Title: State v. Kindle

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Kindle (99-041); 170 Vt. 297; 751 A.2d 757

[Filed 14-Jan-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as  formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the  Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-041

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

	                                         On Appeal from
     v.		                                 District Court of Vermont
	                                         Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

Eric J. Kindle	                                 September Term, 1999

Amy M. Davenport, J.

       Lauren Bowerman, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and John R.
  Treadwell, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

       Robert Andres and James Karns, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Burlington,
  for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       MORSE, J.   The State appeals from the district court's decision
  suppressing evidence of  defendant Eric Kindle's driving while intoxicated
  obtained from a motor-vehicle stop.  The only  issue on appeal is whether
  the observance of a red beam of light emanating from a passing car 
  justified an investigatory motor-vehicle stop.  We hold that it does and,
  therefore, reverse.

       Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the
  influence of an  intoxicating liquor in violation of 23 V.S.A. §
  1201(a)(2).  The court granted defendant's motion  to suppress based on the
  following facts.  

 

       At approximately 2:10 a.m. on August 21, 1998, two Burlington police
  officers were  stopped at a red light at the intersection of East and
  Colchester Avenues.  While awaiting the  light change, a vehicle operated
  by defendant passed through the intersection from the officers'  left to
  right.  As the car traveled in front of the officers, they observed a
  steady red beam of light  pass across the windshield of their cruiser. 
  Concluding that the beam resembled a laser-sighting  device sometimes used
  for aiming a firearm, they pursued defendant and stopped him. 

       The officers ordered defendant and his passenger out of the vehicle. 
  A protective pat-down revealed that the passenger possessed a type of
  hand-held laser pointer typically used as a  visual aid for presentations,
  not a gun sight.  Simultaneously, the officers noticed signs of 
  defendant's intoxication which provided the basis for the DUI charge.

       Defendant moved to dismiss the DUI charge claiming that the officers
  lacked reasonable  suspicion to stop him.  After a hearing, the court
  granted the motion concluding that the events  leading to the traffic stop
  did not constitute reasonable suspicion because neither defendant nor  his
  passenger had threatened the officers' safety.  The court noted both that
  defendant's vehicle  had traveled away from the officers, thereby removing
  any concern for their safety, and hand-held laser pointers are commonly
  used.  The court granted the State's request for permission to  appeal its
  ruling.  See V.R.A.P. 5(b).

       In order to lawfully stop defendant's vehicle, the officers must have
  had a reasonable and  articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  See
  State v. Welch, 162 Vt. 635, 636,