Title: SHIPMAN v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SHIPMAN v. STATE2001 WY 1117 P.3d 34Case Number: 99-151Decided: 02/02/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2000 

                                                                                     
February 
2, 2001  

MARTIN 
G. SHIPMAN,

Appellant

(Defendant), 

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Frank R. Chapman and Les Bowron of Beech Street Law Office, Casper, 
Wyoming  

Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J.; THOMAS, GOLDEN & KITE, JJ.; and DAN SPANGLER, D.J. 
(RET.)

 
            
SPANGLER, District Judge (Retired).

[¶1]           
Appellant 
Martin G. Shipman was convicted of first-degree murder after pleading not guilty 
by reason of mental illness or deficiency.  
He now challenges that jury verdict.  We affirm the verdict and life 
sentence.

ISSUES

[¶2]           
Appellant 
presents these issues for our review:

1.  Was the Defendant denied the effective 
assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights under the 
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming?

2.  Did the District Court commit reversible 
error in appointing and allowing Paul C. Jennings, Ph.D. to testify as the 
State's designated examiner under W.S. § 7-11-301, et[] 
seq.?

3.  Did the District Court's denial of 
retained counsel's Motion for a Continuance deny Defendant a fair 
trial?

4.  Did the District Court commit reversible 
error in allowing testimony regarding Defendant's invocation of his right to 
remain silent?

FACTS

[¶3]           
In the 
early morning hours of May 10, 1998, Appellant strangled his friend and 
co-worker and left her body in her apartment.  Later that morning, he called the Casper 
emergency number and reported a homicide at the victim's apartment.  When Casper Police Officer Jim Clark 
arrived, Appellant summoned him to the third floor landing.  Officer Clark stopped Appellant from 
entering the victim's apartment.

[¶4]           
Another 
officer arrived and asked Appellant when he last saw the victim.  Appellant stated that she came to his 
apartment during the night with a one-quarter full bottle of rum and they 
watched movies while he drank.  He 
said that she left his apartment at approximately 10:00 p.m. and he did not know 
what happened thereafter.

[¶5]           
The 
officers asked if the victim was at home.  
Appellant said that she was.  
The officers asked if she was okay, and Appellant said that she was not, 
she was dead.  Appellant then said 
that he was feeling ill.  The 
officers took him to his apartment next door and sat him on his couch.  He advised the officers that he did not 
want to say anything else to them.

[¶6]           
The 
officers entered the victim's apartment and found her body.  Appellant was arrested and charged with 
first-degree murder.

ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL

[¶7]           
Appellant 
claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel for three 
reasons:  (1) There was no 
investigation of his background to determine whether there were acquaintances 
who could provide testimony in support of his mental illness defense; (2) there 
was a failure to conduct reasonable discovery into the qualifications of the 
prosecution's designated mental health examiner; and (3) there was no 
independent examination and testing of the physical evidence, particularly a 
washcloth containing semen.

[¶8]           
The 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the standards of 
Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  Appellant must first show that 
counsel's performance was deficient.  
466 U.S.  at 687.  Second, Appellant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.  Id.  There is a presumption that trial 
counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance.  Beadles v. State, 984 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Wyo. 
1999).

[¶9]           
This 
Court has further explained the standard:

To 
warrant reversal of a conviction based upon claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, an appellant must establish the attorney's performance was less than 
what a reasonably competent attorney would have done and that the deficient 
performance so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that 
the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just 
result.

Kolb v. 
State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Wyo. 
1996).  Appellant complains that he 
was inadequately represented by consecutive public defenders.  He was represented by the same public 
defender from May 19th through the trial.  He was also represented by a second 
public defender from May 14th to September 17th, by a 
third public defender from September 17th to November 
30th, and by a fourth public defender from November 
18th.  Even if we assume 
that Appellant's counsel were not fully prepared for trial, Appellant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.  At trial, Appellant acknowledged he 
caused the victim's death, and, on appeal, he has failed to identify any other 
evidence which would produce a different result.

[¶10]      
In 
support of his argument, Appellant cites the cases of King v. State, 810 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1991), Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1987), 
and Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo. 
1986).  In the King and 
Gist cases, counsel did not secure the testimony of allegedly favorable 
eyewitnesses.  However, Appellant 
does not offer any evidence that there were any specific witnesses who could 
have bolstered his case.

[¶11]      
In the 
Frias case, counsel did not investigate evidence that might have 
supported a defense that the victim committed suicide.  But Appellant does not identify any 
evidence which would have shown that the victim died other than at his 
hands.

[¶12]      
Regarding 
the lack of a search for background witnesses, trial counsel cannot be faulted 
for failing to investigate unknown witnesses and evidence.  To meet his burden of showing 
ineffective representation, Appellant must make a more concrete demonstration of 
what counsel should have done.

[¶13]      
Appellant 
also complains that his trial counsel did not conduct discovery as to the 
qualifications of the prosecution's mental health examiner.  Again, the charge lacks specifics.  We are not told what discovery would 
have revealed.  Nor does Appellant 
explain how he was prejudiced.

[¶14]      
Further, 
Appellant contends that his trial counsel were ineffective because they did not 
obtain independent testing of the physical evidence.  There is no indication that the 
examination by the State Crime Lab was inadequate or inaccurate.  Appellant does not specify what further 
testing would have revealed.  He 
also fails to explain why this would have made any difference to his case, since 
he acknowledged at trial that he caused the victim's death.  Thus, Appellant has not demonstrated 
that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiencies of trial 
counsel.

THE 
DESIGNATED EXAMINER

[¶15]      
Appellant 
contends that the prosecution's designated mental health examiner, Paul C. 
Jennings, Ph.D., was not qualified under Wyoming law.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-301(a)(i) (LEXIS 
1999) provides as follows:  
"Designated examiner' means a licensed psychiatrist, or other physician 
with forensic training or a licensed psychologist with forensic training."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(c) (LEXIS 
1999) states:  "Only the designated 
examiners who examined the defendant pursuant to W.S. 7-11-303 or 7-11-304 are 
competent witnesses to testify as to the defendant's mental 
responsibility."

[¶16]      
As Dr. 
Jennings is a licensed psychologist, Appellant contends that he lacked the 
required forensic training and was, therefore, not competent to testify.  However, the evidence does not support 
this contention.  The uncontradicted 
testimony was that Dr. Jennings had testified in court a number of times before 
coming to the Wyoming State Hospital in 1989.  He spent his first three and one-half 
years at the Wyoming State Hospital writing forensic reports.  He has written letters to trial courts 
regarding his mental competency examinations.  He has performed psychological testing 
for forensic psychiatrists and has served as a court-appointed examiner.  He has attended four annual workshops in 
Utah for the purpose of qualifying or certifying forensic examiners.  He has been authorized by the State of 
Utah to conduct forensic examinations.  
He has attended monthly meetings of psychologists and psychiatrists in 
Utah.  

[¶17]      
It is 
clear that Dr. Jennings has forensic training and meets the statutory 
requirement.  Therefore, he was 
competent to testify regarding Appellant's mental status.

DENIAL 
OF A CONTINUANCE

[¶18]      
Appellant 
states that the trial court erroneously denied retained counsel's motion for a 
continuance.  Retained counsel 
entered an appearance and filed a motion to continue on December 9, 1998, 
claiming insufficient time to prepare for trial.  The motion was heard and orally denied 
the next day, confirmed by written order on December 14, 1998.  The trial started on December 14th, the date which had been set at a scheduling 
conference nearly five months earlier.

[¶19]   Granting or denying a motion for 
continuance is a discretionary ruling by the trial court which will not be 
disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion.  Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 930 (Wyo. 
1999).

[¶20]      
Appellant 
claimed his counsel were insufficiently prepared as he was "vastly undefended" 
and his counsel had learned just days prior to trial of the nature of the 
opposing expert's qualifications to opine on his mental responsibility.  The trial court was justified in 
considering that new counsel entered the case knowing the trial date had been 
scheduled for months.  Appellant's 
decision to add additional counsel at that late date should not require the 
court to further delay the trial.  
Also, as discussed above, the record demonstrates that the designated 
examiner was fully qualified.  
Additional time to prepare to cross-examine that witness would not likely 
have caused a different result.  We 
conclude Appellant failed to make an adequate showing of an abuse of 
discretion.  Therefore, we do not 
find that there was any error committed in denying the motion for 
continuance.

TESTIMONY 
ON APPELLANT'S SILENCE

[¶21]      
Appellant 
argues that reversible error was committed when testimony was introduced 
concerning his invocation of his right to remain silent.  Officer Clark testified as the 
prosecution's witness concerning a conversation that occurred between him and 
Appellant at the scene.  The 
pertinent portion of that testimony follows:

A         
I asked him if [the victim] was at home.  He advised that, yes, she was at 
home.  I asked him if she was 
okay.  And he advised me, no, that 
she was not okay, that she was dead.

Q         
Okay.  Did [Appellant] say 
anything else to you at this point?

A         
That he was feeling ill.

Q         
Okay.

A         
And it was at that point that I took him back into his apartment and sat 
him on his couch.

Q         
Okay.  And at that point, did 
he say anything else to you?

A         
Yes.  He advised that he 
didn't -- he didn't feel that he wanted to say anything else to 
me.

Q         
Okay.  Did he reassure you in 
any fashion?

A         
Yes, he did.

Q         
What did he say?

A         
When I sat on the couch with him and I turned to walk away, he kept 
trying to reassure me that I didn't have to worry about him, that he wasn't 
dangerous.

[¶22]      
Later, 
during Officer Clark's testimony, the defense moved for a mistrial.  Appellant argues that the denial of that 
motion was erroneous under the decision in Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 
1995).  The Tortolito case 
states that prosecutorial use of the citizen's silence to infer the guilt of the 
citizen is constitutionally prohibited.  
901 P.2d  at 390.  
Failure to respect the constitutional right of the citizen-accused not to 
have his silence called to the jury's attention will entitle the accused to a 
reversal of conviction.  Id. 
 But, a reference to silence 
which is not a "comment" will not be reversed absent a showing of 
prejudice.  Id.  A comment upon an accused's silence 
occurs when it is used to the prosecution's advantage either as substantive 
evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence is an admission of 
guilt.  901 P.2d  at 
391.

[¶23]      
At the 
trial in the Tortolito case, the prosecutor's questions to police 
officers elicited numerous answers that Tortolito remained silent when officers 
accused him of taking money.  
Id.  During his 
opening statement, the prosecutor mentioned Tortolito's silence in the face of 
police accusations.  Id.  During his closing argument, he 
characterized the silence as an admission.  
Id. 

[¶24]      
Application 
of the Tortolito doctrine to this case demonstrates that the prosecution 
did not "comment" upon Appellant's silence.  The prosecution did not attempt to use 
his silence to its advantage.  There 
was no argument to the jury that this was evidence of guilt or an admission of 
guilt.  Appellant does not show that 
he was prejudiced by the officer's remark.  
Therefore, the trial court did not commit error by denying the motion for 
a mistrial.

CONCLUSION

[¶25]      
We 
conclude that Appellant has not shown he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel, the prosecution's designated examiner was competent to testify under 
Wyoming law, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion 
for continuance, and the reference to Appellant's silence does not entitle him 
to a reversal of his conviction.  
Therefore, we affirm the Judgment and Sentence.