Title: People v. Lemcke

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
DESIRAE LEE LEMCKE et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S250108 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G054241 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
14CF3596 
 
 
May 27, 2021 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, Kruger, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
S250108 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
Defendant Charles Henry Rudd was convicted of assault 
and robbery.  The prosecution’s primary evidence at trial was 
the testimony of the victim, who identified Rudd as her assailant 
and confirmed that she had previously identified Rudd during a 
photographic lineup.  The trial court provided the jury an 
instruction modeled on CALCRIM No. 315 that listed 15 factors 
it should consider when evaluating eyewitness identification 
evidence.  One of those factors stated: “How certain was the 
witness when he or she made an identiﬁcation?”  Rudd argues 
that the certainty instruction violated his federal and state due 
process rights to a fair trial (see U.S. Const., 5th & 14th 
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15) because empirical research 
has shown that a witness’s confidence in an identification is 
generally not a reliable indicator of accuracy.   
We reject Rudd’s due process claims.  When considered in 
the context of the trial record as a whole, listing the witness’s 
level of certainty as one of 15 factors the jury should consider 
when evaluating identification testimony did not render Rudd’s 
trial fundamentally unfair.  (See Salas v. Cortez (1979) 24 Cal.3d 
22, 27 (Salas) [“The touchstone of due process is fundamental 
fairness”]; People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1335 (Foster) 
[in determining whether a jury instruction violated a 
defendant’s right to due process, the “ ‘instruction “may not be 
judged in artificial isolation,” but must be considered in the 
context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record’ ” 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
(italics omitted)].)  As we explained in a prior decision approving 
CALJIC No. 2.92’s similarly worded instruction on witness 
certainty, the instruction does not direct the jury that “certainty 
equals accuracy.”  (People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 461–
463 (Sánchez); see People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 
1231–1232 (Johnson) [approving CALJIC No. 2.92’s certainty 
instruction].)  Although the language may prompt jurors to 
conclude that a confident identification is more likely to be 
accurate, 
Rudd 
was 
permitted 
to 
call 
an 
eyewitness 
identification expert who explained the limited circumstances 
when certainty and accuracy are positively correlated.  
Moreover, the court provided additional instructions directing 
the jury that it was required to consider the testimony of the 
expert witness, that the prosecution retained the burden to 
prove Rudd’s identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that witnesses sometimes make honest mistakes.    
Despite the absence of a constitutional violation, we 
nonetheless agree with amici curiae that a reevaluation of the 
certainty instruction is warranted.  Contrary to widespread lay 
belief, there is now near unanimity in the empirical research 
that “eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable indicator 
of accuracy.”  (State v. Henderson (N.J. 2011) 27 A.3d 872, 899 
(Henderson); see Commonwealth v. Gomes (Mass. 2015) 22 
N.E.3d 897, 912–913 (Gomes); State v. Guilbert (Conn. 2012) 49 
A.3d 705, 721–723 (Guilbert); State v. Lawson (Or. 2012) 291 
P.3d 673, 704 (Lawson).)  As currently worded, CALCRIM No. 
315 does nothing to disabuse jurors of that common 
misconception, but rather tends to reinforce it by implying that 
an identification is more likely to be reliable when the witness 
has expressed certainty.  This is especially problematic because 
many studies have also shown eyewitness confidence is the 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
single most influential factor in juror determinations regarding 
the accuracy of an identification.  (See Lawson, at pp. 704–705.)   
Given the significance that witness certainty plays in the 
factfinding process, we refer the matter to the Judicial Council 
and its Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions to 
evaluate whether or how the instruction might be modified to 
avoid juror confusion regarding the correlation between 
certainty and accuracy.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(d).)  
Acting pursuant to our supervisory powers, we further direct 
that until the Judicial Council has completed its evaluation, 
trial courts should omit the certainty factor from CALCRIM No. 
315 unless the defendant requests otherwise.  
I. 
BACKGROUND 
A. The Crime and Investigation 
 
1. The assault and initial investigation  
In July of 2014, Monica Campusano traveled to a motel to 
visit a friend.  While walking down a hallway, Campusano saw 
a woman standing outside room 216 and a man standing just 
inside the doorway.  The woman asked if she could use 
Campusano’s cell phone.  As Campusano began to retrieve her 
phone, the man in the doorway suddenly struck her in the face 
and pulled her into room 216.  The man then punched and 
kicked 
Campusano 
repeatedly, 
causing 
her 
to 
lose 
consciousness.  
When Campusano regained consciousness she was alone 
and her purse and phone were gone. She immediately went to 
the motel lobby and called 9-1-1.  Ricardo Velasquez, an officer 
of the Santa Ana Police Department, responded to the call and 
interviewed Campusano at the motel.  Campusano described 
her assailant as an African-American male, between six feet 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
three inches to six feet five inches in height and weighing 260 to 
300 pounds.  Campusano described the female who had asked to 
use her phone as a “heavy set white female,” standing 
approximately five feet six inches in height and weighing over 
200 pounds.  
After arranging an ambulance for Campusano, Officer 
Velasquez obtained records from the motel manager that 
showed room 216 was registered to a woman named Desirae Lee 
Lemcke.  Officer Velasquez ran a records check on Lemcke and 
determined that she matched Campusano’s description of the 
female standing outside the motel room.  The records check also 
revealed Lemcke had previously obtained a “no contact” order 
against a man named Charles Rudd, who the order described as 
an African-American male, six feet three inches in height and 
weighing approximately 250 pounds.     
Later that evening, Officer Velasquez created a six-pack 
photographic lineup that included an image of Rudd and then 
drove to the hospital where Campusano was receiving 
treatment.  When Velasquez arrived, Campusano was “under 
anesthesia,” but stated that she could answer questions.  Officer 
Velasquez showed her the photographic lineup and asked 
whether she saw the person who had attacked her.  Campusano 
pointed to Rudd’s photograph and stated that she recognized his 
nose, mouth and jaw area.  She signed her name by the photo 
but used an incorrect spelling.    
 
 2. Follow-up investigation 
Approximately three months after Campusano initially 
identified Rudd, Santa Ana Police Department Detective Adrian 
Silva contacted her to discuss the details of the assault.  Silva 
showed Campusano a photographic lineup of several females 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
that included an image of Lemcke.  Campusano selected 
Lemcke’s photograph.  Campusano also mentioned for the first 
time that the male assailant had a tattoo on his neck. 
Based on the information Campusano had provided, 
Detective Silva prepared a photographic lineup showing images 
of two neck tattoos.  The first photograph showed the neck tattoo 
of Rudd and the second showed the neck tattoo of Lemcke’s 
current boyfriend.  The men’s faces were not shown in the 
photographs.   
Silva met with Campusano again six days later and asked 
whether either of the tattoos resembled the one she had seen on 
her assailant’s neck.  Campusano selected the photograph of 
Rudd’s tattoo, explaining that it looked “more like the one that 
she remembered.”  Silva then asked Campusano whether she 
recalled having previously selected an image of an African-
American male during a photographic lineup.  After Campusano 
said yes, Silva showed her the image of Rudd that Officer 
Velasquez had used in the original photographic lineup and 
asked 
whether 
“she 
remembered 
that 
this 
was 
[the] . . . photo . . . that she had already identified.”  Campusano 
confirmed it was the same photograph.  Silva then showed 
Campusano a second six-pack photographic lineup that did not 
include Rudd.  Campusano stated that she did not recognize 
anyone, and then pointed back to the photograph of Rudd and 
said, “for sure it was [him].” 
In October of 2014, the Orange County District Attorney 
filed an information charging Lemcke and Rudd with second-
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
degree robbery (Penal Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c))1 and 
aggravated assault by means of force likely to result in great 
bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(l)).  The information also charged 
Rudd with battery with serious bodily injury.  (§ 243, subd. (d).) 
B. Trial 
1. Prosecution’s witnesses 
At trial, Campusano testified about her recollection of the 
assault.  Campusano stated that she had a good view of her 
assailant during the attack and “remember[ed] his face well.”  
The prosecution asked Campusano whether she saw the person 
who had attacked her in the courtroom.  Campusano said yes, 
explaining that he was sitting at the defense table.  The 
prosecutor asked Campusano to describe what the person was 
wearing.  Campusano then stood up and stated that the 
individual was wearing a blue shirt with a black shirt 
underneath.  When asked what features of his face she 
remembered, Campusano stated:  “I remember his face, his 
tattoo and his look, like he was looking with anger.”  Campusano 
also confirmed that she had selected Rudd from a photographic 
lineup Officer Velasquez had shown to her at the hospital.     
On cross-examination, Campusano admitted that she 
could not see the defense table when she had first identified 
Rudd during her direct examination, which is why she had to 
stand up to describe his clothing.  Campusano explained that 
she had identified Rudd before seeing him because “it [was] 
logical that he was going to be in the courtroom.”  She reiterated 
 
1  
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory citations are 
to the Penal Code. 
 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
that she “remember[ed] [Rudd’s] face well” and that it was 
“impossible for [her] not to recognize his face.”   
Defense counsel questioned Campusano about various 
inconsistent statements she had made throughout the 
investigation, including her initial failure to inform Officer 
Velasquez that her attacker had a neck tattoo, her description 
of what the perpetrator had said to her during the attack, where 
she was when she regained consciousness and the extent of her 
injuries. Defense counsel also elicited testimony in which 
Campusano admitted she had previously been convicted of 
soliciting prostitution and lying to a police officer.  Campusano 
further admitted that after having spoken with law enforcement 
about her assault, she applied for a “U visa,” a form of temporary 
visa that provides legal status for noncitizen victims of serious 
crimes who assist in the investigation.  (See People v. Morales 
(2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 502, 506; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15).)  The 
defense introduced a copy of Campusano’s visa application, 
which stated that she had been kidnapped during the incident, 
an allegation she never made to the investigating officers.   
Officer Velasquez and Detective Silva also testified at trial 
regarding their role in the investigation.  Both officers explained 
what Campusano had told them during their interviews and 
described how they had administered the photographic lineups.  
(See ante, at pp. 3–5.)     
2. Defense’s expert witness on eyewitness 
identifications  
Mitchell Eisen, a psychology professor, testified on behalf 
of the defense as an expert on eyewitness identifications.  Eisen 
discussed a wide range of subjects related to the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications including the procedures law 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
enforcement should follow to ensure a fair, nonsuggestive 
identification process.  Several of the procedures Eisen 
described differed from the procedures that Velasquez and Silva 
had used when administering Campusano’s identifications.  
Eisen also identified various factors that can affect a 
witness’s identification, including what Eisen referred to as the 
“commitment effect.”  Eisen explained that once a witness has 
made an initial identification of a person, the witness is likely to 
select that person again in any future identification regardless 
of the accuracy of the initial identification.  Eisen emphasized 
that the commitment effect is particularly problematic for in-
trial identifications because a witness who has agreed to testify 
is normally prepared to “reassert their belief” as to whatever 
identification he or she had previously made.  According to 
Eisen, a witness’s statements at trial regarding an identification 
are not reflective of memory, but rather reflect “their honest 
belief that they’ve come to believe after a long process that starts 
at the very first viewing, and every identification procedure that 
follows and every discussion and every piece of information they 
get . . . until [the trial].” 
Eisen also testified about the correlation between a 
witness’s level of certainty and the accuracy of the identification.  
Eisen stated that research on that issue had “come a long way,” 
explaining:  “Just a few years ago, if you had an expert in my 
position sitting here, they might say something like confidence 
is not related to accuracy in any regard, but that’s not really 
true.”  According to Eisen, current research suggested that 
“confidence” can be “useful” when there has been a “fair lineup 
soon after the event.”  However, “once outside that window and 
you go forward, that moment in time when [the witness] made 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
an [identification], once you get past that, confidence is not 
related to accuracy in any regard.”   
Eisen further explained that an expression of certainty is 
only useful when the identification is made soon after the event 
because, as the investigation progresses, a witness will normally 
receive additional information that can unconsciously bolster 
his or her confidence.  Eisen clarified that this additional 
information may come in the form of positive feedback from law 
enforcement or even the prosecutor’s decision to file charges 
against the suspect:  “If you inform [the witness] inadvertently 
[or] purposefully . . . that they chose the right picture, we can 
drive confidence through the ceiling.  [A witness can] become 
very, very confident in their choice even when they weren’t 
originally.”  Eisen continued, “So what these studies show . . . is 
really the fundamental point and indisputable, that . . . [b]y the 
time they get to trial, they learned at least the government 
believes that they are the right person and that’s why they are 
prosecuting.  It gives people sort of confirming feedback you can 
manipulate and drive confidence, irrespective of memory. . . .  If 
we are going to look at confidence at all, only be confident in the 
moment they make the selection from a fair and unbiased 
identification test.”  
3. Jury instructions on witness certainty 
After the close of evidence, the trial court heard argument 
regarding the parties’ proposed jury instructions.  The 
prosecution requested an instruction modeled on CALCRIM No. 
315 that listed 15 factors the jury should consider when 
evaluating 
the 
credibility 
and 
accuracy 
of 
eyewitness 
identification evidence.  Counsel for Rudd requested that the 
court strike the eleventh factor, which directed the jury to 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
consider: “How certain was the witness when he or she made an 
identification?”  Counsel explained that his objection was based 
on a concurring opinion in Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 411, that 
questioned the continuing validity of the certainty instruction in 
light of empirical research finding little correlation “between 
witness confidence and witness accuracy.”   
The trial court denied Rudd’s request, explaining that the 
certainty language set forth in CALCRIM No. 315 was 
consistent with the defense expert’s testimony that confidence 
can be reliable under certain circumstances.  The court 
acknowledged the expert had cast doubt on the usefulness of 
certainty more generally but concluded that the defense could 
raise those points at closing argument.  
4. Closing argument 
 
At closing argument, the prosecution focused on 
Campusano’s eyewitness testimony, asserting that she had 
consistently identified Rudd and Lemcke as the perpetrators 
and that the “essentials of her testimony” about the event had 
never changed.  Acknowledging that the accuracy of 
Campusano’s identification was “obviously an issue,” the 
prosecutor directed the jury to CALCRIM No. 315, explaining 
that it provided a “tool to evaluate an eyewitness identification.”  
The prosecutor also reminded the jury that it had heard an 
expert testify about the subject “for quite a while.”  The 
prosecutor then presented argument as to why various factors 
in CALCRIM No. 315 suggested Campusano’s identification was 
accurate, explaining that she had provided an accurate 
description of Rudd prior to the identification, she had picked 
him out of a group of people, and she had never failed to identify 
him.  Regarding Campusano’s level of certainty, the prosecutor 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
asserted that Campusano “was certain the entire time.  And she 
came in here and saw [Rudd] when she walked into court and 
said, ‘that’s him.’ ”   
 
Rudd’s 
closing 
argument 
focused 
primarily 
on 
Campusano’s credibility as a witness.  Defense counsel argued 
that Campusano had made numerous inconsistent statements 
about the event and been argumentative throughout her cross-
examination.  Counsel also emphasized that Campusano had 
been convicted of prostitution and lying to the police, arguing 
that these prior convictions “show[ed] a readiness to lie to a 
police officer, a readiness to lie to the judge, and a readiness to 
lie to you folks.”  In addition to questioning Campusano’s 
credibility, the defense presented alternative theories about 
what had actually occurred at the motel.  First, counsel posited 
that Campusano may have gone to the motel to solicit 
prostitution and then got into a fight with a dissatisfied 
customer.  Second, counsel theorized that Campusano had “to 
claim she was a victim of a violent felony in order for her to get 
that U visa to clear up her immigration status.” 
 
Defense 
counsel 
then 
addressed 
Campusano’s 
identification of Rudd, asserting that the procedures the police 
had used were suggestive and unreliable.  Counsel noted that 
the first identification had occurred while Campusano was 
under anesthesia, and that the second identification was 
“extremely suggestive” because Detective Silva had merely 
shown Campusano the same photograph she had selected 
during the initial lineup that Officer Velasquez had conducted.  
Finally, defense counsel argued that Eisen’s expert testimony 
showed Campusano’s in-court identification was of no value, 
and that “confidence does not equal reliability [or] . . . accuracy.” 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
 
The jury convicted Lemcke and Rudd on all counts.    
 C. Rudd’s Appeal   
Rudd raised a single issue on appeal, contending that his 
“state and federal due process rights were violated when the 
court instructed the jury . . . to consider an eyewitness’s level of 
certainty when evaluating an identification.”2  
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that numerous 
scientific studies had found that a “witness’s certainty does not 
make the identification any more likely to be accurate.”  The 
court explained, however, that Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 
and Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 411, had expressly approved the 
use of similarly worded instructions on witness certainty.  While 
noting that a concurring opinion in Sánchez questioned the 
continuing validity of such an instruction, the court concluded 
that it was “bound by the decisions in Sánchez and Johnson.”  
Rudd filed a petition for review seeking resolution of the 
following question:  “Does instructing a jury with CALCRIM No. 
315, which directs the jury to consider an eyewitness’s level of 
certainty 
when 
evaluating 
an 
identification, 
violate 
a 
defendant’s federal and state due process rights?”3  
 
2  
Codefendant Lemcke filed a separate appeal that raised 
an unrelated instructional error claim.  The Court of Appeal 
rejected her claim, and we denied her petition for review. 
3  
Rudd’s petition also listed a second, broader question: “Are 
rules that assign the trial court a stronger gatekeeping role in 
the admission of eyewitness identification required or 
advisable?” Rudd’s briefing, however, does not address this 
“gatekeeper” issue and he did not raise the issue in either the 
trial court or the Court of Appeal.  We therefore decline to 
address the merits of this claim, deeming it both abandoned and 
 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. The Instruction on Witness Certainty Did Not 
Violate Rudd’s Due Process Rights   
Rudd has not challenged the procedures that Officer 
Velasquez and Detective Silva used to conduct the photographic 
lineups that preceded Campusano’s identifications, nor has he 
challenged the admission of any of the identification evidence.  
(See generally People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 412 
[assessing whether lineup procedures rendered identification 
evidence inadmissible].)4  Instead, his sole claim is that the trial 
court violated his right to due process by listing the witness’s 
 
forfeited.  (See People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 518, fn. 2 
[issue raised in the notice of appeal, but not addressed in the 
briefing, deemed abandoned]; Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. 
(1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 422, fn. 3 [courts generally “assume” 
appellant has “abandoned any claim” that is not briefed]; In re 
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880 [“Ordinarily, a criminal 
defendant who does not challenge an assertedly erroneous 
ruling of the trial court in that court has forfeited his or her right 
to raise the claim on appeal”].)     
4   
As discussed in more detail below (see post, at pp. 31–32 
& fn. 16), the Legislature recently adopted a statute that 
requires law enforcement agencies to enact regulations 
mandating the use of certain procedures when administering 
“photo lineups and live lineups with eyewitnesses.”  (§ 859.7, 
subd. (a).)  The legislation was not in effect when Campusano 
made her identifications and Rudd has not raised any claim with 
respect to the new statute.     
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
level of certainty as one of 15 factors the jury should consider 
when evaluating eyewitness identification testimony.5  
 
5  
The full instruction the trial court provided to the jury in 
this case, which is essentially identical to CALCRIM No. 315, 
stated as follows: 
 
“You have heard eyewitness testimony identifying the 
defendant.  As with any other witness, you must decide 
whether an eyewitness gave truthful and accurate testimony.  
In evaluating identiﬁcation testimony, consider the following 
questions: 
• “Did the witness know or have contact with the defendants 
before the event? 
• “How well could the witness see the perpetrator? 
• “What were the circumstances affecting the witness’s 
ability to observe, such as lighting, weather conditions, 
obstructions, distance, and duration of observation?  
• “How closely was the witness paying attention? 
• “Was the witness under stress when he or she made the 
observation? 
• “Did the witness give a description and how does that 
description compare to the defendants? 
• “How much time passed between the event and the time 
when the witness identiﬁed the defendants? 
• “Was the witness asked to pick the perpetrator out of a 
group? 
• “Did the witness ever fail to identify the defendants? 
• “Did the witness ever change his or her mind about the 
identiﬁcation? 
• “How certain was the witness when he or she made an 
identiﬁcation? 
• “Are the witness and the defendant of different races? 
 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
Rudd’s claim is based on empirical research showing that 
confidence in an identification is generally not a reliable 
indicator of accuracy.  (See Gomes, supra, 22 N.E.3d at pp. 912–
913; Guilbert, supra, 49 A.3d at pp. 721–723; Lawson, supra, 291 
P.3d at pp. 704–705; Henderson, supra, 27 A.3d at pp. 898–899.)  
Rudd contends that the certainty instruction set forth in 
CALCRIM No. 315 implies just the opposite, effectively causing 
jurors to “equat[e] certainty with accuracy” and to “place more 
value than merited on the eyewitness’s confidence.”  In Rudd’s 
view, if a trial court elects to instruct a jury on witness certainty, 
“[d]ue process requires that the [instruction be] accompanied by 
information reflecting scientific research.” 
“The touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness.”  
(Salas, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 27; see Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 
411 U.S. 778, 790 [“[F]undamental fairness [is] the touchstone 
of due process”].)  A jury instruction may “ ‘so infuse[] the trial 
with unfairness as to deny due process of law.’ ”  (Estelle v. 
McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 75 (Estelle).)  However, “ ‘not every 
ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises 
to the level of a due process violation.  The question is “ ‘whether 
the ailing instruction . . . so infected the entire trial that the 
 
• “Was the witness able to identify other participants in the 
crime? 
• “Was the witness able to identify the defendant in a 
photographic or physical lineup? 
• “Were there any other circumstances affecting the 
witness’s ability to make an accurate identiﬁcation? 
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that it was the defendant who committed the crime.  If the 
People have not met this burden, you must ﬁnd the defendant 
not guilty.” 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
resulting conviction violates due process.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Mills 
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 677, quoting Estelle, p. 72.)  “ ‘It is well 
established that the instruction “may not be judged in artificial 
isolation,” but must be considered in the context of the 
instructions as a whole and the trial record.’ ”  (Foster, supra, 50 
Cal.4th at p. 1335, italics omitted; see People v. Haskett (1990) 
52 Cal.3d 210, 235.)  “ ‘If the charge as a whole is ambiguous, 
the question is whether there is a “ ‘reasonable likelihood that 
the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that 
violates the Constitution.” ’ ”  (Mills, p. 677.)   
Over the past 30 years, we have repeatedly endorsed the 
use of instructions that direct the jury to consider an 
eyewitness’s level of certainty when evaluating identification 
evidence.  In People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126 (Wright), 
we approved CALJIC No. 2.92, a predecessor to CALCRIM No. 
315, that includes similar language regarding witness 
certainty.6  Rejecting arguments similar to those Rudd raises 
here, we also concluded that an “instruction on eyewitness 
identification factors should . . . . [¶] . . . not take a position as to 
 
6  
The language in CALJIC No. 2.92 directs the jury to 
consider “[t]he extent to which the witness is either certain or 
uncertain of the identification.”  Although this language differs 
somewhat from CALCRIM No. 315, which directs the jury to 
consider “[h]ow certain was the witness when he or she made an 
identification,” neither party has argued that this slight 
difference in phrasing is material.  For purposes of Rudd’s due 
process claims, we find no material distinction between the two 
instructions.  In effect, the instructions set forth two ways of 
saying the same thing:  that jurors should consider the witness’s 
level of certainty when assessing the credibility and accuracy of 
the identification testimony.        
 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
the impact of each of the psychological factors listed” (Wright, at 
p. 1141), and that “[the] explanation of the effects of those factors 
is best left to argument by counsel, cross-examination of the 
eyewitnesses, and expert testimony where appropriate” (id. at 
p. 1143; see People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 
(McDonald) [approving the use of expert testimony describing 
how psychological factors can affect the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications]).    
Four years later, we rejected a claim that the trial court 
erred when it refused to strike the witness certainty factor set 
forth in CALJIC No. 2.92. (Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183.)  
Citing Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1126, we reiterated that an 
instruction on eyewitness identification testimony “should not 
take a position as to the impact of each of the psychological 
factors listed” (Johnson, at p. 1230) and that CALJIC No. 2.92 
“normally provides sufficient guidance on the subject . . . .”  
(Johnson, at p. 1230).   
Most recently, in Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 411, we 
rejected a claim challenging CALJIC No. 2.92’s certainty 
language based on “scientific studies [finding] that . . . there is, 
at best, a weak correlation between witness certainty and 
accuracy.”  (Sánchez, at p. 461.)  We explained that the studies 
defendant had cited were “nothing new” (id. at p. 462), noting 
that our decision in McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d 351, decided 32 
years earlier, had “cited some of [those studies] . . . [in support 
of its] holding that the trial court has discretion to admit expert 
testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification” 
(Sánchez, at p. 462).  We further explained that our prior 
decisions had “specifically approved” the use of the “certainty 
factor,” and that the instruction was facially neutral, “telling the 
jury only that it could consider [a witness’s level of certainty].  It 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
did not suggest that certainty equals accuracy.”  (Ibid.)  Finally, 
we observed that the instruction was at least partially beneficial 
to the defendant because some of the trial witnesses had 
expressed uncertainty in their identification and concluded that 
“[a]ny reexamination of our previous holdings in light of 
developments in other jurisdictions should await a case 
involving only certain identifications.”  (Ibid.) 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Liu disagreed with the 
majority’s assertion that the instruction was neutral, arguing 
that the language in CALJIC No. 2.92 “naturally ‘prompt[ed] 
the jury to conclude that an eyewitness identification is more 
reliable when the witness expresses greater certainty.’ ”  
(Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 495 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)  
Although Justice Liu agreed that any instructional error was 
harmless based on the additional evidence of guilt presented at 
trial, he contended that this court should reevaluate “whether it 
is proper . . . to instruct that witness certainty is a factor 
bearing on the accuracy of an identification that juries should 
consider.”  (Id. at p. 498.)   
Rudd disagrees with our prior decisions in Wright, 
Johnson and Sánchez.  He contends that instructing the jury to 
consider an eyewitness’s level of certainty, without clarifying 
the limited correlation between certainty and accuracy, violates 
due process in two ways.  First, the instruction “lowers the 
prosecution’s burden of proof” by causing jurors to “equat[e] 
certainty with accuracy, when science establishes otherwise.”  
Second, the instruction denies the defendant “a ‘meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense’ ” as to “why the 
identification was flawed . . . .”   
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
Regarding Rudd’s first contention, we find nothing in 
CALCRIM No. 315’s instruction on witness certainty that 
operates to “lower the prosecution’s burden of proof.”  As 
Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 411, explained with respect to 
CALJIC No. 2.92’s similarly worded instruction, the instruction 
does not direct the jury that “certainty equals accuracy.”  
(Sánchez, at p. 462.)  Nor does the instruction state that the jury 
must presume an identification is accurate if the eyewitness has 
expressed certainty.  (Cf. Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 
307, 316 [instruction that “directs the jury to presume an 
essential element of the offense” violates due process].)  Instead, 
the instruction merely lists the witness’s level of certainty at the 
time of identification as one of 15 different factors that the jury 
should consider when evaluating the credibility and accuracy of 
eyewitness testimony.  The instruction leaves the jury to decide 
whether the witness expressed a credible claim of certainty and 
what weight, if any, should be placed on that certainty in 
relation to the numerous other factors listed in CALCRIM No. 
315.  Indeed, even Rudd acknowledges that, on its face, the 
instruction is “superficially neutral.”  
Although the wording of the instruction might cause some 
jurors to infer that certainty is generally correlative of accuracy 
(see post, at pp. 26–39), Rudd was permitted to present expert 
witness testimony to combat that inference.  Rudd’s expert 
(Eisen) testified that the only time certainty may be useful in 
assessing accuracy is when the identification is made in close 
temporal proximity to the event and law enforcement has 
utilized nonsuggestive procedures.  According to Eisen, “outside 
that window, . . . confidence is not related to accuracy in any 
regard.”  Eisen emphasized that in-trial identification testimony 
is particularly meaningless because it does not “reflect[] 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
memory.”  Eisen also described the procedures law enforcement 
should follow to ensure an accurate identification  and answered 
a series of hypothetical questions that were designed to show 
those procedures were not followed in this case.  (See People v. 
Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1045 [expert may render opinion 
testimony based on hypothetical question that are rooted in the 
facts shown by the evidence].)   
Nothing in CALCRIM No. 315 suggested that the jury 
should ignore Eisen’s expert opinion on witness certainty.  To 
the contrary, the jury received a separate instruction on expert 
testimony (CALCRIM No. 332) directing that it “must consider 
th[ose] opinions.”  (Italics added.)  The jury also received a 
general instruction on witness testimony explaining that 
“[p]eople sometimes honestly . . . make mistakes about what 
they remember” and that the jurors were responsible for 
“judg[ing] the credibility or believability of the witnesses.”  The 
jury “thus remained free to exercise its collective judgment to 
reject what it did not find trustworthy or plausible.”  (Cupp v. 
Naughten (1973) 414 U.S. 141, 149 (Cupp).)   
Additional instructions the jury received in this case 
further undercut Rudd’s contention that the certainty language 
lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof.  (See Foster, supra, 50 
Cal.4th at p. 1335 [“ ‘the instruction “may not be judged in 
artificial isolation,” but must be considered in the context of the 
instructions as a whole . . .’ ”].)  The trial court expressly 
directed the jury that Rudd was presumed innocent, and that 
the prosecution had the burden of proving all elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  The instruction on eyewitness 
identification evidence reiterated that requirement with respect 
to Rudd’s identity, stating: “The People have the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
who committed the crime.  If the People have not met this 
burden, you must ﬁnd the defendant not guilty.” (See Cupp, 
supra, 414 U.S. at p. 149 [instruction directing that witnesses 
were presumed to be truthful did not lower the prosecution’s 
burden of proof where the court provided additional instructions 
that “fully and explicitly [charged the jury] about the 
presumption of innocence and the State’s duty to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt”].)     
Our conclusion that CALCRIM No. 315’s certainty 
instruction did not operate to lower the prosecution’s burden of 
proof under the facts presented here finds substantial support 
in federal case law.7  In Cupp, supra, 414 U.S. 141, the 
prosecution called two witnesses who identified the defendant 
as the perpetrator of an armed robbery; the defendant called no 
witnesses.  The trial court instructed the jury that “ ‘[e]very 
 
7  
While the protections afforded under the due process 
clauses of the California Constitution and the federal 
Constitution are not coterminous (see People v. Ramos (1984) 37 
Cal.3d 136, 151–154 [jury instruction found to violate state due 
process clause despite having been found to comport with 
federal due process clause]; People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 
684), we have previously acknowledged that, as with the federal 
Constitution, the “essence” of our state due process clause is 
“fundamental[] fairn[ess in the] decision-making process.”  
(Ramos, at p. 153; cf. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services 
(1981) 452 U.S. 18, 24 [due process “expresses the requirement 
of ‘fundamental fairness’ ”].)  Moreover, Rudd has failed to 
present any separate argument or analysis with respect to the 
federal and state due process clauses.  Indeed, the portion of his 
brief addressing his due process claims cites almost exclusively 
to federal authorities.   
 
 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
witness is presumed to speak the truth,’ ” but clarified that the 
presumption “ ‘may be overcome’ ” by other evidence.  (Id. at p. 
142.)  After being convicted, the defendant filed a habeas 
petition arguing that “the presumption-of-truthfulness charge 
[violated his due process rights by] shift[ing] the State’s burden 
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and forc[ing] [him] 
instead to prove his innocence.”  (Id. at p. 143.)   
The Supreme Court rejected the claim.  Although the court 
acknowledged that numerous federal circuits had disapproved 
similar instructions on the basis that they tended to “ ‘shift’ the 
prosecution’s burden of proof” (Cupp, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 145), 
it noted that none had found the instruction violated due 
process.  (Id. at p. 146.)  The court explained that the mere fact 
several circuits had deemed the instruction “[un]desirable from 
the viewpoint of sound judicial practice” was “not, without more, 
authority 
for 
declaring . . . the 
giving 
of 
the 
instruction . . . invalid [under the Due Process Clause].”  (Ibid.)  
The court went on to hold that, viewed in the context of the 
record as a whole, the presumption-of-truthfulness instruction 
did not “impliedly” (id. at p. 148) shift the burden to defendant 
to prove his innocence.  In support, the court emphasized that 
the language of the instruction did not compel the jury to accept 
the testimony of any witness and that other instructions had 
“explicit[ly] . . . affirm[ed]” that the prosecution had the 
“obligation . . . to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at 
p. 147.)     
The instruction in Cupp was found not to violate due 
process despite having effectively directed the jury that the 
prosecution’s eyewitnesses were presumed to speak the truth.  
We therefore fail to see how a due process violation could be 
found in a case like this one, where the instruction merely 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
directed the jury that it should consider the eyewitness’s level of 
certainty as one of 15 enumerated factors and where the 
defendant was permitted to present expert testimony explaining 
that certainty is generally not predictive of accuracy. 
Rudd’s argument that the certainty instruction violated 
his due process rights by denying him “a ‘meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense’ ”  as to why the 
identification was flawed fares no better.  The record shows that 
Rudd was permitted to put on a vigorous defense on the issue of 
identity.  As explained above, Rudd called an eyewitness 
identification expert who testified at length about the weak 
correlation between certainty and accuracy, particularly with 
respect to in-court identifications.  Defense counsel emphasized 
that testimony at closing argument, explaining:  “A lot of people 
think the more confident you are in the eyewitness 
identification, the more accurate it can be, but nothing could be 
farther from the truth.  Just listen to Dr. Eisen’s testimony.”8  
In addition, Rudd had the opportunity to cross-examine 
Campusano and the investigating officers regarding her 
identifications and the procedures used during the photographic 
 
8   
Rudd argues that jury instructions are a more effective 
mechanism than expert testimony to educate the jury about the 
limited correlation between certainty and accuracy.  As 
discussed in more detail below, there appears to be an emerging 
dispute in the research regarding the efficacy of enhanced jury 
instructions on eyewitness identifications.  (See post, at pp. 36–
37.)  But even if we assume jury instructions can be a more 
effective method than expert testimony alone, Rudd has cited no 
authority suggesting that the due process clause entitles a 
defendant to a jury instruction summarizing empirical research 
that can otherwise be presented through expert testimony. 
   
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
lineups.  On cross-examination, Campusano admitted she could 
not see Rudd when she made her in-court identification, 
explaining that “it was logical” the person who had committed 
the crime would be in the courtroom.  Defense counsel also 
elicited 
numerous 
inconsistencies 
in 
other 
aspects 
of 
Campusano’s recollection of the crime, including her statements 
as to when she had regained consciousness, the extent of her 
injuries and when she had told law enforcement that the 
perpetrator had a tattoo.   
Defense counsel’s cross-examination of the investigating 
officers explored problematic aspects of the identification 
procedures.  Officer Velasquez admitted that the first 
identification had occurred while Campusano was receiving 
treatment in the hospital.  Detective Silva admitted that during 
the second identification, he showed Campusano the same 
photograph of Rudd that Velasquez had used at the first 
identification.  Given the expert testimony and cross-
examination that occurred in this case, we find no merit in 
Rudd’s claim that he was denied the opportunity to present a 
complete defense on the issue of identity. 
Although unable to cite any California or federal authority 
that has rejected the type of certainty instruction set forth in 
CALCRIM No. 315, Rudd argues that several state courts have 
done so.  As discussed in more detail below, however, none of 
those jurisdictions rejected the instruction on due process 
grounds.  (See post, at pp. 26–29.)  Instead, each of those courts 
acted pursuant to their supervisory powers, concluding the 
instruction should be avoided or supplemented to avoid the 
possibility that jurors might wrongly assume there is generally 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
a strong correlation between certainty and accuracy.9  While an 
enhanced or modified version of the certainty instruction might 
well be advisable (an issue we examine in more detail below), 
that alone does not establish a due process violation.  (See Mills, 
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 677 [“ ‘not every ambiguity, 
inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level 
of a due process violation’ ”]; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
175, 192 [“even if . . . the trial court’s instruction created 
ambiguity, it did not infringe on defendant’s due process 
rights”]; People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 445 
(Engelman) [although instruction regarding jury misconduct 
was “inadvisable and unnecessary” because it might mislead 
jurors, the instruction did not violate any constitutional right]; 
Cupp, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 147.)  
 
9  
The few cases Rudd cites that do actually address a due 
process claim have little relevance to the instructional error 
claim he raises here.  In Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 
1, 4 and People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409–410, for 
example, the courts found a due process violation where the trial 
court’s charge to the jury had omitted an essential element of 
the crime.  In Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, the court 
found a due process violation where the trial court excluded 
evidence regarding the coercive circumstances under which the 
defendant’s confession was made.  In Estelle, supra, 502 U.S. 62, 
the court held that the admission of evidence related to the 
defendant’s uncharged criminal conduct did not violate due 
process.  Finally, in Clark v. Brown (9th Cir. 2006) 450 F.3d 898, 
908, the Ninth Circuit found a due process violation where the 
trial court had refused to instruct the jury on the defendant’s 
theory that he lacked an independent felonious intent at the 
time he started a fire, which would have precluded a conviction 
on the charged offense.  All these cases are far afield from the 
situation presented here.  
  
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
In sum, when considered “ ‘in the context of the 
instructions as a whole and the trial record’ ” (Foster, supra, 50 
Cal.4th at p. 1335, italics omitted), we conclude that listing the 
witness’s level of certainty as one of 15 factors the jury should 
consider when evaluating an eyewitness identification did not 
render Rudd’s trial fundamentally unfair or otherwise amount 
to a due process violation. 
B. Reevaluation of CALCRIM No. 315’s 
Instruction on Witness Certainty  
Amici curiae argue that even if CALCRIM No. 315’s 
instruction on witness certainty does not amount to a due 
process violation, we should utilize our supervisory powers to 
either “strike the certainty factor” or direct trial courts to 
provide an “enhanced jury charge” summarizing the empirical 
research regarding the correlation between certainty and 
accuracy. 
The Attorney General acknowledges that the absence of a 
due process violation “does not necessarily mean that a better 
instruction could not be devised” and that courts should 
“periodically examine procedures relating to eyewitness 
identification, to see whether they can be improved.”  The 
Attorney General contends, however, that “the appropriate way 
forward” for any such changes “is through the procedure 
prescribed by the Rules of Court:  making suggestions to the 
committee that advises the Judicial Council as to instructional 
‘improve[ments],’ and circulating proposed changes for ‘public 
comment.’  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(d).)” 
Several jurisdictions have concluded that the type of 
witness certainty instruction at issue in this case is potentially 
misleading and can be improved upon.  The Supreme Court of 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
New Jersey and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
both modified their instructions on witness certainty after 
having convened special proceedings to assess the scientific 
evidence regarding eyewitness identifications.  (See Henderson, 
supra, 27 A.3d 872 [implementing recommendations of a special 
master appointed to investigate empirical research on 
eyewitness identification evidence]; Gomes, supra, 22 N.E.3d 
897 [implementing recommendations of a study group appointed 
to investigate identification procedures].)  Both courts concluded 
that, contrary to common belief, empirical research has 
consistently shown that “ ‘under most circumstances, witness 
confidence or certainty is not a good indicator of identification 
accuracy.’ ”  (Gomes, at p. 912; see Henderson, at p. 899 
[“eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable indicator of 
accuracy”].)  The courts further found, however, that the 
correlation is stronger under some circumstances — most 
notably when the witness expressed high confidence at the 
initial identification and law enforcement utilized proper lineup 
procedures.  (See Gomes, at p. 912; Henderson, at p. 899.) 
In light of those findings, both courts elected to 
incorporate aspects of the scientific research into their model 
instructions on an eyewitness’s level of certainty.10  Rather than 
 
10  
Both courts also adopted substantial modifications to 
other factors listed in  their eyewitness testimony instructions, 
including, 
for 
example, 
whether 
the 
witness 
received 
information that may have influenced his or her recollection, 
whether the witness and suspect were of different races and 
whether the witness was under stress at the time he or she 
observed the event.  (See Gomes, supra, 22 N.E.3d at pp. 911–
918; Henderson, supra, 27 A.3d at pp. 925–926.)  In this case, 
 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
merely telling the jury to consider a witness’s level of certainty, 
the section of New Jersey’s model instruction on eyewitness 
identification addressing witness confidence now provides:  
“Confidence and Accuracy:  You heard testimony that (insert 
name of witness) made a statement at the time he/she identified 
the defendant . . . concerning his/her level of certainty that the 
person/photograph he/she selected is in fact the person who 
committed the crime. . . . [A] witness’s level of confidence, 
standing alone, may not be an indication of the reliability of the 
identification.  Although some research has found that highly 
confident witnesses are more likely to make accurate 
identifications, eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable 
indicator of accuracy.”  (New Jersey Courts, Model Criminal 
Jury Charges, Identification: In-Court and Out-of-Court 
Identifications (May 18, 2020) p. 8; see id. at p. 3, fns. omitted.)  
The section of Massachusetts’s model instruction that addresses 
witness certainty, in contrast, directs the jury as follows:  
“Expressed certainty.  You may consider a witness’s 
identification even where the witness is not free from doubt 
regarding its accuracy.  But you also should consider that an 
eyewitness’s expressed certainty in an identification, standing 
alone, may not be a reliable indicator of the accuracy of the 
identification, especially where the witness did not describe that 
level 
of 
certainty 
when 
the 
witness 
first 
made 
the 
identification.”  (See Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal 
Practice Jury Instructions (Mass.Cont.Legal Ed. 3d ed. 2018) § 
 
however, we have only been asked to consider CALCRIM No. 
315’s language relating to the certainty factor.  
 
 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
29 
6.2; Commonwealth v. German (Mass. 2019) 134 N.E.3d 542, 
555; Gomes, supra, 22 N.E.3d at p. 923.)11 
The high courts of Kansas and Georgia have taken a 
different approach, directing their trial courts to refrain from 
instructing on witness certainty altogether.  (See State v. 
Mitchell (Kan. 2012) 275 P.3d 905, 912 (Mitchell) [instruction 
“encourages jurors to give more weight to identifications by a 
certain witness than an uncertain one and does nothing to 
inform the jury that certainty evidence may be unreliable”]; 
Brodes v. State (Ga. 2005) 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 [“In light of the 
scientifically-documented 
lack 
of 
correlation 
between 
a 
witness’s certainty in his or her identification . . . and the 
accuracy of that identification, . . . we can no longer endorse an 
instruction authorizing jurors to consider the witness’s certainty 
in his/her identification as a factor to be used in deciding the 
reliability of that identification”].)12   
 
11  
As Rudd notes in his briefing, the model instructions of 
other states include language that “alerts jurors to the 
possibility that certainty does not correlate with accuracy.”  
(See, e.g., Model Utah Jury Instructions (2d ed. 2014) No. CR 
404 [“A witness’s level of confidence in (his) (her) identification 
of the perpetrator is one of many factors that you may consider 
in evaluating whether the witness correctly identified the 
perpetrator.  However, a witness who is confident that (he) (she) 
correctly identified the perpetrator may be mistaken”]; State v. 
Hansley (Me. 2019) 203 A.3d 827, 831 [approving instruction 
directing that “there may not be a correlation between the 
reliability of an eye witness identification and the amount of 
certainty 
expressed 
by 
the 
witness 
in 
making 
that 
identification”].)     
12  
While not directly addressing the question of jury 
instructions, other state courts have rejected witness certainty 
 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
30 
Consistent with the findings of those jurisdictions, the 
California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice13 
has recommended that the state judiciary reevaluate how juries 
are instructed on eyewitness testimony “in light of current 
scientific research regarding . . . the relevance of the degree of  
 
as an appropriate factor to consider when assessing the 
admissibility of eyewitness testimony.  (See Lawson, supra, 291 
P.3d at pp. 745, 759, 777–778; Young v. State (Alaska 2016) 374 
P.3d 395, 426–427; State v. Guzman (Utah 2006) 133 P.3d 363, 
366.)  Numerous federal courts have also acknowledged that 
empirical research has “undercut[] the hypothesis that there is 
a strong correlation between certainty and accuracy.”  (Haliym 
v. Mitchell (6th Cir. 2007) 492 F.3d 680, 705, fn. 15; see U.S. v. 
Greene (4th Cir. 2013) 704 F.3d 298, 309, fn. 4 [“We observe 
that . . . (witness certainty) . . . has come under withering attack 
as not relevant to the reliability analysis”]; Young v. Conway (2d 
Cir. 2012) 698 F.3d 69, 88–89; U.S. v. Bartlett (7th Cir. 2009) 
567 F.3d 901, 906; U.S. v. Brownlee (3d Cir. 2006) 454 F.3d 131, 
142–144.) 
13  
The California Legislature established the California 
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice to “study and 
review the administration of criminal justice in California to 
determine the extent to which that process has failed in the past, 
resulting in wrongful executions or the wrongful conviction of 
innocent persons”; “[t]o examine ways of providing safeguards 
and making improvements in the way the criminal justice 
system functions”; and “[t]o make any recommendations and 
proposals designed to further ensure that the application and 
administration of criminal justice in California is just, fair, and 
accurate[.]”  (Sen. Res. No. 44 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.).) 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
31 
certainty expressed by witnesses in court.”  (California 
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, Final Report 
(Jun. 30, 2008) at p. 11.)14  The commission has explained that 
the current model instruction — presumably a reference to 
CALCRIM No. 315 — “offers no guidance as to the potential 
significance, if any” (Final Report, at p. 32) of a witness’s 
expression of confidence and noted that several other 
jurisdictions have disapproved similar instructions.  The 
commission has recommended that the Judicial Council’s 
Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury instruction look further 
into the issue.  (Id. at p. 32.)  To date, however, our judiciary has 
taken 
no 
action 
in 
response 
to 
the 
commission’s 
recommendation.  
Although our Legislature has not expressed any views 
regarding how jurors should be instructed on eyewitness 
testimony,15 it has taken other actions in response to the large 
 
14  
Available at 
 (as of May 17, 2021). All Internet 
citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket 
number, and case name at 
.  
15  
In other circumstances, our Legislature has mandated the 
use of jury instructions to combat traditional assumptions that 
have been discredited by empirical research.  (See People v. 
Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 315 [statute mandating jury 
instruction that child testimony cannot be discounted based 
solely on the ground of youth was adopted in response to 
empirical 
studies that 
undermined 
“traditional 
notions 
regarding the unreliability of child witnesses”]; People v. Catley 
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 500, 507 [statute mandating instruction 
that juries cannot discount testimony based solely on a witness’s 
disability was adopted to combat “ ‘ “ ‘traditional assumptions’ ” 
[that] may previously have biased the factfinding process’ ”].)  
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
32 
body of research exploring how certain variables can affect the 
accuracy of an identification.  Senate Bill 923, which went into 
effect on January 1, 2020, requires law enforcement agencies to 
adopt regulations mandating the use of specified procedures 
when administering “photo lineups and live lineups with 
eyewitnesses.”  (§ 859.7, subd. (a); Stats. 2018, ch. 977, § 2.)  The 
accompanying legislative findings explain that these newly 
mandated “best practices” are derived from a “large body of peer-
reviewed research . . . demonstrat[ing] that simple systematic 
changes in the administration of eyewitness identification 
procedures by law enforcement agencies can greatly improve the 
accuracy of identifications.”  (Stats. 2018, ch. 977, § 1, subd. (d).)  
The mandated procedures include, among other things, blind 
administration of the lineup and obtaining a statement 
regarding the witness’s level of confidence at the time of the 
identification.  (See § 859.7.)16  These new requirements suggest 
the Legislature has accepted empirical findings that:  (1) an 
 
16  
Rudd argues that several of the procedures Officer 
Velasquez and Detective Silva used during the photographic 
lineups, such as Silva’s use of the same image of Rudd that 
Campusano had selected during the first photographic lineup 
(see ante, at p. 5), conflict with the procedures mandated under 
section 859.7.  (See, e.g., § 859.7, subd. (a)(2), (3) [requiring blind 
administration or written explanation why blind administration 
was not utilized], (9) [“Nothing shall be said to the eyewitness 
that might influence the eyewitness’ identification of the person 
suspected as the perpetrator”], (10)(A) [if the witness identifies 
a suspected perpetrator, “[t]he investigator shall immediately 
inquire as to the eyewitness’ confidence level in the accuracy of 
the identification and record in writing, verbatim, what the 
eyewitness says”], (11) [“An electronic recording shall be 
made . . . of the identification procedures”].)  He acknowledges, 
however, that section 859.7 was not yet in effect when the 
officers conducted their investigation.   
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
33 
expression of certainty is less likely to be a reliable indicator of 
accuracy if the witness failed to express certainty at the initial 
identification; and (2) suggestive lineup procedures can have a 
substantial effect on the accuracy of an identification.   
Although CALCRIM No. 315’s instruction on witness 
certainty did not violate Rudd’s due process rights (see ante, at 
pp. 13–26), we now join other jurisdictions (and the California 
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice) in 
acknowledging that this form of instruction has the potential to 
mislead jurors.  There is near unanimity in the empirical 
research that “ ‘under most circumstances, witness confidence 
or certainty is not a good indicator of identification accuracy.’ ”  
(Gomes, supra, 22 N.E.3d at p. 912; see Henderson, supra, 27 
A.3d at p. 899; Guilbert, 49 A.3d at p. 721; State v. Cabagbag 
(Hawaii 2012) 277 P.3d 1027, 1036.)  The research has also 
consistently shown that “jurors . . . tend to overvalue the effect 
of . . . certainty . . . in determining the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications.”  (Lawson, supra, 291 P.3d at p. 705; see Gomes, 
at p. 913 [“it is necessary to inform a jury about th[e] tenuous 
relationship [between certainty and accuracy] because there is 
a near consensus that jurors tend to give more weight to a 
witness’s 
certainty 
in 
evaluating 
the 
accuracy 
of 
an 
identification than is warranted by the research”].)  Indeed, 
many studies have “show[n] that eyewitness confidence is the 
single most influential factor in juror determinations regarding 
the accuracy of an eyewitness identification.”  (Lawson, at p. 705 
[citing studies]; see Wells & Bradfield, “Good You Identified the 
Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the 
Witnessing Experience (1998) 83 J. Applied Psychol. 360, 361.)          
Although the language in CALCRIM No. 315 does not 
state that a certain identification is more likely to be accurate, 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
34 
the instruction does nothing to disabuse jurors of the common 
misconception that such a correlation exists.  Indeed, merely 
directing the jury to consider a witness’s level of certainty, 
without any further caveats, effectively operates to reinforce 
that misconception.  (See Mitchell, supra, 275 P.3d at pp. 912–
913 [language “encourages jurors to give more weight to 
identifications by a certain witness” and “prompts the jury to 
conclude that an eyewitness identification is more reliable when 
the witness expresses greater certainty”].)  That raises 
particular concerns in a case like this one, where the conviction 
was based almost entirely on the testimony of a single witness 
who expressed certainty in her identification and had no prior 
relationship with the defendant.  (See McDonald, supra, 37 
Cal.3d at p. 363 [“ ‘Centuries of experience in the administration 
of criminal justice have shown that convictions based solely on 
testimony that identifies a defendant previously unknown to the 
witness is highly suspect’ ”]; Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 462 
[“[a]ny reexamination of our previous holdings [regarding the 
witness certainty instruction] . . . should await a case involving 
only certain identifications”].)  
The risk of juror confusion is heightened by the structure 
of CALCRIM No. 315, which lists witness certainty among 
numerous other factors the jury should consider when assessing 
the eyewitness testimony.  As written, the instruction implies 
that each of these factors have a direct, linear bearing on 
accuracy.  For instance, “How well could the witness see the 
perpetrator” implicitly prompts the jury to believe that if the 
witness could see the perpetrator well, the identification should 
be given more weight, and vice versa; “How closely was the 
witness paying attention,” “Was the witness under stress when 
he or she made the observation,” “Did the witness ever fail to 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
35 
identify the defendants,” all do the same.  Hearing the certainty 
instruction in this context increases the risk that the jury will 
infer certainty operates the same way — as having some direct 
relationship with the accuracy of the identification. 
Having acknowledged the current version of the 
instruction might confuse jurors about the relationship between 
confidence and accuracy, that leaves the difficult question of 
determining what information trial courts should provide to the 
jury about witness certainty.  While there is general agreement 
that witness certainty is not a good indicator of accuracy under 
most circumstances, that “does not mean that eyewitness 
certainty is never correlated with accuracy.”  (Gomes, supra, 22 
N.E.3d at p. 912.)  Rather, as Justice Liu explained in his 
concurring opinion in Sánchez, 63 Cal.4th 411, the research 
suggests that “ ‘the strength of the confidence-accuracy 
relationship varies, as it depends on complex interactions 
among [numerous] factors.’ ”  (Id. at p. 497 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.), 
quoting Nat. Research Council, Identifying the Culprit: 
Assessing Eyewitness Identification (2014) p. 108; see also 
Gomes, supra, 22 N.E.3d at p. 912 [“the existence and strength 
of the correlation depends on the circumstances”].)       
The large body of research conducted in this area has 
identified numerous factors that can affect the correlation 
between witness certainty and accuracy including (among other 
things):  (1) whether the confidence statement occurred before 
or after the identification; (2) the temporal proximity between 
the event and the identification; (3) whether the witness 
provided an expression of certainty at the initial identification; 
(4) whether the witness was highly confident; (5) the use of 
suggestive identification procedures; and (6) information 
witnesses receive after the identification that might increase 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
36 
their level of confidence.  (See Gomes, supra, 22 N.E.3d at p. 912; 
Henderson, supra, 27 A.3d at pp. 896–900, 923, fn. 7; 2019 
Report of The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit Task Force on Eyewitness Identifications (2019) 92 
Temp. L.Rev. 1, 53–54, 56, 99–100 (Third Circuit Task Force 
Report); Lawson, supra, 291 P.3d at p. 695; Guilbert, supra, 49 
A.3d at pp. 722–723; ante, at pp. 8–9.)  The relevance of the last 
two factors, in turn, requires further understanding of the type 
of law enforcement conduct that may be suggestive or 
confirmatory.  (See Third Circuit Task Force, at pp. 53–55 
[discussing types of potentially confirmatory or suggestive 
conduct].) 
Even among those states that have chosen to modify their 
instructions on witness certainty, there is no consensus as to 
what specific factors merit inclusion in the charge.  New Jersey’s 
instruction, for example, notes that while “eyewitness 
confidence is generally an unreliable indicator of accuracy,” 
some research has shown that “highly confident witnesses are 
more likely to make accurate identifications . . . .”  (New Jersey 
Courts, Model Criminal Jury Charges, Identification: In-Court 
and 
Out-of-Court 
Identifications, 
supra, 
at 
p. 
8.)  
Massachusetts, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance 
of whether the witness expressed certainty at the initial 
identification.  (Gomes, supra, 22 N.E.3d at p. 923.)  
Connecticut, in contrast, has approved the use of an enhanced 
jury charge on witness certainty, but has given its trial courts 
discretion to determine the content of such an instruction on a 
case-by-case basis.  (Guilbert, supra, 49 A.3d at p. 727, fn. 27.) 
Complicating matters further, there appears to be an 
emerging dispute in the research over the efficacy of highly 
detailed instructions on eyewitness identifications.  (See State v. 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
37 
Booth-Harris (Iowa 2020) 942 N.W.2d 562, 578 [“a growing body 
of academic literature . . . questions the efficacy of certain 
provisions 
in 
such 
jury 
instructions 
on 
eyewitness 
identifications.  In fact, recent studies have shown that the more 
comprehensive jury instructions like New Jersey’s Henderson 
instruction can actually overcorrect the problem”]; State v. 
Clopten (Utah 2009) 223 P.3d 1103, 1110–1111 [citing studies 
showing that enhanced instructions “do[] little to help a jury 
spot a mistaken identification” and are “less effective than 
expert testimony”]; Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra, 92 
Temp. L.Rev. at p. 97 [task force minority view participants 
arguing that studies have found enhanced instructions “do not 
assist jurors in evaluating the evidence, but rather cause jurors 
to question all eyewitness identification testimony, thereby 
increasing 
the 
rate 
of 
acquittal 
regardless 
of 
the 
circumstances”]; Guilbert, supra, 49 A.3d at p. 726 [citing 
research finding that jury instructions are “less effective than 
expert testimony in apprising the jury of the potential 
unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony”].)   
Given the complexities described above, we agree with the 
Attorney General that the Judicial Council and its Advisory 
Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions, which is comprised 
of jurists, scholars and practitioners specializing in criminal law 
(see Cal. Rules Court, rule 10.59), are best suited to reevaluate 
whether or how CALCRIM No. 315’s instruction can be modified 
to remedy potential confusion regarding the correlation between 
certain 
and 
accuracy 
without 
“being 
unduly 
long 
or 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
38 
argumentative.”17  (Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1143; see 
Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 1041, 1053, fn. 9 [directing 
the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions to consider 
whether model instruction defining proximate causation “could 
be improved” in light of empirical research showing that the 
current wording confused a substantial portion of jurors].)  The 
goal of reevaluating the instruction should be to improve the 
jury’s ability to properly evaluate an eyewitness’s expression of 
certainty in an identification while avoiding any interference 
with the jury’s fact-finding function.  (See Cal. Rules Court, rule 
2.1050(a) [goal of “instructions is to improve the quality of jury 
decision making”]; Watson v. Damon (1880) 54 Cal. 278, 279 
[instructions of court “cannot interfere with the exclusive 
prerogative of the jury in passing upon the facts”].)  In assessing 
what modifications might be appropriate, the Judicial Council 
should remain mindful that while there is now general 
agreement in the research that witness certainty is not a good 
indicator of accuracy under most circumstances, research has 
also shown the correlation tends to be stronger when certain 
factors are present.  (See ante, pp. 27–28, 35–36.)  The Judicial 
Council should also consider research showing that highly 
detailed jury instructions may further confuse the jury or 
overcorrect the problem.  (See ante, at pp. 36–37.)18    
 
17  
Referring this issue to the Judicial Council will also 
provide the public an opportunity to weigh in on any 
amendments the Council may propose.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, 
rule 2.1050(d) [“Amendments to these instructions will be 
circulated for public comment before publication”].) 
18  
Given the complexity of the issue, the Judicial Council 
might also consider inviting its Criminal Law Advisory 
 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
39 
As we have explained, Rudd has failed to establish that 
the trial court’s decision to include the certainty factor in 
CALCRIM No. 315 violated his due process rights or otherwise 
constituted error under the circumstances presented here.  
Nonetheless, for the reasons described, we believe there is a risk 
that the current version of the instruction will prompt jurors to 
infer that an eyewitness’s certainty in an identification is 
generally a reliable indicator of accuracy.  Accordingly, in the 
exercise of our supervisory powers, we direct our trial courts to 
omit the certainty factor from CALCRIM No. 315 until the 
Judicial Council has the opportunity to consider how the 
language might be better worded to minimize juror confusion on 
this point.  (See Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 444 [finding 
no error but exercising supervisory powers to disapprove 
potentially misleading instruction regarding juror misconduct]; 
People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 861 [finding no error 
but exercising supervisory powers to disapprove “race-
conscious” jury assignment procedure]; People v. Brigham 
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 283, 292 [exercising supervisory powers to 
disapprove “inartfully drawn” jury instruction that presented 
risk of misleading jurors about the meaning of the reasonable 
doubt standard].)  Trial courts, however, retain discretion to 
include the factor when the defendant requests that it do so.19      
 
Committee and the Appellate Advisory Committee to aid in 
evaluating how jurors should be instructed on the issue of 
witness certainty.  (Cf. People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
151, 169–170, fn. 4.)   
19   
We have previously distinguished the effect of the 
certainty instruction in cases where a witness has expressed 
doubt, rather than confidence, about the accuracy of the 
 
PEOPLE v. LEMCKE  
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
40 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
identification.  (See Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 462 
[“ ‘[certainty] instruction has merit in so far as it deals with the 
testimony of a witness who expressed doubt about the accuracy 
of her identification . . . .’ ”].)  The misleading effect we are 
concerned with here — that the jury is prompted to believe there 
is a strong correlation between certainty and accuracy despite 
empirical research showing just the opposite — is not present 
when 
a 
witness 
has 
expressed 
doubt 
regarding 
the 
identification.       
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Lemcke 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)   
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 6/21/18 – 4th 
Dist., Div. 3 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S250108  
Date Filed:  May 27, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Orange    
Judge:  David A. Hoffer    
 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant Desirae Lee Lemcke. 
 
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant Charles Henry Rudd. 
 
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel, Hannah Lee, David S. Frankel, 
John M. McNulty and Aaron L. Webman for The California Innocence 
Project, The Project for the Innocent at Loyola Law School and The 
Northern California Innocence Project as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant Charles Henry Rudd. 
 
Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, Barry P. Helft, Chief Deputy 
State Public Defender, and Kathleen M. Scheidel, Assistant State 
Public Defender, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Appellant Charles Henry Rudd. 
 
 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitor 
General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General, 
Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Joshua A. Klein, Deputy 
State Solicitor General, Steve Oetting and Minh U. Le, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Jeanine Strong 
Strong Appellate Law 
316 Mid Valley Center #102 
Carmel, CA 93923 
(831) 277-3904 
 
Aaron Webman 
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 
1177 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036 
(212) 715-9100 
 
Joshua A. Klein, 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
1515 Clay St., Suite 2000 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(510) 879-0756