Title: Andrews v. Waste Control, Inc.

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

409 So. 2d 707 (1982) James ANDREWS, Z.B. Fry, Tommy Akers, Carl Kelly and John Ferguson, Supervisors of Warren County, Mississippi, Paul Barrett, Sheriff, Otto Brannan, Justice of the Peace District # 5 v. WASTE CONTROL, INC. No. 53225. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 3, 1982. *708 Ellis, Braddock & Bost, Gerald E. Braddock, Vicksburg, for appellants. Varner & Parker, R.E. Parker, Jr., David M. Sessums, Vicksburg, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and BROOM and DAN M. LEE, JJ. DAN M. LEE, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal from the Chancery Court of Warren County wherein the Warren County Board of Supervisors, Paul Barrett, the Sheriff of Warren County, and Otto Brannan, respondents/appellants, were enjoined from enforcing a resolution passed on September 7, 1976, which restricted maximum weight of vehicles traveling on Halls Ferry Road, Warren County, Mississippi, to 30,000 pounds. The chancellor found the resolution and ordinance arbitrary and unreasonable in that the board of supervisors failed to follow the statutory guidelines of Mississippi Code Annotated section 65-7-45 (1972) as to both load limits and tire widths. Aggrieved of these findings, appellants prosecuted this appeal with supersedeas and assign the following errors: 1. The lower court erred in overruling appellants' demurrers. *709 2. The lower court erred in overruling appellants' motion at the conclusion of appellee's case to exclude the evidence of appellee and dismiss appellee's bill and enter judgment for appellants. 3. The decree of the lower court ordering the issuance of a prohibitory injunction was contrary to the law and evidence and the decree of the lower court was an abuse of discretion and manifest error. 4. The lower court erred in refusing to sustain appellants' pleas in bar. 5. The lower court erred in finding the ordinance of the Board of Supervisors of Warren County, Mississippi, was enacted without authority of law, and in decreeing that a prohibitory injunction issue. Waste Control, Inc. (appellee) is in the business of hauling and disposing of waste products from various commercial and industrial establishments in Warren County. Since 1975 Waste has been hauling refuse for U.S. Rubber and depositing it on the private property owned by Herbert A. Downey, who is also the president of Waste Control, Inc., which property is located at the south end of Halls Ferry Road. The refuse is transported in an 18-wheeled vehicle weighing approximately 30,000 pounds empty and 57,000 pounds fully loaded. On September 7, 1976, the board adopted a resolution imposing a 30,000-pound weight limit to prevent damage and protect Halls Ferry Road. Although Jimmy Andrews, a member of the board of supervisors and one of the appellants here, did not personally know whether any tests were conducted, he asserted that the weight restriction was based on recommendation from an engineer. Andrews could not relate a similar road to Halls Ferry with 30,000-pound weight limit and admitted it was the only road in the county with a 30,000-pound limit except for 20,000-pound limits over certain bridges in the county. Waste received citations for exceeding the weight limit on Halls Ferry Road on September 22, 1976, January 11, 1981, and January 21, 1981. Witnesses asserted that others traversed Halls Ferry Road frequently exceeding the weight restriction and without receiving citations. In any event, Waste has continued to use the road without regard to the 30,000-pound weight limit in hauling refuse from the plant operated by U.S. Rubber. At the conclusion of the hearing, the chancellor found the weight restriction arbitrary and unreasonable in that the board failed to follow the statutory guidelines of Mississippi Code Annotated section 65-7-45 (1972) and "further, that the resolution in question deals with the singular issue of weight limits, whereas Section 65-7-51 specifies that the authority delegated by the legislature to the prospective boards of supervisors deals with, not the singular power to limit weights, but the combination of tire widths and weights, and the regulation in question therefore, does not come within the purported authority granted by the legislature in that it tends to limit maximum weights only." The first assignment of error is that the court erred in overruling appellants' demurrers. There were seven demurrers filed, one for each of the members of the board of supervisors and one for the sheriff and the justice court judge. These demurrers were identical as to their grounds, as follows: "Petitioner's petition for injunction states no cause of action against the respondent and there is no equity on the face of the petition, and the petition for injunction of petitioner, Waste Control, Inc., should be dismissed with prejudice at the cost of the petitioner, Waste Control, Inc." The learned chancellor overruled these demurrers and this Court is unable to find error thereasto because the rule is that all things pled in the petition must be taken as true and the sole question is, does the petition allege a cause of action? We cannot say that the petition, if taken as true, did not allege a cause of action. Ward v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 394 So. 2d 1374 (Miss. 1981); Downs v. Corder, 377 So. 2d 603 (Miss. 1979); Ervin v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, 365 So. 2d 1208 (Miss. 1978); and Robinson v. Martel Enterprises, Inc., 337 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1976). *710 Perhaps it would be more concise for this Court to consider assignments of error No. 1 and No. 4 together because they raise jurisdictional questions. No. 1 states that there is no equity on the face of the petition, and Assignment No. 4 says, the court erred in refusing to sustain appellants' pleas in bar. The first plea in bar was that the chancery court had no jurisdiction. The very able brief of appellants presents the question of jurisdiction of the chancery court in actions which should be confined to the law courts, particularly the criminal courts. The question of jurisdiction of the chancery court to enjoin the board of supervisors from enforcing what is contended to be an invalid ordinance or resolution of the board, and further to enjoin the sheriff and the justice court judge from issuing citations and imposing a criminal penalty, is very well argued in appellants' brief. Jurisdiction, being a threshold question, will be disposed of first. The jurisdiction of the chancery court to enjoin the prosecution of criminal law violations is not to be favored and generally the chancery court, a court of equity, should be encouraged to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in such cases. The appellee was given three tickets in violation of the ordinance limiting the weight to 30,000 pounds, one in 1976 and two in 1981. The question here is whether the weight limitation diminishes or deprives appellee of the use of a public road and effectively denies appellee the full use, benefit and enjoyment of his privately-owned real estate used to dump refuse from U.S. Rubber Company under a contractual agreement so as to bring this case within those holding the chancery court has jurisdiction. It is contended by the appellants that the facts in this case are so similar to those in Pleasants v. Smith, 90 Miss. 440, 43 So. 475 (1907), that it is on all fours with the case at bar. Pleasants dealt with the use of a megaphone on the streets of Clarksdale calling attention to the wares of a merchant wherein it was contended that the loud and unusual noises were in violation of the ordinance of Clarksdale prohibiting a willful disturbance of the peace and quiet of said town. This Court affirmed the chancellor, who denied the injunction on jurisdictional grounds, in an opinion by Chief Justice Whitfield, as follows: In Crighton v. Dahmer, 70 Miss. 602, 13 So. 237 (1893), this Court stated: Concluding in Crighton, supra, this Court stated in affirming the chancellor: The relief sought in the petition for injunction of appellee in no wise restricts itself to the enjoining of criminal prosecution but to the contrary, in paragraph VI, that the said ordinance has been unconstitutionally and "illegally enforced solely against the petitioner herein invidiously discriminating against petitioner," denies Waste utilization of the private landfill available to petitioner, denies the use of a portion of Halls Ferry Road from the intersection of Goodrum Road to the terminus of Halls Ferry Road which is approximately 2.8 miles in distance, which must be utilized by Waste to transport and deposit the waste products which it has contracted to remove. In Paragraph XI appellee alleged deprivation of the use of Halls Ferry Road for ingress and egress to the public landfill operated by Warren County Board of Supervisors. The petition further charges that appellee's land would be landlocked, would destroy its business and unless enjoined will cause irreparable damage and destruction of said business. Therefore, the case sub judice falls in a category or class of cases that this Court spoke to in Knight v. Johns, 161 Miss. 519, 137 So. 509 (1931), in which the City of Clarksdale adopted an ordinance forbidding barbershops to be open before 7:30 in the forenoon, and/or to remain open for business after the hour of 6:30 in the afternoon, wherein the chancellor granted an injunction. In Knight the Court said: This Court likewise adhered to the same reasoning in the zoning case of Brooks v. City of Jackson, 211 Miss. 246, 51 So. 2d 274 (1951). The case sub judice involves an alleged discrimination of use of Halls Ferry Road, rights to use the property to the maximum benefit of the owner and other so-called rights. This Court believes that it cannot therefore fit the facts of this case into the rule of law announced by Pleasants, supra, and Crighton, supra, which in effect hold that the injunction sought must have been for the single purpose of enjoining criminal prosecutions. We do not reach a decision specifically defining what are property rights as they relate to the use of Halls Ferry Road because it is not necessary in this case. *712 The next assignments of error are Nos. 2 and 5 which will be treated together for they are relating to the same subject and are treated by the appellants and the appellee in their briefs as Proposition II. Assignment of error No. 2 provides: Assignment of error No. 5 provides: The learned chancellor entered his decree which stated in part as follows: The boards of supervisors of the several counties have full jurisdiction over roads within their counties, except where the legislature designated certain highways as state highways. Mississippi Constitution, Article 6, section 170 (1890) provides: See also Mississippi Code Annotated section 19-3-41 (1972). This grant of jurisdiction must be exercised in accordance with such regulations as the legislature may prescribe, the board of supervisors having no authority other than that delegated to it by the legislature. H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Jackson County, 324 So. 2d 746 (Miss. 1975). The controversy in the present case evolves around the construction of Sections 65-7-43 and 65-7-45. The board contends it has authority to restrict weight loads on county roads by virtue of Section 65-7-43, without regard to tire width as prescribed by Section 65-7-45. Section 65-7-43 was enacted in 1906 and provides: In 1918 the legislature passed what is now Sections 65-7-45 through 67-7-51, inclusive. The act was entitled: Section 65-7-45 provides: This statute is written in the conjunctive rather than disjunctive; therefore, the phrases concerning the tire width and maximum load must be construed jointly, relating to each other. Myrtle v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry Co., 239 Miss. 110, 121 So. 2d 717 (1960). Moreover, this Court has generally stated the several boards of supervisors are held to the strictest limitations of their powers. Adams v. Bank, 103 Miss. 744, 60 So. 770 (1912). They can do valid acts only consistent with such regulations as the legislature may prescribe. H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Jackson County, supra. While Section 65-7-45 provides for publication of the order, Section 65-7-43 does not; however, the board in the present case published its resolution in the manner prescribed by Section 65-7-45. Section 65-7-47 merely prescribes the penalty for violation and is styled "Penalty for violating load and tire regulations." Section 65-7-49 provides for the posting of notices where such regulations have been imposed. Section 65-7-51 provides that the form of such notice be in both tire width and pounds, and follows: When different code sections deal with the same subject matter, these sections are to be construed and interpreted not only so they harmonize with each other but also where they fit into the general and dominant policy of the particular system of which they are part. Ashcraft v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 204 Miss. 65, 36 So. 2d 820 (1948). Courts may also consider the several acts of the legislature touching the subject matter in order to ascertain the legislative intent in the several acts. McAfee v. Southern R. Co., 36 Miss. 669 (1859). In McCrory v. State, 210 So. 2d 877 (Miss. 1968), this Court stated: Based on the foregoing, this Court believes that Sections 65-7-43 and 65-7-45 must be read together with the latter controlling in more particular terms. Therefore, the chancellor was correct in enjoining enforcement of the board's resolution since the weight restriction was imposed without regard to tire width as required by Section 65-7-45. However, nothing contained herein should be construed to limit the board's power to regulate weight limitations over roads within its jurisdiction provided the language of the statute is strictly complied with as to both width of tires and maximum load. There still remains Assignment of Error No. 3 which is, the decree of the lower court ordering the issuance of a prohibitory injunction was contrary to the law and evidence and the decree of the lower court was an abuse of discretion and manifest *714 error. We cannot say from this record that there was manifest error which would be required for us to reverse the chancellor. Cases are legion that a chancery judge is the trier of the facts and this Court cannot reverse unless there is manifest error. Wilson v. Planters Bank of Tunica, 383 So. 2d 1089 (Miss. 1980); O.J. Stanton & Co. v. Mississippi State Hwy. Com'n, 370 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1979). For the foregoing reasons the decree of the Chancery Court of Warren County should be and the same is hereby affirmed without prejudice as to appellants' right to pass a new resolution encompassing both width of tires and maximum load. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and SUGG, P. JJ., and WALKER, BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur.