Title: Harris v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DARNELL E. HARRIS,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 502, 2000
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN94-09-1663,1664
§        1666,1710-1712,1740,1741
§
Submitted: March 20, 2001
  Decided:   April 25, 2001
Before WALSH, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices
O R D E R
This 25th day of April 2001, upon consideration of the briefs on
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Darnell E. Harris, filed this appeal
from an order of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction
relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find no merit to
the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2)
In this appeal, Harris claims that: i) his multiple convictions
for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were not
authorized by statute; ii) his convictions for both first degree and second
2
degree conspiracy constituted double jeopardy; iii) his constitutional rights
were violated by the Superior Court’s misleading and confusing jury
instruction on accomplice liability; and iv) his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance.
(3)
In 1996, Harris was convicted by a Superior Court jury of
Conspiracy in the First Degree, Reckless Endangerment in the First
Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, three counts of Possession of a
Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Murder in the Second
Degree and Riot.  He was sentenced to a lengthy prison term.  This Court
affirmed Harris’ convictions and sentences on direct appeal.1
(4)
When reviewing a motion under Rule 61, this Court must first
determine that the motion satisfies the procedural requirements of the rule
before addressing any substantive issues.2  Harris’ first and second claims
were not raised either in the proceedings below or on direct appeal.  As
such, they are procedurally barred.3  Moreover, Harris has failed to
overcome the procedural bar by showing either cause for relief from the
                                                          
1Harris v. State, Del. Supr., 695 A.2d 34 (1997).
2Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991).
3Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3).
3
procedural default and prejudice from a violation of his rights4 or a
colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a
constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality,
reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment
of conviction.5  This Court has ruled that separate convictions for each
felony a defendant commits while in possession of a deadly weapon is
consistent with the deterrence goal of 11 Del. C. § 1447 and is supported
by its plain language.6  Furthermore, this Court has ruled that such
convictions are constitutionally permissible.7   Also, it was not improper
for Harris to be convicted under 11 Del. C. § 521(a) of two separate
conspiracies in connection with two separate criminal offenses, where the
evidence showed that the crimes were not the object of the same
agreement.8  Harris’ third claim was decided by this Court in his direct
appeal and, therefore, is procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated.9
                                                          
4Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (3) (A), (B).
5Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (5).
6Robertson v. State, Del. Supr., 630 A.2d 1084, 1092-93 (1993).
7Evans v. State, Del. Supr., 430 A.2d 481, 482 (1981); Evans v. State, Del. Supr., 445
A.2d 932, 933 (1982).
8Liu v. State, Del. Supr., 628 A.2d 1376, 1387-88 (1993).
9Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).
4
Moreover, there is nothing in the record to suggest that reconsideration of
the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.10
(5)
In order to overcome the procedural bars to his first three
claims, Harris also claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance.  This claim is without merit.  In order to prevail on his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, Harris must show that his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.11  Although
not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads
to a “strong presumption that the representation was professionally
reasonable.”12  Harris has failed to demonstrate any basis for his claim that
error on the part of his counsel resulted in prejudice to him.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
                                                          
10Id.
11Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
12Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753 (1990).
5
/s/ Randy J. Holland
Justice