Title: State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

The State ex rel. Huebner, Appellant, v. West Jefferson Village Council et  
al., Appellees. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council (1996), ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Elections -- Reconsideration procedures may be invoked to correct 
decisions made in error -- S.Ct.Prac.R. XI -- Determination of 
number of valid part-petition signatures for placement on ballot of 
proposed municipal charter amendment -- Sections 5, 8, 9, and 14, 
Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution, construed in pari materia -- Writ 
granted, when. 
 
(No. 95-58 -- Submitted April 4, 1995 -- Decided July 26, 1995 -- 
Reconsideration Granted, Judgment Reversed, and Writ Allowed March 6, 
1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Madison County, No. CA94-08-
030. 
 
On Motion for Reconsideration. 
 
Appellant, David A. Huebner, and other individuals circulated part-
petitions to place a proposed charter amendment on the November 8, 
1994 ballot for the village of West Jefferson.  The amendment would 
restrict the village in taxing wages originating within its boundaries to a rate 
 
 
 
 
 
2
of one percent.  On July 18, 1994, the petition, which contained 208 valid 
signatures, was filed with the Clerk of the West Jefferson Village Council.  
As of that date, there were 2,272 registered voters in the village.  The 
number of registered voters who had voted at the last preceding general 
municipal election on November 2, 1993 was 482. 
 
On August 15, 1994, appellees, West Jefferson Village Council 
members, voted not to certify the part-petitions to the board of elections 
“for the reason that they are not sufficient in form and in substance.”  
Appellees determined that the petition did not contain sufficient valid 
signatures because it lacked signatures of at least ten percent of all the 
electors in the village on the date the petition was filed, i.e., ten percent of 
the total number of West Jefferson registered voters (2,272), or 228 valid 
signatures. 
 
On August 19, 1994, Huebner filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Madison County for a writ of mandamus compelling appellees 
to certify the proposed charter amendment to the board of elections for 
placement of the issue on the ballot for the next regular municipal election.  
 
 
 
 
 
3
The court of appeals granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment and 
denied the writ, thereby rejecting appellant’s contention that the requisite 
number of signatures was ten percent of the number of registered voters 
who had voted at the last preceding municipal election, i.e., 49 signatures. 
 
On Huebner’s pro se appeal as of right from the denial of the writ, a 
four to three majority of this court affirmed the court of appeals.  State ex 
rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 589, 
651 N.E.2d 1001. 
 
The cause is now before the court upon appellant’s motion for 
reconsideration, and motions for leave to intervene in support of 
appellant’s motion filed by the city of Cincinnati and the Secretary of State. 
____________________ 
 
S. David Worhatch, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Susan E. Ashbrook and 
Andrew S. Bergman, Assistant Attorneys General, for intervenor Secretary 
of State. 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 
Fay D. Dupuis, City Solicitor, Robert H. Johnstone, Deputy City 
Solicitor, and Richard Gonulin, Assistant City Solicitor, for intervenor city of 
Cincinnati. 
____________________ 
 
Moyer, C.J.  Following our July 26, 1995 decision in this cause, 
appellant retained counsel, who filed the motion for reconsideration here 
and the complaint for a writ of mandamus in a separate expedited election 
case, State ex rel. Ricchiuto v. Reagan, case No. 95-1679.  Both Ricchiuto 
and another expedited election case, State ex rel. Taxpayers for 
Accountable Govt. v. Cincinnati City Council, case No. 95-1714, 
challenged the validity of Huebner.  A third expedited election case, State 
ex rel. Lewis v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, case No. 95-1689, sought 
to apply Huebner to prevent a previously certified charter amendment 
proposal from being submitted to the electorate for vote.  Ricchiuto was 
resolved when this court denied the writ requested by the relators.  State 
ex rel. Ricchiuto v. Reagan (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 11, 655 N.E.2d 1298.  
Taxpayers and Lewis were also subsequently dismissed.  State ex rel. 
 
 
 
 
 
5
Lewis v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1201, 655 
N.E.2d 177 (entry dismissing cause), 74 Ohio St.3d at 1202-1203, 655 
N.E.2d at 177-178 (Moyer, C.J., concurring) and 74 Ohio St.3d at 1203-
1205, 655 N.E.2d at 178-179 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 
Appellant and the city of Cincinnati1 now contend on reconsideration 
that we should vacate our decision in Huebner and adopt the position of 
the dissenting opinion therein or, alternatively, should modify Huebner so 
as to restrict its effect to prospective cases. 
 
We have invoked the reconsideration procedures set forth in 
S.Ct.Prac.R. XI to correct decisions which, upon reflection, are deemed to 
have been made in error.  See State ex rel. Mirlisena v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. 
of Elections (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 597, 622 N.E.2d 329 (reasoning 
contained in a previous dissenting opinion adopted by a majority of this 
court pursuant to a motion for reconsideration); State ex rel. Eaton Corp. v. 
Lancaster (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 106, 541 N.E.2d 64 (views contained in a 
previous concurring opinion adopted by a majority of this court pursuant to 
a motion for “rehearing”). 
 
 
 
 
 
6
 
The majority Huebner opinion reasoned that denial of the requested 
writ was justified, in part, by the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio 
Constitution, which authorizes municipalities “to exercise all powers of local 
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local 
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with 
general laws.”  Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution.  This justification 
for denial of the writ was not raised by appellees or discussed by the court 
of appeals, nor was it fully briefed in this court prior to issuance of our first 
opinion.  We note, additionally, that the discussion of the Home Rule 
Amendment in our original opinion appears to be contrary to established 
precedent, and the sole case cited therein appears to be inapposite.  State 
ex rel. Bedford v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 17, 
577 N.E.2d 645.  See, also, State ex rel. Semik v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 334, 335-336, 617 N.E.2d 1120, 1122, 
citing State ex rel. Hinchliffe v. Gibbons (1927), 116 Ohio St. 390, 395, 156 
N.E. 455, 457; Bazell v. Cincinnati (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 63, 42 O.O.2d 
137, 233 N.E.2d 864, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Appellant now urges 
 
 
 
 
 
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us to recognize and reaffirm the principle that subordinate authority must 
always yield to contrary paramount authority, and hold that municipal 
charters may not be construed so as to overrule rights guaranteed to the 
citizens of Ohio by the Ohio Constitution.  Upon further reflection, and on 
this record, we conclude that the Home Rule Amendment cannot support 
denial of the writ requested in this case. 
 
The second rationale of our Huebner decision, and the basis of the 
court of appeals’ decision, is the premise that Section 9, Article XVIII of the 
Ohio Constitution constitutes a special provision (concerning charter 
amendments) which is in irreconcilable conflict with the general provision of 
Section 14, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution.  However, appellant and the 
Huebner dissent argue for a different interpretation of Sections 9 and 14.  
While Sections 5, 8, and 9 of Article XVIII refer to petitions of “ten per 
centum of the electors,” they do not specify the basis or date upon which 
the “ten per centum of electors” is to be calculated. 
 
The court of appeals additionally determined that Section 9 should be 
deemed to prevail over Section 14 because Section 9 was last amended in 
 
 
 
 
 
8
1971.  On reconsideration, appellant argues against this view, in that the 
1971 amendment to Section 9 did not affect the number of signatures 
required for submission of a proposed charter amendment to the 
electorate, but rather authorized notice of proposed charter amendments to 
be given by newspaper publication and not by mailing.  Am.Sub.S.J.R. No. 
31, 133 Ohio Senate Journal (1969-1970), at 1508.  We agree. 
 
A majority of this court now concludes that Section 14 is reconcilable 
with Sections 5, 8, and 9, of Article XVIII for the reasons set forth in the 
dissent to our first Huebner opinion as summarized herein.  We hold that, 
in determining the number of valid part-petition signatures necessary to 
establish a right to the placement of a proposed amendment of a municipal 
charter before the voters, Sections 5, 8, 9 and 14, Article XVIII of the Ohio 
Constitution must be construed in pari materia.  Accordingly, the 
percentage of electors required to sign such part-petitions is ten percent of 
the electors of the municipality based upon the total number of votes cast 
at the last preceding general municipal election.  In the case at bar the 
relator was therefore required to present 49 valid signatures to create a 
 
 
 
 
 
9
legal duty on the part of the appellees to certify the proposed amendment 
for presentation on the ballot.  Appellant met and exceeded that 
requirement by presenting part-petitions that contained 208 valid 
signatures. 
 
Our decision is based upon a clear reading and consistent 
application of the Ohio Constitution.  It is also the correct result for reasons 
of public policy.  As appellant contends in his motion for reconsideration, 
our original opinion precludes electors from knowing the exact number of 
valid signatures required when circulating part-petitions.  Under our earlier 
opinion, the percentage is not determined until the date the petition is filed, 
and the number of actual electors of a municipality may vary over time 
based on voter registration drives, annexations, or other events.  
Conversely, this uncertainty does not exist if Section 14 is applied, since 
petitioners know the precise number of valid signatures required for 
submission of the issue to the electorate.  Furthermore, this interpretation 
fosters the goal of providing citizens with access to the ballot, a foundation 
of our democracy.  Moreover, Section 14 was adopted contemporaneously 
 
 
 
 
 
10
with the pertinent provisions of Sections 5, 8, and 9 of Article XVIII, all of 
which became effective in 1912, and have been construed in pari materia 
since that time.  We note as well that the Secretary of State, the state’s 
chief election officer, has urged this interpretation of the relevant provisions 
of the Ohio Constitution.  (Motion to dismiss, case No. 95-1689, State ex 
rel. Lewis, supra.) 
 
Having concluded that the reasoning contained in our prior opinion of 
July 26, 1995 should be rejected, we must now discuss issues which the 
court of appeals found unnecessary to address in view of its conclusion 
that appellant failed to present a sufficient number of signatures. 
 
In addition to an alleged lack of sufficient number of signatures, 
appellees further justified their refusal to certify the proposed charter 
amendment based on their conclusion that the petition misled electors and 
was confusing.  However, a municipal legislative authority such as a city or 
village council lacks authority to consider substantive errors in reviewing 
the sufficiency of petitions, and is instead limited to reviewing the form of 
the petition.  State ex rel. Polcyn v. Burkhart (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 7, 11-
 
 
 
 
 
11
12, 62 O.O.2d 202, 204, 292 N.E.2d 883, 886; State ex rel. Concerned 
Citizens for More Professional Govt. v. Zanesville City Council (1994), 70 
Ohio St.3d 455, 457-458, 639 N.E.2d 421, 423; State ex rel. Citizens for a 
Better Portsmouth v. Sydnor (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 49, 572 N.E.2d 649.  
Appellees conceded below that they rejected the petition partly based on 
its substance.  The appellees thereby exceeded their authority, and this 
proffered  alternative basis for rejecting the petition is invalid. 
 
Where a municipal legislative authority erroneously either fails to 
submit a charter amendment when it is presented with a legally sufficient 
petition or fails to make a prompt determination on the sufficiency of the 
petition within the constitutional time period, this court has issued writs of 
mandamus to order placement on the next regular election ballot.  Morris v. 
Macedonia City Council  (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 52, 641 N.E.2d 1075; State 
ex rel. Citizens for a Better Portsmouth v. Sydnor, supra; State ex rel. 
Jurcisin v. Cotner (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 171, 10 OBR 503, 462 N.E.2d 
381.  A regular primary election is scheduled to occur in this state not less 
than sixty nor more than one hundred and twenty days from the date of this 
 
 
 
 
 
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decision.  Cf. Section 8, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution.  We find 
presentation of the charter amendment issue on the March 1996 primary 
ballot to be the most equitable resolution of this cause for both relator and 
the public. 
 
Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XI, the timely filing of a motion for 
reconsideration temporarily relieves the Clerk of this court of the duty to 
issue a mandate in accordance with the court’s judgment.  Because the 
appellant timely filed the instant motion for reconsideration in this cause, 
no mandate has yet been issued in this action to implement the opinion 
previously rendered on July 26, 1995 and reported at 72 Ohio St.3d 589, 
651 N.E.2d 1001.  Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XI(3)(A)(2), where a motion for 
reconsideration is timely filed and granted, a mandate is to issue at the 
time the Supreme Court’s judgment entry on reconsideration is entered.  
Because a majority of this court concludes that the motion for 
reconsideration in this cause should be granted and that the judgment of 
the court of appeals should be reversed, the Clerk is instructed to issue a 
writ of mandamus compelling appellees to certify the proposed charter 
 
 
 
 
 
13
amendment to the board of elections for placement on the primary election 
ballot as a special election issue to be presented to the electorate of West 
Jefferson on March 19, 1996. 
Motion for reconsideration 
granted, judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
WRIGHT, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent. 
 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1The motions for leave to intervene filed by the city of Cincinnati and 
the Secretary of State are granted. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring.     I concur with the legal determinations made by 
the majority because I do not believe that Section 9, Article XVIII of the Ohio 
Constitution clearly prevails over Section 14, Article XVIII. The two provisions in 
the Constitution contradict one another.  After reviewing the brief submitted by 
 
 
 
 
 
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the intervenor Secretary of State, I conclude that our decision in State ex rel. 
Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 589, 651 N.E.2d 
1001, is impractical and that the majority’s new approach is the better way to 
harmonize these conflicting provisions of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.     I respectfully dissent from the judgment and the 
opinion of the majority because I believe the majority makes not only a 
fundamental error of law but also a dangerous and unprecedented error of public 
policy.  The damage of today’s blow to charter municipalities cannot be 
overestimated. 
 
Section 7, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[a]ny 
municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, 
subject to the provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers 
of local self-government.”  (Emphasis added.)  This is the “home rule” provision 
of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
Section 9, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution sets forth the procedure to 
be used in amending a charter created in accordance with Section 7.  Section 9 
provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]mendments to any charter framed and adopted 
 
 
 
 
 
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as herein provided may be submitted to the electors of a municipality by a two-
thirds vote of the legislative authority thereof, and, upon petitions signed by ten 
per centum of the electors of the municipality setting forth any such proposed 
amendment, shall be submitted by such legislative authority.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
R.C. 3501.01(N) defines “elector.”  “‘Elector’ * * * means a person having 
the qualifications provided by law to be entitled to vote.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
3501.01(O) defines “voter.”  “‘Voter’ means an elector who votes at an election.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The difference between a person who is an “elector” and one 
who is a “voter” is obvious from these definitions. 
 
Two other sections of Article XVIII of the Constitution use the term 
“electors” in connection with the right of petition.  Section 5 deals with a 
municipality’s efforts “* * * to acquire, construct, own, lease or operate a public 
utility * * *.”  The section provides that “[i]f within * * * thirty days a petition 
signed by ten per centum of the electors of the municipality shall be filed with the 
executive authority thereof demanding a referendum on such ordinance it shall not 
take effect until submitted to the electors and approved by a majority of those 
voting thereon.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
 
 
 
 
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Section 8 provides, in part, that “* * * upon petition of ten per centum of the 
electors [the legislative authority of any city or village] shall forthwith, provide by 
ordinance for the submission to the electors, of the question, ‘Shall a commission 
be chosen to frame a charter.’” 
 
Thus, Sections 5, 8 and 9 of Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution provide 
for petitions signed by ten per centum of the electors to place on a ballot matters 
concerning public utilities, charter commissions and charter amendments.  
Notwithstanding these clear, unambiguous and mandatory provisions, the majority 
today says that signatures of ten per centum of the electors are not needed.  All 
that is needed to place these important issues on a ballot for, if successful, 
inclusion in the charter of a municipality, are the signatures of ten per centum of 
the persons voting (voters) at the last preceding general municipal election.  To 
arrive at this result, the majority references Section 14, Article XVIII of the Ohio 
Constitution.  If the majority’s conclusion is correct, then Section 14 conflicts with 
Sections 5, 8 and 9, and the specific provisions of Sections 5, 8 and 9 prevail over 
the general provisions of Section 14.  R.C. 1.51.  No matter how the majority says 
it in different ways and no matter how many times the majority says otherwise, the 
 
 
 
 
 
17
terms “electors” and “voters” cannot be made to mean the same.  Our duty is to 
harmonize such conflicts but, sometimes, harmony is not possible.  One could not 
conceive of harmonizing the hymn “Amazing Grace” with the song “Yellow 
Submarine.”  “Electors” are those people registered to vote.  “Voters” are those 
electors who actually vote in a given election. 
 
Why is any or all of this so important?  Because the charter of a city is 
comparable to a local constitution.  In State ex rel. Bednar v. N. Canton (1994), 69 
Ohio St.3d 278, 281, 631 N.E.2d 621, 624, we said that “[m]any ‘matters of local 
self-government’ are, in fact, matters of detail and procedure that are out of place 
in a charter, which is comparable to a local constitution.”  We repeated this in the 
very recent case of State ex rel. Hipp v. N. Canton (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d ___, ___, 
___ N.E.2d ___, ___.  Yet, today the majority makes it easier to obtain a vote to 
place a matter in a municipality’s constitution than it is to obtain a vote on a 
simple ordinance.  By today’s decision, the majority negates, I believe, many 
municipal charter provisions that we do not, nor cannot, even know exist.  Take 
just two examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
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In a recent case decided by this court, Paschal v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 141, 656 N.E.2d 1276 (decided by the court on 
grounds different than the issue now before us in the case at bar),  a number of 
residents of the village of Highland Hills in Cuyahoga County initiated and signed 
petitions seeking to have placed on the ballot an ordinance that would have 
prohibited, if the ordinance were passed, any new penal facilities within the 
village.  The petitions were circulated pursuant to Article VI (Initiative, 
Referendum and Recall) of the charter of the village of Highland Hills.   
 
Section 1(b), Article VI of the charter of the village states, in part, that:  “An 
initiated ordinance or resolution shall be submitted to Council by a petition signed 
by qualified electors equal in number to at least fifteen percent (15%) of the total 
vote cast in the last regular municipal election.”  (Emphasis added.)  Further, a 
subsequent provision in the same section (Section 1) states that “[i]f the initiative 
petition is signed by qualified electors equal in number to at least twenty-five 
percent (25%) of the total votes cast at the last regular municipal election, the 
date of the election may be fixed by the petition.”  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, to 
initiate an ordinance in Highland Hills, petitions signed by at least fifteen percent 
 
 
 
 
 
19
of the electors of the village who voted in the last regular municipal election must 
be presented.  If the petitioners choose to designate a date for the election, then 
signatures of twenty-five percent of the total number of people who cast votes cast 
at the last regular municipal election must be submitted.   
 
By today’s majority decision, it will now be easier to propose the amending 
of the constitution (charter) of the village of Highland Hills than to initiate an 
ordinance.  Accordingly, if a proposed charter amendment, placed on the ballot, 
pursuant to today’s majority decision, by signatures of ten percent of those voting 
at the last regular municipal election were adopted, then the constitution of the 
village of Highland Hills would contain the “no new jails” provision.  Clearly, the 
cited provisions of the charter of Highland Hills and all other charters in this state 
with like or similar provisions are rendered, by a stroke of our pens, inoperative. 
 
Or, as yet another example, take the charter of the city of Toledo.  Section 5, 
Chapter I of the charter provides for the amending of the charter.  The section 
provides, in part, that “[a]ny amendment to this Charter * * * shall be submitted 
when a petition is filed with the Clerk of the Council setting forth the proposed 
amendment and signed by not less than ten percent of the electors.”  (Emphasis 
 
 
 
 
 
20
added.)  Section 6, Chapter I defines “electors” as “residents of the City qualified 
to vote to fill all elective offices.” 
 
Chapter VI of the charter of the city of Toledo is entitled “Initiative, 
Referendum and Recall.”  Section 75, Chapter VI provides for how ordinances 
may be initiated.  The section provides that “[a]ny proposed ordinance may be 
submitted to the Council by petitions filed with the Clerk and signed by electors of 
the City equal in number to twelve percent (12%) of the total number of votes cast 
for all candidates for Mayor at the most recent general municipal election at 
which the Mayor was elected.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Now suppose a group of well-meaning citizens of Toledo decided that no 
junk cars may be parked or stored on a residential property, or that no spray paint 
may be sold to minors because the city has a graffiti problem, or that each cat 
owned by a citizen must have, like dogs, a license, or that there should be a curfew 
(there now is) in the city.  The citizens set about trying to find the easiest way to 
have such proposals become the law of the city.  They determine that a vote of the 
people of Toledo is necessary because city council rejects all the citizens’ ideas. 
 
 
 
 
 
21
 
Assume that the last general municipal election was held in November 
1993.  At that election, there were 172,0002 registered voters (“electors”).  A total 
of 95,500 electors voted (“voters”) and 92,500 of those voted in the mayor’s race.  
If these citizens wanted to initiate an ordinance on any one or all of the matters 
referenced, they would need (to place the matter on the ballot) petitions containing 
the signatures (pursuant to the charter) of twelve percent of 92,500 or 11,100.  If 
they want their proposal(s) to be in the constitution of the city, then a charter 
amendment is necessary and, by the terms of Section 5, Chapter I they need the 
signatures of ten percent of 172,000 (electors) or 17,200.  But by today’s majority 
decision, they can decide that it is easier to put “anti-graffiti” in the city 
constitution because all they now need, to place the question on the ballot as a 
charter amendment, are petitions containing the signatures of ten percent of 95,500 
or 9,550 signatures.  Thus, it is now easier to propose amendments to the charters 
of villages and municipalities than it is to initiate an ordinance or resolution. 
 
It is clear that those persons framing charters know the difference between 
“electors” and “voters.”  This is evidenced by the fact that the term “electors” is 
used and defined, and when the framers of the Highland Hills charter meant 
 
 
 
 
 
22
“voters,” they spelled out “the total vote cast in the last regular municipal 
election.” 
 
Sir Winston Churchill once said, “I have always considered that the 
substitution of the internal combustion engine for the horse marked a very gloomy 
milestone in the progress of mankind.”  International Dictionary of Thoughts 
(1969) 586.  While some will hail today’s majority decision as progress for easy 
access to the ballot, I can foresee that those governmental subdivisions with 
charters will consider this day to be a gloomy milestone for their constitutions.   
 
I respectfully dissent.  I would deny the motion for reconsideration and 
adhere to our decision reported in 72 Ohio St.3d 589, 651 N.E.2d 1001, which 
affirmed the well-reasoned judgment of the court of appeals.  Our prior case was 
decided on July 26, 1995 -- less than eight months ago.  At least now maybe we 
will not see any more lectures on stare decisis.   
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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FOOTNOTE: 
1 
All numbers have been rounded off.