Title: Poll v. State, ex rel., Dept. of Employment, Div. of Workers' Safety and Compensation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Poll v. State, ex rel., Dept. of Employment, Div. of Workers' Safety and Compensation1998 WY 84963 P.2d 977Case Number: 97-122Decided: 07/09/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Jonathan Scott POLL, Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, 
DIVISION OF WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION,

Appellee (Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District Court, Sweetwater County, 
Jere Ryckman, J.

 

Michael J. Finn of Bussart, 
West, Rossetti, Piaia & Tyler, P.C., Rock Springs, for Appellant 
(Petitioner).

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General, 
for Appellee (Respondent).

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at the time of expedited 
conference.

 

THOMAS, Justice.

 [¶1] The essential issue in this appeal by Jonathan 
Scott Poll (Poll) is the lawfulness of the action of the Division of Workers' 
Safety and Compensation (Division) of the Department of Employment (Department) 
in referring the matter to the Department's Internal Hearing Unit (IHU). The 
Department referred the issue of the timeliness of Poll's response to a 
notification of a final determination by the Division to the IHU. That resulted 
in a Final Agency Order which denied further administrative review because Poll 
had failed to make a timely response to the Division's final determination. Poll 
sought review of the Final Agency Order, and the district court ruled 
that the Department had authority to 
adopt rules and regulations establishing the IHU and specifying its functions. 
The district court also held that neither the Division nor the Department was 
required to submit to the Office of Hearing Examiners the issue of timeliness of 
the filing of a response to a final determination. We recently considered 
substantially identical issues in Sheneman v. Division of Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Internal Hearing Unit, 956 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1998). We apply and 
follow the resolution in Sheneman, and 
affirm the Order of the district court.

 

[¶2] In the Brief of 
Appellant, filed on behalf of Poll, these issues are 
raised:

 

1. 
The agency in this matter did not have authority to hold the hearing in this 
matter because it had not been granted the authority to do so by 
statute.

 

2. 
The hearing held below in this matter was conducted before a representative of 
the agency and thus violated the Claimant's constitutionally provided right of 
due process because Claimant was denied a fair and impartial hearing by the 
manner in which Claimant's claims were adjudicated by the 
agency.

 

3. 
The agency in this case violated its own rules in this case by holding a hearing 
pursuant to the APA rather than refer it to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings.

 

4. 
There was no jurisdiction of the agency to hold the hearing that was held below 
in this matter before the agency's "Internal Hearing Unit" (IHU), because the 
Final Determination issued by the agency was insufficient on its 
face.

 

[¶3] This Statement of the 
Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee:

 

The Division made a rule authorizing an Internal 
Hearing Unit (IHU) to determine the timeliness of an Employee's 
objection:

 

          
A. Did the Division have authority to adopt the IHU 
procedure?

 

          
B. Was the application of the IHU procedure to the Employee's pending 
case in accordance with law?

 

          
C. Was the Hearing Officer arbitrary, capricious, or 
unfair?

 

          
D. Is the Division's Final Determination subject to 
review?

 

There is not an additional 
statement of issues in the Reply Brief, filed on behalf of 
Poll.

 

[¶4] Poll was run over by a 
front-end loader at a road construction site on July 27, 1990. He suffered an 
injury to his leg from the accident, and as a result of the injury, his lower 
left leg was amputated. The Division awarded Poll $17,424.46 in permanent 
partial impairment benefits. On March 27, 1996, the Division issued a Final 
Determination of and Application for Loss of Earnings Benefit that informed Poll 
he was eligible for an additional $7,467.62 for a loss of earnings award. The 
Final Determination advised Poll that he had until April 2, 1996, to object to 
the Division's determination and request a hearing before the Office of 
Administrative Hearings.  Poll 
received this notification, but he did not protest the determination until April 
11, 1996.

 

[¶5] On April 17, 1996, the 
Division issued a Notification of Late Response to Final Determination, which 
was sent to Poll. That document stated that Poll's request for a hearing was not 
timely, and the Final Determination was not subject to review. The Notification 
of Late Response to Final Determination also informed Poll that he could request 
a hearing on the issue of timeliness only, which had to be presented by May 10, 
1996. Poll requested such a hearing, and the Division placed that request on the 
docket of the IHU, assigning a Division employee as the hearing 
officer.

 

[¶6] The hearing before the 
IHU was held on July 9, 1996, and at the conclusion of that hearing, the hearing 
officer found that the Division did not receive a timely written request for a 
hearing, and the Final Determination was not subject to further review. The 
hearing officer's decision was confirmed by the Division in its Final Agency 
Order entered on August 9, 1996.

 

[¶7] On September 10, 1996, 
Poll sought review of the Final Agency Order in the district court. Poll 
contended that the Department did not have the authority to hold the hearing 
before the IHU. On March 10, 1997, the district court affirmed the Final Agency 
Order ruling that the Department had authority to adopt rules and regulations 
establishing the IHU and that the Division had failed to receive a timely 
written request for a hearing. The district court affirmed the decision that the 
Final Determination was not subject to further review.

 

[¶8] Our review of an agency 
order is governed by WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1990) which 
provides:

 

(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and 
when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error. The reviewing court shall:

 

          
(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 

          
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

 

          
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law;

 

          
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

 

          
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;

 

          
* * *.

 

When we consider an appeal 
from a review of agency action by the district court, we afford no special 
deference to the ruling of the district court. B-F Drilling, Inc. v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 942 P.2d 392, 395 (Wyo. 
1997); Manning v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 938 P.2d 870, 872 (Wyo. 1997). The interpretation and correct application of the Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Act is a question of law which is accorded plenary review. 
Wright v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 209, 211 (Wyo. 1998); Painter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Div., 931 P.2d 953, 954 (Wyo. 1997). The agency's conclusion of law can only be 
affirmed if they are in accordance with the law. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Div. v. Gerdes, 951 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Wyo. 1997); Manning, 938 P.2d  
at 873.

 

[¶9] Poll contends in this 
Court that the decision of the hearing officer was invalid because the Division 
had no statutory authority to establish the IHU. In the alternative, Poll argues 
that even if the requisite authority to establish the IHU did exist, the 
decision should be vacated because the hearing officer was an employee of the 
agency. Poll contends that this procedure violated his constitutional right to 
due process before a fair and impartial tribunal. As a final matter, Poll 
asserts that the IHU lacked jurisdiction because the IHU was not in existence at 
the time of Poll's injury. Recently in Sheneman, we addressed all three of these 
issues.

 

[¶10] We held that the 
authority for the Division to establish the IHU for the purpose of resolving 
issues of timeliness was derived from the power of the Division to adopt rules 
and regulations for the administration of the Worker's Compensation Act pursuant 
to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-802(a) (Supp. 1995). Sheneman, 956 P.2d  at 349-350. In 
addition, the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act requires that each agency 
shall "[a]dopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of 
all formal and informal procedures available in connection with contested 
cases[.]" WYO. STAT. § 16-3-102(a)(i) (1990). We concluded in Sheneman that 
from these statutory provisions, the 
Division was vested with ample authority to form the IHU. Sheneman, 956 P.2d  at 
350. With respect to Poll's argument that his constitutional right to due 
process before a fair and impartial tribunal was violated when the hearing was 
held before a member of the agency staff, we examined the language of WYO. STAT. 
§ 16-3-112 (1990) in Sheneman.  The 
statute provides:

 

(a) If not otherwise authorized by law there shall 
preside at the taking of evidence in all contested cases the statutory agency, 
one (1) or more members of the body which comprises the agency, or an employee 
of the agency or an employee of another agency designated by the agency to 
act as presiding officer. The functions of all those presiding in contested 
cases shall be conducted in an impartial manner. * * *

 

          
* * *

 

(e) When required by law an agency 
shall adopt rules and regulations providing a procedure for the use and the 
selection of an administrative hearing officer. An agency shall not delegate the 
authority to make final decisions to an independent administrative hearing 
officer unless required by law.

 

Sheneman, 956 P.2d  at 
349-350. We held that these provisions justified the formation of the IHU by the 
Division comprised of members of the 
agency. Sheneman, 956 P.2d  at 349-350.

 

[¶11] As to Poll's other 
argument that the IHU lacked jurisdiction because the IHU did not exist at the 
time of his injury, we ruled in Sheneman that the rules and regulations of the 
Division referring a case to IHU to determine the issue of timely filing was a 
matter of procedural rather than substantive law. Sheneman, 956 P.2d  at 351. The 
law in effect at the time Poll requested a hearing before the IHU controls the 
procedure, rather than the law in effect at the time his 
injury.

 

[¶12] The Order in the 
district court is affirmed in all respects.