Title: Stockbridge School District v.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-1867 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
Stockbridge School District, 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Department of Public Instruction 
School District Boundary Appeal Board, 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 JUN 25, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                
   
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.    The petitioner, Stockbridge School 
District (Stockbridge), seeks review of a published decision of 
the court of appeals.1  That decision affirmed an order of the 
circuit court for Manitowoc County, Fred H. Hazlewood, Judge, 
which affirmed decisions of the respondent, Department of Public 
Instruction School District Boundary Appeal Board ("the Board").  
Stockbridge argues that the Board exceeded its authority under 
                     
     1  Stockbridge Sch. Dist. v. Department of Public Instruction 
Dist. Boundary Appeal Bd., 192 Wis. 2d 622, 531 N.W.2d 624 (Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
2 
Wis. Stat. § 117.12(1) (1993-94)2 when it ordered that parcels of 
property could be detached from Stockbridge and attached to 
adjoining school districts even though the parcels did not border 
those adjoining districts.  Because we conclude that § 117.12(1) 
allows for the detachment of such "island" parcels, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  Residents of the 
Stockbridge School District filed petitions to detach their 
property from the district pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 117.12.3  
                     
     2  All future statutory references are to the 1993-94 volume 
unless otherwise indicated. 
     3  Wisconsin Stat. § 117.12 states in relevant part: 
 
Detachment and attachment of small territory initiated by 
owner.  (1) Application.  This section applies to the 
detachment of territory from one school district and its 
attachment to an adjoining school district if all of the 
following apply: 
 
 
(a) The assessed value of the territory proposed to be 
detached from one school district and attached to an 
adjoining school district, divided by the assessment 
ratio of the taxation district, is less than 7% of the 
equalized valuation of the school district from which it 
is proposed to be detached. 
 
 
(b) Less than 7% of the enrollment of the school 
district from which the territory is proposed to be 
detached resides in the territory proposed to be 
detached from that school district. 
 
 
(2)  Petition.  A majority of the electors residing in 
the territory described under sub. (1) or owners of 50% 
or more of that territory may file a written petition 
with the clerk of the school district in which the 
territory is located requesting the detachment of the 
territory from that school district and its attachment 
to an adjoining school district. 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
3 
Twenty-one of the petitions sought attachment to the Chilton 
School District and the remaining petition sought attachment to 
the Hilbert School District.  Both the Chilton and Hilbert school 
districts border Stockbridge. 
 
The Chilton and Hilbert school boards approved the petitions, 
but 
Stockbridge 
denied 
them. 
 
The 
petitioners 
sought 
administrative appeal with the Board pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 117.12(4), (5).  After conducting a hearing on the petitions, 
the Board established certain criteria to determine which 
petitioners would be permitted to detach their property from 
Stockbridge.4  Based on these criteria, the Board granted portions 
of 15 of the petitions.  In all, the Board ordered 46 parcels to 
be detached from Stockbridge; 44 to be attached to Chilton and two 
to Hilbert.  Forty-one of these parcels are "island" parcels, 
meaning that they do not share a common boundary with the school 
district of attachment. 
 
Stockbridge appealed the Board's orders to the Manitowoc 
County circuit court.5  It argued that the Board lacked 
                     
     4  The Board determined that petitioners were qualified to 
detach if they: (1) were property owners; (2) signed a petition 
for detachment; (3) signed the appeal petition to the Board; and 
(4) had school age children living on the property.  The Board 
subsequently held another hearing for the purpose of reviewing the 
administrative procedures utilized by the Department of Public 
Instruction in applying these standards. 
     5  Each of the Board's orders were separately appealed. 
Stockbridge initially appealed the one order relating to the 
Hilbert island parcels to the Calumet County circuit court.  
However, this order was subsequently moved to Manitowoc County by 
order for change of venue.  All of the orders were subsequently 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
4 
jurisdiction to order the detachment in part because: (1) the 
parcels to be detached had no common boundary with the proposed 
school district of attachment, contrary to § 117.12(1); and (2) 
one of the Board's orders was void because it included territory 
that was also included in a prior and pending appeal, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 117.05(4)(b)1.6  Stockbridge also argued that the 
Board's actions were arbitrary and capricious.  The circuit court 
affirmed the Board's orders.  Stockbridge appealed, relying solely 
on its jurisdictional arguments.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court's order.  
 
The only issues courts may consider on appeals from school 
reorganizations 
are 
whether 
the 
Board 
acted 
within 
its 
jurisdiction and whether its order was arbitrary and capricious.  
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. State Appeal Bd., 83 Wis. 2d 711, 720, 
266 N.W.2d 374 (1978); Larson v. State Appeal Bd., 56 Wis. 2d 823, 
825, 202 N.W.2d 920 (1973).  Because Stockbridge has abandoned its 
argument that the Board's actions were arbitrary and capricious, 
we limit our discussion to the jurisdictional arguments as 
presented by Stockbridge. 
 
I. 
(..continued) 
consolidated into one case. 
     6  Wisconsin Stat. § 117.05(4)(b)1 provides that "[a]ny other 
reorganization proceeding commenced or order made that includes 
any territory included in the pending reorganization proceeding is 
void." 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
5 
 
We first address Stockbridge's argument that the Board can 
only exercise its jurisdiction to detach parcels from one district 
and attach them to another district under § 117.12, if the parcels 
to be detached border the school district of attachment.  This 
requires us to interpret the language of § 117.12.  The 
interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that this 
court reviews de novo.  Town of Clearfield v. Cushman, 150 Wis. 2d 
10, 19, 440 N.W.2d 777 (1989).  Our sole purpose when interpreting 
a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature.  
Marshall-Wis. v. Juneau Square Corp., 139 Wis. 2d 112, 133, 406 
N.W.2d 764 (1987).  The proper method for doing so is well-
established and was recently summarized by this court as follows: 
 This court's first resort is to the plain language of the 
statute itself.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, 
we are prohibited from looking beyond the language to 
ascertain its meaning. . . .  If and only if the 
language 
of 
the 
statute 
does 
not 
clearly 
or 
unambiguously set forth the legislative intent, however, 
will this court construe the statute so as to ascertain 
and carry out the legislative intent.  In such case, we 
examine the history, context, subject matter, scope and 
object of the statute. 
Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., No 94-1523-FT, op. at 7 (S. Ct. May 
23, 1996) (citations omitted). 
 
The statutory language at issue states that § 117.12 "applies 
to the detachment of territory from one school district and its 
attachment to an adjoining school district . . . ."  § 117.12(1). 
 Both Stockbridge and the Board contend that this language is 
clear on its face and, therefore, it is not necessary to engage in 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
6 
statutory construction to determine its meaning.7  However, 
Stockbridge and the Board reach opposite results when interpreting 
the statute based on this plain meaning approach.   
 
 Stockbridge focusses on the word "attachment" to interpret 
the statute.  It argues that because the plain meaning of 
attachment embodies the concept of physical connection, the 
statute mandates that territory to be detached from one school 
district must share a common boundary with the school district to 
which it is to be attached.8  In contrast, the Board focusses on 
the word "adjoining" in its interpretation.  It asserts that 
because the term "adjoining" modifies "school districts," not 
territory, the plain language of § 117.12(1) only requires that 
the two districts involved in the detachment and attachment of 
parcels share a common boundary.   
                     
     7  See Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis. 2d 737, 749 n.5, 
470 N.W.2d 625 (1991) (using the term "construction" to signify 
the second step in our process of ascertaining legislative intent 
where our "interpretation" has shown that the plain language of 
the statute is unclear or ambiguous).   
     8  Stockbridge also relies on Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. 
Sosalla, 3 Wis. 2d 410, 80 N.W.2d 359 (1958).  In Sosalla, this 
court interpreted Wis. Stat. § 40.075 (1955-56), which stated that 
"[t]erritory not in but adjoining a district . . . may be annexed 
thereto upon a petition . . . ."  Relying on that language this 
court disallowed certain annexations because the territory was 
separated by intervening areas from the school district of 
attachment.  Sosalla, 3 Wis. 2d at 415-16.  Stockbridge argues 
that despite this substantially different language and the fact 
that the case did not analyze the word attachment, Sosalla 
supports its plain meaning argument that a common boundary is 
required.  We are unpersuaded that Sosalla has any precedential 
value to this case. 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
7 
 
The lower courts also disagreed on the proper interpretation 
of the statute.  The circuit court interpreted the language using 
a plain meaning approach, but relied on a dictionary definition of 
attachment as referring to "attachment for an administrative or 
political purpose," not actual physical connection.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the key to understanding § 117.12(1) is the 
word "adjoining" and not "attachment."  According to the court of 
appeals, "[t]he real question posed by the statute as applied here 
is 'what must adjoin—the parcel and the attaching district or 
merely the two districts themselves?'"  Stockbridge, 192 Wis. 2d 
at 626. 
 
Ambiguity arises where the language may be reasonably 
construed in two different ways.  State ex rel. Girouard v. 
Circuit Court, 155 Wis. 2d 148, 155, 454 N.W.2d 792 (1990).  
Although 
the 
mere 
fact 
that 
parties 
interpret 
a 
statute 
differently does not create ambiguity, this court has recognized 
that different yet equally reasonable interpretations by various 
decision-making bodies is indicative that a statute may support 
more than one reasonable interpretation.  Harnischfeger Corp. v. 
LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 662, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995). 
    We are persuaded by the court of appeals' approach that the 
key to understanding the statute lies in the term "adjoining" 
rather than "attachment."  Contrary to Stockbridge's plain meaning 
argument, the word "attachment" does not mandate an actual 
physical 
connection. 
 
As 
the 
circuit 
court 
recognized, 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
8 
"attachment" 
may 
reasonably 
indicate 
a 
connection 
for 
an 
administrative or political purpose, or an emotional bond by 
affection, sympathy, or loyalty.  Further, Stockbridge's argument 
focusses only on the word attachment to the exclusion of the 
remaining language in the sentence.  There is additional ambiguity 
when the sentence is considered in its entirety.  We  agree with 
the court of appeals that upon considering the word "adjoining," 
the statute is ambiguous because it may be reasonably interpreted 
in two different ways.  The court of appeals aptly described the 
ambiguity as follows: 
If we consider the phrase "its attachment to an adjoining 
school district," the antecedent of the possessive 
pronoun "its" appears to be "territory."  From this, a 
reasonable reader could infer that the territory must 
adjoin the attaching school district.  However, if we 
consider the obvious parallelism of the phrases "from 
one 
school 
district . . . to 
an 
adjoining 
school 
district," then a reasonable reader could understand the 
statute to require that only the school districts 
themselves need adjoin.   
Stockbridge Sch. Dist. v. Department of Public Instruction Dist. 
Boundary Appeal Bd., 192 Wis. 2d 622, 626-27, 531 N.W.2d 624 (Ct. 
App. 1995) (citations omitted). 
 
Because we conclude that the statute is ambiguous, we next 
turn to extrinsic matters such as the statute's history, context, 
and object in order to ascertain the legislature's intent.  
Jungbluth, op. at 7.  Upon considering the parties' arguments 
regarding these statutory construction aids, we conclude, as did 
the court of appeals, that the legislative history of § 117.12  
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
9 
compels the conclusion that the statute does not require that the 
detaching parcel border the school district of attachment.  
 
The court of appeals engaged in a comprehensive legislative 
history analysis of § 117.12 and its predecessors, which we 
briefly summarize here.  The first statute that specifically 
addressed the detachment of small parcels, Wis. Stat. § 40.032 
(1961-62), provided that property may be detached from one school 
district and attached to an adjoining school district "[i]f the 
owner of an individual parcel of property adjoining the boundary 
line between 2 school districts submits a written petition."  As 
recognized by the court of appeals, this language explicitly 
provided that the parcel to be detached must have a common 
boundary with the school district of attachment. 
 
However, in 1981, this language was amended as follows: 
The owner of an individual parcel of property may file a 
written petition with the school boards of 2 adjoining 
school districts requesting that the parcel be detached 
from its present school district and attached to the 
adjoining school district.  
See Wis. Stat. § 117.08 (1981-82), created by Laws of 1981, ch. 
177, § 6.  According to an analysis by the Legislative Reference 
Bureau, the new language substantially changed the statute to 
allow any property owner to petition for detachment of his or her 
parcel, regardless of its location within the district: 
[C]urrent law provides that the owner of an individual parcel 
of property which adjoins the boundaries of 2 school 
districts may file a written petition with the school 
boards requesting the parcel be detached from its 
present school district and attached to the other school 
district.  This bill provides that the owner of any 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
10 
individual parcel of property may file such a petition 
with the school boards of 2 adjoining school districts. 
Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1981 Senate Bill 392 
(emphasis added).  This change was reiterated in a fiscal estimate 
attached to the same bill.  See Fiscal Estimate of 1981 Senate 
Bill 392. 
 
After this apparent change in the law, the statute was 
changed in 1983 and again in 1989 into its present ambiguous form. 
 See 1983 Wis. Act 27, § 1465; 1989 Wis. Act 114.  Because the 
court of appeals found nothing to indicate that the legislature 
intended to modify its explicit position taken in 1981, it 
concluded that § 117.12(1) requires only that the school districts 
adjoin, not that the detaching parcel adjoin the school district 
of attachment.9  Stockbridge, 192 Wis. 2d at 629-30. 
 
This court has previously held that the analysis by the 
Legislative 
Reference Bureau 
is 
significant 
in 
determining 
legislative intent.  Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 184, 
532 N.W.2d 690 (1995).  Although the language of § 117.08 has 
                     
     9  Stockbridge contends that this legislative history 
analysis is flawed because Wis. Stat. § 117.08 (1981-82) is not a 
predecessor of § 117.12(1).  Stockbridge asserts that there is no 
direct link between § 117.08 (1981-82) and § 117.12(1), because 
§ 117.08 (1981-82) was not "repealed and renumbered" as § 117.12, 
as stated by the court of appeals.  Rather, § 117.12 was newly 
created by the legislature.   See 1989 Wis. Act 114, § 12 
(repealing and recreating § 117.08) and § 1 (creating § 117.12).  
We reject this argument as elevating form over substance.   
Although there may be a technical break in the link between the 
1981-82 and 1989-90 versions, they represent the only statutes 
governing the detachment and attachment of small territory. 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
11 
subsequently been revised and is ambiguous as it now appears in 
§ 117.12(1), we have found no similar statement in the subsequent 
history to indicate that the legislature intended to modify the 
change made in 1981.  Further, counsel for Stockbridge conceded at 
oral argument that there is no legislative history to support its 
construction of the statute.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
legislative history analysis set forth by the court of appeals is 
compelling and indicates that the legislature intended to allow 
the detachment of island parcels.10   
 
In addition to legislative history, the parties offer various 
arguments generally pertaining to the context, scope, and subject 
matter of the statute.  However, we find none of these to be as 
persuasive as the legislative history in terms of providing an 
indication of the legislature's intent.   
 
For example, both the court of appeals and the Board point to 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 117.15(5) as providing significant 
guidance on the question of whether § 117.12 prohibits island 
detachments.  Section 117.15(5) requires that when deciding 
petitions a school board must consider "whether the proposed 
                     
     10  Stockbridge also argues that even assuming that the 
legislative history supports the conclusion that only the two 
school districts involved in the detachment proceeding adjoin each 
other, it still must be determined whether the word attachment 
requires a common boundary.  Stockbridge contends that our 
interpretation 
leaves 
the 
word 
attachment 
as 
meaningless 
surplusage.  We consider this argument to be merely a different 
variation of Stockbridge's argument, which we have previously 
rejected, that the plain meaning of the word attachment requires a 
physical connection with the district of attachment.    
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
12 
reorganization will make any part of a school district's territory 
noncontiguous."  The Board argues that because it is required to 
consider whether a district will be noncontiguous as a result of a 
reorganization, § 117.15(5) expressly contemplates that islands 
could be detached.  Stockbridge contends that § 117.15(5) requires 
that the Board consider only whether a proposed detachment will 
make an island, not whether the proposed detachment is an island. 
 We are unpersuaded by either party's arguments that § 117.15(5) 
provides sufficient evidence of the legislature's intent.11 
 
Finally, Stockbridge contends that allowing the detachment of 
islands is bad public policy and would frustrate the overriding 
purpose of ch. 117--which it asserts is to promote the educational 
welfare of children.  For example, Stockbridge fears that small 
school districts will be decimated by residents who perceive that 
their children can receive a better education in a neighboring 
school district.  Stockbridge also argues that it would allow 
                     
     11 Stockbridge argues that common sense dictates that by its 
very name, the School District Boundary Appeal Board is intended 
to deal with matters involving district boundaries, not serve as 
arbiter of all territory within a district.  We do not consider 
the name of the Board to be particularly indicative of its 
legislatively granted powers in this instance.  Stockbridge also 
argues that the "piggyback" procedure used by the petitioners to 
establish a border link to the school district of attachment 
circumvents the requirements of the large territory detachment 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 117.11, and that applying the common 
boundary requirement to § 117.12(1) harmonizes the interaction 
between small and large territory reorganization.  This argument 
is rendered irrelevant both by our holding that § 117.12(1) allows 
for island parcels to be detached and that § 117.12(5) expressly 
recognizes that there may be multiple small territory petitions 
for detachment.     
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
13 
property owners to "leap-frog" their property across the state to 
distant school districts through successive detachment provisions. 
 
This court has long held that school district reorganization 
represents the determination of policy questions of a legislative 
nature which the legislature has delegated to the Board.  Larson, 
56 Wis. 2d at 826.  Therefore, courts do not review the policy, 
wisdom or fairness of a particular reorganization decision, except 
to determine whether the Board's decision was arbitrary and 
capricious.  See Zawerschnik v. Joint County Sch. Comm., 271 Wis. 
416, 73 N.W.2d 566 (1955).   
 
Stockbridge's argument that allowing islands to be detached 
will potentially decimate smaller school districts is misleading  
because such a result can occur even under its own interpretation 
of § 117.12(1).  For example, nothing would prohibit a large 
number of individual border properties with a substantial portion 
of a district's equalized value from petitioning for detachment 
and potentially decimating a district.  In fact, this court has on 
numerous occasions in the past upheld detachment orders that have 
allegedly decimated a school district.  See, e.g., Iron River 
Grade Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Bayfield County Sch. Comm., 31 Wis. 2d 
7, 142 N.W.2d 227 (1966) (affirming detachment order which left 
only one-third of the original tax base but 92 percent of the 
student population); State ex rel. Grant Sch. Dist. v. Sch. Bd., 4 
Wis. 2d 499, 91 N.W.2d 219 (1958) (affirming detachment order 
which took 80 percent of the equalized value of the district); 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
14 
Zawerschnik,  271 Wis. 416 (affirming order that detached 77 
percent of tax base). 
 
Such reorganizations, while still possible, are less likely 
today given that the legislature has since provided the Board with 
specific factors set forth in Wis. Stat. § 117.15 which it must 
consider before detaching boundary or "island" parcels.  Under 
§ 117.15, the Board must consider factors such as: (1) the 
geographical characteristics of the affected school districts and 
travel time (Wis. Stat. § 117.15(1)), (2) the educational needs of 
all of the children residing in the affected school districts and 
the ability of each district to meet those needs (Wis. Stat. 
§ 117.15(2)), 
(3) 
any 
adverse 
effect 
on 
curricular 
and 
extracurricular 
programs 
of 
each 
district 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 117.15(2m)), and (4) the fiscal effect of the proposed 
reorganization (Wis. Stat. § 117.15(4)).   
 
Accordingly, Stockbridge's fears of wide-scale decimation of 
school districts and property owners "leap-frogging" across the 
state are largely unfounded.  In fact, this case is illustrative 
of the process intended by the legislature.  Counsel represented 
at oral argument that the property proposed to be detached 
represented 63 percent of the district's equalized value.  The 
Board, applying the factors in § 117.15 and its own criteria, 
approved the detachment of property representing 6.8 percent of 
the district's equalized value. 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
15 
 
If, as Stockbridge submits, the legislature meant something 
other than what the legislative history indicates, the remedy is 
not in the courts.  Modifications of the statute, if it works 
badly or in undesirable ways feared by Stockbridge, must be 
obtained through legislative, not judicial, action.  See State ex 
rel. Badtke v. School Bd., 1 Wis. 2d 208, 213, 83 N.W.2d 724 
(1957).  In the meantime, this court will continue to review the 
legislative decisions made by the Board as it has in the past, 
determining whether the Board acted within its jurisdiction and 
whether its order was arbitrary and capricious.  Larson, 56 Wis. 
2d at 825. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the explicit legislative history of 
the predecessor to § 117.12(1) provides the most persuasive 
evidence of the legislature's intent.  None of Stockbridge's 
arguments related to the context, scope, or public policy served 
by the statute is compelling enough to overcome the legislature's 
stated intention in 1981 to allow any property owner to petition 
for detachment and attachment to an adjoining district. 
 
II.  
 
We next address Stockbridge's second jurisdictional argument, 
that one of the Board's orders is void because it dealt with 
territory included in a prior and pending reorganization petition 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 117.05(4)(b)1.  That statute provides 
that while a reorganization is pending, "any other reorganization 
proceeding commenced or order made that includes any territory 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
16 
included in the pending reorganization proceeding is void."  
Stockbridge contends that territory included in Petition No. 1 
(Circuit Court No. 93-CV-331H) was also included in Petition No. 
16 (Circuit Court No. 93-CV-330H), which was filed prior to 
Petition 
No. 
1. 
 
Therefore, 
Stockbridge 
argues 
that 
all 
proceedings related to Petition No. 1 are void.12   
 
Our review of the record reveals that evidence of the overlap 
complained of by Stockbridge has never been fully developed 
throughout these proceedings.  We note that the evidence in the 
record fails to conclusively establish an overlap between 
Petitions No. 1 and 16.  For example, the petitions on their face 
do not establish an overlap because Petition No. 16 lacks any 
legal description of the property to be detached.  Stockbridge in 
its brief relies only on a map it submitted to the Board as an 
exhibit to indicate the overlap.  However, the map indicates by 
its legend that Petitioned Area 16 is a "Possible Petition 
Overlap."   A spokesperson in favor of detachment testified that 
while there was an overlap, it was due to a clerical error.  
 
Even assuming that the record supports a finding that 
Petitioned Areas 1 and 16 overlap, no such finding has ever been 
made.  Stockbridge asserts that the Board failed to decide this 
issue.  However, this court has previously recognized the 
                     
     12  Petition No. 1 involved four of the 44 parcels which the 
Boundary Appeal Board allowed to detach from Stockbridge and 
attach to Chilton.   
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
17 
"fundamental policy that parties to an administrative proceeding 
must raise known issues and objections and that all efforts should 
be directed toward developing a record that is as complete as 
possible in order to facilitate subsequent judicial review of the 
record."  Omernick v. DNR, 100 Wis. 2d 234, 248, 301 N.W.2d 437, 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 883 (1981).  Our review of the record 
indicates that Stockbridge failed to do so.  While it is true that 
counsel for Stockbridge in his opening statement to the Board 
identified the issue as one he was going to address, he never 
subsequently addressed it.13   
 
We note that the court of appeals was also troubled by the 
inadequacy of the record in considering this issue, and concluded 
that even if there were error, Stockbridge "invited" it because it 
likewise considered the overlapping petitions when initially 
denying them.  See Stockbridge, 192 Wis. 2d at 632 & n. 10.  In 
essence, Stockbridge now seeks to prevent the Board from doing the 
very thing that it did, that is, make a determination on a 
                     
     13  In addition to the alleged overlap in Petitions No. 1 and 
16, Stockbridge also argued to the board that an overlap existed 
between Petitions No. 12 and 20.  The record does not reveal why 
Stockbridge apparently abandoned the overlap issue as to Petition 
No. 20.  We note that counsel for Stockbridge raised the overlap 
issue again as to both Petition No. 1 and Petition No. 20 at the 
second hearing, but did not develop it.  Rather, counsel merely 
summarily stated that regardless of the reasons, the overlap 
existed, and that the Board lacked jurisdiction over Petitioned 
Areas 1 and 20.  Nevertheless, the substantive decision had 
already been made, and the second hearing was limited to the 
proper procedure for implementing the Board's decision.  See supra 
n. 4. 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
18 
petition which allegedly contains property described in a 
previously filed petition.  Because the overlap issue was neither 
developed adequately by Stockbridge nor decided by the Board, and 
the error complained of was facilitated by Stockbridge's actions, 
we agree with the conclusion of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 94-1867 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-1867 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
Stockbridge School District, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Department of Public Instruction School 
 
 
 
District Boundary Appeal Board, 
 
 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  192 Wis. 2d 622, 531 N.W.2d 624  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
June 25, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 3, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Manitowoc 
 
JUDGE: 
FRED H. HAZLEWOOD 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Robert W. Burns, Thomas E. Griggs, Paul C. Hemmer and 
Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Green Bay and oral argument by Thomas E. 
Griggs and Robert W. Burns. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent the cause was argued by Laura 
Sutherland, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general.