Title: State ex rel. Cline v. Abke Trucking, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Cline v. Abke Trucking, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5159.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-5159 
THE STATE EX REL. CLINE, APPELLEE, v. ABKE TRUCKING, INC., ET AL.; 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Cline v. Abke Trucking, Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5159.] 
Workers’ Compensation—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and State ex rel. 
Noll relief granted. 
(No. 2012-1017—Submitted September 10, 2013—Decided November 27, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 10AP-888,  
2012-Ohio-1914. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} The Industrial Commission appeals the judgment of the court of 
appeals issuing a writ of mandamus that ordered the commission to vacate its 
order of December 14, 2009, and to enter a new order that determines appellee 
Fred Cline’s request for temporary-total-disability compensation. 
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{¶ 2} Because the Industrial Commission’s December 14, 2009 order did 
not meet the standards of State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 
567 N.E.2d 245 (1991), we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and issue 
a limited writ of mandamus returning the matter to the commission to explain its 
reasoning and conclusions regarding Cline’s termination of employment from 
Abke Trucking, Inc. and, if necessary, regarding his continued participation in the 
workforce. 
{¶ 3} Cline was injured on August 27, 2008, while working as a truck 
driver for Abke.  His claim was allowed for contusion of the left hip and later for 
bursitis.  He was placed on medical restrictions and assigned to modified duty 
offsite with the American Red Cross, where he was required to document his 
hours and send his weekly attendance record to Abke. 
{¶ 4} Cline’s physician released him to return to work on March 25, 
2009, with no restrictions.  On that day, he underwent a medical examination in 
order to renew his commercial driver’s license and answered questions on the 
examination form.  Under health history, Cline indicated “no” when asked 
whether he had diabetes or elevated blood sugar.  He signed the form certifying 
that his answers were complete and true. 
{¶ 5} Two days later, Abke notified Cline in a letter that he was 
terminated as of March 25, 2009: 
 
It has come to our attention that you have been using a 
medication that would not allow you to operate a commercial 
vehicle.  According to FMCSR [Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations] regulation[] 391.41(b)(3) you cannot operate a 
commercial vehicle if you have diabetes currently requiring insulin 
for control.  Records indicate that you are currently taking Lantus 
which is insulin for diabetes.  Given this information you are no 
January Term, 2013 
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longer eligible to drive [a] truck for Abke Trucking Inc.  In 
addition, concern of your knowingly reporting you worked on 
January 19 and February 16 while not actually working is a serious 
violation of falsifying a time card and is cause for immediate 
discharge on the first violation.  Given this information you are 
considered terminated as of March 25, 2009. 
 
{¶ 6} Cline later obtained a job as a truck driver for Hoekstra 
Transportation, L.L.C., but was terminated on June 25, 2009. 
{¶ 7} On July 1, 2009, Dr. David Ervin, Cline’s treating physician, 
certified that Cline was temporarily and totally disabled as a result of his 
industrial injury.  The bureau granted Cline temporary-total-disability 
compensation beginning July 1, 2009.  A district hearing officer affirmed. 
{¶ 8} In December 2009, a staff hearing officer vacated that decision and 
denied temporary-total disability-compensation.  The hearing officer determined 
that Cline’s termination from Abke for violating written work rules was a 
voluntary abandonment of employment that barred compensation for temporary 
total disability. 
{¶ 9} Cline filed an original action in mandamus in the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals.  He alleged that the commission’s decision was not supported 
by the evidence and constituted an abuse of discretion. 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals determined that Cline could not be ineligible 
for temporary-total-disability compensation for being an insulin-dependent 
diabetic, the medical condition that prevented him from returning to his former 
position of employment, and that the commission had abused its discretion in 
finding that Cline had falsified two time cards.  Thus, the court concluded that the 
commission had abused its discretion when it determined that Cline was ineligible 
for temporary-total-disability compensation based upon his termination of 
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employment from Abke.  10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-888, 2012-Ohio-1914, 
¶ 10-13, 63, 81. 
{¶ 11} The dissenting judge concluded that the commission’s order failed 
to specifically state the evidence relied upon or explain the reasoning for the 
decision denying benefits in violation of Noll, 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 
245, and would have issued a limited writ ordering the commission to reconsider 
its decision.  2012-Ohio-1914 at ¶ 19, 24. 
{¶ 12} The commission filed an appeal as of right in this court. 
{¶ 13} A claimant who voluntarily leaves his or her former position of 
employment for reasons unrelated to an industrial injury cannot receive 
temporary-total-disability compensation because the injury no longer is the cause 
of the loss of wages.  State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 72 
Ohio St.3d 401, 650 N.E.2d 469 (1995).  When an employee is fired as a 
consequence of the employee’s misconduct, the discharge may nevertheless 
constitute a voluntary abandonment of employment “when the misconduct arises 
from the claimant’s violation of a written work rule that (1) clearly defined the 
prohibited conduct, (2) identified the misconduct as a dischargeable offense, and 
(3) was known or should have been known to the employee.”  State ex rel. Brown 
v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 132 Ohio St.3d 520, 2012-Ohio-3895, 974 N.E.2d 
1198, ¶ 1. 
{¶ 14} The commission’s December 2009 order summarily concluded, 
without direct reference to any evidence in the record, that Cline had been 
terminated as of March 25, 2009, based upon his violation of written work rules: 
 
Federal regulations prohibit a driver from operating a commercial 
vehicle if the driver has diabetes which requires insulin for control.  
The records in file indicate that [Cline] was taking the prescription 
drug Lantus, which is a form of insulin prescribed for diabetes.  
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
Furthermore, [Cline] falsified his time cards for the dates of 
1/19/2009 and 2/16/2009. 
 
The hearing officer did not identify the evidence relied upon but merely 
concluded that as a result of the termination, Cline was barred from receiving 
compensation for temporary total disability. 
{¶ 15} It is within the discretion of the commission to decide the issue of 
voluntary abandonment and, absent an abuse of discretion, the court may not 
disturb the commission’s order.  See State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc., 31 
Ohio St.3d 18, 508 N.E.2d 936 (1987).  But the commission must issue an order 
that contains sufficient detail of its reasoning and the evidence supporting it to 
indicate the grounds underlying its decision.  Failure to do so constitutes an abuse 
of discretion.  State ex rel. Kinnear Div., Harsco Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 77 Ohio 
St.3d 258, 261, 673 N.E.2d 1290 (1997). 
{¶ 16} Both parties acknowledge that the order may have failed to meet 
the minimum standards for commission orders as set forth in State ex rel. Mitchell 
v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 453 N.E.2d 721 (1983), and Noll.  
Cline even concedes that the commission’s order “is manifestly inadequate under 
Mitchell and Noll” because it “contains no explanation of the rationale for 
concluding that [Cline] falsified time cards, nor does it identify any evidence 
relied upon by the hearing officer as factual support for that conclusion.” 
{¶ 17} The dissenting opinion stated, “[I]t is unclear from the record or 
the [staff hearing officer’s] order whether [Cline] was terminated because he is 
insulin-dependent or because he failed to disclose his condition to Abke,” and 
“the [staff hearing officer] simply stated that [Cline] ‘falsified his time cards for 
the dates of 01/19/2009 and 02/16/2009.’ ”  2012-Ohio-1914 at ¶ 21-22. 
{¶ 18} We agree.  The commission failed to specifically state the evidence 
relied upon or explain the reasoning behind its decision that Cline had voluntarily 
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abandoned his employment with Abke, thus making him ineligible for temporary-
total-disability compensation.  Without more, the order violates Noll. 
{¶ 19} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and issue a limited 
writ of mandamus returning the matter to the commission to issue a new order 
that specifically states the evidence relied upon and briefly explains its reasoning 
consistent with Noll. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
FRENCH, J., not participating. 
____________________ 
Gallon, Takacs, Boissoneault & Schaffer Co., L.P.A., and Theodore A. 
Bowman, for appellee. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant. 
________________________