Title: Berry v. Greene

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

BERRY V. GREENE, JUDGE, ET AL. 
[Cite as Berry v. Greene (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 1235.] 
Motions to dismiss petition for writ of habeas corpus granted and cause dismissed. 
(No. 99-1518 – Submitted October 12, 1999 – Decided December 22, 1999.) 
IN HABEAS CORPUS. 
ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS. 
__________________ 
 
Denise R. Berry, pro se. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and L. 
Christopher Frey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Judge Lillian J. 
Greene. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Diane D. Mallory, Assistant 
Attorney General, for respondent Attorney General. 
__________________ 
 
Respondents’ motions to dismiss are granted, and the cause is dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs separately. 
__________________ 
 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring.  Petitioner filed a complaint with 
this court seeking a writ of habeas corpus to compel respondent Court of Common 
Pleas of Cuyahoga County, through Judge Lillian J. Greene, and respondent 
Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (“BCI”), through the Ohio 
Attorney General, to clear her record.1  Petitioner also claims that her record at the 
BCI was released without authorization to her employer, which caused her to lose 
her job.  I agree with the majority’s dismissal of this case.  I write separately 
because I wish to underscore an apparent injustice. 
 
Petitioner was indicted on drug charges on January 17, 1996.  These charges 
were reflected on petitioner’s BCI record.  On March 26, 1996, petitioner pled no 
contest and accepted treatment in lieu of conviction, during which time the 
proceedings against her were stayed.  But petitioner’s BCI record erroneously 
reflected that she was convicted of the drug charges.  Petitioner alleges that in July 
1997 the court of common pleas suspended her driver’s license because of her 
“drug-related felonies.” 
 
Petitioner completed her treatment, and on October 24, 1997, Judge Greene 
dismissed the charges against petitioner.  Petitioner moved Judge Greene to 
expunge her record.  On February 2, 1998, Judge Greene granted the motion and 
issued a “Judgment of Expungement of Conviction.” (Emphasis added.)  A notice 
 
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of the expungement was forwarded to the BCI.  In turn, petitioner’s BCI record 
noted the expungement. 
 
On May 17, 1999, Judge Greene filed an amended “Judgment of 
Expungement Following * * * Treatment in Lieu of Conviction.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Judge Greene sent notice of the amended expungement to the BCI on May 
25, 1999. 
 
Although Judge Greene’s original judgment mistakenly expunged a 
conviction, it appears that she subsequently corrected that error and has complied 
with her duties with regard to petitioner’s record in this case.  The BCI, on the 
other hand, fails to contradict the merits of petitioner’s claims; its brief merely 
states that the petitioner has no claim for relief pursuant to a complaint for a writ of 
habeas corpus because she was never incarcerated. 
 
Our entire legal system is predicated upon a body of law that dictates that 
specific procedures must be used to obtain certain types of relief.  We cannot 
simply ignore these procedures and grant relief solely upon what appears to be just.  
To do so would create turmoil in our legal system. 
 
“The extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus is for the purpose of 
determining the legality of the restraint or custody under which a person is held.”  
In re Lockhart (1952), 157 Ohio St. 192, 47 O.O. 129, 105 N.E.2d 35, paragraph 
two of the syllabus.  By petitioner’s own admission she is not, and has never been, 
 
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restrained.  Therefore, petitioner’s complaint seeking a writ of habeas corpus fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Thus, I must regrettably concur 
in dismissing this case. 
 
That is not to say that petitioner is necessarily without a remedy.  The 
“evidence” seems to indicate that the suspension of petitioner’s driver’s license in 
1997 was due to the 1996 drug charges before Judge Greene.  These charges were 
dismissed.  Surely, if this characterization of the “evidence” is correct, the Bureau 
of Motor Vehicles would voluntarily reinstate petitioner’s driver’s license. 
 
The “evidence” also seems to indicate that the BCI has improperly 
maintained petitioner’s record.  Petitioner’s BCI record indicates that she was 
convicted of drug charges.  Yet Judge Greene indicates that these drug charges 
were dismissed.  The judgment entry attached to petitioner’s brief confirms the 
dismissal. 
 
Although there is no express proof that the petitioner’s BCI record was 
released to her employer, petitioner’s possession of her record implies that the 
BCI improperly released her record to an unauthorized person despite Judge 
Greene’s Judgment of Expungement that sealed petitioner’s record.  Excluding 
certain exceptions, not raised here, sealed records are not to be available for 
inspection.  See R.C. 2953.53. 
 
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Surely if this characterization of the “evidence” is correct, the BCI would 
voluntarily correct petitioner’s record to reflect that the drug charges against her 
were dismissed, as well as prevent further release of her record to any 
unauthorized party. 
 
But should the BCI fail to act, petitioner’s appropriate recourse might lie in a 
complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the BCI to correct her record to 
reflect the dismissal of the drug charges.  Petitioner might have recourse in the 
form of a declaratory action seeking a judgment declaring that her BCI record 
should not be made available to unauthorized persons.  If the BCI knowingly 
released petitioner’s record, petitioner, through the prosecutor, might also be able 
to pursue criminal charges.  See R.C. 2953.55(B).  Finally, petitioner might have a 
mandamus action to compel the Bureau of Motor Vehicles to reinstate her driver’s 
license. 
 
Therefore, I concur with the dismissal of this case, but express my dismay at 
the apparent injustice that has occurred against the petitioner. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
In the caption of her petition, petitioner names two respondents:  (1) the 
Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, through Judge Greene, and (2) the 
Ohio Attorney General.  However, in the body of her petition it is clear that 
petitioner’s complaints directed at the Attorney General are more specifically 
 
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directed to the BCI, which is part of the Attorney General’s Office.  See R.C. 
109.51.  Therefore, for purposes of clarity, I shall refer to the BCI as the second 
respondent throughout the remainder of my concurrence.