Title: City of Laramie v. Hysong

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

City of Laramie v. Hysong1991 WY 36808 P.2d 199Case Number: 90-219Decided: 03/19/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
CITY OF LARAMIE, Petitioner 
(Appellee/Plaintiff),

v.

Andrew HYSONG, Respondent 
(Appellant/Defendant).

Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty, Arthur T. 
Hanscum, 
J.

District Court 
reversed, Municipal Court's judgment reinstated. 

Jane H. Juve and 
Hugh B. McFadden, Jr. of Corthell & King, Laramie, for petitioner.

Glenn A. Duncan, 
Laramie, for 
respondent.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1.]     Upon a petition for a 
writ of certiorari, the City of Laramie (City) seeks reversal of the district 
court's reversal of Andrew Hysong's conviction of interfering with a police 
officer in violation of the city code. Laramie, Wyoming, Code, Tit. 9, ch. 9, § 30 (1982) (as 
amended). See Sowerwine v. State, 767 P.2d 181 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶2.]     The district court, in 
an appellate capacity, overturned the ruling of the municipal court. The City's 
petition asks whether the district court erred in overturning the municipal 
court's findings of fact that the city police officer, acting on a child abuse 
report, was properly acting within the scope of his official duties in entering 
the Hysong residence to inspect the Hysongs' child. This court granted the 
petition because the question presents an issue of importance pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 13.

[¶3.]     We reverse the district 
court's decision and reinstate the municipal court's judgment of 
conviction.

FACTS

[¶4.]     At 3:00 p.m., Sunday, 
April 1, 1990, a city police officer received a report of possible child abuse 
that had allegedly occurred at 10:30 a.m. that day in a local drug store. 
According to two store clerks who witnessed the incident, a male adult, 
presumably the child's father, forcibly jerked the child, a boy about two or 
three years old, out of a shopping cart in a manner that possibly injured the 
child's arm. As the adult dangled the child by his arm, he spanked the child and 
continued to do so all the way out of the store; all the while the child was 
crying. The adult placed the child in a Chevrolet Blazer parked in the store's 
parking lot. One of the store clerks believed the adult continued striking the 
child in the Blazer because of the movement of the adult's arms and shoulders. 
Based on what they had seen, both clerks stated their belief that the adult had 
probably injured the child.

[¶5.]     After investigating the 
information provided in the store clerks' report, including the license number 
of the Blazer, the officer determined that Andrew Hysong was a suspect. The 
officer contacted the on-call social worker for the Department of Public 
Assistance and Social Services (D-PASS) and together they visited the Hysong 
residence. This occurred within an hour after receiving the initial report. The 
Blazer was not there; no one was home. During the remainder of his shift, the 
officer periodically drove by the residence to see if the Hysongs had returned, 
but it was not until 8:00 p.m., four hours after he first checked the residence, 
that the officer saw that the Hysongs had returned home. The officer and the 
D-PASS social worker visited the residence at that time. The officer, who was in 
uniform, knocked on the front door; Mr. Hysong looked out the window, opened the 
door, and asked what they wanted. The officer introduced himself and the D-PASS 
social worker, explained the reported alleged incident, and asked if they could 
check the child's condition. Mr. Hysong refused to let them in without a search 
warrant.

[¶6.]     After further 
conversation between Mr. Hysong and the officer, Mrs. Hysong came to the door. 
She knew the officer because she worked for the City. The officer explained the 
situation to her. According to the officer's trial testimony, in response to his 
explanation and request to check the child's condition, Mrs. Hysong said, 
"Okay." According to Mrs. Hysong's trial testimony, the house belongs to her 
husband and her, and in response to the officer's explanation and request, she 
merely said, "See, he's O.K." The child, object of the officer's concern, was at 
that moment inside the house and several feet from the front door.

[¶7.]     The officer, believing 
Mrs. Hysong had consented to his entry, started to enter, but was met by Mr. 
Hysong's resistance which caused a scuffle. It was that resistance on Mr. 
Hysong's part that supported the criminal charge on which his conviction was 
based. Mr. Hysong argued that his resistance was justified because of the 
officer's warrantless entry. The municipal court determined, however, that the 
entry was lawful due to exigent circumstances and Mrs. Hysong's possible 
consent.

[¶8.]     Mr. Hysong appealed his 
municipal court conviction to the district court. In its decision letter the 
district court stated, "The legal issue for this court to decide is whether the 
police officer had probable cause to enter the home and inspect the child 
without a search warrant." Answering that question in the negative, that court 
based its reversal of Mr. Hysong's conviction on the following:

1. An adequate amount of 
time had elapsed before any action was taken by the police officer for him to 
obtain a search warrant in order to legally enter the Hysong 
residence;

2. There was insufficient 
evidence which proves that exigent circumstances actually existed in order to 
permit a "warrantless" search, nor was consent voluntarily obtained;

3. The testimony of the 
police officer admitting that he went to the residence with no intention of 
making an arrest leads this court to conclude that the officer was erroneous in 
entering the appellant's home without a search warrant.

[¶9.]     The City's petition for 
writ of certiorari followed.1

DISCUSSION

[¶10.]  The municipal court of the City of 
Laramie is a 
court of limited jurisdiction and is, in the judicial context, inferior in 
jurisdiction to the district court. An appeal from the municipal court's 
judgment to the district court is governed both by the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure for Courts of 
Limited Jurisdiction. W.R.A.P. 1.01; W.R.A.P.C.L.J. 1.01; W.S. §§ 5-6-106 and 
107 (Cum.Supp. 1990). There shall be no trial de novo in the district court 
exercising its appellate jurisdiction. The district court may reverse the 
municipal court's judgment for errors appearing on the record. W.R.A.P. 
1.03.

[¶11.]  In its appellate jurisdiction, the 
district court is governed by the same appellate principles and standards of 
review that govern this court in its exercise of appellate jurisdiction. This 
court has announced these principles and standards countless times; they are so 
universally understood and accepted that we need not cite authority for them. 
The trial court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct, and an appellate 
court shall not disturb them unless they are inconsistent with the evidence, 
clearly erroneous, or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. On questions 
of law, an appellate court accords no special deference to, nor is it bound by 
the trial court's decision. However, if the trial court's judgment is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory appearing in the record, an appellate 
court must affirm that judgment, even if the legal ground or theory articulated 
by the trial court as sustaining the judgment is incorrect.

[¶12.]  The foregoing appellate principles and 
standards of review apply in the realm of the law of search and seizure. It is 
elementary that our federal and state constitutions prohibit "unreasonable 
searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4. Subject to certain 
recognized exceptions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se 
unreasonable. Wilde v. State, 706 P.2d 251, 256 (Wyo. 1985); Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 940 (Wyo. 1983). Among the 
recognized exceptions are searches and/or seizures conducted pursuant to 
voluntary consent2 and conducted when necessary to 
render emergency aid to a person reasonably believed to be in distress and in 
need of assistance. Ortega, 669 P.2d  at 941. Whether an exception exists in a 
particular case is a question of fact that may be properly resolved by a 
preponderance of the evidence standard in the light of all attendant 
circumstances. Wilde, 706 P.2d  at 256; Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253, 258 
(Wyo. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Spoon v. Wyoming, 471 U.S. 1020, 105 S. Ct. 2048, 85 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1985); Ortega, 669 P.2d  at 941; Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 86-87 (Wyo. 1983); Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1378 (Wyo.), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1981). On appellate review 
of the trial court's resolution of that question of fact, the appellate court 
must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party in the 
trial court. Wilde, 706 P.2d  at 256; Stamper, 662 P.2d  at 86; Parkhurst, 628 P.2d  at 1378; Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021, 1024-25 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶13.]  In applying the foregoing appellate 
principles and standards in the realm of search and seizure law, we focus our 
attention on the municipal court's findings of fact. These concern the existence 
and voluntariness of Mrs. Hysong's consent and the presence of exigent 
circumstances, that is, the need to render emergency aid to a child reasonably 
believed to be in distress and in need of assistance. "[A] consent to search is 
not testimonial and it is not evidence which can be described as being of a 
testimonial or communicative nature." Stamper, 662 P.2d  at 87. From the totality 
of the circumstances, the municipal court had to determine whether voluntary 
consent was given. The officer testified that Mrs. Hysong answered "Okay" in 
response to his request to enter the home and inspect the child; Mrs. Hysong 
testified that she merely said, "See he's O.K." To that testimony the municipal 
court commented that "[o]ne might see that the officer could have construed that 
Mrs. Hysong gave him permission." Further, that court stated it "could see there 
is a possibility that an officer in the heat could have considered [that she 
gave him permission]." Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
City, an appellate court must affirm a finding that Mrs. Hysong voluntarily gave 
consent to the officer to enter. Pancratz Company, Inc. v. Kloefkorn-Ballard 
Construction Development, Inc., 720 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Wyo. 1986). See also 
Moorcroft State Bank v. Morel, 701 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Krist v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 667 P.2d 665, 672 (Wyo. 1983)).

[¶14.]  Even with Mrs. Hysong's consent, however, 
the municipal court was faced with Mr. Hysong's refusal to consent. May one 
spouse's consent override the other's refusal to consent? In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974), the Court held that a warrantless search could 
be conducted when consent to search is given by "one who possesses common 
authority over premises and effects" and such consent is "valid as against the 
absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared." Matlock, 415 U.S.  at 170, 94 S. Ct.  at 993, 39 L. Ed. 2d  at 249. In a 1976 case this court followed Matlock in upholding a 
warrantless search consented to by the defendant's wife. There the defendant's 
wife, in her husband's absence, consented to a search of a house jointly 
occupied by them. This court said:

     There is no question 
that Mrs. Williams had "common authority" with appellant over the premises and 
effects; there was mutual use of the house; both had joint control and access; 
she had the right to permit the inspection on her own right; appellant assumed 
the risk that she would permit the search.

Williams v. State, 557 P.2d 135, 141 (Wyo. 1976). Of course, the feature that 
distinguishes this case from Matlock and Williams is Mr. Hysong's presence and 
his refusal to consent to the officer's entry. Other courts faced with this 
question have failed to perceive any constitutional significance to this 
feature. United States v. 
Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88 
(6th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Sealey, 630 F. Supp. 801, 809 
(E.D.Cal. 1986); State v. Frame, 45 Or. App. 723, 609 P.2d 830, 833 (1980); 
People v. Cosme, 48 N Y2d 286, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654-55, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 
1321-23 (1979); State v. Vaster, 24 Wn. App. 405, 601 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1979); 
contra, Silva v. State, 344 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1977). We align with these courts since 
we do not perceive a constitutional significance to the refusal to consent of a 
co-owner or occupant who is present.

[¶15.]  Mr. Hysong's presence and refusal to 
consent to the officer's entry do not dilute his wife's consent. According to 
her trial testimony the residence belonged to her as well as to her husband. In 
our equality state we see no valid reason why her husband's refusal should 
cancel her consent. For the reasons stated in Williams, we hold that she had 
"common authority" to consent to the officer's entry in her own right and her 
husband's refusal did not cancel it.

[¶16.]  Although the municipal court remarked 
about Mrs. Hysong's consent, it looked beyond that and found exigent 
circumstances to exist that justified the officer's warrantless entry. The 
municipal court was mindful, as this court is, that this state has a strong 
public policy of protecting children from child abuse.3 W.S. 14-3-201 through 215 (July 
1986 Repl.); W.S. 14-6-205(a)(iii). We note that one of the duties of a 
countyD-PASS office is, within 
twenty-four hours after notification of a suspected case of child abuse, to 
initiate an investigation and verification of every report. W.S. 
14-3-204(a)(iii). If a countyD-PASS representative is denied reasonable 
access to a child by a parent and D-PASS determines the child's best interest 
requires access, then that office shall seek appropriate court order to see the 
child. In contrast, we find that a law enforcement officer without a warrant or 
court order may take a child into custody when that officer has "reasonable 
grounds to believe a child is * * * suffering from * * * injury or seriously 
endangered by his surroundings and immediate custody appears to be necessary for 
his protection * * *." W.S. 14-6-205(a)(iii).4

[¶17.]  We have carefully read the record. Having 
heard all the testimony surrounding the report of suspected child abuse, the 
officer's investigation, the officer's concern for the safety of the child, and 
the officer's actions, the municipal court was entitled to reasonably conclude 
that exigent circumstances existed which justified the officer's warrantless 
entry into the Hysong residence. In the light most favorable to the City, the 
evidence was that the officer reasonably concluded that injury to the child had 
probably occurred in the nature of an injured arm and bruises on the buttocks. 
Within an hour of receiving the report, the officer had located the suspect's 
house in which the child was probably to be found; however, on checking the 
house, the officer found no one home. Periodically, the officer checked the 
house for signs of human activity; none appeared until 8:00 p.m. that Sunday 
night and, immediately, the officer visited the house to check on the child's 
condition. Clearly, within the short span of time from receiving the report 
until locating the child, the officer acted responsibly in his good faith 
efforts to investigate and verify the child's condition.5

[¶18.]  Giving full and appropriate application 
to the well-recognized appellate principles and standards, this court must 
affirm the municipal court's finding that exigent circumstances existed when the 
officer entered the Hysong home to determine the safety and welfare of the small 
child. Additionally, we would hold that the warrantless entry was reasonable in 
light of Mrs. Hysong's consent to the officer's entry. We hold, therefore, that 
the entry was reasonable and lawful. The district court erred by considering the 
case de novo instead of applying the appropriate appellate standard of review. 
Its decision must be, and is, reversed, and the municipal court's judgment of 
conviction is reinstated.

FOOTNOTES

1 The City, but not Mr. 
Hysong, submitted a brief to this court.

2 Wilde, 706 P.2d  at 256; 
Ortega, 669 P.2d  at 941.

3 Statistics over the past 
five years, furnished by the State of Wyoming Department of Family Services 
(D-FS), demonstrate a serious problem of child abuse and neglect. Using a new 
and more accurate reporting system in 1990, D-FS reported there were 1,157 
victims being treated for various forms of "substantiated maltreatment." 
Discouraging public officials from pursuing good faith investigations of 
suspected child abuse in any of its forms is not consistent with a public policy 
of protecting children from abuse.

4 The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a warrantless entry into 
the suspected child abuser's home for the purpose of determining the safety and 
welfare of two children. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the 
court observed that the situation confronting the officer and social worker 
involved, as in this case, small children inside a home who are less able than 
adults to protect themselves from further harm or to seek independently medical 
attention. State v. Boggess, 115 Wis.2d 443, 340 N.W.2d 516, 524 
(1983).

5 Boggess, 340 N.W.2d  at 
524.