Title: Dominguez v. Pruett

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JUAN MANUEL DOMINGUEZ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 131091 
 
 
 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   April 17, 2014 
SAMUEL V. PRUETT, WARDEN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Randy I. Bellows, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County erred in denying Juan Manuel Dominguez’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
A. Procedural History 
On March 11, 2009, Juan Manuel Dominguez (“Dominguez”) was 
tried and convicted of malicious wounding and robbery in a jury 
trial in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County.  He was sentenced 
to ten years’ imprisonment for malicious wounding and five 
years’ imprisonment for robbery, to be served concurrently. 
Dominguez appealed his convictions to the Court of 
Appeals, asserting that the trial court improperly instructed 
the jury as to the elements of malicious wounding, and that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.  The 
petition for appeal was denied by per curiam order.  Dominguez 
v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2470-09-4 (May 12, 2010).  A three-
judge panel denied Dominguez’s petition for rehearing, and we 
refused his petition for appeal to this Court. 
 
2 
On February 3, 2012, Dominguez filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County.1  As 
relevant to this appeal, Dominguez argued that his trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to 
the malicious wounding jury instruction.  The habeas court 
denied relief to Dominguez, holding that he failed to prove his 
attorney’s performance was prejudicial as required under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
B. Criminal Trial and Appeal 
The evidence against Dominguez at trial included testimony 
from the victim, Eulogio Marroquen-Ulario (“Marroquen”), and 
the responding officer, Officer Gerard Sullivan with the 
Fairfax County Police Department. 
Marroquen testified that he was highly intoxicated on the 
night of the attack.  His backpack and $20 had been stolen 
during an attempted drug deal earlier that night.  He went to a 
nearby convenience store to report the theft.  After talking 
with police, Marroquen shared a beer with Dominguez outside the 
store and told him about the theft.    Marroquen knew Dominguez 
“from the street,” but did not know his name.  Marroquen 
                                                 
1 References to the events and rulings in the underlying 
criminal trial will be to those of the “trial court,” and 
similar references to the habeas corpus proceeding will be to 
those of the “habeas court.” 
 
3 
eventually walked away to inspect a “suspicious car” parked 
nearby.  When he returned, Dominguez was gone. 
As Marroquen was walking home, he was attacked by two men 
who hit him repeatedly with baseball bats.  Marroquen testified 
that the assailants continued to beat him with the bats and 
kick him in the head when he fell to the ground.  The attack 
did not cease until Marroquen emptied his pockets, including 
his wallet, onto the ground.  When asked why he threw his 
wallet onto the ground, Marroquen responded: “[b]ecause I felt 
like they were killing me. . . . I offered the money because I 
want [sic] to save myself.”  Marroquen sustained several blows 
to the head, which required stitches. 
Following the attack, Marroquen provided a detailed 
description of one of the assailants to Officer Sullivan.  He 
then identified Dominguez as one of the assailants from a 
spread of photographs.  Marroquen admitted he could not see 
Dominguez’s face during the attack, but stated he recognized 
him because of his physical appearance. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was instructed 
that the intent needed to find Dominguez guilty of malicious 
wounding was “intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill.”  
Dominguez’s trial counsel did not object to this instruction. 
During subsequent deliberations, the jury asked the trial 
court two questions.  First, the jury asked when a photograph 
 
4 
depicting Marroquen’s injuries was taken. The trial court 
declined to answer.  Three hours later, the jury asked for a 
definition of the term “disable” in the context of 
distinguishing between malicious wounding and unlawful 
wounding.  The trial court directed the jury to rely on the 
given instructions; however, it noted that the difference 
between malicious wounding and unlawful wounding was whether 
the act in question was done with malice. 
The jury ultimately convicted Dominguez of malicious 
wounding, in violation of Code § 18.2-51, and robbery, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-58.  Dominguez appealed his 
convictions to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the jury was 
improperly instructed on malicious wounding.  Dominguez argued 
that the instruction omitted the word “permanently,” 
eliminating the element of intent to cause “permanent” injury. 
The Court of Appeals denied Dominguez’s petition for 
appeal.  With respect to the malicious wounding instruction, 
the Court of Appeals held that Dominguez failed to object to 
the instruction.  Consequently, Rule 5A:18 barred it from 
considering the merits of his argument.  The Court of Appeals 
refused to apply the ends of justice exception in Rule 5A:18, 
stating that “any error . . . in instructing the jury was not 
material” because “there was sufficient and competent evidence 
 
5 
in the record that [Dominguez] acted with [the requisite] 
intent.” 
C. Habeas Corpus Proceeding 
Dominguez filed a habeas petition through newly-retained 
counsel.  Dominguez alleged that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial because, among other things, his 
trial counsel failed to object to the malicious wounding 
instruction. 
Henry J. Ponton, Warden of the Mecklenburg Correctional 
Center (the “Warden”), filed a motion to dismiss Dominguez’s 
habeas petition.2  The Warden argued that Dominguez’s 
ineffective assistance claim failed to meet the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687. 
After hearing argument, the habeas court denied relief to 
Dominguez and dismissed his petition.  The judge stated that, 
“given the evidence of [Marroquen] saying he was almost killed, 
being attacked with a bat, needing multiple stitches, being hit 
all over the head, being in pain in various places, I just 
don’t see . . . prejudice flowing from the failure to object to 
th[e malicious wounding] instruction.” 
                                                 
2 After the motion to dismiss was filed, Dominguez was 
transferred to Coffeewood Correctional Center.  Samuel V. 
Pruett, the Warden of Coffeewood, was substituted as the 
respondent in this case. 
 
6 
Dominguez timely filed a petition for appeal.  We granted 
Dominguez’s appeal limited to the following assignment of 
error: 
The Circuit Court erred when it denied . . . Dominguez’s 
claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel, in violation of Strickland v. 
Washington . . . and the Sixth Amendment, by failing to 
object to the trial court’s deficient jury instruction on 
malicious wounding that omitted the essential requirement 
of an intent to “permanently” maim, disfigure, or disable 
the victim. 
 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
Whether an inmate is entitled to habeas relief is a mixed 
question of law and fact, which we review de novo.  Laster v. 
Russell, 286 Va. 17, 22, 743 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2013).  “[T]he 
[habeas] court’s findings and conclusions are not binding upon 
this Court, but are subject to review to determine whether the 
[habeas] court correctly applied the law to the facts.” Hash v. 
Director, Dep’t of Corr., 278 Va. 664, 672, 686 S.E.2d 208, 212 
(2009) (quoting Curo v. Becker, 254 Va. 486, 489, 493 S.E.2d 
368, 369 (1997)).  “The [habeas] court’s factual findings, 
however, are entitled to deference and are binding upon this 
Court unless those findings are plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support them.”  Hedrick v. Warden, Sussex I State 
Prison, 264 Va. 486, 496, 570 S.E.2d 840, 847 (2002). 
    
 
7 
B. 
Analysis 
Dominguez alleges that the habeas court erroneously denied 
his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance, in violation of Strickland and the Sixth Amendment, 
by failing to object to the trial court’s jury instruction on 
malicious wounding that omitted the element of intent to 
“permanently” maim, disfigure or disable the victim. 
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court established 
a two-prong test to assess whether an attorney’s representation 
was ineffective.  466 U.S. at 687.  To prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Dominguez must satisfy 
both the “performance” prong and the “prejudice” prong of the 
Strickland test. Id.  To satisfy the first prong, “the 
defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688.  Under the 
second prong, “the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that 
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of 
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. 
If Dominguez makes an insufficient showing on either 
Strickland component, his ineffective assistance claim fails. 
Id. at 697.  Accordingly, while we agree that a proper 
malicious wounding instruction would include the element of 
intent to “permanently” maim, disfigure or disable the victim, 
 
8 
see Burkeen v. Commonwealth, 286 Va. 255, 259, 749 S.E.2d 172, 
174 (2013), we will focus first on the “prejudice” prong of the 
analysis.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (observing that it 
is often preferable to address the prejudice requirement in 
full at the outset). 
In analyzing the “prejudice” component, “the ultimate 
focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding whose result is being challenged.”  Id. at 696; see 
also Luchenburg v. Smith, 79 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 1996).  We 
must consider the totality of the evidence before the habeas 
court.  Lewis v. Warden, Fluvanna Corr. Ctr., 274 Va. 93, 113, 
645 S.E.2d 492, 504 (2007); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.  “An 
error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not 
warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if 
the error had no effect on the judgment.”  Id. at 691.  To 
prove the judgment was affected by counsel’s error, 
[t]he [habeas petitioner] must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome. . . . [T]he question is whether there 
is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, 
the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt. 
 
Id. at 694-95. 
Dominguez argues that he was prejudiced by his trial 
counsel’s failure to object to the malicious wounding 
 
9 
instruction because the element of “permanence” was a debatable 
issue, and had the jury been correctly instructed there is a 
reasonable probability it would not have concluded that 
Dominguez intended to “permanently” maim, disfigure or disable 
Marroquen.  He asserts four main arguments to support his claim 
that there is a reasonable probability the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. 
First, Dominguez argues that the lack of severity of 
Marroquen’s injuries belies any intent to permanently 
injure.  He claims that although Marroquen made much of 
the assault at times, his testimony was unreliable.  
Dominguez points out that Marroquen had no remaining scars 
or injuries at the time of trial.  He also notes that the 
probation officer chose not to enhance his Sentencing 
Guidelines point total based on serious physical injury. 
This argument is without merit.  The jury clearly 
resolved any concerns about the credibility of Marroquen’s 
testimony in his favor.  Marroquen’s actual injuries are 
in no way dispositive of Dominguez’s intent with respect 
to the assault.  It is entirely possible for an assailant 
to intend to permanently injure a victim, but only succeed 
in temporarily injuring him.  The severity and permanence 
of the actual wounds are only dispositive when a defendant 
 
10 
is charged with aggravated malicious wounding. See Code § 
18.2-51.2. 
Dominguez next contends that the jury’s questions 
during deliberations support a finding of prejudice.  The 
jury asked when a photograph of the victim was taken and 
for the legal definition of “disable.”  According to 
Dominguez, these questions indicate that the permanence of 
Marroquen’s injuries was controversial.  Thus, he claims 
there is a reasonable probability that, had the jury been 
correctly instructed, he would not have been convicted of 
malicious wounding. 
We disagree.  Dominguez’s argument starts with the 
assumption that the jury’s questions somehow signify its 
belief that Marroquen’s injuries were not permanent.  We 
do not read the questions that way.3  Even if we did, we 
still would not characterize them as some tacit finding of 
fact by the jury.  “A question posed to the court during 
deliberations . . . could suggest as little as the 
tentative views of a single juror.  It cannot be 
extrapolated into a binding finding by the jury as a 
                                                 
3 The jury asked for the definition of “disable” in the 
context of distinguishing between malicious wounding and 
unlawful wounding.  If anything, this question signifies 
confusion, because the definition of “disable” in no way 
distinguishes the two charges.  See Code § 18.2-51. 
 
 
11 
whole.”  Kennemore v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 703, 709, 
653 S.E.2d 606, 609 (2007); see also 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 
2348, at 680 (McNaughton rev. 1961).  We decline to 
speculate as to the jury’s finding on the permanence of 
Marroquen’s injuries based on questions asked during the 
deliberative process.4  See Couture v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. 
App. 239, 247, 656 S.E.2d 425, 429 (2008). 
Dominguez next argues that Marroquen’s own theory of 
the assault effectively concedes that Dominguez lacked the 
intent to permanently injure Marroquen.  He claims that 
Marroquen and the Commonwealth’s attorney repeatedly 
argued that the purpose of the assault was to steal from 
Marroquen, not to permanently injure him.   Marroquen 
testified that he assumed the assailants wanted money, and 
that they released him as soon as he gave them his wallet.  
The Commonwealth reiterated this theory in its closing 
argument:  “[Marroquen] gave them the money and that’s 
when the attack stopped.  And that’s how you can tell what 
                                                 
4 We acknowledge that in Orthopedic & Sports Physical 
Therapy Assocs. v. Summit Grp. Props., LLC, 283 Va. 777, 724 
S.E.2d 718 (2012), we considered a question raised by the jury 
in determining whether to set aside the verdict due to an 
erroneous instruction.  However, in that case, we used the 
jury’s question as proof that we could not conclusively say the 
jury had not been misled by the erroneous instruction. Id. at 
785, 724 S.E.2d at 722-23.  We did not use the question to 
speculate as to the jury’s opinion on any specific issue, as 
argued by Dominguez. 
 
12 
their purpose was.  Because once that purpose was 
accomplished, they ceased to beat him.  They were doing 
this to take his money.” 
To begin, Dominguez’s assertion is contradicted by 
parts of the record.  Marroquen admitted on cross 
examination that Dominguez and his accomplice never asked 
for money.  Marroquen also explicitly testified that the 
attack “was not for money.  It was just for the sake of 
assaulting me.  But I – I offered the money because I want 
[sic] to save myself.”  Likewise, Dominguez misinterprets 
the Commonwealth’s attorney’s statements during closing 
argument.  The Commonwealth’s attorney argued that 
Dominguez intended to steal from Marroquen and therefore 
was guilty of robbery; however, he never suggested that 
Dominguez’s intent to steal supplanted his intent to 
permanently injure.  To the contrary, the Commonwealth’s 
attorney explicitly stated, “there can be no doubt that in 
fact [Dominguez] is guilty of malicious wounding. . . . 
[T]here’s zero question.  It can’t even be argued that Mr. 
Marroquen was [not] the victim of a malicious wounding and 
the victim of a robbery.”  The Commonwealth’s theory 
throughout the trial was that Dominguez intended both to 
steal from Marroquen and to maliciously wound him in the 
process. 
 
13 
Dominguez appears to confuse “intent” with “motive.”  
The attack arguably was motivated by a desire to obtain 
money.  Nevertheless, to concede that Dominguez’s motive 
was to obtain money is not to say that this also was his 
intent.  See Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 210, 218, 
83 S.E.2d 369, 374 (1954).  “Motive is the moving cause 
which induces action, while intent is the purpose to use a 
particular means to effect a definite result.”  Id.  
Dominguez may well have been motivated by a desire to 
obtain money, while at the same time intending to 
permanently injure or disable Marroquen as a means to 
effectuate that aim. 
Finally, Dominguez claims that the nature of the 
attack itself disproves any intent to permanently injure.  
He focuses on the fact that Marroquen’s head injuries were 
just as likely to have been caused by kicks as blows with 
a baseball bat.  Dominguez argues that, while permanent 
injury is the natural and probable consequence of blows to 
the head with a violent instrument such as a baseball bat, 
the same cannot be said for blows to the head with a foot.  
See Lee v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 572, 577-78, 115 S.E.2d 
671, 673 (1923). 
We disagree.  “The intent to maliciously wound . . . 
‘may, like any other fact, be shown by circumstances.’”  
 
14 
Burkeen, 286 Va. at 259, 749 S.E.2d at 175 (quoting 
Banovitch, 196 Va. at 216, 83 S.E.2d at 373).  Thus, it is 
proper for a jury to consider not only the method by which 
a victim is wounded, but also the circumstances under 
which that injury was inflicted in determining whether 
there is sufficient evidence to prove intent to 
permanently maim, disfigure or disable a victim.  See 
Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 63, 41 S.E.2d 500, 
504 (1947). 
In the recent case of Burkeen v. Commonwealth, we 
unanimously held that the intent to permanently injure may 
be presumed from a single blow with a bare fist, where 
that single blow is combined with circumstances of 
violence and brutality.  286 Va. at 259, 749 S.E.2d at 
175.  In that case, “the victim did nothing to provoke the 
attack, and he was hit with extreme force in a vulnerable 
area of his body while he was defenseless and not 
expecting such a blow.  The blow resulted in serious and 
disfiguring injury.”  Id. at 261, 749 S.E.2d at 175.  
Under those circumstances, we held that there was 
sufficient evidence of violence and brutality for the 
court to conclusively presume that, even though the 
assailant delivered only one blow with a bare fist, he 
 
15 
intended to permanently injure the victim. Id. at 261, 749 
S.E.2d at 176. 
As in Burkeen, the evidence in the present case 
clearly gave rise to a conclusive presumption that 
Dominguez intended to permanently injure Marroquen.  The 
evidence established that the attack was unprovoked; 
occurred while Marroquen was unsuspecting and defenseless; 
targeted a vulnerable area of Marroquen’s body – his head; 
and resulted in head injuries that required medical 
attention.  Unlike the attack in Burkeen, Dominguez did 
not just deliver a single blow with a bare fist.  He and 
his co-assailant repeatedly kicked and struck Marroquen 
with enough force to knock him down.  Thus, even if 
Marroquen’s head injuries were caused by kicks rather than 
blows with a bat, the evidence conclusively established 
that Dominguez acted with the requisite intent to 
permanently injure Marroquen.  Thus, the erroneous 
malicious wounding instruction did not render the trial 
fundamentally unfair.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696; 
Luchenburg, 79 F.3d at 391. 
Accordingly, Dominguez’s claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel fails to satisfy the “prejudice” 
prong of the two-part test enunciated in Strickland. 466 
U.S. at 687.  Thus, Dominguez cannot meet his burden of 
 
16 
proving that there is a reasonable probability that, had 
the jury been properly instructed, the result of the trial 
would have been different.  Id. at 694. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we find no error in the habeas 
court’s dismissal of Dominguez’s petition.  We will affirm the 
judgment of the habeas court. 
Affirmed.