Title: Etole C. Furrow v. Gregory Helton

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 10/24/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070667
____________________
Etole C. Furrow
v.
Gregory Helton
Appeal from Mobile Probate Court 
(No. 2006-2093)
SMITH, Justice.
Etole C. Furrow is the proponent of a will her mother,
Jewell B. Malone, executed in 2003.  Gregory Helton is a
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2
grandson of Malone who contested the 2003 will.  After a trial
before the Mobile County Probate Court, a jury returned a
verdict in favor of Gregory, and Furrow appeals from a
judgment entered on that verdict.  We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
Malone, a resident of Mobile County, had three daughters:
Furrow; Sarah C. Lott; and Dorothy June C. Helton, who was
Gregory's mother.  Malone had grandchildren by each daughter.
Malone executed a will in 1995 devising her estate to her
three daughters in equal shares.  If a daughter predeceased
Malone, that daughter's share under the 1995 will would pass
to the daughter's children per stirpes.  The 1995 will named
Furrow as the executrix of Malone's estate; in the event
Furrow could not serve, Lott and Helton were to be co-
executrixes.
After a protracted illness, Malone's daughter Helton died
on November 30, 2003.  Malone executed a new will on December
16, 2003, devising her estate equally between Furrow and Lott,
Malone's two remaining living daughters.  The 2003 will made
no provision for any of Malone's grandchildren; instead, it
provided that if either Furrow or Lott preceded Malone in
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3
death, the surviving daughter would receive Malone's entire
estate.  The 2003 will named Furrow as the executrix or,
alternatively, Lott, if Furrow could not serve.
Malone died on June 20, 2006.  Furrow sought to have the
2003 will probated in the Mobile County Probate Court, and
Gregory filed a will contest alleging, among other things,
that the 2003 will was the result of Furrow's undue influence.
The will contest was tried before a jury.  Before the
matter was submitted to the jury at the conclusion of the
trial, the probate court entered a judgment as a matter of law
("JML") against Gregory on all claims except the claim
alleging that Furrow had exercised undue influence over Malone
regarding the 2003 will.  The jury returned a verdict in
Gregory's favor on his claim of undue influence, and the
probate court entered a judgment on the verdict in favor of
Gregory and against the 2003 will.  Furrow filed a renewed
motion for a JML under Rule 50(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which the
trial court later denied.  Furrow appealed to this Court.  See
§ 12-22-21, Ala. Code 1975 (authorizing an appeal to this
Court from an order, judgment, or decree of the probate court
"on a contest as to the validity of a will").
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4
Discussion
Furrow contends she was entitled to a JML as to
Gregory's claim that the 2003 will was the result of Furrow's
allegedly exercising undue influence over Malone. 
"'When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML
[judgment as a matter of law], this Court uses the
same standard the trial court used initially in
deciding whether to grant or deny the motion for a
JML.  Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate
question is whether the nonmovant has presented
sufficient evidence to allow the case to be
submitted to the jury for a factual resolution.  The
nonmovant must have presented substantial evidence
in order to withstand a motion for a JML.  A
reviewing court must determine whether the party who
bears the burden of proof has produced substantial
evidence 
creating 
a factual dispute requiring
resolution by the jury.  In reviewing a ruling on a
motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury
would have been free to draw.  Regarding a question
of law, however, this Court indulges no presumption
of correctness as to the trial court's ruling.'"
City of Birmingham v. Brown, 969 So. 2d 910, 915 (Ala. 2007)
(quoting Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins.
Co., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003)).  
Gregory, as the contestant, had the burden at trial of
proving the elements of undue influence.  Clifton v. Clifton,
529 So. 2d 980, 983 (Ala. 1988) ("It is well established that
the contestant who challenges a will on the basis of undue
1070667
5
influence bears the burden of proving such allegations."
(citing Kelly v. Donaldson, 456 So. 2d 30, 33 (Ala. 1984))).
As the proponent of the will, Furrow opposed Gregory's claim
of undue influence; therefore, the following is relevant to
our review of the trial court's denial of Furrow's motion for
a JML:
"JML in favor of a movant who does not assert
the claim or affirmative defense but who only
opposes it, and who therefore does not bear the
burden of proof, is appropriate in either of two
alternative cases.  One is that the claim or
affirmative defense is invalid in legal theory.  See
Harkins & Co. v. Lewis, 535 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1988).
The other is that one or more contested essential
elements of the claim or affirmative defenses is
unsupported by substantial evidence.  See Banks v.
Harbin, 500 So. 2d 1027 (Ala. 1986), and McKerley
[v. Etowah-DeKalb-Cherokee Mental Health Bd., Inc.,
686 So. 2d 1194 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)].  If either
alternative be true, JML is appropriate.  See
Harkins, supra, Banks, supra, and McKerley, supra.
If, however, the nonmovant's claim or affirmative
defense is valid in legal theory and is supported by
substantial evidence on every contested element, JML
is inappropriate irrespective of the presence or
weight of countervailing evidence.  See Driver [v.
National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 658 So. 2d 390 (Ala.
1995)],  and First Financial [Ins. Co. v. Tillery,
626 So. 2d 1252 (Ala. 1993)]."
Ex parte Helms, 873 So. 2d 1139, 1143-44 (Ala. 2003).  
Furrow contends that the second scenario described in
Helms applies in the present case, i.e., "that one or more
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6
contested essential elements of the claim or affirmative
defenses is unsupported by substantial evidence."  873 So. 2d
at 1143.  Furrow argues that the burden of proof never shifted
to her and that the trial court erred in denying her motion
for a JML on the undue-influence claim.  We agree.
As the contestant, Gregory was required to offer
substantial evidence showing 
"(1) 
that 
a 
confidential relationship existed
between a favored beneficiary and the testator; (2)
that the influence of or for the beneficiary was
dominant and controlling in that relationship; and
(3) that there was undue activity on the part of the
dominant party in procuring the execution of the
will."
Clifton, 529 So. 2d at 983 (citing Penn v. Jarrett, 447 So. 2d
723, 724 (Ala. 1984); Reed v. Walters, 396 So. 2d 83, 86 (Ala.
1981)).  See also Hubbard v. Moseley, 261 Ala. 683, 686-87, 75
So. 2d 658, 661 (1954).
In the present case, Gregory failed to offer substantial
evidence suggesting that Furrow exercised a dominant or
controlling influence over Malone or that Furrow engaged in
undue activity in procuring the execution of the will.  Thus,
Gregory failed to meet his burden of proof on at least two of
1070667
Because of our disposition of this appeal, we need not
1
decide the issue whether Furrow is a favored beneficiary.
7
the three elements of his undue-influence claim.1
The presumption is that the parent (Malone) was dominant
over the child (Furrow).  Clifton, 529 So. 2d at 984 (citing
Nottage v. Jones, 388 So. 2d 923, 926 (Ala. 1980) (where the
party in a will contest alleged to have exerted undue
influence over the testatrix is the child of the testatrix, it
is ordinarily presumed that the parent is dominant over the
child)).  Thus, Gregory had the burden of offering substantial
evidence to the contrary.  Wilson v. Wehunt, 631 So. 2d 991,
993-94 (Ala. 1994).  See also Clifton, 529 So. 2d at 983-84.
Gregory correctly notes that the issue of dominance may
be proved by circumstantial evidence.  See Ex parte Helms, 873
So. 2d at 1148; Allen v. Sconyers, 669 So. 2d 113, 118 (Ala.
1995).  However, the circumstantial evidence offered to show
dominance must nevertheless be substantial evidence.  See,
e.g., Wilson, 631 So. 2d at 993-94.  "Substantial evidence is
evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons
in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
existence of the fact sought to be proved."  West v. Founders
Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1070667
Specifically, Gregory testified that for approximately
2
two years before the 2003 will was executed, Malone was
"feeble."  He testified that Malone would "hallucinate, see
things," and that "[s]he would repeat herself.  She would tell
you one thing, five minutes later she would tell you the same
thing.  You would sit there an hour and she would tell you the
story three or four times."  Bubba testified that Malone was
"a very unstable woman" a week or so after June Helton's death
in November 2003 and was still "crying every day" about
Helton's death.  Bubba testified that Malone said "off-the-
wall things" during that time. 
Winfred, Sr., testified that
Malone would often repeat things.
In that regard, Bubba testified as follows:
3
"Q.  As far as you know, based on your
observations, did anyone care for Ms. Malone during
the say two- or three-year period before your mother
passed on in 2003?
8
1989).  See also § 12-21-12(d), Ala. Code 1975.
Gregory contends that "the jury accepted the testimony of
[Gregory], [Gregory's father, Winfred Helton, Sr.], and
[Gregory's brother, Winfred Helton, Jr. ('Bubba')], that
[Malone] was feeble, hallucinating, and vulnerable" around the
time she executed the 2003 will.   Bubba testified that Malone
2
"probably took over 10 pills a day" in the two- to three-year
period before June Helton died in November 2003.  He testified
that "on a few occasions" he saw her take the medication
Haldol, which he testified his ex-wife thought was for the
treatment of Alzheimer's disease.3
1070667
"A.  My Aunt Sarah come down in the evening and
brought her supper.
"Q.  Did anybody else go by there and care for
her?
"A.  My mother and father.
"Q. Did you have the opportunity to go into your
grandmother's house on few or many occasions?
"A.  Many occasions.
"Q.  And while you were there, did you ever have
an opportunity to observe if she was--had any
medications sitting around there?
"A.  Yes, sir.  She probably took over 10 pills
a day.
"Q.  And do you know if you ever saw the
prescriptions what those were for?
"A.  The only prescription that I really
realized what--me and my ex-wife Dana was in there
looking to get her medicine ready for her one day
and it was Haldol and it stood out for her--her
grandmother had Alzheimer's and that's what the
medication was for.
"Q.  I see, sir.  Did you ever have an
opportunity to see your grandmother take the
medication?
"A.  Yes, sir.
"Q.  And on few or many occasions?
"A.  Few occasions."
9
Gregory also argues that the jury rejected most of or all
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10
Furrow's testimony because, he says, the jury found it lacking
in credibility.  He contends that the jury's rejection of
Furrow's testimony and the jury's acceptance of his testimony
and the testimony of Winfred, Sr., and Bubba "was in and of
itself [substantial evidence from which] the jury could have
inferred [Furrow] was dominant in her exercise of a
confidential relationship at the time the contested will was
procured."  Gregory contends, therefore, that the facts in the
present case present a jury question on the issue of undue
influence as did the facts in Ex parte Helms, supra, in which
this Court held that a summary judgment was improper on an
undue-influence claim.  873 So. 2d at 1148-49.  
In Ex parte Helms, this Court found that the contestants
had presented substantial evidence of dominance and control
and undue activity in procuring the execution of the will
being contested.  The testator in Ex parte Helms executed a
second will in 1997, approximately 12 days after her doctor
informed her that she was dying of cancer and "that [her]
family situation need[ed] to be put in order."  The second
will "'practically disinherited all of the contestants and
left almost all her estate to the proponents.'"  873 So. 2d at
1070667
Lortab consists of "hydrocodone, a synthetic morphine-
4
like narcotic."  873 So. 2d at 1145.
11
1146 (quoting Morrow v. Helms, 873 So. 2d 1132, 1135 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2001)).  Under the testator's prior will, the
contestants would have inherited "substantial property."  873
So. 2d at 1145.
The evidence showed that the testator in Ex parte Helms
was taking the medication Lortab  for pain on a regular basis
4
both before and after the date of the execution of the second
will.  873 So. 2d at 1145, 1147-48.  There was extensive
medical testimony regarding the side effects of Lortab;
specifically, there was testimony that Lortab alters the mind,
affects thinking, interferes with the ability to think
clearly, "makes a person 'sedated and confused,'" affects the
central nervous system, causes drowsiness, and can cause a
person "to lose the ability to know what he or she is doing."
873 So. 2d at 1146.  Further, there was evidence suggesting
that the testator in Ex parte Helms experienced many of those
side effects.  
This Court held that there was substantial evidence of
the proponents' dominance and control in
"[t]he evidence of the proponents' access to and
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12
control over [the testator's] money and property,
their profiting from this access and control during
[the testator's] last two years of life and soon
after 
[her] 
death, 
their 
control 
over 
[her]
transportation, and their control, to some extent,
of access to [the testator] during the 16 critical
days culminating with the execution of the putative
second will."  
873 So. 2d at 1148-49.  Additionally, this Court in Ex parte
Helms held that the substantial evidence of the proponents'
undue activity in the procurement of the will included the
following: 
--
During the last two years of the testator's life,
the proponents obtained joint ownership with right
of survivorship to certificates of deposit totaling
$215,743.95 in value; 
--
One of the proponents opened a joint checking
account in the names of the testator and the
proponents with right of survivorship and deposited
only the testator's money in the account, and the
statements for the account were mailed only to the
address of one of the proponents;
-- 
Both proponents had a key and access to the
testator's safe-deposit box, although one of the
proponents 
had denied during the will-contest
litigation that she had such access; 
--
One of the proponents suggested the lawyer who
drafted the second will, and that lawyer was not the
same lawyer who drafted the testator's first will;
--
During the weeks preceding her death, the testator
was dependent on the proponents for all of her
transportation, and one of the proponents must have
driven her to the lawyer's office to execute the
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13
second will; and 
--
"[B]oth proponents falsely denied any knowledge of
the second will."  
873 So. 2d at 1145-46, 1148-49.
Furrow contends, however, that the facts here are more
analogous to Wilson, supra, in which this Court examined a
claim that a son had exerted undue influence over his mother
in procuring a deed conveying property to the son.  In Wilson,
the son who was alleged to have exerted undue influence argued
to this Court that the grandchildren seeking to cancel the
deed had not offered sufficient evidence showing that he had
exercised dominance over his mother.  631 So. 2d at 995.  In
agreeing with the son, this Court considered the evidence that
the son had provided his mother with financial assistance and
assistance 
in 
handling 
her 
affairs, 
had 
provided
transportation, had assisted her in writing her checks, and
had arranged to have the deed in question prepared and her
signature notarized.  631 So. 2d at 994.  This Court concluded
that "evidence of this nature, without more, is simply not
sufficient to justify a finding of subservience on the part of
the parent, so as to create a legal presumption of undue
influence."  631 So. 2d at 994. As to the proof necessary to
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14
overcome the presumption that a parent is dominant over a
child, this Court stated: 
"It is well settled that one alleging dominance of
a child over a parent must prove that 'time and
circumstances have reversed the order of nature, so
that the dominion of the parent has not merely
ceased, but has been displaced, by subservience to
the child.'  Hawthorne v. Jenkins, 182 Ala. 255,
260, 62 So. 505, 506 (1913) (emphasis in original).
'Subservient' is defined in The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language (1969) as
'[u]seful as a means or instrument; serving to
promote some end ...[; s]ubordinate in capacity or
function.'  Black's Law Dictionary 486 (6th ed.
1990) defines 'dominate' as '[t]o master, to rule,
or to control.'  Thus, for the burden of proof to
shift, it is clear that our cases require proof of
more than a reversal of the traditional roles of
parent as care giver and child as care recipient;
they require proof that the parent's will has become
subordinate to the will of the child. It is also
clear from our cases that the mere relationship of
parent and child alone, even when coupled with some
activity on the part of the child in securing the
preparation of legal papers for the parent, is not
sufficient to prove subservience on the part of the
parent, so as to shift to the child the burden of
proving an absence of undue influence.  See, e.g.,
Keeble v. Underwood, 193 Ala. 582, 586-87, 69 So.
473, 475 (1915), a will contest case wherein this
Court noted:
"'It is now well settled that where a
donee occupies to the donor a position of
trust and confidence, such as that between
a beneficiary occupying a confidential
relation and the testatrix, and such donee
or beneficiary takes part or exercises some
activity in the preparation or in the
procurement of the execution of the will,
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15
the burden of proof is shifted to the
beneficiary to show that the contested
instrument was not superinduced by undue
influence.  Scarbrough v. Scarbrough, 185
Ala. 468, 64 So. 105 [1913]; Bancroft v.
Otis, 91 Ala. 279, 8 So. 286, 24 Am. St.
Rep. 904 [1890].  This is the general rule.
However, while the relationship of parent
and child is per se confidential, yet it is
well settled that it is always presumed
prima facie that in all transactions
between them the parent is the dominant
party and that such are free from undue
influence.  The mere relationship alone,
coupled with activity on the part of the
child in securing the preparation of the
will, 
is 
not 
sufficient, 
under 
the
authorities, to shift the burden of proof
upon the child in cases of gift by the
parent, as we hold that, prima facie, the
parent is the dominant spirit in the
transaction, and gifts flow naturally from
parent to child.  One of the foundations of
the rule as to presumption of undue
influence is the theory that the donor is
the weaker party.  While the relation of
parent and child is per se confidential,
yet in view of the presumption, recognized
in this state and abundantly supported by
authorities elsewhere, that the parent is
the dominant spirit, the burden of proof is
not 
shifted 
upon 
the 
mere 
proof 
of
relationship and activity, on the part of
the beneficiary child, in the preparation
of the will....'
"(Emphasis added.)  See, also, Bain v. Bain, 150
Ala. 453, 43 So. 562 (1907) (an action to set aside
conveyances from a father to the wife of one of his
sons and his son's children)."
1070667
Gregory contends that Wilson is distinguishable because
5
it involved an action to cancel a deed rather than a will
contest; Gregory asserts that the principles governing the
"legal shifting of the burden" in an action seeking to set
aside an inter vivos transfer "is distinct from wills."  We
disagree that Wilson is distinguishable on that basis.  Many
of the authorities cited in Wilson as to the claim of undue
influence involved claims of undue influence in the actions
contesting wills.  See, e.g., Wilson, 631 So. 2d at 992-94
(citing and quoting extensively from Chandler v. Chandler, 514
So. 2d 1307 (Ala. 1987), and Keeble v. Underwood, 193 Ala.
582, 69 So. 473 (1915), both of which involved will contests).
16
631 So. 2d at 993-94.5
In the present case, there was evidence indicating that
Malone's relatives--including Furrow, June Helton, Lott,
Gregory, and Gregory's wife--would drive her places, help her
into her bath, bring her meals, and write checks on her
behalf.  However, there is no evidence indicating that Furrow
in particular assumed a dominant role over Malone or that she
denied others access to her.  
Furrow testified that she drove Malone to the office of
the attorney who drafted the 2003 will, and Gregory cites
evidence suggesting that Furrow was present in the same room
along with two witnesses and a notary when Malone executed the
2003 will.  Gregory also cites evidence suggesting that when
June Helton died, Furrow and Lott were angered by the listing
in Helton's obituary of one "Jimbo Lambert" as Helton's
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17
stepson even though Lambert apparently was not related to
Helton or to Malone by marriage or otherwise.  Bubba testified
that Furrow told him Malone "was very upset that Jimbo Lambert
was in the obituary" and "that we probably get [sic] the last
thing we would ever get from my grandmother," and that
evidence suggests Furrow's displeasure with the reference to
Lambert in the obituary may have prompted her to talk to
Malone about executing a new will.  Further, Gregory cites
Bubba's testimony that Furrow "is a woman that had a lot of
influence over" Malone, and he contends that the jury could
have reasonably inferred that Furrow used that alleged
influence unduly during the time she was at Malone's house
before the 2003 will was executed.  We disagree.  
Unlike the evidence in Ex parte Helms, there is no
evidence in the present case that Furrow profited from Malone
during the time leading up to Malone's death or that she
exercised exclusive control over Malone and denied others
access to her during the time leading up to the execution of
the 2003 will.  Moreover, the lawyer who drafted the 2003 will
for Malone was the same lawyer who had drafted her first will,
unlike the situation in Ex parte Helms, and the attorney who
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18
drafted Malone's 2003 will testified that he met with Malone
a week before she executed the 2003 will.  Specifically, the
attorney testified that Malone met with him privately and told
him that she wanted to execute a will containing the terms
ultimately included in the 2003 will.  
Further, the witnesses to the 2003 will and the
individual who notarized the 2003 will testified at trial, and
those individuals testified uniformly that Malone did not
exhibit signs of mental slowness when she executed the 2003
will, that she appeared to be of a sound mind, that she knew
the extent of her bounty and her wishes in disposing of it,
and that she claimed to be acting freely and voluntarily in
signing the 2003 will.  Although Bubba testified that Malone
"probably took over 10 pills a day," including Haldol, there
was no evidence as to the possible side effects of those
medications or evidence indicating that Malone had taken any
of those medications on the day she executed the 2003 will.
Finally, unlike the testator in Ex parte Helms, there was no
evidence indicating that Malone was dependent on Furrow for
all of her transportation in the time leading up to the
execution of the 2003 will or immediately thereafter.
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19
The undisputed evidence at trial showed that during the
last 10 years or so of Malone's life, Furrow, who has lived in
Louisiana for more than 30 years, visited Malone "three to
four times every two months."  Furrow testified that she
sometimes would come more often--"[i]t might be for 10 or 12
days."  Again, however, there was no evidence at trial
indicating that Furrow ever exercised any degree of dominance
or control over Malone during those visits or that Furrow
denied others access to her during those visits.  Furrow's
visits to her mother, her driving Malone to the lawyer's
office to execute the 2003 will, and her possibly sitting in
the room in which the will was executed are no more dominating
or controlling than were the actions of the son in Wilson,
supra, which this Court held as a matter of law did not
constitute substantial evidence of dominance or control.
Likewise, Furrow's actions in the present case are not
analogous to the actions described in the following summary by
the Wilson Court of cases illustrating 
dominating or
controlling behavior:
"[S]ee Haginas v. Haginas, 598 So. 2d 1334 (Ala.
1992) (involving an elderly woman, confined to a
nursing home, who was pressured by her son over a
period of several years to execute a deed, the son
1070667
20
threatening to stop his visits if she did not sign);
Brothers v. Moore, 349 So. 2d 1107 (Ala. 1977)
(involving an elderly woman who could not read or
write and whose son had taken over all of her
business affairs); Gosa v. Willis, 341 So. 2d 699
(Ala. 1977) (involving an elderly couple who had
exhibited signs of mental feebleness, had little
education, and whose former son-in-law had duped
them into believing that the conveyance of their
property to him would resolve a 'tax problem');
Jackson v. Rodda, 291 Ala. 569, 285 So. 2d 77 (1973)
(involving a man who had suffered a nervous
breakdown after his wife was accidentally killed and
whose daughter not only had looked after him and
advised him in his personal affairs, but also had
'insisted' that he convey his property to her and
had promised to 'do the right thing by the other
children,' and then refused to reconvey the property
to her father at his request); Orton v. Gay, 285
Ala. 270, 231 So. 2d 305 (1970) (involving an
elderly woman who, shortly after the death of her
husband, conveyed her real property and turned over
significant holdings of personal property to her
daughter, who clearly had manipulated her so as to
obtain her property); and Jones v. Boothe, 270 Ala.
420, 119 So. 2d 203 (1960) (involving an elderly
couple who had conveyed their property to their
daughter shortly before the death of the father,
under circumstances clearly indicating that the
daughter had secretly lied to and pressured the
couple in an attempt to avoid the operation of the
father's will).  We find it significant that in each
of the last four cases mentioned above at least one
of the grantors was alive at the time of the trial
and testified directly with respect to the question
of dominance. In the first case cited, Haginas v.
Haginas, the grantor was coerced into executing the
deed by repeated threats on the part of her son that
he would not visit her in the nursing home if she
did not cooperate with him, and in the second case,
Brothers v. Moore, the evidence indicated that the
grantor was illiterate, in addition to being totally
1070667
Effective June 11, 1987, the scintilla rule was abolished
6
in favor of the substantial-evidence rule.  See § 12-21-12,
Ala. Code 1975.
21
dependent on her son to handle her business affairs.
These 
cases, 
we 
think, 
are 
materially
distinguishable from the present case."
Wilson, 631 So. 2d at 994-95.
In Hall v. Hall, 502 So. 2d 712, 714 (Ala. 1987), this
Court stated that "there must be active interference [by the
dominant party] in procuring the execution of the will, and
such interference must go beyond compliance with the voluntary
directors of the testator."  In Hall, the testator executed a
will making his second wife, Theresa, the sole beneficiary of
his estate; the will made no provision for his three adult
children from his first marriage.  One of those children
contested the will, alleging that Theresa had exerted undue
influence.  This Court held that there was not a scintilla of
evidence indicating that Theresa had exercised dominance over
the testator or actively interfered in procuring the execution
of the will.   502 So. at 713-14.  This Court stated:
6
"This Court has consistently held that the fact
that a person is a favored beneficiary and is in a
confidential relationship with the testator does not
alone raise a presumption that the will was executed
by undue influence.  Arrington v. Working Woman's
Home, [368 So. 2d 851 (Ala. 1979)], Kahalley v.
1070667
22
Kahalley, 248 Ala. 624, 28 So. 2d 792 (1947);
Lockridge v. Brown, 184 Ala. 106, 63 So. 524 (1913).
In addition to the confidential relationship, there
must be active interference in procuring the
execution of the will, and such interference must go
beyond compliance with the voluntary directions of
the testator.  Arrington v. Working Woman's Home,
supra.
"In Arrington v. Working Woman's Home, supra,
this Court stated:
"'The scintilla rule is not satisfied
by 
speculation. 
[Citation 
omitted.]
Moreover, 
evidence 
to 
support 
undue
influence 
must 
provide 
at 
least 
a
reasonable inference, rather than mere
suspicion. [Citation omitted.]'
"The affidavits submitted by the contestant do
not provide any facts which show undue activity on
the part of Theresa in procuring the execution of
Floyd 
Sr.'s 
will. 
 
The 
affidavits 
state 
in
conclusory fashion that Theresa was the dominant
person in the marriage.  These statements appear to
be based upon speculation or suspicions of the
affiants.  There is no evidence that the will was
the result of anything other than the strong bond of
love and affection between Theresa and Floyd."
502 So. 2d at 714.
In the present case, Gregory did not present substantial
evidence indicating that Furrow unduly influenced Malone or
that she caused Malone to do something Malone did not
independently want to do.  The evidence does not suggest that
Malone ever went "beyond compliance with the voluntary
1070667
Because there was not substantial evidence showing that
7
Furrow dominated or controlled Malone or otherwise unduly
influenced the making and execution of the 2003 will, we
pretermit consideration of Furrow's argument that she was not
a favored beneficiary under the 2003 will.
23
directions of the testator."  Hall, 502 So. 2d at 714.
Consequently, under Wilson, supra, and Hall, supra, Gregory
did not present substantial evidence of undue influence, and
the trial court erred in denying Furrow's motion for a JML on
the undue-influence claim.7
Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, and Parker, JJ., concur.