Title: State ex rel. Yeager v. Lake Cty. Court of Common Pleas

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Yeager v. Lake Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1921.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1921 
THE STATE EX REL. YEAGER, APPELLANT, v. LAKE COUNTY COURT OF 
COMMON PLEAS ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Yeager v. Lake Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip 
Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1921.] 
Mandamus—Prohibition—Appellant had adequate remedy in ordinary course of 
law through direct appeal to raise his claim that trial court violated his 
right to counsel—Trial court did not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction—Court of appeals’ judgment granting trial court’s motion to 
dismiss affirmed. 
(No. 2023-1172—Submitted March 26, 2024—Decided May 22, 2024.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, 
No. 2023-L-033, 2023-Ohio-2928. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Andre M. Yeager, is an inmate at the Richland 
Correctional Institution.  He appeals the Eleventh District Court of Appeals’ 
judgment dismissing his complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus against 
appellees, the Lake County Court of Common Pleas and Judge Vincent A. Culotta 
(collectively, “the trial court”).  Yeager generally argues that his criminal 
convictions are unenforceable and must be vacated.  Because Yeager has failed to 
state a valid claim for either writ, we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} In Lake County Court of Common Pleas case No. 21CR001041, 
Yeager waived his right to counsel and represented himself at trial.  A jury found 
Yeager guilty of grand theft, breaking and entering, and vandalism.  On January 10, 
2022, the trial court sentenced Yeager to an aggregate prison term of 39 months.  
Yeager appealed his convictions to the Eleventh District, where he argued that the 
trial court had erred by allowing him to represent himself at trial.  The Eleventh 
District affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction.  See State v. Yeager, 11th 
Dist. Lake No. 2022-L-008, 2023-Ohio-2541, ¶ 31 (“we are completely satisfied 
that appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently chose to represent 
himself”). 
{¶ 3} Yeager filed this original action in the Eleventh District, requesting a 
writ of prohibition precluding the trial court from enforcing his convictions and a 
writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate his convictions.  In his 
complaint, Yeager asserts seven causes of action in which he claims that his case 
was improperly assigned to the trial-court judge, the trial court violated his right to 
counsel, and the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence.  The Eleventh District 
granted the trial court’s motion to dismiss Yeager’s complaint under Civ.R. 
12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, holding that 
January Term, 2024 
 
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Yeager “cannot establish the necessary elements to move forward in mandamus or 
prohibition.”  2023-Ohio-2928, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 4} Yeager appealed to this court as of right. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
{¶ 5} We can quickly dispose of Yeager’s first three propositions of law.  In 
his first proposition of law, Yeager contends that the Eleventh District denied him 
due process of law by granting the trial court’s motion for a protective order and to 
stay discovery in violation of Civ.R. 26.  However, the Eleventh District did not 
grant or make any ruling on the trial court’s motion. 
{¶ 6} In his second and third propositions of law, Yeager maintains that the 
Eleventh District denied him due process of law by granting the trial court’s motion 
to dismiss in its entirety because the trial court failed to address certain causes of 
action in Yeager’s complaint and failed to comply with “Civil Rule 8(b)(2).”1  Yet 
the trial court did briefly describe the entirety of Yeager’s complaint in its motion 
to dismiss: “Although quite lengthy, Mr. Yeager’s complaint appears only to assert 
seven causes of action, six of which appear to allege that he did not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel, and one that alleges that 
the state withheld exculpatory evidence.”  Additionally, Civ.R. 8, which provides 
general rules of pleading, is inapplicable to the trial court’s motion to dismiss.  See 
State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 549, 605 
N.E.2d 378 (1992) (“only complaints, answers and replies constitute pleadings”), 
citing Civ.R. 7(A). 
{¶ 7} Under his final proposition of law, Yeager argues that the Eleventh 
District erred in granting the trial court’s motion to dismiss his complaint under 
 
1. In his appellate brief, Yeager cites “Ohio Civ.R. 8(b)(2)” but quotes language from Fed.R.Civ.P. 
8(b)(2).  Although the rules are similar, Ohio Civ.R. 8 does not have a (b)(2) subsection.  Moreover, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not govern Yeager’s original action filed in a state court.  
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the 
United States district courts”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
Dismissal of Yeager’s complaint was appropriate if, after presuming all factual 
allegations in the complaint to be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 
Yeager’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that he could prove no set of facts entitling 
him to the requested writs of prohibition and mandamus.  State ex rel. Seikbert v. 
Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 490, 633 N.E.2d 1128 (1994).  We review de novo 
a court of appeals’ dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).  State ex rel. McKinney v. 
Schmenk, 152 Ohio St.3d 70, 2017-Ohio-9183, 92 N.E.3d 871, ¶ 8 
{¶ 8} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Yeager must establish that (1) 
the trial court has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was 
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no 
other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. 
Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 165 Ohio St.3d 22, 2021-Ohio-1122, 175 N.E.3d 495,  
¶ 14.  To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Yeager must establish (1) a clear legal 
right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the trial court to 
provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  
State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, 
¶ 6.  However, if the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction, 
Yeager need not establish the lack of an adequate legal remedy.  Schlegel v. 
Sweeney, 171 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-3841, 215 N.E.3d 451, ¶ 6 (prohibition); 
State ex rel. Davis v. Janas, 160 Ohio St.3d 187, 2020-Ohio-1462, 155 N.E.3d 822, 
¶ 10 (mandamus). 
{¶ 9} In his complaint, Yeager claims that his convictions are unenforceable 
and must be vacated because the trial court failed to obtain a valid waiver of his 
constitutional right to counsel, in violation of state and federal case law and Crim.R. 
44.  He additionally claims that the trial court violated its own local rule when 
assigning the case to a judge and that the prosecution denied his right to a fair trial 
by withholding exculpatory evidence. 
January Term, 2024 
 
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{¶ 10} Yeager had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to 
raise these claims, and he exercised that remedy by filing a direct appeal from the 
trial court’s judgment of conviction.  See State ex rel. Rarden v. Butler Cty. 
Common Pleas Court, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-3742, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 16 
(alleged violation of right to counsel); State ex rel. Key v. Spicer, 91 Ohio St.3d 
469, 746 N.E.2d 1119 (2001) (alleged improper assignment of a judge); State ex 
rel. Justice v. State, 172 Ohio St.3d 270, 2023-Ohio-760, 223 N.E.3d 414, ¶ 3, 10 
(alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 
215 (1963)). 
{¶ 11} Moreover, the trial court unquestionably had subject-matter 
jurisdiction over Yeager’s criminal case.  See Smith v. Sheldon, 157 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2019-Ohio-1677, 131 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 8 (under R.C. 2931.03, “a common pleas court 
has subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases”).  “When a specific action is 
within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the exercise of that 
jurisdiction renders the court’s judgment voidable, not void.”  State v. Harper, 160 
Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 26.  Accordingly, Yeager’s 
claim alleges an error only in the trial court’s exercise of its jurisdiction.  And 
extraordinary relief is not available to attack a voidable judgment.  State ex rel. 
Davic v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4569, 
__ N.E.3d __, ¶ 15, citing Harper at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 12} Yeager nevertheless contends in his complaint that he is entitled to 
relief in prohibition and mandamus because the trial court’s alleged failure to obtain 
a valid waiver of counsel deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed to trial.  
In support of this contention, Yeager relies on Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 
S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) and State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common 
Pleas Court, 167 Ohio St.3d 181, 2021-Ohio-4453, 190 N.E.3d 594 (“Ogle I”), 
overruled by State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, 173 Ohio 
St.3d 118, 2023-Ohio-3534, 227 N.E.3d 1202 (“Ogle II”).  In Zerbst, the United 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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States Supreme Court held that a federal court’s jurisdiction “may be lost” if it fails 
to provide counsel “for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not 
intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at 
stake.”  Zerbst at 468.  In Ogle I, we stated that “the declaration in Zerbst that a 
Sixth Amendment violation renders an associated conviction void remains in 
force.”  Ogle I at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 13} We recently overruled Ogle I, however, explaining that in Waley v. 
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-105, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942), the United 
States Supreme Court “ ‘openly discarded the concept of jurisdiction’ that was 
articulated in cases such as Zerbst as a concept that had become ‘more a fiction than 
anything else,’ Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 
594 (1977).”  Ogle II at ¶ 20.  We held that “[a] violation of the defendant’s right 
to counsel does not deprive the sentencing court of subject-matter jurisdiction any 
more than any other constitutional or trial error does.”  Id. at ¶ 21.  “Such a violation 
is a structural error that is reversible on appeal, but it does not result in a sentence 
that is void for the court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”  State ex rel. Boyd v. 
Tone, 173 Ohio St.3d 170, 2023-Ohio-3832, 227 N.E.3d 1246, ¶ 16, citing Ogle II 
at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 14} In his merit brief on appeal, Yeager acknowledges this development 
in the case law but asserts that we misread Waley in Ogle II and that the United 
States Supreme Court has not overruled Zerbst.  However, our decision in Ogle II 
was based on the United States Supreme Court’s own recognition that “its prior 
‘elastic concept of jurisdiction is not what the term “jurisdiction” means today, i.e., 
“the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” ’ ”  (Emphasis 
added in Steel Co.)  Ogle II at ¶ 20, quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 
630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).  
“Rather, subject-matter jurisdiction refers only to ‘the classes of cases * * * falling 
January Term, 2024 
 
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within a court’s adjudicatory authority,’ Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 
S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004), and it is not dependent on the rights or 
obligations of the parties, Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274, 114 
S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994).”  Ogle II at ¶ 20.  “That includes the right to 
counsel.”  Id.  Yeager’s argument is not persuasive. 
{¶ 15} Because Yeager had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 
the law to raise the claims in his complaint and because the trial court did not 
patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction, Yeager is not entitled to a writ of 
prohibition precluding the trial court from enforcing his convictions or a writ of 
mandamus vacating his convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 16} We affirm the Eleventh District Court of Appeals’ judgment 
dismissing Yeager’s complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus under Civ.R. 
12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Judgment affirmed. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Andre M. Yeager, pro se. 
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelly A. 
Echols, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
_________________