Title: Campbell v. Carlisle

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Campbell v. Carlisle, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5707.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-5707 
CAMPBELL ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CITY OF CARLISLE, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Campbell v. Carlisle, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5707.] 
Taxation — Current agricultural use valuation — When the owner of farm land 
who has successfully obtained a current agricultural-use valuation of his 
property pursuant to R.C. 5713.31 petitions to detach the farm land from a 
municipal corporation, the amount of property taxes the owner “is taxed 
and will continue to be taxed” for purposes of R.C. 709.42 is the amount 
of taxes assessed by the county auditor based on the current agricultural-
use valuation of the farm land. 
(No. 2010-0209 — Submitted September 29, 2010 — Decided 
November 30, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Warren County, 
No. CA2009-05-053, 2009-Ohio-6751. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
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When the owner of farm land who has successfully obtained a current 
agricultural-use valuation of his property pursuant to R.C. 5713.31 
petitions to detach the farm land from a municipal corporation, the amount 
of property taxes the owner “is taxed and will continue to be taxed” for 
purposes of R.C. 709.42 is the amount of taxes assessed by the county 
auditor based on the current agricultural-use valuation of the farm land. 
__________________ 
 
BROWN, C.J. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 1} Appellants, Wallace and Helen Campbell, own approximately 40 
acres of farm land within the city of Carlisle.  In 2007, the Campbells filed a 
petition pursuant to R.C. 709.41 in the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County 
seeking detachment of their farm land from the city. 
{¶ 2} The city opposed detachment of the Campbells’ property.  
Following a hearing, the court of common pleas found that the annual taxes 
assessed on the land totaled $172.1  The county auditor had calculated that amount 
by multiplying the applicable property tax rates times the land’s assessed value, 
which was calculated based on the current agricultural use valuation (“CAUV”) 
of the 40 acres.  The court took judicial notice that approximately 80 percent of 
the annual property taxes were assessed in support of the local school district—
not in support of the municipality—and thus would be assessed irrespective of 
whether the property was within the city of Carlisle or detached from it.  The 
                                                 
1.  Examination of the property records maintained by the Warren County auditor show a tax 
liability of $69.56 on a 17.47-acre parcel owned by the Campbells and  $92.40 on a 22.533-acre 
parcel, producing an annual tax liability for both parcels of $161.96.  At the hearing, however, the 
Campbells’ expert affirmed counsel’s representation that the annual tax liability on both parcels 
totaled “around $172.”  In light of our disposition of this case, the difference in the calculations is 
of no consequence.  
 
January Term, 2010 
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court concluded that the Campbells had failed to establish that “the property is 
being taxed and will continue to be taxed for municipal purposes in excess of the 
benefits conferred” on them.  Accordingly, the court denied the petition for 
detachment because the Campbells had failed to demonstrate a requirement for 
detachment imposed by R.C. 709.42. 
{¶ 3} The Campbells appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals.  
They argued that the trial court erred in using the $172 figure for the yearly 
amount “the property is being taxed and will continue to be taxed for municipal 
purposes.”  R.C. 709.42.  The court of appeals agreed.  In a unanimous opinion, 
the court observed that had the property not qualified for the agricultural-use 
valuation, the Campbells’ yearly property taxes would amount to $12,538.99.2  It 
held that the trial court should have used this larger amount in comparing the 
municipal benefits that the Campbells received against the taxes that they paid.  
The court of appeals remanded the cause “with instructions to determine under 
R.C. 709.42 whether, in the absence of the CAUV valuation, a tax assessment of 
$12,538.99 on appellants’ property for municipal purposes is in substantial excess 
of the benefits conferred” upon the Campbells by reason of their land being 
within the city of Carlisle. 
Analysis 
{¶ 4} R.C 5713.31 authorizes an owner of agricultural land to file an 
application with the county auditor requesting that the land be valued for real 
property tax purposes at the current value of the land when used exclusively for 
agricultural purposes, i.e., its CAUV.  Upon determination by the auditor that the 
land is “land devoted exclusively to agricultural use,” the auditor is required to 
                                                 
2.  The record includes an exhibit from the Warren County auditor’s office stating that $12,583.99 
is the estimated tax recoupment amount that the Campbells would be required to pay had they 
changed the use in 2009 and no longer benefited from a CAUV.  Pursuant to R.C. 5713.34(A)(1), 
a recoupment amount represents the preceding three years of tax savings.  The amount is irrelevant 
based on our holding that the relevant tax liability in a R.C. 709.41 action is the amount paid after 
CAUV status has been granted, not the amount of taxes due based on the true value of the land. 
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appraise the land for real property tax purposes in accordance with the CAUV 
rules adopted by the tax commissioner. The auditor is then required to use the 
CAUV, rather than the land’s “true value,”  in determining the value of the land 
for tax purposes.  R.C. 5713.31; R.C. 5713.03. 
{¶ 5} R.C. 709.42, which addresses the hearing and decision on 
detachment, provides:  “If, upon the hearing of a cause of action as provided by 
section 709.41 of the Revised Code, the court of common pleas finds [1] that the 
lands are farm lands, and [2] are not within the original limits of the municipal 
corporation, [3] that by reason of the same being or remaining within the 
municipal corporation the owner thereof is taxed and will continue to be taxed 
thereon for municipal purposes in substantial excess of the benefits conferred by 
reason of such lands being within the municipal corporation, and [4] that said 
lands may be detached without materially affecting the best interests or good 
government of such municipal corporation or of the territory therein adjacent to 
that sought to be detached; then an order and decree may be made by the court, 
and entered on the record, that the lands be detached from the municipal 
corporation and be attached to the most convenient adjacent township in the same 
county. Thereafter the lands shall not be a part of the municipal corporation but 
shall be a part of the township to which they have been so attached. The costs 
shall be taxed as may seem right to the court.” (Enumeration added.)  Moreover, 
R.C. 709.41 provides that a detachment action may not be brought within five 
years from the time that the lands were annexed by the municipal corporation. 
{¶ 6} In the case at bar, the city does not dispute that the land was used 
exclusively for agricultural purposes, that it was not within the original limits of 
the city of Carlisle, and that at least five years had elapsed from the time the 
property had originally been annexed into the municipal corporation. The trial 
court found that the city had not proven that the proposed detachment would 
January Term, 2010 
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detrimentally impact good government of the city.  The city did not appeal this 
finding. 
{¶ 7} The sole issue presented to us, therefore, is the correct 
interpretation of the third requirement of R.C. 709.42, i.e., whether by reason of 
the Campbells’ property “being or remaining within the municipal corporation the 
owner thereof is taxed and will continue to be taxed thereon for municipal 
purposes in substantial excess of the benefits conferred by reason of such lands 
being within the municipal corporation.” 
{¶ 8} We find the third requirement established by R.C. 709.42 to be 
unambiguous.  When statutory language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a 
clear and definite meaning, this court need not invoke rules of statutory 
interpretation.  State v. Muncie (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 447, 746 N.E.2d 1092.  
To do so would constitute “not interpretation but legislation, which is not the 
function of courts.” Iddings v. Jefferson Cty. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1951), 155 
Ohio St. 287, 290, 44 O.O. 294, 98 N.E.2d 827.  R.C. 709.42 requires a trial court 
presiding over detachment proceedings to determine the amount “the owner * * * 
is taxed and will continue to be taxed * * * for municipal purposes.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  The record before the court suggested that the Campbells are taxed $172 
annually on the 40 acres of land they sought to detach, having benefited from the 
CAUV for which they applied pursuant to R.C. 5713.31.  The plain text of the 
detachment statute compels the conclusion that it is irrelevant that the Campbells 
would have been assessed significantly higher taxes had they not applied for, and 
obtained, the CAUV for their property.  The annual amount of property tax the 
Campbells “are taxed” is $172. 
{¶ 9} In addition, the Campbells will “continue to be taxed,” as that 
phrase is used in R.C. 709.42, based on the CAUV of their land, assuming that 
they continue to file their renewal CAUV application each year and continue to 
use the property exclusively for agricultural purposes.  In the event that the 
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Campbells stop applying for the CAUV or change the use of the property so that 
it is not eligible for the CAUV, their tax liability will increase because a higher 
valuation of the land will be used for tax purposes. 
{¶ 10} Should the Campbells fail to apply for a CAUV but continue to use 
the land for agricultural use, the higher property valuation would be relevant for 
detachment purposes, because the property taxes would be assessed based on the 
higher property valuation.  However, nothing in the record suggests that the 
Campbells intend to forgo applying for a CAUV or change the use of the 
property.  To the contrary, Helen Campbell testified that she intends to preserve 
the land as farmland and retain it as a farm in the future.  We conclude that the 
Campbells not only “are taxed” based on the CAUV of their property but will also 
“continue to be taxed” based on the CAUV of their property. 
{¶ 11} R.C. Chapter 5713 further supports the conclusion that the amount 
of tax paid by the Campbells after the CAUV is applied is the amount that they 
“are taxed” based on the CAUV.  R.C 5713.30 through 5713.38 provide the 
statutory framework for CAUV for property-tax purposes.  Pursuant to R.C. 
5713.34, in the event that property qualified for CAUV ceases to be devoted 
exclusively to agricultural use, the tax savings on the converted land during the 
three immediately preceding tax years may be recouped by the auditor.  The 
definition of “tax savings” is instructive.  “Tax savings” is defined as “the 
difference between the dollar amount of real property taxes levied in any year on 
land valued and assessed in accordance with its current agricultural use value and 
the dollar amount of real property taxes that would have been levied upon such 
land if it had been valued and assessed for such year in accordance with Section 2 
of Article XII, Ohio Constitution.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 5713.30(C).  Those 
provisions support the conclusion that the amount of property tax the Campbells 
were taxed in the year they filed the detachment action is the amount the county 
auditor assessed and the Campbells actually paid. 
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{¶ 12} We therefore conclude that when the owner of farm land who has 
successfully obtained a current agricultural-use valuation of his property pursuant 
to R.C. 5713.31 petitions to detach the farm land from a municipal corporation, 
the amount of property taxes the owner “is taxed and will continue to be taxed” 
for purposes of R.C. 709.42 is the amount of taxes assessed by the county auditor 
based on the current agricultural-use valuation of the farm land.  Based on the 
unambiguous text of the relevant statutes and the record before it, the trial court 
did not err in denying the Campbells’ detachment petition. 3     
Judgment reversed. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
Ruppert, Bronson & Ruppert Co., L.P.A., Rupert E. Ruppert, and Mary C. 
Patton-Coffman, for appellees. 
David A. Chicarelli Co., L.P.A., and David A. Chicarelli, for appellant. 
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, Stephen J. 
Smith, and Jeremy M. Grayem; and John Gotherman, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Municipal League. 
______________________ 
                                                 
3.  R.C. 709.42 refers to the amount the landowner “is taxed and will continue to be taxed thereon 
for municipal purposes.”  (Emphasis added.)  Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals 
specifically determined the amount of property taxes paid by the Campbells that was used for 
“municipal purposes” as opposed to nonmunicipal uses, e.g., support of school or park districts. 
We note that counsel for the Campbells conceded during oral argument that the Campbells could 
not prevail on their detachment action if the trial court correctly used the $172 figure as the 
amount the Campbells were taxed.  In so doing, counsel effectively conceded that if the trial court 
was correct, the benefits the Campbells received as a result of their land being within city limits 
outweighed the taxes they paid for municipal purposes. In light of this concession and the trial 
court’s recognition that 80 percent of the $172 tax represented funds to be paid to the local school 
district, we conclude that remand to the trial court in this case is unnecessary.