Title: State v. Kessebeer. ICA mem.op., filed 02/29/2008 [pdf], 118 Haw. 209. ICA Order of Correction, filed 03/28/2008 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 07/08/2008 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LawusRrany

‘+0 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST

 

WOWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

00 —.

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee-Respondent,

ANTHONY KASSEBEER JR., Defendant-Appellent-Petitidhs

Paw
yrs

No. 27660

rive
qatd

 

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 04=1-0688) al

ghd} | ds 0000

SEPTEMBER 30, 2008

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

on May 29, 2008, the defendant-appellant-petitioner
Anthony Kassebeer, Jr., filed an application for a writ of

certiorari, urging this court to review the merorandum opinion of
the Intermediate Court of Appeals

(ICA) in State v. Kassebeer,
No. 27660

(Hawai'i Ct. App. February 29, 2008) (ICA’s mem. op.).
The ICA affirmed the Novenber 16, 2005 judgment of conviction and
sentence of the circuit court of the first circuit, the Honorable
Dexter D. Del Rosario presiding, convicting Kassebeer of sexual
assault in the first degree, in violation of Hawai'i Revised

Statutes (HRS) § 707-730(2) (a) (Supp. 2003),* and kidnapping, in

 

2 was § 707-730(2) (a) provicest

(2) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the first
degree if:

(3) The person knowingly subjects another person to an act
of sexual penetration by strong compulsion

 
 

46° FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
violation of HRS § 707-720(1) (e) (1983).? Kassebeer raises the
following arguments: (1) he was denied his constitutional right
to a fair trial through cumulative errors by the circuit courts
(2) the cizeuit court erred in admitting Kassebeer's handgun into
evidences (3) the circuit court erred in admitting into evidence
testimony of a prior incident of physical abuse by Kassebeer
against Kassebeer’s wife at the time of the incident (the
complainant); (4) the circuit court failed to deliver a specific
unanimity instruction as to the charge of kidnapping? (5) the
circuit court erred in communicating its opinion that an offense
had actually been conmitted; (6) the circuit court erred in

preventing Kassebeer from effectively confronting and cross~

 

examining witnesse: ppellee-respondent

 

called by the plaintifé~
State of Hawai'i (the prosecution); and (7) the circuit court
erred in refusing to grant Kassebeer’s three motions for
mistrial,

For the reasons that follow, we hold that the ICA erred
in concluding (1) that the circuit court did not plainly err when
it failed to include a specific unanimity instruction regarding
the kidnapping charge and (2) that the circuit court did not

BRS § 207-720(2) provides:

(2) A person commits the offen
intentionally or knowingly zestvaine ancther person with intent to:
(a) Hold that person for ransom or reward:
(b) Use thot person ae a shield or hostages
[c)_ Facilitate the conniseion of 8 felony or flight
teri
(a). Inflict bodily injury upon that person or subject
person to a sexual offen
fe) Terrorize that person or a third person; or
[f) Interfere with the performance of any gov
political function.

of kidnapping if the person

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
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prevent Kassebeer from effectively confronting and cross-
examining the complainant. We therefore vacate the ICA's March
28, 2008 judgment and the circuit court's November 16, 2005
judgment. This matter is remanded to the circuit court for a new

trial on the first degree sexual assault and kidnapping counts.

T. BACKGROUND

At the tine of the trial, Kassebeer and the complainant
were divorced, but they had previously been married for over six
years and had two children. They had shared a residence in Pearl
City (the residence) until mid-March 2004, when Kassebeer
voluntarily moved out due to marital problems. Kassebeer went to
live with his sister, Krystal Kassebeer. Kassebeer and the
complainant kept in contact following the separation, including
continued sexual relations “at least once or twice,” the last
instance occurring a week prior to the events at issue.
Kassebeer and the complainant were involved in incidents on the
evening of April 9, 2004, the early morning of april 10, 2004,
land the afternoon of April 10, 2004, the facts of which were
disputed at trial.

on April 13, 2004, an C'ahu grand jury returned an
indictment charging Kassebeer with sexual assault in the first
degree, in violation of HRS § 707-730(1) (a), sexual assault in
the third degree, in violation of HRS § 707-732(1) (£) (Supp.
2004),? and kidnapping, in violation of HRS § 707-720(1) (e).

2 ups § 107-7321) (#1 provides:

(2) A person commits the offense of sexual sesault in the third degree

(continsed.--)

 
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Prior to the commencement of trial, the circuit court
heard motions in limine from both parties. The circuit court
ruled that all testimony regarding the complainant's use of or
trafficking in illegal drugs be excluded, except for her use of
drugs that would affect her ability to perceive or renember

of the incidents. Kassebeer argued that the

 

events on the dat!
incident that occurred in the early morning of April 10, 2004
constituted @ prior bad act that should be excluded under Hawai'i
Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 403 due to its “minimal probative
value and exceedingly great prejudice.” The circuit court ruled
that all testimony concerning alleged prior incidents of
physical, emotional, or verbal abuse by Kassebeer against the

complainant be excluded, with an exception for the alleged use of

 

force by Kassebeer against the complainant on the early morning
of April 10, Following jury selection, the trial began on August

5, 2005.

continued)
a

 

(£] Te person knowingly, by strong compulsion, nas sexual
Contact with another pefson or causes another person to have
Sexoal contact with the actor,

 

‘RE Rule 403, entitled "Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, of waste of time,” states in fal

 

 

Although relevant, evidence nay be excluded if its probative
value {5 substantisily outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, of misleading the jury, or by
Considerations of undue delay, waste of tine, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence

4

 

 
 

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AL Dejal

At trial, the prosecution called Honolulu Police
Department (HPD) Officer Barbara Donato, Andrew Kim (Kim), HPD
Detective Dennis Kim (Detective Kim), Tabatha Hashimoto-Matautia,
and the complainant as witnesses. The defense called Krystal
Kassebeer, Nadine Tan-Salle, M.D., and Kassebeer as witnesses
The following facts are taken from the testimony adduced at trial
and are organized by incident.

1, The April 2% 2004 late night incident

Kassebeer, Andrew Kim, and Christopher Freitas were
driving around Waikiki on the night of April 9, 2004, when they
saw the complainant’s truck going towards the Hilton Hawaiian
Village (the Hilton). They followed the truck to the Hilton
because Kassebeer suspected that the complainant was driving to
rendezvous with another man, but she was in fact going there to
pick up Hashimoto-Matautia, who worked in one of the stores
located within the Hilton.

At the Hilton, Kassebeer attempted to talk with the
complainant, who refused to roll down her window. Kassebeer
noticed that the complainant had a black eye and an injured lip,
80 he inquired as to how she received the injuries, but the
complainant became upset and told Kassebeer to leave her alone.
‘The complainant attempted to drive off, which prompted Kassebeer
to jump into the bed of her truck: eventually, she allowed him to
enter the truck.

Once inside the truck, Kassebeer renewed his inguiry

with respect to her injuries, and she responded that she had
 

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fallen down some stairs at a nightclub. then Hashimoto-Matautia
arrived at the scene, Kassebeer asked her how the complainant had
received the injuries, to which Hachimoto-Matautia responded that
the complainant had fallen off a stool at her house. Kassebeer

tests

 

d that these conflicting accounts regarding the cause of
the complainant's injuries led hin to suspect that the
complainant and Hashimoto-Matautia were hiding something. The
complainant and Hashimoto-Matautia testified that Kassebeer
declared that, if he could not have the complainant, then no one
could and that he would make everyone's life miserable.

Hashimoto-Matautia and the complainant left the Hilton
in the complainant's truck, but Kassebeer and his friends
followed them. According to the complainant’ and Hashimoto~
Matautia’s testimony, Kassebeer phoned the complainant and
accused her of dating one of Hashimoto-Natautia’s co-workers. In
his testimony, Kassebeer denied making the phone call. after
unsuccessfully trying to elude Kassebeer’s car, the complainant
drove back to the Hilton, whee she called the police. However,
by the time the police arrived, Kassebeer was nowhere to be
found.

2, The Apri 10, 2004 early morning incident

Andzew Kim and Kassebeer testified that imnediately
after the incident at the Hilton, they traveled to the
complainant's apartment in order to search for evidence that the
complainant was sleeping with another man. They went through the
complainant's laundry and placed 2 piece of scotch tape on the

rear sliding door of the apartment so that they could determine
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whether the complainant was sneaking another man into the home
through the back door. They also discovered a blurry photograph

that appeared te depict a man and woman engaging in a sexual a

 

Kassebeer testified that, unbeknownst to Kim, he had brought his

handgun into the residence and had placed it under the bed

 

because he did not know what to expect and he thought that there
might be a confrontation with the man he believed had beaten up
the complainant.

While the search was underway, Hashimoto-Matautia and
the complainant were driving home separately after the incident
at the Hilton. Hashimoto-Matautia testified that, at
approximately 2:00 a.m., she was talking to the complainant on
her cellular phone when she heard the complainant scream, “[0]h,
my gosh.” The call ended abruptly. The complainant testified
that on the other end of the line the following sequence of
events occurred. She had entered her home and was shocked to see
Kassebeer in her hallway. He proceeded to grab her from behind,
cover her mouth with his hands in order to muffle her screams,
and drop her to the ground. Slamming her head against the tile,
he asked, “[W]ho are you fucking? Who are you fucking[?]" He
tore the cellular phone away from her ear, hit her across the
chin with the phone, and resumed his inquisition regarding her
sexual activities

Kassebeer and Andrew Kim testified to a different

 

version of this encounter. By their account, Kassebeer walked up
to the complainant, grabbed her by the shoulders, “put” her on or
“took” her to the ground, and said, “I just need to talk to you.”
 

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Kassebeer claims that he did not hit the complainant and, in
fact, assured her that he would do no such thing, but he did

admit to covering her mouth. Kassebeer testified that he grabbed

 

the complainant's cellular phone fron her and that, while they
were fighting for the phone, the complainant hit herself on the
chin,

When Kassebeer released the complainant, she stood up,
whereupon she saw Andrew Kim, Kim confronted her with the blurry
photograph ostensibly portraying a sexual act. The complainant
told Kim to take a picture of her with her camera in order to
demonstrate the poor quality of its photographs. kim obliged and
remarked, “(YJou’re right, you really can't see anything.” The
complainant asked Kim why he had brought Kassebeer to her hone,
to which Kim responded that Kassebeer “Just wants closure.”

The complainant testified that Kassebeer attempted to
remove the complainant’s pants to see if her panties were stained
with semen. The complainant repeatedly asked Kassebeer and
Andrew Kim to leave and attempted to reclaim her phone from
Kassebeer. She asserted that, on two such occasions, Kassebeer
responded that she was being too loud and moved tovards her 2s
though he was about to strike her.

Hashimoto-Matautia testified that, following
unsuccessful attempts to contact the complainant by phone, she
alerted the police. Officers arrived at the scene between 3:00
and 4:00 a.m., and the complainant told them that she simply
s father

 

wanted Kassebeer and Kim to leave. The complaina:

arrived and drove Kassebeer to the complainant’s father’s house.
‘144 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
The complainant testified that, when she later spoke with

t tell hin

 

Detective Dennis Kim about the incident, she did
that Kassebeer “dropped” her to the ground, but, rather, that he
“brought” her to the ground.

3. The April 10, 2004 afternoon incident

‘The next day, Apeil 10, 2004, at approximately noon,
Andrew Kim and Freitas met Kassebeer at Krystal Kassebeer’s
house. Kassebeer, who was still upset about the events of the
night before, told Kim and Freitas that he wanted to talk to the
complainant and attempted to call her cellular phone, which vas
apparently turned off. Kassebeer drove with Kim and Freitas to
the complainant's residence in Freitas’s car. Upon arrival,
Kassebeer entered the residence with Kim and Freitas in order to
wait for the complainant so that he could talk to her. Kim
received a call from Krystal Kassebeer, who explained that Kim's
son, who was staying at her house, had injured his finger. Kim
left the residence with Freitas to pick up his son, with the
intention of returning to the complainant's residence thereafter.

Kassebeer testified that, while he was waiting alone in
the living room, he heard the complainant's truck and saw the
complainant through the window blinds. When the complainant
entered the residence, she was speaking on the cellular phone.
Kassebeer testified that he then panicked because he thought the
complainant would start screaming again upon seeing him in the
residence, so he went into the bedroom. Kassebeer watched the
complainant enter the bathroom and noticed that the complainant

had left the front door open, which he found to be strange, so he
‘04 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
closed and locked the door. As the complainant exited the
bathroon, she observed a shirtless Kassebeer and screamed. Fron
this point, the accounts of the complainant and Kassebeer diverge
dramatically.

ad teu s' accounts

The complainant testified that Kassebeer asked her if
she was going to blane him for the injuries to her face. she
said that she would not. She informed him that Hashinoto-
Matautia was coming and asked him to leave. He replied, “I/11
leave after you give me what I want,” and proceeded to renove the
remainder of his clothes. The complainant begged him to leave,
to which he responded by gesturing with his fist in a striking
motion, saying, “[Y]ou fucking bitch{. S]hut the fuck up{. Get
fon the bed.” Kassebeer pushed her onto the bed, where he took
off her pants and underwear. The complainant tried in vain to
repel Kassebeer with her forearm, but Kassebeer inserted hie
penis into her vagina. Kassebeer engaged in approximately two
minutes of intercourse, during which he fondled one of the
complainant's breasts.

Just then, Hashimoto-Matautia arrived at the front
door, which was locked. Hashimoto-Natautia knocked on the door
intermittently for four minutes, The complainant testified that
she ran to answer the door without putting on her pants, opening
the door only slightly. Hashimoto-Matautia noticed that the
complainant appeared flushed and terrified. On direct
exanination, Hashinoto-Matautia testified that the complainant
said, “[OJh, my gosh, call the cops, [Kassebeer] just beat me,"

10
   

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but, on cross-examination, Hashimoto-Matautia clarified that the

 

complainant actually said, “(Kassebeer] raped ne." The
complainant likewise testified that she told Hashinoto-Matautia
that Kassebeer had raped her and had asked Hashimoto-Matautia to
call the police. Hashimoto-Matautia testified that, as she
turned to use the phone, she observed Kassebeer lurking behind
the complainant. Kassebeer sianmed the door shut and locked it.
Hashinoto-Matautia testified that she then called the
police and reported that the complainant had been raped.
Meanwhile, Kassebeer took the complainant into the bedroom, where
he demanded that the complainant contact Hashimoto-Matautia to
see if she had called the police. The complainant complied,
using the speakerphone. Hashimoto-Matautia testified that, when
she received the call, she sensed that Kassebeer vas listening to
the conversation, so she claimed that she had merely called a
friend. Hashimoto-Matautia recalled the complainant responding,
“[olkay. I just wanted to know. I/11 be out there shortly.”
Hashimoto-Matautia again called the police and asked that the
officers hurry. In the residence, the complainant stated to
Kassebeer that she wanted to leave, but he directed her to get on
the bed. The complainant also told Kassebeer that she would act
Like nothing had happened and that they were going to lunch. The
complainant said that Kassabeer was unpersuaded, stating, “I know
once we get out there, you're going to change, you're going to

through the

 

 

act different.” The complainant attempted to fle:
sliding door of the bedroom, but Kassebeer caught her and
proceeded to barricade the door using a dresser.

a
 

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The complainant testified that a police siren passed
the apartment, which prompted Kassebeer to call Hashinoto-
Matautia. Kassebeer asked Hachimoto-Matautia, “(D]id you call
the fucking cops{? YJou think I['m] fucking stupid?” Hashimoto-
Matautia replied, “{NJo, why? Should I call the cops?”
Kassebeer responded, “I got [the complainant] barricaded in the
room, You want to make this a hostage situation, I'1] make this

a hostage situation.” Kassebeer added, “[I]f you called the
cops, you're going to regret this for the rest of your

life, . . . [This is something you're going to have to live with
for the rest of your life.” After his conversation with
Hashimeto-Matautia, Kassebeer phoned Andrew Kim.

The complainant and Andrew Kim provided testimony to
the following effect: Prior to this incident, Kim had taken
Kassebeer’s handgun and dismantled it because he knew that it was
not in Kassebeer’s best interest to have possession of any kind

of weapon in his state of depression. During Kassebeer’s phone

 

call to Kim, Kassebeer said: “(RJemenber the thing that you

thought you hid from me? Hah, Hah, I know where you put it. It
was in the washer on the top shelf, I saw you... .” Kassebeer
then began to speak specifically and expressty about his gun. He
told Kim that he “had his gun.” He also said to Kim that “this
is going to be a hostage situation and the only person who can
negotiate me out of this is you." Kim believed, during the call,
that he heard the complainant either screaming or arguing in the
background. According to the complainant, she was calling for

Kin’s assistance, pleading, “[P]lease, please, [Kin], (Kin),

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help.” She testified that she wanted to leave the room, but that.
she remained because Kassebeer had just raped her and the next
step would be for him to kill her.
b.  Kassebeer's account

Kassebeer testified to a very different version of the
incident. Upon being discovered by the complainant as she exited
the bathroom, Kassebeer said that he did not want any trouble and
that he just wanted to talk. The complainant walked past
Kassebeer into the bedroom. She asked Kassebeer what he wanted
to talk about, and they discussed how she had received the
injuries to her face. Kassebeer broke down crying, claiming that
his life was falling apart. The complainant approached him and
started hugging and kissing him, assuring him that “it’s going to
be all right.” Kassebeer did not force the complainant to take
off her pants, If fact, she even joked that her underwear did
not have any stains, ostensibly referencing Kassebeer’s
accusation during the early morning incident that the
complainant's underwear exhibited stains from sexual activity.
‘The two engaged in consensual sexual intercourse, in which he was
not forceful towards the complainant. During the activity,
Kassebeer heard a pounding at the front door. The complainant
said, “(HJurry up, that’s (Hashimoto-Matautia)." The complainant
put on her bra, top, and pants before answering the door.

al

 

beer walked to the hallway, where he saw
Hashimoto-Matautia through the doorway. Hashimoto-Matautia was
fon the phone and gave Kassebeer “a strange look like she was
puzzled to see [him] before walking away to the parking lot.

2B
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‘The complainant closed the door and walked past Kassebeer into
the bedroom. The complainant said that she was going to lunch
with Hashimoto-Natautia and that she did not want to talk with
Kassebeer at the moment. Kassebeer suspected that Hashimoto-
Matautia was calling the police and asked the complainant to call
Hashimoto-Matautia to dispel his fear. After listening to the
complainant's conversation with Hashimoto-Matautia, in which
Hashimoto-Matautia denied calling the police, Kassebeer thought
that she was lying, so he called her himself, Kassebeer asked
her whether she had called the police and said that, if she had,
it showed that she did not care about the complainant or the
complainant’ s marital relationship.

After the phone call with Hashimoto-Natautia, the
complainant suggested that Kassebeer come to lunch with her and
Hashimoto-Matautia to discuss matters. Kassebeer did not want to
go with Hashimoto-Matautia, so the complainant suggested that
they eat lunch together with their children the following day,
Easter Sunday. Kassebeer was still upset, so he called Andrew
Kim, He told Kim that he was angry and that he just wanted “an
end to this.” Kassebeer stated that he wished to know whether
the complainant wanted to work on their relationship or to move

on. Kassebeer testified that he did not intend for this

 

statement to alarm anyone; he just wanted closure. Kassebeer

also testified that he did not intend to use the handgun that he

 

had hidden underneath the bed the night before and that he never

brought it out during the incident.

14
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4. The police's arrival and investigation

Hashimoto-Matautia testified that the police arrived

 

approximately fifteen minutes after she called. An officer asked
her if Kassebeer had any weapons, and she told him that Kassebeer
owned a handgun. The police also asked her to call the
residence’s home phone and tell Kassebeer and the complainant
that they should open the door, or elae the police would knock it
down, Kassebeer answered the phone and angrily repeated that
Hashinoto-Matautia would regret calling the police. she relayed
the police’s message to Kassebeer. The police banged on the
front door, which prompted the complainant to open the door.
Hashinoto-Matautia recalled that the complainant looked terrified
and proceeded to cling to her. Kassebeer came through the front
door shirtless and was seized by the police.

Officer Donato testified that she responded to a call
from the complainant’s residence on April 10, 2004. officer
Donato observed that the complainant appeared to have injuries to
her face and arms and seemed distraught. At trial, the
complainant testified that she received the bruises on her
forearm and between her legs during the afternoon incident, but
that the bruises on her chin and shoulder were sustained during
the early morning incident. The complainant admitted on cross~
examination that the bruises on her arms may have resulted from
playing with her children. The complainant testified that she
initially stated in her conversation with Officer Donato,
“[B]verying’s okay, everything’ s okay, we're all okay, you guys

can leave.” But, after Officer Donato escorted the complainant

45
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into the house, the complainant broke down. she grabbed the
officer’s arms and pleaded with the officer not to leave her
alone. The complainant told Officer Donato what had happened to
her. The officer asked the complainant where Kassebeer’ s handgun
was located, but the complainant did not know. After her
discussion with the complainant, Officer Donato conducted a
search of the bedroom and bathroon for weapons. The officer
testified that she discovered a loaded Glock 2¢ handgun
underneath the bed between the mattress and the box springs.

Detective Dennis Kim testified that he interviewed the
complainant on April 11, 2004. He observed that the complainant
appeared nervous and traumatized during the interview. Detective
Kim also interviewed Andrew Kin, who told the detective that he
thought Kassebeer was going to “take it to the extreme” by
kidnapping the complainant and forcing her to reveal the identity
of the person with whom she was having an affair. Andrew Kim
also thought that Kassebeer might harm the complainant or end his
pain by killing himself.

5. Dr, Tan-Salle’s examination

Kassebeer called Dr. Tan-Salle to testify regarding her
examination of the complainant at Kapiolani Medical Center on
April 10, 2004. Dr. Tan-Salle performed a medical exam, as well
as a forensic exam, in order to search for evidence of sexual
assault. Dr. Tan-Salle recalled that the complainant appeared
“very shaken” and “very disheveled” at the examination. She also
noted in her report that the complainant appeared fearful,

anxious, and frightened. Dr. Tan-Salle testified to the contents

16
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of the report she prepared, which indicated, inter alia, thet:

(1) the complainant stated that she had not been fondled; (2) the

 

complainant reported that she had received blows to the forearm
or neck and indicated that she had been grabbed on the arm and
neck; (3) Dr. Tan-Salle did not find any injuries to the
complainant's neck: (4) the complainant was experiencing vaginal

discharge and bleeding; (5) the vaginal bleeding may have been

 

related to her recent menstrual period; (6) the complainant
and (7)

 

experienced pain in her chin, inner arm, and inner thigi
‘the complainant had bruises on her eye, inner thigh, and back, as
well as a cut on her lip. Dr. Tan-Salle performed a pelvic
examination of the complainant’s genitals, which did not reveal
any abnormal lesions, trauma, or bruising.

on cross-examination by the prosecution, Dr. Tan-Salle
explained that it is not unconmon for there to be no trauma to
the vagina in a sexual assault case.

8. Kassebeer’s Objection To The Admission Of the Handaun
Into evidence

‘The prosecution moved to enter into evidence state's

Exhibit 11, the handgun with a magazine and ammunition, prior to

 

resting its case. Kassebeer objected on the grounds of
relevance, prejudice, and inadequate foundation.’ The circuit
court overruled Kassebeer’s objection, received the exhibit into

evidence, and published it to the jury.

5 kaseebeer does not argue on appeal that the foundation for the firearm,
magazine, snd anmunition was inadequate.

n
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C.  Kassebeer’s Motions For Mistria

During the trial, Kassebeer made three motions for a
mistrial on the grounds that prosecution witnesses had violated
the cizcuit court's order in Limine not to discuss Kassebeer’s
prior acts of violence against the complainant. The first motion
was made in response to Hashinoto-Matautia’s testimony on
redirect that “[Kassebeer) kept saying, [‘oJh, what, your other
boyfriend did that to you, huh? Oh, what, you leave me because I

hit you, and you go to somebody else who hit you?("]” Kassebeer

 

promptly objected to the testimony and moved for a mistrial. The
circuit court declined to grant e mistrial, but struck the
testimony from the record and instructed the jury that, “{wlhen
the [clourt strikes an answer, you are to disregard it and not
consider it in any way in your deliberations of this case.”

Next, on direct examination, the complainant was asked
why, at the time of the incidents, she had not filed the
paperwork for her divorce. The complainant responded, “Because
he was trying to say he would change, he wouldn’t hit me
anynore[.)" Kassebeer again objected and again requested a
mistrial. The circuit court declined to grant a mistrial, struck
the answer from the record, and again instructed the jury not to
consider the response in its deliberations. Moments later, still
on direct examination, the complainant stated that Kassebeer had
accused her of having “another boyfriend to abuse ne.” Kassebeer
again moved for a mistrial, which was again denied by the circuit
court. The circuit court struck the complainant's answer fron

the record, and again admonished the jury to disregard the answer

ae
‘S46 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAT'T REZORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+*
and not te consider it in its deliberations. Following a brief
recess, the circuit court gave a further instruction to the jury:

Ladies and gentienes, the [cJourt had
Cestimony by this witness prior to the
the defendant was a goog husband or a bad husband.
You're here to decide whether the (s]tate has proven
beyond s reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crimes that he 1a charged with, and you are eo do
this dsepecsionately. Taat is, without passion, oF
objectively.

   

 

 

After resting his case, Kassebeer renewed his motion for a
mistrial. The circuit court again denied the motion.
D. Verdict and Sentencing
At the close of the evidence, the circuit court
adninistered the jury instructions, and the parties presented
their closing arguments, Following its deliberations, the jury

returned a verdict of guilty as to the charg

 

of first degree
sexual assault and kidnapping. The jury was unable to reach a
unanimous verdict regarding the charge of third degree sexual
assault; therefore, the circuit court declared a mistrial as to
‘that count. On November 16, 2008, Kassebeer was sentenced to
twenty years’ imprisonment with respect to the first degree
sexual assault and ten years’ imprisonment with respect to
kidnapping, the two sentences to run concurrently. On Decenber
12, 2005, Kassebeer filed a timely notice of appeal.
E. Appellate Proceedings

on appeal before the ICA, Kassebeer argued that the
circuit court erred in: (1) admitting the handgun into evidence,
on the grounds that it was prejudicial and not relevant; (2)
denying Kassebeer’s motion in limine to exclude as a prior bad

act evidence of the incident in the early morning of April 10,

19
‘0+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REFORES AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
2004; (3) failing to include a unanimous verdict instruction as
to the charge of kidnapping: (4) referring to “the offense," as
opposed te “the alleged offense”; (5) preventing Kassebeer from
effectively confronting and eross-examining prosecution witnesses
by (a) denying Kassebeer the opportunity to cross-examine Officer

Donato regarding the complainant’s injuries and (b) pre

 

ating
Kassebeer from questioning the complainant about the statements
she made in an interview with Detective Kim: and (6) failing to
grant Kassebeer’s motions for a mistrial.
The ICA issued 2 memorandum opinion on February 29,

2008, which found each of Kassebeer‘s points of appeal to be
meritless. Accordingly, the ICA affirmed the judgment of the
circuit court. ICA’s mem. op. at 16. On March 28, 2008, the ICA
filed its judgment on appeal.

on May 29, 2008, Kassebeer filed a timely application
for a writ of certiorari. this court accepted the application on

July 8, 2008 and heard oral argument on September 4, 2008.

1, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Application For A Writ of certiorari
‘The acceptance or rejection of an application for a
writ of certiorari is discretionary. HRS § 602-59(a)
(Supp. 2007). In deciding whether to grant the application, this
court considers whether the ICA’s decision reflects “(1) {g]rave
errors of law or of fact{] or (2) (o]bvious inconsistencies . . .
with [decisions] of th[is) court, federal decisions, or [the

ICR’) own decision(s]" and whether “the magnitude of those

20
‘4+ FOR PUBLICATION TY WEST'S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER #4
errors or inconsistencies dictat{es] the need for further
appeal.” HRS § 602-$9(b)

B. Evidentiary Sulin

hil

 

court generally reviews the circuit court's
evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, unless there can
be but one correct answer to the question of admissibility, in
Which case this court’s review is de novo. See State v. Duncan,
101 Hawai'i 269, 273-74, 67 P.3d 768, 772-73 (2003)
c.  dury Instructions
othe standard of review for a trial court's issuance or
refusal of a Jury instruction is whether, when £4
Considered asa whole, the instructions given ar
Prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or
misleading.” State v, salanga, 33 avait 279, 283, 1 F.3d
281, 285 (2000). “[E]rroneous instructions a
presumptively narnful and are a ground for
[eartimatively appears from the record asa wh
error was not prejudicial,” State g. Sua, 92 Hat
55, 987 P.2a 983, 867 (1999), In Other words, (ejrror is
ngt_£0 be viewed in Saolation and considered purely in the
State v, Mainaaupo, 117 Havai"t 235, 247, 178 P.3d 1, 13 (2008)
(citations omitted).
D. Improper Comment On The Evidence
In a jury trial, “{t]he court . . . shall not comment
upon the evidence.” HRE Rule 1102.
E. Right To Confront witnesses

The confrontation clause of article I, section 14 of

 

 

  

 

 

the Hawai'i Constitution dizects that, “{iJn all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be

confronted with the witnesses against the accused... ." This
court has further held that “the right of confrontation ‘affords
the accused both the opportunity to challenge the credibility and

2
 

‘04 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +
veracity of the prosecution's witnesses and an occasion for the
jury to weigh the demeanor of those witnesses.’” State
Eiglds, 115 Hawai'i $03, 512, 168 P.34 955, 966 (2007) (citing
State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 360, 845 P.2d $47, 555 (1993)).
F. Hlarmiess Error
“Stn applying the harmiess-beyond~

 

   

 

reagonable-doubt,

 

standard, the court is required to examine the record and
determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the

error complained of might have contributed to the conviction."”

State v. Peseti, 101 Hawai'i 172, 178, 65 P.3d 119, 125 (2003)
(quoting State v. Balisbisana, 83 Hawai'i 103, 113-14, 924 P.2d
1215, 1219-20 (1996)) (brackets omitted) .

- Motion For A Mistrial

This court reviews the circuit court’s decision with
respect to a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion,
See State v. Lagat, 97 Hawai'i 492, 495, 40 P.3d 994, 897 (2002).

IIT. pEscussron

\e ICA DL ing Th a
a Into Ev;

 

Kassebeer argues that the circuit court erred in
admitting into evidence, over his objection, a handgun that he
urges was irrelevant to proof of the elenents of the offenses

with which he was charged, and that, assuming the handgun had

 

some relevance to the issues at trial, its probative value was

substantially outweighed by the danger of “unfair pri

 

judice,
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury,” as explicated by

HRE Rule 403. Kassebeer seems to argue further that the circuit

22
FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *++

 

court abused its discretion by allowing the handgun, magazine and
ammunition into the jury room, inasmuch as such items “carrly]
enormous power and [are] significantly prejudicial in [their]
impact where more relevant evidence is evenly balanced.”

As noted by the ICA, Kassebeer did not object to the
voluminous testimony given regarding the origins of the handgun
and its retrieval from the residence. ICA's mem. op. at 7.
Instead, Kassebeer only raised his objection at the conclusion of
the prosecution’s case-in-chief, when the prosecution moved the
handgun, magazine, and ammunition into evidence. while it is
unclear whether Kassebeer is challenging the aditissibility of the
testimony regarding the handgun, we hold that Kassebeer waived

his right to challenge such testimony due to his failure to

 

object to it. See HRE Rule 103(a) (1). Nevertheless, assuming
arguendo that Kassebeer did not waive his objection, we review
whether the testimony was unduly prejudicial.

Kassebeer initially brought the handgun to the
residence during the early morning incident because he “didn’t
know what to expect.” while the complainant was in the residence
with Kassebeer after the alleged sexual assault, Kassebeer
telephoned Andrew Kim and said, “[RJemenber that thing that you

hid from me? Hah, hah, I know where you put it.” Kassebeer

© aRE Rule 103(a) (2) provides in relevant part

(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated ypon a
Ealing which admits or excludes evidence unless s substantial Tight of
the party is affected, ana
(1) dbsection, In case the ruling is one adnitting
evidence, = tinely objection or motion to strik
Fecord, atating the specific ground of objects
specific ground was net apparent from the conter<(.]

23

 

 

  
 

‘++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAI'T REPORES AND PACIFIC REFORTER
proceeded to make statements to Kim about his gun. Kassebeer
specifically stated that he “had his gun.” He also told Kim,
“[TInis is going te be a hostage situation and the only person

who can negotiate me out

 

 

8 you.” The complainant did
not attempt to leave the room because Kassebeer had just raped
her and the next step would be for him to kill her. In light of
the facts that the complainant was aware that Kassebeer possessed
a handgun, that Kassebeer told Kim during their telephone
conversation that he had his gun, that Kassebeer stated that
there was going to be @ “hostage situation,” and that the
complainant did not leave the room because she believed that
Kassebeer would kill her if she tried, it is apparent that the
handgun had significant probative value with respect to the
charged offenses.

As the ICA stated, from the evidence, “the jury could
reasonably infer that Kassebeer had planned to rape and kidnap
the (complainant) and had brought the gun to embolden hinself and
48 protection should he encounter resistance from the
(complainant) or others.” ICA's mem. op. at 8. The jury also
could have concluded that Kassebeer brought the handgun in order
to coerce and terrorize the complainant. See HRS $$ 707
720(1) (e) and 707=730(2) (a). Kassebeer is correct that a
firearm in a jury room can “carr(y] enormous power.”

Nonetheless, the handgun constituted a significant piece of
evidence pertaining to the state of mind requisite to the charged
offense of kidnapping-with-intent-to-terrorize. Recordingly, the

circuit court’s admission of testimony regarding the handgun was

24
 

‘+8 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +1

 

not erroneous, because the testinony’s probative value outweighed
any potential prejudice. See HRE Rule 403; United States v.
Toulounis, 771 F.2d 235, 239-40 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding, ina
prosecution for the defendant's use of extortionate means to
collect an extension of credit, that the district court did not
abuse its discretion under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 403 in
admitting a handgun found in the ankle holster of a third party
who had been sent by the defendant to collect a gambling debt
from the complainant, despite the fact that the gun had never
been shown to the complainant, because the gun was probative of
the third party’s intent to threaten the complainant and because
the defendant could be found guilty of using extortionate means
to collect credit through the third party's actions).

Kassebeer also seems to argue that the circuit court
erred in allowing the handgun into the jury room. A trial
court’s decision to allow physical evidence that is “non-
testinonial in nature” into the jury room ‘should be governed by
«+ + [whether] the sound discretion of the trial judge dictates
that [the evidence] bear(s] directly on the charge.’” State vs
Robinson, 79 Hawai'i 468, 473, 903 P.2d 1289, 1294 (1995)
(quoting Zeople v. Caldwell, 236 N.B.2d 706, 714 (IIL. 1968))
As noted, the handgun was relevant to the kidnapping charge
against Kassebeer and potentially illuminated Kassebeer’s
requisite state of mind. Moreover, although a handgun in a jury
room may carry “enormous power,” there is nothing in this court's
jurisprudence that expressly prohibits a trial court from

allowing a jury to examine weapons properly admitted into

28.
4+ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAWA'T REFORTS AND FACEPIC REPORTER +++
evidence, and other jurisdictions have determined that the trial
court has discretion te allow such an examination. See Robinson
wa State, 190 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Wis, 1971); State v. Thompson, 326
N.W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 1982), Accordingly, we hold that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
handgun inte the jury room.

B. i a
Court Corre ‘assebeer" Ta _Limine 1.

10.2004.

Kassebeer argues that the circuit court abused its
discretion by denying his motion in Limine to exclude evidence of
his alleged physical abuse of the complainant that occurred
during the early morning incident on April 10, 2004 as a prior
bad act, pursuant to HRE Rule 404(b). The rule provides in
relevant part that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith,” but that such evidence
“may . . . be admissible where such evidence is probative of
another fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
Preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or
absence of mistake or accident.”

In the present matter, the ICA concluded that evidence
of the early morning incident, which tock place approximately ten
hours before the charged sexual assaults and kidnapping, was
probative of Kassebeer’s “motive” in committing the offenses,
because the evidence illustrated that he was obsessed with and

enraged by his belief that his wife was having an affair. See

26
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
ICA’S mem. op. at 10; HRE Rule 404(b); see also HRS
§§ 707-730(1) (a) and 707~

 

O(1)(e), The ICA also concluded that
the early morning incident was relevant to the complainant’s
state of mind and to whether she was subject to strong
compulsion, had consented to the sexual intercourse, and was

involuntarily restrained. See ICA's mem. op. at 10, We believe

 

that those matters were plainly “of consequence” to the issues
presented by the sexual assault and kidnapping charges. See HRE
Rule 404(b)7 HRS $§ 707-730(1) (a) and 707-7201) (e) «

 

Kassebeer does not dispute that the evidence of the
early morning incident was relevant to those issues under HRE
Rule 404(b). Instead, he asserts that the probative value of the
evidence of the early morning incident was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Kassebeer’s

balancing analysis is implicit in HRE Rule 404(b)‘s directive

 

that evidence of a prior bad act “may” be admissible: the rule's
use of the word “may” was intended to trigger an inquiry under
HRE Rule 403, cf. commentary on HRE Rule 404, which provides in
relevant part that, “{a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed oy
the danger of unfair prejudice.” See also State v. Renon, 73
Haw. 23, 31-32, 828 P.2d 1266, 1270 (1992).

on one side of the scale, Kassebeer maintains that the
evidence of the early morning incident is of “little if any”
probative value, insofar as the incident occurred roughly ten
hours before the charged sexual assault and kidnapping. The

passage of time diminishes the probative value of prior bad act

20
 

POR PUBLICATION IN MEST'S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++
evidence. See State v. Sweat, 606 $.£.24 $08, 515-16 (S.C. ct.
App. 2004); cf. Territory v. Hays, 43 Haw. 58, 64 (1958) (holding
that, in a statutory rape case, a physician's testimony of the
physical condition of the complainant is of great probative value
where the examination is made innediately or soon after the
alleged offense, but that its probative value decreases with the
passage of time). Nevertheless, in the present matter, we do not
believe that the ten hours that passed between the early morning
incident and the tine that the charged offenses took place
undermined the probative value of the early morning incident in
any meaningful way. See Sweat, 606 $.£.2d at 515-16 (holding
that the probative value of evidence of prior domestic abuse that
occurred before the events that gave rise to the defendant’ s
burglary and assault and battery convictions was not reduced by
the fact that the prior abuse had occurred two months before
those events).

On the other side of the scale, Kassebeer contends that
the probative value of the early morning incident is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to his
right against self-incrimination and his right to rely upon the
defense of reasonable doubt, as guaranteed by article I,
sections 5 and 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution.’ Kassebeer
nisapprehends the meaning of the term “unfair prejudice.” gee

HRE Rule 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it has “‘an

 

7 gee Maw. Const. art. 1, § § ("No person shall be deprived of Life,
Liberty or property without due process of lew. =. =")? How. Const, art.
$14. (in ail criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 8
speedy end public trial by an inpartial jury

28

 

 
‘4+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +4
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.’”
Kamaks v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn 4 Stifel, 117 Hawai'i 92, 116,
176 F.3d $1, 115 (2008) (quoting Commentary on HRE Rule 403
(1993)). Kassebeer’s argument is not that the evidence probably
caused the jury to find him guilty for an improper reason," but,
rather, that the evidence was so probative that he felt compelled
to take the stand so that he could give his side of the story.
Thus, while the evidence was potentially damaging, Kassebeer has
not established that its admission was in any vay “unfair.” See
State v, Klafta, 73 Haw. 108, 115, 831 P.20 512,
516 (1992) (*Probative evidence always ‘prejudices’ the party

RE Rule 40:

 

against whom it is offered since it tends to prove the case

nited States v, Paredes, 87 F.3d 921,
925 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court did not err

against that person

 

in allowing evidence of the defendant's prior convictions of
impersonating police officers to show her intent, knowledge,
plan, preparation, and identity in a prosecution for
impersonating an FBI agent, because, although the evidence was
particularly damning, its damning nature did not render it
unfairly prejudicial) .

To summarize, Kassebeer has failed to show that the
circuit court abused its discretion in determining that the

probative value of the early morning incident was not

 

+ soe state v MoCrory, 104 Hawai'i 203, 207, 87 P.3d 275, 279 (2008)

(holding that the circuit Court abused its discretion, under NRE Rule 403, in
Adeittiag e defendant's cellmate's tastinony that the defendant failed to
Gapressiy procisim na innocence, because the Jurors covld nave ascuned that
the defendant would have professed his innocence to his celimate if he were
net guilty)

 

 

29
 

‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See
Plichta, 116 Hawai'i 200, 221, 172 P.3d $12, 533 (2007)

 

State v

 

("The burden of establishing abuse of discretion is on appellant
and a strong showing is required to establish it.”
State v, Kide, 109 Hawai'i 458, 461, 128 P.3d 340, 343 (2006))).

Wie therefore agree with the ICA that the circuit court did not

 

(quoting

abuse its discretion in denying Kassebeer’s motion in Liming.

See ICA's mem. op. at 11-12.

c Affirming th it court” ure
Zo Brovide A Specific Unanimity Instruction To The Jury

Regarding The Charse Of Kidnapping.

Kassebeer argues that reversible error was committed
when the circuit court chose not to issue, sua sponte, a specific
unanimity instruction to the jury concerning the charge of
kidnapping. In response to Kassebeer’s claim, the prosecution
proffers a pair of counterarguments: (1) a specific unanimity
instruction was not necessary because the prosecution effectively
elected the specific act upon which it relied to establish the

conduct element of the kidnapping charge;

 

and (2) the jury could
not have found Kassebeer guilty of kidnapping merely due to his
holding the complainant down in the early morning hours of April
10, 2004, because there was no evidence that he did so with any
of the mental states required by the kidnapping statute,
HRS § 707-720. See aupea note 2.

In State vs Arces, 64 Hawai'i 1, 928 P.2d 843 (1996),
this court held that,

when separate and distinct culpable acts sre subsuned

Wehin s single court charging’s sexual assault = any

Gne of which could support s conviction thereunder =
and the defendant is ultimately convicted by a jury of

30
‘440 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+*

tthe charged offense, the defendant's constituticna:
both of the following sccurs: (1) gz or before tae

= the prosecution 25
Fequived to elect the specific act upon which it is
felying to establish the conduct” element of the
Charged offense; or (2) the trial court gives the Jury
2 specific unanimity instruction, juga, an instruction
that advises the jury that all twelve of its Renbers
must agree that the sane underlying cr fee bee
Deen proved beyond a reasonable doubt

Id, at 32-33, 928 F.2d at 874-75 (emphasis added). Although

 

   

 

 

 

 

   

Arcee was concerned with sexual assault, the requirenent
expressed therein has been discussed in cases involving 2 variety
of offenses where multiple acts and jury unanimity were at issue.
See, e.g., State v. Rapoza, 95 Hawai'i 321, 328-30, 22 P.3d 968,
975-77 (2001) (holding that the act of discharging a firearm
multiple times did not anount to “separate and distinct culpable
acts” requiring an Arce instruction); State v. Valentine, 93
Hawai'i 199, 208-09, 998 P.2d 478, 488-89 (2000) (stating that,
although the defendant made multiple attempts to wrest control of
an officer's sidearm, the actions comprised only 2 single episode
that did not mandate an Arceo instruction). Moreover, according

to Valentine,

two conditions must converge before an Arce unanimity
instruction, absent an election by che prosecution, 1s
necessary: (1) at trial, the prosecaticn adduces proof
Of two oF more separate and distinct culpable acts

Gna. (2) the prosecstion seeks ¢> sunmit to the jury
that only one offense was committed. Moreover, it
bears repesting that the purpose of an Atcea unanimity
Gnatruseion is to eliminate any ambiguity that might
infect the jury's deliberations respecting the
particslar conduct in which the defendant. is accused
St engaging sna that allegedly constitutes che charged
offense.

93 Hawai'i at 208, 998 P.2d at 488.

 

 

  

 

 

In this case, the prosecution claims that, by solely
referencing the latter of the two events that took place on April

10, 2004 in its closing argument, a de facto election of the

31
 

‘1** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

specific act was effected. However, in State v. Maunalanga, 90
Hawai'i $8, 976 P.2d 372 (1998), this court indicated that nore
was required to effectuate an election of the particular conduct
upon which a charge is based. In Maumalanga, the defendant's
conviction of place to keep loaded firearm, in violation of HRS
$$ 134-6(c) and (e) (1993), was upheld in spite of his argunent
that

‘there was evidence that (the defendant} took the guns
fron his home eo his work place. ‘Then, [the
Gefenaant} scok one of the guns from the work plac
pick up hie friends to take then hone. Based on these
facts,".". . there were two episodes which could be
deened to be “separate and distinct culpable acts.”
Under Angee, the prosecution must elect vehicn of
the two episodes upon which it is relying to establish
the “Conduct” element of the charged offense or the
court must instruct the jury on the requirenent of an
unanimous verdict a to the underlying conduct «

Id. at 63, 976 P.2d at 377. In affirming the ICA’s decision,

 

 

 

 

 

this court explained the means by which the prosecution
successfully elected the specific conduct that supported the
charge against the defendant as follows:

In its cross-examination of (the defendant] and in
closing argument, the prosecution focused ite
Gevelopaent of the facts ang ite argument on [the
Gefendant’s) conduct in taking the loaded fizesrm with
hin when he lefe his workplace £0 take his friends
home and when he Steppes for gas. No attempt was made
to question (the defendant) whether his firearns were
loaded or enclosed in containers when he transporved
then fron his hone to (hie workplace! Instead, he
was questioned regarding the condition of the firears
Bt the gas station end whether ne knowingly cook it
With him when he departed fron his place of Business.
Similarly; in Closing argument, ‘the prosecution
stated, “defendant told you that (the gun) was in hi
waist (Jband because, renenber, whan ne as in the cer,

 

 

 

teag you
ton [the defendans'e] transportation sf the firearm to
the gas station. Accordingly, inasmich as ua effort
sas Sade to develop the facts necessary to establish a
‘otation cf HRS § 134-6 with regard t0 the period in
hich [the defendant] transported his fitesree, from
Bla hone to nis place of business gr to argue thee the
aforementioned act constituted a viGlation, we hold,

 

32
‘446 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ¢++

fon the present record, thet the prosecution
Gifective election, in satisfaction of the Brces
Fequirenents, to base its charge of place to keep
loaded firearm on (the defendant’ s] conduct in taking
the fixearm from his workplace to the ges station
where the shooting incident occurred:

Id. at 64, 976 P.2d at 378 (some brackets added

 

30 an

 

 

 

 

 

nd some in

 

original) (some emphasis added and some in original).
In contrast to Maumalanga, the prosecution in this case
Included conduct by Kassebeer in its development of the facts
that could serve as a basis for multiple instances of kidnapping.
Considering that the prosecution opposed Kassebeer’s motion in
Liming to have the early morning event of April 10, 2004 excluded
from the trial and then subsequently questioned the complainant
and Kim, in detail, as to the incident, it would seem impossible
for the prosecution now to argue that “no effort was made to
develop the facts necessary to establish” the earlier event as a
separate, culpable act which would in turn necessitate the
circuit court’s issuance of an Arceo unanimity instruction. See
dds (emphasis in original). Therefore, while the prosecution in
the present case avoided reference to the separate, culpable act
in its closing argument (as did the prosecution in Maumalanga, 90
Hawai'i at 64, 976 F.2d at 378), the decision to elicit testimony
developing the facts of the early morning incident of April 10,
2004 effectively trumps the silence that followed because the
prosecution's election of the specific act must take place “at ox
before the close of its case-in-chief,” Arceo, 84 Hawai'i at 33,
928 P.2d 875 (emphasis added), thereby rendering insufficient its
attempt to do so during closing arguments. Therein lies the
difference between the effective election in Maumalanga and the
abortive attempt made by the prosecution in the current appeal.

3
‘4+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++

In any event, the prosecution's closing argunen

without more, cannot take the place of @ specific unanimity

instruction because,

just as arguments of counsel cannot, substitute for
evidence, state ¥. Guitog, &5 Hawai'i 128, 164, 938
Pi2a 589, 575 11997), 80 too may they not cure defects
in Jury instructions{.]" Arguments by counsel cannet
substitute for an instruction by the court. Argunente
by counsel are likely to be viewed as statenents of
Sdvocacy, whereas 8 jury instruction is a definitive
Gna binging statement of law, State v Perkins, 243
Wis.2a 141, 626 New.2d 762, 773 (Was, 200L1-

State v. Nichols, 111 Hawai'i 327, 340 n.8, 141 P.
(2006) .

 

 

 

 

974,

Alternatively, the prosecution argues that the
could not have determined that the evidence of the early
event established the elements of the kidnapping charge.
believe that the prosecution is mistaken. The testimony
Andrew Kim and the complainant regarding the incident cov
establish the elements of HRS § 707-720(1) (e). On direct

examination, the complainant testified to the following:

   

 

(Prosecutor): What, happened, if anything, when you
get home?

[Complainant]: 1 opened the door, I was talking to
[Washimoto-Natautia}, and then T
went into ay hallway, and then all

Gfa susden [Hasseneer] is magically
in my hallway, grabs ne from the
backs drop me to the grouna, nits
my head against the tile and tells
me ["]wno are you fucking, who are
you fucking, (“] grabs the phone away
fron ay eer and hits it across my
chin, and asks me sho am 7 fucking.
And then. (Kassebeer] tells [Kis]!
(Kim), [Kin], [Kin], come. Bring
the pictures, bring the pictures. [”]

 

[Prosecutor]: Now, when (Kassebeer] is doing this,
vehat [are] his emotions ike?

[Corplainant!: Angry and psychotic.

34

987 a

jury

morning
we

of

ld
‘t+¢ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

(Prosecutor): Now, e's telling [Kin], (*Kim),
(ein, come bring the pictures."
rere’ are yoo at this time?

 

 

 

[Complainant]: On the ground in the hallway.
(Prosecutor): And where’s [Kassebeer] at?
[Complainant]: on top of me,

(Prosecutor! and how i he on top of you?

 

[complainant]: ’m Lying down, and he's on top of
ne holding me down.

Moreover, Andrew Kim, a prosecution witness and Kassebeer’s long~
time friend, stated the following on direct examination:

[Prosecutor]: Me. Kim, tan‘t it true thet you cold

Detective #im that on the followiog
Gay of his arroct, April 21th, 2004,
you said[,] "Se she cone home, and
he grabbed her and threw her to the
Ground asking who 18 hey holding her
Routh, covering her mouth because
She 13 going +o be hysterical.”

(ram) + Yes
‘The complainant also testified that Kassebeer threatened to
strike her when she attempted to grab her phone. While not as
violent as the event that would follow later in the day, the jury
could find, based on the foregoing testimony, that Kassebeer
“intentionally or knowingly restrain{ed] [the complainant) with
intent to” “terrorize” her. See HRS § 707-720(1) (e).

‘The circuit court’s instruction regarding the
kidnapping count injects further uncertainty as to whether the
jury was unanimous with respect to the culpable act constituting
the conduct element of the offense. The circuit court instructed
the jury, in relevant part, as folloxs:

A person comaits the offense of (k]idnapping if
he intentionally or negligently restrains 3 person
With the intent to terrorize that person,

‘There are three naterial elements of che offense
of (k]Sdnapping, each of which the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These three elements

are: (1), (t)hat on AbEil 10, 2004 on the islend of
Gaba, [Kageebeer] restrained {the complainant]; and,

35
49 FOR PUBLICATION IN We:

 

'$ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

(2), (t]hat [Kessebeer) did so intentionally oF
knowingly? and (3), [tJhat.[Massebeer] aid zo with the
intent £0 terrorize [the cosplainant!

 

  

Westrain” means to restrain a person's movement
in such a natter as to interfere substantially wit”

 

hie or her liberty by means of force, threats or
deception
(Emphasis added.) hile the circuit court instructed the jury as,

to the date of the charged offense, it did not further explicate
the Lime of the offense. Accordingly, the jurors could have
found that Kassebeer’s culpable acts of either the morning or
afternoon of April 10, 2004 established the conduct element of
the kidnapping count.

Although Kassebeer did not raise a timely objection to
the circuit court’s failure to provide an Arceo instruction or to
the prosecution’s failure to elect a specific act, this court has
noted that

(ule may recognize plain error when the error

conaitted affects substantial rignte of the defendant

(Sles algo (State viksonane, 79 Hawai'i (46,1 50, 697

Frag (373,) 317 [(a9981) ("Ie may be plain error for a

trial court to fail'to give an... instruction even

when neither the prosecution nor the defendant have

Fequeste It .'- "because. . . the ultimate

Fesponsibility properly to ingtruct the jury Lies with
the circuit court and fot with trial couasel."|

 

 

Anceo, 84 Hawai'i at 33, 928 P.2d at 875 (citations and quotation
marks omitted). Under Arcee and its progeny, it was plain error
for the circuit court not to issue a specific unanimity
instruction to the jury regarding Kassebeer’s kidnapping charge.
See, e.c., Arcee 84 Hawai'i at 33, 928 P.2d at 875 (vacating and
renanding the circuit court's conviction, because the circuit
court plainly erred in failing to provide a specific unanimity
instruction to the jury). Accordingly, we hold that the ICA
erred in affirming the circuit court’s kidnapping conviction
under HRS § 707-720.

36
‘#42 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

> i 5 ding That 1

‘The ICA Did Not Err In Holding That the Circuit Court
Committea No Reversible Error When It Referred To The
sorrense.” Aa toahe ao

Kassebeer asserts that, before the trial concluded, the

cuit court conveyed an assumption that an “offense” had in

 

fact taken place, thereby tainting the jury and precluding the

 

possibility of = fair and impartial trial. The allegedly biased
remark was expressed while the circuit court was ruling on an
objection to the prosecution’s examination of Officer Donato

regarding her initial contact with the complainant:

(Prosecution): bo you know approximately when the
sneldent happened to her?

(Kassebeer) Object, foundation

(the court} Sustained. She has no personal

knowledge because she wasn’t ehere
at ony tine of the offense. These
are all hearsay, You can ask ner
hat she knows,” I've sustained the
Objection already, [Prosecutor],
please ack your next question.

 

 

[Prosecution]: From what you know, your personal,
Knowledge, what aid he tell you?

[rhe coure): Excuse me. Is there any objection?

[Kassebeer): Objection, hearsay.

[The court) sustained:

[Prosecution]: Your Honor, again, this would be [a]

hearsay exception:

[the court]: ‘I've ruled on that matter. I
Gisagree with you. Objection is
Sustained. You've mace your record.

 

(Emphasis added.)
In State vs Nomura, 79 Hawai'i 413, 903 P.2d 718 (App.
1995), the ICA held that referring to a complaining witness as a

“victim” in jury instructions was “inaccurate and misleading,”
but that, because of curative instructions that were given by the
circuit court, the comment “would not have had a substantial

influence upon the jury’s verdict and thus, the error was

37
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harmless." Id. at 41
the circuit court’s miscue in the present matter vas far less

18, 903 P.2d at 722-23. By comparison,

severe because it was not included as part of any formal
instruction to the jury, and, as such, the jury was not forced to
contend with inaccurate or misleading instructions. Cf, State v.
Mara, 98 Hawai'i 1, 17, 41 P.3d 157, 173 (2002) (determining
“whether the deputy prosecutor’s remark amounted to reversible
error, the reviewing court considers: (1) the nature of the
misconduct; (2) the promptness of a curative instruction or lack
of it; and (3) the strength or weakness of the evidence against
the defendant”); State v. Webster, 94 Hawai'i 241, 248, 11 F.3d
466, 473 (2000) (applying the same factors to remarks made by a
witness).

Paralleling Nomura, the possibility of any misstatement
by the circuit court was directly addressed as part of the
circuit court’s instructions to the jury:

You must also disregard any renarks I may have made,
‘he remark was an instruction to you.

Tf have said or done anything which has suggested to
you that I am inclined to favor the clains of positions of
Gither party, of if any expression or statement of mine has
Seened Eo indicate an opinion relating to which witnesse
are or are not worthy of belief, or wat facts are or are

Sot established, or what inferences should be dravn
therefrom, 1 instruct you to disregard ie.

nies

 

   

A hard copy of this instruction was also provided for the jurors
to reference during their deliberations.

In addition to explaining what the jury must ignore,
the cixcuit court charged the jury, inter alia, with the

following affirmative instructions: (1) “You are the exclusive

 

\e facts of this case”; (2) “You must presume

 

judges of
defendant is innocent of the charges against him, This

presumption remains with the defendant throughout the trial of

38
 

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the case, unless and until the prosecution proves the defendant

 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”; (3) “You must consider only
the evidence which has been presented to you in this case and

such:

 

ferences therefrom as may be justified by reason and
common sense.” In State v. Hauge, this court noted that it “has
repeatedly adhered to the construct that the ‘jury is presumed to
have followed the [circuit] court’s instructions.'" 103 Hawai'i
38, 59, 79 P.3d 131, 152 (quoting State v. Cordeiro, 99 Hawai'i
390, 413, 56 P.3d 692, 715 (2002)) (brackets in original). Based
on this precept, the jury is presumed to have given no credence
to the judge’s off-the-cuff remark.

In summary, in light of the limited extent of the
comment, the context in which it was uttered, and the curative
and affirmative instructions provided by the circuit court, ve

cannot say that “‘the record discloses actual bias . . . or

 

leaves (us] with an abiding impression that the judge's remark(]
+ + projected to the jury an appearance of advocacy or
partiality.” United states v, Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th
Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Mostella, 802 F.2d 358, 361
(9th Cir. 1986)) (some ellipses added and some in original). In
short, while the record reflects that the circuit court misspoke,
the misstatement did not “result in an unfair trial because the
jury instructions cured any impropriety.” Hauge, 103 Hawai'i
at 58, 79 P.3d at 151. We conclude that Kassebeer has not
demonstrated that the judge’s remarks had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.
Cf. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i at 59, 79 P.3d at 182 (holding that “the
circuit court’s improper comment . . . did not amount to

reversible error or grounds for a new trial, inasmuch as the

39
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
court's jury instruction was sufficiently curative”); Nomura, 79
Hawas'i at 417-18, 903 P.2d at 722-23 (concluding that the jury
instructions in their entirety were sufficient to cure any
impropriety resulting fron the erroneous use of “victin,” as
opposed to “witness,” in the first instruction).
E, The ICA Erred in Holding That The Cixcuis Court Did Not
Erevent z ectively Confronting i
=Fuaninsna The Com

Kassebeer argues that the circuit court erroneously
prevented him from effectively confronting and cross~examining
officer Donato by allowing her to testify that the injuries she
observed on the complainant were consistent with wnat the
complainant had reported, without laying an adequate foundation,
and then denying Kassebeer an opportunity to cross-examine her on
that subject by sustaining the prosecution's hearsay objection on
the ground that Kassebeer had himself failed to lay a sufficient
foundation. Kassebeer also contends that the cirevit court
Prevented him from cross-examining the complainant regarding
statements that she made to Detective Kim that were inconsistent
with her trial testimony and that the circuit court subsequently
allowed the complainant to engage in a long, non-responsive,
sympathy-rendering narrative over his objection that the
narrative was nonresponsive. In support of these points of
error, Kassebeer cites only one case, State v. Furutani, 76
Hawai'i 172, 873 P.2d $1 (1994), for the proposition that “[t]he
inhibition of [Kassebeer’s] ability to cross-examine the
witnesses[] deprived hin of his right to a fair trial.” while
Eurutani does articulate the general principle that “‘{a] fair

trial by an impartial jury is guaranteed to the criminally

40
‘104 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++
accused by both the sixth amendment [to] the United states
Constitution and article 1, § 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution,” 76
Hawai'i at 179, 873 P.2d at 58 (quoting State v. Williamson, 12
Haw. 97, 102, 807 P.2d 593, $96 (1991)), the decision does not
deal with the cross-examination of witnesses and therefore does
not say what Kassebeer claims it does. Nonetheless, we will
address the substance of Kassebeer’s claim.

As a preliminary matter, article I, section 14 of the
Hawai'i Constitution states in relevant part that, “{iln all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against the accused . .
‘This court has held that “the right of confrontation ‘affords the
accused both the opportunity to challenge the credibility and
veracity of the prosecution’s witnesses and an occasion for the
3.1" Elelds, 115
Hawai'i at 512, 168 P.3d at 964 (quoting Oxtiz, 74 Haw. at 360,
845 P.2d at 555).

1. Cross-examination of Officer Donato

Officer Donato testified during the prosecution's

jury to weigh the demeanor of those witne:

 

direct examination that, upon her arrival at the residence, she
witnessed that the complainant had injuries to her face and arms
and seemed very distraught. hen the prosecution asked Officer
Donato what the complainant told her regarding the incident in
the residence, Kassebeer successfully objected to the question as
calling for inadmissable hearsay. The prosecution then asked
Officer Donato whether the complainant’s account of the incident
in the residence “ived” with her injuries. Kassebeer objected
to this question on the ground of insufficient foundation, but

was overruled, and Officer Donato answered in the affirmative

a
 

[FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +

On cross-examination by Kassebeer, Officer Donato was

asked, “[I]nsofar as the injuries, do you recall that [the

complainant) told you that the injuries that you saw were from a

prior incident?” The prosecution objected to the question on the

basis that it called inadmissable hearsay, The circuit court

called the parties to the bench, and the following discussion

ensued:

[Kassebeer!:

(the court):

[Kassebeer)

the court):

(Kassebeer):

(the court):

(Prosecution +

[the court)

(Kassebeer)

[tne court]:

 

I guess this is -- there was an
Ineident, [it] waa repeated again
and again, and hearsay.

Excuse me- There was testimony
through the state chat the insurses
Sbserved (were)
Gonsistent with wat [ene
Complainant) had reported

 

 

Correct. About the accident,

Yes, And you're seeking to elicit
testinony that [the complainant)
Shad tola (Ofticer Donate)
{ls that those injuries waicn [the
Cospiainant] 'n
through the st.
with the allegations
Crimes occurred --

 

 
 
 

Another incident

It's in rebuttal to your testimony,

First of all, . . . we can classify
itas three Giltérent sources of
injuries... .. We have an old

injury that’s 'noe related to =

Well, I'm trying to expedite this
matter. "That's a protien, because
foundation ss which particular
injuries you're talking about,
because there's three. That being
the case, I’m going to sustain the
objection. Objection is sustain

 

 

Your Honor, that’s inhibiting =
significant crosevexamination, which
Certainly =

I sustained the objection. You can
present it on appeal. Because,
again, by your testimony, there's
Several injuries [that] occurred

42
‘10+ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’§ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER +*¢

 
  
 

over differen:
Suetsctene. founda

je! talking about is
talking about:

 

 

  

(Kessebeer): gree, I think the foundation
‘associated 1¢
sncident thse they azrived
there for
[the court]: _T've sustained the objection.

Kassebeer appears to argue that the circuit court's separate
foundation rulings were inconsistent and deprived him of his
right to confront Officer Donato about her understanding of the
source of the complainant’s injuries, leaving the jury “with the
impression that all the injuries seen by Donato were attributable
to the single event that the officer responded to.”

This court has held that “the determination of whether
proper foundation has been established lies within the discretion
of the trial court, and its determination will not be overturned
absent a showing of clear abuse.” State v. Loa, 83 Hawai'i 335,
348, 926 P.2d 1258, 1271 (1996) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Moreover, a defendant has the constitutional right to
present any and all competent evidence in his defense. See State
vetorn, 58 Haw. 252, 255, $66 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1977).
Nevertheless, “‘a defendant’s right to present relevant evidence
ig not without limitation and may, in appropriate cases, bow to
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process.’” State v. Pulse, 83 Hawai'i 229, 246, 925 P.2¢ 797, B14
(1996) (quoting State v. Nizam, 7 Haw. App 402, 410, 771 P.2d
899, 904-05 (1989)).

After reviewing the circuit court's two foundation
rulings at issue, we do not believe that they are inconsistent.

The first ruling, wherein the circuit court overruled Kassebeer’s

a
‘1+ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

foundation objection, stenmed from the prosecution asking Officer

 

Donato, “what she told you, did -- did that jive with the
injuries that she had?” The second ruling came in response to
Kassebeer's asking Officer Donato, “[I)nsofar as the injuries, do
you recall that [the complainant] told you that the injuries that
you saw were from a prior incident?” The circuit court was
correct in allowing the first question by the prosecution,
because it did not necessitate knowledge of when each of the
complainant’s injuries occurred. The question simply asked
whether the complainant's account of the afternoon incident to
Officer Donato comported with the injuries that Officer Donato
observed. This is different from “do you recall that [the
complainant) told you that the injuries that you saw were from a
prior incident?” The latter question presupposes “a prior
incident,” but no foundation had yet been laid for that incident.
Accordingly, the circuit court correctly ruled on both
objections.

We are not persuaded by Kassebeer’s argument that, in
order to lay the foundation required by the circuit court in his
questioning of the complainant, Kassebeer “would have had to
query about the hearsay account given by [the complainant] to
(Officer) Donato . . . which (Kassebeer) had successfully kept
out monents before.” Kassebeer had other potential avenues of
laying the required foundation as to the source of the
complainant's injuries, and he was not denied the opportunity to
do so. See Pulse, 83 Hawai'i at 246, 925 P.2d at 814. Inasmuch
as the circuit court did not exr in its evidentiary rulings, and
Kassebeer had alternative means available of cross-exanining

Officer Donato, the circuit court did not deny Kassebeer the

44
 

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opportunity to challenge the credibility and veracity of officer
Donate, in violation of his constitutional right of
confrontation. See Eields, 115 Hawai'i at 512, 168 P.3d at 964.

2.  Cross-examination of the complainant

Kassebeer next claims that the circuit court prevented
him from effectively confronting and cross-examining the
complainant regarding statements she made to Detective Kim,
“which would have shown that she made statements inconsistent
with her testimony on direct or included details on direct that
she failed to tell . . . Detective [Kim] after the incident.”

Kassebeer takes issue with the following:

[kassebecr) Now, you renenber telling Detective
Kim shen he asked whet you said to
UHashimoto-Matautia) when you got to
the door, that you believed you'd
Sust been raped?

 

[Compiatnant)

[Kessebeer}: Okay. Now, there wore a lot of
questions asked you by Detective
Kin, correct?

 

 

[Complainant]: ¥%
[Kessebeer) And you answered then, correct?
[Complainant]: To the best of my ability. But

honestly vas ==

— distravone:
(eas

 

beer]: Mow, do you remember him asking you
Sf you'd ack(ed Heshinoto-watautis)
to fell the police?

 

[Complainant]: Honestly, T really don't remember
too mich of sy statement. For one
thing, I’m trying to pat this behind
Be[/i 1 just want it to be over

he

 

(assebeer]: _T_understand, understand. aut you
Fecail when be asked you that, that
you had'no response; that ia, he
asked if you cold (Hashinctos
Natautia) to call ==

 

4s
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

 

Ikassebeer)

(Complainant:

[Kassebeer)

[Complainant
(Kassebeer]:

(the court):

[Comptatnanet:

(Kaesebeer]

(Complainant)
(the court):

[Complainant]:
[Kassebeer] :

Well, T know --

Excuse me. He asked you if you told
[Hashinoto-Matautis] 20 call’ the
police, and you had no cesponse?

Perhaps T nodded of something, but
Tad tell [MashinotorMatautis) to
call che police. Taat Twill not
forget. whether it's in'ay
statencnt or ast, I told her to.

 

‘And you recall your wards when you
told her that you had been raped,
that you said that you had believed
you'é Been raped?

 

Honestly, 1 knew that I got raped,
but I wae just so distraugnt making
ny statement, I couldn’ t believe

Senething Like thet happened to me.

Okay, now do you recall thst you
didn't tell him that you told ner to
help you, that you vere afrasa or

anything’ ike that, right? This is
Sc_EIB June Gaking you wna you tol

T told =* well ==

esolisction,

Excuse me, let her finish her
answer.” You may answer:

With Detective Kim, 1 was
Gistraught. I really don’t know
exactly word-for-word what 1 told
Detective Fim. I now what T had
tld [sashimovo-Natautia], and tor
sone reason” I'm trying to Bleck it
out, but 1 can’t, Because T am
Fenenbering its

Okay. But what T'm interested in ss
nat you told Detective Kim and what
you renenber, ana sould you like me

 

Okay. Then would you, please --

Excuse me, excuse me. Ask ner a
question

Yes, please.
Would vou Like ne co show vou 2 cosy

Sf che anction of the statement that
reteeshes tour recollection abso
hat vou saad

46
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[Prosecution]: Your Honor, T believe that’s been
‘eked and anewered. She gave Ret
(The court}: Okay. Sustained.

(Emphases added.)

To summarize, Kassebeer asked whether the complainant
remembered reporting to Detective Kim, on the afternoon of April
10, 2004, that she told Hashinoto-Matautia to call the police
because she had been raped. The complainant responded that she
did not remember, At that point, Kassebeer asked whether
reviewing a copy of her statement to Detective Kim would refresh
her recollection. The prosecution objected on the ground that
Kassebeer’s question had been asked and answered. The circuit
court sustained the objection.

The question at issue that Kassebeer posed was whether
the complainant's review of her statement vould refresh her
recollection. Although it appears that the complainant was
attempting to say that reviewing her report would refresh her
recollection, she never had an uninterrupted opportunity to
answer Kassebeer’s question. Therefore, we conclude that the
cizcuit court erroneously sustained the prosecution’s objection
on the basis that the complainant had answered Kassebeer’s
question, The issue is thus whether the circuit court reversibly
erred

HRE Rule 103(a), which pertains to the effect of
erroneous evidentiary rulings, provides in relevant part that
“{elrror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and. . . [, iJn case the ruling is one excluding

evidence, the substance of the evidence . . . was apparent from

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‘** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
the context within which questions were asked.” The prosecution
essentially argues that Kassebeer’s substantial right to

confrontation was not affected, because he was permitted to

 

completely pursue his theory that the complainant provided
statements to the police that were inconsistent with her
testimony. Kassebeer counters that, had the circuit court
correctly overruled the prosecution’s objection, he would have
been able to impeach the conplainant’s testimony by showing that
she made statements that were inconsistent with her testimony on
direct or included details on direct that she failed to tell
Detective Kim after the incident.

We agree with Kassebeer that the circuit court’s ruling
significantly impaired his efforts to impeach the complainant’ s
testimony. Although Kassebeer does not identify the specific
inconsistencies he sought to emphasize at trial, it is apparent
that he was at least attempting to impeach the complainant's
testimony, given on direct examination, that she told
Hashinoto-Matautia to call the police because she had been raped.
Kassebeer was clearly attempting to lay the foundation to show
that the complainant's testimony regarding her statement to
Hashimoto-Matautia was not credible because she had failed to
mention that statement in her interview with Detective Kim. The
complainant was the prosecution’s key witness, and her
credibility was obviously crucial to its case. In order to lay
the foundation to introduce a prior inconsistent statement, HRE
Rule 613(b) required that Kassebeer bring the circumstances of
the statenent to the complainant's attention and ask her whether
she made the statement. Kassebeer was doing precisely that by

initially asking her if she remembered her statement to Detective

48
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Kim and by then attempting to refresh her recollection with the
statement. Because the circuit court's erroneous ruling
inhibited Kassebeer from confronting the complainant with a
potential prior inconsistent statement, we hold that the error
adversely affected his substantial right to confrontation. See
HRE Rule 103(a)z cf. Duncan, 101 Hawai'i at 279, 67 P.3d at 778
(holding that the erroneous admission of a prior inconsistent
statement was not harmless, because the statement undermined the
defendant’s credibility and credibility was the Linchpin of the
defenses raised by the defendant).

Given the context of his question, the record thus
reflects that, prior to the circuit court’s ruling, Kassebeer was
attempting to introduce the complainant’s prior inconsistent
statement regarding whether she had told Hashimoto-Matautia to
call the police because she had been raped. Accordingly, the
circuit court reversibly erred in sustaining the prosecution's
objection.

Kassebeer further complains that the trial court erred
by subsequently “allowing [the complainant] to engage in [a]
long, non-responsive, sympathy rendering[] narrative over defense
objection.” Kassebeer is referring to the following:

([Kasseboer] Now, do you recall also, just after

you didn't respond to Detective
Hints question about whether you had
told’ [Hashimoto-Matautia) to call
the police or not, that [the
Getettive) said, “(t)hen what,” and
then your response was "(wleli, she
said [*Joxay("}, she said’ ("lyou
want to cone in{7]" and then

Spparently you didn't say anything
else. Do you recall responding?

Prosecution): Objection, Your Honor.
Sigeharacterszes the cranscript.

 

 

[te coure: overruled. I can't tell from here,

 

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[Complainant]: 1 know that when I told her to call
the police, she didn't. know what >
So. "Because sne said that She

Gidne know if it sould be better if
She stayea outside oF if she would
Gone. iny because she figured Sf beth
of us were inside, he could do
anything to ue.

 

[Kassebeer] Again --
[The court): Excuse me. Let her finish her
(Kassebeer) ell ~

[Complainant]: don't know what you're asking we.
(the court) Counsel, Iet her finish her answer
[Kassebeer]: Well, non-eesponsive, Your Honor,
(The court}: overruled. You may finish.
[Complainant]: she had told ne that she aidn’t know

Mnether 1t would be better if she
Shoula cone in with me and then we'd
Both be stuck in there with no nelp,
or if it would be better if she'd
Stay cuteide. So she didn’t know
and she felt bad, because she
thought maybe she could have, you
know, done something to help ovt or
Whathot, "and she didn’t know if she
had dono the right thing by staying
Sutside. Because I don't anon,
either, T Sost wanted help.

 

A trial court's decision to adnit testimony over an
objection based on nonresponsiveness requires a “ ‘judgment call’”
and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Duncan, 101 Hawai's
at 273-74, 67 B.3d at 772-73 (quoting Walsh v. Chan, 60 Hawai's
212, 215, 908 P.2d 1198, 1201 (1995). Strictly speaking, it
appears that the conplainant’s answer was nonresponaive to
Kassebeer’s question, however inartfully posed, which asked
whether the complainant recalled responding to Detective Kim.

This court stated in State v. Hashimoto, 46 Haw. 163, 195, 377
P.2d 728, 736 (1962), that, “{w]hen an unresponsive or improper

answer is given to a proper question, the remedy is a motion to

50
‘46 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER #*+

strike,” and that, “[a]bsent such motion, the answer will
Le

 

generally not be considered when urged on appeal as prejudi:
vy. State, 42 P.2d 615, 617

 

(Citation omitted); see also Stef
(Ariz. 1935) (explaining that motion to strike should be made to
nonresponsive answer in order to preserve the right to claim
error). Although Hashimote did not ultimately rest its holding
on this rule, it is applicable here, where Kassebeer failed to
move to strike the conplainant’s nonresponsive answer.

Apart from Kassebeer’s having failed to move to strike
the complainant's answer, it is difficult to discern how the
answer was prejudicial. whereas in Hashimoto 2 witness's
nonresponsive answer referred to a separate bad act committed by
the defendant, which was not at issue in the trial, the
complainant here simply testified to her and Hashimoto-Matautia’s
confusion as to what steps to take during the incident. We also
note that “responsiveness is not the ultimate test of
admissibility” and that, “[i]£ an unresponsive answer contains
pertinent facts, it is nonetheless admissible: it is only when
the unresponsive answer produces irrelevant, incompetent or
otherwise inadmissible information that it should be stricken.”
State v. Batts, 277 8.£.24 385, 388 (N.C. 1981) (citations
omitted). Here, the complainant's response further clarifies the
conversation that occurred at the door of the residence between
Hashinoto-Natautia and the complainant following the alleged
sexual assault, the details of which Kassebeer had called into
question in the context of whether the complainant had told
Hashinoto-Matautia that she had been beaten or raped. The
response was not irrelevant, incompetent, or otherwise

inadmissable.

st
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the circuit court impaired

Kassebeer’s

 

ight to confront the complainant and abused its
discretion by sustaining the prosecution's “asked-and-answered”
objection, the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court's

judgment.

ro ‘
urt Correct] Ted Kas: "3 Motion:

Mistrial.

Kassebeer contends that the circuit court abused its
discretion in denying his motions for a mistrial following
Hashimoto-Matautia’s and the complainant’s improper testimony.
In addressing whether witnesses’ improper comments warrant a new
trial, this court considers “‘the nature of the misconduct, the
promptness of a curative instruction or lack of it, and the
strength or weakness of the evidence against the defendant.'*
State v, Samuel, 74 Haw. 141, 148, 838 P.2d 1374, 1378 (1992)
(quoting State v, Senteno, 69 Haw. 363, 366, 742 P.2d 369, 372
(1987)).  Kassebeer asserts that Hashimoto-Matautia and the
complainant's conments regarding his alleged prior abuse of the
complainant were improper, because the comments violated the
circuit court’s order in Limine, which excluded “any testimony
from any witness regarding allegations of previous physical abuse

of [the] complainant by [Kasseb

 

rl," with the exception of
testimony regarding the April 10, 2004 early morning incident.
The prosecution does not dispute that the complainant and
Hashimoto-Matautia’s statements regarding Kassebeer’s physical
abuse violated the order in limine or that the statements were
therefore improper. Instead, the prosecution takes the position

that the improper statements were harmless, in light of the

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circuit court’s prompt curative instructions to the jury.

 

inant's

 

Kassebeer counters that Hashimoto-Matautia and the compl

 

testimony concerning the prior abuse substantially prejudiced his

dete!

 

, notwithstanding the circuit court’s curative
instructions. “'The deliberate and unresponsive injection by
prosecution witnesses of irrelevant references to prior arrests,
convictions, or imprisonment may generate insurmountable
prejudice to the cause of an accused.” Loa, 83 Hawai'i at 353,
926 P.2d at 1276 (quoting State v, Kabinu, 53 Haw. 536, 549, 498
P.2d 635, 643 (1972)). Simply put, prosecution witnesses may not
hurl “evidential harpoons” at the defendant’s case. See id.

Kassebeer argues that Hashimoto-Matautia and the
complainant intentionally interjected comments regarding his
prior physical abuse of the complainant. Before taking the
stand, Hashimoto-Matautia and the complainant were each
instructed by the prosecution not to testify regarding
Kassebeer’s alleged abuse of the complainant prior to April 9,
2004. On direct examination, Hashimoto-Matautia testified that,
on the night of April 9, 2004 at the Hilton, Kassebeer confronted
the complainant with his belief that she was having an affair.
on cross-examination, Hashimoto-Matautia testified, in response
to Kassebeer’s questions, that during the confrontation Kassebeer
expressed his concern regarding a bruise near one of the
complainant’s eyes and a cut on her lip. On redirect
examination, the prosecution elicited the following testimony
from Hashimoto-Matautia:

2. [Hashimoto-Matautial, [defense counsel) asked

Sd [, "t)enée it true that [Kas

pried about the injuries to [the

Complainant's] face at the Hilton Hawaiian
Village("] is that correct?

 

)

  

 

53
‘44 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++

 

A Yes.
2 How did he express his concern?
A, He geoned more concerned that che had another

 

boyfriend that mignt have done that eo he: than
the fact that she wae sctually hur

 

And why do you say that?

Because he kept saying, (%O)hy what, your ether

fend did that to you, fuk? Oh, what, you
Re because 7 hit you, and you go to
Somebody cise who Ait you?i"]

    

 

The complainant testified to a similar account. on direct
examination, the complainant recalled that, during the encounter
at the Hilton, Kassebeer had accused her of “(hJaving ancther
boyfriend to abuse (her].” The complainant's use of the word
“another” implied that Kassebeer had previously abused her.
Apart from inquiring into the episode at the Hilton, the
prosecution also asked the complainant about the state of her

relationship with Kassebeer on April 9 and 10, 2004, which led to

 

the following exchange

A. We weren't togethers] he
home; he was

 

9 not Living sn the
jing with his sister.

 

So you two were physically apart, separated?
vei

 

ere there any Like separation papers filed or
anything ike that?

AL Thad fLled for divorce, but I didn’t turn in
the paperwork yet.

@. And why not?

A, Because he was trying to say that he would

Change, he wouldn'e nit me any acres he ==
Kassebeer insists that the complainant and Hashimoto-Matautia
deliberately remarked that he had previously “nit” the
complainant.

Although it is true that the prosecution instructed

Hashimoto-Matautia and the complainant not to mention the issue

54
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of prior abuse, the record does not reflect that either witness
deliberately disregarded those instructions when they testified.
‘They did not speak directly to the issue, but, instead, mentioned
it only tangentially in response to the prosecution’s lines of
questioning. Furthermore, the prejudicial effect of the
references did not rise to the level of being insurmountable.
See Reese v, State, 452 N.B.2d 926, 940 (Ind. 1983) (observing
‘that, under the evidential harpoon doctrine, the “gauge . . . is
not exclusively the way in which the testimony entered the case;
but rather, the probable impact of the irregularity upon the
verdict is of prime importance”). While the testimony indicated
that Kassebeer’s physical abuse of the complainant had caused
problems in their relationship, it did not reveal the nature or
extent of the abuse or any specific details beyond the notion
that Kassebeer had, at some point, “nit” the complainant. Cf.
State v. Pokini, 57 Haw. 17, 19-22, S48 P.2d 1397, 1398-1400
(1976) (holding that jury instructions could not have cured the
“highly prejudicial” effect of admitting a transcript from
another trial that indicated that the defendant shot and killed a
person, intended to frame someone else for the shooting, planned
to Kill the people who witnessed the shooting, and killed another
person). In sum, we do not think that either Hashimoto-Matautia
or the complainant deliberately directed an evidential harpoon at
Kassebeer so as to cause vital injury to his case.

Short of insurmountable prejudice, “tany harm or
prejudice resulting to the defendant (from improper remarks) can
be cured by the [circuit] court's instructions to the jury,’”
because “'it will be presumed that the jury adhered to the

(circuit) court’s instructions.'" Samuel, 74 Haw. at 149 n.2,

55
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +1

€38 P.2d at 1378 n.2 (quoting State v. Amorin, 58 Haw. 623, 629,
574 P.2d 895, 899 (1978)). In the present matter, after each of
the statements by Hashimoto-Matautia and the complainant, the
circuit court sustained Kassebeer’s objections, struck the
statements, and instructed the jury to disregard them. In fact,
as discussed above, following the complainant's remark regarding
the encounter at the Hilton, the circuit court instructed the
jurors as follows:

Ladies and gentienen, the [court had struck certain

testimony by this witness prior to the recess, I want

to remind you that you're not here to decide whether

[Kassebeer} was a goad husband or a bed husband.

You're here to decide whether the [prosecution] ha

proven beyond a reasonable aoubt thst [he] committed

the crimes that he is charged with, and you are to do

this dispessionately. That 1a, without passion, or
objectively,

 

  

In our view, the circuit court's prompt instructions were
sufficient te cure any prejudice to Kassebeer that may have
arisen from each of the statements by Hashimoto-Matautia and the
complainant, See Samuel, 74 Haw. at 148-49, 838 P.2d at 1378-79
(holding that any prejudicial effect resulting from the
prosecution’s expert witness’s improper remarks referencing the
defendant’s prior bad acts, which were made after the witness had
been instructed not to make such remarks, were cured by the
circuit court's immediate instruction to the jury to disregard
the remark); cf. State v. Kupihea, 80 Hawai'i 307, 317-18, 909
P.2d 1122, 1132-33 (1996) (holding that, even if the
prosecution’ s hypothetical example during closing argument
improperly misstated the law, the circuit court’ instruction

that counsel’s arguments were not evidence cured any prejudice to

86
+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+¥
the defendant) .* Hence, the ICA correctly concluded that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kassebeer’s

motions for a mistrial. See ICA's mem. op. at 12-14.

Tv. coucuustoN
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the ICA’s March
28, 2008 judgment and the circuit court's November 16, 2005
judgment, and we remand this matter for a new trial on the first

degree sexual assault and kidnapping counts.
Stephen K, Tsushina,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for the plaintiff-appellee- :
respondent State of Hawai'i Rae Hlrinoo—

Joseph R. Mott] ITI,
for the defendant-appelant- buses OP AiLijars
petitioner

Anthony Kassebeer Jr. a.

Yuen €. Ones br -

* —secause we hold that the instructions were sufficient to cure any
prejudice, this court need not adress the strength of weaknesa of the
Svidence against Kessebeer.” See Samuel, 1d Haw. at 148, 638 P24 at 1378

 

 

 

30 insofar as we hold that Kassebeer should receive a new trisl on beth
counts of which he was convicted, g26 gubta in section £.3., B.5, we do not
Sddreas Kassebeer’s final paint of error that he was "denies a fair trial

‘by cumulative trial errors at trial where the forensic evidence did not
Support the prosecution[*)s assertion of rape and th turned mostly on
the testinony of [Kassebeer} and [the) complainant.” See State v, faili, 103
Hawai 99, 93 ned, 19 F.3d 1263, 1267 n-4 (2003) (deternining that the Tseve
Of cunulative error was moot because the defendant wae entitled vo a new
Eriall. Although we therefore do not reach the question whether the
Cunalative effect of the prosecution's witnesses" three violations of the
cizeuit court's order an linine warranted 2 mistrial, we emphasize that, on
Tetrial, the prosecution would do well to enaure that its witnesses do fot
offend the order:

  

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

37