Title: Commonwealth v. Richards

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12466 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ERIC A. RICHARDS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 10, 2018. - September 5, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, License to operate, Operating under the 
influence.  Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on September 26, 2017. 
 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
 
Robert J. Bender, Assistant District Attorney (Timothy 
Ferriter, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Steven M. Vaillancourt (Andrew Sprow also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  In 2010, the defendant's driver's license was 
suspended for his refusal to consent to a breathalyzer after his 
arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol (OUI).  Because the defendant had three prior 
convictions of OUI when he refused the breathalyzer, his license 
2 
 
was subject to a lifetime suspension.  The defendant was later 
found not guilty of the 2010 OUI charge, and he immediately 
moved to have his license restored, pursuant to G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1).  His motion was denied.  The defendant made 
three subsequent motions for restoration of his license in 2011, 
2015, and 2017.  A judge in the District Court granted the 
defendant's 2017 motion for restoration of his license. 
 
The Commonwealth filed a petition for relief with the 
single justice, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, arguing that the 
defendant's license could not be restored under the statute 
because he was entitled only to an "immediate" hearing on 
restoration of his license, not one held seven years later, and 
that allowance of the motion for the reasons stated by the judge 
would essentially amount to an unconstitutional reformulation of 
the statute.  The single justice reserved and reported the case 
to the full court.  Because the plain language of the statute 
and the legislative history preclude the relief requested, we 
reverse. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Statutory scheme.  "In Massachusetts, 
one's right to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege 
voluntarily granted. . . .  Continued possession of this 
privilege is conditioned on obedience to the Legislature's 
comprehensive regulatory scheme aimed at regulating the 
motorways and keeping them safe."  Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 
3 
 
Mass. 415, 423 (1995).  Toward this end, an individual who 
drives on a public road is "deemed to have consented to submit 
to a chemical test or analysis of his breath or blood in the 
event that he is arrested for operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor."  G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1).  Failing or refusing to take such a test 
results in license suspension.  Id.  Such "suspension serves to 
deter persons from driving while intoxicated; it effectuates the 
Commonwealth's interest in obtaining reliable and relevant 
evidence by inducing suspected drunk drivers to take the breath 
test; and it promotes safety on the highways by summary removal 
of dangerous drivers."  Luk, supra at 425.  See Mackey v. 
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (same). 
 
A comparison of the suspensions imposed on, and remedies 
available to, drivers who take the breathalyzer test and those 
who refuse it is informative.  An individual who fails the 
breathalyzer and is subsequently convicted of OUI faces 
significant suspension consequences.  See G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (c).  Individuals with no prior OUI convictions who are 
subsequently convicted of OUI face a one-year suspension of 
their license.  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (c) (1).  Individuals with 
one prior OUI conviction face a two-year suspension.  G. L. 
c. 90, § 24 (1) (c) (2).  Individuals with two prior OUI 
convictions face an eight-year suspension.  G. L. c. 90, 
4 
 
§ 24 (1) (c) (3).  Individuals with three prior OUI convictions 
face a ten-year suspension.  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (c) (3 ½).  
Individuals with four prior OUI convictions face a lifetime 
suspension.  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (c) (3 ¾).  When an 
individual's license is suspended pursuant to § 24 (1) (c), the 
statute permits the individual to apply for issuance of a 
limited license on the ground of hardship.  The statute does 
not, however, permit individuals subject to a lifetime 
suspension to seek such a hardship license.  See G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (c) (3 ¾). 
 
An individual who refuses to take the breathalyzer faces 
suspension consequences irrespective of whether he or she is 
subsequently convicted of OUI.  See G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1).  Individuals with no prior OUI convictions who 
refuse to take the test face a 180-day suspension of their 
license.  Id.  Individuals with one prior OUI conviction face a 
three-year suspension.  Id.  Individuals with two prior OUI 
convictions face a five-year suspension.  Id.  Individuals with 
three prior OUI convictions face a lifetime suspension.  Id.  
Unlike nonlifetime suspensions imposed pursuant to § 24 (1) (c), 
if an individual's license is suspended for refusing to take the 
5 
 
breathalyzer, the individual is not permitted to apply for a 
hardship license.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).1 
 
The statute does, however, provide an avenue for relief for 
individuals who refuse to take the test but are subsequently 
acquitted of OUI.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  The 
statute provides:   
"the defendant may immediately, upon the entry of a not 
guilty finding or dismissal of all charges under this 
section, . . . and in the absence of any other alcohol 
related charges pending against said defendant, apply for 
and be immediately granted a hearing before the court which 
took final action on the charges for the purpose of 
requesting the restoration of said license.  At said 
hearing, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that said 
license be restored, unless the commonwealth shall 
establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that 
restoration of said license would likely endanger the 
public safety.  In all such instances, the court shall 
issue written findings of fact with its decision." 
 
Id.  On appeal, we must determine whether the statute authorizes 
a defendant who was acquitted to make belated, additional 
motions to restore his or her license after his or her immediate 
motion is denied.  For the reasons discussed, we conclude that 
it does not. 
 
b.  Facts.  On May 6, 2010, the defendant was arrested for 
OUI.  He had three prior OUI convictions from 1989, 1996, and 
                     
 
1 Where a defendant refuses the breathalyzer and is later 
convicted, the suspension period triggered by the conviction 
will "run consecutively and not concurrently" with the 
suspension triggered by the refusal.  See G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1). 
6 
 
2001.  On his arrest, he was informed that if he refused to take 
the breathalyzer, his license would be suspended, pursuant to 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1).  The defendant chose to refuse the test.  His 
license was immediately suspended, and he was charged with OUI, 
fourth offense. 
 
The next day, the registry of motor vehicles suspended the 
defendant's right to operate a motor vehicle for life, pursuant 
to § 24 (1) (f) (1).  The defendant did not seek relief under 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (g).2 
 
On November 8, 2010, a jury found the defendant not guilty 
of OUI, fourth offense, and the defendant immediately moved to 
have his driver's license restored.  The judge who had presided 
over the defendant's trial considered the motion, taking into 
account the evidence presented at trial as well as the police 
report and the defendant's criminal and driving history.  On 
November 16, 2010, the judge issued a ruling denying the motion, 
concluding that "restoration of the defendant's license would 
likely endanger public safety."  The defendant filed a notice of 
                     
 
2 Pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (g), a defendant may 
seek a hearing before the registrar of motor vehicles within 
fifteen days of arrest.  This avenue of relief is very limited, 
however.  At such a hearing, a defendant may contest only the 
following:  (1) whether the police office had reasonable grounds 
to believe the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol; (2) whether the defendant was 
placed under arrest; and (3) whether the defendant refused to 
submit to a breathalyzer or blood test.  Id. 
7 
 
appeal, but ultimately did not seek relief in the Superior 
Court.3 
 
Nine months later, in August, 2011, the defendant filed a 
motion before the same judge to "reconsider" the denial of the 
defendant's motion to restore his driver's license.  Following 
an evidentiary hearing, the judge denied the motion, citing 
facts about the defendant's criminal and driving history from 
the judge's original decision.  The defendant appealed from the 
August, 2011, denial, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of 
prosecution.4 
 
Five years after the denial of the defendant's original 
motion, in November of 2015, the defendant filed a renewed 
motion to restore his driver's license.  He received a hearing 
on the motion in January, 2016.  The 2016 motion judge was not 
the judge from the defendant's trial and first two motions, as 
that judge had since retired.  The 2016 motion judge heard 
additional facts and evidence in support of the defendant's 
motion, but ultimately issued a ruling stating that the motion 
was denied "at this time." 
                     
 
3 Pursuant to our decision in Commonwealth v. Bauer, 455 
Mass. 497, 499-500 (2009), "litigants may obtain review of 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1) license restoration orders entered in the 
District Court by means of a certiorari action brought in the 
Superior Court."  See G. L. c. 249, § 4. 
 
 
4 The stated reason for the dismissal was listed as 
"[b]rief/appendix not received or status report not filed." 
8 
 
 
In August, 2017, nearly seven years after the denial of the 
original motion, the defendant again filed a motion to restore 
his driver's license.  The motion, filed pro se, stated that the 
defendant was seeking to "restore [his] driver's license or try 
to get a work license from 5:00 A.M. [to] 5:00 P.M."  The 
defendant provided additional evidence in support of his motion, 
including "information regarding his long time sobriety, lack of 
any [subsequent] alcohol related offenses, and employment."  The 
2017 motion was heard by a judge who had not presided over any 
of the prior motions or the trial.  The Commonwealth objected to 
the hearing, arguing that G. L. c. 90, § 24, only authorized the 
defendant to receive an immediate hearing before the trial 
judge, which he had received in 2010.  The 2017 motion judge, 
however, determined that nothing in the statute or the case law 
indicated that "an individual is barred by time or requests for 
reconsideration."  She also concluded that the Commonwealth had 
not made this argument at any of the prior motions, and thus the 
Commonwealth's objection was "not timely."  The 2017 motion 
judge further determined that the Commonwealth had "failed to 
establish that reinstatement of [the] defendant's driver's 
license would endanger public safety," and granted the 
defendant's motion.  The order to restore the defendant's 
license has been stayed pending the disposition of this case. 
9 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant characterizes the 
2017 motion judge as ruling on "reconsideration" of the 
defendant's initial 2010 motion for restoration of his license.  
The defendant's 2017 motion was not, however, filed as a motion 
for reconsideration of his 2010 motion.  Indeed, the only motion 
for reconsideration in this case took place in 2011, and was 
heard by the judge who had presided over the trial and who had 
considered the initial motion.  Accordingly, the motion is more 
properly considered a new motion for restoration. 
 
Regardless, whether characterized as a renewed motion for 
restoration or a motion for reconsideration, the 2017 motion was 
not authorized by G. L. c. 90, § 24, as it did not satisfy the 
immediacy requirement of the statute.  Indeed, the judge's 
allowance of such a motion essentially created a judicial 
hardship exception for a defendant who had refused the 
breathalyzer, where the Legislature expressly chose to prohibit 
such a remedy. 
 
To determine the legality of the 2017 motion, we look first 
to the plain meaning of the statutory language in 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1).  See Millis Pub. Sch. v. M.P., 478 Mass. 767, 
775 (2018).  "The effect given to statutory language should be 
consistent with its plain language."  Retirement Bd. of Stoneham 
v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 476 Mass. 130, 135 
(2016).  "Where the language is clear and unambiguous, it is to 
10 
 
be given its 'ordinary meaning.'"  Millis Pub. Sch., supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Mogelinksi, 466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013). 
 
Here, the statute provides that the defendant "may 
immediately, upon the entry of a not guilty finding or dismissal 
of all charges under this section," move to request restoration 
of his or her license.  G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  The text 
does not state that the defendant may move for, or receive, such 
hearing again at a later time.  Indeed, the statute makes 
reference to the immediate nature of the proceeding not once, 
but twice.  It provides for a defendant to make a motion for 
restoration of his or her license "immediately," and a hearing 
on such motion must be granted "immediately."  See id.  The 
statute also requires such motion to be made "before the court 
which took final action on the charges."  Id.  Thus, by its 
plain language, the statutory provision indicates that such 
motions are to be made and heard immediately after the 
defendant's acquittal, by the court which presided over the OUI 
proceedings, based on the defendant's circumstances at the time 
of the acquittal, not years later.5 
 
By requiring an "immediate" motion and an "immediate" 
hearing before the judge who presided over the OUI proceedings, 
the plain language also indicates that the Legislature intended 
                     
 
5 Those circumstances would include his prior driving 
record, and other evidence of alcohol abuse. 
11 
 
for the determination whether restoration "would likely endanger 
the public safety" to be made on the basis of the facts as they 
exist at the time of the defendant's acquittal, and in the 
context of the evidence that was then presented.  See Water 
Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 
740, 744 (2010) (language of statute is primary source of 
insight into legislative intent). 
 
Nevertheless, the defendant contends that the provision 
should be read broadly to permit the defendant to make such a 
motion immediately, but not require it.  The defendant also 
asserts that additional information, including the defendant's 
circumstances years after the acquittal, may be appropriately 
considered.  Indeed, the 2017 motion judge's ruling was based 
entirely on new information, particularly the defendant's 
continued sobriety in the intervening years, lack of subsequent 
offenses, and gainful employment.  This is the very type of 
information that would be considered by the registrar of motor 
vehicles (registrar) when deciding whether to issue a hardship 
license under § 24 (1) (c) for defendants who had taken the 
breathalyzer test. 
Such an expansive reading of § 24 (1) (f) (1) ignores other 
relevant provisions of the statute and the over-all statutory 
scheme.  "[I]f reasonably possible, all parts [of a statute 
must] be construed as consistent with each other" (citation 
12 
 
omitted).  Custody of Victoria, 473 Mass. 64, 73 (2015).  When 
the language is read in context, it is clear that the 
Legislature intended the motion for restoration to be a very 
limited, time-defined exception to the general rules of 
suspension for refusal.  The preceding phrase in the statute 
provides that, for defendants whose license has been suspended 
for refusing the breathalyzer, "[n]o license or right to operate 
shall be restored under any circumstances" (emphasis added).  
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f) (1).  Section 24 (1) (f) (1) also 
explicitly provides that "no restricted or hardship permits 
shall be issued during the suspension period imposed by [this 
section]" (emphasis added).  These categorical prohibitions 
apply to all defendants who refused to take a breathalyzer, not 
just those with multiple OUI convictions. 
This type of categorical prohibition also stands in express 
and stark contrast to the more open-ended hardship exception 
available under § 24 (1) (c) to defendants who agreed to take 
the breathalyzer and were convicted.  Such defendants may apply 
for a hardship exception unless they have four prior OUI 
convictions.  See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (c) (3 ¾).  For example, 
defendants with three prior OUI convictions who consent to the 
breathalyzer and are convicted may apply for a hardship 
exception under the following conditions: 
13 
 
"such person may, after the expiration of five years from 
the date of the conviction, apply for and shall be granted 
a hearing before the registrar for the purpose of 
requesting the issuance of a new license for employment or 
education purposes which license shall be effective for an 
identical twelve hour period every day on the grounds of 
hardship and a showing by the person that the causes of the 
present and past violations have been dealt with or brought 
under control and the registrar may, in his discretion, 
issue such license under such terms and conditions as he 
deems appropriate and necessary." 
 
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (c) (3 ½).  Had the defendant in this case 
consented to the breathalyzer and been convicted, he would have 
been able to apply to the registrar for a hardship exception on 
the basis of new information about his sobriety and employment.  
The statute, however, consistently treats those who refuse to 
take the breathalyzer differently.  They are not entitled to 
hardship exceptions, and there is nothing in § 24 (1) (f) (1) to 
the contrary.6 
                     
 
6 There is one exception to the categorical prohibition 
against hardship licenses for those who refuse to take a 
breathalyzer.  See 1 Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Offenses § 1.3 
(Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2d ed. 2009 & Supp. 2016).  
"Notwithstanding the provisions of . . . [G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (1) (f) (1)], [if a court has assigned a defendant to an 
alcohol education, treatment, or rehabilitation program,] a 
defendant may immediately upon entering [such] program . . . 
apply to the registrar for consideration of a limited license 
for hardship purposes."  G. L. c. 90, § 24D.  This avenue for 
relief, however, is also very limited and was not available to 
the defendant in this case.  Eligibility is limited to 
defendants who have either (1) never before been convicted of 
OUI or been assigned to a program; or (2) once before been 
convicted of OUI or assigned to a program, ten or more years 
before the present offense.  See id. 
14 
 
The relevant inquiry is therefore whether, at the time of 
the immediate hearing, restoration of the defendant's license 
"would likely endanger the public safety," not whether "the 
causes of the present and past violations have been dealt with 
or brought under control" at a later date, as in the case of a 
hardship application.  The statutory language, read as a whole, 
clearly and consistently demonstrates that the Legislature 
intended the motion for restoration to be a narrow exception to 
the general rules of suspension for refusal, not the broader, 
more open-ended remedy available for defendants who have taken 
the breathalyzer test.  See Souza v. Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles, 462 Mass. 227, 232 (2012) (use of language in one 
subsection of § 24 but not another is significant). 
 
This understanding of the statutory language is also 
consistent with the legislative history.  The current refusal 
suspension scheme was inserted in 2005, when the Legislature 
enacted Melanie's Law, which "increas[ed] the periods of license 
suspension for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test."  Id. 
at 231.  See St. 2005, c. 122, § 9.  Prior to the passage of 
Melanie's Law, refusing to take a breathalyzer could result in, 
at most, an eighteen-month license suspension.  See 2005 House 
15 
 
Doc. No. 4099.7  The Governor, who filed the original 
legislation, noted that "[t]oo often experienced drunk drivers 
refuse to cooperate with arresting officers, because they know 
that their refusal will significantly increase their changes of 
acquittal."  2005 House Doc. No. 4453.  The changes to the 
refusal suspension scheme were thus designed to "create an 
increased incentive to submit to [breathalyzer or field 
sobriety] tests."  See 2005 House Doc. No. 4099. 
 
Providing defendants with a very narrow avenue for relief 
on acquittal comports with these public safety concerns.  Unlike 
suspensions pursuant to § 24 (1) (c), which target dangerous 
drivers by number of OUI convictions and permit the registrar to 
issue hardship licenses "when the causes of the present and past 
violations have been dealt with or brought under control," 
suspensions pursuant to § 24 (1) (f) (1) target drivers who have 
not fully cooperated with authorities and otherwise stand to 
benefit from refusing to comply with the breathalyzer.  See 
Mackey, 443 U.S. at 19 ("A state plainly has the right to offer 
incentives for taking a test that provides the most reliable 
form of evidence of intoxication for use in subsequent 
                     
 
7 Specifically, under the pre-2005 scheme, refusal resulted 
in a 180-day suspension for drivers with no prior OUI 
convictions, a twelve-month suspension for drivers with one 
prior OUI conviction, and an eighteen-month suspension for 
drivers with two prior OUI convictions.  See 2005 House Doc. No. 
4099. 
16 
 
proceedings").  The avenue for relief under § 24 (1) (f) (1) is 
therefore much narrower and shorter. 
 
If a defendant could continue to make new motions for 
restoration indefinitely, based on considerations that justify 
the hardship exception for those who agreed to take the 
breathalyzer, it would undercut the Legislature's decision to 
impose harsh suspension consequences that discourage refusal.  
Had the Legislature intended to allow an exception for hardship, 
as it does under § 24 (1) (c), it would have so provided.8  
Instead, the Legislature chose to impose harsher consequences 
for refusal than for conviction in order to increase 
breathalyzer compliance and "[decrease] the number of drunk 
drivers who escape the consequences of their actions."  Cf. 2005 
House Doc. No. 4453. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, the decision 
granting the defendant's motion for restoration of his driver's 
license is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
8 We also note that, even under § 24 (1) (c), defendants 
subject to a lifetime suspension are not eligible to apply for a 
hardship license.