Title: Commonwealth v. Coggeshall

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11904 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAVID A. COGGESHALL. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     December 7, 2015. - February 24, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Reckless Endangerment of a Child.  Probable Cause.  Practice, 
Criminal, Complaint, State of mind.  Evidence, State of 
mind. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Plymouth Division of 
the District Court Department on August 20, 2013.  
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Kathryn E. Hand, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Vanessa L. Madge, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Tara B. Ganguly for the defendant. 
 
Chauncey B. Wood, J. Anthony Downs, Todd Marabella, & Kara 
Harrington, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In this case we are asked to decide whether the 
words "wantonly or recklessly" in G. L. c. 265, § 13L, the 
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statute proscribing reckless endangerment of a child, require 
proof of a defendant's subjective state of mind.1  On August 20, 
2013, a two-count complaint issued against the defendant from 
the Plymouth Division of the District Court Department, accusing 
him of walking on railroad tracks, in violation of G. L. c. 160, 
§ 218, and reckless endangerment of a child by walking on 
railroad tracks with a child, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13L.  The defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the 
count charging him with reckless endangerment.  A judge in the 
District Court ruled that the Commonwealth was required to 
establish that the defendant actually was aware of the 
substantial risk of serious bodily injury to which he exposed 
his child, and that the evidence offered in support of the 
application for the criminal complaint failed to demonstrate 
                     
 
1 General Laws c. 265, § 13L, states in relevant part:   
 
"Whoever wantonly or recklessly engages in conduct that 
creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or 
sexual abuse to a child or wantonly or recklessly fails to 
take reasonable steps to alleviate such risk where there is 
a duty to act shall be punished . . . ."   
 
 
Section 13L defines "wanton or reckless" conduct as 
follows:   
 
"[S]uch wanton or reckless behavior occurs when a person is 
aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that his acts, or omissions where there 
is a duty to act, would result in serious bodily injury or 
sexual abuse to a child.  The risk must be of such nature 
and degree that disregard of the risk constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable 
person would observe in the situation."   
3 
 
probable cause to believe that the defendant, who was heavily 
intoxicated at the relevant time, had the mental state required 
to support the charge.  The judge dismissed the count of 
reckless endangerment.   
 
On appeal the Commonwealth argues that § 13L does not 
require proof of a defendant's subjective state of mind, but 
that, even if it did, sufficient evidence was presented in the 
application for the criminal complaint to establish probable 
cause to believe that the defendant had the requisite mental 
state.  We transferred the appeal to this court on our own 
motion, and now hold that the judge correctly stated the law, 
but that the order of dismissal must be vacated because the 
evidence presented met the threshold standard of probable cause.2   
 
1.  Background.  A police report was attached to the 
application for the criminal complaint.  We summarize the facts 
set forth in that report.  See Commonwealth v. Bell, 83 Mass. 
App. Ct. 61, 62 (2013) (motion to dismiss criminal complaint for 
lack of probable cause decided on four corners of complaint 
application, without evidentiary hearing).   
 
On August 19, 2013, at about 2:15 P.M., two Halifax police 
officers were sent to investigate a report of two individuals 
walking on the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support 
of the defendant.   
4 
 
train tracks.  They saw the defendant and his eleven year old 
son walking along the train tracks.  The MBTA was notified, and 
it slowed the scheduled train to allow the police time to get 
the defendant and his son off the tracks.   
 
The defendant was holding his son's hand for balance.  The 
boy was carrying two plastic bags containing personal effects.  
The boy made several efforts to keep his father from falling, 
but at one point the defendant fell on his back and landed 
between the tracks.  The officers noted that the defendant was 
visibly intoxicated.  A heavy odor of alcohol was detected on 
his breath.  When asked why they were on the tracks, the 
defendant said that he always walks on the tracks, and that he 
was "fucked up."  He also said he had had a few beers.  The 
officers escorted the defendant and his son off the tracks.  At 
no time did the defendant display an ability to walk on his own.   
 
2.  Discussion.  The Commonwealth contends that the police 
report attached to the application for the criminal complaint 
alleged sufficient facts to support the crime of reckless 
endangerment of a child.  Before issuing a complaint a judicial 
officer must find "sufficient evidence to establish the identity 
of the accused . . . and probable cause to arrest him" for the 
offense being charged.  Commonwealth v. Lester L., 445 Mass. 
250, 255-256 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 
5 
 
160, 163 (1982).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 3 (g) (2), as appearing 
in 442 Mass. 1502 (2004).   
 
"Probable cause [to arrest] exists where 'the facts and 
circumstances . . . [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
[person] of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense 
has been . . . committed."  Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 
169, 174 (1982), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 175-176 (1949).  "Probable cause requires more than mere 
suspicion," but it is considerably less demanding than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Hason, supra.  When applying this 
standard we are guided by the "factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonably prudent 
[people], not legal technicians, act."  Id., quoting Brinegar, 
supra at 175.   
 
The application for the complaint must establish probable 
cause as to each element of the offense.  Commonwealth v. 
Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 312 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Moran, 453 Mass. 880, 884 (2009).  Our review of a judge's 
determination of probable cause is de novo.  Commonwealth v. 
Long, 454 Mass. 542, 555 (2009).   
 
The elements of § 13L are (1) a child under age eighteen, 
(2) a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse, 
and (3) the defendant wantonly or recklessly (i) engaged in 
conduct that created the substantial risk, or (ii) failed to 
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take reasonable steps to alleviate that risk where a duty to act 
exists.  Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 462 Mass. 415, 422 (2012).  
There is no dispute that the defendant was adequately 
identified, or that his son was under age eighteen at the time.  
The disputed issues are the sufficiency of the evidence of a 
substantial risk of serious bodily injury, and the sufficiency 
of the evidence that the defendant wantonly or recklessly 
engaged in conduct that created such substantial risk.   
 
We first address the question of substantial risk of 
serious bodily injury.  The defendant contends that the risk of 
serious bodily injury to the defendant's son was not 
substantial, or even likely, but only a possibility.  He 
concedes that he did not make this argument below.  However, he 
contends that an appellate court "'may consider any ground 
apparent on the record that supports the result reached in the 
lower court.' . . .  Therefore, '[a] prevailing party is . . . 
entitled to argue on appeal that the judge was right for the 
wrong reason, even relying on a principle of law not argued 
below'" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 
Mass. 443, 455 (2002).   
 
"[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of 
the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
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imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Smith, 431 
Mass. 417, 421 (2000).  Section 13L does not define the words 
"substantial" or "risk," or the term "substantial risk."  
"Substantial" is defined as "real," "not imaginary," "sturdy," 
or "solid."  See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 
2280 (1961).  "Risk" is defined as "the possibility of loss [or] 
injury," and "danger, peril [or] threat."  See id. at 1961.  The 
term "substantial risk" can be understood to mean a "real or 
strong possibility."  We have said that in the context of § 13L 
a "substantial risk" means "a good deal more than a 
possibility."  Commonwealth v. Hendricks, 452 Mass. 97, 103 
(2008).  The risk also must be considered in conjunction with a 
particular degree of harm, namely "serious bodily injury."  
Section 13L explicates that "[t]he risk must be of such nature 
and degree that disregard of the risk constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person 
would observe in the situation."  Disregard of this risk 
requires a showing that is "substantially more than negligence."  
Hendricks, supra.   
 
Here, the evidence shows that the defendant was incapable 
of walking by himself, and that he was relying on his son to 
help him walk along the tracks.  If he were walking on the 
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tracks alone, his course of conduct would have been illegal, a 
matter that the defendant does not dispute.  Indeed, he does not 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence offered in support of 
the count in the complaint that alleges a violation of G. L. 
c. 160, § 218, the statute proscribing walking on railroad 
tracks.  By enlisting the aid of his son to violate this law, he 
encouraged the boy to violate the same law.  It is well known 
that "[a] railroad track is a place of danger, and one, 
unnecessarily and voluntarily going upon it or so near to it as 
to be in a position of peril, must take active measures of 
precaution."  Joyce v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 
301 Mass. 361, 365 (1938).  This alone constitutes a substantial 
risk of serious bodily injury, and a gross deviation from the 
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in 
the situation.  Matters did not improve.  At one point the 
defendant fell between the tracks.  Not only did he expose his 
son to the danger of walking alongside the tracks, but had a 
train approached while he was lying between the tracks, it is 
reasonably likely that the boy would have tried valiantly and 
desperately to remove his father to safety, thereby exacerbating 
the risk to his own safety and life.  We conclude that the 
evidence supports probable cause to believe that the defendant 
exposed his son to a risk that no reasonable person would have 
9 
 
permitted, namely, a substantial risk of serious personal 
injury.   
 
The next issue is whether § 13L requires proof of an 
accused's subjective state of mind.  The Commonwealth argues 
that the words "wantonly or recklessly" in § 13L take on their 
common-law meaning and do not require proof that the defendant 
intended the risk or was even subjectively aware of the risk.  
The Commonwealth relies on Levesque, 436 Mass. at 451-452, where 
this court said that "wanton or reckless" conduct, at least with 
respect to the common-law crime of manslaughter, is "intentional 
conduct . . . involv[ing] a high degree of likelihood that 
substantial harm will result to another," and "the risk [of 
injury contemplated by the statute] must be known or reasonably 
apparent, and the harm must be a probable consequence of the 
defendant's election to run that risk or of his failure 
reasonably to recognize it. . . .  Under Massachusetts law, 
recklessness has an objective component as well as a subjective 
component.  A defendant can be convicted . . . even if he was 
'so stupid [or] so heedless . . . that in fact he did not 
realize the grave danger . . . if an ordinary normal man under 
the same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the 
danger" (emphases added; citations omitted).  At common law a 
defendant need not be aware of the risk of injury, but the 
Commonwealth could show either that he was aware of the risk of 
10 
 
injury, or that he reasonably ought to have been aware of the 
risk.  That is, the Commonwealth could satisfy its proof by 
showing that an objectively reasonable person would have been 
aware of the risk.  The Commonwealth also relies on Commonwealth 
v. Figueroa, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 251, 259 (2013), where the 
Appeals Court applied the common-law meaning of "wanton or 
reckless" in construing § 13L.   
 
Section 13L differs from the common-law meaning of "wanton 
or reckless."  Section 13L is a crime created by the 
Legislature, and although the Legislature used the words "wanton 
or reckless," it expressly limited such conduct to circumstances 
where an accused "is aware of and consciously disregards" the 
risk.  G. L. c. 265, § 13L.  In these circumstances we ascertain 
a clearly expressed legislative intent to depart from the 
common-law meaning of the words "wanton or reckless."  See 
Commonwealth v. Burke, 392 Mass. 688, 690 (1984), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 495, 514 (1830).  The judge below 
correctly recognized that § 13L requires proof of the 
defendant's subjective state of mind with respect to the risk 
involved.  That is, he must be shown to have been actually aware 
of the risk.  Unlike the common-law meaning of "wanton or 
reckless," the Commonwealth does not have the option of proving 
a defendant's objective or subjective state of mind.   
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The Commonwealth next argues that the evidence was 
sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the 
defendant actually was aware of the risk.  It contends that the 
defendant's statement that he "always walked on the tracks" is 
evidence that he knew where he was, that he knew he was with his 
son because they were holding hands, and that he knew the youth 
was under age eighteen because the youth was his son.  Moreover, 
the defendant's statement that he was "fucked up" and had 
consumed a few beers is evidence that he was aware of his own 
condition and the cause of that condition.  From this evidence, 
as well as the defendant's stated familiarity with railroad 
tracks and the common knowledge that railroad tracks are 
dangerous places to be walking, the Commonwealth contends that 
this evidence establishes probable cause that the defendant 
"wantonly or recklessly" engaged in conduct that created a 
substantial risk of serious bodily injury to his eleven year old 
son within the meaning of § 13L.  Specifically, the Commonwealth 
contends that there is probable cause to believe that the 
defendant was "aware of and consciously disregard[ed] a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that his acts . . . would 
result in serious bodily injury . . . to a child."  G. L. 
c. 265, § 13L.  We agree.  The probable cause requirement, which 
is not particularly burdensome, was satisfied in this case.  We 
express no view as to the strength of the evidence at trial.   
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The order dismissing count two of the complaint is vacated, 
and the case is remanded for trial.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.