Title: Le Maistre v. Baker

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

105 So. 2d 867 (1958)
George A. LE MAISTRE, as Executor, et al.
v.
Emma Jane Alsup BAKER.
6 Div. 238.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 16, 1958.
*868 LeMaistre, Clement & Gewin and Perry Hubbard, Tuscaloosa, for appellants.
E. D. McDuffie and Norma Holcombe, Tuscaloosa, for appellee.
SIMPSON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a decree in equity declaring that the following recitals in a former decree constituted alimony in gross and survived the death of H. Powell Baker, against whom the decree was rendered, wherein he was divorced from his former wife. The divorce decree recites:
Mr. Baker, having died, his divorced wife, appellee Emma Jane Alsup Baker, instituted the proceeding to determine the meaning of said alimony decree and claims that the above quoted provision awarded her alimony in gross. Appellants contend to the contrary and assert that when H. Powell Baker died no further alimony was due. Demurrer to the petition of Mrs. Baker was overruled and the trial court proceeded to a hearing on the evidence and entered the decree from which this appeal is taken, holding that the provision in the paragraph above quoted was a provision for alimony in gross awarded to respondent Mrs. Baker and survived the death of her former husband, H. Powell Baker, and was a charge upon his estate.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether the legal effect of the alimony decree quoted above provided for alimony in gross to be paid monthly to the respondent until she died or remarried survived the death of her former husband, or did the provision for $300 per month alimony terminate at Mr. Baker's death.
It is, of course, well settled that courts of equity have the power to extend payments of alimony beyond the death of the husband. This power has been exercised when the decree by which the alimony was awarded provided for alimony in gross. Justice Somerville observed in Smith v. Rogers, 215 Ala. 581, 112 So. 190, 192:
The Court in that case further held that the fact that the decree allows the award in gross to be paid in installments does not change its nature or effect as alimony in gross. It is to be noted, however, that a distinction was made between alimony in gross and mere periodic allowances for current and continuous support. Concerning such periodic payments for an indefinite period, Justice Somerville wrote:
The full statement of the rule, thus left open for decision in Smith v. Rogers, was finally brought to issue and declared in Borton v. Borton, 230 Ala. 630, 162 So. 529, 530, 101 A.L.R. 320, where Justice Bouldin, speaking for the Court, made the following pertinent concise comment:
The Court went on to hold in the Borton case that the provision in the divorce decree for a monthly allowance payable expressly for future maintenance and support did not charge the estate with those payments, but that "it ended upon the death of the husband, the event upon which the obligation of support would have ended had there been no divorce."
The rule so established in Borton v. Borton was later applied in the case of Cox v. Dodd, 242 Ala. 37, 4 So. 2d 736, and must now be regarded as settled.
As stated, the trial court in the instant case ruled that the decree of divorce which he had rendered almost three years previously, in which there was the foregoing quoted provision, was in fact an award of alimony in gross and that, as such, the obligation of H. Powell Baker to pay to Emma Baker the amount as provided therein survived his death and became a charge against the estate. Although this conclusion was stated as a finding of fact, it is manifest that it was in reality an exercise of judgment on a question of law and is therefore subject to review.
From our authorities it appears that for an award in a divorce decree to qualify as alimony in gross it must meet and satisfy two requirements. First, both the amount and time of payment must be certain. Williams v. Williams, 261 Ala. 328, 74 So. 2d 582; Epps v. Epps, 218 Ala. 667, 120 So. 150; 18A Words and Phrases, Gross Alimony, p. 477, and Pocket Part. Second, the right to it must be vested and not subject to modification. Williams v. Williams, supra; Epps v. Epps, supra; Smith v. Rogers, supra; 18A Words and Phrases, Gross Alimony, p. 477, and Pocket Part.
*870 In no sense can it be said that the alimony provision considered here was either certain in amount or time of payment. True, the amount was set at $300 per month, but the full amount to be eventually paid depended upon the duration of the payments, which was limited in time only by the death or remarriage of the appellee. Such a limitation cannot be termed certain with respect to a particular time.
The provision before us also fails to meet the second test. The decree is absolutely devoid of any indication that it is based upon any agreement of the parties, such as for a division of property or settlement of marital rights. Neither does it show that the trial court considered property rights, or that he tried to make an appraisal of the present value of the wife's future support, in making up the decree. Nor was there any evidence before him upon consideration of the original bill for divorce relative to the estate of H. Powell Baker or germane to making a division of property by an award of alimony in gross. It seems clear that this provision did not effectuate a vested right, but merely provided a periodic allowance for current and continuous support. Furthermore, it would be a strained construction of the decree which would lead this Court to say that the alimony given was not subject to modification.
We said in Colton v. Colton, 252 Ala. 442, 41 So.2d 398:
It is to be noted that the phrase, "as alimony", is used in the decree to describe the award being made. But as pointed out by the appellants in their brief, citing Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897, the word alimony comes from the Latin alimonia, meaning "sustenance", and, as applicable here, the sustenance or support of the wife by her divorced husband. "It stems from the common-law right of the wife to support by her husband, which right, unless the wife by her own misconduct forfeits it, continues to exist even after they cease to live together. Alimony has as its sole object the support of the wife, and is not to be considered a property settlement upon a dissolution of the marriage." (Emphasis supplied.) Eaton v. Davis, supra.
Therefore, the appellant's argument is strengthened by the very words of the decree itself, which, by its own terms, indicates that it was intended only to provide for the wife's support.
The intent to award alimony in gross, binding upon the estate of a deceased husband, should be unequivocally expressed or necessarily inferred from the language used, rather than extracted from phrases suggesting dubiety. Gouthro v. Winstanley, 145 Cal. App. 2d 367, 302 P.2d 450.
It is, therefore, our opinion that the learned trial court was in error. The obligation of H. Powell Baker to pay the periodic payments to the petitioner ceased at his death and did not become a charge against his estate, and a decree will be here rendered accordingly.
Reversed and rendered.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and GOODWYN and COLEMAN, JJ., concur.