Title: ELSIE L. BRAUNSTEIN V. ROBINSON FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP LLP

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ELSIE L. BRAUNSTEIN V. ROBINSON FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP LLP2010 WY 26226 P.3d 826Case Number: S-08-0115Decided: 03/08/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
ELSIE 
L. BRAUNSTEIN,Appellant(Defendant),v.ROBINSON FAMILY 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
LLP,Appellee(Plaintiff)

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Crook County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Paul 
J. Drew and Anita Ann Czapeczka of Drew Law Office, P.C., Gillette, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Max 
Main of Bennett, Main & Gubbrud, P.C., Belle Fourche, South 
Dakota

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]                  
Since the earliest days of settlement and statehood, complaints and 
claims of adverse possession have occupied much of the time of the courts of 
Wyoming.  Once again we are 
requested to grapple within that arena . . . .

 
 

Snell 
v. Ruppert, 
582 P.2d 916, 917 (Wyo. 1978).

 
 
[¶2]      Today, we 
consider the appeal of Elsie L. Braunstein (Braunstein), record owner of several 
parcels of land totaling 615.8 acres adjacent to ranch lands owned by the 
Robinson Family Limited Partnership LLP (Robinson) near Moorcroft, Crook County, 
Wyoming.  Braunstein appeals the 
district court's order granting summary judgment to Robinson on its adverse 
possession complaint seeking title to Braunstein's several parcels of 
land.

 
 
[¶3]      Because we find 
that most of the evidentiary materials submitted by Robinson in support of its 
summary judgment motion are legally insufficient under the requirements of 
W.R.C.P. 56 and our summary judgment case law, and fail to show the absence of 
genuine issues of material fact associated with the elements of the claim of 
adverse possession, and because issues in this case raise important questions 
about the application of Wyoming's "fence-out" doctrine in the context of an 
adverse possession claim, which questions require substantial factual 
development before they can be addressed, we reverse the district court's order 
granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶4]      The dispositive 
issue in this case is whether Robinson properly supported its motion for summary 
judgment as required by W.R.C.P. 56 and our summary judgment case 
law.

 
 

BACKGROUND 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      The principal 
allegations of Robinson's complaint seeking quiet title by adverse possession 
identified the property in question as the E½SW¼  of Section 2, the NW¼ of Section 11, and 
the E½NE¼ and S½ (less State Highway of 24.2 acres) of Section 14, Township 49 
North, Range 67 West, 6th P.M., Crook County, Wyoming, and 
averred:

 
 
4.

 
 
            
Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest have had hostile, actual, 
open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of the property under a 
claim of right for more than ten (10) years last past.  During all of such time, plaintiff and 
its predecessors have enclosed the property with fence and have grazed their 
livestock on the property.

 
 
5.

 
 
            
Defendants claim an estate or interest in the property adverse to 
plaintiff.  Defendants' claim is 
without any right whatever, and defendants have no estate, right, title, or 
interest in or to the property, or any part of the property.  

 
 
[¶6]      Braunstein filed 
her answer which admitted she claimed an estate or interest in the property 
adverse to Robinson and which denied each and every other allegation in the 
complaint. In her answer she also pleaded a counterclaim alleging she was the 
owner and entitled to possession of the property in question. Robinson filed its 
reply to that counterclaim denying those allegations, alleging the ten-year 
statutory bar under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §  
1-3-103, and alleging estoppels, laches, and waivers. 

 
 
[¶7]      With the issues 
thus joined by the pleadings, the parties engaged in discovery.  Without addressing at this point in the 
opinion either the substantive sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence 
developed in that discovery, we can say that the parties generally agree for 
background purposes that Braunstein is the record owner of and has paid the 
property taxes assessed against the property and Robinson claims satisfaction of 
the several elements of adverse possession with respect to that 
property.

 
 
[¶8]      On May 18, 2006, 
Braunstein filed her motion for summary judgment with accompanying evidentiary 
materials.  Robinson opposed that 
motion.  On October 19, 2006, the 
district court filed its decision letter in which it announced that Braunstein 
"has failed to demonstrate that there are no material issues of fact and that 
[she] is due judgment as a matter of law.  
Accordingly, each party's motion for summary judgment is denied."  The district court's order was filed on 
November 15, 2006.

 
 
[¶9]      On December 3, 
2007, Robinson filed its motion for summary judgment with accompanying 
evidentiary materials.  Those 
evidentiary materials were:

 
 

1.    
Alden 
C. Robinson's June 23, 2006, affidavit.

 
 

2.    
Justen 
T. Robinson's June 23, 2006, affidavit.

 
 

3.    
Justen 
T. Robinson's Second Affidavit dated November 13, 2007.

 
 

4.    
Donald 
D. Zacher's October 24, 2007, affidavit.

 
 

5.    
June 
9, 1976, Quitclaim Deed conveying the property to Melvin A. Braunstein and Elsie 
L. Braunstein.

 
 

6.    
Defendant 
Elsie L. Braunstein's Answers to Plaintiff's First 
Interrogatories.

 
 

7.    
The 
Robinson conveyances of the family ranch lands surrounding the 
property.

 
 

8.    
Elsie 
L. Braunstein's deposition.  

 
 
[¶10]   On May 21, 2008, the district court 
filed its order granting summary judgment in Robinson's favor, which order 
incorporated by reference the district court's decision letter which had been 
filed on April 9, 2008.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   As noted above, Braunstein filed a 
motion for summary judgment which the district court denied, and more than six 
months later Robinson filed its motion for summary judgment.  In the district court's decision letter 
announcing its grant of Robinson's motion, it stated:

 
 
Preliminarily, 
the court notes that the issues presented in the motion are not wholly distinct 
from those addressed in the first motion for summary judgment filed by 
[Braunstein].  However, the court 
has determined to treat the current motion in the vein of a cross-motion to that 
of [Braunstein].  Certain details 
and facts have been expanded upon and clarified.  The court will, therefore, re-evaluate 
both motions based on the evidence presented by each party to date. 

 
 
In 
State v. Homar, 798 P.2d 824 (Wyo. 
1990), this Court was faced with a similar situation where all of the parties 
had filed motions for summary judgment but the district court had granted only 
one of them.  Id. at 825.  Stating that we were reviewing only the 
propriety of the district court's granting the Homars' motion for summary 
judgment, we explained:

 
 
The 
fact that all parties filed motions for summary judgment does not require the 
trial court to grant any of the motions and preclude the need for a trial.   10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Civil 2d § 2720, pp. 16-25 
(1983).  Second, the denial of a 
summary judgment motion is not reviewable as it is not a final order.   Kimbley v. City of Green River, 663 P.2d 871, 888 (Wyo.1983); see W.R.A.P. 
1.04 and 1.05.   Thus, our 
review of a grant of a summary judgment motion is the same whether the review is 
of a grant of the first motion filed or of a cross-motion.  See, e.g., Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1988).  The propriety 
of the court's granting the Homars' motion for summary judgment is reviewed in 
this appeal.

 
 

Homar, 
798 P.2d  at 825-26.

 
 
[¶12]   In the appeal before us now, we 
make it clear that we are reviewing only the propriety of the district court's 
granting Robinson's motion for summary judgment.

 
 
[¶13]   All courts and practicing attorneys 
in this state know that summary judgment procedure is governed by Rule 56 of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.  
This Court's cases are legion in which we discuss and explain the 
application of the important legal principles contained in that rule to all 
manner of claims litigated in our courts.  
In the case before us, Robinson is the party seeking to recover on its 
adverse possession claim and, under Rule 56(a), it has moved with supporting 
affidavits, a deposition, answers to interrogatories, and other material for a 
summary judgment in its favor upon that claim.  As Rule 56(c) provides, "[t]he judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories . . . together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law."  
Because Robinson has supported its motion with affidavits, Rule 56(e) 
becomes applicable.  That provision 
requires that supporting affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein.  Sworn or certified copies 
of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith."  We 
require that "[t]he material presented to the trial court as a basis for a 
summary judgment should be as carefully tailored and professionally correct as 
any evidence which is admissible to the court at the time of trial."  Newton v. Misner, 423 P.2d 648, 650 
(Wyo. 1967); see also White v. Woods, 2009 WY 29A, ¶ 18, 208 P.3d 597, 602 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶14]   In many cases we have found summary 
judgment material that failed this requirement.  See, e.g., Bangs v. Schroth, 2009 WY 20, 
201 P.3d 442 (Wyo. 2009) (affidavit insufficient for failing to state specific 
facts, for stating only categorical assertions of ultimate facts without 
specific supporting facts, and for failing to attach sworn or certified copies 
of papers referred to in affidavit); Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 
(Wyo. 1987) (same); Western Surety Co. v. 
Town of Evansville, 675 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 1984) (affidavit containing 
significant opinions and conclusions that may be critical in the outcome of the 
case must reveal the underlying facts and basis and must have attached documents 
referred to in affidavit); Blackmore v. 
Davis Oil Co., 671 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1983) (conclusory affidavit which does not 
contain specific facts indicating presence or absence of genuine issue of 
material fact is inadequate); Bancroft v. 
Jagusch, 611 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1980) (bald conclusion type statement that party 
is or is not negligent contends for the ultimate issue to be decided by the fact 
finder and is inadmissible in evidence at trial); Keller v. Anderson, 554 P.2d 1253 (Wyo. 
1976) (affidavit containing only affiant's conclusions and hearsay unsupported 
by competent material factual statements cannot be used by court in disposing of 
summary judgment motion); and see also Rizkallah v. Conner, 952 S.W.2d 580, 586-88 (Tex. App. 1997), for informative discussion of insufficient 
affidavit containing conclusory statements, subjective opinion, and 
objectionable legal conclusions lacking specific facts.

 
 
[¶15]   Rule 56(e) further provides that if 
the movant has made and supported its motion as required, "an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings," but that 
party's response, "by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."  However, the non-moving party has no 
obligation to counter the motion with materials beyond the pleadings until the 
movant has made a prima facie showing that genuine issues of material fact do 
not exist.  Bangs, ¶ 20, 201 P.3d  at 452.  Because the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure were adopted to promote an orderly and efficient means for handling 
and disposing of litigation, "[c]ompliance with these rules of procedure in 
summary judgment matters is mandatory."  
Platt v. Creighton, 2007 WY 
18, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 1194, 1199 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶16]   We have well-established standards 
for reviewing a district court's order granting summary 
judgment:

 
 
We 
treat the summary judgment movant's motion as though it has been presented 
originally to us.  We use the same 
materials in the record that was before the district court.  Using the materials in the record, we 
examine them from the vantage point most favorable to the nonmoving party 
opposing the motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences 
which may fairly be drawn from the materials.   

 
 

Bangs, 
¶ 20, 201 P.3d  at 452 (internal citations omitted).  "Summary judgment is a drastic remedy 
designed to pierce the formal allegations and reach the merits of the 
controversy, but only where no genuine issue of material fact is present."  Mathisen v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 
2007 WY 161, ¶ 9, 169 P.3d 61, 64 (Wyo. 2007).  Our appellate review is de novo with no 
deference afforded the district court's determinations. Bangs, ¶ 20, 201 P.3d  at 452.  With respect to the term "genuine issue 
of material fact," we have said:

 
 
Materiality 
of a fact depends upon it having some legal significance so that it establishes 
or refutes some essential element of a cause of action or defense asserted by 
one of the parties. In any given case, the materiality of any facts is limited 
by the pertinent legal standard[s] for the asserted claim and for the 
corresponding defenses to that claim.   

 
 

Roussalis 
v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 
4 P.3d 209, 228 (Wyo. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶17]   In the present case, the 
materiality of any facts is limited by the essential elements of Robinson's 
asserted claim of adverse possession.  
Those elements are well-established in our jurisprudence:  

 
 
In 
order to establish adverse possession, the claiming party must show actual, 
open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of another's property which 
is hostile and under claim of right or color of title.  Rutar Farms & Livestock, Inc. v. 
Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 1982); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 
494, 502, 273 P. 908, 910 (1929).  
Possession must be for the statutory period, ten years.  W.S. 1-3-103 
(1988).

 
 

Hillard 
v. Marshall, 
888 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Wyo. 1995).  We 
have further observed:

 
 
[T]here 
is a presumption in favor of the record title holder which can be rebutted if 
the adverse possession claimant makes, in the absence of explanatory 
circumstances to the contrary, a prima 
facie case of adverse possession, whereupon the burden shifts back to the 
record title holder who must produce evidence contrary to the presumption by 
showing that the claimant's possession was permissive.  If the title holder can do that, then it 
becomes a question of weight and credibility to be determined by the trier of 
fact.

 
 

Id. 
at 1261.  One cannot acquire title 
by adverse possession, however, if its use of the property is shown to be 
permissive.  Id. at 1259.

 
 
[¶18]   Many of the adverse possession 
cases from this Court and the courts of our sister states have identified 
certain material facts associated with these elements.  A non-exhaustive list would 
include:

 
 
1.         
An adverse possession claimant's failure to pay taxes on the disputed 
property, while not conclusive, is a fact to be weighed along with the other 
circumstances in the case and tends to weaken a claim of ownership by adverse 
possession.  Cook v. Eddy, 2008 WY 111, ¶ 22, 193 P.3d 705, 712 (Wyo. 2008) (bench trial); Turner v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, 
Inc., 769 P.2d 364, 368 (Wyo. 1989) (bench trial); Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 937 (Wyo. 
1983) (bench trial); Rutar Farms & 
Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1135 (Wyo. 1982) (bench 
trial).

 
 
2.         
The failure of an adverse possession claimant and its ancestors to 
execute any title instruments affecting the disputed property although they did 
execute such instruments affecting the property held by them under their deed is 
a fact to be weighed along with the other circumstances in the case.  Rutar Farms, 651 P.2d  at 1135 (bench 
trial); Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 
340-41 (Wyo. 1966) (bench trial); Tissino 
v. Mavrakis, 67 Wyo. 560, 587, 228 P.2d 106, 116 (Wyo. 1951) (bench 
trial).  

 
 
3.         
Whether an adverse possession claimant or its ancestors told anyone that 
they claimed the disputed property as their own or whether that claim was well 
known in the community are facts to be weighed along with the other 
circumstances in the case.  Rutar Farms, 651 P.2d  at 1134 (bench 
trial); Meyer, 411 P.2d  at 343 (bench 
trial).

 
 
4.         
The presence, quality, location, and purpose of fencing in relation to 
the disputed property and property adjacent to it are facts to be weighed along 
with the other circumstances in the case.  
"A fence enclosing land may be sufficient under some circumstances, and 
not under others . . . . In case of doubt, the question must be submitted to 
[the trier of fact] . . . ."  City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 
494, 517-18, 273 P. 908, 916 (1929).  
See also Rutar Farms, 651 P.2d  at 1134 (bench 
trial); Shores v. Lindsay, 591 P.2d 895, 901-02 (Wyo. 1979) (bench trial).  
There are cases involving fences of convenience which raise the question 
of permissive use which would defeat a claim of adverse use.  See, e.g., Addison v. 
Dallerosa-Handrich, 2007 WY 110, 161 P.3d 1089 (Wyo. 2007) (bench trial); Gillett v. White, 2007 WY 44, 153 P.3d 911 (Wyo. 2007) (summary judgment); Davis 
v. Chadwick, 2002 WY 157, 55 P.3d 1267 (Wyo. 2002) (bench trial); Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303 (Wyo. 
1999) (bench trial); Hillard v. 
Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1995) (bench trial); and Turner v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, 
Inc., 769 P.2d 364 (Wyo. 1989) (bench trial).  There are cases involving casual or 
incidental fences which suggest permissive use and cases involving intentional 
or designed fences which suggest hostile use.  See, e.g., DeArman v. Surls, 618 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (jury trial); McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136 
(Tex. 1971) (jury trial); Wortham v. 
Nevins, 383 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (bench trial) (cited in Shores, 591 P.2d  at 902 n.2); Orsborn v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 267 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1954) (bench trial).

 
 
5.         
The purpose and type of fencing (for convenience, casual or designed) 
becomes an important factual issue when an adverse possession claimant uses the 
disputed property for grazing livestock.  
In Wyoming and other western states the "fence-out" doctrine has long 
prevailed as recognized in the following passage in Martin v. Platte Valley Sheep Co., 12 
Wyo. 432, 450-51, 76 P. 571, 574-75 (1904):

 
 
The 
common law rule requiring the owner of cattle to confine them or in default 
thereof to answer for any damages occasioned by their trespasses upon the lands 
of another is abrogated, or, rather, never obtained, in this State, nor in the 
other western states.  Indeed, that 
rule was either not adopted or has been abrogated by statute in a number of 
other states, notably in Virginia, West Virginia, Mississippi and Texas, and at 
times in the history of some of the states of the east and middle west, a 
different rule was held to obtain either in consequence of custom or necessity, 
or the express provision of statute.  

 
 
In 
this State cattle are permitted to run at large; and the principle in force here 
is that no actionable trespass is committed when domestic animals lawfully at 
large wander upon and depasture the unenclosed lands of a private owner.  (Cosgriff v. Miller, 10 Wyo. 190[, 68 P. 206 (1902)]; State v. Johnson, 7 Wyo. 
512[, 54 P. 502 (1898)]; Hecht v. 
Harrison, 5 Wyo. 279[, 40 P. 306 (1895)]).  But it is well settled that this 
principle will not permit the owner of such animals to wilfully and knowingly 
drive them upon the premises of another, although unenclosed.  (Cosgriff v. Miller, supra, and cases cited.)  Under the operation of the principle 
aforesaid, it is incumbent upon a land owner, in order to prevent domestic 
animals lawfully at large from wandering and trespassing thereon, to properly 
enclose his land; but if he allows it to remain unenclosed, and the cattle of 
others, lawfully at large, wander upon and depasture it, the owner of such 
cattle will not be guilty of an actionable trespass.   

 
 

See 
also R.O. Corp. v. John H. Bell Iron Mountain Ranch Co., 
781 P.2d 910, 912 (Wyo. 1989) (owner of unfenced pasture that is enclosed by 
neighbor's pasture cannot recover depasture damages caused by neighbor's cattle 
that roamed freely from neighbor's pasture onto owner's unfenced pasture); Garretson v. Avery, 26 Wyo. 53, 60, 176 P. 433, 434 (1918); Hardman v. King, 
14 Wyo. 503, 509-10, 85 P. 382, 383-84 (1906); Haskins v. Andrews, 12 Wyo. 458, 471-72, 
76 P. 588, 590 (1904); and Cosgriff Bros. 
v. Miller, 10 Wyo. 190, 220-21, 68 P. 206, 211 (1902).  See England v. Hing, 459 P.2d 498, 
501-02 (Ariz. 1969) (owners of large acreage ranch that is fenced around its 
exterior boundary whose cattle roam freely and graze on unfenced mining claims 
lying within the ranch's exterior fence not entitled to adverse possession title 
where "fence-out" doctrine prevails); De 
Las Fuentes v. Macdonell, 20 S.W. 43, 44 (Tex. 1892) (same); and Jennifer E. 
Starr, Comment, Casual and Designed 
Enclosures: How Texas Courts Determine Adverse Possession, 44 Baylor L. Rev. 
921 (1992).

 
 
6.         
In cases in which the adverse possession claimant rests its claim on the 
grazing of livestock on the disputed property, material facts include whether 
the property is suitable for grazing and pasturage, whether the grazing 
livestock were placed on the adverse claimant's own lands and then roamed freely 
or strayed onto the disputed property or whether the adverse claimant purposely 
drove its livestock onto the disputed property and kept them there each year 
during the full period of the growing season, whether the adverse claimant 
pastured its grazing livestock on the disputed property sporadically or for the 
full period of each growing season, whether the disputed property was separately 
enclosed with its own fence and the adverse claimant placed its grazing 
livestock within that fenced enclosure, and the number of such grazing livestock 
using the disputed property for the full period of each growing season.  See, e.g., Davis, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d  at 1271 
(bench trial); Hillard, 888 P.2d  at 
1260-61 (bench trial); Turner, 769 P.2d  at 368 (bench trial); Rutar 
Farms, 651 P.2d  at 1132-34 (bench trial); Farella v. Rumney, 649 P.2d 185, 186-87 
(Wyo. 1982) (bench trial); Shores, 
591 P.2d  at 900-02 (bench trial); and 
see McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136 
(Tex. 1971) (jury trial); England v. 
Hing, 459 P.2d 498 (Ariz. 1969) (bench trial); DeArman v. Surls, 618 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1981) (jury trial); Wortham v. 
Nevins, 383 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (bench trial); Orsborn v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 267 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1954) (bench trial).

 
 
[¶19]   Considering the nature and extent 
of the material facts associated with the elements of a claim of adverse 
possession, this Court considers an adverse possession action to be "peculiarly 
factual in nature."  Farella, 649 P.2d  at 186; Snell v. Ruppert, 582 P.2d 916, 917 
(Wyo. 1978).  In Rutar Farms, we noted that the trial 
court's forty findings of fact and seventeen conclusions of law demonstrated "a 
consideration of the complex and vigorously disputed factual issues and of the 
multiple principles of law" involved in an adverse possession action.  651 P.2d  at 1137.  We have recognized that in such actions 
"the possession must be with the intent' to assert such adverse claim against 
the true owner, thus the intention of the parties involved most often is 
controlling with doubtful situations to be submitted to the trier of facts.  The intention may be established by 
words or acts."  Gray v. Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88, 90 (Wyo. 
1978) (internal citations omitted); accord, Rutar Farms, 651 P.2d  at 1135.  We have maintained that "[t]he intent to 
assert an adverse claim must be established by objective evidence, that is there 
must be objective indications of an intent to adversely possess the land of 
another.  Testimony as to the 
claimant's subjective intent does not suffice."  Ferguson v. Ferguson, 739 P.2d 754, 757 
(Wyo. 1987).  In those actions that 
by their nature are factually dependent, appellate review of a grant of summary 
judgment is subject to more exacting scrutiny.  Cornelius v. Powder River Energy Corp., 
Inc., 2007 WY 30, ¶ 10, 152 P.3d 387, 390 (Wyo. 2007).  Our case law is clear that the elements 
of an adverse possession claim and of a prescriptive rights claim are quite 
similar.  See Boykin v. Carbon Cty. Bd. of 
Comm'rs, 2005 WY 158, ¶¶ 14-15, 124 P.3d 677, 681-82 (Wyo. 2005); A.B. Cattle Co. v. Forgey Ranches, Inc., 
943 P.2d 1184, 1188-89 (Wyo. 1997); Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 507 
(Wyo. 1994); Koontz v. Town of 
Superior, 746 P.2d 1264, 1267-68 (Wyo. 1987); Shumway v. Tom Sanford, Inc., 637 P.2d 666, 669 (Wyo. 1981); Gray, 576 P.2d 
at 90-91; and William G. Ackerman and Shane T. Johnson, Comment, Outlaws of the Past: A Western Perspective 
on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 Land & Water L. Rev. 79, 
86-89 (1996) (describing the similarities and differences of the two 
claims).  Such claims are not 
favored in the law.  A.B. Cattle Co., 943 P.2d  at 1189; Mueller, 887 P.2d  at 507; Prazma v. Kaehne, 768 P.2d 586, 589 
(Wyo. 1989).

 
 
[¶20]   For the above and foregoing 
reasons, our appellate review of the district court's grant of summary judgment 
in this case shall proceed with more exacting scrutiny.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶21]   The heart of Robinson's complaint 
is the averment that it "and its predecessors in interest have had hostile, 
actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of the property 
under a claim of right for more than ten (10) years last past.  During all of such time, plaintiff and 
its predecessors have enclosed the property with fence and have grazed their 
livestock on the property."  
Braunstein's answer of general denial had the effect of putting every 
material allegation in that complaint in dispute.  W.R.C.P. 8(b); State Bank of Wheatland v. Bagley Bros., et 
al., 44 Wyo. 456, 13 P.2d 564 (1932); see also Grimsley v. Estate of Spencer, 
670 P.2d 85, 93 (Mont. 1983).  With 
the issues thus joined, it became Robinson's burden to prove those elements of 
adverse possession with admissible evidence of specific facts.  When Robinson filed its motion for 
summary judgment, it was required to submit evidentiary material that was as 
carefully tailored and professionally correct as any evidence which was 
admissible to the court at the time of trial.  We will now examine and evaluate 
Robinson's evidentiary materials according to that requirement in light of our 
previous identification of the material facts associated with the elements of an 
adverse possession claim.1

 
 

1.         
Affidavit of Alden C. Robinson dated June 23, 2006 

 
 
[¶22]   This affidavit 
states:

 
 

1.            
I 
am one of the general partners of ROBINSON FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
LLP.

 
 

2.            
I 
was born November 9, 1923 in Moorcroft, Wyoming.

 
 

3.            
I 
grew up on the family ranch in Crook County.  I graduated from Moorcroft high 
school.  While growing up on the 
family ranch, I helped with all ranching work, including fencing and moving and 
working livestock.  I lived 
continuously on the family ranch until 1994, when my wife, Effie, and I moved to 
the town of Moorcroft, Wyoming.  The 
Moorcroft city limits border our family ranch.

 
 

4.            
The 
family ranch lands are adjacent to the property described in the complaint in 
this matter (the "property").  While 
I was growing up on the family ranch and helping with the ranch work, we openly 
claimed the property as our own and continuously possessed and used it as our 
own by enclosing the property with our fences and grazing our livestock on 
it.  We did not allow anyone else to 
use the property.  Our claim to the 
property, and our possession and use of it, were known in the 
community.

 
 

5.            
In 
1957, my brother, Lucian H. Robinson, Jr., and I purchased the family ranch 
lands from our father's estate.  My 
brother and I continued to openly claim the property as our own, and 
continuously possessed and used it as our own by enclosing the property with our 
fences and grazing our livestock on it.  
We did not allow anyone else to use the property.  Our claim to the property, and our 
possession and use of it, were known in the community.

 
 

6.            
I 
acquired my brother's one-half (½) of the family ranch lands in 1961.  I continued openly claiming the property 
as my own, and continuously possessed and used it as my own by enclosing the 
property with my fences and grazing my livestock on it.  I did not allow anyone else to use the 
property.  My claim to the property, 
and my possession and use of it, were known in the 
community.

 
 

7.            
In 
1992, my wife, Effie, and I, conveyed title to the family ranch lands to our 
revocable trusts.  Through our 
trusts, we continued openly claiming the property as our own, and continuously 
possessed and used it as our own by enclosing the property with our fences and 
grazing our livestock on it.  We did 
not allow anyone else to use the property.  
Our claim to the property, and our possession and use of it, were known 
in the community.

 
 

8.            
Our 
family formed the Robinson Family Limited Partnership LLP (the "partnership") in 
November 2001, and my wife, Effie, and I conveyed the family ranch lands to the 
partnership.  The partnership 
continued openly claiming the property as its own, and continuously possessed 
and used it as its own by enclosing the property with its fences and grazing its 
livestock on it.  The partnership 
did not allow anyone else to use the property.  The partnership's claim to the property, 
and its possession and use of the property, were known in the 
community.

 
 

9.            
When 
the family ranch lands were conveyed, it was always my intent to include all the 
lands we were possessing, using, and claiming as our own, including the 
property.  Any omission of the 
description of the property from the conveyances was 
inadvertent.

 
 

10.         
When 
paying the real estate taxes on the family ranch lands, it was always my intent 
to pay the taxes for all the lands we were possessing, using, and claiming as 
our own, including the property.  
The total yearly real estate tax we pay on the family ranch lands is 
approximately $6467.  On information 
and belief, the yearly real estate tax on the property is approximately 
$140.  Any failure on our part to 
pay the real estate taxes on the property was inadvertent.

 
 
[¶23]   This affidavit is insufficient in 
several respects.  In paragraphs 4 
through 8, the affiant states that for more than ten years "we" (paragraph 4), 
"my brother and I" (paragraph 5), "I" (paragraph 6), "our trusts" (paragraph 7), 
and "the partnership" (paragraph 8)

 
 
openly 
claim[ed] the [disputed] property as our own, and continuously possessed and 
used it as our own by enclosing the [disputed] property with our fences and 
grazing our livestock on it.  We did 
not allow anyone else to use the [disputed] property.  Our claim to the [disputed] property, 
and our possession and use of it, were known in the 
community.

 
 
The 
substance of these paragraphs is virtually identical to and no more than a 
restatement of the principal allegation of paragraph four of Robinson's 
complaint:

 
 
            
Plaintiff and its predecessors in interest have had hostile, actual, 
open, notorious, exclusive, and continuous possession of the property under a 
claim of right for more than ten (10) years last past.  During all of such time, plaintiff and 
its predecessors have enclosed the property with fence and have grazed their 
livestock on the property.

 
 
These 
affidavit paragraphs are only categorical assertions of ultimate facts without 
specific supporting facts.  They are 
mere statements of the elements of an adverse possession claim, without any 
evidence of the specific material facts associated with those elements.  For example, these paragraphs contain no 
specific facts describing the location, quality, and purpose (casual or 
intentional) of the fencing and who built it.  There are no specific facts informing 
the Court whether the fencing surrounds only the exterior of the Robinson family 
ranch lands within which is located the unfenced disputed property or whether 
Robinson separately enclosed the disputed property within a fence.  There are no specific facts describing 
the geographical location of the Robinson family ranch lands in relation to the 
disputed property.  There are no 
specific facts informing us of the acreage of the Robinson family ranch 
lands.  There are no specific facts 
explaining and describing in what ways the affiant or his family members did not 
allow anyone else to use the disputed property  what did they do and when.  With respect to grazing livestock, there 
are no specific facts concerning the type and number of livestock, whether that 
livestock was placed on the Robinson family ranch lands and allowed to roam and 
stray freely onto the disputed property or whether that livestock was 
intentionally driven to, placed on, and purposely kept on the disputed 
property.  There are no specific 
facts stating whether the grazing livestock were purposely placed on the 
disputed property each year during the full period of the growing season.  The last sentence in each of the 
paragraphs 4 through 8, "our claim to the property, and our possession and use 
of it, were known in the community," is inadmissible subjective belief and 
opinion having no factual basis.

 
 
[¶24]   In paragraph 9, the affiant refers 
to the conveyances of the Robinson family ranch lands but does not state that 
the disputed property was included in those conveyances.  As we noted earlier, the failure of an 
adverse possession claimant and its ancestors to execute any title instruments 
affecting the disputed property, although they did execute title instruments 
affecting their deeded land, is a fact to be weighed by the trier of fact along 
with the other circumstances in the case.  
Affiant's statements about his intent to include the disputed property in 
conveyances of the family ranch lands and about inadvertent omission of the 
disputed property's description in such conveyances are inadmissible 
self-serving subjective opinion.

 
 
[¶25]   In paragraph 10, the affiant refers 
to the payment of real estate taxes on the Robinson family ranch lands, but does 
not state that he paid the real estate taxes on the disputed property.  As we noted earlier, an adverse 
possession claimant's failure to pay the real estate taxes on the disputed 
property, while not conclusive, is a fact to be weighed along with the other 
circumstances in the case and tends to weaken a claim of ownership by adverse 
possession.  Affiant's statements 
about his intent to pay the taxes on the disputed property and Robinson's 
"inadvertent" failure to pay those taxes are inadmissible self-serving 
subjective opinion.

 
 
[¶26]   We hold that Alden C. Robinson's 
affidavit fails to show the absence of genuine issues of material fact related 
to Robinson's adverse possession claim.

 
 
2.         
Affidavit of Justen T. Robinson dated June 23, 2006 

 
 
[¶27]   This affidavit 
states:

 
 
1.         
I am one of the general partners of ROBINSON FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
LLP.

 
 
2.         
I was born December 11, 1964 in Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 
3.         
I grew up on the family ranch in Crook County.  I graduated from Moorcroft high 
school.  While growing up on the 
family ranch, I helped with all ranching work, including fencing and moving and 
working livestock.  I have lived 
continuously on the family ranch, except for the time I attended college during 
the 1983-84 and 1984-85 school years.

 
 
4.         
The family ranch lands are adjacent to the property described in the 
complaint in this matter (the "property").  
While I was growing up on the family ranch and helping with the ranch 
work, we openly claimed the property as our own and continuously possessed and 
used it as our own by enclosing the property with our fences and grazing our 
livestock on it.  We did not allow 
anyone else to use the property, other than letting our hired man run his cows 
on it.  Our claim to the property, 
and our possession and use of it, were known in the 
community.

 
 
5.         
Our family formed the Robinson Family Limited Partnership LLP (the 
"partnership") in November 2001, and my parents, Alden C. Robinson and Effie B. 
Robinson, conveyed the family ranch lands to the partnership.  The partnership continued openly 
claiming the property as its own, and continuously possessed and used it as its 
own by enclosing the property with its fences and grazing its livestock on 
it.  The partnership did not allow 
anyone else to use the property.  
The partnership's claim to the property, and its possession and use of 
the property, were known in the community.

 
 
6.         
When the family ranch lands were conveyed, it was always our intent to 
include all the lands we were possessing, using, and claiming as our own, 
including the property. Any omission of the description of the property from the 
conveyances was inadvertent.

 
 
7.         
When paying the real estate taxes on the family ranch lands, it was 
always our intent to pay the taxes for all the lands we were possessing, using, 
and claiming as our own, including the property.  The total yearly real estate tax we pay 
on the family ranch lands is approximately $6,467.00.  On information and belief, the yearly 
real estate tax on the property is approximately $140.  Any failure on our part to pay the real 
estate taxes on the property was inadvertent.

 
 
[¶28]   This affidavit, identical in most 
respects to the affidavit of Alden C. Robinson, is, like that one, insufficient 
for the same reasons.  It, too, 
fails to show the absence of genuine issues of material fact related to 
Robinson's adverse possession claim.

 
 

3.         
Justen T. Robinson's Second Affidavit dated November 13, 
2007 

 
 
[¶29]   This affidavit 
states:

 
 
1.         
I am one of the general partners of ROBINSON FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
LLP (the "partnership").

 
 
2.         
Since at least as far back as 1980, there has never been any production 
of oil or gas from the property described in the complaint in this matter (the 
"property").

 
 
3.         
The partnership caused appraisals of the family ranch lands to be 
conducted in 2001 and 2006 for estate planning purposes.  The property is not included in the 
appraisals, because the appraiser used record title to determine the 
descriptions of the lands to be appraised.

 
 
That 
there has been no oil or gas production from the disputed property since at 
least as far back as 1980 does not show the absence of any genuine issue of 
material fact associated with the elements of adverse possession.  Without more factual context, this 
statement has no legal significance. 

 
 
[¶30]   With respect to the family ranch 
land appraisals in 2001 and 2006, the affidavit is inadequate for several 
reasons.  It fails to identify the 
appraiser, fails to state specific facts concerning what that unidentified 
appraiser did and used; and it states a conclusion without any supporting 
specific facts.  The affiant did not 
attach sworn or certified copies of the appraisals or record title referred to 
in the affidavit.  Importantly, the 
affiant admits that the disputed property is not included in the appraisals of 
the family ranch lands, which admission is a fact to be considered along with 
the other facts and circumstances in the case; in this respect, it joins 
Robinson's failures to pay taxes on the disputed property and to include the 
disputed property in title instruments relating to its family ranch lands as 
material facts that tend to weaken a claim of ownership by adverse 
possession.

 
 
4.         
Affidavit of Donald D. Zacher dated October 24, 2007 

 
 
[¶31]   This affidavit 
states:

1.         
I am a licensed abstracter in the State of South Dakota.  I have been licensed in South Dakota 
since October 7, 1999.

 
 
2.         
I have 11 years experience researching and examining real property title 
records.

 
 
3.         
I am not a licensed abstracter in the State of Wyoming; however, I have 
three years experience researching and examining real property title records in 
Wyoming, including Crook County.  I 
research and examine real property title records in Crook County on a regular 
basis.

 
 
4.         
The real property that is the subject of the complaint in this matter is 
described as follows (the "property"): 

 
 

Township 
49 North, Range 67 West, 6th 
P.M.:

Section 
2:     
E½SW¼.

Section 
11:   
NW¼.

Section 
14:   E½NE¼; and S½ (less State 
Highway of 24.2 acres).

 
 
5.         
I have examined the title records regarding the property in the Crook 
County Clerk's Office for the time period from July 8, 1980 through March 4, 
2005, which is the date the Notice of Lis Pendens was recorded in this 
action.  The following are the only 
documents of record during that time period with the names of Melvin A. 
Braunstein, Elsie L. Braunstein, or any other person named Braunstein, on 
them:

 
 
a.         
A June 9, 1980 Oil and Gas Lease granted by Melvin A. Braunstein and 
Elsie Braunstein to L R Company, with a five year term, recorded July 8, 1980 in 
Book 177 Photos, Page 23.  A copy is 
attached and by this reference incorporated herein.

 
 
b.         
A March 1, 1966 Right-of-Way Easement granted by E. L. Braunstein to 
Tri-County Electric Association, recorded May 29, 1981, in Book 184 Photos, Page 
660.  A copy is attached and by this 
reference incorporated herein.

 
 
c.         
An August 8, 1995 Telephone Company Right-of-Way Easement granted by 
Melvin A. Braunstein and Elsie L. Braunstein to R T Communications, Inc., 
recorded February 11, 1997 in Book 349 Photos, Page 197.  A copy is attached and by this reference 
incorporated herein. 

 
 
[¶32]   The affiant fails to state the date 
on which he examined the title records to which he refers.  More importantly, although the affiant 
has attached the referenced documents to his affidavit, those documents are not 
sworn or certified copies as required by W.R.C.P. 56(e).

 
 

5.         
June 9, 1976, Quitclaim Deed conveying the disputed property to Melvin A. 
Braunstein and Elsie L. Braunstein

 
 
[¶33]   Robinson included this document in 
its summary judgment motion submissions, but this document is not a sworn or 
certified copy as required by W.R.C.P. 56(e), and no witness introduced it into 
the record.

 
 
6.         
Defendant Elsie L. Braunstein's Answers to Plaintiff's First 
Interrogatories 

 
 
[¶34]   In Braunstein's answers she 
testified in pertinent part that she and her husband did not cause fencing to be 
done on the disputed property (answer to Interrogatory No. 17); they last ran 
livestock or caused livestock to be run on the disputed property in March of 
2005 (answer to Interrogatory No. 18); no one has ever resided on the disputed 
property (answer to Interrogatory No. 19); she has never traveled to and viewed 
the disputed property (answer to Interrogatory No. 20); her husband never 
traveled to and viewed the property (answer to Interrogatory No. 21); and her 
allegation in paragraph 3 of her counterclaim that plaintiff "keeps [you] ou[t] 
of possession" of the property is based on  
"[t]he plaintiff sued me alleging that the plaintiff owns the property 
and asking the court to enjoin me from entering the property" (answer to 
Interrogatory No. 22).

 
 
[¶35]   We find nothing in these answers 
that shows the absence of any genuine issue of material fact associated with the 
elements of Robinson's adverse possession claim.

 
 

7.         
The Robinson conveyances of the family ranch lands surrounding the 
property

 
 
[¶36]   Robinson included these documents 
in its summary judgment motion submissions, but these documents are not sworn or 
certified copies as required by W.R.C.P. 56(e), and no witness has introduced 
them into the record.

 
 

8.         
Elsie L. Braunstein's deposition 

 
 
[¶37]   In Robinson's memorandum in support 
of its summary judgment motion, there is only limited reference to Braunstein's 
deposition:  

 
 
Elsie 
L. Braunstein has never talked to or corresponded with Alden Robinson, and she 
does not know any members of the Robinson family.  A.53, p.17, lns. 22-25, and p.18, lns. 
7-9, and lns. 18-20.  Likewise, 
Melvin A. Braunstein did not know any members of the Robinson family.  A.54, p.19, lns. 24-25, and p.20, lns. 
1-2.

            
In December 2004, defendant Elsie L. Braunstein caused 50 to 70 horses 
to be turned out on the property and adjacent property owned by 
Robinson.  [no citation to 
Braunstein deposition]  Prior to 
this, the Braunsteins had never used the property, and they had never rented the 
surface to anyone.  A.56, p.30, lns. 
8-12; A.53, p.17, lns. 5-9.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  With respect to the 
underlined statement, we note that Robinson does not cite to Braunstein's 
deposition, and we have carefully read that deposition and find no such 
testimony.  Because we examine 
Braunstein's deposition testimony from the vantage point most favorable to her, 
giving her the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn 
from her testimony, we may reasonably infer that no member of the Robinson 
family, either verbally or in writing, ever informed her or her late husband 
that Robinson was adversely claiming her property until it filed the present 
action.  We find nothing in 
Braunstein's deposition that shows the absence of any genuine issue of material 
fact associated with the elements of Robinson's adverse possession 
claim.

 
 
[¶38]   We have completed our examination 
and evaluation of Robinson's evidentiary materials and have found most of them 
legally insufficient under the requirements of W.R.C.P. 56 and our summary 
judgment case law and have found that taken together they fail to show the 
absence of any genuine issue of material fact associated with the elements of 
Robinson's adverse possession claim.  
Because Robinson has failed to make a prima facie case of adverse 
possession, the presumption in favor of the record title holder Braunstein has 
not been rebutted.  Consequently, 
Braunstein had no obligation to counter Robinson's summary judgment motion with 
materials beyond the pleadings.  We 
reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment to Robinson and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1That Braunstein did not move to strike Robinson's evidentiary materials 
submitted in support of its summary judgment motion does not mean that this 
Court would consider these materials as though they were legally sufficient to 
meet the requirements of W.R.C.P. 56 and our summary judgment case law.  A movant is not relieved of meeting 
those requirements in the absence of a non-movant's objections and motion to 
strike.  Keller v. Anderson, 554 P.2d 1253, 1262 
(Wyo. 1976).