Title: Jewell v. Chrysler Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Jewell v. Chrysler Corp.1999 WY 179994 P.2d 330Case Number: 98-94Decided: 12/28/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
CALVIN W. JEWELL and DIANE E. JEWELL, husband and 
wife,
 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,
   
  Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Big Horn County: The Honorable Hunter Patrick, 
Judge.

Joseph E. Darrah 
of Darrah & Darrah, P.C., Powell, WY., representing 
appellants.

Chris Edwards of 
Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, L.C., Cody, WY., representing 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this "Lemon 
Law" case, the disgruntled car buyers appeal the district court's finding that 
they did not present sufficient evidence to invoke the protections of Wyoming's 
Lemon Law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-17-101 (Lexis 1999). After a review of the 
record, we conclude that the district court's findings are not clearly 
erroneous; and we, therefore, affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      The appellant car 
buyers, Calvin W. Jewell and Diane E. Jewell (Jewells), present three issues for 
our review:

A. As a matter 
of law, does an express concession of a dealer/agent of the manufacturer under 
the W.S. § 40-17-101 (Lemon Law) the vehicle is in fact a `lemon,' per se, 
trigger the remedies provided in W.S. § 40-17-101(c) to the 
consumer?

B. The district 
court erred in not considering and/or not finding from the uncontroverted 
evidence that appellants' vehicle had in fact met the numerical requirement of 
the presumption of the same nonconformity being subject to repair more than 
three times under the circumstances of the case pursuant to W.S. § 
40-17-101(d).

C. The lower 
court erred in finding, and the uncontroverted evidence does not sustain, the 
lower court's express finding the appellants were offered and refused the relief 
the Lemon Law provides.

[¶3]      The appellee, 
Chrysler Corporation, restates:

I. Does a 
statement by the distributor of the vehicle that the vehicle is a lemon 
automatically trigger the remedies provided in Wyoming Statutes section 
40-17-101?

II. Did the 
district court commit reversible error when it determined that appellants' 
vehicle had not met the numerical requirements for repair as required by Wyoming 
Statutes section 40-17-101?

III. Did the 
district court commit reversible error when it determined that the appellants 
were offered and had refused the relief the Lemon Law 
provides?

FACTS

[¶4]      On November 27, 
1995, the Jewells purchased a 1995 Chrysler Cirrus automobile from Justin Ford 
& Chrysler in Powell, an authorized dealer of appellee Chrysler Corporation. 
At the time of purchase, the vehicle's odometer read 4,205 miles. Although the 
vehicle had been previously owned, it remained subject to a 3-year/36,000 mile 
manufacturer's warranty.

[¶5]      The Jewells took 
immediate possession of the vehicle and drove it from Powell to their home in 
Lovell. When they arrived in Lovell, the Jewells discovered that the interior 
lights of the Cirrus were not working. They contacted Justin Ford & Chrysler 
to report the problem and were told to bring the vehicle in and it would be 
fixed. The Jewells brought the vehicle in for service the next day, having 
driven the car a total of 69 miles.

[¶6]      During the time 
the car was in the shop (November 28 - January 8), Justin Ford & Chrysler 
had some difficulty finding the parts needed to fix the Cirrus' problems. Three 
repair orders were written, and those repair orders list a number of different 
repairs. The first two repair orders are dated November 28, 1995, and the third 
is dated December 1, 1995.

[¶7]      On December 30, 
1995, while the Cirrus was still in for service, Mr. Jewell met with Justin Ford 
& Chrysler's sales manager and the salesman who sold the vehicle. Jewell 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the Cirrus. Three options were discussed: (1) 
the Jewells could keep the Cirrus; (2) the Jewells could trade the Cirrus for a 
like Cirrus; or (3) the Jewells could trade the Cirrus for a different type of 
car. Mr. Jewell suggested a fourth option: leave the Cirrus there and take his 
money back. The sales people told Jewell they needed approval from the general 
manager before committing to anything. At trial, Mr. Jewell admitted that, at 
that point in time, he decided he did not want the car, whether it was working 
or not.

[¶8]      On January 8, 
1996, Mr. Jewell met with Justin Todd, the general manager of Justin Ford & 
Chrysler. Mr. Jewell asserted that he believed the vehicle was a lemon. Todd 
responded that he did not disagree. However, Todd also told Mr. Jewell he would 
have to take possession of the vehicle because it was repaired. Mr. Jewell 
refused and walked out without driving the vehicle to determine if it was in 
working order. At the time of trial, December 30, 1997, the Cirrus was still on 
the lot at Justin Ford & Chrysler.

[¶9]      On January 30, 
1996, the Jewells wrote to Chrysler providing notice they intended to pursue a 
Lemon Law action.1 After unsuccessful negotiations, 
Jewells filed this suit on June 10, 1996, relying solely on Wyoming's Lemon Law. 
After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in Chrysler's 
favor.

[¶10]   Specifically, the district court 
ruled that the Jewells had not satisfied either of the presumptions contained in 
the Lemon Law. First, the district court found that the vehicle was out of 
service due to repair for a cumulative total of 26 business days, four short of 
the presumptive number. Although the vehicle was in the shop from November 28, 
1995, to January 8, 1996 (the day the Jewells refused to accept return of the 
vehicle), after subtracting holidays, weekends when Justin Ford & Chrysler's 
service department was not open, and two days in which the Jewells' daughter 
used the vehicle, the district court concluded that the vehicle had been out of 
service due to repair for 26 business days. Pertinent to this appeal, the 
district court also found "there is absolutely no evidence that the subject 
vehicle was subject to repair more than three times." The Jewells timely 
appeal.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶11]   The factual findings of a judge are 
subject to a broader scope of review than a jury verdict, and the appellate 
court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. 
Springer v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wyo. 
1997); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993). The 
district court's findings are presumptively correct and will not be set aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed. Id. We review a district court's conclusions of law de novo. 
Id.

DISCUSSION

[¶12]   Although the Cirrus was previously 
owned, it was transferred to the Jewells while under an express warranty. The 
Jewells therefore qualify as "consumers" who may seek the protections of 
Wyoming's Lemon Law. Britton v. Bill Anselmi Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc., 786 P.2d 855, 862-65 (Wyo. 1990). That law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-17-101 (Lexis 1999), 
provides in relevant part:

§ 40-17-101. 
Definitions; express warranties; duty to make warranty 
repairs.

(c) If the 
manufacturer, its agents or authorized dealers are unable to conform the motor 
vehicle to any applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting any defect 
or condition which substantially impairs the use and fair market value of the 
motor vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable number of attempts, the 
manufacturer shall:

(i) Replace the 
motor vehicle with a new or comparable motor vehicle of the same type and 
similarly equipped; or

(ii) Accept 
return of the motor vehicle and refund to the consumer and any lienholder as 
their interest may appear the full purchase price including all collateral 
charges less a reasonable allowance for consumer's use.

(d) It is 
presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been undertaken to conform a 
motor vehicle to express warranty if within one (1) year following the original 
delivery of the motor vehicle to the consumer, whichever is 
later:

(i) The same 
nonconformity has been subject to repair more than three (3) times by the 
manufacturer, its agents or its authorized dealers and the same nonconformity 
continues to exist; or

(ii) The vehicle 
is out of service due to repair for a cumulative total of thirty (30) business 
days.

Repair 
Attempts

[¶13]   At trial, the Jewells attempted to 
establish both presumptions contained in § 40-17-101(d). First, they tried to 
establish that the vehicle had been out of service due to repair for a 
cumulative total of thirty business days. In the alternative, they tried to 
establish the same nonconformity of the vehicle was subject to repair more than 
three times. On appeal, the Jewells do not challenge the district court's 
finding that the car was out of service due to repair for 26 business days. 
Instead, they argue the district court erred in finding "there is absolutely no 
evidence that the subject vehicle was subject to repair more than three 
times."

[¶14]   Relying on three repair orders 
admitted as exhibits, the Jewells argue that the same nonconformity was subject 
to repair on more than three occasions. However, the repair orders do not 
support this contention. At best, the repair orders establish that an item 
called the body control module was repaired on three occasions. The Lemon Law 
requires that the same nonconformity be subject to repair "more than three 
times" to establish the presumption found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-17-101(d) (i) 
(emphasis supplied). The Jewells failed to establish any repairs other than 
those detailed in the repair orders. Despite this, the Jewells argue that all 
the repairs were of the electrical system, and each item listed on each repair 
order should count as a repair attempt. Like the district court, we decline to 
accept such a strained interpretation of the repair orders or the phrase 
"subject to repair." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-17-101(d) (i). Thus, the district 
court's finding that there is "no evidence that the subject vehicle was subject 
to repair more than three times" is supported by the record and is not clearly 
erroneous.2

[¶15]   We also note in passing that to 
rely on the presumption specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-17-101(d) (i), the 
Jewells were required to establish that the same nonconformity was subject to 
repair more than three times and the "same nonconformity continues to exist." 
Although the district court did not make specific findings on this issue, our 
review of the record satisfies us that the Jewells did not establish any 
nonconformity continued to exist. In fact, the evidence points to the contrary. 
On January 8, the general manager of Justin Ford & Chrysler told Mr. Jewell 
he would have to take possession of the Cirrus because it was repaired. Nothing 
in the record indicates that Mr. Jewell investigated whether the vehicle was in 
working order at that time. Indeed, Mr. Jewell admitted that he walked out 
without ever driving the vehicle to determine if it was repaired. Further, the 
general manager testified that he checked the vehicle prior to trial and "found 
it was fine, nothing wrong with it."

"Lemon" 
Statement

[¶16]   The Jewells argue the general 
manager of Justin Ford & Chrysler admitted the Cirrus was a lemon, thus 
entitling them to the remedies contained in the Lemon Law. To place their 
argument in context, we quote directly from the testimony detailing the January 
8, 1996, meeting between Mr. Jewell and the general 
manager:

Q. [Jewells' 
counsel] What was said?

A. [by Mr. 
Jewell] That we were unhappy with the car; that we wanted out of it; that we 
were not willing to accept it. We felt like it was a 
lemon.

Q. Now this is 
very important. What did Mr. Todd say when you said that?

A. The best of 
my recollection is a direct quote saying, I don't disagree with 
you.

Q. He didn't 
disagree with you that it was a lemon?

A. That is what 
he said.

Relying on this 
testimony, the Jewells claim that Chrysler essentially conceded its 
case.

[¶17]   The Jewells' argument, however, 
misinterprets the significance of the claimed admission.

When the term 
admission is used without any qualifying adjective, the customary meaning is an 
evidentiary admission, that is, words in oral or written form or conduct of a 
party or a representative offered in evidence against the party. Evidentiary 
admissions are to be distinguished from judicial admissions. Judicial admissions 
are not evidence at all. Rather, they are formal concessions in the pleadings in 
the case or stipulations by a party or counsel that have the effect of 
withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of 
the fact. Thus, a judicial admission, unless allowed by the court to be 
withdrawn, is conclusive in the case, whereas an evidentiary admission is not 
conclusive but is subject to contradiction or explanation.

2 McCormick on 
Evidence § 254, at 137-38 (5th ed. 1999) (footnote omitted). In this case, the 
admission by the general manager is simply an evidentiary admission, which is 
not conclusive of the case but is subject to explanation or contradiction. In 
fact, Todd's actions on January 8 contradict his statement to Jewell that he did 
not disagree the Cirrus was a lemon: Todd told Mr. Jewell he would have to take 
the car because it was repaired. Such a statement is contrary to Chrysler's 
obligation to replace or accept return of the vehicle if it was indeed a lemon. 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-17-101(c). Perhaps more importantly, the district court 
found the Jewells had not met the requirements contained in the Lemon Law, and 
we have concluded these findings are not clearly erroneous. Under these 
circumstances, we cannot agree with the Jewells that they were entitled to the 
remedies of the Lemon Law as a result of the general manager's statement that he 
did not disagree that the Cirrus was a lemon.

Chrysler's Offer 
of Relief under the Lemon Law

[¶18]   Having determined that the district 
court did not err in finding that the Jewells were not entitled to relief under 
the Lemon Law, we need not address the issue of whether Chrysler offered the 
relief contained in that statute.

CONCLUSION

[¶19]   While the Jewells' displeasure with 
the Cirrus is understandable, the district court appropriately found they had 
not established the car was a lemon. The decision of the district court is 
affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Wyoming's 
Lemon Law, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-17-101 provides:

(h) 
In no event shall the presumption herein provided in subsection (d) of this 
section apply against a manufacturer unless the manufacturer has received prior 
direct written notification from or on behalf of the consumer and has had a 
reasonable opportunity to cure the alleged defect.

2 Chrysler 
argues the Cirrus was subject to only one repair because it was in the shop on 
only one occasion and the repair attempt was one continuous process. However, we 
need not address this issue, especially when Chrysler admitted, in discovery, 
two experiences of nonconformity.