Title: RALPH DOUGLAS PATRICK V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RALPH DOUGLAS PATRICK V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 32108 P.3d 838Case Number: 04-69Decided: 03/24/2005
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                            

 
 
RALPH 
DOUGLAS PATRICK,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ralph 
Douglas Patrick, pro se

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and SKAVDAHL, 
D.J.

 
 
GOLDEN, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 
  

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Ralph Patrick 
(Patrick) appeals the district court's denial of his motion to amend his 
W.R.Cr.P. 35 motion for reduction of sentence.  Patrick's motion for sentence reduction 
was filed approximately one year before his motion to amend.  The district court denied the motion to 
amend finding that it was without jurisdiction to revise the sentence in 
Patrick's case.  We reverse and 
remand.  

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Patrick's pro 
se brief presents the following issues:

 
 

I.                     
Did the 
trial court err[] in denying the defendant the right to amend the motion for 
sentence reduction?

 
 

II.                   
Did the 
trial court abandon its duty to the defendant in the failure to rule one way or 
the other, on a properly filed motion for sentence 
reduction?

 
 

III.                  
Did the 
trial court abuse it[s] discretion in its ruling not to allow the defendant to 
amend a properly filed motion for sentence reduction?

 
 
The 
State phrases the issues as:

 
 

I.                     
Does 
this court have jurisdiction to consider whether the district court abused its 
discretion in failing to rule on Appellant's "Motion For Reduction For 
Sentence?"

 
 

II.                   
Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's "Motion to Amend 
Sentence Reduction?"  

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶3]      In 1999, Patrick 
was charged with several property crimes.  
Eventually, Patrick pled guilty to four felonies associated with these 
crimes:  check fraud in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-702, forgery in violation of § 6-3-602, obtaining property 
by false pretenses in violation of § 6-3-407, and theft of identity in violation 
of § 6-3-901.  Thereafter, on 
December 18, 2001, the district court sentenced Patrick to four terms of eight 
to ten years.  The sentences were 
structured so that two of the terms would run concurrently and those terms would 
then run consecutive to the other two concurrent terms.  It appears that no appeal was taken from 
those orders. 

 
 
[¶4]      On December 9, 
2002, Patrick filed a pro se Motion for Reduction of Sentence together 
with documents outlining various programs he had participated in while 
incarcerated and detailing family hardships following his incarceration. In his 
motion, Patrick asked that all of his sentences be reduced to terms of two to 
four years or that all the previously imposed terms be made to run concurrently. 
Patrick did not request a hearing on the matter.  

 
 
[¶5]      On May 12, 2003, 
Patrick moved for appointment of counsel to assist him in presenting evidence 
supporting his motion for sentence reduction.  The district court denied this motion, 
finding that a request for sentence reduction pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35 is not a 
"critical stage" of the proceedings and therefore Patrick was not entitled to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  
On December 8, 2003, Patrick filed a Motion to Amend Sentence Reduction. 
Exhibits illustrating his activities after his December 9, 2002, motion for 
reduction accompanied his motion to amend.  
On January 8, 2004, the district court denied Patrick's motion to amend 
finding, "this court no longer has jurisdiction to amend the sentence in this 
matter" but providing no other explanation for this conclusion.  Patrick appeals this denial.  In effect, the order denying Patrick's 
motion to amend denied Patrick's motion for reduction of sentence; it is thus a 
final appealable order.   

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶6]      A motion for a 
sentence reduction is an issue within the sound discretion of the sentencing 
court.  Sweets v. State, 2001 
WY 126, ¶9, 36 P.3d 1130, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Mead v. State, 2 P.3d 564, 566 (Wyo. 2000)).  
Nevertheless, this Court reviews jurisdictional matters, which present 
questions of law, de novo.  
See Padilla v. State, 2004 WY 66 ¶5, 91 P.3d 920, ¶5 (Wyo. 
2004).  

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶7]      We begin by 
considering this Court's jurisdiction because the State asserts that we are 
without jurisdiction to hear this appeal.  
In making this claim, the State argues that Patrick's motion was deemed 
denied after ninety days, and because Patrick did not appeal within thirty days 
of that denial, we do not have jurisdiction.  Rule 1(a) of the Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provides that when a procedure is not established by the 
rules of criminal procedure, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure shall 
govern.  Rule 6(c)(2) of the Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a "motion not determined within 90 days 
after filing shall be deemed denied."  
The State contends that this rule of civil procedure applies to Rule 35 
motions for reduction of sentence.  
Although this is a tempting argument due to the certainty and efficiency 
application the deemed denied rule would provide, we cannot agree that these 
procedures control.  

 
 

[¶8]      Specifically, the 
rules of criminal procedure do allow the rules of civil procedure to apply but 
only to questions not governed by criminal procedure rules.  Padilla, ¶6-8.  Rule 35 specifies that the court 
shall determine the motion within a reasonable time.  The obligatory language of this rule 
strongly suggests that a district court may not simply decide not to rule on 
such a motion, but instead it is required to make a ruling on the motion.  While a "reasonable time" is not as 
precise as the ninety day deemed denied period, Rule 35 does provide a process 
"established by the rules of criminal procedure."  

 
 
[¶9]      Additionally, the 
purposes of Rule 35 and the broad discretion a district court enjoys over such 
motions would also seem to indicate that the deemed denied rule not apply.  The purpose of Rule 35 "is to give a 
convicted defendant a second round before the sentencing judge (a second bite at 
the apple as it were) and to give the judge the opportunity to reconsider the 
original sentence in light of any further information about the defendant."  Nelson v. State, 733 P.2d 1034, 
1035 (Wyo. 
1987).  The second chance provided 
by this rule is for the defendant to get in front of the sentencing judge to 
give that judge the opportunity to reconsider the sentence on its merits.  The sentencing judge is in the best 
position to reconsider the sentence imposed and decide in its discretion whether 
to grant the motion, not this Court on any resulting appeal from a deemed denied 
motion.  We merely review those 
decisions for an abuse of discretion once the district court has applied its 
discretion and determined the motion on its merits.  Application of the deemed denied rule 
thwarts this process.  We therefore 
determine that the deemed denied rule does not apply, and we have jurisdiction 
to consider this appeal.  

 
 
[¶10]   Motions to reduce a sentence may be 
brought pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35, which provides:

 
 
(a) 
Correction.  The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.  Additionally the court may correct, 
reduce, or modify a sentence within the time and in the manner provided herein 
for the reduction of sentence.  

(b) 
Reduction.  A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may 
reduce a sentence without motion, within one year after the sentence is imposed 
or probation is revoked, or within one year after receipt by the court of a 
mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or 
within one year after entry of any order or judgment of the Wyoming Supreme 
Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of 
conviction or probation revocation.  
The court shall determine the motion within a reasonable time.  Changing a sentence from a sentence of 
incarceration to grant of probation shall constitute a permissible reduction of 
sentence under this subdivision.  
The court may determine the motion with or without a 
hearing.

 
 
While 
the rule does impose a one-year time limitation, a plain reading of the rule 
indicates that the one-year limitation applies to the time in which a party must 
file a motion for reduction or the court must reduce a sentence in the absence 
of such a motion.  Thereafter, once 
a motion is filed within the one-year time limit, the district court has a 
reasonable time to determine the motion.  
Accordingly, simply failing to rule on a validly filed motion within one 
year does not per se deny the district court jurisdiction to rule on the 
motion.  

 
 
[¶11]   Prior versions of Rule 35 did 
present some confusion about whether the motion must simply be filed before the 
conclusion of the time period or whether a court must actually rule on the 
motion within the time limit.  We 
explained this confusion in Arland v. State, 788 P.2d 1125 (Wyo. 1990).1  There we noted that a split had 
developed in the federal circuits regarding the interpretation of the federal 
version of Rule 35.  Several 
circuits had determined that jurisdiction was met by filing the motion within 
the time limit and others determined that a ruling on the motion was required 
within the time limit.  Id. at 1127.  The difference resulted from some of the 
courts giving a literal interpretation to the language of the rule thus 
requiring a decision within the time limit, while others applied a non-literal 
interpretation requiring only a motion within that period.  Id.  To settle the dispute the federal rule 
was amended and the committee notes explained:             

 
 
This 
amendment to Rule 35(b) conforms its language to the nonliteral interpretation 
which most courts have already placed upon the rule, namely, that it suffices 
that the defendant's motion was made within the 120 days and that the court 
determines the motion within a reasonable time thereafter.  United 
States v. DeMier, 671 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir.1982); 
United States v. 
Smith, 650 F.2d 206 (9th Cir.1981); United 
States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.1980); 
United States v. 
Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.1978); 
United 
States v. Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287 
(4th Cir.1975).  Despite these 
decisions, a change in the language is deemed desirable to remove any doubt 
which might arise from dictum in some cases, e.g., United States v. 
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189 [99 S. Ct. 2235, 2242, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805] (1979), 
that Rule 35 only "authorizes District Courts to reduce a sentence within 120 
days" and that this time period "is jurisdictional, and may not be 
extended."  See United States v. 
Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1983), following the  Addonizio 
dictum.

 
 

Arland, 788 P.2d  at 1127 (quoting Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 105 F.R.D. 179, 197 (1985)) (alteration in original).  Wyoming similarly amended its rule to include 
such a clarification.2  Thus, it is clear that it is not 
necessary that the court determine the motion within the one year time limit, 
but instead it suffices if the motion is filed within one year.3  In this instance Patrick filed his 
motion for sentence reduction within the one-year time limitation.  Therefore, Patrick has fulfilled this 
jurisdictional requirement of Rule 35.  

 
 
[¶12]   The State agrees that Patrick's 
motion for reduction of sentence was timely filed.  However, it argues that the period of 
time that has elapsed since Patrick filed his motion for reduction is not a 
reasonable time under Rule 35(b) and therefore the court lost jurisdiction to 
decide the sentence reduction.  
"Reasonableness in this context must be evaluated in light of the 
policies supporting the time limitations and the reasons for the delay in each 
case."  Arland, 788 P.2d  at 
1127 (quoting Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
supra, at 197) (internal quotation marks omitted).   The one-year time limitation 
(previously 120 days) serves two policies: it protects judges from repeated 
requests for sentence reduction and assures that courts will not usurp the 
authority of parole officials.  
Nelson, 733 P.2d  at 1036 (citing United States v. Smith, 
650 F.2d 206, 208 (9th Cir. 1981)).  The time runs "at least for so long as 
the judge reasonably needs time to consider and act upon the motion."  Arland, 788 P.3d  at 1127.   

 
 
[¶13]   Several federal courts considering 
this topic have concluded that extended delays in determining a Rule 35 motion 
will deprive a court of jurisdiction to decide the motion.  See e.g., United States v. 
Idone, 38 F.3d 693, 697-98 (3rd Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Taylor, 768 F.2d 114, 118 (6th Cir. 
1985); United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 
1981).  In reaching these 
conclusions the federal courts often focused primarily on the dispersement of 
power between the judicial and executive branches of governments, i.e., 
whether the court was interfering with a parole function.  Idone, 38 F.3d  at 697.  If a district court takes too long to 
determine a sentence reduction, it is put in the position to second-guess parole 
officials.  Therefore, the federal 
courts found that a "reasonable time" does not give courts license to postpone a 
decision on sentence reduction in order to reevaluate the sentence imposed in 
light of subsequent parole developments.  
Id.  Likewise, it seems that federal courts 
may have interpreted what constituted a "reasonable period" narrowly in part 
because the language in the pre-1985 rule was fairly limiting.  As discussed above, originally the 
"reasonable period" allowed to rule on the motion was found outside the literal 
interpretation of the rule.  This is 
no longer the case with the rule.    

 
 
[¶14]   Additionally, in this instance, 
nothing in the record indicates that the district court was trying to interfere 
with the authority of parole officials.  
If anything, the court's inaction on the motion seems to instead be the 
product of some sort of oversight.  
The Tenth Circuit has questioned whether a district court's inaction 
alone is sufficient to deprive the court of jurisdiction under this rule.  United States v. Hernandez, 975 F.2d 706, 709 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992) ("We are 
reluctant to conclude that a district court by inaction on a timely filed motion 
can deprive itself of jurisdiction.").  
In light of the rule's dictate that the district court "shall" determine 
the motion, absent an indication of improper motive for not ruling on the motion 
or actual interference with parole functions, we are similarly reluctant. 
Indeed, it seems only logical that a defendant should not be penalized by the 
court's failure to act.  Were it 
otherwise, the defendant would be twice penalized: once because the court failed 
to act on his motion, and once again because the court's own inaction bars Rule 
35 relief.  Diggs v. United 
States, 740 F.2d 239, 250 (3rd Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J., 
dissenting).  

 
 
[¶15]   In this instance, the circumstances 
that supposedly divested the court of jurisdiction were beyond Patrick's 
control.  He timely filed his motion 
for reduction, and there is no indication of an improper purpose for the 
delay.  We are thus reluctant to 
allow the district court's own inaction to prevent consideration of the merits 
of his motion.  We therefore 
conclude that the district court has jurisdiction to determine the motion for 
reduction of sentence.  We remand 
for the district court to determine the motion to amend and the motion for 
sentence reduction on the merits.  

 

[¶16]   Lastly, although not formally 
presented as an issue, Patrick briefly argues that he is entitled to appointed 
counsel to assist him with his motion for sentence reduction.  Because we are remanding the issue for 
the district court to determine the merits of Patrick's motion for sentence 
reduction, we will briefly address this issue. "The Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel accrues at the time adversary judicial proceedings are initiated against 
the defendant.  Counsel is required 
not just at trial, but at critical stages' both before and after trial in which 
the substantial rights of the accused may be affected."  Pearl v. State, 996 P.2d 688, 689 
(Wyo. 2000).   Additionally, 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-104(c)(vi) (LexisNexis 2003), a needy person who is 
entitled to be represented is "to be represented by counsel at every stage of 
the proceedings, from the time of the initial appointment by the court until the 
entry of final judgment, at which time the representation shall end, unless the 
court appoints counsel for purposes of appeal, correction or modification of 
sentence."  

 
 
[¶17]   The district court, citing to 
State v. Pierce, 787 P.2d 1189 (Kan. 1990), denied Patrick's motion for 
appointment of counsel finding that it was not a critical stage of the 
proceedings.  We agree with this 
reasoning.  As can be seen by § 
7-6-104, there is no statutory requirement for appointment of counsel at every 
post-trial motion.  Instead, such a 
decision rests within the discretion of the district court.  Likewise, the United States Constitution 
does not require counsel for indigent defendants seeking post-conviction 
relief.  Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1994, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-8, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2769, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989).  
A motion for sentence reduction is by its very definition a motion 
seeking post-conviction relief.   
We cannot therefore conclude that the district court erred in denying 
Patrick's motion for appointment of counsel.  

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶18]   For the reasons stated above we 
reverse and remand.  The district 
court has jurisdiction to determine Patrick's motion for reduction of 
sentence.  It should consider that 
motion on its merits. 

  

  
            
VOIGT, Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶19]   I respectfully dissent.  The appellant was sentenced on December 
18, 2001.  Nearly a year later, on 
December 9, 2002, he filed a motion for sentence reduction, without requesting a 
hearing.  That motion was never 
heard.  One day short of a year 
later, he filed a motion to amend the motion for sentence reduction.  On January 8, 2004, the district court 
determined the matter by deciding that it was without jurisdiction to hear the 
motion, due to the passage of too much time.

 
 

[¶20]   Those facts occurred in this legal 
context:  W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) contains 
two relevant provisions.  First, a 
motion for sentence reduction must be filed within one year after imposition of 
sentence.  That happened.  Second, the district court 
shall determine the motion within a reasonable time. 
 That did not happen.  The Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure 
do not establish a procedure for dealing with this situation, in which case 
W.R.Cr.P. 1(a) dictates that the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure shall 
govern.  W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), 
which directly governs motions and motions practice, states that a motion not 
determined within ninety days of filing is deemed denied.  W.R.A.P. 2.01(a) requires that an appeal 
be filed within thirty days from entry of the appealable order.  See Paxton Resources, L.L.C. v. 
Brannaman, 2004 WY 93, ¶¶ 4-18, 95 P.3d 796, 798-802 (Wyo. 2004), cert. 
denied, 125 S. Ct. 976 (2005) (application of W.R.A.P. 2.01 and 2.02 in 
a deemed-denied situation).

 
 
[¶21]   When the appellant's motion for 
sentence reduction was not heard within a reasonable time, it was deemed denied 
ninety days after it was filed.  The 
appellant had thirty days from that date to appeal, and he did not do so.  This appeal should be dismissed as 
untimely.

 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Before 
amendment effective June of 1987 the rule governing sentence reduction 
read:

 
 
The 
court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction 
of sentence.  The court may reduce a 
sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days after 
receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or 
dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after entry of any order or judgment 
of the Supreme Court having the effect of upholding the judgment of 
conviction.  The court may also 
reduce a sentence upon revocation of a probation as provided by law.  

 
 

Arland, 788 P.2d  at 1126.

2Those 
amendments gave both the federal rule and the Wyoming rule the form of our current version 
of Rule 35 with the exception that the time limit was then 120 days.  However, the present version of 
F.R.Cr.P. 35 differs significantly from our Rule 35 as the federal rule was 
amended again as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.  See F.R.Cr.P. 35.  Additionally, the Wyoming version of this 
rule was amended again in 1988 to increase the time limitation to one 
year.

3Of 
course, as noted above, in cases where the district court decides to reduce a 
sentence in the absence of a motion seeking such action, the reduction must 
actually take place within the one-year time specified.  Arland, at 1127.