Title: MORRIS ALEXANDER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY l, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . LZ AT 6;VUyrrMr X;'Vurf -of `g't MORRIS ALEXANDER 2007-SC-00655-MR AFFIRMING RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2009 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE JAMES D . ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE NO. 06-CR-01215 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE On September 5, 2006, Appellant, Morris Douglas Alexander, was found guilty by a Fayette Circuit Courtjury and convicted of kidnapping, rape in the first-degree, assault in the second-degree, two counts of sexual abuse in the first-degree, and of being a persistent felony offender in the second-degree. For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to seventy (70) years imprisonment . Appellant now appeals his conviction as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2) (b) . BACKGROUND Appellant became romantically involved with his neighbor, Shirlene Morton, three to four months prior to the July 4, 2006, holiday. Both Morton and Appellant were residents on the same floor of an apartment building on East Second Street in Lexington, and lived across the hall from one another. On July 3, 2006, Morton spent the day with her children and grandchildren, having previously told Appellant she would not spend the holiday with him. Thereafter, Morton's daughter dropped her off in Mt. Sterling at the residence of a friend, Nanette Dickerson. Morton and Dickerson spent the evening at Dickerson's home "doing their nails," and getting ready for a night out in Lexington at a blues club, known as T.D.'s Lounge, which was located on the first floor of Morton and Appellant's apartment building . Dickerson intended to spend the night with Morton, and after the two had been at the club talking and drinking, they went upstairs to Morton's apartment . As she approached her apartment, Morton noticed that Appellant's door was open slightly, but did not think anything of it. She and Dickerson went into her apartment to relax. Shortly thereafter, Appellant opened Morton's door and told her to "come here," and that he wanted to talk to her. Morton refused and Appellant, who seemed intoxicated and upset, attempted twice to grab her. During this time, Dickerson jumped up and asked Appellant what he was doing. Appellant pulled out a knife and held it against Dickerson's neck, yelling, "back off bitch!" He told her that she did not have anything to do with the situation and then cut her along her back with the knife. Dickerson escaped and ran out of the apartment to try to find help. Meanwhile, Appellant dragged Morton into his apartment, threw her on the floor, locked the door, and demanded that she tell him where she had been all day. When she responded that she had spent the day 2 with her children and grandchildren, Appellant began to assault her, beating her with his fists, kicking and kneeing her. Appellant then hit her in the jaw, causing her to spit up blood and drift out of consciousness. After Dickerson fled, she located Terrance Young, the owner of the nightclub downstairs and landlord of the apartments, and his brother, George Young, and asked them for help . The brothers rushed up to the apartment where Appellant told them that he would kill Morton if they tried to open the door. Terrance used his key to enter and saw Appellant holding a knife to the throat of a beaten and bloodied Morton . Appellant threatened to kill Morton if he did not leave . Fearing for Morton's safety, the brothers left to contact the police . After they left, Appellant continued to beat Morton . Shortly thereafter, police officer Joshua Masterson arrived at the apartment and attempted to enter. Again, Appellant threatened to kill Morton if he tried to come inside. Appellant refused to talk with Masterson because he was white and said he would only speak with an African-American officer. However, Appellant then refused to speak with an African-American officer who arrived and specifically requested to speak with Captain James Turley, a hostage negotiator with whom Appellant was acquainted from a prior hostage situation some years earlier. Captain Turley was called to the scene from his home and engaged in negotiations with Appellant for several hours, eventually persuading Appellant to surrender. 3 Morton testified that, during the time she was held, Appellant beat her and cut her on the face and neck with the knife . She further testified that Appellant engaged in oral sex with her and attempted to rip her underwear off, resulting in a vaginal laceration . Testimony also indicated that Appellant attempted sexual intercourse with Morton, that he penetrated her, but did not ejaculate, as he was unable to sustain an erection and the police negotiators were "interrupting." Subsequent DNA testing of vaginal swabs taken from the rape kit showed the presence of Appellant's DNA. Both Appellant and Morton testified that they had not had consensual intercourse for at least the preceding week . Appellant was tried and convicted of kidnapping, rape, sexual abuse, assault, and of being a persistent felony offender . On appeal, Appellant raises four principal allegations of error stemming from the underlying trial : 1) that the trial court improperly allowed introduction of other crimes evidence ; 2) that an African-American juror was struck in violation of Batson ; 3) that the trial court improperly excluded impeachment testimony concerning a prior rape ; and 4) that the jury should have received an Assault under Extreme Emotional Disturbance instruction as a lesser-included offense . For the reasons that shall be discussed herein, we are unpersuaded by Appellant's arguments and, therefore, affirm his conviction . II. ANALYSIS The Trial Court Carefully Balanced the Probative Value and Prejudicial Effects Before Admitting Evidence of Prior Criminal Acts and Thus Did Not Abuse its Discretion. 4 Appellant argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of other crimes, which operated to his substantial prejudice . We disagree for reasons that we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination. Before trial, the Commonwealth filed notice, pursuant to KRE 404(c) of its intent to present evidence of other crimes or bad acts evidence under KRE 404(b) to demonstrate motive, intent, and modus operandi . KRE 404(b)(1) states : Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith . It may, however, be admissible : (1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident ; The exceptions to the general prohibition against admitting prior crimes evidence listed in KRE 404(b)(1) are illustrative rather than exhaustive and among those non-enumerated exceptions we have previously recognized is modus operandi . See Clark v. Commonwealth , 223 S.W.3d 90, 96 (Ky. 2007) . Here, the evidence that the Commonwealth sought to introduce involved the substance of Appellant's 1993 and 2004 prior convictions, both of which bore a striking similarity to the present charges. See Commonwealth v. English , 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) . In order to prove the elements of a subsequent offense by the modus operandi exception the prior misconduct should be so "strikingly similar" to the present offense as to create a reasonable probability that the acts were 5 committed with the same mens rea . Simeon v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-SC-000237-MR, 2007 WL 541912, at *4 (Ky. Feb. 22, 2007) In the 1993 incident, Appellant kicked in the door of his former girlfriend's residence and, armed with a gun, threatened to kill her and her fourteen (14) year old son. Appellant then remained at the residence holding the occupants hostage for three hours . After Appellant refused to speak with the police officer who was dispatched to the girlfriend's residence (citing racial differences) and after Appellant threatened to kill himself and his girlfriend's child, the Emergency Response Unit was summoned. A negotiator, by the name of Sergeant James Turley, eventually convinced Appellant to release the hostages and give himself over to police. According to testimony, Appellant indicated that he felt compelled to commit the crime out of love . I Appellant ultimately pled guilty to burglary, unlawful imprisonment and wanton endangerment . In 2004, shortly after being released on parole for prior incidents, Appellant became romantically involved with Phyllis Lamey and began living with her. The relationship soured and Lamey subsequently ended their romantic involvement. However, she allowed Appellant to remain living with her until he could find another residence. Shortly thereafter, on September 28, 2004, Appellant called Lamey into his bedroom, isolated her there and pulled a knife from underneath his bed . Placing 1 In the present case, the Commonwealth had initially indicated that the victim of the 1993 incident would testify at trial. However, being unable to locate her, the Commonwealth introduced the testimony of Turley instead . As previously noted, Turley engaged in negotiations with Appellant in both the 1993 and 2006 incidents. 6 the knife against her throat, Appellant told Lamey that he would kill her and her son, who was asleep in another room . Appellant held Lamey hostage for several hours until she was eventually able to convince him that she still loved him and would not end the relationship . After Appellant left the following morning, Lamey notified the police, whereupon Appellant was charged and ultimately pled guilty to unlawful imprisonment . The events in the present instance led to Appellant being charged with burglary, kidnapping, rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse. As noted by the trial court, the "striking similarities" between the prior crimes and the present incident simply cannot be overlooked . However, these similarities, of their own accord, do not make the evidence admissible . Indeed, the general rule is that evidence of a person's character is not admissible to prove action in conformity with the prior bad acts and should be excluded . E__-__., Jones v . Commonwealth, 303 Ky . 666, 198 S.W .2d 969, 970 (1947) ; KRE 404(a) . Moreover, "trial courts must apply [KRE 404(b)] cautiously, with an eye towards eliminating evidence which is relevant only as proof of an accused's propensity to commit a certain type of crime ." Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Ky. 1994) . However, in Sanders v. Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 665, 674 (Ky. 1990), we noted that "relevant evidence which is probative of an element of the crime charged is admissible, even though it may tend to prove the commission of other crimes." KRS 500.070 mandates that the Commonwealth must prove every element of a statutory criminal offense 7 beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, in certain limited circumstances, prior crimes evidence, as introduced through the modus operandi exception, may be used to offer proof of a statutory element of a criminal offense. Of principal interest, here, is Appellant's kidnapping charge . Kidnapping, under KRS 509.040 requires proof of intent:z At the pre- trial conference on the matter, the Commonwealth argued that evidence of Appellant's prior crimes was necessary to establish the intent element of the kidnapping charge because Appellant was asserting that he informed the victim she was free to leave at any time . The Commonwealth's position was that it might be inferred from the similarity of the two prior incidents that, despite Appellant's claim that Morton was free to leave, Appellant intended to keep her at his apartment and terrorize or otherwise use her as a shield . 2 KRS 509.040(l) states, "A person is guilty of kidnapping when he unlawfully restrains another person and when his intent is : (a) To hold him for ransom or reward ; or (b) To accomplish or to advance the commission of a felony; or (c) To inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or another; or (d) To interfere with the performance of a governmental or political function ; or (e) To use him as a shield or hostage; or (f} To deprive the parents or guardian of the custody of a minor, when the person taking the minor is not a person exercising custodial control or supervision of the minor as the term "person exercising custodial control or supervision" is defined in KRS 600.020 . (emphasis added) . On appeal, this Court will review a trial court's determinations on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion . See, e.g . Cook v. Commonwealth , 129 S.W.3d 351, 362 (Ky. 2004) . The oft-cited and well- settled test for abuse of discretion is "whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles ." English, 993 S.W.2d at 945. This Court has established a three-prong test for evaluating the admissibility of evidence under KRE 404(b), which looks to the (1) relevance; (2) probativeness; and (3) prejudice of the proposed other crimes evidence . Benjamin v. Commonwealth , 266 S.W.3d 775, 791 (Ky. 2008) ; Bell , 875 S.W.2d at 889. Bell , as the trial court accurately noted, is the controlling standard . Here, upon review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court's findings were arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by good law. See English, 993 S.W.2d at 945 . The trial court held an extensive and lengthy pre-trial hearing, and the record reflects that the court took great pains in thoughtfully and extensively deliberating upon the matter. Indeed, on multiple occasions during the hearing, the trial judge indicated how seriously he took the task of making such determinations and that his natural inclination was to be wary of admitting prior bad acts evidence . To that end, the trial judge stated, Under KRE 404(b), specifically paren[theses] (1), the Commonwealth having specifically conceded to the court that it is not seeking to introduce any evidence under KRE 404(b)(2) . . . specifically offered for the purpose of motive, intent, these types of issues, the court has specifically looked 9 at the Bell case . . . which I believe is the controlling authority. I think Bell imposes on the trial court that admissibility of [KRE) 404(b) evidence is to be strictly construed and applied cautiously . I do think that prior crimes are prejudicial . . . in this case I think that they are prejudicial . . . I have really scrutinized it and taken a hard look at it . The trial judge then examined each Bell factor in turn, ultimately concluding that the overwhelming similarities in the crimes charged, the types of victims and the acts of the defendant (which the court opined were similar, if not the same, in each incident) led to the conclusion that the Commonwealth should be able to introduce the evidence with certain limitations on its use . Thus, it cannot be said that the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, as the decision was carefully considered within the context of the law. Nor was the determination unsupported by sound legal principles, as the trial court applied the appropriate legal authority in its analysis . Therefore, if the trial court correctly applied Bell , its determination can be neither unfair nor unreasonable . As such, we will look to the Bell factors . The first two Bell prongs inquire into relevance and probativeness. Evidence will be considered relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." KRE 401 . Relevance and probativeness are necessarily intertwined. Relevant evidence is deemed so because it lends support to 10 questions of the probability of an occurrence, and if a fact makes something more probable (and that fact correlates to a consequential determination) then it is probative . Here, Appellant's intent was in dispute. In Walker v . Commonwealth , 52 S.W.3d 533, 535-536 (Ky. 2001) we observed, Professor Lawson notes that under KRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes should be admitted to prove intent only when intent is in genuine dispute . Of course, even when in dispute, a trial court must still determine that the evidence is relevant to prove the intent to commit the crime charged . Further, the evidence is subject to exclusion under KRE 403 . (citing Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.25, p . 98 (3d ed .1993)) . At trial, Appellant argued that he did not intend to use Morton as a hostage or shield and that he did not restrain her with the intent to rape. Appellant claimed that he was merely trying to work things out with Morton and that he had told her she was free to leave at any time. The Commonwealth argued that since Appellant had held two prior girlfriends hostage with similar weapons, such evidence clearly made it more probable that he intended to do so in this instance and did not tell Morton she was free to leave . Thus, evidence which would offer proof of Appellant's intent was probative . Therefore, the prior crimes evidence was probative as proof of modus operandi. In order to prove the elements of a subsequent offense by evidence of modus operandi, the facts surrounding the prior misconduct must be so strikingly similar to the charged offense as to create a reasonable probability that (1) the acts were committed by the same person, and/or (2) the acts were accompanied by the same mens rea . If not, then the evidence of prior misconduct proves only a criminal disposition and is inadmissible . English, 993 S.W.2 d at 945 (citin Billings v . Commonwealth , 843 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1992) and Adcock v . Commonwealth, 702 S.W .2d 440 (Ky. 1986)) . We have held, "it is not the commonality of the crimes but the commonality of the facts constituting the crimes that demonstrates a modus operandi ." Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 451, 469 (Ky. 2005) ; Clark, 223 S.W.3d at 97. Here, the factual commonalities are undeniable . In each of the three criminal instances involving Appellant, the victim was a current or recently terminated romantic interest . In each instance Appellant isolated his victim away from others in the house. In each instance Appellant used a deadly weapon to prevent the women from leaving: in two instances a large knife and in one instance a gun . In each instance the victims were held hostage for a significant duration in their residence. 3 And, in each instance the motivation for the criminal act appears to have been based, in part, on unrequited affection . Thus, the evidence was probative of a repeating pattern of conduct in which Appellant forcibly held his romantic interests against their will .4 See Lear v. Commonwealth , 884 S.W .2d 657, 660 (Ky. 1994) ; English, 993 3 In the 1993 and 2004 incidents the victims were held in their homes ; in the present instance, Appellant held Morton in his apartment which was in the same building and across the hall from Morton's residence. 4 It should be noted that we will not entertain Appellant's argument that the 1993 incident was too remote in time to be admissible as remoteness in time "bears more heavily on weight than on admissibility." Davis v. Commonwealth , 147 S.W.3d 709, 725 (Ky. 2004) . 12 S.W .2d at 945 ("the evidence was offered to show a modus operandi for the purpose of proving motive, intent, knowledge, and the absence of mistake or accident, i. e., contrary to his statements to the police, [a]ppellee knew what he was doing (knowledge), he did it on purpose (intent, absence of mistake or accident), and he did it for his own sexual gratification (motive) .") . Moreover, in Springer v. Commonwealth , 998 S.W.2d 439, 449 (Ky. 1999), we held, "[a] fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action includes not only a fact tending to prove an element of the offense, but also a fact tending to disprove a defense . Relevancy is established by any showing of probativeness, however slight." Here, Appellant had requested and received an instruction on voluntary intoxication and had requested an instruction on Extreme Emotional Distress . Accordingly, evidence of motive, intent, and modus operandi was proper to negate Appellant's defense regarding mental state. See Haight v. Commonwealth , 938 S.W.2d 243, 252 (Ky. 1996) (finding that raising an EED defense brought appellant's mental state into question and holding admission of KRE 404(b) evidence to negate that defense was proper) . The final Bell inquiry asks whether the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by potential for prejudice. 875 S.W.2d at 890 . A trial court's determination in the balancing of prejudice versus probative value will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion . Rake v. Commonwealth , 450 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Ky. 1970) . Here, upon review 13 of the record, the trial judge was quite cognizant of the risk of prejudice and noted this during the third prong of the Bell analysis ; however, the court made a finding under that test that the prejudice was not so overwhelming as to overcome the probativeness . We believe this was a reasonable finding. Therefore, because the evidence in question satisfies inquiry under Bell , and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this determination, the evidence was properly admissible under KRE 404(b)(1) . As such, there was no error. B. Alleged Batson Violation. Appellant next argues that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) was violated when the trial court permitted one of the last remaining African-American members of the venire to be removed from the panel with a peremptory challenge. We disagree for reasons that the Commonwealth articulated a reasonable, race-neutral basis for removing the prospective juror and the trial court's ruling on the matter was not clearly erroneous. As we recently noted in Chestnut v . Commonwealth, 250 S.W .3d 288, 300-301 (Ky. 2008), The United States Supreme Court, in Batson, articulated a three-step process for determining whether the state's use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause . A defendant first has the burden of making a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if this showing is made, then the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral reason for striking the juror in question; and third, the trial court must then determine whether the burden of proving 14 purposeful discrimination has been met. "Batson was not intended to remove all prosecutorial discretion in peremptory strikes, but rather to eliminate the odious practice of eliminating potential jurors simply because of race." (quoting Washington v . Commonwealth, 34 S.W .3d 376, 379 (Ky. 2000)) (internal citations omitted) . "A trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous." Washington, 34 S.W.3d at 380 . Here, at the outset of voir dire, the trial court struck the first prospective African-American juror sua sponte because he was a corrections officer working at the jail where Appellant was being held and knew Appellant by name. Significantly, before empanelling of the venire, Juror # 367 approached the court off-the-record and indicated that the elderly gentleman sitting next her, later identified as Juror # 519, repeatedly muttered to himself that he could not be fair . The trial court elected to wait until the petit jury was called by the clerk to see if Juror # 519 would be in the final thirty-two (32) selected . Juror # 519 was selected and was one of the last two remaining African-Americans on the panel. The trial court subsequently summoned Juror # 519 to the bench to inquire into his ability to be fair and impartial. 5 When asked about the charges, he indicated that he had mixed feelings about them and 5 The trial court noted that Juror # 519 hesitated when his number was called and asked him if this was because he was tired or sleepy . The juror replied that he was writing the number down but did not realize it was his number . He also stated that when he realized it was his number, he said "that's my number" but forgot to stand up. However, the Commonwealth never insinuated that Juror # 519 was inattentive or sleeping . 15 would need to hear "the pros and the cons" of the case . However, when prompted, Juror # 519 stated he could be fair and impartial and could find Appellant guilty if the Commonwealth proved its case . Juror # 519 was returned to the panel and the Commonwealth indicated that it was amenable to this . The trial court stated, "I've been about as bold as I can be on him. So I'm just going to let him go and let you all exercise your peremptories if anybody has any feelings about it." Both sides then used their allotted peremptory challenges, bringing the number of prospective jurors to seventeen (17) . The Commonwealth struck Juror # 519 with one of its peremptory strikes. Appellant did not initially raise any motions about the peremptory strikes or the panel. However, the Commonwealth indicated that for purposes of Batson it wished to indicate on the record that it struck Juror # 519 because he had muttered to another juror (# 367) that he could not be fair, that Juror # 367 was sufficiently troubled by this to bring it to the attention of the court, and that this, in aggregate, was sufficient to warrant a strike . Appellant objected ; however, the trial court overruled finding that the Commonwealth had articulated a race-neutral reason in justification of the strike . Accordingly, of the two African-American jurors included in the initial thirty-two (32), one remained in the final seventeen . Fourteen (14) of the remaining seventeen (17) jurors were selected at random to constitute the jury. No African-American jurors were among the final fourteen (14) . Generally, the defendant will raise an objection that a peremptory challenge has been executed on the basis of race, at which point the onus is on the prosecution to proffer a race-neutral reason . Here, there was no initial objection . However, although the process was somewhat inverted, we do not believe the trial court was clearly erroneous in its determination on the Batson challenge . See Commonwealth v. Coker, 241 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Ky . 2007) . The Commonwealth, in an abundance of caution, volunteered a race-neutral justification for the strike . Only then did Appellant object, claiming that the juror had been rehabilitated . The trial court, however, found the Commonwealth's stated reason sufficiently race-neutral . Thus, the prima facie showing issue is moot . See Hernandez v. New York , 500 U.S . 352, 359 (1991) (plurality opinion) ("The prosecutor defended his use of peremptory strikes without any prompting or inquiry from the trial court . As a result, the trial court had no occasion to rule that petitioner had or had not made a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination . This departure from the normal course of proceeding need not concern us . . . Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.") . In this instance, the use of the peremptory challenge was not a pretext for racial discrimination . Here, the Commonwealth's lingering 17 concern about the prospective juror was legitimate and justifiable. However, it is important to remember that even when [reeasonable minds could differ as to whether the Commonwealth's stated reason for striking the potential juror in question was a pretext for racial discrimination . . . our job is not to determine whether we find a proffered reason to be a mere pretext for discrimination ; ourjob is to determine whether the trial court's acceptance of the validity of the race-neutral reason is clearly erroneous. Coker, 241 S .W.3d at 310 (emphasis added) . The trial court is uniquely situated to determine the legitimacy of a Batson challenge and the "evaluation of a prosecutor's state of mind is peculiarly within the province of the trial courtjudge." Id. at 309 . As such, because the Commonwealth's justification was facially race-neutral, their concern reasonable, and the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous, we will not disturb its determination . Appellant also argues, however, that the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Snyder v. Louisiana , --- U.S . ----, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (2008), is applicable in that it lessons the burden of proof needed to prevail on a Batson claim to a bare minimum. We will not entertain Appellant's argument as it is without merit. Snvder unequivocally reiterates the well-known three-step requirements articulated in Batson and its progeny and applies the familiar "clearly erroneous" standard articulated in Hernandez and again in Miller-El v . Dretke, 545 U.S . 231 (2005) . Snyder , --- U.S . ----, 128 S.Ct. at 1207 .6 6 This Court very recently considered Snvder in a not-yet-final Memorandum Opinion of the Court wherein we recognized the continuance of 18 C. The Trial Court was Proper in Excluding Inadmissible Impeachment Evidence. Appellant next argues that the trial court was erroneous in not allowing him to introduce certain testimony, which was heard outside the presence of the jury, relating to an alleged prior rape of Morton by her stepfather . Appellant claims that this evidence was relevant to demonstrate that the alleged sex between Appellant and Morton was consensual and that the exclusion of this evidence impeded his ability to present a defense . We disagree for reasons that Appellant has mischaracterized the nature of the proposed testimony and the trial court was proper to exclude it. At trial, Morton was asked whether Appellant penetrated her and engaged in oral sex with her. Prior to the jury's removal, Appellant attempted to impeach the victim by requesting that a tape of an interview between her and Detective William Persley be played before the jury . Specifically, Appellant wished to impeach Morton with a portion of the recorded conversation wherein Persley had asked Morton if she wanted to pursue rape charges . The Commonwealth objected and the jury was removed for further discussion outside their presence. During questioning on the matter, Morton explained that she had previously been raped by her stepfather . She compared what happened with Appellant with what had happened with her stepfather and said that the two situations were different. She said that she did not this standard . See Clay v. Commonwealth , --- S.W.3d ----, 2008 WL 5272775 (Ky. 2008) (opinion not yet final) . 19 understand the law, and reiterated that what Appellant did was different . 7 After Morton had been questioned, the taped interview was played before the court outside of the jury's presence . Appellant's counsel then admitted to the court that he had mistakenly thought in the interview that Morton denied being raped. Appellant's counsel apologized to the court and abandoned his attempt to impeach Morton with the tape . However, the following day at trial, Appellant's counsel again attempted to call Morton to the stand and ask her about denying having been raped . The trial court corrected counsel and reminded him that the statement from the previous day had been one of comparison between an ostensibly vicious prior rape by her stepfather and the events with Appellant which had been described to the jury. Further, the trial court indicated that the line of questioning would be improper as it would be asking the victim to make a legal conclusion as to whether Appellant's acts constituted rape under the law . The court commented that Morton had testified that Appellant penetrated her and that counsel could pursue any questions concerning this . However, the court stated that it would not permit Appellant's counsel to ask the victim "ifyou were raped like you were before, I don't think that's proper ; 7 At trial, Morton stated, "I don't understand all that law stuff . . . the rape stuff . . . I believe I said, [referring to the interview with Persley] to me it wasn't really no 'rape-rape .' You know what I'm saying? It's like -'cause I had been raped before . There was a difference in what he had done and what my stepfather had done. You know what I'm saying?" 20 or, were you raped in this case. I don't think that's proper . That's a legal definition . You can ask her the facts . She's a fact witness ." Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are a matter of trial court discretion and should not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion . See Simpson v . Commonwealth , 889 S.W .2d 781, 783 (Ky. 1994 ) . Here, there was no abuse of discretion on the trial court's behalf in excluding the complained of testimony, as it would have been improper lay witness testimony, under KRE 701, and inadmissible under the rape shield law, KRE 412 . KRE 701 dictates that a lay witness cannot give an opinion based on "specialized knowledge," which is in the province of expert testimony. KRE 702 . Indeed, it is well-settled that "a witness generally cannot testify to conclusions of law ." Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W .2d 13,32 (Ky . 1998) ; 31AAm . Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence 117 (2008) . In the present instance, the trial court permitted Appellant to ask any and all questions it desired which related to the circumstances of the alleged rape. However, the trial court would not allow Appellant to pursue a line of questioning which focused on differentiating why she may or may not have considered the prior rape by her stepfather distinguishable from the present events . The court felt that this would be asking the victim to reach a legal conclusion as to whether her attack constituted a rape under Kentucky law, which is impermissible pursuant to Tamme. As the court noted, a sexual attack can still be rape even if a witness calls it something different . The trial court's ruling in this regard was reasonable . 2 1 Likewise, under both federal and Kentucky rules of evidence, when a defendant is alleged to have engaged in sexual misconduct, as a matter of policy, no evidence of specific sexual behavior or of a victim's reputation or sexual propensity may be admitted . See KRE 412 . As was noted in Hall v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W .2d 224, 226-227 (Ky. App. 1997) upon extensive review of other jurisdictions, the general rule in sexual misconduct cases is that allegations of similar misconduct are not admissible by the defendant unless they have been proven to be demonstrably false . Although the Court of Appeals in Hall was specifically referring to circumstances wherein similar accusations were being offered by the defense in support of a fabrication theme, the logic employed by the court is sound, and we believe, applicable here. Specifically, the Court of Appeals reasoned that whether the allegations were either true or unproven, they should be inadmissible because they are irrelevant to the current proceeding . See id. Moreover, the explicit directive of the Rape Shield Law, KRE 412, is to remove the specter of other sexual behavior from a rape trial in all but the most constrained instances, as it carries with it the great danger of confusing and prejudicing the jury . Thus, evidence which necessarily required examination of an unproven prior rape allegation, by means of comparison, was inadmissible here. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so excluding. Request for Assault under Extreme Emotional Disturbance Jury Instruction. 22 At trial, the court denied Appellant's request for an Assault under Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED) jury instruction as a lesser- included offense under the second-degree assault charge. Appellant argues that this ruling was improper because such instruction was warranted under the totality of the evidence . We disagree . A defendant is permitted to introduce evidence of extreme emotional disturbance under KRS 508.040 in instances where intent to cause physical injury is an element of the offense.$ However, in order to establish extreme emotional disturbance as a partial defense to an assault charge, the defendant must prove "he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be." KRS 507 .020(1)(a) . KRS 508.040 states, (1) In any prosecution under KRS 508.010, 508.020 or 508.030 in which intentionally causing physical injury or serious physical injury is an element of the offense, the defendant may establish in mitigation that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in subsection (1) (a) of KRS 507.020 . (2) An assault committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance is: (a) A Class D felony when it would constitute an assault in the first degree or an assault in the second degree if not committed under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance ; or (b) A Class B misdemeanor when it would constitute an assault in the fourth degree if not committed under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance. 23 This Court has articulated the definition of extreme emotional disturbance as being `a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes .' Benjamin v. Commonwealth , 266 S.W .3d 775, 782 (Ky . 2008) (quoting McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S .W.2d 464, 468-469 (Ky . 1986)) . Thus, in order to receive an EED mitigating instruction, a defendant must present evidence which establishes adequate provocation, or a triggering event. See Benjamin , 266 S.W.3d at 782 ; see also Fields v. Commonwealth , 44 S.W .3d 355, 359 (Ky. 2001) . Moreover, the provocation leading to the triggering event must be continuous and uninterrupted - though it need not necessarily be contemporaneous with the triggering event - and the courts should look to whether there was a sufficient "cooling-off period" which rendered the response unreasonable or the provocation inadequate . See Benjamin , 266 S.W.3d at 783. On appeal, this Court will look to the evidence presented below in determining whether a trial court's determination as to whether to give an EED instruction was an abuse of discretion . See Greene v. Commonwealth , 197 S.W .3d 76, 82 (Ky . 2006) . Only when the evidence demonstrates that "the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than . . . evil or malicious purposes" caused the defendant to be in "a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed" that his judgment was overcome, causing a loss of control, should an EED instruction be submitted to the jury to make such determination . See McClellan, 715 S.W.2d at 468-469 . Here, the trial court determined that the evidence was insufficient to warrant an EED instruction on the second-degree assault charge because there was no evidence presented that Appellant was under extreme emotional disturbance and no evidence presented of a triggering event. The evidence indicated that Morton had spent the day in the company of her children and grandchildren and had returned home to celebrate the holiday weekend by going out with a female friend . That Appellant was jealous, controlling and, in the words of the trial court, "got mad as the devil," however, is insufficient, even subjectively, to overcome his capacity to manifest an intent to assault her. Indeed, "there must be some definitive, non-speculative evidence to support an EED instruction ." Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Ky. 1998) (citing Morgan v . Commonwealth , 878 S .W.2d 18, 20 (Ky. 1994)) . Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination . See Schrimsher v. Commonwealth , 190 S.W .3d 318, 333 (Ky . 2006) (holding that there must be a reasonable explanation for the enraged emotional state and that the normal stresses of raising a child were insufficient to suffice as a reasonable explanation) ; Caudill v. Commonwealth , 120 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Ky. 2003) . III. CONCLUSION Therefore, for the above stated reasons, we hereby affirm Appellant's sentence and conviction . All sitting. All concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Julia Karol Pearson Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301 Frankfort, KY 40601 Thomas More Ransdell Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302 Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky James Coleman Shackelford Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Office of the Criminal Appeals 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601