Title: John Bruce Vining v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC99-67
____________
JOHN BRUCE VINING,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 3, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
John Bruce Vining appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion for
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Vining was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery in 1990.  
The pertinent facts of the crime are described in detail in this Court’s opinion on
Vining’s direct appeal.  See Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 923-24 (Fla. 1994).  
The judge followed the jury’s recommendation and imposed a death sentence for the
1. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).  The Huff hearing requirement
was incorporated in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(c).  Under this rule, a
trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is
required before ruling on any rule 3.850 motion filed by a death-sentenced prisoner.
2. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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first-degree murder conviction.  The judge also sentenced Vining as a habitual
offender to life imprisonment on the armed robbery conviction.  On appeal, this
Court affirmed both the convictions and sentences.  See id. at 928.   Vining’s
petition for certioriari was denied by the United States Supreme Court.  See Vining
v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1022 (1994).
Vining filed his original motion for postconviction relief in March 1996,
pursuant to an extension granted by this Court.  He amended the motion in
December 1996, raising a total of twenty-five claims.  Based upon the claim that the
judge who presided over Vining’s trial and sentencing conducted an independent
investigation and considered extra-record materials not presented in open court, the
judge disqualified himself and a new judge presided over Vining’s postconviction
motion.  A Huff1 hearing was held in June 1997 and the court conducted an
evidentiary hearing in April 1999 on Vining’s claims of Brady2 violations and
ineffective assistance of trial counsel based upon the trial judge’s independent
investigation and consideration of extra-record materials.  Following this evidentiary
3. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
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hearing, the postconviction court denied relief on all of Vining’s postconviction
claims in a detailed twenty-nine page order.
On appeal to this Court, Vining raises fourteen claims, including a number of
subclaims.  Vining claims that (1) the lower court failed to properly consider the
evidence withheld by the State as being material evidence under Brady; (2) he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel and a fair and impartial tribunal because
the trial judge utilized extra-record information in violation of Gardner v. Florida;3
(3) the lower court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on his claims of
newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt
phase proceedings; (4) trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present
mitigating evidence and to adequately challenge the State’s case during the penalty
phase proceedings; (5) trial counsel failed to object to a number of constitutional
errors; (6) the one-year time limit imposed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.851 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it denies capital
defendants due process and equal protection; (7) Florida’s death penalty is
unconstitutional; (8) insufficient aggravating circumstances render him ineligible for
the death penalty; (9) Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4), which prohibits
an attorney from initiating communication with a juror regarding the trial,
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improperly restricted his ability to discover information that would warrant a new
trial; (10) the appellate transcript is unreliable because substantial proceedings were
made off the record, including portions of voir dire and the penalty phase and the
entire sentencing proceeding, and counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this
issue on appeal; (11) he was involuntarily absent during critical stages of the trial
proceedings; (12) prosecutorial misconduct relating to evidence of collateral crimes
presented during the penalty phase caused prejudice that resulted in a fundamentally
unfair proceeding; (13) he was denied a full and fair evidentiary hearing on his
public records claim; and (14) the cumulative errors in his trial, sentencing, and
direct appeal deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel, the right to
counsel, a fundamentally fair trial, due process of law, and individualized
sentencing.
In claim one Vining contends that the lower court failed to properly consider
several items of evidence withheld by the State as being material evidence of his
innocence, which constituted Brady violations. The lower court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on this claim and heard testimony from several witnesses
including police detectives who investigated the crime and both of Vining’s trial
counsel.  The court determined that the defense already possessed one of the items
4. Vining argued that the police had not turned over interview notes in which
the gemologist who examined the victim’s diamonds stated that he was not paying
attention to the victim and the suspect during his appraisal.  However, the court
found that this precise information had already been revealed to the defendant
during the detective’s deposition.
5. These items included:  police notes from an interview with the gemologist
who appraised the victim’s gems; police notes indicating some question as to the
exact time the victim left with the suspect; a detective’s handwritten notes regarding
eyewitness descriptions of the suspect; an employee’s statement that the victim had
no loose stones with her; an FBI fiber analysis report; and a complete copy of the
victim’s notebook.
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alleged to have been withheld.4  As to the items that had not been disclosed,5 the
court determined that this evidence was not material and no prejudiced ensued from
its nondisclosure.
A defendant must demonstrate the following elements before a Brady
violation has been proven:  (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused,
either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence has
been suppressed by the State, either wilfully or inadvertently; and (3) the defendant
has been prejudiced by the suppression of this evidence.  See Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1155 (2001); Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 662 (Fla. 2000). 
A defendant is prejudiced by the suppression of exculpatory evidence if it is
material, in other words if "there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
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trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to
the defense."  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289.
In the instant case, the lower court concluded that no prejudice occurred from
the withheld items because Vining did not show any inconsistencies between the
items and the trial testimony nor did he show how the items could have been used to
impeach the witnesses.  Further, the court determined that the evidence was not
material under Brady as Vining had not shown that there is a reasonable probability
that his conviction or sentence would be different.  After reviewing the record and
the order below, we agree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that Vining
failed to show the prejudice and materiality required for a Brady violation.  Thus,
we affirm the denial of relief on this claim.
As his second claim on appeal, Vining contends that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel and a fair and impartial sentencing proceeding because the
judge who presided over his trial and sentencing relied upon extra-record
information in violation of Gardner v. Florida and that trial counsel’s failure to
object to this information constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  On direct
appeal, Vining raised a Gardner claim, arguing that he had been denied due process,
the right to confront witnesses, and the effective assistance of counsel by the trial
judge’s consideration of extra-record evidence.  Specifically, he claimed that the
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trial judge read all of the depositions in the court file, read the medical examiner’s
report and discussed it with the medical examiner, obtained and reviewed the
probate records of the victim’s estate to compare the claims filed against the estate
with the testimony at trial regarding the items consigned to the victim, and
conducted an independent investigation at various locations relating to the victim. 
This Court concluded that the issue was waived for purposes of appellate review
because defense counsel never objected to the court’s consideration of this material
even though the trial judge clearly informed counsel that he had reviewed these
materials.  See Vining, 637 So. 2d at 927.
Under Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), a sentencing judge who
intends to use any information not presented in open court as a factual basis for a
sentence must advise the defendant of what the information is and afford the
defendant an opportunity to rebut it.  See also Porter v. State, 400 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla.
1981) (vacating death sentence where trial court relied on deposition testimony to
support two aggravating factors without advising defendant of intention to use the
deposition and affording defendant opportunity to rebut, contradict, or impeach the
deposition testimony).  However, even where a Gardner violation occurs, this Court
may conclude that such error is harmless.  See Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805,
818 (Fla. 1996) (finding that court erred in referring to out-of-court deposition
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testimony, but error was harmless because court did not actually rely on any
information that was not otherwise proven during trial); Lockhart v. State, 655 So.
2d 69, 73-74 (Fla. 1995) (finding that Gardner violation occurred when trial court
relied on information from newspaper articles not presented in open court to support
its finding of no mitigation, but that error “did not injuriously affect [the
defendant’s] substantial rights” and that the defendant could not claim that such
information was confidential when the articles were based on interviews that the
defendant gave).  This Court specifically distinguished the harmless error in
Consalvo from the reversible error in Porter because the Consalvo trial court “made
reference to facts which were established at trial by evidence other than that referred
to in the sentencing order.”  Consalvo, 697 So. 2d at 817.
In the instant case, while the sentencing order did state that the judge read all
of the depositions, read the medical examiner’s report, and checked the victim’s
probate records, all of which constitute extra-record materials, the trial judge
revealed his consideration of these matters both in letters to the parties and during a
motion hearing prior to the penalty phase.  See Vining, 637 So. 2d at 927.  Thus,
unlike both Gardner and Porter, Vining was advised by the trial judge of his
consideration of extra-record information and afforded an opportunity to rebut or
impeach the information.  Further, like Consalvo, the information relied upon in the
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sentencing order to support the aggravating factors was otherwise proven at trial. 
And like Lockhart, “given the overwhelming evidence supporting [the] aggravating
factors, this error did not injuriously affect [the defendant’s] substantial rights.” 
Lockhart, 655 So. 2d at 74.  Thus, it is questionable whether a Gardner violation
occurred in this case, but even if it did, any error was harmless.
As to the subclaim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object or
rebut the extra-record materials when brought to counsel’s attention by the court,
Vining fails to meet the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).  Strickland requires a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to
show both (1) that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient
performance resulted in prejudice.  See id. at 686.  For the prejudice prong, the
reviewing court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but
for the deficiency, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  See id. at
695; see also Valle v. State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. 1997).
While counsel may have been deficient in failing to object to the trial judge’s
consideration of this extra-record information, Vining was not prejudiced by this
failure, as noted in the Gardner analysis above.  See Consalvo; Lockhart.  Thus,
Vining is not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and
we affirm the lower court’s denial of this claim.
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Even though the postconviction court below properly concluded that Vining
was not entitled to relief on his Gardner claim, we strongly disapprove the actions of
the judge who presided over Vining’s trial and sentencing.  The judge overstepped
his boundaries by conducting an independent investigation and by reviewing
information that was not presented during the trial.  We caution that such behavior
does not promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
See Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canons 1, 2A. 
Vining’s third issue encompasses a newly discovered evidence claim and a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase proceedings.  Vining
further claims that the lower court erred in denying these claims without an
evidentiary hearing.  He contends that expert witnesses could provide “newly
discovered evidence” that the diamond sold by Vining could not be the same
diamond consigned to the victim before her death and that these experts could point
out inconsistencies in the trial testimony identification of the diamonds.  The lower
court ruled that this could not constitute “newly discovered evidence” as “trial
counsel knew of these witnesses at the time [Vining] was originally tried.”  As to
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding identification of the diamond
and the chain of custody, the lower court ruled that Vining had failed to show either
deficient performance or prejudice as required by Strickland.
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The trial record shows that several witnesses positively identified the
diamond in question as being the one in the victim’s possession before her death,
while several other witnesses raised doubt as to the identification of the diamond. 
The record also reveals that trial counsel effectively cross-examined the witnesses
as to their expertise and their identification of the diamond.  We agree with the
postconviction court that this conflicting testimony was properly left to the jury to
evaluate.  Even if further expert testimony about the identification of the diamond
could be considered newly discovered evidence, there is no reasonable probability
that this evidence would have changed the outcome of the verdict.  See Jones v.
State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) (“[I]n order to provide relief, the newly
discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an
acquittal on retrial.”).  Thus, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief on
the diamond identification claim.
As part of claim three, Vining also asserts that the lower court should have
conducted an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
during the guilt phase.  Specifically, Vining claims that trial counsel failed to
properly challenge three witnesses and did not inform the jury that these witnesses
had been hypnotized by the sheriff prior to identifying Vining as the suspect last
seen with the victim.  The lower court found the hypnosis claim procedurally barred
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because it was raised and rejected on direct appeal and that the procedural bar could
not be bypassed by couching it as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
On direct appeal, this Court ruled that the record supported the trial court’s
conclusion that the witnesses had not been hypnotized as defined by this Court in
Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 190 (Fla. 1989), and thus their testimony was
properly admitted at trial.  See Vining, 637 So. 2d at 926.  Because this Court
denied the hypnosis claim on the merits on direct appeal, the substantive claim is
procedurally barred in Vining’s postconviction challenge.  See Swafford v. Dugger,
569 So. 2d 1264, 1267 (Fla. 1990) (stating that postconviction proceedings are not
to be used as a second appeal).  Moreover, trial counsel did not render ineffective
assistance on the hypnosis issue when it was determined that the witnesses had not
been hypnotized and counsel ably questioned the witnesses’ identifications of
Vining during cross-examination.
Vining also claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial
judge’s consideration of extra-record materials as they relate to his conviction. 
However, the record below shows that the jury did not see and was not aware of
any of these materials during either its guilt or penalty phase deliberations.  Further,
as discussed above, this Court upheld the trial court’s determination that the
identification witnesses had not been hypnotized and thus their testimony was
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properly admitted at trial.  See Vining, 637 So. 2d at 926.  Thus, the trial judge’s
review of the materials at issue had no bearing on the jury’s determination of
Vining’s guilt and the postconviction court properly denied this claim.
In his fourth claim, Vining contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance during the penalty phase by failing to adequately investigate and present
mitigating evidence and to adequately challenge the State’s case.  He also claims
that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim.  In his 3.850 motion
below, Vining made a broad claim that he was deprived of an adversarial testing at
the penalty phase of his trial, including that trial counsel failed to present “evidence
to support non-statutory mitigating evidence demonstrating Mr. Vining’s good moral
character and background.”  The lower court summarily denied relief on this claim,
finding that the trial record refuted the claim because the jury heard testimony from
six of Vining’s relatives, who discussed his alcohol consumption and family history. 
The lower court also concluded that any claim that mitigating evidence had been
improperly rejected during Vining’s penalty phase trial was procedurally barred
because it had been raised and rejected on direct appeal.  See Vining, 637 So. 2d at
928 (“The record supports the court’s conclusion that the other proposed factors
either had not been established by the evidence presented or could not be
considered of a mitigating nature.”).  Based on the trial record and the direct appeal,
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we affirm the summary denial of this part of claim four.
In his amended motion to the lower court, Vining also asserted that counsel
“unreasonably failed to present . . . other mitigating evidence, including statutory
and nonstatutory mental health mitigating evidence.”  The motion offered no further
explanation of the purported mental health evidence that counsel failed to present. 
At the Huff hearing, Vining’s counsel never mentioned any mental health mitigating
evidence.  Postconviction counsel instead focused almost entirely on trial counsel’s
failure to object to the trial judge’s reliance on extra-record material (the Gardner
issue discussed above).  Postconviction counsel argued that trial counsel failed to
present adequate evidence of the suggested mitigating circumstances rejected by the
trial judge.  After the postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing only on
the penalty phase aspects of the Gardner claim of ineffective assistance, Vining filed
a motion for rehearing, arguing that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
entire claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in presenting mitigating
evidence during the penalty phase proceedings.  In this motion for rehearing, Vining
for the first time made factual allegations relating to his claim that counsel was
ineffective in investigating and presenting mental health mitigating evidence.  Vining
attached a report from a clinical neuropsychologist stating an opinion that Vining
suffers from hypomania, is bipolar, and has brain damage from his alcohol
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consumption.
The lower court denied Vining’s motion for rehearing, and its order denying
postconviction relief does not specifically address the mental health mitigating
evidence.  However, we conclude that this aspect of the claim was insufficiently
pled in Vining’s December 1996 motion for postconviction relief and thus the lower
court properly denied relief.  See Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 915 (Fla. 2000)
(“Where a motion lacks sufficient factual allegations, or where alleged facts do not
render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the motion may be summarily
denied.”); see also Ragsdale v. State, 720 So. 2d 203, 207 (Fla. 1998).
Only after the lower court denied an evidentiary hearing on the mitigating
evidence claim did Vining make any mention of the neuropsychologist’s report.  A
defendant may not raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on a piecemeal
basis by refining his or her claims to include additional factual allegations after the
postconviction court concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required.  Cf. Pope v.
State, 702 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1997) (stating that a defendant may not raise claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel on a piecemeal basis by filing successive
motions).  Rule 3.850 specifically prohibits successive motions unless “the facts on
which the claim is predicated were unknown by the movant or the movant’s attorney
and could not be ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”  Clearly, the claim of
6.  Vining was convicted of kidnapping and aggravated assault in the
abduction of a woman in Georgia.  The victim of the Georgia crime and the
investigating detective both testified during the penalty phase of the trial in this case.
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ineffective presentation of mental health evidence was encompassed in Vining’s
broader mitigating evidence claim and should have been fully pled at the time he
filed the claim.  Where a previous motion for postconviction relief has raised a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the  postconviction court may summarily deny a
successive motion which raises an additional ground for ineffective assistance of
counsel.  See Pope, 702 So. 2d at 223.  This applies equally where a defendant
raises additional claims in a motion for rehearing.  See Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a) (“A
motion for rehearing . . . shall not present issues not previously raised in the
proceeding.”).
As to the claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance with regard to the
penalty phase witnesses who testified about a prior Georgia incident,6 the
postconviction court concluded that Vining failed to demonstrate prejudice from any
failure in this regard.  Gail Flemming, the victim of the Georgia incident, testified
about her abduction, how Vining and his accomplice terrorized her, threatened to
murder her, took her to a vertical grave in the woods, and proceeded with the
murder plan until the police arrived and rescued her.  A Georgia police officer
testified about the incident and Vining’s involvement.  Trial counsel objected to the
7. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (holding that sentencer may
not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death).
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testimony of these witnesses, effectively limited their testimony on certain aspects of
the incident through objection, and also moved for mistrial based on their testimony. 
Thus, trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective on this issue.  Accordingly, for the
reasons stated above, we affirm the lower court’s denial of relief on claim four.
Claim five encompasses a number of alleged constitutional errors:  Vining’s
death sentence rests on an unconstitutional automatic aggravating circumstance; the
cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) jury instruction was unconstitutionally
vague; the CCP statutory language is unconstitutionally vague; Vining’s death
sentence violates the requirements of Lockett v. Ohio;7 the prior violent felony
aggravating circumstance rests upon unconstitutionally obtained prior convictions;
and the jury was improperly instructed on the “under sentence of imprisonment”
aggravating circumstance.  Vining also claims that counsel was ineffective in failing
to properly object to these alleged errors or to raise the claims on appeal.  We
conclude that the postconviction court properly denied relief as to each of these
subclaims.  We discuss each in turn below.
First, the substantive claim that Vining’s death sentence rests on an
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unconstitutional automatic aggravating circumstance should have been raised on
direct appeal and thus is procedurally barred.  See Garcia v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325,
1326 n.3, 1327 n.5 (Fla. 1993); Johnston v. Dugger, 583 So. 2d 657, 662 n.2 (Fla.
1991).  Thus, only the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was properly raised
below.  However, this Court previously has rejected the substantive claim on the
merits, and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to make a meritless
argument.  See Melendez v. State, 612 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 1992).
Second, the claim that the CCP instruction is unconstitutionally vague is
procedurally barred because the instruction was neither specifically objected to at
trial nor pursued on appeal.  See Brown v. State, 755 So. 2d 616, 622 (Fla. 2000). 
Further, on direct appeal, this Court held that the trial court erred in finding the 
CCP aggravating factor, but found the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.  See Vining, 637 So. 2d at 928.  Thus, Vining cannot prove prejudice from
trial counsel’s failure to object to the instruction.  Vining further argues that counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to the CCP statutory language as
unconstitutionally vague.  However, this Court has rejected the substantive claim
and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless argument. 
See Klokoc v. State, 589 So. 2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1991).
Vining contends that his death sentence violates the requirements of Lockett
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because the trial court rejected nonstatutory mitigating evidence relating to his
alcohol consumption and family background.  The substantive claim is procedurally
barred because it was raised and rejected on direct appeal.  See Vining, 637 So. 2d
at 927-28 (finding that record supported trial court’s conclusion that proposed
mitigating factors either had not been established by the evidence presented or could
not be considered of a mitigating nature).  Vining also asserts an ineffectiveness
claim, arguing that trial counsel failed to effectively argue the mitigating evidence
and that the trial judge relied on extra-record materials in rejecting the nonstatutory
mitigation.  During Vining’s trial, counsel presented evidence relating to the nine
mitigating factors proffered.  This included the testimony of Vining’s ex-wife, his
brothers, a family friend, and his children.  These witnesses testified about Vining’s
family background and history, his family history of alcoholism, and his record of
being a good family member and father.  In light of this presentation, counsel cannot
be deemed ineffective in this regard nor can counsel be blamed because Vining’s
background “could not be considered of a mitigating nature.”  Vining, 637 So. 2d at
928.  Thus, Vining failed to meet the requirements of Strickland on this subclaim.
As his fifth subclaim, Vining asserts that the prior violent felony aggravating
circumstance rests upon unconstitutionally obtained prior convictions. However, the
record shows that this claim was abandoned by Vining’s postconviction counsel at
8. The jury was instructed that “the crime for which John Bruce Vining,
Senior is to be sentenced was committed while he was under sentence of
imprisonment.”  This is the standard jury instruction for the under sentence of
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the Huff hearing.  Counsel admitted that she could not plead facts to prove this
claim because the Office of Capital Collateral Representative (CCR) had been
unable to investigate Vining’s previous convictions.  Counsel further conceded that
Vining was not entitled to a hearing on the claim without this factual predicate. 
Thus, the claim was insufficiently pled and the lower court properly denied relief. 
See Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 915 (Fla. 2000).
In his final constitutional error subclaim, Vining asserts that the jury was
improperly instructed on the “under sentence of imprisonment” aggravating
circumstance because it was not instructed that this aggravator should be accorded
less weight because he had not escaped from prison, but was merely on parole at the
time of the offense.  The lower court properly determined that the claim of
instructional error was procedurally barred because it should have been raised on
direct appeal.  See Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 665 (Fla. 2000) (stating that
substantive challenges to jury instructions are procedurally barred in postconviction
challenges because the claims could and should be raised on direct appeal).  Further,
counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object to the standard jury
instruction or to request a special instruction.8  See id. (stating that trial counsel's
imprisonment aggravating circumstance and is still in use today.  See Fla. Std. Jur.
Instr. (Crim.) 109.
9. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(b) provides that “[a]ny rule
3.850 motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be filed
by the prisoner within 1 year after the judgment and sentence becomes final.”  In
contrast, such motion in a noncapital case must be filed within two years after the
judgment and sentence become final.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b).
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failure to object to standard jury instructions that have not been invalidated by this
Court does not render counsel's performance deficient).  We also note that during
closing argument Vining’s trial counsel emphasized to the jury that Vining was on
parole for forgery charges and thus the jury should not give great weight to the
“under sentence of imprisonment” aggravating circumstance.  Thus, the lower court
properly denied relief on all of the claims of  constitutional error.
In claim six Vining contends that the one-year filing requirement for
postconviction relief in capital cases9 violates due process and equal protection and
suspends the right to habeas corpus for capital prisoners.  The lower court
summarily denied this claim, finding that the unconstitutionality of rule 3.851 was
not an appropriate issue to be considered in a rule 3.850 motion.  The lower court
also noted that Vining was actually given more than two years to file his motion,
based upon the numerous extensions granted to him.
This Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that the one-year time limit
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imposed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 is unconstitutional.  See, e.g.,
Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 919 (Fla. 2000); Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d
246, 251 (Fla. 1993).  To the extent that Vining claims that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance because of the rule, we agree with the postconviction court’s
assessment that “claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel do not
present a valid basis for relief.”  See Lambrix v. State, 698 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla.
1996).
Vining argues in claim seven that Florida’s death penalty scheme is
unconstitutional.  This Court rejected Vining’s direct appeal claim that the death
penalty statute is unconstitutional.  See Vining, 637 So. 2d at 927.  Further, this
Court has repeatedly rejected claims that electrocution is unconstitutional.  See, e.g.,
Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1182
(2000); Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76, 79 (Fla. 1997); Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d
1241, 1244 (Fla. 1997).  We have also rejected claims that lethal injection is
unconstitutional and that the application of the amended statute violates the ex post
facto clause.  See Bryan v. State, 753 So. 2d 1244, 1253 (Fla.) (stating that lethal
injection is “generally viewed as a more humane method of execution”), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1185 (2000); Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 644 (Fla.) (finding no
ex post facto violation), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1183 (2000).  Thus, we affirm the
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postconviction court’s summary denial of this claim.
In claim eight Vining argues that he is “innocent of the death penalty” as
there are insufficient aggravating circumstances to establish his eligibility for a death
sentence.  Even though this Court struck down the CCP aggravating factor on direct
appeal, we found that the three remaining aggravating circumstances (committed
during a robbery, under sentence of imprisonment, and previous violent felony
conviction) were supported by the record.  See Vining, 637 So. 2d at 928.  Also, we
found no merit to Vining’s claim that the trial court erred in rejecting a number of
proffered nonstatutory mitigating factors.  See id.  We concluded that Vining’s
death sentence was appropriate in light of the three valid aggravating circumstances
and one nonstatutory mitigating factor (good military history) which was given little
weight.  See id.  In order to prevail on a claim of being innocent of or ineligible for
the death sentence he received, a defendant “would have to show constitutional
error invalidating all of the aggravating circumstances upon which the sentence was
based.”  In re Medina, 109 F.3d 1556, 1566 (11th Cir. 1997).  Vining has not made
such a showing here.  Thus, this claim is meritless and the lower court’s denial is
affirmed.
In claim nine, Vining argues that the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar
improperly restricted his attorney’s ability to discover information that would
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warrant a new trial.  The lower court concluded that Vining was not entitled to relief
on this claim because he did not allege specific reasons to believe that any particular
juror was unqualified to serve and, in the absence of cause to believe that juror
misconduct has occurred, voir dire is the proper judicial proceeding for investigating
juror biases or prejudices.
Rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar prohibits a lawyer
from initiating communication with any juror regarding the trial with which the
lawyer is connected, except to determine whether the verdict may be subject to legal
challenge.  The rule provides that the lawyer "may not interview the jurors for this
purpose unless the lawyer has reason to believe that grounds for such challenge may
exist."  Before conducting such an interview, the lawyer must file a notice of intent
to interview setting forth the name of the juror to be interviewed and deliver copies
of the notice to the trial judge and opposing counsel a reasonable time before the
interview.
In Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2000), we found a similar claim
procedurally barred because it was not raised on direct appeal.  Like Arbelaez,
Vining did not allege any particular reasons to believe that the verdict might be
subject to legal challenge.  “Instead, he appears to be complaining about a
defendant's inability to conduct ‘fishing expedition’ interviews with the jurors after a
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guilty verdict is returned.  Thus, even if the claim were not procedurally barred, [the
defendant] would not be entitled to relief on the grounds he asserted and no
evidentiary hearing was required on this claim.”  Id. at 920.  Further, this Court has
cautioned “against permitting jury interviews to support post-conviction relief” for
allegations which focus upon jury deliberations.  Johnson v. State, 593 So. 2d 206,
210 (Fla. 1992).  The lower court’s summary denial of this claim is affirmed.
Vining alleges in his tenth claim that he was denied a fair appeal because the
record was incomplete and unreliable and that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.  Any claim relating to the inadequacy of
the appellate record is procedurally barred because it should have been raised during
direct appeal.  See Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000);
Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1323-24 (Fla. 1994).  Further, rule
3.850 motions are not the proper vehicle to advance claims of ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel.  Such claims must be raised in a habeas petition to this Court. 
See Thompson, 759 So. 2d at 660; Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d 1009, 1026
(Fla. 1999).  Thus, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial of this
claim.
In claim eleven Vining contends that he was involuntarily absent during
critical stages of the proceedings which resulted in his conviction and sentence of
10. Vining contends that he was not present during the following proceedings: 
pretrial hearings on a motion to suppress allegedly tainted testimony and evidence, a
motion in limine regarding similar fact evidence, a motion to discharge based on the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, and a motion to prohibit in-court identification
by witnesses whose memories allegedly had been hypnotically refreshed; numerous
off-the-record bench conferences during voir dire and the guilt and penalty phases;
and a jury question to the trial court during guilt phase deliberations.
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death.10  Vining further claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing
to object to his absence during these proceedings.
In the order denying postconviction relief, the lower court stated that “it is
questionable whether these proceedings [raised in Vining’s motion] were critical
stages of the trial.”  We conclude that the lower court erred in this regard.  A
defendant has a “constitutional right to be present at the stages of his trial where
fundamental fairness might be thwarted by his absence.”  Francis v. State, 413 So.
2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 1982).  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a) provides,
in pertinent part, that a defendant shall be present at any pretrial conferences, unless
he waives his presence in writing; during the examination, challenging, impanelling,
and swearing of the jury; and at all proceedings before the court when the jury is
present.
In Coney v. State, 653 So. 2d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 1995), this Court explained
that it is error for the defendant not to be present during a pretrial meeting between
the lawyers and the judge.  However, we concluded that the error was harmless in
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Coney’s case because the meeting was a routine status conference prompted by a
delayed trial date, where several technical, procedural, and legal issues were
discussed, and that the defendant’s presence would not have assisted the defense in
any way.  See id. at 1012-13.  Coney also involved the defendant’s absence from
the immediate site of a bench conference where pretrial juror challenges were
exercised, even though the defendant was present in the courtroom.  This Court
clarified that “presence” means being physically present at the immediate site where
pretrial juror challenges are exercised.  See id. at 1013.  However, the Court ruled
that this clarification was prospective only in application and that in Coney’s case
any error was harmless as the conferences "involved a legal issue toward which
[Coney] would have had no basis for input."  Id.
The substantive claims relating to Vining’s absence are procedurally barred
as they should have been raised either at trial or on direct appeal.  See Harvey v.
Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1995) (“[I]ssues that could have been, but
were not, raised on direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack.”).  
Thus, only Vining’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were properly raised
in his 3.850 motion.
In relation to this claim, Vining has failed to show how he was prejudiced by
his absence during the pretrial and pre-penalty phase proceedings, nor has he
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asserted how he could have made a meaningful contribution to counsel’s legal
arguments during these preliminary proceedings.  As to Vining’s absence from the
bench conferences, while our ruling in Coney requires a defendant’s physical
presence at the immediate site of a bench conference, that ruling was prospective in
application and thus did not apply to Vining’s 1990 trial.  See Boyett v. State, 688
So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 1996) (stating that Coney rule regarding physical presence did
not apply retroactively to trial that took place before Court’s opinion was released). 
Furthermore, as the lower court noted, Vining has not shown that any matter
discussed during these bench conferences required his consultation nor has he
demonstrated any prejudice from his absence.  While Vining cites a number of
pages in the trial record where he allegedly was not present for bench conferences,
he does not elaborate on what was discussed during these conferences or how he
was prejudiced by his absence during them.  Finally, as to Vining’s absence when
the jury asked the judge a question during guilt deliberations, the lower court noted
that both defense counsel and the prosecutor were present when the trial judge
responded “no” to the jurors’ question of whether they should decide on an advisory
sentence if they should agree on a verdict of first-degree murder.  Because this was
clearly the appropriate response, the postconviction court concluded, and we agree,
that any error resulting from Vining’s absence was clearly harmless.  Thus, we
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affirm the lower court’s denial of the claim relating to Vining’s absence because he
has failed to meet the Strickland prejudice prong.
Vining argues in claim twelve that the prosecutor introduced inflammatory
collateral crime evidence that rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.  The
postconviction court found this claim to be procedurally barred because it was
raised and rejected on direct appeal.  In his direct appeal to this Court, Vining raised
a number of claims of improper prosecutorial argument, including improper
emphasis on the victim’s suffering in the crime committed by Vining in Georgia.
This Court found no merit to the issue, explaining that “[m]uch of the prosecutor’s
argument that Vining labels as impermissible consisted of explaining the nature of
the statutory aggravating factors and the weight the jury should accord each of them. 
Other comments did not taint the jury’s recommendation of death.”  Vining, 637 So.
2d at 927.  To the extent that Vining raises a different claim relating to the
prosecutor’s argument about the Georgia incident, that claim is also procedurally
barred as it was available and should have been raised on direct.  See Smith v. State,
445 So. 2d 323, 325 (Fla. 1983) ("Issues which either were or could have been
litigated at trial and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral
attack.").  Thus, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial of this claim.
In claim thirteen, Vining argues that he was denied access to “[m]any public
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records . . . that are routinely provided to other inmates” and that the lower court
erred in denying his public records claim without an evidentiary hearing.  However,
the procedural history in Vining’s postconviction case belies this claim.  On June
14, 1996, the lower court conducted a hearing on Vining’s motion to compel the
production of public records.  During this two and one-half hour hearing, the court
heard testimony from a Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) employee,
the records custodian of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department, and the medical
records custodian for the Orange County Corrections Division.  During this hearing,
the judge expressed frustration with the nature of the questioning by Vining’s CCR
counsel, noting that counsel’s questions would be suitable during a deposition of the
witnesses but were not appropriate during a hearing on a motion to compel.  At a
continuation of this hearing on August 1, 1996, Vining was represented by a
different CCR attorney who acknowledged receipt of documents from FDLE
following the June hearing.  When Vining’s counsel could not specify what
documents were still outstanding, the court chided him for a lack of diligence in
failing to examine the public records received.  The court then denied Vining’s
motion to compel as legally insufficient and ordered the State to respond to the
postconviction motion.  However, the court did grant Vining’s motion to file an
amended motion and granted him several extensions. Vining filed an amended
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postconviction motion on December 23, 1996, and the Huff hearing was conducted
on June 20, 1997.  In February 1998, the court permitted Vining’s CCR counsel to
withdraw and granted substitution of private postconviction counsel.  While the
court denied the private counsel’s motion to amend the postconviction motion or to
expand the scope of issues to be considered at the evidentiary hearing, on
November 19, 1998, the court granted Vining’s request for additional public
records.  This order required Vining to submit a demand to each agency with a list
of the specific documents requested within thirty days and to submit a list of all the
documents requested to the court as well.  The court further ordered the agencies to
comply within fifteen days and to file a notice of compliance with the court.  The
order also scheduled an evidentiary hearing on Vining’s postconviction motion for
April 1999.
Although Vining now contends that there are many public records
outstanding, he made no further complaint on the public records issue during the
five-month span between the postconviction court’s public records order and the
evidentiary hearing.  Based on this record, we conclude that the court afforded
Vining ample time and opportunity to pursue any public records claim.  Through his
own actions, Vining either waived or abandoned any claim that he was denied
public records.
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In his final claim on appeal, Vining argues that he was denied a fundamentally
fair proceeding based upon the cumulative errors that occurred during his trial,
sentencing, and direct appeal and that these errors deprived him of the effective
assistance of counsel, the right to counsel, a fair trial, and an  individualized
sentencing.  However, as discussed in the analysis of the individual issues above,
the alleged errors are either meritless or procedurally barred, or do not meet the
Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Because the alleged
individual errors are without merit, the contention of cumulative error is similarly
without merit.
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the lower court’s denial of
postconviction relief in this case.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, WELLS, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and SHAW and LEWIS, JJ., concur in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,
Theotis Bronson, Judge - Case No. CR 89-2395
Terri L. Backhus of Backhus & Izakowitz, P.A., Tampa, Florida; and John Bruce
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Vining, pro se, Raiford, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Robert J. Landry, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee