Title: First Franklin Fin. Corp. v. Gardner

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2013 ME 3 
Docket: 
Yor-12-115 
Argued: 
December 12, 2012 
Decided: 
January 8, 2013 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
 
v. 
 
JASON L. GARDNER 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 
[¶1]  First Franklin Financial Corporation appeals from a judgment of the 
District Court (Biddeford, Cantara, J.) granting Jason L. Gardner’s motion for 
sanctions and ordering First Franklin to pay monetary sanctions and enter into a 
loan modification with Gardner on the terms agreed upon by the parties at 
foreclosure mediation, as stated in the mediator’s November 4, 2010, report.  See 
14 M.R.S. § 6321-A (2012); M.R. Civ. P. 93.   
[¶2]  On appeal, First Franklin argues that (1) we should reach the merits of 
this interlocutory appeal pursuant to the death knell and judicial economy 
exceptions to the final judgment rule; (2) the trial court erred in finding that the 
parties had reached a binding agreement requiring First Franklin to offer a trial 
loan modification plan to Gardner because the terms of any such agreement were 
 
 
2 
indefinite or conditional; and (3) because the parties had never entered into a 
binding agreement, the court erred in granting Gardner’s motion for sanctions 
against First Franklin.   
 
[¶3]  Gardner requests that we award him sanctions, including treble costs 
and attorney fees, for defending this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
[¶4]  We reach the merits of this interlocutory appeal pursuant to the death 
knell exception to the final judgment rule.  See Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 
2009 ME 71, ¶ 14, 974 A.2d 918.  
 
[¶5]  Contrary to First Franklin’s contentions, the motion court did not err 
(1) in finding that Gardner and First Franklin or its agent, which “had authority to 
agree to a proposed settlement [or] loan modification,” agreed in the foreclosure 
mediation to the terms of a loan modification and (2) in finding, implicitly if not 
explicitly, that the parties entered into a binding agreement requiring First Franklin 
to offer the loan modification to Gardner.  See Barr v. Dyke, 2012 ME 108, ¶ 13, 
49 A.3d 1280 (stating the circumstances under which an agreement is legally 
binding); Muther v. Broad Cove Shore Ass’n, 2009 ME 37, ¶¶ 6-7, 968 A.2d 539 
(stating that the existence of a binding contract or settlement agreement is a 
question of fact; discussing binding settlement agreements and the difference 
between a preliminary agreement to agree and a binding agreement). 
 
 
3 
 
[¶6]  Having reviewed the mediated loan modification agreement, we 
determine that it is sufficiently specific and definite to constitute a binding 
commitment for a loan modification to be offered to Gardner.  See Coastal 
Ventures v. Alsham Plaza, LLC, 2010 ME 63, ¶ 26, 1 A.3d 416 (stating that 
whether a contract term is ambiguous is a question of law reviewed de novo and 
that a contract is to be interpreted to effect the intent of the parties as reflected in 
the contract language, construed in light of the “subject matter motive, and purpose 
of making the agreement, and the object to be accomplished”); Sullivan v. Porter, 
2004 ME 134, ¶¶ 14-15, 861 A.2d 625 (holding that terms of an agreement were 
sufficiently definite and did not create unaddressed elements, even though the 
duration and interest rate of the loan were expressed as a finite range).1  
 
[¶7]  Having found that First Franklin did not mediate in good faith, the 
motion court acted within its discretion in granting Gardner’s motion for 
sanctions. 2  See Gauthier v. Gauthier, 2007 ME 136, ¶ 8, 931 A.2d 1087 
(reviewing a court’s decision to sanction a party for an abuse of discretion). 
                                         
1  We assume that the motion court found all facts necessary to support its order in the absence of a 
motion for findings, see Ward v. Ward, 2008 ME 25, ¶ 5, 940 A.2d 1063, and that the record fully 
supports the court’s findings and discretionary choices when no transcript of the motion hearing, or 
M.R. App. P. 5(d) statement in lieu thereof, is provided, see Rothstein v. Maloney, 2002 ME 179, ¶ 11, 
816 A.2d 812. 
 
2  First Franklin clarified at oral argument that it is not arguing that the motion court exceeded its 
discretion in ordering the specific types of sanctions it imposed. 
 
 
 
4 
 
[¶8]  We decline Gardner’s request to impose sanctions on appeal pursuant to 
M.R. App. P. 13(f). 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed.  Gardner’s motion for sanctions  
on appeal denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs and at oral argument: 
 
Leslie E. Lowry, III, Esq., Jensen Baird Gardner & Henry, Portland, for 
appellant First Franklin Financial Corporation 
 
Marshall J. Tinkle, Esq., Hirshon Law Group, P.C., Portland, for appellee 
Jason L. Gardner 
 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number RE-2010-122 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY