Title: Sav-on Drug Stores v. Super. Ct.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 8/26/04 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SAV-ON DRUG STORES, INC., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S106718 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/4 B152628 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS  
) 
ANGELES COUNTY, 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BC227551 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
) 
ROBERT ROCHER et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
The question presented is whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
certifying as a class action this suit for recovery of unpaid overtime compensation.  
We conclude it did not and accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal. 
Background 
Plaintiffs Robert Rocher and Connie Dahlin, on behalf of themselves and 
others similarly situated, brought this action against defendant Sav-on Drug 
Stores, Inc., a drugstore chain.  The operative second amended complaint alleges 
violation of the overtime statutes (Lab. Code, § 1194 et seq.) and the unfair 
competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), as well as conversion, for 
which plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive and declaratory relief.  Underlying 
 
 
2
each cause of action are factual allegations that defendant misclassified as exempt 
from the overtime laws and failed to pay overtime compensation owing to 
plaintiffs and similarly situated employees who worked during the relevant period 
at defendant’s retail stores in California. 
The Legislature has commanded that “[a]ny work in excess of eight hours 
in one workday and any work in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek . . . shall 
be compensated at the rate of no less than one and one-half times the regular rate 
of pay for an employee.”  (Lab. Code, § 510, subd. (a).)  The Industrial Welfare 
Commission (IWC), however, is statutorily authorized to “establish exemptions 
from the requirement that an overtime rate of compensation be paid . . . for 
executive, administrative, and professional employees, provided [inter alia] that 
the employee is primarily engaged in duties that meet the test of the exemption, 
[and] customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment in 
performing those duties . . . .”  (Id., § 515, subd. (a).)  
During the period covered by the complaint, defendant compensated 
plaintiffs as salaried managers, exempt from the overtime wage laws.  Wage 
orders relating to the mercantile industry promulgated by the IWC and codified at 
California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 11070 provided during that same 
period an exemption from the overtime requirements for “persons employed in 
administrative, executive, or professional capacities.”  The original IWC Wage 
Order No. 7-98 defined this as one “engaged in work which is primarily 
intellectual, managerial, or creative, and which requires exercise of discretion and 
independent judgment.”1  The underlying merits of this litigation concern whether 
                                             
 
1  
The class period defined by the trial court’s certification order is April 3, 
1996, through June 22, 2001, inclusive.  During that period, three applicable IWC 
wage orders, containing substantially similar executive exemptions, successively 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
3
or not plaintiffs and those similarly situated properly were classified and paid 
under this exemption. 
Our present inquiry concerns the trial court’s granting of plaintiffs’ motion 
for class certification.  In support of their motion, plaintiffs argued that class 
members (i.e., defendant’s operating managers, hereafter sometimes OM’s, and 
assistant managers, hereafter sometimes AM’s) had, on the basis of their title and 
job descriptions and without reference to their actual work, uniformly been 
misclassified by defendant as exempt employees.  In fact, defendant’s OM’s and 
AM’s were nonmanagerial, nonexempt employees under relevant law.  Moreover, 
defendant’s store operations were “standardized.”  Accordingly, the duties and 
responsibilities of defendant’s OM’s and AM’s were similar in critical respects 
from region to region, area to area, and store to store.  Class members generally 
performed nonexempt work in excess of 50 percent of the time in their workday, 
and their workday routinely included work in excess of eight hours per day and/or 
40 hours per week.  Notwithstanding these facts, plaintiffs contended, class 
members were not paid statutorily mandated overtime compensation. 
In opposing certification, defendant argued that whether any individual 
member of the class is exempt or nonexempt from the overtime requirements 
depends on which tasks that person actually performed and the amount of time he 
or she actually spent on which tasks.  The actual activities performed by its OM’s 
and AM’s, and the amount of time spent by each OM and AM on exempt 
activities, defendant contended, varied significantly from store to store and 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
governed.  (See IWC Wage Order No. 7-98 (eff. Jan. 1, 1998); IWC Wage Order 
No. 7-2000 (eff. Oct. 1, 2000; and the current order, first adopted as IWC Wage 
Order No. 7-2001 (eff. Jan. 1, 2001) and codified as amended, Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 8, § 11070(1)(A)(1).  
 
 
4
individual to individual, based on multiple factors including store location and 
size, physical layout, sales volume, hours of operation, management structure and 
style, experience level of managers, and number of hourly employees requiring 
supervision.  For this reason, defendant argued, no meaningful generalizations 
about the employment circumstances of its managers could be made. 
The trial court granted the certification motion, appointing plaintiffs to 
represent a class defined as “all current and former salaried [OM’s] and current 
and former salaried [AM’s] employed by defendant . . . in California at any time 
between April 3, 1996 and June 22, 2001, inclusive.”  The parties have estimated 
that the class has between 600 and 1,400 members. 
Defendant petitioned for writ relief.  The Court of Appeal issued a writ of 
mandate commanding the trial court to vacate its order granting class certification 
and to enter a new and different order denying class certification.  We granted 
plaintiffs’ petition for review. 
Discussion 
We quite recently reviewed the established standards for class certification 
generally.  (Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1096, 
1106 (Lockheed).)  Code of Civil Procedure section 382 authorizes class actions 
“when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or 
when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the 
court . . . .”  The party seeking certification has the burden to establish the 
existence of both an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest 
among class members.  (Lockheed, supra, at p. 1104, citing Washington Mutual 
Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 913 (Washington Mutual).)  The 
“community of interest” requirement embodies three factors:  (1) predominant 
common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses 
 
 
5
typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the 
class.  (Lockheed, supra, at p. 1104.) 
The certification question is “essentially a procedural one that does not ask 
whether an action is legally or factually meritorious.”  (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 439-440 (Linder).)  A trial court ruling on a certification 
motion determines “whether . . . the issues which may be jointly tried, when 
compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or 
substantial that the maintenance of a class action would be advantageous to the 
judicial process and to the litigants.”  (Collins v. Rocha (1972) 7 Cal.3d 232, 238; 
accord, Lockheed, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1104-1105.)  The trial court in this case 
determined that plaintiffs had established by a preponderance of the evidence that 
common issues predominate and ruled that a class action is “superior to alternate 
means for a fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.” 
We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.  “Because trial 
courts are ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of 
permitting group action, they are afforded great discretion in granting or denying 
certification. . . .  [Accordingly,] a trial court ruling supported by substantial 
evidence generally will not be disturbed ‘unless (1) improper criteria were used 
[citation]; or (2) erroneous legal assumptions were made [citation]’ [citation]. . . .  
‘Any valid pertinent reason stated will be sufficient to uphold the order.’ ”  
(Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 435-436; see also Lockheed, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 1106.)   
Defendant does not contend the trial court erred in concluding the named 
plaintiffs have claims typical of the class and are adequate representatives thereof.  
The issue in dispute is whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding 
that common issues predominate.  For the following reasons, we conclude it did 
not. 
 
 
6
As the focus in a certification dispute is on what type of questions—
common or individual—are likely to arise in the action, rather than on the merits 
of the case (Lockheed, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1106-1107; Linder, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at pp. 439-440), in determining whether there is substantial evidence to 
support a trial court’s certification order, we consider whether the theory of 
recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an analytical matter, 
likely to prove amenable to class treatment.  (See Lockheed, supra, at p. 1108; 
Anthony v. General Motors Corp. (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 699, 707.)  “Reviewing 
courts consistently look to the allegations of the complaint and the declarations of 
attorneys representing the plaintiff class to resolve this question.”  (Richmond v. 
Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d, 462, 478; see Lockheed, supra, at p. 1106.) 
As noted, plaintiffs allege that defendant during the class period classified 
its AM’s and OM’s as exempt from the overtime laws and failed to pay them 
overtime compensation even though, pursuant to defendant’s uniform company 
policies and practices, they consistently worked overtime hours and, at least partly 
as a consequence of operational standardization imposed by defendant among its 
various stores, in fact spent insufficient time on exempt tasks to justify their being 
so classified.  In moving for class certification, plaintiffs argued to the trial court 
that, if permitted to proceed on this theory, they could with common proof 
demonstrate, inter alia, that:  (1) defendant required all class members to work 
more than 40 hours per week; (2) defendant deemed each class member exempt 
based on his or her job description rather than on any consideration of actual work 
performed; (3) defendant paid no overtime wages to any class member; 
(4) defendant categorically reclassified all of its AM’s from exempt to nonexempt 
in December 1999, without changing their job descriptions or their duties; 
(5) defendant kept no records of class members’ actual work activities; 
(6) defendant conducted no studies of how class members spent their work time; 
 
 
7
(7) defendant did not train class members on the difference between exempt and 
nonexempt work; (8) defendant’s AM and OM job descriptions were uniform 
throughout defendant’s operations; and (9) most of the tasks that both plaintiffs’ 
and defendant’s evidence indicates AM’s and OM’s actually undertook were, as a 
matter of law, nonexempt.  Plaintiffs contend the materials indicating defendant 
treated its AM’s and OM’s uniformly and assigned them to standardized store 
operations constitute substantial evidence that common issues will predominate 
even if individual damage computations ultimately are required. 
In opposing certification, defendant argued that determining its liability, if 
any, for unpaid overtime compensation necessarily requires making individual 
computations of how much time each class member actually spent working on 
specific tasks.  Accordingly, defendant argued, plaintiffs’ evidence of policy 
uniformity and operational standardization is irrelevant and cannot amount to 
substantial evidence that common issues of law and fact will predominate in the 
action.  In its briefing here, defendant emphasizes that any “[e]vidence, to be 
‘substantial’ must be ‘of ponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, 
credible, and of solid value’ ” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576) and 
that an appellate court considering whether there is substantial evidence to support 
a trial court ruling must consider the entire record (id. at p. 577). 
Both parties are correct about the general principles guiding our inquiry.  
Indeed, “we must consider whether the record contains substantial evidence to 
support the trial court’s predominance finding, as a certification ruling not 
supported by substantial evidence cannot stand.”  (Lockheed, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 
p. 1106.)  But, “[w]here a certification order turns on inferences to be drawn from 
the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of 
the trial court.”  (Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 
 
 
8
Cal.App.4th 1282, 1287; accord, Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 
272.)  We turn, therefore, to the record. 
In moving for certification, plaintiffs presented, inter alia, defendant’s 
“Assistant Manager” and “Operating Manager” job descriptions (pursuant to 
which defendant treated all AM’s and OM’s as exempt from the overtime laws for 
some or all of the class period),2 defendant’s form for conducting performance 
reviews of “management associates,” and defendant’s memoranda detailing 
scheduling, compensation and training programs for AM’s and OM’s.  Plaintiffs 
also presented the deposition of defendant’s designated “person most 
knowledgeable,” district manager Frank Paul DeGaetano, defendant’s responses to 
plaintiffs’ interrogatories, the interrogatory responses of named plaintiffs Rocher 
(an OM) and Dahlin (an AM), and the declarations of Mario Gardner (an AM), 
Richard Featherstone (an OM), and Benissa Clifford and Stephen Aldag (both 
general managers) describing their work and defendant’s policies and procedures.   
Defendant presented the declaration of Brad Adams, a human resources 
manager for defendant’s Southern California Northern Area Drug Division, 
describing defendant’s stores, policies, and procedures, and declarations from 51 
current employees of defendant, each an AM or OM, describing their work. 
Presuming in favor of the certification order, as we must, the existence of 
every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the record (People v. 
Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 576), we cannot say it would be irrational for a 
                                             
 
2  
Defendant concedes it “treated its OM’s and AM’s as exempt,” claiming it 
did so “based on its reasonable expectation that managers in those positions would 
be performing primarily managerial duties.”  The record also contains defendant’s 
interrogatory responses indicating it reclassified AM’s “from a salary form of 
compensation to an hourly rate of pay on December 19, 1999,” with “no change in 
the job description or job duties.” 
 
 
9
court to conclude that, tried on plaintiffs’ theory, “questions of law or fact 
common to the class predominate over the questions affecting the individual 
members” (Washington Mutual, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 913).  Rather, as the trial 
court concluded, the documents, depositions, declarations, and interrogatory 
responses presented by the parties comprise substantial evidence that common 
issues of law and fact will predominate over individual issues if the AM’s and 
OM’s overtime claims are tried as a class action.3  They are evidence thereof 
because they comprise “testimony [and] writings . . . offered to prove” (Evid. 
Code, § 140), and having a “tendency in reason to prove” (id., § 210), that fact.  
The evidence is substantial because it is not “qualified, tentative, and 
conclusionary” (Lockheed, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1111) but, rather, “ ‘of 
ponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid 
value’ ” (People v. Johnson, supra, at p. 576). 
The record contains substantial, if disputed, evidence that deliberate 
misclassification was defendant’s policy and practice.  The record also contains 
substantial evidence that, owing in part to operational standardization and perhaps 
contrary to what defendant expected, classification based on job descriptions alone 
resulted in widespread de facto misclassification.4  Either theory is amenable to 
class treatment.  Unquestionably, as the Court of Appeal observed, defendant is 
                                             
 
3  
Defendant’s motion for judicial notice and/or for the court to take 
additional evidence, and the request of amicus curiae Employers Group to take 
judicial notice, both are denied.  (Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 
Cal.4th 1057, 1063.) 
4  
As earlier noted, defendant’s interrogatory responses indicate that during 
the class period it reclassified all AM’s from exempt to nonexempt with “no 
change in the job description or job duties.”  The court could rationally have 
regarded the reclassification as common evidence respecting both defendant’s 
classification policies and the AM’s actual status during the relevant period. 
 
 
10
entitled to defend against plaintiffs’ complaint by attempting to demonstrate wide 
variations in the types of stores and, consequently, in the types of activities and 
amounts of time per workweek the OM’s and AM’s in those stores spent on 
different types of activities.  Nevertheless, a reasonable court crediting plaintiffs’ 
evidence could conclude it raises substantial issues as to both whether a 
misclassification policy existed and whether, in any event, a uniform classification 
policy was put into practice under the standardized conditions alleged.  A 
reasonable court, even allowing for individualized damage determinations, could 
conclude that, to the extent plaintiffs are able to demonstrate pursuant to either 
scenario that misclassification was the rule rather than the exception, a class action 
would be the most efficient means of resolving class members’ overtime claims. 
The record contains substantial evidence suggesting that the predominant 
issue in dispute is how the various tasks in which AM’s and OM’s actually 
engaged should be classified—as exempt or nonexempt.  We previously have 
recognized in an overtime exemption case that task classification is a mixed 
question of law and fact appropriate for a court to address separately from 
calculating the amount of time specific employees actually spend on specific tasks.  
(Ramirez v. Yosemite Water, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785, 803, fn. 5 (Ramirez) 
[instructing trial court in salesperson overtime exemption case to “itemize the 
types of activities that it considers to be sales related” to “enable an appellate court 
to review whether the trial court’s legal classifications are correct”].) 
On the one hand, each of the 51 declarations by the AM’s and OM’s 
describing their actual work (including specific tasks) that defendant submitted in 
opposing certification states that the declarant spends a majority of his or her time 
on managerial tasks.  Plaintiffs characterize most of that same work as 
 
 
11
nonmanagerial.5  Regardless of who is correct, the fact is the tasks discussed in 
both defendant’s and plaintiffs’ submissions comprise a reasonably definite and 
finite list.  As plaintiffs argued to the trial court, “[t]he only difference between 
Defendant’s declarations and Plaintiffs’ evidence is that the parties disagree on 
whether certain identical work tasks are ‘managerial’ or ‘non-managerial.’  . . . 
This is an issue that can easily be resolved on a class-wide basis by assigning each 
task to one side of the ‘ledger’ and makes the manageability of the case not the 
daunting task Defendant has sought to portray.”  The trial court, in reaching its 
certification decision, expressly agreed. 
Defendant, of course, does not concede the viability of plaintiffs’ 
misclassification theories.  Defendant denies it engaged in deliberate 
misclassification, claiming it “treated its OM’s and AM’s as exempt based on its 
reasonable expectation that managers in those positions would be performing 
primarily managerial duties.”  And defendant challenges plaintiffs’ allegations 
                                             
 
5  
Plaintiffs argued in their issues statements submitted in support of the 
certification motion that “[w]hether a series of tasks are exempt or non-exempt for 
purposes of California overtime laws” is a common issue, referencing the “finite 
list of tasks” found in defendant’s own declarations by OM’s and AM’s.  For 
example, plaintiffs argued, “[o]ne can prove that all class members spend a great 
deal of time greeting customers, selling, ringing up sales, answering the telephone, 
assisting customers, stocking shelves, merchandising, unloading and packing 
deliveries, and cleaning” without individual testimony from each class member.  
Plaintiffs also pointed to defendant’s interrogatory responses.  There, defendant 
concedes that both AM’s and OM’s “may occasionally perform” certain “types of 
nonexempt tasks” including “checking out customers, stocking shelves, facing 
shelves, and cleaning the store.”  Defendant also lists tasks (e.g., “supervising the 
unloading of trucks,” “checking the quality and quantity of warehouse and vendor 
shipments,” “safeguarding company assets,” “opening or closing the store,” 
“making the store safe for employees and customers,” “ordering emergency 
repairs”) that defendant contends were exempt, but plaintiffs contend were 
nonexempt. 
 
 
12
respecting the effect of standardization in defendant’s operations, pointing out, as 
the Court of Appeal observed, that its responses to plaintiffs’ interrogatories state 
that the actual tasks performed by class members and the amount of time spent on 
those tasks vary significantly from manager to manager and cannot be adjudicated 
on a class-wide basis.  But the trial court was within its discretion to credit 
plaintiffs’ evidence on these points over defendant’s, and we have no authority to 
substitute our own judgment for the trial court’s respecting this or any other 
conflict in the evidence.  (Walker v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 272.)  
A reasonable court could conclude that issues respecting the proper legal 
classification of AM’s and OM’s actual activities, along with issues respecting 
defendant’s policies and practices and issues respecting operational 
standardization, are likely to predominate in a class proceeding over any 
individualized calculations of actual overtime hours that might ultimately prove 
necessary. 
The trial court was not deciding—nor are we—the merits of plaintiffs’ case.  
We previously have recognized, in the certification context, that common issues 
may be present when a defendant’s tortious acts, as here, “allegedly are the same 
with regard to each plaintiff.”  (Lockheed, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1107 [noting 
defendant’s concession]; see Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 18 
Cal.3d 355, 362 (Occidental Land, Inc.) [concerning defendant’s alleged 
misrepresentations].)  We need not conclude that plaintiffs’ evidence is 
compelling, or even that the trial court would have abused its discretion if it had 
credited defendant’s evidence instead.  “[I]t is of no consequence that the trial 
court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have 
reached a contrary conclusion.”  (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 
874, italics omitted, citing People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 576-577.)     
 
 
13
Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to explain the basis for its 
finding that common questions predominate, but the record is to the contrary.  At 
the certification hearing, the trial court examined the parties’ contentions in detail.  
The court specifically noted plaintiffs’ evidence that defendant classified its AM’s 
and OM’s “exempt without any exception, and rel[ied] exclusively on these titles 
alone in redefining who is exempt and who is not exempt.  The predominance of 
the defendant’s class-wide exemption is evidenced by the fact that there is no 
compliance program that’s ever existed, and no single class member has ever 
received overtime compensation.  The class-wide policy does not vary from store 
to store, or employee to employee.”  The court also noted defendant’s 
“representative evidence, the declarations of 51 persons” describing the work of 
each, which “all say that the declarants spend more than 50 percent of their time 
on managerial activities.” 
The trial court also specified the evidence it was relying upon in certifying 
this action, referencing “all the moving papers,” including the parties’ statements 
respecting common issues, plaintiffs’ multiple exhibits in support of the motion, 
and “the testimony of one Frank Paul, last name is D-E-G-A-E-T-A-N-O.  He’s 
. . . defendant’s corporate representative, and the person most knowledgeable.  
And also the defendant’s answers to interrogatories that have been involved.”  The 
relevant minute order states that “[t]he motion for class-certification is granted 
based upon the grounds recited into the record by the court.”  And the trial court’s 
signed order expressly notes the order is based on “all admissible evidence.” 
Finally, the trial court applied the proper legal criterion for deciding 
whether to certify a class, stating that plaintiffs had established “by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the class action proceeding is superior to 
alternate means for a fair and efficient adjudication of the litigation.”  (Cf. 
 
 
14
Washington Mutual, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 914 [class treatment must “provide 
substantial benefits both to the courts and the litigants”].)   
Defendant does not dispute that class certification may be appropriate in an 
overtime exemption case, only whether it is appropriate in this case.  Defendant 
suggests this class action is likely to “degenerate into a multitude of mini-trials,” 
but, as noted, the evidence to the contrary is substantial.  As alleged, each class 
member’s claim to unpaid overtime depends on whether he or she worked for 
defendant during the relevant period in a position that was misclassified either 
deliberately (on a class basis) or circumstantially (again, as a consequence of 
defendant’s class-wide policies and practices).  That calculation of individual 
damages may at some point be required does not foreclose the possibility of taking 
common evidence on the misclassification questions.  (Collins v. Rocha, supra, 7 
Cal.3d at p. 238 [“only the issue of damages will require separate proof for each 
class member” if plaintiffs prove employer misrepresented job terms and 
conditions]; see, e.g., Hypolite v. Carleson (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 566, 579-581 
[need to calculate wrongfully denied benefits individually does not defeat 
community of interest where class members allege claims based on the same 
invalid regulation].)  In any event, “a class action is not inappropriate simply 
because each member of the class may at some point be required to make an 
individual showing as to his or her eligibility for recovery or as to the amount of 
his or her damages.”  (Employment Development Dept. v. Superior Court (1981) 
30 Cal.3d 256, 266.) 
Defendant sweepingly asserts, without support, that the portion of 
plaintiffs’ evidence that focused on defendant’s class-wide policies and practices, 
rather than on “whether each class member is meeting the employer’s reasonable 
expectations,” is irrelevant to the predominance issue.  But defendant does not 
suggest any per se bar exists to certification based partly on pattern and practice 
 
 
15
evidence or similar evidence of a defendant’s class-wide behavior.  California 
courts and others have in a wide variety of contexts considered pattern and 
practice evidence, statistical evidence, sampling evidence, expert testimony, and 
other indicators of a defendant’s centralized practices in order to evaluate whether 
common behavior towards similarly situated plaintiffs makes class certification 
appropriate.6  Indeed, as the Court of Appeal recently recognized, the use of 
statistical sampling in an overtime class action “does not dispense with proof of 
damages but rather offers a different method of proof” (Bell v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 715, 750). 
Defendant characterizes plaintiffs’ declarations generally as conclusory and 
containing “boilerplate,” contrasting what it calls “Sav-on’s 52 detailed, fact-
specific declarations.”  Such observations, however, go to the weight of the 
                                             
 
6  
See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States (1977) 
431 U.S. 324, 337-340 (statistics bolstered by specific incidents “are equally 
competent in proving employment discrimination”); Lockheed, supra, 29 Cal.4th 
at pages 1106-1108 (“well sampling and other hydrological data” about “the 
pattern and degree of contamination” could, but was insufficient to, support “a 
theory that a defendant’s negligence has necessitated increased or different 
monitoring for all, or nearly all, exposed individuals”); Reyes v. Board of 
Supervisors (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1279 (certification of class action for 
wrongfully denied welfare benefits proper because “whether the County applied 
an unlawful sanctioning process” to deny eligibility “can be proved by reviewing 
the County’s regulations, . . . the standard practices followed in making 
sanctioning decisions, as well as a sampling of representative cases”); Stephens v. 
Montgomery Ward (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 411, 421 (certification proponent 
satisfied commonality requirement with statistical data and analysis of retail 
chain’s corporate structure supporting allegations respecting centralized control 
over employment decisions); see also In re Simon II Litig. (E.D.N.Y. 2002) 211 
F.R.D. 86, 146-151 (tobacco case listing state, high court, other federal, and 
secondary authorities concluding aggregate proof is “consistent with the 
defendants’ Constitutional rights and legally available to support plaintiffs’ state 
law claims”). 
 
 
16
evidence, a matter generally entrusted to the trial court’s discretion.  And, as 
noted, defendant as well as plaintiffs presented evidence respecting defendant’s 
personnel policies and management structure along with evidence respecting 
individual managers’ actual activities. 
Defendant concedes that Mario Gardner’s declaration described his duties 
as an AM in a manner that might permit certification had plaintiffs marshaled 
more such declarations, but argues this single declaration does not support class 
treatment.  Defendant is mistaken.  Evidence of even one credible witness “is 
sufficient for proof of any fact.”  (Evid. Code, § 411.)  And “questions as to the 
weight and sufficiency of the evidence, the construction to be put upon it, the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, the credibility of witnesses . . . and the 
determination of [any] conflicts and inconsistency in their testimony are matters 
for the trial court to resolve.”  (Thompson v. City of Long Beach (1953) 41 Cal.2d 
235, 246.)  Moreover, as noted above, Mario Gardner’s was not the only 
declaration plaintiffs presented to indicate AM’s and OM’s engaged primarily in 
nonexempt activities.  Indeed, on plaintiffs’ theory, even defendant’s declarations 
may prove relevant on that point. 
Nevertheless, defendant insists that because exempt employees are those 
engaged “in work which is primarily intellectual, managerial or creative, and 
which requires the exercise of discretion and independent judgment” (IWC Wage 
Order No. 7-98 (eff. Jan. 1, 1998), “the central factual issues in this dispute [are] 
the actual tasks performed by class members and the amount of time spent on each 
of those tasks.”  But even if some individualized proof of such facts ultimately is 
required to parse class members’ claims, that such will predominate in the action 
does not necessarily follow. 
We long ago recognized “that each class member might be required 
ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude maintenance 
 
 
17
of a class action.”  (Collins v. Rocha, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 238.)  Predominance is 
a comparative concept, and “the necessity for class members to individually 
establish eligibility and damages does not mean individual fact questions 
predominate.”  (Reyes v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1278; 
see Lockheed, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1105; Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 
Cal.2d 695, 707-710.)  Individual issues do not render class certification 
inappropriate so long as such issues may effectively be managed.  (Richmond v. 
Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 473; see also Occidental Land, Inc., 
supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 363-364; Washington Mutual, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 922.)   
Nor is it a bar to certification that individual class members may ultimately 
need to itemize their damages.  We have recognized that the need for 
individualized proof of damages is not per se an obstacle to class treatment 
(Occidental Land, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 363 [homebuyers’ class action 
against developer]) and “that each member of the class must prove his separate 
claim to a portion of any recovery by the class is only one factor to be considered 
in determining whether a class action is proper” (Vasquez v. Superior Court 
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 809 (Vasquez) [consumers’ class action against finance 
companies]). 
Accordingly, neither variation in the mix of actual work activities 
undertaken during the class period by individual AM’s and OM’s, nor differences 
in the total unpaid overtime compensation owed each class member, bars class 
certification as a matter of law.  (Vasquez, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 815 [“although 
ultimately each class member will be required in some manner to establish his 
individual damages this circumstance does not preclude the maintenance of the 
suit as a class action”]; see Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 707 
[“Nor is a common recovery necessary in order to establish a community of 
interest”]; Los Angeles Fire & Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (1972) 23 
 
 
18
Cal.App.3d 67, 74 [“differences in sub-groups as to assignments and ranks” 
among firefighters “in no way detract from” common issues in overtime class 
action].) 
“It may be, of course, that the trial court will determine in subsequent 
proceedings that some of the matters bearing on the right to recovery require 
separate proof by each class member.  If this should occur, the applicable rule . . . 
is that the maintenance of the suit as a class action is not precluded so long as the 
issues which may be jointly tried, when compared to those requiring separate 
adjudication, justify the maintenance of the suit as a class action.”  (Vasquez, 
supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 815; see Lockheed, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1105.)  And if 
unanticipated or unmanageable individual issues do arise, the trial court retains the 
option of decertification.  (Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 128, 144; 
see, e.g., O’Connor v. Boeing North American, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2000) 197 F.R.D. 
404.) 
Defendant mistakenly suggests that our decision in Ramirez, supra, 20 
Cal.4th 785, bars class certification in this matter.  Defendant argues that when 
plaintiffs in an overtime case seek class certification, “the trial court must 
determine whether the evidence shows that application of the Ramirez factors—
the actual tasks performed by each class member, the amount of time each class 
member spent on those tasks, and how the class member’s practices compare to 
the employer’s reasonable expectations—raises common questions that 
predominate over individual issues.”  Defendant both misstates and overstates the 
significance of Ramirez. 
Ramirez was an action for unpaid overtime brought by a bottled-water route 
sales representative against his former employer.  (Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 
p. 790.)  We reversed the Court of Appeal’s ruling that the plaintiff was exempt 
under an IWC wage order defining “outside salesperson,” largely because the 
 
 
19
court had inappropriately relied on certain federal regulations, which varied from 
California law, in making that determination.  (Id. at p. 804.)  In so doing, we 
explained that a court deciding whether an employee is an outside salesperson 
under the applicable state rule should inquire “into the realistic requirements of the 
job.”  (Id. at p. 802, italics omitted.)  Specifically, we indicated, “the court should 
consider . . . how the employee actually spends his or her time” and “whether the 
employee’s practice diverges from the employer’s realistic expectations . . . .”  
(Ibid.)7   
Ramirez was not a class action and, to that extent, is not apposite.  In 
Ramirez, we did not even discuss certification standards, let alone change them.  
Accordingly, Ramirez is no authority for constraining trial courts’ “great 
discretion in granting or denying certification” (Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at 
p. 435) or, more particularly as defendant asserts, for applying a particular set of 
“factors” whenever plaintiffs in an overtime case seek class certification.  The 
certification of a class is a discretionary decision that demands the weighing of 
many relevant considerations.  (Id. at pp. 435-436.)  And even as an overtime 
exemption case, Ramirez is not particularly apposite.  Our analysis was tied to the 
“logic inherent in the IWC’s quantitative definition of outside salesperson” 
(Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 802) and would not necessarily apply, or apply 
with the same force, in every exemption context.  We expressed in Ramirez, for 
example, a concern that under a pure “actual activity” test, an employee assigned 
to sell might “evade a valid [outside salesperson] exemption” by “his own 
                                             
 
7  
It is to these considerations, apparently, that defendant means to refer when 
invoking what it calls “the Ramirez factors.” 
 
 
20
substandard performance” in selling.  (Ibid.)  No one suggests a similar concern 
applies here. 
While we recognized that a trial court may have to resolve significant 
factual discrepancies when applying the salesperson exemption in a particular case 
(Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 803), we did not in Ramirez purport to limit the 
types of evidence or methods of proof that parties to overtime disputes may bring 
to bear.  Listing considerations relevant to the state test for “outside salesperson,” 
we simply counseled trial courts to avoid sole reliance either on “an employer’s 
job description” or on “the actual average hours the employee spent on sales 
activity” (id. at p. 802). 
Presence in a particular overtime class action of the considerations 
reviewed in Ramirez does not necessarily preclude class certification.  Any dispute 
over “how the employee actually spends his or her time” (Ramirez, supra, 20 
Cal.4th at p. 802), of course, has the potential to generate individual issues.  But 
considerations such as “the employer’s realistic expectations” (ibid.) and “the 
actual overall requirements of the job” (ibid.) are likely to prove susceptible of 
common proof.  Defendant’s “realistic expectations,” in particular, may become 
relevant in this case, and a reasonable court could conclude these are susceptible to 
common proof.8 
                                             
 
8  
Defendant claims it “treated its OM’s and AM’s as exempt based on its 
reasonable expectation that managers in those positions would be performing 
primarily managerial duties.”  Defendant’s actual expectations (absent deliberate 
misclassification) presumably are indicated in its job descriptions and training 
materials, and as noted the record contains substantial evidence that whether these 
were realistic—in light of defendant’s policies and practices, and of operational 
standardization—may be addressed with common evidence. 
 
 
21
Defendant would have us extend Ramirez to shield employers from an 
action challenging a type of illegality that our decision in that case was actually 
designed to prevent.  One of our core concerns in Ramirez was that “if hours 
worked on sales were determined through the employer’s job description, . . . the 
employer could make an employee exempt from the overtime laws solely by 
fashioning an idealized job description that had little basis in reality.”  (Ramirez, 
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 802.)  Here, defendant allegedly promulgated exempt job 
descriptions, but implemented policies and practices that failed to afford its AM’s 
and OM’s true managerial discretion, and standardized store operations so that 
managers were obliged to spend over 50 percent of their time doing the same tasks 
as their subordinates.9  Defendant suggests we bar class certification of an action 
based on such allegations, on the somewhat ironic (and only half-stated) surmise 
that some individual AM’s and OM’s may, in fact, have labored below the 50 
percent mark on nonexempt tasks notwithstanding defendant’s alleged class-wide 
policies and practices either designed or destined to assure the contrary.  We 
decline the invitation.  Contrary to defendant’s implication, our observation in 
Ramirez that whether the employee is an outside salesperson depends “first and 
foremost, [on] how the employee actually spends his or her time” (Ramirez, supra, 
                                             
 
9  
Federal authority indicates that either allegation, if proved, would be 
sufficient to render the affected workers nonexempt and thus eligible for overtime.  
(Cf. Donovan v. Burger King Corp. (2d Cir. 1982) 675 F.2d 516, 518-519 
[affirming Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) overtime award where assistant 
managers “ ‘spent at least half of their time doing the same work as the hourly 
employees’ ” as “a direct consequence of a deliberate corporate policy at the 
regional level which dictated ‘ideal’ ratios of hourly labor to production”]; 
Donovan v. Burger King Corp. (1st Cir. 1982) 672 F.2d 221, 228 [worker “whose 
primary duty is management may still fail to qualify” for FLSA “executive” 
exemption “if his managerial status coexists with the performance of a significant 
amount of menial work, as in the case of a working supervisor or ‘strawboss’ ”].) 
 
 
22
at p. 802) did not create or imply a requirement that courts assess an employer’s 
affirmative exemption defense against every class member’s claim before 
certifying an overtime class action. 
Moreover, defendant’s proposed reading of Ramirez would require, 
essentially, that a certification proponent in an overtime class action prove the 
entire class was nonexempt whenever a defendant raises the affirmative defense of 
exemption.  But in Ramirez itself we recognized that “the assertion of an 
exemption from the overtime laws is considered to be an affirmative defense, and 
therefore the employer bears the burden of proving the employee’s exemption.”  
(Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 794-795; accord, Nordquist v. McGraw-Hill 
Broadcasting Co. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 555, 562 [an “employer bears the burden 
of proving an employee is exempt”].)  Were we to require as a prerequisite to 
certification that plaintiffs demonstrate defendant’s classification policy was, as 
the Court of Appeal put it, either “right as to all members of the class or wrong as 
to all members of the class,” we effectively would reverse that burden.  Ramirez is 
no authority for such a requirement, nor does the logic of predominance require it. 
In sum, defendant’s reliance on Ramirez is misplaced.  Perhaps realizing 
this, the Court of Appeal did not rely on that case or even cite it.  But the Court of 
Appeal went astray in other ways.  Although its summary of the evidence 
submitted on certification was generally accurate, the Court of Appeal erred to the 
extent it engaged in any reweighing of that evidence.   
After reviewing defendant’s evidence respecting store variations, the Court 
of Appeal noted plaintiffs’ evidence of defendant’s uniform policies and 
standardization, plaintiffs’ declarations from AM’s and OM’s relating their 
experience of what defendant’s employees in those positions actually did, and the 
interrogatory evidence submitted both by defendant and plaintiffs also respecting 
actual tasks performed by class members.  Thereafter, the court opined that 
 
 
23
plaintiffs’ declarations were “not determinative” and “not conclusive” because 
defendant’s evidence, in particular the declaration of defendant’s human resources 
manager Brad Adams, “showed the work of all the AM’s and OM’s is not uniform 
or identical.”  But a reviewing court is not authorized to overturn a certification 
order merely because it finds the record evidence of predominance less than 
determinative or conclusive.  The relevant question on review is whether such 
evidence is substantial. 
The Court of Appeal also erred to the extent it stated or implied that the 
community of interest requirement for certification mandates that class members’ 
claims be uniform or identical.  Plaintiffs’ theory does not depend on class 
members having identical claims, nor does the law of class certification require 
such.  (Vasquez, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 809 [“a community of interest does not 
depend upon an identical recovery”].) 
Finally, the Court of Appeal erroneously cited City of San Jose v. Superior 
Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447 (San Jose) in suggesting trial courts must “deny class 
certification when each member’s right to recover depends on facts individual to 
the member’s case.”  In San Jose, the trial court had certified a class of property 
owners pressing claims against a municipal airport.  We reversed, remarking at 
one point that the general rule “that a class action cannot be maintained where 
each member’s right to recover depends on facts peculiar to his case . . . remains 
viable in this state.”  (Id. at p. 459.)  But reading this categorical extract out of 
context would misstate the established legal standard for commonality, which, as 
previously noted, is comparative.10  Our holding in San Jose was, in fact, 
                                             
 
10  
The relevant comparison lies between the costs and benefits of adjudicating 
plaintiffs’ claims in a class action and the costs and benefits of proceeding by 
numerous separate actions—not between the complexity of a class suit that must 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
24
expressly comparative (see San Jose, supra, at p. 460 [comparing “the issues 
which may be jointly tried” with “those requiring separate adjudication”]), and we 
consistently have adhered to that approach (see, e.g., Washington Mutual, supra, 
24 Cal.4th at pp. 913-914, quoting San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 460). 
Courts seeking to preserve efficiency and other benefits of class actions 
routinely fashion methods to manage individual questions.11  For decades “[t]his 
court has urged trial courts to be procedurally innovative” (San Jose, supra, 12 
Cal.3d at p. 453) in managing class actions, and “the trial court has an obligation 
to consider the use of . . . innovative procedural tools proposed by a party to 
certify a manageable class” (Osborne v. Subaru of America, Inc. (1988) 198 
Cal.App.3d 646, 653, citing Occidental Land, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 360, 
fn. 3; Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 440 [in class actions, “trial courts must be 
accorded the flexibility ‘to adopt innovative procedures’ ”]).12  Such devices 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
accommodate some individualized inquiries and the absence of any remedial 
proceeding whatsoever.  (Vasquez, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 815-816; Reese v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1236-1237.) 
11  
See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 
1010, footnote 28 (common fund); Rosack v. Volvo of America Corp. (1982) 131 
Cal.App.3d 741, 761-763 (bifurcation, subclasses); Gonzales v. Jones (1981) 116 
Cal.App.3d 978, 985-986 (administrative processing); O’Connor v. Boeing North 
American, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 1998) 184 F.R.D. 311, 327 and Rodriguez v. McKinney 
(E.D.Pa. 1994) 156 F.R.D. 118, 119 (questionnaire); Ungar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of 
America, Inc. (E.D.Pa. 1975) 68 F.R.D. 65, 140 (single-issue hearings). 
12  
Courts on occasion have conducted separate judicial or administrative 
miniproceedings on individualized issues.  (See, e.g., Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co. 
(S.D.Iowa 1972) 59 F.R.D. 25, 33.)  Individualized hearings may sometimes 
efficiently be assigned to special masters.  (See, e.g., Day v. NLO (S.D.Ohio 1994) 
851 F.Supp. 869, 874-876.)  Perhaps, as plaintiffs suggest, in this case each class 
member’s particularized overtime “damages sought may be calculated according 
to a standard formula” (Occidental Land, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 364) based 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
25
permit defendants to “present their opposition, and to raise certain affirmative 
defenses.”  (Day v. NLO, supra, 851 F.Supp. at p. 876.) 
Considerations of sound public policy buttress our conclusion.  Labor Code 
section 1194 confirms “a clear public policy . . . that is specifically directed at the 
enforcement of California’s minimum wage and overtime laws for the benefit of 
workers.”  (Earley v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1429-1430.)  
As defendant’s own authority reminds us, California’s overtime laws are remedial 
and are to be construed so as to promote employee protection.  (Ramirez, supra, 
20 Cal.4th at p. 794.)  And, as we have recognized, “this state has a public policy 
which encourages the use of the class action device.”  (Richmond v. Dart 
Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 473.)  “ ‘By establishing a technique 
whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at the same time, the class 
suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small 
claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be 
too small to warrant individual litigation.’ ”  (Id. at p. 469.) 
Many of the issues likely to be most vigorously contested in this dispute, as 
noted, are common ones.  Absent class treatment, each individual plaintiff would 
present in separate, duplicative proceedings the same or essentially the same 
arguments and evidence, including expert testimony.  The result would be a 
multiplicity of trials conducted at enormous expense to both the judicial system 
and the litigants.  “It would be neither efficient nor fair to anyone, including 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
on survey results (see, e.g., MacManus v. A. E. Realty Partners (1988) 195 
Cal.App.3d 1106, 1117; Braun v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (Minn.Dist.Ct. 2003) 2003 WL 
22990114).  It is not our role at this stage either to devise or to dictate the methods 
by which a trial court conducting a particular class action may choose to manage 
it.  (See Rosack v. Volvo of America Corp., supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at p. 761.)   
 
 
26
defendants, to force multiple trials to hear the same evidence and decide the same 
issues.”  (Boggs v. Divested Atomic Corp. (S.D.Ohio 1991) 141 F.R.D. 58, 67.)13 
Disposition 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
                                             
 
13  
“ ‘If the factual circumstances underlying class members’ claims differ, or 
if class members disagree as to the proper theory of liability, the trial judge, 
through use of techniques like subclassing or [other judicial] intervention, may 
incorporate the class differences into the litigative process, and give all class 
members their due in deciding what is the proper outcome of the litigation.’ ”  
(Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 473, quoting 
Developments—Class Actions (1976) 89 Harv. L.Rev. 1318, 1490-1492.) 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY BROWN, J. 
 
 
I agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
common issues predominate and in certifying this action for recovery of unpaid 
overtime as a class action.  Because I find the majority’s reasoning less than clear, 
however, I write separately to explain my own reasons for reaching this 
conclusion. 
“Because trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and 
practicalities of permitting group action, they are afforded great discretion in 
granting or denying certification.”  (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 
429, 435.)  As such, we generally will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on class 
certification unless:  (1)  the ruling is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) 
“improper criteria were used”; or (3) “erroneous legal assumptions were made.”  
(Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 (Richmond).) 
To obtain class certification, a party must establish, among other things, a 
“well-defined community of interest among the class members.”  (Richmond, 
supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470.)  A well-defined community of interest exists if 
common questions of law and fact predominate.  (Ibid.)  Common issues may 
predominate even if “each member of the class must prove his separate claim to a 
portion of any recovery by the class . . . .”  (Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 
Cal.3d 800, 809 (Vasquez).)  But “each member must not be required to 
 
2 
individually litigate numerous and substantial questions to determine his right to 
recover following the class judgment; and the issues which may be jointly tried, 
when compared with those requiring separate adjudication[,] must be sufficiently 
numerous and substantial to make the class action advantageous to the judicial 
process and to the litigants.”  (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 
447, 460.) 
“In order to determine whether common questions of [law and] fact 
predominate the trial court must examine the issues framed by the pleadings and 
the law applicable to the causes of action alleged.”  (Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad 
Home Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 916.)  I therefore begin my analysis by 
determining the issues and reviewing the law. 
In their complaint, plaintiffs Robert Rocher and Connie Dahlin alleged that 
defendant Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc., misclassified its assistant managers (AM’s) 
and operating managers (OM’s) as exempt from the overtime wage laws.  As a 
result, defendant improperly compensated plaintiffs and other similarly situated 
AM’s and OM’s as salaried managers and failed to pay them overtime 
compensation.  Plaintiffs sought to certify as a class “all current and former 
salaried [OM’s] and current and former salaried [AM’s] employed by 
defendant . . . in California at any time between April 3, 1996 and June 22, 2001, 
inclusive.”  Thus, the primary issue framed by the pleadings is whether 
defendant’s AM’s and OM’s are exempt from the statutory overtime provisions. 
The question of whether defendant’s AM’s and OM’s are exempt 
employees “is, like other questions involving the application of legal categories, a 
mixed question of law and fact.”  (Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 
Cal.4th 785, 794 (Ramirez).)  In determining whether an employee is exempt, the 
trial court must inquire “into the realistic requirements of the job.  In so doing, the 
court should consider, first and foremost, how the employee actually spends his or 
 
3 
her time.  But the trial court should also consider whether the employee’s practice 
diverges from the employer’s realistic expectations, whether there was any 
concrete expression of employer displeasure over an employee’s substandard 
performance, and whether these expressions were themselves realistic given the 
actual overall requirements of the job.”  (Id. at p. 802.)  “[E]xemptions from 
statutory mandatory overtime provisions are narrowly construed.”  (Id. at p. 794.)  
“Moreover, the assertion of an exemption from the overtime laws is considered to 
be an affirmative defense, and therefore the employer bears the burden of proving 
the employee’s exemption.”  (Id. at pp. 794-795.) 
With this framework in mind, I now turn to the question presented on 
appeal:  whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding 
that the common issues of law and fact predominate.  After carefully reviewing the 
evidence in the record in light of the relevant law, I conclude that there is 
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding. 
As an initial matter, the issue of whether defendant intentionally 
misclassified its managers as exempt employees is an issue common to both the 
AM and OM classes.  This issue is not, by itself, sufficient to support the trial 
court’s finding that the common issues predominate, because plaintiffs would still 
have to prove both liability and damages subsequent to the class judgment.  (See 
City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 463 [“Only in an 
extraordinary situation would a class action be justified where, subsequent to the 
class judgment, the members would be required to individually prove not only 
damages but also liability”].)  But the existence of this common issue certainly 
supports the trial court’s finding. 
A review of the record then provides the additional evidence needed to 
substantiate the trial court’s finding.  With respect to the AM class, the 
declarations from individual AM’s and OM’s submitted by plaintiffs constitute 
 
4 
substantial evidence that the common issues predominate.  According to these 
declarants, defendant consistently required AM’s to work over 40 hours a week.  
A former general manager and OM further averred that, based on their years of 
experience at different stores owned and operated by defendant, “[t]he type of 
work performed by [AM’s] does not vary by store.  Each Sav-on store was and is 
operated in the same manner, and require[s] the same essential work, as one might 
expect in a chain of retail stores.  Therefore, the actual work performed by [AM’s] 
on a daily basis was virtually identical in Sav-on stores, and remains so.”  These 
declarations provide substantial evidence that the realistic requirements of the AM 
job are identical for all AM’s and that AM’s, on average, spend the same amount 
of time on the same types of tasks.  Defendant’s subsequent and independent 
decision to reclassify all AM’s as nonexempt employees entitled to overtime 
compensation bolsters this conclusion.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in finding that the common issues predominate with respect to the 
AM class. 
The same reasoning does not, however, apply to the OM class.  While 
plaintiffs submitted multiple declarations attesting to the work and duties of AM’s, 
they submitted no declarations attesting to the work and duties of OM’s.  Indeed, 
the only evidence in the record demonstrating that all OM’s spend the same 
amount of time performing the same types of tasks comes from the special 
interrogatory responses of Rocher.  But these statements are not sufficient to 
support the trial court’s findings as to the OM class.  Rocher merely states that 
he—and no other OM—spent over 50 percent of his time on nonexempt activities.  
And although Rocher asserts that “[d]efendant has an expressed policy and 
practice of requiring [OM’s] to . . . spend a majority of their time performing 
nonexempt tasks,” he provides no foundation or evidentiary support for this 
assertion.  As such, his interrogatory responses are too qualified and conclusory to 
 
5 
support the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs will be able to establish defendant’s 
liability for overtime compensation to the OM’s by common evidence.  (See 
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1096, 1111 (plur. opn. 
of Werdegar, J.) [holding that the evidence is “too qualified, tentative and 
conclusionary to constitute substantial evidence” in support of class certification]; 
see also Lockheed Martin, at p. 1114 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.).) 
Nonetheless, a careful review of the record reveals substantial evidence to 
support the trial court’s finding with respect to the OM class.  In Ramirez, we 
suggested that the classification of tasks as exempt or nonexempt may be 
susceptible to common proof.  (See Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. 5.)  
This appears to be especially true in this case where, as demonstrated by 
defendant’s own evidence, the OM’s perform a finite number of tasks on a regular 
basis.  The record further indicates that plaintiffs and defendant disagree over the 
classification of many of the tasks regularly performed by OM’s.1  Given the 
number and significance of the tasks in dispute, the trial court could reasonably 
conclude that the proper classification of these tasks, when combined with the 
classifications agreed upon by the parties, will largely resolve the issue of whether 
all OM’s should be classified as exempt or nonexempt employees.2  Finally, many 
of the variables that, according to defendant, render the OM’s inappropriate for 
class treatment—like store type, store size, and the number of store employees—
                                             
 
1  
Defining the precise contours of their disagreement is somewhat difficult 
due to the vagueness of the parties’ descriptions of the tasks regularly performed 
by OM’s.  But, at a minimum, the parties appear to disagree over whether the 
following tasks should be classified as exempt or nonexempt:  merchandising, the 
unloading/movement of inventory, customer service, cash handling, finance-
related activities and the opening/closing of the store. 
2  
The same reasoning applies to the AM class as well. 
 
6 
may form the basis for appropriate subclasses.  The trial court could reasonably 
conclude that the creation of these subclasses would sufficiently reduce the need 
for individual litigation as to each member of the class.  (See Vasquez, supra, 4 
Cal.3d at p. 821 [noting that the creation of subclasses may promote the efficiency 
of a class action].)  Accordingly, I find that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in certifying the class of AM’s and OM’s and join the majority in 
reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Sav-on Drug Stores v. Los Angeles Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 97 Cal.App.4th 1070 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S106718 
Date Filed: August 26, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Irvin S. Feffer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, W. Randolph Teslik, Joel M. Cohn, William A. Norris, Rex S. Heinke, 
L. Rachel Helyar and Sandra M. Lee for Petitioner. 
 
Deborah J. La Fetra for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Richard J. Simmons, Kelly L. Hensley and Douglas R. Hart for 
California Retailers Association and National Retail Federation as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Law Offices of Steven Drapkin and Steven Drapkin for Employers Group as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioner. 
 
Seyfarth Shaw and Steven B. Katz for Costco Wholesale Corp., Earl Scheib, Inc., Staples, Inc., and Tuneup 
Masters, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Paul Grossman and Patricia M. Berry for California Employment Law 
Council as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Fred J. Hiestand for Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
PAGE 2 - COUNSEL CONTINUED - S106718 
 
 
Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest: 
 
Riordan & Horgan, Dennis P. Riordan, Donald M. Horgan; RighettiWynne, Matthew Righetti, Edward J. 
Wynne, John J. Glugoski, J.E.B. Pickett; Daniels, Fine, Israel & Schonbuch, Paul R. Fine, Scott A. Brooks, 
Craig S. Momita; Kumetz & Glick, Fred J. Kumetz, Stephen Glick; Law Offices of Ian Herzog, Ian Herzog 
and Evan D. Marshall for Real Parties in Interest. 
 
Brad Seligman; Saperstein, Goldstein, Demchak & Baller, Goldstein, Demchak, Baller, Borgen & 
Dardarian, David Borgen, Laura L. Ho, Joshua Konecky and Darci E. Burrell for The Impact Fund, 
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, The Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center, Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Asian Law Caucus, Asian Pacific American Legal Center 
of Southern California, La Raza Centro Legal, Inc., Women's Employment Rights Clinic of Golden Gate 
University School of Law, Bet Tzedek Legal Services, East San Jose Community Law Center, Professor 
Gary Blasi, University of California, Los Angels School of Law and Professor Joseph Grodin, University 
of California, Hastings College of Law as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest. 
 
Jeffery K. Winikow; Van Bourg, Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, Ellyn Moscowitz, Sandra Rae Benson; 
Spiro, Moss, Barness, Harrison & Barge, Dennis F. Moss, Steven M. Harrison, Ira Spiro and Rene L. Barge 
for California Employment Lawyers Association, California Teamsters Public Affairs Council, Los 
Angeles/Orange County Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, Alameda County Building 
and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO and Contra Costa County Building and Construction Trades 
Council, AFL-CIO as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest. 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Rex S. Heinke 
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 
2029 Century Park East, Suite 2400 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
(310) 229-1000 
 
Brad S. Seligman 
The Impact Fund 
125 University Avenue 
Berkely, CA  94710-1616 
(510) 845-3473