Title: Griffis v. Hill

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

230 So. 2d 143 (1969)
Joseph W. GRIFFIS, Petitioner,
v.
Evelyn Long Pryle HILL, Respondent.
No. 38058.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 19, 1969.
Rehearing Denied February 2, 1970.
*144 Angus W. Harriett, Palalka, for petitioner.
J. Robert McClure, Jr., Charles D. McClure, of McClure, Wigginton & McClure, Tallahassee, Joe C. Miller, II, of Dowda, Millican & Miller, Palalka, for respondent.
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal, First District. We initially denied the writ but on rehearing granted have determined that jurisdictional conflict exists.
The opinion sought to be reviewed follows:[1]
The District Court in the foregoing opinion relied on the decisions of this Court in Puleo[2] and Smith[3] cases, but attributed to those decisions an erroneous principle of law. There is conflict of the type recognized in Pinkerton Hays Lumber Co. v. Pope.[4]
We were confronted with a similar opinion of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in the case of Roberts v. Bushore.[5] There the First District indicated that the prior decisions of this Court in the Puleo and Smith cases, supra, and in Hayes v. Hatchell[6] precluded appellate review on the ground of inadequate damages in personal injury actions. We quashed the decision of the District Court in Roberts v. Bushore and remanded with the following explanation:[7]
*145 But on remand in Roberts, the District Court persisted, stating:[8]
The test to be applied in determining the adequacy of a verdict is whether a jury of reasonable men could have returned that verdict. This test is simply stated but may be difficult to apply in a particular case. We are aware of the difficulties and frustrations courts experience in the search for the mythical jury of reasonable men. The appellate court must be ever alert against the temptation to substitute its "verdict" for that of the jury. On the other hand, we must not refuse to act to relieve the injustice of either a grossly inadequate or excessive verdict.
To the extent that this Court's decision in Roberts or our holding herein are inconsistent with the decisions in Shaw, Hayes and Smith, these latter decisions are modified.
We have reviewed the record and find that the verdict of the jury is clearly and grossly inadequate. Accordingly, the opinion of the District Court is quashed with directions to remand the cause to the trial court with directions to grant a new trial on liability and damages.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, C.J., and ROBERTS, DREW and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
THORNAL, J., agrees to conclusion.
CARLTON, J., dissents.
[1]  217 So. 2d 358 (Fla.App.1st 1968).
[2]  Shaw v. Puleo, 159 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1964).
[3]  City of Miami v. Smith, 165 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1964).
[4]  127 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1961).
[5]  172 So. 2d 853 (Fla.App.1st 1965).
[6]  166 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1964).
[7]  182 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1966).
[8]  183 So. 2d 708, 711 (Fla.App.1st 1966).