Title: HAROLD SPITZER v. ANN MARIE SPITZER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HAROLD SPITZER v. ANN MARIE SPITZER1989 WY 143777 P.2d 587Case Number: 87-123Decided: 07/03/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
HAROLD SPITZER, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

ANN MARIE SPITZER, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Clifford J. 
Neilson and Dallas J. Laird, Casper, for appellant.

Larry R. Clapp 
of Clapp and Barksdale, P.C., Casper, for appellee.

Before BROWN,* C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,[fn**] URBIGKIT and 
MACY, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired June 29, 1988.

[fn**] Became 
Chief Justice June 30, 1988.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a divorce decree entered as a default judgment and which awarded alimony and a 
general property settlement without a hearing. Appeal is also taken from a nunc 
pro tunc order amending the divorce decree.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Appellant Harold 
Spitzer raises the following issues:

1. Whether Mr. Spitzer, 
who stands in contempt of the district court, has standing under the facts of 
this case to present an appeal to this Court;

2. Whether it was error 
for the district court to enter its divorce decree which included matters 
outside the divorce complaint without conducting an evidentiary hearing, by 
affidavit or otherwise, to consider the allegations made by appellee Ann Marie 
Spitzer in her complaint;

3. Whether it was error 
for the district court to include a provision in its divorce decree making the 
payment of $600,000 as and for alimony the obligation of Mr. Spitzer and his 
executor, trustee, or successor after his death; and

4. Whether it was error 
for the district court to amend its divorce decree by its March 16, 1987, nunc 
pro tunc order without a motion or notice to Mr. Spitzer. 

[¶4.]     The approach of 
appellee Ann Marie Spitzer to the question of this Court's jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal, raised by Mr. Spitzer in his first issue, is somewhat different. 
She phrases the issue as being:

1. Whether an appeal may 
be taken from a default judgment without there having first been a motion for 
relief under Rule[s] 55(c) and 60(b), W.R.C.P.

[¶5.]     On November 10, 1986, 
Ms. Spitzer filed a complaint praying that her marriage to Mr. Spitzer be 
dissolved, that the court equitably divide their assets and debts, that she be 
granted support while the action was pending, and that the court grant such 
other and further relief as it deemed just and proper. Ms. Spitzer also 
requested and received a temporary restraining order prohibiting Mr. Spitzer 
from disposing of or encumbering various assets of the parties during the 
pendency of the divorce action.

[¶6.]     Mr. Spitzer answered 
and counterclaimed for divorce. Whereas Ms. Spitzer requested an equitable 
division of the marital property, Mr. Spitzer requested that the property 
division be determined in relation to the property and assets each party brought 
into the marriage. Mr. Spitzer also moved to quash the restraining order. 
Although this may be somewhat speculative, the record strongly indicates that 
Mr. Spitzer then appropriated all the property of the parties which had any 
liquidity and moved it out of the jurisdiction.

[¶7.]     On January 12, 1987, 
Ms. Spitzer filed a notice of deposition in which she demanded that Mr. Spitzer 
produce certain items and documents relating to the parties' mutual assets and 
properties. She also filed a motion to compel, seeking court enforcement of this 
notice of deposition. The motion to compel was requested because, prior to that 
time, Ms. Spitzer had served Mr. Spitzer with a "First Request for Production of 
Documents" to which he had failed to respond. The deposition was scheduled for 
January 22, 1987. Mr. Spitzer did not appear at the deposition nor did he 
furnish, in any form, the various items and documents Ms. Spitzer had requested. 
As a result, Ms. Spitzer then filed a combined "Motion to Compel, Motion for 
Sanctions, and Motion for Attorney's Fees."

[¶8.]     On January 26, 1987, 
the district court conducted a hearing on all of Ms. Spitzer's motions and on 
Mr. Spitzer's motion to quash. On February 3, 1987, the district court entered 
an "Order and Judgment" granting all of Ms. Spitzer's motions and denying the 
motion to quash. This order and judgment provided in pertinent 
part:

1. That [Ms. Spitzer's] 
Motion to Compel, Motion for Sanctions, and Motion for Attorney's Fees shall be, 
and hereby is, granted. [Mr. Spitzer] 
shall have ten (10) days from the date of the Court's entry of the within Order 
and Judgment in which to produce the documents requested in [Ms. Spitzer's] 
First Request for Production of Documents, failing, in which, [Mr. Spitzer] 
shall be deemed in default, and [Ms. Spitzer] shall then be granted her divorce, 
and [Ms. Spitzer] shall retain any and all assets she deems are properly 
hers. [Ms. Spitzer] shall have Judgment against [Mr. Spitzer], and [Mr. 
Spitzer] shall pay to [Ms. Spitzer] the sum of $125.00 as and for costs 
associated with the deposition of [Mr. Spitzer], which was scheduled for January 
22, 1987, and which [Mr. Spitzer] did not attend, the amount for which, let 
execution issue.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶9.]     Mr. Spitzer again 
failed to respond, and on February 17, 1987, Ms. Spitzer filed an "Application 
for Default Judgment." The district court made its entry of default on that same 
day. Also on February 17, the district court entered the divorce decree as a 
default judgment. The decree granted Ms. Spitzer a divorce and provided for a 
property division and an alimony award. The decree noted that "[Mr. Spitzer] has 
willfully, intentionally, and without just cause violated the Order and Judgment 
filed herein on February 3, 1987, thereby mandating this Decree of Divorce and 
Judgment to be entered by default." The decree awarded Ms. Spitzer certain real 
and personal property, apparently consistent with the provision in the prior 
order and judgment that she would retain such property as she deemed to be 
properly hers. With respect to alimony, the decree provided that Mr. Spitzer was 
to pay Ms. Spitzer $600,000 in monthly installments of $5,000 and that Mr. 
Spitzer's obligation to pay would terminate upon the death of Ms. Spitzer. The 
decree further provided, however, that the alimony obligation "will be an 
obligation of [Mr. Spitzer], [Mr. Spitzer's] executor, trustee, or successor 
after [Mr. Spitzer's] death."

[¶10.]  Mr. Spitzer thereafter filed three 
motions to amend the judgment. Two of the motions asserted that certain of the 
property awarded Ms. Spitzer did not belong to Mr. Spitzer but instead were 
owned by his son and daughter and should be excluded from the decree. These 
motions were denied. The district court did grant the other motion which 
requested a change in the decree to reflect the correct marriage date for the 
parties.

[¶11.]  On March 10, 1987, Ms. Spitzer filed 
numerous motions contained within a single document. Included in that document 
was a motion for contempt alleging that Mr. Spitzer had directly and 
intentionally violated the restraining order and original decree by improperly 
converting property included in those orders and by failing to make alimony 
payments. After a hearing, the district court entered its order granting Ms. 
Spitzer's motion for contempt and ordered that a bench warrant be issued for the 
arrest of Mr. Spitzer and that a $300,000 cash bond be posted for his release in 
the event he was incarcerated pursuant to that bench warrant. Additional post 
judgment activities are reflected by the entry, upon application of Ms. 
Spitzer's counsel, of several orders styled "Order Nunc Pro Tunc," which amended 
the original decree by adding specificity to certain of the property 
descriptions and by awarding additional real property to Ms. Spitzer which had 
not been included in the original divorce decree. This appeal was then 
perfected.

JURISDICTION

[¶12.]  Ms. Spitzer contends that no jurisdiction 
lies for this appeal because Mr. Spitzer failed to initially seek relief at the 
district court level from the decree of divorce which was entered upon default. 
In support of her argument, Ms. Spitzer directs this Court to the cases of 
Wyoming Insurance Department v. Sierra Life Insurance Company, 599 P.2d 1360 
(Wyo. 1979), and Robison v. Sales and Use Tax Division, State Tax Commission, 
524 P.2d 82 (Wyo. 1974), which she believes hold that a default judgment may not 
be appealed until the complaining party has first moved to set aside the 
judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(c) and 60(b).1

[¶13.]  We do not question that these cases stand 
for the proposition asserted by Ms. Spitzer. We note, however, that Mr. Spitzer 
is not contesting the facts respecting his liability as established by the entry 
of default. In this respect, the following language in 9 J. Moore, B. Ward & 
J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 203.06 at 3-27 to 3-28 (2d ed. 1989), 
becomes pertinent:

In federal practice a 
party who suffers judgment by default in effect confesses the truth of the facts 
respecting the claim except for facts 
that in their nature require an examination of details, as, for example, the 
amount of damages when the claim is unliquidated. If he later wishes to draw 
in issue the facts thus confessed, he must move in the trial court to set aside 
the judgment; he cannot draw in issue the facts by appealing directly from the 
default judgment, because on the record they stand confessed. But while the 
scope of review is thus limited on appeal from a default judgment, the mere fact 
that the party has defaulted below does not defeat his right to appeal. He may, on direct appeal from the default 
judgment, attack it for want of jurisdiction in the court, or for failure of the 
complaint to state a claim, or for procedural irregularity in the course of the 
proceedings below.

(Emphasis 
added.) Here, while not questioning his liability, Mr. Spitzer's appeal contests 
the procedures in the district court, including specifically the award of 
property and alimony from an unliquidated claim. Thus, we are not convinced that 
Mr. Spitzer would be precluded from bringing this appeal by a failure to move to 
set aside the judgment. We believe, however, that Mr. Spitzer did in fact 
adequately seek the required relief from the trial court.

[¶14.]  We recognize that W.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) 
provides in applicable part:

(b) Motions and other 
papers.

(1) An application to the 
court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or 
trial, shall be made in writing, shall 
state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or 
order sought.

(Emphasis 
added.) Correspondingly, however, in 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2693 at 483-85 (1983), the authors 
state:

The courts continually 
struggle with the conflict between the need to combat delay and disregard of the 
rules and their desire to do justice in the case before them. * * * [S]everal 
courts have concluded that Rules 55(c) and 60(b) express a policy of liberality 
toward motions for relief from default entries and default judgments. Further, 
they have ruled that on a motion for relief from the entry of a default or a 
default judgment, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the party seeking 
relief.

[¶15.]  An examination of the record in this case 
discloses that Mr. Spitzer filed three motions to amend the divorce decree on 
February 26 and 27, 1987. Two of those motions relied upon W.R.C.P. 59(e),2 while the remaining motion recites 
no authority for its basis. In those motions, Mr. Spitzer asked the district 
court for partial relief from its final judgment. We hold, under the 
circumstances, that Mr. Spitzer substantially complied with W.R.C.P. 55(c) and 
60(b) and that such compliance was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this 
Court to consider his appeal from the default judgment entered against 
him.

[¶16.]  We are also asked to decide whether a 
person who is in contempt of the district court has standing to present his case 
on appeal. Mr. Spitzer raised this issue himself, apparently anticipating that 
it would be an issue in this appeal. Ms. Spitzer, however, did not present or 
argue this issue in defending against the appeal. Consequently, we will not 
dismiss the appeal nor address this issue in the absence of adversative briefing 
on the question. We do note, however, that the power to dismiss in such 
situations has been treated as discretionary. See 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error 
§ 239 (1962). In addition, the general rule has been stated 
that

where an appeal or writ 
of error is a matter of right, the party aggrieved by a judgment or decree is 
not deprived of the privilege of having it reviewed by the fact that he is in 
contempt of court.

4 C.J.S., Appeal 
and Error § 208 at 611 (1957).

DISPOSITION

[¶17.]  Mr. Spitzer contends the district court 
abused its discretion when it entered its default divorce decree awarding relief 
to Ms. Spitzer beyond that requested in her complaint without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing to determine what were essentially unliquidated damages. We 
agree.

[¶18.]  We have long recognized that default 
judgments are not favored in the law. Claassen v. Nord, 756 P.2d 189, 193 
(Wyo. 1988); Westring v. Cheyenne National 
Bank, 393 P.2d 119, 122 (Wyo. 1964). It is preferable that cases be 
tried on their merits. Mora v. Husky Oil Company, 611 P.2d 842, 849 (Wyo. 1980); Westring, 393 P.2d  at 122. In a proper case, however, we will recognize the propriety of a 
default judgment. Mora, 611 P.2d  at 849.

[¶19.]  Default, as a sanction for failure to 
comply with discovery orders, is expressly provided for by W.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(C), 
which states in relevant part:

(b) Failure to comply with 
order.

* * * * * 
*

(2) * * * If a party * * 
* fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery * * * the court in which 
the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, 
and among others the following:

* * * * * 
*

(C) An order striking out 
pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is 
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against 
the disobedient party[.]

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶20.]  A trial court has broad discretion in 
controlling discovery and in selecting the appropriate sanction for a willful 
violation of its discovery orders. Farrell v. Hursh Agency, Inc., 713 P.2d 1174 
(Wyo. 1986); Caterpillar Tractor Company v. 
Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276 (Wyo. 1983). When documents are demanded, a 
party is obligated to produce such documents unless he asserts a proper 
objection or moves for a protective order.3 Id. Under circumstances where a party simply 
refuses to produce documents for discovery, the trial court has the inherent 
power to protect the administration of justice by imposing sanctions. Penthouse 
International, Ltd. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 663 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1981). 
As stated in Penthouse International, Ltd.:

"Rule 37 sanctions must 
be applied diligently both `to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to 
warrant such a sanction, [and] to deter those who might be tempted to such 
conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.' National Hockey League v. 
Metropolitan Hockey Club, [Inc., 427 U.S. 639,] 643, 96 S.Ct. [2778,] 
2781[, 49 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1976) (per curiam)]." [(Quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. 
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763, 100 S. Ct. 2455, 2462, 65 L. Ed. 2d 488 
(1980)).]

* * * * * 
*

"* * * [T]he most severe 
in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to 
the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose 
conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might 
be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent." [(Quoting 
National Hockey League, 427 U.S.  at 643, 96 S. Ct.  at 
2781.)]

* * * [G]rossly negligent 
failure to obey a discovery order may justify severe disciplinary 
measures:

* * * * * 
*

"These sanctions serve a 
threefold purpose. . . . [A]lthough the most drastic sanctions may not be 
imposed as `mere penalties,' Hammon Packing Co[mpany] v. Arkansas, [15 Ann.Cas. 
645,] 212 U.S. 322, 29 S. Ct. 370, 53 L. Ed. 530 (1909), courts are free to 
consider the general deterrent effect their orders may have on the instant case 
and on other litigation, provided that the party on whom they are imposed is, in 
some sense, at fault. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"* * * The principal 
objective of the general deterrent policy * * * is strict adherence to the 
`responsibilities counsel owe to the Court and to their opponents,' 427 U.S.  at 640, 96 S. Ct.  at 2780. 
Negligent, no less than intentional, wrongs are fit subjects for general 
deterrence. And gross professional incompetence no less than deliberate tactical 
intransigence may be responsible for the interminable delays and costs that 
plague modern complex lawsuits." [(Quoting Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre 
Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1067, 49 A.L.R.Fed. 820 
(2d Cir. 1979).)]

Id. at 386-87 (citations 
omitted).

[¶21.]  The record in the instant case 
demonstrates that Mr. Spitzer repeatedly and blatantly failed to obey the 
district court's orders on discovery. Initially, Mr. Spitzer ignored the "First 
Request for Production of Documents," although this omission did not violate a 
court order and was not subject to Rule 37 sanctions. Ms. Spitzer then obtained 
an order enforcing the discovery request and requiring compliance with her 
notice of deposition. Mr. Spitzer, in cavalier disregard of the court order, 
failed to respond to either discovery effort. Accordingly, the district court 
entered the order and judgment providing Mr. Spitzer ten additional days to 
produce the discovery documents upon pain of default for failure to comply. Mr. 
Spitzer again failed or refused to respond, and the district court entered 
default pursuant to W.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(C).

[¶22.]  Although the entry of default for failure 
to comply with court mandated discovery is a harsh penalty, we are persuaded 
that the district court acted within its discretion in doing so in this case. We 
conclude that default was an appropriate method to address Mr. Spitzer's 
recalcitrance under the circumstances. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion with respect to the entry of default against Mr. 
Spitzer.

[¶23.]  Although we conclude the entry of default 
was appropriate in this case, we cannot justify the relief granted in the 
divorce decree operating as a default judgment. The distinction between an entry 
of default and a default judgment must here be recognized. Mora, 611 P.2d  at 
849. See generally 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra at §§ 2682 and 
2683, and W.R.C.P. 55(a) and (b). Entry of default is normally a clerical act 
which may be performed by the clerk of court, and it does not constitute a 
judgment. The entry of default generally forecloses the party found to be in 
default from making any further defense or assertion with respect to liability 
or an asserted claim. Zweifel v. State ex rel. Brimmer, 517 P.2d 493 (Wyo. 1974); 10 C. Wright, 
A. Miller & M. Kane, supra at § 2688. Although the entry of default 
generally establishes the fact of liability according to the complaint, it does 
not establish either the amount or the degree of relief. Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 1984); 6 J. Moore, W. 
Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 55.03[2] (2d ed. 
1988).

[¶24.]  The default judgment, on the other hand, 
in addition to the fact of liability, defines the amount of liability or the 
nature of the relief. This is generally done separately from the entry of 
default. Only in those situations where the damages sought are liquidated and 
claimed in the complaint may the court grant relief without further proceedings. 
This principle is encompassed in W.R.C.P. 54(c), which provides in part that 
"[a] judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount 
that prayed for in the demand for judgment."4 In certain circumstances, a claimed 
liquidated sum can be awarded by the clerk of court. W.R.C.P. 55(b)(1).5 Where the damages or relief claimed 
are unliquidated or not specified with certainty in the complaint, further 
proceedings are indicated. W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) provides for entry of default 
judgment by the court. It reads, in relevant part:

If, in order to enable 
the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take 
an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the 
court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary 
and proper, and shall accord a right of trial by jury to the parties when and as 
required by any statute.

[¶25.]  In Farrell, 713 P.2d  at 1179, we noted, 
with respect to the permissive nature of the above rule, 
that

"Rule 55 does not require 
that testimony be presented as a prerequisite to the entry of a default 
judgment. However, when it seems advantageous, a court may conduct a hearing to 
determine whether to enter a judgment by default." 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2688 (1983).

* * * The determination 
of whether a hearing is necessary under Rule 55(b)(2) is also within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.

The scope of 
discretion afforded the trial court under the rule, however, does not extend to 
the entry of a default judgment where the damages are not liquidated or 
articulated with certainty. In Adel, 681 P.2d  at 892, we 
said:

The burden, however, is 
upon those seeking more than mere nominal damages to prove their damages. The 
requirement of Rule 55(b)(2), W.R.C.P., of a hearing with respect to damages 
which are not liquidated is consistent with the rule of those cases. The default 
permitted by a defendant does not concede the amount demanded for unliquidated 
damages.

(Citations 
omitted.) See also Midway Oil Corporation v. Guess, 714 P.2d 339, 346 
(Wyo. 1986) 
(quoting in part and applying the above principle).

[¶26.]  In issuing the divorce decree (here, as a 
default judgment), the district court was required to proceed in accordance with 
Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (1977), which provides:

In granting a divorce, 
the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears 
just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and 
the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom 
the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the 
benefit of either party and children. The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either 
party.

Essentially, the 
statute assigns to the court the function of making a just and equitable 
disposition of the property of the parties, and it allows for the provision of 
reasonable alimony. In order to accomplish its function under the statute, the 
court must have adequate information regarding the nature and extent of the 
property of the parties, including specific information identifying the 
property, such as record ownership to titled or real property. Additionally, in 
making an alimony award, the court must have information regarding the ability 
to pay. Where this information is essential for the entry of a proper judgment, 
the court abuses its discretion by simply entering a form of judgment tendered 
by one of the parties.

[¶27.]  In the instant case, the divorce decree 
contains the only itemization or listing of property of the parties. The record 
is otherwise devoid of anything that identifies, in accordance with the prior 
order and judgment, "any and all assets she deems are properly hers." Further, 
what assets a party to a divorce deems to belong to that party may not be 
particularly relevant, as the property still must belong to the parties. Where, 
as here, the trial court delegates the property division to a party, it 
abdicates its judicial function. The district court's statutory directive to 
make a just and equitable disposition of the parties' property and to provide 
for reasonable alimony cannot properly be assigned to one of the parties. Unless 
the parties have evidenced an agreement regarding alimony and a property 
division, the district court fails to perform its function by making such a 
determination without receiving evidence. Thus, we determine in this case that 
the district court abused its discretion in entering the divorce decree, as a 
default judgment encompassing a property division and alimony award, absent a 
hearing. Although the entry of default and Ms. Spitzer's grant of divorce will 
stand, we reverse for an evidentiary hearing respecting the property division 
and award of alimony.

[¶28.]  Mr. Spitzer's remaining issues concern 
the alimony provision and one of the nunc pro tunc orders amending the property 
division of the divorce decree. Our holding requiring a hearing on the property 
division effectively disposes of any problems with the nunc pro tunc amendments 
adjusting the property award. Although the amount of the alimony award will 
similarly be subject to an evidentiary hearing, the nature of that provision 
presents a problem that will likely again be presented to the district court. It 
is proper for an appellate court to address questions that are bound to arise 
again. McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1286 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶29.]  The problem with the alimony provision is 
reflected in paragraph 7 of the divorce decree, which provides in 
part:

The obligation to pay the 
total sum of Six Hundred Thousand Dollars ($600,000.00) under the terms as 
hereinbefore set forth shall be an obligation of [Mr. Spitzer], [Mr. Spitzer's] 
executor, trustee, or successor after [Mr. Spitzer's] 
death.

Mr. Spitzer 
asserts that such a provision is contrary to Wyoming case law. Ms. Spitzer contends that, 
inasmuch as Mr. Spitzer has not made a full disclosure of the assets acquired 
during the marriage, the alimony provision should be considered as an integral 
part of the adjustment of property rights and should not terminate upon the 
death of either party.

[¶30.]  In Warren 
v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525, 527 (Wyo. 1961), we 
stated:

Alimony granted as 
support and maintenance terminates upon the death of either of the parties. This 
is not true, however, of payments which are themselves an integral part of the 
adjustment of property rights.

(Citations 
omitted.) See also Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Wyo. 1985), and McMillan v. McMillan, 702 P.2d 1279, 1282 
(Wyo. 1985). 
In this case, there is no question that the alimony award was intended as 
support and maintenance rather than as an integral part of the adjustment of 
property rights. Paragraph 7 of the decree expressly 
provided:

[Mr. Spitzer] shall pay 
to [Ms. Spitzer] the sum of Six Hundred Thousand Dollars ($600,000.00) as and for alimony, and not for property 
settlement, as hereinbefore provided * * *.

(Emphasis 
added.) Upon remand, however, if the district court makes a similar award 
intending it to be alimony, the provision should be designed to terminate upon 
the death of either party in order to be effective as intended and to avoid 
further contest as to its operation. We also note, as another reason to avoid 
any ambiguity, that certain tax consequences flow from the construction of such 
provisions by the Internal Revenue Service.

[¶31.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CARDINE, C.J., filed an opinion 
partially concurring and dissenting.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.R.C.P. 55(c) 
provides:

Setting aside 
default. 
- For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered may likewise set it aside in accordance 
with Rule 60(b).

W.R.C.P. 60(b) 
provides in pertinent part:

Mistakes; inadvertence; 
excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. - On motion, and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment.

2 W.R.C.P. 59(e) 
provides:

Motion to alter or amend 
a judgment. - A motion to alter or 
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the 
judgment.

3 In this case, Mr. 
Spitzer did not assert an objection or make a motion for a protective 
order.

4 See Zweifel, 517 P.2d  at 
502, for an elaboration on the theory underlying W.R.C.P. 54(c). See also 
Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wn.2d 612, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989) (a default judgment 
granting relief beyond that sought in complaint without notice and an 
opportunity to be heard denied due process).

5 According to 10 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra at § 2683, an entry of default judgment 
on a liquidated claim may be made by the clerk of court only in those cases 
where the defaulting party failed to appear and not where the default involves a 
failure to participate in subsequent stages of the 
proceedings.

CARDINE, Chief Justice, 
partially concurring and dissenting.

[¶32.]  I concur in the opinion of the court 
except for that part holding that the district court abused its discretion 
because it entered judgment without a hearing and without

"adequate information 
regarding the nature and extent of the property of the parties, including 
specific information identifying the property, such as record ownership to 
titled or real property. Additionally, in making an alimony award, the court 
must have information regarding the ability to pay."

In this case the 
appellant steadfastly refused to give over to the wife and to the district court 
information consisting of income tax returns; financial statements; records 
pertaining to ownership of stocks, bonds, or cash; bank statements; information 
pertaining to assets of the marital estate in the possession of others; 
information pertaining to checking accounts; information pertaining to any 
assets in which the husband claimed an interest; life insurance policies; 
information pertaining to pension, profit sharing, and other retirement plans; 
and information pertaining to indebtedness owed to the 
husband.

[¶33.]  I would hold that a hearing should be 
held at which the wife and husband might present their evidence. If the husband 
chooses not to appear or offer evidence, he is bound by the evidence received, 
and the court could enter an appropriate judgment based upon the only evidence 
available. Under the holding of the court as presently articulated, by refusing 
to disclose information, appellant can prevent forever entry of 
judgment.