Title: YUNKER v MURRAY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13486 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1976 C A R E Y MATOVICH YUNKER, P l a i n t i f f and P e t i t i o n e r , FRANK MURRAY, Secretary of S t a t e of t h e S t a t e of Montana, i n h i s capacity a s Secretary of S t a t e of the S t a t e of Montana, e t a l . , Defendants and Respondents. Original Proceeding: Counsel of Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : Daniel 3. Shea argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondents: Robert L.Woodah1, Attorney General, Helena, Montana William 3. Anderson argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Submitted: September 7, 1976 F i l e d : $El' I. 4 1976 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is a n o r i g i n a l proceeding seeking a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t h a t each of t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t judges of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of Montana i s a n "incumbent" w i t h i n t h e meaning of A r t i c l e V I I , s e c t i o n 8 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n and must r u n on a " r e t a i n o r r e j e c t " b a l l o t i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n pursuant t o s e c t i o n 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947. The p e t i t i o n was f i l e d on behalf of Carey Matovich Yunker, a r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r i n p r e c i n c t 59, Yellowstone County, Montana, w i t h i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . A copy of t h e complaint f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment was a t t a c h e d t o t h e p e t i t i o n f i l e d h e r e i n . The matter was set f o r adversary hearing and n o t i c e given t o t h e Hon. Frank Murray, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , and t o t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t judges of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . Notice w a s n o t given t o t h e c l e r k and r e c o r d e r of each of t h e f i v e c o u n t i e s comprising t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t named a s defendants. B r i e f s w e r e f i l e d by p e t i t i o n e r , t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e , and two of t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t judges of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . A t t h e t i m e of adversary hearing counsel appeared and presented o r a l argument on behalf of p e t i t i o n e r and on behalf of t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e . A s w e understand it, t h e s e a t t o r n e y s s t i p u l a t e d t h a t procedurally t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e admitted t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t u a l a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e p e t i t i o n and complaint b u t n o t t h e l e g a l conclusions, agreed on t h e i s s u e presented, and requested t h i s Court t o render f o r t h w i t h a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment, i n view of t h e t i m e element involved. This Court took t h e m a t t e r under advisement. W e accept j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n on t h e b a s i s set f o r t h and under a u t h o r i t y of Forty-Second Leg. Assembly v. Lennon, 156 Mont. 416, 481 P.2d 330. W e do n o t consider t h e c l e r k s and r e c o r d e r s of t h e f i v e counties of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t necessary p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n and order a l l s t r i c k e n as defendants herein. The s t a t u t o r y duty of prescribing t h e form of b a l l o t is vested i n t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e . Section 23-3517(3), R.C.M. 1947. H i s presence a s a p a r t y herein renders unnecessary t h e joining of county e l e c t i o n o f f i c i a l s . Under t h e circumstances of t h i s case, a bona f i d e j u s t i - c i a b l e controversy f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment has been presented t o us f o r determination. Here we have a complaint f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment; a s t i p u l a t i o n i n open c o u r t t h a t t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t s a r e undisputed and t h a t procedural i r r e g u l a r i t i e s are waived by t h e s e c r e t a r y of state; an admission by two of t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t judges i n t h e i r b r i e f t h a t " t h e f a c t s , i s s u e s , and law a r e now squarely before t h i s Court"; and an agreement on t h e s p e c i f i c i s s u e t o be decided under t h e f a c t s . Under t h e s e circumstances w e w i l l t r e a t t h e s t i p u l a t i o n and admissions as responsive plead- ings t o t h e complaint and consider t h e c a s e ready f o r adjudication. The f a c t u a l background w i l l i l l u m i n a t e t h e i s s u e presented f o r decision. P r i o r t o 1961 d i s t r i c t c o u r t judgeships i n multi- judge j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t s were not designated o r i d e n t i f i e d a s s e p a r a t e o f f i c e s . Each candidate, whether incumbent o r c h a l l e n g e r , r a n a g a i n s t t h e f i e l d r a t h e r than a g a i n s t a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l f o r a designated judgeship. I n a t h r e e judge d i s t r i c t , f o r example, t h e t h r e e candidates receiving t h e highest number of v o t e s i n t h e general e l e c t i o n w e r e declared e l e c t e d t o t h e t h r e e judgeships t o be f i l l e d . I n 1961 t h e l e g i s l a t u r e changed t h i s system by amending s e c t i o n s 23-2001 through 23-2003, R.C.M. 1947, ( l a t e r replaced by s e c t i o n 23-4501, R.C.M. 1947). The new l e g i s l a t i o n provided t h a t each d i s t r i c t judgeship i n a multi-judge j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t was t o be assigned a number and each became a s e p a r a t e j u d i c i a l o f f i c e . A t t h a t t i m e t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t judgeships i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l District w e r e assigned numbers according t o t h e s e n i o r i t y of t h e t h r e e d i s t r i c t judges. Thus t h e judgeship held by Judge Derry became Department #1; t h a t of Judge Fenton became Department # 2 ; and t h a t of Judge Sande became Department #3. This s i t u a t i o n continued u n t i l t h e r e t i r e m e n t of Judge Derry i n 1967. A t t h a t t i m e by c o u r t r u l e i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Judge Fenton became t h e s e n i o r d i s t r i c t judge i n p o i n t of s e r v i c e and succeeded t o Department #1; Judge Sande t o Department # 2 ; and Judge Luedke, appointed t o succeed Judge Derry, t o Department #3. The s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e , however, r e t a i n e d t h e o r i g i n a l department d e s i g n a t i o n and s o f a r a s h i s e l e c t i o n records w e r e concerned Judge Fenton remained i n Department #2, Judge Sande i n Department # 3 , and Judge Luedke succeeded t o Department #l. I n 1969 Judge Fenton d i e d and Judge Wilson was appointed t o succeed him. The l o c a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t r u l e r e s u l t e d i n an o r d e r being entered a s s i g n i n g Judge Sande t o Department #1, Judge Luedke t o Department # 2 , and Judge Wilson t o Department #3. The s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e ' s e l e c t i o n records r e t a i n e d t h e o r i g i n a l d e s i g n a t i o n s and showed Judge Luedke i n Department #1, Judge Wilson i n Department # 2 , and Judge Sande i n Department #3. I n t h e 1972 e l e c t i o n t h e records i n t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e ' s o f f i c e and i n t h e c o u r t records of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t i n d i c a t e d t h i s s i t u a t i o n : T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e D i s t r i c t i n B i l l i n g s Dept. #1 Judge Luedke Judge Sande Dept. # 2 Judge Wilson Judge Luedke Dept. #3 Judge Sande Judge Wilson Confusion r e s u l t e d i n connection w i t h f i l i n g s by c h a l l e n g e r s . One challenger f i l e d according t o t h e Thirteen J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t department numbers, r a t h e r than according t o t h e department numbers i n t h e e l e c t i o n records i n t h e s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e ' s o f f i c e . This r e s u l t e d i n h i s f i l i n g a g a i n s t t h e wrong judge. The e r r o r was discovered before t h e f i l i n g deadline and t h e f i l i n g was amended accordingly. This e l e c t i o n year, according t o t h e B i l l i n g s judges, they decided t o f i l e according t o t h e department over which each pre- sided a s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e c o u r t records of t h e Thirteenth Judi- c i a l D i s t r i c t i n B i l l i n g s , t o avoid t h e confusion t h a t e x i s t e d i n 1972. The records i n t h e s e c r e t a r y of state's o f f i c e w e r e conformed t o those department numbers used i n t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . Accordingly, Judge Sande f i l e d f o r Department #1, Judge Luedke f o r Department #2 and Judge Wilson f o r Department #3. However, p r i o r t o t h e e l e c t i o n t h i s year, t h e 1972 Montana Constitution had been adopted and t h e e l e c t i o n laws p e r t a i n i n g t o d i s t r i c t judges changed. The 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n required a l l unopposed incumbent d i s t r i c t judges t o run on a " r e t a i n o r r e j e c t " b a s i s . A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8 ( 2 ) , 1972 Montana Constitu- t i o n ; Keller v. Smith, 33 St.Rep. 828, Mont . P.2d - 1 - A form of b a l l o t w a s provided t o implement t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision by t h e 1973 l e g i s l a t u r e . Section 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947; Keller v. Smith, supra. The s i t u a t i o n , i n a n u t s h e l l , is t h a t each of t h e t h r e e judges i n t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t was e l e c t e d i n 1972 t o a four year term i n a d i f f e r e n t department o r judgeship than t h a t f o r which they a r e running unopposed i n 1976. The question f o r determination i s whether each is an "incumbent" w i t h i n t h e meaning of A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8 ( 2 ) , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , and must run on a " r e t a i n o r r e j e c t " b a l l o t i n t h e general e l e c t i o n pursuant t o s e c t i o n 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947. A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8 ( 2 ) , 1972 Montana Constitution provides : " ( 2 ) I f , a t t h e f i r s t e l e c t i o n a f t e r senate confirmation, and a t t h e e l e c t i o n before each succeeding t e r m of o f f i c e , any candidate o t h e r than t h e incumbent j u s t i c e o r d i s t r i c t judge f i l e s f o r e l e c t i o n t o t h a t o f f i c e , t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l be placed on t h e b a l l o t . I f t h e r e i s no e l e c t i o n c o n t e s t f o r t h e o f f i c e , t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l nevertheless be placed on t h e general e l e c t i o n b a l l o t t o allow v o t e r s of t h e s t a t e o r d i s t r i c t t o approve o r r e j e c t him. I f an incumbent i s r e j e c t e d , another s e l e c t i o n and nomination s h a l l be made." Section 23-4501(2), R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Each j u d i c i a l o f f i c e i n a d i s t r i c t which has more than one (1) d i s t r i c t judge is a s e p a r a t e and inde- pendent o f f i c e f o r e l e c t i o n purposes." From t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision and s t a t u t e it i s argued t h a t none of t h e t h r e e unopposed d i s t r i c t judges i n t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t is an "incumbent" because each has f i l e d f o r a d i f f e r e n t o f f i c e o r judgeship than t h a t t o which he was e l e c t e d i n t h e preceding e l e c t i o n i n 1972. W e observe t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision i s d i r e c t e d t o incumbent d i s t r i c t judges (and Supreme Court j u s t i c e s ) . W e have previously held t h e word "incumbent" i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l pro- v i s i o n a p p l i e s t o a l l unopposed d i s t r i c t judges i r r e s p e c t i v e of how they o r i g i n a l l y a t t a i n e d t h e i r j u d i c i a l o f f i c e s and i n t h a t context a l l unopposed d i s t r i c t judges must run on a " r e t a i n o r r e j e c t " b a l l o t i n t h e general e l e c t i o n . K e l l e r v. Smith, supra. The explanatory notes of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention following A r t i c l e V I I , Section 8, f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e word "incumbent" appearing t h e r e i n a p p l i e s t o any judge i n o f f i c e . "Convention Notes "Revises 1889 c o n s t i t u t i o n * * * Contested e l e c t i o n of judges is not changed, however i f a judqe i n o f f i c e does not have an opponent i n an e l e c t i o n h i s name w i l l be p u t on t h e b a l l o t anyway and t h e people asked to approve o r reject him. * * *It (Emphasis added.) This expresses t h e i n t e n t of t h e d e l e g a t e s t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention and t h e meaning they attached t o t h e word "incumbent" i n t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision they framed and adopted. It c l e a r l y shows t h e approval o r r e j e c t i o n b a l l o t was intended t o apply t o any unopposed judge i n o f f i c e . Keller v. Smith, supra. The s t a t u t e , on t h e o t h e r hand, was enacted long before t h e 1972 Montana Constitution. O r i g i n a l l y enacted i n 1961 when t h e system of e l e c t i n g judges was changed a s heretofore described, vcol t h e s t a t u t e was subsequently codified a s s e c t i o n 2 3 - M ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947, i n 1969. I t c r e a t e d a s e p a r a t e o f f i c e f o r e l e c t i o n purposes f o r each judgeship i n a multi-judge d i s t r i c t i n order t o e s t a b l i s h head-on c o n t e s t s between two candidates f o r i n d i v i d u a l judgeships i n t h e general e l e c t i o n , r a t h e r than continue t h e p r i o r system whereby a l l candidates r a n i n a f i e l d f o r t h e t o t a l number of judgeships t o be f i l l e d i n t h e e l e c t i o n . Thus t h e purpose and o b j e c t i v e of t h e s t a t u t e , on t h e one hand, and t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision, on t h e o t h e r , a r e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . It follows t h a t t h e r e is nothing i n c o n s i s t e n t i n using t h e word "incumbent" i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision t o mean any judge i n o f f i c e and a t t h e same t i m e preserving t h e s t a t u t o r y mandate t h a t each judgeship i s a s e p a r a t e o f f i c e f o r e l e c t i o n purposes. The two a r e n o t repugnant o r i r r e c o n c i l a b l e , but can be construed and i n t e r p r e t e d as p a r t s of a homogene0.u~ wh01.e~ giving e f f e c t t o each. W e f i n d f u r t h e r support f o r our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h e p r i n c i p l e of reasonable construction. This p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e s equally t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r s t a t u t o r y construction and has been defined and explained i n t h i s language: " I t has been c a l l e d a golden r u l e of s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t unreasonableness of t h e r e s u l t produced by one among a l t e r n a t i v e possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a s t a t u t e i s reason f o r r e - j e c t i n g t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n favor of another which would produce a reasonable r e s u l t . It is said to be a 'well established principle of statutory interpretation that the law favors rational and sensible construction.'" Suther- land, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 2A, Sec. 45.12, p. 37, and cases cited therein. Montana has adopted this principle by statute. Section 49-134, R.C.M. 1947. Applying this principle to the case before us, is it reason- able to construe the intent of the framers of the constitution to permit nullification of the "retain or reject" ballot simply by filing for a different district judgeship in the same judicial district? To ask the question is to answer it. This could be repeated in each succeeding election ad infinitum. We decline to indulge in the assumption the framers of the constitution intended to impose the requirement of a "retain or reject" ballot for unopposed judges with their right hand, and at the same time ef- fectively nullify it with their left. Additionally, public policy supports our construction. In Keller we quoted a recognized authority: "Statutes regulating the rights of citizens to vote are of great public interest, and therefore, are interpreted with a view to securing for citizens their right to vote and to insure the election of those officers who are the people's - - choice." Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 71.15, p . 366. and cases . A therein cited. We applied this principle to Article VII, Section 8 ( 2 ) , 1972 Montana Constitution, in the context of the issue before us in Keller. We apply it here for the same reasons and with the same result. We have considered the subsidiary arguments advanced in opposition to our interpretation and find them not persuasive. This opinion constitutes a declaratory judgment that each of the three judges in the Thirteenth Judicial District of Montana is an unopposed "incumbent" within the meaning of Article VII, Section 8(2), 1972 Montana Constitution, and must run on a "retain or reject" ballot in the general election in 1976 pursuant to section 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947. The secretary of state, pur- suant to section 23-3517(3), R.C.M. 1947, should prescribe the form of ballot accordingly. ------------ 7% d - g - M - Justice * * * * * Justice Wesley Castles dissents but is not available to express his views at this time.