Title: Rodriguez-Flores v. U.S. Coatings, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

e1:06/26/2013,

z to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
‘venue, Montgomery, Alabans 36100-3741 (330)
aenobicat oF obhes Ggesitygs Orser that corrections may be nade

      
 
      

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013

1120099

Fernando Rodriguez-Flores a/k/a Jo:

 

Edgardo Pizarro-Plaza
v.
U.S. Coatings, Inc.

Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(cv-11-1001)

BOLIN, Justice.

Fernando Rodriguez-Flores a/k/a Jose Edgardo Pizarro-
Plaza appeals from the order of the Mobile Circuit Court
dismissing his claims alleging retaliatory discharge and

fraud. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
1120099
Facts and Procedural History

Rodriguez-Flores was employed by U.S. Coatings, Inc., as
a painter. He states that in "early" 2010 he suffered an
injury to his right lower extremity while working in a dry
dock. Rodriguez-Flores further alleges that on June 5, 2011,
he become vielentiy 111 after being exposed te paint fumes and
suffering from heat exhaustion, Rodriguez-Flores's employment
was terminated on June 27, 2011. Rodriguez-Flores sued U.S.
Coatings on September 26, 201:, seeking to recover worker's
compensation benefits pursuant to the Alabama Workers’

Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et. seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the

 

Act"), asserting @ retaliatory-discharye claim pursuant to §
25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975; and also asserting fraud,
wantonness, and tort-of-outrage claims. The first two counts
of Rodriguez-Flores's complaint sought worker's compensation
benefits for the injuries allegedly occurring in early 2010
and in June 2011. Rodriguez-Flores further alleged in his
completa:

“THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION RETALIATORY DISCHARGE

"19, On or about June 27, 2011, Defendant U.S.

Coatings, Inc., wrongfully terminated [Rodriguez-

Flores's] employment because he asserted a claim for
workers* compensation beuelivs.
1120099

20. Such action by [U.S. Coatings] violates the
Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, Ala. Code § 25-5-
11.1 (1975).

"21. As proximate result and consequence of
said conduct, [Rodriguez-Flores] has suffered
substantial damage(], including but not limited to
past, present and future lost earnings, stress and
mental anguish. (Rodriguez-Flores] has also
incurred substantial medical bills for the treatment
of the underlying injury.

“WHEREFORE, Fernando Rodriguez-Flores, aka Jose
Edgardo Pizarro-Plaza, denands judgment against U.S.
Coatings, Inc., for compensatory and punitive
Vamayes ‘in ai amuunt iu excess uf Ue udutmuw
Jurisdictional limits of this Court, together with
interest and costs of Court.

"FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FRAUD

 

"23. After [Rodriguez-Flores] made several
visits to a company doctor following his leg injury
in 2010, he was referred to another doctor who
wanted to begin more aggressive treatments.

"24. [U.S. Coatings], through [Rodriguez-
Plores's}] supervisor, Jerry (last name unknown at
this time), informed [Rodriguez-Flores] that he
would be fired if he continued to seek treatment for
his injury. [U.S. Coatings] also told [Rodriguez-
Flores] that he was not entitled to be paid for time
missed Crom work due Lo lls injury. Jerzy Cuscher
instructed [Rodriguez-Flcres] to tell the doctor
that his injury was healed or [Rodriguez-Flores]
would be fired. Finally, Jerry told [Rodriauez-
Flores] that he was not entitled to be paid for time
missed from work because of the injury and that
[Rodriguez-Flores] was only entitled to be paid for
hivuts autually woiked.
1120099

25. [Rodriguez-Flores}], who does not speak
English and who had no reason to believe that his
supervisor was being dishonest with him, reasonably
relied on his supervisor's statements and as a
result discontinued his treatments and doctor visits
and continued to work while in severe pain.

26. As a direct result of his reliance on his
supervisor's statements, —_ [Rodriguez-Flores]
continued to work while in severe pain, causing him
to suffer severe physical, mental, and emotional
pain and anguish.

"27, As a direct and proximate result of [U.S.

Coatings’] fraud, [Rodriguez-Flores] continues to
suffer severe physical, mental, aud emutional
distress and will continue to so suffer in the
future.

"28. [Rodriguez-Flores's] supervisor made the
statements to [Rodriguez-Flores] either willfully to
deceive or recklessly, in order to convince
[Rodsigues-Floxes) to discontinue treatment fox hie
injury.

‘WHEREFORE, Fernando Rodriquez-Flores, aka Jose
Edgardo Pizarro-Plaza, denands judgment against U.S.
Coatings, Inc., for compensatory and punitive
damages in an amount in excess of the minimum
Juxisdictional limits of this Court, together with
interest and costs of Court.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION OUTRAGE/WANTONNESS

 

30. 10.8. Coatinas] was aware that [Rodriauez~
Flores's} authorized treating physician opined that
[Rodriguez-Flores] suffered from a medical condition
that was wholly caused by his on-the-job accident in
wasly 2010.
1120099

31. [U.S. Coatings] was aware that [Rodriguez-
Flores's] authorized treating physician opined that
[Rodriguez-Flores] was in severe pain due to the
presence of his medical condition that was wholly
caused by his on-the-job accident in early 2010.

32. Despite having the foregoing knowledge
regarding [Rodriguez-Flores's] medical condition,
[U.S. Coatings] consciously disregarded [Rodriguez~
Flores's] rights while aware that harm would likely
reoult, refused to pay [Rodrigues Plorea] temporary
total or partial disability benefits, and ordered
him to discontinue treatment or be fired.

33. The constructive denial of [Rodriguez
Fluses's) cequest fur Cieatuent, under Une Cureyuiuy
circumstances, is conduct that is extreme,
outrageous and intolerable in civilized society.

 

"34, As a direct result of the (U.S. Coatings")
refusal to grant [Rodriguez-Flores] the medical
treatment to which he is entitled by Alabama law,
[Rodsiguez-Flores] has unnecessarily endured and
will continue to endure in the future, severe bodily
pain, mental anguish, and emotional distress.

WHEREFORE, [Rodriguez-Flores] prays that the
jury award compensatory damages for the damages
[Rodriguez-Flores] has suffered as a result of [U.S.
Coatings'}] intentional, wanton and/or reckless
conduct as well as punitive damages to punish [U.S.
Coatings] for its intolerable conduct and to deter
others from such wrongful conduct.”

Ou January 19, 2012, U.S. CuaLinys, selyluy upon Ex parte

Bender Shipbuilding Repair Co., 879 So. 2d 577 (Ala. 2003),

moved the trial court to dismiss all state-law claims asserted

against it,

arguing that those claims were preempted by 33
1120099
U.S.C. § 905(a), a provision of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et. seq. ("the
LAWCAN) .

on February 8, 2012, Rodriguez-Flores filed a response in
opposition to U.S. Coatings’ motion to dismiss, arguing that
the decision in Bx ports Bender hipbuilding to
distinguishable from this case because, unlike the employee in
Ex parte Bender Shipbuilding, Rodriguez-Flores had not sought
or received benefits under the LHWCA and that the remedies he
was seeking were completely within Alabama statutory and
common law. Rodriguez-Flores further argued that, based upon
the facts of this case, he hed the option, pursuant to gun
Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 (1980), to seek
benefits under the LAWCA or under Alabama's workers’
compensation scheme and that he has chosen to seek benefits
under the Act.

on March 1, 2012, Rodriguez-Flores supplemented his
espouse Lu upposiiion Lu Lie uullon Lu Uisilss by submLeLLiy
additional argument in opposition to the motion, as well as
his affidavit.  Rodriguez-Flores acknowledged in his

supplemental response that accidental, negligent, and
1120099
reckless acts by an employer cannot justify bringing a tort
claim against the employer in a state court if the basis of
the tort is within the scope of the LHWCA. However, he argued
that the courts have recognized an exception to the exclusive-
liability provision of § 905(a), "where the injury inflicted

io the result of an intentional act.” louston vy. Bechtel

 

Assocs, Prof'l Corp. D.C., 522 F. Supp. 1094, 1096 (D.D.C.
1981). He argued that the fects presented here, which, he
says, indicate that U.S. Coatings intended with actual malice
to harm him both physically and financially, fall within that
recognized exception.

Rodriguez-Flores also axyued that, given the alleyed
conduct of U.S. Coatings in this case, he should be allowed to
pursue his retaliatory-discharge claim brought pursuant to §
25-5-11.1, Ala. Code 1975, because the relief provided him by
the LHWCA is inadequate as it can result only in a small
penalty being levied against U.S. Coatings, whereas he is
euLitied Lo evover punluive damages aid compensation fo
mental anguish in a retaliatory-discharge claim brought

pursuant to § 25-5-11.1.
1120099
On March 11, 2012, the trial court entered the following
order:

"This matter is before the Court on the Motion
of (U.S. Coatings] to Dismiss all of [Rodriguez-
Flores's) claims on the grounds that they are barred
by the exclusivity provisions of the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ('LHWCA'), 33
U.S.C. Section 905(a).

‘After considering tne pleadings, briefs, and
arguments of counsel, the Court finds that the
Motion is due to be GRANTED IN PART, and DENIED IN
PART.

"Counsel for [Rodriguez-Flores] concedes that
his client thas the choice of seeking benefits from
either the LHWCA or the Alabama Workers’
Compensation Act." However, he also argues that the
injuries 'were outside the navigable waters of the
United States.’ Because the LHWCA provides at least
concurrent coveraye for the injuries of [Rodrigues
Flores], the Court finds that the reasoning of Ex
parte Bender Shipbuilding [é Repair Co.], 879 So. 2d
577 [(Ala. 2003)], bars his tort claims. Because
the record is not clear as to where [Rodriguez~
Flores] may have been injured, the Court cannot say
that the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act does not
provide concurrent coverage for his claim to
worker's compensation benefits.

"For the foregoing reasons, [U.S. Coatings']
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Count Three and
Coun Four uf lds Complalut. ZLs Motion Lo Diswlss
is DENIED as to Count One and Count Two."

(Capitalization in original.)

On August 22, 2012, U.S. Coatings moved the trial court

ly certify its vider uf March 11, 2012, a> final pursuant Ly
1120098
Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P, On August 26, 2012, the trial
court entered an order cert:fying the judgment as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.?
Standard of Review
‘This Court has stated:
Tn Newnan v. Savas, 070 So. 2d 1147 (Ala.
2003), this Court set out the standard of review of

a ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction:

 

A quliuy un a mution Ly diswiss Ls
reviewed without a presumption of
correctness. Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d
297, 299 (Ala. 1993). This Court must
accept the allegations of the complaint as
true. Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke
Housing, L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala.
2002). Furthe:mure, -n reviewing a ruling
on a motion to dismiss we will not consider
whether the pleader will ultimately
prevail but whether the pleader may

‘The trial court's judgment failed to dispose of the
tort-ef-outrage and wantonneer claime. The tort-of-outrage
claim appears to be so closely intertwined with the fraud
claim as to make certification of the fraud claim pursuant to
Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., inappropriate. See Stephens v.
Fine ling, Inc., 84 So. 3d 867 (Ala. 2011).
Recordingly, thio Court, on May 3, 2013, remanded the cauoc to
the trial court to make the order of August 26, 2012, a final
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. Civ. P., by ruling on
count 5, the tort-of-outrage/wantonness claim, and entering an
amended Rule 54(b) order. The trial court entered an order on
May 8, 2013, complying with this Court's order on remand.
Rodriguez-Flores did not appeal as to the tort-of-
outrage/wantonnece claim, and, accordingly, that claim ic not
before this Court on appeal.
1120099

possibly prevail. Nance, 622 So. 2d at
299."

"070 Go. 2a at 1140 49."
Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Autc. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 563
(Ala. 2005). See also Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978
So. 2d 17, 21 (Ala. 2007).
Discussion
I. The State-Law Fraud Claim

The LNWCA, as awended, establishes a compieheusive
federal workers’ compensation program that provides
longshoremen and their families with medical, disability, and
survivor benefits for work-related injuries and death. The
injured or deceased longshoreman's employer must pay the
statutory benefits regardless of fault, but is shielded from
any further liability to the longshoreman or his or her
estate. Howlett v. Dirkdale Shipping Go., 3.A., 512 U.9. 92
(1994) .?

2an cmployec'o coverage under the LHWCA io determined
under a two-pronged test composed of a "status" requirement
and a "situs" requirement. Director, Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Assocs., 459 U.S.
297 (1983). The status prong is satisfied if the employee was
“engaged in maritime employment" at the time of his injury. 33
U.S.C. § 902(3). Section 902(3) defines "employee" as "any
porcon engaged in maritime omployment, ineluding any
longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring

10
1120099
The history of the LHWCA as it relates to preemption and
state workers' compensation schemes has been explained as

follow:

 

"LHWCA jurisprudence has its genesis early in this
century. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 37 8. Ct. 524, 528-29, 61 L. Ed. 1086 (1917),
the Supreme Court ruled that states’ attempts to
opply theiz workmen's compensation laws to maritime
injuries were constitutionally _ impermissible,
thereby establishing the so-called Jensen line,
where land meets water, at which point state
jurisdiction concluded. In the ensuing years, the
Gout suttened Ue siyid Jeuseu Line suena,
allowing states to ex:end their compensation
coverage schemes to maritime circumstances that were
maritime but ‘local in character.’ See Western Fuel
Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 42 S. Ct. 89, 66 L. Bd.
210 (921). Still, many longshoremen injured on
navigable water were left without a remedy. Congress
Eeaponded in 1927 by enacting the LIWCA ea a fedexal
compensation law.

   

 

 

With the enactment of the LHWCA, workers
injured upon the navigable waters had compensation
to redress their injuries. In its original version,
however, the LHWCA's coverage stopped at the
shoreline, allowing compensation for injuries
occurring ‘on the navigable waters,’ but only if

operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman,
ohipbuilder, and chip breaker ...." The oituo prong io met if
the employee's injury occurred “upon the navigable waters of
the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry
dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other
adjoining area ‘customarily used by an employer in loading,
unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel)." 33
U.S.C. § 903(a). The parties do not dispute that Rodriguez-
Flores would qualify for coverage under the LHWCA.

 

  

nu
1120099

compensation under state law was unavailable. Pub.
L, No. 69-803, ch. 509, § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1424, 1426
(1927). The line of demarcation between federal and
state coverage, however, was often difficult to
ascertain. As a result of the ‘doubtful
jurisdictional line," the Supreme Court, in Davis v
Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 256, 63 S. Ct.
225, 229, 87 L. Ed. 246 (1942), recognized for the
first time that the area surrounding the ‘doubtful’
line was a fact-sensitive ‘twilight zone," where
‘employees must have theiz rights determined case by
case.' Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114,
82 S. Ct. 1196, 8 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1962), further
advanced the notion of concurrent federal and state
jurisdiction, holding that the LHWCA covered all
lnjuries un Ue navigable waters even if a case uf
injury was also within the reach of state
compensation laws. Id. 37 U.S. at 126-27, 82 S. Ct.
at 1203-04. At this point in its jurisprudential
evolution, although ‘maritime but local' injuries
fell within the twilight zone's concurrent
jurisdiction, the LHWCA's reach still stopped at the
water's edge.

 

     

"This produced a disparity in benefits for the
same type of injury, depending on which side of the
water's edge the injury occurred. Congress
ameliorated this disparity in 1972 with amendments
to the LHWCA's coverage provision which extended the
LIWCA landwardly. The LMMCA came ashore when its
coverage provision was amended to include injuries
‘occurring upon the navigable waters of the United
States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry
dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or
vlhe: adjoluiny area custumarily used by au employer
in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or
building a vessel).' 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). See
Lonashoremen's and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 2(a), 86
Stat. 1251; H.R. Rep. No. 1441, 92nd Cong., 2nd
Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 4698, 4707-08.

2
1120099

‘Any doubts about the effect of the landward
extension of the LHWCA on the twilight zone were
retired by the Supreme Court's latest seminal
expression in the area, Sun Ship, Inc. ve
Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S. Ct. 2432, 65 L.
Ed. 2d 458 (1980). Five employees of Sun Ship, Inc.,
a shipbuilding and ship repair outfit located on the
Delaware River, were injured on land and filed a
claim for state workmen's compensation benefits
under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act.
The state Appeal Doard affirmed the award of
benefits to the workers, but the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania challenged the benefits awards,
asserting that the LHWCA was the workers’ exclusive
vemedy. The Supreme Court affirmed:

"'Given that the pre-1972 Longshoremen's
Act ran concurrently with state remedies in
the ‘maritime but local’ zone, it follows
that the post-1972 expansion of the Act
landward would be concurrent as well. For
state regulation of worker injuries is even
moze clearly appropriate ashore than it is
upon navigable waters."

"Id, 100 S. Ct. at 2436. In other words, when the
LHWCA came ashore in 1972, the twilight zone
followed. Sun Ship makes crystal clear the notion
that workers injured on land, yet who fall within
LIINCA coverage, axe withir the twilight zone and may
pursue federal or state compensation benefits.

 

"The twilight zone, therefore, is a specie of
maritime law in which overlapping jurisdictional
spheres cieale coucursent Jusisdiclion between Uke
LHWCA and state laws. Currently, maritime injuries
fall within three jurisdictional spheres. At the
seaward extreme, the LHWCA is the exclusive remedy.
For injuries occurring on land outside the
jurisdictional grasp of the LHWCA, state law alone
governs. In the twilight zone, however, ‘maritime
Dut local" injuries may be cumpeusaled by federal ux

B
1120099

 

state law. Id. at 2436; In re All Maine Asbestos
Litigation (BIW Cases), 589 F. Supp. 1563, 1568 (D.
Maine 1984) (hereinafter In re All Maine); see 1A
Denedict on Admiralty $ 10 (1907).

 

Wallace v. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co., 708 F. Supp. 144,
151-53 (E.D. Tex. 1989) (footnotes omitted).

Section 904 of the LHWCA provides, in part, that “[e]very
employer shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to
his employees of the compensat:on payable under sections 907,
908, aid 909 Uf Unis Lille” aid Liat such Compensation “shall
be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the injury.”
Section 905(a) of the LHNCA frovides, in part, that "[t]he
liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this
title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of such employer to the emplovee" and that, in such action,
"the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was
caused by the negligence of @ fellow servant, or that the
employee assumed the risk of his employment, or that the
injury was due to the contributory negligence of the
employee." The exclusivity provision of the LHWCA has been
explained as follows:

"The LHWCA, at 33 U.S.C. § 905, precludes a personal

injury action against any employer who complies with
(he LHWCA. Just a> Ala. code 1975, § 2575-53,

 

rT)
1120099

provides that workers' compensation benefits are the
exclusive remedy for :njuries received in a
work-related accident, the LHWCA provides, in 33
U.0.c. § 905(a)y that an injured worker may not
maintain a tort action against his employer for any
negligence of the employer giving rise to the
injury; the injured worker's exclusive remedy is
under ‘the LHWCA. In International Paper Co. _v.
Murray, 490 So. 24 1234 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, Ex parte
Muzzay, 490 60. 24 1230 (1906), this court noted:

“'The LHWCA was adopted in 1927 as a
federal compensation plan for maritime
workers, and was patterned after existing
Slate wurhers' Compeusatiun lawo.... The
LHWCA is a workmen's compensation statute
imilar to our own, where employers have
relinquished their defenses to tort
actions in exchange for limited and
predictable liability.

 

 

"490 90. 2d at 1296 (quoting Mouse
Constr. Co. v. Director, Office of Workers"
Compensation Programs, United States Department of
Labor, 461 U.S. 624, 103 S. Ct. 2045, 76 L. Ed. 2d
194 (1983)).""

 

on Knudsen

Jarrell v. Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 681 So. 2d 1092,

1094 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). Thus, employers enjoy immunity

from tort claims under the LHWCA as they do under the Act.

 

Mallibustou Cus, 791 F. Supp. 20 967, 962 (5.D. Ten.
2011) (noting that the “exclusivity provision of LAWCA
‘completely obliterates the rights at common, civil or

maritime law against Employer and fellow employee" and that

15
1120099
"‘an employer that secures insurance coverage for its
employees as required by the [Lefense Base Act, 2 U.S.C. § 151
et seq.,] is entitled to immunity under the LHWCA'"); Ex parte
Shelby Cnty. Health Care Auth., 850 So. 2d 332, 338 (Ala.
2002) (stating that the Act provides immunity from common
Jowauits for those employere and carciexo who come within the
Act and makes it clear that the Act is an exclusive remedy
only in situations where an employee is suing his employer for
injuries sustained in the course of his employment). This
immunity is extended by the LHWCA to include co-emplovee
actions. § 933(i); Perron v. Bell Maint. & Fabricators, Inc.,
970 F.2d 1409 (Sth ix. 1992). Although § 25-5-11(b), Ala.
Code 1975, allows for co-employee suits in certain limited
circumstances involving willful conduct, this Court has held
that such suits are barred by the exclusivity provisions of
the LHWCA where the accident falls within the twilight zone of
concurrent jurisdiction and the scope of the LHWCA. Fillinger

Fuster, 448 su. 2u 321 (Ala. 1961).

 

Some courts have recognized an exception to the
exclusivity provision of the LHWCA where the employer has

committed an intentional tort. Fisher v. Halliburton, 667

16
1120098
F.3d 602 (Sth Cir. 2012). However, these "cases take a very
narrow view of the types of intentional injury that lie
outside of the LHWCA--the cases consistently require that the
employer have had a specific intent or desire that the injury
occur." Id, at 618. See Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335,
1346 (9th Ciz. 1905); Roy vs Dethichem Steel Cozp., 030 Tr.
Supp. 312, 316 (E.D. Tex. 1993) ("The employer can be sued
under LHWCA, however, if he committed an intentional tort,
i.e., genuine, intentional injury."); Houston v. Bechtel
Assocs. Prof'l Corp., D.C., 522 F. Supp. at 1096 (observing
that “(t]he courts have ... carved out an exception to
exclusive liability provisions where the injusy inflicted ts
the result of an intentional act"); Austin v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 508 F. Supp. 313, 316 (D. Me. 1981) ("Nothing
short of a specific intent to injure the employee falls
outside the scope of the [LHWCA]."); Sharp v. Elkins, 616 F.
Supp. 1561 (D. La. 1985); and Rustin v. District of Columbia,
491 A.2U 496, 501 (D.C, 1985) (obserViny Lal Lie exLiusiviLy
provision of the LHWCA "does not reach actions where the

employer specifically intended to injure the employee").

vv
1120099

Although Rodriguez-Flores acknowledges in his brief that
the scope of the exception to the exclusivity provision of the
LHWCA is exceedingly narrow, he nevertheless argues that his
fraud claim falls within the exception. We disagree. In Ex

parte Bender shipbuilding, supra, the employee was injured
daring the course of his employment 05 a shipfitter at the
employer's shipyard and as such his claim was subject to the
concurrent jurisdiction of the LHWCA and the Act. The
employee was paid benefits under the LHNCA. The employee then
sued his emplover asserting a fraud claim based on the
employee's allegations that he was entitled to be offered
light-duty work after he was released to xeturn to work
following his injury but that the employer had falsely
represented to him that it had no light-duty work available.
The employee alleged that he suffered monetary losses and
mental anguish as the result of his employer's alleged fraud.
The employer moved the trial court for a summary judgment,
atyulny Uial Ue employee's feaud Claim was vetted by Une
exclusivity provision found in § 905(a) of the LHWCA and that
although some courts had recognized an intentional-tort

exception to the LHWCA's exclusivity provision if the employer

18
1120099
had specifically intended to injure the employee, there had
been no allegation or evidence presented in the case that the
employer had specifically intended to injure the employee.
The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the employee for $40,000.

On appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals, the employer
again argued that the employee's claims were preempted by the
LHWCA. However, the Court of Civil Appeals rejected that

argument, stating:

 

"The LHWCA did not require [the employer] to provide
light-duty work to [the employee] as part of his
‘compensation,’ and it did not provide [the
employee] with any redress for [the employer's]
alleged fraud in denying him light-duty work. gee
generally 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. The mere fact that
[the employee] could not claim [the employer's]
light-duty-work benefit unless [the employer] was
also responsible for paying his LHWCA compensation
did not convert the light-duty-work benefit into
‘compensation’ due under the LHWCA. Thus, [the
employer's] argument that [the employee's] claim is
simply a claim for the mishandling or denial of
benefits due under the LHNCA is without merit.

 

 

"Unlike the claims in [the cases] relied upon by
[the employer], the state-law claim submitted to the
jury in the present case was not a claim for an
alleged improper handling or denial of benefits due
under the LHWCA. As noted, [the employer] eventually
paid all compensation and medical benefits due [the
employee) wider tle Act, as well as all selated

19
1120099

penalties due under the Act, and (the employee]
dismissed his claims pertaining to [the employer's]
initial denial of those benefits.

[The employee's] claim that was submitted to
the jury was based upon an alleged intentional
misrepresentation that there was no light-duty work
available during the period of [the employee's]
temporary disability. Any obligation to provide [the
employee] with such light-duty work in the first
place, and therefore any duty to avoid
misrepresenting the availability of such work, arose
outside of the LHWCA. It arose because [the
employer] undertook to provide such work and the
full compensation benefits associated therewith as
au addiivual Lenelil Lu ils employees. Providing
such work was not a benefit required by the LHWCA.

 

Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Walley, 879 So. 24 568,
576-77 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
On certivrart seview, this cout eaplained.

"[Aln employer charged pursuant to the LHWCA with
compensating an injured employee may provide
light-duty work for an injured employee in certain
circumstances and thereby avoid the obligation to
pay that employee temporary total disability
benefits that might otherwise apply. If the employer
is not able to establish that suitable alternate
employment is available, either in its own facility
or elsewhere, then the LHWCA obligates the employer
to pay disability benefits to the employee. See
Hawlugult v. Steveus Slipplug cu., 22 BRBS 392
(1989)

 

. [T]he availability of a liaht-dutv-work
program, while not mandated by the LHWCA, is an
economic benefit an employer can offer its employees
in lieu of its obligation to pay temporary total
Uisabilily bewefits. Alunwuyl Ue LANGA dues nut

 

20
1120099

require that such a benefit be provided, claims
regarding the mishandling of an economic benefit
such as light-duty work, made available to an
employee as the employer's alternative means of
complying with the LHWCA, would arise under the
LHWCA."

Ex parte Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 879 So. 2d 577, 583
(Ala. 2003).

This Court further determined that the employee's claim
was in essence a claim alleging that the employer had,
Tiuteutioualiy or in bad faith, refused Lu anaid a benefit Ly
him and, in so doing, [had] intentionally inflicted emotional
distress," 879 So. 2d at 584, and determined that that claim
was barred by the exclusivity provision of the LHWCA. This
Court stated:

Most federal courts that have examined the
question whether an employee's state-law claims
alleging intentional or bad-faith refusal to pay
LHWCA compensation, wrongful termination of LHWCA
benefits, or the intentional infliction of emotional
distress as a result of failure to pay or the
termination of LHWCA benefits have concluded that
such claims are preempted by the LHWCA. See, e.g.,

Barnard v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 975 F.2d 919, 920
(GQst ciz. 1992) (lwldlug that tie plaiucice’s clalu

for the employer's intentional infliction of
emotional distress in failing to pay benefits was
preempted by the LHWCA and that the LHWCA is the
‘exclusive remedy for [an employer's] failure to
make timely [compensation] payments, irrespective of
[the employer's] reasons for nonpayment"); Atkinson
ve Gates, MuDuuald @ Cue, 838 F.2d 808, 812 (5Un

2
1120099

Cir. 1988) (holding that a state-law cause of action
addressed by the LHWCA is preempted and that ‘the
LHWCA is plainly preemptive of any state law claim
for intentional or bad faith wrongful refusal to pay
benefits due under the [IHWCA]'); Texas Employers’
Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 820 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir.
1987), rev'd on other grounds, 862 F.2d 491 (5th
Cir. 1988) (en banc); Hall v.‘c & P Tel. Co., 809
F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Claims alleging
intentional infliction cf emotional distress in
bad faith refusal to ake timely compensation
payments fall within the exclusivity provisions of
the LHWCA); Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335 (9th
Cir, 1985) (claims for wrongful refusal to pay or
delay in paying LHWCA benefits are preempted by the
LHWCAD «

 

 

"In Jackson, a panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
employee's bad-faith claims brought under Texas law
were preempted by the LHWCA. Jackson had sued his
employer's LHWCA insurance carrier in state court,
alleging bad-faith insurance practices on the part
of the carrier. The Jackson court explained that
federal law preempts state law in three
circumstances: first, when Congress explicitly
expresses its intent to preempt state law; second,
when Congress's intent to displace state law can be
inferred through the  comprehensiveness or
pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme; and
third, when state law conflicts with federal law or
interferes with the accomplishment and execution of
Congress's purpose. 820 F.2d at 1411. The panel then
concluded that the LHWCA preempted the state law
duvoked by Jacksun lu all Unzee clicumsauces. Zu.
‘That portion of the panel's decision was affirmed by
the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc, although the en
banc court reversed the decision on other arounds.
See 862 F.2d at 496 n. 7.

In Atkinson, the Fifth Circuit noted that 'a
majutity uf courts lave held Wal workers"

22
1120099

compensation statutes, particularly where they
address the subject of delayed or withheld
compensation benefits, provide the exclusive remedy
in that respect." 090 T.2d at 013, The Pifth Circuit
then quoted the following from 2A Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law § 68.34(c), 13-145 to -146 (1987):

 

"It seems clear that a compensation
claimant cannot transforma simple delay in
payments into an actionable tort by merely
inveking the magic words ‘fraudulent,
deceitful and intentional’ or ‘intentional
infliction of emotional distress’ or
‘outrageous’ conduct in his complaint. The
temptation to shatter the exclusiveness
principle by teacliiny for Uke Lust weapon
whenever there is a delay in payments or a
termination of treatment is all too
obvious, and awareness of this possibility
has undoubtedly been one reason for the
reluctance of courts to recognize this tort
except in cases of egregious cruelty or
venality.

 

"one final factor may be noted that
has figured in many of these cases: the
presence in the statute of an
administrative penalty for the very conduct
on which the tort suit is based. A majority
of the courts have taken the view that this
evidences a legislative intent that the
remedy for delay in payments, even
vexatious delay, shall remain within the
system in the forn of some kind of
penalty

 

"938 F.2d at 814."

arte Bender Shipbuilding, 879 So. 2d at 584-85.

23
1120099

Rodriguez-Flores alleged that U.S. Coatings, through its
employee, fraudulently represented to him that “he would be
fired if he continued to seek treatment for his injury," "that
he was not entitled to be paid for time missed from work due
to his injury," and "that he was not entitled to be paid for

time missed from work because of the injury and that [he] was

 

only entitled to be paid for hours actually worked"; that he

was directed to "tell the doctcr that his injury was healed or

 

the] would be fired"; and that he reasonably relied on those
representations that proximately resulted in his suffering
severe physical, mental, and emotional pain and anguish.
These allegations are in the nature of an intentional or bad
faith refusal to provide benefits and/or a wrongful
termination of benefits similar to the fraud claim asserted in
Ex parte Bender. Rodriguez-Flores has not alleged a specific
intent on the part of U.S. Coatings to injure him, which is
required in order to fall within the recognized exception to
Ute exclusivity plovisiun ef Ue LMNCA, paved on Lie
foregoing, Rodriguez-Flores's state-law fraud claim is barred

by both the exclusivity provision of the LHWCA and the Act.

24
1120099
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the
fraud claim.
IL, Retaliatory-Discharge Claim

Rodriguez-Flores argues that the trial court erred in
determining that his retaliatory-discharge claim, brought
pursuant to § 25 5 11.1, Ala. Code 1975, was preempted by $
905(a) of the LHWCA. Specifically, Rodriguez-Flores has
argued that the relief provided by the LHWCA for a retaliatory
discharge is not concurrent with and is inadequate to the
relief provided by § 25-5-11.1. U.S. Coatings contends that
the retaliatory-discharge claim is in the nature of a tort
claim and Ls ale precluded by $ 905(a) of the MICA. Section
25-5-11.1 provides, in part:

'No employee shall be terminated by an employer
solely because the employee has instituted or
maintained any action against the employer to

recover workers’ compensation benefits under this
chapter ....”

 

A retaliatory-discharge claim filed pursuant to § 25-5-11.1 is

dn Wie natuce Uf @ Leadilioual Luzl Claim, gacksun Culy. Musp.

vy. Alabama Hosp. Ass'n Trust, 619 So. 2d 1369, 1371 (Ala.

1993), and a plaintiff is entitled to recover both

compensatory and punitive damages on a claim alleging a

25
1120099
retaliatory discharge pursuant to § 25-5-11.1. See AutoZone,

Ini

 

Leonard, 812 So. 24 1179 (Ala. 2001).
Section 948a of the LHWCA provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any employer or his duly
authorized agent to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against an employee as to his
employment because such employee has claimed or
attempted te claim compensation from ouch employer,
or because he has testified or is about to testify
in a proceeding under this chapter. ... Any employer
who violates this section shall be liable to a
penalty of not less than $1,000 or more than $5,000,
ao tay be Ueteamined by Uke deputy commisoivuess ALL
such penalties shall be paid to the deputy
commissioner for deposit in the special fund as
described in section 944 of this title, and if not
paid may be recovered in a civil action brought in
the appropriate United States district court. Any
employee so discriminated against shall be restored
to hie employment and shall be compensated by his
employer for any loss of wages arising out of such
discrimination: Provided, That if such employee
shall cease to be qualified to perform the duties of
his employment, he shall not be entitled to such
restoration and compensation. The employer alone and
not his carrier shall be liable for such penalties
and payments. Any provision in an insurance policy
undertaking to relieve the employer from the
liability for such penalties and payments shall be
void."

 

qn Fillinger, supe, Ue employee, who was wurkluy as a
“shipfitter" at a land-based operation and within the scope of
the LHWCA, was injured during the course of his employment.

Although eligible to do so, the employee did not seek benefits

26
1120099
under the LHWCA, choosing rather to seek state workers’
compensation benefits pursuant to the Act. The employee also
sued a co-employee pursuant to § 25-5-11(b), alleging that the
co-employee negligently provided him with an unreasonably
dangerous tool that resulted :n his being injured. The co-
employee raised § 933(i) of the LIWCA as a defense to the
negligence claim. Section 933(i) provides, in part:
"The right to compensation or benefits under this
chaple: sliall Le Lie eaclusive cemedy Lv an employee
when he is injured ... by the negligence or wrong of
any other person or persons in the same employ:
Provided, That this provision shall not affect the
liability of a person cther than an officer or
employee of the employer."
The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned @ verdict
in favor of the injured employee. The co-employee appealed
the judgment, arguing that co-employee suits brought in state
courts for damages are barred when the alleged injury falls

within the scope of the LHWCA. The injured employee contended

that in a "case of land-based maritime injury, concurrent

 

JULISULCLlon exLSLS beLuwen federal aud slate gemedies and

that the plaintiff is not barred by the LHWCA unless he elects

to pursue remedies under the LAWCA." Fillinger, 448 So. 2d at

323. This Court explained the parties’ argument as follows:

2
1120099

(The co-employee] s:rongly argues that, as a
matter of federal law, specifically 33 U.S.C. §
933(i), the [injured employee] was prevented from
maintaining a co employee damage suit. (The co
employee's] argument is based upon the proposition
that to allow a co-employee suit by a covered
maritime employee when the federal statute
specifically prohibits such suits would be to create
the ‘type of federal-state conflict in which, under
long established principles of federal pre-emption,
pre emption of atate law io sequized.*

 

"(The injured employee] contends that in a case
of a land-based maritime injury, concurrent
jurisdiction exists between federal and state
Tewedies. Ti fact, [tle injured eupluyee) contends
that the U.S. Supreme Court in Sun Ship{, Inc.
Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 71 (1980)], has held that the
LHWCA does not preclude concurrent —_ state
jurisdiction under a state workmen's compensation
act in a case involving a harbor worker injured on
land. [The injured employee] states that this was
the Sole issue in Sun Ship, supra, as is apparent
from the opinion, and that the issue was decided in
his favor. The Court, in Sun Ship, supra, opined:

 

 

 

The single question presented by
these consolidated cases is whether a State
may apply its workers’ compensation scheme
to land based injuries that fall within the
coverage of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), as
amended in 1972. 33 U.S.C. $$ 901-950. We
hold that it may.

 

"Sun Ship, supra, 447 U.3. at 716, 100 S. Ct. at
2434,

"(The co-employee] counters that ‘a distinction
should be observed between the pre-emption of
co-employee negligence actions for damages and the
aiea in which sume deyree Uf overlay between Ube

 

28
1120099

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
and the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act is
permitted."

"[The co-employee] argues that ‘a careful
reading of the Sun Ship decision indicates that the
only permissible concurrent jurisdiction between
federal and state compensation laws is concurrent
application of "compensation benefit" levels.' He
says ‘That is, "workers who commence their actions
under state law will generally be able to make up
the difference between state and federal benefit
levels."' (Emphasis in [original]).

[The co-employee] azgues:

"'The difference between benefit levels,
however, refers to the schedule of
compensation benefits, for example, for
injuries to limbs, disfigurement and ‘other
categories in which weekly or biweekly
benefit awards are made. This is something
wholly different from the eituation
presented here, involving an action for
damages, in which there is a clear conflict
between the federal statute prohibiting
co-employee damage suits and the state
common law of Alabame which allows it.

 

Pillinger, 440 So. 24 at 924 25.
In determining that the negligence claim was barred by
the exclusivity provision of the LHWCA, this Court stated:

"We are sensitive to the statement made in Sun
Ship, supra, that a state may apply its workers’
compensation scheme to land-based injuries that fall
within the coverage of the LHWCA, but we believe the
concurrent jurisdiction for pursuit of benefits
under a state's workmen's compensation scheme does

29
1120099

not include common law suits for damages against
co-employees.

We are of the opinion that the LIWCA and the
law of Alabama are in serious conflict as to the
maintenance of co-employee suits, and because that
is the case, we hold that federal law will pre-empt
state law. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 83S. Ct. 1210, 10 L. Ed. 2d 248
(1983); Howard v. Uniroval, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 490
(4.0, Ala. 1901)7 Ex parte Alabama Oxygen Con, Ines,
[433 So. 2d 1158 (Ala. 1983)]. If the ‘enforcement
of state law "presents a serious danger of conflict
with the administration of the federal program ...
the federal law must take precedence. Uniroyal,
suyia al 492. We can penelve nu greater conflict
than that which would be presented if we allowed
this employee to sue his co-employee because he was
a land-based maritime worker, and a maritime worker
injured on a navigable waterway would be precluded
from maintaining such a suit; therefore, we are
persuaded to hold that the exclusivity provisions of
39 U.S.C. § 393(1) apply and that the state action
was barred.”

 

Fillinger, 448 So. 2d at 326. See also Hill v. Knapp, 396 Md.
700, 914 A.2d 1193 (2007). Thus, this Court's analysis and
holding in Fillinger supposts the conclusion that in the
context of concurrent jurisdiction, i.e., the twilight zone of
coverage, a remedy provided for in a state workers’
compensation scheme would be preempted where that remedy is
expressly excluded by a provision of the LHWCA. See also Hill.

supra

30
1120099

Fillinger differs from this case in that Fillinger
involved a remedy provided for by the Act that was expressly
precluded by a provision of the LHWCA. Here, both the LiHWCA
and the Act prohibit retaliatory discharge and provide
remedies when a retaliatory discharge has occurred. The
distinction between the twe comes only in the remedies
available, not in an express prohibition of the cause of
action by the federal act. In the case of the LHWCA, an
employee is entitled to be restored to his employment and to
be compensated for lost wages. Additionally, the employer is
subject to a nominal penalty payable to a special fund
administered under the INCA. 99 U.9.C. 9 940(a). Undex the
‘Act, an employee may bring a retaliatory-discharge action and,
Af successful, may recover both compensatory and punitive
damages. Autozone, supra. We must determine whether this
discrepancy in the remedies available for an alleged
retaliatory discharge under the Act and under the LHWCA cause

Uke ACL Lo be preempled by Lie Limca.”

“rhis Court has stated:

‘Federal law may pre-empt state law in any of
three ways. First, in enacting the federal law,
Congrece may enplicitly define the extent to which
it intends to pre-empt state law. E.g., Shaw v.

3
1120099

A state law may be preenpted by federal law where the
state law is in actual conflict with the federal law. MPL
Acquisition, LLC v, Northcutt, 14 So. 3d 126 (Ala. 2009).

This “conflict preemption"

 

urs in two situations: (1)

"‘where compliance with both federal and state regulations is

Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1983).
Second, even in the absence of express pre-emptive
language, Congress may indicate an intent to occupy
an entire field of regulation, in which case the
States muct leave all regulatory activity in that
area to the Federal Government. E.g., Fidelity
Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Blevator
Corp., 331 U.s. 218, 230 (1947). Finally, if
Congress has not displaced state regulation
entirely, it may nonetheless pre-empt state law to
tho omtont that tho state law actually conflicte
with federal law. Such a conflict arises when
compliance with both state and federal law is
impossible, Florida Lime ¢ Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or when the
state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Fidelity Federal
Savings & Loan Assn., supra, 458 U.S., at 153.1"

 

 

MPI Acquisition, LLC v. Northeutt, 14 So. 3d 126, 128 (Ala.
2005) (quoting Michigan Cannero ¢ Precsero” Aso'n v.
Agricultural Marketing 4 Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469
(1984)). There is no express preemption clause in the LHWCA
regarding retaliatory-discharge claims. Further, the United
States Supreme Court has determined that the language of the
1972 amendments to the LHWCA express no intent on behalf of
Congress to preempt any state remedies regarding events
occurring within the "twilight sone" ef coverage. Sun hie,
supra.

32.
1120099

 

a physical impossibility fo: one engaged in interstate

 

commerce'"; or (2) "when, ‘under the circumstances of [al
particular case, [state] law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.'" Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589
(2009) (Justice Thomas concursing in the judgment) (quoting
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,

142-43 (1963), and Hines

 

Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)). We deal here with the second situation.

The Suprene Court has explained the purpose and intent of
the 1972 amendments, which brought land-based maritime
Anjuies within the fold of the LIMCA, as follows:

"As the Reports make clear, the disparities
which Congress had in view in amending the LHWCA lay
primarily in the paucity of relief under state
compensation laws. The thrust of the amendments was
to ‘upgrade the benefits.’ S. Rep. No. 92-1125,
supra, at 1 [(1972)]; see Northeast Marine Terminal
Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 261-262 (1977).
Concurrent jurisdiction for state and federal
compensation laws is in no way inconsistent with
this policy of raising awards to a federal minimum.
When laburezs Clie clalus unde: Lie LIWCA, Uiey ae
compensated under federal standards. And workers who
commence their actions under state law will
generally be able to make up the difference between
state and federal benefit levels by seeking relief
under the [LHWCA] if the latter applies.

33
1120099

To be sure, if state remedial schemes are more
generous than federal law, concurrent jurisdiction
could result in more favorable awards for workers’
injuries than under an exclusively federal
compensation system. But we find no evidence that
Congress was concerned about a disparity between
adequate federal benefits and superior state
benefits. Rather, it seers that the quid pro quo to
the employers for the landward extension of the
LHWCA by the 1972 amendments was simply abolition of
the longshoremen's unscawerthiness remedy. cee C.
Rep. No. 92-1125, supra, at 4-5; H.R. Rep. No.
92-1141, supra, at 1 [(1972)], U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1972, at 4698; Northeast Marine Terminal
Co. v. Caputo, supra, at 261-262. Indeed, it is
hoteworthy Ulal in Ulwiz discussiun of advantages Lo
employers under the 1972 amendments, the bill
Reports dwell upon the rejection of the
unseaworthiness action, and do not _ mention
pre-emption of state remedies. See $. Rep. No.
92-1125, supra, at 4-5; H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441,

supra, at 1, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, at
4090."

 

Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 723-25. The Supreme Court has stated
that "the 1972 extension of federal jurisdiction [to include
land-based maritime injuries) supplements, rather than
supplants, state compensation law" and that the "language of

the 1972 amendments cannot be fairly understood as pre-empting

slale workers’ remedies Crom Ue Cleld of Lie LANA

 

dds at
720.
Unlike the situation in Fillinger where the LHWCA

expressly precluded co-employee negligence actions while the

34
1120099
Act permitted them, both the LHWCA and the Act prohibit a
retaliatory discharge when an employee has sought benefits
under the respective acts. Although an aggrieved employee may
recover different damages under the respective acts, we cannot
say that § 25-5-11.1 “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and exceution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress," MPI Acquisition, 14 So. 3d at 128, in
expanding the LHWCA to include land-based maritime injuries as
explained by the Supreme Court in Sun Ship. See also Wallace,
supra (holding that a retaliatory-discharge claim brought
pursuant to Texas workers' compensation act, for which
compensatory and punitive damages were recoverable, did not
conflict with the LHWCA and was not preempted). Based on the
foregoing, we conclude that Rodriguez-Flores's retaliatory-
discharge claim brought pursuant to § 25-5-11.1 did not
conflict with the LHWCA and, therefore, was not preempted by
the LHWCA. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing
Ute telallatuzy-Wischarye Clalm.
Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is affirmed insofar as it

dismisses the fraud claim. The trial court's judgment is

35
1120099

reversed insofar as it dismissed the retaliatory-discharge
claim, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and
Bryan, J9., concur.

Murdock, J., concurs in the result.

36
1120099
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).

I concur in the result. I do so because of questions I
have with respect to certain federal and state precedents upon
which the main opinion relies. Fernando Rodriguez-Flores
makes no challenge in the present case, however, to the
applicability or validity of those precedents. Mercover, with
respect to Rodriguez-Flores's fraud claim under state law,
Rodriguez-Flores does not argue that this claim is not
preempted by the LHWCA and the applicability of the "very
narrow" exception to the exclusivity rule recognized by sone

federal courts with respect to intentional acts by employers.

7