Title: STATE v ROBBINS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

PJo. 8 3 - 3 1 7 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 5 STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vs- TERRY LEE ROBBINS, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the S i x t h Judicial D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r the C o u n t y of S w e e t G r a s s , T h e H o n o r a b l e T h o m a s A. O l s o n , Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For A p p e l l a n t : T e r r y L e e R o b b i n s , pro se, D e e r L o d g e , Montana F o r R e s p o n d e n t : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Plontana G. T h o m a s B i g l e n , C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , B i g T i m b e r , Montana S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : June 13, 1 9 8 5 D e c i d e d : S e p t e m b e r 2 3 , 1 9 8 5 F i l e d : $EP 2 A 1985 f . 4 - - ',/ @ . : . w - ? /. t L /, - . A & , & - & $ # , 2 - - - - C l e r k Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal of a conviction from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Sweetgrass County. Following a jury trail, Terry Lee Robbins was found guilty of two counts of burglary in violation of § 45-6-204, MCA, and one count of felony theft in violation of S 45-6-301, MCA. He was sentenced to ten years in the Montana State Prison under each of the burglary counts, to run consecutively, and to ten years under the felony theft count, to be served concurrently with the sentence for burglary. Defendant was designated a dangerous offender. We affirm. Robbins and a companion, James Weaver, travelled together in a westerly direction across southern Montana in late July, 1982. They arrived in Rig Timber the afternoon of August 3, 1982, and checked in as guests at the Grand Hotel. They w e e subsequently charged with burglarizing the game room in the hotel and a nearby sport shop in the early morning hours of August 4, 1982. The coin doors of various game machines in the hotel had been pried open and forty-seven pistols were missing from the sport shop. The suspects were arrested by police in Twin Falls, Idaho, on August 6, 1982. Weaver pleaded guilty to the offenses charged. Robbins resisted extradition, but eventually was extradited to Montana and appeared in Sweet Grass County District Court September 20, 1982. The Honorable Jack Shanstrom, District Judge, appointed James Tulley defendant's counsel and a trial date was set. Tulley filed a motion for substitution of judge September 27, 1982. Consequently the trial date was vacated. On September 30, 1982, Robbins moved pro se for dismissa 1 of Tulley. In the meantime, Judge Shanstrom disqualified himself and Judge W. W. Lessley assumed jurisdiction over the cause. During the month of October Robbins filed numerous pro se motions, although at least one of those motions indicated he still considered Tulley to be acting as his counsel. The court acted on Robbins' motion for dismissal of counsel November 8, 1982. Prior to Tulley's dismissal. however, Robbins pleaded not guilty to an amended information. On November 15, 1982, the court ordered Robbins transferred to the custody of Missoula County authorities to answer theft charges against him there. Counsel was appointed for Robbins in Missoula, who negotiated with the Sweet Grass County Attorney regarding a plea bargain on the Missnula County charges. During the time Robbins was in custody in Missoula County, Judge Lessley retired and the Honorable Thomas Olson, newly elected District Judge, assumed his duties January 1, 1983. On January 6, 1983, Judge Olson ordered Robbins returned from Missoula County to Big Timber for a hearing on pending motions. Mr. Karl Knuchel assumed the duties of counsel for Robbins January 7, 1983. A trial date was set for February 23, 1983. Robbins, through his counsel, filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, which the court dismissed. Robbins raises three issues on appeal: (1) Whether he was denied his constitutional right to counsel. (2) Whether he received effective assistance of counsel. (3) Whether h e was a f f o r d e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . Robbins a r g u e s he was denied h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o c o u n s e l . H e contends no counsel was a p p o i n t e d f o r him p r i o r t o h i s a r r a i g n m e n t November 8 , 1982, and t h e r e q o r e he was denied h i s r i g h t t o a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l d u r i n g a c r i t i c a l s t a g e o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t him. The r e c o r d shows t h i s i s n o t t h e c a s e . M r . James T u l l e y was a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l September 20, 1982. Although Robbins f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s c o u n s e l on September 30, 1982, it was n o t a c t e d on u n t i l November 8 , 1982. F u r t h e r a subsequent motion f i l e d by Robbins October 6 , 1982, s t a t e d h e was r e p r e s e n t e d by M r . T u l l e y . M r . T u l l e y was p r e s e n t w i t h Robbins a t h i s a r r a i g n m e n t November 8. Robbins acknowledged h e was c a p a b l e o f e n t e r i n g a p l e a and d i d e n t e r a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y . T u l l e y r e g i s t e r e d no o b j e c t i o n , w i t h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e c o u r t a l l o w Robbins t o f i l e whatever subsequent motions might b e n e c e s s a r y . Even i f M r . T u l l e y had been d i s m i s s e d b e f o r e Kobbins e n t e r e d a p l e a , t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s Robbins made an i n t e l l i g e n t and informed p l e a . I n any e v e n t , no p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t e d from t h e claimed absence o f c o u n s e l . Robbins p l e d n o t g u i l t y t o a l l of t h e c h a r g e s and d i d n o t f o r f e i t any o f h i s r i g h t s . I n any c r i t i c a l s t a g e o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a d e f e n d a n t may q u e s t i o n f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e c o u n s e l o n l y where p o t e n t i a l s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u d i c e i n h e r e s i n t h e absence o f c o u n s e l . Cadena v. E s t e l l e ( 5 t h . C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) , 611 F.2d 1385. See a l s o United S t a t e s v. Lacy ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 1 ) , 446 F.2d 511. A c r i t i c a l s t a g e i s any s t e p of t h e p r o c e e d i n g where t h e r e i s p o t e n t i a l s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u d i c e t o t h e defendant. United S t a t e v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149; S t a t e v. D i e z i g e r (Mont. 1 9 8 2 ) , 650 P.2d 800, 39 St.Rep. 1734. Robbins has n o t shown, nor could he show he was prejudiced i n any way a t t h e t i m e o f h i s arraignment November 8. Counsel was n o t appointed f o r Robbins b e f o r e September 20 because he was i n Idaho f i g h t i n g e x t r a d i t i o n t o Montana. Counsel was appointed f o r him a t h i s f i r s t c o u r t appearance September 20. Robbins claimed a c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t on t h e p a r t o f counsel and on September 30 f i l e d a motion f o r h i s d i s m i s s a l . The record shows counsel had done a " s u b s t a n t i a l amount" o f i n v e s t i g a t i v e work p r i o r t o h i s d i s m i s s a l November 8. I n o t h e r words, Robbins was represented by counsel from September 20 u n t i l November 8. The c o u r t d i d n o t f i n d a c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t , b u t dismissed counsel because Robbins asked t h a t he be dismissed. On November 15, Robbins was t r a n s f e r r e d t o Missoula County where he was represented by c o u r t appointed counsel on t h e t h e f t charges pending t h e r e . This counsel was a c t i n g on Robbins' behalf on t h e Sweet Grass County charges by attempting t o have t h e charges dismissed a s p a r t o f a p l e a b a r g a i n on t h e Missoula County charges. When Robbins was r e t u r n e d from Missoula, Karl Knuchel was appointed counsel and immediately f i l e d a motion f o r discovery. M r . Knuchel had s i x and one-half weeks t o prepare f o r t h e t r i a l scheduled t o begin February 23. Adequate t i m e t o prepare f o r t r i a l i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e S i x t h Amendment guarantee o f e f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f counsel. There i s nothing t o i n d i c a t e he had i n s u f f i c i e n t t i m e adequately t o prepare. Had counsel been appointed e a r l i e r it would have been d i f f i c u l t t o prepare f o r t r i a l w i t h Robbins i n Missoula. F i n a l l y , t h e r e i s no evidence Robbins was prejudiced by t h e l a t e appointment o f counsel. The d e l a y i n appointment o f M r . Knuchel was n o t i n t e n t i o n a l . A f t e r M r . T u l l e y had been dismissed, Robbins was t r a n s f e r r e d t o Missoula County. Judge Lessley, who had assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n , r e t i r e d and Judge Olson assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e case. M r . Knuchel began working on t h e c a s e w i t h i n a day o r two a f t e r Robbins r e t u r n e d from Missoula. It i s c l e a r t h a t Robbins was a f f o r d e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o counsel a t a l l c r i t i c a l s t a g e s o f t h e proceedings a g a i n s t him and any claimed d e n i a l o f counsel f o r any period o f t i m e d i d n o t r e s u l t i n p r e j u d i c e t o him. F i n a l l y , " [ a ] ny e r r o r , d e f e c t , i r r e g u l a r i t y , o r v a r i a n c e which does n o t a f f e c t s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s s h a l l be d i s r e g a r d e d [on appeal] ," $ 46-20-702, MCA. Robbins h a s f a i l e d t o show v i o l a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t t o counsel d u r i n g t h e proceedings a g a i n s t him and t h e r e f o r e h i s claim i s denied. Robbins argues he d i d n o t have e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel. This c o n t e n t i o n , however, is c o n t r a d i c t e d by t h e record. The r i g h t t o counsel i s guaranteed by t h e S i x t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and by A r t . 11, S 2 4 o f t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . The c o u r t h a s i n t e r p r e t e d t h e s e guarantees t o mean e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel, S t a t e v. Bubnash (1961), 139 Mont. 517, 366 P.2d 155, and h a s adopted t h e "reasonably e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e " test s t a t e d a s follows: "Persons accused o f crime a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e range o f competence demanded o f a t t o r n e y s i n c r i m i n a l cases." S t a t e v. Rose (1980), 187 Mont. 74, 86, 608 P.2d 1074, 1081. Challenging t h e a f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel p l a c e s a burden on a defendant t o show " t h a t t h e e r r o r a l l e g e d l y committed by a lawyer r e s u l t e d i n p r e j u d i c e t o him and stemmed from n e g l e c t o r ignorance r a t h e r than from informed professiona 1 d e l i b e r a t i o n . " S t a t e v. Morigeau (Mont. 1982) , 656 P.2d 185, 189, 39 St.Rep. 2311, 2317. Robbins' s p e c i f i c a l l e g a t i o n s o f v a r i o u s f a i l u r e s of appointed counsel simply do n o t withstand s c r u t i n y . There i s no evidence i n t h e record counsel r e f u s e d t o c a l l defense witnesses. There i s no evidence t h a t even had c e r t a i n w i t n e s s e s been c a l l e d t h e y would have been more than " a f t e r t h e f a c t " w i t n e s s e s . That is, t h e relevance o f t h e i r testimony a s t o f a c t s surrounding t h e commission o f t h e c r i m e would have been minimal a t b e s t . The record does n o t show appointed counsel opened t h e door t o evidence o f o t h e r crimes. Nor does t h e record support t h e need f o r a change o f venue. Defense counsel argued l a c k o f c o r r o b o r a t i o n of accomplice Weaver's testimony, and he moved f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t f o r lack o f c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f accomplice testimony. The record shows c o r r o b o r a t i v e evidence was presented. Robbins' charge t h a t counsel f a i l e d t o move f o r suppression o f c e r t a i n evidence borders on t h e r i d i c u l o u s . The primary evidence was t h e s t o l e n guns, which w e r e s e i z e d pursuant t o a p r o p e r l y i s s u e d s e a r c h warrant. Robbins a c t u a l l y volunteered t o a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s t h a t he had a gun on h i s person. There w e r e no i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n Robbins' a r r e s t . I n f a c t , defense c o u n s e l ' s d e c i s i o n n o t t o move t o suppress i s i n d i c a t i v e o f sound p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment, n o t i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e . A l l e g a t i o n s of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel "must be grounded on f a c t which appear i n o r a r e e a s i l y deduced from t h e record and which go beyond . . . m e r e conclusory a l l e g a t i o n s . There must be a showing o f a c t u a l i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s on t h e p a r t o f counsel." S t a t e v. Lewis (1978), 177 Mont. 474, 485, 582 P.2d 346, 353. See a l s o DiGiallonardo v. Betzer (1973), 163 Mont. 104, 515 P.2d 705. Robbins d i d n o t demonstrate t h e a l l e g e d e r r o r s and omissions o f h i s counsel r e s u l t e d i n p r e j u d i c e t o him. He i s unable t o support h i s a l l e g a t i o n s with s p e c i f i c f a c t u a l i n s t a n c e s . Rather, t h e a l l e g a t i o n s r e v e a l h i s counsel e x e r c i s e d p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment of one who z e a l o u s l y defended h i s c l i e n t . Nor d i d Robbins meet t h e Morigeau s t a n d a r d , s u p r a , o r t h e reasonably e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e test. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court r e c e n t l y addressed t h e i s s u e o f i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l , applying an o b j e c t i v e standard o f reasonableness. A convicted defendant' s claim t h a t c o u n s e l ' s a s s i s t a n c e was s o d e f ~ c t i v e a s t o r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l o f a c o n v i c t i o n . . . h a s two components. F i r s t , t h e defendant must show t h a t counsel ' s performance was d e f i c i e n t . This r e q u i r e s showing t h a t counsel made e r r o r s s o s e r i o u s t h a t counsel was n o t f u n c t i o n i n g a s t h e "counsel" guaranteed t h e defendant by t h e S i x t h Amendment. Second, t h e defendant must show t h a t t h e d e f i c i e n t performance p r e j u d i c e d t h e defense. This r e q u i r e s showing t h a t c o u n s e l ' s e r r o r s w e r e s o s e r i o u s a s t o d e p r i v e t h e defendant o f a f a i r t r i a l , a t r i a l whose r e s u l t i s r e l i a b l e . Unless a defendant makes b o t h showings, it cannot be s a i d t h a t t h e conviction . . . r e s u l t e d from a breakdown i n t h e adversary p r o c e s s t h a t r e n d e r s t h e r e s u l t u n r e l i a b l e . S t i c k l a n d v. Washington (1985), U.S. I a t 1 0 4 Robbins has f a i l e d t o demonstrate h i s c o u n s e l ' s performance was s o s e r i o u s l y d e f i c i e n t t o conclude he was n o t f u n c t i o n i n g a s t h e counsel guaranteed by t h e S i x t h Amendment. H e has f a i l e d t o show h i s c o u n s e l ' s performance prejudiced h i s defense t o t h e e x t e n t he was denied a f a i r t r i a l . To show p r e j u d i c e : The defendant must show t h a t t h e r e i s a reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t , b u t f o r counsel ' s unprofessiona 1 e r r o r s , t h e r e s u l t o f a proceeding would have been d i f f e r e n t . A reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y i s a p r o b a b i l i t y s u f f i c i e n t t o undermine confidence i n t h e outcome. S t r i c k l a n d , 104 S.Ct. a t 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d a t 698. Robbins has n o t done t h i s . H e has n o t shown t h e outcome o f h i s t r i a l would be d i f f e r e n t had counsel performed d i f f e r e n t l y . The test o f e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e i s n o t a c q u i t t a l . F i n a l l y , Robbins contends he was n o t afforded h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l guaranteed by t h e S i x t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t . 11, S 24 o f t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . I n analyzing t h e v a l i d i t y o f a claim of l a c k o f a speedy t r i a l , t h e Court i n v e s t i g a t e s and balances f o u r f a c t o r s set f o r t h by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101: (1) l e n g t h o f delay; (2) reason f o r t h e delay; (3) t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n o f h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l ; and (4) p r e j u d i c e t o t h e defendant. Length o f delay i s o f primary importance. Unless it i s s u f f i c i e n t l y long t o be deemed presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e defendant, t h e r e i s no need t o c o n s i d e r t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s . What l e n g t h w i l l be deemed presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l depends on t h e f a c t s i n each i n d i v i d u a l case. S t a t e v. Worden (1980), 188 Mont. 94, 611 P.2d 185. The S i x t h Amendment h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n u n t i l t h e p u t a t i v e defendant i n some way becomes an accused. Until. a c i t i z e n becomes an accused he s u f f e r s no r e s t r a i n t s on h i s l i b e r t y and i s n o t t h e s u b j e c t o f p u b l i c accusation. United S t a t e s v. Marion (1971), 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468. Robbins argues t h a t t h e t i m e should begin t o run when t h e a r r e s t was made, August 6 , 1982. I n S t a t e v. Smith (Mont. 1983), 670 P.2d 96, 100, 40 St.Rep. 1533, 1537, we said the clock begins to run when the defendant is arrested or when the complaint is filed. This is consistent with State v. Larson (Mont. 1981), 623 P.2d 954, 957-58, 38 St.Rep. 213, 215, where we said once a person is accused and subject to criminal prosecution that accusation may be by arrest, the filing of a complaint, or by indictment or information. It is at this time the person is afforded the constitutional protection of a speedy trial. See also State v. Ackley (Mont. 1982), 653 P.2d 851, 39 St.Rep. 2091. The real issue, however, is whether Robbins or the State should be charged with the time Robbins was in Idaho resisting extradition to Montana. Robbins argues this time should be weighed against the State because he was being held on a Montana warrant and therefore was subject to Montana's jurisdiction. The State argues this time should not be weighed against the State because Robbins was not subject to Montana's in personam jurisdiction. We agree with the State. During the forty-five days from Robbins' arrest August 6 in Twin Falls, Idaho, until his appearance in court in Big Timber, Montana, he was resisting extradition to Montana. That time is attributable to him and he therefore waives any right to complain of lack of a speedy trial. ". . . [D]elay[s] in bringing a defendant to trial caused or consented to by defendant are considered to constitute a waiver of the right to be tried within the time fixed by statute or required by the constitution." State v. Talmadge (Idaho 1983), 658 P.2d 920, 924. See also State v. Balla (Idaho 1976) , 544 P. 2d 1148, where the Idaho court decided extradition tolls the calculation of the length of the delay. Previous holdings on t h i s i s s u e a r e i n c o n f l i c t . In S t a t e v. Ackley, supra, even though t h e defendant waived e x t r a d i t i o n , t h e t i m e between h i s a r r e s t i n Oregon and h i s i n i t i a l appearance i n Missoula County, Montana, weighed a g a i n s t him. In S t a t e v. Smith, s u p r a , however, where defendant r e s i s t e d e x t r a d i t i o n , proceedings which continued f o r n e a r l y s i x t y days a l s o weighed a g a i n s t t h e defendant. I n S t a t e v. Armstrong (Mont. 1980), 616 P.2d 341, 37 St.Rep. 1563, t h e Court i s c l e a r , when computing l e n g t h o f d e l a y it does n o t i n c l u d e t h a t t i m e i n which t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t does n o t have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o engage i n proceedings l e a d i n g t o a t r i a 1. D i l i g e n t p r o s e c u t i o n i n c l u d e s a t i m e l y demand f o r e x t r a d i t i o n o f a defendant, and e x t r a d i t i o n proceedings a r e s u f f i c i e n t reason f o r d e l a y i f t h e S t a t e has been d i l i g e n t . S t a t e v. Smith, supra. The r i g h t o f a defendant t o resist formal e x t r a d i t i o n , however, cannot be charged t o t h e S t a t e when computing t h e l e n g t h o f d e l a y f o r speedy t r i a l , i f t h e S t a t e i s a c t i n g i n good f a i t h . B a l l a , supra. The r i g h t o f a defendant t o a speedy t r i a l commences when he becomes an accused. Marion, Smith, Larson, and Ackley, supra. The c o u r t t h e n must a c q u i r e i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e accused t o engage i n proceedings l e a d i n g t o a t r i a l . I f t h e accused i s o u t o f s t a t e , t h e S t a t e must a c t d i l i g e n t l y and i n good f a i t h t o a c q u i r e j u r i s d i c t i o n . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e accused has a r i g h t t o resist e x t r a d i t i o n . When he does s o , however, he loses t h o s e days he resists from computation of length o f delay. When an accused does n o t resist, t h o s e days should n o t b e weighed a g a i n s t him when t h e S t a t e i s a c t i n g d i l i g e n t l y and i n good f a i t h . For t h i s reason, i n c l u s i o n o f t h o s e days i n computing t h e length o f d e l a y , a s was done i n Ackely, w i l l no longer be t h e r u l e . Only t h o s e days an accused a c t i v e l y resists e x t r a d i t i o n w i l l be included. Days i n which t h e c o u r t does n o t o r cannot, through t h e S t a t e ' s e f f o r t s , a c q u i r e j u r i s d i c t i o n over an accused w i l l be counted a g a i n s t t h e accused and w i l l n o t be included i n computing t h e l ength o f delay. When applying t h e Barker t e s t , it i s f i r s t necessary t o c o n s i d e r whether t h e d e l a y which occurred i s presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l t o Robbins. 201 days elapsed between t h e t i m e Robbins was a r r e s t e d August 6, 1982 and t h e t i m e he was brought t o t r i a l , February 23, 1983. During f o r t y - f i v e o f t h e s e days Robbins was i n Idaho r e s i s t i n g e x t r a d i t i o n . A s noted e a r l i e r t h e s e days cannot be weighed a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e , and w i l l n o t be included i n computing t h e delay. Therefore, 156 days elapsed from t h e time o f Robbins' i n i t i a l c o u r t appearance i n Big Timber September 20, 1982, u n t i l h i s t r i a l began February 23, 1983. During t h i s period t h e r e w e r e f u r t h e r d e l a y s , some o f which w e r e caused by Robbins. O n September 2 7 , he d i s q u a l i f i e d Judge Shanstrom, which caused a delay. O n September 30, he attempted t o d i s q u a l i f y h i s counsel and began f i l j - n g motions both a s though he w e r e r e p r e s e n t i n g himself and a s though he w e r e represented by counsel. Some o f t h e s e motions w e r e responded t o a s though he w e r e r e p r e s e n t i n g himself. On November 15 h e was t r a n s f e r r e d t o Missoula County t o answer charges t h e r e , r e s u l t i n g i n a f u r t h e r d e l a y o f f i f t y - t w o days. This d e l a y should n o t weigh a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h our holding i n Armstrong. Even i f t h e e n t i r e d e l a y between September 27 and November 15 does n o t weigh a g a i n s t Robbins, t h e r e i s a delay o f only 104 days, which i s well w i t h i n t h e C o u r t ' s g u i d e l i n e s f o r a c c e p t a b l e l e n g t h of d e l a y , and i s n o t presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l t o Robbins. Therefore t h e o t h e r t h r e e f a c t o r s of t h e Barker t e s t need not be considered. Robbins cannot complain h e was not granted a speedy t r i a l . The conviction of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s affirmed. W e concur: M ilyl i h 8 &$xLL,h J u s t c e s P I