Title: MEANS v MONTANA POWER COMPANY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 80-266 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 JOHN R. MEANS and MARY MEANS, MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF OF NATURAL RESOURCES and CONSERVATION, an agency of the State, Plaintiffs and Appellants, THE MONTANA POWER COMPANY, A Montana Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula, Montana Honorable John Henson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Donald D. MacIntyre, Dept. of Natural Resources, argued, Helena, Montana b ~ ' Williams Law Firm, Missoula, Montana Richard Ranney argued, Missoula, Montana Filed : 4 v l k l 4 4 - 79!37 Submitted: January 13, 1981 Decided: m R 4 - 1 9 8 1 Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s appeal a r i s e s from an o r d e r a p p o i n t i n g respon- d e n t ' s a t t o r n e y l e a d c o u n s e l and p r o v i d i n g f o r r e a s o n a b l e compensation and an o r d e r f i x i n g t h a t compensation e n t e r e d by t h e District Court f o r t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Missoula County, t h e Honorable John S. Henson p r e s i d i n g . There o c c u r r e d on J u l y 1 6 , 1977, a f i r e i n t h e P a t t e e Canyon a r e a of Missoula County, Montana. The f i r e caused e x t e n s i v e damage t o both homes and l a n d i n t h e a r e a . The Montana Department o f N a t u r a l Resources and C o n s e r v a t i o n (DNRC) f o u g h t t h e b l a z e and made arrangements f o r an inves- t i g a t i o n i n t o t h e c a u s e s of t h e f i r e . I t was l a t e r d e t e r - mined t h a t power l i n e s of t h e Montana Power Company could have been t h e c a u s e of t h e P a t t e e Canyon f i r e . A complaint f o r damages t o t h e i r p r o p e r t y caused by t h e f i r e was f i l e d by John and Mary Means on March 1 4 , 1978. F i l i n g of t h e complaint had followed e x t e n s i v e d i s c o v e r y by S h e l t o n C. Williams, a t t o r n e y f o r Mr. and Mrs. Means. On December 21, 1978, DNRC f i l e d its own complaint s e e k i n g approximately $532,000 f o r damages t o s t a t e l a n d and c o s t s f o r e x t i n g u i s h i n g t h e f i r e . On March 30, 1979, t h e Means c a s e and t h e DNRC c a s e w e r e c o n s o l i d a t e d by s t i p u l a t i o n . S u b s e q u e n t l y , o t h e r p a r t i e s who had s u f f e r e d l o s s e s caused by t h e f i r e f i l e d a d d i t i o n a l c o m p l a i n t s a g a i n s t t h e Montana Power Company. A l t o g e t h e r t h e r e were t h i r t y - o n e c a s e s f i l e d i n t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Missoula County, e x c e p t f o r one which Williams f i l e d i n t h e F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t Court f o r Montana. There were approximately t e n a t t o r n e y s o r f i r m s who u l t i m a t e l y became involved i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n f o r t h e v a r i o u s p l a i n t i f f s . The Montana Power Company, by motion on May 23, 1979, sought c o n s o l i d a t i o n of a l l c a s e s pending i n D i s t r i c t Court. S h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s , on J u l y 27, 1979, Williams f i l e d a motion seeking an appointment of l e a d c o u n s e l . The motion f o r c o n s o l i d a t i o n f o r t h e purpose of d e t e r m i n i n g l i a b i l i t y was g r a n t e d on August 8, 1979. The o r d e r provided, however, t h a t t h e damage a s p e c t of t h e a c t i o n s be b i f u r c a t e d w i t h s e p a r a t e t r i a l s being e n v i s i o n e d , i f n e c e s s a r y , i n t h i s r e g a r d . On October 30, 1979, Williams f i l e d a s t i p u l a t i o n whereby counsel f o r a l l p a r t i e s , e x c e p t DNRC, agreed t o h i s being l e a d counsel and t o h i s compensation t h e r e f o r . A s a r e s u l t of t h e s t i p u l a t i o n , Williams r e p r e s e n t e d t h i r t y of t h i r t y - o n e p a r t i e s f o r c l a i m s t o t a l i n g $2,242,875.75. On November 1, 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , w i t h o u t a h e a r i n g , o r d e r e d t h e appointment of Williams a s l e a d counsel i n a l l c o n s o l i d a t e d c a s e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e a c t i o n f i l e d by DNRC. The o r d e r a l s o provided t h a t t h e Williams Law Firm be r e a s o n a b l y compensated f o r s e r v i c e s h e r e t o f o r e o r h e r e a f t e r rendered. The amount of compensation was t o be determined by agreement of t h e p a r t i e s o r by t h e c o u r t a f t e r t e r m i n a t i o n of l e a d c o u n s e l ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The m a t t e r proceeded toward t h e scheduled t r i a l d a t e of December 3 , 1979, w i t h d i s c o v e r y proceeding and numerous p r e l i m i n a r y motions w i t h Williams a s l e a d counsel. P r i o r t o t r i a l s e t t l e m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s began with DNRC and v a r i o u s home owners s e t t l i n g t h e i r c l a i m s f o r $1,215,000 of which $425,000 was f o r DNRC. A group r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e raw landowners f a i l e d t o reach a s e t t l e m e n t and p r e p a r a t i o n on t h e i r b e h a l f continued f o r t h e scheduled t r i a l d a t e . On December 3 , 1979, t h e p r e s i d i n g judge withdrew from t h e c a s e , and t h e t r i a l d a t e was v a c a t e d . A new judge and t r i a l d a t e were s u b s e q u e n t l y set, and t h e raw landowners proceeded t o t r i a l . On December 28, 1979, Williams, a s l e a d c o u n s e l , a f t e r f a i l i n g t o reach an agreement w i t h DNRC, moved f o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of compensation. Af t e r a s e r i e s of h e a r i n g s t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d an o r d e r on March 1 4 , 1980, g r a n t i n g t h e Williams Law Firm $47,222.22 t o be p a i d by DNRC . DNRC a p p e a l s both t h e o r d e r of November 1, 1979, a p p o i n t i n g l e a d counsel and t h e o r d e r of March 1 4 , 1980, d e t e r m i n i n g compensation. The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s have been p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s Court f o r review: 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n f a i l i n g t o hold an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g p r i o r t o e n t e r i n g its f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and o r d e r a p p o i n t i n g l e a d counsel? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n a p p o i n t i n g a l e a d counsel? 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n o r d e r i n g DNRC t o pay compensation t o l e a d counsel? 4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n awarding compensation i n t h e amount of $47,222.22? A s t o t h e f i r s t i s s u e on a p p e a l , DNRC would have t h i s Court remand t h i s a c t i o n t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court due t o its f a i l u r e t o hold an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g p r i o r t o e n t e r i n g t h e November 1, 1979, o r d e r a p p o i n t i n g l e a d counsel. The b a s i s of t h i s c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t s i n c e t h e r e is no r e c o r d t o review, t h i s Court is unable t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e r e is s u f f i - c i e n t evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s made. W e must d i s - a g r e e . The o r d e r of November 1, 1979, was e n t e r e d i n re- sponse t o a motion under Rule 4 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P. ( c o n s o l i d a - t i o n ) . Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , p r o v i d e s t h a t , " [ f l i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law a r e un- n e c e s s a r y on d e c i s i o n s of motions under Rules 12 o r 56 o r any o t h e r motion . . ." F i n d i n g s of f a c t being unnecessary f o r a r u l i n g on s a i d motions, t h e D i s t r i c t Court is under no o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o v i d e an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . The D i s t r i c t Court i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , however, though under no o b l i g a t i o n t o do s o , chose t o make f i n d i n g s of f a c t upon which it based its c o n c l u s i o n s of law and o r d e r . T h i s Court now being p r e s e n t e d w i t h t h e o r d e r f o r examination, it is incumbent upon t h i s Court t o review t h e f i n d i n g s a s w e l l a s t h e a p p l i c a b l e law. See Timmerman v. G a b r i e l ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528; s e c t i o n 3-2-204(5), MCA; Upper Missouri G & T E l e c t r i c C o o p e r a t i v e , I n c . v. McCone E l e c t r i c C o o p e r a t i v e , I n c . ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 157 Mont. 239, 484 P.2d 741. I t is n o t n e c e s s a r y , however, t h a t t h i s a c t i o n be remanded f o r an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g . Here, t h e f i n d i n g s i n d i s p u t e a r e : (1) t h a t t h e s i z e and complexity of t h e c a s e demands t h e appointment of a l e a d c o u n s e l ; and ( 2 ) t h a t almost a l l of t h e d i s c o v e r y and t r i a l p r e p a r a t i o n has been done by Williams w i t h t h e implied con- s e n t of DNRC. An examination of t h e submitted D i s t r i c t Court f i l e ( a s t o t h e complexity of t h e c a s e ) and a review of t h e h e a r i n g s h e l d i n r e g a r d t o t h e o r d e r s e t t i n g compen- s a t i o n ( a s t o t h e work done by Williams w i t h t h e implied c o n s e n t of DNRC) p r o v i d e s a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r review. The second i s s u e on appeal i n v o l v e s a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether o r n o t t h i s a c t i o n was an a p p r o p r i a t e one f o r a l e a d counsel t o be appointed. A s t h e c a s e s c i t e d by both DNRC and Williams i n d i - c a t e , t h e appointment of l e a d counsel is made i n conjunc- t i o n w i t h a motion and o r d e r f o r c o n s o l i d a t i o n and h a s been p r i m a r i l y used i n f e d e r a l c o u r t proceedings i n v o l v i n g m u l t i - p a r t y l i t i g a t i o n . See I n Re Air Crash D i s a s t e r a t F l o r i d a Everglades ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 549 F.2d 1006; Vincent v. Hughes Air West, I n c . ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 557 F.2d 759. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h i r t y - o n e s e p a r a t e p l a i n t i f f s a l l brought s u i t a g a i n s t t h e Montana Power Company claiming damages occasioned by a s i n g l e d i s a s t e r . The t h i r t y - o n e p l a i n t i f f s were r e p r e s e n t e d by t e n d i f f e r e n t a t t o r n e y s . C l e a r l y , t h i s c a s e does n o t appear a s complex a s t h a t s e e n i n Vincent ( s i x t y s e p a r a t e a c t i o n s brought i n s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n Washington, Utah and C a l i f o r n i a ) o r i n F l o r i d a Everglades (150 c l a i m s i n both f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o u r t s ) . However, it cannot be s a i d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t , i n e x e r c i s i n g its managerial power over t h i s proceeding, c l e a r l y abused its d i s c r e t i o n a s a m a t t e r of law i n pro- v i d i n g f o r t h e appointment of a l e a d c o u n s e l . The purpose of c o n s o l i d a t i o n and appointment of l e a d counsel is t o p e r m i t t r i a l convenience and economy i n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b y a v o i d i n g u n n e c e s s a r y c o s t s o r d e l a y . MacAlister v. Guterma (2nd C i r . 1 9 5 8 ) , 263 F.2d 65. Absent a l e a d counsel t h e r e was no g u a r a n t e e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c o u r t t h a t a l l t h e p a r t i e s t o t h i s proceeding would n o t become a c t i v e l y involved i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n . Consequently, had t h e D i s t r i c t Court f a i l e d t o f o r m a l l y o r d e r appointment of l e a d c o u n s e l , it could have been faced w i t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t e n d i f f e r e n t a t t o r n e y s pursuing t e n d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s of a t t a c k . I t is obvious t h a t such an arrangement would f o s t e r undue d e l a y , c o s t and inconvenience. Furthermore, and most i m p o r t a n t l y , i n l i g h t of DNRC's p a s t conduct, t h i s Court s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n s t h e p r o p r i e t y of allowing DNRC t o avoid t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e l e a d counsel o r d e r . A f t e r t h e o r d e r was e n t e r e d a t no t i m e d i d DNRC move f o r a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , nor d i d it seek an a p p e a l o r w r i t t o have t h e o r d e r reviewed by t h i s Court p r i o r t o t h e scheduled t r i a l d a t e . Moreover, d u r i n g t h e i n i t i a l s e t t l e m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s , DNRC f a i l e d t o a c c e p t a p r o p o s a l made by t h e Montana Power Company t o s e g r e g a t e t h e c l a i m s of DNRC, which would have allowed t h e Department t o proceed on its own and t o avoid f u r t h e r a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e l e a d c o u n s e l o r d e r . Even p r i o r t o t h e l e a d counsel o r d e r , d u r i n g e x t e n s i v e d i s c o v e r y engaged i n by t h e p a r t i e s , DNRC allowed Williams t o a c t a s l e a d c o u n s e l , having him t a k e a g r e a t bulk of t h e d e p o s i t i o n needed f o r t r i a l , w h i l e choosing n o t t o a t t e n d and merely paying i t s own p r o r a t a s h a r e of t h e c o s t s . DNRC a l s o allowed Williams t o do t h e m a j o r i t y of t h e work i n p r e p a r i n g i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s . DNRC contends it was bound by t h e l e a d counsel o r d e r and unable t o a p p e a l u n t i l t h e March 1 4 , 1980, o r d e r was e n t e r e d allowing Williams compensation. A f i n a l determina- t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s , a r g u e s DNRC, o n l y occurred when t h e c o u r t ordered it t o pay compensation and t h e m a t t e r was deemed concluded. DNRC b a s e s t h i s argument on language i n t h e l e a d counsel o r d e r t h a t t h e c o u r t was t o r e t a i n c o n t i n - uing j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e m a t t e r t o review t h e a c t s of l e a d counsel t o e n f o r c e and i n t e r p r e t t h e c o u r t a s e n t e r e d . " W e d i s a g r e e w i t h D N R C 1 s p o s i t i o n i n f a i l i n g t o s e e why t h e language noted should make t h e o r d e r a p p o i n t i n g l e a d counsel any l e s s f i n a l t h a n t h e March 1 4 , 1980, o r d e r s e t t i n g compensation. The November 1, 1979, o r d e r s p e c i - f i c a l l y appointed Williams l e a d c o u n s e l , s u b j e c t t o reason- a b l e compensation. The o n l y reason t h e c o u r t was r e t a i n i n g a " c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e m a t t e r " was t o a s s u r e t h a t Williams a c t e d i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e p l a i n t i f f s and t o s e t t h e a l r e a d y o r d e r e d r e a s o n a b l e compensation. I f DNRC d i s p u t e d t h i s appointment and t h e terms t h e r e u n d e r , it should ha.ve made its f e e l i n g s known. I t is a p p a r e n t t h a t DNRC was more t h a n w i l l i n g t o a l - low Williams t o a c t a s l e a d c o u n s e l ; t o a c c e p t h i s appoint- ment a s such; and t o a c c e p t t h e b e n e f i t s of t h e $425,000 s e t t l e m e n t acquired under t h e o r d e r . DNRC having alrea-dy consented t o an a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e l e a d counsel o r d e r , it should n o t be allowed t o avoid t h e same on appeal t o t h i s Court. A s t o t h e o r d e r d e t e r m i n i n g compensation f o r Williams a s l e a d c o u n s e l , DNRC f i r s t a r g u e s t h a t due t o t h e absence of any c o n t r a c t u a l agreement between t h e p a r t i e s o r any s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y , a t t o r n e y f e e s a r e n o t r e c o v e r a b l e . See Winder v. J o n a l Corp. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 247, 545 P.2d 1094. Williams acknowledges t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e b u t contends t h a t i n s i t u a t i o n s where a t t o r n e y f e e s a r e p a i d from a "common fund," it is accepted t h a t t h e s e f e e s can be awarded even i n absence of s t a t u t e o r an e x p r e s s agreement. The "common fund1' concept p r o v i d e s t h a t when a p a r t y through a c t i v e l i t i g a t i o n c r e a t e s , r e s e r v e s o r i n c r e a s e s a fund, o t h e r s s h a r i n g i n t h e fund must bear a p o r t i o n of t h e l i t i g a t i o n c o s t s i n c l u d i n g r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s . The d o c t r i n e is employed t o spread t h e c o s t of l i t i g a t i o n among a l l b e n e f i c i a r i e s s o t h a t t h e a c t i v e b e n e f i c i a r y is n o t f o r c e d t o bear t h e burden a l o n e and t h e " s t r a n g e r " ( i . e . , p a s s i v e ) b e n e f i c i a r i e s do n o t r e c e i v e t h e i r b e n e f i t s a t no c o s t t o themselves. S e e V i n c e n t , s u p r a , 557 F.2d a t 769. The d o c t r i n e is w e l l recognized and h a s been quoted i n s e v e r a l Montana c a s e s . See I n Re B a x t e r ' s E s t a t e ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 94 Mont. 257, 22 P.2d 182; Hardware Mutual C a s u a l t y Co. v. B u t l e r ( 1 9 4 4 ) , 116 Mont. 73, 148 P.2d 563; T u t t l e v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., I n c . ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 166, 580 P.2d 1379. See a l s o C i t y of Klawock v. Gustafson ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 585 F.2d 428. The b a s i s of t h e d o c t r i n e being r o o t e d i n t h e e q u i t a b l e c o n c e p t s of q u a s i - c o n t r a c t , r e s t i t u t i o n and r e c a p t u r e of u n j u s t enrichment, t h e common fund t h e o r y of awarding compensation t o a l e a d c o u n s e l must be allowed a s an expansion of t h e g e n e r a l r u l e provided i n Winder. DNRC argues t h a t even i f t h e common fund concept is recognized i n Montana it should n o t be a p p l i e d i n t h i s i n s t a n c e . DNRC b a s e s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n on an a c t i v e l i t i g a n t v e r s u s p a s s i v e l i t i g a n t d i s t i n c t i o n . I t is s t a t e d t h a t o n l y i n a c t i v e o r p a s s i v e b e n e f i - c i a r i e s should be f o r c e d t o bear t h e c o s t s of l i t i g a t i o n under t h e common fund d o c t r i n e . An i n a c t i v e member i n t h i s r e g a r d h a s been d e f i n e d a s a b e n e f i c i a r y who merely f a i l s t o r e t a i n c o u n s e l o r one who r e t a i n s l e g a l counsel b u t s a i d c o u n s e l f a i l s , i n any d e g r e e , t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n any l a b o r s l e a d i n g t o t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e fund. See I n Re E s t a t e of Korthe ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 88 Cal.Rptr. 465, 9 Cal.App.3d 572; s e e a l s o plumbing f i x t u r e a n t i - t r u s t c a s e s : P h i l a d e l p h i a Housing A u t h o r i t y v. American Radiator and S t a n d a r d S a n i t a r y Corp. (E.D. Pa. 1 9 7 1 ) , 322 F.Supp. 834, modified sub nom., Ace Heating and Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co. ( 3 r d C i r . 1 9 7 1 ) , 453 F.2d 30; P h i l a d e l p h i a Housing A u t h o r i t y v. American R a d i a t o r and Standard S a n i t a r y Corp. ( E . D . Pa. 1 9 7 0 ) , 323 F.Supp. 364; Note, Reimbursement f o r A t t o r n e y s ' F e e s from B e n e f i c i - a r i e s of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e L i t i g a t i o n , 58 Minn. L. R. a t 947- 948 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e c o u r t s have recognized an e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e . See V i n c e n t , 557 F.2d a t 772. The e x c e p t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t s o long a s c o n t r i b u t i o n s of a c t i v e counsel were unequal ( e l g r e a t e r ) when compared w i t h t h o s e of a l e s s a c t i v e c o u n s e l , compensation can still be o r d e r e d p a i d under t h e common fund d o c t r i n e by t h e l e s s a c t i v e p a r t y . See a l s o Doherty v. B r e s s ( D . C . C i r . 1 9 5 8 ) , 262 F.2d 20, c e r t . denied 359 U.S. 934, 79 S.Ct. 649, 3 L.Ed.2d 636. The purpose of t h i s e x c e p t i o n is s i m i l a r t o t h a t of t h e common fund d o c t r i n e i t s e l f - - t o avoid u n j u s t enrichment. Here t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t DNRC accrued 1,680 hours i n l e g a l s e r v i c e s . T h i s t o t a l included t h e s e r v i c e s of D N R C ' s l e g a l s t a f f , l e g a l i n t e r n s and n o n l e g a l p e r s o n n e l . Williams Law F i r m ' s time r e c o r d s r e f l e c t e d 3,909.25 h o u r s on t h e c a s e t o t h e t i m e of s e t t l e m e n t . T h i s t o t a l a l s o i n c l u d e d work by a t t o r n e y s , i n t e r n s and s e c r e t a r i e s . Williams a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s time r e c o r d s u n d e r s t a t e d t h e a c t u a l time s p e n t on t h e c a s e by 10 t o 20 p e r c e n t . The d i s p a r i t y i n e f f o r t s between l e a d c o u n s e l and DNRC being evident, the District Court was proper in ordering compensa- tion. DNRC's final arguments concerning its efforts to avoid paying lead counsel are twofold. First, DNRC main- tains that as a state agency, it should be treated dif- ferently with respect to an obligation to compensate lead counsel in that it can only retain counsel by an exclusive procedure set forth in Executive Order No. 15-78. Second, DNRC contends that DR2-107, "Division of Fees Among Law- yers," of the Canons of Professional Ethics, will be violated should this Court grant Williams the ordered compensation. In rejecting DNRC's contention that it should be treated different from other beneficiaries to a common fund, we need only note that payment for litigation costs by the various beneficiaries is founded upon principles of equity. In enforcing this doctrine, equity demands that all parties receiving a benefit from the common fund be included in its application. Furthermore, there is no basis for applying DR2-107 of the Canons of Professional Ethics as submitted by DNRC. This rule is concerned solely with the question of two lawyers dividing fees. It has no application to a situa- tion where there is a court-appointed lead counsel to whom others may be required to pay compensation, all under the strict supervision and authority of the court. In regard to the final issue on appeal, in deter- mining a reasonable fee in a given case, this Court has established the following guidelines: ". . . The circumstances to be considered in determining compensation to be recovered are t h e amount and t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d , t h e l a b o r , t i m e and t r o u b l e involved, t h e c h a r a c t e r and importance of t h e l i t i g a t i o n i n which s e r v i c e s a r e rendered, t h e amount of money o r t h e v a l u e of p r o p e r t y t o be a f f e c t e d , t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l s k i l l and e x p e r i e n c e c a l l e d f o r , t h e c h a r a c t e r and s t a n d i n g i n t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n of t h e a t t o r n e y s . . . The r e s u l t secured by t h e s e r v i c e s of t h e a t t o r n e y s may be c o n s i d e r e d a s a n i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i r v a l u e . " F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank v . T h o l k e s ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 422, 429-430, 547 P.2d 1328, 1332; a c c o r d , Carkeek v. Ayer ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 613 P.2d 1013, 1015, 37 St.Rep. 1274, 1275-1276. The f e e awarded i n t h i s i n s t a n c e was 11.1 p e r c e n t of D N R C ' s recovery under t h e l e a d c o u n s e l o r d e r . T h i s amount was g r a n t e d o n l y a f t e r e x t e n s i v e t e s t i m o n y r e l a t i n g t o t h e above f a c t o r s . I t is t r u e t h a t t h i s award exceeds t h e com- p e n s a t i o n paid by t h e o t h e r p l a i n t i f f s r e p r e s e n t e d by l e a d counsel; b u t , it should be noted t h a t t h e s e o t h e r p a r t i e s agreed t o a s e t amount w i t h o u t having t o invoke t h e a i d of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . W e can f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a p p o i n t i n g W i l l i a m s a s l e a d c o u n s e l and g r a n t i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n i s af f irmed. W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e I &. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d i s s e n t s and w i l l f i l e a w r i t t e n d i s s e n t later.