Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Micciulla

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Micciulla, 106 Ohio St.3d 19, 2005-Ohio-3470.] 
 
 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. MICCIULLA. 
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Micciulla,  
106 Ohio St.3d 19, 2005-Ohio-3470.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Neglecting entrusted legal matters — Failure 
to seek client’s objectives — Failure to carry out employment contract — 
Intentionally causing damage or prejudice to client — Failure to deposit 
unearned fees in trust account — Failure to maintain records of client 
funds and render account — Failure to notify clients of lack of 
malpractice insurance. 
(No. 2004-2109 — Submitted February 16, 2005 — Decided July 20, 2005.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 04-023. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, James Micciulla of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0044033, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1990.  
On April 19, 2004, relator, Columbus Bar Association, charged respondent with 
six counts of professional misconduct.  A panel of the Board of Commissioners 
on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and, based on the parties’ 
stipulations and other evidence, made findings of misconduct and a 
recommendation, which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
Count One — Murray 
{¶ 2} Respondent has been a sole general practitioner since 1994, 
representing clients mainly in domestic relations, criminal, and bankruptcy 
proceedings.  In October 2000, George H. Murray engaged respondent to 
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represent him in a divorce.  Respondent advised Murray that his fee plus costs 
would be $650.  Murray paid by installments and in January 2002 had paid the 
entire $650.  Respondent later requested $105 more to pay for the cost of service 
by publication on Murray’s wife, who was thought to be living in Texas.  Murray 
objected to this charge because he had not expected to pay any more than the 
$650 respondent had initially quoted. 
{¶ 3} Murray filed a grievance with relator in April 2002, alleging 
respondent’s neglect of his case.  Respondent later prepared divorce papers that 
Murray signed, refunded the $650, and filed the divorce action on Murray’s 
behalf.  A divorce decree was entered in February 2004 after respondent also paid 
the filing fee and publication costs for the action. 
{¶ 4} The parties stipulated and the board found based on clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had violated DR 6-101(A)(3) (barring a 
lawyer from neglecting an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) (requiring a 
lawyer to seek a client’s lawful objectives), and 7-101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from intentionally failing to carry out a contract for legal services). 
Count Two — Kelley 
{¶ 5} Lloyd D. Kelley engaged respondent to file a personal bankruptcy 
case for him.  By November 2001, Kelley had paid respondent the $625 they had 
agreed upon for fees and costs.  Thereafter, respondent had some difficulty 
obtaining a list of creditors from Kelley and also had problems staying in contact 
with him. 
{¶ 6} In July 2003, Kelley filed a grievance against respondent, alleging 
his failure to file a bankruptcy petition on Kelley’s behalf.  Respondent met with 
Kelley in August 2003, agreed to refund $200, and promised to proceed with the 
bankruptcy filing.  Respondent filed the bankruptcy petition in August 2003 and 
later obtained Kelley’s discharge as a debtor.  Before the panel, respondent 
conceded that the filing delay was due in part to failures in his office procedures 
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and that he had neglected Kelley’s case by failing to keep him informed of his 
progress. 
{¶ 7} The parties stipulated and the board found based on clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had violated DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), 
and 7-101(A)(2). 
Count Three — Keener 
{¶ 8} In April 2002, Janette Keener retained respondent to represent her 
in a divorce action, agreeing to pay him a total of $875 in fees and costs.  As of 
February 2003, Keener had paid the entire amount and had instructed respondent 
to proceed with the divorce action.  Respondent prepared the divorce papers, and 
Keener signed them. 
{¶ 9} Keener’s spouse had been recently released from prison, and 
neither she nor respondent knew the spouse’s address for service of process.  In 
March 2003, Keener called respondent at home and inquired about the status of 
the case.  Although he did not have the case file with him, he told her that he 
thought the action had been filed.  He was mistaken and later called Keener to 
advise that he had been unable to obtain a valid service address for her spouse. 
{¶ 10} Thereafter, respondent failed to promptly respond to messages 
Keener left on his voice mail, and the parties stipulated that on March 26, 2003, 
she left a message discharging him and telling him that she had retained new 
counsel and wanted her file returned.  Respondent nevertheless filed the divorce 
action on April 2, 2003. 
{¶ 11} Before the panel, respondent testified that he had spoken with 
Keener after that message and before filing the complaint and that she had 
verbally authorized him to file the signed divorce papers.  The day after he filed 
the papers, the other attorney whom Keener had consulted called respondent, 
advising that respondent did not have Keener’s authority to file the divorce.  The 
second attorney promptly filed an appearance in the Keener divorce as substitute 
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counsel.  Respondent consequently withdrew from the case and refunded $575 to 
Keener. 
{¶ 12} The parties stipulated and the board found based on clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had thereby violated DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-
101(A)(1), 7-101(A)(2), and 7-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally 
causing a client damage or prejudice). 
Count Four — Schmid 
{¶ 13} On October 21, 2002, Marc A. Schmid retained respondent to 
obtain the release of a vehicle-registration block that had been placed on his car 
because of the actions of someone else who had driven it.  Respondent quoted 
Schmid a $300 fee.  Respondent hoped to have the block lifted by Schmid’s 
upcoming birthday, November 2, 2002, to allow Schmid to properly register the 
vehicle. 
{¶ 14} Between November 2002 and early January 2003, Schmid left 
voice messages for respondent, asking about the status of his case, but respondent 
did not return the calls.  On January 14, 2003, respondent moved the Delaware 
Municipal Court to release the registration block on Schmid’s vehicle, sending 
Schmid a copy of the motion.  On January 30, 2003, that court denied the motion 
as untimely, a disposition that respondent conceded was correct at the panel 
hearing. 
{¶ 15} Thereafter, Schmid filed a motion to release the registration block 
on his own.  On May 2, 2003, the municipal court granted Schmid’s motion.  
Later that month, Schmid filed a grievance against respondent.  In June 2003, 
respondent refunded the $300 that Schmid had paid. 
{¶ 16} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent had thereby violated DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), 7-
101(A)(2), and 7-101(A)(3). 
Count Five — Trust Account 
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{¶ 17} In connection with the previous four counts, respondent 
maintained a trust account for his clients’ funds and a separate operating account 
for his business expenses.  Because of incomplete recordkeeping, respondent 
could not produce an accurate accounting of client funds in his trust account.  
Respondent conceded that fees paid by clients in Counts One through Four, some 
unearned, had occasionally been deposited directly into respondent’s general 
operating account.  The board also determined that respondent, who rarely had 
more than $1,000 in his trust account, had not lost any client’s money. 
{¶ 18} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent had thereby violated DR 9-102(A)(2) (requiring a 
lawyer to maintain client funds and unearned fees in a trust account) and 9-
102(B)(3) (requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all client funds and 
to render appropriate accounts regarding them). 
Count Six — Notice Concerning Malpractice Coverage 
{¶ 19} While representing the clients described in Counts One through 
Four, respondent did not maintain a policy of professional liability insurance.  
Respondent also did not inform any of those clients that he did not maintain 
professional liability insurance, nor did he obtain from his clients the necessary 
acknowledgment that he had provided this notice. 
{¶ 20} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent had thereby violated DR 1-104(A) and (B) (requiring a 
lawyer to notify clients if he does not maintain adequate malpractice insurance 
and to keep the client’s signed acknowledgement of the notice). 
Sanction 
{¶ 21} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board 
considered the aggravating and mitigating factors of respondent’s case.  See 
Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.  
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(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). As aggravating features, the parties stipulated that 
respondent had engaged in a pattern of misconduct and committed multiple 
offenses.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c) and (d).  In mitigation, the parties 
stipulated that respondent had no prior disciplinary record, had no dishonest or 
selfish motive, and had cooperated during relator’s investigation.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), and (d). 
{¶ 22} The board accepted these stipulations, noting also that respondent 
had allowed his attorney registration to lapse in September 2001 due to financial 
difficulty but had reinstated it on April 8, 2003.  The board observed that since the 
grievances were filed, respondent has obtained professional liability insurance to 
comply with DR 1-104. 
{¶ 23} The board accepted as mitigating that respondent has been very 
active in providing pro bono legal services to the homeless and the poor through 
Legal Aid and the Columbus Bar Association’s Life Saver Program and has 
unselfishly devoted many hours to these clients.  Respondent has also provided 
free legal services or charged a nominal fee to represent women referred from 
Choices, an organization for battered women.  Moreover, the board credited 
several letters from respondent’s professional acquaintances that highly 
commended his character. 
{¶ 24} In addition, respondent has, with relator’s help, consulted the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) about his health and well-being.  After a 
medical evaluation, respondent learned of previously undiagnosed medical 
conditions, including an anxiety disorder and dysthymia, or low-grade depression, 
that contributed to his feeling overwhelmed by his caseload and to his 
procrastination.  The executive director of OLAP, Scott R. Mote, testified, based 
in part on a psychologist’s report, that respondent has responded favorably to 
treatment and is capable of practicing law, although respondent would benefit 
from another lawyer’s oversight.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g).  Respondent has 
January Term, 2005 
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agreed to an OLAP contract to help him manage these conditions and, in turn, 
more responsibly manage his law practice.  Finally, the board was impressed with 
respondent’s testimony describing at length his embarrassment and contrition 
over his misconduct and his earnest desire to get his life and practice back on 
track. 
{¶ 25} Adopting the panel’s recommendation and sanction suggested by 
the parties, the board recommended a one-year suspension, stayed on conditions.  
The conditions are (1) that respondent be placed on probation for one year, during 
which his client trust account, case-file management, and other office practices 
will be supervised by a monitoring attorney and (2) that respondent’s physical and 
mental health regimen be monitored by OLAP for compliance with respondent’s 
contract. 
{¶ 26} Upon review, we agree that respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(3), 
7-101(A)(1), (2), and (3), 9-102(A)(2), 9-102(B)(3), and 1-104(A) and (B), as 
found by the board.  Moreover, we ordered a one-year stayed suspension with 
probation in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Halliburton-Cohen, 94 Ohio St.3d 217, 2002-
Ohio-640, 761 N.E.2d 1040, for misconduct similar to respondent’s and for 
similar mitigating and aggravating factors.  Thus, we also agree that the 
recommended sanction is appropriate. 
{¶ 27} Respondent is therefore suspended from the practice of law in 
Ohio for one year; however, this suspension is stayed on conditions.  The 
conditions are (1) that respondent be placed on probation in accordance with 
Gov.Bar R. V(9) for one year, during which his client trust account, case-file 
management, and other office practices will be supervised by a monitoring 
attorney and (2) that respondent’s physical and mental health regimen be 
monitored during the probation period by OLAP for compliance with 
respondent’s contract.  If respondent violates the conditions of the stay, the stay 
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will be lifted and respondent will serve the entire one-year suspension.  Costs are 
taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Mary Jo Cusack, Bruce A. Campbell, Bar Counsel, and Jill M. Snitcher 
McQuain, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator. 
 
Mark H. Aultman, for respondent. 
______________________