Title: Walls v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC22-72 
____________ 
 
FRANK A. WALLS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
February 16, 2023 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
 
Frank A. Walls, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals 
an order denying his latest successive postconviction motion, which 
sought relief under Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).1  For the 
reasons given below, we affirm. 
Background 
 
Early one morning in 1987, Walls broke into a mobile home 
then occupied by Edward Alger and Ann Peterson.  Using curtain 
cords, Walls tied them up.  Alger managed to get loose, and a 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
 
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struggle ensued.  Ultimately, Walls tackled Alger, slashed his 
throat, and then shot him in the head several times—killing him. 
Walls then turned his attention to Peterson, who was at that 
time helpless and in tears.  Though Peterson posed no threat to 
him, Walls shot her in the head from close range.  Peterson began 
screaming.  In response, Walls forced Peterson’s face into a pillow 
and again shot her in the head from close range.  She died as a 
result of these gunshot wounds. 
 
Based on these events, the State charged Walls with two 
counts of first-degree murder and other crimes.  A jury found Walls 
guilty as charged on both murder counts and recommended a 
sentence of death for the murder of Peterson.  Following the 
sentencing hearing, the circuit court sentenced Walls to death.  On 
appeal, we reversed his convictions and death sentence, holding 
that a correctional officer committed a Massiah2 violation during 
Walls’s pretrial detention.  Walls v. State, 580 So. 2d 131, 132-35 
(Fla. 1991) (plurality opinion); id. at 135 (Grimes, J., concurring). 
 
2.  Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).  
 
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On remand, a jury found Walls guilty of both first-degree 
murder counts and again recommended a death sentence for the 
murder of Peterson.  Accepting that recommendation, the circuit 
count imposed the death sentence.  This time, we affirmed in all 
respects.  Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381, 391 (Fla. 1994).  Walls 
then filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, which was 
denied.  Walls v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995). 
 
Since then, Walls has challenged his death sentence 
numerous times, including on the basis that he is intellectually 
disabled.  He first raised an intellectual-disability claim shortly after 
the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, which held that the 
Eighth Amendment forbids execution of the intellectually disabled.  
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).  Following a lengthy evidentiary hearing, 
the circuit court denied Walls’s Atkins claim.  We affirmed, noting 
that Walls had never scored 70 or below on an IQ test.  Walls v. 
State, 3 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2008) (table decision) (citing Cherry v. 
State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007)). 
Seven years later, Walls raised his second intellectual-
disability claim—this time relying on Hall v. Florida.  That decision 
held that Cherry’s bright-line test created “an unacceptable risk 
 
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that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.”  Hall, 572 
U.S. at 704.  Reasoning in part that Hall did not apply to cases on 
collateral review, the circuit court summarily denied Walls’s claim.  
We disagreed, determining that Hall was retroactive under our state 
law.  Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 346 (Fla. 2016) (applying 
retroactivity test set forth in Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 
1980)).  In light of that determination, we reversed the summary 
denial and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at 341, 347. 
Over four years later, the evidentiary hearing took place.  
Ultimately, the circuit court denied Walls’s motion, giving two 
reasons for its ruling.  First, relying on intervening case law from 
this Court, see Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020); Nixon 
v. State, 327 So. 3d 780 (Fla. 2021), the circuit court concluded 
that Hall was not retroactive and, thus, Hall could not provide a 
basis for relief.  Second, on the merits, the court found that Walls 
failed to prove that he was intellectually disabled under section 
921.137, Florida Statutes (2021).  Walls now appeals. 
Analysis 
 
Walls argues that the circuit court erred in multiple respects 
in denying his intellectual-disability claim.  We decline to reach his 
 
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merits-based argument and instead affirm on the basis that Hall is 
not retroactive.3 
 
Walls’s death sentence became final in 1995.  Thus, to benefit 
from Hall—a decision that issued almost 20 years later—Walls must 
show that Hall is retroactive.  Our decision in Phillips, however, 
forecloses that argument.  In that decision, we held that Hall is not 
retroactive under federal or state law, receding from prior case law 
to the contrary.  Phillips, 299 So. 3d at 1018-24. 
 
Recognizing the hurdle Phillips poses, Walls contends that 
Phillips was wrongly decided.  And in the alternative, he argues that 
our decision in State v. Okafor, 306 So. 3d 930, 933-35 (Fla. 2020) 
(applying finality-of-judgment principles in concluding that we 
lacked authority to simply reinstate death sentence when time 
period for recalling our mandate vacating death sentence had 
expired), and the law-of-the-case doctrine preclude application of 
Phillips in this particular case.  But we have already rejected 
arguments to recede from Phillips and have instead consistently 
applied its holding in the postconviction context, see, e.g., 
 
3.  Our review in this case is de novo.  See Rogers v. State, 327 
So. 3d 784, 787 n.5 (Fla. 2021). 
 
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Thompson v. State, 341 So. 3d 303, 304 (Fla. 2022) (death sentence 
final in 1993); Pittman v. State, 337 So. 3d 776, 777 (Fla. 2022) 
(death sentence final in 1995); Nixon, 327 So. 3d at 781 (death 
sentence final in 1991); Freeman v. State, 300 So. 3d 591, 593 (Fla. 
2020) (death sentence final in 1991); Cave v. State, 299 So. 3d 352, 
353 (Fla. 2020) (death sentence final in 1999), even in cases where 
we had remanded for additional proceedings in light of Hall, 
see, e.g., Thompson, 341 So. 3d at 306; Nixon, 327 So. 3d at 782. 
For instance, in Nixon, we affirmed the denial of a Hall-based 
intellectual-disability claim.  327 So. 3d at 784.  In so doing, we 
stated that Phillips was the controlling law that governed on appeal, 
concluding: “It would be inconsistent with that controlling law for 
us to entertain Nixon’s successive, Hall-based challenge to the trial 
court’s order here.”  Id. at 783.  We further stressed that the law-of-
the-case doctrine did not compel a different analysis.  Id.  Again, 
noting that Phillips had issued after our mandate in Nixon’s prior 
appeal, we applied an exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine for 
intervening changes in controlling law.  Id. 
We reached a similar conclusion in Thompson, a case that 
involved a remand instruction requiring the circuit court to hold a 
 
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new evidentiary hearing on Thompson’s Hall-based intellectual-
disability claim.  Thompson, 341 So. 3d at 305.  On remand, the 
circuit court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and summarily 
denied the claim on the authority of Phillips.  Id.  Thompson argued 
on appeal that Okafor required the circuit court to hold an 
evidentiary hearing in compliance with the remand instruction.  Id.  
Disagreeing with that argument, we distinguished Okafor based on 
the fact that Thompson’s death sentence remained intact.  Id. at 
305-06.  Additionally, consistent with Nixon, we concluded that 
Phillips constituted an intervening change in law for purposes of an 
exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine.  Id. at 306.  Accordingly, 
we followed Phillips and held that Hall did not apply in Thompson’s 
case.  Id.  Based on this analysis, we affirmed the summary denial 
of Thompson’s intellectual-disability claim.  Id. 
Accordingly, consistent with Nixon and Thompson,4 we 
conclude that Walls does not get the benefit of Hall.  As a 
 
4.  We reject Walls’s argument to recede from Nixon and 
Thompson. 
 
 
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consequence, his Hall-based intellectual-disability claim fails 
regardless of the evidence presented at his evidentiary hearing.5 
Conclusion 
 
 
Based on the above analysis, we affirm the circuit court’s 
ruling. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, 
and FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., dissenting. 
 
Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Phillips v. State, 
299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020) (receding from Walls v. State, 213 So. 
 
5.  Walls also argues that application of Phillips would result 
in a due-process violation, claiming that the decision was both 
“unexpected and indefensible.”  We reject this argument.  Of 
significance, federal and state courts alike have concluded that Hall 
is not retroactive.  See State v. Lotter, 976 N.W.2d 721, 741 
(Neb. 2022) (relying on Phillips in holding that Hall is not 
retroactive); State v. Jackson, 157 N.E.3d 240, 253 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2020) (refusing to apply Hall retroactively; listing Phillips as 
example of “substantial and growing body of case law” declining “to 
apply Hall and Moore [v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1 (2017),] retroactively”); In 
re Payne, 722 Fed. Appx. 534, 538 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting body of 
federal case law finding Hall not retroactive). 
 
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3d 340 (Fla. 2016), and holding that Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 
(2014), does not apply retroactively), I dissent to the majority’s 
decision affirming the denial of Walls’s successive motion for 
postconviction relief. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County, 
William Francis Stone, Judge 
Case No. 461987CF000856XXXAXX 
 
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Julissa R. 
Fontán, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle 
Region, Temple Terrace, Florida; and Kara R. Ottervanger, Office of 
the Federal Public Defender, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee