Title: FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES SHERIDAN AERIE NO. 186, INC., A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION; FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES CHEYENNE AERIE NO. 128, INC. A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION; and DREAM GAMES OF ARIZONA, INC. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING by and through JON R. FORWOOD, DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT; MATTHEW F. REDLE, SHERIDAN COUNTY ATTORNEY, in their official capacities enforcing the criminal laws of the State of Wyoming; the CITY OF CHEYENNE, a Municipal Corporation; and CAROL INTLEKOFER, CITY CLERK, CITY OF CHEYENNE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES SHERIDAN AERIE NO. 186, INC., A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION; FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES CHEYENNE AERIE NO. 128, INC. A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION; and DREAM GAMES OF ARIZONA, INC. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING by and through JON R. FORWOOD, DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT; MATTHEW F. REDLE, SHERIDAN COUNTY ATTORNEY, in their official capacities enforcing the criminal laws of the State of Wyoming; the CITY OF CHEYENNE, a Municipal Corporation; and CAROL INTLEKOFER, CITY CLERK, CITY OF CHEYENNE2006 WY 4126 P.3d 847Case Number: 05-57Decided: 01/10/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
FRATERNAL 
ORDER OF EAGLES SHERIDAN

AERIE 
NO. 186, INC., A NON-PROFIT

ORGANIZATION; 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF

EAGLES 
CHEYENNE AERIE 
NO. 128, INC.,

A 
NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION; and

DREAM 
GAMES OF ARIZONA, INC.,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs/Petitioners-Intervenors,)

 
 
vs.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING by and through

JON R. 
FORWOOD, DISTRICT ATTORNEY

FOR THE 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT;

MATTHEW 
F. REDLE, SHERIDANCOUNTY

ATTORNEY, 
in their official capacities enforcing

the 
criminal laws of the State of Wyoming;

the CITY 
OF CHEYENNE, a 
Municipal

Corporation; 
and CAROL INTLEKOFER,

CITY 
CLERK, CITY OF CHEYENNE,)

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants/Respondents).

 
 

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
Gay 
Woodhouse and Lori Brand, Gay Woodhouse Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
AppelleesState of Wyoming, Forwood, and 
Redle:

 
 
Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Thomas W. Rumpke, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
Representing 
AppelleesCity of Cheyenne and 
Intlekofer:

 
 
Michael 
D. Basom, CheyenneCity Attorney; and Claudia Ryan Angelos, AssistantCheyenneCity Attorney.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, JJ, and PRICE, 
DJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a district court order finding that certain electronic games do not meet 
the statutory exclusion for "bingo," and therefore constitute illegal 
gambling.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]       1.     Did the district court 
apply the appropriate rules for the construction of penal 
statutes?

 
 
             
2.     Did the 
district court err by ignoring the municipal code of the City of Cheyenne?

 
 
             
3.     Were the 
district court's findings of fact clearly erroneous?

 
 
             
4.     Does 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-7-101(a)(iii)(D) (LexisNexis 2005) violate the appellants' right to the 
due process of law?

 
 
STATUTES

 
 
[¶3]      Gambling is 
prohibited by statute in Wyoming.  
For many years, the definition of gambling in the prohibitory statute 
specified "any slot machine, game of faro, monte, roulette, lansquenette, rondo, 
vingt-un, commonly known as twenty-one, keno, props, or any other game played 
with cards, dice or other device of whatever nature, for money, checks, credits, 
or other representatives of value[.]"  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-203 (Michie 1957).  
"Gambling devices" were declared a nuisance, and were subject to seizure 
and destruction.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-210 
(Michie 1957).  In a third statute, 
lotteries and other "schemes of chance" were forbidden, with the following 
exception:  "But nothing in this 
section shall be construed as applying to games of chance known as raffles or 
other honest games, and the tickets of such games shall be sold only in this 
state."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-213 
(Michie 1957).  In 1971, the 
"raffles exception" was expanded to read as follows:  "But nothing in this section shall be 
construed as applying to games of chance known as raffles or bingo conducted by 
charitable or non-profit organizations and the tickets of such raffles or bingo 
shall be sold only in this state."  
1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 
147, p. 190.

 
 
[¶4]      Wyoming's criminal laws 
were recodified in 1982, with the relevant gambling statute taking on the 
following form as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-7-101:

 
 
(a)  As used in this 
article:

 
 
            
* * *

 
 
            
(ii)  "Gambling" means 
risking any property for gain contingent in whole or in part upon lot, chance, 
the operation of a gambling device or the happening or outcome of an event, 
including a sporting event, over which the person taking a risk has no control, 
but does not include:

 
 
                        
* * *

 
 
(D)  Raffles or bingo conducted by charitable 
or nonprofit organizations where the tickets for the raffle or bingo are sold 
only in this state[.]

 
 
1982 
Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 75, 
pp. 573-74.  Gambling devices 
continued to be subject to seizure and destruction.  Id.   The gambling statutes have since 
been amended several times, but not as to the definition of gambling or the 
bingo exclusion.1  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-7-101.  A "gambling device" continues today to 
be defined as "any device, machine, paraphernalia or equipment except an antique 
gambling device that is used or usable in the playing phases of any professional 
gambling activity, whether that activity consists of gambling between persons or 
gambling by a person involving the playing of a machine[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-7-101(a)(iv).  In relevant part, "professional 
gambling" means "[a]iding or inducing another to engage in gambling, with the 
intent to derive a profit therefrom[.]"  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-7-101(a)(viii).

 
 
FACTS

 
 
            
Procedural 
Background

 
 
[¶5]      In 2004, numerous 
prosecutors in Wyoming either took action, or threatened to 
take action, to shut down the electronic "bingo" games being conducted in their 
respective jurisdictions.2  Several court actions for declaratory 
relief followed.3  After consolidation of cases and 
withdrawal of some parties, the current appellants are the Sheridan and Cheyenne 
Eagles Aeries and Dream Games of Arizona (Dream Games).  Dream Games, a for-profit Arizona corporation, is 
the manufacturer and owner of the proprietary software and hardware entitled 
"Fast Action Bingo," the game being conducted by the Eagles Aeries. The current 
appellees are the State, through its prosecutors in Sheridan and Cheyenne, and 
the City of Cheyenne.

 
 
[¶6]      After a bench 
trial, the district court concluded that (1) because profits were shared with 
"for-profit" entities, the electronic bingo games were not being conducted by 
non-profit organizations, and were not, therefore, exempt from the statutory 
prohibition; (2) electronic bingo machines are illegal gambling devices; and (3) 
the gambling statutes are not unconstitutional.  In reaching those conclusions, the 
district court relied directly upon our holding in 37 Gambling Devices (Cheyenne Elks Club and 
Cheyenne Music and Vending, Inc.) v. State, 694 P.2d 711 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 
            
Glossary

 
 
[¶7]       1.   Bingo.  Subject to the analysis below, we will 
begin with a discussion of the general nature of the game called "bingo."  In that regard, it must first be said 
that even "traditional" bingo can be played in a variety of ways and may be 
known by a variety of names, such as call bingo or session bingo.  It is a form of lottery derived from the 
Italian National LotteryLo Giuoco del 
Lotto d'Italiawhich has been around since the 16th century.  John Scarne, Scarne's New Complete Guide to Gambling 
208 (Simon and Schuster 1974).  
The game became popular in the United States during the 1920s.  Id., 207-15.  
Different dictionaries give slightly different definitions of the 
word "bingo":  "A gambling game, 
resembling lotto, usually with many players."  Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 
of the English Language Unabridged 184 (2d ed. 1961).  "A game resembling lotto or keno, the 
card used being a grid on which five numbers that are covered in a row in any 
direction constitute a win, the center square being counted as an already drawn 
numbercalled also beano."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
of the English Language Unabridged 217 (1993).  "[A] game of chance played with cards 
having numbered squares corresponding to numbered balls drawn at random and won 
by covering five such squares in a row; also: a social gathering at which bingo is 
played."  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 
114 (10th ed. 1999).

 
 
[¶8]       Those 
witnesses who testified about session bingo described it as a game played by 
multiple players who manually mark their individual paper cards in response to 
random numbers drawn and called as the game progresses.  Traditional bingo cards used in session 
bingo utilize a twenty-five space grid, with the goal being to match the 
requisite pattern of spaces.  There 
is a winner in every session bingo game, that being the first person to shout 
"bingo" upon achieving the appropriate pattern.  While all agreed that session bingo is a 
game of chance, they identified an element of skill in it, that being paying 
attention and timely shouting "bingo."  
The non-profit organization buys certain supplies and equipment for 
session or call bingo, but does not pay any portion of the profits to another 
entity, such as a supplier or distributor.  
In its findings of fact, the district court described the game as 
follows:  "In traditional session 
bingo, players purchase bingo cards containing numbers which are to be matched 
in various patterns (depending upon the game) against numbers on balls drawn 
randomly from an air hopper.  The 
numbers are called.  Players mark 
the called numbers on their card.  
Players call bingo' when they match the same pattern on their card.  First bingo wins." 

 
 
[¶9]       2.   Bonanza Bingo.4  In Bonanza Bingo, as played at the 
Sheridan Eagles Aerie, fifty numbers are selected via a ball hopper or similar 
device and are posted in some manner.  
Players purchase sealed cards or tickets which, when opened, reveal a 
square grid containing twenty-four numbers (five columns of five numbers each, 
with a center "free" spot).5  The goal is to obtain a 
"blackout"meaning that all twenty-four numbers on the card match numbers 
previously drawn from the hopper.  
If no player wins, additional numbers are drawn and added to the original 
fifty, until there is a winner.  Because the numbers are pre-drawn, and 
because the sealed cards are simply played against those numbers, there is no 
"session" or "call."6  The game differs somewhat as played at 
the Cheyenne Eagles Aerie.7  There, the sealed tickets are similar, 
but only twenty-four numbers are pre-drawn and posted.  Apparently, there are several winners 
each day.

 
 
[¶10]    3.   Quick Shot Bingo.  The record is not totally clear as to 
the nature and characteristics of Quick Shot Bingo, or whether there is any 
distinction between Quick Shot Bingo and Bonanza Bingo.  For instance, several exhibits, 
including player's cards and information sheets, refer to one game as "Quick 
Shot Bonanza Bingo."  Andrew Burns, 
a Casper 
"software architect" and bingo program designer, testified that, in Quick Shot 
Bingo, a player plays sealed cards against twenty-four pre-drawn numbers, with 
the goal of matching one or more of various predetermined patterns.  After identifying several exhibits as 
Bonanza Bingo or Quick Shot Bingo cards, and one card as a "Quick Shot Bonanza 
Bingo" card, however, the manager of the Cheyenne American Legion Bingo Hall 
described Bonanza Bingo as a game where players attempt to get a "cover all" 
against a pre-drawn set of numbers, and Quick Shot Bingo as a game where players 
attempt to match particular patterns on sealed cards against a set of pre-drawn 
numbers.

 
 
[¶11]    Paul Perez owns Dream Games, 
an electronic bingo software development company, and American Software 
Development Company, Inc., a distributor of Fast Action Bingo.  Mr. Perez testified that "Quick Shot is 
a Bonanza game."  He described Quick 
Shot Bingo as a game where players purchase cards to play against pre-drawn 
numbersa "pre-called" gamewith the goal of matching various patterns.  He further testified that, in Quick Shot 
Bingo, twenty-four numbers are pre-drawn, and the cards used have the 
five-by-five grid with twenty-four numbers described above.  A similar description of "Quick Shot 
Bonanza Bingo" was given by Michelle Tanner, president of Helping Hand 
Corporation, a non-profit Wyoming corporation 
that conducts electronic games at several Wyoming locations.

 
 
[¶12]    4.   Fast Action Bingo.  Paul Perez is the sole officer of the 
two companies that developed and now distribute an electronic game called Fast 
Action Bingo.  Fast Action Bingo, 
played at both of the appellant Eagles Aeries, was one of the games subject to 
the declaratory judgment action below, and it is the sole game at issue in this 
appeal.

 
 
[¶13]    Perez testified that his 
association with bingo began in the 1970s, doing volunteer work for one of his 
mother's charities by "selling papers [and] calling bingo balls."  In the mid-1980s, after noting the 
invention of an electronic aid that allowed handicapped persons to play bingo, 
Perez developed video software for session bingo.  Later, upon becoming familiar with Quick 
Shot Bingo, which originated during that same decade, Perez contracted with 
Joseph Zingale, a software programmer, to design a comparable electronic 
game.  That game became Fast Action 
Bingo.

 
 
[¶14]    In Fast Action Bingo, a 
central computer operated by employees of a non-profit or charitable 
organization contains a set of 76,000 player cards, allows for an electronic or 
manual pre-selection of twenty-four numbers for each game, and keeps track of 
wins and losses.  There is no bingo 
session or call.  Instead, players 
utilize individual computer screens to play electronic cards against the 
pre-drawn numbers.  Wins are added 
to the player's credits on the machine, and may be played out as additional 
games or cashed out in money.  Games 
can be played at different denominations (nickels, dimes, quarters, 
half-dollars, dollars).  The object 
of each game is to match a particular pattern of numbers.  Many games can be played in a few 
seconds.

 
 
[¶15]    Profits from electronic bingo 
are shared in various ways between the non-profit organization and Perez's 
distribution company.  The three 
principal methods of sharing are a percentage of net profit, a weekly rate, or a 
per-card rate.  For the two Eagles 
Aeries, the arrangement has been a 50/50 split of net proceeds, with net being 
gross income less player pay-outs.  
The secretary of the Sheridan Eagles Aerie testified that the Aerie 
netted about $8,000 per month from Fast Action Bingo, and that 20% of the 
Aerie's share goes to charity.  The 
remaining 80%about $6,400is used "mostly [to] pay our bills."  In comparison, the president of the 
Cheyenne Eagles Aerie testified that it netted about $4,000$4,500 monthly, of 
which 10% to 20% went to charity.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did the 
district court apply the appropriate rules for the construction of penal 
statutes?

 
 
[¶16]   We recently restated our standard 
for reviewing decisions involving statutory construction:

 
 
            
This court interprets statutes by giving effect to the legislature's 
intent . . . .  We begin by making 
an inquiry relating to the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection . . . .  We give effect to every word, clause, 
and sentence and construe together all components of a statute in pari materia . . . .  Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law. . . .  We review questions 
of law de novo without affording 
deference to the district court's decision.  Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 
52 (Wyo.2001).  If a statute is 
clear and unambiguous, we simply give effect to its plain meaning.  Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 
17, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d 500, 506 (Wyo.2001) (quoting In re Claim of Prasad, 11 P.3d 344, 347 
(Wyo.2000)).  Only when we find a 
statute to be ambiguous do we resort to the general principles of statutory 
construction.  Wesaw, 2001 WY 17, ¶ 13, 19 P.3d  at 506 
(quoting In re Claim of Prasad, 11 
P.3d at 347).  An ambiguous statute 
is one whose meaning is uncertain because it is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation.  Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1125 
(Wyo.1998) (quoting Amrein v. State, 
836 P.2d 862, 864-65 (Wyo.1992)).

  

            
It is a 
basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to determine 
legislative intent by considering the type of statute being interpreted and what 
the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in light of the objects 
and purposes to be accomplished . . . .

 
 
We are 
guided by the full text of the statute, paying attention to its internal 
structure and the functional relation between the parts and the whole.  In re Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Johnson, 2001 WY 48, ¶ 8, 23 P.3d 32, 35 (Wyo.2001) (quoting In re Hernandez, 8 P.3d 318, 321 
(Wyo.2000) and Parker Land and Cattle Co. 
v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Wyo.1993)).  Each word of a statute is to be afforded 
meaning, with none rendered superfluous.  
Jessen v. Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 
1120 (Wyo.2000).  Further, the 
meaning afforded to a word should be that word's standard popular meaning unless 
another meaning is clearly intended.  
Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 
773 (Wyo.1991).  If the meaning of a 
word is unclear, it should be afforded the meaning that best accomplishes the 
statute's purpose.  Radalj v. Union Savings & Loan Ass'n, 
59 Wyo. 
140, 138 P.2d 984, 996 (1943).

 
 

Union 
Pacific Resources Company v. Dolenc, 2004 WY 
36, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d 1287, 1291-92 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Rodriquez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, 
¶¶ 9-10, 50 P.3d 323, 326-27 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 
[¶17]   The specific allegation in the 
instant case is that the district court failed to apply the "rule of lenity" in 
construing the gambling statues, which the appellants characterize as penal 
statutes.  They cite Demeulenaere v. State, 995 P.2d 132, 135 
(Wyo. 2000) and Meerscheidt v. State, 
931 P.2d 220, 224 (Wyo. 1997) for two propositions: (1) penal statutes are 
to be strictly construed and cannot be enlarged by implication or extended by 
inference; and (2) any ambiguity in a penal statute must be resolved in favor of 
the person against whom the statute is being applied.

 
 
[¶18]   We will summarily affirm the 
district court on this issue.  To 
begin with, neither party contends that the statutes are ambiguous, and the 
district court did not find them to be ambiguous.  We agree.  And without ambiguity, statutory 
construction is inappropriate.  
Thus, the rule of lenity that applies to penal statutes, being a rule of 
statutory construction, has no role to play.  See Abeyta v. State, 2002 WY 44, ¶ 9, 42 P.3d 1009, 1012 (Wyo. 2002); Umbach v. 
State, 2002 WY 42, ¶ 9, 42 P.3d 1006, 1008 (Wyo. 2002); Meerscheidt, 931 P.2d  at 224; Matter of ALJ, 836 P.2d 307, 310 (Wyo. 
1992) (rule of lenity applicable only to extent ambiguity exists).  If a statute is plain and unambiguous, 
we simply give effect to its plain meaning.  Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, ¶ 6, 107 P.3d 158, 162 (Wyo. 2005).  Secondly, even assuming that the gambling 
statutes are penal in nature, and assuming that construction was necessary, we 
would construe the exclusion narrowly.  
37 Gambling Devices, 694 P.2d  
at 719.  That is because the strong 
public policy embodied in the statutes focuses upon the illegality of gambling, 
not upon the legality of bingo.  See Citation Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten, 910 P.2d 281, 287 (N.M. 1995).  And 
finally, the rule of lenity does not apply because the gambling statutes are 
more remedial than punitive in nature.  
See Norman J. Singer, 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction, 
Chapters 59-60 (6th ed. 2001).

 
 
Did the 
district court err by ignoring the municipal code of the City of Cheyenne?

 
 
[¶19]   The City of Cheyenne has enacted an 
ordinance entitled "Bingo and Pull Tabs," the stated purpose of which is to 
"regulate, license, and monitor the conduct of games of chance known as bingo 
and pull tabs[.]" Cheyenne City Code, § 5.32.010.  Contained within that ordinance, at § 
5.32.020, is the following definition of bingo:

 
 
"Bingo" 
means a game of chance in which:

 
 
1.  Winning chances are determined by random 
selection of a subset of numbers, designators or objects numbered, lettered or 
otherwise designated by some medium among a total set of numbers, designators or 
objects numbered, lettered or otherwise designated by some 
medium;

 
 
2.  The card(s) held by the player by which 
a winner(s) is associated is sold, rented or used only at the time and place of 
the gaming activity;

 
 
3.  "Bingo" does not mean or include an 
activity which is prohibited under Wyo. Stat. Section 
6-7-101(a)(iii)(D).

 
 
[¶20]   A copy of the city ordinance was 
admitted into evidence during the bench trial.  On appeal, the appellants contend that 
the district court "ignored the valid definitions for statutory terms found in 
Defendant City of Cheyenne's bingo ordinances and thus overturned valid 
enactments with the force and effect of law . . . ."  They cite Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 176 
(Wyo. 1981), 
wherein it was held that "rules and regulations adopted pursuant to statutory 
authority and when properly promulgated have the force and effect of law."  The appellants' specific argument is 
that, in the absence of a legislative definition of bingo in the statutes, "a lawful municipal 
enactment should prevail over an unenacted dictionary definitionespecially one 
edited and then adopted out of the blue by the District 
Court."

 
 
[¶21]   This issue amounts to a contention 
that the district court misapplied the law in construing the statute.  We have already noted that statutory 
interpretation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.  Union Pacific Resources Company, 
2004 WY 36, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d  at 1291.  
Furthermore, challenges to conclusions of law after a bench trial, 
including allegations that factual findings were induced by an erroneous view of 
the law, or by application of an improper legal standard, are subject to de novo review on appeal.  Piroschak v. Whelan, 2005 WY 26, ¶ 7, 
106 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005); Cross v. 
Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 928 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶22]   Although it is somewhat difficult 
to follow, the appellants' full-circuit argument appears to be as follows:  (1) all sorts of bingo games have been 
played across the state for many years, including within the City of Cheyenne; 
(2) the City of Cheyenne has an ordinance in which bingo is defined; (3) 
inasmuch as the City of Cheyenne has not endeavored to shut down bingo in any of 
its various forms, the term "bingo" must encompass "all forms and mediums of the 
game of bingo"; (4) there is no statutory definition of bingo; (5) therefore, 
the district court, and by implication, this Court, must apply the City's 
definition to the State's statutory term.

 
 
[¶23]   We decline to adopt this line of 
reasoning, primarily because there is no legal authority for its central 
thesis.  That is, the appellants 
provide no authority for the proposition that, in giving effect to the plain 
meaning of a statute, courts are bound to apply a definition adopted by a local 
municipality in its ordinances.  Distad certainly does not say that.  Distad was a wrongful death/medical 
malpractice case involving questions about the standard of care, wherein we held 
that "rules or regulations having the force and effect of law will be treated as 
contemplated by the parts of the Restatement we adopt in considering whether 
they should be embraced as standards of conduct in tort actions."  Distad, 633 P.2d  at 176.  There is a large gap between that 
holding and the appellants' contention.8  Furthermore, inasmuch as the statutes 
are not ambiguous, we need not reach out to a municipal ordinance for guidance 
in interpreting those statutes.

 
 
Were the 
district court's findings of fact clearly 
erroneous?

 
 
[¶24]   We review the findings of fact of a 
district court after a bench trial under the following 
standard:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Life 
Care Centers of America, Inc. v. Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, ¶ 7 
(Wyo. 2003)).  Findings may not be 
set aside because we would have reached a different result.  Harber, ¶ 7 (citing Double Eagle Petroleum & Mining Corp. v. 
Questar Exploration & Production Co., 2003 WY 139, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d 679, ¶ 6 
(Wyo. 2003)).  Also, in reviewing a 
trial court's findings of fact, we assume that the evidence of the prevailing 
party below is true and give that party every reasonable inference that can 
fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.  
We do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; 
instead, we defer to those findings unless they are unsupported by the record or 
erroneous as a matter of law.  Harber, ¶ 7 (quoting Life Care Centers, ¶ 7).  We affirm the trial court's findings if 
there is any evidence to support them.  
Id.

 
 

Piroschak, 
2005 WY 
26, ¶ 7, 106 P.3d  at 890-91.  The 
party claiming that its conduct falls within an exception to a statutory 
prohibition bears the burden of proving that proposition.  73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 212 (2001); 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 
47:11 (2000).

 
 
[¶25]   The appellants contend that sixteen 
of the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  Their claims can be categorized as 
follows:

 
 
1.    In Finding Nos. 22, 23, 26, 
29, 30, 43 and 44, the district court failed to recognize that Bonanza Bingo and 
Quick Shot Bingo are the same game.

 
 
2.    In Finding Nos. 25(c) and 27, 
the district court failed to recognize that, in Fast Action Bingo, a printer 
option allows for the production of paper cards that a player may daub manually, 
which incorporates a skill element into the game.

 
 
3.    In Finding No. 42, the 
district court erroneously concluded that Helping Hand's Double Up Bingo is 
substantially the same as Fast Action Bingo.

 
 
4.    In Finding No. 25(h), the 
district court erred in finding that, in Fast Action Bingo, the pre-selected 
numbers are entered into the machine before the cards are selected by the 
machine.  The appellants contend 
that, to the contrary, the same set of 76,000 player cards is stored in the 
machine, but they are not individually daubed until played.9

 
 
5.    In Finding Nos. 14, 21, 26, 
28, 29, 31, 43, and 44, the district court erroneously limited the term 
"traditional bingo" to refer only to session bingo, when the term also should 
include Bonanza/Quick Shot Bingo, which has been played throughout Wyoming for twenty 
years.

 
 
6.    In Finding Nos. 25(g), 25(i), 
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 43, and 44(a)-(d), the district court erroneously adopted 
the appellees' alleged "bingo elements," even though such elements are not 
included in the definition of bingo adopted in Conclusion No. 
6.

 
 
7.    Finding Nos. 31, 32, 44(d), 
and 45(a)(e) reflect the district court's legal error in considering the 
potential for manipulation as a factor in determining that Fast Action Bingo is 
gambling.  The statute contains no 
such factor, and penal statutes must be strictly construed.  Furthermore, there was no evidence at 
trial that Fast Action Bingo games were subject to 
manipulation.

 
 
[¶26]   Before we deal directly with these 
findings of fact, we will discuss 37 
Gambling Devices, the 1985 case that was relied upon by the district 
court.  In that case, officers of 
the Cheyenne Police Department had seized from the Cheyenne Elks Club several 
machines and other devices that allegedly were being used for gambling.  Among the items seized were "two 
electronic machines identified as Shawnee games [and] an electronic bingo 
game."  37 Gambling Devices, 694 P.2d  at 
714.  In affirming the district 
court's conclusion that these machines were gambling devices, we said the 
following:

 
 
            
With regard to the three electronic machines which were seized, it is 
clear from the record that these machines were being operated as gambling 
devices, although unlike the standard slot machines there was no automatic 
payoff.  Instead, those playing the 
machines were paid in cash by the bartender with the amount of payment depending 
upon their success in playing the games.  
See State v. Branney, 62 Wyo. 40, 160 P.2d 972 
(1945).  It also is established by 
evidence in the record that these machines were being operated for profit by 
Elk's Lodge Number 660, and the owner of the machines, Cheyenne Music and 
Vending Company, Inc.  The net 
proceeds from the operation of the machines was divided between these two 
entities on a fifty-fifty basis.  
Cheyenne Music and Vending Company, Inc., concedes that it is organized 
and operated as a profit-making venture.  
That fact, as well as the failure of the proof relating to the nonprofit 
status of the Elk's Lodge, prevents any application of the statutory exception 
to these particular machines.

 
 

Id. 
at 
717.  That is, and was, a correct 
statement of the law.  We continue 
to believe, and we find that the district court was correct in concluding, that 
the legislature did not intend the bingo exclusion, purposely restricted to 
games conducted by charitable or non-profit organizations, to extend to games in 
which the profits go, in anything more than an incidental fashion, to a 
profit-making person or organization.

 
 
[¶27]   While that could, perhaps, be the 
end of this matter, we will provide further guidance with some additional 
comments.  In 37 Gambling Devices, 694 P.2d  at 
717-718, we went on to quote the following language from an Illinois appellate court 
faced with a similar challenge:

 
 
"The law 
is not required to be blind to, and ineffectual against, the ceaseless efforts 
and ingenuity of persons to circumvent the Gambling Device Act.  When we ascend to the bench we do not 
discard the ordinary common sense observations, experiences and intelligence of 
common men and we cannot be so naive as to conclude that the devices which have 
been demonstrated to us are games of amusement. * * * "  People v. One Machine Known as "Circus 
Days", 23 Ill.App.2d 480, 163 N.E.2d, 223, 228 (1960).

 
 
[¶28]   The lesson for us today in that 
quotation is that we are to apply common sense in determining whether the game 
and equipment making up Fast Action Bingo are the equivalent of the "bingo" that 
was excluded from the definition of illegal gambling in 1971.  In 37 Gambling Devices, 694 P.2d  at 718, we 
performed that exercise in another section of the opinion dealing with the 
question of whether "pickle cards" were "raffles," which, like bingo, were 
excluded from the definition of gambling.  
We did so simply by comparing their characteristics in the context of the 
common and ordinary meaning of "raffle."  
That process went as follows:

 
 
The 
common and ordinary use of the term "raffle" would not include a game of chance 
such as the pickles game.  Unlike 
the usual raffle conducted by a charitable or nonprofit organization, pickles 
cards are marked by symbols which when revealed and compared to a pre-existing 
chart determine whether the purchaser is a winner.  In a raffle the probability of any 
individual ticket being randomly drawn to win a prize is equal and determined by 
the total number of tickets actually sold, whereas in the pickles game a 
predetermined number of cards is to be sold with a predetermined number of 
winners.

 
 
In a 
passage implying strict construction of the raffles and bingo exclusion, we then 
voiced our assumption that, in crafting the exclusion, the legislature 
"carefully chose" its limitations, and did not intend to exclude "all lotteries 
or schemes of chance, of any kind or description, by whatever name, style, or 
title the same may be known' which might be conducted by" eligible 
organizations.  Id. at 719.

 
 
[¶29]   Following a similar thought 
process, the Supreme Court of Kansas concluded in State ex rel. Stephan v. Parrish, 887 P.2d 127 (Kan. 1994) that the Kansas Constitution did not allow the Kansas 
Legislature statutorily to legalize pull tabs.10  After considering that state's 
constitutional and statutory framework, the many and varied dictionary 
definitions of bingo, and other cases that have dealt with similar issues,11 that court 
declared:

 
 
            
We agree with the Secretary and the Intervenor, and the State does not 
seriously contend otherwise, that the terms "games of bingo" in Art. 15, § 3a 
may logically be construed to mean more than the traditional game of bingo 
familiar to nearly everyone and as originally defined in the Bingo Act.  However, we think it is beyond fair 
dispute that games of bingo which depart from the general understanding of 
traditional bingo must fall within the same general category of games and have 
the basic characteristics common to all such games.

 
 
            
* * *

 
 
            
In reviewing the numerous definitions of bingo and bingo-type games 
submitted by industrious counsel, there are definite characteristics common to 
and inherent in bingo-type games.  All definitions include the requirement 
of a card or paper utilizing numerous numbers which are to be covered or marked 
if and when one of the numbers is drawn by lot and announced by a caller or 
selected through some other similar method.  Bingo-type games contemplate a group 
activity, often social, with several participants.  The object of the game is to be the 
first to complete the pattern prescribed for that particular bingo-type game 
from the numbers called.  Instant 
bingo utilizes a small pull tab card where the activity may be only one on one 
between the player and the seller of the card.  As such, it does not have the group 
participation required of bingo-type games.

 
 
            
In bingo, each game lasts several minutes with the participants hoping to 
be the first to complete a winning line on their cards.  In instant bingo the result is 
instantaneous with the pulling open of the tab or tabs which will reveal whether 
the player has won or lost.  The 
basic elements or characteristics of games of bingo, as generally understood and 
as defined by knowledgeable authorities, are totally lacking in instant 
bingo.  In fact, instant bingo has 
characteristics far more similar to slot machines, punchboards, and other forms 
of gaming rather than to bingo-type games.

 
 

Id. at 
134-37.

 
 
[¶30]   The evidence adduced at trial gives 
us a clear history of bingo in Wyoming.  
Traditionally, the game played was session or call bingo.  No doubt, that is what the legislature 
had in mind when it legalized bingo in 1971.  We say "no doubt" because there is no 
evidence in the record that any other bingo-type game was being played in 
Wyoming before 
that date.  Once bingo conducted by 
non-profit organizations became legal, however, industrious minds came up with 
ways to play more games, to play them faster, and to raise the stakes.12  Games such as Bonanza Bingo and Quick 
Shot Bingo came into Wyoming during the 1980s, well after the 1971 
legislation.  Numbers now were 
pre-drawn and pre-posted, no session was necessary, no caller was necessary, and 
winning and losing cards were instantly identifiable.  The next step, following technology, was 
"electronic bingo."  Interestingly 
enough, Wyoming was the first state into which Fast 
Action Bingo was introduced.

 
 
[¶31]   The appellants contend that their 
electronic games are simply Bonanza Bingo and Quick Shot Bingo in another 
form.  The bulk of the evidence at 
trial, and the bulk of the argument below and here, has been directed toward a 
comparison of Bonanza Bingo and Quick Shot Bingo, coupled with a comparison of 
the games of paper Bonanza Bingo and Quick Shot 
Bingo and electronic Bonanza Bingo and Quick 
Shot Bingo.  It is in the context of 
these comparisons that the appellants challenge the district court's findings of 
fact.  Neither of these, however, is 
the significant comparison.  The 
significant comparison is that between traditional bingo and Fast Action 
Bingo.  We conclude that, while 
getting unnecessarily entangled in the comparison of Bonanza Bingo and Quick 
Shot Bingo, the district court found and concluded correctly in the end that the 
specific electronic game, Fast Action Bingo, was not similar in nature to the 
game of bingo excluded from gambling in 1971. 

 
 
[¶32]   As of 1971, bingo was played 
simultaneously by a number of people, all of whom watched and waited as numbers 
were called one-by-one as drawn, and all of whom were attempting to beat each 
other to "bingo."  When someone 
obtained the winning pattern, he or she shouted "bingo" and was awarded the 
common prize sought by all players.  
That game was then over.  
Contrast that with a game where a lone player sits down to face a 
machine.  Winning numbers have been 
pre-drawn for the day, or the week, and electronic game cards are simply 
compared to those numbers.  
Available games left to play are characterized as credits on the 
machine.  Such credits may be played 
or paid.  While all the players' 
monitors are networked to the organization's terminal, the players are playing 
in isolation, and if one player wins, that does not end the game for other 
players.  Wins and losses are 
instantaneous, and it takes only a few seconds to play a game.  Andrew Burns, who designed Double Up 
Bingo for Helping Hand, testified that, in electronic bingo, the gamethat is, 
the matching of the cards against the numberstakes place within the server, not 
even within the player's terminal.  In session bingo, of course, the matching 
takes place on the player's card.

 
 
[¶33]   Fast Action Bingo simply does not 
bear even a remote resemblance to traditional bingothe game of bingo envisioned 
by the legislature in 1971. Even the appellants' witnesses provided testimony 
showing that the standard and popular meaning of the word "bingo," as used in 
the 1971 statute, is traditional session bingo.  Michelle Tanner, Helping Hand's 
president, testified that when she started playing bingo in the basement of a 
church around 1970, the game was played with "hard cards," a caller using a 
"squirrel cage," and numbers called out as players marked their cards.13  Similarly, Susan Hall, the manager of 
the Cheyenne American Legion Bingo Hall, admitted that, to her friends, "let's 
go play bingo" means session bingo.  That is the common meaning of 
"bingo."

 
 
[¶34]   In reviewing the district court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, our task is not merely to determine 
whether any of the factual findings are clearly erroneous.  Rather, our ultimate goal is to 
determine whether the legal conclusions are sustained by findings that are 
supported by the evidence.  We began 
that process with a detailed review of the record, as revealed in the discussion 
above.  We will now address the 
groups of findings that the appellants contend are clearly 
erroneous.

 
 
[¶35]   The appellants argue first that, in 
numerous findings, the district court failed to recognize that Bonanza Bingo and 
Quick Shot Bingo are the same game.  
While it is true that some testimony and some exhibits indicated that 
these are simply different names for one game, it is also true that some 
witnesses considered them to be distinct.  
We cannot say that, given this state of the evidence, the district 
court's findings were clearly erroneous.  
Furthermore, in light of the analysis set forth above, the distinction, 
if any, between the two games is irrelevant.  Because of its very nature, Fast Action 
Bingo is just not statutory bingo, and that conclusion does not depend upon any 
comparison of Bonanza Bingo and Quick Shot Bingo.  The same can be said of the appellants' 
claim that the district court erred in finding Fast Action Bingo to be 
substantially the same as Helping Hand's Double Up Bingo.

 
 
[¶36]   The appellants next argue that the 
district court failed to recognize that Fast Action Bingo allows for a player's 
cards to be printed out, rather than to be played on the machine, thereby giving 
Fast Action Bingo the same element of skill found in traditional bingo, where 
the player must mark his or her card.  
In other words, a Fast Action Bingo player could print out the card and then 
compare the numbers shown on it to the pre-drawn set of numbers.  While that may be true, it does not 
change the fundamental nature of the gameman against machine.  Beyond that, nobody testified to what 
extent, if any, such printed cards actually are used in electronic bingo.  As to the skill aspect, Susan Hall and 
Andrew Burns testified that a person can miss a number playing session bingo, 
but not playing electronic bingo.

 
 
[¶37]   In several findings of fact, the 
district court described features of electronic bingo that created the 
"possibility" of "result manipulation."  
In particular, the fact that numbers are pre-drawn means that, when a 
player selects a terminal and purchases electronic cards, those cards could be 
selected by the computer "with reference to the selected numbers."  The appellants contend that this finding 
is clearly erroneous, for two reasons:  
first, there was no evidence that Fast Action Bingo games were subject to 
manipulation, and second, no definition of bingo presented to or adopted by the 
district court contained an element concerning susceptibility to 
manipulation.

 
 
[¶38]   We agree with the appellants that 
this finding was not supported by the evidence and is, therefore, clearly 
erroneous.  The software experts who 
testified both described electronic bingo programs dependent upon random number 
generators.  Their resolute defense 
of random number generators was not successfully challenged, and no evidence of 
actual manipulation was presented.  
However, because there was other sufficient evidence supporting the 
district court's ultimate conclusion, this error was not prejudicial.  We can affirm the district court upon 
any valid basis appearing in the record.  
37 Gambling Devices, 694 P.2d  at 717.

 
 
[¶39]   The appellants next identify eight 
separate findings in which they allege that the district court limited the term 
"traditional bingo" to session bingo, thereby erroneously omitting Bonanza Bingo 
and Quick Shot Bingo.  This 
allegation has, of course, been central to much of the foregoing 
discussion.  The district court did 
not err.  As we stated above, the 
district court may have ventured unnecessarily deep into investigating the finer 
distinctions between Bonanza Bingo and Quick Shot Bingo, but it did not lose 
track of the central inquiry into whether Fast Action Bingo fits the common and 
ordinary meaning of the word "bingo" as used in the statutes.  In determining that it does not, the 
district court correctly compared the nature of traditional bingo to the nature 
of the electronic game.  It was not 
incumbent upon the district court also to compare Fast Action Bingo to every 
modern game to which some manufacturer might affix the appellation "bingo."  The appellants believe Bonanza Bingo and 
Quick Shot Bingo are "traditional" because they have been around for twenty 
years or so.  However, while players 
today may consider them "bingo games," because that is what they are called 
by their creators, they are not, ipso 
facto, "traditional bingo."  
They simply differ too much from traditional session 
bingo.

 
 
[¶40]   Finally, the appellants contend 
that the district court erroneously adopted certain "bingo elements," where the 
evidence did not support those elements and where they were not part of the 
definition of bingo adopted in the conclusions of law.  Those identified elements are:  (1) there is a winner in every game; (2) 
players compete against one another; (3) there is a skill and attentiveness 
aspect in marking the cards and timely shouting "bingo"; and (4) there is no 
opportunity for manipulation in the selection of a player's 
cards.

 
 
[¶41]   We begin our discussion of these 
contentions with the observation that we do not perceive the questioned findings 
as the district court's attempt to describe a finite set of "elements" that make 
up the game of bingo.  Rather, we 
perceive these findings as the district court's reference to evidence that was 
adduced by the parties in their efforts to contrast traditional bingo and Fast 
Action Bingo.  The district court 
simply pointed out characteristics of the two games.  The question is whether the stated 
findings are supported by the evidence.  
Our review of the evidence indicates that they are.

 
 
[¶42]   At least three witnessesValdez, Wigt, and 
Zingaletestified that there is a winner in every game of traditional 
bingo.  Indeed, Zingale stated that 
the nature of the game requires such.  
This is sufficient evidence from which the district court could make the 
questioned finding of fact.  As to 
the competitive nature of traditional bingo, Calkins, Hall, and Wigt testified 
that players are playing against one another in the sense that "you have to yell 
bingo'" before anyone else does.  Although witness Valdez insisted that 
traditional bingo players do not compete against each other, he did concede the 
necessity of being the first player to announce a bingo.  Once again, we cannot say that the 
district court was clearly erroneous in finding that players compete against one 
another in traditional bingo.

 
 
[¶43]   The third characteristic of 
traditional bingo found by the district court is the attentiveness and skill 
required accurately to mark one's playing card as numbers are called and to 
shout out "bingo" at the appropriate time.  
This skill requirement was nearly universally recognized by all the trial 
witnesses.  Witness Hall underscored 
the skill concept by noting the difficulty of keeping track of multiple cards, 
by noting that you do not win if you miss a number, and by admitting that she, 
herself, had missed numbers called during a traditional bingo session.  The evidence clearly supported this 
finding of fact.

 
 
[¶44]   As to the fourth characteristic of 
traditional bingo identified by the district courtthat it is not subject to 
manipulationwe have already discussed above the lack of any evidence to support 
the mirror finding that electronic bingo is 
subject to manipulation.  
Because there is a similar dearth of evidence suggesting that traditional 
bingo is not subject to manipulation, we 
conclude that the district court's finding to that effect is clearly 
erroneous.  Counsel's implications 
through questions are not the equivalent of testimony.

 
 
[¶45]   With this one exception, the 
district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.  Furthermore, those findings support the 
district court's legal conclusions.  
Specifically, the evidence clearly showed the vast differences between 
traditional bingo and Fast Action Bingo.  
The latter is illegal because it is not the game of bingo excepted from 
the statutory ban and because it utilizes gambling devices to induce people to 
gamble, with Dream Games' intent of deriving a profit 
therefrom.

 
 

Does 
Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-7-101(a)(iii)(D) violate the appellants' right to the due process of 
law?

 
 
[¶46]   A statute may be challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague "on its face" or "as applied."  To prove a facial challenge, the 
challenger must show either that the statute reaches a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct, or that it specifies no standard of conduct 
at all.  To prove an as-applied 
challenge, the challenger must show that the statute provides insufficient 
notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that the challenger's conduct was 
illegal.  See Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 9, 110 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Wyo. 2005); Giles v. 
State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 15, 96 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Wyo. 2004); and Browning v. State, 2001 WY 93, ¶¶ 10-11, 
32 P.3d 1061, 1066 (Wyo. 2001).  A 
statute specifies a standard of conduct if, by its terms or as authoritatively 
construed in prior opinions, it applies without question to certain activities, 
even though its application to other activities is uncertain.  Pine v. State, 2001 WY 133, ¶ 13, 37 P.3d 368, 372 (Wyo. 2001); Browning, 
2001 WY 93, ¶ 11, 32 P.3d  at 1066; and Saiz v. State, 2001 WY 76, ¶ 9, 30 P.3d 21, 24 (Wyo. 2001).  In determining 
whether a statute provides sufficient notice, we consider the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the words used in the statute, any prior court decisions that have 
construed the statute, and whether the statute has been previously applied to 
conduct identical to that of the appellant.  Giles, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 23, 96 P.3d  at 
1035; Saiz, 2001 WY 76, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d  
at 26; and Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 408, 412 (Wyo. 
1995).  "The ultimate test under a 
vagueness challenge is whether a person of ordinary intelligence could read the 
statute and comprehend what conduct is prohibited."  Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 657 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 
[¶47]   We apply the following standards 
when determining the constitutionality of challenged 
statutes:

 
 
            
"Issues of constitutionality present questions of law.  We review questions of law under a de novo standard of review and afford no 
deference to the district court's determinations on the issues.  Anderson v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 961 
(Wyo. 
1996).  In reviewing a 
constitutionally based challenge to a statute, we presume the statute to be 
constitutional and any doubt in the matter must be resolved in favor of the 
statute's constitutionality.  Thomson v. Wyoming In Stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778, 789-90 
(Wyo. 
1982).  [Appellant] bears the burden 
of proving the statute is unconstitutional.  Pfeil v. Amax Coal West, Inc., 908 P.2d 956, 961 (Wyo. 
1995)."

 
 

Reiter 
v. State, 2001 WY 
116, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 586, 589 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting V-1 Oil Co. v. State, 934 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 
1997)).  See also Browning, 2001 WY 93, ¶ 12, 32 P.3d  at 1066; Saiz, 2001 WY 76, ¶ 10, 
30 P.3d  at 24; and Campbell, 999 P.2d  
at 657.  The appellant's burden of 
proof is heavy, and it includes the obligation to show both that he has a 
constitutionally protected interest and that it has been infringed in an 
impermissible way.14  Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, 2004 WY 61, ¶ 53, 90 P.3d 724, 739 (Wyo. 
2004); and Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 289 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
[¶48]   The appellants' contention on 
appeal is that the district court erred in its analysis of their constitutional 
challenge.  That analysis, which is 
contained in Conclusion of Law Nos. 10-15, may be summarized as 
follows:

 
 
1.    A statute, even if ambiguous, 
is not unconstitutionally vague unless it requires a person to guess at its 
meaning.  Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 777 
(Wyo. 
1987).

 
 
2.    A person raising a 
constitutional vagueness challenge must show that the statute is impermissibly 
vague in all of its applications.  
Alcalde v. State, 2003 WY 99, 
¶ 15, 74 P.3d 1253, 1261 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
3.    When evaluating a statute to 
determine whether it provides sufficient notice to an appellant, the court must 
consider not only the statutory language, but also any prior court decisions 
that have placed a limiting construction on the statute or that have applied it 
to specific conduct.  Giles, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 23, 96 P.3d  at 
1035.

 
 
4.    The dual holdings in 37 Gambling Devices that the electronic 
games were illegal gambling devices and that the sharing of profits therefrom 
with a for-profit entity took the activity outside the exception for non-profit 
organizations, provided sufficient notice to the appellants that Fast Action 
Bingo was illegal, thereby defeating their vagueness challenge.15

 
 
5.    Therefore, the statute is not 
unconstitutional.

 
 
[¶49]   The appellants contend that this 
analysis is flawed because it "does not comport with the facts."  They then state the relevant facts to be 
as follows:  (1) the appellants' 
conduct is not equivalent to that of the appellants in 37 Gambling Devices; (2) Fast Action 
Bingo had not been invented when 37 
Gambling Devices was decided; (3) people have been playing Bonanza Bingo and 
Quick Shot Bingo throughout Wyoming for the past 20 years; (4) the City of 
Cheyenne has ordinances interpreting the gambling statutes and regulating bingo; 
(5) the present prosecutions are the appellants' first notice that the State 
considers Fast Action Bingo to be illegal; and (6) the present prosecutions 
demonstrate that men of ordinary intelligence must guess as to the meaning of 
the statute.

 
 
[¶50]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-7-101(a)(iii)(D) excludes raffles and bingo from the statutory definition of 
gambling.  The wording of the 
exclusion is as follows:  "[B]ingo 
conducted . . . by charitable or nonprofit organizations where the tickets 
. . . are sold only in this state[.]"  
The appellants contend that this language violates their right to the due 
process of law because it is void for vagueness.  Specifically, citing Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270, 274 
(Wyo. 1977); and State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967, 968 
(Wyo. 1963), 
they argue that the statute is void for vagueness because men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application.  Further, they cite Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d 864, 868 (Wyo. 
1984), for the proposition that criminal statutes must set forth with reasonable 
certainty the act or conduct required or forbidden in a manner that furnishes 
fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that certain conduct is 
proscribed by the State.  Finally, 
the appellants also contend that they were victims of arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement of the statute.

 
 
[¶51]   Our first order of business in 
reviewing a statute for vagueness is to determine whether the challenge is a 
facial challenge.  Luplow v. State, 897 P.2d 463, 466 
(Wyo. 1995); and McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 745 
(Wyo. 
1993).  We have carefully reviewed 
the record and the appellate briefs and, despite references here and there to a 
facial challenge, the appellants actually have only challenged the statute as it 
applies to their conduct.  They have 
not attempted to demonstrate either that the statute reaches a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct or that it specifies no standard of 
conduct at all.  In their reply 
brief, they chastise the appellees for having misstated the law by citing facial 
vagueness cases in response to appellants' as-applied due process 
challenge.  Furthermore, during oral 
argument, the appellees stated without contradiction from the appellants that 
the appellants had abandoned any facial challenge to the gambling statute.  Judging from the record and the parties' 
briefs, that observation appears to be correct.  Consequently, we will address only the 
as-applied challenge.

 
 
[¶52]   An as-applied challenge alleges 
that the statute does not provide sufficient notice to the appellant that his 
particular conduct is illegal.  As 
stated above, the ultimate test is whether a person of ordinary intelligence 
could read the statute and understand that his conduct was illegal.  The most basic problem with the 
appellants' challenge in the instant case is that they do not contend even that 
the statute is ambiguous, no less facially invalid for vagueness.16  In their Reply Brief, the appellants 
contend that "this Court should determine that the statute is clear in excluding 
all forms, variations and mediums of bingo conducted by nonprofit organizations 
from the statute's own definition of gambling."

 
 
[¶53]   This, of course, is exactly what 
the district court did.  The 
district court said that bingo is legal, but that Fast Action Bingo is not 
bingo, and that it is, therefore, illegal.  
The district court said that bingo conducted by a non-profit organization 
is legal, but that Fast Action Bingo is not being conducted by a non-profit 
organization, and that it is, therefore, illegal.  We agree.  The statute is not ambiguous and it is 
not vague as applied to these facts.  
The word "bingo" used in the statute has a plain and ordinary meaning 
that was recognized by the district court and that has been detailed 
hereinabove.17  The phrase "conducted by charitable or 
nonprofit organizations"in its own sense and as held by this Court in 37 Gambling Devicesdoes not include the 
situation where a for-profit entity takes half of the profits.  Fast Action Bingo simply is not a "form 
or variation" of the game of bingo.

 
 
[¶54]   Finally, the appellants contend 
that they are victims of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the 
statute.  They point to the fact 
that state prosecutors have not previously attempted to shut down Fast Action 
Bingo, despite its lengthy history in Wyoming, and to the fact that state 
prosecutors have not attempted to shut down Prime Time Bingo, a similar game 
being conducted by KTWO-TV.

 
 
[¶55]   The appellants present this issue 
as part of their due process and vagueness argument and, indeed, we have often 
considered the question of arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution under that 
rubric.  See, for example, Saiz, 2001 WY 76, ¶ 9, 
30 P.3d  at 24; Lovato, 901 P.2d  at 
412; McCone, 866 P.2d  at 746; and Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 976 (Wyo. 
1988).  We have also, however, 
characterized similar arguments as "selective prosecution," and have analyzed 
them under the equal protection doctrine, or a combination of the two 
protections.  See, for example, Moe, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 9, 
110 P.3d  at 1210; Giles, 2004 WY 101, 
¶ 17, 96 P.3d  at 1032; and Misenheimer v. 
State, 2001 WY 65, ¶¶ 16-19, 27 P.3d 273, 281-82 (Wyo. 2001).  Under either analysis, the present claim 
must fail because there has been no showing of any impermissible motivation on 
the part of state prosecutors.  Giles, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 17, 96 P.3d  at 
1032; and Misenheimer, 2001 WY 65, ¶ 
17, 27 P.3d  at 281.

 
 
A 
selective prosecution exists when it is demonstrated that others similarly 
situated have not been prosecuted and the prosecution of the defendant is based 
on an impermissible motive.  Crozier v. State, 882 P.2d 1230, 1235 
(Wyo. 
1994).  "The impermissible 
motivation must be demonstrated by showing that the charge was deliberately 
based on an unjustifiable standard or designed to inhibit the exercise of a 
constitutional right by the accused."  
Id.

 
 

Misenheimer, 
2001 WY 
65, ¶ 17, 27 P.3d  at 281.  The 
present record is totally devoid of any evidence explaining the various 
prosecutor's apparently individual decisions to threaten or pursue prosecution 
under the gambling statutes.  In the 
absence of such evidence, we are certainly unwilling to presume impermissible 
motives, especially in light of the holdings of 37 Gambling Devices.  The mere fact that the appellants 
got away with violating the statutes for quite some time does not equate to 
arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution in their present 
situation.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶56]   Nothing even resembling Fast Action 
Bingo existed in 1971, and Fast Action Bingo could not have been contemplated by 
the legislature in that year's session.  
While the meanings of statutory terms are not necessarily frozen in time, 
neither are they so amorphous as to have no meaning at all.  

 
 
"The 
true rule is that statutes are to be construed as they were intended to be 
understood when they were passed.  
Statutes are to be read in the light of attendant conditions and the 
state of the law existent at the time of their enactment.  The words of a statute must be taken in 
the sense in which they were understood at the time when the statute was 
enacted.  If the language used is 
broad enough to include unknown things which might spring into existence in the 
future, they would be deemed to come within, and be subject to, the evident 
meaning of the terms used, but it does not follow, when a newly invented or 
discovered thing is called by some familiar word, which comes nearest expressing 
the new idea, that the thing so styled is really the thing formerly meant by the 
familiar word."

 
 

Farmers 
Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. MacDonald, 59 
Wyo. 352, 140 P.2d 905, 913 (1943) (quoting 25 
R.C.L. 959, § 215).  For an activity 
to fit the statutory bingo exclusion, it must be closely similar in nature to 
the concept of bingo as it existed when the exclusion was adopted.  However, even Paul Perez, owner of Dream 
Games, admitted under cross-examination that his "Fast Action Bingo machine 
duplicates not session bingo, but Quick Shot Bingo[.]"  Fast Action Bingo is not bingo in the 
sense of the word as it was used in 1971.18

 
 
[¶57]   The district court was correct in 
all of its major conclusions, which are inter-related:  (1) Fast Action Bingo is not statutory 
bingo; (2) Dream Games operates Fast Action Bingo, thereby inducing others to 
engage in gambling, with the intent to derive a profit therefrom; (3) Fast 
Action Bingo equipment and machines are gambling devices because they are used 
in the playing phase of that operation; and (4) the statutes are not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Fast Action Bingo.

 
 
[¶58]   We affirm.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In 1983, 
an exclusion for calcutta wagering was added.  1983 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 105, p. 250.  The definition of calcutta wagering was 
amended in 1985.  1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 14, p. 13.  In 1986, an exclusion for pull tabs was 
added.  1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 105, p. 216.  The advertising of any "gambling 
activity or event excluded from gambling" was specifically authorized in 
1991.  1991 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 211, p. 521.  In 1996, dog-sled racing was added to 
the definition of calcutta wagering.  1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 115, p. 
384.

 
 

2The word 
"bingo" appears in quotation marks because "bingo" may not always be 
"bingo."

 
 

3Plaintiffs 
have included the Fraternal Order of Eagles Sheridan Aerie No. 186, Inc., 
Fraternal Order of Eagles Cheyenne Aerie No. 128, Inc., Dream Games of Arizona, 
Inc., Helping Hand Corporation, West Coast Game Management, Inc., Buffalo Bingo 
LLC, and Cheyenne Lodge No. 257, Loyal Order of Moose.  The list of defendants has included the 
State of Wyoming, the City of Cheyenne, the Cheyenne City Clerk, and the district or 
county and prosecuting attorneys from LaramieCounty, GoshenCounty, SheridanCounty, PlatteCounty, UintaCounty, and SubletteCounty.

 
 

4These 
terms are being defined with as much precision as possible, given the lack of 
consensus among the witnesses who testified at the bench 
trial.

 
 

5This is 
also the standard face of a traditional session or call bingo 
card.

 
 

6As the 
word suggests, "pre-drawn" means that house personnel select the numbers in 
advance, rather than during the play of the game.

 
 

7This may 
simply be a difference in terminology, inasmuch as the Cheyenne Eagles Aerie 
also conducts a game called "Blackout," which closely resembles the Sheridan 
Eagles Aerie's "Bonanza Bingo."

 
 

8During 
oral argument, the appellants also cited Snake River Brewing Company, Inc., v. Town 
of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 8, 39 P.3d 397, 403 (Wyo. 2002).  Like Distad, however, Snake River Brewing provides no 
authority for the appellants' position.  
The salient, though irrelevant, point of the latter case is that, in the 
law of municipal planning and zoning, "[t]he comprehensive plan is the policy 
statement; the zoning ordinances are what have the force and effect of 
law."  Id.

 
 

9This 
argument seems to be a misconstruction of the finding.  We assume the "pre-selected" numbers 
referenced in the finding are the 24 pre-drawn numbers, not the individual 
player card numbers.

 
 

10In a 
blatant attempt to meet the constitutional mandate, pull tabs were called 
"instant bingo" in the legislation.  
Stephan, 887 P.2d  at 
129.

 
 

11See City of Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So. 2d 435 (Ala. 1994); and People v. 8,000 Punchboard Card Devices, 
142 Cal. App. 3d 618, 191 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1983).

 
 

12Michelle 
Tanner testified that a player can now win a maximum of $2,400 on one play on 
Helping Hand's video machines.

 
 

13"Hard 
cards" were cardboard cards, sometimes with a shutter mechanism with which to 
mark numbers.

 
 

14The 
appellants identified the constitutional right being infringed by the current 
prosecution as "their constitutional right to earn a living or fundraise."  We assume that the formerearn a 
livingrefers to Dream Games, and the latterfundraiserefers to the Eagles 
Aeries.  The questions presented by 
this claimwhether there is a constitutional right to earn a living by gambling 
and whether there is a constitutional right for non-profit organizations to 
raise fundsare not developed by the parties.  Without deciding those questions, we 
will assume for the purposes of this case that there is a constitutionally 
protected right not to be convicted of a criminal offense under a statute that 
is vague as applied.  Even without 
the due process argument, of course, the appellants would have standing to 
challenge the statute under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-101 et seq. (LexisNexis 
2005).

 
 

15This 
fourth conclusion is implicit, rather than explicit, in the district court's 
order.  The only way the court could 
have gone from the third conclusion to the fifth conclusion is by way of this 
fourth conclusion.  

 
 

16In 
response to a specific question during oral argument, the appellants' counsel 
stated that the statute is unambiguous.

 
 

17A statute 
is not ambiguous or void for vagueness just because it contains words that are 
not defined within the statute.  
Such would be an impossible standard, given that virtually every statute 
contains words that are not defined.  
In determining legislative intent, this Court frequently looks to the 
common meaning of undefined statutory terms.  See, for example, Giles, 2004 WY 101, ¶¶ 
20-21, 96 P.3d at 1034-35; and Alcalde v. 
State, 2003 WY 99, ¶¶ 15-16, 74 P.3d 1253, 1260-61.

 
 

18While we 
see no need to go that far, some courts have held that all electromechanical versions of 
authorized games are, by their very nature, so different from the traditional 
versions of the games that they do not meet statutory gambling exceptions.  Citation Bingo, Ltd., 910 P.2d  at 
284-86.