Title: STATE v TURCOTTE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12662 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1974 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - WILLIAM T U R C O T T E , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Morrison, E t t i e n & Barron, Havre, Montana Robert D. Morrison argued, Havre, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas J. Beers, Assistant Attorney General, argued, He lena , Montana Ronald W. Smith, County Attorney, Havre, Montana David G. Rice, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Havre, Montana Submitted: May 23, 1974 Decided : J'& 16 1974 Filed: m L 16 1974 Clerk Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order of the district court of the twelfth judicial district, county of Hill, denying defend- ant's motion to suppress evidence in a drug case. Appeal was brought after defendant had plead guilty to the charge contained in the information and final judgment of the court had been entered. The facts relevant to the appeal are: A police officer of the city of Havre obtained a search warrant January 24, 1973 to search defendant's residence. The search produced evidence which led to the charge against defendant of possession of dangerous drugs in violation of section 54-133, R.C.M. 1947, on January 26, 1973. On March 7, 1973, defendant filed a motion to controvert search warrant and suppress evidence which was heard by the district court on March 30, 1973. The matter was taken under advisement by the court and denied on April 25, 1973. On July 30, 1973 defendant applied to this Court for a writ of super- visory control, Cause No. 12566, State of Montana ex rel. William Turcotte v. District Court of the 12th Judicial District 3f the State of Montana. The application was heard ex parte on July 30, 1973 and the writ denied on procedural grounds the same day. Trial of the cause was set in the district court for November 1, 1973. On that day defendant plead guilty to the charge after first advis- ing the court that he was preserving his constitutional and stat- utory right to appeal the adverse ruling denying the motion to suppress, heretofore discussed. His rationale being to petition the district court to withdraw the guilty plea in the event this Court rendered a decision favorable to defendant. The district court judge very carefully questioned defend- ant on all aspects of a guilty plea and demonstrated in the record t h a t defendant was making an i n t e l l i g e n t voluntary plea and w a s f u l l y s a t i s f i e d with t h e a s s i s t a n c e of h i s counsel. Thereafter on November 29, 1973, t h e c o u r t gave defendant a deferred imposi- t i o n of sentence and defendant was placed on probation. This appeal does not concern t h e g u i l t y plea o r judgment, but presents two i s s u e s f o r review having t o do with t h e search of defendant's residence and t h e f a i l u r e t o make a r e t u r n t o t h e issuing magistrate. The d i s p o s i t i v e question before t h i s Court is whether a voluntary plea of g u i l t y t o t h e crime of possession of dangerous drugs forecloses defendant from seeking review of procedures p r i o r t o t h e e n t r y of t h e g u i l t y plea. The general r u l e is t h a t a plea of g u i l t y v o l u n t a r i l y and understandingly made c o n s t i t u t e s a waiver of nonjurisdictional d e f e c t s and defenses, including claims of v i o l a t i o n s of constitu- t i o n a l r i g h t s p r i o r t o t h e plea. The reasoning i s t h a t a person pleading g u i l t y is convicted and sentenced on h i s plea, not on t h e evidence. United S t a t e s v. Clark, (1972 CA 8 Mo.) 459 F.2d 977, c e r t . den. 409 U.S. 880, 34 L ed 2d 135, 93 S.Ct. 209. I n T o l l e t t v. Henderson, 4 1 1 U.S. 258, 36 L ed 2d 235, 243, 93 S.Ct. 1602, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court held: "We thus r e a f f i r m t h e p r i n c i p l e recognized i n t h e Brady t r i l o g y : a g u i l t y plea represents a break i n t h e chain of events which has preceded it i n t h e criminal process. When a criminal de- fendant has solemnly admitted i n open court t h a t he is i n f a c t g u i l t y of the offense with which he is charged, he may not t h e r e a f t e r r a i s e in- dependent claims r e l a t i n g t o t h e deprivation of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t h a t occurred-prior t o t h e entry of the g u i l t y plea. H e may only attack t h e voluntary and i n t e l l i g e n t character of t h e g u i l t y plea by showing t h a t t h e advice he received from counsel w a s n o t within t h e standards set f o r t h i n McMann." I n P e t i t i o n of Harold Ebeling, 143 Mont. 298, 299, 387 P.2d 302, t h e defendant a f t e r waiving h i s r i g h t t o counsel, plead g u i l t y t o t h r e e counts of burglary i n t h e f i r s t degree. H e later brought a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t of e r r o r coram nobis i n an attempt t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y plea and f o r t h e e n t r y of a plea of not g u i l t y and f o r t h e appointment of counsel t o represent him. De- fendant claimed t h a t an i l l e g a l search had been made of h i s h o t e l room. This Court s t a t e d : " * * * While p e t i t i o n e r makes much of t h e contended i l l e g a l search, these matters were known t o him be- f o r e he made any confession s i n c e he w a s present and knew what was being done. H i s plea of g u i l t y waives t h e necessity of proof on t h e p a r t of t h e s t a t e and we f a i l t o see where any cause e x i s t s f o r t h e issuance of any w r i t herein." In S t a t e v. Lowery, 148 Mont. 75, 80, 417 P.2d 113, t h e defendant plead g u i l t y but l a t e r challenged t h e competency of h i s counsel and coercion of a confession which was not used a g a i n s t him. This Court held t h a t by entering a plea of g u i l t y t h e de- fendant admitted t h a t t h e murder charge was w e l l plead and i n so doing waived a l l o t h e r defenses other than t h a t the Information charges no offense. W e do not disagree with defendant's argument and author- i t y a s it concerns t h e withdrawal of a g u i l t y plea before t h e d i s t r i c t court. I n f a c t under the present deferred imposition of sentence defendant w i l l be allowed t o do p r e c i s e l y t h a t . Defendant seems t o reason t h a t T o l l e t t is not a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e f a c t s presented here, because defendant here preserved h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s before t h e plea. F i r s t , a conditional plea is not allowed i n Montana, section 95-1606(e), R.C.M. 1947. Second, defendant had a f u l l hearing on t h e alleged c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t s and t h e t r i a l court ruled adversely t o him. Third, t h e plea of g u i l t y was properly entered, as discussed above, with a type of plea bargain t o withdraw t h e plea i f t h e r e was a proper appeal t o t h i s Court from t h e motion t o suppress evidence, which evidence was not used a t t r i a l t o convict, and i f t h i s Court ruled favorably t o defendant. Fourth, t h e r e is no s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y i n Montana for a procedure of this type. Section 95-2404, R.C.M. 1947. Fifth, and finally, the case law both federal and state makes these issues matters of defense at trial and upon a judgment of final conviction when the evidence is used against defendant the constitutionality of obtaining the evidence becomes an issue on appeal. In Alden v. State of Montana, 234 F.Supp. 661, 664, where a plea of guilty had been voluntarily entered, Judge Murray held: "'Complaints in regard to arrest and search are matters for defense * * *. One who pleads guilty waives these defenses and is not in a position to - successfully move for a writ of habeas corpus on claims of alleged illegal arrest, search and seizure. Cf. United States v. Zavada, 291 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Salzano, 241 F.2d 849 (2nd Cir. 1957).' United States ex rel. Hazen v. Maroney, 217 F.Supp. 328 (D.C. 1963)." (Emphasis supplied.) For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed. /" Justice 4 We concur: