Title: Sutton v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DEAN SUTTON, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 333, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. N2104001561 
§  
§ 
 
Submitted: May 1, 2024 
Decided: 
June 20, 2024 
 
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the 
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the 
Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On August 31, 2021, a grand jury indicted Dean Sutton for first-degree 
murder, attempted first-degree murder, and two counts of possession of a firearm 
during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”).  The charges arose from an incident 
in which Sutton shot and killed Larry Porter and shot at Porter’s son, Breon Harmon.  
During the four-day jury trial, Sutton admitted that he fired the gun but contended 
that his use of force was justified.  On the evening of April 2, 2021, Porter and 
Harmon arrived at the Sutton family residence at 222 West 19th Street in 
 
2 
Wilmington to confront Sutton’s cousin, Shaun Irby, about domestic issues between 
Irby and his wife.  Irby’s wife was Porter’s niece, and Irby was staying at the Sutton 
residence at the time.  Sutton was leaving the house when Porter, whom Sutton did 
not know, asked whether Irby was at home.1  Sutton went into the house to call for 
Irby, and then Irby and Sutton walked outside together.2  As they exited the house, 
Sutton saw Harmon, whom he also did not know, getting out of a car wearing a black 
ski mask, which raised “red flags” for Sutton.3   
(2) 
Porter and Irby engaged in a heated conversation as Sutton and Harmon 
stood nearby.4  Porter was “really angry,” irate, loud, and yelling, and Sutton asked 
the others to leave and “take it somewhere else.”5  The verbal confrontation turned 
physical when Porter “swung on” Irby.6  Porter got the upper hand in the fight; Porter 
grabbed Irby, pulled him down off the steps, punched him, and knocked him out.7  
As Porter continued to punch Irby as Irby lay on the ground, Sutton tried to push 
 
1 Appendix to Opening Brief at A460. 
2 Id. at A461-62. 
3 Id. at A462, A479-81.  Harmon testified that he was wearing a black hat, not a ski mask.  Id. at 
A374-75.  When asked whether Harmon was wearing a hat or mask, Irby testified that Harmon 
might have been wearing a hoodie but that he did not really remember.  Id. at A363.  Harmon did 
not appear to be wearing a mask in surveillance videos that captured some of the events of the 
night at issue. 
4 Id. at A369-72, A464-66, A358-59. 
5 Id. at A463, A465, A385. 
6 Id. at A372, A466; see also id. at A384 (Harmon testimony agreeing that Porter “took the first 
swing on Mr. Irby”). 
7 Id. at A466-67. 
 
3 
Porter away.8  Harmon then intervened, and Sutton and Harmon began tussling near 
the cars parked in the street, as Porter continued to assault Irby.9  A neighbor 
attempted to break up the fight between Sutton and Harmon, spraying them with 
mace, but they continued fighting.10 
(3) 
Sutton had a permit to carry a concealed weapon, and he had a gun that 
night.11  As Harmon restrained Sutton against a car in a headlock, Porter left Irby 
lying on the sidewalk and joined Harmon in the fight with Sutton.12  Sutton testified 
that he believed that Porter realized that Sutton was armed and might be able to grab 
the gun and use it against Sutton.13  He testified that he “feared for [his] life” because 
he had “two guys jumping on [him],” he had “just seen what he did to my cousin, 
beating him unconscious and continue beating him.  My life was—my life was in 
danger ultimately.  And he had access to my weapon and what else can I do?  No 
other option but to defend myself.”14  Sutton took out the gun and fired at Harmon 
and then at Porter.15  Harmon felt the first shot go past his beard and started running 
 
8 Id. at A467-68, A372-73. 
9 Id. at A467-68, A372-73, A383-84. 
10 Id. at A372, A375, A378, A468, A490-92. 
11 Id. at A470-72, A313. 
12 Id. at A372-74, A468-72, A475. 
13 Id.at A472-73. 
14 Id. at A474. 
15 Id. at A471-74. 
 
4 
away.16  Porter said “stop, stop, stop.”17  Sutton fired one more shot in Harmon’s 
direction as he fled, and then turned toward Porter and fired three more shots.18  
Three bullets struck Porter; he died from his injuries.  Sutton then walked around the 
area, retrieving some of his possessions that had fallen to the ground, before getting 
into his car and driving away.19 
(4) 
Police officers arrived on the scene in response to a “shot spotter” alert.  
They found Irby injured20 and Porter shot at the scene.  They collected evidence, 
including ballistics evidence and several videos from surveillance cameras in the 
area, including a neighbor’s front-porch Ring camera.  The video evidence showed 
the men talking before the physical altercation began, Porter assaulting Irby while 
Irby was on the ground, Sutton and Harmon struggling between the cars, Sutton 
firing the gun, Porter saying “stop,” and Harmon running down the street after the 
shooting.   
(5) 
Over the defense’s objection, the court instructed the jury on the lesser-
included offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter as to the first-degree 
 
16 Id. at A374-76, A481. 
17 Sutton acknowledged that Porter told him to stop, though he denied having heard it at the time 
because “adrenalin [was] rushing.”  Id. at A494-95; see also id. at A376 (Harmon testimony that 
he heard Porter say “stop” after Sutton fired the first shot). 
18 Id. at A482, A497. 
19 Id. at A497-98, A500-01. 
20 Irby was transported to the hospital and woke up there the following day; he sustained a 
concussion, several lacerations, and several broken bones in his face and around his eye.  Id. at 
A361-62. 
 
5 
murder charge and the lesser-included offense of first-degree reckless endangering 
as to the attempted first-degree murder charge.  The jury found Sutton guilty of the 
lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and first-degree reckless endangering and 
acquitted him of the PFDCF charges.  On September 1, 2023, the Superior Court 
sentenced Sutton to a total of thirty years of imprisonment, suspended after ten years 
for decreasing levels of supervision. 
(6) 
In this direct appeal, Sutton’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Sutton’s counsel asserts that, based 
upon a conscientious review of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  
Counsel informed Sutton of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a 
copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Counsel also informed 
Sutton of his right to supplement counsel’s presentation.  Sutton responded with 
points he wanted to present for the Court’s consideration, which counsel included 
with the Rule 26(c) brief.  The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and argues 
that the Superior Court’s judgment should be affirmed.  
(7) 
When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 
under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made 
a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.21  This 
 
21 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 
442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  
 
6 
Court must also conduct its own review of the record and determine whether “the 
appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary 
presentation.”22 
(8) 
Sutton’s first argument is that his use of force was justified.  Sutton 
asserts that he was permitted to use the force that he believed was necessary to 
protect himself from unlawful force or to protect Irby from death or serious bodily 
harm.23  He also contends that he was not obligated to retreat from his dwelling 
before using force in self-protection.24  Because the Superior Court provided the jury 
with a self-defense instruction, including as to the law governing retreat, we construe 
Sutton’s argument to be that the Superior Court should have instructed the jury 
regarding the use of force for the protection of other persons, as provided in 11 Del. 
C. § 465.   
 
22 Penson, 488 U.S. at 82. 
23 Cf. 11 Del. C. § 464(a) (“The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the 
defendant reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of 
protecting the defendant against the use of unlawful force by the other person on the present 
occasion.”); id. § 464(c) (“The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section if the defendant 
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect the defendant against death, serious 
physical injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat.”); id. § 465 
(establishing the circumstances under which the use of force to protect a third person is justifiable). 
24 Cf. id. § 464(e)(2)a (providing that the use of deadly force in self-defense is not justifiable if the 
defendant “knows that the necessity of using deadly force can be avoided with complete safety by 
retreating,” except that the defendant “is not obliged to retreat in or from the defendant’s 
dwelling”); id. § 465(b)-(d) (governing when retreat is required before using force for the 
protection of a third person). 
 
7 
(9) 
Sutton requested a self-defense instruction but did not ask the Superior 
Court to provide an instruction as to the use of force for the protection of another 
person; we therefore review for plain error.25  “Under the plain error standard of 
review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights 
as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”26  By the time Sutton 
fired the gun, Porter had left Irby lying on the sidewalk and joined with Harmon in 
fighting with Sutton.  Moreover, Sutton testified that he believed that it was 
necessary to use the gun after Porter punched Sutton’s side, may have realized that 
Sutton had a gun, and tried to reach for it.  Thus, the more immediate threat by the 
time of the shooting was to Sutton, not Irby, yet the jury declined to find that Sutton’s 
conduct was justified as self-defense.27  On the facts of this case, we conclude that 
 
25 See Canty v. State, 394 A.2d 215, 217 (Del. 1978) (“A request for instruction on defense of 
others was not made before the charge was given, nor was an objection made thereafter.  The Trial 
Judge’s failure to instruct [s]ua sponte on that concept was not plain nor reversible error . . . .”); 
see also Rivera v. State, 2023 WL 1978878, at *8 (Del. Feb. 13, 2023) (“Rivera did not request a 
jury instruction on self-defense . . ., so we review for plain error.”); Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 
119 (Del. 1988) (reviewing for plain error because defendant did not object “at trial to any of the 
jury instructions on the grounds that are currently before us”). 
26 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
27 Consistent with 11 Del. C. § 470(a), the court instructed the jury that if it found that Sutton 
believed that the use of force upon Harmon and Porter was necessary to protect himself against 
death or serious physical injury, but he was reckless in having such belief, self-defense was 
unavailable.  See 11 Del. C. § 470(a) (“When the defendant reasonably believes that the use of 
force upon or toward the person of another is necessary for any of the purposes for which such 
relief would establish a justification under §§ 462-468 of this title but the defendant is reckless or 
negligent in having such belief . . ., the justification afforded by those sections is unavailable in a 
prosecution for an offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to 
establish culpability.”); Clark v. State, 65 A.3d 571, 578 (Del. 2013) (holding that Section 470(a) 
provides that justification is unavailable for offenses that require a reckless mental state if the 
defendant’s belief that force is justified is itself reckless).  The offenses of which Sutton was 
 
8 
the trial court did not plainly err by not sua sponte providing a defense-of-others 
instruction. 
(10) Next, Sutton claims that the police officers’ testimony at trial was 
inconsistent or contradictory in various respects, amounting to perjury and a 
violation of due process.  For example, he asserts that one officer testified that Irby 
spoke to her when she arrived on scene and then later testified that they did not have 
a conversation; another officer said that he saw Porter on the ground but did not see 
Irby; Detective Mosley, the lead investigator, testified that he obtained an arrest 
warrant on April 5, 2021, and then later stated that he obtained it on April 2, 2021; 
and Detective Mosley testified that he could not locate Sutton between April 2 and 
13, 2021.  After careful consideration, we conclude that, to the extent that Sutton has 
identified inconsistencies or contradictions at all, they “were such as would usually 
be found in the trial of criminal cases”28 and merely raised a credibility issue for the 
 
convicted required a reckless mental state.  See Appendix to Opening Brief at A623-24 (instructing 
jury that “a person is guilty of manslaughter when a person recklessly causes the death of another 
person” and that to find Sutton guilty of manslaughter “you must find that the State has proved the 
following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1, the defendant caused the death of Larry 
Porter and; 2, in causing this death, the defendant acted recklessly”); id. at A630 (instructing jury 
that “a person is guilty of reckless endangering in the first degree when the person recklessly 
engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of death to another person” and that “[i]n order 
to find the defendant guilty of reckless endangering in the first degree, you must find the State has 
proved the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:  1, the defendant engaged in 
conduct that created substantial risk of death to Breon Harmon. 2, the defendant acted recklessly”). 
28 Zutz v. State, 160 A.2d 727, 729 (Del. 1960). 
 
9 
jury to resolve.29  Sutton has not demonstrated that the State knowingly used perjured 
testimony, and reversal is not warranted.30 
(11) Sutton also argues that Detective Mosley edited a video from the night 
of the shooting so that it did not show that Harmon was wearing a ski mask.  Sutton 
did not object to the introduction of the video at trial or argue that it had been edited 
as he now claims.  On appeal, Sutton has not substantiated his speculative assertion 
that the video was edited and would have shown Harmon wearing a ski mask.  We 
find no merit to this claim.31  
(12) Sutton asserts that there were certain text messages between Porter, 
Harmon, and Michelle Porter (Porter’s wife and Harmon’s mother), which the State 
 
29 See Romeo v. State, 2011 WL 1877845, at *3 (Del. May 13, 2011) (“[M]ere contradictions in a 
witness’s testimony may not require reversal because those contradictions may not constitute 
knowing use of false or perjured testimony.  Rather, mere contradictions in trial testimony 
establish a credibility question for the jury.” (citations omitted)); see also Knight v. State, 690 A.2d 
929, 932 (Del. 1996) (“It is well-settled that the trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of 
the witnesses and responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony.” (internal quotation 
omitted)). 
30 Jenkins v. State, 305 A.2d 610, 616 (Del. 1973) (“There is nothing before us to indicate that the 
State knowingly used perjured testimony.  The fact that there were contradictions within Hall’s 
testimony does not require reversal.”); see also Zutz, 160 A.2d at 495-96 (“The rule is too well 
established that a verdict of a jury, based upon competent evidence, even though conflicting, will 
not be set aside upon appeal.  An appellate court does not weigh the testimony; to do so would 
usurp the function of the jury.  The only thing which an appellate court may do in such case is to 
determine if there was competent evidence upon which the verdict might reasonably be based.  If 
there was, as we believe to be the case here, the judgment of conviction must be affirmed.” (citation 
omitted)). 
31 Cf. Blackwood v. State, 2023 WL 6629581, at *8-9 (Del. Oct. 11, 2023) (rejecting claim that 
“the prosecution presented to the jury an ‘altered and manipulated’ video” of defendant’s interview 
with police, because defendant “has not provided any evidence that the State altered or 
manipulated the video, other than applying the approved redactions[, n]or does he assert that the 
State did not provide the defense with an unredacted copy of the video, such that the defense could 
have argued to the Superior Cour that the State had spliced the video, if that were true”). 
 
10 
did not introduce into evidence, that would have shown that Porter and Harmon went 
to 222 West 19th Street on the night of the incident intending to fight Irby, not just 
talk to him.  The record reflects that the State produced the contents of Harmon’s 
cellphone extraction, which included the text messages, in discovery in September 
2021.  Thus, the defense could have introduced the messages if they would have 
been helpful to the defense.  In any event, Harmon’s and Sutton’s testimony and the 
video evidence reflected that the interaction quickly turned physical and that Porter 
threw the first punch, and Sutton has not shown how the text messages would have 
changed the result of the trial.32   
(13) Sutton contends that the prosecution misled the jury by playing a 
version of the neighbor’s Ring-camera video that was edited to omit Porter’s assault 
on Irby.  The trial transcript reflects that the neighbor observed that the video played 
during his testimony was “cropped” and did not “show the whole video.”33  Sutton 
concedes that the prosecution later played the full video for the jury.  During closing 
arguments defense counsel encouraged jurors to “[w]atch the uncropped version of 
the video in realtime.”34  We find no reversible error as to this issue. 
 
32 Sutton’s claim that he was denied a fair trial because the State failed to disclose any evidence 
before trial is not supported by the record, which reflects that the State provided substantial 
discovery beginning in September 2021; the discovery included, among many other things, the 
surveillance videos, the crime-scene video, cell phone extractions, numerous police reports, 
medical records and the report of Porter’s autopsy, warrants, a recording and transcript of Sutton’s 
police interview, and a ballistics report. 
33 Appendix to Opening Brief at A313. 
34 Id. at A581. 
 
11 
(14) Sutton also claims that he was denied his right to a speedy trial.  To 
determine whether a speedy-trial violation occurred, we use the four-factor 
balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo.35  The four factors are the length of the 
delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and the 
prejudice to the defendant.36  “The length of the delay is the trigger that necessitates 
the consideration of the other three Barker factors.”37  “Unless the length of delay is 
determined to be ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ it is not necessary to consider the other 
Barker factors.”38  “The right to a speedy trial attaches as soon as the defendant is 
accused of a crime through arrest or indictment, whichever occurs first.”39  If the 
delay between arrest or indictment and trial approaches one year, then the Court will 
generally consider the additional factors.40 
(15) Sutton was arrested on April 13, 2021, and indicted on August 30, 2021.  
Thus, his speedy-trial right attached when he was arrested.  More than two years 
passed between Sutton’s arrest on April 13, 2021, and the beginning of jury selection 
 
35 407 U.S. 514 (1972).  See Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (adopting the Barker 
framework for evaluating speedy-trial claims). 
36 Johnson, 305 A.2d at 623 (citing Barker). 
37 Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 164 (Del. 2008). 
38 McGriff v. State, 2023 WL 600118, at *3 (Del. Jan. 27, 2023) (quoting Middlebrook v. State, 
802 A.2d 268, 274 (Del. 2002)). 
39 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 273. 
40 McGriff, 2023 WL 600118, at *3. 
 
12 
on April 27, 2023, and we will therefore consider the additional Barker factors.41  As 
to the reason for the delay, it was attributable to the judicial emergency that was 
declared in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  The speedy-trial guidelines were 
tolled during some of the period between Sutton’s arrest and his trial.42  With the 
exception of a brief period in October and November 2020, jury trials were 
suspended between March 16, 2020, and June 1, 2021.43  Other proceedings, 
including grand jury proceedings, were also suspended during the initial periods of 
 
41 Compare Rivera v. State, 2023 WL 1978878, at *5 (Del. Feb. 13, 2023) (considering the 
additional Barker factors “because there is more than one year between Rivera’s arrest (June 11, 
2019) and the start of his trial (August 10, 2021),” and concluding that although approximately 
eight weeks of delay were attributable to the State, “most of the trial delay” was the result of the 
COVID-19 judicial emergency), with McGriff, 2023 WL 600118, at *3 (“More than one year 
passed between McGriff’s arrest in May 2020 and trial in November 2021.  McGriff fails, however, 
to acknowledge the reason for this delay.  For a significant portion of the time between McGriff’s 
arrest (May 19, 2020) and trial (November 16, 2021 to November 18, 2021), there was a judicial 
emergency in effect because of the COVID-19 pandemic.  With the exception of a brief period 
between October 5, 2020 and November 16, 2020, jury trials were suspended between March 2020 
and June 1, 2021.  The Chief Justice’s judicial emergency orders tolled the time requirements 
under the Speedy Trial Guidelines.  McGriff also fails to identify any prejudice that he suffered 
from the delay.  He has not shown that the delay caused any impairment to his defense.  There was 
no violation of McGriff’s right to a speedy trial.” (citations omitted), and McGriff v. State, 2023 
WL 469122, at *2-3 (Del. Jan. 27, 2023) (similar discussion relating to different prosecution, in 
which defendant was arrested on April 22, 2020 and trial began on July 20, 2021). 
42 See In re COVID-19 Precautionary Measures, Administrative Order No. 22 Extension of 
Judicial Emergency, at 1-3 (Del. June 29, 2021), available at https://courts.delaware.gov/forms/ 
download.aspx?id=157738 (reciting that a judicial emergency went into effect on March 16, 2020, 
was repeatedly extended, and would be lifted on July 13, 2021, and providing:  “Until the 
expiration of the judicial emergency on July 13, 2021, all time requirements under the Speedy 
Trial Guidelines are tolled. . . .  After the judicial emergency expires, the trial courts shall comply 
with those guidelines, as amended.”). 
43 McGriff, 2023 WL 469122, at *2 & nn. 10-11 (citing administrative orders). 
 
13 
the judicial emergency.44  The suspensions created a backlog of proceedings to 
resolve as the courts moved toward resuming normal operations.  On June 29, 2021, 
in connection with the anticipated end of the judicial emergency on July 13, 2021, 
the Chief Justice authorized the Superior Court to prioritize cases in which the 
defendant was indicted between March 16, 2020, and December 31, 2021, “as [the 
Superior Court] determines to be in the best interests of justice and of allowing for 
the prompt and efficient management of the caseload resulting from the COVID-19 
pandemic.”45  Sutton was indicted on August 30, 2021.  On October 18, 2021, the 
Superior Court entered a scheduling order that provided for Sutton’s jury selection 
to begin on April 27, 2023, and trial to begin on May 1, 2023.  Those dates stuck:  
jury selection began on April 27, 2023, and the jury was sworn and trial began on 
May 1, 2023.  The delay in this case was clearly attributable to the COVID-19 
judicial emergency, and this factor therefore is neutral and does not weigh in 
Sutton’s favor.46 
 
44 See, e.g., In re COVID-19 Precautionary Measures, Administrative Order No. 13 Return to 
Phase 2 of the Reopening Plan (Del. Nov. 16, 2020) (providing for return to Phase 2 of courts’ 
reopening plan and permitting grand jury proceedings during Phase 2). 
45 In re COVID-19 Precautionary Measures, Administrative Order No. 22 Extension of Judicial 
Emergency, supra note 42, Exhibit 1 ¶ (a)(iv). 
46 See United States v. Small, 2023 WL 4399212, at *4 (3d Cir. July 7, 2023) (describing the 
COVID-19 pandemic as a “neutral reason” for a delay that “weighs against neither party” in the 
Barker analysis, and citing cases from other federal courts of appeal); see also United States v. 
Allen, 86 F.4th 295, 305 (6th Cir. 2023) (“[F]rom July 2020 to August 2021, the district court 
delayed the trial because of the COVID-19 pandemic.  We and other courts have treated this type 
of delay as a valid reason that also weighs against the defendants (or at least as a neutral reason 
that favors neither party).”); United States v. Pair, 84 F.4th 577, 589 (4th Cir. 2023) (analyzing 
 
14 
(16) As to the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, Sutton’s 
counsel did not assert a speedy-trial violation, a fact that might be attributable to 
counsel’s recognition that the Superior Court scheduled the matter within the 
authority afforded it in light of the judicial emergency.  Sutton did submit pro se 
correspondence to the court in which he mentioned the length of time that he had 
been incarcerated and his right to a speedy trial, although the correspondence 
focused largely on his claims that his use of force was justified.  The Superior Court 
forwarded the correspondence to counsel under Superior Court Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 47.  This factor is neutral in our analysis. 
(17) As to the fourth Barker factor, this court considers prejudice “in light 
of three of defendants’ interests that the speedy trial right was designed to protect: 
(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and 
concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be 
impaired.”47  “Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a 
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.”48  
“Not only is impairment of a defendant’s defense the most serious type of prejudice, 
but it is also the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time’s 
 
“presumptively prejudicial” delay of 401 days and determining that the judicial response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic was “a valid reason for delay” that “favor[ed] the government” under the 
second Barker factor). 
47 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d 268, 276 (Del. 2002). 
48 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972); Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 277. 
 
15 
erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony can rarely be shown.”49  “[W]hether 
the delay has hurt the defense is not a point to be resolved with mathematical 
certainty.”50  After careful consideration, we conclude that Sutton has not established 
that the delay in this case prejudiced his defense.  The fact that Sutton shot Porter 
was not disputed, and the witnesses’ testimony regarding the incident was generally 
consistent—to the extent that there were material inconsistencies, they appear to be 
attributable to normal differences in witnesses’ motivations or observations, rather 
than to faded memories.51  The issue in the case was whether Sutton was justified in 
shooting Porter, which turned on Sutton’s state of mind and his belief about the threat 
posed by Porter and Harmon.  Sutton has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced 
by the delay.52  We conclude that the pandemic-related delay in this case did not 
violate Sutton’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. 
 
49 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 277 (internal quotations omitted).   
50 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
51 For example, Harmon testified that he was not wearing a ski mask on the night in question, and 
Sutton testified that Harmon was wearing a ski mask.  That difference in testimony is more likely 
explained by the differing motivations of those witnesses than by faded memories, and it presented 
a credibility question to be resolved by the jury. 
52 Cf. United States v. Chu, 99 F.4th 610, 615 (3d Cir. 2024) (holding that COVID-19-related 
delays did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, in case in which defendant 
was indicted in September 2019 and trial began March 1, 2022; stating that the defendant did not 
“provide evidence that the delay impaired her ability to prepare a defense, and only asserted claims 
of emotional distress,” and that defendant’s “desire to minimize the stress she felt from delays in 
her trial, while understandable, is simply not sufficient on its own to establish prejudice”); United 
States v. Allen, 86 F.4th 295, 306 (6th Cir. 2023) (holding that defendants were required to—and 
failed—to show actual prejudice from delays for which there were valid reasons, including 
pandemic-related delays); United States v. Pair, 84 F.4th 577, 590-91 (4th Cir. 2023) 
(acknowledging defendant’s arguments concerning prejudice from pretrial incarceration and 
heightened anxiety from the delay, especially in light of high rates of COVID-19 among inmates, 
 
16 
(18) Sutton also appears to challenge the Superior Court’s decision to grant 
the State’s request for lesser-included-offense instructions, over Sutton’s objection.  
We review this claim de novo.53  A trial court should instruct the jury on a lesser-
included offense if:  (1) a party makes a proper request; (2) the lesser-included 
offense contains some, but not all, of the elements of the charged offense; (3) the 
elements differentiating the two offenses are in dispute; and (4) there is some 
evidence that would allow a rational jury to acquit the defendant of the greater charge 
and convict him of the lesser charge.54   
(19) The State requested that the court instruct the jury on second-degree 
murder and manslaughter as lesser-included offenses of the first-degree murder 
charge and on first-degree reckless endangering as a lesser-included offense of 
attempted first-degree murder.  The offenses on which the court instructed the jury 
differed as to the intent element, which was in dispute.  The Superior Court 
determined that there was some evidence that would allow a rational jury to find that 
 
but concluding that defendant had not demonstrated prejudice under Barker because he did not 
show that “any evidence was damaged or lost, that any witnesses could not be found, or that his 
case was harmed in any manner by the delay” (internal quotation omitted)). 
53 Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 628 (Del. 2001). 
54 Clark v. State, 65 A.3d 571, 581-82 (Del. 2013); see also State v. Cox, 851 A.2d 1269 (Del. 
2003) (“In criminal proceedings, a trial judge is required to instruct the jury on a lesser-included 
offense over the objection of an opposing party if:  it is requested by any party; there exists a 
rational basis in the evidence for the jury to convict the defendant of the lesser charge and acquit 
the defendant of the greater charge;  and prosecution for the lesser-included offense is not time 
barred.  In this case, the trial judge committed legal error by sustaining the defendant’s objection 
and denying the State’s request for a lesser-included offense instruction that was rationally 
supported by the evidence.”). 
 
17 
Sutton acted without the requisite intent for first-degree murder or attempted first-
degree murder but instead acted recklessly or with a cruel, wicked, and depraved 
indifference to human life.55  We agree.  Among the evidence from which a rational 
jury might have concluded that Sutton acted recklessly rather than intentionally was 
Sutton’s testimony concerning the perceived threat; his testimony that he could 
barely see when he reached for the gun,56 he could not hear because adrenaline was 
rushing,57 he was “in shock,”58 “in a panic,”59 and “did not want to hurt them;”60 and 
his statement to Detective Mosley that on the night of the incident he thought he 
might have shot Irby.61  The Superior Court correctly concluded that lesser-included-
offense instructions were warranted. 
(20) Sutton also argues that, by convicting him of manslaughter and first-
degree reckless endangering but acquitting him of the two PFDCF counts, the jury 
rendered inconsistent verdicts.  Sutton did not present this argument to the Superior 
 
55 Appendix to Opening Brief at A530. 
56 Id. at A473. 
57 Id. at A494. 
58 Id. at A475. 
59 Id. at A500. 
60 Id. at A484. 
61 Id. at A492-93. 
 
18 
Court.62  To the extent the verdicts are inconsistent,63 the Court may uphold the 
manslaughter and reckless endangering convictions under the rule of jury lenity 
because there was sufficient evidence to justify those convictions.64 
(21) Finally, Sutton inquires whether it was “legal for [Detective Mosley] to 
sit in on the entire trial as a state witness?”  Sutton did not ask the Superior Court to 
exclude Detective Mosley, the chief investigating officer, from the trial.  “This Court 
has ruled that the chief investigating officer for the prosecution in a criminal case is 
 
62 See DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 8 (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for 
review; provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider 
and determine any question not so presented.”). 
63 See Tilden v. State, 513 A.2d 1302, 1306 (Del. 1986) (“Inconsistent verdicts may take the form 
of acquittal of a predicate offense but conviction of a compound offense; or conviction of a lesser 
included offense which implicitly results in an acquittal of a more serious offense the aggravating 
element of which is required for the conviction of a related compound offense.”).  The jury’s 
verdict in this case does not fit either of the inconsistent-verdict scenarios described in Tilden.  
Sutton was convicted of offenses—manslaughter and first-degree reckless endangering—each of 
which was one of the three elements of the corresponding PFDCF count and acquitted of PFDCF.  
See Appendix to Opening Brief at A625-26 (“[T]o find the defendant guilty of possession of a 
firearm during the commission of a felony, you must find that each of the following three elements 
have been established beyond a reasonable doubt:  1, the defendant committed the felony, in this 
case attempted murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree or manslaughter. 2, the 
defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony. 3, the defendant acted 
knowingly. . . .  Knowingly means that a defendant knew or was aware that the defendant was 
engaging in unlawful conduct.”); id. at A631-32 (“[T]o find the defendant guilty of possession of 
a firearm during the commission of a felony, you must find that each of the following three 
elements has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 1, the defendant committed a felony, in 
this case attempted murder in the first degree or reckless endangering in the first degree. 2., the 
defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony. 3, the defendant acted 
knowingly.  The terms firearm and possession and knowingly have all previously been defined for 
you, so I’m not going to reread them.  They will be in your instructions.”).  The jury might have 
determined that the State did not prove one of the other elements of PFDCF, such as the 
“knowingly” element. 
64 Williams v. State, 2020 WL 388431, at *3 (Del. Jan. 22, 2020). 
 
19 
exempted from sequestration” under Delaware Uniform Rule of Evidence 615(b).65  
“Thus, absent other reasons for sequestration, the chief investigating officer may not 
be excluded from the trial even if he is scheduled to testify.”66  We find no error as 
to this issue. 
(22) We have reviewed the record carefully and conclude that Sutton’s 
appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue.  We 
also are satisfied that Sutton’s counsel has made a conscientious effort to examine 
the record and has properly determined that Sutton could not raise a meritorious 
claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.  
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
65 Taylor v. State, 849 A.2d 405, 408 (Del. 2004).  D.R.E. 615(b) provides that, although the court 
may order sequestration of witnesses, the rule does not authorize excluding “an officer or employee 
of a party that is not a natural person, after being designated as the party’s representative by its 
attorney.” 
66 Taylor, 849 A.2d at 408.