Title: MCALPINE v MIDLAND ELECTRIC CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-109 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 NANCY McALPINE, Individually and as Personal Representative, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS. MIDLAND ELECTRIC CO., and THE STATE OF MONTANA, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade. Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hoyt and Trieweiler, Great Falls, Montana John C. Hoyt argued, Great Falls, Montana For Respondents: Cure and Borer, Great Falls, Montana Edward Borer argued, Great Falls, Montana Marra, Wenz, Iwen & Johnson, Great Falls, Montana Joseph Marra argued, Great Falls, Montana Filed: SEP 2 9 198Q Submitted: June 9, 1981 Decided: September 28, 1.981 - Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. ~ a n i e l McAlpine was k i l l e d i n an automobile a c c i d e n t on ~ p r i l 27, 1975. is widow, Nancy McAlpine, f i l e d a wrongful death a c t i o n a g a i n s t Roger Dahl, Midland E l e c t r i c Company, and t h e S t a t e of Montana. Summary judgment was entered i n favor of a l l t h r e e defendants i n May 1977. Nancy McAlpine appealed, and t h i s Court reversed t h e o r d e r s granting summary judgment. Dahl s e t t l e d with McAlpine, and t r i a l was had a s t o t h e remaining defendants i n November 1979. On December 1, 1979, the jury returned v e r d i c t s f o r Midland E l e c t r i c Company and the S t a t e of Montana. P l a i n t i f f McAlpine f i l e d combined motions t o set a s i d e t h e jury v e r d i c t and f o r a new t r i a l on t h e i s s u e of damages only. The d i s t r i c t judge refused t o g r a n t t h e r e l i e f sought by McAlpine, and she appeals. W e reverse. O n Sunday, A p r i l 27, 1975, Arthur Krueger w a s d r i v i n g a one-ton pickup with a gooseneck f i f t h wheel t r a i l e r westward on a two-lane s t r e t c h of Highway 89 near Great F a l l s , Montana. Krueger was a job foreman f o r Midland E l e c t r i c Company of B i l l i n g s , Montana, and t h e v e h i c l e s belonged t o Midland. A t about 9:30 p.m., a wheel came off of t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e t r a i l e r . The trailer was immobilized and blocked t h e westbound l a n e of t r a f f i c . Krueger had no warning devices, b u t was given t h r e e r e f l e c t o r s by passersby. These were placed behind t h e t r a i l e r t o t h e e a s t . A s h o r t t i m e l a t e r ~ i g h w a y Patrolman James Coey a r r i v e d . Coey radioed f o r a wrecker and Dahl's Wrecker Service dispatched a vehicle. Coey stayed on t h e scene f o r about one-half hour, b u t l e f t before t h e wrecker a r r i v e d . Coey d i d n o t p l a c e any warning devices upon t h e highway, b u t gave Krueger two fusees before departing. H e l e f t i n order t o a s s i s t a fellow o f f i c e r i n t h e apprehension of a suspect on a bad check charge. The o t h e r o f f i c e r had n o t requested a s s i s t a n c e . Coey passed t h e Dahl wrecker on t h e highway and i n s t r u c t e d Dahl over t h e r a d i o t h a t t h e t r a i l e r should be towed t o a n approach 300-400 f e e t e a s t of where it had come t o rest. Dahl hooked h i s wrecker t o t h e l e f t r e a r of t h e t r a i l e r ( t h e s i d e without wheels). This p u t t h e Dahl wrecker i n t h e westbound l a n e of t r a f f i c b u t facing i n an e a s t e r l y d i r e c t i o n . D a h l l s clearance l i g h t s , four-way f l a s h e r s , r o t a t i n g beacon and work l i g h t were a l l i n operation. The Midland v e h i c l e ' s clearance l i g h t s and f l a s h e r s were on. There were fusees and r e f l e c t o r s on t h e roadway t o t h e e a s t . Ronald Mammen, D a h l l s stepson, was standing i n t h e highway alongside t h e t r a i l e r holding a f l a s h l i g h t with a yellow hazard l i g h t on top. Dahl began towing t h e disabled f i f t h wheel t r a i l e r i n a n e a s t e r l y d i r e c t i o n b u t i n t h e westbound lane. Krueger was i n t h e pickup, d r i v i n g it i n reverse. They w e r e t r a v e l i n g a t a very slow speed. A t t h i s time t h e v e h i c l e owned by Daniel McAlpine approached the scene. McAlpine was a farmer/rancher from Sunburst, Montana. He had spent t h e day a t Stanford, Montana, a t t e n d i n g a b u l l s a l e . Michael Hofer had accompanied him t o t h e s a l e . Hofer had moved t o the McAlpine ranch two days before t h e accident. H e had been h i r e d t o help with s p r i n g planting. Whether he had begun work was a t r i a l i s s u e . A t t r i a l two witnesses t e s t i f i e d t o seeing both Hofer and McAlpine consume alcohol a t d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s i n Stanford a f t e r the b u l l s a l e . Two o t h e r witnesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e McAlpine v e h i c l e passed them a t a high r a t e of speed and was being driven i n an e r r a t i c manner. Roger Dahl and Ronald Mammen t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e McAlpine v e h i c l e approached t h e disabled v e h i c l e a t a high r a t e of speed and d i d n o t appear t o slow down. When t h e McAlpine v e h i c l e reached t h e wrecker, it passed t o t h e r i g h t of it b u t s t r u c k t h e r i g h t r e a r corner of t h e Midland t r a i l e r . Michael Hofer, who was d r i v i n g , and Daniel McAlpine were k i l l e d i n s t a n t l y . Hofer died with a beer can between h i s l e g s . There were empty beer cans i n the vehicle. Hofer's blood alcohol l e v e l was Nancy McAlpine brought s u i t and judgment was eventually entered f o r defendants Midland E l e c t r i c Company and t h e S t a t e of Montana. Because we a r e reversing t h e judgment, we w i l l only address those i s s u e s t h a t a r e l i k e l y t o reemerge i f t h e case i s r e t r i e d : 1. Was it e r r o r t o admit the blood alcohol t e s t s of Hofer and McAlpine? 2. Were t h e r e s u l t s of t h e blood alcohol t e s t s inadmis- s i b l e because t h e i r proponents f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h a foundation which would a s s u r e t h e i r trustworthiness? 3. Did the D i s t r i c t Court commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by improperly i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury on t h e i s s u e of contributory negligence? 1 ) Appellant McAlpine bases her argument on t h i s i s s u e upon t h e r e s t r i c t i o n of t h e Uniform Accident Reporting Act. That Act contains t h e following language a t s e c t i o n 61-7- 1 1 4 , MCA: "Accident r e p o r t s confidential, (1) A l l required a c c i d e n t r e p o r t s and supplemental r e p o r t s s h a l l be without prejudice t o the i n d i v i d u a l so report- i n g and s h a l l be f o r t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l use of t h e d i v i s i o n o r o t h e r s t a t e agencies having use f o r t h e records f o r accident prevention purposes, o r f o r t h e administration of t h e laws of t h i s s t a t e r e l a t i n g t o t h e d e p o s i t of s e c u r i t y and proof of f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by persons d r i v i n g o r t h e owners of motor v e h i c l e s , except t h a t t h e d i v i - s i o n may d i s c l o s e t h e i d e n t i t y of a person involved i n an accident when such i d e n t i t y i s n o t otherwise known o r when such person denies h i s presence a t such accident. " (2) A l l accident r e p o r t s and supplemental inform- a t i o n f i l e d a s required by t h i s p a r t s h a l l be c o n f i d e n t i a l and n o t open t o general public inspec- t i o n , nor s h a l l copying of lists of such r e p o r t s be permitted, except, however, t h a t t h e r e p o r t and supplemental information f i l e d by law enforcement personnel, a s required by t h i s p a r t , may be examined by any person named i n such r e p o r t o r r e p o r t s o r by any d r i v e r , passenger, o r pedestrian involved i n t h e a c c i d e n t o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e designated i n w r i t i n g , o r i f such person s h a l l be deceased, by h i s executor o r administrator o r by t h e a t t o r n e y representing such executor o r administrator . " ( 3 ) N o such r e p o r t s h a l l be used as evidence i n any t r i a l , c i v i l o r criminal, a r i s i n g o u t of an accident, except t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n s h a l l f u r n i s h upon demand of any person who has o r claims t o have made such a r e p o r t o r upon t h e demand of any c o u r t a c e r t i f i c a t e showing t h a t a s p e c i f i e d a c c i d e n t r e - p o r t has o r has n o t been made t o t h e d i v i s i o n s o l e l y t o prove a compliance o r a f a i l u r e t o comply with t h e requirement t h a t such a r e p o r t be made t o t h e d i v i s i o n . " The blood alcohol percentages of t h e a c c i d e n t victims were brought before t h e jury i n t h e form of t h e laboratory a n a l y s i s r e p o r t s of both t h e Michael Hofer and Daniel McAlpine blood samples. Appellant d i d not r a i s e t h e p r o h i b i t o r y language of s e c t i o n 61-7-114, MCA, i n her objection t o t h e admission of these r e p o r t s . Normally, t h e p a r t y complaining of e r r o r must stand o r f a l l upon t h e ground r e l i e d upon i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t and o b j e c t i o n s which a r e urged f o r t h e f i r s t time on appeal w i l l n o t be considered by t h i s Court. Bower v. Tebbs (1957), 132 Mont. 146, 160, 314 P.2d 731, 739. Nevertheless, t h i s Court has a duty t o determine whether t h e p a r t i e s before it have been denied s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e by t h e t r i a l court. This Court can, within i t s sound d i s c r e t i o n , consider whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t has deprived a l i t i g a n t of a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l , even i f t h e p a r t i e s ignored t h e mandate of a s t a t u t e o r an e s t a b l i s h e d precedent. Halldorson v. Halldorson (1977), 175 Mont. 170, 573 P.2d 169; Kudrna v. Comet Corp. (1977), 175 Mont. 29, 572 P.2d 183. I f t h e p r o h i b i t i o n of s e c t i o n 61-7-114, MCA, should have been applied t o t h e blood test r e s u l t s of Hofer and McAlpine, it would have been p l a i n e r r o r t o allow t h e tests i n t o evidence d e s p i t e t h e lack of a s p e c i f i c reference t o t h e s t a t u t e i n t h e objection. I n order t o determine i f t h e a p p e l l a n t has been denied s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e , w e w i l l consider whether s e c t i o n 61-7-114, MCA, mandates exclusion of t h i s evidence. Clearly, any r e p o r t s required by t h e Uniform Accident Reporting Act, s e c t i o n 61-7-101 e t seq., and any r e p o r t s which supplement t h e required r e p o r t s a r e n o t admissible i n c o u r t . However, t h e blood test r e s u l t forms themselves w e r e admitted below. W e conclude t h a t t h e blood test r e s u l t s a r e n o t required o r supplemental accident r e p o r t s a s contemplated by t h e s t a t u t e . The information they d i s c l o s e r e l a t e s s o l e l y t o t h e t e s t i n g of blood from an individual. The forms do n o t provide f o r reference t o t h e occurrence of an a c c i d e n t o r t h e conditions e x i s t i n g a t t h e time of t h e occurrence of an accident. Further, t h e forms contain a " N o t i f i c a t i o n of Rights" which s t a t e s i n p a r t t h a t : " P r i o r t o m y voluntary consent t o give a sample of body substance f o r chemical a n a l y s i s , I was informed . . . 3. That t h e r e s u l t s of the chemical a n a l y s i s of t h e body substance, given by m e , might be used a g a i n s t m e i n a c o u r t of law. 4 . That any admissions I make, o r any information contributed by me, may be used a g a i n s t m y i n t e r e s t i n a c o u r t of law." The " N o t i f i c a t i o n of Rights" c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e l a b test form i s n o t a required r e p o r t t o which a guarantee of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y was meant t o a t t a c h . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e language of s e c t i o n 61-7-109 ( 2 ) , MCA, shows t h a t t h e l a b test r e s u l t forms a r e n o t supplemental r e p o r t s required under the s t a t u t e : "The d i v i s i o n [of motor v e h i c l e s ] may r e q u i r e any d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e involved i n an a c c i d e n t of which r e p o r t must be made a s provided i n t h i s s e c t i o n t o f i l e supplemental r e p o r t s whenever t h e o r i g i n a l r e p o r t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t . . ." The l a b t e s t r e s u l t forms a r e n o t addenda used t o complete a p r i o r i n s u f f i c i e n t r e p o r t , nor were they required of a " d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e involved i n an accident." They a r e n o t "supplemental r e p o r t s " and were n o t excludable by reason of s e c t i o n 61-7-114, MCA. Despite our conclusion t h a t t h e l a b r e p o r t forms which were admitted w e r e n o t required r e p o r t s , we must s t i l l concern ourselves with cases c i t e d by a p p e l l a n t which hold t h a t t h a t which goes i n t o a r e p o r t required by the Uniform Accident Reporting Act i s a s inadmissible a s the r e p o r t i t s e l f . Courts which s o conclude g e n e r a l l y follow t h e reasoning of cases such a s Cooper v. S t a t e (Fla. D i s t . C t . App. "There can be no question b u t t h a t t h e taking of t h e blood sample w a s intended a s a p a r t of t h e i n v e s t i - g a t i o n f o r t h e purpose of completing t h e r e p o r t , re- quired of t h e o f f i c e r . Further, it was a t t h e i n - s i s t e n c e and r e q u e s t of t h e o f f i c e r t h a t the doctor took t h e blood sample. This blood sample formed a b a s i s , o r a t l e a s t a portion of t h e b a s i s f o r t h e o f f i c e r ' s w r i t t e n r e p o r t . I f t h e r e p o r t was inad- m i s s i b l e . . . then t h e information obtained by what- ever method, i f obtained f o r the purpose of making t h e r e p o r t speak t h e f a c t s , was inadmissible." (Em- p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l . ) W e w i l l n o t construe s e c t i o n 61-7-114, MCA, i n t h e same manner a s the F l o r i d a court. The reasoning of Cooper could, i f taken t o t h e l i m i t s of i t s l o g i c , r e q u i r e t h e exclusion of any information, r e g a r d l e s s of i t s source, which contributed t o t h e completion of a required r e p o r t . W e cannot accept such a broad apnl-ication of t h e s t a t u t o r y exclusion. I t has been held i n C a l i f o r n i a t h a t : "[The Vehicle Code] r e q u i r e s t h e d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e involved i n an a c c i d e n t . . . t o cause a w r i t t e n r e p o r t t o be made . . . [and] provides t h a t no such r e p o r t s h a l l be used as evidence i n any trial a r i s i n g o u t of such accident. But it was n o t a r e p o r t so provided t o be made t h a t was o f f e r e d . . . N o evidence of t h e f a c t s t h a t occurred a t t h e t i m e of a vehicular accident i s privileged. Only those r e p o r t s a r e c o n f i d e n t i a l which a r e so made by [ t h e Code]. To make a statement p r i v i l e g e d and inad- missible it must come within t h e express terms of the section." Stroud v. Hansen (1941), 48 Cal.App. 2d 556, 559-560, 1 2 0 P.2d 1 0 2 , 104. (Stroud a l s o con- tained language r e l a t i v e t o contributory negligence i n s t r u c t i o n s . That language was "disapproved" i n Cummings v. County of Los Angeles (1961), 56 Cal.2d 258, 268, 363 P.2d 900, 906, 1 4 Cal.Rptr. 668, 674. The decision i n Cumminqs did n o t involve t h e question of the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of accident r e p o r t s . ) The f a c t t h a t t h e accident victims had consumed alcohol was entered upon o f f i c e r Coey's a c c i d e n t r e p o r t . Although t h e exact f i g u r e s from t h e l a b tests were n o t w r i t t e n i n t o Coey's r e p o r t , t h e f i g u r e s formed a b a s i s f o r t h e completion of h i s r e p o r t . ( W e note t h a t p l a i n t i f f sought t o have t h i s required r e p o r t admitted i n s p i t e of t h e reference t o t h e consumption of alcohol. Defendants s u c c e s s f u l l y prevented i t s admission by r a i s i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o h i b i t i o n now i n question. ) Even though t h e l a b test r e s u l t s formed a portion of t h e b a s i s f o r t h e completion of the o f f i c e r ' s r e p o r t , t h e l a b test r e s u l t forms were n o t required r e p o r t s . W e adopt t h e reasoning of t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t , and hold t h a t l a b r e p o r t s of blood alcohol analyses a r e n o t inadmissible by reason of the p r o h i b i t i o n of the Uniform Accident Reporting Act. Appellant argues t h a t even i f t h e Uniform Accident Reporting Act does n o t bar introduction of t h e r e s u l t s of t h e blood alcohol t e s t s , t h e r e s u l t s w e r e s t i l l inadmissible because they lacked a proper foundation. Appellant claims t h a t t h e respondents: 1. f a i l e d t o show t h a t post-mortem blood c l o t t i n g d i d not r e s u l t i n a higher blood alcohol reading; 2. f a i l e d t o show t h a t t h e procuring and t e s t i n g of t h e samples followed t h e procedures s e t o u t i n t h e Administrative Rules of Montana; 3 . f a i l e d t o show t h e blood t e s t e d came from t h e victims ' bodies; and 4. f a i l e d t o produce t h e gas chromatograph records used t o achieve the test r e s u l t s . A review of t h e testimony w i l l a i d i n our r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e . Mortician Ray Fischer t e s t i f i e d t h a t he drew t h e Hofer sample. H e knew t h a t it w a s Hofer because of what he was t o l d a t t h e h o s p i t a l and because he c a l l e d t h e H u t t e r i t e colony a t which Hofer had been r a i s e d f o r permission t o embalm. H e used t h e c a r o t i d a r t e r y and i n t e r n a l jugular vein and drew a sample from the r i g h t v e n t r i c l e of t h e h e a r t . H e f i l l e d a 30 m i l l i l i t e r sample b o t t l e with blood. N o embalming had y e t been done. The sample was drawn with a s t a i n l e s s s t e e l tube t h a t comes a p a r t f o r s t e r i l i z a t i o n . Fischer t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e sample was a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and uncontaminated sample, and t h a t t h e blood serum had n o t separated from t h e c e l l s . Fischer gave t h e sample t o Highway Patrolman Richard Zaharko, who had waited i n the f u n e r a l home lobby while the sample was drawn. Zaharko completed t h e forms t h a t accompany t h e sample b o t t l e , placed t h e b o t t l e i n t h e mailing container, and sealed and mailed t h e container. Mortician L e s l i e Patzer d i d n o t have an independent re- c o l l e c t i o n of having drawn t h e McAlpine blood sample. However, he was t h e only person a t h i s f u n e r a l home who took blood samples. H e employed standard blood drawing procedures each t i m e he drew blood. He was f a i r l y c e r t a i n t h a t none of t h e d i s i n f e c t a n t used t o clean h i s instruments would have contaminated the McAlpine sample. Patzer a l s o gave h i s sample t o patrolman Zaharko . Patrolman Zaharko t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had picked up t h e samples from t h e morticians, received information from them necessary t o fill o u t t h e forms, sealed the samples i n t h e presence of t h e morticians, and mailed them t o t h e l a b . Richard Paulsen i s a f i e l d h e a l t h o f f i c e r f o r t h e Montana Department of Health and i s a l s o a c e r t i f i e d operator- supervisor of gas chromatography. Paulsen t e s t i f i e d g e n e r a l l y a s t o procedures used i n alcohol t e s t i n g . H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e gas chromatography test can d i s t i n g u i s h between d i f f e r e n t types of alcohol and can a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h substances such a s embalming f l u i d s . Paulsen s t a t e d t h a t t h e sample b o t t l e s contain an anticoagulant which prevents c l o t t i n g , b u t t h a t i f c l o t t i n g occurred it would be broken up before t e s t i n g . Paulsen t e s t e d t h e Hofer and McAlpine samples and found t h e blood alcohol contents t o be .09 percent and . 1 4 percent r e s p e c t i v e l y . I t was n o t u n t i l the testimony of these four witnesses was presented t h a t t h e blood alcohol test r e s u l t s were admitted i n t o evidence. W e now t u r n t o our a n a l y s i s of what a p p e l l a n t urges t o be t h e inadequacy of t h e foundation f o r t h e test r e s u l t s . F i r s t , a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t respondents d i d n o t show t h a t post-mortem blood c l o t t i n g d i d n o t s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t t h e t e s t r e s u l t s . Appellant brought no evidence t o support t h i s contention. Appellant d i d n o t challenge respondents' witnesses by reference t o t r e a t i s e s which supported a p p e l l a n t ' s theory a s t o changes i n t h e blood alcohol content. A t most, a p p e l l a n t l a i d the b a s i s f o r a suggestion t h a t a change i n t h e blood of the victims occurred between t h e t i m e of death and t h e time t h e blood was drawn. Such a suggestion goes t o weight, n o t a d m i s s i b i l i t y . The l a p s e of 9 t o 1 2 hours between death and sampling, without proof of i t s e f f e c t s , d i d n o t render t h e test r e s u l t s inadmissible. Appellant next maintains t h a t respondents d i d n o t show t h a t t h e r e was adherence t o the procedures f o r blood t e s t i n g o u t l i n e d i n s e c t i o n 16-2.26 (1) - S2600, Administrative Rules of Montana (ARM), (now s e c t i o n 23.3.931, ARM) . The procedures e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e administrative r u l e s implement s e c t i o n 61-8-405(6), MCA. That code s e c t i o n provides f o r t h e administra- t i o n of blood tests of persons a r r e s t e d f o r d r i v i n g while under the influence of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r . Under s e c t i o n 61-8-401, MCA, a presumption of being under the influence of alcohol may a r i s e i f a defendant's blood alcohol reaches a c e r t a i n l e v e l . This presumption may be used i n an e f f o r t t o convict a person of the charge of d r i v i n g while i n t o x i c a t e d . A criminal defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e procedural safeguards provided by the ARM before such a presumption is applied. I t does n o t follow t h a t t h e same safeguards must be employed when blood test r e s u l t s a r e used i n a c i v i l case. This i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e where, a s i n t h e case before us, the s t a t u t o r y presumption was n o t r e l i e d upon. I n Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co. ( 6 t h C i r . 1974), 502 F. 2d 1117, the c o u r t held t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y presumption of t h e "driving while under t h e influence" law d i d n o t apply i n c i v i l cases. That c o u r t went on t o say t h a t where t h e s t a t u t o r y presumption i s n o t applied, ". . . evidence of blood alcohol concentration i n appropriate cases should be received l i k e any o t h e r e x p e r t testimony. The test procedures need n o t n e c e s s a r i l y conform t o those described i n t h e s t a t u t e , b u t they must accord with good p r a c t i c e i n t h e f i e l d t o assure r e l i a b l e r e s u l t s . " - Bach, 502 F.2d a t 11-21. The testimony of respondents ' witnesses e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the procedures employed followed good p r a c t i c e i n the f i e l d . W e hold t h a t it was n o t e r r o r t o f a i l t o prove compliance with s e c t i o n 23.3.931, ARM. The a p p e l l a n t ' s t h i r d contention on foundation, t h a t t h e r e was a f a i l u r e t o prove t h a t t h e samples came from t h e v i c t i m s , c o n s i s t s of l i t t l e more than a s e l e c t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e testimony below. Both m o r t i c i a n s had no doubt t h a t t h e samples w e r e from t h e v i c t i m s of t h i s a c c i d e n t . W e f i n d no m e r i t i n t h i s argument. F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t maintains t h a t she w a s harmed because t h e l a b o r a t o r y t e c h n i c i a n who t e s t e d t h e samples d i d n o t produce t h e graphs made by t h e g a s chromatograph when he t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l . Appellant claims t h a t t h i s v i o l a t e s Rule 1002, M.R.Evid.: "To prove t h e c o n t e n t of a w r i t i n g . . . t h e o r i g i n a l w r i t i n g . . . i s r e q u i r e d . . . e x c e p t a s otherwise provided by . . . t h e s e r u l e s . " The l a b test r e s u l t form was admitted i n t o evidence. I t was completed by t h e l a b t e c h n i c i a n who f i r s t r a n t h e test, a s c e r t a i n e d t h e graph readings, and then completed t h e form. Thus, t h e r e s u l t s a s w r i t t e n on t h e forms w e r e c o p i e s of e n t r i e s i n t h e r e g u l a r course of business. "A copy of an e n t r y i n t h e r e g u l a r course of business c o n s i s t s of an e n t r y i n a w r i t i n g k e p t i n t h e r e g u l a r course of business copied from another such w r i t i n g by manual o r mechanical means a t o r near t h e t i m e of t h e t r a n s a c t i o n . " Rule 1001 ( 5 ) , M.R.Evid. The l a b test r e s u l t forms were admissible a s c o p i e s i n l i e u of t h e graph under Rule 1003, M.R.Evid.: "A d u p l i c a t e , o r copy of an e n t r y i n t h e r e g u l a r course of business a s defined i n Rule 1 0 0 1 ( 5 ) , i s admissible t o t h e same e x t e n t a s an o r i g i n a l . " Rule 1003 c o n t a i n s t h r e e exceptions t o admission of a copy, none of which apply here. I t was n o t e r r o r t o allow t h e l a b t e s t r e s u l t forms i n t o evidence without t h e graph. I n summary, w e hold t h a t none of t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s i s s u e s concerning improper foundation c o n s t i t u t e e r r o r . W e f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by submitting i t s contributory negligence i n s t r u c t i o n t o the jury. The c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n no. 33 read a s follows: "Under the law of t h e S t a t e of Montana, a passenger, o r one who i s r i d i n g i n a motor v e h i c l e driven by another may be g u i l t y of contributory negligence i n r i d i n g i n an automobile which i s driven by an i n d i v i d u a l under the influence of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r , i f you f i n d t h a t the d r i v e r ' s i n t o x i c a t i o n contributed t o some degree a s a cause of t h e accident." The statement t h a t t h e d r i v e r ' s (Hofer ' s ) i n t o x i c a t i o n must have "contributed t o some degree as a cause of t h e accident" t o t a l l y f a i l s t o s t a t e the e s s e n t i a l proximate cause element of contributory negligence. Before Montana adopted t h e d o c t r i n e of comparative negligence, t h i s Court set down t h e r u l e t h a t f o r contributory negligence t o be a v a i l a b l e a s a defense, t h e negligence of t h e p l a i n t i f f must have been - a proximate cause of t h e i n j u r y . Wolf v. Barry O'Leary, Inc., (1957), 132 Mont. 468, 318 P.2d 582; Dimich Company v. Northern P a c i f i c ~ a i l w a ~ / ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 136 Mont. 485, 503, 348 P.2d 786, 795; (Harrison, C . J . d i s s e n t i n g ) ; Leichner v. B a s i l e (1964), 1 4 4 Mont. 1 4 1 , 394 P. 2d 742; Sztaba v. Great Northern Railway Company (1966), 1 4 7 Mont. 185, 4 1 1 P.2d 379. "Con- t r i b u t o r y negligence by d e f i n i t i o n i n Montana includes 'proximate c a u s e ' , and t h i s strict formula does n o t t o l e r a t e any less o r remote ' c o n t r i b u t i o n ' by t h e p l a i n t i f f . P l a i n t i f f ' s conduct must not only ' c o n t r i b u t e ' t o t h e i n j u r y b u t must c o n t r i b u t e - - a s a 'proximate cause."' DeVerniero v. Eby (1972), 159 Mont. 146, 152, 496 P.2d 290, 293. (Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) "We have always adhered t o t h e strict formula of 'proximate cause'. N o l e s s formula w i l l s u f f i c e t o give t h e jury a c o r r e c t i n s t r u c t i o n on contributory negligence. " Wolf, 318 P. 2d a t 585. The misstatement of proximate cause misled t h e jury and thereby prejudiced t h e p l a i n t i f f . The f a c t t h a t t h e jury was misled i s brought o u t by an examination of t h e c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n no. 28. No. 28 s t a t e d t h a t : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t : " I f you f i n d t h a t Michael Hofer was negligent, b u t t h a t h i s negligence, i f any, occurred without awareness of t h e danger, adding t o e x i s t i n g p e r i l , h i s conduct i s s a i d t o concur with t h e defendants' negligence, i f any, i n proximately causing t h e l o s s . I f you f i n d t h a t Hofer saw o r should have seen t h e danger and n e g l i g e n t l y f a i l e d t o avoid it, h i s conduct is held an unforeseeable, intervening cause (superseding cause) c u t t i n g o f f l i a b i l i t y of t h e defendants." The jury foreman submitted the following question t o t h e judge: "We have a question on i n s t r u c t i o n no. 28. I f we agree Hofer should have seen the danger does t h a t c u t o f f l i a b i l i t y of the defendants e n t i r e l y ? " The judge r e p l i e d t h a t " [ylou a r e n o t t o s i n g l e o u t any c e r t a i n sentence o r any i n d i v i d u a l p o i n t o r i n s t r u c t i o n , and ignore t h e o t h e r s , b u t you a r e t o consider a l l t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a s a whole, and t o regard each i n t h e l i g h t of a l l the o t h e r s . " The foreman's question i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e jury was concerned with t h e causal l i n k of Hofer's conduct. While w e do not c r i t i c i z e t h e d i s t r i c t judge's response t o t h e foreman's question, r e f e r r i n g t h e jury t o t h e o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s would of course lead them t o no. 3 3 . That i n s t r u c t i o n allowed t h e jury t o f i n d t h e defendants n o t l i a b l e i f Hofer's conduct "contributed t o some degree a s a cause of the accident." The jury w a s allowed t o base t h e i r v e r d i c t upon a standard o t h e r than t h e t r u e standard of proximate cause. F a i l u r e t o properly s t a t e t h i s e s s e n t i a l and w e l l - s e t t l e d element of t h e defense of contributory negligence w a s p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e p l a i n t i f f and r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . W e note f o r t h e b e n e f i t of the t r i a l c o u r t t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n no. 28 should n o t be given i n a r e t r i a l of t h i s case. I t i s both confusing and a misstatement of t h e law. W e a r e unable t o determine what t h e f i r s t sentence of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s supposed t o mean. The second sentence p u r p o r t s t o be a statement of i n t e r v e n i n g cause, b u t it, l i k e no. 33, f a i l s t o s t a t e t h a t Hofer's conduct must have been a proximate cause of McAlpine's i n j u r i e s . P l a i n t i f f argued t h a t she was e n t i t l e d t o s a n c t i o n s be- cause of a n improper c l o s i n g argument concerning t h e amount of t h e s e t t l e m e n t with Dahl. The argument was n o t proper. The jury was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t it should n o t concern i t s e l f with t h e s e t t l e m e n t a s t h e c o u r t would t a k e c a r e of t h a t i f t h e j u r y found damages f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f . I n t h e course of f i n a l argu- ment, counsel f o r defendant s t a t e d t h a t Roger Dahl had p a i d f o r h i s s h a r e of t h e a c c i d e n t and t h a t should end it. Such argument went o u t s i d e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and should n o t be per- m i t t e d i n a r e t r i a l . The judgment i s reversed and t h e cause remanded f o r a new t r i a l . W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e 1 J u s t i c e s M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., s p e c i a l l y concurs t o the majority opinion. I concur i n the r e s u l t . However, i n s t r u c t i o n no. 33 i s d e f e c t i v e f o r reasons n o t r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e majority opinion. The s u b j e c t i n s t r u c t i o n allows t h e jury t o f i n d t h e passenger g u i l t y of contributory negligence i f t h e d r i v e r ' s i n t o x i c a t i o n contributed t o t h e cause of t h e accident. This i s n o t t h e law. A passenger can only be defeated i f t h e passenger, knew o r should have known, t h a t t h e d r i v e r was i n t o x i c a t e d . The d r i v e r ' s intox- i c a t i o n , standing alone, cannot d e f e a t recovery on t h e p a r t of t h e passenger. The e r r o r i n t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n goes t o t h e h e a r t of t h i s case and i s highly p r e j u d i c i a l . The blood alcohol reading of t h e d r i v e r was found t o be .09. Such a reading i s i n t h e "gray area". The d r i v e r may well have been under t h e i n f l u e n c e of an i n t o x i c a n t , b u t y e t n o t give any i n d i c a t i o n of t h a t influence t o the passenger. The d r i v e r ' s impairment must be observable t o a reasonably prudent person. I f a reasonably prudent person would n o t be a b l e t o d e t e c t t h e d r i v e r ' s i n t o x i c a t e d s t a t e , then t h a t person cannot be denied recovery on t h e b a s i s of contributory negligence. I t i s obvious from t h e f a c t s of t h i s case t h a t t h e jury could have found t h e d r i v e r t o be under t h e influence and denied recovery t o t h e passenger without t h e r e q u i s i t e finding t h a t t h e passenger was himself g u i l t y of f a i l u r e t o e x e r c i s e reasonable care. I n m y opinion t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n cannot be cured by changing i t s d e f i n i t i o n of "proximate cause". I concur i n t h e s p e c i a l concurrence./ I join in the majority opinion, but also agree with Justice Morrison as to why it was error to give Instruc- tion No. 33.