Title: State v. Williams

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1099-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Maltese Lavele Williams, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 21, 2015. 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., concurs. (Opinion Filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs by John A. 
Pray and the Frank J. Remington Center, University of Wisconsin 
Law School, and oral argument by John A. Pray. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 75
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2014AP1099-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2013CF30) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Maltese Lavele Williams, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Jeffrey A. Wagner, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.61 (2011-12).1  The court of appeals certified the case 
asking this court to clarify precedent related to erroneous jury 
instructions in criminal trials. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
2 
 
¶2 
Maltese Lavele Williams (Williams) and two accomplices 
attempted to rob Michael Parker (Parker) in Parker's home on the 
evening of January 14, 2013.  During the robbery, Parker and a 
houseguest, Authur Robinson (Robinson), were shot and killed.  
At trial, the jury was given an instruction indicating that they 
could convict Williams of the felony murder of Robinson if the 
defendants had attempted to rob Robinson and the attempted 
robbery caused Robinson's death.  However, the State presented 
insufficient evidence at trial that the defendants had attempted 
to rob Robinson.  Instead, the State relied primarily on the 
theory that the men attempted to rob Parker.  The jury convicted 
Williams of felony murder in Robinson's death even though they 
found Williams not guilty of the attempted robbery of Robinson.2 
¶3 
The parties do not dispute that a valid theory of 
felony murder for the death of Robinson would be that Williams, 
as party to a crime, caused the death of Robinson while engaged 
in an attempted armed robbery of Parker.  However, Williams 
argues that the jury was obligated to follow the instructions 
given to them on felony murder, and that the evidence presented 
was insufficient for the jury to convict him under the 
instructions given.  The State counters that any error in the 
jury instructions only increased the burden on the State, and 
that it is clear that had the jury been given the proper 
                                                 
2 Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Jeffrey A. Wagner presided 
at the trial. 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
3 
 
instruction, the jury still would have found Williams guilty of 
felony murder. 
¶4 
We 
are 
presented 
with 
two 
seemingly 
conflicting 
precedents that address the question at issue.  The first case 
is State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997), in 
which we held that a defendant cannot be convicted on a theory 
of a crime not presented to a jury.  The second case is State v. 
Beamon, 2013 WI 47, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681, in which we 
upheld the conviction of a defendant even though the jury was 
given an instruction that inaccurately added an element——not 
required by the statute——to the crime of fleeing or evading a 
police officer. 
¶5 
In certifying this case for our review, the court of 
appeals noted that "[e]ach of these three cases, Wulff, Beamon, 
and now Williams, appears to present a subtle variation of the 
same issue," and observed that it was "uncertain whether 
Williams is more like Wulff or more like Beamon."  State v. 
Williams, No. 2014AP1099-CR, unpublished certification (Wis. Ct. 
App. Nov. 6, 2014).  The court of appeals also noted that two 
other issues on appeal——ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
related to trial counsel's decision not to strike a juror and 
not to object to the admission of crime scene photographs——
involved the application of settled law.  
¶6 
We hold that a jury instruction may be considered 
erroneous when it describes a theory of criminal culpability 
that was not presented to the jury or it omits a valid theory of 
criminal 
culpability 
that 
was 
presented 
to 
the 
jury.  
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
4 
 
Convictions under erroneous jury instructions are subject to 
harmless error review.  When an erroneous instruction has been 
given but it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
would have convicted the defendant had the proper instruction 
been given, the jury verdict can be affirmed. 
¶7 
Here, based on the strength of the evidence presented 
and the statutory elements that the jury found, it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury still would have 
convicted Williams of felony murder had the jury instruction 
accurately reflected the State's theory of the crime.  We 
therefore hold that the defect in the jury instructions was 
harmless error.  Furthermore, we conclude that Williams was not 
prejudiced by his trial counsel's decision not to strike a juror 
and not to object to the admission of crime scene photographs.   
Accordingly, 
we 
affirm 
the 
circuit 
court's 
judgment 
of 
conviction. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶8 
In the early morning hours of January 15, 2013, 
Milwaukee police responded to a double homicide at a house on 
Milwaukee's south side.  The investigators later learned that 
the killings occurred during a failed drug heist.  The first 
homicide victim, Michael Parker, was found dead in the snow 
across the street from his home.  The second victim, Authur 
Robinson, was found dead on the floor of Parker's kitchen.  Both 
victims died from bullet wounds. 
¶9 
Police recovered a cell phone at the scene of the 
murders and traced the phone to an individual named Dajuan 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
5 
 
Collins.  Collins, in turn, led the police to Williams, who was 
arrested around 3:00 p.m. on January 21, 2013. 
¶10 Milwaukee Police Detective Kent Corbett interviewed 
Williams the next day at the Milwaukee Police Department.  
Williams first denied knowing Parker or Collins, but eventually 
admitted to knowing both.  Williams also admitted that he had 
arranged the drug deal and was at the scene when the homicides 
occurred.  He said that Collins had killed Parker. 
¶11 Williams explained that the events leading up to the 
killings began when Collins called Williams seeking an ounce of 
marijuana.  Williams knew that Parker sold similar quantities, 
so Williams arranged a deal.  Some time later, Williams met up 
with Collins and a third individual, Maurice Dixon.  The three 
of them then walked to Parker's home. 
¶12 When the trio arrived at Parker's home, Williams and 
Collins went inside, while Dixon remained outside.  Williams 
noticed Robinson sleeping in the living room.  Parker called 
Williams into the kitchen, and as Parker and Williams were 
discussing Parker's marijuana, Collins burst into the room 
pointing a gun and demanding the marijuana. 
¶13 Parker attempted to flee and Collins opened fire.  
Collins fired one shot in the kitchen and then followed Parker 
into the living room where Collins fired several additional 
shots. 
¶14 In spite of being shot three times, Parker managed to 
escape through the front door of his home.  After getting 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
6 
 
outside, however, Parker ran across the street, collapsed in the 
snow and died. 
¶15 Williams 
explained 
to 
Detective 
Corbett 
that 
he 
remained in the kitchen until after the initial fusillade.  
Williams then returned to the living room and saw Collins and 
Robinson fighting for control of the gun.  Williams said that he 
exited the house through the front door while Collins and 
Robinson continued to fight. 
¶16 In the initial information filed February 5, 2013, 
after a preliminary examination, Williams was charged with two 
counts of felony murder, with an attempt to commit armed robbery 
as party to a crime as the underlying offense.3  An amended 
information, filed March 13, 2013, amended the charges to two 
counts of first-degree intentional homicide as party to a crime, 
and two counts of attempted robbery as party to a crime.4  
Following some preliminary motions, jury selection for Williams' 
trial began April 22, 2013.5 
¶17 During 
jury 
selection, 
prospective 
jurors 
were 
informed that they might "have to look at photographs from the 
scene that have blood on them, that have people deceased, people 
                                                 
3 Contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.03, 943.32(2), 939.32, and 
939.05. 
4 Contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1)(a), 943.32(1)(a) and 
(2), 939.50(3)(a) and (c), 939.05, and 939.32. 
5 Throughout the pretrial process, Williams and Dixon 
appeared 
together 
as 
co-defendants. 
 
However, 
Dixon 
was 
eventually tried separately. 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
7 
 
with gunshot wounds, the victims in this case.  You may have to 
look at other photographs."  When asked whether viewing this 
type of evidence would cause problems for anyone, several jurors 
expressed reservations about their capacity to examine such 
evidence.  Juror No. 21 explained that her children were the 
source of her reservations about dealing with that type of 
evidence.  In response to a follow-up question, she reiterated 
her doubts, stating, "I don't know if I can look at the 
pictures."  Juror No. 6 expressed similar reservations, stating, 
"As far as the pictures, I can't do that."  Juror No. 12 said: 
"It would be totally gross, grossed out in that situation."  
Jurors Nos. 8 and 9 said they shared these concerns. 
¶18 A short time later, the prospective jurors were again 
asked whether any of them "would not be able to listen to all 
the facts, to hear the testimony and weigh the evidence and make 
a decision in this case?  Anyone feel they would not be able to 
do 
that?" 
 
Despite 
their 
reservations 
about 
seeing 
the 
photographs, none of the jurors raised their hands. 
¶19 Still, Williams' attorney returned to the photograph 
issue.  Juror No. 6 said the photos would make her uncomfortable 
and would probably be something she'd think about all day.  
Juror No. 6 denied that the photos would anger her, but agreed 
that she would find them difficult to view.  Juror No. 12 said 
he felt the same as Juror No. 6. 
¶20 When 
asked 
if 
the 
photographs 
might 
affect 
deliberations, Juror No. 12 answered: "Really hard to say. I 
don't know if I would have a bias or not."  This prompted the 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
8 
 
court to interject with the comment that "everybody would agree 
they're not pleasant pictures to look at . . . .  The question 
is whether or not it would impair your ability to come to [a] 
fair and just result in the matter after listening to the 
testimony."  Juror No. 12 responded that he thought he would be 
a 
little 
biased. 
 
Williams' 
attorney 
immediately 
sought 
clarification of Juror No. 12's comment.  After a brief 
exchange, Juror No. 12 agreed that what he was trying to convey 
was that looking at the pictures would make him feel sympathy 
for the victims. 
¶21 Although potential Jurors 6, 8, 9, and 21, who 
expressed concerns about the photographs, were not selected for 
the trial, Juror No. 12 was seated, and defense counsel never 
moved to strike the juror for cause or by a peremptory strike. 
¶22 Williams' trial lasted a total of four days, during 
which the jury heard testimony from two police officers, a 
lieutenant, five detectives, forensic investigators, a DNA 
analyst, Parker's neighbor, and the medical examiner, Dr. Brian 
Linert, who conducted autopsies on the victims.  Dr. Linert 
testified that Parker had been struck by three bullets.  Dr. 
Linert also testified that Robinson died of a penetrating 
gunshot wound to the chest.  The State entered several exhibits 
into evidence during Dr. Linert's testimony, including a number 
of autopsy photographs depicting Parker's wounds, which the 
State used to clarify the nature, extent and location of 
Parker's wounds.  Similar exhibits were entered relating to 
Robinson, including the autopsy report, a photograph of the 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
9 
 
bullet recovered from Robinson's chest, another showing the 
entrance wound of the fatal shot, and several depicting blunt 
force injuries possibly consistent with an altercation. 
¶23 On the last day of trial, prior to closing arguments, 
the parties and the court discussed jury instructions.  Although 
Williams was charged with first-degree intentional homicide, the 
jury instructions also contemplated a number of lesser included 
offenses, including first-degree reckless homicide and felony 
murder.  Williams' counsel observed, as proposed instructions 
were being discussed, that "the way this case has been charged 
and 
now 
in 
combination 
with 
the 
lesser 
included 
offenses, . . . has created a legal Rubik's Cube that I'm not 
sure [Judge Learned Hand] could untangle." 
¶24 Prior to closing arguments, the court reviewed the 
instructions with the jury.  The court explained that if the 
jury did not find Williams guilty of first-degree intentional or 
reckless homicide, they would need to decide whether Williams 
was guilty of felony murder. 
¶25   The court instructed the jury that "Felony murder 
requires the state to prove the defendant caused the death of 
the victim while committing the crime of attempted armed 
robbery, party to a crime." 
¶26 Later the court again said that felony murder is 
committed by "one who causes the death of another human being 
while attempting to commit the crime of armed robbery, party to 
a crime." 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
10 
 
¶27 The jury was told that to find Williams guilty of 
felony murder, the State must prove the following beyond a 
reasonable doubt "that the defendant attempted to commit the 
crime of armed robbery as a party to a crime, that the death of 
Michael Parker in Count 1 and Authur Robinson in Count 2 was 
caused by the attempt to commit armed robbery, party to a 
crime." 
¶28 Then the court added: "The first element of felony 
murder requires that the defendant attempted to commit the crime 
of armed robbery, party to a crime." 
The crime of armed robbery is committed by one 
who with intent to steal and by the use of or threaten 
to use a dangerous weapon, takes property from the 
presence of the owner by using force against the 
person of the owner with intent to overcome physical 
resistance or physical power to resist the taking or 
carrying away of that property. 
The elements of the crime that the state must 
prove are: 
That 
Michael 
Parker, 
Count 
1, 
and 
Authur 
Robinson, Count 2, was the owner of the property. 
Owner means a person who has possession of the 
property. The defendant or a person with whom the 
defendant was acting as party to a crime, took 
property from the person of Michael Parker, Count 1, 
and Authur Robinson, Count 2, the defendant or person 
with whom the defendant was acting as a party to a 
crime took the property with intent to steal. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶29 Both sides then gave their closing arguments.  During 
the State's closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the 
felony murder charge: 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
11 
 
That the defendant is involved in an attempted 
armed robbery.  And that in the course of that 
attempted armed robbery, a death is caused.  And 
that's felony murder. 
So as to Mr. Parker, it's clearly felony murder.  
It's his home.  He's [nicknamed] Old School.  The 
defendant knows him.  He's going to rob him. 
As 
to 
the 
attempted 
armed 
robbery 
to 
Mr. 
Robinson, he is a member of that household with Mr. 
Parker, as the law indicates.  He is in control of 
that property, the marijuana as well.  And he attempts 
to prevent the taking of that marijuana from the 
premises.  So he is a victim of the attempted armed 
robbery as well. 
But more importantly, whether he's the victim or 
Parker's the victim, he is killed in the course of the 
armed robbery.  So he is a victim of the felony murder 
as well. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶30 During Williams' closing argument, defense counsel 
emphasized the lack of evidence as to an attempted armed robbery 
of Robinson, and the effect that had on the homicide analysis: 
Now, the analysis for Mr. Robinson is nearly 
identical except for the fact there's an added lack of 
evidence when it comes to Robinson. 
There was no evidence that he was the owner of 
any of the property in that house.  There was no 
evidence that he was an employee of Parker; in other 
words, like the store clerk. 
There was no evidence that any demand was made of 
Mr. Robinson for anything.  And there was no evidence 
that any force was used or attempted to be used to get 
him to give up his property. 
So in addition to there being no evidence that 
Williams knew a robbery was going to take place, there 
isn't even evidence that an attempted armed robbery 
occurred as to Robinson. 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
12 
 
So when you get to that, the answer is no and 
your work is done.  You find Mr. Williams not guilty 
of attempted armed robbery of Robinson and not guilty 
of any level of the homicides we've discussed. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶31 During the State's rebuttal, the prosecutor again 
returned to felony murder: 
The last thing [defense counsel] said to you was 
that you have to find that, in this case, the 
defendant attempted, as a party to a crime, to rob 
Authur Robinson in order to find him guilty of the 
death of Authur Robinson under a felony murder.  That 
is not true.  That is simply a blatant misstatement of 
the law. 
Felony murder is a special type of murder under 
the law.  And it's typically used in just this type of 
situation. 
Someone goes into a bank, for instance, a store.  
In this case, a drug house.  The intent is to rob the 
bank, or the store, or the drug house.  And the state 
has to show that there was a robbery or an attempted 
armed robbery in this case taking place. 
But doesn't have to show that Authur Robinson was 
a victim.  Because if in the course of this armed 
robbery anyone is killed, whether it be the bank 
clerk, the bank's security guard, an accomplice, a kid 
walking down the street, if anybody, whether it's 
Authur Robinson, or anyone else was killed while an 
armed robbery of [Michael] Parker is taking place, 
that is felony murder. 
¶32 Following 
deliberations, 
the 
jury 
found 
Williams 
guilty of two counts of felony murder.  The jury also returned 
verdicts for the two counts of attempted armed robbery, despite 
having been instructed not to return those verdicts if they 
found Williams guilty of felony murder.  The jury found Williams 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
13 
 
guilty of the attempted armed robbery of Parker, and not guilty 
of the attempted armed robbery of Robinson. 
¶33 Williams appealed, arguing that there was insufficient 
evidence for a finding of guilt as to the felony murder of 
Robinson and that his trial counsel was ineffective.  The court 
of appeals certified the case for our review, and we granted 
review on December 18, 2014. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶34 We first address whether there was sufficient evidence 
to 
convict 
Williams 
of 
the 
felony 
murder 
of 
Robinson.  
Generally, we give significant deference to jury verdicts in 
criminal cases.  However, "[w]here jury instructions do not 
accurately state the controlling law, we will examine the 
erroneous instructions under the standard for harmless error, 
which presents a question of law for our independent review."  
Beamon, 347 Wis. 2d 559, ¶19 (citing State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, ¶18, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189).  In determining 
whether an error was harmless, we will not overturn the jury 
verdict 
"unless 
the 
evidence, 
viewed 
most 
favorably 
to 
sustaining the conviction, 'is so insufficient in probative 
value and force that it can be said as a matter of law that no 
trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'"  Id., ¶21 (quoting State v. Poellinger, 
153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990)). 
¶35 We also address whether Williams received ineffective 
assistance from his trial counsel.  Claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel are mixed questions of fact and law.  
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
14 
 
State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 
N.W.2d 305.  We uphold the circuit court's findings of fact——
including findings about trial counsel's conduct and strategy——
unless those findings are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Whether trial 
counsel's performance unconstitutionally deprived the defendant 
of the right to counsel is a question of law we review de novo.  
Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶36 Our discussion proceeds in two main parts.  First, we 
address the jury instructions and the question of whether the 
evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction for 
the felony murder of Authur Robinson.  Second, we address 
Williams' 
claims 
that 
his 
trial 
counsel's 
performance 
unconstitutionally deprived him of the right to counsel. 
A. Sufficiency of Evidence 
¶37 We begin by considering whether the evidence presented 
to the jury was sufficient to sustain conviction for the second 
count of felony murder.  This involves an examination of the 
jury instructions and their relationship to the crime charged.  
We start with Wulff and Beamon, the controlling cases. 
i. Wulff and Beamon 
¶38 This court decided Wulff in 1997.  The defendant, 
Brian C. Wulff, was charged with attempted second-degree sexual 
assault following an incident that occurred in La Crosse in the 
early morning hours of September 17, 1993.  Wulff and the 
victim, C.D., had encountered each other at a bar that evening.  
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
15 
 
After C.D. became separated from her friends, Wulff agreed to 
walk her home.  Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d at 145-46. 
¶39 According to C.D., she agreed to let Wulff stay at her 
apartment for the night if Wulff slept on the couch.  C.D. 
testified that she fell asleep in her bedroom fully clothed.  
However, at some point in the night, she awoke completely naked 
with Wulff on top of her attempting to force his erect penis 
into her mouth.  C.D. screamed, and Wulff collected his clothing 
and left.  C.D. discovered that her tampon had been removed but 
she had no memory of how.  Id. at 146. 
¶40 C.D. was examined at the hospital.  Cervical, oral, 
and anal swabs revealed that no semen was present, and no semen 
was found on the tampon that had been removed.  Combings taken 
from C.D. did not include any of Wulff's hair, and combings 
taken from Wulff did not include any of C.D.'s hair.  Id. at 
146-47. 
¶41 Wulff was charged with attempted second-degree sexual 
assault in an information that used the precise language of the 
statute.  The information stated that Wulff had attempted 
"sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who the 
defendant knows is unconscious."  Id. at 148.  The relevant 
statute defined "sexual intercourse" as including "[vulvar 
penetration] 
as 
well 
as . . . fellatio, 
or . . . any 
other 
intrusion, 
however 
slight, 
of 
any 
part 
of 
a 
person's 
body . . . into the genital or anal opening either by the 
defendant or upon the defendant's instruction."  Id. (quoting 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(5)(c) (1993-94)).  In its closing argument, 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
16 
 
the State presented theories of attempted sexual contact, 
attempted sexual intercourse by fellatio, and attempted sexual 
intercourse by vulvar penetration.  However, when the jury was 
instructed on the charge, the court's instruction omitted 
fellatio as a possible avenue for finding criminal liability.6  
Despite this omission, the jury found Wulff guilty.  Id. at 148-
49. 
¶42 Wulff appealed, contending that there was no evidence 
that he had attempted sexual intercourse with C.D. as defined in 
the jury instructions.  This court observed that in Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980), the Supreme Court 
                                                 
6 Specifically, the jury instruction given was as follows: 
Take the law as it is given in the jury's 
instructions and apply the law to the facts in the 
case which are properly proven by the evidence.  
Consider only the evidence received during this trial 
and the law as given to you by these instructions and 
from these alone, guided by your soundest judgment, 
reach your verdict. 
The crime of second degree sexual assault is 
committed by: 
A person who has sexual intercourse with a person 
the defendant knows is unconscious. 
The first element requires that the defendant had 
sexual intercourse with [C.D.] 
"Sexual intercourse" means any intrusion, however 
slight, by any part of a person's body or of any 
object, into the genital or anal opening of another.  
Emission of semen is not required. 
State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 148, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997). 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
17 
 
stated "we cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a 
theory not presented to the jury."  Thus, although the State had 
provided sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict on the 
theory of attempted fellatio, this court reversed the conviction 
because the theory of attempted fellatio had not been given as a 
part of the jury instructions.  Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d at 154. 
¶43 In 2013 this court revisited the issue of faulty jury 
instructions in Beamon.  In the early morning hours of November 
19, 2007, Racine police officers were involved in the pursuit of 
a vehicle driven by Courtney C. Beamon.  Id., ¶¶5-6, 11.  While 
being pursued by a police car with its emergency lights and 
siren activated, Beamon's vehicle reached speeds of 45-50 miles 
per hour on city streets without the headlights activated.  Id., 
¶7.  Shortly after driving through an intersection controlled by 
a four-way stop sign without stopping or slowing down, Beamon 
rolled out of the vehicle with the vehicle still in motion.  
Id., ¶¶8-9.  The vehicle ran over Beamon's legs and collided 
with a parked car; but Beamon fled on foot before being 
apprehended after a lengthy chase.  Id., ¶¶9-10. 
¶44 Beamon was charged with multiple counts, including 
"Vehicle Operator Flee/Elude Officer, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.04(3)" (2007-08).  Id., ¶11.  The information stated in 
relation to the charge: 
On or about 11–19–2007 . . . [defendant Beamon 
did] unlawfully and feloniously, as the operator of a 
vehicle, after having received a visual or audible 
signal from a traffic officer, or marked police 
vehicle, knowingly flee or attempt to elude any 
traffic officer by willful or wanton disregard of such 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
18 
 
signal so as to interfere with or endanger the 
operation of the police vehicle, or the traffic 
officer or other vehicles or pedestrians, or did 
increase the speed of the vehicle or extinguish the 
lights of the vehicle in an attempt to elude or 
flee . . . . 
Id. (alterations in original).  This information closely tracked 
the language of the statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) (2007-
08). 
¶45 However, the jury instructions did not follow the 
information or the statute.  Instead, the jury instructions 
stated that a person violates the statute "by willful disregard 
of [a police emergency] signal so as to interfere with or 
endanger the traffic officer by increasing the speed of the 
vehicle to flee."  Id., ¶15 (emphasis added). 
¶46 Missing from the jury instruction was the key word  
"or" before the clause "by increasing the speed of the vehicle."7  
See Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) (2007-08).  As a result, the jury 
instruction appeared to require that the defendant be found to 
have interfered with or endangered the officer by increasing the 
speed of the vehicle.  The State never presented evidence to the 
jury that Beamon accelerated his vehicle.  Nevertheless, the 
jury convicted him of the charge. 
¶47 This court affirmed the conviction.  Beamon, 347 
Wis. 2d 559, ¶4.  First, we noted that it is inappropriate to 
                                                 
7 A person could also violate the law by extinguishing the 
lights on the vehicle in an attempt to flee; however, that seems 
not to have been an issue in the case because Beamon apparently 
never turned the vehicle's lights on.  See State v. Beamon, 2013 
WI 47, ¶6, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681. 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
19 
 
measure the sufficiency of evidence against a jury instruction 
that provides an erroneous statement of the law, as "doing so 
would, in effect, allow the parties and the circuit court in 
that case to define an ad hoc, common law crime."  Id., ¶23.  
Such a possibility would violate the principle of Wisconsin law 
that crimes are defined only by the legislature.  Id. (citing 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.10, 939.12). 
¶48 Second, we acknowledged that faulty jury instructions 
are subject to harmless error review.  Id., ¶24 (citing Hedgpeth 
v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61 (2008); Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 11 (1999)).  Harmless error review applies both to jury 
instructions that have omissions and to jury instructions that 
place an additional burden on the State.  Id., ¶¶24-25.  
"Therefore, where a jury instruction erroneously states the 
applicable statute, we must determine whether, under the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
the 
erroneous 
instruction 
constituted harmless error."  Id., ¶27 (citing Harvey, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶46). 
¶49 Applying these principles, the court determined that 
the jury instruction given on fleeing or evading an officer was 
erroneous in that it "combined two alternative methods of 
proving the second requirement of the offense," but that the 
error was harmless.  Id., ¶¶35, 37.  We concluded that the error 
was harmless because it was "clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the jury would have convicted Beamon" had the jury 
instruction been correct.  Id., ¶37. 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
20 
 
¶50 The court also took care to distinguish Wulff.  We 
identified two significant ways in which Beamon's case was 
different.  We noted that in Wulff, the jury was given an 
accurate instruction that merely omitted a possible avenue for 
finding the defendant guilty——and all of the evidence presented 
related to that omitted avenue.  Id., ¶44.  We also explained 
that Wulff predated the court's adoption of the harmless error 
test in Harvey, and thus did not consider harmless error.  Id., 
¶46. 
ii. Clarification of the Rule 
¶51 With this background in mind, we turn to the rule to 
be gleaned from our prior case law on the subject of sufficiency 
of evidence and erroneous jury instructions.  First, we 
reiterate that errant jury instructions are subject to harmless 
error analysis.  See Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 61; Neder, 527 U.S. 
at 
11; 
Beamon, 
347 
Wis. 2d 559, 
¶¶24-25; 
Harvey, 
254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶47.  See also Wis. Stat. § 805.18.  This includes 
errors that omit an element, cf. State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, 
¶¶60-63, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410, as well as errors that 
create 
requirements 
beyond 
the 
statute. 
 
Beamon, 
347 
Wis. 2d 559, ¶25.  See also State v. Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d 34, 
48-49, 387 N.W.2d 55 (1986); State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 
715-16, 247 N.W.2d 714 (1976). 
¶52 In addition to having precedential support, this 
holding represents sound policy.  As this court noted in Wulff, 
a criminal defendant whose conviction is overturned due to 
insufficient evidence cannot be retried for that crime.  Wulff, 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
21 
 
207 Wis. 2d at 153.  This all-or-nothing proposition would yield 
extraordinary results if appellate courts could not review even 
simple scriveners' errors in jury instructions for harmlessness.  
We 
do 
not 
think 
that 
the 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions require that criminals go free simply because of 
typos.  A more reasonable approach is available. 
¶53 The application of harmless error analysis to jury 
instructions in sufficiency-of-evidence cases asks two basic 
questions.  First, was the jury instruction erroneous?  Second, 
is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury still would 
have convicted the defendant had the correct instruction been 
provided? 
¶54 In Beamon, we identified one way in which a jury 
instruction can be erroneous: "a jury instruction that does not 
accurately state the statutory requirements for the crime 
charged constitutes an erroneous statement of the law."  Beamon, 
347 Wis. 2d 559, ¶24.  However, it would oversimplify the law to 
hold that a jury instruction for a crime is erroneous only if 
the instruction omits an element or includes an extra element. 
¶55 The statutory elements of some crimes may be highly 
context-specific.  See id., ¶55 (Bradley, J., dissenting) 
("[C]ourts 
throughout 
this 
state 
regularly 
give 
jury 
instructions that contain factual theories of prosecution.").  
If the State pursues charges on one theory for a crime, it 
cannot be said that a jury instruction is erroneous if it omits 
theories of the crime that were not presented to the jury.  This 
is particularly true with crimes such as felony murder, for 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
22 
 
which there are a number of possible underlying crimes.8  For 
example, a jury instruction in a felony murder case involving an 
armed robbery does not need to inform the jury that felony 
murder can occur during the course of a sexual assault. 
¶56 On the other hand, we think it is apparent that jury 
instructions can be considered erroneous if they instruct the 
jury on a theory of the crime that was not presented to the 
jury. 
¶57 In much the same way, jury instructions may be 
erroneous if they fail to instruct the jury on the theory of the 
crime that was presented to the jury during trial.  See Manning 
v. Kentucky, 23 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Ky. 2000) ("A trial court is 
required to instruct on every theory of the case reasonably 
deducible from the evidence.").  The jury instructions in Wulff 
are an example of this type of error.  In a sense, these jury 
instructions are erroneous because they do not "accurately state 
the statutory requirements for the crime charged" as applicable 
to the facts presented.  Beamon, 347 Wis. 2d 559, ¶24.  This 
concept is a mere variant of the established principles 
discussed above.   
                                                 
8 "Whoever causes the death of another human being while 
committing or attempting to commit a crime specified in s. 
940.19, 940.195, 940.20, 940.201, 940.203, 940.225 (1) or (2) 
(a), 940.30, 940.31, 943.02, 943.10 (2), 943.23 (1g), or 943.32 
(2)" is guilty of felony murder.  Wis. Stat. § 940.03.  This 
list of crimes includes battery (§ 940.19), sexual assault 
(§ 940.225), arson (§ 943.02), and robbery (§ 943.32). 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
23 
 
¶58 In concluding that erroneous jury instructions are 
subject to harmless error analysis, we do not mean to discount 
the 
vital 
importance 
of 
correct 
instructions 
to 
the 
administration of justice.  The State has the burden of 
developing and presenting a theory of the crime to the jury.  
State v. Velez, 224 Wis. 2d 1, 15-16, 589 N.W.2d 9 (1999).  The 
State cannot second-guess its theory or theories after trial, 
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236, and jury instructions must be 
expected to control jurors' deliberations. 
¶59 In any event, not every erroneous jury instruction is 
harmless, so we turn now to how some erroneous instructions may 
be considered harmless.  To affirm a conviction based on an 
erroneous instruction, a court must be convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the jury still would have convicted the 
defendant of the charge had the correct jury instruction been 
provided.  See Beamon, 347 Wis. 2d 559, ¶4. 
¶60 Simplifying Wulff and Beamon provides illustrations of 
how this concept works in practice.  In Wulff, the defendant was 
charged with a crime that had as its elements A or B or C.9  The 
                                                 
9 Under the relevant statute: 
"Sexual 
intercourse" 
includes 
the 
meaning 
assigned under sec. 939.22(36) ["A"] as well as 
cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal intercourse between 
persons ["B"] or any other intrusion, however slight, 
of any part of a person's body or of any object into 
the genital or anal opening either by the defendant or 
upon the defendant's instruction ["C"]. 
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(5)(c) (1993-94). 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
24 
 
State presented evidence that Wulff had done B.  The jury was 
instructed that they could convict Wulff if he had done C, and 
the jury convicted him.  The conviction was reversed because the 
jury's verdict that Wulff had done C was not sufficient to 
demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have 
concluded that Wulff had done B. 
¶61 In Beamon, the defendant also was charged with a crime 
that had as its elements A or B or C.10  The jury was presented 
only with evidence that Beamon had done A.  However, unlike in 
Wulff, the jury in Beamon was instructed that they could convict 
Beamon if he had done both A and B.  The jury convicted Beamon, 
and the conviction was affirmed because the jury's verdict that 
Beamon had done both A and B was sufficient for this court to be 
certain that the jury would have concluded that Beamon had done 
A. 
¶62 Thus, when an erroneous jury instruction raises the 
State's 
burden 
by 
adding 
an 
element 
not 
necessary 
for 
                                                 
10 Under the relevant statute: 
No operator of a vehicle, after having received a 
visual or audible signal from a traffic officer, or 
marked police vehicle, shall knowingly flee or attempt 
to elude any traffic officer by willful or wanton 
disregard of such signal so as to interfere with or 
endanger the operation of the police vehicle, or the 
traffic officer or other vehicles or pedestrians 
["A"], nor shall the operator increase the speed of 
the operator's vehicle ["B"] or extinguish the lights 
of the vehicle ["C"] in an attempt to elude or flee. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) (2007-08). 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
25 
 
conviction, and the jury convicts, the jury verdict will often 
sufficiently show that the jury would have convicted if 
instructed on the proper elements.  However, if an erroneous 
jury instruction omits an element or instructs on a different 
theory, it will often be difficult to surmise what the jury 
would have done if confronted with a proper instruction, even if 
the jury convicted under the erroneous instruction.  In other 
words, in the latter situation it will be more difficult to 
demonstrate that the error in the jury instruction was harmless. 
¶63 In 
sum, 
what 
constitutes 
an 
"erroneous" 
jury 
instruction 
goes 
beyond 
simple 
misstatements 
of 
statutory 
elements.  Even instructions that provide a correct statement of 
the statutory elements of one way to commit a crime may be 
erroneous in the context of a given case, as, for example, under 
facts similar to those in Wulff.11  These erroneous instructions 
are subject to harmless error review, and a conviction based on 
an erroneous instruction can be upheld if the court is 
convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have 
convicted the defendant if a proper instruction——an instruction 
                                                 
11 Wulff was not analyzed under the harmless error framework 
because it predated this court's adoption of the harmless error 
analysis in State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 
N.W.2d 189.  If this court were to decide Wulff today, it would 
do so under Harvey's harmless error framework. 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
26 
 
that is consistent with both the relevant statute and the 
factual theory presented——had been provided to the jury.12 
iii. Application 
¶64 Having clarified the legal standard for sufficiency-
of-evidence 
claims 
in 
cases 
involving 
erroneous 
jury 
instructions, we now examine the case at hand. 
¶65 The evidence relevant to this appeal that the State 
presented at trial focused on establishing three facts: (1) 
Williams participated in an attempted armed robbery of Parker, 
(2) the attempted armed robbery caused the death of Parker, and 
(3) the attempted armed robbery caused the death of Robinson.  
Williams does not contend that the evidence presented at trial 
is insufficient to sustain a finding of these three facts.  
Williams also does not dispute that these three facts are 
sufficient for a finding of guilt for the felony murder of both 
Parker and Robinson.13  Instead, Williams argues that he is 
entitled to acquittal on the felony murder charge related to 
Robinson's death because the jury instruction stated that the 
predicate offense for that charge was the attempted robbery of 
                                                 
12 To be clear, this is not a new harmless error test.  
Instead, we merely describe how the harmless error test adopted 
in Harvey applies in the context of erroneous jury instructions. 
13 See State v. Rivera, 184 Wis. 2d 485, 487-90, 516 
N.W.2d 391 (1994). 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
27 
 
Robinson himself and the State did not present sufficient 
evidence of such an attempt.14 
¶66 Williams contends that this case is similar to Wulff 
because the jury instruction described one possible way, 
consistent with the statute, that the crime of felony murder 
could be committed.  The jury instruction in question, which 
defined armed robbery as the predicate offense for felony 
murder, is worth quoting at length: 
That 
Michael 
Parker, 
Count 
1, 
and 
Authur 
Robinson, Count 2, was [sic] the owner of the 
property. 
The defendant or a person with whom the defendant 
was acting as party to a crime, took property from the 
person 
of 
Michael 
Parker, 
Count 
1, 
and 
Authur 
Robinson, Count 2, the defendant or person with whom 
the defendant was acting as a party to a crime took 
the property with intent to steal. 
 . . . . 
Forcibly means that the person or persons with 
whom the defendant was acting as a party to a crime 
used force against Michael Parker, Count 1, and Authur 
Robinson, Count 2, with the intent to overcome or 
prevent the physical resistance or physical power of 
resistance to taking and carrying away the property. 
                                                 
14 One of the many charges submitted to the jury was for the 
attempted robbery of Robinson.  Despite being instructed not to 
complete the verdict form for this charge if they found Williams 
guilty of felony murder, the jury did complete the form——and 
found Williams not guilty of the attempted robbery of Robinson.  
In light of this, the State does not argue that there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict of felony murder 
for the death of Robinson if the predicate offense was the 
attempted robbery of Robinson. 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
28 
 
¶67 The jury instruction suggests that finding Williams 
guilty of Count 2 (i.e., felony murder of Robinson) required 
theft of Robinson's property.  However, the parties agree that 
the felony murder statute does not require such proof, and the 
State clearly did not limit itself to that theory at trial.  In 
his closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized exactly the 
opposite: 
The last thing [defense counsel] said to you was 
that 
you 
have 
to 
find 
that . . . the 
defendant 
attempted, as a party to a crime, to rob Authur 
Robinson in order to find him guilty of the death of 
Authur Robinson under a [sic] felony murder.  That is 
not true.  That is simply a blatant misstatement of 
the law. 
 . . . . 
[The State] doesn't have to show that Authur Robinson 
was a victim [of attempted robbery].  Because if in 
the course of this armed robbery anyone is killed, 
whether it be the bank clerk, the security guard, an 
accomplice, a kid walking down the street, if anybody, 
whether it's Authur Robinson, or anyone else was 
killed while an armed robbery of [Michael] Parker is 
taking place, that is felony murder. 
¶68 The prosecutor's contradiction of the jury instruction 
describes a different legal theory under which the jury could 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
29 
 
convict Williams of felony murder.15  Given that it is the role 
of the prosecutor to decide what charges to bring, see State v. 
Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979), we conclude 
that the jury instruction——which did not accurately reflect the 
State's predominant theory of the case (as evidenced by the 
State's closing argument)——was erroneous. 
¶69 Williams' argument that this case is more like Wulff 
than Beamon largely misses the point, as Wulff and Beamon are 
not that dissimilar.  Both cases involved erroneous jury 
instructions.  The approach in each case was different because, 
as we pointed out in Beamon, Wulff predated Wisconsin's modern 
formulation 
of 
the 
harmless 
error 
test. 
 
Beamon, 
347 
Wis. 2d 559, ¶46.  The real difference between Wulff and Beamon—
—under modern harmless error analysis——is the way in which the 
nature of each erroneous jury instruction affected the court's 
ability to conclude whether the jury still would have convicted 
if given a proper instruction.  
                                                 
15 The State contends that Williams' failure to object to 
the prosecutor's statement during closing arguments means that 
the argument is now forfeited, and Williams can pursue only an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim for his trial counsel's 
failure to object at that time.  However, Williams is not 
challenging the prosecutor's statement in this appeal; Williams 
is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
jury's verdict.  The State provides no authority to support its 
argument that a defendant's failure to object to a portion of a 
closing argument somehow changes the relationship between jury 
instructions and sufficiency of evidence.  Accordingly, we 
proceed with our analysis using the framework described above 
rather than an ineffective assistance of counsel framework. 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
30 
 
¶70 This brings us to the question of whether it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury still would have 
convicted Williams of felony murder for the death of Robinson 
had the proper jury instruction been given. 
¶71 The erroneous jury instruction essentially required 
four elements for two counts of felony murder: (1) the attempted 
robbery of Parker, (2) the death of Parker, (3) the attempted 
robbery of Robinson, and (4) the death of Robinson.  The 
appropriate jury instruction, which would comport with the 
prosecutor's theory, would have required only 1, 2, and 4 to 
convict on both counts. 
¶72 We are convinced that the jury's guilty verdict on all 
four elements provides certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the jury would have returned a guilty verdict if the instruction 
had required three of those four elements.  The strength of the 
State's evidence supports this conclusion.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the erroneous jury instruction in this case was harmless 
error, and that there was sufficient evidence to convict 
Williams of felony murder in connection with Robinson's death. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶73 Having resolved the issue presented for certification, 
this court has two procedural alternatives for resolving the 
remaining 
issue 
of 
whether 
Williams 
received 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel: We can remand the case to the court of 
appeals or decide the issue here and now.  In the interests of 
providing the defendant a timely resolution of his case and 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
31 
 
preserving judicial resources, we have chosen to decide the 
remaining issue now. 
¶74 Wisconsin 
has 
adopted 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's two-pronged Strickland test to analyze claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 127, 449 
N.W.2d 845 (1990).  To prevail under Strickland, a defendant 
must prove that counsel's representation was both deficient and 
prejudicial.  State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596 
N.W.2d 749 (1999).  Deficient performance means that defendant's 
counsel's conduct "so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.  
Prejudice means that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
there is a reasonable probability that the trial's outcome would 
have been different.  Id. at 694.  A reasonable probability is 
"a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."  Id.  Courts may apply the deficient performance and 
prejudice tests in either order, and may forgo the deficient 
performance analysis altogether if the defendant has not shown 
prejudice.  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 128. 
¶75 Williams presents two arguments in support of his 
contention that he was afforded ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  We do not review the arguments in isolation, but 
instead make our determination based on whether the cumulative 
effect is sufficient to undermine the outcome of the trial.  
Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶63.  Williams first argues that his 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
32 
 
counsel was ineffective because counsel did not move to strike a 
juror who——during voir dire——expressed an aversion to viewing 
crime scene photographs.  Williams' second argument is that his 
attorney's assistance was ineffective because the attorney did 
not object when the State offered photographs depicting the 
crime scene and the victims' bodies. 
¶76 We disagree with both of Williams' arguments and hold 
that Williams was not prejudiced by his counsel's trial 
performance.  Because Williams was not prejudiced, there is no 
need to determine whether his attorney's performance was 
deficient.  See Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 128.  We address each 
argument in turn. 
i. Voir Dire 
¶77 Williams argues that his right to a fair trial was 
compromised because his attorney did not move to strike a juror 
who expressed an aversion to viewing photographs depicting the 
crime scene and the bodies of the victims.  We reject this 
argument and hold that Williams was not prejudiced by his 
counsel's decision not to strike the juror. 
¶78 The 
United 
States 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions 
guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a trial by an 
impartial jury.  See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 7; State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 2, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 62, 606 
N.W.2d 207.  A juror who "has expressed or formed any opinion, 
or is aware of any bias or prejudice in the case" should be 
removed from the panel.  Oswald, 232 Wis. 2d 62, ¶16.  See also 
Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1). 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
33 
 
¶79 Here we must ask whether the prospective juror 
demonstrated subjective bias.  "[S]ubjective bias refers to the 
bias that is revealed by the prospective juror on voir dire: it 
refers to the prospective juror's state of mind."  State v. 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 717, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999).  "A 
prospective juror is subjectively biased if the record reflects 
that the juror is not a reasonable person who is sincerely 
willing to set aside any opinion or prior knowledge that the 
prospective juror might have."  Oswald, 232 Wis. 2d 62, ¶19.  
The circuit court is in the best position to determine whether 
subjective bias exists, so "we will uphold the circuit court's 
factual 
finding 
that 
a 
prospective 
juror 
is 
or 
is 
not 
subjectively biased unless it is clearly erroneous."  State v. 
Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶36, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223. 
¶80 Excusing jurors for bias is proper if the juror is 
unreasonable and unwilling to set aside preconceived opinions or 
prior knowledge.  Oswald, 232 Wis. 2d 62, ¶19.  Williams has 
failed to demonstrate that any juror was biased.  It is not 
unreasonable for jurors to experience consternation over the 
prospect of having to view the often disturbing evidence 
presented in criminal cases.  To the contrary, it is a perfectly 
reasonable and normal human response.  In addition to Juror No. 
12, four other prospective jurors asserted that they would have 
difficulty viewing crime scene photos.16  Both the prosecutor and 
Williams' attorney questioned the jurors on the issue. 
                                                 
16 Juror 6, Juror 8, Juror 9, and Juror 21. 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
34 
 
¶81 Williams' focus on Juror No. 12's statements is based 
on his use of the term "bias" while attempting to articulate the 
juror's feelings about having to view photographs of the 
victims.  Juror No. 12, however, did not use the term to 
describe the type of subjective bias that would preclude him 
from serving on the jury.  Rather, Juror No. 12, like the 
others, was attempting to articulate his preference not to view 
victim photographs, and explained that viewing the photographs 
might make him feel sympathy for the victims.  Moreover, after 
being advised that photographic evidence of the victims would be 
presented, the jurors were specifically asked whether any of 
them would be unable to render an impartial decision, and Juror 
No. 12 did not come forward. 
¶82 The unfortunate reality of our justice system is that 
jurors are often called upon to examine evidence of heinous acts 
committed against other human beings.  While most jurors would 
prefer never to see such evidence, that preference does not 
render them biased or incapable of impartiality as a matter of 
law. 
¶83 In sum, we do not believe that Juror No. 12's comments 
reflect a "bias" against the defendant as that concept is 
understood in the law, but merely reservations about having to 
view disturbing photographs.  Without a showing that Juror No. 
12 was biased, Williams cannot prove that he was prejudiced by 
his trial counsel's decision not to strike Juror No. 12. 
ii. Crime Scene Photographs 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
35 
 
¶84 "Whether photographs are to be admitted is a matter 
within the trial court's discretion."  State v. Pfaff, 2004 WI 
App 31, ¶34, 269 Wis. 2d 786, 676 N.W.2d 562.  An appellate 
court "will not disturb the court's discretionary decision 
unless it is wholly unreasonable or the only purpose of the 
photographs is to inflame and prejudice the jury."  Id.  In 
State v. Sage, 87 Wis. 2d 783, 788, 275 N.W.2d 705 (1979), we 
held that: 
Photographs should be admitted if they will help the 
jury gain a better understanding of material facts; 
they should be excluded if they are not "substantially 
necessary" to show material facts and will tend to 
create sympathy or indignation or direct the jury's 
attention to improper considerations. 
¶85 Here, Williams argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to the admission of photographs 
depicting the crime scene and the victims' fatal wounds.  Having 
reviewed each of the photographs used as exhibits at Williams' 
trial, we conclude that they were neither overly gruesome nor 
unfairly prejudicial.  The purpose of the photographs was to 
prove an element of the crimes charged (the deaths of the 
victims), not to inflame the jury.  Put another way, the 
probative value of the photographs was not "substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03.  In addition, the photographs likely were useful in 
helping the jury garner a more thorough understanding of the 
events on the night of the killings. 
¶86 Because 
the 
State 
used 
the 
photographs 
for 
a 
legitimate purpose, the photographs could have been properly 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
36 
 
admitted into evidence regardless of whether or not Williams' 
attorney had raised an objection.  See Sage, 87 Wis. 2d at 788.  
Thus, Williams was not prejudiced by the lack of objection, and 
without prejudice, Williams cannot prevail on his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶87 Williams briefly raises the argument that the evidence 
was cumulative because Williams was willing to stipulate to the 
manner of death.  However, in State v. Lindvig, 205 Wis. 2d 100, 
108, 555 N.W.2d 197 (Ct. App. 1996), the court of appeals 
rejected 
the 
argument 
that 
a 
defendant's 
willingness 
to 
stipulate to an element could render photographs inadmissible.  
Instead, the court ruled that even if the defendant is willing 
to stipulate to an element, "[e]vidence is always admissible to 
prove an element of the charged crime even if the defendant does 
not dispute it at trial."  Id. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶88 We hold that a jury instruction may be considered 
erroneous when it describes a theory of criminal culpability 
that was not presented to the jury or omits a valid theory of 
criminal 
culpability 
that 
was 
presented 
to 
the 
jury.  
Convictions under erroneous jury instructions are subject to 
harmless error review.  When an erroneous instruction has been 
given but it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
would have convicted the defendant had the proper instruction 
been given, the jury verdict can be affirmed. 
¶89 Here, based on the strength of the evidence presented 
and the statutory elements that the jury found, it is clear 
No. 
  2014AP1099-CR 
37 
 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury still would have 
convicted Williams of felony murder had the jury instruction 
accurately reflected the State's theory of the crime.  We 
therefore hold that the defect in the jury instructions was 
harmless error.  Furthermore, we conclude that Williams was not 
prejudiced by his trial counsel's decision not to strike a juror 
and not to object to the admission of crime scene photographs.   
Accordingly, 
we 
affirm 
the 
circuit 
court's 
judgment 
of 
conviction. 
 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are affirmed. 
 
No.  2014AP1099-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶90 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  Although I 
agree that the judgment and order should be affirmed, I do not 
join the majority opinion.  
¶91 The court took the instant case to clarify precedent 
related to erroneous jury instructions in criminal trials.  I am 
not sure it successfully accomplishes this goal. 
¶92 The 
majority 
opinion 
is 
unclear 
regarding 
the 
relationship between harmless error review and review of the 
sufficiency of evidence.  This confusion seems to stem from the 
confusion in State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶¶19, 20, 46, 50, 51, 
347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 706, on which the majority opinion 
relies.  As I see it, harmless error analysis renders a 
sufficiency of the evidence analysis redundant.  The majority 
opinion's statement of its approach in ¶53 ("First, was the jury 
instruction erroneous?  Second, is it clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the jury still would have convicted the defendant had 
the correct instruction been provided?") seems to incorporate 
only a harmless error analysis, not a sufficiency of the 
evidence analysis.  But Beamon sets forth and applies the two 
analyses separately.  The majority opinion cites and quotes 
Beamon, masking the majority opinion's rejection of Beamon's 
two-step analysis. 
¶93 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.  
No.  2014AP1099-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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