Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. John R. Dade

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 66 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2627-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John R. Dade, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
John R. Dade, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DADE 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 1, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
2007 WI 66
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2627-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against John R. Dade, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
John R. Dade, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
JUN 1, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the referee's recommendation 
that the license of Attorney John R. Dade be suspended for a 
period of 60 days and that he be required, as a condition of the 
reinstatement of his license, to make "a satisfactory showing to 
the OLR [Office of Lawyer Regulation] that he has obtained 
appropriate CLE [continuing legal education] credits in the area 
of office management and ethics." 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Based upon our independent review of the matter, we 
adopt the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law.  We 
also agree with the referee's recommendation for a 60-day 
suspension of Attorney Dade's license to practice law in this 
state.  We decline, however, to impose the reinstatement 
condition requested by the OLR and recommended by the referee.  
Finally, we determine that Attorney Dade should be required to 
pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding, which were 
$3875.20, as of January 17, 2007. 
¶3 
Attorney Dade was admitted to the practice of law in 
Wisconsin in 1983 and has been engaged in private practice in 
Whitewater.  In 1991, he received a private reprimand for 
failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of 
a matter, for failing to act with reasonable diligence and for 
failing to cooperate with the investigation of the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility. 
¶4 
The OLR, by appointed counsel, filed a four-count 
complaint against Attorney Dade on October 27, 2005.  The 
relevant facts alleged in the complaint are summarized below. 
¶5 
Count 1 involved Attorney Dade's failure to provide 
information to the OLR.  During an investigation concerning a 
grievance filed by M.F., the OLR requested Attorney Dade to 
provide certain additional information and documents.  Attorney 
Dade did not respond to the OLR within the requested time 
period.  The OLR then sent another letter, by both certified and 
first-class mail, seeking a response and reminding Attorney Dade 
of his obligation to cooperate.  When Attorney Dade signed for 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
3 
 
the certified letter but did not respond, the OLR personally 
served Attorney Dade with yet another letter.  Attorney Dade 
still did not respond. 
¶6 
The OLR then filed a motion for the temporary 
suspension of Attorney Dade's license.  After this court issued 
an order to Attorney Dade to show cause why his license should 
not be temporarily suspended, he finally submitted his response 
to the OLR's request for information.  He also submitted a 
separate letter to the court acknowledging that his failure to 
respond to the OLR's requests could be deemed misconduct under 
SCR 22.03(6).1 
¶7 
The OLR subsequently requested further information 
from Attorney Dade, but he again did not respond.  After the OLR 
referred the matter to a district committee for further 
investigation, Attorney Dade did cooperate with that committee. 
¶8 
The OLR's complaint alleged that Attorney Dade's 
multiple failures to provide written responses to the OLR's 
requests for supplemental information had violated SCR 22.03(6), 
thereby also violating SCR 20:8.4(f).2 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.03(6) provides:  Investigation. 
 
(6) In the course of the investigation, the 
respondent's 
willful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
2 SCR 20:8.4(f) states that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
4 
 
¶9 
Count 2 related to Attorney Dade's representation of 
E.D.  On July 3, 2001, Attorney Dade was appointed by the 
circuit court to represent E.D. in connection with charges of 
three counts of felony failure to pay child support following 
her 1997 divorce.  The state alleged that E.D. was behind in her 
support payments by over $35,000.  On July 5, 2001, E.D. 
informed Attorney Dade that at her final divorce hearing, the 
circuit court had ordered her to pay 29 percent of her income as 
child support, but only if she was employed.   
¶10 Attorney Dade represented E.D. at a hearing before a 
family court commissioner on July 6, 2001.  At that hearing the 
commissioner determined that the amount of the child support 
arrearages had to be recalculated and scheduled a further 
hearing on the subject for October 2001. 
¶11 Following the hearing, Attorney Dade told E.D. that he 
would review the court's divorce file, locate the court reporter 
for the final hearing in the divorce action, and then discuss 
the criminal charges with the district attorney.  Although 
Attorney Dade believed that there were some child support 
arrearages, the OLR's complaint alleged that he did not 
investigate the true amount of the arrearages or obtain a copy 
of the transcript of the final divorce hearing. 
¶12 Attorney 
Dade, 
on 
E.D.'s 
behalf, 
subsequently 
negotiated a plea agreement with the state that provided that if 
E.D. pled guilty to two of the three pending felony counts, the 
parties would jointly recommend that the court impose no jail 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
5 
 
time or fine, place E.D. on two years of probation, and require 
her to pay her child support obligations. 
¶13 A plea and sentencing hearing was scheduled for July 
16, 2001.  Prior to the hearing, E.D. and her parents met with 
Attorney Dade to discuss her case and the plea agreement.  E.D. 
again claimed that the divorce hearing transcript would show 
that she did not owe any child support.  Attorney Dade responded 
that pursuing the matter and obtaining the transcript would take 
some time and would be expensive.  He said that he could 
probably obtain a copy of the transcript for $200. 
¶14 Because E.D. wanted to return to Texas as soon as 
possible, she chose to proceed with the plea agreement.  At the 
plea hearing, the circuit court accepted E.D.'s guilty pleas to 
two felonies, withheld sentence, and placed E.D. on probation 
for two years. 
¶15 E.D. 
subsequently 
obtained 
the 
divorce 
hearing 
transcript on her own for $27.71.  The transcript showed that 
E.D. was not obligated to pay child support while she was 
unemployed. 
¶16 E.D. asked Attorney Dade to represent her at the 
October 2001 hearing before the family court commissioner.  
Attorney Dade agreed to do so and appeared at the hearing.  
Because of some confusion over the support issue, the hearing 
was continued until December 6, 2001.  At that hearing, the 
child support agency agreed to reduce the arrears from over 
$35,000 to $17,000.  Attorney Dade subsequently was able to 
negotiate the arrearage amount to $9000, but E.D. refused to 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
6 
 
stipulate to that amount because she believed that she owed only 
approximately $5000.  Attorney Dade promised to file a motion to 
reduce the child support arrearage, but he never did so. 
¶17 Over the ensuing months, Attorney Dade negotiated an 
agreement with E.D.'s former husband, who agreed to terminate 
all of E.D.'s child support arrears and to declare their 
youngest child to be emancipated.  A stipulation was executed in 
late August 2002 and approved by the family court on September 
6, 2002. 
¶18 During late August, Attorney Dade told E.D. that after 
the family court matter was resolved in a couple of weeks, he 
would get the felony convictions against her reversed.  He did 
not, however, take any steps toward that goal. 
¶19 E.D. believed that if Attorney Dade had pursued her 
claim that her divorce hearing transcript did not obligate her 
to pay child support while she was unemployed, she would have 
been convicted of at most misdemeanors, instead of the two 
felonies of which she was actually convicted. 
¶20 The 
OLR's 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
these 
facts 
concerning the representation of E.D. showed that Attorney Dade 
had failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client, contrary to SCR 20:1.3.3 
¶21 Counts 3 and 4 of the complaint relate to Attorney 
Dade's representation of W.V. in the sale of six parcels of real 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.3 states that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
7 
 
estate.  According to the complaint, after W.V. orally agreed to 
sell the six parcels to D.A. for $5756.53, Attorney Dade drafted 
a single page document containing a sales agreement, a closing 
statement and a buyer's settlement statement.  Attorney Dade 
then drafted warranty deeds transferring each of the parcels to 
D.A. and his wife.  In exchange for W.V. executing the warranty 
deeds, D.A. paid $5756.53 into Attorney Dade's trust account. 
¶22 The sales agreement drafted by Attorney Dade and 
entered into by the parties provided that W.V. was to pay from 
the sales proceeds any real estate taxes that were due (with the 
exception of the 2003 taxes) and any lake association fees that 
were due.  W.V. had represented to Attorney Dade and D.A. that 
the sales proceeds would be sufficient to make these payments.  
At the closing of the transaction, Attorney Dade stated that he 
would 
pay 
the property taxes for 2001-02 and the lake 
association dues out of the sales proceeds in his client trust 
account. 
¶23 Prior to determining the actual amounts of taxes and 
lake association fees, Attorney Dade disbursed $600 of the sales 
proceeds in his trust account to W.V.  Attorney Dade also 
disbursed funds from W.V.'s trust account funds to make payments 
to the lake association and to make some real estate tax 
payments.  Attorney Dade's tax payments on W.V.'s behalf, 
however, did not cover all of the delinquent taxes due on the 
six pieces of property.  There remained an outstanding property 
tax balance on those parcels of $1485.97.   
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
8 
 
¶24 In February 2003, Attorney Dade disbursed $515 to an 
individual that W.V. had designated, $900 to his law office, and 
$800 to W.V. himself.  If Attorney Dade had used these trust 
account funds to pay the delinquent taxes, they would have been 
sufficient to cover the entire outstanding tax balance on the 
properties, as required by the sales agreement and as Attorney 
Dade had represented he would do. 
¶25 In addition, neither Attorney Dade nor W.V. recorded 
the warranty deeds for the six parcels with the register of 
deeds.  They also did not complete Wisconsin Transfer Tax 
Returns and pay the appropriate transfer tax fees. 
¶26 In March 2003 and May 2004, Attorney Dade issued 
additional checks out of his trust account debited against 
W.V.'s account.  One of the checks was payable to W.V., and one 
was payable to a police department as a "cash bond" for W.V. 
¶27 In the end, Attorney Dade disbursed to various payees 
more funds from his trust account than the proceeds from the 
sale of the properties.  Because of funds belonging to W.V. that 
had been previously deposited into Attorney Dade's client trust 
account, approximately $105.63 in funds belonging to W.V. remain 
in Attorney Dade's trust account.  This is not sufficient to pay 
the remaining delinquent property taxes for the six parcels, the 
relevant recording fees for the warranty deeds, and the relevant 
transfer taxes. 
¶28 In September 2004, the buyer of the properties, D.A., 
filed a grievance against Attorney Dade.  On October 15, 2004, 
the OLR mailed a copy of the grievance to Attorney Dade and 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
9 
 
instructed him to respond by November 8, 2004.  Attorney Dade 
did not submit a response.  The OLR sent additional letters to 
Attorney Dade by certified mail and personal service that 
directed him to submit a written response to the grievance.  
Attorney Dade still did not respond.  The OLR then filed a 
motion for a temporary suspension of Attorney Dade's license and 
this court issued an order to show cause on January 21, 2005.  
When Attorney Dade did not respond to the order, the court 
temporarily suspended his license to practice law on March 8, 
2005.  On March 17, 2005, Dade finally submitted his response to 
the grievance.  Based on the OLR's request, the court reinstated 
Attorney Dade's license on March 29, 2005. 
¶29 On the basis of these facts, the OLR's complaint 
alleged that by making payments to himself, to his client and to 
others designated by his client while the buyer of the 
properties had an interest in the use of those trust account 
funds to pay outstanding property taxes, recording fees and 
transfer taxes, Attorney Dade had failed to hold in trust the 
property of others in his client trust account, in violation of 
former SCR 20:1.15(a)4 and former SCR 20:1.15(d).5  The complaint 
                                                 
4 Former SCR 20:1.15 applied to misconduct committed prior 
to July 1, 2004.  Former 20:1.15(a) provided in relevant part: 
Safekeeping property. 
 
(a) A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from 
the lawyer's own property, that property of clients 
and third persons that is in the lawyer's possession 
in connection with a representation or when acting in 
a fiduciary capacity.  Funds held in connection with a 
representation or in a fiduciary capacity include 
funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
10 
 
also alleged that Attorney Dade's failure to submit a written 
response to the grievance and to respond to the OLR's continued 
requests for information had violated SCR 22.03(2)6 and SCR 
22.03(6), thereby also violating SCR 20:8.4(f). 
¶30 Attorney Dade's answer admitted essentially all of the 
relevant facts in Count 1 (M.F. grievance) and Counts 3 and 4 
(D.A. grievance).  The answer also admitted that he had 
                                                                                                                                                             
representative of an estate, or otherwise.  All funds 
of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable 
trust accounts . . . . 
5 Former SCR 20:1.15(d) provided:  Safekeeping property. 
 
(d) When, in the representation, a lawyer is in 
possession of property in which both the lawyer and 
another person claim interests, the property shall be 
treated by the lawyer as trust property until there is 
an accounting and severance of their interests.  If a 
dispute arises concerning their respective interests, 
the portion in dispute shall continue to be treated as 
trust property until the dispute is resolved. 
6 SCR 22.03(2) provides:  Investigation. 
 
(2) 
Upon 
commencing 
an 
investigation, 
the 
director shall notify the respondent of the matter 
being investigated unless in the opinion of the 
director the investigation of the matter requires 
otherwise.  The respondent shall fully and fairly 
disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining to the 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served 
by ordinary mail a request for a written response.  
The director may allow additional time to respond.  
Following receipt of the response, the director may 
conduct further investigation and may compel the 
respondent to answer questions, furnish documents, and 
present 
any 
information 
deemed 
relevant 
to 
the 
investigation. 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
11 
 
committed the violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
alleged in those counts.  
¶31 With respect to the E.D. representation addressed in 
Count 2, Attorney Dade admitted some of the factual allegations, 
but denied a number of key factual allegations and denied that 
he had failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, 
as required by SCR 20:1.3.  Essentially, Attorney Dade asserted 
that his original duties to E.D. were generally limited to the 
defense of the criminal case because he had been appointed to 
represent her in that case by the circuit court, although he 
acknowledged that his representation of E.D. at the July 6, 2001 
hearing before the family court commissioner was a necessary 
part of the defense of the criminal action.  He claimed that 
prior to E.D. agreeing to the plea agreement offered by the 
state, he did review the court file in the prior divorce action, 
which contradicted E.D.'s claim that she had not been required 
to pay child support as long as she remained unemployed and that 
there was no deadline for her to become employed.  Attorney Dade 
also alleged that E.D. knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to 
the two felony counts, apparently because she viewed the plea 
agreement as a means by which she could immediately return to 
Texas.  Attorney Dade further asserted that E.D. was aware that 
his original representation of her terminated following the 
entry of her guilty pleas and the imposition of her sentence in 
the criminal case.  He claimed that the reference to the $200 
amount was not only to obtain the transcript, but to review it 
and provide legal advice.  Finally, although he admitted not 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
12 
 
filing a motion to reverse the felony convictions, he asserted 
that he told E.D. that she needed to pay his outstanding 
attorney fees in the family court matter before he would take 
steps toward reopening her criminal case. 
¶32 Reserve Judge William Eich was appointed as the 
referee.  Judge Eich held a disciplinary hearing on August 30, 
2006.  He heard testimony from E.D., D.A., and Attorney Dade, 
and received 9 exhibits into evidence.  At the conclusion of the 
hearing, Judge Eich established a schedule for the parties to 
submit post-hearing briefs.  Attorney Dade did not file any 
brief. 
¶33 The 
OLR's 
post-hearing 
brief, 
in 
addition 
to 
discussing the evidence, requested that the referee recommend a 
60-day suspension as the appropriate level of discipline.  The 
OLR also requested that the referee recommend that this court 
require as a condition of reinstatement that Attorney Dade 
provide a satisfactory showing to the OLR that he had obtained 
approved CLE credits dealing with office management and ethics.  
The OLR's brief did not explain the rationale for this condition 
of reinstatement or cite any authority for it. 
¶34 The referee's report adopted the allegations in the 
OLR's complaint in their entirety as his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  Noting the private reprimand that Attorney 
Dade had received in 1991 was for similar conduct, the referee 
concluded that a 60-day suspension of Attorney Dade's license 
was appropriate here.  The referee also recommended imposing the 
reinstatement condition suggested by the OLR. 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
13 
 
¶35 When reviewing a referee's report and recommendation, 
we affirm the referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Sosnay, 
209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 (1997).  We review the 
referee's conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 
Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718.  We determine the appropriate level 
of 
discipline 
given 
the 
particular 
facts 
of 
each 
case, 
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from 
it.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 
34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶36 After having reviewed the record here and in light of 
Attorney Dade's choice not to challenge the referee's factual 
findings, we adopt the referee's findings of fact and his 
conclusions of law that Attorney Dade committed the ethical 
violations alleged in the four counts of the complaint.  Given 
those findings, we conclude that Attorney Dade's professional 
misconduct requires that his license to practice law in this 
state be suspended for a period of 60 days.  Moreover, given 
that Attorney Dade has not objected to the statement of costs 
filed by the OLR, we determine that he should be required to pay 
the full amount of costs in this disciplinary proceeding. 
¶37 We 
do 
not, 
however, 
impose 
the 
condition 
of 
reinstatement recommended by the OLR and the referee.  While we 
have the authority to impose reinstatement conditions if doing 
so is necessary in a particular case, we generally have not 
imposed reinstatement conditions on disciplinary suspensions 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
14 
 
that are shorter than six months and that do not require the 
full reinstatement process contained in SCR 22.29-.33.   
¶38 Moreover, the recommended condition here is vague and 
does not appear to be tied to the professional misconduct in 
this case.  The recommended condition would require Attorney 
Dade to make a "satisfactory showing" of CLE credits on office 
management and ethics, but does not indicate how many credits 
must be obtained and what subjects the credits should address.  
Neither Attorney Dade, nor the OLR, nor this court, will have a 
sufficient basis to determine whether Attorney Dade has done 
enough to make such a "satisfactory showing."  In addition, 
"office management" is a broad and ambiguous term.  It is also 
unclear 
how 
a 
course 
in 
supervising 
employees 
or 
time 
management, both of which could be considered to fall within 
"office management," would deter future misconduct of the type 
that occurred here.  Consequently, we conclude that Attorney 
Dade should be required simply to comply with the standard 
process for reinstatement following a suspension that is less 
than six months.  See SCR 22.28(2).7 
                                                 
7 SCR 22.28(2) provides:  License reinstatement. 
 
(2) The license of an attorney suspended for 
misconduct 
for 
less 
than 
six 
months 
shall 
be 
reinstated by the supreme court upon the filing of an 
affidavit with the director showing full compliance 
with all the terms and conditions of the order of 
suspension and the director's notification to the 
supreme court of the attorney's full compliance. 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
15 
 
¶39 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney John R. 
Dade to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 
60 days, effective July 13, 2007. 
¶40 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Attorney John R. Dade shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay those costs within that time, 
the license of Attorney Dade to practice law in Wisconsin shall 
remain suspended until further order of the court. 
¶41 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney John R. Dade shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
 
 
 
No. 
2005AP2627-D   
 
 
 
1