Title: Columbus Bar Assn. v. Elsass

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. ELSASS. 
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Elsass (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 195.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Continuing to practice 
law while under suspension — Repeated acts of dishonesty, deceit, and 
failure to abide by Supreme Court’s order — Filing lawsuit to intimidate 
former client who had filed grievance against him — ADA does not prevent 
the discipline of attorneys with disabilities. 
(No. 98-2662 — Submitted March 30, 1999 — Decided July 28, 1999.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 97-14. 
 
On June 10, 1998, the Columbus Bar Association (“relator”) filed a five-
count amended complaint against Tobias H. Elsass of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0024436 (“respondent”).  The complaint alleged several 
violations of the Disciplinary Rules.  Respondent answered, and the matter was 
heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of 
the Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
This is not the first time respondent has appeared before this court on a 
disciplinary matter.  On December 20, 1995, we suspended respondent from the 
practice of law for a period of six months.  See Columbus Bar Assn. v. Schlosser 
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 174, 657 N.E.2d 500.  Count One of the June 10, 1998 
complaint involved respondent’s representation of Kevin L. Bartholomew in a case 
in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas while under this suspension.  Upon 
being suspended, respondent notified Bartholomew that he should seek other 
counsel because respondent was not eligible to practice law.  However, 
Bartholomew was unable to obtain other counsel before the scheduled 
commencement of the case on April 30, 1996.  The complaint alleged that 
respondent had his secretary prepare a motion for continuance, which purported to 
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be a pro se pleading.  Respondent sent the motion for continuance to Bartholomew 
for his signature and instructed him to return it to respondent for filing.  The 
motion for continuance was denied.  Respondent then had his secretary prepare a 
notice of voluntary dismissal of the case, which also purported to be a pro se 
pleading.  Bartholomew signed the notice and respondent subsequently filed it with 
the court. 
 
Count One also alleged that respondent committed similar conduct in a 
separate case involving the representation of Tricia Beckwith.  Again, respondent 
had his secretary prepare a purportedly pro se motion for a continuance on her 
behalf while he was suspended from the practice of law.  The panel concluded that 
respondent’s actions constituted the unauthorized practice of law in violation of 
DR 3-101(B) (practicing law in violation of the regulations) and 1-102(A)(4) 
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation). 
 
Count Two concerned respondent’s filing of a lawsuit against Evalena 
Tabler after she had filed a grievance against the respondent with the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.  Tabler’s grievance alleged 
that respondent had engaged in professional misconduct in the preparation of a will 
for her father and the subsequent representation of the estate. 
 
In response, respondent filed suit against Tabler in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Franklin County, alleging that Tabler had defamed and slandered him by 
filing the grievance.  In the complaint, respondent sought compensatory and 
punitive damages in the amount of $500,000 plus costs and attorney fees.  In light 
of our decision in Hecht v. Levin (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 458, 613 N.E.2d 585, that a 
complaint filed with the grievance committee of a local bar association enjoys an 
absolute privilege against a civil action based thereon, the panel found that 
respondent’s lawsuit was unwarranted and harassing, and that his conduct violated 
DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 
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7-102(A)(1) (filing a suit, asserting a position, or taking action knowing that such 
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another), and 7-
102(A)(2) (knowingly advancing an unwarranted claim). 
 
Respondent was reinstated to the practice of law on July 12, 1996.  
However, on November 26, 1997, we found respondent in contempt and again 
suspended him until such time as he purged himself of contempt.  On April 1, 
1998, we determined that respondent had substantially complied with the 
November 26, 1997 order; therefore, the contempt and suspension orders were 
lifted.  Counts Three, Four, and Five of the relator’s amended complaint alleged 
activity that occurred during this contempt suspension period. 
 
Count Three of the complaint alleged that respondent failed to notify his 
client Maria Wells of his suspension pursuant to the contempt order of November 
26, 1997.  Respondent claimed that he sent a letter notifying Wells of his 
suspension, but Wells denied receiving this letter.  Furthermore, on December 15, 
1997, respondent sent a letter to Wells enclosing an authorization to allow another 
attorney to review her file.  This letter did not mention that respondent had been 
found in contempt and was suspended from the practice of law.  Thereafter, 
Wells’s husband called the respondent to inquire about the status of his wife’s 
case.  Respondent again failed to mention that he had been suspended from the 
practice of law. 
 
Although the panel determined that relator failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent did not send notice of his suspension, it did 
find that respondent’s other correspondence and conversations with his client and 
her husband as related in Count Three violated DR 1-102(A)(4). 
 
Count Four involved the respondent’s mailing of a Christmas card to his 
client Lucy Molitor while under suspension for contempt.  Enclosed with the card 
was a letter addressed “Dear Clients,” which stated, among other things, that “[t]he 
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new year will bring a new direction to my law practice and a new location * * *.  
Beginning January 1, 1998, I will continue to represent my old and existing clients 
on pending matters, but will be restricting my practice.”  The letter did not mention 
that the respondent had been found in contempt and was suspended from the 
practice of law until such time as he purged himself of contempt.  The panel 
concluded that respondent’s correspondence with Molitor violated DR 1-
102(A)(4). 
 
Finally, Count Five of the complaint alleged that Donna Herdman, a resident 
of California, contacted respondent on March 1, 1998, and asked him to assist her 
in the administration of her late husband’s estate.  Respondent agreed to perform 
legal services for Herdman, even though he was still under suspension at that time.  
The respondent did not inform Herdman that he was legally unable to represent 
her.  On March 4, 1998, Herdman sent a check in the amount of $500 as a retainer 
to the respondent.  Respondent deposited the check on March 12, 1998.  
Respondent asserted that he mistakenly deposited the check believing it was rent 
due from property he owned and attempted to return the $500 after the matter was 
already under investigation.  The panel determined that respondent’s actions 
relating to Count Five constituted a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). 
 
In mitigation, the respondent provided several attorneys, former clients, and 
other acquaintances as character witnesses.  The witnesses indicated that 
respondent was careful not to give legal advice during the periods of his prior 
suspensions, and also testified to his truthful nature.  The witnesses also testified to 
his active participation in various youth organizations and in his church.  The panel 
also noted that respondent has continued a successful recovery from drug addiction 
and alcohol abuse. 
 
The panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of 
law for a period of two years, with the second year stayed on the condition that the 
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respondent dismiss his lawsuit against Evalena Tabler with prejudice and 
reimburse her to the satisfaction of the relator.  The board adopted the panel’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  However, based on respondent’s repeated 
acts of dishonesty, deceit, and failure to abide by the court’s order, the board 
recommended an indefinite suspension. 
__________________ 
 
Bruce A. Campbell, Eleanor B. Haynes and Stephen E. Chappelear, for 
relator. 
 
John W. Leibold and Tobias H. Elsass, pro se, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  Respondent offers numerous objections to the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the board.  For the following reasons, we 
reject his objections and adopt the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommendation of the board. 
 
Regarding Count One, respondent argues that there was no witness 
testimony that he prepared the motions in the Bartholomew and Beckwith cases.  
Both respondent and his legal secretary testified that respondent did not dictate 
those documents.  Furthermore, a letter to Bartholomew, which accompanied the 
motion for continuance, stated, “[w]e have taken the liberty of preparing a motion 
for continuance of your case.  Please sign it and return it to the above address and I 
will mail it to the Clerk’s office for acceptance by them.  We need to do this as 
soon as possible since the trial date is April 30, 1996.”  Respondent alleges that the 
word “we” in the letter indicates that he was acting in the capacity of a law clerk in 
transmitting the information from Laura Peterman, his associate, to Suzanne 
Brown, the office manager at that time.  Respondent maintains that at best, the 
testimony and evidence create only an inference that he prepared the documents, 
and that such an inference cannot be considered clear and convincing evidence. 
6 
 
However, the panel determined that the evidence contradicted respondent’s 
assertion that he was acting in the capacity of a law clerk.  In particular, the 
testimony of Peterman refuted his claim.  Respondent argues that Peterman’s 
testimony was biased, as she was engaged in litigation with the respondent in a 
contract dispute.  However, “[w]here the evidence is in conflict, the trier of facts 
may determine what should be accepted as the truth and what should be rejected as 
false.”  Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 478, 53 O.O. 361, 365, 120 
N.E.2d 118, 123-124.  Thus, despite conflicting testimony, the panel properly 
determined that the evidence indicating that respondent had prepared the 
documents was sufficiently clear and convincing. 
 
Regarding Count Two, respondent argues that the board abused its discretion 
by usurping the judicial function of the court system in interpreting Hecht v. Levin, 
supra, as creating an absolute privilege against civil action when a person files a 
grievance against an attorney.  Hecht states, “[a] statement made in the course of 
an attorney disciplinary proceeding enjoys an absolute privilege against a civil 
action based thereon as long as the statement bears some reasonable relation to the 
proceeding.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Although Hecht creates an 
absolute privilege, the statement in question must still bear some reasonable 
relation to the attorney disciplinary proceeding.  We reject respondent’s contention 
that this is an issue exclusively for the courts and find that the board or hearing 
panel may determine the question whether there is such a relation.  The board may 
make such a determination because it has “exclusive jurisdiction” to recommend 
disciplinary action against an attorney and is “empowered to receive evidence, 
preserve the record, make findings and submit recommendations to this court 
concerning complaints of attorney misconduct.”  Hecht, 66 Ohio St.3d at 461, 613 
N.E.2d at 588.  In respondent’s case, the panel properly determined that a 
reasonable relation existed and concluded that respondent filed the lawsuit against 
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Tabler merely to harass her.  Respondent was specifically aware of the Hecht 
decision, yet deliberately filed the defamation and slander lawsuit.  Furthermore, 
he deliberately violated Civ.R. 8(A) in order to intimidate Tabler by demanding 
$500,000 in damages.  Civ.R. 8(A) prohibits a party who seeks more than $25,000 
from specifying in the demand for judgment the amount of recovery sought, except 
in a claim founded on an instrument.  Thus, the board did not abuse its discretion, 
and we find respondent’s argument without merit.1 
 
As to Count Five, respondent claims that the board abused its discretion in 
finding a violation under DR 1-102(A)(4) when he did not provide any legal 
services for Herdman.  However, an attorney may be found to have engaged in 
conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation under DR 1-102(A)(4) 
without having performed legal services for a client.  In this case, the panel found 
that respondent’s conduct was dishonest and deceitful.  The panel found by clear 
and convincing evidence that while under suspension, respondent had talked with 
Herdman about legal work she wanted done and did not tell her that he was under 
suspension.  Herdman thought that she was retaining respondent to perform legal 
services based on her conversation with respondent and sent him a letter and a 
retainer check, which respondent subsequently negotiated.  The fact that 
respondent subsequently performed no legal services for her is irrelevant. 
 
Finally, respondent asserts that the board failed to address his claim of 
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  
Respondent is a recovering drug addict and contends that his past addiction was the 
basis for charges brought by relator.  However, respondent has presented no 
evidence that would support a claim for relief under the ADA.  The Americans 
with Disabilities Act, Section 12101 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code (“ADA”), does not 
prevent the discipline of attorneys with disabilities.  State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar 
Assn. v. Busch (Okla.1996), 919 P.2d 1114, 1119-1120.  See Cincinnati Bar Assn. 
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v. Komarek (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 90, 96, 702 N.E.2d 62, 67.  This is because the 
primary purpose of attorney discipline is to protect the public, and this court has a 
constitutional duty to oversee the bar and to ensure that its members are fit to 
practice law.  Busch, 919 P.2d at 1117-1120. 
 
We adopt the conclusions of law by the board that respondent has violated 
DR 3-101(B), 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 7-102(A)(1), and 7-102(A)(2).  We note 
that “the normal penalty for continuing to practice law while under suspension is 
disbarment.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Koury (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 433, 436, 674 
N.E.2d 1371, 1373.  However, in mitigation the board determined that respondent, 
so far, has successfully recovered from drug and alcohol abuse, and otherwise has 
generally been an upstanding and active member of the community.  Nevertheless, 
due to respondent’s repeated acts of dishonesty, deceit, and failure to abide by this 
court’s orders, we adopt the recommendation of the board.  Respondent is hereby 
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the state of Ohio.  Costs taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS, Acting C.J., RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
T. BRYANT, COOK and SHAW, JJ., dissent. 
 
THOMAS F. BRYANT, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting for MOYER, 
C.J. 
 
STEPHEN R. SHAW, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting for Lundberg 
Stratton, J. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
Regarding respondent’s lawsuit against Tabler, the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals recently upheld the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of 
Evalena Tabler.  The court of appeals held that pursuant to Hecht, Tabler’s 
statements in her grievance bore a reasonable relation to the Columbus Bar 
9 
Association proceedings against appellant.  See Elsass v. Tabler (Mar. 25, 1999), 
Franklin App. No. 98AP-837, unreported, 1999 WL 163259. 
__________________ 
 
SHAW, J., dissenting.  I concur with the analysis and findings of the 
majority, but respectfully disagree with the final disposition.  The majority opinion 
thoroughly and effectively details on the part of respondent the intentional 
disregard of known legal authority of this court in an effort to harass and intimidate 
a former client who filed a disciplinary grievance against him, a pattern of 
deceitful conduct with clients and trial courts, the deliberate disobedience of a 
contempt order issued by this court, and an effort to evade responsibility for his 
own conduct via a less than bona fide effort to invoke relief under the ADA — all 
occurring while respondent was under one or the other of two different suspension 
orders of this court.  In my view, the aggressive pattern of professional deceit and 
dishonesty exhibited by respondent towards the courts, the public, and the 
disciplinary process itself is not outweighed by indications that in his personal life, 
respondent may be presently recovering from drug and alcohol abuse or involved 
in certain community affairs.  Given these circumstances, a departure from the 
normal rule of Disciplinary Counsel v. Koury (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 433, 674 
N.E.2d 1371, seems neither warranted in this case nor prudent for future cases.  I 
believe the only appropriate sanction here is an order of permanent disbarment. 
 
T. BRYANT and COOK, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.