Title: Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, Sheffield Nelson, Sanford SSonnyVarnell, Freddie Black, Brent Morgan, John Benjamin, George Dunklin, Jr., Ronald Pierce, Kimberly G. Smith, and Scott Henderson, Director of the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission, in their official capacities v. Bill Mills, White County Circuit Court Judge, on Petition for Writ of Prohibition

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

No. 07-227

ARKANSAS GAME AND FISH
COMMISSION, SHEFFIELD NELSON,
SANFORD “SONNY” VARNELL,
FREDDIE BLACK, BRENT MORGAN,
JOHNBENJAMIN, GEORGE DUNKLIN,
JR. RONALD PIERCE, AND
KIMBERLY G, SMITH, AND SCOTT
HENDERSON, DIRECTOR OF THE
ARKANSAS STATE GAME AND FISH
COMMISSION, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES

 

PETITIONERS,
vs,
BILL MILLS, WHITE COUNTY

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
RESPONDENT,

 

Opinion Datvere Ocaber 28,2007

PETITION FOR WRIT
PROHIBITION.

WRITDENIED,

or

 

 

TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice

‘On August 16, 2006, Respondents John Tarlton Morrison and Cynthia Mortison,

husband and wife, William Price Morrison, Jr, and Gray J. Morrison, husband and wife, Joseph

‘McCaughan Morrison and Brandon G. Morrison, husband and wife, Carl Eugene Morrison,

IM, and Nancy Morsisor

 

husband and wife, William Todd Carlisle and Carolyn Morrison

(Carlisle, husband and wife, Westley Cooper Morrison and Grace Ann F. Morrison, husband and

wife, (herein after the "Morrison Family”), filed a lawsuit in White County Circuit Court

against the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, Sheffield Nelson, Sanford “Sonny” Carnell,

Freddie Black, Brent Morgan, John Benjamin, George Dunkin, Jr, Ronald Pierce, and

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Kimberly G. Smith, and Scott Henderson, Director of the Arkansas Game and Fish

 

‘Commission, in their representative capacities, (hereinafter “AGFC”), seeking an injunction
enjoining the AGFC from leasing, conveying, encumbering or otherwise transferring the
‘mineral rights to land located in White and Prairie Counties. The complaint requested that the
‘circuit court reform four (4) warranty deeds so that the Morrison Family could maintain the
‘mineral interestin the land. AGFC filed a motion to dismiss, contending Ark. Code Ann. § 16-
{60-103 & Ark, Code Ann, § 16-160-101(d) mandated that the actions against the AGFC and
its commissioners be filed only in Pulaski County. Moreover, contending that there was five-
‘year statute of limitations pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-111(a), AGEC argued that the
Morrison Family no longer had a eause of action asthe complaint was filed six years afer the
contract at issue had been executed. ‘The circuit court entered an order finding that, because
this was a dispute over a contract, 2 deed, and realestate in White and Praitie Counties, this
action could be properly filed in White County Circuit Court. Additionally, the circuit court
‘concluded that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the issue of mutual mistake
“until the mistake was discovered or until the facts proved laches. ‘Therefore, the circuit court
held that the Morrison Family's cause of action was not barred by the statute of limitations

Now, AGFC bring this petition for writ of prohibition in this court, contending that the
White County Circuit Court was entiely without authority or jurisdiction to make this
decision. We deny the petition for writ of prohibition.

[A writ of prohibition isissued to prevent or prohibit the lower court from acting wholly
‘without jurisdiction, Hatfield». Thomas, 351 Ark, 377, 379, 93 S.W.3d 671, 672 (2002). The
purpose ofthe wit of prohibition isto prevent a court from exercising a power not authorized

oo 07-227
by law when there is no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise, ld, Thus, a wit of
prohibition lies only where itis apparent on the fice of the record that (1) the citeuit court is
‘wholly without jurisdiction and (2) there is no other adequate remedy. 1d.

‘Writs of prohibition are prerogative writs, extremely narrow inseope and operation, and
they are to be used with great caution and forbearance. Id. Prohibition should issue only in
cases of extreme necessity. Id, A characteristic of prohibition is that it docs not lie as a matter
‘of right but asa matter of sound judicial discretion. 1d. When considering a petition for writ of
prohibition, jurisdiction is tested on the pleadings, not the proof. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co. .
(Gree Cour forthe Osceola Disc of Missippi County, 317 Ark. 493, 878 S.W.2d 745 (1994)
‘Again, a wit of probibition is appropriate only when there is no other remedy, such as an
appeal, available. Pike v. Benton Circuit Court, 340 Ark. 311, 10 S.W.3d 447 (2000).

A review of the pleadings reveals thatthe writ of prohibition is not warranted. First, the
<icuit court was not wholly without jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss. Arkansas
‘Code Annotated Section 16-60-101 (Repl. 2008) provides:

Actions for the following causes must be brought in the county in which the

subject ofthe action, or some part thereof, is situated, except as provided in § 16-

60-1644)

(1) The recovery of real property, ov of am estate or interest therein;
(2) The partition of teal property;

(3) The sale of real property under a morgage, lin, or other encumbrance or
charges and
(4) An injury to real propery

1M, (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Atk. Code Ann. § 16-60-103 (Repl. 2005) states

a 07-227
The following actions must be brought in the county in which the seat of
government is situated:

(3) All actions against the state and all actions against state boards, state

commissioners, or state officers on account of thei offical acts, except that ifan

‘action could othenvise be brought in another countyor counties under the venue laws ofthis

state, as provided in § 16-60-101 et seq, then the action may be brought ether in

Pulaski County oF the other county or counties]
(Emphasis added.) The plain language of these statutes provides the circuit court with the
authority to conclude that venue was properin White County; thats, the eireuit court was not
‘wholly without jurisdiction to determine that the action could be maintained in White County
and not Pulaski County.

Relying on Ark, Code Ann. § 16-106-101(4) (Repl. 2006), AGFC argues that Pulaski
‘County isthe only place for proper venue, That section states,

(4) All actions for debts due the State of Arkansas, ll actions in favor of any state

officer, state board, or commissioner, in their official capacity, all actions which

are authorized by the provisions ofthis code orby law to be broughtin the name

of the state, and all ations against the board, commissioner, oF sate oficer for

‘or on account of any oficial act done or omitted to be done shall be brought and

prosecuted in the county where the defendant resides,
As pointed out by the Morrison Family, ths statute was enacted in 1871 by Act 48. However,
‘Ark, Code Ann. § 16-60-103(3) was amended to include the exception as set forth in Act 806
‘0f2001, which, s quoted above, sates thatthe action may be brought in a county other than
Pulaski County ifthe action could otherwise be brought in another county as provided by § 16-
{60-101 et seq, While we are not to reach the underlying merits in a petition for writ of

hibition, we can certainly recognize the express authority given to the circuit court by § 16-
prot en

60-103, as amended, in determining that venue may lie in 2 county other than Pulaski

4 07-227
Moreover, our case law relied on by AGFC is inapposite to the instant appeal. Specifically, for
the proposition that this writ should be granted, AGFC: cites Daniels v. Weaver, 367 Atk. 327,
—_S.W.3d __ (2006); Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Harkey, 345 Ark. 279, 45 S.W.3d 829
(2001); Wills v. Circuit Court of Phillips Cty., 342 Ark. 128, 27 $.W.3d 372 (2000); Valley v.
Bogard, 342 Ark. 336, 28 S.W.3d 269 (2000); Tortorich v. Tortorch, 333 Ark. 15, 968 S.W.2d
53 (1998); Ark, Game & Fisk Comm’n v, Lindiey, 292 Atk, 314, 730 S.W.2d 474 (1987);
Downey v. Toler, 244 Ark. 334, 216 S.W.2d 305 (1963); Fomest City Machine Works v. Colin,
257 Atk, 889, 521 S.W.2d 206 (1975); Dean v. Cole, 236 Ark. 64, 364 S.W.2d 305 (1963); and
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Bd. v. Newton, 230 Ark. 267, 322 S.W.2d 67 (1959). Notably, the
majority of those cases are not writ cases. See Davies v. Weaver, supra; Valley v. Bogard, sup;
Tortovich v. Tortovich, supa; Ark. Game & Fish Come’ v. Lindsey, prs; Dean v. Cole, supra; and
Liquefied Petolewn Gas Ba. v, Newton, supra. In addition, the remainder of the cases cited that
involve petitions for writs ether do not involve real property or were cases decided prior tothe
2001 amendment. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Harkey, supra; Wills v. Circuit Court of
Phillips Cty., supra; Downey v. Toler, supa Fomest City Machine Works v. Calvin, supra, Thus,
despite AGFC’s argument otherwise, the circuit court was not wholly without jurisdiction to
determine that venue was proper in White County

‘As to the second prong, AGFC possesses another adequate remedy. Specifically, AGFC
«an appeal this decision, once a final order is entered. Consequently, given the narrow scope
and operation of writ of prohibition, and the availabilty ofanother adequate remedy, we hold
that wit of prohibition would not be appropriate.

Finally, AGEC argues that a writ of prohibition lies because the circuit court was wholly

Se 07-227
‘without jurisdiction because the statute of limitations barred the Morrison Family’s cause of
action. A writ of prohibition is not warranted with respect to this argument as this is a
procedural argument, not a jurisdictional one.

‘We addressed this issue in Tatrov. Langston, 328 Ark. 548, 944 S.W.24 118 (1997). In
that case, the petitioner filed a writ of prohibition with this cour, arguing that the circuit court
‘was wholly without jurisdiction as the three-year statute of limitations had expired on the
underlying produet-lability tort claim, ‘The court denied that writ, and we explained that
statutes of limitations constitute an affirmative defense, see Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(¢), and are
generally not jurisdictional. 1 Those statutes of limitations that are jurisdictional are tied to
the right itself, and not jut the remedy. For instance, the statute of imitations for wrongful-
cath claims is jurisdictional because it is tied to the right itself See Vermeer Mf Cov. Steel
_Judge, 263 Ark, 323, 564 S.W.24 518 (1978). ‘Thus, ina wrongfl-death ase, prohibition may
be proper to raise a statute-of limitations challenge. However, prohibition is not an available
remedy if the statute of limitations governing a particular proceeding is not jurisdictional, but
muy be raised as an affirmative defense. Tato v. Langston, supra.

Here, the underlying complaint raises a cause of action for specific performance ~
reformation of a contract. Because the applicable statute of limitations is not tied to the right
to bring that claim, the statute-of-limitations argument made in this petition for writ of
prohibition must be denied asi is not jurisdictional, but procedural. In addition, AGFC is fee
to appeal this issue, once a final order is entered.

Writ denied

6 07-227