Title: Jeffrey Lee Atwater v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC94865
____________
JEFFREY LEE ATWATER, 
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee.
____________
No. SC99-179
____________
JEFFREY LEE ATWATER, 
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc., et al., 
Respondents.
[June 7, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
Jeffrey Lee Atwater, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order
1  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993)
-2-
entered by the trial court denying his postconviction motion filed pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850; he also petitions this Court for a writ of
habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9) Fla. Const.  These
cases have been consolidated.  We affirm the trial court’s denial of 3.850 relief, and
we deny habeas relief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The following is a statement of the facts that appears in Atwater v. State, 626
So. 2d 1325, 1327 (Fla. 1993):
On August 11, 1989, Atwater entered the John Knox Apartments in St.
Petersburg, Florida, to see Ken Smith, the victim in this case.  Upon entering
the apartment building, Atwater proceeded to Smith’s room where he
remained for about twenty minutes.  After Atwater left, Smith’s body was
discovered in the room.  Smith was dead and his money was missing. 
Atwater told several people that he had killed Smith.  Atwater was arrested
the same day for killing Smith.  At trial, he was convicted of first-degree
murder and robbery.  The jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to
one.  The trial judge found three aggravating factors and no statutory
mitigating factors.  The judge held that the aggravators outweighed the
mitigators and sentenced Atwater to death.
On appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions and sentence of death.
Atwater timely filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850.  He raised twenty-four claims.  After a Huff1 hearing, the
2  The issues that were the subject of the evidentiary hearing were (1) whether
trial counsel improperly conceded Atwater’s guilt to second-degree murder during
the penalty phase closing argument and whether trial counsel prevented Atwater
from testifying in his own behalf; and (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective
during the guilt phase proceeding because of trial counsel’s concession of guilt to a
lesser crime and issues related to that allegation.
3  Atwater testified that given the opportunity at trial, he would have testified
that he was innocent and had not killed the victim.  The trial court ruled that it was
too speculative to find that such testimony would have altered the outcome of the
case in light of the overwhelming evidence against Atwater.  The trial court also
held that defense counsel’s plea to the jury to consider second-degree murder as an
attempt to save Atwater’s life, under the circumstances of this case, was legitimate
trial strategy with or without Atwater’s knowledge or consent, citing McNeal
v.Wainwright, 722 F. 2d 674 (11th Cir. 1984), and McNeal v. State, 409 So. 2d 528
(Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
4  Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137
(1987)
-3-
trial court summarily denied all but two2 of Atwater’s claims.  After an evidentiary
hearing on the two remaining claims, however, the trial court denied those two
claims as well. 3
Atwater now appeals the denial of all the claims in his initial 3.850 motion and
petitions separately for a writ of habeas corpus.
In the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Atwater alleges:  (1) The trial court
gave a nonstandard Enmund/Tison4 jury instruction in the penalty phase and
appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise this issue; (2) Atwater’s sentence
rests upon an unconstitutionally automatic aggravating circumstance; (3) Atwater’s
-4-
rights were denied by the judge and jury’s consideration of nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances.  Appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to raise this claim; (4) Electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment; (5) No
reliable transcript of Atwater’s trial exists, and reliable appellate review was and is
not possible, and there is no way to ensure that which occurred in the trial court
was or can be reviewed on appeal, so the judgment and sentence must be vacated.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby denied.  Claims 1 and 2 are
not proper claims for habeas corpus relief.  “[H]abeas corpus petitions are not to
be used for additional appeals on questions which could have been, should have
been, or were raised on appeal or in a rule 3.850 motion, or on matters that were
not objected to at trial.”  Parker v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989).  As to
the substance of claim 2, this Court rejected this argument in Hudson v. State, 708
So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1998), and Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1997).  Claims 3, 4,
and 5 were also raised in Atwater’s motion for postconviction relief and are
procedurally barred as well. See Parker, 550 So. 2d 459.  As for the claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel raised in claims 1 and 3, these claims are
without merit.  See Harvey v. Dugger, 650 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1995); Ferguson v.
Singletary, 632 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1993); Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 469 (Fla.
1992) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
-5-
Atwater’s claims on appeal from the denial of his 3.850 motion are
paraphrased as follows: (1) Atwater’s trial counsel was ineffective because counsel
conceded guilt without Atwater’s consent; (2) The trial court erred in denying
Atwater a hearing on his claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in
the penalty phase of the trial; (3) Judgment must be vacated because no reliable
transcript of Atwater’s trial exists and reliable appellate review is and was not
possible; (4) Trial counsel was ineffective because the state elicited false and
misleading evidence and expert testimony from FBI agents; (5) The trial court erred
in allowing the prosecutor to elicit opinion testimony regarding blood spatter
evidence from unqualified witnesses; (6) The CCP aggravator is unconstitutionally
vague and the jury was improperly instructed on this aggravator; (7) The State
failed to reveal that it made promises of lenient treatment to witnesses; (8) The trial
court erred in improperly failing to find the statutory mitigator of no significant
criminal history; (9) The trial court failed to ensure Atwater’s presence during
critical stages of the proceedings and Atwater was prejudiced thereby; (10) The
State failed to prove each and every element of the offenses charged; (11)
Atwater’s guilt phase jury instructions were erroneous, unreliable and unsupported
by the evidence; (12)  The jury and judge improperly considered nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances:  the prosecutor’s inflammatory and improper comments
-6-
and arguments; (13)  Trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire; (14)  Atwater’s
sentence rests upon unconstitutionally automatic aggravating circumstances; (15)
The trial court violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to find and weigh the
mitigating circumstances in the record; (16) Florida’s capital sentencing statute is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it fails to prevent the arbitrary
and capricious imposition of the death penalty; (17) Atwater was denied effective
assistance of counsel at the pretrial phase of his trial; (18) The errors at trial were
not harmless when viewed as a whole; (19) Atwater was denied the right to an
individualized sentencing when the court submitted to the jury during deliberations a
copy of a death penalty sentencing outline designed as a judicial tool to assist the
courts in conducting a penalty phase trial; (20) Atwater was denied effective
assistance of counsel at pretrial and the guilt phase when the defense attorney failed
to object to the introduction of gruesome and shocking autopsy photos; (21)
Atwater is innocent of first degree and second-degree murder and was denied
adversarial testing due to ineffective assistance of counsel; (22)  Atwater was
denied effective assistance of counsel at pretrial and guilt phase of his trial because
a full adversarial testing did not occur and counsel’s performance was deficient.
5  The following claims are procedurally barred because they could and should
have been raised on direct appeal:  3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17 (which is a repleading
of claims 3 and 9), and 19.  See Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1995);
Rivera v. Dugger, 629 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1993); Mendyk v. State, 592 So. 2d 1076 (Fla.
1992).  The following claims are without merit:  4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16,
20, 21 (this claim is a repleading of claim 1 which is more fully discussed in this
opinion), and 22.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Provenzano v.
Moore, 744 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999; Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1997); Kennedy
v. State, 547 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1989)(“A defendant may not simply file a motion
for postconviction relief containing conclusory allegations that his or her trial counsel
was ineffective and then expect to receive an evidentiary hearing.”).  Claim 18 alleges
cumulative error.  Because we determine no errors occurred, we necessarily must
conclude that this claim is without merit.  See Downs v. State, 740 So. 2d 506, 509
(Fla. 1999) (finding that where allegations of individual error are found without merit,
a cumulative error argument based thereon must also fail).
-7-
We only discuss claims 1 and 2 of the 3.850 motion.5 
We begin our analysis with the general proposition that a defendant is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion,
files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.  See, e.g.,
Maharaj v. State, 684 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1996); Anderson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1170
(Fla. 1993); Hoffman v. State, 571 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1990);  Holland v. State, 503
So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1987); Lemon v. State, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986); Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.850.  The defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based
upon a legally valid claim.  Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet
this burden.  See Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1989).   However, in
-8-
cases where there has been no evidentiary hearing, we must accept the factual
allegations made by the defendant to the extent that they are not refuted by the
record.  See Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253  (Fla. 1999); Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d
1331 (Fla. 1997).  We must examine each claim to determine if it is legally
sufficient, and, if so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record.
Generally, when a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, he
must establish the two prongs necessary to demonstrate ineffectiveness as outlined
by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
specifically:
        A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's
assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a
conviction or death sentence has two components.  First,
the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable.  Unless a defendant makes both showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that
renders the result unreliable.
466 U.S. at 687.  In reviewing counsel's performance, "a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
-9-
professional assistance."  Id. at 689. 
In claim 1 of his motion for postconviction relief, Atwater argues that during
closing arguments, his counsel forcefully argued in favor of second-degree murder,
displayed gruesome crime scene photographs to the jury, argued the crime was one
of malice, and rejected any consideration of manslaughter because the facts
supported a more serious offense.  Defense counsel’s actions, Atwater argues,
were more like those of a prosecutor than a defense attorney.  Atwater states that
he did not consent to defense counsel’s strategy to concede guilt to any crime.  He
argues that conceding guilt is equivalent to a guilty plea, and defense counsel was
required under Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000), to secure Atwater’s
explicit consent before making any concession to any element of the crime charged,
even if the concession was to a lesser included offense.
The State argues that any concession to a lesser included offense was
legitimate trial strategy in an attempt to save Atwater’s life and that such a strategy
was necessary in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.  The State further
contends counsel’s action was proper even without Atwater’s knowledge or
consent, in accord with McNeal v. Wainwright, 722 F. 2d 674 (11th Cir. 1984), and
McNeal v. State, 409 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).  
At the evidentiary hearing below, defense co-counsel White testified that as
-10-
an experienced attorney of seventeen years with five or six capital trials and over a
hundred criminal trials, he did not believe Atwater had a chance at getting an
acquittal.  His strategy was to save Atwater’s life.  Defense co-counsel
Schwartzberg testified that although he did not recollect a specific conversation
with Atwater as to whether Atwater would consent to such a strategy, he always
explains his strategy to his clients and would have done so in this case.
Not all decisions of counsel are reviewable under Strickland as constituting
ineffective assistance of counsel.  “[A]ny specific discretionary or judgmental act
or position of trial counsel, whether tactical or strategic, on an inquiry as to
effectiveness of counsel” will not be considered under Strickland.  McNeal v. State,
409 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).  Sometimes concession of guilt to some
of the prosecutor’s claims is good trial strategy and within defense counsel’s
discretion in order to gain credibility and acceptance of the jury.
When faced with the duty of attempting to avoid
the consequences of overwhelming evidence of the
commission of an atrocious crime, such as a deliberate,
considered killing without the remotest legal justification
or excuse,  it is commonly considered a good trial
strategy for a defense counsel to make some halfway
concessions to the truth in order to give the appearance
of reasonableness and candor and to thereby gain
credibility and jury acceptance of some more important
position.
-11-
Id. at 529.  In McNeal, the defendant was on trial for a capital felony.  Defense
counsel argued in summation to the jury that, “at most and at best, one and only
logical result of the State’s evidence was proof of manslaughter.”  Id.  The
defendant was nevertheless convicted of first-degree murder.  On appeal from the
denial of his motion for postconviction relief, defendant argued that defense
counsel abdicated his function and the defendant’s cause.  The defendant claimed
he did not consent to the concession.  The court rejected the defendant’s
argument, however, and held that “[t]o be effectual, trial counsel should be able to
do this without express approval of his client and without risk of being branded as
being professionally ineffective because others may have different judgments or
less experience.”  Id. 
In seeking federal habeas corpus relief, McNeal again alleged that his trial
counsel improperly conceded guilt without his consent.  The Eleventh Circuit
agreed that defense counsel’s decision to concede guilt to a lesser charge was a
tactical decision and not reviewable as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
“In view of the overwhelming evidence against McNeal, including a tape recording
of his confession to the shooting, the strategy of trial counsel was proper and
would not amount to a constitutional violation.” McNeal v. Wainwright, 722 F.2d
674, 676 (11th Cir. 1984).  The Eleventh Circuit distinguished McNeal from a
-12-
situation where defense counsel concedes guilt to the offense charged and makes a
plea for leniency.  The latter situation requires a client’s consent.  The former is
counsel’s strategy that may bind a client even when made without consultation. See
McNeal, 722 F.2d at 677 (citing Thomas v. Zant, 697 F.2d 977, 987 (11th Cir.
1983)).
The trial court in this case properly relied upon and applied McNeal. Defense
counsel properly made a strategic decision to argue that the facts showed
Atwater’s acts constituted second-degree murder, and not first-degree murder as
was charged.  This argument was presented to the jury after the State presented its
case and after the State’s summation of the evidence in closing argument.  As we
stated in our opinion on the direct appeal of this case, there was overwhelming
evidence of guilt.  Atwater v. State, 626 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1993).  
In light of the evidence against Atwater, defense counsel properly attempted
to maintain credibility with the jury by being candid as to the weight of the
evidence.  Faced with the prospect of a guilty verdict for first-degree murder and in
light of the State’s evidence, defense counsel’s concession, which was made only
in rebuttal to the State’s closing argument, was reasonable and does not amount to
a constitutional violation.  The concession was made to a lesser crime than
charged, during rebuttal closing argument, and after a meaningful adversarial testing
-13-
of the State’s case.  See, e.g., Brown v. State, 755 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2000) (holding
that concession of guilt of lesser offense did not require defendant’s consent and
was proper strategy in attempt to avoid death sentence in light of overwhelming
evidence).  
While counsel’s actions in this case were proper, not every situation permits
trial counsel to make a concession on a defendant’s behalf without the defendant’s
consent.  In Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000), we remanded a case
where counsel conceded the defendant’s guilt to the crime charged in the opening
statement of the guilt phase.  In opening statement, before any evidence was
presented, defense counsel told the jury that the case was not about the victim’s
death, but about the defendant’s death and whether the defendant would die by
electrocution or die by natural causes after a lifetime of confinement.  In closing
argument, defense counsel told the jury that he believed the State had proven its
case of first-degree premeditated murder against his client.  Defense counsel
entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing;
therefore, the State’s case was never challenged. 
“[I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful
adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that
makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.”  United States v.
6  Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate (1) deficient performance
by counsel and (2) prejudice.
-14-
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).  Thus, in Nixon we held that unless the
defendant expressly consented to this strategy, or in effect knowingly and
voluntarily consented to decline meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution’s
case, then prejudice to the defendant is presumed and counsel is thus per se
ineffective.6   The presumption discussed in Cronic, while applicable in Nixon, is
not applicable here.  
In this case, there was a meaningful adversarial testing.  The State presented
twenty witnesses.  Defense counsel conducted meaningful cross-examination of
fifteen of these witnesses.  The witnesses that defense counsel did not cross-
examine were minor witnesses.  At no point during the opening statement or during
any of the testimony did defense counsel concede Atwater’s guilt.  During the first
part of defense counsel’s closing argument, defense counsel argued that the State
failed to prove robbery and therefore could not prove felony murder. Defense
counsel stated in the first part of closing arguments that he would address
premeditation after the State’s closing argument.  The State argued in closing
argument that it had proven robbery and premeditation, and discussed the evidence
presented which included:  Atwater had threatened to kill Smith a week before;
-15-
Smith was afraid of Atwater and hid from him; on the night of the murder Atwater
signed in on the clerk’s log at Smith’s apartment building; Atwater exited
approximately twenty minutes later and told the desk clerk that nobody answered
the door; Atwater had blood on his shoes and pants that was not from Atwater
himself; and Atwater told his aunt and cousin that he killed Smith and enjoyed it.  In
response, then, and in rebuttal closing argument, defense counsel addressed
premeditation and argued that the evidence might support the lesser offense of
second-degree murder, but there was nothing to support premeditation.  In light of
the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented by the State, which we acknowledged
in our opinion on the direct appeal, defense counsel’s argument was reasonable. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is not measured by the result of counsel’s efforts. 
We cannot say that counsel here did not subject the State’s case to meaningful
adversarial testing.  Indeed, defense counsel did subject the State’s case to
meaningful testing, and only after the State’s case was presented and fully argued
did defense counsel resort to making some concession--a trial strategy intended to
save Atwater’s life.  Under the circumstances, this strategy was reasonable.
Even if defense counsel had denied that Atwater was guilty of any crime,
there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different
conclusion given the evidence against him.   See Patton v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly
-16-
S749 (Fla. Sept. 28, 2000) (finding the facts counsel conceded were supported by
overwhelming evidence and even if counsel had denied these facts, there was no
reasonable possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict).  Therefore,
the trial court properly denied Atwater’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective
for making certain concessions without Atwater’s consent.
As to claim 2, Atwater presents several arguments in support of the assertion
that in the penalty phase of the trial, defense counsel failed to adequately present
evidence in mitigation and failed to adequately challenge the State’s case.   Claim 2
is without merit as well.  The trial court dismissed this claim without an evidentiary
hearing.  As we stated above, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a
postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a
particular claim is legally insufficient. The record in this case conclusively shows
that Atwater is entitled to no relief.  Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed
this claim.
Although Atwater’s claim 2  is without merit, Atwater’s contention that
certain evidence should have been but was not presented for consideration warrants
discussion.  Atwater claims that the following evidence was not presented: 
Atwater, born in 1963, never met or saw his father; Atwater was illegitimate and
-17-
grew up in a town where this was frowned on.  He and his mother were on public
assistance and moved from one small town to another.  Atwater’s mother had an
illegitimate daughter in 1965.  The children were inadequately clothed and
emotionally deprived.  When Atwater’s mother had bad luck with men, she drank
gin.  At age 3, Atwater suffered nosebleeds for a year before he received medical
attention; he was diagnosed with Von Willebrand Syndrome and an upper
respiratory infection.  Atwater was in a special reading class in elementary school;
he later was diagnosed with ADD.  In 1968, Atwater’s mother became pregnant
again and married the baby’s father; Atwater’s new stepfather physically and
emotionally abused him.  In 1974, Atwater’s younger sister was hit by a car and
died, and his mother was glad there was one fewer mouth to feed.  Atwater had an
interest in athletics in high school but could not afford to pursue these interests, and
had to work.  In high school Atwater became attached to a pastor in his church and
his mother did not approve of the relationship; the pastor was transferred out of
state.  Atwater was intoxicated at the time of the murder.  
Atwater argues that these facts show the following nonstatutory mitigators: 
poverty; lack of a father and, later on, a bad father figure; illegitimacy and
community opprobrium; a nomadic family lifestyle; emotional deprivation as a
child; alcohol abuse by his mother; physical and emotional abuse; learning
-18-
disorders and retention in school; grief over the death of his sister; drug and
alcohol addiction; early potential demonstrated by his participation in school
athletics, economic support for his family, church activities, voluntary association
with a beneficial male role model, and voluntary counseling, which were curtailed
by his mother and poverty.
Atwater’s personal and family history were, in fact, presented.  Defense
counsel offered the testimony of four lay witnesses and one expert witness in the
penalty phase trial.  Three of the four lay witnesses testified to events that occurred
on the day of Smith’s murder and one lay witness testified to recent interactions he
had with Atwater and observations about Atwater and his family.  Dr. Merin, a
forensic psychologist and Atwater’s expert witness, testified that he examined
Atwater.  In preparation for the penalty phase trial, Dr. Merin testified that he
reviewed depositions, police reports, investigative reports, the autopsy report, and
photographs.  He conducted a battery of psychological tests on Atwater.  He met
with Atwater and discussed the events on the day of Smith’s murder, as well as
Atwater’s personal and family history and background.  He reviewed
correspondence from Atwater’s mother which supported Atwater’s
characterization of her.  Dr. Merin recounted Atwater’s personal history in his
report and at trial, including the following facts:  He was born in Connecticut and
-19-
lived with his mother.  She did not marry Atwater’s father.  Atwater never knew his
father.  When he was a small child, Atwater’s mother had a daughter, who was also
illegitimate.  She later had a short marriage, and bore a son.  Atwater’s mother was
frequently on welfare.  When Atwater was ten and his sister was eight, his sister
was killed in a car accident and Atwater’s mother apparently blamed him.  Atwater
described his mother as an alcoholic who was selfish and egocentric, and her
boyfriends were reportedly rich and married.  His mother physically and
emotionally abused him.  Atwater quit school twice, the first time due to a knee
injury which prevented him from playing football and thus gave him no reason to
continue to attend school.  The second time, Atwater quit after moving to another
school district and attending for five or six months.  He quit when his mother
ordered him out of the house and he had to live at the Salvation Army.  Atwater
married when he was 23 or 24 years old, and the marriage lasted about four
months.  He slapped his wife because she did not clean the house.  He has no
children.  He suffers from migraine headaches and uses Fiorinol and Codeine for
relief.  He had attended sessions with a mental health professional in his early teens,
but quit.  He takes alcoholic beverages and has a history of smoking marijuana and
using cocaine, LSD, hallucinogenic mushrooms, and amphetamine.  He denies that
he is dependent.  
-20-
Dr. Merin’s trial testimony reveals virtually the same factual evidence Atwater
claims was not presented as fact, but as told to the doctor, which forms the basis
for Atwater’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective.  The record refutes any
prejudice to Atwater.  The facts Atwater wishes to present as nonstatutory
mitigating factors were presented and the sentencing court weighed these facts.  In
the sentencing order, the court stated:
In considering any other aspect of Defendant’s character
or record and any other circumstances in the evidence
which was proffered as a mitigating circumstance, the
Court has carefully considered the following:  whether the
Defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional
distress (even if not “extreme”); whether the Defendant’s
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
impaired (even if not “substantially” impaired) by lack of
intelligence, personality disorder, consumption of alcohol
or perception that his aunt was being treated abusively by
the victim.  The Court additionally considered and
weighed the Defendant’s family background and his lack
of a close family relationship.  All of these factors were
presented to the jury during the penalty phase of the
proceedings in this case, as well as now being fully
considered and weighed by the Court.
In order to establish prejudice as required by Strickland, “[t]he defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
-21-
outcome.”  466 U.S. at 694.  Atwater has not established any prejudice caused by
defense counsel’s failure to present the requested mitigating evidence as fact, as
opposed to the presentation of that evidence through Dr. Merin.  The record shows
that the evidence as it was presented was considered in mitigation, and that the trial
court did not find that this nonstatutory mitigation evidence outweighed the
aggravating factors.  There is no reasonable probability that re-presenting virtually
the same evidence through other witnesses would have altered the outcome in any
manner. 
Atwater argues that defense counsel should have objected to the
prosecutor’s use of the background mitigation evidence that was presented as
nonstatutory aggravators; we find no error.  Again the record clearly shows that the
mitigation evidence offered was considered by the sentencing court.  Atwater also
argues that because defense counsel attempted to get a continuance for the penalty
phase portion of the trial, he was not prepared to proceed when the penalty phase
was begun.  This argument, too, is refuted by the fact that virtually all the evidence
Atwater would have put on in mitigation was actually put on and considered.  For
the same reason, we find no merit to Atwater’s assertion that the trial court
committed reversible error in its sentence of death which Atwater argues occurred
because his expert, Dr. Merin, was not aware that he had been found guilty of a
-22-
capital offense at the time of his deposition, which was taken after the guilt phase
but before the penalty phase, and had not interviewed family members at that time.
Again, the mitigation evidence Atwater would have put on was actually considered. 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 3.850 relief and
deny habeas corpus relief.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur with the majority's determination of the guilt phase issues,
I dissent from the majority's affirmance of the trial court's summary denial of relief
on Atwater's penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Because I
believe that the trial court erred in denying Atwater relief on that claim without an
evidentiary hearing, I would reverse for a hearing on this issue.  
In his postconviction motion, Atwater alleged that counsel was ineffective
for, among other things, failing to adequately investigate and present mitigation in
-23-
the penalty phase.  As a result of this failure, Atwater alleged that counsel was
unable to present a complete picture of Atwater to the jury, and that a complete
picture would have provided the jury a reason to recommend a life sentence.  In his
3.850 motion Atwater alleged:
3.  Jeffrey Lee Atwater was born on December 24, 1963, in a
hospital in Southington, Connecticut.  Due to circumstances beyond
his control Mr. Atwater's father had never met or seen Jeffrey Atwater. 
4.  Jeffrey and his mother lived in Plainville, Connecticut, a small
factory town that frowned on illegitimate children and teenage mothers. 
They received public welfare assistance and moved from one small
town to another in the Plainville area.  On December 11, 1965,
Jeffrey's sister, Croceann Atwater, was born.  Her father Ronald
Nolan never married her mother and was a small part of their lives.
5.  Atwater's mother, now had two children to raise and support
on her own.  She was unskilled and unable to provide for them.  They
were inadequately clothed and emotionally deprived. 
6.  Ms. Atwater began working as a cleaning woman at a fuel
company that was located next to her home.  Mr. Atwater's mother
dated various men, and when they did not show up for a pre-arranged
dates she would drink gin to drown her sorrows. 
7.  At age three, Jeffrey was taken to a hospital because of
constant nose bleeds that would not coagulate.  This condition had
continued for a year before he received medical attention.  When he
appeared before a physician he had black and blue marks on his chin
and other parts of his body.  He was diagnosed with Von Willebrand
Syndrome and an Upper Respiratory Infection.
8.  When Jeffrey entered elementary school he was placed in
"special reading" classes.  He had difficulty grasping concepts and
required tutorial help.  What is now known is that Jeffrey has ADD,
Attention Deficit Disorder with a particular language based learning
disability.  This kind of disability causes one to misunderstood [sic]
the information he receives.  People with ADD and in particular with a
-24-
learning disability such as this often tune out the world and react to it
from the "disinformation."  Little wonder that Jeffrey lacked self-
confidence and was unable to focus or concentrate on the subject
matter being presented in class.
9.  In 1968, Atwater's mother became pregnant with her third
child.  This time she married the child's father.  Jeffrey's stepfather
began to physically and emotionally abuse him.
10.  In 1974, Jeffrey's younger sister was hit by a car while
crossing the street near their home.  She was hospitalized with a
fractured skull and placed on a respirator.  Two days later her mother
had the respirator removed and she died.  Jeff was distraught over his
young sister's death.  When he went to his mother for comfort she
responded to him by saying "Now there's one less mouth to feed." 
11.  When Jeff entered high school he developed an interest in
athletics and joined the football team and participated in cross country
running.  He was forced to leave his athletic endeavors because of his
economic situation.  He found a job and gave his mother fifty dollars a
week to contribute to the family's expenses.
12.  Still looking for emotional support and comfort Jeff
attended a local church and began to participate in its youth services
program.  His mother did not approve of the Pastor at the church and
the relationship he and Jeff developed.  He often had Jeff join him and
his family for dinner.  The Pastor described Jeff as one of the "walking
wounded."  Jeff had been abused and abandoned and screamed out
for attention.  He responded to simple human kindness as an
extraordinary act and would develop strong loyalties to who ever was
kind to him.
13.  When the Pastor was transferred out of state to another
church Jeff was again left on his own without a support system.  His
relationship with his mother had deteriorated and he was forced out of
her home and into the local Salvation Army facility.  He was eighteen
years old at the time.  He continued to attend high school hoping to be
able to graduate.  He began to drink and use drugs which only
exaggerated his emotional problems.  He sought counseling to cope
and overcome his addictions but his financial problems interfered with
any consistent care.
7  At the Huff hearing, collateral counsel also stated that "Mr. Atwater's
contention is that he wasn't even told that he could bring mitigation witnesses at the
penalty phase."  
-25-
In addition to this family and background information that Atwater presented
in his motion, Atwater likewise pointed out that four of the five witnesses presented
by counsel were State witnesses, and that only Dr. Merin was not a State witness.7 
In other words, no family members testified.  On appeal, Atwater further argues
that an evidentiary hearing is also required to determine: (1) why defense counsel
presented Dr. Merin's recitation of Atwater's family history as if it were only Dr.
Merin's version, rather than as if it were the truth; and (2) defense counsel's
preparation for the penalty phase and counsel's desire for a continuance. 
In denying the request for an evidentiary hearing, the trial court stated:
The Court has reviewed the record and agrees with the State's
contention that defense mitigation witness Dr. Merin, a psychologist,
testified to essentially the same information about defendant's early life
and family situation as outlined in defendant's claim.  Defense counsel
also presented testimony from Dr. Merin and from three witnesses
regarding defendant's alcohol use.  The State points out that the
defendant does not suggest what other witnesses should have been
called by the defense counsel to testify to mitigation.  The Court
adopts the State's response as to this claim, and finds that defendant
does not meet the performance component of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Therefore, this ground has no
merit.
8  As Atwater advises, the trial court did not have the benefit of Gaskin when it
issued its order.
-26-
As Atwater contends, it is not clear as to whether the trial court relied upon
collateral counsel's failure to list the names of witnesses who would be available to
testify as to background mitigation, but to the extent that the court did so, that
reliance was improper.  See Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509, 514 n.10 (Fla. 1999). 
As we stated in Gaskin:
[N]othing in the rule states that a movant must allege the identities of
the witnesses, the nature of their testimony, or their availability to
testify.  It is during the evidentiary hearing that Gaskin must come
forward with witnesses to substantiate the allegations raised in the
postconviction motion.  Therefore, we hold that it was error for the
trial court to require Gaskin to plead the identities of witnesses in order
to be entitled to a hearing.
Id.8 
Moreover, as the majority opinion explains, a defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing unless:  (1) the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief; or (2) the motion on a
particular claim is legally insufficient.  See majority op. at 7.  In cases in which there
has been no evidentiary hearing on a claim, this Court must accept the defendant's
factual allegations to the extent that they are not refuted by the record.  See id. at 8.
-27-
In this case, the majority determines that the evidence Atwater sought to
present at the evidentiary hearing was merely cumulative and that "[t]he record . . .
conclusively shows that Atwater is entitled to no relief."  Id. at 16.  The majority
then goes on to evaluate the evidence.  See id. at 17-22.  Such an evaluation of the
evidence, however, is a function much better performed by the trial court after an
evidentiary hearing.  
Further, Atwater's claim in this case is that his counsel's investigation of his
family and background was inadequate and the only real evidence of family and
background came in through the testimony of the expert, Dr. Merin, who
specifically did not testify as to truth or accuracy.  In fact, Dr. Merin told the jury
that "[t]he presented history is essentially that, that is what he is telling me. What he
is telling me may or not be factual."  (Emphasis added.)  Additionally, Atwater
claims that defense counsel did not argue the existence of any mitigating
biographical facts at all, other than to belittle them as details.  He thus asserts that
his counsel's "presentation" of background mitigation consisted only of an
"excuse" for not presenting it because in closing, the only argument made by
defense counsel with regard to background mitigation was as follows:
Lastly, given the history that this man gave to Dr. Merin, a history that
– and evaluation that Dr. Merin thought was significant enough for you
all to contemplate and give what weight you thought was appropriate,
-28-
given all of his background of no father, I won't repeat it, I'm sure you
can remember the details, this man was a product of that.  Given all
that, is it no wonder that no one was here in the penalty phase to speak
up for him? 
Without an evidentiary hearing, it is impossible to state that the evidence
Atwater sought to present was merely cumulative, where the information that the
jury heard at trial came through an expert witness who did not vouch for the
accuracy of the information instead of through family members or others close to
Atwater who could testify first-hand to Atwater's difficult family upbringing. 
Without an evidentiary hearing, we do not know the potential qualitative effect of
this evidence on the evaluation of the aggravation and mitigation--both for the jury
and the trial judge.  It may be that defense counsel made a strategic decision not to
present family members or other witnesses and to instead rely solely on the
testimony of Dr. Merin.  Without an evidentiary hearing, however, we are unable to
make this determination.
Finally, even the majority's discussion of the facts presented at the penalty
phase, see majority op. at 18-20, does not completely incorporate all of the
mitigating factors that Atwater contends that counsel was ineffective for not
presenting.  See id. at 17-18.  These factors that were not included in the penalty
phase testimony include community opprobrium with regard to Atwater's
-29-
illegitimacy, the nomadic family lifestyle, emotional deprivation as a child, learning
disorders and retention in school, grief over the death of his sister, drug and
alcohol addiction, early potential, physical and emotional abuse by his stepfather,
and attachment to a pastor who was transferred out of state.
Given these allegations, the factual issues that Atwater raises should have
been resolved in an evidentiary hearing.  Indeed, this Court "[has] consistently held
that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel usually requires resolution by an
evidentiary hearing where the defendant alleges sufficient disputed issues of fact." 
Lecroy v. Dugger, 727 So. 2d 236, 242 (Fla. 1999) (Anstead, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see Rivera v. State, 717 So. 2d 477, 485 (Fla. 1998) ("[W]e
agree with Rivera that he warrants an evidentiary hearing on his claim of penalty
phase ineffective assistance of counsel."); Ragsdale v. State, 720 So. 2d 203, 208
(Fla. 1998) ("We conclude that Ragsdale has stated sufficient allegations of
mitigation that are not conclusively refuted by the record to warrant an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether counsel was ineffective in failing to properly
investigate and present this evidence in mitigation.); Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d
1069, 1074 (Fla. 1995) ("[W]e agree that Cherry is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on his claims that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase.").
-30-
Because I believe that Atwater has sufficiently pled the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel during the penalty phase proceedings, and because this issue
is not conclusively refuted by the record, I conclude that an evidentiary hearing on
this matter was required, and therefore, I would remand on this issue.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
Two Cases:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,
and an Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Raymond Gross, Judge - Case No. 89-13299-K CFANO
Mark S. Gruber, Assistant CCRC, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle,
Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Candance M. Sabella, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent