Title: State v. Trax

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: August 14, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
CRAIG DONALD TRAX,
	Respondent on Review.
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
     v.
LISA MARIE TRAX,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 97CR2980FA, 97CR2980FB; CA A105215 (Control),
A105216; SC S49484)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted March 11, 2003.
	Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the petition
were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General.
	Robin A. Jones, Senior Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause for respondents on review.  With her on the brief was
Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Oregon Public Defense
Services.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.  
	CARSON, C.J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.	
    *Appeal from Douglas County Circuit Court, William L. Lasswell, Judge. 179 Or App 193, 39 P3d 887 (2002). 
		CARSON, C.J.
		The issue in these consolidated criminal cases is
whether a search warrant that purported to authorize a search of
defendants' residence contained sufficient particularity to
satisfy Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.  The
trial court held that the warrant met constitutional
requirements, denied defendants' motions to suppress evidence
found as a result of execution of the warrant, and found
defendants guilty of multiple drug-related crimes.  The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of defendants' motions
to suppress and defendants' convictions.  State v. Trax, 179 Or
App 193, 39 P3d 887 (2002).  We allowed review and now reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
We take the following facts from the trial court
record.  On November 19, 1997, Detective Admire of the Douglas
County Sheriff's Office learned that, while in a house on Cary
Street in Winston, a person named Lisa had shown methamphetamine
for sale to a confidential informant.  On the basis of the
informant's description, Admire located the house, noted its
address of 111 Cary Street, and observed a Ford Ranger parked in
the front and a Subaru parked in the driveway.  Admire ran checks
on both vehicles through the Driver and Motor Vehicle Services
Branch (DMV) (1) and learned that the Ford Ranger was registered to
Craig and Lisa Trax (defendants), and the Subaru was registered
to Kathleen Brown.  All three vehicle owners had listed their
addresses with the DMV as 111 Cary Street in Winston. 
		Admire further learned that, in October 1996, Detective
Fetsch of the Douglas County Sheriff's Office had conducted a
consent search involving Brown at 111 Cary Street.  During that
search, Fetsch had discovered two growing marijuana plants. 
Through the course of investigating the informant's tip regarding
Lisa Trax, Admire spoke to Fetsch regarding Fetsch's earlier
consent search involving Brown.
		On November 21, 1997, Admire submitted an affidavit to
the Douglas County Circuit Court, which set out the information
summarized above, and obtained a search warrant.  Among other
things, the warrant authorized police to search (1) "[t]he
residence and property located at 111 Cary Street in the City of
Winston, Douglas County, Oregon"; (2) the persons of defendants;
(3) the person of Brown; (4) the Ford Ranger belonging to
defendants; and (5) the Subaru belonging to Brown.  Admire's
affidavit was attached to the warrant.
Later that day, Admire, Fetsch, and three other members
of the Douglas County Sheriff's Office (2) arrived at 111 Cary
Street to execute the warrant.  Admire knocked on the front door,
and Craig Trax answered.  Admire told Trax that he had
information that drugs were being sold on the premises and
requested consent to search, which Trax refused.  Admire then
showed Trax the warrant and entered the house.
Upon entry, Admire discovered that the house in fact
was divided into two separate residences with separate interior
entrances -- one residence consisting of the first floor, with an
interior entry door near the front door, and the other residence
consisting of the second floor, with an upstairs interior entry
door.  Admire and Fetsch then entered the first-floor residence,
which belonged to defendants. (3)  Lisa Trax arrived shortly
thereafter, and both defendants were read their Miranda rights. 
The ensuing search of defendants' residence resulted in the
discovery and seizure of two marijuana plants and paraphernalia
associated with growing and distributing marijuana.
  		While Admire was inside defendants' first-floor
residence, another officer went upstairs to the second-floor
residence, which belonged to Brown, to see if he could obtain
consent to search.  Brown was not home, and the police did not
search her residence.
	On the basis of the evidence discovered during the
search of the Trax residence and vehicle, a grand jury indicted
defendants for manufacture and delivery of a controlled
substance, ORS 475.992(1)(a), and manufacture and delivery of a
controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school, ORS
475.999(1).  Defendants moved to suppress the evidence resulting
from the search, upon the ground that neither Admire's affidavit
nor the warrant itself had described the house at 111 Cary Street
as a multi-unit dwelling. (4)  At a hearing on defendants' motions,
Craig Trax testified about the nature of the separate residences
at 111 Cary Street, as well as about a brief interaction that he
had had with Fetsch during the 1996 consent search of Brown's
residence.  Admire, for his part, testified about discovering the
two separate residences upon entering the front door at 111 Cary
Street when executing the warrant.  Admire further testified
that, despite Fetsch being present in the house in 1996, Fetsch
never had mentioned to Admire that the house consisted of two
separate residences and that Fetsch's report from that search
also had not noted that fact.  
		The trial court denied defendants' motions to suppress,
reasoning that (1) upon discovering that the house contained two
residences, Admire permissibly had employed reasonable effort in
determining that the first-floor residence, which the police
ultimately searched, belonged to defendants; and (2) defendants
had not met their burden of proving that Admire had been aware,
through knowledge that Fetsch had gained during his 1996 search
of Brown's residence, that the house at 111 Cary Street consisted
of two separate residences.  The court thereafter convicted
defendants, based upon stipulated facts, of all charges.
		Defendants appealed, and a divided, en banc Court of
Appeals reversed their convictions.  The majority concluded that
the warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of
Article I, section 9, specifically reasoning as follows:  (1) the
warrant itself authorized the search of only one residence; (2)
the warrant contained no "tie-breaking" information that
permitted the police to determine which of the two residences
within the house at 111 Cary Street was the intended object of
the search; and (3) because no such tie-breaking information
existed, the police constitutionally could not execute the
warrant, and any search pursuant to it was illegal under Article
I, section 9.  Trax, 179 Or App at 210-12.  Four judges
dissented, concluding that, despite the unanticipated discovery
of two separate residences at 111 Cary Street, the warrant,
together with the supporting affidavit, authorized the search of
both defendants' residence and Brown's residence.  Id. at 214,
217-18 (Deits, C. J., dissenting).  As noted, we allowed the
state's petition for review and, for the reasons explained below,
now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
		Article I, section 9, provides, in part:
	"* * * [N]o warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized."
(Emphasis added.)  As this court explained in State v. Cortman,
251 Or 566, 569, 446 P2d 681 (1968), cert den, 394 US 951 (1969),
the purpose of the "particularity" requirement is
"to narrow the scope of the search to those premises
for which a magistrate has found probable cause to
authorize the search.  When the warrant designates the
premises by means that will properly limit the search,
there is little risk that other premises will be
subjected to unreasonable examination."
See also State v. Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28, 34, 511 P2d 331
(1973) (if warrant describes premises so as to make invasion of
privacy interests possible without probable cause, then warrant
too broad and constitutionally defective).  A description in a
warrant of the place to be searched satisfies the particularity
requirement if it permits the executing officer "to locate with
reasonable effort the premises to be searched."  Cortman, 251 Or
at 568-69; see also Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or at 35 (to same
effect).
		As they contended below, defendants first argue on
review that the house at 111 Cary Street in fact contained two
separate residences and that, to satisfy the particularity
requirement of Article I, section 9, the warrant must have
identified that fact and specified which residence within the
house was to be searched.  In defendants' view, the warrant
provided no basis to search any particular residence within the
house, and, upon discovering two separate residences, the police
were not entitled to rely upon any personal knowledge respecting
which residence to search.  As noted, the Court of Appeals
majority generally agreed with defendants, specifically relying
upon this court's decisions in Siverson v. Olson, 149 Or 323, 40
P2d 65 (1935), Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28, and State v. Devine,
307 Or 341, 768 P2d 913 (1989).
		Defendants are correct that a description in the
warrant that the house at 111 Cary Street contained two
residences would have made the warrant more particularized
respecting the place to be searched.  However, the inclusion of
such a description was not necessary, under the facts of this
case, to satisfy the particularity requirement of Article I,
section 9, as discussed below.
		As noted above, in Cortman, 251 Or at 568-69, this
court explained that a description in a warrant is
constitutionally sufficient if it permits the executing officer
to locate, with "reasonable effort," the premises intended to be
searched.  In that case, the officer had obtained and executed a
warrant that had named the defendant and had identified his
apartment building by street number, but had not specified an
apartment number; however, the officer had known in which
apartment the defendant resided.  Id. at 568.  This court
concluded that the warrant was not fatally defective under the
particularity requirement, reasoning that the officer had been
able to execute the warrant "without straying into premises which
he ha[d] no authority to enter."  Id. at 569.  In reaching that
conclusion, the court distinguished other cases involving invalid
warrants describing only the street number of multi-unit
apartment buildings, reasoning that none of those cases had
involved a warrant naming the occupant of the place to be
searched.  Id.  
Here, as in Cortman, the warrant listed the street
address of what turned out to be a multi-unit dwelling and also
named defendants as persons to be searched.  Upon discovering
that the house contained two separate residences, the police
permissibly used reasonable effort -- by obtaining information
from Craig Trax upon arrival (5) -- to ascertain which residence
within the house belonged to defendants and then searched only
that residence.  As in Cortman, then, the police had been able to
execute the warrant "without straying into premises which [they]
ha[d] no authority to enter."  251 Or at 569.  It follows that,
as written, the warrant sufficiently "narrow[ed] the scope of the
search to those premises for which a magistrate ha[d] found
probable cause to authorize the search," id., and, therefore, did
not violate the particularity requirement of Article I, section
9. (6)
		The foregoing discussion disposes, for the most part,
of defendants' argument respecting any alleged particularity
defect in the warrant.  As noted, however, in concluding that the
warrant was constitutionally defective, the majority opinion of
the Court of Appeals relied upon this court's decisions in
Siverson, Blackburn/Barber, and Devine.  Because that discussion
provided the centerpiece of the majority's opinion, we take this
opportunity to clarify the holdings of those cases, particularly
as they apply here.
		Siverson involved a warrant that described the place to
be searched as "a certain building" located at a particular
address, but did not name any person to be searched.  In
executing the warrant, the police discovered that the house at
the listed address actually contained two separate residences on
different floors, each occupied by two people, and a separate
garage apartment occupied by a fifth person.  Notwithstanding
that discovery, the police searched the entire house and garage
apartment.  149 Or at 324-25, 328.  This court held that, under
the facts of the case, the description in the warrant was
insufficient under Article I, section 9.  Id. at 328.  The court
specifically distinguished an earlier case, State v. Quartier,
114 Or 657, 667, 236 P 746 (1925), concerning a warrant that had
involved only one building containing a single residence at the
listed address and that expressly had named the persons who were
the target of the search.  Siverson, 149 Or at 328.
		In Blackburn/Barber, the warrant at issue described the
place to be searched as "Apartment Number 2" in a residence at a
particular address, with the letters "ECURB" on the door. 
Although the warrant did not name a person to be searched, the
police knew the occupant's name to be Barber.  When the police
executed the warrant, they searched apartments numbered as 2 and
3 at the listed address, as well as an additional, unnumbered
apartment in which they had found Barber.  More than one hour
into execution, the police noticed that the letters "ECURB" were
posted above the door of the unnumbered apartment in which they
found Barber, but not above the door of Apartment 2, as stated in
the warrant.  266 Or at 30-33.
		After discussing the purpose of the particularity
requirement, the court in Blackburn/Barber explained:
"The description [in the warrant] must be sufficiently
clear so that the property to be searched is
recognizable from other neighboring properties.  If,
however, a warrant purporting to authorize a search is
sufficiently ambiguous that it is impossible to
identify with a reasonable degree of certainty the
particular premises authorized to be searched,[ (7)] the
warrant may not be executed and any search pursuant to
it is illegal, whether of the premises actually
intended or not, because of the danger that the privacy
of unauthorized premises will be invaded."
Id. at 35 (footnote omitted).  The court then held that the
warrant at issue authorized the search of the apartment with the
letters "ECURB" on the door, reasoning that the "ECURB"
description in the warrant was sufficiently particularized to
allow the officers to ascertain with reasonable certainty that
that apartment was the intended object of the search.  266 Or at
35.  By contrast, the warrant did not authorize the search of
Apartment 2, without the letters "ECURB" on the door (or, in any
event, Apartment 3).  Id. at 36.  
		Having concluded that the officers properly executed
the warrant respecting the "ECURB" apartment, but not respecting
Apartment 2, the court stated:
"[T]he fact that [the police] were acting
unauthorizedly in searching other premises should not
invalidate an authorized search of the premises
intended."
Id.  Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order
suppressing evidence discovered in the "ECURB" apartment, but
affirmed as to evidence discovered in Apartment 2.  Id.
		In Devine, the warrant at issue described the place to
be searched as a white and black, single-story dwelling at 442 W.
Centennial, but did not name any person to be searched.  After
searching the dwelling pursuant to the warrant, the police
discovered a living area in an unattached white garage behind the
dwelling, marked as 442-1/2.  The police then searched the garage
area and found contraband.  307 Or at 343.
		After setting out the purpose of the particularity
requirement, this court stated:
"* * * [O]fficers may search only a single residence in
a multiple-residence building or property if the
warrant described only one such residence.  State v.
Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or [at] 35-37 * * *; see also
Siverson * * *, 149 Or 323[.]
	"Although never explicitly stated,
Blackburn/Barber and Siverson imply that[,] if a
warrant does not state how many residences may be
searched, the warrant only authorizes the search of one
residence."
Devine, 307 Or at 344.  The court went on hold that, under
Article I, section 9,
"a warrant for the search of certain premises applies
only to those premises[,] and * * * if, at some time
during the search, separate premises are encountered
and searched, the search of the latter is unauthorized
without regard to whether the officers could have
anticipated ahead of time that they would encounter
those separate premises."
Id. at 346; see also id. at 345 ("A warrant authorizes the search
of a particular place.  That authorization does not extend to
other places, even when they are somewhat like the place whose
search is authorized and their existence was not anticipated by
the officers.").  The court ultimately determined that it was
unable to ascertain from the record whether the separate garage
area in fact constituted a separate living space and remanded for
further findings in that regard.  Id. at 346-47.
		As noted above, the Court of Appeals majority construed
Siverson, Blackburn/Barber, and Devine collectively to stand for
the following propositions:  
"(1) Unless otherwise specified, a warrant to search a
residence at a specific address authorizes the search
of only one residence at that address. * * * (2) If a
warrant authorizes the search of a residence at a
specific address but the officers executing the warrant
discover more than one residence at that address, the
officers may look to other identifying information
contained in the warrant to discern which is the
residence that is the proper subject of the search.   
* * * (3) However, if it is not possible to tell from
the warrant with a reasonable degree of certainty the
particular premises authorized to be searched, the
warrant may not be executed and any search pursuant to
it is illegal, whether of the premises actually
intended or not[.]"
Trax, 179 Or App at 208-09 (emphasis and brackets in original;
footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).  The foregoing
quotation is accurate as a general matter, as demonstrated by
Siverson, 149 Or 323, wherein this court invalidated a warrant
that had purported to be for a single residence, but had
contained no "tie-breaking" information to distinguish among the
three residences that the police had encountered upon execution. 
Simply stated, upon discovery of multiple residences at the
listed address, the police in Siverson had been unable to
determine -- from either the face of the warrant itself or
through "reasonable effort" in conjunction with the warrant,
Cortman, 251 Or at 268-69 -- which of those residences had been
the intended object of the search.
		By contrast, neither Blackburn/Barber nor Devine
involved a situation in which the warrant had purported to
describe only one residence that, in fact, consisted of multiple
residences.  In Blackburn/Barber, the warrant indisputably had
authorized the search of only one residence; the question was
which residence (Apartment 2 or the "ECURB" apartment) had been
the intended object of the search.  There, and again in contrast
to Siverson, this court concluded that the police could have
determined with reasonable certainty, from the face of the
warrant, that they were authorized to search the "ECURB"
apartment.  Similarly, in Devine, the warrant clearly had
authorized the search of the residence marked 442 W. Centennial;
the question there was whether that description had encompassed
the separate garage apartment marked as 442-1/2.  Ultimately,
then, and unlike the facts at issue here, those cases involved
scenarios in which the police had searched areas beyond those
particularly described in the warrant (Blackburn/Barber) or
possibly had done so (Devine).
As to any ambiguity respecting the place to be
searched, the Court of Appeals majority correctly set out this
court's explanation from Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or at 36, that, if
an executing officer reasonably can determine from the face of
the warrant which of potentially multiple residences the officer
is authorized to search, then the particularity requirement is
satisfied respecting the intended premises (although any search
of premises not encompassed by the warrant would be illegal). 
Trax, 179 Or App at 202-03.  However, the Court of Appeals did
not consider the additional direction from Cortman, 251 Or at
268-69, discussed earlier, that a description in a warrant is
sufficient "if it permits the [executing] officer * * * to locate
with "reasonable effort" the premises to be searched. (8)
		It follows from the foregoing understanding of the case
law that, respecting this particular warrant, the Court of
Appeals took out of context the statement from Devine, 307 Or at
344, that "officers may search only a single residence in a
multiple-residence building or property if the warrant described
only one such residence."  That statement has no application
here, where (1) the warrant set out the address of 111 Cary
Street; (2) the warrant specifically named defendants; and (3)
the police, by permissibly employing reasonable effort (that is,
by obtaining information from Craig Trax), were able to ascertain
the location of defendants' residence within the house
particularly described.  In sum, in the context of the reasonable
effort undertaken upon execution, the warrant indisputably
authorized the search of defendants' first-floor residence within
the house at 111 Cary Street, notwithstanding the wording in the
warrant respecting the singular "residence" at that address.
		Defendants also rely upon the fact that Fetsch had
searched Brown's residence in 1996 to support their contention
that, to pass constitutional muster under the particularity
requirement, the warrant issued in 1997 must have described the
house at 111 Cary Street as a multi-unit dwelling.  Before the
trial court, defendants essentially argued that, in light of
Fetsch's 1996 search and his subsequent presence during the 1997
search pursuant to the warrant at issue, the police in fact must
have known, before executing that warrant, that the house
consisted of two residences.  On review, defendants refine that
argument, contending that the court must impute any knowledge in
Fetsch's behalf (respecting the multi-unit character of the house
flowing from his 1996 search) to Admire (respecting the 1997
search), regardless of whether Admire actually had learned of
that fact from Fetsch before obtaining the warrant in question.
		Our earlier discussion demonstrates that either
variation of defendants' argument misses the mark.  As we have
discussed, using information set out in the warrant
(specifically, the address of 111 Cary Street and defendants'
names as persons to be searched), coupled with reasonable effort
upon entry, the police were able to ascertain the location of the
premises intended to be searched.  The fact that Fetsch's earlier
knowledge from his 1996 search of Brown's residence might have
enabled the police to draft a more particularized warrant --
setting out the multi-unit character of the house -- does not
affect our earlier conclusion that the warrant was sufficiently
particularized to satisfy Article I, section 9.
Defendants next contend on review that, regardless of
the fact that the warrant also named Brown as a person to be
searched, Admire's affidavit did not establish probable cause to
search Brown or her residence.  It follows, defendants argue,
that the warrant was invalid as to the entire house at 111 Cary
Street because it was not supported by probable cause respecting
Brown.  In making that argument, defendants focus upon the Court
of Appeals majority's preliminary conclusion that no probable
cause existed to search Brown's residence.  Trax, 179 Or App at
199-200.  However, the state contends -- and we agree -- that
defendants did not preserve any argument respecting the probable
cause requirement under Article I, section 9, as to Brown. (9)  The
Court of Appeals majority therefore should not have discussed the
issue, and we decline to address it further. 
		Defendants finally argue on review that the warrant did
not satisfy the particularity requirement set out in the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  However, because
defendants did not make any federal constitutional argument in
that regard to the trial court, we do not address that argument.
		As noted above, in conjunction with their motions to
suppress, defendants also filed motions to controvert that
challenged the reliability of Admire's confidential informant. 
The Court of Appeals did not address that issue on appeal, in
light of its reversal of defendants' convictions based upon the
motion to suppress.  We therefore remand the consolidated cases
to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendants'
arguments respecting their motions to controvert.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.



1. 	At the time of the factual events that gave rise to
this case, the Oregon Administrative Rules referred to the agency
known as the DMV as the "Driver and Motor Vehicle Services
Branch" of the Oregon Department of Transportation.  That agency
now is named the "Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division." 
OAR 735-010-0008(11).

2. 	Another detective, a sergeant, and a property evidence
staffer accompanied Admire and Fetsch.  For ease of reference, we
refer to the group executing the warrant as "the police"
throughout this opinion.

3. 	All parties argued the case as if the police had
learned from Craig Trax -- either through questioning or a
voluntary statement on his part -- that he lived in the first-floor residence.  The record does not disclose any information
regarding such an exchange; however, the record does disclose,
and the trial court found, that the police learned from Craig
Trax that "another" residence was located on the second floor of
the house at 111 Cary Street.  From that fact, together with the
other facts surrounding the search, it is reasonable to infer
that the police also learned from Craig Trax that he lived in the
first-floor residence.  See generally State v. Wilson, 323 Or
498, 510-11, 918 P2d 826 (1996), cert den, 519 US 1065 (1997) (in
reviewing trial court's preliminary factual finding on
evidentiary issue, court drew from record all reasonable
inferences that trial court could have made supporting its
ruling).

4. 	Defendants simultaneously filed motions to controvert,
challenging the reliability of the confidential informant.  The
trial court denied those motions, and the Court of Appeals did
not address that ruling, in light of its reversal of defendants'
convictions based upon their motions to suppress. 

5. 	Nothing in the record, and nothing in the parties'
arguments, suggests that the exchange between the police and
Craig Trax implicated any constitutional protections respecting
interactions between the police and the citizenry.  See ___ Or at
___ n 2 (slip op at 3 n 3) (discussing contents of record).

6. 	Defendants also emphasize on review that, although the
police had learned upon entry into 111 Cary Street that Craig
Trax lived in the first-floor residence, they had not learned
necessarily that Lisa Trax -- the only person mentioned in the
affidavit as having attempted to sell methamphetamine to the
informant -- also lived in the first-floor residence, at least
not until her arrival after the police already had begun
searching that residence.  Although it is debatable whether
defendants preserved any legal issue relating to that point, we
note that the fact that the warrant stated that defendants were
registered co-owners of a vehicle listed at 111 Cary Street, and
that they had the same last name, provided sufficient information
for the police reasonably to conclude that defendants lived in
the same residence.

7. 	We note that, in Cortman, 251 Or at 569, decided nearly
five years before Blackburn/Barber, this court had retreated from
the "reasonable certainty" approach:
"In Smith v. McDuffee, 72 Or 276, 283-284, 142 P 558,
143 P 929 (1914), we held that a description in a
warrant was sufficient if, with the instrument before
him, 'a surveyor, either with or without the aid of
extrinsic evidence, could locate the premises with
reasonable certainty.'  This language, if it ever had
any utility in defining the constitutional requirements
of a warrant, appears to have outlived its usefulness
and should be overruled.  The relevant inquiry is
whether a police officer can execute the warrant
without straying into premises which he has no
authority to enter."
Nonetheless, in Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or at 35, the court again
utilized the "reasonable certainty" wording from Smith.  See also
State v. Ingram, 313 Or 139, 144-45, 831 P2d 674 (1992) (quoting
and applying that wording from Blackburn/Barber in context of
construing statutory particularity requirement); State v. Reid,
319 Or 65, 70-71, 872 P2d 416 (1994) (applying Ingram).

8. 	Cortman and the cases cited and relied upon therein
demonstrate that the phrase "reasonable effort," 251 Or at 568-69, refers to minimal police effort in conjunction with the
warrant, as opposed to extensive effort, to ascertain which of
unanticipated multiple residences is the intended object of the
search (or to ascertain otherwise the specific location of the
intended premises).  Compare Siverson, 149 Or at 328 (because
warrant did not name person to be searched, police could not
determine with reasonable effort which of multiple residences was
intended to be searched); and Smith, 72 Or at 282-84 (court
invalidated warrant that did not describe property to be
searched; no minimal reasonable effort could have assisted
police); with Cortman, 251 Or at 568-69 (officer permissibly
utilized personal knowledge, independent of wording in warrant,
concerning location of defendant's apartment within multi-unit
building, rendering warrant sufficiently particularized); United
States v. Pisano, 191 F Supp 861, 863 (SDNY 1961) (warrant listed
address as "129 W. 3rd," instead of "109 W. 3rd"; police
permissibly used reasonable effort to locate intended premises,
consisting in part of personal knowledge of its correct location,
rendering warrant sufficient under Fourth Amendment); and People
v. Estrada, 234 Cal App 2d 136, 144-49, 44 Cal Rptr 165, 170-74
(1965) (warrant named defendant and listed address of multi-unit
building; police searched only defendant's apartment after
learning its precise location from defendant; court concluded
that description sufficient under state and federal constitutions
because executing officers could identify intended premises
"without confusion or excessive effort").

9. 	After reviewing the record, we agree with the Court of
Appeals dissent's conclusion respecting defendants' failure to
preserve that argument or to raise it on appeal.  179 Or App at
213-14, 214 n 1 (Deits, C. J., dissenting).