Title: State v. Hill

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 94,589 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
NATHANIEL L. HILL, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
When a criminal defendant requests a lesser included offense instruction, a trial 
judge is required to give it when there is some evidence that would reasonably justify a 
conviction of the lesser included crime. On the record in this case, the district judge did 
not err in refusing to give a heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter instruction because 
there was no evidence that the defendant intentionally shot the victim because of 
provocation.    
 
2. 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of 
peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors on the basis of race. The third step in the 
three-step analysis of a peremptory strike under Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. 
Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), requires a district judge to determine whether a 
criminal defendant has carried his or her burden of proving purposeful discrimination by 
the State. If a prosecutor's explanation is implausible or fantastic, it may be a pretext for 
purposeful discrimination. On the record in this case, the district judge did not abuse his 
discretion in ruling against defendant on his Batson challenge to the prosecution's 
peremptory strike of an African-American juror.  
 
2 
 
3.  
 
In admitting a photograph into evidence, the court first considers relevance. When 
a party argues on appeal that an admitted photograph was overly repetitious, gruesome, 
or inflammatory, that is to say, prejudicial, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. 
The photograph of the victim's brain admitted in this case was relevant, and its probative 
value outweighed its potential for prejudice. The district judge did not abuse his 
discretion in admitting it. 
 
4.  
 
Authentication of a writing is controlled by K.S.A. 60-464. It does not necessarily 
require direct evidence that a witness recognizes the handwriting in the document. 
Adequate circumstantial evidence supported authentication of the handwritten note 
admitted in this case, and the district judge did not abuse his discretion. 
 
5. 
 
Although presented with conflicting evidence, the district judge did not abuse his 
discretion in ruling that the defendant in this case was competent to stand trial.  
 
Appeal from Montgomery County District Court; RAWLEY J. (JUDD) DENT, II, judge. Opinion 
filed April 15, 2010.  Affirmed.   
 
Reid T. Nelson, of Capital and Conflicts Appeals Office, argued the cause, was on the brief for 
appellant.  
 
Kristafer R. Ailslieger, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Steve Six, attorney 
general, was with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
3 
 
BEIER, J.: Nathaniel L. Hill stands convicted of capital murder, possession of 
marijuana with intent to sell, possession of drug paraphernalia, and failure to purchase a 
drug tax stamp. This is his direct appeal from these convictions. 
 
Hill raises five issues: (1) Whether his jury should have been instructed on heat-
of-passion voluntary manslaughter; (2) whether the prosecution advanced sufficient 
reasons for its peremptory strike of an African-American venire member; (3) whether a 
certain photograph should have been admitted into evidence; (4) whether adequate 
foundation was laid for admission of an incriminating note purportedly written by Hill; 
and (5) whether the district judge erred in handling the issue of Hill's competence to stand 
trial. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Police found the bodies of April Milholland and her boyfriend, Sam Yanofsky, 
dead inside a car that had collided with a tree in Independence, Kansas. Milholland's 
body, wrapped in a black plastic trash bag, was in the backseat of the car. Yanofsky's 
body, covered with a bedspread, was in the car's trunk.  
 
The investigation of the murders quickly led to defendant Nathaniel Hill, an 
Independence drug dealer who supplied Yanofsky with drugs, which Yanofsky then 
resold. Independence Police Department Detective Harry Smith interviewed Hill. Hill 
admitted that he knew Yanofsky and Milholland, that he had last spoken to them on the 
phone the previous evening, and that Yanofsky owed him $2,000 for marijuana. Hill 
denied any involvement in the murders and suggested to police that Yanofsky's half-
brother, Nate Castorena, might have been responsible.  
 
The next day, police approached Hill outside of Jose Castorena's house. Hill got 
out of his car and allowed the officers to search it. During the search, officers found a 
4 
 
block of marijuana, a set of scales, and a pipe. Police arrested Hill, and Smith again 
interviewed him about the murders. Hill again denied involvement and again suggested 
Nate Castorena as the likely murderer.  
 
After obtaining additional information from Hill's girlfriend, Collette Dunn, Smith 
interviewed Hill a third time, 2 days after Hill's arrest. In this interview, Hill gave several 
versions of what had happened the night Milholland and Yanofsky were killed. 
 
In the first version, Hill blamed the murders on the "Mexican Mafia," claiming its 
members had fronted him $2,000 worth of marijuana he had, in turn, fronted to 
Yanofsky. Hill claimed Mexican Mafia members shot Yanofsky and Milholland while 
holding Hill at gunpoint and then carried the bodies out to the car in which they were 
found, Milholland in the back seat and Yanofsky in the trunk. One of the Mexican Mafia 
members then drove the car into a tree while Hill rode in a vehicle that followed. Hill told 
Smith that the Mexican Mafia members then dropped him off at a church and told him to 
run.  
 
Smith challenged this first version of events and pressed Hill for the truth. Hill 
then offered his second version. 
 
In the second version, Hill called Milholland and asked her and Yanofsky for his 
money. Yanofsky told Hill that he had the money and agreed to bring it to Sylvester 
Jones' house. When Yanofsky later showed up at Jones' house without the money, Hill 
became angry. Hill and Yanofsky started wrestling, and Jones shot Yanofsky. Jones then 
took Milholland to a back bedroom and shot her while Hill was cleaning up Yanofsky's 
blood. Hill said he and Jones then carried the bodies out to the car. Jones drove the car 
and jumped out of it as it headed for the tree.  
 
Hill then told a third version of his story. 
5 
 
In the third version, Hill shot Yanofsky accidently as he and Yanofsky wrestled on 
the bathroom floor. Yanofsky and Milholland had gotten drunk and "coked out" after 
arriving at Jones' house. Yanofsky rushed Hill in a drunken, jealous rage, after 
Milholland said "some stupid shit." Because Yanofsky was strangling Hill, Jones slid a 
gun to Hill. Hill picked up the gun and it accidently went off when Yanofsky hit Hill's 
hand.  
 
Detective Smith interviewed Jones the day after the third interview of Hill. Jones 
described himself and Hill as life-long friends. In exchange for Hill providing Jones with 
free marijuana, Jones allowed Hill to store his drugs and gun at Jones' house. Hill and 
Jones had been hanging out together most of the night of the murders. They were 
smoking marijuana and Jones was drinking. Hill left Jones' home about 3 a.m. and Jones 
went to bed. He awoke later when he heard Hill in his house, talking to someone. Hill 
then came into his bedroom, got something off of the nightstand, and told him to go back 
to sleep. The nightstand was where Hill kept his gun and marijuana. A few minutes later, 
Jones heard a gunshot. He then heard Milholland running through the house and 
screaming, "Why did you do that?"  Jones then heard Hill say, "Strip." Five to ten 
minutes later, Jones heard a second gunshot.  
 
Jones said that Hill then came into his bedroom and told him to help clean up the 
mess from the shootings. Hill still had the gun in his hand. Jones walked out into the 
hallway and saw Yanofsky in the bathroom, his head over the tub. Yanofsky was making 
a snoring sound.  
 
Hill told Jones to get some trash bags and put one over Yanofsky's head, which 
Jones did. Hill told Jones to pull Yanofsky out of the bathroom. Jones refused to touch 
Yanofsky. Hill pulled Yanofsky onto a blanket, telling Jones that, if he did not help, Hill 
would leave Yanofsky at the house and Jones would end up being blamed for the crime. 
At Hill's direction, Jones helped Hill pick up Yanofsky, carry him to the car, and put him 
6 
 
into the trunk. Yanofsky was making noises as they put him into the trunk. Hill then 
closed the trunk lid.  
 
Hill and Jones then went back into the house, specifically the back bedroom. 
There Jones saw Milholland lying on the floor. Hill put a trash bag over Milholland and 
rolled her body onto a comforter he had gotten from the laundry room. He and Jones then 
carried Milholland to the car. Hill got into the backseat and pulled Milholland in after 
him.  
 
Hill and Jones then went back into the house and cleaned. At about 6 a.m., Hill 
drove away in the car. Jones continued cleaning. He moved his bed into the back 
bedroom and placed it over a stain on the carpet. Jones put the towels used to clean into a 
broken dryer in the laundry room. He also hid a set of digital scales that had been in the 
bathroom inside the dryer. He put Hill's gun and Hill's marijuana in a hallway closet.  
 
Jones later used a box cutter Hill brought over to cut the stained piece out of carpet 
in the back bedroom. He also hid the stained piece of carpet in the dryer.  
 
In a later search of Jones' house, officers found a bag of marijuana and a .45 
caliber handgun in a hallway closet. In the back bedroom, officers found box springs on 
the floor, under which a piece of carpet had been cut out. There were bloodstains on the 
underside of the box springs. Later DNA testing showed the bloodstains to match 
Milholland's profile. In the bathroom, blood found on a door frame and door was later 
determined to match Yanofsky's DNA profile.  
  
In the broken dryer in the laundry room, officers found plastic bags containing the 
bloody carpet that had been cut out of the back bedroom, bloody carpet padding, items of 
clothing, scales, and a rug.  
 
7 
 
In the back bedroom, officers found a bullet that had lodged under the carpet. A 
bullet hole was found in the bathroom shower stall. Officers tracked the path of the bullet 
through and then outside of the house, and found the bullet in the backyard. Later testing 
showed that both bullets, as well as a shell casing found in the bathroom, came from the 
.45 caliber handgun found in the closet.  
 
A KBI fingerprint examiner found both Hill's and Jones' fingerprints on the black 
trash bag that was around Milholland's legs. Hill's palm print was found on Milholland's 
car door.  
 
Dr. Erik Mitchell performed autopsies on the two bodies and concluded that 
Milholland and Yanofsky each died from a gunshot wound to the head. Mitchell also 
concluded that Milholland died instantly from her injury; Yanofsky, on the other hand, 
was alive for a period of time after he was shot.  
 
A sexual assault examination of Milholland's body performed during autopsy 
showed no traces of Hill's DNA.  
 
Smith interviewed Hill a fourth time after he had interviewed Jones. When Smith 
told Hill that he believed he had killed both Milholland and Yanofsky, Hill did not deny 
it. When the detective told Hill that he was not a bad person and that people make 
mistakes, Hill replied, "How can I not be a bad person for what I've done?"  
 
While Hill was being held pretrial in the county jail, he described details of the 
murders to his cellmate, Donvil Hodges.  
 
According to Hodges, Hill said that he wanted to shoot Milholland and Yanofsky 
because they owed him money for marijuana. Hill said that he called the pair and asked 
them to come to Jones' house. When they arrived, Hill told them to go into the bathroom 
8 
 
and weigh marijuana and said he would be right back. Jones was asleep in his bedroom at 
the time. Hill got a gun from the living room, went into the bathroom, and shot Yanofsky 
in the side of the head. Milholland began screaming and asking if Hill was going to shoot 
her too. Hill had her take off all of her clothes and go to the back bedroom while he 
cleaned the bathroom. Hill told Hodges that he had Milholland strip so that she would not 
try to run away.  
 
According to Hodges, Hill also said that he positioned Yanofsky's body over the 
bathtub so that Yanofsky's blood would drain into the tub. As Hill was cleaning, he heard 
Milholland trying to get out of a window, so he went into the back bedroom. Hill told 
Hodges that he had sex with Milholland and then shot her in the back of the head. After 
Hill shot Milholland, Jones came out of his bedroom. Hill told Jones to clean the back 
bedroom while he cleaned the bathroom. Hill and Jones then wrapped the bodies in 
blankets and carried them out to the car. Hill said he was going to burn the car with the 
bodies inside it, but the car was running out of gas, so he jumped out of it while it was 
still moving.  
 
Hill was charged with one count of capital murder, one count of first-degree 
premeditated murder, and one count of rape.  
 
The capital murder count was charged in the alternative: as the intentional and 
premeditated killing of Milholland and Yanofsky in part of the same act or transaction 
per K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) and as the intentional and premeditated killing of Milholland 
during the commission of or subsequent to the crime of rape per K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(4). 
The first-degree murder charge was based on the murder of Yanofksy.  
 
In a separate case, Hill was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to 
sell, possession of drug paraphernalia, and failure to purchase a tax stamp. Those charges 
were consolidated with the murder charges for trial.  
9 
 
The State charged Jones with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and 
one count of rape but dropped the rape charge at preliminary hearing. Jones eventually 
pleaded guilty to reduced charges of voluntary manslaughter and aiding a felon and 
agreed to testify against Hill.  
 
At Jones' plea hearing, the prosecutor stated that it based the aiding a felon charge 
on the determination that Jones' only involvement in the murder of Milholland was in 
helping to dispose of the bodies and cleaning up the scene. The State reduced the 
Yanofsky murder charge to voluntary manslaughter because the evidence showed 
Yanofsky may still have been alive when Jones carried him to the car and, the State 
contended, Jones assisted Hill because of the mistaken but sincerely held belief that his 
life would be in danger if he did not.  
 
The question of Hill's competency to stand trial was raised first by his lawyers, 
who noted Hill's suspicion of them. They hired Dr. George Athey, a clinical and 
neuropsychologist, to examine Hill in October 2003. Athey reported that Hill understood 
the legal process and that his reasoning abilities were not impaired, but he was 
significantly hampered in his relationship with his attorneys. Specifically, Hill believed 
his attorneys were hiding information from him, lying to him, brainwashing him, and 
threatening him. Athey concluded that Hill was incompetent to assist his attorneys in his 
defense.  
 
The defense filed a motion to determine competency. The district judge sent Hill 
to Larned State Security Hospital (Larned) for a competency evaluation.  
 
Larned held Hill for 51 days for observation and evaluation. At the conclusion of 
the evaluation, the Larned treatment team issued a report that concluded Hill did not 
suffer from any measurable psychopathology and was competent to stand trial. The 
team's report stated: 
10 
 
 
"The [Forensic Evaluation Unit] Treatment Team, after considering all available 
information, is of the opinion that Nathaniel Lee Hill is capable of appropriately 
conducting himself in all aspects of the current legal proceedings. Mr. Hill is 
disappointed in the performance of his attorney. However, his disappointment does not 
appear to be a sufficient obstacle that would prevent him from working successfully with 
his attorney. Mr. Hill stated he feels 'powerless' to do anything in regard to his attorney's 
handling of his case. However, his 'powerlessness' appears to be a feature of Mr. Hill's 
character style rather than a specific inability to work with his attorney. Mr. Hill 
understands his legal charge and its possible legal ramifications. If he so chooses, he 
appears fully capable of rationally evaluating the evidence against him, discussing legal 
strategy with his attorneys or participating and cooperating in assisting his attorney with 
his defense. Therefore, it is the opinion of the treatment team that Nathaniel Lee Hill 
meets the criteria for competency to stand trial as defined by Kansas statutes."  
 
The court then held a competency hearing. The defense presented two experts: 
Athey and Dr. William S. Logan, a psychiatrist.  
 
Athey testified that he spent 12 hours with Hill. He concluded that Hill was 
exhibiting significant paranoia and thinking disturbances, indicating he suffered from a 
psychotic illness, most likely delusional disorder and possibly schizophrenia. Athey 
questioned the findings of the Larned team report, contending that the team overlooked 
the elevated paranoia scale on one of the tests, failed to get information from Hill's 
attorneys, and did not use the same protocol Athey had used for assessing competency. 
Responding to a question about medication, Athey testified that he was not a psychiatrist 
but that he believed antipsychotics "would be mandatory" to give Hill a chance to work 
effectively with his attorneys. Athey testified that, in his opinion, Hill was incompetent to 
assist in his own defense because of mental illness, paranoid delusional disorder, and 
possible schizophrenia.  
 
11 
 
On cross-examination, Athey acknowledged that he had not asked Hill specifically 
about his conversations with his attorneys, about whether his attorneys had recommended 
a plea bargain, or about how Hill felt regarding suggestions he should accept a plea 
bargain. Athey also admitted that, if Hill's attorneys were recommending a guilty plea 
and Hill did not want to plead guilty, the disagreement could affect Hill's trust in them, 
but not to the degree he had observed. 
 
Logan had interviewed Hill for approximately 4 hours a few weeks after Hill's 
arrest. At that time, Hill reported auditory hallucinations of God and Lucifer speaking to 
him, which began in late childhood and increased with drug abuse and stress. The voices 
sometime told him to hurt himself or others. He also noted that Hill had exhibited some 
paranoia concerning circumstances at the jail.  
 
The defense team had asked Logan to reexamine Hill at a later time, expressing 
concern about Hill's mood swings, his disagreement with a plea offer, and his suspicion 
of his attorneys. Hill refused to be reexamined. Thus, when Logan was asked at the 
hearing if he was able to provide a current opinion about Hill's competency, he said he 
had no way of knowing if it was still an issue. He did say, however, that Athey's findings 
about Hill's paranoia, coupled with his own interview results, led him to believe that Hill 
was not competent to assist his lawyers in his defense. Were he Hill's prescribing 
psychiatrist, he would have recommended a very low dose of antipsychotic medication. 
 
Logan also criticized the Larned report, contending that the team should have 
obtained information from Hill's attorneys about the types of problems they were having 
with him, that it failed to mention Hill's elevated paranoia score on the personality 
assessment, and that it failed to administer a test designed to determine competency. 
Logan conceded, however, that it was clinically acceptable to assess a patient through an 
interview. 
  
12 
 
Dr. Patrick L. Pomfrey, a psychologist on the Larned treatment team, testified for 
the State. He explained that Larned determines competency by going over a 30- to 45-
question report similar to the protocol used by Athey, which is designed to determine the 
same sorts of things, i.e., the nature of a defendant's relationship with his or her attorney 
and the defendant's understanding of the charges and court proceedings. Pomfrey testified 
that Hill's paranoia score on the personality assessment was only mildly to moderately 
elevated, not high enough to qualify him for a delusional disorder. He also observed that 
it resulted from Hill's response to a single statement: "I [am] the target of a conspiracy." 
Hill answered: "most of the time." Pomfrey also testified that, during the 51 days the 
team observed and assessed Hill, he observed nothing that would have led him to believe 
Hill was suffering from paranoia.  
 
Pomfrey further testified that the team talked to Hill about his relationship, or lack 
of relationship, with his attorneys. He conceded that what Hill described concerning that 
relationship could be viewed as paranoia, depending on how one viewed Hill's story. 
Pomfrey also testified that it was not unusual for defendants charged with serious crimes 
to believe there may be a conspiracy and feel paranoid; in fact, the absence of such 
feelings would be unusual. "[H]undreds of patients come through our unit every year, and 
the most pervasive complaint among all the patients . . . is their relationship with their 
attorneys," he said.  
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district judge ruled that the defense had not 
met its burden to prove Hill incompetent to stand trial. The judge said:  
 
"I'm inclined to believe that, even based upon the defense's experts in this case, that there 
is a preponderance of the evidence to believe that he is competent to stand trial. 
 
 
. . . .  
 
13 
 
 
". . . [B]oth sides brought up important points. I think that there's a question 
there. There will probably always be a question there, but we're not talking about 
reasonable doubt here. . . . [I]t just appears to me that his—his inability to relate and to 
participate with his defense does seem to be more of a refusal or—I'm not saying that he 
has some scheme in mind, but in light of the fact that his mental disorder only seems to 
be directed towards his attorneys, it makes you wonder whether there's something more 
to that, but, as I said, I'm more inclined to agree with the State.  
 
 
"As I said, the burden isn't reasonable doubt, and I would think that the State has 
met their burden insofar as that matter is concerned, or that the defense has not met their 
burden in proving that Nathaniel was incompetent."  
 
The judge noted the evidence suggesting that Hill might benefit from 
antipsychotic medications. Accordingly, in an effort to "go the extra mile" to make sure 
that there would be no competency issue, the judge ordered that Hill be medicated and 
deferred determination of competency until after the effect of the medication could be 
evaluated.  
 
In September 2004, Dr. V.J. Reddy, a psychiatrist with Four County Mental 
Health Center, evaluated Hill for medication. After considering the reported 
disagreements with defense counsel and Hill's statement that he wanted to go to trial to 
have the chance of being found not guilty, Dr. Reddy noted that Hill exhibited some 
distorted logic based on "circumscribed feelings of distress and paranoia with the 
attorneys and their recommendations." Reddy diagnosed Hill with Delusional Disorder 
and Anti-Social Personality Disorder and prescribed Risperdal. 
 
When Hill's competency came back before the court the following month, defense 
counsel requested a delay so that the medication prescribed by Reddy could have more 
time to take effect. The judge agreed to continue the matter but told defense counsel that 
he had "about closed the door on this competency issue" because of a note he received 
from Hill. The court read the note into the record: 
14 
 
 
"'I'm writing to you so you can have a clearer picture in this competence [sic] area that 
we are still stuck at. Your Honor, I'm not paranoid of my lawyers. I just didn't want to 
work along with them at the time. Then my lawyer Mark switched to a new woman 
lawyer, no offense, right in the middle of this case. That just didn't make me feel too 
comfortable after that, and I can understand that. Judge Dent, I really don't need this 
medication they are giving me. I . . . can understand that. All that it is doing is giving me 
high blood pressure and high cholesterol problems. I am not incompetent to stand trial. I 
know that you, as a Judge, is [sic] supposed to keep order in the courtroom. The DA is 
supposed to try to convict me of the crime. My lawyers is [sic] supposed to defend me 
from being convicted of the crime, and the jury is to listen to both sides of the story, then 
choose if I'm guilty or not guilty, so I believe I am competent to stand trial, Your Honor."  
 
Defense counsel filed a memorandum in support of Hill's motion to determine 
competency, attaching affidavits setting out the problems they had experienced in 
working with Hill. The affidavits said that Hill displayed smug contempt toward them; 
that his thought processes were disorganized and irrational; that he continued to be very 
suspicious of his defense team; that he would not engage in discussions about his 
defense, evidence in the case, a plea offer, an offer of bench trial, or possible punishment; 
that he would not answer questions about the case and had refused to provide other 
information, despite repeated requests; that he used bizarre religious excuses to avoid 
discussing the case; that he did not appear to understand their role in the process; that he 
did not appear to understand the gravity of the situation and did not comprehend the 
evidence against him; and that there had been no improvement in his behavior.  
 
The district judge held another competency hearing. Neither party presented 
further evidence.  
 
In argument, defense counsel pointed out that neither Athey nor Logan was able to 
reevaluate Hill because Hill refused to permit them to do so. Defense counsel also noted 
that Reddy had, within the past week, increased Hill's medication dosage. Moreover, the  
15 
 
note Hill had written to the judge should be evidence of Hill's refusal to cooperate rather 
than competency; the judge had previously admonished Hill not to write directly to the 
court.  
 
The State argued that the only area in which Hill had a problem was cooperation 
with counsel, which indicated a voluntary choice rather than lack of competency.  
  
The court ruled that Hill was competent to stand trial, specifically noting that there 
was a difference between not being able to participate in a defense and choosing not to do 
so.  
 
The following January, defense counsel filed a new competency motion. A 
different defense expert, Dr. Peter Graham, a clinical psychologist, had recently 
evaluated Hill and determined that he was incompetent to stand trial. In addition, defense 
counsel noted they were still unable to work effectively with Hill, because he continued 
to refuse to listen to legal advice or discuss possible affirmative defenses, cross-
examination topics, plea agreements, and the possibility of bench trial.  
 
Another competency hearing followed. Richard Burr, an experienced capital 
defense attorney, and Graham, testified for the defense.  
 
According to Graham, Hill suffered from delusional thought processes, including a 
belief that certain Bible verses referred to what was destined to happen in his trial. Hill 
had claimed to see pages of the Bible turn by themselves and open to particular verses. 
Based on those verses, he believed that the charges against him would be dropped when 
he got into the courtroom. Graham testified that these delusions had affected Hill's ability 
to appreciate the role of his attorneys and had interfered with the type of interaction 
necessary to prepare a defense.  
 
16 
 
On cross-examination, Graham testified that Hill understood the charges against 
him and was capable of making choices. Further, he acknowledged that Hill had made a 
choice to rely on the Bible and his faith, rather than on his attorneys.  
 
Burr had met with Hill for 2 1/2 hours and had reviewed all of the reports and 
evaluations, as well as summaries of problems the defense team had experienced with 
Hill. Burr testified that he had grave concerns about Hill's ability to assist in his defense, 
specifically including Hill's persistent refusal to discuss the evidence; his belief that the 
evidence against him was insubstantial; his refusal to consider plausible defense theories; 
his chronic distrust; his refusal to provide relevant information; his report of a 
hallucination that ants were crawling all over him; and his belief that the case would be 
dismissed because his name appeared on the complaint in capital letters. 
 
On cross-examination, Burr testified that, when he asked Hill what his defense 
should be, Hill said he was not involved in the crimes and was not at the scene when they 
occurred. Burr asked Hill if he had given his attorneys the identity of the person he was 
with at the time of the murders; Hill said he had not. Burr tried to get Hill to tell him 
more so that he could pass the information on to Hill's lawyers; Hill refused.  
 
The district judge denied the new competency motion, observing that it was not 
necessarily delusional for a person of faith to believe the Bible referred to him or her 
specifically. The judge also stated that Hill appeared to be making voluntary choices 
about the defenses that would be developed and presented.   
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court asked Hill about his medication, which 
Hill had refused to take. Hill said the medication gave him bad headaches and made him 
sleepy. He also said that he did not think the medicine had any effect on his relationship 
with his attorneys. Rather, he "just didn't agree with what they wanted, a plea bargain or 
17 
 
nothing like that." Hill told the judge that he wanted to go to trial and that he was not 
going to take the medication any longer.  
 
The judge also asked Hill about his refusal to consider asserting affirmative 
defenses. Hill responded:  
 
 
"All the defenses that they have that I refused is still going to prove me guilty, no 
matter what. They're still saying I done it or I was on drugs when I done it. I'm still going 
to be proved guilty of something. There's no way for me to be proved not guilty, not 
guilty at all, so the one I picked is giving both sides."  
 
The judge asked Hill if he understood that such a choice was against the better 
judgment of his attorneys. Hill affirmed that he did understand and that he had 
nevertheless made his decision.  
 
During voir dire, Hill challenged the State's attempt to use peremptory strikes to 
remove the panel's only three African-American members, invoking Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986) (Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits use of peremptory 
challenges to strike jurors on basis of race). Hill is African-American.  
 
Applying the first step of the three-step Batson analysis, the district judge ruled 
that Hill had made a prima facie showing that the strikes were race-based. Accordingly, 
the judge ordered the State to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strikes.  
 
The judge accepted the State's explanation as to one juror and rejected it as to a 
second. Those strikes are not at issue on this appeal.  
 
With respect to the third strike of prospective juror S.B., the prosecutor offered 
two explanations: (1) S.B. stated during voir dire that she would not listen to or believe 
18 
 
the testimony of a codefendant who was testifying under a plea agreement; and (2) S.B. 
had stated in response to her jury questionnaire that she was personally, morally, and 
religiously opposed to the death penalty and would never vote to impose it regardless of 
the circumstances of the case. The prosecutor was concerned that S.B.'s opposition to the 
death penalty might prompt her to vote against conviction for capital murder, even 
though, in this particular case, this jury would not be considering the death penalty. The 
district judge accepted the State's explanations and permitted removal of S.B. from the 
panel. 
 
At trial, defense counsel lodged a continuing objection to the competency 
determination. 
 
Also at trial, Jones testified about a handwritten note he had received from Hill 
while they were both in jail. Jones testified that his brother, who also was in jail at the 
time, got the note from Hill and delivered it to Jones. The note was not signed by Hill. 
The pertinent exchange between the prosecutor and Hill on the origin of the note reads: 
 
"Q.  
[PROSECUTOR] Did you recognize the note as being from the Defendant? 
 
"A. 
[JONES] It sounded like stuff he would have said in it. 
 
"Q: 
I'm sorry? 
 
"A. 
It sounded like he wrote it, or whatever. 
 
"Q. 
It sounded like words the Defendant would say and use? 
 
"A. 
Yeah.  
 
. . . . 
 
19 
 
"Q. 
And having been best friends with the Defendant for quite a number of years, are 
you convinced [the note] is from the Defendant? 
 
 
. . . . 
 
"A. 
Yeah."  
 
The note stated: 
 
"Sly, I got you out this shit. But the drugs I can't. I'm going to do a statement with Harry 
Smith. ['I did' is written to the side with an arrow to that sentence]. And tell them I done it 
all and you was sleep when it went down! I'll tell them I put the bag in your house, with 
out you knowing. (Scott Free you). 
 
"P.S. When you walk. Remember I was there for you. I know you understand. I was 
never late. I'm glad I seen your face one more time. 
 
"P.S.S. Ball harder then your brother. If you still have that money give to my mom!! 
Watch out for my two kids Sly please in money, clothes shit like that 
 
"Lil Bro 
"Much Real Love 
"I was heated man they didn't have none of my $2,000 
"gave them 
"2 ps 
"1 QP 
"They played me Sorry it was at momma home [crying face] 
"Nigga Don't Forget About My Games My Mother House Please Take!! [smiley face]."  
 
The defense objected to admission of the note, arguing that the State had failed to 
establish sufficient foundation because Jones did not testify that he was familiar with 
Hill's handwriting. The district judge overruled the objection.  
 
20 
 
Hill also objected to admission of an autopsy photograph of Yanofsky's brain with 
a rod through it, which showed the trajectory of the bullet. The district judge overruled 
the objection. Coroner Mitchell used the photograph during his testimony to illustrate that 
the bullet passed through portions of the brain controlling emotions and voluntary activity 
and, thus, did not result in immediate death. Other photographs showed blood spatter on 
the body that, Mitchell testified, was caused by Yanofsky when he coughed blood out of 
his airway. Mitchell depended upon the brain photograph and the blood spatter 
photographs to demonstrate that Yanofsky remained alive for a period of time after he 
was shot.  
 
At the conclusion of the State's case, defense counsel informed the district judge 
that Hill would not be presenting any evidence. However, the defense proffered evidence 
of voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity, defenses that would have been 
asserted if Hill had been competent to stand trial. After the proffer, the judge asked Hill if 
he understood that the voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity defenses were not 
being presented and whether it was his conscious decision not to raise them. Hill said that 
he understood and that it was his decision. 
 
The instructions given to Hill's jury included an instruction on first-degree 
premeditated murder of Yanofsky and on second-degree murder as a lesser-included 
offense of first-degree murder. The defense requested an instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter as another lesser-included offense of first-degree murder, arguing that 
testimony about a fight between Hill and Yanofsky was sufficient to show heat of 
passion. The judge refused to give the voluntary manslaughter instruction.  
 
The jury found Hill guilty of capital murder, first-degree murder, possession of 
marijuana with intent to sell, possession of drug paraphernalia, and failure to purchase a 
tax stamp. The jury acquitted Hill of rape.  
 
21 
 
At Hill's sentencing hearing on April 4, 2005, the district judge deferred decision 
on the capital murder conviction, pending a final decision in Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 
163, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006), concerning the constitutionality of the 
Kansas death penalty. On the remaining convictions, the judge sentenced Hill to a hard 
50 on the first-degree murder, 22 months on the possession of marijuana with intent to 
sell, and 6 months on the tax stamp offense, all consecutive. The judge also sentenced 
Hill to a concurrent 12 months in the county jail for misdemeanor possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  
 
Hill's appeal on the noncapital convictions and his sentencing on the capital 
conviction were stayed pending Marsh. After the United States Supreme Court issued its 
Marsh decision upholding the death penalty in June 2006, the district judge set the 
penalty phase of Hill's capital proceeding to begin the following January. That 
proceeding was rescheduled several times while the issue of Hill's competency was, 
again, addressed.  
 
Finally, in August 2008, the district judge granted a State motion to withdraw its 
notice of intent to seek the death penalty and to vacate the sentence on the first-degree 
murder conviction, based on this court's decision in State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, 183 P.3d 
801 (2008). Two months later, the district judge sentenced Hill to life without the 
possibility of parole on the capital conviction. He ordered the sentence to run consecutive 
with the other remaining sentences.  
 
Voluntary Manslaughter Instruction 
 
The first issue before us is whether the district court erred in rejecting the defense 
request for a lesser included instruction on heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter.  
 
22 
 
When the defendant requests a lesser included offense instruction, a trial judge is 
required to give it "'where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a 
conviction'" of the lesser included crime. See State v. Houston, 289 Kan. 252, 273, 213 
P.3d 728 (2009) (quoting K.S.A. 22-3414[3] and State v. White, 284 Kan. 333, 347, 161 
P.3d 208 [2007]). "'"An instruction on a lesser included offense is not required if the jury 
could not reasonably convict the defendant of the lesser included offense based on the 
evidence presented."'" Houston, 289 Kan. at 274 (quoting White, 284 Kan. at 347). In 
determining whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction, the 
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. Houston, 289 Kan. 
252, Syl. ¶ 12.  
 
Voluntary manslaughter is "the intentional killing of a human being committed . . . 
[u]pon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion." K.S.A. 21-3403(a). Heat of passion is 
defined as "'any intense or vehement emotional excitement which was spontaneously 
provoked from circumstances. Such emotional state of mind must be of such degree as 
would cause an ordinary person to act on impulse without reflection.'" State v. Robertson, 
279 Kan. 291, 305, 109 P.3d 1174 (2005) (quoting PIK Crim.3d 56.04[e]).  
 
To be entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on an act in the 
heat of passion, Hill's "'emotional state of mind must exist at the time of the act and it 
must have arisen from circumstances constituting sufficient provocation.'" State v. 
Vasquez, 287 Kan. 40, 55, 194 P.3d 563 (2008) (quoting State v. Guebara, 236 Kan. 791, 
796-97, 696 P.2d 381 [1985]). Legally sufficient provocation is "'calculated to deprive a 
reasonable [person] of self-control and to cause [the defendant] to act out of passion 
rather than reason.'" Vasquez, 287 Kan. at 55-56 (quoting State v. Horn, 278 Kan. 24, 42, 
91 P.3d 517 [2004]). Whether provocation is legally sufficient is an objective, not a 
subjective, determination. See Robertson, 279 Kan. at 306.  
 
23 
 
Hill argues that evidence that he shot Yanofsky as they were fighting was 
sufficient to reach a jury on voluntary manslaughter. He relies on the following testimony 
of the detective who interviewed him: 
 
"Q. [PROSECUTOR] I also want to talk to you about the Defendant's version where he 
was fighting with Sam in the bathroom. 
 
"A. [DETECTIVE] . . . [I]nitially he told me they were fighting, and he told me the living 
room area, the hallway, and then we ended up in the bathroom. 
 
"Q. 
Okay, so they start in the living room and then they go to the bathroom? 
 
"A. 
Yes. 
  
"Q. 
And then somewhere in there, a gun somehow gets slid to him? 
 
"A. 
Yes. 
 
"Q. 
Okay. Where did the Defendant say he was in the bathroom when he shot Sam? 
 
"A. 
He said he was on the floor and Sam was on top of him. 
 
"Q. 
So he was laying on the floor and Sam Yanofsky was on top of him? 
 
"A. 
Yes. 
 
"Q. 
And how did he say he shot Sam? 
 
"A. 
He said he picked up the gun and told Sam to quit, told him to quit a couple of 
times. Sam wouldn't, and the gun discharged by accident."  
 
In Hill's view, this evidence that Yanofsky was on top of him supported an assault 
and battery by Yanofsky, making it reasonable that Hill could have been in fear of great 
24 
 
bodily harm. State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, Syl. ¶ 25, 173 P.3d 612 (2007) 
("[P]rovocation must be more than mere words or gestures and, if assault or battery is 
involved, the defendant must have a reasonable belief that he or she is in danger of great 
bodily harm or at risk of death."). The problem with this argument is that this testimony 
cannot support an intentional shooting, which is required for a heat-of-passion voluntary 
manslaughter. 
 
Certainly, there was other evidence at trial that Hill intentionally shot Yanofsky. 
Indeed, that was the State's theory of the case. And there was some evidence about a fight 
between Yanofsky and Hill. But there was no evidence that Hill intentionally shot 
Yanofsky because he was provoked into doing so. 
 
Under these circumstances, the district judge did not err in rejecting Hill's request 
for a heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter instruction. It is of no moment that Jones 
ultimately was permitted to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter under an aiding and 
abetting theory, as Hill suggests but does not support. See State v. Torres, 280 Kan. 309, 
321, 121 P.3d 429 (2005) (simply pressing point without pertinent authority, without 
showing why it is sound despite lack of supporting authority akin to failing to brief 
issue). Finally, we need not reach the skip rule relied upon by the State, as there was no 
error in need of the cure it may provide. See Houston, 289 Kan. at 276 (unnecessary to 
reach skip rule because judge did not err). 
 
Peremptory Challenge 
 
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors on the 
basis of race. Analysis of a Batson challenge, such as that pursued by Hill here, involves 
three distinct steps, with different standards of review applied to each step. See State v. 
25 
 
Angelo, 287 Kan. 262, 272, 197 P.3d 337 (2008) (discussing State v. Pham, 281 Kan. 
1227, 1237, 136 P.3d 919 [2006]).  
 
The first step in the Batson analysis requires that a defendant make a prima facie 
showing that the prosecutor has exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. 
Appellate review of the district judge's decision on this step is plenary. Angelo, 287 Kan. 
at 271.  
 
Second, once a defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the 
prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the prospective juror. The 
prosecutor's burden is one of production, not persuasion. Thus the explanation does not 
have to be persuasive, or even plausible; it need only be facially valid. Unless 
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be 
deemed race-neutral.  Angelo, 287 Kan. at 271. "[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion rests 
with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Angelo, 287 Kan. at 272.  
 
Third, the district judge determines the ultimate question—whether the defendant 
has carried his or her burden of proving purposeful discrimination. 287 Kan. at 272 
(quoting Pham, 281 Kan. at 1237). The decision on this step hinges on credibility 
determinations and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Pham, 281 Kan. at 1237 
(quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-65, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 111 S. Ct. 
1859 [1991]) (Decisive question in typical peremptory challenge inquiry whether 
counsel's race-neutral explanation should be believed; seldom much evidence bearing on 
issue; best evidence often demeanor of attorney exercising challenge; evaluation of such 
demeanor "peculiarly within a trial judge's province"); compare Thaler v. Haynes, ___ 
U.S.___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___, 130 S. Ct. 1171 (2010) (when demeanor of venire member 
placed in issue by Batson challenge, ruling judge need not have observed or remember 
venire member's demeanor). 
 
26 
 
Hill's appellate challenge based on Batson focuses on the credibility of the State's 
proffered explanations for striking S.B., i.e., on the third step of the three-step analysis. If 
the explanations are "implausible or fantastic justifications," they may be "pretexts for 
purposeful discrimination." State v. Patton, 280 Kan. 146, 166, 120 P.3d 760 (2005) 
(citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 115 S. Ct. 1769 [1995]), 
disapproved on other grounds, State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 144 P.3d 647 (2006).  
 
Hill argues that the prosecutor's concern about S.B. not listening to or believing a 
codefendant's testimony was unbelievable because the record did not support it. This is 
not the whole story. S.B. initially stated that she would not listen to a codefendant's 
testimony; she later said she would listen to such testimony but would consider it with 
suspicion. As Hill notes, S.B.'s second statement is consistent with the standard pattern 
accomplice instruction, which was given in this case. See PIK Crim. 3d 52.18 (jury 
"should consider with caution the testimony of an accomplice"). And the district judge's 
earlier refusal to strike S.B. for cause was correct. 
 
It does not follow, however, that S.B.'s survival of a challenge for cause made her 
immune to peremptory strike. The rejection of the State's challenge for cause does not 
mean that it could not employ similar reasoning as a basis for a legitimate peremptory 
challenge. To be valid under Batson, the prosecutor's "explanation need not rise to the 
level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause." Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Moreover, the 
purpose of a peremptory challenge is to strike prospective jurors not subject to challenge 
for cause but who are believed to be "inclined against" a party's interests. Morrison v. 
State, 818 So. 2d 432, 443-44 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480, 
107 L. Ed. 2d 905, 110 S. Ct. 803 [1990]) (not improper for State to "'exercise its 
peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors who are opposed to the death penalty, 
but not subject to challenge for cause'").  
 
27 
 
Hill also attacks the validity of the State's second reason for striking S.B: her 
questionnaire response about her opposition to the death penalty. In his view, this 
explanation was pretextual for three interrelated reasons.  
 
First, Hill argues, the jury was not going to decide whether to impose the death 
penalty on Hill; thus S.B.'s questionnaire response was irrelevant. We see no abuse of 
discretion on this basis. It would have been reasonable for the prosecutor to regard a 
person with strong convictions against the death penalty as less likely to vote guilty as 
well, even if he or she had been told that jurors would bear no direct personal 
responsibility for choosing the defendant's punishment for the capital crime in this case. 
Even if it were not reasonable, such a rationale for the peremptory strike of S.B. was 
race-neutral, the only issue before the district judge. See State v. Trotter, 280 Kan. 800, 
816, 127 P.3d 972 (2006) (State's use of peremptory challenge to strike African-
American venire member because of equivocal statements on death penalty race-neutral); 
see also United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 897 (8th Cir. 2002) (peremptory strike 
based on opposition to death penalty valid, race-neutral); Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d at 
444 (citing Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 386 [Fla. 1994]) (prospective juror's 
discomfort with death penalty sufficient race-neutral reason for State's peremptory 
strike).  
 
In Hill's second argument on this point, he appears to characterize the State's 
peremptory challenges as a method to "death qualify" the jury inappropriately, making 
conviction more likely and his trial unfair. Again, this argument has nothing to do with 
whether the prosecution's explanation was credibly race-neutral. Furthermore, this 
argument runs contrary to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). The Lockhart Court 
rejected the proposition that a death-qualified jury, even if more prone to convict of 
capital murder than a non-death-qualified jury, was constitutionally prohibited. Lockhart, 
28 
 
476 U.S. at 173. We see nothing, and Hill directs us to nothing, contrary to Lockhart in 
Kansas constitutional or statutory law.  
 
Lastly, Hill asserts that the State's pretext is exposed by its failure to ask S.B. any 
questions about whether her position on the death penalty would affect her decision in the 
guilt phase of his trial. Hill relies on language from Esteves v. State, 859 S.W.2d 613, 615 
(Tex. App.1993): When "a prosecutor makes an assumption about a prospective juror but 
does not question the prospective juror to verify the assumption, it is some indication that 
[a] strike was not race-neutral."  
 
Esteves is entirely distinct from this case. In it, the prosecutor did not ask a 
prospective juror any questions before using a peremptory challenge to strike her. When 
challenged, the prosecutor stated that she had struck the juror because the juror had been 
staring at her, and the prosecutor thus assumed the juror was a member of the defendant's 
family. Esteves, 859 S.W.2d at 614-15. On appeal, the court held the prosecutor's 
explanation was not race-neutral, given the prosecutor's failure to examine the 
prospective juror and the obvious illogic of the assumption she made in the absence of 
such examination. See Esteves, 859 S.W.2d at 615 (citing Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 
861, 866 [Tex. Crim. 1988]). We are not faced with similar facts here.  Hill's prosecutor 
did not rely on ambiguous and subjective factors such as eye contact, posture, hairstyle, 
or body language to speculate about S.B.'s position on the death penalty. There was no 
need for speculation, whether logical or illogical. S.B. had made an unequivocal 
statement about her position on the death penalty. Again, that position was a race-neutral 
reason for the State's peremptory strike.  
  
In addition, we have previously held that the State need not "probe more deeply" 
into the effect of the prospective juror's answers on his or her ability to be fair and 
impartial in order to uphold a peremptory strike as race-neutral. Trotter, 280 Kan. at 816. 
Even the State's failure to ask any questions of a stricken minority juror does not 
29 
 
necessarily give rise to an inference that its strikes were racially motivated. A prosecutor 
need not "specifically inquire about the link between its stated reason and the possible 
effect on the potential juror's service[.]" 280 Kan. at 816-17.  
 
The district judge heard S.B.'s answers during voir dire and observed her 
demeanor. He also assessed the credibility of the prosecutor's explanations. Both reasons 
for the strike given by the prosecutor appear to be supported by the record and are race-
neutral. There was no abuse of discretion.  
 
Admission of Photograph 
 
Hill argues the district judge abused his discretion in admitting an autopsy 
photograph of Sam Yanofsky's brain, because the photograph, depicting the brain with a 
flexible rod through it, was gruesome and inflammatory and irrelevant to any fact in issue 
in the case.  
 
In State v. Riojas, this court stated: 
 
 
"The standard of review for the admission of photographic evidence requires the 
appellate court to first determine whether the photos are relevant. If a party argued that 
the photographs are overly repetitious, gruesome, or inflammatory, that is to say, 
prejudicial, the standard of review is abuse of discretion." 288 Kan. 379, 387, 204 P.3d 
578 (2009) (citing State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 176, 194, 169 P.3d 1107 [2007]).  
 
Such discretion is abused "'"when the admitted photographs were unduly 
repetitious and cumulative or their introduction was solely for the purpose of prejudice."' 
[Citations omitted.]." State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, 329, 160 P.3d 457 (2007). 
 
"Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. Evidence is relevant if it renders a 
desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence, or if it has any 
30 
 
tendency in reason to prove any material fact." Carter, 284 Kan. at 328 (citing K.S.A. 60-
401[b] and State v. Sexton, 256 Kan. 344, 349, 886 P.2d 811 [1994]). Photographs 
depicting the extent, nature, and number of wounds inflicted are generally relevant in 
murder cases. Riojas, 288 Kan. at 387. Even photographs that are gruesome are relevant 
and admissible if they aid a pathologist in explaining the cause of death. 288 Kan. at 387. 
Further, because the State has the burden of proving all the elements of the crime 
charged, photographs used to prove the elements of the crime, including the fact and 
manner of death and the violent nature of the crime, are relevant and admissible even if a 
defendant does not contest the cause of death. 288 Kan. at 387. 
 
Hill argues that the only point of the photograph was to demonstrate that Yanofsky 
did not die immediately after he was shot. That point, he argues, was relevant in only two 
possible ways: to prove the "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" aggravating factor in a capital 
penalty phase or to corroborate Jones' testimony tending to show Yanofsky did not die 
immediately. The first use was premature, according to Hill, and the second use was 
unnecessary because Mitchell's testimony and the blood spatter pictures were adequate to 
the State's purpose. Hill also argues that he did not contest Mitchell's assertion that the 
blood spatters resulted from Yanofsky coughing up blood after being shot. In short, the 
brain photo was not needed to show the trajectory of the bullet.  
 
The State responds that the trajectory of the bullet that killed Yanofsky was 
relevant to the fact and manner of death and the violent nature of the crime. In addition, 
the photograph helped Mitchell to explain the nature and extent of Yanofsky's injuries 
and supported the State's theory that he survived for some time after being shot, which 
was relevant to premeditation and intent. The State concedes that it also believed the 
photograph would eventually be relevant to the "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" factor at 
sentencing, but it did not ultimately rely on that factor.  
 
The State has the more persuasive argument on this issue. 
31 
 
 
Although Hill did not contest the State's theory that Yanofsky initially survived 
the gunshot wound, the State still had the burden to prove all of the elements of the 
crime, including cause and manner of death. The brain photograph was relevant on this 
point. Also, the evidence that Hill did not seek medical attention for Yanofsky 
circumstantially supports premeditation and intent to kill. See State v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 
603, 634, 102 P.3d 406 (2004) (circumstantial evidence of premeditation when defendant 
saw blood bubbling out of victim's mouth, did not seek medical attention for her); see 
also State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 946, 190 P.3d 937 (2008) (blood spatter 
photographs relevant, admissible because they helped illustrate violent nature of crime, 
fact tending to prove defendant acted with intent to kill).  
 
We also do not believe that the prejudicial nature of the photograph substantially 
outweighed its probative value. See Warledo, 286 Kan. at 945. The photograph was not 
unduly repetitious or cumulative. See Carter, 284 Kan. at 329. It was the only photograph 
that illustrated the pathologist's testimony explaining how a bullet could pass though 
Yanofsky's brain without killing him instantly. The gruesome nature of this photograph 
was not "so extreme that it compels the conclusion it was admitted solely to cause undue 
prejudice" to Hill, see Carter, 284 Kan. at 329, in spite of any "special care" to be taken 
in the admission of autopsy photographs. See State v. Hernandez, 284 Kan. 74, 100, 159 
P.3d 950 (2007) (quoting State v. Carr, 265 Kan. 608, 623, 963 P.2d 421 [1998]); 
compare State v. Hoffman, 288 Kan. 100, 108-09, 200 P.3d 1254 (2009) (autopsy 
photographs of victim's cranial cavity, brain, and larynx not unduly gruesome), with State 
v. Boyd, 216 Kan. 373, 377, 532 P.2d 1064 (1975) (error to admit autopsy photographs 
unnecessarily showing effect of autopsy on victim's body).  
 
There was no abuse of discretion on this issue. 
 
Admission of Handwritten Note 
32 
 
 
Hill next argues that the district judge abused his discretion in admitting the 
handwritten note purportedly written by Hill.  
 
Defense counsel objected to admission of the note based on chain of custody; 
however, the explanation of the basis for the objection was failure to authenticate, not 
chain of custody. Both grounds for objection attack foundation. See State v. Taylor, 231 
Kan. 171, 174, 642 P.2d 989 (1982) (chain of custody part of foundation for admission of 
physical evidence); State v. Milum, 202 Kan. 196, 198, 447 P.2d 801 (1968) 
(authentication provided sufficient foundation for admission of note). The State does not 
challenge the adequacy of Hill's preservation of this issue for appeal. We thus move to 
the merits of whether the note was sufficiently authenticated. 
  
"Whether or not the authenticity of a writing is sufficiently established to render it 
admissible in evidence is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court. 
[Citations omitted.]" State v. Milum, 202 Kan. at 198.  
 
K.S.A. 60-464 provides: "Authentication of a writing is required before it may be 
received in evidence. Authentication may be by evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of 
its authenticity or by any other means provided by law."  
  
Hill cites State v. Plaskett, 271 Kan. 995, 1018, 27 P.3d 890 (2001), in support of 
his argument. In Plaskett, a prosecution of a stepfather for sexual abuse of his 
stepdaughter, the district court refused to admit letters written to the victim by her 
biological father on hearsay grounds when the biological father was not present and did 
not testify. The victim had identified the handwriting in the letters as that of her 
biological father. Plaskett, 271 Kan. at 1015-16. On appeal, this court ruled that 
defendant did not seek to admit the statements in the letters for the truth of the matter 
asserted; thus hearsay was not a proper basis for excluding them. Instead, this court ruled 
33 
 
that the district court judge should have evaluated admissibility of the letters under 
K.S.A. 60-464. Applying that rule, the notes were properly authenticated. Plaskett, 271 
Kan. at 1017-18. The Plaskett opinion notes that the victim identified her biological 
father's handwriting, but the court did not hold that such an identification is indispensable 
to sufficient authentication of the handwritten documents under K.S.A. 60-464.  
 
Under Kansas law, "[t]he authorship or authenticity of a letter 'may be proved by 
indirect or circumstantial evidence, as other facts.'" State v. Uhls, 121 Kan. 587, 598, 249 
Pac. 597 (1926). "Authenticity or genuineness of a writing may be proved not only by 
establishing the genuineness of the writer's signature, or identity of the handwriting 
contained in the instrument, but also, under proper circumstances, by indirect or 
circumstantial evidence without resort to proof of handwriting. [Citations omitted.]" 
Milum, 202 Kan. at 197. When "the contents themselves reveal knowledge peculiarly 
referable to a certain person or the contents are of such nature that the letter could not 
have passed between persons other than the purported writer and the person to whom it 
was delivered[,]" circumstantial evidence is sufficient. Milum, 202 Kan. at 198.   
 
The facts of our Milum case were very similar to those before us now, and its 
reasoning provides guidance. In Milum, the contested writing was a note signed with the 
defendant's first name and sent through a jail employee to the defendant's alleged 
accomplice. The note told the alleged accomplice that he would be "'taken care of'" if he 
testified against the defendant. Milum, 202 Kan. at 197. The alleged accomplice was 
unable to identify the handwriting as the defendant's, but he said that he knew no one else 
at the jail with the same name as the defendant and that he had never had trouble with any 
person by that name except the defendant. Milum, 202 Kan. at 197.   
 
On appeal this court applied the rule that a party may show the authenticity of a 
document by circumstantial evidence. Milum, 202 Kan. at 198. The note's contents and 
other circumstantial evidence supported a reasonable inference that the defendant had 
34 
 
written the note, which was adequate proof of its authenticity and supported its admission 
into evidence. Milum, 202 Kan. at 198. 
 
In this case, Jones testified that Hill passed the note to Jones' brother, who then 
passed the note to Jones. Although Jones was not asked if he recognized the handwriting 
in the note as Hill's, he did testify that he was certain Hill wrote the note because its 
contents "sounded like stuff he would have said" and "[i]t sounded like he wrote it, or 
whatever." In addition, Jones was Hill's best friend; this relationship further supported his 
certainty that Hill authored the note. The note also referred to facts about the case that 
could give rise to additional inferences about Hill's authorship.  
 
Under these circumstances, the State sufficiently authenticated the note for 
admission into evidence. The district judge did not abuse his discretion.  
 
Competency to Stand Trial 
 
Hill next argues that the district judge erred in finding him competent to stand trial 
because the evidence established that he was unable to assist in his defense and that he 
did not have an understanding of the charges against him. 
 
Our standard of review is abuse of discretion: 
 
"'On appeal, a reviewing court's inquiry regarding the decision of a district court that a 
defendant is competent to stand trial is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
[Citation omitted.] Judicial discretion is abused where no reasonable person would take 
the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety 
of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its 
discretion.' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 984, 40 P.3d 139 (2001), 
cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Marsh, 
278 Kan. 520, 102 P.3d 445 (2004).  
35 
 
 
K.S.A. 22-3301(1) provides the pertinent definition: "[A] person is 'incompetent to 
stand trial' when he is charged with a crime and, because of mental illness or defect is 
unable: (a) To understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; or (b) to 
make or assist in making his defense."  
 
A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he or she "'has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . 
[and] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" State v. 
McKinney, 265 Kan. 104, 107, 961 P.2d 1 (1998) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 
U.S. 402, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824, 80 S. Ct. 788 [1960]). "'"[I]f the accused is capable of 
understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on against him; if he rightly 
comprehends his own condition with reference to such proceedings, and can conduct his 
defense in a rational manner, he is, for the purpose of being tried, to be deemed sane, 
although on some other subject his mind may be deranged or unsound." [Citations 
omitted.]'" State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 341, 153 P.3d 1208 (2007) (quoting Van 
Dusen v. State, 197 Kan. 718, 722-23, 421 P.2d 197 [1966]).  
 
A criminal defendant is presumed competent to stand trial. State v. Cellier, 263 
Kan. 54, Syl. ¶ 6, 948 P.2d 616 (1997). The party who raises the issue of competence has 
the burden of going forward with the evidence, and the burden of proof is preponderance 
of the evidence. Cellier, 263 Kan. 54, Syl. ¶ 4.  
 
Counsel for Hill argues: 
 
"There is no rational spin that can be put on Mr. Hill's refusal to consult with his 
attorneys about a trial defense, and his simultaneous refusal to engage in plea bargains. 
His understanding of the proceedings against him was irrational where his interpretation 
of specific biblical passages showed him that the charges would be dismissed on the first 
day of trial."   
36 
 
 
Counsel asserts that Hill's inability to assist in his defense deprived him of the 
benefit that could have been gained from affirmative defenses of voluntary intoxication 
and diminished capacity.  
 
The State contends in response that the district judge's determination of Hill's 
competency followed careful deliberation and weighing of the extensive evidence. It was, 
the State asserts, within the district judge's discretion if he chose to give more weight and 
credit to the conclusions of Larned staff members or his own interactions with Hill, when 
compared with the opinions of defense experts.  
 
Defense counsel directs our attention to three cases in the substantive portion of 
his argument on this issue. 
 
The first, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177-78 n.13, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 95 S. 
Ct. 896 (1975), dealt with the relevance of defense counsel's opinions on a defendant's 
competency. The record before us demonstrates that the district judge considered defense 
counsel's opinions on Hill's ability to comprehend the proceedings and assist in his own 
defense. The judge specifically stated: 
 
 
"I have no reason to ever doubt anything [defense counsel] would ever say or tell 
me, but what – what might be one person's lack of cooperation might be cooperation to 
another person, and it just may be that you're basing Nathaniel's appearance of inability 
or lack of cooperation against all of the other cases where, I'm sure, there was, probably, 
in some cases more than enough cooperation, and it just seems hard to believe that 
someone charged as Nathaniel is charged would – would be unwilling to participate, as 
you feel that he should, but perhaps, for some reason, Nathaniel thinks that this is what is 
in his best interest and that's the road that he's decided to travel down, and if that 
continues, then I – I want to say I'm sorry, and I hope that that's not the case, because as 
you've so eloquently put in your memorandum, not only is it my duty, but it is everyone's 
duty to try and provide him with the fairest possible trial as possible, and I would hope 
37 
 
that he would participate as much as you think is necessary so that you could feel that he 
is getting the fairest trial – or defense that could be presented, so . . . I've made a 
determination that Nathaniel is competent to stand trial."  
 
The second case cited by defense counsel is State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309, 85 P.3d 
1164 (2004). Davis concerned an ineffective assistance claim based on failure to request 
a second competency hearing. In that case, the defendant had a long history of more than 
30 hospitalizations and treatment for various mental health issues; he was not consistently 
taking prescribed antipsychotic medication while in custody awaiting trial; he was found 
incompetent and committed to Larned. While there, he took his medication and, 
eventually, was found competent to stand trial. Davis, 277 Kan. at 316-18. The district 
judge appointed new defense counsel for the defendant; and, before trial, that counsel 
received four incomprehensible notes from the defendant. The defendant also stopped 
taking his medication and began having hallucinations. Davis, 277 Kan. at 318-20, 323. 
Although counsel had some doubts about the defendant's competency, he did not pursue 
the issue. Davis, 277 Kan. at 319-22. 
 
This court held that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the 
defendant's competency and for failing to seek another competency hearing. The 
combination of the defendant's extensive history of mental illness and frequent 
commitments, the evidence supporting the first determination of incompetency, the fact 
that the defendant was found competent only after being treated at Larned and taking his 
medication consistently, and the four incomprehensible  notes meant that counsel was 
required to investigate the competency issue anew and seek a hearing. Davis, 277 Kan. at 
323-24.  
 
Although it is true that Hill, like the defendant in Davis, stopped taking his 
medication, the similarities between his case and Davis end there. In Davis, the 
functioning of a defendant who was found to be incompetent thereafter improved with 
38 
 
medication and then deteriorated without it. Here, the district judge did not rule that Hill 
was incompetent before he began taking medication; rather, the judge held his ruling on 
competency in abeyance before any medication was administered. After Hill spent time 
being evaluated and took and refused to take medication, the judge ruled that Hill was 
competent to stand trial under all of the evidence marshaled by the State and diligent 
defense counsel. Davis did not decide that a defendant's neglect or refusal to take 
medication designed to enhance his or her mental health would require a district court's 
finding of incompetence to stand trial. It merely illustrated that such neglect or refusal 
can be among the factors considered on the competency issue. That is exactly what 
happened here.  
 
The last case to which defense counsel refers us on the competency issue is State 
v. Barnes, 263 Kan. 249, 948 P.2d 627 (1997). Barnes, in the defense view, is 
distinguishable. 
 
In Barnes, a defense expert testified that the defendant suffered from paranoid 
schizophrenia, depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and dementia from a 
possible childhood head trauma. In his opinion, the defendant was incompetent to stand 
trial  
 
"because he was preoccupied with delusions and would not be able to testify in a rational 
manner or assist in his defense . . . [T]the defendant might possibly feel paranoid and 
believe his attorney to be against him and, as a result, might withhold information from 
his attorney. Further, . . . the defendant's borderline mental retardation would make it 
difficult for him to understand the courtroom proceedings." Barnes, 263 Kan. at 264.  
 
 
On cross-examination, the defense expert testified that the defendant 
understood the nature of the court proceedings and was able to describe the 
functions of many of the participants in the courtroom, including defense counsel. 
Barnes, 263 Kan. at 264.  
39 
 
 
The State's expert testified that the defendant was competent, that he understood 
the legal process, and that he was able to cooperate and answer questions in a coherent 
manner. In his opinion, there was "no evidence of thought disorder or paranoid 
delusions," and the "defendant could remember the conversation from one visit to the 
next and understood generally the role of various components of the legal process." 
Barnes, 263 Kan. at 259, 264.  
 
On appeal, this court recognized that the parties had presented conflicting 
evidence but affirmed the district judge's competency determination, giving appropriate 
deference under the governing standard of review: 
 
 
"It is undeniable that the defendant has some mental problems. However, there is 
conflicting evidence on the question whether these problems would render him 
incompetent to stand trial. Both expert witnesses who testified indicated that the 
defendant had comprehension of the roles of the various participants in the trial and 
understood the crimes with which he was faced, as well as the possible ramifications of 
conviction of those crimes. As for his ability to help with his defense, the evidence 
indicated that the defendant was able to respond appropriately in court and cooperate 
with his attorney to the extent that the defendant refused to be examined by [a State 
expert] without his attorney present. Although [the defense expert] testified that the 
defendant's alleged paranoia might cause him to fail to cooperate with his defense 
attorney, this was mere speculation, and there was no indication that such paranoia 
surfaced during trial. 
 
 
"The testimony regarding the defendant's memory retention ability is an area of 
concern. However, although [the defense expert] testified that the defendant was 
woefully deficient in this area, [the State's expert] testified that he saw no problems with 
the defendant's ability to recall recent events. [The State's expert] also testified that the 
defendant met many of the factors which would at least indicate the defendant might be 
malingering. 
 
40 
 
 
"Based on these factors, the district court's determination that the defendant was 
competent to stand trial was not one with which no reasonable person would agree. 
Under our standard of review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion." Barnes, 263 Kan. at 264-65.  
 
We do likewise here. The district judge in this case had before him conflicting 
evidence on Hill's mental stability. He acted well within his discretion in weighing this 
evidence and the parties' competing arguments. To the extent he trusted the opinions 
originating from the Larned team more than those from the defense, he was entitled to do 
so. In addition, there was ample evidence tending to demonstrate that Hill's problems 
with his counsel related to his disagreement with their recommendations. Hill's 
interactions with the judge reinforced that interpretation, as well as the judge's ultimate 
conclusion that he was capable of cooperating with counsel, if he chose to do so. A 
district judge has authority to consider his or her observations of a defendant in assessing 
competency. See Cellier, 263 Kan. at 71 (judge's observations appropriately considered); 
see Barnes, 263 Kan. at 264-65 (defendant's responses in court supported conclusion on 
his ability to help with his defense).  
 
Under the circumstances of this case, there was sufficient evidence that Hill 
understood "'"the nature and object of the proceedings going on against him[,] . . . rightly 
comprehend[ed] his own condition with reference to such proceedings, and [could] 
conduct his defense in a rational manner[.]"' [Citations omitted.]" Shopteese, 283 Kan. at 
341. It cannot be said that no reasonable person would have found the defendant 
competent to stand trial; thus the district judge did not abuse its discretion.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Each of the five issues raised by defendant Nathaniel L. Hill in this appeal lacks 
merit. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.