Title: Ft. Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Ft. Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 102 Ohio St.3d 283, 
2004-Ohio-2947.] 
 
 
FORT FRYE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, OEA/NEA, ET AL., APPELLANTS AND 
CROSS-APPELLEES, v. STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD ET AL., 
APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Ft. Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 102 
Ohio St.3d 283, 2004-Ohio-2947.] 
Schools — Teachers — Unfair labor practices — State Employment Relations 
Board does not have discretion to find that an unfair labor practice has 
not been committed when a determination that an employer’s motivation 
was improper cannot be contested because of issue preclusion — 
Previously decided civil rights action does not necessarily preclude a 
party from seeking monetary damages before SERB. 
(Nos. 2003-0207 and 2003-0254 — Submitted December 16, 2003 — Decided 
June 23, 2004.) 
APPEALS and CROSS-APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Washington County, 
Nos. 02CA31 and 02CA32, 2002-Ohio-7219. 
—————————— 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶1} 
We are asked to determine whether the State Employment 
Relations Board (“SERB”) has discretion to find that an unfair labor practice 
(“ULP”) has not been committed when a determination that an employer’s 
motivation was improper cannot be contested because of issue preclusion.  We 
conclude that it does not.  We are also asked to determine whether a previously 
decided civil rights action necessarily precludes a party from seeking monetary 
damages before SERB.  We conclude that it does not. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶2} 
In Ft. Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd. 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 396-397, 692 N.E.2d 140 (“Fort Frye I”), this court 
stated: 
{¶3} 
“In their federal action, [Fort Frye Teachers Association, 
OEA/NEA, and Michael Rauch] sought damages for the School Board’s violation 
of Rauch’s freedom of association rights.  The material issue was whether the 
School Board nonrenewed Rauch’s contract in retaliation for his exercise of the 
right to associate as protected by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  The underlying facts substantiating the School Board’s retaliatory 
motive centered around Rauch’s union activities.  The test for determining 
whether a violation of First Amendment rights, including associational rights, has 
occurred is found in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Doyle (1977), 
429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471.  This case sets forth a “but for” test 
for establishing that an employee’s exercise of First Amendment rights was 
violated by employer retaliation.  [Footnote omitted.]  This standard is a much 
stricter standard than Ohio’s standard to determine whether an unfair labor 
practice charge has occurred.  (See [State Emp. Relations Bd. v.] Adena [Local 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1993)], 66 Ohio St.3d at 495-497, 613 N.E.2d at 613-
614, where we rejected the Mt. Healthy “but for” test applicable to First 
Amendment rights and established the “in part” test applicable to unfair labor 
practice proceedings.  However, both standards revolve around the same factual 
issue, the employer’s motivation.) 
{¶4} 
“Similarly, in the state administrative action, the material issue was 
whether the School Board nonrenewed Rauch’s contract in retaliation for his 
exercise of rights protected by R.C. Chapter 4117.  As such, the essential facts 
regarding this issue concerned the same union activities engaged in by Rauch that 
were relied upon by the jury in the federal action.  Since the same evidence would 
January Term, 2004 
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prove the underlying facts in each of these two proceedings, the issues are the 
same for purposes of applying the collateral estoppel doctrine. 
{¶5} 
“We find that the collateral estoppel requirements have been 
satisfied.  Thus, we conclude that the court of appeals properly applied collateral 
estoppel to the issue of the employer’s motivation.” 
{¶6} 
This court concluded that on the finding regarding an “employer’s 
motivation,” established and not adequately rebutted in the federal action, the 
parties were collaterally estopped, and, therefore, the issue could not be further 
litigated on remand.  Id., 81 Ohio St.3d at 397, 692 N.E.2d 140.  Because an 
improper employer motivation “raises a presumption of antiunion animus,” we 
impliedly considered that issue dispositive as to whether a ULP had occurred.  Id., 
81 Ohio St.3d at 394, 692 N.E.2d 140, fn. 2.  See Adena, 66 Ohio St.3d 485, 613 
N.E.2d 605, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Nevertheless, we remanded the issue 
to SERB because it has “exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether unfair labor 
practices have occurred.”  Fort Frye I, 81 Ohio St.3d at 394, 692 N.E.2d 140. 
{¶7} 
On remand, SERB dismissed the ULP complaint.  Fort Frye 
Teachers Association and Rauch appealed from this decision to the Washington 
County Court of Common Pleas, which reversed SERB’s dismissal pursuant to 
this court’s holding in Fort Frye I.  The common pleas court remanded the case to 
SERB with an order that it find a ULP to have occurred.  The common pleas court 
also held that the federal jury’s determination of Rauch’s damages was res 
judicata and that Rauch could not further litigate that issue.  SERB appealed from 
the order that it was collaterally estopped from finding that a ULP had not 
occurred.  Fort Frye Teachers Association and Rauch cross-appealed from the 
determination that the damages issue was res judicata.  The Fourth District Court 
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  All parties appealed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶8} 
The case is now before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶9} 
SERB’s exclusive jurisdiction does not authorize SERB to 
overlook our determination that a dispositive issue is precluded from being 
rebutted.  Out of respect for its exclusive jurisdiction in the matter, we did not 
direct SERB to make a specific ruling.  Nevertheless, we affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals, which held, “SERB was required to find that the School 
Board nonrenewed Rauch’s teaching contract based in part upon Rauch’s union 
activities.  Because nonrenewal of a contract based upon an employee’s union 
activities constitutes a ULP, SERB was likewise required to conclude that a ULP 
occurred.” 
{¶10} We now consider whether the issue of damages is also precluded.  
Collateral estoppel “precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been ‘actually 
and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action.’ ”  Krahn v. Kinney 
(1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058, quoting Goodson v. 
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 2 OBR 732, 443 
N.E.2d 978.  As previously noted, in their federal civil rights action, appellants 
and cross-appellees “sought damages for the School Board’s violation of Rauch’s 
freedom of association rights.”  Fort Frye I, 81 Ohio St.3d at 396, 692 N.E.2d 
140.  In this case, appellants and cross-appellees seek damages for the School 
Board’s commission of a ULP.  R.C. 4117.11 and 4117.12.  Nothing in the record 
suggests that the issue of damages caused by the ULP was “ ‘actually and 
necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action.’ ”  Krahn, 43 Ohio St.3d at 
107, 538 N.E.2d 1058, quoting Goodson, 2 Ohio St.3d at 195, 2 OBR 732, 443 
N.E.2d 978.  Accordingly, the issue of monetary damages is not precluded, and 
we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on this issue. 
January Term, 2004 
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{¶11} We remand the cause to SERB for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, O’CONNOR AND O’DONNELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶12} I do not believe that collateral estoppel precludes SERB from 
determining whether the school board’s nonrenewal of Rauch’s contract resulted 
in a ULP in violation of R.C. Chapter 4117. 
{¶13} In Fort Frye I, I joined a dissent authored by Justice Cook in which 
she concluded that “collateral estoppel should not apply to mixed-motive cases 
under SERB’s jurisdiction.”  Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State 
Employment Relations Bd. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 398, 692 N.E.2d 140 
(Cook, J., dissenting).  I continue to adhere to that well-reasoned dissent. 
{¶14} I write here to re-emphasize my belief that requiring SERB to find 
that a ULP occurred based on the federal jury’s determination that the school 
board violated Rauch’s First Amendment rights encroaches upon SERB’s 
“exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters committed to it pursuant to R.C. Chapter 
4117.”  (Emphasis added.)  Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. Fraternal 
Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 572 N.E.2d 
87, paragraph one of the syllabus.  In this case, SERB issued its initial order 
finding that the board’s nonrenewal of Rauch’s contract did not result in a ULP on 
July 22, 1991, which was a month before Rauch even filed his complaint in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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federal court.  By eviscerating SERB’s exclusive jurisdiction to determine a ULP, 
we permit employees to forum-shop their discrimination claims between federal 
courts and SERB, a situation that does not represent the intent of the General 
Assembly in resolving state labor claims.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
Cloppert, Latanick, Sauter & Washburn, William J. Steele and Susan 
Hayest Kozlowski, for appellants and cross-appellees. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, Stephen P. 
Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, Peter M. Thomas, Senior Deputy Attorney 
General, and Michael D. Allen, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee and 
cross-appellant State Employment Relations Board. 
Whalen & Compton Co., L.P.A., G. Frederick Compton Jr. and Robert B. 
Kapitan, for appellee and cross-appellant Fort Frye Local School District Board of 
Education. 
__________________