Title: In re Bradyn B.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 168 
Docket: 
Aro-17-55 
Submitted 
 
On Briefs: July 19, 2017 
Decided: 
July 27, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE BRADYN B. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
[¶1]  The parents of Bradyn B. appeal from a judgment entered by the 
District Court (Presque Isle, O’Mara, J.) terminating their parental rights to 
Bradyn pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2) (2016).  Both 
parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s 
findings that they are unfit, and the father also challenges the court’s 
discretionary determination that termination is in Bradyn’s best interest.1  
Because the evidence supports the court’s findings and discretionary 
determination, we affirm the judgment. 
                                         
1  Additionally, the father argues that he was deprived of either substantive or procedural due 
process because the court terminated his parental rights even though—in his view—it was 
impossible for him to comply with his reunification plan due to a change in his visitation schedule.  
The father did not raise this issue at the termination hearing, however, and in fact he agreed that he 
had resolved the visitation issue but was unable to resume visits with the child only because he was 
arrested approximately one month before the termination hearing and remained incarcerated at 
the time of the hearing.  The due process issue is therefore unpreserved and we do not address it 
further.  See Foster v. Oral Surgery Assocs., P.A., 2008 ME 21, ¶ 22, 940 A.2d 1102; cf. In re Zoe M., 
2004 ME 94, ¶ 6, 853 A.2d 762. 
 
2 
[¶2]  After a two-day termination hearing, the court found, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the parents were unwilling or unable to protect the 
child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time 
reasonably calculated to meet his needs, that they had failed to make a good 
faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child, and that termination of 
their parental rights was in the child’s best interest.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) & (iv); In re Robert S., 2009 ME 18, ¶ 15, 
966 A.2d 894.  The judgment terminating the parental rights of the mother 
and father includes the following findings of fact, all of which are supported by 
the evidence.  See In re Gabriel W., 2017 ME 133, ¶¶ 2-3, --- A.3d ---. 
[¶3]  The father assaulted four women—including the child’s mother 
and his own mother, i.e., the child’s paternal grandmother—either before this 
action was commenced, while it was pending, or both; he only “superficial[ly]” 
engaged in a batterers’ intervention program and was unable to complete the 
program because he was arrested one month before the termination hearing 
and remained in custody at the time of the hearing; because he was 
incarcerated, he was also unable to continue participating in other 
reunification services, including substance abuse counseling and visits with 
the child; several months before his most recent arrest, and nearly one year 
 
3 
after the child had been removed from his care, he had pleaded guilty to a 
Class C drug furnishing charge and was subject to a deferred disposition, see 
17-A M.R.S. §§ 1348 to 1348-C (2015);2 he continued to abuse “multiple 
substances” while this matter was pending even though jeopardy was based 
in part on his “polysubstance abuse”; he was not “open and honest” with his 
providers; he has made statements, which the court discredited, that he does 
not understand what the Department and providers expect of him; and he 
feels he is “the victim” in this proceeding. 
[¶4]  The mother “has a lengthy history of substance abuse, both before 
and during this proceeding”; “admits using drugs until February 2016 and 
alcohol to excess until after an altercation with her sister” in the summer of 
2016, which was several months before the termination hearing, even 
though—as with the father—jeopardy was based in part on her 
“polysubstance abuse”; and she “continues to maintain a relationship with [a 
person] . . . who she should well know should not be in [the child’s] life, and 
who may well be a threat to her sobriety,” and for whom she had, in fact, 
recently provided transportation when he was released from prison.  
                                         
2  Title 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1348-A and 1348-B have since been amended, but the amendments are 
not relevant in the present case.  See P.L. 2015, ch. 496, § 10 (effective July 29, 2016) (codified at 
17-A M.R.S. § 1348-A (2016)); P.L. 2015, ch. 431, § 43 (effective July 29, 2016) (codified at 
17-A M.R.S. § 1348-B (2016)). 
 
4 
[¶5]  Finally, the child, who was nearly five years old when the 
termination hearing was held, had been in foster care for approximately a 
quarter of his life, and his need for “permanency, stability, certainty, and 
competent parenting . . . in a safe and loving home” was being fulfilled at his 
current placement where he was “settled and happy.”  
[¶6]  These findings are sufficient to support the court’s determinations 
that the parents have not ameliorated “the serious issues of substance abuse, 
healthy relationships, and violence” that resulted in the removal of the child 
from their care; and that “[o]ver the 15 or so months [that] this case [was 
pending], neither parent . . . demonstrated the skills, ability, or . . . the desire to 
put [the child’s] . . . needs[] and his safety first.”  Accordingly, the court did not 
err or abuse its discretion in determining that the parents are unfit and that 
termination of their parental rights is in the child’s best interest.  See In re 
Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶¶ 10-11, 154 A.3d 1199; In re Hannah S., 2016 ME 
32, ¶ 9, 133 A.3d 590; In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 30, 889 A.2d 
297.  
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
Matthew A. Hunter, Esq., Caribou, for appellant Father 
 
Amy McNally, Esq., Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A., 
Biddeford, for appellant Mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and 
Human Services 
 
 
Presque Isle District Court docket number PC-2015-16 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY