Title: Mesi v. Mesi

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

136 Nev., Advance Opinion 84
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ERIC THOMAS MESI, No. 79137
Appellant,

vs,

VANESSA MARIE MESI, A/K/A FILED
VANESSA MARIE REYNOLDS,

Respondent. DEC 31 28

 

Appeal from a district court order dismissing a divorce action
‘on comity grounds. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Rhonda
Kay Forsberg, Judge.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

 

Bailey Kennedy and Stephanie J. Glantz and Dennis L. Kennedy, Las
Vegas,
for Appellant.

Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP, and A. Jill Guingcangeo,

Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

BEFORE GIBBONS, STIGLICH and SILVER, JJ.

OPINION
By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:

‘This case arises from a contested divorce action, in which both
spouses sought to litigate in their respective “home court.” The wife filed
first in California, and the husband filed second in Nevada. The husband

10 4990F

 
om

 

argued before both courts that California lacked jurisdiction. The Nevada
district court judge personally called the California superior court judge,
discussed the case with the California judge, verified in the call that the
California case was filed first, and dismissed the Nevada case. Neither
party was present or represented during the call. The husband appealed.

We hold that the district court erred by dismissing the case
immediately after the phone call without providing the parties an
opportunity to respond. Further, under the first-to-file rule, the district
court should have stayed the action, not dismissed it. Absent special
circumstances, the first-to-file rule requires deference to the first court's
jurisdiction, but deference does not always mean dismissal. The second
court can also defer by staying the action, which better serves the rule’s goal
of efficiency when a party disputes the first court’s jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand this matter to
the district court with instructions to enter a stay.

BACKGROUND

Erie and Vanessa Mesi married in Nevada in 2005. While
married, the couple spent time in both Nevada and California, sometimes
together and sometimes apart. In late 2018, they moved together from
California to Las Vegas. But Vanessa did not stay long: one month later,
she returned to California without Eric. In January 2019, Vanessa filed for
divorce in the California Superior Court in San Jose. ‘Two months later,
Eric filed for divorce in Las Vegas. Both parties proceeded pro se in the trial
courts.

Eric moved to dismiss the California suit for lack of jurisdiction.
He argued that Vanessa's California residency was broken up by the month
she spent in Nevada and that she therefore failed to satisfy California's six-

 
month residency requirement for divorce. Cal. Fam. Code § 2320(a) (West
2020). The California court has not ruled on this motion.

Vanessa moved to dismiss the Nevada suit under the first-to-
file rule. She provided the case number and filing date of her California
suit. The Nevada district court promptly notified Eric that it intended to
“set up a conference call with the California court to properly address this
matter.” Eric opposed Vanessa’s motion to dismiss. Although his opposition
contained substantial irrelevant material, it clearly argued that the
California court lacked jurisdiction and that the case should therefore
proceed in Nevada.

The Nevada district court held a phone conference with the
California court. Neither Eric nor Vanessa was present. The California
court confirmed that Vanessa indeed had a suit pending in California and
that she had filed it in January. The California court also noted that Erie
had objected to the California court's jurisdiction. On the phone, the
Nevada court decided that the first-to-file rule applied and that it would
defer jurisdiction to California by dismissing the case.

Immediately after the phone conference, the district court
dismissed the action. Eric appealed.

DISCUSSION
Procedural due process

We first consider Eric’s contention that the district court
deprived him of due process by holding an ex parte conversation with the
California superior court judge and by dismissing the action immediately
thereafter. A deprivation of due process is of constitutional dimension, and

“{tHhis court applies a de novo standard of review to constitutional
challenges.” Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007).

 

 
“Due process is satisfied where interested parties are given an
‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” J.D. Constr., Ine. v. IBEX Int'l Grp., LLC, 126 Nev. 366, 377, 240
P.3d 1033, 1041 (2010) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976). When a district court rules on a dispositive motion, the district
to be heard.

 

court must therefore provide a meaningful opportu

 

Ordinarily, this takes the form of a live hearing, but in some cases the
parties may be “afforded sufficient opportunity to present their case
through affidavits and supporting documents.” See id. at 378, 240 P.3d at
1041; ef. Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 83 (24 Cir.
2018) (“Hearing from the parties either in person or on the papers is
typically an essential component of the inquiry into whether to decline to
.” (emphasis added)).

Vanessa's motion to dismiss included a signed declaration

exercise . . . jurisdiction

 

stating that she had filed a petition for divoree in California in January.
This was competent evidence. See NRS 53.045. Eric opposed the motion
and did not demand a live hearing. Eric was fully notified that the court
was considering dismissing his suit. Accordingly, if the district court had
simply considered the record and held that the undisputed evidence showed
that Vanessa filed first, it might have satisfied due process, as both parties
had an opportunity to be heard “on the papers.” See Catzin, 899 F.3d at 83.2

‘After the district court issued its minute order dismissing the case,
Vanessa supplemented her evidence with a duplicate (not a certified copy)
of the California complaint.

°This case does not present us with the opportunity to determine
exactly when a live hearing is required.

 

 
But the district court did not rely solely on the evidence before
it. Instead, the court contacted the California judge outside the parties’
presence and made a decision based on that judge’s word. In doing so, the
istrict court conducted its own investigation and rested its decision on
matters beyond the record. This was improper? See City of Reno v. Harris,
111 Nev. 672, 678, 895 P.2d 663, 667 (1995) (“A court’s consideration of
matters outside the record, obtained by independent investigation,
generally constitutes error.”), modified on other grounds by Cty. of Clark v.
Doumani, 114 Nev. 46, 53 n.2, 952 P.2d 13, 17 n.2(1998). And because the
district court relied on the telephone call in resolving the dispute, it

 

deprived Eric of an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner” and thereby violated his right to due process. See J.D.
Constr., 126 Nev. at 377, 240 P.3d at 1041 (internal quotation marks
omitted); Sw. Gas Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Nev., 92 Nev. 48, 59-60,
546 P.2d 219, 226 (1976) (observing that consideration of matters outside
the record is inconsistent with the requirement of providing notice and an
opportunity to be heard).

Nevertheless, it is not immediately obvious that this error
requires reversal. “(The court must disregard all errors and defects that
do not affect any party's substantial rights.” NRCP 61. An error affects
substantial rights if “but for the alleged error, a different result might
reasonably have been reached.” Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244

We note that the district court’s written order referred to the
telephone call as a “UCCJEA Conference,” but this was erroneous.
Although the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA) expressly authorizes courts to communicate with each other
regarding certain child custody determinations, see NRS 125.275, Eric and
Vanessa have no children together.

 

 
P.3d 765, 778 (2010). Vanessa argues that the due process violation is
necessarily harmless because the first-to-file rule required dismissal, no
matter how the court learned of the first-filed suit. This court has not had
the opportunity to address the first-to-file rule in a published opinion, but
the rule has arisen with some frequency in our unpublished orders.*
Accordingly, we take this opportunity to review the rule and its purposes.
Overview of the first-to-file rule

The first-to-file rule is a “generally recognized doctrine of
federal comity which permits a district court to decline jurisdiction over an
action when a complaint involving the same parties and issues has already
been filed in another district.” Pacesetter Sys., Ine. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678
F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1982). Although the doctrine was originally
developed in federal court, state courts have applied it as well. Eg.,
Wamsley v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 178 P.3d 102, 110 (Mont. 2008). The rule
is grounded in principles of efficiency and “[wlise judicial administration.”
Pacesetter, 678 F.2d at 95 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip.
Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952) (alteration in original). Courts have
consistently emphasized that the rule is equitable in nature, that it must
not be applied mechanically, and that “an ample degree of
discretion . .. must be left to the lower courts.” Id. (quoting Kerotest, 342
USS. at 183-84).

‘The Ninth Circuit set forth a three-step test for the rule in
Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Products, Inc., 946 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1991), which

“See Tonopah Solar Energy, LLC v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court, Docket
No. 78256 (Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Petition for Writ of
Prohibition or Mandamus, May 29, 2020); Galindo-Milan v. Hammer,
Docket No. 74068 (Order of Affirmance, Apr. 12, 2019); Anders v. Anders,
Docket No. 71266-COA (Order of Affirmance, Dec. 14, 2017).

 

 
 

we now adopt. First, does the rule apply in the first instance? See Alltrade,
946 F.2d at 625-27. If so, is there some equitable reason not to apply the
rule? See id. at 627-28. Finally, if the rule applies, should the second-filed
suit be dismissed or merely stayed? See id. at 628-29.

Application of the first-to-file rule

In order for the rule to apply in the first instance, the parties
and issues ii

strictly identical. Kohn Law Grp., Inc. v. Auto Parts Mfg. Miss., Inc., 787
F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2015). ‘The court should also consider the suits’
“chronology.” See Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 625. Where there are two suits
between the same two parties over the same subject matter, ordinarily, the

the two suits must be substantially the same, even if not

 

second court should defer to the first. Certainly, the first-to-file rule applied
here, as there was no doubt that Eric's and Vanessa's suits were between
the same parties and over the same subject matter, and that Vanessa was
the first to file her action.

We next consider whether “equitable concerns militate against
application of the rule.” See Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 627-28. The first suit
should have priority unless “special circumstances” weigh in favor of the
second suit. William Gluckin & Co. v. Int'l Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177, 178
(2d Cir. 1969). We emphasize that the district court should not embroil
itselfin a mi

 

-trial regarding the propriety of the two forums. For example,
if a party believes that the first court is deeply inconvenient, such that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens applies, that “argument should be
addressed to the court in the first-filed action.” Pacesetter, 678 F.2d at 96,

Although federal courts have identified “anticipatory suit(s]”
and “forum shopping” as reasons not to defer to the first-filed suit, see
Allltrade, 946 F.2d at 628, we think those concerns too should be addressed
to the first court. After all, “Iglenerally, a plaintiff's choice of forum is

1

 
entitled to great deference.” Provincial Gou't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome,
Inc., 131 Nev. 296, 301, 350 P.3d 392, 396 (2015). If the first court was
indeed chosen solely as an egregious act of forum shopping, then the first.
court should ordinarily be trusted to dismiss the action. Cf. Kerotest, 342
USS. at 185 (rejecting an attitude of distrust in the discretion of the court),
Conversely, if the first court declines to dismiss the action, then the parties
should litigate there. Here, we conclude that Eric’s claim that California
lacked jurisdiction did not amount to “special circumstances” justifying an
exception, as he was bound to address that argument to the California court.

Accordingly, under the first two steps of the Alltrade analysis,
we conclude that the first-to-file rule did apply in this case. Even absent
the constitutional error, no “different result might reasonably have been
reached.” See Wyeth, 126 Nev. at 465, 244 P.3d at 778. Therefore, that error
was harmless.

Nevertheless, under Alltrade’s third step, we hold that the
istrict court abused its discretion by dismissing the suit. See Pacesetter,
678 F.2d at 95 (stating that a district court’s application of the first-to-file
rule is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). “{Wlhere the first-filed action
presents a likelihood of dismissal, the second-filed suit should be stayed,
rather than dismissed.” Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 629. This rule applies when
a motion to dismiss is pending in the first-filed action. See id.

This is consistent with the rule's purpose of promoting judicial
efficiency. See id. at 625. Although efficiency is normally “best served when
motions to stay proceedings are discouraged,” see Aspen Fin. Servs., Inc. v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. 635, 649, 289 P.3d 201, 210 (2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted), the situation is different when a court

has already decided to defer jurisdiction and is only choosing whether to

 

 
stay or dismiss. Cf. id. at 649 n.5, 289 P.3d at 210 n.5 (noting that “courts
occasionally find a stay will in fact promote judicial efficiency”). If the first-
filed suit is dismissed, the second court’s stay can be lifted and the action
‘can proceed without the need for a wasteful new filing See Alltrade, 946
F.2d at 629. Conversely, if the first court determines that it does have
Jurisdiction, the second action can be dismissed without difficulty. See id.

Here, the district court ought to have deferred to California by
staying Eric's suit, not by dismissing it. The district court was aware that
Eric had moved to dismiss the California case on the grounds that Vanessa
failed to satisfy California's residency requirement. Given the confused
state of the facts, Eric’s argument was not obviously frivolous. We
‘emphasize that the district court was not required to decide whether Eric's
argument was ultimately meritorious. Though it may turn out that
California has jurisdiction and the Nevada action will have to be dismissed,
the question of the first court's jurisdiction “should be addressed to the court
in the first-filed action.” See Pacesetter, 678 F.2d at 96. The factual and
legal questions regarding Vanessa's residency must be decided in
California. Their existence, however, ought to have “counselled] against
outright dismissal” of the Nevada action. See Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 629.

CONCLUSION

We hold that, generally, a district court may not independently

investigate facts in a pending matter by communicating ex parte with

SStaying the action may also prevent inequitable results if a statute
of limitations applies. See Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 629 (“Granted, the statute
of limitations problems may not be serious... . But why take chances? It
is simpler just to stay the second suit.” (alteration in original) (quoting Asset
Allocation & Mgmt. Co. v. W. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 866, 571 (7th Cir.
1989))).

 

 
another court without giving the parties an opportunity to respond. We
further hold that, where the same action is filed in two courts and a party
contests the first court's jurisdiction, the second court should ordinarily stay
the action, to permit the first court to decide the issue of its own jurisdiction.
A stay gives appropriate deference to the first court, while ensuring a more
efficient transition back to the second court should the first court turn out
to lack jurisdiction. District courts have equitable authority to treat
unusual cases differently, but no special circumstances are present here.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order of dismissal
and remand with instructions to enter a stay. Either party may move to lift,
the stay and to either proceed with or dismiss the action, as appropriate,

based on subsequent decisions of the California court.®

GG 9 J.
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Silver

 

"The parties both represented at oral argument that the California
court has not yet issued any judgment that would make this case moot.