Title: Murey v. City of Chickasaw, et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: March 17, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
1210384 and 1210392 
_________________________ 
 
Carlos Fernando Reixach Murey, as administrator of the Estate 
of Carlos Lens Fernandez, deceased 
 
v.  
 
City of Chickasaw, Michael E. Reynolds, Cynthia Robinson 
Burt, Arellia Taylor, and George Taylor 
 
 
Appeals from Mobile Circuit Court 
(CV-18-901354 and CV-19-903361) 
 
 
STEWART, Justice. 
1210384 and 1210392 
2 
 
 
Carlos Fernando Reixach Murey, as administrator of the estate of 
Carlos Lens Fernandez, deceased, appeals from a summary judgment 
entered in two separate actions by the Mobile Circuit Court ("the trial 
court") in favor of the City of Chickasaw, Michael E. Reynolds, Cynthia 
Robinson Burt, Arellia Taylor, and George Taylor ("the defendants"). For 
the reasons discussed herein, we dismiss appeal no. 1210384 and affirm 
the judgment in appeal no. 1210392.  
Facts and Procedural History 
According to the allegations in the complaints and the evidence 
submitted in support of, and in opposition to, the summary-judgment 
motions, on May 27, 2016, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Sgt. George Taylor 
("Sgt. Taylor"), a police officer employed by the Chickasaw Police 
Department, discovered an automobile on the shoulder of the on-ramp to 
an interstate highway. Carlos Lens Fernandez ("Lens") was passed out 
inside the automobile, and the automobile's engine was running. After he 
failed to complete various field sobriety tests, Lens acknowledged that he 
was intoxicated. Sgt. Taylor arrested Lens for driving under the influence 
and, with assistance from Officer Gregory Musgrove, transported Lens to 
the Chickasaw City Jail ("the jail").  
1210384 and 1210392 
3 
 
At the jail, Sgt. Taylor attempted to conduct a breath test to 
determine Lens's blood-alcohol level,  but Lens repeatedly fell asleep or 
lost consciousness. Sgt. Taylor then called Sgt. Phillip Burson into the 
room to assist. Sgt. Taylor and Sgt. Burson were able to conduct a breath 
test on Lens, and the results of the test showed Lens's blood-alcohol level 
was .12%. At approximately 3:11 a.m., Sgt. Taylor and Sgt. Burson took 
Lens to a jail cell and placed him on his back on a cot. Lens did not advise 
Sgt. Taylor or any other person that he had any medical issues or that he 
needed medical attention. According to both Sgt. Taylor and Sgt. Burson, 
Lens appeared to be intoxicated, and nothing about their encounter with 
Lens indicated to them that Lens needed medical attention.  
Arellia Taylor ("Jailer Taylor") was the jailer/dispatcher on duty at 
the time Lens was booked into the jail. Jailer Taylor wrote the following 
concerning Lens on a jail log: "Need photo, medical questions & changing 
out, & printing" and "Draeger .12, Unable or too intoxicated to stay up 
and use phone, answer questions, get finger printed or change clothes 
upon arrest." At approximately 6:00 a.m., Cynthia Robinson Burt ("Jailer 
Burt") took over as the jailer/dispatcher. Because of Lens's condition and 
1210384 and 1210392 
4 
 
apparent inability to answer questions, neither Jailer Taylor nor Jailer 
Burt fully completed a medical-screening form pertaining to Lens. 
Jailer Burt checked on Lens when she first began her shift, and she 
subsequently monitored Lens through a video-monitoring system. At 
8:38 a.m., Jailer Burt checked on Lens, but he did not respond to Jailer 
Burt's oral commands. Jailer Burt summoned Officer Robert Wenzinger 
and asked him to check on Lens. Officer Wenzinger stated that, when he 
checked Lens, he could not find a pulse and noticed that Lens was cool to 
the touch on his arm and neck. Jailer Burt notified her supervisor of the 
situation and dispatched emergency medical services. At 8:50 a.m., 
personnel with the Chickasaw Fire Department arrived at the jail and 
began attempts to resuscitate Lens. Lens was pronounced dead at 9:14 
a.m. Lens's autopsy report listed the cause of death as "hypertensive and 
atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease."  
On May 26, 2018, pursuant to § 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975, Murey 
commenced a wrongful-death action ("the first action") against the City 
of Chickasaw ("the City"); Michael E. Reynolds, the public-safety director 
for the City; Jailer Burt; and numerous fictitiously named defendants; 
the first action was assigned case no. CV-18-901354. Murey also asserted 
1210384 and 1210392 
5 
 
various federal claims in the complaint. On June 15, 2018, the named 
defendants in the first action filed a joint notice of removal to the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ("the federal 
district court").  
While the first action was pending in the federal district court, 
Murey filed an amended complaint in which he, among other things, 
intentionally omitted the fictitiously named defendants because the 
federal district court had previously indicated that it would strike those 
defendants. See Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 
2010) ("As a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in 
federal court."). The named defendants in the first action moved for a 
summary judgment. On November 26, 2019, the federal district court 
entered a summary judgment in favor of those defendants on the federal 
claims and dismissed Murey's state-law wrongful-death claim, over 
which it had exercised supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1367(a), without prejudice. 
On December 24, 2019, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), 
Murey commenced a second wrongful-death action in the trial court ("the 
1210384 and 1210392 
6 
 
second action"); that action was assigned case no. CV-19-903361. Section 
1367(d) provides:  
"The period of limitations for any claim asserted under 
subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that 
is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the 
dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled 
while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it 
is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling 
period." 
 
In addition to the defendants he had named in the first action, 
Murey also named Jailer Taylor and Sgt. Taylor, a married couple, as 
defendants. On December 25, 2019, Murey filed in the trial court a 
motion to reinstate the first action and to consolidate the second action 
with the first action; the trial court granted that motion. Murey also 
purported to substitute the Taylors for fictitiously named defendants 
that had been designated in the original complaint in the first action. 
On January 29, 2020, the defendants filed an answer in the second 
action in which they asserted various affirmative defenses. On July 9, 
2020, the Taylors filed in the second action a motion to dismiss, asserting 
that the claims against them were barred by § 6-5-410(d), Ala. Code 1975, 
which requires wrongful-death actions to be commenced within two years 
of the decedent's death, and that neither the complaint in the second 
1210384 and 1210392 
7 
 
action naming them as defendants nor Murey's purported substitution of 
them for fictitiously named defendants designated in the original 
complaint in the first action related back to the filing of the original 
complaint in the first action. Murey filed a response in which he asserted 
that he had properly substituted the Taylors for fictitiously named 
defendants under Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., and that 
the claims against them related back to the filing of the original 
complaint in the first action.  On January 15, 2021, the trial court entered 
an order denying the Taylors' motion to dismiss filed in the second 
action.1  
On August 2, 2021, Murey  filed a "first amended complaint" in both 
the first action and the second action, and the defendants filed a joint 
answer in both actions. Thereafter, the defendants moved for a summary 
judgment. The defendants asserted that Murey's claims against the 
individual defendants were barred by State-agent immunity and that the 
 
1The Taylors filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court 
denied. Thereafter, the Taylors petitioned this Court for a writ of 
mandamus, seeking the dismissal of the second action against them. This 
Court denied the petition by an unpublished order. Ex parte Taylor (No. 
1200341, Mar. 17, 2021). 
 
1210384 and 1210392 
8 
 
City was not vicariously liable. The defendants also argued that Murey 
had failed to show that any act of the defendants had caused Lens's 
death. The defendants later filed an additional summary-judgment 
motion in which they argued that Murey's claims against the Taylors 
were barred under § 6-5-410(d) because those claims had not been 
asserted within two years of Lens's death. The defendants supported 
their motions with, among other evidence, deposition and affidavit 
testimony from the defendants, Murey's expert witnesses, and other 
witnesses; copies of the jail's operations policy and prisoner-transport 
policy; the autopsy and toxicology report related to Lens; the jail log 
related to Lens's booking; and the written description of the City's 
jailer/dispatcher job duties.  
Murey filed a response in opposition the defendants' summary-
judgment motions to which he attached, among other evidence, 
deposition testimony from his expert witnesses: Dr. Thomas Shull (a jail-
administration expert), Dr. Anthony Maggio (an emergency-medicine 
expert), Dr. Michael Marlin (an emergency-medicine and medical-
toxicology expert), and Ahna Stolfi (a paramedic). Murey also submitted 
a State Bureau of Investigation report, other deposition and affidavit 
1210384 and 1210392 
9 
 
testimony, the defendants' responses to interrogatories, Reynolds's 
employment contract with the City, and a prehospital-care summary 
completed by Stolfi. The substance of Murey's arguments and experts' 
opinions was that the defendants had negligently prevented Lens from 
receiving a medical evaluation from trained medical personnel and that, 
if Lens had been provided medical attention, he would have survived 
because he would have been in a hospital where he could have received 
close monitoring and rapid intervention.  
On January 28, 2022, the trial court entered a summary judgment 
in both actions in favor of all the defendants. Murey timely filed a notice 
of appeal each action. This Court consolidated the appeals. 
Discussion 
I. Appeal No. 1210384 
Appeal no. 1210384 is an appeal from the judgment entered in the 
first action. At the outset, we must determine whether this Court has 
jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the "'[l]ack of subject matter 
jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties and it is the duty of an 
appellate court to consider lack of subject matter jurisdiction ex mero 
1210384 and 1210392 
10 
 
motu.'" MPQ, Inc. v. Birmingham Realty Co., 78 So. 3d 391, 393 (Ala. 
2011) (quoting Ex parte Smith, 438 So. 2d 766, 768 (Ala. 1983)). 
As mentioned earlier, the first action was removed to the federal 
district court shortly after its commencement. After the federal district 
court entered a summary judgment on the federal claims and elected not 
to continue to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law 
wrongful-death claims, it dismissed the state-law claims without 
prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). The federal district court did not 
remand the first action to the trial court.  
Pursuant to the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446, after a 
defendant has effectuated the removal of an action, "the State court shall 
proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 
1446(d) (emphasis added). This Court has previously interpreted 28 
U.S.C. § 1446(d) as requiring an order of remand before a state trial court 
may proceed with an action that has been removed. See Weinrib v. 
Duncan, 962 So. 2d 167, 169 (Ala. 2007) (explaining that, after removal 
is effectuated, a "state trial court [is] divested of jurisdiction over the 
underlying case and [cannot], in the absence of an order of remand, take 
any further action regarding the case. The federal removal statute is 
1210384 and 1210392 
11 
 
explicit on this point." (emphasis added)); King v. Landrum, 370 So. 2d 
945, 947 (Ala. 1979) (relying on Doerr v. Warner, 247 Minn. 98, 106, 76 
N.W.2d 505, 512 (1956), and holding that a removed "action resumed its 
position as though no removal had ever been attempted upon remand to 
state court" (emphasis added)); and Ex parte Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
707 So. 2d 229, 232 (Ala. 1997) (adopting the holding in King and 
recognizing that "actions taken in a state court immediately become 
effective again upon remand and have the same effect as if no removal 
had taken place" (emphasis added)).  
Regardless of whether the state court's jurisdiction is considered to 
be "stayed" or "divested" during removal, it is clear that the federal 
court's entry of an order remanding the case to the state court is required 
before the state court can resume substantive action in the case. Any 
action taken without a remand order is void for a lack of jurisdiction. This 
holding is in keeping with decisions of other courts. See, e.g., Quixtar, 
Inc. v. Campbell, 298 Ga. App. 617, 617-18, 680 S.E.2d 661, 662 (2009) 
("'[W]hen an action in a State court is removed to a Federal district court, 
the jurisdiction of the State court is suspended until the case is remanded 
to the State court, at which time the case resumes the status it occupied 
1210384 and 1210392 
12 
 
at the time of the removal.'" (citation omitted)); Musa v. Wells Fargo 
Delaware Tr. Co., 181 So. 3d 1275, 1276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("A 
'state court is allowed to resume jurisdiction of the removed case if, and 
only if, the federal court grants permission by entering an order of 
remand.'" (citation omitted)); Lynn v. Aria Health Sys., 227 A.3d 22, 31 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2020) (adopting the reasoning from Fessler v. Hannagan, 
144 Pa. Cmwlth. 274, 278, 601 A.2d 462, 464 (1991), and holding that a 
trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff's attempt to 
"reinstate" a previously removed action that had been dismissed, rather 
than remanded, by the federal court); Fessler v. Hannagan, 144 Pa. 
Cmwlth. at 278, 601 A.2d at 464 ("There is no suggestion in [28 U.S.C. § 
1446] that dismissal of the action in federal court somehow operates as 
an automatic remand to the state court …."); Miller v. Equifax, Inc., 228 
Or. App. 324, 208 P.3d 498 (2009) (holding that a state trial court was 
without jurisdiction to consider an amended complaint filed in a 
previously removed action when the federal court had dismissed, instead 
of remanded, the action and that, in that scenario, the plaintiff was 
required to refile the action as a new case); Willis v. Shelby Cnty. (No. 
W2008-01487-COA-R3-CV, June 8, 2009) (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) 
1210384 and 1210392 
13 
 
(unpublished opinion) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that federal court's 
dismissal of a removed action operated as an automatic remand to the 
state court and explaining "that a state court has no jurisdiction to 
resume proceedings where a federal court, in its discretion, dismisses the 
case rather than remanding it"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of 
County of Santa Clara, 132 Cal. App. 3d 670,  183 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1982) 
(holding that a state trial court had no power to resume proceedings via 
an amended complaint purportedly filed in previously removed action  
when federal court had dismissed, instead of remanded, the action); and 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Preston, 842 F.Supp. 1441, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1992) 
(holding that, because a previously removed case had never been 
remanded, the state trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the 
action). 
Accordingly, because the federal district court dismissed, rather 
than remanded, the state-law wrongful-death claims in the first action, 
the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider Murey's motion to 
reinstate the first action and any other subsequent pleadings or motions 
purportedly filed in that action. Therefore, any action taken by the trial 
court after the removal of the first action -- including the entry of a 
1210384 and 1210392 
14 
 
summary judgment -- is void. "'A judgment entered by a court lacking 
subject-matter jurisdiction is absolutely void and will not support an 
appeal; an appellate court must dismiss an attempted appeal from such 
a void judgment.'" MPQ, 78 So. 3d at 394 (quoting Vann v. Cook, 989 So. 
2d 556, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)). Accordingly, we dismiss appeal no. 
1210384. 
II. Appeal No. 1210392 
Appeal no. 1210392 is an appeal from the judgment entered in the 
second action, which was commenced by Murey within 30 days of the 
federal district court's dismissal of the state-law wrongful-death claims 
in the first action. Therefore, Murey complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). 
See Weinrib, 962 So. 2d at 170; and Roden v. Wright, 611 So. 2d 333 (Ala. 
1992). "Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations for state-law 
claims is tolled only when a party seeks to refile in the state court the 
same state-law claims the party asserted in the federal court." Rester v. 
McWane, Inc., 962 So. 2d 183, 186 (Ala. 2007). Accordingly, Murey 
properly invoked the trial court's jurisdiction with regard to the second 
action, insofar as that action asserts the same state-law claims that were 
1210384 and 1210392 
15 
 
asserted in the first action before the expiration of the applicable statute 
of limitations. 
A. Claims Against the Taylors 
Murey did not assert claims against the Taylors until he 
commenced the second action on December 24, 2019. Lens died on May 
27, 2016, and any wrongful-death claim was required to have been 
asserted within two years of Lens's death. See § 6-5-410(d), Ala. Code 
1975. Accordingly, Murey's claims against the Taylors are time-barred, 
unless the limitations period applicable to those claims was tolled. 
However, the tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) does not apply to 
circumstances in which the claims asserted in a refiled action differ from 
those asserted in the dismissed federal-court action or in which the 
claims are asserted against new defendants. See Rester, 962 So. 2d at 
186 (holding that § 1367(d) did not apply because the claims asserted in 
the federal court were different from the claims asserted in state court); 
Ex parte Profit Boost Mktg., Inc., 254 So. 3d 862, 872 (Ala. 2017) 
(explaining that § 1367(d) was inapplicable to toll the statute of 
limitations for a plaintiff's claims that were added against a new 
defendant after the action was remanded from federal court because 
1210384 and 1210392 
16 
 
those claims had not been asserted at the time that the case was removed 
to federal court). Our construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) is in line with 
federal courts' construction of § 1367(d) as being inapplicable to claims 
asserted against new defendants. See, e.g., Cooper v. City of New York 
(No. 17-CV-1517 (NGG) (RLM), Aug. 5, 2019) (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (not 
reported in Federal Supplement); Barnett v. Connecticut Light & Power 
Co., 967 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599-600 (D. Conn. 2013), aff'd, 580 F. App'x 30 
(2d Cir. 2014); and Brengettcy v. Horton (No. 01 C 197, May 5, 2006) 
(N.D. Ill. 2006) (not reported in the Federal Supplement). Moreover, the 
United States Supreme Court has indicated that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) 
applies only to claims previously asserted against a defendant within the 
applicable limitations period: "Whenever § 1367(d) applies, the defendant 
will have notice of the plaintiff's claims within the state-prescribed 
limitations period. Likewise, the plaintiff will not have slept on her 
rights. She will have timely asserted those rights, endeavoring to pursue 
them in one litigation." Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, ___, 
138 S. Ct. 594, 608 (2018).  
Because Murey did not assert wrongful-death claims against the 
Taylors in the first action that was removed to federal court, but, rather, 
1210384 and 1210392 
17 
 
first asserted those claims in the second action, which was commenced 
after the expiration of the two-year limitations period in § 6-5-410(d), 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(d) did not apply to toll the limitations period applicable to 
the wrongful-death claims against the Taylors. See Rester, 962 So. 2d at 
186; Ex parte Profit Boost Mktg., 254 So. 3d at 872. 
Murey also relies on relation-back principles pursuant to Rule 9(h) 
and Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., in arguing that his claims against the 
Taylors are not time-barred because, he asserts, he substituted the 
Taylors for fictitiously named defendants. Rule 9(h) permits a party who 
is ignorant of the name of a defendant to instead designate a fictitiously 
named defendant in its complaint and to subsequently amend the 
complaint to substitute the defendant by name after its identity is 
discovered. Rule 9(h) works in conjunction with Rule 15(c)(4), which 
permits an amended complaint substituting a defendant for a fictitiously 
named defendant to relate back to the date of the original complaint 
when the plaintiff was ignorant of the defendant's identity at the time of 
the filing of the original complaint and the plaintiff thereafter exercised 
due diligence in discovering the defendant's identity. See Ex parte 
Cowgill, 301 So. 3d 116, 123 (Ala. 2020).  
1210384 and 1210392 
18 
 
The Taylors were specifically named as defendants in the original 
complaint filed in the second action; they were not substituted for 
fictitiously named defendants against whom claims had previously been 
asserted in the second action. The second action was commenced after 
the expiration of the applicable limitations period. The complaint filed in 
the second action cannot relate back to the original complaint filed in the 
first action. Although the second action was purportedly consolidated 
with the first action, consolidated actions retain their separate identities 
and the parties and pleadings in each action are not merged into a single 
action. Solomon v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 1211, 1222 (Ala. 
2006); Ex parte Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So. 2d 34, 50 (Ala. 2005); and 
League v. McDonald, 355 So. 2d 695, 697 (Ala. 1978). Therefore, relation-
back principles do not apply to make timely the Murey's claims against 
the Taylors.  
Because Murey's wrongful-death claims against the Taylors are 
time-barred, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the 
Taylors. See Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health 
Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003) ("[T]his Court will 
affirm the trial court on any valid legal ground presented by the record, 
1210384 and 1210392 
19 
 
regardless of whether that ground was considered, or even if it was 
rejected, by the trial court."). 
B. Claims Against the Remaining Defendants 
 
We now turn to the remaining claims in Murey's appeal regarding 
the summary judgment entered in favor of the City, Reynolds, and Jailer 
Burt. Murey asserts that neither Reynolds nor Jailer Burt are shielded 
by State-agent immunity and, consequently, that the City is likewise not 
immune from suit.  
A State agent may be entitled to immunity from civil liability in his 
or her personal capacity under certain circumstances. See § 36-1-12(c), 
Ala. Code 1975; see also Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 
2000) (plurality opinion) (providing restatement of the law regarding 
State-agent immunity, which was adopted by a majority of the Court in 
Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).  
"We note that '[i]mmunity applies to employees of 
municipalities in the same manner that immunity applies to 
employees of the State. See Ex parte City of Birmingham, 624 
So. 2d 1018 (Ala. 1993). Ex parte Cranman, [792 So. 2d 392 
(Ala. 2000),] did nothing to alter this application.' City of 
Birmingham v. Brown, 969 So. 2d 910, 916 (Ala. 2007)."  
 
Ex parte Tucker, 303 So. 3d 467, 472 (Ala. 2019). 
 
1210384 and 1210392 
20 
 
In discussing the application of State-agent immunity, this Court 
recently explained: 
"In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000), 
a plurality of this Court restated the law governing State-
agent immunity. Although Cranman was a plurality decision, 
the restatement of the law governing State-agent immunity 
set forth in Cranman was subsequently adopted by a majority 
of this Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 
2000). In 2006, this Court, in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 
So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006), modified category (4) of the 
Cranman restatement. Accordingly, the full Cranman 
restatement of the law governing State-agent immunity, as 
modified by Hollis, supra, is as follows: 
 
"'A State agent shall be immune from civil 
liability in his or her personal capacity when the 
conduct made the basis of the claim against the 
agent is based upon the agent's 
 
"'(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; 
or 
 
"'(2) exercising his or her judgment in the 
administration of a department or agency of 
government, including, but not limited to, 
examples such as: 
 
"'(a) 
making 
administrative 
adjudications; 
 
"'(b) allocating resources; 
 
"'(c) negotiating contracts; 
 
"'(d) hiring, firing, transferring, 
assigning, or supervising personnel; or 
1210384 and 1210392 
21 
 
 
"'(3) discharging duties imposed on a 
department or agency by statute, rule, or 
regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or 
regulation prescribes the manner for performing 
the duties and the State agent performs the duties 
in that manner; or 
 
"'(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement 
of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not 
limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or 
attempting to arrest persons[, or serving as peace 
officers under circumstances entitling such officers 
to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 
1975]; or 
 
"'(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of 
duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in 
releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing 
persons of unsound mind, or educating students. 
 
"'Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
in the foregoing statement of the rule, a State 
agent shall not be immune from civil liability in 
his or her personal capacity 
 
"'(1) when the Constitution or 
laws of the United States, or the 
Constitution of this State, or laws, 
rules, or regulations of this State 
enacted or promulgated for the purpose 
of regulating the activities of a 
governmental 
agency 
require 
otherwise; or 
 
"'(2) when the State agent acts 
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in 
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, 
1210384 and 1210392 
22 
 
or under a mistaken interpretation of 
the law.' 
 
"792 So. 2d at 405 (bracketed modification added by Hollis, 
950 So. 2d at 309)." 
 
Burton v. Hawkins, [Ms. 1200825, Mar. 11, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 
2022); see also § 36-1-12(c) and (d). A State agent bears the initial burden 
of demonstrating that the State agent was engaged in conduct that would 
entitle him or her to immunity. Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 
450, 452 (Ala. 2006). After the State agent successfully demonstrates that 
he or she was engaged in conduct that would entitle the State agent to 
immunity, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate by 
substantial evidence the applicability of one of the two exceptions to 
immunity. See § 36-1-12(d)(1) and (2); Ex parte Pinkard, [Ms. 1200658, 
May 27, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022). 
1. Reynolds 
 
Murey concedes that Reynolds, as the City's public-safety director, 
demonstrated that he was engaged in a function that would entitle him 
to State-agent immunity. Murey argues, however, that Reynolds lost that 
entitlement to immunity by acting beyond his authority. Murey's sole 
contention in support of his assertion that Reynolds acted beyond his 
1210384 and 1210392 
23 
 
authority is that Reynolds failed to provide any medical training to Sgt. 
Taylor, Sgt. Burson, Jailer Taylor, and Jailer Burt, which, he asserts, 
was required by Reynolds's employment contract with the City.  
In opposition to the defendants' summary-judgment motions, 
Murey presented a copy of an employment contract between Reynolds 
and the City that required Reynolds to, among other things, "direct[] and 
develop[] a training program including general law enforcement, 
firearms, fire service, fire prevention, fire suppression and other 
employee development training programs …." Citing Howard v. City of 
Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 210 (Ala. 2003), Murey asserts that, although 
Reynolds had the discretion to determine the amount and the timing of 
training provided, he could not abandon the duty to provide training 
altogether. As the defendants point out, however, although the contract 
imposed a duty on Reynolds to direct and develop certain training 
programs, none of those programs involved medical training. Murey has 
not pointed to any evidence indicating that Reynolds was required to 
provide medical training for any City employee in support of his 
contention that Reynolds acted beyond his authority. Therefore, Murey 
did not meet his burden of presenting "substantial evidence" 
1210384 and 1210392 
24 
 
demonstrating that Reynolds had acted beyond his authority or that 
Reynolds's actions otherwise fell within one of the exceptions to State-
agent immunity. Ex parte Pinkard, ___ So. 3d at ___. Accordingly, Murey 
has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in entering a summary 
judgment in favor of Reynolds. 
2. Jailer Burt 
Murey first argues that Jailer Burt did not meet her burden of 
demonstrating that she was engaged in a function that would entitle her 
to State-agent immunity. Conversely, the defendants, relying on Ex parte 
Price, 256 So. 3d 1184 (Ala. 2018), argue that Jailer Burt's position as a 
jailer/dispatcher required her to exercise discretion in carrying out 
departmental policies and that, therefore, she was engaged in a function 
that would have entitled her to State-agent immunity.  
In Ex parte Price, this Court discussed the distinction recognized in 
Cranman "'between conduct involved in planning or decision-making in 
the administration of government and the conduct of those required to 
carry out the orders of others or to administer the law with little choice 
as to when, where, how, or under what circumstances their acts are to be 
done.' 792 So. 2d at 402." 256 So. 3d at 1189. This Court held, among 
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25 
 
other things, that the prison warden in that case, who was tasked with 
broad responsibility for the safety and security of the prison and its 
officers and inmates, was engaged in conduct that placed her within 
category (2) of the Cranman restatement. Id. at 1190. This Court relied, 
in part, on Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 209-10 (Ala. 2003), 
in which this Court had recognized that the chief of police in that case 
was "responsible for the 'day-to-day operations of the … city jail'" and 
that "[t]hose activities fall squarely within category (2) of the Cranman 
formula." Murey argues that Ex parte Price is distinguishable because, 
he says, Jailer Burt was not involved in planning or decision-making and, 
unlike the warden in Ex parte Price, was simply carrying out orders with 
little discretion as a "lower member" of the City's "hierarchy."    
Although Jailer Burt was not the warden, or a police chief, and 
although Jailer Burt was not engaged in a function that is explicitly 
outlined under category (2) of the Cranman restatement, this Court has 
previously explained: "'[T]he situations listed in subparagraphs (2)(a)-(d) 
of the Cranman immunity rule are expressly only "examples" of the 
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26 
 
general principle stated in paragraph (2) itself.' Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So. 
2d 21, 31 (Ala. 2002)." Howard, 887 So. 2d at 210.2  
The defendants presented evidence demonstrating that Jailer Burt 
was employed as a jailer/dispatcher for the City and that only one 
jailer/dispatcher is on duty at a time. Jailer Burt, as the sole 
jailer/dispatcher on duty, was responsible for, among other tasks, the 
care and supervision of inmates. Jailer Burt's usual duties included 
booking, monitoring, feeding, releasing, and providing medical care to 
inmates, if necessary. Jailer Burt was also tasked with performing her 
duties as a dispatcher, which included receiving calls regarding 
emergency services, dispatching officers, completing department 
paperwork, and pulling warrants.  Reynolds's testimony indicated that 
jailers were expected to follow the jail's operations policy as a guideline 
but that jailers had to multitask and exercise discretion in handling their 
various job duties.  
 
2Additionally, we note that, if Jailer Burt had been releasing Lens 
from custody, which is one of her job duties as a jailer, she would have 
been performing a function that explicitly entitled her to State-agent 
immunity. See § 36-1-12(c)(5), Ala. Code 1975 (recognizing immunity 
when the State agent is "[e]xercising judgment in the discharge of duties 
imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners").   
1210384 and 1210392 
27 
 
The evidence submitted indicates that Jailer Burt was tasked with 
exercising her discretion in conducting the operations of the jail and in 
supervising inmates in custody, which, in turn, constitutes administering 
the policies and procedures of the City. Accordingly, Jailer Burt 
presented evidence demonstrating that Murey's claim against her -- 
which was based on how she handled Lens's supervision and care while 
in custody -- arose from Burt's performance of a job function that would 
entitle her to State-agent immunity.3 See, e.g., Shell v. Butcher, 339 So. 
3d 226, 231 (Ala. 2021) ("It is undisputed that [the municipal jailers] were 
discharging duties pursuant to Montgomery municipal-jail policies and 
procedures and, therefore, generally would be entitled to State-agent 
immunity."). Accordingly, the burden then shifted to Murey to present 
substantial evidence demonstrating the applicability of one of the two 
exceptions to State-agent immunity. Id. 
 
3Although this Court has held that "a municipal jailer who lacks 
the authority of a police officer cannot claim immunity under concepts 
applicable to the immunity of a State agent under § 6-5-338(a)," Walker 
v. City of Huntsville, 62 So. 3d 474, 501 (Ala. 2010), this Court has also 
recognized that a municipal jailer may nevertheless qualify for State-
agent immunity under another applicable Cranman category of 
immunity. Shell v. Butcher, 339 So. 3d 226, 231 (Ala. 2021). 
1210384 and 1210392 
28 
 
Murey argues that, even if Jailer Burt was entitled to State-agent 
immunity under one of the categories of the Cranman restatement, she 
would be stripped of that immunity because she acted beyond her 
authority by failing to follow the jail's rules and policies.  
"One of the ways in which a plaintiff can demonstrate that a 
State agent acted beyond his or her authority is by offering 
evidence that the State agent failed '"to discharge duties 
pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated 
on a checklist."' Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 
(Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d [173,] 178 
[(Ala. 2000)])." 
 
Shell, 339 So. 3d at 231. Although Murey vaguely describes actions that 
he asserts were beyond Jailer Burt's authority, he neither delineates the 
particular policies and procedures that he asserts Jailer Burt violated nor 
explains how those alleged policies and procedures come within the scope 
of this Court's holding in Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 
(Ala. 2003). 
Murey asserts that Jailer Burt acted beyond her authority when 
she failed to complete a medical-screening form pertaining to Lens. That 
form was partially completed by Jailer Taylor, but she was unable to 
finish the portions of the form that required direct responses from Lens. 
Jailer Burt testified that she had "planned to complete the medical 
1210384 and 1210392 
29 
 
questionnaire, [and] take [Lens's] photo and fingerprints[,] after serving 
breakfast that morning" and that "[t]here was no standard procedure 
that required those tasks to be completed by a specific time. In similar 
situations in the past, those tasks were completed once the arrestee is 
able." Murey does not identify any policy that requires the completion of 
a medical-screening form within a certain time or by a certain individual 
or otherwise explain how Jailer Burt's failure to obtain Lens's answers to 
complete the form violates a detailed rule or regulation. See Giambrone, 
874 So. 2d at 1052. 
Murey also asserts that Jailer Burt acted beyond her authority 
when she failed to contact emergency medical services after reading the 
information regarding the severity of Lens's intoxication on the jail log 
and because, he asserts, she failed to check on Lens every 30 minutes. 
The jail log is a preprinted form, and it states under "SPECIAL NOTES" 
to "1. CHECK INMATE EVERY 30 MINUTES." As noted above, Jailer 
Taylor handwrote on the jail log: "Need photo, medical questions & 
changing out, & printing." Jailer Taylor also wrote: "Draeger .12, Unable 
or too intoxicated to stay up and use phone, answer questions, get finger 
printed or change clothes upon arrest." The evidence indicated that, 
1210384 and 1210392 
30 
 
when Jailer Burt began her shift at around 6:00 a.m., Lens was sleeping 
in his cell, and there was no evidence to suggest that, at that time, Lens 
was in need of medical attention. Moreover, Reynolds indicated in 
deposition testimony that determining whether an inmate needed 
medical treatment would be the job of the arresting officer and the 
booking jailer, neither of which were Jailer Burt. 
With regard to Jailer Burt's alleged failure to check on Lens, Jailer 
Burt testified that she was trained to check on the inmates every hour 
but that she checked on them as frequently as possible by physically 
viewing them from outside their cells and through the video-monitoring 
system. Jailer Burt testified that she had checked on Lens every 5 to 10 
minutes on the video-monitoring system.4 Each time that Jailer Burt 
checked on Lens, it appeared to her that he was sleeping.  Murey has not 
presented evidence demonstrating that Jailer Burt failed to check on 
Lens or that 30-minute "special note" in the jail log was a detailed rule 
or regulation that Jailer Burt failed to comply with. 
 
4Murey asserts that Jailer Burt could not see Lens on the video-
monitoring system with the lights off, but all the evidence he points to in 
support of that assertion is from Jailer Taylor and his jail-administration 
expert, and that evidence does not indicate that Jailer Burt could not see 
Lens when she checked on Lens through the video-monitoring system. 
1210384 and 1210392 
31 
 
Murey also appears to assert that Burt's actions violated the jail's 
operations policy, which outlines procedures for, among other things, 
booking, housing, and releasing inmates. That policy contains the 
following section pertinent to this appeal: 
"J. NECESSARY PAPERWORK  
 
"1. JAIL SHEET 
 
"2. INTERVIEW SHEET: After interview, both the 
Docket Personnel and Patrol Supervisor will review it and 
sign it. …" 
 
Reynolds's testimony indicated that jailers are expected to follow 
the jail's operations policy, but that jailers have to multitask and exercise 
discretion in handling their various job duties. Like the jail log, the jail's 
operations policy does not explicitly outline whether the booking jailer or 
a subsequent jailer is responsible for completing the "necessary 
paperwork," nor does it provide a deadline or timeline as to when the 
paperwork must be completed. Murey acknowledges that there is no 
specific time frame in which to complete the paperwork, but, he argues, 
the paperwork was never completed. However, the lack of particularity 
in the jail's operations policy and jail log demonstrates that those are not 
the type of detailed rules or regulations envisioned in Giambrone. See 
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32 
 
Shell, 339 So. 3d at 232 (holding that jail's policies that were "broadly 
phrased" and ambiguous and did "not indicate which correctional officer 
is tasked with the duty stated in the provision" were not akin to a detailed 
checklist under Giambrone). Accordingly, based on the materials 
submitted in opposition to the summary-judgment motions, Murey has 
not demonstrated by substantial evidence that Jailer Burt acted beyond 
her authority or that the trial court erroneously entered a summary 
judgment in Jailer Burt's favor.  
3. The City 
The City's liability hinges on the liability of its employees. See § 11-
47-190, Ala. Code 1975 (providing that a municipality may be liable for 
damages for an injury caused by "the neglect, carelessness, or 
unskillfulness of some agent, officer, or employee of the municipality 
engaged in work therefor and while acting in the line of his or her duty"). 
"[I]f a state actor is immune from liability for a particular act or omission, 
the state or municipality is also immune from liability for the same act 
or omission." City of Crossville v. Haynes, 925 So. 2d 944, 954 (Ala. 2005) 
(citing Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 2003)). Because 
Murey has not established that Reynolds and Jailer Burt are not immune 
1210384 and 1210392 
33 
 
from liability, he has, likewise, failed to establish the City's liability for 
their actions. Moreover, Murey does not present any argument regarding 
the City's alleged liability. See Boshell v. Keith, 418 So. 2d 89, 92 (Ala. 
1982) ("When an appellant fails to argue an issue in its brief, that issue 
is waived."). Accordingly, the trial court's summary judgment in favor of 
the City is affirmed. 
Conclusion 
 
Appeal no. 1210384 is dismissed. In appeal no. 1210392, the 
summary judgment entered in favor of all the defendants is affirmed.  
 
1210384 -- APPEAL DISMISSED. 
 
1210392 -- AFFIRMED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur.