Title: Com. v. Sims

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

379 Pa. Superior Ct. 252 (1988) 549 A.2d 1280 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Dennis (Africa) SIMS, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted August 29, 1988. Filed October 19, 1988. *253 Brian R. Williams, Philadelphia, for appellant. Donna G. Zucker, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Com., appellee. Before OLSZEWSKI, KELLY and HESTER, JJ. OLSZEWSKI, Judge: This is an appeal from an order denying relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act ("PCHA"). Appellant asserts that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the court never ascertained that appellant was not a minor at the time of trial and, (2) that stand-by counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no merit to appellant's contentions, we affirm. As a result of his participation in a confrontation between police and MOVE members in Philadelphia on May 20, 1977, appellant was convicted by jury of riot, criminal conspiracy, terroristic threats, and possession of a prohibited weapon. Following the denial of post-trial motions, the trial court sentenced appellant to concurrent sentences of twenty-six months to seven years for the criminal conspiracy and riot charges and one to five years for the weapon and terroristic threats charges, to run concurrent with the previous sentences. This Court affirmed the judgement of sentence in an unpublished memorandum. Commonwealth v. Africa, 339 Pa.Super. 612, 488 A.2d 1161 (1984). On June 6, 1985, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied appellant's petition for allowance of appeal. Appellant filed a pro se PCHA petition on May 7, 1987. Appointed counsel, on December 1, 1987, submitted a "no merit" letter to the PCHA court. After undertaking independent review of the record, the PCHA court dismissed appellant's petition. This appeal followed. Appellant contends that the trial court did not determine appellant's age and, therefore, did not have jurisdiction over *254 the case. During the colloquy regarding appellant's ability to proceed pro se, the following exchange transpired: Transcript at 2.4-2.5. We have decided that non-age is not a matter of jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Harris, 223 Pa.Super. 11, 297 A.2d 154 (1972). Our opinion in Harris is instructive in resolving the instant complaint:[1] Id., 223 Pa.Superior Ct. at 11-12, 297 A.2d 154 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Non-age, then, does not deprive a court of jurisdiction over a juvenile. Rather, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6321(a), contained in the Juvenile Act which governs juvenile matters, imposes a duty upon the trial court to transfer the case to juvenile court "if it appears to the court . . . that the defendant is a child." Instantly, the court determined that appellant appeared to be over 21 years of age. Moreover, appellant refused to divulge his age to the court. In addition, the Juvenile Act provided appellant the opportunity to request that his case be transferred to juvenile court and appellant failed to avail himself of this opportunity prior to prosecution. Id. at § 6355. Therefore, he cannot now offer proof of his age nor complain that the court acted improperly by not transferring the matter to juvenile court. See Harris. Appellant further attempts to blame stand-by counsel for not objecting to the trial court's failure to transfer. The record reflects, however, that appellant chose to proceed pro se: Transcript at 2.5-2.9; 2.20. Our decision in Commonwealth v. Glessner, 337 Pa.Super. 140, 486 A.2d 521 (1985), governs appellant's attempt to invoke the ineffectiveness of stand-by counsel: Id., 337 Pa.Superior Ct. at 146-48, 486 A.2d at 524-25. We, therefore, refuse to address appellant's assertion that stand-by counsel was ineffective. Appellant cannot shift the responsibility for his own performance to stand-by counsel, "who occupied only an advisory role." Id., 337 Pa.Superior Ct. at 148, 486 A.2d at 525, citing Commonwealth v. Celijewski, 324 Pa.Super. 185, 190, 471 A.2d 525, 528 (1984). The order of the PCHA court is affirmed. [1] We acknowledge that the Court in Harris quotes 11 P.S. § 256, which has been repealed. We note, however, that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 et seq., which governs juvenile matters, contains a similar provision as that quoted by the Harris court: [I]f it appears to the court in a criminal proceeding other than murder, that the defendant is a child, this chapter shall immediately become applicable, and the court shall forthwith halt further criminal proceedings, and, where appropriate, transfer the case to the division or judge of the court assigned to conduct juvenile hearings.. . . 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a). A child is defined as an individual who is under the age of 18 years. Id. at 6302(1). This difference does not affect the rule that we garner from Harris.