Title: Burns v. Genovese

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

223 So. 2d 160 (1969) 254 La. 237 Lillian W. BURNS v. Dr. Charles R. GENOVESE. No. 49440. Supreme Court of Louisiana. May 5, 1969. Rehearing Denied June 9, 1969. Robert S. Cooper, Jr., Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-applicant. Ralph L. Kaskell, Jr., of Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, New Orleans, for defendant-respondent. *161 HAMILIN, Justice: In the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction, we directed certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, for review of its judgment which affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's suit and sustaining the peremptory exception of no cause of action filed by defendant. Art. VII, Sec. 11, La.Const. of 1921; 211 So. 2d 336; 252 La. 885, 214 So. 2d 715. Suit was filed by Lillian W. Burns for damages in the sum of $25,000.00 allegedly suffered from mental pain and anguish, humiliation, shame and embarrassment caused by her alleged illegal commitment to the Southeast Louisiana State Hospital, Mandeville, Louisiana. The pertinent allegations of her petition recite: "* * * *162 The above petition prays for a personal judgment against Dr. Charles R. Genovese, Coroner of Tangipahoa Parish. Defendant filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action and no right of action or interest in plaintiff to institute the present suit. He claimed absolute immunity as an alleged judicial officer under the Constitution of Louisiana, Art. VII, Secs. 70, 71 and 72. In view of the absence in plaintiff's petition of any allegation of lack of good faith or of malice, defendant plead qualified or conditional immunity. He averred that plaintiff had no right of action in that she was barred by statute from suing him personally, her only remedy being to compel "official" action on his part. He concluded by praying for dismissal of plaintiff's suit. As stated supra, the trial court sustained the exception of no cause of action; it did not render written reasons. The Court of Appeal stated: "* * * "* * * Plaintiff assigns the following errors to the judgment of the Court of Appeal: LSA-R.S. 33:1555 provides: LSA-R.S. 28:52 provides: LSA-R.S. 28:52.1 (Act 701 of 1954) provided:[1] After having considered the pleadings herein, pertinent statutes supra, arguments, and briefs filed herein, we find, differently from the Court of Appeal, that the allegations of plaintiff's petition, although vague, are to the effect that she was illegally committed to the Southeast Louisiana State Hospital, Mandeville, Louisiana, and that such commitment was not in compliance with LSA-R.S. 28:52, supra. Plaintiff's counsel stressed in argument that plaintiff was transported to the hospital under a Coroner's Commitment. We do not find that plaintiff's allegations are to the effect that she was detained at the hospital for examination. LSA-R.S. 28:52.1. We do not find in defendant's peremptory exception a denial that plaintiff was taken to the hospital under a Coroner's Commitment.[2] It is legend that, "For purposes of the exception [exception of no right or cause of action] all well pleaded facts in the petition must be taken as true. If the petition sets forth a right and a cause of action in any respect, the exception must be overruled." Harwood Oil & Mining Company v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So. 2d 764. See, Loeb v. Badalamenti, La.App., 192 So. 2d 246; Marcotte v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corporation, La.App., 189 So. 2d 426; Bourgeois v. Ducos, La.App., 182 So. 2d 539. Cf. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 931. Articles 865 and 5051, LSA-C.C.P., do not favor technical objections and harsh rules of pleadings; the jurisprudence of this State during the last quarter century has been in accord with this philosophy.[3] We feel that, in view of the record herein, the dismissal of this suit would not be in the interest of justice. Under the circumstances and conditions of plaintiff's pleadings, we are constrained to conclude that the Court of Appeal erred when it maintained the exception of no cause of action. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court sustaining the peremptory exception of no cause of action filed by defendant and dismissing plaintiff's suit, is reversed and set aside; the exception of no cause of *165 action is overruled; the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with law and the views herein expressed. Costs to await the final determination of this cause. HAMITER, J., concurs in the decree. SANDERS, J., dissents, being of the opinion the judgment of the Court of Appeal is correct. SUMMERS, J., dissents. BARHAM, Justice (dissenting). R.S. 33:1555 (Act 151 of 1952, Section 2), which is found under the title "Municipalities and Parishes" and in the particular part of that title setting forth the duties and responsibilities of coroners, assigns to the coroner the detention, confinement, and commitment of the mentally ill and others. This statute declares these acts to be administrative, and that the coroner is "* * specifically granted personal immunity, but not relieved of his official responsibility in his capacity as coroner". R.S. 28:52 and 28:52.1 (Section 1 of Act 152 of 1952 and Section 1 of Act 701 of 1954), under the title "Mental Health", provide the method of making a "coroner's commitment". These provisions also declare that detentions, confinements, and commitments so made are administrative acts for which the coroner is "* * * specifically granted personal immunity, but not relieved of his official responsibility in his capacity as coroner". (Emphasis supplied.) O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 227 La. 262, 79 So. 2d 87 (1955), involving a 1946 commitment, was decided under earlier law, and there was no statutory provision in our law then giving personal immunity to the coroner. That case is therefore not dispositive of this matter. Some have argued that the law does not mean to relieve the coroner if he acts negligently or erroneously. I answer: "Why would he need immunity for acts rightfully and prudently performed?" I find that the law specifically gives to the coroner personal immunity from civil suits for damages for the acts he performs or omits to perform in a "coroner's commitment", though he may be responsible by removal and is otherwise officially accountable for errors in performing these duties. Finally, I do not believe the petition states a cause of action, and would affirm. I respectfully dissent. SANDERS, SUMMERS and BARHAM, JJ., are of the opinion that a rehearing should be granted. [1] In 1966, LSA-R.S. 28:52.1 was amended to recite: "DetentionFor the purpose of complying with R.S. 28:52 the coroner is hereby authorized and directed to detain the patient by confining him in any state hospital or parish jail or private mental hospital for a period not to exceed thirty days or until he is committed to a state or private hospital for the mentally ill or his release is ordered. The superintendent of any and all state hospitals is hereby directed to receive such patients for detention as herein set forth." [2] In his exception defendant alleged: "The determination by Coroner Genovese as to the amount of investigation necessary before issuing a certificate of commitment was really a judicial function, for which he cannot be held liable in damages, `even though it be alleged that he acted corruptly and maliciously.' Gillikin vs United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, [254 N.C. 247] 118 S.E.2d 606, 608 (Supreme Court N.C. 1961). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recognized the doctrine of judicial immunity. Pierson vs Ray, 352 F.2d 213, 217 (C.A. 5-1965)." [3] The author of this opinion concurred in the granting of this writ, stating: "I concur in the granting of this application for the reasons set forth in West's LSA Code of Civil Procedure, Vol. 1, Report of La.Law Institutes, at pp. XII and XIII, `Revision Policies.' See also CCP Art. 5051."