Title: Platte Development Co. v. State, Environmental Quality Council,

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Platte Development Co. v. State, Environmental Quality Council,1998 WY 136966 P.2d 972Case Number: 97-269Decided: 11/06/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

PLATTE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL; and 
Geoffrey Smith, et al., Appellees (Respondents).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, W. 
Thomas Sullins, J.

 

Thomas F. Reese and Jon B. 
Huss of Brown, Drew, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, Wyoming, for 
Appellant.

Terri A. Lorenzon, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming, for Appellee Environmental Quality Council.

Gary L. Shockey of Lawyers 
& Advocates for Wyoming, Jackson, Wyoming, for Appellees Smith, et 
al.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of oral argument and retired 
11/2/98.

 

TAYLOR, Justice, Retired.

 [¶1] Platte Development Company challenges the 
Environmental Quality Council's interpretation of the statutory definition of 
"overburden" found in Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-103(e)(iv) (1997) as applied to a small 
mine permit authorized by Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-401(j) (1997). Finding the 
Environmental Quality Council's interpretation consistent with the plain 
language of the statute, we affirm.

 

                                             
I. ISSUES

 

[¶2] Appellant, Platte 
Development Company (Platte), presents the following issues on 
appeal:

 

A. 
Whether the Wyoming Environmental Quality Council ("EQC") erred in interpreting 
the statutory definition of "overburden", in a manner inconsistent with the 
statutory and regulatory scheme, inconsistent with related statutory provisions, 
inconsistent with the EQC's own regulations, and inconsistent with the 
longstanding interpretation and practice of the Wyoming Department of 
Environmental Quality ("DEQ").

 

                    
1. Whether the EQC erred in determining that "topsoil" is "overburden" 
for purposes of Wyo. Stat. §

35-11-401(j) (1997), which prohibits a small mine 
operator from affecting more than 10,000 cubic yards of overburden per 
year.

 

B. 
Whether the EQC lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain objections to 
Platte's 1983 small mine permit - which deems topsoil separate and distinct from 
overburden - over a decade after the permit was issued and the appeals period 
had expired.

 

[¶3] Appellee, the 
Environmental Quality Council (EQC), phrases the issues as 
follows:

 

          
A. Did the EQC have subject matter jurisdiction over this 
dispute.

 

B. 
Did the EQC correctly interpret the statutory definition of the word 
"overburden" contained in the Environmental Quality Act (the Act) at Wyo. Stat., 
1997, § 35-11-103(e)(iv).

 

          
Appellees, Geoffrey Smith, et. al., do not offer a statement of issues in 
their brief.

 

                                             
II. FACTS

 

[¶4] The predecessor to 
Platte, also known as Platte Development Company (Old Platte), received a small 
mine permit in 1983 to mine for gravel in an area outside of Casper, Wyoming 
known as the Henrie Pit. Under the statutory restrictions governing a small mine 
permit, the operator is limited to the removal of 10,000 cubic yards of 
"overburden" each year. Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-401(j). At the time Old Platte 
submitted its application, the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) 
identified "topsoil" and "overburden" as separate components of the material 
which would be displaced during the mining process. In the report accompanying 
the permit, all the material above the 
gravel was identified as "topsoil," with Topsoil # 1 being the top one foot of 
material and Topsoil # 2 being all the salvageable material remaining above the 
gravel. The DEQ placed no annual volume limitation on the amount of topsoil 
which could be removed with a small mine permit.

 

[¶5] Old Platte extensively 
mined the Henrie Pit from 1983 through 1989, removing more than 10,000 cubic 
yards of "topsoil" each year. Between 1990 and 1995, operations were severely 
curtailed due to economic considerations. In 1995, however, the assets of Old 
Platte were purchased by 71 Construction and Tetral Corporation, which formed a 
new partnership also called Platte Development Company, the appellant in this 
case.

 

[¶6] Platte reinitiated 
aggressive mining operations under the same permit issued to Old Platte. Alarmed 
by the increased activity, the residents of the area, led by Geoffrey Smith, 
wrote letters of complaint to the DEQ. Learning that a new company was operating 
under the old permit, the DEQ required Platte to apply for a permit transfer. In 
response to the complaints, the DEQ conducted an inspection of the mine. By 
letter dated January 5, 1996, the DEQ issued its report that the mine was in 
compliance with relevant regulations, the operations had been sufficiently 
continuous so that the permit remained active, and the current operations did 
not constitute a public nuisance. On 
January 30, 1996, the DEQ approved the transfer of the mine permit. The 
complainants (Smith appellees) formally appealed the DEQ's decision to the EQC 
on February 1, 1996.

 

[¶7] By mid-April 1996, 
Platte had stripped over 18,000 cubic yards of topsoil and mined over 33,000 
tons of gravel. At the request of the Smith appellees, the DEQ director reviewed 
the initial report, and on June 10, 1996, the director issued a decision 
affirming the earlier findings. Shortly thereafter, the Smith appellees amended 
their appeal to the EQC to include a claim that Platte's operations violated the 
10,000 cubic yard overburden limit for a small mine. The Smith appellees argued 
that the DEQ erroneously failed to require that the "topsoil" removed in the mining 
operations be included in the calculation of "overburden."

 

[¶8] The EQC held a lengthy 
contested case hearing on the numerous issues raised by the Smith appellees, and 
issued its order on June 25, 1997. While the EQC affirmed many of the DEQ's 
decisions in favor of Platte, the EQC determined that topsoil is included in the 
term "overburden" for the purposes of compliance with the restrictions 
pertaining to small mines. Platte timely appealed only that portion of the EQC's 
ruling, and the district court then certified the case to this court pursuant to 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(b). The issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised by Platte 
for the first time on appeal.

 

                                      
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶9] Questions of 
jurisdiction are reviewed de novo pursuant to " 'the inherent power, and the 
duty, to address jurisdictional defects on appeal * * *.' " Sheridan Retirement 
Partners v. City of Sheridan, 950 P.2d 554, 556 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Pawlowski 
v. Pawlowski, 925 P.2d 240, 242 (Wyo. 1996) and Gookin v. State Farm Fire and 
Cas. Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1992)). The absence of subject matter 
jurisdiction in a district court cannot be waived, and this court can have no 
greater jurisdiction of the subject matter than the district court. Sheridan 
Retirement Partners, 950 P.2d  at 556. Where the district court is without 
jurisdiction in an administrative appeal 
from an agency, this court must dismiss the appeal. Id.

 

[¶10] Review of a case 
before us pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09 is conducted in accord with Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114(c) (1997). Absent evidentiary dispute, the standard of review is simply 
stated as whether an agency's conclusions are in accordance with law. Parodi v. 
Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 947 P.2d 1294, 1295 (Wyo. 1997). Our review of 
statutory interpretation begins with an inquiry into the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed by the legislature according to the manner in 
which those words are arranged.  
Id.; Sheridan Commercial Park, Inc. v. Briggs, 848 P.2d 811, 815 (Wyo. 
1993). If more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we resort to general 
principles of statutory construction. Moncrief v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Equalization, 856 P.2d 440, 444 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Parker Land and Cattle Co. 
v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Wyo. 1993)). When the 
legislature has spoken in unambiguous terms, however, "we are bound to the 
results so expressed." State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. 
Bergeron, 948 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Wyo. 1997).

 

                                           
IV. DISCUSSION

 

A. SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION

 

[¶11] As an initial matter, 
we turn to Platte's contention that the EQC was without subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the decision of the DEQ. Platte begins with 
the premise that the timely filing of an appeal from agency action is mandatory 
and jurisdictional. Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, 589 P.2d 1295, 
1301 (Wyo. 1979). Platte then notes that the DEQ's rules and regulations require 
an objection to the issuance of a permit to mine be registered within sixty days 
of issuance. DEQ Noncoal Rules and Regulations, Chapter I, Section 16(a) (1993). 
Platte concludes that, because the original mine permit contemplated the removal 
of over 10,000 cubic yards of topsoil and no objection was made within sixty 
days of its issuance, the scope of the 
permit is now unassailable.

 

[¶12] This argument 
misstates the subject matter of the appeal before the EQC. The issue was not the 
issuance of the permit, but whether the DEQ's interpretation of "overburden" was 
impermissible under the statutory definition. It is axiomatic that an agency has 
and may properly exercise only those powers authorized by the legislature. U S 
West Communications, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service Com'n, 958 P.2d 371, 374 
(Wyo. 1998) (quoting Tri County Telephone Ass'n, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service 
Com'n, 910 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Wyo. 1996)); Preferred Energy Properties v. Wyoming 
State Bd. of Equalization, 890 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Wyo. 1995); Hupp v. Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming, 715 P.2d 223, 225 (Wyo. 1986). An agency is wholly without power to modify, dilute 
or change in any way the statutory provisions from which it derives its 
authority. When an administrative agency takes an action that exceeds its 
authority or proceeds in a manner unauthorized by law, that action is null and 
void. Triska v. Department of Health and Environmental Control, 292 S.C. 190, 
355 S.E.2d 531, 533 (1987). As a result, Platte may not rely on the DEQ's 
interpretation of "overburden" if it does not comport with the language of the 
statute.

 

[¶13] The EQC is the body 
established by the Wyoming legislature to hear and decide disputes arising from 
the implementation of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act (the Act). The EQC 
is to "[c]onduct hearings in any case contesting the administration or 
enforcement of any law, rule, regulation, standard or order issued or 
administered by the [DEQ] or any division thereof[.]" Wyo. Stat. § 
35-11-112(a)(iii) (1997). Thus, the EQC is the appropriate body with subject 
matter jurisdiction over a review of the DEQ's interpretation of the law 
governing the permitting and operation of small mines.

 

                                   
B. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

 

[¶14] At issue in this case 
is the interpretation of the statutory definition of "overburden" as applied to 
small mines. Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-103(e)(iv) provides:

 

"Overburden" means all of the earth and other 
materials which lie above the mineral deposit and also means such earth and 
other material disturbed from their natural state in the process of mining, or 
mining from exposed natural deposits[.]

 

This definition must be 
interpreted in light of the Act as a whole. The Act designates three general 
categories for the permitting of mines, depending on the area and volume of 
affected land; the large mine, the small mine, and the exempt mine. The 
standard, or large, mine has no statutory limit on the amount of "overburden" 
which may be disturbed, but it is subject to the most extensive permitting 
requirements. See Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-406 (1997). On the other end of the 
spectrum is what is known as an "exempt" mine. An exempt mine is excused from 
most permitting requirements, but must produce specific minerals and have ten 
acres or less of affected land at any one time. Wyo. Stat. § 
35-11-401(e)(vi).

 

[¶15] In the middle is the 
"small" mine, created by Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-401(j). This provision states, in 
relevant part:

 

The [EQC] * * * may modify or suspend certain 
requirements of W.S. 35-11-406(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) by rules and 
regulations, for surface mining operations involving not more than ten thousand 
(10,000) yards of overburden and ten (10) acres of affected land in any one (1) 
year, if the application requirements insure reclamation in accordance with the 
purposes of this act.

 

Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-401(j). 
Unlike an exempt mine, a small mine is not limited to ten acres of affected land 
at any one time, but may affect ten acres each year. This means that open or 
disturbed lands may expand every year, with reclamation required only when all 
recoverable materials have been exhausted from any mined area. For example, 
under the Henrie Pit permit in excess of thirty-three acres have been mined, but 
only three and one-half acres have been reclaimed.

 

[¶16] Prior to the EQC's 
decision, the DEQ followed industry custom in distinguishing "topsoil" from 
"overburden." "Overburden," as used in the industry and applied by the DEQ, 
means material other than topsoil or material which is synonymous with "spoil." 
In contrast, "topsoil" is defined as "soil on the surface prior to mining that 
will support plant life[.]" Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-103(e)(xiv). This definition is 
pivotal in the regulatory scheme governing reclamation efforts in the mining 
process because topsoil must be separately preserved and managed. Thus, in accord with industry 
usage, the DEQ did not include "topsoil" when calculating the "overburden" 
restrictions in the annual operations of a small mine.

 

[¶17] On appeal to the EQC, 
however, the EQC found that the plain language in the statutory definition of 
"overburden" clearly and unambiguously included topsoil, and therefore, Platte 
must include topsoil in the calculation of the amount of "overburden" disturbed 
each year at its mine. Platte argues that the language is not unambiguous 
because other provisions of the Act and DEQ regulations use the term 
"overburden" in the same context as it is used in the industry. Platte further 
argues that the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the DEQ interpretation, 
because to include "topsoil" as part of "overburden" would undermine or 
hopelessly confuse the reclamation 
provisions of the Act.

 

[¶18] " 'For some forty 
years, this court has espoused and followed, frequently, the rule that we do not 
resort to rules of statutory construction and interpretation when the language 
of a statute is plain and unambiguous.' " Bergeron, 948 P.2d  at 1369 (quoting 
City of Cheyenne v. Reiman Corp., 869 P.2d 125, 127-28 (Wyo. 1994)); Newton v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 922 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 1996). 
The statutory definition of "overburden" could not be more clear, and we are not 
persuaded that "all of the earth and other materials" does not mean exactly what 
it says. Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-103(e)(iv).

 

[¶19] After careful review 
of the statutory provisions regarding "topsoil" and "overburden," we must agree 
with the EQC in its finding that, reading the Act as a whole, the inclusion of 
"topsoil" as a subset of "overburden" is merely effectuating the plain language 
of the statute. Contrary to Platte's predictions, this interpretation does not 
herald a breakdown in reclamation efforts in Wyoming. The statutory provisions 
regarding the handling of the specific substance, "topsoil," permit that 
substance to be distinguished from the more general term, "overburden," for the 
purposes of the reclamation provisions. Indeed, the Administrator of the DEQ 
Land Quality Division testified that any confusion over conflicting references 
in the DEQ's regulations can be resolved.

 

[¶20] We also find that the 
EQC's interpretation advances the legislative intent to restrict small mines in 
both area and quantity of land affected. If these restrictions are economically 
unrealistic, as the DEQ maintains, then it is up to the legislature to address 
this concern and determine any appropriate alterations to the current statutory 
definition of "overburden."

 

                                          
V. CONCLUSION

 

[¶21] The EQC has subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear allegations of an unlawful policy in the 
administration of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, and correctly 
determined that the plain and unambiguous definition of "overburden" 
unquestionably includes topsoil. The order of the EQC is 
affirmed.