Title: Bernard v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

261 So. 2d 133 (1972)
Richard BERNARD, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 41794.

Supreme Court of Florida.
April 12, 1972.
Rehearing Denied May 12, 1972.
*134 Myron Mike Gold, and Charles D. Edelstein, Miami, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Richard E. Gerstein, State's Atty., and Milton Robbins, Asst. State's Atty., for respondent.
ADKINS, Justice.
This cause is here on petition for writ of certiorari supported by certificate of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, that its decision reported at 254 So. 2d 38 is one which involves a question of great public interest in that it concerns an important question of practice as to the time that a trial actually begins. Fla. Const., art. V, § 4(2), F.S.A. We accept jurisdiction.
The facts, as stated by the District Court of Appeal, are as follows:
The State on appeal argued that jeopardy had not attached because no evidence had been heard by the trial judge. The defendant contended that jeopardy in a non-jury trial attached upon the swearing of the witnesses. The District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, saying:
We agree with this statement, as it is in accord with the general law. The following appears in Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. I, § 138, pp. 309-310:
In Newman v. United States, 133 U.S. App.D.C. 271, 410 F.2d 259 (1969), defendant waived his right to a jury trial and the government entered a nolle prosequi after the witnesses in the case were sworn, but before the first witness began to testify. It was held that jeopardy did not attach, the Court saying:
We agree with this reasoning and hold that jeopardy had not attached in the case sub judice because no evidence had been heard prior to the time the State entered a nolle prosequi.
The defendant also contends that he is entitled to be discharged under the provisions of Fla. Stat. (1969) § 915.01(2), F.S.A. That statute, which was recently repealed by the 1971 Legislature (Florida Laws, Chapter 71-1(B)) provided in pertinent part as follows:
Defendant filed his first demand for speedy trial on March 24, 1970. This was in the middle of the February 1970 term of the Criminal Court of Record for Dade County and was, therefore, directed to the April 1970 term, the full first term. The second demand for speedy trial was filed on April 18, 1970, still in the first full term.
*136 During the June 1970 term, the second full term, a third and last demand for speedy trial was filed on June 25, 1970. During the June 1970 term, the trial judge dismissed the information and the case on July 2, 1970.
Three full terms of court had not expired after the defendant filed his demands when the court dismissed the information. This Court in Morrero v. Turner, 246 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1971), in discussing Clawson v. Baker, 245 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1971), said:
We approve the decision of the District Court of Appeal in the case sub judice and the writ of certiorari is hereby discharged.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, Acting C.J., and CARLTON, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.