Title: Guzman v. District Court

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

137 Nev., Advance Opinion G1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

WILBER ERNESTO MARTINEZ, No. 81842
GUZMAN,
Petitioner,

vs,
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT FILE
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

 

WASHOE; AND THE HONORABLE SEP 39 202
CONNIE J. STEINHEIMER, DISTRICT af Aan
JUDGE, ey.
Respondents,

and
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Real Party in Interest.

 

Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district
court order denying a motion to dismiss counts of an indictment.
Petition granted.

John L. Arrascada, Public Defender, and John Reese Petty, Katheryn
Hickman, Gianna M. Verness, and Joseph W. Goodnight, Chief Deputy
Public Defenders, Washoe County,

for Petitioner.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks,
District Attorney, and Marilee Cate, Appellate Deputy District Attorney,

Washoe County; Mark Jackson, District Attorney, Douglas County,
for Real Party in Interest.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

24-2807

 
on

OPINION

 

By the Court, STIGLICH, J.

‘This is the second time this court has considered the scope of a
grand jury's authority to return an indictment for offenses committed by
petitioner Wilber Ernesto Martinez Guzman. Last year, we held that a
grand jury may inquire into an offense as long as venue is proper for that
offense in the district court where the grand jury is impaneled. Martinez
Guzman v, Second Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev. 103, 110, 460 P.34 443,
450 (2020). Today, we consider whether venue is proper.

‘Martinez Guzman has been charged with committing three
burglaries and two murders in Washoe County, and two burglaries and two
murders in Douglas County. A Washoe County grand jury indicted him for
all these offenses. Upon Martinez Guzman’s motion to dismiss the Douglas
County charges for lack of territorial jurisdiction, the district. court found
that venue was proper in Washoe County for each charge. We disagree.
‘The State advanced several theories for why venue was proper in Washoe
County, and venue for the Douglas County charges need only be proper
under one justification for the Washoe County grand jury to have authority
toindict Martinez Guzman, But the State's theories supporting venue were
too speculative and unsupported by the evidence to make venue proper for
any of the Douglas County charges. In particular, we conclude there was
no act or effect requisite to the consummation of the Douglas County
offenses that occurred in Washoe County to justify venue there under NRS
171.030. We also determine there was insufficient evidence that property
taken from Douglas County had been brought into Washoe County to justify
venue there under NRS 171.060. We therefore hold that the district court

 

 
manifestly abused its discretion in denying Martinez Guzman’s motion to
dismiss the Douglas County charges for lack of venue.

BACKGROUND
Crimes and indictment

Martinez Guzman, a Carson City resident, is accused of
committing five burglaries and four murders in three households between
January 3 and January 16, 2019. First, according to the State, Martinez
Guzman burglarized the David home in Reno (Washoe County) on two
consecutive nights. There, among numerous other items, he stole the gun
and ammunition that he went on to use in the subsequent crimes. Around
five days later, the night of January 9, he burglarized the Koontz home and
killed Constance Koontz in Gardnerville (Douglas County). That same
week, he burglarized the Renken home in Gardnerville, killing Sophia
Renken, He then returned to the David home the night of January 15,
burglarizing it and killing Gerald and Sharon David. In a police interview
following his arrest on January 19, Martinez Guzman confessed to the
crimes, told police he had observed the homes while working for a
landscaping business, and directed police to a location in Carson City where
he had buried other weapons taken from the David home. Martinez
Guzman stated he drove the same car to each of the homes. When officers
searched his car after his arrest in Carson City, they discovered a .22 caliber
revolver and ammunition, a small pendant and an airline document from
the Koontz home, and a name tag from the David home.

In March 2019, a grand jury returned an indictment with ten
felony counts in the Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County. The
evidence consisted mostly of Martinez Guzman's police interview. Counts
1, 1, and IX charge the burglaries of the David home in Washoe County,

 
and counts VIT and VIII charge the murders of the Davids. Counts III, IV,
V, and VI (collectively, the Douglas County charges) charge the burglaries
and murders at the Koontz and Renken homes in Douglas County. Count
X charges possession of the stolen firearms in Washoe County and/or
Douglas County and/or Carson City. The State subsequently filed a notice
of intent to seek the death penalty.
Past matter before this court

Martinez Guzman moved to dismiss the Douglas County
charges on the ground that the Washoe County grand jury lacked
jurisdiction under NRS 172.105, which allows grand juries to “inquire into
all public offenses triable in the district court or in a Justice Court,
‘committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court for which
it is impaneled.” The district court denied the motion to dismiss after
concluding that the court's territorial jurisdiction extended statewide.
Martinez Guzman, 136 Nev. at 105, 460 P.3d at 446.

‘This court reviewed that issue on a writ petition and held that
the district court had interpreted NRS 172.105 too expansively, because a
grand jury may indict a defendant only “so long as the district court that
empaneled the grand jury may appropriately adjudicate the defendant's
guilt for that particular offense” under the applicable venue statutes. Id. at
110, 460 P.3d at 450. We vacated the district court's order and remanded
the matter for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss, providing that

In doing so, the district court shall review the
evidence presented to the Washoe County grand
jury to determine whether there is a sufficient
connection between the Douglas County offenses
and Washoe County. To do so, the district court
must determine whether venue would be proper in
Washoe County for the Douglas County offenses.

 

 
on

Id. at 104, 460 P.3d at 445 (emphasis added). If venue was improper, we
explained, “then the Washoe County grand jury does not have the authority
to inquire into the Douglas County offenses, and the district court must
grant Martinez Guzman's motion to dismiss.” Id. at 104, 460 P.3d at 446.
Proceedings on remand

The district court reheard the motion to dismiss after
supplemental briefing. Martinez Guzman argued that only two venue
statutes—NRS 171.030 and NRS 171.060—were applicable, and they did
not support venue in Washoe County for the Douglas County charges. The

 

State countered that venue was appropriate in Washoe County under the
applicable venue statutes and that the district court could also consider
other statutes like NRS 173.116 (concerning joinder of offenses) and NRS
171.020 (concerning Nevada's jurisdiction over offenses committed outside
the state). ‘The district court again denied the motion to dismiss, finding
that venue was proper in Washoe County for all charges and, thus, the
grand jury had authority to indict Martinez Guzman on the Douglas County
charges.

Martinez Guzman again petitioned this court for a writ of
mandamus on the ground that the district court manifestly abused its
discretion in finding venue proper in Washoe County.

DISCUSSION
We choose to entertain this writ petition

Whether a writ of mandamus will be considered is within this
court's sole discretion. Smith v. Bighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674,
677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). A writ of mandamus is available to “compel
the performance of an act that the law requires” or “to control a manifest

abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.” State v. Eighth

 
on

Judicial Dist. Court (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 931, 267 P.3d 777, 779
(2011). Mandamus may be appropriate “when an important issue of law
needs clarification and sound judicial economy and administration favor the
granting of the petition.” State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Ducharm),
118 Nev. 609, 614, 55 P.3d 420, 423 (2002). However, the writ will not be
issued if the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.
NRS 34.170.

Here, the petition touches on an important and largely
unsettled legal question in Nevada: what nexus between where a crime is
committed and where it is charged must exist to make venue proper. If this
matter were to proceed to a complex capital trial on all of these charges,
only for this court to find on appeal that the Washoe County grand jury
lacked authority to indict on the Douglas County charges, much time and
judicial resources would be wasted. Thus, the interests of sound judicial
administration and clear law favor our consideration of this petition.
Generally, venue is only proper in the county where the crime is committed

In our first Martinez Guzman opinion, we tasked the district
court to analyze venue “under the applicable statutes.” Martinez Guzman,
136 Nev. at 110, 460 P.3d at 450. We take this opportunity to note that, in
many instances, no specific venue statute applies and the general common
law rule that ‘each county will have independent jurisdiction over a
criminal offender for conduct occurring in that county” governs. Zebe v.
State, 112 Nev. 1482, 1484-85, 929 P.2d 927, 929 (1996). This makes
sense—when it is clear where a crime has been committed, community
interest weighs towards prosecution in the county where that crime has
been committed. However, there are statutory exceptions that allow some
crimes to be prosecuted in more than one county. Whether the Washoe

 
County grand jury had authority to indict Martinez Guzman on the Douglas
County charges—burglaries and murders that no one disputes happened in
Douglas County homes—depends on whether venue to try those crimes in
‘Washoe County is proper under any of those statutory exceptions.
Venue was not proper in Washoe County under NRS 171.030 for the Douglas
County offenses

NRS 171.030 governs venue over criminal offenses committed
in more than one county:

When a public offense is committed in part in one
county and in part in another or the acts or effects
thereof constituting or requisite to the
consummation of the offense occur in two or more
counties, the venue is in either county.

‘The State argues that Washoe County is a proper venue under
NRS 171.030 on two grounds. First, it asserts that venue is proper because
intent is an “act or effect” integral to committing the charged Douglas
County offenses and Martinez Guzman’s intent could have been formed in
Washoe County. Second, the State contends that venue is proper because
preparatory acts (namely, obtaining the gun in Washoe County) are acts
“constituting or requisite to the consummation of” the Douglas County
offenses. Martinez Guzman counters that there was no evidence that intent
‘was formed in Washoe County or that he obtained the gun in preparation
for the Douglas County offenses.

Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law and
are reviewed de novo, even in the context of a writ petition. Mendoza-Lobos
v. State, 125 Nev. 634, 642, 218 P.3d 501, 506 (2009); see also Cote H. v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 40, 175 P.3d 906, 908 (2008). “This
court will attribute the plain meaning to a statute that is not ambiguous.”
‘Mendoza-Lobos, 125 Nev. at 642, 218 P.3d at 506. “A statute is ambiguous

 

 
on

when its language lends itself to two or more reasonable interpretations.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because venue does not involve an
element of the crime or relate to guilt or innocence, the State need only
prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence. Cf: McNamara v. State,
132 Nev. 606, 615-16, 377 P.3d 106, 113 (2016). “[VIenue may be
established by circumstantial evidence.” James v. State, 105 Nev. 873, 875,
784 P.2d 965, 967 (1989).

Neither formation of intent alone nor preparatory acts alone are
sufficient to make venue proper in a charging county

‘The district court’s finding of proper venue under this statute
depended in part on its finding that intent alone or a preparatory act alone
could meet the requirements of that language. We hold that this conclusion
‘was incorrect.

First, the nebulous formation of intent, without acts furthering
that intent, does not constitute an “act” under NRS 171.030. The difference
between a crime’s actus reus and mens rea is centuries-old. We cannot say

 

that the Legislature—in using the language “acts or effects”—meant to
include the formation of intent alone, despite the fact that intent is certainly
requisite to the consummation of many offenses. The State's argument
assumes that, since intent is an element of the charges, see NRS 200.010;
NRS 205.060, it is an act or effect constituting or requisite to the
consummation of the burglaries and murders. But NRS 171.030 does not
refer to elements of the offense, but rather to “acts or effects,” and intent
standing alone is neither.

Second, whether acts done in preparation for the relevant
offense are “acts ... requisite to the consummation” of an offense under
NRS 171.030 is an issue of first impression for this court, which is not
answered by the plain language of the statute. Below, both the district court

 

 
ii ee

and the parties were guided by California courts’ interpretations of that
state's analogous statute, which is almost identical to NRS 171.030. See
City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Crockett, 117 Nev. 816, 824,
34 P.3d 553, 559 (2001); compare Cal. Penal Code § 781 (West 2020), with
NRS 171.030. Notably, California has said that the statute “must be given
a liberal interpretation to permit trial in a county where only preparatory
acts have occurred.” People v. Simon, 25 P.3d 598, 617 (Cal. 2001).
California has, for example, held that where a defendant was part of a
conspiracy to commit a murder and traveled to one county to obtain a gun
for subsequent use in committing that murder in another county, venue for
the murder was proper in the county where he obtained the gun. People v.
Price, 821 P.2d 610, 640 (Cal. 1991). In California, even a “telephone call
for the purpose of planning a crime received within [a] county is an adequate
basis for venue, despite the fact the call was originated outside the county,”
albeit at the outer limits of adequacy. See People v. Posey, 82 P.3d 755, 773
(Cal. 2004) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
California not only allows venue to be based on preparatory acts, but also
“on the effects of preparatory acts,” such as the person in the charging
county receiving the defendant's call from another county, as discussed in
Posey. People v. Thomas, 274 P.3d 1170, 1176 (Cal. 2012).

Other states with similar statutes have roundly rejected an
interpretation making purely preparatory actions sufficient for venue,
however. Florida, for example, has ruled that “preparation is not one of the

“Although (California Penal Code § 781] speaks in terms of
jurisdiction, it is actually a venue statute.” People v. Britt, 87 P.3d 812, 818
(Cal. 2004), disapproved on other grounds by People v. Correa, 278 P.3d 809
(Cal. 2012).

 

 
Sone at

one

elemental acts ‘constituting’ or ‘requisite to the commission’ of premeditated
first degree murder,” even if certain acts of preparation may be necessary
to complete a particular murder. Crittendon v. State, 338 So. 2d 1088, 1090
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Montana, under its previous statute, held that
“{alets preparatory to the commission of an offense but which are not
essentials of the crime, provided no basis for venue.” State v. Preite, 564
P.2d 598, 601 (Mont. 1977), overruled on other grounds by City of Helena v.
Frankforter, 423 P.3d 581 (Mont. 2018). The Montana court held that venue

could not rest on acts like buying a pistol or traveling through a county to

 

where the crime was committed, even though the crime could not be
‘committed without these acts. Id.

We reject both extremes in our construction of NRS 171.030
with respect to preparatory acts. We hold that in Nevada, venue cannot be
based on supposedly preparatory acts unless the evidence shows that those
acts were undertaken with the intent to commit the charged crime and in
furtherance of that crime, Many crimes involve countless acts which lead
to the ultimate criminal act being possible. But it is obvious that not every
action undertaken by a defendant which puts them in the particular place,
time, and circumstances of an offense was done with the intent to commit
that offense.

We therefore conclude that neither intent nor a supposedly
preparatory act, standing alone, is sufficient to make venue proper in a
charging county. However, when there is evidence of a preparatory act plus
intent in that county, an act requisite to the consummation of the charged
offense has occurred there, and a grand jury may indict a defendant of that

offense.

10

 

 
4

Insufficient evidence was presented to the grand jury that a
preparatory act with the intent to commit the Douglas County charges
‘occurred in Washoe County

So, we turn to this matter’s facts to determine if the Washoe
County grand jury was presented with evidence of a preparatory act plus
intent with respect to the Douglas County offenses.

‘The State argues, and the district court accepted, that Martinez
Guzman had an original plan to rob outbuildings and garages on the three
properties and then changed his intent after finding the Davids’ firearm in
Washoe County. The State argues there is a “very clear triggering event for
the Douglas County offenses: Martinez] Guzman’s procurement of the
revolver and ammunition from Washoe County,” after which Martinez
Guzman decided to “abandon his earlier plan and, instead, enter the living
quarters of the victims in this case.” The State acknowledges that Martinez
Guzman could have formed the intent after obtaining the revolver, but
argues that because intent could have been formed in Washoe County,
Carson City, or Douglas County, venue is proper in Washoe County.

‘This argument relies on this court's decision in Walker v. State,
78 Nev. 463, 376 P.2d 137 (1962), one of our only opinions interpreting the
“acts or effects” portion of NRS 171.030. In Walker, a hitchhiker murdered
the driver who picked him up. The killing took place somewhere between
Elko and Reno, but the State could not pinpoint the county where the
murder occurred, Id. at 470, 376 P.2d at 140. This court concluded that
venue was proper in Washoe County because “[wlith the uncertainty

existing in this case ... ‘the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite

 

to the consummation of the offense’ could have occurred in two or more
counties, one of which was Washoe County.” Id. at 471, 376 P.2d at 141
(quoting NRS 171.030).

u

 

 
That concept from Walker—that venue is proper if an act
constituting or requisite to the offense could have happened in the county
claiming venue—was crucial to the district court finding venue proper
under the State's change-in-intent theory. But the State's theory is too
attenuated from the evidence presented to the grand jury. It was clear that
Martinez Guzman had seen the David, Renken, and Koontz homes while
working for a landscaping business in 2018 and identified those homes as
potential targets for theft. From these bare statements and the fact that
Martinez Guzman first went into the Davids’ outbuildings, the State paints
Martinez Guzman’s supposed initial intent as to steal from these
properties—but not from their living quarters. But the State places too
much weight on the difference between burglarizing a garage or shed, and
the rest of a home—a difference that Martinez Guzman never discussed.
‘The evidence shows that Martinez Guzman formed the intent to steal from
the Koontz and Renken properties before he ever knew he would acquire a
firearm in Washoe County. This belies the State's venue theory, which
completely hinges on the finding of the firearm. There is no evidence of any
supposed “clear triggering event” that caused Martinez Guzman to commit
the offenses in Douglas County.

Likewise, there is no evidence that Martinez Guzman took the
firearm in preparation for the burglaries and murder in Douglas County.
During his second consecutive burglary of the David property, Martinez
Guzman took a bag from a trailer, which contained the revolver and several
fishing poles. No evidence was presented that he even was aware the bag
contained a firearm when he took it from the property. The fact that
Martinez Guzman brought the revolver to the Koontz and Renken homes
days later, and then back to the Davids, is insufficient evidence that his act

12

 

 
of taking the revolver was done in furtherance of his long-existing intent to
burglarize the Douglas County homes, rather than just the consummation
of the offense of burglarizing the Davids. We decline to interpret NRS
171.030 so that actions which may have been preparatory for another
offense are sufficient to make venue lie in one county for a crime entirely
committed within another. In this matter, had there been any
nonspeculative evidence that Martinez Guzman obtained the revolver in
Washoe County with the goal of committing burglary and murder in
Douglas County, our holding may have been different.

Venue was not proper in Washoe County for the Douglas County charges
under NRS 171.060

‘The State also argues that venue was proper under NRS
171.060, which governs offenses in which property is taken from one county
and brought to another. NRS 171.060 reads, in part, as follows:

When property taken in one county by burglary,
robbery, larceny or embezzlement has been brought
into another, the venue of the offense is in either
county.

‘Thus, to make venue proper under this statute, the State must have shown
the grand jury that property taken in Douglas County was at some point
brought into Washoe County.

‘The arguments under this statute hinge on the fact that
Martinez Guzman's vehicle was found upon his arrest in Carson City with
‘two items from the Koontz home in it: an airline document and a small piece
of jewelry. Of the four charges at issue—the Koontz murder, Koontz
burglary, Renken murder, and Renken burglary—we find that the statute
only arguably applies to the Koontz burglary and that venue in Washoe
County was not proper for even that charge.

13

 

 
Martinez Guzman took property from the Koontz home in
Douglas County days before returning to the David home in Washoe County
and drove the same car to each of the crime scenes. Thus, the State alleges
that the presence of the two items in Martinez Guzman's car in Carson City
is circumstantial evidence that the items were in the car from the time of
the Koontz burglary on January 9 or 10, through Martinez Guzman’s return
to Washoe County on January 15 or 16, and until his arrest on January 19,
such that he brought stolen property into the venue county, establishing
venue under NRS 171,060. The district court agreed and found that all the
Douglas County charges could be brought in Washoe County under NRS
171.060. We conclude that the district court's determination constitutes a
manifest abuse of discretion.

As a threshold matter, NRS 171.060 cannot establish Washoe
County as the proper venue for the Koontz or Renken murders or the
Renken burglary. NRS 171.060 provides that “burglary, robbery, larceny
or embezzlement” may be charged in a county where property taken in the
commission of one of those offenses is later brought. ‘The statute does not
expand venue for murder, which is not one of the enumerated crimes, even
if the murder occurred at the time the property was taken. And there was
absolutely no evidence presented to the grand jury to suggest that Martinez
Guzman took property from the Renken home to Washoe County.

Nor does NRS 171.060 support the conclusion that Washoe
County was a proper venue for the Koontz burglary, as the grand jury was
not presented with evidence that the stolen items were in the vehicle when
Martinez Guzman went to Washoe County. The only evidence the State
points to in support of this argument is that Martinez Guzman drove the
same car to the David home. We conclude that the mere possibility that the

4

 

 
one

property found in Martinez Guzman’s car at the time of arrest was
transported everywhere inside the car for days after it was stolen is
insufficient to show proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly,
the district court manifestly abused its discretion in concluding that venue
was proper on this basis.

The district court should not have hinged its decision on NRS 171.020 or
NRS 173.115 for this intercounty venue issue

Below, the district court relied on NRS 171.020 and Nevada's
joinder statute, NRS 173.115(1), to support its conclusion that venue was
proper in Washoe County for the Douglas County charges. NRS 171.020
provides that a person who commits an act in Nevada, which executes an
intent to commit a crime and results in the commission of a crime, may be
punished for that crime as though the crime were committed entirely in
Nevada, NRS 173.115(1)? allows the joinder of multiple offenses against a
defendant where the offenses are based on “the same act or transaction” or
“two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts
of a common scheme or plan.”

We conclude the district court erred in relying on these statutes.
First, NRS 171.020 does not apply here because it deals with interstate
jurisdiction, not intercounty venue. Second, NRS 173.115(1) is not a venue
statute and finding that the offenses are part of a “common scheme or plan”
does not confer venue. The statutes governing these particular intercounty
offenses are NRS 171.030 and NRS 171.060, as discussed above. Therefore,

"This statute was amended by 2021 Nev. Stat., ch. 253, § 1. Any
reference to NRS 173.115 throughout this opinion refers to the prior
version, put in place by 2017 Nev. Stat., ch. 235, § 1.

15

 

 
the district court abused its discretion in resting its decision on NRS
171.020 and NRS 173.115.
CONCLUSION

Despite many statutory exceptions which expand venue, the
common law principle that a person should only be charged in a location
with sufficient connections to the crime remains. See Zebe, 112 Nev. at
1484-85, 929 P.2d at 929.

Under the statutes governing venue for the offenses Martinez
Guzman allegedly committed, it is not enough to present evidence that may
have allowed the grand jury to speculate that intent could possibly have
been formed in the charging county, or that an action in the charging county
may have been preparatory for the disputed charges. NRS 171.030's
reference to “acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the
consummation of the offense” does not refer to intent or potentially
preparatory acts standing alone. If, however, intent is coupled with an act
in furtherance of that intent, venue may be proper. But there is simply no
nonspeculative evidence of that in this matter. Likewise, there is no
evidence besides bare speculation that stolen property was taken to the
charging county as required by NRS 171.060.

‘This court has described venue as “a matter so pliant that it
would expand under the slight pressure of convenience.” Walker, 78 Nev.
at 472, 376 P.2d at 141 (quoting State v. Le Blanch, 31 N.J.L. 82, 85 (1864)).
In this case, we come up against the limits of venue's pliancy. We decline
to hand-wave, solely for convenience’s sake, around the principle that
crimes should be tried where they are committed in the absence of a
statutory exception. Consequently, we grant Martinez Guzman's petition
and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus instructing

16

 

 
the district court to vacate its order denying Martinez Guzman’s motion to
dismiss and to enter an order granting the motion as to Counts I, IV, V,
and VI

 

is haat, — ics
Hardesty

 

 
PICKERING, J., with whom PARRAGUIRRE, J., agrees, dissenting:

Countervailing policy interests are at play when determining
criminal venue—on the one hand, the constitutionally founded interests of
fairness and convenience to the accused, and on the other, the interests of
the local justice system in demonstrating its ability to render justice, as well
as the community's interests in witnessing prosecution of the wrong from
which they suffered. See United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480-82 (24
Cir, 1985) (discussing interests involved in determining constitutional
venue in criminal prosecutions). Where “witnesses and relevant
circumstances surrounding the contested issues” can be gathered with
equal ease in competing venues, the interests of one venue may offset those
of the other; therefore, “there is no single defined policy or mechanical test”
to determine criminal venue in such cases. Id. at 480-81 (internal quotation
marks omitted). But nearly all courts, including this court, agree that the
site of the defendant's acts” is a proper venue “because the alleged criminal

 

acts provide substantial contact with the district” to satisfy the interests
laid out above. Id. at 481; see also Martinez Guzman v. Second Judicial
Dist. Court (Martinez Guzman 1), 186 Nev. 103, 109-10, 460 P.3d 443, 449
(2020) (holding that “territorial jurisdiction ... depends on whether the
necessary connections, as identified in Nevada’s statutes, to the location of
the court exist”) (emphasis added). Under this standard, “necessary
connections” exist under NRS 171.030 sufficient to lay venue in Washoe
County for the Douglas County offenses because Martinez Guzman’s
Washoe acts predicated the Douglas offenses. Martinez Guzman I, 136 Nev.
at 109-10, 460 P.3d at 449. Accordingly, I dissent.

 

 
rc

NRS 171.030 provides that “{wIhen a public offense is
committed in part in one county and in part in another or the acts or effects
thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur
in two or more counties, the venue is in either county.” California's
analogous intercounty venue statute is nearly identical to NRS 171.030. See
Cal. Penal Code § 781 (“{Wlhen a public offense is committed in part in one
jurisdictional territory and in part in another jurisdictional territory, or the
acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the
offense occur in two or more jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction for

the offense is in any competent court within either jurisdictional territory.”).

 

California caselaw is therefore persuasive when interpreting NRS 171.030.
City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Crockett, 117 Nev. 816, 824-
25, 34 P.3d_ 553, 558-59 (2001) (looking to California law as persuasive
authority when interpreting an analogous Nevada statute).

In California, venue is governed by statute, and whether venue
is proper under a particular statute is a question of law reserved to the
court. People v. Posey, 82 P.3d 755, 765 (Cal. 2004). As is relevant here,
California courts have interpreted Section 781 to “permit trial in a county
where only preparatory acts have occurred.” E.g., People v. Simon, 25 P.3d
598, 617 (Cal. 2001). These preparatory acts need not constitute an element
of the offense (e.g., criminal intent) to justify venue under the statute.
People v. Thomas, 274 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 2012). Thus, venue was proper
under Section 781 where (1) criminal conduet in the forum county was
preparatory to later assault of an officer during a police chase in another
county, Simon, 25 P.3d at 603, 617; (2) loading the victim and her
belongings into defendant's car in the forum was preparatory to murder in

 

 
one

another county, People v. Crew, 74 P.3d 820, 834 (Cal. 2003); and
(3) kidnapping in the forum was preparatory to subsequent murder in
another county, People v. Abbott, 303 P.2d 730, 735-36 (Cal. 1956). Most
analogous to this case is People v. Price, wherein the defendant burglarized
ahome in Humboldt County, California, and stole a revolver. 821 P.2d 610,
634-35 (1991). He then drove to Los Angeles County and used that stolen
revolver to shoot and kill the victim, before returning to Humboldt County
to commit another burglary, robbery, and murder. Id. The court held that
venue was proper in Humboldt County for the Los Angeles County murder
under Section 781 because “the jury could reasonably infer from the[ ] facts
that defendant committed acts in Humboldt County that were preparatory
to the murder [in Los Angeles County].” Id. at 640.

As the majority notes, most jurisdictions hold otherwise and
require that an essential element or “overt act” of the charged offense must
have occurred in the forum to lay proper venue there. Addington v. State,
431 P.2d 532, 540 (Kan. 1967). But the majority ignores the key distinction
between those jurisdictions and California—states following the majority
approach have a constitutional guarantee limiting venue in criminal cases,
while California does not. Posey, 82 P.3d at 765 (reasoning that the
California Constitution does not govern venue); Addington, 431 P.2d at 542.
And, like California, the Nevada Constitution does not limit criminal venue.
Walker v. State, 78 Nev. 463, 472, 376 P.2d 137, 141 (1962) (noting that

‘Nevada is not tied down by a constitutional venue guarantee). Criminal

 

venue is therefore governed by Nevada's statutes. Id. And in the principal
case interpreting venue under modern-day NRS 171.030, Walker v. State,
this court deemed venue proper in Washoe County because police found the
victim's body, jewelry, and murder weapon there, even though the murder

 

 
could have occurred in any one of four counties, including Washoe. 78 Nev.
at 470-71, 376 P.2d at 141. This court reasoned that even if it knew where
the murder occurred, or if the murder occurred partially in Washoe and
partially in another county, venue would stil! be proper in Washoe based on
the objective connections to that forum. Id. at 471, 376 P.2d at 141 (“Even
if [the jury] determined that acts resulting in death were committed... in
two or more counties, of which Washoe County was one, then, under NRS
171.030, venue was properly laid in Washoe County.”).

‘Side-stepping this court's holding in Walker and NRS 171.030's
plain language, the majority holds that venue is only proper under NRS
171.030 if the State can conclusively show that the defendant intended to
further the charged offense when he or she took preparatory acts in the
proposed forum. This standard is misguided for several reasons. First, a
court may never be able to pinpoint the precise moment a criminal
defendant formed the intent to commit the crime at issue; instead, the most
concrete measures available are the acts themselves. People v. Carrington,
211 P.3d 617, 650 (Cal. 2009) (holding that it did not matter whether the
defendant took preparatory acts with intent to commit the target offense for
purposes of venue under Section 781). Our contacts analysis can only
practically derive therefrom, without speculating as to the defendant's
intent when taking subject acts. Id. (holding that “if preparatory acts occur
in one county, those acts vest jurisdiction over the crime {under Section 781]
‘even though the intent may have arisen in another county” (quoting People
v. Bismillah, 256 Cal. Rptr. 25, 28 (Ct. App. 1989))). Accordingly, our
existing caselaw on this point remains the most workable and well-reasoned
standard, see Stocks v. Stocks, 64 Nev. 431, 438, 183 P.2d 617, 620 (1947)
(noting that stare decisis is “indispensable to the due administration of

 

 
justice”), and I would follow Walker to hold that the court need only conclude
that a sufficient connection exists between the offense and the forum county
based on the defendant's acts to satisfy NRS 171.030.

Second, any inquiry into the defendant's criminal intent poses
a substantive question of guilt, based in fact, that should be asked of the
jury at trial, see Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1197, 196 P.3d 465, 481
(2008) (noting that the jury must find that the defendant had the requisite
intent to commit the subject offense); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law: Substantive
Principles § 31 (Supp. 2021) (noting that criminal intent is a question of fact
and “intent is therefore a question for the jury”), thus rendering the
majority's standard in conflict with Nevada law, under which criminal
venue is a legal question. See Martinez Guzman I, 136 Nev. at 110, 460
P.3d at 450 (holding that venue is a question of law for the court); Shannon
v, State, 105 Nev. 782, 791, 783 P.2d 942, 948 (1989) (holding that venue
under sister-statute NRS 171.020 is a question of law). Posing such an early
inquiry into criminal intent also risks an unwarranted acquittal later based
solely on improper venue. Posey, 82 P.3d at 762. Under the majorit
factual standard, if a jury returns a conviction, while also concluding that

 

venue is improper—for example, by finding that the defendant formed
intent at a different point in time—then jeopardy has attached and an
acquittal is won on a procedural technicality. Shuman v. Sheriff of Carson
City, 90 Nev. 227, 228, 523 P.2d 841, 842 (1974) (noting that jeopardy
attaches when “the accused has been placed upon trial, upon a valid
indictment, before a competent court, and a jury duly impaneled, sworn,
and charged with the case”) (quoting Ex Parte Maxwell, 11 Nev. 428, 434
(1876)); see also Posey, 82 P.3d at 762 (“UInless the jury is instructed to

return a separate [finding] on the issue of venue before returning

 

 
ne

a... verdict, a {ury] finding that the proceeding has been brought in an
improper venue can result in an unwarranted acquittal, rather than in a
new trial in an authorized venue.” (second alteration in original) (quoting
Simon, 25 P.3d at 618 n.18)).

‘Third, unlike its sister-statute NRS 171.020, NRS 171.030 does
not include an intent requirement, cf. NRS 171.020 (“Whenever a person,
with intent to commit a crime, does any act within this State in execution or
part execution of such intent, which culminates in the commission of a
crime, either within or without this State, such a person is punishable for
such crime in this State....") (emphasis added); well-worn canons of
construction establish that the expression of this requirement in a statute
that is in pari materia necessarily implies the absence of the same in NRS
171.030. Finally, the majority's approach is unworkable with and contrary
to the Legislature's purpose in enacting criminal laws with territorial reach
ending only at state lines. See Shannon, 105 Nev. at 792, 783 P.2d at 948
(interpreting NRS 171.020 to vest Nevada with jurisdiction over crimes
“whenever the criminal intent is formed and any act is accomplished in this
state”), The Legislature enacted NRS 171.030 to enable venue in multiple
counties within Nevada because no practical reason exists to conduct
multiple trials and risk inconsistent results when an offense(s) is
sufficiently connected to a single forum to lay venue there. See 1873 Nev.
Stat., ch. LIN, § 1714, at 471; Martinez Guzman I, 136 Nev. at 109-10, 460
P.3d at 449 (noting that “Nevada's statutes,” including NRS 171.030,

 

modified the former common law rule against prosecuting a crime unless it
occurred entirely within the forum). This is to say nothing of the level of
extreme anguish communities, victims, victims’ families, and criminal
defendants face at the prospect of the sort of duplicative proceedings the

 

 
 

majority's approach would foster. See People v. Gholston, 464 N.E.2d 1179,
1191 (Ill, App. Ct. 1984) (noting the “extreme trauma” that: a victim must
undergo by testifying at multiple court appearances spread over months or
years).

‘There is no legal or practical demand for such a result here
because sufficient connections exist between the Douglas offenses and
Washoe to lay venue in the latter county under NRS 171.030. Martinez
Guzman confessed to committing burglary and murder in Douglas using a
revolver that he stole in Washoe. But for obtaining the revolver in Washoe,
he could not have committed the Douglas offenses. Then, after perpetrating
two residential burglaries in Douglas with the gun that he obtained during
his second Washoe burglary—which firearm he stole only after surveying
the Davids’ property during his first burglary—Martinez Guzman returned
to Washoe where he replicated the Douglas offenses by burglarizing the
Davids’ home a third time and killing both its occupants. All the while,
Martinez Guzman drove the same BMW sedan to and from Washoe and
Douglas counties to commit this veritable crime spree. Martinez Guzman’s
preparatory acts to the Douglas offenses occurred almost entirely in
‘Washoe, but the majority demands that the court dice this continuous crime
spree into distinct pieces fit for two trials in two separate counties. This is
legally unnecessary and an unfair imposition on the victims’ families and
the court system; Martinez Guzman's Washoe acts suffice to satisfy NRS
171.030's requirements and lay venue in Washoe for the Douglas offenses.

 

 
on

0.

In any case, even under the majority's purported standard,
venue in Washoe is appropriate here. As a threshold matter, it is unclear
whether the majority fashioned its standard for the court or the jury to
apply, because, as noted above, although venue is a question of law, a
defendant's alleged criminal intent is a question of fact. See Valdez, 124
Nev. at 1197, 196 P.3d at 481; 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law: Substantive
Principles § 37 (Supp. 2021). But even applying this tenuous standard, the
State alleged sufficient facts for a reasonable jury to find that Martinez

 

Guzman had intent to further the Douglas offenses when he acted in
Washoe and thus satisfied the majority's interpretation of NRS 171.030's
requirements.

‘The State must prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence,
and it may do so with circumstantial evidence. Dixon v. State, 83 Nev. 120,
122, 424 P.2d 100, 101 (1967); ¢f: Grant v. State, 117 Nev. 427, 435, 24 P.3d
761, 766 (2001) (holding that criminal intent can be inferred from conduct).
‘The preponderance of the evidence standard requires the trier of fact “to
find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its
nonexistence.” Abbott v. State, 122 Nev. 715, 734, 138 P.3d 462, 475 (2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Martinez Guzman identified the
David, Renken, and Koontz properties as potential targets for theft while

  

working for his uncle's landscaping company, which operated in both
Washoe and Douglas Counties. Later, Martinez Guzman twice burglarized
outbuildings on the Davids’ property in Washoe—first a shed and then a
trailer—without entering the primary residence and without using a
weapon. After auditing the Davids’ property during his first burglary,
Martinez Guzman returned and burglarized the Davids’ trailer; he

 

 

 
specifically identified and stole fishing poles and a firearm case, which
contained the revolver. Upon stealing the revolver, Martinez Guzman took
it to the Renken and Koontz properties in Douglas, burglarized the primary
residences, and shot and killed the occupants. A reasonable jury could infer
from these facts that it is more likely than not that Martinez Guzman stole
the firearm with intent to move beyond burglary of trailers and sheds and
enable entry into the Renken and Koontz primary residences.

But the majority demands more. Indeed, it appears that
nothing short of a confe
stealing the revolver, at the moment he stole it, will satisfy NRS 171.030's

  

ion pinpointing Martinez Guzman’s motive for

requirements under the majority's reasoning. Such an exacting standard
swallows the statute whole, and in its absence, the majority provides the
common law rule as its substitute. But this conclusion offends the
Legislature's power to define and expand venue with its enactment of NRS
171.030, see Martinez Guzman I, 136 Nev. at 109, 460 P.3d at 449 (noting
that NRS 171.030 modified the common law rule as to intercounty
territorial jurisdiction); Walker, 78 Nev. at 472, 376 P.2d at 141 (noting that
Nevada is not tied down by a constitutional venue guarantee when
interpreting NRS 171.030), and increases the potential for inconsistent
results in unwarranted separate trials because the State must prosecute
the same facts twice. See In re Rolls Royce Corp., 775 F.3d 671, 680 (5th
Cir, 2014) (holding that the court must focus on judicial efficiency more
when considering a motion to sever claims alongside a motion to transfer
partial venue).

Sufficient evidence exists to show that Martinez Guzman acted
in Washoe to prepare for the Douglas offenses, and applying either of the

 

 
above standards, venue is therefore proper in Washoe under NRS 171.030.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

&; i
Pickering

 

Patraguirre