Title: Carlson v. Myers

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: June 18, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

GARY M. CARLSON,

	Petitioner,

	v.

HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General of the
State of Oregon,

	Respondent,

	and

ROBERT D. DAVIS, ELLI WORK
and MATT DeVORE,

	Intervenors.

(SC S44806 (Initiative No. 58))
(SC S44808 (Initiative No. 59))
(SC S44818 (Initiative No. 60))
(SC S44830 (Initiative No. 64))
(SC S44909 (Initiative No. 67))
(Cases consolidated for argument and opinion)

	On petitions to review ballot titles.

	Argued and submitted March 4, 1998.

	James E. Mountain, Jr., of Harrang Long Gary Rudnick PC,
Salem, argued the cause on behalf of petitioner.  With him on the
petitions was Brendan C. Dunn.

	Philip Schradle, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause on behalf of respondent.  With him on the answering
memoranda were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.

	James S. Coon, of Swanson, Thomas & Coon, Portland, argued
the cause and filed memoranda on behalf of intervenors.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Kulongoski, and Leeson, Justices.*

	KULONGOSKI, J.

	Ballot titles certified.  This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).

	Durham, J., concurred and filed an opinion.

	*	Graber, J., resigned March 31, 1998, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.

		KULONGOSKI, J.

		This original proceeding consolidates five separate
ballot title challenges to the Attorney General's certified
ballot titles for proposed initiatives 58, 59, 60, 64, and 67.(1)
Petitioner is an elector who, in a timely manner, submitted
written comments about the Attorney General's draft ballot titles
for each proposed measure.  ORS 250.067(1).  Therefore, he is
entitled to seek modification of the ballot titles in this court. 
ORS 250.085(2).  We review the Attorney General's certified
ballot titles for substantial compliance with the requirements of
ORS 250.035.  ORS 250.085(5).  

		Petitioner challenges the caption, result statements,
and summary of each of the five certified ballot titles, arguing
that the ballot titles are misleading and inaccurate and,
therefore, fail to comply with the requirements of ORS 250.035. 
Petitioner also challenges the ballot titles for proposed
initiatives 59, 60, 64, and 67 on the ground that each of the
titles impermissibly resembles a previously filed ballot title. 
ORS 250.035(6).  Petitioner asserts that, because of the
similarities, this court should not certify ballot titles for
those proposed initiatives.

		For the reasons that follow, we hold that the ballot
title certified by the Attorney General for each of the five
measures substantially complies with the requirements of ORS
250.035.  We reject petitioner's argument that the court should
not certify a ballot title for proposed initiatives 59, 60, 64,
and 67.  We certify the Attorney General's ballot titles for
proposed initiatives 58, 59, 60, 64, and 67.   

Proposed Initiative 58

		Proposed initiative 58, entitled the "Oregon Taxpayer
Fairness Act," would equalize corporate income and excise tax
rates and personal income tax rates.  It also would require that
the percentage amount of excess revenues credited to corporate
income and excise taxpayers be no greater than the percentage
amount of excess revenues refunded to personal income taxpayers. 
Proposed initiative 58 would distribute any increased revenues in
the 1997-99 biennium to school districts for textbooks or capital
improvements.  For the 1999-2001 biennium, it would distribute
one-half of any increased revenues to counties for crime-prevention services and one-half to school districts for learning
enhancements in the classroom.

		Pursuant to ORS 250.067(2), the Attorney General
certified the following ballot title for proposed initiative 58:

	"REQUIRES EQUAL CORPORATE INCOME/EXCISE AND PERSONAL 
	INCOME TAX RATES

		"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote requires state's
corporate income/excise tax rates to equal personal
income tax rates.

		"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains state's
corporate income/excise tax rates separate from
personal income tax rates.

		"SUMMARY: Current law does not link corporate
income/excise tax rates to personal income tax rates. 
Measure requires state's corporate income/excise tax
rates to equal state's personal income tax rates. 
Current law also establishes separate excess revenue
refunds for corporate income/excise taxpayers and
personal income taxpayers when revenues received exceed
certain estimates.  Measure limits corporate
income/excise taxpayers' refund rate to personal income
taxpayers' refund rate for same biennium.  Distributes
certain increased revenues to counties for crime
prevention services and to school districts." 

Proposed Initiative 59

		Proposed initiative 59, entitled the "Oregon Tax
Reduction and Equalization Act," would reduce the maximum
personal income tax rate from 9 percent to 8.85 percent and
equalize corporate income and excise tax rates and personal
income tax rates.  It also would require that the percentage
amount of excess revenues credited to corporate income and excise
taxpayers be no greater than the percentage amount of excess
revenues refunded to personal income taxpayers.  

		Pursuant to ORS 250.067(2), the Attorney General
certified the following ballot title for proposed initiative 59:

	"REDUCES MAXIMUM INCOME TAX RATE;

	EQUALIZES PERSONAL/CORPORATE TAX RATES

		"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote reduces maximum
personal income tax rate and equalizes certain
personal/corporate tax rates.

		"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains current
personal income tax rate and retains separate
personal/corporate tax rates.

		"SUMMARY: Current state law does not link
corporate income/excise tax rates to personal income
tax rates.  Measure reduces state's maximum personal
income tax rate from 9% to 8.85% and requires state's
corporate income/excise tax rates to equal state's
personal income tax rates.  Current law also
establishes separate excess revenue refunds for
corporate income/excise taxpayers and personal income
taxpayers when revenues exceed certain estimates. 
Measure limits corporate income/excise taxpayers'
refund rate to personal income taxpayers' refund rate
for same biennium."

Proposed Initiative 60

 		Proposed initiative 60, entitled the "Fair Taxpayer
Refunds Act," is somewhat simpler.  It would require that the
percentage amount of excess revenues credited to corporate income
and excise taxpayers be no greater than the percentage amount of
excess revenues refunded to personal income taxpayers.  Proposed
initiative 60 would distribute any increased revenues to school
districts for textbooks or capital improvements.

		Pursuant to ORS 250.067(2), the Attorney General
certified the following ballot title for proposed initiative 60:

	"LIMITS CORPORATE TAXPAYERS' EXCESS REVENUE
("SURPLUS KICKER") REFUND RATE

		"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote limits corporate
taxpayers' excess revenue refund rate to personal
income taxpayers' refund rate.

		"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains separate
excess revenue refund rates for corporate taxpayers and
personal income taxpayers.

		"SUMMARY: Current state law establishes separate
excess revenue determinations and separate excess
revenue refund rates for corporate income/excise
taxpayers and personal income taxpayers.  Such "surplus
kicker" refunds are required when revenues received
exceed estimates by two percent.  Measure limits
corporate income/excise taxpayers' refund rate
(provided as a tax credit) to personal income
taxpayers' refund rate during same biennium. 
Limitation first applies to "surplus kicker" refunds in
1999-2001 biennium.  Measure distributes any increased
revenues to school districts for textbooks or capital
improvements."

Proposed Initiative 64

		Proposed initiative 64, entitled the "Fair Tax
Equalization Act," would reduce the maximum personal income tax
rate from 9 percent to 8.85 percent and would equalize corporate
income and excise tax rates and personal income tax rates.  The
measure also would require that the percentage amount of excess
revenues credited to corporate income and excise taxpayers be no
greater than the percentage amount of excess revenues refunded to
personal income taxpayers.  Proposed initiative 64 would
distribute any increased revenues to school districts as follows:
in the 1997-99 biennium, for textbooks or capital improvements;
in the 1999-2001 biennium, for learning enhancement in the
classroom.

		Pursuant to ORS 250.067(2), the Attorney General
certified the following ballot title for proposed initiative 64:

	"REDUCES MAXIMUM INCOME TAX RATE;
	EQUALIZES PERSONAL/CORPORATE TAX RATES

		"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote reduces maximum
personal income tax rate and equalizes certain
corporate/personal tax rates.

		"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains current
personal income tax rates and retains separate
personal/corporate tax rates.

		"SUMMARY: Current state law does not link
corporate income/excise tax rates to personal income
tax rates.  Measure reduces state's maximum personal
income tax rate and requires state's corporate
income/excise tax rates to equal state's personal
income tax rates.  Current law also establishes
separate excess revenue refunds for corporate
income/excise taxpayers and personal income taxpayers
when revenues received exceed certain estimates. 
Measure limits corporate income/excise taxpayers'
refund rate to personal income taxpayers' refund rate
for same biennium.  Distributes any increased revenues
to schools."

Proposed Initiative 67

  		Proposed initiative 67, entitled the "Fair Tax and Tax
Relief Act," would reduce the maximum personal income tax rate
from 9 percent to 8.85 percent and would equalize corporate
income and excise tax rates and personal income tax rates.  The
measure also would require that the percentage amount of excess
revenues credited to corporate income and excise taxpayers be no
greater than the percentage amount of excess revenues refunded to
personal income taxpayers.  Proposed initiative 67 would
distribute any increased revenues as follows: one-half to
counties for crime-prevention activities; one-half to school
districts for learning enhancement in the classroom.

		Pursuant to ORS 250.067(2), the Attorney General
certified the following ballot title for proposed initiative 67:

	"REDUCES MAXIMUM INCOME TAX RATE; 
EQUALIZES 	PERSONAL/CORPORATE TAX RATES

		"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE: 'Yes' vote reduces maximum
personal income tax rate and equalizes certain
corporate/personal tax rates.

		"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE: 'No' vote retains current
personal income tax rates and retains separate
personal/corporate tax rates.

		"SUMMARY: Current state law does not link
corporate income/excise tax rates to personal income
tax rates.  Measure reduces state's maximum personal
income tax rate and requires state's corporate
income/excise tax rates to equal state's personal
income tax rates.  Current law also establishes
separate excess revenue refunds for corporate
income/excise taxpayers and personal income taxpayers
when revenues received exceed certain estimates. 
Measure limits corporate income/excise taxpayers'
refund rate to personal income taxpayers' refund rate
for same biennium.  Distributes increased revenues to
schools/counties."

		As noted, petitioner challenges the caption, result
statements, and summary for each of the five ballot titles
certified by the Attorney General.  Petitioner argues that the
ballot titles are misleading and inaccurate and, therefore, fail
to comply substantially with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)
to (5).  After review, we are not persuaded by those arguments.

		ORS 250.035(2)(a) requires that the ballot title for a
state initiative measure contain a "caption of not more than 10
words that reasonably identifies the subject matter" of the
proposed measure.  The certified ballot titles for proposed
initiatives 58, 59, 60, 64, and 67 each include a caption of not
more than ten words.  Each caption "reasonably identifies" the
subject matter of its respective proposed initiative.  

		ORS 250.035(2)(b) and (c) require that the ballot title
for a state initiative measure contain "simple and understandable
statements of not more than 15 words that describe the result if
the state measure" is approved and the result if the measure is
rejected.  The result statements must be written, if possible, in
such a way that the language of the "yes" and "no" statements is
"parallel."  ORS 250.035(3); Mannix v. Kulongoski, 323 Or 485,
494, 918 P2d 839 (1996).  In addition, the "yes" and "no"
statements must correspond, respectively, to affirmative and
negative voter responses to the proposed measure.  ORS 250.035(4)
and (5).  The certified ballot titles for proposed initiatives
58, 59, 60, 64, and 67 each contain "yes" and "no" result
statements of not more than 15 words, written so that the
language of the "yes" and "no" statements for each measure is
"parallel," and so that the "yes" and "no" statements correspond,
respectively, to affirmative and negative voter responses to each
proposed initiative measure.  

		Finally, ORS 250.035(2)(d) requires that the ballot
title for a state initiative measure include a "concise and
impartial statement of not more than 85 words summarizing the
measure and its major effect."  The certified ballot titles for
proposed initiatives 58, 59, 60, 64, and 67 each contain such a
summary of not more than 85 words, which provide an impartial
statement of the major effect of the corresponding proposed
initiative. 

		Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the
ballot titles certified by the Attorney General for the five
proposed initiatives substantially comply with the requirements
of ORS 250.035(2) to (5).  ORS 250.085.

		Petitioner also contends that, "[b]ecause of the
resemblance between Initiative Nos. 58, 59, 60, 64, and 67, any
formally sufficient ballot titles for the measures necessarily
will resemble the other ballot titles" and that those titles
therefore fail to comply with ORS 250.035(6).  ORS 250.035(6)
provides:

		"To avoid confusion, a ballot title shall not
resemble any title previously filed for a measure to be
submitted at that election."     

Petitioner asserts that ORS 250.035(6) "prohibits outright the
certification of any ballot title that 'resembles' any title
previously filed for a measure" and that, because of that
prohibition, this court should decline to certify ballot titles
for proposed initiatives 59, 60, 64, and 67, and order that the
proposed initiatives not be circulated.

		In order to resolve the issues presented by
petitioner's arguments under ORS 250.035(6), we must interpret
that statute.  The current wording of the statute was adopted by
the legislature in 1995,(2) and its interpretation is a matter of
first impression.

		In interpreting a statute, this court's task is to
discern the intent of the legislature.  PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  The
starting point for interpreting the statute is its text and
context.  Id. at 610-11.  Words of common usage should be given
their "plain, natural and ordinary meaning."  Id. at 611. 
Context includes earlier versions of the same statute.  Krieger
v. Just, 319 Or 328, 336, 876 P2d 754 (1994).  

		The wording of ORS 250.035(6) indicates that any
prohibition, unconditional or otherwise, is relevant only if a
certified ballot title "resembles" any previously filed ballot
title.  ORS 250.035(6).  "Resemble" means "to be like or
similar," so as to suggest another or to give the appearance of
another.  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1930 (unabridged
ed 1993).  Also, by its terms, ORS 250.035(6) prohibits
certification of only a ballot title that resembles a previously
filed ballot title.

    		We reject petitioner's argument with regard to the
certified ballot titles for proposed initiatives 60 and 67,
because those certified ballot titles do not "resemble" each
other, nor do they "resemble" the certified ballot title for
proposed initiative 58.  Because the certified ballot titles for
proposed initiatives 60 and 67 resemble neither each other nor
the certified ballot title for proposed initiative 58, the
standard set by ORS 250.035(6) is not implicated with respect to
those proposed initiatives.

		The ballot titles for proposed initiatives 59, 64, and
67 all closely resemble each other.  Indeed, the three ballot
titles are nearly identical: all three captions are identical,
the "yes" and "no" results statements are identical for each of
the three proposed initiatives, and there are only minor
differences between the summaries.  We conclude that there is a
strong resemblance among the Attorney General's certified ballot
titles for proposed initiatives 59, 64, and 67.  Because of this
resemblance, the court must decide whether, as petitioner
contends, ORS 250.035(6) "prohibits outright the certification of
any ballot title that 'resembles' any title previously filed for
a measure."  This requires us to further interpret ORS
250.035(6).

		The interpretative challenge with respect to ORS
250.035(6) lies in determining the meaning of the phrase "[t]o
avoid confusion."  If the statute were written without that
prefatory phrase, it would be clear that the legislature intended
a complete ban on the certification of a ballot title that
resembled any previously filed ballot title for a measure to be
submitted at the same election.  ORS 250.035(6).  However, in
interpreting a statute, this court should neither insert what has
been omitted by the legislature nor omit what the legislature has
inserted.  Michels v. Hodges, 326 Or 538, 544, ___ P2d ___
(1998); PGE, 317 Or at 611 (citing ORS 174.010).  The phrase
"[t]o avoid confusion" could be interpreted as stating a
legislative object or purpose.  With that interpretation, the
complete statutory text of ORS 250.035(6) would indicate that, in
order to accomplish the legislative objective of avoiding
confusion, the legislature has forbidden unconditionally the
certification of any ballot title that resembles a previously
certified title.

		Alternatively, the phrase "[t]o avoid confusion" could
be read as language of qualification, making conditional the ban
on certification of a ballot title that resembles a previously
filed ballot title.  Under that interpretation, the statute would
prohibit resemblance between or among ballot titles where such
resemblance would cause voter confusion.  The context of ORS
250.035(6) supports the latter interpretation.  Former ORS
250.035(2), the predecessor statute to ORS 250.035(6), expressed
such a conditional prohibition on the certification of a ballot
title that resembled a previously certified ballot title:

		"The ballot title shall not resemble, so far as
probably to create confusion, any title previously
filed for a measure to be submitted at that election." 
(Emphasis added.)

Former ORS 250.035(2) was clearly conditional, and this court
interpreted it accordingly.  In Rooney v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 15,
909 P2d 1143 (1995), this court determined that former ORS
250.035(2) allowed certification of two similar ballot titles if
such certification did not create a risk of voter confusion
(indeed, where proposed initiative measures are very similar or
nearly identical, there may be a great risk of voter confusion
created by the certification of different ballot titles).  322 Or
at 46, 48, 51.

  		In the construction of amendatory acts, such as the one
under consideration here, it is presumed that material changes in
the language of the statute create material changes in meaning. 
At the same time, it is presumed that such changes in meaning do
not go further than is expressly declared or necessarily implied. 
Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington Co., 282 Or 591, 597-98, 581 P2d
50 (1978).  The legislature may have meant ORS 250.035(6) to
materially change the meaning of the words in former ORS
250.035(2); however, because the wording of ORS 250.035(6) is
ambiguous, it is not possible to determine from an examination of
the text and context of the new statute either the nature or the
extent of the intended change, if any.

		When the intent of the legislature is not clear after
an examination of the text and context of a statute, the court
next considers the legislative history of the statute in order to
inform the court's inquiry into legislative intent.  PGE, 317 Or
at 611-12.  Unfortunately, there is no legislative history that
sheds light on the legislature's intent regarding ORS 250.035(6).

		Where no legislative history exists, this court will
resort to general maxims of statutory construction, PGE, 317 Or
at 612, including the maxim that where no legislative history
exists the court will attempt to determine how the legislature
would have intended the statute be applied, had it considered the
issue.  Westwood Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Lane County, 318 Or
146, 158, 864 P2d 350 (1993) (citing PGE, 317 Or at 612), adhered
to as modified 318 Or 327, 866 P2d 463 (1994).  

		Were we to read ORS 250.035(6) as an unconditional ban
on the certification of ballot titles that resemble each other,
as petitioner urges us to do, we would have to conclude that the
legislature intended to force this court to resolve a conflict
between two irreconcilable results.  On the one hand,
certification by this court of the Attorney General's certified
ballot titles for proposed initiatives 59, 64, and 67 would meet
the directive to certify accurate ballot titles for proposed
initiatives, as required by ORS 250.085(5).  On the other hand,
that same act of certification would violate the supposed
unconditional ban on the certification of a ballot title that
resembles any previously filed ballot title for a proposed
initiative to be submitted at the same election.  There is no way
to avoid the dilemma.  Where the texts of two or more proposed
initiative measures are very similar or nearly identical, no
effort to eliminate the prohibited "resemblance" between accurate
ballot titles through the use of synonyms and other linguistic
devices can overcome the problem, because such efforts will
simply produce "resemblance" in a slightly different form.  The
English language is flexible, but not so flexible as to permit
the construction of truly different ballot titles that could at
once both comply with ORS 250.085(5) and still avoid resemblance
to the point that they also complied with ORS 250.085(6).

		The correct analytical route for this court is to avoid
the statutory interpretation that would produce irreconcilable
conflict and, instead, to construe the statute according to the
probable intention of the legislature, had it considered the
issue.  Westwood Homeowners Assn., 318 Or at 158; PGE, 317 Or at
612.  Had the legislature actually addressed this problem, in all
likelihood it would have authorized this court to certify
accurate ballot titles, such as those certified by the Attorney
General for proposed initiative measures 59, 64, and 67, even if
those ballot titles resembled an earlier certified ballot title. 
We thus conclude that interpreting ORS 250.035(6) as a
conditional ban on the certification of a ballot title that
resembles a previously filed ballot title is what the legislature
would have intended.  This interpretation does the least violence
to the interests of the legislature and the voters, in that it
tends to facilitate an honest, clear, and reasonably simple
procedure for certifying an initiative petition ballot title.  

		We hold that ORS 250.035(6) does not prohibit
unconditionally all resemblance between or among ballot titles. 
Rather, the statute conditionally prohibits resemblance between
or among ballot titles only where such resemblance would cause
voter confusion.(3)  In other words, similar or identical ballot
titles are appropriate when their similarities accurately reflect
similarities between or among the measures under consideration. 
As this court held in Rooney, when proposed initiative measures
are themselves very similar or nearly identical, there may be
"too great a risk" of voter confusion created by the
certification of different ballot titles.  322 Or at 46, 48, 51. 
We reject petitioner's argument that the Attorney General's
certified ballot titles for initiatives 59, 64, and 67 should be
invalidated and those measures not circulated.

		We certify the Attorney General's ballot titles for
initiatives 58, 59, 60, 64, and 67.

		Ballot titles certified.  This decision shall become
effective in accordance with ORAP 11.30(10).

	DURHAM, J., concurring.	Carlson v. Myers

	I write separately because I agree with the majority's
decision to certify the Attorney General's ballot titles in these
cases, but I do not agree with all of its analysis of the
interpretive problems posed by ORS 250.035(6).(4)  I join in the
majority's suggestion that "[t]he legislature should revisit ORS 
250.035(6) at its earliest opportunity," 327 Or at ___ n 3 (slip
op at 18 n 3), and offer these additional comments in the hope
that they will assist the legislature in understanding the
complexities of the problem that ORS 250.035(6) creates.

	ORS 250.035(6) provides:  "To avoid confusion, a ballot
title shall not resemble any title previously filed for a measure
to be submitted at that election."(5)  That statute states one of
several requirements that govern the preparation of a ballot
title by the Attorney General pursuant to ORS 250.065, ORS
250.067, and ORS 250.075.  

	Furthermore, in ballot title review proceedings under
ORS 250.085, this court must apply those requirements in two
distinct contexts: (1) in reviewing the Attorney General's ballot
title for "substantial compliance with the requirements of ORS
250.035"; and (2) in certifying a ballot title that substantially
complies with ORS 250.035 to the Secretary of State.  ORS
250.085(5).  

	The judicial review procedure in ORS 250.085 carries
two clear consequences.  First, if this court determines on
review that the Attorney General's ballot title does not comply
substantially with any of the requirements stated in ORS 250.035,
including the requirement in subsection (6) that a ballot title
shall not "resemble" another ballot title, the court is required
to refuse to certify the Attorney General's ballot title.  I
refer to this process as the court's "review" function.  Second,
if this court declines to certify the Attorney General's ballot
title, ORS 250.085(5) requires the court to draft and certify a
ballot title that does comply substantially with ORS 250.035.  I
refer to this process as the court's "drafting" function.

	Petitioner argues that the Attorney General's ballot
titles for initiatives 59, 64, and 67 "resemble" the ballot title
approved for initiative 58, in violation of ORS 250.035(6), and
urges the court, in carrying out its review function, to refuse
to certify the Attorney General's ballot titles for those
initiative measures because of that alleged defect.  The Attorney
General concedes that the ballot titles for initiatives 59, 64,
and 67 do resemble the ballot title for initiative 58.  It would
be impossible to argue otherwise, because those ballot titles are
virtual duplicates of each other.  However, the Attorney General
argues that the statute forbids certification of similar ballot
titles if, but only if, the resulting duplication of ballot
titles would cause voter confusion.  Citing this court's
reasoning in Rooney v. Kulongoski (Elections Division #13), 322
Or 15, 902 P2d 1143 (1995), the Attorney General claims that the
certification of similar ballot titles here will reduce, not
increase, the risk of voter confusion.  Those competing arguments
require the court to interpret ORS 250.035(6).

	The majority concludes that the statutory text is
ambiguous because the introductory phrase, "[t]o avoid
confusion," can be read plausibly either as a statement of
purpose that does not qualify the balance of the sentence or as a
statement of a condition that must be shown to exist before the
balance of the sentence becomes operative.  I do not agree that
the text is ambiguous.  A straightforward reading of the text
indicates that the introductory phrase, "[t]o avoid confusion,"
describes the purpose that the legislature had in mind in
drafting the statute.  That phrase in no sense qualifies the
operation of the prohibition on the certification of ballot
titles that resemble each other that is expressed in the balance
of the sentence.

	We cannot discern a statute's meaning by examining its
text alone.  The majority correctly acknowledges that we must
examine the statutory text in its context, which includes prior
versions of the same statute.  PGE v. Bureau of Labor and
Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993); Kreiger v.
Just, 319 Or 328, 336, 876 P2d 754 (1994).  The majority attempts
to examine the prior version of ORS 250.035(6) but, as the
following discussion indicates, its examination is erroneous.

	ORS 250.035(6) was enacted in 1995.  Or Laws 1995, ch
534, § 1.  The statute in effect at the time of the amendment,
ORS 250.035(2) (1993), stated:

	"The ballot title shall not resemble, so far as
probably to create confusion, any title previously 
filed for a measure to be submitted at that election."

The former statute expressed a qualified prohibition.  It forbade
the certification of a ballot title that resembled another ballot
title already on file if the later ballot title probably would
cause confusion.  It required the Attorney General, and this
court on review, to determine the probability for confusion
resulting from the use of similar ballot titles, and prohibited
the use of similar ballot titles only if doing so probably would
create confusion.  Rooney, 322 Or at 43-44.

	The 1995 amendment enacted a new and substantively
different policy choice.  The majority commits an analytical
error in refusing to acknowledge that different choice and in
labeling the 1995 amendment as "ambiguous."  The 1995 amendment
unconditionally prohibits the certification of a ballot title
that resembles another filed ballot title.  When the legislature
makes a substantive alteration in a statute, this court assumes
that the legislature intends to effect a change in the existing
statutory policy.  See Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404,
414-15 n 6, 939 P2d 608 (1997) (noting principle);(6) Fifth Avenue
Corp. v. Washington Co., 282 Or 591, 597, 581 P2d 50 (1978) (in
the construction of amendatory acts, the court assumes that
"material changes in the language create material changes in
meaning").  The majority refers to that legal principle, but
refuses, without explanation, to follow it.(7)   

	The majority also does not explain what is confusing
about the legislature's introduction of the 1995 amendment with a
phrase that indicates the legislature's purpose, "[t]o avoid
confusion."  The words that follow that phrase express a clear
rule prohibiting "resemblance" between ballot titles.  Nothing in
the text of the introductory phrase or its placement within the
statute casts a doubt on the meaning of that statutory
prohibition.  Under the majority's approach, the legislature now
must be concerned that combining a clear statutory requirement
with a clear statement of legislative purpose will render the
resulting statute "ambiguous."  In my view, that approach imposes
an unnecessary constraint on the legislative drafting process.

	The majority concludes that its comparison of ORS
250.035(6) with its statutory predecessor does not clarify the
supposed ambiguity that arises from the phrase "[t]o avoid
confusion" in the current statute.  As a consequence, the
majority proceeds to examine legislative history.  Finding no
assistance there, the majority moves to a consideration of
"maxims" of statutory construction.  At that stage, the court
purports to speculate about how the legislature might have dealt
with the instant problem, had it addressed the question.  For the
following reasons, that analysis is flawed. 

	A statute's context also includes other related
statutes.  PGE, 317 Or at 611.  However, the majority fails to
consider another aspect of the statutory context of ORS
250.035(6), i.e., other statutes that relate to the same
subject.(8)  It is legal error for the majority to fail to consider
all the relevant statutes in deciding whether they can be read
together with ORS 250.035(6) in order to create a workable,
harmonious construction.  In Davis v. Wasco IED, 286 Or 261, 266-67, 593 P2d 1152 (1979), in quoting C. Dallas Sands, 2A
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.05, 56 (4th ed 1973), this
court said:

		"A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts
or sections and is animated by one general purpose and
intent.  Consequently, each part or section should be
construed in connection with every other part or
section so as to produce a harmonious whole.  Thus it
is not proper to confine interpretation to the one
section to be construed."

	When it considers statutes in context, the court is
obligated to "utilize[] rules of construction that bear directly
on the interpretation of the statutory provision in context." 
PGE, 317 at 611.  As noted in PGE, we derive those rules of
construction from both statutes and case law.  Ibid.

	ORS 174.010 provides that "where there are several
provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to
be adopted as will give effect to all."  (Emphasis added.)  Case
law also supplies several rules of construction of statutes in
context that are relevant here.  In Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or 339,
347, 148 P2d 922 (1944), this court said:

		"If the language is plain and unambiguous, if it
can be given but one meaning, and that meaning does not
lead to an impossibility or an absurdity such as the
legislature could not be supposed to have intended, the
court must give effect to that meaning if
constitutional, even though the result may be, in the
court's opinion, harsh, unjust or mistaken in policy[.]

		"When, however, a literal application of the
language produces an absurd or unreasonable result, it
is the duty of the court to construe the act, if
possible, so that it is a reasonable and workable law
and not inconsistent with the general policy of the
legislature[.]"  (Citations omitted, emphasis
supplied.)

This court has relied repeatedly on that statement in Fox to
reject proposed statutory constructions that, although supported
by a literal reading of statutory text, produced unworkable
results in actual application.  See Johnson v. Star Machinery
Co., 270 Or 694, 704-09, 530 P2d 53 (1974) (court construed
statute of repose governing "negligent injury" to apply as well
to a strict product liability claim); State v. Irving, 268 Or
204, 206-07, 520 P2d 354 (1974) (court rejected a literal
interpretation of a criminal procedural statute because it
produced a "patently unreasonable result"); Beck v. Aichele, 258
Or 245, 249, 482 P2d 184 (1971) (court rejected a proposed
statutory construction that would create a monopoly because,
"[i]n light of our everyday knowledge and common sense, this
interpretation is absurd").

	Another relevant rule of construction of statutes in
context appears in Wright v. Blue Mt. Hospital Dist., 214 Or 141,
147, 328 P2d 314 (1958):

	"[It is a] well-established rule of statutory
construction that when one construction will make a
statute void for conflict with the constitution, and
another will render it valid, the latter will be
adopted though the former at first view is otherwise
the more natural interpretation of the language."

	I turn next to the relevant contextual statutes.  ORS
250.065(3) and ORS 250.067(2) require the Attorney General to
prepare and certify a ballot title.  ORS 250.035(2) states some
of the requirements for a ballot title.  The "caption" must
reasonably identify a measure's subject matter within 10 words. 
ORS 250.035(2)(a).  The "yes" and "no" vote result statements
must convey a "simple and understandable statement of not more
than 15 words that describes the result if the state measure" is
approved or rejected.  ORS 250.035(2)(b) and (c).  The Attorney
General must draft the result statements "so that, to the extent
practical, the language of the two statements is parallel," ORS
250.035(3), and so that an affirmative or negative response to
the statements corresponds to an affirmative or negative vote,
respectively, on the state measure.  ORS 250.035(4) and (5).  The
prohibition on "resemblance" between ballot titles in ORS
250.035(6) concludes the list.

	The Attorney General contends that, on occasion, the
limitations of the English language will prevent compliance with
all those statutory requirements.  I agree.  As this case
illustrates, the English language furnishes insufficient
vocabulary, grammar, and other means of expression to: (1)
construct ballot titles for the closely related initiatives 59,
64, and 67 that comply with ORS 250.035(2) to (5); and, at the
same time, (2) eliminate all resemblance between those ballot
titles and the ballot title already certified for initiative 58. 
Compliance with all those statutory requirements in a case such
as this is, in a word, impossible.

	In determining the legislature's intention in enacting
statutes governing the certification of ballot titles, we must
bear in mind one irreducible minimum requirement:  the drafting
process must take place within the context of the English
language.  The legislature did not intend to require the Attorney
General, in carrying out his ballot title drafting function, to
comply literally with ORS 250.035(6) if it is not possible to do
so because of the limitations of the English language.  Neither
did the legislature intend to compel this court, in carrying out
its review and drafting functions, to carry out such an
impossible task.  Such a construction of the statute would
produce an impractical, unintended result.  

	Moreover, a literal application of ORS 250.035(6) would
mire the court even deeper in the work of the Legislative or
Executive Branches.  See Rooney, 322 Or at 55 (Unis, J.,
dissenting) (expressing the view that the requirement in ORS
250.085(5), that the court must draft and certify a ballot title
that complies with statutory standards, violates the principle of
separation of powers embodied in Article III, section 1, of the
Oregon Constitution).(9)  When the court construes statutes in
context and selects between alternative constructions of an
uncertain text, it is compelled to choose the interpretation that
avoids serious constitutional difficulty.  Tharalson v. State
Dept. of Rev., 281 Or 9, 13, 573 P2d 298 (1978).  That duty
requires the court to reject an interpretation of ORS 250.035(6)
that would create or exacerbate a separation of powers problem. 

	The real question here is what to do about the conflict
between the requirements in ORS 250.035(2) to (5) and the
impossibility of literal compliance, at least in some cases, with
the rule against "resemblance" stated in ORS 250.035(6).  The
answer is complicated by the fact that subsection (6) was adopted
after the other requirements listed in ORS 250.035(2) to (5). 
The majority does not consider the effect of that fact. 
Ordinarily, if the legislature enacts a statutory requirement
that conflicts with another earlier-enacted statutory
requirement, and the conflict is irreconcilable, the earlier
statute must yield to the later statute.  State ex rel Huddleston
v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 604-605, 932 P2d 1145 (1997) (repeal by
implication is applicable if the repugnancy is plain, unavoidable
and irreconcilable); State v. Shumway, 291 Or 153, 160, 630 P2d
796 (1981).  I conclude that that rule plays no role here
because, even under a strict application of ORS 250.035(6), the
preparation of multiple ballot titles that bear no resemblance to
each other would not be possible in all cases.  The repeal by
implication of the ballot title requirements described in ORS
250.035(2) to (5) would undermine, not support, the express
purpose behind ORS 250.035(6), "[t]o avoid confusion."  As the
discussion below indicates, we can avoid those unreasonable
outcomes, and reconcile the apparent conflict in the statutes, by
treating the drafting requirement stated in ORS 250.035(6) as
being subject to the linguistic limitations of the English
language in which every ballot title must appear.  Thus, the rule
expressed in Shumway is not applicable here, because the conflict
between the requirements set forth in ORS 250.035(2) to (6) is
not irreconcilable.

	The Attorney General's argument suggests that the
difficulty in eliminating resemblance between ballot titles
arises, not in every ballot title case, but only in those cases
in which compliance with ORS 250.035(6) is impossible because of
the limitations of the English language.  I agree.  Accordingly,
in order to produce a practical and common sense result, I would
recognize that, in the context of similar ballot measures, the
legislature intended ORS 250.035(6) to permit only that limited
degree of resemblance between multiple ballot titles as is
necessary to permit the Attorney General to publish ballot titles
in understandable English.

	In my view, this court's task in this case is to
recognize that a literal application of ORS 250.035(6) would
produce an absurd outcome and, following the ordinary rules that
apply to the interpretation of statutes in context, to construe
that statute and other related statutes together to produce a
harmonious, workable result.  The problem with ORS 250.035(6)
arises not from any ambiguity in its text, as the majority
erroneously believes, but from the impracticality of literal
compliance with its command.  In responding to that interpretive
problem, this court must adopt a statutory construction that is
both functional and, to the extent possible, faithful to the
legislature's goal of prohibiting "resemblance" between ballot
titles. 

	My reading of ORS 250.035(6) correctly interprets that
statute in context by giving maximum effect to all relevant
statutes, and by avoiding the impossible, absurd and unworkable
result that would flow from a literal application of the text of
ORS 250.035(6).  That approach keeps faith with ORS 174.010 and
the rules of contextual construction described in Davis and Fox. 
Finally, my approach avoids any arguable interference with a
citizen's right to initiate legislation that might result from
declining to certify a ballot title in the name of avoiding
resemblance with another ballot title certified at an earlier
date.

	The analytical approach of this opinion and that of the
majority can lead to very different substantive outcomes.  Under
the majority's approach, the focus of analysis is the supposed
ambiguity of the phrase "[t]o avoid confusion."  The majority's
construction permits the Attorney General to escape the
responsibility to comply with ORS 250.035(6) by demonstrating
merely that the underlying initiative measures are similar.  That
view permits the Attorney General to certify identical ballot
titles for several measures to be considered at the same
election.  The majority fails to acknowledge that the legislature
drafted ORS 250.035(6) to eliminate the evil that arises from
voter confusion due to the certification of ballot titles that
closely resemble each other.  That is, if several measures bear
the same or similar ballot titles, voters will have no practical
way to distinguish between them.  The majority adopts a statutory
construction that seems to ignore the very sort of voter
confusion that ORS 250.035(6) was intended to prevent.

	I join in the certification of the Attorney General's
ballot titles for initiatives 59, 64, and 67, because I am
persuaded that the Attorney General cannot prepare more
distinctive ballot titles for those measures, given the
limitations of the English language that govern that task.  I
disagree with the majority's conclusion that the use of similar
ballot titles here will not cause voter confusion.  Indeed,
unless and until the legislature revisits the problems created by
ORS 250.035(6), voter confusion from the use of nearly identical
ballot titles likely will be the order of the day.  

	Until the legislature reconsiders ORS 250.035(6), the
voting public will have to depend on the Attorney General to
prepare distinctive ballot titles that will permit the voters to
distinguish between similar measures.  In my view, the
legislature has broad power to protect the voting public from
confusion of that sort, and it should not hesitate to use it. 
See Or Const, Art IV, § 1(4)(b) ("Initiative and referendum
measures shall be submitted to the people as provided in this
section and by law not inconsistent therewith").

	I concur.

1. 	The chart below summarizes the effects of each of the
five proposed initiatives:
Initiative Number

58

59

60

64

67
Same Corporate/Personal
Tax Rates

x

x

x

x
Corporate Kicker Credit
Percentage not greater
than Personal Kicker
Refund Percentage

x

x
x

x

x
Appropriation (see key
below)

'97-'99:

1

'99-2001:

2	

1

'97-'99:

1

'99-2001:

3

'97-'99:

1

'99-2001:

4
Reduction of Maximum
Personal Income Tax Rate
from 9% to 8.85%

x

x

x

Appropriation key:

1	To school districts for textbooks or capital improvements.

2	One-half to school districts for learning enhancement and
one-half to counties for crime prevention.

3	To school districts for learning enhancement.

4	One-half to school districts for learning enhancement and
one-half to counties for prevention of criminal involvement
by youth.

2. 	Or Laws 1995, ch 534, § 1.

3. 	The legislature should revisit ORS 250.035(6) at its
earliest opportunity.  This case illustrates clearly that the
Attorney General and this court cannot always satisfy the
competing policies in ORS 250.035 and ORS 250.085(5), as those
statutes currently are written.  The Attorney General and the
court both would benefit from clear legislative guidance as to
what must occur when the text of two or more ballot measures is
nearly identical and, as a consequence, the respective ballot
titles resemble each other.

4. 	This concurring opinion comments on the majority's
analysis of the "resemblance" problems posed by the Attorney
General's ballot titles for initiatives 59, 64, and 67.  I join
fully in the court's reasoning in certifying the Attorney
General's ballot titles for initiatives 58 and 60.

5. 	I raise, but do not attempt to resolve, the question of
what the term "confusion" means in this context.  The answer is
not clear.  The certification of markedly different ballot titles
for multiple, nearly identical ballot measures has the potential
for causing voter confusion by suggesting that the measures are
very different when, in fact, they are not.  This court noted
that potential for voter confusion in Rooney v. Kulongoski
(Elections Division #13), 322 Or 15, 902 P2d 1143 (1995). 
However, the certification of multiple ballot titles that closely
resemble each other carries at least an equal potential for voter
confusion because that practice deprives the voters of their only
practical means for discriminating between multiple, similar
ballot measures.  Rooney did not address that potential source of
voter confusion.  ORS 250.035(6) focuses on the risk of voter
confusion resulting from the use of similar ballot titles, not
different ones, but the majority sidesteps that focus in
interpreting that statute. 

		A separate question concerns whose potential confusion
is at stake.  It is easy to conclude that the legislature was
concerned about the potential confusion of voters.  However, in
drafting ORS 250.035(6), the legislature also may have endeavored
to protect the distinct interests of petition signers, petition
circulators, parties who seek to challenge ballot titles, and
election officials in avoiding "confusion" in contexts other than
simply voting on a ballot measure.

		Finally, the meaning of the term "resemble" in this
context is far from clear.  Like beauty, it is a quality that may
exist only in the eye of the beholder.  Because that term calls
for what can only be fairly described as a subjective
determination, it invites litigation and inevitably will produce
the attendant negative consequences of delay in the initiative
process and an increased workload for the Department of Justice
and this court.  This court need not resolve what "resemble"
means in this case, because the parties agree that the ballot
titles for initiatives 59, 64, and 67 resemble the ballot title
filed for initiative 58 within the meaning of ORS 250.035(6).

6. 	In contrast with the amendment at issue in Jones, the
1995 amendment to ORS 250.035(6) materially altered the policy
set forth in its statutory predecessor.

7. 	To be accurate, "principles," "rules," and "maxims" of
statutory interpretation are not law unless enacted.  Those terms
describe a host of common sense approaches used by judges to
discover a statute's true meaning in the face of textual
ambiguity, inconsistency and contradiction.

	"Each of these common sense approaches fits some cases
but not others, each has 'exceptions' and opposite-and-equal counterparts, and each causes more harm than it
is worth if it is not cheerfully ignored whenever it is
an obstacle to understanding what the legislature
enacted."  Davis v. Wasco IED, 286 Or 261, 274, 593 P2d
1152 (1979) (Linde, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 

The mistaken tendency of some judges and lawyers to treat those
aids to interpretation as enacted law is due in part to this
court's announcement in 1993 in PGE that it would follow a
template for statutory interpretation.  But for this court's
announced preference for a methodological approach to
interpreting statutes, I would avoid citing interpretive aids in
opinions as if they are binding law.  They are not.  Professor
Sinclair makes a similar helpful observation:

	"[W]e [should not] expect a general theory of statutory
interpretation to be very detailed.  The principle of
legislative supremacy * * * requires top-down,
Euclidean reasoning, and with it, a resort to
legislative intent where necessary for the application
of underdeterminate statutes.  Within that boundary, we
should not expect -- and nor do we find -- strict
limitations on method."  M.B.W. Sinclair, Statutory
Reasoning, 46 Drake L Rev 299, 382 (1997).

8. 	This court often refers to PGE as a statement of its
template for statutory interpretation.  Sea-Air Handling
Services, Inc. v. Reed, 327 Or 25, 30, ____ P2d ____ (1998);
Pollin v. Dept. of Rev., 326 Or 427, 431, 952 P2d 537 (1998);
Foltz v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 326 Or 294, 299, 952
P2d 1012 (1998).  That term suggests that this court believes
that the methodical application of a system of well considered
rules, in the context of statutory construction, is a worthy
objective.  I fully agree.  However, by citing and then
disregarding the analysis called for by PGE, the majority tends
to defeat the predictability of both the PGE methodology and our
statutory interpretations, and lends supporting evidence to the
frank but all-too-true empirical observation of Professors
Eskridge and Frickey:

	"Do not expect anybody's theory of statutory
interpretation, whether it is your own or somebody
else's, to be an accurate statement of what courts
actually do with statutes.  The hard truth of the
matter is that American courts have no intelligible,
generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of
statutory interpretation."  Henry M. Hart, Jr. and
Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process:  Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law, 1169 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 2d ed 1994).

9. 	In my view, the separation of powers problem arises not
from the requirement that the court must review the Attorney
General's ballot title, but from the requirement that, if the
Attorney General's ballot title is insufficient, the court must
draft a new ballot title that satisfies statutory requirements
and certify it to the Secretary of State.  ORS 250.085(5). 
Parties that desire to assert that that requirement is unlawful
and that the court must confine itself to the permissible work of
the Judicial Branch must raise that argument in a brief to this
court and, perhaps, in comments to the Secretary of State
regarding the Attorney General's draft ballot title.  ORS
250.085(6) (on review of a ballot title, the court is precluded
from considering arguments not raised in comments to the
Secretary of State regarding the draft ballot title).