Title: In re George J.

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

128 Nev,, Advance Opinion 32
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

    
 
      
     
 
   
  
  
  
   
  
 
 
    
   
   
  
  
   

  

IN THE MATTER OF GEORGE J., A No. 57233,
MINOR.

GEORGE J., FILED
Appellant, JUN 28 2012

vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

 

Appeal from a district court order transferring a juvenile case
for adult criminal proceedings. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family
|Court Division, Clark County; William 0. Voy, Judge.

Affirmed,

Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Susan Deoms Roske, Deputy Public
Defender, Clark County,
{for Appellant.

[Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B.
Wolfson, District Attorney, Mary D. Brown, Chief Deputy District
Attorney, and Nicole J. Cannizzaro, Deputy District Attorney, Clark
County,

or Respondent.

 

BEFORE CHERRY, C.J., PICKERING and HARDESTY, JJ.

OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.

In this appeal, we analyze the relationship between two

statutory provisions, enacted in 2009, that govern the extent of the

12-20304

 
[juvenile court's jurisdiction: NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1) and NRS 62B.335. Both
provisions address a person who has been charged with committing an
loffense when the person was between 16 and 18 years of age that would be
a category A or B felony if committed by an adult. In those circumstances,

NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1) provides that the act is not a “delinquent act” and

 

Jdivests the juvenile court of jurisdiction if the person is identified and
charged between the ages of 20 years, 3 months and 21 years. Pursuant to
NRS 628.335, if a person charged with a delinquent act that would have
been a category A or B felony if committed by an adult is identified before

reaching 21 ye;

 

8 of age but is not apprehended until after reaching 21
years of age, then the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to conduct a
hearing. The purpose of the hearing authorized under NRS 62B.335 is to

determine whether to dismiss the charges or transfer the case to district

 

Jcourt for criminal proceedings. NRS 62B.335(3), (4).

Reading the statutes together, we conclude that NRS 628.335
lonly applies to delinquent acts and therefore does not apply to acts that
fare “deemed not to be a delinquent act” under NRS 62B.330(3). Thus, if
ithe case is excluded from the juvenile court's jurisdiction under NRS
{62B.330(3), then the juvenile court does not obtain jurisdiction by virtue of
INRS 62B.335. Here, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction under NRS
|62B.330(3)e)(1). We nonetheless affirm because the juvenile court
reached the correct result by transferring the case to the district court for
ladult criminal proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In January 2007, when appellant George J. was 17 years of
lage, he allegedly committed the following acts: (1) home invasion, (2)
Jburglary, (3) grand larceny, (4) grand larceny of an automobile, and (5)

jburglary of an automobile. Each of these acts could be a category A or B

 

 
felony if committed by an adult. See generally NRS Chapter 205. In
[February 2010, when George was 20 years, 8 months of age, the State
identified him as the alleged perpetrator through latent fingerprints
retrieved from an exterior window at the scene of the crime, In April
2010, when George was 20 years, 10 months of age, the State filed a
[delinquency petition against him in the juvenile court, In June 2010,
[George turned 21 years of age. In August 2010, George, who was in
[custody on other charges, was apprehended when he was served with the
outstanding arrest warrant for the charges in the petition.

In the proceedings before the juvenile court, the State and
[George disputed the applicability of newly enacted NRS 62B.330(3)(0)(1)
jand NRS 62B.335(1), George argued that while NRS 62B.335 was better
suited to the facts of his case, it did not apply because it was not in effect
lat the time that he allegedly committed the offenses. He further argued
that NRS 62B.335 could not apply retroactively and that retroactive
application of that statute would constitute an ex post facto violation.
Conversely, the State argued that NRS 62B.330 governed this case and

 

thereby divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction. ‘The juvenile court
determined that NRS 62B.335 applied to George’s case. It further
concluded that there was probable cause to believe that George committed
the alleged offenses, and it transferred George's case to the justice court
for criminal proceedings. George appeals.

DISCUSSION

‘This appeal presents a single issue for our review: the

resolution of the apparent contradiction between NRS 62B.330 and NRS

 

 
628.835 governing the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.! On appeal, the
State maintains that NRS 62B.330(3)(¢)(1) governs this case and divests
the juvenile court of jurisdiction over George, thereby leaving jurisdiction
in the district court? Conversely, George argues that if any statute
governs jurisdiction, it is NRS 62B.335. Specifically, he argues that
“{rlead in its entirety, it is quite clear that the [Llegislature intended NRS
[]62B.335 to apply [to] all individuals excluded pursuant to NRS
[J62B.330(8)(e) and apprehended after their 21st birthday.”

“The construction of a statute is a question of law that this
court reviews do novo.” Hardy Companies, Inc. v, SNMARK, LLC, 126
Nev. _, __, 245 P.3d 1149, 1153 (2010) (quoting A.F. Constr, Co, v,
Virgin River Casino, 118 Nev. 699, 703, 56 P.3d 887, 890 (2002)). When
interpreting a statute, this court first examines its plain language to

\Because these statutes were already in offect at the time that the
State initiated the proceedings, we conclude that they apply to George's
case regardless of when George allegedly committed the offenses. See
State v, Barren, 128 Nev.__, _ P.3d_ (Adv. Op. No. _, _
2012). Accordingly, we need not reach the parties’ arguments as to
whether the statutes may apply retroactively or whether retroactive
application would constitute an ex post facto violation, Rather, the only
issue is which statutory provision applies.

 

"George argues that the issue of which statute governs is not
properly raised because the State did not raise the issue in a cross-appeal.
Because the juvenile court transferred the case for adult criminal
proceedings, the State is arguably not an aggrieved party and therefore
could not file a cross-appeal, See Valley Bank of Nevada v, Ginsburg, 110
Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 734 (1994) (NRAP 3A(a) limits the right of
appeal to ‘part[ies] aggrieved! by a district court's decision.” (alteration in
original) (quoting NRAP 3A(@))). However, regardless of whether the
State properly raised the issue, this court can sua sponte consider
Jurisdictional issues. Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. _, __, 251 P.8d 163,
166 (2011); Koller v, State. 122 Nev. 223, 228-29, 130 P.3d 653, 656 (2006).

 

 

 
0

 

determine the Legislature's intent behind the statute, State v. Lucero,
127 Nev. _, _, 249 P.8d 1226, 1228 (2011); Iso Hobbs v. State, 127

Nev. _, __, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). This court “avoid[s} statutory

 

 

interpretation that renders language meaningless or superfluous,” and
“{ilf the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, [this court will]
enforce the statute as written.” Hobbs, 127 Nev. at _, 251 P.3d at 179.
Likewise, this court “will interpret a rule or statute in harmony with
other rules and statutes,” Albios v, Horizon Communities, Inc,, 122 Nev.
409, 418, 132 P.3d 1022, 1028 (2006) (quoting Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon,
109 Nev, 990, 993, 860 P.2d 720, 723 (1993)); see also Leven v, Frey, 123
Nev. 399, 405, 168 P.3d 712, 716 (2007) (‘[T)his court considers the
statute's multiple legislative provisions as a whole ... (and will] not
nt to

 

render any part of a statute meaningless.”). We conclude that pursi
the plain terms of the two statutes in question here, NRS 62B.335 only
applies to offenses that are not excluded from the juvenile court's
jurisdiction by NRS 62B.330(3).

While NRS 62B.330(1) grants a juvenile court exclusive
original jurisdiction over a child “who is alleged or adjudicated to have
committed a delinquent act,” NRS 62B.330(3) limits the definition of
“delinquent act” by listing acts that are not considered to be “delinquent”
and are therefore not within the juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction,
Such nondelinquent acts over which the juvenile court has no jurisdiction,
even when committed by a child, include murder, attempted murder,
sexual assault, and attempted sexual assault. NRS 62B.330(3)(a)-(b).
Significantly, when amended in 2009, NRS 62B.330 further excluded from
the juvenile court's jurisdiction the following nondelinquent acts:

3. For the purposes of this section, each of

the following acts shall be deemed not to be a

 
one ie

 

delinquent act, and the juvenile court does not
have jurisdiction over a person who is charged
with committing such an act:

(©) A category A or B felony and any other
related offense arising out of the same facts as the
category A or B felony, regardless of the nature of
the related offense, if the person was at least 16
years of age but less than 18 years of age when the
offense was committed, and:

(2) The person is not identified by law
enforcement as having committed the offense and
charged before the person is at least 20 years, 3
‘months of age, but less than 21 years of age.

NRS 62B.330(8)(e)(1) (emphasis added). ‘Thus, a person who commits a
category A or B felony and related offenses when the person was between
16 and 18 years of age but who is not identified and charged before 20
years, 3 months of age would be excluded from the juvenile court's
jurisdiction because those acts would not be deemed to be delinquent acts.

‘The juvenile court's jurisdiction over a person charged with
certain delinquent acts that would be a category A or B felony and
occurred when the person was between the ages of 16 and 18 years of age
is also addressed in NRS 628.335. That statute gives the juvenile court
jurisdiction to conduct a hearing to determine whether to dismiss charges
or transfer a case to district court for criminal proceedings where a person
identified by law

has been charged with such offenses and w:

   

enforcement before 1
until after 21 years of age. NRS 62B.335(1)-(4). But the statute applies
only to a delinquent act that also meets the requirements set forth in the
statute as to the nature of the offense and the age of the offender.

iching 21 years of age but was not apprehended

 

Specifically, if

 
 

(a) A person is charged with the commission
of a delinquent act that occurred when the person
was at least 16 years of age but less than 18 years
of age;

(b) The delinquent act would have been a
category A or B felony if committed by an adu

(©) The person is identified by law
enforcement as having committed the delinquent
act before the person reaches 21 years of ago; and

(a) The person is apprehended by law
enforcement after the person reaches 21 years of
age,

 

the juvenile court has jurisdiction over the person,
to conduct a hearing and make the determinations
required by this section in accordance with the
provisions of this section.

NRS 62B.335(1) (emphases added). By its terms, NRS 62B,.335(1) only
applies to delinquent acts. This terminology is consistent with NRS
62B.330, which provides that the juvenile court has jurisdiction over a
child who commits a delinquent act and defines certain acts that are not
delinquent acts and therefore are not within the juvenile court's
jurisdiction. NRS 62B.335 therefore can never apply to acts that NRS
62B.330(3) “deem|s] not to be a delinquent act” because those acts are not
within the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Otherwise, NRS 62B.335 would
circumvent NRS 62B.330(3) and grant a juvenile court jurisdiction to
transfer or dismiss other acts that are deemed not to be delinquent acts
under NRS 62B.330(3), such as murder or sexual assault, provided that
the requirements set forth in NRS 62B.336(1) are met. Reading NRS
628.335 in this way would create an absurd result, which this court seeks
to avoid. Pellegrini v, State, 117 Nev. 860, 874, 34 P.3d 619, 528-29 (2001)
(explaining that this court “construe[s] statutory language to avoid absurd
or unreasonable results, and, if possible, we will avoid any interpretation

1

 
os

 

that renders nugatory part of a statute”). Therefore, reading NRS
62B.330(8) and NRS 62B.335 in “harmony” with each other, Albios, 122
Nev. at 418, 132 P.3d at 1028 (internal quotations omitted), and “not
render{ing] nugatory part of [either] statute,” Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 874,
34 P.8d at 529, we conclude that NRS 628.335 applies only to cases that
are within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under NRS 628.330. Thus, if
the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to NRS 62B.330(3), it doos
not then obtain jurisdiction by virtue of NRS 628.335,

We now consider whether NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1) applies to

George's case. George allegedly committed the delinquent acts when he

 

was 17 years of age, the delinquent acts would have been category A or B
felonies if committed by an adult, and George was identified and charged
when he was between the ages of 20 years, 3 months and 21 years. Under
these circumstances, the charged acts are not delinquent acts and are
therefore not within the juvenile court's jurisdiction. | NRS
62B.330(8)(e)(1). Accordingly, the juvenile court erred when it determined
that NRS 62B.335 granted it jurisdiction in this case. However, because
the juvenile court ultimately reached the correct result by transferring the
case to the district court, we affirm. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298,

sBased on our disposition today, we need not reach whether the
juvenile court correctly analyzed the NRS 628.335 considerations to find
probable cause.

 
468 P.2d 838, 341 (1970) (If a judgment or order of a [lower] court reaches
the right result, although it is based on an incorrect ground, the judgment
or order will be affirmed on appeal.”)

phe heel, J.

Hardesty

We concur:

Chea f Ca.

Pickering