Title: Sloan v. Wells

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

251 S.E.2d 449 (1979) 296 N.C. 570 Lloyd P. SLOAN, Jr., d/b/a Sloan Insurance Agency v. Joseph Earl WELLS. No. 102. Supreme Court of North Carolina. February 5, 1979. *450 William P. Mayo and Rodman, Rodman, Holscher & Francisco by Edward N. Rodman, Washington, for plaintiff-appellee. McCotter & Mayo by Hiram J. Mayo, Jr., New Bern, for defendant-appellant. BRANCH, Justice. The sole question presented is whether the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on defendant's counterclaim. In finding no error in the trial below, the Court of Appeals apparently relied on an Oregon case, Rodgers Insurance Agency v. Andersen Machinery, 211 Or. 459, 316 P.2d 497 (1957), and quoted the following language therefrom: After quoting the foregoing language from Rodgers, Judge Erwin, speaking for the Court of Appeals, stated: We note that a subsequent Oregon case clarifies Rodgers. In Hamacher v. Tumy, 222 Or. 341, 352 P.2d 493 (1960), the court stated: In light of the distinction between contracts of insurance and contracts to procure insurance noted by the Oregon Supreme Court in Hamacher, we are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals' reliance on Rodgers Insurance Agency v. Andersen Machinery, supra, was misplaced. More importantly, however, our own cases dictate a different result than that reached by the Court of Appeals. North Carolina does not adhere to such rigid requirements for valid insurance binders as those imposed by the Court of Appeals. A binder is an insurer's bare acknowledgment of its contract to protect the insured against casualty of a specified kind until a formal policy can be issued. The binder may be oral or written. Wiles v. Mullinax, 270 N.C. 661, 155 S.E.2d 246 (1967); Moore v. Electric Co., 264 N.C. 667, 142 S.E.2d 659 (1965). No specific form, or provision, is necessary to constitute a memorandum, or an oral communication, intended as a binder, a valid contract of insurance. Mayo v. Casualty Co., 282 N.C. 346, 192 S.E.2d 828 (1972); Wiles v. Mullinax, supra. Moreover, it is not required that the writing, or oral communication, set forth all the terms of the contemplated contract of insurance. Mayo v. Casualty Co., supra. *452 In instant case, defendant testified as to the subject matter, the amount of coverage, and the premium to be paid. Although the record does not indicate the exact nature of the risk to be insured against or the duration of the risk, plaintiff testified that he "had insurance or started insuring his [defendant's] logging equipment in July, 1972." This evidence would support an inference which would permit, but not require, the jury to find that upon defendant's request plaintiff would obtain coverage consistent with the parties' previous dealings. We hold that the evidence presented was sufficient to carry defendant's counterclaim to the jury, and the trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict thereon. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. BRITT and BROCK, JJ., did not participate in consideration or decision of this case.