Title: Ray v. ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES OF MOBILE

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

674 So. 2d 525 (1995)
Marion M. RAY, as administratrix of the Estate of Thomas R. Ray, deceased,
v.
ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES OF MOBILE, P.C., et al.
1931023.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 22, 1995.
As Corrected on Denial of Rehearing December 15, 1995.
Andrew T. Citrin, Robert T. Cunningham, Jr., Michael A. Worel and David G. Wirtes, Jr. of Cunningham, Bounds, Yance, Crowder & Brown, Mobile, for Appellant.
Carroll H. Sullivan, W. Pemble DeLashmet and Keith S. Miller of Clark, Scott & Sullivan, Mobile, for Ruth B. Johnson, Paula Green, CRNA and Anesthesia Associates of Mobile, P.C.
PER CURIAM.
Marion M. Ray, as administratrix of the estate of her husband Thomas R. Ray, appeals from the circuit court's order denying her motion to hold the damages "cap" established in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-547, unconstitutional. Section 6-5-547 is a part of the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987. Based on that ruling, the circuit court entered a judgment for the plaintiff for $1,276,873 instead of $1,750,000, the full amount of the jury's verdict in this wrongful death case.[1]
Thomas Ray underwent coronary bypass surgery at Providence Hospital in Mobile on October 2, 1989. During the surgery, he suffered full cardiopulmonary arrest, which resulted in his death. Marion Ray, as administratrix of her husband's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Providence Hospital; Dr. Abel L. Johnson (Dr. Johnson died while the case was pending and his estate was substituted as a defendant); Dr. J. Carmichael; Paula Green, a certified registered *526 nurse anesthetist; C. Cailler, a certified respiratory therapist; and Anesthesia Associates of Mobile, P.C., alleging that an endotracheal tube was improperly placed into her husband's esophagus, and that the improper placement caused oxygen deprivation to his brain and caused the cardiopulmonary arrest. Before trial, the court, by agreement, entered a summary judgment for Dr. Carmichael. On October 28, 1993, the jury returned its verdict. It found against the defendants Green, Anesthesia Associates of Mobile, P.C., and the estate of Dr. Johnson, awarding the plaintiff $1.75 million; it found for the defendants Providence Hospital and Dr. Cailler. On November 5, 1993, those defendants found liable moved to have the verdict remitted, based on the damages cap established by the legislature in § 6-5-547 to apply in wrongful death actions against health care providers. In response, Ray moved the court to declare § 6-5-547 unconstitutional, and she served a copy of her motion on the attorney general.
On March 28, 1994, the circuit judge denied the motion to declare the damages cap unconstitutional and granted the motion to reduce the jury verdict. Thereafter, those defendants found liable withdrew their motion for J.N.O.V. or a new trial. The court entered a judgment in accordance with the verdict as reduced. The defendants did not appeal. However, Ray has appealed from the trial court's order applying § 6-5-547 to reduce the jury verdict. Thus, the sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the circuit court erred in reducing the jury's verdict.[2]
Section 6-5-547 provides:
(Emphasis added.)
Ray argues that the damages cap established by § 6-5-547 is unconstitutional, because, she claims, it violates the right to trial by jury and the right to equal protection of the laws provided by the Alabama Constitution of 1901. This Court recently addressed those issues in Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala.1995). In Schulte, this Court held that § 6-5-547 violates the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution of Alabama (Justices Shores, Ingram, and Cook concurring; Justice Kennedy concurring specially; and Justices Almon and Butts concurring in the result). This Court also ruled that § 6-5-547 violates the right to jury trial afforded by § 11 of the Alabama Constitution (Justices Almon, Shores, and Ingram concurring; Justice Kennedy concurring specially; and Justice Butts concurring in the result).
Accordingly, on the authority of Schulte, we hold that the circuit court erred in reducing the amount of the jury's verdict by applying the damages cap. We reverse the judgment and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
*527 ALMON, KENNEDY,[*] INGRAM, COOK, and BUTTS,[*] JJ., concur.
MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., dissent.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
The Court follows Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala.1995), which struck down the legislatively imposed cap on punitive damages in a wrongful death case arising out of alleged medical malpractice. Smith v. Schulte held that the cap violated the right to trial by jury and the right to equal protection of the laws provided by the Alabama Constitution of 1901.
There is no equal protection provision in Alabama's Constitution. A reading of the debates of the delegates to the 1901 Constitutional Convention should convince anyone that the delegates deliberately did not include an equal protection clause in the Alabama Constitution. See Justice Houston's dissenting opinion in Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d  at 1348-49, in which I concurred.
In view of the Court's holding in this case and in Smith v. Schulte concerning equal protection of the law, it appears to me that this Court has not been consistent in its holdings regarding the scope of legislative power under the provisions of Section 11 of the Alabama Constitution, and has separately held 1) that the Legislature cannot set a cap on punitive damages if the defendant is an individual or a private business corporation, but 2) that the Legislature can impose a cap if the defendant is a county or a municipal corporation, and 3) that the Legislature can take from the jury the power to set a penalty in a criminal case.[3] In citing Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala. 267, 292 So. 2d 651 (1974), in support of these holdings, it seems to me that the Court fails to appreciate the fact that Gilbreath v. Wallace involved a question of whether the Legislature could reduce the number of jurors in a will contest case from 12 to 6. Because "the substance of the right to trial by jury" in Alabama meant 12 jurors, this Court correctly held that the Legislature could not reduce the number to 6. The word "substance" was emphasized in Gilbreath v. Wallace for a specific reason, and I believe this Court fails to appreciate that fact, and because of that it reaches incongruous results, as it has here.
This is a wrongful death action. In Slagle v. Parker, 370 So. 2d 947 (Ala.1979), appeal *528 dismissed by Slagle v. Parker, 444 U.S. 804, 100 S. Ct. 24, 62 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1979), a majority of this Court said:
370 So. 2d  at 949-50 (emphasis in last sentence added).
In Smith v. Schulte, this Court cited Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala. 267, 292 So. 2d 651 (1974), to support its holding that the Legislature could not impose a cap on punitive damages in a wrongful death case, on the ground that to do so would violate a plaintiff's right to trial by jury. I participated in the decision in Gilbreath v. Wallace, and I recall the debates surrounding the decision in that case. Gilbreath v. Wallace was a will contest case, and the issue in that case was whether, at the time of the adoption of the 1901 Constitution, a party was entitled to a trial by jury in a will contest case. That case did not address whether the Legislature had the power to set a cap on punitive damages in a statutorily created wrongful death action, the subject matter of this case. Consequently, the decision in this case and the decision in Smith v. Schulte cannot be bottomed upon the principle of law set out in Gilbreath v. Wallace.
In Gilbreath v. Wallace, this Court discussed only the basic and fundamental right to trial by jury, or as it is stated in the opinion, the "substance" of the right to trial by jury, which "is confined to those classes of cases in which the right existed at common law, or in which it was used at the time of the adoption of the Constitution." Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala. 267, 270, 292 So. 2d 651, 653 (1974), quoting Alford v. State ex rel. Attorney General, 170 Ala. 178, 188-89, 54 So. 213, 215-16 (1910) (Mayfield, J., dissenting).
Of course, this statement of the rule is merely a restatement of the principle declared in Thomas v. Bibb, 44 Ala. 721, 722 (1870): "[T]he right of trial by jury is confined to cases in which it was conferred by the common law, to suits which the common law recognized amongst its old and settled proceedings and suits, in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those in which equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered, or in which was a mixture of law and equity." (Emphasis added) (citing Story on Const. § 1763; Tims v. State, 26 Ala. 165 (1855); cf., Boring v. Williams, 17 Ala. 510 (1850)).
It is plain that Gilbreath v. Wallace does not address the issue presented in this case, *529 but addresses only whether the Legislature could reduce the number of jurors from 12 to 6. A reading of the opinion in Gilbreath v. Wallace shows that the predominate issue was whether, at common law, a person was entitled to a jury in a will contest case. In fact, Justice Jones, the author of the Gilbreath v. Wallace opinion, discussed in some detail whether "an action to contest the validity of a will [was] a proceeding sui generis, unknown to the common law," 292 Ala. at 270, 292 So. 2d  at 654, as argued by the appellee in that case. He wrote:
292 Ala. at 270-71, 292 So. 2d  at 654. (Emphasis original.) Why did Justice Jones discuss whether a will contest case was a "law" case or an "equity" case? Because the right to trial by jury was to be determined by the answer to that question. Therefore, a party's substantive right to trial by jury is determined by whether the party's action is "at law" or "in equity," or is an action where the right to trial by jury, at the time of the adoption of the 1901 Constitution, had been universally recognized and firmly established in Alabama? The Court addressed the substantive right in Gilbreath v. Wallace by the following statement (the word "substance" was italicized in the original opinion):
292 Ala. at 269, 292 So. 2d  at 652. I believe that the whole premise of Gilbreath v. Wallace was based on the fact that the right to a *530 trial by jury in a will contest case had been universally recognized and firmly established in Alabama at the time of the adoption of the 1901 Constitution, and the substance of that right was a trial by a jury of 12 who must reach a unanimous verdict. In my judgment, that is all that Gilbreath v. Wallace held.
I do not believe that Gilbreath v. Wallace should be used as authority for the holding in this case that the people of Alabama, by adopting § 11 of the Constitution, intended that their Legislature could not limit the amount of damages that could be awarded in a wrongful death actiona creature of the Legislature that was meant to prevent homicidesan action that it had created.
In summary, did the people intend that the Legislature could not limit the amount of penalty that could be assessed in a wrongful death action, an action that is purely statutory? They did not so intend.
I do not believe that § 11 should be interpreted to mean that the people prohibited their Legislature from deciding what did or did not constitute a wrong, from providing what it considered to be the appropriate penalty, or from taking away from the jury the power to set the penalty, as it has in every criminal case in this State.
I believe that the Legislature had the power to limit the amount of damages that a jury can assess in a wrongful death case involving a health care provider.
It cannot be disputed that wrongful death actions are creatures of statute in Alabama. They were unknown to the common law at the time of Alabama's first Constitution and they have not come into existence in Alabama as a part of the evolving common law. Consequently, § 6-5-547 does not violate the right to trial by jury protected by § 11 of the Alabama Constitution.
HOUSTON, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. See Smith v. Schulte, [Ms. 1930362, August 18, 1995] 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala.1995) (Houston, J., dissenting).
PER CURIAM.
OPINION CORRECTED; APPLICATION OVERRULED.
ALMON, KENNEDY, INGRAM, COOK, and BUTTS, JJ., concur.
HOOPER, C.J.,[*] and MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., dissent.
[1]  The $1,000,000 damages cap established by § 6-5-547 has been adjusted upward based on increases in the consumer price index since the passage of the statute.
[2]  The defendants did not cross appeal to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury verdict or to challenge the amount of the jury's verdict as excessive.
[*]  Although Justice Kennedy did not sit at oral argument of this case and although Justice Butts was not a member of this Court when this case was orally argued, they have listened to the tape of oral argument and have studied the record.
[3]  In Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala.1993), this Court, grounding its decision on the provisions of Section 11, held that the Legislature could not establish a cap on punitive damages in a civil damages case involving a corporate defendant, but in Garner v. Covington County, 624 So. 2d 1346 (Ala.1993), construing the same provisions of the Constitution, held that the legislature could impose a statutory cap on punitive damages where the defendants were a city and a county, and during the same term of Court, in Ex parte Giles, 632 So. 2d 577 (Ala. 1993), also held that Section 11 did not prohibit the Legislature from taking from the jury the right to impose penalties in criminal cases. In each of these cases, "the substance of the right to trial by jury" remained inviolate, because in each case the parties had a jury of 12 who reached a unanimous verdict. I have great difficulty understanding the Court's rationale, when deciding the extent of legislative power, in making a distinction on the extent of that power based on whether the defendant is an individual, a corporation, a municipal corporation, a county, or a defendant in a criminal case. The right to a jury of 12 persons who must agree on a verdict, the substance of the right to trial by jury, is present in each of the cases. Unfortunately, I have had to state this immutable principle of legislative power on several occasions. See the views I expressed in some detail in Henderson, supra. See other writings of mine in other cases where I was of the opinion that the Court expanded the "substance of the right to trial by jury" to include matters never intended to be included by this Court when it decided Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala. 267, 292 So. 2d 651 (1974). Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 178-83 (Ala. 1991) (Maddox, J., dissenting); Clark v. Container Corp. of America, 589 So. 2d 184, 201-02 (Ala. 1991) (Maddox, J., dissenting); Armstrong v. Roger's Outdoor Sports, Inc., 581 So. 2d 414, 423-27 (Ala.1991) (Maddox, J., dissenting). For my views on the scope of legislative power involving other provisions of Alabama's Constitution, see, Industrial Chemical & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler, 547 So. 2d 812, 824-29, 833-34 (Ala.1988) (Maddox, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part); Fireman's Fund American Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 355-58 (Ala.1980) (Beatty, J., dissenting, joined by Maddox, J.); Grantham v. Denke, 359 So. 2d 785, 789-92 (Ala. 1978) (Maddox, J., dissenting); Bagby Elevator & Electric Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 200-08, 291 So. 2d 306 (1974) (Maddox, J., dissenting).
[*]  Chief Justice Hooper did not sit at oral argument of this case. However, he listened to the tape of oral argument on November 14, 1995.