Title: New Jersey v. Szemple

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

                       State v. Craig Szemple (A-70-19) (084182)

Argued March 2, 2021 -- Decided June 23, 2021

SOLOMON, J., writing for the Court.

       The Court considers whether the State can be compelled to search its file to
determine the existence of information in this post-conviction context, where defendant
Craig Szemple seeks to obtain any statements or reports memorializing any interviews
with his ex-wife, Theresa Boyle, that may have occurred after a letter admitting to the
1975 murder of Nicholas Mirov, believed to be written by defendant, was produced by
Theresa’s father in 1992, during defendant’s first trial for Mirov’s murder.

       Mirov disappeared in 1975, and defendant told members of Mirov’s family that he
had driven Mirov to a bus station so that Mirov could go to New York City. Four months
after Mirov disappeared, police discovered a body in the woods. Police did not identify
the body until sixteen years later, when defendant’s brother, under questioning about a
different homicide, revealed defendant’s prior admission to killing Mirov.

       During defendant’s first trial, defendant’s father-in-law, Michael Boyle, provided
the State with the letter he claimed to have discovered in April 1991 while helping his
daughter move out of the home she had shared with defendant until his arrest for a
different murder. The letter reads in part: “My first hit was an act of treachery, the
ultimate deceit. 4 bullets in the back 1 in the neck and a broken promise made at the
parting of the oncoming river.”

        Defendant’s first trial ended in a mistrial, and he was re-tried in 1994. The State
admitted into evidence the letter, testimony by a handwriting expert that defendant
authored the letter, the .32 caliber bullets found lodged in the victim’s neck and the base
of the tree where the victim’s remains were found, and the testimony of defendant’s
brother that (a) his family kept a .32 caliber handgun in the family store where defendant
worked, and (b) that defendant confessed to shooting the victim. Defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder.

        After an unsuccessful direct appeal, defendant filed a for post-conviction relief
(PCR) in 1999, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and arguing that trial counsel
failed to hire a handwriting expert and neglected to test for fingerprints or DNA on the

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letter. The PCR court denied defendant’s petition, finding trial counsel was a highly
experienced criminal attorney who chose to impeach the letter as a forgery and not seek
expert opinions that may have implicated defendant.

        In 2016, nearly twenty-five years after disclosure of the letter and defendant’s
conviction, defendant’s attorney wrote to the Morris County Prosecutor’s office
requesting copies of any statements or reports memorializing interviews with Theresa
following Michael’s production of the letter. The State responded that defendant had no
right to post-conviction discovery. More than two years after the State’s response, and
twenty-seven years after disclosure of the letter, defendant filed what he titled “Notice of
Motion to Compel Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence Necessary for Defendant to File a
Motion for a New Trial” in December 2018. Defendant claimed that good cause existed
to compel the State to produce any requested statements or reports that might exist
because, in 1991, three years before defendant’s re-trial, detectives interviewed Theresa
regarding an unrelated investigation of a business defendant owned.

       Noting that the State had provided defendant with a redacted nine-page copy of
Theresa’s 1991 interview in post-indictment discovery, the court denied defendant’s
request, which the court treated as “a second petition for post-conviction relief” and
found that it was procedurally barred by Rule 3:22-4. The court also acknowledged that
defendant’s motion could be construed as a motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence, which may be filed at any time; citing State v. Marshall,  148 N.J. 89
(1997), however, the court held that defendant failed to establish good cause to compel
discovery. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded. Relying on Rule 3:13-
3(b)(1)(F) and (G) and the constitutional requirement to disclose exculpatory evidence
under Brady, the Appellate Division held that the State is obligated to produce discovery
beyond defendant’s conviction. The Court granted certification.  241 N.J. 520 (2020).

HELD: Because defendant was aware of the letter and the circumstances relevant to this
appeal for nearly twenty-five years, yet provides no evidence -- and made almost no
effort to uncover evidence -- that police interviewed Theresa after production of the
letter, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s post-conviction
discovery request.

1. The Court notes the extraordinary nature of the motion at issue, which is premised on
defendant’s claim that, because detectives interviewed Theresa before his trial regarding
an unrelated matter involving a business that he owned, the State should be compelled to
search its file for evidence that officers interviewed Theresa after production of the letter.
Significantly, defendant knew of the first interview before his trial. He therefore had all
of the information on which he now predicates his discovery request prior to his trial, and
Rule 3:13-3(f) would have provided a ready remedy, had his motion been made at trial.
Moreover, defendant could have made the present inquiry at any time since trial, but he

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failed to raise the issue presented here in either his direct appeal or in his 1999 PCR
petition, even though they focused on the letter. (pp. 13-14)

2. It is true that, if such a second interview took place, the State would have been obliged
to include any record made of it among its other automatic post-indictment materials
pursuant to Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(F) and (G). And, if the interview took place and was
exculpatory, its disclosure would have been mandatory under both Brady and Rule 3:13-
3(b)(1). The continuing duty to disclose such materials imposed by Rule 3:13-3(f),
however, ends with a defendant’s conviction. Requests for discovery made post-
conviction -- even if the requested materials should have been turned over automatically
post-indictment -- are not granted automatically under either the Court Rules or Brady.
Rather, post-verdict discovery requests fall within the discretion of the trial court: a trial
court’s inherent power to order discovery extends to post-conviction proceedings “when
justice so requires,” Marshall,  148 N.J. at 269, but courts invoke that discretion “only in
the unusual case,” id. at 269-70, in recognition of the importance of finality, see id. at
152. Here, defendant argues that this discovery motion should be analyzed differently
because it is a motion in anticipation of a new trial rather than a PCR petition. The Court
therefore reviews the relevant standards. (pp. 15-17)

3. PCR is New Jersey’s equivalent of the federal writ of habeas corpus. Under Rule
3:22-4(b)(2)(B), even a timely second or subsequent PCR petition “shall be dismissed
unless . . . it alleges on its face . . . that the factual predicate for the relief sought could not
have been discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and the facts
underlying the ground for relief, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,
would raise a reasonable probability that the relief sought would be granted.” Although
procedural roadblocks may be relaxed to avoid fundamental injustice, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized that doing so requires balancing the competing interests of finality
and fundamental fairness. Unlike petitions for post-conviction relief, “[a] motion for new
trial based on the ground of newly-discovered evidence may be made at any time.” R.
3:20-2. But like a petition for PCR, the movant seeking a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence must demonstrate that the evidence is, indeed, newly discovered. A
new trial is warranted only if the evidence is (1) material to the issue and not
merely cumulative or impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not
discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably
change the jury’s verdict if a new trial were granted. (pp. 17-21)

4. Comparison of the PCR petition and new trial motion standards reveals that, although
the trial court incorrectly categorized defendant’s motion as a second PCR petition, the
motion must fail because defendant cannot satisfy the “reasonable diligence” requirement
common to both motions. Nor has defendant made any showing that discovery should be
granted in the interest of justice because a record of the hypothetical interview might
constitute exculpatory evidence. Courts would not require a person who is probably
innocent to languish in prison because the exculpatory evidence was discoverable and

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overlooked, but a post-conviction request for even purported Brady materials must make
a threshold showing that the requested materials are, in fact, Brady materials. Here,
defendant has not made the requisite showing that the requested material should be
considered as Brady material. (pp. 21-25)

5. Under the unusual circumstances presented here, the Court finds defendant’s failure to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 3:20-2 -- the motion in support of a new trial that would
be the ultimate use to which any interview-related discovery would be put -- sufficient to
resolve the matter. There is no freestanding right to post-verdict discovery under the
Court Rules, and so analysis of any motion for such discovery must therefore necessarily
consider the proposed use to which the discovery would be put. If it is impossible for
defendant to prevail on his ultimate claim for relief -- even should the requested
discovery prove favorable to his cause -- then there is no need to separately analyze the
discovery request, as the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in United States v.
Silva-Arzeta,  602 F.3d 1208, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 2010). The Court reviews that case in
detail and similarly finds that granting defendant’s discovery motion here “would be a
useless act” because he cannot possibly satisfy the “reasonable diligence” prong of the
standard for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. In sum, although the trial
court erred in labeling defendant’s motion as a PCR petition, the motion can fare no
better under the standard for new trials because, when such a motion is based on “newly
discovered evidence,” a defendant must show “reasonable diligence.” (pp. 25-28)

6. For completeness, the Court reviews jurisprudence governing post-trial discovery
motions. In Marshall, the Court considered under what standard a request for discovery
made in connection with a PCR petition should be evaluated to determine whether a
particular case was an “unusual case” in which a post-conviction discovery request
should be granted. See  148 N.J. at 270. Defendant challenges the applicability of the
Marshall standard in the non-PCR context of his motion for discovery that might support
a new trial. The Court finds defendant’s challenge unpersuasive. It is appropriate to turn
to the standard applied to discovery requests in the PCR setting for guidance in the
motion-for-a-new-trial context, given the lack of caselaw specific to this circumstance
and the “reasonable diligence” requirement shared by the standards. (pp. 29-30)

7. In Marshall, the Court held that “where a defendant presents the PCR court with good
cause to order the State to supply the defendant with discovery that is relevant to the
defendant’s case and not privileged, the court has the discretionary authority to grant
relief.” Ibid. (emphasis added). “[A]nticipat[ing] that only in the unusual case will a
PCR court invoke its inherent right to compel discovery,” the Marshall court did not
define the “good cause” standard it adopted, ibid., but other jurisdictions have observed
that a showing of good cause entails more than a generic demand for potentially
exculpatory evidence. Without expressly invoking the good cause standard, the Court
reached a similar conclusion in State v. Herrerra,  211 N.J. 308 (2012). (pp. 30-33)

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8. This case is not the “unusual case” contemplated in Marshall. Defendant knew not
only about the letter but also that Theresa had been interviewed about an unrelated crime
involving defendant decades before filing his motion. And, although the discovery
sought here is far more limited than in Marshall and Herrerra, the letter’s admissibility
was heavily litigated. Defendant has also made virtually no effort to investigate his claim
that detectives spoke to Theresa after disclosure of the letter. As the trial court aptly
concluded, this might be a different case had defendant presented a certification that
detectives interviewed Theresa after production of the letter. In the absence of such
evidence, however, and based on the circumstances in this case, defendant fails to make
the necessary showing of good cause under Marshall. In Herrerra, moreover, the Court
observed that given the stage of the proceedings -- “nearly twenty years after the offense
and almost seventeen years since the jury’s verdict” -- the defendants would face the
additional challenge of showing that any newly discovered evidence “would probably
change the jury’s verdict if a new trial were granted.”  211 N.J. at 343. That observation
applies with greater force here -- forty-six years after the offense and twenty-seven years
since the jury’s verdict. And, as stressed in Herrerra, there were “strong corroborative
proofs” in this record. See ibid. In sum, the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s
request was thus not an abuse of discretion. (pp. 34-38)

       The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.

        JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, would grant the particularized request for post-
conviction discovery in this case, which, the dissent explains, would be clearly consistent
with the Court’s jurisprudence. In Justice Albin’s view, this case is not about the finality
of judgments -- defendant has not filed a PCR petition or motion for a new trial -- but
simply whether, in this post-conviction setting, defendant may have access to a critical
piece of evidence -- if it exists -- that either the State already turned over as part of its
original discovery obligation under Rule 3:13-3 or failed to turn over in violation of that
discovery rule. Justice Albin notes that the confession letter allegedly written by
defendant was perhaps the most important piece of evidence introduced at trial and that
defense counsel made a targeted, reasonable request for post-conviction discovery -- the
type of discovery request expressly approved of in Marshall,  148 N.J. at 269-71. Noting
the minimal burden the discovery request placed on the State here, Justice Albin cautions
that a system of post-conviction relief cannot fulfill its true purpose if reasonable,
relevant, and non-burdensome requests for discovery can be thwarted by a prosecutor’s
office intent on keeping from view discovery that was or should have been available
pretrial. Justice Albin writes that defendant has presented “good cause” for the entry of
an order requiring the Prosecutor’s Office to respond to the limited request for discovery.

JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in
JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICE LaVECCHIA join.

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       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-
70 September Term 2019
                       084182

                 State of New Jersey,

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,

                          v.

                    Craig Szemple,

               Defendant-Respondent.

        On certification to the Superior Court,
                  Appellate Division.

      Argued                       Decided
    March 2, 2021                June 23, 2021

John McNamara, Jr., Chief Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for appellant (Robert J. Carroll, Acting Morris
County Prosecutor, attorney; John McNamara, Jr., on the
briefs).

Paul Casteleiro argued the cause for respondent (Paul
Casteleiro, on the briefs).

Paul H. Heinzel, Somerset County Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for amicus curiae County Prosecutors
Association of New Jersey (Esther Suarez, President,
County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, attorney;
Paul H. Heinzel, of counsel and on the brief).

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            Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued
            the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New
            Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney;
            Carol M. Henderson, of counsel and on the brief).

            Hannah M. Thibideau, of the New York bar, admitted pro
            hac vice, argued the cause for amici curiae the Innocence
            Project and the Exoneration Initiative (Donald Yannella
            and Schulte Roth & Zabel, attorneys; Donald Yannella,
            Hannah M. Thibideau, Gary Stein, of the New York bar,
            admitted pro hac vice, and Amanda B. Barkin, of the
            New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the brief).

           JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.

      Nicholas Mirov disappeared in 1975. Four months after his

disappearance, police discovered a body in the woods. Police did not identify

the body until 1991, after defendant’s brother, when questioned about a

separate homicide, revealed that defendant Craig Szemple had admitted to

killing Mirov.

      Defendant was charged in 1991 with the first-degree murder of Mirov.

At his first trial in 1992, after the State rested, Michael Boyle (Michael),

defendant’s then father-in-law, produced a letter (the Boyle letter or the letter)

believed to be written by defendant to his then-wife, Theresa Boyle Szemple

(Theresa), admitting to Mirov’s murder. Michael gave the letter to the

prosecutor, who turned it over to the court and defendant. The trial judge

admitted the Boyle letter into evidence over defendant’s objection. The trial

                                        2
ended in a mistrial but, following a retrial, the jury convicted defendant of

first-degree murder, and the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.

      In 2018, forty-three years after Mirov’s murder and nearly twenty-five

years after defendant’s conviction, defendant moved to compel the State to

produce any statements or reports memorializing interviews with Theresa

following her father’s production of the letter. In doing so, defendant claimed

the discovery sought might support a motion for a new trial.

      The motion court characterized defendant’s request as “a second petition

for post-conviction relief” and therefore barred by Rule 3:22-4. The Appellate

Division reversed, concluding that the State’s obligation to produce discovery

continued post-conviction under Rule 3:13-3(b)(1)(F) and (G) and the

constitutional requirement to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v.

Maryland,