Title: Tran v. Liberty Mutual Group, Inc.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13259 
 
THANH C. TRAN  vs.  LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP, INC., & others.1 
 
 
June 21, 2022. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Withdrawal.  Practice, Civil, Interlocutory 
appeal. 
 
 
 
Thanh C. Tran appeals from a judgment of the county court 
denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. 
c 211, § 3.  Tran is the plaintiff in a civil action pending in 
the Superior Court, where he was represented by attorneys of the 
law firm Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. (firm).  A judge in 
the Superior Court allowed the firm's motion to withdraw from 
the representation.  Tran's motion for reconsideration of that 
order was denied.  Tran then filed a petition for relief from a 
single justice of the Appeals Court pursuant to G. L. c. 231, 
§ 118, first par.  The single justice of the Appeals Court 
denied the petition as untimely and because he discerned no 
error of law or abuse of discretion.  Tran's G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition followed.  We affirm the denial of relief. 
 
 
The case is before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as 
amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a party 
challenging an interlocutory ruling of the trial court to "set 
forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot 
adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment 
in the trial court or by other available means."  Tran cannot 
meet his burden under the rule.  Even if, as he argues, he could 
not obtain adequate review of the interlocutory rulings in 
question on appeal from a final judgment, it is nonetheless 
clear that he had adequate alternative means to obtain review.  
 
1 Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.; Liberty Mutual Group Asset 
Management, Inc.; and Terri Z. Campbell. 
2 
 
Indeed, he has availed himself of such means by seeking review 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par.  See, e.g., Isijola 
v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies & Bonds, 
488 Mass. 1021, 1022 (2021).  See also Greco v. Plymouth Sav. 
Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019-1020 (1996) ("Review under G. L. c. 
211, § 3, does not lie where review under c. 231, § 118, would 
suffice").  The fact that Tran's petition under G. L. c. 231, 
§ 118, was unsuccessful, or that he failed to file it in a 
timely manner, does not render it an inadequate means of 
obtaining review.  See Guzzi v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 450 
Mass. 1016, 1016, (2007) ("Although his petition pursuant to 
G. L. c. 231, § 118, was denied, G. L. c. 211, § 3, does not 
provide a second opportunity as a matter of right for 
interlocutory relief").  The single justice neither erred nor 
abused his discretion by denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
Thanh C. Tran, pro se. 
 
2 It is also possible that Tran could have taken an 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to the doctrine of present 
execution.  He did not, however, attempt to do so.  See 
McMenimen v. Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 186 (2008) (party 
asserting right to interlocutory appeal may "fil[e] a notice of 
appeal and test[] the applicability of the doctrine in the trial 
court and, if necessary, in the appellate court").  It is 
settled that the doctrine permits an immediate appeal from an 
order disqualifying a party's attorney.  Borman v. Borman, 378 
Mass. 775, 778-785 (1979).  We have not considered whether the 
doctrine similarly applies to the allowance of an attorney's 
motion to withdraw from representing a party, and we need not do 
so now.  In any event, if the doctrine does apply, that would be 
another adequate alternative remedy, further supporting the 
denial of extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.