Title: FERGUSSON v. FERGUSSON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

FERGUSSON v. FERGUSSON2002 WY 6645 P.3d 641Case Number: 01-139Decided: 05/02/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                            

STEPHANIE 
ANN FERGUSSON, 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

v.

ANDREW 
JOSEPH FERGUSSON, 

Appellee(Defendant).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Lincoln County

The 
Honorable John D. Troughton, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Randall B. Luthi of Luthi & Voyles, Thayne, Wyoming 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Kenneth S. Cohen, Jackson, Wyoming  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      Pursuant to the 
parties' divorce decree, Appellant Stephanie Ann Fergusson (the mother) was 
awarded primary physical custody of the couple's two children.  After the mother married a man with 
three children of his own, Appellee Andrew Joseph Fergusson (the father) 
observed marked differences in his children's appearance and behavior.  At the same time, a rift developed 
between the mother and her mother, aunt, and grandmother, apparently over their 
opinions concerning the mother's new marriage and the resulting treatment of her 
children.  The father petitioned to 
have the custody of the couple's children modified based upon a material change 
in circumstances.  The trial court 
found the circumstances warranted a change in the custody provisions.  We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      The mother 
presents these issues for our review:

            
I.  Did the district court modify custody of the parties' minor 
children based upon a lack of visitation provided to the grandparent in 
violation of Wyoming statutory law and the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation [of] the Fourteenth Amendment?

            
II.  Did the district court fail to justify a change in custody 
from the original divorce decree?

The 
father states the issue as:

            
I.  Are the district court findings (1) that there were 
material changes in circumstances, and (2) that the best interests of the 
children required a change in custody from the mother to the father, supported 
by the record?

[¶3]      The mother and 
the father married on April 27, 1994.  
Two children were born of the marriage.  In July of 1999, the couple 
divorced.  The Stipulation and 
Marital Settlement Agreement filed with the district court provided the parties 
would share joint legal custody of the children (a daughter born on October 13, 
1994, and a son born on February 14, 1996) with the mother having primary 
physical custody subject to the father's reasonable visitation.  A period of relative family harmony 
ended when the mother remarried.  On 
December 11, 2000, the father alleged changed circumstances and filed a petition 
to modify the custody provisions of the divorce decree requesting primary 
custody of the children be given to him.  
A trial was held on February 27, 2001.

[¶4]      The father 
testified that the mother had always been the primary caregiver for the children 
and had been a good parent.  
Following the divorce, he and the mother maintained an amiable 
relationship and were able to effectively manage his visitations with the 
children.  The father resided in 
Jackson, and the mother resided in Star Valley.  The children were happy to visit their 
father and were equally happy to return to their mother.  The otherwise agreeable relationship 
between the mother and the father gradually became strained when the mother 
began dating Dee Aullman (the stepfather), the man she later married.  The development of the new relationship 
coincided with the father recognizing a change in his children for the 
worse.  The mother became pregnant, 
and the children, who were accustomed to living alone with their mother, now 
shared a two-bedroom home with their stepfather's three children from a prior 
marriage.  The children expressed 
anxiety about returning to their mother's home after spending the weekend with 
their father, and the children stated they did not like their stepfather.  The children began wetting their beds, 
and the father noticed the children's appearance worsened.

[¶5]      The children's 
maternal grandmother testified her relationship with the mother began to 
deteriorate at the same time.  She 
too noticed a progressive change in the children's behavior, and the children 
told her they did not like their stepfather.  The children pleaded to stay with their 
grandmother or their father rather than having to stay with their mother and 
stepfather.  The daughter told her 
grandmother about a wrongful touching incident involving her and her older 
stepbrother.  The incident was 
reported to the Department of Family Services, and no further action was 
taken.  The grandmother testified 
about another incident when the daughter had red marks on her neck.  The daughter stated the mother caught 
her dragging a cat around the house with a rope.  The mother did not approve and put 
either a belt or a rope around the daughter's neck and dragged her around the house 
to let her know how the cat felt.  
The grandmother generally described the children's transformation from 
being full of life and clean into being sullen, aggressive, afraid, and 
unkempt.  The mother's aunt and 
grandmother echoed the same concerns at trial and recounted several instances 
which they feared posed a danger to the children's well-being.  The mother's mother, aunt, and 
grandmother were no longer allowed to see the children except when the children 
were in their father's custody.

[¶6]      The daughter's 
kindergarten teacher testified regarding changes in her personality.  The daughter commenced the school year 
as a happy and polite child but developed signs of aggression and 
unhappiness.  When the teacher asked 
what was wrong, the daughter stated that her stepfather was mean to 
her.

[¶7]      The mother and 
the stepfather testified the new family was experiencing a transitional period 
but the children were being raised in a loving and safe atmosphere.  The mother believed her family was not 
supportive of her new relationship, and, consequently, she determined it was in 
the best interests of her immediate family to curtail visitation with the 
extended family members.  The mother 
also presented testimony from a Head Start counselor who conducted several home 
visits, and the counselor testified she saw no indications of abuse or 
neglect.

[¶8]      On March 20, 
2001, the trial court issued its decision letter granting the father's petition 
to modify the custody provisions.  
The mother appealed.

[¶9]      "The party 
seeking a modification of the custody provisions of a divorce decree has the 
burden of showing that a material and substantial change of circumstances has 
occurred, after the entry of the initial decree, and that modification is in the 
best interests of the children."  Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 150 
(Wyo. 1998).  This court will not 
interfere with the trial court's decision regarding modification of custody 
absent a procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion.  Id.  
We recently clarified the definition of an abuse of discretion when 
we stated the core of our inquiry must reach "the question of reasonableness of 
the choice made by the trial court."  
Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo. 1998); see also Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶9, 22 P.3d 861, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001).  Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  Id.

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   The mother claims the trial court 
improperly considered grandparent visitation in modifying the custody 
arrangement.  She concedes the final 
order does not require visitation for the maternal grandparent but asserts the 
trial court's comments and the eventual change of custody "bears the fruit of 
visitation rights of the grandparent."  
She points to several instances in the trial transcript where the court 
expressed a concern that she did not permit the children to visit members of 
their extended family.

[¶11]   The mother further contends the 
trial court failed to follow the mandatory statutory procedures of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-7-101(a) (LexisNexis 2001) which permits grandparent visitation.  Section 20-7-101(a) provides in 
pertinent part:

(a)  A 
grandparent may bring an original action against any person having custody of 
the grandparent's minor grandchild to establish reasonable visitation rights to 
the child.  If the court finds, 
after a hearing, that visitation would be in the best interest of the child and 
that the rights of the child's parents are not substantially impaired, the court 
shall grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent.  

The 
mother asserts the trial court did not articulate the rationale for its 
conclusion that visitation was in the children's best interests and made no 
determination as to whether visitation would substantially impair the mother's 
rights.  

[¶12]   Finally, the mother claims the 
trial court's decision violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 
the United States Supreme Court recognized the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects parents' fundamental right to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.  In light of that decision, the mother 
argues the trial court must find she was an unfit parent; otherwise, "there will 
normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of 
the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best 
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children."  Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 68-69.  Troxel, however, involved grandparents 
who sued as third-parties seeking visitation with their grandchildren.  Troxel is distinguishable from the 
instant case wherein the father, as the other fit parent, filed the petition to 
modify the custody provisions.

[¶13]   The fundamental fallacy of the 
mother's argument is, the grandmother did not request visitation rights, either 
formally or informally.  
Furthermore, the trial court's order did not provide for grandparent 
visitation.  Therefore, the statute 
was not at issue, and the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel does not apply.  It is true the trial court made it 
patently clear throughout the trial that it was concerned about the mother no 
longer allowing her children to visit or maintain contact with her extended 
family.  However, it could give 
appropriate weight to this consideration in determining what was in the 
children's best interests.  Though 
we are cognizant of the Supreme Court's rationale in Troxel, under these circumstances we 
conclude the mother's argument does not have any merit.

B.        
Required Articulation of Factors

[¶14]   The mother complains the trial 
court's order and decision letter do not delineate the  basis for its decision and are bereft of 
any support.  She argues that, 
because the trial court did not articulate the factors in support of its 
decision, on review this court is left with conjecture and speculation in 
determining whether the custody modification was justified.  The father admits the order is not 
overly detailed but asserts the transcript contains ample statements of the 
trial court's concerns and evidence it deemed important. 

[¶15]   We have repeatedly implored trial 
courts, when exercising their discretionary power in custody matters, to place 
the circumstances and factors which were crucial to their custody determinations 
on the record.  If they did so, the 
reviewing court could better understand and evaluate the soundness of their 
decisions.  See Produit v. Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶¶10-13, 35 P.3d 1240, ¶¶10-13 (Wyo. 2001); Pace, 
2001 WY 43, ¶15; Reavis v. Reavis, 
955 P.2d 428, 431-32 (Wyo. 1998).  
We continue to encourage trial courts to rely on their discretionary 
power to make a record of the critical circumstances and factors which 
constitute the foundation of a custody award.  Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶10.  However, except in instances involving 
unconventional custody approaches, trial courts are not required to do so.  We have placed the onus on the parties 
to request findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(a).  
Id.; Pace, 2001 WY 43, 
¶16; RDS v. GEMN (In re MS), 9 P.3d 984, 986 (Wyo. 2000).  Neither party 
made such a request and, therefore, cannot be heard to complain about the 
absence of formal findings.  Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 148 (Wyo. 
1999).

[¶16]   A trial court may modify an order 
concerning the custody of children if either parent shows a material change in 
circumstances and the modification would be in the children's best interests 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) (LexisNexis 2001).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Section 
20-2-201(a) became effective July 1, 2000, and sets out the factors the court 
shall consider in making the proper disposition of children in a divorce.  Although not specifically requiring 
findings as to the various factors, the statute does direct the court to 
consider specific factors in ordering the disposition of children.  Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶12.  "On appeal, this court can ascertain 
whether the factors have been appropriately weighed only if the district court's 
consideration is reflected in the proceeding transcripts, by opinion letter, or 
as findings in the written order."  
Id.  Remand may be necessary if the 
consideration of § 20-2-201(a) factors is not patent in the district court 
record.  Id. at ¶13.

[¶17]   We agree the trial court in this 
instance provided only a scant explanation of its reasoning in the decision 
letter and order modifying the custody provisions.  However, consistent with Produit, we may look to the trial 
transcripts to determine whether the court's considerations are adequately set 
forth and comply with § 20-2-201(a).  
Several indications in that transcript prove the trial court was assured 
that substantial and material changes in circumstances had occurred and it was 
in the children's best interests for them to live with their father. 

[¶18]   The order states there was a change 
in circumstances that negatively impacted the children; the children were in an 
unhealthy and unhappy environment; and, as a result, it was in their best 
interests to be under their father's care, guidance, and supervision.  Each case requires the trial court to 
carefully weigh the relevant factors while looking to the unique and individual 
family relationships in reaching a resolution which is in the best interests of 
the children in that family.  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431.  In this case, the trial court heard 
testimony that, upon the mother's remarriage, the children exhibited disturbing 
changes in both their behavior and their appearance.  It is true that remarriage by one of the 
divorced parents, standing alone, does not constitute a material change in 
circumstances sufficiently substantial and material to justify a custody 
modification.  Kreuter v. Kreuter, 728 P.2d 1129, 1130 
(Wyo. 1986).  However, the addition 
of what would soon be four other children to the equation in addition to 
friction with the stepfather can be considered a material change in 
circumstances sufficient to justify a custody modification.  Additional evidence included poor 
treatment by the stepfather and an improper touching incident between the 
daughter and her stepbrother.  The 
trial court heard testimony from several witnesses that the daughter became 
aggressive and sullen, the children repeatedly expressed their dislike for the 
stepfather, there were several instances of alleged maltreatment, and the 
children's appearances changed for the worse.  The court also heard the stepfather's 
testimony in which he admitted withholding the children from their relatives was 
against their best interests.  The 
court said, "I think the kids are unhappy.  
I think they're sad.  I think 
the situation is unhealthy."

[¶19]   The court's paramount concern is 
the children's welfare.  Laughton v. Laughton, 71 Wyo. 506, 259 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo. 1953).  The 
trial court's comments reveal that, due to the material and substantial changes 
in circumstances, it was in the children's best interests for them to be in 
their father's custody.  We are 
persuaded the trial court considered the § 20-2-201(a) factors and its 
considerations are adequately reflected in the record.  Therefore, we conclude it is not 
necessary to remand this case for further findings.

[¶20]   Affirmed.