Title: Putnam v. Putnam

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Putnam v. Putnam  (95-535); 166 Vt. 108; 689 A.2d 446

[Filed 20-Dec-1996]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 95-535

Catherine A. Putnam                               Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           Windham Family Court

Jeffrey S. Putnam, Sr.                            September Term, 1996

John P. Wesley, J.

       Gwendolyn W. Harris of Kiewel & Harris, P.C., Brattleboro, for
  plaintiff-appellee

       David A. Gibson, Brattleboro, for defendant-appellant

PRESENT:       Allen, C.J., Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and
  Mandeville, D.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       ALLEN, C.J.  Defendant husband appeals from a final order of the
  Windham Family Court in a divorce action in which the court awarded legal
  rights and responsibilities for the parties' minor child to plaintiff wife. 
  Husband claims that the court erred by (1) striking the final stipulation
  of the parties in which they agreed, with court approval, to joint legal
  responsibility for their child and payment of $7500 from husband to wife;
  (2) denying his motion for appointment of an attorney to represent the
  interests of the child; (3) awarding wife sole legal and physical
  responsibility for the child; and (4) awarding $12,000 to wife as her share
  of the equity in the marital home.  We affirm.

       Husband and wife married in 1987 and had a son in 1991.  Since 1994
  husband has been employed by the buildings department of a college.  Prior
  to that date he worked for a plumbing service.  Wife has been employed as a
  school bus driver since 1990.  According to the trial court, the marriage
  was "characterized by a high degree of criticism and intolerance" with
  husband often degrading wife's performance as a wife and mother.  Although
  husband was not

 

  regularly physically abusive toward wife, the court found that in spring of
  1993, he "became violently angry over being refused sex . . . [and] kicked
  her repeatedly until she was forced to leave their bed and bedroom."  It
  also found that, "[i]n a manner which [wife] took as serious, [husband] has
  indicated that he has felt angry enough to kill her."

       Prior to the bedroom incident the couple discussed divorce but decided
  to stay together for their son.  Husband also made it clear that he would
  fight wife for custody if she insisted on a separation.  After the
  incident, however, wife began to spend a substantial amount of time away
  from the marital home.  On several occasions she stayed out late or did not
  return home, spending some time with a male companion.  During these
  periods, husband cared for the child. Wife arranged to be home when husband
  was not present and while at home she cared for the child.

       In 1992 husband's parents gave the parties the house in which they had
  been living since 1987.  In fall of 1993 husband and wife negotiated a
  $40,000 mortgage on the home.  The purpose of the financing was, in part,
  to provide wife with money to buy her own residence. Husband gave wife
  $1700 from the mortgage proceeds when the parties separated in October
  1993.

       When wife left, husband did not allow her to take the child, who was
  almost two years old.  From October 1993 to the filing of the divorce
  action by wife in February 1994, the child resided primarily with husband. 
  Prior to their separation, both parents had shared responsibility for their
  son, although wife was principally responsible for his day-to-day care and,
  as the trial court found, almost entirely responsible for his medical care.

       On the same day that wife commenced this action for divorce, the court
  issued a final order of relief from abuse, finding that husband had
  physically abused wife during an altercation concerning parent-child
  contact.  The court also decreed shared custody of the parties' son with
  exchanges of the child to be conducted through wife's adult daughter. 
  Following several modifications and an uncontested hearing, the parties
  signed a final stipulation on September 12,

 

  1994.  The agreement called for joint legal responsibility and a
  continuation of the schedule set forth in previous temporary orders.  The
  stipulation also required husband to pay wife $7500 for her interest in the
  marital residence.

       The court approved the final stipulation on September 13 and directed
  counsel to prepare a written order.  On September 26, wife, through her new
  attorney, moved to strike the stipulation, arguing that she had entered
  into the agreement under duress.  Wife also moved for appointment of a
  guardian ad litem (GAL).  The court appointed a GAL and issued an order of
  divorce reserving for further hearing the issues of parental rights and
  responsibilities and property distribution.  The court set aside the final
  stipulation on March 2, 1995.  It found that wife signed the stipulation
  while under duress and described the agreement as a fraud upon the court
  involving collusion between the parties.  Husband then moved for
  appointment of an attorney to represent the child, which the court denied.

       After a hearing on the merits, the court decreed sole legal and
  physical responsibility for the child to wife, subject to husband's right
  to parent-child contact.  The court also valued the parties' equity in the
  residence at $35,000 and awarded wife $12,000 as her share.

       On appeal, husband first contends that the court erred in striking the
  final stipulation of the parties because there is no evidence of duress,
  collusion, or fraud.  He maintains that "[t]here may well have been
  pressure, as there is in every contested suit, to bring matters to a
  close," but such pressure is not sufficient to justify the setting aside of
  the stipulation.  Wife argues that the evidence was sufficient to support
  the court's findings and its order striking the final stipulation.(FN1)

 

       Although we agree with husband that "this Court should reinforce the
  policy that settlement agreements between parties are to be promoted and
  should be enforced," we also note that the policy favors "voluntary
  settlement of marital disputes."  Bendekgey v. Bendekgey, 154 Vt. 193, 197,
  576 A.2d 433, 435 (1990) (emphasis added).  A court-approved, property
  distribution agreement can be set aside if there is a showing of "fraud,
  unconscionable advantage, impossibility of performance, hampering
  circumstances beyond the expectation of the parties, collusion, or duress." 
  Burr v. Burr, 148 Vt. 207, 209,