Title: PHILIP L. HOY V. DRM, INC., a Wyoming corporation; and CONSOLIDATED ENGINEERS, INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PHILIP L. HOY V. DRM, INC., a Wyoming corporation; and CONSOLIDATED ENGINEERS, INC.2005 WY 76114 P.3d 1268Case Number: 04-46Decided: 07/13/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
PHILIP 
L. HOY,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
DRM, 
INC., a Wyoming corporation; 
and

CONSOLIDATED 
ENGINEERS, INC.,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Virgil 
G. Kinnaird and Sheryl Smith Bunting of Kinnaird Law Office, P.C., Sheridan, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Kinnaird.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

 
 
R. 
Douglas Dumbrill of Lubnau, Bailey and Dumbrill, Gillette, Wyoming for appellee 
Consolidated Engineers, Inc., and James L. Edwards of Stevens, Edwards, Hallock 
& Carpenter, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming for appellee DRM, Inc.  Argument by Messers. Dumbrill and 
Edwards.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, DJ., 
Retired.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Phillip L. Hoy 
(Hoy) filed a complaint for negligence alleging that DRM, Inc. and Consolidated 
Engineers, Inc. (collectively the Defendants), while in the course of trenching 
a water line, had damaged the leach field for his mobile home park.1  The district court granted the 
Defendants' motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Hoy's two designated 
expert witnesses because their opinions did not meet the standards for 
reliability set forth in Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467 (Wyo. 
1999).  On the basis of that ruling, 
the district court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment for a 
lack of proof of proximate cause.  
Hoy challenges these rulings on appeal.  We affirm.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Hoy provides the 
following statement of the issue:

The 
trial court abused its discretion in excluding [Hoy's] expert testimony that 
Defendants' construction activities were the proximate cause of the failure of 
[Hoy's] leach field.

 
 
The 
Defendants restate the issue and add an additional one:

Was the granting of summary judgment 
in favor of the Defendants correct?

 
 
Whether 
the cited amendments to the depositions of [Hoy's] experts are properly before 
this court?

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      Hoy filed a 
complaint alleging that the Defendants' negligent acts had caused the leach 
field2 that serviced his mobile home park 
to fail.3  Hoy alleged that while the Defendants 
were trenching a waterline on adjacent property, they accidentally breached the 
leach field.  In attempting to 
repair that damage, the Defendants enlisted the services of a vacuum truck from 
Paintbrush Sanitation.  The truck 
was driven onto the fragile leach field where it became mired.  The Defendants then used heavy equipment 
on the leach field to assist in the removal of the vacuum truck.  Once the truck was free, the Defendants 
used it to vacuum out large quantities of water from the field flowing from the 
breach.  Hoy also theorized that the 
location of the waterline resulted in a "damming effect" whereby water from the 
leach field was prevented from flowing out of the leach field causing the water 
table to rise.  These actions, Hoy 
alleged, caused the leach field to fail and become 
unusable.

 
 
[¶4]      Hoy designated 
two professional engineers, Steven M. Bruce (Bruce) and Gerald Williams 
(Williams), as expert witnesses, each of whom had experience designing, 
constructing, and maintaining leach fields.  In his designation of experts, Hoy 
indicated that each expert's testimony and opinion would be in accord with 
reports that they had produced.  In 
his report, Bruce offered the following:

 
 
My 
conclusion is that the leach field soil system is relatively old, it was however 
operating well and it is difficult to predict how much life it had left.  Leach fields tend to fail, or plug 
slowly.  I believe that it is too 
much of a coincidence that the system suddenly failed naturally while the 
construction was being performed adjacent to and on the surface of the 
facility.  While I do not have any 
direct scientific evidence, I believe that the disturbance caused by heavy 
equipment could have slightly changed the soil structure and water table in the 
immediate area causing the system to fail.

 
 
In his 
deposition, Bruce explained the basis for his opinion.  Bruce testified that heavy equipment 
should never be driven over a leach field because the weight and vibration from 
the machinery will compact the soil.  
He noted that the soil in a leach field tends to compact easier because 
it is wet, and as it compacts, it loses its ability to absorb water from the 
septic tank, which could cause the water table to rise and the field to 
fail.  Bruce also testified that the 
vacuuming of water from the trench after the Defendants breached the leach field 
could have caused the field to fail.  
He opined that the sudden dewatering of the field could have adversely 
affected the structure of the soil by impairing its ability to absorb 
water.  Bruce personally inspected 
the soils taken from the leach field after it had failed and testified that he 
saw no evidence in those samples indicating that the field was failing 
naturally.  Bruce testified that his 
opinion was based upon his personal knowledge of leach field operations, his 
personal observation of the damage to the surface of the leach field from the 
Defendants' equipment, and the application of basic theories of hydrology, soil 
mechanics, and structure.  He 
conceded that he did not run any tests on the soil or the water in the leach 
field or review any scientific literature on leach field failure or consult with 
any other experts.  Bruce admitted 
that his opinion was only a theory based on experience and that he had no direct 
scientific evidence to support it.  
He also admitted that his theory was predicated on Hoy's representations 
that the field had not experienced any operating problems until after the 
Defendants' actions.  Further, he 
acknowledged that he could not rule out other possible causes for the leach 
field's failure, including natural fluctuations in the ground water level or 
nearby coal bed methane mining activity.

 
 
[¶5]      Expert witness 
Williams set forth the following in his report:

The 
field has operated with no problems for 24 years.  Suddenly, after the encroachment into 
the field, the subsequent equipment being placed on the field and the 
construction of the water line near the southern edge of the property, the field 
fails.

 
 
There 
are several possible reasons for this failure:

 
 

1)     
When the 
field was disturbed on the SE edge and the vac truck subsequently drained the 
field to facilitate the repairs, the loss of hydraulic pressure may have allowed 
settlement to occurre [sic].  This 
would account for the depressions in the field surface which were not attributed 
to the equipment.

2)     
The 
placement of heavy equipment on the field may have damaged the leach field pipes 
and the damage was not evident in the one small area exposed for 
observation.

3)     
The 
construction of the water line near the south edge of the field may have created 
a damming effect and caused the water table to rise into the field.  The leach field surface slopes down to 
the SW corner and the ground water table would generally slope this way as 
well.

4)     
The 
water table naturally fluctuated and rose to the field 
level.

5)     
The 
soils in the field area have become clogged and can no longer handle the flow of 
the sewage water.  Based on CER's 
test results, we do not believe this is the case.

6)     
Another 
outside influence, not considered in this report, caused the water to 
rise.

 
 
It is my 
opinion that the water table at its current level has caused the leach field to 
fail.  The encroachment into the SE 
corner of the leach field by the back hoe and the presence of equipment on the 
field in conjunction with the placement of the water line has led to the 
diminished capacity of the leach field.  
With out [sic] historic water table levels it is impossible to verify 
this opinion, but the fact the field has worked well for an extended period of 
time gives a strong indication that this opinion is correct.  Additionally when Phil Hoy exposed the 
leach field infiltrator pipe in 4 locations, the exposed soil did not appear to 
be in a failure mode.

 
 
Like 
Bruce, Williams gave further details about the basis of his opinion during the 
course of his deposition.  Williams 
opined that all three incidents  driving heavy equipment on the leach field, 
breaching the field with a trench, and vacuuming the water out and constructing 
the waterline in a location that caused a "damming" effect on the field  were 
contributing factors to the leach field's failure.  Williams based his opinions upon Hoy's 
representations that the field was working normally before the Defendants' 
actions and only showed evidence of failure thereafter.  Those representations were the 
"linchpin" of Williams' opinions.  
Williams admitted that his opinions were not verifiable largely because 
he did not have access to any baseline or pre-failure data for the soil 
conditions and water table levels.  
Without any baseline data, Williams testified that he had to make certain 
assumptions.  Williams indicated 
that his opinion was basically common sense.  Williams declared that it was within a 
reasonable degree of engineering certainty that the Defendants' actions caused 
the leach field to fail.  Yet, 
Williams also acknowledged that he could not scientifically rule out other 
causes for the field's failure including natural ground water fluctuations, 
flaws in the leach field's design, degradation of the soil's ability to absorb 
water, or nearby methane gas development.  
Ultimately, Williams could not give any probabilities for the potential 
causes of the leach field's failure.

 
 
[¶6]      With respect to 
the specific acts of the Defendants, Williams testified that driving heavy 
equipment over a leach field may cause soil compression and alter the 
"geotechnical capacity of the soil."  
Williams believed that is what happened here.  Williams noted that the compression of 
soil depends upon its moisture content, and he assumed that at the time of the 
incident, the soil was "fairly" moist.  
He admitted that he had no knowledge of the soil condition at the time 
the trucks and equipment went onto the leach field, and that he could only make 
assumptions based upon his personal observations of the field and what Hoy told 
him.  Williams tried to test the 
soil but was unable to get samples for most areas of the leach field, and those 
he did obtain did not evidence any compaction.  Williams conceded that he could not 
determine if there had been any hydraulic movement within the leach field as a 
result of the Defendants' actions.  
Despite the lack of direct evidence, Williams maintained that 
"coincidental" evidence led him to believe that Defendants' actions caused the 
failure of the leach field.  That 
belief was derived from what Williams called an "interpretation of the data" 
with the "data" being the fact that heavy equipment was placed on a working 
leach field coupled with a subsequent failure of the 
field.

 
 
[¶7]      Williams 
testified that the Defendants' breach of the leach field during trenching for 
the waterline may have contributed to the field's failure.  Williams stated that when the Defendants 
breached the field and had to vacuum out a large quantity of water that flowed 
from the field into the trench, the loss of hydraulic pressure may have allowed 
the soil to settle, inhibiting its ability to absorb water.  However, Williams stated that there was 
no way to determine whether the soil surrounding the piping was affected by any 
settlement.  Williams did not 
conduct any scientific experiments to determine whether the removal of the water 
from the leach field had actually affected the soil.  His opinion was just a guess based on 
"engineering principles."  Williams 
cited the presence of undulations on the surface of the leach field in the area 
of the Defendants' activities as evidence in support of his opinion.  When confronted with photographs that 
appeared to show the undulations predated the Defendants' activities by almost 
four years, Williams admitted that they could have been caused by some other 
phenomenon.

 
 
[¶8]      Finally, Williams 
theorized that the waterline installed by the Defendants caused the flow from 
the leach field to back up raising the water table under the field causing its 
failure.  Williams drilled three 
wells, two on the leach side of the waterline and one on the opposite, to 
monitor the water level.  After 
re-activating the leach field, Williams recorded the water level readings.  In his opinion, the experiment indicated 
a possible damming effect since the water levels in the leach-side wells rose 
quicker than the one on the other side of the waterline.  Nonetheless, there was no evidence as to 
how the soil was reacting prior to the placement of the waterline, and without 
any baseline to compare the results of his experiment, Williams admitted that 
the results could have been the same prior to the installation of the line.  Furthermore, Williams did not know if 
the soils underlying each well were the same and that differences in soil could 
account for the difference in water levels between the wells.  While unable to express to any degree of 
certainty that the installation of the waterline caused a damming effect that 
was responsible for the leach field's failure, Williams concluded that his test 
tended to show that was the case.  
At the end of his deposition, Williams opined that the only error the 
Defendants made was in placing the waterline too close to the leach field in the 
initial plans.  Williams confessed 
that where the waterline was actually located did not violate any engineering 
standard of care.  Finally, Williams 
asserted that the damming effect would not have occurred if the Defendants had 
used permeable material around the waterline but he immediately acknowledged 
that the use of non-permeable material was not a violation of any engineering 
standard of care.

 
 
[¶9]      Both experts 
attached amendments to their depositions.  
Bruce included a statement declaring that: 

 
 
After 
reviewing my deposition, I feel that this summary of my concerns is very 
necessary.  After reviewing my 
testimony, I am not disputing the words I said, but the context that both the 
deposing attorney and myself were using them.  In numerous instances, we were not using 
the same definitions and understood terms differently.

 
 
In those amendments, Bruce admits he 
had no laboratory data and that he did not know how deeply or how much the soils 
were adversely affected by the Defendants' activities.  However, he stressed that his opinion 
was based on basic scientific principles embodied in engineering theory.  Bruce stood by his opinion that the only 
logical conclusion was that the construction activities on and around the leach 
field caused its failure. He added that he thought it was unlikely that the 
failure was due to old age because the soil samples that he observed had not 
shown any sign of plugging.

 
 
[¶10]   Williams did not include any 
statement setting forth the reasons for making the amendments to his 
deposition.  In his amendments, 
Williams clarified his statement that his opinion was "common sense" by noting 
that it was based on his personal knowledge of "void ratios, porosity, 
permeability, soil classifications, leach field design, subsidence, effective 
stresses and pore pressures in soil, water tables, water flow through soils, 
compressibility of soils, etc."  
Williams also attempted to mitigate his declaration that his opinions 
were not verifiable because he did not have any baseline data for soil 
conditions and water table levels by declaring: "I do believe I have a baseline 
before the leach field failure.  The 
baseline is the field was working for 24 years.  I also have a baseline after the failure 
in that I know the depth of the water table and the moisture content of the 
soils and soil types."  Finally, 
Williams stressed that the undulations on the surface of the leach field 
mirrored the placement of the leach field lines and the photographs depicting 
these undulations constituted "hard, physical evidence [substantiating] the 
engineering theory."

 
 
[¶11]   After deposing Hoy's experts, the 
Defendants concurrently filed a motion in limine to exclude the proposed expert 
testimony under Bunting and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993) and a motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that Hoy had failed to provide any competent 
expert testimony showing that the Defendants' actions caused damage, and that 
Hoy had failed to propound any evidence that the Defendants' actions deviated 
from the standards of care for engineers in Wyoming.  After a hearing, the district court 
issued a decision letter granting both motions:

 
 
In this 
case, the court finds that the methodology or technique used was not 
reliable.  This first shows in the 
experts['] depositions with their testimony that defendants' actions "may have" 
caused the damages; "Without historic water table levels it is impossible to 
verify this opinion."; "While I do not have any scientific evidenceit could 
have";  "Q: Do you have any 
evidence or information that the soils were compressed to such an extent that 
the leach field was affected?  A: I 
do not."; "I am just throwing theory at you now."; "possibly altering"; 
"could be contribution factors."; ["]  
Q: But you don't know why the ground water level is currently level with 
the leach field; if that is natural or something from some other cause.  A: Correct.";  "Q: Have you done any scientific 
investigation at all to indicate that the removal of water from the leach field 
actually affected the soils in that leach field?  A. No."  There are numerous other examples of the 
experts['] failure to show that their conclusions are reliable.  Although these examples do not state all 
of the experts' opinions, they are emblematic of the testimony in their 
deposition testimony. The following questions and answers are indicative of the 
unreliability of the conclusions:

 
 
Q.  Do 
you have any evidence that it did cause negative 
consequences?

 
 
A.  Yes.

 
 
Q.  What 
evidence is that?

 
 
A.  The 
leach field failed.

 
 
This 
type of "consequences" analysis is insufficient for the court to admit these 
expert opinions.  Of the four 
factors to consider [from Daubert], the experts showed nothing that their 
theories can be or could be tested.  
No research was made to show peer review and publication.  Thus there was no known rate of error or 
standards.  Finally, there seemed to 
be no uniform acceptance within the scientific community.

 
 
The 
expert opinion must be based on reliable methodology and reliably flow from that 
and the facts at issue.  In this 
case, it does not.  "The ultimate 
question for the trial judge is whether both sides will have a fair opportunity 
to test the validity of scientific results; if not, those results should not be 
admissible.  [E]xpert testimony 
should be admitted so long as it can be adequately tested by an adversary."  Bunting, [984 P.2d] at 473, 
citing Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 Georgia Law Rev. No. 3, 
699, 705 (Spring 1998).  I find 
under these tests that the testimony should not be admitted and the plaintiff's 
case fails for lack of proximate cause.

 
 
Hoy has 
appealed.

 
 

[¶12]   Summary judgment is appropriate 
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the prevailing party 
is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the 
parties.  We examine the record from 
the perspective most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give 
that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be fairly drawn from 
the record.  We evaluate the 
propriety of a summary judgment using the same standards and the same materials 
used by the lower court.  We do not 
accord the district court's decisions on questions of law any deference.  In re Estate of Drwenski, 2004 WY 
5, ¶12, 83 P.3d 457, ¶12 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Mathewson v. City of 
Cheyenne, 2003 WY 10, ¶4, 61 P.3d 1229, ¶4 (Wyo. 2003) and Anderson v. 
Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶10, 49 P.3d 1011, ¶10 (Wyo. 2002)).  Summary judgments are not favored, 
especially in negligence actions.  
Drwenski, ¶13.  As a 
consequence, summary judgments in negligence actions are subject to "more 
exacting scrutiny" by this Court.  
Id.; see also Woodard v. Cook 
Ford Sales, Inc., 927 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Wyo. 1996).  

 
 
[¶13]   Where a trial court excludes 
evidence essential to maintain a cause of action, the propriety of the summary 
judgment depends, as here, entirely on the evidentiary ruling.  Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 780 (10th Cir. 1999).  
Our review is, therefore, focused on the district court's evidentiary 
ruling.

 
 
Trial 
court rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  Clark v. Gale, 
966 P.2d 431, 435 (Wyo. 1998).  The ultimate issue is whether the trial 
court reasonably could have concluded as it did or whether it exceeded the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances.  
Id. (quoting Hilterbrand v. 
State, 930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo. 1997)).  This standard applies to a trial court's 
exclusion of expert testimony. Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶8, 18 P.3d 1164, 1169 (Wyo. 2001); Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 470 
(Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
Expert 
testimony is admissible if it meets the requirements of W.R.E. 
702:

 
 
If 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.

 
 
The 
United States Supreme Court has described a "gatekeeper" function for the trial 
court under Rule 702, whereby the reliability of proffered expert testimony is 
tested.  Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 
141, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999); Daubert v. Merrill Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 
(1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869, 116 S. Ct. 189, 133 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1995). * * * 

 
 
The 
primary goal of Daubert's gatekeeping requirement "is to ensure the 
reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that an 
expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal 
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that 
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant 
field."

 
 
[Bunting, 
984 P.2d  at 471.] (quoting Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 
311(5th Cir. 1999)).

 
 
In 
Bunting, we adopted Daubert's two-part test: first, the trial 
court is to determine whether the methodology or technique used by the expert is 
reliable, and second, the trial court must determine whether the proposed 
testimony "fits" the particular case.  
Bunting, 984 P.2d  at 471.  
We also noted with approval the non-exclusive criteria that have been 
utilized to guide trial courts in making that first 
determination:

 
 
1) 
whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested; 2) 
whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; 3) its known or 
potential rate of error along with the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique's operation; 4) the degree of acceptance within the 
relevant scientific community[;] [5)] the extensive experience and specialized 
expertise of the expert[;] [6)] whether the expert is proposing to testify 
about matters growing naturally and directly out of research [he has] conducted 
independent of the litigation; and [7)] the non-judicial uses to which the 
method has been put[.]

 
 

Id. at 
472.  As to the second part of 
Daubert's two-part test  whether the expert testimony "fits" the 
particular facts of the case  we concluded in Bunting that this is a 
question of relevance that incorporates the concept of "helpfulness" found in 
W.R.E. 702.  In other words, "the 
expert's opinion must relate to an issue that is actually in dispute and must 
provide "a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry."'" 
Bunting, 984 P.2d  at 472 (quoting Graham v. Playtex Products, 
Inc., 993 F. Supp. 127, 130 (N.D. N.Y. 1998) and Margaret A. Berger, 
Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 Minn. L.Rev. 1345, 
1351 (1994)).

 
 

Reichert 
v. Phipps, 2004 
WY 7, ¶¶5-8, 84 P.3d 353, ¶¶5-8 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

 
 
[¶14]   Initially, we address a claim 
raised by the Defendants that the amendments to the depositions were improper 
under W.R.C.P. 30(e).4  The Defendants contend that the 
amendments attempted to effect substantive changes to the experts' deposition 
testimony without a statement of the reasons for doing so as required under the 
rule.  They also argue that the 
amendments were an attempt to create a sham issue of fact in an attempt to avoid 
summary judgment.  See generally 
Hanna v. Cloud 9, Inc., 889 P.2d 529, 534 (Wyo. 1995).  For those reasons, the Defendants 
request the amendments be stricken.

 
 
[¶15]   We decline to address the 
Defendants' argument.  The only 
mention of this issue in the record before us is when defense counsel stated 
during the summary judgment hearing that he believed the amendments were not 
proper.  There is nothing in the 
record indicating that the Defendants filed a motion to strike or raised any 
demand that the district court strike the amendments.  The district court's decision letter and 
order on the summary judgment motion and the motion in limine are silent on the 
issue so it is impossible for us to determine whether the court ever considered 
the matter.  Even if it is assumed 
that the district court considered and rejected a motion to strike, we would not 
be able to discern the court's reasoning from the record.

 
 
[¶16]   An appellee may support the 
judgment below by asserting any theory offered to and rejected by the district 
court.  Campbell 
CountySchool 
District v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 1280 
(Wyo. 2000).  The non-appealing 
party is limited, however, to supporting the judgment with matters that appear 
in the record.  Id., see 
also Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wyo. 1985).  We generally do not consider arguments 
not raised in the court below.  
Hammons v. Table Mountain Ranches Owners Association, Inc., 2003 
WY 85, ¶17, 72 P.3d 1153, ¶17 (Wyo. 2003).  As the proponent of the argument, the 
duty is on the Defendants to present us with a sufficient record for 
review.  They have not done so here 
and, therefore, we decline to address the Defendants' 
contention.

 
 
[¶17]   We note that we reviewed the 
amendments and did not find anything contained therein that would affect our 
decision to affirm the district court's ruling.  In a sense then, the Defendants' claim 
is effectively moot.  It should be 
stressed, however, that appellees must, like any appellant, provide us with a 
sufficient record on appeal to ensure proper consideration of their 
arguments.

 
 

[¶18]   We begin with a review of the 
district court's rationale for excluding the experts' testimony.  Hoy asserts that the district court 
misapplied the Daubert test by focusing on the conclusions of the expert 
witnesses and not on their methodology.  
In its decision letter, the court noted that certain excerpts from the 
experts' depositions, wherein they admit that they do not have any direct 
scientific evidence that the Defendants' actions caused the failure of the leach 
field, show that their conclusions are not reliable.  The analysis set forth in Bunting 
and Daubert does not contemplate a determination of whether a 
conclusion is reliable or not:

 
 

 
Daubert 
admonished that methodology should be distinguished from the conclusion of the 
expert.  Daubert at 595, 113 S. Ct. 2786.  Thus, a trial judge 
need not and should not determine the scientific validity of the conclusions 
offered by an expert witness.  
Rather, to decide admissibility, the trial judge should only consider the 
soundness of the general scientific principles or reasoning on which the expert 
relies and the propriety of the methodology applying those principles to the 
specific facts of the case.  Charles 
Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, [Federal Practice and Procedure § 6233 
(1997)]; see also [Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 443 (Wyo. 
1993)], quoting [United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 797 
(2nd Cir. 1992)] ("In other words, the court need not make the 
initial determination that the expert testimony or the evidence proffered is 
true before submitting the information to the jury.")

 
 

Bunting, 984 P.2d  at 472-73.  Instead, the focus 
of the gatekeeping function is to assure that the theories relied upon by 
experts to support their conclusions are scientifically "reliable" and that they 
"fit" the facts in question.  The 
experts in this case relied upon the theories of subsidence caused by 
dewatering, compaction caused by heavy equipment, and damming caused by 
installation of a pipeline.  The 
district court seemed to conclude that these experts could not rely upon these 
theories because there was a lack of on-site testing to prove their application 
to the instant facts.  Rather, the 
court appeared to apply the four, non-exclusive factors applicable to the first 
step of the Daubert analysis, which considers whether a theory or 
technique is sufficiently reliable to support an expert opinion, to the second 
step of the analysis, which considers whether the theories "fit" the facts in 
this case.  The court then concluded 
that without on-site testing of the theories, the experts' conclusions should 
not be admitted.

 
 
[¶19]   The first step of the two-step 
Daubert analysis and the four, non-exclusive factors suggested for 
determining whether an expert's theories are scientifically reliable are "most 
relevant in the context of a new and novel scientific theory  asking if it has 
been tested, subjected to peer review and publication, etc." and that "they do 
provide examples of the general kinds of issues a trial court need probe in 
light of its purpose of ensuring that an expert employs in the courtroom the 
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in 
the relevant field."  Kumho 
Tire, 526 U.S.  at 152.  This step of the analysis does not 
require that all theories must be proven by tests specific to the facts in 
question.

 
 

[¶20]   The 
court in Bitler v. A.O. Smith 
Corporation, 391 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2004) addressed the lack of 
testing of well-accepted theories stating:

 
 
            
We turn to the issue whether the Bitlers' experts, particularly Sommer, 
were required to test their theory.  No doubt, 
Daubert noted that a key factor in valid scientific methodology is the 
practice of testing hypotheses to determine whether they can be falsified.  Daubert, 509 U.S.  at 
593 (citing Karl Popper, Conjectures and 
Refutations:  The Growth of 
Scientific Knowledge (5th ed. 1989), who emphasized the importance of 
testing scientific theories to determine whether they can withstand critical 
scrutiny). One object of Popper's method of falsification as a way of testing 
scientific theory is to acknowledge that any scientific theory is subject to 
future refutation through further observation and testing.  Such emphasis, however, is aimed at 
theories purporting to explain the causal relations among regularly occurring 
natural phenomena.  (Ptolemy's 
theory of the movement of celestial bodies which hypothesized that the Earth was 
the center of the solar system, later falsified by Copernicus, is a prominent 
example of such a scientific theory subject to falsification by further 
inquiry.)  No such theory is in 
question here.  The Bitlers need 
only establish by a preponderance of the evidence that copper sulfide particles 
caused a one-time occurrence - the gas explosion in their basement.  See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Health Plan 
v. Sharp, 741 P.2d 714, 719 (Colo. 1987).  Their experts do not present any 
controversial or novel explanations concerning regularly occurring natural 
phenomena.  Undoubtedly, had their 
experts conducted further tests on their water heater's safety valve and 
established by observation that it did intermittently fail, they would have 
established causation to a near certainty.  But such a high degree of certainty is 
not required.  In fact, the only 
phenomenon of regular occurrence at issue here is one that is undisputed: copper 
sulfide particles of sufficient size or quantity if lodged on the valve seat may 
cause a gas leak. Thus, because testing is not necessary in 
all instances to establish reliability under Daubert, and because it is not required 
by the particular factual circumstances of this case, we conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Bitlers' 
experts' testimony is reliable. 

 
 

Id. at 1122 
(Footnote omitted.).

 
 
[¶21]   Hoy's experts in this case relied 
on well-known and accepted engineering principles such as compaction and 
subsidence.  To the extent the 
district court's reasoning relied upon a lack of on-site testing, irrespective 
of whether such testing was feasible, it constituted a misapplication of the 
Daubert analysis.  However, 
despite our concern that the district court misapplied the Daubert 
two-step test, its ultimate conclusion regarding the inadmissibility of these 
expert opinions is supported for other reasons.  We will affirm a district court's action 
on appeal if it is sustainable on any legal ground appearing in the record even 
if the legal ground or theory articulated by the district court is incorrect. 
 Drwenski, 2004 WY 5, ¶39, 83 
P.3d at ¶39; see also Heilig v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 2003 WY 
27, ¶8, 64 P.3d 734, ¶8 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶22]   Hoy's experts developed several 
theories regarding the cause of the failure of the leach field based upon their 
personal experience coupled with the factual history of the leach field, as 
related by Hoy, along with their knowledge of the basic principles underlying 
the science of water, soils, and their interactions under varying conditions, 
such as pressure.  The experts 
attempted to verify their theories through the application of scientific tests 
of the leach field.  They were 
unable to obtain conclusive results because of the lack of baseline data on the 
nature of the soil and water table underlying the field prior to the Defendants' 
actions.  The experts did not 
attempt to apply any other methodology to verify their theories; instead, they 
simply fell back on what they used to develop their theories in the first place 
 their personal knowledge and experience. 

 
 
[¶23]   A qualified expert may provide 
opinion testimony derived from their knowledge and experience.  W.R.E. 702.  As with all proffered expert opinion 
testimony, the requirements of Daubert and Bunting of 
"reliability" and "fitness" must be satisfied before such testimony is 
admissible.  While Daubert 
does not require a particular kind of causation proof, a proffered expert 
opinion must provide, "a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry." 
 Bunting, 984 P.2d  at 472. 
 The Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently explained how the principles underlying Daubert apply to 
the admission of proffered expert opinion testimony that rests on experience and 
personal knowledge:

 
 
Of 
course, the unremarkable observation that an expert may be qualified by 
experience does not mean that experience, standing alone, is a sufficient 
foundation rendering reliable any conceivable opinion the expert may express. 
 As we observed in Quiet 
Technology, "while an expert's overwhelming qualifications may bear on the 
reliability of his proffered testimony, they are by no means a guarantor of 
reliability.  Our caselaw plainly 
establishes that one may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable 
testimony." 326 F.3d  at 1341-42.  Quite simply, under Rule 702, the 
reliability criterion remains a discrete, independent, and important requirement 
for admissibility.

 
 
Indeed, 
the Committee Note to the 2000 Amendments of Rule 702 expressly says that, "if 
the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must 
explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience 
is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably 
applied to the facts.  The trial 
court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply taking the expert's word 
for it.'" Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amends.) (emphasis 
added); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (on 
remand), 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (observing that the 
gatekeeping role requires a district court to make a reliability inquiry, and 
that "the expert's bald assurance of validity is not enough").  If admissibility could be established 
merely by the ipse dixit of an admittedly qualified expert, the reliability 
prong would be, for all practical purposes, subsumed by the qualification 
prong.

 
 
Thus, it 
remains a basic foundation for admissibility that "proposed [expert] testimony 
must be supported by appropriate validation  i.e., good grounds,' based on 
what is known."  Daubert, 509 U.S.  at 590, 113 S. Ct.  at 2795.  As the Supreme Court put it, "the Rules 
of Evidence  especially Rule 702 -- assign to the trial judge the task of 
ensuring that an expert's testimonyrests on a reliable foundation." Id. at 597, 113 S. Ct.  at 2799. 

 
 
When 
evaluating the reliability of scientific [footnote omitted] expert opinion, the 
trial judge must assess "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid andwhether that reasoning or methodology 
properly can be applied to the facts in issue."  Id. at 592-93, 113 S. Ct.  at 2796.  To evaluate the reliability of scientific 
expert opinion, we consider, to the extent practicable:

 
 

(1)    
whether 
the expert's theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been 
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of 
error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is 
generally accepted in the scientific community.

 
 

Quiet 
Tech., 326 F.3d  at 1341 (citing McCorvey, 298 F.3d  at 1256 (citing Daubert, 
509 U.S.  at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. at 
2796-97)).  These factors are 
illustrative, not exhaustive; not all of them will apply in every case, and in 
some cases other factors will be equally important in evaluating the reliability 
of proffered expert opinion.  See 
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S.  at 150-52, 119 S.Ct. at 1175-76; 
Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amends.); see also Heller 
v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Not only must each 
stage of the expert's testimony be reliable, but each stage must be evaluated 
practically and flexibly without brightline exclusionary (or inclusionary) 
rules.").

 
 
The same 
criteria which are used to assess the reliability of a scientific opinion may be 
used to evaluate the reliability of non-scientific, experience-based testimony. 
 Kumho Tire, 526 U.S.  at 152, 
119 S. Ct.  at 1176; see also Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 758 
(7th Cir. 1999) ("In determining whether an expert's testimony is 
reliable, the Daubert factors are applicable in cases where an expert 
eschews reliance on any rigorous methodology and instead purports to base his 
opinion merely on experience' or training.'").  As the Supreme Court explained in 
Kumho Tire:

 
 
In 
certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial judge to ask, for example, 
how often an engineering expert's experience-based methodology has produced 
erroneous results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in the 
relevant engineering community.  Likewise, it will at times be useful to 
ask even of a witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, a 
perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff, whether his 
preparation is of a kind that others in the field would recognize as 
acceptable.

 
 
526 U.S.  at 151, 119 S. Ct.  at 1176.  Sometimes the specific Daubert 
factors will aid in determining reliability; sometimes other questions may be 
more useful. As a result, "the trial judge must have considerable leeway in 
deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular 
expert testimony is reliable."  Id. at 152, 119 S.Ct. [at] 1176.  Exactly how reliability is evaluated may 
vary from case to case, but what remains constant is the requirement that the 
trial judge evaluate the reliability of the testimony before allowing its 
admission at trial.  See Fed. R. 
Evid. 702 advisory committee's notes (2000 amends.) ("The trial judge in all 
cases of proffered expert testimony must find that it is properly grounded, 
well-reasoned, and not speculative before it can be 
admitted."

 
 

United 
States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 

 
 
[¶24]   As the Frazier court notes, 
the Federal Rule 702 was amended in 2000.5  The amendment was in response to the 
Daubert decision and the many cases applying it.  See Fed R. Evid. 702 advisory 
committee's note (2000 amends.).  Wyoming has not similarly amended its version 
of Rule 702.  However, the advisory 
committee's notes to the federal amendment are relevant, as we have, of course, 
adopted the Daubert analysis.  
We find the following discussion by the committee 
instructive:

 
 
As 
stated earlier, the amendment does not distinguish between scientific and other 
forms of expert testimony. The trial court's gatekeeping function applies to 
testimony by any expert.  See 
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1171, 526 U.S. 137, 
140, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999) ("We conclude that Daubert's general holding  
setting forth the trial judge's general gatekeeping' obligation  applies not 
only to testimony based on scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based 
on technical' and other specialized' knowledge."). While the relevant factors 
for determining reliability will vary from expertise to expertise, the amendment 
rejects the premise that an expert's testimony should be treated more 
permissively simply because it is outside the realm of science. An opinion from 
an expert who is not a scientist should receive the same degree of scrutiny for 
reliability as an opinion from an expert who purports to be a scientist. See 
Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) 
("[I]t seems exactly backwards that experts who purport to rely on general 
engineering principles and practical experience might escape screening by the 
district court simply by stating that their conclusions were not reached by any 
particular method or technique."). Some types of expert testimony will be more 
objectively verifiable, and subject to the expectations of falsifiability, peer 
review, and publication, than others. Some types of expert testimony will not 
rely on anything like a scientific method, and so will have to be evaluated by 
reference to other standard principles attendant to the particular area of 
0expertise. The trial judge in all cases of proffered expert testimony must find 
that it is properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative before it can 
be admitted. The expert's testimony must be grounded in an accepted body of 
learning or experience in the expert's field, and the expert must explain how 
the conclusion is so grounded. See, e.g., American College of Trial Lawyers, 
Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
after Daubert, 1993 WL 754951 (1993) ("[W]hether the testimony concerns 
economic principles, accounting standards, property valuation or other 
non-scientific subjects, it should be evaluated by reference to the knowledge 
and experience' of that particular field.").

 
 
The 
amendment requires that the testimony must be the product of reliable principles 
and methods that are reliably applied to the facts of the case. While the terms 
"principles" and "methods" may convey a certain impression when applied to 
scientific knowledge, they remain relevant when applied to testimony based on 
technical or other specialized knowledge. For example, when a law enforcement 
agent testifies regarding the use of code words in a drug transaction, the 
principle used by the agent is that participants in such transactions regularly 
use code words to conceal the nature of their activities. The method used by the 
agent is the application of extensive experience to analyze the meaning of the 
conversations. So long as the principles and methods are reliable and applied 
reliably to the facts of the case, this type of testimony should be 
admitted.

 
 
Nothing 
in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience alone  or experience 
in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or education  may not 
provide a sufficient foundation for expert testimony. To the contrary, the text 
of Rule 702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be qualified on the basis 
of experience. In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, 
basis for a great deal of reliable expert testimony. See, e.g., United States 
v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (no abuse of discretion 
in admitting the testimony of a handwriting examiner who had years of practical 
experience and extensive training, and who explained his methodology in detail); 
Tassin v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 946 F. Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D. La. 1996) 
(design engineer's testimony can be admissible when the expert's opinions "are 
based on facts, a reasonable investigation, and traditional technical/mechanical 
expertise, and he provides a reasonable link between the information and 
procedures he uses and the conclusions he reaches"). See also Kumho Tire Co., 
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1178, 526 U.S. 137, 155, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 
(1999) (stating that "no one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from 
a set of observations based on extensive and specialized 
experience.").

 
 
If the 
witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must 
explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience 
is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably 
applied to the facts.  The trial 
court's gatekeeping function requires more than simply "taking the expert's word 
for it." See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 
1319 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We've been presented with only the experts' 
qualifications, their conclusions and their assurances of reliability. Under 
Daubert, that's not enough."). The more subjective and controversial the 
expert's inquiry, the more likely the testimony should be excluded as 
unreliable. See O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090 
(7th Cir. 1994) (expert testimony based on a completely subjective 
methodology held properly excluded). See also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. 
Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176, 526 U.S. 137, 151, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999) 
("[I]t will at times be useful to ask even of a witness whose expertise is based 
purely on experience, say, a perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors 
at a sniff, whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would 
recognize as acceptable.").

 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 
702 advisory committee's notes (2000 amends.).  Keeping these principles in mind, we 
turn to the case before us. 

 
 
[¶25]   The reliability of the experts' 
opinions is undermined in two ways.  
First, the experts were unable to rule out other causes for the leach 
field's failure.  That calls into 
question whether their experience was a sufficient basis for their opinion.  Second, when proffering an opinion based 
on experience and knowledge, an expert must explain how that opinion was 
reliably derived from the application of that experience and knowledge to the 
facts.  Reliability could be 
established, for example, by reference to the expert's experience with similar 
situations.  The particular means by 
which the expert may establish the reliability of his opinion will necessarily 
vary with the particular circumstance.  
Nevertheless, there must be some explanation of how that experience and 
knowledge renders the proffered opinion reliable.  Here, there is little in the record that 
could be described as a reliable foundation or basis for the experts' 
opinions.  The experts stated that 
their opinions were based on their experience and knowledge and, only after 
prompting from defense counsel during depositions, on various texts.  The experts, however, never explained 
exactly how their experience and knowledge or the texts supported their 
opinions.  During depositions, the 
Defendants questioned Hoy's experts concerning the basis for their opinions that 
the Defendants' actions were the cause of the leach field's failure. The experts 
replied that they relied on their experience and knowledge of leach fields along 
with their knowledge of soil and water science in general.  After being pressed by the Defendants on 
whether they had relied on any scientific literature or studies, Williams and 
Bruce cited three texts between them: U.S.G.S., Land Subsidence from 
Groundwater Pumping; Perloff and Baron, Soil Mechanics; Braja M. Das, 
Principles of Geotechnical Engineering6.  Both experts acknowledged that beyond 
their inconclusive testing of the field, they had not undertaken any research, 
reviewed any relevant literature, or consulted with any other experts in the 
field to verify the validity of their theories of causation.  An expert cannot rely just upon their 
status as an expert to bootstrap the admission of their opinion testimony.  There must be some indicia of 
reliability.  We cannot say that the 
district court abused its discretion when it excluded the experts' proffered 
testimony under the "reliability" prong of the Daubert 
test.

 
 
[¶26]   Further, we also conclude that the 
experts' proffered testimony would not meet the second part of the 
Daubert test.  In the opinion 
of these experts, the only connection between the leach field failure and 
Defendants' actions was timing.  The 
experts acknowledged, however, that the same circumstantial evidence could 
support a conclusion that there was another cause for the leach field's failure 
such as a natural rise in the water table level.  Williams' report listed six possible 
causes for the leach field failure, three of which were the Defendants' 
responsibility and three that were not.  The possible causes that were not the 
responsibility of the Defendants were 1) natural groundwater fluctuations, 2) 
another unspecified "outside influence" which caused the groundwater levels to 
rise, or 3) soils in the leach field area becoming clogged by operation of the 
field over its twenty-five year life, e.g., age of the field itself.  Williams' on-site examination of the 
soils at the excavation points did not indicate clogging or "failure mode" and, 
therefore, he elminated that possible cause.  However, he could not eliminate the 
other possible causes for which the Defendants had no responsibility  
increasing ground water levels due to natural causes or "another outside 
influence." When asked if he knew what caused the water table to be high enough 
to cause the leach field to fail, Williams testified, "No, I do not."  In answer to the question, "But you 
don't know why the ground water level is currently level with the leach field: 
if that is natural or something from some other cause?", Williams stated, 
"Correct."  He confirmed that he 
could not rule out the other possible causes, but simply thought them less 
likely given the timing of the failure of the field.  Likewise, Bruce could not rule out other 
possible causes.  The experts' 
inability to rule out other admittedly possible causes for the leach field's 
failure prevents their opinions from being "helpful" to the jury as contemplated 
by W.R.E. 702.  They presented 
nothing that would allow a jury to objectively evaluate their opinion on 
causation.  Accordingly, the 
analytical gap in the experts' testimony is simply too great for the opinions to 
establish causation.  Dodge v. 
Cotter Corporation, 328 F.3d 1212, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2003); 
Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 782 (10th Cir. 1999); 
United 
States v. Mamah, 332 F.3d 475, 478 
(7th Cir. 2003); Nelson v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, 243 F.3d 244, 254-55 (6th Cir. 2001).  Their testimony plainly was not helpful 
to a jury because it asked them to determine causation based upon possibilities, 
not probabilities.  Without an 
objective basis upon which the proffered opinion could be evaluated, the experts 
were merely asking a jury to speculate.  Such testimony is not admissible, and the 
district court's exclusion of it was not an abuse of discretion under the 
"fitness" prong of the Daubert test.

 
 

[¶27]   Since the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it excluded the expert testimony, its order granting 
summary judgment is affirmed. 

FOOTNOTES

  
1Defendant CEI, 
an engineering firm, did the design work for the waterline project while DRM 
provided the construction services.

 
 
  
2A leach field is 
part of a septic system.  A typical 
field consists of a perforated piping network laid on top of gravel-filled 
trenches and buried about one to two feet below the surface.  After sewage has undergone primary 
treatment in a septic tank, the clarified effluent flows into the leach field's 
piping system.  The process of 
percolation into the surrounding soil removes any remaining 
impurities.

 
 
  
3In addition to 
DRM and CEI, Hoy named Slattery Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Paintbrush Sanitation as 
a defendant.  Paintbrush reached a 
settlement with Hoy, and the claims against it were dismissed.  Paintbrush is not a party to this 
appeal.

  
4W.R.C.P. 30(e) 
(emphasis added) provides:

 
 
When the testimony is fully transcribed 
the deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination and shall be 
read to or by the witness, unless such examination and reading are waived by the 
witness and by the parties.  Any 
changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered 
upon the deposition by the officer with a statement of the reasons given by the 
witness for making them.  The 
deposition shall then be signed by the witness, unless the parties by 
stipulation waive the signing or the witness is ill or cannot be found or 
refuses to sign.  If the deposition 
is not signed by the witness within 30 days of its submission to the witness, 
the officer shall sign it and state on the record the fact of the waiver or of 
the illness or absence of the witness or the fact of the refusal to sign 
together with the reason, if any, given therefor; and the deposition may then be 
used as fully as though signed unless on a motion to suppress under Rule 
32(d)(4) the court holds that the reasons given for the refusal to sign require 
rejection of the deposition in whole or in part.

  
5Effective 
December 1, 2000, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
reads:

 
 
If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or 
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of 
the case.

  
6The experts 
testified that they consulted these texts.  
Neither offered any explanation specifying how the texts supported their 
opinions.  Williams, for example, 
was asked if there was any particular chapter that was relevant replied, "I 
couldn't tell you off the top of my head."  
In response to a question whether there was a subject that one would look 
under, Williams replied, "Probably the effective stress."  None of the books was put into the 
record.  It is difficult to see how 
recitation of the title of a text with vague references to its contents could 
assist the district court in its endeavor to determine 
reliability.