Title: State v. Ryan D.L.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
97-0676: 
In the Interest of Hezzie R., a person Under the 
Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Hezzie R.,  
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
____________________________________________ 
97-0685: 
In the Interest of Luis H., a person Under the 
Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Luis H.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
_____________________________________________ 
97-1109: 
In the Interest of Ryan D.L., a person Under the 
Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Ryan D.L.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
  
 
97-0676 & 97-0685: 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
97-1109: 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 3, 1998 and August 31, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 29, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
97-0676 & 97-0685:  Milwaukee County 
 
 
97-1109:  Clark County 
 
JUDGE: 
97-0676 & 97-0685:  Thomas P. Donegan 
 
 
97-1109:  James W. Rice 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., and Geske, J., join 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
97-0676:  For the petitioner-appellant the cause 
was argued by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief 
by Debra Flynn-Parrino, assistant state public defender and Stacy 
B. Walker, assistant state public defender and oral argument by 
Eileen A. Hirsch. 
 
 
97-0685:  For the petitioner-respondent the cause 
was argued by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief by 
Michael Yovivich, assistant state public defender and Eileen A. 
Hirsch, assistant state public defender and oral argument by 
Eileen A. Hirsch. 
 
 
97-1109: For the petitioner-respondent the cause 
was argued by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief by 
Michael Yovivich, assistant state public defender and Eileen A. 
Hirsch, assistant state public defender and oral argument by 
Eileen A. Hirsch. 
 
 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of Hezzie R., a 
person Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Hezzie R.,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent.  
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
In the Interest of Luis H., a 
person Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Luis H.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant.  
 
 
In the Interest of Ryan D.L., a Person  
Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ryan D.L.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant.  
 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
2 
 
APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee 
County, Thomas P. Donegan, Judge.  Affirmed and remanded as to 
State v. Luis H., No. 97-0685.  Reversed and remanded as to 
State v. Hezzie R., No. 97-0676.  APPEAL from an order of the 
circuit court for Clark County, James W. Rice, Judge.  Affirmed 
as to State v. Ryan D.L., No. 97-1109. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.    These consolidated cases are 
before the court1 for determination of the constitutionality of 
the elimination of the right to trial by jury in juvenile 
delinquency cases under Wis. Stat. § 938.31(2)(1995-96).2  Three 
juveniles contend that the elimination of a jury trial as part 
of a delinquency adjudication violates their state and federal 
constitutional rights.   
¶2 
We conclude that the provisions in the Juvenile 
Justice Code ("JJC"), Wis. Stat. ch. 938, that may subject a 
juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent to placement in an 
                     
1 No. 97-1109 is before the court on certification by the 
court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61, from 
an order of the Circuit Court for Clark County, James W. Rice, 
Judge.  Nos. 97-0685 and 97-0676 arise on bypass of the court of 
appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60, from orders of 
the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Thomas P. Donegan, 
Judge.  
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the 
1995-96 volumes of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.31(2) indicates in pertinent part 
that in delinquency adjudications "[t]he hearing shall be to the 
court."  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.31(2) (1993-94) had previously 
provided that "[t]he hearing shall be to the court unless the 
child, parent, guardian or legal custodian exercises the right 
to a jury trial by demanding a jury trial at any time before or 
during the plea hearing." 
 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
3 
adult 
prison 
are 
criminal 
in 
nature. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
provisions in Wis. Stat. §§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 938.538(3)(a)1m, and 
938.357(4)(d) which subject a juvenile to placement in an adult 
prison violate a juvenile's rights to a trial by jury under 
Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Those 
provisions can and must be severed from the current JJC, 
consistent with precedent from this court and the Wisconsin 
Legislature's express intent to sever statutory provisions when 
necessary.  The remaining non-criminal portions of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 938 are constitutional even absent the right to a trial by 
jury, 
since 
juveniles 
do 
not 
have 
a 
state 
or 
federal 
constitutional right to a trial by jury in the adjudicative 
phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. 
I. 
¶3 
The facts and procedural history in the consolidated 
cases are undisputed.  We address each in turn. 
A.  State v. Ryan D.L. 
¶4 
Ryan D.L. was 14 years old when the State initiated a 
juvenile petition in Clark County charging him with two counts 
of second degree sexual assault, actions contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.225(2)(a). 
During 
the 
course 
of 
the 
delinquency 
adjudication, Ryan filed a request with the circuit court 
assigned to exercise jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. ch. 938 for a 
jury trial.  Based on Wis. Stat. § 938.31(2) and this court's 
decision in N.E. v. Wisconsin DHSS, 122 Wis. 2d 198, 361 N.W.2d 
693 (1985)(determining that juveniles have no constitutional 
right to a jury trial), the circuit court denied the motion and 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
4 
proceeded to find Ryan delinquent on both counts.  The circuit 
court then entered a dispositional order placing Ryan at Lincoln 
Hills. 
¶5 
Ryan appealed the circuit court's denial of his 
request for a jury trial based on state and federal due process 
protections.  We accepted certification from the court of 
appeals. 
B.  State v. Hezzie R. 
¶6 
The State filed a juvenile petition against 14-year-
old Hezzie R., charging him with first degree sexual assault of 
a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1).  Hezzie requested a 
jury trial, alleging that Wis. Stat. § 938.31(2) deprived him of 
due process.  The State objected to his request.  The circuit 
court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. ch. 938 
reviewed the new JJC and determined that "[t]he procedures of 
the juvenile court have become more like criminal court 
proceedings . . . ."   Finding it significant that an 
adjudication of delinquency would make Hezzie subject to 
placement in the JJC's Serious Juvenile Offender Program 
("SJOP"), 
the 
circuit 
court 
determined 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.31(2) was unconstitutional as applied to Hezzie and that 
he was entitled to a jury based on due process considerations.   
¶7 
At the State's request, the court stayed further 
proceedings pending appeal of that determination.  Upon our 
acceptance of the certification in Ryan L., the State asked for 
and received bypass of the court of appeals in Hezzie. 
C.  State v. Luis H. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
5 
¶8 
Luis H. was 13 years old when the State initiated 
delinquency proceedings charging him with first degree sexual 
assault of a child, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1).  
Prior to any adjudication of delinquency, Luis filed an 
objection to the court's failure to provide him with a jury 
trial.  The case was then consolidated with Hezzie R..   
¶9 
The same circuit court that determined that Hezzie's 
due process rights would be violated since he would be subject 
to placement in the SJOP determined that Wis. Stat. § 938.31(2) 
was not unconstitutional on its face and that Luis's due process 
rights would not be violated by the absence of a jury trial.  
The court reached its disparate determinations in Hezzie and 
Luis H. based on its conclusion that while the punitive aspects 
of the SJOP required a jury determination of delinquency in 
Hezzie's case, juveniles like Luis not potentially subject to 
placement in the SJOP were not entitled to a jury.3 
¶10 Luis then pursued a permissive appeal under Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(2), and the circuit court stayed further proceedings 
pending his appeal.  This court accepted the case on bypass and 
consolidated it with the two other matters. 
II. 
¶11 A thorough discussion of the appropriate standard of 
review by this court is essential.  This 
court 
reviews 
challenges to the constitutionality of a statute de novo.  See 
State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 67, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997)(citing 
                     
3  While Luis and Hezzie were charged with violating the 
same crime, Luis's age precluded the circuit court from placing 
him in the SJOP.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.34(4h)(a). 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
6 
State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989)). 
 Statutes are presumed to be constitutional; therefore,  "every 
presumption must be indulged to uphold the law if at all 
possible."  Norquist v. Zeuske, 211 Wis. 2d 241, 250, 564 N.W.2d 
748 (1997)(citing Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 33 Wis. 2d 408, 
415, 147 N.W.2d 633 (1967);  see also State ex rel. Fort Howard 
Paper Co. v. State Lake Dist. Bd. of Review, 82 Wis. 2d 491, 
505, 263 N.W.2d 178 (1978)("The cardinal rule of statutory 
construction is to preserve a statute and find it constitutional 
if it is at all possible to do so."). 
 
It is an elementary principle of law in this state 
that this court will search for a means to sustain a 
statute and will not infer or go out of its way to 
find means with which to condemn a statute adopted by 
the legislature.  In fact, this court has in the past 
and will continue to sustain the constitutionality of 
a statute if any facts can be reasonably conceived 
which will support its constitutionality.  Thus, the 
burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a 
statute is on the person attacking it, who must 
overcome the strong presumption in favor of its 
validity. 
White House Milk Co. v. Reynolds, 12 Wis. 2d 143, 150-51, 106 
N.W.2d 441 (1960). 
 
¶12 Due to this strong presumption of constitutionality, a 
party challenging a statute bears the heavy burden of proving 
that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 See City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d 168, 188, 532 
N.W.2d 690 (1995).  "If any doubt exists, it must be resolved in 
favor of the constitutionality of a statute."  State v. Starks, 
51 Wis. 2d 256, 259, 186 N.W.2d 245 (1971)(citing State ex rel. 
Thomson v. Giessel, 265 Wis. 558, 564, 61 N.W.2d 903 (1953));  
see also Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888) 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
7 
("Every possible presumption . . . is in favor of the validity 
of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown 
beyond a rational doubt.") (quoting United Pac. R.R. Co. v. 
United States, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878)). 
 
¶13 In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, a 
court may 
find only a 
portion of 
a 
particular statute 
unconstitutional, allowing the remaining valid portions of that 
statute to continue in effect: 
 
It is well understood that part of a statute may be 
unconstitutional, and the remainder may still have 
effect, provided the two parts are distinct and 
separable and are not dependent upon each other.  It 
is only where the void part of a statute was evidently 
designed as compensation for or an inducement to the 
otherwise valid portion, so that it must be presumed 
that the legislature would not have passed one portion 
without the other, that the whole statute must be held 
void. 
Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 515o, 55 N.W.2d 40 
(1952)(quoting Quiggle v. Herman, 131 Wis. 379, 382, 111 N.W. 
479 (1907)).   
¶14 This test for severability has been consistently 
applied in Wisconsin:   
 
The factors to consider in deciding whether a statute 
should be severed from an invalid provision are the 
intent of the legislature and the viability of the 
severed portion standing alone.  Chicago & North 
Western Transportation Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 
566, 575, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977).  Invalid provisions 
of a statute may not be severed when it appears from 
the act that the legislature intended the statute to 
be effective only as an entirety and would not have 
enacted the valid part by itself.  Madison v. Nickel, 
66 Wis. 2d 71, 79, 223 N.W.2d 865 (1974). 
Burlington Northern v. Superior, 131 Wis. 2d 564, 580-81, 388 
N.W.2d 916 (1986); see also State ex rel. Briggs & Stratton v. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
8 
Noll, 100 Wis. 2d 650, 660, 302 N.W.2d 487 (1981); Bence v. 
Milwaukee, 84 Wis. 2d 224, 233-34, 267 N.W.2d 25 (1978); Chicago 
& N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 
(1977); City of Madison v. Nickel, 66 Wis. 2d 71, 79, 223 N.W.2d 
865 (1974).  The test for severability has also been recognized 
by 
other 
state 
and 
federal 
courts, 
as 
well 
as 
legal 
commentators: 
 
[T]he Supreme Court, the state courts, and secondary 
authorities all appear to agree that the invalidity of 
part of a law or of some of its applications will not 
affect the remainder (1) if the valid provisions or 
applications are capable of being given legal effect 
standing alone, and (2) if the legislature would have 
intended them to stand with the invalid provisions 
stricken out. 
Robert Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the 
Supreme Court, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 76, 76 (1937). 
¶15 The question is whether the invalid portion of the 
statute “so infect[ed] the remainder of the legislation as to 
require the entire law to be invalidated[]a question of 
legislative intent.”  Bence, 84 Wis. 2d at 234 (citations 
omitted).   
 
[I]f the purpose of a statute is to accomplish a 
single object only and some of its provisions are 
unconstitutional and void, the whole must fail, unless 
sufficient remains to effect the object without the 
aid of the invalid portions.  On the other hand, if 
sufficient remains to effect the object of the statute 
without the aid of the invalid portion, the latter 
only should be rejected . . . . 
Nickel, 66 Wis. 2d at 79 (quoting 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional 
Law, pp. 414, 415, § 186).   
¶16 In addition to the principles of severance stated in 
our case law, "[t]he legislature can create a clear statement 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
9 
rule by enacting a general severability clause providing that 
all statutes should be treated as severable . . . ."  John 
Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 203, 256 (1993).  
The Wisconsin Legislature has done just that by explicitly 
stating that where a court can sever an unconstitutional portion 
of any statute, the court is required to do so, as long as the 
remaining statutory provisions can stand independent of the 
severed portion.  Wisconsin Stat. § 990.001(11) provides:   
 
SEVERABILITY.  The provisions of the statutes are 
severable.  The provisions of any session law are 
severable.  If any provision of the statutes or of a 
session law is invalid, or if the application of 
either to any person or circumstance is invalid, such 
invalidity 
shall not 
affect 
other 
provisions or 
applications which can be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 
¶17 Determining 
whether 
portions 
of 
a 
statute 
are 
severable requires an analysis of legislative intent, which is a 
question of law.  See Burlington Northern, 131 Wis. 2d at 580.  
As with any statutory interpretation, a reviewing court must 
first look to the language of the statute.  See id.   If the 
statutory language is ambiguous, a court must turn to extrinsic 
aids such as the legislative history, scope, context, subject 
matter and object of the statute to determine legislative 
intent.  See id.  
III. 
 
¶18 Before addressing the constitutional challenges to the 
provisions of the JJC in this case, and determining whether it 
is necessary and appropriate to sever any provisions of the JJC, 
it is important to lay the foundation of controlling precedent 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
10
from the United States Supreme Court and this court addressing 
juveniles' assertions of a right to a jury trial. 
 
¶19 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 530 (1971), 
the United States Supreme Court considered the issue whether the 
Pennsylvania Legislature's failure to provide juveniles with the 
right to a trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a 
delinquency proceeding violated the United States Constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court surveyed its previous case law 
in relation to juveniles' rights, reasoning that: 
 
[s]ome of the constitutional requirements attendant 
upon the state criminal trial have equal application 
to that part of the state juvenile proceeding that is 
adjudicative in nature.  Among these are the rights to 
appropriate notice, to counsel, to confrontation and 
to cross-examination, and the privilege against self-
incrimination.  Included, also, is the standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 533.   
¶20 Notwithstanding the fact that many constitutional 
protections extend to juveniles, the Supreme Court determined 
that juvenile delinquency adjudication proceedings are not 
criminal proceedings within the context of the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.  Therefore, the failure to 
provide juveniles with the right to a jury trial in such 
proceedings did not violate a juvenile's federal due process 
rights.  Thus, the McKeiver Court ultimately concluded that 
"trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not 
a constitutional requirement."  Id. at 545 (emphasis supplied). 
 Rather, if a state legislature chooses to afford juveniles jury 
trial rights, it "is the State's privilege and not its 
obligation."  Id. at 547.   
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
11
¶21 The plurality opinion in McKeiver cited 13 separate 
reasons for its decision.   Specifically, the Supreme Court 
determined 
that 
(1) 
all 
constitutional 
rights 
afforded 
criminally accused adults need not be imposed in a juvenile 
adjudication proceeding, see id; (2) providing juveniles with a 
jury trial would "remake" the juvenile adjudication proceeding 
into a full adversary proceeding, see id; (3) the Task Force 
Report submitted to the Pennsylvania Legislature did not 
recommend 
affording 
jury 
trial 
rights 
to 
juveniles 
and 
recommended against returning juveniles to criminal courts, see 
id. at 545-46; (4) a jury is not necessarily an essential part 
of a fair and equitable proceeding, even in the context of some 
criminal cases, see id. at 547; (5) jury trial rights may 
restrict a juvenile court's "ability to function in a unique 
manner," id; (6) states should be allowed to experiment with 
juvenile proceedings to accomplish rehabilitation goals, see 
id.; (7) denying juveniles the right to jury trials is a 
function 
of 
a 
lack 
of 
resources 
rather 
than 
"inherent 
unfairness," id. at 548; (8) a juvenile court judge has the 
discretion to impanel an advisory jury, see id; (9) a majority 
of state legislatures denied juveniles the right to a jury 
trial, see id.; (10) of the states denying juvenile jury trial 
rights, several had concluded that United States Supreme Court 
precedent did not compel such rights, see id. at 549; (11) 
federal acts did not propose juvenile jury trial rights, see id. 
at 549-50; (12) jury trials would bring delays and formalities 
to juvenile delinquency adjudication proceedings, see id. at 
550; and (13) the juvenile court system contemplates aspects "of 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
12
fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention" 
that are not present in criminal proceedings. See id.   
¶22 Fourteen years after McKeiver was decided, this court 
decided N.E., 122 Wis. 2d 198.  At the time N.E. was decided, 
the Wisconsin Statutes afforded a juvenile the right to request 
a jury trial.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.31(2) (1983-84).  The issue 
presented in N.E. was distinct from that in McKeiver, and raised 
the question of whether a court commissioner erred in accepting 
the withdrawal of a juvenile's request for a jury trial.  See 
N.E., 122 Wis. 2d at 199.  N.E.'s primary argument, however, was 
that a juvenile has a constitutional right to a trial by jury 
under art. I, § 5 and the due process clause of Article I, § 1 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  See id. at 202.   
¶23 In addressing N.E.'s argument, this court determined 
that the rights preserved in Wis. Const. art. I, § 5 are only 
those rights that existed at the time the Wisconsin Constitution 
was adopted in 1848.  See id. at 203 (citing Upper Lakes 
Shipping v. Seafarers' I. Union, 23 Wis. 2d 494, 503, 128 N.W.2d 
73 (1964)).  Because juvenile delinquency proceedings did not 
exist in 1848, this court reasoned, "no right to a jury trial in 
delinquency proceedings could have been preserved."  N.E., 122 
Wis. 2d at 203 (citations omitted). 
¶24 This court also rejected N.E.'s due process argument. 
 See id. at 203-4.  In doing so, it relied upon precedent from 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 504, 
167 N.W. 830 (1918)(concluding juvenile delinquency proceedings 
are not akin to criminal proceedings), and Wisconsin Indus. 
School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 79 N.W. 422 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
13
(1899)(same).  In summary, this court concluded that "a 
juvenile's right to a jury trial is neither a federal nor a 
state constitutional right and is strictly a statutory, non-
fundamental right."  N.E., 122 Wis. 2d at 201 (emphasis 
supplied). 
IV. 
 
¶25 With 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality, 
the 
severability case law and statute, precedent of the United 
States Supreme Court, and precedent from this court as our 
foundation, we next consider the constitutional challenges of 
the juveniles.  Collectively, the juveniles in this case argue 
that the lack of the right to a jury trial in the adjudicative 
phase of delinquency proceedings under the JJC violates the 
following state and federal constitutional provisions:  (1) 
Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution; (2) the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied through 
the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) Article I, § 5 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution; (4) the due process clause of Article I, § 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution; (5) the due process clause of 
Article I, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution; (6) the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment; (7) 
the equal protection clause of Article I, § 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution; and (8) the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We will 
address each of these constitutional challenges in turn, 
consolidating the juveniles' arguments where appropriate. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
14
A.  ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION         
AND THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 
¶26 The juveniles first argue that the JJC violates art. 
I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which states: 
 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment or information, to a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
Similarly, the juveniles argue that the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is violated.  The Sixth Amendment states 
in relevant part: 
 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law . . . . 
Thus, the right to a jury trial under Wis. Const. art. I, § 7 
and the Sixth Amendment extends to any individual who is subject 
to a criminal prosecution.  
¶27 The juveniles in this case contend that, because the 
newly 
enacted 
JJC 
is 
essentially 
a 
criminal 
code, 
the 
protections afforded criminally accused individuals under Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 7, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
apply to them.  They argue that the JJC is distinct from the 
statutory juvenile delinquency provisions at issue in McKeiver 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
15
and N.E.  Therefore, they contend, the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in McKeiver, and this court's decision in N.E., 
are inapplicable in this case.  Accordingly, a discussion of the 
history behind the adoption of the JJC is warranted.  
¶28 In 1994, the Wisconsin Legislature passed legislation 
approved by the governor which created the Juvenile Justice 
Study Committee ("JJSC").  See 1994 Wisconsin Act 377.   The 
JJSC was created to examine the then-existing Children's Code 
codified in Wis. Stat. ch. 48, and recommend suggestions for 
change in Wisconsin's legislation in response to increasing 
juvenile crime.  See Juvenile Justice Study Committee, Juvenile 
Justice: 
 
A 
Wisconsin 
Blueprint 
for 
Change 
2 
(January, 
1995)("JJSC Report"). 
¶29 In its final report to the legislature, the JJSC 
recommended several changes.  Although the JJSC continued to 
recognize "the importance of rehabilitation of young people who 
violate the law,"  JJSC Report at 10, the JJSC determined that 
the legislature should take a more balanced approach to juvenile 
delinquency, 
adding 
personal 
accountability 
and 
community 
protection to the legislature's primary objectives, in addition 
to the rehabilitation of juveniles.  See id. at 6.  This 
approach was advocated as a means to "best serve[] both the 
offender and society."  Id. at 10.4   
                     
4 We disagree with the dissent's repeated assertions that 
consideration of the victims' rights and protection of the 
public are objectives that are new to the JJC, Wis. Stat. Ch. 
938. In the old juvenile code, Wis. Stat. Ch. 48 (1993-94), the 
legislature recognized several times in its statement of 
legislative purpose, the goals of protecting victims' rights and 
"public safety."  See  Wis. Stat. §§ 48.01(1)(a), (d), (h); 
48.01(2). 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
16
¶30 As part of the JJSC's balanced approach philosophy, 
the JJSC endorsed the removal of the juvenile delinquency 
proceeding provisions from Wis. Stat. ch. 48 to another 
statutory chapter, under a new title.  See id. at 9.  The JJSC 
recommended that the newly titled Juvenile Justice Code be 
placed at Wis. Stat. ch. 938, next to the criminal code.  The 
JJSC did "not suggest that the newly created Juvenile Justice 
code be made part of the Criminal Code."  Id. at 11.  Rather, 
the JJSC explained that the statutory placement was recommended 
for symbolic reasons, to "provide incentives for young offenders 
to change their behavior."  Id.5 
¶31 The JJSC also recommended that the express legislative 
intent and purpose codified in the JJC should incorporate and 
promote the goals of balancing rehabilitation, accountability, 
and protection of the public.  See id. at 10.  The JJSC 
suggested, and the legislature and the governor ultimately 
agreed, that such matters as the protection of citizens and 
holding juveniles accountable for their acts be added to the 
express purposes of the statute.  See id.;  see also Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.01.  The JJSC also suggested, and again the legislature 
and the governor agreed, that the express intent of the 
legislature in the JJC should include provisions assuring that a 
child is provided a fair hearing, enforcing the constitutional 
rights of the juvenile, allowing for an individual assessment of 
each juvenile's needs, developing a child's ability to live as a 
                     
5 The dissent fails to recognize these statements of the 
JJSCthe study committee created by the legislature and the 
governor to recommend changes to the then-existing statutory 
provisions governing juvenile delinquency proceedings.  
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
17
productive and responsible member of the community, diverting 
juveniles from the JJC through early intervention if possible, 
and responding to a child's needs for care and treatment in 
accordance with his or her best interests.  See JJSC Report at 
10; Wis. Stat. § 938.01.  
¶32 As part of several substantive changes made in regard 
to juvenile delinquency proceedings, the Wisconsin Legislature 
adopted the JJSC's suggestion to eliminate a juvenile's then-
existing statutory right to a jury trial under Wis. Stat. ch. 
48.  In recommending the elimination of this statutory right, 
the JJSC relied upon this court's decision in N.E., 122 Wis. 2d 
at 201, that a juvenile's right to a jury trial is a statutory 
non-fundamental right, and that juveniles do not have a state or 
federal constitutional right to trial by jury.  See JJSC Report 
at 20.  The JJSC also recognized that "Wisconsin is one of just 
a few states that permit jury trials in [juvenile] matters."  
Id. 
¶33 Although the legislature subsequently enacted the JJC 
 to incorporate a new balanced approach in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings, the legislature did not lose sight of the fact that 
the 
JJC 
provisions 
are 
distinct 
from 
the 
criminal 
code 
provisions, and that the rehabilitation of juveniles is a 
primary objective.  The substantive provisions in the JJC 
provide several indicia of this focus.  For example, an intake 
worker may enter a deferred prosecution agreement to avoid 
delinquency proceedings, if it is in the best interests of the 
juvenile and the public.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.245.  Similarly, 
in accord with Wis. Stat. § 938.21(7), a judge or juvenile court 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
18
commissioner has the discretion to dismiss a petition and refer 
a juvenile's case to a social worker for deferred prosecution, 
if it is in "the best interests of the juvenile and the public." 
 A juvenile court judge also has the discretion to suspend a 
delinquency proceeding at any time prior to the entry of 
judgment 
and 
place 
a 
juvenile 
under 
supervision 
in 
the 
juvenile's own home or in a youth village program.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 938.32(1)(a).6  Under Wis. Stat. § 938.235(1) the court 
may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests 
of a juvenile if that juvenile is placed outside of his or her 
home due to a need for protection or services, or a change in 
placement. 
¶34 Under the JJC, a juvenile is also afforded numerous 
procedural and fundamental rights.  For example, under Wis. 
Stat. § 938.243(1)(ag)-(c), an intake worker must inform a 
juvenile that a petition for an adjudication of delinquency may 
be filed, what the allegations in the petition will likely be, 
and the potential consequences resulting from the proceeding.  
The intake worker must also inform the juvenile of his or her 
right to remain silent, right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, right to counsel, and right to present and subpoena 
witnesses. See Wis. Stat. § 938.243(1)(d)-(f).  Further, the 
                     
6 The provisions of the JJC that allow for a suspension or 
deferment of prosecution to avoid delinquency proceedings are 
consistent with the purpose of the old juvenile code "[t]o 
divert children from the juvenile justice system to the extent 
this is consistent with the protection of children and the 
public safety."  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(d) (1993-94). 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
19
juvenile is informed of the applicable burden of proof the State 
must overcome.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.243(1)(h).7 
¶35 Before a dispositional order is entered for a juvenile 
adjudicated delinquent, a report must be submitted to the court 
addressing a juvenile's individual needs.  The report must 
include a "recommended plan of rehabilitation or treatment and 
care for the juvenile" and a "description of the specific 
services or continuum of services" needed for the child and his 
or her family.  Wis. Stat. § 938.33(1)(b), (c).  The report must 
also include a list of the "academic, social and vocational 
skills needed by the juvenile," and a "plan for the provision of 
educational 
services 
to 
the 
juvenile." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.33(1)(d), (e).  In addition, the report must include any 
necessary recommendations for "mental health treatment, anger 
management, [and] individual or family counseling or parent 
training and education."  Wis. Stat. § 938.33(1)(f). 
¶36 When making an appropriate dispositional order, the 
juvenile court judge has a myriad of alternatives that may be 
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.243(1)(h) states that a juvenile 
has:  
the right to have the allegations of the petition 
proved by clear and convincing evidence unless the 
juvenile comes within the court's jurisdiction under 
s. 938.12 or 938.13(12), in which case the standard of 
proof shall be beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Wisconsin Stats. §§ 938.12 and 938.13(12) respectively set 
forth jurisdiction over juveniles alleged to be delinquent 
and juveniles alleged to be in need of protection or 
services who have committed a delinquent act.  Thus, in 
accord with Wis. Stat. § 938.243(1)(h), the allegations in 
a petition for an adjudication of delinquency must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
20
used, including counseling, supervision, probation programs, 
teen court programs, electronic monitoring, a variety of 
placement alternatives, alcohol and drug treatment, educational 
and vocational programs, day treatment programs, community 
service, 
and 
victim-offender 
mediation. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.34.   
¶37 If a provision of the dispositional order includes 
placement of the juvenile in a foster home, treatment foster 
home, group home, child caring institution, secure detention 
facility or shelter care facility, a "permanency plan" must be 
prepared to "ensure that a juvenile is reunified with his or her 
family whenever possible, or that the juvenile quickly attains a 
placement or home providing long-term stability."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.38(1). 
 
The 
goals 
of 
the 
permanency 
plan 
include 
"ensur[ing] 
proper 
care 
and 
treatment 
of 
the 
juvenile," 
"meet[ing] 
the 
juvenile's 
physical, 
emotional, 
social, 
educational and vocation needs," and "improv[ing] the conditions 
of 
the 
parents' 
home 
to 
facilitate 
the 
return 
of 
the 
juvenile . . . "  Wis. Stat. § 938.38(4)(f).  Transfer of legal 
custody of a juvenile from his or her parents to a relative, the 
county, or a licensed child welfare agency only occurs where "it 
is shown that the rehabilitation or the treatment and care of 
the juvenile cannot be accomplished by means of voluntary 
consent of the parent or guardian."  Wis. Stat. § 938.34(4). 
¶38 The legislature did not express an intent that an 
adjudication of delinquency be treated as a criminal conviction. 
 In fact, the JJC includes explicit legislative language to the 
contrary: 
 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
21
A judgment in a [juvenile delinquency] proceeding on a 
petition under this subchapter is not a conviction of 
a crime, does not impose any civil disabilities 
ordinarily resulting from the conviction of a crime 
and does not operate to disqualify the juvenile in any 
civil service application or appointment. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.35(1). 
¶39 Notwithstanding these provisions in the JJC, the 
juveniles in this case premise their constitutional challenges 
on the assertion that the JJC is not a juvenile code but is, for 
all intents and purposes, a "criminal code."  Because the 
juvenile 
proceedings 
are 
therefore 
akin 
to 
a 
criminal 
prosecution that may impose criminal punishment, they argue, 
their right to a jury trial is guaranteed under Wis. Const. art. 
I, § 7 and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  To support 
their argument, the juveniles assert that under certain specific 
provisions in the JJC, a juvenile is potentially subject to:  
(1) a possible lifetime commitment as a sexually violent 
individual under Wis. Stat. ch. 980; (2) a possible need to 
register as a sex offender; (3) a possible lifetime ban on the 
possession of a firearm; (4) an adjudication of delinquency 
being considered in any future adult sentencing; (5) an 
adjudication 
of 
delinquency 
being 
considered 
for 
future 
impeachment proceedings and in future bail hearings; (6) the 
possibility of several years of placement in a juvenile secured 
correctional facility; and (7) a possible transfer from a 
juvenile secured correctional facility to an adult prison.   
¶40 The juveniles are correct in their contention that a 
juvenile adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense 
may be subject to civil commitment as a sexually violent person. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  What the juveniles fail to 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
22
recognize is that the proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 are 
separate proceedings for which an individual is entitled to a 
jury trial.  Under Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1), the State must file a 
petition alleging that an individual is a sexually violent 
person.  The petition must not only allege that the individual 
has been convicted, or adjudicated delinquent, based on a 
sexually violent offense,8 but must also allege that the 
individual has a mental disorder and that the "mental disorder 
creates a substantial probability that he or she will engage in 
acts of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2).9  Among the 
rights afforded an individual subject to ch. 980 is the right to 
request a trial by a jury of 12 persons.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.03(3).  Thus, the denial of a juvenile's right to a jury 
trial at the delinquency proceeding does not result in potential 
commitment under ch. 980 without the right to a jury trial.   
                     
8 A petition may also be filed where the subject of the 
petition "has been found not guilty of a sexually violent 
offense by reason of mental disease or defect."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02(2)(a)3. 
9 The dissent argues that "[t]he majority fails to 
acknowledge that a 'sexually violent person' is defined as 'a 
person who has been . . . adjudicated delinquent for a sexually 
violent offense . . . .'"  This reading of the definitional 
section of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 seems to state that once a 
juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent 
offense, he or she may automatically be committed as a sexually 
violent person.  The dissent ignores the entire definition of a 
sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) which 
states: 
"Sexually violent person" means a person who has 
been . . . adjudicated 
delinquent 
for 
a 
sexually 
violent offense . . . and who is dangerous because he 
or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it 
substantially probable that the person will engage in 
acts of sexual violence. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
23
¶41 Moreover, this court has previously concluded that a 
commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 is not criminal punishment, 
but that ch. 980 is remedial in nature and furthers the goals of 
treatment of sexually violent persons and protection of the 
public.  See State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 
(1995); State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).  
In Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 259, this court concluded that "ch. 
980 does not violate either the Ex Post Facto or the Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause[s]" 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
or 
United 
States 
Constitutions.  In Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 293-94, this court 
concluded that ch. 980 "violates neither the substantive due 
process nor the equal protection guarantees of the United States 
and Wisconsin constitutions."   
¶42 Although the statutory provisions and constitutional 
challenges 
differ 
in 
this 
case, 
Post 
and 
Carpenter 
are   
enlightening to the extent that they each considered whether the 
 effect 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 
980 
was 
essentially 
criminal 
punishment notwithstanding the legislature's intent to treat 
sexually violent persons.  This court recognized that "[o]ur 
task is not to search for sinister ulterior motives underlying 
the 
legislature's 
acts 
in 
order 
to 
find 
statutes 
unconstitutional," Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 268, and that "we 
presume good faith on the part of the legislature," Post, 197 
Wis. 2d at 308. 
¶43 Applying these standards of review, this court looked 
to the treatment procedures and objectives in Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
and concluded that commitment under ch. 980 is not criminal in 
nature, even though there may be some punitive aspects to the 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
24
statute.   This court reasoned that the goals of the legislature 
in treating sexually violent persons and attempting to protect 
the public were not outweighed by any seemingly punitive nature 
of ch. 980.  This court expressly rejected the argument that ch. 
980 is punitive because persons subject to ch. 980 received some 
procedural safeguards akin to criminal proceedings.  See 
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 252.  This court also rejected the 
argument that the legislature's punitive intent was evident from 
the placement of the statute in the criminal code.  See id.  
Thus, several of the arguments rejected in Post and Carpenter 
are arguments that we also reject in this case in concluding 
that, like ch. 980, the JJC does not impose punishment and is 
not criminal in nature.  
¶44 The juveniles also argue that an adjudication of 
delinquency for a sexually motivated offense may result in 
having to comply with the reporting requirements for sex 
offender registration under Wis. Stat. § 301.45.  The juveniles 
fail to recognize that those reporting requirements may be 
waived.  Under Wis. Stat. § 938.34(15m)(bm) (1997-98),10 a 
juvenile need not comply with the reporting requirements of 
§ 301.45 if "the court determines, after a hearing on a motion 
made by the juvenile, that the juvenile is not required to 
comply under s. 301.45(1m)."  Factors that a juvenile court may 
consider 
in 
determining 
whether 
to 
waive 
the 
reporting 
requirements include: 
 
  
1.  The ages, at the time of the violation, of 
the juvenile and the victim of the violation.     
                     
10 This legislation was enacted on April 17, 1998, as 1997 
Wisconsin Act 130, and went into effect on May 2, 1998. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
25
 
2.  The relationship between the juvenile and the 
victim of the violation. 
 
3.  Whether the violation resulted in bodily 
harm, as defined in s. 939.22(4), to the victim. 
 
4.  Whether the victim suffered from a mental 
illness or mental deficiency that rendered him or her 
temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding 
or evaluating the consequences of his or her actions. 
 
5.  The probability that the juvenile will commit 
other violations in the future. 
 
6.   Any other factor that the court determines 
may be relevant to particular case. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.34(15m)(c).  The requirements of § 301.45, 
therefore, are only imposed on a juvenile who is adjudicated 
delinquent where the particular facts of the case and concerns 
for public safety dictate it.  This is not criminal punishment 
and does not equate the JJC to a criminal code. 
¶45 The juveniles next argue that an adjudication of 
delinquency for a crime that would be a felony if committed by 
an adult subjects a juvenile to a lifetime ban on the possession 
of firearms, just like adults with felony convictions.  They are 
correct that a juvenile is potentially subject to a ban on the 
possession of firearms in accord with Wis. Stat. § 941.29(bm).  
However, § 941.29 does not apply to juveniles in the same manner 
that it applies to adults.  The ban on firearm possession does 
not apply to any juvenile adjudicated delinquent "if a court 
subsequently determines that the [juvenile] is not likely to act 
in 
a 
manner 
dangerous 
to 
public 
safety." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.29(8).  The juvenile has the burden only of showing "by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he or she is not likely to 
act in a manner dangerous to public safety."  Id.  Based upon 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
26
this language, it is evident that the legislature intended to 
restrict firearm possession of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent 
only where public safety is at risk.11  The application of 
§ 941.29 under the JJC is not criminal punishment and does not 
transform the JJC into a criminal code. 
¶46 The juveniles assert that the JJC is a criminal code 
because an adjudication of delinquency may be considered in 
future sentences upon conviction for adult misdemeanor and 
felony crimes.  They are accurate in stating that a criminal 
court may consider an adjudication of delinquency in sentencing 
proceedings for a misdemeanor or felony conviction.  However, 
the former juvenile delinquency adjudication may be considered 
"only for the purpose of a presentence study and report."  Wis. 
Stat. § 938.35(1)(a).  Moreover, adjudications of delinquency, 
and even juvenile contacts with the court system that do not 
result in adjudications of delinquency, have been considered by 
sentencing judges in adult criminal proceedings long before the 
JJC was created and juvenile delinquency procedures amended.  
See, e.g., State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 624, 350 N.W.2d 633 
(1984)("The factors considered by the trial court [including 
juvenile contacts, see Harris, 119 Wis. 2d at 621] prior to the 
imposition of sentence were proper.").  Allowing a court to 
consider 
adjudications 
of 
delinquency 
in 
an 
attempt 
to 
understand the nature and background of an offender and impose 
an appropriate sentence is not criminal punishment. 
                     
11 This requirement that a juvenile must show that his or 
her possession of a firearm would not likely present a danger to 
the public does not rise to the level of proving the "absence of 
any proclivity to commit a bad act," as the dissent contends.  
Dissenting op. at 20 n.13.  
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
27
¶47 As the juveniles argue, evidence of an adjudication of 
delinquency may be used "[f]or the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness."  Wis. Stat. §§ 938.35(1)(cm), 906.09. 
 However, before a court may admit the prior adjudication, it 
must make a determination, in accord with Wis. Stat. § 901.04, 
if the evidence should be excluded because "its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 
 Wis. Stat. § 906.09(2), (3).  Allowing a juvenile delinquency 
adjudication to be considered on the issue of credibility in 
future proceedings furthers the interests of justice.  It is not 
criminal punishment and does not render the JJC a criminal code. 
¶48 The juveniles in this case further contend that the 
JJC is a criminal code because an adjudication of delinquency 
may be a factor considered in setting bail and conditions of 
release in future criminal proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 969. 
 We agree that it is a consideration; yet, it is only one of 
numerous factors a court may consider: 
 
Proper 
considerations 
in 
determining 
whether 
to 
release 
the 
defendant 
without 
bail, 
fixing 
a 
reasonable amount of bail or imposing other reasonable 
conditions of release are:  the ability of the 
arrested person to give bail, the nature, number and 
gravity of the offenses and the potential penalty the 
defendant faces, whether the alleged acts were violent 
in nature, the defendant's prior record of criminal 
convictions and delinquency adjudications, if any, the 
character, health, residence and reputation of the 
defendant, the character and strength of the evidence 
which has been presented to the judge, whether the 
defendant is currently on probation or parole, whether 
the defendant is already on bail or subject to other 
release conditions in other pending cases, whether the 
defendant has been bound over for trial after a 
preliminary examination, whether the defendant has in 
the past forfeited bail or violated a condition of 
release or was a fugitive from justice at the time of 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
28
arrest, and the policy against unnecessary detention 
of the defendant's [sic] pending trial.  
Wis. Stat. § 969.01(4).  In addition, the purpose of bail is not 
to punish a defendant, but is imposed "only in the amount 
necessary to assure the appearance of the defendant."  Id.  
Including a delinquency adjudication in those factors to be 
considered to ensure a defendant's appearance in future court 
proceedings is not criminal punishment and does not render the 
JJC criminal in nature. 
 
¶49 The juveniles maintain that the potential disposition 
of long periods of placement in a juvenile secured correctional 
facility imposes punishment equivalent to confinement under the 
criminal code, particularly under the SJOP provisions in the 
JJC.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.538.  The juveniles argue that they 
may be placed in a secured facility for several years, even 
until the age of 25.   
 
¶50 The dispositional alternatives available to a juvenile 
court judge are numerous, and many do not include placement 
outside the juvenile's home.  However, as stated, if a juvenile 
is placed in a foster home, treatment foster home, group home, 
child caring institution, secure detention facility or shelter 
care facility, a permanency plan must be prepared, keeping in 
mind the primary goals of stability and reunification of a 
juvenile with his or her family.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.38(1)(b). 
 Placement in a juvenile secured correctional facility is an 
option available to the juvenile court judge, subject to certain 
criteria.  For example, a juvenile under the age of 12 may not 
be placed in a juvenile secured correctional facility unless he 
or she has been adjudicated delinquent for an act which would be 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
29
punishable by a sentence of six months or more if committed by 
an adult, and if the juvenile is "found to be a danger to the 
public and to be in need of restrictive custodial treatment."  
Wis. Stat. § 938.34(4m).  In any event, any placement in a child 
caring institution, or a Type 1 or Type 2 secured correctional 
facility 
is 
placement 
in 
a 
facility 
that 
solely 
houses 
juveniles.  The juveniles are not housed with adult criminals.  
The distinctions between juvenile placement and adult criminal 
placement are maintained, allowing the focus of juvenile 
treatment and rehabilitation to remain intact.  Moreover, the 
provisions that may subject a juvenile to placement in a secured 
juvenile correctional facility, potentially until the age of 25, 
are provisions that existed in the old juvenile code.  See Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 48.34(4m); 
48.357(4), 
(5)(e); 
48.366 
(1993-94).  
Placement in a juvenile facility is not criminal punishment and 
does not convert the JJC into a criminal code. 
¶51 Finally, the juveniles argue that the provisions of 
the JJC that potentially subject them to transfer to an adult 
prison are criminal in nature. 
 Under the SJOP, a juvenile 
17 years of age or over may be placed in a Type 1 prison as 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.01(5). 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.538(3)(a)1., 
1m. 
 
Similarly, 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.357(4)(d)(1997-98),12 a juvenile 15 years of age or over 
who is placed in a Type 1 juvenile secured correctional facility 
may be transferred to the Racine Youthful Offender Correctional 
                     
12 All references to Wis. Stat. § 938.357(4)(d) are to the 
1997-98 volume of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
30
Facility13 if the juvenile "presents a serious problem to the 
juvenile or others."  Each of these provisions provide that a 
juvenile adjudicated delinquent may be housed with adult 
criminal offenders in adult state prisons.  Courts in other 
jurisdictions have determined that this type of placement 
subjects a juvenile to criminal punishment, and we agree. 
¶52 In In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391, 392 (La. 1998), the 
Louisiana Supreme Court addressed a Louisiana statute which 
authorized "the Department of Public Safety and Corrections to 
promulgate a regulation requiring juveniles who have been 
adjudicated delinquent (not convicted of a crime) to be 
transferred to adult facilities upon reaching the age of 
seventeen."  Initially, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized 
that 
Louisiana's 
Children's 
Code 
granted 
juveniles 
in 
delinquency proceedings "essentially all rights guaranteed to 
criminal defendants by the federal and state constitutions, 
except the right to trial by jury."  Id. at 396.  The Court also 
recognized that although the focus of the Children's Code was 
rehabilitation 
and 
treatment, 
not 
restitution, 
subjecting 
juveniles to placement in adult prisons resulted in "punitive 
incarceration."  Id.   
¶53 The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that transfer of 
juveniles 
to 
"adult 
penal 
institutions" 
represented 
the 
Louisiana Legislature's "wholesale reversal of one hundred years 
of state policy wherein adjudicated juvenile delinquents have 
been treated in a non-criminal fashion."  Id. at 399. The Court 
                     
13 The Racine Youthful Correctional Facility is a medium 
security state prison. See Wis. Stat. § 302.01. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
31
acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
McKeiver, 403 U.S. 508, but rejected its application based upon 
the criminal nature of the placement in adult prisons at issue 
in In re C.B..  Id. at 398. Accordingly, in concluding that the 
juveniles' 
constitutional 
rights 
had 
been 
violated, 
the 
Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that the juveniles were 
essentially 
receiving 
a 
"de 
facto 
criminal 
sentence . . . without being afforded the right to trial by jury 
as is mandated by [Louisiana's] state constitution."  Id. at 
395. 
¶54 Similarly, we conclude that the provisions in Wis. 
Stat. §§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 938.538(3)(a)1m, and 938.357(4)(d), 
providing for transfer of juveniles to adult prisons, result in 
a "de facto criminal sentence."  Id.  Juveniles transferred 
under these provisions are subject to placement in the exact 
environment to which adults with criminal convictions are 
subject.  In addition, those juveniles are subject to being 
housed with the general population of criminally convicted 
adults.  However, the juveniles subject to placement in adult 
prisons are not afforded the right to a trial by jury, unlike 
the adult offenders.   
¶55 Due to the potential placement in an adult prison 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 
938.538(3)(a)1m, 
and 
938.357(4)(d), we conclude that those provisions in the JJC 
violate Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the 
Sixth 
and 
Fourteenth 
Amendments 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution because they essentially subject a juvenile to the 
consequences of a "criminal prosecution" without the right to a 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
32
trial by jury.   The juveniles have overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality,  and have proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that those provisions are unconstitutional.  See Kilgore, 193 
Wis. 2d at 188.  Accordingly, we must consider whether those 
three provisions may be severed from the JJC.  See Burlington 
Northern, 131 Wis. 2d at 580-81.  To that end, we must determine 
whether severance would be consistent with the legislature's 
intent and whether the remaining provisions of the JJC are 
viable independent of the severed portions.  See id.  If the 
purposes and objectives of the JJC may be effected "without the 
aid of the invalid portion," the invalid provisions should be 
severed.14  Nickel, 66 Wis. 2d at 78-79. 
¶56 There is no express legislative intent regarding 
severability or inseverability in the JJC.  However, as 
previously stated, the Wisconsin Statutes do contain a general 
                     
14 With absolutely no citation to authority, the dissent 
contends that "while severance may be appropriate for a due 
process analysis, its application in an art. I, § 7 framework is 
inappropriate."  Dissenting op. at 6-7.  No authority could be 
found stating that an appellate court's responsibility to sever 
portions of a statuteconsistent with precedent from this court 
and the legislature's intentis inapplicable in a Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 7 analysis.  Similarly, no authority could be found 
for the dissent's statement that a "Wis. Const. art. I, § 7 
inquiry has two prongs."  Dissenting op. at 9. 
The dissent also argues that our "focus on isolating three 
penal provisions only serves to obfuscate the real inquiry" 
which, the dissent contends, is "whether the JJC by its purpose 
and effect is so criminal in nature as to invoke art. I, § 7 
protections."  Dissenting op. at 1.  We fail to see how our 
discussion of the specific provisions of the JJC confuses the 
issue, particularly where the juveniles' argument is premised 
almost entirely upon the assertion that the specific provisions 
of the JJC are criminal in nature.  We cannot consider the 
purpose and effect of the JJC as a whole without addressing its 
individual provisions. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
33
severance statute, which states "[i]f any provision of the 
statutes . . . is invalid . . . such invalidity shall not affect 
other provisions . . . which can be given effect without the 
invalid provision."  Wis. Stat. § 990.001(11).  We conclude that 
the purposes and objectives of the JJC can be fully met even if 
the provisions in Wis. Stat. §§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 938.538(3)(a)1m, 
and 938.357(4)(d), allowing for juvenile transfer to adult 
prisons are severed. 
¶57 The legislative intent and purpose in enacting the JJC 
are set forth in Wis. Stat. § 938.01.  Those express statements 
of 
legislative 
intent 
reflect 
a 
desire 
to 
balance 
the 
rehabilitative needs for care and treatment of each juvenile, 
with holding the juvenile accountable for his or her acts, and 
protecting the public.  See JJSC Report at 10; Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.01.  This balanced approach was adopted with the best 
interests of the juvenile and of society as the foundation.  See 
id.  We have no doubt that these goals may be achieved absent 
the provisions allowing for transfer of juveniles to adult 
prisons.  Severance is beneficial to the juveniles as it 
recognizes their right to a jury trial where the proceedings are 
criminal 
in 
nature 
and 
result 
in 
criminal 
consequences.  
Severance does not interfere with the need to protect society 
because, if necessary under the particular circumstances, a 
juvenile may still be placed in a  secured juvenile correctional 
facility.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.34(4m).  Further, severing the 
provisions allowing for transfer to an adult prison in Wis. 
Stat. §§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 938.538(3)(a)1m, and 938.357(4)(d), in 
no way inhibits the function of the remaining portions of the 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
34
JJC.  It merely eliminates one type of dispositional option15 or 
transfer from numerous others available to a juvenile court 
judge. 
¶58 Absent the provisions in Wis. Stat. §§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 
938.538(3)(a)1m, and 938.357(4)(d), we conclude that the JJC is 
not a criminal code.  As such, the United States Supreme Court 
precedent in McKeiver, and this court's precedent in N.E., 
remain controlling.16 In both cases, the courts concluded that 
juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal proceedings.  
Therefore, with the severance of Wis. Stat. §§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 
938.538(3)(a)1m, and 938.357(4)(d), we conclude there is no 
violation of Wis. Const. art. I, § 7, or the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, for failure to provide juveniles with a 
trial by jury under Wis. Stat. ch. 938. 
B.  ARTICLE I, SECTION 5 OF THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 
¶59 The juveniles next argue that the JJC violates art. I, 
§ 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which states: 
 
                     
15 Under Wis. Stat. § 938.538(3)(a)1 and 1m as they 
currently exist, a juvenile court judge has the discretion to 
order that a juvenile who is subject to the Serious Juvenile 
Offender Program and is age 17 or over be placed in a Type 1 
prison, as defined in Wis. Stat. § 301.01(5). 
16 The dissent argues that our reliance on this court's 
decision in N.E. v. Wisconsin DHSS, 122 Wis. 2d 198, 361 N.W.2d 
693 (1985), is unjustified because "[t]he N.E. court did not 
consider art. I, § 7."  Dissenting op. at 7.  However, the N.E. 
court did consider the application of Wis. Const. art. I, § 5, 
which also addresses the right to a jury trial.  N.E., 122 
Wis. 2d at 203.  The N.E. court concluded that "[j]uvenile 
delinquency 
proceedings 
did 
not 
exist 
at 
the 
time 
the 
constitution was adopted and thus, no right to a jury trial in 
delinquency proceedings could have been preserved."  Id.   
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
35
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and 
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the 
amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived 
by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed 
by law.  Provided, however, that the legislature may, 
from time to time, by statute provide that a valid 
verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of 
a specified number of the jury, not less than five-
sixths thereof. 
A thorough discussion of Wis. Const. art. I, § 5 is unnecessary 
since we have already determined that this court's holding in 
N.E. is controlling, given the non-criminal nature of the JJC 
once 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 
938.538(3)(a)1m, 
and 
938.357(4)(d), are severed.  In N.E., this court concluded that 
art. I, § 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution did not preserve the 
right to a jury trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings.  See 
N.E., 122 Wis. 2d at 203.  Thus, there is no violation of Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 5 in this case. 
C.  DUE PROCESS UNDER ARTICLE I, § 1 AND ARTICLE I, § 8 OF THE 
WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION AND THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
¶60 The juveniles in this case argue that the lack of the 
right to a jury trial in the JJC violates their due process 
rights under the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.  
This court has repeatedly stated that the due process clauses of 
the state and federal constitutions are essentially equivalent 
and are subject to identical interpretation.  See Reginald D. v. 
State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 307, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995). 
¶61 The United States Supreme Court has on several 
occasions discussed the procedural process due juveniles in 
delinquency  proceedings.  See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
36
U.S. 541 (1966); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley 
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).  In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 
(1967), the Supreme Court addressed the due process challenges 
of a 15-year old individual subject to the Arizona Juvenile 
Code.  The Court ultimately concluded that a juvenile's due 
process rights include the right to counsel, see id. at 41, the 
right to remain silent, see id. at 55, the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses, see id. at 57, the right to written 
notice, see id. at 33-34, and the right to sworn testimony, see 
id. at 56.    
¶62 As discussed in part II of this opinion, the United 
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of a juvenile's right 
to trial by jury in McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528.  The Supreme Court 
considered the nature of juvenile proceedings and concluded that 
juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal proceedings.  
Therefore, 
the 
due 
process 
clause 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution does not guarantee juveniles the right to a trial 
by jury.  See id. at 545.  The decision in McKeiver was followed 
in N.E., where this court similarly concluded that the due 
process clause of the Wisconsin Constitution does not guarantee 
juveniles the right to a jury trial because delinquency 
proceedings are not criminal in nature.   
¶63 Although McKeiver and N.E. conclude that a juvenile 
does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial, that does 
not mean that a juvenile is not afforded a fair trial when a 
petition for an adjudication of delinquency has been filed.  
Thus, procedural due process requirements are satisfied when the 
juvenile delinquency proceeding under Wis. Stat. ch. 938 is 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
37
tried before a "neutral and detached" juvenile court judge.  Cf. 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). 
¶64 Based upon our conclusion that the provisions in Wis. 
Stat. §§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 938.538(3)(a)1m, and 938.357(4)(d) may 
be severed, and that the remaining provisions in the JJC are 
non-criminal, we conclude that once those provisions are 
severed, there clearly is no violation of the juvenile's state 
or 
federal 
constitutional 
due 
process 
protections. 
 
See 
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545; N.E., 122 Wis. 2d at 201. 
D.  EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE I, § 1 OF THE WISCONSIN 
CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 
¶65 The juveniles' final argument is that the denial of 
the right to a jury trial violates the equal protection clauses 
of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.  They argue 
that they are denied equal protection under Wis. Stat. ch. 938 
because juveniles and adults subject to Wis. Stats. chs. 48, 51, 
55 and 980 are entitled to a jury trial.17 
¶66 This court has previously concluded that the equal 
protection 
clauses 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
and 
United 
States 
Constitutions are equivalent for purposes of interpretation.  
See Reginald D., 193 Wis. 2d at 307.  Equal protection requires 
that there exist reasonable and practical grounds for the 
classifications created by the legislature.  See id. at 308.  In 
                     
17 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 48 is the Children's Code, Wis. Stat. 
ch. 51 is the Mental Health Act, Wis. Stat. ch. 55 is the 
Protective Service System, and Wis. Stat. ch. 980 governs 
Sexually Violent Person Commitments. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
38
State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989) 
this court stated: 
 
Equal protection does not deny a state the power to 
treat persons within its jurisdiction differently; 
rather, the state retains broad discretion to create 
classifications so long as the classifications have a 
reasonable basis.  The fact a statutory classification 
results in some inequity . . . does not provide 
sufficient grounds for invalidating a legislative 
enactment.  Where . . . a suspect classification is not 
alleged, the legislative enactment “must be sustained 
unless it is ‘patently arbitrary’ and bears no rational 
relationship to a legitimate government interest.” “If 
the classification is reasonable and practical in 
relation to the objective, that is sufficient and 
doubts must be resolved in favor of the reasonableness 
of the classification.” 
(Internal citations omitted). 
¶67 Where a suspect class or a fundamental right is 
involved, a reviewing court must apply a level of scrutiny more 
strict than the rational basis test.  Under the strict scrutiny 
test, the State must prove that the classification is necessary 
to promote a “compelling governmental interest” in order to 
withstand the constitutional challenge.  State v. Post, 197 Wis. 
2d 279, 319, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).   
¶68 In N.E., 122 Wis. 2d at 207, this court concluded that 
a juvenile's then-existing statutory right to a jury trial was a 
non-fundamental right.  In addition, the juveniles in this case 
do not argue that they are members of a suspect class.  
Moreover, 
courts 
in 
other 
jurisdictions 
have 
previously 
determined that juveniles are not a suspect class for purposes 
of an equal 
protection 
analysis. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
State v. 
Stackhouse, 947 P.2d 777, 780 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).  Therefore, 
the appropriate standard of review in this case is to consider 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
39
whether the legislature had a rational basis for eliminating 
juveniles' statutory right to a jury trial.   
¶69 Where our inquiry is whether a rational basis exists 
for the legislature's classification, it is our "obligation to 
locate or to construct, if possible, a rationale that might have 
influenced the legislature and that reasonably upholds the 
legislative determination."  Castellani v. Bailey, No. 95-2733, 
op. at 8 (S. Ct. May 22, 1998) (quoting Sambs v. City of 
Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 371, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980)).  Our 
analysis of the legislature's classification "requires only that 
[we] locate some reasonable basis for the classification made." 
 Castellani, No. 95-2733, op. at 11 n.14 (quoting Omernik v. 
State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 19, 218 N.W.2d 734 (1974)).  We conclude 
that a reasonable basis exists in this case.  
¶70 In enacting the JJC, the JJSC and the legislature 
expressed concerns about negating delays in the juvenile justice 
system.  The JJSC recommended that "[t]he system should operate 
more efficiently through streamlining of processes and improved 
access to information by entities that work with juvenile 
delinquents."  JJSC Report at 7 (emphasis supplied).  This 
concern is also evidenced in Wis. Stat. § 938.01(2)(e), which 
states that one of the purposes of the JJC is "[t]o divert 
juveniles from the juvenile justice system through early 
intervention . . . " (Emphasis supplied).   
¶71 This 
desire 
for 
immediate 
intervention 
bears 
a 
"reasonable and practical" relationship to the legislature's 
desire to rehabilitate and treat juvenile offenders and protect 
the public.  McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 131.  Similar language is 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
40
not found in Wis. Stat. chs. 48, 51, 55, and 980.  The distinct 
nature of juvenile delinquency proceedings and the objectives of 
the legislature evince that there is a "rational basis" for 
attempting to streamline the proceedings by not affording 
juveniles the right to a jury trial.   
¶72 The 
objectives 
of 
the Wisconsin 
Legislature for 
immediate intervention were objectives recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court in McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550, when the 
Court stated that, if a jury trial "were injected into the 
juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with 
it into that system the traditional delay, the formality and the 
clamor of the adversary system."  The objectives of the 
Wisconsin Legislature in relation to the JJC are also similar to 
those noted by the Colorado Supreme Court: 
 
The juvenile system is premised on the concept that a 
more informal, simple, and speedy judicial setting 
will best serve the needs and welfare of juvenile 
defendants . . . .  A separate juvenile system was 
formed to delay placement of juveniles into the formal 
machinery of the judicial system.   
J.T. v. O'Rourke, 651 P.2d 407, 412 n.5 (Colo. 1982). 
¶73 It is this court's responsibility to attempt to locate 
a 
rationale 
for 
the 
legislature's 
classification 
that 
"reasonably upholds the legislative determination.”  Castellani, 
No. 95-2733, op. at 8.  Based upon the legislature's stated 
objectives in the JJC, and other persuasive authority cited 
herein, we conclude that the need for early intervention in the 
JJC is a reasonable basis for requiring that the trier of fact 
in a juvenile delinquency proceeding be the juvenile court 
judge.  Accordingly, we conclude that the juveniles' rights 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
41
guaranteed under the equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin 
and United States Constitutions have not been violated. 
V. 
¶74 In summary, we conclude that the provisions in Wis. 
Stat. ch. 938 that may subject a juvenile who has been 
adjudicated delinquent to placement in an adult prison are 
criminal in nature.  Accordingly, the provisions in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 
938.538(3)(a)1m, 
and 
938.357(4)(d) 
which 
subject a juvenile to placement in an adult prison violate a 
juvenile's rights to a trial by jury under Article I, § 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution.  Those provisions can and 
must be severed from the current JJC.  Severing those provisions 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 
938.538(3)(a)1m, 
and 
938.357(4)(d) is in accord with precedent from this court, see 
Burlington 
Northern, 
131 
Wis. 2d 
564, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature's express intent to sever statutory provisions, see 
Wis. Stat. § 990.001(11).  Moreover, our conclusion that the 
remaining non-criminal portions of the JJC are constitutional 
even absent the right to a trial by jury is consistent with the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver and this 
court's decision in N.E..  It is also consistent with a majority 
of the states in the union which have determined that juveniles 
do not have a state or federal constitutional right to a trial 
by jury in the adjudicative phase of a juvenile delinquency 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
42
proceeding.18  Accordingly, the orders of the circuit court in 
Ryan D.L. and Luis H. are affirmed, while the order of the 
circuit court in Hezzie R. is reversed. 
                     
18 See ALA. CODE § 12-15-65(a) (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 
47.10.070(Michie 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325 (Michie 1998); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-76e (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 1009 
(Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2316, 16-2327 (1981); FLA. 
STAT. ch. 985.228 (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(a) (Supp. 
1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-41(a) (1993 & Supp. 1997); IND. 
CODE § 31-32-6-7 (Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE § 232.47 (1997); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.070(1) (Michie Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 3310(1) (West Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & 
JUD. PROC. § 3-812(f) (Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. § 260.155, subd. 
1 (1996 & Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-203(3) (1993); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 211.171 (Supp. 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
279(1) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62.193 (Michie Supp. 
1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:16 (1994 & Supp. 1997); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-40 (West 1987); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 342.1 
(McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-631 (1995); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 27-20-24(1) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35(A) 
(Anderson Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.310 (1997); 42 PA. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
43
By the Court.—In State v. Ryan D.L., order affirmed.  In 
State v. Hezzie R., order reversed and cause remanded.  In State 
v. Luis H., order affirmed and cause remanded. 
 
                                                                  
CONS. STAT. § 6336(a) (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-755 (Law. 
Co-op Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-124(a) (1996); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-3A-115 (Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 
5523(a) (1991 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.021(2) 
(1996). 
 
 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
1 
¶75 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Dissenting).    All of the 
parties, even the State, concede that in this case severance 
cannot resolve a constitutional challenge under art. I, § 7 of 
the 
Wisconsin 
constitution. 
 
Yet, 
undeterred 
by 
such 
a 
concession, the majority advances a manipulated focus which 
allows it to arrive at its constitutional conclusion. 
¶76 The focus of a Wis. Const. art. I, § 7 inquiry cannot 
be merely whether three plainly penal provisions of the Juvenile 
Justice Code ("JJC") can be severed.  Such a focus on isolating 
three penal provisions only serves to obfuscate the real 
inquiry.  The proper focus is to view the JJC in its entirety 
and the real question is whether the JJC by its purpose and 
effect is so criminal in nature as to invoke art. I, § 7 
protections.  
¶77 After reviewing the JJC under art. I, § 7, I conclude 
that in moving the JJC from Chapter 48 (the Children's Code) to 
Chapter 938 (adjoining the criminal code), the legislature 
intended more than to merely move the statute 890 chapters from 
the first volume to the last volume of the Wisconsin Statutes.  
The move instead signaled a change in direction from the 
unbalanced approach of the Children's Code, which has the 
paramount purpose of promoting the "best interests of the child" 
to a balanced approach akin to the criminal code, which balances 
rehabilitative interests along with protection of the public and 
accountability of the offender.  Because the majority's analysis 
has no continuing basis in the law or in the facts of juvenile 
delinquency adjudications today, I dissent from the majority's 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
2 
conclusion that juveniles have no right to a jury trial under 
art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin constitution. 
I. 
¶78 The State concedes that aspects of the new JJC track 
individual aspects of the criminal code.  It also concedes that 
the move puts the "new system [] closer to a criminal proceeding 
than it used to be."  In moving the juvenile delinquency 
provisions and changing the JJC's purposes, dispositions, and 
long-term consequences to more closely resemble the criminal 
code, while at the same time eliminating the right to a jury 
trial, I conclude that the legislature's enactment of the JJC 
crosses over the constitutional line. 
¶79 Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin constitution declares 
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed 
. . . ."  By its terms, the constitutional protections inherent 
in art. I, § 7 apply only to those proceedings deemed "criminal" 
in nature.  The juveniles claim that the JJC is criminal in 
nature in that it treats juvenile offenders in a manner 
sufficiently similar to adult criminal offenders as to invoke 
this constitutional protection.  The juveniles accordingly 
assert that Wis. Stat. § 938.31(2)'s19 proclamation that juvenile 
delinquency 
adjudications 
shall 
be 
"to 
the 
court" 
is 
unconstitutional. 
                     
19 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to 
the 1995-96 volumes.   
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
3 
¶80 The 
question 
of 
whether 
youthful 
offenders 
are 
entitled to jury hearings is one that courts have faced since 
the creation of a separate juvenile justice system and is one 
still receiving prominent consideration today.  See, e.g., In re 
C.B., 708 So. 2d 391 (La. 1998); State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240 
(Wash. 1987).  It is a question that this court under different 
prior juvenile laws has faced and answered in the negative a 
number of times.  See N.E. v. DHSS, 122 Wis. 2d 198, 361 N.W.2d 
693 (1985)("In Interest of N.E."); State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 
504, 167 N.W. 830 (1918); Wisconsin Industrial School for Girls 
v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, 79 N.W. 422 (1899).20 
¶81 The juvenile justice system has historically been 
focused 
solely 
on 
nurturing 
and 
rehabilitating 
youthful 
offenders while removing the taint that accompanies a criminal 
conviction in adult court.  See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining 
                     
20 There is a long history of providing juveniles with a 
jury trial in Wisconsin.  At common law illegal acts committed 
by juveniles were prosecuted as crimes and the accused was 
entitled to a jury trial.  See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 
(1966).  When Wisconsin created its juvenile courts in 1901, 
felonies were excluded from the new court's jurisdiction so that 
juveniles facing incarceration continued to receive a jury 
trial.  In 1925, when the juvenile court's reach was extended, 
the jury trial right was offered by statute to all juveniles, 
see Wis. Stat. § 48.31(2)(1993-94), and lasted until it was 
eliminated by 1995 Wis. Act 77.  While the legislative history 
does not conclusively indicate the reason for the change, the 
chairperson of the Juvenile Justice Study Committee ("Study 
Committee") has indicated that the right was eliminated because 
jury trials "are expensive for counties to administer, and their 
use often has been as a 'bargaining chip' in negotiating plea 
agreements . . . ."  Dennis J. Barry, Juvenile Justice: A 
Wisconsin Blueprint For Change, Wisconsin Lawyer, Mar. 1995 at 
31. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
4 
Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for 
Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083, 1096-97 
(1991).  As this court noted in Scholl: 
 
It is sufficient to say on this point that the 
proceedings under this law are in no sense criminal 
proceedings, 
nor 
is 
the 
result 
in 
any 
case 
a 
conviction or punishment for crime.  They are simply 
statutory proceedings by which the state . . . reaches 
out its arms in a kindly way and provides for the 
protection of its children . . . . 
Scholl, 167 Wis. at 509.  This unbalanced and "kindly" focus on 
the child, often termed "parens patriae,"21 has kept juvenile 
codes in the past from being labeled "criminal" proceedings.  
See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
¶82 However, in 1995 the balance changed markedly.  The 
Wisconsin legislature reacted to the recommendations of the 
Juvenile Justice Study Committee (the "Study Committee") by 
crafting 
a comprehensive 
overhaul 
of 
Wisconsin's juvenile 
justice system, in the form of Wis. Stat. ch. 938.  See 1995 
Wis. Act 77.  In taking this action, the legislature not only 
made "symbolic" alterations to the old Children's Code, Wis. 
Stat. ch. 48 (1993-94), the legislature also made significant 
substantive modifications to the manner in which juveniles 
alleged delinquent are treated.  As the Study Committee Report 
indicated: 
                     
21 Black's Law Dictionary 1114 (6th ed. 1990) defines 
"parens patriae" as: 
[L]iterally 
"parent 
of 
the 
country," 
refers 
traditionally to role of state as sovereign and 
guardian of persons under legal disability, such as 
juveniles or the insane . . . .  
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
5 
 
The [JJC] will significantly change the way Wisconsin 
treats young lawbreakers.  Personal accountability and 
community protection will join offender rehabilitation 
as the primary objectives of Wisconsin's juvenile 
justice system.  Such a balanced approach is the most 
effective way to respond to juvenile crime. 
Juvenile Justice Study Committee, Juvenile Justice: A Wisconsin 
Blueprint for Change i (1995)[hereinafter "Report"]. 
¶83 In making 
these 
modifications and 
adjusting the 
balance of purposes underlying the juvenile justice system, the 
legislature once again presents this court with the question of 
whether the juvenile code has crossed the constitutional line 
from an acceptable "parens patriae" system of juvenile social 
rehabilitation to what is effectively a separate system of 
criminal prosecution of "young lawbreakers."  If the JJC is the 
former, additional procedural protections need not be applied by 
the court.  If the latter, juveniles may legitimately invoke the 
constitutional protections of art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin 
constitution. 
II. 
¶84 As an initial matter, I note that the majority 
declares four "foundations" for its ultimate constitutional 
conclusion--our standard of review, the rule of severance, and 
state and federal case law.  As for the first foundation, 
standard of review, I agree with the majority that the 
appropriate standard of review is de novo, with the juveniles 
bearing the burden of proving the presumptively constitutional 
JJC unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. 
Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 67, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997); State v. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
6 
McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).  The 
majority's lengthy citation and quotation of precedent for this 
general principle notwithstanding, the basic presumption is 
simply the starting point of our analysis, not our conclusion.  
It does not significantly buttress the majority's failure to 
accurately address the juveniles' arguments. 
¶85 The majority's second declared foundation, the rule of 
severability, is even more problematic.  It allows the majority 
to obfuscate the proper analysis under Wis. Const. art. I, § 7 
and 
declare 
"[a]bsent 
the 
provisions 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 938.538(3)(a)1m and 938.357(4)(d) . . . the 
JJC is not a criminal code."  The problem with relying on the 
rule of severability in a case of this nature, even putting 
aside the concessions of the parties, is that art. I, § 7 is 
concerned with proceedings which are criminal in nature, not 
particular sanctions which are punitive.  The mere removal of 
one potential sanction cannot change the expressed focus and 
real effect of the JJC.  Thus, while severance may be 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
7 
appropriate for a due process analysis, its application in an 
art. I, § 7 framework is inappropriate.22   
¶86 Finally, I note that as further foundations for its 
opinion the majority also repeatedly returns for support to this 
court's decision in N.E. and the 1971 decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in McKeiver.  This reliance is unjustified. 
  
¶87 In N.E. this court determined that "a juvenile's right 
to a jury trial is neither a federal nor a state constitutional 
right."  N.E., 122 Wis. 2d at 201.  The court made that 
statement based on our review of the then-existing parens 
patriae juvenile code--a juvenile code which no longer exists.  
The N.E. court did not even consider Wis. Const. art. I, § 7, 
likely because the emphasis of the old Children's Code was 
significantly different from the JJC. 
¶88 Similarly, the high court in McKeiver examined a 
Pennsylvania juvenile law and concluded that there was no 
federal due process right to a jury trial.  In reaching this 
                     
22 None of the parties in their briefs or at oral argument 
considered or argued that severance is available under an art. 
I, § 7 analysis.  Both parties acknowledge that under art. I, 
§ 7, the focus is on the nature or character of the proceedings—
not as the majority alone asserts on three penal provisions.  
Respondent-appellant's 
supplemental 
brief 
at 
16, 
16-28; 
Petitioner-respondent's brief-in-chief at 10.  At oral argument 
both parties concede that severance is not an available option. 
 In response to a severance question, counsel for the juveniles 
stated that although severance may be an option under a due 
process analysis, it is not available in an art. I, § 7 
challenge.  In response to a similar question, the State also 
acknowledged it could not be done here.  
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
8 
conclusion the Court repeatedly cited the failures of the parens 
patriae system of juvenile justice, but noted that: 
 
[t]he Court, however, has not yet said that all rights 
constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime 
also are to be enforced or made available to the 
juvenile . . .[and] the juvenile court proceeding has 
not yet been held to be a "criminal prosecution" . . . 
and also has not yet been regarded as devoid of 
criminal aspects merely because it usually has been 
given the civil label. 
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 533, 541 (emphasis added).  The Court then 
concluded 
that 
"[i]f 
the 
formalities 
of 
the 
criminal 
adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile 
court system, there is little need for its separate existence.  
Perhaps the ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for 
the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it."  Id. at 
551. 
¶89 The operative philosophy of the juvenile justice 
system in Wisconsin has been modified in a substantial and 
material fashion since N.E. and McKeiver were decided.  To 
blindly rely on those precedents, which go not to whether the 
JJC is sufficiently criminal to invoke the protections of the 
art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin constitution, but rather to 
fundamental fairness challenges to parens patriae juvenile laws 
which no longer exist is to ignore the real constitutional 
challenge before the court.  The "day" referred to by McKeiver 
has arrived.  Because McKeiver and N.E. are reliant upon 
juvenile codes not at issue here, it is incumbent upon this 
court to examine the JJC from a perspective unjaundiced by prior 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
9 
constitutional 
conclusions 
derived 
from 
different 
juvenile 
codes. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
10
III. 
¶90 In this case the State uniformly asserts that the JJC, 
including 
the 
Serious 
Juvenile 
Offender 
Program, 
is 
a 
rehabilitation and treatment based system of juvenile oversight 
not intended by the legislature to be a juvenile criminal code 
for punishing youthful offenders.  The juveniles respond that 
the JJC demonstrates all of the characteristics of a criminal 
code, including an intent to punish.  In considering these 
diametrically opposed positions under the state constitution, 
the dispositive inquiry is not whether the accused is a child or 
whether the proceedings are before a court labeled "juvenile."  
Rather, the inquiry is whether the proceedings at hand may be 
fairly characterized in purpose and effect as being "criminal" 
in nature. 
¶91 Like the related inquiry used to determine whether a 
statute is civil or punitive, see, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 
117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997), the Wis. Const. art. I, § 7 
inquiry has two prongs.  First, the stated intention of the 
legislature must be examined.  Second, a determination must be 
made as to whether the code's purposes and effects are so 
criminal in nature as to defeat the legislature's separation of 
the juvenile code from the protections inherent in the adult 
criminal code.  Upon review of the structure, expressed 
purposes, and substantive provisions of the JJC, I conclude that 
not only has the JJC shifted treatment of juvenile offenders in 
Wisconsin "closer to" the criminal sphere, it has dramatically 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
11
crossed the constitutional line invoking art. I, § 7 of the 
Wisconsin constitution. 
¶92 In adopting a new juvenile code, the Juvenile Justice 
Code, the legislature intended a substantive reorientation of 
the law as it affects children who have committed acts which, if 
they were adults, would subject them to criminal sanction.  This 
intention is readily apparent from the changes in placement and 
expressed legislative purpose accomplished through the enactment 
of the JJC.  As one commentary notes, "[t]he enactment of 
Chapter 938 marked a clear change in the way Wisconsin views its 
children. 
 
By 
situating 
the 
new 
Juvenile 
Justice 
Code 
immediately 
before 
the 
Criminal 
Code 
(ch. 
939-951), 
the 
legislature signaled its intent to treat young offenders . . . 
more like adult criminals under the Criminal Code."  Virginia A. 
Pomeroy & Gina M. Pruski, Wisconsin Juvenile Law Handbook 1-1 
(1998).23  Indeed, as the Study Committee indicated, the JJC has 
                     
23 As the Chairperson and a member of the Study Committee 
have indicated: 
The 
creation 
of 
Chapter 
938 
for 
delinquents 
underscores the differences between child victims of 
circumstances outside of their control and young 
people who choose to violate laws.  While sometimes 
there is a relationship between the two categories, 
Chapter 938 recognizes the illogic in using basically 
the same philosophical and procedural system to deal 
with both classifications of young people.  Thus, the 
new legislation creates a separate chapter in the 
statutes to deal exclusively with young lawbreakers.  
 
Dennis J. Barry & Bonnie Ladwig, Time Ripe for Change, Wisconsin 
Lawyer, Apr. 1996 at 13. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
12
been rebalanced to address young "law violators who often are 
physically and mentally mature and who have demonstrated a 
willingness to engage in serious and even heinous acts."  Report 
at 9. 
¶93 The Study Committee further stated that: 
 
Both codes [the JJC and the Criminal Code] deal with 
the same kinds of behavior, even though there are 
distinctions in the ages of the perpetrators and the 
potential dispositions available.  Young offenders 
would be reminded that while society does not yet 
classify their actions as criminal, they are "almost 
there."   
Report at 11. 
¶94 
In 
examining 
the 
expressed 
legislative 
purpose 
provisions in the new code, I note the contrasts between it and 
the prior code.  The old Children's Code, Wis. Stat. ch. 48 
(1993-94), formerly indicated that the legislature's intent with 
respect to juvenile delinquents was: 
 
(c) Consistent with the protection of the public 
interest, 
to 
remove 
from 
children 
committing 
delinquent acts the consequences of criminal behavior 
and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, 
care and rehabilitation. 
 
(d) To divert children from the juvenile justice 
system to the extent this is consistent with the 
protection of children and the public safety. 
. . . 
Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(c)-(d)(1993-94).  These provisions were to 
be liberally construed to promote the "best interests" of the 
child while also considering the child's parents and the public 
at large.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.01(2)(1993-94). 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
13
¶95 The legislative purpose indicated above is, however, 
in marked contrast to the expressed legislative purpose of the 
new JJC as it was amended and recreated at Wis. Stat. § 938.01. 
 While the expressed legislative purpose of the JJC continues to 
include some intervention for the benefit of the juvenile, in 
Wis. Stat. § 938.01 the legislature expressly stated a change in 
focus to include the illegal act committed by the juvenile, 
protection of the public from the illegal behavior of the 
juvenile, and the imposition of personal accountability on the 
juvenile offender.   
¶96 The applicable legislative intent and purpose section 
of the JJC provides in pertinent part that: 
 
(2) It is the intent of the legislature to promote a 
juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the 
problem of juvenile delinquency, a system which will 
protect 
the 
community, 
impose 
accountability 
for 
violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with 
competencies to live responsibly and productively.  To 
effectuate this intent, the legislature declares the 
following to be equally important purposes of this 
chapter: 
 
(a) To protect citizens from juvenile crime. 
 
(b) 
To 
hold 
each 
juvenile 
offender 
directly 
accountable for his or her acts. 
 
(c) To provide an individualized assessment of each 
alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile, in order 
to prevent further delinquent behavior through the 
development 
of 
competency 
in 
the 
juvenile 
offender . . . . 
 
(e) To divert juveniles from the juvenile justice 
system through early intervention as warranted, when 
consistent with the protection of the public. . . . 
 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
14
(g) To ensure that victims and witnesses of acts 
committed by juveniles that result in proceedings 
under this chapter are, consistent with the provisions 
of this 
chapter and 
the 
Wisconsin constitution, 
afforded the same rights as victims and witnesses of 
crimes committed by adults . . . .  
Wis. Stat. § 938.01 (emphases added).24 
¶97 As these sections illustrate, the JJC was intended not 
only to assist juvenile offenders in becoming more productive 
members of society, it was also designed to hold "juvenile 
offenders" "accountable" for the "crimes" committed against 
"victims," and thereby ensure the "protection of the public."  
Wis. Stat. § 938.01. 
¶98 From the provisions quoted above, it is apparent that 
the 
legislature 
intended 
to 
focus 
not 
primarily 
on 
rehabilitation, as in the old Children's Code, but also on 
punishment of the juvenile offender and protection of the 
community.  Such a balance of purposes is inconsistent with the 
old parens patriae theory of juvenile justice.  The State cannot 
"reach[] out its arms in a kindly way and provide[] for the 
protection of its children," while also attempting to protect 
the public from and hold the offenders accountable for their law 
violating behavior.  See Scholl, 167 Wis. at 509. 
                     
24 The majority attempts to avoid recognition of this 
significant change in language and emphasis between the JJC and 
old 
Children's 
Code. 
 
See 
Majority 
op. 
at 
16 
n.5.  
Interestingly, the majority references neither the "crime" 
language indicated above, nor the "personal accountability," 
i.e. "punishment," provisions of Wis. Stat ch. 938.  The 
majority does not, because it cannot do so and still reach its 
result.  
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
15
¶99 Such a balanced approach is, however, consistent with 
the approach of the adult criminal system, i.e. protection of 
the 
public, 
accountability 
for 
the 
offense, 
and 
the 
rehabilitative needs of the adult offender.  See McCleary v. 
State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 271, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971); State v. 
McMaster, 198 Wis. 2d 542, 551, 543 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1995), 
aff'd 206 Wis. 2d 30, 506 N.W.2d 673 (1996).  Thus, while the 
JJC may retain some effort to rehabilitate the juvenile offender 
for the juvenile offender's sake, that goal combined with the 
explicit concentration on accountability for the offense and 
community protection in order to "attack the juvenile criminal 
problem" 
directly 
parallel 
the 
considerations 
behind 
the 
criminal code.  See Report at i. 
¶100 Ironically, the majority opinion concedes that the 
purposes of the JJC express a more balanced approach to juvenile 
justice. 
 
However, 
the 
majority 
inexplicably 
fails 
to 
acknowledge the import of the provisions quoted above--that they 
demonstrate a shift from the parens patriae philosophy of former 
juvenile codes to a focus more in alignment with the criminal 
code.  Instead, the majority focuses primarily upon those 
provisions which promote rehabilitation and fails to discuss the 
similarity with the criminal code. 
¶101 The majority also seems to suggest that because 
Wisconsin was formerly only one of a few states which offered 
juvenile delinquents the option of a jury trial, the majority's 
conclusion is inevitable.  However, juveniles found delinquent 
in the other 49 states in the Union and the District of Columbia 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
16
are not subject to the provisions of the JJC.  Thus, other 
jurisdictions' juvenile laws are irrelevant for purposes of the 
court's inquiry under art. I, § 7. 
¶102 Having considered the expressed purposes behind the 
JJC, I turn then to an examination of the substantive provisions 
of the 
new juvenile code. 
 Accordingly, 
I 
examine the 
dispositions 
and 
potential 
long-term 
consequences 
of 
a 
delinquency 
adjudication 
to 
determine 
if 
the 
JJC 
"acts" 
criminal. 
¶103 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.34 provides juvenile courts with 
several diverse dispositional options.  Based on the court's 
evaluation of the seriousness of the act for which the juvenile 
is delinquent, the court may order participation in activities 
ranging from counseling to community service.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.34.  In addition, the circuit court may order the juvenile 
placed in, among others, a foster home, a "secure detention 
facility or juvenile portion of a county jail," a "secured 
correctional facility," or the Serious Juvenile Offender Program 
administered 
by 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections 
(the 
"Department").  See Wis. Stat. § 938.34.  Many of these 
dispositions parallel those available to adult courts in 
sentencing.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 973.03-.20.25 
                     
25 The majority cites at length to other tools available to 
the juvenile courts when considering a delinquency petition. 
These tools have parallels in the adult criminal code as well.  
Thus, their existence does nothing to lessen the conclusion that 
the JJC is effectively a criminal code for juveniles.  
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
17
¶104 Of particular concern is the ability of a juvenile 
court to place a juvenile in secure confinement.  For instance, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 938.34(4m), a juvenile who commits an 
act for which an adult may spend six months or more in jail may 
be confined to a secured correctional facility for a two-year 
period, thereafter renewable on an annual basis up to age 18, so 
long as the court determines that the juvenile is a "danger to 
the public and in need of restrictive custodial treatment."  
Wis. Stat. §§  938.34(4m)(b) & 938.355(4)(b).26  Thus, for 
committing a crime for which an adult may only spend six months 
incarcerated, a juvenile may actually spend up to eight years in 
a secured correctional facility.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 938.50, 
938.355(4)(a), 938.365. 
¶105 Another of the dispositional alternatives available to 
a juvenile court is placement of a youthful offender in the 
SJOP. See Wis. Stat. §§ 938.34(4h), 938.355(4)(b) and 938.538.  
Under this program, juveniles as young as 14 who commit any of a 
                     
26 A prima facie showing of public danger is made if the 
juvenile commits one of 25 listed felonies, or if the juvenile 
possesses, uses, or threatens others with a firearm.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 938.34(4m).  In addition, juveniles can be found to be a 
public danger if the juvenile presents a threat to the property 
of another.  See B.M. v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 12, 303 N.W.2d 601 
(1981)("In Interest of B.M."). 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
18
series of serious crimes27 can be placed with the Department.  
Similarly, those children ages 10 and above who are adjudged 
delinquent for violating Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01 (First-degree 
intentional homicide), 940.02 (First-degree reckless homicide), 
or 940.05 (Second-degree intentional homicide) can also be 
subject to the SJOP placement options.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.34(4h)(a). 
¶106 Once 
a 
dispositional 
order 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.34(4h) is applied to a juvenile, the Department is free to 
enforce a program of "[s]upervision, care and rehabilitation 
that is more restrictive than ordinary supervision," and may 
include utilization 
of 
components 
ranging 
from 
electronic 
monitoring to out-patient treatment to placement in a Type 1 
secured correctional facility with transfer to an adult prison. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 938.538(2)(a), (3).  In cases of secure 
confinement, the duration and location of that confinement is 
                     
27 Fourteen-year-old 
offenders 
who 
violate 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 939.31 (Conspiracy), 939.32(1)(a) (Attempt to commit crime 
carrying life imprisonment), 940.03 (Felony murder), 940.21 
(Mayhem), 940.225(1) (First-degree sexual assault), 940.305 
(Taking 
hostages), 
940.31 
(Kidnapping), 
941.327(2)(b)4 
(Tampering 
with 
household 
products 
and 
causing 
death 
of 
another), 943.02 (Arson of buildings; damage of property by 
explosives), 
943.10(2) 
(Burglary), 
943.23(1g),(1m) 
or 
(1r) 
(Armed carjacking; Armed carjacking causing great bodily harm; 
and Armed carjacking leading to death of another), 943.32(2) 
(Robbery by use or threat of use of a dangerous weapon), 
948.02(1) (First-degree sexual assault of a child), 948.025 
(Engaging in repeated acts of sexual assault of the same child), 
948.30(2) 
(Abduction 
of 
another's 
child), 
948.35(1)(b) 
(Solicitation of a child to commit a Class A felony), or 948.36 
(Use of a child to commit a Class A felony) are potential 
candidates for the Serious Juvenile Offender Program.  
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
19
dependent upon the age of the juvenile and the seriousness of 
the crime committed.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.538(3)(a)1.-1m.   
¶107 If the juvenile commits an act which would be a Class 
A felony, the dispositional order must apply until age 25 and 
the juvenile must be placed in a Type 1 secured correctional 
facility (if over 11), a secured child caring facility (if under 
12) or an adult prison (if over 17).  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.538(3)(a)(1).  For adult Class B felonies, the order must 
last at least five years, but the Department may utilize 
nonsecure 
placement 
at 
its 
discretion. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.34(4h)(a).  As long as the youthful offender is subject to 
the Department, the Department may cycle juveniles through 
various restrictive and nonrestrictive placements at will.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 938.538(3)(b).  
¶108 More importantly, I also note that a subsequent 
amendment to the JJC now allows the Department to freely 
transfer juveniles as young as 15 years old to an adult prison 
facility.  The Department can take this action without prior 
hearing.  Wisconsin Stat. § 938.357(4)(d)(1997-98) provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
The department may transfer a juvenile who is placed 
in a Type 1 secured correctional facility to the 
Racine 
youthful 
offender 
correctional 
["RYOC"] 
facility named in s. 302.0128 if the juvenile is 15 
years of age or over and the office of juvenile 
offender review in the department has determined that 
                     
28 When Wis. Stat. § 938.357(4)(d)(1997-98) was enacted, 
Wis. Stat. § 302.01 was amended to include the medium security 
penitentiary in Racine.  See 1997 Wis. Act 27, § 3879m. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
20
the conduct of the juvenile in the Type 1 secured 
correctional facility presents a serious problem to 
the juvenile or others.29 
¶109 Consequently, a 10-year-old who commits what would be 
an adult Class A felony will be subject to the Department until 
age 25 and may spend at least 10 years of that placement in an 
adult 
prison. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 938.34(4m); 
938.50; 
938.357(4)(b)(1); 938.357(4)(d)(1997-98).  Additionally, not 
only may the most serious juvenile offenders initially placed at 
Type 1 secured correctional facilities be transferred to the 
adult prison at Racine, it appears that juveniles committing 
less serious crimes initially placed at a Type 2 facility 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 938.34(4m) may also be transferred to a 
Type 1 facility,30 and from there to adult prison under Wis. 
Stat. § 938.357(4)(d)(1997-98).    
                     
29 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 302.01, the Racine Youthful 
Offender Correctional facility is defined as "[t]he medium 
security penitentiary at Racine."  
30 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.357(4)(b)(1) provides:   
If a juvenile whom the department has placed in a Type 
2 secured correctional facility . . . violates a 
condition of his or her placement in the Type 2 
secured 
correctional 
facility, 
the 
child 
welfare 
agency . . . shall notify the department and the 
department . . . may place the juvenile in a Type 1 
secured correctional facility under the supervision of 
the department without a hearing . . . . 
 
Accordingly, juveniles who are not serious offenders under 
the dictates of Wis. Stat. § 938.538 may be transferred to Type 
1 
facilities 
and 
from 
there, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.357(4)(b)1, to the adult facility at Racine.  
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
21
¶110 Finally, I also find significant the fact that the 
parallels between the JJC and the criminal code do not end with 
the placement of the new JJC next to the criminal code, the 
modified balanced approach of the new JJC, and the potential 
custodial disposition.  The JJC also makes many juvenile 
offenders 
subject 
to 
several 
post-adjudication 
continuing 
sanctions that are imposed on adults convicted of committing the 
same acts.   
¶111 Like adult felons, juveniles found delinquent for acts 
which would constitute a felony are subject to a lifetime ban on 
the possession of a firearm.  See Wis. Stat. §§  938.341, 
941.29(1)(bm).31  Like adult convicts, who can be impeached at 
subsequent 
court 
proceedings 
by 
their 
prior 
criminal 
convictions, juvenile offenders can be impeached through the 
introduction of their delinquency adjudications.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 938.35(1)(cm), 906.09.32  Like adult convicts, the juvenile 
delinquency adjudication can be used against the juvenile for 
                     
31 The majority dismisses this concern by noting that the 
sanction may ultimately be removed.  I find this distinction 
meritless.  To have the sanction that was previously imposed 
removed, the juvenile must initiate an action to prove that the 
juvenile is not likely to act contrary to the public safety in 
the future.  The juvenile must prove this absence of any 
proclivity to commit a bad act in the future (a difficult 
proposition for even the most zealous of advocates) by the 
preponderance of the evidence.  Thus, while an escape clause 
exists, it is one whose existence belies its effective use.  
32 The majority's resort to Wis. Stat. § 901.04 to dismiss 
this continuing sanction is unpersuasive since § 901.04 also 
applies to use of prior criminal convictions against adult 
offenders.  
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
22
sentencing purposes in subsequent criminal proceedings.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 938.35(1)(a).33  Like adult convicts, in the event a 
juvenile commits a sex-related offense, the juvenile can be 
required to register as a sexual offender for 15 years.  See 
§§ 301.45, 938.34(15m).34  Like adult convicts, that same 
juvenile can also be required to provide DNA samples to law 
enforcement.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 938.34(15), 165.77.35  Thus, as 
it was expressed at oral argument, these continuing sanctions 
"look[], talk[], [and] smell like adult criminal code, criminal 
consequences." 
¶112 However, the State disagreed that the parallel nature 
of these same "very serious consequences" for antisocial 
                     
33 The majority asserts that this sanction deserves no 
weight since the adjudication can only be used for the purpose 
of preparing the presentence investigation report.  The majority 
fails, however, to acknowledge the use of that report and its 
internal references to the juvenile adjudication.  
34 The majority responds to this continuing sanction by 
emphasizing that courts retain the discretion, upon subsequent 
petition of a juvenile delinquent, to waive the reporting 
requirement in some cases.  From this limited waiver provision, 
which I note expressly applies only where the goal of "public 
protection" is still vindicated, the majority concludes that 
"this is not criminal punishment and does not equate the JJC to 
a criminal code."  Majority op. at 25-26.  The majority's 
conclusion does not follow from its premise.  The reporting 
requirement continues to apply to all juveniles pending a 
waiver.  Even in the event a particular reporting requirement is 
waived, as to the group of remaining juveniles, the public 
safety, deterrence and punishment aspects of the reporting 
requirement are apparent.  Thus, the requirement, even as 
modified, continues to show the criminal nature of the juvenile 
code. 
35 The majority fails to mention this continuing sanction.  
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
23
behavior adds to the need for a jury trial in delinquency 
proceedings.  The State's justification for this position is 
that the continuing sanctions do not arise as part of a criminal 
conviction.  As the State indicated, "an individual goes through 
life having been adjudicated delinquent, but not having been 
found guilty of a felony."  As discussed above, however, that 
distinction is now a matter more of form than of substance.  
Thus, while the continuing sanctions listed above may arise in a 
delinquency adjudication and not a criminal sanction, the 
effective distinction, from the point of view of the juvenile 
and of society, is negligible.  The juvenile sex offender must 
inform his community of his prior bad acts just like the adult 
sex offender. 
¶113 The majority expends significant energy attempting to 
justify its result in the face of a juvenile's potential long-
term confinement under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, the sexual predator 
statute.  Because ch. 980 is not part of the JJC, I do not 
believe that the sexual predator statute is dispositive in one 
direction or the other of the art. I, § 7 inquiry.  
¶114 However, the juveniles in this case also challenge the 
JJC on equal protection grounds.  The majority never adequately 
addresses their argument.  The majority fails to acknowledge 
that a "sexually violent person" is defined as "a person who has 
been convicted of a sexually violent offense [with the option of 
a jury trial], has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually 
violent offense [no option of a jury trial], or has been found 
not guilty of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
24
by reason of insanity of mental disease, defect or illness [also 
with an option of a jury trial]."  The majority fails to 
identify a rational basis on which to rest its distinction 
between adults who become subject to ch. 980 confinement 
proceedings after a jury trial and juveniles who become subject 
to ch. 980 without the protections of a jury trial, because 
there is no such basis.  The legislature's search for a way to 
deal with juvenile crime leaves juveniles subject to a ch. 980 
proceeding with potential indefinite commitment and without the 
right to a predicate jury finding of guilt or innocence to which 
adults are entitled. 
¶115 The majority's response, that in order for a child 
adjudged delinquent to be committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
that child must also be dangerous due to a mental disorder, 
serves only as a smoke and mirrors attempt to avoid the real 
issue.  Adult convicts, those committed under the NGI, and 
juveniles adjudged delinquent all must be dangerous due to a 
mental disorder and likely to commit sexual violence.  Yet, of 
these three classes of individuals, it is only the juvenile 
adjudged delinquent that becomes subject to a ch. 980 petition 
without the benefit of a jury trial. 
¶116 As demonstrated above, Wisconsin's juvenile code has 
dramatically shifted its focus.  It has moved from providing 
paternalistic guidance to misguided youths to a broader balance 
of holding youthful offenders accountable for their criminal 
actions, protecting the public from juvenile crime, and making 
the offenders more productive members of society.  This change 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109.awb 
 
25
and the tools used to implement that change lead me to conclude 
that the JJC is a criminal code in purpose and effect and cannot 
be deemed a civil code designed solely to rehabilitate the 
juvenile. 
¶117 I conclude where the Juvenile Justice Study Committee 
began.  The first sentence of the Study Committee's report 
states: "[t]he accompanying recommendations will significantly 
change the way Wisconsin treats young lawbreakers."  I agree. 
¶118 The majority of this court requires that juveniles 
suffer the consequences of criminal convictions but withhold 
conferring the same protections as given to adults.  The 
"significant change" has resulted in a code that is criminal in 
nature.  We must either restore the juvenile court's primary 
rehabilitative approach or restore the constitutional right of 
juveniles to trial by jury.  Constitutionally, the court cannot 
have it both ways. 
¶119 Because the newly enacted JJC in purpose and effect is 
criminal in nature, it is subject to art. I, § 7 of the 
Wisconsin constitution.  I would declare the denial of a right 
to a jury trial in juvenile delinquency adjudications pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.31(2) 
unconstitutional 
on 
its 
face.  
Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶120 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson and Justice Janine P. Geske join this opinion. 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
2 
 
 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of Hezzie R., a 
person Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Hezzie R.,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent.  
FILED 
 
AUG 31, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
In the Interest of Luis H., a 
person Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Luis H.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant.  
 
 
In the Interest of Ryan D.L., a Person  
Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ryan D.L.,  
          Respondent-Appellant.  
 
 
 
Nos. 97-0676, 97-0685, 97-1109 
 
3 
MOTION for reconsideration.  Reconsideration denied. 
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.  On motion for reconsideration, in order to 
reiterate the import of this court's decision, we add the 
following language to the end of footnote 15 at __ Wis. 2d __, 
580 N.W.2d at 675, as follows: 
 
We intend, by severing the provisions allowing for 
transfer to an adult (Type 1) prison in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 938.538(3)(a)1, 
938.538(3)(a) 
1m, 
and 
938.357(4)(d), to prevent the placement of Serious 
Juvenile Offender Program participants in a Type 1 
prison, as defined in Wis. Stat. § 301.01(5).  All 
other provisions of the Serious Juvenile Offender 
Program remain unaffected by the severance.  A 
juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent may not 
be placed in an adult (Type 1) prison, since there is 
no opportunity for a trial by jury under the Juvenile 
Justice Code.   
 
¶2 
The juveniles' motion for reconsideration is denied 
without costs.