Title: Washington v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
TYRONE WASHINGTON,
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No. 543, 2000
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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v.
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Court Below: Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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in and for Sussex County
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Cr.A. Nos. S99-10-0089
Plaintiff Below,
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through 0112
Appellee.
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Submitted: October 24, 2001
Decided: December 6, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and BERGER, Justices.
O R D E R
This 6th day of December, 2001, on consideration of the briefs of the parties,
it appears to the Court that:
1) Tyrone Washington was convicted, following a jury trial, of six counts each
of trafficking in cocaine and delivery of cocaine, multiple counts of maintaining a
vehicle and a dwelling for keeping controlled substances, and other related drug
charges.  He argues on appeal that: (i) the trial court should have granted a mistrial
based on two witnesses’ comments about prior bad acts; and (ii) the trial court should
have excluded evidence that was not specifically disclosed to Washington during
discovery.
2
2) The Delaware State Police Special Investigation Unit targeted Washington
as a suspected drug dealer in the summer of 1999.  Detective Matthew Zolper led
the investigation and Detective Danny Wright conducted drug buys at various
locations over a three week period in August 1999.  Washington handed Wright the
drugs directly in some of the buys, and in others, either Angel Cunningham or
Nicole West accompanied Washington and participated in the transaction.  Wright
taped two of his telephone calls to Washington and videotaped one of his meetings
with Washington.  On September 17, 1999, the Delaware State Police executed three
search warrants and arrested Washington.
3) Washington complains that, during West’s testimony about her relationship
to Washington, West said that she and Washington were “talking and smoking
weed.”  The trial court immediately instructed the jury to disregard West’s statement
and strike it from the record.  A few minutes later, however, West answered
questions about what she and Washington did together by saying, in two different
answers, that they “used drugs.”  The trial court again instructed the jury to
disregard her statement and it denied Washington’s motion for a mistrial on the
ground that the curative instruction was sufficient to overcome any prejudice.
3
4) Washington’s other concern about prior bad acts evidence relates to a tape
of one of Wright’s encounters with Washington.  At the beginning of the tape,
Wright said that he was going to try to get Washington to talk about buying guns.
The subsequent conversation, however, did not include any reference to guns by
Wright or Washington.  The tape was redacted before it was given to the jury and
the trial court instructed the jury:
Members of the jury, I want to give you a cautionary instruction.
Earlier this morning I struck testimony from the record concerning
marijuana and instructed you to disregard it.  When the last tape was
played, there was a comment made by the undercover agent that he was
going to try to get the defendant to purchase guns for him.  The
defendant made no statements about this.  He faces no charges for gun
sales and the officer’s thoughts are not evidence and must play no part
in this case.  I am striking that reference from the record and instruct
you to disregard it.  You cannot consider the defendant to be a bad
person and, therefore, probably committed the offenses for which he is
charged on account of what has been stricken.  Like all citizens, the
defendant is presumed to be innocent of the offenses for which he
stands accused.
5) Washington is correct that the references to smoking weed and buying guns
were objectionable.  But the fact that the jury heard inadmissible comments does not
necessarily mean that a mistrial is warranted.  “The trial judge is in the best position
to assess whether a mistrial should be granted.... Absent an abuse of discretion, this
1 Lewis v. State, Del. Supr., 626 A.2d 1350, 1357 (1993).
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Court will not disturb the trial judge’s decision.”1  We find no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s decision to deny a mistrial.  The comments were not particularly
prejudicial and the trial court’s strong cautionary instruction cured any adverse
impact from the objectionable statements.
6) Washington also complains that evidence discovered during the trial should
have been excluded because the State did not identify or produce the evidence during
pre-trial discovery.  The evidence was a false identification card and a piece of paper
with notations about drug sales.  Both items apparently were hidden between the
pages of a Bible that had been seized from Washington at the time of his arrest.
Neither the State nor Washington had inspected the Bible prior to trial.  During
Washington’s direct examination, however, the State found the two items in the
course of looking through the evidence bag.  After considering and rejecting
Washington’s motion to exclude the two items, the trial court recessed to allow
Washington to review the evidence with his counsel before he continued his
testimony.  The State then used the false ID and drug notes to impeach Washington
on cross-examination.
2 Seward v. State, Del. Supr., 723 A.2d 365, 374 (1999).
3 Ibid.
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7) Washington argues that the State violated the discovery rules by not telling
him about these two items before trial.  The trial court found that there was no
discovery violation because: (i) the State did not know the evidence existed until the
day that Washington began testifying; (ii) the Bible, in which the evidence was
discovered, was listed on the State’s inventory and was available for inspection by
Washington at anytime; and (iii) the State disclosed the newly discovered evidence
promptly.
8) Assuming, without deciding, that the State’s late disclosure constituted a
discovery violation, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding on appropriate
sanctions.2  The trial court should consider all relevant factors, including the reason
for the delayed disclosure and the prejudice to the defendant.3  In this case, the trial
court found that the reason for the delayed disclosure was inadvertence and that
Washington was not severely prejudiced since he was able to discuss the evidence
with his attorney before he was cross-examined on it.  We find that the trial court
acted well within its discretion in deciding that the evidence was admissible and in
curing the alleged discovery violation by giving Washington time to prepare his
defense to that evidence. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgements of the Superior
Court be, and the same hereby are, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice