Title: Reade v. Sec’y of Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11776 
 
WILLIAM F. READE, JR.  vs.  SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH & 
others.1 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     May 4, 2015. - September 3, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Civil, Costs.  Indigent.  Veteran.  Statute, 
Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
June 10, 2013. 
 
 
A hearing on a request for indigency status and a waiver of 
fees and costs was had before Robert C. Rufo, J. 
 
 
Leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed in 
the Appeals Court by James R. Milkey, J.  The Supreme Judicial 
Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the 
Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Emily B. Kanstroom (Meredith M. Leary & Robert M. Buchholz 
with her) for the plaintiff. 
 
Daniel P. Sullivan, Special Assistant Attorney General 
(Gwen A. Werner, Special Assistant Attorney General, with him) 
for the intervener. 
                                                          
 
 
1 The Attorney General; Office of Court Management of the 
Trial Court, intervener. 
 
2 
 
 
Georgia Katsoulomitis & Phillip Kassel, for Massachusetts 
Law Reform Institute, Inc., & another, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  Since 1974, the Legislature has demonstrated a 
commitment to ensuring that the doors of the Commonwealth's 
courts will not be closed to the poor.  This commitment is 
embodied in the so-called Indigent Court Costs Law, G. L. 
c. 261, §§ 27A-27G (§§ 27A-27G), which creates a mechanism for 
indigent persons to obtain waivers or reductions of court fees 
and other costs incurred during litigation.  The statutory 
scheme defines "[i]ndigent persons" to include those with income 
below the poverty line; those who demonstrate that the payment 
of fees and costs would create a hardship; and those who receive 
"public assistance" under certain programs, including "veterans' 
benefits programs."  G. L. c. 261, § 27A.  The question 
presented in this appeal is whether a litigant such as the 
plaintiff, who receives Federal veterans' benefits and a 
Massachusetts property tax abatement that are not dependent on 
his economic circumstances, is considered indigent under § 27A 
and therefore entitled to a waiver despite having ample 
financial resources to pay court fees and costs.2 
                                                          
 
 
2 By order of this court, all information submitted in an 
affidavit of indigency is confidential unless otherwise stated 
in a specific court order.  Accordingly, the affidavits of 
indigency and accompanying papers submitted in connection with 
this case were impounded.  See S.J.C. Rule 1:15 (2) (b), as 
3 
 
 
We conclude that the statute was not intended to provide 
for a waiver under these circumstances.  The history of the 
statute reveals an unbroken chain of legislative intent to limit 
the definition of indigent to persons whose limited financial 
resources prevent them from obtaining meaningful access to the 
Commonwealth's courts.  In light of the statute's history and 
purpose, we interpret the phrase "public assistance under . . . 
veterans' benefits programs" as referring only to the 
Massachusetts need-based programs for veterans presently 
administered pursuant to G. L. c. 115, § 5.  Because the 
plaintiff does not participate in such a program, his request 
for a waiver of fees and costs was properly denied.3 
 
1.  Background.  The plaintiff, William Reade, is a retired 
lieutenant colonel of the Unites States Army Reserve and a 
resident of Massachusetts.  In 1978, the Federal Veterans' 
Administration determined that Reade suffered a ten per cent 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
appearing in 401 Mass. 1301 (1988) ("Unless otherwise ordered by 
the appellate court . . . material impounded in the trial court 
shall remain impounded in the appellate court").  Yet, because 
some of the information contained in those materials is critical 
to the resolution of this appeal, we now lift the order of 
impoundment to the extent necessary to explain our decision 
today.  See Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 362 n.1 (2011), S.C., 
466 Mass. 1015 (2013). 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus curiae brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Inc., and Mental Health 
Legal Advisors Committee. 
 
 
4 
 
disability as a result of an injury to his left shoulder and 
elbow incurred in connection with his military service.  As a 
result of his injury, Reade receives a monthly disability 
payment pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1114 (2012), as well as a 
partial property tax abatement pursuant to a Massachusetts 
program for resident disabled veterans, see G. L. c. 59, § 5, 
Twenty-second.  His eligibility for the disability payments and 
property tax abatement is not dependent on his income or 
resource levels.4 
 
In 2013, Reade commenced an action in the Superior Court, 
alleging various constitutional violations with respect to the 
presidential ballot.  Along with his civil complaint, Reade 
filed an affidavit of indigency pursuant to § 27B,5 in which he 
                                                          
 
 
4 General Laws c. 59, § 5, Twenty-second, provides for a 
partial property tax abatement for certain resident veterans 
"who, as a result of disabilities contracted while in the line 
of duty, have a disability rating of ten per cent or more as 
determined by the Veterans Administration or by any branch of 
the armed forces."  The abatement applies to the veteran's 
domicile in "the amount of [$2,000] of [its] assessed taxable 
valuation or the sum of $400, whichever would result in an 
abatement of the greater amount of actual taxes due."  Id.  In 
contrast, G. L. c. 59, § 5, Eighteenth, exempts from taxation 
"[a]ny portion of the estates of persons who by reason of age, 
infirmity and poverty, or financial hardship resulting from a 
change to active military status, not including initial 
enlistment are in the judgment of the assessors unable to 
contribute fully toward the public charges."  Reade does not 
purport to receive the more generous need-based exemption 
afforded by clause Eighteenth. 
 
 
5 General Laws c. 261, § 27B, provides, in relevant part, 
that "[u]pon or after commencing or answering to any civil, 
5 
 
requested a waiver of normal court fees and litigation costs,6 as 
well as extra fees and costs.7  As grounds, Reade indicated in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
criminal or juvenile proceeding or appeal in any court, . . . 
any party may file with the clerk an affidavit of indigency and 
request for waiver, substitution or payment by the commonwealth 
of fees and costs upon a form prescribed by the chief justice of 
the supreme judicial court and in accordance with the standards 
set forth in [§§ 27C-27F], inclusive, and sworn to under oath by 
the affiant."  A person qualifies as "[i]ndigent" under the 
statutory scheme if he or she: 
 
"(a) receives public assistance under aid to families with 
dependent children, program of emergency aid for elderly 
and disabled residents or veterans' benefits programs or 
who receives assistance under Title XVI of the Social 
Security Act or the medicaid program, 42 U.S.C.A. 1396, et 
seq.; 
 
"(b) [has an] income, after taxes, . . . 125 per cent or 
less of the current poverty threshold established annually 
by the Community Services Administration pursuant to 
section 625 of the Economic Opportunity Act, as amended; or 
 
"(c) . . . is unable to pay the fees and costs of the 
proceeding in which he is involved or is unable to do so 
without depriving himself or his dependents of the 
necessities of life, including food, shelter and clothing 
. . . ." 
 
G. L. c. 261, § 27A. 
 
 
6 "Normal fees and costs" are those that "a party normally 
is required to pay in order to prosecute or defend the 
particular type of proceeding in which he is involved," 
including, for example, "filing or entry fees"; "fees and 
related costs for service of process"; "fees and costs for the 
issuance or service of a subpoena and witness fees for trial or 
deposition; jury trial fees; removal fees; costs assessed in a 
bill of costs"; and "fees for the issuance of an injunction, 
restraining order, writ or other process."  G. L. c. 261, § 27A. 
 
 
7 "Extra fees and costs" are those that "result when a party 
employs or responds to a procedure not necessarily required in 
the particular type of proceeding in which he is involved," 
6 
 
his affidavit that his income was at or below the poverty 
threshold for indigency.8  See G. L. c. 261, § 27A ("Indigent" 
definition [b]).  Reade also filed a letter in which he detailed 
his various sources of income.9  A clerk referred the affidavit 
to a judge because Reade's stated income suggested that he was 
not indigent and because Reade requested a waiver of extra fees 
and costs, which may be approved only by a judge.  See G. L. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
including, for example, "the cost of transcribing a deposition, 
expert assistance and appeal bonds and appeal bond premiums." 
G. L. c. 261, § 27A. 
 
 
8 In his affidavit, Reade indicated a household income of 
approximately $3,400 per month. 
 
 
9 In his letter, Reade indicated that he received "SSI."  
Assuming that this was a reference to Supplemental Security 
Income, the program set forth in Title XVI of the Social 
Security Act, Reade may have qualified as indigent under G. L. 
c. 261, § 27A ("Indigent" definition [a]).  Whether he actually 
received such assistance is a matter of considerable doubt, 
however, given his stated income and resource levels.  See  Roe 
v. Rosencratz, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 901 (2007) ("neither the 
statute nor the [Instructions to Courts on the Administration of 
the Indigency Court Costs Law (Indigency Instructions)] requires 
the clerk or the judge to ignore other court filings by the 
plaintiff that raise 'significant question[s]' regarding the 
indigency of the plaintiff").  See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205 
(2014) (Supplemental Security Income resource limit for 
individual with spouse is $3,000).  In any event, Reade does not 
make this argument on appeal, and we consider it waived.  See 
Merriam v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 464 Mass. 721, 722 n.7 
(2013); Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 
(1975).  If Reade does, in fact, receive Supplemental Security 
Income, he is free to file a new affidavit so reflecting.  See 
G. L. c. 261, § 27B ("indigent party may subsequently file one 
or more supplementary affidavits requesting the waiver, 
substitution or payment by the commonwealth of fees and costs 
not previously granted at any time while the case is still 
pending . . ."). 
 
7 
 
c. 261, § 27C (3).  After holding a hearing, the judge denied 
the waiver on the ground that Reade's income exceeded the 
poverty threshold for indigency.  A single justice of the 
Appeals Court affirmed. 
 
Reade then filed a second affidavit of indigency, again 
requesting a waiver of both normal and extra fees and costs.  
This time, however, Reade claimed indigency on the ground that 
he was unable to pay the fees and costs without depriving 
himself or his dependents of the necessities of life.  See G. L. 
c. 261, § 27A ("Indigent" definition [c]).  He also submitted 
the required supplement to the affidavit in which he detailed 
his assets, income, and expenses.10  A clerk referred the 
affidavit to the same judge, again because of Reade's stated 
income and the request for extra fees and costs.  The judge held 
a new hearing and, on the basis of Reade's available assets, 
determined that he was not indigent and again denied the waiver.  
A single justice of the Appeals Court affirmed. 
 
Undeterred, Reade filed a third affidavit of indigency 
seeking a waiver of normal and extra fees, claiming indigency on 
the ground that he received public assistance in the form of 
veterans' benefits.  See G. L. c. 261, § 27A ("Indigent" 
                                                          
 
 
10 In the supplement to the affidavit, Reade declared after 
tax income in excess of $40,000 per year, substantial balances 
in his checking and savings accounts, and more than $200,000 of 
equity in his house. 
 
8 
 
definition [a]).  Reade included documents demonstrating his 
receipt of the property tax abatement for Massachusetts veterans 
and the monthly disability payments from the Veterans' 
Administration.  A clerk again referred the affidavit to the 
same judge, this time for the additional reason that the 
affidavit was not "regular and complete on its face."  The judge 
held another hearing and, after reviewing all three affidavits, 
concluded that Reade was not indigent because he had the ability 
to pay the normal and extra fees and costs.  A single justice of 
the Appeals Court granted Reade leave to file an interlocutory 
appeal, observing that whether a judge has authority to deny 
indigency status to a person receiving "veteran's benefits" was 
a question with "broad policy ramifications for the 
administration of justice."  Reade filed the appeal, the Appeals 
Court allowed the Office of Court Management of the Trial Court 
to intervene, and we transferred the case to this court on our 
own motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The Indigent Court Costs Law entitles an 
indigent person to a waiver or reduction of certain fees and 
costs incurred during litigation.  G. L. c. 261, § 27C.  Under 
§ 27A, first definition, a person is "indigent" if, inter alia, 
he or she receives "receives public assistance under . . . 
veterans' benefits programs."  Reade argues that because he 
receives Federal disability payments and the Massachusetts 
9 
 
property tax abatement for veterans, the plain language of the 
statute compels the conclusion that he is indigent and therefore 
entitled to a waiver.  We disagree. 
 
"[I]t is a well-established canon of statutory construction 
that a strictly literal reading of a statute should not be 
adopted if the result will be to thwart or hamper the 
accomplishment of the statute's obvious purpose, and if another 
construction which would avoid this undesirable result is 
possible."  Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation 
Ass'n, 421 Mass. 106, 113 (1995).  "The legislative intent in 
enacting a statute is to be gathered from a consideration of the 
words in which it is couched, giving to them their ordinary 
meaning unless there is something in the statute indicating that 
they should have a different significance; the subject matter of 
the statute; the preexisting state of the common and statutory 
law; the evil or mischief toward which the statute was 
apparently directed; and the main object sought to be 
accomplished by the enactment."  Meunier's Case, 319 Mass. 421, 
423 (1946).  See Commonwealth v. De'Amicis, 450 Mass. 271, 273-
274 (2007) (interpreting indigent court costs statute in light 
of purpose and history).  See also Edwards, petitioner, 464 
Mass. 454, 461 (2013) (same); Underwood v. Appeals Court, 427 
Mass. 1012, 1013 (1998) (same).  With these principles in mind, 
10 
 
we turn to the legislative history of the statute with an aim 
toward gleaning the Legislature's intent in enacting it. 
 
The seeds for the Indigent Court Costs Law were planted in 
1970 by the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Inc. (MLRI), a 
nonprofit legal advocacy group dedicated to promoting systemic 
legal changes that benefit the poor.  Rodgers, Rap-ups of a 
Retired Reformer:  Stories About How Legal Services Advocates 
Transformed the Laws for Poor People in Massachusetts 81 (2013).  
MLRI's efforts were focused on increasing access to the courts 
for poor people who could not afford to pay filing fees and 
other litigation costs.  Id.  These efforts eventually blossomed 
into 1974 Senate Doc. No. 1099, An Act to relieve indigent 
litigants of burdensome court costs in civil and criminal 
proceedings.  See Rodgers, supra at 81.  The proposed bill 
defined a litigant as "[i]ndigent" where: 
"(1) he receives any federal, state or local public 
assistance, including medical assistance or any rental 
subsidy, or (2) his net income does not exceed the limits 
set out in [§ 27E], or (3) he is otherwise indigent because 
wholly unable to pay the expected total of the fees and 
costs of the proceeding in which he is involved, or is 
unable to do so without depriving himself or his dependents 
of the necessities of life, including shelter, food and 
clothing." 
 
1974 Senate Doc. No. 1099, § 2.  The legislative purpose 
statement included in the bill made clear that the legislation 
was focused on providing aid to the poor: 
11 
 
 
"The General Court hereby finds and declares that many 
litigants in both civil and criminal cases are unable to 
secure due process of law and equal protection of the laws 
in the courts of Massachusetts by reason of being too poor 
to afford the fees and costs (not including attorneys fees) 
incident to such litigation. 
 
 
"Therefore, the purpose of this act is to provide for 
the absorption, payment or obviation of such fees and 
costs, initially by the counties and ultimately by the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
"This Act shall be given a liberal construction to the 
end that its broad and humane purposes may be served." 
 
1974 Senate Doc. No. 1099, § 1. 
 
The Senate bill was ultimately superseded by 1974 House 
Doc. No. 5859, which trimmed the definition of indigent to a 
person who "is unable to pay the fees and costs of the 
proceedings in which he is involved, or is unable to do so 
without depriving himself or his dependents of the necessities 
of life, including food, shelter and clothing," making it even 
clearer that the statute was only intended to provide waivers to 
litigants who could truly not afford to pay litigation costs.  
Under this version of the statute, which was enacted into law by 
St. 1974, c. 694, § 3, Reade would not have qualified as 
indigent. 
12 
 
 
The Senate's version was resurrected in the 1980 amendments 
to § 27A,11 which changed the definition of "[i]ndigent" to a 
person who: 
"(a) . . . receives public assistance under the 
Massachusetts Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 
General Relief or Veteran's Benefits programs or receives 
assistance under Title XVI of the Social Security Act or 
the Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. 1396, et seq.; 
 
"(b) [has] income, after taxes, . . . [125] per cent or 
less of the current poverty threshold annually established 
by the Community Services Administration pursuant to 
[§ 625] of the Economic Opportunity Act, as amended; or 
 
"(c) . . . is unable to pay the fees and costs of the 
proceeding in which he is involved, or is unable to do so 
without depriving himself or his dependents of the 
necessities of life, including food, shelter and clothing." 
 
St. 1980, c. 539, § 5.12  Reade's position is that the 1980 
amendments reflected an intention by the Legislature to broaden 
the definition of indigent to include a person who receives any 
type of veterans' benefit, regardless of the origin of or reason 
for that benefit.  This position is not sustainable. 
                                                          
 
 
11 The amendments were proposed in 1980 Senate Doc. No. 
2260. 
 
 
12 As can be seen, the 1980 definition of indigent is 
reminiscent of the original proposed definition found in 1974 
Senate Doc. No. 1099, which, in light of the legislative purpose 
statement, cannot be interpreted reasonably as applying to 
anything other than needs-based benefits.  An important 
difference between those two versions, however, was in the 
language of the first definition of indigent, which in the 1974 
version applied broadly to a person receiving "any federal, 
state or local public assistance."  See id.at § 2.  In contrast, 
the 1980 version listed five specific public assistance 
programs.  See  St. 1980, c. 539, § 5. 
 
13 
 
 
The 1980 definitional changes may be best understood in the 
context of the amendments as a whole, particularly in tandem 
with the changes made to § 27C.  Prior to 1980, relief from 
court fees and costs had to be approved by a judge.  The 1980 
amendments to § 27C altered this practice by directing the clerk 
to grant relief "forthwith" where a litigant files an affidavit 
that "appears regular and complete on its face and indicates 
that the affiant is indigent, as defined in [§ 27A], and 
requests a waiver, substitution or payment by the commonwealth, 
of normal fees and costs."  St. 1980, c. 539, § 7.  Empowering 
the clerk to grant relief clearly was intended to expedite the 
waiver process in cases involving routine costs and expenses.  
Without the definitional changes to § 27A, the clerk still would 
have been required to engage in the cumbersome process of 
determining whether the payment of fees and costs would deprive 
a litigant of the "necessities of life."  The definitional 
changes circumvented unnecessary delays by capitalizing on 
preexisting systemic determinations of financial need in the 
form of income-poverty guidelines and means-tested public 
assistance programs. 
 
The first definition of indigent set out in the 1980 
statute created two distinct categories of benefits:  "public 
assistance" under three listed programs, and "assistance" under 
two other listed programs.  St. 1980, c. 539, § 5.  This 
14 
 
structure is significant, as "[w]ords grouped together in a 
statute must be read in harmony, and we are not free to 
interpret [one provision] in a way that makes it exceptionally 
broader than its neighbors."  Franklin Office Park Realty Corp. 
v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 466 Mass. 
454, 462 (2013).  The first category began with the word 
"Massachusetts," followed by three programs corresponding to 
statutes located in the Public Welfare section of the General 
Laws:  G. L. c. 115 (veterans' benefits); G. L. c. 117, repealed 
by St. 1991, c. 255, § 3 (general relief); and G. L. c. 118 (aid 
to families with dependent children).  Importantly, each of the 
three statutes -- consistent with the original intent of § 27A -
- premised the receipt of public assistance on financial need.13  
That the Legislature was referring to those specific statutes in 
§ 27A is reinforced by other instances in which the Legislature 
has referenced them in concert.  See, e.g., An Act providing 
                                                          
 
 
13 See St. 1936, c. 413 ("before so aiding any parent the 
board of public welfare . . . shall make an immediate and 
careful inquiry, including the resources of the family and the 
ability of its other members, if any, to work or otherwise 
contribute to its support"); St. 1961, c. 317 ("such [veterans'] 
benefits shall not be paid to any person who is able to support 
himself or who is in receipt of income from any source 
sufficient for his support"); St. 1971, c. 908 ("[general 
relief] aid furnished shall be determined by the department on 
the basis of the circumstances surrounding each application 
[and] shall be sufficient to maintain an adequate standard of 
living for the poor and indigent applicant and his immediate 
family who are eligible"). 
 
15 
 
cost-of-living adjustments for recipients of aid to families 
with dependent children, general relief and veterans' benefits, 
St. 1974, c. 623 (amending G. L. cc. 115, 117, and 118).14 
 
Further, with respect to the second category, the 
Legislature included only Federal programs and referred to those 
programs specifically by statute.  Had the Legislature intended 
to premise qualification for indigency under § 27A on the 
receipt of Federal veterans' benefits, we infer that it would 
have done so in a manner consistent with its treatment of other 
Federal programs in the same section of the statute.  See 
Commonwealth v. Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 681 (2012), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Fall River Motor Sales, Inc., 409 Mass. 302, 316 
(1991) ("Statutes should be read 'as a whole to produce an 
internal consistency'").  It is also telling that both of the 
Federal statutes referred to in the amended version of § 27A -- 
like the aforementioned Massachusetts statutes -- made the 
receipt of benefits contingent on financial need,15 suggesting a 
                                                          
 
 
14 See also St. 1978, c. 367, § 54B ("An advisory committee 
on the implementation of a wage reporting system is hereby 
created consisting of . . . three persons to be appointed by the 
chairman of the state welfare advisory board one of whom shall 
be a recipient of aid to families with dependent children; one 
of whom shall be a recipient of general relief; and one of whom 
shall be a recipient of veterans' benefits"). 
 
 
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 1381a (2012) ("Every aged, blind, or 
disabled individual who is determined under part A of this 
subchapter to be eligible on the basis of his income and 
resources shall . . . be paid benefits" [emphasis added]); 42 
16 
 
continuation of legislative intent to restrict the meaning of 
"indigent" to persons with limited financial resources. 16  St. 
1980, c. 539, § 5.  In view of the foregoing, we conclude that 
the 1980 amendment tying indigency to the receipt of "Veteran's 
Benefits" was intended to encompass only the receipt of 
Massachusetts need-based veterans' benefits under G. L. c. 115, 
§ 5.  St. 1980, c. 539, § 5.  Because Reade did not receive such 
benefits, he would not have qualified as indigent under the 1980 
version of the statute. 
 
The next relevant modification to the statute occurred in 
2000 in connection with a bill introduced pursuant to G. L. 
c. 3, § 53 (§ 53).  Section 53 allows counsel to the Senate and 
House of Representatives, see G. L. c. 3, § 51, to make 
recommendations for the "repeal of such statutory provisions as 
have become obsolete or the reasons for the enactment of which 
have ceased to exist," "rejection of superfluous words, [and] 
condensation of all circuitous, tautological and ambiguous 
phraseology into as concise and comprehensive a form as is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2012) ("For the purpose of enabling each State 
. . . to furnish [1] medical assistance on behalf of families 
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled 
individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet 
the costs of necessary medical services" [emphasis added]). 
 
 
16 Similarly, S.J.C. Rule 3:10, as amended, 416 Mass. 1306 
(1993) (assignment of counsel to indigent criminal defendants), 
defines the term "[i]ndigent" to include, inter alia, a person 
receiving "poverty related veterans' benefits." 
 
17 
 
consistent with the full and clear expression of the will of the 
general court."  In other words, linguistic changes made 
pursuant to § 53 are generally of a technical, rather than 
substantive, character.  The changes made to § 27A in 2000 are 
no exception.  See St. 2000, c. 313, § 46. 
 
The 2000 bill, entitled, "An Act making certain corrective 
changes in certain general and special laws," suggested several 
linguistic changes to § 27A, including the removal of the word 
"Massachusetts."  See 2000 Senate Doc. No. 2212.  The word 
"Massachusetts" was likely omitted because it was superfluous.  
As observed above, where the Legislature referred to a non-
Massachusetts program in § 27A, it did so explicitly by 
including a statutory citation.  The omission of such a citation 
when referring to the other programs sufficed to indicate their 
Massachusetts origins.  See G. L. c. 3, § 53.  See generally 
Hartford Ins. Co. v. Hertz Corp., 410 Mass. 279, 283 (1991) ("As 
a general rule, when the Legislature has employed specific 
language in one part of a statute, but not in another part which 
deals with the same topic, the earlier language should not be 
implied where it is not present").17 
                                                          
 
 
17 The Legislature has a long history of revising statutes 
to remove superfluous language.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Dana, 2 Met. 329, 339 (1841) ("One of the objects of the 
revision of our laws was to condense them by change of 
phraseology, and the rejection of all superfluous words, which 
has been frequently done, where there is evidently no change of 
18 
 
 
Other modifications to § 27A were prompted by inaccuracies 
in the existing program descriptions.18  The final language 
choices in § 27A reflect an intention to conform the text to the 
language of the specific statutes referenced therein, which is 
consistent with the technical nature of the modifications 
contemplated by § 53.  See Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v. 
Commonwealth, 306 Mass. 347, 353 (1940), quoting Main v. 
Plymouth County, 223 Mass. 66, 69 (1916) ("It is a familiar 
principle of statutory construction that mere verbal changes in 
the revision of a statute do not alter its meaning and are 
construed as a continuation of the previous law"). 
 
At oral argument, Reade pointed out the Commonwealth has a 
long tradition of providing preferential treatment to veterans.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
meaning by the change of language or the omission of the 
superfluous parts of the former statutes"). 
 
 
18 For example, the term "Veterans' Benefits," as it is 
spelled in G. L. c. 115, previously had been spelled incorrectly 
as "Veteran's Benefits."  The initial draft of the bill 
contained an oversight, however, insofar as it retained the 
reference to the obsolete general relief statute, G. L. c. 117, 
which had been superseded by G. L. c. 117A.  See. St. 1991, 
c. 255, § 4.  Correspondence from the Department of Transitional 
Assistance (department) while the "draft technical correction 
bill" was still in committee pointed out that "the statutory 
definition presently, and as amended, incorrectly cites two 
department programs."  The DTA then suggested that the term 
"General Relief" be replaced with "Emergency Aid to the Elderly, 
Disabled and Children."  This suggestion was partially adopted 
by way of a handwritten modification to the bill, replacing the 
term "General Relief" with "program of emergency aid for elderly 
and disabled residents," which is the language used in G. L. 
c. 117A, § 1. 
 
19 
 
That is undoubtedly true, and where the Legislature has 
indicated such an intention, we have not hesitated to recognize 
the legitimacy of the public interest at stake.  See, e.g., 
G. L. c. 31, § 26 (affording gradations of civil service 
priority based on veteran and disabled veteran status); Smith v. 
Director of Civil Serv., 324 Mass. 455, 461 (1949) ("it is open 
to the Legislature to say that, whereas all veterans may be 
preferred because of their service in uniform, the public 
interest is served by additionally preferring those who have 
incurred disability in the course of their service").  However, 
the Indigent Court Costs Law did not originate as a veterans' 
preference law and, as the foregoing legislative history 
demonstrates, the "principle embodied in the statute," as it 
stands today, remains "equal justice under the law:  an indigent 
party should have the financial resources necessary to mount as 
effective a case as a party who is not indigent."  Edwards, 
petitioner, 464 Mass. at 461.  Reade's argument, that the 
receipt of any veterans' benefits renders a litigant indigent, 
is incompatible with this principle because it would allow 
waivers for individuals who already have ample financial 
resources to afford court fees and other litigation costs.  See 
Underwood, 427 Mass. at 1013.   We decline to construe § 27A in 
a manner that is plainly inconsistent with its central purpose, 
20 
 
notwithstanding the susceptibility of the statute's plain 
language to such a construction.  See Watros, 421 Mass. at 113. 
 
Rather, we continue to read § 27A, "Indigent" definition 
(a), as referring to the five specific, need-based public 
assistance programs -- three of which derive from Massachusetts 
law and two which derive from Federal law -- that are listed on 
the form affidavit of indigency prescribed by the Chief Justice 
of this court pursuant to § 27B.  This includes the 
"Massachusetts Veterans Benefits" program, which is presently 
codified at G. L. c. 115, § 5.  Accordingly, Reade's receipt of 
Federal disability payments and the Massachusetts property tax 
abatement for veterans, neither of which is contingent on 
financial need, did not render him a "person who receives public 
assistance under . . . veterans' benefits programs" within the 
meaning of § 27A ("Indigent" definition [a]).  Therefore, Reade 
is not indigent and his request for a waiver of fees and costs 
was properly denied by the judge. 
 
The question remains, however, whether Reade's third 
request for a waiver of normal fees and costs even should have 
been referred to a judge.  Reade contends that the clerk was 
required to grant the request forthwith, without further 
inspection of the circumstances, because his affidavit was (i) 
regular and complete on its face; (ii) indicated that he was 
indigent by virtue of his selection of "Massachusetts Veterans 
21 
 
Benefits" on the form affidavit; and (iii) requested a waiver of 
normal fees and costs.  We conclude that the clerk was correct 
to refer the affidavit to a judge. 
 
The "Instructions to Courts on the Administration of the 
Indigent Court Costs Law" of this court direct the clerk to 
refer the affidavit to a judge where there is a "significant 
question about whether the applicant is indigent."  Here, Reade 
did not simply select "Massachusetts Veterans Benefits" on the 
form affidavit.  Rather, he attached a series of documents 
indicating that the Massachusetts benefit he was contemplating 
was a property tax abatement for disabled veterans, which, as 
discussed above, is not the benefit contemplated by the form.  
Thus, considered as a whole -- i.e., the form affidavit along 
with the attachments -- Reade's affidavit created ambiguity as 
to whether he received veterans benefits within the meaning of 
the first definition of "Indigent" in § 27A.19  Moreover, the 
                                                          
 
 
19 Nonetheless, we reject the argument of the Office of 
Court Management of the Trial Court that Reade's affidavit was 
"irregular" on its face because it contained an excessive 
estimate of his costs.  The form affidavit instructs the 
applicant to "indicate your best guess as to the cost, if 
known."  The Indigency Instructions recognize that "[m]ost 
applicants will not know the actual costs of many of these 
services.  Therefore, courts should approve otherwise 
appropriate applications for waiver or [S]tate payment and 
insert in the approval the actual or estimated amount of the fee 
or service, as it is known to the court."  In other words, where 
the only defect in a qualifying affidavit is an incorrect 
estimation of normal fees and costs, the clerk should approve 
the request at the correct amount. 
22 
 
clerk was entitled to consider Reade's past affidavits pursuant 
to Roe v. Rosencratz, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 903 (2007) 
("previous court filings by the plaintiff for payment of entry 
fees and costs, in which she had represented that she had 
significant assets . . . justified further consideration by the 
clerk and referral to a judge").  Those affidavits reflected 
considerable income and assets, casting additional doubt on 
Reade's claim that he received the need-based benefits afforded 
by the Massachusetts Veterans' Benefits program, G. L. c. 115, 
§ 5.  In view of these significant questions about Reade's 
receipt of veterans' benefits, we cannot say that the clerk 
erred in referring the matter to the judge.20 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
20 Section 27C (3) also directs the clerk to refer the 
affidavit to a judge where the applicant requests not only 
normal fees and costs, but also extra fees and costs.  This was, 
therefore, another ground on which Reade's affidavit was 
properly referred to the judge.  The intervener goes one step 
further, however, by arguing that even if Reade had received 
veterans' benefits within the meaning of § 27A ("Indigent" 
definition [a]), once the affidavit was before the judge on the 
request for extra fees and costs, the judge had discretion under 
§ 27C (3) to deny indigency status based on Reade's economic 
circumstances.  Although the judge in this case appears to have 
agreed, we do not.  If Reade had, in fact, received 
Massachusetts veterans' benefits within the meaning of the first 
definition of "[i]ndigent" under § 27A, he would be indigent and 
entitled to relief.  See G. L. c. 261, § 27C (4) ("If the court 
makes a finding of indigency, it shall not deny any request with 
respect to normal fees and costs . . .").  Under those 
circumstances, the judge's discretion would be limited to 
assessing Reade a reasonable partial payment as a substitute for 
the waiver.  See id. at § 27C (6).  See also Underwood v. 
Appeals Court, 427 Mass. 1013, 1013 (1998) ("Requiring litigants 
23 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons set forth herein, we 
conclude that the "veterans' benefits" program described in the 
first definition of "[i]ndigent" under G. L. c. 261, § 27A, 
refers to the need-based Massachusetts veterans' benefits 
program presently administered pursuant to G. L. c. 115, § 5.  
Reade does not receive such benefits and therefore he is not 
indigent on that ground.  Consequently, we affirm the judge's 
decision denying Reade's request for a waiver of normal and 
extra court fees and litigation costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to pay a reasonably reduced filing fee, set within their limited 
financial means, serves the important dual purpose of providing 
equal access to the courts while simultaneously screening out 
frivolous claims").