Title: Fournier v. Fournier

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Fournier v. Fournier (97-529); 169 Vt. 600; 738 A.2d 98

[Filed 12-Jul-1999]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 97-529

                              APRIL TERM, 1999

Vickie L. Fournier	               }	APPEALED FROM:
	                               }
	                               }
     v.	                               }	Orleans Family Court
	                               }	
Janus Fournier	                       }
	                               }	DOCKET NO. 89-6-95 Osdm

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Mother appeals from a decree entered in the Orleans Family Court
  vesting her with sole  parental rights and responsibilities for the
  parties' two minor children, but subject to father's   visitation rights. 
  At issue is mother's allegation that father sexually abused the children
  and thus  should be forbidden from having any contact with them.  On
  appeal, mother contends that (1)  she is entitled to a new trial because
  the record of the previously concluded proceedings is  inadequate to permit
  this Court to conduct the requisite appellate review, (2) given the trial 
  court's finding that the children were the victims of sexual abuse,  it was
  reversible error to  determine that mother had failed to present clear and
  convincing evidence that father was the  perpetrator, and (3) even assuming
  that the relevant findings were not erroneously made, the trial  court
  failed to give due consideration to the best interests of the children in
  fashioning the  visitation order.  We affirm.

       Before reaching the merits, we must first consider father's contention
  that mother's appeal  is untimely, thus depriving us of jurisdiction.  See
  City Bank & Trust v. Lyndonville Savings  Bank & Trust Co., 157 Vt. 666,
  666, 599 A.2d 1051, 1052 (1991) (noting jurisdictional nature  of
  timeliness issue).  The family court judge signed a partial final order and
  divorce decree on  September 8, 1997, dividing the marital estate but
  deferring the issue of parental rights and  responsibilities.  This decree
  was entered on the family court's docket on September 23, 1997.  
  Meanwhile, on September 17, 1997, the court entered the supplemental final
  order that is  presently on appeal, making extensive findings of fact on
  the allegations of sexual abuse and  resolving the issues of parental
  responsibilities and visitation.  On October 2, 1997, mother filed  a
  document captioned "Motion for Reconsideration"  bearing the date of
  October 1, 1997 and the  signature of the attorney who then represented
  her.  After a hearing, the court denied this motion  by order entered on
  November 14, 1997.  Mother filed her notice of appeal with the family court 
  on December 15, 1997.

       Father first argues that the appeal is untimely because the notice of
  appeal was not filed  within thirty days of the supplemental final order. 
  Rule 4 of the Vermont Rules of Appellate  Procedure explicitly provides
  that the running of time for the filing of a notice of appeal is 
  terminated by the "timely" making of certain post-judgment motions in the
  trial court, among  them a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant
  to V.R.C.P. 59(e).  See V.R.F.P.  4(a)(1)(Rules of Civil Procedure apply to
  divorce proceedings unless otherwise provided).   Although the
  post-judgment motion filed by mother was denominated a motion to reconsider 
  rather than a motion to alter or amend the judgment, it was substantively
  indistinguishable from  such a motion.  The caption is not determinative to
  the application  of V.R.C.P. 59(e) and  V.R.A.P. 4.  See 11 C. Wright, A.
  Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, §2810.1 at 122 & n.8
  (1995 and Supp. 1999) (construing analogous F.R.C.P. 59(e)) (citations 

 

  omitted).

       Father also contends that mother's Rule 59(e) motion was not timely
  because it was filed  with the family court eleven days after entry of
  judgment, excluding weekends as provided by  V.R.C.P. 6(a).  We disagree. 
  "[T]he language of Rule 59 is clear and only requires service  within 10
  days and filing a reasonable time thereafter."  Derosia v. Liberty Mut.
  Ins. Co., 155  Vt. 178, 181 n.1, 583 A.2d 881, 883 n.1 (1990) (emphasis
  added). (FN1)

       Under V.R.C.P. 5(b) service by mail, the method properly used in this
  case, is complete  upon mailing.  Mother alleges that she mailed the motion
  to father and the court on October 1,  1997, within the time allowed. 
  Father has not effectively contested this representation, relying  only on
  the erroneous position that the time limit relates to filing rather than to
  service.  Father  failed to contest the timeliness of the motion in the
  family court, and, therefore, there has been  no factual development of the
  issue.  Under the circumstances, we must accept mother's  representation
  and proceed to the merits of the appeal.

       Mother first argues that she is entitled to a new trial because no
  transcript is available for  parts of the testimony in the original trial. 
  Apparently, the court reporter died before the  transcript could be
  completed, and parts of his notes cannot be found.  Without attempting to 
  obtain a stipulation to their accuracy, or resolution of their accuracy in
  the family court, mother  has presented us with letters from trial counsel
  for mother and the children containing  representations as to at least part
  of the testimony for which we have no transcript.

       V.R.C.P. 59(f) directly covers the relief mother seeks, providing that
  if a part of the  evidence cannot be transcribed because of "the reporter's
  death," or other reasons, the trial court  may grant a new trial "if it is
  satisfied that the lack of such transcript prevents a party from 
  effectively prosecuting an appeal."  See V.R.F.P. 4(a)(1)(Rules of Civil
  Procedure apply in  divorce proceedings except as otherwise provided). 
  Mother failed to file a Rule 59(f) motion,  arguing as a justification that
  the rule requires that the motion be filed within ten days, an 
  impossibility in this case.  In fact, the rule contains no time limit, and
  her demand to us for a  new trial is unpreserved.

       Moreover, V.R.A.P. 10(c) and (e) provide procedures for correcting a
  deficient record of  trial court proceedings through reconstruction of
  those proceedings by the trial court.  Although  mother took initial steps
  to determine the substance of the missing testimony by obtaining the 
  recollection of trial counsel, she failed to follow through to a trial
  court determination of that  substance, and father had no opportunity to
  participate in reconstructing the evidence.  Under the  circumstances,
  mother has waived any claim of error based on the deficient transcript.  We 
  recognize that Appellate Rule 10(e) gives us the power to correct the
  record, irrespective of the  action of the trial court, but mother has not
  sought that relief.  Moreover, even if mother's claim  were properly
  preserved, she has made no showing of prejudice from the missing transcript 
  section.  See Gionet v. Town of Goshen, 152 Vt. 451, 455-56, 566 A.2d 1349,
  1351 (1989) (no  relief available under V.R.A.P. 10(e) because appellant
  failed to "demonstrat[e] that the total  record . . . was deficient, or how
  any such deficiency prejudiced [appellant]").  If anything, the  lack of a
  transcript appears to prejudice father because many of mother's arguments
  are based on  her assertion that key findings have no support in the
  evidence.  

 

       Finally, we reject the argument, as we did in the case of In re
  S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294, 297,