Title: Commonwealth v. Garrett

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Goodwyn, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 071654 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
     October 31, 2008 
MARVIN DARRYL GARRETT 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
William D. Hamblen, Judge 
 
 
 
This is an interlocutory appeal from a civil proceeding 
brought by the Commonwealth under the Sexually Violent 
Predators Act (SVPA), Code § 37.2-900 et seq., seeking to have 
Marvin Darryl Garrett committed as a sexually violent 
predator.  We consider whether the circuit court correctly 
ruled that Code § 16.1-306, as applicable to Garrett, 
prohibited the Commonwealth’s use in the SVPA proceeding of 
records relating to proceedings involving Garrett in a 
juvenile and domestic relations district court when he was a 
minor.  We further consider whether the circuit court erred in 
ruling that the Commonwealth’s mental health expert would not 
be permitted to express an opinion based, in part, upon her 
consideration of criminal conduct of which Garrett had been 
accused when he was a minor, but which was not prosecuted on 
the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Because this interlocutory appeal is limited to reviewing 
two discrete rulings of the circuit court, we will recite only 
those undisputed facts necessary to our resolution of this 
appeal.  Dagner v. Anderson, 274 Va. 678, 681, 651 S.E.2d 640, 
641 (2007).  In 1993, Garrett, born on December 5, 1967, was 
convicted of rape of an adult and sentenced to twenty years in 
prison.  Prior to the date of his scheduled release from 
prison in December 2006,1 Garrett was screened by the Virginia 
Department of Corrections (VDOC) and was identified, based 
upon standardized tests, as a potential sexually violent 
predator likely to reoffend upon his release from confinement.  
VDOC referred Garrett’s case to the Office of the Attorney 
General for consideration of whether to seek his civil 
commitment under the SVPA. 
 
Dr. Ilona Gravers, a licensed clinical psychologist, was 
designated by the Commonwealth to perform a mental health 
examination of Garrett to determine whether he met the 
statutory criteria for a sexually violent predator.  The 
                     
1 In addition to serving his sentence for the rape 
conviction, Garrett was serving sentences for other felony 
convictions.  Although Garrett had completed his sentence for 
the rape conviction prior to his scheduled release date, he 
remained subject to evaluation for civil commitment under the 
SVPA.  Code § 37.2-903(B).  Cf. Townes v. Commonwealth, 269 
Va. 234, 240-41, 609 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2005). 
 
 
2
Commonwealth made available to Dr. Gravers records detailing 
Garrett’s criminal and prison history.  Included in these 
records were files of proceedings in the Prince William County 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (hereafter, 
J&DR court) involving delinquency petitions brought against 
Garrett when he was under the age of eighteen. 
 
The J&DR court records revealed that, in addition to 
various nonsexual offenses, Garrett, while a teenager, had 
been the subject of petitions charging him with three counts 
of having carnal knowledge of a minor.  These records 
indicated that all three of the petitions had been dismissed 
without adjudication upon the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle 
prosequi.  During his interview with Dr. Gravers, Garrett 
stated that he did not commit the alleged offenses.  Based 
upon her interpretation of the records, Dr. Gravers concluded 
in her written evaluation that while there was “no official 
version of these charges . . . Mr. Garrett was placed in 
aftercare as a result” of the allegations having been made.  
Dr. Gravers diagnosed Garrett’s mental condition as including 
“Paraphilia, Not Otherwise Specified . . . Sexual Abuse of 
Child.”  Garrett’s adult criminal record did not include any 
charges of sexual abuse of a child, and the only adult offense 
of a sexual nature was the rape conviction. 
 
3
 
Based upon Dr. Gravers’ evaluation and Garrett’s scores 
on the standardized tests used by VDOC to determine the 
likelihood that a prisoner will commit further violent sexual 
crimes upon release, on October 26, 2006, the Commonwealth 
filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Prince William County 
seeking to have Garrett committed as a sexually violent 
predator.  Dr. Gravers’ report, which included extensive 
details of the non-sexual offenses committed by Garrett as a 
juvenile, was appended to the Commonwealth’s petition. 
 
On January 30, 2007, the circuit court conducted a 
hearing pursuant to Code § 37.2-906 to determine whether there 
was probable cause to find that Garrett was a sexually violent 
predator.  Dr. Gravers, the Commonwealth’s only witness, 
testified that her diagnosis of Garrett and her opinion that 
he met the statutory criteria for a sexually violent predator 
were based not only on Garrett’s performance on the 
standardized tests and his single conviction for rape, but 
also on the allegations of the carnal knowledge offenses and 
the other nonsexual offenses contained in the J&DR court files 
pertaining to Garrett.  According to Dr. Gravers, she 
considered the petitions charging Garrett with unlawful carnal 
knowledge to be significant even though the petitions had been 
dismissed because 
 
4
clinicians know that many charges tend to get pled 
down or through the criminal justice system might 
get nol prossed, parts of plea bargaining. . . .  
[T]he charges frequently are actually representative 
of the actual behavior, while the conviction may not 
necessarily represent the actual behavior that took 
place. 
 
Dr. Gravers further testified that she also considered the 
nonsexual offenses in Garrett’s juvenile and adult records, 
including offenses that had been dismissed by nolle prosequi, 
in reaching her diagnosis that Garrett had an “Antisocial 
Personality Disorder,” which in her opinion increased the 
likelihood that he would commit further acts of a sexually 
violent nature.  At the conclusion of the probable cause 
hearing, the court ruled that “the evidence adduced by the 
Commonwealth is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in 
this matter” and subsequently entered an order to that effect. 
 
In anticipation of a subsequent trial on the merits of 
its petition to civilly commit Garrett pursuant to Code 
§ 37.2-908, the Commonwealth, during the January 30, 2007 
hearing, informed the circuit court that it “need[ed] to get 
records from the Department of Juvenile Justice regarding Mr. 
Garrett’s behavior and treatment” while in the department’s 
custody.  The Commonwealth requested that the court enter an 
order for delivery of those records pursuant to Code § 16.1-
300.  The circuit court entered an order directing the 
department to provide the Commonwealth with copies of all 
 
5
records in its possession pertaining to Garrett.  In response 
to that order, the department advised the Commonwealth that 
other than a file index card, “[a]ll other files [pertaining 
to Garrett] have been destroyed.”  The Commonwealth forwarded 
a copy of the department’s response to Garrett’s counsel. 
 
Thereafter, pursuant to Code § 37.2-907, the circuit 
court appointed Ronald M. Boggio, Ph.D., a licensed clinical 
psychologist, to assist Garrett in his defense.  In his 
subsequent report evaluating Garrett, Dr. Boggio also relied 
upon information in Garrett’s juvenile records, which had been 
supplied to him by the Commonwealth, including the three 
carnal knowledge petitions that had been dismissed on the 
Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi.  However, Dr. Boggio 
disputed Dr. Gravers’ characterization of the available 
records as indicating that Garrett had been placed in 
aftercare as a condition of the dismissal of the petitions.  
Rather, he interpreted the records as indicating that Garrett 
had been placed in aftercare on an unrelated petition and the 
notation in the file merely indicated that this status 
continued following the dismissal of the carnal knowledge 
petitions.2  Dr. Boggio concluded that Garrett did not meet the 
                     
2 Ultimately, the circuit court reached a similar 
interpretation of these records. 
 
6
statutory criteria for classification as a sexually violent 
predator. 
 
On May 3, 2007, Garrett filed a motion in limine seeking 
to bar the Commonwealth from introducing documentary evidence 
or testimony concerning “any facts, or circumstances of any 
charge, or conviction of [Garrett] as a juvenile,” including 
Dr. Gravers’ opinion to the extent that it relied upon those 
records.  Relying on the response to the circuit court’s 
January 30, 2007 order by the Department of Juvenile Justice, 
Garrett initially contended that the original records had been 
“destroyed” and, thus, the records the Commonwealth had 
obtained were unauthenticated and should be excluded as 
“hearsay.”  However, without specifying the source, the 
Commonwealth established that it had acquired copies of 
“numerous court documents (including Petitions, social 
histories authored by probation services, and a letter 
regarding a psychological evaluation) and at least one police 
report which document Mr. Garrett’s juvenile criminal 
history.”  Although those documents detailed the nature of the 
allegations of unlawful carnal knowledge against Garrett, they 
did not contain any information regarding the Commonwealth’s 
decision not to prosecute Garrett on those charges.  The 
Commonwealth provided copies of these records to Dr. Gravers 
and Dr. Boggio and advised Garrett that it intended to 
 
7
introduce these records at trial.  Dr. Gravers indicated that 
the information in these records was consistent with and did 
not alter her previous opinion regarding Garrett.  Following a 
hearing, the circuit court deferred ruling on Garrett’s motion 
in limine. 
 
On June 12, 2007, at the outset of the trial on the 
Commonwealth’s petition to civilly commit Garrett as a 
sexually violent predator, the circuit court again considered 
Garrett’s motion in limine.  The court ruled that it would 
exclude all references to the three carnal knowledge 
petitions.  The court concluded that “whether offered for 
their truth, or for some other purpose related to their 
perceived clinical significance, the probative value of the 
specifics of the allegations is well outweighed by their 
tendency to unduly prejudice the jury in this matter.”  The 
circuit court further concluded that despite no evidence of a 
finding of guilt, Dr. Gravers assumed in her report that 
Garrett had committed the carnal knowledge offenses.  
Accordingly, the court ruled that Dr. Gravers’ opinion, as 
expressed in her report that addressed the excluded evidence, 
also would be excluded in its entirety.  The Commonwealth 
objected to the court’s rulings, contending that the newly 
discovered records regarding the charged offenses supported 
Dr. Gravers’ assumption that Garrett had committed the 
 
8
offenses, and that her opinion as expressed in her report 
should not be wholly excluded as it was based on her full 
evaluation of Garrett and was not dependant upon Garrett’s 
guilt of the juvenile sexual offenses. 
 
Responding to the Commonwealth’s objection, Garrett 
conceded that his prior assumption that the J&DR court records 
obtained by the Commonwealth were not original documents was 
in error.  Garrett contended, however, that those records 
should have been expunged and destroyed pursuant to Code 
§ 16.1-306 and, therefore, Dr. Gravers should not be permitted 
to base her opinion on any of those records. 
 
In support of this position, Garrett proffered to the 
court a document from Garrett’s J&DR court records styled 
“Notice of Rights to Destruction of Records,” signed by 
Garrett on July 29, 1980.  As relevant to this appeal, that 
notice advised Garrett that records pertaining to J&DR court 
proceedings against him “will be destroyed automatically” once 
Garrett had reached the age of nineteen and “[f]ive years 
ha[d] passed since the last proceeding [involving Garrett] was 
disposed of by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District 
Court.”  The notice further advised that “such records shall 
not be destroyed until twenty years have passed since the last 
proceeding was disposed of by the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations District Court if [Garrett] was found not innocent 
 
9
of a delinquent act which would be a felony if committed by an 
adult.”3  A further document proffered by Garrett showed that 
the last proceeding involving Garrett in the J&DR court 
occurred on December 23, 1985, shortly after Garrett’s 
eighteenth birthday, in which the court upon “[r]eview of 
[his] Status” directed that Garrett’s file be “closed.” 
 
Upon motion of the Commonwealth, the circuit court 
continued the scheduled trial and deferred making a final 
ruling on either the admissibility of Garrett’s J&DR court 
records or Dr. Gravers’ opinion as expressed in her report.  
The parties were directed to submit briefs on both issues. 
 
Following receipt of briefs and numerous supporting 
exhibits, the circuit court conducted additional hearings on 
the motion in limine.  The positions of the parties as 
detailed in those briefs and in the argument presented during 
the hearings are essentially parallel to the positions they 
have taken on brief and in oral argument of this appeal.  We 
will recount these hereafter in our analysis of the issues 
presented in this appeal. 
 
Ultimately, on June 29, 2007, the circuit court entered 
an order ruling that “the opinion(s) of Dr. Gravers must be 
                     
3 It is not disputed that as a juvenile Garrett was 
adjudicated not innocent of an offense that would have been a 
felony if committed by an adult. 
 
 
10
excluded from the trial in this matter.”  By reference, the 
court adopted as the rationale for this ruling Dr. Gravers’ 
reliance on the three dismissed carnal knowledge petitions as 
stated on the record in the June 12, 2007 hearing.  The 
Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration, contending 
that Dr. Gravers’ opinion was not based upon the details of 
those offenses, which were not known to her at the time of her 
initial diagnosis, but rested primarily on admissible evidence 
including the standardized tests, her interview with Garrett, 
and his adult criminal history. 
 
On July 27, 2007, the circuit court entered an order 
excluding the “admissi[on] and/or utilization of [Garrett’s] 
juvenile records.”  The court expressly ruled “[t]hat the 
version of Virginia Code § 16.1-306 which is controlling to 
this issue is that which was in effect during the period of 
1980 and 1985,” and that the statute “conferred upon [Garrett] 
a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to the scheduled 
destruction of his juvenile records.”  Determining that this 
right could not be altered by any subsequent amendment of Code 
§ 16.1-306, the court further ruled that Garrett’s J&DR court 
records should have been expunged and destroyed in 2005 and, 
thus, were inadmissible for any purpose in any subsequent 
proceeding.  By separate orders of the same date, the circuit 
court denied the Commonwealth’s motion for reconsideration of 
 
11
its ruling excluding Dr. Gravers’ opinion and certified this 
interlocutory appeal to this Court to address these rulings.4 
DISCUSSION 
 
The Commonwealth contends that the circuit court erred in 
ruling that any use of Garrett’s J&DR court records would 
violate a vested right and that, even if Garrett had such 
right, the court nonetheless erred in excluding Dr. Gravers’ 
opinion as expressed in her report in its entirety.  The first 
of these issues, arising from the court’s interpretation and 
application of Code § 16.1-306, presents a question of law 
that we will consider under a de novo standard of review.  
Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 119, 613 S.E.2d 570, 574 
(2005).  The second issue, arising from a decision on the 
admissibility of an expert opinion, is subject to review only 
for an abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Miller, 273 Va. 
540, 549, 643 S.E.2d 208, 213 (2007). 
 
The principal focus of the parties’ disagreement over the 
circuit court’s interpretation and application of Code § 16.1-
306 is whether the court erred in finding that the statute 
                     
4 There is no merit to the Commonwealth’s assertion that 
Garrett took inconsistent positions in support of his motion 
in limine and, therefore, waived the issue of the application 
of Code § 16.1-306 on appeal.  The record clearly indicates 
that the circuit court addressed the Code § 16.1-306 issue in 
a manner to specially preserve that issue for appeal.  
Accordingly, we take no further notice of the Commonwealth’s 
assertion of waiver here. 
 
12
provides a juvenile defendant with a vested right to the 
expungement and destruction of records related to proceedings 
in the J&DR court at the time of the juvenile’s last contact 
with the court and, thus, the timing for the destruction of 
Garrett’s juvenile court records was controlled by the statute 
as it was in effect in 1985.  The Commonwealth contends that 
even if the statute is intended to convey a right upon a 
juvenile defendant to have his J&DR court records expunged and 
destroyed, that right does not vest until the presumptive date 
for expungement and, thus, the intervening amendments to Code 
§ 16.1-306 could change the conditions under which that right 
would vest or eliminate that right entirely.  As relevant to 
Garrett, the Commonwealth asserts that intervening amendments 
to the statute first altered the presumptive date for 
expungement and destruction, but ultimately, under the current 
version of the statute, eliminated entirely the possibility 
that Garrett’s J&DR court records would be subject to 
expungement and destruction. 
 
Garrett contends that the circuit court correctly 
determined that Code § 16.1-306, as in effect in 1985, 
provided him with a vested right to the expungement and 
destruction of his J&DR court records.  Garrett maintains that 
as applicable to him, Code § 16.1-306 “provided for no 
possible preservation of [his] record[s] beyond 20 years” from 
 
13
the date of his last J&DR court proceeding and, thus required 
the expungement and destruction of his J&DR court records “on 
or about December 23, 2005.”5  Accordingly, Garrett contends 
that the circuit court correctly determined that permitting 
the Commonwealth to use his J&DR court records in the SVPA 
proceeding would constitute a violation of a right afforded by 
the statute. 
 
Our analysis in this case necessarily begins with an 
examination of Code § 16.1-306 as it was in effect during the 
time that Garrett was subject to the jurisdiction of the J&DR 
court and the subsequent amendments enacted that altered the 
statute.  Garrett’s first contact with the J&DR court was on 
March 15, 1978 when a petition alleging that he had committed 
simple assault was filed.  Code § 16.1-306, which had been 
enacted in 1977, then provided: 
Expungement and sealing of court records.   
A.  Notwithstanding the provisions of § 16.1-304, 
the clerk of the juvenile and domestic relations 
district court shall, on January second of each year 
or on a date designated by the court, destroy its 
files, papers and records connected with any 
proceeding in such court, if such proceeding was 
with respect to a child, and such child has attained 
the age of nineteen years and five years have 
elapsed since the last proceeding was disposed of by 
the courts; provided, however, such records shall 
not be destroyed if the child was found not innocent 
                     
5 The parties do not contest that December 23, 1985 is the 
relevant date for determining when the “last hearing” occurred 
in the J&DR court pertaining to Garrett as contemplated by 
Code § 16.1-306 as in effect in 1985. 
 
14
of a delinquent act which would be a felony if 
committed by an adult. . . . 
 
B.  The remainder of the records held by the court 
of juveniles who have attained the age of nineteen 
and five years have elapsed since the last 
proceeding was disposed of by the courts shall be 
sealed.  Such records shall be available for 
inspection only by a juvenile court, general 
district court or circuit court sentencing a person 
for conviction of any criminal offense and by the 
person on whom the record is kept. 
 
C.  A person who has been the subject of a 
delinquency petition and whose records fall within 
the provisions of subsection B hereof may, after ten 
years since the last proceeding was disposed of by 
the juvenile court, file a motion requesting the 
destruction of all records pertaining to his case.  
Notice of such motion shall be given to the 
Commonwealth’s attorney.  After a hearing on the 
matter, if the court grants the motion, copies of 
the order shall be sent to offices or agencies that 
are repositories of such records, and all such 
offices and agencies shall comply with the order. 
 
D.  A person found guilty of a charge of delinquency 
shall be notified of his rights under subsections A 
and C of this section at the time of his or her 
dispositional hearing. 
 
E.  All records sealed pursuant to subsection B 
hereof shall be destroyed twenty years from the date 
of the last proceeding in the juvenile court. 
 
F.  Upon destruction of the records of a proceeding 
as provided for in subsections A and C, the 
violation of law shall be treated as if it never 
occurred.  All index references shall be deleted and 
the court and law enforcement officers and agencies 
shall reply and the person may reply to any inquiry 
that no record exists with respect to such person. 
 
G.  The court shall notify all pertinent agencies 
and the circuit court of the destruction of records 
provided for in subsections A and C.  Such agencies 
 
15
and circuit courts shall also destroy any records 
they have in connection with the same proceeding. 
 
 
Code § 16.1-306 was subsequently amended in 1979 by two 
Acts of the General Assembly, and it was this version of the 
statute that was in effect when the petitions charging Garrett 
with carnal knowledge of a minor were filed in 1981.  As 
relevant here, the first 1979 amendment altered the 
calculation of the five year period designated in subsection A 
and the twenty year period designated in subsection D so that 
those periods would commence on the “date of the last hearing 
in any case of the juvenile” rather than the date the “last 
proceeding was disposed of by the courts.”  1979 Acts ch. 736. 
 
The second 1979 amendment to Code § 16.1-306 added a new 
provision, subsection C1, which permitted an individual to 
petition at any time for the expungement of the records of 
offenses which would not be felonies if committed by an adult 
and for which the individual was found to be innocent or where 
the “petition was otherwise dismissed.”  Such petition for 
expungement was to be granted “[u]nless good cause [was] shown 
why such records should not be destroyed.”  1979 Acts ch. 737. 
 
The same amendment altered subsection D of Code § 16.1-
306 to provide that notice of the “rights” provided for in the 
statute was to be given to “[e]ach person,” rather than only 
to persons found guilty of a charge.  Id.  It was under this 
 
16
version of the statute that Garrett first was provided with 
the notice of his “Rights to Destruction of Records” on July 
29, 1980. 
 
Effective July 1, 1990,6 approximately four and one-half 
years after the entry of the December 23, 1985 order closing 
Garrett’s J&DR court records, the twenty year period for 
retaining records of cases involving delinquent acts that 
constitute felonies if committed by an adult was deleted from 
the statute.  The amendment instead substituted a provision 
that such “records shall be destroyed when the child has 
attained the age of twenty-nine.”  1990 Acts ch. 258.  Thus, 
by this amendment, the General Assembly made the destruction 
of J&DR court records dependent solely upon the defendant’s 
age without regard to when the last hearing pertaining to him 
occurred in the J&DR court. 
 
Code § 16.1-306 was amended again effective July 1, 1996.7  
This amendment deleted the provision for destruction of J&DR 
court records of juvenile defendants found to have committed 
delinquent acts that would constitute felonies if committed by 
                     
6 The statute also was amended in 1989, however, this 
amendment only added a provision that the clerk should retain 
for a period of ten years J&DR court records that involved an 
offense that was required by law to be reported to the 
Department of Motor Vehicles.  1989 Acts ch. 183. 
 
7 Amendments to the statute made in 1993, 1994, and 2008 
are not germane to this appeal. 
 
17
an adult when the juvenile attained the age of twenty-nine and 
instead provided that “[i]f the juvenile was found guilty of a 
delinquent act which would be a felony if committed by an 
adult, the records shall be retained.”  1996 Acts ch. 463.  
Garrett became twenty-nine on December 5, 1996.  Thus, if the 
Commonwealth is correct that it is the 1996 version of Code 
§ 16.1-306 that determines whether Garrett’s J&DR court 
records were to be expunged and destroyed, then those records 
were properly retained by the Prince William County Juvenile 
and Domestic Relations District Court and any other agency or 
officer properly possessing copies of those records. 
 
The intention of the General Assembly as expressed in 
Code § 16.1-306 since 1978 and the resulting statutory scheme 
for the expungement and destruction of the records concerning 
delinquency proceedings in a juvenile and domestic relations 
district court could not be more clear.  The language of the 
statute plainly requires the clerks annually to destroy the 
“files, papers and records” of those courts concerning prior 
juvenile defendants who are no longer subject to the 
jurisdiction of those courts when the statutorily established 
time periods have expired and the specific statutory 
exceptions referenced above are not applicable.  The duty 
imposed upon the clerks to destroy such records as well as the 
 
18
rights afforded to the individuals are expressly conditioned 
upon the passage of specific time periods. 
 
The 1985 version of Code § 16.1-306 did not grant a 
substantive right of constitutional dimension to an individual 
to have the records of a juvenile and domestic relations 
district court pertaining to him expunged and destroyed.  
Rather, the statute granted merely an inchoate right until 
such time as the statute then mandated that the destruction of 
these records would occur.  Thus, we agree with the 
Commonwealth’s contention that Garrett never had a “vested” 
right to have his juvenile records destroyed.  This is so 
because the 1996 amendment to Code § 16.1-306, providing that 
“[i]f the juvenile was found guilty of a delinquent act which 
would be a felony if committed by an adult, the records shall 
be retained,” came into effect before Garrett’s twenty-ninth 
birthday, the date on which, under the version of the statute 
in effect for the first time in 1990, the right would 
otherwise have vested.  Two of our recent decisions provide 
support for this conclusion. 
 
In Morency v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 569, 649 S.E.2d 682 
(2007), we considered whether the predecessor statute to Code 
§ 9.1-909, which permitted an individual who was required to 
register as a sex offender to petition to be relieved of that 
requirement and further directed that if such petition were 
 
19
granted the Virginia State Police would remove the 
individual’s data from its public Internet database, conveyed 
a vested right not to be included in the database once such 
petition had been granted.  After Morency successfully 
petitioned to be relieved of the duty to register, Code § 9.1-
909 was amended to eliminate the directive that the data be 
removed from the public database.  The State Police 
subsequently restored Morency’s data to the database.  Morency 
then petitioned to have the data removed, contending that the 
circuit court’s prior order provided him with a right not to 
be included in the database.  Id. at 572-73, 649 S.E.2d at 
683. 
 
Affirming a judgment denying Morency the requested 
relief, we held that Code § 9.1-909 and its predecessor did 
not provide Morency with the right to have his data 
permanently removed from the database, because “[r]emoval of 
such information from the Internet registry was solely an 
action directed by statute by virtue of the receipt of the 
. . . order” granting his petition to be relieved from the 
requirement to register as a sex offender.  Id. at 577, 649 
S.E.2d at 686.  While Morency could not be required to 
continue registering as a sex offender, removal of his data 
from the database was merely “a procedural remedy which ‘may 
be altered, curtailed, or repealed at the will of the 
 
20
legislature’ and therefore did not give rise to any vested 
interest.”  Id. at 576-77, 649 S.E.2d at 685 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 263 Va. 428, 432-33, 559 S.E.2d 623, 
626 (2002)). 
 
Likewise, in McCabe v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 558, 650 
S.E.2d 508 (2007), we held that when the General Assembly 
reclassified certain crimes as “sexually violent offenses” 
and, thus, altered the sex offender registration requirements 
for persons who had previously been convicted of those 
offenses, the changes in the law did not affect a vested 
right.  Id. at 566, 659 S.E.2d at 513.  This was so because 
the sex offender registration requirements in effect at the 
time of McCabe’s conviction gave rise only to a “statutorily-
based expectation” of what would be required of her, not a 
vested right to be subject only to those requirements.  Id., 
659 S.E.2d at 512. 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court erred 
in ruling that Code § 16.1-306 as in effect in 1985 granted 
Garrett a vested right with regard to the destruction of his 
J&DR court records.  Accordingly, we further hold that the 
circuit court erred in finding that version of Code § 16.1-306 
 
21
afforded Garrett the right to have his J&DR court records 
destroyed twenty years after December 23, 1985.8 
 
We now turn to consider the Commonwealth’s remaining 
assignment of error.  Initially, we note that the circuit 
court’s ruling to exclude Dr. Gravers’ opinion was not based 
upon its determination that Garrett’s J&DR court records 
should have been expunged and destroyed, but upon the court’s 
determination that Dr. Gravers improperly relied upon the 
three carnal knowledge petitions which were dismissed on the 
Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi, concluding that her 
opinion that Garrett’s mental condition included “Paraphilia, 
Not Otherwise Specified . . . Sexual Abuse of Child” was based 
on an improper foundation.  As the Commonwealth’s assignment 
of error to the court’s ruling is limited to the court having 
excluded Dr. Gravers’ opinion in its entirety, we will address 
this issue in order to clarify what use, if any, may be made 
of Dr. Gravers’ opinion upon remand in light of our holding 
that Garrett’s J&DR court records were rightly available to 
the Commonwealth. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that the circuit court erred in 
excluding Dr. Gravers’ opinion because her reliance upon the 
                     
8 In light of this holding, we need not consider the 
Commonwealth’s alternate contention regarding the availability 
of Garrett’s juvenile court records with regard to his SVPA 
proceeding. 
 
22
three carnal knowledge petitions was only incidental to her 
overall opinion and diagnosis.  Thus, the Commonwealth 
contends that the court’s ruling excluding Dr. Gravers’ 
opinion in its entirety was overbroad. 
 
Garrett responds that the circuit court properly 
determined that Dr. Gravers’ reliance on the three carnal 
knowledge petitions was not insignificant to her final 
diagnosis.  He contends that the court’s principal concern was 
that Dr. Gravers had assumed that these petitions were 
indicative of actual criminal behavior despite the dismissal 
by nolle prosequi.  Accordingly, Garrett maintains that the 
court’s ruling to exclude the opinion entirely was correct, 
because Dr. Gravers’ diagnosis of “Paraphilia, Not Otherwise 
Specified . . . Sexual Abuse of Child” was the result of 
speculation and conjecture. 
 
We agree with the circuit court that Dr. Gravers’ 
opinion, as proffered, was properly excluded.  Code § 8.01-
401.1 clearly allows an expert to express an opinion or draw 
an inference from inadmissible sources, such as hearsay.  
Nonetheless, to be admissible, an expert opinion must be based 
on an adequate factual foundation.  Countryside Corp. v. 
Taylor, 263 Va. 549, 553, 561 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002).  An 
expert must not be permitted to express an opinion that is 
speculative and unreliable as a matter of law.  Id.; accord 
 
23
Vasquez v. Mabini, 269 Va. 155, 159-61, 606 S.E.2d 809, 811-12 
(2005).  Thus, we have previously held that “[w]hile Code 
§ 37.2-906(C) permits the consideration at a SVP probable 
cause hearing of ‘prior convictions or charges,’ there is no 
statutory mandate that an unadjudicated charge must be taken 
as true for purposes of the hearing.”  Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 276 Va. 184, 196, 661 S.E.2d 810, 816 (2008). 
 
The Commonwealth’s decision not to prosecute a specific 
charge may be made for any number of reasons, and it is well 
established that the granting of a motion for nolle prosequi 
generally does not act as an acquittal.  See Parker v. McCoy, 
212 Va. 808, 810, 188 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1972) (citing Lindsay 
v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 264, 265 (1823)).  But see 
Rosser v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 1028, 1032 167 S.E. 257, 258 
(1933) (holding where the Commonwealth terminated a 
prosecution after jeopardy had attached, the nolle prosequi 
acted as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes).  
Nonetheless, once the charge is dismissed, no legal 
significance can be attached to the fact that the charge was 
brought.  See Miller v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 929, 935, 234 
S.E.2d 269, 273 (1977) (“Under Virginia procedure a nolle 
prosequi is a discontinuance which discharges the accused from 
liability on the indictment”). 
 
24
 
The Commonwealth asserts that in Ellison v. Commonwealth, 
273 Va. 254, 639 S.E.2d 209 (2007), this Court approved the 
admission in an SVPA proceeding of evidence of conduct that 
resulted in a criminal charge, but which did not result in a 
conviction.  Our decision in Ellison, however, is readily 
distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case.  
In Ellison, the Commonwealth was permitted to present the 
testimony of a woman who had alleged that Ellison had raped 
her.  Although Ellison was acquitted in the trial that 
resulted from that allegation, we held that the testimony was 
nonetheless admissible in the SVPA proceeding because the 
standard of proof in such proceedings is different from that 
in a criminal trial.  Id. at 257-58, 639 S.E.2d at 211-12. 
 
Here, even with the additional records obtained by the 
Commonwealth shortly before trial, the record still supports 
only a finding that allegations of wrongdoing were made, but 
that no prosecution resulted.  Unlike in Ellison, the 
allegations were never made the subject of sworn testimony 
before a trier of fact.  And, unlike Ellison, here no 
inference can be drawn from the dismissal of the charges that 
there was simply a failure of the evidence to establish 
Garrett’s guilt under the more stringent standard applicable 
in criminal cases because no effort was ever made to produce 
evidence in support of those allegations. 
 
25
 
We do not challenge Dr. Gravers’ assertion that mental 
health professionals will frequently rely upon judicial 
records indicating that charged conduct did not result in a 
final determination of guilt as nonetheless being indicative 
of the subject’s antisocial behavior.  As Code § 37.2-906(C) 
permits consideration of unajudicated “charges,” there 
undoubtedly will be instances in which additional attendant 
facts would permit a clinician to make a diagnosis of 
“Antisocial Personality Disorder” with confidence.  However, 
with respect to a diagnosis of “Paraphilia, Not Otherwise 
Specified . . . Sexual Abuse of Child” in this case, the three 
carnal knowledge petitions standing alone were legally 
insufficient to permit Dr. Gravers to draw the inference that 
Garrett had in fact committed those offenses in the absence of 
any additional evidence concerning the circumstances 
surrounding the Commonwealth’s decision to dismiss those 
petitions.9 
 
During the probable cause hearing, Dr. Gravers testified 
that her consideration of Garrett’s J&DR court records, and 
especially the three dismissed carnal knowledge petitions, was 
                     
9 Our examination of the relevant documents also confirms 
that Dr. Gravers erred in assuming that Garrett had been 
committed to aftercare as a condition of the dismissal of the 
petitions.  Rather, the records show that Garrett was 
“returned to aftercare” at that time because of an unrelated 
charge. 
 
26
a significant factor in her opinion that Garrett meets the 
statutory criteria for civil commitment under the SVPA.  
Indeed, the only factual basis from which Dr. Gravers could 
have reached the diagnosis of “Paraphilia, Not Otherwise 
Specified . . . Sexual Abuse of Child” was from her reliance 
on these petitions.  There is simply no merit to the 
Commonwealth’s assertion that Dr. Gravers’ reliance upon the 
carnal knowledge petitions was only incidental to her overall 
opinion and diagnosis. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion in excluding Dr. Gravers’ opinion in its 
entirety.  We note, however, that the circuit court’s ruling 
does not eliminate Dr. Gravers’ qualification to testify as an 
expert in this case.  Upon remand, therefore, the Commonwealth 
may call Dr. Gravers as an expert witness and, to the extent 
that she is able to revise her opinion without relying upon 
the carnal knowledge petitions and limit her testimony to the 
analysis of Garrett’s other juvenile and adult records, her 
interview with Garrett, and the standardized tests, the views 
expressed here will not serve to bar that expert testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, the orders of the circuit court will 
be affirmed in part and reversed in part, and we will remand 
 
27
the case for further proceedings consistent with the views 
expressed in this opinion if the Commonwealth be so advised. 
Affirmed in part, 
 
 
 
 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
 and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS joins, concurring. 
 
 
I agree with the majority opinion but write separately to 
clarify reasons why I conclude that the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion by excluding the expert opinion of Ilona 
Gravers, Psy.D., in its entirety. 
The circuit court excluded Dr. Gravers’ opinion because 
the court concluded the opinion was based on the incorrect 
assumption that Marvin Darryl Garrett had in fact committed 
the three carnal knowledge offenses charged in the juvenile 
petitions that were dismissed on the Commonwealth’s motion for 
nolle prosequi.  The circuit court was correct; Dr. Gravers 
did assume that Garrett committed the three carnal knowledge 
offenses, but that assumption had no factual basis. 
In her written report, Dr. Gravers stated that Garrett 
satisfied the “criteria for [the] mental disorder of 
Paraphilia, Not Otherwise Specified” because Garrett “offended 
against a child and against a non-consenting adult.”  Although 
Dr. Gravers acknowledged that the carnal knowledge charges 
were nolle prossed, she nevertheless believed Garrett received 
 
28
a sanction of aftercare placement for that alleged criminal 
conduct.  Her belief that he received aftercare placement as a 
condition of the dismissal of the petitions apparently led to 
her conclusion that he had in fact committed a sexual offense 
against a child. 
Dr. Gravers was wrong about the connection between the 
aftercare placement and the dismissal of the carnal knowledge 
petitions.  As the majority correctly notes, the aftercare 
placement was the result of an unrelated charge.  Dr. Gravers’ 
opinion that Garrett suffers from “Paraphilia, Not Otherwise 
Specified” was therefore based on an assumption that had no 
basis in fact.  “Expert testimony founded upon assumptions 
that have no basis in fact is not merely subject to refutation 
by cross-examination or by counter-experts; it is 
inadmissible.”  Vasquez v. Mabini, 269 Va. 155, 160, 606 
S.E.2d 809, 811 (2005) (citing Virginia Financial Assoc. v. 
ITT Hartford Group, 266 Va. 177, 183, 585 S.E.2d 789, 792 
(2003)).  Thus, Dr. Gravers’ opinion was inadmissible. 
Dr. Gravers’ incorrect conclusion that Garrett actually 
offended against a child also affected her diagnosis of 
“Antisocial Personality Disorder.”  Dr. Gravers wrote in her 
report that “[a] hallmark of Antisocial Personality Disorder 
is the use of acting [out] as a means of interacting with the 
environment and coping with distress.  Roots are evident in 
 
29
childhood.”  Additionally, Dr. Gravers determined that 
“Garrett ha[d] engaged in various forms of acting out since an 
early age to include criminal activity, substance abuse and 
sexual offending.”  Finally, in discussing Garrett’s “sexual 
acting out,” Dr. Gravers stated that “[h]e first sexually 
offended as an adolescent.  While the charges were nolle 
prossed, he was given a sanction of aftercare placement.”  
Again, Dr. Gravers used her incorrect premise that the 
aftercare placement was imposed as a result of the three 
dismissed carnal knowledge petitions to conclude that as a 
juvenile, Garrett sexually offended against a child.  That 
conclusion contributed to Dr. Gravers’ diagnosis of 
“Antisocial Personality Disorder.”  Thus, her diagnosis, like 
the diagnosis of “Paraphilia, Not Otherwise Specified,” was 
based on an assumption that had no basis in fact, thereby 
rendering her opinion inadmissible.  See Vasquez, 269 Va. at 
160, 606 S.E.2d at 811. 
I do not intend for my views to suggest that, in 
conducting an evaluation for purposes of a sexually violent 
predator proceeding, a mental health professional cannot rely 
on unadjudicated criminal conduct.  Indeed, the provisions of 
Code § 37.2-906(C)(ii) state that, at a hearing to determine 
whether there is probable cause to believe a respondent is a 
sexually violent predator, “[t]he existence of any prior 
 
30
 
31
convictions or charges may be shown with affidavits or 
documentary evidence.” But, as I have explained, Dr. Gravers’ 
incorrect assumption about Garrett’s unadjudicated conduct 
formed the basis of her diagnoses of Garrett’s mental 
disorders. 
Finally, the Static-99, one of the standardized tests 
used by mental health professionals to determine the 
likelihood of a sex offender to re-offend, allows for 
unadjudicated conduct to be included in an offender’s 
evaluation.  The coding rules for the Static-99 state: 
In some instances, the offender has been 
arrested for a sexual offense, questioning 
takes place but no formal charges are filed.  
If the offender is arrested for a sexual 
offense and no formal charges are filed, a “1” 
is coded under charges, and a “0” is coded 
under convictions.  If the offender is arrested 
and one or more formal charges are filed, the 
total number of charges is coded, even when no 
conviction ensues. 
 
Both Dr. Gravers and Garrett’s mental health expert used 
the Static-99 in this case.  On remand, mental health 
professionals, in my view, can properly use the three 
unadjudicated carnal knowledge petitions to, among other 
things, code the Static-99 and other such tests. 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.