Title: Garrity v. Manning

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

GARRITY_V_MANNING.94-222; 164 Vt 507; 671 A.2d 808

[Filed 05-Jan-1996]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-222


Lawrence Garrity                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Windsor Superior Court

William Manning                                   January Term, 1994


John P. Meaker, J.

       Harry A. Black of Black Black & Davis, White River Junction, for
  plaintiff-appellant

       Lisa Chalidze of Hull, Webber & Reis, Rutland, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff Lawrence Garrity was employed as a truck driver
  at Hartford Oil Company and was injured when he slipped and fell on a snow-
  and ice-covered parking lot at his place of employment.  After receiving
  workers' compensation benefits, he sued William Manning, president and
  majority stockholder of Hartford Oil Company, alleging that defendant
  negligently failed to sand the parking lot or make arrangements for someone
  else to do so. Concluding that plaintiff's exclusive remedy was fulfilled
  by the receipt of workers' compensation benefits, the Windsor Superior
  Court granted summary judgment to defendant. We affirm.

       The facts bearing on summary judgment were derived from plaintiff's
  deposition and defendant's affidavit and answers to interrogatories.  They
  show that Hartford Oil Company is a small business with "several
  employees," all subject to the supervision of defendant. Apparently,
  various employees cleared the parking lot of ice and snow or made it less
  slippery by sanding or salting.  According to defendant, he assisted in
  maintaining the parking lot of the corporation's premises, including
  sometimes by salting or sanding the lot.  According to

 

  defendant's answers to plaintiff's interrogatories, defendant did the
  plowing and sanding "primarily" using his personal truck.  Plaintiff
  slipped and fell in the parking lot while crossing to the company office
  from where he had parked the company truck.

       Defendant's motion for summary judgment is based on 21 V.S.A. §§ 622 &
  624(a), which state:

     § 622.  Right to compensation exclusive

        The rights and remedies granted by the provisions of this
     chapter to an employee on account of a personal injury for which
     he is entitled to compensation under the provisions of this chapter
     shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his
     personal representatives, dependents or next of kin, at common
     law or otherwise on account of such injury.

     § 624.  Dual liability; claims, settlement procedure
  
        (a)  Where the injury for which compensation is payable under
     the provisions of this chapter was caused under circumstances
     creating a legal liability to pay the resulting damages in some
     person other than the employer, the acceptance of compensation
     benefits or the commencement of proceedings to enforce
     compensation payments shall not act as an election of remedies,
     but the injured employee or the employee's personal representative
     may also proceed to enforce the liability of such third party for
     damages in accordance with the provisions of this section.

  These two sections establish that an injured employee who has received
  workers' compensation benefits may not bring a common-law negligence action
  against the employer, but may bring such an action against any other party. 
  Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 211,