Title: Carroll v. Alabama Public Service Commission

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

206 So. 2d 364 (1968)
E. E. CARROLL, d/b/a Carroll Trucking Company
v.
ALABAMA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al.
6 Div. 489.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 11, 1968.
Wright & Long, Montgomery, for appellant.
Wm. G. Somerville, Jr., Wm. P. Jackson, Jr., and D. H. Markstein, Jr., Birmingham, for appellees.
*365 MERRILL, Justice.
This appeal is from a decree reversing an order signed by two (a majority) of the members of the Alabama Public Service Commission.
Appellant Carroll applied for a permit from the Commission to engage in intrastate transportation as a contract carrier by motor vehicle in the transportation of contractor's equipment, materials and supplies over irregular routes from all places in Alabama to all places in Alabama. After a contested hearing before Attorney-Examiner Black, he recommended that the application be granted subject to the limitations that the permit be effective only during the duration (3 years) of a contract between applicant and W. K. Upchurch Construction Company.
Commissioners Pepper and Pool entered an order dated January 17, 1966, approving the application but without the limitations recommended by Attorney-Examiner Black.
The contesting carriers appealed by filing a bill in equity, pursuant to Tit. 48, §§ 79 and 301(27), Code 1940, as amended.
At trial, the following stipulation was presented:
Carroll, appellee in the circuit court, argued that President Connor's statement was inadmissible, that the word "misconduct" in Tit. 48, § 82, was tantamount to fraud, and that the evidence supported the order.
*366 The trial court disagreed with Carroll in each of the three instances and also found that the failure of the Commission to act as a body constituted prejudicial error requiring the order of the Commission to be vacated. Carroll then appealed to this court.
It is not necessary for us to consider or discuss the sufficiency of the evidence.
Our holding in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., Ala., 199 So. 2d 653, that an order of the Commission, made under similar circumstances to that here, was void, is controlling here and supports the holding of the trial court that the failure of the Commission to act as a body required a reversal. In Redwing, we held that the members of the Commission must act as a body when a quorum is present, and each Commissioner must be given reasonable notice of meetings of the Commission and accorded an opportunity to be present if feasible.
But appellant argues that the statement of Commissioner Connor contained in the stipulation is not admissible under Tit. 48, § 82, Code 1940, which provides:
Appellant contends that the Legislature intended "misconduct" to be that kind of misconduct that amounts to fraud, and there is no argument made by appellees that the actions of the two majority members of the Commission were fraudulent.
In construing a statute, every word and each section thereof must be given effect, if possible, and construed with other sections in pari materia. Smith v. Smith, 266 Ala. 118, 94 So. 2d 863; City of Montgomery v. Smith, 205 Ala. 557, 88 So. 671. If "misconduct" is to be construed as synonymous with "fraud," the Legislature did a useless thing by listing "misconduct."
"Misconduct" is defined as "wrong conduct; bad behavior, mismanagement," Bailey v. Examining & Trial Board of Police Department of City of Helena, 45 Mont. 197, 122 P. 572. The word "misconduct" has several different meanings; it is bad behavior, wrong conduct; in usual parlance, a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left, except what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention, but implies wrongful intention, and not mere error of judgment. Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636; Words & Phrases, "Misconduct," Vol. 27, pp. 466, 467.
It was misconduct for two members of the Commission to issue a certificate of convenience and necessity without meeting as a body and failing to notify the third member of the Commission that they were going to pass on and decide the matter.
It follows that the testimony of Commission President Connor was admissible because it vitally affected the order *367 signed by a majority of the Commission. The testimony showed that the order was void under our holding in Redwing, supra. The order being void, there is no need to consider whether it was supported by the evidence.
Affirmed.
SIMPSON, COLEMAN and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.