Title: SHAWN WAYNE JONES v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SHAWN WAYNE JONES v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 33203 P.3d 1091Case Number: No. S-08-0045Decided: 03/09/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
SHAWN 
WAYNE JONES,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and 
Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Alden.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jenny L. 
Craig, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In a change of 
plea hearing, Shawn Wayne Jones pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated 
assault and battery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(ii), and five 
counts of felony property destruction, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-201(a) and (b)(iii).  Jones also 
admitted to being an habitual offender, and was sentenced to a term of 
incarceration of not less than twenty years nor more than forty years for the 
aggravated assault and battery, and not less than five years nor more than ten 
years for the five counts of felony property destruction, the terms to be served 
consecutively.  Jones appealed, 
claiming that the award for restitution exceeded the jurisdiction of the trial 
court, that an amendment of the initial charge was unauthorized and thus plain 
error, and that the factual basis given at the change of plea hearing was 
inadequate.  We reverse in part, and 
affirm in part.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Jones presents 
three issues for our consideration:

 
 

I.              
Did 
the award of restitution for loss of support constitute an illegal 
sentence?

II.            
Did 
the unauthorized amendment of the charge against Mr. Jones leave Mr. Jones 
unaware of the charge to which he pled guilty and constitute plain 
error?

III.           
Was 
the plea supported by an adequate factual basis to prove 
voluntariness?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues only slightly:

 
 

1.    
The 
District Court erred when it ordered [Jones] to pay restitution for "loss of 
support."

2.    
[Jones] 
consented to the amended felony information and impliedly waived a preliminary 
hearing on the amended charge.

3.    
[Jones'] 
guilty plea was voluntarily made and the district court was presented with a 
sufficient factual basis to accept that plea.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On March 10, 
2007, Shawn Wayne Jones brutally beat his wife.  Jones began attacking his wife while she 
was holding their son.  Mrs. Jones 
attempted to escape to the child's bedroom.  Jones foiled the effort and demanded 
that she come out.  Leaving her son 
behind, Mrs. Jones returned to the living room and the attack resumed.  Jones threw his wife onto the floor and 
hit her on the head multiple times with a wooden dining chair.  He hit her on her face and her chest, 
and kicked her in the ribs.  After 
she ran to the bedroom and crawled under the bed, Jones began tearing the bed 
apart.  As a result of his 
destruction, the bed's box spring fell on top of her, but Jones continued to 
beat his wife with a bedpost.

 
 
[¶4]      Jones' wife 
eventually jumped out the window and ran to a neighbor's house to call the 
authorities.  Members of the 
Gillette Police Department arrived and finally had to taser Jones to gain 
control of him.  Three days after 
the incident, Jones was charged with one count of aggravated assault and battery 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i), as an habitual offender, 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a) and (b)(ii), and five counts of felony 
property destruction, in violation of § 6-3-201(a) and 
(b)(iii).

 
 
[¶5]      After his initial 
appearance, with his bond set at $100,000 and following his preliminary hearing, 
Jones was bound over to the district court on April 20, 2007.  An amended felony information was filed, 
charging Jones with aggravated assault and battery in violation of § 
6-2-502(a)(ii) instead of § 6-2-502(a)(i).  
Jones pled not guilty to all of the charges in June, but changed his 
pleas to guilty on all six counts on September 24, 2007.  After a restitution hearing in which 
Jones was ordered to pay $22,235.87 in restitution, the district court sentenced 
Jones to a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty nor more than forty 
years for the aggravated assault and battery, to run consecutively to a term of 
not less than five nor more than ten years for the five counts of felony 
property destruction.  Jones 
received credit for time served, and on February 1, 2008, he filed his timely 
notice of appeal.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Restitution

 
 
[¶6]      On November 
8, 2007, the district court held a restitution hearing in the instant case.  The State requested that the Division of 
Victims' Services be compensated a total of $9,265.73, of which $5,400.00 was 
for "loss of support" for Jones' wife.  
That request was granted, and the "loss of support" amount was 
incorporated into the district court's sentence, filed January 10, 
2008.

 
 
[¶7]      On December 14, 
2007, this Court issued Hite v. State, 
2007 WY 199, 172 P.3d 737 (Wyo. 2007).  
In Hite, we stated that restitution ordered for 
"loss of support," without more specificity, is insufficient to assure that the 
trial court complied with the statutory mandate, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-103(b), and that restitution be ordered only for "pecuniary damages" caused 
by a defendant's criminal conduct.  
Id. ¶¶ 14-16, 172 P.3d  at 
740-41.

 
 
[¶8]      The facts of Hite are similar to the facts of this 
case regarding restitution.  The 
record here, as in Hite, is insufficiently specific to permit 
the conclusion that the "loss of support" portion of the restitution ordered 
here comported with the statutory definition of "pecuniary damages."  Hite controls the disposition of this 
issue, and thus we remand this issue to the district court for the limited 
purpose of conducting a new, more specific restitution 
hearing.

 
 
Amended 
Information

 
 
[¶9]      In his second 
issue on appeal, Jones claims that the amended felony information was never properly authorized and that he 
never received a preliminary hearing on the amended aggravated assault and 
battery charge.  Jones asserts that 
because of this, he was never adequately informed that he would be called to account for using 
a "deadly weapon" against his wife and, therefore, was unable to consider 
whether the instrument he used against her fit the definition of "deadly weapon" 
pursuant to § 6-2-502(a)(ii).

[¶10]   We review this question of law 
under the plain error standard.  
"When an issue is not raised at trial, the burden is upon the appellant 
to establish that plain error occurred." Britton v. State, 976 P.2d 669, 
671 (Wyo. 1999) (citations omitted).  
Under the plain error standard, 
the appellant must show (1) a clear record of the alleged error; (2) the 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; (3) denial of a substantial 
right; and (4) material prejudice.  
Reece v. State, 2008 WY 121, ¶ 8, 193 P.3d 274, 276 (Wyo. 
2008).

[¶11]   In analyzing Jones' claim that he 
was not properly advised of the charges against him, we first look to the record 
to determine whether it is clear regarding the incident which is alleged as 
error.  While there was no ruling by the circuit court on the State's 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Felony Information, and it does not appear that 
a preliminary hearing was held on the amended charge, it is clear that an 
amended felony information exists.  
From the record, it is also clear that the court, and the parties, 
proceeded according to that information, and not the 
original.

[¶12]   Having determined that the first 
prong of the plain error standard is met, we look next to the second prong:  whether Jones showed that there was a 
violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  Jones argues that this prong is met 
because, first, the court did not authorize the charge to be changed, and 
second, because Jones never received a detailed explanation of the new charge. 
 However, 
it is our conclusion that no clear violation of law occurred because Jones 
waived any objection to the lack of a preliminary hearing or advisement of the 
implications of the amended information.

[¶13]   This Court was presented with a 
similar situation in Mickelson v. State, 
2008 WY 29, ¶ 2, n.1, 178 P.3d 1080, 1081 (Wyo. 2008).  There, the original felony 
information filed in circuit court 
charged the appellant only with aggravated assault and battery.  On that charge, he received a 
preliminary examination and was bound over for trial in district court on that 
charge only.  However, he was 
arraigned in district court on a second amended information that charged two counts:  aggravated assault and battery, and 
possession, manufacture or disposition of a deadly weapon with unlawful 
intent.   As we stated in Mickelson, ¶ 2, n.1, 178 P.3d  at 
1081, this type of change "concerns 
us" because:

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-8-105 (LexisNexis 2007), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §5-9-132(b)(LexisNexis 
2007), W.R.Cr.P. 3(c), and W.R.Cr.P. 5(c) contain clear requirements for a 
preliminary examination, and allow amendment of an information only in limited 
circumstances.  [However],

"the 
time to object to defects in the preliminary hearing is before arraignment and 
trial, and unless some reason is shown why counsel could not have discovered 
and challenged the defect before trial, it will generally be assumed that any 
objections to the preliminary proceedings were considered and waived, and no 
post-conviction remedies will be available."

Trujillo 
v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 582-83 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894, 
900-01 (D.C. Cir. 1964)

 
 
[¶14]   As we stated in Mickelson, neither the preliminary 
examination requirement, nor the amendment process, is jurisdictional, inasmuch 
as both can be waived by failure to raise the issue before trial.  Furthermore, an information may be amended pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 
3(e), which states:

 
 
(e)  Amendment of information or citation.  
Without leave of the court, the attorney for the state may amend an 
information or citation until five days before a preliminary examination in a 
case required to be tried in district court or until five days before trial for 
a case not required to be tried in district court.  The court may permit an information or 
citation to be amended:

(1) with the defendant's consent, at any time 
before sentencing.

(2) Whether or not the defendant 
consents:

(A)  At 
any time before trial if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.

(B)  At 
any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is 
charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.

 
 
[¶15]   Here, not only did Jones fail to 
raise an objection to the amended felony information in his case, but he consented to being 
prosecuted under the amended document in district court and waived his right to 
a preliminary hearing on the amended charge.  First, Jones' counsel was served with 
the Motion for Leave to File Amended Felony Information on April 20, 2007, the 
same date as the preliminary hearing.  
The motion and the amended information were filed with the Clerk of Court on 
April 24, 2007.  Our review of the 
record shows that Jones expressly adopted the amended document as the correct 
charging document, both through defense counsel's statements during the district 
court's arraignment of Jones, and through Jones' contemporaneous acknowledgment 
of the document.  Also, defense 
counsel appeared so comfortable with the amended information, he requested a waiver of its 
reading.  The following colloquy 
occurred:

 
 
The 
Court:  All right.  Does 
the defendant have a copy of the amended felony information?  I want to make sure that's the correct 
document that we have before us for the hearing today.

 
 
Mr. 
Dumbrill, is that the charging document at this point?

 
 
Mr. 
Dumbrill:  Yes.

 
 
Mr. 
Wolfe:  Yes, Your Honor.

 
 
The 
Court:  All right.  Do you 
have that now, sir?

 
 
Jones:  Sure, 
yes.

 
 
The 
Court:  Have you read through that and gone over it with your 
attorney?

 
 
Jones:  Yeah, 
I have.

.

 
 
The 
Court:  Is there anything which would affect your ability to 
understand the charges and to participate in these 
proceedings?

 
 
Jones: 
  Nope.

 
 
The 
Court:  The amended felony information has six 
counts.

 
 
Mr. 
Wolfe:  Your Honor, if it would help anything I would advise the Court 
that we have gone over that and the defendant intends, understands the charges, 
and intends to enter a plea of not guilty to all counts.

 
 
The 
Court:  All right.  Well, 
that will help a little bit.  Let's 
address - - 

 
 
Mr. 
Wolfe:  We would waive the reading of the information. 

 
 
The 
Court:  Well, I appreciate that offer to simplify and shorten; 
however, I like to make sure that the arraignment is more than just something 
that we should skip, but I'll take your thoughts into 
consideration.

.

 
 
[The 
Court]:  you are entitled to be represented by competent counsel at 
all critical stages of the criminal proceedings.  Now, I see that there was a change in 
counsel and you've ended up with Mr. Wolfe, but still from the public defender's 
office.  So it's just a reassignment 
due to a change there.  With regard 
to Mr. Wolfe's representation, I want to ask you a couple of questions.  Have you explained all of the facts of 
your case to him?

 
 
Jones:  Yes.

 
 
The 
Court:  Do you have any complaints about his representation of you up 
until now?

 
 
Jones:  No.

 
 
The 
Court:  The file shows there was a preliminary hearing; is that 
correct?

 
 
Jones:  Yes.

 
 
The 
Court:  And do you recall the circuit judge making the findings of 
probable cause at the conclusion of that hearing?

 
 
Jones:  Yes, 
sir.

 
 
The 
Court:  Do you have any complaints about the time that it's taken to 
get your case to this stage today?

 
 
Jones:  No, 
sir.

 
 
[¶16]   Jones' consent to the amended 
information occurred well before his 
sentencing on December 6, 2007, and thus, the amendment was made pursuant to the 
"consent" provision of W.R.Cr.P. 3(e)(1).  
Additionally, the record is clear that the amending of the 
information occurred well before 
Jones' scheduled trial and subsequent guilty plea on September 24, 2007, 
bringing the amended information 
within the provisions of Rule 3(e)(2)(A).  
In our estimation, the amended information was also permitted by the district court 
because it could not have prejudiced Jones' substantial rights.  Jones was put on notice that he would 
have to defend against the amended charge between the close of his preliminary 
hearing and his arraignment, and what is more, the amended information was based in large part on the same facts 
and evidence as the original charge and stemmed out of the exact same 
occurrence.

 
 
[¶17]   Although Jones did not receive a 
preliminary hearing on the amended charge, his implicit waiver of his right to a 
preliminary hearing is quite apparent on the record.  No demand for another preliminary 
hearing was ever made by Jones' defense counsel.  Jones himself, after discussing the new 
charging document with his counsel, proceeded to enter a plea, prepare for 
trial, and ultimately pled to the charges in the amended information without 
objection.  Accordingly, we find no 
error. 

 
 
Guilty 
Plea/Factual Basis

 
 
[¶18]   In his third and final issue on 
appeal, Jones claims that because he was not adequately informed at his change 
of plea hearing about the definition of the term "deadly weapon" used in 
§ 6-2-502(a)(ii), he could not have given an adequate factual basis 
regarding that element of the crime to insure that his plea was given 
intelligently and voluntarily. 

 
 
[¶19]   We review this claim under a de novo standard of review.  We quote here  portions of what was so thoroughly 
stated in Maes v. State, 2005 WY 70, 
¶ 9, 114 P.3d 708, 710-11 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citations 
omitted):

 
 
            
We review claims that a guilty plea was not voluntary de novo. 
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we determine whether the district 
court sufficiently described the nature of the charges, including the possible 
penalties; informed the defendant of the right to representation; informed the 
defendant of the rights waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a factual basis 
for the plea.  A guilty plea is 
valid where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that a defendant made 
a voluntary and intelligent choice to plead guilty from alternative courses of 
action available to him and understood the consequences of his 
plea.

 
 
We 
also stated in Maes that in reviewing 
a claim that there was not a sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea, our 
review is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 11(f), which states:

 
 

(f)  Determining 
accuracy of plea. 
-- Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not 
enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it 
that there is a factual basis for the plea.

 
 
[¶20]   Also,

 
 
This 
provision does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who 
pleads is actually guilty; the rule's standard is much lower. Rule 11(f) merely 
requires the court to satisfy itself that a factual basis exists for the guilty 
plea before accepting the plea.

 
 

Maes, 
¶ 10, 
114 P.3d 710-11.

 
 
[¶21]   To begin our analysis of whether 
Jones' plea was voluntary, we restate our test used in making that 
determination:

 
 
            
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, 
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, 
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or 
promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including 
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their 
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business 
(e.g. bribes).

 
 

Maes, 
¶ 16, 
114 P.3d  at 713 (quoting Rodriguez v. 
State, 917 P.2d 172, 175 (Wyo. 1966)).  
In Wyoming, this test is fulfilled when the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b)(1) are followed.  Before 
accepting a plea of guilty, this rule requires the district court to advise a 
defendant regarding the following:

 
 
The 
nature of the charge to 
which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum 
penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by 
law and other sanctions which could attend a conviction including, when 
applicable, the general nature of any mandatory assessments (such as the 
surcharge for the Crime Victim Compensation Account), discretionary assessments 
(costs, attorney fees, restitution, etc.) and, in controlled substance 
offenses, the potential loss of entitlement to federal 
benefits.

 
 
W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b)(1).  The intent of the 
procedural requirements of Rule 11 is to "prevent the individual charged with a 
crime from being misled into a waiver of substantial rights."  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 
1106 (Wyo. 1993).  In some 
circumstances, a simple reading of the information and allowing a defendant to 
ask questions satisfies the requirements of Rule 11; however, in other 
situations:

 
 
[I]t 
may be necessary to explain the elements of the crime and define complex legal 
terms.  The actions required of the 
district court in any particular case depend largely on whether the elements of 
the offense are difficult to understand, considering both their complexity to 
the average person with no legal training and the sophistication of the 
individual defendant.

 
 

Peper 
v. State, 768 P.2d 26, 29 (Wyo. 1989) (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶22]   At the change of plea hearing, the 
district court read to Jones each count of the amended information, including the appropriate portion of the 
habitual offender statute that had been agreed upon pursuant to the plea 
agreement.  Additionally, the court 
also gave Jones the appropriate admonitions regarding maximum terms and fines 
associated with each count, the imposition of court costs, the Crime Victims' 
Compensation surcharge, restitution, and repayment of public defender fees.  Furthermore, Jones was advised, among 
other things, that he could lose certain civil rights, that he was giving up his 
right to challenge any errors or omissions in the charging documents, and that 
he was waiving any defenses and the presumption of innocence.  Jones was asked by the court if he had 
discussed his choice to plead guilty with his attorney and whether he was doing 
so voluntarily.  All of Jones' 
answers indicate that he knew full well what he was doing, that he was not under 
the influence, and that there existed no other factor that would affect his 
ability to understand the charges.

 
 
[¶23]   Though Jones' answers indicate that 
he was fully aware of the proceedings and their consequences, he nevertheless 
argues that a sufficient factual basis regarding the "deadly weapon" element of 
his crime was lacking.  This Court 
has explained that:

 
 
The 
intent of the procedural requirement of a factual basis is to prevent the 
individual charged with a crime from being misled into a waiver of substantial 
rights. Sami v. State, 2004 WY 23, ¶ 9, 85 P.3d 1014, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 
2004).  A sufficient inquiry to 
obtain a factual basis includes a determination that the defendant understood 
his conduct, in light of the law, to be criminal. Id. However, the 
factual basis for accepting a plea may be inferred from circumstances 
surrounding the crime and need not be established only from the defendant's 
statements. Id. W.R.Cr.P. 11 does not require proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a defendant who pleads guilty is actually guilty nor does it require 
complete descriptions of the elements. Id. 

 
 

Maes, 
¶ 21, 114 P.3d 714.

            

[¶24]   Here, the district court began the 
factual basis portion of the hearing by asking Jones what conduct he engaged in 
on March 10, 2007, that was a violation of the law.  After Jones briefly spoke, the court 
began to ask more pointed questions.

 
 
The 
Court:  All right.  Let's 
talk about the charges here.  Just 
very briefly tell me what you did that was a violation of the law on March 10th.

 
 
Jones:  Well, 
I came home and I only did just a little bit of drinking and I hit her and I 
tore up the house.  What I did 
wasn't right and I shouldn't have done it.

 
 
The 
Court:  Now, who did you hit?

 
 
Jones:  My 
wife.

 
 
The 
Court:  What did you hit her with?

 
 
Jones:  I 
pushed her.  She hit her 
head.

 
 
The 
Court:  She hit her head on what?

 
 
Jones:  The 
cabinet or something, I don't know, in the bathroom, bed, or something.  I don't know what it 
was.

 
 
The 
Court:  The charge said that you attempted to cause 

 
 
Jones:  I 
think I threw a chair too, I don't know.  
I did a lot of stuff that I can't remember.

 
 
The 
Court:  Okay.  Well, to 
have a factual basis there has to be a deadly weapon involved at some 
point.  Now, it doesn't have to be a 
gun or knife but it could be something else. 

 
 
Jones:  Yeah, 
I threw a chair.

 
 
The 
Court:  You threw a chair at her?

All 
right.  You said you then trashed 
the place.  Was that the word you 
used?

 
 
[¶25]   The prosecutor also made an offer 
of proof to the court regarding what evidence would have been presented had the 
case gone to trial.

 
 
I 
guess, Your Honor, [the] only other thing that I would add to the factual basis 
 and I think that the exhibits speak for themselves, but were Mr. Jones' wife 
to testify she would have testified that she was struck with a chair.  That she had her head rammed through a 
door.  That she was struck with a 
bed rail or some similar object.  
That there was material lit in her presence with a lighter at the same 
time she was told she was going to die and that all of those things in there 
that were used would have been deadly weapons in this 
case.

 
 
The 
following exchange then occurred:

 
 
The 
Court:  All right.  Mr. 
Wolfe, do you have any comments or concerns on the factual basis or other items 
I've covered with your client?

Mr. 
Wolfe:  No, Your Honor.

Court:  Mr. 
Jones, is there any reason the court should not accept your guilty 
pleas?

Jones:  No, 
Your Honor.

 
 
[¶26]   Given the facts and circumstances 
of the crime, the prosecutor's statement and Jones' statement, we conclude that 
the district court was presented with a sufficient factual basis to accept the 
guilty plea.  The district court 
made no error in its determination that this was 
so.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   We affirm the district court's 
judgment and sentence with respect to the crimes charged and the penal sentences 
imposed.  However, we reverse that 
portion of the sentence which ordered Jones to pay restitution for "loss of 
support," and we remand this matter to the district court for further 
proceedings in that regard, as more fully set out 
above.