Title: Village of Chatham, Illinois v. County of Sangamon, Illinois

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 99136-Agenda 16-March 2005.
THE VILLAGE OF CHATHAM, ILLINOIS, an 
Illinois Municipal 
Organization, Appellee, v. THE COUNTY OF SANGAMON,
ILLINOIS, an Illinois Body Corporate and Politic, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 22, 2005.
 
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
At issue is whether the Village of Chatham, Illinois, or 
the County of Sangamon, Illinois, has zoning and building code jurisdiction over 
unincorporated lands that are subject to annexation agreements between the 
property owners and the Village. The circuit court of Sangamon County granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Village, finding that the Village's ordinances 
apply. Further, the circuit court rejected the County's claim that the provision 
of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2.1 (West 2002)) which 
authorizes application of the Village's ordinances is unconstitutional. A 
divided appellate court affirmed. 351 Ill. App. 3d 889. We granted the County's 
petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
Various persons who owned property in unincorporated 
Sangamon County reached agreements with the Village for the future annexation of 
their properties. The property owners and associated contractors obtained 
permits from the Village and began construction upon the properties. On March 8, 
2002, the County sent letters to the property owners and the Village regarding 
the construction, asserting building code jurisdiction over the properties. In 
letters to the property owners, the County's zoning and building administrator 
noted that the County had not issued construction permits to the owners and 
requested that the owners contact the County as soon as possible. In the letter 
to the Village, the County stated that it had noticed construction taking place 
in areas "pre-annexed" to the Village, where the property owners had not 
obtained building permits from the County. The County asked the Village to refer 
to the County all applications for building permits in unincorporated areas and 
all questions regarding zoning of unincorporated areas.
In response, the Village filed an action for declaratory 
judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West 2002)). The Village sought a determination that 
the Village, and not the County, has zoning and building code jurisdiction in 
areas subject to annexation agreements with the Village, and an injunction 
preventing the County from making demands on contractors and interfering with 
the Village's annexation agreements. The Village also asked the court to 
establish an escrow account into which contractors could deposit the County 
building permit fees, with the proceeds to be paid to the County if the County 
prevailed or refunded to the contractors if the Village prevailed. Subsequently, 
the Village and County stipulated that, during the pendency of the lawsuit, 
owners, contractors, and developers would obtain County building permits and pay 
appropriate fees as required by County resolutions. The Village would also issue 
appropriate building permits to the owners, contractors, and developers, but 
would not charge any additional building permit fees. The funds collected by the 
County were to be placed in an escrow fund, administered by the county clerk of 
Sangamon County.(1) Lastly, both the Village and 
the County had the right to inspect the construction sites.
In its answer to the complaint, the County admitted the 
existence of a controversy between the Village and the County as to the 
applicability of section 11-15.1-2.1 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 
5/11-15.1-2.1 (West 2002)), and demanded strict proof of the annexation 
agreements between the property owners and the Village. As an affirmative 
defense, the County claimed that section 11-15.1-2.1 contained an arbitrary 
classification and violated the special legislation provisions of article IV, 
section 13, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13). 
Lastly, the County counterclaimed for declaratory judgment, alleging that it had 
zoning, building code and Plat Act jurisdiction (765 ILCS 205/1 et seq. 
(West 2002)) over the unincorporated lands by operation of law. In a subsequent 
amendment, the County claimed that division 15.1 of the Municipal Code, if 
interpreted in the fashion advocated by the Village, is an invalid exercise of 
the police power because the legislation does not bear a reasonable relationship 
to public health, safety, morals and general welfare or convenience. Yet later, 
the County abandoned the Plat Act portion of its counterclaim.
Both the Village and the County moved for summary 
judgment. In support of its motion, the County submitted a map to the court 
detailing the properties subject to annexation agreements and the corporate 
limits of the Village. Susan Poludniak, a staff member of the 
Springfield-Sangamon County regional county planning commission, caused the map 
to be prepared, and stated in an affidavit that the map "updates the corporate 
limits of the Village of Chatham over and above those maps produced by the 
Village of Chatham, including additional information received about newer 
annexation agreements." The circuit court granted the Village's motion for 
summary judgment and denied the County's motion. The court found that division 
15.1 of the Municipal Code grants zoning and building code jurisdiction to 
municipalities over lands subject to annexation agreements. Further, the court 
upheld section 11-15.1-2.1 and division 15.1 against the County's special 
legislation challenge. The court found that the County "failed to meet its 
burden in establishing that the 1993 amendments made by the legislature to 
Division 15.1 are not rationally related to a legitimate State interest and that 
they are clearly unreasonable and palpably arbitrary."
A divided appellate court affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Village. The court first determined that section 5-1063 
of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-1063 (West 2002)), which grants counties 
building code power over buildings located outside a municipality's corporate 
limits, and section 11-13-1 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-1 (West 
2002)), which provides that a municipality shall not exercise zoning power 
outside its corporate limits if the county has adopted zoning ordinances, are 
not controlling where the lands at issue are subject to an annexation agreement 
with the municipality. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 893-98. The court reasoned:
"By providing 'property that is the subject of an 
annexation agreement *** is subject to the ordinances, control and jurisdiction 
of the annexing municipality in all respects the same as property that lies 
within the annexing municipality's corporate limits' *** (65 ILCS 
5/11-15.1-2.1(a) (West 2002)), the legislature manifested its intent to make 
this general provision controlling in cases where the land is subject to an 
annexation agreement." 351 Ill. App. 3d at 897.
Next, the appellate court rejected the County's special 
legislation challenge, finding that the County failed to meet its burden of 
showing that the classification contained in section 11-15.1-2.1 is arbitrary 
and unreasonable. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 901. The court also rejected the County's 
claim that the legislation is an invalid use of police powers by the 
legislature. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 901-02. Lastly, the court rejected the County's 
argument that there was a genuine issue of material fact which made entry of 
summary judgment in favor of the Village inappropriate. The court noted that the 
County had admitted a dispute with the Village over zoning and building code 
jurisdiction and provided the circuit court with a map showing the location of 
some of the disputed lands. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 902-03. The court concluded that 
entry of a judgment declaring that the Village's ordinances applied to the 
disputed lands was proper and would terminate the controversy between the 
Village and the County. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 903.
Justice Myerscough dissented. Like the majority, she noted 
the apparent conflict between section 11-15.1-2 of the Municipal Code, section 
11-13-1 of the Municipal Code and section 5-1063 of the Counties Code. She 
disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion that section 11-15.1-2 
prevails over the other statutes. She would apply the principle of in pari 
materia to reconcile the statutes and would hold that a municipality's 
zoning power only becomes effective when the property is actually annexed. 351 
Ill. App. 3d at 904-07.
We granted the County leave to appeal, and allowed the 
Illinois Municipal League leave to file an amicus curiae brief in 
support of the Village. We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

ANALYSIS
As noted above, the circuit court entered summary judgment 
in favor of the Village in this action for declaratory judgment. Summary 
judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002). In the present case, the 
correctness of the circuit court's ruling turns on its determination that 
section 11-15.1-2.1 does not violate the strictures of our constitution, and on 
the court's construction of several provisions of the Municipal Code and the 
Counties Code. Review is de novo. Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430, 436 (2002); County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 
188 Ill. 2d 546, 551 (1999).

I. Division 15.1
An understanding of the issues at bar requires discussion 
of the history of division 15.1. We detail the legislative enactment and certain 
amendments thereto, and discuss case law interpreting the enactment.
As originally enacted, section 11-15.1-1 of division 15.1 
provided:
"The corporate authorities of any municipality may enter 
into an agreement with one or more of the owners of record of land in any 
territory which may be annexed to such municipality as provided in Article 7 
such agreement to be valid and binding for a period of not to exceed 5 years 
from the date of execution thereof." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 24, par. 
11-15.1-1.(2)
Section 11-15.1-2 governed the contents and scope of the 
annexation agreements:
"Any such agreement may provide for the following as it 
relates to the land which is the subject of the agreement:
(a) The annexation of such territory to the municipality, 
subject to the provisions of Article 7.
(b) The continuation in effect, or amendment, or 
continuation in effect as amended, of any ordinance relating to subdivision 
controls, zoning, official plan, and building, housing and related restrictions; 
provided, however, that any public hearing required by law to be held before the 
adoption of any ordinance amendment provided in such agreement shall be held 
prior to the execution of the agreement, and all ordinance amendments provided 
in such agreement shall be enacted according to law.
(c) A limitation upon increases in permit fees required by 
the municipality.
(d) Contributions of either land or monies, or both, to 
the municipality and to other municipal corporations having jurisdiction over 
all or part of such land.
(e) The granting of utility franchises for such land.
(f) Any other matter not inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Code, nor forbidden by law.
Any action taken by the corporate authorities during the 
period such agreement is in effect, which, if it applied to the land which is 
the subject of the agreement, would be a breach of such agreement, shall not 
apply to such land without an amendment of such agreement." Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1963, ch. 24, par. 11-15.1-2.
Division 15.1 also delineated the procedures to be 
followed in entering upon an annexation agreement (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 24, 
par. 11-15.1-3) and the methods of enforcement of such an agreement (Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1963, ch. 24, par. 11-15.1-4).
In People ex rel. County of St. Clair v. City of 
Belleville, 84 Ill. 2d 1 (1981), this court considered the validity of four 
ordinances adopted by the council of the City of Belleville. The first 
ordinance, number 3390, purported to annex a railroad right-of-way partly 
contiguous and partly noncontiguous to the city. The second ordinance, number 
3391, purported to annex property noncontiguous to the city. The third 
ordinance, number 3392, adopted an annexation agreement between the city and the 
Catholic Diocese of Belleville, as owner of three tracts totaling 90 acres which 
were noncontiguous to the city. Pursuant to the annexation agreement, the 
property was to be the site of a Venture store. The city agreed to extend its 
sanitary sewerage system to the site, to authorize the owner of the site to have 
a road constructed near the site, and to authorize the owner of the site to have 
Illinois Route 13 and U.S. Route 460 improved in order to provide access from 
those roads to the site. The fourth ordinance, number 3393, purported to annex 
the 90 acres of the Catholic Diocese.
On appeal from the circuit court's ruling upholding the 
validity of the ordinances, the county argued that section 7-1-8 of the Illinois 
Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 7-1-8) required that 
territory be contiguous prior to or at the time the petitions for annexation 
were filed before a municipality could pass annexation ordinances. For its part, 
the city argued that while section 7-1-3 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 
7-1-3) might well require that the territory be contiguous when the petitions 
were filed, section 7-1-8, the section at issue, provided that the territory 
need not be contiguous until the annexation ordinance was actually passed. The 
court rejected the city's argument and invalidated ordinances 3391 and 3393, the 
two ordinances which purported to annex noncontiguous property. The court 
determined section 7-1-8 required that the territory sought to be annexed be 
contiguous at the time the petition for annexation was filed. A municipality 
desirous of annexing several parcels, only one of which was contiguous to the 
municipality, had to annex each parcel at separate times. The court, however, 
distinguished ordinance 3392, the ordinance which authorized an annexation 
agreement but did not attempt to annex the property: "Ordinance No. 3392, which 
adopted the agreement between the city and the diocese, is not affected by this 
conclusion. Since that ordinance simply adopts the agreement between the city 
and the diocese, but does not purport to annex any property, we think its 
validity is not in serious question here." City of Belleville, 84 Ill. 2d  at 12. Lastly, the court invalidated ordinance 3390 because the notice and 
accuracy requirements of the annexation statute had not been met.
In Village of Lisle v. Action Outdoor Advertising Co., 
188 Ill. App. 3d 751 (1989), the village brought an action seeking to enjoin the 
defendants from constructing an outdoor advertising sign, pursuant to a building 
and use permit from Du Page County, on the Smiths' property. The village based 
the action upon an annexation agreement between the village and the Smiths which 
provided for the future annexation and zoning of the Smiths' property when the 
property became contiguous to the village. A pertinent provision of the 
annexation agreement provided that the Smiths would install or otherwise 
construct all landscaping, lighting, signage, utilities, structures, or 
improvements of any kind upon the property in accordance with plans attached to 
the agreement and determined to have been in accordance with the village's code. 
The trial court ruled that the annexation agreement was valid but unenforceable 
because the Smiths' property was not contiguous to the village.
The appellate court affirmed. Initially, the appellate 
court observed that section 11-15.1-1 of the Municipal Code "provides the 
statutory authority for corporate authorities to enter into annexation 
agreements. Pursuant to section 11-15.1-1, '[t]he corporate authorities of any 
municipality may enter into an agreement with one or more of the owner of record 
of land in any territory which may be annexed to such municipality as 
provided in Article 7.' " (Emphasis in original.) Lisle, 188 Ill. 
App. 3d at 755. The court also noted that article 7 "defines 'territory which 
may be annexed' as '[a]ny territory which is not within the corporate limits of 
any municipality but which is contiguous to a municipality.' " 
(Emphasis in original.) Lisle, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 755. The Smiths' 
property not being contiguous to the village, the court observed that the 
property could not be annexed pursuant to article 7. Further, "[s]ince section 
11-15.1-1 of the Code [citation] only authorizes municipalities to enter into 
annexation agreements for property 'which may be annexed to such municipality as 
provided in Article 7,' only an agreement regarding contiguous property would be 
valid." Lisle, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 755.
The appellate court also believed that the village's 
annexation agreement countermanded the purpose of the Municipal Code. The court 
explained:
"[T]he validity of an annexation agreement that purports 
to allow a municipal authority to exercise its police powers over a 
noncontiguous tract of property falls when examined in light of the purpose 
behind the contiguity requirement. The fundamental notion of a municipal 
corporation is that of unity and continuity, not separated or segregated areas. 
[Citation.] This necessity for unity of purpose and facilities forms the very 
basis for the requirement of contiguity. [Citation.] The purpose of the 
contiguity requirement is to permit the natural and gradual extension of 
municipal boundaries to areas which adjoin one another in a reasonably 
substantial physical sense." (Emphasis in original.) Lisle, 188 
Ill. App. 3d at 755.
The court concluded:
"By allowing the Village in the instant action to enforce 
its ordinances on a property owner through an annexation agreement where it 
could not do so through actual annexation would permit the Village to do 
indirectly what it is prohibited by statute from doing directly. In other words, 
while the Village cannot annex the Smiths' property because it is not contiguous 
to the Village, it nonetheless seeks to exercise the same control under an 
annexation agreement which contemplates future contiguity. It is axiomatic that 
a party cannot circumvent the purpose of a statute by doing indirectly what it 
cannot do directly. [Citation.] Accordingly, we hold that the annexation 
agreement in the instant action is invalid and unenforceable as the 
property which is subject to the agreement is not contiguous to the Village and, 
as such, is not a proper object of annexation." (Emphasis in original.) 
Lisle, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 756.
The appellate court purported to distinguish this court's 
opinion in City of Belleville, 84 Ill. 2d 1, claiming that the validity 
of an annexation agreement was not directly at issue.
The legislature reacted swiftly to the appellate court 
opinion in Lisle, amending section 11-15.1-1 as follows:
"The corporate authorities of any municipality may enter 
into an annexation agreement with one or more of the owners of record of land in 
unincorporated territory. That land may be annexed to the municipality in the 
manner provided in Article 7 at the time the land is or becomes contiguous to 
the municipality. The agreement shall be valid and binding for a period of not 
to exceed 20 years from the date of its execution.
Property that is the subject of an annexation agreement 
adopted under this Section is subject to the ordinances, control, and 
jurisdiction of the municipality in all respects the same as property owned by 
the municipality that lies within its corporate limits.
Lack of contiguity to the municipality of property that is 
the subject of an annexation agreement does not affect the validity of the 
agreement whether approved by the corporate authorities before or after the 
effective date of this amendatory Act of 1990.
This amendatory Act of 1990 is declarative of existing law 
and does not change the substantive operation of this Section." 65 ILCS 
5/11-15.1-1 (West 1992).
In 1993, the legislature further amended division 15.1 by 
moving the second paragraph of section 11-15.1-1 to a new section and adding 
thereto a provision mandating contiguity in certain counties (65 ILCS 
5/11-15.1-2.1 (West 1994)). The new section provides:
"Annexation agreement; municipal jurisdiction.
(a) Property that is the subject of an annexation 
agreement adopted under this Division is subject to the ordinances, control, and 
jurisdiction of the annexing municipality in all respects the same as property 
that lies within the annexing municipality's corporate limits.
(b) This Section shall not apply in (i) a county with a 
population of more than 3,000,000, (ii) in a county that borders a county with a 
population of more than 3,000,000 or (iii) a county with a population of more 
than 246,000 according to the 1990 federal census and bordered by the 
Mississippi River, unless the parties to the annexation agreement have, at the 
time the agreement is signed, ownership or control of all property that would 
make the property that is the subject of the agreement contiguous to the 
annexing municipality, in which case the property that is the subject of the 
annexation agreement is subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of 
the municipality in all respects the same as property owned by the municipality 
that lies within its corporate limits." 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2.1 (West 1994).
The legislature has amended division 15.1 two more times. 
It modified section 11-15.1-4 to add a limitation period for lawsuits to enforce 
and compel performance of annexation agreements. 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-4 (West 
1996). Also, it amended section 11-15.1-2 to provide that a municipality could 
abate property taxes as part of an annexation agreement, and that contributions 
of land or monies to a municipality or other unit of local government would 
survive the expiration date of the annexation agreement. 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2 
(West 1998). Section 11-15.1-2.1, however, remained the same. It is this section 
of division 15.1 that the County finds objectionable.

II. Constitutional Issues
A. Special Legislation
In this court, the County argues that section 11-15.1-2.1 
of the Municipal Code violates the special legislation clause of the Illinois 
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13), because it contains an arbitrary 
classification and confers on certain counties special rights and privileges 
that are not available to other counties. Initially, we note that all statutes 
are presumed to be constitutional. Flynn, 199 Ill. 2d  at 436; 
People v. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d 334, 338 (2001). The party challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute has the burden of rebutting the presumption of 
validity and clearly establishing a constitutional violation. Flynn, 
199 Ill. 2d  at 436; Nevitt v. Langfelder, 157 Ill. 2d 116, 124 (1993). 
Further, when construing a statute, the court should uphold the statute's 
validity if reasonably possible. People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 123 (1998).
The special legislation clause of the Illinois 
Constitution provides:
"The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law 
when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can 
be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." Ill. Const. 
1970, art. IV, §13.
Our constitution thus prohibits the General Assembly from 
conferring a special benefit or exclusive privilege on a person or a group of 
persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated. Best v. Taylor 
Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997); In re Petition of the Village of 
Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117, 122 (1995).
Like the equal protection guarantee, the special 
legislation provision of our constitution is intended to prevent arbitrary 
legislative classifications. Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 391. "If there is a 
reasonable basis for the classification, and it bears a reasonable and proper 
relation to the purposes of the act and the evil it seeks to remedy, it does not 
violate the constitutional proscription of special or local laws." 
Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill. 2d 103, 111 (1972). As the court explained in
People ex rel. County of Du Page v. Smith, 21 Ill. 2d 572, 577-78 
(1961),
"[A] law may be general notwithstanding that it may 
operate only in a single place where conditions necessary to its operation 
exist. [Citations.] A law is general not because it embraces all of the 
governed, but because it may, from its terms, embrace all who occupy a like 
position to those included. [Citations.] If there is a reasonable basis for 
differentiating between the class to which the law is applicable and the class 
to which it is not, the General Assembly may constitutionally classify persons 
and objects for the purpose of legislative regulation or control, and may pass 
laws applicable only to such persons or objects. [Citation.] In this regard, it 
is well settled that an act is not local or special merely because of a 
legislative classification based upon population [citation] or territorial 
differences [citation]. Such classifications will be sustained where founded 
upon a rational difference of situation or condition existing in the objects 
upon which it rests, and where there is a reasonable basis for the 
classification in view of the objects and purposes to be accomplished."
Contrarily, a statute will be invalidated if it creates a 
classification so narrow as to effectively identify a limited number of 
entities, precluding all others from ever joining the class. Thus, in People 
ex rel. Koch v. Rinaker, 252 Ill. 266 (1911), the court invalidated a 
statute which provided for the formation of one forest preserve district in a 
county but did not require the district to include a forest. Once a district was 
organized in a county, no matter how small the forest it contained or how many 
acres of forest existed outside the district, no other district could be 
organized in the same county. And in Frye v. Partridge, 82 Ill. 267 
(1876), the court invalided the statute at issue because it was limited in its 
application to one ferry, located at a definite place. See also Christen v. 
County of Winnebago, 34 Ill. 2d 617 (1966); 2 N. Singer, Sutherland on 
Statutory Construction §40:1 (6th ed. 2001).
In the present case, section 11-15.1-2.1 provides that 
property that is the subject of an annexation agreement is also subject to the 
ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the municipality. This provision, 
however, does not apply to Cook County, counties bordering Cook County, and 
counties with a population of more than 246,000 according to the 1990 federal 
census and bordered by the Mississippi River. In those counties, the 
municipality's ordinances do not apply unless the parties to the annexation 
agreement have, at the time the agreement is signed, ownership or control of all 
property that would make the property that is the subject of the agreement 
contiguous to the annexing municipality. The County maintains that the statute 
contains a closed classification because several counties border the Mississippi 
River but only those with a population of more than 246,000 according to the 
1990 census would be able to invoke the contiguity provision. No matter the 
growth in the population of other counties bordered by the Mississippi River, 
the enactment will only apply to Madison County and St. Clair County.
The Village maintains this court should not consider the 
County's special legislation challenge because section 11-15.1-2.1 does not 
impact the County and, consequently, the County lacks standing to complain of 
the statute. Standing is a preliminary question in all declaratory judgment 
actions. Flynn, 199 Ill. 2d  at 436. We consider the Village's argument 
first.
The doctrine of standing ensures that issues are raised 
only by parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy. 
Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 
189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000). In Illinois, standing is shown by demonstrating 
some injury to a legally cognizable interest. Greer v. Illinois Housing 
Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492 (1988); Messenger v. Edgar, 
157 Ill. 2d 162, 170 (1993). The claimed injury, whether actual or threatened, 
must be distinct and palpable, fairly traceable to the defendant's actions, and 
substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the relief 
requested. Chicago Teachers Union, 189 Ill. 2d  at 207; Greer, 
122 Ill. 2d  at 492-93. In the context of a declaratory judgment action, "there 
must be an actual controversy between adverse parties, with the party requesting 
the declaration possessing some personal claim, status, or right which is 
capable of being affected by the grant of such relief." Greer, 122 Ill. 2d  at 493.
In Underground Contractors Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 
66 Ill. 2d 371, 375-76 (1977), the court further explained the requirements for 
standing:
" 'Actual' in this context does not mean that a wrong must 
have been committed and injury inflicted. Rather, it requires a showing that the 
underlying facts and issues of the case are not moot or premature, so as to 
require the court to pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render 
an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as to future events. [Citations.] The 
case must, therefore, present a concrete dispute admitting of an immediate and 
definitive determination of the parties' rights, the resolution of which will 
aid in the termination of the controversy or some part thereof. [Citations.]
The second, and somewhat related requirement, is that the 
party seeking the declaration must be 'interested in the controversy.' 
[Citation.] The word, 'interested' does not mean merely having a curiosity about 
or a concern for the outcome of the controversy. Rather, the party seeking 
relief must possess a personal claim, status, or right which is capable of being 
affected. [Citations.] The dispute must, therefore, touch the legal relations of 
parties who stand in a position adverse to one another."
Thus, to have standing to bring a declaratory judgment 
action challenging the validity of a statute, one must have sustained, or be in 
immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of enforcement of 
the statute. Flynn, 199 Ill. 2d  at 437; Messenger, 157 Ill. 2d  
at 171.
We agree with the Village that the County does not have 
standing to challenge the validity of section 11-15.1-2.1. The County does not 
possess a personal claim, status or right which is capable of being affected by 
the relief requested. As noted above, the legislature amended division 15.1 in 
1990 to provide that "[p]roperty that is the subject of an annexation agreement 
*** is subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the municipality 
in all respects the same as property owned by the municipality that lies within 
its corporate limits." 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-1 (West 1992). Thus, in 1990, all 
counties in Illinois were affected in the same way by an annexation 
agreement-that is, the property subject to the annexation agreement was also 
subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the municipality. 
The legislature specifically instructed that the amendment "is declarative of 
existing law and does not change the substantive operation of this Section." 65 
ILCS 5/11-15.1-1 (West 1992).
In 1993, the legislature further amended division 15.1 by 
moving the provision pertaining to the applicability of the ordinances, control 
and jurisdiction of the municipality to a new section, and adding thereto the 
provision mandating contiguity in Cook County, counties that border Cook County, 
and counties with a population of 246,000 according to the 1990 federal census 
that are bordered by the Mississippi River. See 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2.1 (West 
1994). The County is neither a collar county nor a county bordered by the 
Mississippi River. Thus, the 1993 amendment does not have a direct impact on the 
County. It is only because the 1993 amendment confers a measure of protection to 
Cook County, the collar counties, Madison County, and St. Clair County by 
requiring contiguity at the time the annexation agreement is signed 
that the County claims it has suffered an injury in being denied the same 
protection.
The County argues that we should invalidate the 1993 
amendment because it creates a closed class within the counties bordered by the 
Mississippi River. Were we to strike down the 1993 amendment, however, the 
County would not obtain relief or be impacted in any way. If we were to strike 
the 1993 amendment in part by deleting subsection (b), the provision mandating 
contiguity in Cook County, the collar counties, Madison County and St. Clair 
County, the provision of subsection (a) that "[p]roperty that is the subject of 
an annexation agreement *** is subject to the ordinances, control, and 
jurisdiction of the annexing municipality" would apply to all counties, 
including the County (65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2.1(a) (West 1994)). See Myers v. 
People, 67 Ill. 503, 508-09 (1873) ("It is a general rule, and one founded 
in good sense, that, if one part of a statute be unconstitutional, but it stands 
so independently by itself that it may be rejected, and yet leave that which 
remains so complete in itself as to be fully capable of execution, then the act 
should be construed the same as if the void part had never been inserted. Under 
these rules, we hold that we are at liberty to reject the last section of the 
act, and then, by the terms of the first section, it will apply to all the 
county courts in the State").
If we were to strike the 1993 amendment in its entirety, 
the previous version of the statute, that is, the statute as amended in 1990, 
would spring back to life. See Johnkol, Inc. v. License Appeal Comm'n, 
42 Ill. 2d 377, 382 (1969) (" 'The effect of the enactment of an invalid 
amendment to a statute is to leave the law in force as it existed prior to the 
adoption of such amendment.' [Citations.] As we have noted, prior to the 1961 
amendment, the statute provided that all licensees whose licenses had been 
revoked were permitted to resume business during the pendency of their 
administrative appeals. Only that portion of the 1961 amendment to section 5 of 
the Act which destroyed that equality of treatment is invalidated by our 
decision. [Citation.] Absent legislative modification, licensees in all 
municipalities must be permitted to resume operation during the pendency of an 
administrative appeal"). The 1990 version of the statute also provided that "[p]roperty 
that is the subject of an annexation agreement *** is subject to the ordinances, 
control, and jurisdiction of the municipality." 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-1 (West 1992).
Moreover, we agree with the legislature's assessment that 
the 1990 amendment was declarative of the law as it existed prior to the 
amendment. As discussed above, in City of Belleville, 84 Ill. 2d 1, 
this court upheld the validity of an ordinance which adopted an 
annexation agreement between the City of Belleville and the Catholic Diocese. By 
the terms of the agreement, the city had agreed to extend its sanitary sewerage 
system to the noncontiguous site, to authorize the owner of the site to 
have a road constructed near the site, and to authorize the owner of the site to 
have Illinois Route 13 and U.S. Route 460 improved in order to provide access 
from those roads to the site. In Lisle, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 755, the 
appellate court purported to distinguish City of Belleville and held 
that a municipality could not enforce its ordinances on a noncontiguous property 
owner through an annexation agreement. The appellate court erred in its attempt 
to distinguish City of Belleville. The 1990 amendment restored the law 
as it existed prior to Lisle.
It is a fundamental rule of constitutional law that a 
court will not determine the constitutionality of a provision of a statute that 
does not affect the parties to the cause under consideration. Flynn, 
199 Ill. 2d at 438-39; Chicago Teachers Union, 189 Ill. 2d  at 206. 
Under all versions of division 15.1, property subject to an annexation agreement 
within the county would be subject to the municipality's ordinances, control, 
and jurisdiction. It is thus apparent that striking the later version of the 
statute would not impact the County in any way. The County has not sustained an 
injury which is likely to be redressed by the relief requested and lacks 
standing to challenge the statute as special legislation.

B. Police Power
The County also maintains that division 15.1 is an invalid 
exercise of the police power. The County notes that "while lands cannot be 
annexed to a municipality until they are contiguous to the corporate boundaries 
of the municipality, the Division permits unlimited power of a municipality to 
assert zoning and building code and other jurisdiction *** over lands covered by 
an agreement that may be many miles and hundreds of miles away from the 
municipality, thus defeating the sound land use principles of unity and 
continuity in the extension of corporate jurisdiction." The County argues "the 
Division will permit a landowner to bargain with unlimited municipalities across 
the State for the best zoning deal available, even though annexation may never 
be able to occur as a practical matter, thus permitting municipalities with no 
valid government interest in the zoning to bargain away the public interest of 
those legitimately concerned with the zoning of the lands." The County concludes 
that division 15.1 does not bear a reasonable relationship to public health, 
safety, morals and general welfare or convenience.
In City of Carbondale v. Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d 111, 114-16 (1979), the court outlined the principles we must consider in 
resolving the County's challenge:
"Recently, the concept of police power in Illinois has 
been more thoroughly considered.
'The police power is an attribute of sovereignty inherent 
in every government. It has been reserved to all the States by the constitution 
of the United States. [Citations.] While it is not without limitation and may 
not be exercised arbitrarily, the legislatures of the States have broad 
discretion in the passage of statutes in its exercise. [Citation.] When the 
legislature has considered a problem and enacted legislation thereon, the act is 
presumptively a valid exercise of the power and the burden rests upon the one 
assailing the statute to show that it is without reasonable basis and entirely 
arbitrary. [Citations.]' (Memorial Gardens Association, Inc. v. Smith 
(1959), 16 Ill. 2d 116, 123.)
The police power may be exercised to protect the public 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare or convenience. [Citations.] To be a 
valid exercise of police power, the legislation must bear a reasonable 
relationship to one of the foregoing interests which is sought to be protected, 
and the means adopted must constitute a reasonable method to accomplish such 
objective. [Citations.] Although the determination of reasonableness is a matter 
for the court, the legislature has broad discretion to determine not only what 
the interests of the public welfare require but what measures are necessary to 
secure such interest. [Citations.] The court will not disturb a police 
regulation merely where there is room for a difference of opinion as to its 
wisdom, necessity and expediency. [Citation.] The reasonableness requirement 
also applies to ordinances passed pursuant to legislative authority."
The court further explained that "a zoning ordinance will 
be upheld as a proper exercise of the police power if it bears any substantial 
relationship to the public health, safety, comfort or welfare." City of 
Carbondale, 78 Ill. 2d  at 115.
On a prior occasion, this court has considered a 
constitutional challenge to the validity of division 15.1. In Meegan v. 
Village of Tinley Park, 52 Ill. 2d 354 (1972), an action for mandamus 
commenced in 1971, the plaintiffs asked the trial court to compel the issuance 
of a building permit pursuant to an annexation agreement entered into in 
September 1959. As adopted by the legislature in 1963, division 15.1 limited the 
enforcement of preexisting annexation agreements to five years from the date of 
execution of the agreement. The plaintiffs maintained that division 15.1 
impaired the obligations of a valid and existing contract, in violation of 
section 10 of article I of the federal constitution. In affirming the dismissal 
of the action as time-barred, this court observed:
"The adoption of zoning regulations constitutes an 
exercise of the police power of the State. [Citations.] The 1963 amendment to 
the Illinois Municipal Code which added section 11-15.1-1 et seq. 
relating to annexation agreements provides in section 11-15.1-2 that zoning is a 
permissible subject of such agreements. To the extent that section 11-15.1-5 
limits the enforcement of such agreements relating to zoning, as in this case, 
the legislature is thereby exercising its police power.
We need not here attempt to distinguish between 
obligations of contract and remedies for breach thereof nor determine into which 
category the limitations on the enforcement of the agreement fall [citation], 
because we are here concerned with the exercise of the police power by the 
State. The contract clause of the Federal constitution does not prohibit the 
enactment of all laws that may affect or interfere with the free exercise of 
rights granted by contracts. Such rights are subject to the reasonable and 
legitimate exercise of the police power by the State. [Citations.] Neither the 
contract clause nor the due process clause of the Federal constitution has the 
effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that 
are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, comfort and general 
welfare of the community. [Citation.] We conclude, therefore, that the 
limitation provision of section 11-15.1-5 as applied to this case is not invalid 
as a violation of the contract clause of the Federal constitution." Meegan, 
52 Ill. 2d  at 357-58.
Also instructive is this court's opinion in City of 
Belleville, 84 Ill. 2d 1. As discussed above, the court invalidated several 
ordinances which purported to annex property because the statute at issue 
required contiguity at the time the petitions for annexation were filed.(3) In doing so, the court observed:
"We realize that this construction requires a municipality 
desirous of annexing several parcels, only one of which is contiguous to the 
municipality, to annex each parcel at separate times. In some situations this 
requirement may appear cumbersome. We can only conclude that the General 
Assembly has imposed this limitation to prevent a municipality from conducting a 
wholesale annexation of successive parcels of property where each parcel, other 
than the first, is not contiguous to, and is more remote from, the original 
corporate limits. Since this is peculiarly a legislative judgment, we will not 
interfere with it." City of Belleville, 84 Ill. 2d  at 11.
Although the court invalidated the ordinances which 
purported to annex property, the court upheld the validity of an ordinance which 
authorized an annexation agreement for property noncontiguous to the 
municipality, but did not attempt to annex the property. City of 
Belleville, 84 Ill. 2d  at 12. Thus, the City of Belleville court 
recognized that the legislature has broad discretion to determine what the 
interests of the public welfare require and what measures are necessary to 
secure such interest. Also, the court determined that the legislature may 
authorize an annexation agreement for property which is noncontiguous to a 
municipality.
In considering the County's challenge, we note that the 
arguments the County presents reflect the analysis and decision of the appellate 
court in Lisle, 188 Ill. App. 3d 751. We have discussed the appellate 
court's opinion at length and noted that the court was in error. We have also 
outlined the legislature's reaction to the Lisle opinion. We are 
satisfied that the legislature had the opportunity to consider the reasons 
advanced by the Lisle court for the requirement of contiguity in 
annexation agreements. The legislature soundly rejected the Lisle 
court's analysis and decision.
We do not believe that the legislature has abused its 
discretion in determining what the interests of the public welfare require and 
what measures are necessary to secure such interest. The orderly development of 
municipalities is a matter clearly impacting upon the public health, safety, and 
welfare. Further, as this court observed in City of Belleville, 84 Ill. 
2d at 12: "The purpose of the contiguity requirement is to permit the natural 
and gradual extension of municipal boundaries to areas which 'adjoin one another 
in a reasonably substantial physical sense.' " That purpose will be met fully, 
however, at the time the property is annexed. Division 15.1 clearly 
requires contiguity for effective annexation of property. Section 11-15.1-1 
provides: "That land may be annexed to the municipality in the manner provided 
in Article 7 at the time the land is or becomes contiguous to the municipality." 
65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-1 (West 2002). Article 7 also requires contiguity of property 
being annexed. See 65 ILCS 5/7-1-8 (West 2002).
The County expresses strong disagreement with the 
timing utilized by the legislature. The legislature has determined that a 
municipality may exercise certain jurisdiction over property which is subject to 
an annexation agreement as of the time the agreement is entered into, 
rather than the time of annexation. This is a determination, however, 
which is best left to the discretion of the legislature in the exercise of its 
police power. We see no reason to reconsider our decisions in Meegan, 
52 Ill. 2d 354, and City of Belleville, 84 Ill. 2d 1, and to 
countermand the legislature's determination of the interests of the public 
welfare.

III. Statutory Construction
We consider next the County's contention that, by statute, 
the County, not the Village, has zoning and building code jurisdiction over 
noncontiguous property in unincorporated areas. In doing so, we are guided by 
familiar principles. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to give 
effect to the intent of the legislature. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d  at 
556; Stewart v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Ill. 2d 337, 341 (1987). The 
best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute, which 
must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997); Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 194-95 (1992). It is never proper for a court to depart from plain 
language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions 
which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. Nottage v. 
Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996); Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 
159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). When the statutory language is clear, it must be 
given effect without resort to other tools of interpretation. Land v. Board 
of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 421-22 (2002); 
Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1983).
As outlined above, division 15.1 provides that property 
that is the subject of an annexation agreement is subject to the ordinances, 
control, and jurisdiction of the municipality. 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2.1(a) (West 
2002). Ordinarily, cities have no jurisdiction beyond their corporate limits, 
and municipal ordinances are confined in their application to the territory of 
the municipality adopting them. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 243 (1956) (citing Dean Milk Co. v. City of Elgin, 405 Ill. 204 
(1950), and City of Rockford v. Hey, 366 Ill. 526 (1937)). However, the 
legislature may, if it sees fit, confer special extraterritorial powers on 
municipalities, and when it does so the courts recognize and give effect to 
them. Petterson, 9 Ill. 2d  at 243 (legislature could properly grant a 
municipality exclusive control and jurisdiction over lands located within 1½ 
miles of the corporate limits of the municipality).
Although section 11-15.1-2.1 is clear and unambiguous, the 
County argues that the provision cannot be given effect because it conflicts 
with section 5-1063 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5-1063 (West 2002)) and 
section 11-13-1 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-1 (West 2002)). 
Specifically, the County argues that where a county has adopted building code 
and zoning ordinances, the county has jurisdiction, pursuant to section 5-1063 
of the Counties Code and section 11-13-1 of the Municipal Code, over lands 
located outside the corporate limits of the municipality.
Section 5-1063 of the Counties Code provides in part:
"For the purpose of promoting and safeguarding the public 
health, safety, comfort and welfare, a county board may prescribe by resolution 
or ordinance reasonable rules and regulations (a) governing the construction and 
alteration of all buildings *** where such buildings *** are located outside the 
limits of cities, villages and incorporated towns, but excluding those for 
agricultural purposes on farms including farm residences ***." 55 ILCS 5/5-1063 
(West 2002).
Thus, section 5-1063 grants building code jurisdiction to 
counties over nonagricultural buildings located outside the territorial limits 
of municipalities. The County has adopted building code ordinances pursuant to 
the statute.
Pursuant to section 11-13-1 of the Municipal Code, a 
municipality may exercise zoning power within the corporate limits of the 
municipality and within contiguous territory not more than 1½ miles beyond the 
corporate limits of the municipality if the contiguous territory is not included 
within any other municipality. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-1 (West 2002). Section 11-13-1 
specifically provides, however, that a municipality may not exercise zoning 
power outside the corporate limits of the municipality if the county in which 
the municipality is situated has adopted "An Act in relation to county zoning" 
(55 ILCS 5/5-12001 et seq. (West 2002)). In the present case, it is 
undisputed that the County has adopted "An Act in relation to county zoning." 
Section 11-13-1 therefore limits the Village's right to exercise zoning power 
over lands situated outside the Village's corporate limits.
We agree with the County that division 15.1 conflicts with 
section 5-1063 of the Counties Code and section 11-13-1 of the Municipal Code. 
Further, the legislative enactments do not specifically state that division 15.1 
is an exception to either section 5-1063 or section 11-13-1. In determining 
which act is controlling, two rules of statutory construction are helpful. 
First, when two statutes appear to be in conflict, the one which was enacted 
later should prevail, as a later expression of legislative intent. State of 
Illinois v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 254 (1990). The legislature amended 
division 15.1, effective January 1, 1991, to clarify that property that is the 
subject of an annexation agreement is subject to the ordinances, control, and 
jurisdiction of the municipality. This amendment postdates the provision of 
section 5-1063 authorizing a county board to prescribe reasonable rules and 
regulations governing the construction and alteration of buildings and 
structures located outside city limits. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 34, par. 
422. The amendment also postdates the provision of section 11-13-1 limiting a 
municipality's right to exercise zoning power where the county has adopted "An 
Act in relation to county zoning." See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 24, par. 
11-13-1. By application of this statutory rule of construction, division 15.1 
prevails as the later expression of legislative intent.
Second, where there are two statutory provisions, one of 
which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is 
particular and relates to only one subject, the particular provision must 
prevail. Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d  at 195, quoting Bowes v. City of 
Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 205 (1954); Stone v. Department of Employment 
Security Board of Review, 151 Ill. 2d 257, 266 (1992). Section 5-1063 of 
the Counties Code and section 11-13-1 of the Municipal Code apply to zoning and 
building code regulation of properties in general. Division 15.1 applies where a 
municipality has entered into an annexation agreement with the owner of 
properties located outside the boundaries of the municipality. Division 15.1 
details the procedures to be followed in entering into the annexation agreement; 
what may be included in the agreement, the methods of enforcement of the 
agreement, and the period of enforcement of the agreement. Division 15.1 then 
provides that property that is the subject of an annexation agreement is subject 
to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the municipality. We are of the 
opinion that division 15.1 is the more specific legislation and must prevail 
where the property at issue is the subject of an annexation agreement.
Even if we were to find division 15.1 the more general 
statute, our conclusion would not change. As discussed above, the Lisle 
court invalidated an annexation agreement that allowed a municipality to 
exercise its police powers over a noncontiguous tract of property. The 
legislature specifically rejected the Lisle decision, providing by 
amendment that "[p]roperty that is the subject of an annexation agreement *** is 
subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the annexing 
municipality in all respects the same as property that lies within the 
annexing municipality's corporate limits." (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 
5/11-15.1-2.1(a) (West 2002). It is a rule of statutory construction that a more 
specific statute does not control where the legislature intended to make the 
general act controlling. Stone, 151 Ill. 2d  at 266, quoting 2B N. 
Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §51.05, at 174 (5th ed. 1992). In 
light of the legislature's reaction to the appellate court decision in Lisle, 
there can be no doubt of the legislature's intent to grant jurisdiction to 
municipalities over properties located in unincorporated areas which are subject 
to annexation agreements.

IV. Summary Judgment
In the alternative, the County argues that the Village was 
not entitled to summary judgment because there was a material issue of fact, 
precluding entry of summary judgment. In particular, the County maintains that 
the Village failed to establish the existence of the annexation agreements and, 
consequently, failed to establish its right to exercise zoning and building code 
jurisdiction over lands in unincorporated areas. We disagree.
The County initiated contact with the property owners and 
the Village by correspondence noting that the property owners had begun 
construction in areas "pre-annexed" to the Village, without first obtaining 
permits from the County. The County submitted a map to the circuit court showing 
the locations of the "pre-annexed" areas. Lastly, pursuant to a stipulation 
between the County and the Village, property owners and developers affected by 
this dispute obtained building permits from the County. The fees paid for the 
permits were placed in an escrow fund administered by the county clerk of 
Sangamon County.
Importantly, the issues that the courts have considered in 
this case are uniquely issues of law. Resolution of this case turned on whether 
division 15.1 was either special legislation or an improper exercise of the 
police power. In the absence of a constitutional violation, the question became 
one of statutory construction, namely, whether the County or the Village has 
jurisdiction of properties subject to annexation agreements. The interpretation 
of a statute is a matter of law for the court and appropriate for summary 
judgment. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d  at 551.

V. Declaratory Judgment
In a related issue, the County argues that the trial court 
rendered an abstract judgment which will not terminate the dispute between the 
parties. The County claims there are no specific lands covered by annexation 
agreements to which the judgment can apply. Again, we disagree. The County 
provided the circuit court with a map showing the locations of areas 
"pre-annexed" to the Village. The County also issued permits and charged fees to 
property owners and developers in areas "pre-annexed" to the Village. These 
fees, deposited into an escrow account, amounted to $17,836.99 as of the 
conclusion of the proceedings in the circuit court. At the very least, the 
circuit court's ruling affected the zoning and building code jurisdiction of the 
Village with respect to the properties whose owners and developers had obtained 
permits from, and paid fees to, the County. The court's ruling was not an 
abstract decision.

CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of 
the appellate court.
 

Appellate court judgment affirmed.
 
 
1. 
1At the conclusion of the proceedings in the circuit court, the 
balance in the escrow account stood at $17,836.99.
2. 2The time period has 
since been lengthened to 20 years. See 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-1 (West 2002). 

3. 3The statute has since 
been amended to require that the property be contiguous at the time of 
annexation, rather than at the time when the petition for annexation is 
filed. See 65 ILCS 5/7-1-8 (West 2002).