Title: Byron Porter Williamson v. Donald Porter, et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: June 26, 2020
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180355
____________________
Donald Porter et al.
v.
Byron Porter Williamson
____________________
1180634
____________________
Byron Porter Williamson
v.
Donald Porter et al.
Appeals from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-13-902152)
1180355, 1180634
BRYAN, Justice.
In appeal no. 1180355, Donald Porter, Marc Porter, Porter
Capital Corporation, Porter Bridge Loan Company, Inc.,
Lowerline Corporation, CapitalPartners Leasing, Inc., and
CapitalPartners 
Leasing, 
LLC 
(hereinafter 
referred 
to
collectively as "the Porter defendants"), appeal from a
judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial
court") in favor of Byron Porter Williamson in his action
seeking specific performance of a shareholders agreement that
Williamson had entered into with Donald and Marc ("the
agreement").  In appeal no. 1180634, Williamson cross-appeals
from the same judgment seeking prejudgment interest on the
full amount of the judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
A. Porter v. Williamson
This is the second time the parties in this case have
appeared before this Court. See Porter v. Williamson, 168 So.
3d 1215 (Ala. 2015).   The relevant background and procedural
history was set forth in Porter:
"Marc Porter and Donald Porter are brothers;
they founded Porter Capital Corporation in 1991 and
thereafter established the related companies Porter
Bridge Loan Company, Inc., Lowerline Corporation,
2
1180355, 1180634
CapitalPartners Leasing, Inc., and CapitalPartners
Leasing, LLC (the business entities are hereinafter
referred to collectively as 'the Porter companies').
In 1992, the Porters hired their nephew Williamson
as an employee of the Porter companies. In 2004,
Williamson, Marc Porter, and Donald Porter entered
into a shareholders agreement that made Williamson
a 10% shareholder in Porter Capital Corporation,
Porter 
Bridge 
Loan 
Company, 
Inc., 
Lowerline
Corporation, and CapitalPartners Leasing, Inc. ('the
agreement').[1]
"On August 3, 2012, Williamson's employment as
an employee of the Porter companies was terminated.
Williamson thereafter provided written notice to the
Porter companies of his intention to retire as a
shareholder of the corporations and as a member of
the 
limited-liability 
company. 
The 
agreement
provided that under certain circumstances, including
termination of the employment of a shareholder for
cause or retirement of a shareholder, the Porter
companies were required to purchase the shares of
the terminated or retiring shareholder. Following
his termination and resignation as a shareholder of
the 
corporations 
and 
a 
member 
of 
the
limited-liability company, Williamson demanded that
his shares in the corporations and his interest in
the limited-liability company be purchased by the
Porter companies pursuant to the agreement. The
parties, however, were unable to agree on the value
of Williamson's shares and interest. On May 30,
2013, Williamson sued Marc Porter, Donald Porter,
and the Porter companies.
"Count I of Williamson's complaint asserted
that, pursuant 
to the agreement, the Porter
1We noted in Porter that the agreement did not include
CapitalPartners Leasing, LLC, which was formed after 2004, but
that the parties treated the limited-liability company as
being included in the agreement. See Porter, 168 So. 3d at
1216 n. 1 and n. 2.  The same is true in these appeals.
3
1180355, 1180634
defendants were required to purchase his shares and
interest 
in 
the 
Porter 
companies. 
Williamson
requested that the court enter an order requiring
specific performance of the provisions of the
agreement 
requiring 
the 
Porter 
defendants 
to
purchase his shares and interest. Count II of
Williamson's 
complaint 
asserted, 
alternatively, 
that
the agreement was due to be rescinded. Count III
sought compensatory and punitive damages for alleged
misrepresentations and suppression of material facts
by the Porter defendants. Count IV alleged that the
Porter defendants had converted money belonging to
Williamson from an investment account controlled by
the Porter companies."
168 So. 3d at 1216–17 (footnotes omitted).
The Porter defendants moved the trial court to dismiss
the action without prejudice or to stay discovery and compel
arbitration based on the terms of an arbitration provision set
forth in the agreement. The trial court denied that motion
after concluding that the arbitration provision in the
agreement contained an exception for claims seeking specific
performance of the 
agreement.  The Porter defendants appealed,
and the sole issue on appeal "concern[ed] the scope of the
specific-performance 
exception 
of 
the 
arbitration 
provision 
--
i.e., whether the 
arbitration provision applies to the dispute
in question." 168 So. 3d at 1218. We held:
"In the present case, the agreement requires
that all claims arising out of the agreement shall
be arbitrated '[e]xcept for items of specific
4
1180355, 1180634
performance referred to' in Section 28 of the
agreement. Section 28 provides, in pertinent part:
"'Should any dispute arise concerning the
sale or disposition of the Securities, an
injunction may be issued restraining any
sale or disposition thereof pending the
determination of such controversy, in the
event of any controversy concerning the
purchase or sale of any such Securities,
the same shall be enforceable in a court of
equity by a decree of specific performance
or by temporary or permanent injunction or
any other legal or equitable remedy,
without the necessity of showing actual
damages or furnishing a bond or other
security.'
"(Emphasis added.) The allegations of Williamson's
complaint include the following:
"'[T]he 
[Porter] 
defendants 
have 
failed 
and
refused 
to 
follow 
the 
Shareholder 
Agreement
and purchase Plaintiff Williamson's shares
as set forth in the Shareholders Agreement,
even though they agreed [Williamson] has
voluntarily retired....
"'6. Accordingly, [Williamson] is entitled
under Section 28 of the Agreement to
specific performance and an injunction
requiring 
[the 
Porter] 
Defendants 
to
purchase his shares in accordance with the
Agreement.
"'7. If a jury determines the Agreement is
valid, [the Porter] Defendants are in
breach of this Agreement, and [Williamson]
prays that this Court shall enter an order
requiring 
specific 
performance 
and 
purchase
of his shares.
5
1180355, 1180634
"'....
"'9. [Williamson] prays that this Court
shall empanel a jury on all issues and
determine if the Agreement is enforceable
and, if valid, [enter] a judgment that [the
Porter] Defendants are required to buy his
shares at their fair value.'
"Williamson's 
action 
clearly 
pertains 
to 
a
'controversy concerning the purchase or sale of any
... Securities.' As a result of that 'controversy,'
Williamson 
seeks 
'a 
decree 
of 
specific
performance[,] ... injunction or other legal or
equitable remed[ies].' Accordingly, we hold that,
under the express and unambiguous terms of the
agreement, 
Williamson's 
claims 
for 
specific
performance and injunctive relief are not within the
scope of the arbitration provision."
168 So. 3d at 1219–20 (footnote omitted; final emphasis
added).
Thus, we affirmed "the trial court's denial of the Porter
defendants' motion to compel arbitration insofar as that
motion 
related 
to 
Williamson's 
request 
for 
specific
performance and injunctive relief." 168 So. 3d at 1220
(emphasis added). As to Williamson's remaining claims, the
Court "remand[ed] this case with instructions for the trial
court to determine if any of the remaining claims are due to
be dismissed," but, "[t]o the extent those claims [were] not
dismissed, we instruct[ed] the trial court to grant the Porter
6
1180355, 1180634
defendants' motion to compel arbitration with respect to 
those
claims." Id.
B. On Remand After Porter v. Williamson
On July 2, 2015, the trial court entered an order
dismissing with prejudice counts II and IV of Williamson's
complaint and dismissing without prejudice count III.  The
sole remaining count, count I, which sought specific
performance of the agreement, was set for a bench trial.  On
remand, the trial court conducted a hearing over three days in
late July and early August 2015 at which it heard ore tenus
evidence.
The primary factual dispute between the parties was
whether, under the agreement, there was an event that
triggered the 
obligation of 
Porter 
Capital 
Corporation, 
Porter
Bridge 
Loan 
Company, 
Inc., 
Lowerline 
Corporation,
CapitalPartners Leasing, Inc., and CapitalPartners Leasing,
LLC (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Porter
companies"), to purchase Williamson's 10% interest in the
Porter companies.  The evidence indicated that, on August 3,
2012, Donald and Marc notified Williamson that they were
terminating his 
employment with 
the 
Porter 
companies 
effective
7
1180355, 1180634
December 31, 2012; Williamson was given no reason for his
termination 
from 
the 
Porter 
companies. 
 
Williamson
communicated his desire to sell his interest in the Porter
companies to Marc and Donald. The parties engaged in
discussions regarding the value of Williamson's shares, and
Donald invited Williamson to make a proposal as to the value
of his interest in the Porter companies. Williamson hired an
evaluator who determined the value of Williamson's shares in
the Porter companies, but Donald and Marc rejected that
valuation.  
The parties could not agree on which part of the
agreement –- if any –- controlled the sale of Williamson's
shares of the Porter companies to the remaining shareholders,
i.e., Donald and Marc.  The agreement provided that the Porter
companies "shall ... acquire" or "shall ... purchase" the
securities of a shareholder in the event of the shareholder's
death (paragraph 8), retirement (paragraph 9), voluntary
termination 
of 
employment 
with 
the 
Porter 
companies (paragraph
10), permanent disability (paragraph 11), or termination of
employment of the shareholder for cause (paragraph 12). It is
undisputed between the parties that the agreement does not
8
1180355, 1180634
require the Porter companies to purchase the shares of a
shareholder who, like Williamson, was terminated without
cause.2  Thus, Donald and Marc insisted that, pursuant to the
terms of the agreement, the Porter companies were obligated to
purchase Williamson's shares in the Porter companies only if
Williamson was willing to "travel" under paragraph 12 of the
agreement, i.e., termination for cause.  However, unlike other
buyout provisions in the agreement, paragraph 12 provided
significantly less favorable buyout terms for the departing
shareholder.
Regardless of the reason for the Porter companies'
obligation to purchase or acquire a departing shareholder's
shares in the companies, the agreement defined how the value
of the shares would be determined.  The agreement defines
"share value" as "the value (as determined in accordance
herewith) of each Corporation divided by the number of shares
outstanding in each such Corporation upon the occurrence of a
2"Cause" is defined in the agreement as when "a
Shareholder commits any of the following acts: (i) disloyalty
or dishonesty which results or is intended to result in
personal enrichment to the Shareholder at the expense of any
of the Corporations or (ii) fraudulent conduct in connection
with the business or affairs of any Corporation."
9
1180355, 1180634
Triggering Event."3 (Emphasis added.) In the definition of
"share value," the agreement further provides:
"For purposes of determining the value of each
Corporation, 
the 
current 
accountant 
for 
the
Corporation shall select an independent evaluator
('the Evaluator') acceptable to the Shareholders.
The Evaluator shall determine the value of each
Corporation by using the evaluation methods set
forth on Exhibit 'C' attached hereto which are most
applicable for the Corporation being evaluated and
then averaging the result obtained to determine the
value of each Corporation."
(Emphasis added.) Exhibit C to the agreement, which is labeled
"Evaluation Methods," has two numbered blanks, and the first
blank is followed by a parenthetical that states: "(Get from
Shank)."  It was undisputed that the reference to "Shank" was
a reference to the Porter companies' long-time accountant,
John Shank.  Exhibit C does not actually contain any
evaluation methods –- just the parenthetical indicating that
the evaluation methods should be "gotten" from Shank.  It was
undisputed that Exhibit C to the agreement was in this form
3The 
agreement defines 
a 
"Triggering Event" 
as 
"the 
death,
permanent disability, retirement or termination of the
employment with the Corporations of a Shareholder."  As noted
above, however, the parties agreed that a termination without
cause was not an event that triggered the Porter companies'
obligation 
to 
purchase 
the 
shares 
of 
the 
departing
shareholder.
10
1180355, 1180634
when the parties signed the agreement in 2004 and that it had
not been changed at any point thereafter.
In late November 2012, Donald sent Williamson an e-mail
stating that Shank would provide the shareholders with the
names of three evaluators who Williamson could choose from to
determine share value under the agreement. In early December
2012, Donald, Marc, and Williamson tentatively agreed to have
the evaluation performed by William Dameworth, one of the
evaluators 
recommended 
by 
Shank, 
subject 
to 
further 
discussion
concerning the valuation method to be used.  However, Donald
and Marc refused to engage Dameworth to value Williamson's
shares unless Williamson agreed that paragraph 12 of the
agreement controlled the buyout; Williamson, however, refused
to accept paragraph 12 -- and its less favorable buyout terms
-- as the operative provision of the agreement because his
employment was not terminated for cause.
 Shortly thereafter, on December 11, 2012, Williamson
notified Donald and Marc that he was retiring "as a
shareholder," effective 
February 
3, 
2013. 
 
Williamson informed
Donald and Marc that, because he was retiring as a
shareholder, paragraph 9 of the agreement controlled the
11
1180355, 1180634
Porter 
companies' obligation 
to 
purchase 
his 
shares. 
Paragraph
9 provides:
"9. Retirement of a Shareholder. In the event of
the Retirement of the Shareholder, after such
shareholder has given at least six months notice to
the Corporations and the remaining Shareholders of
his Retirement, the Corporations shall within ninety
(90) days after the date of such retirement of the
Shareholder, 
acquire 
the 
Securities 
from 
the
Shareholder at a price equal to the Share Value for
the Securities determined as of the end of the
fiscal year immediately preceding the date of
retirement of the Shareholder times the number of
shares 
held 
by 
such 
Shareholder, 
plus 
the
undistributed profit or loss of each Corporation
since the end of such fiscal year."
Although the buyout terms in paragraph 9 and paragraph 12
of the agreement differ, both paragraph 9 and paragraph 12
require a determination of the "Share Value for the Securities
determined as of the end of the fiscal year immediately
preceding the date of such termination of employment [or
retirement of the Shareholder] times the number of shares held
by such Shareholder."
Shank testified that, in fall 2012, he provided the names
of three individuals who could serve as evaluators pursuant to
the agreement. Shank further testified that, in February 2013,
while the parties were still discussing how to value
Williamson's interest in 
the 
Porter companies, he e-mailed the
12
1180355, 1180634
attorney for the Porter companies and advised that "share
value" pursuant to the agreement should be determined using
the fair-market-value standard of valuation.  In his e-mail,
Shank further stated that "[t]he Evaluator shall use his
education, skill, training and expertise to determine the
appropriate weight to be given to the following three
evaluation methods so as to determine the fair market value." 
Shank then provided three evaluation methods that the
evaluator was to use to determine the fair market value of the
Porter companies.  Williamson was not included in this e-mail,
and it is unclear when he learned that Shank proposed that
share value be determined based on the fair-market-value
standard of valuation.
Donald and Marc did not believe that Williamson could
retire "as a Shareholder" after his employment with the Porter
companies had already been terminated, and they maintained
that the Porter companies were required to purchase
Williamson's interest in the companies only if Williamson was
willing to travel under paragraph 12 of the agreement. 
Sometime after Williamson filed this action in May 2013,
Donald and Marc engaged Dameworth, without Williamson's
13
1180355, 1180634
knowledge, to conduct an evaluation of Williamson's shares in
the Porter companies.  However, although Dameworth applied the
fair-market-value standard endorsed by Shank, Dameworth
completed only a draft report that was a "calculation of
value" of the Porter companies rather than a full appraisal of
the value of the Porter companies.  The Porter defendants did
not view Dameworth's draft report as a final, accurate
representation of the value of the Porter companies.
At the hearing, over the Porter defendants' repeated
objections, the trial court allowed Williamson to present
expert testimony concerning the value of his shares from an
evaluator independently selected by Williamson. The Porter
defendants argued that Williamson's expert was not a mutually
acceptable evaluator selected by Shank, as required by the
agreement, and that he did not apply the valuation methods
required by the agreement -- i.e., the methods proposed by
Shank in his February 2013 e-mail.
Goodloe White, Williamson's expert witness, testified
that he determined the value of Williamson's interest in the
Porter companies using the fair-value standard of valuation,
rather than the fair-market-value standard that was endorsed
14
1180355, 1180634
by Shank. White testified that he believed that fair value was
the "more appropriate" standard, that it was "more applicable
here as defined under the ... agreement," and that,
irrespective of the valuation methods provided by 
Shank, White
did not view Shank's determination of the appropriate
valuation methods "as part of the agreement." 
The Porter defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of
law at the close of Williamson's evidence and again at the
close of all the evidence.  The Porter defendants argued that
White's testimony should not be considered because it had no
bearing on Williamson's claim for specific performance, which
was the only claim this Court recognized as being properly
before the trial court on remand from our decision in Porter. 
They argued that, because Williamson sought only specific
performance of the agreement, and did not bring a breach-of-
contract claim, if the trial court found that there had been
a "triggering event" that required the Porter companies to
purchase Williamson's interest in the Porter companies, the
trial court could only order the Porter defendants to perform
under the terms of the agreement, which, in this case, would
require Shank to select an evaluator "acceptable" to the
15
1180355, 1180634
parties who would then value Williamson's interest in the
Porter companies based on the valuation methods provided by
Shank.  Because White was not selected pursuant to the terms
of the agreement –- that is, he was not "an independent
evaluator ... acceptable to the Shareholders" -- and because
he had not used the valuation methods proposed by Shank –-
instead using fair value and not fair market value -- the
Porter defendants argued that the trial court could not
consider 
White's 
testimony regarding the 
value 
of 
Williamson's
interest in the Porter companies.  The trial court denied the
motions.
On December 26, 2018, more than three years after the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered a judgment
holding that Williamson was entitled to specific performance
of the agreement.  Specifically, the trial court found that
Williamson gave valid notice of his retirement on December 11,
2012, and that his retirement, which became effective six
months later, was a "triggering event" under the agreement
that 
"legally 
obligated 
[the 
Porter 
companies] to 
specifically
perform the purchase of all of [Williamson's] shares, as well
as comply with other relevant provisions of the agreement, on
16
1180355, 1180634
or before September 9, 2013."  The trial court further held
that the agreement, specifically Exhibit C, did not contain
any evaluation methods; that the evaluation method set forth
by Shank in February 2013 was "not the 'most applicable for
the Corporation being evaluated'";4 and that the fair-value
standard, rather than the fair-market-value standard, should
be applied to determine the value of Williamson's interest in
the Porter companies.  Thus, the trial court accepted White's
testimony 
concerning 
the 
"fair 
value" 
of 
Williamson's 
interest
in the Porter companies and held that Williamson was entitled
to $2,554,969.30 from the Porter defendants pursuant to the
buyout provisions for a retiring shareholder under paragraph
9 of the agreement, which included an award of undistributed
profits.   
The Porter defendants filed a postjudgment motion,
arguing, among other things, that the  trial court "went
outside the long-established parameters of the specific
performance equitable remedy ... by ... purporting to
4This language is taken from the definition of "share
value" in the agreement. This part of the definition allowed
the evaluator to consider the valuation methods provided by
Shank and to apply the valuation method "most applicable for
the Corporations being evaluated."
17
1180355, 1180634
determine the value of Williamson's shares in the Porter
companies, disregarding the provisions of the Shareholders'
agreement concerning share valuation, and entering a money
damage[s] award."  Williamson also filed a 
postjudgment motion
seeking an award of prejudgment interest.  The trial court
awarded Williamson prejudgment interest on the part of the
judgment that represented his undistributed profits, but the
parties' postjudgment motions were otherwise denied. The
Porter defendants appealed, and Williamson filed a cross-
appeal.
II. Standard of Review
The trial court's findings of fact, insofar as they are
based on evidence presented during the hearing, are presumed
correct and will not be overturned unless they are shown to be
plainly or palpably wrong. See Ex parte Powell, 763 So. 2d
230, 232 (Ala. 1999) ("When evidence is presented to a trial
court sitting without a jury, the general rule is that its
findings will be presumed correct unless there is plain and
palpable error.").  
However, a presumption of 
correctness does
not attach to the trial court's legal conclusions, which are
reviewed de novo. See Van Hoof v. Van Hoof, 997 So. 2d 278,
18
1180355, 1180634
286 (Ala. 2007) ("The presumption of correctness accorded a
trial court's judgment following a bench trial does not extend
to its decisions on questions of law. Instead, this Court
reviews such rulings on questions of law de novo."). 
III. Analysis
A. Appeal No. 1180355
The question presented for this Court's review is whether
the trial court exceeded the scope of Williamson's request for
specific performance of the agreement by awarding Williamson
a monetary sum representing the value of his interest in the
Porter companies based on a valuation process that differed
from the valuation process set forth in the agreement. In this
appeal, the Porter defendants do not challenge the trial
court's determination that Williamson's retirement was a
"triggering event" under the agreement that required the
Porter defendants to "acquire" Williamson's shares under
paragraph 9 of the agreement.  They argue only that the trial
court awarded relief beyond the scope of a request for
specific performance of the agreement.  
19
1180355, 1180634
"The remedy of specific performance is equitable in
nature ...." Wilson v. Thomason, 406 So. 2d 871, 872 (Ala.
1981). Specific performance is
"[t]he rendering, as nearly as practicable, of a
promised performance through a judgment or decree;
specif[ically], a court-ordered remedy that requires
precise fulfillment of a legal or contractual
obligation when monetary damages are inappropriate
or inadequate, as when the sale of real estate or a
rare article is involved."
Black's Law Dictionary 1686 (11th ed. 2019). In other words,
"[s]pecific performance means 'performance specifically as
agreed.'" 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance § 1 (2012). 
"The purpose of the remedy is to give the one who seeks it the
benefit of the contract in specie by compelling the other
party to the contract to do what he or she agreed to do --
perform the contract on the precise terms agreed upon by the
parties." Id. (Emphasis added.)
"It is also a principle of equity jurisprudence
that, before a court of chancery will specifically
enforce a contract, it must be made to clearly
appear to the court that it is thereby enforcing the
contract which the parties made .... The court will
not attempt to make a contract for the parties, and
enforce it, even though it be one which the parties
might and ought to have made."
 
Gachet v. Morton, 181 Ala. 179, 182, 61 So. 817, 818
(1913)(emphasis added).  "[T]he courts, under guise of
20
1180355, 1180634
specific performance, cannot do violence to the contract
itself, and make a contract for the parties." City of
Andalusia v. Alabama Utils. Co., 222 Ala. 689, 693, 133 So.
899, 902 (1931). 
"This court has frequently held that specific
performance may be ordered where the contract is
just, fair and reasonable, and reasonably certain in
respect to the subject matter, terms and founded on
a valuable consideration. Alabama Central Railroad
Co. v. Long, 158 Ala. 301, 48 So. 363 (1909);
Carlisle v. Carlisle, 77 Ala. 339 (1884); Moon's
Adm'r v. Crowder, 72 Ala. 79 (1882)."
Montgomery v. Peddy, 355 So. 2d 698, 700 (Ala. 1978). "In
order for a complainant to procure the specific performance of
a contract through a court of equity, he must show a contract
that 
is 
specific, certain 
and 
complete." 
Citronelle 
Turpentine
Co. v. Buhlig, 184 Ala. 404, 406, 63 So. 951, 951 (1913).  
If Williamson's request for specific performance of the
agreement is about compelling the Porter defendants "to do
what [they] agreed to do," 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance
§ 1, we must first determine what the parties actually "agreed
to do" after a shareholder provided notice of his retirement
and triggered the Porter companies' obligation to acquire the
retiring shareholder's interest in the Porter companies. 
Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the agreement, upon notice of a
21
1180355, 1180634
shareholder's retirement, the Porter companies were required
to "acquire the Securities from the Shareholder at a price
equal to Share Value for the Securities determined as of the
end of the fiscal year immediately preceding the date of
retirement of the Shareholder."  Understandably, the parties
did not agree on a specific "share value" of each share in the
Porter companies, but they did agree that "share value" would
be determined in a particular way: (1) "the current accountant
for the Corporation shall select an independent evaluator ...
acceptable 
to 
the 
Shareholders"; 
and 
(2), 
after 
an
"acceptable" evaluator was identified, "[t]he Evaluator shall
determine the value of each Corporation by using the
evaluation methods set forth on Exhibit 'C' ... which are most
applicable for the Corporation being evaluated and then
averaging the results obtained."  However, as noted above,
Exhibit C does not contain any evaluation methods; Exhibit C
includes two blanks with the following parenthetical: "(Get
from Shank.)"  The parties dispute whether Exhibit C expresses
any agreement of the parties.
The Porter defendants argue that the fact that no
evaluation methods were specifically included in Exhibit C is
22
1180355, 1180634
immaterial because, they say, Exhibit C clearly demonstrates
that the parties agreed that the evaluation methods for
determining share value would be provided by Shank.  Thus,
according to the Porter defendants, for purposes of
determining share value, the parties agreed (1) that Shank
"shall" select an evaluator "acceptable" by the shareholders
and (2) that the agreed-upon evaluator "shall" determine share
value using the evaluation methods provided by Shank.  They
further argue that, instead of requiring performance of these
clear terms, the trial court (1) accepted valuation evidence
from an evaluator independently selected by Williamson and 
(2)
rejected the valuation methods provided by Shank in favor of
a valuation method that the court found was the most
appropriate method of valuing the Porter companies.  The
Porter defendants argue that, by taking these actions, the
trial court, under the guise of ordering specific performance
of 
the 
agreement, 
actually 
enforced 
"a 
new, 
judicially-crafted
contract that is at odds with the contract actually agreed to
by the parties." Porter defendants' brief at 15.  
Williamson maintains that the trial court's actions were
acceptable for several reasons. First, he contends that the
23
1180355, 1180634
trial court found that the parties did not agree to any
particular evaluation method because they never filled in the
blanks in Exhibit C and that, therefore, the trial court was
within its discretion to supply an evaluation method based on
the evidence presented at trial.  In its judgment, the trial
court, citing Murphree v. Henson, 289 Ala. 340, 267 So. 2d 414
(1972), stated that, "[i]f a term in the contract is
considered too indefinite to permit specific performance, it
may later acquire a more definite meaning and become
enforceable based on the parties' subsequent acts, words, or
conduct."  Citing the facts that Shank did not provide the
names of any evaluators or evaluation methods until after a
dispute arose between the parties concerning the value of
Williamson's shares, that Shank was not an evaluation expert,
and that Shank selected the fair-market-value standard of
valuation because Marc told Shank to do so, the trial court
concluded that the valuation method proposed by Shank was "not
the 'most applicable for the Corporations being evaluated.'" 
The trial court then looked to the agreement itself and
concluded that "share value" was the equivalent of fair value,
not fair market value, and held that the fair-value standard
24
1180355, 1180634
of valuation proposed by Williamson should be applied to
determine the value of Williamson's shares in the Porter
companies.
The Porter defendants argue that the trial court's
reliance on Murphree was misplaced and that the agreement,
including the method therein for determining share value, was
sufficiently definite to support specific enforcement of the
actual terms of the agreement, including the provision in
Exhibit C that the evaluation methods would be provided by
Shank. In Murphree, the plaintiff, Henson, sought specific
performance of an oral contract between himself and Murphree
for the conveyance of approximately 120 acres of land. 
Murphree, the owner of the land, argued that the specific
terms of the agreement –- the land to be conveyed, the price
to be paid, and the time for delivery of the deed -- were too
vague for the agreement to be enforced through specific
performance.  The Court noted that the Statute of Frauds
required such agreements to be in writing, "'[u]nless the
purchase money, or a portion thereof be paid, and the
purchaser be put in possession of the land by the seller.'"
Murphree, 289 Ala. at 348, 267 So. 2d at 421 (emphasis
25
1180355, 1180634
omitted) (quoting the Statute of Frauds found in former § 20-
3-5, Ala. Code 1940). The Court stated:
"It is well established by our decisions that to
authorize the specific performance of an agreement
to sell land, all the terms of the agreement must
have 
been 
agreed 
upon, 
leaving 
nothing 
for
negotiation. Alba v. Strong, 94 Ala. 163, 10 So. 242
[(1891)]; Tensaw Land and Timber Co. v. Covington,
278 Ala. 181, 176 So. 2d 875 [(1965)].
"However, as stated in 17 Am. Jur. 2d,
Contracts, Sec. 78, p. 418:
"'A contract which is originally and
inherently 
too 
indefinite 
may 
later 
acquire
precision and become enforceable by virtue
of the subsequent acts, words and conduct
of the parties. ... Thus, the objection of
indefiniteness 
may 
be 
obviated 
by
performance 
and 
acceptance 
of
performance.'"
289 Ala. at 348, 267 So. 2d at 421 (emphasis added).  The
Court in Murphree held that the evidence of the parties'
subsequent acts, words, and conduct –- including that Murphree
had put Henson in possession of the land at issue after
Murphree promised to convey that land to Henson in exchange
for Henson's work on other land Murphree owned, which Henson
had performed -- was sufficient to remove any uncertainties in
the oral agreement to convey the land at issue.
26
1180355, 1180634
We agree with the Porter defendants that the trial
court's reliance on Murphree was misplaced.  We cannot agree
that the method of determining share value in the agreement
was so unclear or indefinite that it could not be specifically
enforced.  As set forth above, the agreement provided a two-
step process to determine share value.  Regarding the first
step, there is no indication that any of the parties believed
that the part of the agreement requiring an evaluator to be
selected by Shank that was acceptable to the shareholders was
indefinite or otherwise unenforceable.  Yet, the trial court
ignored that clear and specific part of the agreement when it
accepted the valuation provided by an evaluator independently
selected by Williamson.  As to the second step, we must
conclude, as a matter of law, that the agreement clearly
expressed the parties' agreement that Shank would provide the
evaluation methods that would be used by the independent
evaluator acceptable to the shareholders to determine share
value.  The evidence reflected that Shank had been the
accountant for the Porter companies since 1992 or 1993, and,
given his knowledge and familiarity with the 
Porter companies,
we see no reason why the parties could not have agreed to
27
1180355, 1180634
allow Shank to provide the evaluation methods to be used by an
independent evaluator for purposes of determining share
value.5  Thus, the rule from Murphree, which the trial court
applied in an attempt to make a purportedly indefinite term of
the agreement definite, was unnecessary.6
Williamson also contends that, "[i]f the blanks in
Exhibit C are viewed as missing terms, ... the trial court can
supply a reasonable term." Williamson's brief at 43.  In
5Williamson contends that taking this holding "to its
logical conclusion, if Shank proposed that the 
methodology for 
valuing the [Porter companies by] valuing them at $0,
Williamson would be bound to follow said methodology." 
Williamson's speculation about what Shank "could do" is not a
convincing basis for ignoring, in an action for specific
performance, the clear intent of the parties to obtain
evaluation methods from Shank.
6Even if we concluded that the agreement did not include
an evaluation method and, therefore, that that part of the
agreement was indefinite, and even if we determined that the
rule from Murphree could be applied in that circumstance to
make that purportedly indefinite part of the agreement
definite and enforceable, the trial court still incorrectly
applied the rule in Murphree to the facts in this case.  The
facts the trial court relied on do not support a conclusion
that there was "performance and acceptance of performance" so
that the parties' conduct demonstrated that they agreed to the
terms that were enforced by the trial court, i.e., there was
no evidence indicating that by their conduct the parties
indicated that they had agreed that share value would be
determined 
by 
an 
evaluator 
independently 
selected 
by
Williamson who applied the fair-value standard to determine
share value. 
28
1180355, 1180634
support of this argument, Williamson relies upon § 204 of the
Restatement (Second) Contracts, which provides: "When the
parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract
have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to
a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is
reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court." 
This Court has never expressly endorsed § 204 of the
Restatement.  Regardless, for the reasons set forth above, §
204 of the Restatement would not have any application in this
case because we conclude that the parties agreed on all terms
essential to the determination of their rights and duties
under the agreement.  Although Exhibit C included blanks
instead of any specific evaluation methods, the 
parties signed
the agreement, which included Exhibit C, with the intent that 
evaluation methods would be obtained from Shank.  The
shareholders were apparently content to allow Shank to choose
the evaluation methods, and we see no reason why, in an action
for specific performance, that part of the agreement should be
ignored.
Confronted with the clear conclusion that on remand the
trial court did not order specific performance of the actual
29
1180355, 1180634
terms of the agreement, Williamson argues that "the trial
court was not rigidly bound by the abstract doctrine of
'specific performance.'" Williamson's brief at 27.  He
contends that paragraph 28 of the agreement, which was the
subject of our decision in Porter, supra, "expressly provides
for broader remedies."  Williamson's brief at 27.  Williamson
relies on language in paragraph 28 of the agreement, which
excepts certain claims from arbitration: "[I]n the event of
any controversy concerning the purchase or sale of any such
Securities, the same shall be enforceable in a court of equity
by a decree of specific performance or by temporary or
permanent injunction or any other legal or equitable remedy
...." (Emphasis added.)  Thus, Williamson argues, because
paragraph 28 allows for "other legal and 
equitable remed[ies]"
in addition to specific performance in addressing a
controversy over the sale of securities under the agreement,
the trial court was not bound to provide a remedy within only
the confines of a specific-performance claim.7 
7The trial court, in its final judgment in this case,
noted the existence of the "any other legal or equitable
remedy" language from paragraph 28 and stated that this Court
"emphasized" that phrase from paragraph 28 in Porter, supra.
At one point in Porter, we emphasized the entire portion of
paragraph 
28 
that 
was 
subject 
to 
application 
and
30
1180355, 1180634
Although Williamson attempts to construe our decision in
Porter as "expressly acknowledging" that the trial court was
not bound to provide a remedy within only the confines of a
specific-performance claim, nothing in Porter supports that
contention.  Indeed, the actual holding in Porter was simply
that Williamson's claims for specific performance and
injunctive relief were properly before the trial court. See
Porter, 168 So. 3d at 1220 ("[W]e hold that, under the express
and unambiguous terms of the agreement, Williamson's claims
for specific performance and injunctive relief are not within
the scope of the arbitration provision."(footnote omitted)).
Regardless of whether paragraph 28 of the agreement may
allow for legal and equitable remedies beyond specific
performance of the agreement and an injunction, Williamson is
bound by the claims he actually brought against the Porter
defendants.  As we held in Porter, those claims sought
specific performance of the agreement and an injunction. 
Williamson did not attempt to amend his complaint on remand
interpretation in that decision, including the phrase "any
other legal or equitable remedy."  However, no part of our
decision in Porter "emphasized" the language in question any
more than any other part of paragraph 28. Regardless, the
trial court granted Williamson's request for specific
performance, not "any other legal or equitable remedy."
31
1180355, 1180634
after the decision in Porter, nor is there any indication in
the record that Williamson's complaint was amended by the
express or implied consent of the parties. See Rule 15(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P.  Accordingly, because Williamson had pending
before the trial court only a claim for specific performance
of the agreement and an injunction, the trial court was not at
liberty to provide relief pursuant to "any other legal or
equitable remedy" that may have been available to Williamson
under paragraph 28 of the agreement. 
Finally, Williamson argues that, even if "strict
compliance" with the agreement is required, the Porter
defendants "waived their right to enforce strict compliance"
because, as the trial court found, the Porter defendants
initially indicated a willingness to operate outside the 
terms
of the agreement when Donald asked Williamson to make a
proposal for the value of his shares, Shank selected proposed
evaluators and a method of valuation only after a dispute
arose between the parties, and Shank's method of valuation was
not "the most applicable for the Corporation being evaluated,"
as determined by the trial court. See Silverman v. Charmac,
Inc., 414 So. 2d 892, 895 (Ala. 1982) ("[A] party's waiver of
32
1180355, 1180634
contractual provisions may be implied from the acts and
circumstances surrounding the performance of the contract."). 
However, neither the trial court nor Williamson cites any
evidence indicating that the Porter defendants, knowing that
paragraph 9 of the agreement applied, demonstrated a
willingness to deviate from the process for determining share
value as set forth in the agreement.  There was no "waiver" on
the part of the Porter defendants. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's judgment,
insofar as it determined share value using an evaluation
process that was inconsistent with the evaluation process set
forth in the agreement, must be reversed.  The case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
B. Appeal No. 1180634
In appeal no. 1180634, Williamson filed a cross-appeal
challenging part of the trial court's judgment.  In his brief
on appeal, Williamson makes no challenge to the trial court's
judgment and asserts that he "voluntarily waives [his] cross-
appeal." Williamson's brief at iii.  We construe this
33
1180355, 1180634
statement as a voluntary dismissal of Williamson's appeal,
and, therefore, we dismiss the cross-appeal.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, in appeal no. 1180355,
the trial court's judgment is reversed, insofar as it
determined share value using an evaluation process that was
inconsistent with the evaluation process set forth in the
agreement, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.  In case no. 1180634, the cross-
appeal is dismissed.
1180355 –- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1180634 –- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, Stewart, and Mitchell,
JJ., concur.
Sellers, J., recuses himself.
34