Title: Zinnser v. Gregory

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

77 So. 2d 611 (1955)
Hattie S. ZINNSER, Irene Worster and Edna C. Rutkin, Appellants,
v.
B.A. GREGORY, Lloyd B. Browning and Donn Gregory, as Executors of the Will of Emmitte H. Carter, Deceased, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.
January 25, 1955.
Ramseur, Bradham & Clark, St Petersburg, Joseph P. Lieb and Fowler, White, Gillen, Yancey & Humkey, Tampa, and Cotton & Shivers, Tallahassee, for appellants.
Gregory & Cours, Tampa, for B.A. Gregory, Lloyd B. Browning and Donn Gregory as Executors of the Will of Emmitte H. Carter, Deceased, Hardee & Hardee and Paul Game, Tampa, for Mildred E. Dennis, appellees
MURPHREE, Associate Justice.
Emmitte H. Carter executed his last will and testament on February 13, 1953, and *612 died of a heart attack the following day, leaving an estate valued at nearly $500,000. Surviving was a brother, a sister, and four nieces, the children of a deceased brother and sister. The will was duly admitted to probate, but shortly thereafter three of the nieces, appellants herein, filed their petition to revoke the probate of the will.
The estate consists principally of improved real estate in St. Petersburg and Tampa, Florida. It was acquired by the decedent through a deed from and under the will of his sister, Rhoda L. Jones, who died in 1947.
Carter, in his will, remembered his sister, Loca L. Brock, his brother, Sumter A. Carter, and "his friend" Mildred E. Dennis, but left nothing to any of his nieces. The will provided a life annuity of $150 per month for his sister, together with a life estate in a place of residence, with taxes, insurance and maintenance expenses paid; a life annuity of $100 per month for his brother, and the use for life of a farm with taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses paid; and for "his friend", Mildred E. Dennis, an annuity for life of $500 per month, and some silverware of no great value. Subject to the foregoing, the residue of the estate was placed in trust with the three designated executors to be eventually used for the purpose of establishing a hospital to be known as the "Emmitte H. Carter Memorial Hospital", upon the site of testator's home place at Tampa.
B.A. Gregory, who was Emmitte H. Carter's personal attorney for many years, drafted the will in question. Named therein as executors and trustees of the estate were B.A. Gregory, his son, Don Gregory, and Lloyd B. Browning.
Carter's will vested in the executors very broad powers relative to the administration of the estate, provided that they should serve without bond, and left to their discretion the time and the manner in which the "Emmitte H. Carter Memorial Hospital" was to be set up and operated, subject to the said bequests to Loca L. Brock, Sumter A. Carter and Mildred E. Dennis.
Appellants advance three theories in their petition to revoke the probate of Carter's will, namely:
(1) That Carter acquired the estate by deed and device from his sister, Rhoda A. Jones, with the verbal understanding with her that he would eventually divide the same among her relatives, which included the appellants. Carter, therefore, held the property of the estate under a resulting or constructive trust, and could not legally dispose of it by will to the exclusion of the appellants.
(2) That Mildred E. Dennis and B.A. Gregory through the exercise of undue influence upon Emmitte H. Carter caused him to execute the said will.
(3) That Carter was suffering from Monomania, directed toward his relatives, to the extent that he was devoid of testamentary capacity to make a valid will, insofar as the appellants were concerned.
To the petition, motions to dismiss and motions to strike most of its principal allegations, were filed by the appellees, Mildred E. Dennis and the three executors of the estate. The Probate Court concluded that the facts alleged in the petition were not sufficient to warrant revocation, so the motions to dismiss were sustained. On review, the Circuit Judge affirmed the ruling of the County Judge.
In taking this appeal, appellants have listed thirty-four assignments of error. After considering each of them it appears to us that this cause can be fairly determined by an examination of the three theories advanced by appellants in their petition to revoke probate of the will, as stated above.
The contention that Carter held title to the estate, consisting principally of real estate, in trust for the heirs of Rhoda A. Jones, and therefore, could not by will divest appellants of their alleged interest therein, provokes the question of jurisdiction of the Probate Court to determine title to the said real estate. Both courts below correctly held that this issue was determinable only in the Circuit Court. Inasmuch *613 as the contest here is by claimants against the estate, rather than being a contest between beneficiaries of the estate, it could not be otherwise. See: In re Lawrence's Estate, Fla., 45 So. 2d 344, 345, wherein it is said:
Undue influence was defined by this Court in the case of In re Peters' Estate, 155 Fla. 453, 20 So. 2d 487, 492, as follows:
With respect to the charge of undue influence against Mildred E. Dennis, the petition alleges:
Such vague generalities and conclusions clearly fail to depict a course of conduct on the part of Mildred E. Dennis within the definition of undue influence.
As to the charge of undue influence against B.A. Gregory, the petition contains the following:
Despite the intimation of the petition that the will vested a life interest in the property of the estate in B.A. Gregory and his co-trustees, the will itself clearly shows that they were neither legatees nor devisees.
We have recognized that where a person, standing in fiduciary relationship to the testator, is active in the procurement of a will in which he is made a substantial beneficiary, a presumption of fact will arise that the will is the result of undue influence and the burden will be upon the beneficiary to show that such influence was not exercised. See: In re Palmer's Estate, Fla., 48 So. 2d 732, and the authorities therein cited, especially the discussion in Redfearn on Wills and Administration of Estates in Florida (2d Ed.), Section 52.
B.A. Gregory as the personal attorney for Emmitte H. Carter stood in a fiduciary relationship when he drafted the will in question, but B.A. Gregory was not a beneficiary of the estate, unless the emoluments to be derived from his position as executor and trustee be deemed the equivalent.
Appellants argue that the foregoing is sufficient to invoke the presumption of undue influence against B.A. Gregory, and in support of their position lay stress upon the Alabama case of Zeigler v. Coffin, 1929, 219 Ala. 586, 123 So. 22, 63 A.L.R. 942. In that case Coffin, an attorney, drew Zeigler's will in which an active trust was created and Coffin was named as executor with practically unlimited power and authority in the administration of the estate. Coffin was very active in the preparation and execution of the will. Such factor alone distinguishes that case from this; however, the Alabama court did classify Coffin as a beneficiary in view of the fees and other emoluments that would naturally enure to him in the course of administering the trust.
We cannot agree, however, that an attorney who is neither legatee nor devisee, but is named as executor in a will drafted by him for his client, has such a beneficial interest in the estate as to give rise to the presumption of undue influence on his part. This view finds support in cases from a number of other jurisdictions. See: Shelton v. McHaney, 1936, 338 Mo. 749, 92 S.W.2d 173; Breadheft v. Cleveland, 1915, 184 Ind. 130, 108 N.E. 5; In re Dobrzensky's Estate, 1951, 105 Cal. App. 2d 134, 232 P.2d 886; In re Heaverne's Estate, 1926, 118 Or. 308, 246 P. 720; In re Heitholt's Estate, 1950, 202 Okla. 351, 213 P.2d 865. Also annotations in 63 A.L.R. 948, 66 A.L.R. 244, and 154 A.L.R. 589.
Appellants concede the general testamentary capacity of Emmitte H. Carter at the time he executed his will, but contend that due to monomania directed toward his relatives, he was mentally incapable of making a valid will that would exclude as beneficiaries the appellants, his nieces.
In Hooper v. Stokes, 107 Fla. 607, 145 So. 855, 857, 146 So. 668, Monamania was defined as follows:
In support of the charge of monomania, appellants alleged in their petition that Emmitte H. Carter, without any basis in fact or reason, had a fixed obsession that his family mistreated him as a boy, that they were persecuting him and were hostile to him, that anonymous threats were being made against his life, that he was being hunted by people who sought to take his life, that he kept his house securely locked at all times with shades drawn even in the day time, and that he possessed other eccentricities besides.
Assuming all that to be sufficient to show the existence of a diseased or deranged condition of mind, in order to constitute monomania, insofar as the appellants are concerned, it must appear that they were the object of the alleged delusions or aberrations experienced by Carter. Nowhere in the petition is this specifically alleged, it being indicated only that Carter had it in for his relations generally, as a class. And the hard fact is that Carter did not do badly by his closest of kin, his brother and his sister, and there is no showing that any of his nieces had any special claim to his bounty, by virtue of any particular affection existing between them, or of any service or kindness they may have rendered to their uncle during his life time.
Under those circumstances, we cannot say that the Circuit Judge was in error for endorsing the view of the Probate Court that the allegations of the petition did not constitute monomania.
Appellants also assert as a basis for reversal the fact that their petition was dismissed without leave to amend. It appears, however, that appellants never sought leave to amend before coming here. Where a party thus stands mute it must be assumed that he put his best foot forward at the outset.
The judgment of the Circuit Court in sustaining the ruling of the Probate Court is affirmed.
MATHEWS, C.J., and THOMAS, HOBSON and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
TERRELL, J., dissents.
DREW, J., not participating.