Title: Louden v. A.O. Smith Corp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Louden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 121 Ohio St.3d 95, 2009-Ohio-319.] 
 
 
LOUDEN, EXR., APPELLANT, ET AL., v. A.O. SMITH CORPORATION ET AL.; 
GOULDS PUMPS, INC. ET AL., APPELLEES. 
BORDER, EXR., APPELLANT, v. AEP OHIO ET AL.; GOULDS  
PUMPS, INC. ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Louden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 121 Ohio St.3d 95, 2009-Ohio-319.] 
Appellate procedure — Notice of appeal — Electronic filing — Unless local rule 
expressly permits electronic filing of notice of appeal, paper copy of notice 
of appeal must be filed with clerk of trial court pursuant to App.R. 3. 
(Nos. 2007-1819 and 2007-1821 — Submitted October 7, 2008 — Decided 
February 4, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 90184. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 90185. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Unless a local rule of the appellate court, properly approved under Sup.R. 27, 
expressly permits filing a notice of appeal by electronic means, a party 
appealing a trial court order must file a paper copy of the notice of appeal 
with the clerk of the trial court pursuant to App.R. 3. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
I. Introduction 
{¶ 1} The issue before us is whether a trial court’s case-management 
order that requires parties in asbestos cases to file trial court documents 
electronically also authorized those same parties to file a notice of appeal 
electronically.  We hold that filing an appeal requires an appellant to present a 
paper copy of the notice of appeal to the clerk of the trial court, unless a rule of 
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appellate procedure expressly permits the notice of appeal to be filed 
electronically.  In the instant case, the court of appeals has not adopted any rule 
permitting such electronic filing.  Because appellants did not timely file paper 
copies of their notices of appeal to the clerk, we affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals dismissing appellants’ appeals. 
II. Facts 
{¶ 2} Recognizing the proliferation of asbestos cases on its docket in 
1998, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas found that “current methods 
in processing, serving, and storing the paper will soon be inadequate.”  Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas Special Docket No. 73958, General Personal 
Injury Asbestos Case Management Standing Order No. 10, Regarding Adoption 
of the Complex Litigation Automated Docketing (CLAD) System (Jan. 26, 1998).  
To manage its asbestos docket more efficiently, the court issued a case-
management order that adopted the Complex Litigation Automated Docket 
system (“CLAD”) provided by Lexis-Nexis for managing filings in asbestos 
cases.  Id.  In 2003, the court switched from the CLAD system to the “File & 
Serve” system, another electronic filing service provided by Lexis-Nexis.  Special 
Docket No. 73958, Case Management Order to Implement Lexis-Nexis File & 
Serve in place of CLAD (June 2003).  This second order is at issue in this case. 
{¶ 3} Subsequent to the implementation of the File & Serve system, 
Bertha Louden and Mary K. Border (“appellants”) filed separate civil actions 
alleging that their husbands had contracted asbestos-related disease in the 
workplace.1  The court consolidated the two cases. 
                                                          
 
1.  Roger Louden filed suit on his own behalf with his wife as coplaintiff. He has since died. His 
wife, Bertha, continued to prosecute the case as the executor of Roger’s estate.  Mary K. Border 
filed suit on behalf of her husband as executor of his estate.   
January Term, 2009 
3 
{¶ 4} Appellees, Goulds Pumps, Inc., and Ingersoll-Rand Company, 
filed motions for summary judgment.  On April 5, 2007, the trial court issued 
entries granting summary judgment to appellees. 
{¶ 5} On May 4, 2007, appellants, using the File & Serve system, 
electronically transmitted notices of appeal to the clerk of courts for the trial court 
for the purpose of initiating an appeal of both summary judgments.  However, the 
trial court clerk did not forward the notices to the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals. 
{¶ 6} On July 24, 2007, appellants filed paper copies of their notices of 
appeal with the clerk of the trial court.  This time, the clerk forwarded the notices 
to the court of appeals.  However, the court of appeals sua sponte dismissed 
appellants’ notices of appeal as being untimely filed. 
{¶ 7} We accepted this matter as a discretionary appeal. 
III. Analysis 
{¶ 8} Appellants assert the following proposition: “When the trial court 
has ordered that all filings must be submitted to the clerk electronically, a notice 
of appeal filed electronically in accordance therewith within thirty days of the 
entry of judgment satisfies the requirements of App.R. 3(A) and 4(A).”  We 
disagree. 
A. The Rules of Appellate Procedure Govern the Filing of a Notice of Appeal 
{¶ 9} This court alone has the authority to “prescribe rules governing 
practice and procedure in all courts of the state.” Section 5(B), Article IV of the 
Ohio Constitution.  Section 5(B) also provides that “[c]ourts may adopt additional 
rules concerning local practice in their respective courts which are not 
inconsistent with the rules promulgated by the supreme court.”  Pursuant to this 
authority, we have promulgated rules governing procedure in Ohio courts, 
including the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and 
the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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{¶ 10} Although a notice of appeal is filed with the clerk of the trial court, 
it is the Rules of Appellate Procedure that “govern procedure in appeals to courts 
of appeals.”  (Emphasis added.)  App.R. 1(A); see also State v. McGettrick 
(1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 138, 141, 31 OBR 296, 509 N.E.2d 378, fn. 5  (“Under 
ordinary circumstances, neither the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the 
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to cases on appeal; the Appellate 
Rules ‘govern procedure in appeals to courts of appeals from the trial courts of 
record in Ohio.’ App.R. 1; see, also, Crim.R. 1(C)(1) and Civ.R. 1(C)(1)”). 
{¶ 11} App.R. 3(A) provides: 
{¶ 12} “An appeal as of right shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal 
with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4.  Failure of an 
appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does 
not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the court 
of appeals deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 13} App.R. 4(A) provides: 
{¶ 14} “A party shall file a notice of appeal required by App.R. 3 within 
thirty days of the later of entry of the judgment or order appealed or, in a civil 
case, service of the notice of judgment and its entry if service is not made on the 
party within the three day period in Rule 58(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 15} The Rules of Appellate Procedure do not define the term “filing.”  
However, historically, “filing” occurs when a person manually presents a paper 
pleading to the clerk of courts.  See, e.g., King v. Paylor (1942), 69 Ohio App. 
193, 196, 23 O.O. 594, 43 N.E.2d 313 (“a filing can only be accomplished by 
bringing the paper to the notice of the officer, so that it can be accepted by him as 
official custodian”). 
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 16} Advancements in information technology, including electronic 
transmission of documents, are streamlining the practice of law.  See Bryce A. 
Lenox, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Teaching the Stream of Commerce 
Dog New Internet Tricks: CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 
1996) (1997), 22 U.Dayton L.Rev. 331, 346 (by accepting the use of technologies 
such as the Internet and real-time audio and video, the “ ‘cyber-courthouse’ will 
no longer be a myth”).  In light of this emerging technology, this court 
promulgated Rule 27 of the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio and 
amended numerous other procedural rules to address the use of information 
technology in Ohio courts.  See Civ.R. 5, 11, and 73; Crim.R. 12; Juv.R. 8; 
App.R. 13 and 18. 
{¶ 17} App.R. 13 states:  
{¶ 18} “ (A) * * * A court may provide, by local rules adopted pursuant to 
the Rules of Superintendence, for the filing of documents by electronic means.  If 
a court adopts such local rules, they shall include all of the following: 
{¶ 19} “(1) Any signature on electronically transmitted documents shall 
be considered that of the attorney or party it purports to be for all purposes. If it is 
established that the documents were transmitted without authority, the court shall 
order the filing stricken. 
{¶ 20} “(2) A provision shall specify the days and hours during which 
electronically transmitted documents will be received by the court, and a 
provision shall specify when documents received electronically will be considered 
to have been filed. 
{¶ 21} “(3)  Any document filed electronically that requires a filing fee 
may be rejected by the clerk of court unless the filer has complied with the 
mechanism established by the court for the payment of filing fees.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 22} Sup.R. 27 provides: 
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{¶ 23} “Before adopting any local rule of practice that relates to the use of 
information technology, a court shall submit a copy of the proposed local rule to 
the Supreme Court Commission on Technology and the Courts for review in 
accordance with the process established by the Commission.  A local rule of 
practice that relates to the use of information technology shall be considered 
inconsistent with this rule and of no force and effect unless the Commission 
determines that the local rule complies with the minimum, uniform standards 
adopted by the Commission.” 
{¶ 24} Sup.R. 27 “establishes a process by which minimum standards for 
information technology are promulgated, and requires that courts submit any local 
rule involving the use of information technology to a technology standards 
committee designated by the Supreme Court for approval.”  2001 Staff Notes to 
App.R. 13. 
{¶ 25} To date, only four of Ohio’s 12 district courts of appeals have 
adopted rules to permit electronic filing of certain documents.  See Loc.R. 16 of 
the First District Court of Appeals (permits filing by facsimile and by electronic 
filing over the Internet); Loc.R. 10(B) of the Third District Court of Appeals 
(permits filing by facsimile); Loc.R. 2 of the Fifth District Court of Appeals 
(permits filing by facsimile); and Loc.R. 8(A) of the Sixth District Court of 
Appeals (permits filing by facsimile). 
{¶ 26} The Eighth District Court of Appeals has not adopted any local 
rule that permits electronic filing.  Accordingly, the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals does not permit pleadings to be filed electronically. 
B. The Case Management Order Encroaches upon Procedural Rules 
{¶ 27} Appellants argue that submitting a notice of appeal electronically 
using the “File & Serve” system is no different from submitting a paper notice of 
appeal, and therefore a notice of appeal filed electronically should invoke 
January Term, 2009 
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jurisdiction of the court of appeals. To hold otherwise, appellants argue, would 
place form over substance.  Again, we disagree. 
{¶ 28} The Case Management Order in this case sets forth the 
requirements for electronic filing.  However, nowhere does the Case Management 
Order discuss procedures for filing a notice of appeal.  Furthermore, the order, 
which purports to set forth the procedure for electronic filing for asbestos cases, 
does not comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.  While App.R. 13 permits 
a court to adopt local rules for the electronic filing of documents, any such rule 
must (1) be approved pursuant to Sup.R. 27 and (2) contain certain provisions.  
See App.R. 13(A)(1), (2), and (3).  For example, the clerk of courts must be 
allowed to reject any electronically filed document that does not comply “with the 
mechanism established by the court for the payment of filing fees.”  App.R. 
13(A)(3).  The Case Management Order contains no such provision.  Finally, the 
order was not approved by this court’s Technology Committee pursuant to Sup.R. 
27. 
{¶ 29} Therefore, even assuming arguendo that a trial court could 
authorize the electronic filing of a notice of appeal, the Case Management Order 
herein violates App.R. 13 and Sup.R. 27. 
C. Trial Courts Lack Authority over Appellate Procedure 
{¶ 30} A trial court does not have authority to dictate appellate practice 
and procedure.  We are unaware of any other case in which a party depended 
upon a trial court’s order as authority to file a notice of appeal electronically in 
the absence of a rule of appellate procedure permitting such filing.  Appellants’ 
counsel stated at oral argument that he was not aware of any other case in which 
an appellant had filed a notice of appeal electronically pursuant to the Case 
Management Order. 
{¶ 31} In the instant case, the Eighth District Court of Appeals has not yet 
adopted any rule that permits electronic filing of any document.  Therefore, we 
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hold that electronic filing is currently not permitted in the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals and that the trial court’s Case Management Order could not authorize 
appellants to file their notices of appeals electronically. 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 32} Today’s technology supports electronic filing.  We have authorized 
courts to adopt local rules that permit electronic filing and created uniform 
standards to which these rules must conform.  While electronic filing will one day 
likely be the rule rather than the exception, advancements in information 
technology appear to be outpacing the promulgation of new rules providing for 
the use of such technology in Ohio courts.  But in the meantime, we need an 
orderly and uniform system for incorporating information technology in our 
courts.  That system has been laid out in App.R. 13 and Sup.R. 27.  Thus, we hold 
that unless a local rule of the appellate court, properly approved under Sup.R. 27, 
expressly permits filing of a notice of appeal by electronic means, a party 
appealing a trial court order must file a paper copy of the notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the trial court pursuant to App.R. 3. 
{¶ 33} Consequently, the appellants’ notices of appeal filed electronically 
were invalid.  Appellants’ subsequently filed paper notices of appeal were 
untimely.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing 
appellants’ appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 34} I concur in the syllabus of the majority.  But because App.R. 3(A) 
did not, until today, prevent electronic filing of a notice of appeal unless a local 
January Term, 2009 
9 
rule had been adopted pursuant to Sup.R. 27, and because appellants relied on a 
specific order of the trial court directing them to file electronically, and finally 
because the appellees are not prejudiced, since the notices were electronically 
“filed” within time, I join Justice Pfeifer in dissenting from the judgment in this 
case. 
{¶ 35} I would remand this case to the court of appeals to allow for the 
technical defect in filing to be cured by allowing appellants the right to file their 
notices in hard copy format as App.R. 3(A) now requires.  Such a judgment 
would honor the tenet, as yet not overruled, that the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
should be liberally applied and would adhere to “the policy of exercising all 
proper means to prevent the loss of valuable rights when the validity of a notice of 
appeal is challenged solely on technical, procedural grounds.”  Maritime Mfrs., 
Inc. v. Hi-Skipper Marina (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 257, 258-259, 24 O.O.3d 344, 
436 N.E.2d 1034. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 36} The majority opinion is another example of this court obfuscating 
rather than promoting justice. 
{¶ 37} “This court has long recognized that, in construing the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the law favors and protects the right of appeal and that a 
liberal construction of the rules is required in order to promote the objects of the 
Appellate Procedure Act and to assist the parties in obtaining justice.  In re 
Guardianship of Love (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 111, 115 [48 O.O.2d 107], 249 
N.E.2d 794.”  Maritime Mfrs., Inc. v. Hi-Skipper Marina (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 
257, 258, 24 O.O.3d 344, 436 N.E.2d 1034.  We are supposed to promote justice, 
not, as the majority does today, point to seven different rules and inform an 
appellant that if you had read all of these rules in conjunction with each other, you 
should have realized that you should ignore the express directive of a trial court.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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That’s what happened in this case.  The trial court instructed all parties to submit 
all filings electronically.  The appellants filed their notices of appeal 
electronically.  It turns out that appellants should have filed electronically to 
satisfy the trial court and in hard copy to satisfy this court.  Because they didn’t, 
their appeals have been dismissed.  Such is justice in the age of the Internet. 
{¶ 38} It is readily apparent that this court no longer recognizes that the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure should be liberally applied, even though none of the 
cases adopting a liberal construction have been overruled.  See, e.g., In re 
Wisner’s Guardianship (1947), 148 Ohio St. 31, 34, 34 O.O. 558, 72 N.E.2d 751 
(“All through the centuries, in the growth of the systems of common law and 
equity, the great threat has been that the procedural rules have, from time to time, 
become so complicated and technical that they have operated to delay substantive 
justice, to ensnare and entrap the unwary and to defeat the real purposes for which 
they were supposed to have been provided”).  This court should have the courage 
to plainly overrule cases with which it no longer agrees, a step the court is 
prevented from taking by its sometimes slavish, sometimes selective, devotion to 
the legalistic straitjacket known as the Galatis test, enshrined in paragraph one of 
the syllabus in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-
5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256.  See Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 
2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 219-224 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in part) 
(inviting this court to discard Galatis as unworkable); State ex rel. Shelly 
Materials, Inc. v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 115 Ohio St.3d 337, 2007-Ohio-
5022, 875 N.E.2d 59, ¶ 50 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting); Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of 
Cleveland, Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 141, 2007-Ohio-3762, 870 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 19 
(Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 39} We have stated that “this court has consistently adhered to the 
policy of exercising all proper means to prevent the loss of valuable rights when 
the validity of a notice of appeal is challenged solely on technical, procedural 
January Term, 2009 
11 
grounds.”  Maritime Mfrs., 70 Ohio St.2d at 258-259, 24 O.O.3d 344, 436 N.E.2d 
1034.  This statement — from a case that has not been repudiated — suggests that 
we should not allow the appeals in this case to be dismissed.  We should consider 
the totality of the circumstances and strive to achieve justice.  To the contrary, this 
court has essentially informed Ohio litigants that they can no longer rely on the 
express orders of trial court judges.  A more just solution would be to 
acknowledge that when a judge makes a decision regarding appellate procedure 
that this court ultimately deems a mistake, and a party relies on the judge’s 
mistake, that party should not be prejudiced.  Accordingly, we should craft an 
equitable remedy to provide substantial justice to the appellants in this case by 
allowing them time to cure the now apparent defect in their filings. 
{¶ 40} Under this approach, the lower court would be informed that it 
cannot allow filing of appeals by electronic means, the appellants would have 
their day in court, and the appeals would be decided on the merits, something that 
this court has stated is a “fundamental tenet of judicial review in Ohio.”  DeHart 
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 189, 192, 23 O.O.3d 210, 431 N.E.2d 
644.  See Reichert v. Ingersoll (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 220, 222, 18 OBR 281, 480 
N.E.2d 802 (“Judicial discretion must be carefully—and cautiously—exercised 
before this court will uphold an outright dismissal of a case on purely procedural 
grounds”).  The bottom line in this case is that the appellees had ample notice of 
the appeals and would not be prejudiced if the appeals were allowed to proceed.  
Alas, the majority reckons otherwise, preferring to restrict the ability to appeal, 
not, as we have stated in the past, liberally allow it.  Unfortunately, this is not an 
isolated incident.  See In re Guardianship of Richardson, 120 Ohio St.3d 438, 
2008-Ohio-6696, 900 N.E.2d 174; In re Guardianship of Santrucek, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 67, 2008-Ohio-4915, 896 N.E.2d 683.  It’s a sad day when doing what the 
judge tells you to do isn’t enough to ensure that your case is heard.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Mazur & Kittel, P.L.L.C., John I. Kittel, and Bryan M. Frink; and Paul W. 
Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, for appellants. 
 
Gallagher Sharp, John A. Valenti, Timothy J. Fitzgerald, and Holly M. 
Olarczuk-Smith, for appellees. 
______________________