Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES A. McCUE, deceased. ROBERT A. McCUE v. GEORGE W. McCUE, JAMES E. McCUE, THELMA M. DEXTER, AND MARION L. ALLEN, appellees (objectors), STOCKMENS BANK & TRUST COMPANY of Gillette, Wyoming, Executor of the Estate of JAMES A. McCUE, deceased

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES A. McCUE, deceased. ROBERT A. McCUE v. GEORGE W. McCUE, JAMES E. McCUE, THELMA M. DEXTER, AND MARION L. ALLEN, appellees (objectors), STOCKMENS BANK & TRUST COMPANY of Gillette, Wyoming, Executor of the Estate of JAMES A. McCUE, deceased1989 WY 142776 P.2d 742Case Number: 88-107Decided: 06/30/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF JAMES A. McCUE, DECEASED. ROBERT A. McCUE, APPELLANT 
(RESPONDENT),

v.

GEORGE W. McCUE, JAMES E. 
McCUE, THELMA M. DEXTER, AND MARION L. ALLEN, APPELLEES (OBJECTORS), STOCKMENS 
BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF GILLETTE, WYOMING, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES 
A. McCUE, DECEASED, APPELLEE (PETITIONER).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

Charles E. 
Graves and Jane A. Villemez of Graves, Santini & Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Bruce P. Badley 
of Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for appellees George W. McCue, James E. 
McCue, Thelma M. Dexter, and Marion L. Allen.

Thomas E. Lubnau 
of Lubnau Law Office, Gillette, for 
appellee Stockmens Bank & Trust Co. of Gillette, 
Wyoming.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order of the probate court accepting an appraisal of decedent's interest in 
the surface of ranch lands.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant Robert A. 
McCue raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the purchase 
price for land under an ambiguous testamentary option is governed by the 
court-approved stipulation between all interested parties, setting out the 
proper means for determining said purchase price.

2. Whether the probate 
court abused its discretion in approving and accepting an appraisal that was 
performed and prepared in violation of the court's order and instructions to 
appraisers.

[¶4.]     On January 28, 1983, 
James A. McCue, appellant's father, executed his Last Will and Testament, which 
contained the following provision:

I hereby direct my 
Executor hereinafter named to sell all real property which I may own at the time 
of my death, provided however, my son Robert A. McCue shall have the first right 
to purchase said real property at its appraised value.

[¶5.]     James A. McCue was 
thereafter declared incompetent, and appellee Stockmens Bank & Trust Company 
of Gillette, Wyoming, was appointed the guardian of his 
estate. On December 27, 1984, all the beneficiaries named in the Last Will and 
Testament of James A. McCue entered into a stipulation and order with the 
guardian and a court-appointed guardian ad litem, which provided appellant with 
a six-month option, effective upon the death of his father, to purchase the 
ranch

at a value determined by 
three appraisers, one selected by Robert McCue, one selected by the Executor of 
the James A. McCue Estate, and the third one selected by the two appraisers so 
chosen * * *.

[¶6.]     James A. McCue died on 
October 15, 1985, possessed of a 15/29ths interest in the surface of 4,191 acres 
of ranch lands. After the Last Will and Testament of James A. McCue was admitted 
to probate, the court, upon a motion of appellee Stockmens Bank & Trust 
Company of Gillette, 
Wyoming, as the personal 
representative of the estate of James A. McCue, deceased, appointed Joe W. King, 
Milton B. Williams, and Robert E. McKee to appraise the estate. On March 3, 
1986, they appraised the decedent's interest in the ranch lands at the time of 
his death at a value of $140,904.31 ($65 per acre) on the basis of Mr. Williams' 
viewing of the property one year prior to the decedent's 
death.

[¶7.]     On May 13, 1986, a 
second appraisal was made by Milton B. Williams, George Clabaugh, and William L. 
King, who appraised one hundred percent of the interest in the 4,191 acres on 
April 14, 1986, at a value of $147,500 ($35.19 per acre). Mr. Williams was 
selected by the personal representative of the estate, Mr. Clabaugh was selected 
by appellant, and Mr. King was selected by joint agreement of appellant and the 
personal representative.

[¶8.]     On April 15, 1986, 
appellant submitted a letter stating that he wished to exercise his option to 
buy his father's land for $35 per acre. The personal representative filed its 
return of sale on June 23, 1986, requesting that the court set appellant's 
purchase offer for hearing because of the disparity between the two appraisals. 
One day prior to the scheduled hearing, appellees George W. McCue, James E. 
McCue, Thelma M. Dexter, and Marion L. Allen offered to purchase their father's 
surface interest in the 4,191 acres for $94,839.44, an amount they alleged was 
twenty-five percent above appellant's offer of $75,871.55.1

[¶9.]     Following the hearing, 
the court entered its order on August 14, 1986, denying confirmation of the sale 
upon making the findings that there was no good basis for either of the 
appraisals, that the sale to appellant should be refused, and that a new 
appraisal of the property should be conducted. The court then ordered that the 
appraisal be conducted in the following manner:

a. Robert A. McCue will 
submit the name of a competent real estate appraiser.

b. George W. McCue, James 
E. McCue, Thelma M. Dexter and Marion L. Allen will submit the name of a 
competent real estate appraiser.

c. The two appraisers 
selected will then submit the names of three real estate appraisers with whom 
they can agree, and along with the names they will submit a brief resume of 
their qualifications.

d. The court will select 
a name from the three appraisers submitted to it.

e. The three appraisers 
as above selected will make an appraisal of the real property and submit it to 
the court.

The court also 
ordered that appellant would have sixty days from the date of the filing of the 
appraisal in which to exercise his option.

[¶10.]  For their choices of appraisers, 
appellant selected William King and appellees George W. McCue, James E. McCue, 
Thelma M. Dexter, and Marion L. Allen selected A.R. Ostlund. The court selected 
M.L. Watson from the list of three names provided by Mr. King and Mr. Ostlund. 
These individuals were appointed as the appraisers and were instructed to 
appraise the property at its fair market value on the basis of the highest and 
best use of the premises on the date of the appraisal.

[¶11.]  On December 3, 1987, appraisers Ostlund 
and Watson filed their appraisal which valued the surface of the 4,191 acres at 
$172,000 (approximately $41 per acre). On December 7, 1987, appraiser King filed 
his minority report in which he appraised the property at $148,800 ($35.50) per 
acre. The minority report states:

Mr. Ostlund made 
available to me the appraisal completed by him and Mr. Watson which I returned 
unsigned. I was not consulted regarding the sight inspection, comparable sales, 
analysis, or conclusion. Having already testified before your Court in this 
matter, and at the time feeling justified with our valuation of $147,500.00 to 
agree conclusively with Mr. Ostlund's and Mr. Watson's valuation, I would have 
been remiss in my duty at my previous appearance.

[¶12.]  On December 31, 1987, appellant filed his 
resistance to the appraisal alleging that his designated appraiser, Mr. King, 
was not consulted prior to the preparation of the other appraisers' report and 
that the appraisal was made off the site and prior to the date for valuation 
specified in the court's instructions to the appraisers. On March 3, 1988, the 
court filed an order accepting the Watson and Ostlund appraisal. This appeal is 
taken from that order.

[¶13.]  Appellant addresses his first issue by 
questioning the propriety of the court's appointment of the third appraiser in 
violation of the court-approved stipulation. Appellant devotes a considerable 
portion of his brief to contending that the option provision in his father's 
will is ambiguous in that it does not provide the manner for determining the 
appraised value of the property and that the court should have complied with the 
stipulation. Appellant failed to raise these objections at the time the court 
announced the method it would utilize in appointing the appraisers and in his 
resistance to the appraisal which was filed and argued to the court, and these 
objections appear before this Court for the first time on appeal. We see no 
reason to deviate from our general rule that we will not address issues raised 
for the first time on appeal, and we continue to decline to do so in this 
instance. Thatcher & Sons, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Casper, N.A., 750 P.2d 1324 (Wyo. 1988); Grindle v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 722 P.2d 166 
(Wyo. 
1986).

[¶14.]  Appellant contends in his second issue 
that the court abused its discretion by accepting the appraisal report of Mr. 
Ostlund and Mr. Watson, who failed to work with Mr. King as contemplated in the 
order, and that Mr. Ostlund and Mr. Watson failed to value the property as of 
October 5, 1987.

This court has defined 
abuse of discretion numerous times. Recently, we said:

"`A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. * * *' Martinez v. State, 
Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).

* * * * * 
*

"Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. 
Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).

* * * * * 
*

"* * * Each case must be 
determined on its peculiar facts. * * *" Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894, 
896-897 (1986).

England v. 
Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 1140 (Wyo. 1986), quoted in Rivermeadows, Inc. v. 
Zwaanshoek Holding and Financiering, B.V., 761 P.2d 662, 669 (Wyo. 
1988).

[¶15.]  The record reflects 
that:

a. Each appraiser 
individually viewed the property;

b. Mr. Watson prepared a 
draft of an appraisal report for consideration by all the appraisers fixing the 
value of the property at $172,000 as of September 21, 1987, or approximately $41 
per acre;

c. Mr. Ostlund was to 
consult with Mr. King before a formal appraisal was filed with the court but, 
before he could do so, Mr. King informed Mr. Ostlund that he had previously 
valued the property at approximately $35 per acre and that he was not going to 
change that amount;

d. Mr. King was furnished 
with a copy of the proposed appraisal to be submitted to the court for 
signature;

e. Mr. King returned the 
appraisal which was thereafter filed with the court as the Ostlund-Watson 
majority report; and

f. Mr. King filed his own 
appraisal fixing the value for the property at $148,800 as of October 5, 1987, 
or approximately $35.50 per acre.

[¶16.]  We are unable to glean from the record 
why the court instructed the appraisers to value the property as of October 5, 
1987, as opposed to the date of death or the date fixed in the second appraisal. 
In any event, appellant has failed to even suggest that Mr. Ostlund and Mr. 
Watson would have valued the property differently had they valued it as of 
October 5, 1987, rather than as of September 21, 1987. We see no reason for the 
probate court to have attached any significance to the few days' interim, 
particularly in view of Mr. King's insistence that the value of the property had 
not changed since the first time he appraised it as of April 14, 
1986.

[¶17.]  Appellant has not directed us to anything 
in the record which indicates that the probate court abused its discretion. We 
conclude that the court exercised sound judgment in the best interest of the 
estate and the beneficiaries by accepting the majority appraisal of Mr. Ostlund 
and Mr. Watson.

[¶18.]  Affirmed.

CARDINE, C.J., filed a 
concurring opinion.

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which GOLDEN, J., 
joined.

FOOTNOTES

1 Thirty-five dollars per 
acre for 15/29ths of 4,191 acres equals $75,871.55.

CARDINE, Chief Justice, 
concurring.

[¶19.]  I concur in the opinion of the court. I 
see this case as a studied effort by the trial judge to arrive at an appraisal 
that was fair, reasonable, and in accord with the testator's intention. The will 
itself does not specify that the "appraised value" for exercise of the option be 
that for probate or estate tax purposes or the first appraisal. I could not 
accept a conclusion that, with respect to the purchase option granted appellant, 
the court is powerless to do other than accept the first appraisal. Whether it 
be $1,000 per acre or $5,000 per acre. The trial court's resolution of this 
controversy was entirely appropriate.

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom GOLDEN, Justice, 
joins.

[¶20.]  I must dissent from the disposition of 
this case made by the majority opinion. It is my understanding that the effect 
of the majority holding, in this instance, is that the district court, sitting 
in probate, did not abuse its discretion in accepting an appraisal of real 
property in the estate that was not accomplished according to the statute. I 
cannot conceive of that approach being anything other than an abuse of the 
probate court's discretion. In publishing his Last Will and Testament, the only 
appraised value James A. McCue could have alluded to is the statutory appraisal. 
The adoption of an alternative appraisal arrived at in a different manner than 
that prescribed by statute is antithetical to our established rule that the 
intent of the testator controls.

[¶21.]  The appellant essentially seeks to 
establish a value for the purpose of exercising an option to purchase real 
property contained in the Last Will and Testament of James A. McCue. That option 
is articulated as follows:

"* * * I hereby direct my 
Executor hereinafter named to sell all real property which I may own at the time 
of my death, provided however, my son Robert A. McCue shall have the first right 
to purchase said real property at its appraised value."

In accordance 
with well-established principles of law, the option speaks of the date of the 
testator's death.

[¶22.]  The statute which governs estate 
appraisals provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) Within one hundred 
twenty (120) days after the timely filing by the personal representative of the 
inventory of assets of the estate of the decedent, pursuant to W.S. 2-7-403, the 
personal representative shall file under oath a report of appraisal of values of 
estate assets listed in the inventory. The report shall be in compliance with 
such of the following requirements as may be applicable:

"(i) As to all assets 
listed in the inventory which have a readily determinable market value, the 
value of each asset as of date of 
death shall be stated in writing by one (1) disinterested 
person;

"(ii) As to all assets 
listed in the inventory that do not have a readily determinable market value, 
the personal representative shall employ disinterested persons to determine the 
fair market value of each such asset, as 
of the date of death. A separate written report as to the value of each 
asset, showing the appraiser's basis for arriving at the value, shall be 
attached to the report." (emphasis added) Section 2-7-404, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1988).

The statute is 
clear that the appraisal is to be made as of the date of death which, of course, 
matches the effective option date articulated in the will.

[¶23.]  Consequently, I can find no room for the 
court to exercise its discretion and adopt a different appraisal, at least in 
relation to the option. Since, in the context of this appeal, that is the only 
concern of Robert A. McCue, the case should be reversed and remanded with 
direction that Robert A. McCue's option is to be exercised, if at all, with 
respect to the first appraisal made which was as of the date of the testator's 
death. While the designation of those appraisers does not match the statute just 
quoted in all respects, I am satisfied that substantially those appraisers were 
nominated by the personal representative and, even though court approval was 
sought, that did not affect the validity of the appraisal that those appraisers 
furnished.

[¶24.]  I am appalled by the suggestion that it 
is appropriate to adopt an appraisal accomplished by a different method even if 
agreed upon by the heirs and approved by the court. For me, that is no different 
from approving a distribution different from that provided by the testator if 
the heirs agree to it. That does not comport with the law recognizing the power 
of any person to dispose of his property as he sees fit.

[¶25.]  Certainly, if the case were to go beyond 
the option and the real property were ordered sold at public sale or a private 
sale apart from the option, I would have no difficulty with the exercise of the 
discretion of the probate court in doing whatever might be necessary to assure 
that a fair value was obtained as of the date of the sale. That is not the 
problem in this case, however, and it should be reversed and remanded with 
directions to apply, for purposes of the option, the initial appraisal made by 
Joe W. King, Milton B. Williams, and Robert E. McKee, who appraised the 
decedent's interest in the ranch lands at the time of his death at a value of 
$140,904.31 ($65 per acre). In my judgment, that appraisal established the value 
at which Robert A. McCue should have the first right to purchase the real 
property.

[¶26.]  This appeal is from an order approving an 
appraisal, which brings me to a further concern about the case. I am not able to 
identify any authority from this court which would recognize an order of the 
probate court accepting an appraisal as a final order pursuant to Rule 1.05, 
W.R.A.P. It is not such an order as determines the action and prevents a 
judgment. It is not such an order made in a special proceeding as truly affects 
a substantial right because the appraisal is not a special proceeding. My 
analysis causes me to conclude that the order accepting an appraisal is 
interlocutory in the truest sense, and some further request for relief was 
required by Robert A. McCue before a final order could be entered. I speculate 
that perhaps a complaint seeking a declaration of his rights under the will, or 
an offer to purchase based upon the appraisal followed by a rejection by the 
personal representative could result in a final order. Consequently, while I 
have addressed the resolution on the merits made in the majority opinion, my 
disposition would be to dismiss this appeal as one taken from an interlocutory 
order that is not a final order as defined in Rule 1.05, 
W.R.A.P.