Title: In re Estate of George

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DEANNA BESS GEORGE, Deceased: TERRANCE POLAND v. ELAINE NALEE, Personal Representative of the Probate Estate of Deanna Bess George, Deceased; TERRANCE POLAND v. THE ESTATE OF DEANNA BESS GEORGE and ELAINE NALEE, in her capacity as personal representative of the Estate of Deanna B. George, and as successor trustee of the Deanna Bess George Revocable Trust dated April 3, 2008 2011 WY 157Case Number: S-11-0086, S-11-0087Decided: 11/17/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF DEANNA BESS GEORGE, Deceased:TERRANCE 
POLAND,Appellant (Petitioner),v.ELAINE NALEE, Personal 
Representative of the Probate Estate of Deanna Bess George, 
Deceased,Appellee (Respondent).TERRANCE POLAND,Appellant 
(Plaintiff),v.THE ESTATE OF DEANNA BESS GEORGE and ELAINE NALEE, 
in her capacity as personal representative of the Estate of Deanna B. George, 
and as successor trustee of the Deanna Bess George Revocable Trust dated April 
3, 2008,Appellees (Defendants).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County
The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Stuart 
S. Healy of Healy Law Firm, Sheridan, WY.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Anthony 
J. Wendtland of Wendtland & Wendtland, LLP, Sheridan, 
WY.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
HILL, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Deanna Bess 
George (the Decedent) executed a pour-over will and a revocable inter vivos 
Trust for the intended purpose of disinheriting her surviving spouse, Terrance 
Poland (Poland), and thereby effectively destroying his elective share under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101 (LexisNexis 2011) as to the property transferred 
to the Trust.  The district court 
concluded that the assets transferred to the revocable inter vivos Trust were 
not subject to the elective share of the surviving spouse.  We affirm the district court’s entry of 
summary judgment in favor of the Decedent’s estate.
 
[¶2]      In the related 
civil action, Case No. S-11-0087, Poland seeks $125,000.00 from the Trust as a 
creditor for work performed during the marriage on a commercial building solely 
owned by the Decedent and transferred to the Trust.  The district court granted summary 
judgment for the Trust and dismissed the complaint with prejudice concluding 
that the claim was time barred under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-507 (LexisNexis 
2011).  We 
affirm.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      The Decedent and 
Poland were married in May of 1985.  
They did not have any children.  
The Decedent died on November 3, 2009.  In 2003, along with her brother and 
sister, the Decedent inherited significant real and personal property from her 
parents.  She held this property in 
her own name and never conveyed any interest in the property to Poland in any 
way during the marriage.
 
[¶4]      In 2008, the 
Decedent transferred her inherited property to her own revocable inter vivos 
Trust, the Deanna B. George Trust.  
The Decedent became the trustee and her sister, Elaine George Nalee 
(Nalee), was named the successor trustee.
 
[¶5]      It is also of 
note that on February 23, 2009, the Decedent initiated an action for dissolution 
of her marriage to Poland.  The 
divorce action was dismissed as moot on April 16, 2010.
 
[¶6]      The Decedent’s 
father had employed a similar trust to provide for his wife and three 
children.  A spendthrift provision 
in the father’s trust protected the trust assets until the death of the 
Decedent’s parents.  Although the 
Decedent and Poland were married at the time of the creation of her father’s 
trust in 1989, the father’s trust did not mention or provide for 
Poland.
 
[¶7]      In 2004, the 
Decedent signed a one-page holographic will that, if proven valid, would have 
entitled Poland to all of her property including the inherited property that 
Decedent had received in 2003.  On 
April 3, 2008, the Decedent executed the pour-over will and a revocable inter 
vivos Trust with the intended result that the property held in the Trust would 
not pass to Poland upon her death.  
These documents are the centerpiece of this matter.  The probate matter was initiated by 
Poland’s filing of the 2004 holographic will “In the Matter of the Estate of 
Deanna Bess George, Deceased,” Probate No. PR 2010-4, Sheridan County District 
Court.
 
[¶8]      The 2008 Trust 
Agreement did provide for Poland in that it expressly states that Poland would 
receive the jointly-held property accumulated during the marriage and 
specifically excluded the jointly owned property from the Trust.  Nevertheless, Poland now also claims the 
elective share provided by § 2-5-101 of the Wyoming Probate Code against 
the property transferred to and held in the Trust.  The district court granted summary 
judgment to the estate concluding that such property was not subject to the 
elective share.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶9]      As to the probate 
matter, Poland states the issues:
 
Can 
a revocable inter vivos trust with 
testamentary provisions be used by one party to a marriage to defeat the 
elective share of the surviving spouse under the Wyoming Probate 
Code?
 
Does 
the probate jurisdiction of the District Court, having been invoked by the 
filing of a will and trust, extend to legal and equitable matters concerning the 
trust?
 
In 
the civil action, Poland states the issue as follows:
 
After 
the admission of a will with incorporated trust into probate in a district court 
in Wyoming, are the jurisdictional and procedural statutes of the Uniform 
Probate Code subordinate to those of the Uniform Trust 
Code?
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶10]   The Court reviews summary judgment 
on a de novo basis.  Because summary 
judgment involves a purely legal determination, we undertake de novo review of 
the trial court’s summary judgment decision.  Glenn v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2008 WY 
16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2008).  W.R.C.P. 56(e) provides in pertinent 
part:
 
When 
a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse 
party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.  If the 
adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against the adverse party.  
[Emphasis added.]
 
W.R.C.P. 
56(b) requires the moving party to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of 
any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The Court will not disturb a summary 
judgment where the party opposing the motion neither files an affidavit pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 56(f), nor files a motion pursuant to W.R.C.P. 6(b) requesting the 
enlargement of time to file the affidavits.  Dudley v. East Ridge Dev. Co., 694 P.2d 113, 116-17 (Wyo. 1985).  We will 
affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any legal ground 
appearing in the record.  Platt v. Creighton, 2007 WY 18, 
¶ 7, 150 P.3d 1194, 1198-99 (Wyo. 2007).
 
[¶11]   In reviewing the entry of summary 
judgment, we have said that we are to examine it in the same light as the 
district judge and treat it as though it was originally before this Court acting 
upon the same materials in the record, taking into consideration all the 
documents presented to the district court.  
Fegler v. Brodie, 574 P.2d 751 
(Wyo. 1978).  We have also said that 
summary judgment will be upheld where the appellant has not properly made all 
materials upon which he relied to oppose the summary judgment a part of the 
record.  Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist. v. 
Johnston, 717 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1986).
 
[¶12]   With regard to the review of the 
trust language, we have stated that a trust agreement is governed by the plain 
language contained in the four corners of the document.  In re Estate of Lohrie, 950 P.2d 1030 
(Wyo. 1997).  In Lohrie we noted that we have construed 
and given effect to revocable trusts after the death of the settlor made them 
irrevocable.  Id. at 1033 (citing First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367 (Wyo. 1973); Hronek v. Saint Joseph’s Children’s 
Home, 866 P.2d 1305, 1307 (Wyo. 1994)).
[¶13]   In First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 504 P.2d  at 1369 we said that in construing a trust agreement, the intention of the 
settlor must govern and, if possible, be ascertained from the trust 
agreement.  We also said 
that:
The 
clearly expressed intention of the settlor should be zealously guarded by the 
courts, particularly when the trust instrument reveals a careful and painstaking 
expression of the use and purposes to which the settlor’s financial 
accumulations shall be devoted.  A 
settlor must have assurance that his solemn arrangements and instructions will 
not be subject to the whim or suggested expediency of others after his 
death.
Id., 
504 P.2d  at 1371.
The 
Trust Agreement
 
[¶14]   The April 3, 2008 Trust Agreement 
at Section 5.4(a) states Decedent’s intention with regard to Poland and the 
property that she had inherited from her parents:
 
Trustor’s 
Intention as to Trustor’s Separate Property.
The 
Trustor acknowledges that the Trustor is married to Terrance Poland at the time 
the Trustor establishes the Deanna B. 
George Trust under this written Agreement as originally dated April 3, 2008.  The Trustor, however, declares and states that 
the Trustor expressly intends that all property and interests in property which 
are owned by the Deanna B. George 
Trust, or which becomes a part of the Deanna B. George Trust following the 
death of the Trustor, whether through conveyance, assignment, or transfer during 
the lifetime of the Trustor, or through probate administration, or by 
contractual beneficiary designation or otherwise following the death of the 
Trustor, are and shall be deemed to be the sole and separate property or interests in 
property of the Trustor or solely and separately attributed to the Trustor, 
as property or interests in property which the Trustor has received from the 
Trustor’s parents or other blood-relations by gift, inheritance, or 
death–related transfers or conveyances, or otherwise has acquired with the 
intent of having such property become, be, and remain the sole and separate 
property of the Trustor and to be so held under and subject to this Agreement; 
and, that all such property and interests in property are not, and shall not be, and shall not be characterized as, and 
shall not be deemed to be marital property of the 
Trustor with reference or respect to the Trustor’s marriage to Terrance Poland, 
or any dissolution of such marriage.  The Trustor further declares and states 
that the Trustor and the said Terrance Poland own other property, which they 
have titled in their joint names with spousal rights of survivorship between the 
two of them, and with the intention that such jointly owned survivorship 
property is not to be owned by or held subject to the Deanna B. George Trust under this 
Agreement, either as originally made and dated April 3, 2008, or as thereafter 
ever amended or restated.  
Therefore, the Trustor declares and states that the Trustor intentionally 
does not make any gift or other 
disposition of any property or interest in property whatsoever unto the said 
Terrance Poland under or from the Deanna 
B. George Trust under this Agreement, either as originally made and dated April 3, 2008, or as thereafter 
ever amended or restated; and, further declares and states that the said 
Terrance Poland does not have and shall not obtain or ever have any 
interest whatsoever, including but not being limited to any resulting, 
constructive, remainder, or any other beneficial interest in, under, or with 
regard to the Deanna B. George Trust 
under this written Agreement as originally dated April 3, 2008, or as thereafter ever amended or 
restated.”  [Emphasis in 
original.]
[¶15]   Simply stated, the Decedent went to 
great lengths to affirm her intention that Poland would not receive any interest 
in the solely owned property that she had inherited from her parents, but that 
Poland would receive the jointly owned property accumulated during the 
marriage.  The Decedent emphasizes 
in a painstaking manner, that Poland “does not have and shall not obtain or ever 
have any interest whatsoever” in the property transferred to the 
Trust.
 
[¶16]   In the “Declaration of Trust” the 
Decedent also declares that the trustee and any successor trustee are “vested 
with legal title” to all of the property which was included in the Trust estate. 
 The Decedent transferred and 
delivered to the Trust all real and personal property by specific 
description.  On April 3, 2008, a 
quitclaim deed was executed by the Decedent, as grantor, “dealing in and with 
her own sole and separate property,” in favor of the Trust.  An assignment and transfer of stock was 
also executed at the same time, as well as a “Restated Specific Gift List,” 
which did not include Poland.  Therefore, the vast majority of the 
Decedent’s property was transferred to the Deanna B. George Trust in 2008.  On June 4, 2009, the Decedent executed 
an amendment to the Trust Agreement designating Nalee as the current trustee of 
the Trust.
 
[¶17]   As a practical matter, Decedent’s 
property passed by virtue of the transfers to the Trust in 2008 and upon her 
death by virtue of the pour-over will or by the use of joint tenancy.  In essence, the Decedent’s property 
passed through the use of “will substitutes.”  “A 'will substitute’ is an arrangement 
that shifts the rights to property outside of probate to the donee at the 
donor’s death.”  See 2 Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 7.1 (2003).  Most, if not all, of Decedent’s assets 
were transferred by law without the need for probate.
 
The 
Pour-over Will
 
[¶18]   The 2008 will states, in pertinent 
part, that the
 
… 
rest, residue, and remainder of my[decedent’s] probate estate, whether real or 
personal property, . . , which I may have the power to dispose of at the time of 
my death by testamentary disposition, . . ., I hereby give, devise, bequeath, 
and appoint, IN TRUST, unto the successor Trustee of the DEANNA B. GEORGE TRUST, 
namely Elaine Nalee, who is my sister, or the alternate successor Trustee namely 
Jean Claude Bosio who is my brother-in-law, . . . .
 
“A 
'pour-over’ devise is a provision in a will that (i) adds property to an inter 
vivos trust, or (ii) funds a trust that was not funded during the testator’s 
lifetime but whose terms are in a trust instrument that was executed during the 
testator’s lifetime.”  1 Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 3.8 
(1999).
 
[¶19]   The will also named Nalee as the 
personal representative and her brother-in-law as the alternate personal 
representative.  The will also 
stated that the property would be disposed of and distributed by the successor 
trustee “outside and exclusive of the supervisory or controlling jurisdiction of 
any Court.”
[¶20]   The intent of the Decedent was that 
the matter would be handled without invoking the jurisdiction of the probate 
court.  However, in this particular 
situation, the filing of the will and the Trust became necessary due to Poland’s 
filing of the holographic will.  
Without the filing of the 2008 documents, the 2004 holographic will, if 
proven valid, could be admitted to probate.  As demonstrated by this case, the 
creation of a trust and the transfer of the decedent’s assets in the trust does 
not always obviate the need for a probate proceeding.  Schneider v. Cate, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 
1258 (D. Colo. 2005).  Due to the 
existence of the holographic will, a probate proceeding was necessary to 
determine the validity of the 2008 pour-over will and the effect of the 2008 
Trust.
Course 
of Proceedings in Case No. S-11-0086
 
[¶21]   On January 5, 2010, Poland filed a 
“Petition for Probate and Administration Declaratory Relief/Notice of 
§ 2-5-101 Election” in the probate court.  The petition sought to probate the 
holographic will dated June 8, 2004.  
The holographic will consists of a single paragraph on a single page, 
which passed all of the Decedent’s “worldly goods, including property and 
stocks,” to Poland.
 
[¶22]   In response, on January 12, 2010, 
the attorney for Nalee, in her capacity as the duly named and qualified personal 
representative of the Decedent and on behalf of Nalee in her capacity as the 
trustee of the Deanna B. George Trust, filed two documents in the probate 
proceeding: (1) a “Traverse to Petition for Probate and Administration 
Declaratory Relief/Notice of § 2-5-101 Election and Alternative Affirative 
[sic] Defenses;” and (2) “Alternative Petition for Probate and Administration of 
Estate of Deanna B. George, Deceased and Letters Testamentary.”  The self-proving “Last Will and 
Testament” of the Decedent dated April 3, 2008 and the Deanna B. George Trust 
Agreement are attached to the documents.  
It also states that Poland is not one of the Decedent’s “heirs” or 
“devisees” as defined in the Wyoming Probate Code, but as a matter of courtesy, 
Nalee mailed a copy of the alternative petition for probate and attachments to 
Poland’s attorney.
 
[¶23]   The alternative petition for 
probate listed the heirs and devisees of the Decedent:  (1) Elaine Nalee the Decedent’s 
sister-heir; (2) the Deanna Bess 
George Trust dated April 3, 2008 (Sole Devisee); and (3) Theodore L. George (her 
brother-heir).  This alternative 
petition for probate also states that none of the property in the Trust is 
subject to this probate proceeding as a part of the probate estate of the 
Decedent.  The petition asserts that 
there should be no personal or real property of the Decedent available for 
probate except any personal or real property that was not somehow conveyed into 
the Trust.
 
[¶24]   Numerous affirmative defenses are 
asserted in the traverse filed by Nalee including, but not limited to: (1) that 
Poland’s petition fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as the 
petition does not attach the alleged holographic will; and (2) that the Decedent 
left a valid self-proving pour-over will dated April 3, 2008 that is the valid 
last will of the Decedent.  The 
traverse also challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the probate court 
over the Trust.
 
[¶25]   Thereafter, the probate court 
entered an order admitting the April 3, 2008 will to probate and appointed Nalee 
as personal representative.  Upon 
the filing of an oath, the probate court issued letters testamentary.  With assistance of her attorney, Nalee 
prepared and published a notice of probate to creditors of the estate informing 
them that claims must be filed within three months from the date of 
publication.  The creditors notice 
was published in the Sheridan Press Newspaper on February 23, 2010, and March 2 
and 9, 2010.
 
[¶26]   An “Inventory of Assets and Report 
of Appraisal” was thereafter filed by Nalee on February 25, 2010.  The inventory specifically gives notice 
as follows:  “There are no assets subject to probate, 
whether personal or real property, for which an appraisal can be done.  All assets of the decedent at death were 
held jointly with her husband, Terrance Poland, and have since been taken by 
Terrance Poland by affidavit.”  
The document also claims that, “[p]rior to death, the decedent 
transferred all of her other assets into Trust as shown in [the] January 12, 
2010 filings by the Personal Representative in this Court file.”  [Emphasis in 
original.]
 
[¶27]   On March 23, 2010, Poland filed 
three responsive documents in the probate proceeding:  (1) “Surviving Husband’s Verified 
Petition for Revocation of Will” seeking revocation of the 2008 will and asking 
for distribution of the estate; 
(2) “Notice of § 2-5-101 Election Petition for Elective Share Petition for 
Homestead Allowance/Request for Hearing;” and (3) “Verified Creditor’s Claim of 
Terrance Poland.”  All three of 
these documents were filed in the probate proceeding and sought relief by and 
through the estate.  No creditor’s 
claim was filed against the Trust by Poland.  A summons was signed on March 23, 2010 
by the clerk of the district court to Elaine Nalee, personal representative. 
 Six months later, on September 28, 
2010, the three documents were served upon Nalee by the sheriff.  The return was filed on October 4, 
2010.
 
[¶28]   A “Response to Petition to Revoke 
the Will” was filed by Nalee on April 20, 2010, which asserted several 
affirmative defenses including, but not limited to: (1) the Decedent’s April 3, 
2008 self-proving last will and testament and Trust are valid and binding in all 
respects and preclude Poland’s claims in all respects; (2) there are no assets 
to probate; and (3) that the petition fails to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.  This response was 
mailed to Poland’s attorney and the Decedent’s brother.
 
[¶29]   On September 1, 2010, Nalee filed a 
“Motion for Summary Judgment Favoring the Probate Estate on all Claims Set Forth 
on the Petition to Revoke Will filed by Terrance Poland” under W.R.C.P. 56.  The motion was accompanied by supporting 
affidavits.  The motion also 
contains a W.R.C.P. 56.1 statement of undisputed record facts.  The motion asserts that the only issue 
before the probate court is the validity of the pour-over 
will.
 
The 
Untimely Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
 
[¶30]   On October 5, 2010, Nalee as the 
trustee, filed a motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings under 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(c) to dismiss the Trust from any kind of 
proceeding in the probate court.  In 
footnote 1 this pleading provides, in pertinent part that: 

 
The 
Trust notes that the [Personal Representative] has previously responded to these 
claims by Mr. Poland in this Probate Case in a Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
with the Court on September 1, 2010 and served by hand delivery on Mr. Poland’s 
counsel that day.  Mr. Poland has never filed any response to 
that motion [for summary judgment] and no longer has the right to do so pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 6(c), which required Mr. Poland to file any response to that motion 
on or before September 21, 2010.  [Emphasis added.]
 
[¶31]   Poland’s response to the September 
motion for summary judgment and three opposing affidavits were not filed until October 7, 2010. 
 As previously explained, the late 
filing was not made by leave of the court.  W.R.C.P. 6(c)(1) requires the responsive 
pleading to be filed in twenty days plus three days for mailing.  Poland’s response was clearly filed out 
of time.  Furthermore, there is no 
indication that a request to enlarge the time to respond was made by Poland or 
his attorney.  W.R.C.P. 56(e) 
provides in pertinent part, “If the adverse party does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse 
party.”
 
[¶32]   On October 13, 2010, Nalee filed an 
“Objection and Motion to Strike Untimely Response Pleading and Affidavits by 
Terrance Poland.”  The pleading 
alleges that Poland’s response to the motion for summary judgment was untimely 
and the court could not consider it.  
The motion to strike the affidavits and response filed by Poland was 
granted by the district court.
 
[¶33]   A motion to consolidate the two 
cases was filed by Poland on October 7, 2010.  Nalee’s opposition to the motion to 
consolidate was also filed.  The 
motion to consolidate was denied.
 
[¶34]   On October 20, 2010, Nalee also 
filed a motion to dismiss and alternatively for summary judgment in the probate 
court to dismiss her individually from any kind of 
party respondent or defendant from the proceeding in the probate 
court.
 
[¶35]   As to the creditor’s claim filed by 
Poland in the probate proceeding on March 23, 2010, it was accompanied by, inter 
alia, a letter from a local contractor estimating the value of improvements at 
$125,500.00 made over a four-year period to the second floor of Dan’s Western 
Wear Building on Main Street in Sheridan.  
The claim was made for $125,000.00 on the basis of quantum meruit, 
implied contract, and promissory estoppel.  
A “Rejection of Creditor’s Claims” was filed by the estate and mailed on 
June 22, 2010 by Nalee to Poland.  
An affidavit of mailing was attached to the rejection of the creditor’s 
claim filed against the estate.
 
Case 
No. S-11-0087 Course of Proceedings
 
[¶36]   With regard to the 2008 Trust in 
which most, if not all, of the Decedent’s property was held, a “Notice of Intent 
to Distribute Assets” was published at the same time as the notice of 
probate.  This notice was provided 
by the Trust and authorized by Nalee as successor trustee.  The required information was provided to 
creditors under § 4-10-507(a).  The 
notice was also specifically served on Poland’s attorney in this 
matter.
 
[¶37]   On July 20, 2010, Poland filed a 
“Complaint for Monetary Damage and Equitable Relief” as a separate civil action 
in the amount of $125,000.00 for work done on the real estate owned by the Trust 
for the period of June 1, 2005 through February 23, 2009.  An answer and alternative defenses and a 
set-off counterclaim were filed by Nalee on August 4, 2010.  On the same day, a “Motion and Memorandum 
of the Deanna Bess George Revocable Trust Dated April 3, 2008 to Dismiss 
Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and/or (6) With Alternative Motion for Summary 
Judgment Pursuant to W.R.C.P 56” was filed by Nalee in her capacity as trustee 
of the Trust.  The motion asserts 
that Poland’s complaint is time barred under § 4-10-507, as the complaint 
was not filed within 120 days of the required notice.
 
The 
District Court Decision
 
[¶38]   On February 25, 2011, the district 
court’s order of dismissal including decision letter was filed.  The district court granted the September 
1, 2010 motion for summary judgment favoring the Decedent’s estate on all claims 
set forth in the “Petition to Revoke the Will” filed by Poland, and the petition 
was dismissed with prejudice.
 
[¶39]   The district court stated the issue 
as:  “Whether public policy prevents 
a decedent from using a trust as an estate planning tool to disinherit a spouse 
including a spouse’s elective share.”  
The district court specifically rejected Poland’s public policy 
arguments.  With regard to the 
probate matter, the district court concluded that the fact that there were no 
assets subject to probate, does not render void the transfer of assets during 
the Decedent’s life.
 
[¶40]   In the separate civil action, the 
district court found that the complaint filed by Poland against the Trust was 
filed out of time under § 4-10-507.  The undisputed facts establish that a 
“Notice of Intent to Distribute Assets” was published on February 23, 2010, and 
March 2 and 9, 2010 by the trustee of the Trust.  Furthermore, the notice was sent by 
Nalee as the trustee of the Trust to potential creditors informing them that 
they had 120 days to assert claims pursuant to § 4-10-507.  The notice was sent to Poland’s attorney 
by certified mail return receipt requested.  Poland received the notice on February 
22, 2010.
 
[¶41]   Poland’s complaint against the 
Trust was not filed until July 20, 2010.  
Poland failed to comply with the time limitations of § 4-10-507 and 
under the statute is forever prohibited from making any claim against the assets 
of the settlor’s trust or from commencing any judicial proceeding against the 
settlor or the assets of the settlor’s trust.  Thus, the district court had no subject 
matter jurisdiction in this matter.
 
[¶42]   With regard to the October 5, 2010 
trustee’s motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, the district 
court ruled that the motion had been converted to a motion for summary judgment 
with the notice and consent of the parties at the November 12, 2010 hearing and 
granted the summary judgment on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction 
over the Trust in this probate matter and dismissed all claims filed against the 
Trust with 
prejudice.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶43]   In support of his argument in Case 
No. S-11-0086, Poland cites two divorce cases, Mann v. Mann, 979 P.2d 497 (Wyo. 1999) 
and Kane v. Kane, 706 P.2d 676 (Wyo. 
1985), for the proposition that the right of free transferability is adjusted 
with the filing of a complaint for divorce and the jurisdiction of the district 
court may provide for the equitable treatment of the parties under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2011).  
Poland argues that the elective share provisions of § 2-5-101 and Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-6-101 (LexisNexis 2011) have a preclusive effect on the 
ability of a married person to transfer property otherwise included in the 
marital estate.  In essence, 
Poland argues that the so-called forced share or the “elective share” under the 
probate code cannot be eliminated or destroyed by the use of a pour-over will 
and trust due to the equitable powers of the district court in an action for 
divorce.  We do not agree.  As noted by the court in Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335, 345 
(Mass. 2003):
 
Death 
is not divorce, and the problems posed by each of those two life-altering events 
are profoundly different.  It should 
not surprise us that the law, be it modern or antiquated, does not view death as 
the equivalent of divorce, or that the Legislature has adopted quite differing 
rules governing the disposition of property following those two 
events.
 
Poland 
relies upon the public policy argument in favor of a common law policy of 
unrestricted alienation of separate property during marriage, but would curtail 
this right based upon the equitable powers of the court once a divorce action is 
filed.  In this case, although a 
divorce action had been initiated by the Decedent, it was rendered moot by her 
death.  The fact that the divorce 
action became moot by the death of the party that initiated the action does not 
affect the disposition of property under the probate laws of this state or under 
the laws governing trusts.  In 
essence, Poland argues that the estate for purposes of the elective share should 
include the non-probate property or be augmented by the non-probate property 
held in the 2008 Trust as a matter of policy.
 
Issue 
#1:  Wyoming has Rejected the 
Augmentation Concept of the UPC
 
[¶44]   “Under the Revised Uniform Probate 
Code, the decedent’s surviving spouse is entitled to an elective-share amount 
calculated by applying a specified percentage to the augmented estate[.]”  2 Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills 
& Other Donative Transfers § 9.2(a) (2003).  Simply put, the Wyoming Probate Code 
does not incorporate the augmented estate concept.  The Wyoming legislature has not adopted 
this concept.  For purposes of 
applying the augmented estate concept to the elective share of a surviving 
spouse, some states utilize an “illusory” test and some states use a “fraud” 
test.  Regardless of the many 
variations used in other states, until the Wyoming legislature adopts a 
motive-based approach to the elective share, as well as the requirement that 
non-probate assets be added back to the probate estate for purposes of the 
elective share, the policy adopted by other states is largely 
irrelevant.
 
[¶45]   Wyoming may not be in accord with 
other states on the issue of whether or not certain non-probate assets should be 
added back to the probate estate for purposes of the surviving spouse’s elective 
share.  See Amundson v. Amundson (In re Estate of 
Amundson), 621 N.W.2d 882, 886 (S.D. 2001).  Under any circumstances this is a policy 
choice for the Wyoming legislature to consider, and either accept or 
reject.
 
[¶46]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101(a) 
(LexisNexis 2011) provides for the elective share of a surviving spouse and 
states:
 
§ 2-5-101.  Elective share of 
property.
(a)  If 
a married person domiciled in this state shall by will deprive the surviving spouse of 
more than the elective share, as hereafter set forth, of the property which is subject to disposition under the 
will, reduced by funeral and administrative expenses, homestead allowance, 
family allowances and exemption, and enforceable claims, the surviving spouse 
has a right of election to take an elective share of that property as 
follows:
(i)  One-half(1/2) 
if there are no  surviving issue of 
the decedent, or if the surviving spouse is also a parent of any of the 
surviving issue of the decedent; or
(ii)  One-fourth(1/4), 
if the surviving spouse is not the parent of any surviving issue of the 
decedent.
[Emphasis 
added.]
 
The 
elective share of a surviving spouse under § 2-5-101 of the Wyoming Probate 
Code only applies to dispositions by will.
 
[¶47]   In Briggs v. Wyoming Nat’l Bank, 836 P.2d 263 (Wyo. 1992), we determined that a waiver of the right to challenge an inter 
vivos trust did not violate the elective share statute.  This Court noted that Wyoming’s elective 
share statute “states that it is applicable to testamentary or 'will’ 
dispositions of property.”  Id. at 273.  The Briggs court also notes that the laws of 
the states vary with respect to the right of the survivor to claim a share of 
assets transferred to a revocable trust before the decedent’s death.  Id. at 274.  For example, other states utilize 
different statutory criteria to determine the validity of the inter vivos 
transfers to an inter vivos trust with regard to the elective 
share.
 
[¶48]   On the other hand, the plain 
language of the elective share statute is limited to “disposition by will.”  This so-called bright line rule is not dependent on the decedent’s 
intent or retention of control.  
Section 2-5-101 begins with the condition, “[i]f a married person 
domiciled in this state shall by will deprive the surviving spouse of more than 
the elective share,…”  Here, the 
surviving spouse was not deprived by will, but rather by the Decedent’s transfer 
of property to a revocable inter vivos Trust prior to her death.  We have found no legal basis, nor has 
Poland cited any legal basis, for this Court to augment for purposes of the 
elective share the probate estate of the Decedent with the property transferred 
to the Trust prior to Decedent’s death or with property transferred by will 
substitutes at the time of Decedent’s death.
 
[¶49]   The Wyoming Probate Code defines 
“Will” at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-301 (a)(xxxiv) (LexisNexis 2011) to include “a 
codicil, a testamentary instrument that merely appoints an executor, or a 
testamentary instrument that merely revokes or revives another will.”  In this case the will does more than 
merely appoint an executor or merely revoke a will; it actually pours-over the 
assets held at death by the Decedent into the Trust.  Albeit that this is a relatively small 
amount of property; nevertheless, this transfer is made pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 2-6-103 (LexisNexis 2011).1
[¶50]   In addition, prior to 2007, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 4-10-505, now § 4-10-506(c), provided:
 
 
§ 
4-10-505.  Creditor’s claim against 
settlor.
(a)  Whether 
or not the terms of a trust contain a spendthrift provision, the following rules 
apply:
. 
. . .
(iii) 
After the death of a settlor, and subject to the settlor’s right to direct the 
source from which liabilities will be paid, the property of a trust that was revocable 
at the settlor’s death, is subject to claims of the settlor’s creditors, costs 
of administration of the settlor’s estate, the expenses of the settlor’s funeral 
and disposal of remains and statutory 
allowances as provided in W.S. 2-5-101 and 2-5-103 to a surviving spouse  and children to the extent the 
settlor’s probate estate is inadequate to satisfy those claims, costs of 
administration, expenses, and allowances 
as provided in W.S. 2-5-101 and 2-5-103.” [Bolded text deleted in 2007 
amendment.]
 
2007 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 155, § 3.
 
[¶51]   Ordinarily, when a statute is 
amended by deleting an express provision, the presumption is that a substantial 
change in the law was intended.  Payne v. Laramie, 398 P.2d 557, 561 
(Wyo. 1965).  The legislature’s 
intent is clear that by its 2007 amendment to § 4-10-506, that property 
transferred to a revocable trust by the decedent prior to death was not subject 
to the elective share of a disinherited surviving spouse.
 
[¶52]   In 2007, the legislature 
specifically removed from § 4-10-506(c) the language that previously 
provided that property held in a revocable trust was subject to the elective 
share of a disinherited spouse.  The 
amendments to § 4-10-506(c) removed the specific references to “the 
statutory allowances as provided in §§ 2-5-101 and 2-5-103 to a surviving spouse 
and children” and “allowances as provided in §§ 2-5-101 and 2-5-103.”  2007 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 155, § 
3.
 
[¶53]   The Wyoming legislature has not 
adopted or integrated the concept of augmenting the estate for purposes of 
computation of the elective share with the non-probate assets transferred to an 
inter vivos trust during the lifetime of the decedent.  There is a definite split of authority 
between the states as to whether or not assets transferred and held in a 
revocable inter vivos trust are to be added back to the estate for purposes of 
the elective share.  However, the 
legislature has specifically addressed how this split of authority should be 
viewed by this Court.
[¶54]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-1101 
(LexisNexis 2011) provides:
§ 4-10-1101.  Uniformity of application and 
construction.
In 
applying and construing this act, consideration shall be given to the need to 
promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states 
that enact it.  With respect to article 5 of this act, a 
court shall not give consideration to cases from jurisdictions that have adopted 
some version of the Uniform Trust Code, but have not modified article 5 of the 
Uniform Trust Code in a manner similar to Article 5 of this act.  [Emphasis 
added.]
[¶55]   Article 5 referred to above 
contains § 4-10-507.  The 
second sentence was adopted in 2007 as part of the same act that removed the 
elective share from the list of claims now found in § 4-10-506.  Given the split of authority found in 
other states, we agree that the consideration of case law from other 
jurisdictions would be of limited assistance in this case given the clear and 
unambiguous language used by the legislature.  See 2007 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 155, § 
3.
[¶56]   It is reasonable to suggest that 
the legislature during its consideration of the 2007 amendments was made aware 
of the different criteria used by other states to implement the augmentation 
rule, as well as the need to clearly define its intent with regard to these 
multiple and sometimes confusing methods used to address this issue in other 
states.  For a comprehensive article 
explaining that “most of the confusion stems from the approach to the problem 
taken by the courts and from their being overly concerned with the statute of 
wills:  See V. Woerner, Annotation, “Pour-over 
Provisions from Will to Inter Vivos Trust,” 12 A.L.R. 3d 56 (1967 and 2011 
Supp.).  Also see Bezzini v. Department of Soc. Servs., 
715 A.2d 791 (Conn. 1998); Taliaferro v. 
Taliaferro, 843 P.2d 240 (Kan. 1992); Soltis v. First of Am. Bank-Muskegan, 
513 N.W.2d 148 (Mich. 1994) and Dumas v. 
Estate of Dumas, 627 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio 1994) (involve cases holding that 
assets held in a revocable inter vivos trust are not subject to the surviving 
spouse’s elective share).  For cases 
holding that assets transferred to an inter vivos trust were subject to the 
elective share of a surviving spouse, see Dunnewind v. Cook, 697 N.E.2d 485 ,489 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998), and In re Estate of 
Inter, 664 A.2d 142, 147 (Pa. 1995); Sieh v. Sieh, 713 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa 
2006).
 
[¶57]   Furthermore, the Uniform Trust Code 
also provides at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-106 (LexisNexis 2011), “The common 
law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this act, except to the extent 
modified by this act or another statute of this state.  When interpreting article 5 of this act, 
the court shall first use the law of this state, then general common law.”  The law of this state includes the 
following legislative directive at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-102(a)(ii) and 
(iv) (LexisNexis 2011) that provide that the Wyoming Probate Code shall be 
liberally construed and applied to promote the following purposes: to 
“[d]iscover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his 
property;” and to “[f]acilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts.”  We are of the opinion that the district 
court properly determined that summary judgment was appropriate in this matter 
in that the Decedent’s testamentary intent regarding the property transferred to 
the Trust was made effective and the 2008 Trust was 
enforced.
Issue 
#2:  The Jurisdiction of the Probate 
Court over the Trust
[¶58]   Although the filing of the will was 
made necessary by Poland’s filing of the holographic will, it was also necessary 
to invoke the jurisdiction of the probate court to implement the intent of the 
Decedent contained within the 2008 will and Trust.  The will not only revokes the 2004 
holographic will filed by Poland, it also transfers to the Trust the remainder 
of the property accumulated by the Decedent from the time of creation of the 
will and Trust in 2008 to the time of death under § 2-6-103.  At the same time, none of the claims 
filed by Poland in the probate proceeding were directed at the Trust, but rather 
were directed at the estate.  Poland 
sought to revoke the 2008 will, as opposed to the Trust.  As a matter of law, the elective share, 
§ 2-5-101, is limited to deprivation by will.  What’s more, it is clear that by its own 
terms, the creditor’s claim was filed against the estate and not the 
Trust.
[¶59]   By his own choice, Poland proceeded 
against an estate that was penniless.  
It is undisputed that Poland did not file a claim within the statutory 
120-day limit under § 4-10-507.  
By the time the complaint was filed against the Trust, it was simply too 
late.  In any event, the issue of 
whether the probate court can address the validity of the Trust is not presented 
by this matter.  Poland has never 
claimed that the 2008 Trust was invalid.
Issue 
#3:  Jurisdiction over the 
Creditor’s Claim
[¶60]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-507 
(LexisNexis 2011) provides:
 
§ 
4-10-507. Limitation on action by creditors.
(a)  Subject 
to the rights of persons dealing with a fiduciary as provided in W.S. 4-10-1013, 
a creditor may file a claim against the assets of the trust or commence a 
judicial proceeding to contest the validity of a trust that was revocable at the 
settlor’s death within the earlier of:
(i)  Two 
( 2) years after the settlor’s death;
(ii)  One 
hundred twenty (120) days after a notice of the intent of the trustee to have 
the property of the settlor distributed as permitted under the terms of the 
trust has been published once per week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county or counties where venue of the 
trust is properly established as provided in W.S 4-10-204; or 

(iii)  One 
hundred twenty (120) days after known creditors have been mailed notice, by 
certified mail return receipt requested. The notice shall inform the 
creditor:
(A)  Of 
the trust’s existence;
(B)  Of 
the trustee’s name and address; 
(C)  That 
the creditor shall make all claims in writing to the trustee within one hundred 
twenty (120) days of the date of mailing of the notice; 
and
(D)  That 
time allowed for commencing a proceeding to contest the validity of a trust or 
of the proposed distribution of the trustee is one hundred twenty (120) days 
from the date of mailing of the notice.
(b)  A 
creditor failing to file his claim or to commence a judicial proceeding to 
contest the validity of a trust within the times provided is forever prohibited 
from making any claim against the assets of the settlor’s trust or commencing 
any judicial proceeding against the settlor or the assets of the settlor’s 
trust.
[¶61]   The question of jurisdiction is 
always present in any case and can be raised at any time.  It is a matter which the Court has a 
duty to raise at any time upon its own motion.  In re Estate of Fulmer, 761 P.2d 658, 
660 (Wyo. 1988).  If the lower court 
is without jurisdiction, then this Court is also without jurisdiction.  Id.  Also, as a rule we do not furnish 
advisory opinions.  Spear v. Nicholson, 882 P.2d 1237, 1242 
(Wyo. 1994).
[¶62]   The Wyoming Probate Code requires 
that a creditor file any claim it may have against the estate within the time 
limited in the notice to creditors.  
Any claim not so filed is forever barred under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2-7-703(a) (LexisNexis 2011).  
Stringari v. Taylor (In re Estate 
of Novakovich), 2004 WY 158, 101 P.3d 931 (Wyo. 2004).  Case No. S-11-0087 presents an issue 
involving the failure of the surviving spouse to timely present his creditor’s 
claim against the Trust as required by § 4-10-507.  This untimely filing of the complaint 
deprives this Court as well as the lower court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  As noted above, we do 
not render advisory opinions.  We 
simply do not have the authority to become legal advisor to the estate planning 
community.  We cannot issue any 
rulings where the Court does not have jurisdiction.
[¶63]   This Court is without jurisdiction 
to address the substance of the underlying issue in Case No. S-11-0087.  We affirm the entry of summary judgment 
by the district court on the basis of the lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  In this regard, it 
should be noted that the creditor’s claim filed in this case was a claim against 
the estate by its own admission, “the undersigned credtor [sic], Terrance 
Poland, asserts the following claim against the estate of Deanna B. 
George.”  The claim also cites Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 2-7-706 and 2-7-709 (LexisNexis 2011) as the applicable 
authority which specifically involves “Claims against 
Estate.”
[¶64]   Here, Poland was served with the 
notice on February 22, 2010.  The 
notice was also published for three consecutive weeks in the local newspaper, as 
opposed to the two weeks mandated by the statute.  Poland had actual notice of the 2008 
will and Trust upon receipt of the traverse and alternative petition for probate 
filed by Nalee on January 12, 2010.  
Poland was also given notice of the lack of assets in the estate in the 
“Inventory of Assets.”  Poland was 
given multiple notices of the fact that most, if not all, of Decedent’s property 
and assets had been transferred to the inter vivos Trust.  The residue property was transferred to 
the Trust by virtue of the pour-over will upon her death.  Poland was informed many times that 
there were no assets subject to probate due to transfers to the 
Trust.
[¶65]   Furthermore, the Court has stated 
that there are limits on a court’s authority to advise and instruct trustees, 
the prime limitation being that courts should not serve as legal advisor to 
trustees.  The rules of construction 
of a trust agreement are simple.  A 
trust agreement is governed by the plain language contained in the four corners 
of the document.  Where there is no 
ambiguity and the language is clear and susceptible of only one construction, 
then the plain provisions of the trust instrument must be given effect.  Rock Springs Land & Timber, Inc. v. 
Lore, 2003 WY 100, 75 P.3d 614 (Wyo. 2003).  The goal of the probate court should be 
a speedy settlement and adjudication of the rights in the property of a 
decedent.  Pike v. Markman, 633 P.2d 944, 947 (Wyo. 
1981).  In any event, the case is 
subject to the time restraint of § 4-10-507.
[¶66]   Here, Poland has never filed a 
claim against the Trust.  It is true that he did file a claim 
against the Estate.  The claim against the estate was 
rejected by the estate.  In any 
event, Poland cannot bootstrap the rejection of the claim by the Estate into a right to file a 
complaint against the Trust, 
where the suit was late under the limitation of § 4-10-507.  The failure of Poland to file the 
complaint in a timely manner deprived the court of jurisdiction.  The district court properly entered 
summary judgment for the Trust and trustee.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶67]   Simply stated, the Decedent went to 
great lengths to state her intention that Poland would not receive any interest 
in the solely owned property that she had inherited from her parents, but that 
Poland would receive the jointly owned property accumulated during the marriage 
upon the Decedent’s death.  The 
Decedent clearly states in her estate planning documents that Poland “does not 
have and shall not obtain or ever have any interest whatsoever” in the property 
transferred to the Trust.
 
[¶68]   Here, the property transferred to 
the Trust was never legally the property of the Decedent’s estate.  We cannot as a matter of law find any 
basis for making this property a part of the Decedent’s estate for purposes of 
the elective share.  And, Poland has 
not provided this Court with any legal basis for doing so.
 
[¶69]   Moreover, the legislature has 
limited creditors’ claims against revocable inter vivos trusts as provided in 
§ 4-10-507.  Poland has failed 
to meet the requirements for invoking the court’s subject matter jurisdiction 
over his creditor’s claim.
 
[¶70]   We affirm the district court in 
both cases.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Here, 
the Decedent utilized some rather complex and legally sophisticated estate 
planning devices.  A “pour-over” 
devise must be validated by statute, by incorporation by reference, or by 
independent significance.  Unless 
properly validated, the pour-over devise is invalid because the beneficial 
devisees are not identified in a document executed in compliance with the 
statutory formalities for a valid will.  
Wyoming enacted a statute that is similar in substance to the Uniform 
Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-103 (LexisNexis 2011), which was originally 
adopted on February 20, 1957, provides that:
§ 2-6-103.  Property passed may be governed by trust 
instrument.
By a will signed and attested as provided in this article a testator may 
devise and bequeath real and personal estate to a trustee of a trust which is 
evidenced by a written instrument in existence when the will is made and which 
is identified in the will, even though the trust  is subject to amendment, modification, 
revocation or termination.  Unless 
the will provides otherwise the estate so devised and bequeathed is governed by 
the terms and provisions of the instrument creating the trust including  any amendments or modifications in 
writing made before or after the making of the will and before the death of  the testator.  [Emphasis 
added.]
 
Section 
2-6-103 has the effect of validating the pour-over will as it relates to the 
assets poured-over into the Trust on the death of the Decedent.  This rule of construction applies 
“unless a contrary intention is indicated in the will.”  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-105 
(LexisNexis 2011).  The pour-over 
provisions of the will transfer the residue or remainder of the property 
accumulated by the Decedent from the time of creation of the will and Trust in 
2008 to the time of death.  Section 
2-6-103 validates the will and Trust, which govern the disposition of the estate 
including the remainder.  Thus, the 
property of the Trust is not disposed of by the 
will.