Title: Makinen v. PM P.C.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Makinen v. PM P.C.1995 WY 54893 P.2d 1149Case Number: 94-71Decided: 04/18/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Randy 
J. MAKINEN and Lorie B. Makinen, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

PM P.C., a Wyoming corporation; The Officers and 
Directors of Larry's, Inc., a Wyoming corporation, Larry F. Suchor (President), 
Joe (George) O. Suchor (Vice-President), and Leo Suchor (Secretary/Treasurer); 
and Jim Larscheid (Employee of PM P.C.), each individually and severally, 
Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Carbon County, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Andrew W. Decora of Decora 
Legal Services, P.C., Laramie, representing 
appellants.

Christopher B. Petrie of 
Schaefer & Lewis, P.C., Laramie, representing appellees PM P.C. and 
Larscheid.

Patrick T. Holscher of 
Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, Casper, representing appellees 
Suchors.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants Randy 
Makinen and Lorie Makinen appeal from the district court's order which granted a 
summary judgment in favor of Appellees PM P.C. and Jim Larscheid and from the 
district court's order which granted a summary judgment in favor of Appellees 
Larry Suchor, Joe (George) Suchor, and Leo Suchor (the 
Suchors).

[¶2]      We affirm. 

Issues

[¶3]      The Makinens 
present three issues on appeal:

I.          
Whether the statutory requirement to give notice to the director of the 
Worker[s'] Compensation Division and the Wyoming Attorney General is a condition 
precedent to the filing of an action under W.S. § 27-14-105, resulting in a lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to comport 
therewith[?]

II.          
Whether the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to 
defendants, Larry, George and Leo Suchor, on the premise that plaintiff[s'] 
theory of the case against them was based on a theory of co-employee liability 
when plaintiffs explicitly framed the lawsuit against them not as co-employees, 
but as third parties having separate duties to 
plaintiffs[?]

III.         
Whether the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to 
defendants, PM, P.C., and Jim Larscheid[,] partly on the premise that 
plaintiff[s'] theory of the case against them was based on a theory of 
co-employee liability when plaintiffs explicitly framed their lawsuit against 
them not as co-employees, but as third parties having separate duties to 
plaintiffs[?]

Facts

[¶4]      Mr. Makinen 
worked as a construction worker for Larry's, Inc., a Wyoming corporation. The 
Suchors were the officers of that corporation. Larry's, Inc. contracted with the 
Town of Saratoga to install water and sewer lines for that town (the Saratoga 
project). PM P.C., an engineering firm, designed the Saratoga project. Mr. 
Larscheid, an engineer employed by PM P.C., was assigned to the Saratoga 
project.

[¶5]      During the 
evening of October 25, 1991, while they were working on the Saratoga project, 
Mr. Makinen and another Larry's, Inc. employee were in the bottom of a ditch, 
tamping the earth with a compacting machine. At the same time, Larry's, Inc.'s 
project manager was operating a front-end loader to backfill a portion of the 
ditch. Mr. Makinen was positioned so that he had his back to the loader as he 
was operating the compacting machine. The project manager apparently dumped a 
load of the fill material near Mr. Makinen. Mr. Makinen contended that he was 
knocked to the ground and that his back was injured when some of the fill 
material struck him.

[¶6]      Mr. Makinen 
received worker's compensation benefits for his injuries. When the Workers' 
Compensation Division terminated Mr. Makinen's benefits, the Makinens filed this 
action in the district court against Appellees and several other defendants. Mr. 
Makinen sought damages for his injuries, and Mrs. Makinen claimed that she had 
suffered a loss of marital consortium as a result of Mr. Makinen's injuries.1

[¶7]      Appellees filed 
motions for summary judgments, and the district court granted those motions. The 
district court also certified, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 54(b), that no just reason 
existed for delaying the entry of the summary judgments. The Makinens appealed 
to this Court.

Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

[¶8]      The Makinens 
contend that the district court erred by ruling that it did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case as it pertained to PM P.C. and Mr. Larscheid. 
Initially, we note that the order entered by the district court did not reflect 
the ruling alleged by the Makinens. The district court's order found only 
that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that Defendants, P.M., P.C., and Jim Larscheid[,] are entitled to Summary 
Judgment as a matter of law in their favor against the Plaintiffs[,] Randy J. 
Makinen and Lorie B. Makinen[,] on all of the Plaintiffs' claims against P.M., 
P.C., and Jim Larscheid.

The district court, however, 
stated in its decision letter following the summary judgment hearing that it did 
not have jurisdiction over the matter "due to [the] Makinen[s'] failure to give 
notice of the filing of this suit to the director and attorney general as 
required by the Wyoming Worker['s] Compensation Act." Even though the district 
court's decision to grant a summary judgment in favor of PM P.C. and Mr. 
Larscheid may not have been made upon the basis of a lack of jurisdiction, we 
will consider the jurisdictional issue on appeal. Jurisdictional issues may be 
considered at any time. Gookin v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance 
Company, 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶9]      Pursuant to WYO. 
STAT. § 27-14-105 (1991), when an injured employee who is covered by the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act wishes to pursue his remedies at law by filing a 
lawsuit, he must serve both the director of the Department of Employment and the 
attorney general with copies of the complaint:

(a) If an employee covered by this act receives an 
injury under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than 
the employer to pay damages, the employee if engaged in work for his employer at 
the time of the injury is not deprived of any compensation to which he is 
entitled under this act. He may also pursue his remedy at law against the third 
party or the coemployee to the extent permitted by W.S. 27-14-104(a). If the 
employee recovers from the third party or the coemployee in any manner including 
judgment, compromise, settlement or release, the state is entitled to be 
reimbursed for all payments made, or to be made, to or on behalf of the employee 
under this act but not to exceed one-third (1/3) of the total proceeds of the 
recovery without regard to the types of damages alleged in the third-party 
action. . . .

(b) The 
director and the attorney general shall be served by certified mail return 
receipt requested with a copy of the complaint filed in any suit initiated 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Service of the complaint on the 
director and attorney general is a jurisdictional requirement in order to 
maintain the suit. The director and the attorney general shall be notified 
in writing by certified mail return receipt requested of any judgment, 
compromise, settlement or release entered into by an employee. If there is a 
settlement, compromise or release entered into by the parties in claims against 
a person other than the employer, the attorney general representing the director 
shall be made a party in all such negotiations for settlement, compromise or 
release. The attorney general and the director, for purposes of facilitating 
compromise and settlement, may in a proper case authorize acceptance by the 
state of less than the state's claim for reimbursement. The proceeds of any 
judgment, settlement, compromise or release are encumbered by a continuing lien 
in favor of the state to the extent of the total amount of the state's claim for 
reimbursement under this section and for all current and future benefits under 
this act.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶10]   The Makinens filed their complaint 
on February 1, 1993, but they did not serve a copy of the complaint upon the 
director or the attorney general at that time. PM P.C. and Mr. Larscheid filed a 
motion for a summary judgment on November 5, 1993, arguing, in part, that the 
district court did not have jurisdiction over the case because the Makinens had 
failed to give notice to the director and the attorney general as was required 
by § 27-14-105. On November 30, 1993, the Makinens served the director and the 
attorney general with copies of the complaint.

[¶11]   In order to determine whether the 
district court had jurisdiction over this case, we must construe the relevant 
portions of § 27-14-105. In construing a statute, we must determine whether the 
statute is clear or ambiguous. "[A] statute is unambiguous if its wording is 
such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with 
consistency and predictability." Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo. 1991). "[A] statute is ambiguous only if 
it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations." 
813 P.2d  at 219-20. "[W]hether an ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of 
law to be determined by the court." 813 P.2d  at 220. If the language of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words and do not resort to the rules of statutory construction. Soles v. State, 
809 P.2d 772, 773 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶12]   The Makinens contend that the 
district court had jurisdiction over the case because they served the complaint 
on the director and the attorney general in compliance with the statutory notice 
requirement. They assert that § 27-14-105 is ambiguous with respect to when the 
complaint must be served upon the director and the attorney general, and they 
argue that service of the complaint is not required in order for the district 
court to obtain jurisdiction over the case. PM P.C. and Mr. Larscheid maintain 
that the statute is not ambiguous. They contend that, pursuant to § 27-14-105, 
service must be made upon the director and the attorney general before or 
concurrently with the filing of an action in order for the district court to 
acquire jurisdiction over the matter.

[¶13]   Section 27-14-105 is clear and 
unambiguous in the context of this case. Under the clear language of the 
statute, the district court does not obtain jurisdiction over any case which 
involves an injured worker until the complaint has been served upon the director 
and the attorney general. Accordingly, the district court did not have 
jurisdiction over the case at the time that PM P.C. and Mr. Larscheid filed 
their motion for a summary judgment.

[¶14]   Our ruling that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction would effectively dispose of this appeal. However, we 
presume that the district court would have dismissed the case without prejudice; 
therefore, in the interest of judicial economy, we will consider the other 
issues on appeal. Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Board, 851 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 
1993).

B. Claims 
Against the Suchors

[¶15]   The Makinens allege that the 
district court erred when it granted a summary judgment in favor of the Suchors. 
The district court held that the Suchors and Mr. Makinen were coemployees and 
that a summary judgment was appropriate because the Makinens had not shown that 
the Suchors were culpably negligent. The Makinens insist that the Suchors and 
Mr. Makinen were not coemployees and that they framed their lawsuit as being 
against third parties (the Suchors) who had separate duties assigned to them. 
The Makinens contend that they were only required to make a showing that the 
Suchors were ordinarily negligent in order to survive a motion for a summary 
judgment.

[¶16]   "Summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issue of material fact exists and when the prevailing party is 
entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law." Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 884 P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶17]   This Court addressed the issue of 
what duty a corporate officer owes to an employee of the corporation in Barnette 
v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981). In that case, the corporate president 
argued that he was immune from liability under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act because he was an officer of the corporation which employed the injured 
worker. This Court held that, because the corporate president worked for the 
corporation and received a salary, he had assumed the "additional role of a 
coemployee" and that he could, therefore, be found to be liable to his fellow 
employee if he were found to be culpably negligent. 622 P.2d  at 
1352-55.

[¶18]   The Makinens insist that Mr. 
Makinen and the Suchors cannot be considered as being coemployees because the 
Suchors were not employees as defined by WYO. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) (1991) 
(amended 1993). Section 27-14-102(a)(vii) provides in pertinent 
part:

(a) As used in this act:

.           
.            
.            
.            
.            
.

(vii) "Employee" means any individual entering into 
the service of or working under contract of services or apprenticeship with an 
employer engaged in an extrahazardous occupation for which compensation is paid 
except as provided under this paragraph. . . . "Employee" also includes the 
officers of a corporation, the business of which is classed as extrahazardous, 
if the officers are actually subject to the hazards of the business in the 
regular performance of their duties. . . . "Employee" does not include any 
individual whose employment is purely casual and not for the purpose of the 
usual trade or business of the employer . . .

The Makinens claim that we 
must determine whether the Suchors were "actually subject to the hazards of the 
business in the regular performance of their duties" in order to decide whether 
they were Mr. Makinen's coemployees. We do not agree. This Court did not engage 
in such an analysis in Barnette, and we decline to do so in this 
case.

[¶19]   Under the statutory definition of 
"employee," corporate officers who actually work for the corporation are 
distinct from officers who do not. When corporate officers otherwise qualify as 
employees under § 27-14-102(a)(vii) because they work for and are salaried by 
the corporation, no determination needs to be made as to whether the officers 
are "actually subject to the hazards of the business in the regular performance 
of their duties." On the other hand, corporate officers who do not otherwise 
qualify as being employees under the statutory definition will be considered to 
be employees under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act only when they are 
"actually subject to the hazards of the business in the regular performance of 
their duties." Section 27-14-102(a)(vii).

[¶20]   The district court correctly 
classified Mr. Makinen and the Suchors as being coemployees. The Suchors worked 
for and were salaried by Larry's, Inc. They fit within the statutory definition 
of "employee" because they were in service to the corporation and were 
definitely more than casual employees. Even if, as the Makinens contend, the 
Suchors' duties were primarily clerical, the Suchors would still be engaged in 
the usual trade or business of the employer. Section 
27-14-102(a)(vii).

[¶21]   In Copp v. Redmond, 858 P.2d 1125 
(Wyo. 1993), we held:

[F]or claims accruing between July 1, 1987, and 
February 18, 1993, culpable negligence is the degree of negligence that an 
injured employee must prove against a co-employee in an action to recover 
damages for personal injury suffered in a work-related 
accident.

858 P.2d  at 
1125.

[¶22]   The Makinens do not contest the 
district court's finding that no demonstrable evidence linked any of the Suchors 
with Mr. Makinen's injuries. Accordingly, no genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to whether the Suchors were culpably negligent. See generally Case v. 
Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 191 (Wyo. 1989) (holding that the Court must determine 
whether each employee actually owed a duty to the injured 
coworker).

C.        Claims Against PM P.C. and Mr. 
Larscheid

[¶23]   The Makinens contend that PM P.C. 
and its employee, Mr. Larscheid, were negligent when they breached their duty to 
Mr. Makinen to maintain a safe workplace and that the district court, therefore, 
erred by granting a summary judgment in their favor.

[¶24]   "Under Wyoming law, the tort of 
negligence must be based upon the breach of a duty where that breach proximately 
caused an injury to the plaintiff. Whether a legal duty exists is a question of 
law." Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533, 536 (Wyo. 1991) (citation 
omitted).

[¶25]   We have carefully reviewed the 
evidence presented at the summary judgment hearing, and we conclude that no 
genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether PM P.C. or Mr. 
Larscheid, individually, had a duty to provide Mr. Makinen with a safe place to 
work. The contract between the Town of Saratoga and Larry's, Inc. articulated 
the respective responsibilities of the various parties on the Saratoga project. 
The contract was clear and unambiguous; therefore, we must construe the parties' 
intentions from the "four corners" of the document. See Prudential Preferred 
Properties v. J and J Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993); see also 
Johnson v. EMPE, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing 
that, "[g]enerally, an engineer or architect can avoid liability for 
construction accidents by contracting that they will play no significant role in 
supervising the construction work"). Under the clear language of the contract, 
the Town of Saratoga delegated the sole responsibility to Larry's, Inc. for 
directing the details of the work and for all safety matters on the job 
site.

[¶26]   PM P.C. did not have control over 
the work site merely because it had "`the general right to order the contractors 
to stop work, to inspect the progress of the work, to make recommendations 
thereon, or to prescribe alterations or deviations in the work.'" Cockburn v. 
Terra Resources, Inc., 794 P.2d 1334, 1342 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Hill v. Pacific 
Power & Light Co., 765 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Wyo. 1988)), quoted in Natural Gas 
Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Wyo. 1994). See also Fiscus v. 
Atlantic Richfield, 773 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1989). The Makinens direct us to a recent 
New Jersey decision in support of their contention that the summary judgment 
granted in favor of PM P.C. was improper. Carvalho v. Toll Brothers and 
Developers, 278 N.J. Super. 451, 651 A.2d 492 (Ct.App. Div. 1995). In that case, 
the court held that the engineer had a duty to take some reasonable action to 
prevent injury to workers because the engineer had actual knowledge of a 
dangerous condition. Id., 651 A.2d  at 497-98. Unlike the plaintiff in Carvalho, 
the Makinens did not present any evidence which disclosed that Mr. Larscheid or 
PM P.C. had actual knowledge that Larry's, Inc.'s project manager would drop the 
fill material close enough to Mr. Makinen to injure him. Therefore, neither PM 
P.C. nor Mr. Larscheid was legally responsible for any deficiencies which may 
have compromised the safety of Mr. Makinen's workplace.2

Conclusion

[¶27]   We hold that the district court 
properly granted summary judgments in favor of Appellees.

[¶28]   Affirmed.

THOMAS, 
J., filed a specially concurring opinion.

THOMAS, 
Justice, specially concurring.

[¶29]   I am in complete accord with all 
that is set forth in the opinion of the court in this case. It is my opinion, 
however, that WYO. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) (June 1991 Repl.) provides 
additional authority for refutation of the Makinen argument that the Suchors 
should not be considered co-employees in this instance.

[¶30]   The complete language from WYO. 
STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(vii), out of which the Makinens take one phrase, 
reads:

"Employee" also includes the officers of a 
corporation, the business of which is classed as extrahazardous, if the officers 
are actually subject to the hazards of the business in the regular performance 
of their duties, and the employer elects to come under the provisions of this 
act by notifying the division by registered or certified mail, return receipt 
requested, at least thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of the 
coverage. Coverage remains effective until withdrawn by written notice to the 
division.

When this is read in 
context, rather than out of context, it is clear the legislature was dealing 
only with coverage of corporate officers under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act. The referenced language has no significance in relation to liability of 
co-employees. As the majority opinion notes, this implication is apparent from a 
careful reading of Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981). 

 

FOOTNOTES

1 The Makinens filed a motion to amend 
their complaint to include their children as plaintiffs so that the children 
could assert claims for loss of parental consortium. Although the district court 
granted their motion to amend the complaint, the record on appeal does not 
include the amended complaint.

2 The Makinens also contend that it was 
against public policy for the Town of Saratoga to delegate the responsibility 
for safety on the work site to Larry's, Inc. Their argument has no merit. An 
owner can effectively delegate such responsibilities to the general contractor. 
See, e.g., Allmaras, 820 P.2d  at 537-38. The Makinens also suggest that a theory 
of "peculiar risk" can be applied in this situation. We refuse to consider this 
issue because the Makinens did not offer any pertinent authority or cogent 
argument to support their suggestion. McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 886 P.2d 595, 597 n. 2 (Wyo. 1994).