Title: Jostens, Inc. v. Herff Jones, LLC

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: April 24, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180808
____________________
Jostens, Inc., John Wiggins, and Chris Urnis
v.
Herff Jones, LLC, and Brent Gilbert
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-16-901869)
MENDHEIM, Justice.
Jostens, Inc. ("Jostens"), John Wiggins, and Chris Urnis
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants")
appeal from the Mobile Circuit Court's denial of their renewed
motions for a judgment as a matter of law following the entry
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of a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Herff Jones, LLC
("Herff Jones"), and Brent Gilbert (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the plaintiffs").  We affirm.
I.  Facts
Herff Jones and Jostens are nationwide competitors that
manufacture scholastic-recognition products -- items such as
class rings, diplomas, caps, gowns, tassels, and graduation
announcements -- for high school students.1  As the plaintiffs
explain in their appellate brief:
"The scholastic achievement market is unlike most
other consumer markets because it is entirely
dependent on schools.  That is, although students
and their parents are typically the end consumers,
it is the schools who decide which company's
products will be offered for sale to the students.
Each graduating class in most schools might be
offered products from either Herff Jones or Jostens,
but not both.  School administrators are thus key
decision makers, deciding whether Herff Jones or
Jostens will have the opportunity to sell to its
students.  Herff Jones and Jostens compete to 'win'
schools."
Plaintiffs' 
brief, 
pp. 
5-6. 
 
Decisions 
about 
which
manufacturer of scholastic-recognition products to choose are
1Herff Jones and Jostens agree that the other major
national competitor in this industry is Balfour, which is not
a party to this action.
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typically made each year before the start of the upcoming
academic school year.
The competing manufacturers sell their products to
schools through independent-contractor small businesses that
are located in the schools' territories.  These small
businesses purchase from a manufacturer of scholastic-
recognition products the exclusive right to sell that
manufacturer's 
products 
within 
a 
certain 
geographic 
territory. 
For example, Brent Gilbert's business is GradPro Recognition
Products, Inc. ("GradPro"), and he has worked with Herff Jones
for over 30 years, both as a sales representative for his
father and as the current owner of GradPro.  Gilbert's father
purchased from Herff Jones much of the territory in Alabama
when Gilbert was a child, and Gilbert purchased his father's
territory in July 2004, paying $400,000 over 10 years to
acquire it.  Gilbert operates primarily out of Dothan for
servicing his Alabama territory.
All the parties agree that the scholastic-recognition-
products business is highly competitive and that sales
representatives 
ostensibly 
working 
for 
each 
manufacturer 
pitch
their products to schools in their territories every year in
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an effort to "win" schools for their respective manufacturer.
The parties also agree that the business is relationship-
driven:  sales representatives strive to establish cordial and
lasting relationships with school administrators in an effort
to secure and maintain contracts.  One method manufacturers
use to increase their market share of schools in a territory
is to entice a competitor's sales representatives to switch
employers.  In order to discourage such switching of
employers, it is common practice in the scholastic-
recognition-products industry for sales representatives, as a
stipulation of employment, to sign noncompetition agreements,
agreeing not to compete against their former employers for a
specified period and/or in a specified location.
Wiggins worked for an independent distributor of Jostens
from 2000 to late 2003, selling Jostens products to schools in
southwest Alabama and in the Florida panhandle.  Urnis worked
for an independent distributor of Jostens from 2001 to 2005,
selling Jostens products to schools in central Alabama. In
2004 and 2006, respectively, Gilbert hired Wiggins and Urnis
away from Jostens to be sales representatives for GradPro and,
ostensibly, for Herff Jones.  Before joining Gilbert in
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working on behalf of Herff Jones, Wiggins and Urnis each spent
one year away from the industry to honor their noncompetition
agreements.  Wiggins spent his year away fishing and
volunteering at his church, and he began selling Herff Jones
products to schools in southwest Alabama in August 2004. 
Urnis spent his year away volunteering in youth sports
organizations, and he began selling Herff Jones products to
schools in central Alabama in June 2006.  It is undisputed
that neither Wiggins nor Urnis violated his noncompetition
agreement during his respective year after leaving the 
Jostens
distributor and coming to work for GradPro and Herff Jones. 
Testimony at trial indicated that, during the respective year
that each did not work, one school account that had belonged
to Wiggins when he worked with Jostens switched to Herff Jones
and six school accounts that had belonged to Urnis when he
worked with Jostens switched to Herff Jones.
As part of their employment arrangement, Gilbert gave
Wiggins and Urnis each part ownership in GradPro and they, in
turn, each signed an employment agreement that contained a
section providing that they agreed not to compete in the
respective territory each was assigned to cover for a period
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of one year after leaving employment with GradPro.  Those
noncompetition agreements provided, in part:
"Employee covenants and agrees that as long as
he is employed by [Gilbert] under the terms of this
Agreement and for a period of one year after
Employee's relationship with [Gilbert] is terminated
and after Employee ceases selling Herff Jones
Products, he shall not compete in the Territory,
directly or indirectly (nor receive, in any form,
benefits from a competitor of [Gilbert] or Herff
Jones), with [Gilbert's] Business of soliciting
orders for the Products and/or with Herff Jones's
business 
of 
manufacturing 
and/or 
selling 
the
Products.  To 'compete' as used herein shall
include, among other things, the servicing of
customer 
accounts, 
soliciting 
of 
sales 
from
customers, 
supervision 
of 
such 
sales, 
the
recommendation of a supplier of Products other than
[Gilbert] and/or Herff Jones or conducting himself
in such a manner that Representative's and/or Herff
Jones's goodwill with customers is diminished.
"Employee acknowledges that, by virtue of his
activities for [Gilbert] on behalf of Herff Jones,
regardless of any limitations in the assignment of
Products or coverage of Territory, he has had
contact with or otherwise gained valuable knowledge
of school decision makers and the requirements and
practices relating to the purchase of Products or
similar products by students of all schools within
the Territory through which Herff Jones has done or
had sought to do business.  Employee, therefore,
acknowledges 
that 
the 
foregoing 
covenant 
is
reasonable in time and area and that it is necessary
for the reasonable protection of the interests of
Herff Jones and [Gilbert]. 
"Employee further agrees, during his employment
and for one year after, not to use or disclose,
directly or indirectly, any of [Gilbert]'s and/or
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Herff Jones's price lists, records, customer lists,
statistics or other information acquired by him in
the course of his employment, nor to aid or be party
to any actions which would tend to divert, diminish
or prejudice the goodwill of [Gilbert] or Herff
Jones. ..."
At trial, the plaintiffs presented testimony and evidence
indicating that, before 2014, Jostens's nationwide sales had
been in a 10-year decline but that, beginning in that year,
under the direction of chief operating officer John Biebault,
Jostens engaged in 
strategies aimed at reversing that decline. 
The 
plaintiffs introduced 
into 
evidence 
a 
Jostens 
confidential
business 
document 
produced 
in 
December 
2015 
titled 
"Scholastic
Strategic Plan Summary (2016-2019)."  In that document,
Jostens listed one of its "Key Growth Initiatives" as being
"Rep Acquisition," which 
included seeking to take advantage of
"[i]nterest from strong performing external independent rep
groups in joining Jostens (particularly from Herff Jones)." 
(Emphasis added.)  This initiative also noted that those
strategies "[m]ay provide access to reps with $20M and $15M
accounts" and that there was a "[n]eed to navigate two-year
non-compete reps have in their territories."  Jostens
countered this evidence with testimony from Louis Kruger,
Jostens's national sales director at the time the document was
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produced, who stated that the "Key Growth Initiatives"
specifically mentioned Herff Jones representatives only
because several sales representatives from Herff Jones had
expressed interest in joining Jostens.  He also testified that
the money figures referred to "two groups that were with
Balfour" in Atlanta and Louisiana and that those two groups
had two-year noncompetition agreements "that we have to 
adhere
to."
Sometime in December 2015 or January 2016, Kruger began
communicating with Wiggins while Wiggins was still working for
GradPro.  On January 4, 2016, Wiggins, using his wife's e-mail
address, sent an e-mail to Kruger's wife's e-mail address that
was intended for Kruger. In the e-mail, Wiggins sought to
provide Kruger with 
"the 10 most important items ... I'd like to request
in the event of a transition.  These are the things
that would make me feel as though Jostens is
committed to the long-term success and market
domination of my current territory.  While I'm
asking Jostens for 10 essential items below, I'd
like to offer Jostens the assurance that I am highly
confident in my ability to transition all of my
current accounts as well as 4 new target accounts."
Those "essential items" included, among other things:
"1.  Jostens to pay for office to open in Mobile in
June 2016 through May of 2017.  ...
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"2.  Jostens to pay salaries for 12 months beginning
June 2016 through May 2017 to my existing 3
employees that will make the transition immediately
and run the office for the 12-month non-compete
period.  ...
"3.  Jostens ... to pay me monthly beginning June of
2016 through May of 2017 the amount of $175,000.
June of 2017, we will adjust if necessary.
"4.  Jostens ... to pay me $100,000 in June 2016
through May 2017 as a territory transition fee.
"5.  Jostens to offer a territory (to be discussed
later) in central/south Alabama that would, at
minimum, include all counties where I have active
accounts.  Said territory would include immediate
equity and at no point cost me to acquire. In short,
territory would be mine immediately, free and clear.
"....
"10.  While it is my intent to fully comply and not
violate my existing 12 month 'covenant not to
compete' with my current company, I would ask that
Jostens indemnify me against any legal action taken
against me."
Jostens responded to Wiggins's demands by having one of
its lawyers send an e-mail to Wiggins's attorney on
January 21, 2016, that requested that Wiggins provide
"additional information and documentation."  The requested
information included:
"1.  Gross commissions earned in 2014 and 2015.
"2.  Charges your client incurred in connection with
his employment in 2014 and 2015; and
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"3.  Cash payments made by his employer and/or Herff
Jones in 2014 and 2015."
Kruger admitted at trial that gross commissions earned would
constitute confidential information.
In an e-mail to his attorney on January 26, 2016, Wiggins
provided his gross commissions earned.  With respect to
charges incurred, Wiggins stated: 
"2.  I have no knowledge of these charges as I am
not a rep for [Herff Jones] but rather an employee
of GradPro.  Obtaining the info requested would
require me to go to my partner and President of
GradPro, W. Brent Gilbert.  I don't think they
[Jostens] want me to do this."
Wiggins also noted that he had never received cash payments
from either Herff Jones or GradPro.  Gilbert testified that
the 
underlying 
commission 
information could 
have 
been 
obtained
only from Herff Jones's confidential "Commission County
Summary Report."  Jostens used this information to generate a
model of what it believed Wiggins's territory was currently
worth, $1.2 million, and what it anticipated the territory
could be worth, $3.81 million.  The model projection indicated
that it was based on Jostens's expectation of capturing
85 percent of Wiggins's school accounts in the first year
after he left Herff Jones.
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On February 19, 2016, Jostens, through its attorney,
e-mailed Wiggins's attorney an offer of employment for 
Wiggins
which was termed a "Transition Agreement."  
Jostens acquiesced
to Wiggins's request that he be given a geographic territory
free and clear, which, Wiggins admitted, "[i]n my nineteen
years, I would say that's not standard at all."  According to
Gilbert, when Wiggins met with Gilbert to inform him that
Wiggins was leaving to go to Jostens, Gilbert began to discuss
ways he could have another sales representative in Mobile for
the next year, but Wiggins cut him off, saying: 
"[Brent,] there's not going to be a next year for
you in Mobile.
"And I said, 'What do you mean, John?'
"He said all the schools are going.
"I said, 'What do you mean they're going?'
"He said 'They're gone, Brent.  All the schools are
already gone.  They're going to go to Jostens.'
"I was, like, 'John, so you're saying that all the
schools have already made the decision that they're
going to Jostens?'
"He went, 'They're all going.'"
Wiggins resigned from GradPro on April 1, 2016.  Wiggins
testified that he worked as a consultant for Jostens during
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the year his noncompetition agreement was in effect and that 
he became a sales associate for Jostens on July 1, 2017.
Urnis began communicating with Kruger by direct e-mail on
January 12, 2016.  Subsequently, they also talked by telephone
and in person.  In the course of this communication, Urnis
disclosed the general volume of his sales, as well as the
amount of his earned commissions.  Jostens used this
information to generate a model of what it believed Urnis's
territory was currently worth, $950,000, and what it
anticipated the territory could be worth, $3 million.  The
model projection indicated that it was based on the
expectation of capturing 100 percent of Urnis's school
accounts in the first year after he left Herff Jones.
Shortly after his conversation with Wiggins, Gilbert met
with Urnis, who told Gilbert:  "Brent, I don't want to work
with you.  I want out.  I'm either going to go to Jostens, and
when I go I will take every school that you've got, or you can
give me the territory.  I'll stay with Herff Jones."  Both
Gilbert and Herff Jones refused to give Urnis the territory
free of charge.  Gilbert and Urnis met a few more times, but
during their third meeting, on May 31, 2016, Urnis handed
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Gilbert his resignation from GradPro, telling Gilbert:  "I'm
leaving because I'm not going to pay for a territory." 
Gilbert testified that Urnis also told him:  "[Y]ou better not
sue me.  And I went, 'Why would I sue you?  Have you been
talking to schools?'  And he says, 'They all know the deal and
you're losing all of them.'"
Urnis testified that, after he resigned from GradPro, he
worked as a consultant for Jostens during the year his
noncompetition agreement was effective and that he became a
sales associate for Jostens on July 1, 2017.
The parties agree that Jostens selected independent
distributor Scott Moore to spearhead its operations in the
territories Wiggins and Urnis had worked for GradPro/Herff
Jones.  Moore had worked with Jostens for 16 years, and his
home territory was in the Tuscaloosa area.  Some of Moore's
territory overlapped with the areas Urnis worked, and at one
time Moore had a second office located in Mobile -- Wiggins's
home territory -- but Moore closed that office in 2014 because
he had been unable to generate enough business to justify
keeping it open.  Moore testified that, when Wiggins and Urnis
left GradPro (and Herff Jones), it presented an opportunity to
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gain new school accounts the likes of which he had never seen
in all of his years in the scholastic-recognition-products
industry.  Moore admitted that, before the 2016-2017 school
year, the most school accounts he had won in one year was
five.  In 2016, before Wiggins and Urnis had officially
resigned from GradPro, Moore had convinced two schools to
switch from GradPro and Herff Jones to Jostens.  Moore related
that in 2016 he had some members of his sales team take care
of his home-territory accounts so that he could concentrate on
winning accounts in Wiggins's and Urnis's territories.  He
further testified that he worked extremely hard that year and
that he put over 75,000 miles on his automobile driving to
prospective schools.
The trial record indicates that, while he was still
working for GradPro and thus Herff Jones, Wiggins began to
tell administrators at schools with whom he had accounts that
he was leaving Herff Jones to go work for Jostens, and he told
at least one of those administrators to "keep quiet" about
this change because he had a noncompetition agreement with
GradPro and Herff Jones.  In some instances, Wiggins put
school administrators in contact with Moore.  In at least one
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case, during the one-year period of his noncompetition
agreement, Wiggins made repeated telephone calls to an
administrator using his wife's and his daughter's cell phones
to introduce the administrator to Moore and then to relate
that he would be officially taking over for Moore once the
period of his noncompetition agreement had ended.  There is
also record evidence indicating that Wiggins provided Jostens
with specific pricing on Herff Jones products during the
period of his noncompetition agreement.  In at least one
instance, Wiggins gave Jostens pricing on a product and
Jostens's regional sales manager Duke Walker e-mailed Wiggins
asking him to clarify the price he had provided because Walker
"just want[ed] to give Scott [Moore] the best leg up going
into this."  Wiggins also helped Moore in opening a new Mobile
office -- paid for by Jostens per its employment agreement
with Wiggins.  For example, on May 9, 2016, Wiggins e-mailed
Kruger and Walker with a proposed budget for the Mobile office
and asked for prompt feedback because "our target open date is
June 1[, 2016]."  In June 2016, Wiggins sent Walker a list of
schools that were doing business with Herff Jones that
included their order histories and their order preferences. 
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Walker admitted at trial that this was very useful information
that Jostens used to prepare their own products and forecast
sales volumes.2  Walker also admitted that Moore used the
information contained in the list "in the execution of sales
in his territory."
Gilbert testified that, after Wiggins and Urnis resigned,
he and the remainder of his sales team started contacting
schools in Wiggins's and Urnis's former assigned territories,
and several of those schools would not provide dates for
GradPro to make presentations of Herff Jones products, take
orders, and then make deliveries.  Gilbert testified that if
a school principal or other administrative decision-maker
would not give a date, "[t]hat means you don't have business
in the school."  Gilbert stated that, by the time school
started for the 2016-2017 school year, he and his sales team
had "a pretty good idea of what we had lost."  He testified
that "[t]here were forty-seven schools" in the territories
formerly serviced by Wiggins and Urnis for GradPro and Herff
Jones that switched to Jostens in the 2016-2017 school year. 
2In his deposition, Walker agreed that the list had come
from Wiggins.  At trial, he contended that the list came from
one of Wiggins's employees, Lib Blossom.
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Gilbert stated that 47 schools constituted "a little over
half" of GradPro's entire scholastic-recognition-products
business (the parties refer to these 47 schools as the "blue
list" of schools).  In a motion filed in the trial court, the
defendants acknowledged that the 47 schools made up
"80 [percent] of the sales volume of schools serviced by
Wiggins or Urnis while at GradPro."  Gilbert testified that it
had taken "[t]en or twelve years" to build up the business in
those territories and that the business was lost in one cycle. 
Donald Agin, the general manager of Herff Jones's scholastic
division in 2016, testified that Herff Jones "had never had
that type of transition" of school accounts going to a
competitor "in as short a period of time" "[i]n the thirty-
four years that [he had] been in [the] industry."
At trial, the defendants presented testimony from two
principals of schools on the "blue list" who stated that their
schools did not switch from Herff Jones to Jostens because of
any wrongdoing by Jostens, Wiggins, or Urnis.  Principal Craig
Smith of Baldwin County High School testified that one reason
his school switched scholastic-recognition-products suppliers
was that there had been some "quality issues" with hoodies his
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school had gotten from Herff Jones that had cheap iron-on
patches.  Smith also stated that he liked Moore and that
Jostens's prices were "pretty close" to those of Herff Jones. 
Principal Alvin Dailey of LeFlore High School testified that
the school switched from Herff Jones to Jostens because
Jostens's prices were cheaper, particularly the class rings it
offered, and because there had been a problem with hoodie
orders from Herff Jones and a slight delay in diploma delivery
in the 2015-2016 school year.
As part of their presentation of testimony from the
principals, as well as through questioning of 
other witnesses,
the defendants also sought to present evidence of other
reasons schools may have switched scholastic-recognition-
products providers from Herff Jones to Jostens.  Those reasons
included:  changes in administrators at some high schools;
problems with some products ordered from Herff Jones, such as
hoodies and tassel frames; delayed delivery of some diplomas; 
and the open competition created by Wiggins's and Urnis's
vacating for one year the territories they had serviced. The
plaintiffs, in turn, sought to counter some of these proffered
reasons through testimony from Gilbert and Agin.
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On September 7, 2016, the plaintiffs sued the defendants
in the Mobile Circuit Court.3  They asserted claims of breach
of contract against Wiggins and Urnis based on the
noncompetition agreements contained in their contracts with
GradPro; 
tortious 
interference 
against 
Jostens; 
and
misappropriation of 
trade 
secrets 
and 
civil 
conspiracy against
all the defendants.  In general, the plaintiffs asserted that,
because of the defendants' alleged wrongful conduct, the
plaintiffs lost 47 school accounts in territories previously
serviced by Wiggins and Urnis.  
During the motions-practice phase of the litigation,
Jostens filed two summary-judgment motions, the second of
which specifically contended, among other things, that the
plaintiffs had not presented evidence indicating that any
alleged wrongful conduct by the defendants had caused any of
the 47 school accounts to switch from Herff Jones to Jostens. 
Wiggins and Urnis likewise filed separate summary-judgment
motions in which they contended that the plaintiffs lacked
evidence of causation.  The trial court denied the defendants'
3The plaintiffs also named Moore as a defendant, but he
was voluntarily dismissed as a defendant before trial.
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summary-judgment motions with respect to dismissal of claims
based on a lack of causation evidence. 
As the case proceeded to trial, Jostens filed a motion in
limine in which it requested, among other things, that the
plaintiffs be prohibited from introducing "[a]ny evidence or
testimony related to ... the fact that Plaintiffs lost the
business of 47 schools in one year and that such loss in and
of itself is evidence that the Defendants committed wrongdoing
in this case."  The trial court denied the motion.  
The case proceeded to trial in April 2019, and the trial
lasted almost two weeks.  The plaintiffs presented testimony
from Wiggins, Gilbert, Moore, Urnis, Jostens area sales
manager 
Al 
Bunge, 
GradPro 
operations 
manager 
Lawrence 
Herring,
certified public accountant Jeffrey Windham, Walker, Mobile
attorney Ben Rowe, and Agin.  The defendants presented
testimony from Smith, Kruger, and Dailey.  At the close of the
plaintiffs' case, the defendants filed separate motions for a
judgment as a matter of law in which they again asserted,
among other things, that the plaintiffs had not presented
evidence that the alleged damages represented by the lost
school accounts was caused by the defendants' alleged wrongful
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conduct.  The trial court denied those motions.  The
defendants likewise filed separate motions for a judgment as
a matter of law at the close of all the evidence; the trial
court denied those motions as well, and it submitted the case
to the jury.  
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs,
finding the defendants jointly liable for the damages. 
Specifically, 
the 
jury 
awarded 
compensatory 
damages 
to 
Gilbert
in the amount of $579,620 and to Herff Jones in the amount of
$1,884,960.  The jury assessed punitive damages against
Jostens in the amount of $650,000, against Wiggins in the
amount of $25,000, and against Urnis in the amount of $10,000. 
The trial court entered a judgment based on the verdict.  The
defendants filed a joint renewed motion for a judgment as a
matter of law in which their sole argument was that the
plaintiffs failed to present evidence of causation for the
damages claimed based on the defendants' allegedly wrongful
conduct, which the trial court denied.  The defendants appeal. 
II.  Standard of Review
"The standard of review for a ruling on a motion
for a judgment as a matter of law ('JML') is as
follows:
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"'"When reviewing a ruling
on a motion for a JML, this Court
uses the same standard the trial
court used initially in deciding
whether to grant or deny the
motion for a JML.  Palm Harbor
Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.
2d 3 (Ala. 1997).  Regarding
questions of fact, the ultimate
question is whether the nonmovant
has presented sufficient evidence
to allow the case to be submitted
to 
the 
jury 
for 
a 
factual
resolution.  Carter v. Henderson,
598 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1992).  The
nonmovant must have presented
substantial evidence in order to
withstand a motion for a JML. See
§ 12–21–12, Ala. Code 1975; West
v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871
(Ala. 1989).  A reviewing court
must determine whether the party
who bears the burden of proof has
produced 
substantial 
evidence
creating 
a 
factual 
dispute
requiring resolution by the jury.
Carter, 598 So. 2d at 1353.  In
reviewing a ruling on a motion
for a JML, this Court views the
evidence 
in 
the 
light 
most
favorable to the nonmovant and
entertains 
such 
reasonable
inferences as the jury would have
been free to draw.  Id. Regarding
a question of law, however, this
Court indulges no presumption of
correctness 
as 
to 
the 
trial
court's ruling.  Ricwil, Inc. v.
S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So. 2d
1126 (Ala. 1992)."
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"'Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors
Life Ins. Co., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1152 (Ala.
2003).'
"CSX Transp., Inc. v. Miller, 46 So. 3d 434, 450–51
(Ala. 2010)."
DISA Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 272 So. 3d 142, 148 (Ala. 2018).
III.  Analysis
The defendants' sole contention in this appeal is that
the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence of proximate
causation and that, therefore, the case should not have been
submitted to the jury.4  Specifically, the defendants argue:
"Plaintiffs did not present any testimony at trial
establishing why those forty-seven schools took
their business elsewhere.  Therefore, Plaintiffs did
not submit any evidence at trial to prove that any
one of the forty-seven schools on their blue list
chose to leave for a different competing supplier
because of Defendants' alleged wrongful conduct. 
Plaintiffs did not call even one principal or school
official to the stand to testify at trial that the
reason for them switching suppliers was Defendants'
wrongful conduct."  
4In their reply brief, the defendants attempt to argue
that the jury's damages calculation was based on "guesswork
and speculation."  Defendants' reply brief, p. 6.  However,
the defendants did not challenge the damages calculation in
their renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law in the
trial court, nor did they raise the issue in their initial
appellate brief.  The sole ground for appeal was a lack of
causation evidence.  Therefore, we will not consider that
argument.  See, e.g., Melton v. Harbor Pointe, LLC, 57 So. 3d
695, 696 n.1 (Ala. 2010) (noting that "this Court will not
consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief").
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Defendants' brief, pp. 13-14.  The defendants contend that,
instead 
of 
presenting 
concrete 
evidence 
of 
proximate
causation, the plaintiffs "elected to throw 47 schools in a
basket, wave around alleged bad conduct evidence with their
blue list of 'lost' schools and simply say that the bad
conduct obviously caused all 47 schools to select a different
scholastic products supplier."  Defendants' reply brief, p. 
1.
The defendants insist that, in lieu of causation
evidence, the plaintiffs merely "point to liability evidence
as their proof of causation."  Defendants' brief, p. 36.  The
defendants contend that it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs
to introduce testimony from decision-makers for each of the
47 schools stating that the school chose to switch scholastic-
recognition-products providers because of wrongful conduct by
the defendants.  See, e.g., Defendants' brief, pp. 26, 29
(complaining that the plaintiffs "failed to introduce any
evidence from any customer that the loss was caused by any
improper conduct of Defendants" and stating that, "[i]n order
to prove causation and damages, Herff Jones and Gilbert were
required to prove why each school decided to use Jostens ...
as a supplier for the 2016-2017 school year").
24
1180808
In support of their causation argument, the defendants
rely on Corson v. Universal Door Systems, Inc., 596 So. 2d 565
(Ala. 1991).  Corson involved a former employee of Universal
Doors Systems, Inc. ("Universal"), Timothy Corson, whom
Universal had accused of violating a nonsolicitation covenant
contained in his employment contract with Universal.  Corson
began working for Universal in August 1985.  "At Universal,
Corson served as a service and installation technician.  ...
While he was employed by Universal, the company's customers
included Handy Dan, Delchamps, Sam's Wholesale Club, Service
Merchandise, St. Vincent's Hospital, Druid City Hospital, and
the divisions of Bruno's."  Corson, 596 So. 2d at 566–67.  The
nonsolicitation covenant in the employment agreement Corson
signed 
with 
Universal 
prohibited 
him 
from 
soliciting 
Universal
customers within a certain geographic territory for one year
following the termination of his employment.  In April 1989,
Corson resigned from Universal and accepted comparable
employment with Alabama Door Systems, Inc. ("Alabama Door"),
one of Universal's competitors. Subsequently, "Universal sued
Corson, seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction, as
well as damages, for his alleged solicitation of Universal's
25
1180808
customers in violation of the nonsolicitation covenant."  596
So. 2d at 567.  The trial court ruled in favor of Universal,
granting 
a 
permanent 
injunction and 
awarding 
Universal 
damages
in the amount of $7,935, and $8,427 in attorney fees.  Corson
appealed and argued, among other things, that Universal had
failed to introduce any evidence supporting a damages award
against him.
This Court agreed with the trial court that there was
evidence to support a finding that Corson had violated the
nonsolicitation covenant in his employment agreement with
Universal.  However, it concluded that the trial court had
placed "the burden of proof as to damages" on Corson, the
defendant, rather than upon Universal, the plaintiff.  
Corson,
596 So. 2d at 570.  
"The covenant at issue prevented Corson only
from 'call[ing] upon any customer of [Universal] for
the purpose of soliciting sales to such customer
[of] any product or services associated [sic] or
provided 
by 
[the] 
business 
of 
[Universal].'
Consequently, Corson was liable only for business
that he personally, directly or indirectly, diverted
from companies dealing with Universal during the
time of his employment.  Corson was not liable for
business flowing to Alabama Door from Universal's
customers because of the efforts of others, or for
other reasons unrelated to Corson's efforts.
26
1180808
"Universal would be entitled to nominal damages
for breach of the nonsolicitation covenant upon mere
proof that Corson successfully solicited a Universal
customer.  James S. Kemper & Co. v. Cox &
Associates, Inc., 434 So. 2d 1380, 1385 (Ala. 1983).
However, in order to collect more than nominal
damages, Universal must also prove that it actually
lost money because of Corson's breach, that is, that
it would have gotten the business that went to
Alabama Door.  It follows that if Corson could
demonstrate other reasons that might have accounted
for Universal's alleged loss of business since
Corson's termination, Universal's burden of proof on
the issues of causation and damages would become
more substantial."
Corson, 596 So. 2d at 570 (emphasis added).  
The Corson Court went on to explain that the evidence
indicated that Universal shared the market for its products
and services with several competitors.  The Court noted that
when Corson's counsel "attempted to establish whether
Universal had an exclusive business relationship with any of
the companies on its customer list," the trial court prevented
the line of questioning.  596 So. 2d at 570.  The Court
concluded that the trial court had erred in precluding such a
line of inquiry:
"The line of questioning pursued by Corson's
counsel was material and highly relevant on the
issues of causation and damages, that is, in
determining whether Universal actually lost revenue
because of Corson's breach of the nonsolicitation
covenant.  Only if Universal had an exclusive
27
1180808
relationship with a customer is it reasonably
inferable, in the absence of other evidence, that
any revenue brought to Alabama Door by Corson would
have gone to Universal."
Corson, 596 So. 2d at 570–71 (emphasis added).  The Court
further explained:
"Although the record supports a finding that
Corson successfully solicited jobs performed by
Alabama Door at Handy Dan, [Delchamps], Sam's
Wholesale Warehouse, and Foodworld [sic] number 13,
Universal produced no evidence that it would have
received the revenue for the work done at Handy Dan,
[Delchamps], or Sam's Wholesale Warehouse, but for
Corson's breach of contract.  On the contrary,
testimony revealed that they, and nearly all the
companies on Universal's customer list, periodically
contracted for products and service with Alabama
Door and other competitors of Universal before,
during, 
and 
after 
Corson's 
employment 
with
Universal. Indeed, the only company on Universal's
customer list whose business was not regularly
shared by Alabama Door or its affiliate was Bruno's,
of which Food World is a division.  ...  Because
Universal thus failed to meet its burden of proof on
the issues of causation and damage, the trial court
erred in awarding more than nominal damages for work
performed by Alabama Door at Handy Dan, [Delchamps],
and Sam's Wholesale Warehouse."
Corson, 596 So. 2d at 571.
The defendants contend that Corson is exactly on point
with the situation presented in this case.  They say that,
even 
though 
the 
plaintiffs 
introduced 
evidence 
indicating that
Wiggins 
and 
Urnis 
violated 
their 
noncompetition agreements 
and
28
1180808
that Jostens tortiously interfered with business relations --
just as Universal demonstrated that Corson had violated the
nonsolicitation covenant in his employment agreement with
Universal -- the plaintiffs had to demonstrate that they would
have retained the accounts of all 47 schools on the blue list
absent the wrongful conduct.  The defendants argue that
because Herff Jones/GradPro's contracts with those schools
were not exclusive, i.e., schools were free to switch
providers each school year, the only way the plaintiffs could
demonstrate proximate causation was to present testimony from
the decision-makers at each school as to why they switched
from Herff Jones to Jostens for the 2016-2017 school year. 
See, e.g., Defendants' brief, p. 36 (contending that the
plaintiffs "were required to introduce evidence that the
decision-makers at each school would have chosen to use Herff
Jones/Gilbert as their vendor for 2016-2017 if the Defendants
had not committed the wrongful acts").  Additionally, the
defendants note that they presented evidence of other
potential reasons schools switched providers that year,
including changes in administrators at some high schools,
problems with some products and services provided by Herff
29
1180808
Jones, and the open competition created by Wiggins's and
Urnis's vacating for one year the territories they had
serviced.  The defendants contend that the plaintiffs
"submitted 
no 
evidence 
to 
rebut/controvert" 
their 
"affirmative
evidence of actual and potential reasons the schools on
Plaintiffs' blue 
list 
switched 
suppliers." 
 
Defendants' brief,
p. 20.  
The plaintiffs counter that 
"the totality of the circumstances showed that
[defendants'] illegal actions caused Herff Jones'
and Gilbert's harm.  Such evidence was more than
enough to warrant the circuit court's submission of
that fact dispute to the jury, and for the jury to
reasonably 
infer 
from 
the 
evidence 
that
[defendants'] actions were the proximate cause."
Plaintiffs' brief, p. 24.  The plaintiffs further assert, in
contravention of the defendants' reliance on Corson, that
"Alabama law is clear that a plaintiff need not produce
direct, 
customer-by-customer evidence 
of 
causation in 
order 
to
prevail on a claim for lost profits."  Id.
For support of their contention that direct customer-by-
customer evidence was not required to demonstrate proximate
causation, the plaintiffs rely upon Intergraph Corp. v.
Bentley Systems, Inc., 58 So. 3d 63 (Ala. 2010).  Intergraph
30
1180808
concerned a complicated contractual arrangement between
Intergraph Corporation ("Intergraph") and Bentley Systems
Incorporated and Bentley Systems Europe B.V. (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "Bentley").  Intergraph and
Bentley were two software-design corporations that produced
software 
products 
for 
architects 
and 
engineers, 
which 
products
were dependent upon one another.  The contractual arrangement
between Intergraph and Bentley involved Bentley's purchasing
certain software products from Intergraph and Intergraph's
giving Bentley the right to service maintenance contracts
connected with those software products.  The issue in
Intergraph 
relevant 
to 
this 
case 
concerned 
Bentley's
counterclaim against Intergraph alleging a breach of the
contractual arrangement.  Specifically, Bentley alleged that,
because Intergraph provided Bentley with bad and late
maintenance-agreement data, Bentley was not able to renew a
large percentage of customer software-maintenance agreements
connected to the software it had purchased from Intergraph. 
Bentley 
further 
alleged 
that 
Intergraph's 
failure 
had 
resulted
in a large amount of lost profits Bentley had expected to gain
through its contractual arrangement with Intergraph.  The
31
1180808
trial court -- following a recommendation from a special
master -- awarded Bentley over $2 million in lost profits
based on Intergraph's breach of its contract with Bentley.  
On appeal, Intergraph contended that Bentley had failed
to present evidence that Intergraph's provision of bad and
late data had been the reason Bentley had lost customer
software-maintenance agreements.  In assessing this issue,
this Court noted the standard for assessing damages in a lost-
profits case:
"'"[T]he loss of profits must be
the natural and proximate, or
direct 
result 
of 
the 
breach
complained of and they must also
be capable of ascertainment with
reasonable, 
or 
sufficient,
certainty, or there must be some
basis 
on 
which 
a 
reasonable
estimate of the amount of the
profit can be made; absolute
certainty is not called for or
required."'
"Mason & Dixon Lines[, Inc. v. Byrd,] 601 So. 2d
[68,] 70 [(Ala. 1992)] (quoting Paris v. Buckner
Feed Mill, Inc., 279 Ala. 148, 149–50, 182 So. 2d
880, 881 (1966))."
Intergraph, 58 So. 3d at 75.  The Court further explained that
"cases applying the 'reasonable certainty' standard have
rejected imposing a burden on the plaintiff in the first
32
1180808
instance to prove negatives, i.e., to exclude every
conceivable cause for its lost profits."  Intergraph, 58
So. 3d at 76.  Instead, it is incumbent upon a defendant in
such a scenario "to go forward with evidence" of other reasons
for the lost profits, and then the plaintiff has to address
those reasons.  58 So. 3d at 77.  The Intergraph Court quoted
and cited Corson in support of this principle.
The Intergraph Court also directly addressed the issue
whether 
Bentley 
had 
established 
a 
connection 
between
Intergraph's wrongful conduct and Bentley's loss of customer-
maintenance agreements.  Discussing an argument presented by
Intergraph that echoes the defendants' assertion that the
plaintiffs simply assume damages as a result of "liability
evidence," the Court explained:
"Northcut[5] used a 'but for' theory in calculating
Bentley's damages, meaning that he assumed Bentley
would be able to renew the vast majority of the
[purchased software-]maintenance agreements 'but
for' Intergraph's breaches of the APA [asset-
purchase agreement] relating to the provision of
customer data and the renewal of customer contracts. 
He calculated Bentley's losses during the APA year
and the ensuing four years based on Bentley's
5Dana Northcut was Bentley's accounting expert who
testified as to the calculation of damages that resulted from
Bentley's not gaining the renewal of multiple customer
software-maintenance agreements.  
33
1180808
inability to renew those agreements during the APA
year. 
 
Intergraph 
essentially 
complains 
that
Northcut's methodology assumed damages without any
specific customer-by-customer evidence to support
such damages.
"We 
find 
Intergraph's 
argument 
unpersuasive. 
The
fact 
that 
Northcut 
testified 
that 
data 
was
'fundamental' and that damages could be established
'by simple inference' does not mean that damages
were assumed.  It simply means that damages were an
obvious result of Intergraph's behavior because
customer data was vital to retaining the [purchased
software-]maintenance agreements.  As Northcut
testified, there is 'a direct link between the
information provided through this transaction and
Bentley's ability to transition these [purchased
software] seats to Bentley maintenance.'  Moreover,
it is not surprising that Bentley did not base its
calculation on actual customer responses because
customers were not likely to know the reason behind
Bentley's failure to contact them.  Furthermore,
Intergraph fails to provide any authority stating
t h a t  
c u s t o m e r - b y - c u s t o m e r ,  
o r
transaction-by-transaction, evidence is required to
establish damages in a situation involving lost
profits, especially on such a large scale.  In fact,
several cases have held that it is not.
"....
"Greg Bentley, Bentley's president and chief
executive officer, specifically testified that
Bentley had every confidence that it would 'renew
virtually all of the Intergraph maintenance book of
business for [the purchased software] under our
Bentley Select program' in a seamless fashion but
that this did not happen because of the bad and late
data provided by Intergraph, as well as Intergraph's
improper renewal of some maintenance contracts.  He
also testified that the delay in renewals was a
'natural consequence' of bad or late data because
34
1180808
one 'can only sell a maintenance contract for
[purchased] software to someone who is a due
licensee when I know who he is and where he is, and
if I don't know that I can't begin the process of
rolling over a maintenance contract.'  He stated
that there was no other cause for the delay because
Bentley 'did not suffer any such problems with
renewing and continuing our maintenance coverage on
our other products, including those for which the
characteristics 
of 
the 
products 
and 
the
characteristics of the users are as comparable as
can be to the [purchased software] products.'
Bentley's chief operating officer, Malcolm Walter,
testified that Bentley expected to convert all the
[purchased software-]maintenance contracts because
all the customers for the [purchased software]
products were already Bentley customers.  He also
testified 
that 
renewal 
rates 
for 
maintenance
contracts drop after the expiration date of the
contract, so it is vital to begin the renewal
process before the contract expires.  He further
testified 
that 
Intergraph's 
breaches 
had 
a
'significant impact' on Bentley's ability to timely
renew 
the 
[purchased 
software-]maintenance
contracts.  Even one of Intergraph's own witnesses
testified that 'it's very important that you not
have any interruption in the maintenance renewal
process.'
"Through this and other testimony, Bentley
established that its MicroStation product was
required to run most of the [purchased software]
products acquired from Intergraph, that it renewed
a high percentage of its own software-maintenance
agreements that are similar to the [purchased
software-]maintenance agreements, and that, as to
the [purchased software-]maintenance agreements
Bentley was able to renew in its name, it thereafter
retained them at about a 98% annual renewal rate.
Bentley also established that Intergraph's errors in
providing Bentley with information on the [purchased
software-]maintenance agreements were the most
35
1180808
likely cause of its initial lost profits because it
demonstrated that renewal delays were an unexpected
occurrence, given the products involved and the
history of renewals on such maintenance contracts.
... [T]hese facts concerning past performance and
the likelihood of similar future results established
with sufficient certainty that [the purchased
software-]maintenance agreements would have been
renewed but for Intergraph's breaches of the APA,
which in turn established the fact of lost profits
for Bentley."
Intergraph, 58 So. 3d at 74–75 (emphasis added).
The plaintiffs contend Intergraph demonstrates that
customer-by-customer evidence is not required to establish
proximate causation in large-scale lost-profits cases such as
this one.  The plaintiffs emphasize that they presented
evidence that usually only a few schools elect to change
scholastic-recognition-products providers in a given year and
that, during the noncompetition years in which Wiggins and
Urnis left Jostens to join Herff Jones, a total of only seven
schools switched from Jostens to Herff Jones.  They argue that
this evidence indicated that the plaintiffs had a strong
likelihood of retaining the vast majority of the school
accounts formerly serviced by Wiggins and Urnis in their
former territories but for wrongful actions taken by Wiggins,
Urnis, and Jostens, just as Bentley had demonstrated that it
36
1180808
had a strong likelihood of renewing customer software-
maintenance agreements but for Intergraph's wrongful conduct.
The plaintiffs add that they did refute the other
potential reasons for switching scholastic-recognition-
products providers given by the defendants.  Gilbert admitted
that Herff Jones had had some problems with hoodies it
supplied, but he testified that he offered complete refunds
and replacement of the product to customers who were not
satisfied.  Through cross-examination of Wiggins and Urnis,
the plaintiffs showed that some schools were not made aware of
Herff Jones's accommodations for the poorly manufactured
hoodies because Wiggins and Urnis failed to inform those
schools about those accommodations while they were still
employed by GradPro and Herff Jones.  Gilbert also testified
that the diploma issue did not result in any school receiving
its diplomas too late for graduation and that no school that
he was aware of expressed grave disappointment about the
delays in delivery.  The plaintiffs also observe that the
defendants did not provide a single specific example of a
school-administrator change between the 2015-2016 school year
and the 2016-2017 school year for any of the 47 schools on the
37
1180808
blue list.  They also argued that they presented sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that ordinary competition could not
have produced such a drastic shift of school accounts in one
year.  
"The question of proximate causation is ordinarily one
for the jury, if reasonable inferences from the evidence
support the plaintiff's theory."  Garner v. Covington Cty.,
624 So. 2d 1346, 1349 (Ala. 1993).  Nonetheless, according to
the defendants, because there were other potential reasons for
the schools to have switched from Herff Jones to Jostens, in
order for the plaintiffs to satisfy their burden and to
warrant submission of the issue of causation to the jury, the
plaintiffs had to introduce evidence from decision-makers at
each of the 47 schools on the blue list demonstrating that
they would have stayed with Herff Jones but for the wrongful
acts committed by the defendants.  The plaintiffs failed to
provide such direct evidence, and, therefore, the defendants
insist, no causal link was made between the defendants'
conduct and the plaintiffs' loss of the 47 school accounts. 
This argument contains at least two underlying assumptions: 
(1) that the only competent evidence of causation is from
38
1180808
school 
administrative decision-makers and 
(2) 
that 
a 
plaintiff
must provide customer-by-customer evidence to demonstrate
damages.  Neither of those assumptions is correct.
There are several problems with the first assumption.
First, it deprives the jury of its role to determine the
veracity of witness testimony.  See, e.g., Scott v. Farnell,
775 So. 2d 789, 793 (Ala. 2000) (observing that "it is within
the province of the jury ... to weigh the credibility of
witnesses").  As the defendants have noted, they presented
testimony from principals at two of the high schools on the
blue list that switched from Herff Jones to Jostens during the
year Wiggins and Urnis were supposed to be honoring their
noncompetition agreements.  Those two principals testified
that their schools did not switch scholastic-recognition-
products providers because of wrongful conduct by the
defendants.  Under the defendants' argument, their testimony
settled the issue with respect to those two schools.  However,
the jury was free to believe or disbelieve, or assign whatever
weight and credibility it chose, to the testimony of those two
principals, and the same would have been true for any of the
decision-makers at the other 45 schools if they had been
39
1180808
called to testify.  For example, it could be inferred from the
evidence that at least some school administrators actually
switched their schools' accounts from Herff Jones to Jostens
because Wiggins gave those administrators a heads-up that he
was leaving Herff Jones to go to Jostens and that Wiggins had
promised the administrators that he would be the one taking
care of their school's account at Jostens.  But a reasonable
jury could surmise why a school administrator might hesitate
to testify that this was the case because of his or her
relationship with Wiggins.  In short, because direct evidence
could not have settled the issue of causation for the jury any
more than circumstantial evidence would do so, it is difficult
to conclude that the plaintiffs were required to submit direct
evidence in order to meet their burden and that the
circumstantial evidence should be disregarded.
Second, the defendants' assumption that only school
administrative 
decision-makers 
could 
present 
competent
causation testimony presumes that those administrators would
have been aware of that the defendants' conduct was wrongful. 
In Intergraph, the Court noted:  "[I]t is not surprising that
Bentley did not base its calculation on actual customer
40
1180808
responses because customers were not likely to know the reason
behind Bentley's failure to contact them."  Intergraph, 58
So. 3d at 74.  The same observation holds in this case:  much
of the wrongful conduct the plaintiffs accused the defendants
of committing was "behind the scenes," secretly carried out
between Wiggins, Urnis, and Jostens.  Because of this, it is
quite conceivable, for example, that some schools switched
because of product prices offered by Jostens without being
aware that Jostens's pricing models were based on 
confidential
information concerning Herff Jones's prices that had been
provided by Wiggins and/or Urnis.  Thus, testimony from school
administrative decision-makers would not necessarily shed
light on the causal connection between the defendants'
wrongful conduct and the schools switching their scholastic-
recognition-products providers.  Again, if direct testimony
may or may not be helpful in establishing whether there was a
causal 
connection 
between 
the 
defendants' wrongful 
conduct 
and
the plaintiffs' loss of school accounts, it is difficult to
understand why the defendants would be required to present
such evidence to meet their burden.
41
1180808
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the defendants'
position presumes that causation may be proved only by direct
evidence; this is simply not the case.  
"There is nothing wrong with a case built around
sufficient circumstantial evidence, provided the
circumstances are proved and not merely presumed.
Richards v. Eaves, 273 Ala. 120, 135 So. 2d 384
(1961).  Any judgment in such a case must
necessarily involve some amount of speculation or
inference by the jury.  There is conjecture only
where there are two or more plausible explanations
of causation, and the evidence does not logically
point to one any more than the other.  Where the
evidence does logically point in one direction more
than another, then a jury can reasonably infer that
things occurred in that way."
Folmar v. Montgomery Fair Co., 293 Ala. 686, 690, 309 So. 2d
818, 821 (1975).  As this Court has repeatedly emphasized:
"'"'Circumstantial evidence is in nowise considered inferior
evidence and is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence
provided it points to the guilt of the accused.'"'"  Wiggins
v. Mobile Greyhound Park, LLP, [Ms. 1170874, May 3, 2019] ___
So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2019) (quoting Edwards v. State, 139 So.
3d 827, 836-37 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013), quoting in turn
Hollaway v. State, 979 So. 2d 839, 843 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007),
quoting in turn White v. State, 546 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1989)).  As long as the circumstantial evidence
42
1180808
presented by the plaintiffs was sufficient to allow the jury
to reasonably infer that wrongful acts by the defendants led
to the plaintiffs' loss of the 47 school accounts, direct
evidence was not required to submit the issue of causation to
the jury.  See Bell v. Colony Apartments Co., 568 So. 2d 805,
810–11 (Ala. 1990) ("A fact is established by circumstantial
evidence if it can be reasonably inferred from the facts and
circumstances adduced.").
It is true that the defendants presented several other
potential reasons schools switched their accounts from Herff
Jones to Jostens, but, in evaluating the trial court's ruling
on a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, we must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs as
the nonmovants and entertain any reasonable inferences the
jury would be free to draw.  See DISA Industries, 272 So. 3d
at 148.  There was overwhelming evidence that Wiggins and
Urnis 
violated 
their 
noncompetition agreements.  
Evidence 
also
strongly 
indicated 
that 
Jostens 
used 
Herff 
Jones's
confidential information that it had obtained from Wiggins
and/or Urnis to win school accounts in Wiggins's and Urnis's
former territories.  There was also evidence indicating that
43
1180808
Wiggins and Urnis knew before they had left their employment
with GradPro and Herff Jones that most of the schools they
serviced would switch to Jostens during the year of their
noncompetition agreements.  Internal Jostens documents
likewise indicated that Jostens was under the impression it
would win the vast majority of Wiggins's and Urnis's former
school accounts during Wiggins's and Urnis's noncompetition-
agreement year.  Finally, there was the undeniable fact that
the number of school accounts lost by Herff Jones and acquired
by Jostens in one school-year cycle was unprecedented. 
Normally, only a few schools changed providers in a given
territory each year, and the most school accounts Moore had
ever previously won for Jostens from another provider in a
single year was five.  In the years of Wiggins's and Urnis's
noncompetition 
agreements 
when 
they 
left 
Jostens 
for
employment at Herff Jones, a total of seven schools switched
providers.  But before the 2016-2017 school year -- the year
Wiggins and Urnis were supposed to be honoring their
noncompetition agreements with GradPro and Herff Jones before
starting to work for Jostens -- Moore won 47 schools for
Jostens in the territories formerly serviced by Wiggins and
44
1180808
Urnis for GradPro and Herff Jones, which constituted 80
percent of GradPro's school accounts.  Given all the
foregoing, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a
jury to reasonably infer that the defendants' wrongful conduct
was the actual reason the schools on the blue list changed
scholastic-recognition-products providers.  
The defendants second assumption -- that the plaintiffs
had to provide customer-by-customer evidence of causation to
prove damages -- is also flawed.  As we explained earlier, the
parties' positions on this issue are framed by their reliance
on different cases from this Court:  the defendants rely on
Corson and the plaintiffs rely on Intergraph.  The portions of
those cases relied upon by the parties address causation for
lost-profits damages.  In Corson, the Court faulted Universal
for failing to establish that Universal would have received
the business of each of the lost customers but for Corson's
violation of his nonsolicitation covenant with Universal.  In
Intergraph, this Court did not require Bentley to introduce
evidence demonstrating that each lost customer chose not to
renew its software-maintenance contracts with Bentley because
of the bad and late data Intergraph provided to Bentley to
45
1180808
establish 
a 
causal 
connection between 
Intergraph's 
conduct 
and
the damages requested by Bentley.  
Corson is superficially similar to this case in that it
involved a former employee's violation of a nonsolicitation
covenant.  But with respect to the issue whether customer-by-
customer evidence is necessary to establish causation,
Intergraph presents a closer parallel.  It involved customer
loss on a large scale, whereas Corson involved the alleged
loss of four customers by Universal to Alabama Door as a
result of Corson's breach of his nonsolicitation covenant.  As
the difference in the evidentiary requirements in the two
cases no doubt reflects, whether presenting customer-by-
customer evidence is practical and feasible plays a role in
determining whether it should be part of the plaintiff's
burden 
in 
establishing 
damages 
for 
lost 
profits.6 
Furthermore, 
in 
Intergraph 
Bentley 
presented 
evidence
indicating that it had a high confidence that it would have
obtained the software-maintenance contracts that had belonged
6In 
this 
regard, 
the 
plaintiffs assert 
that 
putting 
school
administrative decision-makers on the stand from each school
potentially could have put more strain on Herff Jones's
relationships with those schools, further diminishing any
chance the plaintiffs might have in the future of convincing
those schools to switch back to Herff Jones.
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to Intergraph upon their expiration, just as the plaintiffs
presented evidence indicating that most schools did not
routinely change scholastic-recognition-products providers
after each year and the volume of school accounts lost by
Herff Jones in the 2016-2017 school year was disproportionate
to the typical number of annual lost accounts.  In contrast,
in Corson, Universal failed to present any 
evidence indicating
that it would have retained three of the four customers in
question.  See Corson, 596 So. 2d at 571 (observing that
"testimony revealed that [the three customers], and 
nearly all
the companies on Universal's customer list, periodically
contracted for products and service with Alabama Door and
other competitors of Universal before, during, and after
Corson's employment with Universal").  Given the parallels
between Intergraph and this case in contrast to Corson in the
context of customer-by-customer evidence and the facts that
Intergraph is the more recent of the two precedents and that
the Intergraph Court acknowledged Corson for a 
different legal
principle, we find the analysis in Intergraph to be more
persuasive for the situation presented here.  Accordingly, we
conclude that the plaintiffs were not required to present
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customer-by-customer evidence as to why each of the 47 schools
on the blue list switched scholastic-recognition-products
providers from Herff Jones to Jostens to establish a causal
connection between the defendants' wrongful conduct and the
plaintiffs' loss of school accounts before the 2016-2017
school year.
IV.  Conclusion
The plaintiffs were not required to present direct,
customer-by-customer evidence of the reasons each of the 47
blue-list schools switched from Herff Jones to Jostens in
order for the issue of causation to be submitted to the jury. 
The plaintiffs presented ample circumstantial evidence that
would allow the jury to infer that the defendants' wrongful
conduct led to the plaintiffs' loss of the school accounts at
issue.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying
the defendants' renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of
law.
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers,
Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
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