Title: Mueller v. Hoblyn

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Mueller v. Hoblyn1994 WY 145887 P.2d 500Case Number: 94-1, 94-2, 94-3, 94-4Decided: 12/15/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Dale H. 
MUELLER,

Appellant (Defendant 
Third Party Plaintiff),

v.

Richard F. HOBLYN and 
Gary Hoblyn,

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs),

Lawrence R. Coffee; 
Conrad T. Dodson and Janet R. Dodson, George A. Refior and Nancy M. Refior, 
Appellees (Third Party Defendants).

 

Richard F. 
HOBLYN,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Dale H. 
MUELLER,

Appellee 
(Defendant),

George A. Refior and 
Nancy M. Refior,

Appellees (Third Party 
Defendants).

 

Lawrence R. 
COFFEE,

Appellant (Third Party 
Defendant),

v.

Dale H. 
MUELLER,

Appellee 
(Defendant),

George A. Refior and 
Nancy M. Refior,

Appellees (Third Party 
Defendants).

 

Ralph 
JOHNSON,

Appellant 
(Intervenor),

v.

Dale H. 
MUELLER,

Appellee (Defendant Third 
Party Plaintiff),

Richard F. Hoblyn and 
Gary Hoblyn,

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs),

Lawrence R. Coffee; 
Conrad T. Dodson and Janet R. Dodson, George A. Refior and Nancy M. 
Refior,

Appellees (Third Party 
Defendants).

 

Appeal from District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

John W. Pattno, 
Gusea, Pattno & White, Cheyenne, Philip White, Jr., Laramie, for Dale H. 
Mueller.

John M. Walker, 
Hickey & Evans, Cheyenne, for Lawrence R. 
Coffee.

Donald E. 
Miller, Cheyenne, for Richard F. Hoblyn and Gary 
Hoblyn.

John B. Rogers 
and Rachel R. Rouse, Rogers, Blythe & Lewis, Cheyenne, for Ralph 
Johnson.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY** and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

*Retired July 
6, 1994.

**Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      The right to use 
an easement is at issue in these consolidated appeals. The owners of the 
dominant estate filed an action against the owner of the servient estate to 
quiet title to the easement. The owners of the dominant estate claimed they had 
been denied use of the easement. The owner of the servient estate maintained the 
entire easement had been lost by adverse possession. Using a variety of 
procedural means, other present and former owners of dominant estates also 
became parties to this action. After a bench trial, the district court 
determined that only a small portion of the easement near a water well had been 
terminated by adverse possession.

[¶2]      We affirm in part 
and reverse in part.

I. 
FACTS

[¶3]      In 1963, Herbert 
J. Engleman and Glenys G. Engleman (Englemans) owned a single undivided tract of 
property in Laramie County, Wyoming. The western boundary of the property had 
access to Yellowstone Road, a highway north of the City of Cheyenne. On July 15, 
1963, the Englemans conveyed a parcel of land within their tract to REB, Inc. 
(REB). The parcel of land REB purchased was located east of Yellowstone 
Road.

[¶4]      The Englemans 
also conveyed an easement to REB to provide access to Yellowstone Road. The 
easement gave REB the right to use a private road to travel across the parcel of 
land which the Englemans owned. The recorded instrument contained a legal 
description of the property owned by the Englemans and the property owned by 
REB, but it did not describe, with particularity, the location of the 
easement:

NOW, THIS INDENTURE 
WITNESSETH That, in pursuance of the said agreement and for valuable 
consideration, the [Englemans], their heirs and assigns, do hereby grant to 
[REB]:

Full and free right for 
[REB], its tenants, employees, visitors and licensees, in common with all others 
having the like right, at all times hereafter, with or without vehicles of any 
description, for all purposes connected with the use and enjoyment of the said 
land of the [Englemans] for whatever purposes the said land may be from time to 
time lawfully used and enjoyed, to pass and re-pass along the said private road, 
which shall be not to exceed 20 feet in width, and which shall be fenced by 
[REB], for the purpose of going from the nearby highway to [REB's] said property 
or vice-versa.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the 
said easement for ingress and egress hereby granted under [REB], its successors 
and assigns, as an appurtenance to the said land of [the Englemans] and every 
part thereof.

[¶5]      On April 21, 
1969, the Englemans transferred title to their remaining parcel of land to Henry 
Dale Mueller and Jean Louise Mueller (Mueller). The conveyance expressly stated 
that Mueller took the property: "Subject to easements of record." At the time 
Mueller purchased this parcel of land, access to the REB property was 
customarily obtained by traveling down a dirt driveway which was located outside 
the fenced northern boundary of Mueller's property.

[¶6]      On September 21, 
1979, REB sold a parcel of the land the corporation had acquired from the 
Englemans to a predecessor-in-interest of George A. Refior and Nancy M. Refior 
(Refiors). The conveyance transferred all of REB's rights in that parcel of 
land, including a right to use the easement. The easement was described, with 
particularity, as including the northern twenty feet of the property Mueller had 
purchased from the Englemans:

The north 20 feet of S 
1/2 NW 1/4; the north 20 feet of SW 1/4 NE 1/4 and the west 20 feet of the north 
338.8 feet of SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of said Section 30.

On October 30, 
1987, the Refiors conveyed their interests in the parcel of land by warranty 
deed to Lawrence R. Coffee (Coffee).

[¶7]      On February 27, 
1981, REB sold another parcel of the land formerly owned by the Englemans to a 
predecessor-in-interest of Ralph Johnson (Johnson). This conveyance also 
transferred a right to use the easement described, with particularity, as 
including the northern twenty feet of Mueller's property:

Including an easement for 
ingress and egress for above portion described as follows: the North 20 feet of 
S 1/2 NW 1/4, the North 20 feet of SW 1/4 NE 1/4 and the West 310 feet of the 
North 20 feet of the SE 1/4 NE 1/4, Section 30, T. 16 N., R. 66 W., 6th P.M., 
Laramie County, Wyoming.

On October 1, 
1986, Johnson executed a contract for deed to convey his interests to Richard F. 
Hoblyn and Gary D. Hoblyn (collectively Hoblyn).

[¶8]      Coffee and Hoblyn 
both experienced difficulty using the existing dirt driveway to access their 
properties. Snow drifts sometimes blocked portions of the nearly mile-long 
driveway during the winter months. Finally, in 1990, Coffee had the land 
surveyed. The survey disclosed that, except for a small overlapping portion, the 
route of the dirt driveway did not correspond with the easement. Coffee and 
Hoblyn individually requested permission to use the easement from Mueller. 
Mueller refused. Mueller claimed that no one had ever used the easement and he 
was using the land burdened by the easement for agricultural crops and a water 
well.

[¶9]      On July 11, 1991, 
Hoblyn filed an action against Mueller in district court to quiet title to the 
easement. Mueller responded with a counterclaim against Hoblyn and a third-party 
complaint against Coffee and other landowners who allegedly had a right to use 
the easement in their chain of title. Johnson was granted permission to 
intervene in the action. After almost two years of proceedings, Coffee filed a 
third-party complaint against the Refiors alleging they had a duty to indemnify 
Coffee for his expenses in defending the title to the easement. 

[¶10]   On May 24, 1993, the district court 
conducted a trial on all the various claims of the parties. The district court 
found that in 1977, Mueller had drilled a water well within the easement 
boundaries. The district court concluded that by drilling the water well, 
Mueller terminated by adverse possession a two-hundred foot long portion of the 
easement despite the fact the well had never been used for irrigation purposes 
as Mueller had intended. All other claims for relief were denied. Multiple 
appeals were filed challenging the district court's 
decision.

II. 
DISCUSSION

[¶11]   The findings of fact made by the 
district court will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Hopper v. All 
Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993). "`A finding is 
"clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed.'" Id. (quoting United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746 
(1948)). The district court's conclusions of law are not binding upon this court 
and are reviewed de novo. Hopper, 861 P.2d  at 538; Powder River 
Oil Co. v. Powder River Petroleum Corp., 830 P.2d 403, 407 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶12]   An "easement" is an interest in 
land which entitles the easement holder to a limited use or enjoyment over 
another person's property. Restatement of Property § 450(a) (1944). See 
also Black's Law Dictionary 509 (6th ed. 1990). This court has recognized 
that an easement has five essential qualities: first, an easement is incorporeal 
or without material nature; second, an easement is imposed upon corporeal 
property, not the owner of the property; third, an easement confers no right to 
participate in the profits arising from the property; fourth, an easement is 
imposed for the benefit of corporeal property and; fifth, there must be two 
distinct estates, the dominant estate, the one to which the right belongs, and 
the servient estate, the one upon which the obligation is imposed. Belle 
Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State, 766 P.2d 537, 543 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Day 
v. Buckeye Water Conservation & Drainage Dist., 28 Ariz. 466, 237 P. 636, 640 (1925)).

[¶13]   The incorporeal nature of an 
easement corresponds with the slight degree of control the easement holder has 
over the servient estate. Restatement of Property, supra, at § 450 cmt. 
c. The owner of the servient estate retains all rights to the property except as 
limited by the easement.

The fee or leasehold 
owner of the land to which an easement applies retains all the incidents of 
ownership in the land that do not contradict the particular rights of the 
easement holder. Thus if the easement holder has the right to cross over the 
land of another at a certain point, the owner of the underlying property 
ordinarily has the right to use the exact same part of the property in any way 
that does not prevent the easement holder from the actions which the easement 
grants.

7 Thompson on 
Real Property, § 60.02(d) at 394 (Thomas ed. 1994). As a matter of law, 
therefore, the owner of the servient estate may use the land burdened by the 
easement as long as the use does not interfere with the easement holder's 
rights. Wilkoske v. Warren, 875 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Wyo. 
1994).

[¶14]   The use of the servient estate is 
at the core of this dispute. Mueller admits that from 1963 to 1990, all parties 
believed that the location of the dirt driveway corresponded to the easement the 
Englemans granted REB. During this same time, however, Mueller maintains that 
his boundary fencing, agricultural use of the servient estate and drilling of a 
water well have prevented use of the easement. Under these circumstances, 
Mueller argues the district court erred in finding that the rights of the owners 
of the dominant estates to use only a portion of the easement had been 
terminated by adverse possession. Instead, Mueller asserts that the entire 
easement has been extinguished under one of several alternative 
theories.

[¶15]   Coffee and Hoblyn and their 
predecessors-in-interest admit that they have obtained access to their 
properties by traveling over the dirt driveway north of Mueller's property line. 
Coffee and Hoblyn maintain, however, that their rights to use the easement could 
not be terminated until they made a demand upon Mueller to use the land. Under 
these circumstances, Coffee and Hoblyn argue that the district court erred in 
finding that a portion of the easement had been terminated by adverse 
possession. Instead, Coffee and Hoblyn assert that they have the right to use 
the easement for a private road. Our review discloses that the right to use the 
easement has not been terminated by operation of law.

[¶16]   In 1963, the Englemans granted an 
easement to REB for access to their parcel of land by a private road. The 
Englemans' parcel of land became the servient estate, burdened by the easement. 
The REB property became the dominant estate, benefitted by the 
easement.

[¶17]   In 1969, when Mueller purchased the 
Englemans' property, he took with record notice of the existence of the 
easement, if not of the exact location. Presently, Wyoming law requires specific 
descriptions for easements recorded after May 20, 1981. Wyo. Stat. § 34-1-141(a) 
(1990). See Vance T. Countryman & Drew A. Perkins, Comment, Death Of The 
Dark Ages? The Troubled Law Of Easements In Wyoming, XXVII Land and Water 
L.Rev. 151, 169-71 (1992). However, the easement granted by the Englemans is 
valid and enforceable under our prior law. See Carney v. Board of County 
Com'rs of Sublette County, 757 P.2d 556, 561 n. 3 (Wyo. 
1988).

[¶18]   In 1979, when REB first sold a 
parcel of the land the corporation had acquired from the Englemans, REB 
effectively subdivided its holdings. Subdivision means that each of the parts of 
the dominant estate succeed to the privileges of use of the servient estate 
authorized by the easement. Restatement of Property, supra, § 
488.

"The fact that the 
dominant estate is divided and a portion or portions conveyed away does not, in 
and of itself, mean that an additional burden is imposed upon the servient 
estate. The result may be that the degree of burden is increased, 
but that is not sufficient to deny use of the right of way to an owner of a 
portion so conveyed."

Hayes v. 
Aquia Marina, Inc., 243 Va. 255, 414 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1992) (quoting Cushman Virginia Corp. v. Barnes, 204 Va. 245, 
129 S.E.2d 633, 640 (1963)) (emphasis in original). Accord Westland Nursing 
Home, Inc. v. Benson, 33 Colo. App. 245, 517 P.2d 862, 867 
(1974).

[¶19]   The easement granted by the 
Englemans provided for unlimited use for ingress and egress. Subdivision, 
therefore, did not create an additional burden on the easement since the use 
remained the same. Restatement of Property, supra, § 488. We hold that 
while the degree of the burden was increased, the easement was not terminated 
when REB subdivided its parcel of land. Westland Nursing Home, Inc., 33 
Colo. App. 245, 517 P.2d  at 867; Hayes, 414 S.E.2d  at 823.

[¶20]   Easements may be terminated by 
abandonment. Abandonment occurs when one person relinquishes or surrenders 
rights or property to another. Phillips v. Hamilton, 17 Wyo. 41, 51, 95 P. 846, 848 (1908). Abandonment of an easement requires an intentional 
relinquishment indicated by conduct which discloses the intention to surrender 
the right to use the land authorized by the easement. Carney, 757 P.2d at 
562-63; Restatement of Property, supra, § 504.

[¶21]   There is no evidence of an 
intentional relinquishment by Coffee, Hoblyn or their predecessors-in-interest 
of their rights to use the easement. Phillips, 95 P.  at 848. For example, 
there is no evidence the owners of the dominant estates ever constructed any 
permanent buildings or structures to obstruct the route of the easement onto 
their lands. Restatement of Property, supra, § 504 cmt. e. Nevertheless, 
Mueller maintains that use by the owners of the dominant estates of the dirt 
driveway from 1963 to 1990 should have terminated the easement. We 
disagree.

[¶22]   Abandonment requires more than 
simple nonuse of an easement, no matter how long the period of nonuse. 
Restatement of Property, supra, at § 504 cmt. d. In Harrison v. State 
Highways and Transp. Com'n, 732 S.W.2d 214, 221 (Mo. App. 1987), the court 
found an easement to remove fill dirt for use in highway construction was not 
abandoned even though it had not been used in twenty-four years. "The question 
of abandonment is largely one of intention, and intention to abandon must be 
proved and it may be inferred only from strong and convincing evidence." 
Id. at 221.

[¶23]   The court in Richards Asphalt 
Co. v. Bunge Corp., 399 N.W.2d 188, 192-93 (Minn. App. 1987) determined that 
an easement for a railroad spur was not abandoned despite nonuse for sixteen 
years. During this period, the owner of the dominant estate had obstructed the 
railroad tracks with four to seven feet of fill dirt to control periodic 
flooding. Id. at 190. The court, however, found that placing the fill 
dirt and leaving it for sixteen years did not disclose a permanent intent to 
abandon the easement. Id. at 193. "A claim of abandonment can be upheld 
only where nonuse is accompanied by affirmative and unequivocal acts indicative 
of an intent to abandon and is inconsistent with the continued existence of the 
easement." Id. at 192.

[¶24]   Coffee, Hoblyn and their 
predecessors-in-interest did not attempt to make use of the entire easement 
across Mueller's property for twenty-seven years. However, the right to use the 
land was not relinquished by mere nonuse. Richards Asphalt Co., 399 
N.W.2d at 192-93; Harrison, 732 S.W.2d  at 221. The mere nonuse of the 
easement did not disclose an affirmative and unequivocal intent to abandon the 
easement. Restatement of Property, supra, at § 504 cmt 
d.

[¶25]   The use of an alternative access 
route from 1963 to 1990 also does not establish an intent to abandon the 
easement. In Jackvony v. Poncelet, 584 A.2d 1112, 1117 (R.I. 1991), the 
owner of the dominant estate had two available routes to access his property. 
The court determined that despite the fact the alternative route was more 
convenient, the owner of the dominant estate retained the right to use and enjoy 
an easement giving him access to another route. Id. The court reiterated 
that abandonment would only be found when there is an expression of an intent to 
abandon the easement. Id.

[¶26]   While Coffee and Hoblyn did make 
use of another means of access, the failure to use the easement does not mean 
the purpose of the easement ceased to exist. Crabbe v. Veve Associates, 
150 Vt. 53, 549 A.2d 1045, 1048 (1988). The easement holders retained the 
right to use the easement even if they used an alternative route. 
Jackvony, 584 A.2d  at 1117. We hold that Coffee, Hoblyn and their 
predecessors-in-interest did not abandon the easement granted by the Englemans. 
Carney, 757 P.2d  at 562-63.

[¶27]   Detrimental reliance on the conduct 
of the owners of a dominant estate may also result in a termination of the 
easement. Restatement of Property, supra, at § 505 acknowledges that the 
owner of a servient estate may seek to terminate an easement by 
estoppel:

An easement is 
extinguished when action is taken by the owner of the servient tenement 
inconsistent with the continued existence of the easement, 
if

(a) such action is taken 
in reasonable reliance upon conduct of the owner of the easement; 
and

(b) the owner of the 
easement might reasonably have foreseen such reliance and the consequent action; 
and

(c) the restoration of 
the privilege of use authorized by the easement would cause unreasonable harm to 
the owner of the servient tenement.

[¶28]   Mueller, however, failed to make 
any showing of conduct by Coffee, Hoblyn or their predecessors-in-interest that 
he reasonably relied upon to his detriment. Squaw Mountain Cattle Co. v. 
Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Wyo. 1991). There is no evidence in the record 
that the owners of the dominant estates ever intentionally expressed their 
permission for Mueller to take any actions inconsistent with the continued 
existence of the easement. Restatement of Property, supra, at § 505 cmt. 
c. We hold that the easement was not terminated by 
estoppel.

[¶29]   Finally, adverse possession for the 
statutory period of ten years may result in the termination of an easement. Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-3-103 (1988). To terminate an easement by adverse possession, the 
owner of the servient estate must take an action that would be permitted only if 
the easement did not exist. 

An easement is 
extinguished by a use of the servient tenement by the possessor of it which 
would be privileged if, and only if, the easement did not exist, 
provided

(a) the use is adverse as 
to the owner of the easement and

(b) the adverse use is, 
for the period of prescription, continuous and 
uninterrupted.

Restatement of 
Property, supra, at § 506.

[¶30]   This court has identified several 
elements which must be satisfied to establish adverse possession of land. The 
party claiming adverse possession must show actual, open, notorious, exclusive 
and hostile possession of another's property for ten years under a claim of 
right or color of title. Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 935 (Wyo. 1983); 
Rutar Farms & Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 
1982). The party claiming adverse possession must have acted with the intent to 
assert an adverse claim against the true owner. Gray v. Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88, 90 (Wyo. 1978).

[¶31]   The elements of adverse possession 
of land are very similar to the elements necessary to establish adverse 
possession of an easement. There is, however, an analytical distinction between 
the two categories of adverse possession. The owner of the servient estate 
claiming adverse possession of an easement already has the right to possess and 
use the land so long as that use is not inconsistent with the easement. WYMO 
Fuels, Inc. v. Edwards, 723 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Wyo. 1986). Therefore, the 
owner of a servient estate must prove the use of the servient estate made during 
the period of adverse possession is sufficiently hostile and inconsistent with 
the use permitted by the easement.

To extinguish an easement 
over (or use of) the servient tenements, the servient tenement owner must 
demonstrate a visible, notorious and continuous adverse and hostile use of said 
land which is inconsistent with the use made and rights held by the easement 
holder, not merely possession which is inconsistent with another's claim of 
title.

Estojak v. 
Mazsa, 
522 Pa. 353, 562 A.2d 271, 275 (1989). Accord Abbott v. Thompson, 56 Or. 
App. 311, 641 P.2d 652, 655 (1982). Just as the creation of an easement by 
prescription is not favored in the law, the termination of an easement by 
adverse possession is not favored. Shumway v. Tom Sanford, Inc., 637 P.2d 666, 670 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶32]   The district court ruled that 
Mueller's actions in drilling a water well on a portion of the easement 
terminated by adverse possession the rights held by Coffee and Hoblyn to use a 
two-hundred foot long portion of the easement. The district court also 
determined that Mueller had failed to establish his adverse possession of the 
remainder of the easement. The district court found that Mueller's actions in 
maintaining boundary fencing or making agricultural use of the land burdened by 
the easement were "not sufficient" to terminate the easement by adverse 
possession.

[¶33]   Mueller maintains the district 
court erred in ruling that only the portion of the easement around the water 
well was terminated by adverse possession. Mueller asserts that his use of the 
land was sufficiently hostile and notorious to terminate the entire easement by 
adverse possession. Mueller argues that as the owner of the servient estate, he 
has proven that his use of the land has been inconsistent with the use permitted 
by the easement.

[¶34]   Coffee and Hoblyn contend that no 
portion of the right to use the easement has been terminated by adverse 
possession. Coffee and Hoblyn assert that Mueller's actions prior to 1990 were 
not adverse to their interests because Mueller was permitted to make use of his 
land until the owners of the dominant estates requested to use the easement. 
Coffee and Hoblyn argue that Mueller's actions were nothing more than an 
exercise of his right as the landowner to use and develop his property. We agree 
that Mueller's actions in maintaining boundary fencing, growing various crops 
and drilling the water well did not terminate any portion of the easement by 
adverse possession.

[¶35]   In Joe Johnson Co. v. 
Landen, 738 P.2d 711, 712-13 (Wyo. 1987), this court considered a 
landowner's right to use land burdened by interests held by another. The 
landowner declared that he had terminated, by adverse possession, the right to 
use a natural water reservoir located on his land. Id. at 712. The 
landowner claimed that during a period of over ten years when the reservoir was 
not being used, he and his predecessor-in-interest had made hostile and 
notorious use of the land. Id. The landowner planted agricultural crops, 
drilled a water well and installed an irrigation system within the boundaries of 
the dry reservoir. Id. The right to use the reservoir belonged to the 
holder of a certificate of appropriation. Id. When the landowner diverted 
water away from the reservoir land to protect his crops, the holder of the 
certificate of appropriation filed a complaint. Id. This court determined 
that the landowner had failed to establish all the necessary elements of adverse 
possession. Id. at 712-13. We held that the landowner had not 
demonstrated that his uses of the land were separate and exclusive uses which 
were inconsistent with the right to use the reservoir which belonged to the 
holder of the certificate of appropriation. Id.

[¶36]   Other courts have specifically 
addressed the rights of the owner of a servient estate to use land burdened by 
an unused easement. In Beebe v. Swerda, 58 Wn. App. 375, 793 P.2d 442, 
443-44 (1990), the owner of a dominant estate demanded the right to use an 
easement for a private road. The owner of the servient estate claimed the 
previously unused easement had been terminated by adverse possession. Id. 
793 P.2d  at 446. The court found that despite the improvements the owner of the 
servient estate had made to the land, the easement was not terminated by adverse 
possession. Id. 793 P.2d  at 447. "This right of the servient estate owner 
to the use of the property covered by the easement during periods when the 
easement is not being used means that the use of the area covered by the 
easement is not adverse to the owner of the dominant estate." Id. The 
court affirmed a lower court order that required the owner of the servient 
estate to remove his improvements within thirty days of the time the dominant 
estate owner sought to use the easement. Id. See also City of Edmonds 
v. Williams, 54 Wn. App. 632, 774 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1989) (holding easement 
was not terminated by adverse possession when the owner of the servient estate 
constructed a fence across an unused easement).

[¶37]   In Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 
Idaho 65, 813 P.2d 876, 877 (1991), the Supreme Court of Idaho considered 
whether the owner of the servient estate had terminated, by adverse possession, 
the right to use an easement for a private road. The owner of the servient 
estate had placed six trees down the center of the easement, constructed a fence 
inside the boundary of the easement, constructed a concrete irrigation diversion 
system on one end of the easement and placed several large boulders on the 
easement. Id. 813 P.2d  at 878. The court determined that when an easement 
has never been used, the owner of the servient estate had a right to use the 
land "for any purpose not inconsistent with the purpose reserved in the 
easement." Id. 813 P.2d  at 879-80. The court held that the owner of the 
servient estate had not made adverse or inconsistent use of the land prior to 
the time the owner of the dominant estate needed to use the easement. Id. 
813 P.2d  at 880.

[¶38]   Kolouch builds upon a rule 
first announced in Castle Associates v. Schwartz, 63 A.D.2d 481, 407 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1978). In Castle Associates, the court considered whether 
an unused easement created by a grant in 1903 had been terminated. Id. 
407 N.Y.S.2d  at 719. Seventy-three years later, the owner of the dominant estate 
demanded the right to use the easement. Id. 407 N YS.2d at 720. The owner 
of the servient estate claimed his actions in fencing the land had terminated 
the easement by adverse possession. The court considered a variety of precedents 
and summarized:

[W]here an easement has 
been created but no occasion has arisen for its use, the owner of the servient 
tenement may fence his land and such use will not be deemed adverse to the 
existence of the easement until such time as (1) the need for the right of way 
arises, (2) a demand is made by the owner of the dominant tenement that the 
easement be opened and (3) the owner of the servient tenement refuses to do 
so. 

Id. 407 N.Y.S.2d  at 723. 
See also Armour v. Marino, 140 A.D.2d 752, 527 N.Y.S.2d 632, 633 (1988) 
(holding unused easement created by a grant was not terminated by adverse 
possession despite obstructions by owners of servient estate which included 
fencing, trees and a garden).

[¶39]   The court in Spiegel v. 
Ferraro, 73 N.Y.2d 622, 543 N.Y.S.2d 15, 17, 541 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1989) 
recognized the limited nature of the exception to general principles of adverse 
possession contained in the holdings of Castle Associates, Armour 
and similar cases:

The theory underlying the 
exception is that easements not definitively located and developed through use 
are not yet in functional existence and therefore the owner of the easement 
could not be expected to have notice of the adverse claim until either the 
easement is opened or the owner demands that it be opened. It is only at such 
point, therefore, that the use of the easement by another is deemed to be 
adverse to the owner and the prescriptive period beings to run * * 
*.

[¶40]   We are persuaded that no portion of 
the easement granted by the Englemans was terminated by adverse possession. 
Joe Johnson Co., 738 P.2d at 712-13; Kolouch, 813 P.2d at 879-80; 
Spiegel, 541 N.E.2d  at 17; Armour, 527 N.Y.S.2d  at 633; Castle 
Associates, 407 N.Y.S.2d  at 723; Beebe, 793 P.2d  at 447; City of 
Edmonds, 774 P.2d  at 1244. The easement has never been developed through 
use. Therefore, the period of adverse possession began in 1990 when Coffee and 
Hoblyn demanded the easement be opened and Mueller refused. Spiegel, 541 N.E.2d  at 17. At that time, Coffee and Hoblyn were first placed on notice that 
another was claiming actual, open, notorious, exclusive and hostile possession 
of their property under a claim or right or color of title. Doenz, 665 P.2d  at 935. This action was filed well before the ten year prescriptive period 
had run. Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-103. Even if the statutory period had run, Mueller's 
uses of the servient estate were not adverse to the holders of the unused 
easement. Restatement of Property, supra, at § 506.

[¶41]   Prior to 1990, Mueller's use of the 
land was simply "not inconsistent with the purpose reserved in the easement." 
Kolouch, 813 P.2d  at 880. As the owner of the servient estate, Mueller 
maintained boundary fencing. An easement for a private road which has been 
"definitively and functionally in existence" may be terminated by adverse 
possession when access is obstructed for the prescriptive period. 
Spiegel, 541 N.E.2d  at 17. However, the maintenance of a fence which 
obstructs an unused easement does not terminate the easement by adverse 
possession. Castle Associates, 407 N.Y.S.2d  at 723.

[¶42]   Mueller also used the land for 
seasonal cultivation of agricultural crops. This use also was not inconsistent 
with rights held by the owners of the dominant estates. Joe Johnson Co., 
738 P.2d at 712-13; Kolouch, 813 P.2d  at 880; Armour, 527 N.Y.S.2d  
at 633. The owners of the dominant estates have the right to demand the easement 
be cleared when they are ready to use it. Beebe, 793 P.2d  at 
447.

[¶43]   Finally, Mueller drilled a water 
well within the boundaries of the easement. After the water well was completed, 
Mueller capped it. Mueller maintains he still intends to use the water well for 
crop irrigation at some point in the future. Drilling a water well, however, was 
not adverse to the continued existence of this previously unused 
easement.

[¶44]   The landowner in Joe Johnson 
Co., 738 P.2d  at 712-13 had drilled a water well and installed an irrigation 
system. Nevertheless, this court determined that those actions were not 
inconsistent with the rights to use the natural reservoir which belonged to the 
holder of a certificate of appropriation. Id. Similarly, the owner of the 
servient estate in Kolouch, 813 P.2d  at 878 constructed an irrigation 
diversion on a portion of the easement. The court determined, however, that this 
use did not terminate the easement by adverse possession. Id. at 
880.

[¶45]   Mueller's use of the servient 
estate to drill a water well did not terminate the rights of the owners of the 
dominant estate to use the easement for a private road. Therefore, the district 
court's finding that a portion of the easement was terminated by adverse 
possession was clearly erroneous. Hopper, 861 P.2d  at 
538.

III. 
CONCLUSION

[¶46]   From 1963 to 1990, the various 
landowners failed to develop and use the easement granted by the Englemans. 
Every landowner took with knowledge of the existence of the easement. However, 
no one took prudent precautions when purchasing their lands to develop and use 
the easement. As a result, numerous problems have developed which have pitted 
neighbor against neighbor in complex litigation. No matter how just the 
resolution under the law, everyone has suffered.

[¶47]   We affirm in part and reverse in 
part.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶48]   I cannot agree with the decision in 
this case according to the majority opinion. I am satisfied the trial court and 
this court have placed this jurisdiction in the minority with respect to the 
acquisition of an easement right-of-way by adverse possession. Annotation, 
Loss of Private Easement by Nonuser or Adverse Possession, 25 A.L.R.2d 
1265, 1329 (1952). In relying upon Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65, 813 P.2d 876 (1991), the trial court and this court have rested upon unstable 
ground.

[¶49]   Kolouch expanded upon 
Castle Associates v. Schwartz, 63 A.D.2d 481, 407 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1978). 
The Idaho court and this court both ignored the severe limitation placed upon 
Castle Associates by the New York Court of Appeals in Spiegel v. 
Ferraro, 73 N.Y.2d 622, 543 N.Y.S.2d 15, 17, 541 N.E.2d 15, 17 
(1989):

A narrow exception to 
this general rule [an easement created by grant may be extinguished by adverse 
possession] has evolved with regard to the extinguishment of easements that have 
not been definitively located through use. In Smyles v. Hastings, 22 N.Y. 217, 224, we held that an easement that was not so definitively located through 
use and which lead to a "wild and unoccupied" parcel, was not extinguished by 
adverse possession because the owner of the easement had had no occasion to 
assert the right of way during part of the prescriptive period. Relying on 
Smyles, the Appellate Division has held that such "paper" easements may 
not be extinguished by adverse possession absent a demand by the owner that the 
easement be opened and a refusal by the party in adverse possession (Castle 
Assocs. v. Schwartz, 63 A.D.2d 481, 490, 407 N.Y.S.2d 717; see also, 
Powlowski v. Mohawk Golf Club, 204 App. Div. 200, 198 N.Y.S. 30; 
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. MASP Equip. Corp., 109 A.D.2d 604, 606, 486 N.Y.S.2d 4, affd. on other grounds 67 N.Y.2d 35, 499 N.Y.S.2d 647, 490 
N.E.2d 514). In Castle, the court held that an easement created by grant 
as the result of a subdivision, but never located, was not extinguished by 
adverse possession because the owner of the easement had never demanded that the 
easement be opened.

Then, following 
the language quoted by the majority, slip op. at 11, the New York Court of 
Appeals reversed a holding by the Appellate Division that denied extinguishment 
of an easement and ruled the case did not fall within the Castle 
exception.

[¶50]   In this case, the trial court 
found, among other things:

2. That the legal 
description for the previously described easement by deed is set forth as 
follows:

"The North 20 feet of S 
1/2 NW 1/4; The North 20 feet of SW 1/4 NE 1/4 and the West 20 feet of the north 
338.8 feet of the SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of said Section 30, Laramie County, 
Wyoming."

* * * * * 
*

4. That the above 
described easement has been fenced off since the Defendant, Dale H. Mueller's 
purchase of the servient estate on May 21, 1969. In addition, Dale H. Mueller 
has cultivated the area encompassed by the easement with crested 
wheat.

5. That in November of 
1977, the Defendant, Dale H. Mueller drilled a water well within a portion of 
the area encompassed within the above described easement. This water well has 
never become operational. 

While the trial 
court also found Mueller's conduct of fencing off and cultivating the easement 
was not sufficient to result in forfeiture of the easement by adverse 
possession, that conclusion is clearly contrary to the rule of adverse 
possession in vogue in Wyoming, articulated in Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932 (Wyo. 1983). The clear implication of Doenz is that fencing plus 
cultivation results in gaining title in fee by adverse 
possession.

[¶51]   My analysis of Kolouch leads 
me to conclude the Idaho court was reasoning to a decision that ingress and 
egress to a valuable commercial project should be protected. It would have been 
well advised to at least acknowledge that it was expanding upon the ratio 
decidendi of Shelton v. Boydstun Beach Ass'n, 102 Idaho 818, 641 P.2d 1005 (Ct.App. 1982), by alluding to the record in Shelton to incorporate 
information not contained in the reported decision. Shelton, of course, 
follows the majority rule and affirms a ruling of extinguishment by the trial 
court.

[¶52]   The product of the majority 
decision in this case is to adopt as the rule in Wyoming for extinguishment of 
an easement by adverse possession a very narrowly confined rule in New York as 
it apparently has been liberalized by the Idaho court. Consequently, the rule of 
adverse possession for acquiring fee title to land in Wyoming is disparate and 
quite different from the rule with respect to extinguishing an easement by 
adverse possession. I can find no logic or justifiable public policy in this 
departure. To the extent the decision appears to be justified by Joe Johnson 
Co. v. Landen, 738 P.2d 711 (Wyo. 1987), my disagreement with the majority 
in that case is recorded and, at the very least, I would limit it to its unique 
facts.

[¶53]   In the instant case, the majority 
reversed that aspect of the trial court's decision which extinguished the 
easement for 100 feet on the east, west, and south of the well. The trial 
court's decision in that regard clearly is justified by the majority rule with 
respect to permanent structures in the claimed easement. Annotation, 25 A.L.R.2d 
1265. I would affirm that part of the trial court's decision, but I would 
reverse the ruling that the balance of the claimed easement had not been 
extinguished by adverse possession. The other property owners are not without 
remedy in Wyoming (Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, 811 P.2d 287 (Wyo. 
1991)), and holding that the entire easement has been extinguished avoids the 
anomaly of requiring an action for a private road to fill in the remaining 200 
feet. Furthermore, extinguishment of the entire easement comports with the usual 
rule in Wyoming with respect to adverse possession.

[¶54]   I would reverse and remand and 
order the entry of judgment that the entire easement had been extinguished by 
adverse possession.