Title: Wright v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
NICHOLAS EVERETTE WRIGHT 
 
v.  Record No. 062527  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   January 11, 2008 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The issue in this appeal concerns whether a circuit 
court, after accepting a plea agreement of the type 
specified in Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C), can nevertheless impose a 
term of suspended incarceration and a term of post-release 
supervision pursuant to Code §§ 18.2-10(g) and 19.2-
295.2(A) when such terms are not mentioned in the plea 
agreement.  Because general principles of contract law 
apply to plea agreements and the law in effect when a 
contract is made becomes a part of the contract as though 
incorporated therein, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia holding that such additional 
terms can be imposed. 
A grand jury indicted Nicholas Everette Wright for the 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Bruce 
Nelson, Jr., during the commission of robbery in violation 
of Code § 18.2-31(4).1  Before trial, Wright entered into an 
                     
1 A violation of Code § 18.2-31(4) constitutes capital 
murder and is punishable by death, imprisonment for life, 
 
2
“Agreed Disposition” with the Commonwealth pursuant to Rule 
3A:8(c)(1)(C).2  In relevant part, the plea agreement 
provided: (1) the Commonwealth would amend the indictment 
to charge first degree murder instead of capital murder; 
(2) Wright would plead guilty to the charge of first degree 
murder and be sentenced to imprisonment for life; and (3) 
Wright would acknowledge violation of the terms of his 
probation in three unrelated felony convictions for which 
he received three five-year concurrent, suspended sentences 
and be sentenced to five years imprisonment to run 
consecutive to any other sentence imposed on him. 
Upon determining that Wright voluntarily and 
intelligently entered a plea of guilty to the charge of 
first degree murder and after hearing a proffer of the 
evidence, the Circuit Court of Rockingham County accepted 
the guilty plea as well as the plea agreement.  The court 
concluded that the plea agreement was “an appropriate 
disposition in this matter.”  The circuit court found 
Wright guilty of first degree murder in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-32 and, in accordance with the terms of the plea 
                                                             
or imprisonment for life and a fine of not more than 
$100,000.  Code § 18.2-10(a). 
2 Under Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C), a defendant and the 
Commonwealth may enter into a plea agreement in which the 
Commonwealth “[a]gree[s] that a specific sentence is the 
appropriate disposition of the case.” 
 
3
agreement, sentenced Wright to life imprisonment.3  Pursuant 
to the requirements of Code §§ 18.2-10(g) and 19.2-
295.2(A), the circuit court also imposed an additional 
sentence of three years imprisonment but suspended that 
sentence, imposing three years of post-release supervision. 
Wright subsequently moved the circuit court for 
clarification of its sentencing order.  In that motion, 
Wright asserted that the additional three-year term of 
suspended incarceration and post-release supervision 
constituted an addition to or revision of the plea 
agreement that was improper and not within the circuit 
court’s authority under Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C).  Wright asked 
the circuit court to enter a sentencing order consistent 
with the terms of the plea agreement.  After hearing 
argument on Wright’s motion, the circuit court determined 
that, in this case, the additional period of suspended 
incarceration and post-release supervision was statutorily 
mandated and thereby included in the plea agreement even 
though it was otherwise silent on the subject.  Thus, the 
court concluded that it had not altered the terms of the 
parties’ plea agreement and denied Wright’s motion. 
                     
3 The circuit court also revoked the five-year 
concurrent, suspended sentences in the other three prior 
felony convictions and directed that the five-year sentence 
run consecutive to Wright’s life sentence. 
 
4
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the judgment 
of the circuit court.  Wright v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 
58, 636 S.E.2d 489 (2006).  The Court of Appeals held that 
the basic rules of contract law apply to plea agreements 
and that “ ‘the law in force on the date a contract is 
formed determines the rights of its parties.’ ”  Id. at 62, 
636 S.E.2d at 491 (quoting Esparza v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. 
App. 600, 606, 513 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1999)).  Because Code 
§§ 18.2-10(g) and 19.2-295.2(A) were both “in effect at the 
time the plea agreement was formed,” the Court of Appeals 
concluded “the plea agreement necessarily included the 
suspended sentence and post-release supervision as a matter 
of law.”  Wright, 49 Va. App. at 62, 636 S.E.2d at 491.  To 
hold otherwise, according to the Court of Appeals, would 
“require trial judges to disregard the mandatory provisions 
of the statutes when imposing sentence pursuant to a plea 
and create an anomaly in our sentencing procedures.”  
Wright, 49 Va. App. at 64, 636 S.E.2d at 492. 
The sole issue now before this Court is whether a 
circuit court, after accepting a plea agreement of the type 
specified in Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C), can then impose an 
additional period of suspended incarceration and post-
release supervision pursuant to Code §§ 18.2-10(g) and 
19.2-295.2(A) when such terms were not included in the plea 
 
5
agreement.4  This question presents a matter of statutory 
interpretation and is subject to de novo review by this 
Court.  See Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 
634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006). 
Wright contends that the circuit court erred by 
imposing the additional term of suspended incarceration and 
post-release supervision.  According to Wright, the circuit 
court in effect rejected the plea agreement but failed to 
afford Wright the opportunity to exercise his rights 
provided in Rule 3A:8(c)(4), specifically, to withdraw his 
guilty plea and choose to have his case heard by another 
trial judge, or to maintain his guilty plea and face the 
possibility of a less favorable disposition than the one 
provided in the plea agreement.  Thus, Wright contends that 
he is entitled to be sentenced in accordance with the terms 
of his plea agreement with the Commonwealth or to have the 
opportunity to exercise his rights under Rule 3A:8(c)(4).  
We do not agree. 
                     
4 We emphasize that the plea agreement at issue was 
silent with regard to the requirements set forth in Code 
§§ 18.2-10(g) and 19.2-295.2(A).  We do not decide today 
whether a circuit court would have to reject a plea 
agreement containing an agreed disposition that directly 
conflicted with particular mandated statutory requirements 
such as the ones before us, those relating to the taking of 
a defendant’s blood, saliva or tissue for DNA analysis, see 
Code § 19.2-310.2, or those imposing certain minimum 
 
6
For felony offenses committed after July 1, 2000, for 
which the punishment includes an active term of 
incarceration in a correctional facility, except in cases 
when a circuit court orders a suspended term of confinement 
of at least six months, the provisions of Code § 18.2-10(g) 
require a circuit court to “impose an additional term of 
not less than six months nor more than three years, which 
shall be suspended conditioned upon successful completion 
of a period of post-release supervision pursuant to [Code] 
§ 19.2-295.2.”  Similarly, for that same class of offenses, 
the provisions of Code § 19.2-295.2(A) direct a circuit 
court to “impose a term of post[-]release supervision of 
not less than six months nor more than three years.”  The 
provisions of these two statutes are mandatory.  Alston v. 
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 769-70, 652 S.E.2d 456, 462 
(2007).  They comprise part of the maximum term of 
incarceration permitted by statute and are added to the 
term that can otherwise be imposed upon a convicted felon.  
See id. at 770, 652 S.E.2d at 462 (citing Williams v. 
Commonwealth, 270 Va. 580, 584, 621 S.E.2d 98, 100 (2005)).  
Nothing in the statutes suggests that their terms are not 
applicable when, as in this case, a defendant enters into a 
                                                             
sentences, see, e.g., Code §§ 18.2-12.1, -53.1, -57, and –
255(A). 
 
7
plea agreement that fails to address the mandatory 
requirements. 
To the contrary, the provisions of both Code sections 
constituted a part of Wright’s plea agreement as though 
they were incorporated therein.  In Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 
651, 203 S.E.2d 123 (1974), we stated that “[t]he law 
effective when the contract is made is as much a part of 
the contract as if incorporated therein.”  Id. at 653, 203 
S.E.2d at 125; accord Buchanan v. Doe, 246 Va. 67, 72, 431 
S.E.2d 289, 292 (1993); Marriott v. Harris, 235 Va. 199, 
215, 368 S.E.2d 225, 233 (1988); Harbour Gate Owners’ 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Berg, 232 Va. 98, 105, 348 S.E.2d 252, 257 
(1986); Maxey v. American Cas. Co., 180 Va. 285, 290, 23 
S.E.2d 221, 223 (1942); Esparza, 29 Va. App. at 606, 513 
S.E.2d at 888.  As the Court of Appeals held, this 
principle of contract law applies to plea agreements.  
Wright, 49 Va. App. at 62, 636 S.E.2d at 491 (citing 
Esparza, 29 Va. App. at 606, 513 S.E.2d at 888); see also 
United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, 179 (1st Cir. 
1985) (“[P]lea bargains are subject to contract law 
principles insofar as their application will insure the 
 
8
defendant what is reasonably due him.”) (citations 
omitted).5 
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err by holding that 
“the plea agreement necessarily included the suspended 
sentence and post-release supervision as a matter of law.”  
Wright, 49 Va. App. at 62, 636 S.E.2d at 491.  The circuit 
court’s imposition of the three-year term of suspended 
incarceration and post-release supervision did not alter or 
modify the terms of the parties’ plea agreement.  Contrary 
to Wright’s argument, the circuit court did not implicitly 
reject the plea agreement but, instead, sentenced Wright in 
accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.  Wright 
therefore was not entitled to an opportunity to exercise 
the rights afforded under Rule 3A:8(c)(4) when a circuit 
                     
5 Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have applied 
contract principles to plea agreements.  See e.g., United 
States v. Cimino, 381 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Peglera, 33 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979); 
State v. Crockett, 877 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Nev. 1994); State 
v. Bethel, 854 N.E.2d 150, 166 (Ohio 2006); In re 
Palodichuk, 589 P.2d 269, 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).  But 
see United States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d 369, 375 (6th Cir. 
2004) (stating that although general principles of contract 
law apply to plea agreements, “‘[a] guilty plea, however, 
involves the waiver of at least three constitutional rights 
by a defendant . . . [and,] therefore, the analogy of a 
plea agreement to a traditional contract is not complete or 
precise, and the application of ordinary contract law 
principles to a plea agreement is not always 
appropriate.’ ”) (citing United States v. Skidmore, 998 
 
9
court rejects a plea agreement of the type specified in 
Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C). 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
                                                             
F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. 
Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1990))).