Title: In the Matter of the Guardianship of K.H.O., a Minor

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). HANDLER, J., writing for a unanimous Court. This appeal involves the statutory standard of the best interests of the child, the standard applied when the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) seeks to terminate the parental rights of the biological parent of a child pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The standard has four overlapping criteria that a court must find are satisfied before terminating parental rights: (1) endangerment of the child's health and development by the parental relationship, (2) unwillingness or inability of the parent to provide a safe and stable home for the child and harm to the child caused by the delay in permanent placement, (3) diligent efforts by DYFS to reunite the child and parent, and (4) termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good to the child. The child in this case is K.H.O., who was born to B.A.S. on August 31, 1993. B.A.S. had used drugs during her pregnancy and K.H.O. was born addicted and suffering from heroin withdrawal and other physical problems. The child spent the first month of her life in a hospital. Her mother voluntarily placed K.H.O. in foster care when the child was released from the hospital and K.H.O. has lived with the same foster family since that time. B.A.S. continued to use drugs after the birth of K.H.O. despite her referral by DYFS to drug treatment programs and many psychological and substance-abuse evaluations. In her most recent efforts at drug rehabilitation, through a clinic in Georgia, B.A.S. has shown more positive progress, testing negative for drug use on periodic tests. In evaluations by court-appointed and other psychologists and at the hearing in this matter, B.A.S. acknowledged that her recovery was precarious. She has maintained contact with K.H.O. throughout the period, having supervised visitation with her on a regular basis and being encouraged by the foster mother to develop a positive relationship with the child. DYFS filed a guardianship complaint in August 1996, seeking to terminate B.A.S.'s parental rights so K.H.O.'s foster parents could adopt her. B.A.S. contested the proposed adoption. K.H.O.'s biological father did not appear in the proceedings and a default judgment was entered against him. The court appointed counsel, a law guardian, and a psychologist, who conducted evaluations of the parties. The psychologist identified the foster mother as K.H.O.'s psychological parent and recommended that K.H.O. be freed for adoption. At the trial held on March 17, 1997, K.H.O.'s law guardian and B.A.S.'s DYFS caseworker recommended that B.A.S.'s parental rights be terminated. B.A.S. acknowledged through counsel that she was not really capable and needed more time to take custody of K.H.O. The court determined that the initial harm caused to K.H.O. in utero by her mother's drug use satisfied the first prong of the best interests standard and that K.H.O. would suffer irreparable harm if separated from her foster parents, which satisfied the fourth prong. Finding the other criteria met as well, the court terminated B.A.S.'s parental rights and committed K.H.O. to the care, custody and control of DYFS. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, holding that neither the first nor the fourth prong of the statutory standard had been met. The Supreme Court granted DYFS's petition for certification. HELD: It is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parental rights of her biological mother when there is clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child is born addicted to drugs and her mother cannot care for her, being herself addicted to drugs; (2) her mother continues to be unable to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the child will suffer substantially from a lack of stability and a permanent placement and from the disruption of the bonds with her foster family; (3) DYFS used diligent efforts to reunite child and mother; and (4) the child's bond with her foster parents is stronger than that with her biological mother. 1. A parent's constitutional right to a relationship with his or her child is tempered by the State's responsibility to protect the welfare of children; the balance between the two is achieved through the best interests of the child standard. (pp.7-11) 2. A child born addicted to drugs and suffering from drug withdrawal as a result of her mother's substance abuse during pregnancy, as K.H.O. was, has been harmed by the mother and that harm endangers the child's health and development. That the child's condition may have improved during the time spent in foster care does not provide a basis for finding the first prong of the best interests standard not to be met. The mother's failure to provide continuing care for K.H.O. or to help her overcome her suffering, an aspect of the second prong of the standard, reinforces the finding that the first prong is satisfied. (pp.11-15) 3. The second element of the best interests test focuses on the steps the parent takes to maintain the parent-child relationship and to foster an environment leading to normal child development. Here, although B.A.S. has maintained a limited but positive relationship with K.H.O., B.A.S. has consistently been unable to take any responsibility for the child's parental care and her drug use has been chronic and unresolved. Further, the record supports the conclusion that the delay in permanent placement caused by the failure of B.A.S. to assume a responsible parental role will itself harm K.H.O. by disrupting or weakening other bonds K.H.O. might form, such as with her foster parents. The second prong has been met. (pp. 16-18) 4. The third prong of the standard has been satisfied: DYFS tried unsuccessfully to find relatives or friends of B.A.S. to care for K.H.O.; DYFS encouraged B.A.S. to visit and develop a positive relationship with her daughter and monitored the visits; the foster parents communicated with B.A.S. about K.H.O.'s progress and encouraged the mother-child relationship; and DYFS sent B.A.S. to numerous drug-treatment programs. (pp. 18-19) 5. To decide whether the fourth prong of the best interests standard is satisfied in a case like this, a court must look into the child's relationship with both her biological parents and her foster parents and determine after balancing those relationships whether the child will suffer a greater harm from the termination of ties with her biological parents than from the permanent disruption of her relationship with her foster parents. Long-term foster care is the exception to the general rule favoring adoption and usually is not in the best interests of the child. K.H.O.has lived virtually her whole life with the foster parents who want to adopt her and B.A.S. has never been in a position to take custody of her for even a short time. The final prong of the standard is met here. (pp. 20-29) 6. The issue of open adoption, whereby biological family members are able to have visitation with the child after parental rights are terminated and the child is adopted, is a matter for the Legislature. Voluntary and mutual agreements permitting such continued contact that are reached after full counseling and advice and are in the best interests of the child may be recognized but are not judicially enforceable. In K.H.O.'s case, the Court is hopeful that such an informal agreement can be reached. (pp.29-32 ) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the order of the Family Part terminating the parental rights of B.A.S. in respect of K.H.O. is REINSTATED. JUSTICE O'HERN, concurring, is of the view that giving birth to a drug-dependent child cannot in and of itself satisfy the first element of the best interests standard, and although on the record before it, the Appellate Division properly ordered a remand for further consideration by the trial court, the record developed after the Appellate Division decision convincingly establishes that reunification of K.H.O. with her mother is not viable or appropriate and K.H.O. should be adopted by her foster parents. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE HANDLER's opinion. JUSTICE O'HERN has filed a separate concurring opinion. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF K.H.O., A Minor. Argued November 9, 1998 -- Decided August 3, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 308 N.J. Super. 432 (1998). Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant, New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services (Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Lisa B. Landsman, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs). Dean T. Bennett, Law Guardian, argued the cause for respondent K.H.O. (Hartlaub, Dotten, Terry & Townsend, attorneys). Melville D. Miller, Jr., argued the cause for respondent B.A.S. (Mr. Miller, President, Legal Services of New Jersey, attorney; Mr. Miller, Beatrix W. Shear and Nancy Goldhill, on the briefs). Cecilia M. Zalkind argued the cause for amicus curiae Association for Children of New Jersey. Lawrence S. Lustberg and Lori Outzs Borgen submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Women's Resource Panel on Substance Abuse (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys). Lorraine M. Augostini, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, Janet L. Fayter, Deputy Public Defender, and Phyllis G. Warren, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Law Guardian Office (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by HANDLER, J. The brief life story of this child, K.H.O., brings into sharp focus those circumstances that will impel the courts to terminate parental rights as a basis for a child's adoption. Determining when such termination is appropriate requires consideration of the statutory standard based on the best interests of the child. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services brought this termination action against the biological mother of K.H.O. The complaint was based on the statutory standards that codified this Court's decision in New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986). That standard, considered also in the companion case In re Guardianship of DMH, __ N.J. __ (DMH (II)), decided today, encompasses several criteria to determine the best interests of the child. The application of that standard in this case raises the issue of whether this child's drug addiction at birth, caused by the mother's prenatal drug use, endangered the health and development of the child. It also requires the Court to consider the legal effect of the mother's continuing inability to care for her child. Additionally, the application of this standard underscores the difficulties courts face in comparing the harm to the child that results from severing biological ties upon the termination of parental rights with the benefits of adoption. (2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his foster parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child; (3) The division has made diligent efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and (4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF K.H.O., a Minor. O'HERN, J., concurring. I concur in the judgment of the Court, but for different reasons. I agree that an injury inflicted on an unborn child by its mother may be considered as part of the harm suffered by a child under the first prong of the four-part test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), necessary to terminate parental rights. I disagree that in and of itself, giving birth to a drug-dependent child qualitatively establishes the first prong of the test. (Recall the cases of mothers who leave their children in locked cars at malls. A single incident of neglect on the part of a parent is not enough normally to terminate parental rights.) Rather, I agree with the Appellate Division that the trial court's findings were incomplete and inadequate to sustain a judgment terminating parental rights. 308 N.J. Super. 432, 453 (1998). Except for perhaps placing too much emphasis on the possibility of long-term foster care, the Appellate Division conscientiously applied the four-part test for the termination of parental rights.See footnote 9 After thorough review, the court properly remanded the matter for further consideration. In hindsight, we now have the benefit of the remand ordered by the Appellate Division. The supplemental psychological evaluation reports, submitted October 10, 1998, convincingly establish that "[a] case goal of reunification of [K.H.O.] with [her biological mother B.S.] is not viable or appropriate to consider. . . . [K.H.O.] should be adopted by her foster parents." B.S. is currently in an out-patient drug rehabilitation program in Georgia. Although the results of her most recent drug tests indicate that she is negative for both opiates and ethanol, B.S. acknowledges that she would not be able to continue her progress in New Jersey. Although she has now apparently changed her position, B.S. conveyed to the trial court and the psychologist that she is prepared to surrender her parental rights; her only hesitation is based on the concern that there will be no guarantee that she will be permitted future contact with K.H.O. The record clearly indicates that B.S. is honest enough to realize that she cannot realistically perform her parental obligations within the time frame of her child's needs. All that she asks is that she be allowed continued visitation. We should be able to accommodate her plea to play a part in her child's life. See In re Adoption of Child by D.M.H., 135 N.J. 473, cert. denied sub nom. Hollingshead v. Hoxworth, 513 U.S. 967, 115 S. Ct. 433. 130 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1994) (explaining that "[n]otwithstanding the absence of legislation, voluntary and informal open-adoption arrangements do exist and, for some families, such arrangements may balance the needs of biological and adoptive parents.") (citation omitted). NO. A-224 IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF K.H.O., A Minor. DECIDED