Title: Estate of Jack R. Pirozzolo v. Department of Marine Resources

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 147 
Docket: 
Ken-16-489 
Argued: 
May 11, 2017 
Decided: 
July 6, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
ESTATE OF JACK R. PIROZZOLO et al. 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF MARINE RESOURCES et al. 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Christopher R. Goddu and the Estate of Jack R. Pirozzolo appeal, 
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Kennebec County, Mullen, J.) that affirmed in part and vacated in part a 
decision of the Department of Marine Resources granting Joseph Porada a 
three-year limited-purpose aquaculture lease to farm oysters and quahogs in 
Morgan Bay in Surry.  The court vacated the decision insofar as it granted 
Porada a lease covering four acres, and remanded the matter to the 
Department to decrease the area of the lease site from four to two acres.  The 
court also dismissed as duplicative several independent claims for declaratory 
relief brought with the Rule 80C appeal.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
conclude that the judgment is not final and therefore dismiss the appeal. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On February 18, 2011, Joseph Porada submitted an application to 
the Department for a three-year limited-purpose aquaculture lease covering 
four subtidal acres in Morgan Bay off the coast of Surry.  Porada sought the 
lease to cultivate American oysters, European oysters, and quahogs.  A group 
of property owners in the vicinity of the proposed lease site, including 
Jack Pirozzolo1 and Christopher Goddu (the Neighbors), intervened in the 
Department proceeding. 
[¶3]  The Department held a total of three public hearings on Porada’s 
application on March 25 and 27 and June 18, 2013.  A Department hearing 
officer issued a decision, dated March 20, 2015, recommending that the 
Department grant Porada’s lease application.2  On May 19, 2015, the 
Department issued a written decision that largely adopted the recommended 
decision and granted the application with conditions. 
[¶4]  On June 18, 2015, the Neighbors filed a Rule 80C petition in the 
Superior Court challenging the Department’s decision (Count 1) and bringing 
two independent claims for declaratory relief (Counts 2 and 3).  Intervenors 
                                               
 
1  Pirozzolo died in August 2014.  The Estate filed the Rule 80C petition. 
 
2  The record on appeal does not disclose the reason for the twenty-one-month delay between 
the hearing and the recommended decision. 
 
3 
Ann 
Mudge 
Backer, 
Nicholas 
Sichterman, 
and 
Mariah 
Hughs 
(the Backer Intervenors) filed a separate petition, which was consolidated 
with the Neighbors’ action.  On September 29, 2016, the court dismissed the 
Neighbors’ independent claims because they were duplicative of the Rule 80C 
appeal.  As to the Rule 80C appeal, the court affirmed in part the Department’s 
decision to grant the lease application, but vacated its decision regarding the 
size of the site and, concluding that a Department rule in effect at the time of 
the application restricted limited-purpose aquaculture leases to two acres, 
remanded and ordered the Department to reduce the area of the site from 
four to two acres.  The Neighbors timely appealed pursuant to 5 M.R.S. 
§ 11008 (2016) and M.R. App. P. 2.3 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶5]  “Generally, in Rule 80C appeals, a remand from the Superior Court 
to an executive agency for additional decision-making is not a final judgment.”  
Fox Islands Wind Neighbors v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2015 ME 53, ¶ 9, 
116 A.3d 940.  Pursuant to the rules and statutes governing administrative 
appeals, we limit our exercise of appellate review to agency actions “that fully 
decide[] and dispose[] of the whole cause leaving no further questions for . . . 
                                               
 
3  The Backer Intervenors did not appeal. 
 
4 
future consideration and judgment by the administrative agency.”  Bryant v. 
Town of Camden, 2016 ME 27, ¶ 12, 132 A.3d 1183 (quotation marks omitted).  
“On rare occasions we have taken direct appeals of remand orders when the 
remaining action is essentially ministerial, such as the formal issuance of a 
permit.”  Malonson v. Town of Berwick, 2003 ME 148, ¶ 2, 838 A.2d 338.  “If the 
issue which the parties seek to present to this court might be affected by the 
action taken pursuant to the remand order, we will usually refrain from 
entertaining the appeal.”  Wheeler v. Me. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 
477 A.2d 1141, 1145 (Me. 1984).  “The requirement of a final judgment for 
appellate review, although not jurisdictional, is a long-standing prudential 
rule . . . intended to avoid piecemeal appeals and to promote the efficient and 
effective resolution of legal disputes.”  Forest Ecology Network v. 
Land Use Regulation Comm’n, 2012 ME 36, ¶ 16, 39 A.3d 74 (citation omitted).  
Whether a judgment is final is an issue of law.  See Murphy v. Maddaus, 
2002 ME 24, ¶ 8, 789 A.2d 1281. 
[¶6]  The trial court’s remand order is not a final judgment for three 
reasons.  First, the Department’s action on remand could affect the issues and 
claims asserted in this case.  The particular area of the bay selected for the 
revised two-acre site may be relevant to the Neighbors’ arguments about the 
 
5 
effects of the lease activity.  Second, at oral argument, counsel for the 
Neighbors represented that it was possible that they would appeal from the 
Department’s decision on remand.4  In light of our policy of avoiding the 
piecemeal adjudication of appeals, we decline to reach the merits to render a 
decision 
that 
may 
not 
finally 
dispose 
of 
the 
matter. 
 
See 
Forest Ecology Network, 2012 ME 36, ¶ 16, 39 A.3d 74.  Third and finally, none 
of the three exceptions to the final judgment rule applies here.  See Cassidy v. 
City of Bangor, 2014 ME 44, ¶ 4, 88 A.3d 732. 
[¶7]  Because the Department’s decision as to where and how to reduce 
the lease site to two acres could affect issues and claims in this case, and the 
Neighbors may subsequently appeal from the Department’s decision on 
remand, we conclude that the judgment is not final, and accordingly dismiss 
the appeal. 
The entry is: 
Appeal dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
4  The arguments that the Neighbors have asserted in this appeal would be preserved in a 
subsequent appeal from the Department’s action on remand.  See 5 M.R.S. § 11001(1) (2016); 
M.R. Civ. P. 80C(m). 
 
6 
Sarah A. McDaniel, Esq., Douglas McDaniel Campo & Schools, LLC PA, 
Westbrook, and Sarah A. Slack, Esq. (orally), Foley & Lardner LLP, Madison, 
Wisconsin, for appellants Christopher R. Goddu and the Estate of Jack R. 
Pirozzolo 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Lauren E. Parker, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Marine 
Resources  
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket numbers AP-2015-40 and -41 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY