Title: Knolls Condominium Ass'n v. Harms

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 92971-Agenda 30-September 2002.
KNOLLS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. 								MARY E. HARMS, Appellee.
Opinion filed November 21, 2002.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	The issue in this case is whether a condominium unit owner
can assert the homestead exemption contained in section 12-901
of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/12-901
(West 2000)) as an affirmative defense to a condominium
association's action in forcible entry and detainer brought because
of the unit owner's nonpayment of maintenance assessments. The
circuit court of Du Page County answered this question in the
negative and entered judgment for possession in favor of the
condominium association. The appellate court reversed, with one
justice dissenting. 326 Ill. App. 3d 18. We granted leave to appeal
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse the judgment of the
appellate court.



BACKGROUND
	The plaintiff, Knolls Condominium Association, filed a
complaint in forcible entry and detainer against the defendant,
Mary E. Harms. The complaint alleged that plaintiff was entitled
to possession of a certain condominium unit owned by defendant
in Willowbrook, Illinois, because defendant failed to pay plaintiff
$2,326.40 in maintenance assessments, plus costs and attorney
fees, as required by the condominium declaration. The complaint
further alleged that defendant was unlawfully withholding
possession of the premises from plaintiff.
	Defendant answered the complaint by denying that plaintiff
was entitled to possession of the property or that she was
unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff. Additionally,
defendant asserted as an affirmative defense that she owned and
occupied the property and, therefore, was entitled to an estate of
homestead to the extent of $7,500 in the property.
	At the hearing on the matter, the parties stipulated that
defendant owed plaintiff past-due maintenance assessments of
$2,326.40. Defendant then argued that an estate of homestead was
a proper defense to plaintiff's action for possession. In response,
plaintiff argued that various provisions of the Condominium
Property Act (765 ILCS 605/1 et seq. (West 2000)), and of article
IX of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, the Code or the
forcible entry and detainer statute) (735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq.
(West 2000)), specifically afford a condominium association the
right to maintain an action for possession against a unit owner for
nonpayment of assessments. The trial court agreed with plaintiff
and found that the specific language of the statutory authority
relied upon by plaintiff controlled over the more general language
of the homestead exemption relied upon by defendant.
	A divided appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial
court. In so doing, the appellate court majority relied upon the
principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the enumeration
of certain exceptions in a statute is construed as an exclusion of all
others. The appellate court majority found that section 12-903 of
the Code (735 ILCS 5/12-903 (West 2000)) specified its own
exceptions to the homestead exemption of section 12-901 (735
ILCS 5/12-901 (West 2000)). It concluded that because an
exception for a forcible entry and detainer action brought by a
condominium association was not listed in section 12-903, the
legislature did not intend to make an exception to the homestead
exemption in such cases.
	The dissenting justice argued that the majority's analysis
produced a statutory disharmony that was not intended by the
legislature. The dissent maintained that section 9-102(a)(7) of the
Code (735 ILCS 5/9-102(a)(7) (West 2000)), and section 9.2 of
the Condominium Property Act (765 ILCS 605/9.2 (West 2000)),
both of which specifically allow an action for possession brought
by a condominium association against a unit owner for
nonpayment of assessments, should be read harmoniously with the
homestead statute so as not to render any of the statutory
provisions meaningless.
	We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. We
subsequently granted leave to the Association of Condominium
and Townhome Associations to file an amicus curiae brief in
support of plaintiff's appeal.

ANALYSIS
	On appeal to this court, plaintiff argues that the specific
statutory provisions allowing a condominium association to obtain
possession of a condominium unit for the owner's failure to pay
maintenance assessments control over the general language of the
homestead exemption. Because the question of the proper
interpretation to be afforded statutory provisions is a question of
law, our standard of review is de novo. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348 (2001); County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The
Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 551 (1999).
	We begin our analysis by examining the relevant statutory
framework. Section 12-901 of the Code provides, inter alia, as
follows:
			"Amount. Every individual is entitled to an estate of
homestead to the extent in value of $7,500 of his or her
interest in a farm or lot of land and buildings thereon, a
condominium, or personal property, owned or rightly
possessed by lease or otherwise and occupied by him or
her as a residence ***. That homestead and all right in
and title to that homestead is exempt from attachment,
judgment, levy, or judgment sale for the payment of his or
her debts or other purposes and from the laws of
conveyance, descent, and legacy, except as provided in
this Code ***." 735 ILCS 5/12-901 (West 2000).
Section 12-904 of the Code states, generally, that only a written
release, waiver, or conveyance of the exempted homestead estate
is valid. 735 ILCS 5/12-904 (West 2000). Section 12-903
provides a few exceptions to the homestead exemption, which are
applicable in the context of a sale:
			"No property shall, by virtue of Part 9 of Article XII of
this Act, be exempt from sale for nonpayment of taxes or
assessments, or for a debt or liability incurred for the
purchase or improvement thereof, or for enforcement of
a lien thereon for nonpayment of common expenses
pursuant to the 'Condominium Property Act' ***." 735
ILCS 5/12-903 (West 2000).
	We now turn to the specific provisions of the Condominium
Property Act and the forcible entry and detainer statute, which set
forth the appropriate procedure available to a condominium
association for remedying a default in the obligations of a unit
owner. Sections 9(g)(1) and 9(h) of the Condominium Property
Act provide that if a unit owner fails to make timely payment of
common expenses, the amount due shall constitute a lien on the
interest of the unit owner in the property, which may be foreclosed
upon by the board of managers of the condominium association.
765 ILCS 605/9(g)(1), (h) (West 2000). Section 9.2 of the Act
specifically provides for further remedies as follows:
			"Other remedies. (a) In the event of any default by any
unit owner, his tenant, invitee or guest in the performance
of his obligations under this Act or under the declaration,
bylaws, or the rules and regulations of the board of
managers, the board of managers or its agents shall have
such rights and remedies as provided in the Act or the
condominium instruments including the right to maintain
an action for possession against such defaulting unit
owner or his tenant for the benefit of all the other unit
owners in the manner prescribed by Article IX of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
			(b) Any attorneys' fees incurred by the Association
arising out of a default by any unit owner, his tenant,
invitee or guest in the performance of any of the
provisions of the condominium instruments, rules and
regulations or any applicable statute or ordinance shall be
added to, and deemed a part of, his respective share of the
common expense." (Emphases added.) 765 ILCS 605/9.2
(West 2000).
Section 9-102(a)(7) of the Code gives the board of managers of a
condominium association the authority to maintain a forcible entry
and detainer action against a defaulting unit owner as follows:
			"(a) The person entitled to the possession of lands or
tenements may be restored thereto under any of the
following circumstances:
* * *
				(7) When any property is subject to the provisions of
the Condominium Property Act, the owner of a unit
fails or refuses to pay when due his or her proportionate
share of the common expenses of such property, or of
any other expenses lawfully agreed upon or any unpaid
fine, the Board of Managers or its agents have served
the demand set forth in Section 9-104.1 of this Article
in the manner provided for in that Section and the unit
owner has failed to pay the amount claimed within the
time prescribed in the demand ***." 735 ILCS
5/9-102(a)(7) (West 2000).
	Defendant argues that plaintiff does not have standing to bring
an action under the forcible entry and detainer statute because it is
not "a person entitled to possession." Defendant's contention,
however, is contradicted by the clear statutory language and must
be rejected. Section 9.2 of the Property Condominium Act plainly
provides that the board of managers of a condominium association
is entitled to maintain a cause of action for possession against a
defaulting unit owner under the forcible entry and detainer statute.
Additionally, section 9-102(a)(7) of the forcible entry and detainer
statute intimates that the board of managers is "a person entitled
to possession" within the meaning of the statute when the property
is subject to the Condominium Property Act, the unit owner fails
to pay his proportionate share of common expenses, the unit owner
is served with a demand, and the unit owner fails to pay within the
time prescribed in the demand. Defendant does not contend that
these criteria were not satisfied here.
	Additional support for plaintiff's right to maintain a cause of
action for possession is found in section 9-111(a) of the forcible
entry and detainer statute (735 ILCS 5/9-111(a) (West 2000)).
That section provides in relevant part as follows:
			"As to property subject to the provisions of the
'Condominium Property Act' *** when the action is
based upon the failure of an owner of a unit therein to pay
when due his or her proportionate share of the common
expenses of the property, *** and if the court finds that
the expenses *** are due to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall
be entitled to the possession of the whole of the premises
claimed, and judgment in favor of the plaintiff shall be
entered for the possession thereof and for the amount
found due ***." 735 ILCS 5/9-111(a) (West 2000).
	Other provisions of the statutory scheme allow the board of
managers to rent the condominium unit of which it has gained
possession under the Code and to collect the rental funds
therefrom until the amount owed by the unit owner is satisfied,
with possession eventually returning to the unit owner. See 735
ILCS 5/9-111(a), 9-111.1 (West 2000). The historical and
practice notes for section 9.2 of the Condominium Property Act
note that this statutory procedure for collecting assessments has
been in force for over 30 years and has provided an efficient
collection method. Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 30, par. 309.2, Historical &
Practice Notes, at 179-80 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991). The historical
and practice notes for that section further state in relevant part:
			"This section was added by P.A. 77-1760, effective
July 1, 1972, as part of a legislative package which also
included P.A. 77-1759, which added the procedures
applicable to condominiums to the Forcible Entry and
Detainer Act [authorizing condominium associations to
use the forcible procedures to collect unpaid assessments
from unit owners] ***.
			P.A. 83-645, effective January 1, 1984, *** deleted the
requirement that the declaration or by-laws contain
authorization to maintain an action, thereby extending the
forcible remedy to all associations in Illinois, regardless
of when created. Prior to the adoption of P.A. 83-645,
there was a question as to whether a condominium
association could use the forcible procedures if such a
remedy was not expressly provided for in the association
declaration or by-laws. [Citation.]
			This section makes Illinois unique in allowing a
condominium association to evict a unit owner for failure
to pay assessments. When such action occurs, the unit
owner maintains title to the unit and the association has
the right to possession of the unit until the judgment for
possession is vacated after the amount owed is paid.
* * *
			This section was adopted to provide a constitutionally
permissible, quick method for collection of assessment
arrearages in condominium associations, and it has
provided one of the better collection procedures found in
any state." Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 30, par. 309.2, Historical &
Practice Notes, at 179-80 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
	Defendant acknowledges the general applicability of the
above-quoted statutes, which would allow a condominium
association to maintain a forcible entry and detainer action where
the unit owner fails to pay his or her proportionate share of
condominium expenses. Defendant argues, however, that the
homestead provisions of article XII of the Code control the
outcome of this case by providing a defense to the unit owner for
plaintiff's cause of action for possession. We disagree.
	The controlling principles of statutory construction are well
settled. In construing a legislative enactment, a court should
ascertain and give effect to the overall intent of the drafters.
Villegas v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 167 Ill. 2d 108,
123 (1995). A court presumes that the legislature intended that two
or more statutes which relate to the same subject are to be read
harmoniously so that no provisions are rendered inoperative.
Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 391-92
(1998). Statutes relating to the same subject must be compared and
construed with reference to each other so that effect may be given
to all of the provisions of each if possible. Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d  at
392. Even when an apparent conflict between statutes exists, they
must be construed in harmony with one another if reasonably
possible. United Citizens of Chicago & Illinois v. Coalition to Let
the People Decide in 1989, 125 Ill. 2d 332, 339 (1988), quoting
People v. Maya, 105 Ill. 2d 281, 287 (1985). It is also a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that where there exists
a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision,
either in the same or in another act, both relating to the same
subject the specific provision controls and should be applied.
People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368, 379 (1992); People ex rel.
Kempiners v. Draper, 113 Ill. 2d 318, 321 (1986).
	Applying the above-mentioned principles, we find that the
appellate court majority placed undue emphasis upon the rule of
construction that the inclusion of one item in a statute is intended
as the exclusion of other possible items that were not included.
See Villegas, 167 Ill. 2d  at 122. We instead emphasize that the
overall intent of the legislature is of paramount importance, and
statutes must be construed in harmony if possible. United Citizens
of Chicago & Illinois v. Coalition to Let the People Decide in
1989, 125 Ill. 2d  at 338-39. We believe that the dissenting justice
was correct in his conclusion that the forcible entry and detainer
statute and the Condominium Property Act more specifically
address what is at issue in this case-a remedy when a unit owner
fails to pay condominium assessments-and therefore the more
specific provisions of those statutes should control over the more
general provisions of the homestead statute.
	The forcible entry and detainer statute and the homestead
statute relate to the same subject matter and provide a statutory
scheme. Section 12-901 of the homestead statute states that
condominium property occupied as a residence by the owner is
exempt from judgment "except as provided in this Code."
(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/12-901 (West 2000). Section
9-102(a)(7) of the Code, otherwise known as the forcible entry
and detainer statute, is a part of "this Code" referred to in section
12-901. Thus, by specifically allowing for possession of a unit
under the circumstances here, section 9-102(a)(7) provides an
exception to the homestead right of section 12-901. From our
review of the statutory scheme, we conclude that the legislature
specifically provided for a procedure for the temporary eviction of
a unit owner who fails to pay assessments, and it did not intend to
eliminate this remedy by failing to list it in section 12-903 as one
of the exceptions to the applicability of the homestead estate.
	Our interpretation of the statutory scheme harmonizes the
homestead statute with the forcible entry and detainer statute and
the Condominium Property Act and avoids rendering any of the
provisions inoperative. We do not find it to be inconsistent with
the purpose of the homestead statute to allow an action by a
condominium association in forcible entry and detainer against a
unit owner for purposes of recovering past due assessments.
Section 12-903 of the Code relates to exceptions to an estate of
homestead when a sale of the property is involved. As previously
noted, plaintiff here did not seek the sale of defendant's property,
but only sought possession of it until it recovered the amount of
past due assessments and other related sums. Section 9-111.1 of
the Code makes it clear that when a judgement for possession is
entered on behalf of the condominium association against the unit
owner, the unit owner maintains title to the unit and the
condominium association has the right of possession only until the
assessments and related amounts that are owed are paid. It is
therefore not surprising that the legislature did not list a forcible
entry and detainer action brought to recover past-due
condominium assessments as one of the exceptions of section
12-903, as section 12-903 is concerned with sales of homestead
property. The forcible entry and detainer statute, by contrast,
specifically addresses possession of condominium property where
title is not transferred. Accordingly, we do not find that plaintiff's
cause of action in the instant case is subject to a homestead
defense simply because of the legislature's failure to specifically
list an exception in section 12-903 of the Code mentioning the
condominium association's right to maintain an action for
temporary possession.
	Our analysis resolving the foregoing issue is supported by the
General Assembly's recent amendments to the applicable statutory
provisions. The amendments were made in the aftermath of the
appellate court's decision and make it clear that the legislature had
intended to give a condominium association the right to maintain
an action for possession against a unit owner under the forcible
entry and detainer statute without interference from the right of
homestead. Pub. Act 92-540, §5, eff. June 12, 2002, amending
735 ILCS 5/12-903 ("[n]o property shall, by virtue of Part 9 of
Article XII of this Act, *** be exempt from enforcement or
judgment for possession pursuant to paragraph (a)(7) or (a)(8) of
Section 9-101 of this Code"); Pub. Act 92-540, §5, eff. June 12,
2002, amending 735 ILCS 5/9-111 (language inserted stating that
"[t]he judgment of possession is not subject to an exemption of
homestead under Part 9 of Article XII of this Code"). The
legislature specifically included language to point out that the
amendments were "intended as a clarification of existing law and
not as a new enactment." Pub. Act  92-540, §5, eff. June 12, 2002,
amending 735 ILCS 5/9-111, 12-903.

CONCLUSION
	In sum, we hold that a condominium unit owner may not
assert the homestead exemption contained in section 12-901 of the
Code as an affirmative defense to a condominium association's
action in forcible entry and detainer brought because of the unit
owner's nonpayment of maintenance assessments. Accordingly,
we find that the trial court properly entered judgment for
possession in favor of plaintiff. We therefore reverse the judgment
of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.