Title: In re Duckman

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Duckman  (2004-483); 179 Vt. 467; 898 A.2d 734

2006 VT 23

[Filed 10-Mar-2006]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 26-Apr-2006]


  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT  23

                                No. 2004-483


  In re Appeal of Lorin Duckman     Supreme Court

                                    On Appeal from
                                    District Court of Vermont,
                                    Unit No. 2, Addison Circuit

                                    March Term, 2005

  Helen M. Toor, J.

  William A. Nelson, Middlebury, for Appellant.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and John Treadwell, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for Appellee.

  John L. Pacht of Hoff, Curtis, Pacht, Cassidy, Frame, Somers & Katims,
  P.C., Burlington, for Amicus Curiae Vermont Association of Criminal Defense
  Lawyers.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, Anna Saxman, Deputy Defender General,
  Montpelier for Amicus Curiae Office of the Defender General.


  PRESENT:  Dooley and Johnson, JJ., and Eaton, D.J., Gibson, J. (Ret.),
            and Martin, Supr. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned 

        
       ¶  1.     DOOLEY, J.  Attorney Lorin Duckman appeals a district
  court order finding him in summary criminal contempt and placing him in
  custody for forty-five minutes.  On appeal, attorney makes numerous claims
  regarding the court's contempt order and subsequent denial of his motion to
  vacate.  Generally, these claims can be summarized as follows: (1) attorney
  was justified in disobeying the court's order because the court did not
  have the authority to issue the order, and an exception to the collateral
  bar rule applies; (2) the court's contempt order was based on erroneous
  factual findings; (3) attorney was denied his due process guarantees of
  notice, a hearing, and an impartial tribunal; and (4) the sentence was
  beyond the court's discretion.  We reject all of these claims and affirm
  the rulings of the district court.

       ¶  2.     The events forming the basis for the contempt finding
  occurred on August 30, 2004, when attorney was in Addison District Court
  representing the defendant in the criminal trial of State v. Barrows, Nos.
  163-3-03, 602-10-03, and 240-6-04 Ancr.  The parties presented the court,
  Judge Helen M. Toor presiding, with a written plea agreement.  At the time,
  the plea agreement included the proposed sentence, except for the element
  of restitution, which the parties were still negotiating.  The parties
  discussed restitution and the defendant's ability to pay with the court. 
  The victim did not support the plea agreement and gave an unsworn statement
  to that effect.

       ¶  3.     Before ruling on acceptance of the plea agreement, the court
  turned to the defendant to conduct a Rule 11 colloquy (FN1) and allow the
  defendant a chance to speak.  Attorney objected, and asked that the court
  rule on whether the plea agreement would be accepted before addressing his
  client.  The court declined to change its procedure, and attorney stated
  that he would then be forced to withdraw his client's plea.(FN2)
   
       ¶  4.     The court explained that attorney had no independent
  authority to withdraw his client's plea and must first consult with his
  client.  Attorney refused to adjourn and consult with his client and
  claimed that the court was interfering with his attorney-client
  relationship.  The court ordered attorney to leave and speak with his
  client.  When attorney refused, the court found him in contempt for
  expressly refusing to comply with the court's order and directed a court
  officer to place him in a holding cell until 1:00 p.m., which was
  approximately 45 minutes later.(FN3)
   
       ¶  5.     In a written order, the court certified the contempt
  finding on August 31, 2004, stating that attorney's "direct refusal of the
  court's order, along with [his] angry, confrontational, and disrespectful
  manner . . . made it impossible to proceed with the case, evidenced an
  utterly inappropriate manner for a lawyer to use in the courtroom towards a
  judge, and constituted contempt of court."  On September 9, 2004, attorney
  filed a motion to vacate the contempt order, arguing that it was invalid on
  several grounds.  Attorney also requested an evidentiary hearing to present
  his own version of the facts.  On October 20, 2004, the court denied
  attorney's request for a hearing, finding that it was unnecessary because
  the contemptuous conduct took place in the court's presence.
   
       ¶  6.     The ruling on the motion to vacate was extensive and
  addressed each of attorney's claims at length.  The introduction set the
  stage:

         The undersigned has never in twenty-two years in the legal
       profession . . . seen an attorney behave in as disrespectful
       and angry a manner towards a judge as Attorney Duckman has on
       repeated occasions, both in the courtroom and in chambers. 
       Prior to August 30, 2004, the court had attempted to address
       Respondent's behaviors by, for example, speaking to
       Respondent in chambers, asking one of his superiors to speak
       to him, and clearly explaining the court's expectations of
       him.  He and his superior were also advised that if such
       conduct continued the court would be forced to take more
       serious action.  On at least one prior occasion, Respondent
       was warned that he was on the verge of being held in
       contempt.

         On August 30, not only did Respondent display the same rude
       and disrespectful behavior that he had displayed on previous
       occasions - repeatedly interrupting the judge - but he went
       further than he had in the past.  On this occasion, he
       willfully refused to comply with a direct order of the court
       intended to protect his client's right to determine whether
       to proceed with a guilty plea pursuant to a proffered plea
       agreement, or whether to withdraw from that agreement. 
       Moreover, Respondent's refusal forced the courtroom
       proceedings to come to a halt.  Because of this direct
       refusal to comply with the court's order, as well as the
       disrespectful way in which it was done and its interference
       with the ongoing proceeding, the court concluded that it had
       no choice but to take immediate action.  Such action was
       needed to punish the behavior, to deter similar future
       behavior by Respondent, and to make clear to others that such
       behavior would not be tolerated.  Because Attorney Duckman's
       actions demonstrated that repeated prior attempts to remedy
       his behavior had been unsuccessful, the court also concluded
       that a severe sanction was necessary.  For all of these
       reasons, the court imposed the sanction of a brief
       incarceration until after the lunch hour.

  The introduction was followed by a section entitled "Past Inappropriate
  Conduct," which provided "a brief summary of some of the prior instances of
  unprofessional conduct."  The court explained the influence of these prior
  acts:

       These incidents were not the basis for the contempt finding,
       but they contributed to the court's decision that there was
       no less severe action that would adequately address the
       situation.  They also contributed to the court's decision to
       impose the sanction it chose, rather than a monetary
       sanction.
       
  The court then went on to describe the events that led up to the contempt
  finding.  The court reiterated the reasons stated in the August order: 
  "The court's finding of contempt was based upon the willful refusal of
  counsel to comply with a clear order of the court, as well as the 'angry,
  confrontational, and disrespectful manner' in which he did so."  The court
  analyzed the grounds necessary for an adjudication of contempt and held
  that they were present.  The court concluded:

  
         As noted above, the court had been faced over a period of months
       with repeated challenges to its authority, displays of anger,
       and other unprofessional conduct by Attorney Duckman. . . . 
       [C]ounsel was well aware of the court's expectations, and
       kinder and gentler efforts to modify his behavior had been
       unsuccessful.

         If the conduct on August 30 had been the first incident of
       oppositional and disrespectful behavior by Attorney Duckman,
       the court likely would not have taken the action it did. 
       Generally, the court seeks to speak at the bench or in
       chambers with attorneys about any issues with their courtroom
       behavior.  With another attorney, that would have been the
       likely course of action.  Here, however, the prior history
       with Attorney Duckman had made it clear that lesser steps
       would be ineffective.  Given the interruption of the
       proceedings, the willful and disrespectful nature of the
       conduct, and the court's past experience with the attorney in
       question, it was apparent that a severe sanction was
       necessary to convey the message that such behavior was
       unacceptable.
  
       ¶  7.     Under our procedural rules,

       [A] criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge
       certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the
       contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of
       the court.  The order of contempt shall recite the facts and
       shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.

  V.R.Cr.P. 42(a).  Although this rule provides the procedure for
  adjudicating a criminal contempt, common law dictates the substantive
  elements of summary contempt.  State v. Allen, 145 Vt. 593, 600,