Title: Anderson B. Connor v. Sara Connor

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 49 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Anderson B. Connor and Thelma A. Connor,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
Sara Connor,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 234 Wis. 2d 150, 610 N.W.2d 511 
 
 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 18, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 3, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Forest 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert A. Kennedy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Mark E. Sostarich and Petrie & Stocking S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mark E. Sostarich. 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief 
by Ann E. Stevning-Roe and Juneau, Minder, Gross & Stevning-Roe, 
S.C., Marshfield, and oral argument by Ann E. Stevning-Roe. 
 
2001 WI 49 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No.  99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Anderson B. Connor and Thelma A. Connor,  
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
 
v. 
 
Sara Connor, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Sara Connor (defendant) 
petitions us to review a decision of the court of appeals that 
denied her relief from a default judgment entered against her.  
The circuit court, Judge Robert A. Kennedy presiding, entered 
the default judgment against her because she failed to serve her 
answer to a complaint filed by Anderson B. and Thelma A. Connor 
(plaintiffs) within the statutory deadline and failed to show 
excusable neglect for her untimely answer.  We conclude that the 
record does not support a finding of excusable neglect or any 
basis for relief to reopen the default judgment.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals' decision.   
FILED 
 
MAY 18, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
2 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
This lawsuit originated from a disagreement between 
the parties over property rights, specifically, a dispute over 
the use of a road.  Both parties in this case owned property on 
the west side of and adjacent to Birch Lake in Forest County.  
The plaintiffs' property was located to the north of the 
defendant's property.  The plaintiffs gained access to their 
property by traveling on a north-south road that ran along the 
western side of the lake.  A section of this road crossed the 
defendant's property.   
¶3 
In 
the 
fall 
of 
1997, 
the 
defendant 
asked 
the 
plaintiffs to use an alternative route.  They refused.  The 
defendant then blocked access to the road. 
¶4 
On June 10, 1998, the plaintiffs filed a three-count 
complaint against the defendant.  All three counts were based on 
alleged violations of their easement rights to the road.  The 
first 
cause 
of 
action 
alleged 
that 
the 
defendant 
had 
intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs' access to the 
easement road.  The plaintiffs sought damages and permanent 
injunctive relief to prohibit the defendant from interfering 
with their use of the road.  The remaining causes of action 
alleged (1) conversion or dispossession of property rights and 
(2) intentional interference with contractual rights.  On that 
same date, the plaintiffs also filed a separate motion for 
temporary injunctive relief.  
¶5 
On June 15, 1998, the defendant received the summons, 
complaint and notice of motion for temporary injunction.  The 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
3 
summons stated that the defendant was required to respond with a 
written answer within 45 days.  The defendant retained Steven 
Polich as her attorney.  Polich represented the defendant at a 
July 16, 1998, hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for temporary 
injunction.  The circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion on 
that date. 
¶6 
The statutory deadline for the defendant to serve her 
answer was July 30, 1998.  The defendant, however, failed to 
meet this deadline.  Instead, she mailed her answer to the 
plaintiffs on August 4, 1998, and filed the answer with the 
court on August 10, 1998.  The defendant substituted attorney 
Mark 
Sostarich 
for 
Polich 
as 
her 
counsel 
and 
filed 
a 
substitution of counsel with the court on September 10, 1998. 
¶7 
In response to the defendant's answer, the plaintiffs 
filed a motion to strike the answer and a motion for default 
judgment.  The plaintiffs asserted that they did not receive the 
defendant's answer until August 10, 1998, and that no extension 
of time to answer was ever requested by or granted to the 
defendant.  
¶8 
On November 12, 1998, the defendant filed a motion 
requesting the court to accept her answer.  The defendant argued 
that the court should regard her answer as timely served because 
Polich had received an extension of time to serve the answer 
from Patrick Juneau, an attorney who worked at the same firm as 
the plaintiffs' counsel.  An affidavit from Polich attested to 
this fact and was filed with the defendant's motion.  In the 
alternative, the defendant argued that the court should accept 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
4 
the answer because any misunderstanding by Polich about the 
existence of such an agreement amounted to excusable neglect, 
requiring an enlargement of time to answer under Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.15(2)(a)(1997-98).1  
¶9 
The court held a hearing on the parties' motions on 
November 16, 1998.  The court concluded that Polich's affidavit 
only stated that he understood that there was a courtesy 
extension agreement between the parties; it did not state that 
he ever asked for or received an extension.  This lack of a 
clear agreement was a factor in the court's conclusion that 
there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of 
excusable neglect.  The court also based its decision on the 
amount of time that Polich had to answer the complaint and 
Polich's active involvement in the case prior to the deadline.  
The court then denied the defendant's motion and granted the 
plaintiffs' motions.  An order was issued on November 30, 1998. 
 On that same date, the court entered judgment only on the first 
cause of action.  The judgment granted permanent injunctive 
relief to the easement rights of the road and costs associated 
with this relief to the plaintiffs. 
¶10 The 
defendant 
then 
filed 
both 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration and a motion to reopen and vacate the judgment 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a), (b), (g) or (h).  In her 
motion, she alleged in part that the judgment should be vacated 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
5 
in light of a second affidavit from Polich.  In the affidavit, 
Polich again alleged that the parties had in fact entered into a 
oral courtesy extension agreement and further stated that the 
basis for this agreement was so that Polich could conduct 
depositions of the plaintiffs before filing the answer.  
¶11 In response, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit 
from their attorney, Ann Stevning-Roe.  Stevning-Roe admitted 
that Polich had contacted her about setting up depositions and 
that she agreed to make her clients available for deposition, 
but stated that nothing further had developed on this matter.  
She denied the existence of any agreement, stating that 
"[a]bsolutely 
nothing was 
requested, 
discussed, 
stated or 
granted regarding an extension to file Answers based upon the 
scheduling of depositions" and that "[a]t no time did Mr. Polich 
say anything regarding wanting to schedule depositions prior to 
filing an Answer in this matter."  
¶12 During a March 29, 1999, hearing, the court denied 
both of the defendant's motions.  In its decision, the court 
dismissed Polich's second affidavit as unbelievable and "self-
serving."  The court further stated that Polich should have sent 
out confirmation of the agreement and that he should have been 
aware that the answer was due because he was actively involved 
in the case prior to the deadline.  An order to that effect was 
issued on April 7, 1999.  
¶13 The court of appeals affirmed, and we accepted review. 
 Two issues are presented:  (1) whether the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs' 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
6 
motion to strike the answer and motion for default judgment; and 
(2) whether the court properly exercised its discretion in 
denying the defendant's motion for reconsideration and her 
motion to vacate the default judgment.   
II.  ISSUE ONE: MOTION TO STRIKE AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
¶14 We examine two orders issued by the circuit court.  
The first order, entered on November 30, 1998, addressed four 
separate motions.  Two of these motions——a motion to strike the 
defendant's entire answer and a motion for default judgment——
were both properly brought by the plaintiffs in response to the 
defendant's untimely answer.  See Martin v. Griffin, 117 Wis. 2d 
438, 441-42, 344 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1984).  The other two 
motions——a motion to accept the answer and a motion to enlarge 
the time for serving an answer——were then filed by the 
defendant.  The defendant's motions are appropriately considered 
as one motion because they both essentially seek relief under 
Wis. Stat. § 801.15(2)(a) on the basis of excusable neglect.  
See Clark County v. B.T.U. Structures, Inc., 144 Wis. 2d 11, 15-
16, 422 N.W.2d 910 (Ct. App. 1988) (evidence of a courtesy 
extension agreement is excusable neglect). 
¶15 The circuit court noted that it only needed to address 
the plaintiffs' motions in this case.  The court did not err in 
this respect.  It could proceed in this manner because, under 
either party's motions, the court was required to determine 
whether 
excusable 
neglect 
was 
present. 
 
See 
Leonard 
v. 
Cattahach, 214 Wis. 2d 236, 248-49, 571 N.W.2d 444 (Ct. App. 
1997); Rutan v. Miller, 213 Wis. 2d 94, 101, 570 N.W.2d 54 (Ct. 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
7 
App. 1997); Martin, 117 Wis. 2d at 442.  The court correctly 
applied the excusable neglect standard in this case. 
¶16 Excusable 
neglect 
is 
not 
the 
same 
as 
neglect, 
carelessness or inattentiveness.  Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 
109 Wis. 2d 461, 468, 326 N.W.2d 727 (1982).  Instead, it is 
"'that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably 
prudent person under the same circumstances.'"  Id. (quoting 
Giese v. Giese, 43 Wis. 2d 456, 461, 168 N.W.2d 832 (1969)).  In 
the context of an untimely answer, reasonable grounds for 
noncompliance with the statutory period constitutes excusable 
neglect.  Id.  
¶17 A circuit court has great discretion in granting 
relief based on excusable neglect.  Id. at 467.  In exercising 
this discretion, the court must consider whether the interests 
of justice would be served in its finding.  Id. at 468.  The 
interests of justice require the court to be aware that a 
failure to find excusable neglect could result in a default 
judgment and that the law generally disfavors default judgments 
and prefers a trial on the merits.  Id. at 469.  The court 
should also balance other competing interests of a default 
judgment, such as promoting prompt adjudication and encouraging 
quality legal representation.  Id.  
¶18 We will not disturb a circuit court's decision 
regarding excusable neglect unless an erroneous exercise of 
discretion is clearly shown.  Id. at 471.  An erroneous exercise 
of discretion will result "[i]f the record indicates that the 
circuit court failed to exercise its discretion, if the facts of 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
8 
record fail to support the circuit court's decision, or if this 
court's review of the record indicates that the circuit court 
applied the wrong legal standard . . . ."  Id. at 471-72.  If 
the circuit court enumerates its reasons for finding excusable 
neglect, we "will focus on the facts of record to determine 
whether they support the court's reasons."  Id. at 471. 
¶19 Upon review, we conclude that the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion in finding that excusable 
neglect was not present and in granting default judgment.  The 
reasons articulated by the court provide a reasonable basis for 
this determination and are supported by the record.   
¶20 One reason articulated by the court was that Polich's 
affidavit did not provide clear evidence of an oral courtesy 
extension agreement.  The affidavit only stated that Polich 
understood 
that 
there 
was 
an 
agreement 
based 
on 
prior 
communications with Juneau and their "mutual cooperation."2  This 
                     
2 Polich's affidavit stated in relevant part as follows: 
2.  In May, 1998, Attorney Patrick J. Juneau of 
the law firm of Juneau, Minder, Gross & Stevning-Roe, 
S.C. wrote to me an [sic] informed me that he would be 
representing Andy and Thelma Connor with regard to 
their claims of purported blocked access to a road 
which they contended they had easement rights to.  I 
had numerous conversations and communications with Mr. 
Juneau and established a highly cooperative working 
relationship with him. 
 
3.  I worked with Mr. Juneau in an effort to 
amicably resolve the matter, and when it could not be 
so resolved, worked with him regarding the scheduling 
of an injunction hearing and the manner in which this 
case would be brought before the Court's attention.  
Based 
upon 
our 
communications 
and 
our 
mutual 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
9 
assertion, the court determined, was insufficient to support a 
finding of a clear agreement.  At that time, the record also 
contained an affidavit from Juneau, which denied the existence 
of the agreement3 and alleged that, on a prior occasion when an 
adjournment was necessary, the parties entered into a written 
agreement.  This evidence supports the conclusion that no 
agreement for an extension of time to answer existed.  Thus, the 
court correctly concluded that the alleged agreement could not 
constitute a basis for excusable neglect.   
¶21 The defendant argues that this finding by the court 
essentially concluded that the courtesy extension agreement was 
unenforceable because it was not in writing or confirmed in 
writing.  This is an incorrect interpretation of the circuit 
court's decision.  The court only concluded that the affidavit 
did not reflect a clear agreement between the parties; it did 
not conclude that the agreement was unenforceable because it was 
                                                                  
cooperation, it was my understanding that I had been 
granted a reasonable time to answer after the hearing 
regarding the Injunction on July 16, 1998 and that, in 
fact, I answered just four days beyond the statutory 
time. 
3 Juneau's affidavit stated in relevant part: 
 
 
6.  Subsequent to turning the file over to 
Attorney Stevning-Roe for litigation, your affiant had 
no discussions with Mr. Polich regarding response 
times for answer in this proceeding.  Your affiant 
never made any reference or had any discussion with 
Mr. Polich regarding the time to answer so there is 
absolutely no basis for him to construe that there was 
an extension of a time to answer granted by your 
affiant since there was absolutely no discussion that 
took place regarding the same. 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
10
not in writing.  In fact, the only mention the court made about 
the agreement not being in writing was that most attorneys 
confirm such extensions in writing.  It did not state that the 
agreement had to be in writing.  Indeed, courtesy agreements 
that are not reduced to writing may be enforceable in certain 
instances.  See Rutan, 213 Wis. 2d at 102.  Here, however, the 
parties disputed the existence of the agreement; therefore, the 
court was forced to make a determination as to whether the 
agreement even existed.  Certainly, this case reemphasizes our 
previous warning that, as a matter of good practice, such 
agreements 
should 
be 
reduced 
to 
writing 
with 
additional 
notification to the court.  See Oostburg State Bank v. United 
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 130 Wis. 2d 4, 13, 386 N.W.2d 53 (1986). 
¶22 Also, 
with 
respect 
to 
the 
courtesy 
extension 
agreement, the defendant argues that the court erred by failing 
to acknowledge that Polich's misunderstanding of the agreement 
may have constituted excusable neglect.  However, at the time of 
this hearing, there was no evidence——no notes, confirmation 
letters, or other documentation from Polich——to indicate that he 
misunderstood that there was an agreement.  Further, the record 
did not contain any testimony from Polich to indicate that he 
ever asked for an extension or that Juneau ever misled him into 
thinking that an extension was granted.  Indeed, the defendant 
could have provided additional evidence to the court on this and 
other factors; however, she decided to rest her case on Polich's 
affidavit without seeking a continuance for an evidentiary 
hearing where Polich could have appeared and given testimony.  
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
11
Polich was not present because of a scheduling conflict.  Thus, 
in light of the lack of evidence showing any misunderstanding, 
the court did not err in failing to find excusable neglect based 
on this alleged misunderstanding.  
¶23 Another reason articulated by the court was that the 
defendant had reasonable time to serve the answer.  In 
particular, the court noted that the defendant had 14 days in 
which to file from the time of the temporary injunction hearing 
to the statutory deadline and concluded that this amount of time 
was sufficient to file an answer.  The defendant argues that 
this factor was outside the scope of the court's analysis for 
excusable neglect.  She asserts that the court's focus should 
have been on whether there was a justifiable explanation for the 
untimely answer, not on whether there was adequate time to serve 
the answer.   
¶24 However, in this case, the defendant made this time 
frame an issue when it entered Polich's affidavit into evidence, 
which alleged: "[I]t was my understanding that I had been 
granted a reasonable time to answer after the hearing regarding 
the Injunction on July 16, 1998 and that, in fact, I answered 
just four days beyond the statutory time."  In an apparent 
response to this statement, the court concluded that the time 
between the hearing and the statutory deadline was a reasonable 
time to answer, implying that the defendant did not need extra 
time in which to answer.  The time to answer was reasonable, the 
court concluded, in light of the fact that Polich did not 
provide any reason as to why he could not answer by the 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
12
deadline.  Thus, because the defendant made this time period an 
issue, the court acted properly in considering it and using it 
as a basis for rejecting the defendant's excusable neglect 
argument.  
¶25 Based on the above, we conclude that the record 
supports the circuit court finding that the defendant failed to 
show excusable neglect and that it appropriately entered the 
default judgment.  The defendant contends that the court erred 
because it failed to consider policy reasons weighing against 
default judgment in its determination.  The court, however, was 
aware of these factors at the hearing.  In particular, the 
defendant informed the court that it had broad discretion in 
granting motions to enlarge the time to answer and that the law 
generally treats default judgment as an extreme measure.  The 
fact that the court did not specifically articulate its 
consideration of these policy factors does not mean that it was 
not cognizant of these factors before granting the plaintiffs' 
motions.  The court acted properly.  
III.  ISSUE TWO: RECONSIDERATION AND VACATING JUDGMENT 
¶26 We next review the court's order that denied the 
defendant's motion for reconsideration and denied her motion to 
vacate the judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1).  In her 
motion for reconsideration, the defendant argued that the court 
erred by considering the time between the temporary injunction 
hearing and the statutory deadline as a factor for excusable 
neglect.  However, as we concluded above, the court did not err 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
13
in this respect, and we will not revisit this issue.  Our 
analysis is limited to the motion to vacate the judgment.  
¶27 A circuit court's decision to grant or deny a motion 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) is reviewed subject to an erroneous 
exercise of discretion standard.  State ex rel. M.L.B. v. 
D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 541-42, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985).  In its 
exercise of discretion, the court "must attempt to strike the 
appropriate 
balance 
between 
the 
countervailing 
policy 
considerations that consistently pull at either end of the 
default judgment spectrum."  J.L. Phillips & Assocs. v. E & H 
Plastic Corp., 217 Wis. 2d 348, 359, 577 N.W.2d 13 (1998).  
These considerations were mentioned above.  In short, we balance 
the competing values of finality and fairness in the resolution 
of a dispute.  State ex rel. M.L.B., 122 Wis. 2d at 542.  
¶28 The 
defendant 
sought 
relief 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(a), (b), (g) and (h).  This statute provides: 
 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court, 
subject to subs. (2) and (3), may relieve a party or 
legal 
representative 
from 
a 
judgment, 
order 
or 
stipulation for the following reasons: 
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; 
(b) Newly-discovered evidence which entitles a 
party to a new trial under s. 805.15(3); 
. . . .  
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or 
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a), (b), (g) & (h).  This statute is 
construed liberally because of its remedial nature.  J.L. 
Phillips, 217 Wis. 2d at 359.  The defendant bears the burden to 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
14
prove that the requisite conditions existed.  Hansher v. 
Kaishian, 79 Wis. 2d 374, 389, 255 N.W.2d 564 (1977).   
¶29 In her motion, the defendant argued that relief was 
warranted based on the following: (1) Polich's misunderstanding 
of the courtesy extension 
agreement 
constituted 
excusable 
neglect; (2) the information provided by Polich in his second 
affidavit 
constituted 
newly 
discovered 
evidence; 
and 
(3) 
application of the judgment was not equitable.  The defendant 
did not specifically enumerate any basis for relief under 
subsection (h) in her motion.  
¶30 We first review whether the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion by denying relief under subsection (a). 
 We conclude that it did.  The defendant presented Polich's 
second affidavit as a basis for relief under this subsection.  
In it, Polich alleged that he delayed filing the answer because 
he wanted to first conduct depositions of the plaintiffs before 
filing the answer.  Polich asserted that he and the plaintiffs' 
attorney reached an agreement that an answer would not have to 
be filed until the depositions were taken.  As stated above, the 
plaintiffs' attorney specifically denied that any such agreement 
was reached between the parties. 
¶31 During the hearing on the motion, the court dismissed 
Polich's affidavit as "self-serving."  It stated that it did not 
believe Polich's assertion that the parties had reached an 
agreement to allow the defendant to file her answer after the 
depositions.  We regard this conclusion as a dismissal of 
Polich's sworn statements based on the court's finding that 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
15
Polich lacked credibility.  We uphold this ruling by the circuit 
court because it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of a 
witness.  Homa v. East Towne Ford, Inc., 125 Wis. 2d 73, 80 n. 
7, 370 N.W.2d 592 (Ct. App. 1985).  After the court rejected 
this explanation by Polich, the court was basically presented 
with the same facts and explanations presented by the defendant 
at the first hearing.  As a result, the court could properly 
exercise its discretion and deny relief under subsection (a) 
because the record would again support a finding by the court 
that excusable neglect was not present.  
¶32 The defendant argues that the court erred in several 
respects in reaching this determination.  First, she contends 
that the court again erred by basing its decision on the fact 
that oral courtesy extension agreements are unenforceable unless 
they are in writing or confirmed in writing.  Again, the court 
did not make any such finding.  Instead, the court only noted 
that there was a lack of any documentation in the record and 
that, in practice, there would have normally been confirmation 
letters sent.  The court certainly may consider the lack of 
documentation in making a determination as to whether an 
agreement existed.  Such consideration must not be construed as 
a requirement that courtesy extension agreements must be in 
writing.   
¶33 Second, the defendant contends that the court failed 
to reconcile the conflicting affidavits in this case to 
determine whether an oral courtesy extension agreement existed 
or whether the affidavits showed substantial confusion between 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
16
the parties as to the existence of an agreement to support a 
finding of excusable neglect.  However, the court resolved the 
various conflicts in the affidavits by dismissing the affidavits 
of Polich and relying on affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs. 
 This decision was a proper determination of credibility.  In 
light of the remaining testimony, the court did not erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
by 
concluding 
that 
an 
extension 
agreement had not been reached or that any other basis for 
excusable neglect was present.  
¶34 Third, the defendant argues that the court failed to 
consider and articulate interests of justice factors in denying 
the motion to vacate the judgment.  In particular, the defendant 
asserts that the court should have considered such factors as 
the drastic consequences of the default judgment in this case, 
the meritorious defenses presented in the answer, and the lack 
of any prejudice to the plaintiffs from the late answer.  Again, 
however, the court was made aware of these factors during the 
hearing and made its decision in light of these relevant 
interests.   
¶35 Fourth and finally, the defendant contends that the 
court erred by imputing the negligence of Polich to her in this 
case.  She argues that Polich's negligence took on many forms, 
including that he was ineffective at the temporary injunction 
hearing, that he failed to secure a written courtesy extension 
agreement, and that he failed to provide her with affidavits to 
prepare for hearings in a prompt manner.  According to the 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
17
defendant, Polich's conduct was so egregious in this case that 
the judgment must be vacated.  
¶36 "A court is not bound to impute to a client everything 
his lawyer does or omits to do."  Charolais Breeding Ranches, 
Ltd. v. Wiegel, 92 Wis. 2d 498, 514, 285 N.W.2d 720 (1979).  
However, "[m]istakes, ill advice, or other failures of a lawyer 
may constitute excusable neglect on the part of the client, when 
the client has acted as a reasonable and prudent person in 
engaging a lawyer of good reputation, has relied upon him to 
protect his rights, and has made reasonable inquiry concerning 
the proceedings."  Id.  "In deciding whether to impute the 
negligence of the lawyer to the client, the trial court must 
exercise its 'equitable powers to secure substantial justice 
between the parties.'"  Id. (quoting Paschong v. Hollenbeck, 13 
Wis. 2d 415, 424, 108 N.W.2d 668 (1961)).   
¶37 The defendant asserts that she took all reasonable 
steps 
to 
protect 
her 
position, 
including 
forwarding 
the 
complaint immediately to her attorney, attending the temporary 
injunction hearing, and substituting counsel when she believed 
that Polich was ineffective.  On this issue, however, we agree 
with the conclusion reached by the court of appeals.  As the 
court noted, although the defendant decided to substitute 
Sostarich for Polich as counsel, the record does not reflect 
that she made any reasonable inquiry into the status of the case 
before firing Polich to secure her position in the litigation.  
As a result, without any such inquiry, we conclude that it is 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
18
reasonable to impute any alleged negligence on the part of 
Polich in failing to file the answer to the defendant.4 
¶38 Finally, we examine the court's determination with 
respect to subsections (b), (g) and (h).  On these subsections, 
the circuit court failed to set forth any specific reasons for 
its denial for relief.  Regardless, we may conduct our own 
examination of the record to determine whether the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion and whether the facts provide 
support for the court's decision.  Hedtcke, 109 Wis. 2d at 471; 
Homa, 125 Wis. 2d at 79.  We note that remand to the circuit 
court for an evidentiary hearing may be warranted in some cases 
where the defendant's claim sets forth a basis for relief and a 
hearing is necessary to determine the truth of the allegations. 
 See State ex rel. M.L.B., 122 Wis. 2d at 553-54.  However, in 
this case, we make our determination based solely on the record 
in light of the fact that the defendant effectively waived any 
right to an evidentiary hearing during the motion hearing.  The 
waiver occurred when the defendant rejected the court's repeated 
                     
4 The defendant filed a motion after oral argument 
requesting that this court allow supplemental briefing and take 
judicial notice that Polich was not a licensed attorney in 
Wisconsin at the time that he represented the defendant. 
However, during the hearing on the motion to vacate the 
judgment, the defendant specifically represented to the court 
that Polich was in fact a licensed attorney in Wisconsin.  The 
defendant does not provide any compelling reason to this court 
for her failure to discover this information before the hearing 
in the circuit court.  Accordingly, we deny the defendant's 
motion.   
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
19
inquiries as to whether an adjournment for an evidentiary 
hearing was necessary.   
¶39 On review, we first conclude that the record does not 
support a finding that Polich's second affidavit constituted 
"newly discovered evidence" under subsection (b).  The defendant 
failed to present any evidence to establish the elements of 
"newly discovered evidence," particularly that the information 
"did not arise from lack of diligence in seeking to discover 
it."  See Wis. Stat. § 805.15(3)(b).  As the plaintiffs argued, 
the affidavit contained information that the defendant could 
have likely discovered before the first hearing.  Thus, in light 
of this failure to prove these elements, it was not an erroneous 
exercise of discretion for the court to deny relief under this 
subsection.  
¶40 We also conclude that subsection (g) does not apply in 
this case.  This subsection specifically requires a person 
seeking relief from the judgment to show that the prospective 
application of the judgment "is no longer equitable."  Thus, 
under the 
clear language 
of this 
statute, 
a 
change in 
circumstances is specifically contemplated which makes the 
judgment no longer equitable.  See State ex. rel M.L.B., 122 
Wis. 2d at 543-44.  The defendant did not allege any such change 
in circumstances, and as a result, the court did not err by 
failing to grant relief under this subsection as well. 
¶41 Finally, we conclude that the court properly denied 
relief to the defendant under subsection (h).  Under this 
subsection, 
relief 
is 
warranted 
only 
when 
"extraordinary 
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
20
circumstances" are present.  Id. at 552.  A circuit court 
considers 
the 
following 
factors 
in 
determining 
whether 
extraordinary circumstances exist:  
 
whether 
the 
judgment 
was 
the 
result 
of 
the 
conscientious, deliberate and well-informed choice of 
the 
claimant; 
whether 
the claimant received the 
effective assistance of counsel; whether relief is 
sought from a judgment in which there has been no 
judicial consideration of the merits and the interest 
of 
deciding 
the 
particular 
case 
on 
the 
merits 
outweighs the finality of judgments; whether there is 
a meritorious defense to the claim; and whether there 
are intervening circumstances making it inequitable to 
grant relief. 
Id. at 552-53.  
¶42 The defendant never clearly articulated its reason for 
seeking relief under this subsection.  However, during the 
hearing on the motion to vacate the judgment, the defendant 
argued that she should be entitled to relief from the judgment 
because the entry of judgment in this case inequitably and 
permanently impaired her property.  She contended that any 
remedy available——such as an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim against Polich——would not alleviate the impairment of her 
property.  It would only lead to compensation for the property. 
 We construe this argument as one seeking relief based on 
extraordinary circumstances, but conclude that in this case this 
argument does not provide a basis for relief.    
¶43 Certainly, the effects of the entry of default 
judgment should be considered by the court; however, simply 
because the entry of judgment impairs or affects property does 
not 
warrant 
a 
finding 
of 
extraordinary 
circumstances.  
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
21
Extraordinary circumstances may exist only in extreme and 
limited cases.  This case does not present such extraordinary 
circumstances. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶44 In sum, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion 
in granting default judgment or in denying the motion to vacate 
the judgment.  The defendant failed to present sufficient 
evidence of excusable neglect or of any basis for relief under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1).  As a result, we affirm the court of 
appeals' decision upholding the orders and judgment issued by 
the circuit court.  In addition, because the record does not 
indicate that the circuit court ever made a determination as to 
the amount of costs to be awarded to the plaintiffs, we remand 
to the circuit court for a determination on this issue. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.   
No. 
99-0157 & 99-1042 
 
 
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