Title: In re Bailey

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Bailey (2003-263); 178 Vt. 614; 883 A.2d 765

2005 VT 38A

[Filed 26-July-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-263
  	
                               JULY TERM, 2005

  In re Appeal of Richard Bailey	}	APPEALED FROM:
                                        }
                                        }	
      	                                }	Environmental Court
                                        }	
  	                                }
                                        }	DOCKET NO.  230-10-02 Vtec

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       In response to appellee's April 5, 2005 motion for reargument, this
  Court's March 22, 2005 decision is amended by revising the language in the
  last two sentences of paragraph 9 and adding a footnote to that paragraph. 
  The amended decision also includes Chief Justice Reiber's dissenting
  statement that he would allow reargument.  In all other respects, the
  decision remains unchanged, and appellee's motion for reargument is denied.

  Dissenting:	                       BY THE COURT:

       	
  ______________________________       _____________________________________
  Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice	       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _____________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _____________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT 38A

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-263

                              APRIL TERM, 2004

  In re Appeal of Richard Bailey	}	APPEALED FROM:
                                        }
                                        }
                                        }	Environmental Court
                                        }	
  	                                }
                                        }	DOCKET NO. 230-10-02 Vtec

                                                Trial Judge: Merideth Wright

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Plaintiff Richard E. Bailey appeals from an environmental
  court order affirming a decision by the Town of Arlington's Zoning Board of
  Adjustment (Board) that granted a variance from the front and rear setback
  requirements for an undersized land parcel owned by Black Locust
  Development, LLC (applicant).  Plaintiff contends that the court erred when
  it included a strip of land which is used as a public highway, although
  owned by applicant, in determining whether applicant's property qualifies
  for treatment as a pre-existing small lot under 24 V.S.A. § 4406(1) and the
  Arlington zoning ordinance.  Plaintiff further argues that if the property
  is a pre-existing small lot, applicant cannot demonstrate that it meets all
  five of the requirements necessary to obtain a variance.  We reverse.

       ¶  2.  The facts of this case are undisputed and can be summarized
  as follows.  Applicant owns a parcel of land on Route 7A adjacent to a U.S.
  Post Office.  The lot as deeded is approximately 8100 square feet in area
  and has dimensions of 120' of frontage and 67 ½' of depth.  The 67 ½'
  dimension includes approximately 33 ½' of highway over which the State
  holds a public easement for road travel.  Without including the public
  highway, the parcel is 34' deep and has an area of approximately 4080
  square feet.  During the 1970s, a 1770 square foot service station operated
  on the disputed property.  After the service station discontinued
  operations, it was used by the then owner as a residence until it was
  purchased by applicant in 1999.  In the spring of 2000, applicant tore down
  the former service station.  Several months later, plaintiff purchased an
  adjacent vacant parcel.  Plaintiff purchased his lot for the purpose of
  preserving undeveloped land in the Arlington area with the expectation that
  applicant's land would remain undeveloped.  

       ¶  3.  Applicant has entered into a purchase and sale agreement with
  Frank A. Molgano contingent on the issuance of a zoning permit for his
  proposed 640 square foot commercial building.  The proposed building would
  house a real estate office with four parking spaces.  This lot is located
  in Arlington's commercial residential zone.  In order to allow development
  in this zone, the town's zoning ordinance requires that a lot be at least ½
  acre in size and allow for a front yard set-back of 25' and a rear yard
  set-back of 15'-applicant's lot cannot meet these requirements.

       ¶  4.  The zoning ordinance allows certain preexisting undersized
  lots to be developed:
   
    Any lot in individual and separate non-affiliated ownership from
    surrounding properties in existence on the effective date of this
    Bylaw (August 28, 1973) may be developed for the purposes
    permitted in the district in which it is located, even though not
    conforming to minimum lot size requirements, if such lot is not
    less than one-eighth (1/8) acre in area with a minimum width or
    depth dimension of forty (40) feet.

  This ordinance provision is identical to 24 V.S.A. § 4406(1), which
  requires its inclusion  in every zoning ordinance in the state.  See
  Drumheller v. Shelburne Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 155 Vt. 524, 527, 586 A.2d 1150, 1151 (1990).  Applicant claimed the lot is covered by this
  provision and, therefore, could be developed even though it did not meet
  the minimum lot size requirement for the zone.  He also sought a variance
  from both the front and rear setback requirements.  

       ¶  5.  At the Board hearing, plaintiff challenged both the status of
  applicant's lot as a preexisting undersized lot under the ordinance and
  applicant's variance request.  Over plaintiff's objections, the Board
  granted applicant's variance, after concluding that it did not have to meet
  the minimum size requirement. Plaintiff appealed the Board's decision to
  the environmental court.

       ¶  6.  Plaintiff argued in the environmental court that applicant's
  lot did not meet the requirement of a preexisting undersized lot because it
  was neither 1/8 acre in area nor 40' deep if the highway area was excluded
  when calculating the lot size and depth.  The environmental court rejected
  plaintiff's argument that the area under the road should not be considered,
  explaining that "[n]othing in the state statute [24 V.S.A. § 4406(1)] or
  town ordinance requires that all the land in such an undersized lot be
  useable land, or that it would in any way be practical actually to develop
  the lot . . . the practical ability to develop the lot does not affect its
  status as an existing small lot."  The court also found that applicant
  satisfied the variance criteria.  

       ¶  7.  Plaintiff appeals the court's ruling, challenging the
  decision to treat applicant's lot as a preexisting undersized lot and the
  grant of the variance.  We conclude that the area under the highway cannot
  be included in the lot size calculation and therefore that the lot is not a
  preexisting undersized lot as defined by the ordinance.  We do not reach
  whether the court erred when it determined that applicant met the variance
  criteria. 

       ¶  8.  The pre-existing undersized lot provision acts as a
  grandfather clause allowing development of lots that do not meet a town's
  minimum lot size requirements.  In Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Board, 148
  Vt. 47, 51,