Title: Service Steel Warehouse Co., L.P. v. United States Steel Corp.

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 21S-CC-408 
Service Steel Warehouse Co., L.P., 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
–v– 
United States Steel Corp., 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
Argued: October 28, 2021 | Decided: March 10, 2022 
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court 
No. 45D02-1311-CC-828 
The Honorable Calvin D. Hawkins, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 20A-CC-1643 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Mar 10 2022, 9:26 am
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Massa, Justice. 
A supplier sold steel for a project to a fabricator who did not perform 
any work on the project site. The supplier later sued to foreclose on its 
mechanic’s lien against the site. The trial court granted summary 
judgment for the site’s owner because the fabricator’s lack of on-site work 
meant it was also a supplier, and case law barred supplier-to-supplier-
based liens. An appellate panel reversed, because it found the fabricator 
was a subcontractor, even if it did not perform on-site work, so the 
supplier could have a lien. 
We now conclude the supplier can have a lien, because it furnished 
materials for the project, which is all the mechanic’s lien statute required. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand.  
Facts and Procedural History 
United States Steel Corp. contracted with Carbonyx, Inc. to design and 
build two facilities in Gary. Carbonyx contracted with Steven Pounds, 
who did business as Troll Supply, to fabricate steel for the project. Service 
Steel Warehouse Co., L.P. sold steel for the project to Troll Supply, and it 
even identified the project on its invoices. The fabrication involved 
significant labor—cutting, welding, drilling, painting, and connecting 
thousands of pieces of steel to the exact specifications necessary for the 
project. Troll Supply did not perform any work at the project site, which 
would have been impossible. The fabricated steel ultimately ended up at 
the site. 
Troll Supply did not pay all its bills and ultimately owed Service Steel 
$452,825.03. Service Steel recorded a mechanic’s lien against the project 
site and sued U.S. Steel to foreclose on it. Both parties moved for summary 
judgment. Relevant here, U.S. Steel argued that because Troll Supply did 
not perform on-site work, it was a material supplier of fabricated steel, not 
a subcontractor. And that meant Service Steel, also a material supplier, 
could not have a lien. The trial court granted summary judgment for U.S. 
Steel on the mechanic’s lien claim. Although the court did not provide a 
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basis for its ruling, the parties agree it was based on the prohibition 
against supplier-to-supplier-based liens. Service Steel appealed.  
Our Court of Appeals reversed. It found the mechanic’s lien statute 
does not require subcontractors to perform on-site work. Serv. Steel 
Warehouse Co., L.P. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 171 N.E.3d 115, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2021), vacated. It then defined a “subcontractor” under the statute “as one 
who performs a definite, substantial portion of the prime contract.” Id. at 
123. Under that test, “Troll Supply was a subcontractor, not a material 
supplier,” so the prohibition against supplier-to-supplier-based liens did 
not bar Service Steel’s lien. Id. at 123–24.  
U.S. Steel petitioned for transfer, which we granted. Serv. Steel 
Warehouse Co., L.P. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 173 N.E.3d 1021 (Ind. 2021).  
Standard of Review 
We review summary judgment decisions de novo and apply the same 
standard as the trial court. City of Marion v. London Witte Grp., LLC, 169 
N.E.3d 382, 390 (Ind. 2021). Summary judgment is proper only “if the 
designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We draw all reasonable inferences in 
the non-moving party’s favor. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 
2009). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review 
de novo. ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 
1195 (Ind. 2016).  
Discussion and Decision 
Indiana’s broad mechanic’s lien statute has long been interpreted to 
only confer lien rights on suppliers who furnished materials to a recipient 
who performed on-site work, which meant a contractor or subcontractor. 
The status of the recipient—here, Troll Supply—determined a supplier’s 
ability to acquire a lien. That interpretation, however, is incorrect.  
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Because a mechanic’s lien is purely a creation of statute, the General 
Assembly determines who can have one. And it has broadly conferred 
lien rights on suppliers, regardless of whether they furnish materials to a 
contractor, subcontractor, or another supplier. If a supplier, like Service 
Steel, furnishes materials for the erection of a building, it can have a lien.  
I. Under the mechanic’s lien statute, a supplier can 
have a lien by furnishing materials, regardless of 
the recipient, for the erection of a building.  
A mechanic’s lien is a statutory tool to help collect payment for labor 
and materials that improve real property. Premier Invs. v. Suites of Am., 
Inc., 644 N.E.2d 124, 130 (Ind. 1994). It prevents landowners from enjoying 
their improved property while those who provided the labor and 
materials get the shaft. See id. A mechanic’s lien statute has long been part 
of Indiana law. Although its precise language has differed, it has 
continually conferred broad rights on suppliers. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 3, 
1834, ch. 87, 1834 Ind. Acts 165, 165 (allowing “all others . . . furnishing 
materials for the construction or repair of any building” in a town or 
within a half-mile of a town to have a lien); Act of Mar. 9, 1889, ch. 123, 
1889 Ind. Acts 257, 257 (allowing “all persons . . . furnishing material or 
machinery for erecting . . . any house, mill, manufactory or other 
building” to have a lien). The statute currently allows “[a] contractor, a 
subcontractor, a mechanic, a lessor leasing construction and other 
equipment and tools, . . . a journeyman, a laborer, or any other person 
performing labor or furnishing materials or machinery . . . for the erection 
. . . of a house, mill, manufactory, or other building” to have a lien on that 
building and the accompanying land. Ind. Code § 32-28-3-1(a)(1)(A), (b) 
(2013). A party seeking a lien must prove it falls within the statute. Premier 
Invs., 644 N.E.2d at 127.  
Although Indiana’s statute is broad, at times it has been interpreted to 
not support supplier-to-supplier-based liens. See, e.g., Caulfield v. Polk, 17 
Ind. App. 429, 436–37, 46 N.E. 932, 934 (1897). In other words, a supplier 
who furnished materials to another supplier could not have a lien. City of 
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Evansville v. Verplank Concrete & Supply, Inc., 400 N.E.2d 812, 819 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1980). A supplier had to furnish materials to someone who 
performed work on the project site, which meant a contractor or 
subcontractor (or the owner, of course). Id. at 819–20. The prohibition 
against supplier-to-supplier-based liens protected landowners, because 
“[i]f one material man furnishing material to another material man ha[d] a 
right to a lien, then any material man, no matter how far removed, ha[d] 
the same right.” Caulfield, 17 Ind. App. at 437, 46 N.E. at 934.  
That prohibition conflicts with the statute’s plain language, which 
unambiguously allows any person who furnishes materials for the 
erection of a building to have a lien “without any limitation in respect to 
the person to whom the materials are furnished.” Colter v. Frese, 45 Ind. 96, 
100 (1873); I.C. § 32-28-3-1(a)(1)(A). And when “a statute is clear and 
unambiguous on its face, no room exists for judicial construction.” 
Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ind. 2011). 
In Barker v. Buell, an early lien case, the governing statute allowed “all 
persons performing labor, or furnishing materials for the construction . . .  
of any building” to have a lien. 35 Ind. 297, 299 (1871) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Under that statute, we found it “was 
not necessary” for a supplier to furnish materials to a landowner or 
contractor to have a lien. Id. at 302. Rather, the supplier there had a lien 
because his bricks “were furnished to a sub-contractor, and used in the 
erection of a new building, and this is all that was necessary, according to 
[the governing statute], to give the party furnishing them a right to 
acquire a lien.” Id. We recognized the supplier’s rights did not depend on 
whom he supplied, because that was irrelevant under the statute. 
In Colter v. Frese, we were “earnestly pressed to reconsider” Barker, only 
to “again reach[] the same conclusion” under the same broad statute. 45 
Ind. at 98. We emphasized that the statute provided that “all persons . . . 
furnishing materials for the construction or repair of any building, shall 
have a lien, without any limitation in respect to the person to whom the 
materials are furnished.” Id. at 100. That conclusion—faithful to the 
statute’s plain language—remains true while the statute continues to 
unambiguously confer broad lien rights on suppliers. 
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And in Smith v. Newbaur, we cited Barker to acknowledge that “[i]f the 
materials are furnished for the building to one who has authority to place 
them in it, and they are so placed in the building, the right to a material 
man’s lien is thereby acquired.” 144 Ind. 95, 101, 42 N.E. 40, 42 (1895). And 
that was true: a supplier could have a lien in that situation. But that 
acknowledgment was made while concluding there was “no difference in 
the rights of those who furnish materials to contractors and those who 
furnish them to subcontractors,” which was the issue before this Court. Id. 
Like Barker and Colter, Smith affirmed that suppliers’ lien rights are 
determined by statute, not arbitrary, nonstatutory limits based on the 
recipient of the materials. 
Subsequent intermediate appellate court decisions misconstrued and 
departed from Barker, Colter, and Smith by not staying faithful to the 
statute’s plain language. Instead, they formulated a rule that limited 
suppliers’ lien rights: A supplier can only have a lien by furnishing 
materials to a party who performs on-site work, i.e., a contractor or 
subcontractor. See Caulfield, 17 Ind. App. at 434, 437, 46 N.E. at 933–34 
(citing Smith and Colter and concluding the statute “makes no provision 
for a lien in favor of one who simply sells materials to another who is 
himself but a material man”); Rudolph Hegener Co. v. Frost, 60 Ind. App. 
108, 112, 108 N.E. 16, 17 (1915) (concluding there was “no reason to depart 
from the holding in Caulfield . . . that a materialman furnishing material to 
another materialman has no right to a mechanic’s lien”); Verplank, 400 
N.E.2d at 819–20 (citing Barker, Colter, Caulfield, and Frost before affirming 
that a supplier to a supplier has no lien rights). We now disapprove of that 
demonstrably erroneous, though longstanding, rule. See Gamble v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984–85 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
The mechanic’s lien statute unambiguously confers broad lien rights on 
suppliers and does not require them to furnish materials to one who 
performs on-site work. I.C. § 32-28-3-1(a); Colter, 45 Ind. at 100. Barker, 
Colter, and Smith affirmed that suppliers did not have to furnish materials 
to a specific party to have a lien. Today, we follow those decisions and 
again affirm that, under the statute, a supplier’s lien rights do not depend 
on whom it supplies. While there may be valid reasons to prohibit 
supplier-to-supplier-based liens, that decision rests with the legislature, 
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not the courts. See Ind. Const. art. 3, § 1; WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Se. Schs., 
178 N.E.3d 1187, 1192 (Ind. 2022); Premier Invs., 644 N.E.2d at 127. 
Under Indiana’s mechanic’s lien statute, a supplier that furnished 
materials for the erection of a building, regardless of the recipient, can 
have a lien on that building and the accompanying land. Of course, the 
supplier must have furnished the materials “for the particular building 
upon which” it bases its lien. Talbott v. Goddard, 55 Ind. 496, 502 (1876); I.C. 
§ 32-28-3-1(b). Here, the evidence—including Service Steel’s invoices—
establishes that Service Steel furnished steel for the erection of U.S. Steel’s 
facilities. Accordingly, it can have a lien on the project site.  
Conclusion 
We reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for U.S. Steel 
and remand for reconsideration of Service Steel’s summary judgment 
motion in light of this opinion.  
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
Joshua W. Casselman 
Rubin & Levin, P.C. 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLE E  
Kevin E. Steele 
Burke Costanza & Carberry LLP 
Valparaiso, Indiana