Title: Marsh v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NATHANIEL MARSH, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§    No. 468, 2018 
§     
§ 
§    Court Below—Superior Court 
§    of the State of Delaware 
§   
§   Cr. ID Nos. 1707006525,  
§                       1707006527 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  March 18, 2019 
   Decided:  May 3, 2019 
 
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
After consideration of the no-merit brief and motion to withdraw filed by the 
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the 
Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In September 2017, the appellant, Nathaniel Marsh, was indicted on 
multiple counts of burglary, conspiracy, theft, and other charges arising from a series 
of residential break-ins that occurred in June and July 2017.  After a three-day trial, 
a jury found Marsh guilty of one count of Conspiracy Second Degree relating to a 
burglary at a property on Heritage Court Drive and found him guilty of one count of 
Conspiracy Second Degree, one count of Burglary Second Degree, one count of 
Theft, and one count of Criminal Mischief relating to a break-in at a property on 
 
2 
Talbot Drive.  The jury found Marsh not guilty of burglary and other charges relating 
to the Heritage Court break-in and two break-ins at a property on Carvel Avenue.  
After granting the State’s motion to declare Marsh an habitual offender, the Superior 
Court sentenced Marsh to a total of nine years of Level V incarceration, followed by 
probation.  This is Marsh’s direct appeal. 
(2) 
The charges arose from burglaries of three residences.1  Melissa Biddle 
testified, as a condition of a plea agreement, that Marsh was her boyfriend and that 
they committed the burglaries together.  The residents of each of the properties also 
testified, and the State presented a variety of corroborating circumstantial evidence, 
including photographs and video footage, text messages, and other evidence. 
(3) 
On June 5, 2017, Biddle had been living at an apartment located on 
Carvel Avenue.  The apartment was occupied by Opal Senior, an acquaintance of 
Biddle’s who was out of the apartment for long periods of time because he worked 
two full-time jobs.  Senior had provided Biddle with a key to the apartment.  Biddle 
testified that she and Marsh used the key to enter the apartment and steal Senior’s 
laptop computer and gun ammunition.  Two hours later, they returned to the site and 
Marsh went into the apartment and stole a gun safe, which contained a gun, 
checkbooks, and other items belonging to Senior.  The following day, they returned 
to the apartment and threw a brick through the window, so that it would not appear 
                                                 
1 Marsh was also indicted on charges arising from a burglary of a fourth residence, but the State 
dropped those charges after the resident of the property died before trial. 
 
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that Biddle was involved.  The jury acquitted Marsh of all charges relating to the 
Carvel Avenue incident. 
(4) 
On June 27, 2017, Marsh and Biddle developed a plan to steal property 
from another acquaintance of Biddle’s, Carroll Carter, who lived in an apartment on 
Heritage Court Drive.  Biddle called Carter and asked him if he would do her a favor 
by meeting an acquaintance of hers at a nearby McDonald’s in order to pick up some 
clothing.  Carter agreed.  He waited at McDonald’s for more than an hour.  During 
the time he was waiting, he spoke with Biddle to ask when the acquaintance would 
arrive, and he spoke with a man who said he was on his way.  The man never arrived.  
While Carter was out, Biddle and Marsh cut a window screen, entered Carter’s 
apartment, and stole a television and a video game console.  Ashley Parham testified 
that she was with Biddle and Marsh when Biddle and Marsh went into Carter’s 
apartment building through a window and stole a television and a video game 
console; she further testified that she heard them making phone calls before they 
went to Carter’s apartment.  The jury found Marsh guilty of Conspiracy Second 
Degree and found him not guilty of Burglary Second Degree and Theft charges 
relating to the Heritage Court Drive burglary. 
(5) 
A few days later, Marsh and Biddle developed a plan to steal property 
from Karen Hess and Bill Hallock, who lived in a house on Talbot Drive.  Biddle 
testified that she and Hess were best friends, and Biddle knew that Hess was in a 
hospital in New Jersey recovering from surgery.  On July 1, 2017, Biddle visited 
 
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Hess and Hallock’s home and learned from Hallock that he would be leaving soon 
to visit Hess in the hospital.  Biddle and Marsh watched Hallock leave the house and 
followed him in their car to make sure that he was driving toward the bridge to New 
Jersey.  Biddle and Marsh then returned to the house, backed into the driveway, 
jumped over the backyard fence, broke into the house, and stole televisions, video 
game consoles, a computer tablet, a jar containing loose change, credit cards, and an 
assortment of collectible coins, including Civil War era coins.   
(6) 
While Biddle and Marsh were loading the stolen property into the car, 
a neighbor saw them.  When the neighbor attempted to confront them, they drove 
away.  The neighbor testified at trial and provided the police with video footage from 
surveillance cameras on his property, as well as a photograph that the neighbor took 
on his cell phone as the car drove away.  The video showed Biddle entering the house 
to speak with Hallock; it showed Hallock leaving the house and driving away; and 
it showed Biddle and a man loading property into the car and driving away.  The 
evidence at trial also included security video and still photos from a Wal-Mart where 
Marsh used Hess’s credit card to purchase fireworks during the evening after the 
Talbot Drive burglary, and testimony from the detective who searched the vehicle 
that Marsh had been driving before he was arrested, in which several of the Civil 
War era coins that were stolen from the Talbot Drive residence were located.  The 
jury found Marsh guilty of Burglary Second Degree, Conspiracy Second Degree, 
Theft, and Criminal Mischief in connection with the Talbot Drive burglary. 
 
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(7) 
On appeal, Marsh’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
under Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Marsh’s counsel asserts that, based upon a 
conscientious review of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  Counsel 
informed Marsh of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of the 
motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Counsel also informed Marsh of 
his right to supplement counsel’s presentation.  Marsh responded with points he 
wanted to present for the Court’s consideration, which counsel included with the 
Rule 26(c) brief.  The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and argues that the 
Superior Court’s judgment should be affirmed.  
(8) 
When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 
under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made 
a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.2  This 
Court must also conduct its own review of the record and determine “whether the 
appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary 
presentation.”3   
(9) 
Marsh’s arguments on appeal may be summarized as follows:  (i) he 
should not have been declared an habitual offender because he had no previous 
convictions for Burglary Second Degree; (ii) the State did not prove the burglary 
                                                 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 
442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S.738, 744 (1967).  
3 Penson, 488 U.S. at 81. 
 
6 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt; (iii) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
stating during closing arguments that Marsh was in a vehicle when the police 
arrested him; and (iv) the sentencing order is internally inconsistent with respect to 
the payment of restitution.  We conclude that all of Marsh’s claims are without merit 
and affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(10) Marsh’s first claim on appeal is that he should not have been declared 
an habitual offender because he had no previous convictions for Burglary Second 
Degree.  This argument is without merit.  The Superior Court sentenced Marsh for 
the Burglary Second Degree conviction under 11 Del. C. § 4214(d) and for the two 
Conspiracy Second Degree convictions under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).4  Section 4214 
does not provide that a predicate offense for sentencing as an habitual offender must 
be the same type of offense as the new conviction for which the defendant is being 
sentenced.  The State relied on Marsh’s previous convictions for Robbery Second 
Degree, Reckless Endangering First Degree, and Disregarding a Police Officer’s 
Signal as the basis for declaring Marsh to be an habitual offender.5  These offenses 
are predicate offenses under Section 4214(a) and 4214(d).6 
                                                 
4 See Marsh v. State, No. 468, 2018, Docket Entry No. 35, at A359-60 (Del.). 
5 State v. Marsh, Cr. ID No. 1707006527, Docket Entry No. 24 (Del. Super. Ct.); State v. Marsh, 
Cr. ID No. 1707006525, Docket Entry No. 26 (Del. Super. Ct.). See also Marsh, No. 468, 2018, 
Docket Entry No. 35, at A355 (transcript of discussion of the habitual offender motion). 
6 See 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), (d) (establishing the requirements for sentencing as an habitual offender, 
including the effect of prior convictions for violent felonies as defined in 11 Del. C. § 4201(c)); 
11 Del. C. § 831 (providing that Robbery Second Degree is a class E felony); 11 Del. C. § 604 
(providing that Reckless Endangering First Degree is a class E felony); 21 Del. C. § 4103(b) 
(providing that Disregarding a Police Officer’s Signal is a class G felony); 11 Del. C. § 4201(c) 
 
7 
(11) Marsh’s second claim on appeal is that the State failed to prove the 
burglary charge beyond a reasonable doubt.  We review a sufficiency of evidence 
claim de novo,7 to determine “‘whether any rational trier of fact, reviewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’”8  “For the purposes of this inquiry, we do not 
distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence,” and we “recognize that it 
is the ‘sole province of the fact finder’—in this case the jury—‘to determine witness 
credibility, resolve conflicts in testimony and draw any inferences from the proven 
facts.’”9 
(12) The record does not support Marsh’s argument that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction.  The defense strategy at trial was to attempt to 
raise questions about whether Marsh committed the burglaries with Biddle or 
whether Biddle acted alone or with someone other than Marsh.  Indeed, the defense 
was successful with respect to many of the charges against Marsh, because the jury 
found him not guilty of any charges relating to the incident at Carvel Avenue and 
not guilty of burglary and other charges relating to the incident at Heritage Court 
Drive.   
                                                 
(providing that Reckless Endangering First Degree and Robbery Second Degree are “violent 
felonies”). 
7 Harris v. State, 2019 WL 459766, at *2 (Del. Feb. 5, 2019). 
8 Caulk v. State, 2019 WL 1299962, at *3 (Del. Mar. 19, 2019) (quoting Robertson v. State, 596 
A.2d 1345, 1355 (Del. 1991)). 
9 Harris, 2019 WL 459766, at *2 (quoting Poon v. State, 880 A.2d 236, 238 (Del. 2005)). 
 
8 
(13) The jury found Marsh guilty of burglary and other charges relating to 
the Talbot Avenue break-in.  The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict 
Marsh of these charges, including the burglary charge.  The evidence identifying 
Marsh as one of the perpetrators of the Talbot Avenue burglary included Biddle’s 
testimony, the testimony of Hess and Hallock’s neighbor, video footage of the 
perpetrators loading the stolen goods into a car, photographs and video footage of 
Marsh using a credit card stolen from Talbot Avenue to purchase fireworks at Wal-
Mart, Marsh’s own testimony regarding his visit to Wal-Mart, and evidence from 
Marsh’s cell phone circumstantially linking him to the crime.  Having reviewed the 
record de novo, we conclude that the evidence admitted at trial supports the jury’s 
findings that Marsh was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the Talbot Drive 
burglary.10 
(14) Marsh’s third argument on appeal is that the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct by stating during closing arguments that Marsh was in a vehicle when 
he was apprehended, although in fact Marsh was on foot, and not in or near any 
vehicles, when the police approached him.  We find no error with respect to the 
prosecutor’s statement.  Detective Brian Lucas, a member of the New Castle County 
police department testified that, on the day that Marsh was arrested, he observed 
                                                 
10 See William Marsh v. State, 2003 WL 231616, at *2 (Del. Jan. 30, 2003) (summarizing the 
circumstantial evidence that corroborated a co-defendant’s testimony that the defendant joined in 
burglarizing multiple businesses, and stating that “[e]ven if [the co-defendant’s] testimony had 
been uncorroborated, the jury could still have convicted [the defendant] on that basis alone”). 
 
9 
Marsh driving a silver BMW SUV and then conducted surveillance on Marsh for an 
hour or two.  Detective Lucas testified that “eventually the defendant exited the 
vehicle at which time we attempted to apprehend him.  He fled on foot from us and 
after about a two or 300-yard foot pursuit he was taken into custody.”11  Detective 
Lucas also provided additional details about the arrest, testifying that Marsh parked 
the BMW behind a liquor store and was on foot in front of the liquor store when the 
police pulled up next to him in a minivan.  Detective Lucas left the minivan, 
identified himself as a police officer, and told Marsh to get on the ground.  Marsh 
then fled on foot, running across four lanes of traffic and behind a McDonald’s, at 
which time the officers caught up with him and took him into custody.12   
(15) During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that a “search of the 
BMW which the defendant was found in revealed coins and you heard Bill Hallock 
tell you about the [Civil War era] coins that were collected as part of the investigation 
from that BMW and he told you that those are his coins.”13  The prosecutor also 
referred to “coins found in the vehicle that Nathaniel Marsh was taken into custody 
from” and the license plate of the “vehicle that the defendant was in.”14  The evidence 
clearly established that the police officers observed Marsh driving the vehicle in 
which the coins were later found and that he was arrested after leaving the vehicle.  
                                                 
11 See Marsh, No. 468, 2018, Docket Entry No. 35, at A266 (Del.). 
12 Id. at A267-68. 
13 Id. at A315. 
14 Id. at A326. 
 
10 
Marsh also admitted at trial that he drove the BMW on the date of his arrest and that 
he was aware that the coins were in the BMW.15  The prosecutor’s statements during 
closing arguments were consistent with the evidence.  To the extent that the 
reference to the “vehicle that Nathaniel Marsh was taken into custody from” 
suggested that Marsh was still in the vehicle at the precise moment of his arrest, we 
find that the statement did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.16 
(16) Finally, Marsh contends that the sentencing order contains an error 
because in one section it orders him to pay restitution jointly and severally with 
Biddle and in another section it orders him to pay the full amount of restitution.  This 
claim also is without merit.  A defendant may be held jointly and severally liable 
with a co-defendant for restitution for the value of stolen property.17  A defendant 
who is subject to a joint and several liability is responsible for the entire obligation 
                                                 
15 Id. at A307-08. 
16 See Jones v. State, 2015 WL 6941516, at *2 (Del. Nov. 10, 2015) (“This Court’s review of 
prosecutorial misconduct requires a two-step analysis.  First, we determine whether misconduct 
has occurred.  If it has not, our analysis ends.  If it has, then we must analyze the misconduct under 
the framework outlined in Hughes v. State to determine whether it unduly prejudiced the defendant 
and thus amounted to reversible error.  In Hughes, this Court adopted a three-factor balancing test 
to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced the defendant such that it justifies 
reversal:  ‘(1) the closeness of the case, (2) the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and (3) 
the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.’” (citations omitted)). 
17 State v. Rodriguez, 2017 WL 1192916, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 2017).  See generally 
Thornton v. State, 1998 WL 309837 (Del. June 3, 1998) (affirming conviction and sentence that 
included order to pay joint and several restitution where defendant argued that the Superior Court 
erred by ordering him to pay restitution because he could not afford to pay). 
 
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if the other liable person does not pay.18  The Superior Court therefore did not err by 
ordering that Marsh is jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution. 
(17) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and concluded that 
Marsh’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue.  
We also are satisfied that counsel made a conscientious effort to examine the record 
and the law and properly determined that Marsh could not raise a meritorious claim 
on appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.  
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
18 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 377 (Pocket Ed. 1996).  See also In re Keil’s Estate, 145 A.2d 563, 
566 (Del. 1958) (“A joint and several obligation under our law may be enforced by the creditor 
against both or either [obligor]; but as between obligors each of them, in the ordinary case, is liable 
for one-half the debt.”).