Title: State v. Lawrence Whaley

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LaVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue in this appeal is whether it was proper to proceed with the trial in defendant's absence. Lawrence Whaley was indicted in July 1995 for first-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute and third-degree possession of CDS. The indictment alleged that in April 1995, Whaley, an Ohio resident, and his co- defendant, Robert Lovejoy, were transporting cocaine when State troopers stopped and searched their vehicle and discovered the CDS. Whaley pled guilty at his arraignment on September 5, 1995. The trial court directed him to appear on October 16, 1995, for a pretrial status conference. Whaley signed the order, which stated that the parties agreed to appear for the status conference; that no further notice would be provided; and that if Whaley did not appear on the next scheduled date or on the trial date, the trial would proceed without him. Whaley appeared for the October 16, 1995, pretrial conference. The trial court directed him to appear next on November 17, 1995, on his motion to suppress evidence. Whaley signed the pretrial conference order, which, like the prior order, stated that if Whaley did not appear on the next scheduled date or on the trial date, the trial would proceed without him. That October 1995 appearance was Whaley's last until September 1997, after he was tried in absentia. The motion to suppress was adjourned numerous times at the request of either or both of the defendants. Whaley was never in court for any of those dates. The motion to suppress was finally heard on March 31 and April 1, 1997, and denied. The trial court proceeded on the basis that Whaley's counsel had consented after being unable to secure Whaley's appearance. Defendant's counsel stated on the record that he was in contact with the person who Whaley had asked him to notify, and that person attempted to contact Whaley but had not been successful in doing so. In addition, he indicated that the letter concerning the trial date was sent to Whaley's last known address and was returned because Whaley was no longer at that address. The trial commenced against Whaley on April 2, 1997, and a jury found him guilty of second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and third-degree possession of cocaine. Five months later, Whaley was arrested in Florida and returned to New Jersey. In a pre-sentence investigation report, a Bergen County probation officer stated that Whaley admitted he did not show up for his court date and split and ran because of the prison time he faced, and that he lived under an alias name in Florida until he was apprehended. When Whaley appeared for sentencing on October 17, 1997, he moved for a new trial on the ground that he did not waive his right to appear at trial because he was unaware of the trial date. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that a new trial motion had to be made within 10 days of conviction. Whaley was sentenced to an aggregate term of eighteen years with a nine-year term of parole ineligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed Whaley's conviction and sentence, except that it remanded for entry of a judgment to reflect merger of the convictions. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certification. HELD: Where a defendant does not receive actual notice of the trial date, there can be no inference of a valid waiver of the right to be present at trial. 1. The right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of the trial is an essential element of the constitutional guarantee of a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him. Under certain conditions, however, a trial may proceed without a defendant's presence. In State v. Hudson, 119 N.J. 165, 182 (1990), this Court held that a defendant's knowing, voluntary, and unjustified absence before or after trial has commenced does not prevent trial from proceeding in absentia. Pursuant to Hudson, R. 3:16(b) was amended to provide that a defendant's unjustified absence may be found to be a waiver of his right to be present at trial if the defendant has received actual notice in court of the trial date, or trial has commenced in defendant's presence. (Pp. 6-12) 2. The record in this case precludes the conclusion that Whaley received actual notice of the trial date. During Whaley's two court appearances in 1995, the trial court did not set a trial date. Defense counsel's representations to the trial court in all subsequent proceedings was that he had not informed Whaley of the trial date and that the contact person had not been able to do so, either. (Pp. 12-15) 3. Because the record is conclusive concerning the failure to provide Whaley actual notice of a trial date, the Court need not review the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial. The Court notes, however, that it does not agree with the conclusion that Whaley's motion was untimely because not filed within ten days of the verdict. The pertinent time period for filing a motion for a new trial based on a claim of nonwaiver of appearance for trial is prior to sentencing. R. 3:20-2. (Pp. 15-16) 4. The Court has sought to balance a criminal defendant's right to be present at trial and the government's prerogative to prosecute. The defendant's right to be present at trial is not an invitation to obstruction. The question is whether there is reason to continue with the seeming rigidity of the language of R. 3:16(b). Actual notice of a scheduled trial date can be demonstrated in ways other than through in-court notification to the defendant of the trial date. The Court refers to the Criminal Practice Committee reconsideration of the Rules pertaining to trials in absentia. The Committee should consider a means by which a defendant may agree, before a trial date is set, that actual notice may be imputed by communication to his attorney or some other means. A defendant should not be able to manufacture lack of notice by failing to keep counsel and the court informed of his whereabouts. (Pp. 16-20) The judgment of conviction is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED for a new trial. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LAWRENCE WHALEY, Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________ Argued January 2, 2001 -- Decided June 11, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Mordecai D. Garelick, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Garelick and Patricia A. Nichols, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Annmarie Cozzi, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (William H. Schmidt, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney). Christine A. Hoffman, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LaVECCHIA, J. This case involves a defendant who was tried and convicted in absentia on charges related to his alleged participation in drug trafficking. We must determine whether it was proper to have proceeded with trial in defendant's absence. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction. We granted certification, 164 N.J. 189 (2000), to review whether defendant waived his right to be present at trial. Defendant appeared for that October 16, 1995, pretrial conference, and the trial court directed him to appear next at a hearing scheduled for November 17, 1995, on defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant signed that pretrial conference order, which informed defendant in part: The parties shall next appear and be ready for [a] Motion . . . on November 17, 1995. . . . If you do not appear on the next scheduled date or on the trial date, you will lose any bail that has been posted; a Bench Warrant will be issued for your arrest; and the trial shall proceed without you. That October 1995 appearance is the last occasion clearly indicated in the record that defendant actually was present in court until September 1997, which was after defendant's trial in absentia. That no trial date was set at either of the two in- court appearances made by defendant in September and October 1995 is undisputed. The progression of the case stalled immediately after that second in-court appearance by defendant in October 1995. Numerous dates for the motion to suppress were adjourned over the ensuing months at the request of either or both defendants. Defendant was never in court for any of those dates. The motion to suppress finally was heard on March 31 and April 1, 1997. The trial court proceeded on the basis that defendant's counsel had consented throughout to continue defendant's Hudson charge pursuant to Rule 3:16 and State v. Hudson, 119 N.J. 165, 181-82 (1990). Prior to taking testimony on the motion to suppress, the trial court noted that pursuant to Hudson Hall, the defendant . . . is not here and we're proceeding in his absence based on representation _ [defendant] is not here and [defense counsel has] been unsuccessful in getting him here . . . . Defendant's counsel then informed the court that counsel had been in contact with the person to whom [defendant] asked me to notify . . . of any court dates, and that person was advised by me and has been advised on several occasions of the trial dates in this matter, and she has attempted to contact [defendant]. As far as I know she hasn't been successful in doing that, but she was notified, and the letter that I sent to [defendant] was returned, no longer at the address that he [gave] . . . to me. At that point, the prosecutor stated: On October 16th, 1995, defendant Lawrence Whaley was given in writing at the pretrial/status conference an order, the date for the motion to suppress on November 17, 1995, and at that time, Judge, it's also listed on that order that if defendant did not appear on that date, that trial shall proceed in his absence, a warrant issue. Defendant did sign that form, subsequent to that there have been numerous adjournment dates, starting from November '95 there were nine more adjournment dates 'till today's date, and on several of those occasions, [counsel for both defendants] had made representations that accepted a continuing Hudson charge now in [the] tradition of State vs. Hall, where an adjourn[ed] date would also continue to have the same restrictions. The court ultimately denied the motion to suppress. A joint trial then commenced against defendant and co-defendant on April 2, 1997. Defendant was absent throughout the trial. The jury acquitted defendant and co-defendant of first-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, but found each of them guilty of second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and third-degree possession of cocaine. The trial court issued a bench warrant for defendant's arrest, noting that he failed to appear pursuant to Hudson. Five months later, defendant was arrested in Florida and returned to New Jersey. On September 15, 1997, when defendant appeared in court, the trial court canceled the bench warrant and set a sentencing date of October 17, 1997, allocating time for a pre-sentence investigation (P.S.I.) report to be completed. A Bergen County probation officer interviewed defendant at the Bergen County jail in September 1997 and prepared a P.S.I. report that provided in pertinent part: Defendant became a fugitive and was found guilty in absentia. Defendant admitted that he did not show up for his court date because of the amount of prison time on these charges. Defendant said he was offered 20 years NJSP on a plea bargain or go to trial and get forty years. Defendant admitted that he split and ran and worked under the alias of Don Earles in Florida until he was apprehended. On October 17, 1997, defendant appeared for sentencing, at which time he moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 3:20-2 on the ground that he did not waive his right to appear at trial because he was unaware of the trial date. The trial court denied the motion because the time window for a new _ new trial motion is ten days after [defendant] was in absentia at that point. That's out of time and that's denied. The court sentenced defendant to an eighteen-year term of imprisonment with a nine- year period of parole ineligibility for the second-degree conviction, and a concurrent four-year term for the third-degree conviction, and imposed appropriate fees and penalties. In November 1997, defendant moved for reduction of sentence. That motion was denied. As noted earlier, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction but remanded for entry of an amended judgment to reflect merger of the convictions. Applied literally, the language of our current Rule 3:16(b) adopts the approach of requiring in-court notification to the defendant of the trial date, in order for a trial court to be assured of actual notice to a defendant when it infers that a knowing waiver of the right to be present at trial has occurred. Although proof of actual notice may come in a variety of forms, notice is indisputably actual when a trial court directly communicates the trial date to a defendant in court. State v. Finklea, 147 N.J. 211, 213 (1996) (noting that trial court notified defendant at plea conference that trial would commence on date certain); State v. Butler, 278 N.J. Super. 93, 101 (App. Div. 1994) (concluding that defendant had notice of scheduled trial date because he attended hearing at which trial court, four days prior to trial, set date for trial). NO. A-101 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LAWRENCE WHALEY, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED June 12, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz