Title: Cameron Creek Apartments v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Complaint of Cameron Creek Apts. v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2013-
Ohio-3705.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-3705 
IN RE COMPLAINT OF CAMERON CREEK APARTMENTS, INTERVENING 
APPELLEE, v. COLUMBIA GAS OF OHIO, INC., APPELLANT; PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, 
 it may be cited as In re Complaint of Cameron Creek Apts. v. Columbia Gas of 
Ohio, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3705.] 
Public utilities—Apartment complex sought to prevent utility from terminating 
service unless owners retrofitted each apartment to conform to model code 
adopted by utility’s tariff—No evidence of imminent or verifiable safety 
threat was presented—Customer able to show met alternative compliance 
methods of model code—Orders preventing utility from terminating 
service affirmed. 
(No. 2011-1758—Submitted April 10, 2013—Decided August 29, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission, No. 08-1091-GA-CSS. 
____________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’NEILL, J. 
SUMMARY 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., is a public utility under R.C. 
4905.02.  Columbia provides natural gas to intervening appellee, Cameron Creek 
Apartments, a complex located in Galloway, Ohio. 
{¶ 2} Cameron Creek filed a complaint with the Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio pursuant to R.C. 4905.26, alleging that Columbia had 
demanded major structural retrofitting of the ventilation system to the gas 
appliances in each apartment in the complex.  According to Cameron Creek, 
Columbia unilaterally declared the method of ventilation unsafe because Cameron 
Creek had failed to comply with the National Fuel Gas Code (“NFG Code”) and 
threatened to disconnect gas service to the entire complex unless Cameron Creek 
retrofitted the units to meet NFG Code requirements.  The complaint requested 
that the commission prohibit Columbia from terminating service and requiring 
expensive remedial construction. 
{¶ 3} The commission found in favor of Cameron Creek, and Columbia 
appealed to this court.  Columbia raises six propositions of law.  None has merit.  
Therefore, we affirm the commission’s orders. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 4} Cameron Creek consists of 240 apartment units.  There are 21 two-
story buildings in the complex.  The apartments are flats, with each second-floor 
apartment located directly above a first-floor apartment.  Each apartment has a 
gas furnace and gas water heater.  Each apartment also contains a hard-wired 
combination smoke-detector and carbon-monoxide alarm located in the main 
living area. 
{¶ 5} At issue in this case is the manner in which the gas appliances are 
vented.  The one-bedroom and two-bedroom apartments each have a gas furnace 
and gas water heater located in a bathroom closet.  The walls of the closet have 
January Term, 2013 
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two air grilles that open up into the apartment’s main living room.  The furnace 
has a four-inch vent connector and the water heater has a three-inch vent 
connector.  Both of these connectors are tied together into either a five-inch or 
six-inch vent.  In turn, the vent that runs from the first-floor appliances is tied 
together with the vent from the second-floor appliances and vented through the 
roof using a single stack.  The three-bedroom apartment is similar, but its gas 
appliances are located in a hallway closet instead of the bathroom. 
{¶ 6} The city of Columbus approved a building permit for Cameron 
Creek in 1997 and a final occupancy permit in 1998.  When Cameron Creek 
installed the gas appliances, the installations and venting configuration complied 
with the city’s existing building code. 
{¶ 7} Since 1990, Columbia has continuously used the NFG Code1 as a 
reference standard for evaluating the safety of residential gas lines and appliance 
installations and venting.  The NFG Code is a model code written by a private 
organization that sets out recommended general standards for installations and 
operations of gas piping and appliances.  Columbia considers violations of the 
NFG Code to be a significant safety hazard and a threat to human life. 
{¶ 8} In 2006, Columbia began “red tagging” gas appliances at Cameron 
Creek, citing violations of the NFG Code.  Under Columbia’s red-tag policy, 
service technicians are required to turn off the gas supply and attach a red tag to a 
gas appliance if the appliance is deemed unsafe.  Columbia would not reestablish 
gas service until the customer had arranged for a qualified repairman to make any 
necessary repairs. 
{¶ 9} On January 14 and February 18, 2008, Columbia sent letters to 
Cameron Creek stating that the ventilation of the gas furnaces and water heaters 
did not comply with the NFG Code and that remedial measures needed to be 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all references are to the National Fire Protection Association’s National 
Fuel Gas Code, 1996 Edition, the version in effect at the time Cameron Creek was built. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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taken to ensure tenant safety.  Columbia presented testimony that the NFG Code 
requires that Cameron Creek obtain all air involved in combustion, ventilation, 
and dilution in the gas furnaces and water heaters directly from outdoors and that 
self-closing doors with weather-stripping be installed on the closets where the 
appliances are located.  Columbia was concerned that failure to fix the violations 
could cause a buildup of carbon monoxide in the living spaces of the apartments, 
which in turn could cause serious illness or death to occupants. 
{¶ 10} After the letters were sent, the parties engaged in discussions in an 
attempt to resolve the situation.  The parties, however, were unable to reach a 
resolution. 
{¶ 11} On August 13, 2008, Columbia informed Cameron Creek that it 
would disconnect gas service to the entire complex if Cameron Creek did not 
bring all apartment units into compliance with the NFG Code by October 13, 
2008.  Cameron Creek responded that the units complied with all applicable 
building codes at the time of construction and that carbon-monoxide detectors had 
been installed.  Cameron Creek threatened legal action if Columbia refused to 
provide service. 
{¶ 12} On September 15, 2008, Columbia sent letters directly to residents 
of Cameron Creek, informing them that Columbia would have to disconnect their 
gas service due to Cameron Creek’s refusal to remedy the NFG Code violations.  
The letter informed residents of the potential risk of carbon-monoxide exposure 
and that service would be terminated at the end of October 2008 if the problem 
was not solved. 
{¶ 13} On September 17, 2008, Cameron Creek filed a complaint against 
Columbia with the commission pursuant to R.C. 4905.26.  The complaint alleged 
that Columbia had unreasonably and unlawfully threatened to disconnect gas 
service to all units if Cameron Creek refused to retrofit the ventilation system in 
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each apartment.  Cameron Creek estimated that it would cost a minimum of 
$1,500 per apartment to comply with Columbia’s demands. 
{¶ 14} On October 8, 2008, the attorney examiner assigned to the case 
issued an entry precluding Columbia from terminating service to Cameron Creek, 
unless disconnection of an individual unit was necessary to prevent or resolve a 
present or imminent hazardous situation.  By entry issued April 24, 2009, the 
attorney examiner granted Columbia’s motion to modify the October 8 entry, 
clarifying that the commission’s directive also precluded Columbia from refusing 
to reconnect gas service unless the refusal was necessary to prevent or resolve a 
present or imminent hazardous situation. 
{¶ 15} In July 2009, a three-day hearing was held at the commission.  On 
June 22, 2011, the commission issued its opinion and order.  The commission first 
considered whether Cameron Creek had sustained its burden under R.C. 4905.26 
of proving that Columbia’s policy of enforcing the NFG Code as referenced in its 
tariff is unjust and unreasonable.  The commission found that Columbia did not 
violate its tariff by applying the NFG Code and that Columbia could continue its 
practice of relying on and enforcing the most recent NFG Code to determine if 
supplying gas service to customers is safe.  According to the commission, 
“Columbia must apply a standard of review that is in keeping with the most 
current safety standards enforced by the gas industry,” and both parties “agree 
that the NFG Code is an acknowledged compilation of [such safety] standards.”  
Pub. Util. Comm. No. 08-1091-GA-CSS, at 18 (June 22, 2011), available at  
http://dis.puc.state.oh.us/TiffToPDF/A1001001A11F22B41223H86128.pdf. 
{¶ 16} The commission then turned to whether Columbia’s attempt to 
require Cameron Creek to retrofit the apartments to conform to current NFG Code 
standards was unjust and unreasonable.  The commission first stated that when 
there is a verifiable safety hazard, Columbia has the right under its tariff and the 
commission’s rules to disconnect gas service and to require customers to address 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the safety issue.  The commission, however, found that no verifiable safety hazard 
existed at Cameron Creek.  The commission found that the city of Columbus had 
deemed Cameron Creek safe when it issued building and occupancy permits 
under the building code in effect at the time of construction and that the complex 
was still in compliance with all applicable building codes.  Thus, as to the 
question of retrofitting, the commission found that Columbia could not threaten to 
disconnect service and force Cameron Creek to conform to current NFG Code 
requirements based merely on a potential safety hazard. 
{¶ 17} Finally, the commission considered whether Cameron Creek met 
the NFG Code’s alternative compliance methods.  According to the commission, 
Cameron Creek effectively complied with the NFG Code’s safety standards when 
it modified its building plans during construction to add a four-inch fresh-air-
supply duct. 
{¶ 18} On July 22, 2011, Columbia sought rehearing, raising six grounds.  
On August 17, 2011, the commission denied rehearing.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
{¶ 19} “R.C. 4903.13 provides that a [Public Utilities Commission] order 
shall be reversed, vacated, or modified by this court only when, upon 
consideration of the record, the court finds the order to be unlawful or 
unreasonable.”  Constellation NewEnergy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 104 Ohio 
St.3d 530, 2004-Ohio-6767, 820 N.E.2d 885, ¶ 50.  We will not reverse or modify 
a commission decision as to questions of fact when the record contains sufficient 
probative evidence to show that the commission’s decision was not manifestly 
against the weight of the evidence and was not so clearly unsupported by the 
record as to show misapprehension, mistake, or willful disregard of duty.  
Monongahela Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 571, 2004-Ohio-
6896, 820 N.E.2d 921, ¶ 29.  The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that 
January Term, 2013 
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the commission’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence or is 
clearly unsupported by the record.  Id. 
{¶ 20} Although the court has “complete and independent power of review 
as to all questions of law” in appeals from the commission, Ohio Edison Co. v. 
Pub. Util. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 466, 469, 678 N.E.2d 922 (1997), we may rely 
on the expertise of a state agency in interpreting a law when “highly specialized 
issues” are involved and “agency expertise would, therefore, be of assistance in 
discerning the presumed intent of our General Assembly.”  Consumers’ Counsel 
v. Pub. Util. Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d 108, 110, 388 N.E.2d 1370 (1979). 
DISCUSSION 
{¶ 21} The question on appeal is whether Columbia can shut off gas 
service to the entire apartment complex in order to compel Cameron Creek’s 
owners to retrofit each apartment to conform to current NFG Code standards.  The 
commission’s orders found that Columbia was prohibited from taking such action.  
Columbia now challenges the orders on six grounds.  After review, we find that 
none of Columbia’s arguments justifies reversal of the commission’s orders. 
I.  The court lacks jurisdiction over Columbia’s first proposition of law. 
{¶ 22} In proposition of law No. I, Columbia challenges the commission’s 
conclusion that “a violation of the National Fuel Gas Code’s safety requirements 
is not a hazardous condition.”  According to Columbia, the commission’s orders 
are unlawful and unreasonable because they are unsupported by the evidence. 
{¶ 23} Columbia filed an application for rehearing before the commission 
pursuant to R.C. 4903.10, setting forth six grounds for rehearing.  In none of those 
six assignments of error, however, did Columbia assert the same claim that it now 
raises in the first proposition of law.  R.C. 4903.10 provides that an application 
for rehearing “shall be in writing and shall set forth specifically the ground or 
grounds on which the applicant considers the order to be unreasonable or 
unlawful.  No party shall in any court urge or rely on any ground for reversal, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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vacation, or modification not so set forth in the application.”  We have long held 
that setting forth specific grounds for rehearing is a jurisdictional prerequisite for 
our review.  See Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 70 Ohio St.3d 244, 
247, 638 N.E.2d 550 (1994); Akron v. Pub. Util. Comm., 55 Ohio St.2d 155, 161-
162, 378 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Cincinnati v. Pub. Util. Comm., 151 Ohio St. 353, 
86 N.E.2d 10 (1949), paragraph seventeen of syllabus. 
{¶ 24} We have “strictly construed the specificity test set forth in 
R.C. 4903.10.”  Discount Cellular, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 112 Ohio St.3d 360, 
2007-Ohio-53, 859 N.E.2d 957, ¶ 59; see also Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. 
Comm. at 248 (recognizing a “strict specificity test” in R.C. 4903.10).  Indeed, 
this court has explained that by using the language set forth in R.C. 4903.10, “the 
General Assembly indicated clearly its intention to deny the right to raise a 
question on appeal where the appellant’s application for rehearing used a shotgun 
instead of a rifle to hit that question.”  Cincinnati v. Pub. Util. Comm. at 378.  
Columbia’s rehearing application did not “set forth specifically” the claim 
asserted in proposition of law No. I: that the commission’s “conclusion that a 
violation of the [NFG] Code’s safety requirements is not a hazardous condition is 
unsupported by the evidence.”  Compare id. at 377 (general grounds raised in the 
rehearing application could not support the specific ground later relied on by the 
appellant and therefore the court could not consider the issue); Agin v. Pub. Util. 
Comm., 12 Ohio St.2d 97, 98, 232 N.E.2d 828 (1967) (a “casual similarity” 
between the grounds stated in the rehearing application and the statements in the 
appellants’ brief does not meet the requirements of R.C. 4903.10).  So regardless 
of what appears in Columbia’s brief on appeal, the failure to set forth specifically 
those arguments on rehearing as required by R.C. 4903.10 deprives this court of 
January Term, 2013 
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jurisdiction of Columbia’s first proposition of law.2  Accordingly, we dismiss the 
first proposition of law for lack of jurisdiction. 
II.  Columbia has not demonstrated that the commission committed 
reversible error when it ruled that Cameron Creek’s venting  
modification was a permissible alternative to the NFG Code. 
{¶ 25} In the second and third propositions of law, Columbia raises 
several challenges to the commission’s finding that Cameron Creek had complied 
with certain alternative compliance methods of the NFG Code.  The following 
facts are necessary to put this issue in context. 
{¶ 26} When Cameron Creek was under construction in 1996, the 1995 
Ohio Basic Building and the Ohio Mechanical Codes were in effect, and 
Columbus enforced those codes for structures within the city.  At the time of 
construction, Cameron Creek modified its original building plans to add a four-
inch fresh-air-supply duct that was designed to bring outdoor air into each 
apartment’s mechanical room.  Thereafter, the city issued a building permit to 
Cameron Creek in 1997 and an occupancy permit in 1998, after finding that the 
installation and venting of the gas water heaters and furnaces complied with all 
applicable codes. 
{¶ 27} Conversely, Columbia relied on the NFG Code, through its tariff, 
when gas service was originally supplied to Cameron Creek.  Columbia, however, 
                                                 
2 We also note that Columbia forfeited any claim that the two carbon-monoxide incidents 
constituted evidence of a hazardous condition.  Columbia disputes the commission’s finding that 
the two carbon-monoxide readings taken by Columbia’s service technician were invalid.  
Columbia first raised this issue in a footnote in its application for rehearing.  Columbia’s footnote, 
however, challenged only one of the two readings that were taken.  Moreover, Columbia cited no 
evidence that would support its argument that that reading was valid.  By failing to cite supportive 
evidence in its application for rehearing, Columbia deprived the commission of an opportunity to 
cure any error when it reasonably could have.  See Parma v. Pub. Util. Comm., 86 Ohio St.3d 144, 
148, 712 N.E.2d 724 (1999) (“we do not accept * * * objections” when appellant has “deprived 
the commission of an opportunity to redress any injury or prejudice that may have occurred”); In 
re Application of Am. Transm. Sys., Inc., 125 Ohio St.3d 333, 2010-Ohio-1841, 928 N.E.2d 427, 
¶ 31 (same). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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did not inspect the gas appliances at the complex to determine if they were in 
compliance with the NFG Code because the commission’s rules did not require 
the company to inspect appliance installations at that time. 
{¶ 28} In the opinion and order, the commission first held that Columbia 
could not require Cameron Creek to retrofit its apartments because there were no 
imminent safety threats or verifiable safety issues with the gas appliances or 
venting system at the complex.  The commission’s order placed significant weight 
on the fact that the dwellings at Cameron Creek met the standards for construction 
under the city codes in effect at the time the complex was built.  According to the 
commission, Cameron Creek was still safe because it had not undergone any 
renovations since the time of construction and the complex has remained in 
compliance with all state and local building-code requirements. 
{¶ 29} Despite the fact that the city of Columbus has never adopted the 
NFG Code as part of its building-code standards and applied different safety 
standards when it issued building and occupancy permits to Cameron Creek, the 
commission held that Cameron Creek met the “current” NFG Code’s allowance 
for alternative compliance methods because of the addition of the four-inch fresh-
air-supply duct at the time of construction.  The commission stated that the NFG 
Code allows for “alternative and specially engineered solutions” as other methods 
of meeting the safety standards set forth in the code.  See Sections 1.2 and 5.3.4 of 
the NFG Code (permitting other methods and special engineering to provide an 
adequate supply of air for combustion, ventilation, and dilution of gases).  The 
commission noted that when Cameron Creek modified its original building plans 
to add the four-inch fresh-air-supply duct, it submitted engineering calculations 
from a licensed professional engineer verifying that combustion air was adequate 
for the gas appliances.  According to the commission, the modified building plan 
qualified as an alternative-compliance method that was approved by the city, and 
January Term, 2013 
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it effectively brought Cameron Creek into compliance with the current NFG 
Code. 
{¶ 30} Columbia raises several challenges to the commission’s finding 
that Cameron Creek had met the alternative compliance provisions of the NFG 
Code.  Columbia, however, bears the burden of demonstrating reversible error.  
AK Steel Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 95 Ohio St.3d 81, 88, 765 N.E.2d 862 (2002) 
(the appellant bears the “burden of demonstrating * * * that it has been or will be 
prejudiced by the error”).  See also Ohio Commt. of Cent. Station Elec. Protection 
Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 50 Ohio St.2d 169, 174, 364 N.E.2d 3 (1977); Myers v. 
Pub. Util. Comm., 64 Ohio St.3d 299, 302, 595 N.E.2d 873 (1992).  To the degree 
that Columbia identifies any error in the order, it has not shown that such error 
caused harm to Columbia. 
{¶ 31} The critical problem is that Columbia does not challenge the 
commission’s finding that Cameron Creek’s venting installations were deemed 
safe because they complied with the local building codes enforced by the city of 
Columbus.  As noted, the city approved Cameron Creek’s design at the time of 
construction and issued building and occupancy permits under the Ohio Building 
Code and Ohio Mechanical Code.  Cameron Creek’s experts testified that those 
codes allowed for the type of ventilation installed at Cameron Creek and that the 
gas appliances received a sufficient supply of air for combustion, ventilation, and 
dilution of gases.  Testimony was also presented that Cameron Creek had not 
undergone any renovations since it was constructed and was currently in 
compliance with state and local building codes.  Based on this evidence, the 
commission found that Columbia could not force retrofitting of the apartments to 
comply with the NFG Code, because there was no evidence of any imminent or 
verifiable safety threat and Cameron Creek was providing a “reasonable margin 
of safety” for its residents.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 08-1091-GA-CSS, at 21. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 32} A showing of prejudice would require Columbia to negate the 
commission’s findings that the venting installations are safe under the applicable 
building codes and that there is no existing safety threat at Cameron Creek.  Yet 
Columbia does not challenge any of the evidence supporting the commission’s 
findings.  It does not challenge the qualification of any expert witness.  Columbia 
does not point to any contrary testimony or cross-examination that would call 
direct testimony into question.  Moreover, Columbia does not dispute that the 
city’s building codes permitted the type of ventilation installed by Cameron Creek 
at the time of construction.  And it does not contend that the NFG Code 
supersedes the city’s building codes. 
{¶ 33} In the end, Columbia has not demonstrated prejudice, which it must 
in order to obtain a reversal of a commission order.  Indus. Energy Consumers v. 
Pub. Util. Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 551, 553, 589 N.E.2d 1289 (1992).  Even if the 
commission erred in finding that Cameron Creek’s installations met the NFG 
Code’s alternative-compliance methods, Columbia failed to show harm stemming 
from that error.  See, e.g., Elyria Foundry Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 114 Ohio 
St.3d 305, 2007-Ohio-4164, 871 N.E.2d 1176, ¶ 67 (rejecting a claim that not 
only was speculative, but was “supported by no argument or evidence” as to how 
the alleged error prejudiced the appellant”).  Therefore, we reject Columbia’s 
second and third propositions of law. 
III.  Columbia’s claims regarding carbon-monoxide monitors 
and “non-tight” building construction lack merit. 
{¶ 34} In proposition of law No. IV, Columbia argues that the commission 
erred when it found that carbon-monoxide detectors provided a reasonable margin 
of safety at Cameron Creek.  According to Columbia, the installation of detectors 
did not mitigate the carbon-monoxide hazard at the complex.  Columbia also 
challenges the commission’s conclusion that the buildings at Cameron Creek 
January Term, 2013 
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provided significant outside-air infiltration because they were not “tightly” 
constructed. 
A.  Columbia’s challenges to the carbon-monoxide monitors 
are frivolous and speculative. 
{¶ 35} Columbia first maintains that the commission concluded that 
carbon-monoxide detectors require “diligent maintenance and repair” if Cameron 
Creek is to be safe.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 08-1091-GA-CSS, at 21.  But, 
according to Columbia, the carbon-monoxide detectors do not adequately protect 
residents because Cameron Creek introduced no evidence that it had maintained 
its detectors since they were installed in 2008. 
{¶ 36} Columbia’s argument borders on the frivolous.  The passage from 
the commission’s order quoted by Columbia is incomplete.  The quotation should 
read: “The Commission agrees that the key to sustaining a safe and hazard-free 
complex at Cameron Creek is continued and diligent maintenance and repair of 
the gas appliances, ventilation system, and CO detectors, as well as the 
replacement of appliances when necessary.”  (Emphasis added.)  Pub. Util. 
Comm. No. 08-1091-GA-CSS, at 21.  When the entire passage is construed in 
context, it is clear that the commission in this case did not require Cameron Creek 
to submit evidence that it was properly maintaining carbon-monoxide detectors.  
Instead, the commission merely reminded Cameron Creek of its ongoing 
obligation to monitor and maintain carbon-monoxide detectors, gas appliances, 
and ventilation systems. 
{¶ 37} Columbia also asserts that a carbon-monoxide detector is useless in 
a power outage if the battery is dead.3  While this is true, it does not advance 
Columbia’s claim.  Cameron Creek’s residents might not diligently replace all 
                                                 
3 We note that hardwired carbon-monoxide detectors generally come equipped with a warning 
signal to alert residents when the backup battery needs replacing.  And most (if not all) detectors 
have a testing button to determine whether the device is operational. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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backup batteries when necessary, but that failure does not render carbon-
monoxide detectors inherently unreliable.  The fact remains that carbon-monoxide 
detectors are effective warning devices as long as they have a power source. 
{¶ 38} Columbia’s focus on carbon-monoxide detectors misconstrues the 
commission’s order.  The order did not turn solely on the installation and proper 
functioning of carbon-monoxide detectors at Cameron Creek.  Rather, the 
commission cited other factors when it determined that the key to sustaining a 
safe complex was continued and diligent maintenance and repair of the gas 
appliances, ventilation system, and carbon-monoxide detectors. 
B.  Columbia’s challenge to the type of construction at Cameron Creek 
is not supported by admissible, material evidence. 
{¶ 39} The commission found that Cameron Creek’s venting system and 
construction design allowed for a sufficient combination of indoor and outdoor air 
to the gas appliances.  According to the commission, the gas appliances received a 
sufficient supply of outside air for combustion and dilution purposes because 
buildings like those at Cameron Creek that were constructed in the 1990s were 
not as tightly constructed as buildings are today. 
{¶ 40} Columbia challenges this finding, arguing that the construction 
practices of the 1990s will not keep Cameron Creek’s residents safe.  Columbia 
cites five newspaper articles published in the Columbus Dispatch in 1996 about 
carbon-monoxide poisoning in homes.  Columbia also refers the court to three 
cases involving carbon-monoxide-related deaths of or injuries to apartment 
tenants in the 1990s.  Columbia contends that the fact that these articles and 
opinions were published is proof that the construction is insufficient to protect 
Cameron Creek’s residents from carbon-monoxide poisoning.  We disagree. 
{¶ 41} First, nothing suggests that Columbia submitted this evidence to 
the commission or made it part of the record.  See Thomas v. Pub. Util. Comm., 
24 Ohio St.3d 167, 169, 493 N.E.2d 1328 (1986) (the court considers only the law 
January Term, 2013 
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and facts upon the record made before the commission).  Second, Columbia has 
not submitted copies of the newspaper articles or included anything more than a 
parenthetical explaining the court opinions; whether they support Columbia’s 
argument is thus unclear.  Based on Columbia’s failure to explain its appellate 
arguments and support them with relevant citations to the record, we reject this 
claim.  Allnet Communications Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 70 Ohio St.3d 202, 
206, 638 N.E.2d 516 (1994) (rejecting an argument when the appellant “provided 
no further reasoning or record citations to support” it). 
C.  The court lacks jurisdiction over the remaining 
claims in proposition of law No. IV. 
{¶ 42} Columbia makes two additional arguments under its fourth 
proposition of law: (1) the commission erred in leaving the safety of residents in 
the hands of Cameron Creek’s maintenance staff and (2) the commission has no 
authority to supervise Cameron Creek’s future maintenance activities.  We lack 
jurisdiction to consider these claims because Columbia failed to set forth either 
alleged error in its notice of appeal.  See R.C. 4903.13 (the procedure for seeking 
reversal of a commission order is through a notice of appeal “setting forth the 
order appealed from and the errors complained of”); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. 
v. Pub. Util. Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-5466, 816 N.E.2d 238, ¶ 21 
(failure to raise error in the notice of appeal precludes this court from considering 
the issue). 
IV.  Columbia’s fifth proposition of law is not well taken; 
the commission’s orders provide clear guidance. 
{¶ 43} In proposition of law No. V, Columbia asserts that the 
commission’s order and rehearing entry are unreasonable because they provide 
Columbia with no clear guidance as to how it may apply the NFG Code in other 
existing residential structures.  Columbia’s assertion is without merit. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 44} The commission first held that “when there is a verifiable safety 
hazard, Columbia has the right, under its tariff and the Commission’s rules, to 
disconnect gas service and require customers to address the safety issue.”  Pub. 
Util. Comm. No. 08-1091-GA-CSS, at 20.  The commission also held that 
Columbia’s current practice of citing and enforcing the NFG Code is just and 
reasonable and that Columbia can continue to apply the NFG Code as the 
standard to determine whether supplying gas service to a customer is safe. 
{¶ 45} Columbia’s argument fails to comprehend the commission’s 
finding that strict adherence to the NFG Code is not required and that other 
methods may be employed to ensure that dwellings achieve the “same level of 
safety espoused by the NFG Code.”  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 08-1091-GA-CSS, at 
21.  The commission found that compliance with the NFG Code is a safe harbor 
for customers, but that compliance cannot be compelled if it is “economically or 
practically unreasonable.”  Moreover, the order is clear that Columbia may not 
force extensive retrofitting of dwellings based solely on a violation of the NFG 
Code.  Columbia can require retrofits that are necessary to ensure a reasonable 
margin of safety, but only if the customer cannot show compliance with the NFG 
Code or a specifically engineered solution that complies with the local building 
code and is supported by a professional engineering verification of adequacy. 
V.  Columbia’s undue-burden claim is speculative 
and lacks evidentiary support. 
{¶ 46} Under the sixth and final proposition of law, Columbia maintains 
that the vague and subjective standards in the commission’s order will impose an 
enormous administrative burden on Columbia.  According to Columbia, its 
service technicians disconnect hundreds of gas appliances each month for NFG 
Code violations and the commission’s orders will impose significant record-
keeping requirements on Columbia and will require extensive and expensive 
changes to its computer system.  We find that this claim lacks merit. 
January Term, 2013 
17 
 
{¶ 47} First, Columbia’s claim hinges entirely on the belief that the 
commission’s rulings will create “a backlog of customers contesting the 
enforceability of the NFG Code.”  But Columbia’s backlog claim is speculative.  
Even before the commission issued its orders in this case, customers had the right 
to challenge disconnection of service, and the commission had the ability to 
determine whether disconnection was reasonable.  See R.C. 4905.26 (the 
commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether any public utility 
service is unjust, unreasonable, or unlawful) and 4905.06 (the commission has 
“the power to prescribe any rule or order that the commission finds necessary for 
the protection of the public safety”).  Nothing about the commission’s orders 
suggest that customers will now be more inclined to challenge Columbia’s 
disconnections. 
{¶ 48} Second, an essential premise of Columbia’s argument is factual: 
the commission’s orders will impose significant recordkeeping requirements and 
require changes to Columbia’s computer system.  But Columbia provides almost 
no citation to the record in support of its factual assertions, and not one citation 
that is helpful.  Columbia provides only a single citation to the record that is 
relevant to its claims.  According to Columbia, the testimony of one of its service 
technicians demonstrates that its computer system is currently incapable of 
documenting past service calls addressing NFG Code violations or providing 
information instantaneously to its service technicians.  But this testimony does not 
support Columbia’s argument that it will be necessary to modify its computer 
system.  On the contrary, the technician’s testimony indicates that Columbia’s 
service trucks are equipped with onboard computers that allow technicians to 
record detailed information about service calls and pass that information to other 
technicians if follow-up service is necessary. 
{¶ 49} In the end, Columbia fails to identify the kind of evidence that 
could have supported its claim.  Columbia’s failure to support its appellate 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
arguments with relevant citations to the record is a fatal flaw.  Allnet 
Communications Serv., Inc. at 206, 638 N.E.2d 516 (rejecting an argument when 
the appellant “provided no further reasoning or record citations to support” it). 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 50} We find that none of Columbia’s propositions of law is well taken.  
Therefore, we affirm the commission’s orders in this case. 
Orders affirmed. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and FRENCH, JJ., concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
____________________ 
FRENCH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 51} I agree that Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., may not force Cameron 
Creek Apartments to retrofit its apartments to conform to the standards in the 
National Fuel Gas Code (“NFG Code”).  I do not agree, however, that the Public 
Utilities Commission’s order gives clear guidance as to what Columbia should do 
in the future when it identifies a safety hazard.  The order does not address 
whether Columbia can continue its current practice of “red-tagging” and 
terminating service to unsafe appliances.  I would remand to the commission for 
clarification of that issue. 
{¶ 52} Under the commission’s order, Columbia may continue to use the 
NFG Code as its safety standard.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 08-1091-GA-CSS, at 21 
(June 22, 2011), available at http://dis.puc.state.oh.us/TiffToPDF/A1001001A11 
F22B41223H86128.pdf.  Strict compliance with the NFG Code is not, however, 
always necessary to remedy a safety issue.  Id.  Although strict compliance is a 
safe harbor, customers may also pursue alternative solutions that achieve the same 
level of safety that the code demands.  Id. 
January Term, 2013 
19 
 
{¶ 53} There will always be some period of time between Columbia’s 
identification of a safety hazard and a customer’s demonstration of compliance, 
be it prescriptive compliance or alternative compliance.  Unfortunately, the 
commission’s order provides no guidance as to how Columbia should proceed 
during this interim period.  Columbia’s current practice is to immediately shut off 
service to red-tagged, unsafe appliances until the customer shows that the 
appliance complies with safety standards.  The commission’s order does not 
address whether Columbia can continue this practice going forward or whether 
Columbia must continue to provide service while the customer works toward 
achieving or demonstrating compliance.  The commission acknowledged this 
open question,4 but failed to answer it.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 08-1091-GA-CSS 
(Aug. 17, 2011), at 9-10, available at http://dis.puc.state.oh.us/TiffToPDF/ 
A1001001A11H17B15644J85824.pdf. 
{¶ 54} Accordingly, I must respectfully disagree with the majority’s view 
that the commission’s order provides clear guidance to Columbia.  I would 
remand for the commission to determine whether Columbia may refuse to provide 
service until a customer demonstrates safety compliance or whether Columbia 
must continue to provide service while the customer works toward compliance. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Isaac, Wiles, Boyle, Burkholder & Teetor, L.L.C., Brian M. Zets, and 
Thomas L. Hart, for intervening appellee Cameron Creek Apartments. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Eric B. Gallon, and Mark S. 
Stemm; Charles McCreery, Stephen B. Seiple, and Brooke Leslie, for appellant. 
                                                 
4 As the commission wrote, “Columbia questions whether it can terminate, or refuse to connect, 
natural gas service immediately, and then give the customer time to provide the necessary 
evidence [of safety], or whether it must allow the customer to keep operating in violation of the 
NFG Code, until it can be determined [whether the appliance meets an alternative compliance 
method].”  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 08-1091-GA-CSS (Aug. 17, 2011), at 9-10, available at 
http://dis.puc.state.oh.us/TiffToPDF/A1001001A11H17B15644J85824.pdf. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, William L. Wright, Thomas W. 
McNamee, and Devin D. Parram, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee Public 
Utilities Commission of Ohio. 
________________________