Title: Yene v. Stassinos

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Yene v. Stassinos1986 WY 219730 P.2d 791Case Number: 86-190Decided: 12/30/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
OWEN A. YENE AND JUDY 
BROCK, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

HARRY H. STASSINOS AND 
EVELYN M. STASSINOS, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES 
(PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Bert T. 
Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellants.

David M. Piaia 
of Kaumo, Piaia & Tyler, Rock 
Springs, for 
appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Summary judgment was 
granted in a quiet-title action to void a recorded deed arising from an oral 
transaction for the purchase of real estate, now presenting the appeal question 
of existence of a factual issue enjoining summary judgment disposition. We 
remand for trial.

[¶2.]     Appellants' statement 
of the issue on appeal essentially questions the trial court decision; appellees 
agree with the statement of the issue, and neither suggest what rule or 
principle was improperly violated or appropriately followed as a principle for 
application to a summary judgment.

[¶3.]     This court will define 
the controversy to be whether there was a material issue of fact created by 
summary-judgment documentation, including answers to interrogatories and 
affidavits, requiring trial resolution.

[¶4.]     We discern as the 
established fact that in December, 1977 the parties entered into an oral real 
estate purchase agreement contendably involving two parcels. When the resulting 
litigation developed in 1981, now continued for five years, just about 
everything else was in factual conflict except that a warranty deed for two 
parcels had been executed and recorded in favor of the 
buyer.

[¶5.]     Owen Yene and Judy 
Brock (the appellant is Brock as apparent successor in interest) entered into 
the transaction with Harry and Evelyn Stassinos to purchase SweetwaterCounty real estate. How much, for what 
price, and what was paid, created the factual disputes in the oral transaction, 
now continued in this unusual litigation.

[¶6.]     The Stassinoses claimed 
by complaint to quiet title that the recorded warranty deed was delivered in 
error for two parcels, while payment of $7,000.00 had been made, sufficient only 
to pay for the first parcel, so that the composite deed for two parcels was 
invalid and voidable as to one tract as a result of mutual mistake and failure 
of consideration.1 To understand the present status, 
those pleadings must be related to the summary-judgment decree whereby the court 
voided the claim of buyers to parcel two and ordered sellers to repay to buyers 
$1,500.00, which was found to be an overpayment. Unquestioned in the record is 
that buyers have paid whatever was claimed as a maximum for parcel one, 
$7,000.00, and had paid not less than $1,500.00 more, or, by their testimony, 
the entire purchase price for parcel two. The decree as entered did not even 
allow interest to buyers on their 1979-1980 overpayment.2

[¶7.]     Documentation for a 
decision on whether an issue of fact exists, Cordova v. Gosar, Wyo., 719 P.2d 625 (1986) (Category 6), includes Brock's answers to interrogatories and 
affidavit, and affidavits of the Stassinoses' present counsel and past counsel, 
and three signed by them.

[¶8.]     Recognizing the 
parameters of litigation as whether there was a "deal" on the second parcel and 
what was actually paid, we find the following sequence in the file as relevant 
evidence:

[¶9.]     (1) Brock's Answers to 
Interrogatories: There was an oral agreement for two parcels totaling 7.67 acres 
at $3,000.00 per acre; $1,000.00 down payment, $6,000.00 paid in full for two 
acres. A deed was given. Brock has been in possession since 1978 and paid a 
total of $21,000.00. Payments claimed are December 8, 1977 - $1,000.00; February 
14, 1978 - $1,500.00; December 18, 1978 - $500.00; May 8, 1978 - $2,500.00; 
January 4, 1976 - $6,000.00; May 26, 1978 - $5,000.00; February 7, 1978 - 
$500.00. The other buyer, Yene, has additional money-order 
receipts.

[¶10.]  (2) Affidavit of attorney for 
Stassinoses: Defendants provided evidence of payment to plaintiff, pursuant to 
request for production of documents, in the amount of $8,500.00 for payment of 
Parcel A and part payment of Parcel B, the receipt of which is admitted by 
plaintiff, and:

"c. That Defendants have 
not provided evidence of any payments in excess of Eight Thousand Five Hundred 
and 00/100 Dollars ($8,500.00) for both Parcels A and B, and that Plaintiffs 
deny receiving any amount in excess of said Eight Thousand Five Hundred and 
00/100 Dollars ($8,500.00).

"d. That William H. 
Jackson, the attorney representing Plaintiffs, while waiting for information to 
complete the promissory note and mortgage for the sale of Parcel B to 
Defendants, inadvertently recorded the Warranty Deed, attached hereto as Exhibit 
`A', containing Parcel A and Parcel B.

"e. That Plaintiffs never 
intended to transfer Parcel B, outright, to Defendants, nor did Plaintiffs have 
any knowledge that said transfer had been made until May of 1980, which date was 
more than two (2) years after Mr. Jackson had inadvertently recorded the 
Warranty Deed, attached hereto as Exhibit `A'.

"5. That the three 
issues, which the Answer purports to raise, are without merit, and the inference 
irresistible that the purpose intended to be served by said pleadings will be 
merely to delay this action and to impede Plaintiffs in their 
rights.

"6. That upon these facts 
and upon the facts communicated to Affiant by Plaintiffs, Affiant is firmly 
convinced that there is and can be no defense to this action, and that 
Defendants' Answer is wholly without merit, and has been interposed for the 
purpose of delay, and for no other purpose."3

(3) Harry 
Stassinos' affidavit dated October 31, 1985:

"4. That said Defendants 
agreed to purchase Parcel A, consisting of 2.00 acres for cash at the price of 
Three Thousand Five Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($3,500.00) per 
acre.

"5. That on or about 
December 8, 1977, Defendants paid One Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($1,000.00) as 
a down payment for Parcel A and on or about January 4, 1978, Defendants paid the 
remaining Six Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($6,000.00) for Parcel A, after which 
payment said Defendants were to receive a Warranty Deed to said Parcel 
A.

"6. That with regard to 
the purchase of Parcel B, consisting of 5.67 acres, my wife and I agree to 
finance the purchase price of Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Five and 
00/100 Dollars ($19,845.00) at nine per cent (9%) interest with the term of 
years adjustable according to the amount the Defendants could afford to pay in 
monthly payments.

"7. That Defendants never 
informed me of the amount of monthly payments which they could afford to pay, 
and the note and mortgage were never drafted by our attorney, Mr. William H. 
Jackson * * *.

* * * * * 
*

"9. That Owen A. Yene and 
Judy Brock, Defendants herein, have paid a total of Eight Thousand Five Hundred 
and 00/100 Dollars ($8,500.00), which amount represents payment in full of Seven 
Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($7,000.00) for Parcel A and One Thousand Five 
Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($1,500.00) toward the purchase of Parcel 
B."

(4) Evelyn M. 
Stassinos' affidavit of October 31, 1985:

"4. That said Defendants 
agreed to purchase Parcel A, consisting of 2.00 acres for cash at the price of 
Three Thousand Five Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($3,500.00) per 
acre.

"5. That on or about 
December 8, 1977, Defendants paid One Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($1,000.00) as 
a down payment for Parcel A and on or about January 4, 1978, Defendants paid the 
remaining Six Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($6,000.00) for Parcel A, after which 
payment said Defendants were to receive a Warranty Deed to said Parcel 
A.

"6. That with regard to 
the purchase of Parcel B, consisting of 5.67 acres, my husband and I agreed to 
finance the purchase price of Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Five and 
00/100 Dollars ($19,845.00) at nine percent (9%) interest with the term of years 
adjustable according to the amount the Defendants could afford to pay in monthly 
payments.

"7. That Defendants never 
informed me of the amount of monthly payments which they could afford to pay, 
and the note and mortgage were never drafted by our attorney, Mr. William H. 
Jackson * * *.

"8. That in May, 1978, I 
contacted Owen A. Yene, a Defendant herein, and inquired as to whether or not he 
intended to go through with the purchase of Parcel B and he responded that he 
was still interested in purchasing said Parcel B, however, nothing more was 
done.

"9. That again in 
December, 1978, I contacted Mr. Owen A. Yene, and told him that `if he intended 
to purchase Parcel B, I would need some money as payment' and Mr. Yene sent me a 
bank check in the amount of Five Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($500.00) and stated 
that more money would follow.

"10. That in February, 
1979, I received an additional One Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($1,000.00) from 
Mr. Yene as payment for Parcel B, however, no paperwork, to my knowledge, had 
yet been drafted by Mr. William H. Jackson.

"11. That after February, 
1979, I did not hear anything more from either Defendants, nor did I receive any 
further payment for Parcel B."

(5) Affidavit of 
William H. Jackson, a prior attorney for the Stassinoses:

"1. That I was the 
attorney representing Harry and Evelyn Stassinos at the time said individuals 
sold land to Owen A. Yene and Judy Brock, which land was located in the SW 1/4 
of Section 20, Township 20 North, Range 105 West of the 6th Principal Meridian, 
Sweetwater County, 
Wyoming.

"2. That the specific 
land which was purportedly sold to Owen A. Yene and Judy Brock consisted of a 
2.00 acre parcel and a 5.67 acre parcel, which parcels are more particularly 
described in a copy of the Warranty Deed attached hereto as Exhibit `A', and by 
this reference made a part hereof.

"3. That according to the 
records in my possession, Owen A. Yene and Judy Brock were to pay $3,500.00 per 
acre for a total cost of $26,845.00 for the purchase of 7.67 
acres.

"4. That my records 
further indicate the above-mentioned purchase was to be on the following 
terms:

"Owen A. Yene and Judy 
Brock paid $7,000.00 for two acres of land and were to receive a Warranty Deed 
free and clear of any mortgage, and the remaining 5.67 acres would be financed 
by Harry and Evelyn Stassinos and subject to a mortgage, payable monthly at 9% 
interest.

"5. That in accordance 
with the above-mentioned terms, I prepared the Warranty Deed attached hereto as 
Exhibit `A', containing both parcels of land.

"6. That I was unable to 
complete the mortgage and order the amortization schedule until Evelyn Stassinos 
informed me of the amount which Owen A. Yene and Judy Brock were willing to pay 
monthly.

"7. That on or about 
January 13, 1978, before I had completed the mortgage, I mistakenly recorded the 
Warranty Deed attached hereto as Exhibit `A' containing both parcels of 
land."

(6) Testimony of 
Evelyn Stassinos in a different case:

"Q. Would you recall for 
the Court the nature of those negotiations?

"A. They were gonna buy 
two - they wanted to buy eight acres. They were gonna pay for two, thirty-five 
hundred an acre, which they did. They paid for that, I believe it was in a 
$6,000.00 check and then a $1,000.00 followed after, I think it was after the 
first of the year.

"Q. Okay. So they paid in 
full for the two acres?

"A. Yes, they paid two 
acres in full, and then there was to be a time payment schedule made up, and 
they were gonna - I don't know exactly how much or how long - and take ten years 
at 9 1/2% interest, which never was done.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. And what was going to 
be the purchase price for those six acres?

"A. Thirty-five hundred 
an acre.

"Q. Mrs. Brock has 
testified that she has forwarded payments to you on those six 
acres.

"A. No. When Mr. Yene was 
still living here, he was living at the ranch in our house at the ranch, and he 
came and gave $500.00.

"Q. To apply towards this 
second six acres?

"A. Yes. And then after 
he left, he mailed - it was like two money orders or something, in $500.00 each. 
So, there's been a total of fifteen hundred dollars paid.

* * * * * 
*

"A. Okay. Mr. Jackson was 
our attorney at the time. He was supposed to draw a time schedule and Mr. and 
Mrs. Yene was supposed to come in to his office and tell him how much they 
wanted to pay and for how long. This is supposed to have been at 9 1/2% interest 
on this.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. All right. In May of 
1980, were you under the impression that there was - that they had an option on 
that land?

"A. This is what we 
assumed, yes; that's what we thought still was."

(7) Affidavit of 
Judy Brock dated December 27, 1985:

"2. That during the 
latter part of December, 1977, she participated in negotiations to purchase the 
subject property from the Plaintiffs in Civil No. 5634, which comprised 
approximately 8 acres, in 2 parcels.

"3. That, pursuant to the 
agreement of the parties, the purchase price was paid, in total, during the year 
1978, partially by check and partially by cash.

"4. That after Parcel A 
(2 acres) was paid off, your Affiant and Plaintiff Evelyn Stassinos entered into 
an agreement for a cash settlement as to the remaining balance on Parcel B (5 + 
acres), for the reason that said Plaintiff stated that she wanted to divert the 
cash to her own use in that she was going to obtain a divorce from Plaintiff 
Harry Stassinos, and she needed the cash to supplement her income after the 
divorce.

"5. Pursuant to that 
agreement, and as a means of security to your Affiant, Plaintiff Evelyn 
Stassinos caused the Warranty Deed pertaining to said property to be recorded; 
and your Affiant was given a copy of the recorded 
instrument.

"6. That no formal 
contracts were ever prepared by William Jackson, Plaintiffs' Attorney, because 
payment was made and the transaction was completed before he got around to 
it.

* * * * * 
*

"9. That all monies 
requested to be paid for said land were paid in full; and that the Deed was 
recorded as per those agreements."

[¶11.]  The record reflects no direct refutation 
by Mrs. Stassinos to answer the cash-payment statement by Mrs. 
Brock.

[¶12.]  There was an issue of fact as to what the 
deal was and what was paid.4 The test is:

"The motion for summary 
judgment should be sustained in the absence of a real and material fact issue 
considering movant's burden, respondent's right to the benefit of all favorable 
inferences and any reasonable doubt, with credibility questions to be resolved 
by trial." Cordova v. Gosar, supra, 719 P.2d  at 640.

[¶13.]  That test is not met by these factual 
circumstances as the record now is found. Mrs. Brock may or may not be able to 
satisfy her burden of proof before the trier of fact that she has paid more than 
$8,500.00, but certainly she satisfies this court that an issue of fact exists 
both as to amounts paid and as to the legal status and factual terms of the 
sales agreement. Cordova v. Gosar, supra. Compare Hensley v. Williams, 
Wyo., 726 P.2d 90 (1986), where the record is written documents.

[¶14.]  Considering the continuation of this 
litigation now existent since 1981, we are reluctant to prolong the agony, but, 
lacking an alternative, remand for trial to determine what was the deal and who, 
if anyone, is in breach and with what result. Additionally, disposition should 
resolve the contentions found in the counterclaims as affirmative claims within 
the burden-of-proof responsibilities of Brock as defendant, to which subject no 
affidavit contention is addressed except the conclusional comments of counsel in 
his affidavit. It would be provident for the parties to rethink their theories 
and legal contentions for trial application, since on this record possession of 
the contested land by plaintiffs was neither alleged nor proved as an element of 
a quiet-title action. Section 1-32-201, W.S. 1977. See The Ohio Oil Company v. 
The Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773 
(1947).

[¶15.]  The summary judgment is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for trial disposition.

FOOTNOTES

1 This creates an 
interesting anomaly, since, by the documentation, the buyer was entitled to a 
deed for one parcel and consequently the deed was not generally voidable but is 
contendably invalid and voidable only as to the second parcel. Additionally, 
plaintiffs do not claim to be in possession in the complaint, and later by 
answer to interrogatories Brock claims possession since January 4, 1978. See § 
1-32-201, W.S. 1977, and Rule 84, W.R.C.P., Appendix Form 
16.

2 Stassinos never alleged 
overpayment by pleading, and counterclaims of Brock included negligence, 
malicious prosecution, lost land, and mental anguish, but not repayment as 
relief to be afforded. Consequently the summary-judgment action on the repayment 
was neither offered by Stassinos nor requested by Brock.

3 Questionable in terms of 
ethics and possible perjury where statements of fact are made under oath by an 
attorney as a litigator, third-party nonpersonal knowledge affidavits are not 
"evidence" for summary-judgment proceedings. Cordova v. Gosar, supra; Cook Ford 
Sales, Inc. v. Benson, 
Wyo., 392 P.2d 307 
(1964).

Counsel could be exposed 
to subpoenaed-witness status in any final trial if professing factual personal 
knowledge.

4 Except by adverse 
allusion and appearances of litigative conclusion, the counterclaim issues, as 
put in contest by the general denials of the reply, were never addressed by the 
summary-judgment motion, nor by the judgment. Under the circumstances, and in 
the absence of discussion in the briefs, we will not further address questions 
of Rule 5.04, W.R.A.P. compliance.