Title: The People v. Lewie

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 113  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Alicia Lewie,
            Appellant.
Matthew C. Hug, for appellant.
Kathleen B. Hogan, for respondent.
District Attorneys Association of the State of New
York, amicus curiae.
SMITH, J.:
A jury convicted defendant of second degree
manslaughter and first degree reckless endangerment for her role
in the events leading to the death of her son.  In so doing, the
jury found that defendant acted both recklessly and with depraved
indifference to human life.  We hold that the record supports the
jury's finding as to the first of these mental states, but not
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No. 113
the second.  We therefore uphold the conviction for manslaughter
and vacate the conviction for reckless endangerment.  
I
On November 13, 2007, defendant and the man she lived
with, Michael Flint, brought her eight-month-old son, Colbi
Bullock, to a hospital emergency room.  The child was not
breathing and had no pulse.  Attempts to resuscitate him did not
succeed, and he was pronounced dead the following day.
At the time of his death, Colbi had injuries consistent
with very severe abuse.  There were many bruises on his face --
around his cheek, his chin, both eyes and one ear -- and there
were also bruises elsewhere on his head, and on his neck, chest
and abdomen.  There were patterns of bruises and abrasions on his
arms consistent with three human bite marks, two on the right arm
and one on the left.  The injuries on his neck were consistent
with choking.  His ribs had been broken at least a month
previously; this injury was consistent with squeezing, or
grabbing and shaking.  It also appeared that the ribs had been
reinjured more recently.  A bone in the forearm had been recently
broken, close to a bite mark.  A doctor who conducted an autopsy
found that injury to be "consistent with someone biting and
snapping the arm at the same time."  He also found evidence of a
brain injury, in the form of hemorrhages less than four days old. 
In the doctor's opinion, the brain injury was the cause of death.
It is not disputed that Colbi's injuries were inflicted
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by Michael Flint.  Flint pleaded guilty to two counts of depraved
indifference murder, and related lesser charges.  Defendant was
prosecuted on two counts of second degree manslaughter based on
two different theories: that, in the last two or three days of
Colbi's life, she knew he had life-threatening injuries and
failed to seek medical help; and that, in the last 45 days of his
life, she left him in Flint's care, knowing that to do so was to
put the child's life in danger.  She was also charged with first
degree reckless endangerment and with endangering the welfare of
a child.
Defendant was convicted on all four counts.  The
Appellate Division reversed as to the first manslaughter count,
finding that the evidence did not establish defendant's knowledge
that the injuries the child had received were life-threatening,
and otherwise affirmed (People v Lewie, 67 AD3d 1056 [3d Dept
2009]).  A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal. 
We now affirm as to the manslaughter and endangering the welfare
of a child counts, but reverse as to reckless endangerment.
II
The People have not challenged the Appellate Division's
holding that the evidence was insufficient on the first of the
two manslaughter counts, and defendant does not dispute the
sufficiency of the evidence that she was guilty of endangering
the welfare of a child.  She does challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting her remaining manslaughter conviction and
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No. 113
her conviction for reckless endangerment.  As to both counts, the
critical question is what the evidence shows as to defendant's
state of mind when, over a period of six weeks, she repeatedly
left her baby with the man who abused and eventually killed him.
We will summarize the evidence on that issue, resolving any
conflicts, as the jury presumably did, in the People's favor. 
Defendant and Colbi began living with Flint when Colbi
was about three months old.  Defendant worked full-time; she
hired a babysitter, but Flint was often alone with Colbi.  A few
days before Colbi's death, defendant dismissed the babysitter and
agreed with Flint that Flint would care for the child while
defendant worked.
Seven friends and acquaintances of defendant testified
to contacts with defendant, Flint and Colbi during the time the
three of them lived together.  Five of them said that they saw
bruises on Colbi, and six of them said that defendant expressed,
in one way or another, knowledge, belief or fear that Flint was
abusing the child.  One said that defendant told her "how she
felt uncomfortable leaving the baby home with Michael, that she
was scared, she never knew what she was going to go home to." 
The same witness said defendant "told me that Michael had shaken
the baby . . . shaken and bit him."  Another witness recounted a
conversation between defendant and Flint, as defendant described
it to the witness: "she had told him he had to be more careful
with Colbi . . . and if he happened to get angry or upset, to
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No. 113
shake the teddy bear instead of Colbi."  (In a statement to
police after Colbi's death, defendant admitted telling Flint
something quite similar.)  A third witness said that Flint had
shown the witness some bruises on Colbi's head and that, when
defendant learned of the conversation, she "walked over to
Michael and started yelling at him . . . . She asked him why he
pointed out the bruises to me."
Three witnesses said they had told defendant to call
the police, leave the apartment or both.  A fourth told her that
the idea of Flint as babysitter "scared me and made me quite
nervous for Colbi," and a fifth, when defendant told him that
Flint would be babysitting, observed: "You're nuts."
There was other evidence that defendant knew Flint
could be violent and cruel.  Three witnesses testified that
defendant told them Flint had abused her physically: One said
that, according to defendant, Flint had shoved, hit and bitten
her; another that defendant had "bruises . . . that she said was
from Michael"; and a third that she had "bruises and a burn" that
she said "were from Mike."  Two witnesses testified that
defendant knew Flint had been charged with cruelty to a dog, and
one said that she had "started to believe" he was guilty of that
crime.  The same witness testified that, according to defendant,
Flint had once kicked a kitten against a wall; defendant later
found the kitten dead; and "she believed Michael had killed the
cat."
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The events of the last days of Colbi's life, while
directly relevant to the dismissed manslaughter count (based on
failure to seek medical care), also have some bearing on the
counts before us, because they show defendant's persistence in
leaving Colbi with a dangerous man.  Flint called defendant at
work on November 12 to tell her that "the baby had fallen in the
shower."  Defendant reported this to a co-worker who was a
certified nursing assistant, and received advice about what
symptoms to look for.  Arriving home, defendant found, according
to her statement to the police, that Colbi "had bruising on the
side of his face, his eyes were black and blue, he had a fat lip,
and he had redness on his torso and his neck area."  Flint told
her the baby had vomited -- one of the symptoms the co-worker had
identified as calling for medical attention.
Defendant not only sought no care for the baby; there
was evidence that she tried to conceal the injuries.  A witness
who encountered Colbi, Flint and defendant the following morning,
before defendant went to work, testified that her attention was
drawn by Colbi's "persistent, weak . . . very strange cry." 
Colbi was dressed in a snowsuit, with a hood covering his head
(though defendant herself wore a T-shirt).  When the witness slid
the hood back, she saw that Colbi had two black eyes, and asked
defendant: "Did you take him to the hospital?"  Defendant
replied, falsely, that she had been at the hospital all night,
and that the doctor had told her that the baby was fine.  Later
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No. 113
that day, defendant went to work as usual, leaving Colbi with
Flint for the last time.
We must decide whether this evidence shows the degree
of culpability necessary to support defendant's manslaughter and
reckless endangerment convictions.  We consider the two
separately.
Manslaughter
Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the second
degree, a class B felony, under Penal Law § 125.15 (1),
applicable to someone who "recklessly causes the death of another
person."  "Recklessly" is defined in Penal Law § 15.05 (3), which
says, in relevant part:
"A person acts recklessly with respect to a
result . . . when he is aware of and
consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that such result will
occur . . .  The risk must be of such nature
and degree that disregard thereof constitutes
a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a reasonable person would
observe in the situation."
The question here is whether the jury could find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was aware of, and
consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that leaving Colbi in Flint's care would lead to Colbi's death. 
It is not enough that defendant should have known the child's
life was in danger, or that she did know the child could be
seriously hurt.  She must have actually known of, and consciously
disregarded, a risk to the child's life (see People v Wong, 81
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No. 113
NY2d 600, 608 [1993]).  On the other hand, it is not necessary to
a manslaughter conviction that defendant knew the child would
die, or believed it likely.  Even a small risk that a baby will
die of child abuse is "substantial and unjustifiable."  
We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support
the jury's finding that defendant knew such a risk existed.  The
evidence shows that defendant knew, or at least believed it
possible, that Flint was hitting, shaking and biting her child. 
She knew that he was capable of inflicting significant injury on
an adult, herself.  She believed him capable of killing a small
animal in a rage.  She was worried enough to tell Flint that, if
he was angry, he should "shake a teddy bear, not Colbi."  Yet,
she left Colbi with Flint again and again -- even after she saw,
on November 12 and 13, that Colbi had been seriously hurt.
It is, perhaps, conceivable that defendant did not
actually know that Flint's maltreatment of Colbi created a risk
to the child's life, but the jury could rationally find that she
did know it.  The dissent, in concluding otherwise, proceeds on
the mistaken premise that "[w]e know" from the Appellate
Division's dismissal of the first manslaughter count that
defendant perceived no substantial and unjustifiable risk to
Colbi's life during the child's last three days (dissenting op at
6).  In fact, the dismissal establishes only that the People
failed to prove defendant knew the injuries Colbi had already
received were life-threatening.  There is no inconsistency in
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No. 113
holding, as the Appellate Division correctly did, that the People
presented sufficient evidence that defendant knew -- before and
during the last days of Colbi's life -- of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that Flint would injure him fatally.
Having found that defendant knew of that risk, the jury
was also justified in finding that she consciously disregarded
it.  And it is obvious that the risk was "of such nature and
degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in
the situation."  The evidence was therefore sufficient to support
defendant's conviction for manslaughter in the second degree.
Reckless Endangerment
Reckless endangerment in the first degree is defined by
Penal Law § 120.25:
"A person is guilty of reckless endangerment
in the fist degree when, under circumstances
evincing a depraved indifference to human
life, he recklessly engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another
person."
This crime, a class D felony, is less serious than
manslaughter in the second degree.  Yet the mental culpability
necessary to support defendant's reckless endangerment conviction
is greater than that required to support her manslaughter
conviction: to be guilty on the reckless endangerment count, she
must have acted not only recklessly, but also with depraved
indifference to human life.
The reason for this apparent anomaly is an exercise of
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prosecutorial discretion.  The People chose not to charge
defendant with depraved indifference murder, though such a charge
has just as much basis in the record as the charge of first
degree reckless endangerment.  The definition of depraved
indifference murder contained in Penal Law § 125.25 (2) is
identical to the definition of reckless endangerment that we have
quoted, except that the murder statute adds the words "and
thereby causes the death of another person."  Here, of course,
the person who was put at risk did die, and indeed the jury, in
convicting defendant of manslaughter, so found.  Thus the jury
that convicted defendant on the reckless endangerment count
would, if it was logically consistent, also have convicted her of
depraved indifference murder had that charge been presented to
it.  And we cannot uphold her reckless endangerment conviction
unless we would uphold a murder conviction on the same facts.
The distinction between conscious disregard of a known
risk to human life (required for a reckless manslaughter
conviction) and depraved indifference to human life (required for
a depraved indifference murder or first degree reckless
endangerment conviction) can be hard to grasp, especially in a
disturbing case like this one.  Consciously to disregard a
substantial risk to the life of one's own child -- as the jury
found, on legally sufficient evidence, this defendant did -- is
shocking behavior, and in ordinary speech people might call it
"depraved."  But "depraved indifference to human life," as used
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in the murder and reckless endangerment statutes, is something
even worse.
Our cases make clear that the word "indifference" is to
be taken literally: "depraved indifference is best understood as
an utter disregard for the value of human life -- a willingness
to act . . . because one simply doesn't care whether grievous
harm results or not" (People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288, 296 [2006],
quoting the dissenting opinion of Ciparick, J. in the same case
[id. at 298], which in turn quoted People v Suarez, 6 NY3d 202,
214 [2005]).  In other words, a person who is depravedly
indifferent is not just willing to take a grossly unreasonable
risk to human life -- that person does not care how the risk
turns out.  This state of mind is found only in "rare cases"
(Suarez, 6 NY3d at 218-219 [G.B. Smith, Rosenblatt and R.S.
Smith, JJ. concurring]).  Such cases do exist; in the situation
before us, Flint pleaded guilty to depraved indifference murder,
and we do not suggest that his plea was ill-founded.  But
depraved indifference to the life of another is still rare, and
it is surely even rarer when the other person is one's own child.
Here, while the evidence certainly shows that defendant
cared much too little about her child's safety, it cannot support
a finding that she did not care at all.  On the contrary, the
evidence shows that defendant feared the worst and -- recklessly,
as the jury found -- hoped for the best.  A witness who
unsuccessfully advised defendant to call the police about Flint's
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No. 113
behavior testified that defendant seemed "worried," and no
witness's testimony points to a contrary finding.  Some of the
evidence most damaging to defendant on the manslaughter count is
actually favorable to her on the depraved indifference issue. 
Thus her statement that she "was scared" and "never knew what she
was going to come home to" shows that she was fearful of harm to
her baby, not that she was indifferent to the possibility.  And
in telling Flint to "shake the teddy bear instead of Colbi," she
was trying, however weakly and ineffectively, to protect the
child.
There is, it is true, evidence that defendant not only
knew of, but tried to conceal, Flint's abuse of the child.  She
chastised Flint for showing someone Colbi's bruises and, in the
last hours of Colbi's life, she tried to hide his injuries and
lied to minimize their severity.  Even this, however, does not
show -- and nothing in the record shows -- that defendant did not
care whether Colbi lived or died.  Trying to cover up a crime
does not prove indifference to it.  
In short, while the evidence is sufficient to support
the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of manslaughter, it
would not support a conviction for the even more serious crime of
depraved indifference murder.  Perhaps the People implicitly
recognized this when they decided not to bring a murder
prosecution -- even though they asked the jury to find all the
elements of depraved indifference murder.  Since a murder
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No. 113
conviction could not stand on this record, as a matter of logic
the conviction of depraved indifference reckless endangerment
cannot stand either.
III
Defendant suggests several other reasons for reversal. 
We reject them all; three warrant some discussion.
First, defendant claims that one of several statements
that she gave to the police after Colbi's death should have been
suppressed because it was taken in violation of her "indelible"
right to counsel (see generally People v Lopez, ____ NY3d ___,
2011 NY Slip Op 1316 [2011]; People v Bing, 76 NY2d 331 [1990]). 
That right attached, defendant says, when counsel was appointed
for her in a Family Court proceeding, hours before Colbi was
officially pronounced dead.  Though the child was, according to
the first doctor who saw him, "moribund" and "essentially
deceased" when he arrived at the hospital on November 13, a vain
effort to resuscitate him continued for almost 24 hours.  During
that time, a proceeding was begun to remove Colbi from
defendant's home, and Family Court appointed a Legal Aid lawyer
to represent defendant.  The People were notified of the
appointment at 4:06 P.M. on November 14; Colbi was declared dead,
thus mooting the Family Court proceeding and ending the attorney-
client relationship, at 6:18 P.M.  During that two hour interval,
defendant, who had previously received Miranda warnings and
agreed to speak to the police, continued answering their
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No. 113
questions.  She now says that the questioning should have stopped
when the People received notice that she was represented by
counsel.
We have never held, and we now reject the argument,
that the indelible right to counsel can attach by virtue of an
attorney-client relationship in a Family Court or other civil
proceeding.  The indelible right, as Judge Kaye's concurring and
dissenting opinion in Bing explained, has
"at its core the perception that in criminal
cases -- wholly unlike civil cases -- the
presence of an attorney is the most effective
means we have of minimizing the disadvantage
at which an accused is placed when . . .
directly confronted with the awesome law
enforcement machinery possessed by the State"
(76 NY2d at 351 [internal quotation omitted and emphasis added]).
Thus while an attorney-client relationship formed in one criminal
matter may sometimes bar questioning in another matter in the
absence of counsel (see Lopez, ___ NY3d at ___, 2011 NY Slip Op
1316, *4), a relationship formed in a civil matter is not
entitled to the same deference.
People v Townes (41 NY2d 97 [1976]), on which defendant
relies, is distinguishable.  There, an attorney-client
relationship was formed in a criminal proceeding: "the defendant
was arraigned in criminal court and counsel was assigned by order
of that court" (id. at 99).  A police officer then interviewed
the defendant, in the absence of counsel, in connection with a
complaint the defendant had filed with the Civilian Complaint
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No. 113
Review Board, and the People sought to use the resulting
statements in the criminal case.  We held that the criminal and
Review Board proceedings were so closely related that the
indelible right, which attached when an attorney-client
relationship was formed in the criminal case, barred questioning
in the non-criminal one.  But here no relationship was formed in
a criminal case, and no indelible right ever attached.
Secondly, defendant argues that the trial court erred
in its response when, during jury deliberations, one of the
jurors sent an odd and inappropriate note asking for the
opportunity to thank all concerned, after the verdict was
rendered, for the privilege of serving.  The note mentioned,
among other things, the breakup of the juror's marriage and her
view that the male lawyer who sat in the second chair at the
prosecution table was a "Cutie"; the juror asked, perhaps
jokingly, to be given that lawyer's telephone number when the
trial was over.
We think the trial judge handled this problem quite
skillfully.  After disclosing the note to counsel and discussing
it with them, he interviewed the juror in counsel's presence;
explained to her gently that the note was inappropriate; and
obtained her assurance that nothing, including her favorable
impression of a prosecutor, would prevent her from being fair to
both sides.  Nothing in the interview, or in the note itself,
suggests that the juror was biased.  Indeed, she made clear that
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No. 113
her gratitude for the opportunity to serve extended not only to
the judge and both sides' lawyers, but to defendant personally. 
Defendant argues in substance that the juror's note and her
comments during the dialogue in chambers show that the juror had
an eccentric personality, but eccentrics are not barred from
serving on juries.  Under CPL 270.35 (1), a sworn juror may be
discharged only if the court finds that she "is grossly
unqualified to serve . . . or has engaged in misconduct of a
substantial nature."  This juror was not grossly unqualified and
engaged in no substantial misconduct.  There was no reason for
the trial judge either to discharge her or to make further
inquiry.
Thirdly, defendant complains of five words in the trial
court's response to a juror's question during deliberations about
the meaning of recklessness.  In its original charge, the court
defined that term twice, once in explaining the elements of
manslaughter and again in explaining the elements of reckless
endangerment.  The court's definition tracked the language of
Penal Law § 15.05 (3), and defendant does not complain of it. 
After retiring to deliberate, the jury asked several times for
the definition to be reread, and the court obliged.  Later, in
response to a jury note, the court gave a slightly expanded
version of the definition, not changing its substance but
separating it into three components -- awareness of a risk,
conscious disregard of the risk, and gross deviation from a
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No. 113
reasonable person's standard of conduct.  This supplemental
charge, also, is not now challenged.
After some other supplemental instructions were given,
a juror asked for further explanation of recklessness, saying:
"Are we supposed to do [sic] consider how the Defendant is
thinking or what a reasonable person would think?"  After a
discussion with counsel outside the jury's presence, the court
replied that recklessness "requires both of those things."  The
judge again took the jury through the three components of
recklessness, summarizing the second -- conscious disregard of a
known risk -- in this way:
"Then the second part is required as well. 
So, besides the first part, the second part
must be that he or she -- in this case, the
Defendant -- was aware of and consciously
disregarded the risk.  So, that goes to the
particular person, what they saw, what they
should have seen, and what they disregarded"
(emphasis added).
  
The court concluded its response to the juror's
question by saying:
"So, long and short answer to your question
is both of those things come in: What the
individual Defendant's aware of, and what she
or he consciously disregards; and then
secondly, whether that risk that they're
aware of deviated from -- constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard that a reasonable
person would observe." 
It is undisputed that, in including the words "what
they should have seen" in its description of conscious disregard,
the court misspoke.  The jury was required to consider what risk
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No. 113
defendant actually perceived and disregarded, not what she should
have perceived.  Indeed, when this supplemental charge is
examined minutely, the words "should have seen" do not make
sense; it is not possible "consciously" to disregard something
one "should have" seen but did not.
In evaluating a jury charge, however, we are "not
limited to the appropriateness of a single remark" (People v
Umali, 10 NY3d 417, 426 [2008]).  Rather, we examine "the context
and content of the entire charge" (id. at 427) and determine
whether "the instruction as a whole . . . was likely to confuse
the jury" (People v Fields, 87 NY2d 821, 823 [1995]).  We are
satisfied that the minor error in the supplemental charge here
created no significant risk of confusion.  The jurors had already
heard, several times, a completely correct explanation of
recklessness as defined in the Penal Law.  The juror's specific
question -- should the jury consider what defendant actually
thought, or what a reasonable person would have thought -- was
concisely answered at the beginning and end of the supplemental
charge with the word "both."  And the supplemental charge as a
whole makes clear that the jury must consider both the risk
defendant actually perceived and disregarded, and what a
reasonable person in her situation would have done.  The
supplemental charge, taken as a whole, was proper.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division,
insofar as appealed from, should be modified by vacating
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No. 113
defendant's conviction for reckless endangerment in the first
degree, dismissing that count of the indictment and remitting the
matter to County Court for resentencing, and as so modified
affirmed.
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People v Alicia Lewie
No. 113 
JONES, J. (dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority's dismissal of the reckless
endangerment count.  However, I dissent from that portion of the
majority's opinion upholding defendant's conviction for
manslaughter in the second degree (count seven of the indictment)
because I do not believe this conviction was supported by legally
sufficient evidence.
In a legal sufficiency inquiry, this Court's role is
limited to determining whether, "after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt" (Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 319
[1979]; see also People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]). 
Where the evidence adduced at trial establishes "any valid line
of reasoning and permissible inferences [that] could lead a
rational person" to convict, then the conviction survives
sufficiency review (People v Williams, 84 NY2d 925, 926 [1994]). 
"A sufficiency inquiry requires a court to marshal competent
facts most favorable to the People and determine whether, as a
matter of law, a jury could logically conclude that the People
sustained its burden of proof" (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342,
349 [2007]).
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No. 113
Penal Law § 125.15 (1) provides that a "person is
guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when . . . [h]e
recklessly causes the death of another person" (emphasis added). 
Penal Law § 15.05 (3) defines the term "recklessly" as follows:
"A person acts recklessly with respect to a
result or to a circumstance described by a
statute defining an offense when he is aware
of and consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that such result will
occur or that such circumstance exists.  The
risk must be of such nature and degree that
disregard thereof constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the
situation."
Thus, the elements of second-degree manslaughter are "the
creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk [of death]; an
awareness of and disregard of such a risk on the part of
defendant; and a resulting death" (People v Licitra, 47 NY2d 554,
558 [1979]).  
Our case law makes clear that causation is "an
essential element which the People must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt" in a second-degree manslaughter prosecution (People v
Stewart, 40 NY2d 692, 697 [1976]).  That is, "the defendant's
actions must be a sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death"
(id. [emphasis added]).  If the evidence only establishes a
possible or probable connection between defendant's acts and the
victim's death, the evidence is not legally sufficient to support
a conviction for second-degree manslaughter (see id.).
Defendant Alicia Lewie is not alleged to have herself
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No. 113
ever physically abused her child.  She is accused of recklessly
causing the death of her eight-month-old son by repeatedly
leaving him in her live-in boyfriend's (Michael Flint's)
unsupervised care during a 45-day period prior to the child's
death (between October 1, 2007 and November 14, 2007), despite
being aware that Flint was physically abusing the child.  Because
she is a "passive" defendant charged with reckless manslaughter,
this Court's decision in People v Wong (81 NY2d 600 [1993]) has
application.  In Wong, both caretakers of an infant, who died of
shaken baby syndrome, were convicted of first and second-degree
manslaughter and endangering welfare of child, even though there
was no evidence as to which of the caretakers shook the child. 
In reversing the convictions, this Court held that the
prosecution had to establish that the passive defendant was
personally aware that the physical abuse had taken place and
"that such abusive conduct created a risk that the infant would
die without prompt medical treatment" (Wong, 81 NY2d at 608
[emphasis added]; see People v Northrup, 83 AD2d 737 [3rd Dept
1981]).  In Northrup, defendant-mother was convicted in the
Ostego County Court of depraved indifference murder stemming from
the death of her son at the hands of her live-in boyfriend, who
physically abused the child.  Defendant was charged with causing
her son's death by unjustifiably and inexcusably failing to
obtain or provide medical care or assistance for him.  In
reversing this conviction on legal sufficiency grounds, the
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No. 113
Appellate Division wrote:
"Evidence is lacking that this 23-year-old
woman, without medical training or knowledge,
was cognizant of that risk [of death] and
consciously disregarded it.  Although the
external injuries were serious, [her son]
ceased crying and walked about without
complaining shortly after [her boyfriend]
left.  Particularly noteworthy is the fact
that the injury causing his death was an
internal one, not detectable from observing
the boy's body.  In our view, this record
does not support a finding that defendant
acted recklessly"
(Northrup, 83 AD2d at 738 [emphasis added]).  The Northrup court
further stated, "[s]ince reckless conduct is also a requisite for
manslaughter in the second degree, one of the lesser included
offenses which was charged, defendant's conviction of that crime
must likewise be ruled out" (83 AD2d at 738).
The prosecution here built its reckless manslaughter
case around the allegation that sometime during the stated 45-day
period, defendant actually became aware that Flint was physically
abusing her son and chose to ignore the grave risk this conduct
posed for the child by repeatedly leaving him in Flint's
unsupervised care.  To make out its case, the prosecution had
witnesses testify that defendant told them that Flint, on
numerous occasions, had physically abused her and was physically
abusing her child in her absence.  Further, the prosecution
proffered medical evidence which confirmed that defendant's son
had been repeatedly abused during the period of time that
defendant left him in unsupervised Flint's care.  
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No. 113
While this evidence may have shown that defendant was
criminally negligent in leaving her child with Flint, it did not
establish the elements necessary to support a reckless
manslaughter conviction.*  The evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, established that the acts of
abuse took place while defendant was at work -- i.e., defendant
could not know the severity of the abuse to the child; it was not
possible for defendant to know that the injuries sustained by her
child were life-threatening or could contribute to his death
because to the naked eye they only appeared to be marks or
bruises; hospital personnel were only able to determine the
extent of the child's internal injuries after multiple x-rays and
blood tests were performed; and the internal injuries that caused
the child's death were only detected upon the medical examiner's
internal inspection of the child's remains during the postmortem
examination.  Further, while the evidence established that the
child's death resulted from trauma to the head, the medical
examiner was unable to pinpoint precisely when the trauma was
inflicted upon the child.  He could only opine that the fatal
injuries were sustained within four days prior to his death
* Viewing this evidence in conjunction with the trial
1
court's supplemental instruction to the jury explaining
2
recklessness in terms of what defendant saw, what defendant
3
should have seen, and what defendant disregarded, a reasonable
4
argument could be made that the jury convicted defendant of
5
reckless manslaughter based on proof of criminally negligent
6
homicide. 
7
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No. 113
(which occurred on November 14, 2007).
While the evidence adduced at trial established that
defendant was aware of a risk of abuse to her son, the
prosecution did not meet its burden of establishing defendant's
awareness and conscious disregard of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of her son's death.  There was no evidence to
establish at what point during the stated 45-day period defendant
actually perceived that her child was exposed to a substantial
and unjustifiable risk of death.  We know from the unchallenged
dismissal of the reckless manslaughter count under count six of
the indictment that the jury could not rationally find that
defendant perceived this risk during the last three days of her
son's life, the last three days of the stated 45-day period.  We
further know from the dismissal of count six that the jury could
not rationally find that defendant perceived this risk when
during the three days covered by that count she left her child in
Flint's care when she left for work.  Nor was there evidence that
defendant would have disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable
risk to her child's life even had one been apparent.  Her actions
-- on November 12 and 13, 2007 -- with respect to her child --
i.e., attempting to treat him with over-the-counter medications,
feeding and playing with him, checking on him throughout the
night, and when it became apparent that his condition worsened,
calling 911 and taking him to the hospital -- belie the
allegation that she would have consciously disregarded a
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No. 113
substantial and unjustifiable risk to her child's life.  
Moreover, the evidence adduced by the prosecution did
not prove that defendant was aware that Flint's abusive conduct
created a risk that defendant's child would die without prompt
medical treatment (see Wong, 81 NY2d at 608).  As stated, supra,
it was not possible for defendant to know that the injuries
sustained by her child were life-threatening or could contribute
to his death.  Further, there was no proof demonstrating that
defendant's acts (of leaving the child with Flint) or omissions
were a sufficiently direct cause of the child's death (see
Stewart, 40 NY2d at 697).
In upholding defendant's reckless manslaughter
conviction, the majority concludes that the jury could logically
find, based on the evidence adduced at trial, that defendant knew
a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death existed and
consciously disregarded it (see Majority Op at 7).  But, in
support of the inference it claims the jury could make, the
majority points to evidence of defendant's awareness of a risk of
physical abuse, not death.  Stated differently, the majority,
without support, equates knowledge of a risk of physical abuse
with knowledge of a risk of death.  In effect, the majority has
held that once a parent is aware his/her child has been
physically abused by someone with whom they regularly leave the
child, even where the abuse occurs outside the presence of the
parent, and even where any injuries sustained appear to be
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No. 113
superficial, that parent may be held criminally liable for
reckless manslaughter if the child dies at the hands of the
abusive caregiver.  Such a ruling marks an unwarranted departure
from our jurisprudence and a drastic diminution of the proof
required to make out reckless manslaughter in a case involving a
passive defendant-parent.  Indeed, the majority's holding appears
to read the very stringent direct causation requirement out of
the reckless manslaughter statute in cases involving passive
defendants-parents.  
For the foregoing reasons, I would modify by dismissing
count seven of the indictment charging reckless manslaughter and
by dismissing count eight of the indictment charging reckless
endangerment.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order, insofar as appealed from, modified by vacating defendant's
conviction for reckless endangerment in the first degree,
dismissing that count of the indictment and remitting to County
Court, Warren County, for resentencing, and, as so modified,
affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Smith.  Judges Ciparick, Graffeo,
Read and Pigott concur.  Judge Jones dissents in part and votes
to modify by dismissing count seven of the indictment charging
manslaughter in the second degree and by dismissing the count
charging reckless endangerment, in an opinion in which Chief
Judge Lippman concurs.
Decided June 9, 2011
    
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