Title: State v. Emanuel D. Miller

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-0159 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Emanuel D. Miller, Enos S. Hershberger 
David E. Yoder, Eli M. Zook, Eli E.  
Swartzentruber, Eli J. Zook, Levi E. Yoder, 
and Jacob J.D. Hershberger, 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants, 
 
United States of America, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 JUNE 19, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Miller et al., 196 Wis. 
2d 238,  538 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1995).  Claiming infringement of 
their rights of religious freedom, Miller and the other seven 
Amish defendants (Respondents) appealed a circuit court order 
imposing forfeitures on them for failing to comply with Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.245 (1993-1994), by not displaying the red and orange 
triangular slow-moving vehicle (SMV) emblem on their horse-drawn 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
2 
buggies.  The court of appeals, relying on federal statutory and 
constitutional grounds, held that § 347.245 was unconstitutional 
as applied to the eight Amish defendants because the State failed 
to prove that the SMV symbol was the least restrictive alternative 
available that would satisfy the State's interest in traffic 
safety.  Miller, 196 Wis. 2d at 243.  We agree with the ultimate 
conclusion reached by the court of appeals, although we base our 
holding on the guarantees contained in the Wisconsin Constitution 
that the right to worship "according to the dictates of 
conscience" shall not be interfered with or infringed.  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 18. 
 
I.   FACTS 
 
The facts are not in dispute.  The Respondents are all 
members of the Old Order Amish faith.  Between January 1st and 
June 30th of 1993, the eight Respondents were individually issued 
citations for failure to display the SMV emblem on the rear of 
their horse-drawn buggies as required under Wis. Stat. § 
347.245(1).
1  They assert that their religious convictions do not 
allow them to display the symbol which they object to for three 
reasons: (1) the fluorescent red and orange colors are too "loud 
                     
     
1  Wisconsin Stat. § 347.245 reads in relevant part: 
   Identification emblem of certain slow moving vehicles. (1) 
. . . no person may operate on a highway, day or night, 
any vehicle or equipment, animal-drawn vehicle,  . . . 
that usually travel at speeds less than 25 miles per 
hour . . . unless there is displayed . . ., a slow 
moving vehicle (SMV) emblem as described in and 
displayed as provided in sub. (2). 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
3 
and bright;" (2) it is a "worldly symbol" prohibited by their 
faith's requirement of separateness; and (3) as Amish, they cannot 
place their faith in a human symbol above that in God.  It is 
important to note that there is no dispute as to the sincerity of 
the Respondents' religious beliefs or the burden imposed on them 
by the SMV statute.  As further explained in the discussion 
section of this opinion, the Respondents face a crisis of 
conscience in being forced to choose between the rules of their 
faith that forbid display of the SMV symbol and Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.245 which requires them to do so.  As an alternative to the 
SMV symbol, all the buggies involved were equipped with a red 
lantern and white reflective tape outlining the perimeter of the 
rear of the buggy.
2 
 
In April of 1993, the Respondents filed motions to dismiss 
the citations on the grounds that the statutory requirement 
violated their rights of conscience under Article I, section 18 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.
3  Circuit Court Judge for Clark 
                     
     
2  The Ordnung, or rule formulated by the local church 
counsel, requires that members of the order place 24 inches of 
reflective tape along the top of the buggy, 18 inches on either 
side, and 12 inches on the lower crosspiece.  In addition, during 
inclement weather and at night, they are required to have a lit 
red lantern attached to the rear lower left of the buggy.  The 
Amish also instruct their members to drive defensively and to stay 
on the shoulder of the highway whenever possible to let faster 
traffic pass with ease. 
     
3  Article I, § 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides, in 
relevant part: 
 
The right of every person to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of conscience shall never be 
infringed; . . .  nor shall any control of, or 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
4 
County, Michael W. Brennan ordered the eight citations joined.  At 
the motion hearing and trial to the court on November 18, 1993, 
the circuit court permitted the Respondents to orally amend their 
motion by adding a federal constitutional claim based on the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, enacted two 
days earlier.
4 
 
The circuit court found that the Amish defendants were 
sincere in their religious beliefs and that the free exercise of 
their beliefs was burdened by § 347.245(1).  However, the court 
denied the defendants' motion because it found that the State's 
compelling interest in traffic safety was not met by the proffered 
alternative warning method which it deemed "irregular and non-
enforceable."  Subsequently, the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit 
court's 
order 
holding 
that 
the 
statute 
was 
unconstitutional as applied to the Amish because "the State has 
(..continued) 
interference 
with, 
the 
rights 
of 
conscience 
be 
permitted, . . . 
     
4  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) 
provides in pertinent part: 
 
(a) In General.—Government shall not substantially 
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability, 
except as provided in subsection (b). 
 
(b) Exception.—Government may substantially burden a 
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates 
that application of the burden to the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
5 
not demonstrated that the SMV emblem is the least restrictive 
means of furthering the State's interest in traffic safety."  
Miller, Wis. 2d at 252. 
 
II.   CLARIFICATION OF KING 
 
Although we reach the same conclusion as did the court of 
appeals, we do not follow the same path.  The court of appeals 
stated that its "resolution of this case rests on a constitutional 
as well as a statutory basis."  Miller, 196 Wis. 2d at 247.  Both 
of these bases however were federal (the First Amendment and 
RFRA), as the court of appeals concluded that the scope of its 
review of freedom of religion claims was limited to federal 
jurisprudence under its interpretation of our holding in King v. 
Village of Waunakee, 185 Wis. 2d 25, 517 N.W.2d 671 (1994).  On 
the contrary, we reject such limitations to review of this vital 
liberty, and note that our holding in this case is based on the 
protections 
embodied 
in 
Art. 
I, 
§ 
18 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.
5   
                     
     
5  Although we base today's decision solely on the 
protections guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution, we note that 
every other jurisdiction that has faced this issue has also 
decided in favor of the Amish.  See State v. Hershberger, 462 
N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (concluding that application of the slow-
moving vehicle statute to the Old Order Amish defendants violated 
their freedom of conscience rights as protected under the 
Minnesota Constitution); People v. Swartzentruber, 429 N.W.2d 225 
(Ct. App. Mich. 1988) (holding the state's SMV statute as applied 
to Old Order Amish defendants unconstitutional because the state's 
interest in public safety was not sufficiently compelling to 
override the right to free exercise protected by the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution). 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
6 
 
The court of appeals began its analysis with a discussion of 
this court's recent decision in King, 185 Wis. 2d 25.  The 
appellate court accurately notes that in the King opinion we 
commented that Art. 1, § 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution is our 
state's "equivalent" of the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and that they serve the "same dual purpose of prohibiting the 
establishment of religion by the state and protecting a person's 
free exercise of it."  Miller, 196 Wis. 2d at 245 (citing King, 
185 Wis. 2d at 52, 54-55).  However, we disavow the conclusion 
reached by the court of appeals that our opinion in King "requires 
that [Wisconsin courts] construe Article I, § 18 in the same 
manner as the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." 
Miller, 196 Wis. 2d at 245. 
 
In King we were faced with the question of whether the town 
of Waunakee's annual holiday display, which contains a nativity 
scene, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
King, 185 Wis. 2d at 31.  Accordingly, we conducted our analysis 
by applying federal constitutional principles within the context 
of United States Supreme Court precedent.  Id. at 31-52.  It was 
only after concluding that the display did not violate the federal 
Establishment Clause that we addressed the issue in light of our 
state constitution.   
 
Initially, we point out that King did not involve a challenge 
based on the right of conscience, but rather the question of 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
7 
whether the display of a creche in a municipality's holiday 
display constituted an endorsement of the Christian religion in 
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  See 
King, 185 Wis. 2d at 37.  Further, in that case, the counsel for 
the plaintiffs conceded that this court must look to the federal 
case 
law, 
even 
when 
interpreting 
the 
state 
establishment 
provision.  Id. at 55.   
 
The majority opinion in King should be understood in the 
framework of what was not said as well as what was said.  Nowhere 
in King did we hold that Article I, § 18 is subsumed by the First 
Amendment.  Although we quoted with approval the court of appeals' 
comment that because both clauses serve the same dual purpose we 
will interpret our provision "in light of United States Supreme 
Court cases," that statement should not be read as an abandonment 
of our long-standing recognition that the language of the two 
documents is not the same.  Some questions cannot be fully 
illuminated by the light of federal jurisprudence alone, but may 
require examination according to the dictates of the more 
expansive protections envisioned by our state constitution.  
 
Contrary to the reading ascribed to the King majority by both 
the dissent in that opinion (King, 185 Wis. 2d at 59-60) and the 
court of appeals in this instance (Miller, 196 Wis. 2d at 245), we 
did not repudiate a reading of the Wisconsin Constitution which 
provides stronger protection of religious freedom than that 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
8 
envisioned in the federal constitution.
6  In fact, we explicitly 
stated that we reached our conclusion given the specific facts in 
King, "even assuming that" our state establishment provision might 
be "'less flexible' than the First Amendment."  King, 185 Wis. 2d 
at 54 (quoting State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 
149, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962)). 
 
 
This court has previously commented that the portions of Art. 
I, § 18, dealing with the freedom of conscience,  
operate as a perpetual bar to the state, . . . from the 
infringement, 
control, 
or 
interference 
with 
the 
individual rights of every person . . . .  They 
presuppose the voluntary exercise of such rights by any 
person or body of persons who may desire, and by 
implication guaranty protection in the freedom of such 
exercise. 
 
State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 210-11, 44 
N.W. 967 (1890).  In recognition of the state's unique history, 
the drafters of our constitution created a document that embodies 
the ideal that the diverse citizenry of Wisconsin shall be free to 
                     
     
6  This erroneous interpretation of our holding in King 
served as the basis of a recent law review article which opined 
that our opinion in King could ultimately lead to the "downfall of 
religious 
freedom 
in 
Wisconsin," 
by 
setting 
a 
"dangerous 
precedent" that challenges based on Wis. Const. art. I, § 18 must 
be determined solely under First Amendment jurisprudence.  Rhonda 
L. Lanford, Note, King v. Village of Waunakee: Redefining 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in Wisconsin, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 
185, 216, 214.  However, other commentators have correctly taken a 
more measured approach by pointing out that King did not 
necessarily preclude independent analysis of freedom of religion 
claims under the Wisconsin Constitution.  See Robert L. Gordon, 
How Vast is King's Realm?, Wisconsin Lawyer 18 (Aug. 1995). 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
9 
exercise the dictates of their religious beliefs.  We reiterate 
our previous observation: 
Wisconsin, as one of the later states admitted into the 
Union, having before it the experience of others, and 
probably in view of its heterogeneous population, . . . 
has, in her organic law, probably furnished a more-
complete bar to any preference for, or discrimination 
against, any religious sect, organization or society 
than any other state in the Union. 
 
Reynolds, 17 Wis. 2d at 165 (quoting Weiss, 76 Wis. at 207). 
 
Although the First Amendment and Article I, § 18 serve the 
same underlying purposes and are based on the same precepts, we 
conclude that our analysis of the freedom of conscience as 
guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution is not constrained by the 
boundaries of protection the United States Supreme Court has set 
for the federal provision.  We hold that our state constitution 
provides an independent basis on which to decide this case.
7 
 
III.   STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We will apply the compelling state interest/least restrictive 
alternative test to our review of this claim that Wis. Stat. § 
347.245(1), as applied to the eight Amish respondents, violates 
freedom of exercise and freedom of conscience under Art. I, § 18 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Succinctly stated, under this 
analysis, the challenger carries the burden to prove: (1) that he 
                     
     
7  This conclusion parallels that reached by the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota, which found that their state constitution 
supplied an "independent and adequate" basis for determining a 
similar challenge brought by the Old Order Amish to a slow-moving 
vehicle statute.  State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396-97 
(Minn. 1990). 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
10 
or she has a sincerely held religious belief, (2) that is burdened 
by application of the state law at issue.  Upon such proof, the 
burden shifts to the State to prove: (3) that the law is based on 
a compelling state interest, (4) which cannot be served by a less 
restrictive alternative. 
 
This test evolved from the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) 
(state 
must 
not 
only 
show 
compelling 
interest 
but 
must 
"demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would [serve 
the state's interest] without infringing First Amendment rights"), 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("only those 
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can 
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion"), 
and Thomas v. Review Board, Ind. Emply. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 
718 (1981) ("state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by 
showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some 
compelling state interest").   
 
However, in 1990, the United States Supreme Court repudiated 
use of the compelling state interest standard in claims based 
solely on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  
Employment Div., Oregon Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990).
8  Smith, like Sherbert, involved a challenge to 
                     
     
8  The Smith Court concluded, however, that the compelling 
state interest test was still applicable in "hybrid" cases 
involving 
claims 
of 
infringement 
of 
other 
constitutionally 
protected rights in addition to a free exercise claim.  Employment 
Div., Oregon Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
11 
the denial of unemployment benefits based on free exercise 
grounds.  After the Smith claimants were fired for ingesting the 
hallucinogenic drug peyote, the Oregon Department of Human 
Services 
denied 
them unemployment 
compensation 
despite the 
claimants' showing that they used the peyote in a religiously 
inspired sacrament of the Native American Church.  The United 
States Supreme Court specifically concluded that a state is not 
barred by the Free Exercise Clause from prohibiting sacramental 
peyote use and therefore can deny unemployment benefits for such 
use.  In its opinion, the Court rejected the Sherbert test and 
instead found that neutral, generally applicable state laws which 
are not aimed at regulation of religious belief and which do not 
implicate other constitutional protections are permissible under 
the First Amendment even if they interfere with conduct based on 
religious convictions.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.  The United States 
Congress responded in 1993 with passage of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act which implicitly rejected Smith and statutorily 
adopted the four-step Sherbert test for analysis of free exercise 
based challenges.
9   
(..continued) 
882 (1990).  Thus, the Respondents urge that the Sherbert analysis 
can be applied to their challenge to the SMV statute under the 
First Amendment because the statute infringes upon the rights of 
freedom of travel and assembly, as well as the free exercise of 
their religious beliefs.  Although this position may have merit, 
we do not need to resolve the appropriate standard of review under 
the United States Constitution because, as stated earlier in this 
opinion, we conclude that our decision today is firmly grounded on 
the Wisconsin Constitution alone. 
     
9  Because we conclude that the statutory requirement for 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
12 
 
Despite the Court's revision of the test applicable to 
federal claims, we concur with the logic of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in a post-Smith review of a similar Amish buggy case: 
while the terms "compelling state interest" and "least 
restrictive 
alternative" 
are 
creatures 
of 
federal 
doctrine, concepts embodied therein can provide guidance 
as we seek to strike a balance under the [state] 
Constitution between freedom of conscience and the 
state's public safety interest. 
 
State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990).  In 
assessing previous free conscience and free exercise challenges, 
this court, and the court of appeals, have utilized the principles 
and analytical framework developed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas.  See State v. Yoder, 49 
Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539, aff'd sub. nom Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Kollasch v. Adamany, 99 Wis. 2d 533, 299 
N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 104 Wis. 2d 
552, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981); State v. Peck, 143 Wis. 2d 624, 422 
N.W.2d  160 (Ct. App. 1988).  We conclude that the guarantees of 
our state constitution will best be furthered through continued 
use of the compelling interest/least restrictive alternative 
analysis of free conscience claims and see no need to depart from 
this time-tested standard.  
(..continued) 
display of the SMV symbol violates this state's guarantee of 
freedom of conscience, we need not further address the federal 
issues raised in this appeal.  Specifically, we do not reach the 
issue of the constitutionality or applicability of RFRA. 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
13 
 
IV.   APPLICATION OF THE COMPELLING INTEREST/ 
 
     LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE TEST 
 
The State concedes that the Respondents' challenge to Wis. 
Stat. § 347.245(1), is based on sincerely held religious beliefs. 
 As members of the Old Order Amish, the eight Respondents live 
"separate and apart from the world" in a community in which 
religion permeates every aspect of their lives.  The United States 
Supreme Court noted in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210 
(1972), that "the Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines 
the entire mode of life of its adherents." 
 
The local church district formulates rules, or Ordnung, which 
set the religious parameters for permissible behavior.  The 
Ordnung governing Respondents' community prohibits the use of 
"loud colors" and "worldly symbols."  The buggy used by the Amish 
is a plain black four-sided box on wheels which is horse-drawn.  
It is not only their mode of transportation but is considered an 
expression of their religious beliefs.   
 
The State also concedes that application of the statute to 
the Respondents constitutes a burden on their sincerely held 
religious beliefs.  At trial, two of the Respondents testified 
that they could not display the loud and worldly SMV symbol on 
their buggies, because to do so would be in direct violation of 
the Ordnung.  To violate a rule of the church would be in direct 
conflict with the dictates of their conscience and would 
constitute a sin for which they would be subject to shunning or 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
14 
excommunication.  Section 347.245 requires the Respondents to 
place the red and orange SMV symbol on their buggies while driving 
on public roads.  However, the rules of their faith prohibit the 
Respondents from displaying the loud, worldly symbol.  One 
Respondent testified that, rather than be forced to violate the 
dictates of conscience, he would move out of the state to escape 
imposition of a law with which he could not in conscience comply.  
 
Once it has been established that compliance with a statute 
would burden a challenger's sincerely held religious beliefs, the 
burden shifts to the State to prove that such action is justified 
by a compelling state interest.  Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.  This 
court, as well as the Amish Respondents, agree that the State 
possesses a compelling interest in public safety on the highways.  
 
We now turn to the final stage of the four-part test--the 
State must show that its interests cannot be met by alternative 
means that are less restrictive of the challengers' free exercise 
of religion.  Id.  The Amish assert that their proffered 
alternative of placing white reflective tape around the perimeter 
of their buggies adequately serves public safety concerns.  At 
trial, Jack Anderson, a licensed Wisconsin engineer and expert in 
traffic safety, testified that the white reflective tape was 
actually superior to the SMV emblem for a number of reasons.  At a 
distance, the SMV symbol is not recognizable as a triangle, but 
rather appears as a "red blob."  The inner orange portion of the 
symbol is not visible in the dark, and red reflective tape is 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
15 
approximately four times less bright than white tape.  Anderson 
testified that brightness is a critical safety factor because 
brighter objects will be perceived earlier than darker ones, 
allowing more time for an approaching driver to react in order to 
avoid a collision. 
 
Anderson also testified that the method of placing tape 
around the rear perimeter of the buggy is safer than that called 
for under § 347.245, which requires the SMV emblem be displayed on 
the lower left corner of the slow-moving vehicle.  The four strips 
of tape provide depth perception, giving approaching motorists a 
frame of reference to aid in calculating the distance to an object 
and the rate of closure, according to Anderson.  Additionally, the 
tape at the top and sides of the buggy can be seen in hilly 
terrain at times when visibility of the lower left portion of the 
vehicle is obscured.  The Respondents supplied a videotape 
illustrating both the heightened visibility of the white tape and 
the effectiveness of the outlining in hilly country. 
 
The State argues that the trial court correctly determined 
that the "State has compelling interests that can't be met in this 
matter by this irregular and nonenforceable alternative . . . ."  
The critical element for safety, according to the State, is 
uniformity because when the designated SMV symbol is used it 
provides "instant subliminal recognition" to one viewing it that a 
slow moving vehicle is ahead.  While the State does not dispute 
that a perimeter of white reflective tape is more visible than the 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
16 
SMV symbol in some situations, it contends that the proffered 
alternative fails because it is not an instantly recognizable 
symbol that universally conveys the message that a slow-moving 
vehicle is on the roadway ahead.  In essence, the State maintains 
that there can be no adequate alternative, because its compelling 
interest in traffic safety can only be served by the unique and 
uniform symbol designated in the statute--the red and yellow 
truncated triangle.   
 
 
However, there are problems with this contention.  The 
State's faith in the "instant recognizability" of the symbol and 
the universal knowledge of its meaning seems misplaced.  By its 
own terms, the statute is not universally applied; it contains 
exemptions for numerous kinds of slow-moving vehicles including 
bicycles, mopeds, vehicles being towed, equipment engaged in 
highway construction or maintenance, and any vehicle displaying a 
flashing 4-inch diameter yellow or amber light on the left rear.  
See Wis. Stat. § 347.245(1)-(5).  Further, as Jack Anderson, the 
Respondent's traffic safety expert testified, similar symbols 
which are meant to convey different meanings are in common use, 
such as orange triangles which are used along interstate highways 
to signify the presence of a stalled truck.   
 
Finally, and most damaging to its case, the State was unable 
to put forth any concrete evidence that the SMV symbol actually 
serves the interest of promoting public safety better than the 
white tape alternative.  Although asked, the State was unable to 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
17 
provide data on the relative distances at which the white tape and 
the SMV symbol could be seen, nor could it supply a distance at 
which the SMV symbol was clearly recognizable as a triangle rather 
that a red blob.  The State could cite to no studies comparing 
frequency of accidents involving the two different warning 
methods, nor did it present any evidence of any collisions that 
had occurred between motor vehicles and Amish buggies not 
displaying the SMV symbol. 
 
We conclude that the State has failed to demonstrate that 
public safety on the highways cannot be served by the Respondents' 
proposed less restrictive alternative of the white reflective tape 
and the red lantern.  The statutory burden placed by the State 
upon the sincerely held religious beliefs of the Respondents 
therefore cannot be justified.  Thus, we hold that Wis. Stat. 
§ 347.245, as applied to the eight Old Order Amish Respondents, 
violates the guarantee of freedom of conscience found in Article 
I, section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-0159 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Emanuel D. Miller, Enos S. Hershberger,  
 
 
 
David E. Yoder, Eli M. Zook, Eli E. Swartzentruber, 
 
 
 
Eli J. Zook, Levi E. Yoder and Jacob J.D.  
 
 
Hershberger, 
 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants, 
 
 
 
United States of America, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  196 Wis.2d 238, 538 N.W.2d 573  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
June 19, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 29, 1996  
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Clark 
 
JUDGE: 
MICHAEL W. BRENNAN 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Maureen McGlynn Flanagan, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
 
 
No. 94-0159 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief by Kristina 
E. Williamson and Reinstra & Van Dyk, S.C., New Richmond; Kyle D. 
White, St. Paul, MN and Philip G. Villaume, Bloomington, MN and 
oral argument by Kristina E. Williamson and Kyle D. White. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-respondent there was a brief by 
Frank 
W. 
Hunger, 
assistant 
attorney 
general; 
Peggy 
Ann 
Lautenschlager, United States attorney; Michael Jay Singer and 
Patricia A. Millett, Civil Division, Department of Justice, 
Washington, D.C. and Pamela J. Marple, Federal Programs Br., Civil 
Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. and oral 
argument by Patricia A. Millett. 
 
 
Amicus Curiae brief was filed by Marc D. Stern and the 
American Jewish Congress, New York, NY of the Coalition for the 
Free Exercise of Religion.