Title: Ligon v. County of Goochland

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
 
DAVID F. LIGON, III 
 
v.   Record No. 090250 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
February 25, 2010 
COUNTY OF GOOCHLAND 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GOOCHLAND COUNTY 
Timothy K. Sanner, Judge 
 
In this question of first impression involving the Virginia 
Fraud Against Taxpayers Act (VFATA), Code §§ 8.01-216.1 through 
–216.19, we consider whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
bars a retaliatory discharge claim against a County filed under 
the “whistleblower protection” provision in Code § 8.01-216.8. 
David F. Ligon, III filed a complaint in the circuit court 
against his former employer, Goochland County (the County), 
asserting that Ligon unlawfully was terminated from his 
employment in the County’s Building and Grounds Department and 
that he was entitled to relief under the “whistleblower 
protection” provision in Code § 8.01-216.8.1  Ligon alleged that 
he was terminated because he opposed certain fraudulent actions 
of his former supervisor, Cecil H. Youngblood, or because Ligon 
initiated or participated in an investigation of those 
                     
1 In his complaint, Ligon also asserted a claim of 
defamation against his former supervisor, Cecil H. Youngblood. 
The circuit court dismissed that claim and dismissed Youngblood 
from the suit entirely.  Youngblood is not a party to this 
appeal. 
practices.  As permitted by Code § 8.01-216.8, Ligon sought 
compensatory damages, reinstatement of his employment, twice the 
amount of his “back pay,” and attorney fees and costs.2 
In his complaint, Ligon asserted that Youngblood used 
County property for personal gain, that Youngblood permitted 
employees he supervised to engage in personal errands during 
work hours, and that he directed employees he supervised to help 
complete personal projects during work hours.  Ligon alleged 
that he reported Youngblood’s improper actions to an 
investigator in the County Sheriff’s Department and that several 
weeks later, the investigator interviewed Youngblood. 
Ligon alleged that before the events in question, 
Youngblood previously had given Ligon a positive work 
evaluation.  However, according to Ligon’s complaint, 
immediately after Youngblood was interviewed by the 
investigator, Youngblood presented Ligon with a memorandum that 
criticized Ligon’s “attitude” and was intended to “intimidate 
and harass” Ligon.  Ligon also asserted that the day after the 
interview, Youngblood terminated Ligon’s employment, stating 
that Ligon had engaged in “disruptive behavior and 
insubordination.” 
                     
2 Ligon sought additional damages based on his assertion 
that Youngblood acted negligently.  However, as previously 
explained, Youngblood was dismissed from the suit and is not a 
party to this appeal. 
 
2 
 
The County filed a demurrer on several grounds, including 
that Ligon’s retaliatory discharge claim was barred by the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity.3  After conducting a hearing, the 
circuit court sustained the County’s demurrer, concluding that 
the County was immune from suit.4  The circuit court held that 
the VFATA did not contain a waiver of immunity sufficient to 
allow an action against the County.  Ligon appealed from the 
circuit court’s judgment. 
On appeal, Ligon argues that the circuit court erred in 
sustaining the County’s demurrer because the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, while applicable to common law tort claims, 
does not affect statutory claims of retaliatory discharge under 
the VFATA.  Ligon asserts that the plain language of Code 
§ 8.01-216.8 protects “[a]ny employee” from retaliatory 
discharge, which includes employees of the Commonwealth and its 
political subdivisions. 
In response, the County argues that the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity is applicable to all claims against the 
Commonwealth and its political subdivisions, including the claim 
                     
3 In its amended demurrer, the County also argued that the 
circuit court lacked jurisdiction under Code § 8.01-216.8 
because the Commonwealth had knowledge of Ligon’s allegations 
prior to his filing the lawsuit and because Ligon failed to 
comply with Code § 15.2-1248.  The circuit court did not address 
these issues in its holding. 
4 The circuit court also held that the doctrine of 
respondeat superior does not apply to the County, but that issue 
is not before us on appeal. 
 
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brought by Ligon, unless that immunity is expressly waived by 
statute.  The County contends that the VFATA does not contain an 
express waiver of immunity and that, therefore, the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity bars Ligon’s suit under the VFATA.  We agree 
with the County’s arguments.5 
The issue whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred 
Ligon from filing a retaliatory discharge claim against the 
County presents a purely legal question that we review de novo.  
See Antisdel v. Ashby, 279 Va. 42, 47, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ 
(2010); Gray v. Virginia Sec’y of Transp., 276 Va. 93, 97, 662 
S.E.2d 66, 68 (2008); Miller v. Highland County, 274 Va. 355, 
364, 650 S.E.2d 532, 535 (2007).  Under the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, the Commonwealth is immune from liability 
for damages and from suits to restrain governmental action or to 
compel such action.  Gray, 276 Va. at 102, 662 S.E.2d at 70; 
Afzall v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 226, 231, 639 S.E.2d 279, 282 
(2007).  Thus, the Commonwealth is immune from tort liability 
for the acts or omissions of its agents and employees unless an 
express statutory or constitutional provision waives that 
immunity.  Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va. v. Carter, 267 
                     
5 In this appeal, we are not asked to consider and we do not 
consider whether Ligon’s claim presents a valid assertion that 
Youngblood engaged in any unlawful practices as described in 
Code § 8.01-216.3 or that Ligon participated in an investigation 
of those practices.  We consider only the sovereign immunity 
holding of the circuit court. 
 
4 
 
Va. 242, 244, 591 S.E.2d 76, 78 (2004); Patten v. Commonwealth, 
262 Va. 654, 658, 553 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2001); Melanson v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 178, 181, 539 S.E.2d 433, 434 (2001).  The 
same immunity principles apply to counties, which are political 
subdivisions of the Commonwealth.  See Mann v. County Board of 
Arlington County, 199 Va. 169, 174, 98 S.E.2d 515, 518 (1957); 
Fry v. County of Albemarle, 86 Va. 195, 197-98, 9 S.E. 1004, 
1005 (1890). 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity serves many purposes.  
These purposes include protecting the public purse, ensuring the 
uninterrupted functioning of government, eliminating any public 
inconvenience and danger that may result from officials being 
fearful to act, assuring that citizens will continue to accept 
public employment, and discouraging individuals from improperly 
threatening or initiating vexatious litigation.  Gray, 276 Va. 
at 101, 662 S.E.2d at 70; Afzall, 273 Va. at 231, 639 S.E.2d at 
282; Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307-08, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 
(1984). 
Only the General Assembly can determine as a matter of 
policy whether the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity should be 
abrogated with regard to a particular type of legal action.  
Afzall, 273 Va. at 230, 639 S.E.2d at 281; Commonwealth v. 
Luzik, 259 Va. 198, 206, 524 S.E.2d 871, 876 (2000).  In 
reviewing a statute, courts will conclude that the General 
 
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Assembly has taken such action abrogating the Commonwealth’s 
sovereign immunity only when the statutory language has 
explicitly and expressly announced such a waiver.  See Gray, 276 
Va. at 102, 662 S.E.2d at 71; Afzall, 273 Va. at 230, 639 S.E.2d 
at 281; Hinchey v. Ogden, 226 Va. 234, 241, 307 S.E.2d 891, 895 
(1983); Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist. v. Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 
457, 117 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1961). 
In this context, we consider whether the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity bars a claim of retaliatory discharge brought 
under the VFATA against the Commonwealth or a political 
subdivision of the Commonwealth.  We hold that it does. 
Courts in Virginia generally do not recognize a common law 
tort claim for retaliatory discharge.  Dray v. New Market 
Poultry Prods., Inc., 258 Va. 187, 191, 518 S.E.2d 312, 313 
(1999); Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 468, 362 S.E.2d 
915, 918 (1987); but see Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 
Va. 534, 539-40, 331 S.E.2d 797, 800-01 (1985) (applying narrow 
exception to employment-at-will rule to hold that employees had 
stated cause of action in tort against directors for retaliatory 
discharge in violation of public policy).  However, the General 
Assembly has provided statutory causes of action for retaliatory 
discharge in certain limited circumstances.  In addition to the 
“whistleblower protection” provision in the VFATA, the General 
Assembly also has provided a statutory cause of action for 
 
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retaliatory discharge for any employee discharged for filing a 
safety or health complaint, see Code §§ 40.1-51.2:1 and -51.2:2, 
and for any employee who is fired for filing a workers’ 
compensation claim, see Code § 65.2-308.  See Miller, 234 Va. at 
468, 362 S.E.2d at 918-19. 
The “whistleblower protection” provision in Code § 8.01-
216.8 provides a limited cause of action unknown at common law.  
See Dray, 258 Va. at 191, 518 S.E.2d at 313; Miller, 234 Va. at 
468, 362 S.E.2d at 918.  The seventh paragraph of Code § 8.01-
216.8 states in relevant part: 
Any employee who is discharged, . . . threatened, harassed, 
or in any other manner discriminated against . . . by his 
employer because he has opposed any practice referenced in 
§ 8.01-216.3 or because he has initiated, . . . assisted, 
or participated in any manner in any investigation . . . 
under this article, shall be entitled to all relief 
necessary to make the employee whole.  Such relief shall 
include reinstatement with the same seniority status such 
employee would have had but for the discrimination, two 
times the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and 
compensation for any special damages sustained as a result 
of the discrimination, including litigation costs and 
reasonable attorneys’ fees. 
 
In creating this cause of action, the General Assembly 
chose the words “any employee” when identifying the class of 
employees covered by the statute.  See Code § 8.01-216.8.  In 
like manner, the General Assembly identified the “employer” of 
“any employee” as the person or entity against whom suit may be 
brought under the VFATA.  Id.  Notably, however, the General 
Assembly did not define either the term “employer” or the term 
 
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“employee” in the VFATA.  Therefore, because neither of these 
terms contains an explicit reference to the Commonwealth and its 
political subdivisions or to their employees, we must examine 
the text of the VFATA to determine whether the General Assembly 
explicitly and expressly announced a waiver of sovereign 
immunity permitting the filing of retaliatory discharge actions 
under Code § 8.01-216.8 by employees of the Commonwealth or its 
political subdivisions. 
We conclude that the General Assembly did not announce such 
a waiver in the text of the VFATA.  The only mention in the 
VFATA of actions against the Commonwealth is made in the third 
paragraph of Code § 8.01-216.8.  That paragraph states, in 
relevant part: 
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought 
under this article against any department, authority, 
board, bureau, commission, or agency of the Commonwealth, 
[or] any political subdivision of the Commonwealth . . . if 
the action is based on evidence or information known to the 
Commonwealth when the action was brought. 
 
Code § 8.01-216.8. 
 
This language is silent regarding the question whether 
employees of the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions are 
included in the term “[a]ny employee” in the seventh paragraph 
of Code § 8.01-216.8.  Although the above language in the third 
paragraph indicates that the General Assembly contemplated that 
the Commonwealth may be named as a defendant in some type of 
 
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legal action under the VFATA, nothing in that language, or any 
other language in the VFATA, specifically states that employees 
of the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions may sue their 
employers for retaliatory discharge under the statute.  Thus, we 
conclude that the language in the third paragraph of Code 
§ 8.01-216.8 does not contain an explicit waiver of sovereign 
immunity allowing employees of the Commonwealth and its 
political subdivisions to bring retaliatory discharge actions 
under the VFATA. 
Finally, we observe that we previously have rejected other 
attempts to construe general statutory language as an 
announcement waiving the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity.  See 
e.g. Carter, 267 Va. at 245, 591 S.E.2d at 78 (Virginia Tort 
Claims Act contained no express waiver of immunity for agencies 
of Commonwealth); Beecher, 202 Va. at 457, 117 S.E.2d at 689 
(statutory language stating that entity “may sue and be sued” 
did not constitute explicit waiver of immunity).  Our conclusion 
that the VFATA does not contain an explicit and express waiver 
of the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity regarding retaliatory 
discharge actions is consistent with our prior holdings, because 
a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied from general 
statutory language.  See Gray, 276 Va. at 102, 662 S.E.2d at 71; 
Afzall, 273 Va. at 230, 639 S.E.2d at 281; Hinchey, 226 Va. at 
241, 307 S.E.2d at 895; Beecher, 202 Va. at 457, 117 S.E.2d at 
 
9 
 
689.  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in 
sustaining the County’s demurrer on the grounds of sovereign 
immunity. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment.6 
Affirmed. 
                     
6 Based on our holding, we need not consider Ligon’s 
argument comparing the VFATA to the Federal False Claims Act, 31 
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006 & Supp. I 2007).  
 
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