Title: METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT COMM. v. Marianos

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

408 N.E.2d 1267 (1980)
The METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT COMM. of Marion County, Appellant,
v.
George MARIANOS d/b/a George's Garage, Appellee.
No. 980S361.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
September 3, 1980.
Larry F. Whithan, Corp. Counsel, Indianapolis, for appellant.
John D. Raikos, Indianapolis, for appellee.
PIVARNIK, Justice.
This cause comes to us on petition to transfer following a decision by the Second District Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial court. The Metropolitan Development Commission of Marion County (MDC) appealed from the trial court's denial of its prayer for injunctive *1268 relief against certain commercial uses of industrial zoned property leased by George Marianos, doing business as George's Garage. The MDC is a governmental entity created by Chapter 173 of the Acts of the Indiana General Assembly for the year 1969, and exercises all powers previously conferred upon the Metropolitan Plan Commission of Marion County by the Indiana General Assembly. Since 1963, the property in question has been zoned I-4-U under the industrial zoning ordinance of Marion County. The I-4-U district is an industrially zoned district which allows for certain enumerated less intensive uses. However, the I-4-U district does not permit gasoline stations, automobile repair garages or automobile salvage operations. The use of the property in question as a gasoline service station and repair garage apparently began about 1940. When the gasoline supplier for the station ceased doing business in Indiana, the primary business on the property became automobile salvage and automobile repair. Appellee Marianos was in touch with other gasoline suppliers in an attempt to resurrect the gasoline business that had decreased measurably with the absence of Gulf Corporation, but had trouble making such arrangements because of the shortage of gasoline.
Marianos did not dispute his non-compliance with the ordinance. He asserted the affirmative defense of a non-conforming use. The trial court found there was a non-conforming use and denied the MDC injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals found the trial court made insufficient findings to support its decision and reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for the Metropolitan Development Commission.
While it is true that the findings of fact of the trial court fall short of supporting the conclusion that the defendant has a valid non-conforming use, the record itself reveals that there was testimony before the trial court from which at least strong inferences could be drawn that there was, in fact, a non-conforming use that would support a judgment for Marianos. We accordingly grant transfer and order that the opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals be vacated.
The trial court made the following findings of fact:
A non-conforming use is one that is permitted in a given area, despite being against zoning regulations, because the non-conforming use was in existence on or before the controlling zoning ordinance took effect. The non-conforming use must exist as such continuously after the effective date of the ordinance. See generally Jacobs v. Mishawaka Bd. of Zoning Appeals, (1979) Ind. App., 395 N.E.2d 834.
The critical year for determining whether there was a non-conforming use in this case is 1963. Thus, if a certain use was being made of the property in 1963, and it had been continuously used in that manner since, then it might be a continuing valid non-conforming use. The appellee garage owner in this case leased the property in 1969. The Court of Appeals pointed out that nowhere was a finding made that appellee or his predecessors had used the property in a valid non-conforming way in 1963 and up until the time that appellee himself began using the property in this manner. It appears the trial court may have believed it was sufficient to show the non-conforming use from the year 1969, when the MDC came into operation under the law. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the ordinance was effective November 7, 1963, and, therefore, that date, and not 1969, would have to be used to establish a non-conforming use.
Appellee Marianos testified as follows:
Thus, while the fact of continuous use is not totally revealed by Marianos in his attempt to prove the affirmative defense of non-conforming use, the trier of fact certainly could infer from the testimony a continuous use since at least 1963.
Examining a cold record in this manner does not give us the opportunity to gain the impression from inferences which the trier of fact does in hearing the entire testimony in a cause. The record shows, by the testimony of several witnesses, that none of the people in the area object to Marianos' presence. The evidence showed that businesses and former businesses in the area were not of a nature to be affected by any unsightly quality of his business and, in fact, some of them may be, or may have been, more objectionable than his garage. These businesses included a foundry, an abbatoir, a factory, an electric generation plant and a junkyard. There was testimony that the junkyard was within four blocks of Marianos' garage, and some evidence that the Federal Government maintained a junkyard across the street from the garage.
In view of this record, we do not think it was appropriate to reverse the trial court and enter judgment for the MDC. Ind. R.Ap. 15(N) provides for a more appropriate disposition:
This cause is now ordered remanded to the trial court pursuant to Appellate Rule 15(N)(4), and the trial court is directed to make specific findings with regard to continuous non-conforming use as demonstrated by the evidence. If deemed necessary by the trial court, it may re-open the judgment and hear further evidence on non-conforming use. Thereafter, the court shall enter judgment accordingly. It is so ordered. Transfer is granted.
All Justices concur.