Title: Illinois Press Ass'n v. Ryan

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 88597-Agenda 18-September 2000.
ILLINOIS PRESS ASSOCIATION et al., Appellees, v. GEORGE 								H. RYAN, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 19, 2001.
	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	The plaintiffs, the Illinois Press Association and many of its
member newspapers, brought this action for a declaratory
judgment in the circuit court of Sangamon County against the
Governor of the State of Illinois, George H. Ryan. The plaintiffs
sought a determination that a provision of the Illinois Constitution
requires that ethics commissions created under the State Gift Ban
Act (5 ILCS 425/1 et seq. (West 1998)) conduct their proceedings
in public. The circuit court held that proceedings of one of the
commissions established by the Act, that serving the legislative
branch, must be public, to comply with the constitution. The
Governor brings this appeal. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1).
	The State Gift Ban Act prohibits various officers and
employees of the three branches of state government from
soliciting or receiving gifts from certain sources. To enforce the
provisions of the legislation, the Act establishes separate ethics
commissions, applicable to employees and officers of the
executive branch generally, of four other constitutional
offices-Attorney General, Secretary of State, Comptroller, and
Treasurer-and of the legislative and judicial branches. 5 ILCS
425/45 (West 1998). The Act also prescribes procedures that the
commissions must follow when considering ethics complaints
filed against persons subject to the Act's requirements. The Act
directs the commissions to meet in closed session at various stages
of these proceedings. 5 ILCS 425/60(c), (d) (West 1998).
	In May 1999, the Illinois Press Association and a number of
its members filed the instant action in the circuit court of
Sangamon County. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the
ethics commissions created by the Act must conduct their
proceedings in public. The plaintiffs argued that public
proceedings were required by article IV, section 5(c), of the
Illinois Constitution, which provides:
			"Sessions of each house of the General Assembly and
meetings of committees, joint committees and legislative
commissions shall be open to the public. Sessions and
committee meetings of a house may be closed to the
public if two-thirds of the members elected to that house
determine that the public interest so requires; and
meetings of joint committees and legislative commissions
may be so closed if two-thirds of the members elected to
each house so determine." Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §5(c).
 	The Governor moved to dismiss the action. The Governor
argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit because
there did not then exist any actual controversy regarding the
proceedings of any of the ethics commissions. The Governor also
contended that he was not a proper party defendant in the case
because he had no authority or control over the various
commissions, beyond his power to appoint the members of one of
the commissions, that for the Governor. See 5 ILCS 425/45(a)(1)
(West 1998). With respect to the merits of the plaintiffs'
complaint, the Governor argued that the commissions established
by the Act were not "legislative commissions" and therefore did
not fall within the purview of article IV, section 5(c), of the
Illinois Constitution.
	The circuit judge rejected the Governor's argument that no
controversy existed. The judge believed that the plaintiffs could
seek declaratory relief in advance of commission proceedings. The
judge also concluded that the Governor was a proper party
defendant in a case like this, involving a challenge to the
constitutionality of a state statute. The circuit judge determined,
however, that the only ethics commission to come within the
scope of the provision in article IV, section 5(c), of the Illinois
Constitution was the one created for the legislative branch,
because only its members were appointed by the legislature. The
judge therefore allowed the plaintiffs' action to proceed only with
respect to that commission.
	The circuit judge later heard arguments on the application of
article IV, section 5(c), to the legislative branch's ethics
commission. In a written order, the court ruled that the
constitutional provision applied to the commission and that the
proceedings of the commission must therefore be public. The court
noted that the General Assembly, in enacting the Gift Ban Act, did
not exempt the ethics commission serving the legislature from the
requirements of article IV, section 5(c), as the legislature is
authorized to do under that provision. Because the effect of the
court's ruling was to invalidate, on constitutional grounds, the
provisions of section 60 of the Gift Ban Act directing the General
Assembly's ethics commission to meet in closed session, the
Governor brings the present appeal directly to this court. 134 Ill.
2d R. 302(a)(1).
	The Governor renews here his contention that he is not a
proper party defendant in this action. The Governor observes that
he has no authority or control over the operations of the legislative
branch's ethics commission, which is the sole focus of the present
appeal, and he maintains that any ruling or remedy entered in the
case cannot be binding on the commission or its members. The
Governor concludes that the instant appeal must be dismissed
because he is the only defendant in the matter. We agree.
	Declaratory relief may be obtained only when there is "an
actual controversy between adverse parties." Greer v. Illinois
Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 493 (1988). A
court should "refuse to enter a declaratory judgment or order, if it
appears that the judgment or order, would not terminate the
controversy or some part thereof, giving rise to the proceeding."
735 ILCS 5/2-701(a) (West 1998).
	We do not believe that the Governor is a proper party to this
action. The only ethics commission at issue here is the one that
serves the legislative branch. The Governor represents a different
branch of government, however. He has no authority over the
legislative branch's commission; he does not select its members
or exercise any control over the manner in which it conducts its
proceedings. The plaintiffs and the Governor are not adverse
parties to any dispute involving the ethics commission for the
legislative branch of government. Accordingly, we do not believe
that the present case involves an actual controversy between the
plaintiffs and the Governor, a prerequisite for declaratory relief.
See Saline Branch Drainage District v. Urbana-Champaign
Sanitary District, 399 Ill. 189, 195-96 (1948). The plaintiffs' claim
here centers on the statutory provision that directs the legislative
branch ethics commission to meet in closed session at certain
stages in the proceedings. In granting the plaintiffs relief, the
circuit court directed the commission to makes its meetings "open
to the public to the extent mandated by the Illinois Constitution."
The plaintiffs' argument thus challenges the manner in which the
commission conducts its business and the way in which it would
apply the statute, as enacted. But as the federal court of appeals
has noted:
		"A person aggrieved by the application of a legal rule
does not sue the rule maker-Congress, the President, the
United States, a state, the state's legislature, the judge
who announced the principle of common law. He sues the
person whose acts hurt him." (Emphasis in original.)
Quinones v. City of Evanston, 58 F.3d 275, 277 (7th Cir.
1995).
	In the present case, the plaintiffs have brought this action
against the Governor in his capacity as chief executive. But the
absence of any connection between the Governor and the subject
of the suit-the actions of the legislative branch's ethics
commission-demonstrates to us that the Governor is not a proper
party to defend the challenged legislation. When the circuit court
limited the scope of the plaintiffs' action to the legislative branch
ethics commission, the court also effectively severed any possible
connection between the only named defendant and the case. For
these reasons, too, any order entered in this case directing the
commission to meet publicly rather than in closed session would
not bind the commission or its members, for they are not parties
to this action. See Zurich Insurance Co. v. Baxter International,
Inc., 173 Ill. 2d 235, 246 (1996). Thus, an adjudication of the
merits of this appeal, involving only these parties, would
constitute merely an advisory opinion.
	Opposing this result, the plaintiffs argue that this court
allowed a similar action to go forward against Governor Edgar in
Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162 (1993). The plaintiff in that
case brought suit against the Governor and the Attorney General,
seeking a declaration that a provision in the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act was unconstitutional, and the case
was resolved on its merits, even though the Governor was named
a party to the action and had no direct relationship to or control
over the legislation challenged there. The plaintiffs in the present
case thus argue that, just as the statute in Messenger could be
challenged in a declaratory judgment action against the Governor
and the Attorney General, so too should we allow the present suit
to proceed against the Governor.
	This court's opinion in Messenger discussed the plaintiff's
standing to bring the suit, but the opinion did not also examine
whether either the Governor or the Attorney General was a proper
party to the action, for the defendants' status as proper parties was
not questioned there. Accordingly, we do not believe that
Messenger stands for the proposition the plaintiff would derive
from it. See Underground Contractors Ass'n v. City of Chicago,
66 Ill. 2d 371, 376 (1977) ("We note, however, that in none of
these decisions was the question of standing raised. Those
decisions, therefore, are not authority for the position urged by the
plaintiff").
	Two other cases cited by the plaintiffs do not compel a
different result. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971),
vacated on other grounds, 410 U.S. 950, 35 L. Ed. 2d 682, 93 S. Ct. 1410 (1973), involved a challenge in federal court to an Illinois
abortion statute. The district court concluded that the Attorney
General was a proper defendant in that case. The court found that
the Attorney General, as the chief legal representative of the state,
had an interest in the enforcement and validity of the challenged
legislation, given his responsibility to prosecute violations of the
statute. The present action, in contrast, has been brought against
the Governor alone, who has no connection with or authority over
the subject of the action-the legislative branch ethics commission.
	Koehler v. Ogilvie, 53 F.R.D. 98 (N.D. Ill. 1971), also cited
by the plaintiffs, involved a challenge in federal court to the
application and facial validity of certain Illinois divorce laws.
Regarding the plaintiffs' challenge to the application of the
statutes, the court concluded that the Governor and other
defendants were not proper parties to the proceeding, because they
had no role in the adjudication of divorce cases. With respect to
the challenge to the facial validity of the statutes, the court
declined to address the defendants' argument that they were not
proper parties to the action because of their immunity as public
officials. Noting that the defendants must possess some connection
to the challenged laws to be proper parties, the court found the
record incomplete concerning their relationship to the enforcement
of decrees rendered under the statutes. The court ultimately
declined to exercise its jurisdiction over the case, however,
deferring to the state courts under the abstention doctrine.
	Unlike Koehler, the case at bar presents no uncertainty
regarding the absence of any connection between the Governor
and the legislation challenged here. As noted above, the Governor
has no role in the selection of the members of the legislative
branch ethics commission, and no authority over the proceedings
conducted by that commission. Moreover, support for the present
holding may be found in the federal court's first determination in
Koehler, noted above, that the Governor and other named
defendants were not proper parties to the portion of the action
challenging the applications of the laws. Just as the defendants in
that case had no role in the allegedly improper application of the
statutes, the Governor in the present case possesses no control
over the legislative branch ethics commission's compliance or
noncompliance with the constitutional provision forming the basis
for the plaintiffs' challenge here.
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Sangamon County is vacated, and the appeal is dismissed.
Vacated and dismissed.