Title: Reese v. Board of Directors of Memorial Hosp. of Laramie County,

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Reese v. Board of Directors of Memorial Hosp. of Laramie County,1998 WY 22955 P.2d 425Case Number: 97-179Decided: 02/26/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Sandra REESE, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

The BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF LARAMIE COUNTY, d/b/a United Medical 
Center,

 Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Keith G. Kautz, J.

Donald J. 
Sullivan, Cheyenne, for Appellant.

George E. 
Powers, Jr., of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, for 
Appellee.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Sandra Reese 
appeals from a jury verdict which found that the Appellee Board of Directors of 
Memorial Hospital of Laramie County, d/b/a United Medical Center (UMC), was not 
negligent during her treatment at the UMC same day surgery 
unit.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant Reese 
submits only one issue for our review:

1. Whether the 
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the rule of res ipsa 
loquitur.

[¶3]      Appellee UMC 
presents the following issues:

1. Did the 
district court abuse its discretion in refusing Plaintiff's instructions on res 
ipsa loquitur due to the failure of Plaintiff's counsel to comply with the 
Court's pretrial order?

2. Did the trial 
court correctly refuse to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
based upon the evidence presented at trial[?]

3. Can the 
Plaintiff demonstrate prejudice as a result of the trial court's refusal to 
instruct on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur[?]

FACTS

[¶4]      On November 11, 
1992, Reese underwent oral surgery and was given a general anesthetic in a UMC 
facility. While Reese was still unconscious under the influence of the general 
anesthesia, she was moved to the recovery room and then to a patient room by 
employees of UMC. Reese was released from the hospital on the same day at 12:40 
p.m. and walked out of the building on her own power.

[¶5]      Approximately one 
month after her oral surgery, Reese visited her personal physician, Dr. Davis, 
who had seen Reese for several years following a ski injury in 1988 which 
resulted in neck fusion surgery in 1989. Dr. Davis examined Reese and had an MRI 
performed on her neck. Because Dr. Davis could not determine the significance of 
the MRI findings during his physical examination of Reese, he referred her to 
Dr. Pettine in Colorado. The MRI showed a disk problem in the C6-C7 area, and 
fusion surgery was performed on January 6, 1993.

[¶6]      Reese filed this 
lawsuit in November of 1994. In her complaint, Reese alleged that the UMC 
employees did not adequately support her head and neck, causing her head to fall 
freely backward with great force and momentum. She also alleged that those acts 
were negligent and did not comport with the applicable standard of 
care.

[¶7]      In the trial 
court's pre-trial conference report and order, the trial court relied on Keller 
v. Anderson, 554 P.2d 1253, 1260 (Wyo. 1976), to determine that "it does not 
appear that the claimed negligence and its causal connection to plaintiff's 
claimed injuries is `within the common knowledge of man,' and res ipsa is 
inapplicable." During the instruction conference after the close of the 
evidence, the trial court found that Reese did not timely file her instructions 
with the court in accordance with the court's pre-trial conference order, and 
summarily rejected all of her proposed instructions. However, the trial court 
allowed Reese to offer her proposed instructions in order to make a complete 
record. Reese offered the pattern jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur. The 
court determined that the case was not appropriate for a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction because evidence had been presented that "you can get a herniated 
disk from turning wrong, sneezing, et cetera." The jury returned a verdict 
finding UMC was not negligent, and judgment was entered in favor of the 
defendant, UMC. This appeal timely followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      Reese complains 
that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to give her 
proffered pattern jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur. The function of jury 
instructions is to give the jury guidance regarding the law applicable to the 
case. DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 186 (Wyo. 1986). The trial court is not 
obligated to give an instruction offered by a party as long as the jury is 
adequately instructed on the law as it pertains to that case. Id. We will not 
reverse a trial court's ruling on an instruction unless it is demonstrated that 
the instruction was necessary to provide the jury with the proper principles of 
law applicable to the case and the proponent of the refused instruction can show 
prejudice. Id.

[¶9]      Our case law 
holds that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is limited to those situations 
where something causes injury, that thing is under the exclusive control of the 
defendant, and the injury is such that, in the ordinary course of things, does 
not occur if one having such control uses proper care. Wood v. Geis Trucking 
Co., 639 P.2d 903, 906 (Wyo. 1982). Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine of limited 
application which allows a plaintiff to recover for negligence even though she 
is unable to point to a specific act of negligence which caused the injury. Id. 
The doctrine is not applied where the circumstances warrant an inference that 
the injury did not result from the negligence of the defendant. Id. at 
906-07.

[¶10]   The doctrine is applied where an 
act or omission was negligent within the common knowledge of man. Keller v. 
Anderson, 554 P.2d 1253, 1260 (Wyo. 1976). However, the doctrine will not be 
applied where the determination of the alleged negligence is not within the 
common knowledge of man. Id. Translated into English, res ipsa loquitur means 
"[t]he thing speaks for itself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (5th ed. 1979). If 
the determination of the alleged negligence does not "speak for itself," or is 
not within the "common knowledge of man," then the plaintiff must establish and 
prove each element of negligence. Keller, 554 P.2d  at 1260-61. The doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur is predicated upon the plaintiff's inability to specify the 
act of negligence which caused her injury, allowing her to rely on the doctrine 
to substitute for specific proof of negligence. Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1164 (Wyo. 1992). If the circumstances or the evidence do not show or 
suggest that the defendant should have superior knowledge, or if the plaintiff 
possesses equal or superior means of explaining the occurrence, the rule may not 
be invoked. Id.

[¶11]   Applying the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur to this case would permit Reese to substitute an inference of 
negligence for direct evidence of the hospital's negligence. Yet Reese argued at 
trial and continues to argue that specific acts of the hospital staff, i.e., 
mishandling her when she was returned to her hospital bed and allowing her head 
to snap back, constituted negligence. Additionally, the doctrine cannot be 
applied when an inference that the injury was due to a cause other than the 
defendant's negligence could be drawn as reasonably as one that it was due to 
his negligence. Id. at 1165. In other words, when the thing does not "speak for 
itself," the doctrine should not be applied. The trial court considered relevant 
testimony that the injury could have been caused by "turning wrong, sneezing, et 
cetera." Because other causes of the injury could be inferred, the fact of the 
injury did not necessarily mean it resulted from some negligent act on the part 
of the hospital. In this situation, res ipsa loquitur could not form the basis 
of Reese's recovery and the instruction was properly 
refused.

CONCLUSION

[¶12]   Res ipsa loquitur should not be 
used to create an inference of negligence where the plaintiff's evidence points 
to specific acts, which are in dispute, and where equal evidence exists to 
support the contention that the defendant was not negligent. In this case, the 
occurrence of the injury did not "speak for itself" nor was it "within the 
common knowledge of man" that the injury must have occurred while Reese was in 
the hospital's care, another disputed issue. The district court did not err when 
it refused to instruct the jury on an inapplicable principle of 
law.

[¶13]   We affirm.