Title: Bugado v. State

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘senor FOR PUBLICATION***
a

No. 26723

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I
a
PHILLIP BUGADO, JR., Petitioner-Appellant

vs 3
=

STATE OF HAWAI'T, Respondent-Appellee

   

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT
(SPP NO. 041-0001)

aa

 

(py: Moon, C.J-, Levinson, Nakayama,
‘Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.)

 

Petitioner-Appellant Philip Bugado, Jr. (Bugado)
appeals from the Order Denying Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or
correct Judgment or to Release Petitioner from Custody (the
order) entered by the circuit court of the second circuit (the
court)! on June 28, 2004 pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Penal

Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 (2004).? We affirm.

‘the Honorable Shackley F. Raffetto presided over this matter.

 

tn pertinent part, Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRP) ule 40
i200), entitles "Post-coneietion proceeding,” provides a petitioner relief
freekisgguate of conviction and from custody based on judgments of
ESnviceion, where “(1) . . - the tudament
Siolapion of she constitution of the United States or ofthe State of
HES SANT ew around wbich is a basis for a collateral attack on the
indanest.”" (Emphases acdes.)

Trradgition, HAPP Rule 40 does not apply when ~

 

be cajced have been orsviously rule: weds Tn that
babe calsed bevtaiy and understanaingly failed to raise (the isaves] » >.»
reese eRe etial, ae’ the trial, on appeal, . . . oF {in} any other proceeding

before te pducted, oF in a prior proceeding actually initiated under this
SeiUad Ly cone the’ existence ef extraordinary circunstonces to justify -
rule lopeens lee he issue.” ARPP Rule 40(a)(3) (emphasis added]. Moreover,
failure to reiSgnuttable presumption that a failure to appeal a ruling or Fo
TEEUISES Sade He'S"Knowine ang understanding failore.”

 
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on April 11, 2001, Bugado was convicted after trial by
jury of Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree under Hawai‘
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-716(1) (d) (1993)? (Count 1), three
counts of Abuse of Family or Household Member under HRS § 709-906
(Supp. 2005)* (Counts 11, IV, and V), and Unlawful Imprisonment
in the Second Degree under HRS § HRS § 707-722(1) (1993)* (Count
VI) of the indictment, and acquitted of Count III, one of the
abuse charges. Previously, Bugado pled no contest to Count VIT
of the indictment, for Possession of 2 Firearm by Persons under
Restraining Orders in violation of HRS § 134-7 (Supp. 2005),¢
which the court accepted after engaging Bugado in a colloquy.

After moving for substitution of trial counsel,
appellate counsel was appointed for Bugado. Bugado’s conviction
was affirmed by this court by Summary Disposition Order filed

January 21, 2003. Subsequently, on January 8, 2004, Bugado filed

 

* ., tauai't Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-726(1) (¢) (1993), entitled
Glerroristic threatening in the firet degree,” provides in pertinent part that
[a] person commits the offense of terroristic threatening in the first degree
if the person comite terroristic threatening (elith the use of 8
dangerous instrument.”

« e aalitS § 709-90612) (Supp. 2008), entitled “Abuse of family oF
household menbers: penalty,” provides in pertinent part that “(i]t shall be
unlawful for any person, singly or in concert, to physically abuse a faaily oF
household member = ys

 

» cop clitS §.707-72212) (2993), entitled “Unlawful imprisonnent in the
second degree,” states that “[s) person commits the offence of unlanfur
Smprisonnent in the second degree if the person knowingly restrains ancther
person.”

san general, HRS § 134-7(f) (Sugp. 2005), entitled “Ownership or
Possession prohibited, when; penalty,” prohibits any peracn who has been
Festreined pursuant to an order of a court from possessing a firearm oF
ammunition.” HRS § 13¢-7(h) (Supp. 2005) provides that any person violating
ims 134-7 (£) shall be guilty ef e misdemeanor,

 

 

2
ssiyor FoR PUBLICATION*+*
a
2 Fetition to Vacate, Set Aside, oF Correct Judgment or to
Release Petitioner from Custody (Rule 40 petition) which the
court denied without @ hearing, The court held that Bugado
esther waived the clains in his petition oF presented no
colorable claim.

oon appeal, Bugado reiterates his argunenta in his Rule
40 petition, that (1) the court erred in denying him a hearing on
his petition:? (2) his convictions were “obtained by the
unconstitutional failure of [Respondent-Appellee state of Havas't
(the State) ] to disclose to the petitioner evidence favorable to
[nin)"; (3) his plea of no contest as to Count VIZ, for
possession of @ Firearm by Persons under Restraining Orders, “was
not knowingly, voluntarily, of intelligently made since [trial]
counsel told petitioner that there was a plea agreement, when in
fact, there was not, and that @ [deferred acceptance of @ no
contest (OANC)} plea was statutorily barred, notwithstanding

[trial] counsel's representation [to the contrary]; (4) his

 

Under the firet ground of his Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, oF
Correct Judgment of to Release Petitioner from Custody, Petitioner-Appel lant
Philip Bugado, Je. (Bugado) claimed as sub-issues that his tris! counsel
Reglected'eo “investigate. and to present exculpatory evidence,” by his failure
[er{]) subpocne abuse reports showing that Complainant physically abuses him
Th 195; (el subpoena relevant witnesses to prior abuse by Complainant,

{3) ‘subpoena forgery and theft reports against Complainant, (4) hire a
handuesting expert to support the forgery and theft charges despite seeking
Centinuances ffem the court and assuring Bugado that he would do so,

if) interview witnesses presented by Respondent-Appellee state of Hawai'i (the
Statel, (é) obeain and elicit prior bad acts evidence of Complainant to
Suppers his claim of selé-defense, (J) submit into evidence a sworn statement
By*Eonpiainant made to support a request for a tenporary restraining order
Tiaoi bo prove inconsistencies in her statements that she was threatened with
a 'gun, (8) move to diseise the charge Bugado pled guilty to even though
[ndufficiene evidence was adduced at the grand Jury to support a finding of
prsbeble esuse, (9) cross-examine certain witnesses presented by the State,
End (20) present ‘of evidence on behalf of the defen:

   

 

 

 

    

3
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convictions were obtained by “violation of the protection against
double jeopardy("] and [HRS § 701-109 (1993)),"? that “the court
was without jurisdiction because abuse of household members can

only be heard by the family court,” and that “his trial and

 

+ article 1, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution provides én
pertinent part

No person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise’ infamous crime, unless on @ presentment oF
indictment of a grand jury or upon a finding of probable
cause afters preliminary hearing held as provides by lav
except in ceses arising in the armed forces when an actual

 

Ssabakdu; ror shall ony person be conpelied Tn any criminal
case to be a witness against oneself

(Emphasis added.)

+ ns § 701-109 (1993), entitled “Method of prosecution when conduct
establishes an element of more than one offense,” reads in pertinent part:

12) then the sane conduct of a defendant may establish
an elenent of more than one offense, the defendant may De
prosecuted for each offense of which such conduct is an
Slenent. ti

ote Shan one offense if:
(2) Gat offense is included in the otuex, as defined

(ei) ” ine offense js detined as a coninuine course of
‘onduct “andthe defengant"s course of conauct

kes guintertustad, uniess he law proviges that
Epecifie periods of conduct constitute separate
oftenses

igi A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in an offense charged in the indictment oF the
information. An offense is's0 included when?

(a) “Inds established by proof of the same on less
‘Mian_all the tacts reaulred to establish the
‘soamission of the offense charced: or

(b) Tteconsists of an attempt to commit the offense
charged or to commit an offense otheruise
incluged therein; oF

(c) Iedlfgers fron the offense charged only in the
respect that 8 less serious injury of risk of

Sony property of pubic

    
   

of culpability suffices to
establish its commission

(Emphases added.)
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION***

eee

 

appellate counsel did not raise the issue(s].” Bugado requests
that this court vacate his convictions or in the alternative, for
a remand for trial.

In response, the State contends that (1) the court was
right in determining that the issues were waived and are without
merit, and (2) even S€ not waived, the court was correct in its
ruling. In reply, Bugado states that (1) he “was denied a
hearing and an opportunity te question his counsel{] under oath
as to why certain witnesses were not called,” (2) “no showing of
actual prejudice is requized for the [court] to order a Rule 40
|. hearing{,]” and (3) he “should be allowed to call all of
his witnesses to testify at a hearing” inasmuch as “[t]heir
testimony will support their sworn statements made in the
petition [which] would have made a difference in the trial
outcome.”

on appeal, “the issue whether the trial court erred in
denying 2 Rule 40 petition without @ hearing based on @ showing
of no colorable claim is reviewed de novo; thus, the right [orl
wrong standard of review is applicable.” Dan v. State, 76
Hawai'i 423, 427, 879 P.2d $28, $32 (1994) (quoting State vw.
Allen, 7 Haw. App. 89, 92-93, 744 P.2d 789, 792-93 (1987),
overruled on other crounds by Dan, 76 Hawai'i at 427, 879 P.2d at
552.

With regard to Bugado’s first ground, it is noted that

Bugado does not allege that appellate counsel was ineffective,
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and therefore, trial counsel's actions or inactions are at issue.
It 4s concluded that sub-issues (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (8) and
(9) of the first ground of Bugado’s petition were waived. Sub-
issue (1), pertaining to failure of trial counsel to subpoena
reports of the alleged 1995 abuse by Complainant, when asked at
trial whether Complainant's prior or subsequent bad acts would be
referred to by Bugado, trial counsel indicated he did not intend
to use any. Inasmuch as trial counsel's intention not to use any
of Complainants prior or subsequent bad acts were made on the
record, Bugado had a “realistic opportunity,” Matsuo v. State, 70
Haw. 573, $77, 778 P.2d 332, 334 (1989) (citing Commonvealth v.
Hextzog, 425 A.2d 329 (Pa, 1981)}, to raise this issue on appeal
but did not do so.

Moreover, the reports state that Bugado and Complainant
were “involved in a verbal argument” and that “{nJo injuries
[were] reported or complained of.” Assuming that this omission
precluded Bugado from raising a claim of self-defense, no basis
exists as a matter of law for such a claim since the abuse
reports concern an incident fron 1995, and would not be
admissible given that Bugado’s convictions relate to incidents
occurring in February and March of 2000. See HRS § 703-304
(Supp. 2005) (providing that “the use of force upon or toward
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such

force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting

himself against the use of unlawful force by the other person on
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the present occasion” (emphasis added)). Furthermore, Bugado’ s
court testimony made no mention of any aggression on

Complainant’s part. In sum, even if not waived, trial counsel's
alleged omissions did not “result(] in either the withdrawal or

substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense.”

State v. Fukusaky, 85 Hawai'l 462, 479-80, 946 P.2d 32, 49-80
(3397).

Similarly, with regard to sub-issue (2), trial
counsel's supposed failure to subpoena relevant witnesses as to
the alleged 1995 abuse, again, trial counsel's intention not to
use prior or subsequent bad acts are in the record. Accordingly,
such claim was waived for the sane reason noted in item (1).
Even if not waived, because the alleged abuse by Complainant took
place approximately five years before, the statements of these
witnesses would not be relevant to a potential self-defense claim
by Bugado for the abuse incidents in 2000 with which he was
charged.

In regard to the 1995 incident, the statement by Sgt.
Eric Muroki (Muroki) provided by Rule 40 counsel stated that he
noticed that, in 1995, Bugado had scratches on his neck and chest
but he could not determine whether they were “offensive or
defensive” injuries, and that Bugado declined to file a
complaint, A statement by Officer Eric Lee Correa stated that he
recalled observing Bugado in 1995 with swelling and bruising on

his legs. Hence, Muroki’s and Correa’s testimonies conflicted as
‘**¢NOT FOR PUBLICATION*#* .

 

to the nature of the injuries. In any event, as noted above,
such statements would not be relevant to the defense of self
defense for the 2000 charges. According to Rule 40 counsel's
investigation, Lt. Daniel Matsuura and Sgt. Lloyd Yamashita did
not possess knowledge of Bugado being involved in a dispute with
Complainant:

Bugado also did not produce any affidavit or sworn
statements as to what the remaining witnesses, Sot. Delima and
Lt. Gregg Peresa, would testify to, see State v. Richie, 88
Hawai'i 19, 39-40, 960 P.2d 1227, 1247-48 (1998) (stating that
“[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims based on the failure
to obtain witnesses must be supported by affidavits or sworn
statements describing the testimony of the proffered witnesses”),
and, therefore, Bugado failed to meet his burden of showing these
omissions “resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial
impairment of a potentially meritorious defense.” Fukusaku, 85
Hawai'i at 479-80, 946 P.2d at 49-50.

With respect to sub-issue (3), involving trial
counsel's alleged failure to subpoena reports that Complainant
was involved in theft and forgery, trial counsel did obtain such
reports, which according to the State, were made a part of
discovery. The record indicates that the checks alleged to have
been forged were deposited into Bugado and Complainant's joint
account. Complainant freely admitted to depositing these checks
inte their joint credit union account, and Bugado does not
dispute Complainant's admission.

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a

Even if evidence of Conplainant’s alleged forgery would
be admissible to impeach her credibility, inasmuch as such
evidence was available and therefore apparent in the record,
Bugado had a “realistic opportunity,” Matsuo, 70 Haw. at 577, 778
P.2d at 334, to raise this issue on direct appeal but failed to
do so.

In the same light, because the checks in question are
in the record, sub-issue (4), trial counsel’s failure to hire

handwrit

 

g expert, was waived. The purpose of obtaining an
expert was to ascertain whether Complainant had indeed forged
pugado’s signature. As noted previously, when asked by the court
whether Complainant’ s prior or subsequent bad acts would be
referred to by Bugado, trial counsel indicated he did not intend
to use any. Thus, Bugado had a “realistic opportunity,” ida, to
raise an ineffective assistance claim against trial counsel for
failure to obtain a handwriting expert.

Sub-issue (6) apparently relates to trial counsel's
failure to elicit “prior bad acts” evidence of Complainant
following the alleged 1995 abuse incident in order to
substantiate self defense. Such evidence seemingly refers to
acts by Complainant wherein she became emotional about Bugado’s
alleged infidelities, and purportedly threatened to kill herself.
Again, trial counsel's intention not to use these prior or
subsequent “bad acts” are in the record, and, thus, Bugado had

the opportunity te raise this sub-issue on direct appeal.
‘**soT FOR PUBLICATION***
Moreover, the omission by trial counsel of Complainant's “prior

bad acts," as Bugado claims them to be, appears to be a matter of
trial strategy. In excluding such evidence, trial counsel

apparently avoided introduction of Bugado’s own alleged bad acts,
including his alleged infidelities. Such determination by trial

counsel should not be second-guessed. See Richie, 88 Hawai'i at

 

39-40, 960 P.2d at 1247-48 (stating that the “calling of
witnesses is @ strategic decision that is generally left to
defense counsel” and that the “decision whether to call witnesses
in a criminal case is normally a matter within the judgnent of
counsel [which] will rarely be second-guessed by judicial
hindsight”).

With respect to sub-issue (8), trial counsel's failure
to move to dismiss the charge of Possession of Firearm by Persons
Under Restraining Orders, such issue could also have been raised
on direct appeal and was therefore waived. The record shows that
trial counsel observed that “[t)hey have got witnesses to say
[Bugado] handed (the firearms] over. That’s why we are pleading
no contest to it.” Bugado had the opportunity to challenge the
grand jury determination that probable cause existed to support

the charge on direct appeal but failed to do

 

Sub-issue (9), pertaining to trial counsel’s alleged
failure to cross-examine certain witnesses, was similarly waived.
Bugado provides a long list of such witnesses. The witnesses’

testimony are apparent in the transcripts, and are made a part of

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a

the record. Although Bugado does not specify what relevant
information was omitted by trial counsel's failure to cross-
examine these witnesses, Bugado had the opportunity to review the
record in order to raise the ineffectiveness of counsel during
direct appeal and, therefore, had a “realistic opportunity . . -
to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Matsuo, 70
Haw. at 577, 778 P.2d at 334; see Stanley v. State, 76 Hawai'i
446, 450, 879 P.2d 551, $55 (1994) (recognizing that “HRPP Rule
40(a) (3) restricts the issues that may be raised in @ post-
conviction proceeding and provides that ‘[s)aid proceeding shall
not be available and relief thereunder shall not be granted where
the issues sought to be raised have been previously ruled upon ox
were vaived” and explaining that “Jain issue is waived if the
petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed to raise it and
it could have been raised before the trial, at the trial, on
appeal, in a habeas corpus proceeding or any other proceeding
actually conducted” (quoting HRPP Rule 40(a) (3)) (emphases
added); Bryant 2, 6 Haw, App. 331, 334, 720 P.2d 1015,
1016 (1986) (noting that in a HREP Rule 40 proceeding, waiver
“ean only be lodged against the petitioner when it may be
inferred fron an examination of the entire record”), overrul
other arounds by Briones v. State, 74 Haw. 442, 460-61 n.11, 848
P.2d 966, 975-76 n.11 (1983).

As to the remainder of Bugado’s claims under the first

ground of the petition, the court was correct in ruling that

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these claims were without merit. Bugado, as the court
recognized, “lists multiple specific errors or omissions
reflecting [trial] counsel’s lack of skill, judament, or
diligence.” However, Bugado fails to meet his burden of showing
that “such errors or omissions resulted in either the withdrawal
or substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense.”
Eukusaku, @5 Hawai'i at 479-80, 946 P.2d at 49-50.

With respect to sub-issue (5), trial counsel's failure
to interview witnesses presented by the State, Bugado names three
witnesses in particular. The first witness, Ruth Balderas
(Balderas), a victim witness counselor and acquaintance of
Complainant's, testified at trial that Complainant approached
her, she contacted the Maui Police Department domestic violence
unit, and requested assistance for Conplainant to get her
personal belongings and to report the abuse incident. Balderas
then testified that she observed that Complainant had a bruise on
her neck and appeared “upset, worried, and scared.” Trial

coun: 1d his intention not to cross-examine. No

 

1 then expre:

 

affidavit or sworn statement was obtained from Balderas, and
Bugado does not present any argument as to how he was affected by
trial counsel's failure to interview this witness prior to trial.
The second witness, Barbara Pagay, also testified at
trial, and provided a sworn statement, and would have further
testified that (1) Bugado and Complainant are her friends,

(2) she would have denied that Bugado brandished a gun on a

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certain date, (3) she was never told by Complainant that
Complainant was threatened with a firearm, and (4) Bugado
complained to her about Complainant having an affair. Although
said information could have been used to impeach Complainant,
Bugado does not say how this resulted in a “withdrawal or
substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense,”
ids, much less identify the defense affected.

The third witness, Lt. Duane Asami, would have only
testified as to what he observed in 1995 which, as stated
earlier, would not have been relevant to show self defense. Thus
as to the three witnesses, Bugado failed to meet his burden of
showing how this omission would have “resulted in either the
withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious
defense.” Id.

As to sub-issue (7), trial counsel’s failure to
subpoena Complainant's ex-parte petition for a temporary
restraining order, that petition was made following the March 6,
2000 abuse incident. Complainant did not allege that Bugado used
a firearm in that incident. Further, Complainant apparently was
responding to a question in the petition form regarding the abuse
incident, and stated that she was unsure if Bugado had possession
of any firearm, Bugado does not state how this omission would
have resulted in the “withdrawal or substantial impairment of a

potentially meritorious defense.” Id

a3
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As to sub-issue (10), trial counsel's failure to
present exculpatory witnesses or evidence, only Lt. Asami,
Stephen Kaneshiro (Kaneshiro), and Philip Bugado, Sr. (Philip)
provided statements, As discussed, Lt. Asami’s testimony relates
to the 1995 abuse incident. Kaneshiro’s testimony would have
Ancluded his opinion that Bugado’'s “behavior was detrimental to
his marriage” and that Bugado “was treating his wife... ina
very poor manner.” Accordingly, because Kaneshiro’'s testimony
would have been detrimental to Bugado’s defense, it is apparent
that trial counsel’s omission was 2 matter of trial stratesy.

Similarly, Philip's testimony would only adduce
evidence of the 1995 sbuse, that Complainant was emotionally
upset about Bugado’s infidelities, and that she was not afraid of
firearms. It was reasonable for trial counsel not to present
Philip inasmuch as potentially damaging information in the form
of prior bad acts by Bugado could have resulted. Furthermore,
the fact that Complainant was unafraid of firearms would not,
ipso facto, mean that she would not be threatened when a gun is
pointed at her. Therefore, trial counsel’s decision not to
present Kaneshiro’s and Philip's testimony should not be second-
guessed. Bichie, 68 Hawai'i at 39-40, 960 P.2d at 1247-49.

As to the second ground of Bugado’s petition, it is
unclear at what stage Bugado knew of the presence or absence of
the audiotape at issue, The State argues that HRPP Rule 16(b)

provides that statements recorded by the State “shall not be

Mu
‘+#*NOT FOR PUBLICATION***

 

subject to disclosure,” and, thus, the State would have had no
duty to provide Bugado with the audiotape. Even if HREP

Rule 16(b) (1) (vid) (2004) controls, as Bugado asserts, the record
Indicates that such audiotape is not in the “possession or
control,” HRPP Rule 16(b) (1) (i), of the State. Bugado has not
suggested or indicated that the State acted maliciously,
egregiously, or in bad faith.

Moreover, Lt. Asami, the witness who made the statement
on the audiotape, testified in court. When questions were asked
by the State as to what Complainant had told Lt. Asami, @ hearsay
objection was raised by trial counsel which was sustained by the
court. Thus, trial counsel's objection on the grounds of hearsay
to preclude Lt. Asani from testifying as to what Complainant may
have told him may have provided @ benefit to Bugado, and appears
to be “an informed tactical decision,” Briones, 74 Haw. at 463,
848 P.2d at 977, which will not be second-guessed on review, id.

As to the third ground in Bugado’s petition, that his
conviction resulted from a no-contest plea not made “knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently” as he asserts, Bugado apparently
argues that he entered a no-contest plea only after trial counsel
allegedly informed him that a plea agreement was entered into and
that he would move for a DANC plea. The record shows that Bugado
entered his plea after the trial court conducted an appropriate

colloquy, the sufficiency of which Bugado does not challengi

 

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Accordingly, the court did not err in finding that Bugado’s claim

in this respect had no merit.
Bugado contends, further, that trial counsel
misinformed him of the availability of a DANC plea as to
Count Vit, and was therefore ineffective. Count VII pertains to
Bugado’s possession of a firearm while a protective order was in
effect. ‘The record indicates that trial counsel requested the
granting of a OANC plea with respect to Count VIZ but that his
no-contest plea was inmediately accepted.

HRS § 653+

 

(9) (Supp. 2005) appears to make a DANC plea
unavailable when “a firearm was used in the commission of the
offense charged.” (Emphasis added.) That was not the case here
as to the Count VIT charge. Hence, it cannot be said that trial
counsel was ineffective by stating that he would move for 2 DANC
plea.

As stated before, as to his fourth ground, Bugado
clains that his convictions were obtained in violation of the
protections against double jeopardy and HRS § 701-109, and that
the court was without jurisdiction to be tried for abuse of
household members under HRS § 709-906. Bugado clearly could have
raised these issues on direct appeal, but failed to do so.
However, Bugado also claims that both trial and appellate counsel
were ineffective for failing to raise these issues. Therefore, a
determination is required on whether trial counsel's and

appellate counsel's omissions were “within the range of

16
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a

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Briones, 74
Haw, at 462, 848 P.2d at 976 (quoting State v. Kahalawei, $4 Haw.

28, 30, S01 P.2d 977, 979 (1972)).

In support of his double jeopardy argument, Bugado
relies on this court’s opinion in State vy. Lessary, 75 Haw. 446,
865 P.24 150 (1994), in claiming that he cannot be convicted of
counts V and VI, the abuse charge and unlawful imprisonment
charge, respectively, because those offenses occurred on the sane
date.

However, Lessary involved a subsequent conviction for
terroristic threatening and unlawful imprisonment after the
defendant in that case had already been convicted of abuse under
HRS § 709-906, a situation not present in this case. As
indicated in Lessary, the offenses of abuse and unlawful

imprisonment are separate and distinct. It stated:

a : pase: unlawts

Terrotistic Threatenina do gat, Terroristic Thr
Fequites proof cf a threat to cause bodily injury:
Oniawest Imprisonment do not

  

Stet etares toner tration
Id. at 452 n.8, 865 P.2d at 153 n.8 (emphases added).

‘The Lessary court barred prosecution for both the
unlawful imprisonment charge and the abuse charge because the
State alleged that the defendant engaged in throwing the victim
against the wall and dragging the victim out of the office into

his vehicle as the conduct element for the abuse charge, id. at

v
‘*sNOT FOR PUBLICATION®#*

460, 865 P.2d at 167, which was the same conduct element used to
support the charge of unlawful imprisonment. Because the alleged
conduct had already been proven as part of the abuse charge, the
unlawful imprisonment charge was not allowed to stand. Id, at
460, 865 P.2d at 157.

contrary to Bugado’s contentions, no “multiple
punishments for the sane offense,” id. at 454, 865 P.2d 154,
exists. Based on the record, the convictions were apparently
based on the evidence following. On March 6, 2000, Complainant
testified that after she placed her hands on Bugado’s shoulders,
she shook Bugado in order that he would stop threatening her.
Bugado pushed Complainant to the ground, punched her several
times on the head while she was on the ground, and then started
choking her. Complainant testified she managed to free herself
and ran to her neighbor's unit.

Bugado then followed her and after the neighbor
interceded, Complainant returned to their residence. Bugado
again assaulted Complainant, struck her on the head, and choked

Complainant then ran to the neighbor’s unit, Bugado again

 

followed her, and forcibly pulled Complainant against her will by
grabbing her by her hand, and carried her without her permission,
presumably to return to their residence. Complainant's
neighbor's testimony essentially corroborated Complainant’ s
recollection. Hence, sufficient evidence to support convictions

for the offenses of unlawful imprisonment and abuse existed for

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the jury to find that Bugado committed two offenses based on
distinguishable conduct. See State v. Bui, 104 Hawaii 462, 467,
92 P.3d 471, 476 (2004) (stating that “(ijn reviewing whether
substantial evidence exists to support a conviction, . . . due
deference must be given to the right of the trier of fact to
determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable
Anferences from the evidence adduced” (quoting State v. Lubona,
77 Hawai'i 429, 432, 886 P.2d 766, 769 (App. 1994))). Moreover,
as earlier stated, the elements of abuse of family and household
menbers and unlawful imprisonment differ.

As to Bugado’s claim with respect to HRS § 701-109,
Bugado posits that because the State stated during trial that
Bugado “engaged in @ continuous course of conduct[,]” he claims
‘that he was engaged in a continuing course of conduct. In
addition, Bugado claims that “the unlawful imprisonment charge is
also an included offense of the abuse of household menber
charge.”

HRS § 701-109 states that “{w)hen the same conduct of a
defendant may establish an element of more than one offense, the
defendant may be prosecuted for each offense of which such
conduct is an element.” (Emphasis added.) Hence, unless the
offense falls within the five exceptions under HRS § 701-109, a
defendant may be prosecuted for separate offenses where the
conduct element for respective offenses are one and the same.

Under subsection (e), prosecution is barred where “the offense is

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‘senor FOR PUBLICATION***
defined as 2 continuing course of conduct and the defendant’ s
course of conduct was uninterrupted.”

Here, however, the offense of abuse of a family or
household member under HRS § 709-906 is not defined as a
continuing course of conduct offense. The facts of the instant
case show that Bugado’s actions were not continuous. Hence, HRS
§ 701-109(e) is inapplicable.

Second, unlawful imprisonment was not an included
offense of abuse." Since an attempt is not involved here, and
the offenses do not differ, only in respect that a less serious
injury or risk of injury is sought to be protected or a different
state of mind indicating lesser culpability is involved,
subsections (b) and (c) are not germane.

With respect to HRS § 701-109(4) (a), as discussed
earlier, abuse of family or household menber requires proof of
physical abuse, which unlawful imprisonment does not require, and

unlawéul imprisonment requires proof of restraint, which is not a

% pursuant to HRS § 701-109(4), an included offense must meet one of
the following definitions

@ 4 by proot ess tt

te) Fe'seneiete of an attenpt co commit the offense
Gharged of to commit an offense otherwise included
therein: oF.

[c) Te siffers from the offense charged only in the
Fespect that a less serious injury or risk of injury
Eo the sime person, property, or public interest or =
Aiterent state of mind indicating lesser degree of
Sulpability suffices to establish its comission

 

 

(Emphasis added.|
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‘+#+NOT FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

requirement to establish abuse. Hence, it cannot be said that
each of the counts against Bugado was “established by proof of
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged.” HRS § 701-109(4) (a).
Because Bugado’s claims are without merit, it cannot be said that
trial counsel's and appellate counsel’s failure to raise these
issues fell outside “the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases.” Briones, 74 Haw. at 462, 848 P.2d
at 976.

It is noted that Bugado fails to present any argument
that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the charge of Abuse of
Fanily or Household Menbers under HRS § 709-906, and, therefore,
Fugado!'s claim as to jurisdiction is disregarded. See Bui, 104
Hawai'i at 464, 92 P.3d at 473 (stating that where a defendant
‘presents no discernable argunent in support of [his]
contention(,] . . . it is our prerogative to disregard this
claim” (quoting State v, Moore, &2 Hawai'i 202, 206, 921 P.2d
122, 126 (1996))).

Accordingly, Bugado waived or failed to raise a
colorable claim in his petition for post-conviction relief.

Therefor

 

In accordance with Hawai'l Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 25, and after carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and duly considering and analyzing the

law relevant to the arguments and issues raised by the parties,

2
‘+*4NOT FOR PUBLICATION*#*

Tf 1S HEREBY ORDERED that the court's June 28, 2004
Order Denying Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment
or to Release Petitioner from Custody is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 23, 2006.
on the briefs:
Richard 7, Patunat
for. petitioner-appel ant g
Philip Bugado, or
Arleen Y. Watanabe Star Glateenarm
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
County of Maui

for respondent.
State of Hawai'i.

 

  

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