Title: Wright v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, 
JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
LAMONT D. WRIGHT 
 
v.  Record No. 090308 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
    NOVEMBER 5, 2009 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal we consider whether a conviction under Code 
§ 18.2-308.4(C) for possession of a firearm while possessing a 
controlled substance with the intent to distribute, requires 
proof of actual, simultaneous possession of the firearm and 
controlled substance, or if a conviction can be sustained by 
proving constructive possession of the firearm and drugs. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
Detective G.B. Smith of the Portsmouth Police Department 
received a tip from a confidential informant that Lamont D. 
Wright was distributing cocaine from his black Beretta vehicle 
on Suburban Parkway in Portsmouth.  Smith located and confronted 
Wright, told him about the informant’s information and advised 
him of his Miranda rights.  Because Smith had encountered Wright 
in possession of a firearm two days earlier, Smith asked Wright 
if he had the firearm.  Wright told Smith that the firearm was 
at his house.  In answer to Smith’s questions, Wright denied 
that he had any cocaine.  When Smith searched Wright, he found 
two small bags that contained a total of five grams of cocaine. 
 
While transporting Wright to his office, Smith asked Wright 
to cooperate, told Wright that they would have to go back to his 
house and retrieve his gun, and asked Wright if he had any 
additional cocaine or a scale.  Wright admitted that he had 
another bag of cocaine in his shoe, which the police retrieved.  
That bag contained approximately two grams of cocaine.  Wright 
also told Smith that his gun was near the rail of his bed in his 
bedroom, that a scale was in a dresser drawer, and that about 
125 grams of crack cocaine were in the room. 
Smith took Wright to his house, which was approximately 
five miles from the location of the original stop.  In Wright’s 
room, police located the gun near the bed, the scales in a 
dresser drawer, and, at Wright’s direction, approximately 117 
grams of cocaine in a pocket of his clothing hanging in a 
closet.  Some plastic bags “with corners missing” and ammunition 
were also found in the room. 
Wright was indicted for one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a violation 
of Code § 18.2-248, and one count of possession of a firearm 
while in possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute, a violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(C).  At trial a 
police officer expert testified that the amount of cocaine found 
on Wright’s person was inconsistent with personal use and that 
“everything combined” was inconsistent with personal use.  The 
 
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expert stated that the gun was something “that you normally find 
with people that are doing something other than using drugs.”  
The trial court convicted Wright on both charges, sentenced 
Wright to five years for each charge, and suspended five years 
of the sentence. 
In Wright’s appeal to the Court of Appeals, he argued, as 
relevant here, that a conviction under Code § 18.2-308.4(C) 
requires the Commonwealth to prove actual, simultaneous 
possession of both the drugs and the firearm.1  The Court of 
Appeals rejected this argument, holding that constructive 
possession of either or both the drugs and the firearm was 
sufficient but that “the statute requires proof of a nexus 
between the firearm and the drugs that the defendant actually or 
constructively possesses.”  Wright v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 
266, 282, 670 S.E.2d 772, 780 (2009).  The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy this 
standard and affirmed Wright’s conviction.  Id. at 282-87, 670 
S.E.2d at 780-82.  Wright timely appealed to this Court. 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
Wright argues here, as he did in the Court of Appeals, that 
Code § 18.2-308.4(C) requires actual, simultaneous possession of 
                                                 
1 Wright’s appeals to the Court of Appeals and this Court 
included a challenge to the constitutionality of the search of 
his person and house.  Neither Court granted an appeal on this 
issue. 
 
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the firearm and the controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute.  According to Wright, when he was stopped by Officer 
Smith and arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, the firearm was not in his possession but miles away 
at his house and, therefore, the trial court and Court of 
Appeals erred in basing his conviction on constructive 
possession of the firearm. 
Code § 18.2-308.4 provides in relevant part: 
A. It shall be unlawful for any person unlawfully 
in possession of a controlled substance classified in 
Schedule I or II of the Drug Control Act (§ 54.1-3400 
et seq.) of Title 54.1 to simultaneously with 
knowledge and intent possess any firearm. . . . 
B. It shall be unlawful for any person unlawfully 
in possession of a controlled substance classified in 
Schedule I or II of the Drug Control Act (§ 54.1-3400 
et seq.) to simultaneously with knowledge and intent 
possess any firearm on or about his person. . . . 
C. It shall be unlawful for any person to 
possess, use, or attempt to use any pistol, shotgun, 
rifle, or other firearm or display such weapon in a 
threatening manner while committing or attempting to 
commit the illegal manufacture, sale, distribution, or 
the possession with the intent to manufacture, sell, 
or distribute a controlled substance classified in 
Schedule I or Schedule II of the Drug Control Act 
(§ 54.1-3400 et seq.) of Title 54.1 or more than one 
pound of marijuana. . . . 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
Wright argues that the use of the word “while” in 
Subsection (C) rather than “simultaneously” which is used in 
Subsections (A) and (B) shows a legislative intent to treat the 
simple possession of drugs differently than possession with the 
 
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intent to distribute.  That difference, according to Wright, is 
to limit the use of constructive possession of a firearm to 
circumstances in which the defendant possesses the firearm and 
the drugs he intended to distribute at the same time and place. 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we 
review de novo, and we determine the legislative intent from the 
words used in the statute, applying the plain meaning of the 
words unless they are ambiguous or would lead to an absurd 
result.  Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 
S.E.2d 310, 313-14 (2006).  Nothing in Code § 18.2-308.4 
suggests the construction advanced by Wright.  There can be no 
dispute that the purpose of the legislation was to establish 
three categories of crimes relating to possession of controlled 
substances and firearms at the same time.  Although the General 
Assembly chose to use the word “while” in Subsection (C) rather 
than “simultaneously” which it used in Subsections (A) and (B), 
there is no meaningful difference between the two words.  
“While” is defined as “during the time that,” and “simultaneous” 
is defined as “existing or occurring at the same time.”  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2604, 2122 (1993).  
Thus, both have the temporal meaning of “at the same time.” 
Furthermore, a well-settled principle of our jurisprudence 
is that a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm or 
controlled substance may be based solely on evidence of 
 
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constructive possession.  See, e.g., Rawls v. Commonwealth, 272 
Va. 334, 349-50, 634 S.E.2d 697, 705 (2006) (constructive 
possession of firearm); Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 
426, 497 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1998) (constructive possession of 
drugs); Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 741, 173 S.E.2d 
799, 805-06 (1970) (constructive possession of drugs).  Nothing 
in Code § 18.2-308.4(C) alters or suggests an intent to alter 
this principle.  Accordingly, in Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 
144, 654 S.E.2d 584 (2008), when considering a violation of 
Subsection (C) of Code § 18.2-308.4 based on constructive 
possession of a firearm we recited the well-established general 
rule: 
To establish constructive possession of the firearm 
by a defendant, “the Commonwealth must present 
evidence of acts, statements, or conduct by the 
defendant or other facts and circumstances proving 
that the defendant was aware of the presence and 
character of the firearm and that the firearm was 
subject to his dominion and control.” 
 
Id. at 148, 654 S.E.2d at 586 (quoting Rawls, 272 Va. at 349, 
634 S.E.2d at 705). 
Wright also argues that the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals erred in concluding that sufficient evidence was 
produced to show that he possessed the firearm while committing 
the offense of possession of cocaine with the intent to 
distribute or to show a nexus between the possession of the 
firearm and the criminal act.  Wright’s arguments are based 
 
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primarily on his premise that the crime of possession of cocaine 
with intent to distribute occurred while he was in or at his car 
on Suburban Parkway and the police recovered some cocaine.  
However, at Wright’s direction and in his presence, cocaine was 
also found in his bedroom along with the firearm.  The 
indictment charging a violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(C) did not 
limit the charge to Wright’s possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute while in his automobile on Suburban Parkway.  
Trial testimony established that both the cocaine recovered from 
Wright at the time of his initial arrest and “everything 
combined,” which included the cocaine recovered at Wright’s 
home, the gun, the packaging material, and the scale, along with 
the absence of items to use cocaine, supported the conclusion 
that the cocaine was not for personal use.  Taking the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 
party below, Riley v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 467, 482-83, 675 
S.E.2d 168, 177 (2009), we conclude that the evidence recovered 
at Wright’s house was sufficient to establish that Wright 
constructively possessed the firearm while constructively 
possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute.2  
Finally, we need not address Wright’s arguments that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish a nexus between the 
                                                 
2 Wright’s challenge is limited to the issue of possession 
of the firearm.  His conviction for possession of cocaine with 
intent to distribute is not the subject of this appeal. 
 
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possession of the firearm and the unlawful activity.  The Court 
of Appeals held that “the statute requires proof of a nexus 
between the firearm and the drugs that the defendant actually or 
constructively possesses.”  Wright, 53 Va. App. at 282, 670 
S.E.2d at 780.  However, nothing in Code § 18.2-308.4(C) 
contains such a requirement.3  As stated above, the terms 
“simultaneously” and “while” have a temporal meaning.  Neither 
of these words nor any other language used in the statute 
carries with it the requirement that the firearm is in some way 
being used in conjunction with the unlawful drug activity or to 
further such activity.  The General Assembly has criminalized 
the possession of a firearm in conjunction with other 
circumstances without regard to whether the firearm is utilized 
for any purpose connected to such circumstances.  See, e.g., 
Code § 18.2-308.1(B) (possession on school grounds); Code 
§ 18.2-308.2 (possession by a felon); Code § 18.2-308.2:01 
(possession by a non-citizen).  In the absence of any statutory 
language supporting the requirement of a “nexus” between the 
possession of the firearm and the illegal activity, we cannot 
impose such a requirement in prosecutions under this Code 
section.  Compare the very different language found in a federal 
                                                 
3 Although the record reflects that the Commonwealth 
apparently “conceded” that the statute contained a nexus 
requirement, the issue is a question of law which is not subject 
to a concession binding on this Court.  Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 
230 Va. 99, 111 n.5, 334 S.E.2d 838, 846 n.5 (1985).  
 
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provision, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(2006 & Supp. I 2007)(“any 
person who, during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking 
crime . . . in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a 
firearm” shall be sentenced to imprisonment in addition to the 
sentence for the drug trafficking crime)(emphasis added). 
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed in this opinion, we 
will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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