Title: HULSE v. BHJ, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HULSE v. BHJ, INC.2003 WY 7571 P.3d 262Case Number: 02-148Decided: 06/17/2003
April Term, A.D. 2003

 

 

RAYMOND 
M. HULSE and KRISTINA

HULSE, 
f/k/a KRISTINA BOVA,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs) 
,

 

v.

 

BHJ, 
INC.,

 

Appellee(Defendant) 
.

 

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Crook County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Brad 
A. Schreiber of Day, Morris & Schreiber, LLP, Belle Fourche, SD; and Michael 
W. Strain of Morman Law Firm, Sturgis, SD.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

James 
R. Bell of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, WY.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the entry of summary judgment against appellants Raymond M. Hulse and 
Kristina Hulse (collectively the Hulses) in favor of appellee BHJ, Inc. (BHJ), 
ruling that the Hulses' claim of negligence against BHJ is barred by the statute 
of limitations.  We 
affirm.  

 

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      The Hulses' raise 
a solitary issue on appeal:

 

Whether 
or not the trial court erred as a matter of law granting BHJ's motion for 
summary judgment. 

 

 

FACTS 
AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

 

[¶3]      On August 10, 
1998, the Hulses filed their complaint surrounding their purchase of a piece of 
real property.  The Hulses alleged 
breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and bad faith against First American 
Title Company of Crook County (First American) and negli­gence and fraud 
against BHJ, the real estate broker of the selling party.  The basis of the complaint stemmed from 
allegations that there was a failure by First American and BHJ to disclose that 
the access easement to the property was restricted prohibiting commercial use of 
the easement.  

 

[¶4]      In their 
complaint, the Hulses allege they purchased the property with the intent of 
conducting commercial business, including an outfitting and hunting business and 
a bed and breakfast, and that both First American and BHJ were aware of the 
Hulses' reasons for purchasing the property.  However, subsequent to the purchase, the 
Hulses learned that sole access to the property was by way of a restricted 
easement which prohibited commercial use of the easement causing the Hulses to 
sustain damages.  

 

[¶5]      Initially, the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of both First American and 
BHJ.  Following appeal, this court 
issued its opinion in Hulse v. First American Title Co. of Crook County, 
2001 WY 95, 33 P.3d 122 (Wyo. 2001) (hereinafter, Hulse I), upholding the 
summary judgment ruling as to First American and BHJ, with the exception of 
summary judgment entered in favor of BHJ on the negligence claim.  Specifically, this court remanded the 
negligence claim asserted against BHJ to the district court for a 
determina­tion of whether BHJ's agent, Edward "Amory" Hubbard, exercised the 
care, skill, and diligence others who are engaged in the profession would 
ordinarily exercise under similar circumstances in fulfilling the duties imposed 
upon him by statute.  Hulse 
I, at ¶62.  In Hulse I, 
this court also recognized that the claim asserted by the Hulses against BHJ, 
while labeled "negligent misrepresentation," essentially asserted a breach of 
the duty of care owed by real estate professionals to non-client buyers or a 
"professional negli­gence" claim as defined under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 33-28-124 (LexisNexis 2001) and controlled by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-3-107 (LexisNexis 2001).  
Hulse I, at ¶¶51-62.

 

[¶6]      On remand, BHJ 
filed a second motion for summary judgment asserting that the Hulses had failed 
to timely file their professional negligence claim against BHJ within the 
applicable two-year statute of limitations called for under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-107.  Upon review, the district 
court entered summary judgment in favor of BHJ.  This appeal followed. 

 

 

 

[¶7]      Our standard of 
review is well established.  We 
recently reiterated this standard of review in the case of Trabing v. 
Kinko's, Inc., 2002 WY 171, ¶8, 57 P.3d 1248, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2002):

 

            
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material 
fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter 
of law.  Eklund v. PRI 
Environ­mental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001); 
see also W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A 
genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the 
cause of action or defense that has been asserted by the parties.  Williams Gas Processing-Wamsutter Co. 
v. Union Pacific Resources Co., 2001 WY 57, ¶11, 25 P.3d 1064, ¶11 (Wyo. 
2001).  We exam­ine the record 
from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and 
we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be 
drawn from the record.  Id. 
We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards 
and by using the same materi­als as were employed and used by the lower 
court.  Scherer Constr., LLC v. 
Hedquist Constr., Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001).  We do not accord any deference to the 
district court's decisions on issues of law.  Id.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      The Hulses 
contend that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-28-124 and 1-3-107 refer to the 
render­ing of services and that the rendering of services contemplates a 
contractual or fiduci­ary relationship with a client, not a non-client.1  Therefore, the Hulses reason that 
because they had no contractual or fiduciary relationship with BHJ, BHJ's agent, 
Mr. Hubbard, could not have provided professional services to the Hulses.  The Hulses argue that due to the fact 
that they had no contractual or fiduciary relationship with BHJ, they may only 
sue BHJ for non-disclosure of the restricted easement under a "negligent 
misrepresentation" theory defined under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-28-303(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001), which they assert is controlled by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (LexisNexis 2001), affording a four-year statute of 
limitations.2  Thus, the Hulses conclude that their 
negligence claim against BHJ was timely made.

 

[¶9]      We begin our 
analysis by reiterating the language stated in Hulse I.  While we recog­nize that this 
quotation is somewhat lengthy, we find it instructive.  Therein, we 
stated:

 

            
The Hulses appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment for the 
defendant BHJ, Inc., a licensed real estate brokerage, for the acts of its agent 
Amory Hubbard on claims they label negligent misrepresentation and fraud.  We take this opportunity to clarify the 
duties owed by licensed real estate brokers, agents, and salespersons and the 
causes of action that may arise as a result of an alleged breach of those 
duties.  

 

            
The Hulses assert a claim of negligent misrepresentation against 
defendant BHJ, Inc. citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 552.  In Richey v. Patrick, a case 
involving claims by purchas­ers of real property against lay sellers, we 
discussed the tort of negligent misrepre­sentation as found in the 
Restatement and stated that in order for there to have been a 
negli­gent misrepre­sentation, the plaintiff must show 
that

 

[o]ne who, 
in the course of his business, profession or employ­ment, or in any 
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false 
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is 
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable 
reliance upon the infor­mation, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information.

 

Richey,  904 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo. 1995).

 

            
In Richey, we found that the sellers had not "supplied false 
information," as required by the claim, because the sellers had not supplied 
any information to the purchasers.  We said, "[a] nondisclosure of 
information cannot support a claim of mis­representation; since nothing has 
been represented, an essential element of the claim is missing."  Id. at 802 (citing Burman v. 
Richmond Homes, Ltd., 821 P.2d 913, 919 (Colo.App. 1991)).  We went on to hold that the crux of the 
purchasers' complaint was that the sellers should have informed them of a 
material fact, they owed a duty to do so, and it was this nondisclosure that 
caused the plaintiff's damage.  In 
Richey, we then clarified that the appropriate claim was one for 
negligent nondisclosure as found within Restatement (Second) Torts § 
551.  However, we declined to apply 
the Restatement section to the plaintiffs' claim because we reasoned that 
the "as is" clause contained within the purchase contract signed by the sellers 
and purchasers placed the risk of discovery of adverse material facts upon 
pur­chasers of real estate.  
Thus, we recognized the relationship between the parties was essentially 
contractual and held that when a contract places the burden on the purchaser to 
discover defects, they are barred from seeking relief for negligent 
non­disclosure.

 

            
Likewise, in our recent case of Snyder v. Lovercheck, we addressed 
as an issue of first impression whether a purchaser of realty could even bring a 
claim of negligent misrepresen­tation, a tort action, against a seller when 
the relationship between the parties arises in contract.  Again, we held that the contractual 
relationship is controlling.  When 
purchasers of realty sign con­tracts with disclaimers and merger clauses 
stating that the purchaser is not relying on the representations of the sellers 
or their agents as to the condition of the property, the contract has allocated 
the risks of loss resulting from the purchaser's reliance on the seller's 
representations to the purchaser.  
In reasoning to our ultimate conclusion, this court had an extended 
discussion of the distinction between duties arising by tort and those arising 
by contract.  We said: 

 

Tort law 
proceeds from a long historical evolution of externally imposed duties and 
liabilities.  Contract law proceeds 
from an even longer historical evolution of bargained-for duties and 
liabilities.  The careless and 
unnecessary blanket confusion of tort and contract would undermine the carefully 
evolved utility of both.

 

            
In tort, the legislatures and the courts have set the parameters of 
social policy and imposed them on indi­vidual members of society without 
their consent.  The social policy in 
the field of contract has been left to the parties themselves to determine, with 
judicial and legis­lative intervention tolerated only in the most extreme 
cases.  Where there has been 
interven­tion, it has been by the application of well established contract 
doctrines, most of which focus on threats to the integrity of the 
bar­gaining process itself such as fraud or extreme imbalance in bargaining 
power.

 

Snyder v. 
Lovercheck, 992 P.2d  at 
1087.

 

            
As illustrated by our holdings in Richey and Snyder, this 
court continues to value the freedom to contract between sellers and purchasers 
of realty.  We recognize that the 
parties to the contract may allocate the risks of loss as they so choose.  Hav­ing done so, absent proof of 
fraud, we generally allow the unambiguous language found in the parties' 
contract to con­trol the scope of subsequent litigation.  We have been exceedingly reluctant to 
introduce tort principles into claims that are essen­tially contract 
actions.

 

            
However, this court's jurisprudence reflects that the inverse rule is 
likewise valid.  Contract principles 
that govern the parties to a contract are not controlling on claims against 
nonparty professionals whose duties arise in tort.  Our prece­dent reveals a 
recognition that tort duties and liabilities imposed by the legislatures and 
courts are supported by underlying social policies which require the imposition 
of obligations on a defendant to act reasonably for the protection of a 
plaintiff.  By imposing tort duties, 
courts and legislatures have exter­nally allocated the risks arising from 
certain rela­tionships for the protection of the public.  Having done so, individual parties are 
limited in shifting those burdens from the obligor to the obligee by private 
action.  

 

            
At this point in time, there can be no doubt that licensed 
professional real estate agents and brokers are a class of persons on whom the 
law has imposed affirmative tort duties.  
Two decades ago this court stated in Hagar v. 
Mobley:

 

            
Real estate brokers and salesmen are licensed by the State of Wyoming and 
required to meet high stan­dards of honesty, integrity, trustworthiness and 
competency.  Theirs is a regulated 
profession.  Failure to satisfy 
those standards is ground for suspension or revocation of a real estate broker's 
or salesperson's license.  An act 
licensing real estate agents must be construed in the light of an obvious 
purpose of pro­tecting the public in the handling of important and valuable 
transactions relating to real property.  
As a result, such an agent does not stand in the same shoes of a lay 
vendor.  Such realtors owe the 
vendee the same duties of integrity owed the public at large.  They must be honest, trustworthy and 
competent.

 

Hagar v. 
Mobley, 638 P.2d 127, 136 (Wyo. 1981) (emphasis added and citation omitted).  In Hagar, we cited with approval 
the reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court reversing the dis­missal of a claim 
against a realtor: 

 

            
In this state, it is apparent that the rule of caveat emptor does not 
apply to those dealing with a licensed real estate agent.  Though not occupying a fiduciary 
relationship with prospective purchasers, a real estate agent hired by the 
vendor is expected to be honest, ethi­cal, and competent and is answerable 
at law for breaches of his or her statutory duty to the 
public.

 

Hagar, 
638 P.2d  at 
137 (quoting Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 
1980)).

 

            
Furthermore, we cited with approval the Montana Supreme Court's then 
recent hold­ing that real estate brokers have, like other 
professionals, certain standards of care which must be satisfied.  We said that the Montana court observed 
that the failure to maintain those standards of skill, compe­tency, and 
integrity exposes realtors to, in effect malpractice actions.  Hagar, 638 P.2d  at 137 (citing 
McCarty v. Lincoln Green, Inc. 620 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Mt. 1980)).  This court went on to state that we may 
exact a high standard of care from real­tors and held that the standard of 
care for realtors may be adopted by the court from a legislative enactment.  Id. (citing Distad v. 
Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981)).  
We reiter­ated:

 

            
Realtors, just like doctors, lawyers, engineering consult­ants, 
and builders, hold themselves out as professionals; it is their job to know 
their profession.  People rely on 
and trust them.  Failure to comply 
with either the accepted standards in the field or the stan­dards society is 
willing to recognize as acceptable, is actionable.

 

Hagar, 638 P.2d  
at 138.  As to the question of 
damages, we held "[t]he liability of real estate agents, brokers and 
salespersons, as in all actions predicated upon the fail­ure to perform some 
duty, sounds in tort.  In tort cases 
damages are generally awarded in order to compensate claimants for loss.  The measure of dam­ages is the 
amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused by the 
breach of duty."  Hagar, at 
139. 

 

            
Subsequent to our holding in Hagar, parties have appar­ently 
seized on the language within the opinion stating the duty of care as "the 
broker is liable because of material repre­senta­tions of the principal 
if he repeats them and knows, or reasonably should know, of their falsity.  Liability attaches in this context on 
grounds of negligence," id. at 137,  and have asserted claims labeled 
"negligent misrepresentation" against both lay sellers and real estate brokers 
and agents.  "Negligent 
misrepresentation" and "negligent nondisclosure" are generic tort actions found 
within the Restatement (Second) Torts §§ 552 and 551 
respec­tively.  These torts have 
specific elements and, as previously discussed, this court has addressed in 
various opin­ions whether to adopt and apply them to claims brought by 
plain­tiffs against sellers of realty and real estate brokers and 
agents.  See Richey v. Patrick, 
904 P.2d 798 (Wyo. 1995); Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 
1999); Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Real Estate Co., Inc., 8 P.3d 324 (Wyo. 
2000).  We have also addressed the 
effect of various exculpatory clauses on the above causes of action.  At this juncture, we reaf­firm all 
prior holdings and precedent as applied to lay vendors/sellers of real property 
and their agents or subagents, who are not licensed real estate 
professionals.  

 

            
However, notwithstanding any subsequent confusion in formulating, 
titling, or decid­ing tort claims against licensed real estate professionals 
premised upon their duties imposed by statute, it is abundantly clear that Hagar 
contemplated that the claim was one of profes­sional negligence.  This is the holding that we expressly 
reaffirm by this decision.  It is 
fur­ther supported by legislative enactments in 1997 by which the Wyoming 
Legislature essentially codified the court's holding in Hagar and went further 
to expand and clarify the duty of care owed by real estate professionals to 
parties when acting as seller's, buyer's or intermediary agents.  See Wyo. Stat. § 33-28-303 
(LexisNexis 2001) Seller's agent engaged by seller; Wyo. Stat. § 33-28-304 
(LexisNexis 2001) Agent engaged by buyer; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-28-305 
(LexisNexis 2001) Inter­mediary.  
The Wyoming Legislature in 2000 adopted Wyo. Stat. § 33-28-124 Act, 
error or omission in the rendering of real estate ser­vices, which 
provides:  "A cause of action 
aris­ing from an act, error or omission in the rendering of services 
provided by a licensee under this act shall be brought within the time limits 
provided under W.S. 1-3-107."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 is the statute of limitations for claims of professional 
negligence.  It is applicable to 
claims arising after the effective date of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
33-28-124.

 

            
As we held in Hagar, the court may adopt from legisla­tive 
enactment a standard of care for realtors.  
Id., 638 P.2d  at 137.  Wyo. 
Stat. § 33-28-303(c) provides:

 

            
A broker acting as a seller's agent owes no duty or obli­gation to 
the buyer, except that a broker shall disclose to any prospective buyer all 
adverse material facts actually known by the broker.  The adverse material facts may include 
adverse material facts pertaining to the title and the physical condition of the 
property, any mate­rial defects in the property and any envi­ronmental 
hazards affecting the property which are required by law to be disclosed.  The broker acting as a seller's agent 
shall not perpetuate a material misrepresentation of the seller which the broker 
knows or should know is false."

 

In Hagar we 
said that the facts necessary to be disclosed are those that are "pivotal to the 
transaction from the buyer's per­spective." Id. at 138 (quoting Tennant v. 
Lawton, 615 P.2d 1305, 1309-1310 (Wash.App. 
1980)).

 

            
Having hereby outlined what law is applicable to the liability of 
real estate brokers and salespersons, we note that the claims asserted by the 
plaintiffs, while labeled "negligent misrepresentation," essentially assert a 
breach of the duty of care owed by real estate profes­sionals to non-client 
buyers.  However, as a 
reviewing court, we are not fact finders in the first instance.  The district court's grant of summary 
judgment did not address the issue of whether BHJ, Inc.'s agent, Hubbard, 
exercised such care, skill, and diligence as others who are engaged in the 
profession would ordinarily exercise under similar circumstances in 
ful­filling the duties imposed upon him by statute.  We, therefore, vacate the district 
court's grant of summary judgment to BHJ, Inc. on the issue of "negligent 
misrepresentation" and remand for a determination under the applicable standard 
consistent with the law we have herein set out. 

 

Hulse, 
at ¶¶51-62 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).

 

[¶10]   We specifically clarified in 
Hulse I, citing Hagar and other cases as precedent, that an 
affirmative duty exists on the part of real estate professionals with respect to 
non-client parties to a real estate transaction.  Such duty is imposed as a matter of 
public policy given the importance of transactions relating to real 
property.  As stated in 
Richey, at 802, such duty arises in anyone who, in the course of his 
business, profession, or employment, supplies false information for the guidance 
of others in their business transactions, if he fails to exercise reasonable 
care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.  Thus, within the real estate context, 
brokers and realtors who unquestionably act through their business, profession, 
or employment owe a buyer, although not in privity in contract with that buyer, 
duties of integrity, honesty, and competency.  

 

[¶11]   Accordingly, we do not agree with 
the Hulses' argument that because §§ 33-28-124 and 1-3-107 refer to the 
"rendering of services," such infers the rendering of professional 
services requiring a formal contractual or fiduciary relationship with a client 
and, therefore, these statutes are inapplicable in this instance where the 
Hulses were not clients of BHJ.  To 
the contrary, we made it clear in Hulse I, (citing in part 
Hagar, at 137 (quoting Dugan v. Jones, at 1248)), that 
although no contractual or fiduciary relationship exists with a buyer, a real 
estate professional hired by the seller is expected to be honest, ethical, and 
competent and is answerable at law for breaches of that statutory duty to the 
buyer as a matter of public policy. 

 

[¶12]   Likewise, we came to this same 
conclusion in Hulse I with respect to the application of § 33-28-303(c) 
defining "negligent misrepresentation."  
As such, we note that § 33-28-303 is not controlled by the four-year 
statute of limitations imposed by § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) but is instead governed by 
the two-year statute of limitations set forth in § 1-3-107.  As stated in Hulse 
I:

 

[N]otwithstanding 
any subsequent confusion in formulating, titling, or deciding tort claims 
against licensed real estate pro­fessionals premised upon their duties 
imposed by statute, it is abundantly clear that Hagar contemplated that 
the claim was one of professional negligence.  This is the holding that we expressly 
reaffirm by this decision. 

 

Hulse 
I, 
at ¶60.  This statement simply 
cannot be characterized as obiter dictum as asserted by the Hulses.  Rather, this is the established law in 
Wyoming, as well as the established law of this case.  As plainly stated in Hulse I, at 
¶¶60-62, § 1-3-107 sets forth the statute of limi­tations for claims of 
professional negligence after the effective date of § 33-28-124. Claims of 
professional negligence include those claims asserted under § 33-28-303(c) for 
"negligent misrepresentation" against real estate professionals by non-client 
buyers.

 

[¶13]   Finally, as indicated above, our 
holding is consistent with long standing case law authority and enacted 
statutory mandate established in Wyoming.  
Hence, argument by the Hulses to the contrary is not well taken.  In addition, the Hulses request that we 
adopt the reasoning in Durbin v. Ross, 916 P.2d 758 (Mont. 1996), 
implying that because the realtors in that case did not represent the buyers 
there was no professional relationship and, without such a professional 
relationship, there could be no actionable claim for professional 
negli­gence.  We, however, 
decline to do so.  As stated above, 
insofar as the court in Durbin espouses such a rule of law and is not 
otherwise limited solely to the required expert testi­mony issue therein 
particularly addressed, we find such holding to be directly contrary to 
established Wyoming authority.   

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶14]   Upon our review and analysis, 
we affirm the action of the district court in granting summary judgment in favor 
of BHJ and against the Hulses in this action. 

 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 33-28-124, in applicable part, provides:

 

Act, 
error or omission in the rendering of real estate 
services.

 

            
A cause of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering 
of services provided by a licensee under this act shall be brought within the 
time limits provided under W.S. 1-3-107.

 

This 
court recognizes that this statute did not become effective until July 1, 
2000.  Nevertheless, the Hulses 
contend that this statute is merely a formal codification of the previous 
intentions of the legislature.

 

            
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(i) states:

 

Act, 
error or omission in rendering professional or health care 
services.

 

(a)  A 
cause of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of 
licensed or certified professional or health care services shall be brought 
within the greater of the following times:

 

(i)  Within 
two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a 
cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of 
the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the 
alleged act, error or omission was:

 

(A)  Not 
reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

 

(B)  The 
claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two 
(2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

 

  2Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-28-303(c) and 
1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) read as follows, respectively:

 

(c)  A 
broker acting as a seller's agent owes no duty or obligation to the buyer, 
except that a broker shall disclose to any prospective buyer all adverse 
material facts actually known by the broker. The adverse material facts may 
include adverse material facts pertaining to the title and the physical 
condition of the property, any material defects in the property and any 
environmental hazards affecting the property which are required by law to be 
disclosed. The broker acting as a seller's agent shall not perpetuate a material 
misrepresentation of the seller which the broker knows or should know is 
false.

 

_____

 

Actions 
other than recovery of real property.

 

(a)  Civil 
actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within 
the following periods after the cause of action accrues:

 

. . .

 

(iv)  Within 
four (4) years, an action for:

 

. . .

 

(C)  An 
injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein 
enumerated[.]