Title: State v. Meader

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-37 
No. 49A20 
Filed 16 April 2021 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
FAYE LARKIN MEADER 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 
the Court of Appeals, 269 N.C. App. 446, 838 S.E.2d 643 (2020), finding no error after 
appeal from judgments entered on 19 December 2018 by Judge R. Stuart Albright in 
Superior Court, Guilford County.  Heard in the Supreme Court on 15 February 2021. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Matthew Baptiste Holloway, Assistant 
Attorney General, for the State-appellee. 
 
 Bonnie Keith Green for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
BERGER, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
On December 19, 2018, a Guilford County jury found defendant Faye Larkin 
Meader guilty of felony breaking or entering a motor vehicle, misdemeanor larceny, 
and misdemeanor possession of stolen property.1  Defendant received a split sentence, 
and she was placed on supervised probation.  The Court of Appeals determined that 
the trial court did not err when it declined to instruct the jury on voluntary 
                                            
1 The trial court arrested judgment on the possession of stolen goods conviction. 
STATE V. MEADER 
2021-NCSC-37 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
intoxication.  Defendant appeals.  
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
At approximately 2:00 p.m. on November 22, 2017, defendant arrived at a 
mental health counseling center in Greensboro, North Carolina.  Law enforcement 
was contacted, and dispatch was informed that defendant was behaving as if she was 
intoxicated. 
¶ 3 
 
Earlier that afternoon, a family arrived for an appointment at the same 
counseling center.  When the family returned to their vehicle after the appointment, 
they noticed that the driver’s side door was open, and items were missing from their 
vehicle.  Among the missing items were an ammunition clip, a pair of sunglasses, and 
a drink koozie.  In addition, a soda can, which did not belong to any of the family 
members, had been placed in a cupholder.  The husband called law enforcement to 
report the incident.  The wife returned to the counseling center, where she observed 
defendant drinking soda out of a cup.  The wife recognized defendant because they 
had attended school together.  
¶ 4 
 
The husband returned to the counseling center and informed an employee that 
someone had broken into his vehicle.  He asked if anyone had “seen anything weird.”  
Defendant, who was still in the lobby of the counseling center at the time, “stood up 
and came over to where [the family was] and started talking” to them.  Defendant 
informed the husband that she knew who broke into the car and provided him with a 
STATE V. MEADER 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
name.  When the husband informed defendant that law enforcement had been 
contacted, defendant got “irate” and said, “no cops.” 
¶ 5 
 
When the husband walked past defendant to exit the counseling center, he 
“smelled alcohol somewhere.”  Two other witnesses stated that defendant “appeared 
to be” or “seemed” intoxicated. 
¶ 6 
 
Caterina Sanchez, a therapist at the counseling center, testified that defendant 
“was disruptive in terms of not wanting to leave and not really listening to us [ b]ut 
she . . . wasn’t misbehaving or anything like that.”  Ms. Sanchez testified that because 
of defendant’s behavior, Ms. Sanchez decided to call law enforcement and Chris 
Faulkner, the owner of the counseling center.  
¶ 7 
 
Mr. Faulkner testified that, although defendant was “agitated,” she “was 
answering the [law enforcement officers’] questions . . . [and was being] fairly 
cooperative.”  Mr. Faulkner advised defendant that she was banned from the 
property; when asked if she understood, defendant replied, “yes, sir.” 
¶ 8 
 
When officers arrived at the counseling center, they asked defendant why she 
was there.  Defendant told them her father passed away the previous month and that 
she had been the victim of a domestic violence incident the day before.  Defendant 
removed her pants to show officers a bruise on her thigh.  
¶ 9 
 
As officers escorted defendant from the center, she became agitated and stated 
that she needed to collect her shoes, bra, and purse.  When defendant failed to leave 
STATE V. MEADER 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
the premises as instructed, defendant was handcuffed and escorted out.  Defendant 
navigated a flight of stairs without assistance while her arms were handcuffed behind 
her back.  
¶ 10 
 
A search of the premises failed to reveal missing property, and officers were 
prepared to release defendant when they noticed a shiny object in defendant’s jacket 
pocket.  Defendant told officers that the object was a cellphone, but she pulled the 
missing ammunition clip from her pocket.  Defendant was then arrested for felony 
breaking or entering a motor vehicle, misdemeanor larceny, and misdemeanor 
possession of stolen property.  Once at the police station, the stolen drink koozie was 
located in defendant’s jacket pocket and the stolen sunglasses were found on the 
floorboard of the patrol car.  
¶ 11 
 
On September 24, 2018, defendant was indicted on one count of felony breaking 
or entering a motor vehicle, one count of misdemeanor larceny, and one count of 
misdemeanor possession of stolen property.  On December 7, 2018, defendant gave 
notice of her intent to offer the defense of voluntary intoxication.  On December 17, 
2018, defendant’s case came on for trial.  The trial court denied defendant’s request 
for a voluntary intoxication jury instruction.  On December 19, 2018, the jury found 
defendant guilty on all charges.  Defendant entered notice of appeal.  
¶ 12 
 
In denying defendant’s request for the instruction on voluntary intoxication, 
the trial court stated: 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
That will be denied[.] . . . [T]he [c]ourt has listened to all of 
the testimony intently. I also reviewed State’s Exhibit 
Number 1, which was admitted without objection. And—
and there are three videos on State’s 1. The first video 
clearly shows the Defendant, and I understand that the 
witnesses in the light most favorable to the Defendant have 
testified that the Defendant was intoxicated. However, 
during the course of the video, I could hear the Defendant’s 
words. She was not slurring her words. She was speaking 
in easily understandable English. There were many 
questions that were asked of her to which she was 
responsive. It was clear that she was responsive and was 
aware of what was going on around her.  
 
For instance, they asked her how she got there, and 
she said, well, they brought me. It was an appropriate 
response to the question. She later identified, or attempted 
to identify the name of the people that brought her, but in 
any event, there are many other indications that she was 
responsive and aware of what was going on. 
 
For instance, on the video you clearly hear Mr. 
Faulkner, the owner of the business at issue, “You are not 
allowed to come here any longer. You understand?” And 
her response was, “Yes, sir.” At one point one law 
enforcement officer, I believe it was a law enforcement 
officer, asked her for her name, and she clearly indicated it 
was Faye Larkin Meader. It was easily understandable. It 
was an appropriate response, a direct response to the 
question asked. 
 
Although she was escorted out of the business at 
issue by law enforcement officers, she was able to walk 
under her own power. In other words, the officers didn’t 
have to carry her, did not have to put her in some type of 
wheelchair, simply directed her to leave, and that’s what 
she did. 
 
At one point, when she was sitting in the patrol car, 
she was directed or requested by the officer to put your feet 
STATE V. MEADER 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
back in there for me, and the Defendant immediately 
complied, indicating she understood, was responsive and 
aware of what was going on. At one point, when she was 
attempting to articulate what happened, and how she got 
to the predicament she was in, she was complaining of 
another 
person 
selling 
marijuana 
and 
oxycontin. 
Oxycontin is not a—it’s not a tongue-twister, but for 
someone that was so completely intoxicated and without 
the ability to form intent, it would—it would seem to me to 
be very hard to articulate such a word very clearly and 
easily, as she did, as I witnessed in the video. At one point, 
she indicated she wanted her coat because it was cold 
outside. Again, the point is she was aware of what was 
going on, that it was cold, and that when you’re cold, you 
need a jacket. That’s exactly what she indicated. 
 
At one point, she was asked on the video what 
happened to the laptop computer, or words to that effect, 
and the Defendant immediately said she had no idea what 
the officer was talking about, which was, in fact, an 
accurate statement based on the facts of this case. Again, 
the Defendant was responsive and aware of what was going 
on around her, and answered that question immediately, 
appropriately, and, as it turns out, accurately. 
 
She was also—the Defendant was also aware of 
what was going on around her because she knew she was 
interacting with law enforcement officers. At one point she 
said, “God bless you all. You all have a hard job.” In any 
event, there is ample evidence to show that, again, she was 
responsive and aware of what was going on around her. 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
No one in this case testified that the Defendant was, 
in fact, drunk. Although the testimony was that she was 
impaired or intoxicated on some type of substance. The 
substance has been unidentified.  
 
¶ 13 
 
In an opinion filed January 21, 2020, the Court of Appeals held that the trial 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
court did not err when it declined to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication 
because defendant failed to produce sufficient evidence of voluntary intoxication.  
State v. Meader, 269 N.C. App. 446, 450, 838 S.E.2d 643, 646 (2020).  The dissenting 
judge argued that substantial evidence was presented to support a voluntary 
intoxication instruction and the failure to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication 
constituted prejudicial error which requires a new trial.  Id. at 451–56, 838 S.E.2d at 
646–50 (Brook, J., dissenting). 
¶ 14 
 
Defendant argues that substantial evidence was presented to require a 
voluntary intoxication instruction.  We disagree. 
II. 
Standard of Review 
¶ 15 
 
To determine whether a defendant is entitled to a requested instruction on 
voluntary intoxication, this Court reviews de novo whether each element of the 
defense is supported by substantial evidence when taken in the light most favorable 
to the defendant.  State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 348, 372 S.E.2d 532, 537 (1988).  
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion.”  State v. Franklin, 327 N.C. 162, 171, 393 S.E.2d 
781, 787 (1990). 
III. 
Analysis 
¶ 16 
 
“[T]he doctrine [of voluntary intoxication] should be applied with great 
caution.”  State v. Murphy, 157 N.C. 614, 617–18, 72 S.E. 1075, 1076–77 (1911).  A 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
defendant is not entitled to an instruction on voluntary intoxication “in every case in 
which a defendant . . . consum[es] intoxicating beverages or controlled substances.”  
State v. Baldwin, 330 N.C. 446, 462, 412 S.E.2d 31, 41 (1992).   
¶ 17 
 
To obtain a voluntary intoxication instruction, a defendant 
must produce substantial evidence which would support a 
conclusion by the judge that [s]he was so intoxicated that 
[s]he could not form [the specific] intent . . . . The evidence 
must show that at the time of the [crime] the defendant’s 
mind and reason were so completely intoxicated and 
overthrown as to render [her] utterly incapable of forming 
[specific intent]. In absence of some evidence of intoxication 
to such degree, the court is not required to charge the jury 
thereon. 
Mash, 323 N.C. at 346, 372 S.E.2d at 536 (cleaned up).  “[T]here must be some 
evidence tending to show that the defendant’s mental processes were so overcome by 
the excessive use of liquor or other intoxicants that he had temporarily, at least, lost 
the capacity to think and plan.”  State v. Cureton, 218 N.C. 491, 495, 11 S.E.2d 469, 
471 (1940).  “A defendant who wishes to raise an issue for the jury as to whether he 
was so intoxicated by the voluntary consumption of alcohol . . . has the burden of 
producing evidence, or relying on evidence produced by the [S]tate, of his 
intoxication.”  Mash, 323 N.C. at 346, 372 S.E.2d at 536.  “Evidence of mere 
intoxication . . . is not enough to meet defendant’s burden of production.”  Id. at 346, 
372 S.E.2d at 536.  
STATE V. MEADER 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 18 
 
Defendant argues that witnesses testified about her bizarre behavior, that she 
appeared to be intoxicated, and that there was an odor of alcohol in the counseling 
center.  In addition, defendant argues that testimony and police body camera footage 
established that she was out of touch with reality, hallucinating, talking to people 
who were not present, and unaware of her surroundings.  However, while defendant’s 
actions were periodically unusual, the mere fact that “[a] person may be excited, 
intoxicated and emotionally upset” does not negate “the capability to formulate the 
necessary” intent.  Id. at 347, 372 S.E.2d at 537 (cleaned up).  Defendant has failed 
to present substantial evidence that she was “utterly incapable” of forming specific 
intent.  Id. at 346, 372 S.E.2d at 536.   
¶ 19 
 
The record reflects that defendant did not slur her speech or hesitate when 
asked to provide biographical information, and defendant gave appropriate responses 
to the law enforcement officers’ questions when prompted.  As the trial court stated, 
defendant “was not slurring her words.  She was speaking in easily understandable 
English.  There were many questions that were asked of her to which she was 
responsive.”  In addition, when police arrived and arrested defendant, she was able 
to navigate a flight of stairs with her hands cuffed behind her back.  As the trial court 
noted, defendant “was able to walk under her own power” and “officers did[ not] have 
to carry her, did not have to put her in some type of wheelchair, simply directed her 
STATE V. MEADER 
2021-NCSC-37 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
to leave, and that’s what she did.”  Thus, even in the light most favorable to 
defendant, defendant has demonstrated, at best, mere intoxication.   
¶ 20 
 
In State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 14, 257 S.E.2d 569, 579 (1979), the defendant 
was charged with first-degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and 
kidnapping.  Defendant argued that his voluntary intoxication prevented him from 
premeditation and deliberation necessary for a conviction of first-degree murder. 
¶ 21 
 
In that case, the defendant shared a six pack of beer with two other men, 
consumed more beer at a bar less than thirty minutes before the victim got in the car 
with the defendant, and there was beer in the car the defendant was driving.  Id. at 
13–14, 257 S.E.2d at 579.  However, this Court stated that “[w]hether intoxication 
and premeditation can coexist depends upon the degree of inebriety and its effect 
upon the mind and passions; no inference of the absence of deliberation and 
premeditation arises as a matter of law from intoxication.”  Id. at 12, 257 S.E.2d at 
578 (citation omitted).  This Court determined that, despite evidence that the 
defendant had been drinking, the defendant “was capable of premeditation and 
deliberation and could form the specific intent.”  Id. at 14, 257 S.E.2d at 579.  This 
Court went on to conclude that the trial court did not err when it declined to give an 
instruction on voluntary intoxication because there was “no evidence which showed 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
that defendant’s capacity to think and plan was affected by drunkenness [at the time 
he shot the victim].”2  Id. at 14, 257 S.E.2d at 579.  
¶ 22 
 
Such is the case here.  The undisputed evidence tended to show that defendant 
was aware of her surroundings, and in control of her faculties, both before and after 
the police arrived.  When the husband asked if anyone had “seen anything weird,” 
defendant stood up, walked over to the family whose vehicle had been broken into, 
and started talking to them.  Defendant informed the husband that she knew who 
broke into the car and provided him with a name.  When the husband informed 
defendant that law enforcement had been contacted, defendant became “irate” and 
said, “no cops.”   
¶ 23 
 
Defendant understood that involving law enforcement was detrimental to her 
interests.  To conceal her involvement in the crime, she fabricated a story about 
another individual’s involvement.  Based on these facts, viewed in the light most 
favorable to defendant, she cannot demonstrate that her “mind and reason were so 
completely intoxicated and overthrown as to render [her] utterly incapable of forming 
[specific intent].”  Mash, 323 N.C. at 346, 372 S.E.2d at 536 (cleaned up). 
                                            
2 One could argue that Goodman presents an even stronger argument for an 
involuntary intoxication instruction than the case sub judice in light of the amount of alcohol 
that the defendant was shown to have consumed.  That an instruction was not required on 
the facts in Goodman provides support for this Court’s admonition that “the doctrine [of 
voluntary intoxication] should be applied with great caution.”  Murphy, 157 N.C. at 617–18, 
72 S.E. at 1076–77.  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 24 
 
Because a voluntary intoxication instruction is only appropriate when the 
record contains evidence that permits the jury to determine that the defendant is 
unable to form the specific intent necessary to support a conviction for the crime 
charged, the trial court did not err when it declined to instruct the jury on voluntary 
intoxication. 
 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice HUDSON dissenting. 
¶ 25 
 
Because I would hold that the evidence, when taken in the light most favorable 
to defendant, was sufficient to warrant a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
¶ 26 
 
A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on voluntary intoxication 
when there is substantial evidence that the defendant was so intoxicated that he or 
she could not form the requisite intent. State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 346 (1988). 
“When determining whether the evidence is sufficient to entitle a defendant to jury 
instructions on a defense or mitigating factor, courts must consider the evidence in 
the light most favorable to defendant.” Id. at 348. In addition, all reasonable 
inferences from that evidence must be drawn in defendant’s favor. Cf. State v. 
Chevallier, 264 N.C. App. 204, 214 (2019) (“In determining whether the trial evidence 
adduced was sufficient to instruct on a particular theory of criminal liability, we 
review the evidence and any reasonable inference from that evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State.”). 
¶ 27 
 
In the light most favorable to defendant, the evidence here tends to show that 
she was intoxicated and that she was unaware that she had taken another’s property. 
A rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant was so intoxicated that she could 
not form the requisite intent to commit the offenses charged. 
¶ 28 
 
At trial, the jury heard testimony from various witnesses who observed 
defendant at the counseling center. In addition, jurors were shown footage from the 
STATE V. MEADER 
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Hudson, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
responding officers’ bodycams and so were able to observe defendant’s behavior for 
themselves. This evidence tended to show that defendant was intoxicated at the time 
of the alleged crime. On the day of the incident, there were two calls to 911; the first 
call was by a therapist at the counseling center to report an “intoxicated person,” and 
the second call was by the vehicle owner to report a break-in to his vehicle. The first 
person who called 911 testified that defendant appeared to be intoxicated. Officer 
Fulp, who was on the team that responded to the first 911 call, testified that 
defendant appeared to be intoxicated or impaired by an illegal substance. And, at the 
scene, a witness told an officer that he smelled alcohol on defendant.   
¶ 29 
 
There was also evidence, much of which has not been mentioned in the 
majority opinion, that defendant was acting in a manner consistent with intoxication. 
When Officer Fulp first approached defendant, she “started talking about getting beat 
up the night before by a guy named Sebastian,” and then defendant pulled down her 
pants in front of everyone. While speaking with the officers, defendant asked someone 
named Omar for her wallet, but no one named Omar was present at the time. When 
the owner of the counseling center asked the officers if they would continue their 
investigation outside, defendant “became loud” and had to be handcuffed. While the 
officers escorted defendant from the building, defendant claimed that she needed to 
get her bra from the bedroom, but the counseling center had no bedrooms. When she 
was in the police vehicle being questioned by the officers, defendant lost control of her 
STATE V. MEADER 
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Hudson, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
faculties and urinated on herself. She then refused to get out of the police vehicle. 
Once the officers coaxed her into exiting the vehicle, she produced a stolen 
ammunition magazine from her pocket saying it was her cell phone. Officer Fulp then 
placed defendant back in handcuffs and took her to the jail. From the jail, defendant 
phoned her aunt, who testified that she “sounded delirious.” We are required to 
consider the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable 
to defendant. Accordingly, I would conclude there was substantial evidence that 
defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime. 
¶ 30 
 
The majority is correct that “[e]vidence of mere intoxication . . . is not enough 
to meet defendant’s burden of production.” Mash, 323 N.C. at 346. “[T]he defense of 
voluntary intoxication depends not on the amount of alcohol consumed, but on its 
effect on the defendant’s ability to form the specific intent [required by the statute].” 
State v. Cagle, 346 N.C. 497, 508 (1997). Evidence of exactly what substance 
defendant consumed, in what quantity she consumed it, and over what period of time 
it was consumed, is not required or dispositive. A defendant is only required to show 
that her intoxication rendered her unable to form the requisite intent to commit the 
crimes charged. Mash, 323 N.C. at 346. 
¶ 31 
 
Cases in which a voluntary intoxication instruction has been denied have 
involved either evidence of purposefulness despite intoxication or a complete absence 
of evidence of the effects of intoxication on the defendant’s functioning. In Cagle, for 
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Hudson, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
example, we concluded that the trial court had committed no error in refusing to give 
an instruction on voluntary intoxication when the defendant had consumed 
significant amounts of alcohol and smoked marijuana but had discussed his plan to 
rob the victim, took steps to follow that plan, repeatedly said, “go finish him, go kill 
him,” and planned an alibi. 346 N.C. at 508–09; see also State v. Geddie, 345 N.C. 73, 
95 (1996) (“[E]vidence showed only that defendant drank some liquor. There was no 
evidence indicating that defendant was so intoxicated as to be utterly incapable of 
forming the intent to kill.”); State v. Long, 354 N.C. 534, 538–39 (2001) (holding that, 
despite being “substantially impaired,” actions taken to hide his involvement in the 
crime demonstrated defendant could think rationally); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 
509 (1987) (“[N]o evidence was presented showing that the defendant’s capacity to 
think and plan was affected or impaired by intoxication.”). 
¶ 32 
 
Likewise, in State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 12 (1979), we held that intoxication 
alone does not automatically lead to the inference that a defendant cannot form the 
requisite intent. There, we concluded that the trial court had not erred by refusing to 
give an instruction on voluntary intoxication because the evidence showed that 
despite defendant’s consumption of alcohol, he was able to drive, give directions, lead 
a group on a search through a neighborhood looking for items that had been stolen 
from his car, and participate in planning a scheme for disposing of the victim's body. 
Id. at 14. In addition, witnesses testified that defendant was “not in a drunken 
STATE V. MEADER 
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Hudson, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
condition” and we concluded that “[t]here was no evidence which showed that 
defendant's capacity to think and plan was affected by drunkenness.” Id. 
¶ 33 
 
Unlike those cases, from the evidence here one could infer that defendant was 
so intoxicated that she could not form the requisite intent to commit the crimes 
alleged. A reasonable juror could infer from the evidence that defendant was unaware 
of her surroundings, was completely unaware that she had taken items from the 
vehicle, and that her capacity to think and plan was affected by intoxication. For 
example, when the owner of the vehicle discovered the break-in and asked if anyone 
had seen anything, defendant approached the owner and told an unrelated story 
involving a man jumping from a third floor to punch her. Also, when the police arrived 
at the counseling center, defendant believed they had come to help her rather than to 
remove her from the premises.  
¶ 34 
 
Additionally, defendant made no effort to conceal her actions. During a 
conversation with the officers, she told them she did not have a cell phone. But a few 
minutes later, when an officer asked her about a bulge in her pocket, she told the 
officer the bulge was her cell phone. She then proceeded to grab the bulge and hand 
it over to the officer without reservation or reluctance. In fact, she had handed the 
officer an ammunition magazine—an item reported missing from the vehicle that had 
been broken into. When the officers reacted to the ammunition magazine as evidence 
of a potential crime, defendant got upset and seemed to believe all of a sudden that 
STATE V. MEADER 
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Hudson, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
she had handed them a weapon. She said, “I didn’t know [it was a gun]; I would have 
never handed it to you if I would have known it was a gun.” She also wore the 
sunglasses she was later charged with stealing in her shirt in plain sight of the 
officers and other witnesses. Although evidence of defendant being an unskilled 
criminal does not entitle her to a voluntary intoxication instruction, in the light most 
favorable to defendant this evidence tends to show that she could not have formed 
the intent to commit the offenses charged. This evidence goes beyond defendant being 
“excited, intoxicated and emotionally upset,” Mash, 323 N.C. at 347 (quoting State v. 
Hamby, 276 N.C. 674, 678 (1970)), and could support an inference of a real inability 
to comprehend the surroundings and events around her.  
¶ 35 
 
Pointing to evidence that defendant walked down a stairway while handcuffed, 
provided biographical information, did not slur her words, and responded to the 
officers’ questions, the majority concludes that this is not a “ ‘very clear case[ ]’ [where] 
the intoxication was so severe that it could have negated [ ] defendant’s ability to form 
specific intent.”1 But the sum of the evidence here is, at best, equivocal. Substantial 
                                            
1 I also note that our law does not require that a voluntary intoxication instruction be 
given only in “very clear cases.” The majority quotes from State v. Absher, 226 N.C. 656, 660 
(1946), where our Court quoted from a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. In that 
instruction, the trial court said, “[a]s the doctrine [of voluntary intoxication] is one that is 
dangerous in its application, it is allowed only in very clear cases.” Id. at 660. Far from 
establishing a threshold requirement that the voluntary intoxication jury instruction only be 
given in very clear cases, our Court was merely quoting from a case in which the trial court 
determined there was sufficient evidence to warrant instructions on voluntary intoxication. 
The trial court then gave that instruction to the jury, warning the jury that the defense 
should only apply in clear cases. 
STATE V. MEADER 
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Hudson, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
evidence supports the opposite conclusion, and our courts are required to consider the 
evidence in the light most favorable to defendant; in doing so, I would hold that the 
jury should have been instructed on voluntary intoxication. 
¶ 36 
 
Finally, I would conclude that the trial court’s failure to deliver the voluntary 
intoxication instruction to the jury was prejudicial. Having been given no instruction 
on voluntary intoxication, the jury was initially split regarding defendant’s intent 
and had to be reminded that they must reach a unanimous verdict. The jury 
continued to deliberate before eventually requesting the definition of “utterly 
incapable,” a term that pertains to the voluntary intoxication defense. The trial 
court’s response was that “utterly incapable” had no legal significance in this case. 
Ultimately, the jury returned guilty verdicts. Because the jury seemed particularly 
concerned with defendant’s ability to form the requisite intent, I would conclude that 
there is a reasonable possibility that had a voluntary intoxication instruction been 
given, the jury would have reached a different result. 
¶ 37 
 
When taken in the light most favorable to defendant, there is substantial 
evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found that defendant was so 
intoxicated that she could not form the specific intent to commit the offenses charged. 
In addition, the trial court’s failure to deliver the instruction was prejudicial. 
¶ 38 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
Justice MORGAN and Justice EARLS join in this dissenting opinion.