Title: Pelton v. Palmco, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Pelton v. Palmco, Inc.1986 WY 28713 P.2d 245Case Number: 85-162Decided: 01/31/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHARLES A. PELTON AND 
LEILA B. PELTON, APPELLANTS (APPELLANTS/DEFENDANTS), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
PALMCO, INC., A WYOMING 
CORPORATION, APPELLEE (APPELLEE/PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the 

County Court, 
Laramie
 County, Robert W. Allen, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Daniel W. White, of 
Vines, Rideout, Gusea & White, P.C., Cheyenne.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Jack R. Gage, of 
Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, Cheyenne.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., 
BROWN, CARDINE, and URBIGKIT, JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., 
Retired.

 
 

BROWN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The Honorable Robert W. 
Allen, Laramie County Judge, rendered judgment on a promissory note against 
appellants. The district court, sitting as an intermediate court of appeals, 
affirmed the judgment. Appellants now appeal the district court's "Order 
Affirming County Court," and appellants suggest three 
issues:

 
 
"I

 
 
"Does the parol evidence 
rule apply to the February 6, 1978 agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) where the 
appellee was not a signatory party to the subsequent agreements pertaining to 
the transaction at issue?

 
 
"II

 
 
"If the parol evidence 
rule applies in this case, what effect does it have on the February 6, 1978 
agreement?

 
 
"III

 
 
"If the February 6, 1978 
agreement is merged into and superseded by the subsequent agreements, should the 
promissory note, which arises from said agreement and which forms the basis of 
appellee's claim, be barred for lack of consideration?"

 
 

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     On April 15, 1978, 
appellants executed a $12,000 installment note payable to appellee. The 
circumstances surrounding the execution of this note were obscured at trial by 
irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent evidence. As nearly as we can determine, 
the note was signed by appellants Charles A. and Leila B. Pelton to facilitate a 
land sale from the Wayne Palm Trust to Fredrick L. Pelton, son of appellants. At 
the time of the sale this land was owned by the Wayne Palm Trust. Appellee 
Palmco, Inc., was the lessee of the land and entitled to two-thirds of the 
seeded crop of winter wheat. Appellant Charles A. Pelton helped negotiate the 
land sale on behalf of his son. For reasons that are not entirely clear, it 
appeared expedient to appellant to terminate the lessee's interest in the seeded 
crop.1

 
 

[¶4.]     On February 6, 1978, 
appellants signed an agreement providing that a note be executed to pay appellee 
for its interest as lessee in the seeded crop. The agreement provided in 
part:

 
 
"* * * Charles A. Pelton 
agrees to give to SELLER a note in the amount of $12,000.00 bearing interest at 
the rate of 9 1/4% payable in equal principal installments of $2,400.00 annually 
which $12,000.00 shall constitute payment in full of SELLER'S interest in the 
1978 crop in growth."

 
 
Appellants subsequently 
signed the note at issue here according to the above agreement. Appellants made 
four annual payments on the note according to its terms; they tendered a fifth 
payment to appellee in a sum less than appellee thought was due. The tendered 
payment was rejected and a suit on the balance followed.

 
 

[¶5.]     In the courts below 
appellants' principal theory of defense was "economic duress." Lack of 
consideration for the note was mentioned only incidentally. The theory of 
"economic duress" as a defense was specifically abandoned by appellants on 
appeal to this court. Appellee's brief in this court, however, addressed 
appellants' theory of defense in the lower courts but not the issues raised by 
appellants here. Appellants list three issues; simply stated, however, the only 
issue is whether or not the action on the note was "barred for lack of 
consideration."

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellants contend that 
three exhibits are crucial to an understanding of their theory on appeal. The 
February 6, 1978 agreement provided that appellant Charles A. Pelton sign a 
$12,000 note payable to appellee. The other two exhibits are instruments 
pertaining to the sale of land from the Wayne Palm Trust to Frederick L. Pelton, 
appellants' son.

 
 

[¶7.]     Appellants contend that 
the February 6, 1978 agreement to execute the note was not enforceable because 
"it was merged into and superseded" by a subsequent agreement entitled "Earnest 
Money Receipt, Offer to Purchase, and Acceptance," dated February 7, 1978. The 
parties in the case before us were not the contracting parties in the February 
7, 1978 agreement. Appellants contend, however, that there was a privity between 
appellee and the Wayne Palm Trust (seller), in the agreement of February 7, 
1978. From this assertion of privity appellants reason:

 
 
"* * * Appellee's 
knowledge concerning the existence and terms of Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 must have 
been imputed to the Wayne Palm Trust when it executed Defendant's Exhibit C 
[Earnest Money Receipt, Offer to Purchase, and Acceptance] on February 7, 1978. 
It must be presumed that the parties changed the structure of this transaction 
such that payment for all of the seeded crop on the land was to be included in 
the purchase price paid by Fredrick L. Pelton pursuant to Defendant's Exhibit C. 
* * *"

 
 

[¶8.]     Appellants assume 
privity based on the fact that Charles Wayne Palm and Patsy N. Palm are 
corporate officers for appellee, and trustees in the Wayne Palm Trust. 
Additionally, appellee and the Wayne Palm Trust had a tenant-landlord 
relationship at the time of the real estate transaction previously 
mentioned.

 
 

[¶9.]     After assuming privity, 
appellants reason that the February 7, 1978 agreement had the effect of merging, 
superseding and cancelling the February 6, 1978 agreement, which provided for 
the note at issue here. Appellants further reason that if the agreement 
providing for the note was merged, superseded and canceled, then the note dated 
April 15, 1978, was without consideration.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellants' contention must fail for 
several reasons. Appellants' argument regarding privity, merger, cancellation 
and one agreement superseding another is not supported by adequate reference to 
the record, cogent argument or authority. Under these circumstances we need not 
address this issue. Matter of Adoption of 
RHA, Wyo., 
702 P.2d 1259 (1985). Arguably, testimony and exhibits could be construed to 
give a modicum of support for appellants' theory. However, appellants' conduct 
indicates they did not intend that the February 7, 1978 agreement supersede the 
February 6, 1978 agreement, and cancel appellants' obligation to execute the 
$12,000 note to appellee.

 
 

[¶11.]  It is significant that appellants did, in 
fact, sign the note on April 15, 1978, which the February 6, 1978 agreement 
obligated them to do.

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellants are in a poor position at this 
late date to talk about lack of consideration. They made four annual payments on 
the note and tendered part of the fifth. After the last payment was rejected as 
being insufficient, appellants decided that there was lack of consideration for 
the note they signed.

 
 

[¶13.]  Simply stated, appellant Charles A. 
Pelton purchased from appellee an interest in the 1978 seeded crop, and as 
consideration for this interest executed a promissory note for $12,000. Judgment 
was rendered by the trial court for the balance due on that note. We can find no 
error in the judgment rendered.

 
 

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

1 There was some evidence 
suggesting the lending institution (Farmers Home Administration) required that 
the lessee's interest in the seeded crop be extinguished.