Title: Claim of Grindle

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Claim of Grindle1986 WY 153722 P.2d 166Case Number: 85-249Decided: 07/16/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of Worker's 
Compensation Claim of Doloris W. GRINDLE, Employee, Claimant, Bethesda Care 
Center, Employer. Doloris W. GRINDLE, Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming, ex 
rel. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Objector-Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Tony S. Lopez, 
Zimmers, Bluher & Lopez, Laramie, for appellant (employee-claimant). 

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., and Patrick J. Crank, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee 
(objector-defendant).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The issues which must 
be resolved in this case relate to the correctness of the finding of the 
district court that Doloris Grindle had sustained a readily apparent injury 
which caused the statute of limitations relating to worker's compensation claims 
to begin to run; whether Doloris Grindle's lack of knowledge with respect to the 
statutory scheme generally and the applicable statute of limitations 
specifically excused her from timely filing of a claim; and whether the district 
court erred in its decision that the failure of the employer to file a report 
required by statute did not prejudice the claimant. We affirm the decision of 
the district court.

[¶2.]     Ms. Grindle, who is a 
licensed practical nurse, began employment as a nurse's aide at BethesdaCareCenter in January, 1984. She first was 
hired as a nurse's aide, and later she was promoted to the position of nurse. It 
is the practice of BethesdaCareCenter to conduct an 
orientation for new employees, and at that time they are informed about worker's 
compensation. Grindle attended two orientation sessions, the first when she was 
hired as a nurse's aide and the second when she was promoted to the position of 
nurse. Grindle denied in her testimony that she ever had been informed of 
worker's compensation benefits. The record also demonstrates that the notice 
which relates to worker's compensation and work related injuries, required by 
statute to be posted, was posted in the staff lounge at all significant times. 
Grindle testified that she never had seen the posted 
notice.

[¶3.]     On February 15, 1984, 
Grindle, in accordance with instructions from her supervisor, was assisting an 
elderly, obese patient back to the patient's bed following dinner. She was 
behind this patient who was steadying herself on a wheelchair. The patient had 
complained that without assistance she would be unable to walk halfway back to 
her bed. After going only about two steps this patient fell down, and Ms. 
Grindle, in the performance of her duties, made an effort to break the patient's 
fall. This resulted in both them ending up on the floor. At that time Grindle 
felt a sharp pain in her back, which then became a severe but dull pain, an 
"agonizing type thing." The pain later diminished.

[¶4.]     In the period of time 
which followed this pain became chronic, but it was not continuous. It was 
aggravated when Grindle did heavy lifting or pulling. Ultimately, in April of 
1985, she consulted a physician who recommended surgery. This occurred after she 
began to experience a numbness in "her bottom and down both legs." Having 
experienced back surgery some ten years previously, Grindle sought a second 
opinion, and that physician also recommended surgery. She then decided to have 
the problem corrected, and as a result of that surgery she was in a body cast 
for several months and received physical therapy.

[¶5.]     Immediately after the 
fall, on February 15, 1984, Grindle consulted with her supervisor, and she then 
filled out a BethesdaCareCenter incident report in 
which she indicated she had pain in her back and left shoulder. She did not lose 
any time from work because of this incident, and she did not file any worker's 
compensation report of the accident until after she was released from the 
hospital in May of 1985. When a claim for medical services was received the 
clerk of the district court requested an accident report from the employer, and 
the director of nursing at BethesdaCareCenter completed this form. 
That individual, however, indicated that the cause of the injury was unknown 
because the incident report, which indicated pain in the back and left shoulder, 
did not correlate with Grindle's accident report which reflected lumbar back 
trouble. At the hearing Grindle testified that the first she knew of her 
eligibility for worker's compensation benefits was when the surgeon's nurse 
informed her of the possible availability of those benefits on the day that she 
was admitted to the hospital.

[¶6.]     The procedural history 
in this instance is that Doloris Grindle did not file her Worker's Report of 
Accident until May 3, 1985. The worker's compensation file was initiated by a 
claim from a physician on April 12, 1985. After two other claims for medical 
services were filed BethesdaCareCenter objected to these 
claims on April 23, 1985. Similar objection was lodged by the Worker's 
Compensation Division on May 20, 1985. After trial the district court denied 
worker's compensation benefits holding that the injury was readily apparent on 
February 15, 1984; the statute of limitations expired on February 15, 1985; and 
the May 3, 1985, claim for benefits was barred by the statute of limitations. 
The district judge also decided that there were no facts in this case which 
would justify an equitable estoppel. Grindle has appealed from this order of the 
district court.

[¶7.]     The statement of issues 
presented by Doloris Grindle for decision in this case is:

"I. Did the district 
court err in ruling that the failure of the employer to file its required report 
pursuant to § 27-12-506 did not prejudice the claimant?

"II. Is lack of knowledge 
as to the applicable statute of limitations for filing a claim for benefits an 
excuse for failure to file a timely claim?

"III. Did the trial court 
err in ruling that the accident of February 15, 1984, constituted a readily 
apparent injury causing the statute of limitations to run from that 
date?"

The Worker's 
Compensation Division asserts that the following questions must be 
resolved:

"I. Did the district 
court err in ruling that the failure of the employer to file its required report 
pursuant to Section 27-12-506, W.S. 1977, did not prejudice the 
appellant?

"II. Does sufficient 
evidence exist to support the trial court's factual finding that the appellee 
was not estopped in asserting the applicability of Section 27-12-503, W.S. 1977, 
under Bauer v. State of Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 
Wyo., 695 P.2d 1048 (1985)?

"III. Does sufficient 
evidence exist to support the trial court's factual finding that the injury was 
`readily apparent' to the appellant on February 15, 1984?

"IV. Should this court's 
decision in Martini v. Kemmerer Coal Co., 38 Wyo. 172, 265 P. 707 (1928) be 
reversed?"

[¶8.]     In accordance with our 
usual rule on appeal we will not consider the first issue presented by the 
parties.

"Our rule is that in the 
absence of fundamental error affecting a substantial right of the appellant or 
involving the jurisdiction of the court, we do not consider questions sought to 
be raised for the first time on appeal. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43 (1983), 
cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983); Nickelson v. 
People, Wyo., 607 P.2d 904 (1980); and Nisonger 
v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 1094 (1978)." Jahnke v. State, 
Wyo., 692 P.2d 911, 928 (1984).

Other cases 
which have developed this same basic proposition are Harries v. State, Wyo., 650 P.2d 273, 277 (1982); In the Matter of Parental Rights of PP, Wyo., 648 P.2d 512, 519 (1982); Laramie Citizens for Good Government v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 
617 P.2d 474, 478 (1980); Elder v. Jones, Wyo., 608 P.2d 654, 660 (1980); 
Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders of Canada, Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corporation, Wyo., 
590 P.2d 1306 (1979); Allen v. Allen, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1137 (1976); Steffens v. 
Smith, Wyo., 477 P.2d 119 (1970); and Gore v. John, 61 Wyo. 246, 157 P.2d 552 
(1945). The record which was filed in this case does not contain any briefs 
which were presented to the trial court, and opening statements were waived. Our 
examination of the record does not disclose that Ms. Grindle, in any way, 
brought to the attention of the trial court any alleged prejudice resulting to 
her because of the failure of the employer to file an employer's accident report 
as required by § 27-12-506, W.S. 1977. This issue was not presented for 
disposition in the trial court, and we do not address it on 
appeal.

[¶9.]     Turning then to the 
question of whether this injury was a readily apparent injury within the 
definition set forth in § 27-12-503(a), W.S. 1977, we conclude that the district 
court properly found that it was. Section 27-12-503(a), W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"(a) No order or award 
for compensation involving an injury which is the result of a single brief 
occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, shall be 
made unless in addition to the reports of the injury, an application or claim 
for award is filed with the clerk of court in the county in which the injury 
occurred, within one (1) year after the day on which the injury occurred or for 
injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of the injury 
by the employee. The reports of an accident do not constitute a claim for 
compensation."

We have held 
that "[i]t is the duty of the trial judge as finder of fact to determine and 
find by a preponderance of the evidence whether there was a compensable injury, 
and, if so, when it was actually suffered by an employee, * * *." In the Matter 
of Barnes, Wyo., 
587 P.2d 214 (1978); and Big Horn Coal Company v. Wartensleben, Wyo., 502 P.2d 187 (1972). See also Baldwin v. 
Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 531, 62 P.2d 531, 108 A.L.R. 304 
(1936) (it is the clear duty of the trier of fact to determine when compensable 
injury has occurred).

[¶10.]  The standard pursuant to which factual 
findings of a trial court are reviewed is settled in worker's compensation 
cases. We accept the prevailing party's evidence as true, give to it every 
favorable inference which may be drawn, and we do not take into account the 
conflicting evidence of the other party. Matter of Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 
(1985). We will not interfere with the findings of fact by the trial court 
unless they are "clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong and totally against the 
evidence." Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, Wyo., 678 P.2d 874 (1984), citing Valentine v. Ormsbee 
Exploration Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452 (1983). See also, Matter of 
Abas, supra; and Matter of Robinson, Wyo., 641 P.2d 195 
(1982).

[¶11.]  There is sufficient evidence in this 
record to support the trial court's finding that Ms. Grindle's injury was 
readily apparent to her on February 15, 1984. As we have noted she was a 
licensed practical nurse, and she previously had had back surgery resulting from 
injuries in a fall. Furthermore, on cross-examination she 
testified:

"Q. Did you think at that 
time that you had done some kind of physical damage to your 
back?

"A. I thought I just 
pulled a muscle, a muscle that would, you know, just remedy itself. That's the 
reason I didn't even think about seeing a doctor myself.

"Q. But did you think 
that you had done some kind of physical damage, a tearing or 
rupturing?

"A. Yes, yes, I knew 
something had happened, I didn't know what."

The district 
court did not commit any error in finding that the statute of limitations, § 
27-12-503(a), W.S. 1977, began to run on February 15, 
1984.

[¶12.]  In 1928 this court articulated the 
following construction of the statute of limitations encompassed in the 
Wyoming 
worker's compensation statutes:

"If the limitation is 
mandatory, as we are required to hold it to be, the fact that the claimants were 
in Italy cannot, of course, be held to be an excuse for not filing the claim in 
time. * * * In any event the legislature has fixed the time, which it had a 
right to do. It made no exceptions, and for us to read an exception into it 
would plainly be legislation and not a construction of the law." Martini v. 
Kemmerer Coal Company, 38 Wyo. 172, 180, 265 P. 707 
(1928).

While we are 
invited to consider adjusting this standard by the appellant who, quoting out of 
context, relies upon Professor Larson's characterization of the "accident" type 
of statute as a "fragment of irrational cruelty" (3 Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, § 78.42(b) at 15-225 (1985), we are not persuaded to do 
so.

[¶13.]  We recognize that in Bauer v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1048, 1053 (1985), a 
limited exception to the absolute bar of § 27-12-503(a), W.S. 1977, was set 
forth in the following language:

"Appellant had a valid, 
meritorious claim that was not filed because of reliance upon her employer's 
representation that she was not covered by worker's compensation. We hold that 
the employer's misleading statements, although unintentional, were sufficient to 
constitute estoppel and prevent the employer and the state of Wyoming from invoking the 
statute of limitations as a defense. * *"

In that case, 
however, we reiterated the proposition that the statute of limitations will bar 
relief in worker's compensation cases in the absence of equitable estoppel. 
Bauer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, supra, 695 P.2d  
at 1050. Doloris Grindle freely admits that following her accident no supervisor 
or any other employee of BethesdaCareCenter ever discussed 
worker's compensation with her one way or the other. Furthermore, the usual 
practice of her employer was to furnish information to employees at their 
orientation sessions, and the information about the right to submit a claim was 
posted in an area readily accessible to Ms. Grindle.

[¶14.]  There was sufficient evidence to support 
the trial court's finding of fact that Ms. Grindle suffered a readily apparent 
injury on February 15, 1984, and that her claim for worker's compensation 
benefits which was filed on May 3, 1985, is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. We can find no help in this record for her suggestion that in some 
way the statute should not be enforced.

[¶15.]  The order of the district court denying 
worker's compensation benefits because of the bar of the statute of limitations 
is affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶16.]  This court incorrectly affirms the trial 
court's finding that the accident of February 15, 1984 constituted a readily 
apparent injury, in disregard of the additional requirement for knowledge of 
compensability first established for Wyoming Worker's Compensation law by 
Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 108 A.L.R. 304 
(1936).

[¶17.]  This court has consistently held "that 
the Worker's Compensation Act should receive a liberal construction to 
accomplish the benevolent purposes for which it was promulgated." In re 
Barnes, Wyo., 
587 P.2d 214, 218 (1978); Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, 
Wyo., 566 P.2d 219, 222 (1977); Baldwin v. Scullion, supra. In 1936, this court stated in 
Baldwin the now long-standing rule that "`[t]he 
injury is not the accident but the result of the accident. If the result is 
delayed, the injury is delayed.'" 62 P.2d  at 535, quoting from Wheeler v. 
Missouri Pac. R. Co., 328 Mo. 888, 42 S.W.2d 579, 581 (1931). In 1978, under the 
now applicable statute, the Barnes court agreed:

"We likewise hold that 
the term `injury', as used in the Worker's Compensation Law, means compensable 
injury and is not used in the sense of the occurrence of an industrial accident 
giving rise to or causing the compensable injury." (Emphasis added.) 587 P.2d  at 
218.

See also Big 
Horn Coal Company v. Wartensleben, Wyo., 502 P.2d 187, 188 (1972). The Barnes 
court further stated that it would

"* * * do violence to the 
Act were we to say that merely because an employee is aware at the time of the 
accident that a compensable injury may manifest itself * * * sometime in 
the future, that knowledge will bar a future claim based upon the earlier 
accident and injury." 587 P.2d  at 218.

[¶18.]  There is no doubt that Ms. Grindle knew 
she had sustained some sort of injury at the time of the initial incident. What 
she did not know was that it would involve later medical treatment or a claim 
under the Worker's Compensation law as a continuing injury. As the majority 
point out, she "felt a sharp pain, which then became a severe but dull pain." 
However, § 27-12-503(a), W.S. 1977, as interpreted by this court, requires the 
trial court to determine whether or not compensable injuries were readily 
apparent at the time of the accident. According to Ms. Grindle's uncontroverted 
testimony, she did not believe her injury to be serious:

"Q. Did you think at that 
time that you had done some kind of physical damage to your 
back?

"A. I thought I just 
pulled a muscle, a muscle that would, you know, just remedy itself. That's the 
reason I didn't even think about seeing a doctor myself."

Ms. Grindle 
continued to work after the accident, despite chronic, but not continuous pain. 
Eventually she began to experience numbness in "her bottom and down both legs." 
Ms. Grindle's injury became compensable when she first gained knowledge of her 
disability. Neither Ms. Grindle's continued employment nor the gradual onset of 
her compensable injury affect her right to compensation:

"[I]t seems to us 
palpably unjust to the employee to deny him compensation because he has tried to 
keep his place on the employer's pay roll by doing his regular work and then has 
found that conditions produced at the time of the accident, and which medical 
science could not recognize or whose final consequences it could not forecast, 
have gradually and ultimately produced a compensable injury." 62 P.2d  at 
539.

[¶19.]  In Big Horn Coal Company v. Wartensleben, 
supra, this court cited with approval Potter v. Midland Cooperatives, Inc., 248 
Minn. 380, 80 N.W.2d 59, 61 (1956):

"* * * In that case the 
Minnesota Supreme Court stated, where an employee in the course of his 
employment sustains an apparent trivial 
injury which does not result in present disability and which would not 
reasonably be expected to cause future disability, but which injury in fact 
after a period of latency does cause future disability, the time for giving 
notice of the occurrence of the injury to the employer runs from the time when 
it becomes apparent that such injury has resulted in, or is likely to cause, 
compensable disability." 502 P.2d  at 188.

It is precisely 
that standard for the commencement of the limitation statute which § 
27-12-503(a) seeks to effectuate. The statute creates a permissive limitation 
for injuries not readily apparent; compensation is not precluded until one year 
after the injury is discovered by the employee. I would hold that an injury is 
discovered when it becomes apparent 
that such injury has resulted in, or is likely to cause, compensable disability. 
In this case, the time for filing the claim should have run from the time when 
it became apparent to Ms. Grindle that her fall had resulted in, or was likely 
to cause, a compensable injury.

[¶20.]  On February 15, 1984, the fact that Ms. 
Grindle had injured herself was readily apparent; but that she had incurred compensable injuries was not then known. 
I find no support in the record for the conclusion that Ms. Grindle received a 
readily apparent compensable injury 
on the day she fell. Absent this support, the trial court's finding that the 
"injury was readily apparent to the Claimant on February 15, 1984" is factually 
true, but invokes an erroneous principle for denial, contrary to prior decisions 
of this court. Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., Wyo., 400 P.2d 529, reh. denied 401 P.2d 708 
(1965), is expressly contrary to the present decision which now eliminates 
compensability from the limitation factors of readily apparent injuries. See 
also In re Barnes, supra. Knowledge of compensability, as the time-test factor 
for statute of limitations compliance, is missing in the court's decision since 
the determining factor for filing limitations is the discovery of compensability, and not the 
occurrence of some injury which could 
be self-correcting without medical care or time lost from 
employment.

[¶21.]  The compensability rule of earlier 
Wyoming cases 
is similarly recognized in other jurisdictions. Shepherd v. Easterling 
Construction Company, 7 Ark. App. 192, 646 S.W.2d 37 (1983) (knee); Dillinger v. 
City of Sioux City, Iowa, 368 N.W.2d 176 (1985) (back); Rebiski v. Pioneer 
Telephone Company, Minn., 262 N.W.2d 424 (1978) (back); Bowerman v. Employment 
Security Commission, Mont., 673 P.2d 476 (1983) (tendonitis); Smith v. Dowell 
Corporation, a Division of Dow Chemical, USA, 102 N.M. 102, 692 P.2d 27 (1984) 
(back); Jones v. Home Indemnity Insurance Company, Tenn., 679 S.W.2d 445 (1984) 
(back); Houston General Insurance Company v. Vera, Tex. App., 638 S.W.2d 102 
(1982) (back). See also 3 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.40 at 15-155 
et seq.

[¶22.]  Since the standard applied here by this 
court is contrary to its established precedent, as well as the intent of the 
constitutional amendment and our statute providing for employee benefits, I 
respectfully dissent.