Title: Szubielski v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GERARD SZUBIELSKI, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 190, 2012 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. I.D. No. 0605023366 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  October 23, 2013 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  November 26, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices, and 
NOBLE, Vice Chancellor,1 constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 26th day of November 2013, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1) 
On January 1, 2007, a jury found the defendant-appellant, 
Gerard E. Szubielski (“Szubielski”) guilty of Assault in the First Degree 
pursuant to title 11, section 613 of the Delaware Code.   On March 2, 2007, 
the Superior Court granted the State’s motion to declare Szubielski a 
habitual offender and sentenced him to life imprisonment pursuant to title 
11, section 4214(b). 
                                          
 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supr. Ct. R. 2 and 4. 
2 
 
 
2) 
In this direct appeal, Szubielski has raised four claims of error:  
first, the prosecutor’s questions during cross examination implied that the 
defense had a duty to corroborate their asserted facts, which constituted 
impermissible burden shifting in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Delaware 
Constitution; second, the prosecutor’s closing argument repeatedly stating 
that there was no corroboration of Szubielski’s asserted facts was 
prosecutorial misconduct amounting to improper burden shifting in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 
1, section 7 of the Delaware Constitution; third, the prosecutor’s “improper 
comments” throughout the trial amounted to prosecutorial misconduct 
warranting reversal; and fourth, the repetitive errors by the prosecutor during 
trial amounted to a persistent pattern of prosecutorial misconduct 
compromising the integrity of the trial process, warranting reversal.   
 
3) 
We have concluded that there was no reversible error.  
Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
 
4) 
On May 25th, 2006, Officer Simpkins attempted to pull 
Szubielski’s vehicle over because it matched the description of a car 
reportedly used in another crime.2  Szubielski initially stopped after the 
                                          
 
2 The facts are taken from Szubielski’s opening brief. 
3 
 
officer activated her emergency equipment, but then drove away.  Officer 
Simpkins testified that she chased Szubielski from Route 40 to Route 1, at 
speeds in excess of 65 mph.  Szubielski lost control of his vehicle causing 
him to speed into a construction site.  Ron Cirillo, a flagger for the 
construction site, sustained serious injuries as a result of Szubielski’s car 
crashing into a dump truck and then striking him.   
5) 
Szubielski was apprehended shortly thereafter and charged with 
Assault in the First Degree pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 613.  The 
State asserted that Szubielski recklessly sped away at speeds in excess of 80-
90 miles per hour without his lights on.  He fled from the pursuing officer 
into a construction zone, lost control of his vehicle, hit Ron Cirillo, and then 
attempted to flee the scene on foot.   
6) 
At trial, Szubielski took the stand in his own defense.  On direct 
examination, Szubielski described the events and circumstances leading up 
to the point where he lost control of his vehicle: 
I noticed I had taken the turn a little too wide.  I couldn’t 
recover from it.  I went down into a grass median area with 
high grass.  Immediately as I went down in, I remember like 
water – it had water in it because the water shot out the sides 
like you were driving through a puddle.  I immediately came 
back up onto the on ramp. 
 
 
I proceeded to go enter Route 1.  I noticed my car 
thumping.  A loud thumping.  It was, thump, thump, thump. 
4 
 
The car was still driving.  I was driving it, I didn’t know what 
the sound was.  
 
7) 
He further testified that his girlfriend, Maggie, threw a soda in 
his face just before the crash: 
I was looking in the rearview mirror, Maggie’s screaming 
at me.  She’s yelling something about the lights, the lights.  My 
eyes are glued to the rearview mirror as the officer is chasing 
me.  I look down to the dashboard, I see the dashboard, the 
lights are dark.  I see the radio – excuse me, the radio and the 
air conditioning and heat control, everything was dark.  My 
whole entire dashboard was dark.  I immediately reached over 
and turn – thinking something shorted out. 
 
 
As I’m doing that, I get struck – I haven’t even looked 
forward yet.  I get struck on the right side of my face with an 
object.  It wasn’t hard to, like, knock me out or – but I 
immediately remember an ice –cold sensation of liquid on my 
face and on my hands where it splattered.  I – my right eye 
immediately started burning.  The liquid went into my eye. 
Partially into my left eye, but not as bad in my left as in my 
right.  I remember rubbing my eye, continuing rubbing my eye, 
and I looked up.  And as I looked up, all I see was brake lights 
right in front of me.  My vision was blurry but I could see 
bright red lights. 
 
 
8) 
On cross examination, the prosecutor questioned Szubielski 
about his “car troubles:” 
By [Prosecutor]: 
 
Q.  
Would it be fair to say that you haven’t done something 
since your arrest to ascertain what was wrong with the car that 
led those lights to go out without you turning them out? 
 
A. 
No, I haven’t.  What would I do? I’m incarcerated, I 
can’t do anything.  
5 
 
 
Q. 
Well, did you call your lawyer and say, look, there’s 
something wrong with the car, go get— 
 
A. 
I— 
 
Q. 
Let me finish. – go get the car checked out all right?  Go 
get the car checked out to see if there was some malfunction 
which would corroborate your story that the lights went out on 
their own? 
 
[Defense Attorney]: 
Your Honor, I’m going to 
object to the attorney/client privilege. 
 
[Prosecutor): 
Your Honor, I’m not—I’m asking 
him if he inquired, if he asked. I’m not asking— 
 
THE COURT: 
The objection is overruled. 
 
By [Prosecutor]: 
 
Q. 
Do you understand my question? 
 
A. 
Yes. 
 
Q. 
Did you do anything to find out if there was anything 
wrong with the car which caused some liquid to hit you in the 
face, cause your eyes to burn and corroborate your story here 
today? 
 
A. 
I did ask about the car several times.  I didn’t know the 
location of the car, where the car was taken.  I didn’t know 
anything. 
 
Q. 
And you didn’t know to ask, right? 
 
A. 
Huh? 
 
Q. 
You didn’t know to ask? 
 
6 
 
A. 
This is my first time going to trial.  To be honest with 
you, I was in trouble a long time ago and I took a plea bargain.  
This is all new to me.  
 
9) 
Further, on cross examination of Szubielski, the State compared 
his case to the O.J. Simpson trial: 
Q. 
Okay.  So how fast were you going right before the turn? 
 
A. 
As I made the turn, probably in the thirties. 
 
Q. 
Thirties.  You’re going – the thirties down Route 40 
approaching that traffic light, knowing that the cops are after 
you, and you’re saying you’re only going 30 miles an hour? 
 
A. 
I said 30 as I was making the turn. 
 
Q. 
Are you sure OJ wasn’t there on that Route 40?  Was it a 
high speed chase or a low speed chase?  You were going fast, 
weren’t you? 
 
10) 
In closing, the Szubielski’s attorney conceded all elements of 
the offense, except the defendant’s mental state at the time of the accident.  
Szubielski’s attorney stated “I’m not going to contend to you that he did not 
suffer serious physical injury . . . the question in this case is what was the 
defendant, Jerry Szubielski’s state of mind when this all happened.”  The 
defense’s position was that the crash was simply an accident, or at worst, 
criminal negligence.  
11) 
The State argued that Szubielski’s conduct was reckless in that 
he was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable 
7 
 
risk.  In rebuttal, the State argued that the defense failed to corroborate their 
version of the incident.   
12) 
The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict following 
two days of deliberations.  After the trial judge delivered an Allen charge, 
the jury found Szubielski guilty of Assault in the First Degree, pursuant to 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 613.  On March 2, 2007, the trial judge granted the 
State's motion, declaring Szubielski a habitual offender and sentencing him 
to life imprisonment pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(b).  
13) 
On August 14, 2007, Szubielski filed a pro se motion for post 
conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file 
an appeal, as well as other trial related matters.  The motion was granted and 
Szubielski, without being present, was re-sentenced to the same terms 
effective October 17, 2007. 
14) 
On June 2, 2008, Szubielski filed a second pro se motion for 
post conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and 
that he never received the sentencing order from the October 17, 2007 
sentencing hearing.  The Superior Court denied relief.  An untimely appeal 
to this Court was denied.  
15) 
On April 27, 2010, Szubielski filed his third motion for post 
conviction relief which raised three arguments.  First, he claimed that the 
8 
 
amended indictment was unauthorized, thus the court lacked jurisdiction. 
Second, he re-raised the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, arguing that 
the court’s failure to appoint counsel violated his Sixth Amendment rights. 
Lastly, he re-raised his claim that neither he nor his former counsel received 
a copy of the October sentencing order.  On May 16, 2011, a Commissioner 
recommended denial of all counts which the trial judge adopted on May 31, 
2011.  On June 15, 2011, Szubielski filed a notice of appeal from the denial 
of his third motion for post conviction relief. 
 
16) 
On January 24, 2012, this Court reversed and remanded the 
denial of Szubielski’s third motion for post conviction relief, directing that 
Szubielski be appointed counsel and re-sentenced.  On March 9, 2012 
Szubielski was ordered re-sentenced to the same terms and conditions.  
Counsel was appointed to represent Szubielski for the appeal.  This is 
Szubielski’s direct appeal from the March 9, 2012 order. 
17) 
As his first claim of error, Szubielski argues that the prosecutor 
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense when he asked 
Szubielski if he had made any efforts to confirm that his car had suffered 
mechanical failure.  Szubielski’s second related argument is that it was 
similarly improper for the prosecutor to reiterate that there was no 
corroboration of the alleged mechanical failures in the State’s rebuttal 
9 
 
argument.  Thus, the issue posed by Szubielski’s first two arguments can be 
summarized as follows:  did the prosecutor impermissibly shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant by asking Szubielski if he had made any efforts to 
corroborate his theory of mechanical failure and arguing in rebuttal that 
Szubielski had not? 
18) 
Szubielski’s defense was that he should not be held responsible 
because his striking of Mr. Cirillo was an accident due to a mechanical 
failure in his motor vehicle.  In presenting such a theory, Szubielski 
subjected himself to the prosecutor’s permissible questions and argument on 
the lack of corroboration that there had been a mechanical failure.3  
Consequently, Szubielski’s first two argument are without merit.   
 
19) 
Szubielski next argues that several allegedly-improper remarks 
made by the prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial.  Specifically, Szubielski 
argues first, that the prosecutor improperly “compared” his case to that of 
O.J. Simpson; second, that it was improper to ask Szubielski whether it was 
smart to attempt to evade police; and, third, that the prosecutor 
mischaracterized defense counsel’s closing argument.  Szubielski concedes 
that he did not object to any of these remarks at trial.  Accordingly, those 
allegedly improper remarks are reviewable only for plain error. 
                                          
 
3 See Benson v. State, 636 A.2d 907 (Del. 1994).   
10 
 
 
20) 
“An improper prosecutorial remark . . . requires reversal when 
it prejudicially affects substantial rights of the accused.”4  In order for a 
prosecutor’s improper comments to constitute plain error, they must be so 
clear, and the defendant’s failure to object must have been so inexcusable, 
that a trial judge would have had no reasonable alternative other than to 
intervene sua sponte and declare a mistrial or issue a curative instruction.5   
 
21) 
Szubielski argues that the prosecutor intended to “inflame the 
prejudices of the jury by associating him with O.J. Simpson.” Szubielski’s 
argument appears to be that any mention of O.J. Simpson is per se improper, 
citing several cases from other jurisdictions.6  In both DeFreitas v. Florida7 
and Minnesota v. Thompson,8 it was deemed misconduct to compare the 
defendant to O.J. Simpson.  In DeFreitas, the prosecutor directly compared 
the defendant’s behavior and the circumstances of the offense to Simpson.9  
In Thompson, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to Simpson during opening 
and closing arguments.10   
                                          
 
4 Boatson v. State, 457 A.2d 738, 743 (Del. 1983) (citation omitted).   
5 Caldwell v. State, 770 A.2d 522, 527-28 (Del. 2001) (citations omitted).   
6 See, e.g., Perdomo v. Florida, 829 So.2d 280, 285-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Barnes 
v. Kentucky, 91 S.W.3d 564, 569 (Ky. 2002).   
7 DeFreitas, III v. Florida, 701 S.2d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
8 Minnesota v. Thompson, 578 N.W.2d 734 (Minn. 1998).  
9 DeFreitas, III v. Florida, 701 S.2d at 601. 
10 Minnesota v. Thompson, 578 N.W.2d at 743. 
11 
 
22) 
In Szubielski’s case the prosecutor “did not characterize [him] 
as O.J. Simpson.”11  The reference to O.J. Simpson was improper, but is not 
a per se basis for reversal.  We have concluded that the prosecutor’s 
improper isolated reference to the O.J. Simpson case does not constitute 
plain error.   
23) 
Szubielski next argues that the following exchange with the 
prosecutor on cross-examination was improper: 
Q. 
 And you would agree with me, would you not, that back 
on May 25th of 2006 when this officer stopped you, 
right, that it would have been a prudent thing for you to 
have stopped; correct? 
A. 
Prudent? 
Q. 
A smart move on your part? 
A. 
Oh, correct, yes. 
Q. 
But you weren’t too smart that morning were you? 
A. 
I made a bad decision. 
 
24) 
To prove that Szubielski acted recklessly, the State was 
required to show that he was “aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk” that his conduct would “create[] a 
substantial risk of death to another person.”12  Accordingly, it was 
permissible for the prosecutor to ask whether Szubielski was aware that his 
course of conduct was unwise.  The State argues that “because the phrasing 
                                          
 
11 Perdomo v. Florida, 829 So.2d at 281 n.1 (declining to find prosecutorial misconduct 
because “[t]he prosecutor’s reference to O.J. Simpson trial, while ill-advised, did not 
characterize defendant as O.J. Simpson.”). 
12 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 231(e); 613(a)(3). 
12 
 
chosen by the prosecutor – after the defendant did not apparently understand 
the word ‘prudent’ – had the consequence of implying that the defendant 
acted foolishly does not necessarily render the prosecutor’s question 
improper.”  The record supports the State’s argument.  Szubielski’s 
argument to the contrary is without merit. 
 
25) 
Finally, Szubielski argues that the prosecutor misrepresented 
the defense counsel’s argument in closing rebuttal by stating:  “The defense 
apparently is arguing to you that there was no substantial risk of death so, 
therefore, find my client guilty of assault in the second degree.”  The record 
reflects that the prosecutor’s statement was factually inaccurate, because 
Szubielski’s counsel  stated:  “I’m not going to contend to you that he did 
not suffer serious physical injury . . . the question in this case is what was the 
defendant, Jerry Szubielski’s state of mind when this all happened.”  
Although the prosecutor’s statement is contradicted by the record, there was 
no defense objection to that remark.  The jury was given the standard 
instruction about the significance of counsel’s closing arguments.  The 
record does not support Szubielski’s argument that the isolated factual 
misstatement by the prosecutor, that was not objected to at trial, constituted 
plain error. 
 
 
13 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment 
of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice