Title: ST PAUL FIRE MARINE INS CO v

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N O . 82-279 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 3 ST. PAUL FIRE and MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, a c o r p o r a t i o n , P l a i n t i f f a n d R e s p o n d e n t , v s . KEVIN E. CUMISKEY, J O H N E. CUMISKEY, STEPHANIE S . CUMISKEY, a n d K . S . J . , I N C . , a Montana c o r p o r a t i o n , D e f e n d a n t s a n d A p p e l l a n t s , a n d ELIZABETH M . BRADLEY, D e f e n d a n t a n d C r o s s A p p e l l a n t . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e E i g h t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n a n d f o r t h e C o u n t y o f G a l l a t i n H o n o r a b l e J o s e p h B . G a r y , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f R e c o r d : F o r A p p e l l a n t : L a r r y W . Moran a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana F o r C r o s s - A p p e l l a n t : L a n d o e , Brown, P l a n a l p , Kommers & L i n e b e r g e r , Bozeman, Montana Randy K . D i x , a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana F o r R e s p o n d e n t s : A n d e r s o n , Brown, G e r b a s e , C e b u l l & J o n e s , B i l l i n g s , Montana J a m e s L. J o n e s a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana S u b m i t t e d : March 1, 1983 D e c i d e d : June 10, 1983 ~ i l e d : JUN 1 0 1 9 8 3 C l e r k Mr. Chief Justice Frank I . Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Cumiskeys and Bradley appeal a judgment upon a Gallatin County jury verdict which set the cost of repairs of fire damaged property, which determined the parties' liabilities to one another and which awarded and set attorney fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part. In early 1978, Kevin Cumiskey contacted Elizabeth Bradley in order to lease West Yellowstone property owned by Bradley as the site of a Mexican restaurant. They entered into a lease agreement prepared by Cumiskey's attorney which required that Cumiskey insure the property to protect Bradley's interest and which specified that fixtures and alterations added by Cumiskey would remain his property. Kevin opened the restaurant, "Chiripa's," for a short 1978 tourist season, closed it for the winter, and then reopened it for summer 1979. From September 1978 to September 1979, the property was insured in the name of Kevin Cumiskey, d/b/a "Chiripa's." During that period, Kevin improved the premises with funds borrowed from his father, John Cumiskey. At no time was Bradley's interest insured. From September 1979 to June 1980, the property was not insured at all. In 1979 the restaurant business was incorporated as K.S.J., Inc. (for Kevin, Stephanie, and John Cumiskey), and the lease was assigned to the corporation. Kevin and his mother, Stephanie, each owned 49 percent of the stock. John owned 2 percent. Kevin is president, John is vice president and Stephanie is secretary. Kevin decided to stay in New York to work for the sum- mer of 1980, so John and Stephanie Cumiskey agreed to spend the summer in West Yellowstone operating the restaurant. Upon their arrival, the Cumiskeys contacted a Bozeman insurance agency to arrange for reissuance of the prior insurance coverage. Again, the insured on the policy was listed as Kevin Cumiskey, d/b/a "Chiripass." John and Stephanie ran the restaurant, which had consistently lost money since its opening, until, on August 10, 1980, a series of explosions accompanied by fire damaged the premises. The fire investigation revealed that the blazes had been intentionally set. Extensive circumstantial evidence focused on John Curniskey as the alleged arsonist. That evidence included serious burns sustained by Cumiskey, a series of inconsistent and uncorroborated stories told by Cumiskey to explain his burns and his actions after the fire, and the fact that his keys to the restaurant and other objects owned by Cumiskey were found in the street outside Chiripass after the explosions. Once the investigation established that the fire had been intentionally set, St. Paul requested that Cumiskeys produce the financial records of the business. John Cumiskey refused to do so for some sixteen months af ter the August 1980 fire. In October 1980, Kevin Cumiskey filed a claim with St. Paul seeking recovery under the policy. St. Paul was told both that the destroyed property belonged to Kevin Cumiskey and that it was the property of K.S. J., Inc. St. Paul also became aware of the Bradley lease, which required that Bradley's interest be insured. John Cumiskey was charged with arson and criminal mischief in connection with the fire and was tried in November 1980. The business records were not a part of the criminal trial. Cumiskey's defense was that he was a wealthy man, t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s was p r o f i t a b l e , and t h a t h e had no motives f o r arson. H e was a c q u i t t e d of both c h a r g e s . Two months a f t e r John Cumiskey's a c q u i t t a l , S t . Paul f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment. I n its com- p l a i n t , S t . Paul asked t h e c o u r t t o d e c l a r e Kevin Cumiskey t h e proper r e c i p i e n t of any p o l i c y proceeds, t o d e t e r m i n e t h e r i g h t s and o t h e r l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s of t h e p a r t i e s , t o determine t h e s p e c i f i c amount of recovery t o which Kevin Cumiskey was e n t i t l e d , and t o r e q u i r e t h a t John E. Cumiskey s u b r o g a t e any c l a i m p a i d by S t . Paul. K.S.J., I n c . , was l a t e r added t o t h e a c t i o n by s t i p u l a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s . B r a d l e y c r o s s - c l a i m e d a g a i n s t Kevin Cumiskey a n d M.S.J., I n c . , f o r f a i l u r e t o i n s u r e her i n t e r e s t i n t h e b u i l d i n g . She a l s o brought a t o r t c l a i m a g a i n s t John Cumiskey f o r d e l i b e r a t e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y . Cumiskeys and K.S.J., I n c . , brought c o u n t e r c l a i m s a g a i n s t S t . Paul f o r t h e company's breach of both s t a t u t o r y and common-law d u t i e s t o s e t t l e t h e i n s u r a n c e c l a i m s i n good f a i t h and f o r l i b e l and s l a n d e r . A number of i s s u e s r a i s e d were d i s p o s e d of b e f o r e t h e c a s e was given t o t h e j u r y . Before t r i a l , t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d summary judgment i n f a v o r of Bradley on t h e i s s u e of Kevin C u m i s k e y ' s f a i l u r e t o i n s u r e B r a d l e y ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e premises. K.S.J., Inc., dropped its c l a i m t o t h e i n s u r a n c e proceeds on t h e day b e f o r e t r i a l . A t t h e o u t s e t of t r i a l , t h e D i s t r i c t Court dismissed Cumiskeys' s t a t u t o r y c o u n t e r c l a i m f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a proper claim. I t a l s o dismissed Cumiskeys' c l a i m of l i b e l and s l a n d e r , which was based upon S t . P a u l ' s f i l i n g of t h i s a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment. A t t h e c l o s e of evidence, t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of S t . Paul on Cumiskeys' common-law c o u n t e r c l a i m f o r bad f a i t h . The j u r y r e t u r n e d a special. v e r d i c t which determined: (1) S t . Paul and Bradley had proved by a preponderance of t h e evidence t h a t John E. Cumiskey caused t h e f i r e ; ( 2 ) t h e c o s t t o r e p a i r t h e main b u i l d i n g of t h e r e s t a u r a n t was set a t $12,300.00; ( 3 ) t h a t Kevin Cumiskey was e n t i t l e d t o recover $19,910.00 under t h e p o l i c y ; and, ( 4 ) t h a t Bradley was e n t i t l e d t o recover $25,000.00 i n p u n i t i v e damages from John E. Cumiskey. The p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d i n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r t h a t t h e f i r e had been set i n t e n t i o n a l l y . The j u r y was s o informed and was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i f it found t h a t John E. Cumiskey set t h e f i r e , S t . P a u l was e n t i t l e d t o recover from him t h e amount it must pay t o Kevin Cumiskey under t h e p o l i c y . Cumiskeys and K.S.J., I n c . , moved f o r a judgment not- w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e f o r a new trial. The motions were d e n i e d . Cumiskeys now a p p e a l and Bradley c r o s s - a p p e a l s . A p p e l l a n t s , i n t h e i r shotgun approach, b a r r a g e t h i s Court w i t h i s s u e s . W e w i l l a d d r e s s o n l y two of t h o s e i s s u e s . W e w i l l a l s o a d d r e s s c r o s s - a p p e l l a n t ' s claim. W e have c o n s i d e r e d t h e o t h e r e r r o r s advanced by a p p e l l a n t s and f i n d them t o be w i t h o u t m e r i t . W e w i l l n o t concern o u r s e l v e s with t h e s e arguments s i n c e t h e y w i l l n o t change t h e outcome of t h i s a p p e a l . W e a l s o n o t e i n p a s s i n g t h a t a p p e l l a n t s ' b r i e f s , which c o n t a i n more v i t r i o l t h a n s u b s t a n c e , f a i l t o s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e i r c l a i m s w i t h r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e r e c o r d p u r s u a n t t o Rule 2 3 ( a ) and ( e ) , f4.R.App.Civ.P. The i s s u e s w e a d d r e s s a r e : I. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t on Cumiskeys' c o u n t e r c l a i m s f o r bad f a i t h ; 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d summary judgment i n f a v o r of Bradley; and, 3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court c o r r e c t l y c a l c u l a t e d t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s awarded t o Bradley. Kevin Cumiskey f i r s t c h a l l e n g e s d i s m i s s a l of h i s bad f a i t h c o u n t e r c l a i m s a g a i n s t S t . Paul. H e contends t h a t S t . Paul v i o l a t e d both s t a t u t o r y and common-law d u t i e s t o s e t t l e t h e i n s u r a n c e c l a i m s i n good f a i t h . The s t a t u t o r y c l a i m is based upon s e c t i o n 33-18-201(6) and ( 1 3 ) , MCA, of t h e Unfair Trade P r a c t i c e Chapter of t h e I n s u r a n c e Code. I t p r o v i d e s : "Unfair c l a i m s e t t l e m e n t p r a c t i c e s p r o h i - b i t e d . No person may, w i t h such frequency - a s t o i n d i c a t e a g e n e r a l b u s i n e s s p r a c - t i c e , do any of t h e following: " ( 6 ) n e g l e c t t o a t t e m p t i n good f a i t h t o e f f e c t u a t e prompt, f a i r , and e q u i t a b l e s e t t l e m e n t s of c l a i m s i n which l i a b i l i t y h a s become r e a s o n a b l y c l e a r ; " ( 1 3 ) f a i l t o promptly s e t t l e c l a i m s , i f l i a b i l i t y has become r e a s o n a b l y c l e a r , under one p o r t i o n of t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y coverage i n o r d e r t o i n f l u e n c e s e t t l e - ments under o t h e r p o r t i o n s of t h e i n s u r - ance p o l i c y coverage;" (Emphasis added.) The s t a t u t o r y c l a i m was s t r u c k by t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r i o r t o t r i a l on t h e b a s i s t h a t Kevin Cumiskey had n o t pleaded and was n o t going t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t S t . Paul f a i l e d t o s e t t l e c l a i m s "with such frequency t o i n d i c a t e a g e n e r a l b u s i n e s s p r a c t i c e . " D i s m i s s a l of t h e s t a t u t o r y claim on t h a t b a s i s was proper. Klaudt v. F l i n k ( 1 9 8 3 ) , Mont . , 658 P.2d 1065, 40 St.Rep. 64; H a r r i s v. American General L i f e I n s u r a n c e Company of Delaware ( 1 9 8 3 ) , The common-law bad f a i t h c l a i m was d i s p o s e d of w i t h a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t a t t h e c l o s e o f e v i d e n c e . W e f i r s t recog- n i z e d t h a t an i n s u r a n c e company h a s a d u t y independent of s t a t u t e o r o f i n s u r a n c e c o n t r a c t t o s e t t l e c l a i m s i n good f a i t h w i t h its i n s u r e d s i n L i p i n k s i v. The T i t l e I n s u r a n c e Company ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mon t . , 655 P.2d 970, 39 St.Rep. 2283. The D i s t r i c t Court h e r e p r o p e r l y allowed Kevin Cumiskey t o p r e s e n t evidence i n s u p p o r t of h i s c l a i m t h a t S t . Paul a c t e d i n bad f a i t h and breached t h a t d u t y . Con- f l i c t i n g evidence was i n t r o d u c e d on whether a g e n t s of S t . P a u l had r e p r e s e n t e d t h a t t h e i n s u r e r would s e t t l e t h e claim. Kevin p r i m a r i l y based h i s c l a i m on t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e f i l i n g of t h e d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n was i n bad f a i t h s i n c e t h e c l a i m should have been p a i d and s i n c e t h e a c t i o n s e r v e d t o d e s t r o y t h e b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Cumiskeys and B r a d l e y . A t t h e c l o s e o f t h e e v i d e n c e , however, t h e c o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h a t c l a i m w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t : " I ' m going t o r e v e r s e myself. I am going t o g r a n t t h e motion f o r a d i r e c t e d ver- d i c t on t h e q u e s t i o n of p u n i t i v e damages t o t h e i n s u r a n c e company on t h e i r coun- t e r c l a i m and l e t you go on your a c t u a l damages . . . There was a l e g i t i m a t e q u e s t i o n i n t h i s c a s e on t h e b a s i s of who set t h e f i r e , how t h e f i r e was set, who t h e c l a i m was i n , and t h e i n s u r a n c e com- pany came i n and asked f o r a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment, and t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e is t o make t h e i n s u r a n c e company pay i n any r e s p e c t , and t h e n a t t e m p t t o g e t i t back, and t h e y used t h e p r o c e s s of t h e c o u r t s and w i t h i n r e a s o n a b l e t i m e , and s o you a r e , however, e n t i t l e d t o go on your a c t u a l damages on your claim." The D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f S t . Paul on t h o s e grounds. The c o u r t s h o u l d vlew a motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom t h e motion is d i r e c t e d . Dleruf v. Gollaher ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 156 Mont. 440, 481 P.2d 322. Here, even viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o Kevin Cumiskey, t h e c o u r t found t h a t S t . P a u l ' s d e c i s i o n t o b r i n g t h i s a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment was a p p r o p r i a t e . W e a g r e e . An a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment may be b r o u g h t f o r t h e purpose of s e t t l i n g and a f f o r d i n g " r e l i e f from uncer- t a i n t y and i n s e c u r i t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o r i g h t s , s t a t u s , and o t h e r l e g a l r e l a t i o n s . " S e c t i o n 27-8-101 e t s e q . , MCA. The a c t i o n , i n o r d e r t o t e r m i n a t e t h e c o n t r o v e r s y a s t o a l l p a r t i e s , should i n c l u d e a s p a r t i e s a l l p e r s o n s who have o r c l a i m any i n t e r e s t t h a t would be a f f e c t e d by t h e d e c l a r a - t i o n . Empire F i r e & Marine I n s . Co. v. Goodman ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147 Mont. 396, 412 P.2d 569. I f o t h e r w i s e a p p r o p r i a t e , an a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment is n o t precluded by t h e e x i s t e n c e of a n o t h e r ade- q u a t e remedy. Rule 57, I4.R.Civ.P. I n a proper c a s e , an i n s u r e r may use t h i s p r o c e d u r a l d e v i c e i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e v a l i d i t y , c o n t i n u a n c e , o r coverage of an i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y ; a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e e x t e n t of l i a b i l i t y ; o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e i n s u r e r ' s d u t i e s under t h e p o l i c y . 6A Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e , l(57.19 a t 57-195 through 57-198. W e hold t h a t i n t h i s c a s e , S t . P a u l p r o p e r l y f i l e d an a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment. While Kevin Cumiskey f i l e d a c l a i m f o r p r o c e e d s a s t h e named i n s u r e d , a p o t e n t i a l f o r l i a b i l i t y t o o t h e r p a r t i e s a l s o e x i s t e d . B r a d l e y ' s i n t e r e s t should have been i n s u r e d p u r s u a n t t o t h e l e a s e agreement and was n o t . There was t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s h e would a t t e m p t t o c l a i m a l l o r p a r t of t h e i n s u r a n c e proceeds. K.S.J., I n c . , i n s i s t e d throughout most of t h e l a w s u i t t h a t it was t h e named i n s u r e d s i n c e S t . P a u l ' s a g e n t s had been informed of t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h e b u s i n e s s . Not u n t i l t h e day b e f o r e t r i a l was t h a t c l a i m dropped. John Cumiskey's p o s s i b l e c u l p a b i l i t y i n r e g a r d t o t h e f i r e a l s o r a i s e d q u e s t i o n s on t h e i n s u r e r ' s l i a b i l i t y . Where an o f f i c e r , d i r e c t o r , s t o c k h o l d e r , and managing a g e n t of a c o r p o r a t i o n is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n t e n t i o n a l l y s e t t i n g a f i r e , t h e i n s u r e r has a v a l i d d e f e n s e t o t h e claim. 18 Couch on I n s u r a n c e , 2d, S 74:671; 5 Appleman I n s u r a n c e Law and P r a c t i c e , S 3113 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . S t . Paul had a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g of t h i s a c t i o n t o r a i s e t h a t d e f e n s e . John Cumiskey a r g u e s t h a t s e c t i o n 33-24-102, MCA, r e q u i r e s payment of t h e p o l i c y l i m i t where t h e p r o p e r t y is c o n s i d e r e d a t o t a l l o s s and where no c r i m i n a l f a u l t is e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e p a r t of t h e i n s u r e d o r h i s a s s i g n s . T h e r e f o r e , he contends t h a t h i s a c q u i t t a l on t h e a r s o n and c r i m i n a l mischief c h a r g e s r e q u i r e d t h e i n s u r e r t o pay t h e p o l i c y l i m i t s r a t h e r t h a n b r i n g i n g t h i s a c t i o n . H e i g n o r e s t h e complete c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n h i s s t a n c e on t h e i s s u e of t h e amount of t h e l o s s . Cumiskeys t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t S t . P a u l ' s a g e n t s had s t a t e d t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g was a t o t a l l o s s and t h e c l a i m would be p a i d i n f u l l . The a g e n t denied making t h a t s t a t e - ment. No o t h e r evidence i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g was a t o t a l l o s s . I n f a c t , w h i l e B r a d l e y ' s e s t i m a t e on r e p a i r s t o t h e b u i l d i n g set t h e c o s t a t approximately $12,500, Cumis- Keys p r e s e n t e d t h e a f f i d a v i t of t h e i r c o n t r a c t o r and a b r i e f i n o p p o s i t i o n t o B r a d l e y ' s motion f o r summary judgment t h a t set t h e r e p a i r c o s t s a t $8,500. A t no time throughout t h e c o u r s e o f t h i s a c t i o n d i d Cumiskeys a g r e e t o s e t t l e B r a d l e y ' s c l a i m i n an amount t h a t would repay h e r f o r t o t a l l o s s of t h e b u i l d i n g . Nor d i d Cumiskeys i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e l o s s t o t h e b u s i n e s s itself. The j u r y r e l i e d upon evldence i n t r o d u c e d by S t . Paul: t h e b u s i n e s s income t a x r e t u r n s and e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y by t h e b u s i n e s s ' s a c c o u n t a n t . N o evidence was p r e s e n t e d t h a t s u g g e s t e d t h e b u s i n e s s was a t o t a l l o s s o t h e r t h a n John Cumiskey's s t a t e m e n t t h a t an a d j u s t o r had s t a t e d : "Well, a s f a r a s I can see, i t ' s a t o t a l l o s s . " S t . Paul a l s o f a c e d a q u e s t i o n on t h e e x t e n t it was l i a b l e t o Kevin Cumiskey a s t h e named i n s u r e d s i n c e t h e p r o p e r t y i n s u r e d i n h i s name had been a s s i g n e d t o K.S.J., Inc. T h i s c r e a t e s an i s s u e on t h e e x t e n t of Kevin's r i g h t t o recover a s s t o c k h o l d e r . See, 3 Couch on I n s u r a n c e , S 24:92; Annot., 39 ALR2d 714; 4 Appleman on I n s u r a n c e , S 2145. The f a c t s of t h i s c a s e p r e s e n t e d a j u s t i c i a b l e con- t r o v e r s y , e x i s t i n g and genuine. The a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment was a p p r o p r i a t e l y brought t o d e t e r m i n e t h e l e g a l r i g h t s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s of t h e p a r t i e s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t on t h e i s s u e of bad f a i t h . Cumiskeys n e x t a r g u e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n g r a n t l n g summary judgment i n f a v o r of Bradley on t h e i s s u e o t breach of t h e l e a s e agreement. They contend t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e l e a s e allowed Cumiskeys and K.S.J., I n c . , t o r e t a i n any f i x t u r e s o r o t h e r improvements added t o t h e p r o p e r t y . T h e r e f o r e , Bradley was n o t e n t i t l e d t o summary judgment on t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y f o r f a i l u r e t o i n s u r e because B r a d l e y ' s l o s s was u n c l e a r . W e d i s a g r e e . B r a d l e y ' s m o t i o n f o r p a r t i a l summary judgment r e q u e s t e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o f i n d l i a b i l i t y f o r B r a d l e y ' s damages o r l o s s on t h e b a s i s of t h e f a i l u r e t o i n s u r e . The amount of damages were undetermined and were t o be i n c l u d e d a s an i s s u e a t t r i a l . Cumiskeys and K.S.J., I n c . , argued t h a t they had made e x t e n s i v e improvements t o t h e p r o p e r t y which, under t h e terms of t h e c o n t r a c t , remained t h e i r p r o p e r t y . T h e r e f o r e , t h e i r c o n t r a c t l i a b i l i t y t o Bradley under t h e terms of the agreement was u n c l e a r and should be l e f t f o r a j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h i s argument is w i t h o u t merit. The l e a s e a g r e e m e n t c l e a r l y r e q u i r e d t h a t K e v i n Cumiskey o r h i s a s s i g n s i n s u r e B r a d l e y ' s i n t e r e s t . They d i d n o t . The D i s t r i c t Court p r o p e r l y found t h a t t h e terms on improvements were ambiguous and used an a p p r o p r i a t e r u l e of c o n s t r u c t i o n t o i n t e r p r e t t h o s e c l a u s e s . The l e a s e provided t h a t "ALTERATIONS" were t o remain t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e l e s s e e s : "The Lessees w i l l be e n t i t l e d t o make, o r w i l l s u f f e r t o be made, any a l t e r a t i o n s which t h e y i n t h e i r s o l e d i s c r e t i o n deem n e c e s s a r y . Any a d d i t i o n s t o , o r a l t e r a - t i o n s o f , a t t a c h e d t o t h e s a i d l e a s e d p r o p e r t y s h a l l n o t become p a r t of t h e r e a l t y b u t w i l l r e m a i n t h e s o l e a n d s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y of t h e Lessees. The Lessees a g r e e t o a d v i s e L e s s o r s i n w r i t - ing of t h e d a t e upon which such a l t e r a - t i o n s w i l l commence i n o r d e r t o p e r m i t t h e L e s s o r s t o p o s t n o t i c e of nonrespon- s i b i l i t y . The L e s s e e s s h a l l keep t h e demised premises f r e e from any and a l l l i e n s a r i s i n g o u t of any work performed, m a t e r i a l s f u r n i s h e d , o r o t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s i n c u r r e d by t h e Lessees." I t a l s o provided t h a t "FIXTURES1' were t o remain t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e lessees: "It is hereby e x p r e s s l y agreed between t h e p a r t i e s t o t h i s L e a s e t h a t a n y c o u n t e r s , t a b l e s , c h a i r s , s t o v e s , ovens, g r i l l s , i c e machines, s i n k s , o r any o t h e r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y belonging t o t h e Les- sees which is brought upon t h e demised p r e m i s e s and a t t a c h e d t h e r e t o , s h a l l n o t become a f i x t u r e and p a r t of t h e r e a l t y . The Lessor hereby e x p r e s s l y g r a n t s p e r - m i s s i o n t o t h e L e s s e e s t o remove any and a l l p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y which t h e y b r i n g upon s a i d demised premises. L e s s e e s a g r e e t o r e p a i r any damage t o t h e premises which is caused by removal of s a i d p e r - s o n a l p r o p e r t y . " The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n on a l t e r a - t i o n s was u n c l e a r i n t h a t it d i d n o t s p e c i f y what t y p e of a 1 t e r a t i o n s were i n c l u d e d . The c o u r t t h e r e f o r e found t h a t t h e s p e c i f i c "FIXTURES" c l a u s e c o n t r o l l e d t h e g e n e r a l "ALTERATIONS" c l a u s e and t h a t such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was i n conformance w i t h t h e g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e of Montana l a n d l o r d s and t e n a n t s and w i t h Montana s t a t u t e s . W e a g r e e . Where a d d i t i o n s a r e b u i l t o r a f f i x e d t o p r o p e r t y by a t e n a n t w i t h o u t a n agreement t o a l l o w him t o remove t h o s e a d d i t i o n s o r f i x t u r e s , t h e y may n o t be removed i f t h e i r removal w i l l damage t h e premises. S e c t i o n 70-18-102, MCA; Sanders v. B u t t e Motor Co. ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 142 Mont. 524, 385 P.2d 263. Here, an agreement e x i s t s t o a l l o w removal of f i x t u r e s and a l t e r a t i o n s . It is u n c l e a r what was contemplated by its t e r m s , however. The c o n t r a c t was p r e p a r e d by an a t t o r n e y on behalf of Kevin Cumiskey. Kevin p r e s e n t e d it t o Bradley f o r s i g n a t u r e . She d i d n o t t a k e p a r t i n p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e terms. The record a l s o d e m o n s t r a t e s Kevin Cumiskey's i n t e n - t i o n t o use t h e s e c l a u s e s t o c o e r c e Bradley i n t o renewing t h e l e a s e o r s e l l i n g her p r o p e r t y . Bradley t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had t o l d Kevin Cumiskey on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s t h a t s h e was n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n s e l l i n g t h e p r o p e r t y and had no i n t e n t i o n of doing so. H e t e s t i f i e d a t h i s d e p o s i t i o n t h a t Bradley had agreed t o a l l o w him t o b u i l d a d d i t i o n s on s k i d s s o t h a t he could " p i c k them up and c a r r y them away." H e w a s t h e n asked a b o u t t h i n g s t h a t could n o t be c a r r i e d away: "Q. Those t h i n g s you could n o t p i c k up and c a r r y away I assume you were going t o l e a v e on t h e premises. A. No, I was n o t . "Q. What were you going t o do w i t h t h e t h i n g s you c o u l d n ' t p i c k up and move away? A. I was going t o u s e them a s a l e v e r f o r a new l e a s e . "Q. Could you e x p l a i n what you mean by t h a t ? A. Well, i n my l e a s e , a l l t h e i m p r o v e m e n t s a r e m i n e , and if Mrs. Bradley d i d n ' t want t o i s s u e m e a new l e a s e o r g i v e m e a f i x t u r e s f e e , t h e n I would t a k e them o u t . " I t was c l e a r from K e v i n ' s d e p o s i t i o n testimony t h a t i f Kevin "could b u i l d i n a 'manner where w e could p i c k it up and c a r r y it away, ' it was f i n e w i t h [Bradley] . " The D i s t r i c t Court found ambiguity and c o n f l i c t i n t h e l e a s e p r o v i s i o n s and r u l e d t h a t t h o s e items s p e c i f i c a l l y nained i n t h e "FIXTURES" c l a u s e ( t h e c o u n t e r s , t a b l e s , c h a i r s , etc. ) belonged t o Cumiskeys and e v e r y t h i n g e l s e b e l o n g e d t o B r a d l e y . Kevin Cumiskey a r g u e d t h a t a n y improvements o r a l t e r a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g w i r i n g i n t h e r o o f , should belong t o him under t h e "ALTERATIONS" c l a u s e . H e h a s f a i l e d t o demonstrate t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d e d such a n interpretation of t h e c l a u s e s o r t h a t an agreement a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d t h a t would a l l o w damage t o t h e p r o p e r t y t o remove t h o s e a l t e r a t i o n s . The s p e c i f i c "FIXTURES" c l a u s e c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t any damage t o t h e premises caused by removal of f i x t u r e s would be r e p a i r e d . There is no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e p a r r l e s concernplated a l l o w i n g a removal of a 1 t e r a t i o n s t h a t might r e s u l t i n damage t o t h e p r e m i s e s . Where an ambiguous term is u s e d , t h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e n t w i l l govern its c o n s t r u c t i o n and e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e can be used t o d i s c o v e r t h a t i n t e n t . Adams v. C h i l c o t t ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 182 Mont. 511, 517, 597 P.2d 1140, 1144. A c o u r t should look t o t h e whole c o n t r a c t and its purpose i n d e t e r m i n i n g i n t e n t and is n o t bound by any s i n g l e p r o v i s i o n o r e x p r e s s i o n . Gropp v. L o t t o n ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 415, 421, 503 P.2d 661, 664-665. Repugnant p r o v i s i o n s should be i n t e r p r e t e d i n a way t o g i v e them some e f f e c t , s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e g e n e r a l i n t e n t and purpose of t h e e n t i r e c o n t r a c t . R i i s v. Day (1980) I Mon t . , 613 P.2d 696, 698, 37 St.Rep. 1093, 1096. Where u n c e r t a i n t y i n a w r i t t e n i n s t r u m e n t e x i s t s , t h e provisions should p r o p e r l y be c o n s t r u e d a g a i n s t t h e p a r t y c a u s i n g t h e u n c e r t a i n t y . P a r k h i l l v. F u s e l i e r ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mon t . , 632 P.2d 1132, 1135, 38 St.Rep. 1424, 1427. Here, t h e p a r t i e s ' i n t e n t was u n c l e a r . I t is n o t c e r t a i n t h a t B r a d l e y i n t e n d e d t o a l l o w Kevin Cumiskey t o damage t h e p r e m i s e s i n removing a l t e r a t i o n s . Cumiskey p r e p a r e d t h e l e a s e agreement and was r e s p o n s i b i l e f o r t h e ambiguity t h a t e x i s t e d . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y i n t e r - p r e t e d t h e p r o v i s i o n s t o g i v e some e f f e c t t o each and t o conform w i t h g e n e r a l l a n d l o r d t e n a n t p r a c t i c e s . Cumiskeys t h e n had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e o t t h e i r l o s s of b u s i n e s s f i x t u r e s and t o d i s p u t e B r a d l e y ' s c l a i m f o r t h e c o s t of r e p a i r s . They f a i l e d t o do s o . They may n o t now argue t h a t t h e j u r y may have l i m i t e d an award t o Kevin Cumiskey t o t h e amount of B r a d l e y ' s c o s t of r e p a i r s . I t is a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e j u r y d i d n o t . Kevin Cumiskey w a s awarded 519,910, while the cost to repair the building was set at only $12,300. Further, the lease agreement remained in effect until the end of its term in April 1983. At that time, the build- ing was to be returned to Bradley in its original condition. The effect of the District Court's ruling was simply to remove from the jury an issue not properly before it at that time. Attorney fees were awarded pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement. Cross-appellant challenges the calcu- lation of those fees. Bradley's attorneys filed affidavits in support of awarding attorney fees that computed time expended: (1) solely relating to pretrial matters concerning Bradley's claims against Kevin Cumiskey and K.S.J., Inc., and excluding all time spent in preparation of the tort claim against John Cumiskey (39.4 hours at $60 = $2,364); (2) for the entire six days of trial time actually expended (6 days at $750 per day = $4,500); and, (3) for services rendered in connection with the preparation, briefing and attendance at the hearing on the claim for attorney fees ($348). The aggregate amount requested was $7,212. The District Court granted attorney fees for the pretrial preparation, for the work in preparing for the hearing on attorney fees and for one-third of the trial time. In its supporting memorandum, the District Court noted that possibly less than one-third of trial time was actually occupled with Bradley's claim against Kevin Cumiskey and that most of her effort was against John Cumiskey f o r wrongful s e t t i n g of t h e f i r e and d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e premises. W e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n b o t h t h e c a l c u l a t i o n of t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s and i n t h e r e d u c t i o n o f f e e s f o r t r i a l t i m e t o o n e - t h i r d of t h e r e q u e s t . I n i t s o r d e r , t h e D i s t r i c t Court awarded $2,636, "which r e p r e s e n t s o n e - t h i r d ( 1 / 3 ) of t h e a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s f o r t h e e n t i r e t r i a l " and awarded $348 f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e h e a r i n g on a t t o r n e y f e e s p l u s an a d d i t i o n a l b r i e f . The sum of $6,864 does n o t r e p r e s e n t t h e f e e s f o r t h e e n t i r e t r i a l . T h a t f i g u r e is t h e t o t a l of both t h e p r e t r i a l p r e p a r a t i o n work d i r e c t l y r e l a t i n g t o t h e c l a i m a g a i n s t Kevin Cumiskey and t h e s i x f u l l days of t r i a l . The D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n reducing both f i g u r e s by t w o - t h i r d s where t h e p r e t r i a l work a l l r e l a t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e Kevin Cumiskey claim. A t a minimum, t h e award should have i n c l u d e d $2,364 f o r t h e pre- trial work, $ 1 , 5 0 0 f o r two days of t r i a l , and $348 f o r t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s h e a r i n g , f o r a t o t a l of $4,212. W e f u r t h e r hold, however, t h a t it e r r e d i n reducing f e e s awarded f o r t h e t r i a l t i m e by two-thirds. Bradley was f o r c e d t o p u r s u e her c l a i m a g a i n s t Kevin Cu~niskey through t h e t r i a l . She a t t e m p t e d t o r e s o l v e t h e damages i s s u e stemming from K e v i n ' s b r e a c h of t h e l e a s e agreement through a motion f o r summary judgment. Kevin Cumiskey s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s i s t e d t h a t motion on t h e b a s i s of an a f f i d a v i t provided by h i s c o n t r a c t o r t h a t d i s p u t e d t h e Bradley r e p a i r e s t i m a t e s . Bradley and h e r c o u n s e l were t h e r e f o r e f o r c e d t o a t t e n d a six-day t r i a l . She p r e s e n t e d damages t e s t i m o n y t h a t went unchallenged. Kevin Cumiskey i n t r o d u c e d no evidence whatsoever i n d i s p u t e of h e r claim. Here, t h e r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t t h e t r i a l s c h e d u l e r e q u i r e d t h a t c o u n s e l f o r Bradley be p r e s e n t throughout t h e s i x d a y s i n o r d e r t o p u r s u e t h e c l a i m a g a i n s t K e v i n Cumiskey. The e n t i r e f i r s t day o f t r i a l was s p e n t i n j u r y s e l e c t i o n . On t h e morning of t h e second day of t r i a l , B r a d l e y ' s c o u n s e l gave h i s opening s t a t e m e n t . On t h e f o u r t h day, a w i t n e s s o f f e r e d by Cumiskeys r e q u i r e d e x t e n s i v e cross-examination on B r a d l e y ' s b e h a l f t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t even Cumiskey's evidence supported t h e amount of damages s h e claimed. On t h e f l f t h day, c o u n s e l was r e q u i r e d t o o b j e c t t o Kevin Cumiskey's a t t e m p t t o t e s t i f y t o t h e b u i l d i n g ' s c o n d i t i o n p r i o r t o a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e l e a s e . Kevin attempted t o i n t r o d u c e t h i s m a t t e r i n s p i t e of a p r e t r i a l r u l i n g t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was improper. Much of t h e l a s t day of t r i a l was s p e n t i n s e t t l e m e n t of i n s t r u c t i o n s , p r e s e n t a - t l o n of B r a d l e y ' s c a s e - i n - c h i e f , and c l o s i n g arguments. I n t h i s i n s t a n c e it is n o t p o s s i b l e t o c l e a r l y s e g r e - g a t e t h e t r i a l t i m e d u r i n g which Bradley pursued h e r c l a i m s a g a i n s t Kevin Cumiskey i n t o o n e - t h i r d of t h e t i m e expended. W e r e v e r s e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r on a t t o r n e y f e e s d a t e d March 1 8 , 1982, and hold t h a t Bradley is e n t i t l e d t o a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h e amount o f $7,212 i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e proceedings below and an a d d i t i o n a l $1,500 f o r t h e e f f o r t s expended on a p p e a l . W e remand t h i s m a t t e r t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n . Affirmed i n p a r t and r e v e r s e d i n p a r t . 7444, c ; b Q e Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I dissent from that portion of the foregoing opinion which affirms the District Court's dismissal of Kevin Cumiskey's bad-faith action against St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company. Under our recent spate of decisions on the point of bad faith, Kevin's cause of action should have been submitted to the jury. See Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065 40 St.Rep. 64; Lipinski v. The Title Insurance Company (1982) Montana , 655 P.2d 970, 39 St.Rep. 2283. I am also of the opinion that the District Court should have submitted the question of total loss to the jury to determine if the valued policy law, Section 33-24-102, MCA, was applicable to Kevin's claim against St. Paul. The District Court's interpretation of the valued policy law was disadvantageous to Kevin, and would make no difference to St. Paul, since it, under the verdict, would be subrogated for anything it paid to Kevin from John Cumiskey. Otherwise, I concur in the judgment entered in the District Court.