Title: Stiger v. DISTRICT COURT IN & FOR COUNTY OF BOULDER

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

535 P.2d 508 (1975) Clarence STIGER, Jr., d/b/a Longmont Auto Sales, Ltd., Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF BOULDER, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Howard O. Ashton, one of the judges thereof, Respondents. No. 26665. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. May 19, 1975. *509 Joseph P. Jenkins, P. C., Estes Park, for petitioner. Dolan & Dolan, Larry L. Hopkins, Boulder, for respondents. KELLEY, Justice. Clarence Stiger, Jr., d/b/a Longmont Auto Sales, Ltd., petitioner, filed in this court a petition for relief in the nature of prohibition (C.A.R. 21) to prohibit the District Court in and for Boulder County and the Honorable Howard O. Ashton, one of the judges thereof, respondents (referred to herein collectively and singly as "respondent"), We issued a rule to show cause. The case is at issue. We now discharge the writ. Two actions are pending in the District Court in and for the County of Boulder wherein the National State Bank of Boulder as Administrator of the Estate of Jack E. Gale, Deceased, is plaintiff and the petitioner is the defendant. Both actions involve the same leasehold interest in property located in the City of Longmont. The first action, No. 73-2429-2, for $12,750 past due rent was pending trial at the time the default judgment for immediate restitution of the leased premises was entered against the petitioner in the second action. The trial court's denial of petitioner's motion to set aside the default judgment provoked the instant proceeding. Petitioner alleges in his petition three grounds for invoking this court's jurisdiction: Relief in the nature of prohibition is available "where the district court is proceeding without or in excess of its jurisdiction." C.A.R. 21. Prohibition is generally a preventive remedy and usually issues only to prevent the commission of a future act, rather than undo an act already performed. In most cases, correction of error is the function of appeal, a trial court having the jurisdiction to render a wrong as well as a right decision. Aurora v. Congregation, 140 Colo. 462, 345 P.2d 385 (1959); Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P.2d 781 (1958); Prinster v. District Court, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 938 (1958). *510 In General Aluminum Corp. v. District Court, 165 Colo. 445, 439 P.2d 340 (1968), this court held: C.A.R. 21 is the successor to Rule 116(a). The same rule is applicable to a trial court order either denying an application to set aside a default judgment or to one granting such an application. Petitioner's third ground, that "there is an absence of other relief available to petitioner" is without merit. The quotation from General Aluminum Corp. v. District Court, supra, points out that the remedy is appeal. The rule is discharged.