Title: State of West Virginia v. Damron

State: west-virginia

Issuer: West Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA FILED December 4, 2002 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA September 2002 Term __________ No. 30530 __________ STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, Plaintiff Below, Appellee v. CHARLES C. DAMRON, Defendant Below, Appellant RELEASED December 4, 2002 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA __________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County Honorable Thomas C. Evans, III, Judge Criminal Action No. 99-F-63 AFFIRMED __________________________________________________________________ Submitted: October 29, 2002 Filed: December 4, 2002 Jack L. Hickok, Esq. Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Esq. Paul R. Stone, Esq. Attorney General West Virginia Public Defender Services Allen H. Loughry, II, Esq. Charleston, West Virginia Senior Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for Appellant Charleston, West Virginia Attorneys for Appellee The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. “PursuanttoW.Va.Code § 62-3-21 (1959), when an accused is charged with a felony or misdemeanor and arraigned in a court of competent jurisdiction, if three regulartermsofcourtpasswithouttrialafterthepresentmentorindictment,the accused shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the felony or misdemeanor charged unless the failure to try the accused is caused by one of the exceptions enumerated in the statute.” Syllabus, State v. Carter, 204 W.Va. 491, 513 S.E.2d 718 (1998). 2. “Inacriminalproceeding,thedefendant'sabsenceatacriticalstageof such proceeding is not reversible error where no possibility of prejudice to the defendant occurs.” Syllabus Point 3, State ex rel. Redman v. Hedrick, 185 W.Va 709, 408 S.E.2d 659 (1991). 3. “Atrialcourthastwooptionstocomply with the mandatory requirements ofRule11(e)(2)oftheWestVirginiaRulesofCriminalProcedure. It may initially advise the defendant at the time the guilty plea is taken that as to any recommended sentence made in connectionwithapleaagreement,ifthecourtdoesnotaccepttherecommended sentence, the defendantwillhavenorighttowithdrawtheguiltyplea. As a second option, the trial court may conditionallyaccepttheguiltyplea pending a presentence report without giving the cautionary warning required by Rule 11(e)(2). However, if it determines at the sentencing hearing not to followtherecommended sentence,itmustgivethe defendant the right to withdraw the guilty plea.” Syllabus Point 2, State v. Cabell, 176 W.Va. 272, 342 S.E.2d 240 (1986). i 4. “Disparatesentencesforcodefendantsarenotperseunconstitutional. Courts consider many factors such as each codefendant's respective involvement in the criminal transaction (including who was the prime mover), prior records, rehabilitative potential (including post-arrest conduct, age and maturity), and lack of remorse. If codefendants are similarly situated, some courts will reverse on disparity of sentence alone.” Syllabus Point 2, State v. Buck, 173 W.Va. 243, 314 S.E.2d 406 (1984). ii Per Curiam: This case is beforethisCourtuponappealofafinalorderofthe Circuit Court ofJacksonCountyenteredonJune14,2001. In that order, the appellant and defendant below, Charles Damron, was sentenced to not less than one year nor more than fifteen years of confinementinthepenitentiaryfor his conviction of burglary and one year of confinement in theJacksonCountyjailforhisconvictionofpetitlarceny. The order further provided that said sentences shall run concurrent to one another, but consecutive to the appellant’s term of incarcerationforhisfederalconvictionand his term of incarceration for his conviction in Wirt County, West Virginia. Inthis appeal, the appellant asserts several assignments of error. He contends thecircuitcourterred by: (1) not promptly arraigning him and appointing counsel to represent him; (2) holding hearings in his absence and withouthiswrittenconsent;(3)notgivinghis counselsufficienttimetopreparefortrial;(4)notacceptingtheState’srecommendation of concurrentsentencesorallowinghimtowithdrawhisplea;and(5)imposingasentence that was disproportionate to that of his codefendant. ThisCourthas before it the petition for appeal, the entire record, and the briefs and argument of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the final order is affirmed. 1 I. FACTS OnJune23,1999,the appellant and his codefendant, Michael R. Meadows, were indicted on three counts of burglary and three counts of grand larceny.1 At that time, the appellantwasservingaforty-eight-month sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution in Ashland, Kentucky. Accordingly, on July 7, 1999, the State lodged a detainer against the appellantwiththe warden of the Federal Correctional Institution pursuant to W.Va. Code § 62- 14-1 (1971), also known as the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (hereinafter “IADA”). No further action was taken in this case untilOctober24,2000. On that date, a hearing was held and the State informed the circuit court that the appellant remained in federal custody. The case was continued. On December 11, 2000, the appellant requested dispositionofthependingindictmentpursuanttotheIADA. On January 12, 2001, the circuit court issued an order tentatively scheduling the appellant’s trial for July 31, 2001. 1TheappellantandMeadowsallegedlyburglarized three dwellings, removing various items including firearms. After entering into a plea agreement with the State, Meadows confessedandstatedthat the appellant, who was his employer, threatened to fire him if he did not help him steal from houses. Meadows said he entered the homes and removed the property while the appellant stayed in his truck. 2 OnApril4,2001,theStatemovedforanewtrial date. The State indicated that it had received the appellant’s request for disposition of the indictment on December 13, 2000,and therefore, pursuant to the IADA, the appellant would have to be tried prior to June 11,2001.2 By order dated April 20, 2001, the court set a new trial date of May 29, 2001, and appointed an attorney to represent the appellant. On May 16, 2001, the appellant’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case because the appellant had not been tried within three terms of court since he was indicted. The circuit court denied the motion. Subsequently, the appellant filed motions to suppress the statement given by his codefendantandtosuppressevidenceobtainedby search warrants. These motions were also denied. 2W.Va. Code § 62-14-1, provides, in pertinent part: Wheneverapersonhasentereduponatermofimprisonmentin apenal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be deliveredto the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of theprosecutingofficer'sjurisdictionwrittennoticeoftheplace of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint[.] 3 OnMay29,2001,theappellantwasarraigned. He entered a plea of not guilty to the charges set forth in the indictment. Trial began that same day. After the opening statements were completed, the appellant, outside the presence of the jury, moved to withdraw his plea of not guilty. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, the appellant pled guilty to one count of burglary and one count of petit larceny. The State agreed to recommendthatanysentencetheappellantmight receive run concurrent with his Wirt County sentence. On July 14, 2001, the court sentenced the appellant to not less than one nor more than fifteen years in the penitentiary for his conviction of burglary. The appellant was also sentenced to one year in the county jail for his conviction of petit larceny. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently with each other, but consecutive to the appellant’s term of incarceration for his federal conviction and his term of incarceration for his conviction in Wirt County. This appeal followed. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Assetforthabove, the appellant asserts several assignments of error. This Court has held that: 4 Inreviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of review. We reviewtherulings of the circuit court concerning a new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlyingfactualfindings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review. Syllabus Point 3, State v. Vance, 207 W.Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000). With these standards in mind, we now address the issues in this case. III. DISCUSSION The appellant first contends that the circuit court erred by not promptly arraigning him and appointing him counsel. Essentially, the appellant claims that his case shouldhavebeendismissedpursuanttoW.Va.Code62-3-21 (1959), generally referred to as the“three-termrule.”3 Although the appellant was indicted in June 1999, no action was taken 3W.Va. Code § 62-3-21 states: Everypersoncharged by presentment or indictment with a felony or misdemeanor, and remanded to a court of competent jurisdiction for trial, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the offense, if there be three regular terms of such court, after the presentment is made or the indictment is found against him, without a trial, unless the failure to try him was caused by his insanity; or by the witnesses for the State being enticedorkeptaway,orpreventedfromattending by sickness or inevitable accident; or by a continuance granted on the motion of (continued...) 5 in his case for eighteen months because he remained in federal custody. When the case was calledbythecircuitcourtinOctober2000,itwascontinued because the appellant was still in federal custody. The case was continued on another occasion for the same reason. Finally, the appellantwasappointedcounselonApril20,2001,andhe was arraigned on May29,2001, immediately before his trial began. In Statev.Carter, 204W.Va.491,513S.E.2d718(1998),thisCourtaddressed the issue of whether the three-term rule was violated when defendant Carter was not tried withinthreetermsofcourtafter hewasindicted. Like the appellant in the case at bar, Carter was in continuous federal custody until he was secured by the State and brought before the circuit court for arraignment. Defendant Carter was tried during the next term of court following his arraignment. Affording W.Va. Code § 62-3-21 its plain meaning, this Court held in the Syllabus of Carter, that: 3(...continued) the accused; or by reasonofhisescapingfromjail,or failing to appear according to his recognizance, or of the inability of the jury to agree in their verdict; and every person charged with a misdemeanor before a justice of the peace [magistrate], city policejudge,oranyotherinferiortribunal,andwhohastherein been found guilty and has appealed his conviction of guilt and sentence to a court of record, shall be forever discharged from furtherprosecution for the offense set forth in the warrant against him,ifafterhishavingappealed such conviction andsentence, therebe three regular terms ofsuchcourtwithoutatrial,unless the failure to try him was for one of the causes hereinabove set forth relating to proceedings on indictment. 6 Pursuant to W.Va.Code § 62-3-21 (1959), when an accused is charged with a felony or misdemeanor and arraigned in a court of competent jurisdiction, if three regular terms of court pass without trial after the presentment or indictment, the accused shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the felony or misdemeanor charged unless the failure to try the accused is caused by one of the exceptions enumerated in the statute. Since Carter had not been arraigned,even though hehadbeenindictedformore than three regulartermsofcourtbeforehe was tried, this Court determined that the three-term rule had not been violated. LikeCarter,theappellantinthiscasewas promptly tried after his arraignment. Thus, the State complied with the three-term rule. In addition, the State fully complied with the IADA. Following the appellant’s indictment, the State promptly filed a detainer with the Ashland Federal Correctional Institution where the appellant was incarcerated. As soon as the appellant requested disposition of his indictment pursuant to the IADA, the State took the requisite steps to have the appellant returned to West Virginia. The appellant was then appointedcounsel. He was arraigned and his trial began immediately thereafter. Accordingly, we find no merit to the appellant’s first assignment of error. Theappellant next contends that the circuit court committed reversible error by holdinghearingsinhisabsenceandwithouthiswritten consent. The circuit court held hearings onOctober24,2000andNovember 16,2000. At these hearings, the court was informed by theStatethattheappellant was in federal custody, and the case was continued. At a January 12, 7 2001 hearing, the court set a trial date of July 31, 2001, after the State indicated that the appellanthadrequesteddispositionofhisindictmentpursuant to the IADA. Four months later, in April 2001,thetrialwasrescheduledforMay29,2001,and the appellant was appointed counsel. The appellant was not present at any of these hearings, and thus, he claims that he was deniedhisconstitutionalrighttobepresentatallcriticalstages of the proceedings in his case. In Syllabus Point 6 of State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234, 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977), this Court held that: The defendant has a right under Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution4 to be present at all critical stages in the criminalproceeding;andwhenheisnot,theStateisrequiredto prove beyond a reasonable doubt that what transpired in his absence was harmless. (Footnote added). “If an accused demonstrates that his right to confront his accusers was abridgedbytheState or that he was absentduringacriticalstageofthetrialproceeding,his 4Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution states: Trials of crimes, and misdemeanors, unless herein otherwise provided, shall be by a jury of twelve men, public, without unreasonable delay, and in the county where the alleged offence wascommitted, unless upon petition of the accused, and for good cause shown, it is removed to some other county. In all such trials, the accused shall be fully and plainly informed of the character and cause of the accusation, and be confronted with the witness against him, and shall have the assistance of counsel, and a reasonable time to prepare forhisdefence; and there shall be awarded to him compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. 8 conviction of a felony will be reversed where a possibility of prejudice appears from the abrogation of the constitutional or statutory right.” Syllabus Point 8, State ex rel. Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647, 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975). However, “[i]n a criminal proceeding, the defendant's absence at a critical stage of such proceeding is not reversible error where no possibility of prejudice to the defendant occurs.” Syllabus Point 3, State ex rel. Redman v. Hedrick, 185 W.Va 709, 408 S.E.2d 659 (1991). Havingreviewed the record, we find that the appellant was not prejudiced by his absenceatthepre-trialhearingsinhiscase,and therefore, no reversible error was committed. As discussed above, the first two hearings in this case were held only for the purpose of determining whether the appellant was still in federal custody. Although the court set a trial dateduringtheJanuary12,2001hearing,therecordestablishesthatthisaction was taken for thesolepurposeofhavingthe appellant returned to West Virginia pursuant to his request for apromptdispositionofhisindictmentundertheIADA. Likewise, the appellant’s trial was rescheduledduringtheApril4,2001hearing so that he would be tried within one hundred eighty days of the State receiving his request for disposition of his indictment pursuant the IADA. 5 As discussed more fully below, the appellant was given the option to continue his trial, but chose not to do so. Accordingly, we find no merit to this assignment of error. 5See note 2, supra. 9 Next,theappellantclaimsthathewasdenieddue process when the court forced himtotrialwithoutgivinghiscounselanopportunityto prepare. He claims that the court did notconsiderhisrightsinsettingthetrialdateandthathiscounseldidnothavesufficient time to prepare his case. The appellant says that as a result, he was forced to enter into a plea agreement with the State. ThisCourthasheldthat,“Therightguaranteed by State and Federal Constitutions toapersonchargedwithacriminalviolationtohaveeffectiveassistanceofcounsel,cannot beabrogatedbydenyingcounsel,iftimelyemployed,sufficient time to adequately prepare for trial.” Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Eno, 135 W.Va. 473,63S.E.2d845(1951). However, after reviewing the record in this case, we find that the appellant’scounselhadsufficienttimetopreparefortrial. First, we note that the appellant’s trialdatewassetbased on his request for disposition of his indictment pursuant to the IADA. Inotherwords,thecasewaspromptlysetfortrialtoaccommodate the appellant, not the State. Secondly,therecordshowsthattheappellant’s counsel had nearly forty days to prepare for the trial. Historically, this Court has only found merit in claims of insufficient time to prepare where counsel had no more than a few days’ notice before trial. See Statev. Morris, 166 W.Va.811,277 S.E.2d 638(1981)(defense counsel was given fifteen minutes in which to consult with the defendant before commencing trial); State ex rel. Rogers v. 10 Casey,166W.Va.179,273S.E.2d356(1980)(defense counsel was given lessthantwenty­ four hours’ notice of trial); State v. Demastus, 165 W.Va. 572, 270 S.E.2d 649 (1980) (defensecounselhadtwelvedays’noticebeforetrial); Eno,supra, (defensecounselhadless thantwenty-fourhourstoconferwiththedefendants). Furthermore, the record shows that the appellant’s counsel indicated that he did not want a continuance and that he was “ready to go to trial.” Given these circumstances, we do not find that the appellant’s trial counsel had insufficient time to prepare his case for trial. In addition, we are unable to find that the appellant was forced to enter into a plea agreement with the State. In that regard, the appellant hasnotpointedtoanyevidencetosupport his claim that he had no choice buttoenterintoa plea agreement with the State. To the contrary, the record shows that the appellant’s plea was entered freely and voluntarily. Thus, we find no merit to this assignment of error. Theappellantalsoclaims that the circuit court erred by not accepting the State’s recommendation of concurrent sentences or allowing him to withdraw his plea of not guilty. Theappellantsaysthat given the “peculiar circumstances” of his case, the court should have either accepted the State’s recommendation with regard to sentencing or permitted him to withdraw his plea. In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Cabell, 176 W.Va.272,342 S.E.2d 240 (1986), this Court has held that, 11 A trial court has two options to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 11(e)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. 6 It may initially advise the defendant at the timetheguiltypleaistakenthatasto any recommended sentence madeinconnectionwithapleaagreement,if the court doesnot accept the recommended sentence, the defendant will have no right to withdraw the guilty plea. As a second option, the trial court may conditionally accept the guilty plea pending a presentence report without giving the cautionary warning required by Rule 11(e)(2). However, if it determines at the sentencing hearing not to follow the recommended sentence, it must give the defendant the right to withdraw the guilty plea. (Footnote added). The record in this case shows that the circuit court complied with the mandatory requirements of Rule 11(e)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. The 6Rule 11(e)(2) of the West Rules of Criminal Procedure states: Notice of Such Agreement. -- If a plea agreement has been reachedbytheparties,thecourt shall,ontherecord,requirethe disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered. If the agreementisofthetypespecifiedinsubdivision(e)(1)(A),(C), or (D), the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may deferitsdecisionastotheacceptanceorrejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report. If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the courtshall advisethedefendantthatifthecourtdoesnotaccept therecommendation orrequest,thedefendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the plea. Rule11(e)(1)(B)concernsagreementswherebytheState“[m]ake[s]arecommendation or agree[s]nottoopposethedefendant's request for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court[.]” 12 followingcolloquybetween the court and the appellant occurred before the appellant entered his guilty plea. THE COURT: Okay. Now, there’s one important thing here in this plea bargain,and that has to do with the -- Is thisa binding sentencing recommendation? [PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: No, your Honor. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, your Honor. THECOURT: Okay. Now, by this agreement, which, if you plead guilty here today, you’re going to get the benefit of this agreement. Okay? THE [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: These charges are going to be dismissed. The State is required to recommend at sentencing that, if you receive atermofincarceration,itistorun concurrent with thesentence of incarceration imposed onyouinWirtCounty Circuit Court. All right? THE [APPELLANT]: Yes sir, your Honor. THE COURT: Now, here’s something very important for you to remember. It is function [sic] of the judge to impose the sentence. The judge receives the recommendation of the lawyers, theprosecutingattorney,yourlawyer,and even you, if you wish to make one. But the decision is ultimately the judge’s to make. So the judge is free to reject the sentencing recommendation made by the prosecuting attorney and impose - I guess - consecutive sentences. Do you understand that? THE [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Did you talk about this with your lawyer? THE [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir, I did. THE COURT: Okay. If that happens, you won’t be able to withdraw your pleas of guilty for that reason. THE [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you understand what I am saying? THE [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay. Can you assure me you’ve read this plea bargain? THE [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir; I have. THE COURT: Okay. It’ll be filed. Given all of the above, we find no merit to this assignment of error. 13 Finally,theappellantcontendsthatthesentenceimposed upon him was grossly disproportionate to that received by his codefendant, Meadows. After Meadows agreed to testify against the appellant, the State decided not to prosecute him. The appellant claims that theevidenceindicatedthatheandMeadowswereequally involved in the crimes. He further claimsthat Meadows has a more egregious prior record and that he unfairly benefitted from having counsel appointed to represent him early in the proceedings. In Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Buck, 173 W.Va. 243, 314 S.E.2d 406 (1984), this Court held that: Disparate sentences for codefendants are not per se unconstitutional. Courts consider many factors such as each codefendant's respective involvement in the criminal transaction (including who was the prime mover), prior records, rehabilitative potential(includingpost-arrestconduct, age and maturity), and lack of remorse. If codefendants are similarly situated, some courts will reverse on disparity of sentence alone. Having reviewed the record, we do not believe that the appellant and Meadows were similarly situated. Unlike the appellant, Meadows was not serving a federal sentence or facing charges in Wirt County. In addition, Meadows entered into his plea agreement before his case proceeded to trial. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the appellant, who was Meadows’ employer, instigated the crimes and threatened to fire Meadows if he did not participate. In sum,theappellant and Meadows were not similarly situated, and therefore, we find no merit to this assignment of error. 14 IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the final order of the Circuit Court of Jackson County entered June 14, 2001, is affirmed. Affirmed. 15