Title: State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff's Office

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3288.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3288 
THE STATE EX REL. ROCKER, APPELLANT, v. GUERNSEY COUNTY 
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3288.] 
Public Records Act — Liberal construction in favor of broad access — Burden to 
establish applicability of exceptions not met — Some parts of the record 
are not inextricably intertwined with the suspect’s protected identity — 
Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 
(No. 2010-0057 — Submitted June 9, 2010 — Decided July 20, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Guernsey County, 
No. 09-CA-4, 2009-Ohio-6336. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Court of Appeals 
for Guernsey County denying the request of appellant, Beth Rocker, for a writ of 
mandamus to compel appellee, the Guernsey County Sheriff’s Office, to release 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
investigative records relating to a priest who had been investigated for criminal 
sexual conduct between 1980 and 1992.  Rocker claims to have been one of his 
victims.  Because the court of appeals erred in holding that all of the withheld 
records were exempt from disclosure under the R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) uncharged-
suspect exception to the Ohio Public Records Act, we reverse the judgment and 
remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} In January 2008, Rocker reported to the sheriff’s office that she 
had been sexually assaulted in the early 1990s, when she was a child.  Rocker 
claimed that the priest of the church she had attended as a child was the 
perpetrator of the crime.  The matter was submitted to a grand jury, but no 
indictment was returned. 
{¶ 3} On October 1, 2008, after the investigation had concluded, Rocker, 
through counsel, made a public-records request “for the entire contents of the 
investigative file and any documents reviewed during or related to the 
investigation.”  The sheriff’s office provided Rocker with a copy of the incident 
report, but denied her access to the remaining investigative records. 
{¶ 4} A few months later, Rocker filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Guernsey County for a writ of mandamus to compel the sheriff’s 
office to provide her with access to “all documents reviewed during, related to, or 
prepared concerning the criminal investigation” of the suspect.  After the sheriff’s 
office filed a response, the court ordered the office to submit copies of all the 
requested records under seal for an in camera inspection.  Pursuant to the court’s 
order, the parties submitted briefs on whether the various categories of 
investigative records withheld by the sheriff’s office are disclosable under the 
Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. 
{¶ 5} On December 2, 2009, the court of appeals denied the writ. 
Legal Analysis 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 6} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 
R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C)(1).  We construe the Public 
Records Act liberally in favor of broad access and resolve any doubt in favor of 
disclosure of public records.  State ex rel. Perrea v. Cincinnati Pub. Schools, 123 
Ohio St.3d 410, 2009-Ohio-4762, 916 N.E.2d 1049, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 7} “Exceptions to disclosure under the Public Records Act, R.C. 
149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records custodian, and the 
custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception.  A 
custodian does not meet this burden if it has not proven that the requested records 
fall squarely within the exception.”  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-
Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, paragraph two of 
the syllabus. 
{¶ 8} The sheriff’s office claimed, and the court of appeals determined, 
that the remaining requested records are exempt from disclosure as confidential-
law enforcement investigatory records under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h) and (2).  “The 
applicability 
of 
the 
R.C. 
149.43(A)(2) 
confidential-law-enforcement-
investigatory-record exemption requires, first, that the records pertain to a law 
enforcement matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative nature, 
and, second, that the release of the records would create a high probability of 
disclosure of any of the four types of information specified in R.C. 149.43(A)(2).”  
State ex rel. Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Mentor (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 
440, 444, 732 N.E.2d 969. 
{¶ 9} The sheriff’s office established the first requirement for the 
exemption because the records pertain to a law-enforcement matter of a criminal 
nature.  Id. at 445.  The investigative records were generated by claims of alleged 
sexual misconduct by a priest. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 10} For the second requirement, the court of appeals held that the 
release of the investigative records would probably reveal the identity of an 
uncharged suspect under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a).  The claimed perpetrator of the 
sexual assault is an uncharged suspect because he has never been charged with a 
criminal offense.  See State ex rel. Musial v. N. Olmsted, 106 Ohio St.3d 459, 
2005-Ohio-5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 25 (suspect investigated by police 
department was an uncharged suspect for purposes of exemption because the 
grand jury issued a no bill instead of an indictment).  “The uncharged suspect 
exception applies despite the passage of time, the lack of enforcement action, or a 
prosecutor’s decision not to file formal charges.”  State ex rel. Master v. 
Cleveland (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 23, 30, 661 N.E.2d 180.  Public knowledge of 
the accused and the alleged criminal conduct also does not preclude application of 
the exemption “because release of the records would subject suspects to 
additional adverse publicity and might compromise subsequent efforts to resolve 
the matter.”  Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn., 89 Ohio St.3d at 447, 732 
N.E.2d 969. 
{¶ 11} Nevertheless, this exception applies only to those portions of 
records that, if released, would create a high probability of disclosure of the 
suspect’s identity.  We have held that records are exempt under the uncharged-
suspect exception when “the protected identities of uncharged suspects are 
inextricably intertwined with the investigatory records.”  State ex rel. Master v. 
Cleveland (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 340, 342, 667 N.E.2d 974. 
{¶ 12} The court of appeals determined, in effect, that every part of the 
requested records was inextricably intertwined with the identity of the priest 
accused of sexual assault and that the records were thus not subject to disclosure 
under R.C. 149.43. 
{¶ 13} Rocker argues on appeal that the court of appeals “seems to have 
bypassed a thorough analysis of the nature of each document, and instead focused 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
on references within them to [the suspect].”  The sheriff’s office, citing Master, 
76 Ohio St.3d 340, 667 N.E.2d 974, contends that the court of appeals acted 
correctly in refusing to compel the disclosure of any part of the withheld 
investigative records because the suspect’s identity is inextricably intertwined 
with all of the records. 
{¶ 14} We have reviewed the sealed records and conclude that some of 
the withheld records are subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act 
because they are not inextricably intertwined with the suspect’s protected identity.  
For most of these records, if the sheriff’s office redacts the priest’s name, the 
name, location, and diocese of the church he worked at, and other specific 
identifying information, the disclosure of the records will not create a high 
probability of disclosure of the priest’s identity.  For example, after the priest’s 
name and specific identifying information are redacted, the call record does not 
disclose the priest’s identity.  Notably, in Master, 76 Ohio St.3d at 342, 667 
N.E.2d 974, Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn., 89 Ohio St.3d at 448, 732 
N.E.2d 969, and Musial, 106 Ohio St.3d 459, 2005-Ohio-5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243, 
at ¶ 29, we did not hold that the claimed uncharged-suspect exemption applied to 
all the requested records. 
{¶ 15} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in concluding that all the 
withheld investigative records were covered by a blanket uncharged-suspect 
exemption. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 16} Based on our independent review of the sealed investigative 
records, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause so 
that the court can review the sealed records and order the disclosure of those 
records following the redaction of those portions of the record that are subject to 
the uncharged-suspect exemption, e.g., the priest’s name, his address, the name, 
location, and diocese of the church he worked at, and other specific, identifying 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
information.  By so holding, we adhere to our strict construction of exceptions to 
the Public Records Act as well as our duty to resolve any doubt in favor of access 
to public records. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 17} Because I believe that this case represents a weakening of the 
uncharged suspect exception to the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a), 
and, correspondingly, makes it more difficult for trial courts to determine which 
parts of particular records are exempt from disclosure, I respectfully dissent from 
the majority’s decision to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 18} First, under the uncharged suspect exception to the Public Records 
Act, I believe that the requested sealed investigative records should be excluded 
from disclosure in their entirety because the documents are “inextricably 
intertwined” with records whose release would result in a “high probability” of 
disclosure of the suspect’s identity.  Although it is true that the Public Records 
Act is liberally construed in favor of broad access to public records, I believe that 
disclosure of the sealed records in question would create a “high probability” of 
disclosure of the suspect’s identity. 
{¶ 19} The majority’s decision to attempt to redact the suspect’s name, 
address, and place and dates of employment creates a new standard that is not 
only onerous to trial courts but, as in this case, as a practical matter, is 
unworkable.  The reality is that just redacting the uncharged suspect’s name, place 
of employment, dates he or she worked for the organization, and other specific 
identifying information will not prevent the high probability of disclosure of the 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
uncharged suspect’s identity in a less populous county such as the one in this 
case, where the suspect involved may be the only person in the county during the 
time in question to have held the position of leadership that he or she held and 
may have been employed at the only organization of its kind in that county. 
{¶ 20}  “[O]ne of the purposes for the public records exception * * * is to 
avoid the situation in which the release of confidential law enforcement 
investigatory records would subject a person to adverse publicity where he may 
otherwise never have been identified with the matter under investigation.” State 
ex rel. Thompson Newspapers, Inc. v. Martin (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 28, 30, 546 
N.E.2d 939.  Accord State ex rel. Polovischak v. Mayfield (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 
51, 552 N.E.2d 635, syllabus; State ex rel. Moreland v. Dayton (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 129, 131, 616 N.E.2d 234.  Moreover, as the court of appeals noted, “[t]he 
uncharged-suspect exemption may still apply even though the accusation of 
criminal conduct is already public knowledge,” citing State ex rel. Master v. 
Cleveland (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 340, 342, 667 N.E.2d 974, and State ex rel. Ohio 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Mentor (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 440, 446-447, 732 
N.E.2d 969.  State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Guernsey App. 
No. 09-CA-4, 2009-Ohio-6336, at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 21} As for the jeopardy to law enforcement, this court has held in State 
ex rel. Master v. Cleveland  (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 340, 667 N.E.2d 974, that 
another of the exception’s purposes is to “prevent compromising subsequent 
efforts to reopen and solve inactive cases.”  (Citations omitted.)  Id. at 343.  
Releasing 
information 
about uncharged suspects in inactive criminal 
investigations could compromise later efforts to reopen and solve those inactive 
cases.  On occasion, police cannot secure enough evidence to convict a suspect 
until years after the initial investigation was opened.  See State ex rel. Moreland 
v. Dayton (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 129, 131, 616 N.E.2d 234. The statute of 
limitations has not yet run on this investigation.  See R.C. 2901.13(A)(3).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
Disclosure of these records might interfere with law enforcement efforts to further 
investigate this matter. 
{¶ 22} Second, I would find that the requested records are exempt from 
disclosure under the specific confidential investigatory techniques or procedures 
or specific investigatory work product exception to the Public Records Act.  See 
R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).  In my view, this court’s decision in State ex rel. Steckman 
v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83, is relevant to this analysis.  
In Steckman, we held that “except as required by Crim.R. 16, information 
assembled by law enforcement officials in connection with a probable or pending 
criminal proceeding is, by the work product exception found in R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(c), excepted from required release as said information is compiled 
in anticipation of litigation.”  Id. at 435. 
{¶ 23} For the reasons outlined above, I dissent from the majority’s 
decision to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause.  
The court of appeals has already reviewed the disputed ten sealed documents and 
found them to be confidential law enforcement investigatory records, each of 
which is exempt from disclosure, concluding that release of the disputed records 
would “undoubtedly reveal the identity of the uncharged suspect.”  State ex rel. 
Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2009-Ohio-6336, at ¶ 16.  As the court 
noted, “[n]ot only do most of the records reveal the name of the suspect, they also 
reveal facts unique to him which would have a high probability of revealing his 
identity.”  Id.  Despite the majority’s attempt to redact some of this identifying 
information, I continue to believe that the release of these documents will create a 
high probability of revealing the uncharged suspect’s identity. 
{¶ 24} Absent an abuse of discretion, we should not second-guess these 
findings and substitute our own opinion for that of the lower courts.  The court 
below followed our case law.  Some on this court merely disagree with the factual 
conclusions.  I believe that the uncharged suspect’s identity is “inextricably 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
intertwined” with the investigatory records requested, such that redaction is an 
insufficient safeguard against disclosure.  Therefore, I would affirm. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Kircher, Arnold & Dame, L.L.C., Konrad Kircher, and Michael F. Arnold, 
for appellant. 
 
Daniel G. Padden, Guernsey County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
____________________