such intent is expressed clearly and without 
ambiguity in the language of the statute, such intent must be given effect." 
Oroz v. Hayes, Wyo., 598 P.2d 432, 434 
(1979).

 
 
Carroll By 
and Through Miller v. Wyoming Production Credit Ass'n, 755 P.2d  at 
871-72. See also Hays v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 768 P.2d 11, 13, 78 A.L.R.4th 959 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶15.]  Appellees argue they have immunity for 
their actions because of the reporting immunity statute. If their actions 
alleged in the complaint fall within the immunity statute, there is no liability 
for such actions. See e.g., Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1295 
(Wyo. 1991), Sawyer v. City of Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476, 477 (Wyo. 
1990).

 
 

[¶16.]  The State of Wyoming has "a strong 
public policy of protecting children from child abuse." City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 204 (Wyo. 1991) (citing W.S. 
14-3-201 through -215 (1986)). Having deemed the prevention and detection of 
child abuse a priority, the Wyoming legislature has adopted a statutory 
scheme which requires reporting and protects those who report child abuse. A 
person is required to report child abuse as follows:

 
 
            
(a) Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe or suspect 
that a child has been abused or neglected or who observes any child being 
subjected to conditions or circumstances that would reasonably result in abuse 
or neglect, shall immediately report it to the child protective agency or local 
law enforcement agency or cause a report to be made.

 
 
W.S. 
14-3-205 (1986). Once a report has been made, the reporter has qualified 
immunity from a criminal or civil action. The immunity statute 
provides:

 
 
            
Any person, official, institution or agency participating in good faith 
in any act required or permitted by W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 is immune 
from any civil or criminal liability that might otherwise result by reason of 
the action. For the purpose of any civil or criminal proceeding, the good faith 
of any person, official or institution participating in any act permitted or 
required by W.S. 14-3-201 through 14-3-215 shall be 
presumed.

 
 
W.S. 
14-3-209 (1986).

 
 

[¶17.]  Statutory schemes such as Wyoming's which require 
reporting and also provide immunity are designed to encourage the reporting of 
child abuse. All fifty states have child abuse reporting immunity statutes. 
Harris v. City of Montgomery, 435 So. 2d 1207, 
1213 (Ala. 
1983). Federal legislation provides incentives for states that have child abuse 
reporting requirements and an immunity protection for those who report. Harris, 
435 So. 2d  at 1213 (citing Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
5101-5106). States must grant immunity for mandatory reporting in order to 
qualify for federal assistance. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
5103(b)(2)).

 
 

[¶18.]  Wyoming's reporting immunity statute fits most 
closely with those statutes that have been interpreted as qualified immunity 
statutes. Wyoming's statute only provides immunity if 
the report was made in good faith. W.S. 14-3-209. In contrast, absolute immunity 
statutes provide immunity even if the report were made with malice. See e.g., 
McMartin v. Children's Institute Int'l, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1393, 261 Cal. Rptr. 437, 
441 (1989). 

 
 

[¶19.]  Some state statutes have varying levels 
of immunity. For example, California's statutes provide absolute 
immunity to "mandatory reporters." Thomas v. Chadwick, 224 Cal. App. 3d 813, 274 Cal. Rptr. 128, 133 (1990). Mandatory reporters are those who face a criminal 
penalty if they fail to report. Thomas, 274 Cal. Rptr.  at 133 n. 8. Those who 
have a general duty to report but do not face a criminal penalty if they fail to 
report ("permissive reporters"), are provided qualified immunity. Id.; see also McMartin v. 
Children's Institute Int'l, 261 Cal. Rptr.  at 441; Ferraro v. Chadwick, 221 Cal. App. 3d 86, 270 Cal. Rptr. 379, 381 (1990).

 
 

[¶20.]  All persons who report child abuse 
pursuant to the Wyoming reporting statute are "permissive 
reporters," because they do not face a criminal penalty if they fail to report 
child abuse. See W.S. 14-3-201 through -215 (1986). Looking to the legislative 
language and by comparing our statute to others, it is clear that the Wyoming legislature 
intended to provide qualified immunity, that is immunity for all who report 
child abuse in good faith. Therefore, should it appear that appellee reported 
this suspected child abuse in good faith, she will be entitled to qualified 
immunity under the statute.

 
 

[¶21.]  The reporting immunity statute contains 
two basic requirements. First, the report must be made pursuant to W.S. 
14-3-205, which requires that a person immediately report abuse if they "kno[w] 
or ha[ve] reasonable cause to believe or suspect" that abuse has or is 
occurring, and second, that the reporter be acting in good faith. W.S. 14-3-209 
(1986); see also Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1990). Under 
Wyoming's 
statute, good faith is presumed. W.S. 14-3-209.

 
 

[¶22.]  We agree with the district court that 
appellees' actions met the requirements for statutory reporting immunity. Van 
Horn "reported" the abuse for purposes of the statute when she telephoned 
Detective Owen of the Cheyenne Police Department. Van Horn also requested and 
Detective Owen did observe two sessions with MJ at Van Horn's office. Detective 
Owen then made a report and referred the matter to Campbell County DPASS. The 
statute provides a presumption that the report was made in good faith absent any 
contrary allegation or showing from appellants. W.S. 14-3-209. There is no claim 
of a malicious motive on Van Horn's part. Instead it appears that Van Horn acted 
in good faith on the basis of what the child had told her. Van Horn, therefore, 
is protected by qualified immunity to the extent the complaint alleges actions 
based on or stemming from the act of reporting.

 
 

[¶23.]  Appellants argue that Van Horn is liable 
because she was negligent in reporting abuse and thereafter did not report in 
good faith. We hold that W.S. 14-3-209 provides immunity, though negligence may 
be involved in reporting, for the report may still be made in good faith. The 
material facts found in affidavits and evidence presented when considered in a 
light most favorable to appellants establish at most negligence which is 
insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption and evidence of good faith. 
There is no evidence of bad faith to defeat the immunity provided her. This 
construction of the statute does not afford immunity for deliberately false 
accusations, yet still protects those who report in good faith. Were we to 
construe the statute in a different fashion, the result might be to chill 
legitimate reports of child abuse.

 
 

[¶24.]  The district court's rationale is 
persuasive here:

 
 
            
     In this 
case, the trial court ruled against the mother and found that there was not 
sufficient evidence of child abuse. The trial court did that twice, two 
different judges.

 
 
            
     That 
doesn't mean that just because a judge disagrees with you that you're to run 
back into your hole and not try again. And certainly I would think that if I 
were not to grant summary judgment in this case, a substantial number of child 
abuse cases would simply go by the wayside. I don't believe that Fleming 
Associates would ever touch a child abuse case again.

 

Accord, 
City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d  at 204 and n. 3, and Leonard v. Converse 
County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119, 1124 (Wyo. 1990) (Golden, J., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part).

 
 

[¶25.]  Other states have adopted this same 
policy argument in construing their statutes to provide immunity for those who 
report child abuse. Lux by Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 
1989); Brown v. Pound, 585 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1991); Maples v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529 (Iowa 1990); Gross v. Myers, 229 Mont. 509, 748 P.2d 459, 73 A.L.R.4th 771 
(1987); Harris v. City of Montgomery, 435 So. 2d 1207 (Ala. 1983); Dunning v. 
Pacerelli, 63 Wn. App. 232, 818 P.2d 34 (1991); Gross v. Haight, 496 So. 2d 1225 
(La. App. 1986); Davis v. Durham City Schools, 91 N.C. App. 520, 372 S.E.2d 318 
(1988). Because the statute provides qualified immunity rather than absolute 
immunity, sufficient flexibility is afforded to protect against reporting 
outside the statute or in bad faith. See e.g., Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307 
(Utah 1990) (social worker went beyond the reporting statute and sent letter to 
the city mayor); Montoya by Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285, 289 (Colo. App. 
1988) (if action not taken in good faith, the immunity is removed - counselor 
advising the mother to terminate father's visitation); F.A. by P.A. v. W.J.F., 
248 N.J. Super. 484, 591 A.2d 691 (1991) (neighbors made a report of abuse about 
one year after child's leg had been broken).

 
 

[¶26.]  A California appellate court summarized the 
difficult situation we face:

 
 
            
[W]e are obligated to honor the determination of the Legislature that 
protection of one innocent segment of society warrants occasional injury to 
another. The mute and powerless victims of child abuse have long suffered at the 
hands of their tormenters. Society's protective voice, the Legislature has 
found, has been silenced by the fear of retaliation. The protection of the young 
victims, the Legislature has determined, requires that uncompensated injury 
occasionally result to an adult.

 
 
Thomas, 274 Cal. Rptr.  at 138. The legislature has provided qualified immunity for those who 
report child abuse in the manner specified in W.S. 14-3-205. Van Horn's report 
was within the purview and in accord with the statute.

 
 

[¶27.]  Appellees are protected by statutory 
qualified immunity for reporting child abuse in good 
faith.

 
 
WITNESS 
IMMUNITY

 
 

[¶28.]  Appellants also allege causes of action 
claiming Van Horn was negligent in signing her affidavit and testifying in court 
proceedings. Appellees argue that actions taken prior to and in the course of 
legal proceedings are immune under the common law doctrine of witness 
immunity.

 
 

[¶29.]  Since we have not considered the scope of 
common law witness immunity, we look to United States Supreme Court precedent. 
Traditionally, witnesses and those who participate in judicial proceedings enjoy 
absolute immunity for civil claims which could result from their statements made 
in open court. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 75 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983). "The immunity of parties and witnesses from subsequent damages 
liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings was well established in 
English common law." Briscoe, 460 U.S.  at 330-31, 103 S. Ct.  at 1113 
(citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court summarized the two main 
reasons for affording witnesses civil immunity for their 
testimony:

 
 
            
A witness' apprehension of subsequent damages liability might induce two 
forms of self-censorship. First, witnesses might be reluctant to come forward to 
testify. And once a witness is on the stand, his testimony might be distorted by 
the fear of subsequent liability.

 
 
Briscoe, 
460 U.S.  at 333, 103 S. Ct.  at 1114 
(citations omitted).

 
 

[¶30.]  Van Horn testified in court as to her 
suspicions of child sexual abuse. Under Briscoe, Van Horn is entitled to 
absolute immunity for her testimony in court. Briscoe, 460 U.S.  at 330-33, 
103 S. Ct.  at 1113-14. The district court was correct in dismissing those causes 
of action that rely upon Van Horn's testimony in court.

 
 

[¶31.]  Appellees argue that we should extend the 
traditional witness immunity to actions taken in anticipation of litigation, 
such as the affidavit signed by Van Horn. Appellees cite Collins v. Walden, 613 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D.Ga. 1985), judgment aff'd, 784 F.2d 402 (11th Cir. 
1986).

 
 

[¶32.]  Collins involved a motion for 
reconsideration of the custody award in a divorce proceeding. 613 F. Supp.  at 
1308. A motion to recuse Judge Miller from considering the motion was made on 
the grounds that the judge was biased because of improper ex parte 
communications and was physically and mentally incompetent to continue in the 
case since he had terminal cancer. Collins, 613 F. Supp.  at 1308-09. In response 
to the motion to recuse, an attorney obtained, from persons who knew Judge 
Miller, affidavits which stated that Judge Miller was still mentally alert and 
able to rule in the case. Collins, 613 F. Supp.  at 1309. In part because of the 
affidavits, the motion to recuse was denied; and Judge Miller ruled on the 
underlying matter and then died ten days later. Collins, 613 F. Supp.  at 1310. 
Collins filed suit, alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of 
his civil rights by denying him a fair hearing on the motion to recuse Judge 
Miller. Collins, 613 F. Supp.  at 1311.

 
 

[¶33.]  The court recognized the common law 
absolute immunity that protects participants in judicial proceedings. Collins, 
613 F. Supp.  at 1314 (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct. 1108. The court then decided that the rationale in Briscoe for affording 
immunity is equally applicable to other forms of testimony such as depositions 
and affidavits. Collins, 613 F. Supp.  at 1314. The court 
reasoned:

 
 
            
The threat of a suit for damages can have the same chilling effect on a 
witness who testified by affidavit or deposition as one who testifies in court. 
Yet, testimony by affidavit or deposition is an important part of the judicial 
process, especially before and after the actual trial, and should enjoy the same 
protection as in court testimony. * * * The immunity applies even though the 
testimony might have been knowingly false and malicious.

 
 
Collins, 
613 F. Supp.  at 1314. The court also pointed out the importance of affidavits 
for gathering of information which is crucial to the judicial 
process:

 
 
            
This process of discovering, organizing, and understanding evidence is a 
vital part of the judicial process. It is perhaps more essential to the court's 
truth-seeking function than the actual trial for without it there would be no 
grist for the mill. The search for evidence often requires interviews with 
persons who may not actually testify at trial but who are nonetheless important 
to the process because they might know of someone else whose testimony would be 
more helpful. The possibility that they may be forced to defend a lawsuit for 
damages can only discourage such people from becoming involved. The court's need 
for evidence demands that all participants in the process of gathering evidence 
for use at trial be immune from any liability for 
damages[.]

 
 
Collins, 
613 F. Supp.  at 1315. The court also acknowledged that if a witness gave 
knowingly false and malicious testimony, the witness could be found guilty of 
perjury and face criminal penalties. Id. at n. 9. Thus, a witness is subject to 
criminal penalties and not entirely free to testify falsely, but the witness 
still will not be subject to a civil action for damages. Id. The court concluded 
that the defendants had immunity for matters stated in affidavits to the court. 
Id. at 
1315-16.

 
 

[¶34.]  That rationale is persuasive here. There 
are other remedies for false affidavits apart from civil liability. And imposing 
civil liability poses the very real risk that witnesses may not participate in 
pretrial preparations and thus the crucial things that occur before trial - 
preparation, settlements, dismissals - might be thwarted altogether. Other 
courts have reached this conclusion in similar circumstances. See Kahn v. 
Burman, 673 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.Mich. 1987) judgment aff'd 878 F.2d 1436 (6th Cir. 
1989) (physician's report and deposition concluding there had been medical 
malpractice was immune); Dolan v. Von Zweck, 19 Mass. App. 1032, 477 N.E.2d 200 
(1985) (psychiatrist's letter about child custody made in institution of 
litigation was covered by immunity); Adams v. Peck, 43 Md. App. 168, 403 A.2d 840 (1979) judgment aff'd 288 Md. 1, 415 A.2d 292 (1980) (psychiatrist's report 
containing a conclusion that abuse was occurring had immunity). Therefore, we 
find that Van Horn possessed absolute immunity for her activities in preparation 
for litigation, including signing of the affidavit.

 
 

[¶35.]  Finding that witness immunity covered Van 
Horn's actions not only supports the traditional policy reasons we have 
discussed but it also is consistent with the Wyoming Child Protection Act. The 
Child Protection Act anticipates that it will be necessary for those who report 
to testify in court. See W.S. 14-3-210. Granting immunity to reporters who 
testify in court furthers the purposes of the Protection Act as 
well.

 
 

[¶36.]  Appellants argue that Van Horn should not 
be shielded from liability for negligent actions she took which were independent 
of signing the affidavit or testifying. They cite Babcock v. State, 116 Wn.2d 596, 809 P.2d 143 (1991). In Babcock, the caseworkers did not fulfill the 
statutory requirements and did not conduct an adequate investigation before 
placing the children in foster care with a convicted rapist who then raped the 
children. They were denied immunity. 809 P.2d 143, 149. The approach is 
consistent with the approach we take here. Actions taken to report suspicions of 
child abuse are covered by qualified immunity so long as the reporter complies 
with requirements of the statute.

 
 

[¶37.]  Appellants also cite Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637 (1985), and argue 
that the judicial privilege will not cover all actions taken in furtherance of 
litigation. We agree. However, Ribas is easily distinguished as not claiming 
immunity for a pretrial preparation affidavit and actual testimony but instead 
for eavesdropping. The court, nevertheless, in Ribas, held that the privilege 
barred actual damages but remanded for assessment of damages stemming from 
violation of a California Privacy Act for the eavesdropping. Ribas, 212 Cal. Rptr.  at 150, 696 P.2d  at 644.

 
 

[¶38.]  Appellants also cite James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1982) and argue that immunity for 
reporting should not extend to underlying malpractice or negligence that was 
independent of the reporting. We need not reach that question since the amended 
complaint contains allegations based on the affidavit and the testimony and not 
the actual therapy rendered to MJ.

 
 

[¶39.]  The district court was correct in finding 
that Van Horn had immunity from civil damages for signing the affidavit and 
testifying.

 
 
OTHER 
CAUSES OF ACTION

 
 

[¶40.]  We have left only the question of whether 
the district court was correct in dismissing appellants' claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Because the conduct that serves as the basis 
for the intentional infliction claim is the very same conduct for which there is 
immunity as a matter of law and there is no evidence of bad faith in the record, 
we find that this claim was correctly dismissed.

 
 

[¶41.]  The language in the complaint 
demonstrates how the conduct which we have found to be immune is the conduct 
alleged as the basis for the intentional infliction claim:

 
 
COUNT 
III

 
 
            
53. Defendant, Gailene Van Horn, intentionally and knowingly signed her 
affidavit of July 18, 1988. * * 
*

 
 
            
56. By signing the affidavit 
of July 18, 1988, defendant, Gailene Van Horn, acted intentionally and 
knowingly.

 
 
            
57. * * * The other professionals and agencies continued to collect 
information, investigate, perform psychological assessments on both parents and 
the minor child * * *, all of which were available to Gailene Van Horn prior to 
her testimony at the trial on February 22, 1989. Gailene Van Horn's actions were 
extreme and constitute outrageous conduct and thereby intentionally or 
recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress on the plaintiff[.] [emphasis 
added]

 
 
It is clear 
from the language contained in the complaint that the cause of action for 
intentional infliction is based solely on Van Horn's affidavit and testimony 
which we have found covered by immunity.

 
 

[¶42.]  Having found that common law witness and 
statutory immunity bar this action, we need not review appellants' other claims 
of error. The district court was correct in dismissing all 
claims.

 
 

[¶43.]  Affirmed.