Title: Motor Vehicle Administration v. Smith

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Motor Vehicle Administration v. Megan E. Smith, No. 42, September Term 2017, Opinion 
by Hotten, J.  
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – DUE PROCESS – RIGHTS AFFORDED TO 
DETAINEES – The Court of Appeals held that pursuant to Transportation Article § 16-
205.1 if a person is detained under the suspicion of driving while impaired or intoxicated, 
they by virtue of operating a motor vehicle in the state, the individual has provided implied 
consent permitting the administration of a test for blood alcohol concentration.  
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – DUE PROCESS – RIGHTS AFFORDED TO 
DETAINEES – The Court of Appeals held that Transportation Article § 16-205.1 provides 
to any person suspected of driving while impaired or intoxicated, the right to refuse a breath 
test for blood alcohol concentration, upon proper advisement of the sanctions associated 
with any such refusal.   
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – DUE PROCESS – SUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS – The 
Court of Appeals held that current administrative procedural safeguards adequately protect 
the constitutional rights of individuals detained for suspicion of driving while intoxicated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Saint Mary’s County 
Case No.  18-C-16-001627 
Argued: January 8, 2018  
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 42 
 
September Term, 2017 
 
__________________________________ 
 
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION 
v. 
MEGAN E. SMITH 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
Barbera, C.J., Adkins and Watts, JJ., 
concur. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: April 20, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
This appeal was taken from the review of a decision of the Circuit Court for Saint 
Mary’s County, regarding a decision from Administrative Law Judge John Henderson 
(“ALJ”), that found Respondent, Megan Smith, was coerced into submitting to an alcohol 
breath test required by Md. Code (Repl. Vol. 2012),  § 16-205.11 of the Transportation 
Article, (“TRANSP.”).2  In affirming the ALJ, the circuit court found that there was 
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision that Respondent did not voluntarily 
submit to the testing.  As a result, the Maryland Department of Transportation – Motor 
Vehicle Administration (“MVA”), timely noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals.  The 
MVA presents the following question for our review:  
Did the administrative law judge err in dismissing an Order of Suspension 
for a driver who had a breath alcohol concentration test result of .18 because 
the investigating officer refused to allow her to visit the restroom before 
submitting to alcohol chemical testing, where the officer (1) had reasonable 
grounds to believe that she had been driving while under the influence of 
                                              
1 TRANSP. § 16-205.1 is also known as the “implied consent administrative per se 
law.”  See Motor Vehicle Administration v. Krafft, 452 Md. 589, 591, 158 A.3d 539, 540 
(2017).  
 
2 TRANSP. § 16-205.1(a)(2)provides:    
Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or 
on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is 
deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 
10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a 
test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to 
drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while 
so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of 
one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle 
safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of 
an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title. 
 
 
2 
 
alcohol and (2) fully and correctly advised her of the administrative sanctions 
that could be imposed? 
 
For reasons we shall explain infra, we answer the question in the affirmative, vacate the 
judgment of the circuit court, and remand the case with instructions.  
The administrative hearing adduced the following facts.  On April 19, 2016, Officer 
Christopher Ditoto pulled Respondent over on Great Mills Road, near the intersection of 
Light Westbury Boulevard in Saint Mary’s County, at approximately 2:05 am.  Officer 
Ditoto observed Respondent operating a motor vehicle without her headlights activated.  
During the course of the stop, Officer Ditoto detected a strong odor of alcohol, and asked 
Respondent to exit the vehicle and perform field sobriety tests.  After Respondent failed to 
execute the field sobriety tests in a satisfactory manner, Officer Ditoto detained her under 
the suspicion that she was driving under the influence or while impaired by alcohol and 
transported her to the Maryland State Police barracks.  While at the police barracks, Officer 
Ditoto read the DR-15 form (Advice of Rights) to Respondent,3 which included 
information regarding the nature of the detention, and the sanctions associated with any 
refusal to submit to a chemical test.4  Officer Ditoto read the form to Respondent and 
                                              
3 The DR-15 form outlines several important pieces of information for the suspected 
driver including the possible sanctions associated with varying levels of blood alcohol 
concentration as well as the sanctions for the refusal to take the test, and the right to have 
an administrative hearing among other things. 
 
4 TRANSP. § 16-205.1(b) outlines the applicable sanctions for drivers who produce 
a chemical test result greater than 0.08 or who refuse testing.  The statute provides that a 
test result greater than 0.08 can result in a suspension of the person’s driving privilege for 
180 days for the first offense.  TRANSP. § 16-205.1(b)(1)(i)(5) goes on to provide that 
upon the refusal to submit to chemical testing the person’s driving privilege is suspended 
for 270 days.   
 
3 
 
thereafter she signed it.  Respondent asked no questions but requested to use the restroom 
prior to taking the chemical test, but Officer Ditoto denied the request.  In testifying before 
the ALJ, Officer Ditoto explained why the request was denied stating, “[s]he would not 
have been allowed to use the bathroom until after the [i]ntoximeter.”5  After deciding to 
submit to testing, the subsequent test revealed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.18, more 
than twice the legal limit, of 0.08. 
Administrative Proceedings  
The Office of Administrative Hearings heard the matter on August 31, 2016 and 
November 16, 2016.  On the first day of the hearing, the ALJ considered testimony from 
several witnesses, including Respondent and her parents.  On the second day of the hearing, 
the ALJ considered testimony from Officer Ditoto, who testified that the procedure used 
comported with his statutory duty under COMAR 10.35.02.08G6 and TRANSP. § 16-
205.1.  Additionally the ALJ heard arguments concerning Respondent’s Motion for No 
                                              
 
5 An intoximeter is “[a] non-portable instrument for measuring the alcohol content 
of a person’s breath, especially in cases of suspected drunken driving, usually sited at a 
police 
station.” 
Intoximeter 
definition, 
English 
Oxford 
Dictionary, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/intoximeter, 
archived 
at 
https://perma.cc/WRN4-224Y  
 
6 COMAR 10.35.02.08G provides the method for the administration of alcohol 
chemical testing.  COMAR 10.35.02.08G provides: “(1) For at least 20 minutes before a 
breath sample is taken, an individual may not: (a) Eat or drink; (b) Have any foreign 
substance in the individual’s mouth or respiratory tract; or (c) Smoke.”  The Regulation 
goes on to provide that: “(2) The individual shall be observed and mouth checked.”   
 
 
 
4 
 
Action.7  Respondent advanced several arguments, which included that she suffered from 
Trisomy X syndrome8, a cognitive disorder that severely affected her ability to understand 
the DR-15 form.  Respondent further asserted that she desperately needed to use the 
restroom, and when combined with the effects of her condition, resulted in an inability to 
consider the choices before her.  In support of this argument, Respondent’s father testified 
that Respondent was permanently disabled, and while in some ways self-sufficient, still 
required continued assistance throughout her day-to-day activities.  Respondent presented 
no other evidence to support her cognitive deficit argument, the impact of the alleged 
deficit, or that Officer Ditoto was aware of any alleged deficit.  
  At the conclusion of the evidence, the ALJ rendered several Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and granted Respondent’s Motion for No Action.  Although the ALJ 
determined that Respondent failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that she did not 
understand the DR-15 form, the ALJ found that  Respondent had been coerced by Officer 
                                              
7 A Motion for No Action arises “[i]n an administrative license suspension hearing, 
[and is] a ‘[f]avorable decision’ [and] is defined as a ‘dismissal or no action decision by 
the administrative law judge....’  COMAR 28.03.01.02(B)(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added).  See 
also Leonard R. Stamm, Maryland DUI Law 63 (2008–2009 ed.) (describing a motion for 
‘no action’ as a motion that a driver can make after the MVA has presented its evidence 
and after all evidence has been presented).”  Najafi v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 418 
Md. 164, 168, 12 A.3d 1255, 1257 n.4 (2011).  
 
8 Trisomy X or Triple X syndrome is a disorder that affects females and is 
characterized by the presence of an additional X chromosome.  Triple X definition, 
National Organization for Rare Disorders, https://rarediseases.org/rare-diseases/trisomy-
x/, archived at https://perma.cc/3M88-Q9WC .  The effects and symptoms vary but some 
of the symptoms include speech and language delays as well as learning disabilities.  
 
5 
 
Ditoto’s refusal of her request to use the restroom, which impacted her ability to knowingly 
and voluntarily submit to the alcohol chemical test required under TRANSP. § 16-205.1.  
Circuit Court Hearing 
The MVA sought judicial review to the Circuit Court for Saint Mary’s County 
pursuant to TRANSP. § 12-209(a)(2).9  The circuit court considered arguments during a 
hearing on May 16, 2017.  In its written opinion on June 19, 2017, the court determined 
that the ALJ decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record,  and  that the 
officer’s refusal to allow Respondent to use the restroom constituted a “road block” that 
impacted Respondent’s ability to exercise her statutory rights under TRANSP. §16-205.1.  
See Forman v. Motor Vehicle Administration 332 Md. 201, 215, 630 A.2d 753, 761 (1993).  
Following the circuit court decision, the MVA noted an appeal to this Court pursuant to 
Md. Code (Repl. Vol. 2012), § 12-305 of Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW  
“When this Court reviews a decision of an administrative agency, we take the same 
posture as the circuit court or the intermediate appellate court, and limit our review to the 
agency’s decision.”  Anderson v. Gen. Casualty. Ins. Co., 402 Md. 236, 244, 935 A.2d 746, 
751 (2007) “Where the agency’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, in 
the form either of direct proof or permissible inference, in the record before the agency, an 
appellate court may not substitute its judgment, even on the question of the appropriate 
                                              
9 TRANSP. § 12-209(a)(2) provides: “If the matter concerns the license of an 
individual to drive and the individual is a resident of this State, the aggrieved party may 
appeal to the circuit court for the county in which the individual resides.”   
 
6 
 
inference to be drawn from the evidence, for that of the agency.”  Liberty Nursing Ctr., 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 330 Md. 433, 442, 624 A.2d 941, 945 (1993).  
Stated differently, this Court “reviews an agency decision [to assess] whether there is 
substantial evidence in the record to support the decision and whether the decision is based 
upon an error of law.  Motor Vehicle Administration v. Krafft, 452 Md. 589, 603, 158 A.3d 
539, 547 (2017).  As we have previously stated, “the test for substantial evidence is 
‘whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the 
agency reached[.]’”  Motor Vehicle Administration v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 18, 997 A.2d 768, 
778 (2010).  ).  Further, the “test ‘requires restrained and disciplined judicial judgment so 
as not to interfere with the agency’s factual conclusions[.]’”  Supervisor of Assessments of 
Montgomery County v. Asbury Methodist Home, Inc., 313 Md. 614, 625, 547 A.2d 190, 
195 (1988) (quoting State Insurance Commissioner v. National Bureau of Casualty 
Underwriters, 248 Md. 292, 309, 236 A.2d 282, 292 (1967)). 
“While this standard accords less deference to an agency’s legal conclusions than 
to its fact findings, a reviewing court should give weight to the administrative agency’s 
interpretation and application of the statute that the agency administers.”  Motor Vehicle 
Administration v. Deering, 438 Md. 611, 622, 92 A.3d 495, 502 (2014).  However, when 
the case “involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, 
our Court must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are legally correct under 
a de novo standard of review.”  Nesbit v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 72, 854 
A.2d 879, 883 (2004) (quoting Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 
 
7 
 
(2002)).  As such, we will determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the 
ALJ findings while addressing the application of TRANSP. § 16-205.1 de novo.  
DISCUSSION 
We must consider the sufficiency of the due process afforded to Respondent and 
determine whether the officer’s actions impermissibly induced Respondent to submit to an 
alcohol breath test.  Under TRANSP. § 16-205.1, where an officer determines that 
reasonable grounds exist to believe that a person has been driving or attempting to drive a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far 
impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs 
and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, the officer “shall” detain the 
suspected driver, advise the driver of the possible administrative sanctions associated with 
the offense, and attempt to conduct an alcohol breath test.  TRANSP. § 16-205.1(a)(2) 
further indicates that the operator of a motor vehicle in Maryland is “deemed to have 
consented” to a breath test that measures blood alcohol concentration if the person should 
be detained on presumption of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of 
alcohol.  The MVA asserts that Respondent was advised of her statutory rights as required 
by TRANSP. § 16-205.1, and that Officer Ditoto’s handling of Respondent was in 
accordance with COMAR 10.35.02.08G.  In that regard, the MVA argued that Officer 
Ditoto’s conduct was not coercive but related to his obligation to ensure the integrity of 
any examination.  See COMAR 10.35.02.08G.  For the reasons discussed infra, we find 
that the officers’ actions did not violate Respondent’s due process rights and that the ALJ’s 
determination was erroneous.  
 
8 
 
 
The issue before us relates to the due process afforded to individuals detained on 
suspicion of drunk driving.  To establish a due process violation, one must demonstrate the 
deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest.  See Town of La Plata v. Faison-
Rosewick LLC, 434 Md. 496, 526, 76 A.3d 1001, 1019 (2013).  The inquiry begins with 
the determination of the specific interest involved in the challenge, followed by an 
examination of the sufficiency of the process afforded to the individual.  This analysis 
requires us to evaluate three factors articulated by this Court in, In re Ryan W., 434 Md. 
577, 609, 76 A.3d 1049, 1068 (2013).  In Ryan, the Court compared the potential risk for 
deprivation against the procedure employed in order to ascertain the individual risk level.  
We subsequently determined that where the risk of deprivation is substantial, and the 
procedure in place minimal, a due process violation exists.  In determining the risk the 
Ryan court articulated the following factors which aid in the evaluation of risk: “[1] the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action; [2] the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3] the Government’s interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”  Id.  Ultimately, “[i]n determining what 
process is due, this Court will balance both the government interests and the private 
interests affected.”  Id.  Finally, when evaluating the invocation or waiver of a due process 
right, the inquiry turns on whether the invocation or waiver was made knowingly and 
voluntarily.  As we will demonstrate, the procedure afforded to Respondent did not violate 
due process, and her decision to submit to chemical testing was voluntary.  
 
9 
 
 
During the administrative hearing, Respondent asserted that Officer Ditoto violated 
her due process rights in refusing her request to use the restroom until she decided whether 
to take the test, thereby influencing whether she should submit to testing.  In support, 
Respondent alleged that she suffered from cognitive delays that affected her understanding 
of the DR-15 form, exacerbated when Officer Ditoto refused her request to use the 
restroom.  As such, Respondent perceived that her only option was to submit to testing in 
order to use the restroom.  Although the ALJ noted that Respondent might suffer from 
Triple X syndrome, which could affect cognitive development, Respondent presented no 
evidence regarding the condition or its severity, nor did she establish any impairment 
evidencing that the condition affected the advisement or that she failed to understand the 
rights as advised.  The ALJ also noted that the DR-15 form did not confuse Respondent, 
and that Officer Ditoto was not aware of the condition.  Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that 
while Respondent may suffer from the condition, it did not influence her appreciation of 
the rights as advised.  Therefore, we must consider whether the refusal of a request to use 
the restroom constitutes coercive action sufficient to violate a detained driver’s due process 
rights.  To address this question, we must examine factors articulated by this Court in 
Ryan.10 
 
                                              
10 For continuity, the factors will be evaluated out of order because the first and third 
factors are closely related. 
 
 
10 
 
Weighing competing goals: the private interest versus the governmental interest 
 
The first and third factors articulated by the Ryan Court, call for a balance between 
an individual’s interest and any interest held by the government.  Often these interests are 
in opposition, requiring one to yield to the other.  In this case, there are two rights in 
opposition.  On one hand, we have the individual right to due process before the imposition 
of State sanctions.  Meaning, before the state may impose a sanction on a detained driver 
there must be compliance with due process requirements.  See Hare v. Motor Vehicle 
Administration, 326 Md. 296, 301, 604 A.2d 914, 916 (1992) (holding “[t]he continued 
possession of a driver’s license ... may become essential to earning a livelihood; as such, it 
is an entitlement which cannot be taken without the due process mandated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment[]”).  To protect this right there is an explicit advising requirement 
mandating the disclosure of rights prior to the imposition of alcohol breath testing.  See 
TRANSP. § 16-205.1.  In this case, Respondent argued that the refusal of her bathroom 
request infringed upon her ability to decide whether to submit to testing, thereby violating 
her due process rights.  The right to refuse to submit to alcohol testing, however, is not 
absolute, but subject to balancing against the State’s restraint of that interest.   
On the other hand, the State has an equally compelling interest in subjecting 
suspected drivers to alcohol chemical testing.  We have previously articulated that the 
purpose of TRANSP. § 16-205.1 is to ensure the safety of other drivers and have 
consistently maintained the importance of this interest.  See generally Motor Vehicle 
Administration v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255, 923 A.2d 100, 108 (2007) (holding that 
 
11 
 
TRANSP. § 16-205.1 was designed to reduce the incidence[s] of drunk driving and to 
protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol concentration tests); Motor 
Vehicle Administration v. Jones, 380 Md. 164, 178-79, 844 A.2d 388, 396-97 (2004) 
(holding that TRANSP. § 16-205.1 is designed to provide a swift penalty aimed at ensuring 
driver safety, which is separate from any criminal penalties that may be imposed for the 
driving offenses).  
As we have stated, “[e]very state has enacted some form of an implied consent law 
as part of its strategy to combat drunk driving.”  Motor Vehicle Administration v. Krafft, 
452 Md. 589, 592, 158 A.3d 539, 541 (2017).  Additionally, “the statute provides an 
incentive to take the test, at least in terms of the potential administrative sanction.”  Id. at 
594, 158 A.3d at 542.  This process has been limited however because TRANSP. § 16-
205.1 provides that implied consent can be withdrawn.  In determining whether a due 
process violation has occurred, we must evaluate the interest of the respective parties as 
well as the process applied thereto.  If a suspected driver is properly advised, that individual 
is free to refuse alcohol chemical testing.  Since the ALJ found that Officer Ditoto advised 
Respondent, we can safely conclude that her due process rights were protected.  When 
viewed in the context of Ryan, we see that there is a proper balance between the public or 
individual interest and that of the government.  See Ryan W., 434 Md. at 609, 76 A.3d at 
1068 (holding that the Court must weigh the factors to ascertain the sufficiency of the 
process).  
 
 
12 
 
Determining the extent of the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
An evaluation of the second Ryan factor to TRANSP. § 16-205.1 reveals that it 
provides sufficient protections to prevent the erroneous deprivation of constitutional rights.  
This factor requires an evaluation of the process applied with an eye toward the likelihood 
of erroneous deprivation.  In addition, we must evaluate the procedures applied and any 
burdens resulting from additional procedures.  To address this factor, we must examine the 
process applied.  TRANSP. § 16-205.1, in relevant part provides:  
(a)(2) Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a 
highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in 
this State is deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-
302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article, to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving 
or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired 
by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or 
a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not 
drive a vehicle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, 
in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title. 
The plain language of the statute creates a presumption that a person implicitly consents to 
testing when suspected of driving while intoxicated, simply by obtaining licensing in the 
State.  Implied consent is in some ways limited, as the statute states:  
(b)(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person may not 
be compelled to take a test.  However, the detaining officer shall advise the 
person that, on receipt of a sworn statement from the officer that the person 
was so charged and refused to take a test, or was tested and the result 
indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more…. 
TRANSP. § 16-205.1 (b)(1).  This section reflects that a person cannot be compelled to 
submit to alcohol chemical testing despite the inherent implied consent contained in 
 
13 
 
TRANSP. § 16-205.1 except in instances where the driver is involved in a fatal or life 
threatening accident.  Additionally, this section imposes a requirement that the suspected 
driver be apprised of the sanctions associated with the refusal to submit to testing.  In Motor 
Vehicle Administration v. Dove we stated, “[an] officer must advise a driver of 
consequences of refusing the alcohol concentration test, thus affording the driver the 
opportunity to make an informed choice.”  413 Md. 70, 83, 991 A.2d 65, 73 (2010).  
Therefore, before testing can be imposed, the statute requires proper advisement.  
Specifically, drivers may not be subject to involuntary testing and are explicitly informed 
of this freedom prior to the administration of testing.  Next, if an individual refuses testing, 
the refusal must be the product of a knowing, voluntary, and informed decision.  Finally, 
the implicated driver has the opportunity to challenge the deprivation of a right during the 
administrative hearing.  
In sum, the application of the Ryan factors to TRANSP. § 16-205.1 weigh in favor 
of the sufficiency of the process.  Here, the potential risk of deprivation is low when 
evaluated against the process afforded.  The statute includes a process by which individuals 
are advised of their rights and given the opportunity to refuse testing if they so choose.  A 
part of that advisement includes written acknowledgement, obtained through the Advice of 
Rights form, which outlines the potential sanctions, and affords the suspected driver the 
opportunity to consider whether to submit to testing.  The driver also has the opportunity 
to challenge the sufficiency of the process as applied to them during an administrative 
 
14 
 
hearing.  Therefore, we determine that the current process is sufficient to protect a 
suspected driver’s due process rights when being asked to submit to alcohol testing.   
Evaluating the voluntariness of the waiver 
 
In addressing the voluntariness of any consent to testing, this Court has stated, “a 
person detained for drunk driving must be capable of making a knowing and voluntary 
decision to refuse the alcohol concentration test.”  Forman v. Motor Vehicle 
Administration, 332 Md. 201, 218, 630 A.2d 753, 762 (1993).  To be capable of making a 
“knowing and voluntary decision,” the suspected driver must be fully advised of the 
potential sanctions associated with alcohol chemical testing.  We have previously 
addressed the issue of an officer’s advisement and stated that: 
In Maryland, a prerequisite to the MVA’s suspension of a driver’s license 
after a hearing is a finding that the police officer “requested a test after the 
person was fully advised of the administrative sanctions that shall be 
imposed....” [TRANSP.] § 16–205.1(f)(8)(i)(3) (emphasis added).  “Fully 
advised” means not only advised initially, but the detaining officer must also 
take care not to subsequently confuse or mislead the driver as to his or her 
rights under the statute.  Further, the officer certainly must not in any way 
induce the driver into refusing the test, a result running counter to the 
statute’s purpose of encouraging drivers to submit to alcohol concentration 
tests.  See [TRANSP.] § 16–205.1(b)(1)(i) & (ii) (providing substantially 
longer and non-discretionary suspension for test refusal versus test failure, to 
encourage drivers to take the test). 
Id. at 217, 630 A.2d at 762.  There is a requirement that the “State not mislead the defendant 
or construct road blocks, thus unduly burdening [the defendant’s] decision-making.”  Id. 
at 215, 630 A.2d at 761.  However, “due process does not require the driver to be informed 
of more than the statute requires[.]”  Id.  In the instant case, Respondent was properly 
advised of her rights and voluntarily consented to testing.  
 
15 
 
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the facts surrounding Respondent’s 
submission to testing.  Once Officer Ditoto stopped Respondent for driving without 
activating her headlights, he detected the odor of alcohol upon approaching her vehicle.  
Suspecting that Respondent was driving under the influence of alcohol, he directed her to 
exit the vehicle and perform field sobriety tests, which she did not complete satisfactorily.  
These reasonable suspicions triggered TRANSP. § 16-205.1, which requires that an officer 
detain an individual upon reasonable suspicion.  Thereafter, Respondent was taken into 
custody and transported to the Maryland State Police barracks, where she was provided a 
copy of the DR-15 Advice of Right form that contained a list of rights and the sanctions 
applicable to the submission or non-submission to chemical testing.  Officer Ditoto read 
Respondent the form and thereafter she signed it.  
We have previously determined that the refusal to submit to testing is appropriate 
when the suspected driver is advised of the consequences of that refusal, and that such a 
refusal is complete when it is communicated to the officer.  See Dove, 413 Md. at 84, 991 
A.2d at 73.  No such communication occurred here.  No evidence was offered to 
demonstrate that Respondent considered refusing the testing, that any conduct influenced 
her decision to take the test, or that the officer’s conduct affected that decision.  
Additionally, assuming arguendo that there was a violation of Respondent’s due process 
rights, the exclusionary rule is “inapplicable to license suspension proceedings conducted 
pursuant to the Statute.”  Motor Vehicle Administration v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 17, 997 A.2d 
768, 777 (2010).  Therefore, even if there were a determination that the process applied to 
 
16 
 
Respondent denied due process protections, the remedy would not be the exclusion of the 
test results.   
CONCLUSION 
Respondent failed to show that there was an insufficient advisement of rights in 
violation of her due process protections.  Additionally, Respondent failed to establish that 
the refusal of her request to use the restroom impaired her ability to appreciate the gravity 
of the circumstances or overcame her intention to refuse testing.  Accordingly, we 
determine that the process applied to Respondent afforded appropriate due process 
protections, and the refusal to permit her to use the restroom prior to her decision whether 
to take the test did not justify the grant of a Motion for No Action.  
 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR 
SAINT 
MARY’S 
COUNTY IS VACATED.  CASE IS 
REMANDED TO THAT COURT 
WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO 
REMAND THE CASE TO THE 
OFFICE 
OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
HEARINGS 
FOR 
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT 
WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS TO 
BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT, 
MEGAN SMITH.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 42 
 
September Term, 2017 
______________________________________ 
 
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION 
 
v. 
 
MEGAN E. SMITH 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Concurring Opinion by Watts, J., which 
Barbera, C.J., and Adkins, J., join. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: April 20, 2018 
 
Circuit Court for Saint Mary’s County 
Case No. 18-C-16-001627 
 
Argued: January 8, 2018 
 
Respectfully, I concur with the judgment in this case, and write briefly to explain 
my reasons for doing so.  The issue in this case is not whether there is a right to refuse 
testing under Md. Code Ann., Transp. (1977, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.) (“TR”) § 16-
205.1, “commonly known as the ‘implied consent, administrative per se law,’” see Motor 
Vehicle Admin. v. Gonce, 446 Md. 100, 102, 130 A.3d 436, 437-38 (2016) (citation 
omitted), because Megan Smith, Respondent, did not refuse testing, i.e., an alcohol 
concentration test.  TR § 16-205.1, by its plain language, legislates that a person has 
implicitly consented to testing.  Specifically, TR § 16-205.1(a)(2) provides for “implied 
consent” as follows: 
Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or 
on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is 
deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 
10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a 
test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to 
drive while under the influence of alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while 
so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of 
one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle 
safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of 
an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title. 
 
(Emphasis added).1 
                                              
1The language of the statute is clear.  Despite TR § 16-205.1(a)(2)’s embodiment of 
“implied consent,” a person cannot be compelled to take an alcohol concentration test 
unless the “person is involved in a motor vehicle accident that results in the death of, or a 
life[-]threatening injury to, another person and the person is detained by a police officer 
who has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving or attempting to 
drive while” impaired, TR § 16-205.1(c)(1); see TR § 16-205.1(b)(1) (“Except as provided 
in [TR § 16-205.1](c) [], a person may not be compelled to take a test.”).  In other words, 
if a driver has not been involved in a motor vehicle accident that results in death or a life-
threatening injury to another person, then the driver may refuse to take an alcohol 
concentration test. 
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If a person is detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol, the person is deemed to have consented to alcohol or drug 
testing, and is subject to a mandatory suspension of his or her driver’s license for not 
consenting to take a test.  Thus, under ordinary circumstances, if a driver decides to take 
an alcohol concentration test, there would be no issue of voluntariness with respect to 
consent, i.e., by operation of TR § 16-205.1, the driver is deemed to have impliedly 
consented to testing without an assessment of whether the driver’s decision was voluntary. 
An issue of voluntariness, however, could arise where, unlike in this case, a driver 
refuses testing.  See Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 332 Md. 201, 218, 630 A.2d 753, 
762 (1993) (“[A] person detained for drunk driving must be capable of making a knowing 
and voluntary decision to refuse the alcohol concentration test.”  (Emphasis added))  see 
also Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Dove, 413 Md. 70, 84, 991 A.2d 65, 73 (2010) (“Refusal 
must be voluntary and with knowledge of the rights contained in the [Advice of Rights] 
form.”  (Emphasis added) (citation omitted)).  Under that circumstance, i.e., where a driver 
refuses alcohol concentration testing, a driver could properly raise an issue as to whether 
he or she was induced or coerced into refusing to take the test, thereby incurring the penalty 
for refusal.  Rather than holding that a driver has a right to refuse to take an alcohol 
concentration test and that Smith’s consent was voluntary, see Maj. Slip Op. at 10, 13, 14, 
I would hold that the issue of voluntariness is at stake only where a driver refuses to take 
an alcohol concentration test because, under TR § 16-205.1, a driver is deemed to have 
consented to such testing and the statute is designed to encourage drivers to take alcohol 
concentration tests.  In other words, I would cabin the issue of voluntariness to the situation 
- 3 - 
in which a driver refuses to take an alcohol concentration test.  As this Court explained in 
Forman, 332 Md. at 217, 630 A.2d at 762, an “officer certainly must not in any way induce 
[a] driver into refusing [an alcohol concentration] test, a result running counter to [TR § 
16-205.1]’s purpose of encouraging drivers to submit to alcohol concentration tests.”  
(Emphasis added) (citation omitted).  In other words, an officer cannot “ma[k]e the refusal 
option more attractive.”  Id. at 219, 630 A.2d at 763 (emphasis added).   
Both Forman and Dove involve refusals to take alcohol concentration tests; 
significantly, nowhere in Forman or Dove did this Court indicate that a decision to take an 
alcohol concentration test, like a refusal to take an alcohol concentration test, is subject to 
a voluntariness test.  In short, there is no support in this Court’s case law for the proposition 
that voluntariness can be at issue where a driver takes an alcohol concentration test.  Such 
a determination is counterintuitive because under TR § 16-205.1 a driver is already deemed 
to have consented to testing without the necessity of a finding of voluntariness.  Put simply, 
I would adopt the rationale of this Court’s existing case law, which concludes that the 
decision to refuse to take an alcohol concentration test must be knowing and voluntary, and 
that voluntariness is not at issue where a driver takes an alcohol concentration test.2 
                                              
2There is, of course, a difference between the issue of whether a driver who is 
stopped or detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol has been properly advised of the driver’s rights under the 
“Advice of Rights” form, previously labeled DR-15, and the issue of voluntariness as to 
refusal of testing.  The majority opinion appears to conflate the two.  It goes without saying 
that a driver who is stopped or detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol is entitled to a proper advisement of 
rights pursuant to the Advice of Rights form, which was drafted by the Motor Vehicle 
Administration “[t]o assist law enforcement officers with making the advisements that TR 
(Continued...) 
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For the above reasons, respectfully, I concur.  Chief Judge Barbera and Judge 
Adkins have authorized me to state that they join in this opinion. 
 
 
                                              
§ 16-205.1(b)” and “advises detained drivers of certain consequences of either failing or 
refusing to take an alcohol concentration test.”  Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seenath, 448 Md. 
145, 172, 136 A.3d 885, 901 (2016).  Indeed, it is through the proper advisement of rights 
that a law enforcement officer determines whether a driver refuses or consents to testing.  
Under TR § 16-205.1, with proper advisement of rights, consent is deemed.