Title: State v. Gilbert

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 109,303 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
TERRY L. GILBERT, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
An appellate court reviews a district court's summary denial of a motion to correct 
an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 de novo because the reviewing court has the 
same access to the motions, records, and files. The reviewing court, like the district court, 
must determine whether the documents conclusively show the defendant is not entitled to 
relief. 
 
2. 
K.S.A. 22-3504 only applies if a sentence is illegal. Whether a sentence is illegal 
is a question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review. An illegal 
sentence under the statute is one:  (a) imposed by a court without jurisdiction; (b) which 
does not conform to the statutory provisions, either in the character or the term of the 
punishment authorized; or (c) which is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in 
which it is to be served. 
 
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3. 
K.S.A. 22-3504 is merely a vehicle to correct a sentence. It is not a mechanism to 
reverse a conviction. 
 
4. 
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed, giving effect to the pleading's content 
rather than the labels and forms used to articulate the arguments. A defendant's failure to 
cite the correct statutory grounds for a claim is immaterial. 
 
5. 
Whether the district court correctly construed a pro se pleading is a question of 
law subject to unlimited review. 
 
Appeal from Saline District Court; JARED B. JOHNSON, judge. Opinion filed June 6, 2014. 
Affirmed. 
 
Gerald E. Wells, of Lawrence, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Ellen Hurst Mitchell, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for 
appellee.  
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  Terry L. Gilbert appeals the summary denial of a pro se motion entitled 
"Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence," which was filed more than 10 years after he was 
sentenced for felony murder. Gilbert claims his sentence is illegal because the standard 
used at his trial for issuing lesser included offense instructions in felony-murder cases 
was overruled over a decade later. See State v. Berry, 292 Kan. 493, 513-14, 254 P.3d 
1276 (2011) (overruling judicially created felony-murder instruction rule that had 
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permitted lesser included offense instructions only when evidence of the underlying 
felony was weak, inconclusive, or conflicting), superseded by statute as stated in State v. 
Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 934, 287 P.3d 245 (2012).   
 
The district court treated the pro se motion as a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence, and Gilbert's appellate counsel argues the pro se motion should have been 
liberally construed as invoking K.S.A. 60-1507(a) (prisoner in custody may claim 
sentence imposed in violation of state or federal Constitution). Had this happened, Gilbert 
reasons, the district court should have determined whether Gilbert's untimely claim could 
be brought under the manifest injustice exception in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2) (court may 
extend 1-year time limitation in K.S.A. 60-1507[f][1] to prevent manifest injustice). 
 
We affirm the district court's construction of Gilbert's pleading as a motion to 
correct an illegal sentence. We acknowledge pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed 
to give effect to their content rather than adhering to any labels and forms used to 
articulate the pro se litigant's arguments. State v. Kelly, 291 Kan. 563, 565-66, 244 P.3d 
639 (2010) (based on allegations in the pleading, district court erred in construing pro se 
motion only under K.S.A. 60-1507, rather than as a motion to withdraw plea). But the 
content of Gilbert's motion specifically cites and applies rules governing motions to 
correct illegal sentences. It does not allege the manifest injustice required to bring an 
untimely motion under K.S.A. 60-1507. Liberal rules of construction cannot transform 
the reality of a pleading's content or the arguments being advanced, even when a litigant 
is pro se. 
 
We also affirm the summary denial of the motion because Gilbert's jury instruction 
claim cannot be raised in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Gilbert challenges his 
conviction, not the sentence imposed. See State v. Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, 902, 295 P.3d 
1039 (2013). 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1999, a jury convicted Gilbert of first-degree felony murder, aggravated 
robbery, aggravated burglary, and criminal damage to property for crimes occurring on or 
around September 14, 1998. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder 
conviction. In his direct appeal, Gilbert argued in part that he was prejudiced by the 
district court's failure to issue lesser included offense instructions for felony murder. The 
court held Gilbert was not entitled to lesser included offense instructions under the rule 
prevailing at that time that such instructions were only required if evidence of the 
underlying felony was weak, inconclusive, or conflicting. Gilbert's convictions were 
affirmed. State v. Gilbert, 272 Kan. 209, 213-15, 32 P.3d 713 (2001). In 2011, this court 
overruled that prevailing rule. 
 
In Berry, this court held that felony murder should no longer be treated differently 
than other crimes for the purposes of lesser included offense instructions, noting K.S.A. 
22-3414's requirement that lesser included offense instructions should be issued if there is 
some evidence that would reasonably justify the conviction of the lesser included crime 
also applied to felony-murder instructions. Berry, 292 Kan. at 513-14. Pertinent to this 
appeal, the Berry court also held its ruling should be applied to all pending cases not yet 
final. 292 Kan. 493, Syl. ¶ 7. 
 
But Berry's impact was short-lived. The legislature modified the statute governing 
lesser included offenses to explicitly state there are no lesser included offenses to felony 
murder. K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-5109(b)(1) (effective July 1, 2012). Gilbert filed his pro se 
motion entitled "Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence" on August 24, 2012. 
 
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Citing Berry, Gilbert argued the district court committed structural error in 1999 
and deprived him of his defense theory by failing to instruct the jury on lesser included 
offenses of felony murder. And recognizing Berry applied to pending cases not yet final, 
Gilbert argued there is no finality to an illegal sentence because an illegal sentence can be 
corrected at any time under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) ("The court may correct an illegal 
sentence at any time."). Gilbert argued his sentence was illegal because his felony-murder 
sentence was "a product of [the district] court's failure to conform to the statutory 
provision K.S.A. 22-3414(3) and K.S.A. 22-2103 as a consequence." K.S.A. 22-2103 
provides:  "This code is intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal 
proceeding. Its provisions shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in 
administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." 
 
The State responded that Gilbert's sentence was not illegal. It noted the trial court 
had jurisdiction and that the sentence both conformed to the applicable statutory 
provisions and was not ambiguous. The State also addressed the merits of Gilbert's claim 
that Berry should apply to his collateral attack on the judgment. It recited the general 
principle that new rules of criminal procedure apply only to cases not yet final. It also 
argued Berry was inapplicable because Gilbert's convictions were final, i.e., his direct 
appeal to this court was concluded. The State further argued that any limited exceptions 
to that rule did not apply, citing Hollingsworth v. State, No. 106,357, 2012 WL 718971, 
at *7 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion) (declining to apply Berry retroactively in 
collateral attack on conviction because conviction was final in 2009), rev. denied 297 
Kan. 1245 (2013). 
 
The district court summarily denied Gilbert's motion, finding it raised no genuine 
factual or legal issues. It addressed the substance of Gilbert's Berry argument 
"[n]otwithstanding the fact that Mr. Gilbert raises alleged trial errors in a Motion to 
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Correct Illegal Sentence." It held Gilbert's case was not pending at the time Berry was 
decided, rendering Berry inapplicable. 
 
Gilbert appealed. This court's jurisdiction arises under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-
3601(b)(3); see State v. Pennington, 288 Kan. 599, 599, 205 P.3d 741 (2009) (jurisdiction 
over appeal of motion to correct illegal sentence lies with court that had jurisdiction to 
hear original appeal). 
 
SUMMARY DENIAL OF MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
 
The first issue is whether the district court erred by summarily denying Gilbert's 
motion. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
An appellate court reviews a district court's summary denial of a motion to correct 
an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 de novo because the reviewing court has the 
same access to the motions, records, and files. Trotter, 296 Kan. at 901. This court, like 
the district court, must determine whether the documents conclusively show the 
defendant is not entitled to relief. 296 Kan. at 901-02.  
 
Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which this court has 
unlimited review. This court has defined an "illegal sentence" under K.S.A. 22-3504 as:  
(1) a sentence imposed by a court without jurisdiction; (2) a sentence that does not 
conform to the applicable statutory provision, either in character or the term of authorized 
punishment; or (3) a sentence that is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in 
which it is to be served. 296 Kan. at 902.  
 
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Discussion 
 
Gilbert argues his instructional error claim fits within the second category—his 
sentence does not conform to applicable statutory provisions—because failure to issue 
lesser included offense instructions on the felony-murder charge violated K.S.A. 22-
3414(3), which requires lesser included offense instructions "where there is some 
evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime." 
 
As the district court stated, Gilbert's instructional error claim is a challenge to his 
conviction, not his sentence. This is evident because the proper remedy for the failure to 
issue a lesser included offense instruction is to reverse Gilbert's conviction—not impose a 
different sentence. See State v. Qualls, 297 Kan. 61, 72-73, 298 P.3d 311 (2013) 
(reversing conviction for failure to instruct on lesser included offense of voluntary 
manslaughter). 
 
K.S.A. 22-3504 is solely a vehicle to correct a sentence. It is not a mechanism to 
reverse a conviction. Trotter, 296 Kan. at 902; State v. Williams, 283 Kan. 492, 495-96, 
153 P.3d 520 (2007) (stating K.S.A. 22-3504 is "not a vehicle for a collateral attack on a 
conviction"). This court has repeatedly applied this principle to reject a motion to correct 
an illegal sentence in the context of challenges to a defective complaint, noting the 
defendant must obtain a reversal of his conviction to overturn his sentence based on a 
defective complaint. Trotter, 296 Kan. at 904; State v. Sims, 294 Kan. 821, 825, 280 P.3d 
780 (2012). Given this well established rule, the district court did not err by summarily 
denying Gilbert's instructional error claim in the context of a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence. 
 
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CONSTRUING PLEADING AS A K.S.A. 60-1507 MOTION 
 
Gilbert also argues the district court erred by treating his motion as a motion to 
correct an illegal sentence. He contends the district court should have treated it as a 
K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
"Pro se pleadings are liberally construed, giving effect to the pleading's content 
rather than the labels and forms used to articulate the defendant's arguments. A 
defendant's failure to cite the correct statutory grounds for his or her claim is immaterial." 
Kelly, 291 Kan. at 565. Whether the district court correctly construed a pro se pleading is 
a question of law subject to unlimited review. 291 Kan. at 565. 
 
Discussion 
 
K.S.A. 60-1507(f) requires a motion under the statute to be brought within 1 year 
of the final order of the last appellate court or the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari 
to the United States Supreme Court. But that time limitation may be extended "to prevent 
a manifest injustice." K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2). Gilbert recognizes the 1-year time limit 
expired years ago, so he necessarily argues the district court should have determined 
whether resolving his motion was necessary to prevent manifest injustice—assuming the 
pleading may properly be construed as being brought under K.S.A. 60-1507.  
 
Under this court's rules of construction, the pleading's content governs. 
Makthepharak v. State, 298 Kan. 573, 581, 314 P.3d 876 (2013); Kelly, 291 Kan. at 565. 
Gilbert titled his pleading as a "Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence." And he 
acknowledges this court has defined an illegal sentence as "one which does not conform 
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to the statutory provisions." Applying that rule, he argues his sentence does not conform 
to the statutory provisions governing lesser included offenses in light of this court's Berry 
decision. Moreover, Gilbert specifically argues he can raise this issue now despite this 
court's holding in Berry that the new rule only applies to pending cases because that rule 
does not apply to motions to correct an illegal sentence. Gilbert's theory is that "there is 
no finality in an illegal sentence." 
 
The substance of his pleading is that of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
There is nothing in it that can reasonably be read as raising a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. 
Most noticeably, Gilbert claimed his motion was timely because it was a motion to 
correct an illegal sentence, which carries no time restriction, as opposed to a K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion, which does. K.S.A. 60-1507(f). And he did not argue the manifest injustice 
necessary to permit an untimely K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. 
 
In State v. Holt, 298 Kan. 469, 480, 313 P.3d 826 (2013), this court described 
manifest injustice as meaning "'"obviously unfair"'" or "'"shocking to the conscience."'" 
In that case, we upheld the summary dismissal of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion when the 
defendant failed to cite any facts supporting his bald assertion of manifest injustice. The 
Holt court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate he was entitled to the K.S.A. 60-
1507(f) time extension because he did not point to any specific facts supporting his claim 
of manifest injustice and held the district court correctly declined to reach the merits of 
the claim. 298 Kan. at 481. 
 
In his motion, Gilbert did not assert manifest injustice, much less facts supporting 
such a contention. We hold that the failure to allege manifest injustice not only weighs 
against construing the motion as one falling under K.S.A. 60-1507, but it also supports a 
conclusion that any K.S.A. 60-1507 argument was insufficiently raised to warrant review 
by the district court.   
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Affirmed.  
 
MORITZ, J., not participating.