Title: Carnahan v. Lewis

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRAD CARNAHAN and  BRENDA CARNAHAN v. REX I. LEWIS and VICKIE R. LEWIS, AS TRUSTEES OF THE REX I. LEWIS LIVING TRUST and the VICKIE R. LEWIS LIVING TRUST2012 WY 45Case Number: S-11-0122Decided: 03/27/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
 
BRAD 
CARNAHAN and BRENDA CARNAHAN,Appellants (Defendants/Third-Party 
Plaintiffs),v.REX I. LEWIS and VICKIE R. LEWIS, as Trustees of 
the REX I. LEWIS LIVING TRUST and the VICKIE R. LEWIS LIVING 
TRUST,Appellees (Plaintiffs/Third-Party Defendants).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County
The 
Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellants:
Karen 
Budd-Falen, Franklin J. Falen, Kathryn J.B. Morrow of Budd-Falen Law Offices, 
LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by 
Ms. Morrow.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Nicholas 
G.J. Healey and Timothy L. Woznick of Dray, Dyekman, Reed & Healey, PC, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Healey.
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 [¶1]  Rex I. Lewis and Vickie R. Lewis, as 
trustees of the Rex I. Lewis Living Trust and the Vickie R. Lewis Living Trust, 
(Lewises) and Brad and Brenda Carnahan (Carnahans) own property in a subdivision 
in Laramie County.  The Lewises 
filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Carnahans did not have 
authority to block their use of a public easement to access their property, an 
injunction requiring the Carnahans to remove a fence they erected across the 
easement and nuisance damages allegedly caused by the blocked easement.  The Carnahans filed counterclaims for 
ejectment and trespass against the Lewises and a third party complaint against 
the Lewises and Laramie County (which they alleged had an interest in the 
easement) to have title to the easement quieted in them.  
 
[¶2]  Both parties moved for summary judgment 
and, after a hearing, the district court issued a decision letter ruling that 
the Lewises had standing to bring their claim for declaratory relief but not to 
collect damages for nuisance; Laramie County was not a necessary party; issues 
of material fact existed precluding summary judgment as to the Carnahans’ 
statute of limitations and laches defenses; and the Board of Laramie County 
Commissioners’ (Board) 2003 denial of an application to replat the subdivision 
did not estop the Carnahans from maintaining a quiet title claim.  Subsequently, the district court ruled 
that an affidavit recorded in 1994 was not effective to vacate the public 
easement because it did not comply with state statute.  Consistent with that ruling, the 
district court dismissed the Carnahans’ trespass claim.  The district court set for trial the 
Carnahans’ statute of limitations and laches defenses.  After trial, the district court 
concluded neither the statute of limitations nor laches barred the Lewises’ 
declaratory judgment action.  
Further, the district court declared that Laramie County continued to 
hold the easement in trust for the public, meaning the Lewises have the right to 
use the easement and the Carnahans do not have the right to obstruct their 
use.  The Carnahans appealed.  We affirm.             

 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]  We re-phrase the issues the Carnahans 
present as follows:
 
            
1.         
Whether the district court correctly held: 
 
                        
a.         
the Lewises had standing to seek declaratory 
relief;
                        
b.         
the Lewises’ claims are not barred by the statute of 
limitations;
                        
c.         
the Lewises’ claims are not barred by the doctrine of 
laches;
                        
d.         
the Carnahans’ predecessors-in-interest did not properly vacate the 
public easement in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-12-101 et seq.; 
and
            
e.         
the Carnahans’ trespass claim must be dismissed.
 
The 
Lewises contend the district court ruling was correct on all of the above issues 
and raise the additional issue that the Carnahans’ appeal should be dismissed as 
premature.
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]  In June of 1977, the Board acknowledged 
and approved the final plat for Table Mountain Ranches, Fourth Filing, 
containing eighty-one separate lots.  
The Laramie County Clerk recorded the plat in September the same 
year.  The plat subdivided property 
located in Laramie County south of County Road No. 20 (Valley View Road) 
approximately eighteen miles west of Cheyenne.  The plat included an eighty foot 
easement named the “Mountain View Loop.”  
The easement begins at its intersection with County Road No. 20, travels 
south, and then loops through Table Mountain Ranches in a U-shape back to County 
Road No. 20 approximately 400 to 500 yards west of where it begins.  Thus, Mountain View Loop provides access 
to Table Mountain Ranches from County Road No. 20 at two different points.  The plat contained the following 
dedication:
 
KNOW 
ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS; that Robert Tomb and Kenneth H. Barber, owners in fee 
simple of the land embraced in this subdivision of the within described lands, 
do hereby declare the subdivision of said land, as appears on this plat, to be 
their free and voluntary act and deed and in accordance with their desires do 
hereby dedicate, to the use of the public forever, all of the road rights-of-way 
shown hereon; do hereby grant, to the use of the public forever, all of the 
public access and utility easements shown hereon and do hereby grant, for the 
specified purposes, all of the remaining easements shown hereon.   
 
[¶5]  The property now owned by the Carnahans 
was previously owned by Noel R. and Colleen Ann Griffith.  The Griffiths purchased the property in 
February of 1994 as fourteen individual lots—shown as tracts 219, 220 and 
223-234 on the Table Mountain Ranches final plat.  In March of 1994, the Griffiths filed 
and the Laramie County Clerk’s office recorded an “Affidavit for the Vacation of 
Certain Tract Lines, Public Access and Utility Easements within the Table 
Mountain Ranches, Fourth Filing Subdivision.”  The affidavit expressed the Griffiths’ 
intent to combine their fourteen lots into one parcel and vacate all interior 
tract lines and the eighty foot wide public access and utility easement running 
along and through the parcel.  The 
affidavit went unchallenged at that time and the Laramie County attorney and 
Cheyenne/Laramie County development office treated it as effectively vacating 
the tract lines and the public access and utility easement.    
 
[¶6]  After filing the affidavit, the 
Griffiths built a home on the property.  
Construction began roughly in April and was completed by October or 
November of 1994.  The Griffiths 
also installed a septic system and a garage.  The house, garage and septic system are 
located partially on Mountain View Loop between what were originally tracts 219 
and 225 on the Table Mountain Ranches Plat, Fourth Filing.  During the time the Griffiths were 
building their house, the Lewises purchased 83.33 unplatted acres directly west 
of the Griffiths’ property and almost completely surrounded by the 
subdivision.  The Griffiths 
subsequently conveyed a portion of their property to Troy Griffith and the 
remainder to the Griffith Family Limited Partnership.  In 1999, the Lewises purchased most of 
the remaining lots in the Table Mountain Ranches subdivision.  As it relates to the Lewis property, 
Mountain View Loop comes south from County Road No. 20 through the Griffith 
property, crosses over the southern edge of the Lewises’ unplatted property and 
then winds through the western part of Table Mountain Ranches, also owned by the 
Lewises, back to its second intersection with County Road No. 20.   
 
[¶7]  In 2003, Troy Griffith offered the 
Griffith property for sale.  He and 
the Carnahans executed a purchase agreement for the property in April of 
2003.  As part of the agreement, Mr. 
Griffith agreed to petition the Board to re-plat the parcel to vacate the 
existing fourteen lots, create two lots instead, vacate the portion of Mountain 
View Loop running through the property and replace it with an eighty foot access 
and utility easement west of the buildings and the original easement.1  The Lewises objected to the re-plat on 
the grounds that it would close an existing county road and the proposed 
replacement easement was not the physical and legal equivalent of Mountain View 
Loop.  The Board addressed the 
petition at two meetings and voted unanimously to deny it.  The Board issued findings, conclusions 
and an order in July of 2003, stating that the re-plat 
would
 
abridge 
or destroy the rights and privileges of other proprietors in Table Mountain 
Ranches, Fourth Filing, for the following reasons.  First, because the replat vacates a 
statutorily dedicated public right-of-way and replaces it with an “access 
easement” which is not dedicated to the public and not designated as “Mountain 
View Loop”.  Second, because the 
proposed replat and corresponding vacation of Mountain View Loop deprives the 
other proprietors in Table Mountain Ranches, Fourth Filing, of their right and 
privilege to use an existing public, two track, passable, dirt road, which 
travels over, primarily, flat grass lands and replaces it with a completely 
undeveloped non-public “access easement.”  

 
Soon 
after the denial, the Carnahans went ahead and purchased the Griffiths’ 
property. 
 
[¶8]  In 2007, the Carnahans built a fence 
with a locked gate on Mountain View Loop where it crosses from the unplatted 
portion of the Lewises’ property onto their property.  The Lewises then filed their complaint 
against the Carnahans seeking declaratory and injunctive relief establishing 
their right to use Mountain View Loop and prevent the Carnahans from blocking 
it.  The Carnahans responded with 
their cross-claims for ejectment and trespass and third party complaint to quiet 
title to the easement in them as against the Lewises and Laramie County.  Laramie County moved to be dismissed 
from the action. The district court granted the County’s motion.2  The Carnahans and the Lewises filed 
cross motions for summary judgment.  

 
[¶9]  After a hearing, the district court 
dismissed the Lewises’ nuisance claim, denied the Carnahans’ motion for summary 
judgment on the declaratory judgment claim, held that Laramie County was not an 
indispensable party and set for trial the matter of whether the Lewises’ claims 
were barred by the statute of limitations or laches.  The district court requested additional 
briefing on the issue of whether the Griffiths’ 1994 affidavit effectively 
vacated Mountain View Loop.  After a 
hearing, the district court ruled that the affidavit was ineffective to vacate 
Mountain View Loop because it did not comply with Wyoming statutes.  Having found that the vacation was not 
effective and the easement remained dedicated to public use, the district court 
dismissed the Carnahans’ trespass claim. The remaining matters proceeded to 
trial.  The district court 
subsequently issued findings of fact and conclusions of law holding the Lewises’ 
claims were not barred by the statute of limitations or laches and they were 
entitled to declaratory relief.  The 
district court denied the Carnahans’ quiet title and ejectment claims.  The Carnahans timely appealed.         

 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶10]  To the extent we have been asked to 
consider the district court’s rulings on summary judgment, the following 
standards apply.  

 
Summary 
judgment motions are governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c):
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  
 
We 
review a district court’s summary judgment rulings de novo, using the same 
materials and following the same standards as the district court.  The facts are reviewed from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  
 
Grynberg 
v. L & R Exploration Venture, 
2011 WY 134, ¶ 16, 261 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo. 2011) (citations 
omitted).
 
[¶11]  The following standards apply to our 
review of the district court’s rulings following a bench 
trial:
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  
 
We 
review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo.  
 
Kelly 
v. McNeel, 
2011 WY 79, ¶ 17, 250 P.3d 1105, 1109-1110 (Wyo. 2011) (citation 
omitted).
 
DISCUSSION
 

  Timeliness 
  of Appeal
 
[¶12]  The Lewises contend this appeal is 
untimely because the district court has not ruled on their claim for injunctive 
relief.  Because a ruling in their 
favor on that issue would result in dismissal of the appeal and we would not 
consider the remaining issues at this juncture, we begin by considering whether 
the appeal is premature.  The 
Carnahans assert it is not premature because the district court effectively 
denied the Lewises’ claim for injunctive relief in its summary judgment decision 
letter.  They base this assertion on 
the district court’s conclusion that the Lewises lacked a sufficient possessory 
interest in Mountain View Loop to sustain a nuisance action for damages.  
 
[¶13]  In its summary judgment order, the 
district court expressly denied the Carnahans’ summary judgment motion as to the 
Lewises’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, finding that factual 
questions existed as to whether those claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations or the doctrine of laches.   Had the district court intended to 
deny the Lewises’ claim for injunctive relief, it would have granted the 
Carnahans’ summary judgment motion on that claim just as it granted their 
summary judgment motion on the nuisance claim. Clearly, the district court did 
not deny the claim for injunctive relief, at least not at the summary judgment 
stage of the proceedings.  

 
[¶14]  After the trial, the district court 
granted the Lewises’ request for declaratory relief.  The declaratory relief the Lewises 
requested in their complaint was a declaration that the Carnahans did not have 
authority to block their use of Mountain View Loop by erecting a fence across 
it.  Although it would have been 
preferable for the district court to have expressly ruled on the Lewises’ 
request for injunctive relief as it did the request for declaratory relief, we 
conclude it is implicit in the district court’s order that the fence must be 
removed.  We, therefore, decline to 
dismiss the appeal and will proceed to address the issues presented.    
 
2.  Standing    

 
[¶15]  The Carnahans’ assertion that the 
Lewises lack standing to pursue their claims is twofold.   First, they contend the Lewises 
have no legally protectable interest at stake because Laramie County holds title 
to Mountain View Loop in trust for the public and no individual member of the 
public has a comparable interest.  
Second, they assert the Lewises’ only allegations of harm from being 
denied use of Mountain View Loop are speculative and based on conjecture.  
 
[¶16]  The Lewises filed their complaint 
pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 
through 1-37-115 (LexisNexis 2011).  
Section 1-37-102 of the Act gives Wyoming courts the power to “declare 
rights, status and other legal relations.”  
Section 1-37-103 provides:
 
            
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other 
writings constituting a contract, or whose right, status or other legal 
relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by statute, municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or 
validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of 
right, status or other legal relations.
 
The 
Lewises sought to have the court construe their rights as owners of property 
located in the final plat for Table Mountain Ranches.   We consider language used in a 
plat in accordance with contract interpretation principles.  Brumbaugh v. Mikelson Land Co., 2008 WY 
66, ¶ 13, 185 P.3d 695, 701 (Wyo. 2008).  
The Lewises’ complaint, therefore, falls within the general scope of the 
declaratory judgment act.  

 
[¶17]  In order to bring a declaratory judgment 
action, the challenger must also be an “interested” person.  Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 146, ¶ 
8, 79 P.3d 500, 505 (Wyo. 2003).  That is, the challenger must be involved 
in a justiciable controversy before declaratory relief will be granted.  Id., ¶ 9, 79 P.3d  at 505.  A justiciable controversy is defined as 
a controversy fit for judicial resolution.  
Id.  The elements necessary to establish a 
justiciable controversy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 
are:
 
1.  The parties have existing and genuine, 
as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests.  
 
2. 
The controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively 
operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, 
administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion.  
 
3. 
It must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force 
and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, 
status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in 
interest, or, wanting these qualities to be of such great and overriding public 
moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them.  
 
4. 
The proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere 
disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough 
research and analysis of the major issues.  

 
Id., 
¶ 10, 79 P.3d  at 505.
 
[¶18]  The concept of justiciability 
encompasses several doctrines, including standing, ripeness, and mootness.  Id., ¶ 9, 79 P.3d  at 505.  The doctrine of standing the Carnahans 
place at issue here focuses on whether a litigant is properly situated to assert 
an issue for judicial determination.  
Id.  A litigant has standing when he has a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.  Id.   In the declaratory judgment 
context, the requirement that a litigant have a personal stake in the outcome of 
the controversy is intended to ensure that he or she is sufficiently interested 
in a case to present a justiciable controversy.   
 
[¶19]  With these principles in mind, we 
consider whether a justiciable controversy exists in this case and whether the 
Lewises were properly situated to assert it for judicial determination.  The Lewises are landowners in the Table 
Mountain subdivision who claim that their right to travel to and from their 
property by way of an easement dedicated for public use has been impeded by the 
Carnahans’ action of building a fence across the easement.  The controversy is one upon which a 
judgment by a court may effectively operate.  A judgment declaring that Mountain View 
Loop is, or is not, dedicated to the public use will operate to determine 
whether the Lewises are entitled to access their property by using the easement 
and whether the fence must go or stay.  
A judicial determination on those issues will act as a final judgment 
upon the parties’ rights.  The 
proceedings are genuinely adverse in character—the Lewises allege that they 
asked the Carnahans to remove the fence and the Carnahans refused, thereby 
impeding their use of the easement to access their property. 

 
[¶20]  In asserting the Lewises do not have 
standing to maintain this action the Carnahans argue that they lack any “legally 
protectable” interest in the easement.  
They rely on Owsley v. 
Robinson, 2003 WY 33, 65 P.3d 374 (Wyo. 2003) and Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. v. Billingsly, 
660 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1983).  In Owsley, the original owners of property 
filed a plat creating three separate tracts and identifying three 
easements:  a utility easement (A) 
along the western side of tract 2; a road and utility easement (B) along the 
southern side of tracts 2 and 3; and a utility easement (C) along the eastern 
side of tract 3.  Id., ¶ 3, 65 P.3d  at 375.  They conveyed tracts 2 and 3 to a second 
individual by deed identifying easements A and B and granting an additional road 
and utility easement (D) on the southern boundary of the tracts on other 
property they owned.   Id., ¶ 4, 65 P.3d  at 375.  The second individual subsequently sold 
tract 3 to the Owsleys by deed identifying easements A, B and D as well as 
another road and utility easement (E) along the west side of tract 2.  Id.  Easement E covered the same portion of 
tract 2 encumbered by easement A.  
Id., ¶ 5, 65 P.3d  at 376.  Later, the second individual sold tract 
2 to the Robinsons.  Upon 
discovering that the Owsleys were using easement E as a driveway, the Robinsons 
filed an action seeking a declaration as to the validity of easement E and 
quieting title to the easement in them.  
Id.  The district court granted summary 
judgment for the Robinsons, holding that upon the original owners’ recording of 
the plat, the public had a fee simple interest in the easements and the second 
owner had no authority to convey easement E to the Owsleys on land previously 
dedicated to the public.  Id.
 
[¶21]  This Court reversed the district court’s 
ruling.  Because easement A was a 
utility easement, we concluded it was not dedicated for use by the general 
public and was subject to the rules pertaining to non-public easements.  Id., ¶ 14, 65 P.3d  at 377.  We said:
 
An 
easement is an interest in land which entitles the easement holder to a limited 
use or enjoyment over another person’s property.  Provided the easement does not clearly 
indicate it is exclusive to the dominant owner, the owner of the servient estate 
retains the right to use the easement area.  The servient owner’s use of the easement 
area must not, however, interfere with the dominant use as articulated in the 
easement language.  In other words, 
both owners possess rights and each must as far as possible respect the other’s 
use.
 
Id., 
¶ 13, 65 P.3d  at 377 (internal citations omitted).  Because no evidence was presented that 
the Owsleys’ use of easement E exceeded the scope of the easement or caused an 
undue burden to the Robinsons’ servient estate, we concluded the Robinsons could 
not maintain their action for a judgment declaring the easement valid and 
quieting title to it in them. 
 
[¶22]  Owsley did not involve an easement 
dedicated to public use and is, therefore, factually distinguishable from the 
present case.  We said in Owsley that the Robinsons could not 
maintain an action for a judgment declaring easement E to have been set aside 
for public use because it was a utility easement that had not been set aside for 
public use.  However, we went on to 
say that if the easement had been set aside for public use, the public authority 
would hold title to it in trust for the public’s benefit “and the Robinsons 
would have no individual possessory interest in the easements and thus no 
standing to contest the Owsley’s use of Easement E.”  Id., ¶ 16, 65 P.3d  at 378 (citations 
omitted).  It is this statement the 
Carnahans point to in arguing that the Lewises lacked standing to bring this 
action for a judgment declaring that the Carnahans did not have authority to 
block their use of Mountain View Loop and ordering removal of the fence.  Because Laramie County holds title to it 
in trust for the public’s benefit, they contend, the Lewises have no possessory 
interest in Mountain View Loop and no standing to contest the Carnahans’ 
fence.
 
[¶23]  We reiterate that Owsley is factually distinguishable from 
the present case because it did not involve an easement dedicated to public 
use.  Additionally, in making the 
statement the Carnahans rely on in Owsley, the Court cited Ruby Drilling, 660 P.2d 377.  There, a drilling company installed a 
water line within the lines of a subdivision easement.  The Billingslys, who owned lots in the 
subdivision, brought an action against the company for trespass.  We concluded the easement was dedicated 
to the public.   Therefore, the 
Billingslys had only the right to use the easement to access their property; 
they had no possessory interest sufficient to support a trespass action.  We stated, however, that they “could 
have maintained an action for interference with their right to use the 
easement.”  Id. at 381.                   

 
[¶24]  In filing this action, the Lewises 
sought a judgment declaring that they have the right to use Mountain View Loop 
to access their property and the Carnahans do not have the right to interfere 
with that use by erecting a fence across it.  While the Lewises do not have the right, 
any more than the Billingslys did in Ruby 
Drilling, to exclusive possession of Mountain View Loop as required to 
maintain an action for trespass, they do have the right to seek a judgment 
declaring their right to use the public easement without interference by the 
Carnahans.  Our statement in Owsley was made in the context of 
easements that were not set aside for public use.  To the extent Owsley suggested in dicta that a 
landowner who has the right to use a road dedicated for public use does not have 
standing to seek a declaration as to his right, we now clarify that is not the 
law.  The Lewises have a legally 
protectable interest in Mountain View Loop sufficient to maintain an action for 
a judgment declaring the respective rights of the parties with respect to 
it.   
 
[¶25]  The Carnahans also assert the Lewises 
did not show they have been or will be harmed by construction of the fence 
across Mountain View Loop because the fence only blocks access to the easement 
where it enters the Carnahans’ property just south of County Road No. 20.  They maintain the Lewises have access to 
all of their property even with the fence because Mountain View Loop intersects 
County Road No. 20 at two points and the fence only impedes use of the easement 
across the Carnahan property south of one of those intersections.  The Carnahans submit the Lewises’ 
contention that without two points of access they may be unable to develop their 
property in the future is speculative and more than speculative harm is required 
to establish standing.   They 
assert the Lewises must show substantial, perceptible harm to have standing to 
pursue their claim. 
 
[¶26]  Addressing the concept of standing in 
the declaratory judgment context, we have said that a person must show a 
“perceptible,” rather than a “speculative” harm from the action; a remote 
possibility of injury is not sufficient to confer standing.  Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 
WY 36, ¶ 50, 226 P.3d 889, 911 (Wyo. 2010).  The Lewises own substantial property in 
a subdivision containing an easement dedicated to public use and platted to run 
through the subdivision from one access point to another.  The Carnahans have constructed a fence, 
contrary to the dedication, blocking the Lewises’ use of a portion of the 
easement to reach their property from one of the access points.  We find these facts sufficient to 
demonstrate perceptible harm, and conclude the district court correctly 
determined the Lewises had standing to bring their claim for declaratory relief. 

 
3.  Statute of 
Limitations
 
[¶27]  The statute of limitations for a 
declaratory judgment action is four years.  
Cox, 79 P.3d  at 509.  Statutes of limitations are triggered in 
Wyoming when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence of a cause 
of action.  Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 2009 WY 65, ¶ 
22, 208 P.3d 1296, 1304 (Wyo. 2009).  
That is, the statute begins to run when the claimant is chargeable with 
information which should lead him to believe he has a claim.  Id.  If the material facts are in dispute, 
the application of a statute of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact; 
otherwise, it is a question of law.  
Id.
 
[¶28]  The Carnahans contend the Lewises missed 
the statute because they did not file their complaint within four years of the 
date they were charged with knowledge that Mountain View Loop had been vacated 
or blocked.  The Carnahans assert 
the Lewises had constructive notice that it had been vacated when they purchased 
land surrounded by the subdivision in 1994 because the affidavit of vacation was 
on record in the Laramie County Clerk’s office and the word “vacated” was 
written on the plat.3  They contend the Lewises also had actual 
knowledge that access to Mountain View Loop was impeded when the Griffiths built 
their home on the easement in 1994.   
The Carnahans further contend the Lewises knew their access was impeded 
in 1995 or 1996 when the Griffiths erected a gate and fence with a no 
trespassing sign across the width of Mountain View Loop.  The Carnahans assert the Lewises were 
put on notice several more times by various events in 1999, 2002 and 2003. 

 
[¶29] 
The district court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed for 
trial as to when the Lewises discovered their claim.  After the trial, the district court made 
the following findings:
 
            
(9)       
At some point in 1995 or 1996, Troy Griffith installed a gate across 
Mountain View Loop on the border of his and the Lewises’ property, which he 
testified was meant to keep the public off his land.  He also hung a “No Trespassing” sign on 
the gate.  Nevertheless, Griffith 
allowed the Lewises and [another owner in the subdivision] to regularly pass 
through the unlocked gate and use the [Mountain View Loop].  Griffith testified he did so in part to 
be neighborly, and because the Lewises allowed him to graze his horses on their 
land.  Griffith also testified he 
allowed anyone else who wanted to use [Mountain View Loop] to do 
so.
            
. . . .
            
(18)  The Lewises 
occasionally used Mountain View Loop on the property after it was conveyed to 
the Carnahans, either by walking or driving all-terrain vehicles.  There is no indication that the 
Carnahans prohibited access to the road prior to the summer of 
2007.
            
(19)  In 2007, the Carnahans 
installed a fence on their property which blocked access to [Mountain View 
Loop].  They assert that the fence 
was only erected in order to protect newly installed landscaping from livestock, 
and that it was temporary in nature.  
In any event, the Lewises brought this action in August 2007, and the 
Carnahans have responded that the road is no longer open to them or the 
public.
            
. . . . 
(30)  . . . .   The uncontroverted evidence 
presented to this Court was that the Lewises and others were allowed access to 
and actually used Mountain View Loop following the 1994 affidavit.  In addition, while construction of the 
house, garage and septic system took place within the easement, [Mountain View 
Loop] is passable and one can drive entirely through Mountain View Loop without 
disturbing those structures.  There 
is simply no evidence that the Lewises were required to being suit in order to 
enjoy use of the [easement].
            
(31)  The first sign of a 
possible controversy may have started to arise in 2002 or 2003 when the County 
expressed its opinion that the subject tracts and [Mountain View Loop] were not 
effectively vacated.  At the time, 
Troy Griffith attempted to replat the tracts . . . with the hopes that such 
action would vacate the [easement].  
The Board of Commissioner[s] rejected the application, finding that it 
would abridge upon the Lewises’ and others’ rights to use Mountain View 
Loop.  The Carnahans chose to 
purchase the property despite the decision, and the Lewises continued to use and 
enjoy the [easement] without objection for several years. 
            
(32)  Given Troy Griffith’s 
attempt to replat the tracts, the Board’s subsequent decision, and the 
uncontested use of the [easement] before and after the decision, the Court 
cannot conclude that the Lewises’ had reason to know that a suit was required in 
order to enforce their right to use Mountain View Loop.  It was not clear that an actual and 
unsettled controversy had arisen until 2007 when the Carnahans erected a fence 
completely blocking access to the road.  
Because the suit was brought in August of the same year, it is not time 
barred.   

 
[¶30]  The district court’s findings are 
supported by the record.  Mr. and 
Mrs. Lewis testified that they used Mountain View Loop on a regular basis from 
the time they purchased the unplatted property in 1994 until the Carnahans 
blocked access by installing a fence and a gate in 2007.  Mr. Lewis testified that from 2003 when 
the Carnahans bought the property until they installed the fence and gate in 
2007, he and his wife continued to use Mountain View Loop without objection from 
the Carnahans.  Although Troy 
Griffith put up a gate and a no trespassing sign in 1995 or 1996, the Lewises 
testified they continued to use Mountain View Loop without objection by driving 
through the gate when it was open or opening the unlocked gate when it was 
closed.  Troy Griffith testified 
that he saw the Lewises using Mountain View Loop, they were welcome on his 
property and he never denied them access to his property.  Noel Griffith testified that he never 
instructed the Lewises not to drive on Mountain View Loop.  Mr. Carnahan also testified that he did 
not object to Mr. Lewis driving on the portion of Mountain View Loop on the 
Carnahans’ property because he was trying to be neighborly.     
 
[¶31]  In addition to this evidence, Mr. Lewis 
testified that he was not told prior to purchasing the unplatted portion of his 
property in 1994 that Mountain View Loop had been vacated.  Mr. Lewis testified that he did not look 
at the official plat recorded with the county when he purchased the property and 
was not aware of the attempt to vacate Mountain View Loop; he relied on the plat 
provided to him by the seller.  He 
testified that when he purchased additional tracts in 1999, the developer 
assured him Mountain View Loop was intact.  
Mr. Lewis testified that he became aware in 2003 that the Griffiths were 
trying to re-plat their property to remove tract lines and Mountain View 
Loop.  He attended county meetings 
concerning the re-plat and was present when the Board of County Commissioners 
denied the re-plat.  Based on the 
denial, Mr. Lewis believed the matter was settled.  He testified that it was not until after 
the Carnahans installed the fence and locked gate in 2007 that his family was 
denied use of Mountain View Loop.   

 
[¶32]  Having examined all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record, giving due regard to the district court’s 
opportunity to assess witness credibility, and being mindful that our review 
does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence or substituting ourselves for the 
trial court, we conclude there is evidence to support the district court’s 
factual findings.  Strong Constr., Inc. v. City of 
Torrington, 2011 WY 82, ¶ 9, 255 P.3d 903, 907 (Wyo. 2011).  Our review of the evidence does not 
leave us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  Id.  Rather, the evidence fully supports the 
district court’s conclusion that the Lewises were not chargeable with 
information which should have lead them to believe they had a claim until 2007 
when their access to and use of Mountain View Loop was obstructed by the 
Carnahans’ erection of a fence with a locked gate.  The statute of limitations did not begin 
to run until then and the Lewises filed their complaint the same year.  Their claims were not barred by the 
statute of limitations.       

 
4.  Laches
 
[¶33]  The Carnahans also assert the Lewises’ claims 
are barred under the equitable doctrine of laches.  
 
“Laches 
is defined as such delay in enforcing one’s rights that it works to the 
disadvantage of another.”  Dorsett v. Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶ 9, 61 P.3d 1221, 1224 (Wyo.2003).  The 
defense of laches is based in equity and whether it applies in a given case 
depends upon the circumstances.  Hammond v. Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 201 
(Wyo.2000); Moncrief v. Sohio Petroleum 
Co., 775 P.2d 1021, 1024-25 (Wyo.1989).  There are two elements which must be 
shown to establish the defense of laches--inexcusable delay in the assertion of 
a right and injury, prejudice or disadvantage to the defendants.  Moncrief, 775 P.2d  at 
1025.
 
Ultra 
Resources, 
¶ 123, 226 P.3d 889 at 929. 
 
[¶34]  The district court concluded laches was 
not a defense to the Lewises’ claims for two reasons.  First, the actual controversy was not 
fully developed until 2007 and so there was no inexcusable delay in bringing the 
action.  Second, the Carnahans were 
made fully aware before they purchased the Griffith property that Mountain View 
Loop may not have been properly vacated in 1994 and that the Board of County 
Commissioners had denied the application for re-plat in 2003.  Therefore, the district court concluded, 
the Carnahans could not rely on equity to contend that their injuries resulted 
from the Lewises’ failure to bring their suit earlier.
 
[¶35]  As we have discussed above, the district 
court’s findings and conclusions that the Lewises did not have reason to bring 
this action until 2007 and, therefore, did not delay in bringing it are fully 
supported by the record.  
Additionally, the record supports the conclusion that the Carnahans knew 
Mountain View Loop had not been vacated and purchased the property anyway.  Noel Griffith testified unequivocally 
that he told the Carnahans before he attempted to have the property re-platted 
that the 1994 vacation was invalid.  
He also testified that he told the Carnahans he would work with them to 
get Mountain View Loop relocated.  
He testified that he offered to contribute $5,000 toward the effort.  He testified that the Carnahans 
purchased the property knowing that Mountain View Loop had not been vacated and 
he had not been successful in getting it relocated.  In light of this testimony, the 
Carnahans failed to prove that their injuries were caused by any action or 
inaction by the Lewises.   

 
5.  Affidavit to Vacate 
Plat
 
[¶36]  As reflected in the facts set out above, 
the Griffiths attempted to vacate the plat lines and Mountain View Loop on their 
portion of the subdivision by filing an affidavit for vacation which was 
recorded by Laramie County on March 2, 1994.  The affidavit was signed by Noel and 
Colleen Ann Griffith.  

 
[¶37]  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-12-102 (LexisNexis 
2011) provides in relevant part:
 
            
Every original owner or proprietor of any tract or parcel of land, who 
has heretofore subdivided, or shall hereafter subdivide the same into three (3) 
or more parts for the purpose of  
laying out any . . . suburban lots, shall cause a plat of such 
subdivision . . . to be made . . . .
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-12-103 (LexisNexis 2011) provides:
 
            
Every such plat . . . shall be signed by the owners and proprietors, and 
shall be duly acknowledged before some officer authorized to take the 
acknowledgement of deeds.  The plat 
shall meet the approval of the board of county commissioners if it is of land 
situated without the boundaries of any city or town. . . .    When thus executed, 
acknowledged and approved, said plat shall be filed for record and recorded in 
the office of the clerk of the proper county[.]
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-12-106 (LexisNexis 2011), governing the vacation of plats, 
provides:
 
Any 
such plat may be vacated by the proprietors thereof at any time before the sale 
of any lots therein, by a written instrument declaring the same to be vacated, 
duly executed, acknowledged or proved and recorded in the same office with the 
plat to be vacated, 
and the execution and recording of such writing shall operate to destroy the 
force and effect of the recording of the plat so vacated, and to divest all 
public rights in the streets, alleys, commons and public grounds laid out or 
described in such plat, and in case where any lots have been sold, the 
plat may be vacated as herein provided, by all the owners of lots in such plat 
joining in the execution of the writing aforesaid. 

 
[¶38]  In the present case, the original owner 
or proprietor of Table Mountain Ranches had sold lots within the subdivision at 
the time the Griffiths sought to vacate the plat.  Pursuant to § 34-12-106, therefore, in 
order to vacate the plat, all owners of lots in the plat had to join in a 
written instrument, duly executed, acknowledged and recorded in the Laramie 
County Clerk’s office, declaring the plat to be vacated.  It is undisputed that the Griffiths were 
the only owners of lots in the subdivision to execute the affidavit of vacation; 
no other owners of lots in the plat joined in the affidavit.  Consequently, the effort to vacate the 
plat was not done in accordance with Wyoming law. 
 
[¶39]  This Court has established the principle 
that, once a road becomes a public road, the public has a vested right to use 
it, and it “cannot be vacated . . . without compliance with the appropriate 
statutes.”  Sare v. Sheridan County Bd. of County 
Comm’rs, 784 P.2d 593, 595 (Wyo. 1989), quoting Sheridan County v. Spiro, 697 P.2d 290, 303 (Wyo. 1985) and citing Bd. of County 
Comm’rs, Carbon County v. White, 547 P.2d 1195 (Wyo. 1976).  There is no question from the language 
contained in the original plat that the owner intended to dedicate Mountain View 
Loop for public use.  Consequently, 
the Griffiths could not vacate it without following the statutory 
procedures.  They did not follow 
those procedures; therefore, the attempt to vacate Mountain View Loop was not 
effective. 
 
[¶40]  Citing Moorcroft v. Lang, 779 P.2d 1180, 1184 
(Wyo. 1989), the Carnahans assert that after an original owner or proprietor 
sells lots in a subdivision, the decision to vacate a street in the subdivision 
belongs to the owners of lots abutting the street.  Because the only lots sold before the 
Griffiths vacated the plat did not abut the portion of Mountain View Loop they 
attempted to vacate, and only the Griffiths’ lots abutted that portion of the 
easement, the Carnahans maintain the Griffiths acted in accordance with the 
statutes.   

 
[¶41]  The issue in Moorcroft was whether a mineral interest 
underlying a street dedicated to public use transferred with the sale of lots 
adjoining the street to the lot owners, or whether the original owner-developer 
retained the mineral interest.  A 
majority of the court held that the mineral interest remained with the 
owner-developer.  In reaching that 
result, the Court addressed generally the interests created when an 
owner-developer dedicates a street for public use and vacates the street before 
any lots are sold, as compared to when a developer sells lots and vacation is 
sought after the sale.  In the first 
instance, it is clearly the developer who has the authority to vacate the 
street.  In the second instance, the 
authority to vacate the street transfers from the developer to the new 
owners.  
 
[¶42]  In the course of that discussion, the 
Court said in dicta that upon the sale of lots within a plat “the decision to 
vacate [a street] belongs to the abutting lot owners.”  This statement is correct to the extent 
that it means upon the sale of lots in a plat, the developer no longer has the 
authority to vacate; that authority belongs to the lot owners.  The statement is incorrect to the extent 
it suggests owners of lots abutting a portion of a plat dedicated to public use 
can unilaterally vacate that portion of the plat.  The express language of § 34-12-106 
provides that, after lots have been sold, a plat may be vacated “by all 
owners of lots in such plat joining” in a written, duly executed and 
acknowledged statement and recording it in the office where the plat is 
recorded.  The Griffiths did not 
have the authority to vacate any portion of Mountain View Loop without all 
owners of lots in the plat joining in the written instrument recorded in the 
Laramie County Clerk’s office.
 
[¶43]  The Carnahans also cite Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 34-12-108 (LexisNexis 2011) which provides for partial vacation of a plat as 
follows:
 
            
Any part of a plat may be vacated under the provisions, and subject to 
the conditions of this act [§§ 34-12-101 through 34-12-104, 34-12-106 through 
34-12-115]; provided, such vacating does not abridge or destroy any of the 
rights and privileges of other proprietors in said plat[.] 

 
They 
assert the Griffiths’ attempt to vacate Mountain View Loop did not abridge or 
destroy any of the rights and privileges of other owners because the vacation 
did not affect access to other lots.  
Presumably, the Carnahans mean that no rights were affected because the 
vacation did not involve either eastern access from County Road No. 20 to lots 
221 and 222 or western access from the county road to the remaining lots in the 
subdivision.    
 
[¶44]  In addressing the Carnahans’ claims that 
the Lewises lacked standing to pursue this action because they could not 
demonstrate perceptible harm, we concluded the Lewises showed sufficient 
harm.  Our resolution of that issue 
applies equally in the context of the Carnahans’ assertion that vacation of the 
portion of Mountain View Loop on their property did not affect the Lewises’ 
rights.  As we have said, the 
Lewises own property in a subdivision containing an easement dedicated to public 
use and platted to run through the subdivision from one access point to 
another.  The Carnahans constructed 
a fence, contrary to the dedication, blocking the Lewises’ use of a portion of 
the easement to get to and from their property from one of the access 
points.  Clearly, the 1994 Affidavit 
to Vacate the easement affected their rights.  The district court correctly concluded 
that the 1994 Affidavit did not comply with Wyoming law and was not effective to 
vacate Mountain View Loop.  Our 
resolution of this issue makes it unnecessary to address the Carnahans’ trespass 
claim.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶45]  This action resulted from an 
unfortunate, to say the least, set of circumstances.  Laramie County played a direct role in 
allowing a private landowner to build a home on a public easement.  Despite the seeming inequities, however, 
the law does not provide a means to rectify the situation.  It would be this Court’s hope that the 
parties, together with the County, could work together to resolve this matter by 
relocating Mountain View Loop a reasonable distance from the Carnahans’ home to 
allow them at least to sell the property if it is not acceptable to them to live 
there with the road crossing their property.  While it is difficult to tell without 
actually seeing the property, it appears from some of the trial exhibits that 
where the current road jogs to the east and runs into the residence, it could 
instead head southeast across what appears to be prairie and rejoin the existing 
road where it turns west toward the Lewises’ property.  
 
[¶46]  The Lewises had standing to maintain an 
action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.  Their claims were not barred by the 
statute of limitations or the equitable doctrine of laches.  The Griffiths’ 1994 Affidavit did not 
comply with Wyoming law and was not effective, therefore, to vacate the easement 
dedicated to public use through the subdivision.  The Lewises have the right to use 
Mountain View Loop, including the portion that crosses the Carnahans’ 
property.  The Carnahans are 
permanently enjoined from obstructing access along Mountain View Loop.   
 
[¶47]  The orders and judgment of the district 
court are affirmed.      

 
 
FOOTNOTES
1Mr. Carnahan testified the petition to re-plat was filed in order to help 
the Carnahans obtain financing to purchase the property.  Noel Griffith testified he filed the 
petition after he was called to a meeting with county representatives in 2002 
and informed that the 1994 affidavit to vacate the plat was not done correctly 
and the County did not accept it.    

 
2The district court’s order does not state the grounds for the 
dismissal.  In its brief supporting 
its motion, the County asserted the Carnahans’ quiet title and ejectment claims 
were barred by sovereign immunity and were in any event not cognizable because 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-12-106 through 111 provide the exclusive means for  vacating a public easement.  The County also argued equitable 
estoppel did not apply to governmental functions and it could not be estopped 
for unauthorized acts of its officers and employees.   
3The record suggests the word “vacated” was written on the original plat 
and then at least partially erased.  
It is not clear from the record who wrote the word “vacated” on the plat, 
when it was written or who erased it and when.  The deputy county clerk testified that 
since she began working at the clerk’s office in 2003, she and any customer who 
comes into the office have had access to the original plats but no one is 
permitted to take them out of the room where they are kept.