Title: In re Child of Rebecca R.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 165 
Docket: 
Yor-19-213 
Submitted 
On Briefs: November 21, 2019 
 
Decided: 
December 12, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF REBECCA R. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  A mother and father appeal from a judgment of the District Court 
(Biddeford, Duddy, J.) terminating their parental rights to their child pursuant 
to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(a), (B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv) (2018).  The 
parents contend that the court erred in finding by clear and convincing 
evidence that each of them is unfit.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii), (iv).  
The mother additionally contends that the court violated her constitutional 
rights to due process and equal protection by terminating her parental rights 
“based solely on [her] economic status.”  The father separately contends that 
the court erred in (1) finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination 
was in the child’s best interest, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a); (2) declining 
to allow a witness who testified at the hearing to testify as an expert; and 
 
2 
(3) failing to accommodate his disability at the hearing.  We affirm the 
judgment.1 
A. 
Unfitness and Best Interest Findings 
 
[¶2]  The court made its unfitness findings, as well as its finding that 
termination was in the child’s best interest, based on competent evidence in the 
record.  “We review the court’s factual findings supporting its determination of 
parental unfitness and best interest[] of the child[] for clear error, and review 
its ultimate conclusion that termination is in the best interest[] of the child[] for 
an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, 
through the trial court’s lens, and giving the court’s judgment substantial 
deference.”  In re Children of Jessica D., 2019 ME 70, ¶ 4, 208 A.3d 363 (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
[¶3]  The court’s supported, thorough factual findings underlying its 
unfitness and best interest determinations include the following: 
 
This is a deeply frustrating and somewhat odd case.  [The 
father and mother] are the biological parents of [the three-year-old 
child].  [The child’s] parents do not suffer from domestic violence or 
substance use disorder.  Jeopardy in this case should have been 
easily rectifiable.  Instead, over the course of nearly three years [the 
father and mother] selfishly elevated their own lifestyle choices over 
the needs of [the child], stubbornly refused to engage in key aspects 
                                         
1  We also affirm, without further discussion, the trial court’s order denying the mother’s 
M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from the judgment.  We previously ordered that the mother’s 
appeal from that order be consolidated with this matter. 
 
3 
of the reunification plan, and persistently failed to alleviate lack of 
safe and stable housing, which was a critical element of jeopardy.  As 
a result of their actions, [the child] has remained in foster care for 
most of her young life. . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
. . . The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
Department has made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify 
the family, and has made reasonable efforts to identify and pursue 
an alternative permanency plan. . . . 
 
 
The Court finds the following facts by clear and convincing 
evidence. . . . Within days of [the child’s] birth, [hospital] staff 
reported concerns regarding [the child’s] parents to the Department 
due to the mother’s untreated mental health and difficulty managing 
[the child’s] care, and the father’s lack of engagement with the infant.  
As a result, the Department opened an assessment of the family.  
[The child] was discharged from [the hospital] . . . to the care of her 
parents with a Department Safety Plan in place requiring the mother 
be supervised at all times with [the child]. 
 
 
[Eight months later], another report was made to the 
Department with concerns for [the child] and her parents.  [The 
parents] had left [the] eight month old [child] in the care of two 
individuals they had just met at a grocery store.  These two 
individuals were not safe or appropriate caregivers for [the child].  
One of the individuals had significant cognitive limitations.  The 
other individual had child protective history and had lost the 
custody of her own children.  [The parents] left [the child] in their 
care for approximately one month, allegedly because where they 
were living had become infested with bed bugs.  Neither [parent] 
recognized the risk of their judgment and decision to leave [the 
child] with these individuals. 
 
 
The Department requested and received an Order of 
Preliminary Child Protection granting custody of [the child] to the 
Department . . . . A Jeopardy Order as to both parents was [later] 
 
4 
entered by agreement of the parties . . . with custody of [the child] 
remaining with the Department.  By this point, [the parents] had 
been evicted from their housing and were homeless. . . . 
 
 
 
The Jeopardy Order set forth several required steps . . . .  Both 
parents were required to participate in parenting education.  [The 
mother] was required to consistently engage in mental health 
treatment and follow recommendations.  [The father] was to 
participate in a mental health evaluation and follow the resulting 
recommendations.  [The parents] for the most part complied with 
these requirements.  However, both parents were also required to 
establish and maintain safe, stable housing suitable for family 
reunification.  Toward this end, the parents were required to notify 
the Department and Guardian Ad Litem of any changes in the 
composition of their household, since one of the grounds for 
jeopardy was the parents’ inability to recognize safe and 
appropriate caregivers for [the child].  [The parents] failed to satisfy 
these requirements. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
 
[The parents] initially participated in joint supervised visits 
through Home Counselors, Inc. (HCI) with [the child].  However, it 
soon became clear that [the father] was unable to participate 
meaningfully in morning visits with [the child].  This was the first 
indication the Department had that something was seriously amiss 
with [the father]. . . . The visit supervisor reported safety concerns 
due to [the father’s] inability to care for [the child].  [The mother] 
did not appear to recognize the risk posed by [the father].  Both 
parents reported that [the father’s] dysfunction was due to his sleep 
schedule and that he was up most of the night and slept during the 
day.  The visits were suspended in order to have a Family Team 
Meeting to address the visit supervisor’s concerns. . . . [T]he issues 
created by [the father’s] self-imposed total and shocking inability to 
function throughout the morning and into the early afternoon—
enabled by [the mother]— . . . became a major concern as the case 
moved along. 
 
 
 
5 
 
As of May 2017, the parents had failed to make sufficient 
progress toward reunification and the Department filed a Petition 
for Termination of Parental Rights.  Both parents had started mental 
health services, but neither parent could acknowledge the reasons 
why [the child] had come into foster care or acknowledge the risk of 
[the father’s] behavior at visits.  The parents had yet to participate 
in parenting education.  The parents were residing in a home 
provided by their Church but the caseworker was receiving reports 
of unsafe individuals being in the home.  Despite filing the Petition, 
the Department continued with the concurrent plan of reunification. 
 
 
 
In the summer of 2017, the visit supervisor continued to 
report [the father’s] inability to participate appropriately in 
morning visits. . . . [T]he caseworker . . . observed a supervised visit 
with [the father] while [the mother] was absent due to illness.  [The 
father] was thoroughly nonfunctional during the visit and unable to 
parent [the child]. . . . [The father] continued to be unable to function 
or interact with [the child] at morning sessions.  His behavior during 
morning sessions did not reflect someone who was merely tired 
from staying up late, but was extreme, disturbing and frightful.  
[Footnote omitted.]  [The father] needed support to even stand and 
walk.  [The social worker] reported that [the child] continued to be 
afraid of her father.   
 
 
. . . . 
 
  
 
. . . [T]he Department agreed to pay for a sleep consultation for 
[the father] as the parents maintained that [the father] suffered from 
a sleep disorder.   
 
 
[The father] participated in a sleep consultation with 
[a neurologist]. . . . [The neurologist] diagnosed [the father] with a 
“circadian shift condition,” an easily curable sleep pattern akin to jet 
lag.  Circadian shift condition can be corrected in as little as four to 
five days, or gradually over two to three weeks. . . . According to [the 
neurologist], [the father] could easily correct his circadian rhythm, 
and make it consistent with a conventional nighttime sleep pattern, 
if he wanted to.  However, [the father] reported that he was content 
 
6 
with his sleep pattern, and was not interested in changing it. . . . The 
Court accepts [the neurologist’s] testimony in all respects, and finds 
as a matter of fact the narrative set forth above. 
 
 
[The neurologist] recommended a follow-up visit with his 
office and possible mental health counseling.  [The father] refused to 
comply with the recommendations. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
The Department caseworker . . . went to observe the parents’ 
home in late June 2018 . . . . [The caseworker] observed the home to 
be in an unsafe and chaotic condition with boxes piled high and 
clutter covering all surfaces.  For the first time, [the mother] 
informed [the caseworker] that there were two roommates living in 
the home.  In April 2018, [the mother] had inexplicably invited two 
unknown individuals . . . to move into the home.  [The parents] did 
not know the individuals beforehand, and [the mother] had only just 
met the individuals when she invited them to live with her and [the 
father].  Neither [parent] had reported the housing change as 
required by the Jeopardy Order and reunification plans.  [The 
mother] learned soon thereafter that [one of the roommates] had 
child protective involvement regarding her own children and that 
[the other] had criminal history and neither individual was a safe or 
appropriate roommate. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
The parents appeared at Court for a Judicial Review in 
August 2018. [The father] could not walk independently or function 
in Court, due to his lack of a normal sleep cycle.  [The father] had not 
participated in any follow-up services to address his sleep pattern.  
The parents had made no progress toward in-home visits or trial 
placements due to the decisions made by [the mother] and the 
parents’ inability to rectify the home situation. It was approaching 
two years since [the child] came into the custody of the Department. 
With the support of the Guardian Ad Litem, the Department re-filed 
the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights . . . . 
 
7 
 
 
. . . The condition of the home through the summer and fall of 
2018 deteriorated.  The relationship with the roommates also 
deteriorated and resulted in destruction of personal property and 
police involvement.  The roommates refused to leave the home, and 
became belligerent.  [The father] was of little to no use because of 
his sleep pattern.  He ultimately disengaged from the situation and 
stayed out of the home.  [The mother] was left to try to manage the 
home situation, which she was not able to do.  Ultimately, [their 
pastor] had to evict the roommates, but that did not occur until 
November 2018.  [The mother] conceded that the home was not safe 
for [the child] to visit or reside in between April 2018 and late 
November 2018. 
  
 
In addition to [the two roommates], [the parents] inexplicably 
continued to allow a series of other, unsafe individuals to reside in 
their home for varying lengths of time. . . . 
 
 
Of signal importance, [the] Pastor . . . told [the father] 
sometime in July or August 2018, that he was facing foreclosure on 
the house they were living in.  He explained that . . . they needed to 
find new housing, since they would not be able to stay in the house 
indefinitely, and they might need to move out in a matter of months.  
[The parents] claim they renewed their applications for low-income 
or subsidized housing, but had no success. 
 
 
[The parents] were unable to secure housing by paying rent 
on their own, because their respective decisions not to work or to be 
underemployed left them essentially impoverished. But this 
inability to pay rent was self-inflicted, not the result of external 
factors or poverty.  From the first Rehabilitation/Reunification 
Plans, [the parents] were instructed to establish safe and 
stable housing, and to prove financial self-sufficiency through 
employment, disability, or some other alternative means of income.  
During the case, [the mother] stabilized her mental health issues and 
became consistent with her medication management, and was thus 
mentally and physically able to work.  She has no disability 
preventing her from working, and during the case she has had no 
 
8 
child at home to care for.  Nevertheless, she chose not to work to 
earn income.  At trial, she claimed that she is a full time student at an 
online university, and thus has no time to work.  The Court is not 
persuaded by the testimony, but even if true, [the mother’s] 
imprudent decision to forego employment and income during this 
critical phase of [the child’s] life . . . was a significant contributor to 
[the mother] failing to secure safe and stable housing for [the child]. 
  
 
As to [the father], his choice to maintain an unorthodox sleep 
pattern meant that during the case he only worked part-time, low 
paying, late night jobs that did not interfere with his lifestyle.  He 
worked only 20-25 hours per week, and did not earn enough income 
to be able to afford paying a commercially reasonable rent.  But [the 
father] has no disability, and there is no reason why he could not 
work a decent-paying, full-time job. He just does not want to, 
because it would require him to change his sleep lifestyle.  His 
decision in this regard, coupled with [the mother’s] decision not to 
work at all, means that for the life of the case he has failed to secure 
safe and stable housing for [the child], even though there is no 
reason why he could not provide an appropriate home for her if he 
was willing to do so. 
 
 
As of the date of the last trial day . . . [the parents] had been 
officially evicted from the Pastor’s former house in which they had 
been living.  [The mother] testified that her plan was to stay with a 
friend who had child protection involvement.  [The mother] 
acknowledged that it would not be a safe and appropriate 
environment for [the child] to live [in] or visit, and that [the father] 
was not welcome there.  [The mother] claimed she had a back-up 
opportunity that would be safe for [the child], but [she] was not 
pursing it.  [The father] had no housing plan at all.  So as the trial 
ended, both parents were homeless, unemployed or underemployed 
due to their own choices, without safe and stable housing, and with 
no plans whatsoever for obtaining safe and stable housing.  Neither 
parent was or is willing to change their lifestyle so as to care for [the 
child].  Entirely due to their own lifestyle choices, [the parents] have 
made no progress on safe and stable housing for the two and a half 
years since the case began. 
 
9 
 
 
As of the date of the last hearing . . . [the child] had been in the 
care of the Department for two and [a] half years.  [The child has] 
turned three . . . . Since coming into care . . . and thus for the majority 
of her life, [the child] has lived in the home of [the foster parents]. . . . 
[The foster parents] have provided safe and stable housing for [the 
child].  They have also provided consistent and loving care for [the 
child] and have met all of her needs. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
. . . [T]he Department has provided clear and convincing 
evidence, based on three out of the four termination grounds, that 
[the parents] are unfit . . . . These grounds include 1) an inability or 
unwillingness to protect the child from jeopardy within a time 
reasonably calculated to meet her needs; 2) an inability or 
unwillingness to take responsibility for the child within a time 
reasonably calculated to meet her needs; and 3) failure of the 
parents to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with 
the child.  [22 M.R.S. §] 4055(1)(B)(2)[(b)](i), (ii) & (iv). 
 
 
. . . [T]he Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
termination of parental rights is in the best interest of [the child]. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
This is not a case about poverty; it is a case about the parents’ 
deliberate choices to put their own lifestyle preferences first, and 
disregard the needs of [the child]. . . . Under the circumstances, the 
Court is unwilling to provide the parents additional time. . . . This 
termination hearing was concluded two and [a] half year[s] after 
[the child] entered foster care. No more time is available for 
reunification because “once a child has been placed in foster care, 
a statutory clock begins ticking. In setting that clock, the 
Legislature has spoken in terms of days and months, rather than in 
years, as might better fit an adult’s timeframe for permanent 
change.” 
 
 
10 
The Court finds that due to the selfish and ill-considered 
actions of her parents, [the child] has been forced to wait far too 
long and needs permanency now.   She has been in a safe and stable 
placement that she considers home for two and [a] half years.  She 
has thrived in the placement.  The [foster parents] are willing to 
adopt her and [they] consider her a part of their family. 
 
(Citation omitted.) 
 
 
[¶4]  We discern no clear error or abuse of discretion in the court’s 
findings or analysis.  See In re Children of Jessica D., 2019 ME 70, ¶ 4, 
208 A.3d 363. 
B. 
Mother’s Constitutional Claims 
 
[¶5]  Beyond her unavailing argument that the court’s unfitness finding 
was not supported by sufficient evidence, the mother asserts that her 
constitutional substantive due process and equal protection rights were 
violated when the court “terminated her parental rights based solely on her 
financial status, specifically her ability to finance a home.” 
 
[¶6]  “Before we reach directly any constitutional issue, prudent 
appellate review requires that we first determine whether the issue may be 
resolved on a basis that does not implicate the constitution.”  In re 
Christopher H., 2011 ME 13, ¶ 18, 12 A.3d 64 (quotation marks omitted).  As set 
out above, the court based its finding that the mother was unfit on considerably 
more than the bare fact that she was unable to afford housing; the court was 
 
11 
primarily concerned with why she was unable to afford housing, namely her 
unwillingness to change her lifestyle for the child’s benefit in order to do so.  
Furthermore, the court made extensive findings concerning the mother’s 
choice to allow unsafe people access to the family home, a significant factor 
unrelated to financial issues, and it found the mother’s testimony to the 
contrary to be not credible. 
 
[¶7]  Given the supported factual findings underlying the court’s 
unfitness determination, and given the court’s explicit affirmation that “[t]his is 
not a case about poverty,” we need not and do not reach the mother’s 
constitutional argument because it is grounded in a faulty premise.  See id. 
C. 
Expert Testimony 
 
[¶8]  The parents’ pastor testified at the hearing concerning his 
relationship with the parents as their pastor; their landlord; and, for a period 
of five weeks, their couples counselor.  The father contends that the trial court 
erred in declining to allow the pastor to testify as an expert concerning the 
parents’ counseling, although the pastor was permitted to testify as a fact 
witness regarding the topics that he discussed with them.  We disagree. 
 
[¶9]  Maine Rule of Evidence 702 provides that “[a] witness who is 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 
 
12 
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if such testimony will help 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  
“Expert testimony can be relevant only if it is reliable . . . .”  State v. Burbank, 
2019 ME 37, ¶ 8, 204 A.3d 851. 
 
[¶10]  Ordinarily we review a court’s ruling concerning the admissibility 
of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion.  Id. ¶ 7.  Here, however, following 
the court’s sua sponte ruling that the pastor would not be permitted to testify 
as an expert concerning the theoretical underpinnings of the program that he 
used with the parents, the father’s attorney advised the court, 
Your Honor, I will clarify.  I’m not asking and I haven’t been asking 
for him to be offered as an expert into [sic] marriage counseling. . . . 
I’ve been trying to get from him . . . what he was asked to do from 
everybody’s perspective, and . . . what they worked on. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Accordingly, because this contention was not raised before 
the trial court, our review is for obvious error.  See Maietta v. Int’l Harvester Co., 
496 A.2d 286, 294 (Me. 1985) (“[D]efense counsel failed to preserve the 
objection that is now being pressed.  The difference in testimony does not rise 
to the level of obvious error affecting substantial rights.”). 
 
[¶11]  The parents’ pastor testified that he did not have a professional 
degree in counseling or any college coursework completed in that subject, 
although he did have related experience working as an “understudy” to another 
 
13 
pastor.  On this record, the court did not obviously err in finding that the pastor 
“lacked the qualifications necessary to offer an opinion” concerning the 
parents’ counseling and limiting the pastor’s testimony to a factual recitation of 
their work together.  Burbank, 2019 ME 37, ¶ 10, 204 A.3d 851. 
D. 
Father’s Asserted Disability 
 
[¶12]  As evidenced in the court’s factual findings, the father’s sleep 
pattern was a significant issue at the hearing.  The court took note of the father’s 
physical condition during the hearing several times and found in its judgment 
that 
[the father’s] presentation at trial, which the Court noted on the 
record from time to time, amply corroborated witness testimony 
about his disconcerting appearance and behavior whenever he was 
required to awake before early afternoon.  At trial, [the father] did 
not just appear tired like someone who had worked a night shift.  
[The father] was barely able to stand at the “All Rise,” and had to 
support himself from falling over.  He moved in slow motion.  He 
sat slumped in his chair.  His eyes were frequently shut, rolling in 
his head, or staring vacantly.  His own testimony was confused and 
forgetful.  He sometimes shook and trembled while he sat at 
counsel table.  He looked pale and unwell at all times.  On the 
morning of the last day of trial, the Court commented on the record 
that [the father] looked particularly unwell.  [The father’s] counsel 
objected to the Court putting its observation on the record.  By 
afternoon, however, counsel advised the Court on the record that 
[the father’s] mother had taken him to the hospital.  The Court finds 
as a matter of fact, based on the witness testimony and evidence 
adduced at trial, corroborated by the Court’s observations over 
several days of trial commencing at various times of day, that [the 
 
14 
father’s] voluntarily chosen sleep pattern leaves him unable to 
function on any day in which he is required to wake up before early 
afternoon. 
 
 
[¶13]  The father now contends that the court violated the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 12101-12213 (LEXIS through 
Pub. L. No. 116-72), and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), 5 M.R.S. 
§§ 4551-4634 (2018),2 in viewing his sleep pattern as a correctable lifestyle 
choice rather than as a disability requiring accommodation.  Although the 
father objected at the hearing to the court’s comments concerning his in-court 
presentation, he did not request an accommodation under the ADA or MHRA 
and thus failed to preserve the issue for appeal.  See Gallagher v. Penobscot Cmty. 
Healthcare, 2019 ME 88, ¶ 6 n.2, 209 A.3d 106; Newbury v. Virgin, 2002 ME 119, 
¶ 14, 802 A.2d 413; see also Blackhouse v. Doe, 2011 ME 86, ¶ 8, 24 A.3d 72 (“An 
individual with a disability may request special accommodations to ensure an 
equal opportunity to participate in a court proceeding.”). 
 
[¶14]  Even if the father had preserved this argument, the trial court had 
ample evidence on which to find that his sleep pattern was not a disability, but 
rather a lifestyle choice.  The neurologist who examined the father and 
conducted a sleep evaluation testified that the neurologic exam revealed no 
                                         
2  The Maine Human Rights Act has since been amended, but those amendments are not relevant 
to this appeal.  P.L. 2019, ch. 464-465 (effective Sept. 19, 2019). 
 
15 
physical problems; that there was no suggestion of disease or a sleep disorder 
requiring further investigation; and that if the father chose to do so, his sleep 
pattern could be gradually changed over the course of “a couple of weeks.”  
Accordingly, the court’s factual finding that the father’s “unorthodox sleep 
pattern” was a “choice” and not a disability was not clearly erroneous.  See 
In re Children of Jessica D., 2019 ME 70, ¶ 4, 208 A.3d 363. 
The entry is: 
Judgment and order denying relief from the 
judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Amy McNally, Esq., Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A., 
Biddeford, for appellant mother 
 
James S. Hewes, Esq., South Portland, for appellant father 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number PC-2016-48 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY