Title: State ex. rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Arthur

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

State ex. rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Arthur  State ex. rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Arthur 1999 OK 97 991 P.2d 1026 70 OBJ 3637 Case Number: SCBD-4440 Decided: 12/07/1999 Supreme Court of Oklahoma STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association, Complainant, v. ROBERT H. ARTHUR, Respondent. [991 P.2d 1027] BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING. ¶0 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the complaint alleges, in one count, multiple instances of unprofessional conduct deemed to warrant sanctions. Upon de novo review of the evidence presented to the trial panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal and acceptance of the parties' stipulated findings of fact and conclusions of law, RESPONDENT'S LICENSE TO PRACTICE LAW IS ORDERED SUSPENDED FOR A PERIOD OF THIRTY DAYS AND HE IS DIRECTED TO PAY THE COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING NOT LATER THAN NINETY DAYS AFTER THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL. Janis Hubbard, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Complainant. [991 P.2d 1028] Robert H. Arthur, pro se, Duncan, Oklahoma for Respondent. OPALA, J. ¶1 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the issues to be decided are: (1) Does the record submitted for our examination provide sufficient evidence for a meaningful de novo consideration of the complaint's disposition? I INTRODUCTION TO THE RECORD ¶2 The Oklahoma Bar Association [Bar] charged Robert H. Arthur [Arthur or respondent], a licensed lawyer, with one count of professional misconduct. ¶3 Following receipt of the parties' joint brief and upon consideration of the testimony on file and stipulations, the trial panel issued a report with its findings of fact and conclusions of law together with a recommendation for discipline. In accord with the parties' stipulations, the Professional Responsibility Tribunal [PRT or trial panel] found that Arthur violated ORPC Rules 1.8(a) and 1.8(b). It recommended that Arthur be privately reprimanded and that he bear the costs of the proceedings. II THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT CONTAINS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A MEANINGFUL DE NOVO CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS PROCEEDING ¶4 In a bar disciplinary proceeding this court functions in an adjudicative capacity as a licensing authority vested with exclusive original jurisdiction.5 Its cognizance [991 P.2d 1029] rests on the constitutionally invested, nondelegable power to regulate the practice of law. The court's authority includes the licensure, ethics, and discipline of legal practitioners in this state.6 Before deciding whether discipline is warranted and what sanction, if any, is to be imposed for the misconduct alleged, this court conducts a nondeferential, full-scale, de novo examination of all relevant facts,7 in the course of which the recommendations of the trial panel are neither binding nor persuasive.8 The court is not guided by the standard-of-review criteria applicable in the context of corrective process on appeal or on certiorari. In the latter context mandated deference may require that another tribunal's findings of fact be left undisturbed.9 ¶5 The court's duty can be discharged only if the trial panel submits a complete record of its proceedings.10 Our initial task is to ascertain whether the record is sufficient to permit (a) an independent determination of the critical facts and (b) the crafting of appropriate discipline. The latter factor is to be guided by (1) what is consistent with the discipline imposed upon other lawyers who have committed similar acts of professional misconduct and (2) what discipline avoids the vice of visiting disparate treatment on the respondent-lawyer.11 ¶6 Arthur has admitted, and the record supports, the charge of professional misconduct. Upon consideration of the record, we conclude that its contents are adequate for this court's de novo consideration of respondent's professional misconduct. III THE CHARGES LODGED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT ¶7 The charges against Arthur rest on three loans he solicited and received from two clients. Beginning in 1994, Arthur performed estate planning among other legal services for an elderly couple, Mr. and Mrs. Detrick. ¶6 Arthur has admitted, and the record supports, the charge of professional misconduct. Upon consideration of the record, we conclude that its contents are adequate for this court's de novo consideration of respondent's professional misconduct. III THE CHARGES LODGED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT ¶7 The charges against Arthur rest on three loans he solicited and received from two clients. Beginning in 1994, Arthur performed estate planning among other legal services for an elderly couple, Mr. and Mrs. Detrick.¶8 Arthur failed to repay the loans despite repeated reassurances he would do so. Mrs. Detrick eventually sought the assistance of another lawyer to help her secure repayment of the obligation that was then in default. Only after Mrs. Detrick contacted the Bar, and professional disciplinary proceedings were imminent, did Arthur make arrangements to repay the loans.18 IV ENTERING A BUSINESS TRANSACTION WITH A CLIENT ¶9 The Bar has charged Arthur with violating ORPC Rule 1.8(a) ¶10 While representing a client a lawyer is often privy to financial information that may lead the legal practitioner to approach a client about entering into a business transaction. ¶11 Arthur admits that he procured a loan from his client without complying with the procedure prescribed by Rule 1.8(a) and (b). By his conduct Arthur has impermissibly used information obtained in the course of client representation with a view to entering into a business transaction for a purely personal purpose. There is here no question about the respondent's breach of professional discipline. The sole issue is whether a more severe sanction should be imposed. ¶12 On de novo consideration, we adopt the PRT's findings of fact and conclusions of law, holding that more severe discipline is warranted because respondent entered into a business transaction with a client and used [991 P.2d 1031] information gained in the course of representation to the client's disadvantage. V A THIRTY-DAY SUSPENSION IS AN APPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR RESPONDENT'S PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT ¶13 The primary purpose for imposing professional discipline is not to punish the offender but to protect the public by a thorough inquest into the respondent's continued fitness to practice law. ¶14 As for mitigating factors, we are reliably informed that respondent has repaid the borrowed funds¶15 Although both the PRT and the Bar recommend that respondent be privately reprimanded (and that he bear the costs of these proceedings), the court is of the view and holds that the severity of the offence (combined with a lack of compelling mitigating factors) warrants a license suspension for thirty days. ¶16 Respondent's misconduct results from three separate violations of the ORPC. Upon de novo review, the court concludes that there is clear and convincing evidence of respondent's violations charged in the complaint. In appropriate instances an attorney may be disciplined more severely than the PRT and Bar have recommended. This is especially true when the degree of discipline the court imposes is consistent with other decisions in like cases. ¶17 Respondent's license to practice law is accordingly suspended for thirty days and he shall pay the costs of this proceeding - in the sum of $227.23 - not later than ninety days after this opinion becomes final. ¶18 SUMMERS, C.J., and LAVENDER, OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, and BOUDREAU, JJ., concur; ¶19 HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and HODGES, J., concur in part and dissent in part. HODGES, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. ¶1 I would impose a public reprimand. FOOT