Title: State v. Gregory J. Franklin

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 38 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2426 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Gregory J. Franklin: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Gregory J. Franklin,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 263 Wis. 2d 430, 662 N.W.2d 678 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 1, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 3, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis P. Moroney   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Patrick M. Donnelly, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Eileen W. Pray and Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorneys 
general, with whom on the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, 
attorney general. 
 
 
2004 WI 38 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-2426  
(L.C. No. 
98 CI 4) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Gregory J.  
Franklin: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gregory J. Franklin,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 1, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.    Gregory J. Franklin was 
committed by Milwaukee County Circuit Court according to the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 980, after a jury found him to be a 
sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) 
(1997-98).1  
Franklin claims 
the 
circuit 
court 
committed 
reversible error when it admitted "other acts" evidence, 
contrary to the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  The court 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
00-2426   
 
2 
 
of appeals affirmed.  We accepted review to clarify whether 
§ 904.04(2) applies to evidence offered in ch. 980 commitment 
proceedings to prove that it is substantially probable that the 
respondent will commit acts of sexual violence in the future.2  
We conclude that during a commitment proceeding under ch. 980, 
§ 904.04(2) does not apply to evidence offered to prove that the 
respondent has a mental disorder that makes it substantially 
probable that the respondent will commit acts of sexual violence 
in the future.  Because we also conclude that evidence of prior 
conduct was properly admitted here, we affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In March 1998, the State filed a petition pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980, alleging that Franklin was a sexually 
violent person and that he was within 90 days of release from 
his sentences for sexual assault.3  The State's petition also 
alleged that Franklin had a mental disorder that predisposed him 
to engage in acts of sexual violence.  
¶3 
Prior to trial, Franklin moved to exclude the prior 
acts evidence, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  The evidence 
                                                 
2 The concurrence asserts that "Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) 
is not the focus of this case."  Concurrence, ¶26.  However, 
both the State and Franklin requested that we decide whether 
§ 904.04(2) applied in the context of a ch. 980 proceeding. 
3 Franklin was serving sentences for second-degree sexual 
assault and attempted second-degree sexual assault, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225(2)(a) and 939.32 (1985-86), consecutive to 
an earlier conviction for first-degree sexual assault, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(b) (1979-80).     
No. 
00-2426   
 
3 
 
included Franklin's adult criminal record containing crimes that 
he asserts are unrelated to sexual activity, pre-sentence 
investigation reports, department of corrections conduct reports 
from his periods of incarceration, evidence of his parole 
violations and references to his juvenile record.  The circuit 
court analyzed the evidence pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.01 for 
relevancy; concluded that it was relevant; determined that the 
probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03; and admitted it.  The jury found Franklin a sexually 
violent person, and the circuit court committed him to a secure 
facility.   
¶4 
Franklin appealed the commitment order on a number of 
grounds.4  The court of appeals affirmed.  On the issue of the 
admission of what he characterized as other acts evidence, all 
members of the court of appeals panel agreed that the evidence 
was properly admitted, but each member had a different rationale 
for that conclusion.  The application of Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) 
in this ch. 980 commitment proceeding and the Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
4 Franklin argued on appeal that the State failed to prove 
he lacked the volitional ability to control his dangerous and 
sexually violent behavior; that the circuit court erred in 
admitting the other acts evidence; that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in refusing to give a 
special jury instruction he requested; that the legislative 
changes made to ch.980 violated his due process and equal 
protection rights; and, lastly, that his commitment should be 
reversed in the interest of justice.  State v. Franklin, No. 00-
2426, unpublished slip op. at ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. March 11, 2003).  
Before us Franklin argues only that Wis. Stat. §§ 904.01, 904.03 
and 904.04 were misapplied.   
No. 
00-2426   
 
4 
 
§ 904.01 and Wis. Stat. § 904.03 questions are the issues before 
us. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶5 
This case requires us to construe and apply Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2) in the context of a ch. 980 proceeding.  Statutory 
interpretation and the application of a statute to established 
facts are questions of law that we review de novo.  State ex. 
rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 Wis. 2d 112, 121, 561 N.W.2d 
729, 733 (1997); Stockbridge School Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 
214, 219, 550 N.W.2d 96, 98 (1996);  Minuteman, Inc. v. 
Alexander, 147 Wis. 2d 842, 853, 434 N.W.2d 773, 778 (1989). 
¶6 
However, 
whether 
evidence 
is 
admissible 
is 
a 
discretionary decision of the circuit court.  National Auto 
Truckstops, Inc. v. DOT, 2003 WI 95, ¶12, 263 Wis. 2d 649, 665 
N.W.2d 198; Grube v. Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533, 541-42, 570 N.W.2d 
851 (1997); State v. Oberlander, 149 Wis. 2d 132, 140, 438 
N.W.2d 580 (1989).  We review discretionary decisions under the 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  National Auto 
Truckstops, 263 Wis. 2d 649, ¶12.  
No. 
00-2426   
 
5 
 
B. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2)5 
¶7 
The State is required to prove in a ch. 980 commitment 
that the respondent is "sexually violent" within the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) because the respondent suffers from a 
mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the 
person will engage in acts of sexual violence in the future.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.06.  Here, the State introduced evidence of 
Franklin's past conduct both to show Franklin has a mental 
disorder and that it was substantially probable that he would 
commit acts of sexual violence in the future, thereby meeting 
its burden under § 980.01(7) and § 980.06. 
¶8 
Franklin contends that the admission of evidence of 
his past conduct is prohibited character evidence under Wis. 
Stat. § 904.04(2), which statute he contends is applicable.  The 
State 
asserts, 
among 
other 
arguments, 
that 
because 
the 
definition set out in Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) requires proof for 
assessing the substantial probability of future conduct, rather 
                                                 
5 Because proving the respondent's mental state is an 
essential element of the State's case, it can be argued that the 
respondent's character, itself, is at issue.  Therefore, 
evidence of character, or specific instances of conduct that 
bear on character, may be offered.  See Wis. Stat. § 904.05(2) 
(2001-02).  Section 904.05(2) states, "In cases in which 
character or a trait of character of a person is an essential 
element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made 
of specific instances of the person's conduct."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  This statute does not address the admissibility of such 
character evidence; rather, it addresses methods of proof when 
character is at issue.  7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice, 
Wisconsin Evidence § 405.1 (2d. ed. 2001).  However, because the 
applicability of § 904.05(2) was not fully briefed by the 
parties, we do not further address it. 
No. 
00-2426   
 
6 
 
than 
proof 
offered 
in 
regard 
to 
disputed 
past 
conduct, 
§ 904.04(2) is not part of the analysis for admission of the 
evidence received here. 
¶9 
Given the positions of the parties, this case requires 
us to interpret the use of Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) in the context 
of a ch. 980 proceeding.  As is usual in cases of statutory 
construction, we begin with the language of the statute itself.  
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give 
effect to the legislature's intent.  Angela M.W., 209 Wis. 2d at 
121; Ball v. District No. 4, Area Bd. of Vocational, Technical & 
Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 537-38, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984).  
Unless technical terms are involved, the statutory language is 
given its plain and ordinary meaning.  Angela M.W., 209 Wis. 2d 
at 121; Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 
633, 660 N.W.2d 656.  If that meaning is clear on its face, we 
need go no further, and simply will apply it.  Bruno, 260 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶20; Ball, 117 Wis. 2d at 537-38.  However, if the 
language is ambiguous, we may examine extrinsic sources for 
evidence of legislative intent.  Angela M.W., 209 Wis. 2d at 
121.  Here, although neither party contends that the statute is 
ambiguous in the usual sense of disputing what it means, they do 
disagree about whether it is applicable in a ch. 980 proceeding 
for the evidence received here. 
¶10 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) is known as the "other 
acts" statute and it sets out when certain types of evidence may 
be excluded or admitted.  It provides: 
No. 
00-2426   
 
7 
 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.  
This subsection does not exclude the evidence when 
offered for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
In order to ascertain whether evidence of Franklin's past acts 
is to be evaluated under § 904.04(2), it is helpful to review 
the types of evidence that fall within § 904.04(2) and for what 
purposes use has been restricted or permitted.   
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) evidence may be offered in 
a criminal trial or a civil suit.  State v. Sullivan, 216 
Wis. 2d 768, 783, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998) and Daniel B. Blinka, 
Evidence of Character, Habit and "Similar Acts" in Wisconsin 
Civil Litigation, 73 Marq. L.Rev. 283, 289 (1989).  It has been 
offered to prove the character of a person: (1) for the 
impermissible purpose of implying that the person committed a 
disputed past act6 that is consistent with his or her character, 
or (2) for a permissible purpose, such as showing the person 
                                                 
6 See State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 783, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998) (concluding that a "focus on an accused's character 
magnifies the risk that jurors will punish the accused for being 
a bad person regardless of his or her guilt of the crime 
charged"); see also La Crosse County Dep't of Human Servs. v. 
Tara P., 2002 WI App 84, ¶18, 252 Wis. 2d 179, 643 Wis. 2d 194 
(concluding that "[t]he other acts evidence statute is directed 
at 
preventing 
fact 
finders 
from 
unnecessary 
exposure 
to 
character and propensity evidence in the context of determining 
whether a party committed an alleged act"). 
No. 
00-2426   
 
8 
 
acted with a plan, motive, absence of mistake.7  Its use is 
carefully regulated when the other acts are "bad acts" because 
the admission of such evidence may imply that the defendant is a 
bad person.  Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 292-97, 154 N.W.2d 
557 (1967).  As we said in Whitty, when other acts evidence is 
admitted, there can be "an overstrong tendency" to believe that 
a defendant is guilty of the crime charged simply because he or 
she is the kind of person who is likely to act a certain way, or 
that the defendant should be punished now, not necessarily for 
the crime charged, but because the defendant may have escaped 
punishment for a previous offense.  Id. at 292.  
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Peasley v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 224, 232-33, 265 
N.W.2d 506 (1978) (allowing evidence of defendant's prior drug 
sales to show defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to 
deliver); Haskins v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 408, 412-14, 294 N.W.2d 
25 (1980) (admitting evidence of defendant's earlier felony 
conduct as proof of plan and motive for murder); State v. Pharr, 
115 Wis. 2d 334, 346-47, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983) (allowing 
evidence of other crimes in order to show plan and to provide 
context for the crime charged); State v. Rutchik, 116 Wis. 2d 
61, 68, 341 N.W.2d 639 (1984) (concluding that evidence of 
defendant's previous burglary was admissible to show method of 
operation, preparation, plan, identity and intent); and State v. 
Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶42, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833 
(concluding that defendant's possession of videotapes of young 
girls performing striptease dances is admissible to show intent 
and motive in a child enticement case).  And in a civil context, 
see Lievrouw v. Roth, 157 Wis. 2d 332, 349, 459 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. 
App. 1990) (concluding that evidence of defendant's other 
incidents of drunk driving is admissible when a plaintiff seeks 
compensatory and punitive damages arising out of an accident 
that defendant allegedly caused while intoxicated in order to 
show that defendant was aware of the dangers of drunk driving); 
Lobermeier v. General Tel. Co. of Wisconsin, 119 Wis. 2d 129, 
150, 349 N.W.2d 466 (1984) (permitting evidence of other or 
similar accidents or occurrences to show that the responsible 
party knew or should have known of a defect or unsafe 
condition). 
No. 
00-2426   
 
9 
 
¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) addresses evidence offered 
for a prohibited use and for a permitted use.  When evidence is 
offered for a prohibited use, it is offered as relevant proof of 
acts that have already occurred by attempting to show that the 
person has a certain character and the acts denied are 
consistent with his or her character.  State v. Veach, 2002 WI 
110, ¶48, 255 Wis. 2d 390, 648 N.W.2d 447.  As the statute 
explains, "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that the person acted in conformity therewith  . . . ."  Section 
904.04(2) (emphasis added).  Additionally, in a permitted use of 
other acts evidence, e.g., to prove "motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident,"8 § 904.04(2) evidence again is offered to 
prove whether the defendant did or did not do a past act.  State 
v. Anderson, 230 Wis. 2d 121, 129-30, 600 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 
1999).  Therefore, in each instance, § 904.04(2) looks back to 
analyzing proof of acts that have already occurred.  It does not 
look forward to assess the substantial probability of future 
conduct, which is the relevant question here. 
¶13 We can reasonably presume that the legislature chose 
the statutory words carefully.  Ball, 117 Wis. 2d at 539.  
Therefore, its use of the past tense, consistent with the lack 
of a prospective quality to the statute, evidences unambiguous 
                                                 
8 See 
Blinka, 
supra, 
§ 404.7 
(stating 
the 
list 
of 
"permissible propositions 
in 
[Wis. 
Stat.] 
§ 904.04(2) are 
neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive").    
No. 
00-2426   
 
10 
 
legislative intent to restrict the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.04(2) to analyzing evidence used to prove past acts. 
¶14 We also note that the use of prior acts has provided 
proof where future conduct is the focus of other types of 
proceedings.  For example, in actions to terminate parental 
rights, a parent's past conduct is offered not to prove that the 
parent is a bad person, but to illuminate the reasons why the 
parent 
is 
unable 
or 
unwilling 
to 
establish 
a 
parental 
relationship or adequately care for the child in the future.  
See Wis. Stat. § 48.415 (2001-02); State v. Quinsanna D., 2002 
WI App 318, ¶23, 259 Wis. 2d 429, 655 N.W.2d 752 (concluding 
that evidence of the parent's past criminal conduct and 
resulting incarceration is relevant to the parent's failure to 
establish a substantial parental relationship with her children 
and why that failure continued); La Crosse County Dep't of Human 
Servs. v. Tara P., 2002 WI App 84, ¶13, 252 Wis. 2d 179, 643 
Wis. 2d 194 (concluding that evidence of a parent's failure to 
meet specific conditions necessary for the return of her 
children was relevant to proving whether there is a "substantial 
likelihood" that the parent will be able to meet those 
conditions within the requisite time period).  In  Tara P., the 
court of appeals explained, 
In 
determining 
whether 
"there 
is 
a 
substantial 
likelihood" that a parent will not meet conditions for 
the return of his or her children, a fact finder must 
necessarily consider the parent's relevant character 
traits and patterns of behavior, and the likelihood 
that any problematic traits or propensities have been 
No. 
00-2426   
 
11 
 
or can be modified in order to assure the safety of 
the children.   
Id., ¶18.  Likewise, in ch. 980 proceedings, the fact finder 
must necessarily consider a respondent's "relevant character 
traits and patterns of behavior, and the likelihood that any 
problematic traits or propensities have been or can be modified" 
in order to assure the safety of the community at large and the 
person himself.9  To look forward, we must necessarily look back.  
From this we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) is not 
applicable when evaluating the admissibility of evidence that is 
offered in a ch. 980 proceeding.  
C. 
Evidence Admitted Here 
¶15 Chapter 
980 
provides 
a 
process 
for 
the 
"civil 
commitment of persons, previously convicted of a sexually 
violent offense, who currently suffer from a mental disorder 
that predisposes them to repeat such acts."  State v. Post, 197 
Wis. 2d 279, 294, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  In a ch. 980 
proceeding, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(1) the person has a mental disorder; and (2) the person is 
dangerous to others because his or her mental disorder creates a 
substantial probability that he or she will engage in acts of 
                                                 
9 One 
authority noted, 
"[T]he 
nature 
of 
the 'sexual 
predator' 
inquiry 
virtually 
guarantees 
the 
wide-ranging 
admissibility of evidence concerning the defendant's past crimes 
and transgressions."  Blinka, supra, § 404.4.  
No. 
00-2426   
 
12 
 
sexual violence.10  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 298.  The distinction, 
between 
a 
dangerous 
sexual 
offender 
subject 
to 
ch. 
980 
commitment and the typical recidivist, is the lack of behavioral 
control in regard 
to 
acts 
of sexual 
violence 
that the 
respondent's mental disorder causes.  State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 
82, ¶21, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784. 
¶16 In order to be admissible in a ch. 980 proceeding, all 
evidence must be relevant and that relevance must not be 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01; Wis. Stat. § 904.03; State v. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 136, 
¶39, 246 Wis. 2d 233, 631 N.W.2d 240.  It is that dual test the 
circuit court must have applied in order to have appropriately 
exercised its discretion in admitting this evidence. 
¶17 Here, Franklin's complained of error is the circuit 
court's admission of:  (1) his adult criminal record for 
battery, thefts, and obstruction; (2) conduct reports from the 
department 
of 
corrections; 
(3) 
pre-sentence 
investigation 
reports; (4) evidence of his probation and parole violations; 
and (5) references to his juvenile record.  He does not object 
                                                 
10 Although there are other factors the State must address 
in a ch. 980 commitment, these two factors are those for which 
the State says the objected-to evidence is relevant so we focus 
on them.  The concurrence asserts the majority is in error in 
examining the evidence in terms of proof for two components 
relative 
to 
Franklin's 
condition. 
 
Concurrence, 
¶¶53-54.  
However, both Dr. Dennis Doren, the State's expert, and Dr. 
Charles Lodl, Franklin's expert, identified two components to 
their opinions. 
No. 
00-2426   
 
13 
 
to the admission of his prior adult criminal record of sexually 
related conduct. 
¶18 Much of the objected to evidence initially came in 
through probation agent Plewa.  For example, in introducing the 
three pre-sentence reports, she explained the repetitive nature 
of Franklin's criminal conduct, which began when he was only 
fifteen years old and was found to be "uncontrollable."  She 
described his repeated lack of control of his behavior that 
continued as an adult.  She explained that one of the theft 
convictions resulted from his pushing a woman to the ground, 
punching her in the face and taking her purse, while the other 
two thefts involved merchandise taken from a jewelry store and 
the theft of an automobile.  She described the battery, which 
involved a female that he beat and kicked and batteries and 
attempted batteries that occurred while he was incarcerated.  
The State tied her testimony to that of Dr. Dennis Doren, a 
major witness for the State.   
¶19 Doren testified that in his expert opinion Franklin 
suffers from paraphilia, a mental disorder characterized by 
sexual arousal toward something that causes the person problems 
in his life.  It was his opinion that Franklin is aroused by 
non-consenting 
sexual 
interactions 
and 
that 
during 
these 
interactions Franklin is not in control of what happens.   
No. 
00-2426   
 
14 
 
¶20 In forming his opinions, Doren reviewed the records 
that Franklin complains should not have been admitted.11  Doren 
opined that the 1978 battery did have a sexual component and if 
not interrupted it would have led to a sexual assault.  He noted 
that while incarcerated, Franklin has had repeated instances of 
out-of-control conduct and that Franklin has said that he was 
not in control of what happened during the sexual crimes of 
which he was convicted.  Doren opined that since Franklin was a 
juvenile he has had difficulties controlling his behavior and 
that this lack of control is a feature of his paraphilia.  Doren 
also explained that each time Franklin was released from a 
controlled environment, he soon committed another act of sexual 
                                                 
11 The concurrence asserts this evidence has no relevance 
because it does not relate to whether it is substantially 
probable that Franklin will engage in future acts of sexual 
violence.  Concurrence, ¶¶48-52.  This is too limited a reading 
of the proof required by Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7), which requires 
proof of a mental disorder and proof that the disorder causes it 
to be substantially probable that the respondent will commit 
acts of sexual violence in the future.  Furthermore, both 
experts relied on this evidence as background for their 
opinions.  Most specifically, Lodl, Franklin's expert, required 
this information to form the basis for his opinion that Franklin 
suffered from schizophrenia, which Lodl opined would not cause 
it to be substantially probable that Franklin would commit 
future acts of sexual violence.  See R. 52:36-40, 48-49. 
Additionally, Lodl specifically considered whether Franklin 
ever had "been involved with the legal system other than the 
sexual offenses that occurred."  R. 52:19.  Lodl also decided 
that there was insufficient evidence upon which he could opine 
that Franklin had a mental disorder sufficient to satisfy ch. 
980, even though he acknowledged on cross examination that 
Franklin did evidence elements of an anti-social personality 
disorder, both in his sexual interactions and in other conduct.  
See R. 52:81-84. 
No. 
00-2426   
 
15 
 
violence, showing a compulsion to continue non-consensual sexual 
interactions.  And finally, his department of correction records 
and the pre-sentence reports show Franklin has not completed 
treatment programs for his sexual disorder while confined.  
Doren said it was his opinion that Franklin suffers from a 
mental disorder, paraphilia, and it is substantially probable 
that if released from confinement, Franklin will commit acts of 
sexual violence in the future due to that mental disorder.   
¶21 In ruling on Franklin's motion, the circuit court 
considered the potential relevancy of the challenged evidence 
and concluded it had some degree of relevancy to whether 
Franklin was a sexually violent person, but the weight was for 
the jury.  It also concluded that the evidence appeared to 
support Franklin's case as well as the State's, and that there 
was no unfair prejudice.  Based on this record and the circuit 
court's patient attention to the arguments and the testimony 
presented, we cannot say the circuit court erroneously exercised 
its discretion in concluding that the evidence at issue was 
relevant and not unfairly prejudicial.   
¶22 Our opinion in this regard is supported by Doren's 
diagnosis that Franklin has a mental disorder that features 
uncontrolled, aggressive conduct.  Franklin has a long history 
of repeatedly being out-of-control, commencing with his juvenile 
court adjudications, continuing in his adult criminal conduct 
and in his failure to conform his behavior to established rules 
when on probation, parole or when within a correctional 
No. 
00-2426   
 
16 
 
institution.12  Other courts have noted past uncontrolled 
behavior 
is 
relevant 
to 
whether 
a 
person 
will 
exhibit 
uncontrolled behavior in the future.  See Wolfe, 246 Wis. 2d 
233, ¶37.13  As the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
"[p]revious instances of violent behavior are an important 
indicator of future violent tendencies."  Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 
312, 323 (1993)).  Here, even though all of the past examples of 
uncontrolled conduct did not relate to sexual acts, they were 
relevant 
to 
Franklin's 
diagnoses 
of 
paraphilia 
and 
of 
schizophrenia, as both experts used this evidence to support 
their opinions.  Additionally, as the record in this case shows, 
                                                 
12 Franklin had 126 conduct reports while incarcerated as an 
adult.  Those department of corrections violations that were 
repeated to the jury involved battery, attempted battery, 
disorderly conduct, threats to others, fighting and failure to 
obey the rules of the institution.  Additionally, as Lodl 
testified, "there are sexual issues in his record as well, the 
sexual assaults that he is convicted of, the battery incidents 
that seem to include some sexual behavior or at least have some 
sexual inuendo to them all the way back to I believe 1971 where 
he was charged with fornicating  . . . ."  R. 52:48-49. 
13 In State v. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 136, 246 Wis. 2d 233, 631 
N.W.2d 240, the court of appeals determined that the use of 
other acts evidence unrelated to sexual behavior in a ch. 980 
proceeding was relevant to the proofs required for commitment.  
There, the State introduced evidence of Wolfe's misconduct at 
Norris Adolescent Treatment Center and his adult conviction of 
arson.  The court of appeals concluded that these convictions 
demonstrated a pervasive pattern of disregard for the rights of 
others, failure to comply with rules, irresponsibility and lack 
of remorse, which were relevant to Wolfe's diagnosed personality 
disorder and therefore relevant to the ch. 980 elements required 
for commitment.  Id., ¶40. 
No. 
00-2426   
 
17 
 
the standard risk assessment for sexual offenders takes into 
account all past violations of the law in attempting to evaluate 
the 
probability 
of 
future 
sexually 
assaultive 
behavior.14  
However, those violations that are sexually related are weighted 
more heavily in the assessment.  Both experts testified that 
they used these risk assessment tools.  We agree that the 
evidence is relevant. 
¶23 We also agree that the probative value of this 
evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to 
Franklin.  See Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  Almost any relevant 
evidence presented by the State would be prejudicial to 
Franklin.  The test, however, is whether the evidence is 
unfairly prejudicial.  Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it 
has "a tendency to influence the outcome by improper means or if 
it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of 
horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a 
jury 
to 
base 
its 
decision 
on something 
other 
than the 
established propositions in the case."  Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 
789-90.  See State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶73, 236 Wis. 2d 
537, 613 N.W.2d 606; Wolfe, 246 Wis. 2d 233, ¶41.  There is 
nothing unfairly prejudicial about the other acts evidence 
offered in this case.  It is simply factual observations showing 
                                                 
14 The concurrence maintains that the only place where these 
tools are found is in a deposition that was not admitted into 
evidence.  Concurrence, ¶45.  However, all three tools are in 
the appendix of Franklin's brief in reply.  The State did not 
object to this inclusion, so we have assumed that both parties 
agree the assessment tools are correctly part of the record.  
No. 
00-2426   
 
18 
 
Franklin's long and consistent history of poorly controlled 
conduct that both experts used in coming to their conclusions.  
As such, we conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in admitting it.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶24 We conclude that during a commitment proceeding under 
ch. 980, Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) does not apply to evidence 
offered to prove that the respondent has a mental disorder that 
makes it substantially probable that the respondent will commit 
acts of sexual violence in the future.  Because we also conclude 
that such evidence was properly admitted here, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶25 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I do not 
dispute 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
conclusion 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2), 
which 
prevents 
"evidence 
of 
other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts" from being admitted to "prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in 
conformity 
therewith," 
is 
inapposite 
to 
a 
chapter 
980 
proceeding.   
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.04(2) is not the focus of this 
case.15  Evidence must clear the relevance hurdle, § 904.01, 
before its admissibility comes into question.16 
¶27 The real issues in this case are twofold: First, is 
the testimony introduced by the probation and parole agent 
regarding the defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct relevant to 
a determination under chapter 980 that the defendant's "mental 
disorder . . . makes 
it 
substantially 
probable 
that 
the 
[defendant] will engage in acts of sexual violence?"17  Second, 
even if such evidence is relevant, was its probative value 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice?18   
                                                 
15 The majority opinion asserts that defendant moved to 
exclude prior acts evidence pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2). 
Majority op., ¶3.  According to the trial record, the defendant 
objected to this evidence primarily on the basis of relevance 
and its relation to laying a foundation for the State's expert 
witness.   
16 Wisconsin 
Stat. § 904.01 
provides 
that 
"'[r]elevant 
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." 
17 Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). 
18 Wis. Stat. § 904.03. 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶28 I conclude that the answer to both of these questions 
is no and that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in failing to consider each type of evidence that the 
defendant sought to exclude to determine its relevance and its 
potential for unfair prejudice.  Despite the circuit court's 
erroneous exercise of discretion, I concur, rather than dissent, 
because I agree with the State that the circuit court's error in 
admitting the challenged evidence in this case was harmless. 
I 
¶29 I first consider the issue of relevance.  The first 
consideration in assessing relevance is whether the evidence 
relates to a fact or proposition that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action.19   
¶30 Determining whether or not evidence is relevant lies 
within the discretion of the circuit court.20  This court has 
often said that "a discretionary determination must be the 
product of a rational mental process by which the facts of 
record and law relied upon are stated and are considered 
together 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
achieving 
a 
reasonable 
                                                 
19 Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  The court has explained that "[t]he 
first consideration in assessing relevance is whether the other 
acts evidence relates to a fact or proposition that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action."  State v. 
Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998).  
20 Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis.2d 67, 629 
N.W.2d 698 ("We review a circuit court's decision to admit or 
exclude evidence under an erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard.").  See also Morden v. Cont'l AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶81, 235 
Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659; State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 
342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983). 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
3 
 
determination."21  An appellate court will affirm a circuit 
court's discretionary decision as long as the circuit court 
"examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, 
and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion 
that a reasonable judge could reach."22  Therefore, the record on 
appeal must "reflect the circuit court's reasoned application of 
the appropriate legal standard to the relevant facts in the 
case."23  "If a judge bases the exercise of his discretion upon 
an error of law, his conduct is beyond the limits of 
discretion."24 
¶31 The 
majority opinion 
contends that 
"the circuit 
court's patient attention to the arguments and the testimony 
presented" demonstrated a proper exercise of discretion.25  I 
disagree with this characterization of the record.     
¶32 In making its determination to admit the evidence, the 
circuit court did not examine the evidence of the defendant's 
                                                 
21 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 
(1981). 
22 Long v. Long, 196 Wis. 2d 691, 695, 539 n.462 (Ct. App. 
1995).  See also State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 
Wis. 2d 536, 541, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985); Shuput v. Lauer, 109 
Wis. 2d 164, 177-78, 325 N.W.2d 321 (1982). 
23 State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 281, 588 N.W.2d 1 
(1999). 
24 State v. Hutnik 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 N.W.2d 733 
(1968).  See also In re Settlement for Personal Injuries of 
Konicki 186 Wis. 2d 140, 150, 519 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("[A] trial court erroneously exercises its discretion when its 
decision is based on a misapplication or erroneous view of the 
law."). 
25 Majority op., ¶21.     
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
4 
 
prior juvenile convictions, nonsexual adult convictions, or 
institutional conduct reports for their relevance.  The circuit 
court never ruled on how each of these types of evidence is 
relevant to show that the defendant had a mental disorder that 
makes it substantially probable that he will engage in future 
acts of sexual violence.26  Rather, the circuit court merely 
asserted 
that 
all 
of 
the 
evidence 
was 
relevant 
without 
considering the legal requirements of chapter 980.   
¶33 Had the circuit court examined and analyzed the 
evidence of the defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct, it would 
have concluded as a matter of law that none of this evidence was 
relevant.27   
¶34 Relevance is governed by Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  In the 
context of a chapter 980 proceeding, evidence is relevant if it 
pertains to "a mental disorder that makes it substantially 
probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual 
violence."28  In order to address relevance, I must first set 
forth certain facts that are not clearly provided in the 
majority opinion.  I then address the majority opinion's 
erroneous explication of the State's and the defendant's expert 
witnesses and U.S. Supreme Court precedent to support its 
                                                 
26 Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  See State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, 
¶2, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784. 
27 The circuit court provided no analysis to overcome 
defense counsel's objection.  The circuit court explained that 
it would be helpful to defense counsel's case to allow all of 
this evidence to come in because it would be consistent with  
the defendant's position that he suffered from schizophrenia 
rather than paraphilia. 
28 Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).   
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
5 
 
conclusion that evidence of the defendant's prior nonsexual 
misconduct was relevant. 
A 
¶35 At trial, the defendant sought to exclude evidence of 
three 
types 
of 
prior 
nonsexual 
misconduct 
contained 
in 
presentence 
investigation 
reports 
and 
other 
institutional 
records from being read to the jury by a probation and parole 
agent.  Those pieces of evidence were: (1) his juvenile record; 
(2) his prior adult criminal record for crimes unrelated to 
sexual activity; and (3) conduct violations while he was 
incarcerated.  The defendant did not contest the admission of 
his prior misconduct that was sexual in nature. 
¶36 The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to 
exclude this evidence and allowed the probation and parole agent 
to testify.  As a result of that decision, the State introduced 
instances of the defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct into 
evidence, including the following: 
 
Juvenile conduct: 
• 1970: Uncontrollable conduct. 
• 1971: Uncontrollable conduct. 
• 1971: Loitering, escape from custody, obstructing an officer, 
running away, uncontrollable and disorderly conduct, fleeing 
and fornication. 
 
 
Adult conduct: 
• 1973: Battery. Convicted and sentenced to one year of 
probation. 
• 1975: Theft misdemeanor. Convicted and sentenced to 6 months, 
stayed and 1-year probation. 
• 1976: Theft from person, obstructing an officer and theft. 
Convicted and sentenced to two years.  
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
6 
 
• 1978: Battery. Convicted and sentenced to 6 months.29 
 
 
Institutional conduct (107 minor and 19 major incidents): 
• Attempted battery 
• Battery, disobeying orders, disruptive conduct, threats 
• Fighting 
• Disobeying orders, disrespect, threats 
• Disobeying orders, disrespect, threats 
• Attempted escape 
¶37 At trial, the probation and parole agent testified 
about these numerous incidents involving the defendant.  With 
regard to his juvenile record, the agent testified that at the 
ages of fifteen and sixteen the defendant had three contacts 
with the criminal justice system on various occasions for 
uncontrollable 
conduct, 
loitering, 
escape 
from 
custody, 
obstructing 
an 
officer, 
running 
away, 
uncontrollable 
and 
disorderly conduct, and fleeing and fornication. 
¶38 With regard to his adult record, the agent testified 
about a battery conviction in which the defendant struck his 
girlfriend in the face with his fist and with his cleated shoe, 
and that the defendant had stolen a car from a friend.  The 
agent also testified that the defendant's probation had been 
revoked for theft of some jewelry and a purse snatching incident 
in which he punched a female victim in order to take her purse. 
¶39 The agent further testified about conduct reports the 
defendant received while he was incarcerated.  She testified 
that the defendant had received 107 minor reports and 19 major 
                                                 
29 The 1978 battery had a sexual component to it.  The 
defendant threw a woman into the bushes and attempted to lie on 
her, and when he was apprehended his penis was exposed.  The 
defendant does not challenge the admission of this evidence. 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
7 
 
reports.  The 126 conduct reports are mostly unspecified in the 
Department of Corrections reports admitted into evidence.  The 
agent testified that these conduct reports included violations 
for attempted battery, battery, disruptive conduct, threats, 
disobeying 
orders, 
disrespect, 
and 
one 
attempted 
escape.  
According to the probation and parole agent many of the conduct 
reports were related to hygiene problems and abnormal behavior 
related to the defendant's schizophrenia.  
B 
¶40 The majority opinion contends that this evidence of  
the defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct was relevant, relying 
on the testimony of the State's and the defendant's expert 
witnesses, Doctors Doren and Lodl respectively.   
¶41 According to the majority opinion, "[E]ven though all 
of the past examples of uncontrolled conduct did not relate to 
sexual acts, they were relevant to [the defendant's] diagnoses 
of paraphilia and of schizophrenia . . . ."30  Evidence of the 
defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct was, according to the 
majority opinion, relevant because both experts used risk 
assessment tools that considered the prior nonsexual conduct of 
the defendant.31 
¶42 The majority opinion asserts that the State "tied [the 
parole and probation agent's] testimony to that of Dr. Dennis 
Doren,"32 who "opined that since Franklin was a juvenile he has 
                                                 
30 Majority op., ¶22. 
31 Id. 
32 Id., ¶18. 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
8 
 
had difficulties controlling his behavior and that this lack of 
control 
is 
a 
feature 
of 
his 
paraphilia."33 
 
These 
characterizations of the relevance of the defendant's prior 
nonsexual misconduct are not substantiated by Dr. Doren's or Dr. 
Lodl's testimony to the jury at trial, nor by the State's or the 
defendant's closing arguments.  Neither of the experts drew a 
link 
between 
the 
defendant's 
"uncontrolled 
behavior" 
and 
sexually violent behavior.34   
¶43 Dr. Doren and Dr. Lodl apparently relied on the 
defendant's prior nonsexual criminal history when using sex 
offender risk assessment tools in evaluating the defendant.35  An 
expert's reliance on various facts and materials is not 
dispositive of the question of whether such facts and materials 
are admissible evidence.  Expert witnesses are allowed to base 
their testimony on evidence that is otherwise inadmissible and 
not properly considered by the jury.36  Defense counsel objected 
to the jury's consideration of the defendant's prior acts of 
misconduct, not to the expert witnesses' consideration of such 
acts in forming their medical opinions. 
                                                 
33 Id., ¶20. 
34 Dr. Doren testified that the defendant's sexually violent 
behavior may indicate an "internal drive or internal push" to 
commit sexually violent assaults.  Dr. Doren testified that the 
defendant said that his sexual violence related to lack of 
control when he was drinking and that the defendant is not in 
control during sexual assaults.  
35 Majority op., ¶22.  
36 See Wis. Stat. § 907.03; Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light 
Co., 162 Wis. 2d 1, 36, 469 N.W.2d 595 (1991). 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶44 The majority opinion makes much of these tools, 
arguing that "as the record in this case shows, the standard 
risk assessment for sexual offenders takes into account all past 
violations of the law in attempting to evaluate the probability 
of 
future 
sexually 
assaultive 
behavior. 
 
However, 
those 
violations that are sexually related are weighted more heavily 
in the assessment."37 
¶45 The "record" of which the majority opinion speaks, 
however, was not Dr. Doren's testimony at trial, but his 
deposition (which apparently was not introduced at trial and was 
not presented to the jury) in which he acknowledged that the 
defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct added points to the score 
of some, but not all, of the instruments that measure the risk 
of sexual offense recidivism that Dr. Doren considered.38 
¶46 The majority opinion mistakenly believes that I am 
objecting to its consideration of these tests because they are 
not part of the record.39  My argument is that these tests were 
                                                 
37 Majority op., ¶22. 
38 Each of the tools uses slightly different factors, but 
Dr. Doren testified that they are primarily the same.  Dr. Doren 
identified three tests he had used on the defendant in this 
case:  RRASOR, Static-99, and the Minnesota Sex Offender 
Screening Tool.  Dr. Doren described the RRASOR test as having 
four components: (1) the official record of the defendant's 
history for sex offenses; (2) the age of the offender; (3) 
whether the offender has had a male victim; and (4) whether the 
offender's victim was outside of the family.  Dr. Doren 
described Static-99 as "work[ing] in the same way" and the 
Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool as "basically working in 
the same way." 
39 Majority op., ¶22 n.14. 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
10 
 
never shown to the jury and no expert testimony, by either Dr. 
Doren or Dr. Lodl, explained why the probation and parole 
agent's testimony regarding the defendant's prior acts of 
misconduct made it substantially probable that the defendant 
would engage in future acts of sexual violence. 
¶47 At trial, Dr. Doren never described any of these tools 
as taking into account all past law violations in attempting to 
evaluate the probability of sexual violence.  Thus the majority 
opinion's conclusions that "uncontrolled behavior" and sexually 
violent behavior are connected are not supported by Dr. Doren's 
use of the assessment tools. 
¶48 At trial, Dr. Doren never suggested that any of the 
defendant's nonsexual behavior related to a predisposition to 
sexually violent behavior.  Dr. Doren did not draw any 
conclusions at trial suggesting that the defendant's prior 
nonsexual misconduct made it more likely that he would commit 
acts of sexual violence in the future.   
¶49 Dr. Doren's testimony at trial did not rely on the 
defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct.  Dr. Doren did not 
specifically refer to any of the defendant's prior misconduct or 
history unrelated to sexual behavior in explaining his diagnosis 
to the jury.  Dr. Doren did not testify that the defendant's 
prior nonsexual misconduct was relevant to his determination of 
the defendant's propensity for sexual violence.  In fact, 
Doren's testimony leads to the conclusion that the defendant's 
prior nonsexual misconduct is not relevant.  Dr. Doren concluded 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
11 
 
that general criminality does not suggest paraphilia.  Dr. Doren 
testified as follows about the defendant's prior misconduct:  
[T]he first thing I was looking for in Mr. Franklin's 
situation was his behavioral pattern, whether I could 
demonstrate that he interacted with someone in a 
known-consensual way for sexual purposes.  There were 
three different times [the defendant] was convicted of 
offenses that were, in my opinion, clearly sexual in 
nature and involving a non-consensual process; it 
occurred in 1978, 1979, and 1984. 
Another aspect of the behavioral pattern that I look 
at, though, is to see whether or not that's all part 
of an overall criminal way of being or if a person's 
criminality is quite specific to sexual offending.  If 
a person is just criminal in a lot of ways, that does 
not suggest paraphilia, it doesn't negate it but it 
doesn't suggest it; whereas if the person's sole way 
of acting in an illegal way is sexual, that would 
suggest 
there's 
something 
driving 
the 
person 
specifically in a sexual manner. 
As a juvenile, the records would indicate anyway, that 
as a juvenile his——and early adulthood his illegal 
behavior was of a variety of types not including much 
in the way of sexuality; there was one event as a 
juvenile, but as a——as an adult, basically since July 
of '76, all of his known illegal behavior involved 
raping or attempted raping. (Emphasis added.) 
¶50 In sum, nothing in Dr. Doren's testimony to the jury 
suggested that a determination that a person is sexually violent 
is 
aided 
by 
past 
episodes 
of 
uncontrolled 
behavior 
or 
criminality not relating to sexual misconduct. 
¶51 Furthermore, the majority opinion's claim that the 
defendant's expert witness supports its conclusion that the 
defendant has a mental disorder that features uncontrolled, 
aggressive conduct is not supported in the record.  The majority 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
12 
 
opinion quotes Dr. Lodl's testimony40 but omits the underlined 
portion below and changes the meaning of his testimony: 
And obviously there are sexual issues in his record as 
well, the sexual assaults the he is convicted of, the 
battery incidents that seem to include some sexual 
behavior or at least have some sexual innuendo to them 
all the way back to I believe to 1971 where he was 
charged with fornicating, although I do not see that 
as a diagnosis——as a legal issue that would contribute 
to a diagnosis of sexual deviation, okay, it's just 
people are noting his sexual behavior. 
¶52 Dr. Lodl's testimony actually undercuts the majority 
opinion's conclusion and suggests that the mere presence of 
prior sexual behavior in the defendant's past does not lead to a 
conclusion that he is sexually deviant. 
¶53 The majority opinion errs in its relevance analysis by 
bifurcating Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) into two prongs, namely: (1) 
finding that the defendant has a mental disorder that makes it 
difficult for him to control his behavior; and (2) evaluating 
whether the defendant will engage in future sexual violence.41  
This test is not the one set forth in § 980.01(7), however.  The 
statute requires a nexus between the mental disorder and the 
probability of future sexual violence.  The court explained in 
State v. 
Laxton, 
2002 WI 
82, ¶2, 
254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 
N.W.2d 784, that a nexus must be established between the mental 
disorder and the probability of future sexual violence.  The 
court stated:  
                                                 
40 Id., ¶22 n.12. 
41 Id., ¶15. 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
13 
 
[W]e conclude that such a civil commitment [of a 
sexual predator] does not require a separate finding 
that the individual's mental disorder involves serious 
difficulty for such person to control his or her 
behavior.  The requisite proof of lack of control is 
established when the nexus between such person's 
mental 
disorder 
and 
dangerousness 
has 
been 
established. 
¶54 The 
majority 
opinion's 
apparent 
conclusion 
that 
because the expert witnesses "identified two components to their 
opinions" that this must be the law is perplexing and erroneous.  
Dr. Doren testified that the defendant suffered from paraphilia 
not-otherwise-specified 
and 
that 
this 
diagnosis 
made 
it 
substantially probable that the defendant would engage in future 
acts of sexual violence.  Dr. Lodl testified that the defendant 
suffered from schizophrenia and that this made it less likely 
that he would commit future acts of sexual violence.  The 
testimony of the experts attempted to draw a link between the 
defendant's mental condition and his propensity for future 
sexual violence. 
¶55 I conclude that the majority opinion's attempt to 
support its conclusion that the defendant's prior nonsexual 
misconduct was relevant to the chapter 980 determination by 
reference to the testimony of the State's and defendant's expert 
witnesses fails.  Evidence of the defendant's prior acts of 
misconduct were not relevant because, according to the record, 
this evidence does not relate to a fact or proposition that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action. 
C 
¶56 The majority opinion contends that evidence of the 
defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct was relevant, relying on 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
14 
 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  The majority opinion relies on 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997), to support its 
conclusion that the defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct was 
relevant because "[p]revious instances of violent behavior are 
an important indicator of future violent tendencies."42    
¶57 The majority opinion takes the U.S. Supreme Court's 
language out of context.   
¶58 What the Court actually said in Hendricks was that 
substantive due process in sexual predator cases requires proof 
of more than a disposition for violence; it requires evidence of 
past sexually violent behavior and a mental condition that 
creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person 
is not incapacitated:  
The [Kansas] statute thus requires proof of more than 
a mere predisposition to violence; rather, it requires 
evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a 
present mental condition that creates a likelihood of 
such conduct in the future if the person is not 
incapacitated.  As we have recognized, "[p]revious 
instances 
of 
violent 
behavior 
are 
an 
important 
indicator of future violent tendencies."43 
¶59 If anything, the Hendricks court explicitly rejected 
the proposition that prior uncontrolled behavior (at least under 
the 
Kansas 
statute, 
which 
is 
substantially 
similar 
to 
                                                 
42 Id., ¶22. 
43 Kansas 
v. 
Hendricks, 
521 
U.S. 
346, 
357-58 
(1997) 
(emphasis added). 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
15 
 
Wisconsin's) is, in itself, sufficient to demonstrate future 
sexual violence.44   
 
¶60 The U.S. Supreme Court explained in a later case that 
Hendricks emphasized that commitment of sexual predators cannot 
become a law of general deterrence.45  According to the Court, 
the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness 
subjects him to civil commitment must be distinguished from the 
dangerous but typical criminal recidivist.  The Court wrote as 
follows: 
Hendricks underscored the constitutional importance of 
distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to 
civil commitment "from other dangerous persons who are 
perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through 
                                                 
44 The majority opinion's reliance on the court of appeals 
decision, State v. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 136, 246 Wis. 2d 233, 631 
N.W.2d 240, for the proposition that "past uncontrolled behavior 
is relevant to whether a person will exhibit uncontrolled 
behavior in the future," is inaccurate.  Majority op., ¶22.  
Unfortunately, Wolfe quoted only part of the language from 
Hendricks discussed above, taking the Hendricks language out of 
context.  Wolfe did, however, explain the "relevancy" standard 
as follows:  "The jury needed to consider evidence of relevant 
past conduct to determine whether Wolfe had a mental disorder 
which predisposed him to commit acts of sexual violence and 
whether there was a substantial probability that he would commit 
acts of sexual violence in the future."  Wolfe, 246 Wis. 2d 233, 
¶37.  Furthermore, the majority opinion's assertion that "in ch. 
980 proceedings, the fact finder must necessarily consider a 
respondent's 
'relevant 
character 
traits 
and 
patterns 
of 
behavior, and the likelihood that any problematic traits or 
propensities have been or can be modified' in order to assure 
the safety of the community at large and the person himself," 
presumes a different context.  Majority op., ¶14.  The majority 
opinion quotes State v. Tara P., 2002 WI App 84, ¶18, 252 
Wis. 2d 179, 643 N.W.2d 194, which is a family law case and does 
not deal with the specific workings of chapter 980 or its 
constitutional requirements. 
45 See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412-13 (2002). 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
16 
 
criminal 
proceedings." . . . That 
distinction 
is 
necessary lest "civil commitment" become a "mechanism 
for 
retribution 
or 
general 
deterrence"——functions 
properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment. 
. . . . 
[T]he severity of the mental abnormality itself[] must 
be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual 
offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or 
disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the 
dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an 
ordinary criminal case.46   
¶61 I agree with the defendant that "the closer the state 
gets to committing individuals based on incidents or conduct 
unrelated to the subject's mental disorder and their risk for 
committing sexually violent acts in the future the more tenuous 
the constitutionality of Chapter 980 becomes."47   
¶62 The 
majority 
opinion's 
attempt 
to 
support 
its 
conclusion that the defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct was 
relevant to the chapter 980 determination by reference to U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent fails.   
II 
¶63 Assuming the majority opinion is correct that the 
probation and parole agent's testimony regarding the nonsexual 
misconduct of the defendant was relevant, I disagree with the 
majority opinion's conclusion that "the probative value of this 
evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to 
[the defendant]."48   
                                                 
46 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412-13 (2002). 
47 Brief of Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner at 10. 
48 Majority op., ¶23.  
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶64 Probative value is one facet of relevance.49  The court 
has 
explained 
probative 
value 
as 
follows: 
"The 
second 
consideration in assessing relevance is whether the evidence has 
probative value, that is, whether the other acts evidence has a 
tendency to make the consequential fact or proposition more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."50 
¶65 Probative 
evidence 
may 
be 
excluded. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 904.03 provides that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  The 
question whether the probative value of otherwise admissible 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, like relevance, rests in the discretion of the 
circuit court.51  
¶66 The circuit court did not exercise its discretion by 
performing the necessary balancing test in this case.  The 
circuit court conflated relevance, hearsay, and the balancing 
test without clearly articulating its basis for overruling the 
defendant's objections to the evidence.  The circuit court ruled 
                                                 
49 Wis. Stat. § 904.01. 
50 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998). 
51 Johnson v. Kokemoor, 199 Wis. 2d 615, 636, 545 N.W.2d 495 
(1996); Featherly v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 73 Wis. 2d 273, 283, 243 
N.W.2d 806 (1976). 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
18 
 
as follows in admitting the probation and parole agent's 
testimony about the defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct:  
[B]ut 
based 
on 
what 
I 
know 
about 
the 
[expert 
witnesses] and what I've heard from you guys, it is 
relevant and it is probative and, you know, it does 
get by the hearsay based on all those various sections 
[the 
assistant 
district 
attorney 
has] 
indicated . . . . And obviously the definition of 
being probative is making an issue more likely than 
not to the trier of fact . . . . So I guess all I can 
say is it's one of those cases that yes it does come 
in for all those reasons . . . . For all those reasons 
and based on the fact that the Court has considered 
the balancing of the relevance versus probative value 
versus prejudicial effect. 
¶67 In this case, the probative value of the evidence is 
nonexistent or minimal at best.52  Dr. Doren did not testify that 
he relied on any nonsexual misconduct in his diagnosis of 
paraphilia.  The nonsexual offenses play a minimal role in the 
risk assessment tools relied on by Dr. Doren to predict the 
defendant's proclivity for future sexual violence.  To the 
extent that these risk assessment tools do take into account 
prior nonsexual misconduct, they do not distinguish between 4 
offenses and 400.  Therefore, when the jury heard testimony 
about the defendant's numerous prior acts of misconduct, it was 
hearing far more than what was needed to understand the risk 
assessment tools being used by the experts.   
                                                 
52 "Probative value, then, is the product of relevance and 
an assessment of what the evidence adds to the case.  The lower 
the probative value, the more likely it will be 'substantially 
outweighed' 
by 
unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion, 
or 
other 
consideration."  7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: 
Wisconsin Evidence § 403.1 at 114 (2d ed. 2001). 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶68 After examining the probative value of the nonsexual 
prior misconduct, which was minimal at best in the present case, 
a circuit court must determine whether the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues, 
or misleading the 
jury 
or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
¶69 The mere fact that evidence proves or strengthens the 
State's case at trial does not make it unfairly prejudicial, 
however.  In order to demonstrate unfair prejudice, the 
defendant must show that "the proffered evidence has a tendency 
to influence the outcome by improper means or if it appeals to 
the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its 
instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its 
decision on something other than the established propositions in 
the case."53  
¶70 The defendant in this case asserts that the admission 
of his juvenile record, his adult criminal record for crimes 
unrelated to sexual misconduct, and Department of Corrections 
conduct 
reports 
for 
violations 
unrelated 
to 
sexual 
acts 
contributed to the almost unavoidable conclusion that he is a 
recidivist criminal and an unpleasant, difficult, and dangerous 
person generally.  This evidence could arouse in jurors a sense 
of horror, provoke their instinct to punish, or otherwise cause 
                                                 
53 State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶73, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 
N.W.2d 606; State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 64, 590 N.W.2d 918 
(1999); 
State 
v. 
Sullivan, 
216 
Wis. 2d 768, 
789-90, 
576 
N.W.2d 30 (1998). 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
20 
 
a jury to base its decision on something other than the 
established propositions in the case.  
 
¶71 The State responds that none of the evidence that was 
admitted in this case was of such a hideous or horrible nature 
that the jury would have been provoked to punish the defendant 
for that conduct.  The State misses the point.  The probation 
and parole agent testified about the defendant's juvenile 
offenses, his adult criminal behavior, and his 126 incidences of 
misconduct while incarcerated.  That no one of these offenses 
was, in itself, hideous or horrible is not significant.  A piece 
of evidence need not be hideous or horrible to fail the unfair 
prejudice test.   
 
¶72 The concern is that testimony about the defendant's 
repeated repulsive conduct has a cumulative effect.  This 
evidence creates the danger that a jury might be provoked to 
conclude that the defendant is a bad individual and a repeat 
criminal who should be institutionalized.  This evidence of 
misconduct is precisely the kind of evidence that can create 
unfair prejudice because the jury's task is to determine whether 
it was substantially probable that the defendant would engage in 
sexual misconduct, not whether he would commit a crime if 
released into the community.  The evidence distracts the jury 
from its task. 
 
¶73 The State's further argument that the defendant is 
essentially estopped from arguing unfair prejudice because 
defense counsel urged the jury to look at the defendant's "whole 
picture" is not compelling.  After defense counsel objected, was 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
21 
 
overruled, and lodged a continuing objection to the introduction 
of the probation and parole agent's testimony, what further 
option did defense counsel have?  The fact that defense counsel 
surmised that his objection might be overruled and developed a 
legal defense in light of that expectation is good lawyering. 
¶74 I cannot agree with the majority opinion that the 
circuit court properly exercised its discretion in this case. 
III 
¶75 Despite my conclusion that the defendant's nonsexual 
prior misconduct was not probative and was unfairly prejudicial 
and that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
in admitting the evidence, I nevertheless agree with the 
majority opinion's conclusion that the commitment need not be 
reversed.  I agree with the State that the defendant's juvenile 
record, institutional misconduct record, and adult nonsexual 
criminal record "pale in comparison to the unchallenged evidence 
of his sexual offense history."54  Furthermore, the effect of the 
evidence of misconduct was mitigated by the testimony of the 
expert witnesses and the restraint of the State in its closing 
arguments.  I conclude that the circuit court's errors were 
harmless and the commitment should stand. 
¶76 The test for harmless error is that an error is not 
harmless when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of "contributed to the verdict obtained."55  The 
                                                 
54 Brief of Petitioner-Respondent at 27. 
55 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), reh'g 
denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967). 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
22 
 
harmless error test is not a test for the sufficiency of 
evidence; it does not ask whether there is evidence in the 
record apart from the erroneously admitted evidence that could 
support a conviction.  
¶77 The question in harmless error analysis is whether the 
admission of the defendant's nonsexual misconduct contributed to 
the jury verdict.  The impact of the erroneously admitted 
evidence cannot be assessed either by looking at the erroneously 
admitted evidence in isolation or by looking at the evidence 
unaffected by the error.56   
¶78 The court has posited several guidelines for assessing 
whether an error was harmless, including but not limited to the 
nature of the error, the frequency of the error, the nature of 
the state's case, the nature of the defense, the importance of 
the 
erroneously 
admitted 
or 
excluded 
evidence 
to 
the 
prosecution's or defense's case, the presence or absence of 
evidence corroborating or contradicting the erroneously admitted 
or excluded evidence, whether the erroneously admitted evidence 
duplicates the untainted evidence, and the overall strength of 
the prosecution's case.57 
 
¶79 The error in the present case was the circuit court's 
admission of evidence of the defendant's prior nonsexual 
misconduct.  Although the defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct 
                                                 
56 State v. Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 661, 668, 329 N.W.2d 192 
(1983). 
57 State v. Norman, 2003 WI 72, ¶48, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 
N.W.2d 97; State v. Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 661, 668-70, 329 
N.W.2d 192 (1983). 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
23 
 
was plentiful, it played a relatively insignificant role in the 
case.  
¶80 At 
trial, 
the 
jury 
heard 
testimony 
from 
four 
witnesses: the parole and probation agent who introduced the 
evidence of the defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct; an 
employee from the Department of Corrections who testified that 
the defendant was within 90 days of his release at the time the 
chapter 980 petition was filed; Dr. Doren, the State's expert 
witness; and Dr. Lodl, the defendant's expert witness. 
¶81 The probation and parole officer testified first, 
consuming approximately 50 pages of the transcript, about one-
half of which related to the defendant's prior nonsexual 
misconduct.  The agent's testimony was followed by the very 
brief testimony of the Department of Corrections employee.  The 
remaining 200 pages of testimony were evenly divided between 
Drs. Doren and Lodl. 
¶82 In his testimony, Dr. Doren did not rely on the 
defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct.  Dr. Doren's testimony 
dealt with the defendant's prior sexual misconduct and the fact 
that all of the defendant's most recent crimes were sexual in 
nature.  Dr. Doren testified that it was his opinion that the 
defendant had the mental disorder paraphilia not-otherwise-
specified and that it was substantially probable that the 
defendant would engage in future sexual violence. 
¶83 Dr. Lodl's testimony primarily sought to refute Dr. 
Doren's diagnosis of paraphilia.  According to Dr. Lodl, the 
defendant's prior history suggested schizophrenia.  Although Dr. 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
24 
 
Lodl referred generally to the defendant's background, he did 
not identify specific instances of the defendant's prior 
misconduct. 
 
Dr. 
Lodl 
asserted 
that 
the 
defendant's 
schizophrenia is not a disorder that predisposes an individual 
to future sexually violent behavior. 
¶84 Thus, this case was largely a battle of the experts.  
The State argues that there was no dispute between these experts 
that the defendant suffered from a mental disorder.  The only 
dispute, according to the State, was whether the defendant's 
mental disorder made it substantially probable that he would 
engage in acts of sexual violence.   
¶85 In closing argument, the State focused exclusively on 
the competing testimony of the two expert witnesses and did not 
mention the defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct. The State 
focused on the three violent sexual acts that the defendant 
concedes are admissible and sought to discredit Dr. Lodl's 
testimony. 
¶86 Defense counsel in closing argument explained that in 
the defendant's long history of treatment, he had repeatedly 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia and that the schizophrenia 
involved hearing voices that had a sexual content.  Defense 
counsel conceded that the defendant had had some other criminal 
convictions and criminal problems going back to his adolescence 
but argued that those related to the onset of the defendant's 
schizophrenia.  Defense counsel did not discuss the defendant's 
prior nonsexual misconduct; he argued that the defendant was 
confounded by the disease of schizophrenia and that it was not 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
25 
 
substantially probable that he would commit acts of sexual 
violence in the future. 
¶87 Between the time that the probation and parole agent 
testified about the defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct and 
the time that the jury entered its verdict, several days elapsed 
and a substantial amount of relevant testimony was heard.  A 
relatively small amount of this testimony related to the 
defendant's prior nonsexual misconduct.  This misconduct did not 
appear to form the basis of either the State's or the 
defendant's case.  Counsel and experts for both the State and 
the defendant focused on the sexual misconduct that the 
defendant concedes is relevant to the disposition of this case.  
The jury does not appear to have been sandbagged by a litany of 
the defendant's irrelevant past wrongs as the competing parties 
urged them toward an ultimate disposition. 
¶88 Applying the harmless error standard to these facts, I 
agree with the State that it appears beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the admission of the evidence of the defendant's prior 
nonsexual misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict.  
¶89 For the reasons set forth, I concur. 
¶90 I am authorized to state the Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
joins this opinion. 
 
No.  00-2426.ssa 
 
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