Title: O'Connell v. Killington, Ltd.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

OCONNELL_V_KILLINGTON.93-394; 164 Vt 73; 665 A.2d 39

[Filed 4-Aug-1995]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 93-394


Mary Ryan O'Connell                               Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Rutland Superior Court

Killington, Ltd.                                  January Term, 1995



Richard W. Norton, J.

Thomas M. French, Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellee

Allan R. Keyes and John J. Zawistoski of Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, 
for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant ski area, Killington Ltd., appeals from a
  negligence judgment against it based on defendant's failure to identify an
  unknown skier with whom plaintiff, Mary Ryan O'Connell, collided while
  skiing.  On appeal, defendant claims that it owed no duty to plaintiff to
  identify the other skier, that plaintiff's claim is barred because the jury
  found that the accident resulted from an inherent risk of skiing, and that
  the court made errors in its charge to the jury.  We reverse.

       On January 12, 1990, plaintiff was skiing one of defendant's most
  difficult trails.  She stopped to rest at the edge of the trail and was
  struck by another skier who lost control on the ice at the center of the
  trail.  One of defendant's ski patrollers, along with plaintiff's sister,
  arrived at the scene shortly after the collision.  Plaintiff requested that
  they obtain the name of the other skier.  While the ski patroller was
  occupied with evaluating and stabilizing plaintiff's injury, plaintiff's
  sister spoke to the other skier, and requested that he follow plaintiff to
  the patrol station and identify himself.  The skier failed to arrive at the
  patrol station as requested,

 

  and has never been identified.  Plaintiff's injuries proved serious,
  and she and her husband filed suit against defendant in Rutland Superior
  Court, complaining that defendant negligently (1) failed to warn of the icy
  conditions on the trail, (2) failed to close the trail because of its
  dangerous condition and (3) failed to obtain the identity of the skier who
  had collided with plaintiff.  Defendant denied those allegations and
  alleged that plaintiff's injuries were the consequence of her assumption of
  the inherent risks of skiing.

       The trial court denied defendant's motion for directed verdict, both
  at the close of plaintiff's case and at the close of the evidence.  The
  court submitted the failure-to-warn and the failure-to-identify counts to
  the jury.  In its instructions to the jury on the failure-to-identify
  count, the court stated that the jury could find that defendant had assumed
  the duty to identify skiers involved in accidents based on its employee
  manual.  This manual instructed defendant's employees to investigate
  thoroughly all accidents and to obtain the identity of everyone involved.
  The court instructed the jury that, to decide defendant's negligence on
  this count, it need determine only whether defendant had an opportunity to
  identify the other skier involved in the accident.

       Based on the instructions, the jury found for defendant on the
  failure-to-warn count and on the failure to close the trail because it
  found that the accident resulted from an inherent risk of the sport of
  skiing.  It further found that defendant had negligently failed to obtain
  the identity of the other skier and that its negligence was the proximate
  cause of the loss of plaintiff's "right to compensation" from that skier
  for her injuries.  The jury awarded plaintiff $71,108.69 in damages, and
  the trial court denied defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the
  verdict and for a new trial.

       Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether defendant had a
  duty to plaintiff to obtain the identity of the other skier who collided
  with her; (2) whether plaintiff's failure-to- identify claim is precluded
  by the jury's finding that the accident and injury were a result of one or
  more inherent risks in the sport of skiing; and (3) whether certain
  instructions to the jury
  
 

  were proper.  We agree with defendant's position on the first issue
  and, therefore, reverse. Because the case must be dismissed, we do not
  reach the second and third issues.

       Defendant first claims that it owed plaintiff no duty to obtain the
  identity of the other skier, and that, accordingly, the trial court erred
  by instructing the jury that could find that defendant's employee manual
  created such a duty.  We agree.

       In deciding this question, we first note that although the Vermont
  Legislature has passed a statute governing liability vis-a-vis the
  obtaining of names of skiers involved in a collision, see 12 V.S.A. §
  1038(b)(2), this accident preceded the effective date of the statute so
  that it does not apply to this case.  In any event, we conclude that the
  result in this case is the same under either the common law or the
  statute.(FN1)

       Common-law negligence requires that there be a legal duty owed by
  defendant to plaintiff, breach of that duty, that such breach be the
  proximate cause of plaintiff's harm, and that plaintiff have suffered
  actual loss or damage.  See Langle v. Kurkul, 146 Vt. 513, 517,