Title: Bradford v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Roger BRADFORD v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-113                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
              Opinion delivered September 25, 1997


1.   Criminal procedure -- speedy trial -- when time is excluded. -
     -  Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.3 provides a number
     of instances where time is excluded for speedy-trial purposes,
     including: (1) the period of delay resulting from other
     proceedings concerning the defendant; (2) the period of delay
     resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the
     defendant or his counsel; (3) the period of delay resulting
     from the absence or unavailability of the defendant; and (4)
     other periods of delay for good cause.
 
2.   Criminal procedure -- speedy trial -- contemporaneous record
     of proceedings reflecting delay caused by defendant sufficient
     for exclusion of time. -- The trial court should enter written
     orders or make docket entries at the time a continuance is
     granted to detail the reason for the continuance, and to
     specify to a date certain the amount of excluded time;
     however, when a case is delayed by the accused and that
     delaying act is memorialized by a record taken at the time it
     occurred, that record may be sufficient to count as excluded
     time attributable to the defendant; in these situations, the
     trial court's failure to comply with Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(i)
     does not result in automatic reversal. 

3.   Criminal procedure -- speedy trial -- trial held outside
     applicable period -- State's failure to meet burden resulted
     in reversal. -- Where it was apparent that appellant's trial
     was held outside of the applicable speedy-trial period found
     in Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1, the burden was upon the State to
     show that the delay was the result of the defendant's conduct
     or was otherwise justified; only 1,110 days were found to be
     excludable under Rule 28.3; the State failed to meet its
     burden to show that the delay was the result of the
     defendant's conduct or was otherwise justified; the case was
     reversed and dismissed.


     Appeal from Arkansas Circuit Court; Russell Rogers, Judge;
reversed and dismissed.
     Maxie G. Kizer, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  David R. Raupp, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.  
     The appellant, Roger Bradford, appeals his judgment of
conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, cocaine, as a
habitual offender.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment and given
a $25,000 fine.  For his sole point on appeal, Bradford contends
that his right to a speedy trial was violated.  We agree and
reverse and dismiss.   
     On March 20, 1992, the Arkansas County Prosecuting Attorney
filed an information against Bradford charging him with delivery of
a controlled substance, cocaine, as a habitual offender.  This
charge encompassed a controlled-drug buy conducted in Dewitt on
February 28, 1992.  The case was styled "CR 92-28" in the Arkansas
County Circuit Court, and was initially joined with other charges
pending against Bradford on April 14, 1992.  
     While the record suggests that Bradford's trial for CR 92-28
was first set for June 10, 1992, what unfolds is a prolonged series
of continuances and other delays, almost all caused by the
appellant.  The trial court granted over fifteen continuances at
Bradford's request.  At least seven different attorneys, both
retained and appointed, represented Bradford at one point or
another.  While trial dates approached, Bradford engaged in a
recurrent and eventually predictable pattern of attempts to have
counsel relieved or fired.  During two of several attempts to try
Bradford on another charge, he attacked his own counsel.  There is
also evidence to suggest that Bradford feigned injury by falling
down the courthouse stairs in yet another successful attempt at
delay.  The appellant even escaped from prison on the eve of a
trial date.
     Ultimately, Bradford was tried and convicted on June 27, 1996,
where the jury imposed a life sentence.  Bradford now brings the
present appeal, arguing that he was denied his right to a speedy
trial under Ark. R. Crim. P. 28, and that therefore his conviction
should be reversed and dismissed.  
     For speedy-trial purposes, the time for bringing Bradford to
trial began when the information was filed on March 20, 1992.  Ark.
R. Crim. P. 28.2(a).  As it is apparent that Bradford's trial was
held outside of the applicable speedy-trial period found in Ark. R.
Crim. P. 28.1, the burden is upon the State to show that the delay
was the result of the defendant's conduct or was otherwise
justified.  Tanner v. State, 324 Ark. 37, 918 S.W.2d 166 (1996). 
The period of time between the filing of the information and the
commencement of trial is 1,560 days.  Thus, by the State's own
calculation, it must exclude 1,195 days.  Rule 28.3 provides a
number of instances where time is excluded for speedy-trial
purposes, including: (1) the period of delay resulting from other
proceedings concerning the defendant; (2) the period of delay
resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the
defendant or his counsel; (3) the period of delay resulting from
the absence or unavailability of the defendant; and (4) "[o]ther
periods of delay for good cause."
     The calculation of excluded time in this case is made
difficult due to the trial court's failure to maintain a docket
sheet or written orders memorializing all of the excluded periods
in accordance with Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(i).  The only docket sheet
found in the record is attached as an exhibit to a writ of
prohibition filed by Bradford, and the last entry on this docket
sheet is dated August 18, 1993.
     The trial court should enter written orders or make docket
entries at the time a continuance is granted to detail the reason
for the continuance, and to specify to a date certain the amount of
excluded time.  Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(c); Hicks v. State, 305 Ark.
393,