Title: Martel v. Stafford

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-126


Scott Martel                                 Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      Rutland Superior Court

George F. Stafford, Administrator            September Term, 1991
of the Estate of Wilhelmina S.
Parker and Ronald J. Gould


Arthur J. O'Dea, J. (opinion and order); Frank G. Mahady, J. (judgment
  order)

Patricia S. Orr and Robert E. Manchester of Manchester Law Offices, P.C.,
  Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

Barbara E. Cory of Dinse, Erdmann & Clapp, Burlington, for defendant-
  appellee


PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ. and Mandeville, D.J.,
          Specially Assigned


     DOOLEY, J.   On April 18, 1985, plaintiff, Scott Martel, was a
passenger in a car being driven by Ronald Gould when it collided with a car
driven by Wilhelmina Parker.  Ms. Parker died from injuries incurred in the
accident.  Alleging that he had incurred injuries as a result of the
drivers' negligence, plaintiff sued Gould and defendant George Stafford,
executor of Parker's estate, on April 18, 1988.  The Rutland Superior
dismissed the action as filed beyond the limitation period imposed by 12
V.S.A. { 557(a), and this appeal followed. (FN1) We affirm.
     It is undisputed that if the limitation period in 12 V.S.A. { 557(a)
controls, this action is barred.  That statute provides that if a person,
against whom an action may be brought, dies before the expiration of the
time within which the action may be commenced, the normal limitation period
ceases to operate as of the date of death.  Then:
         [a]fter the issuance of letters testamentary . . . such
         action, if the cause of action survives, may be com-
         menced . . . against the executor or administrator with-
         in two years, and not after.

Wilhelmina Parker died two days after the accident, and the normal limi-
tation period for tort actions ceased to operate on that date.  Letters of
Administration were issued to defendant Stafford by the Orphans' Court in
Montgomery County, Maryland, on May 21, 1985. (FN2) The two-year period set by 
{557(a) expired in May of 1987.  This action was commenced some eleven months
after that period expired.(FN3)

     Plaintiff argues, however, that the limitation period has not expired
for two reasons:  (a) the limitation period contained in 12 V.S.A. { 557(a)
is tolled by virtue of 14 V.S.A. { 1202; (b) 12 V.S.A. { 557(a) denies
plaintiff due process of law unless actual notice is given to plaintiff of
the issuance of letters testamentary to defendant Stafford.  We take these
claims in order.
     The statute on which plaintiff relies provides in part:
         The running of any statute of limitations measured from
         some event other than death and advertisement for claims
         against a decedent is suspended during the four months
         following the first publication of notice under section
         1201 of this title but resumes thereafter as to claims
         not barred pursuant to the sections which follow.

14 V.S.A. { 1202.  Plaintiff argues that { 1202 applies since 12 V.S.A. {
557(a) is a statute of limitations and it is measured from an event other
than death or the advertisement of claims.  As a result, plaintiff argues,
the running of the two-year period set forth in 12 V.S.A. { 557(a) was
tolled from the opening of the estate until four months after notice to
creditors was given under { 1201.  Since no notice was given, as detailed
below, plaintiff argues that { 1202 continues to toll the statute of
limitations period to this day.
     Section 1202 is part of a group of statutes governing the presentation
of claims to the executor of an estate and is ancillary to a statute com-
monly referred to as a "nonclaim statute."  The nonclaim statute set forth
in 14 V.S.A. { 1203 bars certain claims that are not formally presented to
the estate within a specified time.  The process begins with a notice to
creditors under Rule 64(a) of the Vermont Rules of Probate Procedure.  That
notice includes notice by publication and notice by first class mail "to any
creditor known to or reasonably ascertainable by the executor . . . ."  Id.
However, the probate court can excuse the executor from giving notice
because, among other reasons, "there are no debts existing against the
decedent."  14 V.S.A. { 1201(a)(1).  Defendant certified on August 27, 1985
that no debts existed against the decedent, and the Rutland Probate Court on
August 30, 1985 ordered that defendant was excused from publishing a notice
to creditors.(FN4)
     The core of plaintiff's argument is that defendant improperly certified
that no debts existed when he knew or should have known of plaintiff's
negligence claim.  If we accept this premise, then defendant should have
given notice to plaintiff within thirty days of being issued letters testa-
mentary, presumably by first class mail.  See V.R.P.P. 64(a).  Plaintiff
asserts that the only possible remedy for this violation of defendant's duty
is to toll the limitation period until notice is given.
     A weakness in plaintiff's argument arises from treatment of tort claims
under Vermont's nonclaim statute.  The central statutory provision is 14
V.S.A. { 1203(a), which provides that most claims against a decedent's
estate which arose before the death of the decedent are barred unless
presented to the executor within four months following the first notice to
creditors, or presented within three years if no notice to creditors has
been published.  However, the statute does not apply to "claims for injury
to the person and damage to property suffered by the act or default of the
deceased . . . ."  Id.  The negligence claim that plaintiff asserts against
defendant fits within this exclusion.  Thus, defendant argues that in view
of the exclusion, the tolling period set forth in { 1202 does not apply at
all.
     The parties' arguments hinge on several elements of a complicated
statutory scheme.  As we must consider all of the statutes together, State
v. International Collection Service, Inc., 155 Vt. ___, ___, 594 A.2d 426,
428 (1991), and implement the intent of the Legislature as best it can be
determined, In re Walker, 155 Vt. ___, ___, 588 A.2d 1058, 1059 (1991), we
will evaluate the arguments in light of the overall statutory scheme.  The
superstructure of these statutes is taken from Part 8 of Article III of the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC).  See 8 U.L.A. {{ 3-801 - 3-803.  However,
Vermont adopted the UPC provisions only with some significant amendments.
While the UPC's nonclaim statute applies to all claims, including tort
claims, see UPC {{ 1-201 (definition of claims), 3-803(a) (nonclaim
statute), Vermont's version excludes certain tort claims as well as claims
for possession of or title to real estate.  14 V.S.A. { 1203(a).  The UPC
four-month tolling period begins at death, UPC { 3-802, while Vermont's
otherwise identical version commences on proper notice to creditors.  14
V.S.A. { 1202.
     Despite the differences between the Vermont and UPC versions, it is
helpful to examine the intent of the UPC drafters.  Cf. State v. D'Amico,
136 Vt. 153, 156,