Title: State v. Monika S. Lackershire

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 74 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP1189-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Monika S. Lackershire, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 265 
Reported at: 288 Wis. 2d 609, 707 N.W.2d 891 
(Ct. App.2005—Published)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 21, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Pepin   
 
JUDGE: 
Dane F. Morey 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Steven P. Weiss, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 74
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP1189-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CF32) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Monika S. Lackershire, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, J.    The petitioner, Monika 
Lackershire, seeks review of a published court of appeals 
decision affirming a judgment of conviction and an order denying 
her post conviction motion for plea withdrawal.1 Based on her 
guilty plea, she was convicted of one count of second-degree 
sexual assault of a child under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) (2003-
                                                 
1 See 
State 
v. 
Lackershire, 
2005 
WI 
App 
265, 
288 
Wis. 2d 609, 707 N.W.2d 891 (affirming judgment and order of the 
Circuit Court for Pepin County, Dane F. Morey, Judge). 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
2 
 
04).2 Lackershire contends that she was the victim, rather than 
the perpetrator, of a sexual assault. She therefore seeks to 
withdraw her plea on the grounds that her plea colloquy was 
defective and her plea was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary. 
¶2 
She argues that her plea colloquy was defective for 
two reasons. First, she asserts that the circuit court did not 
explain the nature of read-in charges. Second, she argues that 
the circuit court failed to satisfy the "factual basis" 
requirement under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b). As a consequence of 
the failure, she maintains that she did not realize that if she 
was the victim of rape, she could not have committed the offense 
charged. In addition to her claim that the plea colloquy was 
defective, Lackershire argues that she pleaded guilty because 
she feared that the stress of a trial would affect her 
pregnancy, and that her plea was therefore involuntary. 
¶3 
We determine that the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that the dismissed charges were read-in offenses. 
Because the record does not reflect that the dismissed charges 
were treated as read-ins, a read-in analysis is not warranted. 
Thus, whether Lackershire understood the nature of read-ins is 
not at issue.  
¶4 
We also determine that Lackershire's plea colloquy was 
inadequate. The factual basis relied upon by the court in 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
3 
 
accepting Lackershire's plea raised a substantial question as to 
whether she had committed sexual assault of a child or had 
herself been the victim of rape. This necessitated that the 
circuit court make further inquiry to establish a sufficient 
factual basis to support Lackershire's plea under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(b).3 
¶5 
Finally, we determine that her fear about the effect 
of a trial on her pregnancy did not render her plea involuntary. 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court for a hearing on whether Lackershire's plea is 
knowing and intelligent.4 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 971.08 provides in relevant part:  
Pleas of guilty and no contest; withdrawal thereof. 
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following:  
 . . . . 
 (b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
4 Lackershire's petition for review and original brief to 
this court focused primarily on the treatment of read-in 
charges. In addition to the factual basis argument and the 
argument regarding voluntariness premised on her fear of the 
stress of trial, she also advanced an argument that she lacked 
an understanding of the elements of the offense. Before oral 
argument, she submitted supplemental authority on the question 
of elements.  
After oral argument, we requested that both parties submit 
supplemental briefs. In her supplemental brief, Lackershire 
advances both the argument that the plea colloquy did not 
satisfy 
the 
factual 
basis 
requirement 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b) 
and 
that 
the 
plea 
colloquy 
inadequately addressed the elements of the offense. Ultimately, 
however, she advances that: 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
4 
 
I 
¶6 
In November 2003, Lackershire was charged with one 
count of second-degree sexual assault of a child pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).5 The charge was based on an alleged act 
of intercourse with Stephen G., who was then 14, that took place 
in the evening around August 27, 2003, in the house where 
Stephen G. and Lackershire both resided. After the preliminary 
hearing in that case, Lackershire was charged with a second 
count of the same offense. That count was based on an alleged 
act of intercourse that took place in the shed adjacent to the 
house around the third week of August 2003 (prior to the 
incident alleged in the first count). In a separate case, 
Lackershire was charged with two counts of the same offense for 
alleged intercourse with Joseph C., who was also 14 at the time. 
¶7 
Lackershire is a mentally and physically challenged 
person. She suffers from learning and cognitive disorders, has a 
                                                                                                                                                             
[I]t is almost irrelevant under the facts of this case 
whether the issue is viewed as a defective colloquy on 
the elements, or as the failure to find an adequate 
factual basis . . . . Under any view, at the time of 
the plea Lackershire was not advised and did not 
understand that she was not guilty of any crime if, 
indeed, she was the victim of the boy's assault, as 
she claimed. 
Because we determine that the plea colloquy was inadequate as a 
result of the circuit court's failure to make sufficient inquiry 
to satisfy the factual basis requirement, we do not address the 
argument regarding the elements of the offense.  
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(2) provides: "Whoever has sexual 
contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained 
the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony." 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
5 
 
tenth-grade education, and has a history of psychological 
problems. She is legally blind, and lives on Social Security 
Disability and Supplemental Security Income payments. 
¶8 
The probable cause portion of the criminal complaint 
against Lackershire in the case involving Stephen G. consisted 
of an incident report by Jesse Van Alstine, chief of police for 
the Village of Pepin. In that report, Van Alstine describes 
talking to Matthew Tucke, Stephen G.'s older brother and 
Lackershire's boyfriend at the time. Tucke informed Van Alstine 
that Lackershire told him that Stephen G. had raped her.  
¶9 
When Van Alstine interviewed Lackershire about the 
incident, she maintained that Stephen G. had raped her. The 
incident report relates Lackershire's version of the incident as 
follows: 
She stated that she also believed that the incident 
was around August 27, 2003 as Matthew and his mother 
had left . . . and that she and [Stephen G.] were in 
the living room together . . . . She stated that 
[Stephen's brother and father were asleep]. She stated 
that continuously that night [Stephen G.] had asked 
her to have sex with him and she continuously told him 
no that she would not do this because she loved his 
brother, Matthew, and would not do that to him. Also, 
that she could get into trouble if she had sex with 
him because of his age. She stated that during this 
time period, [Stephen G.] walked over to her, pulled 
the blanket that she had covered herself up with, 
pulled her shorts down and stuck his penis in her. She 
stated that due to embarrassment, she placed her face 
into the pillow and said and did nothing, other than 
that she had said no several times. 
¶10 Van 
Alstine 
also 
interviewed 
Stephen 
G. 
about 
Lackershire's 
accusation. 
He 
stated 
they 
had 
consensual 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
6 
 
intercourse. The incident report relates Stephen G.'s version of 
the incident as:  
[Stephen G.] stated that on the night in question, 
which he believed was August 27, 2003, that after his 
father and brother ... had gone to sleep, and his 
mother and brother, Matthew [had left], that he asked 
Monika to have sex with him. He stated that he asked 
her approximately three to four times and that each 
time she said no. After the third or fourth time 
Monika went and laid down on the couch on her stomach. 
At which time [Stephen G.] asked her one more time if 
she would have sex with him. At this time Monika gave 
him a look that he felt showed that she was interested 
and she said ["]what do you think.["] At this time he 
walked over toward her  . . . . at which time they 
engaged in sexual intercourse.  
[Stephen G.] stated that at no time after she said 
["]what do you think["] did she say no or protest or 
in any way try to stop [him] from having sex with her. 
¶11 At the preliminary hearing in the case, Stephen G. 
testified about having intercourse with Lackershire in his home. 
He confirms that he was the one to initiate intercourse:  
Q: Where did that event take place?  
A: That happened in the living room.  
Q: In the living room of your family home? 
A: Yep.  
Q: And, once again, how did that come about?  
A: I don't really know. I had asked her, because of 
the time before. That's kind of how it came about.  
Q: You asked her if she would have sex with you?  
A: Yah. 
¶12 Lackershire negotiated a plea with the State. She 
agreed to plead guilty to one count of second-degree sexual 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
7 
 
assault of a child for the incident involving Stephen G. that 
occurred in the living room of his home. The State agreed to 
dismiss the second count in Stephen G.'s case and both counts in 
the case involving Joseph C. The plea questionnaire that 
Lackershire completed stated only that the non-charged offenses 
were to be dismissed, and made no mention of read-ins. 
¶13 At the plea hearing,6 the district attorney told the 
court that the State believed it appropriate to dismiss those 
counts, and that there was "ample opportunity for punishment, 
penalty, and rehabilitation, given a conviction on one . . . ." 
Throughout the plea hearing, the court referred to the non-
charged offenses as being dismissed. For example, the court 
established that Lackershire was pleading guilty in part because 
the State agreed to dismiss other charges:  
The Court: I presume and believe that one of the 
reasons that you're entering the plea to this first 
count is that, by the plea, the State is agreeing to 
dismiss several other counts that are pending in this 
court. 
Is that true? 
Lackershire: Yes. 
The court also confirmed with Lackershire's attorney that the 
charges would be dismissed, stating that "It's my assumption 
that she is accepting this plea agreement partially on the basis 
that the other charges that are pending would be dismissed." 
                                                 
6 Robert W. Radcliffe, reserve judge of the Circuit Court 
for Pepin County, presided over the plea hearing.  
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
8 
 
Nowhere in the plea hearing do the parties or the court indicate 
that the dismissed charges would be read in at sentencing.  
¶14 Regarding the offense charged, Lackershire's attorney 
told the court he had "gone over the elements with my client." 
The court had the following exchange with Lackershire, in which 
it described the offense charged as consisting of sexual 
intercourse with a child under 16 years old: 
The Court: The Information in this case——and referring 
specifically to the first count in the Information of 
03-CF-32 [involving Stephen G.]——alleges that, in 
August of 2003——that would have been last August——in 
this county, you had sexual intercourse with a child 
under the age of sixteen years.  
Do you understand that?  
Lackershire: Yes. 
The Court: Is that true?  
Lackershire: Yes. 
The Court: Do you understand it's alleged that this is 
a violation of Section 948.02 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes? 
Lackershire: Yes.  
¶15 The court established that the factual basis for 
Lackershire's plea was the criminal complaint and testimony at 
the preliminary examination. However, at no point did the court 
question Lackershire about her contention that Stephen G. had 
raped her on the occasion of the offense charged. Neither did 
the court establish that Lackershire understood that if Stephen 
G. had raped her, she could not be guilty of sexual assault. The 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
9 
 
court accepted Lackershire's plea, and ordered a presentence 
investigation (PSI).  
¶16 The circuit court sentenced Lackershire to three years 
initial confinement and six years of extended supervision. In 
explaining its decision in reaching the sentence, the court made 
no mention of the dismissed charges being treated as read-ins. 
Likewise, neither the State nor the defense made any mention 
that the dismissed charges were to be treated as read-in 
offenses. However, the PSI contained a description of each 
dismissed charge, and it captioned those descriptions as "read-
ins." Nowhere else did it describe the charges as read-ins. 
¶17 Lackershire moved to withdraw her plea, or to have her 
sentence modified. She stated that there had not been a specific 
recitation of the elements of the crime to which she had 
pleaded. She also posited, based on a review of the PSI, that 
the 
dismissed 
charges 
had 
been 
treated 
as 
read-ins 
at 
sentencing, and that she had not understood that they would be 
treated that way. Further, she argued that her fear of harm to 
her pregnancy caused by the stress of trial served to coerce her 
into pleading guilty. 
¶18 At the hearing on the postconviction motion, the court 
stated that it thought Lackershire's plea hearing had been 
thorough, that Lackershire had understood everything, and that 
her motion to withdraw was meritless: 
And the Court has read every sentence of the plea 
hearing. It is very thorough. In fact, the Judge even 
asked her if she wanted to withdraw her plea. And she 
was represented by counsel. She did not withdraw her 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
10 
 
plea. She said she fully understood everything. Her 
counsel was there.  
So this is a meritless motion, in the Court's opinion, 
sir. I'm not going to waste a lot of the Court's time 
on it because I'm incorporating in my opinion the 
entire transcript of the plea hearing by Judge 
Radcliffe, which was very thorough and very detailed.  
¶19 Despite its view that Lackershire's motions were 
without 
merit, 
the 
court 
allowed 
Lackershire 
to 
testify 
regarding her understanding of the plea. However, the court 
prefaced Lackershire's testimony by stating:  
So you can——You're a lawyer. You can do what you want 
here. I'll give you permission to make as good of a 
record as you want to. But I want you to know that 
that's what you're doing.  
¶20 Lackershire testified that she had not had any 
discussions with her attorney about read-ins. She also testified 
that she believed she had a defense to the charge for which she 
had been sentenced, namely that the intercourse underlying that 
charge was rape: 
Q: Did you have any questions, when you were pleading 
to the one, exactly what you were pleading to?  
A: Well, yes, because of what the crime element is and 
what I continued to testify as— 
Q: Did you believe you had a defense to the charge?  
A: Yes.  
Q: What was that?  
A: I was raped. 
¶21 Finally, Lackershire testified that she had been 
pregnant during the plea negotiations and sentencing, and that 
she had been hospitalized in late February 2004 due to the 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
11 
 
stress of the proceedings. She stated that she had been advised 
to eliminate stress, and that she had agreed to plead guilty in 
order to avoid the stress of trial and its potential harm to her 
pregnancy.  
¶22 After Lackershire's testimony, the court immediately 
stated that: 
I haven't heard anything here to change my mind.  
 . . . . 
And 
these 
are 
very 
self-serving 
statements 
by 
[Lackershire]. There's nothing stated that changes the 
Court's ruling.  
We're over with this case. 
¶23 Lackershire appealed. The court of appeals determined 
that knowledge of read-in charges "is not required for a 
defendant to enter a knowing, intelligent, or voluntary plea." 
State v. Lackershire, 2005 WI App 265, ¶15, 288 Wis. 2d 609, 707 
N.W.2d 891. It also determined that Lackershire's plea colloquy 
was not otherwise deficient. Id., ¶10. Finally, it concluded 
that Lackershire's pregnancy concerns did not render her plea 
involuntary. Id., ¶¶19-20. 
II 
¶24 Lackershire contends that her guilty plea was not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. She asserts that she is 
therefore entitled to withdraw her plea. Whether a plea was 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered presents a 
question of constitutional fact. State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 
¶19, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. "We accept the circuit 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
12 
 
court's findings of historical and evidentiary facts unless they 
are clearly erroneous, but we determine independently whether 
those facts demonstrate that the defendant's plea was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary." Id. 
¶25 Specifically, 
Lackershire 
asserts 
that 
her 
plea 
colloquy was defective.  Whether a plea colloquy conforms to the 
statutory requirements is a question of law that we review 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  Id., ¶21. 
III 
¶26 Lackershire 
asserts 
that 
her 
plea 
colloquy 
was 
defective in that the circuit court failed to fulfill its plea-
taking duties in two ways. First, the court failed to advise her 
that the dismissed counts would be read in at sentencing and to 
explain that read-in charges could have consequences on her 
sentence. Second, the circuit court failed to satisfy the 
"factual 
basis" 
requirement 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b) 
because it did not "make such inquiry as satisfies it that 
[Lackershire] in fact committed the crime charged."  As a result 
of the failure, she did not realize that if she were the victim 
of rape, she could not have committed the offense charged. We 
address each in turn.  
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
13 
 
¶27 Lackershire based her motion to withdraw her plea, in 
part, on the circuit court's failure to explain read-ins,7 and 
premised her appeal, in part, on the claim that the circuit 
court 
read 
in 
the 
dismissed 
charges. 
Not 
surprisingly, 
therefore, the court of appeals analyzed this as a read-in case. 
Our review of the record, however, reveals that this is not a 
read-in case. 
¶28 Nowhere in the transcript of the plea hearing, the 
transcript of the sentencing hearing, the transcript of the 
adjourned sentencing hearing, or the plea questionnaire do 
either the parties or the court refer to the dismissed charges 
as being read in for the purpose of sentencing. The only place 
in the record where the charges are characterized as read-ins is 
the caption reference in the PSI. Without anything in the record 
establishing that the State and Lackershire agreed to read-in 
charges, or that the circuit court treated the dismissed charges 
                                                 
7 This court explained the procedure for read-in charges in 
Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971). When 
charges are read in during sentencing, the defendant admits to 
having committed the underlying crimes, but does not plead 
guilty to the charges, and therefore is not sentenced for those 
charges. 
However, 
such 
admitted, 
uncharged 
offenses 
are 
considered in the sentencing for the offenses charged. "Thus 
under the read-in procedure, the defendant does not run the risk 
of consecutive sentences or even concurrent sentences. His only 
risk is a longer sentence for the crime charged but this 
sentence cannot exceed the maximum." Id. at 732. Read-in charges 
do not constitute prior convictions and cannot be used under the 
state's repeater statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.12. Id. Read-ins also 
serve a role in setting restitution. Robinson v. City of W. 
Allis, 2000 WI 126, ¶42, 239 Wis. 2d 595; 619 N.W.2d 692; State 
v. Szarkowitz, 157 Wis. 2d 740, 753-54, 460 N.W.2d 819 (1990). 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
14 
 
as 
read-ins, 
we 
cannot 
treat 
this 
as 
a 
read-in 
case. 
Accordingly, we determine that the court of appeals erred in 
concluding that the dismissed charges were read-in offenses, and 
whether Lackershire understood the nature of read-ins is not at 
issue.8  
¶29 Lackershire's second argument centers on the somewhat 
unique posture of this case.  A violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(2) is generally viewed as a strict liability offense. 
Unlike other sexual assault offenses, where consent of the 
victim may be a central issue, the consent of the child in a 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) violation is not relevant. Yet, here, 
where we have an assertion that it was the defendant who did not 
consent to the intercourse, that it was she who was raped by the 
child, then the issue of her consent becomes paramount. If the 
                                                 
8 We do not adopt the court of appeals' determinations that 
read-in charges are merely "collateral consequences" of a plea, 
and that therefore information about read-ins "is not a 
prerequisite to entering a knowing and intelligent plea." 
Lackershire, 288 Wis. 2d 609, ¶15 (citing State v. Byrge, 2000 
WI 
101, 
¶61, 
237 
Wis. 2d 197, 
614 
N.W.2d 477). 
Those 
determinations appear to extend existing law. See Austin v. 
State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 734, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971) (stating that 
"[a] plea agreement should always be made a matter of record 
whether it involves a recommendation of sentencing, a reduced 
charge, a nolle prosequi of charges or read ins with an 
agreement of immunity."); Garski v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 62, 77, 
248 N.W.2d 425 (1977) (providing that "[t]he defendant should be 
advised by the trial court, on the record, of the effect of the 
read-ins . . . ."). We decline to engage in further analysis 
regarding the circuit court's obligation to explain the nature 
of read-in offenses in a case where the record demonstrates that 
the dismissed charges were not treated as read-ins at either the 
plea or sentencing. 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
15 
 
defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a 
child does not constitute a crime. Wis. Stat. § 948.01(6). 
¶30 In her second argument, Lackershire advances that the 
circuit court did not satisfy the factual basis requirement of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b). In her motion to withdraw her plea, 
Lackershire did not use the words "factual basis." Rather, she 
asserted that the circuit court did not adequately explain the 
elements of second-degree sexual assault of a child, that she 
did not understand that being raped would preclude her from 
being charged with such an assault, and that her plea colloquy 
was therefore inadequate under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a). She 
similarly framed the issue under § 971.08(1)(a) in her brief to 
this court. However, at oral argument it appeared that the issue 
may not have been appropriately framed and this court asked for 
supplemental briefs.  
¶31 In her supplemental brief, Lackershire made it clear 
that her argument was that she had been raped by Stephen G. and 
that her plea colloquy was deficient because she did not 
understand that being raped would preclude the charge. Thus, she 
asserted, the plea colloquy could be deficient either because 
the circuit court did not fulfill its statutory obligations 
under § 971.08(1)(a) by not stating the elements or because it 
did not establish a factual basis under § 971.08(1)(b).  
¶32 Lackershire has consistently maintained that she was 
raped by Stephen G. Admittedly, it would have been preferable 
for her to have been explicit that her motion to withdraw her 
plea was based on the failure to establish a factual basis. 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
16 
 
Nevertheless, it has been clear from the time she filed the 
motion that her argument with respect to the elements was based 
upon her assertion that she was raped, and that she did not 
understand that having been raped is inconsistent with her 
having sexual intercourse for the purpose of second-degree 
sexual assault of a child. 
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1)(b) provides that before a 
circuit court accepts a defendant's guilty plea, it must "make 
such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in fact 
committed the crime charged." This court has determined that 
establishing a sufficient factual basis requires a showing that 
"the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense 
charged . . . ." White v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 485, 488, 271 
N.W.2d 97 (1978) (quoting Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 674, 
170 N.W.2d 713 (1969)); State v. Black, 2001 WI 31, ¶21 n. 8, 
242 Wis. 2d 126, 624 N.W.2d 363.   
¶34 The duties established in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 are 
"designed to ensure that a defendant's plea is knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary." Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶23. In our 
recent decision in State v. Kelty, for example, we allowed that 
a plea may not be "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because 
the plea colloquy was defective in discussing the elements of 
the crime or the factual basis" for the charges.  2006 WI 101, 
¶44, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886. Thus, establishing a 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
17 
 
factual basis under § 971.08(1)(b) is necessary for a valid 
plea.9 
¶35 Specifically, the obligation that the circuit court 
establish a sufficient factual basis helps ensure that the 
defendant's plea is knowing and intelligent.10 The factual basis 
requirement "protects a defendant who is in the position of 
pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the 
charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually 
fall within the charge." State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶14, 232 
Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836. Likewise in Morones v. State, this 
court noted that "[t]he purpose of the statutory requirement for 
                                                 
9 The dissent objects that Lackershire did not use the words 
"factual basis" and that this should preclude plea withdrawal. 
Dissent, ¶90. This objection misses the point.  Lackershire has 
consistently claimed that she was raped, and that she did not 
understand that being raped would preclude the crime with which 
she had been charged. Thus, her assertions in the motion and at 
the hearing on the motion comport with the requirement that 
Lackershire "(1) make a prima facie showing of a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-mandated duties . . . ; 
and (2) allege that the defendant did not know or understand the 
information that should have been provided at the plea hearing." 
Dissent, ¶78 (citing State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶39, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906). To preclude this court's review of 
the issue on the ground that Lackershire did not use the magic 
words "factual basis" in her motion, as the dissent would have 
it, ignores the essence of her argument. To contend that the 
issue in this case was not really before the court is at odds 
with the record. 
10 This court has in the past discussed the factual basis 
requirement in terms of whether a plea is voluntary. See Ernst 
v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 673, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969). More 
recently, the factual basis requirement has been viewed as 
"distinct from the voluntariness requirement." White v. State, 
85 Wis. 2d 485, 491 (1978); State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶14, 
232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836. 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
18 
 
a court inquiry as to basic facts is to protect the defendant 
who pleads guilty voluntarily and understanding the charge 
brought but not realizing that his conduct does not" constitute 
the charged crime. 61 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 213 N.W.2d 31 (1973); 
see also Broadie v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 420, 423, 228 N.W.2d 687 
(1975). A defendant's failure to realize that the conduct to 
which she pleads guilty does not fall within the offense charged 
is 
incompatible 
with 
that 
plea 
being 
"knowing" 
and 
"intelligent." 
¶36 The essence of the factual basis requirement and its 
relation to whether a plea is knowing and intelligent is 
illustrated by this court's decision in White v. State, 85 
Wis. 2d 485, 271 N.W.2d 97 (1978). In that case, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to the charge of stealing a chainsaw valued at 
$150 and was sentenced based on the value of the chainsaw being 
greater than $100. He sought to withdraw his plea, claiming that 
the circuit failed to establish a factual basis that the value 
of the saw was $150.  
¶37 There was no question that White's plea was voluntary, 
and that White understood the nature of the theft charge. 
However, the court determined that the record did "not suggest 
that White had any knowledge of the value of the saw." Id. at 
491. Thus, White was in the position of "pleading voluntarily 
with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without 
realizing that his conduct [did] not actually fall within the 
charge." Id. (citation omitted). 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
19 
 
¶38 In the present case, the circuit court's inquiry into 
the factual basis for the plea (that is, its inquiry into 
whether Lackershire "in fact committed the crime charged") was 
likewise insufficient. After the colloquy there remained a 
substantial question as to whether the facts that formed the 
basis of Lackershire's plea constituted the offense charged. 
Because of this substantial question, the plea colloquy failed 
to demonstrate that Lackershire realized that if the underlying 
conduct was a sexual assault upon her, that conduct could not 
constitute the offense charged.  Like the defendant in White, 
Lackershire was potentially in the position of pleading guilty 
without realizing that her conduct did not constitute the 
offense charged.  
¶39 At the plea hearing, the court noted that the criminal 
complaint and the testimony from the preliminary hearing 
provided the factual basis for the offense charged. However, 
neither of these documents unequivocally supports the conclusion 
that Lackershire admitted to conduct that "constitutes the 
offense charged." The offense to which Lackershire pleaded 
guilty was the first count of the indictment in Stephen G.'s 
case. That count was based upon the sexual intercourse between 
Lackershire and Stephen G. that took place around August 27, 
2003, in the living room of the house in which they resided.  
¶40 However, Chief Van Alstine's incident report, which 
formed the probable cause portion of the complaint, makes it 
clear that Lackershire maintained that Stephen G. had raped her 
on that occasion. In all of her statements to Van Alstine, 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
20 
 
Lackershire asserted that Stephen G. had "continuously" asked 
her to have sex, that she had refused, and that finally Stephen 
G. had walked over to her, pulled off a blanket and her shorts, 
and raped her, despite her continuing to tell him "no." 
¶41 Stephen 
G.'s 
statements 
to 
Van 
Alstine 
confirm 
Lackershire's assertion that Stephen G. had repeatedly asked her 
to have sex, and that she had repeatedly refused. Further, his 
statements do not suggest that Lackershire asked or approached 
him for sex. His preliminary hearing testimony about the offense 
charged is scant, and it fails to establish that Lackershire 
consented to having sex with him on that occasion. He testified 
that he had asked her to have sex, that she had not asked him, 
and that his belief that she wanted to have sex with him did not 
derive from her verbal consent. Thus, there is a substantial 
question as to whether these facts, which form the basis of 
Lackershire's 
plea, 
constitute 
the 
offense 
charged. 
That 
substantial question obligated the circuit court to make 
additional inquiry, pursuant to § 971.08(1)(b), to ensure that 
Lackershire in fact committed the crime charged. 
¶42 Resolving that question is vital to fulfill the 
purpose of the factual basis requirement, which is to protect 
the defendant who pleads guilty "without realizing that his 
conduct does not actually fall within the charge." Thomas, 232 
Wis. 2d 714, ¶14; White, 85 Wis. 2d at 491. This is precisely 
the 
concern 
here. 
Lackershire's 
plea 
colloquy 
did 
not 
demonstrate whether Lackershire realized that if the underlying 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
21 
 
conduct was a sexual assault upon her, then her conduct does not 
actually fall within the charge.11  
¶43 During the plea colloquy, the circuit court assessed 
her understanding of the offense charged in the following 
exchange:  
                                                 
11 The dissent concludes that the statutory requirement that 
a circuit court establish an adequate factual basis for the 
offense charged amounts to a "new" procedure. Dissent, ¶75. It 
contends that the possibility that a defendant may withdraw her 
plea based on the circuit court's failure to fulfill a statutory 
obligation somehow creates a "new obligation" that a judge 
considering a plea withdrawal motion "will have to be on the 
lookout for substantial questions and red flags in the record, 
even if the defendant did not raise them." Id., ¶95. This 
assertion is a disservice because it is both incorrect and may 
lead to a misinterpretation of the holding of this case.   
The requirement that judges establish a factual basis is 
statutory, Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b), and does not come from 
this 
opinion. 
There 
is 
nothing 
"new" 
about 
a 
statutory 
requirement. Further, as explained in the text, Lackershire's 
motion was sufficient to make clear that the motion was based on 
her failure to understand that having been raped is incompatible 
with her committing the crime charged. That such a failure is 
better characterized as implicating § 971.08(1)(b) rather than 
§ 971.08(1)(a) should not prevent review, contrary to the 
dissent's view. Moreover, the facts in the record relevant to 
her motion regarding the elements are precisely the same facts 
as the ones relevant to the factual basis requirement. Thus, the 
dissent's claims that "a prima facie showing may spring from the 
record itself," dissent, ¶91, and that "a judge will have to be 
on the lookout for substantial questions and red flags in the 
record, even if the defendant did not raise them," id., ¶95, 
misconstrue the case. 
Finally, 
the 
dissent's conjecture that this decision 
somehow signals there is "[n]o need for a motion that raises [a] 
'substantial question'" (id., ¶91) is hyperbole. The motion in 
this case raised a substantial question because it was based on 
Lackershire's consistent assertion that she was raped.  
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
22 
 
The Court: The Information in this case . . . alleges 
that, in August of 2003——that would have been last 
August——in this county, you had sexual intercourse 
with a child under the age of sixteen years.  
Do you understand that?  
Lackershire: Yes. 
The Court: Is that true?  
Lackershire: Yes. 
The Court: Do you understand it's alleged that this is 
a violation of Section 948.02 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes? 
Lackershire: Yes.  
This description of the conduct underlying the charge——that 
Lackershire had sexual intercourse with a child under 16 years 
old——is on its face compatible with Lackershire's claim that 
Stephen G. raped her. Under the facts of this case, however, 
merely stating that the charge involved intercourse and a child 
served to obscure the fact that being the victim of rape negates 
a charge of sexual assault. Similarly, it obscures the fact that 
if the underlying conduct was a sexual assault of Lackershire, 
then that conduct does not constitute the offense charged. Given 
the unique circumstances of this case, the circuit court's 
description of the charge failed to protect Lackershire from 
pleading guilty without realizing that if the underlying conduct 
was a sexual assault upon her, then her conduct does not 
actually fall within the charge. 
¶44 We find support for this view in the court of appeals 
decision in State v. Olson, 2000 WI App 158, 238 Wis. 2d 74, 616 
N.W.2d 144. In that case, the defendant, who was 18 years old, 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
23 
 
was charged with second-degree sexual assault of a child, but 
claimed that she had in fact been the victim of rape. The 
circuit court denied the defendant's request for a jury 
instruction that the state had to prove that the intercourse was 
the result of the defendant's intentional acts or upon her 
"affirmative instructions." The defendant was convicted of the 
charge. Id., ¶1. The court of appeals reversed the judgment. 
Noting that there was evidence that the defendant had reported 
the incident as a sexual assault upon her, it determined that 
"the act or acts which bring about the sexual intercourse must 
be, . . . in the words of [Wis. Stat. § 948.01(6)], undertaken 
'upon the defendant's instruction.'" Id., ¶13. It therefore 
determined that under those facts, the defendant was entitled to 
a jury instruction to that effect.  Id. 
¶45 Like the present case, in Olson there was no dispute 
that a sexual assault took place, but there was a question as to 
whether it was an assault by the defendant or an assault of the 
defendant. In Olson, the proposed jury instruction served to 
establish the understanding that being the victim of rape would 
negate the charge that the defendant committed the assault.  
¶46 In the present case, with similar facts, we determine 
that the circuit court had an obligation to make sufficient 
inquiry to establish a factual basis exists for the crime 
charged. Here, the preliminary hearing transcript and the 
complaint, which formed the factual basis upon which the circuit 
court relied, should have raised a red flag prompting further 
inquiry. 
Such 
inquiry 
is 
required 
in 
order 
to 
protect 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
24 
 
Lackershire from pleading guilty without realizing that the 
conduct she admitted does not constitute the offense charged.12 
Because a substantial question exists whether this is a sexual 
assault of or by Lackershire, and because the colloquy did not 
establish that Lackershire realized that if the underlying 
conduct was an assault upon her, she could not be guilty of the 
offense charged, the circuit court failed to satisfy the factual 
basis requirement.  
IV 
¶47 Having determined that the circuit court failed to 
make sufficient inquiry under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b), we must 
address the appropriate remedy. In  State v. Bangert, this court 
set out "the proper remedy for failure to follow . . . the 
procedures set forth in sec. 971.08(1)." 131 Wis. 2d 246, 272-
73, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). Under Bangert, where a defendant seeks 
to withdraw her plea and alleges a deficiency in the plea 
colloquy, she must first make a prima facie showing of a 
                                                 
12 The 
dissent 
contends 
that 
an 
allegation 
of 
rape 
constitutes a defense to the charge of second-degree sexual 
assault of a child, and that "Lackershire's admission that she 
had sexual intercourse (i.e., affirmatively acted or directed 
action) means that her admitted conduct did not amount to a rape 
defense." Dissent, ¶108. This argument begs the question. The 
underlying issue in this case is whether Lackershire understood 
that being raped is incompatible with having sexual intercourse 
for the purposes of second-degree sexual assault of a child. To 
conclude that because Lackershire admitted to having sexual 
intercourse entails that she admitted to affirmatively acting or 
directing action simply assumes the answer to the question that 
the circuit court ought to have addressed in the plea hearing, 
and which brings the case before this court. 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
25 
 
violation of § 971.08(1) or other mandatory procedure and allege 
that she did not know or understand information that should have 
been provided at the colloquy. Id. at 274. If the defendant 
fulfills these requirements, the court must hold an evidentiary 
hearing at which the state has the opportunity to show by clear 
and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent. Id.; Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶40. 
Bangert encompasses the requirement in § 971.08(1)(b) to "[m]ake 
such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in fact 
committed the crime charged."  
¶48 In some ways, however, applying the Bangert procedure 
for failure to satisfy the factual basis requirement is an 
awkward fit.  Factual basis cases typically involve the question 
of whether undisputed facts actually constitute the crime 
charged.  Where undisputed facts cannot constitute the crime 
charged as a matter of law, the defendant is allowed to withdraw 
her plea to prevent a manifest injustice. State v. Smith, 202 
Wis. 2d 21, 25, 539 N.W.2d 232 (1996).  
¶49 In State v. Johnson, for example, the defendant sought 
to withdraw his guilty plea for armed robbery on the ground that 
there had been no asportation, and that asportation is necessary 
for there to be an armed robbery. 207 Wis. 2d 239, 242, 558 
N.W.2d 375 (1997). The state did not dispute that there had been 
no asportation. Id. This court determined that asportation is 
required for armed robbery, and that the defendant was therefore 
entitled to withdraw his plea. Id.; see also Black, 242 
Wis. 2d 126, ¶1 (question of whether undisputed fact that felon 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
26 
 
handled pistol satisfied factual basis for charge of felon in 
possession of handgun). 
¶50 In the present case, however, the facts are in dispute 
precisely because the circuit court failed to conduct a 
sufficient inquiry into the factual basis of the offense 
charged. The plea colloquy failed to establish whether the 
underlying conduct was a sexual assault of Lackershire or by 
Lackershire. This is not a case in which there are undisputed 
facts. Rather it is a case in which there is a substantial 
question as to factual basis, which raises doubts as to whether 
Lackershire's plea was knowing and intelligent.  
¶51 In a number of cases subsequent to Bangert, this court 
has reiterated that the failure to fulfill the § 971.08(1)(b) 
factual basis requirement entitles the defendant to the Bangert 
procedure.  Kelty, 294 Wis. 2d 62, ¶44; Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
¶¶35-36; State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶17, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 
644 N.W.2d 891; State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶¶48-49, 232 
Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199; State v. Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d 131, 
140-41, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997).  Accordingly, we determine that 
it is appropriate here. 
¶52 Under the Bangert procedure, where a defendant seeks 
to withdraw a plea after sentencing and alleges that the plea 
colloquy is defective, the defendant must first make a prima 
facie 
showing 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
violated 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
27 
 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other plea requirements.13 Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 274. In addition, the defendant must allege that she 
did not know or understand the information that the court should 
have provided at the plea hearing. Id.; Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
¶39. Once the defendant has made a prima facie case and alleged 
a lack of knowledge or understanding, the burden shifts to the 
state "to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
entered," despite the inadequacy of the plea hearing. Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 274. To afford the state the opportunity to make 
such a showing, the circuit court must hold a postconviction 
evidentiary 
hearing. 
Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
¶40 
(citing 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274). 
¶53 Because the circuit court had an obligation to make 
further inquiry as to the factual basis of the offense charged 
under 
§ 971.08(1)(b), Lackershire has satisfied the first 
condition necessary for her to withdraw her plea. She has 
established a prima facie showing that her plea colloquy was 
defective. 
¶54 In her motion to withdraw her plea, Lackershire stated 
that "she did not fully understand the elements of the crime to 
which 
she 
pled, that she did not fully understand the 
consequences of her plea, and that her plea was not knowing or 
                                                 
13 For a catalog of the statutory and court-mandated duties 
of circuit courts at plea hearings, see Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
¶35. 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
28 
 
voluntary." Further, she states that "she has always maintained 
that she was raped."  
¶55 Lackershire's allegation of lack of understanding 
focuses on the effect of being raped in relation to the charge 
of sexual assault of a child. We therefore determine she has 
alleged that she did not know or understand information that the 
court should have provided at the plea hearing, and that 
Lackershire fulfills the second requirement for plea withdrawal. 
¶56 Once the defendant meets those two requirements, the 
court must hold a postconviction evidentiary hearing at which 
the state is given an opportunity to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, despite the identified inadequacy of 
the plea colloquy. Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶40 (citing Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 274). We therefore conclude that such a hearing 
is required in this case. Because Lackershire's plea colloquy 
was defective due to the circuit court's failure to make further 
inquiry to establish an adequate factual basis, the focus of the 
inquiry will be on whether Lackershire's plea was knowing and 
intelligent. Specifically, it will focus on whether Lackershire 
realized that if she was raped, her conduct would not actually 
fall within the charge. 
¶57 The circuit court did hold a hearing on Lackershire's 
motion to withdraw her plea. However, that hearing did not 
provide an adequate opportunity for the State to demonstrate 
that 
there 
was 
a 
sufficient 
factual 
basis, 
and 
that 
Lackershire's plea was therefore knowing and intelligent. The 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
29 
 
circuit court rejected out of hand Lackershire's contention that 
her plea colloquy was defective, calling it "meritless" and 
"plain not sensible," in effect holding that Lackershire had not 
made the prima facie case necessary to shift the burden to the 
State. The State therefore did not have the opportunity to 
present evidence with the understanding that it bore the burden 
of 
showing 
that 
Lackershire's 
plea 
was 
knowingly 
and 
intelligently entered.  
¶58 While 
the 
court 
allowed 
Lackershire 
to 
present 
evidence, it implied that hearing evidence would not bear on its 
decision. It prefaced Lackershire's presentation of evidence by 
stating that "[y]ou can do what you want here. I'll give you 
permission to make as good of a record as you want to. But what 
I want you to know that that's what you're doing." 
¶59 A motion hearing where the court implies that evidence 
will not affect its decision cannot be characterized as an 
"evidentiary hearing at which the state is given an opportunity 
to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's 
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, despite the 
identified 
inadequacy 
of 
the 
plea 
colloquy." 
Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, ¶40. The State asks that if this court determines 
that the circuit court erred, then the State be provided the 
opportunity to show that Lackershire's plea was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary. Although Lackershire submits that 
the State did have an opportunity to show that her plea was 
adequate, she recognizes that the record of the motion hearing 
reflects that the opportunity was limited. We agree that the 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
30 
 
State has not had the opportunity to present evidence to which 
it is entitled under Bangert. We therefore remand the case to 
the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing. 
¶60 In determining whether the plea was knowingly and 
intelligently made, the circuit court may look at the totality 
of the circumstances. As we set out in our recent decision in 
State v. Thomas, in determining whether a defendant's admitted 
conduct constitutes the charged crime: 
[A] 
court 
may 
look 
at 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances when reviewing a defendant's motion to 
withdraw 
a 
guilty 
plea 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
defendant has agreed to the factual basis underlying 
the guilty plea. The totality of the circumstances 
includes the plea hearing record, the sentencing 
hearing record, as well [as] the defense counsel's 
statements concerning the factual basis presented by 
the state, among other portions of the record.  
Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶18.  
¶61 Moreover, in Bangert, this court determined that when 
a defendant has shown a prima facie violation of § 971.08(1)(a) 
and alleged that she did not know or understand information that 
should have been provided at the plea hearing, the state may use 
any evidence to determine that the plea was knowing and 
voluntary: 
The 
state 
may 
then 
utilize 
any 
evidence 
which 
substantiates 
that 
the 
plea 
was 
knowingly 
and 
voluntarily made. . . . The state may examine the 
defendant or defendant's counsel to shed light on the 
defendant's understanding or knowledge of information 
necessary for him to enter a voluntary and intelligent 
plea. 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
31 
 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274-275. We determine that the state 
should receive similar latitude where the plea hearing is 
deficient under § 971.08(1)(b). 
V 
¶62 Finally, we consider Lackershire's argument that her 
plea was involuntary because she feared that the stress of trial 
would affect her pregnancy. Lackershire testified that on 
February 
24 
and 
25, 
2004, 
she 
was 
hospitalized 
with 
complications of her pregnancy, and that upon her discharge, she 
was told to maintain bed rest and to avoid stressful situations 
in order to protect her pregnancy. She maintains that allowing 
her to withdraw her plea is necessary to avoid a manifest 
injustice.  We disagree.  
¶63 This court explained the nature of voluntary pleas in 
Craker v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 222, 223 N.W.2d 872 (1974). In 
Craker, the defendant argued that his guilty plea was not 
voluntary on the ground that he was compelled to plead guilty 
because of his moral scruples and family pressure rather than 
his legal guilt. In determining that the defendant's plea was 
voluntary, the Craker court cited to Rahhal v. State, 52 
Wis. 2d 144, 151-52, 187 N.W.2d 800 (1971) for the proposition 
that ". . . [t]he distinction between a motivation which induces 
and a force which compels the human mind to act must always be 
kept in focus. When the defendant is not given a fair or 
reasonable alternative to choose from, the choice is legally 
coerced. . . ." Craker, 66 Wis. 2d at 229. The Craker court 
concluded that moral scruples and family pressure are "'self-
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
32 
 
imposed coercive elements' [which] do not vitiate the voluntary 
nature of the defendant's guilty plea."  Id. (citing Drake v. 
State, 45 Wis. 2d 226, 233, 172 N.W.2d 664 (1969)).  
¶64 Lackershire has raised no plausible argument that her 
plea was legally coerced. She does not contend that she asked 
the circuit court to postpone her trial date and was refused. 
Although she asserts that the district attorney told her that 
postponement "was not an option," she does not claim that the 
district attorney implied that the plea agreement was contingent 
upon Lackershire not seeking such a postponement. Thus, neither 
the court nor the prosecutor denied her a fair or reasonable 
alternative to choose from such that her choice was coerced.  
¶65 Rather, we determine that because the decision whether 
to seek a postponement was within her control, the choice 
between pleading guilty and going to trial on the scheduled date 
was self-imposed. Accordingly, we conclude that her concern 
about the stress of a trial does not vitiate the voluntary 
nature of her plea.  
VI 
¶66 In conclusion, we determine that the court of appeals 
erred in concluding that the dismissed charges were read-in 
offenses. Because the record does not reflect that the dismissed 
charges were treated as read-ins, a read-in analysis is not 
warranted. Thus, whether Lackershire understood the nature of 
read-ins is not at issue.  
¶67 We also determine that Lackershire's plea colloquy was 
inadequate. The factual basis relied upon by the court in 
No. 
2005AP1189-CR   
 
33 
 
accepting Lackershire's plea raised a substantial question as to 
whether she had committed sexual assault or had herself been the 
victim of rape. This necessitated that the circuit court make 
further inquiry to establish a sufficient factual basis to 
support Lackershire's plea under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b).  
¶68 Finally, we determine that her fear about the effect 
of a trial on her pregnancy did not render her plea involuntary. 
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand to the 
circuit court for a hearing on whether Lackershire's plea is 
knowing and intelligent. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶69 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  With the 
exception of footnote 4, I join the majority opinion.  I write 
separately because I would address Monika Lackershire's argument 
that the plea colloquy inadequately addressed the elements of 
the offense of second degree sexual assault of a child, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2). 
¶70 Section 948.02(2) provides in relevant part:  "Whoever 
has . . . sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained 
the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.01(6) defines "sexual intercourse" as the 
"vulvar penetration as well as cunnilingus, fellatio or anal 
intercourse between persons or any other intrusion, however 
slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the 
genital or anal opening either by the defendant or upon the 
defendant's instruction."  Lackershire argues that the phrase 
"by the defendant or upon the defendant's instruction" is an 
element of the offense to which Lackershire pled.  The State 
disagrees, asserting that the phrase is not a separate element 
of the offense charged here, but an element of a different type 
of sexual assault involving a victim's insertion of an object 
into his or her own genital or anal opening at the defendant's 
instruction.  The State further argues that Lackershire's "non-
consent" is a defensive matter to be raised by her.    
¶71 Because the majority concludes that the guilty plea 
colloquy was inadequate as a result of the circuit court's 
failure to make sufficient inquiry to satisfy the factual basis 
requirement, the majority has declined to reach the issue 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
concerning the elements of the offense of second degree sexual 
assault of a child.  Majority op., ¶5 n.4.   Because the issue 
is squarely before us and is likely to impact a significant 
number of future cases, I would address it to provide guidance 
to trial and appellate courts.  Such a determination could also 
ultimately 
impact 
the 
language 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Jury 
Instructions with respect to sexual assault cases.  See, e.g., 
Wis JI——Criminal 2101B and 2104.   
¶72 For the forgoing reasons, I respectfully concur.       
 
 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶73 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  Lackershire moved 
to withdraw her plea on three grounds: (1) she did not 
understand the elements of the crime to which she pleaded 
guilty, (2) she was not made aware of the read-in charges, and 
(3) her pregnancy caused her to act involuntarily in entering 
her guilty plea.   
¶74 When 
deciding 
Lackershire's 
motion, 
the 
judge 
addressed the grounds raised in it.  For focusing on the motion 
made by the defendant, and failing to focus on the factual basis 
requirement that Lackershire herself did not even raise, the 
judge erred. 
¶75 You did not misread that: for focusing on the motion 
made by the defendant, the judge erred in this case.  The 
majority arrives at its odd result by imposing a new obligation 
on trial judges during the plea procedure.  Now, regardless of 
the motion made by a defendant seeking to withdraw his or her 
plea, the judge is responsible for identifying any potential 
grounds for withdrawal (i.e., substantial questions that warrant 
further inquiry).  This new obligation undercuts the burdens 
already in place during the well-established plea withdrawal 
procedure.   
¶76 According to the majority, it is not just the judge 
that considered Lackershire's motion to withdraw that erred: the 
judge that conducted the plea colloquy failed to satisfy the 
factual basis requirement.  Majority op., ¶38.  On this more 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
substantive 
issue, 
I 
also 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.    
I 
¶77 The 
majority 
decides 
that 
Lackershire 
had 
an 
inadequate plea colloquy because the circuit court judge taking 
her plea did not satisfy the factual basis requirement.  Before 
getting to the substance of that decision, it is worth 
articulating the effect of the majority even getting to the 
factual basis requirement in the first place.   
A.  Plea withdrawal procedure  
¶78 The procedure for determining whether plea withdrawal 
is warranted is well established.  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 
¶39-41, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906; State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 274-75, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  It begins with a 
motion by the defendant.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶39; Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 274.  The legislature has defined "motion" in the 
context of a criminal proceeding: 
(1) "Motion" means an application for an order. 
(2) Unless otherwise provided or ordered by the court, 
all motions shall meet the following criteria: 
(a) Be in writing. 
(b) Contain a caption setting forth the name of 
the court, the venue, the title of the action, the 
file number, a denomination of the party seeking the 
order or relief and a brief description of the type of 
order or relief sought. 
(c) State with particularity the grounds for the 
motion and the order or relief sought. 
Wis. Stat. § 971.30. 
 
A 
motion 
to 
withdraw 
a 
plea 
must 
specifically do the following:  
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
3 
 
(1) make a prima facie showing of a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)1 or other court-mandated duties2 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1) provides the following: 
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following: 
(a) 
Address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the 
potential punishment if convicted. 
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
(c) Address the defendant personally and advise 
the defendant as follows: "If you are not a citizen of 
the United States of America, you are advised that a 
plea of guilty or no contest for the offense with 
which you are charged may result in deportation, the 
exclusion from admission to this country or the denial 
of naturalization, under federal law." 
Understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential 
punishment, as 
addressed in § 971.08(1)(a), has been 
interpreted as requiring "'an awareness of the essential 
elements of the crime.'"  State v. Lange, 2003 WI App 2, 
¶17, 259 Wis. 2d 774, 656 N.W.2d 480 (quoting State v. 
Brandt, 226 Wis. 2d 610, 619, 594 N.W.2d 759 (1999)).   
Distinct from § 971.08(1)(a), § 971.08(1)(b) requires 
that the circuit court be satisfied that the defendant in 
fact committed the crime charged.  In State v. Thomas, 2000 
WI 13, ¶14, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836, we referred to 
this requirement as the "factual basis" requirement.  To 
satisfy the factual basis requirement, a judge must 
"determine to the court's satisfaction that the facts, if 
proved, 'constitute the offense charged and whether the 
defendant's conduct does not amount to a defense.'"  
Morones v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 213 N.W.2d 31 (1973) 
(quoting Edwards v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 231, 236, 186 
N.W.2d 193 (1971)). 
 
2 In State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906, the court provided the following list of duties a 
circuit court judge has during a plea hearing: 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
4 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) Determine the extent of the defendant’s 
education and general comprehension so as to assess 
the defendant's capacity to understand the issues at 
the hearing; 
(2) Ascertain whether any promises, agreements, 
or 
threats 
were 
made 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
defendant's anticipated plea, his appearance at the 
hearing, or any decision to forgo an attorney; 
(3) Alert the defendant to the possibility that 
an attorney may discover defenses or mitigating 
circumstances that would not be apparent to a layman 
such as the defendant; 
(4) Ensure the defendant understands that if he 
is indigent and cannot afford an attorney, an attorney 
will be provided at no expense to him; 
(5) Establish the defendant's understanding of 
the nature of the crime with which he is charged and 
the range of punishments to which he is subjecting 
himself by entering a plea; 
(6) Ascertain personally whether a factual basis 
exists to support the plea; 
(7) Inform the defendant of the constitutional 
rights he waives by entering a plea and verify that 
the defendant understands he is giving up these 
rights; 
(8) Establish 
personally 
that 
the 
defendant 
understands that the court is not bound by the terms 
of any plea agreement, including recommendations from 
the district attorney, in every case where there has 
been a plea agreement; 
(9) Notify 
the 
defendant 
of 
the 
direct 
consequences of his plea; and 
(10) Advise the defendant that "If you are not a 
citizen of the United States of America, you are 
advised that a plea of guilty or no contest for the 
offense [or offenses] with which you are charged may 
result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to 
this country or the denial of naturalization, under 
federal 
law," 
as 
provided 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c). 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
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by pointing to passages or gaps in the plea hearing 
transcript; and (2) allege that the defendant did not 
know or understand the information that should have 
been provided at the plea hearing.  
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶39.   
¶79 Once the defendant has filed a motion to withdraw his 
or her plea, the circuit court reviews it.  Id., ¶40.  If the 
motion establishes a prima facie violation and makes the 
requisite allegations, the defendant has met his or her burden.  
Id.  The circuit court then holds an evidentiary hearing, which 
allows the state "to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
despite the identified inadequacy of the plea colloquy."  Id.  
If the state meets its burden, the evidentiary hearing ends and 
the defendant may not withdraw his or her plea as a matter of 
right.  Id., ¶41.  If the state fails to meet its burden, the 
defendant may withdraw his or her plea as a matter of right.  
Id.   
B.  Procedural posture of this case   
¶80 In this case, Reserve Judge Radcliffe presided over 
Lackershire's plea hearing, which occurred March 16, 2004.  At 
the plea hearing, Lackershire pleaded guilty to one count of 
second-degree sexual assault of a child.   
¶81 Five months after Lackershire's plea hearing, Judge 
Morey presided over Lackershire's sentencing hearing.  According 
to the sentencing hearing transcript, Lackershire was sentenced 
to "nine years and zero months.  That is three years and zero 
                                                                                                                                                             
Id., ¶35 (footnotes omitted). 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
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months confinement in prison, and six years and zero months is 
the extended supervision time."   
¶82 Over six months after Lackershire's sentencing hearing 
she filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea.  Lackershire's 
motion to withdraw her plea listed three separate grounds:  
She stated that there had not been a specific 
recitation of the elements of the crime to which she 
had pleaded.  She also posited, based on a review of 
the [Pre-Sentence Investigation], that the dismissed 
charges had been treated as read-ins at sentencing, 
and that she had not understood that they would be 
treated that way.  Further, she argued that her fear 
of harm to her pregnancy caused by the stress of trial 
served to coerce her into pleading guilty. 
Majority op., ¶17.  (Note that the majority's own summary of the 
grounds raised in Lackershire's motion does not include a 
reference to the factual basis requirement.)   
¶83 During the motion hearing, Lackershire's attorney 
focused on the grounds raised in the motion.  Judge Morey asked, 
"do 
you 
wish 
to 
supplement 
your 
brief 
with 
anything?"  
Lackershire's attorney responded, "Yes.  Briefly, Judge.  I set 
out most of the authorities in the actual motion."  The attorney 
then went on to describe the grounds on which Lackershire's 
motion was based.  During the motion hearing, the attorney made 
no reference to the factual basis requirement; nor did the 
district attorney or Judge Morey make any reference to it.   
¶84 At the outset of oral argument before this court, 
Lackershire's attorney framed the issues of this case as 
follows: "There are three sets of issues concerning her plea 
that are being raised today.  There are issues related to the 
existence of read-in charges, issues related to the elements of 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
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the crime to which she pled and the issues related to her 
pregnancy."  The State recapped the issues being addressed in a 
similar way: "The Defendant seeks to withdraw her guilty plea on 
three grounds: the read-in charges, the elements, and her 
pregnancy."  Neither attorney mentioned any issue related to the 
factual basis requirement. 
¶85 The way that the parties framed the issues tracks the 
issues presented in Lackershire's petition for review.  These 
were as follows: 
1. 
Should 
the 
longstanding 
rule 
that 
read-in 
offenses that are part of a plea agreement must 
be set forth on the record at the time of the 
plea-taking procedure be reversed? 
2. 
If read-in offenses are made part of a plea 
agreement, 
must 
the 
defendant 
have 
actual 
knowledge and understanding of those offenses and 
the consequences of the read-in procedure? 
3. 
When a defendant has moved to withdraw a plea, 
and 
testified 
as 
to 
the 
confusion 
and/or 
misunderstanding about the elements or nature of 
the charge, must the state produce affirmative 
evidence in order to prevail? 
4. 
Where the uncontroverted evidence shows that a 
pregnant 
defendant entered a plea with the 
understanding that she could not medically endure 
a trial without risking her health or the health 
of the unborn baby and that she believed she 
could not get an adjournment of the trial date, 
has the defendant shown that her plea was not 
voluntary, thereby entitling her to withdraw the 
plea?    
Again, there was no mention of the factual basis requirement in 
Lackershire's petition for review.  Given the procedural posture 
of the case, it is understandable that the factual basis 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
8 
 
requirement was not mentioned during oral argument by either 
party or any of the justices. 
¶86 It was not until a supplemental brief, after this 
court heard oral argument on the questions presented, that 
Lackershire even mentioned the factual basis requirement.  In an 
order seeking additional briefing in the case, we posed three 
questions.  The second question asked the following:  
If the phrase "either by the defendant or upon the 
defendant's 
instruction" 
provides 
an 
affirmative 
defense 
for 
the 
sexual 
assault 
crime 
to 
which 
Lackershire pleaded guilty, does the failure, during 
the plea colloquy, to discuss the claim by the 
defendant that she was raped, since that issue was 
raised in the probable cause portion of the criminal 
complaint and in the preliminary hearing transcript 
presented to support her plea, mean that her plea was 
not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently? 
In her supplemental brief responding to the question, she stated 
the following:  
Lackershire submits that it is almost irrelevant under 
the facts of this case whether the issue is viewed as 
a defective colloquy on the elements, or as the 
failure to find an adequate factual basis, or even 
under the manifest injustice test requiring her to 
show a lack of knowledge or understanding of a 
material element.  Under any view, at the time of the 
plea 
Lackershire 
was 
not 
advised 
and 
did 
not 
understand that she was not guilty of any crime if, 
indeed, she was the victim of the boy's assault, as 
she claimed.    
In essence, Lackershire invited the court to decide her case 
based on the grounds of the elements being misunderstood, the 
factual basis requirement not being satisfied, or the manifest 
injustice test.  The grounds the court chose was "almost 
irrelevant." 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
9 
 
¶87 There is a problem with Lackershire's invitation: she 
never moved the circuit court to withdraw her plea because of a 
failure to satisfy the factual basis requirement.  According to 
the well-established procedure for plea withdrawal, Lackershire 
would have had to include her claim that Judge Radcliffe failed 
to satisfy the factual basis requirement in her motion to the 
circuit court.  Judge Morey then could have assessed whether she 
had made a prima facie showing and the requisite allegations to 
satisfy her burden.  However, Lackershire never made such a 
motion.  The issue was not reviewed by the circuit court and 
should not be reviewed by any appellate courts. 
C.  The new plea withdrawal procedure 
¶88 The majority accepted Lackershire's invitation to 
decide the case based on the factual basis requirement.  
Majority op., ¶5 n.4.     
¶89 The 
majority 
not 
only 
accepted 
Lackershire's 
invitation to decide the case on the factual basis requirement, 
it makes it seem as though the factual basis requirement has 
been one of Lackershire's primary arguments all along.  For 
example, in explaining Lackershire's arguments, the majority 
states the following: "[S]he argues that the circuit court 
failed 
to 
satisfy 
the 
'factual 
basis' 
requirement 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b)."  Majority op., ¶2; see also id. ¶5 
n.4 
("In 
addition 
to 
[Lackershire's] 
factual 
basis 
argument . . . "), id., ¶26 ("Lackershire asserts that her plea 
colloquy was defective . . . in two ways. . . .  Second, the 
circuit 
court 
failed 
to 
satisfy 
the 
'factual 
basis' 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
10 
 
requirement . . . "), and id., ¶30 ("In her second argument, 
Lackershire advances that the circuit court did not satisfy the 
factual basis requirement . . . ").   
¶90 The record in this case tells a different story: 
Lackershire never alleged that the plea-taking court failed to 
satisfy the factual basis requirement.  Lackershire failed to 
present any argument related to the factual basis requirement in 
her motion to the circuit court.  Having failed to raise it in 
her motion to the circuit court, not surprisingly she did not 
make any such argument to the court of appeals.  Similarly, she 
did not petition this court to review an issue about the factual 
basis requirement.  Lackershire sensibly did not make an 
argument related to the factual basis requirement in her primary 
briefs to this court, given that we did not grant a petition to 
review for such an issue.  Only in a supplemental brief 
answering 
a 
question 
about 
whether 
rape 
constitutes 
an 
affirmative defense to the crime to which she pleaded guilty did 
Lackershire stumble upon the factual basis requirement.   
¶91 In the face of the well-established plea withdrawal 
procedure that requires that the defendant make a motion with a 
prima facie showing of a violation of § 971.08(1) or other court 
mandated duty, the majority decides that a prima facie showing 
may spring from the record itself.  Majority op., ¶38.  It 
stated that:  
there is a substantial question as to whether these 
facts, which form the basis of Lackershire's plea, 
constitute the offense charged.  That substantial 
question 
obligated 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
make 
additional inquiry, pursuant to § 971.08(1)(b), to 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
11 
 
ensure that Lackershire in fact committed the crime 
charged.  Resolving that question is vital to fulfill 
the purpose of the factual basis requirement. 
Id., ¶¶41-42.  No need for a motion that raises the "substantial 
question."  The presence of a "substantial question" somewhere 
in the record seems to be enough to obligate a judge reviewing a 
plea colloquy to address it.3  (Such a new procedure makes one 
wonder if a new claim is around the corner: ineffective 
assistance of judge.)   
¶92 Previously, the plea withdrawal procedure empowered 
defendants to make a motion alleging how a plea-taking court 
failed to satisfy a plea colloquy duty.  That motion permitted 
the defendants to have the court deal with their allegation 
directly.  Now, judges considering defendants' motions have the 
added obligation to be on the lookout for substantial questions 
                                                 
3 This is not an isolated comment by the majority.  It also 
stated the following a few paragraphs later: 
Here, the preliminary hearing transcript and the 
complaint, which formed the factual basis upon which 
the circuit court relied, should have raised a red 
flag prompting further inquiry.  Such inquiry is 
required in order to protect Lackershire from pleading 
guilty without realizing that the conduct she admitted 
does not constitute the offense charged.  Because a 
substantial question exists whether this is a sexual 
assault of or by Lackershire, and because the colloquy 
did not establish that Lackershire realized that if 
the underlying conduct was an assault upon her, she 
could not be guilty of the offense charged, the 
circuit court failed to satisfy the factual basis 
requirement. 
Majority op., ¶46.  Again, no need for a motion by the defendant 
that raises the "substantial question."  Circuit court judges 
are not only obligated to satisfy the requirements of a valid 
plea, but when reviewing a plea colloquy they are now also 
responsible for identifying any defects.  
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
12 
 
and red flags in the record of the plea colloquy.  That role 
used to be fulfilled by the defendants and their counsel. 
¶93 It seems the majority fails to completely grasp the 
change it is making.  Majority op., ¶42 n.11.  While noting that 
bringing 
to 
light 
the 
new 
obligation 
on 
judges 
is 
a 
"disservice," "conjecture" and "hyperbole," the majority states 
the following: "The requirement that judges establish a factual 
basis is statutory, Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b), and does not come 
from this opinion."  Id.  This misses the point.  
¶94 A judge having an obligation to satisfy the statutory 
and other court mandated duties when taking a plea is not new.  
However, the new obligation I am pointing out has nothing to do 
with the taking of a plea.   
¶95 The 
new 
obligation affects judges considering a 
defendant's plea withdrawal motion.  Before, such a judge would 
focus on the allegations made in the defendant's motion.  Now, 
such a judge will have to be on the lookout for substantial 
questions and red flags in the record, even if the defendant did 
not raise them.      
¶96 Nonetheless, the majority of this court has decided 
that spotting all the potential grounds for withdrawal in the 
record is an acceptable obligation.  We are, after all, 
discussing 
protecting 
defendants' 
constitutional 
rights.  
Reading the majority opinion, one may even be left with the 
impression that this record raised such an obvious red flag and 
substantial question that the new obligation can hardly be 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
13 
 
labeled an obligation.  See majority op., ¶¶4, 38, 41, 46.  That 
would be a mistake. 
¶97 Consider the actions of those involved with this case 
that did not benefit from hindsight.  First, Lackershire's own 
attorney did not spot the red flag.  He even received the two 
extensions 
he 
requested 
to 
file 
Lackershire's 
motion 
to 
withdraw.  The extra time to review the record apparently did 
not help him identify the seemingly substantial issue related to 
the factual basis requirement.   
¶98 During oral argument to this court, Lackershire's 
attorney did mention a red flag: 
Certainly I just think this is less than a routine 
case and there are enough red flags here on the 
element issue that I think in this case the plea-
taking itself didn't go far enough to satisfy the 
trial judge or to inform this particular defendant as 
we find her with her various difficulties, also which 
were noted in the record. 
The red flag mentioned related to Lackershire's understanding of 
the elements, not the judge's satisfaction of the factual basis 
requirement.  A red flag, but apparently the wrong one for the 
majority.  Majority op., ¶5 n.4.   
¶99 Only after this court requested supplemental briefs on 
an unrelated issue, did Lackershire's attorney mention the 
factual basis requirement.  If the factual basis requirement 
were such an obvious grounds for further inquiry, why did 
Lackershire's own attorney not stumble upon it until after oral 
argument before this court?    
¶100 Lackershire's attorney was not the only one who failed 
to spot the red flag that the factual basis requirement 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
14 
 
purportedly presented.  A panel of three court of appeals judges 
did not identify the factual basis requirement as one that 
needed to be addressed.4  Additionally, none of the seven 
justices on this court noted the factual basis requirement 
during the oral argument.  The court even issued an order after 
oral argument that requested supplemental briefing on three 
questions, 
none 
of 
which 
mentioned 
the 
factual 
basis 
requirement.     
¶101 If the defendant, the circuit court judge, three court 
of appeals judges, and seven supreme court justices failed to 
spot the substantial question in this case, it seems the 
majority is imposing a more unrealistic obligation on circuit 
court judges than it appreciates.  The unrealistic obligation 
also unnecessarily undercuts the burdens already in place for 
the plea withdrawal procedure. 
II 
¶102 The court bases its decision on the existence of 
enough evidence in the record to make a prima facie showing that 
the plea was invalid because the judge failed to satisfy the 
factual basis requirement.  The fact that Lackershire did 
nothing to make that prima facie showing and satisfy her burden 
in the plea withdrawal procedure aside, the record reflects that 
Judge Radcliffe did satisfy the factual basis requirement.   
                                                 
4 Of course, the court of appeals focused on the questions 
presented on appeal.  See State v. Lackershire, 2005 WI App 265, 
288 Wis. 2d 609, 707 N.W.2d 891.  But, apparently, that will no 
longer be sufficient when the court of appeals reviews a circuit 
court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea. 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
15 
 
¶103 To satisfy the factual basis obligation, a judge must 
"determine to the court's satisfaction that the facts, if 
proved, 
'constitute 
the 
offense 
charged 
and 
whether 
the 
defendant's conduct does not amount to a defense.'"  Morones v. 
State, 61 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 213 N.W.2d 31 (1973) (quoting 
Edwards v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 231, 236, 186 N.W.2d 193 (1971)).  
In this case, the judge did both: (1) the facts that Lackershire 
admitted to, if proved, constitute second-degree sexual assault 
of a child and (2) Lackershire's conduct did not amount to a 
rape defense.  Accordingly, Judge Radcliffe satisfied the 
factual basis requirement. 
A.  Facts that constitute the offense charged  
¶104 During the plea colloquy in this case, the following 
exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: 
Can you tell me what charge – what the 
charge is that you’re going to enter a 
plea to? 
LACKERSHIRE:   I believe it’s the sexual assault of a 
child under the age of sixteen. 
THE COURT:   
The 
Information 
in 
this 
case . . . alleges that, in August of 
2003—that would have been last August—
in 
this 
county, 
you 
had 
sexual 
intercourse with a child under the age 
of sixteen years.   
Do you understand that? 
LACKERSHIRE:   Yes. 
THE COURT:   
Is that true? 
LACKERSHIRE:   Yes. 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
16 
 
THE COURT:   
Do you understand it’s alleged that 
this is a violation of Section 948.02 
of the Wisconsin Statutes? 
LACKERSHIRE:   Yes. 
Lackershire admitted that she had sexual intercourse with a 
child under the age of sixteen.  Second-degree sexual assault of 
a child has only two elements: "that the accused had sexual 
contact or intercourse with the victim, and that the victim was 
under the age of sixteen."  State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68, ¶12, 
272 
Wis. 2d 418, 680 N.W.2d 810.  Lackershire's admission 
establishes facts that, if proved, would constitute the offense 
charged. 
¶105 After questioning Lackershire, Judge Radcliffe also 
had the following exchange with Lackershire's attorney: 
THE COURT: 
Now, you have heard the questions that 
I have asked of your client this 
afternoon. 
 
Based on your discussions with her in 
this case, do you believe that she's 
answered those questions truthfully and 
accurately? 
ATTORNEY: 
I do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
Are you satisfied that she understands 
the nature of the charge? 
ATTORNEY: 
I am, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
And 
you 
indicated 
that 
you 
have 
explained the elements of the offense 
to her? 
ATTORNEY: 
I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
You have explained how the evidence 
that would be available to the State at 
a trial in this matter relates to each 
of those elements? 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
17 
 
ATTORNEY: 
I have, Your Honor. 
Later in the exchange, the following was stated: 
THE COURT: 
Do you stipulate to a factual basis for 
the first count based on the criminal 
complaint and the testimony taken at 
the preliminary hearing? 
ATTORNEY: 
I do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
Your client has indicated that she 
thought 
that 
that 
did 
provide 
sufficient reason for that charge. 
 
Are you satisfied that it does, in 
fact, do so?    
ATTORNEY: 
I agree, Your Honor. 
Not only did Lackershire's admission establish facts that, if 
proved, would constitute the offense charged, but her attorney 
and advocate gave his assessment that that is what she had done.    
B.  Conduct that does not amount to a defense 
¶106 A significant difference exists between a defendant 
admitting to conduct that amounts to a defense and a defendant 
having a defense.  While it is the court's responsibility to 
ensure that the defendant is not admitting to conduct that 
amounts to a 
defense, it is the responsibility of the 
defendant's attorney to discuss defenses with his or her client.  
See State v. Froehlich, 49 Wis. 2d 551, 559, 182 N.W.2d 267 
(1971).  This case presents a situation where Lackershire may 
have had a defense, not one where she admitted to conduct that 
amounts to a defense.   
¶107 Lackershire may have had a defense, versus having 
admitted 
to 
conduct 
that 
constituted 
a 
defense, 
because 
admitting to having "sexual intercourse" pursuant to § 948.02 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
18 
 
and alleging rape relate to different underlying conduct, at 
least according to § 948.01(6).  Having "sexual intercourse" 
requires that the activity be done "either by the defendant or 
upon the defendant's instruction."  Wis. Stat. § 948.01(6).  The 
definition of "sexual intercourse" provided in § 948.01(6) 
"establishes that, in order for sexual intercourse, as defined, 
to occur, the defendant has to either affirmatively perform one 
of the actions on the victim, or instruct or direct the victim 
to perform one of them on him- or herself."  State v. Olson, 
2000 WI App 158, ¶10, 238 Wis. 2d 74, 616 N.W.2d 144.  When 
Lackershire admitted to having sexual intercourse, the judge 
followed up with her by confirming that she was acknowledging 
that she violated § 948.02.  Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02 makes 
sexual intercourse, as defined by § 948.01(6), a crime.  
¶108 Unlike admitting to having sexual intercourse in 
violation of § 948.02, alleging rape entails a person claiming 
he or she was the victim of a sexual assault.  A person that is 
a victim of sexual assault does not have "sexual intercourse" 
because they neither affirmatively perform a necessary act on 
the other person, or instruct or direct the other person to 
perform a necessary act on them.  Accordingly, Lackershire's 
admission that she had sexual intercourse (i.e., affirmatively 
acted or directed action) means that her admitted conduct did 
not amount to a rape defense.  The court did not err in 
fulfilling its obligation to ensure that the defendant's conduct 
does not amount to a defense. 
III 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
19 
 
¶109 The majority reached a decision on the factual basis 
requirement with which I cannot agree.  More troubling though, 
because of the impact it will have on other plea withdrawal 
cases, is the ill-advised new obligation the majority has placed 
on circuit court judges.  See e.g., State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, 
___ Wis. 2d ____, ____ N.W.2d ___.     
¶110 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
¶111 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion. 
 
No.  2005AP1189-CR.jpw 
 
1