Title: VT Agency of Natural Resources v. Upper Valley Regional Landfill

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-121


 Vermont Agency of Natural Resources          Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Environmental Law Division

 Upper Valley Regional Landfill               October Term, 1992
 Corporation, Frank L. Barker, Jr.
 and Robert MacNeil

 TRASH, Intervenor


 Merideth Wright, J.

 Joseph T. Bivins, Thetford Center, for intervenor

 Edward V. Schwiebert and Donna L. Duffy of Abell, Kenlan, Schwiebert & Hall,
    P.C., Rutland, for defendants-appellees


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      GIBSON, J.   Intervenor Thetford Residents Against Statewide Hauling
 (TRASH), a citizen environmental group, appeals from an order of the
 environmental law division granting defendants' motion to require TRASH to
 be represented by an attorney in an action filed by the Vermont Agency of
 Natural Resources (ANR) against Upper Valley Regional Landfill Corporation
 (UVRL).  We reverse.
      The underlying action involves closure of a landfill.  TRASH sought and
 was granted intervenor party status before the environmental law division
 pursuant to 10 V.S.A. { 8012(d).  Joseph Bivins, a member of TRASH, appeared
 as TRASH's representative.  Defendant UVRL then filed motions to reconsider
 TRASH's party status and to require TRASH to be represented by an attorney.
 The court denied defendant's motion to reconsider but ruled that TRASH must
 appear through counsel.  TRASH moved for reconsideration of the counsel
 requirement and, in the alternative, moved for permission to appeal the
 collateral final order pursuant to V.R.A.P. 5.1.  The motion for
 reconsideration was denied but the court granted intervenor permission to
 appeal the order that it appear through counsel.
      In LaBrie, Inc. v. Vermont Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, ___ Vt. ___,
 ___, 596 A.2d 354, 354 (1991), we recognized the general rule that a
 corporation must appear through counsel.  Because the record in that case
 did not support the plaintiff's claim that the corporation could not afford
 counsel, we did not decide whether the counsel requirement would offend
 Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution under such circumstances.
 In this appeal, we consider whether an unincorporated organization must
 appear through counsel where this requirement would preclude the
 organization's appearance.
      The primary purpose of the "lawyer-representation rule" is the
 protection of the public, not the creation of any private advantage for
 attorneys.  Margaret Maunder Assoc. v. A-Copy, Inc., 499 A.2d 1172, 1174
 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1985).  Courts have generally refused to permit
 nonattorneys to represent organizations because they do not have the ethical
 responsibilities of attorneys and are not subject to the disciplinary
 control of the courts.  Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1983).  The lawyer-representation rule also ensures that the
 courts have control over the management and administration of cases.  Mercu-
 Ray Indus., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co.,