Title: Vanlier v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SHAWN VANLIER, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 287, 2001 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. No. 98090815, 98090816, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)   98090817, 98100193, 9809006423, 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  December 10, 2002 
Decided:  December 27, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, STEELE and 
HARTNETT,1 Justices: 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 27th day of  December 2002, it appears to the Court that: 
 
 
(1) 
In October 1998, the New Castle County Grand Jury returned an 
indictment against the appellant, Shawn Vanlier.  The indictment charged Vanlier 
with Attempted Rape in the First Degree, Kidnapping First Degree, Reckless 
Endangering Second Degree and Assault Third Degree.  In March 2001, a Superior 
Court jury found Vanlier guilty on all counts.  Vanlier contends that the delay 
between the indictment and trial violated his right to a speedy trial guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of 
                                                 
1 Designated pursuant to Art. IV § 12, of the Delaware Constitution and Supreme Court Rules 2 
and 4. 
 
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the Delaware Constitution.  In the alternative, Vanlier contends that the trial judge 
abused his discretion when he failed to dismiss the indictment sua sponte pursuant 
to Superior Court Criminal Rule 48(b).  
 
(2) 
Police arrested Vanlier on September 9, 1998, the same day the rape 
occurred.  Despite the swift pace of the investigation leading to Vanlier’s arrest 
and indictment in October 1998, pretrial proceedings lasted two and one-half years.  
Vanlier remained incarcerated from arrest to trial.  On November 23, 1998, the 
Superior Court assigned the case to the “problem list” as a result of expectations of 
delay inherent in awaiting the completion of FBI laboratory testing.  The FBI 
forwarded an initial “Report of Examination” to the State on September 30, 1999.  
The FBI then sent a second report, revealing an exculpatory mitochondrial DNA 
test result to the State on November 15, 1999.   
 
(3) 
The discovery process continued for another four months until March 
6, 2000, when the trial judge considered discovery complete.  In May of 2000, 
Vanlier, despite being represented by counsel, wrote a letter to the trial judge, 
requesting that his case be dismissed on the theory that he had been denied his 
right to a speedy trial.  The trial judge wrote Vanlier that he could not act on the 
motion because Vanlier had counsel of record.  The trial judge did, however, 
forward a copy of the letter to Vanlier’s counsel.  A similar exchange occurred in 
June and July of 2000 when Vanlier wrote two similar letters to the trial judge. 
 
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(4) 
The trial judge set a “firm” trial date for August 22, 2000.  Two 
months before the scheduled trial date, the State filed a motion in limine requesting 
a Daubert2 hearing challenging the admissibility of its own expert’s testimony on 
mitochondrial DNA analysis.  Both the State and Vanlier’s counsel requested a 
continuance.  Vanlier’s counsel ostensibly wished a continuance to retain its own 
expert in light of the State’s apparent repudiation of its expert’s testimony.  While 
the record falls well short of documenting the parties’ position, counsel’s argument 
before us suggests that the State sought a Daubert hearing to validate 
mitochondrial DNA as a relevant and credible form of identification.  Ironically, 
the test the State wished validated in Vanlier’s case resulted in an expert opinion 
helpful to the defense.  The trial judge postponed the trial to schedule a Daubert 
hearing to assess the validity of the DNA tests.  As best we can tell from the record 
and argument, Vanlier’s counsel did not object to further delay.  The trial judge 
then set a new date of March 13, 2001. 
 
(5) 
Vanlier wrote two additional letters to the trial judge in August 2000 
and October 2000 asking that his case be dismissed because of the continuances 
and the length of his incarceration.  On November 15, 2000, Vanlier sent another 
letter to the trial judge soliciting the Court’s permission to appear pro se.  Vanlier 
later retracted the request.   
                                                 
2 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 
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(6) 
The trial proceeded on March 14, 2001.  The Daubert hearing that 
caused the rescheduling of the August 22, 2000 “firm” trial date never took place.  
The State and Vanlier’s counsel agreed to a stipulation that would be read to the 
jury stating that no forensic evidence implicated Vanlier as the rapist.  The jury 
convicted Vanlier nonetheless on March 16, 2001.  This is Vanlier’s direct appeal. 
(7) 
Courts should assess four factors in determining whether a defendant 
has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial: (1) the length of delay, (2) the 
reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and 
(4) prejudice to the defendant.3  Although none of the factors is “either a necessary 
or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial,”4 
we conclude that a discussion of all four factors is unnecessary because the record 
clearly shows that Vanlier suffered no prejudice to his defense as a result of the 
delay.   
(8) 
Prejudice to the defendant should be considered in light of three of the 
defendants’ interests that the speedy trial right was designed to protect: (1) 
preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and 
concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be 
                                                 
3 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 
530 (1972)).  
4 Id. 
 
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impaired.5  Vanlier cannot point to any specific harm that he has suffered or 
presented any evidence to demonstrate his defense was impaired by the delay.  In 
fact, Vanlier arguably benefited from the delay because Vanlier ultimately 
obtained a favorable stipulation as exculpatory as any expert testimony could have 
produced as a result of the FBI DNA testing.  Vanlier argues that the delay 
prevented him from seeking his own DNA expert at trial.  The fact he did not or 
could not retain his “own” expert is of no consequence.  The best Vanlier could 
have hoped for from his own expert was a finding that the hair sample tested did 
not match his DNA.  The FBI expert came to this conclusion.  As a result, Vanlier 
obtained a stipulation heard by the jury that the forensic evidence did not implicate 
him.   
(10) Vanlier also contends that the trial judge should have dismissed the 
charges against him, sua sponte, pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 48(b).  
Rule 48(b) provides that “[i]f there is unnecessary delay … in bringing a defendant 
to trial, the Court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.”  For a 
criminal complaint to be dismissed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 48 
because of unnecessary delay, we have held that the delay, unless of constitutional 
dimensions, must be attributable to the prosecution and have prejudiced the 
                                                 
5 Middlebrook, 802 A.2d at 276 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). 
 
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defendant.6  As discussed above, Vanlier suffered no prejudice as a result of the 
delay.  Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he failed to 
dismiss the charges sua sponte pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 48(b).  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS SO ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court be AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_/s/ Myron T. Steele___________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Clark v. State, 2002 Del. LEXIS 208 (Del. Supr.) (citing State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291 
(Del. 1992)).