Title: Ex parte C&M Equipment, Inc., and David Manning.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: September 09, 2022 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.  
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
SPECIAL TERM, 2022  
 
_________________________ 
 
1210276 
_________________________ 
 
 
Ex parte C&M Equipment, Inc., and David Manning 
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
(In re: S.P. Petroleum Equipment Sales & Service, LLC 
 
v. 
 
David Manning and C&M Equipment, Inc.) 
 
(Macon Circuit Court, CV-20-900051) 
 
WISE, Justice. 
 
PETITION DENIED.  NO OPINION. 
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Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur. 
 
 
Parker, C.J., and Sellers, J., dissent. 
 
 
Mitchell, J., dissents, with opinion, which Bolin, J., joins. 
 
 
 
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MITCHELL, Justice (dissenting).  
 
I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to deny the 
mandamus petition filed by David Manning and C&M Equipment, Inc. 
("C&M") (collectively referred to as "the C&M defendants").  It is clear 
from the materials before us that the C&M defendants met their burden 
of showing that venue in this case is inappropriate in Macon County, and 
the speculative, conclusory affidavits submitted by S.P. Petroleum 
Equipment Sales & Service, LLC ("S.P. Petroleum"), did nothing to rebut 
that showing.  Accordingly, I would grant the petition and issue a writ 
directing that the case be transferred from the Macon Circuit Court to 
the Lee Circuit Court, where venue is proper. 
Background 
S.P. Petroleum sued the C&M defendants in the Macon Circuit 
Court, alleging that its former employee Manning had taken confidential 
information from S.P. Petroleum and that Manning's new employer C&M 
had then used that information to undercut S.P. Petroleum when bidding 
on projects that both companies sought.  The C&M defendants moved the 
trial court to transfer the action to Lee County, submitting affidavits 
from Manning and C&M's president indicating that (1) none of the 
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parties were residents of or had their principal place of business in Macon 
County and (2) none of the wrongful acts alleged to have been committed 
by Manning or C&M were committed in Macon County.  Accordingly, 
they argued, venue was not proper in Macon County under either § 6-3-
2, Ala. Code 1975 (the statute governing venue of claims against 
individual defendants), or § 6-3-7, Ala. Code 1975 (the statute governing 
venue of claims against corporate defendants).   
S.P. Petroleum responded by submitting affidavits from its owner 
and former office manager asserting that the C&M defendants had used 
information that Manning had wrongfully obtained to submit bids 
undercutting S.P. Petroleum's bids for projects with three specific Macon 
County businesses -- Becks Turf Farm, Lake Martin, Inc., and Walters 
Gas and Grocery -- and that S.P. Petroleum had lost those bids as a 
result.  Therefore, S.P. Petroleum argued, venue was proper in Macon 
County under either § 6-3-2(a)(3) (providing that an action against an 
individual "may be commenced … in the county in which the act or 
omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred") or § 
6-3-7(a)(1) (providing that an action against a corporation "may be 
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brought … [i]n the county in which a substantial part of the events or 
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ….").   
The C&M defendants countered by filing another affidavit from 
C&M's president in which he swore that C&M had never bid on or 
performed any work for Becks Turf Farm, Lake Martin, Inc., or Walters 
Gas and Grocery.  The C&M defendants further moved the trial court to 
strike the affidavits submitted by S.P. Petroleum because, the C&M 
defendants argued, those affidavits were based on mere speculation as 
opposed to personal knowledge of the underlying facts.  The materials 
before us do not indicate whether the trial court ruled on the C&M 
defendants' motion to strike, but following a hearing, it denied the motion 
to transfer the action.  The C&M defendants then petitioned this Court 
for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order 
denying their motion and to enter an order transferring this action to Lee 
County. 
Analysis 
While it's not clear whether the trial court ruled on the C&M 
defendants' motion to strike, it's clear that their motion should have been 
granted.  Although the affidavits submitted by S.P. Petroleum summarily 
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recite that they are based on personal knowledge, it is not apparent how 
the affiants could know what projects C&M had bid on or the specific 
details of those bids, especially when a basic presumption underlying 
most bidding processes is that parties do not know the details of other 
bids.  In the absence of any foundational explanation from the affiants as 
to how they acquired personal knowledge of that information, it appears 
that they are simply speculating that S.P. Petroleum's loss of business 
stems from Manning's alleged appropriation of confidential information.  
The C&M defendants' motion to strike those affidavits should therefore 
have been granted.  See Sooudi v. Century Plaza Co., 622 So. 2d 1275, 
1278 (Ala. 1993) ("Affidavits must contain statements based upon the 
personal knowledge of the affiant, and mere speculation and statements 
of subjective beliefs are not the equivalent of personal knowledge.").   
Consequently, when the trial court ruled on the C&M defendants' 
motion to transfer the action, the only evidence properly before the court 
indicated that none of the parties resided in or had their principal place 
of business in Macon County and that the C&M defendants had 
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committed no relevant acts or omissions in Macon County.1  In the 
absence of any conflicting evidence, the C&M defendants' motion to 
transfer the action should have been granted.  See Ex parte Pike 
Fabrication, Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089, 1092-93 (Ala. 2002) (holding that 
motion to transfer the action should have been granted when the plaintiff 
failed to submit any evidence countering the defendant's prima facie 
showing that venue was improper in the plaintiff's chosen forum).   
Bolin, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
1The trial court held a hearing on the C&M defendants' motion to 
transfer the action; a transcript of that hearing is not included in the 
materials before us.  But hearings on motions to transfer do not typically 
include witnesses and the presentation of evidence; indeed, the Alabama 
Code specifically contemplates that at least some such motions will be 
decided on the basis of only affidavit testimony.  See § 6-3-20, Ala. Code 
1975 ("Either party to a civil action may move the court to change the 
venue at any time before final trial, making affidavit that for causes set 
forth, he cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the county where the 
action is pending.  The court may direct a change to the nearest county 
free from proper objection by either party, to be determined by affidavits 
…." (emphasis added)); 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 66 (2016) ("The 
determination of a motion or other application for a change of venue is 
ordinarily made upon the sufficiency of the affidavits filed in support of 
the motion."); see also Ex parte Wayne Farms, LLC, 210 So. 3d 586, 590 
(Ala. 2016) (quoting trial court's order denying a motion to transfer the 
action in which it noted that it had reviewed the affidavit and other 
evidence submitted by the parties and had considered "'the arguments of 
the parties at the hearing'").