Title: Bulman v. Myers

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

321 Pa. Superior Ct. 261 (1983) 467 A.2d 1353 Miriam BULMAN and Paul Bulman, her husband, Appellants, v. Franklin J. MYERS, D.D.S. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued September 21, 1983. November 18, 1983. Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied March 12, 1984. *262 Barbara Ellen Sarkin, Philadelphia, for appellants. Patrick O. McDonald, Philadelphia, for appellee. Before CIRILLO, JOHNSON and CERCONE, JJ. *263 CIRILLO, Judge: In April, 1976 the appellant, Miriam Bulman, first came under the care of the appellee, Franklin J. Myers, D.D.S., for the care and treatment of impacted wisdom teeth. On or about April 14, 1976 the appellant was admitted to Jeanes Hospital for the purpose of surgically removing her maxillary and mandibular left and right third molars. Following surgery, which was performed by the appellee, the appellant suffered a marked loss of temperature, taste and pain sensations in her tongue and a slurring of speech. The appellant brought a trespass action against the appellee, seeking damages for injuries sustained as a result of the surgery being performed without her "informed consent." No assertion of negligent performance was ever advanced by the appellant. This matter was tried before the Honorable Harry A. Takiff and a jury on July 24 and 25, 1980. The appellee did not testify in his own behalf, although the appellant introduced sections of the appellee's deposition transcript into evidence. Following a verdict in favor of the appellee, the appellant filed motions for a new trial and judgment n.o.v.[1] These post-trial motions were subsequently denied and this appeal followed. On appeal, the appellant avers that the trial judge erred in failing to charge the jury that a patient cannot formulate a valid, informed consent to a surgical procedure when disclosures of the risks of surgery are made by a nurse assistant and not by the operating surgeon. As regards this area of the law, our Court has stated: DeFulvio v. Holst, 272 Pa.Super. 221, 224-225, 414 A.2d 1087, 1089 (1979).[2] At trial, the appellant testified that any information that she received concerning possible complications came only from Mrs. Myers who was the nurse/assistant to her dentist/husband. The appellee, through his deposition, however, testified that he explained the risks of surgery to the appellant. In addition, Mrs. Myers testified in detail as to the substance of the pretreatment information she communicated to the appellant. The appellant asserts that only the appellee, as operating physician, can effectively relate all the information necessary for an informed consent. The appellant cites Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966), as support for this claim. However, as Judge Takiff expressed in his opinion: (Trial Court Slip Op. at 3). We fully agree with the learned trial judge's interpretation. In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by the words of our distinguished colleague, the Honorable J. Sydney Hoffman: Sauro v. Shea, 257 Pa.Super. 87, 94, 390 A.2d 259, 262-263 (1978). Thus, in this instance, whether the information received by the appellant was sufficient for informed consent was a question of fact for the jury. The trial court properly rejected the appellant's requested point for charge. The appellant also contends that the lower court erred in refusing to charge the jury that the appellant was entitled to a negative inference based on the appellee's failure to testify. Bentivoglio v. Ralston, 447 Pa. 24, 29, 288 A.2d 745, 748 (1972); See also: Commonwealth v. Newmiller, 487 Pa. 410, 409 A.2d 834 (1979). During trial the appellee appeared in the court room from time to time. The appellants were free to subpoena the appellee to testify, or to call him as on cross-examination as an adverse witness when he was in the court room, or to introduce all of his pre-trial deposition testimony. The appellants, though, did not subpoena the appellee, nor call him as a witness while he was present, and only offered portions of his deposition testimony at trial. The appellee was equally available to both parties and was subject to service by the appellants. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, we agree with the trial court that a jury instruction on negative inference was inappropriate. [1] Post-trial motions were not filed until August 25, 1981, well beyond the ten day period mandated by Pa.R.C.P. 227.1. However, the issues presented are devoid of merit so we address them for disposition. [2] Where the patient can be shown to be mentally and physically able to consult about his condition, in the absence of an emergency, the consent of that patient is clearly a prerequisite to any surgical procedure by his physician and any operation without such consent may be held to be a technical assault. Sauro v. Shea, 257 Pa.Super. 87, 390 A.2d 259 (1978). [3] Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940 (3d Cir. 1970).