Title: State v. Board of County Com'rs of Dona Ana County

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

380 P.2d 830 (1963) 72 N.M. 86 STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION of New Mexico, T. B. White, Chief Highway Engineer, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF DONA ANA COUNTY, and the City of Las Cruces, a municipal corporation, Defendants-Appellees. No. 7196. Supreme Court of New Mexico. April 15, 1963. *831 Joseph L. Droege, John C. Worden, M. J. Underwood, Special Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellant. Earl E. Hartley, Atty. Gen., Shirley C. Zabel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellees. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, John P. Eastham, Albuquerque, amicus curiae. MOISE, Justice. This appeal presents for determination the question of whether or not the State Highway Commission, hereinafter referred to as "Commission" must pay compensation to Dona Ana County, hereinafter referred to as "County" for property of the County taken by the Commission for highway purposes. It reaches us by appeal from a judgment in favor of the County in a declaratory judgment proceeding filed by the Commission. The property being taken is owned by the County; part of it constitutes ground utilized in connection with the county court house, and part of it in connection with the county hospital. It is argued that both these uses are governmental and consequently the rule of State ex rel. Highway Comm. v. City of Albuquerque, 67 N.M. 383, 355 P.2d 925, is not applicable. This case differs from the City of Albuquerque case in that the instant case arose after Chap. 324, N.M.S.L. 1959 (§ 22-9-39 et seq., N.M.S.A. 1953) became effective and involves an interpretation of that statute, whereas the City of Albuquerque case arose before the effective date of that statute. Concerning the governmental nature of the operation of a county hospital, there can be no doubt. We expressly so held in Elliott v. Lea County, 58 N.M. 147, 267 P.2d 131. So far as the county court house property is concerned, it would seem to be self evident that the same is used and maintained by the county in its governmental function. Brooks v. Baldwin County, 273 Ala. 138, 135 So. 2d 816; 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 190, § 4.132; Rhine, Municipal Law 68, §§ 4-6. Having determined that the property being taken is property held and used in a governmental capacity, does it follow that it may be taken by another agency of the state without compensation? The trial court concluded that insofar as §§ 22-9-39 22-9-54, N.M.S.A. 1953, are concerned, the property in question was held by the county *832 in its proprietary capacity. In the view we take of the problem, this erroneous conclusion is immaterial. Art. II, Sec. 20, New Mexico Constitution, provides that "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." The property in question being public property and used for governmental purposes, the County cannot claim it is guaranteed compensation under this constitutional provision. We think it is established that absent statutory authority, property of one public body being used for public purposes cannot be condemned by another public body. City of Albuquerque v. Garcia, 17 N.M. 445, 130 P. 118. In State v. City of Albuquerque, supra, we found authority in the Commission to take park property of a municipality held in its proprietary capacity by purchase or condemnation under § 22-9-1, N.M.S.A. 1953, upon payment of the fair and reasonable value of the land. We were not called upon, and did not pass on the question of whether the same result would follow if the property were used in a governmental function. We are here called upon to determine that question under § 22-9-1, N.M.S.A. 1953, and §§ 22-9-39 to 22-9-54, N.M.S.A. 1953. Since compensation is not guaranteed by the constitution, we must determine if the legislature has evidenced an intent that public property may be taken without compensation. See State by State Highway Com'r v. Cooper, 24 N.J. 261, 131 A.2d 756. We recognize the rule to be as stated in 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain 223, § 5.9, that: In The School District of the Speers Borough School District v. Commonwealth, 383 Pa. 205, 117 A.2d 702, 703, the rule is stated as follows: The court then found in the statute a showing of legislative intent that compensation should be paid by one public body to another where lands used either in a governmental or proprietary capacity were taken for another public use. Accordingly, our task is to determine if our legislature has provided for payment of compensation even though not required to do so by any constitutional limitations. Specific authority for taking public property for highway purposes was provided by the legislature in Chap. 234, N.M.S.L. 1957 (§§ 55-10-1 to 55-10-10, inc., N.M.S.A. 1953), and, as already noted, it was held in State v. City of Albuquerque, supra, that such property could be taken and that compensation must be paid if the public property taken was held by the municipality in connection with its proprietary function. The county, together with amicus curiae aligned with it, argue that legislative intention that compensation be paid is clearly manifest in the alternative procedure provided for in Chap. 324, N.M.S.L. 1959 (§ 22-9-39 et seq., N.M.S.A. 1953). In support of their position they point to the title which reads: We also note the following language in the act which aids us in determining the legislative intent: Chapter 324, § 15, N.M.S.L. 1959, was amended by Chap. 75, § 1, N.M.S.L. 1961, so as to read: We do not propose to separately analyze each section, provision or word in this act. We think that the legislative intent is so clear that there can be little room for argument. By its title, the act is one providing an alternative procedure whereby public or private property may be condemned for highway purposes. In Section 1 is an expression of the legislative intent to establish a special procedure more speedily to accomplish the purposes as set forth in Section 3, which is the acquisition by the state for highway purposes of public or privately owned lands "by gift, agreement, purchase, exchange, condemnation or otherwise." The Commission would attribute to the legislature, by use of the words "or otherwise" some indication of intention that payment of compensation was not required when public property is condemned. We do not agree that any such thought is thereby expressed or implied. This is made doubly clear because private as well as public property may be acquired by all the methods stated, and unquestionably private property cannot be condemned without payment of compensation. Art. II, § 20, N.M.Const. Provision is made in the same section that there shall be a determination of "the greater public need" when state owned property is being taken. We call attention to the use of the term "state owned" property rather than "public" property at this point. Also, in this connection, we would point to Section 4, subd. A(7), quoted above, requiring the condemnation petition to include a statement that the requirement of Section 3 has been complied *835 with. The balance of the provisions quoted treat the owners of public property no differently than the owners of private property in any respect, including specification of the proper measure of compensation "for all property taken [or] injuriously affected" (Sec. 14, subd. A) and requirement for the entry of a final order of condemnation after payment in full has been made. (Sec. 15). It would have been practically impossible for the legislature to have stated more clearly their intention that compensation should be paid, when public property was condemned for highway purposes. The requirement for payment is clearly without regard to the nature of uses being made and accordingly includes property being used for a governmental as well as a proprietary purpose. If there was any question that § 55-10-5, N.M.S.A. 1953, authorizing the commission to acquire "private or public property" by condemnation, contemplated payment therefor whether it was used for proprietary or governmental purposes, we are clear that all uncertainty was erased with the adoption of Chap. 324, N.M.S.L. 1959. We would add a word to the effect that any other conclusion might lead to most incongruous results. Whereas, property owned and used by political subdivisions of the state for governmental purposes is technically state property, under our system of government each subdivision is made responsible for providing the facilities required by the particular subdivision through taxes or bond issues payable by the property owners of the subdivision. If the state can take a strip from the court house lot or the hospital lot, it can also take the court house building and the hospital building. Many such buildings are financed by the county through the issuance of general obligation bonds repayable with the taxes levied against property in the county. If the state took the buildings and did not compensate the county, replacement would have to be made through new bond issues or by other means which might be available to the subdivision. The burden would be intolerable or, possibly, even prohibited by debt limitations pertinent to the subdivision. See Art. IX, §§ 10 to 13, inc., N.M.Const.; § 15-49-2, N.M.S.A. 1953. Since the highways are state projects paid for by the public of the state at large, including in many instances contribution by the federal government, it is only just and proper that the legislature in its wisdom should provide for compensation when public property is taken for highway purposes as they have clearly done in Chap. 234, N.M.S.L. 1959, and since this is an alternative procedure, must also have intended by § 55-10-5, N.M.S.A. 1953. Under this construction of the statutes, absurdity, hardship and injustice are avoided and the public interest and convenience are favored. These are the results to be sought. Cox v. City of Albuquerque, 53 N.M. 334, 207 P.2d 1017; Scott v. United States, 54 N.M. 34, 213 P.2d 216. The commission argues that there is nothing stated in the title or the body of Chap. 234, N.M.S.L. 1959, indicating an intention to grant rights to compensation where none previously existed, and calls particular attention to the fact that since certain special provisions applicable to public property (Secs. 3 and 4, subd. A(7)) were included, and since the legislation is "a special alternative procedure" and was not intended to create new rights, we should conclude that no compensation need be paid for public property used for governmental purposes when taken under this alternative procedure. We have set forth our reasons for concluding otherwise. We have noted the cases of The School District of the Speers Borough School District v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra, and State by and through Road Comm. v. Salt Lake City Public Board of Education, 13 Utah 2d 56, 368 P.2d 468, both of which cases involved the same question here considered. Both in Pennsylvania and in Utah, under statutes not nearly as clear as ours, a legislative intention that payment should be made in the event of condemnation of public property used for *836 governmental purposes was found. We know of no cases to the contrary. For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. It is so ordered. CARMODY and NOBLE, JJ., concur.