Title: Juneau County Star-Times v. Juneau County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 4 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP2313 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Juneau County Star-Times and George Althoff, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Juneau County and Kathleen Kobylski, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 337 Wis. 2d 710, 807 N.W.2d 655 
(Ct. App. 2011 - Published) 
PDC No: 2011 WI App 150 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 8, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 5, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Juneau 
 
JUDGE: 
Charles A. Pollex 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
Roggensack, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)  
 
DISSENTED: 
Prosser, J., dissents. Ziegler, Gableman, J.J., 
join. (Opinion filed.) 
Ziegler, J., dissents. Gableman, J., joins. 
(Opinion filed.)  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Joseph P. Wright, Bryan Kleinmaier, and Richard 
K. Nordeng and Stafford Rosenbaum, LLP, Madison, and oral 
argument by Bryan Kleinmaier.   
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Christa Westerberg and Pamela R. McGillivray, and McGillivray, 
Westerberg & Bender, LLC, Madison, and oral argument by Christa 
Westerberg.  
An amicus curiae brief was filed by April Rockstead Barker 
and Schott, Bublitz & Engel, S.C., Brookfield, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin 
Freedom 
of 
Information 
Council, 
the 
Wisconsin 
 
 
2
Newspaper 
Association, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Broadcasters 
Association.  
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Department of Justice by Mary E. Burke, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney 
general. 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips and 
Patrick C. Henneger, and Phillips Borowski, S.C., Mequon, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Counties Association.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                2013 WI 4
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP2313 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV109) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Juneau County Star-Times and George Althoff, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Juneau County and Kathleen Kobylski, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 8, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This case calls upon the 
court to interpret once again the Wisconsin Public Records Law.1  
The duties of government authorities under the Public Records 
Law are of substantial and continuing interest.   
                                                 
1 For purposes of this opinion, we refer to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.31-.39 (2009-10) as the Public Records Law, although these 
provisions are sometimes referred to as the "Open Records Law."  
Retention and preservation of documents, addressed at Wis. Stat. 
§§ 16.61-.62, and also sometimes referred to as the "Public 
Records Law," is not involved in the instant case.   
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 
version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
2 
 
¶2 
We are reviewing a published decision of the court of 
appeals that reversed a judgment of the Circuit Court for Juneau 
County, Charles A. Pollex, Judge.2  The circuit court dismissed 
the complaint of the Juneau County Star-Times and George Althoff 
(collectively, the Star-Times) seeking relief pursuant to the 
Public Records Law against Juneau County and Kathleen Kobylski 
(collectively, the County).3  The court of appeals reversed the 
judgment of the circuit court.  We affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals.   
¶3 
The genesis of the present case is litigation against 
the County relating to an employee of the Juneau County 
Sheriff's Department.  The County's defense was conducted by the 
Crivello Carlson law firm (the law firm), which was retained to 
represent 
the 
County 
by 
the 
County's 
insurance 
company, 
Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corporation (the insurance 
company).   
¶4 
The County and the insurance company are parties to a 
contract, namely the Public Entity Liability Policy (the 
liability insurance policy), which the County procured from the 
insurance company.  The liability insurance policy provides that 
the insurance company shall defend the County for covered 
occurrences; shall pay sums that the County becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages as a result of a covered occurrence; 
                                                 
2 Juneau County Star-Times v. Juneau County, 2011 WI App 
150, 337 Wis. 2d 710, 807 N.W.2d 655. 
3 George Althoff is the publisher of the Juneau County Star-
Times.  Kathleen Kobylski is the Juneau County Clerk.  
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
3 
 
and shall also pay attorney fees and related costs in defending 
against a claim.4  The liability insurance policy also provides 
that the County shall cooperate with the insurance company (and 
therefore with counsel retained by the insurance company) in 
preparing the County's defense.     
¶5 
Pursuant 
to the liability insurance policy, the 
insurance company retained the law firm to represent the County.  
The County accepted the law firm's representation pursuant to 
the liability insurance policy and worked with the law firm in 
preparing the County's defense.  Thus, an attorney-client 
relationship was created between the law firm and the County 
                                                 
4 The liability insurance policy provides, in relevant part: 
We [County Mutual] have the right and duty to defend 
any suit against the insured seeking monetary damages 
on account of bodily injury, personal injury, property 
damage or errors and omissions or any combination 
thereof, but: 
1. The amount we will pay for damages is limited as 
described in Section IV – Limits of Insurance; 
2. 
We 
may, 
at 
our 
discretion, 
investigate 
any 
occurrence and settle any claim or suit that may 
result even if the settlement amount is exclusively 
within the insured's deductible, and 
3. Our right and duty to defend end when we have used 
up the Limit of Insurance in the payment of judgments 
or settlements under Coverages A, B or C.  This 
applies to both claims and suits pending at that time 
and those filed thereafter. 
Defense costs are payable in addition to the policy 
limit 
after 
any 
applicable 
deductible 
has 
been 
exhausted. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
4 
 
pursuant to the liability insurance policy.  Representatives of 
the County, including corporation counsel, consulted directly 
with the law firm with regard to the litigation.   
¶6 
The law firm prepared and sent to the insurance 
company invoices (itemized bills) for its legal services 
rendered pursuant to the liability insurance policy in the 
defense of the County.  Relying on the Public Records Law, the 
Star-Times sought access to these invoices. 
¶7 
The parties dispute whether the invoices generated by 
the law firm fall within Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) of the Public 
Records Law, the "contractors' records" provision.  Section 
19.36(3) requires an authority (as defined in the Public Records 
Law) to "make available for inspection and copying . . . any 
record produced or collected under a contract entered into by 
the authority . . . to the same extent as if the record were 
maintained by the authority."5  
¶8 
The circuit court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) 
does not apply to the invoices because the County had not 
contracted 
with 
the 
insurance 
company 
"for 
purposes 
of 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(3) reads in full as follows: 
Contractors' records.  Subject to sub. (12), each 
authority shall make available for inspection and 
copying under s. 19.35(1) any record produced or 
collected under a contract entered into by the 
authority with a person other than an authority to the 
same extent as if the record were maintained by the 
authority.  This subsection does not apply to the 
inspection 
or 
copying 
of 
a 
record 
under 
s. 
19.35(1)(am). 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
5 
 
collecting and maintaining the information" that the Star-Times 
was seeking.  According to the circuit court, the invoices were 
produced by the law firm for the insurance company under the 
insurance company's agreement with the law firm, not under the 
insurance company's liability insurance policy with the County.  
The circuit court further concluded that even if § 19.36(3) 
applied, the invoices were properly redacted to protect the 
attorney-client privilege.6   
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court and remanded the matter to the circuit court, 
ordering the County to make available unredacted copies of the 
invoices to the Star-Times.  The court of appeals concluded:  
(1) Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) applies to the invoices as records 
collected by the insurance company under its liability insurance 
                                                 
6 The circuit court reasoned: 
1. The legal invoices are not records under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(2) because they were neither created by nor kept 
by the County.  
2. The legal invoices are not contractors' records under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) because the invoices were generated 
under an apparent agreement or contract between the 
County's insurer and the Crivello Carlson law firm, to 
which the County was not a party.  
3. The County did not waive its right to argue that the 
legal invoices were not records or contractors' records by 
failing to assert that in its initial response to the 
Star-Times request.  
4. Even if the invoices were subject to a Public Records 
request, the invoices do contain detailed descriptions of 
the nature of the legal services rendered to Juneau County 
and are protected by attorney-client privilege. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
6 
 
policy with the County; and (2) the County failed to point to 
evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment on the question 
whether its redactions qualify as privileged attorney-client 
information.7 
¶10 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
use somewhat different reasoning, however.  We too conclude that 
the 
invoices 
are 
contractors' 
records 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.36(3).8 
 
Our 
decision 
is 
based 
on 
the 
tripartite 
relationship of the County, the insurance company and the law 
firm, all arising from the liability insurance policy.    
¶11 The tripartite relationship arising from the liability 
insurance policy is as follows: 
(1) The liability insurance policy is the basis of a 
contractual 
relationship 
between 
the 
County 
and 
the 
insurance company:  The insurance company agrees in the 
liability insurance policy to pay damages the County owes 
and to pay attorney fees incurred for the County's defense.   
(2) The liability insurance policy is the basis of a 
contractual relationship between the insurance company and 
the law firm:  The insurance company retains the law firm, 
pursuant to the liability insurance policy, to represent 
the County and agrees to pay the attorney fees.  The law 
                                                 
7 Star-Times, 337 Wis. 2d 710, ¶2. 
8 In light of our holding, we need not and do not address 
whether the invoices should be viewed as records under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.32(2) and whether the County has waived its argument 
that the invoices are not records. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
7 
 
firm that accepts the assignment undertakes the County's 
representation in accordance with the liability insurance 
policy. 
(3) The liability insurance policy is the basis of a 
contractual relationship between the law firm and the 
County:  Pursuant to the liability insurance policy, the 
law firm retained by the insurance company enters into a 
contractual attorney-client (agency) relationship with the 
County. 
¶12 The liability insurance policy thus is the basis for 
contractual relationships between the County and the insurance 
company, as well as between the insurance company and the law 
firm, and the law firm and the County.    
¶13 The invoices——the billings for the law firm's legal 
work performed as the County's defense counsel and the insurance 
company's retained counsel——were produced or collected in the 
course of the law firm's representation of the County and the 
insurance company under the liability insurance policy between 
the County and the insurance company.  Because the liability 
insurance policy is the basis for the tripartite relationship 
between the County, the insurance company, and the law firm, and 
is the basis for an attorney-client relationship between the law 
firm and the County, we conclude that the invoices were produced 
or collected during the course of the law firm's representation 
of the County and the insurance company pursuant to the 
liability insurance policy; the liability insurance policy is a 
contract entered into by the County and the insurance company.  
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
8 
 
Thus, the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) have been met 
and § 19.36(3) governs the accessibility of the invoices.  
¶14 We do not address the question whether the circuit 
court's approved redactions of the invoices were proper.  This 
issue is not before the court.  The County did not seek review 
of the issue of redaction, explaining in its petition for review 
that it sought review only of the issue whether the invoices are 
subject to the Public Records Law.9  The Order of this court 
accepting review in the instant case provided that the County 
"may not raise or argue issues not set forth in the petition for 
review unless otherwise ordered by the court."  The County 
repeated its position at oral argument that the invoices in 
question did not contain any confidential work product or 
attorney-client privileged information that had to be redacted. 
¶15 The propriety of the redaction was not briefed or 
argued in this court.  Our ruling in the present case does not 
alter 
the 
rules 
governing 
confidentiality, 
attorney-client 
privilege, or lawyers' work product, or any other rules 
protecting against disclosure.  No issue has been raised with 
regard to these rules.  We therefore do not decide which court——
the circuit court or the court of appeals——reached the correct 
result regarding redaction of the invoices.      
¶16 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals remanding the matter to the circuit court to order the 
                                                 
9 County's Petition for Review at 10.  
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
9 
 
County to provide unredacted copies of the invoices to the Star-
Times. 
I 
¶17 The facts of this case are undisputed.  The County 
procured a Public Entity Liability Policy (the liability 
insurance policy) from Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Company 
(the insurance company).   
¶18 Pursuant to the terms of the liability insurance 
policy, the insurance company retained the Crivello Carlson law 
firm to represent it, Juneau County Sheriff Brent H. Oleson, and 
the County in matters involving the County as defendant in 
proceedings related to Jeremy Haske, a former deputy sheriff.  
The law firm performed services on the Haske matter in which the 
County was a defendant and sent invoices for this work directly 
to the insurance company.  The insurance company paid the law 
firm on the basis of the invoices.  Neither the law firm nor the 
insurance company sent any invoices to the County.   
¶19 The liability insurance policy is silent about whether 
the County has any right to any records, including access to 
invoices arising from the law firm's defense of the County.  No 
written contract between the law firm and the insurance company 
for this legal work is in the record.  The record does not 
reveal what kind of invoices, if any, the insurance company 
sought from the law firm.  
¶20 On February 7, 2010, Peter Rebhahn, a reporter with 
the Star-Times, sent a letter to Kathleen Kobylski, the Juneau 
County Clerk, requesting access to any legal bills from the law 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
10 
 
firm submitted to the insurance company for services rendered as 
counsel to the County in the Haske matters.10  
¶21 Three 
days 
later, 
on 
February 
10, 
2010, 
after 
conferring with Juneau County Corporation Counsel David Lasker, 
Attorney Michele Ford of the law firm provided redacted invoices 
related to the Haske matters to Mr. Rebhahn.  Attorney Ford's 
letter explained that "[t]he invoices have been redacted to 
exclude information that is privileged by statute and common 
law."  Attorney Ford also sent the redacted invoices to the 
County, along with a copy of the letter to Mr. Rebhahn. 
¶22 On February 16, 2010, George Althoff, the Star-Times 
Publisher, sent a follow-up letter to County Clerk Kobylski, 
renewing the newspaper's request for records, asserting that the 
February 10 response from the law firm ignored the original 
request.  Clerk Kobylski responded by letter on February 17, 
2010, explaining that all redacted content in the legal invoices 
is privileged under applicable law and refusing to provide 
anything further. 
¶23 The Star-Times then filed an action for mandamus and 
declaratory relief against the County on March 9, 2010, seeking 
disclosure of the redacted portions of the legal invoices.  The 
                                                 
10 The letter specifically asked for "access to bills 
submitted for payment to Juneau County's insurer, the Wisconsin 
County Mutual Insurance Corp., by Michele Ford, or submitted by 
her law firm, Crivello Carlson, for services Attorney Ford 
rendered as counsel to Juneau County Sheriff Brent Oleson in the 
years 2008, 2009 and 2010." 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
11 
 
County answered the complaint, denying all claims.  The parties 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
¶24 On August 26, 2010, the circuit court granted the 
summary judgment motion in favor of the County.  On appeal by 
the Star-Times, the court of appeals ruled in favor of the Star-
Times. 
II 
¶25 This case involves the interpretation and application 
of the Public Records Law to undisputed facts, presenting a 
question of law that this court determines independently while 
benefitting from the analyses of both the circuit court and the 
court of appeals.11  
¶26 We shall in the instant case, as in prior cases, 
examine numerous sources in interpreting and applying the Public 
Records Law, including the text and context of relevant 
provisions, 
the 
interpretation 
proffered 
by 
the 
Attorney 
                                                 
11 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 
65, ¶17, 341 Wis. 2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367 (Abrahamson, C.J., lead 
op.).  
At the circuit court, each party filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  We review a circuit court's grant or denial of a 
summary judgment motion independently of either the circuit 
court or the court of appeals.  We apply the same methodology 
and benefit from their analyses.  WIREdata v. Village of Sussex, 
2008 WI 69, ¶44, 310 Wis. 2d 397, 751 N.W.2d 736.  Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  The facts in the present case are undisputed. 
There are no competing reasonable inferences preventing summary 
judgment on the question of law whether Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) 
applies to the invoices.      
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
12 
 
General, the legislature's Declaration of Policy in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.31, 
and 
interpretations 
of 
the 
relevant 
statutory 
provisions in prior cases.12   
III 
¶27 We turn first to the text of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3), 
the contractors' records provision.  The general rule is that a 
record under the Public Records Law is a record created or kept 
by an authority.  Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).13  The contractors' 
records provision provides that even if a record is not created 
by or kept by an authority, the record is subject to the Public 
Records Law if it is "produced or collected under a contract 
entered into by the authority with a person other than an 
authority to the same extent as if the record were maintained by 
the authority."  The contractors' records provision is designed 
to prevent a government entity from evading its responsibilities 
under the Public Records Law by shifting a record's creation or 
custody to an agent.14     
¶28 Section 19.36(3) reads as follows: 
Contractors' Records.  Subject to sub. (12), each 
authority shall make available for inspection and 
copying under s. 19.35(1) any record produced or 
collected under a contract entered into by the 
                                                 
12 Milwaukee 
Journal 
Sentinel, 
341 
Wis. 2d 607, 
¶18 
(Abrahamson, C.J., lead op.); Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 
2010 WI 86, ¶21, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., lead op.).  
13 Machotka v. Village of West Salem, 2000 WI App 43, ¶6, 
233 Wis. 2d 106, 607 N.W.2d 319. 
14 Machotka, 233 Wis. 2d 106, ¶8. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
13 
 
authority with a person other than an authority to the 
same extent as if the record were maintained by the 
authority.  This subsection does not apply to the 
inspection 
or 
copying 
of 
a 
record 
under 
s. 
19.35(1)(am). 
¶29 No one disputes that the County is an authority as 
defined in the Public Records Law.15  No one disputes that the 
liability insurance policy is "a contract entered into by" the 
County with the insurance company, and no one disputes that the 
insurance company is not an authority.  
¶30 The dispute revolves around whether the invoices 
prepared by the law firm that contracted with the insurance 
company to furnish legal services to the County were produced or 
collected under the liability insurance policy, a contract 
between the County and the insurance company.  
¶31 To resolve the dispute we must explore the meaning of 
the key words in Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) governing the present 
dispute:  "produced," "collected," and "under."  Three different 
approaches have been presented to the court. 
¶32 The circuit court focused on the word "produced" and 
concluded that the invoices were not produced under a contract 
between the County and the insurance company.  The County agrees 
with this position and argues here that no separate contract 
exists between the County and the law firm retained by the 
insurance company.   
¶33 The word "produce" has numerous definitions: to bring 
forth; to yield; to create by intellectual or physical effort; 
                                                 
15 See Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1). 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
14 
 
to make; to generate; to manufacture; to cause to occur or 
exist; to give rise to or to happen; to form or shape.  
¶34 The court of appeals focused on the word "collected" 
and concluded that the invoices were "collected" under a 
contract between the County and the insurance company.  The 
court of appeals reasoned that the insurance company's mandatory 
obligation under the liability insurance policy to defend the 
County will necessarily result in the insurance company's 
collecting some form of invoice from the law firm.16  The court 
of appeals rejected the County's argument that the invoices were 
collected under whatever agreement existed between the insurance 
company and the law firm, not the contract between the County 
and the insurance company.17 
¶35 The word "collect" also has numerous definitions:  to 
gather; to bring together in a group or mass; to receive, 
gather, or exact from a number of persons or other sources.  
¶36 In contrast, the Department of Justice focuses its 
nonparty brief on the word "under" in the statutory phrase 
                                                 
16 Star-Times, 337 Wis. 2d 710, ¶17. 
17 The 
Wisconsin 
Freedom 
of 
Information 
Council, 
the 
Wisconsin Newspaper Association, and the Wisconsin Broadcasters 
Association submitted a nonparty brief supporting the position 
of the court of appeals and the Star-Times.  The brief argued 
that the contractors' records provision precludes government 
from performing an "end run" around the Public Records Law by 
contracting away the public's access to information. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
15 
 
"collected or produced under a contract."18  The Department 
examines dictionary definitions of the word "under" (along with 
other materials) and concludes that "the §19.36(3) language 
'record produced or collected under a contract' means records 
produced or collected as required by or as obligated by a 
contract" (emphasis added).  
¶37 The Department substitutes the words "as required by 
or obligated by" for the word "under."  But other substitutes 
for the word "under" exist that have different connotations than 
"required by" or "obligated by."  "Under," in reference to a 
contract, may be used to mean in accordance with, pursuant to, 
                                                 
18 The Department of Justice plays a special role in the 
Public Records Law.  The legislature has accorded the Attorney 
General, who supervises and directs the Department of Justice, 
special significance in interpreting the Public Records Law.  
The legislature has specifically authorized the Attorney General 
to advise any person about the applicability of the law.  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.39.  The Attorney General has not issued a formal or 
informal opinion letter or other document regarding the issue 
presented in the instant case.  Rather, the Department of 
Justice has filed a nonparty brief expressing its view.  The 
Attorney General's opinion, advice, and brief are not binding on 
this court, but we may give them persuasive effect.  Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel, 341 Wis. 2d 607, ¶41 (Abrahamson, C.J., lead 
op.). 
The Department of Justice is critical of the court of 
appeals' interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) as defining 
"under" too broadly and in effect allowing release of all 
records connected to the subject matter of any contract between 
an authority and its contractor.  The County agrees with the 
Department, arguing that the court of appeals effectively 
transforms private records into public records, an unwarranted 
intrusion into the affairs of the private entity. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
16 
 
in compliance with, in carrying out, subject to, or because of a 
contract.  
¶38 The Department claims its interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(3) is supported by the history of the statute.  The 
Department rests its interpretation of § 19.36(3) on a slim reed 
of unexplained changes to the draft as it worked its way through 
the legislature before the final language was enacted.  When 
first proposed, the statute included language that in part 
defined a contractor's record as one "used in connection with 
the performance" of contractual services.  The Department argues 
that removal of this language from the final bill indicates that 
the legislature intended to narrow the scope of the provision.  
There are, however, many possible reasons why particular 
language may fall by the wayside before a bill becomes a law, 
and the failure of the legislature to enact particular language 
has limited persuasive value.19   
¶39 Applying its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) 
to 
the 
present 
case, 
the 
Department 
concludes 
that 
the 
production or collection of invoices was not required by the 
liability insurance policy; rather, the invoices were the 
product of an agreement between the insurance company and the 
law firm. 
                                                 
19 Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 723 (1989) ("We do 
not 
attach 
decisive 
significance 
to 
the 
unexplained 
disappearance of one word from an unenacted bill because 'mute 
intermediate legislative maneuvers' are not reliable indicators 
of congressional intent.") (quoting Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 
331 U.S. 40, 61 (1947)).  
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
17 
 
¶40 This interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(3) 
is 
very 
narrow. 
 
It 
seems 
contrary 
to 
the 
legislature's directive that it is the public policy of the 
state that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and the official 
acts of those officers and employees who represent them.  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.31.  We shall return to the public policy argument 
later.  Moreover, this reading of § 19.36(3) may permit an 
authority and contractor to draft a contract to evade Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(3) by delegating a record's creation and custody to an 
agent.20   
¶41 Like the circuit court, the court of appeals, and the 
Department of Justice, we explore the meaning and application of 
the key words in Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) governing the present 
dispute: "produced," "collected," and "under."  These words are 
not technical or specialized words.  They are words with 
commonly understood meanings, as we described above, that should 
be used in interpreting and applying the Public Records Law.21  
                                                 
20 See Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. School Bd. of Shorewood, 
186 Wis. 2d 443, 452-53, 521 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1994) (the 
purpose of the contractors' records provision is to prevent an 
authority from evading its responsibilities under the Public 
Records Law by delegating a record's creation and custody to an 
agent). 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 990.01(1) provides as follows: 
Construction of laws; words and phrases.  In the 
construction of Wisconsin laws the words and phrases 
which follow shall be construed as indicated unless 
such construction would produce a result inconsistent 
with the manifest intent of the legislature: 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
18 
 
The statutory text is constant, but each of these words may have 
a different meaning and application depending on the fact 
situation.   
¶42 The meaning of these words used separately and 
together in Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) must be found in their 
context.  Context usually refers to the relationship of the 
words at issue to other provisions in the statute or to other 
statutes.  Context can also mean the factual setting in which 
the words are to be applied.22  The implication of each of these 
words 
in 
§ 19.36(3) 
may 
vary 
somewhat 
according 
to 
the 
circumstances in which § 19.36 is applied.  The circumstances to 
which these statutory words apply are myriad.   
¶43 We therefore interpret and apply the statute and the 
words "collected," "produced," and "under" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(3), in their commonly understood meanings, in the 
context of the factual setting of the present case.  The factual 
setting here is the tripartite relationship of the County, the 
insurance company, and the law firm based on the liability 
insurance policy.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) General Rule.  All words and phrases shall be 
construed according to common and approved usage; but 
technical words and phrases and others that have a 
peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed 
according to such meaning. 
22 Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
612 N.W.2d 659 ("Context usually refers to the relationship with 
other statutes.  Context also can mean factual setting.") 
(internal citation omitted). 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
19 
 
¶44 The instant case presents the classic tripartite 
relationship between an insured, an insurance company, and a law 
firm retained by the insurance company to represent the insured. 
We have described this tripartite relationship previously.  The 
liability insurance policy is the basis of a contractual 
relationship between the County and the insurance company.  It 
is the basis of a contractual relationship between the insurance 
company and the law firm.  It is the basis of a contractual 
attorney-client (agency) relationship between the law firm and 
the County.    
¶45 When an insurance company retains a law firm to defend 
an insured in an action, it does so pursuant to the liability 
insurance policy.  The insurance company's retention of a law 
firm to represent the insured (here the County) and the 
insured's 
(the 
County's) acceptance of the representation 
pursuant to the liability insurance policy create an attorney-
client relationship between retained counsel (the law firm) and 
the insured (the County).23   
                                                 
23 Meixell v. Superior Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 335, 341 (7th Cir. 
2000) (an attorney retained by an insurance company to defend 
the insured assumes all the duties imposed by the attorney-
client relationship); Homberger v. Wendel, 764 N.W.2d 371, 376 
(Minn. App. 2009) (insurance defense counsel has attorney-client 
relationship with insured) (quoting Pine Island Farmers Coop v. 
Erstad & Riemer, P.A., 649 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Minn. 2002)); 2 
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 134 cmt. f 
(2000) ("It is clear in an insurance situation that a lawyer 
designated 
to 
defend 
the 
insured 
has 
a 
client-lawyer 
relationship with the insured.  The insurer is not, simply by 
the fact that it designates the lawyer, a client of the 
lawyer."). 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
20 
 
¶46 The law firm has duties owing to both the insurance 
company and the insured pursuant to the liability insurance 
policy.24  And the insurance company and insured have duties 
owing to the law firm pursuant to the liability insurance 
policy.       
¶47 The insured is required under the liability insurance 
policy to assist the insurance company (and the law firm that 
the 
insurance 
company 
retains). 
 
In 
the 
instant 
case 
representatives of the County, including corporation counsel, 
consulted directly with the law firm with regard to the 
litigation, pursuant to the liability insurance policy.25  
                                                 
24 "The relationship of attorney and client is one of 
agency."  Marten Transport Ltd. v. Hartford Specialty Co., 194 
Wis. 2d 1, 13, 533 N.W.2d 452 (1995).  See also Majorowicz v. 
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 2d 513, 525, 569 N.W.2d 472 (Ct. 
App. 1997); Security Bank v. Klicker, 142 Wis. 2d 289, 295, 418 
N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1987). 
25 There was substantial direct interaction between the law 
firm and the County.  Attorney Michele Ford of the law firm met 
with Sheriff Oleson multiple times to prepare his defense.  She 
corresponded 
with 
David 
Lasker, 
the 
County's 
Corporation 
Counsel, and with County Clerk Kobylski in preparing a defense.  
She prepared documents to be approved by David Lasker.  Attorney 
Ford had also been the public face of the County, representing 
it in court in the Haske matters, a case which drew significant 
public attention. 
An authority's attorney-client relationship with a law firm 
may have significant ramifications for the County.  For a 
discussion of some possible significant ramifications of an 
attorney-client 
relationship 
to 
an 
authority, 
see 
Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 186 Wis. 2d at 453-54. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
21 
 
¶48 The tripartite relationship in the context of an 
insurance policy is unique.26  "These relationships among a 
liability insurer, its insured, and the attorney chosen by the 
insurer to represent the insured are sui generis."27  Insurance 
defense counsel are generally recognized as having two clients 
in any given case:  the insurer and the insured.28  This 
situation 
is 
unique 
because 
a 
party 
is 
not 
ordinarily 
represented by counsel selected and paid for by a third party 
whose interests may not be the same as those of the individual 
or entity the attorney was hired to represent. 
¶49 The tripartite relationship in the present case is 
different from the typical relationships contemplated by Wis. 
                                                 
26 Compare Marten Transport Ltd. v. Hartford Specialty Co., 
194 Wis. 2d 1, 18, 533 N.W.2d 452 (1995) (internal citation 
omitted) (No tripartite relationship existed because the law 
firm was hired by the insured and was not retained or paid by 
the insurance company which functioned primarily as a workers 
compensation claims administrator for the insured.). 
27 Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872 
(W.D. Wis. 1977). 
28 Douglas R. Richmond, Walking a Tightrope:  The Tripartite 
Relationship Between Insurer, Insured, and Insurance Defense 
Counsel, 73 N. L. Rev. 265, 270 (1994).  See also State Bar of 
Wisconsin, Wisconsin Ethics Opinions, Formal Opinion E-99-1 
(2011) ("Wisconsin lawyers retained by insurers under a policy 
of insurance typically represent both the insurer and insured in 
the defense of claims. . . . Counsel who regularly represent 
insureds usually have ongoing attorney-client relationships and 
economic ties to those insurers.").  The law firm's relationship 
with both the insurance company and the insured is permitted 
under the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys 
as an exception to the general rule that a lawyer shall not 
accept compensation from a third party for representing a 
client.  SCR 20:1.8(f)(1). 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
22 
 
Stat. § 19.36(3) between an authority, a contractor and a 
subcontractor of the contractor.  The County in the present case 
has a direct contractual relationship with the law firm pursuant 
to the liability insurance policy.  The County and the law firm 
have an attorney-client relationship formed pursuant to the 
liability insurance policy.   
¶50 The County attempts to characterize the law firm as 
contracting solely with the insurance company and thus as a 
subcontractor of the insurance company.  In the ordinary 
business relationship between an authority, a contractor, and a 
subcontractor of the contractor, the authority does not have a 
direct contractual relationship with the subcontractor; the 
subcontractor is not an agent of the authority; and the 
authority does not work directly with the subcontractor.  The 
tripartite 
relationship in the liability insurance policy 
context 
differs 
in 
each 
of 
these 
respects 
from 
the 
authority/contractor/subcontractor situation.    
¶51 We consider the unique tripartite relationship in the 
present 
case 
and 
conclude 
that 
the 
contractors' 
records 
provision applies to the invoices in the insurance policy 
context.  To say that the invoices sought by the Star-Times are 
private records produced and collected pursuant to the private 
contractual relationship between the insurance company and the 
law firm ignores the unique, direct attorney-client agency 
relationship between the County and the law firm in the present 
case based on the liability insurance policy.   
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
23 
 
¶52 The invoices relating to the County's defense in the 
Haske matters were generated (that is, "produced or collected," 
according to the common usage of these words), pursuant to (that 
is, "under," according to the common usage of this word) the 
liability insurance policy between the County and the insurance 
company, 
which 
established 
a 
contractual, 
attorney-client 
relationship between the law firm and the County.  To 
characterize the invoices as solely private records under an 
agreement between the insurance company and the law firm is to 
turn a blind eye to the realities of the relationship between 
the County, the insurance company, and the law firm in the 
present case.   
¶53 With regard to the significance of the County's 
attorney-client relationship with the law firm for purposes of 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3), Journal/Sentinel, Inc.  v. School Board 
of Shorewood, 186 Wis. 2d 443, 521 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1994), 
is instructive, although the fact situation differs from that in 
the present case.  In Journal/Sentinel, the court of appeals 
explicitly 
relied 
on 
the 
authority's 
attorney-client 
relationship to mandate the production of a document kept by the 
attorney.    
¶54 The attorney in Journal/Sentinel was hired by the 
school board and prepared a memorandum of understanding reciting 
the terms of a settlement with the school district's former 
superintendent.  The school board refused to produce the 
memorandum, arguing that the document was created by and kept by 
the attorney, not the school board, and therefore was not a 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
24 
 
record under the Public Records Law.  The school board also 
argued that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) does not apply because the 
attorney's contract with the board was to provide legal 
services, not a memorandum of understanding.29   
¶55 The 
Journal/Sentinel 
court 
quickly 
shelved 
these 
arguments and concluded that a public body may not avoid the 
public access mandated by the Public Records Law by delegating 
both record creation and custody to an agent.30  The court of 
appeals reasoned that the document was produced during the 
course of the attorney's representation of the school board and 
is a contractor's record subject to disclosure under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(3) of the Public Records Law. 
¶56 The facts in the present case differ from those in 
Journal/Sentinel.  In the Journal/Sentinel case, the authority 
(the school board) contracted directly with the attorney for 
legal services.  In the present case, the insurance company, not 
the County, contracted with the law firm to provide legal 
services for the County.  Nevertheless, by procuring the 
liability insurance policy and by allowing the insurance company 
to retain counsel for it, the County in the present case has in 
                                                 
29 Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 186 Wis. 2d at 453. 
30 Id. at 452-53. 
No one claims that the County attempted to circumvent the 
Public Records Law here.  But the Public Records Law does not 
require an authority to intend to circumvent the law before the 
contractors' records provision becomes applicable and the 
contractors' records are accessible. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
25 
 
effect contracted with the law firm for legal services and has 
created an attorney-client relationship with the law firm 
similar to the relationship that would have been created had the 
County and the law firm contracted directly.  Journal/Sentinel 
teaches that when a public authority contracts for legal 
services, a record created and kept by the attorney may be 
subject to the Public Records Law.     
¶57 Because the liability insurance policy is the basis 
for 
the 
tripartite 
relationship 
between 
the 
County, 
the 
insurance company, and the law firm and is the basis for an 
attorney-client relationship between the law firm and the 
County, we conclude that the invoices that were produced or 
collected during the course of the law firm's representation of 
the County pursuant to the liability insurance policy come under 
the liability insurance policy.  Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(3) 
therefor governs the accessibility of the invoices. 
¶58 We consider now the Department of Justice's contention 
that public policy does not support such an interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3).  The Department asserts that its narrower 
interpretation 
advances the public policy of facilitating 
oversight of public entities while protecting the private 
financial relationship between the insurance company and the law 
firm, a private relationship that is not a legitimate matter of 
public interest.    
¶59 To evaluate the Department's argument that allowing 
access to the invoices does not comport with the public policy 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
26 
 
underlying the Public Records Law, we examine the legislature's 
declaration of policy in Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  
¶60 The 
court 
has recognized that the legislature's 
"statement of public policy in [Wis. Stat.] § 19.31 is one of 
the strongest declarations of policy to be found in the 
Wisconsin statutes."31   
¶61 The legislature has instructed that the Public Records 
Law be construed "with a presumption of complete public access, 
consistent with the conduct of governmental business.  The 
denial of public access generally is contrary to the public 
interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be 
denied."32  
                                                 
31 Zellner v. Cederburg Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 53, ¶49, 300 
Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240. 
32 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.31 states:  
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, 
it is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them.  Further, providing persons with such 
information is declared to be an essential function of 
a representative government and an integral part of 
the routine duties of officers and employees whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information.  To 
that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in 
every instance with a presumption of complete public 
access, consistent with the conduct of governmental 
business.  The denial of public access generally is 
contrary to the public interest, and only in an 
exceptional case may access be denied. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
27 
 
¶62 The 
Department 
of 
Justice 
argues 
that 
the 
legislatively established public policy does not apply to the 
instant case because the invoices are private records generated 
by a private entity and delivered to a private entity and do not 
relate to the affairs of government.  The Department claims that 
other records subject to the Public Records Law are available 
for oversight in the present case and that the requesters have 
not explained why members of the public need the invoices from a 
private law firm and a private insurance company to exercise 
meaningful oversight of Deputy Haske's conduct, costs, or the 
County's legal liability coverage.33  That a requester may seek 
other records does not, however, prohibit a requester from 
seeking these records if they are accessible under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(3).  
¶63 The Star-Times argues persuasively that its position 
comports with the public policy embodied in the Public Records 
                                                 
33 The Department of Justice seems to question the purpose 
of the request for the invoices.  A request for records may not 
be refused because the requester "is unwilling . . . to state 
the purpose of the request."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(i).  The 
Star-Times' brief does claim a public purpose.  It asserts that 
the invoices may inform the public about the use of taxpayers' 
dollars and give the public information about allegations of 
misconduct and how the allegations are handled.  The Star-Times 
does not expand on this thesis, but it has not made the purpose 
of the request the linchpin of its argument.  We therefore need 
not discuss the purpose of the Star-Times' request further. 
Compare Building & Construction Trades Council v. Waunakee 
Community 
School 
District, 
221 
Wis. 2d 575,587 
n.4, 
585 
N.W.2d 726 (Ct. App. 1998), in which the records requester made 
the reasons underlying its request the linchpin of its public-
policy argument to get access to records prepared and kept by a 
subcontractor. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
28 
 
Law.  It points out that if Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) does not apply 
to the invoices, it will not apply to other documents produced 
by the law firm while defending the County under the insurance 
policy, such as a memorandum of understanding or a settlement 
agreement the law firm negotiates. 
¶64 The invoices were produced by the law firm during its 
representation of the County based on the liability insurance 
policy.  The invoices therefore have a clear connection to the 
County's attorney-client relationship with the law firm and the 
liability insurance policy.     
¶65 Accordingly, we conclude that access to the invoices 
in the present case comes within the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(3) and is consistent with the legislative policy of 
"making available those documents whose contents are related to 
the affairs of government, to the official acts of officers and 
employees, and to 'the conduct of governmental business.'"34   
IV 
¶66 Finally, we turn to prior court interpretations of 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) to determine whether our interpretation 
and application of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) in the present case 
comport with the case law.  It is important to acknowledge, as 
do the parties and the amici, that none of the prior cases is 
directly on point.  We agree with the Department of Justice that 
                                                 
34 Schill, 327 Wis. 2d 572, ¶80 (Abrahamson, C.J., lead 
op.). 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
29 
 
"[t]he attorney invoices at issue in the present case fall 
somewhere between" the published decisions.    
¶67 Each published decision presents a different fact 
situation, and none addresses the tripartite attorney-client 
relationship relevant here.  Still, an examination of the case 
law demonstrates that our holding is consistent with the 
principles set forth in the prior cases.  
¶68 We 
recently 
discussed 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.36(3) 
in 
WIREdata, 
Inc. 
v. 
Village 
of 
Sussex, 
2008 
WI 
69, 
310 
Wis. 2d 397, ¶¶79-89, 751 N.W.2d 736, in deciding whether an 
authority may direct a requester to seek records about property 
assessments from an independent contractor assessor.  In 
WIREdata, the authority contracted directly with an independent 
contractor to complete property assessments, and the contractor 
maintained the records.   
¶69 The WIREdata court concluded that municipalities could 
not avoid liability under the Public Records Law by contracting 
with 
independent contractor assessors for the collection, 
maintenance, and custody of property assessment records.35  The 
court concluded that the property assessment records collected 
and kept by the independent contractor assessors were within the 
scope of the contract between the authority and the assessor and 
were therefore records within the purview of the contractors' 
records provision in Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3).   
                                                 
35 WIREdata, 310 Wis. 2d 397, ¶¶82, 84. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
30 
 
¶70 The present case is consistent with the principles 
that guided the WIREdata decision.  In the present case, unlike 
in the WIREdata case, the authority (the County) did not 
contract directly with the independent contractor (the law firm) 
who maintained the invoices.  We have concluded in the present 
case, however, that the County had a contractual relationship 
(attorney-client) with the law firm based on the liability 
insurance policy, a contract between the County and the 
insurance company.  Furthermore, pursuant to the liability 
insurance policy between the County and the insurance company, 
there was substantial direct interaction between the County and 
the law firm; both the law firm and the County had obligations 
to each other pursuant to the liability insurance policy 
regarding the conduct of the litigation and apparently both met 
their obligations.  Thus, here as in WIREdata, the records 
requested were produced or collected under a contract between 
the authority and the contractor.  The invoices are therefore 
subject to Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3). 
¶71 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
has 
addressed 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.36(3) 
in 
Journal/Sentinel 
(which 
we 
have 
discussed 
previously) and again in Machotka v. Village of West Salem, 2000 
WI App 43, 233 Wis. 2d 106, 607 N.W.2d 319, and Building & 
Construction 
Trades 
Council 
v. 
Waunakee 
Community 
School 
District, 221 Wis. 2d 575, 585 N.W.2d 726 (Ct. App. 1998).  Our 
ruling in the present case is consistent with both cases. 
¶72 In Machotka, the Village of West Salem had sold 
municipal bonds to Robert W. Baird & Company, which then sold 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
31 
 
the bonds to investors.  The issue before the court of appeals 
was whether the contractors' records provision required the 
Village to provide a record requester with the names of the 
ultimate purchasers of the municipal bonds.  The contract 
between West Salem and Baird did not provide that the Village 
would learn the identities of the ultimate bond purchasers, and 
it was not standard industry practice to reveal those names.36 
¶73 The court of appeals concluded that Baird's record of 
sales to ultimate investors was not a record produced or 
collected under Baird's contract with the Village.  Baird 
contracted with the Village only to underwrite the bond issue, 
and anything else it did——such as its sale of the bonds to 
others——"was undertaken for Baird's own purposes and its own 
benefit, not the Village's."37  The records Baird kept of its 
sale of the Village's bonds to investors were kept for its own 
purposes, and were not in any way part of the contract with the 
Village.  The records sought were created after Baird's 
contractual obligations to the Village were completed.38   
¶74 In contrast, in the present case the insurance 
company's contractual obligation to the County was to pay the 
County's attorney fees.   The invoices at issue were produced by 
the law firm pursuant to its work for its clients, the County 
and the insurance company, under the liability insurance policy.  
                                                 
36 Machotka, 233 Wis. 2d 106, ¶2, n.2. 
37 Id., ¶9. 
38 WIREdata, 310 Wis. 2d 397, ¶87. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
32 
 
Inasmuch as the invoices at issue in the present case were 
produced or collected pursuant to the contract between the 
authority (the County) and the contractor (the insurance 
company), they are subject to Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3).      
¶75 The court of appeals also addressed Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(3) in Building & Construction Trades Council v. Waunakee 
Community School District, 221 Wis. 2d 575, 585 N.W.2d 726 (Ct. 
App. 1998), in which the school district entered into a 
construction contract with a general contractor who in turn 
entered into contracts with subcontractors to perform certain 
work on a school construction project.  The issue before the 
court of appeals was whether the Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(3), considered in light of the prevailing wage law, 
§ 66.293, required the school district to obtain payroll records 
from the subcontractors and provide them to a record requester. 
¶76 More specifically, the question presented was whether 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) was applicable when the subcontractors' 
records sought were not produced or collected under the school 
district's contract with the contractor, but rather were 
produced entirely under other contracts, namely the contracts 
between the contractor and the subcontractors, to which the 
school district was not a party.  
¶77 For Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) to apply, the court of 
appeals required the records requester to provide the court with 
authority that would "bridge the gap" between the requirement in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) that the school district disclose records 
produced or collected under its contract with the contractor and 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
33 
 
the fact that the payroll records requested were the internal 
records of two entities that had entered into subcontracts with 
the contractor——subcontracts to which the school district was 
not a party.  
¶78 After careful and detailed analysis of the prevailing 
wage laws that govern payroll records and the enforcement 
methods of the wage laws, the court of appeals concluded that 
the wage laws regarding monitoring the prevailing wage rates and 
hours of work for employees of private employers working on 
public works projects did not "bridge the gap."  The court of 
appeals ruled that for numerous reasons, the prevailing wage 
laws did not render the payroll records of the subcontractors 
within the purview of the contract between the school district 
and the contractor or the public policy of the Public Records 
Law.       
¶79 The County argues that there is a gap between the 
requirement in Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) that the County disclose 
records produced or collected under its contract with the 
insurance company (the liability insurance policy) and the fact 
that the invoices requested were records generated and submitted 
by the law firm to the insurance company on the basis of the 
contract between the law firm and the insurance company.  We 
conclude that there is no gap in the present case.  The invoices 
were generated and submitted as a result of the tripartite 
relationship of the County, insurance company and law firm 
pursuant to the liability insurance policy.  The liability 
insurance policy is a contract between the County and the 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
34 
 
insurance company.  We thus conclude that our ruling today 
comports with the Building & Construction Trades case.  
* * * * 
¶80 In sum, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  We use somewhat different reasoning, however.  We too 
conclude that the invoices are contractors' records under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.36(3).  Our decision is based on the tripartite 
relationship of the County, the insurance company, and the law 
firm, all arising from the liability insurance policy.    
¶81 The tripartite relationship arising from the liability 
insurance policy is as follows: 
(1) The liability insurance policy is the basis of a 
contractual 
relationship 
between 
the 
County 
and 
the 
insurance company:  The insurance company agrees in the 
liability insurance policy to pay damages the County owes 
and to pay attorney fees incurred for the County's defense.   
(2) The liability insurance policy is the basis of a 
contractual relationship between the insurance company and 
the law firm:  The insurance company retains the law firm, 
pursuant to the liability insurance policy, to represent 
the County and agrees to pay the attorney fees.  The law 
firm that accepts the assignment undertakes the County's 
representation in accordance with the liability insurance 
policy. 
(3) The liability insurance policy is the basis of a 
contractual relationship between the law firm and the 
County:  Pursuant to the liability insurance policy, the 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
35 
 
law firm retained by the insurance company enters into a 
contractual attorney-client (agency) relationship with the 
County. 
¶82 The liability insurance policy thus is the basis for 
contractual relationships between the County and the insurance 
company, as well as between the insurance company and the law 
firm, and the law firm and the County.    
¶83 The invoices——the billings for the law firm's legal 
work performed as the County's defense counsel and the insurance 
company's retained counsel——were produced or collected in the 
course of the law firm's representation of the County and the 
insurance company under the liability insurance policy between 
the County and the insurance company.  Because the liability 
insurance policy is the basis for the tripartite relationship 
between the County, the insurance company, and the law firm, and 
is the basis for an attorney-client relationship between the law 
firm and the County, we conclude that the invoices were produced 
or collected during the course of the law firm's representation 
of the County and the insurance company pursuant to the 
liability insurance policy; the liability insurance policy is a 
contract entered into by the County and the insurance company. 
Thus, the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) have been met 
and § 19.36(3) governs the accessibility of the invoices. 
¶84 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the proceeding to the circuit court to order the County 
to make available to the Star-Times unredacted copies of the 
invoices. 
No. 
2010AP2313   
 
36 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2010AP2313.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶85 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   I join 
the majority opinion in concurrence.  I write separately to 
reiterate a point that the majority opinion emphasizes:  our 
decision in this case does nothing to alter the rules governing 
attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product, or any other 
duties involving attorney confidentiality.  See majority op., 
¶¶14–15.  The parties neither briefed nor argued these issues, 
and the court properly declines to address these issues.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶86 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
opinion permits Wisconsin's public records law to breach 
privileged communications, contrary to sound public policy and 
the text of the public records statute.  The majority's 
assurance that the opinion "does not alter the rules governing 
confidentiality, attorney-client privilege, or lawyers' work 
product, or any other rules protecting against disclosure," 
majority op., ¶15, is unpersuasive given the opinion's analysis 
and its other declarations.  Because I believe the opinion has 
serious negative ramifications for the practice of law, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶87 Juneau County (the County) contracted with Wisconsin 
County Mutual Insurance Corporation (County Mutual) to provide 
public entity liability insurance for the County.  Under this 
insurance 
policy 
(or 
insurance 
contract), 
County 
Mutual 
committed itself to pay damages that the County became legally 
obligated to pay as the result of a covered occurrence.  The 
policy also covered attorney fees and costs related to defending 
a claim.  The public entity liability policy was similar to 
insurance 
policies 
acquired 
by 
a 
multitude 
of 
Wisconsin 
municipalities and likely parallel to the liability policies 
acquired by innumerable non-public entities such as businesses 
and nonprofits.   
¶88 In 2008 Juneau County Sheriff Brent Oleson suspended 
one of his deputies, Jeremy Haske, for alleged misconduct.  This 
action led to litigation, including two lawsuits by Haske 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
2 
 
against the sheriff.  The County called upon its insurer, County 
Mutual, to provide a defense.  County Mutual assigned the 
Milwaukee law firm of Crivello Carlson, S.C. (Crivello Carlson) 
to provide representation. 
¶89 In the midst of this litigation, the Juneau County 
Star-Times (Star-Times) made a public records request through 
the Juneau County Clerk.  The Star-Times requested access to any 
legal bills for 2008, 2009, and 2010 submitted by Crivello 
Carlson to County Mutual for its representation of the County in 
the Haske matters. 
¶90 The record shows that Attorney Michele M. Ford 
(Attorney Ford) of Crivello Carlson, after conferring with the 
County's corporation counsel, supplied the Star-Times with 27 
pages of redacted legal invoices that it had submitted to County 
Mutual.  These invoices were dated February 16, 2009; June 8, 
2009; August 20, 2009; or September 22, 2009, respectively.  The 
redacted invoices showed total hours in each reporting period; 
total attorney fees in each reporting period; and other 
disbursements in each reporting period.  They revealed the days 
Attorneys Ford, John T. Juettner, and Linda J. Slawson worked on 
the cases but did not reveal the exact amount of time that an 
attorney put in on a given day.  Most significantly, the 
invoices did not disclose what an attorney was doing on a given 
day. 
¶91 Attorney Ford explained in a cover letter to the Star-
Times 
that 
"The 
invoices 
have 
been 
redacted 
to 
exclude 
information that is privileged by statute and common law.  
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
3 
 
Access to records may be denied where there is a specific 
statutory exemption to disclosure, Wis. Stat. § 19.36, or where 
there is a common law or public policy exception."   
¶92 Attorney Ford cited Wis. Stat. § 905.03, the lawyer-
client privilege statute.  She also cited "the privileged status 
of attorney work product."  "The presumption of access under 
[Wis. Stat.] § 19.35(1)(a) is defeated because the attorney work 
product 
qualifies 
under 
the 
'otherwise 
provided 
by 
law' 
exception." 
¶93 When 
the 
County 
declined 
to 
release 
additional 
information from the legal invoices, the Star-Times filed suit 
in Juneau County Circuit Court. 
¶94 Adams County Circuit Judge Charles A. Pollex was sent 
to Juneau County to hear the case.  He determined that while 
Juneau County was an "authority" under the public records law, 
"There is no evidence before the court that the information in 
question has been created by nor that it is being kept by Juneau 
County." 
¶95 Because the unredacted invoices were not a Juneau 
County "record," the court next considered whether the legal 
invoices were a "contractor record" under Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3).  
The court concluded that: 
The invoices for attorney's fees rendered are, as far 
as this summary judgment record is concerned, a 
private matter between the Crivello Carlson law firm 
and Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corp. and any 
connection between the invoices and Juneau County's 
contract with Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corp. 
is tenuous at best. 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
4 
 
Thus, the court held that the invoices did not qualify under 
§ 19.36(3). 
¶96 In addition, the circuit court found that "the 
invoices contain detailed descriptions of the nature of the 
legal services rendered to Juneau County.  Producing these 
billing records would, therefore[,] reveal the substance of 
lawyer-client communications and fall within the purview of the 
lawyer-client privilege." 
¶97 The court of appeals reversed, rejecting the County's 
explanation 
of 
the 
redactions 
and 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determinations.  It directed the circuit court "to order the 
County to make available to the Star-Times unredacted copies of 
the invoices."  Juneau Cnty. Star-Times v. Juneau Cnty., 2011 WI 
App 150, ¶2, 337 Wis. 2d 710, 807 N.W.2d 655 (emphasis added).  
The majority now affirms this conclusion without directly 
discussing the lawyer-client privilege or lawyer work product. 
¶98 In short, the majority determines that this case can 
be decided by its construction of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3). 
II 
¶99 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(3) reads as follows: 
 
Contractors' Records.  Subject to sub. (12), each 
authority shall make available for inspection and 
copying under s. 19.35(1) any record produced or 
collected under a contract entered into by the 
authority with a person other than an authority to the 
same extent as if the record were maintained by the 
authority.  This subsection does not apply to the 
inspection 
or 
copying 
of 
a 
record 
under 
s. 
19.35(1)(am). 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
5 
 
¶100 The crucial words in this subsection are "any record 
produced or collected under a contract entered into by the 
authority." 
¶101 The relationships in this case may be diagrammed using 
the three corners of a triangle.  In one corner of the triangle 
is Juneau County (the insured).  In another corner is County 
Mutual (the insurer).  There is indisputably a contract between 
these two "corners" and any record "produced" or "collected" 
"under" this contract is a "contractor record" under the 
statute, even though it was not created or kept by the County. 
¶102 There is another corner to the triangle representing 
Crivello Carlson.  Crivello Carlson has a contract with County 
Mutual.  This contract is different from the County's insurance 
contract.  We do not know the provisions of this contract; that 
is, we do not know the precise relationship between County 
Mutual and Crivello Carlson in terms of which Crivello Carlson 
attorneys will be involved in representing the public entities 
that 
County Mutual 
insures, how much the firm will be 
compensated for its services, when it will be compensated for 
its services, what sort of briefings Crivello Carlson must 
provide to the insurer, and what kind of invoices the firm must 
submit.  We also do not know when this contractual relationship 
began.  What we do know is that the County was not a party to 
this second contract and that the County did not select and did 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
6 
 
not have a right to select Crivello Carlson as its law firm.1  
Crivello Carlson, by its own admission, was "assigned" to 
represent Juneau County.2 
                                                 
1 The Legal Expense Coverage Endorsement to the insurance 
policy states: "We [County Mutual] have the right and duty to 
select counsel to handle any matter for which you have given 
notice of your intent to seek legal expense coverage under 
Coverage D."  This particular provision covered legal expense 
coverage related to "collective bargaining disputes, disputes 
with regulatory agencies or disputes involving any operation of 
principles 
of 
eminent domain, condemnation proceedings or 
inverse condemnation."  
The insurance policy provision relating to general legal 
defense and settlement reads as follows: 
We have the right and duty to defend any suit 
against the insured seeking monetary damages on 
account of bodily injury, personal injury, property 
damage or errors and omissions or any combination 
thereof, but: 
1. The amount we pay for damages is limited 
as described in Section IV – Limits of Insurance; 
2. We may, at our discretion, investigate 
any occurrence and settle any claim or suit that 
may result even if the settlement amount is 
exclusively within the insured's deductible; and 
3. Our right and duty to defend end when we 
have used up the Limit of Insurance in the 
payment 
of 
judgments 
or 
settlements 
under 
Coverages A, B, or C.  This applies to both 
claims and suits pending at that time and those 
filed thereafter. 
Defense costs are payable in addition to the policy 
limit 
after 
any 
applicable 
deductible 
has 
been 
exhausted. 
2 See letter from Michele Ford to Juneau County Star-Times 
dated February 10, 2010. 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
7 
 
¶103 Crivello Carlson's invoices to County Mutual would not 
have been sent to the County but for the Star-Times public 
records request.  Thus, the invoices were not "produced" for the 
County or "collected" for the County.  They were "produced" or 
"collected" 
under 
the 
County's 
insurance 
contract 
only 
indirectly, raising the question whether an indirect connection 
is all the statute requires. 
¶104 County Mutual must have contracts with providers for 
equipment and services that are paid for in part by Juneau 
County's insurance premiums.  Thus, if Crivello Carlson's 
invoices are "under" the County's insurance contract, other 
invoices sent to County Mutual involving some interaction with 
the County may be "under" the insurance contract as well.  This 
is why the Wisconsin Counties Association expressed concern that 
the court of appeals decision——which the majority affirms——
"suggests that an authority's duty to provide access to 
contractors' records is almost limitless." 
¶105 The majority opinion commences its analysis with the 
simple proposition that "(1) The liability insurance policy is 
the basis of a contractual relationship between the County and 
the insurance company[.]"  Majority op., ¶11 (emphasis added).  
This proposition may be true, but it is also true that the 
liability insurance policy is a contract.  A contract gives rise 
to a contractual relationship.  The majority opinion adopts "the 
basis of" phraseology, however, so that it can treat other 
relationships in the triangle as functionally equivalent to the 
County's insurance contract. 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶106 The majority's statement that "(2) The liability 
insurance policy is the basis of a contractual relationship 
between the insurance company and the law firm[,]" id., ¶11 
(emphasis added), is true only if the law firm's contractual 
relationship was initiated because of the County's liability 
insurance policy.  This is not a fact of record. 
¶107 The majority opinion also asserts that the attorney-
client relationship between Crivello Carlson and Juneau County 
is a third "contractual" relationship.  Id., ¶11.  This may not 
be 
true. 
 
A 
lawyer-client 
relationship 
is 
a 
fiduciary 
relationship.3  It is often an agency relationship.  But it is 
not necessarily a contractual relationship.  The majority 
opinion's conclusory assertions to the contrary are overly 
sweeping, and they have not been supported with Wisconsin 
precedent. 
¶108 Once established and sanctified, the "tripartite" 
relationship described in the majority opinion is subject to 
application in other contexts.  For instance, suppose an 
"authority" enters into a collective bargaining agreement (e.g., 
contract) with a public employee union.  If the union later 
hires counsel to represent one of the authority's employees, 
must the union disclose the legal invoices it receives from 
hired counsel?  Are these invoices contractor records because 
they are indirectly "under" the collective bargaining contract? 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Sands v. Menard, Inc., 2010 WI 96, ¶53, 328 
Wis. 2d 647, 787 N.W.2d 384; Berner Cheese Corp. v. Krug, 2008 
WI 95, ¶41, 312 Wis. 2d 251, 752 N.W.2d 800. 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
9 
 
¶109 It is not difficult to apply the principles of the 
majority 
opinion 
to 
other 
situations 
involving 
legal 
representation as well as other sensitive relationships loosely 
related to an authority's contract. 
¶110 Thus, the pivotal question before the court is whether 
records related only indirectly to a contract entered into by an 
authority are records "under" that contract that must be 
disgorged by the authority pursuant to the public records law. 
¶111 The amicus Wisconsin Department of Justice (the DOJ) 
urges the court to interpret "any record produced or collected 
under a contract" as a record "required or obligated by a 
contract." 
 
It 
contends 
that 
the 
"statutory 
language, 
legislative history, and public policy all support this result." 
¶112 The DOJ further argues that the legislature knew how 
to draft broader language describing contractor records in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.36(3) than it eventually chose.  The DOJ concludes 
that because the legislature chose not to use broad language in 
§ 19.36(3), the contractor records provision does not include 
any 
record 
"used 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
performance 
of 
contractual services."  The DOJ believes that the court of 
appeals decision wrongly adopts the "used in connection with" 
concept for the contractor records provision in § 19.36(3). 
¶113 The DOJ points to legislative history in its analysis.  
The legislature created Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) in ch. 335, Laws 
of 1981 (Chapter 335).  Chapter 335 was based on amended 1979 
Senate Bill 482 that failed to pass (SB 482).  Drafting File, 
ch. 335, Laws of 1981, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
10 
 
Wis.  Senate Bill 482 did not include a contractor records 
provision like the current § 19.36(3).  However, SB 482, as 
amended, added a defined term, "maintains," in regard to 
personal data maintained by an authority.4  This defined term 
used the broad concept of "used in connection with," similar to 
the broad interpretation of the contractor records provision 
adopted by the court of appeals in this case.  Cf. Star-Times, 
337 Wis. 2d 710, ¶¶17, 22–23.   
¶114 Ultimately, Chapter 335 did not include the broadly 
defined term "maintains" as drafted for SB 482.  In fact, the 
legislature rejected several attempts to amend Chapter 335 to 
include the broader "maintains" definition from SB 482.  Thus, 
the DOJ concludes, the legislature knew how to describe 
contractor records in broad terms, chose not to use broad terms, 
and this court should not interpret the present contractor 
records provision in Wis. Stat. § 19.36(3) as broadly as the 
court of appeals did and as the majority opinion does now.   
¶115 The majority's dismissal of the DOJ's argument is not 
compelling.  I would adopt the DOJ's interpretation of the 
public records law, recognizing that the DOJ is entitled to 
great weight deference because of the experience of this agency 
charged with enforcing the law. 
                                                 
4 The engrossed version of 1979 Senate Bill 492 defined 
"maintains" to include data in "the legal custody of a person 
who performs or has performed services under contract to the 
authority agency and the data has been collected, stored, 
disseminated or used in connection with the performance of the 
services . . . ."   
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶116 If the DOJ's interpretation were adopted, the legal 
invoices would not be contractor records under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.36(3). 
III 
¶117 Juneau County has not relied on Wis. Stat. § 905.03, 
the statute on lawyer-client privilege, as a basis for its 
nondisclosure, in arguing its case in this court.  It did, 
however, assert the privilege in the circuit court and in the 
court of appeals. 
¶118 The majority seizes upon the County's strategy in this 
court as justification for not discussing the lawyer-client 
privilege in its opinion.  Nonetheless, in ordering the County 
to turn over unredacted legal invoices under the public records 
law, the majority appears to be sending a message that the 
confidentiality of legal invoices may be in jeopardy under the 
public records law.  If this is correct, it would be very bad 
news for "authorities" involved in litigation because it would 
depart from established precedent by treating "authority" 
parties different from non-authority parties under Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.03.5  
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 905.03(2) and (3) provide in part: 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
12 
 
¶119 Our precedent is that "attorney billing records are 
protected by the lawyer-client privilege."  Lane v. Sharp 
Packaging Systems, Inc., 2002 WI 28, ¶3, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 
N.W.2d 788.  They are confidential if they reveal the nature of 
legal services provided or the substance of lawyer-client 
communications.  Id. 
¶120 In 
Lane, 
the 
court 
observed 
that 
"once 
the 
professional relationship is established, all communications, 
oral and written, between attorney and client are privileged 
from production excluding those exceptions outlined in the 
statute."  Id., ¶21 (quoting State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit 
Court for Milwaukee Cnty., 34 Wis. 2d 559, 580, 150 N.W.2d 387 
(1967)).  However, the court added that the privilege should be 
contained so that it does not extend beyond its core rationale 
of ensuring candor and full disclosure between lawyer and 
client.  Lane, 251 Wis. 2d  68, ¶21. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) General Rule of Privilege.  A client has a privilege 
to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of 
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the 
client: between the client or the client's representative and 
the client's lawyer or the lawyer's representative; or between 
the client's lawyer and the lawyer's representative; or by the 
client or the client's lawyer to a lawyer representing another 
in a matter of common interest; or between representatives of 
the client or between the client and a representative of the 
client; or between lawyers representing the client. 
(3) Who May Claim the Privilege.  The privilege may be 
claimed by the client, . . .  The person who was the lawyer at 
the time of the communication may claim the privilege but only 
on behalf of the client.  The lawyer's authority to do so is 
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
13 
 
¶121 Hence, legal invoices are not inherently beyond the 
reach of a public records request, especially when the request 
is focused on fee arrangements involving the expenditure of tax 
dollars.  But when a request seeks to uncover details about "the 
nature of legal services provided," id., ¶37 (citing United 
States v. Horn, 976 F.2d 1314, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1992), and Real 
v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 211, 213-14 (N.D. Cal 1986)), 
or "the substance of lawyer-client communications," Lane, 251 
Wis. 2d 68, ¶39, the request becomes highly sensitive and may 
require in camera review by a court, as happened here.6 
¶122 In my view, the County, County Mutual, and Crivello 
Carlson all had the right to assert the lawyer-client privilege.  
County Mutual and Crivello Carlson had an obligation to do so. 
¶123 The lawyer-client privilege may be claimed by the 
client (the County).  Wis. Stat. § 905.03(3).  In this case it 
was.  The client's decision binds others who are bound up in a 
confidential relationship with the client. 
¶124 County Mutual had and has a contractual and fiduciary 
relationship with the County and is a "representative of the 
lawyer" as defined in Wis. Stat. § 905.03(1)(c) and listed in 
Wis. Stat. § 905.03(2).  If the latter categorization were not 
true, the insurer's ability to protect its insured client's 
confidential communications would become hollow.  In support of 
this categorization, the insurer/"representative of the lawyer" 
                                                 
6 The court of appeals acknowledges that "many of the 
redacted portions are descriptions of legal services rendered."  
Juneau Cnty. Star-Times v. Juneau Cnty., 2011 WI App 150, ¶41, 
337 Wis. 2d 710, 807 N.W.2d 655; see also id., ¶45. 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
14 
 
monitors the lawyer's expenditures, pays the lawyer's bills, and 
plays a role in any settlement. 
¶125 The stakes in this dispute are obvious.  The Star-
Times already has information on the names of the County's 
lawyers, the number of hours they worked, and the amount they 
were paid——not by the County with County tax dollars, but by the 
County's insurer.  What the Star-Times wants are "detailed 
descriptions of the nature of the legal services rendered" and 
"the substance of [the] lawyer-client communications."  See ¶96, 
supra. 
¶126 Any court that determines that these matters of 
substance are not present in the subject invoices must be 
prepared to rule that the circuit court's findings were clearly 
erroneous. 
¶127 Deciding this case without discussing the lawyer-
client privilege in relation to the limiting language of the 
public records law (in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31, 19.35(1), 19.36(1), 
and 19.85(1)(g)) casts a dark shadow over the lawyer-client 
privilege and other privileges in Chapter 905.   
¶128 An appellate court should reduce uncertainty, not 
magnify it.  The likely result of this case will be to force 
changes in billing practice.  In the future, legal invoices 
related to an "authority" may be sanitized so that they provide 
insurers and public entity clients with no information except 
the hours worked and the amount owed as well as an invitation to 
discuss the details orally. 
¶129 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2010AP2313.dtp 
 
15 
 
¶130 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this opinion with 
the caveats expressed in Justice Ziegler's dissenting opinion. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2010AP2313.akz 
 
1 
 
¶131 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  I join 
Justice Prosser's dissent and write separately to clarify my 
position regarding Section III of that dissent as it pertains to 
my interpretation of the majority opinion and to clarify the 
extent to which I join that portion of Justice Prosser's 
dissent.  I depart from the portion of the dissent that infers 
the majority opinion has concluded that the records must be 
disclosed regardless of the attorney-client privilege.  I 
dissent from any such inference in the majority opinion. 
¶132 Juneau County has not relied on Wis. Stat. § 905.03, 
the statute regarding lawyer-client privilege, in its arguments 
before this court.  The majority recognizes the potential 
limitation of the opinion's application because the County 
failed to discuss attorney-client privilege.  While the majority 
opinion makes some broad statements regarding an attorney-client 
relationship being created between the law firm and the County, 
it does so noting that the County failed to argue that the 
attorney-client privilege protects it from disclosure.  In 
short, the majority opinion does not decide whether the 
attorney-client privilege may bar production of these documents.  
Thus, the majority opinion could have limited usefulness as it 
does not address a scenario where attorney-client privilege is 
at issue. 
¶133 The County could have argued that the attorney-client 
privilege bars access to these billing records, and the majority 
recognizes that this case is decided without consideration of 
that issue.  In fact, the majority states: "Our ruling in the 
No.  2010AP2313.akz 
 
2 
 
present case does not alter the rules governing confidentiality, 
attorney-client privilege or lawyers' work product, or any other 
rules protecting against disclosure.  No issue has been raised 
with regard to these rules.  We therefore do not decide which 
court——the circuit court or the court of appeals——reached the 
correct result regarding redaction of the invoices."  Majority 
op., ¶15.  Hence, the majority opinion is limited insofar as it 
does not address (because it was not argued, briefed, or 
decided) disclosure of documents where the attorney-client 
privilege is an issue. 
¶134 For the foregoing reason I write separately to clarify 
my position regarding Section III of Justice Prosser's dissent. 
¶135 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  2010AP2313.akz 
 
1