Title: Commonwealth v. Selavka

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11461 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EDGAR L. SELAVKA. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     February 4, 2014. - August 25, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Global Positioning System Device.  Practice, 
Criminal, Sentence, Probation, Double jeopardy, Duplicative 
punishment. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 13, 2007. 
 
 
A motion to vacate a condition of probation, filed on 
November 19, 2012, was heard by Mary-Lou Rup, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Kathryn Hayne Barnwell (Bonnie G. Allen with her) for the 
defendant. 
 
Steven Greenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
William C. Newman & Matthew R. Segal, for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
1 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
LENK, J.  Fifteen months after child pornography was 
discovered on his computer, the defendant pleaded guilty to 
eleven counts of possessing child pornography in violation of 
G. L. c. 272, § 29C.  In addition to a period of incarceration, 
the defendant was sentenced to a term of probation.  
Notwithstanding the provisions of G. L. c. 265, § 47, requiring 
that defendants convicted of certain enumerated sex offenses, 
including possession of child pornography, be subject to global 
positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of any term 
of probation, such monitoring was not imposed as part of the 
defendant's sentence.  Almost one year later, the Commonwealth 
sought correction before the sentencing judge of what it termed 
an illegal sentence by the addition of GPS monitoring as a 
condition of the defendant's probation.  After a hearing, the 
Commonwealth's motion was allowed and GPS monitoring was ordered 
for the duration of the defendant's probationary period. 
 
The defendant now appeals from the denial of his subsequent 
motion brought pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001) (rule 30[a]), to vacate the 
addition of GPS monitoring to the conditions of his probation, 
contending both that the judge lacked authority to modify his 
sentence and that the delayed imposition of GPS monitoring 
violated principles of double jeopardy.  As we determined in 
Commonwealth v. Guzman, ante     (2014), G. L. c. 265, § 47, 
3 
 
affords a sentencing judge no discretion as to the imposition of 
GPS monitoring for probationers convicted of the specified 
predicate offenses.  Accordingly, the defendant's initial 
sentence was illegal insofar as it did not include GPS 
monitoring as a condition of the defendant's probation.  In the 
circumstances, however, the belated correction of that sentence 
contravened the defendant's legitimate expectation of finality 
in the terms of his initial sentence, and the imposition of GPS 
monitoring on him cannot stand. 
 
1.  Background.  On April 22, 2008, the defendant, who was 
then over fifty years old, pleaded guilty to eleven counts of 
possession of child pornography, G. L. c. 272, § 29C.  Neither 
during the plea colloquy that day nor at the subsequent 
sentencing hearing on July 9, 2008, was any mention made of the 
fact that G. L. c. 265, § 47, required the imposition of GPS 
monitoring as a condition of any term of probation.  At the 
sentencing hearing, the defendant was sentenced to two 
concurrent terms of incarceration for two and one-half years, 
each with one year to serve and the balance to be suspended 
during a seven-year term of probation.  The judge accepted all 
of the Commonwealth's recommended special conditions of 
probation;2 GPS monitoring was not among them.  Moreover, the 
                                                     
 
 
2 The Commonwealth requested, and the judge ordered as 
conditions of probation, that the defendant participate in sex 
4 
 
defendant's probation contract did not mention GPS monitoring.  
The defendant was released on parole on February 13, 2009.3 
 
On May 22, 2009, after the defendant had completed his 
committed sentence and while he was serving his probationary 
term, the Commonwealth filed a motion for GPS monitoring of 
defendant, arguing that the sentencing judge had been required 
to impose GPS monitoring as a condition of the defendant's 
probation pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 47.  After a hearing in 
June, 2009, the judge allowed the motion over the defendant's 
objection, but ordered that the defendant not be subject to any 
geographic exclusion zones.4  On November 19, 2012, before a 
different judge, the defendant moved pursuant to rule 30 (a) to 
vacate the modified sentence. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
offender treatment, continue taking his then-current 
medications, participate in substance abuse treatment, and 
attend Narcotics Anonymous.  The judge also prohibited the 
defendant from using the Internet, having unsupervised contact 
with minor children, living with minor children, and obtaining 
employment requiring unsupervised contact with minor children. 
 
 
3 On September 8, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to 
revise and revoke his sentence pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 29 (a), 378 Mass. 899 (1979) (rule 29 [a]); he sought a 
reduction of the period of incarceration from one year to six 
months.  The sentencing judge denied the motion. 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 265, § 47, provides that the Commissioner 
of Probation (commissioner) may prohibit a defendant from 
entering certain geographic areas throughout the term of his 
probation, if applicable.  Here, the commissioner did not 
propose any exclusion zones. 
5 
 
 
While this motion was under advisement, the defendant 
visited a movie theater during his probation and while wearing 
the GPS device.  Upon leaving the theater, he received voicemail 
messages from the Department of Probation, instructing him to 
telephone the electronic monitoring company.  Although the 
monitoring company told the defendant that he was "all set," 
police officers arrested him for purportedly violating the 
conditions of his probation, and detained him for four days.  
Seeking release, the defendant moved to dismiss the asserted 
violation and to stay the execution of GPS monitoring.  The 
motion judge dismissed the alleged violation without prejudice, 
but declined to stay the imposition of GPS monitoring.  
Subsequently, the judge denied the rule 30 (a) motion as well as 
a motion to reconsider. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant contends, first, that the 
sentencing judge lacked authority to alter the terms of his 
probation, and, second, that the belated imposition of GPS 
monitoring as a condition of his probation violated the 
principles of double jeopardy.  The Commonwealth maintains that 
the defendant's initial sentence was illegal for its failure to 
include GPS monitoring, and that the passage of time did not 
prevent the judge from correcting that error.  The Commonwealth 
further urges that the defendant had no legitimate expectation 
of finality in his illegal sentence. 
6 
 
 
We begin by noting that the defendant's initial sentence 
was, in fact, illegal for its failure to include GPS monitoring.  
See Goetzendanner v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., 
Norfolk, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 537 (2008), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Layne, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 17, 19 (1985) (illegal sentence is 
one that is "in some way contrary to the applicable statute").  
As we held in Commonwealth v. Guzman, supra at    , G. L. 
c. 265, § 47, requires a sentencing judge to impose GPS 
monitoring where a defendant has been convicted of an enumerated 
offense and has been sentenced to a term of probation.  The 
defendant here pleaded guilty to possession of child 
pornography, a qualifying offense under G. L. c. 6, § 178C, and 
was sentenced to a seven-year probationary term.  Pursuant to 
G. L. c. 265, § 47, therefore, the defendant's initial sentence 
was illegal insofar as it did not include GPS monitoring,5 and 
                                                     
 
 
5 The Commonwealth contends, separately, that the 
defendant's initial sentence did, in fact, include global 
positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of probation.  
Because G. L. c. 265, § 47, operates automatically, the 
Commonwealth maintains, the sentencing judge need not 
specifically have ordered such monitoring. 
 
 
We reject this interpretation.  The GPS monitoring mandated 
by G. L. c. 265, § 47, is not like other conditions of probation 
that a sentencing judge need not always articulate.  See Rule 56 
of the Rules of the Superior Court (2012) (enumerating 
conditions applicable to all terms of probation and stating that 
"[a]ny other condition shall be presumed to be in addition to 
the foregoing").  Unlike those routine conditions, which include 
compliance with all laws and orders of the court, contact with 
the probation officer at his request, and reasonable efforts to 
7 
 
the subsequent imposition of GPS monitoring constituted a 
revision of that illegal sentence. 
 
Given this premise, we consider whether the sentencing 
judge had the authority to correct the defendant's illegal 
sentence, then examine whether he was time barred from doing so 
under the principles of double jeopardy.  We conclude that, 
although the judge was empowered to correct the defendant's 
sentence, he was not permitted to do so nearly one year after 
the defendant received that sentence, where the defendant 
already had served his entire period of incarceration and had a 
legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence as initially 
imposed.  We therefore vacate the order insofar as it imposes 
GPS monitoring on the defendant as a condition of his probation. 
 
a.  Judge's authority to modify the defendant's sentence.  
The defendant contends that the judge lacked authority to alter 
his sentence in response to the Commonwealth's motion for GPS 
monitoring.  Notably, the Commonwealth filed that motion without 
making reference to any rule of criminal procedure that would 
                                                                                                                                                                           
obtain and maintain employment, the imposition of GPS monitoring 
is singularly punitive in effect.  See Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 
Mass. 559, 568-569 (2009).  For this reason, a defendant must 
receive actual notice from the sentencing judge that his 
probation will be conditioned on such a harsh requirement.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 57, 65-66 (2008); 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (3) (B), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 
(2004) (judge required to inform defendant, during plea 
colloquy, of maximum possible sentence for his offense as well 
as any mandatory minimum sentence). 
8 
 
have permitted it to do so.  Neither Mass. R. Crim. P. 29 (a), 
378 Mass. 899 (1979) (rule 29 [a]), nor rule 30 (a), the usual 
mechanisms for altering the terms of a defendant's sentence, 
have application in these circumstances.  The defendant urges 
the view that, absent authorization under these or any other 
rules of criminal procedure, the judge's modification of his 
sentence by the addition of GPS monitoring as an additional 
condition of probation was invalid.  We do not agree. 
 
The Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure provide two 
means by which a judge may alter the terms of a defendant's 
sentence.  Under the caption, "Revision or Revocation of 
Sentence," rule 29 (a) provides: 
 
"The trial judge upon his own motion or the written 
motion of a defendant filed within sixty days after the 
imposition of a sentence . . . may upon such terms and 
conditions as he shall order, revise or revoke such 
sentence if it appears that justice may not have been 
done." 
 
Rule 30 (a) concerns postconviction relief, and provides: 
 
"Any person who is imprisoned or whose liberty is 
restrained pursuant to a criminal conviction may at any 
time, as of right, file a written motion requesting the 
trial judge to release him or her or to correct the 
sentence then being served upon the ground that the 
confinement or restraint was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States or of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts." 
 
 
It is plain that neither rule 29 (a) nor rule 30 (a) 
expressly permits the Commonwealth to file a motion to correct 
an illegal sentence or otherwise ask that a defendant's sentence 
9 
 
be altered.  See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 685 
(1998).  Indeed, "there is no rule of criminal procedure that 
permits the Commonwealth to take such an appeal."6  Id. 
 
In this regard, although the defendant earlier had filed a 
timely motion pursuant to rule 29 (a) seeking revision or 
revocation of his sentence, see note 3, supra, the Commonwealth 
did not urge the judge to take that opportunity to correct his 
error of law, and the sixty-day period contemplated by that rule 
had long since run when the judge did take such action.  Nor did 
the defendant file a rule 30 (a) motion prior to the 
Commonwealth filing its motion for GPS monitoring that would 
have afforded the judge a similar opportunity.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 471 (2013) (judge 
amended sentence on grounds other than those requested by 
defendant in his rule 30 [a] motion; defendant had "knowingly 
exposed himself to the possibility that his entire sentencing 
scheme might be restructured"). 
 
But it cannot be the case that a judge lacks the authority 
to correct an illegal sentence simply because we have not 
determined a mechanism by which the Commonwealth may prompt such 
                                                     
 
 
6 The Commonwealth did not petition the county court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, to correct an illegal sentence.  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 Mass. 286, 289 (2013); 
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 14-15 (2010).  It is in 
any event far preferable that such matters be addressed in the 
first instance by a judge of the trial court, particularly where 
the sentencing judge is available. 
10 
 
action.  "A sentencing judge has flexibility to respond 
appropriately" where he discovers an error in the defendant's 
initial sentence.  Dunbrack v. Commonwealth, 398 Mass. 502, 506 
(1986).  Here, as noted, the failure of the judge to impose GPS 
monitoring on the defendant as a condition of his probation 
violated the terms of G. L. c. 265, § 47, and rendered the 
resulting sentence unlawful.  See Commonwealth v. McGuinness, 
421 Mass. 472, 475 (1995) (sentence unlawful where "premised on 
a major misunderstanding of the sentencing judge as to the legal 
bounds of his authority").  The Commonwealth must have some 
recourse by which to prompt judicial action in these 
circumstances, and a judge must have the ability to take 
appropriate action to rectify the error.  See Thompson v. United 
States, 495 F.2d 1304, 1306 (1st Cir. 1974) ("a trial court not 
only can alter a statutorily-invalid sentence in a way which 
might increase its severity, but must do so when the statute so 
provides"). 
 
We note that the Commonwealth occasionally has sought to 
correct a purportedly illegal sentence by encouraging the 
sentencing judge to exercise his or her authority under 
rule 29 (a).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Galvin, 466 Mass. 286, 
288 & n.7 (2013).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Sitko, 372 Mass. 305, 311 
(1977), S.C., 379 Mass. 921 (1980) (Commonwealth sought, by 
means of rule 29 [a], to increase defendant's sentence).  
11 
 
Although nothing in the text of rule 29 (a) explicitly permits 
such requests, it is appropriate that the Commonwealth be 
permitted to contest an invalid sentence by means of essentially 
the same mechanism for adjusting sentences that is available to 
the defendant and the sentencing judge.  The sixty-day period 
set forth in rule 29 (a) implicates certain of our common-law 
protections against double jeopardy, discussed in greater detail 
below.  Specifically, while subject to revocation and revision 
within the time frame and under the terms of rule 29 (a), a 
sentence remains conditional rather than final in nature.  This 
"reasonably balances the defendant's interest in finality 
against society's interest in law enforcement."  Aldoupolis v. 
Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 275 (1982), S.C., 390 Mass. 438 
(1983) (Aldoupolis).  Requiring that the Commonwealth now adhere 
to a uniform procedure further ensures that a defendant need 
not, based on the ongoing possibility of heightened punishment, 
"live in a constant state of anxiety and insecurity."  Id. at 
274. 
 
For these reasons, we determine that rule 29 (a), with its 
sixty-day time frame, is the proper vehicle by which the 
Commonwealth may challenge illegal sentences,7 as here, and 
                                                     
 
 
7 As at present, the Commonwealth may not use rule 29 (a) as 
a vehicle to contest a legal sentence with which it is 
dissatisfied.  When the Commonwealth proves that the sentence 
challenged is illegal, however, correction of the sentence is 
12 
 
request this court's standing advisory committee on the rules of 
criminal procedure to propose an amendment to rule 29 (a) 
reflecting this conclusion. 
 
b.  Double jeopardy and the defendant's legitimate 
expectation of finality.  We turn now to the novel question 
before us:  whether the belated correction of a defendant's 
initial sentence, invalid for its failure to have imposed a 
punitive probationary term required by statute, violates the 
double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the 
same crime.  The defendant maintains that the belated addition 
of GPS monitoring to the conditions of his probation constituted 
the impermissible imposition of a new and harsher sentence at a 
time when his initial sentence, while invalid, had nevertheless 
become final.  The Commonwealth, on the other hand, contends 
that double jeopardy was not violated by the correction of an 
illegal sentence nearly one year after that sentence first had 
been imposed given that the initial sentence was not final by 
virtue of illegality.  For the reasons we discuss, we conclude 
that even an illegal sentence will, with the passage of time, 
acquire a finality that bars further punitive changes 
detrimental to the defendant.  Accordingly, in the circumstances 
here, the delayed correction of the defendant's initial 
                                                                                                                                                                           
mandatory and satisfies the rule's proviso that "justice may not 
have been done." 
13 
 
sentence, in which he by then had a legitimate expectation of 
finality, violated double jeopardy and cannot stand. 
 
The guarantee against double jeopardy consists of three 
independent protections.  "It protects against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.  It protects 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction.  And it protects against multiple punishments for 
the same offense."  Aldoupolis, supra at 271-272, quoting North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).  These 
proscriptions "represent[] a constitutional[8] policy of finality 
for the defendant's benefit" in criminal proceedings, 
Aldoupolis, supra at 274, quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 
U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality).  See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 
458 Mass. 11, 19 (2010) (Goodwin), quoting United States v. 
Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("primary purpose of 
[double jeopardy] is to protect the finality of judgments").  
Since the defendant here was not twice prosecuted for the same 
offense, we consider only whether he was subjected to multiple 
punishments for the same crime. 
                                                     
 
 
8 The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not, in 
contrast to the United States Constitution, contain a double 
jeopardy clause, but we consider our common law to embrace the 
same principles and protections.  See Aldoupolis v. 
Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260, 271 n.14 (1982), S.C., 390 Mass. 
438 (1983). 
14 
 
 
Despite the seemingly straightforward language of our 
double jeopardy principles, the scope of the protection against 
"multiple punishments for the same offense" is far from clear.9  
We have, however, repeatedly defined "multiple punishments" as 
those "in excess of what a Legislature intended to be the 
punishment for a particular offense," Aldoupolis, supra at 272, 
citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981).  For 
example, in Gallinaro v. Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 728, 729 n.2 
(1973), two defendants were sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
as well as required to pay a fine under a statute that permitted 
only one or the other such penalty, not both.  These sentences 
constituted multiple punishments, we concluded, because they 
violated the Legislature's stated intent that a defendant 
undergo but one of the two alternative statutory penalties.  Id. 
at 732-733.  See Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 175-176 (1873) 
(judge prohibited from sentencing defendant to both fine and 
imprisonment where statute permitted only fine or imprisonment).  
Similarly, unless the Legislature has specifically authorized 
cumulative punishments, we have long prohibited separately 
penalizing a defendant for each of two convictions where one 
                                                     
 
 
9 Then Justice Rehnquist observed that "the decisional law 
in the area is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to 
challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."  Albernaz v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).  See Marshall v. 
Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 534 (2012) (addressing "web of 
jurisprudence" concerning double jeopardy principles in 
Commonwealth). 
15 
 
crime is a lesser included offense of the other.  See 
Commonwealth v. Suero, 465 Mass. 215, 223 (2013); Morey v. 
Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871).  See also Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) ("the Fifth Amendment 
forbids . . . cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser 
included offense"). 
 
The present case, however, does not resemble any of these 
situations.  Given that the imposition of GPS monitoring on the 
defendant was necessary to bring his initial sentence into 
compliance with G. L. c. 265, § 47, it cannot be said, by virtue 
of his corrected sentence, that the defendant endured a greater 
penalty than the Legislature had envisioned for his particular 
offense.  See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 
(1980) (no multiple punishment where defendants' increased 
sentence remained within statutory boundaries).  Indeed, as 
corrected, the defendant's sentence was exactly the sentence 
that the Legislature mandated:  the use of a GPS device as a 
mandatory condition of his probationary term.  See Bozza v. 
United States, 330 U.S. 160, 165-167 (1947) (judge permitted to 
correct initial sentence so as to include statutorily mandated 
fine). 
 
It is precisely because an illegal sentence contravenes the 
intention of the Legislature that the modification of an illegal 
sentence, in itself, has not been seen as subjecting a defendant 
16 
 
to multiple punishments.  To the contrary, "[t]he sentence, as 
corrected, [merely] imposes a valid punishment for an offense 
instead of an invalid punishment for that offense."  Id. at 166-
167 & n.2 (double jeopardy not implicated where judge, five 
hours after initial imposition of sentence, corrected erroneous 
omission from sentence).  Even where a corrected sentence is 
harsher than its previous iteration, a defendant is not punished 
twice where the sentencing judge "only set[s] aside what [he or 
she] had no authority to do, and substitute[s] directions 
required by the law to be done upon the conviction of the 
offender."  Id., quoting In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 260 (1894).  
See generally Commonwealth v. Cowan, 422 Mass. 546 (1996) (no 
discussion of double jeopardy where judge corrected sentence to 
incorporate statutory minimum requirement, subjecting defendant 
to harsher penalty). 
 
This principle, however, does not resolve the case before 
us, which involves not merely the correction of an illegal 
sentence, but the long-delayed correction of such a sentence.  
Although it has been said that the rectification of an illegal 
sentence does not implicate the notion of multiple punishment 
since such a sentence is void and must be set aside, cases to 
that effect have not addressed whether substantial delay may 
render even an illegal sentence final for the purposes of double 
jeopardy analysis.  See, e.g., Bozza v. United States, supra at 
17 
 
166 ("five-hour interim" between initial sentence and subsequent 
correction); Commonwealth v. Cowan, supra at 549-550 (no 
discussion of double jeopardy where judge's correction of 
illegal sentence occurred within sixty-day period of 
rule 29 [a]). 
 
We have held, outside the context of illegal sentences, 
that the addition of a sufficiently punitive term to a 
defendant's initial sentence may constitute multiple punishment 
if the revision adding a new and harsher penalty occurs after 
that sentence becomes final.  In Goodwin, supra at 11-12, we 
considered whether a judge permissibly could modify the 
conditions of a defendant's probation by the addition of GPS 
monitoring.  Ordinarily, reasonable additions to the conditions 
of a defendant's probation do not constitute the revision or 
revocation of a sentence under rule 29 (a).  Id. at 16, citing 
Buckley v. Quincy Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 395 Mass. 815, 
818-819 (1985).  However, as we noted in Goodwin, supra at 19, 
certain modifications are "so punitive as to increase 
significantly the severity of the original probation," and, by 
virtue of their harshness, amount to sentence revisions within 
the meaning of rule 29 (a).  Where such punitive amendments are 
at issue, we concluded, our common-law principles of double 
jeopardy bar the imposition of "what is essentially a new, 
harsher sentence" once the rule 29 period has expired.  Goodwin, 
18 
 
supra.  Because the defendant's initial sentence had become 
final upon the expiration of the rule 29 (a) deadline, the 
addition of GPS monitoring -- a "serious, affirmative restraint" 
on a defendant's liberty -- as a condition of probation would 
constitute multiple punishment.  Id. at 22-23, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 Mass. 559, 570 (2009). 
 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bruzzese, 437 Mass. 606, 613 
(2002) (Bruzzese), a judge had sentenced a defendant to four 
concurrent sentences, each consisting of two and one-half years 
of incarceration.  After the defendant had served those two and 
one-half years on the first three convictions, the judge revoked 
his probation as to the fourth, and ordered that he remain 
incarcerated for an additional year.  Id. at 614.  We barred 
this revision, which subjected the defendant to greater 
punishment than the initial sentencing scheme had contemplated, 
as an impermissible multiple punishment in violation of double 
jeopardy.  Id.  The entire concurrent sentencing scheme was 
subject to the terms of rule 29 (a), we noted, and "could not be 
changed" once the sixty-day deadline set forth by that rule had 
expired.  Id.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Woodward, 427 Mass. 659, 685-
686, 690 (1998) (affirming denial of Commonwealth's 
postconviction request to vacate and remand lawful sentence for 
possible increase where defendant's expectation of finality in 
19 
 
initial sentence would render new, harsher sentence 
impermissible multiple punishment). 
 
The circumstances of Goodwin and Bruzzese are, plainly, 
distinct in certain respects from those in the present case.  
Here, the modification requested was mandatory rather than 
discretionary in nature insofar as it was to remedy the 
erroneous sentence initially imposed.  Goodwin and Bruzzese, on 
the other hand, both involved discretionary modifications to a 
defendant's sentence.  See Goodwin, supra at 18 n.9 ("We address 
here only discretionary modifications of probation").  Moreover, 
whereas the defendant's initial sentence here was invalid for 
its noncompliance with G. L. c. 265, § 47, the sentences at 
issue in Goodwin and Bruzzese complied with all relevant 
statutes, both initially and as modified. 
 
These factual differences notwithstanding, however, we have 
never indicated that the principles of finality on which Goodwin 
and Bruzzese relied are inapplicable where illegal sentences are 
concerned, or that an illegal sentence may never become final 
for the purposes of double jeopardy.  Far from holding that the 
Commonwealth may correct an illegal sentence at any time without 
regard for a defendant's expectation of finality,10 we have said 
                                                     
 
 
10 Although a judge may correct, at any time, clerical 
errors and other technical flaws in a defendant's sentence, see 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 42, 378 Mass. 919 (1979) ("[C]lerical 
mistakes . . . may be corrected by the court at any time of its 
20 
 
that a sentencing judge may correct a defendant's illegal 
sentence only when the error "is discovered in a timely manner."  
Dunbrack v. Commonwealth, 398 Mass. 502, 506 (1986); 
Commonwealth v. Weymouth, 2 Allen 144, 145 (1861) (court may 
correct defendant's sentence within same term that it initially 
issued).  Cf. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 175 Mass. 37, 39-40 
(1899) (judge may "correct any illegality or error in a 
sentence, provided it then remains wholly unexecuted").  To be 
sure, a defendant's legitimate expectation of finality may well 
be diminished when his sentence is illegal.  See Commonwealth v. 
Woodward, supra at 687.  But, by the same token, that principle 
does not afford carte blanche to correct erroneous sentences at 
any point subsequent to their initial imposition.  See Breest v. 
Helgemoe, 579 F.2d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 1978) ("the power of a 
sentencing court to correct even a statutorily invalid sentence 
must be subject to some temporal limit"). 
 
The rationale underlying both Goodwin and Bruzzese thus 
applies with substantial force to the facts before us.  Where a 
defendant's expectation of finality in his initial sentence has 
"crystallized" after enough time, United States v. Lundien, 769 
F.2d 981, 987 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064 
(1986), the invalidity of that sentence does not render its 
                                                                                                                                                                           
own initiative . . ."), and Commonwealth v. Miranda, 415 Mass. 
1, 5 (1993), "errors of substance" that "trample the defendant's 
rightful expectations" are not considered clerical.  See id. 
21 
 
subsequent correction by way of increased penalties immune to a 
double jeopardy challenge.  Such an approach would undermine the 
notion of finality, which animates our common-law protections 
against double jeopardy and prevents the Commonwealth from 
"shatter[ing] the defendant's repose and threaten[ing] him with 
grievous harm."  Double Jeopardy, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 101, 102 
(1977).  Even where a defendant's original sentence, as here, 
unquestionably is erroneous, his "interest in repose" remains, 
and may suffice to prohibit the addition of even those punitive 
terms necessary to bring the sentence into compliance with a 
relevant statute (citation omitted).  See Aldoupolis, supra at 
272. 
 
In the future, as discussed, the Commonwealth will be 
obliged to discern and seek to correct sentencing errors within 
the sixty-day time period of rule 29 (a).  Even an illegal 
sentence will become final for the purposes of double jeopardy 
after the expiration of that time period, and no longer will be 
subject to revision or revocation within the terms of 
rule 29 (a).  Here, as was the case in Goodwin, supra, and 
Bruzzese, supra, the sixty-day period set forth in rule 29 (a) 
had long since expired when the Commonwealth requested the 
defendant's initial sentence be amended.  We acknowledge that, 
at the time GPS monitoring was imposed on the defendant, we had 
not yet concluded that rule 29 (a) provided the relevant 
22 
 
deadline for the correction of illegal sentences.  Nevertheless, 
in the circumstances, we conclude that the belated imposition of 
GPS monitoring on the defendant violated the principle of 
finality and constituted an impermissible multiple punishment. 
 
A defendant's expectation of finality in his sentence 
increases once he has begun to serve that sentence.  See Fine v. 
Commonwealth, 312 Mass. 252, 256 (1942); Commonwealth v. 
Weymouth, supra at 147.  Prior to the Commonwealth's request 
that GPS monitoring be imposed, the defendant had served 
approximately seven months of incarceration before being 
released on parole and, having completed his committed sentence, 
had begun serving his seven-year term of probation.  During that 
time, the defendant had every reason to believe that his 
sentence would remain fixed; he could not have anticipated that 
the judge might revisit his initial sentencing decision and 
"impose[] new burdens" on him.  Goodwin, supra at 19.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Cumming, 466 Mass. 467, 471 (2013) (defendant 
who filed rule 30 [a] motion to alter sentence diminished any 
expectation of finality he previously had in that sentence); 
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980) (judge 
permitted to increase defendant's initial sentence; defendant 
lacked expectation of finality in that sentence where statute 
provided that sentence was subject to appeal). 
23 
 
 
Moreover, the defendant was given no opportunity to 
withdraw his guilty plea upon the addition of GPS monitoring to 
the conditions of his probation, see Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 12 (c) (2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004), even 
though this revision did not "conform to [his] legitimate 
sentence expectation."  Goodwin, supra at 21, quoting Reporters' 
Notes (Revised, 2004) to Rule 12, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1429 (LexisNexis 2008-2009).  
Defendants who tender such pleas on the prosecutor's 
recommendation do so to achieve a measure of certainty in their 
sentences.  "It would be unfair and contrary to the spirit of 
rule 12 (c) (2) for a judge to accept a plea bargain and impose 
the recommended sentence, and then, after the defendant has lost 
the opportunity to withdraw his plea, increase the sentence by 
adding a new or modified probationary condition so severe as to 
significantly increase the recommended sentence."  Goodwin, 
supra.  
 
In these circumstances, therefore, the imposition of GPS 
monitoring on the defendant was not timely enough to protect his 
interest in the finality of his initial punishment.  The judge 
did not require the defendant to wear a GPS device until nearly 
one year after he first received his sentence.  As discussed, by 
then the defendant had served his entire term of incarceration 
and had been given no notice that the conditions of his 
24 
 
probation might change.  Disrupting, at such a late date, the 
defendant's reasonable expectation of finality as to the 
conditions of his probation would engender precisely the 
"anxiety and insecurity" that our principles of double jeopardy 
guard against.  Aldoupolis, supra at 274. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Nearly one year after the defendant 
received his initial sentence, the judge allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion to impose GPS monitoring as an additional 
condition of the defendant's probation.  The defendant filed a 
rule 30 (a) motion seeking to vacate this addition to his 
initial sentence, and appealed from the denial of that motion.  
For the reasons discussed, the order imposing GPS monitoring on 
the defendant was impermissible and is therefore vacated.  All 
other terms and conditions of the defendant's sentence were 
unaffected by the defendant's motion, and remain valid and 
unchanged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.