Title: Drinkard, et al. v. Perry, et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: December 2, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0700 
_________________________ 
 
Matthew C. Drinkard and Jefferson Blane Dolbare  
 
v. 
 
 Jacquelyn Turner Perry, Debra Sue Turner, Mildred 
Williamson, Edna Fant, Sermenedia White, and Amanda Louise 
Turner 
 
Appeal from Choctaw Circuit Court 
(CV-19-900010) 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2022-0701 
_________________________ 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
2 
 
 
Matthew C. Drinkard and Jefferson Blane Dolbare  
 
v.  
 
Jacquelyn Turner Perry, Debra Sue Turner, Mildred 
Williamson, Edna Fant, Sermenedia White, and Amanda Louise 
Turner 
 
 
Appeal from Choctaw Circuit Court 
(CV-20-000011) 
 
BOLIN, Justice. 
 
Matthew C. Drinkard and Jefferson Blane Dolbare filed a motion 
to intervene in the proceedings regarding the administration of the estate 
of Milton Turner, deceased, which were pending in the Choctaw Circuit 
Court ("the circuit court") after having been removed from the Choctaw 
Probate Court ("the probate court").  The circuit court denied the motion 
to intervene, and Drinkard and Dolbare appealed. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Milton Turner died on July 25, 2018.  On September 20, 2018, 
Mildred Williamson filed a petition for letters of administration of 
Turner's estate in the probate court; that case was assigned probate-court 
case number A-2018-5218.  In her petition, Williamson asserted that 
Turner had died intestate and that Williamson was Turner's only 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
3 
 
surviving heir.  Also on September 20, 2018, the probate court entered an 
order granting Williamson letters of administration of Turner's estate.  
The probate court entered a separate order naming Williamson as the 
personal representative of Turner's estate.   
 
On January 25, 2019, Williamson, individually and in her capacity 
as the personal representative of Turner's estate, entered into a contract 
agreeing to sell to Drinkard and Dolbare ("the purchasers") real property 
belonging to the estate for $880,650.  Part of the real estate to be 
conveyed included "[t]he East half of the Southeast Quarter … in Section 
33, Township 9 North, Range 4 West, Choctaw, Alabama."  The real-
estate sales contract specified that the closing of the sale was to occur on 
or before May 31, 2019.  On February 7, 2019, Williamson, individually 
and in her capacity as personal representative of Turner's estate, 
executed a deed conveying other real property that was part of Turner's 
estate to Marcus Hester.   
 
On February 13, 2019, Callway Sargent, alleging to be an heir of 
Turner's, filed a claim of heirship in Turner's estate.  Sargent also filed a 
motion for injunctive relief in which he acknowledged the February 7, 
2019, deed, asserted that Williamson had agreed to sell and had conveyed 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
4 
 
real property belonging to Turner's estate without the approval of the 
probate court, and requested that the probate court enjoin "Williamson 
from engaging in any further administration of [Turner's] estate until so 
ordered by [the probate court]."   
 
On February 14, 2019, Williamson filed in the circuit court a 
petition pursuant to § 12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975, requesting that the 
circuit court enter an order removing the administration of Turner's 
estate from the probate court to the circuit court.  On February 19, 2019, 
the circuit court granted Williamson's petition and entered an order 
removing the administration of Turner's estate from the probate court to 
the circuit court; the removed case was assigned circuit-court case 
number CV-19-900010.   
 
From February 28, 2019, to March 18, 2019, the following 
individuals, all claiming to be heirs of Turner's, filed individual claims 
against Turner's estate: Horace Turner, Jr., John Edward Daniels, Amos 
Hill, Jr., Kantoria Hill, Sermenedia White, Amanda Louise Turner 
("Amanda"), Juanita Marie Kirksey, Brandon Pearson, Vera D. Warren, 
Phillip Kirksey, Jr., Thurman Pearson, Jermaine McGrew, Angela 
McGrew, Mallie McGrew, Jr., Edna Fant, Jacquelyn Turner Perry, Debra 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
5 
 
Sue Turner ("Debra Sue"), and Robert Lee Daniels.  The claims filed by 
White and Amanda requested "that a judicial determination be made as 
to the heirs-at-law of Milton Turner, deceased, and to declare and 
determine questions regarding the intestate succession, administration 
and distribution of the intestate estate."   
 
On March 1, 2019, Williamson filed a motion pursuant to § 43-2-
844, Ala. Code 1975, requesting that the circuit court approve the sale of 
real property belonging to Turner's estate.  As amended on March 20, 
2019, Williamson's motion requested that the circuit court (1) approve 
the sale memorialized in the January 25, 2019, real-estate sales contract 
between Williamson and the purchasers and (2) "approve, ratify and 
confirm" the February 7, 2019, deed conveying real property belonging to 
Turner's estate to Hester.  Williamson further acknowledged that Fant, 
Perry, and Debra Sue are "heirs and beneficiaries of the estate."  On April 
9, 2019, the circuit court entered two separate orders granting 
Williamson's motion.   
 
On May 8, 2019, Fant, Perry, and Debra Sue filed a motion to alter, 
amend, or vacate the circuit court's April 9, 2019, orders or, in the 
alternative, to certify its April 9, 2019, orders as final pursuant to Rule 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
6 
 
54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  On May 22, 2019, following a hearing, the circuit 
court denied Fant, Perry, and Debra Sue's motion to alter, amend, or 
vacate but certified its April 9, 2019, orders as final judgments pursuant 
to Rule 54(b).  No party appealed from the circuit court's April 9, 2019, 
orders.   
 
Williamson and the purchasers did not close on the sale of the 
property that was the subject of the January 25, 2019, real-estate sales 
contract by May 31, 2019, as required by the contract.  Accordingly, on 
July 29, 2019, the purchasers filed a breach-of-contract action against 
Williamson, individually and in her capacity as personal representative 
of Turner's estate, alleging that Williamson had breached the January 
25, 2019, real-estate sales contract by failing to close on the sale on or 
before May 31, 2019.  The purchasers requested specific performance of 
the real-estate sales contract or compensatory damages. 
 
On June 9, 2020, White and Amanda filed a motion to alter, amend, 
or vacate the circuit court's April 9, 2019, order approving the sale of real 
property belonging to the estate memorialized in the January 25, 2019, 
real-estate sales contract or, in the alternative, to "stay" the order.  In 
support of their motion, White and Amanda asserted that, on June 2, 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
7 
 
2020, they had received "a copy of the 1988 last will and testament of 
Milton Turner" and that the will purported to devise to Turner's brother, 
Millage Turner ("Millage"), a portion of the real property that was to be 
sold to the purchasers pursuant to the January 25, 2019, real-estate sales 
contract that had been approved by the circuit court's April 9, 2019 order.  
White and Amanda further asserted that Millage had died intestate 
before Turner died and that they are the great-granddaughters of 
Millage.  In fact, Turner's alleged 1988 will specifically devised to Millage 
approximately 40 acres of land described as "the Southeast one-quarter 
of the Southeast one-quarter … in Section 33, Township 9 North, Range 
4 West" ("the contested property"); the contested property comprises a 
portion of the property to be sold pursuant to the January 25, 2019, real-
estate sales contract, which was described, in part, as "[t]he East half of 
the Southeast Quarter … in Section 33, Township 9 North, Range 4 West, 
Choctaw, Alabama."  White and Amanda argued that, because Turner's 
alleged will purported to devise to Millage the contested property, which 
comprises a portion of the property to be sold to the purchasers, the April 
9, 2019, order approving the sale had to be revised to exclude mention of 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
8 
 
the contested property.  On July 8, 2020, before their June 9, 2020, 
motion had been ruled upon, White and Amanda withdrew the motion.  
 
On June 23, 2020, following a trial that had occurred on May 29, 
2020, the circuit court entered an order determining that Sargent, 
Horace Turner, Jr., John Edward Daniels, Amos Hill, Jr., Kantoria Hill, 
Juanita Marie Kirksey, Brandon Pearson, Vera D. Warren, Phillip 
Kirksey, Jr., Thurman Pearson, Jermaine McGrew, Angela McGrew, 
Mallie McGrew, Jr., and Robert Lee Daniels had "failed to produce clear 
and convincing evidence that they are the descendants/heirs of Milton 
Turner, deceased, for the purposes of intestate succession."    Accordingly, 
the circuit court denied the above-mentioned parties' claims of heirship 
in Turner's estate.  In that same order, the circuit court also stated that 
Williamson had "confessed" that White and Amanda are Turner's heirs. 
 
On November 13, 2020, White and Amanda filed in the probate 
court a "petition for probate of lost last will and testament" of Turner; 
that case was assigned probate-court case number A-2020-05422.  In 
their petition, White and Amanda recognized that the administration of 
Turner's estate had previously been removed from the probate court and 
was pending in the circuit court.  White and Amanda offered a copy of the 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
9 
 
alleged will of Turner, noting that "the original last will and testament 
of Milton Turner is lost and has not been located."   
 
On December 9, 2020, the probate court entered an order in 
probate-court case number A-2020-05422 stating that the will of Turner 
"be received, and the same is hereby declared to be duly proven as the 
last will and testament of the said Milton Turner, and as such admitted 
to probate."  The probate court further purported to appoint Williamson, 
again, as the personal representative of Turner's estate in this second 
estate proceeding. On the same day, White and Amanda filed in the 
circuit court a petition pursuant to § 12-11-41 requesting that the circuit 
court enter an order removing probate-court case number A-2020-05422 
from the probate court to the circuit court.   
 
On December 14, 2020, the purchasers filed in case number CV-19-
900010, the original proceeding regarding the administration of Turner's 
estate pending in the circuit court, a motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 
24, Ala. R. Civ. P. In their motion to intervene, the purchasers claimed 
an interest in the contested property.   
 
On December 18, 2020, the circuit court purported to grant White 
and Amanda's petition to remove probate-court case number A-2020-
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
10 
 
05422 from the probate court to the circuit court; that case was assigned 
circuit-court case number CV-20-000011.   
 
On January 13, 2021, the purchasers, even though their motion to 
intervene had not yet been ruled upon, filed a motion requesting that the 
circuit court vacate its December 18, 2020, order purporting to remove 
probate-court case number A-2020-05422 from the probate court to the 
circuit court.  The purchasers argued that, because the administration of 
Turner's estate had already been removed from the probate court 
pursuant to the circuit court's initial removal order dated February 19, 
2019, the circuit court thereafter had exclusive jurisdiction of the 
administration of Turner's estate and the probate court had no 
jurisdiction over any aspect of the administration of Turner's estate.  
Accordingly, the purchasers argued, the probate court had lacked 
jurisdiction to probate Turner's alleged will, to declare that will to be 
valid, or to again appoint Williamson as the personal representative of 
Turner's estate; the purchasers argued that, therefore, the probate 
court's December 9, 2020, order entered in probate-court case number A-
2020-05422 was void for lack of jurisdiction.  Further, the purchasers 
argued that, because the probate court had lacked jurisdiction to consider 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
11 
 
White and Amanda's November 13, 2020, petition, which purportedly 
initiated probate-court case number A-2020-05422, the circuit court's 
removal of probate-court case number A-2020-05422 was void because 
that case essentially does not exist.  Also on January 13, 2021, the 
purchasers filed a motion to dismiss circuit-court case number CV-20-
000011 (which is the purportedly removed probate-court case number A-
2020-05422) based on the same jurisdictional argument explained above.   
 
On January 19, 2021, White and Amanda filed a motion requesting 
that the circuit court vacate its April 9, 2019, orders, in which the circuit 
court had approved the sale or conveyance of real property belonging to 
Turner's estate.  Fant, Perry, and Debra Sue filed motions joining White 
and Amanda's motion requesting that the circuit court vacate its April 9, 
2019, orders.  On February 4, 2021, the purchasers filed a response to 
White and Amanda's motion.   
 
On February 25, 2021, White and Amanda filed a response in 
opposition to the purchasers' motion to intervene.  White and Amanda 
argued that the purchasers "wholly lack[ed] standing" to intervene 
because (1) the purchasers are, undisputedly, not heirs of Turner or 
beneficiaries under Turner's alleged will, (2) any interest in the real 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
12 
 
property belonging to Turner's estate that the purchasers may have had 
under the January 25, 2019, real estate-sales contract terminated when 
the contract expired on May 31, 2019, and (3) the January 25, 2019, real-
estate sales contract was void or voidable for a lack of a meeting of the 
minds because, White and Amanda argued, Turner had, before the 
execution of that contract, devised the contested property to Millage. 
Further, White and Amanda argued that Williamson, as the personal 
representative of Turner’s estate, had no interest in the contested 
property to convey because ownership of the contested property had 
already vested in White and Amanda, as Millage's heirs, under Turner's 
alleged will.  The purchasers filed a reply. 
 
Also on February 25, 2021, White and Amanda filed a response in 
opposition to the purchasers' January 13, 2021, motion requesting that 
the circuit court vacate its December 18, 2020, order purporting to 
remove probate-court case number A-2020-05422 from the probate court 
to the circuit court.  White and Amanda disagreed with the purchasers' 
argument that the probate court had lacked jurisdiction over White and 
Amanda's November 13, 2020, "petition for probate of lost last will and 
testament" of Turner.  White and Amanda asserted that, even though the 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
13 
 
administration of Turner's estate had already been removed from the 
probate court to the circuit court by the circuit court's February 19, 2019, 
order, § 43-8-162, Ala. Code 1975, required that Turner's alleged will be 
filed in the probate court before the circuit court could consider it.  This 
is so, White and Amanda argued, because a circuit court cannot consider 
an issue that has not been removed from a probate court.  White and 
Amanda argued that the original proceeding that had been removed from 
the probate court by the circuit court (probate-court case number A-2018-
5218) was a proceeding regarding the administration of Turner's 
intestate estate, which did not include a will contest, and that the second 
proceeding that had been initiated in the probate court by White and 
Amanda (probate-court case number A-2020-05422) concerned the 
alleged 1988 lost will of Turner, which did involve a will contest.  White 
and Amanda argued that it was necessary to initiate the second 
proceeding in the probate court, and then remove that proceeding to the 
circuit court, in order for the circuit court to be able to consider the will 
contest. 
 
On May 12, 2021, the circuit court entered an order consolidating 
circuit-court case number CV-19-900010, the first removed probate case 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
14 
 
(probate-court case number A-2018-5218), and circuit-court case number 
CV-20-000011, the second purportedly removed probate case (probate-
court case number A-2020-05422).   
 
On December 7, 2021, after conducting a hearing, the circuit court 
entered an order denying the purchasers' motion to intervene.  The 
circuit court determined that the purchasers' only interest relating to the 
administration of Turner's estate is based on the January 25, 2019, real-
estate sales contract and that the contract "was premature and 
unenforceable because the land sought to be sold includes a 40 acre parcel 
devised by the last will and testament of Milton Turner to heirs, … White 
and Amanda."  Accordingly, the circuit court essentially determined that 
the purchasers had no interest relating to the administration of Turner's 
estate. 
 
On January 5, 2022, the purchasers filed a motion to alter, amend, 
or vacate the circuit court's order denying their motion to intervene.  On 
January 12, 2022, White and Amanda filed a response to the purchasers' 
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's December 7, 2021, 
order.  On January 17, 2022, Williamson, in her capacity as the personal 
representative of Turner's estate, also filed a response to the purchasers' 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
15 
 
motion to alter, amend, or vacate.  On February 24, 2022, the purchasers 
filed a motion requesting a hearing on their motion to alter, amend, or 
vacate.  The circuit court did not rule upon the purchasers' motion to 
alter, amend, or vacate, and the purchasers assert that their motion was 
denied by operation of law pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., on April 
5, 2022, without a hearing on the motion having been conducted.  The 
purchasers appealed on May 13, 2022.1   
Standard of Review 
 
"[A]n order denying intervention as of right is appealable." 
Thrasher v. Bartlett, 424 So. 2d 605, 607 (Ala. 1982).  "The standard of 
review applicable in cases involving a denial of a motion to intervene as 
of right is whether the trial court has acted outside its discretion. See 
City of Dora v. Beavers, 692 So. 2d 808, 810 (Ala. 1997)."  Black Warrior 
 
1The purchasers identified Perry, Debra Sue, Fant, White, and 
Amanda, all of whom claim to be Turner's heirs, as appellees.  They also 
identified Williamson as an appellee, but they did not indicate in what 
capacity they were naming Williamson -- i.e, as the personal 
representative of Turner's estate, as an individual claiming to be 
Turner's heir, or both; Williamson has not filed a brief with this Court in 
any capacity. 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
16 
 
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. East Walker Cnty. Sewer Auth., 979 So. 2d 69, 72 
(Ala. Civ. App. 2007).2 
Discussion 
 
Initially, we will consider the purchasers' argument that the 
probate court did not have jurisdiction over probate-court case number 
A-2020-05422, which was purportedly initiated by White and Amanda's 
"petition for probate of lost last will and testament" of Turner filed in the 
probate court on November 13, 2020.  We note that "[m]atters of subject-
matter jurisdiction are subject to de novo review."  DuBose v. Weaver, 68 
So. 3d 814, 821 (Ala. 2011).  This jurisdictional question is significant for 
our purposes on appeal because the circuit court purported to remove 
probate-court case number A-2020-05422 from the probate court in its 
December 18, 2020, order, purportedly initiating circuit-court case 
number CV-20-000011, which serves as the basis of one of the appeals 
currently before this Court, appeal number SC-2022-0701.  Accordingly, 
 
2In their motion to intervene filed in the circuit court, the 
purchasers asserted arguments under Rule 24(a) and (b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  
However, the purchasers assert an argument under only Rule 24(a), 
permitting intervention as of right, on appeal; they have abandoned any 
argument under Rule 24(b). 
  
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
17 
 
if the probate court did not have jurisdiction over probate-court case 
number A-2020-05422, then the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to 
remove that case from the probate court, which removal purportedly 
created circuit-court case number CV-20-000011, and, in turn, this Court 
does not have jurisdiction over appeal number SC-2022-0701, which is an 
appeal from circuit court case number CV-20-000011, and the appeal 
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
As set forth extensively above, on September 20, 2018, Williamson 
filed a petition for letters of administration of Turner's estate in the 
probate court, and that case was assigned probate-court case number A-
2018-5218.  The probate court entered orders granting Williamson letters 
of administration of Turner's estate and naming Williamson as the 
personal representative of Turner's estate.  On February 19, 2019, in 
response to a petition filed by Williamson, the circuit court entered an 
order removing the administration of Turner's estate from the probate 
court to the circuit court pursuant to § 12-11-41, and the case was 
assigned circuit-court case number CV-19-900010. 
 
After the administration of Turner's estate had been removed from 
the probate court pursuant to § 12-11-41, on November 13, 2020, White 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
18 
 
and Amanda filed in the probate court a "petition for probate of lost last 
will and testament" of Turner, which was assigned probate-court case 
number A-2020-05422.  On December 9, 2020, the probate court entered 
an order purporting to admit to probate Turner's alleged 1988 lost will 
and purporting to again appoint Williamson as the personal 
representative of Turner's estate.  White and Amanda then filed in the 
circuit court a petition requesting that the circuit court enter an order 
removing probate-court case number A-2020-05422 from the probate 
court to the circuit court.  On December 18, 2020, the circuit court entered 
an order purporting to remove probate-court case number A-2020-05422 
from the probate court to the circuit court, which purportedly created 
circuit-court case number CV-20-000011, from which appeal number SC-
2022-0701 arises. 
 
Before this Court, the purchasers argue that the probate court 
never obtained jurisdiction over probate-court case number A-2020-
05422.  The purchasers argue that the circuit court, in the already-
removed circuit-court case number CV-19-900010, would be the only 
court to possess jurisdiction over White and Amanda's petition to probate 
Turner's alleged will.  The purchasers' argument is based on this Court's 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
19 
 
decision in Allen v. Estate of Juddine, 60 So. 3d 852 (Ala. 2010), a case 
involving very similar facts to the present case. 
 
In Allen, a decedent's heir filed a petition with the Etowah Probate 
Court alleging that the decedent had died intestate; the Etowah Probate 
Court issued letters of administration to the petitioning decedent's heir.  
Shortly thereafter, the decedent's common-law wife filed a petition in the 
Etowah Circuit Court requesting that administration of the decedent's 
estate be removed to that court under § 12-11-41.  The decedent's 
common-law wife asserted that the decedent had executed a will before 
his death and attached to her petition a copy of the decedent's alleged 
will.  The Etowah Circuit Court entered an order granting the decedent's 
common-law wife's petition and removed the administration of the 
decedent's estate to the Etowah Circuit Court pursuant to § 12-11-41.  
Once the administration of the estate was removed to the Etowah Circuit 
Court, the decedent's common-law wife filed a petition requesting that 
the Etowah Circuit Court probate the decedent's alleged will.  The 
decedent's heir filed a response in opposition, arguing that the Etowah 
Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to probate the decedent's alleged 
will.  The Etowah Circuit Court ultimately concluded that it did not have 
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20 
 
jurisdiction to probate the decedent's alleged will and ordered the 
decedent's common-law wife to file in the Etowah Probate Court a 
petition to probate the alleged will.  The decedent's common-law wife 
appealed to this Court. 
 
On appeal, the sole issue before this Court was whether the Etowah 
Circuit Court had jurisdiction to probate the decedent's alleged will.  The 
decedent's common-law wife argued that the Etowah Circuit Court "had 
exclusive jurisdiction of the administration of the estate. As a result, [the 
decedent's common-law wife] argue[d], the circuit court erred in declining 
to probate the will and in ordering her to submit the will to the probate 
court."  Allen, 60 So. 3d at 854.  In considering this issue, this Court set 
forth the following well-established principles of law: 
 
"Probate courts have original and general jurisdiction 
over the probate of wills and over the '[t]he granting of letters 
testamentary and of administration.' See § 12-13-1, Ala. Code 
1975. However, the administration of an estate may be 
removed from a probate court to a circuit court under the 
procedures stated in § 12-11-41, Ala. Code 1975. That section 
provides: 
 
 
"'The administration of any estate may be 
removed from the probate court to the circuit court 
at any time before a final settlement thereof, by 
any heir, devisee, legatee, distributee, executor, 
administrator or administrator with the will 
annexed of any such estate, without assigning any 
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21 
 
special equity; and an order of removal must be 
made by the court, upon the filing of a sworn 
petition by any such heir, devisee, legatee, 
distributee, 
executor, 
administrator 
or 
administrator with the will annexed of any such 
estate, reciting that the petitioner is such heir, 
devisee, 
legatee, 
distributee, 
executor, 
administrator or administrator with the will 
annexed and that, in the opinion of the petitioner, 
such estate can be better administered in the 
circuit court than in the probate court.' 
 
 
"Article VI, § 144, Ala. Const. 1901, describes the power 
of a circuit court upon such a removal, stating, in part: 
'[W]henever the circuit court has taken jurisdiction of the 
settlement of any estate, it shall have power to do all things 
necessary for the settlement of such estate, including the 
appointment and removal of administrators, executors, 
guardians, and trustees and including action upon the 
resignation of either of them.' This Court has explained: 'Once 
the administration and settlement of an estate are removed 
from the probate court, the probate court loses jurisdiction 
over the estate, and the circuit court obtains and maintains 
jurisdiction until the final settlement of the estate.' Oliver v. 
Johnson, 583 So. 2d 1331, 1332 (Ala. 1991). 
 
 
"This Court has recognized the authority of a circuit 
court to retransfer the administration of an estate to the 
probate court where the removal was improper, such as where 
the petitioner lacked standing or where the probate court had 
already entered a final settlement of the estate. See Ex parte 
Terry, 985 So. 2d 400 (Ala. 2007); Ex parte McLendon, 824 So. 
2d 700 (Ala. 2001). However, this Court has consistently held 
that, once a circuit court has properly taken jurisdiction of the 
administration of an estate under § 12-11-41, its jurisdiction 
over the estate is exclusive. Specifically, this Court has stated: 
 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
22 
 
 
"'In Hinson v. Naugher, 207 Ala. 592, 93 So. 
560 (1922), the Court stated that when the 
administration of an estate is removed from the 
probate court to an equity court, the jurisdiction of 
the equity court is exclusive and the equity court 
must enter the final settlement. See, also, Cater v. 
Howard, 230 Ala. 133, 159 So. 830 (1935) (when 
the administration of an estate is duly removed 
from the probate court into a court of equity, the 
jurisdiction of the equity court is complete to 
accomplish 
the 
ultimate 
purpose 
of 
the 
administration); Johnson v. Johnson, 252 Ala. 366, 
41 So. 2d 287 (1949) (when the administration of 
an estate is removed from the probate court to an 
equity court, the entire administration goes into 
equity for the completion of administration); and 
Opinion of the Clerk No. 32, 390 So. 2d 1040 (Ala. 
1980) (clerk expressed opinion that when the 
administration of an estate is removed from the 
probate court to the circuit court, the jurisdiction 
of the circuit court encompasses the power to make 
all orders necessary to the administration of the 
estate). 
 
 
"'The administration of [the subject] estate 
was properly removed from the probate court to 
the circuit court; the circuit court, therefore, has 
the exclusive jurisdiction to enter a final 
settlement of the estate.' 
 
"Ex parte Nelson, 644 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Ala. 1994) (emphasis 
added)." 
 
Allen, 60 So. 3d at 854-55.  This Court concluded that "the administration 
of [the decedent's] estate was properly removed from the probate court to 
the circuit court under § 12-11-41. Accordingly, the circuit court had 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
23 
 
exclusive jurisdiction of the administration of the estate."  60 So. 3d at 
855. 
 
This Court also noted that, in removing the administration of the 
decedent's estate from the Etowah Probate Court, the Etowah Circuit 
Court had stated 
"that its administration of the estate and the probate of the 
will were 'two totally different matters,' noting the exclusive 
authority of the probate court to initiate the administration of 
an estate, citing Ex parte Smith, 619 So. 2d 1374, 1376 (Ala. 
1993) ('The circuit court cannot initiate the administration of 
an estate, because the initiation of administration is a matter 
exclusively in the jurisdiction of the probate court.')." 
 
60 So. 3d at 855.  In addressing that statement of the Etowah Circuit 
Court, this Court stated: 
"'[T]he administration and settlement of a 
decedent's estate in equity is a single and 
continuous 
proceeding; 
and 
when 
the 
administration of an estate is once removed from 
the probate court into a court of equity, its 
jurisdiction becomes exclusive and efficient, and 
the court must operate to a final settlement 
governed by its own procedure.' 
 
"Hinson v. Naugher, 207 Ala. 592, 593, 93 So. 560, 561 (1922) 
(emphasis added). See also Ex parte Farley, 981 So. 2d 392, 
396 (Ala. 2007) ('"[T]he administration and settlement of a 
decedent's estate is a single and continuous proceeding 
throughout, and there can be no splitting up of such 
administration, any more than any other cause of action ...."' 
(quoting McKeithen v. Rich, 204 Ala. 588, 589, 86 So. 377, 378 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
24 
 
(1920)(emphasis added))). Additionally, in his special 
concurrence, Justice Bolin aptly observes the relevance of 
authority recognizing the in rem status of proceedings to 
probate a will or to set aside the probate of a will." 
 
60 So. 3d at 855.  The relevant portion of the special writing in Allen 
stated: 
"At the time of removal [of an intestate estate from the 
probate court to the circuit court pursuant to § 12-11-41, Ala. 
Code 1975], the estate res is carried with the estate to the 
circuit court, which then takes sole jurisdiction of the in rem 
proceeding. The main opinion correctly cites Oliver v. 
Johnson, 583 So. 2d 1331, 1332 (Ala. 1991), for the proposition 
that after removal 'the probate court loses jurisdiction over 
the estate, and the circuit court obtains and maintains 
jurisdiction until the final settlement of the estate.' 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
"In McCann v. Ellis, 172 Ala. 60, 55 So. 303 (1911), the 
Court held that proceedings to probate or to set aside the 
probate of wills are proceedings in rem, and not in personam. 
This Court stated: 
 
 
"'It has been uniformly ruled by all English 
and American cases which we have examined that 
proceedings to probate or to set aside the probate 
of wills are proceedings in rem and not in 
personam; that such proceedings are exclusively to 
determine the status of the res, and not the rights 
of the parties. Judgments or decrees as to the 
status of the res, in proceedings strictly in rem, are 
conclusive against all the world as to that status; 
while such judgments as to the rights of parties, 
whatever may be the point adjudicated, not being 
as to the status, are only conclusive between the 
parties or privies to the suit.' 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
25 
 
 
"McCann, 172 Ala. at 69, 55 So. at 305. See also Tipton v. 
Tipton, 257 Ala. 32, 34, 57 So. 2d 94, 96 (1952) ('The probate 
of a will is a proceeding in rem, fixes the status of the res, 
binding all the world until revoked or vacated in a direct 
proceeding to that end.'); Caverno v. Webb, 239 Ala. 671, 674, 
196 So. 723, 724 (1940) ('True, also, the probate of a will is a 
proceeding in rem, fixes the status of the res, binding on all 
the world until revoked or vacated in a direct proceeding to 
that end.'); Ex parte Walter, 202 Ala. 281, 283, 80 So. 119, 121 
(1918) ('"The probate of a will is a judgment in rem. ... Its 
validity and effect can be contested and vacated only by a 
seasonable appeal, or by a bill filed under the statute."' 
(quoting Kaplan v. Coleman, 180 Ala. 267, 274, 60 So. 885, 
887 (1912))). 
 
 
"As stated above, once the administration of the estate 
was removed from the probate court to the circuit court, the 
estate res and the in rem jurisdiction of it were also removed. 
Thereafter, the circuit court had the 'power to do all things 
necessary for the settlement of such estate, including the 
appointment and removal of administrators, executors, 
guardians, and trustees and including action upon the 
resignation of either of them.' Article VI, § 144, Ala. Const. 
1901 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court 
succinctly summed up the obvious jurisdictional principle 
involved in this case in Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 
311, 126 S. Ct. 1735, 164 L. Ed. 2d 480 (2006), when the Court, 
addressing the probate exception to federal jurisdiction, 
stated: 'When one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over 
a res, a second court will not assume in rem jurisdiction over 
the same res.' Accordingly, the subsequent attempt to probate 
the alleged lost will in this proceeding must proceed in the 
circuit court, the only court having in rem subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the estate after it was removed from the 
probate court until a final settlement of the estate is had." 
 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
26 
 
60 So. 3d at 856-57 (Bolin, J., concurring specially).  Ultimately, this 
Court concluded that the Etowah Circuit Court had "erred in refusing to 
probate [the decedent's] will," stating that the "administration of the 
estate was properly removed to the circuit court," that the  
"administration of the estate was a single and continuous proceeding over 
which the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction, and [that] the probate 
of [the decedent's] will could not be split from the action."  60 So. 3d at 
856. 
 
In the present case, as in Allen, the administration of Turner's 
estate was initiated in the probate court when the probate court issued 
letters of administration to Williamson on September 20, 2018.  The 
administration of the estate (probate-court case number A-2018-5218) 
was properly removed from the probate court to the circuit court (circuit 
court case number CV-19-900010) on February 19, 2019.  Based on the 
principles set forth in Allen, the administration of Turner's estate was a 
single and continuous proceeding over which the circuit court had 
exclusive jurisdiction in circuit-court case number CV-19-900010, and the 
probate of Turner's alleged will could not be split from that proceeding.  
See Hinson v. Naugher, 207 Ala. 592, 593, 93 So. 560, 561 (1922) ("[T]he 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
27 
 
administration and settlement of a decedent's estate in equity is a single 
and continuous proceeding; and when the administration of an estate is 
once removed from the probate court into a court of equity, its jurisdiction 
becomes exclusive and efficient, and the court must operate to a final 
settlement governed by its own procedure." (emphasis added)); see also 
Ex parte Farley, 981 So. 2d 392, 396 (Ala. 2007) ("'[T]he administration 
and settlement of a decedent's estate is a single and continuous 
proceeding throughout, and there can be no splitting up of such 
administration, any more than any other cause of action ....'" (quoting 
McKeithen v. Rich, 204 Ala. 588, 589, 86 So. 377, 378 (1920)(emphasis 
added))).3  Therefore, the probate court did not have jurisdiction over 
 
3In their briefs before this Court, some of the appellees argue that 
Allen is distinguishable from the present case.  They assert that, in Allen, 
before the decedent's intestate estate was removed to the Etowah Circuit 
Court, the Etowah Circuit Court had been notified of the fact that the 
decedent's common-law wife believed that the decedent had executed a 
will.  They argue that, 
 
"[t]hus, the [Etowah] Circuit Court …, unlike under the 
present facts, … had been instructed by an interested party 
while still in [the Etowah] Probate Court to decide the lost will 
validity issue, such that when the matter was removed from 
the [Etowah] Probate Court to [the Etowah] Circuit Court, 
only the circuit court had jurisdiction to determine that 
disputed issue expressly transferred to it, because both the 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
28 
 
White and Amanda's petition to probate Turner's alleged will (probate-
court case number A-2020-05422) and its December 9, 2020, order 
purporting to admit Turner's alleged will to probate was a nullity.  
Further, because the probate court had no jurisdiction over White and 
Amanda's petition to probate Turner's alleged will, the circuit court's 
December 18, 2020, order purporting to remove probate-court case 
number A-2020-05422 and to create circuit-court case number CV-20-
000011 was also a nullity; there was nothing to remove from the probate 
court, because the probate court did not have jurisdiction over White and 
Amanda's petition (White and Amanda should have filed their petition to 
 
intestate and the will/validity/probate administrations had 
been expressly transferred to the [Etowah] Circuit Court." 
 
White and Amanda's brief, p. 35; Perry and Debra Sue's brief, p. 36; and 
Fant's brief, p. 32. 
 
This argument is not convincing.  First, the appellees have cited no 
authority to support their argument, and, for that reason alone, we need 
not consider it.  White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042, 
1058 (Ala. 2008).  Second, as set forth extensively above, the 
"administration and settlement of a decedent's estate in equity is a single 
and continuous proceeding."  Hinson, 207 Ala. at 593, 93 So. at 561.  
Contrary to their assertion, there is not a distinction between the 
administration 
of 
"the 
intestate 
and 
the 
will/validity/probate 
administrations."  Their argument does not convince us that Allen is 
distinguishable from the present case. 
   
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
29 
 
probate Turner's alleged will in the circuit court in circuit-court case 
number CV-19-900010).  Accordingly, any judgments entered in circuit-
court case number CV-20-000011 are void and will not support an appeal.  
As a result, we dismiss appeal number SC-2022-0701. 
 
Next, we turn to the purchasers' argument in appeal number SC-
2022-0700 that the circuit court erred in denying their Rule 24(a) motion 
to intervene as of right in the proceedings regarding the administration 
of Turner's estate.  As noted above, the circuit court denied the 
purchasers' motion to intervene on the basis that the January 25, 2019, 
real-estate sales contract "was premature and unenforceable because the 
land sought to be sold includes a 40 acre parcel devised by the last will 
and testament of Milton Turner to heirs, … White and Amanda."  The 
circuit court appears to have based its denial of the purchasers' motion 
to intervene on the operation of Turner's alleged will purporting to devise 
the contested property.  We have determined, however, that the probate 
court did not have jurisdiction to consider White and Amanda's petition 
to probate Turner's alleged will and that the probate court's December 9, 
2020, order in probate-court case number A-2020-05422 purporting to 
admit Turner's alleged will to probate was a nullity.  As a result, because 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
30 
 
there has not been a proper petition filed requesting that the circuit 
court, the only court having sole and proper in rem jurisdiction of 
Turner's estate, admit Turner's alleged will to probate, that unprobated 
alleged will cannot serve as the basis of the circuit court's order denying 
the purchasers' motion to intervene. 
 
Even though the stated basis for the circuit court's order denying 
the purchasers' motion to intervene is invalid, "this Court will affirm a 
judgment for any reason supported by the record that satisfies the 
requirements of due process."  Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So. 2d 375, 
380 (Ala. 2006) (citing Taylor v. Stevenson, 820 So. 2d 810, 814 (Ala. 
2001)).  Therefore, we will consider whether the circuit court's order 
denying the purchasers' motion to intervene is due to be affirmed based 
on an alternative basis supported by the record.  Mainly, we will consider 
whether the purchasers satisfied the requirements of Rule 24(a). 
 
In their brief before this Court, the purchasers state that they "filed 
their motion to intervene under the provisions of Rule 24(a)[, Ala. R. App. 
P.]"  The purchasers' brief, p. 22.  Specifically, they argue that they have 
the right to intervene in the proceedings regarding the administration of 
Turner's estate pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2), which provides: 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
31 
 
"Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: … when the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or 
impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless 
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing 
parties." 
 
In interpreting Rule 24(a)(2), this Court has stated that,  
"[i]n its exercise of discretion, the trial court must determine 
whether the potential intervenor has demonstrated: (1) that 
its motion is timely; (2) that it has a sufficient interest 
relating to the property or transaction; (3) that its ability to 
protect its interest may, as a practical matter, be impaired or 
impeded; and (4) that its interest is not adequately 
represented. Rule 24(a)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P." 
 
City of Dora v. Beavers, 692 So. 2d 808, 810 (Ala. 1997).  As noted above, 
we will not reverse a trial court's decision denying a motion to intervene 
as of right unless we determine that the trial court "has acted outside its 
discretion."  Black Warrior, 979 So. 2d at 72 (citing City of Dora, 692 So. 
2d at 810). 
 
The parties dispute whether the purchasers have a sufficient 
interest relating to the administration of Turner's estate to intervene.  
The purchasers argue that they have a sufficient interest relating to the 
administration of Turner's estate based on their alleged interest in the 
contested property, which interest, the purchasers assert, was granted to 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
32 
 
them in the January 25, 2019, real-estate sales contract.  The purchasers 
further argue that White and Amanda "made a claim" to the contested 
property by seeking to probate Turner's alleged will, which purported to 
devise the contested property, in the probate court.  The purchasers 
argue that White and Amanda's petition to probate Turner's alleged will 
"was simply an act to circumvent [the purchasers] from purchasing the 
property" and "triggered the right of [the purchasers] to intervene" in the 
proceedings regarding the administration of Turner's estate.  The 
purchasers' brief, p. 27. 
 
Before this Court, the purchasers take the position that their right 
to intervene in the proceedings regarding the administration of Turner's 
estate is premised on White and Amanda's petition to probate Turner's 
alleged will.  This is so, the purchasers argue, because, by filing the 
petition to probate Turner's alleged will, White and Amanda essentially 
made a claim to the contested property that the purchasers had agreed 
to purchase by executing the January 25, 2019, real-estate sales contract.  
The purchasers argue that they are asserting a claim to the contested 
property pursuant to the January 25, 2019, real-estate sales contract and 
that White and Amanda are asserting a claim to the same property 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
33 
 
pursuant to Turner's alleged will.  However, neither of those assertions 
are supported by the record. 
 
First, we consider the purchasers' alleged interest in the contested 
property.  Initially, we note that the purchasers have cited no authority 
in support of their argument claiming an interest relating to the 
administration of Turner's estate sufficient to support their request to 
intervene.  Specifically, the purchasers have not cited any authority 
indicating that a real-estate sales contract conveys to the potential 
purchaser an interest in the property that is the subject of the sales 
contract, let alone an interest sufficient to justify the potential 
purchaser's intervention in proceedings regarding the administration of 
a decedent's estate when the estate is the potential seller.  Accordingly, 
we need not consider this particular argument asserted by the 
purchasers.  See White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 
1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008)("Rule  28(a)(10)[, Ala. R. App. P.,] requires that 
arguments in briefs contain discussions of facts and relevant legal 
authorities that support the party's position. If they do not, the 
arguments are waived. Moore v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. 
P'ship, 849 So. 2d 914, 923 (Ala. 2002); Arrington v. Mathis, 929 So. 2d 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
34 
 
468, 470 n. 2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); Hamm v. State, 913 So. 2d 460, 486 
(Ala. Crim. App. 2002). 'This is so, because "'it is not the function of this 
Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal 
arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not 
supported by sufficient authority or argument.'"' Jimmy Day Plumbing 
& Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Butler v. 
Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Dykes v. Lane 
Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala. 1994))."). 
 
Nevertheless, even if we were to consider the purchasers' argument, 
the January 25, 2019, real-estate sales contract does not grant the 
purchasers a sufficient interest to intervene in the proceedings regarding 
the administration of Turner's estate.  The January 25, 2019, real-estate 
sales contract states that the sale of the property was to close on or before 
May 31, 2019, which undisputedly did not occur.  It is also undisputed 
that the parties did not extend the deadline for the closing date beyond 
May 31, 2019, and no language in the real-estate sales contract indicates 
that the closing could occur after that date.  As argued by some of the 
appellees in their briefs, the January 25, 2019, real-estate sales contract 
expired on May 31, 2019.  See Joseph v. MTS Inv. Corp., 964 So. 2d 642, 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
35 
 
648-50 (Ala. 2006).  Accordingly, even if the January 25, 2019, real-estate 
sales contract did convey to the purchasers some interest in the contested 
property (a proposition that the purchasers have not demonstrated), that 
alleged interest expired on May 31, 2019.  The purchasers did not file 
their 
motion 
to 
intervene 
in 
the 
proceedings 
regarding 
the 
administration of Turner's estate until December 14, 2020, nearly 19 
months after any potential interest in the contested property had already 
expired.  The purchasers have failed to demonstrate that they have a 
sufficient interest to intervene in the proceedings regarding the 
administration of Turner's estate. 
 
Second, considering the purchasers' argument that White and 
Amanda have asserted an interest in the contested property based on 
their petition to probate Turner's alleged will, as we have already 
determined, White and Amanda's petition to probate Turner's alleged 
will was a nullity because the probate court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider that petition.  The basis of White and Amanda's claim to the 
contested property therefore does not currently exist.  The event that the 
purchasers assert "triggered" their right to intervene has not legally 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
36 
 
occurred.  Taking the purchasers' argument as we find it, they cannot 
prevail.4 
 
Accordingly, the purchasers have not established the two factual 
premises they say are necessary to their argument: (1) the purchasers 
have not established that they have an interest in the contested property 
based on the expired January 25, 2019, real-estate sales contract and (2) 
the purchasers have not established that White and Amanda have made 
a claim to the contested property, because White and Amanda's petition 
to probate Turner's alleged will was a nullity.  Having failed to establish 
those facts, the purchasers cannot demonstrate that they have a 
sufficient interest to intervene in the proceedings regarding the 
administration of Turner's estate. 
 
Further, the purchasers have also failed to demonstrate that their 
ability to protect their alleged interest may, as a practical matter, be 
impaired or impeded by not allowing them to intervene.  As discussed 
 
4We further note that the purchasers have not explained how White 
and Amanda's filing of their petition to probate Turner's alleged will, 
which did not occur until November 13, 2020, could have possibly 
interfered with the purchasers' closing on the sale of the property that 
was the subject of the January 25, 2019, real-estate sales contract, which 
included the contested property, which was supposed to occur more than 
a year earlier, on or before May 31, 2019. 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
37 
 
earlier, the only interest that the purchasers could have in the contested 
property is based on the January 25, 2019, real-estate sales contract.  The 
parties did not close on the sale by the contractual deadline of May 31, 
2019.  In an effort to protect their contractual rights, on July 29, 2019, 
after the real-estate sales contract had expired, the purchasers 
commenced a breach-of-contract action against Williamson, individually 
and in her capacity as personal representative of Turner's estate.  The 
purchasers alleged that Williamson had breached the real-estate sales 
contract by failing to close on the sale on or before May 31, 2019.  The 
purchasers have requested specific performance of the real-estate sales 
contract or compensatory damages.  There appears to be no reason why 
the purchasers cannot fully litigate their contractual claims in that 
separate litigation, rather than by intervening in the proceedings 
regarding the administration of Turner's estate. 
 
The purchasers have failed to demonstrate that the circuit court 
exceeded its discretion in denying their motion to intervene.  The record 
supports the conclusion that the purchasers did not have a sufficient 
interest relating to the administration of Turner's estate and that their 
ability to protect their contractual rights was not impaired or impeded by 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
38 
 
not allowing them to intervene.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's 
order denying the purchasers' motion to intervene. 
 
Lastly, the purchasers argue that the circuit court erred in failing 
to hold a hearing on their motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit 
court's December 7, 2021, order denying their motion to intervene before 
that postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law pursuant to 
Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.  In Flagstar Enterprises, Inc. v. Foster, 779 So. 
2d 1220, 1221 (Ala. 2000), this Court stated that, 
 
"[i]n general, whether to grant or to deny a posttrial 
motion is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and 
the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless by its ruling the court abused some legal right and the 
record plainly shows that the trial court erred. See Green Tree 
Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So. 2d 38 (Ala. 1990). 
However, if a party requests a hearing on its motions for a 
new trial, the court must grant the request. Rule 59(g), Ala. 
R. Civ. P. See Walls v. Bank of Prattville, 554 So. 2d 381, 382 
(Ala. 1989) ('[W]here a hearing on a motion for [a] new trial is 
requested pursuant to Rule 59(g), the trial court errs in not 
granting such a hearing.'). Although it is error for the trial 
court not to grant such a hearing, this error is not necessarily 
reversible error. For example, if an appellate court determines 
that there was no probable merit to the motion, it may affirm 
based on the harmless-error rule. See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P.; 
and Kitchens v. Maye, 623 So. 2d 1082, 1088 (Ala. 1993) 
('failure to grant a hearing on a motion for new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59(g) is reversible error only if it "probably injuriously 
affected substantial rights of the parties"')." 
 
SC-2022-0700; SC-2022-0701 
 
39 
 
We hold that the denial by operation of law of the purchasers' motion to 
alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court December 7, 2021, order without 
conducting a hearing was harmless error because there was no 
probability of merit in the purchasers' motion.  The purchasers asserted 
essentially the same arguments in their motion to alter, amend, or vacate 
that they have asserted before this Court.  We have thoroughly addressed 
the arguments concerning the purchasers' right to intervene and have 
determined that they lack merit. 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, in appeal number SC-2022-0700, we affirm 
the circuit court's order denying the purchasers' motion to intervene, and, 
in appeal number SC-2022-0701, we dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 
SC-2022-0700 -- AFFIRMED. 
 
SC-2022-0701 -- APPEAL DISMISSED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and 
Mitchell, JJ., concur. 
 
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.