Title: Griffin v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-01 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL JOSEPH GRIFFIN  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1894 
____________ 
 
MICHAEL JOSEPH GRIFFIN  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MICHAEL D. CREWS, etc.  
Respondent. 
 
[May 16, 2013] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Michael Joseph Griffin appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
motion to vacate his conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death filed 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  Griffin also petitions this Court 
 
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for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. 
Const.  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s order denying 
relief on the claims relating to Griffin’s guilty plea and an alleged Brady violation 
and granting relief on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty 
phase.  We also deny his petition for habeas relief as the claim in the petition 
should have been raised in the postconviction motion at the trial court and is 
therefore procedurally barred. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Griffin pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder in the deaths of 
husband and wife Tom and Patricia McCallops at the Service America Corporation 
location in Pinellas County in 1995.  Griffin had worked as a service and repair 
technician for his father’s refrigeration company after he graduated from high 
school in 1989.  Griffin provided service to the refrigerators and coolers at the 
Service America warehouse for a number of years and became very familiar with 
its business practices, including that a great deal of cash was deposited daily in 
lockers at the warehouse by the drivers who collected the coins from vending 
machines at various sites.  When Griffin became addicted to cocaine, he stopped 
working for his father’s company and moved out of the house he shared with his 
wife.  Griffin moved in with a drug dealer acquaintance, Nicolas Kocolis, and 
another drug addict named Anthony Lopez.   
 
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Griffin came up with a plan to steal money from the Service America 
lockers and convinced Lopez to assist him.  Kocolis was initially going to 
participate in the crime, but decided against it.  Prior to going to Service America, 
Griffin traded his gold chain to Kocolis for a nine millimeter pistol that he intended 
to use during the theft.  Griffin also possessed a shotgun that was used during the 
crime.  Griffin realized that he would not be able to get into Service America 
because of the locked gate and the alarm system.  However, Griffin hoped that an 
employee would recognize him from his past work on the refrigeration equipment 
and thus let him into the warehouse.  Griffin and Lopez waited at a bar across from 
the warehouse on the night of October 6, but no employee arrived at the warehouse 
that night.  The two men went back to the bar the next night and waited again.  
Service America employee McCallops and his wife arrived and, as Griffin hoped, 
McCallops recognized him and let him into the facility.  Once inside, Griffin and 
Lopez wielded their weapons.  Lopez locked the husband and wife inside a cooler, 
while Griffin opened the money lockers with a crowbar.  There was some dispute 
about who actually shot the McCallopses, but both victims were killed by 
gunshots.  Tom sustained one shotgun wound that severed his aorta and four other 
wounds from a handgun.  Patricia suffered two handgun wounds, one in the head 
and one in the chest.  Griffin testified that he heard Lopez shoot Tom with the 
shotgun when Tom attempted to get up from the floor.  However, other witnesses 
 
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testified that Griffin had stated that he went back inside the facility after the money 
bags were removed and shot Tom McCallops with the shotgun and then told Lopez 
to finish the job with the handgun.  Immediately after the murders and robbery, 
Griffin had a party at a hotel suite, where his guests were served champagne and 
cocaine. 
 
The State informed Griffin’s defense counsel that the victims’ families were 
amenable to a life sentence if both defendants pled guilty to the murders.  Although 
Griffin denied killing the McCallopses, he pled guilty to the charges and accepted 
the factual basis of the plea.  He stated that he felt responsible for what happened 
because he had taken Lopez with him to Service America.  However, Lopez  was 
unable to accept the plea when he developed severe mental problems and was 
institutionalized in order to restore his competency to stand trial. 
 
At the penalty phase, Griffin waived an advisory jury, any presentence 
investigation report, and a Spencer1
                                         
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).  
 hearing.  Griffin presented evidence during a 
two-day penalty phase proceeding before the judge.  After hearing evidence and 
considering memoranda from both sides, the trial court sentenced Griffin to death 
on both murder counts in July 1998.  The trial court found four aggravating factors:  
(1) a previous conviction of another capital offense (based on the other conviction 
of first-degree murder of the victims); (2) the murders were committed during a 
 
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kidnapping; (3) the murders were committed to avoid arrest; and (4) the murders 
were committed for pecuniary gain.  The trial court found the statutory mitigator of 
no significant prior criminal history.  The court also found that Griffin had partly 
established the mitigating factor that he was an accomplice in the capital felony 
committed by another; established his family background as a loving son, brother, 
and father and a hard worker; exhibited good jail conduct and courtroom behavior; 
and displayed remorse for his actions.  The court rejected Griffin’s age of twenty 
five at the time of the murder and his mental and emotional problems as mitigating 
factors.  While the court found that drug usage and dependency had been 
established, it gave this very little weight because there was no testimony that 
Griffin committed the crime while under the influence of drugs or that his ability to 
comprehend what was going on was impaired by drugs. 
 
On appeal, this Court affirmed Griffin’s convictions and the death sentences.  
Griffin v. State, 820 So. 2d 906, 917 (Fla. 2002).  Griffin raised three issues on 
appeal:  (1) the validity of his waiver of a jury during the penalty phase; (2) the 
failure of the trial court to consider his potential for rehabilitation as a mitigating 
circumstance; and (3) that the kidnapping and pecuniary gain aggravators 
constituted improper doubling.  Even though not raised by Griffin, we also 
addressed the proportionality of his death sentences.  We found the waiver issue 
was procedurally barred on appeal because Griffin did not move to withdraw his 
 
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plea at the trial court.  Id. at 913.  We found no merit to the two other claims and 
found the death sentences to be proportionate. 
 
Griffin filed his initial postconviction motion in August 2003, raising eleven 
claims.  The trial court granted an evidentiary hearing on three of Griffin’s claims:  
(1) that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt phase; (2) 
that Griffin was not afforded adequate assistance of a mental health expert; and (3) 
that counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase.  The court 
reserved ruling on a claim of cumulative error, but denied the remaining claims. 
 
After codefendant Lopez’s trial was completed in 2005, Griffin filed an 
amended motion in which he amended the three claims to be heard at the 
evidentiary hearing.  After the trial judge granted a motion to disqualify himself, 
the case was assigned to a new judge who also served as the administrative judge 
for the circuit.  Due to this judge’s busy schedule and the large number of 
witnesses to be heard, the evidentiary hearing was conducted over the course of 
fourteen months, concluding in February 2008.  Griffin filed a number of amended 
motions, including a new claim of a Brady violation based on the testimony of the 
hearing witnesses.  In September 2007, Griffin also filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170.  In November 
2008, the trial court entered an order granting Griffin a new penalty phase 
proceeding based on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the 
 
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penalty phase, but denying the remaining claims and Griffin’s motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea.  Sua sponte, the court also addressed the validity of Griffin’s death 
sentences in light of Lopez’s subsequent life sentences for the same crimes, but 
concluded that it lacked “sufficient record evidence to satisfactorily weigh the 
culpability of Defendant Griffin to co-defendant Lopez” and could not say whether 
the relief granted to Griffin (i.e., a new penalty phase proceeding) might have been 
further justified by Lopez’s subsequent life sentence. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
Both parties filed timely notices of appeal.  Griffin raises several 
postconviction claims:  (1) that he should have been able to withdraw his guilty 
plea; (2) that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the guilt phase through 
various actions that affected Griffin’s decision to accept the guilty plea; and (3) 
that the State committed a Brady2
                                         
 
2.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 violation based on an alleged immunity deal 
given to the drug dealer Kocolis for statements he made to the police.  On cross-
appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting Griffin a new penalty 
phase proceeding based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  Griffin has also filed 
a habeas petition, claiming that his death sentence is disparate and disproportionate 
based on the newly discovered evidence of the subsequent life sentence of his 
codefendant Lopez.  We address each claim in turn below. 
 
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1.  Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
 
Griffin was sentenced to death on July 10, 1998, on each of two counts of 
first-degree murder.  He filed a motion to withdraw plea pursuant to Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l) on September 25, 2007.  The trial court dismissed 
this motion to withdraw plea, noting that the rule requires that such a motion be 
filed within thirty days of rendition of sentence and Griffin’s motion was filed nine 
years after his sentence was rendered.  Citing the district court decision in Gafford 
v. State, 783 So. 2d 1191, 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), the trial court explained that 
the thirty-day limit is jurisdictional and thus the court did not have the authority to 
consider Griffin’s rule 3.170(l) motion.  Griffin argues that the limit is not 
jurisdictional and that other courts have granted motions to withdraw that were 
filed outside the rule’s time limit.  In particular, Griffin cites this Court’s decision 
in Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1996), and the Second District’s decision 
in Johnson v. State, 834 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), as examples where courts 
have accepted motions to withdraw pleas that were filed outside the thirty-day 
limit. 
 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l) permits a “defendant who 
pleads guilty or nolo contendere without expressly reserving the right to appeal a 
legally dispositive issue [to] file a motion to withdraw the plea within thirty days 
 
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after rendition of the sentence, but only upon the grounds specified in Florida Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii)(a)-(e).”  These grounds include an 
involuntary plea.   However, once sentence has been imposed, a defendant must 
demonstrate a manifest injustice requiring correction in order to withdraw a plea.  
State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2003).  The denial of a motion to withdraw 
plea is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.  White v. State, 15 So. 3d 
833, 835 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). 
 
We conclude that neither Kilgore nor Johnson specifically support Griffin’s 
argument regarding his rule 3.170(l) motion.  In Kilgore, the defendant was 
indicted for first-degree murder and possession of contraband by an inmate.  
Kilgore pled nolo contendere to both charges.  When a death sentence was 
announced, Kilgore moved to withdraw his plea on the grounds that his attorney 
had mistakenly advised him that the death sentence would not be imposed because 
of the plea.  Although Kilgore had already filed a notice of appeal, this Court 
relinquished jurisdiction to the circuit court in order for it to address the motion.  
The motion to withdraw plea was granted and Kilgore was subsequently tried by a 
jury.  688 So. 2d at 897.  There is no discussion of exactly when Kilgore’s motion 
to withdraw plea was filed, just that it was filed after sentencing.  Thus, Kilgore’s 
motion to withdraw plea could have been filed within the rule’s time limit and the 
case does not support Griffin’s argument regarding the time limit.  
 
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In Johnson, the Second District determined that it was improper not to allow 
the defendant to withdraw his plea under the special circumstances of the case, 
which are very different from those presented here.  Johnson pled guilty to two 
counts of armed robbery without an agreement as to the sentences that would be 
imposed.  Johnson, 834 So. 2d at 385-86.  Johnson was aware that he faced 
potential life sentences under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act 
(“Act”), but was sentenced to separate thirty-year sentences.  The State objected, 
arguing that life sentences were mandatory under the Act unless one of the 
statutory exceptions applied.  On appeal, the Second District affirmed Johnson’s 
sentences on the basis that the trial court had discretion to determine whether a 
defendant should be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender under the Act.  
However, this Court quashed the Second District’s opinion on the basis of its 
decision in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000), which held that the Act 
established minimum mandatory sentences and removed sentencing discretion 
from the judicial branch.  Id. at 385.  On remand, the trial court denied Johnson’s 
attempt to withdraw his plea.  On appeal after remand and resentencing to life 
sentences, the Second District concluded that Johnson should have been permitted 
to withdraw his plea because it was based on a misapprehension as to the sentences 
that the trial court could impose.  When Johnson entered his plea, both he and his 
counsel believed that the trial court had discretion to impose something other than 
 
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mandatory life sentences, that they would have the opportunity to present 
information supporting the imposition of lesser sentences, and that the judge who 
accepted the plea had acknowledged that Johnson could present witnesses to speak 
on his behalf at sentencing to present mitigation.  Id. at 385-86.  However, because 
Johnson’s case was remanded by this Court for resentencing under the Act, 
Johnson sought to withdraw his plea before his sentencing, which would have been 
pursuant to rule 3.170(f) rather than rule 3.170(l) as in the instant case.3
 
Griffin argues that courts have broad discretion in determining motions to 
withdraw a plea and the court should exercise that discretion liberally in favor of a 
defendant withdrawing his plea.  See, e.g., Adler v. State, 382 So. 2d 1298, 1300 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (“A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty prior to imposition of 
sentence should be liberally construed in favor of the defendant.”).  However, this 
is clearly the standard applicable to rule 3.170(f), which expressly states that a 
court has discretion in this matter “at any time before a sentence.”  As this Court 
explained in Partlow, subdivision (l), which applies to motions to withdraw a plea 
 
                                         
 
3.  Johnson does not expressly state under which rule relief was sought.  
However, the opinion does state that a trial court should allow a defendant to 
withdraw a plea when the defendant establishes that the plea was entered “under 
mental weakness, mistake, surprise, misapprehension, fear, promise, or other 
circumstances affecting the defendant’s rights.”  834 So. 2d at 385.   This is the 
standard set forth for motions filed under rule 3.170(f) which might be based on 
any one or a combination of grounds.  Further, the cases cited by the Second 
District in Johnson for this proposition involved motions filed under rule 3.170(f).   
 
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that are filed after sentencing, “allows withdrawal of a plea only on the limited 
grounds listed in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b).”  840 So. 2d at 
1042.  Thus, a court does not enjoy broad discretion as to motions filed after 
sentencing.  A number of district courts have correctly held that failure to file a 
motion to withdraw the plea within thirty days waives the issue for appellate 
review, and the defendant is limited to filing a motion pursuant to applicable 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 or 3.851.  See, e.g., McKnight v. State, 
964 So. 2d 803, 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Dayton v. State, 867 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2004); Weidner v. State, 767 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing Griffin’s rule 3.170(l) motion to withdraw plea and we affirm that 
ruling. 
2.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding Guilty Plea 
 
The trial court noted that an involuntary plea claim based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel can be raised pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.851 and evaluated under the Strickland4
                                         
 
4.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 test.  Griffin raised a postconviction 
claim regarding the voluntariness of his plea based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the guilt phase proceedings, which he contended rendered his plea 
involuntary.  The court assessed this claim under the two-prong Strickland 
 
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standard and denied relief on each of Griffin’s five separate arguments regarding 
counsel’s ineffectiveness, namely:  (1) counsel gave him erroneous advice; (2) 
counsel failed to find and present expert evidence regarding his cocaine use and 
possible cognitive problems; (3) counsel failed to present evidence that Kocolis 
was the mastermind behind the robbery; (4) counsel failed to make a plea offer to 
the State that did not involve a package deal with Griffin’s codefendant; and (5) 
counsel failed to consider and present a voluntary intoxication defense. 
 
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the United States Supreme Court 
established a two-prong test for determining claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel relating to guilty pleas.  The first prong is the same as the deficient 
performance prong of Strickland, that is, the defendant must specifically identify 
acts or omissions of counsel that were manifestly outside the wide range of 
reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional norms.  Hill, 474 
U.S. at 58-59; see also Lynch v. State, 2 So. 3d 47, 56-57 (Fla. 2008).  As to the 
second prong, the Supreme Court held that a defendant must demonstrate “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”   Hill, 474 U.S. at 
59; see also Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176, 1181 (Fla. 2004).  The defendant 
does not have to show that he actually would have prevailed at trial, but the 
strength of the government’s case against the defendant should be considered in 
 
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evaluating whether the defendant really would have gone to trial if he had received 
adequate advice from his counsel.  Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d at 1181.  Counsel’s 
effectiveness is determined according to the totality of the circumstances.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).  Therefore, in determining 
whether a reasonable probability exists that the defendant would have insisted on 
going to trial, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the plea, including such factors as whether a particular defense was likely to 
succeed at trial, the colloquy between the defendant and the trial court at the time 
of the plea, and the difference between the sentence imposed under the plea and the 
maximum possible sentence the defendant faced at trial.  Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d at 
1181-82.  “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the 
conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process 
that renders the result unreliable.”  Lynch, 2 So. 3d at 57 (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687).   
 
The trial court found that not only the claims relating to counsel’s erroneous 
advice about the sentence, but also that the claims of failure to investigate Kocolis’ 
involvement in the crime, failure to seek a plea deal that did not involve 
codefendant Lopez, and failure to consider or present a voluntary intoxication 
defense were refuted by the record.  The court determined that Griffin failed to 
 
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demonstrate prejudice on his other claim that trial counsel failed to find and 
present expert evidence.  We address each of these subclaims in turn below.   
 
Griffin contends that his plea was involuntary because counsel led him to 
believe that he was going to get a life sentence if he entered a guilty plea.  While 
both of Griffin’s trial counsel believed that Griffin would be sentenced to life, they 
also testified that they understood that the State was seeking the death penalty.  
The record shows that Griffin entered his plea knowing that he did not have an 
agreed-upon, guaranteed sentence and that death was the maximum sentence that 
could be imposed.  During the plea colloquy, the trial court advised Griffin that he 
was facing the death penalty or life without the possibility of parole.  The record 
also shows that counsel consulted with Griffin about his plea, that Griffin knew the 
potential sentences he was facing, and that he stated that he was entering the plea 
knowingly and voluntarily.  Counsel also testified that Griffin was extremely 
remorseful and ready to plead guilty even before most of the discovery was 
complete.  At the plea colloquy in December 1997, Griffin expressed his 
affirmative understanding that the two possible sentences were death and life in 
prison without the possibility of parole. 5
                                         
 
5.  The original plea form erroneously provided that a life sentence would be 
for a twenty-five year minimum mandatory term, which was not the law at the time 
Griffin committed the murders or when he entered his guilty plea.  When this error 
was brought to the judge’s attention at the beginning of Griffin’s penalty phase 
proceeding in December 1997, the judge took a brief recess and permitted counsel 
   
 
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Griffin also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to errors 
and omissions in the plea colloquy.  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172 
governs the taking of pleas in criminal cases.  This rule provides basic procedures 
designed to ensure that a defendant's rights are fully protected when he or she 
enters a plea to a criminal charge.  Hall v. State, 316 So. 2d 279, 280 (Fla. 1975).  
Under rule 3.172(c), a determination of voluntariness must be made based on a 
court inquiry to determine that the defendant understands:  (1) the nature of the 
charge and the mandatory minimum and maximum penalties provided by law; (2) 
that he or she has a right to an attorney and that one will be appointed if necessary; 
(3) that the defendant has the right to plead not guilty and to be tried by a jury with 
assistance of counsel, the right to compel attendance of witnesses and to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate 
himself or herself; (4) that a plea represents a forfeit of the right to appeal all 
matters relating to the judgment unless expressly reserved; (5) that there will be no 
trial; (6) that the trial judge may examine the defendant under oath about the 
offense and that the answers may be later used against the defendant; (7) the 
                                                                                                                                   
to discuss this matter with Griffin and his family members in the courtroom.  After 
the recess, the judge conducted a colloquy as to Griffin’s understanding that the 
two possible sentences were death and life without possibility of parole.  Griffin 
expressed his affirmative understanding as to the two possible sentences and still 
chose to enter a guilty plea. 
 
 
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defendant must meet all terms of any plea agreement; and (8) that a plea may 
subject the defendant to deportation if he or she is not a United States citizen.  See 
also Gill v. State, 14 So. 3d 946, 960-61 (Fla. 2009).  Notably, the rule also 
provides that “[f]ailure to follow any of the procedures in this rule shall not render 
a plea void absent a showing of prejudice.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(j).  Mere 
irregularity in the plea colloquy is not a basis for relief.  Lubin v. State, 760 So. 2d 
241, 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). 
 
Griffin cites two errors in the plea colloquy that resulted in alleged 
prejudice.6
                                         
 
6.  First, the trial judge mischaracterized the role of the penalty phase jury 
when he stated that the jury could still recommend a death sentence “after hearing 
the aggravating circumstances” but without mentioning that the jury would also 
hear the mitigating circumstances.  Second, the trial judge erroneously stated that 
Griffin’s plea would preclude him from challenging “counsels’ job as it relates to 
the guilt phase.”  Trial counsel did not object to either statement. 
  While the statements that Griffin cites may have constituted error, 
Griffin suffered no prejudice from them.  See Wuornos v. State, 676 So. 2d 966, 
969-70 (Fla. 1995) (concluding that defendant suffered no prejudice when the State 
presented without objection a detailed factual basis to accept the plea, the overall 
thrust of the conversation between the trial court and the defendant indicated that 
she knew the import of her plea, and the trial court had established that the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily signed a detailed form which met all 
requirements imposed by law).  Without objection from Griffin, the State provided 
 
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a detailed factual basis for accepting his plea;7
 
As to the claim that trial counsel failed to find and present expert evidence 
for a defense based on cocaine delirium, the court found that Griffin failed to 
demonstrate prejudice.  Griffin presented testimony from two experts at the 
evidentiary hearing, neurologist Dr. Thomas Hyde and professor of neurology and 
 the court conducted a thorough 
colloquy during which Griffin indicated that he knew the import of his plea; and 
Griffin knowingly and voluntarily signed the change of plea form.  Thus, we affirm 
the trial court’s denial of this claim. 
                                         
 
7.  The prosecutor presented the following factual basis for accepting 
Griffin’s plea.  Griffin, along with codefendant Anthony Lopez, had been charged 
in a two-count indictment for an offense that occurred on October 7, 1995, at the 
Service America on Gim Gong Road in Oldsmar, Pinellas County, Florida.  Griffin 
and Lopez entered the business of Service America by trickery and deceit.  Griffin 
had previously worked for a company that had a contract to repair freezers at 
Service America and was thus known by several of the warehouse employees at 
Service America.  Griffin and Lopez went to the front gate of the business during 
the evening hours of October 7, 1995.  Tom McCallops, who was a warehouse 
employee at Service America, and his wife Patricia McCallops, who was not 
employed by Service America but was substituting for one of the truck drivers, 
were present at the business.  Tom McCallops knew Griffin, who entered under the 
guise of fixing one of the freezers.  The McCallopses were walked at gunpoint to 
one of the coolers and locked inside.  Griffin and Lopez forcefully opened several 
metal money lockers at Service America and removed in excess of $8,000 in 
United States currency.  After removing the money, Griffin and Lopez returned to 
the cooler and fired their guns at the McCallopses from the door of the cooler.  
Both Tom and Patricia McCallops died from the gunshots fired by Griffin and 
Lopez.  Griffin’s blood was found on one of the metal lockers and also on the 
floor.  Both Griffin and Lopez admitted their involvement to several of their 
friends, but made no confessions to law enforcement after their arrest.  Griffin’s 
counsel stated that these were the facts as he understood them based on his 
discovery. 
 
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pharmacology Dr. Deborah Mash.  Both experts testified about Griffin’s cocaine 
use and possible cognitive problems related to a childhood brain injury.  The State 
presented testimony from neuropsychologist Dr. Sidney Merin, who testified that 
there was no evidence that Griffin suffered from brain damage and that none of 
Griffin’s IQ scores fell below the average range.   
 
Under Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, prejudice is shown by “a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial.”  Where a defendant claims ineffective 
assistance on the ground that counsel failed to advise him of a viable defense, 
counsel’s consideration of that defense is relevant to whether counsel performed 
deficiently and also informs the credibility of the assertion that the defendant 
would have gone to trial if he had been told of the defense.  Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d 
at 1181-82.  The viability of a defense is also relevant to determining whether 
counsel performed deficiently.  Id. at 1182.  In determining whether that 
reasonable probability exists, a court should consider the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the plea, including whether a particular defense was 
likely to succeed at trial, the colloquy at the time of trial, and the difference 
between the sentence imposed under the guilty plea and the maximum possible 
sentence that the defendant faced at trial.  Id. at 1181-82.   
 
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Griffin has not demonstrated that counsel’s failure to present this expert 
testimony at trial creates a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial instead.  While Griffin’s two 
experts presented evidence relating to his cocaine use and possible cognitive 
problems related to his childhood brain injury, they also presented evidence that 
Griffin’s deliberate actions and planning were not consistent with someone 
suffering from cocaine delirium.  The experts testified that Griffin chose the target 
of the robbery, was actively involved in planning the robbery, and obtained the 
weapons used to kill the victims.  The experts’ testimony corroborated the physical 
evidence and witness testimony about Griffin’s involvement.  Additionally, Griffin 
did not present any evidence or testimony that if he had known about this expert 
testimony, he would not have pleaded guilty.  See Lawrence v. State, 969 So. 2d 
294, 308 (Fla. 2007) (concluding that defendant had not demonstrated prejudice 
relating to guilty plea).  Trial counsel also testified that Griffin was remorseful 
about his involvement in the crime and ready to enter a plea even before the 
discovery process was complete.  The testimony presented at the evidentiary 
hearing confirmed that Griffin’s decision to plead guilty was based on his belief 
that a plea would provide a better chance of avoiding the death penalty.  See 
Lawrence, 969 So. 2d at 308.  Moreover, the sentence imposed under Griffin’s plea 
was the same as the maximum possible sentence that he faced at trial.  See 
 
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Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d at 1182.  Thus, Griffin has failed to prove prejudice on this 
claim and is not entitled to relief. 
 
Griffin also asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 
evidence about Nicolas Kocolis’ involvement in planning the robbery and that 
Griffin would not have entered a guilty plea if he had been aware of this evidence.  
The trial court found this claim to be refuted by the record.  At the evidentiary 
hearing, Griffin’s counsel testified that he had hired an investigator to obtain 
information about Kocolis, but Kocolis was uncooperative and refused to talk to 
counsel or the investigator.  At the evidentiary hearing, Kocolis testified about the 
statements he had made to the police and the state attorney after the crime, 
including that Griffin had told him that he knew where there was a large amount of 
money and had asked Kocolis to help him steal the money.  Kocolis also testified 
that he turned down Griffin’s request.  However, when Kocolis was asked 
questions that could implicate him in the planning or cover-up of the crime, he 
invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination8
                                         
 
8.  “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself.”  U.S. Const. amend. V.   
 and refused to 
answer these questions at the evidentiary hearing.  Kocolis also asserted that he 
had been granted immunity by the State for any incriminating information that he 
gave the police about the crime.  An assistant state attorney testified that the State 
 
- 22 - 
had considered charging Kocolis in the crime, but concluded there was not 
“enough evidence to be able to make everything stick.”  Thus, Kocolis was never 
prosecuted in connection with this case.  Other evidentiary hearing witnesses 
presented contradictory evidence about Kocolis’ involvement in planning the 
robbery.  However, Griffin’s own penalty phase testimony refuted the allegation 
that Kocolis was the “mastermind” behind the robbery.  Griffin admitted that he 
came up with the idea for the robbery and planned out the details based on his 
knowledge of Service America’s business practices and physical layout.  Based on 
this evidence, we agree with the trial court that Griffin is not entitled to relief on 
this claim. 
 
Griffin argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a plea 
offer to the State that did not involve his codefendant Lopez.  The trial court found 
this claim to be refuted by the record, and indeed it is.  After trial counsel learned 
that the victims’ family was not in favor of the death penalty, counsel asked if the 
State would be willing to accept a guilty plea from both codefendants in exchange 
for life sentences.   The State assented, but made it clear that such a plea 
arrangement was a “package deal,” i.e., both codefendants had to enter a guilty 
plea.  Because Lopez became incompetent shortly after his arrest and remained in a 
state hospital for four years, a joint plea could not be entered.  Even so, Griffin’s 
counsel continued to approach the State with a renewed offer to plead without 
 
- 23 - 
Lopez.  However, the State refused the offer.  Thus, counsel’s performance was not 
deficient in this regard.  
 
Finally, Griffin argues that his trial counsel failed to consider or present a 
voluntary intoxication defense.  The trial court concluded that this claim was 
refuted by the evidence because counsel did consider the defense, had strategic 
reasons for not pursuing it, and advised Griffin of the shortcomings of that defense 
under the facts of his case. 
 
Lead counsel testified that he was aware of Griffin’s cocaine use around the 
time of the crime and had considered using a voluntary intoxication defense to set 
up the penalty phase.  However, counsel also testified that he considered a 
voluntary intoxication defense to be a “last resort” because juries were very 
unlikely to give a person a break for voluntarily taking drugs and using that as a 
defense for something they then did to another person.   Counsel also testified that 
the evidence showed that Griffin exercised goal-related judgment to increase the 
likelihood that the robbery would be successful and that he would not get caught.  
Even though Griffin was using cocaine during the time leading up to the crime, he 
obtained a firearm, staked out the robbery location, consciously decided not to 
commit the robbery on the day before because there was no one at the business to 
help him circumvent the alarm system and the locked gate, drove from Brandon to 
Oldsmar to commit the robbery, and devised a plan to get around the security 
 
- 24 - 
system.  This evidence belied a voluntary intoxication defense based on cocaine 
use, which generally causes some lack of control and increased impulsivity.  See 
Stewart v. State, 801 So. 2d 59, 65 (Fla. 2001) (holding that counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to present voluntary intoxication defense where counsel 
determined that defense would be inappropriate given defendant’s detailed account 
of the crime). 
 
Counsel also testified that he did not think it would be appropriate to set up 
the penalty phase by presenting a voluntary intoxication defense during the guilt 
phase because of Griffin’s behavior after the murders.  Counsel explained that after 
Griffin murdered the two victims and left them in the freezer at Service America, 
he took the money from the robbery, rented a hotel suite, ordered champagne, and 
threw a party with his friends.  Counsel discussed this and the other facts of the 
case9
                                         
 
9.  These facts included:  witnesses identified Griffin as the driver of the van 
used in the robbery; tire tracks at the crime scene matched Griffin’s van; shotgun 
shells, money wrappers and other evidence linking Griffin to the crime were found 
in his van; and State witnesses would testify that Griffin had admitted his 
participation in the shootings. 
 with Griffin before advising him to enter a guilty plea, rather than go to trial 
with a voluntary intoxication defense.  Id.   Counsel advised Griffin not to pursue 
this defense, and Griffin followed his advice.  Moreover, counsel’s advice was an 
informed and reasoned strategic decision based on his judgment that it would not 
 
- 25 - 
be an effective defense under the facts of the case.  Such strategic decisions by 
counsel will not be second guessed on postconviction.  Id.   
 
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 
postconviction relief on Griffin’s claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance as to his guilty plea. 
3.  Brady Violation 
 
Griffin also asserts that the State committed a violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), based on an alleged immunity deal given to the 
drug dealer Kocolis for statements he made to the police.  The trial court denied 
relief on this claim after conducting an evidentiary hearing.  The court concluded 
that Griffin had not been able to establish any of the factors required for a Brady 
violation. 
 
Brady requires the State to disclose material information within its 
possession or control that is favorable to the defense.  Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 
2d 161, 168 (Fla. 2004).  To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the 
burden to show (1) that favorable evidence—either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) 
was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the 
evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); see also Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000).  
To meet the materiality prong, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable 
 
- 26 - 
probability that had the suppressed evidence been disclosed the jury would have 
reached a different verdict.  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.  A reasonable probability is 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Way, 760 So.2d 
at 913; see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290. 
Postconviction Brady claims present mixed questions of law and fact.  Where 
the trial court has conducted an evidentiary hearing, this Court will defer to the 
factual findings of the trial court that are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence, but will review the application of the law to the facts de novo.  Sochor v. 
State, 883 So. 2d 766, 785 (Fla. 2004); see also Lowe v. State, 2 So. 3d 21, 29 (Fla. 
2008).  Moreover, “this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the 
weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.”  Lowe, 2 So. 3d at 30 
(quoting Blanco v. State, 702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997)). 
 
The trial court found Kocolis’ claim that he was granted immunity not 
credible.  This determination is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  
There was conflicting evidence about whether Kocolis was granted immunity.  
Kocolis testified that he had been given immunity by the State.  However, assistant 
state attorney Bruce Bartlett testified that he never offered Kocolis immunity and 
that he did not have authority to offer immunity without getting approval from the 
state attorney.  Bartlett also testified that at one point the state attorney was 
 
- 27 - 
considering charging Kocolis in the crimes, but did not feel there was enough 
evidence to make the charges “stick.”  Additionally, at the hearing on the motion to 
supplement Griffin’s postconviction motion to include this Brady claim, Griffin’s 
counsel stated that during her investigation she had asked Kocolis “point blank” if 
he had been promised anything by the State and “he said no.”10
                                         
 
10.  The State argued that the claim was not timely because Griffin’s 
postconviction counsel “knew or should have known” about the alleged immunity 
deal as Kocolis was Griffin’s witness at the evidentiary hearing and postconviction 
counsel had interviewed him in preparation for filing the rule 3.851 motion.  
Postconviction counsel responded that she did inquire about promises or deals with 
the State and that Kocolis had denied that any were made.   
  The court 
determined that Kocolis’ testimony was not credible and Bartlett’s was.  See 
Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 785 (deferring to the circuit court’s resolution of the factual 
component of a Brady claim involving prosecution’s alleged grant of immunity to 
a witness in exchange for his testimony where there was conflicting testimony by 
the witness and the prosecutor; the court found the witness’ testimony to be 
“unreliable and not credible” and the prosecutor’s testimony to be “candid, 
trustworthy, and credible”).  Cf. Kight v. Dugger, 574 So. 2d 1066, 1073 (Fla. 
1990) (“There was sufficient competent evidence adduced at the rule 3.850 hearing 
to support the trial court's denial of this [Brady] claim.  While there was conflicting 
testimony concerning whether the state made concessions in exchange for the 
informants’ testimony, it was within the trial court’s discretion to find the state’s 
 
- 28 - 
witnesses more credible than those of the defense.”).  As we stated in Sochor, 
“[w]e cannot say that the circuit court’s decision to discredit the [witness’] 
evidentiary hearing testimony was unreasonable or unsupported.”  883 So. 2d at 
786.   Thus, we find no Brady violation and affirm the trial court’s denial of relief 
on this claim.11
4.  New Penalty Phase 
  
In his postconviction motion, Griffin argued that counsel was ineffective 
during the penalty phase because he failed to adequately investigate and present 
mitigating evidence that would have supported a life sentence.  The trial court 
agreed with Griffin and granted him a new penalty phase proceeding. The State has 
                                         
 
11.  Even though the trial court concluded that there was no immunity 
granted to Kocolis, the court still addressed the other Brady requirements, finding 
neither.  First, because the court found Kocolis’ claim of immunity was not 
credible, it did not find that the information had been suppressed.  Second, the 
court concluded that even if Griffin had proven that Kocolis received immunity, he 
could not show prejudice from the non-disclosure of such evidence.  We agree.  
Griffin admitted that he came up with the plan to target Service America, used his 
knowledge of the facility to develop a plan for the robbery, procured the weapons 
used in the robbery, drove the vehicle used in the crimes, and needed the money 
because of his financial problems.  Even though Griffin maintained that he had not 
been the shooter, other witnesses testified that he admitted shooting the victims.  
Griffin admitted that he disposed of the weapons after the murders.  The physical 
evidence also tied Griffin to the scene, including tire tracks from his van at the 
scene and shell casings and money wrappers found in his van.   Cf. Pardo v. State, 
941 So. 2d 1057, 1066 (Fla. 2006) (stating that defendant’s testimony admitting the 
killings put the nondisclosure of videotaped interview of state witness in a less 
prejudicial light under Brady; also noting forensic evidence that strongly 
implicated defendant in murders). 
 
- 29 - 
cross-appealed on this issue, arguing that the mitigating evidence presented at the 
evidentiary hearing did not undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding 
and thus the prejudice prong of Strickland was not met.  
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland, this 
Court has held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, 
two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.   
 
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted).  
“When evaluating claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or 
present mitigating evidence, this Court has phrased the defendant’s burden as 
showing that counsel’s ineffectiveness deprived the defendant of a reliable penalty 
phase proceeding.”  Grim v. State, 971 So. 2d 85, 99-100 (Fla. 2007) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998).  
“However, along with examining what evidence was not investigated and 
presented, we also look at counsel’s reasons for not doing so.”  Sliney v. State, 944 
So. 2d 270, 281-82 (Fla. 2006).   Defense counsel’s reasonable, strategic decisions 
do not constitute ineffective assistance if alternative courses have been considered 
 
- 30 - 
and rejected. Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 679, 685 (Fla. 2003).  However, a 
reasonable, strategic decision must be based on informed judgment.  See Wiggins 
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527-28 (2003) (finding counsel’s decision “to abandon 
their [mitigation] investigation at an unreasonable juncture ma[de] a fully informed 
decision with respect to sentencing strategy impossible”).  
When a guilty plea could not be entered by both of the codefendants in this 
case, the State did not offer or negotiate a separate plea agreement with Griffin.  
Even with no guarantees as to sentence, defense counsel advised Griffin to enter a 
guilty plea, which he did.  When it came to light at the beginning of the penalty 
phase that defense counsel misrepresented the possible sentences by telling Griffin 
that he would be eligible for parole in twenty-five years if he received a life 
sentence, the trial judge conducted another plea colloquy and informed Griffin that 
the two possible sentences were death and life without a possibility of parole.  
After discussing the matter with counsel and his family, Griffin again entered a 
guilty plea.  On counsel’s advice, Griffin waived a penalty phase jury, a penalty 
phase opening statement, a Spencer hearing, and a presentence investigation report. 
At the penalty phase trial, counsel presented witnesses to support a “good 
guy” defense, that is, Griffin had led a productive and law-abiding life until he got 
addicted to cocaine.  Family members and friends testified about Griffin’s close 
relationship with his family and his good work ethic. These witnesses also testified 
 
- 31 - 
about how drugs had drastically changed Griffin’s behavior.   Psychiatrist Dr. 
Michael Maher testified as a mental health expert at the penalty phase proceedings, 
concluding that the statutory mental health mitigating factors were not applicable.  
Dr. Maher also testified that Griffin expressed remorse about the victims’ deaths, 
had used cocaine heavily in the months before the crime, suffered a head injury as 
a child that left him with abnormal brain functioning and made him vulnerable to 
other things that would interfere with his brain functioning, and that he had 
attempted suicide in his teens during a serious depression.  Dr. Maher had 
conducted a general psychiatric interview and a mental status examination of 
Griffin a few months before the penalty phase began, but had not conducted any 
brain function tests, did not review medical records related to the head injury, did 
not review the criminal case records, did not interview Griffin’s associates, and did 
not review Griffin’s jail records.  Dr. Maher stated he did not believe that further 
testing would change his opinions about Griffin. 
Neuropsychologist Dr. Sidney Merin testified for the State at the penalty 
phase proceeding.  Dr. Merin testified that Griffin’s childhood head injury was 
minor and that the gun pellet never entered the dura mater12
                                         
 
12.  The dura mater is the outermost of the three layers of the meninges 
surrounding the brain.  The dura mater lies under the skull. 
 of Griffin’s brain.  Dr. 
Merin also testified that there was no evidence that the injury caused any brain 
 
- 32 - 
defect.  Dr. Merin based this opinion in part on Griffin’s self-reported high 
academic performance in school.13
 
In sentencing Griffin to death, the trial court gave little weight to Griffin’s 
lack of criminal history and very little weight to his drug problem.  The court noted 
that there was no testimony that Griffin had committed the crime under the 
influence of drugs or that his ability to comprehend what was going on was 
impaired at the time of the crimes.  While the court gave great weight to Griffin’s 
family background, this was based only on evidence that he was a loving son and 
brother, a hard worker, and a good father.  The trial court also concluded that there 
was no lasting effect from Griffin’s childhood head injury.  The court noted that 
Griffin had been doing fine until he started using cocaine, which negatively 
  Dr. Merin also minimized Griffin’s suicide 
attempt as an “attention-getting device” and found that cocaine use had no effects 
on Griffin’s judgment.  However, Dr. Merin admitted that the only documents he 
reviewed were the depositions of four witnesses regarding statements that Griffin 
made after the crime.  Dr. Merin did not review any of Griffin’s prior medical or 
mental health records, did not administer any tests to Griffin, and only conducted 
one ninety-minute interview with Griffin shortly before the penalty phase. 
                                         
 
13.  Dr. Merin testified that Griffin had maintained a 3.3 grade point 
average, based on Griffin’s self-report.  However, school records show that Griffin 
actually had a 1.89 grade point average.  Trial counsel did not correct this error, 
presumably because counsel was unaware of Griffin’s true academic performance 
because he never obtained any of Griffin’s records. 
 
- 33 - 
changed his life.  The trial court characterized Dr. Maher’s testimony regarding 
emotional and mental problems as “limited,” found this factor had not been 
established, and gave the factor no weight.  
In the order granting postconviction relief on this claim, the court noted that 
Griffin had presented a wealth of mitigating evidence at the evidentiary hearing, 
including the severity of his cocaine addiction and the impact it had on his 
participation in the crimes, his history of depression, the impact of his prior brain 
injury,14 and his family history of mental illness and substance abuse addiction.  
More importantly, the postconviction order noted that counsel’s failure to 
investigate or present this evidence was based on his belief that Griffin’s guilty 
plea would result in the trial judge sentencing him to life, especially in light of the 
State’s initial willingness to enter into a plea with both codefendants for life 
sentences in exchange for guilty pleas.15
                                         
 
14.  Medical records show that Griffin was shot in the right parietotemporal 
area of the head with a pellet gun when he was nine years old.  He had to have 
brain surgery to remove pieces of skull and hair from his brain and was 
hospitalized for three to four weeks.  
   
 
15.  The State initially offered a plea agreement—life sentences in exchange 
for both codefendants pleading guilty.  However, the terms of that plea agreement 
were contingent on both codefendants pleading.  Because Lopez was not able to 
enter a plea because of his incompetency, the plea agreement was never executed.  
Instead, Griffin’s counsel advised him to enter a guilty plea without any agreement 
with the State, which he did. 
 
- 34 - 
At the evidentiary hearing, Griffin’s trial counsel testified that after hearing 
about the possible plea agreement for both codefendants, it “colored everything I 
did afterward.”  Griffin’s trial counsel believed that the ultimate sentence would be 
life, which affected preparation for the penalty phase.  Counsel did not compile a 
family, medical, or social history; did not request a neuropsychiatric evaluation or 
any type of brain function testing; did not discuss alternative defenses with Griffin; 
and did not hire the penalty phase mental health expert until late in the process and 
did not give any of Griffin’s medical records to the expert.  Because of this lack of 
investigation, counsel was not aware of the family history of alcoholism and drug 
abuse.  Counsel also had no independent evidence of the amount or severity of 
Griffin’s drug use in the hours before the crime and had to rely on Griffin’s self-
reports.  
At the postconviction hearing, a number of witnesses testified about 
Griffin’s cocaine and drug use, including on the day of the crimes.  These friends 
and family members testified that Griffin was using cocaine daily in the summer of 
1995, that he started using other substances as well, and that he exhibited 
progressively strange behavior and mental instability.  According to several of 
these witnesses, Griffin had been using cocaine continually for days before the 
robbery and right up to the time he left to commit the robbery.  Family members 
also related an extensive family history of substance abuse, alcoholism, and mental 
 
- 35 - 
illness.  Griffin’s mother testified about his head injury and its effects, including 
that Griffin was no longer permitted to participate in contact sports and suffered 
from depression and headaches on a regular basis after the injury.  Medical records 
presented at the hearing confirmed that the gun pellet penetrated Griffin’s brain, 
that he had to have a craniotomy, and that he was prescribed Dilantin for two years 
as a prophylactic for seizures that are often secondary to such head injuries. 
The testimony of the mental health experts at the postconviction hearing 
support Griffin’s claim that he suffered from cocaine dependence during the six 
months prior to the crime, that his childhood brain injury was significant and may 
have caused lasting effects, that his family history of substance abuse and mental 
illness made him more susceptible to the effects of cocaine abuse, and that his low 
academic performance in school indicated low right hemisphere functioning, 
which would make him more prone to depression and impulsivity.  The two 
experts also opined that two statutory mental mitigating factors were applicable to 
Griffin.  
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing goes directly to some of 
the mitigating factors that the sentencing court gave little weight and supports 
other mitigating factors that the court found had not been established at all.  Had 
the trial judge been presented with evidence about the severity of Griffin’s drug 
use, his use of drugs at the time of the crimes, his family history of alcohol and 
 
- 36 - 
drug abuse and mental illness, his history of depression, and the impact of his prior 
brain injury, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty phase 
proceeding would have been different, that is, “a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in [that] outcome.”  Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 
(2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94).  Moreover, Griffin’s trial counsel 
was unable to rebut some of the erroneous statements16
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that “counsel’s penalty-
phase strategy, or lack thereof, was clearly based on an unsubstantiated hunch that 
if the Defendant entered a straight-up plea the trial judge would sentence him to 
life and not death.”  Counsel’s “hunch” was no basis for an informed strategy as it 
limited his investigation of possible mitigating evidence.  The failure to present 
this available mitigating evidence undermines the confidence in the sentence 
imposed.  Thus, we agree with the lower court that Griffin is entitled to a new 
 made by the State’s expert 
at the penalty phase because counsel never obtained Griffin’s medical or school 
records.  This erroneous evidence could have influenced the sentencing court’s 
conclusion that Griffin suffered no lasting effects from his head injury. 
                                         
 
16.  Dr. Merin testified erroneously that the gun pellet never entered 
Griffin’s brain and that Griffin had maintained a 3.3 grade point average in school. 
While Dr. Merin admitted that he had not reviewed any of Griffin’s records, trial 
counsel was not able to confront him with the true facts from the records because 
counsel never obtained these records. 
 
- 37 - 
penalty phase proceeding based on counsel’s deficient performance and the 
prejudice it caused.   
5.  Sentence Disparity 
 
Griffin has also filed a habeas petition, claiming that his death sentence is 
disparate and disproportionate based on the newly discovered evidence of the 
subsequent life sentence received by his codefendant Lopez.  The trial court sua 
sponte addressed this issue in its postconviction order, concluding that there was 
not sufficient record evidence to weigh Griffin’s culpability against Lopez’s.  
However, in light of the new penalty proceeding required by counsel’s ineffective 
assistance during the penalty phase, the trial court noted that the relief may or may 
not have been further justified by the Court’s precedent in Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 
2d 465 (Fla. 1992). 
In Scott, this Court held that “in a death case involving equally culpable 
codefendants the death sentence of one codefendant is subject to collateral review 
under rule 3.850 when another codefendant subsequently receives a life 
sentence.”17
                                         
 
17.  At the time that the Court issued its opinion in Scott, all postconviction 
motions were governed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  The Court 
subsequently created Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 which governs 
postconviction motions in death penalty cases. 
  Id. at 469.  Scott involved two codefendants who “had similar 
criminal records, were about the same age, had comparable low IQs, and were 
 
- 38 - 
equally culpable participants in the crime.”  Id. at 468.  Both were charged and 
convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and kidnapping.  Initially, both men 
were sentenced to death, but the codefendant’s death sentence was vacated on 
direct appeal by this Court and on remand the codefendant was resentenced to life.  
Id.  Scott’s postconviction motion sought to have his own death sentence vacated 
as disproportionate, disparate and invalid in light of his codefendant’s subsequent 
life sentence, which he characterized as “newly discovered evidence.”  The circuit 
court summarily denied relief on this claim, finding it untimely and improper under 
rule 3.850.  Id.   
 
On appeal, this Court explained that “[e]ven when a codefendant has been 
sentenced subsequent to the sentencing of the defendant seeking review on direct 
appeal, it is proper for this Court to consider the propriety of the disparate 
sentences in order to determine whether a death sentence is appropriate given the 
conduct of all participants in committing the crime.”  Id. (citing Witt v. State, 342 
So. 2d 497, 500-01 (Fla. 1977)).  The Court extended this disparity review to 
Scott’s postconviction proceedings because his codefendant’s subsequently 
imposed life sentence met the two requirements of newly discovered evidence.  
First, the asserted fact of the codefendant’s life sentence was “unknown by the trial 
court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and . . . defendant or his 
counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence.”  Id. (quoting Hallman 
 
- 39 - 
v. State, 371 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla.1979) abrogated on other grounds, Jones v. 
State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991)).  Second, the codefendant’s life sentence was of 
such a nature that it would probably result in a life sentence being imposed.  Id.  
This second requirement is met when the codefendants are equally culpable 
participants in the crime, as “[d]efendants should not be treated differently upon 
the same or similar facts.”  Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1975). 
 
Under Scott, Lopez’s subsequently imposed life sentence constitutes “newly 
discovered evidence” that would be cognizable in a postconviction motion by 
Griffin.  However, Griffin did not raise this claim in his postconviction motion to 
the court below.  Instead, he has raised it in a habeas petition to this Court.  
“[C]laims of newly discovered evidence should be raised in a postconviction 
motion filed pursuant to rule 3.850 rather than in a petition for habeas corpus.”  
Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 668 n.13 (Fla. 2000); see also Steinhorst v. 
Singletary, 638 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. 1994).  Even though Griffin filed several 
amended postconviction motions, he never included a claim based on the disparity 
of Lopez’s life sentence.  A postconviction claim of newly discovered evidence 
based on Lopez’s subsequently imposed life sentence would have to be filed 
“within one year of the date upon which the claim became discoverable through 
due diligence.”  Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2008).  Lopez’s life 
sentence was imposed in January 2004.  Griffin admits that he received records 
 
- 40 - 
from Lopez’s trial in July 2005 and based upon these records he amended the three 
claims which were to be considered at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.  A 
newly discovered evidence claim based on Lopez’s life sentence would have been 
timely if filed by July 2006.  Thus, had Griffin amended his postconviction motion 
with a timely claim based on Lopez’s subsequent life sentence, the trial court could 
have included this claim in the evidentiary hearing.  Instead, the trial court sua 
sponte addressed Lopez’s life sentence in its postconviction order, noting that 
Griffin did not affirmatively plead the issue and concluding that the court lacked 
“sufficient record evidence to satisfactorily weigh the culpability of Defendant 
Griffin to co-defendant Lopez.”   
 
Griffin contends that the trial court’s sua sponte consideration of this issue 
recognizes his “dilemma” in being able to bring this claim.  He also asserts that the 
court “deferred” the disparate treatment/proportionality review to this Court 
because it had insufficient record evidence to weigh the relative culpability of the 
codefendants.  Neither of these assertions is true.  The trial court did not 
characterize the issue as a dilemma and did not state that it was deferring review to 
this Court.  The order simply states that Griffin did not affirmatively plead the 
issue and thus the court lacked a sufficient record to weigh the codefendants’ 
culpability.  Griffin further alleges that he “could not have presented his claim of 
disparate treatment to this Court until now,” thereby seeking to avoid the time bar 
 
- 41 - 
applicable to a claim of newly discovered evidence.  A petition for extraordinary 
relief is not a second appeal and cannot be used to litigate or relitigate issues that 
were or could have been raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction 
proceedings.  Wallace v. McNeil, 50 So. 3d 603 (Fla. 2010).  As noted above, there 
was no impediment to Griffin timely amending his postconviction motion to 
include this claim after he learned of Lopez’s life sentence.  Accordingly, we deny 
Griffin’s petition for habeas relief as procedurally barred.18
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the trial court’s postconviction 
order dismissing Griffin’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, denying his claims 
relating to his convictions, and granting him a new penalty phase proceeding based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel.  We also deny his petition for habeas corpus 
relief as procedurally barred.  We vacate Griffin’s sentence of death and remand 
the case for a new penalty phase proceeding. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, and CANADY, JJ., concur in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
                                         
 
18.  Because Griffin has been granted a new penalty phase proceeding, he 
can raise Lopez’s life sentence as a factor to be considered in that proceeding. 
 
- 42 - 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
Robert James Morris, Jr., Judge - Case No. CRC95-18753CFANO-K 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
 
Terri Lynn Backhus, Special Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and 
Celeste Bacchi, Assistiant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Candance M. 
Sabella, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent