Title: State v. Pidcock

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

759 P.2d 1092 (1988)
306 Or. 335
STATE of Oregon, Respondent On Review,
v.
Thomas Henry PIDCOCK, Petitioner On Review.
CC 10-85-09438; CA A40456; SC S34991.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted June 8, 1988.
Decided August 2, 1988.
Reconsideration Denied September 20, 1988.
*1093 Larry R. Roloff, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner on review.
Rives Kistler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review.
JONES, Justice.
Defendant appealed his convictions on two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, ORS 475.992(4)(b), contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Pidcock, 89 Or. App. 443, 749 P.2d 597 (1988). We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals recited the stipulated facts of the parties as follows:
The record establishes that defendant never claimed the briefcase, apparently fearing apprehension.
The sheriff did not obtain a warrant for the search of the briefcase or its contents. Defendant moved to suppress the briefcase and its contents, relying on Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and the federal Fourth Amendment. Defendant argues: (1) The police had no authority to open and search the briefcase; (2) the police had no probable cause to believe that the briefcase contained contraband; and (3) once the police opened the briefcase, they needed a warrant to open and search the manila envelopes. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and held that when defendant made no effort to claim or recover the briefcase after he learned the briefcase and contents were in police custody, that defendant "abandoned" the property in a constitutional sense. The Court of Appeals stated: "One who acts to abandon property cannot claim a constitutional violation, even if the act was done to avoid police action." 89 Or. App. at 448, 749 P.2d 597.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals' analysis, although we affirm the result. Defendant did not "abandon" the briefcase until after the deputies had opened the briefcase and opened the envelopes and tested their contents without a warrant. When the deputies opened the briefcase and tested the contents, defendant was still actively attempting to recover that property. Defendant nevertheless loses the motion to suppress, because the deputies were not searching the briefcase or contents for contraband related to any criminal activity. Rather, when the police opened the briefcase and the envelopes, *1095 they were simply trying to identify the owner.
Finders of lost property have a statutory duty to attempt to return the property to its owner. When the finder of the property turned it over to law enforcement officers, on the finder's own initiative, the deputies were placed in the position of the finder. ORS 98.005 provides:
The statutes concerning lost or misplaced property, taken together, place a burden on the finder of lost property to discover the owner of the property. ORS 98.005 gives the finder a claim to the property if the owner is unknown. If the owner is known, ORS 98.005 does not apply.
Under the facts as determined by the trial court, the sheriff's deputies were simply assisting the finder of the property to ascertain the identity of the owner or to determine if the owner of the briefcase was indeed unknown, as described in ORS 98.005. In doing so, an officer may open the briefcase in an attempt to identify the owner, just as the statute would make it reasonable and proper for the citizen to have done the same act.
The trial court accepted the prosecutor's statement of facts, which included the following:
Apparently after the deputies opened the manila envelopes, seeking identification, they found plastic baggies containing white and brownish granular material. The deputies could see, without conducting any search, that these baggies contained substances which they knew from experience probably contained cocaine and methamphetamine. The crime laboratory found that one of the plastic baggies contained cocaine and the other baggie contained methamphetamine.
Defense counsel stipulated to the statement of evidence by the prosecutor, but did comment as follows:
The trial court resolved this factual dispute by stating:
The court then concluded:
From the above, it is apparent that the trial court found that the sheriff's deputies had opened the briefcase, first to discover identification and, second, to find out whether it contained a bomb. Once the deputies had opened the briefcase, the manila envelopes were readily visible. Nothing about the manila envelopes announced their contents. The trial court found that the deputies opened the envelopes in a further attempt to identify the owner of the property. That was reasonable. It was done in pursuit of a statutory, nonprosecutorial objective, not law enforcement. Compare State v. Bridewell, 306 Or. 231, 759 P.2d 1054 (1988). The evidence that the deputies found and used to prosecute defendant was not sought in the course of this civil function. Cf. Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (1987), where the actions were not a part of the police's civil functions. Once the deputies opened the manila envelopes for that legitimate purpose, the contents of the plastic baggies "announce[d] their contents," see State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 206, 729 P.2d 524 (1986), and no search warrant was necessary for the deputies to deliver the baggies to the crime laboratory for testing. Obviously, the deputies had probable cause to obtain a warrant to open the manila envelopes once they found the weapon, the marijuana and the $9,000. Had the deputies opened the manila envelopes in search of contraband, they would have violated defendant's state and probably federal constitutional rights. However, the trial court found that the deputies were seeking identification and not contraband. That finding is supported by the evidence and is binding upon us. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 443 P.2d 621 (1968). As such, the opening of the manila envelopes by the sheriff's department was permissible and the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court are affirmed.