Title: State v. Flying" W" Enterprises, Inc.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

160 S.E.2d 482 (1968) 273 N.C. 399 STATE of North Carolina, ex rel. T. Wade BRUTON, Attorney General of the State of North Carolina v. FLYING "W" ENTERPRISES, INC., a corporation; W. L. Wilde, Robert T. Squyres, Jerry Adams, and John Doe, Richard Roe, and All Other Persons Threatening to Trespass Upon the S.S. MODERN GREECE, Her Engines, tackle, apparel, furniture or cargo, and all other vessels lying within a marine league off the coast of the State of North Carolina. No. 199. Supreme Court of North Carolina. April 10, 1968. *486 Poisson & Barnhill by L. J. Poisson, Jr., Wilmington, for defendant appellants. Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton, Asst. Atty. Gen. Parks H. Icenhour, and Rountree & Clark by George Rountree, III, Wilmington, for plaintiff appellee. PARKER, Chief Justice. Defendants have not excepted to any findings of fact except the finding of fact that a continuation of the diving and salvage *487 operation of the defendants will result in irreparable loss and damage to the State of North Carolina. A number of facts were stipulated by the parties. The parties stipulated in substance that all the hulks or wrecks of the vessels herein involved, together with all the property in and upon them, "lie in the Atlantic Ocean, below the surface of the water at low tide, within a marine league seawardly from the Coast of North Carolina, offshore from the waters of Pender, New Hanover and Brunswick Counties, North Carolina." Under this stipulation of fact, all the hulks or wrecks herein involved, together with all the property in and upon them, lie within the territorial boundaries of the State of North Carolina and have substantially so lain since they were sunk, except the Spanish sailing vessel Fortune which, with its cargo therein, was sunk in the early 1700's and has substantially lain in the same position since it was sunk. G.S. § 141-6(a) and (b) read: See North Carolina Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights § 25. By statute the United States has in effect quitclaimed and confirmed the ownership of the State of North Carolina in the lands beneath the Atlantic Ocean within a marine league seaward from the eastern boundary of the State. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1312 reads: A marine league is a distance which is the equivalent of three geographical miles. Ballentine's Law Dictionary (2nd Ed. 1948). Defendants assign as error that Judge Mintz in answering the issue set forth above "yes" held in effect that the plaintiff is the *488 owner and entitled to the immediate possession of the sunken hulks and all property thereon or therein, including those hulks and artifacts specifically described in the complaint, lying in the Atlantic Ocean seaward within one marine league of the North Carolina coast, as alleged in the complaint. Defendants also assign as error the court's conclusion of law that the State of North Carolina has never abandoned the wrecks of the S/S Modern Greece, the S/S Phantom, the S/S Ranger and the Spanish privateer Fortune, and the articles contained therein, nor the wrecks of any other ships, lying in the Atlantic Ocean within the territorial waters of the State of North Carolina and within a marine league seaward from the Coast of North Carolina. It is well-settled law that the owners of sunken or derelict vessels or their contents may abandon them so effectively as to divest title and ownership. Thompson v. United States, 62 Ct.Cl. 516; Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 79 Am.Dec. 88; Howard v. Sharlin (Fla.), 61 So. 2d 181; State by and through Ervin v. Massachusetts Company (Fla.), 95 So. 2d 902, 63 A.L.R.2d 1360; Creevy v. Breedlove, 12 La.Ann. 745; Steinbraker v. Crouse, 169 Md. 453, 182 A. 448; Deklyn v. Davis, 1 Hopk.Ch. 135, 2 N.Y.Ch. 369; Williamson v. Mennella, 248 App.Div. 911, 290 N.Y.S. 645; Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1369, 1372. "A vessel, cargo, or other property is derelict in the maritime sense of the word when it is abandoned without hope of recovery or without intention of returning." 48 Am.Jur., Shipping § 647 at p. 451. It is manifest from the stipulations and the findings of fact made by the judge, which findings of fact relevant here are unchallenged, that the vessels herein involved were derelicts, and that the one-time owners of these submerged vessels and their contents have abandoned them so effectively that they, and each one of them, have divested themselves of any title and ownership. Defendants contend the State of North Carolina has no property rights in these sunken vessels or their cargoes either under the early English common law or under the subsequent law of the State of North Carolina prior to the enactment of Chapter 533, Session Laws of 1967 (now codified as G.S. § 121-22 through G.S. § 121-28). Defendants in their brief contend in essence that these vessels and their cargoes were abandoned by their former owners, and that ownership has vested in defendants because they have lawfully appropriated them to their own use and reduced them to possession with the requisite intent to become the owners. We will first consider the question of the right of the sovereign at common law to goods found wrecked or derelict at sea, regardless of whether they were "cast upon the land or shore." The Supreme Court of Florida, en banc, dealt with this precise question in State by and through Ervin v. Massachusetts Company (Fla.), 95 So. 2d 902, 63 A.L.R.2d 1360. In a very scholarly opinion, Justice Roberts said for the Court: "The difficulty which the Chancellorand apparently the parties, alsohas had with this question stems from a misunderstanding of the meaning and effect of the two English statutes cited above. The statute of 3 Edward I, Ch. 4, (enacted in 1275) provides that: "The statute of 17 Edward II, Ch. 11 (enacted in 1324) provides that: A rehearing was granted by the Supreme Court of Florida in this case on 12 June 1957 and, upon further consideration, it adhered to its former opinion and judgment. 95 So. 2d 908, 63 A.L.R.2d 1369. Thereupon, defendant Massachusetts Co. petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, which was denied 25 November 1957, 355 U.S. 881, 78 S. Ct. 147, 2 L. Ed. 2d 112. This is said in 1 Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, Ch. 8, p. 280 (Reprint of the First Edition, Dawsons of Pall Mall, London, 1966): In Hetfield v. Baum, 35 N.C. 394, Justice Pearson said for the Court: "`Wreck' has been defined to be such goods as after a shipwreck are cast on land by the sea and left there, and as the ruins of a ship which has been stranded or dashed on a shelf, rock, or lee shore by tempestuous weather, * * *." "In England, by the early common law, all wreck or wrecks (in the technical sense) became the property of the Crown or its grantee after a year and a day, if no owner appeared within that time to claim it." 48 Am.Jur. Shipping § 648. To the same effect, 80 C.J.S. Shipping § 259. This statute in its present form is codified in G.S. § 4-1 as follows: This Court said in Resort Development Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689, 71 S.E.2d 474: The term "Common Law" refers to the common law of England and not of any particular state. Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 578, 22 S. Ct. 515, 46 L. Ed. 697. Defendants rely strongly upon the case of Murphy v. Dunham (1889, D.C.Mich.), 38 F. 503. The concept of the sovereign's prerogative as to a derelict ship or cargo apparently has been rejected expressly in this case. The Federal District Court in Michigan held, in the absence of statute, that the ownership of a cargo of coal in a vessel sunk in Lake Michigan did not pass to the State of Illinois as sovereign. The Court reasoned as follows: The Statute of Westminister (3 Edw. I. c. 4), which it held to be expressive of the common law upon the subject, applied only to "wreck of the sea" consisting of goods cast upon the shore, and goods known as flotsam, jetsam, and lagan; flotsam being goods cast upon the water, jetsam being goods cast overboard to save a laboring ship, and lagan being goods cast overboard attached to a line and buoy to mark their presence. The Court held that under these definitions coal lying at the bottom of the lake could not be considered "wreck of the sea" such as would be a prerogative of the sovereign. In the annotation in 63 A.L.R.2d 1377, it is said: Defendants contend as follows: In the case of H.M.S. "Thetis" (1835), 3 Hagg. 228, 166 Eng.Repr. 390, 393, the Court said: As long ago as the year 1798, in The "Aquila," 1 C.Rob. 37, 165 Eng.Repr. 87, we find the salvor attempting to claim title by right of occupancy to the cargo carried in a ship found derelict at sea, where the ship was reclaimed and restored by the owner and the cargo remained unchanged. The learned and distinguished Admiralty Judge, Sir W. Scott, in this case said: We do not accept the statement in Murphy v. Dunham, supra, as a correct statement of applicable common law, nor do we agree with the contention of defendants that "it was not until the enactment of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60) that the term `wreck' at common law was extended to apply to any vessel or its cargo not thrown upon the shore." State by and through Ervin v. Massachusetts Company, supra. We conclude that the hulks or vessels and the cargoes therein involved in the instant case were "derelicts" which, at common law, would belong to the Crown in its office of Admiralty at the end of a year and a day under the authority of the English cases we have quoted above from the Supreme Court of Florida, and of The "Aquila," supra. The North Carolina statutes which we have quoted above declaring the common law to be in force in this State since 1776 show the intention of the State to pre-empt for itself those fiscal perquisites which, at common law, had been the prerogative right of the Crown. Consequently, since these hulks or vessels and the cargoes therein were resting in territorial waters of the State of North Carolina and within the boundaries of the State of North Carolina, they are within the purview of the common law and belong to the State in its sovereign capacity. The parties stipulated as follows: *493 According to the stipulation of facts and the facts found by the judge, which are unchallenged in respect to this point, it is our opinion, and we so hold, that the sovereign State of North Carolina has never abandoned the hulks or sunken vessels herein involved, nor the property in or upon them. The two assignments of error above mentioned are overruled. Defendants assign as error the court's finding that the diving and salvaging operations conducted and performed by defendants on the wrecks of the S/S Modern Greece, the Spanish privateer Fortune, the S/S Ranger, and the S/S Phantom constitute unlawful trespasses by them, jointly and severally. This assignment of error is overruled. For the reason stated above, we hold that the State of North Carolina, in its sovereign capacity, has a possessory right or title to these hulks or vessels and their cargoes; and, consequently, the defendants, in going upon them and removing objects therefrom, were trespassers. It is hornbook law that to trespass is a wrongful invasion of the possession of another. 4 Strong, N.C. Index, Trespass, § 1. Defendants assign as error that the court erred in its finding of fact that a continuation of defendants' activities in and upon the hulks of these sunken vessels will result in irreparable loss and damage to the State of North Carolina. Defendants also assign as error the granting of the State's request for injunctive relief. According to the stipulated facts, these old derelict vessels, with the exception of the Spanish privateer Fortune, were once Confederate blockade runners, sunk over a century ago during the War Between the States; and, since that time, they have lain at the bottom of the sea within the territorial waters of the sovereign State of North Carolina abandoned by their onetime owners. These sunken vessels contain articles of unique historical significance and value which cannot be replaced. No reasonable redress at law can be afforded for defendants' taking of these artifacts, and the sovereign State of North Carolina, in equity and good conscience, should not be required to submit to the defendants' unlawfully going upon its property and removing therefrom such articles. Under the facts stipulated and found, defendants are not engaged in any legitimate enterprise with respect to these old derelicts. The Honorable James Sprunt, a distinguished citizen of this State, one of its more prominent businessmen and a longtime resident of New Hanover County, at the age of 17 1/2 years, sailed on the blockade runners Advance, Eugenie, Northheath, Lillian, Susan, Beirne, and the Alonzo in the capacity of purser. The historical value and rare interest which these old derelict vessels may have for future generations who are interested in days long past have been expressed by Mr. Sprunt in his accurate and most interesting volumes Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, 1660-1916, and Derelicts, 1920. We quote from page 396 of the Second Edition of Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, speaking of these blockade runners: And at page 461 of the same book, Mr. Sprunt goes on to say: Mr. Sprunt, in his book Derelicts, 1920, in speaking of blockade runners, has this to say on page 51: The "wrecks" statutes of North Carolina, G.S. §§ 82-1 through 82-18, both inclusive, do not refer in any way to the ownership of the hulks or sunken vessels here and the cargoes therein contained. These statutes are concerned with the protection and sale of stranded vessels or a vessel's cargo or material or any property cast ashore, and the application of the proceeds. According to all the facts stipulated and found, these hulks or sunken vessels and their cargoes have lain unattended and abandoned for more than one hundred years beneath the surface of the Atlantic Ocean within the territorial limits of the State of North Carolina, except for the Spanish privateer Fortune which has lain for more than two hundred fifty years beneath the surface of the Atlantic Ocean in the territorial limits of the State of North Carolina. In this case we are not concerned with property which Blackstone says is distinguished "by the barbarous and uncouth appellations of jetsam, flotsam, and ligan." It is manifest that no attempt has been made or will be made to salvage these sunken vessels, and it is equally manifest that the sunken vessels here have little, if any, value for salvage. In recent years since the advent of skin divers and oxygen tanks which may be strapped to the backs of skin divers, it is possible to explore such sunken vessels with no great difficulty and carry to shore articles of unique historical value found therein. It is manifest that the activities of the defendants here were solely for their own personal gain. Upon the facts stipulated and found, we do not think that our "wrecks" statutes divested this State of a prerogative right of the Crown to which it succeeded when it became a sovereign State and adopted the common law of England as it existed in 1776. In our opinion, and we so hold, our "wrecks" statutes have no application to the facts in the present case. Upon the stipulated facts and facts found, which are not challenged except in one respect heretofore stated, the trial court correctly entered an order permanently enjoining defendants from diving upon, going on, molesting, or in anywise interfering with the hulks or sunken vessels here and their cargoes, and the court also was correct in issuing a mandatory injunction that defendants shall forthwith return to the sovereign State of North Carolina the articles specified above which were taken from these hulks or sunken vessels. All defendants' assignments of error are overruled. The judgment below is Affirmed. HUSKINS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.