Title: Thibodeau v. Thibodeau

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Thibodeau v. Thibodeau (2003-558); 178 Vt. 457; 869 A.2d 142

2005 VT 14

[Filed 26-Jan-2005

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 14

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-558

                             DECEMBER TERM, 2004

  Timothy Thibodeau	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Windsor Family Court
                                       }	
  Patricia Thibodeau	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NOS. F501-11-95 WrDmd 
                                       }	and F341-10-95 WrFa

                                                Trial Judge: Amy M. Davenport

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Plaintiff Timothy Thibodeau appeals a family court order that
  denied his motion to terminate a relief from abuse order protecting
  defendant, Patricia Thibodeau, and the parties' two children.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  The parties were once married and have two minor children
  together.  Defendant has had legal and physical parental rights and
  responsibilities for the minor children since she obtained a relief from
  abuse order against plaintiff in October 1995.  After a contested hearing,
  the family court issued a final divorce order on June 11, 1997, and a final
  relief from abuse order on June 20, 1997.  The divorce order found that
  plaintiff had physically abused defendant, and the relief from abuse
  decision reiterated plaintiff's history of violent behavior towards
  defendant and found that plaintiff had also physically abused the children. 
  The relief from abuse decision suspended contact between plaintiff and the
  children until plaintiff engaged in "appropriate mental health counseling
  to include domestic violence counseling, anger management counseling and
  empathy counseling."  The court set the duration of this order as
  "permanent."  Plaintiff never appealed either order.
   
       ¶  3.  Shortly after the orders were issued, defendant moved with
  the children to a place in New York not disclosed to plaintiff.  Plaintiff
  had no contact with the children for five years, although they continued to
  have contact with members of plaintiff's family.  From June 2001 to August
  2002, plaintiff participated in a Batterers Intervention Program (BIP) in
  fulfillment of a probation condition.  In the BIP, "[p]articipants are
  challenged to identify their own thought patterns or belief systems which
  underlie the violent behavior, identify risk factors and develop cognitive
  and behavioral interventions that are non-controlling and non abusive."  In
  July 2002, plaintiff filed motions to restore parent-child contact and to
  review the final relief from abuse order.  Defendant supported plaintiff's
  request to see the children, and the parties entered an agreement for
  plaintiff to have contact with the children supervised by plaintiff's
  brother and father.  The first visit was in August 2002 and appeared to go
  well.  The children had two visits with their father in August 2003, the
  second of which was marked by anger and confrontation.  Plaintiff and his
  brother had an angry confrontation in front of the children during which
  plaintiff invited a physical fight.  Plaintiff also had an argument with
  his father that ended when plaintiff went to the police.  Additionally,
  plaintiff became very angry with the children's guardian ad litem, leaving
  abusive and threatening messages on his telephone.  Following the second
  August visit, the children insisted on sleeping in the same bed as their
  mother and exhibited violent behavior.  Defendant decided that contact with
  their father was detrimental to the children and would not agree to further
  visits.  As a result, the matter was presented to the family court.

       ¶  4.  The court found that plaintiff had not met the requisite
  conditions for renewed contact with his children.  The court was concerned
  with plaintiff's behavior during the second 2003 visit and set specific
  conditions he had to fulfill to restore parental contact.  Further, the
  court found that there was no basis to discontinue the final relief from
  abuse order, but modified it to expire on October 26, 2019. (FN1)  

       ¶  5.  On appeal, plaintiff challenges only the family court
  decision not to terminate the relief from abuse order and claims that the
  court abused its discretion.  Plaintiff characterizes the court's decision
  as an extension of the original relief from abuse order.  Under such
  circumstances,

    the court may extend any order, upon motion of the plaintiff, for
    such additional time as it deems necessary to protect the
    plaintiff, the children, or both, from abuse.  It is not necessary
    for the court to find that abuse has occurred during the pendency
    of the order to extend the terms of the order.

  15 V.S.A. § 1103(d).  Under this language, plaintiff argues that the trial
  court had to find that continuing the order was necessary and the evidence
  did not support such a finding.  
 
       ¶  6.  Defendant responds that plaintiff misconstrues the procedural
  posture of the family court proceeding and resulting order.  Specifically,
  defendant argues that the family court was not extending the original
  relief from abuse order, rather plaintiff was arguing for a modification of
  that order.  Defendant points out that the original order was permanent,
  without an expiration date, and the court did not need to extend it.  Thus,
  defendant claims that plaintiff had to show a substantial change in
  circumstances to modify the order and the court correctly determined that
  plaintiff failed to make any such showing.  We agree with defendant and
  further hold that the court's findings are supported by the evidence, and
  the conclusions were supported by the findings and within the court's
  discretion.

       ¶  7.  The family court is given broad discretion in determining
  questions of fact and we review its findings for clear error.  Begins v.
  Begins, 168 Vt. 298, 301,