Title: Ex Parte Slimp

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

660 So. 2d 994 (1995)
Ex parte Paul L. SLIMP.
(In re NABISCO BISCUIT COMPANY v. Paul L. SLIMP).
1930499.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 13, 1995.
Rehearing Denied April 7, 1995.
Lyman H. Harris and R. Stan Morris of Harris, Evans, Berg, Morris & Rogers, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner.
James N. Nolan of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
This is a workers' compensation case, and the question presented is whether the worker presented evidence that his employer had "actual knowledge" of his alleged work-related injury. The trial court found that the worker's injury was work-related, and that he was totally and permanently disabled.
The trial court, in its order, stated that "Mr. Slimp testified that on the date of his accident, he notified his direct supervisor, Randy Gillis, that he had hurt his back that day," and that "Mr. Gillis did not come to Court to deny Mr. Slimp's testimony in this regard, nor was any testimony offered by deposition of Gillis to refute that testimony." The trial court found, as a fact, that the employer had actual knowledge of the injury.
In its opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals set out pertinent portions of the trial court's order finding that the employer had received actual notice of the injury. Nevertheless, that court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause, holding that the employer had not received adequate notice of the injury. In reversing, the Court of Civil Appeals said, in part:
Nabisco Biscuit Co. v. Slimp, 660 So. 2d 991, at 993 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). In determining that the employee failed to meet his initial burden, the Court of Civil Appeals, citing James v. Hornady Truck Line, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1059 (Ala.Civ.App.1992), recognized that "[w]ritten notice [to the employer generally required by § 25-5-78, Ala.Code 1975] is not required where ... the employer had actual notice of the injury," and that "[o]ral notice is sufficient to give the employer actual notice" if the employer is notified that the injury occurred within the scope of the employee's employment.[1] 660 So. 2d  at 992. The Court of Civil Appeals opined:
660 So. 2d  at 993.
After reviewing the arguments of the worker and those of his employer, and after reviewing the applicable law, we conclude that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in determining that there was not some legal evidence to support the trial court's finding that the employer had sufficient notice to comply with the statute's requirement of actual notice. The appellate standard of review is set out in Russell Coal Co. v. Williams:
550 So. 2d  at 1010. Applying this standard of review, we find some testimony to support the finding of the trial judge; consequently, we hold that the Court of Civil Appeals' conclusion that "Nabisco did not have any information from which it could have inferred that Slimp's injury was connected to his work activity," 660 So. 2d  at 993, is incorrect. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for an order consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON, KENNEDY, INGRAM and COOK, JJ., concur.
[1]  In the James case, the Court of Civil Appeals specifically said:

"The purpose of written notice is to advise the employer that the employee received a specified injury, in the course of his employment, at a specified time, and at a specified place, so that the employer may verify the injury by its own investigation. International Paper Co. v. Murray, 490 So. 2d 1228 (Ala.Civ. App.), remanded on other grounds, 490 So. 2d 1230 (Ala.1984). Written notice is not required where it is shown that the employer had actual notice of the injury. International Paper Co. Oral notice is sufficient to give the employer actual notice. International Paper Co."
601 So. 2d  at 1060-61.