Title: MASER v. L. & H. WELDING & MACH. CO.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MASER v. L. & H. WELDING & MACH. CO.2000 WY 571 P.3d 642Case Number: 99-211, 99-227Decided: 03/24/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
DOYLE ALEXANDER JR. 
MASER, Appellant (Plaintiff), v.L. AND H. WELDING AND MACHINE COMPANY, a 
Wyoming corporation, d/b/a L & H WELDING & MACHINE COMPANY, Appellee 
(Defendant). DOYLE ALEXANDER JR. MASER, Appellant (Plaintiff), v.L. AND H. WELDING 
AND MACHINE COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation d/b/a L & H WELDING & MACHINE 
COMPANY, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Sweetwater County, Honorable Jere Ryckman, 
Judge.

Clark D. Stith 
of Greenhalgh, Beckwith, Lemich & Stith, P.C., Rock Springs, WY, 
Representing Appellant.Michael Rosenthal, Dominique D.Y. Cone, and 
Ian D. Shaw of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne, WY, Representing 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1] Doyle 
Alexander Jr. Maser1 (Appellant) appeals from a 
determination by the district court that the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act (the Act) provided the exclusive remedy for injuries he 
suffered while an employee of L. and H. Welding and Machine Company (L&H 
Welding). We conclude that the Act constitutes Appellant's exclusive remedy and 
affirm.

[¶2] Appellant 
provides us with the following statement of the issues:

1. Whether an employer 
may be subject to civil liability for work related injuries to a minor who is 
not a "legally employed minor" and thus not an "employee" under Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(vii).

2. Whether the Wyoming 
State Legislature, in amending the definition of "employee" under Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(vii) to include "legally employed minors," intended to exclude minors 
whose employment is illegal under federal child labor 
laws.

3. Whether the District 
Court erred in finding that DJ Maser was a "legally employed minor" under Wyo. 
Stat. § 27-14-102(vii), where DJ Maser was hired for an illegal purpose and his 
only activities were illegal under federal child labor 
laws.

4. Whether the disputed 
fact of whether DJ Maser's job description included any lawful activities is 
material precluding summary judgment, or whether an employment contract is 
voidable where illegal tasks form any part, or a substantial part, of the 
contract for employment.

5. Whether the District 
Court erred in adopting a subjective intent standard for contract formation in 
finding that an employment contract was valid because of the employer's alleged 
subjective intent, at some undetermined time in the future, to request that DJ 
Maser perform some lawful activities in addition to the expressed purpose of 
performing illegal activities.

6. Whether the District 
Court violated Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 6(c)(2) in ruling on L. and H. 
Welding's Motion to Dismiss without a hearing, where a hearing had been timely 
requested.

7. Whether the District 
Court wrongfully held DJ Maser's supplemental affidavit to be untimely, where it 
was submitted at least one day prior to any hearing on L. and H. Welding's 
Motion under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 6(c)(1).

[¶3] L&H 
Welding responds with the following statement of the 
issues:

1. Whether the 
exclusivity provisions of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act bar Appellant's 
lawsuit where Appellant's employer properly paid into the worker's compensation 
fund, where Appellant applied for and received worker's compensation benefits 
and where Appellant was legally employed.

2. Whether the 
exclusivity provisions of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act bar Appellant's 
lawsuit if Appellant's employment was legal under Wyoming law but involved the 
performance of a task which violated the federal Fair Labor Standards 
Act.

3. Whether the District 
Court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion to reconsider the 
order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee.

FACTS

[¶4] In April of 
1997, Appellant, who was sixteen years old, began working part-time for L&H 
Welding. Appellant was put to work cleaning a large, inoperable press brake, 
which, when operational, is used to bend steel. The cleaning procedure required 
that Appellant, using a plastic brush and rags soaked in a flash naphtha 
solvent, scrub off the oil and grease that had accumulated on the press brake. 
Appellant was provided with a bucket of rags and when the rags were no longer 
useable, they were simply discarded in a pile on the floor by the press brake. 
On the day of his accident, Appellant was cleaning the press brake as usual. At 
the same time, two other employees were welding in Appellant's vicinity. The 
proximity of the welding and the highly flammable cleanser unsurprisingly 
combined to create a dangerous environment: Sparks from the welding set 
Appellant's pile of rags on fire. Appellant was severely burned when he 
attempted to extinguish the fire by stamping on the rags. Subsequently, 
Appellant was awarded worker's compensation benefits for his 
injuries.

[¶5] On July 23, 
1998, this action was commenced against L&H Welding alleging negligence, 
negligent hiring, respondent superior, and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress for the injuries sustained by Appellant in the fire. Appellant's action 
was predicated upon his contention that federal law prohibited anyone under the 
age of eighteen years from working on a press brake. Appellant argued that since 
his employment was unlawful, he was not covered by worker's compensation and, 
hence, was able to sue his employer. L&H Welding countered with a motion to 
dismiss based on the exclusivity provisions of the Act.

[¶6] The motion 
to dismiss was converted by the district court into a motion for summary 
judgment. On May 10, 1999, after considering the materials offered by each party 
in support of their respective position, the district court issued a decision 
letter granting summary judgment in favor of L&H Welding. The district court 
concluded that while federal law may have prohibited the type of employment 
Appellant was engaged in when injured, the employment was lawful under Wyoming 
law and, hence, worker's compensation provided Appellant with his exclusive 
remedy. On June 8, 1999, Appellant filed an additional affidavit in rebuttal to 
an affidavit from an L&H Welding employee. Nevertheless, the district court 
affirmed its decision letter through an order issued on June 14, 1999. Appellant 
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on July 19, 1999. The 
district court concluded that the rebuttal affidavit was untimely and concluded 
further, that even if it had been timely, it would not have affected the court's 
decision. Appellant takes his appeal from the district court's orders 
challenging the grant of the summary judgment in favor of L&H Welding and 
the denial of his motion for reconsideration.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7] Our 
standards for reviewing an appeal of a summary judgment order are well 
established:

A summary judgment is 
appropriate when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to be awarded a judgment as a matter of law. Marchant v. Cook, 
967 P.2d 551, 553-54 (Wyo. 1998); Covington v. W.R. Grace-Conn., Inc., 952 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Wyo. 1998); see also W.R.C.P. 52(c). The Wyoming Supreme Court 
evaluates the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards 
and by using the same materials as the district court employed and used. 
Covington, 952 P.2d  at 1106. We examine the record in the light most favorable 
to the party who opposed the motion for a summary judgment, and we give that 
party the benefit of all the favorable inferences that may be fairly drawn from 
the record. Id.; Marchant, 967 P.2d  at 554. We do not accord deference to the 
district court's decisions on issues of law. Ahern v. Tri-County Federal Savings 
Bank, 948 P.2d 896, 897 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶8] Boone v. 
Frontier Refining, Inc., 987 P.2d 681, 685 (Wyo. 1999). The resolution of this 
matter requires us to engage in statutory interpretation, which is a question of 
law. Farmer v. Wyoming Department of Transportation, 986 P.2d 165, 166 (Wyo. 
1999). When interpreting statutes, we look at the "`ordinary and obvious meaning 
of the words employed by the legislature according to the manner in which those 
words are arranged.'" Id. (quoting Parodi v. Wyoming Department of 
Transportation, 947 P.2d 1294, 1295 (Wyo. 1997)). We will abide by the plain 
meaning of a statute if its language is clear and unambiguous. Peterson v. 
Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 989 P.2d 113, 117 (Wyo. 1999). Statutes are 
"construed as a whole with the ordinary and obvious meaning applied to words as 
they are arranged in paragraphs, sentences, clauses and phrases to express the 
intent of the legislature." Id.

DISCUSSION

[¶9] The scope 
of worker's compensation coverage is set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(vii) (LEXIS 1999), which provides in part:

"Employee" means any 
person engaged in any extra-hazardous employment under any appointment, contract 
of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, and includes 
legally employed minors and aliens authorized to work by the United States 
department of justice, immigration and naturalization 
service.

[¶10] (Emphasis 
added.) The core of this dispute centers around the effect of the phrase 
"legally employed minors." Appellant relies upon federal law to support his 
contention that he was not a legally employed minor; specifically, the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, which defines "oppressive child labor" 
as:

a condition of employment 
under which . . . any employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is 
employed by an employer in any occupation which the Secretary of Labor shall 
find and by order declare to be particularly hazardous for the employment of 
children between such ages or detrimental to their health or 
well-being[.]

[¶11] 29 
U.S.C.A. § 203(l) (1998). In accordance with that section, federal regulations 
define the following as hazardous occupations for minors:

(a) Finding and 
declaration of fact. The following occupations are particularly hazardous for 
the employment of minors between 16 and 18 years of age:

(1) The occupations of 
operator of or helper on the following power-driven metal forming, punching, and 
shearing machines:

. . . 
.

(iii) All bending 
machines, such as apron brakes and press brakes.

. . . 
.

(2) The occupations of 
setting up, adjusting, repairing, oiling, or cleaning these machines including 
those with automatic feed and ejection.

[¶12] 29 C.F.R. 
§ 570.59 (1999). Since federal law prohibits the employment of anyone under the 
age of eighteen in an occupation found to be hazardous for minors, Appellant 
asserts that his employment cleaning the press brake was illegal, and, hence, he 
was not covered by worker's compensation. See also 29 C.F.R. § 570.2 (1999).2

[¶13] L&H 
Welding counters with a reference to Wyoming law:

(a) No child under 
sixteen (16) years of age shall be employed, permitted, or allowed to work at, 
in, or in connection with any of the following occupations, or at any of the 
following kinds of work except for the purpose of instruction in the public 
schools:

(i) The operation of or 
working on heavy construction equipment;

(ii) Employment requiring 
contact with or exposure to explosives or dangerous chemicals; or in any other 
occupation declared by the department of employment as hazardous, for the 
employment of children under sixteen (16) years of age.

(b) The department of 
employment is hereby authorized to declare any occupation hazardous for the 
employment of children under sixteen (16) years of age.

[¶14] Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-6-112 (LEXIS 1999). L&H Welding contends that since Appellant was 
sixteen years old at the time he was working on the press brake, his employment 
was lawful under Wyoming law and, hence, worker's compensation provides the 
exclusive remedy for his injuries.

[¶15] In 1996, 
the legislature amended § 27-14-102(a)(vii) to include, among other things, the 
phrases "legally employed minors" and "aliens authorized to work by the United 
States department of justice, immigration and naturalization service." 1995 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws, Ch. 121. Taking the plain, unambiguous language of that statute, we 
conclude that the legislature intended for Wyoming law to define whether a minor 
was "legally employed." Unlike the following phrase related to aliens, "legally 
employed minors" is not modified by a subsequent phrase directing us 
specifically towards federal law as the defining authority of whether that 
particular type of employee is covered by worker's compensation. See Felix v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 986 P.2d 161, 
163-64 (Wyo. 1999). Obviously, since the legislature included a reference to 
federal law in conjunction with the worker's compensation coverage of aliens and 
if such was its intent in regard to minors, then the legislature could have 
easily chosen to include a similar reference. That it chose not to do so is 
telling, especially in light of the fact that Wyoming law provides standards for 
the legal employment of minors.

[¶16] In support 
of its decision, the district court relied upon Boyd v. Permian Servicing Co., 
Inc., 825 P.2d 611 (N.M. 1992).3 In that case, a sixteen-year-old 
was killed while working on a power-driven hoisting device in violation of the 
Federal Fair Labor Standards Act. Nevertheless, the New Mexico court ruled that 
state law defined the scope of legal employment under that state's worker's 
compensation act:

The New Mexico 
Legislature has enacted child labor laws under which the employment in question 
is legal for sixteen-year-old workers. NMSA 1978, § 50-6-4 (Repl.Pamp. 1988) (no 
child under the age of sixteen shall be employed, inter alia, on or around a 
power-driven hoisting apparatus). On this point, the state and federal laws are 
in conflict. When employment that is illegal under federal penal statutes is not 
the subject of specific state legislative policy to the contrary, we likely will 
be disposed to apply the Maynerich [v. Little Bear Enters., 82 N.M. 650, 485 P.2d 984 (Ct.App. 1971)]4 doctrine in favor of the workers' 
option. We would infer that to be the intention of the legislature. We cannot, 
of course, recognize a policy inconsistent with a declaration of the 
legislature. Here, we conclude the legislature's specific consideration of the 
employment of sixteen-year-old workers was sufficient to reflect an intent that 
the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act apply to such 
employment.

Boyd, 825 P.2d  
at 613-14.

[¶17] Similarly, 
we conclude that in the absence of a specific legislative directive to apply 
federal law, state law applies. The legislature has deemed the employment of 
sixteen-year-old minors in the job at issue here to be legal. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-6-112 (LEXIS 1999). We note that what is at issue here is the scope of 
worker's compensation coverage, not the validity of § 27-6-112 as a safety 
regulation in light of the apparent conflict with federal law. It is within the 
legislature's province to determine the scope of worker's compensation coverage, 
and we will not disturb that judgment.

[¶18] Finally, 
Appellant argues that the district court erred when it concluded that his 
affidavit in rebuttal was late. The district court denied the admission of the 
affidavit, but it noted that even if it had considered the affidavit, the 
decision would have remained the same. We have reviewed the affidavit and concur 
with the district court's determination. Error, if any, in the denial of the 
affidavit's admission was harmless.

CONCLUSION

[¶19] Absent a 
specific directive from the legislature, we will apply Wyoming law to define the 
parameters of worker's compensation coverage. In this instance, Wyoming law 
indicates that Appellant's employment was lawful. Therefore, we affirm the 
district court's determination that the provisions of our Worker's Compensation 
Act provide the exclusive means of Appellant's recovery for his 
injuries.

[¶20] 
Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Initially, 
this action was commenced on Appellant's behalf by his parents because he was a 
minor. Appellant attained the age of majority during the course of the 
proceedings below and, on July 23, 1999, the district court granted a motion to 
substitute Appellant as the plaintiff.

2 A question 
was raised as to whether or not cleaning an inoperable machine of this type 
would even fall within the purview of this statute. However, as the answer to 
the question is not pertinent to our analysis, we will not consider 
it.

3 Several 
other states have ruled that even if a minor is employed in violation of federal 
safety laws, worker's compensation provides the exclusive remedy. See Estep v. 
Janler Plastic Mold Corporation, 297 N.E.2d 341 (1st App.Ill. 1973), aff'd, 312 N.E.2d 618 (Ill. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1109 (1975); Bruley v. Fonda 
Group, Inc., 595 A.2d 269 (Vt. 1991); Rangel v. Denton Plastics, Inc., 939 P.2d 644 (Or.App. 1997); Noble v. Blume Tree Services, Inc., 646 So. 2d 441 (La.App. 1 
Cir. 1994); Estate of Kimmell v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 993 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 
1993); Jensen v. Sport Bowl, Inc., 469 P.2d N.W.2d 370 (S.D. 1991); In re 
Lockard, 285 P.2d 473 (Idaho 1955); and Gaston v. San Ore Construction Co., 477 P.2d 956 (Kan. 1970). Each of these cases, however, reached their result 
relying, at least in part, on the rule of "liberal construction." Wyoming does 
not follow the common law rule of "liberal construction." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-101(b) (LEXIS 1999). In our decision we rely on only the New Mexico case, 
since that state does not follow the common law rule either. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 
52-5-1 (Michie 1991).

4 Maynerich 
held that when a minor was employed under a contract made invalid by the State 
Child Labor Law, they could sue for personal injury under the common law or take 
the worker's compensation benefits at their discretion. 485 P.2d  at 
986.