Title: State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor City Council

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor City Council, 105 Ohio St.3d 372, 2005-Ohio-2163.] 
 
 
[THE STATE EX REL.] DUNCAN, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF MENTOR CITY 
COUNCIL ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor City Council, 105 Ohio St.3d 372, 
2005-Ohio-2163.] 
Mandamus sought to compel city of Mentor to commence appropriation 
proceedings to determine the amount for the city’s taking of relator’s 
property — City’s summary-judgment motion denied, when. 
(No. 2004-1793 ─ Submitted February 15, 2005 ─ Decided May 18, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No. 2003-L-041, 2004-Ohio-
5009. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal as of right from an order denying a writ of 
mandamus to compel appropriation proceedings against a landowner who wishes 
to build a residence on his property.  Because the court of appeals erred in 
granting summary judgment on behalf of appellees, we reverse and remand. 
{¶ 2} In 1984, the Shiloh Park Subdivision was created in Mentor, Ohio.  
The property was conveyed subject to various easements, restrictions, covenants, 
and conditions.  In 1994, appellant, Richard A. Duncan, purchased a parcel in the 
subdivision at a sheriff’s sale for $1,000.  Duncan’s parcel contains a large 
drainage creek in which Mentor has easement rights. 
{¶ 3} In August 2002, Duncan applied to build a single-family residence 
on that portion of his subdivision parcel adjacent to the city’s easement.  The city 
engineer requested that Duncan provide topographic information and details 
concerning groundwater in the event Duncan’s plan included a basement.  Duncan 
never provided the requested information.  Duncan noted that although he had 
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discussed a sale of his parcel with abutting property owners, they would not likely 
agree on a price.  Even though Duncan had purchased the property for $1,000, he 
was asking $11,000 from Mentor to purchase the land.  The city noted that if 
Duncan’s offer were more reasonable, the city might respond. 
{¶ 4} On January 30, 2003, appellee Municipal Planning Commission of 
Mentor denied Duncan’s application to build a residence on the property.  The 
planning commission determined that the subdivision’s declaration of covenants, 
conditions, and restrictions had designated Duncan’s parcel a common area and 
not a buildable lot. 
{¶ 5} On February 28, 2003, Duncan filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Lake County for a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, the Mentor 
City Council, the Mentor Planning Commission, and the council and commission 
members, to commence appropriation proceedings “to determine the amount by 
which the value of [his] use of the property has been diminished as a consequence 
of the City’s unconstitutional enforcement against Duncan’s property of its zoning 
ordinances or other ordinances.”  Duncan alleged that he had been denied 
“economically viable use of his land (totally and/or partially).”  Duncan attached 
an affidavit verifying the facts alleged in his complaint. 
{¶ 6} After the court of appeals denied appellees’ motion to dismiss 
Duncan’s complaint, appellees answered and moved for summary judgment.  
Appellees claimed that no taking of Duncan’s property had occurred because they 
did not apply any zoning ordinance in denying his application to build a house 
and they had not denied Duncan all economically viable use of his land.  In his 
memorandum in opposition, Duncan claimed that he is being denied a permitted 
use of his lot.  He specified by affidavit that he did not provide the requested 
topographic information to the city because he was told it was not yet required.  
Duncan also stated in his affidavit that he had read the covenants before he 
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purchased the property and that the lot had never been owned by any 
homeowners’ association. 
{¶ 7} On September 20, 2004, the court of appeals granted appellees’ 
summary-judgment motion and denied the writ.  The court of appeals held that the 
planning commission’s reliance on restrictive covenants in a subdivision 
declaration was insufficient to warrant an appropriation action because the 
commission was not enforcing any governmental regulation when it rendered its 
decision ─ i.e., the private nature of the covenants in the subdivision declaration 
precluded a taking by the city. 
{¶ 8} This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 9} Duncan asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting 
appellees’ summary judgment motion and denying his claim for a writ of 
mandamus.  Summary judgment is appropriate if (1) no genuine issue of any 
material fact remains, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can came to but 
one conclusion, and construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the 
nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion 
for summary judgment is made.  Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio 
St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 364 N.E.2d 267. 
{¶ 10} In order to be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus, Duncan 
has to establish a clear legal right to compel appellees to commence an 
appropriation action, a corresponding clear legal duty for appellees to institute this 
action, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  
State ex rel. Savage v. Caltrider, 100 Ohio St.3d 363, 2003-Ohio-6806, 800 
N.E.2d 358, ¶ 8. 
Mandamus:  Appropriation 
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{¶ 11} “The United States and Ohio Constitutions guarantee that private 
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”  State ex 
rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 63, 765 N.E.2d 345; Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Section 19, Article 
I, Ohio Constitution.  “Mandamus is the appropriate action to compel public 
authorities to institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of 
private property is alleged.”  Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 63, 765 N.E.2d 345. 
{¶ 12} The court of appeals determined that Duncan’s mandamus claim 
was not yet ripe because the planning commission’s denial of Duncan’s 
application to build a single-family home on his lot did not constitute a final 
determination concerning the application of regulations to the property.  The court 
of appeals reasoned that the planning commission’s decision was based on the 
private restrictive covenants of the subdivision declaration rather than on the 
application of any Mentor zoning ordinance.  According to the court of appeals, 
“[t]he proper forum for relator to litigate the question of the interpretation and 
application of the subdivision declaration would be the Lake County Court of 
Common Pleas in a declaratory judgment action.” 
{¶ 13} The court of appeals erred in so holding.  In finding that Duncan’s 
claim is not ripe, the court of appeals relied on Williamson Cty. Regional 
Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City (1985), 473 U.S. 172, 105 
S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126, and Karches v. Cincinnati (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 
526 N.E.2d 1350.  In Williamson, 473 U.S. at 186, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 
126, the Supreme Court of the United States held that “a claim that the application 
of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until 
the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a 
final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”  
Similarly, in Karches, 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 526 N.E.2d 1350, paragraph two of the 
syllabus, this court held that “[a] prerequisite to a determination that an actual 
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controversy exists in a declaratory judgment action is a final decision concerning 
the application of the zoning regulation to the specific property in question.” 
{¶ 14} Neither Williamson nor Karches, however, involved a mandamus 
action.  Williamson concerned a federal civil rights action under Section 1983, 
Title 42, U.S.Code, and Karches involved declaratory-judgment actions. 
{¶ 15} Moreover, the planning commission has reached its “final 
decision” concerning Duncan’s application:  it has denied the application.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 341-342, 
699 N.E.2d 1271 (taking alleged by city’s denial of demolition permit). 
{¶ 16} Furthermore, the court of appeals’ conclusion that the subdivision 
declaration constituted a purely private matter was erroneous.  Under Mentor 
Code of Ordinances 152.012, “No land shall be subdivided within the corporate 
limits of the City of Mentor until:  [A] The subdivider shall submit plats as 
described by this chapter; [B] Said plats have been approved as provided herein; 
and [C] The approved plats are recorded in the County Record of Plats.”  Cf. R.C. 
711.09(A)(1) (“when a city planning commission adopts a plan for the major 
streets or thoroughfares and for the parks and other open public grounds of a city 
or any part of it, * * * then no plat of a subdivision of land within that city or 
territory shall be recorded until it has been approved by the city planning 
commission and that approval endorsed in writing on the plat”).  Because some 
municipal approval of the subdivision is contemplated, restrictive covenants 
contained in the subdivision declaration are not completely “private.”  Cf. Canton 
v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, ¶ 28, quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th Ed.Rev.1999) 371 (“A ‘restrictive covenant’ is a 
‘private agreement, usu. in a deed or lease, that restricts the use or occupancy of 
real property, esp. by specifying lot sizes, building lines, architectural styles, and 
the uses to which the property may be put’ ”). 
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{¶ 17} Therefore, insofar as Mentor approved the creation of the 
subdivision and applied covenants contained in the subdivision declaration to 
deny Duncan’s application to build a single-family residence on his property, a 
compensable taking might have occurred.  This conclusion is consistent with 
comparable authority.  See, e.g., 1 Sackman & Van Brunt, Nichols on Eminent 
Domain (3d Ed.2004) 1-243, Section 1.42[2], citing Price v. Keene (1982), 122 
N.H. 840, 451 A.2d 382 (“the city’s approval of a subdivision plan which 
eliminated a landowner’s right-of-way to her property was a ‘taking,’ entitling the 
landowner to just compensation”). 
{¶ 18} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand for further proceedings.  Genuine issues of material fact 
remain regarding whether there was a compensable taking, e.g., whether the  
planning commission’s application of subdivision covenants to deny Duncan’s 
application substantially advanced legitimate state interests and whether that 
action denied Duncan all economically viable use of his property.  See State ex 
rel. Trafalgar Corp. v. Miami Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 104 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-
Ohio-6406, 819 N.E.2d 1040, ¶ 25, quoting Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 63, 765 
N.E.2d 345 (“a compensable regulatory taking could ‘occur either if the 
application of the zoning ordinance to the particular property is constitutionally 
invalid, i.e., it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies 
the landowner all economically viable use of the land’”).  (Emphasis sic.) 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur separately. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
January Term, 2005 
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{¶ 19} I concur in the judgment of the majority.  However, I write to 
emphasize that we are simply finding that summary judgment was premature.  We 
are not taking a position on the merits of the case.  Issues of whether the 
covenants applied to Duncan, Duncan’s knowledge of the covenants when he 
purchased the land for a mere $1,000, and the purpose of the covenants for a 
common area all involve concerns about the state’s legitimate interest in 
regulating use of the land.  Similarly, the city’s offer to purchase Duncan’s 
property may be evidence of the economic viability of the land.  These issues 
need to be resolved on remand. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Richard A. Duncan, pro se. 
 
Mazanec, Raskin & Ryder Co., L.P.A., John T. McLandrich, and David J. 
Sipusic; Richard A. Hennig, Mentor Law Director, for appellees. 
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