Title: CLEO COOPER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CLEO COOPER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 5174 P.3d 726Case Number: S-07-0018, S-07-0049Decided: 01/18/2008Modified: 01/25/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
CLEO 
COOPER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge (No. 
S-07-0049)

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and 
Kirk A. Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Cathleen D. Parker, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After trial, a 
jury convicted Cleo Cooper (Cooper) of two counts of forgery, one count of 
obtaining goods by false pretenses, and one count of unlawful use of credit 
card.  Cooper argues on appeal that 
the district court should not have admitted the testimony of the handwriting 
expert, and that the prosecution committed misconduct in its closing.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Cooper sets forth 
two issues on appeal:

 
 

1.      
Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion when it allowed the testimony of a handwriting 
expert whose training and education consisted primarily of one two-week course, 
and whose testimony was not based on a reliable application of the approved 
methodology?

 
 

2.      
Did the 
cumulative effect of several acts of prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
arguments prejudice [Cooper] and deny him of a fair trial?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In July of 2005, 
American Express issued a credit card to Henry Clark, mailing it to his 
residence at 1705 East 15th Street in 
Casper.  However, Mr. Clark had not requested an 
American Express card.  
Nevertheless, someone else reported the first card as not having been 
received, and requested American Express to send a second card to another 
address in Casper, 1144 Boxelder Street.  This is Cooper's 
address.

 
 
[¶4]      The second 
American Express card sent out in Henry Clark's name was activated on July 27, 
2005.  That same day, Cooper used 
the card to purchase $1,200.00 worth of prepaid credit cards, a prepaid phone 
card worth $212.03, and a soda at Loaf N Jug #104 in Casper.  The very next day, on July 28, 2005, 
Cooper visited another Loaf N Jug (#102) in Casper, and used Henry Clark's credit card to 
buy several small items.

 
 
[¶5]      Using 
surveillance videos, Loaf N Jug employees created still pictures of the 
purchases at issue.  The times on 
the videos were coordinated with the times on cash register receipts.  As a result of the investigation, Cooper 
was charged on December 12, 2005, with two counts of forgery under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-602(a)(ii), one count of obtaining goods by false pretenses under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-407(a)(i), and one count of unlawful use of a credit card 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 6-3-802(a)(b)(i).

 
 
[¶6]      Prior to trial, 
Cooper filed a Motion in Limine to 
exclude testimony from the State's document examiner, Casper Police Officer 
Chris Reed, but after a hearing on the motion, the court ruled that Officer Reed 
would be allowed to testify.  During 
trial, Cooper was identified by the Loaf N Jug employees who assisted Cooper in 
the transactions.  Officer Reed also 
testified that, although she could not conclude that Cooper signed the credit 
card receipts, she could conclude that the receipts were all signed by the same 
person.

 
 
[¶7]      The jury found 
Cooper guilty on all four counts.  
After merging the false pretenses and unlawful use convictions into the 
forgery convictions for purposes of sentencing, two consecutive sentences of 7 
to 10 years were imposed.  This 
appeal followed. 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Expert 
Testimony

 
 
[¶8]      In his first 
issue on appeal, Cooper faults the district court for allowing Officer Chris 
Reed, a handwriting examiner for the Casper Police Department, to testify at 
trial.  The State contends that the 
expert's testimony was properly admitted.

 
 
[¶9]      A decision to 
admit or reject expert testimony rests solely within the discretion of the 
district court and is not disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse 
of discretion.  Williams v. State, 2002 WY 184, 
¶ 5, 60 P.3d 151, 153-154 (Wyo. 2002).           

 
 
[¶10]   When reviewing matters pertaining 
to the admission of testimony of expert witnesses, we look to the standard this 
Court adopted in Bunting v. Jamieson, 
984 P.2d 467 (Wyo. 1999).  In that case, this Court adopted the 
reasoning used by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), which has 
been further clarified as follows:

 
 

The 
trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an 
expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other 
proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides 
whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is reliable.  Our opinion in Joiner [General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1997)] makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an 
abuse-of-discretion standard when it "review[s] a trial court's decision to 
admit or exclude expert testimony."  
522 U.S.  at 138-39, 
118 S. Ct. 512, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508.  That standard applies as much to the 
trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate 
conclusion. . . .  Thus, whether 
Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of 
reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge 
broad latitude to determine.

 
 

Kumho 
Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999). "In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, 
the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it 
did."  Campbell v. Studer, 970 P.2d 389, 392 
(Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
"[D]ecisions 
of the trial court with respect to the admissibility of evidence are entitled to 
considerable deference and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for 
the trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be reversed on appeal.'"  It is also well established that a 
district court judgment may be affirmed on any proper legal grounds supported by 
the record. However, where the law imposes a duty on the district court to make 
findings on the record, we will not speculate as to the reasons for the 
decision.

 
 

Bunting, 984 P.2d  at 470 (quoting English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 
1999)).

 
 

A 
qualified expert witness may testify about scientific, technical, or specialized 
knowledge if such testimony will help the jury understand the case.  W.R.E. 702.  This court has adopted the federal 
Daubert model imposing gatekeeping responsibilities on trial courts 
deciding whether scientific or technical expert testimony is admissible.  See Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 471 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993)). In doing so, however, we 
did not "abandon our own precedent regarding the admissibility of expert 
testimony."  Bunting, 984 P.2d  at 471.  Under the Daubert 
model, the trial court must first determine whether the expert's methodology 
is reliable; then the court must determine whether the proposed testimony "fits" 
the facts of the particular case.  
Id.  A district court's decision to admit or 
reject expert testimony is a decision solely within that court's 
discretion.  Seivewright v. 
State, 7 P.3d 24, 29 (Wyo. 2000); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 438 
(Wyo. 1993); Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1022 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 

Williams 
v. State, 
2002 WY 184, ¶ 5, 
60 P.3d 151, 153-54 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶11]   
In light of the standard elicited above, we begin with a more 
detailed look at Cooper's claim.  
Specifically, he argues that Officer Reed lacked expertise as a 
handwriting expert, and insists that by admitting her testimony, the district 
court denied him a fair trial, necessitating reversal of all his 
convictions.  The State disagrees, 
and in support of its argument points to the record and the "uncontroverted 
testimony" showing that Cooper completed all three fraudulent 
transactions.

 
 
[¶12]   We must determine whether or not 
the district court appropriately applied a Daubert analysis in this case.  In the first prong of Daubert, there are four non-exclusive 
factors utilized for guiding a trial court in its inquiry into the reliability 
of proffered expert testimony:

 
 

1.      
Whether 
the theory or technique in question can be and has been 
tested;

2.      
Whether 
it has been subjected to peer review and publication;

3.      
The 
known or potential rate of error for the utilized theory or technique along with 
the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the applicable process; 
and

4.      
The 
degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific 
community.

 
 

Bunting, 984 P.2d  at 472.  Bunting also 
discussed additional factors that may be utilized by a trial court in fulfilling 
its gatekeeping function including: 

 
 

1.      
The 
experience and specialized expertise of the proffered 
expert;

2.      
Whether 
or not that expert is testifying about matters occurring "naturally and 
directly" out of research conducted independent of litigation; 
and

3.      
Any 
"non-judicial" utilization of the expert methodology in 
question.

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶13]   In this case, Cooper contends, as 
he did in his motion in limine before trial, that Officer Reed was not 
qualified, and that her testimony was not the product of reliable application of 
approved methods because she failed to take notes or provide any documentation 
whatsoever that would act as a foundation for her opinion.  Cooper complains that the officer's only 
training on document examination was an 80-hour course she attended in 2000, and 
furthermore, that she has no certifications or licenses in document 
examination.  In fact, at the 
liminal hearing prior to trial, Cooper's own expert testified that the officer 
was not qualified to testify as a handwriting expert.

 
 
[¶14]   In countering Cooper's claims, 
Officer Reed testified both during the motion hearing and at trial regarding the 
methodology or scientific technique used in examining the questioned documents 
in this case.  She testified that 
her work is tested and subjected to peer review.  Furthermore, she explained the potential 
error rates associated with the methodology and that the methodology is accepted 
within the community of forensic document examiners.  Also, the officer testified that the 
methodology used was the same method accepted and utilized by the American Board 
of Forensic Documents Examiners and other experts in the scientific field.  Even Cooper's expert conceded that the 
methodology used was proper.

 
 
[¶15]   Officer Reed also testified with 
respect to her qualifications.  She 
completed an 80-hour handwriting analysis training course conducted by the 
United States Secret Service and has over five years of practical analysis 
encompassing at least 100-150 documents.  
After the officer's testimony, the district court made specific findings, 
excerpted in pertinent part below:

 
 

1)     
Officer 
Reed's expert testimony was reliable and relevant;

2)     
The 
document examination fits the facts of the particular 
case;

3)     
The 
technique was valid for evaluating questioned documents;

4)     
The 
technique had been subject to peer review and publication;

5)     
There 
was a known or potential rate of error for utilizing the 
technique;

6)     
It was 
accepted within the specific testing community; and

7)     
Any 
challenges to Officer Reed's use of standard operating procedures and ability to 
form an opinion can be addressed on cross-examination.

 
 
[¶16]   
We are confident that under the Daubert model, the trial court 
properly determined that Officer Reed's methodology was reliable and, 
subsequently, that her testimony fit the facts of this case.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
court's decision to admit Officer Reed's testimony in this instance was not an 
abuse of discretion.

 
 
Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 
[¶17]   Next, Cooper claims that his 
convictions should be reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct that 
allegedly occurred during closing arguments. Cooper argues first that the 
prosecutor incorrectly stated that Cooper admitted to being present in the 
stores, and second that the prosecutor improperly stated that Detective Tina 
Tweedy received journals/logs of certain credit card transactions and improperly 
emphasized that the journals related to a separate crime.  In response, the State contends that, 
when viewed in their proper context, the prosecutor's comments were not 
prejudicial.

 
 
[¶18]   In reviewing claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct, we have previously stated:

 
 
Prosecutorial 
misconduct "has always been condemned in this state."  
Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 787, [789-90] 
(Wyo. 2001) (quoting Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 156 (Wyo. 1974)).  Whether such misconduct has been 
reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04, or 
on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05, this Court has 
focused on whether such error affected the accused's "substantial rights."  The accused's right to a fair trial is a 
substantial right. "Before we hold that an error has affected an accused's 
substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a conviction, we must conclude 
that, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, in the 
absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
accused." Earll, ¶ 9, [29 P3d. at 789-90].

 
 
[¶19]   Williams v. State, 2002 WY 
136, ¶ 21, 54 P.3d 248, 254 (Wyo. 2002) (some citations omitted).  This Court has also recognized the 
difficulty in determining what constitutes impermissible prosecutorial 
conduct:

 
 
The 
question of the propriety of a given statement is not one that can be decided by 
reference to a judicial checklist of improper words or prohibited phrases to 
determine if error is present.  Of 
necessity, each statement must be considered in the context in which it was made 
and in the context of the evidence produced at trial.

 
 

Barela 
v. State, 787 P.2d 82, 83 (Wyo. 
1990).

 
 
[¶20]   Claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
are settled by reference to the entire record and hinge on whether or not the 
defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute the denial of a fair 
trial.  English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 
(Wyo. 1999) (citing Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 
(Wyo. 
1998)).  The propriety of any 
comment within a closing argument is judged "in the context of the prosecutor's 
entire argument, considering the context of the statements and comparing them 
with the evidence produced at the trial."  
Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, 
¶ 26, 49 P.3d 975, 986 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 11, 
46 P.3d 309, 313 (Wyo. 2002)).  The 
burden of proving prejudicial error rests with Cooper.  Wilks, ¶ 26, 49 P.3d  at 986; see also Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 19, 17 P.3d 715, 722 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶21]   Because Cooper did not object at 
trial to the prosecutor's alleged misconduct, the standard of review is plain 
error.  That standard requires 
first, that the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as 
error.  Second, the party claiming 
the error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated.  Finally, that party must 
prove a substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he has been 
materially prejudiced.  Wilks, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d  at 
981.

 
 
[¶22]   With these ideas in mind, we turn 
to the comments with which Cooper takes issue.  First, Cooper claims the prosecutor 
misstated that Cooper had admitted to being in the stores.  The prosecutor said, "Ladies and 
gentleman, he's in the store.  
They've said that."  This 
statement, however, is immediately followed by a discussion of testimony from 
the store clerks.  The prosecutor's 
comments to "they" could reasonably relate to the multiple witnesses that 
identified Cooper, not to Cooper himself, especially because Cooper exercised 
his right not to testify.  
Furthermore, even though Cooper never admitted to being present in the 
stores, the theory of defense jury instruction and Cooper's closing argument 
alluded to Cooper's presence in the stores.  First, the theory of defense instruction 
reads, "It is the defendant's theory of the case and position that merely being 
present at the scene of a crime is not sufficient."1  Second, in closing, Cooper's own counsel 
implies that Cooper was in the stores when he stated, "[M]aybe she didn't want 
him to see that that time was actually accurate because that would put Cleo 
Cooper in that store at a different time and would make it impossible for him to 
be the person that signed those credit card receipts."

 
 
[¶23]   Given the magnitude of the evidence 
against Cooper, Cooper's counsel's remarks, and the prosecutor's relatively 
benign reference to "they," there seems to be no reasonable probability that the 
prosecutor's comments adversely affected the outcome of Cooper's 
trial.

 
 
[¶24]   Cooper's next claim of misconduct 
is that the prosecutor misrepresented Detective Tweedy's testimony when the 
prosecutor made the following statement: "They talked about these electronic 
journals and how the detective didn't pick them up, but they were given to 
her.  What did the detective tell 
you, ladies and gentleman? That was a separate crime."  In response to Cooper's claim, the State 
acknowledges that Detective Tweedy had not reviewed certain of the credit card 
journals.  However, the State 
insists this was a minor, harmless misstatement in closing and contends that no 
misconduct occurred.  Even if it did 
occur, it does not rise to prejudicial plain error given the evidence of 
guilt.

 
 
[¶25]   Looking more closely at the 
testimony in question, it is clear on the record that Cooper called Detective 
Tweedy in his case in chief and asked her about the credit card journals.  The officer stated that she had not seen 
the journals because they were involved in a "different case."  In closing, the prosecution attempted to 
explain that Detective Tweedy had not seen the journals because they were 
related to a different case.  The 
prosecutor's statements, then, when viewed in the context in which they were 
made, did not transgress the line of permissible argument.   Indeed, the purpose of closing 
argument is to give both the prosecution and defense counsel the opportunity to 
explain the significance of the evidence and how it should be viewed.  Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298, 1302 
(Wyo. 
1982).  In presenting closing 
argument, the prosecutor is entitled to comment on the evidence and to draw 
reasonable inferences from it in order to assist the jury in its fact-finding 
function.  McLaughlin v. State, 780 P.2d 964, 968 
(Wyo. 
1989).  Simply put, that is what the 
prosecutor did in this instance.  
Notwithstanding a momentary inaccuracy, the record provides no support 
for a claim that the comments were a purposeful attempt to inflame or mislead 
the jury.  There is also no evidence 
on the record that Cooper was materially prejudiced by the comments, and Cooper 
has not, therefore, satisfied the second prong of the plain error analysis 
because he has not shown a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26]   The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by allowing the testimony of handwriting expert Officer Reed.  Furthermore, the prosecutor did not 
commit misconduct in his closing argument because the statements, when taken in 
context, were appropriate and did not prejudice Cooper.  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Cooper 
claims, in passing, that the State mischaracterized the Theory of the Case jury 
instruction as an admission that Cooper was present in the stores.  We find nothing in the record that 
supports this contention, and without further argument or support by Cooper, we 
give this sideline argument no credence.