Title: Hill v. Urbana

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

HILL ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. CITY OF URBANA, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Hill v. Urbana (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 130.] 
Torts — Political subdivision liable in damages for injury, death, or loss to 
persons or property caused by an act of any of its employees in connection 
with the performance of a proprietary function — Establishment, 
maintenance, and operation of a municipal water supply system is a 
proprietary function — R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(c), construed and applied. 
1. 
Pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(B)(2), a political subdivision is liable in damages 
in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by an 
act or omission of the political subdivision or any of its employees in 
connection with the performance of a proprietary function. 
2. 
The “establishment, maintenance, and operation” of a municipal corporation 
water supply system encompasses, but is not limited to, the installing of 
water lines, equipment, and other materials which are a necessary part of the 
system and such activity is a proprietary function of a political subdivision.  
(R.C. 2744.01[G][2][c], construed and applied.) 
(No. 95-1924 — Submitted November 13, 1996 at the Urbana Session — Decided 
June 25, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Champaign County, No. 94-CA-22. 
 
Appellant, Herbert Hill, worked as a general laborer for R.E. Holland 
Excavating, Inc. (“Holland”).  Holland was hired by appellee, the city of Urbana, 
to assist appellee in improving its water distribution system.  Part of the project 
required the attaching of a new fourteen-inch water line to an existing twenty-inch 
line.  To complete the attachment, it was necessary to install a valve. 
 
On August 10, 1987, a crew of Holland workers, including appellant, 
arrived at a designated job site to install the required valve.  A hole was dug and 
 
2
appellant, along with a Holland supervisor, descended into the hole to install the 
valve.  The project was under the supervision of Urbana’s Water Department 
Supervisor, Manny Gonsalves. 
 
In order to facilitate completion of the valve installation, Gonsalves ordered 
that the water supply to the existing line be shut off.  Because the existing line was 
a source of supply to the city’s water tower, Gonsalves was anxious to have the 
job completed so that the water could be turned back on. As appellant was 
tightening bolts to connect the valve, he heard Gonsalves tell a city employee to 
“crack” the valve and “bleed” some water back into the pipe.  Upon hearing that 
instruction, appellant hollered to Gonsalves not to turn on the water.  Gonsalves 
nodded his head at appellant and told a city employee to wait.  Appellant then 
continued to tighten the bolts.  Within a few minutes, however, Gonsalves once 
again ordered a city employee “to crack the valve.”  Appellant then stood up in the 
pit where he was working, turned around to face Gonsalves, and, gesturing with 
his wrench, stated “don’t turn the damn water on while I am down here at this 
dead end.”  Gonsalves again indicated to appellant that he (Gonsalves) would 
wait.  Appellant then knelt back down into the pit to continue tightening the bolts.  
Apparently, the exchanges between appellant and Gonsalves concerning the 
admonition not to turn on the water took place on three separate occasions. 
 
Notwithstanding appellant’s specific requests and instructions, the water 
was turned on prior to completion of the valve installation.  As a result, the water 
pressure blew the valve off the pipe, striking appellant in the head and shoulders.  
The Holland supervisor, who was in the pit with appellant, saw appellant lying in 
a semi-conscious state face down on the bottom of the pit.  The water temporarily 
rose to the level of the supervisor’s shoulders.  Appellant’s supervisor rescued 
appellant by rolling him into a lift bucket.  Appellant was then lifted out of the 
 
3
hole and taken to a hospital.  As a result of the accident, appellant suffered serious 
and permanent injuries. 
 
On May 10, 1989, appellant filed an action for negligence against Urbana.  
Additionally, appellant’s wife, Carolyn, brought a claim for loss of consortium.  
On September 8, 1994, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Urbana.  The trial court held that the “City of Urbana has statutory immunity as to 
the claims of the Hills [appellants] because of Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised 
Code.  The Court finds that the City was engaged in a governmental function at 
the time of the circumstances of this case.”  On appeal, the court of appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding, among other things, that the trial 
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Urbana. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Brannon & Deutsch and David M. Deutsch, for appellants. 
 
Green & Green, Thomas M. Green and Jennifer L. Layton, for appellee. 
 
Martin, Browne, Hull & Harper, Robin R. Freeman and Richard F. Heil, 
Jr., urging affirmance for amicus curiae, R.C. Holland Excavating, Inc. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The question presented by this case is whether the Political 
Subdivision Tort Liability Act (“Act”), as codified in R.C. Chapter 2744, gives 
immunity to the city of Urbana, appellee, under the facts of this case.  No more 
than just a reading of the statute is required to answer this question in the negative.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the 
trial court for further proceedings. 
 
4
 
The parties raise several issues for our possible consideration.  Implicitly 
raised is the question of the constitutionality of the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
as applied to political subdivisions of this state.1  Explicitly raised are the 
questions of whether R.C. Chapter 2744 abrogates the common-law public-duty 
doctrine and the special-duty exception of governmental immunity.  Since we find 
and hold that even under the statute, appellant Hill’s claim is well taken, we need 
not discuss these implicit and explicit issues. 
 
R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) provides: 
 
“For purposes of this chapter, the functions of political subdivisions are 
hereby classified as governmental functions and proprietary functions.  Except as 
provided in division (B) of this section, a political subdivision is not liable in 
damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly 
caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the 
political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.” 
 
R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) is not absolute.  By its own terms, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) 
is subject to R.C. 2744.02(B), which provides: 
 
“Subject to sections 2744.03 and 2744.05 of the Revised Code, a political 
subdivision is liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person 
or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or 
any of its employees in connection with a governmental or proprietary function, 
as follows * * *.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) through (5) then list circumstances where a municipal 
corporation is responsible for torts committed by an employee of the subdivision.  
Specifically, R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) states that “political subdivisions are liable for 
injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent performance of 
acts by their employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political 
 
5
subdivisions.”  A “proprietary” function includes “[t]he establishment, 
maintenance, and operation of a utility, including, but not limited to, a light, gas, 
power, or heat plant, a railroad, a busline or other transit company, an airport, and 
a municipal corporation water supply system[.]”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
2744.01(G)(2)(c). 
 
Clearly, Urbana was involved in a proprietary function at the time of the 
accident.  See, also, Ranells v. Cleveland (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 1, 4, 70 O.O.2d 1, 
2, 321 N.E.2d 885, 887, fn. 1 (It is clear that a city in the operation of its water 
department acts in a proprietary capacity.).  Further, it is equally apparent that 
Urbana’s conduct in turning on the water was, at the very least, negligent.  
Appellant had instructed Gonsalves on three separate occasions not to turn on the 
water until the job was completed.  However, the water was turned on prior to the 
completion of the installation of the valve and, as a result, appellant was seriously 
injured.  Thus, pursuant to the statute, liability attaches to appellee. 
 
The issue has and will be raised that this court is precluded from 
considering whether Urbana was performing a proprietary function because that 
specific question was not raised by appellants in the court of appeals.  We 
disagree. 
 
This court has held on numerous occasions that the waiver doctrine is 
discretionary.  See, e.g., In re M.D. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 527 N.E.2d 286, 
syllabus.  In fact, we specifically held that “[e]ven where waiver is clear, this court 
reserves the right to consider constitutional challenges to the application of 
statutes in specific cases of plain error or where the rights and interests involved 
may warrant it.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
 
This case concerns the rights and interests of a worker who has been injured 
by a negligent tortfeasor.  Moreover, this case involves not only a particular 
 
6
worker, but it also ultimately concerns the rights and interests of any citizen of this 
state who may be injured by the negligence of an employee of a political 
subdivision.  Accordingly, we not only have the authority to consider this issue, 
but we believe we also have the duty to do so. 
 
Therefore, we hold that (1) pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(B)(2), a political 
subdivision is liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to 
persons or property caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or 
any of its employees in connection with the performance of a proprietary function, 
and (2) the “establishment, maintenance, and operation” of a municipal 
corporation water supply system encompasses, but is not limited to, the installing 
of water lines, equipment, and other materials which are a necessary part of the 
system and such activity is a proprietary function of a political subdivision. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and this cause is remanded 
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., separately dissent. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
The author of this opinion continues to adhere to his dissent in Gladon v. 
Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 323, 662 
N.E.2d 287, 296, an opinion in which Justices Resnick and Pfeifer concurred. 
 
See, also, Garrett v. Sandusky (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 139, 141, 624 N.E.2d 
704, 706 (Pfeifer, J., concurring). 
 
7
 
LUNDBERG  STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I agree 
with the majority’s interpretation of the R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) exception to political 
subdivision immunity as set out in the syllabus.  A political subdivision clearly 
engages in a proprietary function in the establishment, maintenance, and operation 
of a municipal water supply system, and therefore can be liable for acts of 
negligence in the performance of its duties.  However, because this issue was 
clearly not raised below and because this is a civil case where plain error does not 
apply, I reluctantly conclude that the plaintiff has waived this issue and therefore 
is precluded from recovery. 
 
In searching through the lower court records, I find that although he alleged 
negligence, the plaintiff in his complaint did not plead the statutory exception to 
immunity, R.C. 2744.02(B)(2).  In a brief to the trial court on the issue of statutory 
immunity, plaintiff even agreed that Urbana was engaged in a governmental 
function, again with no mention of an exception to statutory immunity under R.C. 
2744.02(B)(2).  In fact, the plaintiff did not even oppose Urbana’s motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
On appeal to the court of appeals, Hill argued that a “special-duty” 
exception to the public-duty doctrine precluded Urbana from asserting statutory 
immunity as a defense to liability.  Hill claimed that the special-duty exception to 
the public-duty doctrine is a common-law theory independent of statutory 
immunity, which would allow Hill to recover against Urbana under negligence 
standards.  Alternatively, Hill  argued that, pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(5),2 
Urbana was liable because its actions were willful and wanton.  Again,  Hill did 
not argue that Urbana was liable under one of the enumerated exceptions to 
statutory immunity set out in R.C. 2744.02(B). 
 
8
 
It was not until his appeal to this court that Hill raised the argument that 
Urbana was liable for his injuries pursuant to one of the exceptions to statutory 
immunity set out in R.C. 2744.02(B)(2).  Despite the fact that the issue of the 
statutory exceptions to liability had been waived below, the majority uses that 
cause of action as the basis to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.  After 
careful research of the case law and further analysis of the case cited by the 
majority, I reluctantly conclude that the case cited, In re M.D. (1988), 38 Ohio 
St.3d 149, 527 N.E. 2d 286, applies only to waivers in criminal cases and has no 
application in civil cases.  Neither does Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ 
Assn. v. R.E. Roark Cos., Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 617 N.E.2d 1075, apply 
where the wrong cause of action is pled.  Despite my great sympathy for the 
plaintiff in this case, I cannot find the waiver to be correctable without doing 
serious damage to the entire issue of civil waiver.  As Chief Justice Moyer’s 
dissent points out, in our adversary system, an innocent party should not bear the 
risk of the other’s omission.  When there is such error in a civil case, the plaintiff 
may seek redress against his own counsel. 
 
Therefore, I join in Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent on the issue of waiver. 
FOOTNOTE: 
2. 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) is not an exception to statutory immunity, but rather is a 
defense to liability for a political subdivision.  Further, even if we accepted Hill’s 
argument that R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) could be used as a sword, Hill did not raise the 
issue at the appellate level until he filed his reply brief.  A reply brief may only be 
used to respond to the opposing party’s arguments.  App.R. 16(C).  Therefore, a 
reply brief cannot be used to raise a new issue as Hill attempted to do in his 
appellate case. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent. 
 
9
 
Today the majority casts away any notion of reasonable certainty that we 
will not use our considerable powers to pronounce on issues not raised by the 
parties in the trial courts.  Clearly, the facts of this case illustrate the pitfalls of 
expanding the discretionary aspect of the waiver doctrine based only upon a 
standard of whether the “rights and interests involved warrant it.”   
 
Subsequent to the incident that caused Hill’s injury, as described in the 
majority opinion, Hill and his wife, Carolyn, filed an action for negligence and 
loss of consortium against Urbana in the Champaign County Court of Common 
Pleas.  At trial, Hill asserted two arguments.  He first claimed that Urbana was 
liable because the city assumed a special duty to act to insure his safety.  In 
addition, Hill argued that Urbana was subject to suit because Gonsalves exercised 
his supervision over the project in a wanton and reckless manner, thereby leading 
to his injury.  At no time did Hill claim that Urbana was liable under any of the 
statutory exceptions to immunity outlined in R.C. 2744.02(B).  Hill did not even 
mention R.C. Chapter 2744 in substance, except to simply assert that Urbana was 
not immune under the statute.  Hill also never asserted that Urbana’s project was a 
proprietary function that would potentially subject it to liability under R.C. 
2744.02 (B)(2).  In fact, plaintiff’s counsel stated in his brief to the trial court that 
“Herbert Hill was involved in a governmental function.”  (Emphasis added.)   
 
The trial court accepted that view and granted summary judgment to 
Urbana, finding, inter alia, that the city was engaged in a governmental function at 
the time of the incident.  Hill did not appeal that finding to the court of appeals.  
Rather, he  posited the same two arguments to the appellate court that he had 
asserted in the trial court.  It was not until he filed his reply brief  that Hill raised 
the issue of Urbana’s liability under R.C. 2744.02(B).  The court of appeals 
affirmed. 
 
10
 
 Hill then argued to this court that Urbana was subject to suit because the 
city’s actions fell within at least one of the exceptions enumerated in R.C. 
2744.02(B).  As the majority rightfully notes, the thrust of Hill’s claim is that 
Urbana’s employee was negligent in turning on the water which led to his injury.  
Therefore, Hill asserts here that Urbana is liable under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2), which 
subjects political subdivisions to suit when a municipal employee acts negligently 
in the performance of a proprietary function.  R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(c) defines 
“proprietary function” as “[t]he establishment, maintenance, and operation of a 
utility, including, but not limited to * * * a municipal corporation water supply 
system,” R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(c), thereby, Hill contends, allowing him to assert a 
claim under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2). 
I 
 
It is well settled that we will generally not consider issues in a civil action 
that are not presented for consideration to the trial court.  State ex rel. Zollner v. 
Indus. Comm. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 276, 278, 611 N.E.2d 830, 832; Miller v. 
Wikel Mfg. Co. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 78, 78-79, 545 N.E.2d 76, 79; Centennial 
Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 221, 226, 16 O.O.3d 251, 
254, 404 N.E.2d 759, 763, fn. 5; State ex rel. Hamblin v. Brooklyn (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 152, 154, 616 N.E.2d 883, 885.  Similarly, we will not consider a claimed 
error which was not raised and assigned as error in the appellate court.  Foran v. 
Fisher Foods, Inc. (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 193, 194, 17 OBR 430, 431, 478 N.E.2d 
998, 999; State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117, 5 O.O.3d 98, 101, 364 
N.E.2d 1364, 1367, vacated on other grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3137, 
57 L.Ed.2d 1156; State ex rel. Babcock v. Perkins (1956), 165 Ohio St. 185, 59 
O.O. 258, 134 N.E.2d 839, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Hill is therefore 
precluded from raising the applicability of the statutory exceptions to immunity to 
 
11
Urbana here, and is specifically estopped from raising the applicability of R.C. 
2744.02(B)(2) because he did not assert it at trial and did not appeal the trial 
court’s finding that Urbana was engaged in a governmental function at the time of 
the accident. 
 
By applying the standard enunciated in In re M.D. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 
149, 527 N.E.2d 286, the majority claims the right to decide this case based on 
issues not presented to this court, on the grounds that the “rights and interests 
involved may warrant it.”  The majority therefore implicitly recognizes the myriad 
of omissions present in Hill’s case, but does not apply the proper analysis in 
deciding whether Hill waived his newfound claims by failing to raise them in the 
trial and appellate courts.  In re M.D. was a criminal case where the defendant-
appellant raised the issue of constitutionality of a rape statute for the first time on 
appeal.  In re M.D. at 150, 527 N.E.2d at 287.  In analyzing the issue of waiver 
there, we exercised our discretion after reviewing the doctrine, as it applies to 
criminal cases.  Given the critical distinctions between civil and criminal actions 
(among those being the penal nature of sanctions imposed on criminal defendants), 
this court has never applied the plain-error doctrine adopted for criminal appeals 
to appeals in civil actions.  Applying the doctrine in criminal actions often raises 
constitutional issues that simply do not exist in civil cases.  Accordingly, the 
authority upon which the majority rests its decision has no application to this civil 
action. 
 
Even application of the majority’s new standard cannot compel an outcome 
favorable to the plaintiff.  The majority states that deviation from the waiver 
doctrine is warranted because this case “concerns the rights and interests of any 
citizen of this state who may be injured by the negligence of an employee of a 
political subdivision.”  Were we to apply the waiver doctrine here, we would no 
 
12
more restrict the ability of any person to recover under R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) than if 
the General Assembly were to eliminate that provision altogether.  Applying the 
waiver doctrine here does not require any pronouncement as to the scope of 
recovery provided by R.C. 2744.02(B)(2).  The next plaintiff certainly may plead, 
argue, and appeal the proprietary nature of a political subdivision’s conduct.  The 
importance of this case is simply that a plaintiff failed to assert a legal basis for his 
claims at trial and failed to assert error on appeal. 
 
While the majority is correct in stating that the waiver doctrine is not 
absolute, absent from the majority’s analysis is any reference to case law analyzing 
the waiver doctrine as it applies to civil cases.  There are two bases upon which we 
have applied the waiver doctrine in civil appeals.  The first is enumerated in 
Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn. v. R.E. Roark Cos., Inc. (1993), 67 
Ohio St.3d 274, 617 N.E.2d 1075.  In Belvedere, we presented one analytical 
framework for deciding when we may consider legal issues not raised in the trial 
or appellate courts.  We stated there that “[w]hen an issue of law that was not 
argued below is implicit in another issue that was argued and is presented by an 
appeal, we may consider and resolve that implicit issue.  To put it another way, if 
we must resolve a legal issue that was not raised below in order to reach a legal 
issue that was raised, we will do so.”  Id. at 279, 617 N.E.2d at 1079.  Pursuant to 
Belvedere, we would consider Hill’s new claim that Urbana’s acts at the time of 
the accident fall within a statutory exception to immunity outlined in R.C. 
2744.02(B) only if this court must decide that issue in order to reach an argument 
that Hill did raise below.  Since this is the only issue of law put before us that the 
plaintiff failed to raise below, we may determine only whether this precise issue is 
implicit in other issues that were correctly raised. 
 
13
 
Hill asserts two propositions before this court that were properly argued in 
the court of appeals. He first argues that the public-duty doctrine applies to this 
case.  Therefore, the issue that appellant failed to raise below (Urbana’s liability 
under R.C. 2744.02[B][2] because it was engaged in a proprietary function) must 
be implicit within the issue of whether the common-law public-duty doctrine 
survived the enactment of statutory sovereign immunity if we are to properly 
consider that claim.  Clearly, we are not compelled to resolve whether Urbana’s 
actions fall within a statutory exception to immunity in order to decide whether 
R.C. Chapter 2744 abrogated the public-duty doctrine.   
 
Hill also contends that Urbana is liable under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) because 
the city performed the acts that led to his injury with wantonness and recklessness. 
 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) provides: 
 
“The political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury, death, or 
loss to persons or property resulted from the exercise of judgment or discretion in 
determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, 
personnel, facilities, and other resources, unless the judgment or discretion was 
exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Hill argues the applicability of R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) as if it were a provision 
allowing him to claim Urbana’s liability under R.C. Chapter 2744. R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5), however, is not an exception to immunity; it is a defense to 
liability.  Only a municipality may assert the defenses and immunities provided in 
R.C. 2744.03, in response to a claim of liability based on the statutory exceptions 
to immunity enumerated in R.C. 2744.02(B). 
 
Therefore, 
Hill 
cannot 
establish 
Urbana’s 
liability 
under 
R.C. 
2744.03(A)(5).  He may only argue that Urbana is not entitled to the defense of 
 
14
R.C. 2744.03(A(5) because the city acted with wantonness and recklessness, if he 
had first claimed Urbana’s liability under R.C. 2744.02(B) and Urbana in turn had 
claimed R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) as a defense. 
 
Therefore, a claim that a subdivision is liable under R.C. 2744.02(B) is a 
necessary predicate to the assertion of a defense by a political subdivision under 
R.C. 2744.03.  R.C. 2744.02(B) itself states that political subdivision liability 
under that section is “subject to” the defenses or immunities designated in R.C. 
2744.03.  Similarly, a municipality must assert R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) as a defense 
before the injured party may argue, under that section, that the defense is 
unavailable due to malicious purpose, bad faith, wantonness, or recklessness on 
the part of the municipality. 
 
Throughout this case, however, Urbana has never had the opportunity to 
assert R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) as a defense, or any of the other defenses outlined in 
R.C. 2744.03, because Hill at trial did not claim that the city was liable under R.C. 
2744.02(B).  Consequently, if we apply the plain words of the statute, Hill cannot 
claim that Urbana is liable under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).  Since appellant could not 
procedurally raise this issue, it is therefore unnecessary to decide whether 
Urbana’s actions subject the city to suit under R.C. 2744.02(B).  Thus, under 
Belvedere we may not consider Hill’s R.C. 2744.02(B) claim. 
II 
 
Analysis of waiver in Belvedere and the sister doctrine of plain error 
indicates that we may exercise discretion only within the narrowest of confines.  
While part of this court’s role is to decide cases in a way that expresses the law in 
an orderly and predictable manner, Belvedere, 67 Ohio St.3d at 279, 617 N.E.2d at 
1079-1080,  that role is balanced with other interests of the judiciary and the legal 
system.  Judges, attorneys, parties, and other citizens expect and deserve a system 
 
15
of appellate procedure that provides fairness, certainty, and finality.  To that end, 
our law has, until today, reflected a long-standing doctrine that appellate courts 
will not consider issues not raised in the trial court or assigned as error.  
Exceptions to the waiver doctrine should be crafted with considerable caution in 
order to protect and maintain a credible appellate system.  Courts have long 
required orderly procedure in the judicial system “to avoid unnecessary delay” and 
to prevent parties from taking advantage of favorable outcomes or eluding 
unfavorable ones.  See State v. Childs (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 56, 62, 43 O.O.2d 
119, 123, 236 N.E.2d 545, 549, citing Douglas v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 415, 
85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934. 
 
No standard, whether it is that articulated in Belvedere or that of the 
majority, should permit us to consider an argument not raised below which is 
appended to a different issue that the party was not procedurally able to raise.  
Such a result is illogical and illustrates the need for caution in emphasizing the 
discretionary nature of the waiver doctrine.  Belvedere allows us to consider only 
whether precise issues of law, raised before this court but not raised below, are 
implicit within precise issues of law that were properly argued at all stages of the 
appellate process.  It does not permit us to consider an issue not raised below 
simply because it may be implicit within a general issue that forms the context of 
the case.  In addition, if we apply the majority’s standard, what framework are we 
to use in deciding whether the “rights and interests involved” in a case warrant our 
exercise of discretion in applying the waiver doctrine?  Without a standard 
analytical process that provides some basis for exercising or declining to exercise 
discretion, the scope of the waiver doctrine is left to anyone’s best guess.   
 
Further, our result today, based upon a very broad standard, does not serve 
our stated role of deciding cases in a way that reflects orderly and predictable 
 
16
application of the law.  Belvedere, 67 Ohio St.3d at 279, 617 N.E.2d at 1079-1080.  
We have disfavored the sister doctrine of plain error where no objection was made 
to the error at trial, limiting it to extremely rare cases involving exceptional 
circumstances.  Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 
1099, syllabus, decided today.  A party waives an issue for the purposes of appeal 
by failing to timely advise a trial court of possible error.  See Gallagher v. 
Cleveland Browns Football Co. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 427, 436-437, 659 N.E.2d 
1232, 1240; Buchman v. Wayne Trace Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 260, 271, 652 N.E.2d 952, 961.  
 
Having applied the waiver doctrine in two recent cases, how do we support 
consistency in our decisions when we do not apply the doctrine here and instead 
state another standard?  Here, the attorney for Hill not only failed to object to the 
trial court’s finding that Urbana was engaged in a governmental function at the 
time of the incident, thereby waiving the issue for appeal, but counsel actually 
expressed agreement with that position in Hill’s brief to the trial court.   
 
This is not an extremely rare case with exceptional circumstances.  The sole 
issue here is the plaintiff’s participation in the “error” at the trial court and his 
failure to raise issues of possible error on appeal.  By not claiming that Urbana 
was liable under one of the exceptions enumerated in R.C. 2744.02(B), Hill failed 
to respond to the city’s defense of statutory immunity.  “When the defendant 
interposes an avoidance or affirmative defense which appears to have merit, the 
defense frequently becomes an issue upon which the case may turn.  Generally, 
the plaintiff must vigorously oppose the defense at the earliest opportunity.” 
(Emphasis added.)  Gallagher, 74 Ohio St.3d at 436, 659 N.E.2d at 1240.  Parties, 
through their counsel, are responsible for shaping the trial through the issues they 
select for resolution; a trial court cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate the 
 
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existence of an argument that is not raised, Gallagher at 436, 659 N.E.2d at 1240, 
nor may we allow an opposing party to bear the loss caused by poor litigation of 
the trial by counsel for the party responsible, Goldfuss at 122, 679 N.E.2d at 1104. 
 
The exercise of discretion in this case, however, implicitly relieves parties 
in civil litigation and their counsel of this responsibility.  Among the errors Hill 
and his counsel seek to elude are the failure to argue (in the alternative) the 
existence of a proprietary function at trial, failure to object to the trial court’s 
finding of a governmental function, failure to appeal the finding of a governmental 
function, and failure to assert a claim of statutory liability in the merit brief to the 
court of appeals.  “Requiring a non-erring party to bear the burden of his 
opponent’s errors may not be reasonable in many circumstances and in fact may 
[itself] constitute a miscarriage of justice.”  Deppe v. Tripp (C.A.7, 1988), 863 
F.2d 1356, 1361.  No court, particularly this court, should relieve parties of their 
responsibility to raise all possible claims at every stage in the appellate process, 
particularly where, as here, a party can easily claim liability of another party but 
simply fails to do so.  The rights of opposing parties and the interests of preserving 
a reliable, credible, and effective appellate system require no less. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  Although I agree with much of the dissenting opinion 
written by Chief Justice Moyer,3 I adhere to my view that the plain error doctrine 
should be reserved for use in criminal cases and held wholly inapplicable to civil 
cases. 
 
The majority holds that the doctrine should be applied “where the rights and 
interests involved may warrant it.”  How, then, are we, as courts, to rank rights and 
interests?  By discarding the criminal and constitutional dimensions that grounded 
the court’s plain-error analysis in In re M.D. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 527 
 
18
N.E.2d 286,4 the majority leaves judges with standardless discretion to weigh 
interests according to personal predilections.  Such an illusory standard is 
damaging to the integrity of the judicial process.5 
 
The standard announced in Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 
679 N.E.2d 1099, syllabus, is, by its language, more cautious, but still provides no 
real boundaries for its application.  The Goldfuss court held that plain error may be 
recognized in civil cases where the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the 
judicial process necessitates its application.  Neither Goldfuss nor the cases upon 
which it relies, however, found the plain-error doctrine applicable or provided a 
meaningful example of appropriate circumstances for its application.  Instead, this 
court legitimizes plain error in civil cases — eschewing the uniformity, 
predictability and equal treatment of individuals that a complete ban would foster 
— based on the possibility that there is a scenario where its application would be 
judicious.  As discussed in my concurring opinion in Goldfuss at 125, 679 N.E.2d 
at 1106, however, that scenario is more imaginary than real. 
 
Because this court has imported the doctrine of plain error into the civil 
arena despite its absence from our Civil Rules and fundamental inapplicability to 
the civil judicial process, and for the reasons cited in my concurrence in Goldfuss, 
I respectfully dissent.  
FOOTNOTES: 
3. 
Particularly, I am in general accord with Chief Justice Moyer’s conclusion 
that this case is inapposite to Belvedere Condominium Unit Owner’s Assn. v. R.E. 
Roark Cos., Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 617 N.E.2d 1075.  I would 
additionally note, however, that the rule in Belvedere should not be read to provide 
discretion to a court to make an exception to the waiver doctrine.  Instead, the 
Belvedere court recognized that a legal issue that is not specifically argued must 
 
19
nevertheless be analyzed when its resolution is essential to determining an issue 
that was argued.  Accordingly, it is more appropriate to analyze the Belvedere rule 
as exemplifying circumstances where an issue is not waived rather than as an 
exception to the waiver doctrine. 
4. 
The complete syllabus of In re M.D. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 527 N.E.2d 
286, reads: 
 
“The waiver doctrine in State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 22 OBR 
199, 489 N.E.2d 277, is discretionary.  Even where waiver is clear, this court 
reserves the right to consider constitutional challenges to the application of 
statutes in specific cases of plain error or where the rights and interests involved 
may warrant it.” 
 
In re M.D. involved only review of constitutional issues not raised to the 
trial court and argued on appeal in a criminal case.  There is no suggestion that the 
holding in In re M.D. was meant to apply to civil cases or to issues of no 
constitutional moment.  The majority’s deletion from the In re M.D. syllabus of 
any reference to State v. Awan, supra, and its use of italics after the conjunction 
“or” to imply that waiver may be excepted “where the rights and interests involved 
may warrant it,” irrespective of whether the challenge involves constitutional 
issues, are misleading. 
5. 
Bright-line generalizations ought to be favored over discretion-conferring 
approaches such as balancing tests, or “totality of the circumstances” tests.  The 
benefits from application of a clear, previously enunciated rule include (1) the 
appearance of equal treatment, (2) an ability to point to a rule in explanation of the 
decision, (3) uniformity in application, and (4) predictability.  These legal values 
outweigh the occasional substantive distortion that may occur.  Since our court 
reviews only a small percentage of the cases appealed, and our objective is a 
 
20
principled decision, “one that rests on reasons * * * that in their generality and 
their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved,” rules are better. 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law (1959), 73 
Harv.L.Rev. 1, 19.