Title: CHRISTOPHER DUANE GREENE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CHRISTOPHER DUANE GREENE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 99214 P.3d 222Case Number: S-09-0014Decided: 08/18/2009Modified: 10/14/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
CHRISTOPHER 
DUANE GREENE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]          
Christopher 
Greene entered guilty pleas to three felony charges of obtaining controlled 
substances by misrepresentation, and no contest to a charge of attempting to 
obtain property by false pretenses.  
He now appeals his convictions on two of the felony charges, and 
challenges the sentence imposed by the district court.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]          
Mr. 
Greene sets forth these two issues:

 
 
1.         
Should Mr. Greene's first two convictions have been 
misdemeanors?

 
 
2.         
Did the trial court err by not making a finding of Mr. Greene's 
status under the Addicted Offender Accountability Act?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]          
On 
June 13, 2007, an Information was filed against Mr. Greene charging him with two 
felony counts of obtaining controlled substances by misrepresentation, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1033(a)(iii) and (b) (LexisNexis 
2007).1  The affidavit filed in support of the 
Information asserted, as to the first count, that in November 2006, 
Mr. Greene altered his prescription for a narcotic pain reliever from 30 
tablets to 80 tablets, and obtained the larger amount from a pharmacy in Green 
River, Wyoming.  As to the second 
count, the affidavit asserted that in April 2007, he altered and filled another 
prescription for the same drug, this time from 35 tablets to 85.  He was arrested on these charges on 
December 5, 2007, and released on bond.

 
 

[¶4]          
On 
April 20, 2008, a second Information was filed, charging Mr. Greene with 
attempting to obtain property by false pretenses, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 6-3-407(a)(i) and 6-1-301(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).2  The supporting affidavit asserted that 
on March 6, 2008, Mr. Greene attempted to cash two payroll checks he had stolen 
from a local welding company.  He 
was arrested on this charge on April 27, 2008, and again released on bond.  

 
 

[¶5]          
On 
May 16, 2008, a third Information was filed, charging Mr. Greene with two more 
felony counts of obtaining controlled substances by misrepresentation, also in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1033(a)(iii) and (b) (LexisNexis 
2007).  The affidavit filed in 
connection with these charges asserted that, on four occasions ranging from 
June 11, 2007, to October 29, 2007, Mr. Greene obtained various 
narcotic pain medications and other controlled substances using forged or 
altered prescriptions.  
Mr. Greene was arrested on these charges on June 9, 2008. 

 
 

[¶6]          
Mr. 
Greene initially pleaded not guilty to all of the charges.  He later reached a plea agreement with 
the prosecution involving all three cases listed above.  On October 8, 2008, he pleaded 
guilty to three counts of obtaining controlled substances by misrepresentation, 
and no contest to the charge of attempting to obtain property by false 
pretenses.  In return, the 
prosecution dismissed one of the counts of obtaining controlled substances by 
misrepresentation, dismissed other charges pending in a fourth case, and agreed 
not to pursue certain other potential charges not specified in the record.  On December 3, 2008, the district court 
sentenced Mr. Greene to terms of three to five years on each of the three 
counts of obtaining controlled substances by misrepresentation, and a term of 
four to eight years on the count of attempting to obtain property by false 
pretenses.  All sentences were to be 
served concurrently.  Mr. Greene 
appealed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶7]          
Both 
of Mr. Greene's issues require us to interpret and apply Wyoming statutes.  "Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law, so our review is de novo."  Qwest Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm'n, 2007 WY 97, ¶ 3, 161 P.3d 495, 497 (Wyo. 2007).  "We attempt to determine the 
legislature's intent based primarily on the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words used in the statute."  Krenning v. Heart Mt. Irrigation Dist., 
2009 WY 11, ¶ 9, 200 P.3d 774, 778 (Wyo. 2007).  "If we determine that a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute."  RK v. State ex rel. Natrona County 
Child Support Enforcement Dep't, 2008 WY 1, ¶ 10, 174 P.3d 166, 169 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Issue 
1:  Felonies or 
Misdemeanors?

 
 

[¶8]          
"Crimes 
which may be punished by death or by imprisonment for more than one (1) year are 
felonies.  All other crimes are 
misdemeanors."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-10-101 (LexisNexis 2007).  
The crimes for which Mr. Greene was convicted were committed in 2006 and 
2007, and he was charged in 2007 and early 2008.  During all of that time, the Wyoming 
statutes specified that the crime of obtaining controlled substances by 
misrepresentation was a felony:

 
 
(a)  It 
is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: . . .  

 
 
(iii)  To 
acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, 
fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge. . . .  

 
 
(b)  Any 
person who violates this section is guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be 
imprisoned for not more than five (5) years, or fined not more than ten thousand 
dollars ($10,000.00), or both.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1033(a)(iii) and (b) (LexisNexis 2007).  

 
 

[¶9]          
In 
2008, the legislature amended this statute.  Effective July 1, 2008, the first two 
convictions of this crime were changed to misdemeanors, while the third and 
subsequent offenses remained felonies:

 
 
(a)  It 
is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally:

 
 
(iii)  To 
acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of or to obtain a prescription for any controlled substance by 
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or 
subterfuge. . . .  

 
 
b)  Except 
as otherwise provided:

 
 
(i)  A 
person who is convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of 
violating paragraph (a)(iii) of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more 
than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or 
both. . . .

 
 
(ii)  A 
person convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of a second 
offense of violating paragraph (a)(iii) of this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or 
both. . . .

 
 
(iii)  A 
person convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of a third 
or subsequent offense of violating paragraph (a)(iii) of this section is guilty 
of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine 
of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both.

 
 
2008 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 83, § 1.3  Mr. Greene pleaded guilty and was 
convicted and sentenced after the effective date of this amendment.  He now contends that he should have been 
convicted and sentenced under the amended statute in effect at the time, so that 
the first two of his three convictions for obtaining controlled substances by 
misrepresentation should have been misdemeanors rather than 
felonies.

 
 

[¶10]     
As 
a preliminary matter, we question whether Mr. Greene is entitled to raise this 
claim on appeal.  He did not raise 
it before the district court.  In 
addition, a guilty plea generally constitutes a waiver of all 
non-jurisdictional defenses.  Walters v. State, 2008 WY 159, 
¶ 26, 197 P.3d 1273, 1280 (Wyo. 2008); Kunselman v. State, 2008 WY 85, 
¶ 11, 188 P.3d 567, 569 (Wyo. 2008).  
Before accepting Mr. Greene's guilty plea, the district court 
carefully informed him that he could be sentenced to a maximum of five years in 
prison on each of the three counts of obtaining controlled substances by 
misrepresentation.  These were the 
felony penalties specified in the version of the statute in effect during 2006 
and 2007, not the misdemeanor penalties specified in the 2008 amendment.  Mr. Greene never objected to 
treating the charges as felonies, and never asserted that they should be treated 
as misdemeanors under the 2008 amendment.  
By pleading guilty to felony charges, he may have waived his current 
argument that the first two convictions should be considered 
misdemeanors.

 
 

[¶11]     
We 
will not decide this claim on the basis of waiver, however.  The State has not asserted that 
Mr. Greene waived the issue, and neither party briefed or discussed the 
question of waiver.  Moreover, Mr. 
Greene's claim is readily resolved on other grounds.

 
 

[¶12]     
In 
a provision sometimes referred to as a "savings"4 statute, the Wyoming legislature 
has specified how an amendment to a statute applies to pending 
cases:

 
 
If 
a statute is repealed or amended, the repeal or amendment does not affect 
pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, civil or criminal.  If the repeal or amendment relates to 
the remedy, it does not affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, 
unless so expressed, nor shall any repeal or amendment affect causes of action, 
prosecutions or proceedings existing at the time of the amendment or repeal, 
unless otherwise expressly provided in the amending or repealing 
act.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107 (LexisNexis 2007).  We agree with the State's assertion that 
"There is nothing ambiguous about this statute and its meaning can be easily 
discerned from its face:  a pending 
prosecution will not be affected in substance or remedy by an amendment to a 
statute unless that intent is expressly stated."  In the 2008 statutory amendment relied 
upon by Mr. Greene, there is no legislative language expressing any intent to 
apply the 2008 amendment to pending prosecutions.  2008 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 83, 
§ 1.  Absent that express 
statement of legislative intent in the legislation itself, we apply the 
unambiguous language of the savings statute to conclude that the 2008 amendment 
did not affect Mr. Greene's pending prosecutions.

 
 

[¶13]     
Our 
review of Wyoming precedent indicates that we have consistently applied the 
savings statute in just this way.  
In Schiefer v. State, 774 P.2d 133, 138 (Wyo. 1989), we said that, "Since the most current legislature is 
silent in the pertinent amending and repealing provisions, the changes cannot 
affect Schiefer's sentencing if enacted since the crime occurred."  See also Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368, 
369 n.2 (Wyo. 1989).  In fact, this 
application of the statute is sufficiently well-established that we sometimes 
discuss it only in abbreviated fashion:

  

We 
will deal with this issue rather perfunctorily, with two observations: first, 
Appellant's argument, being completely devoid of legal support, can be 
characterized as little short of bizarre; and second, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107 
(LexisNexis 2007) specifically provides that the repeal of a statute "does not 
affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, civil or criminal."  Trial counsel did not provide ineffective 
assistance by failing to raise this baseless argument.

 
 

Montez 
v. State, 
2009 WY 17, ¶ 10, 201 P.3d 434, 437-38 (Wyo. 2009) (footnote omitted).  To similar effect:

  

The 
appellant has offered a fourth argument which we need only mention in passing. 
He claims that a criminal defendant cannot be prosecuted under a statute that 
was effective at the time of the criminal offense but repealed before judgment. 
Section 8-1-107, W.S. 1977, answers that contention. It provides:  "If a statute is repealed or amended, 
the repeal or amendment does not affect pending actions, prosecutions or 
proceedings, civil or criminal." 

 
 

Caton 
v. State, 
709 P.2d 1260, 1271 n.12 (Wyo. 1985).

 
 

[¶14]     
Mr. 
Greene directs our attention to a separate statute that, he asserts, expresses 
legislative intent to apply the 2008 amendment to his pending prosecutions.  The statute under which Mr. Greene was 
convicted is part of the "Wyoming Controlled Substances Act of 1971."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1001, 
1002(a)(xxviii) (LexisNexis 2007).  
Mr. Greene relies on another provision of this same 
Act:

 
 
Prosecution 
for any violation of law occurring prior to the effective date of this act is 
not affected or abated by this act.  
If the offense being prosecuted is similar to one set out in 
Article V of this act, the penalties under Article V apply if they are less 
than those under prior law.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1053(a) (LexisNexis 2007).  Mr. Greene asserts that this provision 
indicates that the legislature meant to apply the 2008 amendment because the 
penalties specified are less than under prior law.  As the statutory language indicates, 
however, this provision applies to violations that occurred "prior to the 
effective date of this act."  That 
date was March 4, 1971.  See 1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 246, 
§ 57.  Mr. Greene's 
violations did not occur prior to that date, and this statutory provision has no 
application to offenses committed in 2006 and 2007.

 
 

[¶15]     
Mr. 
Greene cites decisions from a dozen other jurisdictions for the proposition 
that, when a criminal statute is amended while a prosecution is pending, any 
changes that benefit the defendant should be applied in the pending case.  While there is "a split of authority 
on the question," State v. Stafford, 
129 P.3d 927, 929 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006), we acknowledge that the proposition 
advocated by Mr. Greene appears 
to be the rule in several jurisdictions.  
For various 
reasons, however, the cases cited by Mr. Greene are unpersuasive 
here.

 
 

[¶16]     
For 
example, in some of the cases cited by Mr. Greene, the courts did not rely on 
specific savings statutes, but on common law principles.  E.g. State v. Urbano, 256 Neb. 194, 206, 589 N.W.2d 144, 154 (1999); see also People 
v. Bloom, 195 Colo. 246, 252, 577 P.2d 288, 292 (1978), and People v. Thomas, 185 Colo. 395, 397-98, 
525 P.2d 1136, 1138 (1974) (relying upon both an express statement of 
legislative intent and the common law).  
Because the Wyoming legislature has enacted a savings statute that 
specifies how to apply statutory amendments, we no longer resort to these common 
law principles.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-101 
(LexisNexis 2007).

 
 

[¶17]     
In 
fact, none of the cases cited by Mr. Greene dealt with the language of the 
Wyoming savings statute that we must interpret and apply here.  For example, in one case cited by Mr. 
Greene, the Indiana Court considered a savings statute providing that "Whenever 
a statute is repealed which repealed a former statute, the former statute shall 
not thereby be revived unless it shall be so expressly provided."  Ind. Code § 1-1-5-1 (1995).  This provision applies only to repeals, 
not amendments.  Lacking any 
indication of legislative intent on how to apply statutory amendments, the 
Indiana court "approved the view" that "where an amendment to a sentencing 
statute is ameliorative, the amendment itself is a sufficient indication of the 
legislative intent that it be applied to all [to] whom such application would be 
possible and constitutional.'"  Elkins v. State, 659 N.E.2d 563, 565 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995), quoting Lewandowski 
v. State, 271 Ind. 4, 6, 389 N.E.2d 706, 707 (1979).  Unlike the Indiana legislature, however, 
our Wyoming legislature has not been silent about how to apply statutory 
amendments:  "If a 
statute is repealed or amended, the repeal or 
amendment does not affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, 
civil or criminal."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107 (LexisNexis 2007) (emphasis 
added).

 
 
Issue 
2:  Addicted Offender Accountability 
Act

 
 

[¶18]     
One 
purpose of Wyoming's Addicted Offender Accountability Act was to provide 
alternatives for sentencing "addicted qualified offenders."  2002 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 81, 
Preamble.  This Act requires that a 
person convicted of any felony or a specified misdemeanor must receive a 
substance abuse assessment as part of his presentence investigation report.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1302 
(LexisNexis 2007).  Based on that 
assessment, the district court may determine that the person is a "[q]ualified 
offender" with "a need for alcohol or other drug treatment."  Id., § 7-13-1301(a)(iv).  A qualified offender, in lieu of being 
incarcerated, may receive probation or a suspended sentence, under which he must 
complete "a treatment program based upon the substance abuse assessment and any 
other terms and conditions as the court may deem appropriate under the 
circumstances."  Id., § 7-13-1303(a).  The Act also specifies, however, that a 
qualified offender may still be incarcerated under specified circumstances.  Id., 
§ 7-13-1303(c).

 
 

[¶19]     
Mr. 
Greene concedes that he received a substance abuse assessment, in compliance 
with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1302.  
The record reflects, and Mr. Greene does not dispute, that the assessment 
was included with the presentence investigation report, and that the district 
court considered the assessment in determining Mr. Greene's sentence.  Mr. Greene complains, however, that the 
written judgment and sentence issued by the district court contained no express 
finding of whether Mr. Greene was a qualified offender under the Act.  The district court's failure to specify 
his status as a qualified offender, Mr. Greene contends, "denied him the 
opportunity for sentencing under the preferred treatment 
disposition."

 
 

[¶20]     
Mr. 
Greene's position does not square with the unambiguous provisions of the 
Act.  Under the Act, a qualified 
offender "may" receive probation or a 
suspended sentence, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1303(a) (LexisNexis 2007) 
(emphasis added), but there is no language in the statute requiring that 
result.  To the contrary, the 
statute explicitly provides that qualified offenders may be incarcerated if "the 
interests of justice require a period of incarceration," or if "[n]o adequate 
treatment alternative exists."  Id., § 7-13-1303(c).  The record reflects the district court's 
explicit determination that both of these circumstances were present in Mr. 
Greene's case. 

 
 

[¶21]     
Explaining 
the sentence it was about to impose on Mr. Greene, the district court stated 
that "justice does require a period of incarceration."  Among other reasons for this 
determination, the district court reminded Mr. Greene that "[j]ust about 
your entire adult history has been one of committing crimes, and this now makes 
eight felony convictions for you."  
The district court also noted that Mr. Greene had been incarcerated 
for approximately twelve of the past fourteen years, and had not "made the 
required changes in [his] life to become law-abiding." 

 
 

[¶22]     
Further, 
based on Mr. Greene's criminal history, the substance abuse assessment included 
in his presentence investigation report questioned whether Mr. Greene could 
qualify for any appropriate treatment program available to a person on 
probation.  The district court 
echoed this concern.  On the other 
hand, the district court indicated that if Mr. Greene were incarcerated, he 
could receive treatment in the state penitentiary's "excellent Intensive 
Treatment Unit."  

 
 

[¶23]     
Relying 
upon two of the circumstances specifically mentioned in the Act as justifying 
incarceration, the district court determined that it was appropriate to 
incarcerate Mr. Greene whether or not he was a qualified offender.  In this case, it simply does not matter 
whether the district court documented in writing its determination of 
Mr. Greene's status as a qualified offender.  The record confirms that the district 
court's actions and determinations complied with the requirements of the 
Addicted Offender Accountability Act.

 
 

[¶24]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This 
statute is quoted in paragraph 8 below.

2As 
Mr. Greene does not challenge his conviction on this charge, we need not focus 
on the specific language of this statute.

3We 
note that this statute was amended again in 2009.  2009 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 78, 
§ 1.  The current version of 
this statute is therefore different from either version at issue 
here.

4See 
Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908, 915 (Wyo. 1977), and 
Schakel v. State, 513 P.2d 412, 414 (Wyo. 1973), both referring to this 
statute (as formerly codified) as "our general savings 
clause."