Title: Milligan v. Big Valley Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Milligan v. Big Valley Corp.1988 WY 71754 P.2d 1063Case Number: 87-59Decided: 05/17/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
ELIZABETH MILLIGAN, AS 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AND THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF DEAN KEVEN 
GRIFFIN, DECEASED, AND ON BEHALF OF JOHN MATTHEW BROCK MILLIGAN, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

BIG VALLEY CORPORATION, A 
WYOMING CORPORATION D/B/A GRAND TARGHEE SKI RESORT, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT), IRA 
KOPLOW (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

Jeffrey A. 
Tennyson (argued), and Robert N. Williams, Jackson, for appellant.

Roger E. Shumate 
(argued), and W. Henry Combs, III of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Elizabeth 
Milligan, as personal representative of the estate of Dean Griffin, brought this 
wrongful death action against Big Valley Corporation d/b/a Grand Targhee Ski 
Resort, alleging negligence and willful and wanton misconduct in organizing, 
sponsoring and coordinating a ski race as part of the Ironman Decathlon. Summary 
judgment was entered in favor of appellee, predicated upon a release signed by 
the decedent prior to the ski race. This appeal is from the summary 
judgment.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises two 
issues on appeal:

I. Whether the release in 
question violates public policy and is therefore invalid and 
unenforceable.

II. Whether the trial 
court correctly granted summary judgment to appellee in light of the allegation 
that appellee was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct.

[¶3.]     We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶4.]     The appellant's 
decedent, Dean Griffin, entered an Ironman Decathlon at the Grand Targhee Ski 
Resort in Alta, Wyoming, on April 13, 1985. Grand Targhee is 
solely owned and operated by Big Valley Corporation, a Wyoming corporation, 
doing business as Grand Targhee Ski Resort. The decathlon was sponsored and 
organized by several individuals for fun and not for profit; there was no 
advertising or financial sponsors. The decathlon consisted of several events, 
including swimming five pool laps, bowling one line, drinking a quart of beer, 
throwing darts, and both downhill and cross-country ski 
races.

[¶5.]     The first event in the 
decathlon was the downhill ski race. The race was held early in the morning 
before the ski resort was opened to the public. The only skiers on the mountain 
at that time were those participating in the race. The race was run under 
extremely hard and icy snow conditions. No course was marked for the 
contestants; thus, they could take any way down the mountain they chose. The 
race was begun with a "La Mans" start, whereby the skiers removed their skis and 
left them at a distance up the mountain. Once the race started, the racers ran 
up to their skis, scattered for confusion's sake, put them on, and began the 
descent to the finish line. There were no speed gates, hay barriers, or safety 
nets used in the race. Nor were the racers required to wear safety 
helmets.

[¶6.]     Prior to the race, and 
in consideration of being allowed to enter the downhill race portion of the 
decathlon, all of the downhill contestants, including Mr. Griffin, were required 
to sign a document entitled "General Release of Claim," which 
provided:

"The undersigned does 
hereby acknowledge that he/she ____ has under the auspices of Targhee Resort at 
his free and voluntary will, and and [sic] further acknowledges that he 
understands and appreciates the risks and hazards as a participant of IRONMAN 
DECATLON [sic] and that there is a possibility of personal 
injury.

"In consideration of my 
being allowed to participate in IRONMAN DECATLON [sic] at Targhee Resort, Alta, 
Wyoming, I irrevocably and forever hereby release and discharge Targhee Resort 
and the other sponsors of and any and all of the employees, agents or servants 
and owners of Targhee Resort and the other sponsors of IRONMAN DECATLON [sic] 
officially connected with this event of and from any and all legal claims or 
legal liability of any kind, nature and description involving or relating to 
bodily injury or death suffered or sustained by me, or any property damage of 
mine, during my stay at Targhee Resort.

"I hereby personally 
assume all risks in connection with said event and I further release the 
aforementioned resort, its agents, and operators, including but not limited to 
persons not mentioned, for any harm, injury or damage which might befall me as a 
participant in this event including all risks connected therewith, whether 
foreseen or unforeseen and further save and hold harmless said resort and 
persons from any claim by me or my family, estate, Heirs or 
assigns.

"/s/ Dean Griffin 4/13/84 
Participant's Signature Date"

[¶7.]     Prior to the race, a 
ski patrol member inspected and skied the run. He radioed to the top of the hill 
that the snow was extremely hard, icy, and fast and that there were some rough 
areas in the lower section of the run. The rough areas were marked with skis, 
and the skiers were informed of the conditions of the run at least five or six 
times before the race began. The skiers were also warned that the race was just 
for fun and that anyone taking it too seriously would be 
disqualified.

[¶8.]     About ten minutes after 
the race began, the decedent Griffin, an experienced expert skier and a 
certified ski instructor at the Jackson Hole ski area, was found unconscious 
approximately 3/4 of the way down the mountain. Mr. Griffin never regained 
consciousness and was pronounced dead a few hours later by the Teton County 
Coroner's office. No one witnessed the incident that resulted in Mr. Griffin's 
death. It was speculated that he lost control of his skis, fell, hit a tree or 
trees, and suffered fatal injuries. At least three other race participants also 
lost control of their skis at approximately the same place where Mr. Griffin's 
accident occurred.

[¶9.]     Appellant, Elizabeth 
Milligan, as personal representative for and administratrix of the estate of 
Dean Griffin, commenced this wrongful death action on behalf of Dean Griffin's 
son, John Matthew B. Milligan, against appellee, alleging negligence and willful 
and wanton misconduct on the part of appellee in organizing, sponsoring, and 
coordinating the ski race competition. The district court, finding that the 
release signed by Dean Griffin released appellee from all liability, granted 
summary judgment to appellee.

DISCUSSION

[¶10.]  There is no dispute that the release in 
question was signed by the decedent. However, appellant argues that the 
exculpatory language contained in the release is invalid because it is contrary 
to Wyoming's 
public policy. Exculpatory agreements, releasing parties from negligence 
liability for damages or injury, are valid and enforceable in Wyoming if they do not 
violate public policy. Schutkowski v. Carey, Wyo., 
725 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1986). "Generally, specific agreements absolving 
participants and proprietors from negligence liability during hazardous 
recreational activities are enforceable, subject to willful misconduct 
limitations." Id.

[¶11.]  Exculpatory agreements, also referred to 
as releases, are contractual in nature. Kelliher v. Herman, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1157, 1159 (1985). 
Interpretation and construction of contractual agreements are questions of law 
for the court to decide. Schutkowski v. Carey, supra; Amoco Production Company 
v. Stauffer Chemical Company of Wyoming, 
Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 (1980).

[¶12.]  This court recently addressed the issue 
of the validity and enforceability of a release in Schutkowski v. Carey, supra. 
In Schutkowski, a skydiving student brought a negligence action against her 
instructors after being injured during her first jump. This court held that a 
release signed by the student prior to her injuries excused her instructors from 
any liability for negligence. In reaching this holding, we adopted the four-part 
test found in Jones v. Dressel, Colo., 623 P.2d 370 (1981), to determine 
whether this type of release is valid and enforceable. This four-part test is 
applicable here. Thus, we consider:

"(1) [Whether there 
exists] a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service performed; (3) 
whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the intention of 
the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language." Id. at 
376.

[¶13.]  A duty to the public exists if the nature 
of the business or service affects the public interest and the service performed 
is considered an essential service. Thus, our first inquiry is whether 
sponsoring, coordinating, and organizing a ski race is a business or service 
affecting the public interest and is considered an essential service demanding a 
public duty.

[¶14.]  A release agreement affecting the public 
interest, giving rise to a public duty, has been described as one 
that

"concerns a business of a 
type generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party seeking 
exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is 
often a matter of practical necessity 
for some members of the public. The party holds himself out as willing to 
perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it * * *. As a 
result of the essential nature of the 
service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking 
exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any 
member of the public who seeks his services." (Emphasis added and footnotes 
omitted.) Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 
383 P.2d 441, 445-46, 6 A.L.R.3d 693 (1963).

Types of 
services thought to be subject to public regulation, and therefore demanding a 
public duty or considered essential, have included common carriers, hospitals 
and doctors, (see Tunkl, supra, in which the California court held that an 
agreement between a hospital and an entering patient affects the public 
interest), public utilities, innkeepers, public warehousemen, employers, and 
services involving extra-hazardous activities. Malecha v. St. CroixValley Skydiving Club, Minn.App., 392 N.W.2d 727, 730 (1986). Generally, a private recreational business does not 
qualify as a service demanding a 
special duty to the public, nor are its services of a special, highly necessary 
or essential nature. Schutkowski v. Carey, supra 725 P.2d  at 1060, citing Jones 
v. Dressel, supra 623 P.2d 370. Further, contracts relating to recreational 
activities do not fall within any of the categories above where the public 
interest is involved. Malecha, supra.

[¶15.]  The type of "business" contemplated by 
the Tunkl court is not the type at issue in this case. The Tunkl court 
envisioned a type of business that "each member of the public, presently or 
potentially, may find essential to him * * *." 383 P.2d  at 447. The sponsoring 
of an "Ironman Decathlon" can hardly be deemed of great importance to the public 
or essential to individual members of the public. The Ironman Decathlon can best 
be labeled a recreational type of activity of no great public 
import.

[¶16.]  The agreement in question does not 
involve severe disparity of bargaining power, the third Schutkowski criteria. A 
disparity of bargaining power will be found when a contracting party with little 
or no bargaining strength has no reasonable alternative to entering the contract 
at the mercy of the other's negligence. For example, a member of the public 
contracting with a public utility, common carrier, hospital or employer often 
has no real choice or alternative and is, therefore, at the mercy of the other 
party. Springer, Releases: An Added Measure of Protection from Liability, 39 
Baylor L.Rev. 487, 493 (1987). Such is not the case here. Grand Targhee did not 
force Dean Griffin to ski in the race. Griffin could have chosen not to race. Skiing 
in the race was not a matter of practical necessity for the public, and putting 
on the race was not an essential service. Nor was skiing in the race the only 
reasonable alternative. Thus, no decisive bargaining advantage or disadvantage 
existed. Further, no evidence suggests that the decedent was unfairly pressured 
into signing the agreement or that he was deprived of an opportunity to 
understand its implications.

[¶17.]  Appellant argues that the release was 
entered into unfairly because it contained boiler plate language prepared solely 
by the resort and was an adhesive contract. The argument is without merit. The 
mere fact that a contract is on a printed form prepared by one party and offered 
on a "take it or leave it" basis does not automatically establish it as an 
adhesive contract. Matter of Estate of Frederick, Wyo., 599 P.2d 550, 557 
(1979); Clinic Masters, Inc. v. District Court In and For County of El Paso, 192 
Colo. 120, 556 P.2d 473, 475 (1976). There must be a showing that the parties 
were greatly disparate in bargaining power and that there was no opportunity for 
negotiation for services which could not be obtained elsewhere. Clinic Masters, 
Inc., supra at 476. Here no such showing was made. Indeed, the evidence is to 
the contrary. This was not a contract of adhesion. The release was fairly 
executed and satisfies the first three criteria from Schutkowski v. Carey, 
supra, for validity.

[¶18.]  The final Schutkowski factor requires us 
to determine whether the release agreement evidences the parties' intent to 
release appellee from liability for negligent acts in clear and unambiguous 
language. Schutkowski v. Carey, supra 725 P.2d  at 1060. "The parties' intentions 
are determined by giving effect to all of the contract language." Id. at 1061; Sunburst Exploration, Inc. v. Jensen, Wyo., 635 P.2d 822 (1981). We interpret the 
contract considering the meaning of the document as a whole. Kost v. First 
National Bank of Greybull, 
Wyo., 684 P.2d 819 (1984). Common 
sense is a basic characteristic of contract interpretation. Schutkowski, supra 
at 1062, citing Marathon Oil Co. v. Kleppe, 407 F. Supp. 1301 (D.Wyo. 1975), 
aff'd 556 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1977).

[¶19.]  Appellant first argues that the release 
is ambiguous in not specifically naming appellee Big Valley Corporation in the 
document. An ambiguous contract is one

"capable of being 
understood in more ways than one. It is an agreement which is obscure in its 
meaning, because of indefiniteness of expression, or because a double meaning is 
present." Bulis v. Wells, Wyo., 565 P.2d 487, 490 (1977). See also 
Western Utility Contractors, Inc. v. City of Casper, Wyo., 731 P.2d 24 
(1986).

The absence of 
the words "Big Valley Corporation" in the release does not create an ambiguity. 
The release states:

"I irrevocably and 
forever hereby release and discharge Targhee Resort and the other sponsors of 
and any and all of the employees, agents or servants and owners of Targhee 
Resort and the other sponsors of IRONMAN DECATLON [sic] officially connected 
with this event of and from any and all legal claims or legal liability of any 
kind, nature and description involving or relating to bodily injury or death 
suffered or sustained by me, or any property damage of mine, during my stay at 
Targhee Resort." (Emphasis added.)

[¶20.]  The language could not be clearer. 
Examining the release in light of the purpose of the contract, it is clear that 
the parties intended to release the ski resort and all those involved in the 
Ironman Decathlon from liability. While Big Valley Corporation is not 
specifically named in the release, it is included in the words "owners of 
Targhee Resort and the other sponsors." Big Valley Corporation is the owner and 
operator of Grand Targhee Ski Resort. Grand Targhee Ski Resort and Big Valley 
Corporation are not separate entities; rather they are one and the same entity. 
The release clearly envisioned releasing Big Valley 
Corporation.

[¶21.]  Appellant also argues that the language 
of the release is too broad and ambiguous to release appellee, Big Valley 
Corporation, even if appellee had been specifically named in the document. 
Considering all of the language of the release in context, it is clear that the 
intent was to release appellee from negligence liability. The release expressly 
states that the signor

"acknowledges that he 
understands and appreciates the risks and hazards as a participant of IRONMAN 
DECATLON [sic] and that there is a possibility of personal injury * * * [and] 
irrevocably and forever hereby release[s] and discharge[s] Targhee Resort * * * 
and owners of Targhee Resort and the other sponsors of IRONMAN DECATLON [sic] * 
* * from any and all legal claims or 
legal liability of any kind * * * for any harm, injury or damage * * * 
whether foreseen or unforeseen * * * and hold harmless said resort and persons 
from any claim * * *." (Emphasis added.)

[¶22.]  The language focuses particular attention 
on the unconditional nature of the release. It specifically and repeatedly 
exempts appellee from any responsibility for potential "legal claims or legal 
liability of any kind * * * whether foreseen or unforeseen." Although the 
release does not contain the word "negligence," we held in Schutkowski, supra, 
that "the absence of the word `negligence' is not fatal to an exculpatory clause 
* * * if the terms of the contract clearly show intent to extinguish liability." 
Schutkowski, supra 725 P.2d  at 1061. It is difficult to envision any other 
intent of the parties than to release appellee from liability for negligence, 
considering the release language. If this were not the intent, there would be 
little purpose in the release at all.

[¶23.]  Appellant's second argument is that there 
exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether appellee was guilty of 
willful and wanton misconduct. The well-established standard of review for 
summary judgment appeals is:

"`When reviewing a 
summary judgment on appeal, we review the judgment in the same light as the 
district court, using the same information. A party moving for summary judgment 
has the burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Material fact has been defined as one which, if proved, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense 
asserted by the parties. Upon examination of a summary judgment, we view the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 
giving him all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts.'" 
(Citations omitted.) England 
v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137, 1141 (1986) (quoting from Garner v. 
Hickman, Wyo., 709 P.2d 407 (1985)). See also 
Schutkowski v. Carey, supra.

Where willful 
and wanton misconduct is shown, an otherwise valid release is unenforceable. 
Schutkowski v. Carey, supra.

[¶24.]  In Weaver v. Mitchell, Wyo., 715 P.2d 1361, 1370 (1986), this court 
defined willful and wanton misconduct as follows:

"Willful and wanton 
misconduct is the intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure to do 
an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences and under circumstances and 
conditions that a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know that such 
conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in harm to 
another."

See also 
Danculovich v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187, 191 (1979), wherein we 
said that willful and wanton misconduct was

"that which tends to take 
on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, or an extreme departure from 
ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent. It is 
not with the intent to cause injury or damage, but it must be more than mere 
mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement or confusion, and more than mere 
thoughtlessness or inadventure, or simple inattention."

[¶25.]  We affirmed summary judgment because of 
the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding willful 
misconduct in Bryant v. Hornbuckle, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1132 (1986). In Bryant, a 
worker applied heat with a butane torch to a frozen valve on a water truck, 
resulting in an explosion. He brought an action against the foreman who 
instructed him on the use of the butane torch thawing method. The foreman 
produced evidence sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing that there was 
no genuine issue of material fact on the question of willful misconduct. This 
showing being unrefuted by appellant, we upheld summary judgment in favor of 
appellee. Id. 
at 1137.

[¶26.]  Applying the Weaver definition to this 
case, Big Valley Corporation is guilty of willful and wanton misconduct only if 
it deliberately acted, or failed to act, in reckless disregard of the 
consequences or in a manner that evidenced a high degree of probability that 
harm would result to others. Here, upon the undisputed facts presented, it is 
clear that appellee did not act in utter disregard of consequences but was 
concerned for the safety of the participants. Appellee attempted to protect the 
racers from danger by inspecting the likely course, including the course where 
the decedent was killed, by grooming the course, by allowing the race at a time 
when the public would not be present on the mountain, by having someone ski the 
course to assess the snow conditions, and by announcing warnings regarding the 
conditions to all of the racers prior to the race. Appellant states that there 
were no safety nets or speed gates used. No marked course was set up. The racers 
were started in a group rather than in timed intervals, and no helmets were 
provided or required. True, the race was not down a marked course; thus there 
were no speed gates, safety nets, or timed intervals. Nothing is presented that 
indicates a requirement that the race must be down a marked course or timed. The 
participants knew that the race was not down a marked course, that it was a "La 
Mans" start, and that they might be disqualified if they did other than just ski 
down the hill for fun.

[¶27.]  Granting all favorable inferences from 
these facts to appellant, they are insufficient to establish that appellee was 
guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. The undisputed facts show that safety 
was of concern to appellee and that specific steps were taken for the safety of 
the racers. While appellant posits an alternate conclusion, the record contains 
no evidence which demonstrates an extreme departure from ordinary care or 
reckless disregard of the consequences.

[¶28.]  We conclude that the release is not void 
as a matter of public policy, that there is no genuine issue of material fact, 
and that appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court 
properly granted summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.

THOMAS, J., files a specially 
concurring opinion.

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶29.]  I concur in the opinion of the court in 
this case because the majority position in Schutkowski v. Carey, Wyo., 725 P.2d 1057 
(1986), now is the law in Wyoming. The doctrine of stare decisis demands 
concurrence, but I have not receded from my position in Schutkowski v. Carey, 
supra, that a more appropriate and fair rule would require the use of the word 
"negligence" in an exculpatory agreement like this one.