Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Terry L. Constant

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 78 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2021AP33-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Terry L. Constant, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Terry L. Constant, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST CONSTANT  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 23, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per curiam. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 78
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2021AP33-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Terry L. Constant, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Terry L. Constant, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 23, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
revoked.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review Referee Charles H. Barr's 
report recommending that the court declare Attorney Terry L. 
Constant in default and revoke his license to practice law in 
Wisconsin for 13 counts of professional misconduct.  The referee 
also recommends that Attorney Constant make restitution to the 
Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client protection (the Fund) and to 
certain clients and that Attorney Constant pay the full costs 
associated with this proceeding. 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
No appeal has been filed so we review the referee's 
report pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 22.17(2).1  After 
careful review of the matter, we agree with the referee that, 
based on Attorney Constant's failure to answer the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation's (OLR) complaint or otherwise appear in the 
proceeding, Attorney Constant is in default.  We conclude that 
revocation of Attorney Constant's license is an appropriate 
sanction for his professional misconduct.  We agree that 
Attorney Constant should be required to make restitution to the 
Fund and certain clients.  And finally, we conclude that he 
should be assessed the full costs of this proceeding, which 
total $4,135.06 as of June 20, 2022. 
¶3 
Attorney Constant was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 1968.  His professional disciplinary history 
consists of a six-month suspension of his license to practice 
law in 2020.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Constant, 
2020 WI 4, 390 Wis. 2d 1, 937 N.W.2d 599 (Constant I).  That 
case involved nine counts of misconduct involving numerous trust 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) provides:  
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline. The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
3 
 
account violations, conversion, co-mingling of funds, and 
mishandling a personal injury settlement.  Id., ¶24.2 
¶4 
On January 7, 2021, the OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Constant alleging 13 counts of attorney misconduct 
relating to three clients, S.C., M.R., and S.R., between 2014 
and 2020, along with an order to answer.  Referee Charles H. 
Barr was appointed on March 22, 2021.  On March 1, 2021, 
Attorney Constant filed a verified Petition to Voluntarily 
Surrender a Wisconsin License, in which he stated that he 
"cannot successfully defend" against the grievances pending 
against him and that he wished to surrender his license 
"permanently."3   
¶5 
The OLR made multiple failed attempts at personal 
service at Attorney Constant's Kenosha address on file with the 
State Bar of Wisconsin (State Bar).  On March 9, 2021, the OLR 
                                                 
2 While not referenced in the complaint or the referee's 
report, we take judicial notice that the State Bar's records 
indicate that Attorney Constant's law license currently is 
administratively suspended for failure to pay mandatory bar dues 
and for failure to file required trust account certification.  
Additionally, 
Attorney 
Constant 
did 
not 
petition 
for 
reinstatement following his six-month suspension by this court 
in Constant I.  
3 SCR 10.03(7)(a) allows an attorney to file a petition to 
surrender his or her license to practice law with the State Bar 
and this court.  However, voluntary surrender of a law license 
is not appropriate in response to a pending disciplinary matter.  
In re Voluntary Resignation of Robinson, 2010 WI 37, 323 
Wis. 2d 727, 729, 782 N.W.2d 98.  To the extent that Attorney 
Constant intended to file a petition for consensual license 
revocation under SCR 22.19, he did not follow the proper 
procedure for doing so.  See SCR 22.19(3)-(4).   
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
4 
 
sent the complaint by certified mail to that address, and 
tracking 
information 
indicated 
that 
it 
was 
delivered 
in 
Henderson, Nevada.  The referee ultimately concluded that 
substitute service was accomplished on March 16, 2021, and 
Attorney Constant's answer was due April 5, 2021.  Attorney 
Constant did not file an answer.   
¶6 
Attorney Constant failed to appear for a telephonic 
scheduling conference on April 22, 2021, at which time the OLR 
informed the referee that Attorney Constant's wife indicated a 
health issue prevented his attendance.  Attorney Constant failed 
to appear for a subsequent scheduling conference, and the OLR 
again informed the referee that Attorney Constant's wife stated 
medical issues prevented his participation.  The referee ordered 
Attorney Constant to execute medical releases so the OLR could 
determine if he had a medical incapacity that made defense of 
the proceeding impossible.  See SCR 22.16(4)(a).  Attorney 
Constant returned medical releases to the OLR.  The OLR obtained 
some of Attorney Constant's medical records but ultimately 
advised the referee that the OLR could not reach a conclusion on 
whether Attorney Constant had a medical incapacity.   
¶7 
The OLR indicated its intent to file a motion for 
default and invited Attorney Constant to provide further 
information 
to 
support 
any 
claim 
of 
medical 
incapacity.  
Attorney Constant did not respond and did not assert a medical 
incapacity defense.   
¶8 
The OLR filed a motion for default on February 21, 
2022, along with an affidavit showing proof of substitute 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
5 
 
service.  On March 1, 2022, the referee issued an order 
concluding that "justice is best served by providing Respondent 
an additional and final opportunity to assert his incapacity 
claim as a matter of record in response to the motion for 
default."  He therefore ordered that Attorney Constant had 30 
days to file a response to the motion for default, "in which he 
may allege incapacity and any other reason why the motion should 
not be granted."  No response was filed.   
¶9 
Following a hearing, the referee issued an order 
recommending that this court find Attorney Constant in default 
and that the factual allegations in the complaint be accepted as 
true.  The order also concluded Attorney Constant had been 
properly served, recited several facts indicating that Attorney 
Constant had actual notice of the proceeding, and noted that he 
had been copied on notices of all hearings, orders, and 
correspondence.  The referee also ordered the OLR to submit a 
brief as to the appropriate level of discipline and allowed 
Attorney Constant to do the same.   
¶10 The OLR filed a brief advocating that that the referee 
recommend that this court should revoke Attorney Constant's 
license to practice law and that he be ordered to pay 
restitution.  Attorney Constant did not file a response.   
¶11 On May 31, 2022, the referee issued a report and 
recommendation with findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
to default and the underlying misconduct allegations.  As to 
default, the referee found that the OLR unsuccessfully attempted 
personal service on Attorney Constant at his State Bar address 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
6 
 
in Kenosha on five different dates and thereafter mailed a 
certified copy of the complaint, which was ultimately delivered 
to an address in Henderson, Nevada.  Attorney Constant filed a 
signed and notarized petition to voluntarily surrender his law 
license, in which he indicated his residence was a P.O. Box in 
Henderson, Nevada.  Attorney Constant left a voicemail with the 
OLR's counsel early in the proceeding "in which Attorney 
Constant referred to service on him of documents in the 
proceeding." 
 
Attorney 
Constant's 
wife 
had 
multiple 
communications with counsel for the OLR acknowledging awareness 
of the proceeding and she provided a residential address in 
Henderson, Nevada, to the OLR.  All of the referee's written 
communications with the OLR's counsel, as well as all notices 
and orders, were copied to Attorney Constant at the e-mail 
address on file for him with the State Bar, and none of them 
bounced back.  The March 1, 2022 order allowing Attorney 
Constant to oppose the motion for default and assert a medical 
incapacity defense was mailed to the Henderson, Nevada address 
that Attorney Constant's wife provided, in addition to being 
mailed to the address in Kenosha and e-mailed.  Counsel for the 
OLR also e-mailed a copy of the order to Attorney Constant's 
wife in response to an e-mail from her.  The referee found that 
these 
facts 
constituted 
"substantial 
indicia 
of 
Attorney 
Constant's 
awareness 
of 
this 
proceeding 
throughout 
its 
pendency."   
¶12 Based on these findings, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Constant was properly served with the complaint, failed 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
7 
 
to timely file an answer or otherwise appear in the proceeding, 
and therefore was in default.  The referee further concluded 
that neither Attorney Constant nor anyone on his behalf claimed 
as a matter of record that he possessed a medical incapacity 
that made defense of the proceeding impossible.  The referee 
further concluded that it was "implausible" that Attorney 
Constant could not have done so if he intended to pursue such a 
claim based on his filing of a petition to surrender his law 
license during the same time period.  Accordingly, the referee 
recommended that this court find Attorney Constant in default.  
¶13 Having concluded that Attorney Constant was in default 
for failing to answer, the referee adopted and accepted the 
salient factual allegations of the complaint.  Those allegations 
are summarized as follows. 
¶14 In 2011, S.C. hired Attorney Constant to represent her 
in a personal injury action after a January 2011 car accident 
(first accident).  Attorney Constant settled the case and 
provided no further services relating to the matter after April 
15, 2015, but retained $3,756.86 in his trust account.  However, 
by April 10, 2016, his trust account held only $34.21 pertaining 
to the first accident.  
¶15 On April 15, 2015, S.C. was involved in another car 
accident and hired Attorney Constant to represent her (second 
accident).  Attorney Constant was entitled to one-third of any 
recovery, plus reimbursements of costs.   
¶16 On January 31, 2018, Attorney Constant received a 
partial insurance payment for S.C.'s medical payments (medpay) 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
8 
 
claim in the second accident in the amount of $1,205.89.  
Attorney Constant deposited the check into his trust account on 
February 7, 2018, and disbursed $401.96 (one-third) of that 
amount to himself.  The same day, he issued another check from 
the trust account to himself for $800, which indicated it was 
for legal fees relating to the first accident.  The following 
day, he wrote another trust account check payable to himself for 
$700, again indicating it was for legal fees relating to the 
first accident.  These withdrawals extinguished S.C.'s balance 
in Attorney Constant's trust account.  In the next two months, 
Attorney Constant disbursed seven more checks from his trust 
account to himself, totaling $4,900, which he indicated were for 
legal fees from S.C.'s first accident.   
¶17 On April 10, 2018, Attorney Constant deposited an 
insurance settlement check for $50,000 for S.C.'s second 
accident.  He orally notified S.C. of the check, but told her he 
could not disburse any settlement funds to her until all claims 
had been settled and her medical bills were paid.  Over the next 
16 months, Attorney Constant repeated these representations to 
S.C.   
¶18 On or about the same day that Attorney Constant 
received the $50,000 settlement check, he disbursed $200 to 
himself, indicating it was for legal fees relating to the first 
accident.  He also wrote two additional checks to himself 
disbursing one-third of the settlement ($16,666.66) from the 
second accident.  Over the next six months, Attorney Constant 
disbursed 41 checks to himself from his trust account totaling 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
9 
 
$33,200, purportedly as legal fees relating to S.C.'s first 
accident.  As a result, Attorney Constant held only $271.25 from 
the $50,000 settlement check in trust.  He later wrote another 
check to himself for $1,000, purportedly for fees relating to 
the first accident and matters unrelated to S.C.   
¶19 Between December 12, 2018 and February 12, 2019, 
Attorney Constant received 42 medpay checks totaling $32,462.43 
relating to S.C.'s second accident.  Attorney Constant orally 
told S.C. he had received some medpay checks, but he did not 
notify her in writing of his receipt of each and again 
represented that he could not disburse any funds to S.C. until 
all medpay claims were satisfied.  Attorney Constant paid only 
$122.27 in medpay claims and disbursed the remainder to himself, 
purportedly as fees for other matters.   
¶20 On August 2, 2019, Attorney Constant received another 
insurance check for $17,500 relating to the second accident.  
Before depositing this amount, Attorney Constant should have 
been holding $53,356.64 in trust for S.C., but had a balance of 
only $1,762.70.  Attorney Constant deposited the $17,500 check, 
which he later disbursed to S.C. at the same time he gave her a 
promissory note for $47,557.30 for the remainder of the 
settlement.4  At that time, S.C. had outstanding medical bills 
from the second accident, but Attorney Constant made no further 
                                                 
4 The OLR's brief regarding sanctions indicates that after 
the complaint was filed, "the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client 
Protection (Fund) fully paid a claim filed by [S.C.]"     
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
10 
 
payments to S.C. or on her behalf, and he failed to make any 
payments on the promissory note.   
¶21 As a result of these allegations, the OLR claimed 
Attorney Constant engaged in four counts of attorney misconduct.  
The 
OLR 
alleged 
that 
Attorney 
Constant: 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.15(d)(1)5 by failing to give written notice of funds (Count 
1); violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(1)6 by failing to hold and safeguard 
settlement funds (Count 2); violated SCR 20:1.37 by failing to 
act with reasonable diligence to pay S.C.'s medical providers 
                                                 
5 Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to 
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule."  See S. 
Ct. Order 14-07, 2016 WI 21 (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 
2016). 
 
Former 
SCR 
20:1.15(d)(1) 
was 
renumbered 
as 
SCR 
20:1.15(e)(1).  The text of the rule was not changed and 
provides:  
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client has an interest, or in which a lawyer has 
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest 
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or 
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client 
or 3rd party in writing. Except as stated in this rule 
or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to the 
client or 3rd party any funds or other property that 
the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive. 
6 SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) provides: 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation. All funds of clients 
and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm in 
connection with a representation shall be deposited in 
one or more identifiable trust accounts. 
7 SCR 20:1.3 provides:  "A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
11 
 
(Count 3); and violated SCR 20:8.4(c)8 by converting client trust 
funds (Count 4).   
¶22 In a different matter, on August 17, 2016, M.R. and 
S.R. were in a car accident and hired Attorney Constant to 
represent them.  Under their agreement, Attorney Constant would 
be entitled to one-third of their recovery as a legal fee.  The 
statute of limitations on M.R.'s and S.R.'s claims expired on 
August 17, 2019.  
¶23 In 
April 
2017, 
Attorney 
Constant 
received 
and 
deposited an insurance check settling M.R.'s claims against one 
insurer for $6,850.  Attorney Constant later disbursed $2,975.97 
to M.R., paid $1,365 to satisfy a medical lien, and disbursed 
$2,488.35 to himself.  Despite still holding $20.68 in trust for 
M.R., Attorney Constant told M.R. that he had disbursed the 
entirety of the settlement.   
¶24 In February 2018, Attorney Constant received $9,161.60 
from an insurer in partial payment of S.R.'s medpay claims and 
deposited the same into his trust account.  He did not notify 
S.R. of this payment, but paid some of her medical expenses, 
disbursed $2,980 to her, and paid $3,053.56 to himself for his 
one-third fee.  By November 2018, Attorney Constant's trust 
account held only $544.83 relating to S.R., and he told her he 
could not disburse the remaining medpay funds due to outstanding 
liens.  However, between February 2019 and August 2019, Attorney 
                                                 
8 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
12 
 
Constant disbursed an additional $19,250 in trust funds to 
himself purportedly for fees relating to S.R.   
¶25 In early August 2019, an insurer offered to settle 
S.R.'s claims for $4,348.40; Attorney Constant forwarded the 
offer to S.R.  S.R. never authorized the settlement, but 
Attorney Constant agreed to settle her claims for $4,400.  
Attorney Constant received the funds, deposited them into his 
trust account, but did not notify S.R.  Attorney Constant 
disbursed $300 of the settlement funds to himself, and never 
disbursed any to S.R.   
¶26 Attorney Constant never provided S.R. or M.R. with an 
accounting of the funds he received or paid out on their behalf.  
In September 2019, Attorney Constant prepared to close his law 
office, but did not inform S.R. or M.R., arrange for successor 
counsel, or otherwise communicate with them.  When Attorney 
Constant closed his office on or about September 30, 2019, he 
had not resolved all of S.R.'s outstanding liens or disbursed 
the remainder of her settlement funds.  In November 2019, S.R. 
and M.R. discovered that the statute of limitations on their 
claims had expired and attempted to contact Attorney Constant by 
phone and e-mail, but his phone was disconnected and he did not 
respond to their e-mails.  Attorney Constant also did not 
respond to further inquiries in January 2020 about the status of 
S.R.'s claims and settlement.   
¶27 On January 28, 2020, in Constant I, this court 
suspended Attorney Constant's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin 
for 
six 
months, 
effective 
March 
10, 
2020.  
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
13 
 
Nonetheless, in February and March 2020, Attorney Constant 
attempted to negotiate one of S.R.'s outstanding medical bills 
and attempted to negotiate a settlement with S.R's and M.R.'s 
former landlord.  On April 15, 2020, Attorney Constant sent a 
proposed settlement to the landlord along with a check drawn 
from his trust account for $500.  In April and May 2020, S.R. 
and M.R. repeatedly asked Attorney Constant to pay the remainder 
of S.R.'s settlement funds.  He did not do so.   
¶28 Based on these allegations, the OLR claimed that 
Attorney Constant engaged in nine counts of misconduct.  The OLR 
claimed that Attorney Constant: violated SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) by 
failing to provide prompt notice of receipt of settlement funds 
and deliver them to S.R. (Count 5); violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(3)9 by 
failing to provide S.R. and M.R. with information necessary to 
understand their settlements and the status of their claims 
(Count 6); violated SCR 20:1.2(a)10 by failing to obtain S.R.'s 
                                                 
9 SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) provides:  "A lawyer shall keep the 
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter." 
10 SCR 20:1.2(a) provides:   
Subject to pars. (c) and (d), a lawyer shall 
abide 
by 
a 
client's 
decisions 
concerning 
the 
objectives of representation and, as required by SCR 
20:1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means 
by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take 
such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly 
authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer 
shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a 
matter. In a criminal case or any proceeding that 
could result in deprivation of liberty, the lawyer 
shall 
abide 
by 
the 
client's 
decision, 
after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
14 
 
authorization to settle her claims before accepting a settlement 
(Count 7); violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) by failing to safeguard 
settlement funds belonging to S.R., M.R., and third parties 
(Count 8); violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by converting settlement funds 
for 
his 
own 
use 
(Count 
9); 
violated 
SCR 
20:8.4(c) 
by 
misrepresenting that numerous disbursements from his trust 
account were related to his representation of S.R. (Count 10); 
violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(4)11 by failing to respond to S.R.'s and 
M.R.'s requests for information (Count 11); violated SCR 
20:1.16(d)12 by failing to inform S.R. and M.R. that he closed 
his law office and had terminated his representation or 
otherwise intended to take no further action on their behalf 
(Count 12); and violated SCR 22.26(2),13 enforceable via SCR 
                                                                                                                                                             
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the 
client will testify. 
11 SCR 20:1.4(a)(4) provides:  "A lawyer shall promptly 
comply with reasonable requests by the client for information." 
12 SCR 20:1.16(d) provides: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable 
to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for 
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by 
other law. 
13 SCR 22.26(2) provides: 
An attorney whose license to practice law is 
suspended or revoked or who is suspended from the 
practice of law may not engage in this state in the 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
15 
 
20:8.4(f),14 by practicing law in Wisconsin at a time when his 
license was suspended (Count 13).   
¶29 The referee concluded that Attorney Constant violated 
each provision as alleged.  The referee then addressed the 
proper sanction for Attorney Constant's violations, "focus[ing] 
principally on the conduct that directly and most tangibly 
injured his clients——namely, his conversion to his own use of 
funds that he had a duty to hold in trust for distribution to 
those clients or for their benefit."   
¶30 The 
referee 
noted 
that 
the 
OLR 
advocated 
for 
revocation of Attorney Constant's license based on principles of 
progressive discipline articulated in ABA Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions, this court's decision in Constant I, and 
various prior disciplinary cases.  The OLR noted that in 
Constant I, this court suspended Attorney Constant's license to 
practice law for six months based on nine counts of misconduct 
involving systemic trust account problems, conversion, and 
mishandling an injury settlement.  The referee concluded that a 
comparison of the conduct in the two cases "unquestionably 
                                                                                                                                                             
practice 
of 
law 
or 
in 
any 
law 
work 
activity 
customarily done by law students, law clerks, or other 
paralegal personnel, except that the attorney may 
engage in law related work in this state for a 
commercial employer itself not engaged in the practice 
of law. 
14 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides:  "It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
16 
 
establishes a pattern of similar misconduct with regard to funds 
held, or that should have been held, in trust for the benefit of 
clients" and that the facts underlying the violations in 
Constant I "poignantly illustrate that the trust account 
misconduct involved in this case was a continuation of a pattern 
of misconduct" from the prior case.  The referee concluded that 
progressive discipline was appropriate even though most of the 
conduct in the present case occurred before this court's 
decision in Constant I.  He concluded that this case called for 
a sanction that was "substantially more severe" because all of 
the clients and lienholders in Constant I were eventually paid 
whereas here, Attorney Constant's clients and lienholders lost 
"over $53,000 in the aggregate."   
¶31 In assessing the severity of the sanction, the referee 
noted 
the 
general 
rule 
under 
ABA 
Standards 
§ 4.11 
that 
disbarment is appropriate when an attorney knowingly converts 
client property and causes injury to a client, but stated a 
"more particularized analysis is required" because in Constant 
I, this court imposed less severe punishment for the same type 
of conduct.  That said, the referee agreed with the OLR that the 
facts of this case involved "multiple aggravating factors under 
ABA Standards §§ 9.22(a)—(d) and (g)—(k)," including "prior 
disciplinary history, dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of 
misconduct, multiple offenses, refusal to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the victims, 
substantial experience in the practice of law, and indifference 
to paying restitution."  However, the referee stated that some 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
17 
 
of 
these 
factors 
"deserve 
caveats" 
because 
most 
of 
the 
misconduct here occurred before imposition of discipline in 
Constant I and because while Attorney Constant's failure to 
participate "is deemed a refusal to acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of his conduct," it "should be viewed less harshly than 
that of an attorney who defends himself unjustifiably."  And the 
referee further concluded that Attorney Constant's "ill-fated 
petition to surrender his law license" could be "construed, 
albeit generously, as an acknowledgment of wrongful conduct."  
Out of those factors, the referee concluded that the most 
important aggravating factor was Attorney Constant's "apparent 
indifference to paying restitution."   
¶32 As to mitigating factors, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Constant failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to 
whether his health issues caused his misconduct.  However, the 
referee acknowledged Attorney Constant's legal career spanned 
over half a century and that in Constant I, this court noted 
that he "brought credit to the legal profession by his many 
positive community involvements."  The referee concluded that in 
the prior case, "this Court accorded substantial weight to this 
mitigating factor" given the imposition of only a six-month 
suspension.   
¶33 The referee then looked to prior disciplinary cases 
cited by the OLR——including In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Runyon, 2020 WI 74, 393 Wis. 2d 612, 948 N.W.2d 62; In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grogan, 2014 WI 39, 354 
Wis. 2d 659, 847 N.W.2d 817; and In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
18 
 
Against Krombach, 2005 WI 170, 286 Wis. 2d 589, 707 N.W.2d 146——
and concluded that none of them "definitively assist with the 
choice between a lengthy suspension or revocation" in this case. 
Surveying several other decisions, the referee concluded that 
"[i]n 
other 
instances 
of 
an 
attorney's 
conversion 
of 
a 
significant amount of money that was or should have been held in 
trust for clients, this Court has typically imposed revocation 
in the absence of substantial mitigating facts."  The referee 
stated that such mitigating facts include "restitution of all or 
almost all of the converted funds, other indicia of remorse and 
acceptance of responsibility, and unusually severe adverse 
conditions that affected the attorney and were not of his or her 
own making."   
¶34 The referee concluded that no mitigating factors were 
present in this case and that "[t]he decisive fact in [the] 
analysis is the lack of evidence that Attorney Constant has so 
much as lifted a finger to reimburse the victims of his 
misconduct, or at the very least to explain why he cannot do 
so."  The referee further explained that Attorney Constant's 
long legal career and contributions to the community were 
"insufficient to counterbalance his complete indifference to 
restitution."   
¶35 The referee concluded that revocation was "necessary 
to fulfill at least two of the four primary goals of attorney 
discipline:  to address the seriousness of the misconduct, and 
to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct."  
And while the OLR had advised that the Fund reimbursed S.C.'s 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
19 
 
loss of $47,557.30, that "did not lessen the seriousness of 
Attorney Constant's conversion.  It merely transfers the loss 
from S.C. to all members of the Wisconsin Bar."   
¶36 Accordingly, the referee recommended that this court 
revoke Attorney Constant's license to practice law in Wisconsin 
and further recommended that the court order Attorney Constant 
to pay restitution in the amount of $47,557.30 to the Fund, 
$5,757.87 to S.R., and $225.70 to M.R.  Finally, the referee 
recommended that Attorney Constant be assessed the full costs of 
this proceeding, which were determined to be $4,135.06, and that 
costs be paid after Attorney Constant paid restitution.  
¶37 We review the referee's findings of fact under the 
clearly erroneous standard and review conclusions of law de 
novo.  Runyon, 393 Wis. 2d 612, ¶11.  We determine the 
appropriate level of discipline independent of the referee's 
recommendation.  Id. 
¶38 We first address the issue of default.  Having 
reviewed the record, we see no reason to disturb the referee's 
factual findings that Attorney Constant was properly served with 
the complaint via substitute service and that he did not timely 
file an answer.  The record shows that the OLR made several 
unsuccessful attempts at personal service at the address listed 
on file for him with the State Bar.  The OLR then accomplished 
substitute service on Attorney Constant by mailing a certified 
copy of the complaint to that address which was then forwarded 
and delivered to Henderson, Nevada.  See SCR 22.13(1) (if 
personal service cannot be accomplished then substitute service 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
20 
 
may 
be 
effectuated 
by 
"sending 
by 
certified 
mail 
an 
authenticated copy of the complaint and order to answer to the 
most recent address furnished by the respondent to the state 
bar").  Attorney Constant did not file an answer within the time 
prescribed by the rules and indeed filed no answer at all.  See 
SCR 22.14(1) ("The respondent shall file an answer with the 
supreme court and serve a copy on the office of lawyer 
regulation within 20 days after service of the complaint").   
¶39 While nothing in our supreme court rules or the rules 
of civil procedure require proof of actual notice before a 
default for failing to answer can be declared,15 given the 
severity of the recommended sanction in this case, we further 
agree that the record supports the referee's determination that 
Attorney Constant had actual knowledge of this proceeding before 
the referee declared a default.  After the complaint was filed, 
but before service was accomplished, Attorney Constant filed a 
Petition to Voluntarily Surrender a Wisconsin Law License, 
listing a P.O. Box address in Henderson, Nevada, and indicating 
that he had "grievances pending against me, which I cannot 
successfully 
defend." 
 
This 
filing 
demonstrates 
Attorney 
Constant's actual knowledge of the disciplinary proceeding.   
                                                 
15 See SCR 22.15(1) (permitting referee to consider a motion 
for default following the scheduling conference); SCR 22.16(1) 
(stating that a referee has the powers of a judge trying a civil 
action and that the rules of civil procedure and evidence shall 
be followed); Wis. Stat. § 806.02(1), (3) (default judgment may 
be entered after time for joining issue has expired upon proof 
of service).   
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
21 
 
¶40 Additionally, 
the 
referee 
mailed 
copies 
of 
all 
pleadings, motions, orders, and correspondence to Attorney 
Constant's address on file with the State Bar and sent copies of 
the same to the e-mail address Attorney Constant maintained on 
file with the State Bar.  Attorney Constant also returned signed 
medical release authorizations to the OLR, as ordered by the 
referee.   
¶41 Finally, after the OLR filed its motion for default, 
the referee entered an order giving Attorney Constant additional 
time to file a response and assert any defenses he wished to 
make.  The referee indicated that this order, in addition to 
being sent in the manner described above, was also mailed to a 
residential address in Henderson, Nevada, that was provided to 
the OLR by Attorney Constant's wife.  See Wis. Stat. § 801.14(1) 
("No service need be made on parties in default for failure to 
appear.").  
¶42 Therefore, the record demonstrates that the OLR made 
proper substitute service of the complaint on Attorney Constant, 
that he had actual awareness of the proceeding, that he was 
provided with notice of the motion for default, and that he 
chose not to join issue or otherwise respond to the allegations 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
22 
 
against him in this proceeding.16  We agree with the referee that 
Attorney Constant is in default for failing to timely answer and 
join issue.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kelly, 2012 
WI 55, ¶19, 341 Wis. 2d 104, 814 N.W.2d 844 ("A defendant's or 
respondent's failure to join issue is the usual situation where 
a default may be declared").   
¶43 Because Attorney Constant is in default for failure to 
timely answer, the allegations in the complaint are accepted as 
true for purposes of this proceeding.  Id., ¶25.  The referee 
therefore properly relied upon the allegations in the complaint 
as clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Attorney 
Constant committed all 13 counts of misconduct as alleged in the 
complaint.  Runyon, 393 Wis. 2d 612, ¶12.  
¶44 We next address the issue of the proper level of 
discipline in this case.  We agree with the referee that given 
the nature of the conduct involved in the 13 charged counts of 
misconduct, as well as Attorney Constant's prior disciplinary 
record, that the appropriate discipline in this case is to 
revoke Attorney Constant's license to practice law in Wisconsin, 
                                                 
16 While the referee raised the issue of a possible medical 
incapacity defense in this case, see SCR, 22.16(4)(a), the 
record shows that after reviewing some of Attorney Constant's 
medical records, the OLR was unable to make a determination on 
the issue and that the referee gave Attorney Constant the 
opportunity to assert a incapacity defense in response to the 
OLR's motion for default.  As no medical incapacity claim was 
ever made in this proceeding, we do not discuss the matter 
further.  
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
23 
 
require him to pay restitution to his former clients and the 
Fund, and impose the full costs of this proceeding. 
¶45 In determining the appropriate sanction, we consider 
the following factors:  "the seriousness, nature and extent of 
the misconduct; the level of discipline needed to protect the 
public; the need to impress upon the attorney the seriousness of 
the misconduct; and the need to deter other attorneys from 
similar misconduct."  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Zenor, 2021 WI 77, ¶10, 399 Wis. 2d 326, 964 N.W.2d 775.  
Generally, attorney discipline is progressive in nature absent 
extenuating circumstances.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Dade, 2017 WI 51, ¶9, 375 Wis. 2d 140, 895 N.W.2d 37.   
¶46 We agree with the referee that progressive discipline 
is appropriate in this case given Attorney Constant's prior 
disciplinary history and sanctions imposed in Constant I.  In 
that proceeding we suspended Attorney Constant's license to 
practice law for six months as a result of nine counts of 
misconduct involving an array of trust account violations 
including failing to maintain trust account records, failing to 
provide written notice of receipt of settlement proceedings in 
trust, 
failing 
to 
promptly 
disburse 
settlement 
proceeds, 
converting trust funds for business and personal use, making 
improper electronic transfers from client trust accounts, making 
disbursements from a client trust account before funds were 
deposited that were attributable to the matter, and depositing 
personal funds into his trust account.  Constant I, 390 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶24.  The referee in that case characterized the 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
24 
 
misconduct as "serious" and said these were "major violations."  
Id., ¶27.  We imposed a more severe sanction than recommended by 
the referee in that case because Attorney Constant was not 
remorseful for his conduct and "consistently maintained he did 
nothing wrong."  Id., ¶45.17  We decided that a six-month 
suspension was appropriate because requiring Attorney Constant 
to petition for reinstatement would "provide assurance that he 
can be safely recommended to the profession, the courts, and the 
public as a person who is fit and capable to practice law in 
this state."  Id. 
¶47 The referee concluded that the misconduct in this case 
was a continuation of a pattern of trust account violations in 
Constant I.  We agree.  But the conduct in the present case is 
much more severe.  Whereas Attorney Constant ultimately made 
restitution to the client whose trust funds he converted in the 
previous matter, id., ¶46, in the present case, he pocketed over 
$53,000 in trust funds belonging to his clients or lienholders.  
And while Attorney Constant attempted to (unsuccessfully) 
justify his misconduct in the prior case as a simple matter of 
poor bookkeeping practices, no such claim can be made in the 
present case.  The record demonstrates multiple instances where 
Attorney Constant converted large sums of client trust funds for 
                                                 
17 The court imposed a six-month suspension requiring a 
petition for reinstatement whereas the referee recommended only 
a five-month suspension.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Constant, 2020 WI 4, ¶¶1–2, 390 Wis. 2d 1, 937 N.W.2d 599.  
Justice Hagedorn dissented and would have adopted the referee's 
recommended five-month suspension.  Id., ¶53. 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
25 
 
his own personal use, misrepresented the status of settlement 
payments to clients, and fraudulently attempted to characterize 
disbursements as relating to closed or unrelated legal matters.  
In short, the record here demonstrates repeated instances of 
outright theft of client trust funds and misrepresentations in 
an attempt to justify it.  
¶48 While the referee focused almost exclusively on the 
Attorney Constant's conversion of trust funds, we note that the 
misconduct here is more serious than in Constant I in other 
respects.  For instance, Attorney Constant settled a portion of 
S.R.'s claim without her approval.  He closed his law practice 
while S.R.'s and M.R.'s claims were unresolved and after the 
statute of limitations had run on some of the claims, and 
refused to communicate with them about their case——effectively 
abandoning them and their unresolved claims.  Moreover, despite 
the suspension of his license following Constant I, he continued 
to practice law by attempting to negotiate and resolve minor 
aspects of S.R.'s and M.R.'s claims.  In so doing, Attorney 
Constant 
exhibited 
indifference 
to 
his 
professional 
responsibilities to his clients and also a clear disregard of 
the authority of this court.  
¶49 We agree with the referee that the nature, extent, and 
severity of misconduct involved here "calls for a sanction 
substantially more severe" than the six-month suspension we 
meted out in Constant I.  The referee discussed several prior 
disciplinary cases where this court concluded that revocation of 
an attorney's license was a proper sanction for repeated 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
26 
 
occurrences of conversion of client trust funds.  While the 
referee found distinguishing facts in several of these cases, 
and while we agree that no two cases are the same and each must 
be decided on its own particular facts, we conclude that many of 
the cases the referee discussed demonstrate that revocation is 
the appropriate sanction in the present matter. 
¶50 For instance, in Grogan, 354 Wis. 2d 659, we revoked 
the license of an attorney with prior disciplinary history for 
misappropriating 
the 
funds 
of 
several 
clients, 
lack 
of 
diligence, for engaging in dishonest and fraudulent practices in 
multiple matters, and for failing to cooperate with the OLR's 
investigation into his misconduct.  In Runyon, 393 Wis. 2d 612, 
¶23, we revoked the license of an attorney with several prior 
disciplinary matters who committed 23 counts of misconduct 
involving four separate clients, including conversion of large 
sums of trust funds based on "a clear pattern of misconduct by 
Attorney Runyon and disregard for his obligations as an attorney 
in this State."  While there are some factual differences 
between 
these 
two 
cases 
and 
Attorney 
Constant's 
current 
misconduct, we nevertheless conclude that the facts of the 
present case demonstrate a similar pattern of misconduct and 
disregard for Attorney Constant's obligations as an attorney in 
this state.   
¶51 The referee found In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Hinnawi, 202 Wis. 2d 113, 549 N.W.2d 245 (1996) most 
analogous.  In that case, this court concluded that revocation 
was proper where the attorney timely failed to perform his 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
27 
 
duties 
as 
representative 
of 
an 
estate, 
charged 
it 
an 
unreasonable fee, failed to keep funds in his client trust 
accounts, 
made 
numerous 
misrepresentations 
to 
the 
OLR's 
predecessor agency during its investigation, practiced law while 
suspended 
from 
practice, 
and 
did 
not 
respond 
to 
client 
inquiries. 
 
The 
referee 
also 
discussed 
Krombach, 
286 
Wis. 2d 589, ¶63, where this court revoked an attorney's license 
for converting large sums of a client's money for personal use, 
altered documents in an attempt to hide his theft, took 
advantage 
of 
a 
vulnerable 
client, 
and 
failed 
to 
accept 
responsibility for his wrongful actions.  In so doing, we stated 
that "[a]lthough each case turns on its specific facts, in many 
instances we have revoked the licenses of attorneys that have 
converted client funds to their own personal use."  Id., ¶63.  
Again, while neither Hinnawi nor Krombach involve the exact same 
set of facts as the present case, the nature and seriousness of 
the 
misconduct 
in 
those 
cases 
is 
analogous 
to 
Attorney 
Constant's multiple instances of misconduct, and the sanction 
imposed in those cases demonstrate that revocation is warranted 
in the present case.  
¶52 Accordingly, after a careful review of the record and 
similar disciplinary cases, we agree with the referee that 
revocation of Attorney Constant's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin is appropriate in this case.  The misconduct here 
involves repeated instances of Attorney Constant converting 
large sums of client trust funds for his personal use, failing 
to advise his clients of the status of their cases and 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
28 
 
settlement 
proceedings, 
multiple 
acts 
of 
dishonesty 
in 
attempting to falsely characterize disbursements, abandoning and 
failing to communicate with his clients, an act of settling a 
claim without his client's permission, and practicing law while 
his license was suspended for engaging in similar conduct in the 
past.  Attorney Constant has not acknowledged the wrongful 
nature of his actions, shown any remorse, or attempted to make 
restitution.  Nor is there any evidence of other mitigating 
factors that could explain Attorney Constant's actions.  Cf. In 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery, 2009 WI 89, ¶82, 
320 Wis. 2d 422, 769 N.W.2d 858 (revocation not appropriate in 
case of conversion of client funds, misrepresentations, and 
other misconduct when attorney "indicated his remorse, accepted 
responsibility . . . made significant restitution" and where 
attorney was "faced with significant stressors involving his 
health, his family, as well as his law practice.")  Revocation 
is necessary given the seriousness of Attorney Constant's 
misconduct, 
the 
harm 
caused 
to 
his 
clients, 
his 
prior 
disciplinary history, and the need to deter attorneys from 
engaging in similar misconduct and protect the public.18 
¶53 We agree with the referee that Attorney Constant 
should pay restitution to his clients.  However, given that the 
                                                 
18 Although three justices join the concurrence authored by 
Chief Justice Ziegler, that fact does not effect a change to our 
current rule governing license revocation.  See SCR 22.29(2). 
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
29 
 
Fund has already reimbursed S.C.,19 we order that the amounts 
owed to S.R. and M.R. be given priority before restitution is 
made to the Fund.  Finally, we follow our normal practice of 
imposing the full costs associated with this matter.  See SCR 
22.24(1m).  
¶54 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Terry L.r Constant 
to practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective the date of 
this order. 
¶55 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Terry L. Constant shall pay restitution as 
follows:  $5,757.87 to S.R.; $225.70 to M.R.; and $47,557.30 to 
the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for the claims 
of S.C., after full restitution has been made to S.R. and M.R.   
¶56 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Terry L. Constant shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are 
$4,135.06 as of June 20, 2022. 
¶57 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that payment of restitution is 
to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation.  
¶58 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pleadings and documents 
filed by the parties in this matter that have been marked sealed 
                                                 
19 As noted, the OLR informed the referee in a pleading that 
the Fund paid the full amount of S.C.'s claim for $47,557.30.  
While there is no documentation of that payment in the record, 
we will accept the OLR's representation that such payment was 
made.  
No. 
2021AP33-D   
 
30 
 
or confidential shall remain so until further order of the 
court.   
¶59 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Terry L. Constant shall 
comply, if he has not already done so, with the requirements of 
SCR 22.26 pertaining to the duties of a person whose license to 
practice law in Wisconsin has been revoked. 
¶60 IT 
IS 
FURTHER 
ORDERED 
that 
the 
administrative 
suspension of Terry L. Constant's license to practice law in 
Wisconsin, due to his failure to pay mandatory bar dues and for 
failure to file Office of Lawyer Regulation trust account 
certification, will remain in effect until each reason for the 
administrative suspension has been rectified pursuant to SCR 
22.28(1). 
 
 
No.  2021AP33-D.akz 
 
1 
 
¶61 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   (concurring).  I 
concur in the court's order revoking Attorney Constant's license 
to practice law in Wisconsin.  I write separately to point out 
that in Wisconsin the "revocation" of an attorney's law license 
is not truly revocation because the attorney may petition for 
reinstatement after a period of five years.  See SCR 22.29(2).  
I believe that when it comes to lawyer discipline, courts should 
say what they mean and mean what they say.  We should not be 
creating false perceptions to both the public and to the lawyer 
seeking to practice law again.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Moodie, 2020 WI 39, 391 Wis. 2d 196, 942 
N.W.2d 302 (Ziegler, J., dissenting).  And, as I stated in my 
dissent to this court's order denying Rule Petition 19-10, In 
the Matter of Amending Supreme Court Rules Pertaining to 
Permanent Revocation of a License to Practice Law in Attorney 
Disciplinary Proceedings, I believe there may be rare and 
unusual cases that would warrant the permanent revocation of an 
attorney's license to practice law.  See S. Ct. Order 19-10 
(issued Dec. 18, 2019) (Ziegler, J., dissenting). 
¶62 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, BRIAN HAGEDORN, and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this 
concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2021AP33-D.akz 
 
 
 
1