Title: People v. Mickel

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 12/19/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S133510 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
  
ANDREW HAMPTON MICKEL, 
) 
 
) 
 Tehama County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CR45115 
 
____________________________________) 
 
On April 5, 2005, a jury convicted defendant Andrew Hampton Mickel of 
the first degree murder of Officer David Mobilio (Pen. Code, § 187),1  and also 
found that Mobilio was a peace officer killed while engaged in the performance of 
his duties (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(7)).  Three days later, the jury returned a verdict of 
death.  The trial court automatically reviewed the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), 
declined to modify it, and sentenced defendant to death.     
This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment in 
its entirety.  
                                              
1 
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated.  
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
 
Defendant was a resident of Olympia, Washington.  In October 2002, 
defendant purchased a Sig Sauer P229 .40-caliber handgun from Larry‘s Gun 
Shop in Olympia.  Defendant also purchased several boxes of hollow-point 
bullets.     
 
On November 17 of that year, a Tehama County deputy sheriff, while on 
duty, observed a maroon 1990 Ford Mustang with Washington state license plates.  
The deputy ran the plates through his patrol car computer because the vehicle 
―seemed out of place‖ and had ―immediately turned‖ after the deputy pulled up in 
his patrol car behind the vehicle.   
 
At about 6 p.m. the next evening, two witnesses drove to Red Bluff, 
California, located in Tehama County, for recreational off-road driving in the 
vicinity.  The witnesses saw a maroon or red Ford Mustang parked off 
Breckenridge Road, approximately 300 to 400 yards from Warner‘s Petroleum in 
Red Bluff.  The vehicle‘s front license plate was covered with a sheet secured with 
zipties, and the windows were fogged up.  The two witnesses saw a person inside 
of the car, whom they described as looking startled and nervous.  The Mustang 
remained parked when the two witnesses left the area approximately 20 minutes 
later.   
 
On November 19, 2002, Red Bluff Police Officer David Mobilio was 
working patrol on the overnight shift.  Around 1:27 a.m., Mobilio went to 
Warner‘s Petroleum to refuel his patrol car.  Around 1:40 a.m., a dispatcher 
conducted a status check on Mobilio, but received no response.  Another officer, 
Sergeant Ted Wiley, drove to Warner‘s Petroleum to check on Mobilio.  Wiley 
3 
observed a patrol car parked by the gas pumps and Mobilio lying face-down at the 
north end of the pumps.  Wiley did not see anyone else in the vicinity.  After 
calling for assistance, Wiley approached Mobilio‘s body and saw a large circular 
wound to the back of the head.  Next to Mobilio‘s body, Wiley saw an object that 
he thought was a piece of cardboard or paper that had some writing on it, as well 
as a drawing of a snake.  The object, a homemade flag, had the phrase ―This Is A 
Political Action.  Don‘t Tread On Us‖ written below the image of a snake.   
 
At 2 a.m., Red Bluff Fire Department Engineer Domenic Catona was 
dispatched to Warner‘s Petroleum.  When Catona came closer to Officer Mobilio‘s 
body, he observed one bullet wound to the back of the head and another bullet 
wound just below the shoulder blades.  On the ground directly to the left of 
Mobilio‘s body, Catona saw a three-foot cloth.  The paramedic who examined 
Mobilio pronounced him dead at the scene.  An autopsy later revealed that 
Mobilio had been shot three times from a distance of at least three to four feet.  
The forensic pathologist opined that the final shot was to the back of Mobilio‘s 
head, while he was lying face-down on the ground.   
 
Later the same day, around 1 p.m., Alice Lay –– who lived on her ranch in 
southeastern Oregon –– learned of a car wreck on the road near her ranch.  Lay 
and her son, Wilson, went to flag the wreck, as the accident was on a blind curve.  
When they arrived at the wreck, the Lays saw defendant standing by a small fire 
near the overturned vehicle.  The vehicle did not have any license plates on it, and 
defendant had a bloody face.  Wilson also observed empty shell casings on the 
ground, which he believed appeared to be .40-caliber or 9-millimeter.   
 
Defendant acted a ―little bit nervous‖ and explained that he had been 
driving too quickly before the car rolled when he hit the bank of the curve.  When 
Alice asked defendant about the missing license plates, defendant explained he 
had thrown them away because he was going to abandon the car.  Defendant 
4 
eventually located the plates.  The Lays collected several of defendant‘s 
belongings that he insisted he was abandoning, including a gun case and a ―brass 
catcher,‖ which is designed to catch ejected rounds from a gun.  Because 
defendant was injured, the Lays took him back to their home and called the police 
to report the wreck.   
 
Deputy Tim Alexander from the Harney County Sherriff‘s Department in 
Burns, Oregon arrived and met with defendant.  Defendant introduced himself as 
―Andrew McRae‖ and produced a Washington state driver‘s license.  Defendant 
explained how the accident occurred and that he wanted to sign over the wrecked 
car and remaining belongings to the Lays.  Alexander drove defendant to the 
wreck to investigate and take some photographs.  Alexander observed the license 
plates leaning against the car, as well as tools on the ground.  When Alexander 
searched defendant‘s backpack before driving defendant to the nearest town, 
Alexander found a loaded Sig Sauer .40-caliber handgun and a large quantity of 
ammunition.  Alexander ran the handgun‘s serial number through dispatch, and 
the gun came back clean.  After explaining to defendant that he could not take the 
weapon on public transportation, Alexander drove defendant to Burns.   
 
On November 20, 2002, defendant purchased a bus ticket in Burns, and left 
the Sig Sauer handgun with an employee at the bus stop.  Ballistics tests on the 
gun would later reveal that it was the weapon used to kill Officer Mobilio.  
Defendant then traveled to New Hampshire, where he was eventually arrested 
after he contacted the media to explain his actions.   
 
During the investigation of the crime scene at Warner‘s Petroleum, 
investigators photographed and preserved tire and shoe impressions from the 
5 
original crime scenes.2  A senior forensic scientist, Michael Barnes, later 
compared photographs of defendant‘s vehicle and tires to the photographs of the 
tire impressions and concluded the size and pattern were the same.  Barnes 
compared the shoes defendant was wearing at the time of his arrest to the shoe 
impressions from Warner‘s Petroleum and nearby Breckenridge Road.  Barnes 
opined that defendant‘s shoe made the impression from the Breckenridge scene, 
but could only conclude that the patterns were the same with respect to the 
impressions from Warner‘s Petroleum.   
 
Following defendant‘s arrest in New Hampshire, law enforcement searched 
defendant‘s apartment in Olympia, Washington.  They found additional 
ammunition, pieces of wire and cloth, and a ―possible template‖ for the snake 
image on the cloth left at the scene.  While the template for the snake image had 
unique edging that corresponded to the cloth flag found at Warner‘s Petroleum, it 
did not match the image in size.  
 
The police obtained DNA swabs from wire attached to the cloth flag.  A 
comparison of defendant‘s blood to samples taken from the DNA swabs of the 
flag revealed a mixture of DNA from two individuals, which an expert concluded 
was consistent with Mobilio as a minor contributor and defendant as a major 
contributor.  Based on the odds of the major contributor‘s DNA appearing in 
unrelated individuals, the expert opined that it was very strong evidence that 
defendant was the major contributor.   
 
Finally, the prosecution offered several inculpatory statements defendant 
had made in prior proceedings.  These statements included:  ―Your Honor, I admit 
that I committed the act that resulted in Officer Mobilio‘s death,‖ and ―I have 
                                              
2 
At trial, a criminalist described findings from the relevant crime scenes of 
Warner‘s Petroleum and the Breckenridge site.   
6 
never denied that I killed Officer Mobilio, and I never intend to deny that.  And it 
will become clear to the jury, both by myself and by the prosecution, that there is 
no question of that fact.‖   
2.  Defense  
 
On January 30, 2003, defendant first appeared in Tehama County Superior 
Court, where he stated his desire to represent himself and requested that a public 
defender be appointed as co-counsel.  The court appointed Attorney James 
Reichle, who represented defendant through the preliminary hearing.  On 
December 8, 2003, the trial court granted defendant‘s motion for self-
representation.  While defendant made an opening statement, he did not put on a 
defense during the guilt phase.  During his opening statement, defendant explained 
that he ―did ambush and kill Officer David Mobilio‖ and that he ―came forward‖ 
to ―take[] responsibility for being the one who took Officer Mobilio‘s life.‖  
Defendant conceded that the prosecution would ―have the facts [of the murder] 
right,‖ but that ―they won‘t have the right interpretation for what really happened.‖   
 
Defendant cross-examined nine of the 26 prosecution witnesses, but did not 
call any witnesses of his own.  Defendant had previously indicated his intent to put 
on a justification defense based on the ―defense of liberty.‖  During an in camera 
proceeding, the trial court concluded that the defense was not legally cognizable 
and precluded defendant from introducing evidence in support of this proposed 
defense.  Defendant responded by stating that he would ―sit in silent protest during 
the guilt phase‖ and that he would ―not speak or raise any issues until the penalty 
phase.‖  Defendant gave a brief closing statement, stating that he would explain 
during the penalty phase why he had killed Officer Mobilio.   
 
The jury deliberated for approximately 45 minutes before returning a 
verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree murder and finding true the special 
7 
circumstance that David Mobilio was a peace officer who was killed while 
engaged in the performance of his duties.   
B. Penalty Phase 
 
At the penalty phase, the prosecution put on victim impact testimony from 
Officer Mobilio‘s family members, fellow police officers, and an elementary 
school student who Mobilio had taught as part of the nationwide Drug Abuse 
Resistance Education (DARE) program.   
 
Defendant called his mother and father as witnesses to testify about the 
circumstances under which they learned of defendant‘s crime.  Defendant 
presented testimony from a state investigator that the state could quickly retrieve 
digital information about automobile licenses and gun registration, as well as 
testimony from an expert in public administration regarding the existence of 
systems and databases aggregating personal information about United States 
citizens.   
 
During the penalty phase, defendant also testified that he had acted out of a 
sense of patriotism.  Defendant ultimately presented the theory that he had killed 
Officer Mobilio in order to defend constitutionally guaranteed liberties that he 
believed the government was infringing, including the right to bear arms.  
Defendant explained that he came to California to kill a police officer because he 
wanted his actions to make a national statement.  He believed California to be the 
least gun-friendly state in the country, and where ―the war on drugs is fought the 
hardest.‖  Defendant traveled to California in September 2002 to find a location 
where he could ambush a police officer, drive back to Washington, and then fly to 
New Hampshire without being arrested.  He explained that he had intentionally 
chosen New Hampshire as the location where he would be arrested because he 
believed the New Hampshire Constitution guaranteed the right of revolution.   
8 
 
When he arrived in New Hampshire, defendant contacted his parents and 
the media.  When contacted by police, defendant explained that he would come 
peacefully, but that he wanted to speak with a reporter to explain what he had 
done.  After speaking with the reporter, defendant surrendered himself to law 
enforcement and was arrested.  
 
After both sides presented their evidence during the penalty phase, they 
concluded with arguments to the jury.  The jury then returned a death verdict.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Issues Affecting Both Phases 
1.  Failure to Suspend Proceedings Prior to Trial 
 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to suspend proceedings 
under section 1368 because there was substantial evidence that raised a doubt as to 
defendant‘s competence to stand trial.  Defendant further argues that this failure 
violated his due process rights.  We reject defendant‘s claim. 
a.  Background 
 
As noted, after shooting Officer Mobilio and encountering the Lays and 
Officer Alexander, defendant purchased a bus ticket in Burns, Oregon.  Defendant 
then fled to New Hampshire, where he was arrested on November 26, 2002.  
Following the People‘s application for requisition, the Governor of California 
formally requested defendant‘s extradition from New Hampshire to California on 
December 18, 2002.   
 
On January 8, 2003, defendant‘s counsel in New Hampshire, Mark Sisti, 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the New Hampshire Superior Court, 
alleging that defendant was incompetent to stand trial and therefore could not be 
extradited.  According to the petition, Sisti had ―immediate concerns regarding the 
Petitioner‘s ability to communicate with, and adequately assist counsel‖ and his 
9 
―lack of ability to understand the proceedings against him.‖  In support of the 
petition, counsel referred to and attached a ―preliminary psychiatric/competency 
evaluation‖ conducted by Dr. Drukteinis, where Dr. Drukteinis concluded that 
defendant‘s competency was ―highly questionable because of his irrational 
thinking.‖  Dr. Drukteinis had met with defendant for over two hours, reviewed 
one of defendant‘s writings, and interviewed defendant‘s mother by phone.  Dr. 
Drukteinis noted that these were preliminary findings that would need to be 
assessed after a full psychiatric evaluation, but that there was evidence that 
defendant ―suffers from a mental disturbance.‖  
 
The New Hampshire Superior Court held a hearing on defendant‘s petition 
on January 14, 2003.  The court then denied defendant‘s petition, concluding that 
competence is not required for extradition under either New Hampshire or federal 
law.  The court further observed that defendant‘s ability to ―calmly and 
methodically g[i]ve his account (of the murder) without any psychotic 
disorganization of thought‖ supported the conclusion that defendant understood 
and was capable of discussing the charges against him in California, as well as the 
extradition proceedings.  Defendant was then extradited to California.  
 
When defendant first appeared in Tehama County Superior Court on 
January 30, 2003, he expressed his wish to represent himself and to have a public 
defender appointed as co-counsel.  The court appointed James Reichle, who 
subsequently stated his support for defendant‘s request to represent himself.  After 
the trial court explained the advantages of representation and that defendant would 
not be waiving his right to self-representation during trial, defendant accepted 
Reichle‘s representation through the preliminary hearing.  
 
On April 25, 2003, defense counsel filed a motion to seal eight categories 
of evidence and prevent their public disclosure during the preliminary hearing.  
Among these categories was ―any mention of the extradition proceedings in New 
10 
Hampshire or any information presented therein, including the contents or sealing 
of the Drukteinis report‖ which was allegedly ―divulged in violation of his 
attorney-client and psychotherapist privileges.‖  After the People filed an 
opposition indicating that they did not intend to use any of the eight categories of 
documents at the preliminary hearing, the trial court denied defendant‘s motion 
without prejudice.  
 
On July 7, 2004, defendant filed a motion for change of venue, which did 
not reference the Drukteinis report, but did reference former counsel Sisti‘s 
―attempt[] to lay the foundations for an Insanity Defense‖ before the New 
Hampshire state court.  Defendant argued that Sisti had made ―dramatic, 
unsubstantiated claims‖ that defendant could not identify himself, understand the 
proceedings, or understand the differences among the judge, the prosecution, and 
the defense.   
 
In a filing concerning whether defendant should be physically restrained 
during proceedings, the People referenced defendant‘s uncooperativeness during 
his incarceration in New Hampshire.  According to the People, defendant had 
obstructed jail personnel and refused to dress.  Defendant chose to be covered by a 
blanket and made a court appearance via closed circuit video monitor in that state 
of undress.  
b.  Legal Standard 
 
A criminal trial of an incompetent person violates his or her federal due 
process rights.  (Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 354.)  The state 
Constitution and section 1367 similarly preclude a mentally incompetent 
defendant‘s criminal trial or sentencing.  (§ 1367, subd. (a) [―A person cannot be 
tried or adjudged to punishment . . . [while] mentally incompetent‖]; People v. 
Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 691 (Lightsey).)  A defendant is incompetent to 
11 
stand trial if the defendant lacks ―sufficient present ability to consult with his 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . [or] a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.‖  (Dusky v. United 
States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402 (Dusky); Lightsey, at p. 691 [―[s]tate 
constitutional authority is to the same effect‖ as Dusky].)   
 
Under section 1368, subdivision (a), a judge must state on the record any 
doubt that arises in her mind as to the mental competence of the defendant, and 
either seek defense counsel‘s opinion as to the defendant‘s mental competency, or 
appoint counsel if the defendant is unrepresented.  The decision whether to order a 
competency hearing rests within the trial court‘s discretion, and may be disturbed 
upon appeal ―only where a doubt as to [mental competence] may be said to appear 
as a matter of law or where there is an abuse of discretion.‖  (See People v. 
Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 518 (Pennington).)  When the court is presented 
with ―substantial evidence of present mental incompetence,‖ however, the 
defendant is ―entitled to a section 1368 hearing as a matter of right.‖  (Ibid.)  On 
review, our inquiry is focused not on the subjective opinion of the trial judge, but 
rather on whether there was substantial evidence raising a reasonable doubt 
concerning the defendant‘s competence to stand trial.  (People v. Welch (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 701, 737-738.)  Evidence may be substantial even where it is contested or 
presented by the defense.  (Lightsey, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 691.)  A trial court 
reversibly errs if it fails to hold a competency hearing when one is required under 
the substantial evidence test.  (See ibid.)   
c.  Analysis 
 
Defendant argues first that the trial court was obligated to hold a full 
competency hearing prior to trial, but failed to do so in violation of his due process 
rights.  According to defendant, the trial court was aware of the Drukteinis 
12 
evaluation, and was therefore obligated to suspend proceedings and investigate 
whether defendant was competent to stand trial.   
 
It is difficult to credit the argument that the trial court should have ordered 
a competency hearing based on the Drukteinis report, when the record does not 
support the conclusion that any party ever presented the report or expressly 
conveyed the substance of the evaluation to the court.  Defendant argues that the 
trial court was made aware of the existence of the report when he moved to seal 
the report.  True:  the motion to seal referenced ―[a]ny mention of the extradition 
proceedings . . . including the contents or sealing of the Drukteinis report . . . 
which defendant asserts was divulged in violation of his attorney-client and 
psychotherapist privileges.‖  But this oblique reference to the Drukteinis report as 
one of eight categories of evidence does not support the inference that the trial 
court was made sufficiently aware of the substance of the report through the 
motion to seal.  There is no indication in the record that either side attached the 
report as a sealed exhibit to the motion or to any responsive pleading.  During the 
hearing on the motion, the parties did not discuss the specific categories of 
evidence, and there was no mention of the report or its contents.  As the People 
indicated they were not seeking to introduce any of these categories of evidence, 
the parties and the trial court resolved the mooted motion in a cursory fashion.   
 
Defendant‘s other tangential references to the Drukteinis report and to his 
level of competence to stand trial are similarly vague and unavailing.  That 
defendant referenced Sisti‘s attempt to ―lay the foundations for an Insanity 
Defense‖ in his motion for change of venue is hardly sufficient to show that the 
trial court knew or should have known that defendant had been subject to a 
preliminary evaluation by Dr. Drukteinis.  Indeed, that reference arose in the 
context of defendant arguing that his New Hampshire counsel had made 
13 
―dramatic, unsubstantiated claims,‖ which would not signal to the trial court that 
those claims were based on an expert evaluation.   
 
Included among the media reports defendant submitted as exhibits in 
support of his change of venue motion were certain references to the contents of 
the Drukteinis report.  A small number of these reports referenced Dr. Drukteinis‘s 
preliminary evaluation, which found that defendant‘s competency to stand trial 
and rationally participate in court proceedings was ―highly questionable.‖  It is 
possible that, from these exhibits, the court may have become generally aware of 
the report‘s existence and the preliminary conclusions included therein.  But these 
articles were submitted as evidence that media publicity in Tehama County could 
bias jurors and prevent defendant from receiving a fair trial.  Neither party drew 
the court‘s attention to these articles as providing any insight into defendant‘s 
competence or lack thereof.  What mentions of the Drukteinis report were 
contained within exhibits spanning several hundred pages, attached to a motion 
unrelated to the question of defendant‘s competence.  Those references did not 
constitute substantial evidence of defendant‘s incompetence to stand trial.  So the 
court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a competency hearing based on 
such brief, secondhand accounts of the Drukteinis report.  
 
In his reply brief, defendant argues for the first time that the trial court 
should be presumed to have acquired constructive knowledge of the contents of 
the Drukteinis evaluation based on the New Hampshire state court‘s review of the 
letter.  Ordinarily, we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply 
brief.  (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075.)  And defendant‘s argument 
fails to persuade on the merits.  Defendant cites no authority, nor have we found 
any, for the proposition that one state‘s courts may be charged with constructive 
knowledge of the record presented before another state‘s courts.  Defendant relies 
on agency principles applied to the prosecution and police officers when a 
14 
criminal defendant invokes the right to remain silent.  But this sheds no light on 
why a Tehama County trial court should be held to have knowledge of the entire 
record made before a New Hampshire state court in a proceeding that did not bear 
on the merits of the proceeding before the Tehama County court.   
 
For substantial evidence to raise a doubt about a defendant‘s competence, 
we must be able to reasonably conclude that the evidence was in fact part of the 
record presented or otherwise made available to the trial court.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 738 [noting that under Pennington, ―once the 
accused has come forward with substantial evidence of incompetence to stand 
trial, due process requires that a full competence hearing be held as a matter of 
right‖].)  We do not require a trial court to evaluate a defendant‘s competence 
based on evidence not before it at the time of its decision.  (Id. at p. 739.)  As the 
trial court was never presented with the Drukteinis report, and scattered references 
to the report within the record were brief and indirect, there is no reasonable basis 
to conclude that the trial court erred in failing to order a section 1368 hearing.  
Whether the trial court erred in failing to order a competency hearing after 
receiving additional information is discussed post.  
2.  Defense Counsel’s Failure to Present the Drukteinis Report on 
Defendant’s Competence  
 
Defendant claims he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel based on counsel‘s failure to inform the trial court about the 
substance of Dr. Drukteinis‘ evaluation.  We reject defendant‘s claim as 
inappropriate to resolve on direct appeal.  
a.  Background 
 
Implicitly acknowledging some of the limitations of his first claim, 
defendant argues in the alternative that it was his counsel‘s ineffectiveness that 
gave rise to any unawareness of the Drukteinis report on the part of the trial court.  
15 
James Reichle represented defendant from the time of defendant‘s arraignment on 
January 30, 2003, until the time the trial court granted defendant‘s motion for self-
representation on December 8, 2003.  During that 10-month period, counsel 
supported defendant‘s motion for self-representation and further informed the 
court that it was counsel‘s opinion that there was ―no . . . evidence‖ of defendant‘s 
incompetence to stand trial.   
b.  Legal Standard 
 
In order to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show that his or her counsel‘s performance was deficient and that 
the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of such deficient performance.  
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692.)  To demonstrate 
deficient performance, defendant bears the burden of showing that counsel‘s 
performance ―fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under 
prevailing professional norms.‖  (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966.)  To 
demonstrate prejudice, defendant bears the burden of showing a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel‘s deficient performance, the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different.  (Ibid.; In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 
833.)   
 
As we have observed in the past, certain practical constraints make it more 
difficult to address ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal rather than in the 
context of a habeas corpus proceeding.  (See People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 
94-95; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-268 (Mendoza Tello).)  
The record on appeal may not explain why counsel chose to act as he or she did.  
Under those circumstances, a reviewing court has no basis on which to determine 
whether counsel had a legitimate reason for making a particular decision, or 
16 
whether counsel‘s actions or failure to take certain actions were objectively 
unreasonable.  (Mendoza Tello, at pp. 267-268.)   
 
Moreover, we begin with the presumption that counsel‘s actions fall within 
the broad range of reasonableness, and afford ―great deference to counsel‘s tactical 
decisions.‖  (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 674.)  Accordingly, we have 
characterized defendant‘s burden as ―difficult to carry on direct appeal,‖ as a 
reviewing court will reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel on direct appeal only if there is affirmative evidence that counsel had ―no 
rational tactical purpose‖ for an action or omission.  (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 
Cal.4th 415, 437.)   
c.  Analysis 
 
Defendant contends that counsel‘s failure to present the Drukteinis report to 
the trial court constitutes deficient performance under prevailing professional 
norms.  As defendant concedes, however, ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
are rarely successful on direct appeal because the appellate record will often not 
sufficiently reveal why defense counsel acted or failed to act on any given 
occasion.  (Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 267-268; People v. Snow, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 94-95.)   
 
On this record, we do not know why counsel did not bring the Drukteinis 
report to the trial court‘s attention or move for a section 1368 hearing.  Indeed, the 
only information we have with respect to why counsel made that decision is that 
counsel himself did not believe that there was substantial evidence of defendant‘s 
incompetence.  Counsel affirmatively supported defendant‘s request to represent 
himself.  Counsel even stated on the record that he believed there was no 
substantial evidence of defendant‘s incompetence, and that defendant was 
competent.  His reasoning may have been, for example, informed by his own 
17 
observations and interactions with defendant, or based on investigation not 
included in the appellate record.  But counsel was never asked to explain his 
decision or the basis of his belief in defendant‘s competence.  
 
Defendant cites various federal and state cases holding that counsel‘s 
failure to request a competency hearing constituted deficient performance.  These 
cases only further demonstrate the deficiency of this record on direct appeal in 
revealing what information trial counsel had access to and why trial counsel made 
the decisions that he did.  As the People note, each one of the cases relied upon by 
defendant involves either a habeas proceeding, a habeas proceeding consolidated 
with a direct appeal, a personal restraint petition, or a direct appeal involving a 
postconviction hearing.  (See Ford v. Bowersox (8th Cir. 2001) 256 F.3d 783 
[federal habeas corpus]; Speedy v. Wyrich (8th Cir. 1983) 702 F.2d 723 [federal 
habeas corpus]; Kibert v. Peyton  (4th Cir. 1967) 383 F.2d 566 [federal habeas 
corpus]; Loe v. United States (E.D.Va. 1982) 545 F.Supp. 662 [federal habeas 
corpus]; State v. Johnson (Neb.Ct.App. 1996) 551 N.W.2d 742 [postconviction 
hearing]; People v. Kinder (N.Y.App.Div. 1987) 512 N.Y.S.2d 597 
[postconviction hearing]; Wilcoxson v. State (Tenn.Ct.App. 1999) 22 S.W.3d 289 
[postconviction hearing]; In re Fleming (Wash. 2001) 16 P.3d 610 [personal 
restraint petition]; State v. Johnson (Wis. 1986) 395 N.W.2d 176 [postconviction 
hearing].)  Unlike the cases defendant cites, here the record is silent as to what 
investigation or inquiry counsel made into defendant‘s competence, or why 
counsel concluded there was no substantial evidence raising a doubt as to 
defendant‘s competence.  
 
Defendant‘s argument may amount to a claim that trial counsel should be 
found ineffective as a matter of law for failing to request a competency hearing 
18 
regardless of whether or not there was substantial evidence raising a doubt as to 
competence.  Yet this argument is unpersuasive.  Counsel is not ineffective for 
failing to raise the issue of competence where there may be some evidence raising 
a doubt, but that evidence is not substantial.  (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 
Cal.4th 1060, 1111-1112; cf. People v. Lewis (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1047 
[―Evidence is not substantial enough to mandate a mental competence hearing 
unless it raises a reasonable doubt on the issue‖].)  
 
The record does not reveal why counsel chose not to pursue a section 1368 
hearing or otherwise present the Drukteinis report to the trial court.  As defendant 
has failed to show affirmative evidence that counsel could have had ―no rational 
tactical purpose‖ for these decisions, defendant has not demonstrated 
constitutionally deficient performance on this record.  (See People v. Lucas, supra, 
12 Cal.4th at p. 437.)  Under these circumstances, it would be inappropriate for us 
to address defendant‘s ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal.  (See People v. 
Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 674-675.)  
3.  Failure to Suspend Proceedings Prior to Judgment  
 
In addition to claiming that the trial court had substantial evidence of 
defendant‘s incompetence prior to trial, defendant contends that the trial court 
became aware of additional evidence of his incompetence after the preliminary 
hearing, requiring the trial court to suspend proceedings and hold a competency 
hearing.  Defendant argues that the trial court‘s failure to do so violated his due 
process rights.  For the reasons discussed below, defendant‘s claim fails. 
a.  Background 
 
At the guilt phase, defendant was precluded from presenting his legally 
invalid ―liberty defense‖ to first degree murder.  In response to the trial court‘s 
order preventing him from presenting the defense of liberty as a justification of 
19 
murder, the trial court observed that defendant became ―very emotional‖ as he 
responded that he would ―sit in silent protest during the guilt phase and . . . not 
speak or raise any issues until the penalty phase.‖  While defendant cross-
examined several prosecution witnesses and gave both an opening and closing 
statement, he did not otherwise put on a defense during the guilt phase.  At the 
penalty phase, defendant testified to explain that his actions were motivated by a 
sense of patriotism, and that he had consequently killed Officer Mobilio in order to 
defend constitutionally guaranteed liberties that he believed the government was 
infringing.   
 
On April 27, 2005, after the jury had returned the guilt and penalty verdicts, 
the trial court conducted proceedings on the automatic motion to modify the 
judgment under section 190.4.  (§ 190.4, subd. (e).)  The trial court denied the 
motion in a written statement of reasons.  In denying the section 190.4 motion, the 
trial court declined to consider letters from defendant‘s family and friends or the 
probation report because the trial court believed it was only entitled to review 
evidence presented to the jury.  After issuing its decision on the section 190.4 
motion, the trial court read the letters and probation report.   
 
Defendant‘s mother, Karen Mickel, submitted a character reference letter 
for her son.  In her letter, defendant‘s mother expressed her belief that defendant 
had ―a mental illness‖ and referred to reports by ―two psychiatrists‖ who had 
apparently assessed defendant after he killed Officer Mobilio.  One psychiatrist 
had given Karen a ―verbal diagnosis‖ that defendant ―suffered from a psychosis.‖  
A second psychiatrist came to a similar conclusion, but did so ―[b]efore the entire 
assessment was completed,‖ and informed Karen that ―he needed more time to be 
able to completely delineate the exact form.‖  Defendant‘s father, Stanley Mickel, 
also submitted a letter describing defendant‘s ―growing mental illness.‖  Other 
letters from defendant‘s friends and family described defendant as ―crazy,‖ ―very 
20 
sick,‖ ―very confused and disturbed,‖ and referenced defendant‘s prior treatment 
by psychologists. 
b.  Legal Standard 
 
Section 190.4, subdivision (e), provides for an automatic application to 
modify the verdict in every case in which the jury has returned a verdict imposing 
death.  In ruling on such a motion, the trial court must independently reweigh the 
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and exercise its 
independent judgment to determine whether the weight of the evidence supports 
the jury‘s verdict.  (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 669.)   
 
As noted above, section 1368, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, 
that ―[i]f, during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment . . . a doubt 
arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant,‖ the 
trial court must suspend proceedings to determine the defendant‘s competence.  
(Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 521.)  A defendant is incompetent to stand trial 
if the defendant lacks ―sufficient present ability to consult with his [or her] lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . [or] a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him [or her].‖  (Dusky, supra, 
362 U.S. at p. 402.)  Because the decision whether to order a competency hearing 
―is for the discretion of the trial judge,‖ we will not reverse it on appeal unless ―a 
doubt as to [mental competence] may be said to appear as a matter of law or where 
there is an abuse of discretion.‖  (Pennington, at p. 518.)  Only where the court is 
presented with substantial evidence of mental incompetence is a defendant 
―entitled to a section 1368 hearing as a matter of right.‖  (Ibid.)  
c.  Analysis  
 
In deciding defendant‘s automatic motion to modify the verdict under 
section 190.4, the trial court limited its review to evidence actually presented ––
21 
 and it was right to do so.  (People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 230 [― ‗[T]he 
court may review only evidence that was presented to the jury‘ ‖ in § 190.4, subd. 
(e) hearing]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 849 [trial court correctly 
declined to hear statements by victims‘ relatives before ruling on modification 
motion].)  The trial court therefore properly refused to consider the letters 
submitted by defendant‘s friends and family in advance of deciding the automatic 
motion to modify the judgment.   
 
Defendant contends, however, that the trial court‘s failure to consider the 
letters from defendant‘s family members and friends also violated his due process 
rights.  The due process violation, he claims, occurred because these letters 
provided additional evidence of defendant‘s incompetence, which required the 
court to suspend proceedings at that point.  Defendant‘s friends and family sought 
leniency for defendant, and described him as ―crazy‖ and ―very disturbed.‖ 
 
To raise a doubt under the substantial evidence test, we require more than 
―mere bizarre actions‖ or statements, or even expert testimony that a defendant is 
psychopathic, homicidal, or a danger to him- or herself and others.  (People v. 
Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 285 (Laudermilk); People v. Jensen (1954) 43 
Cal.2d 572, 579.)  Rather, the focus of the competence inquiry is on a defendant‘s 
understanding of the criminal proceedings against him or her and the ability to 
consult with counsel or otherwise assist in his or her defense.  (See Dusky, supra, 
362 U.S. at p. 402.)  Defendant‘s trial demeanor is relevant to, but not dispositive 
of, the question whether the trial court should have suspended proceedings under 
section 1368.  (See Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 386 [―While 
Robinson‘s demeanor at trial might be relevant to the ultimate decision as to his 
[competence to stand trial], it cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on 
that very issue‖].)  In assessing whether the trial court erred in failing to suspend 
22 
proceedings, we consider all evidence related to defendant‘s competence of which 
the trial court had become aware before it entered judgment.  
 
The court was indeed informed of evidence demonstrating defendant‘s 
erratic behavior.  The motion for change of venue stated that former counsel Sisti 
had attempted ―to lay the foundations for an Insanity Defense‖ before the New 
Hampshire state court, though defendant himself characterized Sisti‘s claims about 
his competence as ―dramatic‖ and ―unsubstantiated.‖  In a filing concerning 
whether defendant should be physically restrained during proceedings, the People 
referenced defendant‘s uncooperativeness during his incarceration in New 
Hampshire, including the fact that he refused to dress and chose to cover himself 
with a blanket to make a court appearance via closed circuit monitor.  Defendant 
sought to justify the killing of Officer Mobilio as a ―necessary‖ exercise of his 
―right to defend liberty‖ and attempted to claim corporate immunity based on his 
decision to register as a corporation.  When the court decided that defendant could 
not present his liberty justification, defendant became ―very emotional‖ and opted, 
―in protest,‖ not to present any evidence for his case during the guilt phase.  
Defendant‘s bizarre behavior and his unconventional trial demeanor pertain to his 
competence, but they are not dispositive.   
 
The record of trial proceedings shows that defendant understood the nature 
and purpose of the proceedings and was capable of assisting in his own defense.  
Defendant submitted well-researched legal briefs, argued motions, and cross-
examined witnesses.  A few months after his initial appearance in court, defendant 
represented that he had ―undertaken extensive and diligent study to become more 
familiar with the criminal trial process.‖  Defendant later filed a 15-page 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of his request for self-
representation, where he cited relevant legal authority and made logical 
23 
arguments.  There is also no evidence in the record that defendant failed to 
cooperate with Reichle while he served as defense counsel or as advisory counsel. 
 
And the letters and probation report, read by the court after a verdict was 
rendered, do not provide further evidence raising a doubt as to competence.  The 
letters from family and friends claimed, among other things, that defendant had 
been assessed by psychiatrists, and he was ―crazy‖ or ―very confused and 
disturbed.‖  Revealing though these letters might be of the extent of concern 
among defendant‘s family or friends, they convey little about defendant‘s 
competence to stand trial.  Such letters did not speak to defendant‘s ability to 
understand the proceedings or assist in his defense.  At best, these letters reflect 
generalized concerns that defendant suffered from depression or a psychosis, but 
they do not show that defendant was, as a result of his mental illness, unable to 
understand the nature and purpose of the criminal proceedings against him or 
conduct his defense.  (See Laudermilk, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 285; see also People 
v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 403 [statements by expert that defendant 
suffered from mental illness and exhibited erratic and psychotic behavior not 
substantial evidence of incompetence]; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 714 
(Blair) [―even a history of serious mental illness does not necessarily constitute 
substantial evidence of incompetence that would require a court to declare a 
doubt‖].)  Defendant relies on references to a ―verbal diagnosis‖ of a psychosis 
and an incomplete assessment reaching a similar conclusion by two psychiatrists 
in his mother‘s letter but, again, those claims offer little insight into whether 
defendant lacked the ability to understand the proceedings against him or 
otherwise participate in and conduct his defense.  (See Laudermilk, at p. 282.)  Nor 
does the probation report support defendant‘s argument.  That report concludes 
that ―[n]othing in [defendant‘s] background suggests a serious moral or emotional 
24 
weakness of character.  There is no indication of instability; he speaks with utter 
clarity about what he did and why.‖ 
 
The evidence before the trial court, in short, did not amount to substantial 
evidence requiring the court to suspend proceedings prior to entering judgment.  
Because of this, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion by failing 
to declare a doubt as to defendant‘s competence and order a hearing.  We therefore 
reject defendant‘s claim.  
4.  Deprivation of the Right to Counsel  
 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing him to waive his 
constitutional right to counsel because defendant was incompetent to do so.  More 
specifically, defendant contends that under Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 
164 (Edwards), California may impose requirements beyond Faretta v. California 
(1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta), and that California has done so.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we reject defendant‘s claim.  
a.  Background 
 
Defendant expressed his desire to represent himself during his first 
appearance in the trial court.  After being informed that his acceptance of 
counsel‘s representation during the preliminary hearing would not constitute 
waiver of his right to represent himself during trial, defendant accepted 
representation on February 4, 2003.  
 
On April 7, 2003, counsel filed a motion requesting an opportunity for 
defendant to personally address the court during the preliminary hearing and 
explain the ―legal basis and nature of his affirmative defense.‖  Following a 
response by the People, the court held a hearing on the motion.  During the 
hearing, defense counsel explained that while defendant ―admitted [to] doing the 
act,‖ defendant wanted an opportunity to justify his action of killing Officer 
25 
Mobilio.  Defense counsel explained that there was ―obviously no case or jury 
instruction for a justification in this case,‖ but that defendant wished to explain his 
actions to the court during the preliminary hearing.  The trial court denied the 
motion, citing the potentially prejudicial publicity and absence of any entitlement 
to put forth such a justification during the preliminary hearing.  
 
On November 20, 2003, defendant, through counsel, filed a motion seeking 
self-representation.  Defendant personally prepared a memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of his motion.  Citing relevant legal authority, defendant 
requested that he be allowed to represent himself and that Reichle be appointed as 
advisory counsel.  Reichle also filed a brief in support of defendant‘s motion.  The 
People‘s response did not oppose defendant‘s request for self-representation, but 
argued that defendant‘s demonstrated legal capabilities obviated the need for 
advisory counsel.3  At the hearing on the motion, the trial court engaged in a 
Faretta colloquy with defendant.  The court verified that defendant had read, 
understood, and signed the written Faretta waiver.  It then concluded on the 
record that defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.  
The court granted defendant‘s motion and appointed Reichle as advisory counsel.  
b.  Legal Standard 
 
A defendant has a federal constitutional right to the assistance of counsel 
during all critical stages of a criminal prosecution.  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 
807; United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 223-227.)  A defendant may also 
waive this right and personally represent him- or herself, so long as the 
defendant‘s waiver of the right to counsel is valid.  A valid waiver requires that the 
                                              
3 
Notwithstanding the People‘s position in their response, the prosecution did 
argue in favor of appointing standby counsel.  
26 
defendant possess the mental capacity to comprehend the nature and object of the 
proceedings against him or her, and that the defendant waive the right knowingly 
and voluntarily.  (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069 (Koontz).)  If a 
defendant has validly waived the right to counsel, a trial court must grant a 
defendant‘s request for self-representation.  (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 
p. 729.)  We review a Faretta waiver de novo, and examine the entire record to 
determine the validity of a defendant‘s waiver of the right to counsel.  (Koontz, at 
p. 1070.)  
c.  Analysis 
 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in permitting him to represent himself 
without determining whether defendant was sufficiently competent to conduct his 
own defense.  According to defendant, the evolution of California and federal case 
law on the intersection of competence and the right of self-representation requires 
that California courts apply the highest standards of competence consistent with 
federal law, i.e., that a defendant understand ―the nature of the charges and the 
available defenses.‖   
 
We begin with established principles.  There is no dispute that the right of 
self-representation is not absolute.  (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 171.)  The 
autonomy and dignity interests underlying our willingness to recognize the right of 
self-representation may be outweighed, on occasion, by countervailing 
considerations of justice and the state‘s interest in efficiency.  (See, e.g., ibid.; 
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. (2000) 528 U.S. 152, 
163 [no right of self-representation on direct appeal]; McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 
465 U.S. 168, 178-179 [appointment of standby counsel against defendant‘s 
wishes is permissible].)  What we have declined to find is that a defendant‘s 
autonomy and dignity interests are outweighed as a matter of law whenever the 
27 
criminal trial happens to be a capital one.  (People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 
850, 865 (Taylor).)  This is so even where a self-represented defendant chooses a 
strategy seeking death rather than life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole, as an individual could rationally prefer the death penalty.  (Ibid.)  We have 
also rejected claims that the fact or likelihood that an unskilled, self-represented 
defendant will perform poorly in conducting his or her own defense must defeat 
the Faretta right.   
 
Accordingly, the critical question is not whether a self-represented 
defendant meets the standards of an attorney, or even whether a defendant is 
capable of conducting an effective defense.  Instead, we have accepted that the 
cost of recognizing a criminal defendant‘s right to self-representation may result  
― ‗in detriment to the defendant, if not outright unfairness.‘ ‖  (Taylor, supra, 47 
Cal.4th at p. 866, quoting Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 739.)  But that is a cost that 
we allow defendants the choice of paying, if they can do so knowingly and 
voluntarily.   
 
Both the high court and this court have further elucidated the limitations 
that competence may impose on the scope of the self-representation right.  Until 
the high court‘s decision in Edwards, California courts had generally held that the 
standards for competence to stand trial and competence to represent oneself were 
identical.  (See Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 874.)  In Edwards, the high court 
addressed ―gray-area defendants,‖ i.e., those defendants who satisfy the Dusky 
standard for competence to stand trial, but because of severe mental illness are not 
capable of conducting trial proceedings on their own.  (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 
at pp. 175-176 [―an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky‘s mental 
competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the 
same time . . . may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present [a] 
defense without the help of counsel‖].)  While the high court had previously held 
28 
that a state may permit a gray-area defendant to represent him- or herself (see 
Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 402), it was not until Edwards that the 
high court clarified that a state may also limit a defendant‘s right to self-
representation by requiring more than mere competency to stand trial (Edwards, at 
p. 174).  The Edwards court declined to adopt a more specific standard for 
determining a defendant‘s competency to represent him- or herself.  (Id. at p. 178.) 
 
Taking up the question Edwards left unresolved, we held in Johnson that 
— consistent with California law — trial courts may deny self-representation as 
permitted under Edwards.  (People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 528 
(Johnson).)  As did the high court, we declined to adopt a more specific standard 
for competency in the self-representation context, and instead concluded that the 
appropriate standard is ―whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness 
to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the 
defense without the help of counsel.‖  (Id. at p. 530.)  In adopting the Edwards 
formulation, we rejected calls to adopt more specific standards articulated by the 
People, various amici curiae, lower court decisions, and law review articles.4  (Id. 
                                              
4 
―The Attorney General suggest[ed] the ‗standard could be as simple as 
determining whether the defendant can conceive of a defense and coherently 
communicate it to the judge and jury.‘ ‖  (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 529.)  
Some amici curiae suggested we ―return to . . . the pre-Faretta standard in 
California ‗requiring that a defendant who wishes to represent himself demonstrate 
an understanding of the charges, defenses and punishments, and an ability to 
rationally communicate.‘ ‖  (Ibid.)   
 
Still others called for adoption of the test for ― ‗cognitive and 
communicative skills,‘ ‖ first articulated in People v. Burnett (1987) 188 
Cal.App.3d 1314 and repeated in Taylor, which looked at whether a defendant:  
― ‗ ―(1) possesses a reasonably accurate awareness of his [or her] situation, 
including not simply an appreciation of the charges against him [or her] and the 
range and nature of possible penalties, but also his [or her] own physical or mental 
infirmities, if any; (2) is able to understand and use relevant information rationally 
in order to fashion a response to the charges; and (3) can coherently communicate 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
29 
at p. 529.)  While other, more specific standards were plausible, we reaffirmed the 
basic principle articulated in Edwards:  state courts may only exercise the 
discretion to deny self-representation based on a defendant‘s mental state as 
permitted under Edwards.  (Id. at 530.)    
 
Here, defendant argues once more that we should adopt a more specific 
standard for competence to waive the right to counsel.  Defendant observes that 
our pre-Faretta case law required that a defendant not only understand the nature 
of the criminal proceedings against him or her, but also the nature of the charge, 
the elements of the offense, the available pleas and defenses, and the range of 
possible punishments.  (In re Johnson (1976) 62 Cal.2d 325, 335.)  True, but our 
pre-Faretta case law cannot be indiscriminately imported into a post-Faretta 
world.  As we concluded in Johnson, California courts may only exercise the 
discretion permitted under Edwards, not the discretion our pre-Faretta case law 
reflected.  (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 530.)  We came to that conclusion 
while rejecting suggestions that we adopt the very same standard which defendant 
now advocates.  (Id. at pp. 529-530.)  Under Edwards, a trial court may exercise 
its discretion to deny self-representation where a defendant suffers from a severe 
mental illness such that he or she is unable to perform the basic tasks necessary to 
present a defense.  (Johnson, at p. 530; Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 175-176.)   
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
that response to the trier of fact.‖  [Citation.]‘ ‖  (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 
529, quoting Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 873.)  Contrary to defendant‘s 
argument, we noted that while trial courts and experts may consider these factors, 
we did not hold that trial courts must consider these factors in exercising their 
discretion to deny self-representation.  (Johnson, at p. 530.)   
30 
 
What defendant contends here is that there was substantial evidence that he 
was incapable of presenting a defense without the assistance of counsel.  
Defendant cites the Drukteinis report, his theory concerning his liberty 
justification, and his emotional reaction to the trial court‘s exclusion of the defense 
as sufficient indicia of defendant‘s incompetence to require the trial court to deny 
defendant‘s request for self-representation.  But a trial court is not required to 
―routinely inquire‖ into a defendant‘s mental competence when evaluating a 
Faretta motion.  (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 530-531.)   Indeed, a trial court 
need only do so where it has doubts about the defendant‘s competence, and for the 
reasons discussed ante, the trial court here had little reason to doubt defendant‘s 
mental competence.   
 
In the instant case, the record reflects that defendant demonstrated his 
capability to undertake the basic tasks necessary to represent himself, and that the 
trial court had no reason to doubt defendant‘s skill and ability to do so.  Defendant 
was cooperative, respectful, and articulate during courtroom proceedings.  He filed 
motions citing relevant legal authority that he applied to the specific facts at hand, 
made organized and internally consistent arguments, and was able to effectively 
communicate his arguments to the trial court in written and oral form.  Defendant 
demonstrated the ability to understand courtroom proceedings and apply rules of 
procedure.  During the pretrial and trial proceedings, defendant moved for and 
won a motion to change venue, challenged two jurors for cause after engaging in 
voir dire, exercised a peremptory challenge, gave opening and closing statements, 
and cross-examined witnesses.  There is ample evidence throughout the record that 
defendant was capable of undertaking the types of basic trial tasks the high court 
identified as relevant to the competence inquiry.  (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 
175-176, citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 174 [―basic tasks‖ 
include ―organization of defense, making motions, arguing points of law, 
31 
participating in voir dire, questioning witnesses, and addressing the court and 
jury‖].)   
 
The trial judge had the benefit of observing and interacting with defendant.  
The court indicated on multiple occasions that it was extremely impressed with 
defendant‘s competence and skill in representing himself and that defendant was 
―very articulate, [and] very well prepared.‖  And while the trial court correctly 
concluded that defendant‘s political theories could not serve as a valid legal 
defense, the mere fact that defendant held fringe political beliefs that inspired his 
murder of a police officer does not render him incompetent to represent himself.  
And defendant‘s decision to present no defense — though ill-advised — was a 
valid exercise of his right to control his defense.  (See People v. Clark (1990) 50 
Cal.3d 583, 617 [―The defendant has the right to present no defense and to take the 
stand and both confess guilt and request imposition of the death penalty‖].)      
 
In sum, defendant‘s conduct demonstrated he was capable of performing 
the basic tasks of self-representation.  We reject defendant‘s claim that the trial 
court erroneously deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.   
5.  Violation of Penal Code Section 686.1  
 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred under section 686.1 by failing to 
revoke his self-representation during the penalty phase.  We conclude there was no 
error.  
 
Section 686.1 requires defendants in capital cases to be represented by 
counsel during all stages of the preliminary and trial proceedings.  This provision 
predates the high court‘s decision in Faretta and may only be applied where 
Faretta is not implicated.  (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 526 [explaining that 
post-Faretta, ―Penal Code section 686.1 . . . cannot be given effect,‖ but that 
California courts should ―give effect to this California law‖ when possible]; see 
32 
People v. Burgener (2016) 1 Cal.5th 461, 474-475 (Burgener II).  As defendant 
concedes, a capital defendant‘s right to self-representation may not be limited at 
the penalty phase.  Indeed, the penalty phase is merely another stage in a unitary 
capital trial, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and corresponding right to 
self-representation is not vitiated during the penalty phase.  (Blair, supra, 36 
Cal.4th at pp. 737-738.)  We have also considered and rejected defendant‘s 
argument that there is any diminution of a criminal defendant‘s autonomy interests 
during the penalty phase.  (Id. at p. 738; see Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 865 
[―the autonomy interest motivating the decision in Faretta . . . applies at a capital 
penalty trial as well as in a trial of guilt‖].)  Indeed, we have concluded that a 
defendant continues to have ―an interest in personally presenting his or her 
defense‖ at the penalty phase and controlling what, if any, mitigating evidence to 
present.  (Blair, at p. 738.)   
 
Notwithstanding this contrary precedent, defendant argues that these cases 
do not reflect the high court‘s holding in Edwards that states may limit the right to 
self-representation for gray-area defendants.  Defendant is correct that Edwards 
stands for the proposition that California may, consistent with the federal 
Constitution, limit a criminal defendant‘s self-representation right where a 
defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct his or her defense.  That does not, 
however, support the broad conclusion that the right to self-representation is 
abrogated during the penalty phase.  (See Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 174-
175.)  Contrary to defendant‘s argument, we find nothing in Edwards that requires 
us to conclude that a state‘s interest in the integrity of death judgments may trump 
a defendant‘s autonomy interests merely because the trial has proceeded to the 
sentencing stage.  Indeed, we rejected such an argument in Taylor, a post-Edwards 
decision, in which we held that the autonomy interests underlying Faretta apply 
33 
with equal force at the penalty phase of a capital trial as at the guilt phase.  
(Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 865.)  
 
To the extent defendant‘s argument relies on the same claims addressed in 
the prior section, we again conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to sua 
sponte revoke defendant‘s self-representation.  For the reasons stated above, the 
trial court had little reason to question defendant‘s ability to carry out the basic 
tasks of self-representation. 
6.  Failure to Obtain a Renewed Faretta Waiver 
 
The People filed a section 190.3 notice of intent to seek death after the trial 
court granted defendant‘s motion for self-representation.  Defendant contends that 
the trial court erred in failing to obtain an updated Faretta waiver after the People 
filed their section 190.3 notice.  As the record supports the conclusion that 
defendant was fully aware that the People sought the death penalty before the trial 
court granted defendant‘s motion for self-representation, we conclude that 
defendant‘s Faretta waiver was knowing and voluntary.   
a.  Background 
 
Defendant expressed his desire to represent himself during his first 
appearance in the trial court on January 30, 2003.  After being represented by 
counsel through the preliminary hearing, defendant filed a motion requesting self-
representation on November 20, 2003.  Defendant personally prepared a 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of his motion.  At the hearing on 
the motion, the trial court informed defendant that he had a right to be represented 
by counsel, and warned defendant about the disadvantages of self-representation, 
including that the prosecutor would be an experienced and skilled attorney and 
that the court would be unable to assist defendant.  The trial court further 
explained that defendant would be unable to make an ineffective assistance of 
34 
counsel claim with respect to his self-representation and gave defense counsel and 
the prosecutor an opportunity to be heard on the motion.  The prosecutor stated the 
People‘s preference that standby counsel be appointed to take over if the court 
terminated defendant‘s self-representation but otherwise submitted on the motion.  
Defendant disagreed with the prosecutor‘s description of the limited role of 
standby counsel.  He cited state and federal case law for the proposition that 
standby counsel could provide assistance throughout the proceedings when 
requested by the defendant and allowed by the court.  After the trial court 
explained that Reichle would be only an ―advisor‖ to defendant, and that 
defendant would be responsible for presenting his own defense, the trial court 
asked whether defendant understood that ―[i]f you are taking on the responsibility 
of self-representation, you are taking on all of it, and must assume that you are 
going to have to handle that case on your own.‖  Based on defendant‘s affirmative 
response, the trial court concluded on the record that defendant had knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel.  The court granted defendant‘s motion 
and appointed Reichle as advisory counsel.  Defendant then entered a plea of not 
guilty and denied the special circumstance.   
 
At a status conference on February 9, 2004, the prosecutor indicated that he 
―would just like to state on the record that this will be a death penalty case,‖ and 
that the prosecutor had ―let Mr. Reichle know that before.‖  The trial court asked 
whether defendant or Reichle had anything further to discuss, they answered in the 
negative, and the hearing ended.   
b.  Legal Standard 
 
A criminal defendant may waive his or her right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  A valid waiver requires that the 
defendant have ―the mental capacity to understand the nature and object of the 
35 
proceedings against him or her,‖ and that the defendant waives the right 
knowingly and voluntarily.  (Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1069-1070.)  In 
deciding whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary, we examine the record as a 
whole to see whether the defendant actually understood the consequences and 
import of the decision to waive counsel, and whether the waiver was freely made.  
(Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. at p. 401, fn. 12.)  There is no prescribed 
script or admonition that trial courts must use in warning a defendant of the 
disadvantages of self-representation.  But, in whatever way the trial court chooses 
to explain the perils of self-representation, the record as a whole must establish 
that the defendant understood the ―dangers and disadvantages‖ of waiving the 
right to counsel, including the risks and intricacies of the case.  (Blair, supra, 36 
Cal.4th at p. 708; People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 241 (Burgener I).)  
We review a Faretta waiver de novo, and examine the whole record to determine 
the validity of a defendant‘s waiver of the right to counsel.  (Burgener I, at p. 241.) 
c.  Analysis 
 
Defendant argues that the trial court should have obtained an updated 
Faretta waiver when the People formally put on the record their intention to seek 
the death penalty.  Pivotal to defendant‘s claim is the assumption that defendant 
failed to apprehend that the People intended to seek the death penalty at the time 
he filed his motion for self-representation.   
The record shows otherwise. As the People note, the criminal information 
filed on May 29, 2003, charged defendant with one count of murder and the 
special circumstance that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the 
performance of his duties.  The information also specified that the sentencing 
range was life without parole or death.  Defendant also concedes that he filed a 
Faretta waiver form, which states that the defendant had been advised of ―the 
36 
penalties for the offense[s] if found guilty and additional consequences that could 
result.‖  In response to the court‘s queries at the hearing on defendant‘s motion for 
self-representation, defendant stated that he had read and understood the form and 
did not have any questions.  
 
Defendant dismisses the importance of the waiver form and the questioning 
by the trial court.  Instead, defendant contends, there is no evidence in the record 
that the trial court ever explicitly advised defendant that death was a possible 
penalty before granting his motion for self-representation.  Defendant is right that 
the record does not indicate clearly whether the trial court so advised defendant.  
While many defendants will know the potential sentences they face while waiving 
representation, it is valuable for trial courts –– as a routine practice –– to orally 
review during a Faretta colloquy the potential sentence a defendant faces. 
What is nonetheless clear from this record is that, one way or another, 
defendant was fully aware of the fact that this was a capital case at the time he 
requested to represent himself.  In defendant‘s November 24, 2003, memorandum 
of points and authorities in support of his motion for self-representation, defendant 
referred to the capital nature of the case multiple times throughout the 15-page 
document.  Defendant specifically requested that the court appoint Reichle as 
advisory counsel, and in citing legal authority setting forth the scope of the trial 
court‘s discretion to do so, argued that, ―In capital cases the Court has the 
authority to appoint an additional attorney as co-counsel.  P.C. 987(d).‖  On the 
next page, defendant cited section 987, subdivision (d) and case law for the 
proposition that ―[i]n a death penalty case a trial court may be required to appoint 
a second attorney as co-counsel.‖  Defendant acknowledged that ―apparently a 
defendant representing himself in a death penalty case is not recognized to have 
this same right to the appointment of second counsel,‖ but then put forth an 
argument that the same standard for appointing second counsel should apply to pro 
37 
se capital defendants.  Defendant also argued that his planned defense was an 
―extremely complex‖ one that required the assistance of ―death-qualified counsel.‖  
There is little doubt that defendant comprehended that this was a capital case at the 
time the trial court accepted his Faretta waiver. 
 
The People‘s response to defendant‘s motion for self-representation also 
referred to the case, repeatedly, as a capital one.  Defendant disagreed with the 
People‘s response to his motion at the hearing and demonstrated that he had both 
read and understood the nuances of the People‘s brief.  These facts support the 
conclusion that defendant was both advised and fully aware of the fact that he 
would be facing the death penalty at the time he waived his right to counsel.  That 
the People did not give their section 190.3 notice until February 9, 2004, is of little 
import where, as here, the record as a whole reflects that defendant knew and 
understood that he would be facing the death penalty.  Accordingly, we reject 
defendant‘s claim. 
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Witt Issues as to Jurors Nos. 7877, 7017, 10155, and 9466 
 
According to the defendant, the written questionnaires of four seated jurors 
indicated that these jurors believed a defendant convicted of killing a police officer 
engaged in the performance of his or her own duties should automatically receive 
the death penalty.  Defendant contends that these jurors therefore should have 
been excused for cause under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt).  
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his rights to an impartial jury under 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Defendant‘s claim is 
forfeited and, even if not forfeited, meritless.  
38 
a.  Background 
 
The trial court, with the input of the parties, required prospective jurors to 
fill out a written questionnaire prior to voir dire.  The questionnaire included 
several questions intended to elicit prospective jurors‘ views on the death penalty, 
and whether a prospective juror would be capable of setting aside his or her own 
personal beliefs and defer to the law.  Questions Nos. 38 and 54 sought to 
determine whether a prospective juror would always vote for death if a defendant 
was found guilty of intentional first degree murder, and whether a prospective 
juror could see him- or herself exercising both sentencing options.5  Similarly, 
question No. 55 asked prospective jurors whether they strongly agreed, somewhat 
agreed, strongly disagreed, or somewhat disagreed with the statement that 
―[a]nyone who intentionally kills another person should always get the death 
penalty.‖   
 
In addition, questions Nos. 39 and 49 asked prospective jurors for their 
opinions about capital punishment under the facts presented in the case at hand:  
the killing of a police officer while the officer was engaged in the performance of 
his duties.  More specifically, question No. 39 asked: ―Do you feel that the State of 
                                              
5  
Question No. 38 asked: ―If the jury found a defendant guilty of intentional 
first degree murder and found a special circumstance to be true, would you always 
vote for death, no matter what other evidence might be presented at the penalty 
hearing in this case?‖  
 
Question No. 54 asked: ―There are no circumstances under which a jury is 
instructed by the court to return a verdict of death. No matter what the evidence 
shows, the jury is always given the option in the penalty phase of choosing life 
without the possibility of parole. (a) Given the fact that you will have two options 
available to you, can you see yourself, in the appropriate case, rejecting the death 
penalty and choosing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole instead? 
(b) Given the fact that you will have two options available to you, can you see 
yourself, in the appropriate case, rejecting life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole and choosing the death penalty instead?‖   
39 
California should automatically put to death everyone who:  A. Kills another 
human being?  B. Is convicted of murder?  C. Is convicted of multiple murder?  D. 
Is convicted of murder plus the murder was of a peace officer while the peace 
officer was engaged in the performance of his duties?‖  Question No. 49 queried:  
―The murder alleged in this case alleges the special circumstances that David 
Mobilio was a police officer who was intentionally killed while engaged in the 
performance of his duties and that the defendant knew and reasonably should have 
known that David Mobilio was a peace officer who was engaged in the 
performance of his duties.  Do you think that, depending on the circumstances of 
this case and the evidence to be presented in the penalty phase, if any: -- you could 
impose the death penalty in such case?  -- you could impose life in prison without 
parole in such a case?‖ 
 
During voir dire, the trial court asked prospective jurors additional 
questions.  The court inquired as to the prospective jurors‘ views on the death 
penalty, their ability to impose either life without the possibility of parole or the 
death penalty based on the evidence, and their willingness to be fair and impartial 
and follow the court‘s instructions.  The trial court asked each prospective juror 
these questions on the record, and also asked follow-up questions if the 
prospective juror‘s questionnaire responses indicated potential bias or revealed 
any inconsistencies or ambiguities.  After the trial court questioned prospective 
jurors on death qualifications, defendant and the prosecution stipulated to the 
excusal of two prospective jurors, and the parties were allowed to conduct their 
own voir dire.  
 
Defendant challenged two prospective jurors for cause.  The prosecution 
submitted as to the first juror and objected to the second.  The trial court excused 
the first juror, but denied defendant‘s challenge as to the second juror.  Defendant 
subsequently exercised a peremptory strike as to the second juror.  Defendant also 
40 
struck another prospective juror.  Defendant then passed on the remainder of his 
peremptory challenges. 
b.  Legal Standard 
 
A criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury.  (People v. Earp 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 852.)  A prospective juror‘s opinions on the death penalty 
may support an excusal for cause if those opinions would ― ‗prevent or 
substantially impair the performance‘ ‖ of the prospective juror‘s duties.  (Witt, 
supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.)  A prospective juror who is incapable of 
―conscientiously consider[ing]‖ the full range of sentencing options, including the 
death penalty, should be excluded from service.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 
Cal.4th 900, 987 (Jenkins).)  An inability to carefully and sincerely consider all 
sentencing options is distinct, however, from merely holding views about the 
death penalty, including personal opposition to capital punishment.  (People v. 
Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 591 (Leon) [―But personal opposition to the death 
penalty is not an automatic ground for excusal‖].)  Rather, so long as a prospective 
juror is willing to ― ‗temporarily set aside [his or her] own beliefs‘ ‖ and fairly 
consider the sentencing alternatives presented under the law, the prospective juror 
may properly serve on a capital jury.  (Id. at p. 592; Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 
476 U.S. 162, 176.)  
 
Where a trial court conducts in-person voir dire, we generally defer to the 
trial court‘s determination as to a prospective juror‘s true state of mind.  (Leon, 
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 593; Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987.)  Unlike the 
reviewing court, the trial court that has conducted voir dire has the unique benefit 
of observing a prospective juror‘s credibility, tone, attitude, and demeanor — 
factors we have described as of ― ‗ ―critical importance‖ ‘ ‖ in determining 
41 
whether a prospective juror is capable of performing his or her duties as a juror.  
(Leon, at p. 593.)   
c.  Analysis 
 
Defendant has forfeited any Witt claim.  As a general matter, we require a 
defendant to exhaust his or her peremptory challenges as a condition precedent to 
a claim of error in this context.  (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 315.)  A 
defendant must (1) use a peremptory challenge to remove the objected-to juror, (2) 
exhaust his or her peremptory challenges or provide a justification for the failure 
to do so, and (3) ―express dissatisfaction‖ with the selected jury.  (Blair, supra, 36 
Cal.4th at p. 741; Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 884 [quoting Blair].)   
Here, defendant concedes that he failed to use his peremptory challenges 
with respect to Jurors Nos. 7877, 7017, 10155, and 9466, that he did not exhaust 
his peremptory challenges, and that he did not express dissatisfaction with the 
final jury.  Defendant provides no justification for his failure to challenge or object 
to these jurors, and we find no reason in the record why defendant could not have 
done so.  Indeed, as noted, defendant challenged other jurors for cause and 
exercised a peremptory strike as to the juror that the trial court did not excuse for 
cause.  Defendant has forfeited any claim of error with respect to Jurors Nos. 
7877, 7017, 10155, and 9466.  
 
Moreover, even assuming defendant had not forfeited his claims with 
respect to Jurors Nos. 7877, 7017, 10155, and 9466, those claims lack merit.  
Defendant argues that the four jurors‘ responses to the questionnaire were subject 
to challenge for cause, as their opinions would prevent or substantially impair their 
performance of their duties as jurors.  Specifically, Jurors Nos. 7877, 7017, and 
10155 all responded ―yes‖ to question No. 39-d, which asked whether the 
individual felt that the state should automatically put to death everyone who ―[i]s 
42 
convicted of murder plus the murder was of a peace officer while the peace officer 
was engaged in the performance of his duties.‖  Juror No. 9466 responded to this 
question with a question mark.  As the People observe, however, each of these 
jurors also answered a series of other questions on the written questionnaire, 
including providing affirmative responses to question No. 49, which asked each 
juror whether ―you could impose‖ the death penalty or life in prison without 
parole, after describing the specific facts of this case:  that defendant had allegedly 
killed a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his duties.   
 
It is conceivable that these jurors held the personal opinion that the state 
should automatically impose the death penalty whenever a defendant is found 
guilty of the intentional murder of a peace officer engaged in the performance of 
his or her duties.  But each of these four jurors also affirmatively stated that he or 
she was capable of imposing either the death penalty or life in prison without 
parole under the specific facts presented in the instant case.  That they had 
particular feelings and opinions about the propriety of capital punishment for the 
killing of peace officers is, standing alone, insufficient to require excusal from 
service.  (See Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 592; Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 
987.)  Instead, we ask whether the record reflects the jurors‘ ability and 
willingness to ― ‗temporarily set aside‘ ‖ these personal opinions, and fairly 
consider either the death penalty or life in prison without parole.  (Leon, at p. 592.)  
Here, each juror not only affirmed that he or she was capable of conscientiously 
considering the sentencing alternatives on their written questionnaires, but also 
indicated during voir dire that he or she would not automatically vote for or 
against death regardless of the evidence, and that he or she was capable of 
imposing either sentence.  Moreover, to the extent these jurors‘ responses might be 
considered ambiguous or conflicting, we defer to the observations of the trial 
court, as it was best positioned to evaluate the jurors‘ responses, attitudes, and 
43 
demeanors.  (Leon, at p. 593; Jenkins, at p. 987.)  Defendant‘s claims would fail 
on the merits, even if he had not forfeited them.  
2.  Exclusion of Defendant’s Liberty Defense 
 
Defendant argues that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right 
to testify in his own defense by excluding defendant‘s liberty defense.  For the 
reasons discussed below, defendant‘s argument fails. 
a.  Background 
 
The trial court granted defendant‘s motion for self-representation on 
December 8, 2003.  Defendant first indicated at a pretrial hearing on May 10, 
2004, that he intended on testifying at trial.  After some discussion with the trial 
court about whether defendant would be allowed to testify in narrative form, ask 
himself questions, or have advisory counsel ask him questions, the trial court 
indicated that it would ―entertain whatever request it is that‖ defendant would 
make, and give the People an opportunity to be heard.   
 
At a subsequent pretrial hearing on March 17, 2005, the trial court indicated 
that if defendant intended on providing a defense, the trial court would require 
defendant to make an offer of proof.  Based on defendant‘s Internet postings and 
offer to stipulate to culpability in the acts underlying the offense, the trial court 
was concerned that defendant planned to argue legally invalid defenses.  The trial 
court referenced defendant‘s statements from his Internet postings that ―I was a 
corporation; therefore, I am immune from liability,‖ and ―I want to make a 
political statement protesting police brutality.‖  Defendant indicated his 
understanding of the trial court‘s concerns and offered no other explanation or 
statement at that particular hearing.  
 
Defendant then submitted two briefs to the trial court, in which he argued 
that he should be allowed to make an offer of proof in camera and ex parte, and 
44 
also outlined his proposed defense theory.  The People submitted on defendant‘s 
request to have an in camera opportunity to explain his liberty defense to the trial 
court, and the court held an in camera hearing with defendant and advisory 
counsel on April 1, 2005.  At that hearing, defendant explained that his killing of 
Officer Mobilio was a ―necessary‖ exercise of his ―right to defend liberty.‖  
Defendant conceded that his defense theory was not recognized anywhere in the 
United States.  According to defendant, the government‘s infringement of 
individual liberties justified his killing of Officer Mobilio, as police officers 
enforce unjust laws.  The court explained that the democratic rule of law required 
individuals who sought to defend liberty to use the political process or the courts, 
and that the law could not countenance ―[s]hooting a cop on the street‖ in order to 
effect political change.  The court then concluded that defendant would not be 
allowed to present a defense to the jury that was ―not cognizable in the law‖ 
because the court could not instruct on such a defense and that the evidence as to 
those theories was irrelevant.  In response, defendant became ―very emotional‖ 
and indicated that he would sit in ―silent protest during the guilt phase.‖  The court 
offered to give defendant time to reconsider that decision, and after consulting 
with advisory counsel, defendant again stated that he would not present a defense 
during the guilt phase.   
b.  Legal Standard 
 
 Under the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to testify on his or 
her own behalf.  (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332; People v. 
Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 215.)  These constitutional due process guarantees 
include the right to present witnesses and evidence in support of a defense.  
(Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302.)  As the high court has 
45 
explained, however, these rights are ―subject to reasonable restrictions.‖  (United 
States v. Scheffer (1998) 523 U.S. 303, 308; Chambers, at p. 302 [noting that a 
defendant ―must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence 
designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and 
innocence‖].)   
 
―As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly 
infringe on the accused‘s right to present a defense.‖  (People v. Hall (1986) 41 
Cal.3d 826, 834; Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 55 [the right to present 
―relevant testimony is not without limitation‖].)  As long as the trial court‘s 
restrictions on a defendant‘s right to testify are not ―arbitrary or disproportionate 
to the purposes they are designed to serve,‖ a court may limit a defendant‘s 
testimony pursuant to a rule of evidence if ―the interests served by [the] rule 
justify the limitation imposed on the defendant‘s constitutional right to testify.‖  
(Rock, at p. 56.)  We review a trial court‘s ruling to exclude evidence as irrelevant 
for abuse of discretion.  (See People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 892.)     
c.  Analysis 
 
Defendant contends that the trial court‘s order excluding him from 
presenting evidence in support of his proffered liberty defense to murder on 
relevance grounds was arbitrary and disproportionate to the interests the relevance 
doctrine is designed to serve, thus violating defendant‘s fundamental constitutional 
right to testify on his own behalf.  On appeal, defendant does not argue that his 
right to testify was improperly restricted because his liberty defense was legally 
cognizable as justification for the homicide.  Instead he contends that the 
categories of evidence about which he sought to testify were relevant to the 
circumstances of the offense and to his motive for committing the offense.  But the 
trial court did not err in restricting defendant‘s ability to testify that his killing of 
46 
Officer Mobilio was legitimate because it was in defense of liberties that 
defendant believed were being infringed by the government.  Defendant‘s 
proffered evidence, that he did not know Officer Mobilio and had no prior 
interactions with Officer Mobilio, was not relevant to any element of the charged 
offense of first degree murder, nor did it have any bearing on defendant‘s guilt or 
innocence.   
 
Defendant argues that his motive to defend his liberty was relevant 
evidence.  His theory was that such a motive tended to negate the element of 
premeditation under CALJIC No. 8.73.1, as it tended to show he acted under a 
delusion.  (CALJIC No. 8.73.1 (2004 ed.)  [―A hallucination is a perception that 
has no objective reality.  [¶]  If the evidence establishes that the perpetrator of an 
unlawful killing suffered from a hallucination which contributed as a cause of the 
homicide, you should consider that evidence solely on the issue of whether the 
perpetrator killed . . . without deliberation and premeditation.‖].)  This argument 
fails to persuade.  Defendant argued that his killing of Officer Mobilio was 
justified because he acted in defense of liberty in the same way that American 
colonists did against British attempts to disarm them.  At no point was there any 
evidence or inference that defendant had hallucinated the historical events of the 
American Revolution or any other events related to the offense.  Rather, defendant 
analogized his actions to those of American revolutionaries, and argued that his 
killing of a law enforcement officer was an action against tyranny and therefore 
justified.  This does not fall within the scope of CALJIC No. 8.73.1, and the record 
does not support the conclusion that defendant‘s liberty defense was relevant to 
premeditation.  
 
There was no basis in law for either convicting defendant of a lesser offense 
or excusing defendant from criminal liability altogether.  Allowing defendant to 
testify about his political opinions regarding the government‘s infringement on 
47 
personal liberties, including the right to bear arms, would have confused the jury 
as to why defendant‘s beliefs were relevant to the elements of first degree murder 
and would have misled the jury as to the relevance of defendant‘s personal beliefs.  
The court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence related to defendant‘s 
liberty defense. 
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
 
Defendant raises a variety of challenges to the death penalty statute.  As 
defendant concedes, we have previously considered and rejected each of his 
claims.   
 
Allowing the jury to consider defendant‘s age as a sentencing factor is not 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 977; People v. 
Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 358.)  We have also previously rejected claims that 
California‘s capital punishment scheme fails to perform the narrowing function 
mandated under the Eighth Amendment.  (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
596, 632.)   
 
Section 190.3, factor (a), as applied, sufficiently minimizes the risk of 
arbitrary and capricious action prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  (People v. 
Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 304-305 (Schmeck), abrogated in part on different 
grounds by People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610.)  A jury need not find that 
aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(Schmeck, at p. 304.)  
 
We have previously rejected each of defendant‘s arguments regarding 
CALJIC 8.85.  We see no reason to reconsider our prior conclusion that CALJIC 
8.85 does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by ―failing to delete 
inapplicable sentencing factors, delineate between aggravating and mitigating 
48 
circumstances, or specify a burden of proof‖ as to aggravation or the penalty 
decision, nor by limiting certain mitigating factors by adjectives such as ―extreme‖ 
or ―substantial.‖  (Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 305; People v. Ray, supra, 13 
Cal.4th at pp. 358-359.)  
 
Moreover, CALJIC 8.88 is not inconsistent with the principle that the jury 
may return a verdict of life without parole even if it concludes that the evidence in 
aggravation outweighs the evidence in mitigation.  (People v. Smith (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 334, 370.)  
 
Nor does California ―deny capital defendants equal protection by providing 
certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital 
defendants.‖  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 295.)  And we have 
previously rejected claims that international laws and treaties render the death 
penalty unconstitutional as applied in this state.  (Id. at pp. 295-296.)  Defendant 
cites the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but the United 
States expressly reserved the right to impose capital punishment under that 
agreement.  (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 403-404.)  Defendant 
provides no reason for us to reconsider our prior decisions.  
49 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed.   
CUÉLLAR, J.  
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Mickel 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S133510 
Date Filed: December 19, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Tehama 
Judge: S. William Abel 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Lawrence A. Gibbs, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ward A. Campbell and Robert C. Nash, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Lawrence A. Gibbs 
P.O. Box 7639 
Berkeley, CA  94707 
(510) 525-6847 
 
Robert C. Nash 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 323-5809