Title: State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1703.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1703 
THE STATE EX REL. BOYD, APPELLANT, v. TONE, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1703.] 
Prohibition—Inmate had adequate remedies in ordinary course of law to raise 
alleged defect in plea colloquy—Trial court did not patently and 
unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction to convict him—Court of 
appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed. 
(No. 2023-1140—Submitted March 26, 2024—Decided May 7, 2024.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County, 
No. E-23-0022, 2023-Ohio-2802. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Deonta Boyd, is an inmate at the Richland Correctional 
Institution.  He appeals the Sixth District Court of Appeals’ judgment sua sponte 
dismissing his complaint for a writ of prohibition against appellee, Erie County 
Common Pleas Court Judge Tygh M. Tone (“the trial court”).  We affirm. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} In 2006, Boyd pleaded guilty in two consolidated cases to aggravated 
murder with a firearm specification, felonious assault, and aggravated burglary.  
The trial court accepted Boyd’s pleas and sentenced him to an aggregate sentence 
of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 41 years.  The trial court informed 
Boyd of his right to appeal at the sentencing hearing and in its sentencing entries. 
{¶ 3} Boyd did not appeal his convictions or sentence.  He has attempted 
unsuccessfully to withdraw his guilty pleas multiple times.  See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 
6th Dist. Erie No. E-20-006, 2020-Ohio-6866 (affirming denial of Crim.R. 32.1 
motion to withdraw guilty plea), appeal not accepted, 162 Ohio St.3d 1412, 2021-
Ohio-961, 165 N.E.3d 328; State v. Boyd, 6th Dist. Erie Nos. E-22-044 and E-22-
045, 2023-Ohio-2618 (same), appeal not accepted, 171 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2023-
Ohio-3789, 218 N.E.3d 973.  And we affirmed the Sixth District’s sua sponte 
dismissal of two prior extraordinary-writ actions, in which Boyd sought to vacate 
his convictions and sentence.  State ex rel. Boyd v. Tone, 173 Ohio St.3d 170, 2023-
Ohio-3832, 227 N.E.3d 1246. 
{¶ 4} In March 2023, Boyd filed this complaint for a writ of prohibition in 
the Sixth District, claiming that the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and their 
counterparts in the Ohio Constitution.  Specifically, Boyd claims that the trial court 
failed to inform him that he was waiving his constitutional right to compulsory 
process at the 2006 plea hearing and thereby failed to strictly comply with Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(c).  Boyd alleges that his guilty pleas were “not equally voluntary and 
knowing” and that they were “obtained in violation of due process and [are] 
therefore void.”  Boyd seeks a writ of prohibition “as means to void” his guilty 
pleas and the trial court’s sentencing entries. 
{¶ 5} The Sixth District sua sponte dismissed Boyd’s prohibition complaint.  
The court held that Boyd could have challenged any defect in the plea colloquy on 
January Term, 2024 
 
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direct appeal and that any issue concerning the trial court’s alleged failure to advise 
him of his right to compulsory process is therefore barred by res judicata.  2023-
Ohio-2802, ¶ 11, 14. 
{¶ 6} Boyd has appealed the dismissal of his complaint. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
{¶ 7} A court of appeals may sua sponte dismiss a complaint “if the 
complaint ‘is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged 
in the complaint.’ ”  State ex rel. Kerr v. Pollex, 159 Ohio St.3d 317, 2020-Ohio-
411, 150 N.E.3d 907, ¶ 5, quoting State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 
324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14.  “Such a dismissal is appropriate only 
if, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations of the petition and 
making all reasonable inferences in the claimant’s favor, it appears beyond doubt 
that the claimant can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested 
extraordinary relief in prohibition.”  Id.  When reviewing a sua sponte dismissal of 
a complaint without notice to the parties, we determine whether the appellant’s 
claims are frivolous or obviously meritless.  State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 8} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Boyd must show that (1) the 
trial court has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was 
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no 
other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. 
Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 165 Ohio St.3d 22, 2021-Ohio-1122, 175 N.E.3d 495, 
¶ 14.  If the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction, Boyd need 
not establish the lack of an adequate legal remedy.  Schlegel v. Sweeney, 171 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-3841, 215 N.E.3d 451, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 9} Because a criminal defendant waives several constitutional rights by 
entering a guilty plea, due process requires that the defendant’s decision to enter a 
guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  State v. Brinkman, 165 Ohio 
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St.3d 523, 2021-Ohio-2473, 180 N.E.3d 1074, ¶ 10; Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 
28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992).  Prior to accepting a guilty plea from 
a criminal defendant, a trial court must inform the defendant that he is waiving 
certain constitutional rights, including the right to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  See State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 
473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981), paragraph one of the syllabus, citing Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); see Ohio 
Constitution, Article I, Section 10 (“the party accused shall be allowed * * * to have 
compulsory process to procure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf”).  Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(c) requires the court in felony cases to inform the defendant personally 
and determine whether the defendant understands that he is waiving his 
constitutional rights by entering a guilty plea.  See also State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 11-12. 
{¶ 10} Boyd claims in his complaint that he is entitled to a writ of 
prohibition because the trial court failed to inform him during the plea colloquy that 
by entering his guilty pleas, he was waiving his constitutional right to compulsory 
process.  But Boyd had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law to raise 
this claim, including a direct appeal, a petition for postconviction relief, and a 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  See State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court 
of Common Pleas, 173 Ohio St.3d 328, 2023-Ohio-4569, 229 N.E.3d 1182, ¶ 17, 
citing State ex rel. Parker v. Russo, 158 Ohio St.3d 123, 2019-Ohio-4420, 140 
N.E.3d 602, ¶ 21; Bell v. McConahay, 171 Ohio St.3d 564, 2023-Ohio-693, 218 
N.E.3d 926, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 11} Boyd contends that he need not show the lack of an adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of the law, because the trial court patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to convict him.  In support of this contention, 
Boyd relies on Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 
January Term, 2024 
 
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(1938), in which the United States Supreme Court held that “[a] court’s jurisdiction 
at the hearing of trial may be lost ‘in the course of the proceedings’ due to failure 
to complete the court—as the Sixth Amendment requires—by providing counsel 
for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived 
this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake,” id. at 468.  Boyd 
argues, by comparison, that the trial court “lost” jurisdiction when it accepted his 
guilty pleas without informing him that he was waiving his constitutional right to 
compulsory process.  Even assuming that a waiver of the right to compulsory 
process stands on equal footing with a waiver of the right to counsel, Boyd’s 
argument is mistaken because “the United States Supreme Court no longer treats a 
violation of the right to counsel * * * as an error divesting the trial court of 
jurisdiction,” State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, 173 Ohio 
St.3d 118, 2023-Ohio-3534, 227 N.E.3d 1202, ¶ 18; see id. at ¶ 20, citing Waley v. 
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942). 
{¶ 12} The trial court unquestionably had subject-matter jurisdiction over 
Boyd’s criminal cases.  See R.C. 2931.03 (vesting courts of common pleas with 
jurisdiction over all felony cases).  Accordingly, Boyd’s claim alleges an error only 
in the trial court’s exercise of its jurisdiction.  “An error in the exercise of 
jurisdiction ‘renders the court’s judgment voidable, not void.’  And extraordinary 
relief is not available to attack a voidable judgment.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Davic at 
¶ 15, quoting State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 
248, ¶ 26; see Boyd, 173 Ohio St.3d 170, 2023-Ohio-3832, 227 N.E.3d 1246, at 
¶ 16 (violation of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights may be reversible 
error on appeal, but it does not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction), 
citing Ogle at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 13} Because Boyd had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the 
law to challenge the alleged defect in the 2006 plea colloquy and because the trial 
court did not patently and unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction to convict 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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him, Boyd is not entitled to a writ of prohibition.  The Sixth District correctly 
dismissed the prohibition action. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 14} We affirm the Sixth District Court of Appeals’ judgment sua sponte 
dismissing Boyd’s complaint for a writ of prohibition. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Deonta Boyd, pro se. 
Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gerhard R. Gross, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
_________________