Title: State v. Gibson

State: nebraska

Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court

Document:

422 N.W.2d 570 (1988) 228 Neb. 455 STATE of Nebraska, Appellee, v. Richter U. GIBSON, Appellant. No. 87-675. Supreme Court of Nebraska. May 6, 1988. *571 Thomas M. Kenney, Douglas County Public Defender, and Timothy P. Burns, Omaha, for appellant. Robert M. Spire, Atty. Gen., and Steven J. Moeller, Lincoln, for appellee. HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ. SHANAHAN, Justice. A jury found Richter U. Gibson guilty of violating Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-1206(1) (Reissue 1985), which prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm "with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length." In his appeal, Gibson does not contest the sufficiency of evidence for the conviction, but does contend that the district court erred in overruling Gibson's motion to suppress an oral statement made to police at the time of his arrest and in admitting that statement as evidence in Gibson's trial. Before trial, Gibson moved for suppression of his oral statement. See Neb.Rev. Stat. § 29-115 (Reissue 1985) (proceedings for suppression of a statement obtained by violation of a defendant's constitutional rights). In his suppression motion, Gibson alleged that his oral custodial statement was made without the antecedent "Miranda warning." See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). At the suppression hearing, Paul W. Briese, an officer in the narcotics unit of the Omaha Police Division, testified about the circumstances surrounding Gibson's statement in question. Police had obtained a warrant to search premises designated as 3504 North 24th Street in Omaha, which was the duplex residence of Gayle Eagle Feather. Gibson shared the residence with Eagle Feather. The warrant authorized a premises search for "[m]arijuana its derivatives and administrating instruments either homemade or manufactured. Monies and records pertaining to an illegal narcotics operation and records pertaining to the occupants of 3504 North 24th Street, Omaha, Douglas County, Nebraska." At approximately 11:30 a.m. on December 4, 1986, and equipped with the *572 search warrant, Officer Briese and five other narcotics officers went to the residence described in the search warrant to search for contraband "drugs." Some of the officers wore vest-like jackets bearing the visible inscription "Omaha Police" on the front and back of such vests. When the officers arrived at the duplex, the front door was unlocked. The officers entered through the front door, announcing: "Police officers, search warrant." In the residence the officers found Gibson with Eagle Feather and her two children. Briese handed Gibson a copy of the search warrant. While Eagle Feather remained with some officers in the residence's living room-dining room area, Briese and other officers undertook a search which, after a half hour, brought them into the residence's kitchen. Before entry into the kitchen, the officers had not questioned Gibson and had not given him the Miranda warning. In the kitchen, Briese, who was accompanied by two other officers, directed Gibson "to sit down and not try to leave." Officer Briese acknowledged that Gibson was not free to leave the kitchen or premises. While searching in the kitchen's wall cupboard, Officer Briese discovered a loaded "stub-nose" .38-caliber revolver. Displaying the discovered revolver, Briese remarked: "Oh, look what I found." As an immediate response to the officer's remark, Gibson stated: "That's my gun, and I use it for protection." Briese explained his comment on discovering the revolver. First, Briese's comment was not directed toward Gibson alone but was made for all"everybody"to hear. Second, Briese's reason for his comment was: In the remainder of their search, the officers found a "controlled substance." Police gave the Miranda warning to Gibson, who declined to talk with the officers. Apparently by radio, an officer inquired about the registration of the revolver which Briese had discovered. Based on the revolver's serial number, the officer determined that the firearm was unregistered and, when checking whether Gibson had a criminal record, ascertained that Gibson was a convicted felon. Police arrested Gibson. In his further testimony at the suppression hearing, Officer Briese testified that Gibson was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs and was calm throughout the search of the duplex. The district court concluded that Gibson's statement was not made in response to custodial interrogation by police and overruled Gibson's suppression motion. At trial and over objection by Gibson's counsel, Officer Briese testified substantially in accord with his testimony at the suppression hearing, including the circumstances surrounding discovery of the .38-caliber revolver and Gibson's statement concerning the discovered revolver. After the verdict of guilty, the court sentenced Gibson to imprisonment for 1 to 2 years. Gibson contends his oral statement, when Officer Briese discovered the revolver, should have been suppressed and excluded from evidence because police had not administered the Miranda warning before Gibson's statement. "` "`In determining the correctness of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the Supreme Court will uphold the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous ....'" '" State v. Blakely, 227 Neb. 816, 820, 420 N.W.2d 300, 303 (1988) (quoting State v. Vrtiska, 225 Neb. 454, 406 N.W.2d 114 (1987)). There is no question that Gibson was in custody when he made the statement in question. Officer Briese emphatically instructed Gibson to remain in the kitchen, where Gibson was not free to leave the officer's presence. *573 "`Custodial interrogation' has been characterized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda as `questioning instigated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'" State v. Bodtke, 219 Neb. 504, 509, 363 N.W.2d 917, 921 (1985) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)). Before a defendant's custodial statement is admissible as evidence, the absolute and indispensable prerequisites of the Miranda warning must have been satisfied preceding the interrogation producing such statement, namely, law enforcement personnel must (1) inform the defendant of the right to remain silent, (2) explain that anything said can and will be used against the defendant in court, and (3) inform the defendant of the right to consult with a lawyer, retained or court-appointed, and to have a lawyer present during interrogation. State v. Norfolk, 221 Neb. 810, 381 N.W.2d 120 (1986). According to the U.S. Supreme Court, a purpose of the Miranda warning is "preventing government officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment." Arizona v. Mauro, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S. Ct. 1931, 1936-37, 95 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1987). Consequently, Gibson made a custodial oral statement to police. However, the question is: Was Gibson's custodial statement the product of police interrogation? In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court expanded "custodial interrogation" beyond express questioning of a defendant while in police custody. Police arrested Innis for a robbery perpetrated with a sawed-off shotgun and advised Innis of his Miranda rights before transporting him to the police station. Innis stated that he understood such rights and wanted to talk with a lawyer. The police had not located the shotgun used in the robbery. While accompanying Innis to the station, officers talked among themselves regarding the missing shotgun, which conversation included comments by the officers concerning the possible tragedy of a child's finding the loaded shotgun and receiving an injury from that weapon. Innis interrupted the officers' conversation and told the officers that, if they would return to the arrest scene, he would locate the shotgun for the police. Near the arrest scene, Innis led police to the missing shotgun. In considering whether Innis' actions in pointing out the shotgun were the product of interrogational compulsion by police, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: We do not, however, construe the Miranda opinion so narrowly. The concern of the Court in Miranda was that the "interrogation environment" created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would "subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner" and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Id., at 457-458 [86 S. Ct. at 1619]. The police practices that evoked this concern included several that did not involve express questioning. For example, one of the practices discussed *574 in Miranda was the use of line-ups in which a coached witness would pick the defendant as the perpetrator. This was designed to establish that the defendant was in fact guilty as a predicate for further interrogation. Id., at 453 [86 S. Ct. at 1602]. A variation on this theme discussed in Miranda was the so-called "reverse line-up" in which a defendant would be identified by coached witnesses as the perpetrator of a fictitious crime, with the object of inducing him to confess to the actual crime of which he was suspected in order to escape the false prosecution. Ibid. The Court in Miranda also included in its survey of interrogation practices the use of psychological ploys, such as to "posi[t]" "the guilt of the subject," to "minimize the moral seriousness of the offense," and "to cast blame on the victim or on society." Id., at 450 [86 S. Ct. at 1615]. It is clear that these techniques of persuasion, no less than express questioning, were thought, in a custodial setting, to amount to interrogation. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-302, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1688-1690, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980). In Innis, the Court also noted: Id. at 301-02 n. 7, 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n. 7. The Innis Court further noted: Id. at 302 n. 8, 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n. 8. Finally, the Court, in Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, concluded that there was no interrogation within the meaning of Miranda because the police had not subjected Innis to the "functional equivalent" of express questioning. According to the U.S. Supreme Court: Id. at 303, 100 S. Ct. at 1691. Therefore, as concluded in Innis, supra, the Miranda warning is required before a defendant's custodial statement, as the product of express questioning or its functional equivalent, is constitutionally admissible as evidence against the defendant. As we interpret Innis, supra, to determine whether there is interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, an objective standard is applied: Would a reasonable and disinterested person conclude that police conduct, directed to a suspect or defendant in custody, would likely elicit an incriminating response from that suspect or defendant? See 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.7 (1984). If the answer is "yes," there is interrogation requiring the Miranda warning before a defendant's incriminating response is constitutionally admissible as evidence against the defendant. According to Innis, some factors which may be considered in determining whether there has been interrogation within the meaning of Miranda are a police practice designed to elicit an accused's incriminating response and a defendant's susceptibility to respond to a particular persuasion. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, has been applied in decisions of this court to determine whether a defendant's oral statement was the product of the "functional equivalent" of custodial interrogation by police. See, State v. Whitmore, 221 Neb. 450, 378 N.W.2d 150 (1985): officer's question about ownership of keys found in room where defendant was present was a neutral question, resulting in a spontaneous reaction; State v. Taylor, 221 Neb. 114, 115, 375 N.W.2d 610, 612 (1985): during a booking procedure, the defendant's volunteered statement, "`It can't get much worse than this'" was not the product of interrogation; State v. Parsons, 213 Neb. 349, 328 N.W.2d 795 (1983): without interrogation, the defendant admitted he was responsible for the marijuana which was the subject of a criminal charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; In re Interest of Durand. State v. Durand, 206 Neb. 415, 420, 293 N.W.2d 383, 386 (1980): showing a defendant police reports of unsolved burglaries, after the defendant had asserted his right to remain silent and terminated conversation with police, was "the functional equivalent of questioning" which produced defendant's self-incriminating statement. In addition to application of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980), to determine whether a suspect or defendant was subjected to the "functional equivalent" of custodial interrogation, this court has also held that a *576 "spontaneously volunteered statement" of a suspect or defendant is admissible in the absence of the Miranda warning. State v. Red Feather, 205 Neb. 734, 738, 289 N.W.2d 768, 771 (1980). See, also, State v. Taylor, supra ("`Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence,'" 221 Neb. at 116, 375 N.W.2d at 612-13). In Gibson's case, Officer Briese's remark, "Oh, look what I found," was not express questioning of Gibson. However, we must now determine whether Officer Briese's remark was conduct directed to Gibson, which the officer should have known was likely to evoke an incriminating response from Gibson. See Rhode Island v. Innis, supra. In State v. Finehout, 136 Ariz. 226, 665 P.2d 570 (1983), police detectives repeatedly urged the defendant, who had refused to talk to the detectives, to tell the truth, and appealed for the defendant's honesty through their remarks, such as "`it's just better to tell the truth and get out in the open.'" Id. at 230, 665 P.2d at 574. The Arizona Supreme Court determined that "the detectives' repeated urging of the defendant to tell the truth was, under the circumstances, interrogation because the detectives should have known that their appeals for honesty were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. United States v. Suggs, 755 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.1985), involved an incriminating statement made when Suggs was shown a copy of the indictment charging him with falsifying travel vouchers and responded: "`[H]ell, everybody cheats on their travel vouchers,'" and "'[E]verybody falsifies their travel vouchers.'" Id. at 1541. In finding that Suggs' statements were constitutionally admissible evidence, the court stated: "[T]he evidence reasonably supports the trial court's finding that defendant's comment was a spontaneous exclamation not prompted by any questioning. The trial court apparently found that Suggs made the statement not as a result of any Government probing, but spontaneously after he was shown his indictment." Id. at 1541-42. In People v. Benjamin, 101 Mich.App. 637, 300 N.W.2d 661 (1980), officers were investigating a shoplifting charge against Benjamin and found a "razor knife and a jackknife" in Benjamin's purse. Id. at 641, 300 N.W.2d at 663. When a deputy sheriff, Purucker, removed the knives from the purse and showed Benjamin the knives, Benjamin said: "`I carry them when I'm walking down Frances Street, never know when I might need them'." Id. at 642, 300 N.W.2d at 663. Benjamin had not been given the Miranda warning before she made the statement about the knives. Benjamin was charged and convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. Referring to Rhode Island v. Innis, the court concluded that Benjamin's statement regarding the knives was not a response to the "functional equivalent" of interrogation and stated: (Emphasis in original.) 101 Mich.App. at 649, 300 N.W.2d at 667. In Benjamin, the court also noted, id. at n. 4: In State v. Grisby, 97 Wash. 2d 493, 647 P.2d 6 (1982), Grisby and his eventual codefendant, Frazier, were implicated in a criminal homicide. Police arrested Frazier, who, having been given the Miranda warning, *577 refused to talk to the police. While a detective was placing a clear plastic bag of money on a table in Frazier's view, Frazier asked the detective what he was doing with the money. When the detective responded that he was going to place the bag of money with other evidence regarding the homicide investigation, Frazier spontaneously said: Id. at 504, 647 P.2d at 12-13. In holding that Frazier's statements did not violate the "Miranda rights," the Supreme Court of Washington stated: 97 Wash. 2d at 504-05, 647 P.2d at 13. In the light of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980), and the decisions mentioned from other jurisdictions, we find that Gibson's statement, made when he saw the revolver displayed by Officer Briese, is constitutionally admissible evidence. Officers went to Eagle Feather's residence to search for contraband or illicit controlled substances and other items related to illegal use or trafficking in controlled substances. The district court may have concluded that Officer Briese's remark was a precautionary measure to alert officers about the possible presence of other firearms on the premises and accessible to Gibson or Eagle Feather, especially since the officers were still in the process of their search. As such measure, Officer Briese's remark was not directed to Gibson. Mere display of the discovered revolver cannot be categorically characterized as "[a] practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect...." Rhode Island v. Innis, supra at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1690. Although Gibson's statement in response to the discovered and displayed revolver may be on the cutting edge of immeasurable imprudence, Gibson's statement was not the product of interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. Rather, Gibson made a spontaneously volunteered statement, "That's my gun," a totally unsolicited and unexpected response under the circumstances. "[S]ince the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." (Emphasis in original.) Rhode Island v. Innis, supra at 301-02, 100 S. Ct. at 1690. Police conduct which results in an unforeseeable or volunteered response by a defendant is not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, requiring the Miranda warning before that response is constitutionally *578 admissible as evidence against the defendant. Most assuredly, Gibson's response to the discovery and display of the revolver was relevant evidence at Gibson's trial. See Neb.Evid.R. 401 (relevant evidence, defined) (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1985)). The district court was correct in overruling Gibson's suppression motion and in admitting Gibson's statement as evidence in Gibson's trial. AFFIRMED.