Title: Commonwealth v. Snyder

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-09203 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ERIC SNYDER. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     May 6, 2016. - September 8, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Cordy, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Expert opinion, Identification, Relevancy 
and materiality.  Witness, Expert.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Sentence, Execution of sentence. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 8, 2000. 
 
 
The case was tried before Robert A. Mulligan, J. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan (Victoria L. Nadel & Roger Witkin with 
him) for the defendant. 
 
Stephanie Martin Glennon, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In March, 2003, the defendant was convicted by a 
Superior Court jury of murder in the first degree, on a theory 
of deliberate premeditation, in the 1994 shooting death of 
                     
 
1 Justices Cordy and Duffly participated in the deliberation 
on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
Joseph O'Reilly in Quincy.  On direct appeal from that 
conviction, the defendant argues that the judge erred in not 
allowing the admission of testimony by an expert on eyewitness 
identification, and in allowing the admission of testimony 
concerning a stocking cap with eye holes that was seized from a 
vehicle the defendant was driving several months after the 
shooting.  The defendant also seeks relief under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and asks that his sentence be revised to run concurrently 
with an unrelated Federal sentence he was serving at the time of 
his conviction.  Having reviewed the record, we affirm the 
conviction and discern no reason to exercise our authority to 
grant extraordinary relief.2  Because the defendant's motion to 
revise and revoke his sentence was timely filed on the day of 
sentencing, but has not been acted upon, we remand the matter to 
the Superior Court for consideration of his pending motion. 
 
Facts.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving certain details for later discussion.  At 
approximately 6:45 P.M. on September 29, 1994, Joseph O'Reilly 
was shot to death outside his girl friend's apartment on Quincy 
                     
 
2 Ordinarily our review of the record pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, would include a review of all trial exhibits.  
Despite exhaustive search efforts by the Superior Court clerk's 
office in Norfolk County, however, the exhibits from the trial 
in this case cannot be located.  The exhibits listed and 
described in the trial transcript do not seem pertinent to the 
issues raised at oral argument or in the briefs.  Of necessity, 
we confine our review to the record before us. 
3 
 
 
Shore Drive in Quincy.  Police quickly responded to the scene.  
The victim's girl friend, Patricia Licciardi, reported hearing 
someone yell, "Hey, O'Reilly, we got you now," followed by four 
to five gunshots.  One of Licciardi's neighbors informed police 
that she had seen two white males in their twenties or early 
thirties in flight immediately after the shooting. 
 
Initial efforts by police to locate the attackers were 
unsuccessful, but interviews with area residents indicated that 
two white males had spent the later afternoon in the vicinity of 
the Neponset River Bridge, which overlooked Licciardi's 
apartment.3  A police dog tracked a scent from the scene of the 
shooting to the bridge.  The dog also alerted to a strong scent 
in the yard outside Licciardi's apartment, indicating that at 
least one person had been standing there for an extended period. 
                     
 
3 Quincy Shore Drive meets the Neponset River Bridge, 
passing over Commander Shea Boulevard.  A set of stairs leads 
from Commander Shea Boulevard up to the bridge.  One witness 
reported seeing a man crouched down on those stairs, making eye 
contact with another man across Quincy Shore Drive, at 
approximately 5:30 P.M. on the day of the shooting.  Another 
witness recalled seeing two men standing at the top of the 
stairs at 6 P.M.  That individual had never seen anyone else use 
the stairs, despite having lived in the area for thirty years.  
A third individual similarly described that she had been 
"throw[n] . . . off" by seeing two men talking with each other 
near the stairs at approximately 6 P.M.  Patricia Licciardi's 
landlord also observed two men standing on the bridge at 
approximately 6 P.M., looking towards Licciardi's apartment.  
One of Licciardi's neighbors reported seeing two men walking in 
the direction of Licciardi's apartment at approximately 6:15 
P.M.  She had seen one of the men nearby earlier in the 
afternoon, between 4 P.M. and 4:30 P.M. 
4 
 
 
 
From early in the investigation, police suspected the 
defendant of involvement in the shooting, because of a 
contentious history with the victim.  Before being incarcerated 
in 1988, the victim had been involved romantically with a woman 
named Lisa Dinsmore, with whom he had a son.4  In 1990, while the 
victim was in prison, the defendant -- then on parole -- began 
dating Dinsmore, and lived intermittently with her and her 
children, including the victim's son.  Beginning in 1990 and 
continuing at least through 1992, the victim undertook extreme 
measures to interfere with the defendant's relationship with 
Dinsmore and also with the victim's son.5  As a result of the 
victim's efforts, by June, 1991, the defendant was required to 
                     
 
4 Lisa Dinsmore married and changed her name prior to the 
defendant's trial. 
 
 
5 Even before the defendant began living with Dinsmore, the 
victim had been writing her threatening letters.  After the 
defendant moved in with Dinsmore, however, the victim started 
sending her one to two threatening letters per day.  In one of 
those letters, the victim drew pictures of Dinsmore's children, 
dead.  Beginning approximately in 1990, the victim also sent 
multiple letters to Dinsmore's brother.  After opening the first 
of those letters and discovering that it contained threats 
directed against Dinsmore and the defendant, Dinsmore's brother 
marked additional letters "return to sender" without opening 
them.  In 1990 or 1991, the victim falsely reported to police a 
break-in at Dinsmore's apartment while the defendant was at 
home, apparently in order to jeopardize the defendant's parole 
status.  At some point, the victim also informed the Department 
of Social Services that the defendant had molested his son.  In 
July and August, 1991, the victim contacted two different parole 
officers to report that the defendant had violated the terms of 
his parole.  By early 1992, the victim also had sent the 
defendant a forged medical document indicating that the 
defendant had tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus. 
5 
 
 
move out of Dinsmore's apartment as a condition of his parole.6  
In May, 1992, the victim wrote a letter to the defendant's half-
brother, David Piscatelli, in which he threatened to kill the 
defendant, Piscatelli, other members of the defendant's family, 
and Dinsmore.  In response to that letter, both the defendant 
and Piscatelli sought criminal complaints against the victim.  
At some point in 1992, the victim's mother accused the defendant 
of stalking her, and the defendant's parole was revoked.  The 
victim then arranged to have his mother send the defendant 
contraband in prison, in an effort to complicate the defendant's 
efforts at having his parole reinstated. 
 
The defendant described the victim as a "puke rat," and 
expressed to Dinsmore that he would "like to kill him."  After 
the prison contraband incident, the defendant told Arnold Emma, 
an inmate with whom he was acquainted, that he would "take care 
of" his issues with the victim.  The victim apparently 
anticipated some form of retaliation:  upon his release from 
prison,7 the victim kept several firearms in Licciardi's 
                     
 
6 Evidence that the defendant was on parole and the victim 
was trying to put him back in jail was introduced by the 
Commonwealth in support of its theory of the defendant's motive 
to kill the victim.  The judge gave a limiting instruction on 
the use of this testimony.  As part of that instruction, the 
jury were told not to consider the defendant's criminal record 
as indicative of a propensity to commit the offense charged. 
 
 
7 The defendant was released from prison prior to the 
victim's release. 
6 
 
 
apartment, ostensibly for protection from the defendant.8  The 
victim also went regularly to the windows of the apartment to 
see if the defendant was hiding nearby.  At the time of his 
death, the victim was carrying documents related to the criminal 
complaints that the defendant and Piscatelli had filed against 
him. 
 
Other evidence indicated that the defendant followed 
through on his expressed interest in killing the victim.  The 
day after the shooting, William Petras, who worked at a dry 
cleaning store across the street from Licciardi's apartment, 
identified the defendant from an array of fifty photographs.  
According to Petras, the defendant had stopped by the store and 
asked to use the telephone at approximately 1:30 P.M. on the day 
of the shooting.  In addition, Emma eventually implicated the 
defendant more directly in the shooting.9  According to Emma, 
while incarcerated for an unrelated conviction in April, 1995, 
                     
 
8 Investigators determined that the victim's firearms were 
not used in the shooting. 
 
 
9 Arnold Emma first provided information about the 
defendant's role in the shooting to a State police trooper after 
Emma had been released from prison in 1995, and had been 
arrested again on a new charge.  Although Emma hoped to obtain a 
reduced bail in exchange for the information, at trial he denied 
actually receiving any promise, reward, or inducement.  The 
prosecutor who prosecuted Emma on the new charge was unaware 
that Emma had provided any information to police. 
7 
 
 
the defendant had gloated to him about killing the victim.10  The 
defendant explained that he had had to kill the victim so that 
the victim did not kill him first. 
 
Prior proceedings.  On February 8, 2000, a Norfolk County 
grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with 
murder in the first degree.  See G. L. c. 265, § 1.  Although a 
warrant issued the same day, at that time the defendant was 
incarcerated in a Federal prison in Pennsylvania as a result of 
a conviction on a Federal firearms charge.11  In March, 2002, an 
interstate detainer agreement finally issued authorizing the 
defendant's transfer to Massachusetts for trial.  Before trial, 
the judge allowed the defendant's motion for funds to obtain an 
eyewitness identification expert.  The defendant then filed 
                     
 
10 Emma explained that the defendant told him that he had 
learned where the victim lived, and visited the area several 
times to plan his attack.  The defendant added that the place 
was hard to access, and required climbing over a wall to get in 
and out safely.  When he and an unidentified associate went to 
"do" the victim, they parked nearby and hid behind a set of 
bushes.  After the victim pulled into the driveway, they came 
out of hiding, wearing ski masks.  The defendant shouted, 
"Payback," and started shooting.  He and his associate then fled 
the scene. 
 
 
11 The defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 
for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and 
ultimately was sentenced as an armed career criminal, pursuant 
to Federal sentencing guidelines, to twenty-two years in prison.  
See United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2000), 
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1057 (2001).  The defendant was found 
with the firearm and ammunition at issue in the Federal case 
several months after the victim had been killed.  That firearm 
was determined not to be the weapon used to shoot the victim.  
See note 26, infra. 
8 
 
 
several additional motions, including a motion in limine to 
allow testimony from an eyewitness identification expert, and a 
motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding the expert's 
qualifications; both of those motions were denied.  Trial 
commenced in February, 2003.12 
 
The defendant's theory of the case was one of mistaken 
identity.  The defense cross-examined Petras and Emma 
extensively, and called an alibi witness who testified that the 
defendant had been at a dog racing track in Raynham at the time 
of the shooting.  The defendant filed motions for required 
findings of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case 
and at the close of all the evidence; the motions were denied.  
On March 10, 2003, after deliberating for three days, the jury 
found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on a 
theory of deliberate premeditation.  He was sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole, to run from and after 
his Federal sentence.13 
                     
 
12 Before trial, the defendant waived his speedy trial 
rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, St. 1965, 
c. 892, § 1, art. IV (c).  On appeal, the defendant does not 
assert that any of his speedy trial rights were violated, and, 
on the record before us, we discern no grounds for relief on 
that basis pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
13 Although the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal in 
March, 2003, inexcusable delay on the part of the defendant's 
appellate counsel led this court on September 18, 2015, to order 
him replaced by an attorney to be assigned by the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services.  The order noted that "any motion for a 
9 
 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Eyewitness identification expert.  Before 
trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to allow expert 
testimony by Dr. Steven D. Penrod, an eyewitness identification 
expert, as well as a motion for an evidentiary hearing pursuant 
to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-595 
(1993), and Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994), to 
establish the scientific validity of Penrod's opinion.14  The 
judge denied both motions on the day of the hearing on the 
motions, with minimal explanation.15 
 
At trial, Petras testified regarding his identification of 
the defendant from the photographic array.  Another witness, 
                                                                  
new trial that is filed before this direct appeal is decided 
will be considered after the direct appeal."  Replacement 
counsel filed the defendant's brief in January, 2016, and oral 
argument was heard in May, 2016. 
 
 
14 Juries today are instructed extensively regarding the 
limitations of eyewitness identifications.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 376-377 (2015).  Such instruction, 
however, was not required at the time of the defendant's trial.  
See id. at 376 ("We intend the new instruction to have no 
retroactive application").  See also Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
378 Mass. 296, 310-311 (Appendix) (1979) (eyewitness 
identification instructions in effect at time of defendant's 
trial). 
 
 
15 At the hearing on the motions, defense counsel argued, 
"[I]f the Court is not inclined to hear Dr. Penrod today -- if 
the Court's inclination today is not to allow for Dr. Penrod to 
testify at trial, then the defendant would certainly argue for 
and I have a written motion for requesting a [Daubert] hearing 
in order to qualify him as an expert and discuss the issue 
without a jury."  The judge replied, "Fine.  Motion for expert 
on eyewitness identification and the reliability of eyewitness 
identification is denied."  The motion for an evidentiary 
hearing was denied the same day, in a one-word written order. 
10 
 
 
Carol O'Mahony, also identified the defendant, for the first 
time, in the court room.  When interviewed by police on 
September 31, 1994, O'Mahony told police she had seen two men in 
the vicinity of the Neponset River Bridge on the day of the 
shooting.  She was shown the same photographic array that had 
been shown to Petras, but she did not recognize any of the men 
depicted.16  On direct examination, O'Mahony testified that she 
did not see either of the men in the court room that she had 
seen on the day of the shooting.17  On cross-examination, 
however, she identified the defendant as one of those men.  
After this testimony, the defendant renewed his motion in limine 
to allow Penrod to testify as an eyewitness identification 
expert, without success. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge erred in not allowing 
Penrod to testify.  As has become increasingly clear, "common 
sense is not enough to accurately discern the reliable 
eyewitness identification from the unreliable."  Commonwealth v. 
Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 366 (2015).  Expert testimony may be an 
                     
 
16 Carol O'Mahony selected photographs of men she thought 
had a similar complexion to the complexion of one of the men she 
had seen, but did not make a specific identification.  She told 
police that she thought she would be able to identify the man if 
she saw him in person. 
 
 
17 See Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 266 (2014) 
(requiring Commonwealth on prospective basis to move in limine 
to allow in-court identification testimony by eyewitness who 
"has not made an unequivocal positive identification of the 
defendant before trial"). 
11 
 
 
important means of explaining counterintuitive principles 
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications, or of 
challenging such principles.  See id. at 365-366.18  Eyewitness 
identification expert testimony also may be an important means 
of explaining how other variables relevant in a particular case 
can affect the reliability of the identification at issue.  See 
id. at 378.  Nonetheless, there are some circumstances in which 
such testimony permissibly can be excluded.  See Commonwealth v. 
Watson, 455 Mass. 246, 257 (2009) (admission of eyewitness 
identification expert testimony "is not admissible as of right, 
but is left to the discretion of the trial judge").  A judge 
must consider whether "the tests and circumstances" on which the 
expert's opinion rests "provide a basis for concluding that the 
opinion is reliable."  Commonwealth v. Santoli, 424 Mass. 837, 
844 (1997), and cases cited.  In addition, "the offered opinion 
must be relevant to the circumstances of the witness's 
identification."  Commonwealth v. Santoli, supra.  Furthermore, 
"the judge must conclude that the subject of the opinion is one 
on which jurors need assistance and can be helped, and will not 
be confused or misled, by the expert's testimony."  Id. 
                     
 
18 See also Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness 
Evidence:  Report and Recommendations to the Justices (July 25, 
2013), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness-
evidence-report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/WY4M-YNZN]. 
12 
 
 
 
In reviewing the judge's assessment for abuse of 
discretion, see Commonwealth v. Watson, supra, we consider 
whether the judge made a "clear error of judgment in weighing" 
the relevant factors "such that the decision falls outside the 
range of reasonable alternatives" (citation omitted).  See L.L. 
v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014), and cases 
cited.  The parties do not dispute that Penrod's opinions 
regarding eyewitness identifications were grounded in reliable 
scientific evidence.  Nonetheless, the judge reasonably could 
have determined that Penrod's opinions were not relevant to the 
circumstances of the identifications at issue, and would not aid 
the jury. 
 
The motion in limine indicated that Penrod's testimony 
would aid the jury in assessing the reliability of Petras's 
identification of the defendant from the photographic array19 by 
describing "factors affecting eyewitness identification 
including, but not limited to, the relationship between the 
passage of time and the recall of the event, the effect of post-
identification events on memory, misidentification problems 
associated with photo spreads and photo arrays, including subtle 
cues and hints by the administrator(s), and how the confidence 
the identifier feels influences jury perception, even when the 
                     
 
19 The motion in limine did not address Carol O'Mahony's 
identification of the defendant, which was made for the first 
time during trial. 
13 
 
 
identifier is mistaken."  Yet Petras first identified the 
defendant on the day after the shooting, apparently without any 
intervening events that could have affected his identification.20  
In such circumstances, the judge reasonably could have 
determined that the proffered expert testimony regarding the 
effects of the passage of time and postidentification events was 
irrelevant. 
 
The judge likewise reasonably could have determined that 
expert testimony regarding the hypothetical deficiencies of 
photographic arrays was not relevant, in light of his express 
prior determination that such deficiencies were not present in 
this case.  On January 23, 2003, while the defendant's motion to 
introduce expert testimony was under advisement, the judge 
issued findings in connection with the defendant's motion to 
suppress Petras's identification from the photographic array.  
In a written memorandum of decision denying the motion, the 
judge concluded that "[t]here was nothing in the array itself or 
in the procedure which was suggestive in the slightest of the 
                     
 
20 Contrast Commonwealth v. Johnson, 470 Mass. 389, 393 
(2015) (witness unable to identify defendant in lineup eighteen 
days after crime, by which time defendant had changed his 
hairstyle). 
 
14 
 
 
defendant."21  The judge reasonably could have relied on that 
conclusion in resolving not to allow Penrod's testimony. 
 
It also was reasonable to conclude that testimony 
concerning the effect on the jury of the witness's expressed 
confidence was not relevant based on the anticipated testimony.  
The judge noted during the hearing on the motion to introduce 
expert testimony that the Commonwealth would not be permitted to 
question Petras concerning his degree of confidence in his 
identification.  See Commonwealth v. Santoli, supra at 845-846 
(eyewitness's degree of confidence is not reliable indicator of 
accuracy of identification).  Petras ultimately volunteered 
during his testimony that he was not wholly confident in the 
accuracy of his identification.22  Given Petras's own doubts, 
                     
 
21 According to the judge's findings, the array that police 
showed Petras comprised fifty color photographs of "the same 
size, shape[,] clarity of color[,] and definition," showing 
frontal and profile views of the defendant and forty-nine other 
"dark haired young men," approximately thirty-five of whom 
appeared to be Caucasian and twelve to sixteen of whom appeared 
to be Hispanic.  The judge further found that Petras was by 
himself during his interview with police, and that he was shown 
the photographs in a random order.  In addition, the judge found 
that the interviewers did not react in a confirmatory manner 
when Petras selected the defendant's photograph. 
 
 
22 Petras stated that he was "pretty sure" that the 
photograph he selected was of the person he had seen on the 
afternoon of the shooting.  In addition, when asked during 
direct examination whether the person he had seen in the store 
was present in the court room, Petras stated that he was "not a 
hundred percent sure."  He explained, 
 
15 
 
 
however, it is not clear how expert testimony calling into 
question the reliability of an eyewitness's expressions of 
confidence would have altered the jury's assessment of Petras's 
identification.  The judge reasonably could have denied the 
renewed motion in limine on that basis. 
 
The judge's decision not to allow Penrod's testimony after 
O'Mahony's identification of the defendant on cross-examination 
also was not error.  The motion to introduce expert testimony 
indicated that Penrod was prepared to testify regarding pretrial 
identifications by means of a photographic array, not in-court 
showup identifications.  See Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 
255, 262 (2014) (noting differences between pretrial 
identifications and in-court showup identifications).  In any 
event, O'Mahony's identification was made for the first time 
approximately eight and one-half years after the shooting, and 
contradicted her earlier testimony on direct examination.  The 
judge reasonably could have concluded that the jury were able to 
assess the reliability of such an identification without the aid 
of Penrod's testimony.  In short, the judge did not make "a 
                                                                  
 
"I'm looking at the -- I'm looking over here, because 
I know this is the [d]efendant.  And he looks different 
from those days, you know.  It could be.  It could be.  If 
you showed me the other picture, you know.  He looks 
broader now.  He looks broader, and he looks like his hair 
is different.  It could be." 
 
The defendant did not object to, or move to strike, Petras's 
assessments of his confidence in his identification. 
16 
 
 
clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the 
decision" (quotation and citation omitted).  See L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, supra at 185 n.27. 
 
Moreover, even if the judge had abused his discretion in 
declining to allow Penrod's testimony, any error would not have 
been prejudicial.  See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 
210 (2014).  The defense cross-examined both Petras and O'Mahony 
extensively regarding their identifications, and the jury were 
instructed specifically to scrutinize with "great care" the 
circumstances in which those identifications were made.23  
Indeed, the jury in this case were made aware of the limitations 
                     
 
23 The jury were instructed to consider "whether you are 
satisfied that the identification made by the witness later was 
a product of his or her own recollection."  The judge added, 
 
 
"I am referring now to an identification made 
photographically by Mr. Petras, and an identification made 
in court in this case by Ms. O'Mahony, and any testimony 
about similarities or dissimilarities that you heard in 
this case, dissimilarities of [the defendant], similarities 
of [the defendant].  If the identification by the witness 
may have been influenced by the circumstances under which 
the person, the defendant in this case was presented to him 
or her for identification, you should scrutinize that 
identification with great care.  You may also consider the 
length of time that lapsed between the occurrence, that is 
the afternoon of September 29, 1994, and the opportunity of 
the witness to see and identify the defendant as a factor 
bearing on the reliability of the identification.  You may 
also take into account that an identification made by a 
person by picking the defendant out of a group of similar-
looking individuals is generally more reliable than an 
identification that results from a presentation of the 
defendant alone to a witness.  When I say 'out of a group 
of similar-looking individuals,' I'm talking about either 
alive or photographically." 
17 
 
 
of eyewitness identifications -- at one point, a witness 
incorrectly identified the foreperson of the jury as having been 
present in Quincy on the day of the shooting.  Furthermore, this 
case did not turn on the identifications by Petras and O'Mahony.  
Neither Petras nor O'Mahony placed the defendant directly at the 
scene of the crime,24 and Petras's identification was consistent 
with the defendant's alibi.25  Emma testified that the defendant 
told him in considerable detail how he had shot the victim, and 
was cross-examined exhaustively regarding that testimony.  
Moreover, other witnesses described extensively the defendant's 
motive to kill the victim, who had gone to great lengths to 
cause him distress.  In such circumstances, there is no 
reasonable possibility that the judge's decision not to allow 
the proffered expert testimony affected the verdict.  See 
Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 23 (1999). 
                     
 
24 See Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 265 n.15 
(2014), citing Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 242 n.17 
(2014) (noting possible distinction between reliability of 
identification by eyewitness who was present during commission 
of crime and identification by eyewitness who was "not present 
during the commission of the crime but who may have observed the 
defendant before or after the commission of the crime, such as 
where an eyewitness identifies the defendant as the person he or 
she saw inside a store near the crime scene a short time before 
or after the commission of the crime"). 
 
 
25 As noted, Petras recalled seeing the person he identified 
as the defendant at approximately 1:30 P.M. on the day of the 
shooting.  According to the defendant's alibi, the defendant did 
not leave for Raynham that day until between 2 P.M. and 3 P.M. 
18 
 
 
 
2.  Admission of stocking cap testimony.  When recounting 
the defendant's jailhouse confession, Emma testified that the 
defendant had told him he was wearing a ski mask at the time of 
the shooting.  The Commonwealth then introduced, over objection, 
testimony from a police officer who found an orange stocking cap 
with eye holes cut out of it during a search of a vehicle the 
defendant was driving several months after the shooting.26  
Although the cap was not admitted in evidence, at the 
Commonwealth's request, the officer put his fingers through the 
eye holes and showed the cap to the jury.  The defendant argues 
that the officer's testimony, including the demonstration, 
should not have been admitted, because it constituted 
impermissible evidence that the defendant had used the stocking 
cap to commit other crimes.  The defendant further argues that 
the admission impermissibly suggested, without foundation, that 
the cap was the ski mask mentioned by Emma in connection with 
the shooting. 
 
The defendant does not make clear why his possession of the 
stocking cap would have indicated to the jury that he was 
involved in other criminal activity besides the charged offense.  
Even assuming that the jury could have drawn such an inference, 
                     
 
26 A firearm and a roll of duct tape were found together 
with the stocking cap, in a locked briefcase in the trunk of the 
vehicle.  The defendant filed a motion to suppress the firearm, 
which was allowed.  The officer did not testify about the 
discovery of the duct tape. 
19 
 
 
however, evidence of a defendant's involvement in uncharged 
criminal activity "may be admissible if relevant for some other 
purpose" than to show the defendant's bad character or 
propensity to commit the charged offense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 450 (2015) (citation omitted).  To be 
relevant, evidence "must have a rational tendency to prove an 
issue in the case . . . or render a desired inference more 
probable than it would have been without it" (quotations and 
citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Carey, 463 Mass. 378, 387 
(2012).  Although the neighbor who saw two men fleeing the scene 
did not report that they were wearing masks, the officer's 
testimony regarding the cap corroborated Emma's account of what 
the defendant told him about the shooting. 
 
Furthermore, "[w]hether proffered evidence is relevant and 
whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect are matters entrusted to the trial judge's 
broad discretion and are not disturbed absent palpable error" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 
Mass. 141, 156 (2014).  Because the testimony had at least "a 
rational tendency" to render Emma's account more probable, its 
admission was not an abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. 
Carey, supra. 
 
3.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
argues that this court should use its power under G. L. c. 278, 
20 
 
 
§ 33E, to reverse his conviction in the interest of justice.  He 
emphasizes that Petras's identification of him as being in 
Licciardi's neighborhood almost six hours before the shooting 
was consistent with his alibi, and therefore did not prove that 
he actually played a role in the shooting.  The defendant argues 
further that there is reason to distrust Emma's account of his 
jailhouse confession.  Nonetheless, the defendant concedes that, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 
evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  General Laws c. 278, § 33E, "does not . . . 
convert this court into a second jury, which must be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of a defendant by reading 
the reported evidence, without the advantage of seeing and 
hearing the witnesses" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 916 (2013). 
 
In the alternative, the defendant asks that his conviction 
be reduced to a lesser degree of guilt because of the extent to 
which the victim's efforts to harass the defendant brought about 
his own demise.  The victim's efforts were not so immediate to 
the shooting, however, as to mitigate the offense as a matter of 
law, see Commonwealth v. Keohane, 444 Mass. 563, 567 (2005), and 
we decline to reduce the defendant's conviction to a lesser 
degree of guilt by means of our extraordinary powers pursuant to 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
21 
 
 
 
The defendant further requests that we exercise our 
authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to revise his sentence to 
run concurrently with the Federal sentence for which he was 
incarcerated at the time of his conviction in this case.  As 
noted, the trial judge ordered that the mandatory life sentence 
be imposed from and after the defendant's Federal sentence.  The 
judge also directed the defendant, however, to file a motion to 
revise and revoke the sentence.  The judge apparently planned to 
revisit the timing of the sentence after the issuance of the 
rescript in this case.27  The defendant filed a motion to revise 
and revoke, and an affidavit explaining the basis for that 
                     
 
27 The judge explained, 
 
 
"Here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to make it a 
consecutive sentence now.  And after the rescript, file a 
motion to revise and revoke on that one issue only:  
consecutive or concurrent.  And after the rescript comes 
down from the Supreme Judicial Court, I'll make the 
decision then. 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"The victim impact statement will be marked and placed 
in the file of the case.  The sentence, of course, is 
statutory, mandatory.  So the impact statement, although I 
have read it, can have no [effect] on the sentence I have 
imposed.  So impose that consecutively with the sentence 
now being served. 
 
 
"You file the revise and revoke, and I will take up 
that issue after the decision by the Supreme Judicial 
Court." 
22 
 
 
motion,28 pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, 378 Mass. 899 (1979), 
on the day he was sentenced.  The judge since has retired, and 
the motion remains pending. 
 
General Laws c. 278, § 33E, does not give this court 
independent authority to revise and revoke the timing of 
sentences.29  Rule 29(a), by contrast, allows a trial judge to 
revise or revoke a sentence upon "the written motion of a 
defendant filed within sixty days after the imposition of a 
sentence, [or] within sixty days after receipt by the trial 
court of a rescript issued upon affirmance of the judgment . . . 
if it appears that justice may not have been done."  
Accordingly, we remand the case to the Superior Court for a 
ruling on the defendant's pending motion to revise and revoke.  
While rule 29(a) "contains strict time limits," see Commonwealth 
v. Costa, 472 Mass. 139, 148 n.5 (2015), the defendant timely 
filed his motion to revise and revoke the sentence, as directed 
by the trial judge.  The motion should be considered. 
                     
 
28 In the affidavit, defense counsel stated, "I believe that 
after there has been review by the Supreme Judicial Court, the 
[Superior] Court ought to take a second look at this case on the 
issue of whether the defendant should receive a 'from and after' 
sentence or a concurrent sentence." 
 
 
29 See G. L. c. 278, § 33E ("[T]he court may, if satisfied 
that the verdict was against the law or the weight of the 
evidence, or because of newly discovered evidence, or for any 
other reason that justice may require [a] order a new trial or 
[b] direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt, 
and remand the case to the [S]uperior [C]ourt for the imposition 
of sentence" [emphasis added]). 
23 
 
 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The judgment of conviction is affirmed.  
The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for consideration 
of the defendant's pending motion to revise and revoke the 
sentence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.