Title: Commonwealth v. Kennedy

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12345 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHRISTOPHER J. KENNEDY. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     October 3, 2017. - February 9, 2018. 
 
Present (Sitting at Greenfield):  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, 
Budd, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Indecent Assault and Battery.  Indecent Exposure.  Assault and 
Battery.  Mistake.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions to 
jury, Jury and jurors, Voir dire, Challenge to jurors.  
Jury and Jurors.  Evidence, First complaint. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 15, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Daniel A. Ford, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
David Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
 
Thomas J. Carey for Kari Hong & others. 
 
Wendy J. Murphy for Women's and Children's Advocacy Project 
at New England Law|Boston. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of indecent assault and battery on a person over fourteen, G. L. 
c. 265, § 13 H, assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13 A (a), 
and indecent exposure, G. L. c. 272, § 53.  The charges stemmed 
from an encounter between the victim, M.M., and the defendant, a 
State trooper, who met on a dating Web site and exchanged 
flirtatious messages.  They arranged to meet in person for 
coffee, and M.M. agreed to the defendant's suggestion that they 
finish their conversation at her apartment.  Once inside, the 
defendant exposed himself to M.M.  She immediately informed the 
defendant that he had the wrong idea, and repeatedly told him, 
"No."  Despite M.M.'s requests to stop, the defendant advanced 
toward her, grabbed her wrist, and forced her to touch his 
penis.  She told him, "No means no," and that he had to leave.  
He then apologized and left the apartment. 
 
At trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction on 
mistake of fact, asserting that he honestly and reasonably had 
believed that M.M. had consented to the contact leading to the 
charges, and would not have been offended by his act of exposing 
himself.  The request was denied.  The defendant appeals from 
the denial and from the admission of what he asserted was 
unnecessary first complaint evidence.  We conclude that the 
trial judge did not err in declining to give an instruction on 
mistake of fact for either the charge of indecent assault and 
3 
 
 
battery or the charge of indecent exposure.  The judge also did 
not err in allowing the admission of the challenged testimony. 
 
This case also presents the issue of the extent to which a 
judge has discretion to question prospective jurors following 
attorney-conducted voir dire, and to rule on challenges for 
cause.  The defendant contends that the answers provided by the 
prospective jurors when questioned by the judge were not 
sufficient to address issues of bias raised during attorney-
conducted voir dire on the same topics, and that the judge erred 
by refusing to excuse the jurors for cause.  We conclude that 
the judge did not abuse his discretion either in asking follow-
up questions or in his rulings that the jurors were impartial.  
Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions.1 
 
1.  Facts.  The jury could have found the following.  The 
defendant first contacted M.M. on a dating Web site in June, 
2014.  Over the following week, the defendant and M.M. exchanged 
messages through the Web site and via text messages on their 
cellular telephones, with both of them sending multiple 
flirtatious and explicit messages.  They also spoke on the 
telephone at least once.  Early on in these exchanges, the 
defendant told M.M. that he was a State trooper who was 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services; Kari Hong, Brooke 
Kootman, and Nicholas Dodson; and the Women's and Children's 
Advocacy Project at New England Law|Boston. 
4 
 
 
separated from his wife, but was still living in the same house 
with her for financial reasons.  M.M., who was separated from 
her husband, said that his "situation," as he had portrayed it, 
was not a "deal breaker" for her. 
 
As the relationship progressed, M.M. became suspicious that 
the defendant was trying to cheat on his wife, a suspicion that 
he denied.  They continued to send each other explicit messages 
and to try to find a time at which they could meet in person.  
Both said that they were working long hours and looking for 
someone "to spend time with on a casual basis." 
 
In July, 2014, the defendant offered to meet M.M. at a 
coffee shop next to a gasoline station in Williamsburg on her 
way home from work.  M.M. told the defendant she could meet him 
for a short period of time while getting gasoline, but that she 
had promised to help her landlord with some work.  M.M. 
testified at trial that she did need to get gasoline, but she 
had no plans with her landlord, and that she simply "wanted an 
excuse to just cut it off" if she decided to leave.  She wanted 
an opportunity to meet the defendant face to face in order "to 
see what the situation really was" with his wife. 
 
While at the gasoline pumps, M.M. saw the defendant arrive 
in uniform in a police cruiser and enter the coffee shop.  She 
moved her vehicle next to his and began a conversation with him 
in the parking lot.  M.M. and the defendant discussed their 
5 
 
 
relationships with their spouses and otherwise had "a friendly 
conversation" in which they "were shooting the breeze."  M.M. 
testified at trial that she felt comfortable with the defendant 
and was not intimidated.  They spoke for approximately ten 
minutes and then M.M. said she had to leave.  The defendant told 
M.M. that he was enjoying their conversation and asked if he 
could go back to her house with her to finish the coffee and the 
conversation.  M.M. agreed, and he followed her vehicle as she 
drove home. 
 
When M.M. and the defendant arrived at M.M.'s apartment, 
three of her landlords' children were in the swimming pool.  
M.M. asked the defendant to wait outside for a minute so that 
she could put away laundry that was hanging up inside.  M.M. 
then told the defendant he could come in. 
 
As the defendant walked into M.M.'s apartment, he started 
walking toward her and unzipped his pants.  He pulled out his 
penis and said, "I want you to see what you're doing to me."  
M.M. responded, "No.  This isn't what I thought was going to 
happen here," but the defendant continued to walk towards her 
with his penis exposed.  M.M. continued to say "no" and "no 
means no" as the defendant reached for her wrist and forced her 
to touch his penis.  She tried to pull away, but her back was 
against the kitchen counter.  The defendant kissed M.M. until 
she turned her head away.  He then backed off, and M.M. said, 
6 
 
 
"You need to fucking leave."  The defendant zipped his pants, 
apologized, and said that he would leave.  On his way out, the 
defendant asked M.M. if she was going to report him.  The 
defendant had been inside M.M.'s apartment for approximately 
five minutes. 
 
A few minutes after the defendant left, M.M. sent a text 
message to a friend, J.D.,2 to tell her what had happened.  She 
then spoke to J.D. on the telephone and sent text messages to 
several other friends.  That night, M.M. telephoned both the 
Worthington and Williamsburg police departments, and left voice 
mail messages.  The next morning, not having heard from either 
police department, M.M. called 911. 
 
The defendant sent M.M. a text message that afternoon, 
asking how her day was going, but M.M. did not respond.  At some 
point that day, the defendant removed his profile from the 
dating Web site.  The defendant was arrested and charged with 
indecent assault and battery, indecent exposure, and assault and 
battery. 
 
All of the messages between M.M. and the defendant were 
introduced at trial through M.M.'s testimony.3  In addition, the 
jury heard testimony from J.D. as a first complaint witness, and 
                     
 
2 A pseudonym. 
 
3 The prosecutor presented M.M. with copies of the messages 
while she was on the stand and she testified from those copies. 
7 
 
 
testimony from State trooper Robin Whitney and Northampton 
police Detective Michael Briggs concerning the investigation. 
 
At the close of all the evidence, defense counsel requested 
a jury instruction on mistake of fact for the charges of 
indecent assault and battery and indecent exposure.4  The judge 
declined to give the instructions.  On the charge of indecent 
assault and battery, he decided that the current state of the 
law does not require that a defendant intend that the touching 
                     
 
4 The defendant proposed the following mistake of fact 
instruction for indecent assault and battery: 
 
"You must also consider whether a reasonable person in 
[the defendant's] situation, considering all of the 
circumstances, could have been reasonably mistaken about 
whether [M.M.] consented to any touching that the 
Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Again, 
because the Commonwealth always bears the burden of proof 
of all elements of the offenses by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, if after considering all of the evidence 
you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a person in [the 
defendant's] situation reasonably could have been mistaken 
about whether [M.M.] consented to the touching at issue, 
the defendant is entitled to the benefit of that reasonable 
doubt and must be acquitted." 
 
 
The defendant proposed the following instruction for the 
charge of indecent exposure: 
 
"If you find beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant 
exposed his genitals, you should then consider whether a 
reasonable person in [the defendant's] position, 
considering all the circumstances, might have been mistaken 
as to whether exposing his genitals would be offensive to 
[M.M.].  Keep in mind that the burden of proof is always on 
the Commonwealth, so the Commonwealth has to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a reasonable person in [the 
defendant's] position, considering all of the 
circumstances, could not have been mistaken as to whether 
[M.M.] would find the exposure of his genitals offensive." 
8 
 
 
be without consent and, therefore, a mistake of fact as to 
consent was both irrelevant and not supported by the facts in 
this case.  The judge similarly ruled that giving the 
instruction for the charge of indecent exposure would add an 
element not otherwise required by current jurisprudence, 
although he acknowledged that this court has not addressed the 
issue of mistake of fact for indecent exposure.  He observed 
that the facts in this case may support a mistake of fact 
defense for the charge of indecent exposure. 
 
The defendant was convicted of all three offenses.  He 
appealed from his convictions, and we allowed his application 
for direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant challenges his convictions 
on three bases: (1) the jury should have been instructed on 
mistake of fact for both indecent assault and battery and 
indecent exposure where he reasonably believed that M.M. had 
consented to the touching and would not be offended by his 
exposure; (2) the judge should not have allowed first complaint 
testimony from J.D. and "a related category of evidence" from 
the investigating officers; and (3) the judge incorrectly 
refused to dismiss for cause two members of the venire who had 
indicated bias during attorney-conducted voir dire. 
 
a.  Mistake of fact instruction.  Because the defendant 
requested mistake of fact instructions for the indictments 
9 
 
 
alleging indecent assault and battery and indecent exposure, and 
objected to the judge's ruling, we review for prejudicial error.  
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 687 (2015). 
 
A mistake of fact instruction "is available where the 
mistake negates the existence of a mental state essential to a 
material element of the offense."  Commonwealth v. Lopez, 433 
Mass. 722, 725 (2001).  See Commonwealth v. Liebenow, 470 Mass. 
151, 161-162 (2014) (allowing mistake of fact instruction for 
charge of larceny where defendant thought property was 
abandoned); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Mass. 840, 857 (2007) 
(defendant may present evidence of honest mistake about age of 
child depicted in pornographic material); Commonwealth v. Vives, 
447 Mass. 537, 540-541 (2006) (defendant entitled to jury 
instruction on defense of honest and reasonable belief that he 
was collecting debt to refute element of intent to steal).  See 
also Lopez, supra at 725-726, quoting Model Penal Code 
§ 2.04(1)(a) (1985) (ignorance or mistake of fact is defense "if 
. . . the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, 
belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a 
material element of the offense"). 
 
In Lopez, 433 Mass. at 727-728, we held that a defendant 
charged with rape is not entitled to raise a defense of an 
honest and reasonable mistake as to the victim's consent, noting 
that our rape statute, G. L. c. 265, § 22, does "not require 
10 
 
 
proof of a defendant's knowledge of the victim's lack of consent 
or intent to engage in nonconsensual intercourse."  A defendant 
need only intend to perform the act by force or threat of force.  
Id. at 728-729.  Because the Commonwealth is not required to 
prove that a defendant intended the intercourse be without 
consent, "a mistake of fact as to that consent cannot . . . 
negate a mental state required for the commission of the 
prohibited conduct."  Id. at 728. 
 
We further determined that requiring the Commonwealth to 
prove that a defendant "compelled the victim's submission by use 
of force; nonphysical, constructive force; or threat of force" 
negates "any possible mistake as to consent."  Id. at 729.  In 
so holding, we observed that a mistake of fact defense has the 
potential to "eviscerate the long-standing rule in this 
Commonwealth that victims need not use any force to resist an 
attack."  Id.  A rape victim need not fend off attackers with 
physical force "in order to communicate an unqualified lack of 
consent to defeat any honest and reasonable belief as to 
consent."  Id. 
 
Nonetheless, we concluded our analysis by acknowledging 
that a mistake of fact defense as to consent might, in some 
circumstances, be appropriate.  Accordingly, we left open the 
possibility of its use in "a future case where a defendant's 
11 
 
 
claim of reasonable mistake of fact is at least arguably 
supported by the evidence."  Id. at 732. 
 
Seven years later, in Commonwealth v. Blache, 450 Mass. 
583, 594 (2008), we considered whether a defendant charged with 
raping someone incapable of consenting to intercourse (due to 
intoxication) was entitled to an instruction on mistake of fact.  
Because the Commonwealth is not required to prove the use of 
force beyond that necessary for penetration, "the possibility of 
a defendant's reasonable mistake about the complainant's consent 
could increase, creating the potential for injustice."  Id.  We 
held that "in such a case the Commonwealth must prove that the 
defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the 
complainant's condition rendered her incapable of consenting to 
the sexual act."  Id. 
 
i.  Indecent assault and battery on a person over fourteen.  
To prove indecent assault and battery on a person over fourteen, 
the Commonwealth is required to establish that the defendant 
committed "an intentional, unprivileged, and indecent touching 
of the victim."  Commonwealth v. Marzilli, 457 Mass. 64, 67 
(2010), overruled on another grounds by Commonwealth v. Brie, 
473 Mass. 754 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Mosby, 30 Mass. 
App. Ct. 181, 184 (1991).  The intent element is satisfied upon 
proof that "the defendant intended -- had a conscious purpose 
. . . -- to commit an indecent or offensive touching without 
12 
 
 
[the victim's] consent" (citation omitted).  Marzilli, supra.  
See Commonwealth v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480, 482-484 (1983) (lack 
of consent is element of indecent assault and battery where 
victim is over age fourteen). 
 
The defendant contends that sexual assaults involving an 
adult victim, like indecent assault and battery on a person over 
the age of fourteen, which do not require proof of the use of 
force, and whose criminality depends on the victim's lack of 
consent, are subject to a mistake of fact defense.  In an 
attempt to equate this case to the circumstances in Blache, he 
argues, "The principles underlying this rule are as applicable 
to cases like the defendant's which involve allegations of 
brief, offensive touching and non-contact exposure, as they are 
to cases involving an alleged victim's incapacity, since in both 
situations the key question is what a defendant understood about 
another's wishes in the absence of clear, objective indicia of 
consent or non-consent." 
 
The problem with this claim is not the defendant's legal 
argument.  Rather, it is that, here, M.M. did provide clear, 
objective indicia of nonconsent.  She said, "No."  The 
defendant, undeterred by M.M.'s statement of nonconsent, 
persisted by moving closer to her as she continued to say "no."  
At one point, M.M. even said, "No means no," and held her hands 
up in the air in front of her.  The defendant continued to 
13 
 
 
advance toward her and backed her up against a kitchen counter 
where she could no longer move away.  He reached out and grabbed 
her hand and pulled it toward his penis as she tried to pull her 
hand away.  M.M.'s indications of non-consent were abundantly 
clear.  A defendant who ignores a victim's clear and unambiguous 
pleas to stop does not raise a legitimate claim of mistake of 
fact as to consent. 
 
The prior communications from M.M., regardless of their 
flirtatious or sexually explicit content, were not sufficient to 
support a mistake of fact instruction.  "The law of rape is not 
a part of the law of contracts.  If on Friday you manifest 
consent to have sex on Saturday, and on Saturday you change your 
mind but the man forces you to have sex with him anyway, he 
cannot use your Friday expression to interpose, to a charge of 
rape, a defense of consent or of reasonable mistake as to 
consent."  Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 448 (7th Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1041 (1996). 
 
We continue to adhere to our decision in Lopez, and hold 
open the possibility that a mistake of fact instruction may be 
an appropriate and fair defense to charges of indecent assault 
and battery on a person over fourteen.  See Lopez, 433 Mass. at 
732.  On these facts, however, we agree with the judge that the 
defendant was not entitled to an instruction on mistake of fact. 
14 
 
 
 
ii.  Indecent exposure.  The crime of "[i]ndecent exposure 
requires proof of an intentional act of lewd exposure, offensive 
to one or more persons" (quotations and citation omitted).5  
Commonwealth v. St. Louis, 473 Mass. 350, 364 (2015).  "The 
exposure of one's genitalia is a necessary element to indecent 
exposure."  Id.  Offensive acts are those that cause 
"displeasure, anger or resentment, and are repugnant to the 
prevailing sense of what is decent or moral" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Bishop, 296 Mass. 
459, 460, 462 (1937) (evidence sufficient to support conviction 
of indecent exposure where defendant was in his bedroom but 
intentionally exposed himself to his neighbor by flashing mirror 
to get her attention).6 
                     
 
5 The crime of indecent exposure is a misdemeanor punishable 
by imprisonment in a house of correction for up to six months, a 
fine, or both imprisonment and a fine.  See G. L. c. 272, § 53.  
The crime of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, by 
contrast, requires proof that a defendant intentionally exposed 
him or herself in a manner designed to "shock" or "alarm" one or 
more persons, and is a felony punishable by incarceration in a 
State prison.  See G. L. c. 272, § 16; Commonwealth v. Maguire, 
476 Mass. 156, 158 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. Fitta, 391 
Mass. 394, 396 (1984). 
 
6 The judge instructed the jury in accordance with 
Instruction 7.340 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for 
Use in the District Court (2009).  He stated, "To prove guilt on 
this offense, the Commonwealth must prove three . . . essential 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.  Number one, that the  
defendant exposed his genitals to one or more persons, and in 
this case [M.M.]; number two, that the defendant did so 
intentionally; and number three, that the person to whom he 
15 
 
 
 
To raise a defense of mistake of fact, the defendant would 
have been required to demonstrate that his mistaken belief 
negated the culpability required for conviction of the crime of 
indecent exposure.  See Lopez, 433 Mass. at 728.  Here, the 
Commonwealth bore the burden of proving that the defendant 
intentionally exposed his genitalia to M.M.  Commonwealth v. 
Broadland, 315 Mass. 20, 21-22 (1943).  See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Swan, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 261-262 (2008) (sufficient 
evidence of defendant's intent to expose himself in public 
school bathroom).  The Commonwealth did not have to prove that 
the defendant intended to offend M.M.  Cf. St. Louis, 473 Mass. 
at 364 (mens rea for crime of indecent exposure consists of 
intentional exposure of genitalia).  Thus, the defendant's 
belief (whether reasonable or not) that M.M. would not be 
offended by the display of his penis did not negate a mental 
state required for commission of the crime of indecent exposure. 
Moreover, in these circumstances, we discern no reason that 
a mistake of fact instruction was necessary to prevent an 
injustice.  See Lopez, 433 Mass. at 728 (discussing necessity of 
mistake of fact instruction in interests of justice).  As 
stated, M.M. reacted to the defendant's act of exposure by 
informing him, "No, this isn't what I thought was going to 
                                                                  
exposed himself was offended by the defendant's thus exposing 
himself." 
16 
 
 
happen here."  She also told the defendant, "No means no."  The 
defendant ignored her statements and advanced toward her with 
his penis exposed.  Therefore, regardless of any possible 
misunderstanding by the defendant of the circumstances when he 
entered the apartment, M.M.'s subsequent negative reaction 
vitiated any belief, whether reasonable or otherwise, that M.M. 
was not offended by the defendant's act of exposure, and the 
defendant continued his actions in the face of M.M.'s repeated 
protests. 
In sum, there was no error in the trial judge's decision to 
deny the defendant's request for an instruction on mistake of 
fact. 
 
b.  First complaint testimony.  The defendant asserts that 
the judge improperly allowed J.D.'s objected-to first complaint 
testimony, because there was no need for the first complaint 
testimony to rebut any possibility that the victim's delay in 
reporting suggested that the crime had not in fact occurred.  
The defendant argues also that Whitney and Briggs should not 
have been allowed to testify as to the investigative process, 
because their testimony in effect served as additional first 
complaint testimony and unfairly buttressed the Commonwealth's 
case.7 
                     
 
7 The defendant did not object at trial to the investigative 
testimony by Whitney and Briggs, so we review that testimony for 
17 
 
 
 
We clarified in Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 73 
(2011), that the standard of review for admission of first 
complaint evidence is abuse of discretion. 
 
i.  Testimony by the victim's friend.  The defendant argues 
that the judge abused his discretion by not evaluating fully the 
particular circumstances of this case in deciding whether to 
allow admission of the evidence.  As the defendant notes, our 
modification of the first complaint doctrine in Commonwealth v. 
King, 445 Mass. 217, 243 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 
(2005), acknowledged the risk of "unfairly enhanc[ing] a 
complainant's credibility as well as prejudic[ing] the defendant 
by repeating for the jury the often horrific details of an 
alleged crime." 
 
We addressed that risk, however, by limiting first 
complaint testimony to one witness in order to prevent "piling 
on," allowing defendants to cross-examine that witness and the 
complainant, and encouraging judges "to curtail direct or cross-
examination to avoid any undue prejudice."  Id. at 245.  
Additionally, "[f]irst complaint testimony may be admitted for a 
limited purpose only, to assist the jury in determining whether 
to credit the complainant's testimony about the alleged sexual 
                                                                  
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 845-846 (2010). 
18 
assault."  Id. at 219.  "The testimony may not be used to prove 
the truth of the allegations."  Id. 
The first complaint doctrine is intended to accomplish two 
goals:  "to refute any false inference that silence is evidence 
of a lack of credibility on the part of rape complainants," id. 
at 243, and "to give the jury as complete a picture as possible 
of how the accusation of sexual assault first arose," id. at 
247.
The defendant seeks to limit this doctrine in cases
involving an adult complainant to situations where the 
complainant delayed reporting, which might tend to suggest 
fabrication.  Questions involving a complainant's credibility, 
however, may be at issue even absent any delay in disclosure.  
"There is a continued need in sexual assault cases to 
counterbalance or address inaccurate assumptions regarding 
stereotypes about delayed reporting of a sexual assault or about 
sexual assault victims in general."  Id. at 240. 
M.M. sent a text message to J.D. shortly after the incident
with the defendant to tell her what had happened.  J.D.'s 
testimony about this text message is a textbook example of the 
reasons for permitting first complaint testimony, and provided 
the jury with a contemporaneous description of the victim's 
reaction to the defendant's actions.  The judge properly limited 
J.D.'s friend's testimony, and did not permit her to discuss the
content of the telephone call she had with M.M. after having 
19 
 
 
received the text message.  In addition, he twice instructed the 
jury on the limited purpose of J.D.'s testimony.  There was no 
abuse of discretion. 
 
ii.  Investigative testimony by Whitney and Briggs.  There 
also was no error in allowing the investigative testimony by 
Whitney and Briggs.  While the first complaint doctrine 
prohibits "piling on" of additional complaint witnesses, "it 
does not exclude testimony that 'is otherwise independently 
admissible' and serves a purpose 'other than to repeat the fact 
of a complaint and thereby corroborate the complainant's 
accusations.'"  See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 845 
(2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 220-221, 
229 (2009).  But see Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 
457 (2008) (fact that Commonwealth "brought resources to bear on 
this incident creates the imprimatur of official belief in the 
complainant" and may be prejudicial; jury do not "need to know 
how the complaint of abuse evolved into the case before them"). 
 
Whitney testified that she met with M.M., reviewed the 
messages sent between M.M. and the defendant, was present when 
photographs of M.M.'s apartment were taken, applied for a search 
warrant for the defendant's personal cellular telephone, 
obtained surveillance video -- that was played for the jury 
during Whitney's testimony -- of the in-person meeting between 
M.M. and the defendant at the gasoline station, and was aware of 
20 
 
 
subpoenaed information on the two accounts used by M.M. and the 
defendant on the dating Web site.  Briggs testified that he used 
forensic software to acquire the contents of M.M.'s cellular 
telephone, including text messages and call logs.  He then 
explained how to read the information on the resulting records. 
 
None of the testimony of the officers reiterated M.M.'s 
accusations or enhanced her credibility by suggesting that the 
officers believed her.  See McCoy, 456 Mass. at 851-852.  The 
testimony simply described how different exhibits were obtained.  
Such testimony may have been repetitive, particularly because 
the messages and photographs had been admitted in evidence.  
While the first complaint doctrine exists to prevent the 
appearance of buttressing a victim's allegations, here, the 
testimony by the investigating officers was not a "piling on" of 
first complaint evidence.  See id. at 845.  Contrast Stuckich, 
450 Mass. at 456-457. 
 
c.  Jury empanelment.  The defendant also challenges the 
judge's refusal to excuse for cause two members of the venire 
who, the defendant contends, had admitted to bias during 
attorney-conducted voir dire.  The judge ultimately denied the 
defendant's request to excuse those two jurors for cause after 
asking them follow-up questions to determine whether any 
potential bias would affect their ability to be fair and 
impartial in judging the defendant's guilt.  The defendant used 
21 
 
 
peremptory challenges to remove the two prospective jurors, and 
then properly preserved for the record his inability to use an 
additional peremptory challenge on a juror who had been seated 
and then deliberated. 
 
"When a defendant uses a peremptory challenge to excuse a 
juror that the judge refused to excuse for cause and the 
defendant is later 'forced to accept a juror whom he otherwise 
would have challenged peremptorily' . . . the correctness of the 
judge's refusal to excuse the former juror for cause is 
preserved for review" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Clark, 446 Mass. 620, 629 (2006).  "If the judge's refusal to 
excuse the juror for cause is determined to be error, the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial without a showing of 
prejudice."  Id. 
 
The first juror, juror no. 27, originally indicated, in 
response to the prosecutor's questions, that her ability to be 
fair and impartial might be affected by the defendant having 
worn his uniform at the time of the alleged crime.  In response 
to defense counsel's questions, she continued to suggest that 
her judgment might be affected by that evidence, and also said 
that she would be affected by evidence that the defendant was 
married and seeking a sexual encounter with someone who was not 
his wife.  The judge then posed some additional questions to the 
juror: 
22 
 
 
The judge:  "How would it [a]ffect you?" 
 
The juror:  "If he was married and an officer and he went 
to have sexual relations with someone else or relations, I 
don't agree with it." 
 
The judge:  "Whether you agree with it or not, would it 
affect your ability as to whether he committed a crime?" 
 
The juror:  "No, no." 
 
The judge:  Well, that's the issue.  The Commonwealth says 
he committed a crime. 
 
The juror:  "Yeah." 
 
The judge:  "The issue is would the fact that he was 
wearing a uniform and went to this place in a cruiser 
affect your ability to judge whether or not he committed 
the crime . . . when he got there." 
 
The juror:  "I guess not.  I guess no." 
 
The judge:  "It would not?" 
 
The juror:  "No." 
 
The judge found juror no. 27 indifferent and denied the 
defendant's  request to excuse her for cause. 
 
The second challenged juror, juror no. 37, said that she 
would not be affected by the defendant having worn a uniform or 
having driven a police vehicle, so long as he was off duty, but 
indicated that the defendant's being married might affect her 
ability to be fair and impartial:  "I have a very close girl 
friend in that predicament right now.  Her husband is cheating 
on her, so I am empathetic to her and I am not sure I could 
23 
 
 
separate that, hearing the case like this. . . . I don't know, 
it may color how I hear the details." 
 
The judge again asked clarifying questions: 
The judge:  "Do you think it would affect your ability to 
judge whether or not the Commonwealth can prove him guilty 
of committing a crime?" 
 
The juror:  "I would hope not.  I would hope I could 
separate the two." 
 
The judge:  "Well, that is the issue." 
 
The juror:  "Correct.  Correct." 
 
The judge:  "If he was cheating on his wife, I think we all 
can agree, that was not a good thing." 
 
The juror:  "Correct." 
 
The judge:  "But would that affect -- that fact, alone, 
make you more likely to convict him?" 
 
The juror:  "No." 
 
The judge:  "Can you be fair to him, even though he may 
have been cheating on his wife, in regard to these 
charges?" 
 
The juror:  "I believe so." 
 
The judge found juror no. 37 indifferent and denied a request to 
excuse her for cause.  The defendant argued that the judge's 
follow-up questions were designed to provide answers "the court 
wants."  The judge explained, "It's not a matter of what the 
court wants; it's a matter of getting to the point.  The point 
is whether [the juror] can be fair to the defendant and judge 
24 
 
 
the case with an open mind, whether or not [the juror] think[s] 
he was cheating on his wife."8 
 
The defendant contends that attorney questioning had 
uncovered "real indicia of bias from [j]urors [nos.] 27 and 37."  
He argues that the judge's follow-up questions were inadequate 
because the judge failed fully to explore the jurors' 
conflicting responses on questions of potential bias.  In the 
defendant's view, the judge was required "[a]t a minimum . . . 
to ask why each potential juror had changed answers depending on 
the identity of her questioner."  We do not agree. 
 
A trial judge has considerable discretion in conducting the 
process of jury selection.  See Commonwealth v. Andrade, 468 
Mass. 543, 547 (2014); Clark, 446 Mass. 629-630.  It is the 
judge's obligation to "examine jurors fully regarding possible 
bias or prejudice where it appears that there is a substantial 
risk that jurors may be influenced by factors extraneous to the 
evidence presented to them" (quotations and citation omitted).  
                     
 
8 After attorney questions and his own follow-up questions, 
the judge sua sponte excused nine prospective jurors he 
determined likely would be unable to be fair and impartial.  The 
judge also allowed one of the Commonwealth's challenges for 
cause when the prospective juror indicated that evidence that 
M.M. and the defendant met through a dating Web site, and that 
the defendant was cheating on his wife, might affect his ability 
to be fair and impartial.  After the jury had been seated, the 
judge asked the entire panel "one more time" whether anyone 
wanted to change his or her answer to any of the questions or 
had "any issue or problem . . . relative to serving on [the] 
case as fair and impartial jurors." 
25 
 
 
See Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 688 (2011).  Nothing 
in the process of attorney-conducted voir dire restricts a 
judge's exercise of his or her broad authority to ask 
prospective jurors appropriate questions designed to determine 
whether the juror is impartial.  See  G. L. c. 234A, §§ 67A-67D, 
inserted by St. 2016, c. 36 § 4; Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 
458 Mass. 827, 856, (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Garuti, 454 
Mass. 48, 52 (2009) (judge shall examine prospective jurors to 
determine if extraneous issues impact ability to stand 
indifferent); Rule 6(1) of the Rules of the Superior Court 
(2017) (trial judge has discretion to determine procedure for 
selection of impartial jurors). 
 
We discern no error in the judge's inquiry in this case.  
He was required to determine whether jurors nos. 27 and 37 were 
capable of setting aside their own opinions, weighing the 
evidence without considering extraneous issues, and following 
his legal instructions.  See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 447 Mass. 
494, 501 (2006); Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 435 Mass. 635, 639 
(2002).  Juror no. 27 expressed concerns about the allegation 
that the defendant committed a crime while in uniform and 
driving a police cruiser, as well as concerns about the 
defendant's infidelity.  The judge asked the juror how the 
extramarital affair would affect her.  After clarifying that she 
did not approve of the defendant's infidelity, the juror stated 
26 
 
 
that those feelings would not affect her decision "on whether 
the defendant had committed a crime."  In response to the 
judge's inquiry, juror no. 27 also stated that the defendant's 
wearing a uniform and driving a police cruiser would not affect 
her decision-making.  Similarly, juror no. 37 told the attorneys 
that she was bothered by allegations that the defendant was 
cheating on his spouse.  The judge asked more specific questions 
about this subject, and that juror answered that evidence of the 
defendant's infidelity would not prevent her from being a fair 
juror. 
 
We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
denying the challenges for cause.  See Commonwealth v. 
Lattimore, 396 Mass. 446, 450 n.6 (1985) (judge who observes 
prospective juror is in best position to determine whether 
follow-up questions are warranted).  Jurors nos. 27 and 37 
affirmatively stated, and demonstrated, to the judge's 
satisfaction, an ability to set aside personal dislike of some 
aspect of the defendant's actions, such as marital infidelity, 
and impartially decide the case.  See Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 
Mass. 126, 136, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 841 (2011) (judge vested 
with broad discretion in deciding whether prospective juror is 
impartial).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Vann Long, 419 Mass. 798, 
804 (1995) (error where juror never answered unequivocally that 
he could put aside ethnic bias against defendant); Commonwealth 
27 
 
 
v. Auguste, 414 Mass. 51, 57-58 (1992) (judge's inquiry failed 
to ascertain whether juror would be impartial).  We see no 
reason to disturb the judge's determination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.