Title: State v. Dobbs

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2020 WI 64 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP319-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Timothy E. Dobbs, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 144,930 N.W.2d 280 
(2019 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 1, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Clayton Patrick Kawski & Jill Karofsky   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to Parts I, II, and III.C., in which all Justices 
joined; the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Part 
III.A., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, 
and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined; and the majority opinion of the Court 
with respect to Part III.B., in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, and KELLY, JJ., joined.  ZIEGLER, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and HAGEDORN, J., 
joined.  KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Michael D. Rosenberg and Community Justice, Inc., 
Madison. There was an oral argument by Michael D. Rosenberg. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
 
 
2 
brief is Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Michael C. Sanders. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Innocence 
Projects, In., and the Wisconsin Innocence Project by Andrew T. 
Dufresne, Sopen B. Shah, and Perkins Coie LLP, Madison; with 
whom on the brief was Keith A. Findley and the Wisconsin 
Innocence Project, Madison.  
 
 
 
2020 WI 64 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2018AP319-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF1938) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Timothy E. Dobbs, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court with 
respect to Parts I, II, and III.C., in which all Justices 
joined; the majority opinion of the Court with respect to Part 
III.A., in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, 
and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined; and the majority opinion of the Court 
with respect to Part III.B., in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, and KELLY, JJ., joined.  ZIEGLER, J., filed a 
concurring opinion, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and HAGEDORN, J., 
joined.  KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which REBECCA 
GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   The petitioner, Timothy E. 
Dobbs, seeks review of the court of appeals' decision1 affirming 
his judgment of conviction for homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle. 
                                                 
1 State v. Dobbs, No. 2018AP319–CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. May 2, 2019). 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
2 
 
¶2 
Dobbs raises two issues on appeal.  First, Dobbs 
asserts that the circuit court improperly excluded the expert 
testimony of Dr. Lawrence White.2  Second, Dobbs claims that the 
circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements 
that he made to law enforcement because he was subject to 
custodial interrogation and not read the Miranda warnings,3 or, 
in the alternative, because his statements were not voluntarily 
made.4 
¶3 
We conclude that the circuit court properly exercised 
its discretion when it excluded Dr. White's exposition testimony 
for a lack of fit with the facts of Dobbs's case.  Additionally, 
although we determine that several of Dobbs's statements should 
have been suppressed because he was subject to custodial 
interrogation and was not read the Miranda warnings, we conclude 
that the error was harmless.  We further conclude that all of 
Dobbs's statements were voluntary. 
¶4 
We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
On the morning of September 5, 2015, a vehicle crossed 
several lanes of traffic and a median area, drove over a curb, 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Clayton P. Kawski of the Dane County Circuit 
Court presided over the State's motion to exclude the testimony 
of Dr. Lawrence White. 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4 The Honorable David T. Flanagan of the Dane County Circuit 
Court presided over Dobbs's motion to suppress. 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
3 
 
and struck a pedestrian.  The vehicle left the scene.  Several 
blocks from the scene, Madison Police Officer Jimmy Milton 
noticed a vehicle with a completely deflated tire and exposed 
wheel rim on the front driver's side that matched the witnesses' 
description of the vehicle involved in the hit and run.  Officer 
Milton positioned his squad car to prevent the driver, later 
identified as Dobbs, from leaving. 
¶6 
With his hand on his service weapon, Officer Milton 
instructed Dobbs to show his hands and exit the vehicle.  Dobbs 
was immediately handcuffed and placed in the squad car.  Officer 
Milton told Dobbs he was "being detained" for an ongoing 
"accident investigation" and that he was suspected of striking a 
pedestrian.  Shortly after placing Dobbs in the squad car, 
Officer Milton learned that the pedestrian had died. 
¶7 
At 7:30 a.m., Officer Milton started questioning Dobbs 
while he remained handcuffed in the backseat of the locked squad 
car.  The audio from Officer Milton's microphone did not start 
recording until 7:34 a.m.5  At 7:34 a.m., Officer Milton asked 
Dobbs his date of birth and questions about his vehicle's 
registration.  At 7:36 a.m., Officer Milton said to Dobbs "I 
smell alcohol."  Over the course of the next hour, Officer 
Milton talked to Dobbs about a variety of topics and asked him 
numerous questions, including: 
                                                 
5 Officer Milton testified that he asked Dobbs his name, 
address, where he had been coming from, where he was headed, and 
other "identifying" information during this time. 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
4 
 
 "Do you have any medical issues other than that splint 
that you were wearing?" 
 "Do you take medications for depression and anxiety?" 
 "Do you have any injuries from the collision with the 
curb?" 
 "So [those bruises and scratches on your face] are all 
old?" 
In response to Officer Milton's comments, Dobbs stated that he 
had not slept in 40 hours and had not taken his medication that 
morning.  Dobbs told Officer Milton that "he was adjusting his 
arm in the sling, and he lost control of the vehicle and he hit 
the curb, and that's what caused the damage to his front 
driver's side tire." 
¶8 
About 30 minutes into the questioning, Dobbs said "I 
take it I'm going to jail."  Officer Milton never responded to 
Dobbs's statement, but he made several subsequent comments that 
there was an ongoing investigation and that was why there were 
up to three other officers on the scene at a time, including a 
K-9 unit. 
¶9 
During the questioning, Officer Milton exited the 
squad car several times to observe the exterior and interior of 
Dobbs's vehicle, alongside two other officers.  Officer Milton 
saw "impact damage" to the front end and hood of Dobbs's 
vehicle, including two dents and a tree branch that was lodged 
in the vehicle's hood.  Officer Milton also observed a can of 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
5 
 
air duster6 in plain view in the front center console, which was 
within reach of the driver's seat.7  Officer Milton described the 
vehicle's damage in detail to Dobbs and made comments like "it's 
obvious you hit something because your wheel is damaged." 
¶10 After about an hour, Officer Milton removed Dobbs's 
handcuffs and he was escorted out of the locked squad car to 
perform field sobriety tests.  Dobbs displayed no signs of 
intoxication during the tests, but Officer Milton asked him to 
submit to a blood test.  Dobbs agreed and was subsequently 
transported to a nearby hospital. 
¶11 Dobbs arrived at the hospital at approximately 9:08 
a.m.  Additional officers arrived at the hospital, including 
Officer Nicholas Pine, who began a drug recognition evaluation 
at approximately 9:45 a.m.8  As part of that evaluation, Dobbs 
was given a preliminary breath test, which revealed that Dobbs 
did not have any alcohol in his system.  Nearly three hours 
after Dobbs was first handcuffed and placed in the locked squad 
car, at 10:19 a.m., Officer Pine first read Dobbs the Miranda 
warnings.  Dobbs waived his Miranda rights and was questioned by 
Officer Pine. 
                                                 
6 The can of air duster was referred to by a variety of 
names during the suppression hearing and the jury trial, 
including DustOff, Ultra Duster, air duster, duster, and 
compressed air.  For ease of reference, we will refer to it as 
"air duster" throughout this opinion. 
7 During a search of Dobbs's vehicle, Officer Timothy Frey 
found a Menards receipt for air duster dated the morning of the 
accident. 
8 There is no audio or visual recording of this evaluation. 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
6 
 
¶12 Dobbs was then formally placed under arrest, informed 
that the pedestrian had died, and read the Miranda warnings for 
a second time by Officer Milton.  Dobbs again waived his Miranda 
rights and agreed to answer questions.  Dobbs eventually 
confessed that he had taken a puff of the air duster while he 
was driving, passed out, swerved, and then drove away from the 
scene. 
¶13 Dobbs was transported to the City County Building 
garage where Officer Paul Fleischauer continued to question him.  
Dobbs confessed to Officer Fleischauer that he had been huffing 
for pain management, in addition to taking an antidepressant and 
prescribed pain medication.  Dobbs said he had inhaled the air 
duster while driving, likely striking the pedestrian after he 
lost consciousness. 
¶14 Dobbs was driven to another hospital to receive 
medical clearance to be booked into the jail.  While at that 
hospital, Officer Van Hove heard Dobbs say twice, unprompted, 
that he had "taken a puff of Dust-Off and had killed a man" with 
his vehicle.  Officer Van Hove did not ask any follow-up 
questions in response. 
¶15 Shortly thereafter, Dobbs indicated he wanted to call 
his father, despite being warned that anything he said on the 
phone could ultimately be used in court.  Officer Van Hove 
overheard Dobbs tell his father that he went to Menards to buy 
air duster, took a puff on his way home, and then drove over a 
curb and "killed a man."  He also heard Dobbs say "he understood 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
7 
 
his rights and wanted to be honest."  Later that night, Officer 
Bryan Dyer heard Dobbs spontaneously repeat the same story. 
¶16 The next morning, despite Officer Dean Baldukas's 
reminder to Dobbs that he was under arrest "and still had rights 
associated with that," Dobbs blurted out, unprompted, that he 
had taken a puff of the air duster.  Additionally, Officers 
Linda Baehmann and Bryan Dyer overheard similar spontaneous 
comments from Dobbs regarding huffing air duster. 
¶17 Dobbs was ultimately charged with one count of 
homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle and one count of hit 
and run resulting in death. 
¶18 Prior to trial, the circuit court heard a number of 
motions, two of which are relevant to this appeal.  The first 
was Dobbs's motion to suppress his statements on the grounds 
that:  (1) he was not read the Miranda warnings despite being 
subject 
to 
custodial 
interrogation; 
and 
(2) all 
of 
his 
statements were not voluntarily made due to his mental and 
physical condition.  The circuit court denied Dobbs's motion to 
suppress, concluding that the "first interrogation that would 
have required a Miranda warning, had the defendant been in 
custody, was the interview by [Officer] Pine," at 10:19 am, when 
Officer Pine first read Dobbs the Miranda warnings.  Further, 
the circuit court concluded that "[e]ach of the statements made 
by the defendant to Officers Milton, Pine, Kleinfeldt, Van Hove, 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
8 
 
Dyer, Baldukas, and Baehmann has been demonstrated to have been 
voluntary and not the product of coercion in any degree."9 
¶19 The second pre-trial motion relevant to this appeal 
was the State's motion to exclude the testimony of Dobbs's 
proffered experts, including Dr. Lawrence White.  The defense 
had named Dr. White to testify generally about the phenomenon of 
false confessions, as well as the interrogation techniques and 
dispositional characteristics that make false confessions more 
likely.  The State argued Dr. White's testimony would not be 
relevant because there was no link between his testimony and the 
facts surrounding Dobbs's confessions.  The State further argued 
that Dr. White's testimony would confuse the jury, invade the 
province of the jury as the ultimate assessor of credibility, 
and re-litigate the voluntariness of Dobbs's statements.  In 
response, Dobbs alleged that Dr. White's testimony would assist 
the jury by dispelling a common misbelief that an innocent 
person would never confess to a crime he or she did not commit. 
¶20 At 
the 
Daubert10 
evidentiary 
hearing, 
the 
State 
stipulated to Dr. White's qualifications.  Dr. White testified 
that he saw his role as a jury educator, lecturing about the 
social science and legal scholarship on false confessions and 
the general psychology behind interrogation techniques and 
confessions.  He detailed the interrogation techniques that 
                                                 
9 Dobbs filed a motion for reconsideration on his motion to 
suppress, which was denied. 
10 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
9 
 
could make an innocent person confess:  isolation, confrontation 
with inculpatory evidence, police indifference to claims of 
innocence, being in custody for over six hours, persistent 
questioning, minimization of the accused's culpability or the 
consequences, and implying lenient treatment would be given in 
return for a confession.  Dr. White further described the 
dispositional characteristics that make a person more vulnerable 
to 
confessing 
falsely 
when 
subject 
to 
these 
coercive 
interrogation techniques, including:  youth (under 25 years 
old), 
low 
intelligence, 
a 
suggestible 
or 
compliant 
predisposition, mental disorders like anxiety or depression, 
sleep deprivation, and physical exhaustion.  Dr. White affirmed 
that he did not review any reports or the specific facts of 
Dobbs's case, and that he would not offer an ultimate opinion on 
the truthfulness of Dobbs's confessions. 
¶21 The circuit court ruled that Dr. White's testimony 
would not assist the jury because he never reviewed Dobbs's case 
and therefore could not explicitly apply his expertise to the 
specific facts of the case.  The circuit court determined his 
proffered testimony was a "lecture" at the "highest level of 
generality" which could not satisfy the requirement in Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02(1) (2017-18)11 that "the witness has applied the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." 
                                                 
11 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
10 
 
¶22 Dobbs moved for reconsideration.  The circuit court 
affirmed its original ruling but articulated a second rationale 
for excluding Dr. White's exposition testimony:  it did not 
"fit" the particular facts surrounding Dobbs's confessions.  
Specifically, the circuit court found that Dobbs had made no 
showing 
that 
the 
police 
employed 
the 
types 
of 
coercive 
techniques that Dr. White would testify about. 
¶23 At 
Dobbs's 
jury 
trial, 
Officers 
Milton, 
Dyer, 
Baldukas, Baehmann, and Van Hove all testified to Dobbs's 
confessions that he inhaled air duster prior to the accident.  
Dobbs took the witness stand and denied huffing any air duster 
while driving on the day of the accident.  A jury ultimately 
found Dobbs guilty of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle.12  
Dobbs was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, consisting of 12 
years of initial confinement followed by 8 years of extended 
supervision. 
¶24 Dobbs 
appealed, 
challenging 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decisions granting the State's motion to exclude Dr. White's 
testimony and denying his motion to suppress his statements. 
¶25 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
in 
an 
unpublished, 
per 
curiam 
decision. 
 
It 
determined that the circuit court "reasonably concluded that 
[Dr. White] would not assist the trier of fact unless [he] also 
applied his knowledge about false confessions to the specific 
                                                 
12 The jury found Dobbs not guilty on the second count of 
hit and run. 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
11 
 
circumstances in Dobbs's case."  State v. Dobbs, No. 2018AP319–
CR, unpublished slip op., ¶7 (Wis. Ct. App. May 2, 2019).  
Further, it affirmed the circuit court's decision on Dobbs's 
motion to suppress based on its determination that Dobbs was not 
entitled to Miranda warnings because he was not in custody when 
he was "first placed in the squad car."  Id., ¶¶11-14.  
Additionally, the court of appeals rejected Dobbs's argument 
that his statements were not voluntarily made.  Id., ¶¶15-17. 
¶26 Dobbs petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.  Additionally, we asked the parties to brief the 
following issue:  "Whether the court of appeals' decision is 
consistent with 
State v. Morgan, 2002 WI App 124, 254 
Wis. 2d 602, 648 N.W.2d 23, and if not, whether Morgan should be 
overruled." 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶27 It is within the circuit court's discretion whether to 
admit proffered expert testimony.  State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66, 
¶15, 382 Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95.  We review the circuit 
court's decision under an erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard and therefore we will not reverse a circuit court's 
decision if the decision "had a reasonable basis," and "was made 
in accordance with accepted legal standards and in accordance 
with the facts of record."  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting State v. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, ¶15, 310 
Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780). 
¶28 In evaluating a circuit court's decision on a motion 
to suppress, we uphold the circuit court's findings of fact 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
12 
 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 
¶9, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625.  However, we independently 
apply constitutional principles to the facts as found by the 
circuit court to ensure that the scope of constitutional 
protections do not vary from case to case.  State v. Turner, 136 
Wis. 2d 333, 344, 401 N.W.2d 827 (1987).  Whether Dobbs was in 
custody for purposes of Miranda is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  State v. Mosher, 221 Wis. 2d 203, 211, 584 
N.W.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1998). 
¶29 Finally, in assessing the circuit court's decision on 
the voluntariness of Dobbs's statements, we independently apply 
the constitutional principles of due process to the facts as 
found by the circuit court.  See State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, 
¶34, 
261 
Wis. 2d 294, 
661 
N.W.2d 407. 
 
Whether 
Dobbs's 
statements were voluntary is a question we review de novo.  Id. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶30 We first address whether the circuit court reasonably 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
excluding 
Dr. White's 
expert 
testimony.  Next we consider whether any of the statements Dobbs 
gave before he was read the Miranda warnings should have been 
suppressed because he was subject to custodial interrogation, 
and if so, whether admission of those statements was harmless 
error.  Finally we consider the voluntariness of Dobbs's 
statements in light of his mental and physical condition. 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
13 
 
A.  The circuit court properly excluded Dr. White's exposition 
testimony on the grounds that it did not "fit" the facts of the 
case. 
¶31 Dobbs 
sought 
to 
admit 
the 
expert 
testimony 
of 
Dr. White, 
who 
would 
have 
testified 
generally 
about 
interrogation techniques and dispositional factors that can lead 
an innocent person to falsely confess without directly opining 
on whether those techniques and factors led Dobbs to give a 
false confession.  We refer to an expert witness testifying in 
the form of an educational lecture on general principles as 
exposition testimony.  See Daniel D. Blinka, Expert Testimony 
and the Relevancy Rule in the Age of Daubert, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 
173, 219 (2006) ("Expository testimony consists of a lecture or 
explanation 
on 
a 
specialized 
subject 
such 
as 
economics, 
accounting, engineering, medicine, or psychology."). 
¶32 The circuit court excluded Dr. White's testimony after 
determining that it would not assist the trier of fact for two 
reasons:  (1) Dr. White did not know, and thus could not apply 
his expertise to, the specific facts of the case, contrary to 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) that the expert witness 
"appl[y] the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case"; and (2) Dobbs made no showing that Dr. White's exposition 
testimony would fit the facts of the case.  We will not overturn 
the circuit court's exercise of discretion if the decision had a 
"reasonable basis" and was made in accordance with the proper 
legal standard and the facts in the record.  Pico, 382 
Wis. 2d 273, ¶15.  We accept the circuit court's findings of 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
14 
 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Metro. Assocs. v. City 
of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶25, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784. 
¶33 The admission of expert testimony is governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02.  As originally enacted, § 907.02 permitted 
expert testimony in the form of an opinion or otherwise as long 
as the expert witness was qualified, the evidence assisted the 
trier of fact, and the evidence was relevant.  § 907.02 (1973-
74); Seifert v. Balink, 2017 WI 2, ¶52, 372 Wis. 2d 525, 888 
N.W.2d 816 (lead opinion).  This court initially interpreted 
§ 907.02 to permit exposition testimony without requiring an 
expert to "apply[] those factors to the concrete circumstances 
of th[e] case" or "stat[e] to the jury his own opinion."  
Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 458, 285 N.W.2d 868 (1979).  
This court's reading of § 907.02 was consistent with the federal 
interpretation of the identical language as set forth in Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702 ("Rule 702").13  See Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 
F.2d 374, 378 (4th Cir. 1993) ("An expert on the stand may give 
a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles 
relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to 
                                                 
13 Rule 702 and Wis. Stat. § 907.02 both read: 
If 
scientific, 
technical, 
or 
other 
specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Pub. L. No. 93–595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937 (1975); Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02 (1973-74). 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
15 
 
the facts." (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee 
Notes14 to 1972 Proposed Rule 702)).15 
¶34 In 
2000, 
Rule 
702 
was 
amended 
to 
codify 
the 
reliability standard articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and its progeny.16  In 2011, 
the Wisconsin legislature followed suit, renumbering Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02 to § 907.02(1) and amending it to expressly "adopt the 
Daubert reliability standard embodied in Federal Rule of 
                                                 
14 As Justice Shirley Abrahamson explained in Seifert: 
Under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
is 
authorized 
to 
promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the 
federal courts.  This authority is exercised by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States.  The 
Conference promulgates and changes rules of practice 
and procedure in the federal courts subject to 
oversight by the Court.  For the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, the Judicial Conference is aided in its 
rule-making powers by the Evidence Advisory Committee; 
the members of and reporter to this Committee are 
appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Seifert v. Balink, 2017 WI 2, ¶55 n.13, 372 Wis. 2d 525, 888 
N.W.2d 816 (lead opinion) (citing Paul R. Rice and Neals-Erik 
William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee: A 
Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 679 
(2000)). 
15 Rule 702 served to expressly "encourage the use of expert 
testimony in non-opinion form when counsel believes the trier 
can itself draw the requisite inference," as opposed to having 
an expert witness opine on hypotheticals before the jury.  
Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450, 459, 285 N.W.2d 868 (1979) 
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes to 1972 
Proposed Rule 702). 
16 See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); 
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
16 
 
Evidence 702."  State v. Kandutsch, 2011 WI 78, ¶26 n.7, 336 
Wis. 2d 478, 799 N.W.2d 865; see also State v. Jones, 2018 WI 
44, ¶7, 381 Wis. 2d 284, 911 N.W.2d 97 ("These changes [to 
§ 907.02] adopted the federal standard, which incorporates the 
analysis promulgated in Daubert . . . .") (citing Seifert, 372 
Wis. 2d 525, ¶6); 2011 Wis. Act 2, Wis. S. Amend. Memo, 2011 
Jan. Spec. Sess. S.B. 1 ("This language [in § 907.02(1)] is 
identical to the language of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.").  Section 907.02(1) now reads: 
If 
scientific, 
technical, 
or 
other 
specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
2011 Wis. Act 2, § 34m (emphasis added to signify added 
language). 
¶35 Whether the Daubert reliability standard expressly 
adopted in Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) altered Wisconsin's long-
standing practice of allowing expert exposition testimony is a 
question of first impression.  In answering this question, we 
begin with the text of § 907.02(1).  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. 
Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  We interpret the statutory language in the context 
in which it is used, not in isolation, and we consider prior 
case law in this inquiry as it "may illumine how we have 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
17 
 
previously interpreted or applied the statutory language."  
Augsburger v. Homestead Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 133, ¶16, 359 
Wis. 2d 385, 856 N.W.2d 874 (quoting Belding v. Demoulin, 2014 
WI 8, ¶16, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373).  Since § 907.02(1) 
is identical to the language of Rule 702, we also look to the 
federal interpretation of Rule 702 for guidance.  See State v. 
Poly–America, Inc., 164 Wis. 2d 238, 246, 474 N.W.2d 770 (1991) 
("When a state statute is modeled after a federal rule, we look 
to the federal interpretation of that rule for guidance and 
assistance.").  Lastly, although not dispositive, we consider 
how other state courts have interpreted analogous state laws.  
See Seifert, 372 Wis. 2d 525, ¶55 (lead opinion). 
¶36 The text of Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) permitting an 
expert to testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise" 
remains unchanged by the addition of the Daubert reliability 
standard.  See Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1).  As we recognized in 
Hampton, the phrase "or otherwise" signifies that expert 
testimony may take a form other than an opinion, which courts 
should encourage when the trier of fact can itself draw the 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
18 
 
requisite inference from the facts of the case.17  Hampton, 92 
Wis. 2d at 459; see also Hagenkord v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 452, 
463, 302 N.W.2d 421 (1981) ("Testimony by experts is not limited 
to giving opinions or to the stating of facts derived from 
specialized knowledge.").  A reading of § 907.02(1) that 
requires an expert to apply his or her expertise to the facts of 
the case would result in an expert always providing some type of 
                                                 
17 Circuit courts need this flexibility to limit otherwise 
relevant and reliable expert testimony that, if given in the 
form of an opinion, would invade the prerogative of the finder 
of fact.  See Hampton, 92 Wis. 2d at 458 (holding that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by 
limiting an eyewitness identification expert to only provide 
exposition testimony rather than rendering an opinion on the 
reliability of any of the eyewitnesses' identifications in the 
case); 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series:  Wisconsin 
Evidence § 608.3, at 560 (4th ed.) ("Indeed, the supreme court 
has encouraged the use of expert evidence in non-opinion form 
because such expository testimony assists the jury while 
minimizing the risk that the jury will surrender its autonomy to 
the expert.  A judge reluctant to introduce Jensen evidence may 
nonetheless permit exposition to assist the jury without 
sacrificing the record." (footnote omitted) (citing State v. 
Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 256, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988))). 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
19 
 
an opinion about the matter18 and would render the phrase "or 
otherwise" inoperative.  Such a reading would violate this 
court's interpretive canon "to give reasonable effect to every 
word" in a statute.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. 
¶37 There 
is 
a 
reasonable 
reading 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 907.02(1) 
that 
gives 
effect 
to 
both 
the 
language 
"or 
otherwise" and the condition that "the witness has applied the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case."  If 
the expert is testifying in the form of an opinion, he or she is 
applying the principles or methods to the specific facts of the 
case and must therefore do so reliably.  If, however, the expert 
is testifying in a form other than an opinion, such as an 
exposition, then the expert would not be applying principles or 
                                                 
18 For example, in this case, if Dr. White applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case, he would be 
giving an opinion on whether or not Dobbs's dispositional 
factors combined with the police interrogation techniques could 
have resulted in Dobbs falsely confessing.  It is important to 
recognize that if Dr. White offered such an opinion, it would 
invade the province of the factfinder as the sole determiner of 
credibility.  Cf. State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶104, 328 
Wis. 2d 42, 786 N.W.2d 144 ("The essence of the rule prohibiting 
vouching testimony is that such testimony invades the province 
of the fact-finder as the sole determiner of credibility."  
(citing 
State 
v. 
Haseltine, 
120 
Wis. 2d 92, 
95-96, 
352 
N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984))).  Even if Dr. White had simply been 
asked whether any of the factors he described in his exposition 
testimony related to Dobbs's case, his response would be 
offering his view about whether his exposition testimony relates 
to the particular facts in Dobbs's case.  This is the very 
definition 
of 
an 
opinion. 
 
See 
"Opinion," Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary (2020), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/opinion ("[A] view . . . formed in the 
mind about a particular matter."). 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
20 
 
methods to the facts of the case and it would be nonsensical to 
require him or her to do so reliably. 
¶38 A 
reading 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 907.02(1) 
permitting 
exposition testimony is consistent with the intent of the 
drafters of Rule 702, as evidenced by the Advisory Committee 
Notes to the 2000 Amendment.  See Guertin v. Harbour Assur. Co. 
of Bermuda, 141 Wis. 2d 622, 628–29, 415 N.W.2d 831 (1987) ("The 
'written comments of legislatively created advisory committees 
are relevant in construing statutes and ascertaining the 
legislative intent of statutes recommended by such committees.'" 
(quoting Champlin v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 621, 625, 267 N.W.2d 295 
(1978))).  The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 Amendment 
clarify that the amendment was not intended to alter the 
established practice of admitting exposition testimony without 
requiring an expert to apply those principles to the facts of 
the case. 
If an expert purports to apply principles and methods 
to the facts of the case, it is important that this 
application be conducted reliably.  It might also be 
important in some cases for an expert to educate the 
factfinder about general principles, without ever 
attempting to apply these principles to the specific 
facts of the case.  For example, experts might 
instruct 
the 
factfinder 
on 
the 
principles 
of 
thermodynamics, or bloodclotting, or on how financial 
markets respond to corporate reports, without ever 
knowing about or trying to tie their testimony into 
the facts of the case.  The amendment does not alter 
the venerable practice of using expert testimony to 
educate the factfinder on general principles. 
Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 
Amendment (emphasis added).  The drafters of Rule 702(d) 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
21 
 
intended it to mean that if the expert gives opinion testimony, 
then the expert must reliably apply the principles and methods 
to the facts of the case. 
¶39 Federal courts of appeals also uniformly interpret 
Rule 702 to continue to permit the admission of exposition 
testimony without an expert applying general principles to the 
specific facts of the case.  For example, "[t]he federal courts 
uniformly hold . . . that government agents or similar persons 
may testify as to general practices of criminals to establish 
the defendants' modus operandi."  United States v. Mejia-Luna, 
562 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. 
Skyers, 787 F. App'x 771, 774 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) 
(upholding admission of a detective's expert testimony that 
"generally explained" a drug trafficking circle because it "was 
relevant to helping the jury understand the general nature of 
international 
narcotics 
trafficking 
organizations"); 
United 
States 
v. 
Reed, 
788 
F. App'x 903, 
906 
(4th 
Cir. 
2019) 
(unpublished per curiam) ("Rule 702 did not require [the expert 
witness] to explicitly link his testimony to the specific facts 
of [the] case."); United States v. Galatis, 849 F.3d 455, 462 
(1st Cir. 2017) (holding a Medicare-fraud investigator could 
describe the applicable regulatory regime without ever applying 
the regulations to the facts of the case or suggesting that any 
actions had violated the law); Lapsley v. Xtek, Inc., 689 
F.3d 802, 809 (7th Cir. 2012) ("As the Rule 702 committee 
notes . . . make clear, an expert may . . . 'give a dissertation 
or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
22 
 
case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts.'" 
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes to 1972 
Proposed Rule 702)). 
¶40 Federal courts acknowledge that an expert need not 
even know the specific facts of the case to satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 702.  See United States ex rel. Miller v. 
Bill Harbert Int'l Const., Inc., 608 F.3d 871, 893-96 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (per curiam) (upholding the admission of an expert witness 
who had no direct knowledge of the facts in the case, but whose 
testimony on how bid-rigging cartels work in general was 
sufficiently connected to the facts to be relevant and helpful 
to 
the 
jury); 
see 
also 
United 
States 
v. 
Warren, 
774 
F. App'x 778, 780-82 (4th Cir. 2019) (unpublished per curiam) 
(concluding that a FBI agent, "who acknowledged that he had no 
information 
regarding 
the 
facts 
of 
[the] 
case," 
could 
permissibly "testif[y] generally about human trafficking" to put 
the case into context for the jury); United States v. Brinson, 
772 F.3d 1314, 1319-20 (10th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the argument 
that an expert without knowledge of the specific case facts was 
unreliable because he testified generally "about characteristics 
of the prostitution trade" rather than "about case-specific 
facts"). 
¶41 State supreme courts faced with this issue have 
likewise interpreted state statutes modeled after Rule 702 to 
allow for the admission of expert exposition testimony.  The 
Arizona Supreme Court was recently faced with a claim that the 
same statutory language——"the expert has reliably applied the 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
23 
 
principles and methods to the facts of the case"——necessitates 
that the expert have knowledge of, and apply his or her 
expertise to, the particular facts of the case.  State v. 
Salazar-Mercado, 325 P.3d 996 (Ariz. 2014) (interpreting Ariz. 
R. Evid. 702).  Citing federal case law and the Advisory 
Committee Notes, the Arizona Supreme Court held that its expert 
testimony rule "does not bar admission of 'cold' expert 
testimony that educates the trier of fact about general 
principles but is not tied to the particular facts of the 
case."19  Id. at 997-99, 1001.  The South Dakota Supreme Court 
likewise reached the same conclusion.  See State v. Johnson, 860 
N.W.2d 235, 247-48 (S.D. 2015) ("[A]n expert's testimony may be 
admissible [pursuant to S.D. Stat. § 19-19-702] even if the 
expert's sole function is 'to educate the factfinder about 
general principles, without ever attempting to apply [those] 
principles to the specific facts of the case.'" (alteration in 
original) (quoting Salazar-Mercado, 325 P.3d at 999)); see also 
                                                 
19 In a similar vein, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that 
its state's adoption of the Rule 702 language resolved the 
"Catch-22" expert witnesses faced when testifying to eyewitness 
reliability.  State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1106-07, 1114 
(Utah 2009) (interpreting Utah R. Evid. 702 (2009)).  Under 
Utah's prior rule, eyewitness experts whose testimony was too 
specific would be excluded for invading the province of the 
factfinder, while experts whose testimony was too general would 
be excluded for lecturing rather than dealing with the specific 
facts of the case.  Id.  The Utah Supreme Court concluded that 
the recent amendment to its own expert witness rule adopting the 
language of Rule 702 now permitted an eyewitness expert to 
"'give a dissertation or exposition' of factors found in the 
case 
that 
are 
understood 
to 
contribute 
to 
eyewitness 
inaccuracy."  Id. at 1114. 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
24 
 
State v. Marshall, 596 S.W.3d 156, 160-62 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020) 
(interpreting Mo. Stat. § 490.065.2(1)). 
¶42 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) continues to 
permit an expert witness to testify in the form of an opinion 
"or otherwise," including exposition testimony on general 
principles without explicitly applying those principles to, or 
even having knowledge of, the specific facts of the case.  If an 
expert testifies in the form of an opinion, then the expert must 
apply the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the 
case. 
¶43 Our inquiry does not end there, however, because the 
admissibility of exposition testimony pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02(1) is not automatic.  "[T]he trial judge stands as a 
gatekeeper to prevent irrelevant or unreliable testimony from 
being admitted."  Lapsley, 689 F.3d at 809; see also Jones, 381 
Wis. 2d 284, ¶¶31-32 ("[T]he heightened standard under the 
amended Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) does not change this gatekeeping 
function.").  When expert testimony is proffered in the form of 
an exposition on general principles, the circuit court, as 
gatekeeper, 
must 
consider 
the 
following 
four 
factors:  
(1) whether the expert is qualified; (2) whether the testimony 
will address a subject matter on which the factfinder can be 
assisted by an expert; (3) whether the testimony is reliable; 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
25 
 
and (4) whether the testimony will "fit" the facts of the case.20  
7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series:  Wisconsin 
Evidence § 702.4032, at 673-74 (4th ed. 2017) (citing Fed. R. 
Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 Amendment).  The 
party proffering the expert testimony bears the burden of 
satisfying 
each 
of 
these 
preliminary 
questions 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 901.04; see also 
                                                 
20 This four-part inquiry is consistent with how federal 
courts analyze exposition testimony.  See, e.g., United States 
ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int'l Const., Inc., 608 F.3d 871, 
894-96 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Burton v. Am. Cyanamid, 
362 F. Supp. 3d 588, 601-02 (E.D. Wis. 2019); Emblaze Ltd. v. 
Apple Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 949, 959-61 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Konikov 
v. Orange Cty., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2003); 
Magistrini 
v. 
One 
Hour 
Martinizing 
Dry 
Cleaning, 
180 
F. Supp. 2d 584, 612 n.30 (D.N.J. 2002), aff'd, 68 F. App'x 356 
(3d Cir. 2003); TC Sys. Inc. v. Town of Colonie, 213 
F. Supp. 2d 171, 175, 178-79 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Fed. R. 
Evid. 702, Advisory Committee's Notes to 2000 Amendments; 32 
C.J.S. Evidence § 801 (2020); Daniel D. Blinka, Expert Testimony 
and the Relevancy Rule in the Age of Daubert, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 
173, 219 & n.215 (2006).  State courts with an expert 
evidentiary rule modeled after Rule 702 similarly recognize this 
test as the proper one for exposition testimony.  See State v. 
Johnson, 860 N.W.2d 235, 248 (S.D. 2015); State v. Marshall, 596 
S.W.3d 156, 160-61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020). 
These 
considerations 
differ 
slightly 
from 
the 
considerations 
to 
admit 
opinion 
testimony 
of 
an 
expert:  
(1) whether the scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (2) whether the expert 
is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education; (3) whether the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data; (4) whether the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods; and (5) whether the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case.  State v. Jones, 2018 WI 44, ¶29, 381 
Wis. 2d 284, 911 N.W.2d 97. 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
26 
 
Seifert, 372 Wis. 2d 525, ¶58 (lead opinion) (citing Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 593); Blinka, supra, § 702.403, at 672. 
¶44 Fit "goes primarily to relevance," Daubert, 509 U.S. 
at 591, and is tied to the gatekeeping function the circuit 
courts perform under Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  Whether expert 
testimony "fits" a case turns on whether it is "sufficiently 
tied to the facts of the case" such that "it will aid the jury 
in resolving a factual dispute."  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 
(quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (1985)).  
"[E]xpert testimony is helpful to the jury," or fits, "if it 
concerns a matter beyond the understanding of the average 
person, assists the jury in understanding facts at issue, or 
puts the facts in context."  United States v. Welch, 368 
F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2004), judgment vacated on other 
grounds, 543 U.S. 1112 (2005).  Establishing the fit of 
exposition testimony is particularly important because, unlike 
opinion testimony, exposition testimony does not in and of 
itself explicitly connect the witness's expertise to the 
particular facts of the case.  See Trout v. Milton S. Hershey 
Med. 
Ctr., 
576 
F. Supp. 2d 673, 
677 
(M.D. 
Pa. 
2008) 
("Generalized expert testimony that is factually disconnected 
from the case is inadmissible because it does not assist the 
jury in rendering a verdict based on the material facts in 
issue.") (citing Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 755 n.12 
(3d Cir. 2000)). 
¶45 In this case, the circuit court determined that 
Dr. White's exposition testimony did not fit the particular 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
27 
 
facts of Dobbs's case because Dobbs "made no showing that the 
types of tactics that were employed in [his] case would 
correspond to any of the generalized opinions that Dr. White 
holds about false confessions and police interrogations."  We 
conclude that the circuit court applied the proper legal 
standard for admission of exposition testimony in assessing the 
fit of Dr. White's testimony to the facts of the case.  We 
therefore uphold its exercise of discretion so long as the 
circuit court had "a reasonable basis," applying the proper 
legal standard "in accordance with the facts of record."  Pico, 
382 Wis. 2d 273, ¶15 (quoting LaCount, 310 Wis. 2d 85, ¶15). 
¶46 Dr. White testified that he would educate the jury on 
police interrogation techniques that could make an innocent 
person confess:  isolation, confrontation with inculpatory 
evidence, police indifference to claims of innocence, being in 
custody for over six hours, persistent questioning, minimization 
of the accused's culpability or the consequences, and implying 
lenient treatment will be given in return for a confession.  
Dr. White 
also 
testified 
he 
would 
educate 
the 
jury 
on 
dispositional characteristics that, when combined with those 
police interrogation techniques, make an accused person more 
vulnerable to falsely confessing:  youth (under 25 years old), 
low intelligence, a suggestible or compliant predisposition, 
mental disorders like anxiety or depression, sleep deprivation, 
and physical exhaustion. 
¶47 According to Dobbs, Dr. White's testimony would have 
assisted the jury in assessing the truthfulness of Dobbs's 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
28 
 
confessions to police by correcting a common misbelief that 
innocent people do not confess to crimes they did not commit.  
Dobbs further argues that he established a "fit" with his 
circumstances 
and 
Dr. White's 
testimony 
based 
on 
his 
dispositional 
factors——anxiety, 
depression, 
and 
sleep 
deprivation——combined with the police using the interrogation 
technique of confronting him with evidence suggesting his guilt. 
¶48 We acknowledge that the circuit court could have found 
this 
narrow 
overlap 
provided 
a 
sufficient 
fit 
between 
Dr. White's testimony and the facts of Dobbs's case.21  This is a 
matter of circuit court discretion, however, and therefore our 
role on review is to "search the record for reasons to sustain 
the circuit court's exercise of discretion."  Pico, 382 
Wis. 2d 273, ¶15 (quoting LaCount, 310 Wis. 2d 85, ¶15). 
                                                 
21 The Innocence Project, Inc. and The Wisconsin Innocence 
Project, as amicus curiae, argue that once the presence of even 
one of the recognized risk factors is shown, the Daubert 
threshold for fit is satisfied and at that point the circuit 
court loses any discretion in the matter.  A circuit court, in 
its discretion, might reasonably decide that the testimony is 
not beyond the understanding of the average person, does not 
assist the jury in understanding facts at issue, or does not put 
the facts in context.  United States v. Welch, 368 F.3d 970, 974 
(7th Cir. 2004), judgment vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 
1112 (2005). 
Additionally, the circuit court may always exclude expert 
testimony, "if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  Wis. 
Stat. § 904.03. 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
29 
 
¶49 The circuit court found that Dobbs was not subject to 
most of the types of coercive interrogation techniques described 
by Dr. White.  Dobbs had not been in custody for over six hours, 
was not persistently interrogated while in custody, nor was he 
isolated for much of that time.  The police did not attempt to 
lessen his culpability or offer him leniency if he confessed.  
The police did not fabricate incriminating evidence.  The record 
further contains at least six instances of Dobbs spontaneously 
admitting to huffing the air duster absent any coercive police 
tactics. 
¶50 Additionally, our review of the record indicates that 
Dobbs did not possess most of the characteristics that Dr. White 
would testify may predispose an individual to falsely confess if 
coercive interrogation techniques were used.  Dobbs was not 
younger than 25 years old and did not claim to be of low 
intelligence or particularly suggestible. 
¶51 The circuit court could have reasonably concluded that 
Dr. White's exposition testimony regarding situational factors 
that increase the likelihood of false confessions would not 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence, especially 
in light of the numerous spontaneous confessions introduced into 
evidence.  See United States v. Mamah, 332 F.3d 475, 477-78 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (upholding the exclusion of expert testimony for lack 
of fit where the defendant had previously been subjected to 
coercive interrogation tactics, but the confession at issue was 
made at a later point when the defendant was not subjected to 
those tactics).  We conclude that the circuit court properly 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
30 
 
exercised its discretion in excluding Dr. White's testimony on 
the grounds that it did not sufficiently fit the facts of 
Dobbs's case. 
 
B.  Dobbs was subject to custodial interrogation without being 
read Miranda warnings, but the admission of those statements was 
harmless error. 
¶52 Dobbs moved to suppress the statements he made from 
approximately 7:30 a.m. to 10:19 a.m. on the grounds that he was 
subject to custodial interrogation and not read the Miranda 
warnings, violating his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.  The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."22  In 
order to protect the rights secured by the Fifth Amendment, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the government "may not 
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming 
from 
custodial 
interrogation 
of 
the 
defendant 
unless 
it 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination."  Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  Pursuant to Miranda, no 
suspect may be subjected to custodial interrogation until he is 
"warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement 
                                                 
22 The Wisconsin Constitution similarly provides that "[n]o 
person . . . may be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself or herself."  Wis. Const. Art. I, § 8.  
This court has generally interpreted this provision consistent 
with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution.  See State v. Ward, 
2009 WI 60, ¶18 n.3, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236. 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
31 
 
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he 
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed."  Id.  Incriminating statements made in violation of 
Miranda must be suppressed, id., unless the admission of the 
statements was harmless error. 
¶53 Since custody is "a necessary prerequisite to Miranda 
protections," we must first resolve whether Dobbs was "in 
custody," as that term is understood in the Miranda context.  
State v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶23, 346 Wis. 2d 523, 828 
N.W.2d 552.  A person is in custody for Miranda purposes if 
"there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of 
a degree associated with a formal arrest."  State v. Bartelt, 
2018 WI 16, ¶31, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906 N.W.2d 684 (quoted source 
omitted); see also California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 
(1983) (per curiam) ("Although the circumstances of each case 
must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is 
'in custody' for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the 
ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or 
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with 
a formal arrest." (quoted source omitted)). 
¶54 This objective test requires us to examine the 
totality of the circumstances.  See Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 
¶¶31-32; see also Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-13 
(1995).  There are several factors we consider, including:  "the 
defendant's freedom to leave; the purpose, place, and length of 
the interrogation; and the degree of restraint."  State v. 
Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶35, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
32 
 
(quoting Morgan, 254 Wis. 2d 602, ¶12).  When evaluating the 
"degree of restraint," we consider "whether the suspect is 
handcuffed, whether a weapon is drawn, whether a frisk is 
performed, the manner in which the suspect is restrained, 
whether the suspect is moved to another location, whether 
questioning took place in a police vehicle, and the number of 
officers involved."  Morgan, 254 Wis. 2d 602, ¶12. 
¶55 As the State conceded, in both its brief23 and at oral 
argument,24 Dobbs was in custody at some point while he was being 
questioned in the squad car and therefore Miranda warnings were 
required well before Officer Pines first read them at 10:19 a.m.  
While we accept that concession, we also explain why, under the 
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Dobbs's 
position would have felt a restraint on his freedom of movement 
of a degree associated with formal arrest and why he was 
                                                 
23 For example, the State conceded that "Dobbs's statements 
in response to inquisitorial questions before he waived his 
Miranda rights probably should have been suppressed because 
Dobbs was probably in custody at some point while he was being 
questioned." 
24 As the assistant attorney general conceded at oral 
argument: 
At some point when you look at the [State v. Bartelt, 
2018 WI 16, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906 N.W.2d 684] factors, 
it would appear that at some point because he was 
frisked, he was handcuffed, he was in the back of a 
locked squad car, and he was asked some questions, 
some of which were not inquisitorial and some of them 
may have been.  So I think at some point during that 
hour, it is likely that it changed into a custodial 
type situation. 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
33 
 
therefore in custody for purposes of Miranda.  But first, we 
answer the question we presented to the parties:  "Whether the 
court of appeals' decision is consistent with State v. Morgan, 
2002 WI App 124, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 648 N.W.2d 23, and if not, 
whether Morgan should be overruled." 
¶56 In Morgan, 254 Wis. 2d 602, ¶13, the court of appeals 
emphasized that the analyses required by the Fourth Amendment 
and Fifth Amendment are distinct, despite some lack of clarity 
in the case law.  See United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1096 
(7th Cir. 1993) ("[O]ur inquiry into the circumstances of 
temporary detention for a Fifth and Sixth Amendment Miranda 
analysis requires a different focus than that for a Fourth 
Amendment Terry25 stop.").  The court of appeals in this case 
fell prey to this confusion when it relied upon Blatterman, a 
Fourth Amendment case, to resolve Dobbs's Fifth Amendment 
claim.26  See Dobbs, No. 2018AP319–CR, ¶¶12-13 (per curiam) 
(relying exclusively on State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, 362 
Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26). 
                                                 
25 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
26 In her concurrence in Martin, then-Chief Justice Shirley 
Abrahamson made a "cautionary point" that "[i]t is possible that 
some past cases have cited Fourth Amendment cases while deciding 
Fifth Amendment issues or cited Fifth Amendment cases while 
deciding Fourth Amendment issues.  Going forward, this court 
should 
be 
cautious 
to 
avoid 
conflating 
closely 
related 
constitutional standards and analyses."  State v. Martin, 2012 
WI 96, ¶¶72, 77, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring). 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
34 
 
¶57 We uphold Morgan and clarify that the Fourth Amendment 
and Fifth Amendment protect different interests and involve 
different inquiries.  A claimed violation of a defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights involves balancing the government's 
interest in crime prevention against an individual's right to be 
free from government intrusion.  See Morgan, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 
¶14 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-27 (1968)).  When 
evaluating a Terry stop under the Fourth Amendment, this court 
considers the totality of the circumstances leading up to the 
stop and focuses on "the reasonableness of the officers' actions 
in the situation facing them."  State v. Miller, 2012 WI 61, 
¶30, 341 Wis. 2d 307, 815 N.W.2d 349 (quoted source omitted). 
¶58 The Fifth Amendment protects a different interest:  
the right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself.  Morgan, 
254 Wis. 2d 602, ¶15.  We require Miranda warnings to be given 
based on the need to protect the fairness of a criminal 
defendant's trial.  Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 240 (1973)).  It is well-settled that at the point in 
time where an individual's freedom of action is "curtailed to a 
'degree associated with a formal arrest'" under the totality of 
the circumstances, the safeguards of Miranda become applicable.  
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting Beheler, 
463 U.S. at 1125). 
¶59 A brief detention, such as a traffic stop, typically 
does not rise to the level of "custody" for purposes of Miranda.  
See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437-40.  However, if under the 
totality of the circumstances a detained motorist's freedom of 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
35 
 
action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest, 
he or she is entitled to the "full panoply of protections 
prescribed by Miranda."  Id. at 440 (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)); see State v. Griffith, 
2000 WI 72, ¶69 n.14, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72 (noting that 
the United States Supreme Court has "made clear that if a 
detained motorist is treated in such a manner that he or she is 
rendered 
'in 
custody' 
for 
practical 
purposes, 
Miranda 
protections are triggered."); State v. Gruen, 218 Wis. 2d 581, 
594, 582 N.W.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]he fact that a 
defendant was detained pursuant to a Terry stop does not 
automatically dispel the need for Miranda warnings."). 
¶60 We therefore recognize the distinction between an 
analysis of a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment as 
aptly described in Morgan, 254 Wis. 2d 602, ¶¶13-16.  Having 
clarified this framework and identified the court of appeals' 
error in relying on Blatterman, 362 Wis. 2d 138, we return to 
the facts of Dobbs's case. 
¶61 We conclude that Dobbs was in custody for purposes of 
Miranda 
protections 
because, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, a reasonable person would have considered himself 
restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest.  See 
Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶¶34-35.  First, Dobbs was never free 
to leave from the moment Officer Milton blocked Dobbs's vehicle 
and handcuffed him in a locked squad car.  In each of the 
locations Dobbs was taken, he was either locked in, guarded by 
armed law enforcement, or both.  This was not like a routine 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
36 
 
traffic stop where if Dobbs had successfully performed the field 
sobriety tests, he would have been free to leave.  See State v. 
Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 452, 475 N.W.2d 148, abrogated on 
other grounds by State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 
695 N.W.2d 277 ("A reasonable person would understand a request 
to perform a field sobriety test to mean that if he or she 
passed the test, he or she would be free to leave."). 
¶62 Second, 
as 
to 
the 
"place[] 
and 
length 
of 
the 
interrogation," 
Martin, 
343 
Wis. 2d 278, 
¶35, 
Dobbs 
was 
initially questioned by Officer Milton in his parked, locked 
squad car from 7:31 a.m. until 8:52 a.m., with a short break to 
complete field sobriety tests.  Dobbs was then subjected to more 
questioning at the hospital by several armed officers.  Unlike a 
brief traffic stop, the place of interrogation did not expose 
Dobbs to public view and would have caused a reasonable person 
to feel completely at the mercy of police.  See Berkemer, 468 
U.S. at 437-40. 
¶63 Ultimately, Dobbs was not read the Miranda warnings 
until almost three hours after he was first handcuffed and put 
in the backseat of a locked squad car.  Three hours is 
significantly longer than the 30 minutes of questioning in a 
patrol car that the United States Supreme Court has implied 
rises to the level of custody for purposes of Miranda.  On 
multiple occasions the Supreme Court has cited favorably to 
Commonwealth v. Meyer, 412 A.2d 517 (Pa. 1980), which concluded 
that a driver was in custody for purposes of Miranda when he was 
detained for over 30 minutes, part of the time in a patrol car, 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
37 
 
and subject to questioning.  See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 427 
nn.7 & 8, 441 n.34; see also Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 
11 n.2 (per curiam) ("[T]he motorist in Meyer could be found to 
have been placed in custody for purposes of Miranda safeguards 
because he was detained for over half an hour, and subjected to 
questioning while in the patrol car."). 
¶64 Lastly, we examine the degree of restraint, which 
includes "whether the suspect is handcuffed, whether a weapon is 
drawn, whether a frisk is performed, the manner in which the 
suspect is restrained, whether the suspect is moved to another 
location, whether questioning took place in a police vehicle, 
and the number of officers involved."  Morgan, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 
¶12.  A degree of restraint was used when Officer Milton 
initially blocked Dobbs's car and ordered him out while holding 
onto his service weapon.  Dobbs was then frisked, handcuffed, 
and locked in the backseat of Officer Milton's squad car while 
being questioned for the first hour.  Dobbs was not told "no" 
when he asked whether he was going to be arrested and whether he 
was going to jail.  Cf. State v. Quigley, 2016 WI App 53, ¶¶36-
43, 370 Wis. 2d 702, 883 N.W.2d 139 (holding that the defendant 
was not in custody for purposes of Miranda where he was told 
numerous times during questioning in an unlocked room that he 
was not under arrest and was free to leave).  Dobbs was also 
surrounded by multiple officers at all times on the scene and at 
the hospital, as many as four officers at one time. 
¶65 Unlike in Gruen, 218 Wis. 2d at 598, where the 
defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda because he 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
38 
 
was only held in a police van for 10-15 minutes without 
handcuffs 
and 
asked 
"three 
short, 
general, 
common-sense 
investigatory questions," Dobbs was initially questioned for an 
hour while handcuffed in a locked squad car.  Just as the 
defendants in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984), and 
Morgan, 254 Wis. 2d 602, were determined to be in custody for 
purposes of Miranda because they were surrounded by multiple 
officers and handcuffed27 at the time of questioning,28 Dobbs's 
freedom was restricted to the degree associated with formal 
arrest. 
¶66 Having concluded that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, Dobbs was in custody for purposes of Miranda well 
before 10:19 a.m., we must next ascertain whether he was subject 
to interrogation.  Custodial interrogation can take two forms:  
express questioning or its functional equivalent.  See State v. 
Harris, 2017 WI 31, ¶15, 374 Wis. 2d 271, 892 N.W.2d 663; see 
also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) ("[T]he 
term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express 
                                                 
27 While we have recognized that the use of handcuffs alone 
"does not in all cases render a suspect in custody for Miranda 
purposes," Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶34, this case involves 
other factors relevant to the degree of restraint. 
28 These cases are distinguishable from Torkelson, where the 
court concluded that a reasonable person in the defendant's 
position "would not believe his freedom was restricted to a 
'degree associated with formal arrest'" after being briefly 
questioned by one officer in an area open to the public and not 
handcuffed or physically restrained.  State v. Torkelson, 2007 
WI App 272, ¶20, 306 Wis. 2d 673, 743 N.W.2d 511 (quoted source 
omitted). 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
39 
 
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the 
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.") (footnotes 
omitted).  "Express questioning" does not encompass every 
inquiry that is directed to a suspect, it covers only those 
"designed to elicit incriminatory admissions."  Harris, 374 
Wis. 2d 271, ¶16 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 
602 n.14 (1990)).  Therefore, it is "the nature of the 
information the question is trying to reach" that determines 
whether a question is inquisitorial.  Id., ¶17. 
¶67 As the State concedes, Officer Milton's questions and 
statements about the damage to Dobbs's vehicle, his depression 
and anxiety, and injuries to his face were intended to illicit 
incriminatory 
admissions 
and 
therefore 
were 
likely 
inquisitorial.29  Accordingly, we conclude that under the 
                                                 
29 We need not determine which questions and statements were 
intended to illicit incriminatory admissions.  However, the 
questions Officer Milton asked Dobbs included: 
 Do you have any medical issues other than that 
splint that you were wearing?" 
 "Do you take medications for depression and 
anxiety?" 
 "Do you have any injuries from the collision with 
the curb? 
 "So [those bruises and scratches on your face] 
are all old?" 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
40 
 
totality of the circumstances, Dobbs was subject to custodial 
interrogation for purposes of Miranda.30  Therefore, it was error 
for at least some of Dobbs's pre-Miranda statements to be 
admitted at trial.  However, because we determine the error in 
admitting Dobbs's statements was harmless, we need not resolve 
precisely which statements should have been suppressed by the 
circuit court. 
¶68 Admitting Dobbs's pre-Miranda statements was harmless 
error if it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 
jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error."  
Martin, 
343 
Wis. 2d 278, 
¶45 
(quoted 
source 
omitted).  
Accordingly, the State must prove "that the error complained of 
                                                                                                                                                             
We also note that Officer Milton's comments "I smell 
alcohol" and "its obvious you hit something" could also be 
considered the functional equivalent to express questioning. 
30 Rejecting the State's concession that Dobbs was subject 
to custodial interrogation because she finds it "ill-advised," 
Justice Ziegler reframes this case in a way that was neither 
briefed nor argued by the parties:  "To me, the actual issue in 
this case is whether law enforcement's investigatory detention 
of Dobbs under Terry turned into custody under Miranda for 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment purposes."  Justice Ziegler's 
concurrence, ¶101.  Justice Ziegler further declares that "The 
extent to which a stop can be reasonable under Terry for Fourth 
Amendment purposes and, nonetheless, render the suspect in 
custody under Miranda for Fifth Amendment purposes is an issue 
subject to a federal circuit court split."  Id., ¶99.  Although 
the discussion that follows demonstrates that a few circuits 
simply frame the issue differently, as opposed to being "split," 
we focus only on whether Dobbs was in custody for purposes of 
Miranda, which the State expressly concedes.  See Springer v. 
Nohl Elec. Prods. Corp., 2018 WI 48, ¶40, 381 Wis. 2d 438, 912 
N.W.2d 1 
("[T]he 
court 
must 
always 
be 
careful 
not 
to 
gratuitously address issues unnecessary to the resolution of the 
matter before us"). 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
41 
 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained."  State v. Mayo, 
2007 WI 78, ¶47, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115 (quoted source 
omitted). 
¶69 All of Dobbs's incriminating statements about huffing 
air duster before hitting the pedestrian were made to Officers 
Milton and Fleischauer following Dobbs's waiver of his Miranda 
rights, or were made to officers, hospital staff, and his father 
spontaneously.  To the extent that Dobbs's five pre-Miranda 
statements introduced into evidence were incriminating, they 
were also independently testified to by other witnesses or were 
inconsequential to the crime of homicide by intoxicated use of a 
vehicle, the only crime for which Dobbs was convicted. 
¶70 First, Officer Milton testified that Dobbs told him 
"he had gone to Menards and he was on his way home."  This fact 
was independently introduced by Officer Frey, who found the 
Menards receipt for air duster dated the morning of the 
accident.  Second, Officer Milton testified that Dobbs "admitted 
to having hit a curb," a fact that a witness to the accident 
testified to at trial.  Third, Dobbs told Officer Milton he "had 
a few beers the previous evening," but the jury heard that there 
was no alcohol detected in Dobbs's blood.  Fourth, Dobbs told 
Officer Milton that he "suffered from depression and anxiety and 
he 
took 
medications 
for 
those 
conditions, 
as 
well 
as 
painkillers."  Dobbs testified at trial about his medical 
conditions and his medications.  Finally, the jury heard that 
Dobbs said "none of the injuries on his face were as a result of 
the accident."  However, identifying when Dobbs received his 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
42 
 
facial injuries was not relevant to proving he committed 
homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle.  We therefore conclude 
that any error in admitting Dobbs's pre-Miranda statements "did 
not contribute to the verdict obtained," and was harmless. 
C.  All of Dobbs's statements were voluntary. 
¶71 In the alternative, Dobbs moved to suppress his 
statements both before and after he was read the Miranda 
warnings because he alleged they were not voluntarily made.  In 
its written decision, the circuit court merely said:  "Each of 
the statements made by the defendant to Officers Milton, Pine, 
Kleinfeldt, Van Hove, Dyer, Baldukas and Baehmann has been 
demonstrated to have been voluntary and not the product of 
coercion in any degree." 
¶72 When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of the 
statements he made to law enforcement the State bears the burden 
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
statements were voluntary.  See State v. Moore, 2015 WI 54, ¶55, 
363 Wis. 2d 376, 864 N.W.2d 827.  We evaluate voluntariness in 
light of all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and 
balance the defendant's personal characteristics against the 
actions of law enforcement.  See id., ¶56.  We cannot properly 
label a statement involuntary unless there is "some affirmative 
evidence of improper police practices deliberately used to 
procure a confession."  Id. (quoting State v. Clappes, 136 
Wis. 2d 222, 239, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987).  A defendant's personal 
characteristics alone "cannot form the basis for finding that 
the 
suspect's 
confessions, 
admissions, 
or 
statements 
are 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
43 
 
involuntary."  Moore, 363 Wis. 2d 376, ¶56; see Hoppe, 261 
Wis. 2d 294, ¶37 ("Coercive or improper police conduct is a 
necessary prerequisite for a finding of involuntariness." 
(citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986))); 
Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 239. 
¶73 Dobbs asks this court to conclude that his statements 
to the police were involuntary without providing any evidence of 
improper police conduct or coercion.  Instead, he points solely 
to his personal characteristics, namely his "physical and 
emotional duress" on September 5, 2015, including: 
 his swollen and infected hand that he had not taken 
his painkillers or antibiotics for; 
 his depression and anxiety; 
 his failure to take his prescribed medication for his 
depression and anxiety; 
 his lack of sleep in 40 hours; and 
 his emotional breakdowns throughout the day. 
Additionally, Dobbs notes that he had minimal contact with law 
enforcement prior to the day of the accident as he had no prior 
adult or juvenile record and had never been on probation or 
supervision. 
¶74 However, Dobbs's failure to establish any improper 
police 
practices 
is 
determinative. 
 
We 
decline 
Dobbs's 
invitation to assess the voluntariness of his statements based 
solely on the his physical and mental condition as it would 
"effectively result in the establishment of a per se rule of 
involuntariness 
(and 
inadmissibility) 
whenever 
an 
officer 
No.  2018AP319-CR 
 
44 
 
questions a defendant who is suffering from serious pain and 
undergoing medical treatment at the time the questioning takes 
place."  Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 242.  We conclude that based 
upon the lack of proof of any improper police practices, Dobbs's 
statements were voluntary. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶75 We conclude that the circuit court properly exercised 
its discretion when it excluded Dr. White's exposition testimony 
for a lack of fit with the facts of Dobbs's case.  Additionally, 
although we determine that several of Dobbs's statements should 
have been suppressed because he was subject to custodial 
interrogation and not read the Miranda warnings, we conclude 
that the error was harmless.  We further conclude that all of 
Dobbs's statements were voluntary. 
¶76 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶77 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion's analyses and conclusions regarding the 
admissibility 
of 
Dr. 
White's 
expert 
testimony 
and 
the 
voluntariness of Dobbs' statements to law enforcement.  But I do 
not join the majority's analysis or conclusions regarding 
Miranda1 and custodial interrogation for two reasons.  First, I 
disagree with the majority's ultimate conclusion.  Dobbs was not 
subject to custodial interrogation at any time prior to 
receiving his Miranda warnings on the day in question.  Second, 
I am concerned that the majority's analysis, though it addresses 
the Fifth Amendment and Miranda, could seriously undermine 
Fourth Amendment law regarding Terry2 stops and investigatory 
detention.  Accordingly, I write separately to clarify the 
jurisprudence 
surrounding 
the 
intersection 
of 
Terry 
investigatory detention and Miranda custodial interrogation.  I 
respectfully concur. 
 
I.  MIRANDA AND THIS CASE 
¶78 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states that "[n]o person" "shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself" or herself.  Article 1, 
section 8(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution affords the same 
protection.  State v. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, ¶26, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 
906 N.W.2d 684 (citing State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶18 n.3, 318 
Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236).  In Miranda v. Arizona, the 
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
Supreme Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment requires law 
enforcement to inform suspects of their rights prior to 
conducting custodial interrogations.3  384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
Miranda warnings are required because "'[t]he circumstances 
surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to 
overbear the will of [the suspect.]'"  Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 
¶27 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469).  Accordingly, Miranda is 
rooted in a concern that custodial interrogation can "compel[]" 
a suspect "to be a witness against himself" or herself.  U.S. 
Const. amend. V. 
¶79 In this case, law enforcement did not inform Dobbs of 
his Miranda rights until around 10:19 a.m., after he had already 
made a series of statements.  This concurrence focuses on the 
narrow issue of whether Miranda required Dobbs' pre-warning 
                                                 
3 We summarized the content of 
Miranda warnings and 
suspects' relevant rights in Bartelt as follows: 
"[The suspect] must be warned prior to any 
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, 
that anything he says can be used against him in a 
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of 
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney 
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning 
if he so desires."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.  If the 
accused indicates that he or she wishes to remain 
silent, questioning must stop.  If he or she requests 
counsel, questioning must stop until an attorney is 
present.  Id. at 474. 
State v. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, ¶27 n.6, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906 
N.W.2d 684. 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
statements 
to 
be 
suppressed.4 
 
Because 
only 
custodial 
interrogation triggers Miranda protections, the court must 
determine whether Dobbs was both in custody and subject to 
interrogation prior to 10:19 a.m.  On review, determinations of 
custody and interrogation involve a two-step process.  Bartelt, 
379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶25; State v. Harris, 2017 WI 31, ¶9, 374 
Wis. 2d 271, 892 N.W.2d 663.  We review the circuit court's 
factual findings and uphold them unless they are clearly 
erroneous. 
 
Bartelt, 
379 
Wis. 2d 588, 
¶25; 
Harris, 
374 
Wis. 2d 271, ¶9.  We then apply constitutional principles 
regarding Miranda custody and interrogation to the facts de 
novo, but benefit from the analyses of the courts below.  
Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶25; Harris, 374 Wis. 2d 271, ¶9.  The 
parties do not dispute the circuit court's factual findings in 
this case. 
A.  Custody 
¶80 "The test to determine whether a person is in custody 
under Miranda is an objective test."  Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 
¶31 (citing State v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶27, 346 Wis. 2d 523, 
828 N.W.2d 552).  We look to the "totality of the circumstances" 
to determine "whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of a degree associated with a formal 
arrest."  Id. (citing Lonkoski, 346 Wis. 2d 523, ¶27; California 
                                                 
4 Dobbs 
does 
not 
challenge 
the 
sufficiency 
of 
law 
enforcement's Miranda warnings, once he heard them, or the 
validity of his waiver.  Rather, he challenges the admissibility 
of his post-Miranda warning statements as involuntary only.  I 
join the majority on the voluntariness issue, and so will not 
address it here. 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam); and State 
v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶33, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270)).  
See also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) ("'[T]he 
ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a "formal arrest or 
restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with 
a formal arrest[.]'" (quoting Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125)). 
¶81 "We consider a variety of factors to determine whether 
under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person 
would feel at liberty to [leave]."  Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 
¶32.  Those factors include: "the defendant's freedom to leave; 
the purpose, place, and length of the interrogation; and the 
degree of restraint."  Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶35 (citing 
State v. Morgan, 2002 WI App 124, ¶12, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 648 
N.W.2d 23).  Regarding degree of restraint, "we consider: 
whether the suspect is handcuffed, whether a weapon is drawn, 
whether a frisk is performed, the manner in which the suspect is 
restrained, whether the suspect is moved to another location, 
whether questioning took place in a police vehicle, and the 
number of officers involved."  Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶32 
(citing Morgan, 254 Wis. 2d 602, ¶12). 
¶82 But the restraint-on-freedom-of-movement test does not 
end the inquiry.  Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶33.  Restraint on 
freedom of movement, i.e., constructive arrest, is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition to establish Miranda custody.  
Id.  "If we determine that a suspect's freedom of movement" is 
restrained to a degree "such that a reasonable person would not 
feel free to leave, we must then consider whether 'the relevant 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
environment 
presents . . . inherently 
coercive 
pressures 
. . . .'"  Id. (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 
(2012)).  Only then will Miranda's Fifth Amendment concerns 
regarding compelled witness testimony be triggered.  A person 
may not always be free to leave circumstances such as those 
present here, but that does not require a determination that 
such person is in custody. 
¶83 In this case, Dobbs was not in custody prior to 
receiving the Miranda warnings.  The circuit court determined 
that Dobbs was not subject to custodial interrogation until 
after 10:19 a.m.  Similarly, the court of appeals concluded that 
Dobbs was detained, but not in custody.  State v. Dobbs, No. 
2018AP319-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶11-14 (Wis. Ct. App. May 
2, 2019).  I agree.  Under the totality of the circumstances, 
Dobbs was not formally arrested or subject to a restraint on 
freedom of movement to a degree associated with formal arrest 
prior 
to 
receiving 
the 
Miranda 
warnings. 
 
Bartelt, 
379 
Wis. 2d 588, ¶31.  The majority concludes otherwise only because 
it seemingly changes the Bartelt test for Miranda custody.5  It 
gives too much weight to particular factors at the expense of 
the totality of the circumstances, and ignores the final inquiry 
whether the environment included inherently coercive pressures. 
                                                 
5 The majority also relies on the State's concession in this 
case that Dobbs was subject to custodial interrogation.  See 
majority op., ¶55.  But we are not bound by the State's 
concession. 
 
State 
v. 
Anderson, 
2014 
WI 
93, 
¶19, 
357 
Wis. 2d 337, 851 N.W.2d 760 ("[W]e are not bound by a party's 
concession 
of 
law." 
(citing 
Bergmann 
v. 
McCaughtry, 
211 
Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 (1997))). 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
¶84 Regarding Dobbs' "freedom to leave," Martin, 343 
Wis. 2d 278, ¶35, the majority notes that Officer Milton blocked 
Dobbs' vehicle, handcuffed him, and put him in the squad car.  
Majority op., ¶61.  The majority also notes that, while at the 
hospital, Dobbs was guarded.  Id.  But during any traffic stop, 
the suspect is not permitted to drive away, whether the vehicle 
is blocked or not.  Additionally, it is not unusual for law 
enforcement to place a suspect in a squad car while they 
investigate and control the scene or to guard a suspect.  The 
majority determines that Dobbs was not free to leave under these 
circumstances.  Id.  That may be true.  But even if a suspect is 
not free to leave, that does not establish that he is in 
custody.  Not being free to leave, though a necessary condition 
to conclude a suspect is in custody, is not itself sufficient to 
conclude a suspect is in custody.  See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655 
(describing the ultimate inquiry as "whether there is a 'formal 
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree 
associated with a formal arrest").  If it was sufficient, then 
any person temporarily detained for an ordinary traffic stop 
would be in custody.  While perhaps not actually "free to 
leave," these people are not in Miranda custody.  See Berkemer 
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984) ("Certainly few motorists 
would feel free . . . to leave the scene of a traffic stop 
without being told they might do so.").  The record reflects 
that 
Dobbs' 
case 
unfolded 
in 
a 
manner 
similar 
to 
an 
investigation and detention incident to a traffic stop.  Indeed, 
Officer Milton repeatedly told Dobbs that there was an ongoing 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
investigation.  See majority op., ¶8.  Dobbs may not have been 
actually "free to leave," but that does not mean that he was in 
custody. 
¶85 Regarding the second factor, "the purpose, place, and 
length of the interrogation," Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶35, the 
majority's analysis again distorts facts ordinarily associated 
with a routine traffic stop into Miranda concerns.  The majority 
does not analyze the purpose of Officer Milton's questioning at 
all, but notes that it occurred intermittently over the course 
of three hours in the squad car and at the hospital.  Majority 
op., ¶¶62-63.  There are several problems with this.  First, 
general on-the-scene questioning is not the same thing as 
interrogation and does not raise Miranda concerns to the same 
degree.  Dobbs was not subjected to questioning of any 
significant length and the type of conversation that occurred 
did not amount to interrogation.  Second, the place of Dobbs' 
questioning was not of particular concern.  Questioning suspects 
in squad cars and hospitals, particularly incident to suspected 
OWI or traffic accident cases, is a common, and often necessary, 
law enforcement practice in order to control a scene or ensure 
the health and well-being of a suspect.  Regarding the purpose 
of law enforcement's questions, Dobbs was asked who he was, 
where he was coming from, where he was going, how he got his 
injuries, and whether he had any other medical issues or took 
any medications.  Majority op., ¶7.  These types of questions 
are routine in traffic stops, traffic accidents, and suspected 
OWI cases. 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
¶86 Regarding "the degree of restraint," Martin, 343 
Wis. 2d 278, ¶35, the majority notes that Officer Milton held 
his service weapon, that there were other officers on the scene 
and at the hospital, and that Dobbs was frisked, handcuffed, and 
locked in the squad car.  Majority op., ¶64.  But again, during 
a routine traffic stop, a frisk or the presence of multiple 
officers 
is 
common 
in 
order 
to 
ensure 
officer 
safety.  
Importantly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
Officer Milton, though he had his hand on his service weapon, 
ever pointed it at Dobbs.  Simply holding a service weapon, 
without pointing it at a suspect, is also appropriately related 
to officer safety.  Nor does the fact that Dobbs was handcuffed 
pull the degree of restraint in this case into Miranda custody.   
Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶34 ("We recognize that the use of 
handcuffs does not in all cases render a suspect in custody for 
Miranda purposes.").  Even as a whole, these facts did not 
necessarily render Dobbs in Miranda custody.  Martin, 343 
Wis. 2d 278, 
¶34 
n.23 
("[D]rawing 
weapons, 
handcuffing 
a 
suspect, placing a suspect in a patrol car for questioning, or 
using or threatening to use force does not necessarily elevate a 
lawful stop into a custodial arrest for Miranda purposes." 
(quoting United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109–10 (4th 
Cir. 1995))). 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
¶87 Accordingly, none of the Miranda custody factors favor 
a determination of custody in this case.6  Dobbs was not formally 
arrested or restrained to a degree associated with formal 
arrest.  Because I so conclude, my custody analysis ends here.  
But, under Bartelt, since the majority concluded that Dobbs was 
restrained to the degree associated with formal arrest, the 
majority should have continued on to consider "whether 'the 
relevant 
environment 
present[ed] . . . inherently 
coercive 
pressures . . . .'"  Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶33 (quoting 
Howes, 565 U.S. at 509.)  For the sake of completeness, I note 
that there was nothing inherently coercive or wrongful about law 
enforcement's conduct in this case.  There is nothing in the 
record to suggest otherwise.  Indeed, the majority notes the 
utter lack of wrongful or coercive conduct in the record in its 
                                                 
6 This case is distinguishable from State v. Morgan, 2002 WI 
App 124, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 648 N.W.2d 23.  In that case, the 
court of appeals concluded that Morgan was in custody where, 
after police pointed their guns at Morgan, he tried to flee and 
was chased and caught by police, was frisked, handcuffed and 
placed in a squad car.  Id., ¶¶3-4, 17.  Dobbs never had a 
weapon pointed at him and never tried to evade or escape law 
enforcement.  Under the totality of the circumstances, it is 
clear that Dobbs was handcuffed and in the back of the squad car 
for a very different reason from Morgan, and law enforcement 
used significantly less force against Dobbs than Morgan. 
Rather, this case is more analogous to State v. Gruen, 218 
Wis. 2d 581, 582 N.W.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1998).  In that case, 
Gruen was not in custody where, after a traffic accident, he was 
stopped near the scene, frisked, placed in the back of a police 
van, and questioned by law enforcement.  Id. at 586, 597-98.  
Just like Gruen, Dobbs did not have a weapon pointed at him, but 
was stopped near the scene of a traffic accident, frisked, 
detained in a police vehicle, and questioned.  If Gruen was not 
in custody, then Dobbs was not either. 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
voluntariness analysis.  Majority op., ¶¶73-74.  Consideration 
of 
the 
relevant 
environment 
further 
counsels 
against 
a 
determination of Miranda custody in this case. 
B.  Interrogation 
¶88 For 
purposes 
of 
Miranda, 
interrogation 
includes 
express questioning or its functional equivalent.  Harris, 374 
Wis. 2d 271, ¶¶16-17, 19-22.  "Express questioning" includes 
"only 
those 
questions 
'designed 
to 
elicit 
incriminatory 
admissions.'"  Id., ¶16 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 
582, 602 n.14 (1990)). "It is the nature of the information the 
question is trying to reach, therefore, that determines whether" 
the question triggers Miranda.  Id., ¶17.  If the desired 
"information has no potential to incriminate the suspect, the 
question requires no Miranda warnings."  Id. (citing Doe v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 n.10 (1988) ("In order to be 
privileged, it is not enough that the compelled communication is 
sought for its content.  The content itself must have 
testimonial significance.")). 
¶89 Miranda can also be triggered by the "'functional 
equivalent' of an interrogation."  Harris, 374 Wis. 2d 271, ¶19 
(citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)).  
Functional equivalence is aimed at capturing law enforcement 
"techniques of persuasion that, in a custodial setting, can 
create the same potential for self-incrimination even in the 
absence of an express question."  
Id.  The functional 
equivalents of interrogation include "'any words or actions on 
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.'"  
Id. (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (footnotes omitted)).  
Functional equivalence is an objective inquiry; neither law 
enforcement's underlying subjective intent nor the suspect's 
subjective understanding is dispositive.  Id., ¶¶20, 22. 
¶90 Rather, we review law enforcement's actions from the 
perspective of a "reasonable third-person observer and inquir[e] 
into how such a person would expect the suspect to react to the 
officer's words and actions."  Harris, 374 Wis. 2d 271, ¶22.  We 
impute to the third-person observer "'[a]ny knowledge the police 
may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a 
defendant to a particular form of persuasion.'"  Id., ¶21 
(quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8).  The test is: 
"[I]f an objective observer (with the same knowledge 
of the suspect as the police officer) could, on the 
sole basis of hearing the officer's remarks or 
observing the officer's conduct, conclude that the 
officer's conduct or words would be likely to elicit 
an incriminating response, that is, could reasonably 
have had the force of a question on the suspect, then 
the conduct or words would constitute interrogation." 
Id., ¶22 (quoting State v. Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d 272, 278-79, 
423 N.W.2d 862 (1988)). 
¶91 The majority concludes that Dobbs was subject to 
interrogation.  Majority op., ¶67.  But, in so concluding, it 
relies entirely on the State's ill-advised concession that 
Officer Milton interrogated Dobbs.  Because I conclude Dobbs was 
not in custody, I need not analyze whether he was interrogated; 
regardless, the Miranda protections are not triggered.  See 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 ("[T]he Miranda safeguards come into 
play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express 
questioning or its functional equivalent." (Emphasis added.)).  
But I have reason to doubt the merit of the State's concession 
in this case. 
¶92 First, I note——and the majority seems to agree——that 
at least some of Dobbs' statements were spontaneous and not 
elicited in any way.  See majority op., ¶¶15-16, 49, 69.  
Second, I am unpersuaded that Officer Milton's questions were 
express questions designed to elicit incriminating admissions.  
As discussed above, Officer Milton's questions were routine 
investigatory questions incident to ordinary traffic stops, 
traffic accidents, or suspected OWI cases.  General, on-the-
scene questioning of this sort is not interrogation.  See United 
States v. Adegbite, 846 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he 
solicitation of information concerning a person's identity and 
background does not amount to custodial interrogation prohibited 
by Miranda . . . .").  Third, I am equally unpersuaded that this 
case presents any functional equivalent concerns.  I do not 
readily see a basis for a reasonable third-party observer to 
conclude that any officer's words or conduct "'could reasonably 
have had the force of a question on'" Dobbs.  Harris, 374 
Wis. 2d 271, ¶22 (quoting Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 279). 
¶93 Thus, 
I 
disagree 
with 
the 
majority's 
ultimate 
conclusion; Dobbs was not subject to custodial interrogation 
under Miranda.  But my disagreement with the majority does not 
end there.  I am also concerned that its analysis conflates the 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
routine investigatory detention of Dobbs in this case with 
custody 
and 
Miranda 
Fifth 
Amendment 
violations, 
thereby 
undermining our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
 
II.  THE INTERSECTION OF MIRANDA AND TERRY. 
¶94 The Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution protect different interests.  As discussed above, 
the Fifth Amendment and Miranda protect the right to be free 
from compulsion to incriminate oneself.  U.S. Const. amend V.  
Relevant here, the test for Miranda custody is whether, under 
the "totality of the circumstances," viewed objectively, "there 
is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of a 
degree 
associated 
with 
a 
formal 
arrest." 
 
Bartelt, 
379 
Wis. 2d 588, ¶31.  Custody is analyzed in light of various 
factors, including: "the defendant's freedom to leave; the 
purpose, place, and length of the interrogation; and the degree 
of restraint."  Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶35 (citing Morgan, 254 
Wis. 2d 602, ¶12). 
¶95 In contrast, the Fourth Amendment protects the right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV.; see also Wis. Const. art. 1, § 11.  If law 
enforcement conducts a traffic stop or "temporary investigative 
stop," that is "a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment . . . ."  State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶17, 362 
Wis. 2d 138, 
864 
N.W.2d 26. 
 
To 
comply 
with 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, the stop must be reasonable at its inception and in 
its duration.  Id., ¶¶19-20.  "Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, a police officer may, under certain circumstances, 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
temporarily detain a person for purposes of investigating 
possible criminal behavior even though there is not probable 
cause to make an arrest."  Id., ¶18 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 
22; State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 198 N.W.2d 377 
(1972). 
 
"The 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
codified 
the 
Terry 
constitutional standard in Wis. Stat. § 968.24."  Id.  Relevant 
here, 
"an 
officer 
may 
conduct 
a 
temporary 
investigatory 
detention when 'the officer reasonably suspects that [a] person 
is 
committing . . . a 
crime.' 
 
§ 968.24." 
 
Id., 
¶19.  
Accordingly, an officer may conduct an investigatory detention 
so long as he has reasonable suspicion to do so and the 
detention is reasonable in duration.  See id., ¶¶19-20. 
¶96 What starts as an investigatory detention can turn 
into an arrest.  If and when it does, the Fourth Amendment 
requires that the arrest be supported by probable cause.  See 
Blatterman, 362 Wis. 2d 138, ¶29.  The test whether a suspect is 
arrested is "whether a 'reasonable person in the defendant's 
position would have considered himself or herself to be "in 
custody," 
given 
the 
degree 
of 
restraint 
under 
the 
circumstances.'"  Id., ¶30 (quoting State v. Swanson, 164 
Wis. 2d 437, 447, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991), abrogated on other 
grounds by State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 
N.W.2d 277)).  The similarities between Fourth Amendment arrest 
analysis and Fifth Amendment custody analysis are readily 
apparent. 
 
This 
case 
tees 
up 
questions 
surrounding 
the 
intersection between the Fifth Amendment and Miranda custodial 
interrogation on one hand, and the Fourth Amendment, Terry 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
investigatory detentions, and arrests on the other.  A Terry 
investigatory detention can turn into an arrest.  Miranda 
custody occurs when a suspect is under arrest or restrained to a 
degree associated with formal arrest.  So can a 
Terry 
investigatory 
detention 
turn 
into 
Miranda 
custodial 
interrogation?  If so, when and how? 
¶97 In Morgan the court of appeals said that Miranda and 
Terry are two different analyses designed to protect different 
constitutional rights.  
Morgan, 254 Wis. 2d 602, ¶¶13-16.  
Morgan was not the first time that Wisconsin courts noted the 
intersection of Miranda and Terry.  See also, State v. Griffith, 
2000 WI 72, ¶69 n.14, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72; Swanson, 
164 Wis. 2d at 447-49; Gruen, 218 Wis. 2d at 593-94; and State 
v. Pounds, 176 Wis. 2d 315, 322, 500 N.W.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1993).  
In Griffith, a Fourth Amendment traffic stop case, we stated: 
The United States Supreme Court has held that persons 
temporarily detained in ordinary traffic stops are not 
"in custody" and therefore not subject to the rule in 
[Miranda].  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 436, 440 
(1966); see also [Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d at 449].  
However, the Court made clear that if a detained 
motorist is treated in such a manner that he or she is 
rendered "in custody" for practical purposes, Miranda 
protections are triggered.  Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440. 
Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶69 n.14. 
¶98 In this case, the majority appears to draw a bright 
line between Terry Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and Miranda 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.  See majority op., ¶57 ("We 
uphold Morgan and clarify that the Fourth Amendment and Fifth 
Amendment protect different interests and involve different 
inquiries."); see also id., ¶60 ("We therefore recognize the 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
distinction between an analysis of a violation of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment as aptly described in Morgan, 254 Wis. 2d 602, 
¶¶13-16.").  In doing so, the majority oversimplifies the 
analysis 
in 
this 
case, 
ignores 
an 
important 
issue 
in 
constitutional law, and potentially undermines Fourth Amendment 
law as an expense of its development of Fifth Amendment law. 
¶99 The extent to which a stop can be reasonable under 
Terry for Fourth Amendment purposes and, nonetheless, render the 
suspect in custody under Miranda for Fifth Amendment purposes is 
an issue subject to a federal circuit court split.  The Second, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits conclude that the two 
inquiries are entirely distinct.  See United States v. Ali, 68 
F.3d 1468, 1473 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that whether a stop was 
permissible under Terry is "irrelevant" to Miranda analysis, 
because "Terry is an exception to the Fourth Amendment probable-
cause requirement, not to the Fifth Amendment protections 
against self-incrimination"); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 
1088, 1096-97 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting the "'vast difference 
between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the 
rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment'"; stating that its 
"inquiry into the circumstances of temporary detention for a 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment Miranda analysis requires a different 
focus than that for a Fourth Amendment Terry stop"); United 
States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that 
"whether an individual detained during the execution of a search 
warrant has been unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment 
purposes and whether that individual is 'in custody' for Miranda 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
purposes are two different issues"); and United States v. 
Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463–64 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that "a 
suspect can be placed in police 'custody' for purposes of 
Miranda before he has been 'arrested' in the Fourth Amendment 
sense"; holding that a gunpoint stop permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment "created the 'custodial' situation envisioned 
by Miranda and its progeny"). 
¶100 The First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits conclude that 
the two inquiries are not so distinct.  See United States v. 
Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating, "As a general 
rule, Terry stops do not implicate the requirements of Miranda 
because Terry stops, though inherently somewhat coercive, do not 
usually involve the type of police dominated or compelling 
atmosphere 
which 
necessitates 
Miranda 
warnings") 
(internal 
quotations omitted); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 
1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing Terry law in the course of 
its Miranda analysis and stating, "From these standards, we have 
concluded that drawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect, placing a 
suspect in a patrol car for questioning, or using or threatening 
to use force does not necessarily elevate a lawful stop into a 
custodial arrest for Miranda purposes"); and United States v. 
Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2003)(rejecting the 
defendant's "broad contention that a person is in custody for 
Miranda purposes whenever a reasonable person would not feel 
free to leave"); see also id. ("One is not free to leave a Terry 
stop until the completion of a reasonably brief investigation, 
which may include limited questioning.  But most Terry stops do 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
18 
 
not trigger the detainee's Miranda rights.").  See also 
Katherine M. Swift, Drawing a Line Between Terry and Miranda: 
The Degree and Duration of Restraint, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1075, 
1084-88 (summarizing this split of authority). 
¶101 To the majority, the issue in this case is whether 
Dobbs was in custody under Miranda.  To me, the actual issue in 
this case is whether law enforcement's investigatory detention 
of Dobbs under Terry turned into custody under Miranda for 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment purposes.  I answer no, it did not.  
The 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
viewed 
objectively, 
demonstrate that Dobbs was subject to a reasonable investigatory 
detention, but not in Miranda custody.  The intersection of 
Miranda and Terry is at the heart of this case.  But the 
majority fails to meaningfully address it.  I am concerned that 
the majority's analysis of Fifth Amendment Miranda law could 
seriously undermine Fourth Amendment Terry law, and so I cannot 
join it. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶102 I join the majority opinion's analyses and conclusions 
regarding the admissibility of Dr. White's expert testimony and 
the voluntariness of Dobbs' statements to law enforcement.  But 
I do not join the majority's analysis or conclusions regarding 
Miranda and custodial interrogation for two reasons.  First, I 
disagree with the majority's ultimate conclusion.  Dobbs was not 
subject to custodial interrogation at any time prior to 
receiving his Miranda warnings on the day in question.  Second, 
I am concerned that the majority's analysis, though it addresses 
No.  2018AP319-CR.akz 
 
19 
 
the Fifth Amendment and Miranda, could seriously undermine 
Fourth Amendment law regarding Terry stops and investigatory 
detention.  Accordingly, I write separately to clarify the 
jurisprudence 
surrounding 
the 
intersection 
of 
Terry 
investigatory detention and Miranda custodial interrogation. 
¶103 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶104 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK and Justice BRIAN HAGEDORN join this opinion. 
 
No.  2018AP319-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
¶105 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  There are many 
reasons people grow frustrated with the law.  It's language is 
too arcane, it's written at such length that no normal person 
can reasonably hope to comprehend even a small part of its 
content, it spreads like a crazed spider web across innumerable 
sections, subsections, paragraphs, and parts, it changes so 
frequently it's impossible to stay abreast of it, etc.  But for 
those who actually make an effort to discover what the written 
law requires, perhaps one of its most maddening features is 
that, apparently, it sometimes doesn't mean what it so plainly 
says.  Or at least that's sometimes the case once we get our 
hands on it, as we did today with Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1).  No 
tremors will spread through our republic because of our 
treatment of this evidentiary rule.  But the way we reached our 
conclusion will alienate the people from their law just a 
smidgen more, and will further encourage the perception that the 
law cannot be understood without the priestly class of lawyers 
and judges revealing their gnosis to those to whom the law 
actually belongs.1 
                                                 
1 The advent of a written code of law is one of the most 
significant developments in the relationship between governors 
and the governed.  Some of the key attributes of a written code 
include the following:  
[I]t was important that the laws be stated in the 
vernacular, not Latin, and be phrased in clear and 
ordinary language, so that citizens could consult the 
code 
and 
perfectly 
understand 
their 
rights 
and 
obligations, without having to go to lawyers and 
judges.  The codes needed to be organized logically so 
that people could readily find the relevant laws. And 
the provisions ought to be short, so that people could 
more easily remember them. 
No.  2018AP319-CR.dk 
 
2 
 
¶106 Today, we made Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) say something 
that no reasonably capable English-speaker would understand it 
to say.  Our task was to determine whether the 2011 addition of 
the Daubert2 standard for the admission of expert witness 
testimony changed the standard for the admission of expert 
witness testimony.  Just to state the question suggests the 
answer.  The text of the statute confirms the answer cannot be 
anything other than "yes."  It's not a lengthy provision, so 
I'll set it out in full with the text added by the 2011 
"Daubert" amendment underlined for the sake of clarity: 
If 
scientific, 
technical, 
or 
other 
specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
2011 Wis. Act 2, § 34m (emphasis added).  Most of the preamble 
in this provision addresses whether expert testimony would be 
helpful to the jury and whether the proposed witness qualifies 
as an expert.  The part at issue today is the permission 
granting clause, which provides that an expert witness "may 
testify thereto [that is, his area of expertise] in the form of 
an 
opinion 
or 
otherwise, 
if" 
the 
witness 
satisfies 
the 
conditions that follow. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Peter Tiersma, The Rule of Text: Is It Possible to Govern Using 
(Only) Statutes?, 6 NYU J.L. & Liberty 260, 270–71 (2011). 
2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
No.  2018AP319-CR.dk 
 
3 
 
¶107 I pause at this spot in the statute because this is 
where the majority discovers some gnosis not accessible through 
the words on the page.  Ordinary folk like me see the "if" and 
conclude that what precedes it is contingent on what follows.3  
Thus, I understand this language to mean that the expert may 
testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise" but only if he 
can meet the conditions following the "if."4  The court, however, 
acting on a plane of understanding to which I apparently do not 
have access, says that only testimony in the form of an opinion 
is subject to the listed conditions.  Testimony in the 
"otherwise" category, for some reason, is not.  The court 
dedicates the bulk of its opinion on this subject to a detailed 
discussion of testimony in the "otherwise" category——its type, 
                                                 
3 The 
Oxford 
English 
Dictionary 
defines 
"if" 
as 
"[i]ntroducing a clause of condition or supposition" and as 
meaning "[o]n condition that; given or granted that; in (the) 
case that; supposing that; on the supposition that."  If, The 
Oxford English Dictionary (definition A. I. (conjunction)).  
Merriam-Webster similarly defines "if" as meaning "in the event 
that," "allowing that," "on the assumption that," and "on 
condition that." See If, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/if. 
4 We actually have a requirement that we read statutory 
language the way everyone else does, with a narrow exception for 
technical meanings and special definitions.  "[S]tatutory 
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citation 
omitted).  We give that language "its common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases 
are 
given 
their 
technical 
or 
special 
definitional meaning."  Id., ¶45.  There are no technical or 
specially-defined 
words 
involved 
in 
the 
statute 
we 
are 
considering today, so we should read it just like everyone else. 
No.  2018AP319-CR.dk 
 
4 
 
its value, and our treatment of it prior to the 2011 Daubert 
amendment.  I have no quibble with this historical recitation, 
but I can't figure out how it separates "opinion" from 
"otherwise" such that testimony in the former category is 
subject to the statute's Daubert conditions while testimony in 
the latter is not.  The actual words on the page flat-out 
contradict the court inasmuch as they do not distinguish between 
"opinion" testimony and "otherwise" testimony.  They say an 
expert "may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise, if . . . ."  In ordinary English, this means the "if" 
applies with just as much force to "otherwise" as it does to 
"opinion."5 
                                                 
5 Part of the problem might be the court's apparent 
understanding that an expert who applies his principles and 
methods to the facts of a case must necessarily be offering an 
opinion.  It says "[e]ven if Dr. White had simply been asked 
whether any of the factors he described in his exposition 
testimony related to Dobbs's case, his response would be 
offering his view about whether his exposition testimony relates 
to the particular facts in Dobbs's case."  Majority op., ¶36 
n.18.  The court does not explain why this is the only way Dr. 
White could have been asked to connect his principles and 
methods to the facts of this case, nor does it provide any 
authority for the proposition. 
 
No.  2018AP319-CR.dk 
 
5 
 
¶108 Although 
I'm 
highlighting 
the 
court's 
gnostic 
understanding of Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1), the majority isn't 
exactly hiding it, as a comparison between its framing of the 
question and its answer makes plain.  The majority says, and I 
agree, that the issue before us is "[w]hether the Daubert 
reliability 
standard . . . altered 
Wisconsin's 
long-standing 
practice 
of 
allowing 
expert 
exposition 
testimony . . . ."  
Majority op., ¶35.  Before I get to the court's answer, a short 
glossary:  In this framing, "Daubert reliability standard" means 
the requirements following the "if" in § 907.02(1), including 
the requirement that the witness "applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case"; and the term 
"exposition 
testimony" 
means 
testimony 
included 
in 
the 
"otherwise" category.  And now the court's answer:  "[W]e 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) continues to permit an 
expert witness to testify in the form of an opinion 'or 
                                                                                                                                                             
It's not hard to imagine exposition testimony that the 
expert ties to the facts of the case without expressing an 
opinion.  Here, after providing his exposition about false 
confessions, Dr. White could have been asked whether he examined 
Mr. Dobbs, and what the observation or examination comprised.  
And he could have been asked whether, pursuant to this 
examination, he observed any of the factors he described in his 
exposition as potentially disposing a person to confess falsely.  
So long as Dr. White does not take the ultimate step of saying 
whether he believed the presence of those pre-disposing factors 
meant that Mr. Dobbs had confessed falsely, he would not have 
rendered an opinion.  But he would have applied his principles 
and methods to the facts of the case. In fact, this is exactly 
the type of connection the court describes as "fitness." 
So it simply is not true that all expert testimony that the 
witness ties to the facts of the case is necessarily opinion 
testimony. 
No.  2018AP319-CR.dk 
 
6 
 
otherwise,' including exposition testimony on general principles 
without explicitly applying those principles to, or even having 
knowledge of, the specific facts of the case."  Majority op., 
¶42.  So, although the words on the page say the legislature 
made the admission of "otherwise" testimony contingent on the 
expert having "applied the principles and methods reliably to 
the facts of the case," we know——with our special knowing——that 
this actually means the opposite, that the expert does not need 
to have "applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case."  And so today we reveal to the bench, bar, 
and public that our special insight allowed us to see that the 
Daubert reliability standard of § 907.02(1) applies to only one 
of the listed categories, even though the actual text says it 
applies to both.6 
¶109 But that does not end our revelation.  Having 
discerned that the existing words do not mean what they so 
obviously say, we further discerned that Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1) 
contains a condition that is not actually there.  The court says 
that 
[w]hen expert testimony is proffered in the form of an 
exposition on general principles, the circuit court, 
                                                 
6 The majority cites other courts that have experienced 
similar insight, as well as the Advisory Committee Notes to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (the federal analog to our expert 
witness rule).  The court's apparent goal is to create a sense 
of authority out of nothing more than a multiplicity of sources 
because none of the citations lend any additional explanatory 
power to the court's gnostic insights.  If other sources explain 
why certain language doesn't actually mean what it appears to 
say, I will be an attentive student.  But a sea of others simply 
ignoring the text of the law means nothing to me. 
No.  2018AP319-CR.dk 
 
7 
 
as gatekeeper, must consider the following four 
factors:  (1) whether the expert is qualified;[7] (2) 
whether the testimony will address a subject matter on 
which the factfinder can be assisted by an expert;[8] 
(3) whether the testimony is reliable;[9] and (4) 
whether the testimony will "fit" the facts of the 
case.[10] 
Majority op., ¶43.  From the footnotes I attached to each of the 
elements in this quote, it is easy to see that one of them is 
not like the others.  Elements one through three each reiterates 
a requirement contained in § 907.02(1).  Element four, however, 
has no counterpart in the statute and is instead a purely 
judicial creation.   
¶110 That we would add a condition not already present in 
the statute is interesting enough.  But what I find fascinating 
is why the court grafted the condition onto the statute.  
"Establishing the fit of exposition testimony is particularly 
important," the court says, "because, unlike opinion testimony, 
exposition testimony does not in and of itself explicitly 
connect the witness's expertise to the particular facts of the 
                                                 
7 This element echoes the statute's requirement that the 
witness is "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education[.]"  Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1). 
8 This is a restatement of the statutory requirement that 
expert testimony is admissible only "[i]f scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue[.]"  
Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1). 
9 This reflects one of the Daubert reliability standards, 
that is, that "the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods."  Wis. Stat. § 907.02(1). 
10 This 
element 
has 
no 
counterpart 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 907.02(1). 
No.  2018AP319-CR.dk 
 
8 
 
case."  Majority op., ¶44.  Well, yes.  But the explicit 
connection is absent only because our gnosis revealed that the 
statutory 
requirement 
that 
"the 
witness 
has 
applied 
the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case" does 
not apply to exposition testimony, even though the text 
obviously says it does.  So now we are trying to patch a hole of 
our own making. 
¶111 It gets better.  The "fitness" patch the court 
engineered to cover the hole it created is uncannily similar to 
the condition it excised. 
Whether expert testimony "fits" a case turns on 
whether it is "sufficiently tied to the facts of the 
case" such that "it will aid the jury in resolving a 
factual dispute." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quoting 
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (1985)).  
"[E]xpert testimony is helpful to the jury," or fits, 
"if it concerns a matter beyond the understanding of 
the average person, assists the jury in understanding 
facts at issue, or puts the facts in context." 
Majority op., ¶44 (emphasis added).  There's a reason for the 
similarity, and the court's Daubert cite should have tipped it 
off to the irony of what it is doing here.  The Daubert quote on 
which the majority relies for its "fitness" requirement is 
itself 
the 
inspiration 
for 
the 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 907.02(1) 
requirement that the witness apply his testimony to the facts of 
the case.  So let's take stock of where we are.  Our legislature 
wrote into § 907.02(1) the Daubert requirement that the expert 
connect his testimony to the facts of the case, we took that 
condition out and replaced it with a patch based on Daubert's 
"fitness" concept, the very concept that inspired the condition 
we removed, the removal of which created the need for the patch.  
No.  2018AP319-CR.dk 
 
9 
 
This is dizzying and disorienting even for those trained in the 
law.  For everyone else, it just makes the law a hopeless 
jumble. 
¶112 One would hope that the end product of the court's 
superior insight into the true meaning behind the words of Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02(1) would yield something profound.  But it 
didn't.  In fact, it produced just a few minor alterations to 
the condition it removed.  Whereas the statute requires that the 
witness apply his testimony to the facts so that there is an 
actual testimonial connection between the two, the court's 
"fitness" requirement downgrades the connection from explicit to 
implicit, and requires that the court make the connection as 
part of its gate-keeping function rather than requiring the 
witness to make it as part of his testimony.  I don't think that 
cake is worth the candle.  And it's most definitely not worth 
the statute-rending process necessary to get there. 
¶113 Having said all this, I agree with the court's 
conclusion that the circuit court did not err in not admitting 
Dr. White's testimony.  As everyone agrees, he not only did not 
apply his testimony to the facts of this case, he did not even 
know what they were.  Consequently, he did not satisfy the Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02(1) condition that the witness must "appl[y] the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case."  
Therefore, I join the court's opinion except with respect to 
Part III.A. 
¶114 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
No.  2018AP319-CR.dk 
 
 
 
1