Title: Best Price Plumbing, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Exch.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 44 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
10AP1474 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Best Price Plumbing, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Erie Insurance Exchange, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 332 Wis. 2d 806, 798 N.W. 2d 321 
(Ct. App. 2011 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 3, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 7, 2012   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael O. Bohren 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J., dissents (Opinion filed). 
ROGGENSACK, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by George W. Love and Love Law Offices, LLC, Waukesha, and 
oral argument by George W. Love. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Elissa M. 
Bowlin, Brandon J. Robison and Jacobson Legal Group, S.C., 
Brookfield, and oral argument by Elissa M. Bowlin. 
 
 
2012 WI 44
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP1474 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV2581) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Best Price Plumbing, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Erie Insurance Exchange, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 3, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  Best Price Plumbing, Inc., 
seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals decision that 
reversed an order entered by the circuit court and reinstated a 
jury verdict.1  At trial, the jury found that a contract existed 
between Erie Insurance Exchange and Best Price, but that Erie 
did not breach the contract.  The circuit court granted Best 
                                                 
1 Best Price Plumbing, Inc. v. Erie Ins. Exch., No. 
2010AP1474, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2011), 
reversing an order of the circuit court for Waukesha County, 
Michael O. Bohren, Judge. 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
2 
 
Price's motion after verdict to change the jury's answer.  It 
concluded as a matter of law that a breach occurred, and it 
entered judgment in favor of Best Price.  
¶2 
Best Price argues that the court of appeals erred in 
reversing the circuit court.  It asserts that under State v. 
Kenosha Home Telephone Co., 158 Wis. 371, 148 N.W. 877 (1914), 
it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   
¶3 
The problem with Best Price's argument is that the 
Kenosha Home Telephone case was not raised at any time prior to 
or during the jury trial.  Because the jury was not given any 
instruction about the Kenosha Home Telephone rule, the jury 
never applied that rule to the facts of this case, and it was 
not asked to answer any questions that would support the 
application of that rule as a matter of law.  We conclude that 
any error in the jury instructions has been forfeited, and that 
we 
should 
evaluate 
the evidence in the context of the 
instructions that were given to the jury.   
¶4 
We 
further 
determine 
that 
there 
was 
sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict and the circuit court was 
clearly wrong when it changed that answer to the verdict 
question.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.   
I 
¶5 
Although several important facts in this case are 
disputed, the parties agree on many of the events that preceded 
this lawsuit.  Willtrim Group, LLC, owned rental property that 
sustained damage as a result of frozen pipes.  Trevor Trimble, a 
member of Willtrim Group, contacted its insurer, Erie Insurance 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
3 
 
Exchange, and Erie agreed that the damage was covered under the 
policy.  Trimble called Best Price Plumbing to repair the 
property damage because Trimble's partner had hired Best Price 
in the past.   
¶6 
Upon receiving Trimble's call, Darryl Michlig, who was 
employed by Best Price, met with Trimble to examine the 
property.  Trimble called Erie's property adjuster and then 
handed the phone to Michlig.  The property adjuster told Michlig 
that Erie would be paying for the repairs.  Best Price sent a 
proposal to Erie's office on February 5, 2008.  Erie never 
signed or returned the proposal.  Representatives of Erie and 
Best Price testified that they did not specifically discuss mode 
of payment.    
¶7 
Best Price performed the repair work, and it sent 
Erie's adjuster an invoice for $8,997.  The adjuster authorized 
payment in the amount set forth in the invoice.  He issued a 
two-party check payable to Willtrim Group, LLC and Best Price 
Plumbing, Incorporated, and he mailed the check to Willtrim's 
address.  The adjuster later testified that it comports with 
Erie's practice and insurance industry standards to issue a two-
party check in such a situation.     
¶8 
It is undisputed that the check, which bore two 
handwritten endorsements (one signed "Willtrim LLC" and the 
other signed "Best Price Plumbing"), was ultimately deposited 
into Willtrim's account.  However, the parties disagree about 
what happened to the check after it was mailed and whether Best 
Price ever endorsed it.   
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
4 
 
¶9 
Trimble testified that he gave the check to a handyman 
by the name of Abdul, and he instructed Abdul to get an 
endorsement from a Best Price employee.  He testified that "[i]t 
would have either been Darryl or Paul" who endorsed the check 
with the name "Best Price Plumbing."  He explained that two Best 
Price employees, Darryl and Paul, were at the work site, and 
Abdul did not need to go anywhere to get the signature.  Three 
Best Price principals testified that no one from Best Price ever 
endorsed the check.   
¶10 The parties agree that Willtrim never forwarded any 
funds to Best Price and that Best Price never received payment 
for its services.  Best Price filed suit against Erie, alleging 
a breach of contract.  Erie defended the suit on the basis that 
there was no contract between Erie and Best Price, and, even if 
there were a contract, Erie satisfied its obligations to Best 
Price by sending the two-party check to its insured.  The 
lawsuit proceeded to trial.      
¶11 Best Price submitted a proposed special verdict with 
two questions.  First, Best Price's proposed verdict asked 
whether there was a contract.  Second, it asked whether Erie 
breached the "duty of good faith in performing its contract" 
with Best Price.    
¶12 The court reviewed the submissions and modified the 
special verdict questions to read as follows: 
1. Did Erie Insurance Exchange enter into a contract 
with Best Price Plumbing, Inc.? 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
5 
 
2. If you have answered Question No. 1 yes, then, and 
only then, answer this question. Did the defendant 
Erie Insurance Exchange, breach its contract with Best 
Price Plumbing, Inc.? 
¶13 During the jury instruction and special verdict 
conference, the court explained that it had shared the proposed 
verdict with the parties and that Best Price had no objection to 
the form of the verdict as modified by the court: "We have been 
discussing the jury verdict.  The proposed verdict was shown to 
the parties.  The plaintiff is satisfied with it." 
¶14 The court moved on to address Erie's objection to the 
proposed verdict.  Erie requested that, in addition to asking 
the jury whether it had breached the contract, the jury also be 
asked whether Erie substantially performed by mailing the two-
party check to its insured.  The circuit court disagreed, 
concluding that a question about substantial performance would 
"cloud[] the issue."    
¶15 The court explained that, based upon its understanding 
of the legal arguments advanced by the parties, an additional 
verdict question was unnecessary.  It indicated that if the jury 
determined that Erie satisfied its contractual obligations by 
mailing the two-party check to Willtrim, it would find that 
there was no breach: "If the jury concludes that [Erie] could 
have given [the two-party check] to Trimble, then you have won 
the case.  Then there is not a breach.  I just don't see the——I 
don't see the application of substantial performance."   
¶16 The court then confirmed that Best Price had no 
objection to the special verdict:     
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
6 
 
So I would leave the verdict stand as I drafted it 
with, 'Was there a contract, yes or no?  Was it 
breached, yes or no[?]' . . .  
If [Best Price does not] prevail on one [and] two, 
they get nothing.  That's how I read the case. 
The court inquired whether Best Price's attorney had "any 
disagreement with that," and he answered, "None." 
¶17 With the special verdict behind them, the court and 
both parties turned to discussing the jury instructions.  
Neither party lodged any objection to the jury instructions 
proposed by the court.   
¶18 Regarding the applicable contract law, the court 
instructed 
the 
jury 
on 
agreement, 
offer, 
acceptance, 
consideration, 
definiteness 
and 
certainty, 
and 
implied 
contracts.2  After the instructions were given, both parties 
                                                 
2 In relevant part, the court instructed the jury as 
follows: 
 . . . If it is apparent that the parties intended to 
enter into a contract and that the conduct of the 
parties 
in 
the 
surrounding 
circumstances 
will 
reasonably permit omitted terms to be inferred, the 
contract is not indefinite.  But where the parties 
have indicated an intention that leaves some essential 
matter to be agreed upon in the future, no provision 
as to that matter omitted can be inferred.  For the 
jury may neither write nor rewrite an agreement 
between the parties nor supply any essential term. 
Where the parties disagree in their recollection 
concerning the provisions of an oral contract, the 
jury must decide what the provisions were. 
An agreement may be established by the conduct of the 
parties without any words being expressed in writing 
or orally if from such conduct, it can fairly be 
inferred that the parties mutually intended to agree 
on all of the terms. 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
7 
 
agreed that they were complete and did not vary from the 
instructions 
agreed 
upon 
at 
the 
instruction 
and 
verdict 
conference.   
¶19 During 
closing 
arguments, 
both 
parties 
primarily 
focused on the first question, the existence of a contract 
between Erie and Best Price.  Regarding the second question, 
breach of that contract, Best Price's attorney argued: "The 
problem is [Erie] never delivered the check.  Now, if the check 
is written and thrown on the street or put in Mr. Trimble's 
hands, but it never reaches Best Price Plumbing, then there has 
been no payment made because there has been no delivery."  He 
argued that Erie breached its contract with Best Price "not 
because they were evil but because delivery was not made and 
they still have not made delivery of the money."  
¶20 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Erie.  With 
one juror dissenting, it found that there was a contract between 
Best Price and Erie, and therefore, it answered the first 
question "yes."  However, it also found that Erie did not breach 
the contract.  Therefore, the jury answered the second question 
"no." 
                                                                                                                                                             
This type of agreement is known as an implied 
contract.  An implied contract may rest partially on 
the words expressed in connection with conduct or 
solely upon conduct. 
A party to a contract breaches it when performance of 
a duty under the contract is due and the party fails 
to perform.  Failing to perform the duty under the 
contract includes defectively performing, as well as 
not performing at all.   
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
8 
 
¶21 Best Price filed a motion after verdict under Wis. 
Stat. § 805.14(5)(c) (2009-10)3 and asked that the circuit court 
change the answer to the second question from "no" to "yes."  It 
listed five grounds for relief.  Of these five grounds, none had 
been previously raised.4    
¶22 During the hearing on Best Price's motion, much of the 
argument revolved around a common law rule set forth in State v. 
Kenosha Home Telephone Co., 158 Wis. 371, 148 N.W. 877 (1914).5  
Under that case, "[w]here a contract for the payment of money is 
silent as to the place of payment, in the absence of any 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.14(5)(c), entitled "[m]otion to 
change answer," provides: "Any party may move the court to 
change an answer in the verdict on the ground of insufficiency 
of the evidence to sustain the answer."   
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 Best Price argued that it was entitled to judgment because 
(1) a common law rule provides that place of payment must be at 
the place of business of the contractor; (2) payment by check is 
conditional on the check clearing the bank; (3) a demand 
performance is indispensable to Erie's right of action for 
breach of contract by Best Price; (4) Erie failed to plead that 
it had paid the contract; (5) Erie failed to plead defective 
performance by Best Price.    
5 In its motion, Best Price did not cite to State v. Kenosha 
Home Telephone Co., 158 Wis. 371, 148 N.W. 877 (1914).  Rather, 
it cited State ex rel. Gurney Lumber Co. v. Risjord, 161 Wis. 
118, 152 N.W. 847 (1915) and State ex rel. Flambeau River Lumber 
Co. v. Reid, 206 Wis. 478, 240 N.W. 149 (1932).  In ruling on 
Best Price's motion, the circuit court also discussed State ex 
rel. Hartwig's Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Bunde, 44 Wis. 2d 229, 170 
N.W.2d 734 (1969).  The rule set forth in these cases is 
directly derived from Kenosha Home Telephone.  For the sake of 
consistency, we will refer to this rule as the Kenosha Home 
Telephone rule throughout this opinion. 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
9 
 
legitimate inferences to the contrary the law implies that 
payment shall be made at the residence, office, or place of 
business of the creditor, if within the state."  Id. at 374.  
Best Price argued that Erie's failure to send the check to its 
place of business constituted a breach of contract as a matter 
of law. 
¶23 The circuit court appeared to struggle to reconcile 
Best Price's motion regarding the sufficiency of evidence with 
the fact that Best Price's new theory regarding breach of 
contract was not raised or argued at trial.  It indicated that, 
"depending how one looks at the evidence, the court could make 
the finding that there was some credible evidence to support the 
jury verdict" that Erie did not breach the contract.   
¶24 However, the court resolved the dilemma by concluding 
that Best Price's motion could be construed as a motion for 
judgment 
notwithstanding 
the 
verdict 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.14(5)(b).6  It tacitly acknowledged that it was difficult 
to ascertain from the jury verdict what terms the jury thought 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.14(5)(b) provides: "A party against 
whom a verdict has been rendered may move the court for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict in the event that the verdict is 
proper but, for reasons evident in the record which bear upon 
matters not included in the verdict, the movant should have 
judgment."  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.14(2)(b) allows a court to 
treat a mistakenly designated motion after verdict as if there 
had been a proper designation.     
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
10 
 
were contained in the contract.7  Nevertheless, the court 
concluded that the contract was silent on the place of payment.   
¶25 The court reasoned that Erie had made two separate 
contracts——one with its insured and one with Best Price.  It 
addressed the testimony of Erie's property adjuster that Erie's 
customary practice is to send a two-party check.  However, it 
concluded that the adjuster's testimony "relates to the contract 
between . . . Erie and the insured, it doesn't relate to the 
contract between Erie and Best Price Plumbing.  That being the 
case then the testimony is silent as to where payment was to be 
made."  It applied the default rule from Kenosha Home Telephone, 
concluded that Erie had breached the contract, and changed the 
jury's answer to the second question.   
¶26 The court of appeals reversed.  Best Price Plumbing, 
Inc. v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 2010AP1474, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2011).  It reasoned that "[t]he 
jury was charged with resolving the conflict in the testimony 
about how Best Price was to be paid and how Best Price's 
endorsement came to be on the check."  Id., ¶9.  After reviewing 
the evidence, the court of appeals determined that "there was 
credible evidence to support the jury's verdict that Erie did 
not breach its contract with Best Price," and therefore, "the 
                                                 
7 The circuit court asked, "So what was the contact and what 
did [the jury] find"?  It appeared to settle upon the terms in 
Best Price's written proposal: "[The jury] certainly had [as] 
one of the trial exhibits . . . the proposal . . . ."  
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
11 
 
circuit court was clearly wrong when it changed the jury's 
answer."  Id., ¶10.   
¶27 We accepted Best Price's petition for review.  Given 
the difference between the approaches taken by the circuit court 
and the court of appeals, we also directed the parties to 
address whether this case presents a question of fact or law.  
II 
¶28 The most challenging question in this case is the 
proper standard of review.  Best Price asserts that this case 
can be decided as a matter of law.  By contrast, Erie argues 
that this case presents questions of fact.  It contends that the 
circuit court was clearly wrong to change the jury's answer to 
the special verdict question because there was credible evidence 
to support it.   
¶29 The disconnect about the proper standard of review in 
this case is illustrated by the different approaches taken by 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  The circuit court 
acknowledged that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
jury verdict.  Nevertheless, it determined that the jury's 
answer must be changed based upon the default rule from Kenosha 
Home Telephone, 158 Wis. 371.  On the other hand, the court of 
appeals treated this case as presenting a typical question of 
sufficiency of evidence.  Because it determined that there was 
conflicting evidence and some of the evidence supported a 
finding that Erie did not breach the contract, it upheld the 
jury's verdict. 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
12 
 
¶30 If we conclude that this case presents a question of 
law, then we will review it independently of the determinations 
rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
However, if we determine that this case presents a question of 
fact, then it is a jury question, and we review it under the 
established framework for reviewing a circuit court's decision 
on a motion after verdict based on the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  A circuit court's decision to change the jury's 
answer is "clearly wrong" if the jury verdict is supported by 
"any credible evidence."  Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 197 
Wis. 2d 365, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995). 
III 
¶31 The uncertainty about the proper standard of review 
arises as a result of the way that this case was presented in 
the circuit court.  Best Price asserts that it is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law under Kenosha Home Telephone, 158 
Wis. 371.  However, Best Price's argument about that case was 
not raised at any time prior to or during the jury trial, and it 
was not reflected in the jury instructions and special verdict.  
It was only after the jury returned an unfavorable verdict that 
Best Price first cited to the rule set forth in Kenosha Home 
Telephone and argued that it was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.    
¶32 In that case, the parties entered into a written 
contract for telephone services.  Id. at 372.  The contract 
provided for cancellation upon nonpayment, but it was silent as 
to the place of payment.  Id.  The customer, whose payment was 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
13 
 
delinquent, called the manager of the telephone company to his 
office and attempted to pay the overdue account.  Id. at 373.  
The manager refused to accept the payment because he had been 
instructed to receive payments at the telephone company offices, 
only.  Id.  Ultimately, the telephone company cancelled the 
service, and the customer filed suit.  Id.   
¶33 The Kenosha Home Telephone court concluded that the 
telephone company was within its right to refuse payment when 
offered outside the telephone company's office, and therefore, 
it was the customer (and not the telephone company) that had 
breached the contract.  In making this determination, the court 
set forth the following common law rule:  When a contract for 
the payment of money is silent as to the place of payment, the 
law implies that payment shall be made at the place of business 
of the creditor, in the absence of any legitimate inferences to 
the contrary.8  Id. at 374. 
                                                 
8 The Kenosha Home Telephone rule has been repeated several 
times in the context of determining venue for a breach of 
contract case.  See Gurney Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 118; Flambeau 
River Lumber Co., 206 Wis. 478; Hartwig's Poultry Farm, 44 
Wis. 2d 229.   
In all three cases, the court was called upon to determine 
whether the cause of action or some part thereof arose in the 
county in which the payee's place of business was located.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 801.50.  In these cases, one party argued that a 
lawsuit should have been venued in the county where the contract 
was made because that was the county in which the plaintiff's 
contact rights arose. The other party argued that venue was 
proper in the county where the plaintiff's place of business was 
located because that was the county where payment was to be made 
and where the plaintiff's contract rights were violated.     
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
14 
 
 ¶34 Best Price now asserts that the contract was silent 
about place of payment and Erie did not deliver the check to 
Best Price's place of business.  Accordingly, it contends that 
under the Kenosha Home Telephone rule, Erie breached the 
contract as a matter of law.    
¶35 However, the jury was never instructed about the 
Kenosha Home Telephone rule of law.  Additionally, the jury was 
not asked to answer any questions that would support the 
application of the Kenosha Home Telephone rule as a matter of 
law.  
¶36 It is unknown what the jury would have done had it 
been instructed about this rule.  A properly instructed jury 
might have concluded that Erie breached the contract by failing 
to deliver payment to Best Price's "place of business."  In the 
alternative, it might have concluded that under the rule, there 
were "legitimate inferences to the contrary."9  Because the jury 
was never asked to apply the Kenosha Home Telephone rule to the 
facts of this case, we cannot know how a properly instructed 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that during the circuit court's oral 
ruling on the motion after verdict, the court's recitation of 
the Kenosha Home Telephone rule was incomplete.  The circuit 
court set forth the rule as follows: "The contract being silent 
as to the place of payment, the place of payment is at the 
residence of the seller. . . . That's the statement of the law."  
The court's recitation of the rule omitted the caveat: "in the 
absence of any legitimate inferences to the contrary."  Because 
the circuit court did not consider the rule in its entirety, it 
did not consider whether a jury could have made "any legitimate 
inference" that the default rule of Kenosha Home Telephone was 
inapplicable.     
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
15 
 
jury would have answered the special verdict question asking 
whether Erie breached the contract.10     
¶37 These omissions occurred, in part, because Best Price 
did not request a special instruction about the Kenosha Home 
Telephone rule and did not object to the jury instructions and 
special verdict that were given to the jury.  In such a case, if 
the instructions were erroneous, any error in the instruction is 
forfeited under Wisconsin statutes and case law.11   
                                                 
10 In the order accepting the petition for review, we asked 
the parties to address the following question: Where a contract 
is silent as to the place of payment, is the question of whether 
a payee under a contract must make a direct pay request a 
question of fact or law?  After reviewing the parties' 
submissions and the facts of this case, we conclude that the 
question is better phrased as follows: Where a contract is 
silent as to the place of payment, is the question of whether 
payment must be made at the payee's place of business a question 
of law or fact?   
As our analysis demonstrates, the answer to this question 
is, "it depends."  Whether there are "any legitimate inferences" 
that payment is to be made at a place other than the payee's 
place of business is a question of fact for the jury.  However, 
when a contract is silent regarding place of payment and there 
is no evidence that would support a "legitimate inference to the 
contrary," the Kenosha Home Telephone rule can be applied as a 
matter of law.       
11 In State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 
N.W.2d 612, this court recognized that the terms "forfeiture" 
and "waiver" are often used interchangeably, but that the terms 
embody distinct legal concepts.  Forfeiture is the failure to 
make the timely assertion of a right, and waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right.  In the context of 
the failure to object to a jury instruction, the applicable 
concept 
is 
forfeiture. 
 
Therefore, 
even 
though 
Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3) and some of the cases that interpret that 
statute refer to this concept as waiver, we use the term 
forfeiture throughout the opinion.     
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
16 
 
¶38 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 805.13(3), 
which 
discusses 
the 
instruction and verdict conference, provides: ". . . Counsel may 
object to the proposed instructions or verdict on the grounds of 
incompleteness or other error, stating the grounds for objection 
with particularity on the record.  Failure to object at the 
conference constitutes a waiver of any error in the proposed 
instructions or verdict."    
¶39 In State v. Shah, 134 Wis. 2d 246, 251 n.4, 397 
N.W.2d 492 (1986), this court interpreted the statute as 
follows: "even when an instruction misstates the law, the party 
must object to the instruction to preserve a challenge to the 
instruction as of right on appeal.  Failure to object to an 
instruction constitutes a waiver of the error."  See also Tammy 
W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, ¶72, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 
N.W.2d 854; D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co. v. Anderson, 
2008 WI 126, ¶39, 314 Wis. 2d 560, 757 N.W.2d 803; State v. 
Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 409, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988); Air 
Wis., Inc. v. N. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 98 Wis. 2d 301, 315-16, 
296 N.W.2d 749 (1980).       
¶40 The court of appeals was presented with a similar 
situation 
in 
Kovalic 
v. 
DEC 
International, 
Inc., 
161 
Wis. 2d 863, 873 n.7, 469 N.W.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1991).  In that 
case, the jury instruction was misleading, but the defendant 
failed to object to the misleading instruction.  Id.  When it 
later moved to change the jury's answer, the court of appeals 
concluded that the defendant had waived the objection to the 
misleading instruction.  It stated: "Such a motion challenges 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
17 
 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the answer . . . and 
it must be considered in the context of the instructions given 
to the jury."  Id.       
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.13(3) and the above cited cases 
represent the policy that parties should marshal the relevant 
facts and law prior to trial.  A party is not permitted to save 
its legal arguments until after trial, only to present those 
arguments if the party dislikes the jury's ultimate conclusion.  
"[I]f attorneys are not required to raise issues at the trial 
court level, there is less of an incentive for attorneys to 
diligently prepare their cases for trial . . . [and] it may 
result in hardship to one of the parties."  Vollmer v. Luety, 
156 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990).  Accordingly, because 
there was no objection, we conclude that any error in the jury 
instructions has been forfeited.  
IV 
¶42 Because Best Price forfeited any objection to the jury 
instruction, we evaluate the evidence in the context of the 
instructions that were given to the jury.  Kovalic, 161 
Wis. 2d at 873 n.7.  Best Price's motion asked the circuit court 
"to change an answer in the verdict on the ground of 
insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the answer."  Wis. 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
18 
 
Stat. § 805.14(5)(c).12  The standard that a circuit court must 
apply when considering such a motion and the standard that an 
appellate court must apply on review are both well established.   
¶43 The circuit court is guided by the proposition that 
"the credibility of witnesses and the weight given to their 
testimony are matters left to the jury's judgment."  Richards v. 
Mendivil, 200 Wis. 2d 665, 671, 548 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1996).  
"[W]here more than one inference can be drawn from the 
evidence," the circuit court "must accept the inference drawn by 
the jury."  Id.  The circuit court "must view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the verdict and affirm the verdict 
if it is supported by any credible evidence."  Id.   
                                                 
12 We respectfully disagree with both the circuit court and 
the dissent that Best Price's motion to change the jury's answer 
is more appropriately designated as a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict.  Such a motion "accepts the 
findings of the verdict as true but contends that the moving 
party should have judgment for reasons evident in the record 
other than those decided by the jury."  Hicks v. Nunnery, 2002 
WI App 87, ¶15, 253 Wis. 2d 721, 643 N.W.2d 809. 
Here, the special verdict asked whether Erie breached the 
contract, and the jury answered that question "no."  Best 
Price's motion asked the court to change the answer from "no" to 
"yes."  By definition, Best Price's motion was not a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it did not accept 
the finding of the verdict as true.  Instead, it asked the court 
to answer "yes," indicating that Erie did breach the contract, 
despite the jury's determination that there was no breach.    
If granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict were 
appropriate in a situation like this, such a motion could be 
raised whenever a party fails to request an appropriate jury 
instruction.  Such a practice would undermine the policy 
underlying Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3) that parties should marshal 
the relevant law prior to trial.      
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
19 
 
¶44 In reviewing the circuit court's decision to grant 
such a motion, an appellate court will search for credible 
evidence to sustain the jury's verdict.  Weiss, 197 Wis. 2d at 
398.  The appellate court will overturn the circuit court's 
decision if the circuit court was "clearly wrong."  Id. at 389.  
A circuit court's decision to change the jury's answer is 
"clearly wrong" if the jury verdict is supported by "any 
credible evidence."  Id.  "When there is any credible evidence 
to support a jury's verdict, even though it [is] contradicted 
and 
the 
contradictory 
evidence 
[is] 
stronger 
and 
more 
convincing, nevertheless the verdict must stand."  Id. at 389-90 
(emphasis in original).   
¶45 Having 
set 
forth 
the 
standards 
that 
guide 
our 
determination, we turn to the facts of this case.  Here, the 
jury was instructed that it "may neither write nor rewrite an 
agreement between the parties nor supply any essential term," 
but that "[a]n agreement may be established by the conduct of 
the parties without any words being expressed . . . if from such 
conduct, it can fairly be inferred that the parties mutually 
intended to agree on all of the terms."  Additionally, the jury 
was instructed that "[a] party to a contract breaches it when 
performance of a duty under the contract is due and the party 
fails to perform."    
¶46 After receiving these instructions, the jury found 
that Erie did not breach its contract with Best Price.  At the 
outset, it must be acknowledged that the jury verdict provides 
little insight on how, precisely, the jury arrived at this 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
20 
 
finding because the jury was not asked to find the terms of the 
contract.  However, we are guided by the observation made by the 
circuit court prior to trial: "If the jury concludes that [Erie] 
could 
have 
given 
[the 
two-party 
check] 
to 
Trimble, 
then . . . there is not a breach."     
¶47 We agree with the circuit court's observation.  If the 
jury found that the parties' agreement was silent on the method 
of payment and it heeded the court's instruction that it could 
not rewrite the contract to supply the term, the jury could have 
found that delivering the two-party check to Trimble satisfied 
Erie's contractual obligations.     
¶48 Alternatively, the jury could have relied on evidence 
of the parties' conduct and Best Price's closing arguments when 
it found that there was no breach.  The jury could have inferred 
from the parties' conduct that they mutually agreed that Erie's 
payment could be made by delivering a two-party check to its 
insured. 
¶49 The jury was instructed that "[a]n agreement may be 
established by the conduct of the parties without any words 
being expressed . . . if from such conduct, it can fairly be 
inferred that the parties mutually intended to agree on all of 
the terms."  During closing arguments, Best Price asserted that 
Erie had breached the contract because it "never delivered the 
check."  Likewise, during oral argument in this court, Best 
Price argued, "If the check never falls into the hands of Best 
Price Plumbing, there is no payment."     
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
21 
 
¶50 In this case, contrary to Best Price's closing 
argument, there was evidence that the check did "fall[] into the 
hands of Best Price Plumbing."  Specifically, the jury was 
presented with a copy of the check, which bore a handwritten 
endorsement from Best Price.  Additionally, the jury heard 
testimony from Trimble that he had given the check to his 
handyman, Abdul, and asked him to get Best Price's endorsement.  
Trimble testified that Abdul was not required to leave the work 
site to get the endorsement because two Best Price employees, 
Darryl and Paul, were on site.  Trimble testified that he 
believed that Best Price's endorsement was made by either Darryl 
or Paul.   
¶51 In its review, the court of appeals noted that there 
was a "conflict in the testimony about how Best Price was to be 
paid and how Best Price's endorsement came to be on the check."  
Best Price Plumbing, unpublished slip op., ¶9.  In its argument 
to this court, Best Price's attorney likewise acknowledged that 
there was "conflicting testimony" regarding whether Best Price 
received and endorsed the check.13   
¶52 We are required to search the record for evidence to 
sustain the verdict, and we must view the evidence in the light 
                                                 
13 Best 
Price's 
attorney 
explained: 
"Well, 
there 
was 
conflicting testimony.  Best Price's three principals denied the 
signature, and Mr. Trimble testified that he gave the check to a 
certain handyman by the name of Abdul who was instructed to go 
to the job site two weeks after my client had finished the job 
and get a signature and return with the signature. So, this was 
hotly contested as to whose signature this was."  
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
22 
 
most favorable to the verdict.  We will affirm the verdict if it 
is supported by any credible evidence.  Weiss, 197 Wis. 2d at 
389-90.  Here, the verdict is supported by the endorsement on 
the check and Trimble's testimony.  
¶53 Nevertheless, 
Best 
Price 
argues 
that 
Trimble's 
testimony and the evidence of Best Price's signature is 
"patently incredible."  We recognize that Trimble's credibility 
was called into question during the course of the trial.14 
However, questions about the weight and credibility of evidence 
are reserved for the trier of fact.  Richards, 200 Wis. 2d at 
671.  We cannot say as a matter of law that Trimble's testimony 
could not be believed.15     
                                                 
14 According to notes made by Erie's adjuster, when Trimble 
was initially questioned about the payment to Best Price, he 
made no mention of Abdul.  He explained that his secretary, 
Chandra, signed some checks and took some money from Willtrim.  
Trimble told Erie's adjuster that he would "track down his 
secretary who he has been unable to reach."   
15 Additionally, Best Price contends that the evidence is 
entitled to no weight because Erie failed to establish the 
authenticity 
of 
Best 
Price's 
signature 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 909.015.  It contends that Trimble forged Best 
Price's signature, and "conversion of insurance proceeds through 
a forgery" is "a matter not lightly to be upheld."  We agree 
that conversion of insurance proceeds through forgery is a 
matter not to be taken lightly by a court.  However, the central 
issue in this case is whether Erie breached the contract, and 
Best Price had the burden of proof on this issue.  By shifting 
the focus to the standards for authenticating signatures, Best 
Price attempts to shift the burden of proof to Erie.  If Best 
Price wishes to try the issue of the authenticity of the 
endorsement, it should file suit against Trimble, the party that 
allegedly forged the endorsement and converted the insurance 
proceeds. 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
23 
 
¶54 Best 
Price 
introduced 
the 
endorsed 
check 
into 
evidence, and the jury was entitled to draw its own inferences 
from the signature on the check and Trimble's testimony.  Given 
the conflicting testimony about the endorsement on the check, 
"more than one inference can be drawn from the evidence."  Id.  
The jury could have found that Best Price endorsed the check, 
and it could have inferred from this conduct that the parties 
mutually agreed that Erie's payment could be made by delivering 
the two-party check to its insured.   
¶55 In the context of the instructions given to the jury, 
we determine that there was some credible evidence to support 
the jury's verdict.  Accordingly, the circuit court was clearly 
wrong when it changed the answer to the verdict question.  
¶56 Before concluding, we pause briefly to make the 
following observation.  Even if the jury had been instructed 
about the default rule from Kenosha Home Telephone, it could 
have relied on evidence discussed above to reach the same 
verdict.  A properly instructed jury could have relied on the 
endorsed check and Trimble's testimony to make the "legitimate 
inference" that the default rule was inapplicable.   
¶57 If the jury had been given an instruction about 
Kenosha Home Telephone, it would have been told that the rule 
applies when the contract is silent about place of payment, "in 
the absence of any legitimate inferences to the contrary."  158 
Wis. at 374.  Additionally, as noted above, the jury was 
instructed that "[a]n agreement may be established by the 
conduct of the parties . . . if from such conduct, it can fairly 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
24 
 
be inferred that the parties mutually intended to agree on all 
of the terms." 
¶58 A properly instructed jury could have relied on the 
endorsed check and Trimble's testimony to find that Best Price 
accepted payment at the job site.  From that conduct, it could 
have made a "legitimate inference" that Best Price and Erie must 
have agreed to a place of payment other than Best Price's "place 
of business."  Under those circumstances, the jury could have 
concluded that Erie did not breach the contract.    
V 
¶59 In sum, the problem with Best Price's argument about 
Kenosha Home Telephone is that the case was not raised at any 
time prior to or during the jury trial.  Because the jury was 
not given any instruction about the Kenosha Home Telephone rule, 
the jury never applied that rule to the facts of this case, and 
it was not asked to answer any questions that would support the 
application of that rule as a matter of law.  We conclude that 
any error in the jury instructions has been forfeited, and that 
we 
should 
evaluate 
the evidence in the context of the 
instructions that were given to the jury.   
¶60 We 
further 
determine 
that 
there 
was 
sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict and the circuit court was 
clearly wrong when it changed that answer to the verdict 
question.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
No. 
2010AP1474   
 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP1474.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶61 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
dissent from the majority opinion which concludes that the 
circuit court was clearly wrong when it changed the answer in 
the verdict because there was credible evidence to support the 
jury's finding that Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie) did not 
breach its contract with Best Price Plumbing, Inc. (Best Price).  
See majority op., ¶4.  Despite acknowledging that the circuit 
court treated Best Price's motion after verdict as a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), id., ¶24, a motion 
that does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence,1 the 
majority nevertheless reviews Best Price's motion as a motion to 
change an answer in the verdict and searches the record for any 
credible evidence to support the verdict, see id., ¶¶42-52.  
Because the circuit court treated Best Price's motion as a 
motion for JNOV, the majority should apply the standard of 
review applicable to a circuit court's decision to enter JNOV——
de novo.  The majority errs by not applying the appropriate 
                                                 
1 As the majority notes, see majority op., ¶24 n.6, when a 
party mistakenly designates a motion for JNOV as a motion to 
change an answer in the verdict, "the court shall treat the 
motion as if there had been a proper designation."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.14(2)(b).  In this case, Best Price designated its motion 
after verdict as a motion to change an answer in the verdict.  
However, evident by Best Price's argument at the motion hearing, 
it is clear that Best Price's motion was more appropriately 
designated a motion for JNOV.  Best Price completed its argument 
by requesting the circuit court to change the jury's answer to 
the second question "as a matter of law, and on the undisputable 
facts of this case."  Unlike a motion for JNOV, a motion to 
change an answer in the verdict does not accept as true all 
facts 
before 
the 
jury. 
 
Compare 
§ 805.14(5)(b), 
with 
§ 805.14(5)(c). 
No.  2010AP1474.akz 
 
2 
 
standard of review.  Had the majority appropriately reviewed 
de novo the circuit court's decision, it would have concluded, 
as I do, that Best Price was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
¶62 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.14(5)(b), "[a] party 
against whom a verdict has been rendered may move the court for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the event that the 
verdict is proper but, for reasons evident in the record which 
bear upon matters not included in the verdict, the movant should 
have judgment."  As § 805.14(5)(b) makes clear, a motion for 
JNOV does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the jury's findings.  Mgmt. Computer Servs., Inc. v. 
Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 206 Wis. 2d 158, 176, 557 N.W.2d 67 
(1996).  Rather, a motion for JNOV assumes arguendo that the 
verdict is proper but nevertheless asserts that judgment should 
be granted to the moving party on grounds other than those 
decided by the jury.  Id. at 177; Herro v. DNR, 67 Wis. 2d 407, 
413, 277 N.W.2d 456 (1975); see also Wozniak v. Local 1111 of 
the United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 57 Wis. 2d 725, 
733, 205 N.W.2d 369 (1973) (explaining that a motion for JNOV is 
effectively a post-verdict motion for directed verdict).  In 
other words, a motion for JNOV "raises only questions of law and 
admits all facts supporting the jury's verdict.  It is, in a 
sense, a demurrer to the evidence."  State v. Escobedo, 44 
Wis. 2d 85, 90-91, 170 N.W.2d 709 (1969).  Because a motion for 
JNOV presents a question of law, this court reviews de novo a 
circuit court's decision on a motion for JNOV.  Danner v. Auto-
No.  2010AP1474.akz 
 
3 
 
Owners Ins., 2001 WI 90, ¶41, 245 Wis. 2d 49, 629 N.W.2d 159; 
Mgmt. Computer Servs., 206 Wis. 2d at 177. 
¶63 In this case, accepting as true all facts supporting 
the jury's verdict, I conclude that Best Price was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  It is undisputed that the contract 
between Erie and Best Price was silent as to the place of 
payment.  "Where a contract for the payment of money is silent 
as to the place of payment, in the absence of any legitimate 
inferences to the contrary, the law implies that payment shall 
be made at the residence, office, or place of business of the 
creditor, if within the state."  State v. Kenosha Home Tel. Co., 
158 Wis. 371, 374, 148 N.W. 877 (1914).  Here, there is no 
question that Best Price performed and that payment was not made 
at Best Price's place of business.  Consequently, as a matter of 
law, a reasonable jury could not find that Erie did not breach 
its contract with Best Price.  On that very basis, the circuit 
court noted that, had it been asked, it would have directed a 
verdict in Best Price's favor. 
¶64 The majority acknowledges that the jury was not 
instructed on the above rule of law, majority op., ¶35, but 
concludes that Best Price forfeited any error in the jury 
instructions by not objecting to them, id., ¶37.  Nevertheless, 
assuming for the sake of argument that the jury was properly 
instructed, the majority posits that a reasonable jury still 
could have found that Erie did not breach its contract with Best 
Price because a reasonable jury could have legitimately inferred 
No.  2010AP1474.akz 
 
4 
 
that Erie and Best Price agreed to a place of payment other than 
Best Price's place of business.  Id., ¶58.  I disagree.   
¶65 In support of its position, the majority relies on the 
testimony of Trevor Trimble (Trimble), an employee of Erie's 
insured, and the two-party check purportedly endorsed by Best 
Price.  Id.  In relevant part, Trimble's testimony consisted of 
the following: Trimble instructed a "handy man" by the name of 
Abdul, presumably an associate of Trimble's, to get a Best Price 
employee to endorse the check; Abdul did not have to leave the 
work site to get the signature; and "either Darryl or Paul," 
both of whom were Best Price employees present at the work site, 
endorsed the check on behalf of Best Price.  Notably, Trimble 
had no personal knowledge of any Best Price employee endorsing 
the check, and neither Abdul, Darryl, nor Paul——the three men 
who might have had such personal knowledge——testified.  What is 
more, three Best Price principals testified that no one from 
Best Price ever endorsed the check, and it is undisputed that 
Best Price was never actually paid.  Thus, according to the 
majority's 
logic, 
Trimble's 
uncorroborated, 
self-serving 
testimony somehow translates into evidence that Best Price 
accepted payment at the work site in lieu of its place of 
business.  While a jury is entitled to draw inferences from the 
evidence, any inferences must be reasonable.  The majority's 
leap in logic is not a reasonable inference for a jury to draw. 
¶66 For that same reason, even assuming, as the majority 
apparently does, that Best Price properly designated its motion 
after verdict as a motion to change an answer in the verdict, I 
No.  2010AP1474.akz 
 
5 
 
would still conclude that there was insufficient evidence to 
sustain the jury's finding that Erie did not breach its contract 
with Best Price. 
¶67 In the end, Best Price is not the only one to lose as 
a result of the majority's decision.  After today, similar small 
businesses all over the state should be wary of a client's mere 
word or handshake, lest their services will go unpaid for.  In 
the future, they ought to get a signed contract requiring 
payment up-front.   
¶68 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2010AP1474.akz 
 
 
 
1