Title: In re A.K.O.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 68A20  
Filed 11 December 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: A.K.O. and A.S.O. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 2 
December 2019 by Judge Dennis J. Redwing in District Court, Cherokee County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 23 November 2020 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
 
Elizabeth Myrick Boone for petitioner-appellee Cherokee County Department of 
Social Services. 
 
Michelle FormyDuval Lynch for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
Dorothy Hairston Mitchell for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
NEWBY, Justice. 
 
Respondents appeal from the trial court’s orders terminating their parental 
rights to A.K.O. and A.S.O. (“Alyson” and “Adam”).1 After careful review, we affirm 
in part, vacate in part, and remand to the trial court to reconsider Adam’s age of 17 
years old, reweigh his request to keep respondents’ parental rights intact with whom 
                                            
1 Pseudonyms are used in this opinion to protect the juveniles’ identity and for ease of 
reading. 
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he had a strong bond, and to reevaluate guardianship for Adam as an alternative to 
termination of parental rights. Alyson, Adam’s younger sister, was only nine years 
old at the time of the hearing, significantly younger than Adam; thus, our analysis 
regarding Adam is not applicable to Alyson. 
On 31 March 2017, the Cherokee County Department of Social Services (DSS) 
received a report claiming that respondents were both in jail, and Alyson had not 
been in school that day. The reporter expressed concern because Alyson had stated 
that the family was homeless, and they were “going to somebody’s old house that 
stinks.” The reporter believed it to be an abandoned house. Social workers met with 
respondent-father at the Cherokee County Detention Center concerning the 
allegations. Respondent-father told social workers that he was not sure what was 
happening with the children because he had been in jail for the past week, but he 
informed social workers that he, along with respondent-mother and the two juveniles, 
had recently moved to Murphy, North Carolina and were living in his grandparents’ 
house.  
Social workers went to the grandparents’ house in Murphy. Upon arriving at 
the house, they observed a significant amount of furniture, trash, clothes, broken 
glass, and other objects on the outside grounds. The items were stacked in large 
unorganized piles and had “a strong offensive pet like odor.” The social workers 
knocked on the door, and it was answered by respondent-mother. The social workers 
informed respondent-mother of the report they received and told her they needed to 
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discuss it with her. Upon being admitted into the home, social workers found the 
house to be cluttered with trash, clothing, dishes, glasses, and other items. They also 
found three mattresses on the floor of the living room. On the mattresses were two 
unrelated males and the two juveniles. The two men and the two juveniles were 
wearing dirty and soiled clothing. The home had a pungent smell, and one of the 
social workers observed a dog urinate in the living room. The dog’s urine was not 
cleaned up throughout the visit, and pet feces and urine spots could be found 
throughout the home. Additionally, the floor was falling in one of the bedrooms, and 
some rooms were so cluttered that social workers could not enter them.  
Social workers asked if respondent-mother would be willing to take a drug 
screen, and respondent-mother agreed to complete one. At that time, she disclosed 
that she had taken prescription medication that had not been prescribed for her a 
couple of days beforehand. Respondent-mother was transported to the Health 
Department where she tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and 
THC. Respondent-mother subsequently admitted to “snorting meth a couple of days 
ago.” Respondent-mother was asked about a safety resource placement for the 
children, but she was unable to identify a suitable placement that would be approved 
by DSS. Accordingly, DSS filed a petition alleging that Alyson and Adam were 
neglected and dependent juveniles and obtained nonsecure custody.  
On 15 May 2017, the trial court adjudicated Alyson and Adam neglected and 
dependent juveniles. The trial court ordered that custody of the juveniles should 
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remain with DSS, granted respondents visitation, and ordered respondents to work 
on their case plan. The trial court subsequently set the permanent plan for the 
juveniles as reunification. Following a hearing held on 7 March 2018, the trial court 
entered an order changing the permanent plan to guardianship along with a 
concurrent plan of reunification.   
In an order entered on 20 May 2019, the trial court found that respondents 
were not complying with their case plans. Specifically, the trial court found 
respondents did not have appropriate housing, had not made child support payments, 
and had missed half their visits with the juveniles since December 2018. The trial 
court additionally found that respondents were consistently testing positive for 
marijuana and methadone, and on 7 January 2019 their drug screens were positive 
for opioids and marijuana. Accordingly, the trial court changed the permanent plan 
for the juveniles to adoption with a concurrent plan of guardianship.  
On 26 August 2019, DSS filed petitions to terminate respondents’ parental 
rights on the grounds of neglect, failure to make reasonable progress, failure to pay 
support, and dependency. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3), (6) (2019). On 2 December 
2019, the trial court entered orders in which it determined grounds existed to 
terminate respondents’ parental rights based on the grounds alleged in the petitions. 
The trial court further concluded in separate dispositional orders that it was in 
Alyson’s and Adam’s best interests that respondents’ parental rights be terminated. 
Accordingly, the trial court terminated their parental rights. Respondents appeal, 
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arguing that the trial court erred when it determined termination of their parental 
rights was in Alyson’s and Adam’s best interests.  
A termination of parental rights proceeding consists of an adjudicatory stage 
and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019). At the adjudicatory 
stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence” the existence of one or more grounds for termination under subsection 7B-
1111(a) of the General Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f). If the trial court finds grounds 
to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), it proceeds to the 
dispositional stage where it must “determine whether terminating the parent’s rights 
is in the juvenile’s best interest” based on the following factors:  
(1) The age of the juvenile. 
 
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
 
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in 
the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 
juvenile. 
 
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
 
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and 
the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or 
other permanent placement. 
 
(6) Any relevant consideration. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).  
 
We review the trial court’s determination of “whether terminating the parent’s 
rights is in the juvenile’s best interest,” id., for abuse of discretion, In re Z.A.M., 374 
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N.C. 88, 99, 839 S.E.2d 792, 800 (2020). “Under this standard, we defer to the trial 
court’s decision unless it is ‘manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that 
it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.’ ” Id. at 100, 839 S.E.2d at 
800 (quoting Briley v. Farabow, 348 N.C. 537, 547, 501 S.E.2d 649, 656 (1998)). We 
review the trial court’s dispositional findings of fact to determine whether they are 
supported by competent evidence. In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 57, 839 S.E.2d 735, 740 
(2020). Dispositional findings not challenged by respondents are binding on appeal. 
In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437, 831 S.E.2d 62, 65 (2019). 
I. 
 
First, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by terminating 
respondents’ parental rights to Adam. The trial court made a finding of fact indicating 
it considered Adam’s age and took judicial notice of the findings of facts made at the 
adjudication hearing. The trial court also made the following findings concerning the 
factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a):  
8. [Adam] is bonded with his current foster parents, their 
biological children, and their extended family. 
 
9. [Adam’s] foster family have extended family that are 
bonded with [Adam] and are interested in adopting [him].  
 
10. That the court considered the testimony of [Adam] with 
regard to his bond with his sister [Alyson] and his 
forthright expression of his desires in this case. 
 
11. That the [c]ourt admires [Adam] for his actions in 
trying to understand this situation and responding by 
making reasoned decisions on behalf of his sister [Alyson]. 
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. . . . 
 
15. That termination of the Respondent Parents’ parental 
rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent 
plan of Adoption or Guardianship for [Adam], legally 
freeing [Adam] for adoption [or] guardianship.  
 
16. 
That 
[Adam] testified that 
he 
would 
prefer 
Guardianship with the family in Alabama so he can remain 
with his sister, but wishes to maintain a relationship with 
the Respondent Parents and does not want their parental 
rights terminated. 
 
17. That [Adam] testified that he wishes to keep his family 
name and wants to continue to have the Respondent 
Parents’ names listed on all of his legal documents.  
 
18. That [Adam] testified that he wanted to stay with and 
protect his sister. 
 
19. The Respondent Parents testified to their desire to 
maintain a relationship with [Adam]. 
 
. . . .  
 
21. 
Based 
upon 
the 
ongoing 
Neglect 
of 
[Adam] 
demonstrated by the Respondent Parents from at least 
March 31, 2017 to the present, there is a probability of 
repetition of the Neglect should [Adam] be returned to the 
home of the Respondent Parents. 
 
22. The conduct of the Respondent Parents has been such 
as to demonstrate that they will not promote the healthy 
and orderly physical and emotional wellbeing of [Adam]. 
 
23. [Adam] is in need of a Permanent Plan of Care at the 
earliest age possible that can be obtained only by the 
severing of the relationship between [Adam] and the 
Respondent Parents by termination of the parents’ 
parental rights. 
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Respondents challenge findings of facts 8, 9 and 15 in the trial court’s order. 
Respondents both argue that there was no competent evidence to support findings of 
fact 8 and 9 that Adam had a bond with his foster family’s extended relatives in 
Alabama. Respondents further challenge finding of fact 15, which states that 
termination of respondents’ parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the 
permanent plan of adoption or guardianship by “legally freeing [Adam] for adoption 
[or] guardianship.” Respondents note that, due to his age, Adam’s consent is required 
for him to be adopted. See N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601(1) (2019) (providing that a minor over 
the age of 12 must consent to adoption, unless consent is not required under N.C.G.S. 
§ 48-3-603 (2019) and the trial court makes the necessary findings under that 
section). Here Adam clearly expressed his desire to not be adopted but rather to keep 
his biological parents’ rights intact.  
Findings of fact 8 and 9 are supported by competent evidence. During the 
dispositional hearing, DSS’s Court Report was admitted into evidence without 
objection. In the report, DSS stated that Adam and Alyson had “spent holidays and 
vacations” with the family in Alabama and, “[d]uring these times, they have 
developed a bond with the family.” This evidence supports the factual findings in that 
it permits a reasonable inference that Adam is bonded with the prospective adoptive 
family in Alabama. Consequently, we are bound by them on appeal. See In re E.F., 
375 N.C. 88, 91, 846 S.E.2d 630, 632 (2020). 
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We next consider respondents’ challenges to finding of fact 15 concerning the 
need to terminate respondents’ rights to aid in the accomplishment of the permanent 
concurrent plans of adoption or guardianship. Adam, just days away from his 
sixteenth birthday when the trial court entered its order, indicated that he does not 
wish to be adopted and prefers guardianship even though his permanent plan 
remains a concurrent plan of adoption or guardianship. While it is true that 
termination of respondents’ parental rights would aid in the permanent plan of 
adoption, see In re A.J.T., 374 N.C. 504, 512, 843 S.E.2d 192, 197 (2020), it is not 
legally necessary to accomplish the concurrent permanent plan of guardianship, see 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-600(a) (2019) (providing for appointment of guardians “when no parent 
appears in a hearing with the juvenile or when the court finds it would be in the best 
interests of the juvenile”). Thus, the trial court was incorrect in believing that 
termination of respondents’ parental rights is necessary to free Adam for 
guardianship. 
 
We next consider respondents’ arguments that the trial court failed to make 
written findings regarding all the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). 
Respondent-father contends the trial court failed to address his bond with Adam, 
whereas respondent-mother asserts that the trial court failed to make written 
findings regarding her bond with Adam, as well as the likelihood of Adam being 
adopted.   
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Subsection 7B-1110(a) requires the trial court to consider all the factors but 
“does not, however, explicitly require written findings as to each factor,” particularly 
when there was no conflict in the evidence regarding those factors. In re A.U.D., 373 
N.C. 3, 10, 832 S.E.2d 698, 702 (2019). Here it is uncontested that Adam had a bond 
with his parents. Adam testified that he had a bond with his father, and during 
closing arguments the attorney for DSS stated that Adam was bonded with his 
parents. It was also undisputed that Adam did not wish to be adopted and would not 
give his consent to being adopted, and therefore it was unlikely that he would be 
adopted. Thus, because these factors were uncontested, no written findings were 
necessary. Id. at 11, 832 S.E.2d at 703. 
We further note that while the trial court may not have made explicit findings 
regarding the statutory factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2) and (4), its 
remaining dispositional findings of fact demonstrate that it considered Adam’s bond 
with his parents and the likelihood of his being adopted. In finding of fact 10, the trial 
court found that it had considered the “expression of [Adam’s] desires in this case,” 
meaning that Adam did not wish to be adopted. In finding of fact 16, the trial court 
noted Adam’s testimony that he wished to maintain a relationship with his parents 
and did not want their rights terminated. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 
court did not err by failing to make written findings of fact using the exact language 
contained in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).  
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Lastly, respondents argue that consideration of the statutory factors set forth 
in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) does not support termination of their parental rights. 
Specifically, respondents cite: (1) their bond with Adam; (2) the likelihood that he 
would not be adopted because he would not grant consent; (3) that termination of 
their parental rights was unnecessary to accomplish Adam’s preferred disposition of 
guardianship; and (4) that due to Adam’s age, there were few, if any, benefits to Adam 
being adopted. While generally the trial court’s decision is well supported, it seems 
the trial court’s decision to terminate respondents’ parental rights was made under a 
mistake of law concerning guardianship.  
First, it is undisputed that Adam had a bond with respondents, and it appears 
he especially had a strong bond with respondent-father. When considering the other 
factors set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), however, the trial court’s determination 
that termination of respondents’ parental rights is in Adam’s best interests seems to 
misapprehend the weight that should be given to Adam’s consent to adoption, 
particularly given his age. While termination of respondents’ parental right would 
technically aid in accomplishing the permanent plan of adoption, the trial court 
should not place undue emphasis on this statutory factor when Adam will not consent 
to adoption and is a much older juvenile.  
Adam clearly expressed that did not wish to be adopted and would not give 
consent to being adopted. Here, just prior to the termination hearing, Adam wrote a 
letter to the judge who would preside over the hearing, in which he stated: 
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I understand there is a family in Alabama who are willing 
to adopt my sister and provide guardianship for me. I 
understand that I have a choice, being over 12 years old, 
that I seek guardianship and NOT adoption. I prefer 
guardianship over adoption due to wanting to keep my last 
name, I want [respondents’] names to remain on legal 
documents, and I will be an adult in two years and will only 
return to Alabama to visit my biological sister. I am 
struggling to understand the benefits of adoption as I will 
be turning 18 in twenty-six months. When moving to 
Alabama I do not want to give up access to mom and dad. I 
want to be able to speak directly to my parents . . . 
unrestrained and unsupervised by others.  
 
Adam is now 17 years old. Given Adam’s well-reasoned objection to adoption, the trial 
court’s unchallenged finding that Adam’s interest in maintaining a relationship with 
respondents is reciprocated by respondents, as well as the fact that Adam is 
approaching the age of majority, there are few benefits to terminating respondents’ 
parental rights. As a juvenile ages, the trial court should afford more weight to his 
wishes.  
While Adam is unlikely to be able to return to respondents’ home, other 
dispositional alternatives were available. The guardian ad litem advocated for 
placing Adam in guardianship rather than proceeding with adoption. Contrary to 
findings of fact 15 and 23, termination of respondents’ parental rights is not necessary 
to place Adam in guardianship with the family in Alabama. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-600(a). 
Those findings suggest a misapprehension of the legal differences between adoption 
and guardianship. In such a situation, the proper remedy is to remand for 
reconsideration. Cf. In re Estate of Skinner, 370 N.C. 126, 146, 804 S.E.2d 449, 462 
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(2017) (“It is well-established in this Court’s decisions that a misapprehension of the 
law is appropriately addressed by remanding the case to the appropriate lower forum 
in order to apply the correct legal standard.”). As such, we vacate that portion of the 
order terminating respondents’ parental rights to Adam and remand to the trial court 
to reconsider guardianship as a dispositional alternative, which does not require 
termination, and to give proper weight to Adam’s age, his lack of consent to adoption, 
his bond with his parents, and the availability of a family that could be appointed as 
guardians. 
II. 
We next consider respondents’ arguments concerning the order terminating 
their parental rights to Alyson. Respondents argue that the trial court failed to make 
a written finding of fact regarding the bond between Alyson and respondents. 
Respondent-mother argues that the matter should be remanded for further findings 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), whereas respondent-father asserts that because the 
trial court failed to consider all relevant statutory factors, the trial court abused its 
discretion by terminating his parental rights. We are not persuaded. 
Explicit written findings regarding each of the factors set forth in N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1110(a) are not required when there is no conflict in the evidence. In re A.U.D., 
373 N.C. at 10–12, 832 S.E.2d at 702–03. Here the guardian ad litem testified that 
Alyson had a bond with respondent-mother. The guardian ad litem described a visit 
between Alyson and respondent-mother as follows: “[Alyson] and her mom generally 
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will color, or they’ll play a game on the phone, or yesterday they were playing a Heads 
Up! game and enjoying themselves. It was a nice visit.” Additionally, a DSS Court 
Report from July 2018 stated that “the children and the respondent parents are well 
bonded.” Alyson also wrote a letter to the presiding judge, which was admitted into 
evidence, in which she stated that she loved her prospective adoptive family and 
would like to live with them. Alyson further explained, “I would live with my parents 
but I know why I can’t.” It thus appears that the undisputed evidence shows Alyson 
had a bond with respondents. Even assuming arguendo, however, that the trial court 
erred by failing to make a finding regarding this dispositional factor, we would decline 
to find reversible error because it would only delay permanence for Alyson.  
Here Alyson was only nine years old at the time of the hearing, significantly 
younger than Adam, and thus the same considerations are not applicable to Alyson. 
Specifically, Alyson’s consent is not required for adoption. Additionally, the trial court 
made unchallenged findings that Alyson was bonded with her prospective adoptive 
parents, termination of respondents’ parental rights would aid in the permanent plan 
of adoption, Alyson was in need of a permanent plan of care at the earliest age 
possible, and respondents’ conduct had demonstrated that they would not promote 
Alyson’s physical and emotional well-being. Furthermore, it is not contested that 
Alyson is likely to be adopted.  
Therefore, we conclude the trial court appropriately considered the factors set 
forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) when determining Alyson’s best interests and that the 
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trial court’s determination that respondents’ minimal bond with Alyson was 
outweighed by other factors was not manifestly unsupported by reason. We therefore 
hold the trial court’s conclusion that termination of respondents’ parental rights was 
in Alyson’s best interests did not constitute an abuse of discretion and affirm the trial 
court’s orders as to Alyson.  
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.