Title: McCain v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Goodwyn, JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 
 
TYRONE JUNIOR MCCAIN 
 
v.  Record No. 071189                      OPINION BY 
JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
      April 18, 2008 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this case we consider the circumstances under which a 
law enforcement officer may, within the confines of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution (“the Fourth 
Amendment”), conduct a “pat-down” search for weapons on a 
passenger in a vehicle whose driver was stopped for a traffic 
violation. 
Tyrone Junior McCain (”McCain”) was charged in the 
Danville Circuit Court with possession of cocaine with the 
intent to distribute, possession of a firearm while possessing 
cocaine with the intent to distribute, possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon, and carrying a concealed weapon.  Prior 
to trial, McCain filed a motion to suppress, claiming that 
evidence was seized from him in violation of his 
constitutional rights.  The trial court denied the motion to 
suppress, and convicted McCain on all charges. 
McCain appealed to the Court of Appeals.  In an 
unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
convictions.  McCain v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0110-06-3 
(May 8, 2007).  McCain appeals. 
In the early morning hours of August 9, 2005, Officer 
R.V. Worsham (“Worsham”), of the City of Danville Police 
Department, observed a vehicle (“the vehicle”) parked in front 
of a house on Sublett’s Alley in the City of Danville.  The 
two occupants of the vehicle walked up to the house in front 
of which the vehicle was parked and, in less than a minute, 
returned to the vehicle.  Worsham was familiar with the house 
because he was involved in a transaction “months” earlier in 
which an informant made a controlled purchase of cocaine 
there. 
When the vehicle left, Worsham followed in his police 
vehicle.  Worsham observed that the vehicle’s rear license 
plate had a plastic border that covered the expiration date of 
the license plate.  He intended to stop the vehicle for that 
reason, but “before [he] could get to it to stop it for that, 
it was [improperly] backing out into North Main Street.”  
Worsham initiated a traffic stop. Worsham stopped the vehicle 
within sight of the house where Worsham had first seen the 
vehicle.  
Worsham approached the vehicle and asked the driver, 
Kelly Hartman (“Hartman”), for her license.  McCain was the 
 
 
 
 
3
front seat passenger.  McCain, whom Worsham already knew, 
identified himself truthfully.  Worsham obtained Hartman’s 
information and went back to his car to check her driver’s 
license and to call for “back-up” assistance.  
Hartman’s driver’s license was reported suspended.  
Worsham went back to the vehicle and asked McCain if he had a 
license, so that he could drive the vehicle without it being 
towed.  McCain told Worsham that his license also was 
suspended.  Because both drivers’ licenses were suspended, 
Worsham needed to conduct an inventory of the vehicle’s 
contents and have it towed.  When Officer E.K. Thompson 
(“Thompson”) arrived on the scene, Worsham explained to him 
what had occurred and asked Thompson to watch the passenger 
side of the vehicle while Worsham got the driver out.  Worsham 
asked the driver to exit the vehicle.  She did so and 
consented to a search of her person and the vehicle.  
Thompson went to the passenger side of the car and asked 
McCain to exit the car.  Thompson asked McCain if he could 
perform a “frisk” or “pat-down” search on McCain.  Up to that 
point, McCain had complied with every request made by the 
officers.  McCain declined to give Thompson permission for the 
search.  However, Thompson ordered McCain to place his hands 
on the vehicle and performed a pat-down search on him. 
 
 
 
 
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Thompson testified that McCain seemed nervous as Thompson 
began to pat him down and that Worsham had told him that he 
thought McCain was “edgy.”  When McCain removed his hands from 
the car, Thompson grabbed McCain by the arm and put him back 
on the car and said, “Look, don’t be coming off the car like 
that cause I take that as a sign of aggression towards me.”  
Thompson continued the pat-down and found keys in McCain’s 
pocket.  Later during the pat-down search, Thompson asked 
McCain if he had any weapons on his person, and McCain said 
that he had a gun, at which time Thompson removed a gun from 
McCain’s waistband and placed him under arrest.  During a 
search incident to the arrest, Worsham discovered cocaine in 
McCain’s pocket. 
The neighborhood where the traffic stop occurred had been 
patrolled by Worsham for almost five years and was “known for 
the drugs, known for shots fired, being called [in] all the 
time [,] . . . probably at least once a night shift.”  In 
fact, Thompson, who also regularly patrolled the area, 
testified that, “for officer safety,” he conducts a pat-down 
search of every person he interacts with in that neighborhood, 
whether they want him to or not.  Thompson testified, “If I’m 
getting out for a reason to talk to somebody I would 
definitely pat them down for my safety.”  The trial court 
 
 
 
 
5
found that McCain was seized for purposes of the pat-down 
search, but that his detention for that purpose was 
constitutional. 
DISCUSSION 
McCain claims that he was subjected to an unlawful 
seizure and search and that all evidence obtained as a result 
thereof should have been suppressed.  The Commonwealth 
contends that, under the circumstances, the police officer’s 
seizure and search of McCain was constitutional. 
A defendant’s claim that evidence was seized in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and 
fact that we review de novo on appeal.  Murphy v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 573, 570 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2002); 
see Bolden v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 465, 470, 561 S.E.2d 701, 
704 (2002); McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 489, 545 
S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 
U.S. 690, 691, 699 (1996).  In making such a determination, we 
give deference to the factual findings of the circuit court, 
but we independently determine whether the manner in which the 
evidence was obtained meets the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Bolden, 263 Va. at 470, 561 S.E.2d at 704; McCain, 
261 Va. at 490, 545 S.E.2d at 545; Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 
Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000).  The defendant has 
 
 
 
 
6
the burden to show that, considering the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trial court’s denial 
of his suppression motion was reversible error.  Bolden, 263 
Va. at 470, 561 S.E.2d at 704; McCain, 261 Va. at 490, 545 
S.E.2d at 545; Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 
S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980). 
Whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated is a 
question to be determined from all the circumstances.  Samson 
v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); see Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).  Review of the existence of 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion involves application of 
an objective rather than a subjective standard.  Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); Bass, 259 Va. at 475, 525 
S.E.2d at 923-24; Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217, 491 
S.E.2d 721, 722 (1997); Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 
609, 611-12, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988); Leeth v. 
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340, 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982). 
Under well-settled principles of law, police officers may 
stop a person for the purpose of investigating possible 
criminal behavior even though no probable cause exists for an 
arrest.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.  A stop is permissible so long 
as the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
criminal activity may be afoot.  United States v. Sokolow, 490 
 
 
 
 
7
U.S. 1, 7 (1989).  To establish reasonable suspicion, an 
officer must be able to articulate more than an 
unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” that criminal activity 
is afoot.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000).  
The character of the location and the time at which a person 
is observed are relevant factors, but they do not supply a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal 
activity on the part of the particular person stopped.  See 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1979); Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
at 124. 
Worsham observed McCain go to a house on Sublett’s Alley 
and return to a parked car in less than a minute.  Worsham did 
not observe any suspected drug activity or transaction when 
McCain went to the house, but he was aware of a controlled 
purchase of drugs at the house “months” before McCain 
approached the house, which is in a “high drug” area. 
McCain’s brief presence at a house the officer associated 
with drug activity months prior does not support a reasonable 
inference of criminal activity.  The record does not contain 
any evidence concerning the purpose of McCain’s visit or any 
suspicious behavior during the visit.  A person’s Fourth 
Amendment rights are not lessened simply because he or she 
happens to live or travel in a “high crime” area.  Despite the 
 
 
 
 
8
neighborhood, the activity Worsham observed on Sublett’s Alley 
was not sufficient to stop McCain because of a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.  However, Worsham did have a 
legitimate basis for stopping the vehicle McCain was traveling 
in. 
An officer may effect a traffic stop when he has 
reasonable suspicion to believe a traffic or equipment 
violation has occurred.  Bass, 259 Va. at 475, 525 S.E.2d at 
923-24.  Here, Worsham had probable cause to stop the vehicle 
in which McCain was riding when Worsham observed both an 
equipment violation and a traffic infraction.  Thus, although 
there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the 
part of McCain, stopping the vehicle in which McCain was 
traveling was constitutionally permissible because of the 
traffic and equipment violations that Worsham observed. 
During the course of a traffic stop, an officer may take 
certain steps to protect himself, such as asking the driver 
and any passengers to exit the vehicle.  Maryland v. Wilson, 
519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997).  “[P]olice officers may also 
detain passengers beside an automobile until the completion of 
a lawful traffic stop.”  Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 
554, 562, 500 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1998) (citing Hatcher v. 
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 487, 491-92, 419 S.E.2d 256, 259 
 
 
 
 
9
(1992)).  An officer’s authority to order an occupant from a 
vehicle during a traffic stop is justified by the potential 
risks associated with traffic investigation that implicate 
safety concerns.  Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-14; see Pennsylvania 
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977).  There was nothing 
constitutionally improper about Thompson asking McCain to exit 
the vehicle, nor was it improper to detain McCain during the 
traffic stop.  The resolution of McCain’s motion to suppress 
hinges upon the constitutional propriety of subjecting McCain 
to a seizure and pat-down search after he exited the vehicle. 
 
“Because a frisk or ‘pat-down’ is substantially more 
intrusive than an order to exit a vehicle, . . . an officer 
must have justification for a frisk or a ‘pat-down’ beyond the 
mere justification for the traffic stop.”  United States v. 
Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998).  An officer may not 
automatically search a driver or his passengers pursuant to 
the issuance of a traffic citation or in the course of a Terry 
stop, but he may frisk the driver and passengers for weapons 
if he develops reasonable suspicion during the traffic or 
Terry stop to believe the particular person to be frisked is 
armed and dangerous.  Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-18 
(1998); see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).  
“Even in high crime areas, where the possibility that any 
 
 
 
 
10
given individual is armed is significant, Terry requires 
reasonable, individualized suspicion before a frisk for 
weapons can be conducted.”  Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 
334 n.2 (1990). 
Circumstances relevant in this analysis include 
characteristics of the area surrounding the stop, the time of 
the stop, the specific conduct of the suspect individual, the 
character of the offense under suspicion, and the unique 
perspective of a police officer trained and experienced in the 
detection of crime. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28; Whitfield v. 
Commonwealth, 265 Va. 358, 362, 576 S.E.2d 463, 465 (2003).  
Nervousness during the course of a traffic stop, standing 
alone, is insufficient to justify a frisk for weapons, but 
“nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor” for 
consideration in assessing the totality of the circumstances.  
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 
U.S. 1, 6 (1984); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8-9)). 
 
Here, the circumstances establish that McCain was a 
passenger in a vehicle stopped for a relatively minor traffic 
infraction.  Worsham and Thompson detained McCain solely 
because of the actions of the driver.  Neither officer 
articulated a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
 
 
 
 
11
implicating McCain, and viewing the circumstances objectively, 
none existed.  Also, McCain’s actions gave the officers no 
legitimate reasonable suspicion that he was armed and 
dangerous.  Although the character of the location and the 
time are relevant factors, they did not provide either officer 
a particularized and objective basis for suspecting McCain was 
armed and dangerous. 
Worsham may have had a hunch that McCain was involved 
with drugs because of the neighborhood and the house McCain 
visited; however, such a hunch does not rise to the level of 
reasonable suspicion.  The officers’ interaction with McCain 
during the traffic stop in no way supported this hunch, 
because the officers did not observe or notice any drugs, odor 
of drugs, or drug paraphernalia in the vehicle.  Further, the 
officers did not notice any physical or mental impairment that 
would indicate drug use by McCain, and there were no physical 
or other characteristics observed by the officers that 
indicated McCain might be armed and dangerous.  Although he 
may have appeared to be nervous, McCain identified himself 
when requested, did not make any furtive movements, and 
cooperated with the police officers until Thompson asked 
permission to do a pat-down search. 
 
 
 
 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Terry does not permit a 
generalized policy that authorizes a police officer to frisk 
all persons.  The totality of the circumstances, namely, the 
time of day, the location in a “high crime” area, and the fact 
that Worsham had months earlier conducted a controlled cocaine 
purchase from the house McCain visited on Sublett’s Alley, did 
not create reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify 
detaining and frisking McCain.  No additional circumstances 
developed during the course of the traffic stop that would 
support a reasonable suspicion that McCain was involved in 
criminal activity or was armed and dangerous.  Therefore, we 
hold that McCain was seized and frisked in violation of his 
rights under the Fourth Amendment, and his motion to suppress 
should have been granted. 
Because the evidence seized from McCain should have been 
suppressed, there would be insufficient evidence to sustain 
convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute and the related firearms and weapons offenses.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, vacate McCain’s convictions, and dismiss the 
indictments against him. 
Reversed, vacated and dismissed. 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE CARRICO, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ and JUSTICE 
KINSER join, dissenting.  
 
 
 
 
13
 
 
I agree with the majority that to justify a “pat-down 
search,” the rule is that “the police officer must be able to 
point to specific and articulable facts” showing that 
“criminal activity may be afoot” and that the suspect “may be 
armed and presently dangerous.”  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
21, 30 (1968).  I do not agree, however, that in applying the 
rule in this case the majority has reached the correct 
conclusion.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
In my opinion, the police in this case did point to 
specific and articulable facts sufficient to satisfy the rule.  
An investigating officer “need not be absolutely certain” that 
criminal activity may be afoot or that the suspect may be 
armed and dangerous.  Id. at 27.  An assessment of the 
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure must “be 
judged against an objective standard:  would the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the 
search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ 
that the action taken was appropriate.”  Id. at 21-22 (quoting 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
Here, the confrontation between the police and the 
defendant occurred near 3:00 a.m. in a high-crime and high-
drug area of the City of Danville where the police receive 
reports of  “shots fired . . . at least once a night shift.”  
 
 
 
 
14
Officer Worsham had participated months before in a controlled 
drug buy in the very house he saw the defendant and Kelly 
Hartman enter and then within one minute return to their 
vehicle on the night in question. 
The fact that Officer Worsham did not specify the number 
of months the drug buy preceded the present confrontation does 
not, in my view, diminish the probative value of his 
testimony.  The drug buy obviously made a lasting impression 
upon him; it was still fresh in his mind; and it is a relevant 
circumstance in an objective assessment of the reasonableness 
of his actions.  Furthermore, Officer Thompson testified that 
when he arrived on the scene Officer Worsham told him before 
he patted down the defendant that the house “was known for 
selling drugs” (emphasis added), indicating that Officer 
Worsham had recent information that the house was a continuing 
site of drug activity. 
The foregoing are specific and articulable facts that 
would, as I see the case, warrant a person of reasonable 
caution in the belief that criminal activity, i.e., the 
purchase of illicit drugs, may have been afoot on the 
defendant’s visit to the house in question.  And, because the 
suspected criminal activity that may have been afoot was drug 
related, the same facts would warrant a person of reasonable 
 
 
 
 
15
caution in the belief that the defendant was armed and 
dangerous, posing a threat to the safety of the police 
officers and others.  In Jones v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692, 
636 S.E.2d 403 (2006), this Court took special note of the 
“attendant dangers of violence in the drug trade.”  Id. at 701 
& n.3, 636 S.E.2d at 407 & n.3 (citing United States v. 
Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (“it is 
reasonable for an officer to believe a person may be armed and 
dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a 
drug transaction”), and United States v. Grogins, 163 F.3d 
795, 799 (4th Cir. 1998) (“the connection between illegal drug 
operations and guns in our society is a tight one”)). 
 
Officer safety in the Fourth Amendment context is a 
subject of great concern to the courts.  Indeed, it was a 
pivotal consideration in the approval of a “stop and frisk” 
rule in Terry.  392 U.S. at 10.  There, the Supreme Court 
stated as follows: 
Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police 
officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their 
duties.  American criminals have a long tradition of armed 
violence, and every year in this country many law 
enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and 
thousands more are wounded. Virtually all of these deaths 
and a substantial portion of the injuries are inflicted with 
guns and knives. 
 
 
In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the 
need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and 
other prospective victims of violence in situations where 
 
 
 
 
16
they may lack probable cause for an arrest.  When an officer 
is justified in believing that the individual whose 
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is 
armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, 
it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the 
officer the power to take necessary measures to determine 
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to 
neutralize the threat of physical harm. 
 
392 U.S. at 23-24. 
 
And the concern for officer safety does not change 
because the suspect happens to be, as the defendant was in 
this case, a passenger in a motor vehicle.  “[T]he same 
weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of 
whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or 
passenger.”  Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997).  
“[W]hen drugs are suspected in a vehicle and the suspicion is 
not readily attributable to any particular person in the 
vehicle, it is reasonable to conclude that all occupants of 
the vehicle are suspect.  They are in the restricted space of 
the vehicle presumably by choice and presumably on a common 
mission.”  United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 
1998).   Finally, in Lansdown v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204, 
308 S.E.2d 106 (1983), involving a passenger in a van occupied 
by several persons and driven recklessly by the driver, this 
Court stated as follows: 
If, as we now hold, Officer Missouri was justified in 
believing the van’s occupants might be armed, the possible 
 
 
 
 
17
danger to the officer would have been just as great from an 
armed passenger as from an armed driver.  The law does not 
expect that a police officer must gamble on turning away 
from a possible danger and chance taking a bullet in the 
back merely because of the status of a vehicle’s occupants. 
 
Id. at 212, 308 S.E.2d at 111.   
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.