Title: THOMAS LEROY SANDERS V. SHIRLEY K. SANDERS and DANIEL K. SANDERS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

THOMAS LEROY SANDERS V. SHIRLEY K. SANDERS and DANIEL K. SANDERS2010 WY 77234 P.3d 343Case Number: S-09-0238Decided: 06/15/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
THOMAS 
LEROY SANDERS,Appellant(Defendant),v.SHIRLEY K. 
SANDERS and DANIEL K. 
SANDERS,Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Don 
W. Riske and James R. Salisbury of Riske, Salisbury & Kelly, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Salisbury.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

John 
J. Maier of John Maier Law Offices, Torrington, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Thomas Leroy 
Sanders (Leroy) was named as a joint tenant with right of survivorship on two 
Goshen County deeds.  The other 
joint tenants, Shirley K. Sanders (Shirley) and Daniel K. Sanders (Daniel), 
brought a reformation action to have Leroy removed from the deeds.  The district court reformed the deeds, 
and Leroy appealed.    We conclude that the requirements 
for reformation were not met in this case and reverse.    

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Although the 
parties articulate several issues on appeal, the dispositive issue 
is:

 
 
            
Are the District Court's Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order providing for reformation of the deeds 
by removing Leroy as a joint tenant with right of survivorship supported by sufficient evidence and in 
accordance with Wyoming law? 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Shirley operates 
a farming and ranching enterprise in Goshen County and is the father of Leroy 
and Daniel.  In 1995, Shirley's 
mother, Yola Sanders (Yola), decided to sell property referred to by the parties 
as Parcel 1 to Shirley.  The 
purchase agreement drafted by Yola's attorney, Jerry Smith, stated that Yola 
would sell the property to Shirley under an installment contract which would 
require him to execute a promissory note and a mortgage on the property to 
secure the debt.      

 
 
[¶4]      On May 9, 1995, 
Yola and Shirley went to Mr. Smith's office to execute the documents.  Shirley told Mr. Smith that he wanted 
Leroy's name added to the deed with a right of survivorship.  He wanted to do this for two reasons  
1) he was estranged from his wife and did not want her to be able to make a 
claim to the property; and 2) as part of his estate planning, he wanted the 
property to pass to Leroy by operation of law without going through 
probate.  Although the attorney 
advised him against it, Shirley insisted on putting Leroy's name on the deed. 
 Consequently, the deed was revised 
to include Leroy as a joint tenant with right of survivorship.  Leroy signed the mortgage which secured 
the debt to Yola, but Shirley remained solely liable on the promissory 
note.  

 
 
[¶5]      In 1998, property 
referred to by the parties as Parcel 2 and owned by the Janet E. McIlquham 
Revocable Trust became available for purchase.  Members of the Sanders family had leased 
the property for many years and Shirley's father had wanted to purchase it.  To that end, he had placed funds in 
certificates of deposit to finance the eventual purchase of the property.  After Shirley's father died, Yola had 
title to the certificates of deposit, and she gifted the funds to Shirley, 
Daniel, Leroy and Leroy's wife1 to be used to purchase the 
property.  Shirley, Leroy and Daniel 
were named on the deed to Parcel 2 as joint tenants with right of survivorship. 
   

 
 
[¶6]      Shirley and Leroy 
farmed together until a dispute arose between them.  In June 2002, Leroy brought suit 
(hereinafter referred to as the First Case) against Shirley and Daniel asserting 
that he had the right to a present possessory interest in Parcels 1 and 2.  During the course of that litigation, 
Shirley requested that the deeds be reformed to establish that Leroy did not 
have a present possessory interest in the properties, but only a survivorship 
interest.  Shortly before the matter 
was to go to trial, Leroy moved to dismiss the action.  The First Case was dismissed on November 
1, 2004, with the district court making the following rulings: 

 
 

1.    
[Leroy's] 
Motion to Dismiss is granted, and all of [Leroy's] causes of action are 
dismissed, with prejudice; specifically including but not limited 
to:

 
 
            A.  All of  [Leroy's] claims and causes of action 
alleging any present ownership interest in or rights to possession, use or 
control of [Parcels 1 and 2] and any right or claim to partition of said real 
property.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 

2.    
[Shirley 
and Daniel] have voluntarily dismissed their claims, counterclaims and defenses 
against [Leroy] and that such dismissal shall be without prejudice and that 
[Shirley and Daniel], or either of them, may, in the future, assert any of their 
claims, counterclaims and defenses against [Leroy] . . . .

  

[¶7]      After dismissal 
of the First Case, Leroy continued to assert that he had the right to a present 
possessory interest in the properties.  
He accessed the properties and told others, including hunters, that they 
could use them.  On June 15, 2007, 
Shirley and Daniel filed a complaint against Leroy.  Among other remedies, they sought 
reformation of the deeds to Parcels 1 and 2 by removing Leroy as a joint 
tenant.  Leroy moved for summary 
judgment claiming the deeds clearly set forth his interest in the properties. 
 Shirley and Daniel responded with a 
motion to strike Leroy's summary judgment motion on the grounds that his claims 
were barred by res judicata or judicial estoppel because of the dismissal with 
prejudice of his claims in the First Case.            

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court denied Leroy's motion for summary judgment, ruling that its order in the 
First Case dismissing Leroy's claims with prejudice was binding in the current 
action and res judicata prohibited Leroy from claiming any present interest in 
Parcels 1 and 2.  The court also 
stated, however, that Leroy was entitled to assert a future interest, such as a 
remainder interest, in the properties.    

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court conducted a bench trial on December 1, 2008, and after the trial, the 
district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, ordering 
reformation of the deeds to Parcels 1 and 2 by removing Leroy as a grantee 
without any mention of a future interest.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   In reviewing the determination of a 
district court after a bench trial, we apply the following standard:

 
 
            
After a bench trial, we review the trial court's factual findings under a 
clearly erroneous standard and its legal conclusions de novo.  Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 
165, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 215, 218 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Rennard v. Vollmar, 977 P.2d 1277, 1279 
(Wyo. 1999)).  We do not substitute 
ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts;  instead, we defer to the trial court's 
findings unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of 
law.  Deroche v. R.L. Manning Co., 737 P.2d 332, 336 (Wyo. 1987).  Although the 
factual findings of a trial court are not entitled to the limited review 
afforded a jury verdict, the findings are presumptively correct.  Piroschak v. Whelan, 2005 WY 26, ¶ 7, 
106 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
            
This Court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the 
record, but we do not reweigh the evidence.  Forshee, et ux. v. Delaney, et ux., 2005 
WY 103, ¶ 6, 118 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo. 2005).  Due regard is given to the opportunity 
of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses.  We accept the prevailing party's 
evidence as true and give to that evidence every favorable inference which may 
fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.  
Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, 
¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. 
Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 389 (Wyo. 2003)).  Findings may not be set aside because we 
would have reached a different result.  
Harber, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d  at 60 
(citing Double Eagle Petroleum & 
Mining Corp. v. Questar Exploration & Production Co., 2003 WY 139, ¶ 6, 
78 P.3d 679, 681 (Wyo. 2003)).  A 
finding will only be set aside if, although there is evidence to support it, 
this Court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.  
Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty 
Trust, 2006 WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 
. 
. . . 

 
 
We 
review questions of law de novo.  Y-O Investments, Inc. v. Emken, 2006 WY 
112, ¶ 8, 142 P.3d 1127, 1130 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 

Snelling 
v. Roman, 
2007 WY 49, ¶¶ 7-9, 154 P.3d 341, 345 (Wyo. 2007).  See also,  Ultra Resources, Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 
WY 36, ¶ 97, 226 P.3d 889, 922-23 (Wyo. 2010). 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   The district court's order after 
the bench trial included the following pertinent findings of 
fact:

 
 

3.    
For 
many years prior to June 28, 2002, Shirley farmed and ranched with his son, 
Leroy.  Prior to May 9, 1995, 
Shirley and Leroy entered into an oral agreement whereby Shirley would, from 
time to time, include Leroy as a joint owner on certain of Shirley's property, 
as part of Shirley's estate planning and in order to prevent Shirley's wife from 
possibly claiming interests in the property.  Leroy agreed that he would not have or 
exercise any rights to such property during Shirley's life and that Shirley 
would retain all rights to such property during his life; including, but not 
limited to,  the right to sell, 
transfer or otherwise alienate any or all of such property.  Shirley and Leroy further agreed that, 
upon Shirley's death, if any such property had not been sold, transferred or 
otherwise alienated, Leroy would then receive an ownership interest in such 
property in accordance with the title, deed or other evidence of title relating 
to such property. 

 
 

4.    
In 
reliance on his agreement with Leroy, Shirley included Leroy's name on titles 
and bills of sale to various vehicles, equipment and other personal property 
prior to May 9, 1995, for which Leroy provided no consideration. 

 
 

5.    
On 
May 9, 1995, Shirley entered into an agreement with his mother, Yola Sanders, 
for his installment purchase of the real property described above as Parcel 1. . 
. . In reliance on his agreement with Leroy, Shirley had Yola Sander's attorney 
include Leroy on the deed to Parcel 1 . . . as a joint tenant with right of 
survivorship along with Shirley.  Shirley was solely liable for the debt to 
Yola Sanders for the purchase price and Leroy has never provided any 
consideration for, or paid any of the taxes or operating expenses of Parcel 
1.

 
 

6.    
On 
June 3, 1998, Shirley purchased the real property described above as Parcel 2 
from the trustee of the Janet E. McIlquham Revocable Trust.  A portion of the consideration for the 
purchase of Parcel 2 had come from transfers made from Yola Sanders to Shirley, 
Leroy, and Daniel for the express purpose of allowing Shirley to purchase Parcel 
2.  In reliance on his agreement 
with Leroy, and upon his identical agreement with Daniel, Shirley had Leroy and 
Daniel included on the deed to Parcel 2 as . . . joint tenant[s] with right of 
survivorship along with Shirley.  

 
 

7.    
On 
June 28, 2002, Leroy sued his father, Shirley, and his brother, Daniel, [in the 
First Case], alleging that he had a present possessory interest in the real 
property described in Parcel 1 and Parcel 2.  Shirley and Daniel testified at trial 
that Leroy violated his agreement with Shirley by making these 
claims.

 
 
. 
. . .

 

10.    After the dismissal of [the 
First Case], pursuant to the terms of his agreement with Shirley and at 
Shirley's request, Leroy signed titles to allow Shirley to transfer ownership of 
several vehicles to other people.  

 
 
. 
. . . 

 
 
13.    Leroy presented no testimony 
or evidence at trial to contest the existence or terms of his oral agreement 
with Shirley.

 
 
The 
district court made the following relevant conclusions of 
law:

 
 
            
4.         
[Shirley and Daniel] proved by uncontested, clear and convincing evidence 
that prior to May 9, 1995, Shirley and Leroy entered into an oral agreement 
whereby Shirley would, from time to time, include Leroy as a joint owner on 
certain of Shirley's property, as part of Shirley's estate planning in order to 
prevent Shirley's wife from possibly claiming interests in the property.  The agreement specified that Leroy would 
not have or exercise any rights to such property during Shirley's life and that 
Shirley would retain all rights to such property during his life, including but 
not limited to, the right to sell, transfer or otherwise alienate any or all of 
such property.  Shirley and Leroy 
further agreed that, upon Shirley's death, if any such property had not been 
sold, transferred or otherwise alienated, Leroy would then receive an ownership 
interest in such property in accordance with the title, deed or other evidence 
of title relating to such property.  

 
 
            
5.         
Shirley fully performed his side of his oral agreement with 
Leroy.

 
 
            
6.         
Leroy breached his oral agreement with Shirley by asserting rights in 
Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 by filing suit against Shirley and Daniel in [the First 
Case].

 
 
            
7.         
The parties mutually believed the deeds properly addressed their 
agreement, but the deeds did not.  
The agreement did not provide for Leroy to have any legal interest in the 
property, but to have a potential testamentary interest.  

 
 
            
8.         [The order 
dismissing the First Case] was a final order and a complete adjudication that 
Leroy had no present possessory interest in Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 
thereafter.

            

9.         
Leroy is barred from asserting any present possessory interest in Parcel 
1 and Parcel 2 by virtue of the dismissal in [the First Case].  

            

10.       Leroy's 
continued entries onto Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, and his directions to third 
parties to enter Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 after the [district court entered the 
order dismissing the First Case] were violations of said Order . . . 
.

            

11.       [Shirley 
and Daniel] are entitled to reformation of the deeds to Parcels 1 and Parcel 2 
to remove Leroy as a joint owner as equitable relief to conform to the intention 
of Shirley and Leroy when they made the oral agreement.  The parties' agreement did not provide 
for Leroy to have any ownership interest in the real estate.  

 
 
[¶12]   Reformation is an equitable remedy 
arising from the tenet that "equity treats that as done which ought to have 
been done.'"  Hutchins v. Payless Auto Sales, Inc., 
2002 WY 8, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d 1057, 1063 (Wyo. 2002), quoting 66 Am.Jur.2d Reformation of Instruments § 2 at 528 
(1973).  The remedy is appropriate 
when a written instrument does not accurately memorialize the parties' 
agreement.  In order to reform an 
instrument, the court must conclude there is clear and convincing evidence 
of:

 
 

(1)          
a 
meeting of the minds-a mutual understanding between the parties-prior to the 
time a writing is entered into, (2) a written contract, or agreement, or deed 
(3) which does not conform to the understanding, by reason of mutual mistake. 
Toland v. Key Bank of Wyoming, 847 P.2d 549, 554 (Wyo. 1993); Gasaway 
v. Reiter, 736 P.2d 749, 751 (Wyo. 1987); Crompton v. Bruce, 669 P.2d 930, 934 (Wyo. 1983). 

 
 

Id.  Clear 
and convincing evidence is "proof which would persuade a trier of fact that the 
truth of the contention is highly probable." MacGuire v. Harriscope 
Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830, 839 (Wyo. 1980).  See also, Story v. State Bd. of 
Medical Examiners, 721 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Wyo. 1986); In re: Matter of GP v. Natrona County Dep't of 
Public Assistance and Social Servs., 679 P.2d 976, 982 (Wyo. 
1984).

 
 
[¶13]   In order to establish a reformation 
claim, the proponent must demonstrate that a mutual mistake was made by the 
parties in the drafting of the instrument.  
The requirements for showing a mutual mistake are: a prior agreement that 
the written instrument undertook to evidence; a mistake occurred in the drafting 
of the instrument; and an absence of fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of 
a party.  Mathis v. Wendling, 962 P.2d 160, 164 
(Wyo. 1998).  

 
 
[¶14]   Leroy argues, first, that 
reformation was improper because there was no evidence of the grantors' intent, 
and, consequently, there was no showing of mutual mistake between the grantor 
and grantee as required by the reformation doctrine.  He is correct that most reformation 
cases involve a showing of the grantor's and grantee's respective intents with 
regard to the instrument.  See, e.g., Toland v. Key Bank of 
Wyoming, 847 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1993); 
Gasaway v. Reiter, 736 P.2d 749 (Wyo. 1987).  However, there is authority that allows 
reformation when the dispute is solely between co-grantees.  "In a proper case, relief may be had as 
between parties claiming under the same instrument, the interests of the grantor 
not being at stake."  66 Am.Jur.2d 
Reformation of Instruments, § 43 
(2009).  We need not decide whether 
the absence of evidence regarding the grantors' intent is fatal to the claim 
here because we find this is not a proper case for reformation for other 
reasons.  

 
 
[¶15]   The district court ruled Shirley 
and Leroy had an antecedent agreement that, although Leroy would be included on 
the deeds as a joint tenant, he would have no present rights in the properties 
and Shirley could do as he wished with them during his lifetime.  Based upon this finding, the district 
court reformed the deed by completely removing Leroy as a grantee.  However, there is no evidence indicating 
either that the parties mistakenly included Leroy on the deed and thus he should 
be removed as a grantee, or that the parties intended that the restriction on 
Leroy's present use of the property be included in the deed language.  With regard to Parcel 1, Shirley 
directed Yola's attorney, Mr. Smith, to name Leroy as a joint tenant with a 
right of survivorship.  He testified 
that he wanted Leroy's name on the property in order to try to prevent his wife 
from making a claim to the property and for estate planning purposes.  Mr. Smith advised Shirley that, by 
making Leroy a joint tenant, he was running the risk that Leroy would assert a 
present claim to the property.  

 
 
[¶16]   Shirley even recounted a story the 
attorney told him about another case involving a mother who had included her son 
as a joint tenant on a property and the son was "taking the property from 
her."  Shirley rejected the 
attorney's advice to not place Leroy on the deed on the basis that he and Leroy 
had a good relationship and he trusted Leroy.  He stated:  "Well, I don't believe Leroy would do 
that."  The attorney confirmed that 
he had advised Shirley against putting Leroy's name on the deed, but Shirley had 
persisted.  The attorney testified 
that there was no error in the drafting of the agreement.    

 
 
[¶17]   In W.N. McMurry, ¶ 19, 160 P.3d  at 77-78, 
we explained that in order for the remedy of reformation to be available, the 
evidence must establish that a mistake occurred in the drafting of the 
instrument, rather than in the reaching of the antecedent agreement.   We even reinforced the fact that 
the mistake must occur in the drafting phase by quoting a more modern definition 
of reformation:

 
 
 
 

Black's 
Law Dictionary 
1307 (8th ed. 2004), citing Douglas Laycock, Modern American 
Remedies 39 (3d ed. 2002), has modernized the definition of reformation to 
explain that "[i]f the parties made a mistake about the premises of their 
agreement, about some fact in the world outside their word-processing machines, 
reformation is not a solution."

 
 

Id., 
¶ 
19 n.7, 160 P.3d  at 78 n.7.  

 
 
[¶18]   Shirley's own testimony confirms 
there was no drafting or "word processing" error:

 
 
Q.        [Y]ou 
indicated to Mr. Smith that you wanted the grantees as Shirley K. Sanders and 
Thomas Leroy Sanders as joint tenants with right of survivorship, 
correct?

 
 
A.        After 
the discussion, yes.

 
 
Q.        And 
that deed . . . reflects exactly what you told Jerry Smith that you wanted, 
correct?

 
 
A.        Says 
Leroy's name is on this.

 
 
Q.        
Doesn't it say . . . that Yola is conveying and warranting to Shirley . . 
. and . . . Leroy . . . as joint tenants with right of 
survivorship?

 
 
A.        
Right.

 
 
Q.        
That's exactly what you told him you wanted.

 
 
A.        
Yes.

 
 
Q.        There 
is no mistake in the way that that is stated on that deed, is 
there?

 
 
A.        
No.

 
 
[¶19]   The transaction regarding Parcel 2 
occurred three years later, in 1998.  
Shirley testified that he directed the title company to include Leroy and 
Daniel on the deed and he intended that they would be joint tenants with right 
of survivorship.  There is no 
evidence that the parties intended that a restriction on Leroy's rights to the 
property in accordance with the oral agreement would be included in the 
deed.  Shirley confirmed at the 
trial that there was no mistake in the way the deed was drafted.2    

 
 
[¶20]   As we stated in Mathis, 962 P.2d  at 164, a mutual 
mistake is shown only if the instrument is intended to evidence a prior 
agreement and does not do so.  The 
record clearly shows that the parties intended for Leroy to be included on the 
deeds as a joint tenant with right of survivorship.  The evidence does not demonstrate that 
Shirley intended for the other aspects of his agreement with Leroy, i.e., that 
Shirley would have exclusive right of possession, be included in the deeds.  Thus, the evidence in this case does not 
clearly establish a mutual mistake was made when the deeds were drafted to 
include Leroy as a joint tenant, and the elements necessary to support a claim 
for reformation are not present.

 
 
[¶21]   There is one Wyoming case that 
ostensibly supports reformation of the deed even though the elements of the 
equitable doctrine are not present  Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 
1976).  In Allen, the son and his wife wanted to 
purchase a property, the Haptonstall Place, but it was not large enough to 
qualify for a Farmers Home Administration loan.  In order to help facilitate the 
purchase, the son and his father agreed that the Haptonstall Place and property 
the father already owned, the River Place, would be conveyed to all three as 
joint tenants with right of survivorship.  
Id. at 1140.  The parties verbally agreed that, when 
the loan was satisfied, the River Place would be returned to the father as his 
sole property and the Haptonstall Place would be the property of the son and his 
wife.  The son apparently did not 
honor the agreement to reconvey the River Place to his father and the father 
brought suit.  The trial court 
ordered the River Place deed reformed to be the father's sole property.  Without discussing the elements of 
reformation, this Court ruled that the trial court had properly allowed 
reformation to conform to the intention of the parties.  Id. at 1144.  One of the dissenting justices indicated 
that reformation was not the proper doctrine to be used under the 
circumstances.   Id. at 1144-46, McClintock, J., 
dissenting.   

 
 
[¶22]   Allen certainly is not consistent with 
our other reformation cases.  There 
was no indication that the deeds making the parties joint tenants of each of the 
properties were the product of mistake.  
Instead, the case seems to require specific performance of the oral 
agreement to reconvey the property when the loan was satisfied.  In fact, the Court stated that "[t]he 
modified decree should also provide for reconveyance."  Because there is no discussion of the 
elements of reformation in the Allen 
majority opinion, we are convinced that the case simply used the reformation 
terminology as a type of short hand to accomplish what was unquestionably the 
correct result  require the son and his wife to reconvey the River Property to 
the father in accordance with the parties' original agreement.      

 
 

[¶23]   As in Allen, the evidence here supports the 
existence of a separate oral agreement, giving Shirley the right of sole 
possession during his lifetime.  A 
joint tenancy typically allows each joint tenant full possession of the property 
at all times; however, the intent of the parties is paramount.  48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 8 (2009); Choman v. Epperley, 592 P.2d 714, 715-16 
(Wyo. 1979).  "[J]oint tenants may contract with 
each other concerning exclusive possession or control of the jointly held 
property, or with respect to the income to be derived therefrom, without 
severing or terminating the joint tenancy." 
 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 20 (2009).  Although we have not located a Wyoming 
case directly on point, there are many cases from other jurisdictions stating 
that joint tenants may agree that one of them has the exclusive right of 
possession or income from the jointly owned property.  See, e.g., Downing v. Downing, 606 A.2d 208 (Md. 
Ct. App. 1992) (mother and son were joint tenants of a farm but entered into an 
agreement that mother would receive all rental payments from the property); Nichols v. Nichols, 168 N.W.2d 876 (Wis. 
1969) and Cole v. Cole, 294 P.2d 494 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (husband and wife owned property as joint tenants but 
agreed as part of their divorce proceedings that one party would have exclusive 
possession of the property); Miller v. 
Riegler, 419 S.W.2d 599 (Ark. 1967) (parties owning stocks in joint tenancy 
properly agreed that one of the joint tenants would retain all dividends from 
stocks).

 
 
[¶24]   Moreover, the district court ruled 
that its dismissal of Leroy's claims with prejudice in the First Case is binding 
here.  That order dismissed with 
prejudice "[a]ll of  [Leroy's] 
claims and causes of action alleging any present ownership interest in or rights 
to possession, use or control of [Parcels 1 and 2] and any right or claim to 
partition of said real property."  
Leroy does not contest the district court's legal ruling that the order 
in the First Case is preclusive and, consequently, he is prohibited from 
asserting any present interest in the property and such order can be enforced by 
proper means if he violates it.  

 
 
[¶25]   The district court found the 
following terms of the oral agreement between Leroy and 
Shirley:

 
 
Shirley 
and Leroy entered into an oral agreement whereby Shirley would, from time to 
time, include Leroy as a joint owner on certain of Shirley's property, as part 
of Shirley's estate planning and in order to prevent Shirley's wife from 
possibly claiming interests in the property.  Leroy agreed that he would not have or 
exercise any rights to such property during Shirley's life and that Shirley 
would retain all rights to such property during his life; including, but not 
limited to,  the right to sell, 
transfer or otherwise alienate any or all of such property.  Shirley and Leroy further agreed that, 
upon Shirley's death, if any such property had not been sold, transferred or 
otherwise alienated, Leroy would then receive an ownership interest in such 
property in accordance with the title, deed or other evidence of title relating 
to such property. 

 
 
Leroy 
does not challenge the district court's findings as to the terms of the oral 
agreement between his father and him, and we conclude the findings were not 
clearly erroneous.  In fact, the 
record contains evidence that, when Shirley wanted to transfer other jointly 
held property such as vehicles, Leroy signed the transfer documents.  If, in the future, Leroy fails to comply 
with the terms of the agreement, Shirley may bring a proper action to enforce 
it.  However, this is not a proper 
case for reformation because the evidence does not establish that the parties 
made a mistake in drafting the deeds. 

 
 
[¶26]   Reversed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Although Leroy's wife was initially involved in this dispute, she is no 
longer a party.  

 
 

2Part of the consideration for the purchase of Parcel 2 came through gifts 
from Yola to Leroy and his wife.  
Although Leroy mentions that he provided valuable consideration for the 
purchase of Parcel 2, he does so in the context of arguing that there was no 
mistake in the deed language.  He 
does not argue that, by providing consideration for the purchase, he had a 
separate, quantifiable interest in the property.