Title: Chavez-Becerra v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Chavez-Becerra v. State1996 WY 113924 P.2d 63Case Number: 95-247Decided: 09/03/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Ramiro CHAVEZ-BECERRA,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Keith G. Kautz, J.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; Gerald L. Gallivan, Director, Defender Aid 
Program; Travis B. Samulski, Student Intern., for appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Sr. Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Assistant Attorney General, 
for appellee.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

GOLDEN, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Ramiro 
Chavez-Becerra appeals his conviction on two counts of delivering a controlled 
substance. He claims reversible error occurred when the trial court refused to 
give his offered jury instruction on his theory of defense and claims plain 
error occurred when the trial court allowed the prosecutor to deliver an 
improper closing argument.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Chavez-Becerra 
presents these issues for our review:

I.          
Whether it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to give 
defendant's theory of the case jury instruction or one of similar substance 
regarding the informants' reasons and motives to lie in their testimony which 
provided the only basis for conviction?

II.          
Did the trial court commit plain error when it allowed the prosecuting 
attorney, Ms. Nau, to use statements based on hearsay in her closing argument 
which were not relevant to the charges against Mr. Chavez-Becerra, but clearly 
suggested that the defendant was a well known violator, if not a career criminal 
and that such information should be used to corroborate informant 
testimony?

[¶4]      The State 
restates the issues as:

I.          
Did the District Court properly refuse Appellant's proffered jury 
instruction?

II.          
Was plain error committed by the prosecutor's statements in closing 
argument?

 

FACTS

[¶5]      In January of 
1994, Louise Burton, on probation from a 1989 drug conviction, purchased cocaine 
and delivered it to an informant working for the Laramie County Sheriff's 
Department. In February of 1994, Louise and Gerry Burton agreed to work as 
informants for the Laramie County Sheriff's Department. In return, Mrs. Burton 
hoped to avoid prison for delivery of cocaine charges and probation violations. 
The Burtons arranged two controlled cocaine purchases from Ramiro 
Chavez-Becerra. On March 3, 1994, Mrs. Burton placed a recorded telephone call 
to Chavez-Becerra from the sheriff's department and arranged to purchase an 
eight-ball of cocaine, about 3.5 grams. After being fitted with a recording 
device, given $200.00 in buy money, and having been searched, she met 
Chavez-Becerra at his residence while under constant surveillance by law 
enforcement officers and gave him the money. She then departed without receiving 
any cocaine. Chavez-Becerra left his home and drove to Greeley, Colorado. Upon 
his return, he left a message for Mrs. Burton. She went to the sheriff's 
department and returned the phone call which was recorded. Later that evening, 
wired, searched, and under surveillance, Mrs. Burton returned to 
Chavez-Becerra's home and received cocaine which she turned over to officers at 
the sheriff's department. On March 17, 1994, Gerry Burton made a recorded 
telephone call to Chavez-Becerra to arrange the purchase of another eight-ball 
of cocaine. The arranged buy was also recorded, buy money provided, and constant 
surveillance kept in the same manner as during Mrs. Burton's arranged purchase. 
Once again Chavez-Becerra made a trip to Colorado and was contacted by Mr. 
Burton that evening. Mr. Burton returned to Chavez-Becerra's home and picked up 
the cocaine and turned it over to officers. Approximately one month later, 
Chavez-Becerra was arrested for delivery of cocaine. A jury convicted him on two 
counts of delivery of a controlled substance and he now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Theory of 
Defense Instruction

[¶6]      Chavez-Becerra 
contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on his 
theory of defense, denying him a fair trial. At trial, Chavez-Becerra requested 
a drug addict instruction which stated:

You are instructed that a 
drug addict may have a motive for testifying falsely and for falsely accusing 
persons of supplying him with drugs, and further, that regular use of narcotic 
drugs may impair the witness's capacity to observe, remember and recall. A 
present or former drug addict is inherently a perjurer where his own interests 
are concerned, because of the possibility of being rewarded by the authorities. 
Examples of possible rewards are the dropping of charges presently pending 
against the witness and the recommending of a lighter sentence for a crime of 
which the witness has already been convicted. An addict witness faces the 
immediate threat of being kept from access to the drugs to which he is addicted, 
as well as the prospect of a long term prison sentence. These factors 
substantially increase the danger that the addict may color his/her testimony so 
as to place guilt on a defendant.

[¶7]      On appeal, 
Chavez-Becerra contends he was entitled to this instruction or one like it 
concerning the inherent bias of drug informers and claims it is reversible error 
for the trial court to have not instructed the jury on his theory of defense. 
The State contends the trial court properly instructed the jury on evaluating 
witness credibility when it gave this instruction at the start of the 
trial:

You will decide which 
witnesses you believe and how much weight you give their testimony. In deciding 
what you believe, you may consider anything about a witness which tends to prove 
or disprove truthfulness, including the following:

1. Conduct, attitude, and 
manner while testifying;

2. The physical and 
mental capacity to have heard or seen that about which the testimony 
relates;

3. Ability to remember 
and to tell here in Court what was heard or seen; 

4. Reputation for honesty 
and truthfulness or for dishonesty and untruthfulness;

5. Whether the witness 
has a bias or prejudice, an interest in the outcome of the trial, or any other 
motive for not telling the truth; and

6. Whether the facts 
related are inherently believable or unbelievable[.]

[¶8]      A criminal 
defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on a defense theory if a 
timely submission is made of an instruction that correctly states the law and is 
supported by the evidence. Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 490 (Wyo. 1992). The 
defense must be recognized by statute or case law of Wyoming. DeLeon v. State, 
896 P.2d 764, 768 (Wyo. 1995). Thus, instructions which do not contain a proper 
statement of the law are properly refused. Stapleman v. State, 680 P.2d 73, 76 
(Wyo. 1984).

[¶9]      Similarly, 
instructions not based on the evidence can be properly refused. While we have 
said even weak, inconclusive, or unworthy of belief evidence requires giving of 
the instructions, Stagner v. State, 842 P.2d 520, 523 (Wyo. 1992), the 
instruction need not be given unless a reasonable person might conclude the 
evidence supports the defendant's position. Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739 (Wyo. 
1987); Stagner, 842 P.2d  at 523. Evidence is to be viewed in a light favorable 
to the accused and taken as true to determine if evidence is competent. Stagner, 
842 P.2d  at 522.

[¶10]   It is reversible error for a trial 
court to refuse to give a properly requested instruction, which is supported by 
the evidence, contains a correct statement of law and is not otherwise covered 
in the instructions. Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544, 549 (Wyo. 1990). However, a 
defendant is not entitled to a particularly worded instruction where 
instructions given cover the substance of the requested instruction. Channel v. 
State, 592 P.2d 1145, 1151 (Wyo. 1979). The court retains discretion in framing 
the instruction. Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 142 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶11]   Just as the trial court can 
properly refuse an instruction which merely rephrases the jury's obligation to 
find all elements beyond a reasonable doubt, Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125, 
1128 (Wyo. 1992), a narrative recitation of defendant's version of the facts is 
unacceptable and may be refused if it gives undue emphasis to defendant's 
version of the facts. Jansen v. State, 892 P.2d 1131, 1140 (Wyo. 1995); 
Virgilio, 834 P.2d  at 1128; Ellifritz v. State, 704 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Wyo. 1985). 
Instructions which are clearly erroneous, confusing or unduly emphasize one 
aspect of the case are properly refused. Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1346 
(Wyo. 1996); Simonds v. State, 762 P.2d 1189, 1192 (Wyo. 1988); Noetzelmann v. 
State, 721 P.2d 579, 581 (Wyo. 1986). Furthermore, instructions which contain 
detailed descriptions of the purported evidence and inferences drawn by defense 
counsel have been properly refused. Jansen, 892 P.2d  at 1140; Simonds, 762 P.2d  
at 1192. An instruction which only comments on evidence favorable to the 
defendant without presenting a legally cognizable defense is not a theory of the 
case instruction and is properly refused. Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d  at 491; Phillips v. 
State, 760 P.2d 388, 390 (Wyo. 1988). There is no duty to give a theory of 
defense instruction that has not been requested.

[¶12]   Chavez-Becerra defended himself 
against these charges by testifying that he was innocent and arguing that the 
Burtons falsely accused him in order to obtain leniency on the criminal charges 
pending against Louise Burton. An instruction that a drug addict is inherently a 
perjurer and an instruction that a drug informer who receives some benefit by 
his testimony has an inherent bias is not a theory of defense instruction 
recognized by Wyoming statute or decision. See Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149, 154 
(Wyo. 1989). This Court's decision in Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263 (Wyo. 1985), 
listed possible defenses to criminal actions. Keser, 706 P.2d  at 269. Special 
instructions to the jury would be appropriate if one of these defenses applied. 
In this case, Chavez-Becerra's claim of innocence is a failure of proof defense 
and, in view of this Court's past decisions as to what constitutes a theory of 
defense, we do not believe that such an obvious concept can be elevated to a 
theory of defense and, therefore, such an argument does not necessitate a 
special instruction. We agree with the view that, "[w]hat is required before the 
theory of the case rule comes into play is a more involved theory involving 
`law' or fact, or both, that is not so obvious to any jury." Laughlin v. United 
States, 474 F.2d 444, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941, 93 S. Ct. 2784, 37 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1973) (rejecting an instruction that if the jury believes 
defense testimony denying guilt, it should acquit).

[¶13]   Drug addict and informant 
instructions are properly characterized as cautionary instructions providing the 
jury with a standard by which to evaluate a witness' credibility. United States 
v. Smith, 692 F.2d 658, 660-61 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200, 
103 S. Ct. 1183, 75 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1983); Champion v. State, 87 Nev. 542, 490 P.2d 1056, 1057 (1971). Cautionary instructions are given in a number of different 
situations and Chavez-Becerra correctly states that this Court has said that a 
cautionary instruction should be given concerning accomplice testimony in Pike 
v. State, 495 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Wyo. 1972), and is sometimes given when an 
informant testifies. LeBeau v. State, 589 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Wyo. 1979); see also 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990). His reliance on LeBeau for contending 
that the court's failure to instruct is reversible error misreads the holding. 
At most, LeBeau requires a court to issue a cautionary instruction if the 
particular facts of the case require it. The particular facts of this case did 
not require the court to caution the jury to weigh the testimony of the Burtons' 
with greater care.

[¶14]   In Pino v. State, 849 P.2d 716 
(Wyo. 1993), the appellant-defendant argued that refusal of a similar cautionary 
instruction on a witness informant's testimony required reversal. This Court 
held no reversible error occurred because the instruction given, which was 
worded very similarly to the instruction given by the court in this case, 
properly instructed the jury on possible bias of informants and also left room 
for the defense to argue this issue in closing argument, which it did. Id. at 
722. Under the particular facts of this case, the instruction given by the trial 
court covered possible bias of informants, the Burtons were extensively 
cross-examined on the deal, and the issue was argued during closing argument. 
There was no error. It was also not error to refuse Chavez-Becerra's proposed 
drug addict instruction. Chavez-Becerra does not point to any evidence that 
Burton was a drug addict, only a past drug user. Additionally, the instruction 
was worded in an unacceptably argumentative manner. There was no error in 
refusing this instruction.

Improper 
Closing Argument

[¶15]   Chavez-Becerra alleges that the 
prosecutor's closing argument made without objection constitutes plain error. 
The relevant portions are as follows:

In his opening statement 
Mr. Serelson [defense counsel] characterized Mr. Chavez as an innocent member of 
the community.

Law enforcement was 
familiar with Mr. Chavez prior to January of 1994. Law enforcement was familiar 
with Mr. Chavez when he lived at 2522 Thomes and knew that he lived there. Both 
the Burtons indicated that they had been buying cocaine from Mr. Chavez for some 
time, not on frequent occasion, but for some time. On March 3rd and on March 
17th, Mr. Chavez delivers cocaine to the Burtons. I would submit that Mr. Chavez 
is not an innocent member of the community.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

Now, Mr. Chavez wasn't 
charged with anything because it is not a crime, that is correct, as Mr. 
Serelson said, just for the police to have information about you. That's not a 
crime; but that certainly tends to corroborate it when somebody else comes in 
who is buying cocaine and selling cocaine and says, by the way, my source is 
Ramiro Chavez, and then whoever that is, intelligence says, Ramiro Chavez, we 
know about him. We have heard about him previous to this.

No, he is not guilty 
because the Sheriff's Department has information about him, but it certainly 
ties in and helps corroborate the testimony and statements of Louise and Gerry 
Burton.

The Sheriff's Department 
when they do drug investigations don't just pick people's names out of the air 
or out of the phone book. They don't flip through the phone book and say let's 
go buy drugs from this person today. They buy drugs from people that they have 
information on. They have information that this person has drugs available, that 
this person is selling drugs.

*           
*           *           
*           
*          
*

If we are going to stop 
drug activity in Laramie County, it has to start somewhere, and I will submit to 
you it needs to start here.

[¶16]   He claims the argument is referring 
to testimony which was inadmissible hearsay and that, in violation of 
WYO.R.EVID. 404, the prosecutor improperly argued he should be convicted because 
the police had information on his past bad acts which were evidence of his 
criminal disposition.

[¶17]   During cross-examination of the 
investigating officer, defense counsel asked this:

Q.        And that 
there is an extensive network of law enforcement and others providing 
information regarding drug activity.

A. Yes.

*           
*           
*           
*         
  *           
*

Q.        And you 
testified that prior to January of 1994 you had no such information regarding 
Ramiro Chavez-Becerra.

A.        No, I did 
not testify to that.

[¶18]   On redirect, the prosecutor 
followed up that question with this:

Q.        Did you 
have other intelligence information about Mr. Chavez in January of 
1994?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        Knowledge 
of illegal drug activity, on your part, is not necessarily enough to arrest 
somebody; is that correct?

A.        No, it is 
not.

[¶19]   We agree with the State that this 
testimony is not inadmissible hearsay. It does not speak to any out-of-court 
statement or an assertion that Chavez-Becerra was a drug dealer or delivered 
cocaine to the Burtons as charged. WYO.R.EVID. 801(c). We also agree with the 
State this testimony did not violate WYO.R.EVID. 404. Wyoming follows the 
"opening the door" rule. Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1148 (Wyo. 1992). A 
defendant may "open the door" on cross-examination to evidence of prior criminal 
misconduct. Id. When he raises a line of questions, the prosecutor is entitled 
to make a permissible inquiry without crossing into prosecutorial overkill. Id. 
In this case, the defense counsel's question of the investigating officer opened 
the door concerning whether the police had previous information about drug 
activities by Chavez-Becerra, and the prosecutor permissibly inquired and 
clarified that the police did have information about drug activities by 
Chavez-Becerra. Both questions implied prior criminal activities by 
Chavez-Becerra.

[¶20]   The State contends that the 
prosecutor's use of this testimony in her closing argument was not plain error, 
but was proper argument based on the evidence and in rebuttal to the 
characterization of Chavez-Becerra as an innocent member of the community by 
defense counsel in opening statements and in rebuttal to defense counsel's 
closing argument.

[¶21]   "The general rule in Wyoming is 
that a failure to interject a timely objection to an allegedly improper argument 
is treated as a waiver, unless the misconduct is so flagrant as to constitute 
plain error and require reversal." Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 
1992). "The plain error doctrine requires the appellant demonstrate that a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law has been violated, that he was denied a substantial 
right and, as a result, has been materially prejudiced." Id. Under the plain 
error standard, the limit on argument by the prosecutor is exceeded if the 
prosecutor's argument states or implies that the jury should consider factors 
other than the evidence presented in determining the facts. Id. "In review, this 
court considers the prosecutor's argument in its entirety, not just the 
sentences and phrases taken out of context." Id. During closing arguments, the 
prosecutor is entitled to reflect upon the evidence and to draw reasonable 
inferences from that evidence in order to assist the jury in its function. Id. 
at 1116. 

[¶22]   In his closing argument, defense 
counsel argued that the fact that the police had information on his client did 
not mean that he was not an innocent member of the community. In response to 
this, the prosecutor argued that the police's familiarity with Chavez-Becerra 
corroborated the Burtons' testimony that he was their source for cocaine. In our 
view, the prosecutor's response to the defense's attempt at damage control was 
not a reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence. The testimony merely 
referred to police information about drug activities, but did not specify the 
type of information or provide any details and was in fact too general a 
statement to argue that it corroborated informant testimony about two specific 
crimes. The statement by the prosecutor was a comment on facts not in evidence 
and improperly exploited the door that the defense had opened. Although improper 
argument, it is not so flagrant, however, as to overcome the doctrine of waiver. 
Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 772-73 (Wyo. 1995) (Golden, J., 
concurring).

[¶23]   Chavez-Becerra contended that the 
meetings with the Burtons did not result in cocaine sales, but concerned other 
innocent matters, and the Burtons were lying in order to have Mrs. Burton's 
sentence reduced. In its case, the prosecution presented testimony from the 
Burtons about the drug transactions, testimony from law enforcement officers who 
monitored the phone calls the Burtons made to set up the meetings and then 
conducted surveillance of the drug transactions as they took place, tape 
recordings of the phone calls and the meetings, and presented the cocaine which 
was purchased. This was not a close case and the improper argument of the 
prosecutor did not materially prejudice Chavez-Becerra.

[¶24]   Affirmed.