Title: State v. Messenger

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Messenger, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4562.]                                                                
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4562 
THE STATE OF OHIO v. MESSENGER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Messenger, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4562.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2901.05—Affirmative defenses—Self-defense—Burden of 
production and burden of persuasion—Defendant has burden of production 
regarding self-defense claim and must produce legally sufficient evidence 
that defendant’s use of force was in self-defense—State then has burden of 
persuasion to disprove self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt—On 
appeal, sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to 
defendant’s burden of production and manifest-weight standard of review 
applies to state’s burden of persuasion—Court of appeals’ judgment 
affirmed. 
(No. 2021-0944—Submitted May 25, 2022—Decided December 21, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 19AP-879, 2021-Ohio-2044. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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DONNELLY, J. 
{¶ 1} Recent legislation now dictates that when a defendant presents a claim 
of self-defense in a criminal case, the state has the burden of disproving that self-
defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt.  This discretionary appeal from the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals involves the latest of questions that have arisen from the 
legislative change: is the state’s rebuttal of a defendant’s claim of self-defense now 
subject to review under the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard?  We hold that it 
is not, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Tenth District holding the same. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Kandle Messenger, was charged with murder and felony 
murder, along with accompanying firearm specifications.  The charges stemmed 
from the fatal shooting of Richard Pack.  Messenger claimed that he had acted in 
self-defense.  The witnesses who testified at Messenger’s jury trial provided 
conflicting accounts of what happened, but there was no dispute that Messenger 
ultimately shot Pack 14 times in quick succession with a semiautomatic handgun. 
{¶ 3} Messenger and Pack were stepbrothers and good friends.  During two 
incidents on the evening of February 25, 2019, Pack confronted Messenger about 
Messenger’s secret romantic involvement with Samantha Anderson.  Anderson was 
Pack’s recently estranged girlfriend and the mother of his two children.  Pack came 
to the house where Messenger and Anderson lived—and where Pack had also lived 
before moving out in January 2019.  After telling Messenger to sit down on the 
living-room couch, Pack repeatedly punched Messenger while Messenger 
apologized for the betrayal.  Pack left shortly thereafter but returned to the house 
later in the evening. 
{¶ 4} Before Pack returned, Messenger retrieved a handgun and put it in his 
waistband.  Messenger testified that he was afraid that Pack would return to the 
house armed with a gun because Pack had threatened to kill him during the first 
incident and also because Pack owned multiple guns and was very experienced with 
January Term, 2022 
 
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them.  When Pack returned, he confronted Messenger again, and the two men 
argued in the backyard.  According to Messenger’s testimony at trial, he drew his 
gun on Pack but he put it back in his waistband after Pack said to put it away.  Pack 
then went into the house with Anderson and demanded that Messenger come inside.  
Messenger initially refused and stayed in the yard for a few minutes, but he 
ultimately went into the house. 
{¶ 5} Messenger testified that after he entered the house, Pack came toward 
him and insisted they should hug.  Messenger knew that Pack had expertise in 
disarming people, and he feared that Pack was going to take the gun and shoot him.  
Messenger testified that once he was backed into a corner with Pack still coming at 
him and ignoring his pleas to stop, Messenger panicked and started shooting.  The 
three other adults in the house—Anderson, her sister, and her sister’s fiancée—
overheard but did not see Messenger shoot Pack.  Anderson testified that she heard 
Messenger repeatedly beg Pack to stop and not come any closer and that she then 
heard gunshots.  The other two women each testified that before the gunfire, they 
heard Messenger tell Pack, “[N]o * * * don’t.” 
{¶ 6} Messenger’s next-door-neighbors testified that they watched the 
backyard confrontation from their kitchen window.  One neighbor testified that she 
stopped watching once Pack entered the house but that she heard gunshots roughly 
two minutes later.  The other neighbor said that he watched Messenger as he stood 
alone in the yard after Pack went inside.  After a few minutes, the neighbor saw 
Messenger as he “took off,” strode quickly into the house, and slammed the door.  
The neighbor testified that he heard gunshots immediately after Messenger entered 
the house. 
{¶ 7} Messenger moved for acquittal under Crim.R. 29 after the state rested 
and again at the end of trial.  The trial court denied the motions, finding that 
reasonable minds could differ as to whether each element of the crime had been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 8} The state’s theory of the case, presented during closing arguments, 
was that Messenger went into the house in a rage and immediately began to shoot 
wildly at Pack, thereby committing murder and felony murder.  The state’s theory 
against self-defense was that Messenger initiated the confrontation by choosing to 
enter the house and “almost instantaneous[ly]” begin shooting.  Messenger could 
not have believed he needed to act in self-defense, because Pack posed no threat to 
Messenger between the time that Messenger stood outside the house and the 
moment that he began shooting Pack.  Messenger could have chosen not to enter 
the house.  And Messenger did not use reasonable force, because he shot far more 
times than was necessary to repel an attacker. 
{¶ 9} Messenger’s theory of self-defense was that Pack started the 
confrontation by coming to the house where Messenger was staying.  Messenger 
reasonably feared that Pack was going to disarm and shoot him once Messenger 
was inside the house given Pack’s previous threats to kill Messenger, Pack’s 
ownership of guns, Pack’s expertise at disarming people, and the fact that Pack 
continued to approach Messenger for a hug despite Messenger’s pointing a weapon 
at him and telling him to stop.  Because Messenger was living at that house, he had 
a right to enter the house and had no duty to retreat.  And Messenger reasonably 
shot at Pack until Pack fell down.  He further claimed that the number of shots and 
the scattered range of shell casings were indicative of panic and fear. 
{¶ 10} In its jury charge, the trial court included an instruction on self-
defense in accordance with the newly amended R.C. 2901.05(B)(1): “If you find 
that evidence was presented that tends to support the finding that the Defendant 
used deadly force in self-defense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the Defendant did not properly act in self-defense.”  The trial court also 
instructed that “a person using force to defend himself who lawfully is in that 
person’s residence or business has no duty to retreat before using deadly force [in] 
January Term, 2022 
 
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self-defense.”  The jury found Messenger guilty on all counts and specifications.  
The trial court imposed a sentence of 18 years to life in prison. 
{¶ 11} Among his arguments in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, 
Messenger argued that the state had not presented legally sufficient evidence to 
establish that he had not acted in self-defense.  He also argued that the state had 
failed to disprove self-defense under a “manifest weight” test.  The court held that 
Messenger’s self-defense claim was not subject to review for the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  2021-Ohio-2044, 174 N.E.3d 425, ¶ 44.  The appellate court held that a 
sufficiency analysis applies only to the elements of an offense and that affirmative 
defenses remain subject only to manifest-weight review on appeal.  The court went 
on to reject Messenger’s manifest-weight challenge, id. at ¶ 53, and his remaining 
assignments of error, and it affirmed Messenger’s convictions, id. at ¶ 79. 
{¶ 12} Messenger sought our discretionary review of the Tenth District’s 
decision, advancing several propositions of law.  We accepted the appeal on the 
following proposition of law: “Self-defense claims may be reviewed on direct 
appeal for sufficiency of the evidence.”  See 164 Ohio St.3d 1460, 2021-Ohio-3594, 
174 N.E.3d 811. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 13} The question whether a claim of self-defense is subject to review 
under a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard is a question of law, which we review 
de novo.  See Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 165 Ohio St.3d 
390, 2021-Ohio-2067, 179 N.E.3d 1169, ¶ 6.  A sufficiency analysis “ ‘determine[s] 
whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to 
support the jury verdict as a matter of law.’ ”  State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 
380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (6th 
Ed.1990).  If the state fails to present sufficient evidence on every element of an 
offense, then convicting a defendant for that offense violates the defendant’s right 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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to due process of law.  Id. at 386-387; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
316, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d (1979). 
{¶ 14} A self-defense claim includes the following elements: 
 
(1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving 
rise to the affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that 
he [or she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm 
and that his [or her] only means of escape from such danger was in 
the use of such force; and (3) that the defendant did not violate any 
duty to retreat or avoid the danger. 
 
State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). 
{¶ 15} In a criminal trial taking place prior to March 28, 2019, the effective 
date of 2018 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 228 (“H.B. 228”), a defendant claiming the 
affirmative defense of self-defense had the burden of proving the foregoing 
elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.  See former R.C. 
2901.05(A), 2008 Sub.S.B. No. 184; State v. Brooks, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-
2478, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 23 (discussing former versions of R.C. 2901.05).  H.B. 228 
amended R.C. 2901.05, and since March 28, 2019, the burden regarding self-
defense has been as follows:  
 
A person is allowed to act in self-defense * * *.  If, at the trial of a 
person who is accused of an offense that involved the person’s use 
of force against another, there is evidence presented that tends to 
support that the accused person used the force in self-defense * * *, 
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused person did not use the force in self-defense * * *. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
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R.C. 2901.05(B)(1). 
{¶ 16} Because the state must prove all elements of an offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt and because the state must now prove lack of self-defense beyond 
a reasonable doubt, Messenger argues that both must be examined under a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard.  This argument fails to account for the 
difference between the nature of the evidence and the strength of a conclusion 
regarding that evidence. 
{¶ 17} Reasonable doubt is “the condition of mind produced by the proof 
resulting from the evidence in the cause.  It is the result of the proof, not the proof 
itself * * *; thus one is a cause, the other an effect.”  Coffin v. United States, 156 
U.S. 432, 460, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895).  Reasonable doubt speaks to the 
extent to which the factfinder must be convinced that a party met its burden of 
persuasion.  State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103, 107-108, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976); 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).  The 
reasonable-doubt standard does not apply to whether a party has met its burden of 
producing legally sufficient evidence in the first place; if a party fails to meet its 
burden of production, the factfinder cannot consider the claim at all, let alone how 
persuasive the evidence was.  See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16, 98 S.Ct. 
2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (reversal for insufficient evidence “means that the 
government’s case was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to 
the jury” [emphasis sic]). 
{¶ 18} The state has the burden of production regarding the elements of a 
criminal offense because an accused person has the right to a presumption of 
innocence on each element.  R.C. 2901.05(A); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, 275, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315, 99 S.Ct. 
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  The presumption of innocence “is an instrument of proof 
created by the law in favor of one accused, whereby his innocence is established 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has 
created.”  Coffin at 459. 
{¶ 19} Conversely, there is no due-process right to a presumption of an 
affirmative defense such as self-defense.  State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 
2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 37; see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 
798-799, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952) (legislative allocation of the burden 
of proving the affirmative defense of insanity does not raise a constitutional issue, 
because the affirmative defense is not constitutionally based).  There is also no 
statutory right to a presumption of self-defense in Ohio.  R.C. 2901.05(A) provides 
that an accused is “presumed innocent,” in line with the constitutionally guaranteed 
right.  But R.C. 2901.05(B) states that “[a] person is allowed to act in self-defense.”  
(Emphasis added.)  With no “proof created by the law in favor of” self-defense, see 
Coffin at 459, the defendant has the burden of producing legally sufficient evidence 
of self-defense to trigger the state’s duty to overcome that evidence. 
{¶ 20} Although there is no explicit presumption of self-defense in R.C. 
2901.05(B)(1), Messenger nonetheless maintains that H.B. 228’s amendment to the 
statute eliminated the defendant’s burden of production regarding self-defense.  He 
notes that former R.C. 2901.05(A) stated that a defendant had the affirmative 
“burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the 
burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense,” 
see 2008 Sub.S.B. No. 184, but the new standard specific to self-defense in R.C. 
2901.05(B)(1) uses passive language and triggers the state’s duty to disprove self-
defense so long as “there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused 
person used the force in self-defense.”  He contends that the vagueness of the new 
language in R.C. 2901.05(B)(1), coupled with the state’s new burden of persuasion, 
indicates that the absence of self-defense is now an element of all applicable 
offenses and that the state has the burden of production.  We disagree. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 21} The plain language of R.C. 2901.05(A) reflects that self-defense is 
still an affirmative defense and that the burden of production is still on the 
defendant: 
 
The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative 
defense, and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, for an affirmative defense other than self-defense, defense 
of another, or defense of the accused’s residence presented as 
described in division (B)(1) of this section, is upon the accused. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  By stating that the burden of persuasion is on the defendant for 
“an affirmative defense other than self-defense,” the statute indicates that self-
defense falls within the category of affirmative defenses but is excepted from the 
burden of persuasion.  And by stating that the defendant bears the “burden of going 
forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense,” the statute indicates that there 
are no exceptions to the defendant’s burden of production regarding affirmative 
defenses. 
{¶ 22} The reference in R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) to “evidence presented that 
tends to support” self-defense indicates that the defendant’s burden of production 
is not a heavy one and that it might even be satisfied through the state’s own 
evidence.  However, we cannot infer from these few words alone that the absence 
of self-defense is now a substantive element of every offense involving the use of 
force.  We have already determined that the amendment to R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) was 
procedural, not substantive, in nature.  Brooks, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-2478, 
__ N.E.3d. __, at ¶ 15-16.  The amendment changed the procedure for adjudicating 
criminal cases involving evidence of self-defense; it did not make substantive 
changes to the elements of any offenses. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 23} The law defining the murder offenses charged against Messenger 
remained the same before and after H.B. 228’s amendment to R.C. 2901.05: 
  
(A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or 
the unlawful termination of another’s pregnancy. 
(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate 
result of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit an 
offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree and 
that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the Revised 
Code. 
 
R.C. 2903.02. 
{¶ 24} The change to the state’s burden of persuasion regarding self-
defense in R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) did not change the elements of Messenger’s charged 
offenses of murder and felony murder.  A statutory requirement that the state must 
disprove an affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt does not in itself cause 
the affirmative defense to become an element of the offense.  Engle v. Isaac, 456 
U.S. 107, 120, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982).  Self-defense remains an 
affirmative defense in Ohio, and an affirmative defense is not an element of a crime, 
see Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032, at ¶ 35. 
{¶ 25} Given the foregoing, a defendant charged with an offense involving 
the use of force has the burden of producing legally sufficient evidence that the 
defendant’s use of force was in self-defense.  Similarly to the standard for judging 
the sufficiency of the state’s evidence, if the defendant’s evidence and any 
reasonable inferences about that evidence would allow a rational trier of fact to find 
all the elements of a self-defense claim when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the defendant, then the defendant has satisfied the burden.  See State v. Filiaggi, 86 
January Term, 2022 
 
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Ohio St.3d 230, 247, 714 N.E.2d 867 (1999); Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d at 109-112, 
351 N.E.2d 88. 
{¶ 26} At the close of Messenger’s jury trial, the trial court provided the 
jury with an instruction regarding self-defense, which means that the trial court 
concluded that Messenger put forward sufficient evidence that he was acting in self-
defense when he shot and killed Pack.  The guilty verdict means that the state met 
its burden of persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Messenger was 
not acting in self-defense when he killed Pack.  As the Tenth District aptly 
explained, the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to 
Messenger’s burden of production and a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard 
of review applies to the state’s burden of persuasion.  2021-Ohio-2044, 174 N.E.3d 
425, at ¶ 44-45; see also Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (Cook, 
J., concurring) (a sufficiency challenge disputes whether a party “met its burden of 
production at trial,” and a manifest-weight challenge disputes whether a party 
“carried its burden of persuasion”). 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 27} H.B. 228’s amendments to R.C. 2901.05 did not eliminate the 
defendant’s burden of production regarding a claim of self-defense.  The state’s 
new burden of disproving the defendant’s self-defense claim beyond a reasonable 
doubt is subject to a manifest-weight review on appeal, and the Tenth District 
correctly declined to review the state’s rebuttal of self-defense for sufficiency of 
the evidence.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, STEWART, and ROBB, 
JJ., concur. 
CAROL ANN ROBB, J., of the Seventh District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
BRUNNER, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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_________________ 
G. Gary Tyack, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Carpenter, Lipps & Leland, L.L.P., Kort Gatterdam, and Erik P. Henry, for 
appellant. 
 
Steven L. Taylor, urging affirmance on behalf of amicus curiae, Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
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