Title: State v. Campbell

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

107 Ariz. 348 (1971) 488 P.2d 968 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Raymond John CAMPBELL, Appellant. No. 2248. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. September 24, 1971. Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by Paul J. Prato, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by James H. Kemper, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Justice. I. Nature of the Appeal This is an appeal from a judgment of guilt after a plea of guilty to the crime of voluntary manslaughter, § 13-455, § 13-456 subsec. A, par. I, and § 13-457. Defendant was sentenced to the Arizona State Prison for a term of not less than eight nor more than ten years. II. Questions to be Decided We are called upon to determine: III. Essential Facts The facts necessary for a determination of the matter on appeal are as follows. An information was filed on 11 September 1970 charging defendant with murder, second degree, in violation of § 13-451, § 13-452, and § 13-453 A.R.S. On 17 September 1970, the defendant at arraignment pleaded not guilty. Defendant had been granted a preliminary hearing in the West Phoenix Justice Court of Maricopa County at which time he was represented by counsel. Trial by jury was set for 22 October 1970. On 28 October 1970, the State amended the information to voluntary manslaughter, and the defendant pleaded guilty. After sentence, the defendant indicated his desire to appeal and counsel was appointed to represent him on appeal. *349 IV. Determination of the Questions In the case of State v. Laurino, 106 Ariz. 586, 480 P.2d 342 (1971) we construed the case of Boykin v. Alabama, supra, to, in effect, extend the procedural requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to the state courts. Federal Rule 11 reads as follows: The defendant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty. The change of plea from not guilty to guilty was as a result of plea bargaining. Before accepting the plea of guilty the court questioned the defendant extensively, a portion of which is as follows: After further extensive questioning concerning the plea the court concluded: The matter was continued until a probation report was made, at which time the defendant was sentenced. In considering whether a plea of guilty is properly made under the Boykin mandate, the record must show that it was voluntarily and intelligently made with an understanding of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea. State v. McCallister, 107 Ariz. 143, 483 P.2d 558 (1971). We do not require the court to go further. State v. Reynolds, 106 Ariz. 47, 470 P.2d 454 (1970); State v. Laurino, supra. The Arizona Court of Appeals in dealing with the mandate of Boykin v. Alabama, supra, has stated: A review of the record before this court affirmatively shows that the guilty plea of the defendant, made as a result of the plea bargaining, and while represented by counsel, was made with full knowledge of the facts and consequences thereof, and was properly accepted by the trial court as being voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made. Boykin v. Alabama, supra. Defendant contends that the trial court did not make a proper determination of the factual basis for the plea of guilty. We cannot agree. The judge questioned the defendant as to the facts of the crime, specifically asking the defendant whether "on or about July 28, 1970, in the County of Maricopa, State of Arizona, that [he] then and there unlawfully kill Ladislado Anaya * * *" to which the defendant answered he did. What is required to show that the trial court has a satisfactory factual basis upon which to accept a plea of guilty will differ from case to case depending in large part upon the demeanor of the defendant at the time the plea is entered. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). A reading of the reporter's transcript in this case indicates that the defendant was clear, concise, and direct in his answers and admission of guilt. There was nothing before the trial court to indicate that the defendant did not in fact kill the victim as he in fact affirmatively admitted that he did. Neither, it is noted, does the defendant on appeal deny that he killed the victim. We believe that there was a factual basis for the acceptance of the plea. V. Conclusion We have reviewed the entire record as required by § 13-1715 A.R.S., State v. Burrell, 96 Ariz. 233, 393 P.2d 921 (1964), and as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), in cases wherein the attorney is unable to find error. We have found no fundamental error. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., HAYS, V.C.J., and UDALL and LOCKWOOD, JJ., concur.