Title: Commonwealth v. Torres

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12374 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSE TORRES. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 4, 2017. - June 1, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Stalking.  Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes.  Evidence, 
Medical record.  Practice, Criminal, Discovery, Redaction, 
Instructions to jury, Question by jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 6, 2015. 
 
 
The case was tried before Heidi E. Brieger, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for the defendant. 
 
Timothy Ferriter, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this appeal, we consider whether a 
defendant's conviction of stalking should be reversed where, at 
his trial, a Superior Court judge denied his motion for access 
to records held in the victim compensation file maintained by 
2 
 
 
 
the Attorney General.  The defendant was charged with nine 
offenses, including stalking, strangulation or suffocation, 
assault and battery causing serious bodily injury, assault by 
means of a dangerous weapon, and five counts of assault and 
battery on a family or household member.  On the eve of his 
scheduled trial, the defendant learned that the complainant had 
applied for the Attorney General's victim compensation program; 
this program provides compensation for damages suffered by some 
victims of crime. 
The defendant sought access to records of the complainant's 
claim for compensation for dental services from the Attorney 
General as mandatory discovery, and, in the alternative, as 
third-party records, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17, 378 Mass. 
842 (1979), and the procedures of Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 
Mass. 122, 145-146 (2006).  The judge concluded that the records 
could not be produced or disclosed to the defendant because the 
Attorney General's regulations mandated that such records be 
kept confidential.  Before us, the defendant reasserts these 
claims.  In addition, he challenges the judge's decision to 
redact significant portions of the complainant's dental records, 
which mentioned that she had applied for compensation.  Finally, 
the defendant challenges two of the judge's instructions, one on 
the Commonwealth's burden to prove stalking, and one on the 
complainant's interest in the outcome of the case. 
3 
 
 
 
 
We conclude that the defendant's motion for access to the 
victim compensation records held by the Attorney General should 
have been evaluated as a request for third party records under 
rule 17, notwithstanding the regulation requiring 
confidentiality of records.  In addition, the judge committed 
error by redacting the complainant's dental records.  We 
conclude also that, in responding to a confusing jury question, 
the judged erred by not clearly delineating the requirement 
that, to prove the offense of stalking, the Commonwealth must 
prove three specific incidents of stalking.  Accordingly, the 
defendant's conviction must be vacated and the matter remanded 
for a new trial. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts from 
evidence that was presented at trial.  The defendant met the 
complainant in March, 2014.  They began dating a few weeks 
later, and the defendant moved into the complainant's apartment 
shortly thereafter.  The complainant testified at trial that the 
defendant physically and verbally abused her during their 
relationship; she said that the defendant threatened to kill her 
if he saw her with another man, and that the defendant hit, 
choked, and shoved her. 
 
Sometime around August, 2014, after the defendant and the 
complainant had separated, the defendant returned to her 
condominium and asked to speak with her.  They went into her 
4 
 
 
 
bedroom to talk.  While they were talking, the defendant 
received a text message from another woman.  The complainant 
asked the defendant why he wanted to speak with her if he was 
speaking to another woman.  The complainant testified that the 
defendant became angry, grabbed her, pushed her up against a 
closet, and head-butted her between her nose and mouth.  She 
said that her teeth broke as a result of this action.  She also 
explained that those teeth had held in place a bridge that 
supported her false teeth; that she had to use "Super glue" to 
keep her bridge in place; and that she had difficulty eating in 
public and sleeping because of fear that she would swallow her 
bridge. 
 
The complainant testified that she applied for victim 
compensation, through the Attorney General's office, to pay for 
the cost of having her teeth repaired.  She said that she had 
applied with the assistance of a victim advocate in the district 
attorney's office.  She applied after she reported the head-
butting incident to the police, and had not had any knowledge of 
the compensation program prior to making her report.  The 
complainant testified that her application for compensation had 
been approved, but that she had not received any funds and no 
longer intended to accept any funds because she had obtained 
employment. 
5 
 
 
 
 
The complainant acknowledged that she was aware that, in 
order to receive victim compensation funds, her injury had to be 
related to a crime, she had to cooperate with the prosecutor by 
testifying in court, and she could be in trouble if she made a 
false statement or filed a false application in the Attorney 
General's office.1 
 
At a dentist visit in November, 2014, the complainant's 
dentist recommended that she remove her remaining top teeth and 
use dentures.  At that visit, the complainant did not tell the 
dentist that the defendant's head-butt broke her bridge and her 
teeth.  She testified that she told the dentist about the head 
butting incident before she reported it to the police.  The 
dental records and the dentist's testimony indicated that, at 
the office visit in November, 2014, the complainant had advanced 
decay under her bridge.  The decay was not present in an X-ray 
taken during a 2012 visit. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  In August, 2015, the defendant was 
indicted in the Superior Court on nine counts:  stalking, 
                     
 
1 The victim compensation statute, G. L. c. 258C, § 2 (c), 
provides: 
 
"A claimant shall be eligible for compensation only if 
such claimant cooperates with law enforcement authorities 
in the investigation and prosecution of the crime in which 
the victim was injured or killed unless the claimant 
demonstrates that he possesses or possessed a reasonable 
excuse for failing to cooperate." 
6 
 
 
 
strangulation or suffocation, assault and battery causing 
serious bodily injury, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, 
and five counts of assault and battery on a family or household 
member. 
 
The judge granted the Commonwealth's motion to admit 
redacted versions of the complainant's dental records,2 over the 
defendant's objection.  The redactions were to eliminate any 
reference to the complainant's ability to pay and her 
application for victim compensation. 
 
On Monday, March 14, 2016, the day scheduled for jury 
empanelment and opening statements in the defendant's trial, his 
counsel sought access to the Attorney General's file regarding 
the complainant's application for victim compensation, of which 
counsel had been made aware the previous Friday.  On that 
Friday, the prosecutor had provided defense counsel with a copy 
of the complainant's application for compensation, which had 
been held by the victim witness advocate in the district 
attorney's office.  The defendant argued that the Attorney 
General's file was mandatory discovery under Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004), because the Attorney 
General, as the "overarching prosecutor" for the Commonwealth, 
                     
 
2 The Commonwealth originally intended to call the dentist, 
but she was called by the defendant. 
7 
 
 
 
was a party to the criminal case, and because the records showed 
an agreement, promise, or inducement between the prosecutor and 
the complainant.  In the alternative, he argued that the file 
should be subject to discovery under rule 17 as the record of a 
third party.  The judge initially ruled that the records in the 
file were discoverable and instructed the prosecutor to acquire 
the records. 
 
At the start of the second day of trial, the Commonwealth 
reported that the Attorney General objected to producing the 
records.  The office of the Attorney General argued that 940 
Code Mass. Regs. § 14.09 (2014), promulgated under G. L. 
c. 258C, § 4, supported this position.  The regulation provides: 
"All information received, obtained or maintained by 
the [d]ivision [of victim compensation in the Attorney 
General's office] in connection with any claim for 
compensation shall be maintained as confidential 
investigative material, and shall not be released or 
disclosed to any person or entity whatsoever, except 
authorized by the claimant or as otherwise provided by 
law." 
 
The judge withheld ruling on the defendant's motion to produce 
the records because no party had provided a copy of the 
regulation for her review.  As the complainant was scheduled to 
testify first that morning, and because the records were 
relevant to her testimony, the defendant requested a ruling on 
the motion to produce before the complainant testified.  The 
8 
 
 
 
judge denied the motion because she did not find the records to 
be so material that the trial could not proceed.3 
 
Following the complainant's direct examination, the 
defendant renewed his objection to proceeding without a ruling 
on whether the victim compensation records were discoverable.  
The defendant argued that the complainant's statement during 
direct examination that she did not plan to accept any award 
from the victim compensation fund was new information that made 
the records even more relevant.  During the morning break, which 
took place in the course of the cross-examination of the 
complainant, the judge, without hearing further argument, ruled 
that the Attorney General was not required to disclose the 
records.  The judge found that the exception to the 
confidentiality requirement, "as otherwise provided by law," did 
not include within its meaning an issued court order.  Following 
a recess, and after the judge again declined to hear argument, 
the defendant moved for a mistrial.  The judge denied that 
motion. 
 
At the close of the evidence, the defendant requested an 
instruction that the jury "examine [the complainant's] 
credibility with particular care" because she had applied for 
                     
 
3 The judge also denied the defendant's motions to dismiss 
the indictments or to preclude the complainant's testimony for 
failure to provide discovery. 
9 
 
 
 
victim compensation and because that application required that 
she cooperate in the prosecution of the defendant.  The judge 
declined to give this instruction, and instead instructed the 
jury that they could "consider whether the witness has any 
motive to testify for or against either party, or the interest 
or lack of interest the witness may have in the outcome of the 
case." 
 
After deliberating for an hour, the jury returned with 
questions for the judge; one of those questions was whether the 
complainant's payment from the victim compensation fund was 
dependent on the defendant's conviction or acquittal.  Another 
question read, "which one of proofs need only one to be true?" 
 
The defendant was convicted of stalking, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 43 (a), and was acquitted of the other eight 
charges.  He appealed from the conviction, and we allowed his 
petition for direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant challenges his conviction on 
four grounds.  He argues that the judge's decision not to order 
the Attorney General to provide the defendant access to the 
victim compensation records violated his due process rights; the 
judge abused her discretion by allowing the introduction of 
redacted versions of the complainant's dental records and 
restricting the dentist's testimony on the topics of the cause 
of the complainant's dental problems, and her application for 
10 
 
 
 
victim compensation; the judge's decision not to instruct the 
jury to weigh the complainant's testimony with particular care 
was prejudicial error requiring a new trial; and the judge's 
response to a jury question likely caused confusion about the 
number of incidents the Commonwealth was required to prove to 
support a conviction of stalking, creating a substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice. 
 
a.  Victim compensation records.  The defendant argues that 
the records in the Attorney General's file are mandatory 
discovery under Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 because they are in the 
possession of the Commonwealth and because the records show an 
agreement, promise, or inducement between the prosecutor and the 
complainant.  The defendant argues, alternatively, that the 
records held by the Attorney General are third-party records 
subject to discovery under rule 17, and that he satisfied his 
burden for discovery.  The Commonwealth contends that the 
records of the victim compensation fund are not subject to 
mandatory discovery, because the Attorney General is not a party 
to the criminal case, and because there was no agreement, 
promise, or inducement between the complainant and the district 
attorney.  The Commonwealth also argues that the judge properly 
determined that the records were confidential under 940 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 14.09, and that the defendant had sufficient 
opportunity to probe bias on cross-examination. 
11 
 
 
 
This court "uphold[s] discovery rulings 'unless the 
appellant can demonstrate an abuse of discretion that resulted 
in prejudicial error.'"  Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast 
Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 302 (2009), quoting Buster v. George W. 
Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. 635, 653 (2003).  "'Mixed questions of 
law and fact[, however,] generally receive de novo review.'"  
McCarthy v. Slade Assocs., Inc., 463 Mass. 181, 190 (2012), 
quoting Commissioner of Revenue, supra at 303. 
i.  Rule 14.  A.  Whether the Attorney General was a party 
to the case.  "Rule 14 (a) (1) [(A) (iii)] of the Massachusetts 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires, among other things, that, 
on motion, the prosecution must disclose any facts of an 
exculpatory nature within the possession, custody, or control of 
the prosecutor" (quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Wanis, 
426 Mass. 639, 643 (1998).  The victim witness advocate is a 
member of the prosecution team and, accordingly, subject to the 
same duty to disclose as is a prosecutor.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bing Sial Liang, 434 Mass. 131, 136–137 (2001).  Therefore, the 
witness's application for compensation, held by the victim 
witness advocate in the district attorney's office, was properly 
disclosed to the defendant because it was subject to mandatory 
disclosure under rule 14.  See id. 
The records related to the complainant's application that 
are held by the Attorney General, however, fall outside the 
12 
 
 
 
scope of rule 14.  Rule 14 adopts a practical test for 
determining what information must be disclosed:  information 
that is "in the possession, custody, or control of the 
prosecutor."  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A).  "The 
prosecutor's duty [to disclose exculpatory information] does not 
extend beyond information held by agents of the prosecution 
team."  Commonwealth v. Beal, 429 Mass. 530, 532 (1999).  
"Rule 14 does not apply here because the records sought are not 
within the control of the prosecution, or someone under the 
'control of the prosecutor.'"  Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 
Mass. 265, 268 n.4 (2004). 
There is no indication in this case that the Attorney 
General participated in the investigation or prosecution of the 
defendant.  The district attorney does not have access to the 
Attorney General's files.  As the practical indicia of the 
prosecutor's "possession, custody, or control" are absent, the 
records in the Attorney General's files are not subject to 
mandatory disclosure under rule 14.  See Commonwealth v. Ira I., 
439 Mass. 805, 809–811 (2003) (information in possession of 
assistant principal was not subject to rule 14 disclosure 
because official did not act "as an agent of the prosecution or 
of the police"); Wanis, 426 Mass. at 643 (police internal 
affairs documents were not subject to mandatory discovery under 
rule 14 because department officers were not "participants in 
13 
 
 
 
the investigation and presentation of the case [or] police 
officers who regularly report to the prosecutor or did so in 
reference to a given case").  See also Commonwealth v. Donahue, 
396 Mass. 590, 596 (1986) ("The prosecutor cannot be said to 
suppress that which is not in his possession or subject to his 
control," and thus "[o]rdinarily the prosecutor's obligation to 
disclose information is limited to that in the possession of the 
prosecutor or police" [quotations and citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 702 (1979) (declining 
to hold that prosecutor must disclose information held by 
Department of Corrections because "prosecutor has no duty to 
investigate every possible source of exculpatory information").  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 679 (1998) 
(medical examiner who conducted autopsy on murder victim was 
Commonwealth agent for purposes of Commonwealth's duty to 
preserve exculpatory evidence because medical examiner 
"participate[s] in the investigation or evaluation of the case 
and . . . either regularly report[s] or with reference to the 
particular case ha[s] reported to [prosecutor's] office" 
[citation omitted]). 
Relying on G. L. c. 12, §§ 6, 27, the defendant argues that 
the Attorney General is the "overarching prosecutorial 
authority" for the Commonwealth and, therefore, a party to the 
14 
 
 
 
case.4  This argument, however, would render all files held by 
the Attorney General subject to disclosure under rule 14 in 
every criminal case.  It also would require us to depart from 
rule 14's instruction to make a practical determination about a 
prosecutor's "possession, custody, or control" when determining 
disclosure requirements.  Moreover, we previously have declined 
to hold that possession of documents by one government agency is 
sufficient to require mandatory discovery, absent control by the 
prosecutor or contribution by that agency to the prosecutor's 
investigation.  See Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 733 
(1992) (no mandatory disclosure where Essex County "prosecutor 
[did not have] access to the Boston police department files"); 
                     
 
4 The defendant relies on G. L. c. 12, § 6 ("[The Attorney 
General] shall consult with and advise district attorneys in 
matters relating to their duties; and, if in his judgment the 
public interest so requires, he shall assist them by attending 
the grand jury in the examination of a case in which the accused 
is charged with a capital crime, and appear for the commonwealth 
in the trial of indictments for capital crimes.  [The Attorney 
General] shall also consult with and advise district attorneys 
in all civil actions brought pursuant to [G. L. c. 258], and may 
assist them in the defense of such actions"), and G. L. c. 12, 
§ 27 ("District attorneys within their respective districts 
shall appear for the commonwealth in the superior court in all 
cases, criminal or civil, in which the commonwealth is a party 
or interested, and in the hearing, in the supreme judicial 
court, of all questions of law arising in the cases of which 
they respectively have charge, shall aid the attorney general in 
the duties required of him, and perform such of his duties as 
are not required of him personally; but the attorney general, 
when present, shall have the control of such cases.  They may 
interchange official duties"). 
15 
 
 
 
Campbell, 378 Mass. at 702 (prosecutor not required to disclose 
material held by Department of Corrections).  We therefore 
decline the defendant's invitation to depart from our well-
established practice with respect to determinations whether a 
government agency is subject to the control of the district 
attorney for purposes of mandatory discovery under rule 14. 
B.  Whether the victim compensation program served as a 
promise or inducement.  We turn to the defendant's argument that 
the Attorney General's file must be disclosed because it is 
evidence of a promise or inducement offered for the 
complainant's testimony.  "Understandings, agreements, promises, 
or any similar arrangements between the government and a 
significant government witness is exculpatory evidence that must 
be disclosed .  .  .  . [A]ny communication that suggests 
preferential treatment to a key government witness in return for 
that witness's testimony is a matter that must be disclosed by 
the Commonwealth."  Commonwealth v. Hill, 432 Mass. 704, 715–716 
(2000).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (ix), as amended, 
444 Mass. 1501 (2005). 
Here, however, the file is not evidence of an agreement, 
inducement, or reward between the prosecutor and a witness; 
rather, the victim compensation program is a government benefit 
program administered by an entity distinct from the district 
16 
 
 
 
attorney's office.5  In addition, testimony is not an explicit 
statutory requirement to receive compensation.  See G. L. 
c. 258C, § 2 (c) ("A claimant shall be eligible for compensation 
only if such claimant cooperates with law enforcement 
authorities in the investigation and prosecution of the crime in 
which the victim was injured or killed unless the claimant 
demonstrates that he possesses or possessed a reasonable excuse 
for failing to cooperate"). 
The complainant's application for victim compensation is 
unlike the plea agreement struck between the prosecutor and a 
cooperating witness in Hill, 432 Mass. at 715-716.  In Hill, the 
court concluded that the Commonwealth and the witness had a 
"'loose' agreement that 'consideration be shown'" in exchange 
for the witness's testimony.  Id. at 709.  The witness in that 
case pleaded guilty to a lesser included charge that carried a 
term of incarceration of two and one-half years, rather than the 
mandatory minimum of fifteen years that the witness had faced.  
Id.  In this case, unlike in Hill, the complainant was not 
herself charged with any crimes and there was not issue of an 
                     
 
5 See G. L. c. 12, § 11K ("there shall be established within 
the department of the attorney general a division of victim 
compensation and assistance"); G. L. c. 258C, § 4 ("[t]he 
division of victim compensation and assistance shall administer 
the provisions of this chapter.  Subject to appropriation, the 
attorney general shall designate a program director of said 
division"). 
17 
 
 
 
effort to negotiate a lesser sentence in exchange for testimony 
at trial.  In addition, the complainant's efforts to secure 
victim compensation were processed through the office of the 
Attorney General, rather than being submitted through the office 
of the district attorney, i.e., the office that is responsible 
for prosecuting the defendant. 
ii.  Rule 17.  As stated, the defendant moved under rule 17 
for the production of records from the Attorney General, and the 
judge denied the motion.  The judge found that 940 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 14.09, which provides, "[a]ll information received, 
obtained or maintained by the [d]ivision [of victim compensation 
in the Attorney General's office] in connection with any claim 
for compensation shall be maintained as confidential 
investigative material, and shall not be released or disclosed 
to any person or entity whatsoever, except authorized by the 
claimant or as otherwise provided by law," required her to deny 
the defendant's motion.  In particular, the judge found that the 
phrase "otherwise provided by law" did not include a court order 
for discovery. 
We conclude that the judge erred in finding that the 
Attorney General's regulation ended the inquiry; whether records 
are confidential does not affect whether they are discoverable.  
See Wanis, 426 Mass. at 642 ("A defendant's right of access to 
information gathered by an internal affairs division does not 
18 
 
 
 
turn on whether the investigatory materials are or are not 
subject to disclosure as public records").  Rather, confidential 
records, such as those in a victim compensation fund file, are 
subject to normal discovery rules.  See id. at 644.  At any 
potential retrial, the trial judge should consider the 
defendant's rule § 17 motion for access to the complainant's 
records under the Dwyer-Lampron standard for confidential, third 
party records.  See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 145-146; Lampron, 441 
Mass. at 269. 
The denial of the defendant's request for records under 
rule 17, prejudiced him.  The defendant established that the 
records related to the complainant's application for 
compensation were relevant to her truthfulness.  Moreover, the 
complainant's credibility and potential bias were likely 
significant questions for the jury.  The jurors asked two 
questions that show the topic of the complainant's compensation 
was on their minds:  "Is payment from the victim fund to [the 
complainant] dependent on conviction or acquittal?  How much is 
the compensation?"6  The defendant has a due process right to 
cross-examine a witness about a request for financial 
                     
 
6 The judge instructed the jury to "rely on the collective 
memory of the evidence to answer those questions."  Although 
defense counsel was consulted and agreed with the judge's 
response, the instruction was incorrect.  The judge should have 
instructed that a conviction is not required in order for a 
victim to recover compensation. 
19 
 
 
 
compensation.  See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 109–
110 (2010), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1013 (2011).  The judge's 
rejection of the defendant's motion for access to the records 
under rule 17 hampered his ability to conduct that cross-
examination and protect his rights. 
b.  Jury instructions.  Approximately one hour after 
beginning deliberations, the jury asked the following question:  
"Which one of proof need only one to be true?"  The judge 
interpreted the jury's question as being about whether the 
Commonwealth needed to prove that the charged offense occurred 
on a specific date.  The judge instructed that the specific date 
was not an element of the crime and that the jury "may find him 
guilty only if you unanimously agree that the Commonwealth has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense 
on at least one specific occasion."  The defendant argues that 
this instruction created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice, because it obliterated the distinction between the 
offense of stalking, which requires three specific incidents to 
support a conviction, and the five charged offenses of assault, 
which each required only a single incident.  The Commonwealth 
contends that there was no error because jury instructions are 
evaluated as a whole and there is no risk of injustice where the 
judge was clear throughout that stalking required a finding that 
the defendant engaged in a series of acts over a period of time. 
20 
 
 
 
 
In her final charge, the judge properly instructed on the 
elements of stalking:  "In order to prove [the defendant] guilty 
of stalking, the Commonwealth must prove five things beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  First, that over a period of time, the 
defendant knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct or a series 
of acts involving at least three incidents, directed at [the 
complainant]."  The subsequent instruction, that the 
Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant "committed 
the offense on at least one specific occasion," created 
ambiguity and the potential for confusion as to the 
Commonwealth's burden for the stalking charge, because the judge 
did not make clear the requirement for three separate incidents 
to support a guilty verdict on the charge of stalking; indeed, 
the instruction misinformed the jury concerning a critical 
element of the offense.  "The fact that some of the instructions 
were correct is not determinative in this case, since we cannot 
know whether the jury were guided by the correct or the 
incorrect portion of the instructions" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Richards, 384 Mass. 396, 403 (1981).  
The jury question shows a fundamental confusion about the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof, increasing the risk created by 
an incorrect instruction.7  As "the issue of burden of proof goes 
                     
 
7 Although a judge is not required "specifically [to] 
 
21 
 
 
 
to the very heart of the truth-finding function," Commonwealth 
v. Collins, 374 Mass. 596, 599 (1978), the inconsistent 
instructions on the Commonwealth's burden went to the core of 
the question for the jury.  The conflicting instructions about 
an essential element of the Commonwealth's case, where the jury 
question revealed a fundamental confusion about the nature and 
extent of the Commonwealth's burden, created a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice. 
c.  Redaction of dental records.  Prior to trial, the 
parties agreed that the complainant's dental records were 
admissible, but disagreed on the extent to which redactions were 
necessary.  The defendant argued that the records should be 
admitted without redaction.  The judge adopted the 
Commonwealth's view and ordered the records redacted to remove 
the dentist's conclusion that the complainant's bridge broke 
because of decay and not because of spousal abuse.  The judge 
also ordered redacted all references to the complainant's plan 
to use the compensation fund to pay for dental services.  
Specifically, the judge ordered the following redacted in full:  
"The xray show[s] that she has decay under the bridge . . . the 
                                                                  
address [the jury's] confusion," see Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 
427 Mass. 484, 488 (1998), where "the judge [is] unclear what 
the jurors [are] asking, the judge [may seek] further 
clarification of the question which concerned the jurors.  
[That] decision [is] well within the judge's discretion."  
Commonwealth v. Scott, 428 Mass. 362, 367 (1998). 
22 
 
 
 
bridge probably was loose because [of] the decay not because her 
husband hit her."  The judge ordered that the dentist would not 
be permitted to testify about matters redacted in the dental 
records.8 
General Laws c. 233, § 79, " permits the admission in 
evidence, in the judge's discretion, of certified hospital 
records 'so far as such records relate to the treatment and 
medical history' with the proviso that 'nothing therein 
contained shall be admissible as evidence which has reference to 
the question of liability.'"  Commonwealth v. Dube, 413 Mass. 
570, 573 (1992), quoting G. L. c. 233, § 79.  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 803(6)(B) (2017).  "The statute has long been construed to 
permit the admission of a record that relates directly and 
primarily to the treatment and medical history of the patient, 
'even though incidentally the facts recorded may have some 
bearing on the question of liability.'"  Dube, supra, quoting 
Leonard v. Boston Elevated Ry., 234 Mass. 480, 482–483 (1920).  
                     
 
8 Other redacted notes include, "she doesn't have money"; 
"mail copy of records [and] FMR Plan to Middlesex District 
Att[orney]"; "with victim's comp[ensation]"; a reference to the 
district attorney; "[r]ecord review.  This [patient] has 
victim's comp[ensation].  After review of comp[lete] 
exam[ination], dental problems are not caused by spousal abuse, 
and will not be covered by victim's comp[ensation] insurance"; 
and "[e]xplain to patient that I talk[ed] to DA about her xray.  
I did no[t] send a letter.  The xray show[s] that she has decay 
under the bridge . . . the bridge probably was loose because 
[of] the decay [not] because her husband hit her." 
23 
 
 
 
The court construes G. L. c. 233, § 79, liberally to allow the 
admission of medical records.  Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 
387, 394 (2010). 
 
The judge abused her discretion by requiring redaction of 
the dentist's statement that "the bridge probably was loose 
because [of] the decay."  The statement "relates directly and 
mainly to the treatment and medical history of the patient . . . 
even though incidentally the facts recorded may have some 
bearing on the question of liability" (citation omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 242 (1998).  Indeed, the 
statement reflects the core role of a medical professional:  
diagnosing the cause of a physical ailment.  The dentist's note, 
therefore, is a "physical observation[] from which [exculpatory] 
inferences [may] flow," rather than a "conclusory fact central 
to the jury's inquiry."  See id. at 242, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Baldwin, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 202 (1987), overruled on other 
grounds by Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 161 (2005).  
Notably, the statement was made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis, and does not reflect any legal conclusions.9  In 
addition, the reason for creating the records was entirely for 
                     
 
9 Some notes in the dental records, such as "[treatment] 
will not be covered by victim's comp[ensation] insurance," are 
legal conclusions, and properly may be redacted, without 
removing the dentist's medical conclusions. 
24 
 
 
 
medical diagnosis and treatment, rather than having been 
prepared as part of a criminal investigation.  See DiMonte, 
supra.  Therefore, the statement is admissible evidence under 
G. L. c. 233, § 79, and it was error to order the records be 
redacted.10 
d.  Instruction on witness credibility.  The defendant 
argues that the judge erred by not instructing the jury that 
they should scrutinize the complainant's testimony with 
"particular care" because of an agreement she had reached with 
the government.  The Commonwealth contends that there was no 
cooperation agreement between the complainant and the 
government, and there was no reward for her testimony.  We agree 
with the judge that the defendant was not entitled to a 
"particular care" instruction. 
"Because of the possible improper influences on a jury that 
could develop from hearing testimony given pursuant to a written 
plea agreement that offers substantial benefits to a witness but 
                     
 
10 If this had been the only error, it would be harmless.  
Although the judge stated that the dentist would not be 
permitted to testify concerning from matters that had been 
redacted from the dental records, the dentist, in fact, did 
testify without objection that she believed the bridge was loose 
because of "advanced decay," and that teeth which show decay are 
weak and more prone to breaking.  Defense counsel relied on this 
testimony in her closing.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Elliot, 393 Mass. 
824, 831–832 (1985), and cases cited (error in preventing 
impeachment harmless, where equivalent information was 
communicated to jury). 
25 
 
 
 
only if the witness tells the truth . . . the judge must 
specifically and forcefully tell the jury to study the witness's 
credibility with particular care."  Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 
Mass. 257, 266 (1989).  Here, there was neither a plea agreement 
nor any type of written agreement that required the complainant 
to testify truthfully, and so the Ciampa instruction was not 
required.  See Commonwealth v. Felder, 455 Mass. 359, 369 
(2009).  The prosecutor did not enter into an agreement with the 
complainant; rather, the complainant pursued a separate, 
statutory benefit, related to her report that she was the victim 
of a crime.  The opportunity to pursue a statutory benefit does 
not rise to the level of a written agreement with a prosecutor 
that requires a Ciampa instruction.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Sealy, 
467 Mass. 617, 625 (2014) (defendant must have opportunity to 
impeach witness with evidence that she applied for visa that 
grants work authorization to noncitizen victims of crime who 
report crime to police, but visa application in this case was 
not "clearly . . . relevant to a motive to lie").  Additionally, 
as discussed, the Commonwealth had not offered a reward or 
inducement for the complainant's testimony.  Given the lack of a 
nexus between the potential benefit to the complainant and her 
testimony, the pending application to the program does not rise 
to the level of a reward or inducement.  The complainant's 
perception of the application process may create a motive to 
26 
 
 
 
lie, but the judge properly instructed the jury that they "may 
also consider whether the witness has any motive to testify for 
or against either party, or the interest or lack of interest the 
witness may have in the outcome of the case."  Such an 
instruction is sufficient, where the judge specifically 
highlighted the complainant's potential interest in the outcome 
of the case; a "particular care" instruction is not required. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The defendant's conviction is vacated and 
set aside.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.