Title: State v. Jerry W. Sample

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2184-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Jerry W. Sample,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 10, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 6, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Joseph E. Wimmer 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
  BABLITCH, J., joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Gary Seeling and Seeling Law Offices, Waukesha and oral argument 
by Gary Seeling. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, assistant attorney general. 
 
96-2184-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2184-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Jerry W. Sample, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 10, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Joseph E. Wimmer, Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   The question certified to this 
court is whether Wis. Stat. § 939.311 codifies the "unilateral" 
or only the "bilateral" approach to the inchoate crime of 
conspiracy.  The amended information alleged that the defendant, 
Jerry W. Sample, agreed or combined with another for the purpose 
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 939.31 (1993-94) CONSPIRACY  
. . . [W]hoever, with intent that a crime be 
committed, agrees or combines with another for the 
purpose of committing that crime may, if one or more 
of the parties to the conspiracy does an act to effect 
its object, be fined or imprisoned or both not to 
exceed the maximum provided for the completed crime. . 
. .  
 
All other statutory references in this opinion will refer to the 
1993-94 volume, unless otherwise indicated. 
96-2184-CR 
 
2 
of committing a crime, and that he knowingly and unlawfully 
possessed cocaine, a controlled substance, with intent to 
deliver to a prisoner within the precincts of a jail.  The two 
people with whom Sample was alleged to have conspired were an 
undercover officer and a police informant.  After a jury trial, 
Sample was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 
cocaine, 
distribution 
to 
a 
prisoner, 
and 
conspiracy, 
in 
violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 161.41(1m)(c)1, 161.465, and 939.31. 
  
¶2 
Sample asserts that Wis. Stat. § 939.31 criminalizes 
only bilateral conspiracy, that is, a conspiracy where two or 
more persons agree, with criminal intent, to commit a crime.  
The circuit court denied several motions made by Sample to 
dismiss the conspiracy charge and held that a person can enter 
into a conspiracy with an undercover agent and an informant to 
accomplish some common criminal objective.  We conclude that a 
plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 939.31 embraces both unilateral 
and bilateral conspiracies, and therefore affirm the circuit 
court.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
The defendant, Jerry W. Sample, was a correctional 
officer at the Waukesha County Jail.  In July 1993 an inmate 
offered Sample $50 to get a pack of "cigarettes" from his 
"grandmother" in Milwaukee, and to bring it to him in the jail. 
 After further conversation, Sample agreed, went to an address 
the inmate had given him, picked up the package and the $50, and 
delivered the package to the inmate. 
96-2184-CR 
 
3 
¶4 
Over the next several months, Sample brought similar 
packages to the inmate on approximately 15 occasions.  At some 
point Sample understood that these packages actually contained 
marijuana or cocaine, and that the inmate was distributing these 
controlled substances to other inmates in the jail.  Sample was 
typically paid $50 for picking up and delivering the packages.  
He was paid $100 when a package contained cocaine.   
¶5 
At some point in the fall of 1993, the Waukesha County 
Sheriff's Department received information that a prisoner housed 
in the federal block of the jail was receiving controlled 
substances from a Sheriff's Department employee.2  Members of the 
Sheriff's Department traveled to interview several federal 
prisoners 
formerly 
housed 
at 
the 
Waukesha 
jail. 
 
Those 
interviews led the investigators to focus on a particular 
federal prisoner then housed in the Waukesha County Jailthe 
inmate with whom Sample had been working.  
¶6 
Before meeting with the inmate, Captain Lentz, the 
officer in charge of the investigation, met with the Assistant 
United States Attorney for the Eastern District to learn more 
about him.  On December 2, 1993, Captain Lentz met with the 
inmate at the United States Attorney's office in Milwaukee, and 
promised the inmate that the State would not prosecute him for 
his involvement in distributing drugs in the Waukesha County 
                     
2 The Waukesha County Jail, at least at the time of these 
events in 1993, had a contract to serve as a federal holding 
center.  As such, the jail housed federal prisoners whose cases 
were pending, or who, for example, were en route from a federal 
facility to hearings.  
96-2184-CR 
 
4 
Jail if he cooperated in the investigation.  The inmate agreed 
to cooperate with authorities and identified Sample as the 
employee who was bringing in the controlled substances.3  
¶7 
On December 8, 1993, Mr. Bernard J. Tesmer, of the 
Waukesha County Jail, watched a video surveillance monitor and 
observed the inmate and correctional officer Sample having some 
contact in one of the jail cell pods.  Tesmer made a note of his 
observation.  Tesmer testified that the inmate and Sample 
exchanged some sort of small package or envelope, but Tesmer did 
not know the contents of the package.  Tesmer immediately 
contacted the jail captain in charge of the investigation.  
Later that same day, arrangements were made for an undercover 
officer to meet with Sample outside a restaurant, so that the 
undercover officer could give Sample $200.  Sample never went to 
the restaurant that day.  
¶8 
On the following day, December 9, 1993, Waukesha 
authorities conducted a controlled "reverse sting" operation in 
which the inmate asked Sample to get a package of cocaine from 
the inmate's girlfriend and to bring it to the jail.  As he was 
instructed by the inmate, Sample met the girlfriend, who was 
actually an undercover detective, and received a package of 
cocaine from her.  When the undercover detective signaled that 
the transaction had taken place, other officers immediately 
moved in to arrest Sample.  As one of the officers identified 
                     
3 Although he agreed to cooperate in the investigation, the 
inmate 
never 
directly 
admitted 
that 
he 
had 
distributed 
controlled substances to other Waukesha County Jail inmates.  
96-2184-CR 
 
5 
himself and ordered Sample not to move, Sample tossed the 
package of cocaine on the ground beside him.  
¶9 
Sample admitted in a police interview later that day 
that he had been bringing marijuana and cocaine to the inmate 
for several months.  Sample was charged with one count of 
conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver to an inmate during late November and early December 
1993.4    
¶10 Sample challenged the conspiracy charge in a motion to 
dismiss the information and renewed his argument several times 
before and during the trial, including a request for jury 
instructions encompassing the bilateral approach to conspiracy. 
Sample argued to the circuit court, citing State v. (Thomas C.) 
Smith, 189 Wis. 2d 496, 501, 525 N.W.2d 264 (1995), that a 
conspiracy must involve at least two people, with each member 
subject to the same penalty for the conspiracy, or that each 
person has a stake in the outcome.  Sample argued that 
Wisconsin's conspiracy statute is bilateral and that he could 
not be convicted of the crime because the other members of the 
conspiracy never intended that a crime be committed. 
¶11 Ruling on Sample's motion to dismiss, the circuit 
court held that an undercover agent can enter into a conspiracy 
with another person in a mutual understanding to accomplish a 
common criminal objective, even though the two parties have 
                     
4 Sample 
was 
charged 
with 
violating 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ § 161.01(4), 161.16(2)(b)(1), 161.41(1m)(c)(1), 161.465 and 
939.31 (1993-94).  
96-2184-CR 
 
6 
different reasons in fact for doing so.  The circuit court also 
rejected Sample's proposed jury instruction, ruling that a 
conspiracy could occur even if the stakes were different for 
each of the actors.  The circuit court then instructed the jury 
using the standard instruction Wis JICriminal 570.5 
                     
5 The circuit court gave the following instruction, based on 
pattern instruction Wis JICriminal 570: 
The crime of conspiracy, as defined in Section 
939.31 of the criminal code of Wisconsin is committed 
by one who, with intent that a crime be committed 
agrees or combines with another for the purpose of 
committing such crime, if one or more of the parties 
to the conspiracy does an act to affect it's [sic] 
object.  
 
The defendant in this case is charged with having 
conspired to commit the crime of possession of cocaine 
with intent to deliver to a prisoner within the 
precincts of a jail. 
 
Before you may find the defendant guilty, the 
State must prove by evidence which satisfies you 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the following three 
elements were present. 
 
The first element requires that the defendant 
intended that the crime of possession of cocaine with 
intent to deliver to a prisoner within the precincts 
of a jail be committed. 
 
The second element of the crime of conspiracy 
requires that the defendant was a member of a 
conspiracy to commit the crime of possession of 
cocaine with intent to deliver to a prisoner within 
the precincts of a jail. 
 
A person is a member of a conspiracy if with 
intent that a crime be committed, the person agrees 
with or joins with another for the purpose of 
committing that crime.  A conspiracy is a mutual 
understanding 
to 
accomplish 
some 
common 
criminal 
objective or to work together for a common criminal 
purpose.  It is not necessary that the co-conspirators 
had any express or formal agreement or that they had a 
meeting or even that they all knew each other. 
96-2184-CR 
 
7 
¶12 On November 22, 1995, the jury found Sample guilty of 
conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver to an inmate, and he was sentenced to eight years in 
prison.  Sample appealed, and we accepted certification6 from the 
court of appeals.7  Sample now asks this court to vacate his 
                                                                  
 
The third element of the crime of conspiracy 
requires that an act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy was performed by one or more of the co-
conspirators, such an act must be more than mere 
planning and agreement.  However, it need not by 
itself be an attempt to commit the crime or an 
unlawful act.  If there was an act which was a step 
toward accomplishing the criminal objective, that is 
sufficient. 
 
If you're satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that 
the 
defendant 
intended 
that 
the 
crime 
of 
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver to a 
prisoner within the precincts of a jail be committed, 
that the defendant was a member of a conspiracy to 
commit 
the 
crime, 
and 
that 
an 
act 
toward 
the 
commission of that crime was performed by a member of 
the conspiracy, you should find the defendant guilty. 
 
If you're not so satisfied, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. 
 
6 The court of appeals requested certification pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1995-96).  
7 The question of whether the Wisconsin legislature adopted 
a "unilateral" or "bilateral" approach to conspiracy was before 
the 
court 
once 
before. 
 
In 
1995 
this 
court 
accepted 
certification in State v. (Edgar) Smith, No. 94-1725-CR.  After 
hearing oral arguments, the court determined that the unilateral 
versus bilateral issue was never raised in the circuit court, 
and then vacated the order accepting the certification. 
96-2184-CR 
 
8 
conviction and the sentence imposed, claiming that no crime of a 
one-person conspiracy exists under Wisconsin law.8  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 The 
issue 
presented 
is 
one 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, a question of law which this court reviews de 
novo.  See State v. Sostre, 198 Wis. 2d 409, 414, 542 N.W.2d 774 
(1996).  We have often expressed the rules by which we interpret 
statutes: 
 
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
discern the intent of the legislature.  To do so, we 
first consider the language of the statute.  If the 
language of the statute clearly and unambiguously sets 
forth the legislative intent, we apply that intent to 
the case at hand and do not look beyond the statutory 
language to ascertain its meaning. 
State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 406, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997) 
(citations omitted).  By focusing on the intent of the 
                     
8In its memorandum requesting certification, the court of 
appeals suggested that this case presents an opportunity to give 
guidance to the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee in drafting 
pattern instructions that correctly state the law of conspiracy. 
 See Wis. JICriminal 570, 401, 410.  The committee uses the 
same definition of conspiracy in its pattern instruction for the 
charge of party to a crime under Wis. Stat. § 939.05, and the 
charge of conspiracy under Wis. Stat. § 939.31.  The former 
statute codifies vicarious liability for a substantive crime 
under the conspiracy theory, and the latter codifies the 
inchoate crime of conspiracy.  We conclude that a challenge to 
either 
the 
jury 
instructions 
for 
the 
inchoate 
crime 
of 
conspiracy, Wis. Stat. § 939.31, or to the instructions for Wis. 
Stat. § 939.05, is not presented in this case and decline to 
specifically address it. 
 
96-2184-CR 
 
9 
legislature rather than our own policy views, we preserve 
principles of separation of powers. 
 
¶14 Legislative intent is not always readily discernible, 
however.  Our rules of interpretation also recognize that  
 
[a] statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being 
understood 
in 
two 
or 
more 
different 
senses 
by 
reasonably well-informed persons.  However, a statute 
is not rendered ambiguous merely because the parties 
disagree as to its meaning.  If a statute is ambiguous 
we look to the scope, history, context, subject 
matter, and object of the statute in order to 
ascertain legislative intent.  However, resort to 
legislative history is not appropriate in the absence 
of a finding of ambiguity. 
Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 406 (citations omitted). 
¶15 The parties in this case disagree as to the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.31.9  Both Mr. Sample and the State contend that 
a 
plain 
reading 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.31 
supports 
their 
interpretation of the statute.  Under Sample's reading, the 
statute applies only to bilateral conspiracies.  The State reads 
the 
statute 
to 
encompass 
both 
unilateral 
and 
bilateral 
conspiracies.10  The circuit court concluded that the plain 
meaning of the statute permitted prosecution for a unilateral 
conspiracy. 
                     
9 Wis. Stat. § 939.31 (1993-94) was revised by 1995 Act 448, 
§ 447, effective July 9, 1996, to reflect a renumbering of a 
referenced statute.  The revision did not materially change the 
statute.  
10 The State conceded in its brief to this court that if the 
statute is interpreted to include only bilateral conspiracies, 
then Sample could not be found guilty under the statute.   
96-2184-CR 
 
10
¶16 Commentators have described the differences between 
unilateral and bilateral conspiracies.  "Under a unilateral 
formulation, the crime of conspiracy is committed when a person 
agrees to proceed in a prohibited manner."  Note, Conspiracy: 
Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 
1122, 1136 (1975)[hereinafter Statutory Reform].  The unilateral 
approach assesses the subjective, individual behavior of a 
defendant in determining guilt.  See Dierdre A. Burgman, 
Unilateral Conspiracy: Three Critical Perspectives, 29 DePaul L. 
Rev. 75, 76 (1979-80).  Under the unilateral approach, criminal 
conspiracy will lie even where one of two alleged "co-
conspirators" is, unknown to the defendant, an undercover police 
agent or a police informant who merely feigns participation in 
the conspiracy.  "[T]he immateriality of co-conspirators' legal 
status to defendant's criminal liability is implicit in the . . 
. unilateral approach."  Statutory Reform, at 1138. "[U]nder a 
bilateral formulation, the crime of conspiracy is committed when 
two or more persons agree to proceed in [a prohibited] manner." 
 Id. at 1136. 
III. PLAIN LANGUAGE 
 
¶17 Sample makes several arguments in urging us to 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 939.31 applies only to bilateral 
conspiracies. We will first address his argument that the plain 
language of the statute evinces a legislative intent to cover 
only bilateral conspiracies.  Sample contends that the undefined 
term "whoever" in the statutory phrase "[W]hoever, with intent 
that a crime be committed, agrees or combines with another for 
96-2184-CR 
 
11
the purpose of committing that crime may," necessarily refers to 
"persons" in the plural.  Sample also contends that the 
undefined verbs "agrees" and "combines" in the statute imply 
plurality.  He relies on Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. 
Kenosha Ed. Ass'n, 70 Wis. 2d 325, 332, 234 N.W.2d 311 (1975) 
and State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 196 Wis. 2d 86, 106-07, 537 
N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1995), for these grammatical conclusions. 
¶18 The State counters with a dictionary definition to 
assert that "whoever" is an indefinite pronoun which may be 
either singular, plural, or both.  See The American Heritage 
Dictionary, Usage Note to "everyone" at 470 (2d college ed. 
1982); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 
2611 (1986 unabridged).  Next, the State points out that the 
verbs "agrees" and "combines", as found in the conspiracy 
statute, are in the singular inflection.  Further, the State 
asserts that the dictionary definitions do not require that the 
"agreement" or "combination" must actually exist.  Instead, 
according to the State, the "agreement" or "combination" in the 
context of a conspiracy statute may be real, apparent, or merely 
imagined, and still be compatible with the ordinary definition 
of the terms. 
¶19 The authorities offered by Sample to confine "whoever" 
to the plural form are not persuasive.  Neither Kenosha Unified 
nor Richard Knutson addresses whether "whoever" is solely 
singular or solely plural.  The court in Kenosha interpreted a 
96-2184-CR 
 
12
statute assessing penalties for striking municipal employees.11  
See 70 Wis. 2d at 330-332.  The school district argued that the 
penalty statute applied to the teachers' union as a whole, as 
well as to individual striking teachers.  The point of 
contention was whether "whoever" applied only to individual 
human beings, or whether it also applied to collective groups of 
individuals, such as unincorporated associations.  This court 
concluded that the plain language of the statute evinced a 
legislative intent only to limit the potential penalty imposed 
upon individual strikers, based in part on the statutory 
provision that any fine imposed could be deducted from the 
striker's salary. 
¶20 The court of appeals in Richard Knutson12 concluded 
that the term "whoever" as used in a homicide statute was 
                     
11 That statute read in pertinent part: 
Wis. Stat. § 111.70(7) PENALTY FOR STRIKER.  Whoever 
violates sub. (4)(l) after an injunction against such 
a strike has been issued shall be fined $10.  After 
the injunction has been issued, any employee who is 
absent from work because of purported illness shall be 
presumed to be on strike unless the illness is 
verified . . .  The court shall order that any fine 
imposed under this subsection be paid by means of a 
salary deduction at a rate to be determined by the 
court.    
 
12 In State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 191 Wis. 2d 395, 528 
N.W.2d 430 (1995), this court vacated its decision to certify 
the question presented by the court of appeals, because, after 
oral argument, the court was equally divided on whether to 
affirm or reverse the judgment of the circuit court.  191 
Wis. 2d at 396.  This court then remanded the cause back to the 
court of appeals, whereupon that court issued its decision, 
published at 196 Wis. 2d 86, 537 N.W.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1995).    
96-2184-CR 
 
13
ambiguous as to whether it referred only to human beings, or to 
both natural and artificial persons.13  See 196 Wis. 2d at 96.  
The Richard Knutson court was not asked to determine the number 
of human beings included in the term "whoever" as used in Wis. 
Stat. § 940.10.  
¶21 We agree with the State that the common and ordinary 
meaning of the word "whoever" can encompass both a single 
individual or more than one person.  For purposes of statutory 
interpretation or construction, the common and approved usage of 
words may be established by consulting dictionary definitions.  
See Wis. Stat. § 990.010(1);  see also Swatek v. County of Dane, 
192 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995).  This is not to say 
that courts may resort to a dictionary only when construing 
ambiguous statutes.  See Figgs v. City of Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 2d 
44, 51, 357 N.W.2d 548 (1984) and State ex rel. Smith v. City of 
Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d 788, 798 n.6, 407 N.W.2d 901 (1987) 
(concluding that the necessity of looking to a standard 
dictionary to ascertain the usual meaning of words does not 
render a word used in a statute ambiguous). 
¶22 One 
dictionary frequently 
relied 
upon 
by 
courts 
defines "whoever" as a pronoun with the following meaning: "1. 
Whatever person or persons: Whoever comes will be welcomed.  2. 
 Who: Whoever could have dreamed of such a thing?" The American 
                     
13 Wis. Stat. § 940.10 provided in pertinent part: 
"[W]hoever causes the death of another human being by 
the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is 
guilty of a Class E felony."  
96-2184-CR 
 
14
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language at 2038 (3d ed. 
1992).  We conclude that the term "whoever" can be read as 
singular or plural.  Second, we do not read the terms "agrees"  
or "combines" strictly to require application to a unilateral 
conspiracy.  Instead, we simply conclude that the singular form 
of "agrees" and "combines" when used with the indefinite pronoun 
"whoever" represents subject-verb agreement within the language 
of the statute. 
¶23 We 
disagree 
with 
the 
State's 
third 
grammatical 
argument that an "agreement" or "combination" in the context of 
a conspiracy charge may be merely apparent or imagined.  The 
State asserts that the dictionary definitions for those terms do 
not require actual existence, and likewise the statute may 
encompass "imagined" agreements.  This third argument may suffer 
from a poor choice of words more than anything else.  We 
understand the State's position to be that feigned agreement by 
another member of the conspiracy is sufficient under the 
unilateral approach.  We agree.  In the context of an agreement 
between a defendant charged under Wis. Stat. § 939.31 and 
another person, as long as the parties agree or combine by their 
words or actions, it is not necessary that the other person 
intend agreement.  His or her "agreement" may be feigned.    
¶24 The State also argues that Wis. Stat. § 939.31 plainly 
encompasses 
unilateral 
conspiracies 
because 
the 
statutory 
phrase, "with intent that a crime be committed" modifies only 
the pronoun "whoever."  The relevant portion of the statute 
reads: "[W]hoever, with intent that a crime be committed, agrees 
96-2184-CR 
 
15
or combines with another for the purpose of committing that 
crime may . . . ."  Because of the placement of that modifying 
phrase - following the pronoun "whoever," but preceding "agrees 
or combines" - the State asserts that the legislature intended 
to embrace the unilateral conspiracy theory.  The statute 
therefore, according to the State, only requires intent on the 
part 
of 
the 
individual 
charged, 
the 
"whoever," 
and 
not 
necessarily intent by any of the persons who agree or combine 
with the defendant for the purpose of committing a crime, or who 
seemingly do so.  
¶25 A plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 939.31's codification 
of the inchoate14 crime of conspiracy evinces a legislative 
purpose to assess the subjective behavior of the individual 
defendant.  This purpose is discerned from both the use of the 
singular form of pronouns and verbs, as well as the absence, 
within the statute, of a requirement of criminal intent on the 
part of anyone other than the person charged.  To read the 
statute as only applying to bilateral conspiracies would mean 
that a person is liable for conspiracy based on the state of 
mind of another.  Such a reading would be contrary to the 
singular form of the statutory terms, and the grammatical 
construction of the statute itself.  The district attorney 
                     
14 Blacks 
Law 
Dictionary 
761 
(6th 
ed. 
1990) 
defines 
"inchoate": 
Imperfect; 
partial; 
unfinished; 
begun, 
but 
not 
completed; as a contract not executed by all the 
parties. 
  
96-2184-CR 
 
16
succinctly summed up the application of the statute in the case 
of a unilateral conspiracy: 
 
 
[The inmate], even if he is acting as an agent of 
the State, can still be a part of the conspiracy if he 
has an agreement with [the inmate] (sic) to bring the 
drugs - - with Mr. Sample to bring the drugs into the 
jail.  Mr. Sample is stuck with who he chose to deal 
with.  He chose [the inmate], who turned informant on 
him and turned essentially state's evidence.  That's 
still part of the conspiracy from the time frame 
that's charged when this defendant admitted that he 
was delivering cocaine into the jail between November 
and December of 1993.  Just because the person who 
he's conspiring with to achieve an objective happens 
to turn state's evidence on him and he doesn't know 
about it doesn't mean the conspiracy no longer exists. 
  
To read the statute as limited to bilateral conspiracies would 
preclude the State from prosecuting anyone who entered into an 
agreement to commit a crime, where that second person is 
cooperating with law enforcement authorities, or otherwise lacks 
criminal intent.15  Instead, we read the plain language of the 
statute to focus on the criminal intent of a single defendant.  
We conclude that the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 939.31 
embraces 
both 
unilateral 
conspiracies 
and 
bilateral 
conspiracies.   
¶26 Defendant Sample next argues that interpreting the 
statute to include the unilateral conspiracy approach is 
                     
15 We recognize, however, that some jurisdictions have 
codified only a bilateral formulation of conspiracy.  Those 
jurisdictions include, for example, Cal. Penal Code § 182 (West. 
1998); Iowa Code Ann. § 706.1 (West. 1997); Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann. § 750.157a (West. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-103 (West 
1997); and 13 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. § 1404 (West. 1997).   
96-2184-CR 
 
17
inconsistent with prior case law.  We disagree.  The cases 
Sample cites are either factually distinct or concern another 
statute. 
 
¶27 Sample bases his interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 939.31 
in part on State v. (Thomas C.) Smith, 189 Wis. 2d 496, 525 
N.W.2d 264 (1995).  He cites Smith for the proposition that a 
conspiracy must involve at least two people, with each member 
subject to the same penalty for the conspiracy, or that each 
person has a stake in the outcome.  The true rationale of Smith, 
however, was that members of the conspiracy must be in agreement 
to commit the same crime.16  In that case, the defendant seller 
was convicted of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance.  
However, the only evidence presented by the state was that the 
seller purported to have in his possession and agreed to sell a 
small amount of controlled substance to the buyer.  The amount 
was consistent with personal use, and there was no claim that 
the buyer thereafter intended to sell, deliver or give the 
controlled substance to a third party.  See 189 Wis. 2d at 498. 
 Based on the evidence, we determined that at most the buyer 
could have been guilty of a misdemeanor of possession, a 
different crime from that with which defendant seller was 
charged.  We therefore concluded that there was no factual basis 
to sustain a theory of conspiracy to deliver a controlled 
                     
16 Indeed, a difference in actual available penalties cannot 
dictate whether persons are subject to liability for conspiracy 
under Wis. Stat. § 939.31.  For example, one member of the 
conspiracy could have already had a criminal history and be 
subject to a penalty enhancer for being a repeater.  
96-2184-CR 
 
18
substance, and allowed the defendant to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  See id. at 504.  The evidence in this case is different, 
and is not consistent with mere personal use of a controlled 
substance.  Here, the evidence shows that Sample conspired to 
deliver drugs to someone engaged in delivering drugs to other 
persons in a jail. 
¶28 The "stake in the outcome" language from Smith derives 
from cases directly or indirectly relying on State v. Nutley, 24 
Wis. 2d 527, 129 N.W.2d 155 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 918 
(1965), overruled on other grounds, State v. Stevens, 26 Wis. 2d 
451, 463, 132 N.W.2d 502 (1965).  Nutley concluded that "each 
member of the conspiracy must individually consciously intend 
the realization of the particular criminal objective."  The 
Nutley court then went on to say that "[e]ach must have an 
individual 'stake in the venture.'"  24 Wis. 2d at 556.  Nutley 
gave that explanation of the party to a crime statute by relying 
upon language from cases written before the conspiracy statute 
was revised. 
¶29 Although Sample argues that the Nutley statement 
regarding the individual stake in the venture constitutes a 
separate element necessary to establish liability under Wis. 
Stat. § 939.31, we conclude otherwise.  Nutley concerned a 
different statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.05.  Further, the statement 
in Nutley did not lay down a new element for proof of that 
crime, but instead offered a narrative description of the type 
of proof that could be used to prove the statutory elements for 
party to a crime liability.  As such, Nutley and its progeny do 
96-2184-CR 
 
19
not compel us to read into the plain language of the inchoate 
crime of conspiracy statute either an additional element of 
intent on the part of the other members of the conspiracy, or 
alternately, an element of a "stake in the venture," or "stake 
in the outcome."17  Nutley involved the charge of party to a 
crime under Wis. Stat. § 939.05.  That statute forms a separate 
basis for criminal liability, distinct from that for the 
inchoate crime of conspiracy.  Nutley described the operation of 
the conspirators' intent in party to a crime liability: the fact 
of agreement imposes liability for the substantive offense on 
all conspirators when the crime is consummated by a single 
perpetrator.  See 24 Wis. 2d at 555.  In contrast, under the 
inchoate crime of conspiracy, by definition no substantive crime 
                     
17 We find support for our distinction of Nutley in other 
cases.  See, e.g., State v. Hecht, 116 Wis. 2d 605, 627, 342 
N.W.2d 721 (1984).  A number of Wisconsin decisions have held 
that "a stake in the venture" is not an element of the crime of 
party to a crime codified in Wis. Stat. § 939.05.  See, e.g., 
Krueger v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 272, 286, 267 N.W.2d 602 (1978) 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 874; State v. Manson, 76 Wis. 2d 482, 
486, 251 N.W.2d 788 (1977); State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 
427, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977).   
One case relied upon by Nutley was Direct Sales Co. v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943), an inchoate conspiracy case. 
 However, the Court in Direct Sales considered proof of a stake 
in the venture as merely relevant to proof of the transition 
from knowledge to intent to participate in the commission of a 
crime.  Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 704, 713.  Direct Sales did 
not elevate proof of a stake in the venture to an element of the 
inchoate crime of conspiracy.  Nor does the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 939.31 include a "stake in the venture" as an element.  
We will not judicially insert it.   
96-2184-CR 
 
20
is ever needed.  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.31 focuses on the 
subjective behavior of the individual defendant.18 
IV. OTHER CLAIMS 
 
¶30 Sample also briefly argues that the reverse sting in 
this case violated his right to protection from ex post facto 
prosecution and his rights to due process under the law.  
Because we read Wis. Stat. § 939.31, as presently drafted, to 
have always encompassed unilateral conspiracy as a criminal act, 
this is not a retrospective interpretation and Sample's claims 
of ex post facto prosecution and deprivation of a due process 
                     
18 Recently, the court of appeals in State v. West, 214 
Wis. 2d 467, 475, 571 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1997), stated that 
the elements of a conspiracy under Wis. Stat. § 939.31 are: "(1) 
an agreement between the defendant and at least one other person 
to commit a crime; (2) intent on the part of the conspirators to 
commit the crime; and (3) an act performed by one of the 
conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy," citing Hawpetoss 
v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 71, 80, 187 N.W.2d 823 (1971).  The issue 
in West was only whether there was any evidence that another 
person had agreed with West to commit a crime.  The West court 
did not reach the question of whether the other person possessed 
criminal intent.  The Hawpetoss court, upon which the West court 
relied, in turn relied on Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527.  Two other 
court of appeals § 939.31 conspiracy cases recite the need for 
intent on the part of more than one conspirator, based on the 
language in Nutley but without relying on that requirement for 
their holdings.  See State v. Copening, 103 Wis. 2d 564, 579, 
309 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that probable cause 
existed to charge the defendant with conspiracy) and State v. 
Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 704, 422 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding 
that 
co-conspirator's 
statements 
were 
admissible 
because his acts were in furtherance of the conspiracy).  We do 
not read either of these decisions as inconsistent with our 
conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 939.31 encompasses the unilateral 
approach.  
96-2184-CR 
 
21
right 
to 
advance 
warning 
of 
prohibited 
conduct 
are 
not 
supported. 
 
¶31 In addition, Sample argues that a unilateral reading 
of the statute allows law enforcement officers to create crimes. 
 He also claims that he is the victim of a governmental abuse of 
power, in the form of the reverse sting operation which resulted 
in his arrest.  Sample, while not asserting the affirmative 
defense of entrapment, states that the investigating officers 
"created a conspiracy-like crime to ensnare Mr. Sample."  
Petitioner's brief at 25.  We disagree with both assertions. 
¶32 The government conduct in this case was to infiltrate 
an ongoing scheme of bringing drugs into the precincts of a 
jail.  The complaint against Mr. Sample was not based merely on 
the events of December 9, 1993.  The government may have 
provided 
opportunity 
for 
a 
particular 
delivery, 
but 
the 
government did not create the crime here.  The government did 
not instigate the ongoing scheme of bringing drugs into the 
jail.  See State v. Steadman, 152 Wis. 2d 293, 302, 448 N.W.2d 
267 (Ct. App. 1989).  Sample's due process rights were not 
violated.  Further, the fact that the investigating officers 
enlisted the aid of a jail inmate and utilized an undercover 
officer is not the type of police behavior that is "shocking to 
a universal sense of justice."  United States v. Russell, 411 
U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (holding that where law enforcement agents 
provided the defendant with ingredients for illegal manufacture 
of drugs, the agents' participation was not unfair or shocking 
96-2184-CR 
 
22
to any sense of justice because it related to criminal activity 
already in progress).  
 
¶33 Because the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 939.31 
evinces a legislative intent to criminalize both unilateral and 
bilateral conspiracies, we affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
96-2184-CR.ssa 
 
1 
¶34 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).   I 
join the court in its mandate.  I write separately to express my 
disagreement with the majority opinion's reliance on the plain 
meaning canon to interpret Wis. Stat. § 939.31.  
¶35 In determining the legislative intent, the majority 
opinion looks solely to the text of the statute.  Discussing 
whether the word "whoever" is singular or plural, the majority 
bases its decision that the statute embraces the unilateral 
approach to conspiracy on the statute's use of pronouns and verb 
conjugations.  Pronouns are a natural source of uncertainty in 
statutory interpretation because they have little inherent 
meaning and do not contain enough information on their own to 
name the person(s) to whom they are intended to refer.  See 
Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges 38, 121 (1993). 
¶36 In using dictionary meanings and rules of grammar, the 
majority dons thick grammarian spectacles and fails to see other 
available evidence bearing on the meaning of the statute.19  In 
this case the 1950 and 1953 Wisconsin Legislative Council 
reports provide a rich discussion on the revisions to the 
conspiracy statute, a discussion which is omitted by the 
majority opinion. 
                     
19 West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 
U.S. 83, 113 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority 
opinion 
for 
putting 
on 
"its 
thick 
grammarian's 
spectacles 
and 
ignor[ing] 
the 
available 
evidence 
of 
congressional purpose and the teaching of prior cases construing 
a statute").  
96-2184-CR.ssa 
 
2 
¶37 The 
majority's 
approach 
has 
been 
criticized 
by 
scholars and courts, including the United States Supreme Court 
in Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 
U.S. 1 (1976).  The Train Court refused to rely exclusively on 
the plain language of a statute:  "When aid to construction of 
the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, 
there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, 
however 
clean 
the 
words 
may 
appear 
on 
'superficial 
examination.'"  Id. at 10 (quoting United States v. American 
Trucking Ass'ns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)).   
¶38 Furthermore, in resolving the meaning of the statute, 
the court should consider the public policy reasons that support 
either a unilateral or a bilateral approach to conspiracy.  
Justification for the unilateral approach is explained in the 
Model Penal Code as follows: "Under the unilateral approach of 
the [Model Penal] Code, the culpable party's guilt would not be 
affected by the fact that the other party's agreement was 
feigned.  . . . [H]is culpability is not decreased by the 
other's secret intention."20 
¶39 Public policy also supports the bilateral approach to 
conspiracy.  One court explained the rationale for the bilateral 
rule as follows: 
 
The rationale behind making conspiracy a crime also 
supports [the bilateral] rule.  Criminal conspiracy is 
an offense separate from the actual criminal act 
                     
20 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part I § 5.03, at 400 
(1985). 
96-2184-CR.ssa 
 
3 
because of the perception "that collective action 
toward an antisocial end involves a greater risk to 
society than individual action toward the same end."  
In part, this view is based on the perception that 
group activity increases the likelihood of success of 
the criminal act and of future criminal activity by 
members of the group, and is difficult for law 
enforcement officers to detect . . . .  Such dangers, 
however, are nonexistent when a person "conspires" 
only with a government agent. 
United States v. Escobar De Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th 
Cir. 1984)(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
¶40 I would interpret Wis. Stat. § 939.31 by considering 
the statutory language, the legislative history, the prior 
cases, the legislative purpose and the conspiracy statute in the 
context of the criminal code.  Several scholars have proposed 
methods of statutory interpretation that take into account the 
text and various extrinsic aids.21  By using this approach to 
statutory interpretation, judges can acknowledge and deal with 
interpretive problems that arise from the inherent ambiguity of 
language as well as the limits of our linguistic capabilities.  
See Solan at 117. 
¶41 For the foregoing reasons, I join the court's mandate 
and write separately. 
                     
21 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) (focusing 
on the entire history of a statute and how it fits into the 
current legislative scheme); Richard A. Posner, The Problems of 
Jurisprudence 
(1990) (placing 
weight 
on the 
pre-enactment 
history of a statute); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 
Stan. L. Rev. 321 (1990) (urging consideration of a broad range 
of textual, historical and evolutive evidence in interpreting 
statutes). 
96-2184-CR.ssa 
 
4 
¶42 I am authorized to state that Justice William A. 
Bablitch joins this concurrence.