Title: Lightbourne v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-677 
____________ 
 
IAN DECO LIGHTBOURNE, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
August 30, 2018 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We have for review Ian Deco Lightbourne’s appeal of the circuit court’s 
order denying Lightbourne’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.851.  This Court has jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.   
Lightbourne’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on 
remand in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2161 (2017).  Lightbourne responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing 
why this Court’s decisions in Lightbourne v. State, 235 So. 3d 285 (Fla. 2018), 
 
 
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petition for cert. filed, No. 18-5012 (U.S. June 28, 2018), and Hitchcock v. State, 
226 So. 3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017), should not be dispositive 
in this case. 
After reviewing Lightbourne’s response to the order to show cause, as well 
as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that our prior denial of 
Lightbourne’s appeal from the circuit court’s denial of his successive motion for 
postconviction relief raising similar claims is a procedural bar to the claims at issue 
in this appeal.  All of Lightbourne’s claims depend upon the retroactive application 
of Hurst, to which we have held he is not entitled.  See Lightbourne, 235 So. 3d at 
286; Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 217.  Accordingly, we affirm the denial of 
Lightbourne’s motion. 
The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Lightbourne, 
we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken.  It is 
so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, 
JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. 
I agree with the per curiam opinion that we have formerly denied 
Lightbourne’s claims to Hurst1 relief pursuant to Hitchcock,2 which, of course, is 
now final.  Nevertheless, as I have expressed several times, I would apply Hurst 
retroactively to Lightbourne’s case.  See Hitchcock, 226 So. 3d at 221-23 (Pariente, 
J., dissenting).  Applying Hurst to Lightbourne’s case, in which the jury’s vote is 
unclear, I would grant a new penalty phase because the State cannot prove that the 
Hurst error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Marion County,  
Steven Glen Rogers, Judge - Case No. 421981CF000170CFAXXX 
 
Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Suzanne Keffer, Chief 
Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Nicole M. Noël, Assistant 
Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Patrick A. Bobek, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
                                          
 
 
1.  Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2161 (2017); see Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 
 
2.  Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 
(2017).