Title: Jennifer Lynn Jordan, a minor, by and through her mother and next friend, Amanda Jordan v. Robin Calloway, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Amanda Calloway, deceased

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 9/19/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2008
____________________
1070354
____________________
Jennifer Lynn Jordan, a minor, by and through her mother and
next friend, Amanda Jordan
v.
Robin Calloway, individually and as the personal
representative of the estate of Amanda Calloway, deceased
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court 
(CV-06-1073)
SEE, Justice.
Jennifer Lynn Jordan, a minor, by and through her mother
and next friend, Amanda Jordan, appeals from the trial court's
1070354
2
denial of her motion for a new trial in a tort action
resulting from an automobile accident.  We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On March 30, 2004, in Orange Beach, Jennifer, who was
then 14 years old, was a passenger in an automobile driven by
Amanda Calloway ("Amanda"), who was then 16 years old.  The
automobile driven by Amanda and owned by her mother, Robin
Calloway, struck the rear end of a truck that was stopped at
a traffic signal.  Jennifer, who was sitting in the front
passenger seat, injured her knee when it struck the dashboard
during the collision.  At the time of the collision, the truck
had been sitting at the traffic signal for 15 to 30 seconds
and the road was straight, with no obstructions between Amanda
and the truck.  Jennifer did not receive any medical treatment
at the scene of the accident, but two days later she
complained of knee pain and went to her doctor.  Jennifer's
knee pain worsened, and in June 2005, Jennifer underwent the
first of three surgeries; she had the second surgery in
September 2005 and the third in June 2006.  Jennifer's mother,
Amanda Jordan ("Jordan"), as Jennifer's next friend, filed
this action on Jennifer's behalf against Robin Calloway
1070354
Amanda, who had a history of cancer, died from cancer in
1
April 2004.  
Amanda was first diagnosed with cancer in her right leg
2
and hip in 2000.  After treatment, Amanda's doctors thought
she was free of cancer, but in July 2003 Amanda was diagnosed
with a cancerous tumor on her skull, which was surgically
removed. In January 2004, Amanda was diagnosed with an
inoperable cancerous brain tumor, and she died in April 2004.
3
("Calloway"), individually and as personal representative of
the estate of Amanda,  alleging that Calloway had wantonly
1
and/or negligently entrusted the vehicle to Amanda, and that
Amanda had wantonly operated it.  Calloway filed a motion in
limine in the trial court to prevent Jordan from entering
Amanda's medical records into evidence,  arguing that the
2
records had not been properly authenticated and that they
lacked probative value.  Jordan argued that the records were
authenticated because they were produced by Calloway in
response to a discovery request.  The trial court granted the
motion in limine to exclude the medical records, agreeing with
Calloway that the records were not properly authenticated and
that they lacked probative value.  
After opening statements, Jordan moved the court to
reconsider the motion in limine, arguing that Calloway had
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4
"opened the door" for the medical records to be admitted into
evidence 
by 
discussing 
Amanda's 
medical history in her opening
statement, specifically 
the dimensions 
and 
extent of the brain
tumor that had been discovered in January 2004.  Calloway
responded that there was nothing in the opening statement that
could not be testified to by her.  The trial court, however,
allowed Amanda's medical records from the University of South
Alabama Medical Center to be admitted into evidence because
"they 
are 
properly 
authenticated," 
but 
it 
continued 
to 
exclude
her 
records 
from 
Nemours 
Children's 
Clinic, 
Alabama 
Orthopedic
Clinic, and the University of Alabama Pediatric Oncology
Clinic. 
During the trial, Jordan testified, in support of
Jennifer's mental anguish claim, that the medical bills from
Jennifer's knee surgeries had placed Jordan's family in a
precarious financial condition and that they could not afford
to pay both Jennifer's medical bills and their regular
household expenses.  During cross-examination, Calloway's
attorney asked Jordan whether she had recently purchased a new
car for Jennifer.  Both parties were subject to a motion in
limine preventing them from disclosing a pretrial insurance
1070354
5
settlement 
between 
Jordan 
and 
Calloway's 
automobile-liability-
insurance carrier.  Jordan had paid for the car, at least in
part, with the proceeds from the settlement with the insurance
carrier.  The trial court allowed the question over Jordan's
objection and refused to allow Jordan to mention the insurance
settlement in her answer. 
At the close of Jordan's case, Calloway moved for a
judgment as a matter of law ("JML") on Jordan's claims.  The
trial court entered a JML as to the wanton-entrustment claim
against Calloway, but it denied a JML as to the negligent-
entrustment claim against Calloway and as to the wantonness
claim against Amanda's estate.  The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Calloway on both the negligent-entrustment claim and
the wantonness claim.  Jordan moved for a new trial.  The
trial court denied the motion, and Jordan now appeals.  
Issues
Jordan raises three issues in her appeal: (1) whether the
trial court erred in excluding Amanda's medical records, other
than her records from the University of South Alabama Medical
Center; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing cross-
examination of Jordan as to the purchase of the new car for
1070354
6
Jennifer; and (3) whether the trial court erred in entering a
JML on Jordan's wanton-entrustment claim. 
Standard of Review
"'The decision to grant or to deny a motion for
a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court.'  Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827
So. 2d 63, 73 (Ala. 2001); Hill v. Cherry, 379 So.
2d 590 (Ala. 1980).  'A denial of a motion for a new
trial strengthens the presumption of correctness
afforded a jury verdict.'  Bowers, 827 So. 2d at 73.
This Court will not disturb the decision of the
trial court 'unless the verdict is against the
preponderance of the evidence or is clearly wrong or
unjust.'  Bowers, 827 So. 2d at 73."
Keibler-Thompson Corp. v. Steading, 907 So. 2d 435, 440 (Ala.
2005).
"The standard applicable to a review of a trial
court's rulings on the admission of evidence is
determined by two fundamental principles.  The first
grants trial judges wide discretion to exclude or to
admit evidence.  'The test is that the evidence must
... shed light on the main inquiry, and not withdraw
attention from the main inquiry.'  Atkins v. Lee,
603 So. 2d 937 (Ala. 1992) (citing Ryan v. Acuff,
435 So. 2d 1244 (Ala. 1983)).  The second principle
'is that a judgment cannot be reversed on appeal for
an error unless ... it should appear that the error
complained of has probably injuriously affected
substantial rights of the parties.'"  Atkins, 603
So. 2d at 941.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Thompson, 726 So. 2d 651, 655 (Ala
1998). 
1070354
7
"In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion
for a judgment as a matter of law, we apply the same
standard the trial court applied initially in
granting or denying the motion. Palm Harbor Homes,
Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997).  The
nonmovant must present substantial evidence to
withstand a motion for a judgment as a matter of
law. Palm Harbor Homes; West v. Founders Life
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1989).  When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a
judgment as a matter of law, this Court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, entertaining any reasonable inferences
that the jury would have been free to draw.  Carter
v. Henderson, 598 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1992).  This
Court indulges no presumption of correctness as to
the trial court's rulings on questions of law."
Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So. 2d 1126
(Ala. 1992).
Keibler-Thompson Corp., 907 So. 2d at 440.
Analysis
I.
Jordan's 
first 
argument 
is 
that 
the 
trial 
court
improperly excluded Amanda's medical records as not being
properly authenticated.  In Alabama Power Co. v. Tatum, 293
Ala. 500, 508, 306 So. 2d 251, 258 (1975), this Court held:
"It is an established rule of evidence in this state
that a party is relieved from the necessity of
proving the authenticity of a document which he
offers in evidence when such document is produced by
the adverse party on notice or motion, and the party
producing the document is a party to the instrument
or claims a beneficial interest thereunder."
1070354
8
Calloway, however, argues that Tatum should be read to include
only those documents created by the party to the action.  We
need not address this question, however, because this Court
will not reverse the trial court's decision to deny a motion,
including a motion for a new trial, unless, "after an
examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the
error complained of has probably injuriously affected
substantial rights of the parties."  Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P.
The trial court granted Calloway's motion in limine to exclude
all Amanda's medical records on the grounds, first, that the
records were not properly authenticated and, second, that the
records were not probative.  
After Calloway's opening statement, Jordan moved the
trial court to reconsider its ruling excluding the medical
records.  She argued that in her opening statement Calloway
had "opened the door" to admitting the records by discussing
Amanda's medical condition in general, by mentioning the
specific size of her brain tumor, and by comparing Amanda to
a normal 16-year-old.  The trial court concluded that the
medical records from the University of South Alabama Medical
Center 
had 
been 
"authenticated" 
and 
were 
therefore 
admissible.
1070354
Those excluded medical records contained treatment
3
information regarding (1) seizures Amanda had occasionally
suffered 
from, 
the 
last 
one 
having 
occurred 
approximately 
four
years before the accident; (2) Amanda's earlier bouts with
cancer; and (3) Amanda's final treatment for brain cancer,
which took place two weeks after the accident and during which
she died.
9
Those records contained the CT scan that had been performed on
Amanda, showing the size and location of the brain tumor she
was suffering from at the time of the accident.  The trial
court continued to exclude Amanda's remaining medical
records.  
3
Jordan argues that under Holly v. Huntsville Hospital,
865 So. 2d 1177 (Ala. 2003), the trial court's decision to
exclude the medical records is reversible error.  In Holly,
after the defendant doctor testified that he had not breached
the standard of care, the trial court would not allow the
plaintiff's expert witnesses to testify as to the standard of
care.  This prevented the plaintiffs from responding to the
doctor's testimony as to the standard of care and as to
whether he had breached it.  On appeal, the doctor argued that
the error in not allowing the plaintiff's experts to testify
as to the standard of care was harmless because, he argued,
the plaintiffs were allowed to introduce sufficient expert
1070354
10
testimony to present a prima facie case as to whether the
defendant was liable, and, therefore, it was not prejudicial
to exclude the expert witnesses' testimony on the particular
issue of the standard of care.  This Court stated that the
exclusion of evidence is reversible error if the evidence
"'"goes to settle an ultimate issue in the case and ... is
different from the testimony given by the witnesses who have
already testified."'"  865 So. 2d at 1188 (quoting State ex
rel. Pryor v. Cupps, 770 So. 2d 1111, 1112 (Ala. Civ. App.
2000), quoting in turn C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence
§ 10.6 at 34 (5th ed. 1996)).  
This case is distinguishable from Holly because in Holly
the excluded evidence went to the doctor's liability and
directly contradicted the doctor's own testimony concerning
his breach of the standard of care.  In the case before us,
Calloway testified and was cross-examined on the information
contained in the medical records.  The excluded medical
records would have been cumulative in that they would not have
contradicted or differed from Calloway's testimony.  "The
exclusion 
of 
admissible 
evidence 
does 
not 
constitute
reversible error where the evidence 'would have been merely
1070354
11
cumulative of other evidence of the same nature, which was
admitted.'"  Houston v. State, 565 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1990) (quoting Ex parte Lawson, 476 So. 2d 122, 122 (Ala.
1985).  Therefore, the trial court's error, if any, in finding
that the excluded medical records were not properly
authenticated was not prejudicial to Jordan, and we affirm the
trial court's denial of Jordan's motion for a new trial on
this issue.  See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P.
II.
Jordan argues that by allowing Calloway to ask on cross-
examination whether Jordan had purchased a new car, the trial
court permitted inadmissible evidence regarding Jordan's
general wealth or poverty.  See Marks v. Intergraph Corp.,
Inc., 740 So. 2d 1066, 1068 ("Reference to a party's wealth or
poverty is generally not permitted under Alabama law.").
However, 
in 
support 
of 
Jennifer's 
mental-anguish 
claim, 
Jordan
testified on direct examination that she and her family had
difficulty paying Jennifer's medical bills; that the family
had to choose between paying the medical bills and buying
groceries; and that she had had to beg creditors for payment
1070354
Jordan claims in her brief that her testimony on direct
4
examination as to the difficulty in paying bills went only to
establishing the amount of Jennifer's medical bills; however,
the record shows that Jordan offered the testimony in support
of 
Jennifer's 
mental-anguish 
claim. 
 When 
Calloway 
objected 
to
the direct-examination testimony on the ground that it
interjected Jordan's general wealth or poverty, Jordan
responded that "the jury has to hear what position that family
was in" to determine whether Jennifer had a reasonable basis
for her claim.  Thus, Jordan's testimony went to the impact of
the medical bills on Jennifer, not to the amount of those
bills.
12
plans allowing her to make payments as low as $10 per month.4
Marks, however, stands not only for the general
proposition that a reference to a party's wealth or poverty is
not permitted, but also for the proposition that "[i]t is
generally recognized that a party may inquire into an opposing
party's wealth on cross-examination or in rebuttal if that
opposing party 'opens the door' to such an inquiry."  740 So.
2d at 1068.  Calloway explains that her question regarding
Jordan's purchase of the car for Jennifer was an attempt to
refute Jordan's prior testimony regarding her family's
inability to pay Jennifer's medical bills.  Thus, Calloway's
question regarding Jordan's purchase of an automobile was a
direct response to Jordan's mental-anguish claim, which arose
out of the family's inability to pay its bills. 
1070354
13
Jordan further argues that because the money used to
purchase Jennifer's car came, at least in part, from a
settlement with Calloway's insurer, the question allowed the
introduction of evidence of an insurance settlement.  Jordan
notes that "[t]he principle that reference to indemnification
or insurance of an opposing party is highly prejudicial and
grounds for a mistrial or a new trial is firmly established."
Cook v. Anderson, 512 So. 2d 1310, 1311 (Ala. 1987).  However,
in pursuing that line of questioning, Calloway made no mention
of the insurance settlement. 
Jordan alleges that the trial court compounded its error
by not allowing Jordan to disclose in her answer the source of
the money she used to purchase the car and that she was then
prejudiced because the jury was allowed to impermissibly
consider 
the allegedly irrelevant 
fact 
of 
Jordan's 
purchase 
of
a new car for Jennifer.  Calloway did not mention the
insurance settlement or infer its existence in asking her
question.  Jordan argues that Calloway "opened the door" to
disclosing the insurance settlement by asking the question
regarding the purchase of the car.  That question, however,
was relevant to the substantive issue whether Jennifer's
1070354
14
medical bills were the cause of the family's financial
difficulties, and that issue was introduced by Jordan's
testimony on direct examination.  
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court
did not exceed its discretion by allowing Calloway to ask
Jordan about the purchase of the new car or by preventing
Jordan from 
discussing the 
insurance 
settlement in her 
answer,
and, as to this ground, we affirm the trial court's denial of
Jordan's motion for a new trial.    
III.
Finally, Jordan argues that she is entitled to a new
trial because, she says, the trial court erred in entering a
JML 
in 
favor 
of 
Calloway 
on 
Jordan's 
wanton-entrustment 
claim.
Wantonness is "'the conscious doing of some act or the
omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing
conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to
do an act, injury will likely or probably result.'" Barker v.
Towns, 747 So. 2d 907, 907 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (quoting Alfa
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So. 2d 1250, 1256 (Ala. 1998)).
In order to establish wanton entrustment, Jordan must show
that 
Calloway 
entrusted 
the 
automobile 
to 
Amanda 
while 
knowing
1070354
15
that that entrustment would likely or probably result in
injury to others. 
Jordan argues that she presented substantial evidence of
wantonness by showing that Calloway was aware that Amanda was
suffering from terminal brain cancer at the time she entrusted
her with a vehicle and that, after the accident, Calloway
allegedly stated that she should not have let Amanda drive
"during spring break."  First, Jordan did not present any
evidence indicating that the accident was causally related to
Amanda's medical condition, and none of those present at the
accident scene, including Jennifer, gave any indication that
they had seen anything that would suggest that Amanda's
cancer, or its symptoms, had caused the accident.  
Second, Calloway's statement that she should not have
allowed her 16-year-old daughter to drive her vehicle during
spring break is not substantial evidence indicating that
Calloway knew that Amanda was incompetent to drive and that
she was conscious that injury to others would likely or
probably result if she let Amanda drive her vehicle.
"'Substantial evidence is "evidence 
of 
such 
weight 
and quality
that 
fair-minded 
persons 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
impartial 
judgment
1070354
It would be speculative to conclude that by her comment
5
Calloway was speaking of Amanda's medical condition, and
"[e]vidence which affords nothing more than mere speculation,
conjecture, or guess is insufficient to warrant submission of
a case to a jury."  Nelson v. Dunaway, 536 So. 2d 955, 956
(Ala. Civ. App. 1988). 
16
can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be
proved."'"  Moon v. Pillion, [Ms. 1070124, July 11, 2008] ___
So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2008) (quoting Catrett v. Baldwin County
Elec. Membership Corp., [Ms. 1061538, May 23, 2008] ___ So. 2d
___, ___ (Ala. 2008), quoting in turn West v. Founders Life
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)).
Jordan did not 
present 
any 
evidence 
indicating that Calloway's
statement regarding not 
allowing 
Amanda to 
drive 
during spring
break was somehow related to Amanda's medical condition.    
5
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in entering a judgment as a matter of law on
Jordan's wanton-entrustment claim, and we affirm the trial
court's judgment on this issue.     
Conclusion
Jordan has not demonstrated that the trial court
committed reversible error or that it exceeded its discretion
1070354
17
in denying her motion for a new trial.  Therefore, we affirm
the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.