Title: Commonwealth v. Bois

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-10725 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RYAN BOIS. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     January 12, 2016. - November 10, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Rape.  Armed Home Invasion.  Felony-Murder Rule.  
Insanity.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Assistance of counsel, Jury and jurors, Conduct of 
juror, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 30, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on October 12, 2012, was heard by 
her. 
 
 
 
Dennis Shedd for the defendant. 
 
Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In 2009, a Superior Court jury convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder.  The jury found that, on 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justices Spina, Cordy, and Duffly participated in the 
deliberation on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
August 4, 2007, the defendant broke into his grandmother's house 
and then raped and strangled his six-year-old cousin, who was 
staying there for the night.  The defendant was convicted also 
of nine other charges, including home invasion while armed with 
a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 18C.2  At trial, the 
defendant conceded that he had killed the victim, but argued 
that he was not guilty by reason of insanity.  On appeal from 
his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new 
trial, the defendant asserts that (a) trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to present certain evidence relevant to 
his insanity defense and to object to the jury charge on the 
insanity defense; (b) the judge did not respond adequately to 
reports that a juror slept through certain portions of the 
trial; (c) the evidence was insufficient on an element of the 
home invasion charge, and the judge incorrectly instructed the 
jury on that element; (d) the instructions on felony-murder 
impermissibly removed from the jury's consideration one of its 
elements; and (e) the prosecutor's closing argument was 
improper.  The defendant asks also that, pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, we reduce the murder conviction to murder in the 
                                                          
 
 
2 These included two counts of forcible rape of a child, 
G. L. c. 265, § 22A, as well as one count each of kidnapping, 
G. L. c. 265, § 26; larceny under $250, G. L. c. 266, § 30 
(lesser included offense); larceny of a motor vehicle, G. L. 
c. 266, § 28 (a); malicious destruction of property, G. L. 
c. 266, § 127; reckless driving, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a); and 
failure to stop for a police officer, G. L. c. 90, § 25. 
3 
 
 
second degree as more consonant with justice, because his 
actions were the product of mental illness. 
 
We affirm the conviction of murder in the first degree, and 
decline to exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the degree of guilt or to order a new trial.  With 
respect to the charge of home invasion, we agree with the 
defendant that the evidence was insufficient, and that his 
conviction must be reversed.  We affirm the other convictions. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury 
could have found, reserving certain details for later 
discussion.  In 2007, when the defendant was twenty years old, 
he did not have a permanent residence and stayed with various 
friends and family members.  At one point during the year, he 
lived with his grandmother in Weymouth for approximately one 
month.  After moving out, he asked his grandmother for money to 
pay his rent.  She agreed, but insisted on driving the defendant 
to meet his landlord and to obtain a receipt.  When they 
arrived, the grandmother handed the defendant the money, and he 
ran off.  Several weeks later, on the morning of August 4, 2007, 
the defendant called his grandmother, asking if he could come to 
her house.  She refused. 
 
At 2 or 3 P.M. that day, the defendant attended a cookout 
at the home of his friend, Megan Phinney, staying there until 
late in the evening.  At "10 or 10:30" P.M., at the defendant's 
4 
 
 
request, one his friends drove him from the cookout to his 
grandmother's house, approximately one mile away.  The victim, 
the defendant's six year old cousin, and her four year old 
brother were staying with his grandmother that night.3  All three 
had gone to sleep by the time the defendant arrived. 
 
After being dropped off, the defendant climbed on top of 
his grandmother's white Ford Explorer vehicle, which was parked 
in the driveway in front of the house, below a front-facing 
second-floor window.  He used a "folding" knife with a three-
inch blade to cut a hole in the window screen, and entered.  
Somewhere inside, he encountered the victim.  He raped and 
strangled her in a front bedroom, then wrapped her body in 
bedding taken from that bedroom.  He took cash from his 
grandmother's purse, as well as her cellular telephone and the 
keys to the Explorer.  He left the house carrying the victim's 
body, which he placed on the floor of the Explorer between the 
front and rear seats, and drove off. 
 
At 10:57 P.M., the defendant appeared on a surveillance 
video recording entering a convenience store approximately one 
mile from his grandmother's house.  He left the store without 
purchasing anything. 
                                                          
 
 
3 The children slept in a bedroom in the back of the house, 
while the grandmother slept on a porch separated from the 
bedroom by a sliding glass door. 
5 
 
 
 
Sometime after midnight, on August 5, 2007, the defendant 
used his grandmother's cellular telephone to call one of his 
acquaintances, Terrence Gandy.  He told Gandy that he "had some 
money to burn" and "wanted to get some drugs."  He drove to 
Gandy's house in the Dorchester section of Boston, bought 
marijuana, and smoked it with Gandy.  He told Gandy that the 
Explorer he was driving "was stolen," and asked him, "If I ever 
killed anybody, what would I do with the body to get rid of 
it[?]"  Gandy replied that he should "chop it up."  The 
defendant left after "fifteen to [twenty] minutes." 
 
At approximately 1:15 A.M., a Weymouth police officer in 
the canine unit stopped the Explorer for speeding.  When the 
officer approached the vehicle, however, it sped off, and the 
officer pursued it.  During the chase, both vehicles reached 
speeds of one hundred miles per hour.  The Explorer ultimately 
crashed into a taxicab while attempting to turn at an 
intersection.  The defendant got out of the vehicle and ran 
away.  When the defendant disregarded the officer's warning to 
stop, the officer released his police dog.  The dog chased and 
subdued the defendant.  As the officer approached the defendant, 
who was lying face down on the ground with his arms 
outstretched, as instructed, the defendant turned to the officer 
and started yelling, "Just shoot me in the face.  Kill me now.  
6 
 
 
You don't know what I did.  Just kill me now.  Shoot me in the 
fucking face." 
 
The officer turned around to signal other officers who had 
arrived at the scene.  When he turned his attention back to the 
defendant, he saw that the defendant had tucked his hands 
underneath his body.  The defendant was holding a folding knife 
with a three-inch blade, and was pleading with the officer "to 
shoot him, kill him."  The defendant eventually released the 
knife and was arrested.4  He continued "ranting and raving" until 
he was placed in a police cruiser. 
 
After the defendant's arrest, officers conducted an 
inventory search of the Explorer, which they intended to have 
towed.  They discovered the victim's body, naked from the waist 
down, wrapped in the grandmother's bedding.  Her shorts and 
underwear were nearby.  Police contacted the grandmother, who 
was unaware that the defendant had been in her house, that her 
Explorer had been stolen, or that the victim was missing.  
During a search of the grandmother's house, police found that 
the bedsheets were missing from the front bedroom.  They also 
found traces of blood and seminal fluid in that room, and bloody 
pillows in the victim's bedroom. 
                                                          
 
 
4 Police recovered a knife and a small bag containing what 
was later determined to be cocaine. 
7 
 
 
 
b.  Trial proceedings.  On August 30, 2007, the defendant 
was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree and twelve 
other offenses.5  At trial in March, 2009, the Commonwealth 
proceeded on the murder charge on theories of deliberate 
premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder.  
To establish that the defendant was criminally responsible for 
his actions, the Commonwealth presented testimony regarding his 
behavior on the day of the killing.  The defendant's girl friend 
testified that she spoke with him around noon that day, and 
agreed that he did not "sound any different" than usual.  A 
friend who had been at the cookout recalled that the defendant 
drank beer, played horseshoes, and agreed that he did not 
"appear[] different . . . than what [his friends] had known him 
to be like in the past." 
 
The Commonwealth also presented expert testimony regarding 
fingerprints, blood, and seminal fluid that were recovered from 
the grandmother's house and the victim's body.  One expert 
testified that samples of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) recovered 
from sperm cells on the victim's body matched the defendant's 
                                                          
 
 
5 The other indictments included two counts of forcible rape 
of a child, and one count each of home invasion; kidnapping; 
assault with a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b); 
possession of cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 34; larceny over $250; 
larceny of a motor vehicle; malicious destruction of property; 
reckless driving; operating a motor vehicle with a suspended 
license, G. L. c. 90, § 23; and failure to stop for a police 
officer. 
8 
 
 
DNA profile, and another testified that a palm print on the 
front window matched that of the defendant. 
 
The defendant conceded that he had raped and killed the 
victim, but contended that he was not guilty by reason of 
insanity.  The defendant did not, however, offer expert 
testimony regarding specific mental illnesses from which he 
suffered, and did not present any medical or treatment records.  
Nor did he offer an expert opinion that he lacked criminal 
responsibility for his actions.  Rather, he relied on testimony 
concerning his behavior immediately following the killing, as 
well the nature of the crime itself, to establish his mental 
state.6  He also presented testimony from his grandmother, on 
cross-examination, that he had been admitted to psychiatric 
hospitals numerous times during his adolescence, that he had 
been prescribed medications for psychiatric disorders, and that, 
because of behavioral issues, he had been placed in the custody 
of the Department of Youth Services (DYS).7 
 
In addition, the defendant introduced expert testimony from 
a forensic psychologist who had not examined him, concerning the 
                                                          
 
 
6 The defendant's acquaintance Terrence Gandy, for instance, 
testified that the defendant "didn't seem like he was himself," 
that "he was a little more hyper" than usual, and that "he just 
didn't seem like he was in his right mind."  The arresting 
officer testified that the defendant was "ranting and raving." 
 
 
7 On direct examination by the Commonwealth, the grandmother 
agreed that she never "bec[a]me aware of [the defendant] having 
any type of a mental illness." 
9 
 
 
general standards used to evaluate a defendant for lack of 
criminal responsibility, and the general characteristics of a 
number of mental illnesses.  The expert agreed that someone may 
"be in the throes of mental illness and appear normal to lay 
observers," and testified that a person "would be admitted to 
[a] psychiatric facility only [if] someone . . . as part of the 
admission . . . believed that they had symptoms of a mental 
illness."  The expert did not present any opinion regarding the 
defendant's mental state or behavior. 
 
The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first 
degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-
murder,8 but not on the theory of deliberate premeditation.9 
 
c.  Motion for a new trial.  In October, 2012, the 
defendant filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  He argued, 
among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to review and present to the jury records of psychiatric 
                                                          
 
 
8 The predicate felonies for the conviction of felony-murder 
were rape of a child by force and home invasion. 
 
 
9 The jury also convicted the defendant of eight of the 
other offenses charged, including two counts of rape, home 
invasion, kidnapping, larceny of a motor vehicle, malicious 
destruction of property, reckless driving, failing to stop for a 
police officer.  In addition, he was convicted of the lesser 
included offense of larceny under $250.  The jury acquitted him 
of possession of cocaine and operating a motor vehicle with a 
suspended license.  The judge entered a directed verdict on the 
indictment charging assault by means of a dangerous weapon. 
10 
 
 
treatment he had received as an adolescent.  Those records, he 
maintained, indicated that the defendant had suffered sexual 
abuse as a child, and that he had been diagnosed with several 
mental illnesses.  He argued also that trial counsel had failed 
to present evidence of certain strange behavior he exhibited on 
the day of the killing.  After a nonevidentiary hearing, the 
motion was denied by the Superior Court judge who had been the 
trial judge. 
 
4.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant contends that 
(a) trial counsel was ineffective in her presentation of the 
insanity defense, (b) the judge did not respond adequately to 
reports of a sleeping juror, (c) there was insufficient evidence 
on the home invasion charge and the jury were incorrectly 
instructed on that issue, (d) the judge's instruction removed an 
element of the felony-murder charge from the jury's 
consideration, and (e) the prosecutor made certain inappropriate 
remarks during closing argument.  He claims also that we should 
reduce the degree of guilt pursuant to our authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
 
a.  Claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  As he did 
in his motion for a new trial, the defendant argues that 
counsel's investigation and presentation of his insanity defense 
was constitutionally deficient.  He claimed, in particular, that 
"counsel failed to adequately investigate [his] history of 
11 
 
 
treatment for mental illnesses"; "failed to present evidence of 
his unusual behavior shortly before the . . . crime"; and 
"failed to object to erroneous instructions on the mental health 
defense[]." 
 
"Because the defendant has been convicted of murder in the 
first degree, we consider [his] contention of ineffectiveness of 
counsel to determine whether there exists a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice . . . , which is more 
favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for 
determining whether there has been ineffective assistance.  
Thus, we consider whether there was error during the course of 
the trial, and, if so, whether the error was 'likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion'" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 204-205 (2009).  "Under 
this more favorable standard of review, we consider a 
defendant's claim even if the action by trial counsel does not 
'constitute conduct falling "measurably below" that of an 
"ordinary fallible lawyer."' . . .  A strategic decision by an 
attorney, however, amounts to ineffective assistance 'only if it 
was manifestly unreasonable when made'" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Pena, 455 Mass. 1, 22 (2009). 
 
i.  Treatment records.  The defendant maintains that 
defense counsel erred in failing to read, or to introduce at 
trial, treatment records from his psychiatric hospitalizations 
12 
 
 
and from his commitments to DYS facilities.  These records 
indicate that the defendant suffered sexual abuse as a child, 
and that, during his adolescence, he was diagnosed with several 
mental illnesses, including agitated depression, bipolar 
disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder.  The records span a 
period of twelve years, from 1992, when the defendant was five 
years old, to 2004, shortly before his eighteenth birthday.  The 
defendant contends that, had evidence of these specific 
diagnoses been presented to the jury, the insanity defense might 
have been successful. 
 
In an affidavit submitted in conjunction with the 
defendant's motion, trial counsel explained that she was aware 
of the treatment records, and had seen them mentioned in the 
defendant's competency evaluation prepared by a forensic 
psychologist at Bridgewater State Hospital.  She stated further 
that, although she herself did not review the records, she had 
obtained funds to hire an expert psychologist to review the 
documents.  Having reviewed the records, and having asked a 
colleague to do the same, the expert informed counsel that he 
was unable to offer an opinion that, at the time of the offense, 
the defendant had not been criminally responsible.  Counsel 
averred that she therefore decided not to present expert 
testimony on the basis of the defendant's medical records.  She 
did not, however, explain why she chose not to introduce the 
13 
 
 
treatment records themselves, unaccompanied by expert testimony.  
See Commonwealth v. Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. 8, 20 (2012) 
("defendant with prior history of mental disorders and treatment 
'may offer evidence of the same through medical records with or 
without expert witnesses'" [citation omitted]). 
 
While unexplained in the affidavit, counsel's decision not 
to introduce the records appears to have been strategic.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015) (where 
ineffective assistance claim is based on tactical or strategic 
decision by counsel, defendant may show counsel was ineffective 
only if decision was "manifestly unreasonable" when made).  At a 
pretrial hearing, counsel argued successfully, against the 
Commonwealth's opposition, that the Commonwealth was not 
entitled to review the defendant's mental health records, 
because she was neither presenting them at trial nor seeking to 
introduce expert testimony based on their content.  Moreover, 
during voir dire of the venire, she asked each prospective 
juror, "If there is no evidence presented regarding 
hospitalization or a diagnosis, would you still be able to keep 
an open mind about an insanity defense?"  It therefore seems 
that, after due consideration, counsel deliberately decided not 
to present documentary evidence of the defendant's mental 
illnesses.  "[S]trategic choices made after thorough 
investigation of [the] law and facts . . . are virtually 
14 
 
 
unchallengeable."  Commonwealth v. McMahon, 443 Mass. 409, 425 
(2005), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 
(1984). 
 
The defendant contends, however, that without having read 
the records herself, counsel could not have conducted a 
"thorough investigation," Commonwealth v. McMahon, supra, and 
was not in a position to make the strategic decision to keep the 
records from the jury's consideration.  See Commonwealth v. 
Baker, 440 Mass. 519, 529 (2003) ("Until [counsel] 
commenced . . . an investigation, he simply had no way of making 
a reasonable tactical judgment"). 
 
We do not agree.  Although it would have been preferable 
for counsel personally to review the treatment records, she did 
not fail to consider them, or to make an investigation of their 
contents.  Indeed, she reviewed the competency report prepared 
by the forensic psychologist at Bridgewater, which summarized 
most of the relevant records, and which described the 
defendant's treatment history and diagnoses.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Lang, 473 Mass. 1, 11 (2015) (Hines, J., 
concurring) ("defendant's trial counsel did not review the 
defendant's psychiatric history").  Counsel also retained two 
experts, both of whom reviewed the records and opined that they 
did not support the conclusion that the defendant lacked 
criminal responsibility at the time of the crime.  Contrast 
15 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 433 Mass. 93, 101 (2000) ("Counsel's 
failure to review or provide to the defense expert [relevant] 
medical records . . . fell measurably below that of an ordinary 
fallible lawyer" [emphasis supplied]).  In light of counsel's 
knowledge of the substance of the records, and given that the 
experts she retained could not endorse an insanity defense after 
reading them, counsel's investigation was sufficient to allow 
her to make the strategic decision not to present the records to 
the jury.  This decision was not "manifestly unreasonable." 
 
Moreover, it is unlikely that the exclusion of the records 
resulted in any prejudice to the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 453 Mass. at 204-205.  As the judge noted in her 
decision on the defendant's motion for a new trial, although the 
records contained sympathetic information, such as the 
defendant's history of abuse and mental illness, and while they 
would have prevented the prosecutor from arguing that the 
defendant's hospitalizations were not the result of a 
diagnosable disease, they also contained information that would 
have painted the defendant in a negative light.  For example, 
the records indicated that the defendant had a criminal record10 
and was a member of a gang, and stated also that he "attempt[ed] 
                                                          
 
 
10 They indicate, for instance, that the defendant was 
adjudicated delinquent for, among other things, committing 
assault by means of a dangerous weapon and malicious destruction 
of property over $250. 
16 
 
 
to manipulate situations by avoiding responsibility for his 
behavior" and "display[ed] little remorse for his [violent] 
actions."11 
 
In addition, the records contained information that might 
have undercut the insanity defense.  The most recent of the 
records, from three years before the crime, indicated that the 
defendant was "doing well," that he was employed and had a girl 
friend, and that he "recently discontinued his medication 
[(impliedly with medical approval)]."12  Had these records been 
presented to the jury, the prosecutor likely would have used 
them to support the argument that the defendant was capable of 
rational, calculated thought, and that the killing was the 
result of such thought, rather than of mental illness. 
 
In sum, counsel's decision not to introduce the defendant's 
treatment records was not manifestly unreasonable, and did not 
result in prejudice to the defendant. 
                                                          
 
 
11 Counsel was aware from the competency evaluation that the 
records described the defendant's history of delinquent and 
criminal behavior, and contained other potentially damaging 
information. 
 
 
12 The defendant contends that some of these details, if not 
relevant to his diagnosis and treatment, could have been 
redacted.  See Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600, 616, cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 487 (2012) (medical records admissible as 
business records only to extent they are "germane to the 
defendant's treatment or medical history").  On their face, 
however, the records suggest that many of these details were, in 
fact, relevant to the defendant's psychiatric treatment -- 
focused, as it was, on his behavioral issues -- and thus 
unlikely to have been subject to redaction. 
17 
 
 
 
ii.  Defendant's behavior earlier on day of killing.  In 
August, 2007, a State trooper interviewed Cynthia Phinney, the 
mother of the defendant's friend who had hosted the cookout that 
the defendant attended on the day of the killing.  Phinney 
reported seeing the defendant at the cookout, and told the 
trooper that he was "in a funny mood . . . he was sad."  She 
added that 
"at one point [the defendant] took a shower in the 
house. . . . [A]fter [he] took a shower, he remained in her 
laundry room for about ten minutes. . . . [S]he walked into 
the laundry room and found [him] just standing there 
naked." 
 
The defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 
not calling Phinney to testify about this incident, as it would 
have suggested that the defendant exhibited "behavior . . . 
consistent with that of a person suffering from bipolar 
disorder."13 
 
The record does not indicate whether counsel considered 
calling Phinney.  We are persuaded, however, that, overall, 
Phinney's testimony was not "likely to have influenced the 
jury's conclusion" [citation omitted].  See Commonwealth v. 
Williams, 453 Mass. at 206.  Before describing the defendant's 
mood and behavior, Phinney told the trooper that the defendant 
"showed up with a thirty-pack of beer," that he became 
                                                          
 
 
13 The defendant's expert described to the jury the expected 
symptoms of bipolar disorder. 
18 
 
 
"trashed . . . and [that he] needed to sober up."  Thus, it is 
likely that the jury would have attributed his mood to 
consumption of alcohol, rather than as a symptom of mental 
illness.  In addition, Phinney testified before the grand jury 
that, earlier that afternoon, the defendant "was fine.  He's 
always happy-go-lucky, always singing, dancing, and always just 
a happy kid."  Had Phinney testified, such statements could have 
undermined any testimony that the defendant was "sad" or in a 
"funny mood."  Given the potentially harmful impact of Phinney's 
statements on the defendant's insanity defense, no prejudice to 
him resulted from counsel's decision not to call her to testify. 
 
iii.  Jury instructions.  The defendant argues that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to two specific jury 
instructions. 
 
A.  Instruction on insanity.  In instructing the jury on 
the insanity defense, the judge stated: 
 
"To summarize then, if the Commonwealth fails to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the 
substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality or 
wrongfulness of his conduct, and also that the defendant 
possessed a substantial capacity to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law, you must return a verdict of 
not guilty by reason of insanity" (emphasis supplied). 
 
The defendant contends that this instruction was erroneous, 
because it implies, in his view, that a verdict of not guilty by 
reason of insanity was required only if the Commonwealth failed 
to prove both that the defendant "possessed the substantial 
19 
 
 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct," and 
that he "possessed a substantial capacity to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law."  If, however, the Commonwealth 
were able to prove only one of these two prongs, the defendant 
argues, this instruction implied incorrectly that the jury 
should return a guilty verdict.  As the defendant asserts, the 
Commonwealth must prove both a defendant's ability to understand 
the wrongfulness of his conduct and his capacity to conform his 
conduct to the law; failure to prove either prong requires a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.  See Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide 51-52 (1999). 
 
Trial counsel did not object to the instruction as given. 
The defendant claims that counsel's failure to object 
constituted ineffective assistance.  This claim is unavailing.  
While the language at issue might, in isolation, be understood 
in the manner the defendant suggests, a more natural 
interpretation is that a verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity was required if the Commonwealth failed to prove either 
one of the prongs, by failing to show both that "the defendant 
possessed the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality 
or wrongfulness of his conduct, and that the defendant possessed 
a substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law."  We are persuaded that the jury 
understood the instruction in this way, since, as the defendant 
20 
 
 
concedes, the judge explained the standard correctly, clearly, 
and without ambiguity earlier in her instructions.14  See 
Commonwealth v. Young, 461 Mass. 198, 207 (2012) ("When 
reviewing jury instructions, '[w]e evaluate the instruction as a 
whole, looking for the interpretation a reasonable juror would 
place on the judge's words.' . . .  We do not consider bits and 
pieces of the instruction in isolation" [citations omitted]). 
 
B.  Instruction on diminished capacity.  The judge 
instructed the jury that they could convict the defendant of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty if they found that the defendant had so-called "third-
prong malice," i.e., "intent to do an act which, in the 
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would 
have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death 
would follow."  The defendant argues that the judge erred in not 
instructing the jury that, in determining whether the defendant 
had such an intent, "they should consider the extent of the 
defendant's knowledge of the circumstances at the time of the 
killing and, in that regard, they should consider the evidence 
of his mental impairment."  See Commonwealth v. Delaney, 418 
                                                          
 
 
14 For example, the judge stated that a "person is not 
criminally responsible for his conduct if he suffers from a 
mental disease or defect, and as a result of that mental disease 
or defect lacks a substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality of wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law" (emphasis supplied). 
21 
 
 
Mass. 658, 663-64 (1994).  The defendant maintains also that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the absence of 
this language.  The instructions as a whole, however, do not 
support this claim.  Shortly after giving the now-challenged 
instruction, the judge explicitly told the jury that they must 
consider the defendant's mental state in determining the extent 
of the defendant's knowledge.15 
 
b.  Report of sleeping juror.  Before the jury charge, a 
juror reported that another juror had been sleeping during 
closing arguments.  The judge conducted a hearing on what should 
be done in response to the juror's assertion.  Defense counsel 
stated, "I think we [should] leave it alone.  I didn't notice 
it, and I think we were both looking at the jurors during our 
closing argument."  She added, "I'm more concerned about [the 
reporting] juror than I am the juror who may have been falling 
asleep.  It sounds like that juror has an agenda of some type."  
The prosecutor also said that he had not noticed the juror had 
                                                          
 
 
15 The judge instructed: 
 
 
"In determining whether the Commonwealth has proved 
this third meaning of malice, you must consider the 
defendant's actual knowledge of the circumstances at the 
time that he acted. 
 
 
"Again, in determining whether the Commonwealth has 
proved that the defendant had the intent required to 
constitute malice in any one of these ways, you may 
consider any evidence regarding the defendant's mental 
condition at the time of the alleged events." 
22 
 
 
been sleeping, and suggested that no action was required in 
response to the report. 
 
The following day, a juror who had been designated as an 
alternate16 sent the judge a note stating that he had observed 
the same juror "f[a]ll asleep during trial on several occasion's 
[sic]."  Defense counsel responded, 
 
"I just wanted to say that I watched this particular 
juror yesterday during Your Honor's very lengthy . . . 
charge . . . because it was brought to our attention that 
this particular juror had been falling asleep. . . .  What 
I noted is that she occasionally closed her eyes, but would 
move her hands and turn her head and open her eyes.  I was 
confident yesterday in observing her during Your Honor's 
charge that she was not sleeping." 
 
As requested, the judge took no further action.  The defendant 
now argues that the judge erred in taking no action, and should, 
at a minimum, have conducted a voir dire of the juror in 
question.  See Commonwealth v. Dyous, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 508, 
512-514 (2011) (judgment reversed because of sleeping juror 
although defendant's trial attorney urged judge to take no 
action). 
 
The defendant's argument is not persuasive.  "[N]ot every 
complaint regarding juror attentiveness requires a voir 
dire. . . .  Rather, if a judge receives a complaint or other 
information suggesting that a juror was asleep or otherwise 
                                                          
 
 
16 It is not clear if the juror making this report was the 
same one who had reported suspicions of a sleeping juror the 
previous day. 
23 
 
 
inattentive, the judge must first determine whether that 
information is 'reliable.' . . .  In making this determination, 
the judge must consider the nature and source of the information 
presented, as well as any relevant facts that the judge has 
observed from the bench. . . .  The burden is on the defendant 
to show that the judge's response to information about a 
sleeping juror was 'arbitrary or unreasonable'" (quotations and 
citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. McGhee, 470 Mass. 638, 644 
(2015). 
 
Here, the defendant has not met this burden.  On both 
occasions, the judge immediately conducted a hearing on the 
juror's report.  At those hearings, both defense counsel and the 
prosecutor stated that they had not noticed that the juror was 
asleep, and defense counsel provided specific information to 
explain both the basis of the report (the juror had closed her 
eyes) and why there was ultimately no cause for concern (the 
juror was actually awake).  In light of this, there was no error 
in the judge's decision that the report of a sleeping juror was 
not "reliable," id., and that no further action was required. 
 
c.  Armed home invasion.  In instructing the jury on the 
elements of home invasion, the judge stated that the 
Commonwealth must prove "that the defendant at the time of the 
entry was armed with a dangerous weapon[.]"  See G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18C.  She then instructed that, as a matter of law, "[k]nives 
24 
 
 
are inherently dangerous."  The defendant contends that this was 
error, and that the jury should have been instructed to 
determine whether the knife he had in his possession was 
dangerous as used.  He contends also that, even if a correct 
instruction were given, there was insufficient evidence that the 
knife was dangerous as used, and that a directed verdict on this 
charge should have entered.  We agree. 
 
Conviction under the home invasion statute requires the 
Commonwealth to prove the defendant entered the dwelling "while 
armed with a dangerous weapon" and "use[d] force or threaten[ed] 
the imminent use of force upon any person within such 
dwelling[.]"  See G. L. c. 265, § 18C.  The "phrase 'dangerous 
weapon' has a defined meaning under the common law that is 
routinely applied to those statutory crimes that have a 
dangerous weapon element."  Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 459 Mass. 
745, 749 (2011).  See Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 846 
n.12 (2010) (applying common-law definition of dangerous weapon 
to home invasion statute).  Under this common-law definition, a 
determination whether a weapon is "dangerous" is based on a 
distinction between weapons that are dangerous per se and those 
that are dangerous as used.  See Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 
Mass. 296, 303 (1980).  A weapon is "dangerous per se" if it is 
an "instrumentality designed and constructed to produce death or 
great bodily harm" and "for the purpose of bodily assault or 
25 
 
 
defense."  Weapons of this type include "firearms, daggers, 
stilettos and brass knuckles" but not "pocket knives, razors, 
hammers, wrenches and cutting tools" [quotations and citations 
omitted].  Id. 
 
On the record here, the evidence was insufficient for a 
determination that the defendant's knife was dangerous per se.  
The knife that the defendant had in his possession when he was 
arrested was a three and one-half inch "folding" knife that was 
on his person, but was not in his hand, when he was apprehended.  
See id. ("pocket knives" are not dangerous per se).  Such a 
determination cannot be made absent "information regarding the 
design, purpose, and construction of the knife."  See 
Commonwealth v. Wynton W., 459 Mass. at 755.  The judge noted in 
her decision on the defendant's motion for a new trial that the 
requisite determination could not be made on this record.  Thus, 
the jury should have been instructed not that the knife was 
inherently dangerous, but that they must determine whether it 
was dangerous as used.17  See Commonwealth v. Delaney, 442 Mass. 
604, 615 (2004) (because "[a] pocket knife of the type the 
defendant described is not a dangerous weapon per se, as it is 
not 'designed for the purpose of bodily assault or defense'" 
                                                          
 
 
17 The judge, however, declined to disturb the home invasion 
conviction, concluding that there was sufficient evidence that 
the knife was dangerous as used, such that a correct instruction 
would not have led to a different result. 
26 
 
 
[citation omitted], judge should have instructed jury to 
determine whether knife was dangerous as used and not that it 
was dangerous per se); Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. at 303 
(pocket knives not classified as dangerous per se). 
 
Such an instruction, however, would not have obviated the 
need to vacate the defendant's conviction of this charge, as the 
evidence was also insufficient to support a finding that the 
defendant's knife, which he had in his possession when he 
entered his grandmother's house, was dangerous as used.  The 
evidence suggests only that the defendant used the knife to gain 
entry to the house; there is no indication that he used it 
thereafter.  There was no evidence or argument that the victim 
was stabbed, or that any item inside the house was cut or 
slashed.  In addition, while displaying the knife in a 
threatening manner might have rendered it dangerous as used, the 
Commonwealth adduced no evidence that such a display occurred.18  
See Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass at 846 n.12 (whether weapon 
is dangerous as used in home invasion depends on its "apparent 
ability to inflict harm" and "whether the victim reasonably so 
perceived it" [citation omitted]).  Accordingly, the defendant's 
conviction of armed home invasion must be vacated and set aside, 
                                                          
 
 
18 The argument that the defendant may have used the knife 
to threaten the victim is speculative and not supported by any 
evidence introduced at trial. 
27 
 
 
and, on remand, a directed verdict in favor of the defendant 
must be entered.19 
 
d.  Instruction on felony-murder.  The defendant claims 
also that the judge's instruction on felony-murder impermissibly 
removed from the jury's consideration the critical factual issue 
whether the intent to commit the predicate felony exhibited a 
"conscious disregard" for human life.  "[T]he felony-murder rule 
is based on the theory that the intent to commit the felony is 
equivalent to the malice aforethought required for murder."  See 
Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 507 (1982).  
Accordingly, "[f]or this theory to be tenable the nature of the 
felony must be such that an intent to commit that crime exhibits 
a conscious disregard for human life" [citation omitted]  Id. 
 
In instructing the jury on felony-murder, the judge said 
that the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant killed the 
victim in the course of committing a felony "inherently 
dangerous to human life."  She then instructed that, "as a 
matter of law, the crime of home invasion with a dangerous 
weapon and rape of a child by force are felonies which are 
inherently dangerous to human life." 
                                                          
 
 
19 While armed home invasion was one of the predicate 
felonies on which the conviction of felony-murder was based, we 
need not reverse the felony-murder conviction, as the jury also 
found that the defendant committed a second predicate felony, 
viz., rape of a child by force.  See note 23, infra. 
28 
 
 
 
Contrary to the defendant's argument, this instruction was 
in accordance with well-established case law.  See Commonwealth 
v. Wadlington, 467 Mass. 192, 208 (2014) (judge did not relieve 
prosecution from its burden of proving "conscious disregard" 
element of offense of felony-murder" because "[i]t is not the 
province of the jury to determine whether a felony is inherently 
dangerous" [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Scott, 428 Mass. 
362, 364 (1998) (whether felony is inherently dangerous is "a 
matter of law" to be decided by judge; where felony is 
inherently dangerous, "[t]here is no need to show a 'conscious 
disregard for human life because the risk is implicit in the 
intent required for the felony'" [citation omitted]).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. at 505 n.15 ("common law 
felonies of arson, rape, burglary, and robbery" are "inherently 
dangerous").  We decline the defendant's invitation to revisit 
this issue. 
 
e.  Closing argument.  i.  Whether inferences were 
permissible.  In his closing, the prosecutor argued that the 
defendant was not mentally ill, and that his actions reflected 
calculated thinking by a "criminal mind."  The prosecutor noted, 
in particular, that the defendant had broken into his 
grandmother's house with the intention of stealing her money and 
her vehicle, and that he had been spotted by the victim.  The 
defendant then killed the victim to prevent her from revealing 
29 
 
 
his presence, removed her body and clothing to conceal what had 
happened, and went immediately to the convenience store to 
establish an alibi.  Once he had been caught by the canine 
officer, the prosecutor asserted, the defendant contemplated 
killing the police dog with his knife and, when that effort was 
unsuccessful, feigned insanity.  The prosecutor maintained also 
that the defendant's hospitalizations were the result, not of 
mental illness, but of "acting out" or "a substance abuse 
problem."  The prosecutor suggested that the defendant had 
concocted the insanity defense because he knew that the evidence 
against him was strong, and that he had no other viable defense.  
The defendant objected to these factual assertions as lacking 
support in the evidence.  His objections were overruled.  The 
defendant raises the same arguments on appeal. 
 
"A prosecutor must limit comment in closing statement to 
the evidence and fair inferences that can be drawn from the 
evidence. . . .  Nonetheless, a prosecutor may argue zealously 
in support of inferences favorable to the Commonwealth's case 
that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence" [quotation and 
citations omitted].  Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 22 
(2014).  In determining whether impermissible statements in a 
prosecutor's closing argument require reversal, "we consider (1) 
whether the defendant seasonably objected; (2) whether the error 
was limited to collateral issues or went to the heart of the 
30 
 
 
case; (3) what specific or general instructions the judge gave 
the jury which may have mitigated the mistake; and (4) whether 
the error, in  the circumstances, possibly made a difference in 
the jury's conclusions."  Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 
422-23 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 518 
(1987). 
 
Here, the challenged arguments were based largely on such 
reasonable inferences.  The assertion that the defendant broke 
into his grandmother's home intending to steal her money and her 
vehicle is supported by evidence that the defendant entered the 
house by climbing on his grandmother's Explorer, and then 
cutting through a window screen on a second-floor window, at 
night and while the occupants were sleeping, and that he 
actually stole these items, which were found in his possession 
after the motor vehicle chase.  See Commonwealth v. Maia, 429 
Mass. 585, 587-588 (1999) ("intent to steal may be inferred 
where a person enters a building by force at night"). 
 
The argument that the defendant was discovered by the 
victim, somewhere in the house, is supported, in part, by 
reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence.  
Although she slept in a room adjacent to the victim's and 
separated from it only by a sliding glass door, the grandmother 
was not aware, until hours later, that the defendant had been in 
the house, or that the victim was missing.  Both the victim's 
31 
 
 
bedroom and the room where the grandmother was sleeping were at 
the back of the house, while the defendant broke in through a 
front window, and committed the rape in a front bedroom.  Based 
on this, the jury reasonably might have inferred that the 
defendant encountered the victim not in her bedroom, but 
elsewhere in the house.20 
 
In any event, "the line separating speculation and 
inference is often a fine one," and we "recognize that closing 
argument is identified as argument," and that the jury 
understand from the judge's instructions that closing arguments 
are not evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Bresilla, 470 Mass. 422, 
437-438 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. at 516.  
Moreover, any impermissible inference in the prosecutor's 
suggestion as to the defendant's motive for the killing could 
not have resulted in prejudice to the defendant.  The 
defendant's motive was a collateral issue that the Commonwealth 
was not required to prove.  See Commonwealth v. Kozec, supra 
at 518 (distinguishing "collateral" errors in prosecutor's 
closing argument that did not go to "the heart of the case"). 
 
The jury also reasonably could have inferred that the 
defendant's actions after the killing were a conscious attempt 
to cover his tracks, demonstrating rational thought rather than 
                                                          
 
 
20 There was also evidence, however, that bloody pillows 
were found in the victim's bedroom.  There was no evidence whose 
blood it was. 
32 
 
 
insanity.  That the defendant removed the victim's body and 
clothing from the house could be viewed as an attempt to delay 
discovery of the crime.  Similarly, the defendant's visit to the 
convenience store, where he walked around but did not buy 
anything -- despite having just stolen cash from his 
grandmother -- might suggest that he went to the store for some 
purpose other than to shop, and that this purpose was to 
establish an alibi.  Such an inference could have been bolstered 
by the defendant's question to Gandy, a few hours later, about 
how he might dispose of a body.  The high-speed police chase and 
the defendant's flight on foot further support the inference, 
suggested by the prosecutor, that the defendant was trying at 
all costs to avoid capture and punishment.  In addition, the 
jury could have inferred that, when the defendant reached for 
his knife after the officer turned his back, the defendant 
intended to attack the police dog.  The evidence also supported 
an inference that, when the defendant realized escape was not 
possible, he began "ranting and raving" to establish an insanity 
defense.  See Commonwealth v. McColl, 375 Mass. 316, 323 (1978) 
(prosecutor allowed to argue "that the defendant was dissembling 
in his claim of insanity"). 
 
Finally, based on the grandmother's testimony, the jury 
reasonably could have adopted the prosecutor's suggestion that 
the defendant's psychiatric hospitalizations were related to 
33 
 
 
substance abuse rather than another mental illness.  Several 
witnesses testified that the defendant used marijuana or had 
possessed cocaine.  Thus, the prosecutor's argument "seems to 
have been based properly on reasonable inferences that could 
have been drawn from the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Carriere, 
470 Mass. at 22. 
 
ii.  Appeals to juror sympathy.  In his closing, the 
prosecutor asked the jury to recall that "one of the greatest 
fears of little kids are monsters that come out in the night."  
He said that, on the "night of August 4th, 2007, a monster came 
in the night.  A monster came into the life of [the victim], and 
the monster looked like [the defendant]."  The prosecutor 
repeated this comment, almost verbatim, five times.  At the end 
of his closing, the prosecutor was crying.  The defendant 
objected to the display of emotion, and to the refrain regarding 
monsters, as impermissible "appeal[s] to the sympathy of the 
jurors."  The judge overruled the objection. 
 
Prosecutorial "appeals to sympathy . . . obscure the 
clarity with which the jury would look at the evidence and 
encourage the jury to find guilt even if the evidence does not 
reach the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 425 Mass. 491, 501 (1997), S.C., 427 
Mass 298 and 428 Mass. 39 (1998).  Here, the prosecutor's 
display of emotion, and his characterization of the defendant as 
34 
 
 
a monster, were "unprofessional," "wholly inappropriate[,] and 
should not have occurred."  Commonwealth v. Rosario, 430 Mass. 
505, 515 (1999) (prosecutor "called the defendant a 'monster'").  
Coming from a prosecutor who twice previously has been rebuked 
by this court -- and reversed -- for similar types of 
inappropriate argument, the remarks are particularly troubling.  
See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 128, 133 (2013) (where 
same prosecutor "unjustifiably demeaned the defense, the 
defendant, and defense counsel in his closing argument," court 
concluded that "prosecutor's argument was highly improper"); 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Mass. 894, 902-907 (2008) (same 
prosecutor improperly vouched for witness and "improperly urged 
the jury to do something beyond impartial fact finding").  See 
also Matter of Nelson, 25 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 413, 413-
414 (2009) (public reprimand of prosecutor for argument in 
Commonwealth v. Williams, supra).21 
 
That being said, whether the argument requires reversal 
depends not only on whether it was improper, which it plainly 
was, but "whether the improper statements made by the prosecutor 
                                                          
 
 
21 We observed in Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Mass. 894, 
906 n.10 (2008), and reiterate here, that the prosecutor was "an 
experienced member of the district attorney's staff.  To say 
that he knew or certainly should have known better than to offer 
the wholly improper argument is a gross understatement."  Here, 
the "judge should have interrupted the prosecutor when he began" 
making such inappropriate remarks, and should have provided a 
"curative instruction."  See id. 
35 
 
 
'constituted prejudicial error.'" See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
425 Mass. at 500, quoting Commonwealth v. Daggett, 416 Mass. 
347, 352 n.5 (1993).  As the defendant notes, a timely objection 
was lodged, and the argument "went to the heart of the case."  
See Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. at 422.  The assertion that 
the defendant was a "monster" was, in context, an attempt to 
convince the jury that the defendant was not mentally ill but, 
rather, a calculating killer.  Nevertheless, we are persuaded 
that reversal is not required in the circumstances here. 
 
First, the judge instructed the jury, both before and after 
the closing arguments, that such arguments "are not evidence."  
She also gave the standard instruction that the jury should "not 
be swayed by prejudice, by bias, by sympathy or anger," and 
should not "be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes that 
[they] have come to feel toward any party."  See id. (we examine 
"what specific or general instructions the judge gave the jury 
which may have mitigated the mistake").  See also Commonwealth 
v. Camacho, 472 Mass. 587, 609 (2015) ("Although none of the 
errors was addressed specifically, the judge instructed the jury 
that closing arguments are not evidence and that the jury were 
not to be swayed by emotion, sentiment, sympathy, or 
prejudice"). 
 
Second, given the gruesome nature of the crime, it is 
unlikely that the prosecutor's argument had an inflammatory 
36 
 
 
effect on the jury beyond that which naturally would result from 
the evidence presented.  See Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. at 
423 ("a certain level of emotion on the part of the jurors could 
be expected from this type of trial").  In addition, it is clear 
that the jury did not blindly accept the prosecutor's arguments, 
as they rejected the Commonwealth's theory that the defendant 
had committed the killing with deliberate premeditation, 
acquitted him of drug possession and driving without a valid 
license, and convicted him of a lesser included offense on the 
larceny charge.  These "verdicts show that the jury were able to 
distinguish wheat from chaff.  We ordinarily assume that jurors 
are reasonably sophisticated and capable of sorting out 
hyperbole and speculation. . . .  The verdicts bear out this 
assumption."22  Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 510-
512 (2000) (reversal not required although prosecutor "erred 
egregiously," where defendant claimed lack of criminal 
responsibility, by telling jury "to ignore the question of 
[defendant's] mental condition"). 
 
f.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We address two 
additional issues in conjunction with our review under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
                                                          
 
 
22 The jury also sent a note to the judge asking whether 
"each charge [is] to be considered independent of other charges 
regarding the defendant's sanity."  This suggests that, the 
prosecutor's inflammatory remarks notwithstanding, the jury 
properly considered the defendant's insanity defense. 
37 
 
 
 
i.  Request for reduction of verdict to murder in the 
second degree.  Analogizing the facts of this case to those in 
Commonwealth v. Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 422, 430-434 (2008), 
the defendant asks us to reduce his conviction to murder in the 
second degree.  In that case, we reduced the degree of guilt to 
murder in the second degree where, suffering from psychotic 
depression, the defendant strangled her child, because her 
"conduct, although culpable, was very much driven by her mental 
condition."  Id. at 434.  The evidence that the killing was 
"driven by [the defendant's] mental condition" in that case, 
however, was strong.  See id.  The defendant there presented 
unrebutted expert testimony that she "lacked substantial 
capacity to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law 
due to a serious mental illness."  See id. at 422.  Here, by 
contrast, there was no expert testimony that the defendant's 
actions were the product of a mental illness, and the 
Commonwealth's evidence that the defendant did not lack criminal 
responsibility was strong. 
 
In this case, we discern no reason to exercise our power 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to modify the jury's verdict. 
 
ii.  Lack of statistical context for DNA evidence.  We note 
one other point not raised by the defendant.  The Commonwealth 
presented testimony from a laboratory technician that DNA 
samples recovered from sperm on the victim's body "matched the 
38 
 
 
DNA profile from [the defendant] and his paternal relatives."  
Such testimony should not have been admitted "without 
accompanying testimony explaining the statistical relevance of 
those . . . results."  See Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. at 
846.  This error did not give rise, however, to a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, as the factual 
proposition for which the evidence was admitted -- that the 
defendant raped the victim -- was undisputed.  Moreover, the 
technician's testimony was cumulative of other evidence that the 
victim was raped by the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Linton, 
456 Mass. 534, 560 (2010) ("Considering the limited probative 
value of the DNA evidence when considered in the context of the 
evidence as a whole, we are satisfied that admission of 
the . . . evidence without qualifying statistical measures . . . 
did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The conviction of home invasion is vacated 
and set aside, and a required finding of not guilty shall be 
entered on that charge.  The convictions of murder in the first 
degree, and of the remaining charges, are affirmed.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                          
 
 
23 Because the defendant was convicted of murder on theories 
of felony–murder and extreme atrocity or cruelty, the judgment 
on the indictment charging aggravated rape is not duplicative.  
See Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 421 (2011), 
citing Commonwealth v. Felder, 455 Mass. 359, 370–371 (2009).