Title: Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY

No, 26308

IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF KAWAI'T

 

KITTY K. KAMAKA, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

cooosits apenscn gone « SEL, = tow comsorailn,

 

   
  

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. No. 97-4007)

MOTION

 

& STIFEL’S

 

oopsy

(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ.;
Circuit Judge Wong, in place of Acca, J., recused)

 

Upon consideration of defendant -appellee/cro:
appellant Goodsil1 Anderson Quinn & Stifel’s “Motion for
Clarification,” brought pursuant to Hawai's Rules of Appellate
Procedure Rule 40 (2007), which we deem as a notion for
reconsideration, the papers in support thereof, and the record
herein,

IT I$ HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted and the
opinion of the court in the above-captioned matter, filed January
24, 2008, starting at page 25, is amended as follows (deleted
text is stricken; new language is double-underscored) :

However, Goodsill, in moving to dismiss, argued that ‘an

enployee is barred by the exclusivity provision of. iitawali’s

Workers’ compensation law, ARS §] 386-5 ((1993),] fzom
jserting clains for negligence against his or her

employer-" HRS 5 206-5, entie. wanes —
Sibtiatiaceceiah ie ete pertinent pate

 

 

 
acento i
Gtanted to an emplovee or the employee's
Sependente on account of a work injury"
Suffered by the employe
Tiabiiiey of the employer to the
‘at common Taw or otherwiee, on
account of the injury, except for sexual
harassment or sexual assault ané infliction of
‘snotional distress or invasion of privacy
Eelated thereto, in vaich case 2 civil section
Ely ates be Brought.

 

 

intrest
3 auch claim 8, pursuant to Tee noe.
inact cenicartsuaemeemsaistunmuamnpeaneeenmensied

 

‘Srappesir anaka alg contends
anneaa thar HRAESRSLEEES, SF Soe acting in feSapucity aa

fer enployer when it investigated; therefore, the workers"
compensation exclusivity rules did not apply’ and, (2) once
fn Investigation 1s commenced, the at-will doctrine ie
Snapplicabie and an Investigating employer owes a duty of
care in the conduct of that investigation.

 
 

‘The Clerk of the Court is directed to incorporate the
foregoing changes in the original opinion by removing pages
29 through 34 and replacing them with the pages attached hereto
and take all necessary steps to notify the publiehing agencies of
these changes.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, February 14, 2008
Lindalee K. (Cissy) Farm
and Edmund K. Saffery (of
Goodsill Anderson Quinn
& Stifel), for defendant - castes COV Naas ar

Sppelise/eesoe-copettact, Woe owe:

fon the motion daceteD

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

HRS § 386-3 (1993) provides in relevant part:

If an employee suffers personal injury either by accident
Arising out of and in the course of the employment. -
employers -. shall pay compensation tol
a5 hereinafter provided.
arising out of and in the course of the
employnent includes the wilful act of a third person
Gsrected against an employes because of the employee's
exployment

   

However, Goodaill, in moving to dismiss, argued that “an employee
is barred by the exclusivity provision of (Hawaii's workers’
compensation law, HRS §] 386-5 [(1993),] from asserting clains
for negligence against his or her employer.” HRS § 386-5,
entitled "Exclusiveness or right to compensation; exception(,)*
(bold emphasis omitted), provides in pertinent part:
remedies
ox shes seploveescependence on account OF = work, InUrY

Sethe euplover to the employee... at common lav or
yon account of the injury, except for sexual

    

jault and infliction of enotional,
distiass or invasion 9f privacy xelated theresa, in which
Gaze a civil action may also be browse

(enphases added.) Based on a plain reading, HRS § 386-5
unambiguously provides that clains for infliction of emotional
distress or invasion of privacy are not subject to the
exclusivity provision when such claims arise from claims for
sexual harassment or sexual assault, in which case a civil action
nay be brought. Inasmuch as Kamaka has alleged a claim for

emotional distress that does not arise out of sexual harassment

 

HRS § 286-1 (1993) defines ‘work injury” as a “personal injury.
suffered unter the conditions specifica in specifies in section 186-3(,]"
quoted aupra.

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in West’s Hawai‘i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

or sexual assault, ouch claim i, pursuant to HRS § 386-5,
barred.

Nevertheless, Kamaka also contends on appeal that
(2) Goodsitl was not acting in ite capacity as her employer when
it investigated; therefore, the workers’ compensation exclusivity
rules did not apply and, (2) once an investigation is commenced,
the at-will doctrine is inapplicable and an investigating
employer owes a duty of care in the conduct of that
investigation. In support of her position, Kamaka urges this

doctrine and points to a

 

court to adopt the “dual person:
Massachusetts case that explains the doctrine:

‘The dual persona theory provides that an employer may
be regarded as a third party and thus be subject to muit, if
the enployer's liability to the injured employes derives
from a second persona so completely independent from and
unrelated to his status as employer that. by established
Standards the law recognizes it as a separate legal person.
‘The relevant inquiry in a dual persona allegation ie not
whether a separate theory of lisbiiity could be argued
against the save legal person, but rather whether the
Controversy Involves @ separave legal entity.

Barrett v. Rodgers, 562 N.F.24 480, 482 (Ma
omitted). In Barrett, an employee was injured when attacked by

 

 

 

. 1990) (citations

 

his employer's dog during the course of his employment. Id.
After receiving workers’ compensation benefits, the injured
enployee attempted to, despite the prohibitions in the

Massachusetts workers’ compensation laws, maintain a separate

 

tort action againat the employer aa the owner of the dog, despite
the prohibitions in the Massachusetts workers’ compensation laws,

by invoking the “dual persona” doctrine. id. In declining to

=30-
*** FORPUBLICATION ***
in West’s Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

adopt the doctrine, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
that the employee was not entitled to maintain the suit,
reasoning that the employer was a single legal entity because his
obligations as a dog owner were related to his obligations as an
employer to provide a safe working environment. Id. at 482-03.

Kamaka theorizes that Goodsill had a “dual persona” --
a legal entity as her employer and a separate legal entity as
attorneys. Because Goodsill was acting under its attorney-
persona vhen it negligently investigated her and not as her
employer, Kanaka submits that Goodsill is precluded from
asserting the workers’ compensation immunity defense. We
disagree.

Similar to the employer in Barrett, Goodsill’s
obligations as attorneys were related to its obligations as a law
firm to protect its clients from unscrupulous employees engaging
im unethical billing practices. As Goodsill points out, “the
(uRPC) expressly requires law firm partners to take euch renedial
actiona in their capacity as ‘employers’ and ‘supervisors’ of

aseociate attorneys. See HRPC [Rules] 5.1 [and 8.3(

 

(2005)}."” ‘Therefore, even if this court were to recognize and

 

© RC Rules 5.1 and 6.3(a) and commentary state:

Rule 5.1, RESPONSIBILITIES OP A PARTNER OR SUPERVISORY

(a) A partaer in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to

enture that the firm has in effect measures giving

Eeasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to

the rules of professional conduct

(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over
(continued...)

 

oa
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

 

apply the “dual persona” doctrine, there was no ‘separate legal
entity" conducting the investigation of Kamaka’s billing

practices.

that *Goodsill took the position

 

Kamaka further argue:
that it was acting in its capacity (and claiming immunity) ag

lawverg and not as her employer. [Therefore, t]he ‘dual persona’

(continued)
‘another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the other lawyer conforms £0 the rules of professional
conduct.

(ei°A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’ s
Violation of the rules of professional conduct if?
(2) the iawer orders or, with knowledge of the
apecific conduct, retifice the conduct involvet
(2) the lawer is a partuer in the law firm in
which the other lawyer practices, or has direct
Supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and
knows of the conduct at 2 tine when ite
Consequences can be avoided of mitigated but
fails to take reasonable renedial action.

 

 

coment: (1) Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to lawyers who
have supervisory authority over the professional work of @
Eien or legal department of a government. agency. Thi
includes penbere of a partnership and the shareholders in
law firm organized as a professional corporation; lawyers
having supervisory authority in the lew deparesent of an
enterprise or government agency; and lawyers vino have
Sntermediate munagerial responsibilities in a firm

 

 

Rule #.3, REPORTING PROPESSTONAL MISCONDUCT.
a) A lawyer having knowleage that another Lawyer has
committed a violation of the rules of professional conduct
thee raises 4 eubstantial question as to that lawyer's
or fitness asa lawyer in other
12 profeasional

   

   

asthority:

 

comment: [1] self-regulation of the legal prof
Tequires that senbers of the profession initiate
EfSciplinary savestigation when they know of a violaticn of
the Rulee of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar
obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An
Spparently iolates violation may indicate a pattern of
Misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can
Uncover. Reporting a violation ie especially important where
the victim is unlikely £0 discover the offensi

 

 

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*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

oo
doctrine (as well as Rosa v. CilJ Contractors, Ltd, [(relating to
judicial estoppel*)}) precludes Goodsiil's inconsistent defense
of immunity [under HRS § 386-5] as [an] employer." Goodsill
answers that, under the HRPC, ite role as both attorneys and an
employer was not inconsistent. We agree with Goodsill. The
commentary to ERPC Rule 5.1, quoted supra note 19, specifically
imposes the responsibilities of supervising attorneys to a “law
firm organized as a professional corporation.” A law firm, faced
with allegations of fraudulent billing practices by one of its
associates, has both a duty to the affected-client and related
duties'to the profession: (1) the client’s account must be
examined for any billing irregularities; (2) reasonable remedial
action must be taken; and (3) pursuant to HRPC Rule 8.3(a),
should this process raise “a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects," the law firm “shall inform the appropriate
professional authority.” Without an examination of the clients’

accounts, which Kamaka alleges constituted the negligent

 

% in a footnote to the reference to the Rosa case, Kamaka states her
entire judielal estoppel argument as follows:

vrais (Judietar
aesuning sneonsise
Judicial proceeding.” “Rosa v._ciz Contractors. iid.
App. 210, "st8, 664 6.22748, 752 [119631] (eitatione
oneted) |

 
 
 

Although Kanaka bears the burden of showing error in the trial court's
aichowgh "Soa Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 80 Hawai'i 225, 230, 909 7.24 553,
Ste. (1995), she provides no analysis in support of her position that judicial
seeogpel precludes Goodesii fron claiming immunity under MRS § 386-5,” We,
Ekereferes disregara her judicial estoppel argunent

 

 

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in West's Hawai'i Reports and the Pacific Reporter

investigation, billing irregularities, if any, cannot be

corrected. By the same token, without an examination of the

cliente’ accounts, the law firm cannot determine what appropriate

 

remedial action, if any, is required under the HRPC. Therefore,

 

Goodsill's duty as an employer was consistent with its duties as

a law firm, d.e., as attorneys

Kamaka also contends that, once an investigation is
commenced, the at-will doctrine is inapplicable and an
investigating employer owes a duty of care in the conduct of that

investigation. specifically, Kamaka argues:

411 doctrine is inapplicable because|:)
(2) once Goodsill Began an investigation, the authorities
hold Goodatil to a duty eo use reasonable care. in conducting
Tee sgveatigarion; (2) Goodsiii had a policy of probation;
and () this case falle within the recognized public policy
tnception relating to violations of professional ethical
Soles (leiting, in a footnote, co

fv. ine., 10 Haw. App. 250, 236-1
(ssaniT-

HE 'Famaka were at-will, once Goodell went forward
with its investigetion, the lav imposes a duty of care.
iiawaii]'e publie policy on the conduct of lawyers is
comprehended by the [MRPC]- Goodsill’s termination of
Kenaka war in conjunction with, and preceded by the intent,
and for the purpose, [alc] of violating and abusing these
fules. Goodsili obstructed Kanaka from being able to get
Evidence in her oun defense. tea counsel, knowing that
Goedsiil was an adversary to Kanaks, failed to disclose his
Sun capacity, or to adviee her to cotain counsel, (HREC]
Rule #3. ite supervising partners failed to oversee (sic).
Tather, encourages deceitful, overzealous efforts by
Associates co haraes and intimidate Karaka. Te offered a
harrow group of negative evidence procured through a biased
process, while suppressing broad categories of favorable and
Cxeulpatory evidence. These ethical violations create an
exception to the at-will rule.

 

 

 

65 Pez 170, 173-78

 

 

  

      

 

 

 

(Citations to the record omitted.) With regard to Kamaka’s bare

 

citation to Smith, Goodsill notes that, although Kamaka “cite:

[to Smith], this case does not address the standard of care

 

during an investigation into an employee's misconduct. This c

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