Title: State v. Brian Hibl

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2936-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Brian Hibl, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 228 
Reported at: ___ Wis. 2d ___, 706 N.W.2d 134 
(Ct. App. 2005 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 26, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 5, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Paul F. Reilly 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Joel H. 
Rosenthal and Luck & Rosenthal, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Joel H. Rosenthal. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Keith A. Findley, John 
A. Pray, Byron C. Lichstein and University of Wisconsin Law 
School, Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Innocence Project of 
the Frank J. Remington Center, University of Wisconsin Law 
School. 
 
 
 
 
2006 WI 52 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2936-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CF115 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Brian Hibl, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 26, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
State 
of 
Wisconsin 
petitions for review of a published court of appeals' decision 
affirming the circuit court's order that suppressed the State's 
eyewitness identification evidence against the defendant, Brian 
Hibl.1  The eyewitness, who was initially able to describe Hibl 
only as a "white male," identified Hibl 17 months later at the 
courthouse on the day that Hibl's case was scheduled for trial.    
                                                 
1 See State v. Hibl, 2005 WI App 228, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 706 
N.W.2d 134 (affirming an order of the circuit court for Waukesha 
County, Paul F. Reilly, Judge). 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
2 
¶2 
The 
State 
asserts 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
incorrectly applied State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶16, 285 
Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, a case in which this court 
addressed a police "showup" procedure.  It argues that the court 
of appeals should instead have applied State v. Marshall, 92 
Wis. 2d 101, 284 N.W.2d 592 (1979), pertaining to "spontaneous" 
or "accidental" identifications. 
¶3 
We determine that Dubose does not directly control 
cases 
involving 
identification 
evidence 
derived 
from 
"accidental" 
confrontations 
resulting 
in 
"spontaneous" 
identifications.  However, we further determine that in light of 
developments since the time of Marshall, including those 
recognized in Dubose, Marshall does not necessarily resolve all 
such cases.  We conclude that the circuit court still has a 
limited gate-keeping function to exclude such evidence under 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03 (2003-04).2  Accordingly, we reverse the 
court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for a 
determination of whether evidence of the identification of Hibl 
should be excluded under § 904.03.  
I 
¶4 
On the afternoon of June 25, 2002, a City of Muskego 
police officer was driving southbound on Racine Avenue.  He 
noticed two northbound vehicles, a red pickup truck and a white 
van, that appeared to be exceeding the speed limit of 35 miles 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version. 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
3 
per hour.  The two vehicles appeared to jockey for position as 
they traveled toward a portion of the road that narrows from two 
lanes to one.   
¶5 
After the vehicles passed him, the officer continued 
to watch them in his rear and side view mirrors, at which time 
he observed that the white van was ahead of the pickup truck.  
The truck then pulled into the southbound lane, apparently 
attempting to pass the van.  The next thing he saw was that the 
pickup truck had collided with something.  The white van did not 
stop and was not located.  
¶6 
Alan Stuller, who was also driving southbound on 
Racine Avenue, witnessed the accident.  As he passed the two 
vehicles, he looked into his rear view mirror and saw the pickup 
truck pull completely into the southbound lane in order to pass 
the white van.  While the truck was attempting to pass the van, 
the van was accelerating.  Stuller then observed the pickup 
truck collide head-on with another southbound vehicle.   
¶7 
A police detective took a brief statement from Stuller 
at the scene and asked him to go to the police station to give a 
more complete statement.  At that time, Stuller identified the 
van's driver as a white male but was unable to describe him in 
further detail.  The police did not ask Stuller to make an 
identification of the van's driver using a photo array or a 
lineup procedure.   
¶8 
Two days after the accident, police were informed that 
Hibl reported witnessing the accident.  A detective interviewed 
Hibl, who stated that he had been driving a white van northbound 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
4 
on Racine Avenue at approximately the same time the accident 
occurred.  At one point, Hibl admitted that he may have been a 
contributing factor. 
¶9 
The State charged Hibl with one count of causing great 
bodily 
harm 
to 
another 
by 
reckless 
driving 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 346.62(4), and two counts of causing bodily harm to 
another by reckless driving contrary to § 346.62(3).  The 
prosecutor advised defense counsel that there were no known 
witnesses who could identify Hibl as the driver of the white 
van.  Similarly, defense counsel determined that the discovery 
documents received from the State did not contain any indication 
that there was a witness capable of identifying Hibl as the 
driver of the van.  
¶10 Approximately three weeks to a month before the date 
set for Hibl's trial, Stuller received a subpoena to appear as a 
witness.  On the day of trial, he arrived at the courthouse 
before the trial began.  He was speaking with the prosecutor 
outside the courtroom in the hallway, when he looked up and 
recognized Hibl as the driver of the white van.  The prosecutor 
informed defense counsel, who moved for a mistrial based upon 
the potential identification evidence that had come to light.  
The State joined in the motion, which the circuit court granted. 
¶11 Hibl subsequently moved to suppress Stuller's pretrial 
identification, along with any in-court identification the State 
might seek to elicit.  He asserted that the circumstances of the 
pretrial, hallway identification were impermissibly suggestive. 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
5 
¶12 At the suppression hearing, Stuller testified that at 
the time of the accident, he was traveling at 35 or 40 miles per 
hour and that the white van and red pickup truck were traveling 
approximately 60 miles per hour when he first saw them.  The 
vehicles "had [his] attention from when they went by" because 
they were speeding.  Stuller estimated that he first saw the 
driver of the van from about 50 feet away and that he had looked 
directly at the driver for three to five seconds.  He could not 
remember whether the driver had glasses and could describe the 
driver only as a "white male."  Stuller told an investigating 
officer that he was unable to provide any other description of 
the van driver, including height, weight, or age, and that he 
did not think he could make an identification.  
¶13 Stuller also testified that between the time he 
received the subpoena and the trial date, he had no contact with 
police.  He had one contact with the district attorney's office, 
in which the prosecutor advised him that they would meet at the 
courthouse to review his statement immediately before trial.  
Stuller admitted that he possessed some articles about the 
accident, but said that he did not read them and did not think 
that they contained any photographs. 
¶14 Stuller further testified that on the day of trial he 
arrived at the courthouse and, without looking into the 
courtroom, sat down on a chair in what he described as the 
"waiting room."  He had never been to the courthouse before, had 
never appeared as a witness before, and did not expect to see 
the same person that he had seen driving the white van on the 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
6 
date of the accident.  While waiting outside the courtroom, he 
spoke briefly with a police officer, but not about the case.  
The prosecutor came out of the courtroom and walked with Stuller 
into the hallway to review his statement.  Stuller could not 
recall whether the prosecutor asked him at that time if he could 
identify the driver of the white van.  According to Stuller's 
testimony, he did not see anyone else leave the courtroom, and 
he thought there were about 10 people in the hallway. 
¶15 After talking with the prosecutor for approximately 
two or three minutes, Stuller "just turned to [his] left 
and . . . saw the defendant, Mr. Hibl," about ten feet away 
walking with someone.  Although Hibl had glasses on, Stuller 
"knew 
[he] 
recognized 
[Hibl]" 
from 
"[h]is 
face 
in 
general. . . .  It just——it——he stood out from everybody else in 
the hallway."  Stuller told the prosecutor:  "That's him." 
¶16 A detective met separately with Stuller and the 
prosecutor immediately following the identification, and he also 
testified at the suppression hearing.  He corroborated Stuller's 
testimony in some respects, but said that Stuller made the 
identification after seeing Hibl come out of the courtroom.  
¶17 At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the 
prosecutor gave a brief oral statement to the court in which he 
confirmed that he had telephoned Stuller to speak with him about 
his testimony.  The prosecutor did not recall whether they 
discussed Stuller's ability to make an identification. 
¶18 The circuit court applied State v. Wolverton, 193 
Wis. 2d 234, 533 N.W.2d 167 (1995), a case involving the right 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
7 
to due process and identification evidence derived from a showup 
procedure conducted by police.  Applying Wolverton, the court 
first determined that "Stuller's juxtaposition in the courtroom 
hallway with the ADA, anticipating the alleged defendant in 
court in a few minutes, constitutes an identification that 
occurred in an impermissibly suggestive manner."  It found that 
there was no evidence that the police or district attorney's 
office 
intentionally 
or 
unintentionally 
suggested 
the 
identification.  However, it also found that Stuller "knew he 
would see the alleged defendant."    
¶19 Still following Wolverton, the circuit court then 
concluded that the State could not show the identification was 
reliable based on the totality of the facts:  Stuller had 
observed the van's driver while traveling 35 to 40 miles per 
hour while the van was traveling toward him at a high rate of 
speed; on the day of the alleged offense Stuller could not 
identify the driver's facial features, height, and weight, or 
whether he wore glasses; Stuller could identify the driver that 
day only as a "white male"; and Stuller's identification of Hibl 
in the courtroom hallway occurred 15 months after he witnessed 
the accident.3  The circuit court therefore suppressed Stuller's 
identification of Hibl. 
¶20 The State appealed, and after the parties completed 
their appellate briefing but before the court of appeals issued 
                                                 
3 Stuller's identification of Hibl actually occurred almost 
17 months after the accident. 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
8 
an opinion, this court decided Dubose.  In Dubose the court held 
based on the due process clause in the Wisconsin Constitution 
that evidence obtained from an out-of-court showup is inherently 
suggestive and will not be admissible unless, based on the 
totality 
of circumstances, 
the procedure was 
"necessary."  
Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶33.  The court also withdrew certain 
language from Wolverton.  Id., ¶33 n.9.  
¶21 In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court but employed a different analysis.  The court of 
appeals majority determined that although Dubose addressed a 
police showup procedure, the concerns articulated in Dubose 
about misidentification are not limited to situations where 
police arranged a confrontation.  It further determined that 
principles of fairness dictate that identification evidence, 
even absent police involvement, must be scrutinized to determine 
whether suppression is required.  After noting that evidence 
must be reliable enough to be probative, the court of appeals 
majority concluded that the circuit court's rationale was sound.   
¶22 The dissent in the court of appeals determined that 
Dubose was limited to pretrial police showup procedures, thus 
leaving prevailing rules in place with respect to other pretrial 
identifications.  It concluded that the prevailing rule relevant 
to Hibl's case was set forth in Marshall, a case in which this 
court determined that identification evidence need not be 
scrutinized 
for 
a 
due 
process 
violation 
unless 
the 
identification occurs as part of a police procedure directed 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
9 
toward 
obtaining 
identification 
evidence. 
 
Marshall, 
92 
Wis. 2d at 118.  The State petitioned for review. 
II 
¶23 This case comes to us in the context of Hibl's 
suppression motion.  When reviewing a motion to suppress, we 
uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous.  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶16.  However, we 
independently 
review 
the 
circuit 
court's 
application 
of 
constitutional and other legal principles.  See id.4 
III 
¶24 The framework for analyzing showups, as set forth in 
both Wolverton and previous cases, springs from the due process 
clause in the federal constitution as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court in a series of decisions culminating in 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).5  In Brathwaite, the 
                                                 
4 Some 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
fact 
findings 
appear 
unsupported by the record unless the court implicitly found that 
portions of Stuller's testimony were not credible.  Hibl makes 
arguments suggesting that the circuit made such an implicit 
finding.  We need not address whether any of the circuit court's 
fact findings are clearly erroneous.  Hibl conceded at oral 
argument that the record supports the circuit court's finding 
that the police and district attorney did not intentionally 
suggest the identification.  Indeed, the record before us would 
not have supported a finding that the identification in this 
case 
involved 
any 
law 
enforcement 
procedure 
directed 
at 
obtaining identification evidence.  These are the key facts for 
our purposes here.  On remand, the circuit court and parties may 
seek to clarify other fact findings if necessary.  
5 See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
10 
Court stated what has become an oft-stated maxim,6 that 
"reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of 
identification testimony."  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114; see 
also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) ("[i]t is the 
likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's 
right to due process").  
¶25 Under Wolverton, courts were to use a two-step test to 
determine whether a showup must be suppressed to avoid a due 
process violation.  The defendant bore the initial burden of 
demonstrating that an identification procedure was impermissibly 
suggestive.  Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 264.  If that burden was 
met, the State had to show that the identification was reliable 
under the totality of the circumstances even though the 
procedure was suggestive. Id.  As already noted, the circuit 
court here applied this two-step test.  
¶26 Last term, in Dubose, when this court held that 
evidence obtained from an out-of-court showup will not be 
admissible unless the procedure was "necessary," it based its 
decision 
on 
the 
due 
process 
clause 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  It withdrew language from Wolverton and other 
cases that could be construed to the contrary.  Dubose, 285 
                                                 
6 See, e.g.,  McFowler v. Jaimet, 349 F.3d 436, 449 (7th 
Cir. 2003); State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶25, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 
699 N.W.2d 582; State v. Streich, 87 Wis. 2d 209, 215, 274 
N.W.2d 635 (1979); Simos v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 251, 255, 265 
N.W.2d 278 (1978); State v. Thornton, 506 N.W.2d 777, 779 (Iowa 
1993); State v. Faust, 696 N.W.2d 420, 427 (Neb. 2005); State v. 
Norrid, 611 N.W.2d 866, 871 (N.D. 2000); State v. Jells, 559 
N.E.2d 464, 470 (Ohio 1990). 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
11 
Wis. 2d 143, ¶33 & n.9.  Under Dubose, identification evidence 
resulting 
from 
an 
"unnecessary" 
showup 
is 
suppressed 
as 
inherently too suggestive, without any separate fact-based 
inquiry into suggestiveness or reliability. 
¶27 Dubose 
and 
Wolverton 
involved 
similar 
showup 
procedures.  In both cases, police exhibited a suspect to one or 
more eyewitnesses while the suspect was sitting alone in a 
police car.  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶¶8-9; Wolverton, 193 
Wis. 2d at 246, 249, 265-68.   
¶28 In Marshall, decided over 25 years ago, the court 
addressed a different type of identification scenario that is 
more akin to what occurred here.  Specifically, in Marshall the 
identification occurred when a witness spotted the defendant 
sitting a few rows in front of him in the courtroom.  Marshall, 
92 Wis. 2d at 109.  The record showed that the identification of 
the defendant "was not pre-arranged and was as much a surprise 
to the State as it was to the defendant."  Id. at 118. 
¶29 The court began by citing the two-step due process 
test, but then, without citation, qualified the scope of the 
test's applicability:  "[I]t must first be determined whether 
the confrontation was deliberately contrived by the police for 
purposes of obtaining an eyewitness identification of the 
defendant."  Id. at 117.  The court ultimately concluded that 
the test does not apply when "the confrontation is not part of a 
police procedure directed toward obtaining additional evidence, 
but occurs as a result of mere chance or for some other reason 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
12 
not related to the identification of the defendant."  Id. at 
118.7 
IV 
¶30 The State asserts that when the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court, it erroneously applied Dubose and 
should have applied Marshall instead.  It argues that Stuller's 
"spontaneous" or "accidental" identification falls squarely 
within the confines of Marshall. 
¶31 For the reasons stated below, we determine that Dubose 
does not directly control cases involving evidence derived from 
"accidental" 
confrontations 
resulting 
in 
"spontaneous" 
identifications.  However, we further determine that in light of 
developments since the time of Marshall, including those 
recognized in Dubose, Marshall does not necessarily resolve all 
such cases.  Although most such identifications will be for the 
jury to assess, the circuit court still has a limited gate-
keeping function.  It may exclude such evidence under § 904.03 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
                                                 
7 In other cases that pre-date State v. Marshall, 92 
Wis. 2d 101, 284 N.W.2d 592 (1979), and that also involved 
accidental confrontations, the court seemed to apply the due 
process 
framework 
without 
the 
qualification 
of 
a 
police 
procedure.  See Jones v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 97, 107-09, 216 
N.W.2d 224 (1974); State v. Brown, 50 Wis. 2d 565, 570-71, 185 
N.W.2d 232 (1971), overruled in part by State v. Walker, 154 
Wis. 2d 158, 186, 453 N.W.2d 127 (1990).  Somewhat curiously, 
the court in Marshall nonetheless analogized its conclusion to 
the Jones and Brown cases.  See Marshall, 92 Wis. 2d at 118.  
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
13 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury.8 
A 
¶32 Dubose is not directly controlling.  Although the 
court in Dubose relied, in part, on research that potentially 
implicates all eyewitness identifications, the court's holding 
was more circumspect.  Specifically, the court "adopt[ed] a 
different test in Wisconsin regarding the admissibility of 
showup identifications."  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶33 (emphasis 
added).  It held that "evidence obtained from such a showup will 
not be admissible unless, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the showup was necessary."  Id., ¶¶2, 45 
(emphasis added). 
¶33 The term "showup" itself denotes a police procedure.  
The court in Dubose used the following definition of showup:  
"an out-of-court pretrial identification procedure in which a 
suspect is presented singly to a witness for identification 
purposes."  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶1 n.1 (emphasis added; 
quoting Wolverton, 193 Wis. 2d at 263 n.21). 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 904.03 reads, in full, as follows: 
Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.  Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair 
prejudice, 
confusion 
of 
the 
issues, 
or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
14 
¶34 Moreover, 
the 
court's 
characterization 
of 
what 
constitutes a "necessary" showup reinforces the notion that the 
court 
did 
not 
intend 
that 
Dubose 
necessarily 
control 
identifications that do not involve a law enforcement procedure.  
Under Dubose, a showup is "necessary" only if "police lacked 
probable cause to make an arrest or, as a result of other 
exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a lineup or 
photo array."  Id., ¶¶2, 45. 
¶35 Thus, Dubose does not directly control Hibl's case, 
which does not involve a "showup" as this court has defined the 
term.  That said, the Dubose focus on one type of inherently 
suggestive police procedure does not mean that courts must 
ignore the potential for unreliability in all other types of 
eyewitness identifications.  Here, the question becomes how to 
address the potential for unreliability in the context of an 
apparently 
"accidental" 
confrontation 
that 
results 
in 
a 
"spontaneous" identification.  Although Dubose is not directly 
controlling, aspects of Dubose will inform the answer. 
B 
¶36 Having 
determined 
that 
Dubose 
is 
not 
directly 
controlling, we turn to Marshall.  At first, it might appear 
that Marshall provides not only the starting point but also the 
ending point for "spontaneous" identifications resulting from 
"accidental" confrontations.  Given developments since the time 
of Marshall, however, we take this opportunity to re-examine 
Marshall. 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
15 
¶37 Since the time this court decided Marshall, over 25 
years ago, concerns with the reliability of eyewitness testimony 
have come to the fore.  In Dubose, the court recognized that 
"much new information has been assembled" and that recent 
studies confirm that eyewitness testimony is "often 'hopelessly 
unreliable.'"  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶¶29-30.  The court 
explained that "research strongly supports the conclusion that 
eyewitness misidentification is now the single greatest source 
of wrongful convictions in the United States, and responsible 
for more wrongful convictions than all other causes combined."  
Id., ¶30.  Earlier this term, the court similarly acknowledged 
its "growing appreciation for the difficulties inherent in 
eyewitness identification."  State v. Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, ¶43, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, 709 N.W.2d 370. 
¶38 Of course, some phenomena affecting the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications have long been recognized.  For 
example, the United States Supreme Court observed almost 30 
years ago in Brathwaite that a witness's "recollection of the 
stranger can be distorted easily by the circumstances or by 
later actions of the police."  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112. 
¶39 Courts have traditionally employed several factors to 
assess reliability, based on common sense notions of human 
perception and memory.  Those factors are the ones recited in 
Wolverton that the circuit court applied here:  the opportunity 
of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; 
the witness's degree of attention; the accuracy of the witness's 
prior description of the criminal; the level of certainty 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
16 
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and the length 
of time between the crime and the confrontation.  Biggers, 409 
U.S. at 199-200. 
¶40 More recently, other phenomena that may affect the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications have been widely 
proffered or recognized.  These phenomena may not be within the 
common knowledge of many jurors or judges.  They include the 
"relative judgment" process;9 the stressfulness of the event for 
the eyewitness;10 whether the event involved "weapon focus";11 the 
cross-racial nature of an identification;12 and whether an 
eyewitness is given positive feedback during or immediately 
following the identification.13  
                                                 
9 See State v. Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, ¶28, ¶49 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., dissenting), ___ Wis. 2d ___, 709 N.W.2d 370; State of 
Wisconsin, Office of the Attorney General, Model Policy and 
Procedure for Eyewitness Identification (Sept. 12, 2005) at p. 2 
(footnotes omitted).  The "relative judgment" process refers to 
"the tendency when viewing a simultaneous presentation (viewing 
an entire photo array or lineup at once) for eyewitnesses to 
identify the person who looks the most like the real perpetrator 
relative to the other people."  Model Policy and Procedure, at 
2. 
10 See United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 
1985); see also Shomberg, 
2006 WI 
9, ¶70 
(Butler, J., 
dissenting). 
11 Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, ¶70 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
12 See State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 170 n.9, 570 
N.W.2d 384 (1997). 
13 Shomberg, 2006 WI 9, ¶71 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
17 
¶41 Many of the phenomena said to affect the reliability 
of eyewitness identification are the subject of ongoing debate.14  
One thing not subject to debate is that even unintentional 
suggestiveness can become a key factor in identification errors.  
See State of Wisconsin, Office of the Attorney General, Model 
Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification (Sept. 12, 
2005) at p. 2 (emphasis added).  What is important for our 
examination here is that many of these phenomena do not depend 
on the presence of a law enforcement procedure.  To the extent 
that identification evidence is extremely unreliable based on 
such phenomena, independent of any law enforcement procedure, 
Marshall's holding may need to be modified.     
¶42 Courts since the time of Marshall have not uniformly 
followed its approach.  Some jurisdictions have taken approaches 
consistent with Marshall.  See State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14, 
25-27 (R.I. 1991); State v. Naoum, 548 A.2d 120, 124-25 (Me. 
1988); State v. Brown, 528 N.E.2d 523, 533 (Ohio 1988); Wilson 
                                                 
14 There is also debate over the traditional factors from 
Biggers.  At least one of those factors, eyewitness certainty in 
the identification, has come under serious attack.  The 
Wisconsin Innocence Project, amicus in this case, provided a 
copy of an amicus brief recently submitted to the United States 
Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Connecticut, No. 05-9500, on 
behalf of numerous university professors who hold themselves out 
as experts in the field.  They assert that the certainty factor 
has no scientific basis.  In support of this assertion, they 
engage in an extensive review of research suggesting that the 
relationship 
between 
eyewitness 
certainty 
and 
eyewitness 
accuracy is generally weak and easily subject to corruption.  
The State maintains, however, that research shows certainty 
remains a reliable predictor of accuracy. 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
18 
v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Ky. 1985) ("in order to 
establish that a pre-trial confrontation was unduly suggestive, 
the defendant must first show that the government's agents 
arranged the confrontation or took some action during the 
confrontation which singled out the defendant"). 
¶43 Others have not.  United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 
1506, 1513-16 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[b]ecause the due process focus 
in the identification context is on the fairness of the trial 
and not exclusively on police deterrence, it follows that 
federal courts should scrutinize all suggestive identification 
procedures, not just those orchestrated by the police"); Thigpen 
v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895-97 (6th Cir. 1986); Green v. Loggins, 
614 F.2d 219, 223 (9th Cir. 1980) ("a court is obligated to 
review every pre-trial encounter, accidental or otherwise, in 
order to insure that the circumstances of the particular 
encounter have not been so suggestive as to undermine the 
reliability of the witness' subsequent identification"); see 
also State v. Holliman, 570 A.2d 680, 684 (Conn. 1990) (applying 
the two-step test to an identification resulting purely from 
private 
citizen 
action, 
and 
holding 
that 
the 
criteria 
determining the admissibility of identifications for purposes of 
due process should apply "even if the defendant's claim has no 
constitutional underpinning"). 
¶44 Professor LaFave, discussing what he terms the "so-
called 'accidental' showup," is critical of the Marshall 
approach: 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
19 
[T]he mere fact that the confrontation was not 
deliberate does not mean that it was necessary:  
doubtless many of these "accidents" could be prevented 
by more careful procedures concerning the movement of 
prisoners.  Moreover, because "the due process focus 
in the identification context is on the fairness of 
the trial and not exclusively on police deterrence," 
courts 
"should 
scrutinize 
all 
suggestive 
identification procedures, not just those orchestrated 
by the police, to determine if they would sufficiently 
taint the trial so as to deprive the defendant of due 
process."   
Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, & Nancy J. King, 2 Criminal 
Procedure § 7.4(b), at 670-71 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
¶45 To the extent that we can generalize from the 
authorities cited, little more can be said than this:  the 
approach the court took in Marshall has not become a prevailing, 
well-settled, or generally-accepted rule across jurisdictions.  
¶46 In light of all of the developments since the time of 
Marshall, we make the unremarkable observation that in some 
future case presenting different circumstances Marshall may need 
to be modified.  There may be some conceivable set of 
circumstances under which the admission of highly unreliable 
identification evidence could violate a defendant's right to due 
process, 
even 
though 
a 
state-constructed 
identification 
procedure is absent. 
¶47 Based on the record before us, however, we are not 
prepared to declare that the admission of the identification 
evidence in this case would violate Hibl's right to due process.  
The circumstances of Stuller's identification of Hibl in the 
courthouse hallway are not sufficiently suggestive.  Thus, we 
need not and do not modify Marshall at this time.  Nonetheless, 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
20 
our inquiry is not at an end.  Marshall did not address, and 
therefore 
does 
not 
preclude, 
circuit 
court 
scrutiny 
of 
eyewitness identification evidence for admissibility under the 
rules of evidence.       
C 
¶48 The Marshall focus on a state-constructed procedure 
for a due process violation does not mean that courts must 
always ignore the circumstances of an identification and assume 
there is sufficient reliability absent a police procedure.    
Regardless of whether law enforcement officers have used a 
procedure directed at obtaining identification evidence, circuit 
courts still have the authority and the responsibility to serve 
a limited gate-keeping function.  They still have the discretion 
to exclude relevant evidence under § 904.03 if it is "so 
unreliable that its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of prejudice and confusion."  Boyer v. State, 91 
Wis. 2d 647, 663, 284 N.W.2d 30 (1979); cf. State v. Moss, 2003 
WI App 239, ¶21, 267 Wis. 2d 772, 672 N.W.2d 125 (confession 
coerced by a private citizen could be excluded as unreliable on 
evidentiary grounds, including § 904.03, even though it was not 
subject to challenge on due process grounds).  
¶49 Traditionally, eyewitness identification evidence has 
been thought to involve a credibility determination solely for 
the jury.  As the Supreme Court explained in Stovall v. Denno, 
388 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1967), "[t]he overwhelming majority of 
American courts have always treated the evidence question not as 
one of admissibility but as one of credibility for the jury."  
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
21 
In Brathwaite, however, the court observed that "[United States 
v.] Wade[, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)] and its companion cases" (one of 
which is Stovall) "reflect the concern that the jury not hear 
eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of 
reliability."  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112.   
¶50 Despite the right to a trial by jury, the law permits 
and sometimes requires that a trial court keep evidence from the 
jury.  Although some rules of admissibility, such as those in 
Brathwaite 
or 
Dubose, 
are 
based 
on 
constitutional 
considerations, others, such as § 904.03, are founded on common 
law or statute.  Thus, "neither constitutional considerations 
nor the presence of State action (besides the use of the 
evidence itself) are essential preconditions for a determination 
that certain relevant evidence should be kept from the trier of 
fact."  Commonwealth v. Jones, 666 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (Mass. 
1996). 
¶51 At oral argument, the parties agreed that § 904.03 has 
a role to play in the context of the reliability of eyewitness 
identification evidence.  The State conceded that unfair 
prejudice could be the consequence of extreme unreliability and 
stated it was not disputing that unreliability could be an 
ingredient in the application of § 904.03.    Similarly, when 
Hibl was asked his position on a circuit court's use of § 904.03 
to exclude eyewitness identification evidence as unreliable, he 
responded "I agree with that."   
¶52 That circuit courts serve a limited gate-keeping 
function, 
even 
for 
constitutionally 
admissible 
eyewitness 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
22 
identification 
evidence, 
comports 
with 
the 
maxim 
that 
"reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of 
identification testimony."  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114; cf. 
State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 519, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984) 
(scientific expert testimony must be "reliable enough to be 
probative") (quoting State v. Catanese, 368 So.2d 975, 979 (La. 
1979)). 
¶53 We emphasize that in most instances, questions as to 
the 
reliability 
of 
constitutionally 
admissible 
eyewitness 
identification evidence will remain for the jury to answer.  
Generally we are "content to rely upon the good sense and 
judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of 
untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill."  
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116.  Juries can often "measure 
intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has 
some questionable feature."  Id.  At the same time, however, the 
circuit court's gate-keeping function should not be abdicated.  
¶54 In exercising its gate-keeping function, the court 
should consider whether cross-examination or a jury instruction 
will fairly protect the defendant from the unreliability of the 
identification.  The court may take a number of other factors 
into consideration, including those we have articulated in ¶¶38-
40, if appropriate, but litigants and trial courts should not be 
bound to an inflexible list of factors.  We urge circuit courts, 
with assistance from the litigants before them, to take into 
consideration 
the 
evolving 
body 
of 
law 
on 
eyewitness 
identification.  Any tests for reliability and suggestiveness in 
No. 
2004AP2936-CR   
 
23 
the eyewitness identification context should accommodate this 
still-evolving 
jurisprudence, 
along 
with 
the 
developing 
scientific research that forms some of its underpinnings. 
¶55 In this case, neither the circuit court nor the court 
of appeals majority addressed Marshall.  The circuit court 
applied Wolverton and did not apply § 904.03.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals and remand for the circuit court to 
make a determination of whether Stuller's identification of Hibl 
should be excluded pursuant to § 904.03.  On remand, the circuit 
court may or may not determine that § 904.03 requires the 
exclusion of this identification evidence. 
V 
¶56 In sum, we determine that Dubose does not directly 
control cases involving evidence derived from "accidental" 
confrontations 
resulting 
in 
"spontaneous" 
identifications.  
However, we further determine that in light of developments 
since the time of Marshall, including those recognized in 
Dubose, Marshall does not necessarily resolve all such cases.  
The circuit court still has a limited gate-keeping function to 
exclude such evidence under § 904.03.  We reverse the court of 
appeals and remand to the circuit court for a determination of 
whether the identification evidence in this case should be 
excluded under § 904.03. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
No.  2004AP2936-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶57 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring).  My 
understanding of the majority's opinion in this matter is that 
because the admission of the identification evidence in this 
case would not violate the defendant Hibl's right to due 
process, we need not and do not modify at this time this court's 
earlier decision in State v. Marshall, 92 Wis. 2d 101, 118, 284 
N.W.2d 592 (1979).  Majority op., ¶47.  With that caveat, I join 
all but paragraph 46 of the majority's opinion. 
       
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP2936-CR.lbb 
 
 
 
1