Title: State Ex Rel. Chambers v. School District No. 10

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

472 P.2d 1013 (1970) The STATE of Montana ex rel. Robert W. CHAMBERS, Petitioner and Respondent, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 10 OF the COUNTY OF DEER LODGE et al., Respondents and Appellants. No. 11685. Supreme Court of Montana. Submitted May 14, 1970. Decided July 28, 1970. Rehearing Denied August 27, 1970. John L. McKeon, argued, Anaconda, William B. Ball, argued, Harrisburg, Pa., Edward D. Yelsa, County Atty., Anaconda, for respondents and appellants; Ward Shanahan, argued, amicus curiae, Helena. John H. Jardine, argued, Whitehall, Rex. F. Henningsen, argued, Butte, for petitioner and respondent; Leo Kottas, Sr., argued, amicus curiae, Helena. PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from a judgment and order granting a peremptory writ of prohibition against the school district, school board and superintendent of schools of School District No. 10 of Deer Lodge County, Montana. School District No. 10 operated the Anaconda High School in the city of Anaconda, Montana, a public high school supported entirely by public finds. There is a Roman Catholic parochial high school known as Anaconda Central High School located within the boundaries of School District No. 10 in the city of Anaconda. The fact situation in this cause as disclosed by the record shows that on April 28, 1969, the trustees of School District No. 10 held a special meeting to consider holding a special election in order to submit to the qualified electors the questions of special levies for the operation of the Anaconda High School and other matters. At this special meeting a resolution was passed which provided, so far as pertinent here: Pursuant to the resolution adopted by the board of trustees, the school district caused ballots to be prepared which contained the following language, with boxes for indicating an affirmative or negative vote therefor: Respondent, a resident taxpayer of School District No. 10, on May 20, 1969, brought this action in the district court of Deer Lodge County to obtain a writ of prohibition directed against appellants herein, School District No. 10 of Deer Lodge County, Montana, and the board of trustees and superintendent of said school district, seeking to enjoin them from submitting to the qualified electors of the county, on May 27, 1969, a special tax levy for the purpose of hiring eight teachers as full time employees of the school district. It was alleged that the special levy was in violation of state and federal constitutional prohibitions. An alternative writ was issued on May 20, 1969 ordering appellants to take the necessary steps to remove from the ballot the question relating to the special mill levy and prohibiting them from submitting the question to the electors at the election of May 27, 1969, or to show cause on May 23, 1969, why such was not done. On May 23, 1969, the district court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition. The writ did not by its terms order that the question be removed from the ballot or prohibit the question from being submitted to the electors, but provided: On Tuesday, May 27, 1969, the election was held and the question was submitted to the electors of Deer Lodge County, Montana. At this election 1,471 qualified electors voted in favor of the levy and 1,233 qualified electors voted against it. From the judgment and order granting the peremptory writ of prohibition the school district, school board and superintendent of schools appealed. The issues presented for review are two in number. As stated by the appellant the first is whether the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Montana prohibit a public school board from employing teachers, as full time employees of the school district, for the purpose of providing the standard course of secular instruction for high schools, as approved by the county superintendent of schools, to resident students of the county, for the reason that such students are enrolled in a parochial high school or, as stated by the respondent, does the Constitution of the State of Montana and the United States prevent appellant school district from making *1015 a special high school tax levy for the purpose of employing and paying eight school teachers to teach students enrolled in a parochial high school on the premises of said high school? Secondly, in the words of appellants, whether the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated by the district court's order which prohibits the appellants from collecting or spending the additional mill levy for teachers' salaries, solely by reason of the fact that the students who are to receive the benefit of the program are enrolled in a parochial high school. Or, as stated by the respondent did the appellant school district act in violation of statutory authority and in excess of its jurisdiction in proposing a special high school tax levy to the voters of Deer Lodge County for the purposes set forth in issue No. 1 under section 75-4609, R.C.M. 1947, as to special tax levy for high schools and section 75-3801, R.C.M. 1947, as to district school taxes? Section 75-4609, R.C.M. 1947 provides: The emphasis of respondent is directed to this portion of the statute: "If a majority of the board of trustees, as provided in section 75-4601, of the high school district attending such meeting shall determine that the proposed expenditures are necessary for the purposes of, altering, repairing or enlarging any high school or high schools of said district or for proper maintenance and operation of the high schools of said district". (Emphasis ours.) Section 75-3801, R.C.M. 1947, so far as pertinent to our discussion, provides that if the board of trustees of any school district deems it necessary to raise money by taxation in excess of the levy required to meet its foundation program "for the purpose of maintaining the schools of said district, or building, altering, repairing or enlarging any schoolhouse or houses of such district, for furnishing additional school facilities for said district, or for any other purpose necessary for the proper operation and maintenance of the schools of said district," the board may fix and determine the amount required and submit it to an election. The second portion of the statute provides for levies for district or county high schools and contains much the same language as the first portion and the words "schools of said district, or county high school." This is a case of first impression in our state and it has been exhaustively briefed by counsel for the parties and amicus curiae. We appreciate that the constitutional issue presented by this appeal, in one form *1016 or another, has been before various courts throughout our nation. We do not intend to discuss all the cases which have been urged upon us as authorities since it is the constitutional provisions of our state where not in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States that should and will govern our decision. To commence our discussion we should start at the beginning, the Enabling Act, passed by the Congress and approved on February 22, 1889, appearing as 25 Stat. 676. The Enabling Act set forth the provisions that the people of Montana must comply with in order to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states. That the people of Montana did recognize this necessity is stated in the Preamble to our Constitution, which reads: The Constitution was ratified by the people October 1, 1889. The Enabling Act provided in § 4, in part as follows: Paragraph Fourth of § 4, it provided: In compliance with these provisions of the Enabling Act the constitutional convention adopted Ordinance No. 1, which provided "BE IT ORDAINED: First. That perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured and that no inhabitant of the state of Montana shall ever be molested in person or property, on account of his or her mode of religious worship." Under Fourth it was ordained: "That provision shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of a uniform system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of said state of Montana and free from sectarian control." Under Sixth it was ordained: "That the ordinances in this article shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of said state of Montana." The Constitution of Montana contained these provisions in compliance with the Enabling Act and the Ordinances: The school board contends that Anaconda Central High School as a part of the local Catholic Parochial School System is an integral and important part of the public and private educational system in Deer Lodge County. They cite that since it carries a sizeable portion of the total educational load, complies with the standards set by the superintendent of public instruction, and enrollment of a student therein satisfies the compulsory education requirement of Montana law, that it pursues a valid and valuable secular function in providing secular education, in addition to its sectarian function. Further, that the proposed mill levy, for the purpose of hiring eight additional teachers as full time employees of the school district, to teach the standard course of instruction to students at the parochial high school, has a valid public purpose, that being to achieve the secular education of such students. Respondent contends that the proposal of the school district is an obvious violation of the principle of separation of church and state as found in both the Constitution of the State of Montana and in the religious clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In view of these respective contentions it is apparent that the primary question raised in this appeal is whether the contemplated use of public funds would contravene the provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of Article XI, Sec. 8 of the Montana Constitution. These provisions of the United States Constitution, so far as pertinent here, in part provide: "Amendment 14: "* * * nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * * *." *1018 Article XI, Sec. 8 of the Constitution of Montana has been heretofore quoted. The most recent pronouncement of its views in this field by the Supreme Court of the United States is contained in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 25 L. Ed. 2d 697 decided on May 4, 1970. This case deals with the constitutionality of statutes granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious worship and while we are not here concerned with that problem we do desire to quote from that opinion for its background material. The opinion was written by Mr. Chief Justice Burger and therein it states: Later in the opinion the Chief Justice wrote: However, in the instant cause this actually is what is contemplated. The Chief Justice proceeded to point out the dangers of such a course in these words: Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent to the majority opinion calls attention to the fact that: Since Mr. Justice Douglas has been on the court for more than 30 years, a period in which many cases dealing with the constitutional provisions here under consideration were before the Court, his further observation in his dissent is worthy of quoting: The foregoing quotations from the Walz opinion express the present views of the United States Supreme Court in the area of separation of church and state as contained in the religious clauses of the First Amendment to our national constitution. We now turn to our own constitutional provisions to bring this matter to a conclusion. We have quoted various sections thereof previously and we now wish to give detailed consideration to Section 8 of Article XI. This section reads: "Neither the legislative assembly, nor any county, city, town, or school district, or other public corporations, shall ever make directly or indirectly, any appropriation, or pay from any public fund or moneys whatever, or make any grant of lands or other property in aid of any church, or for any sectarian purpose, or to aid in the support of any school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary, scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect or denomination whatever." (Emphasis ours.) As a guide to our discussion we recall the words of this Court in State ex rel. Mills v. Dixon et al., 66 Mont. 76, 213 P. 227: Returning to Section 8 of Art. XI, it cannot be asserted that this section is ambiguous or indefinite and thereby open to interpretation since it clearly states in no uncertain terms that no school district can directly or indirectly appropriate or pay from public funds to aid the support of any school controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect or denomination. While it was argued to the contrary by the appellants, that such section could be interpreted to support their theory of this case, we cannot accept such argument. Anaconda Central High School is a parochial school, owned, operated and controlled by the Roman Catholic Church. The school district has no control over it and even though it complies with the laws with respect to the instruction necessary to *1021 be given therein under the laws of Montana and regulations of the superintendent of public instruction, it of necessity must supplement these courses of instruction by those required by the doctrines of the Church. While in the instant case we were not favored with the facts surrounding the purposes and operation of Anaconda Central High School as such, yet we do find from the Roman Catholic Church itself, as set forth in the Encyclical of Pope Pius XI, (Five Great Encyclicals, The Paulist Press, page 60.) If this is the aim of the Church then if teachers were to be furnished at public expense to a parochial school it would not be possible to determine where the secular purpose ended and the sectarian began. Thus one could hardly disagree with the following statement of Mr. Justice Jackson in Everson v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (Oct. 1946). Finally, we quote from Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in School District of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844, wherein he stated: When our late associate, Mr. Justice John W. Bonner, was Attorney General of Montana, he was asked for his opinion as to whether public school moneys could be expended for transportation of a parochial school student. His opinion No. 228, found in Vol. 19, Opinions of the Attorney General, at page 358, so far as pertinent, reads: The Transportation Act he referred to is still the law of Montana, being sections 75-3401 to 75-3414, R.C.M. 1947. While there have been amendments to the original act in the 29 years since its enactment, none of them change the provisions of the law then Attorney General Bonner discussed and ruled on as above quoted. In answer to the first issue, we hold that the constitutional provisions of this state prohibit a public school board from making a levy for, or expending funds for the employment of teachers to teach in a parochial school. As to the second issue, that the issuance of the writ of prohibition operated to deprive the resident students of Deer Lodge County of public educational benefits solely on account of their religion: The argument is that once the voters of the county resolved to extend these benefits to the students of the parochial school it was not proper for the court to deny the benefits solely on account of the fact the students were enrolled in a parochial school. The school board contends that under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, reading so far as pertinent: and in Sec. 4 of Art. III of our Constitution (heretofore quoted) the writ of prohibition deprived some students of the "free exercise" of their religion because it denied them educational benefits which the school board had resolved to provide and which the voters had approved. The respondent answers, and in our opinion correctly, that the school district board acted in violation of section 75-4609 and 75-3801, R.C.M. 1947 in adopting the resolution calling for the special levy since these statutes limit such actions to be for the benefit of public schools of the district solely. There is no question that the parochial school is not a public school and is not a school under the jurisdiction of the school board. Such being the situation the school board was without statutory authority to proceed as it did, and in doing so it acted in excess of its statutory authority. The district court was correct in prohibiting the school board from collecting or spending the additional levy for teachers' salaries in the parochial school since such procedure is not permissible under the applicable statutes. There exists no necessity to further discuss the free exercise clauses in either the United States or Montana Constitutions. The judgment and order are affirmed.