Title: Nellis v. Wyoming Dept. of Transp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Nellis v. Wyoming Dept. of Transp.1997 WY 23932 P.2d 741Case Number: 96-115Decided: 02/12/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

James 
S. NELLIS, Appellant (Plaintiff/Petitioner),

v.

WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee 
(Defendant/Respondent).

 

 

Appeal from District Court, 
Teton County, Nancy Guthrie, J.

 

W. Keith Goody, of Goody & Brodie, Jackson, 
for Appellant. 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Lawrence A. Bobbitt, III, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ. 

 

THOMAS, 
Justice. 

[¶1]      James S. Nellis 
(Nellis) challenges the probable cause for a deputy sheriff to arrest him for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI) and the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the ruling of a hearing examiner that a ninety day 
administrative suspension of his driver's license should be upheld. In arguing 
his first contention, Nellis asserts that the evidence did not support the 
determination that the deputy sheriff had probable cause to arrest him for DWUI. 
Nellis argues that in the absence of adequate probable cause the chemical testing procedure articulated in WYO. STAT. 
§ 31-6-102 (1994) was unlawfully invoked. In his second argument, Nellis 
contends that the results of the blood analysis that were obtained were not 
adequate to support a determination of intoxication because of the time 
differential between the arrest and the drawing of the blood sample. Upon 
initial review the district court ruled:

 

1). The hearing examiner's decision was not 
arbitrary, capricious. The decision was in accordance with the law. It did not 
exceed the statutory jurisdiction. There is substantial evidence in the record 
to support the hearing officer's decision.

 

The decision of the district 
court is irrefutable on the record before us, and the decision of the district 
court is affirmed.

 

[¶2]      In the 
Appellant's Brief on Appeal, Nellis identified the issues 
as:

 

I. Was the finding of the hearing examiner that the 
"arresting officer had probable cause to believe licensee had been driving . . . 
in violation of W.S. § 31-5-233(b)" supported by substantial 
evidence?

 

II. Was the finding of the hearing examiner that "the 
chemical test result indicated that licensee had an alcohol concentration of ten 
one-hundredths of one percent (0.10%) or more" supported by substantial 
evidence, or, indeed, any evidence whatsoever?

 

The answering Brief of 
Wyoming Department of Transportation (Department), the appellee, states only one 
issue:

 

Does the record contain substantial evidence to 
establish compliance with the implied consent statute? In particular, does the 
record establish that the officer made a lawful arrest, that the officer had 
probable cause to believe that appellant had been driving under the influence on 
a public street or highway, and that appellant submitted to a chemical test 
which indicated an alcohol concentration of .10% [?]

 

[¶3]      The events that 
culminated in the suspension of Nellis' driver's license occurred on February 
17, 1995. Nellis and his wife, and two other couples who were visiting with the 
Nellises, went out to dinner at Teton Village. The dinner was at a cabin which 
was reached by a sleigh from the tram tower cafeteria. While waiting at the 
cafeteria for the sleigh, Nellis made some drinks for the party. After about a 
quarter hour on the sleigh the couples arrived at the cabin and had dinner. Wine 
was served with dinner, and Nellis had maybe one and a half glasses of wine. 
Then the party went back to the tram tower cafeteria and from there began their 
return journey to Jackson.

 

[¶4]      The weather had 
worsened, and a wet heavy snow was falling, accompanied by wind. It was snowing 
heavily, and the road was covered with snow. The members of the Nellis party 
were unanimous in their view that Nellis had no difficulty driving, and they 
were certain that he was not impaired by alcohol as they were traveling from 
Teton Village back to Jackson.

 

[¶5]      When Nellis 
reached the junction of state highway 390, on which he was driving, with state 
highway 22, he pulled out to the left, around a line of traffic that was stopped 
in the correct lane, and drove in the oncoming traffic lane. He stopped at the 
traffic light, waited for it to change, and then turned left towards Jackson. 
This entire maneuver was observed by a deputy sheriff, who followed the Nellis 
vehicle for some distance before he pulled it over. The deputy sheriff spoke 
with Nellis, and observed that his eyes were reddened and glassy. He could smell 
alcohol on Nellis' breath, and Nellis admitted to having consumed three drinks. 
Apparently, Nellis also reported that he had taken some Tylenol 
3.

 

[¶6]      The deputy 
sheriff requested Nellis to perform some field sobriety tests. Nellis was unable 
to perform the walk and turn test and the one leg stand test. He could not count 
properly, and he failed the horizontal nystagmus test. Furthermore, a 
preliminary breath test indicated a blood-alcohol content of 0.084%. The deputy 
sheriff then arrested Nellis, and read the implied consent advisement form to 
him.1 Nellis submitted to a blood test 
which reported a blood-alcohol content of 0.10%.

 

[¶7]      Nellis was not 
prosecuted for driving while under the influence of alcohol, but he was informed 
of an administrative suspension of his driver's license for ninety days. Nellis 
took the matter to a contested case hearing, and the ninety day suspension was 
upheld by the hearing examiner. Nellis sought judicial review, and the district 
court affirmed the decision of the hearing examiner. This appeal is from the 
Order entered in the district court, which affirmed the order of the hearing 
examiner.

 

[¶8]      Rule 12.09, of 
the WYO. R. APP. P. provides that judicial review of an action by an 
administrative agency must be consistent with WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1990), 
which provides:

 

The reviewing court shall:

 

* 
* * * * *

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

 

* * * or

 

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 

[¶9]      When a case 
initiated in an administrative agency comes before this court on appeal we do 
not give any special deference to the decision of the district court. Instead, 
we review the case as if it came to us directly from the agency. Wyoming Steel 
& Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994). The deference normally 
accorded the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to an administrative 
agency, and the agency's determination of the facts will not be overturned 
unless clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on record. 
Robles, 882 P.2d  at 875. On review, we examine the entire record to determine 
whether substantial evidence is present to support the findings of fact by the 
hearing examiner. Romero v. Davy McKee Corp., 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993). 
"Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept 
in support of the conclusions of an agency."  Stuckey v. State, ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wyo. 1995). There must be more 
than a mere scintilla of evidence or a simple suspicion for the fact to be 
established. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Wyoming, 662 P.2d 878, 882 (Wyo. 1983). The fact that 
there are contradictions in the evidence regarding certain matters does not 
result in an unsupportable finding by the hearing examiner. He is tasked with 
resolving factual disputes. State, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. 
v. Harris, 931 P.2d 255 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶10]   Nellis' primary argument in this 
appeal is that the deputy sheriff did not have probable cause to arrest him for 
DWUI. He contends that, in the absence of probable cause, the arrest was 
improper and evidence obtained pursuant to the unlawful arrest, such as his 
blood-alcohol test, is not available. In Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 115 (Wyo. 1992), we recognized that "peace officers have a general duty to 
apprehend, arrest, and remove drunk drivers from Wyoming's roadways." Even so, 
we reminded litigants that:

 

[I]t is first important to note that the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4. A warrantless 
arrest is an unreasonable seizure when not supported by probable cause. Probable 
cause for a warrantless arrest exists when, under the totality of the 
circumstances, a prudent, reasonable, and cautious peace officer would be led to 
believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the individual 
arrested is the perpetrator. Jandro v. State, 781 P.2d 512, 517-18 (Wyo. 1989); 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-2-103 (June 1987).

 

Keehn, 834 P.2d  at 116.

 

[¶11]   Clarification of the right to 
arrest is found in our statutes. It is specified in WYO. STAT. § 7-2-102 (Supp. 
1994) that a peace officer may arrest for a misdemeanor, without a warrant, 
when:

 

(i) Any criminal offense is being committed in the 
officer's presence by person to be arrested;

 

* 
* * or

 

(iii) The officer has probable cause to believe that 
a misdemeanor has been committed, that the person to be arrested has committed 
it and that the person, unless immediately arrested:

 

(A) Will not be apprehended;

 

(B) May cause injury to himself or others or damage 
to property; or

 

(C) 
May destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the 
misdemeanor.

 

[¶12]   With respect to the offense of 
DWUI, the peace officer must have probable cause to believe that the accused has 
actual physical control of a motorized vehicle when legally intoxicated. WYO. 
STAT. § 31-5-233 (1994). The statutory definition of legal intoxication is a 
blood-alcohol content equal to or greater than 0.10%, or being otherwise 
incapable of driving safely while under the influence of an intoxicant. WYO. 
STAT. § 31-5-233(b). The statute also provides that if the blood-alcohol 
concentration is 0.05% or less the individual is presumed not to be under the 
influence of alcohol. WYO. STAT. § 31-5-233(c)(i). If the blood-alcohol 
concentration is more than 0.05% and less than 0.10% "that fact shall not give 
rise to any presumption that the person was or was not under the influence of 
alcohol, but it may be considered with other competent evidence in determining 
whether the person was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders 
him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle." WYO. STAT. § 
31-5-233(c)(ii).

 

[¶13]   The circumstances reflected in this 
record disclose more than a scintilla of evidence that the deputy sheriff 
observed Nellis breaking a traffic law by moving into the oncoming lane while 
turning left at the traffic signal, thus causing a potentially dangerous road 
situation.  There is substantial 
evidence that Nellis failed the field sobriety test that he was asked to 
perform. The record demonstrates Nellis' eyes were glassy; he smelled of 
alcohol; and he admitted to drinking alcohol that evening. The preliminary 
breath test administered to Nellis was 
between 0.05% and 0.10%, which indicated that he might have been driving under 
the influence of alcohol. In light of these circumstances, the deputy sheriff 
had ample probable cause to arrest Nellis for DWUI in violation of WYO. STAT. § 
31-5-233.  See Vrooman v. State, 642 P.2d 782 (1982).

 

[¶14]   Following the arrest, Nellis was 
informed of the requirement for chemical testing and the consequences for 
refusal to submit to testing, according to the implied consent advisement 
required by the statute. He submitted to the administration of a blood test, the 
result of which demonstrated a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.10%. With that 
test result, the statute requires the Department of Transportation to "suspend 
the person's Wyoming driver's license * * * for ninety (90) days." WYO. STAT. § 
31-6-102(e). The driver's license suspension was imposed in accordance with 
law.

 

[¶15]   As a second argument, Nellis 
insists that because the blood test was accomplished thirty-six minutes after he 
was stopped, the statute cannot be invoked. This argument borders on being 
specious. The statute providing for implied consent sets forth the exclusive 
means and the mandatory procedure to determine the blood-alcohol level when a 
suspect is arrested, and the law enforcement officer has probable cause to 
suspect the individual of DWUI. State v. Chastain, 594 P.2d 458 (Wyo. 1979), 
overruled on other grounds by Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1985); Van 
Order v. State, 600 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1979). We have never suggested that a test 
was inadmissable because it was given thirty-six minutes after the suspect was 
stopped (The record indicates that the actual period of time was thirty-three 
minutes as Nellis was pulled over at 10:22 p.m. and the blood for the test was 
furnished at 10:55 p.m.). The exact timing is not material because our Wyoming 
cases readily establish the impropriety of Nellis' claim.

 

[¶16]   In Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 
704 (Wyo. 1992), the results of the test administered one to one and one-half 
hours after a collision were used as evidence of intoxication to achieve a 
conviction. That case also upheld a post-death drug test as evidence. In 
Whitfield v. State, 781 P.2d 913, 914 (Wyo. 1989), a blood test taken 
approximately one hour after the accident was used to achieve a conviction of 
aggravated vehicular homicide. In yet another aggravated vehicular homicide 
case, decided in 1989, a conviction was affirmed in an instance in which the 
blood sample was taken some 40 minutes after the accident and produced a result 
of 0.13 to 0.14% alcohol in the blood. McLaughlin v. State, 780 P.2d 964 (Wyo. 
1989).

 

[¶17]   In arguing this aspect of his case, 
Nellis does not cite any authority or furnish any statutory references to 
sustain his argument. As he states in his brief, the Wyoming implied consent 
statute was intended to create a more objective means of identifying a violation 
of the DWUI statute by establishing a precise standard to be demonstrated by the 
result of a chemical analysis. Carried to its logical extreme, Nellis' argument 
would result in the implied consent statute losing all meaning because one never 
could accomplish the chemical test at the precise moment the individual was 
driving. Establishing DWUI would revert to a purely subjective analysis and 
opinion on the part of peace officers. The implied consent law, however, creates 
an objective standard for establishing DWUI by presumption of intoxication from 
the presence of a certain percentage of alcohol in the blood. It follows that if 
the driver had not consumed more alcohol subsequent to the arrest, the test 
would establish intoxication while driving. The statute does provide that the 
test shall be "[g]iven as promptly as possible after the arrest." Wyo. Stat. § 
31-6-102(a)(i)(B). Nothing in this record indicates that the test of Nellis was 
not accomplished according to the statute.

 

[¶18]   In a secondary argument, Nellis 
relies upon the breath test given prior to his arrest, which did not reach the 
statutory level of intoxication. He reasons that the subsequent blood test was 
not relevant, and it should not have been admitted. The breath test was not 
given pursuant to the statute. The implied consent law is triggered when the 
subject is arrested and has been advised of his rights under the statute. Wyo. 
Stat. 31-6-102. It is the preliminary breath test that is not relevant to the 
revocation procedure conducted pursuant to the implied consent law because it 
was obtained prior to the arrest and the advisement required by the 
statute.

 

[¶19]   We hold that substantial evidence 
in this record justifies the finding of fact by the hearing examiner that 
probable cause existed to arrest Nellis for DWUI. Furthermore, the blood-alcohol 
test, properly administered pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 31-6-102, established the 
statutory basis for the imposition of the license suspension. Nellis' license 
was properly suspended in accordance with the law.

 

[¶20]   The Order of the trial court 
affirming the order of the hearing examiner is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The required advisement is set forth 
in WYO. STAT. § 31-6-102(a)(ii)(1994):

 

(ii) For 
tests required under this act, the arrested person shall be advised 
that:

 

(A) His 
failure to submit to all required chemical tests requested by the peace officer 
shall result in the suspension of his Wyoming driver's license or his privilege 
to operate a motor vehicle for a period of six (6) months for a first offense or 
eighteen (18) months for a second or subsequent offense as provided by W.S. 
31-6-107;

 

(B) If a 
test is taken and the results indicate the person is under the influence of 
alcohol, he may be subject to criminal penalties and his Wyoming driver's 
license or his privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for 
ninety (90) days;

 

(C) He 
may go to the nearest hospital or clinic and secure any or all required tests at 
his own expense or any remaining required tests shall be administered by a 
person at a place and in a manner prescribed by and at the expense of the agency 
employing the peace officer;

 

(D) If 
he refuses to take all required tests, he shall not be eligible for limited 
driving privileges.