Title: Commonwealth v. Griffin

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11524 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KRISTOPHER GRIFFIN. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     April 8, 2016. - November 4, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Home Invasion.  Insanity.  Mental Health.  Evidence, 
Sanity.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of 
counsel, Opening statement, Argument by prosecutor, 
Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 28, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before E. Susan Garsh, J. 
 
 
 
Neil L. Fishman for the defendant. 
 
Yul-mi Cho, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In the late evening or early morning of July 
23 and 24, 2009, the defendant broke into the house where his 
six year old daughter lived with the defendant's former girl 
friend and slit his daughter's throat, causing her death.  A 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justices Spina and Duffly participated in the deliberation 
on this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the 
first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1, 
and of home invasion, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 18C.2  At 
trial, the defendant did not contest that he had killed the 
victim, but pursued a defense that he was not criminally 
responsible at the time of the killing. 
The defendant presents four claims on appeal.  First, he 
contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter 
of law to permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he was criminally responsible at the time of the 
killing.  Second, he claims that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel by admitting in his opening 
statement that the defendant's conduct was "not psychotic."  
Third, he contends that the prosecutors made improper remarks 
during their opening statement and closing argument.  Fourth, he 
argues that the judge's instruction regarding the consequences 
of a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice.  We affirm the defendant's convictions, and having 
reviewed the entire record of the case pursuant to our duty 
                                                          
 
 
2 On the conviction of murder in the first degree, the 
defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.  On the conviction of home invasion, the 
defendant was sentenced to a concurrent term of life 
imprisonment. 
3 
 
 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we find no reason to exercise our 
authority to order a new trial or to reduce the verdict of 
murder in the first degree. 
 
Background.  Because the defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we recount the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  In July, 2003, 
Deborah Mons gave birth to the victim; the defendant was the 
victim's biological father.  The defendant and Mons had begun to 
date in 2002, and in July or August of that year the defendant 
moved into Mons's home, where she lived with her three sons from 
previous relationships.  From 2003 to the spring of 2006, the 
defendant continued to live with Mons in her house for "most of 
the time," but their relationship was turbulent.  In January, 
2003, after the defendant made a trip to Florida and visited 
with an ex-wife, Mons told the defendant that he could not be in 
a relationship with both her and his ex-wife.  When Mons gave 
the defendant this ultimatum, the defendant appeared depressed 
and asked to be taken to the hospital.  He was treated at the 
hospital for three to five days, and did not live at Mons's 
house from February to July of 2003. 
 
In 2006, Mons broke off the relationship because it "just 
wasn't working out," and she asked the defendant to move out.  
However, between 2006 and 2009, Mons and the defendant 
occasionally dated, albeit "[n]othing on a regular basis," and 
4 
 
 
the defendant would occasionally stay at Mons's house when he 
needed a place to stay.  Each time the defendant moved back into 
the house, he would stay until Mons told him that he needed to 
leave. 
In January, 2008, the victim, then four, made "a sexually 
inappropriate statement" that appeared to implicate one of 
Mons's sons, who was thirteen at the time.  As a result of that 
statement, the son was sent to a hospital for a psychiatric 
evaluation and was later placed in a residential treatment 
facility. 
In the spring of 2009, Mons began a relationship with a man 
named Anthony,3 who lived in North Carolina.  In June, Mons spent 
a week in North Carolina with him.  At this time, Mons told the 
defendant that she was planning to move to North Carolina and 
take the victim with her, but before she could move she needed 
to arrange for her son to be placed in a treatment facility in 
North Carolina, which she anticipated would take at least 
another year. 
The defendant began staying at Mons's house again early in 
June, 2009.  While he was living there, the defendant learned 
that Mons was in a sexual relationship with both him and 
Anthony.  Thereafter, the defendant logged on to a social 
networking account used by Mons, read exchanges between her and 
                                                          
 
 
3 The record does not identify Anthony's last name. 
5 
 
 
Anthony, and deleted her social networking profile.  Around the 
same time, the defendant told Mons that he would "go to the 
facility [her son] was at and take [the son] out and then take 
himself out" in order to make her move to North Carolina easier.  
Because of that statement, Mons asked the defendant to move out 
of her home, which he did on July 9. 
Mons said the defendant was not "happy" about having to 
move out, and did not know where he was going to stay.  On July 
10, Mons returned a missed telephone call from the defendant and 
heard his outgoing voicemail message, in which he said that he 
"had lost his battle with mental illness and was no longer 
available."  A few hours after hearing that message, the 
defendant arrived at Mons's house to retrieve some belongings.  
Mons called the police and spoke to the defendant when the 
police arrived.  The defendant stated that he was "just upset" 
and "did not really mean what he had said in the voicemail."  He 
agreed to be voluntarily taken by the police to a hospital for a 
psychiatric evaluation.  The hospital determined that he was not 
suicidal and released him the following day. 
After his release, on July 11, the defendant asked a 
friend, Robert Fisher, if the defendant could stay in a camper 
that Fisher had on his property.  Fisher and his wife allowed 
the defendant to stay in the camper for two weeks.  During the 
next twelve days, the defendant lived in the camper and assisted 
6 
 
 
with the care of Fisher's father, who lived with Fisher and had 
Alzheimer's disease.  Fisher did not notice anything unusual 
about the defendant's behavior during this period. 
On July 23, the defendant called Mons's house at 7:30 P.M. 
to speak to the victim, as he did many nights.  Mons told him 
that the victim was already in bed and that, if he wanted to 
talk to the victim over the weekend, he should call Mons's 
cellular telephone as she was taking the victim on a trip to 
Washington, D.C., or North Carolina that weekend.  The defendant 
was upset and told Mons that she could not "take [the victim] 
away from [him] like that."  He told Mons that the victim was 
not safe whenever he was not around to speak with the victim and 
that the last time the defendant left the house the victim was 
"molested" by Mons's son.  At 8 P.M., Fisher spoke to the 
defendant on the telephone, and the defendant told Fisher he was 
going to the library to return a video and asked if Fisher 
needed anything.  Fisher did not notice anything unusual about 
the defendant's behavior. 
At 11 P.M., the defendant packed various items into a 
backpack, including rope, duct tape, a first-aid kit, a 
flashlight, scissors, two utility tools, and a knife in a 
sheath.  It was raining, and the defendant put on a poncho to 
walk the twenty minutes to Mons's house.  He did not take his 
Jeep vehicle because it was loud and might wake someone.  
7 
 
 
Arriving at the house, the defendant cut the telephone lines on 
the exterior of the house.  He entered the house by sliding open 
the screen on a window above a bulkhead and then climbing in 
through the window.  Once inside the house, he took off his 
boots and went down to the basement of the house where he took 
off his wet clothes and turned off the electricity to the house 
at the circuit board.  He also cut the telephone line inside the 
house. 
The defendant then went to the victim's bedroom where he 
sat with her before eventually carrying her to the basement.  
After sitting with the victim for some time, the defendant 
placed a hand over the victim's mouth and cut her throat three 
times, each time deep enough to reach the victim's spinal 
column.  The defendant then wiped his hands with a towel and 
used disinfecting wipes from the kitchen to clean the light 
switch in the basement and further clean his hands.  The 
defendant then repacked his belongings into his backpack and 
left the house through the window by which he had entered. 
 
At 3:45 A.M., Fisher received a call from the defendant's 
telephone, and when he answered he only heard someone gasping 
for breath and gagging.  Thinking the defendant might have hurt 
himself, Fisher went to the camper to check on the defendant.  
He found the camper empty but discovered a note addressed to him 
that purported to be the defendant's last will and testament and 
8 
 
 
stated the defendant's intent to leave all of his property to 
Fisher.  Concerned, Fisher's wife called the police.  
Thereafter, Fisher's wife found another note in the camper, this 
one addressed, "To whom it may concern."  In the note, the 
defendant wrote, in relevant part:  "I am sorry for what sins I 
have committed.  Sending [the victim] to heaven was the only way 
I could think of to protect her.  I dont want any of my children 
to grow up + suffer with mental illness the way I have.  [The 
victim] is the only one I can still save. . .  Please notify my 
family of my passing." 
 
At 4:10 A.M., Officer Joshua Ellender of the Mansfield 
police department arrived at Fisher's house, spoke to Fisher 
briefly, and then left to look for the defendant.  Officer 
Ellender found the defendant one-quarter mile from Fisher's 
house, walking in the direction of the house.  Ellender asked 
the defendant if he was all right and questioned why he was 
walking in the rain.  The defendant answered that he was all 
right and that he had gone to a pharmacy to fill a prescription 
and was on his way home.  Ellender offered to drive the 
defendant home, and the defendant accepted.  Ellender asked the 
defendant a few questions in the police cruiser, and the 
defendant responded in a "very timid high-pitched voice."  When 
they arrived at Fisher's house, Fisher told Ellender about the 
second note, and the officer asked the defendant if he had hurt 
9 
 
 
anyone.  The defendant responded that he had and told Ellender 
and Fisher that he had killed his daughter.  Ellender then 
handcuffed the defendant and, after the defendant stated that 
the knife was in his backpack, the officer took the backpack 
from him.  While sitting in the back of the police cruiser, the 
defendant said that he deserved to die and began hitting his 
head against the partition in the cruiser, but stopped when 
Ellender asked him to; the defendant later asked Ellender to 
shoot him. 
 
Police responded to Mons's house, where they awoke Mons and 
discovered the victim's body in the basement under a blanket. 
 
Willa Griffin, the defendant's mother, testified that, at 
some point after the defendant began dating Mons, the defendant 
had told her in a telephone call that he had "found a doctor 
that could draw up the papers" for him to obtain Social Security 
disability benefits and that he was going to apply to get the 
benefits.  The defendant again telephoned his mother in early or 
mid-July 2009, and asked if she thought the victim "would be 
better off in heaven."  His mother responded that everyone would 
be better off in heaven, but that only God could make that 
choice.  Later, on the evening of July 22, 2009, the defendant 
again telephoned his mother and asked to come home to live with 
her in Florida because he could not stay any longer in the place 
where he was currently living.  She told him that he could come 
10 
 
 
home and agreed to pay for the rental truck he would need to 
transport his belongings.  On July 23, the defendant telephoned 
his mother between 6 P.M. and 7 P.M. and told her that he was 
going to postpone coming to Florida until the beginning of 
August because he needed his Social Security money to pay for 
gasoline and because he thought he might have "permanent 
housing" by Saturday.4  He ended the call by saying, "And no 
matter what happens, know I love you."  After the killing of the 
victim, the defendant spoke again with his mother by telephone; 
the telephone call was recorded, and an excerpt was played at 
trial.  In response to her question about whether he told the 
police that God had told him to kill the victim, he told her 
that he did not tell them that; he said he told the police that 
he "prayed and [God] gave [him] two choices." 
 
The defendant was booked and, after waiving the Miranda 
rights, gave two interviews to police that morning.  In the 
statements, the defendant explained what had happened that 
night.  The defendant stated that, after the telephone call with 
Mons, he was upset and wished to hurt Mons.  He played 
videogames for a few hours and attempted to sleep but could not.  
He stated that he then began praying to God, and God told him 
that the only way to protect the victim was to send her to 
heaven.  He packed many of the supplies into his backpack with 
                                                          
 
 
4 July 23, 2009, was a Thursday. 
11 
 
 
the intent of hurting Mons, but while he was walking to Mons's 
house, God told him that he was not to harm Mons, but that he 
needed to protect the victim by sending her to heaven.  He 
stated that, once he was in the house, he had a conversation 
with God where he told God that he did not want to hurt the 
victim, but God told him that it was the only way to protect her 
and that, if the defendant did not send her to heaven, any harm 
that befell her in the future would be on the defendant's 
conscience.  The defendant also expressed his belief that if 
Mons's son were released from the residential treatment 
facility, he would molest the victim again.  The defendant 
explained that, after he killed his daughter, he attempted to 
kill himself, but was unable to. 
 
During the interviews, the defendant also described his 
anger at Mons.  He stated that Mons was responsible for making 
him homeless, that she had turned her back on him, that she had 
been in a sexual relationship with Anthony at the same time she 
was having a sexual relationship with the defendant, and that 
she did "what she wants, when she wants, with who she wants."  
He stated that he wanted Mons "to understand what she had done 
to [him]." 
 
Through the defendant's statements to police and Mons's 
testimony, evidence was presented regarding the defendant's 
mental health history.  The defendant stated during the police 
12 
 
 
interviews that he began receiving disability benefits for 
bipolar disorder, severe depression, and suicidal ideation two 
years earlier and that he took antidepressant and mood-
stabilizing medications.  He recounted that he had taken his 
morning medication on July 23, but had not taken his evening 
medication that night.  He told police that he had attempted 
suicide several times, most recently two weeks prior to the 
killing, that he had had a major breakdown in 2005, and four or 
five hospitalizations for mental health reasons between August 
of 2005 and October of 2006.  At various times throughout the 
interviews, the defendant spoke in a voice that was described as 
high-pitched or meek and, as one of the officers explained, at 
times, so soft that the officer had to lean in to understand 
him.5 
 
Mons testified that she knew the defendant to be depressed 
at times and to take an antidepressant, but that he was mostly 
depressed when they were having fights about his fidelity.  Mons 
also testified that, other than the hospitalization following 
the argument about his relationship with his ex-wife, she did 
not remember the defendant being hospitalized at any point when 
he lived with her and that she was not aware of any suicide 
attempts by the defendant around 2006.  She further testified 
                                                          
 
 
5 Video recordings of both interviews were played for the 
jury. 
13 
 
 
that the high-pitched voice he used while being interviewed was 
normal for him. 
 
There was also testimony about the defendant's religious 
practices.  The defendant explained in his statements to police 
that he considered himself "spiritual" but did not belong to any 
particular religion.  He stated that every night he would call 
the victim and tell her to say her prayers and that he tried to 
take the victim to church but that Mons would not allow it.  
Mons testified that the defendant was not a very religious 
person, and that she only knew of the defendant going to church 
twice during the time that she knew him.  A search of the camper 
he was staying in at the time of the killing turned up no Bible 
or other religious materials. 
 
At trial, the defendant did not contest that he had killed 
his daughter, but argued that he lacked criminal responsibility 
at the time of the killing.  The defendant requested and was 
granted funds to retain a forensic psychiatrist and a 
psychiatric consultant, but neither the Commonwealth nor the 
defendant at trial offered expert testimony regarding the 
defendant's mental health or his criminal responsibility. 
 
Discussion.  We address in turn each of the defendant's 
claims on appeal. 
 
1.  Sufficiency of the evidence of criminal responsibility.  
"[A] required finding of not guilty by reason of lack of 
14 
 
 
criminal responsibility may rest on the failure of proof of 
criminal responsibility."  Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 
806, 812 (2016).6  In Lawson, we declared that "[t]he inference 
that a defendant is probably sane because most people are sane 
is not strong enough alone to permit a rational finder of fact 
to conclude that a defendant is criminally responsible beyond a 
reasonable doubt".  Id. at 814.  But we reaffirmed our long-
standing law that the Commonwealth need not call an expert 
witness to prove criminal responsibility in every case and "may 
prove criminal responsibility through the inferences arising 
from the circumstances of the offense, including evidence that 
the defendant planned the offense, acted on a rational motive, 
made rational decisions in committing the offense and in 
avoiding capture, and attempted to conceal the offense or his or 
her role in the offense."  Id. at 816, citing Commonwealth v. 
Cullen, 395 Mass. 225, 229-230 (1985); Commonwealth v. Ricard, 
355 Mass. 509, 515 (1969). 
 
To prove a defendant criminally responsible where, as here, 
there is no claim of voluntary intoxication, the Commonwealth 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: 
                                                          
 
 
6 We declared in Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 816 
(2016), that a defendant's motion for a required finding of not 
guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility shall be 
considered only at the close of all the evidence.  Here, the 
timing of the motion was without consequence because the 
defendant rested without presenting any evidence. 
15 
 
 
 
"1.  That at the time of the alleged crime the 
defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect; 
or 
 
 
"2.  That if the defendant did suffer from a mental 
disease or defect, he nonetheless retained the substantial 
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness or criminality of 
his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law." 
 
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 10 (2013).  See Commonwealth 
v. Keita, 429 Mass. 843, 849-850 (1999), citing Commonwealth v. 
McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546-547 (1967).  In evaluating the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we "examine the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth and determine whether 
'the evidence and the inferences that reasonably could be drawn 
from it were "of sufficient force"' to permit a rational finder 
of fact to conclude that the defendant was criminally 
responsible beyond a reasonable doubt."  Lawson, 475 Mass. at 
816, quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815, 820 (2015). 
 
Here, although there was no expert testimony that the 
defendant was criminally responsible, the evidence viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth permitted the jury to 
find that the defendant was criminally responsible beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  There was evidence that the defendant 
appeared to be acting normally in the days leading up to the 
killing, that he helped Fisher care for Fisher's father, and 
that he prepared his "last will and testament" before he left 
the camper to commit the killing.  There was also evidence that 
16 
 
 
the defendant carefully planned the killing before he left the 
camper by assembling all of the materials he might need during 
the assault and placing them in his backpack.  He decided to 
walk to Mons's house in the rain rather than drive his Jeep 
there because he feared the noise of the Jeep would alert the 
occupants that he had arrived.  When he arrived at Mons's house, 
he took the precaution of preventing any land-line telephone 
calls for help from the occupants by cutting the telephone lines 
both outside and inside the house.  By turning off the 
electricity in the house, he also ensured that any occupants who 
awoke would be left in the dark, leaving him with the potential 
advantage of his flashlight.  After killing the victim, he 
methodically sheathed his knife, wiped his hands, cleaned the 
basement light switch with disinfecting wipes, repacked his 
backpack, and left the house without waking anyone. 
 
The evidence also supported a motive for the killing 
arising from his anger at Mons for making him homeless, for 
having a sexual relationship with him and Anthony at the same 
time, and for planning to take his daughter with her to North 
Carolina to live with Anthony, her new boy friend.  In the 
second note found in the camper, he wrote that he was "sorry for 
what sins" he planned to commit and that he "pray[ed] for gods 
mercy," which allows the inference that he recognized that the 
killing was morally wrong. 
17 
 
 
 
The jury were entitled to discredit the statements made by 
the defendant to police that he killed his daughter on a direct 
command from God, especially where there was no indication that 
he was deeply religious.  The jury were also entitled to 
conclude that the defendant overstated the severity of his 
mental illness where there was evidence that he had falsely 
claimed to be suicidal in the past to garner sympathy from Mons 
and where he overstated his mental health symptoms and 
hospitalizations in speaking with the police. 
 
From this evidence, a rational jury could reasonably 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct and that he had the 
ability to conform his conduct to the law.  See Lawson, 475 
Mass. at 817-818 (considering circumstances of crime, as well as 
motive, in finding sufficiency of evidence of criminal 
responsibility).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 538 
(1976) (evidence of planning and motive supports criminal 
responsibility of defendant). 
 
2.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because, even 
though his sole defense was lack of criminal responsibility, 
counsel told the jury in his opening statement that the 
defendant's conduct was "not psychotic." 
18 
 
 
 
The defendant did not file a motion for a new trial and 
therefore rests his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
solely on the trial record.  Such ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are "the weakest form of such a challenge" 
because they lack "any explanation by trial counsel for his 
actions."  Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 437 Mass. 204, 210 n.5 
(2002).  Examining this claim under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, "we 
review the trial record alone to determine whether a defense 
counsel's strategic or tactical decision questioned on appeal 
was manifestly unreasonable when made and, if so, whether the 
unreasonable decision resulted in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Mass. 620, 
629 (2012). 
 
Considering this claim in the context of trial counsel's 
entire opening statement, as well as the evidence at trial, we 
conclude that counsel's remark was not manifestly unreasonable.  
Trial counsel stated in relevant part in opening statement: 
 
"So what we have here is [the defendant] unable to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct nor understand 
the requirements of law and conform his conduct to the law 
because of really defective thinking.  . . .  [P]eople with 
defective brain or defective minds because of some disease 
or defect still can function.  So the fact that he 
functioned is not manifest of how he was thinking. . . .  
[H]e had a discussion with God, a prayer from God, and this 
is a debate with God.  It's not psychotic.  It's a debate 
with God.  That clearly I suggest to you should show you 
that there was a defect in his ability to reason, and a 
defect in his ability to perform his conduct under the 
requirements of law." 
19 
 
 
 
Trial counsel in this case was confronting extensive evidence 
that the defendant planned to commit the crime and made 
considerable efforts to avoid detection while committing the 
crime.  He appears to have been attempting to explain to the 
jury how the evidence would show that the defendant was not 
criminally responsible even though he appeared to make 
calculated, reasoned choices.  Counsel appears to have been 
using the term "psychotic" to refer to individuals who have 
significant functional limitations due to a mental illness, and 
attempting to contrast that with his view of the defendant as 
someone who was highly functional but had a "defect in his 
ability to reason" caused by mental illness that resulted in a 
lack of criminal responsibility.  By admitting that the 
defendant's conduct was "not psychotic," trial counsel was not 
abandoning the defense of lack of criminal responsibility; 
instead, he was attempting to tailor it to the facts he was 
given.7  This strategic choice was not manifestly unreasonable in 
this context and under these circumstances.  See Commonwealth v. 
Denis, 442 Mass. 617, 626 (2004) (concession that defendant was 
                                                          
 
 
7 The defendant does not challenge trial counsel's decision 
not to call a forensic psychologist as a defense witness.  
Without such an expert, trial counsel reasonably could have 
anticipated that the jury would not hear any opinion that the 
defendant was "psychotic," and therefore may reasonably have 
sought to address this weakness in his defense in his opening 
statement. 
20 
 
 
shooter not manifestly unreasonably where consistent with only 
viable defense); Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 581-583 
(2003) (concession of guilt not manifestly unreasonable where it 
"does not undercut viable defenses"). 
 
3.  Improper remarks by prosecutors in opening statement 
and closing argument.  The defendant argues that the two 
prosecutors made improper remarks in their opening statement and 
closing argument.  In his opening statement, one prosecutor 
referred several times to the victim's death as a "murder" and 
to the defendant as having "murdered" the victim.  The defendant 
objected at the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening 
statement.  In response, the judge promptly gave a strong 
curative instruction in which she explained to the jury that 
"murder" is a legal term, that they would be instructed 
regarding what the Commonwealth needed to prove for the jury to 
find "murder," and that the issue whether the victim was 
murdered was ultimately for them to decide, notwithstanding any 
opinion of the prosecutor.8 
                                                          
 
 
8 The judge's full instruction on this point is as follows: 
 
 
"During the opening, the Commonwealth several times 
characterized the actions of the defendant as that you 
would be hearing testimony that he murdered [the victim].  
The word murder is a legal term.  At the end of this trial, 
I'll be giving you specific instructions as to just what it 
is that the Commonwealth has to prove to the extent that 
that reflected an opinion by the Commonwealth, an opinion 
by the Assistant District Attorney that the killing, a 
21 
 
 
 
The defendant is correct that it was improper for the 
prosecutor to refer to the killing as a "murder" in his opening 
statement where the question whether the killing was, in fact, a 
murder was the ultimate question before the jury.  However, the 
judge's instruction on this point was sufficient to cure even 
the modest risk of prejudice that resulted from the prosecutor's 
statements.  See Commonwealth v. Almonte, 465 Mass. 224, 235-236 
(2013). 
 
The defendant also claims that the other prosecutor's 
repeated statements during her closing argument that the 
defendant's behavior was not consistent with mental illness were 
unsupported by the evidence and allowed the prosecutor to 
"essentially testify[] as an unqualified expert witness."  
Similarly, the defendant contends that the prosecutor's 
statement that the only evidence that the defendant suffered 
from mental illness was from the defendant's "self-serving 
statements" denigrated his defense of lack of criminal 
responsibility.  Neither of these statements was improper. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
killing amounted to murder.  You should disregard it.  This 
is not the place for argument and at the end of the case, 
you will be able to hear argument and the attorneys may be 
able to argue to you that from the evidence that you've 
heard of a killing, the elements of murder are met, but to 
the extent that there's anything in that that reflected a 
personal opinion of murder as opposed to evidence of a 
killing ultimately will be for you to determine whether the 
Commonwealth has met its burden that any killing amounted 
to murder." 
22 
 
 
 
As noted earlier, in determining whether a defendant was 
criminally responsible, a jury may decide whether the defendant 
suffered from a mental disease or defect, and they may reach 
this determination without expert evidence based on rational 
inferences from the defendant's relevant conduct.  See Lawson, 
475 Mass. at 807, 815-816.  Where, as here, no expert evidence 
was offered, a prosecutor does not "testify[] as an unqualified 
expert witness" when he or she argues in closing that the 
defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect based 
on evidence such as the defendant's deliberate planning and 
orchestration of the killing, and the inconsistencies between 
his description of his own mental health history and the 
testimony of other witnesses who knew him during the relevant 
time period.  See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 473-474 
(1998) (prosecutor's comment on credibility of criminal 
responsibility defense was proper where based on evidence). 
 
As to the prosecutor's characterization of the defendant's 
statements to police regarding his mental health history as 
"self-serving," it was not improper for the prosecutor to argue 
to the jury that the defendant's statements to police were not 
credible because the defendant had a motive to exaggerate or 
fabricate his mental health symptoms.  The trial judge properly 
instructed the jury that, in evaluating the credibility of 
witnesses, the jury could consider whether "the witness [stood] 
23 
 
 
to gain or lose anything depending upon how this case comes 
out"; if so, whether "that . . . color[ed] the witness's 
testimony"; and whether "the witness ha[d] an incentive or 
motive to testify in a certain fashion."  See Massachusetts 
Superior Court Criminal Practice Jury Instructions § 1.8, at 1–
25 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 1999 & 1st Supp. 2003).  The 
prosecutor's suggestion to the jury that they should find the 
defendant's statements to the police not to be credible because 
they were self-serving invited the jury to do nothing more than 
what the judge invited them to do in her instructions.  See 
Commonwealth v. Espada, 450 Mass. 687, 699 (2008). 
 
4.  Instruction on the consequences of a verdict of not 
guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility.  The 
defendant requested an instruction on the consequences of a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility as provided in Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 
810, 823 & n.12 (1975) (Mutina instruction).  The judge gave 
such an instruction to the jury, one that followed almost 
verbatim the instruction set forth in the current Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide.9,10  See Model Jury Instructions on 
                                                          
 
 
9 At the time this case was tried, the current Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide had been issued as proposed revisions, 
but had not yet been adopted by the court.  Subsequent to the 
trial in this case, in Commonwealth v. Chappell, 473 Mass. 191, 
206, 209 (2015) (Appendix), we proposed a new provisional 
24 
 
 
Homicide 11-12 (2013).  The defendant did not object to the 
content of that instruction. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
instruction on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by 
reason of lack of criminal responsibility. 
 
 
10 The judge instructed the jury regarding the consequences 
of a verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility as follows: 
 
 
"As I have previously instructed, your discussion 
should be based on the evidence and the law of this case 
without regard to the possible consequences of the 
verdicts.  You may not consider sentencing or punishment in 
reaching your verdicts. 
 
 
"However, I am going to tell you what happens to a 
defendant if he is found not guilty by reason of lack of 
criminal responsibility.  The Court may order the defendant 
to be hospitalized at a mental health facility for a period 
of 40 days for observations and examination.  During this 
observation period, or within 60 days after a verdict of 
not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility, 
the district attorney or other appropriate authorities may 
petition the Court to commit the defendant to a mental 
health facility or to Bridgewater State Hospital.  If the 
Court then concludes that the defendant is mentally ill and 
that his discharge would create a substantial likelihood of 
serious harm to himself or others, the Court may grant the 
petition and commit him to a proper mental facility or to 
Bridgewater State Hospital for six months. 
 
 
"Periodically thereafter, the Court reviews the 
order of commitment.  If the person is still suffering from 
a mental illness or defect and is still dangerous, he is 
kept in the mental facility.  If the person is no longer 
mentally ill and can resume a normal life, he is 
discharged. 
 
 
"The district attorney must be notified of any hearing 
concerning whether the person may be released, and the 
district attorney may be heard at any such hearing.  
However, the final decision on whether to recommit or 
release the person is always made by the judge.  This is 
what happens if you find the defendant not guilty by reason 
of lack of criminal responsibility." 
25 
 
 
 
The defendant now argues that this instruction created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice insofar as it 
left the jury with the impression that, if they found the 
defendant not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility, the defendant could be released from custody at 
any time.  In Commonwealth v. Chappell, 473 Mass. 191, 205-206 
(2015), we addressed a similar claim where the defendant 
proposed a modified Mutina instruction that was not adopted by 
the trial judge, who gave the model instruction.11  Although we 
set forth a proposed modification to the model Mutina 
instruction, we concluded that the Mutina instruction in the 
current Model Jury Instructions on Homicide accurately stated 
the law regarding the commitment of individuals found not guilty 
by reason of lack of criminal responsibility and that the judge 
did not err in giving it.  Chappell, supra at 205-206, 208-209 
(Appendix).  We reach the same conclusion here.12 
                                                          
 
 
11 In Chappell, 473 Mass. at 205, the defendant requested 
that the judge modify the model Mutina instruction in several 
respects, including a request that the judge instruct the jury 
that "if the defendant were still suffering from a mental 
illness and still dangerous, '[t]here is no limit to additional 
commitments [following the initial commitment of six months] and 
the defendant could be committed for the rest of his life.'" 
 
 
12 The defendant argues alternatively that trial counsel was 
ineffective for requesting a Mutina instruction without more 
favorable language.  Where the model instruction accurately 
reflected the law, counsel neither erred nor was ineffective for 
failing to request language that was more beneficial to the 
defendant than that provided by the model instruction. 
26 
 
 
 
5.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  In reviewing 
the entire record of the case pursuant to our obligation under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we address one additional issue.  The trial 
judge, in instructing the jury on the issue of criminal 
responsibility, declared, "[I]f you feel it appropriate, you may 
take into account that the great majority of people are sane and 
that there is a resulting likelihood that any particular person 
is sane."  In Keita, 429 Mass. at 846, we directed that such an 
instruction should be given in every case where the question of 
criminal responsibility is raised.  Such an instruction was also 
included in the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide effective at 
the time of the trial.  See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 
51 (1999). 
 
We omitted this instruction in the criminal responsibility 
section of the current Model Jury Instructions on Homicide.  
Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 1-12 (2013).  And in Lawson, 
475 Mass. at 815 n.8, we concluded that juries should not be 
instructed regarding such an inference due to "the meager weight 
of this inference and the risk of juror confusion regarding the 
burden of proof."  Where the trial judge strongly and 
specifically instructed that the burden is on the Commonwealth 
to prove criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt and 
where there was substantial evidence supporting the jury's 
finding of criminal responsibility, we conclude that this 
27 
 
 
instruction did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
Conclusion.  We have reviewed the entire record of the case 
pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and find no 
reason to exercise our authority to order a new trial or to 
reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree.  The judgments 
of conviction are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.