Title: Fosler v. Panoramic Design

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 73
September Term, 2001
_________________________________________
SCOTT FOSLER, et al.
v.
PANO RAM IC DESIGN, LTD.
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
        Eldridge
       
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia, 
                                
         JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:  July 28, 2003
After becoming dissatisfied with a renovation project on their home, the
petitioners, Scott and Gail Fosler, filed three actions against the respondent, Panoram ic
Design, Ltd., with which the Fosters had entered a “Construction Consultant
Agreement.”  One suit, filed in the Circuit Court for Montgom ery County, was this
declaratory judgment action.  The Foslers also filed a complaint with the Maryland
Home Improvement Comm ission, a state government agency in the Maryland
Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation.  In addition, the Foslers filed a
complaint with the Montgomery County Department of Housing and Comm unity
Affairs.  The three actions essentially alleged that Panoram ic was performing home
improvement work without a license, and, consequently, that the contract between the
Foslers and Panoram ic was unenforceable.  
The Maryland Home Improvement Commission stayed its proceedings during the
pendency of the other actions.  The Circuit Court, however,  allowed this declaratory
judgment action to go to trial and to be resolved on the merits.  The Circuit Court
eventually ruled that Panoram ic was performing home improvement work without a
license and that the contract was unenforceable.  On appeal, the Court of Special
Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court in an unreported opinion.  This
Court issued a writ of certiorari, primarily to consider whether the Circuit Court for
Montgom ery County erred in failing to dismiss or stay the declaratory judgment action.
We shall hold that it did; accordingly, we shall not reach any other issues in the case.
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I.
The following facts are not in dispute.  The Foslers resided in a single-family
house in Chevy Chase, Maryland, which they decided to renovate completely.
Discussions between the Foslers and the respondent, Panoram ic Design, Ltd., resulted
in the parties entering into a “Design Agreement” and a “Construction Consultant
Agreement.”  The latter, which is the contract at issue in the case at bar, was executed
on May 20, 1997.  Pursuant to the Construction Consultant Agreem ent, Panoramic
agreed to the following terms:
“A.
BIDDING PROJECT
1.
PD, Ltd. will bid or negotiate the complete project
to 
individual 
subcontractors, 
vendors, 
and
suppliers required to complete the project for
Scott and Gail Fosler.
2.
PD, Ltd. will prepare an itemized construction
budget and construction schedule.
3.
PD, Ltd. will coordinate contracts with Scott and
Gail Fosler and subcontractors.
4.
PD, Ltd. will acquire copies of all subcontractors’
insurance policies, licenses, and references.
“B.
MANAGING PROJECT
1.
PD, Ltd. will coordinate subcontractor work on
job site and local government inspections.
2.
PD, Ltd. will supervise Gail and Scott Fosler’s
construction site, but is not responsible for
subcontractors’ work.
-3-
1
  Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to this Article. 
3.
PD, Ltd. will provide Scott and Gail Fosler with a
financial Construction Management Report on the
1st and 15th of each month during the
construction of your project.  This report will
outline 
Scott 
and 
Gail 
Fosler’s 
financial
expenditures for construction to date.
4.
PD, Ltd. will secure all subcontractors lien-release
forms if required.”
In exchange, the Foslers agreed to pay to Panoram ic a fee of twenty percent of the cost
of materials and labor.  Panoram ic earned additional income based on a twenty percent
mark-up of all procured materials. 
Early in 1999, the Foslers became dissatisfied with Panoramic’s work.  As a
result, on March 16, 1999, the Foslers filed the present declaratory judgment action in
the Circuit Court for Montgom ery County.  Their complaint sought a declaration that
the services provided to them by Panoram ic under the contract constituted a “home
improvem ent” within the meaning of the Maryland Home Improvement Law, Maryland
Code (1992, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2002 Supp.), §8-101 et seq. of the Business Regulation
Article.1  They also sought a declaration that the contract was unenforceable under this
Court’s holding in Harry Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, 258 Md. 290, 265 A.2d 759 (1970),
on the grounds that Panoram ic was required to have a license from the Maryland Home
Improvement Commission, but did not have such a license, when it performed home
improvement services for the Foslers.  
As previously mentioned, the Foslers also filed a complaint with the Maryland
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Home Improvement Commission on May 25, 1999.  Similarly, this complaint claimed
that Panoram ic was performing home improvement work without a license, in violation
of the Maryland Home Improvement Law.  The Commission submitted the complaint
to its Legal Services Division to determine whether administrative charges should be
issued against Panoramic.  Finally, the Foslers filed a complaint with the Montgom ery
County Department of Housing and Comm unity Affairs.  In that action, the Foslers
alleged that Panoram ic committed a deceptive practice in violation of the County’s
consumer protection laws by performing home improvement work without a license.
On August 24, 1999, an investigator from the Montgom ery County Department
of Housing and Comm unity Affairs sent a letter to the state investigator assigned to the
Maryland Home Improvement Commission complaint, stating in relevant part as
follows:
“Enclosed is a copy of the court notice setting trial in this
matter for October 26, 1999.  The charge is whether Panoram ic
committed a deceptive practice in violation of the county’s
consumer protection laws by doing home improvement work
without a license.
“It would be helpful to have the MHIC [Maryland Home
Improvement Commission] opinion on the issue of whether
Panoram ic needed a license by then, as the court would give it
great weight.”
One month later, however, the Maryland Home Improvement Commission advised the
Foslers “that this agency will take no action on the complaint until final resolution” of
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2
The record discloses very little about the complaint which the Foslers filed with the
Montgomery County Department of Housing and Community Affairs, and the parties’ briefs in this
Court make no mention of it.  The briefs refer only to the present declaratory judgment action and
the administrative proceeding before the Maryland Home Improvement Commission, which
administrative proceeding has been stayed.
The Montgomery County Department of Housing and Community Affairs proceeding was
apparently instituted pursuant to Chapter 11, §§ 11-1 through 11-9, of the Montgomery County
Code, which provide for consumer complaints about alleged “deceptive trade practices” and “unfair
trade practices” to be made to the County Department, investigation by the Department, attempts at
conciliation, and, if conciliation fails, actions in circuit court by the County Attorney on behalf of
the consumer (§§ 11-7, 11-7A, and 11-8).  These provisions seem to create a new circuit court cause
of action, and appear to be somewhat similar to the local ordinance involved in McCrory
Corporation v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12, 570 A.2d 834 (1990).
The record in the case at bar indicates that an action was filed in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Montgomery County Code, and based on the
Foslers’ complaint to the local Department.  The record does not indicate what has happened to that
action.
the court actions against Panoramic.2
Subsequently, Panoram ic filed a motion to dismiss the Foslers’ declaratory
judgment action, asserting that “[t]he Maryland Legislature has determined that the sole
and exclusive avenue for determining whether a contractor is a ‘home improvement
contractor,’ lies with the Maryland Home Improvement Commission.  As such, the
Declaratory Judgment Action is an inappropriate and unavailable remedy.”  Panoram ic
also relied on the fact that the Home Improvement Statute “contains no provision
authorizing a private cause of action by a homeowner against a person or firm that is
alleged to be a home improvement contractor.”  Alternatively, Panoram ic argued that,
“when a statutory scheme includes both administrative proceedings and provisions for
judicial review of the administrative decision, this is such a scheme that requires the
parties to exhaust the administrative remedies prior to recourse to the courts.”  Thus,
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Panoram ic maintained that the declaratory action was improper, since the Foslers had
“failed . . . to exhaust their administrative remedies.” 
The Foslers responded by arguing, inter alia, that
“[e]ven assuming, arguendo, Panoramic’s position relative to
administrative exhaustion has some merit, the Foslers filed a
complaint with the MHIC [Maryland Home Improvement
Commission] and have been advised by the MHIC that MHIC on
its own initiative has stayed any action on the Foslers’ complaint
pending ‘completion of litigation.’
* * * 
“Accordingly, any argument that the Foslers have failed to
exhaust their remedies before  the MHIC is without merit.  The
Foslers have done everything they could do to obtain a
determination from MHIC on their complaint against Panoramic.
It is the MHIC, and not the Foslers, that has decided to await the
outcome of the various court actions and take no administrative
action on the Foslers’ complaint.”
Following a hearing, the Circuit Court denied Panoramic’s motion to dismiss. 
The Foslers then filed a motion for summary judgment, which was also denied
by the Circuit Court.  A three-day trial before a jury ensued.  At the conclusion of the
trial, the court discharged the jury, holding, inter alia, that there were no disputed facts
for the jury to consider which could resolve the issue of whether Panoram ic was acting
as a contractor or as a consultant.  The Circuit Court then filed a judgment declaring
that Panoram ic “performed home improvement contractor services for” the Foslers
“within the meaning of the Maryland Home Improvement statute,” that “Panoramic . . .
was required to have a license issued by the Maryland Home Improvement
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Commission,” that “Panoramic . . . performed [the] home improvement contractor
services for plaintiffs . . . without a license issued by the Maryland Home Improvement
Commission,” and that, consequently, the contract was unenforceable under Maryland
law.  
Panoram ic appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate appellate
court reversed the order of the Circuit Court and remanded the case for a new trial,
holding that the issue of whether Panoram ic was a general contractor or a consultant
was for the jury.  The Foslers then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which we
granted, Fosler v. Panoramic, 365 Md. 472, 781 A.2d 778 (2001).
II.
A.
The Maryland Home Improvement Law was originally enacted by Ch. 133 of the
Acts of 1962.  The title of the original statute explained that the General Assemb ly
enacted it with the intention of, inter alia, “providing generally for the regulation of
the home improvement business of all persons in this State” and “establishing a system
of licensing certain contractors and salesmen under a new administrative agency to be
known as the Maryland Home Improvement Commission.”  For a review of the
Maryland Home Improvement Law and the authority of the Commission, see Judge
Harrell’s opinion for the Court of Special Appeals in Brzowski v. Md. Home
Improvement, 114 Md. App. 615, 691 A.2d 699 (1997).  
Although § 8-208 of the Home Improvement Law charges the Commission with
-8-
the administration and enforcement of the statute, and subtitle 3, §§ 8-301 through 8-
317, authorize the Commission to take certain remedial actions if there are violations
of the licensing provisions, there is no indication in the language of the Act that the
Legislature intended that the administrative remedies provided therein were to be the
exclusive method of enforcem ent.  
As this Court explained in detail in Zappone v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 349 Md. 45,
60-61, 706 A.2d 1060, 1067-1068 (1998),
“[w]henever the Legislature provides an administrative and judicial
review remedy for a particular matter or matters, the relationship
between that administrative remedy and a possible alternative
judicial remedy will ordinarily fall into one of three categories. 
     
“First, the administrative remedy may be exclusive, thus
precluding any resort to an alternative remedy.  Under this
scenario, there simply is no alternative cause of action for matters
covered by the statutory administrative remedy. 
“Second, the administrative remedy may be primary but not
exclusive.  In this situation, a claimant must invoke and exhaust the
administrative remedy, and seek judicial review of an adverse
administrative decision, before a court can properly adjudicate the
merits of the alternative judicial remedy.  See, e.g., McCullough v.
Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 613, 552 A.2d 881, 886 (1989) (“Under
circumstances like these, where a plaintiff has both an
administrative remedy and an independent judicial action, and the
administrative agency’s jurisdiction is deemed primary, it is
appropriate for the trial court to retain, for a reasonable period of
time, jurisdiction over the independent judicial action pending
invocation and exhaustion of the administrative procedures”);
Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. Comm’n v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 18, 511
A.2d 1079, 1088 (1986) (“Once the administrative procedures are
exhausted, the trial court may proceed [with both the independent
judicial action and the administrative review action]; the plaintiff
whose case is meritorious may be entitled to whatever relief is
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3
As pointed out in the beginning of the above-quoted passage from Zappone, the relationship
between a statutory administrative remedy and a possible alternative judicial remedy will
“ordinarily” fall into one of three categories (emphasis added).  Other scenarios, however, could
occur.  For example, subtitle 4 of the Maryland Home Improvement Law, discussed later in Part II.B.
of this opinion, illustrates a fourth category, namely where there is a statutory administrative remedy
and an alternative judicial remedy, and the Legislature specified that, if both are invoked, the
alternative judicial remedy shall be primary.
available under either the independent judicial action or the
administrative/judicial review remedy”); Bd. of Ed. for Dorchester
Co. v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 792, 506 A.2d 625, 634 (1986). 
“Third, the administrative remedy and the alternative judicial
remedy may be fully concurrent, with neither remedy being
primary, and the plaintiff at his or her option may pursue the
judicial remedy without the necessity of invoking and exhausting
the administrative remedy.  Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. Comm’n v.
Crawford, supra, 307 Md. at 22- 31, 511 A.2d at 1090-1094; Bd.
of Ed. for Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard, supra, 305 Md. at 791, 506
A.2d at 633 . . . .
“Which one of these three scenarios is applicable to a particular
administrative remedy is ordinarily a question of legislative
intent.” 3
The Court continued, Zappone, 349 Md. at 63, 706 A.2d at 1069 (footnote omitted,
emphasis added):
“Despite occasional dicta in a few opinions suggesting the
contrary, where neither the statutory language nor the legislative
history disclose an intent that the administrative remedy is to be
exclusive, and where there is an alternative judicial remedy under
another statute or under common law or equitable principles, there
is no presumption that the administrative remedy was intended to
be exclusive.  There is in this situation, however, a presumption
that the administrative remedy is intended to be primary, and that
a claimant cannot maintain the alternative judicial action without
first invoking and exhausting the administrative remedy.”
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See also, e.g., Brown v. Fire and Police Employees’ Retirement System, ___ Md. ___,
___ A.2d ___ (2003); Moose v. F. O. P., 369 Md. 476, 485-494, 800 A.2d 790, 796-802
(2002); Bell Atlantic v. Intercom, 366 Md. 1, 12, 782 A.2d 791, 797 (2001); Josephson
v. City of Annapolis, 353 Md. 667, 674-678, 728 A.2d 690, 693-695 (1998); Md.
Reclamation v. Harford County, 342 Md. 476, 493, 677 A.2d 567, 576 (1996); Luskin’s
v. Consumer Protection, 338 Md. 188, 194-199, 657 A.2d 788, 791-793 (1995); Clinton
v. Board of Education, 315 Md. 666, 678, 556 A.2d 273, 279 (1989); Quesenberry v.
WSSC, 311 Md. 417, 424, 535 A.2d 481, 484 (1988); Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. Comm’n
v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 13, 511 A.2d 1079, 1085 (1986); Bd. of Ed. for Dorchester Co.
v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 786, 506 A.2d 625, 631 (1986).
Specifically with regard to declaratory judgement actions, the presumption that
a statutory administrative remedy is primary is reflected in the Declaratory Judgment
Act.  Code (1974, 2000 Repl. Vol.), § 3-409(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article, which is part of the Declaratory Judgment subtitle, states that, “[i]f a statute
provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy
shall be followed in lieu of a proceeding under this subtitle.”  See Brown v. Fire and
Police Employees’ Retirement System, supra, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___; Moose
v. F.O.P., supra, 369 Md. at 486, 800 A.2d at 796-797; Utilities v. WSSC, 362 Md. 37,
44-45, 763 A.2d 129, 133 (2000); Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, 360 Md.
438, 457, 758 A.2d 995, 1005 (2000).
We explained in the Zappone opinion, 349 Md. at 61-65, 706 A.2d at 1069-1070,
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and have reaffirmed in more recent opinions (e.g., Bell Atlantic v. Intercom, supra, 366
Md. at 12, 782 A.2d at 797), that several factors may be pertinent in determining
whether the Legislature intended that the administrative remedy be primary or, stated
another way, in determining whether the presumption of administrative primary
jurisdiction is rebutted.  The factors include any indication of legislative intent in the
statutory language, the comprehensiveness of the administrative remedy, the agency’s
view as to whether its jurisdiction is primary, etc.  Among the most important factors
are the nature of the alternative judicial remedy in relation to the statutory scheme
containing the administrative remedy, the type of disputed issues, and the relevance of
administrative expertise.  The Zappone opinion thus stated (349 Md. at 65-66, 706 A.2d
at 1070):
“An extremely significant consideration under our cases is the
nature of the alternative judicial cause of action pursued by the
plaintiff.  Where that judicial cause of action is wholly or partially
dependent upon the statutory scheme which also contains the
administrative remedy, or upon the expertise of the administrative
agen cy, the Court has usually held that the administrative remedy
was intended to be primary and must first be invoked and
exhausted before resort to the courts.  * * *  
“On the other hand, where the alternative judicial remedy is
entirely independent of the statutory scheme containing the
administrative remedy, and the expertise of the administrative
agency is not particularly relevant to the judicial cause of action,
the Court has held that the administrative remedy was not intended
to be primary and that the plaintiff could maintain the independent
judicial cause of action without first invoking and exhausting the
administrative procedures.”
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4
Section 1-101(g) of the Business Regulation Article defines “person” as including a
“partnership, firm, association, corporation, or other entity.”
Applying these principles to the present controversy leads to the conclusion that
the administrative remedies provided by the Maryland Home Improvement Law are
primary under the circumstances of the present case.  Thus, the Circuit Court and the
Court of Special Appeals erred in not requiring the petitioners to exhaust their
administrative remedies prior to proceeding with the merits of the declaratory judgment
action.
B.
The Foslers’ complaints against Panoram ic fall within subtitle 3 of the Maryland
Home Improvement Law, §§ 8-301 through 8-317 of the Business Regulation Article,
which relate to the requirement that a home improvement contractor, subcontractor, or
salesperson “must” have a license from the Commission, the examination and other
requirements for obtaining a license, the approval or denial of applications for a
license, the scope and term of a license, an applicant’s right to a contested case hearing
before the Comm ission in accordance with the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act,
Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol.), §§ 10-201 through 10-226 of the State Government
Article, the different sanctions which the Commission may impose on licensees for
various types of misconduct, and, in § 8-208, the authority of the Commission to
enforce the Home Improvement Law against “a person alleged to be in violation of this
title,” including “a person who is not licensed under this title . . . .”4
Subtitle 3 of the Home Improvement Law contains no language expressly
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providing that the Commission has primary jurisdiction when there is a substantial
issue over whether a person or entity is required to obtain from the Commission a
license.  Nevertheless, when the language of subtitles 4 and 1 is compared to the
absence of similar language in subtitle 3, the presumption of primary jurisdiction in the
Commission, over a substantial dispute concerning the need to obtain a license, is
reinforced.
Subtitle 4 of the Home Improvement Law establishes the Home Improvement
Guaranty Fund.  The Fund was created to provide an additional remedy for homeowners
who suffer “actual loss” because of unsatisfactory work performed by a home
improvement contractor.  See § 8-405(a) (“an owner may recover compensation from
the Fund for an actual loss that results from an act or omission by a licensed
contractor”).  Subtitle 4 provides for an administrative remedy before the Commission
for claims against the Fund, a contested case hearing before the Commission, and
payments by the Commission.  Section 8-402 of subtitle 4, however, expressly
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“§ 8-402.  Scope of subtitle.
This subtitle does not:
* * *
(2)  limit the availability of other remedies to a claimant; or
(3) require a claimant to exhaust administrative remedies before
the Commission before bringing an action in court.”
Section 8-408(b) of subtitle 4 also states as follows:
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“(b) 
Administrative 
and 
legal 
proceedings. 
– 
(1)
Notwithstanding § 8-402(2) of this subtitle, a claimant may not
concurren tly submit a claim to recover from the Fund and bring an
action in a court of competent jurisdiction against a contractor
based on the same facts alleged in the claim.
“(2) If the claimant brings an action in a court of competent
jurisdiction based on the same facts alleged in a pending claim, the
Commission shall stay its proceedings on the claim until there is a
final judgment and all rights to appeal are exhausted.
“(3)(i) To the extent that a final judgment or final award in
arbitration is decided in favor of the claimant, the Commission
shall approve the claim against the Fund.
“(ii) If a final judgment or final award in arbitration is
decided in favor of the defendant, the Commission shall dismiss
the claim against the Fund.”
Consequently, subtitle 4 of the Home Improvement law explicitly provides that the
Commission’s jurisdiction under that subtitle is not primary but, rather, that judicial or
arbitration proceedings shall be primary.  See also Brzowski v. Md. Home Improvement,
supra, 114 Md. App. at 630-631, 691 A.2d at 707 (“A claimant has essentially three
avenues from which he can obtain relief from the Fund.  He can file a claim directly
with the Commission or proceed initially in court or in an arbitration proceeding”).
In light of the language of subtitle 4, it is reasonable to assume that, if the
General Assembly also intended that the Commission’s jurisdiction under subtitle 3 not
be primary, it would have said so.  The contrast between the primary jurisdiction
language of subtitle 4 (which makes judicial or arbitration proceedings primary), and
the absence of such language in subtitle 3, clearly indicates a legislative intent that the
Commission have primary jurisdiction over disputed issues covered by subtitle 3.
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Title 1, § 8-102(c), of the Home Improvement law also expressly addresses the
relationship between the Commission’s jurisdiction and specified possible alternative
actions.  It is relevant to both preemption and primary jurisdiction issues.  Section 8-
102(c) states as follows:
“(c) Authorized regulation. – This title does not limit the power
of a county or municipal corporation:
(1) to regulate the character, performance, or quality of a
home improvement by having a system of inspections and permits
designed to:
(i) ensure compliance with and help to enforce applicable
State and local building laws; or
(ii) enforce other laws necessary to protect the public
health and safety; or
(2) to adopt a system of inspections and permits that
requires:
(i) submission to and approval by the county or municipal
corporation of plans and specifications for an installation, before
construction of the installation begins; and
(ii) inspection of work done.”
Section 8-102(c), however, does not encompass a substantial dispute over whether a
person or entity is required to be licensed by the Commission as a home improvement
contractor or subcontractor.
It is obvious that the General Assembly, in enacting the Home Improvement
Law, carefully specified situations where the Commission’s jurisdiction would not be
primary in relationship to alternative remedies or regulations.  The failure to make
similar specifications with respect to the Commission’s subtitle 3 licensing jurisdiction
certainly indicates that the Commission’s subtitle 3 jurisdiction ordinarily should be
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5
Sections 8-101(c), 8-101(g), 8-101(h), 8-101(i) and 8-301(a) of the Home Improvement Law
state as follows:
“(c) Contractor. – ‘Contractor’ means a person, other than an
employee of an owner, who performs or offers or agrees to perform
a home improvement for an owner.”
* * *
“(g) Home improvement. – (1) ‘Home improvement’ means:
(i) the addition to or alteration, conversion, improvement,
modernization, remodeling, repair, or replacement of a building or
part of a building that is used or designed to be used as a residence or
a structure adjacent to that building; or
(ii) an improvement to land adjacent to the building,
(2) ‘Home improvement’ includes:
(i) construction, improvement, or replacement, on land
adjacent to the building, of a driveway, fall-out shelter, fence, garage,
(continued...)
treated as primary.
C.
The nature of the Foslers’ declaratory judgment action in relation to the Home
Improvement Law, and the type of dispute between the Foslers and Panoramic, further
confirm that the Commission’s jurisdiction was primary under the circumstances of this
case.
The Foslers’ declaratory judgment action sought a declaration that, inter alia, the
“Construction Consultant Agreem ent” with Panoram ic and Panoramic’s services under
that agreement constituted a “home improvement contract” and a “home improvem ent”
within the meaning of the Home Improvement Law, that Panoram ic was a “contractor”
under the Home Improvement Law, and that, therefore, Panoram ic was required to be
licensed by the Commission under subtitle 3 of the Home Improvement Law.5 
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5
(...continued)
landscaping, porch, or swimming pool;
(ii) connection, installation, or replacement, in the
building or structure, of a dishwasher, disposal, or refrigerator with
an icemaker to existing exposed household plumbing lines;
(iii) installation, in the building or structure, of an awning,
fire alarm, or storm window; and
(iv) work done on individual condominium units.
(3) ‘Home improvement’ does not include:
(i) construction of a new home;
(ii) work done to comply with a guarantee of completion
for a new building project;
(iii) connection, installation, or replacement of an
appliance to existing exposed plumbing lines that requires alteration
of the plumbing lines;
(iv) sale of materials, if the seller does not arrange to
perform or does not perform directly or indirectly any work in
connection with the installation of application of the materials;
(v) work done on apartment buildings that contain four or
more single-family units; or
(vi) work done on the commonly owned areas of
condominiums.
(h) Home improvement contract. – ‘Home improvement
contract’ means an oral or written agreement between a contractor
and owner for the contractor to perform a home improvement.
(i) License. – (1) ‘License’ means, except where it refers to a
license other than one issued under this title, a license issued by the
Commission.
(2) ‘License’ includes:
(i) a contractor license;
(ii) a subcontractor license; and
(iii) a salesperson license.”
* * *
“§ 8-301. License required; exceptions.
(a) Contractor license. – Except as otherwise provided in this
title, a person must have a contractor license whenever the person acts
as a contractor in the State.”
Thus, the declaratory judgment action was based on the statute which the Commission
is responsible for administering.  The substance of the action had no independent legal
basis.  The General Assemb ly charged the Commission with the duty, and with having
-18-
the required expertise, to determine whether an entity was engaged in home
improvement and, therefore, needed a home improvement contractor’s license from the
Commission.  This is an important factor indicating that, with regard to the present
dispute, the Commission had primary jurisdiction.  See Zappone v. Liberty Life Ins. Co.,
supra, 349 Md. at 65, 706 A.2d at 1070 (“Where the judicial cause of action is wholly
or partially dependent upon the statutory scheme which also contains the administrative
remedy, or upon the expertise of the administrative remedy, the Court has usually held
that the administrative remedy was intended to be primary”).
Moreover, this is not a case where it is clear that a person or entity was engaging
in the home improvement business, needed a license from the Commission, was not
licensed, and the issue before the court in a breach of contract action or mechanic’s lien
action was the effect, as a matter of public policy, of the illegality upon the breach of
contract or mechanic’s lien action.  Cf. Harry Berenter, Inc. v. Berman, supra, 258 Md.
at 292, 265 A.2d at 760 (“The facts are not in dispute.  The appellant, Berenter, Inc.,
. . . was engaged in the construction business including the remodeling of homes.
There is no contention by the appellant that the Home Improvement Law does not apply
to it[,] and it is conceded that it was not licensed under that Law when the contract or
contracts involved in the present case were made”).  In the case at bar, however, there
are genuine disputes over whether the contract at issue was a home improvement
contract, whether Panoram ic was engaged as a contractor in the home improvement
business, and, therefore, whether Panoram ic was required to be licensed by the
-19-
Commission.  As the investigator for the Montgom ery County Department of Housing
and Comm unity Affairs recognized in his letter to the Commission, the General
Assemb ly charged the Commission with the duty of resolving these disputes.  See
Luskin’s v. Consumer Protection, supra, 338 Md. at 196, 657 A.2d at 791-792 (“We
find that the mere nature of this dispute indicates the need for the interpretation of the
facts and the application of the law to the facts to be done, in the first instance, by the
agency with special expertise in the area”).
In addition, when an administrative agency like the Home Improvement
Commission is charged with administering a statute, the “‘administrative agency’s
interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should
ordinarily be given considerab le weight by reviewing courts.’” Division of Labor v.
Triangle General Contractors, 366 Md. 407, 416, 784 A.2d 534, 539 (2001), quoting
Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381
(1999).  See also, e.g., Dimensions v. Insurance Administration, 374 Md. 1, 17, 821
A.2d 40, 50 (2003) (“When construing a statute intended to be administered by an
administrative agen cy, courts normally give significant weight to an agency’s
interpretation of the statute”); Jordan v. Hebbville, 369 Md. 439, 459-460, 800 A.2d
768, 780-781 (2002); MTA v. King, 369 Md. 274, 289, 799 A.2d 1246, 1254 (2002);
Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 172-173, 783 A.2d 169, 177 (2001); Gigeous v. ECI,
363 Md. 481, 496, 769 A.2d 912, 921-922 (2001); Lussier v. Md. Racing Commission,
343 Md. 681, 696-697, 684 A.2d 804, 811-812 (1996), and cases there cited.
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Furthermore, when an administrative agency renders a final decision in an adjudicatory
case, “the agency’s decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid,” Board of
Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, supra, 354 Md at 68, 729 A.2d at 381 (quoting
prior cases, with internal quotation marks omitted).  See, e.g., Mehrling v. Nationwide
Insurance Co., 371 Md. 40, 57, 806 A.2d 662, 672 (2002); Division of Labor v.
Triangle General Contractors, supra, 366 Md. at 416, 784 A.2d at 539; Marzullo v.
Kahl, supra, 366 Md. at 172, 783 A.2d at 177; MVA v. McDorman, 364 Md. 253, 261,
772 A.2d 309, 314 (2001); Catonsville Nursing Home v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 569,
709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998).
Under the circumstances here, if a declaratory judgment action were permitted
to proceed to judgment, when there is no decision by the Commission in this or in a
similar case, the principle that weight should be given to the agency’s interpretation
and application of the statute will not be given effect.  The same is true concerning the
principle that the agency’s decision is prima facie correct.  This Court’s observation in
State v. State Board of Contract Appeals, 364 Md. 446, 458, 773 A.2d 504, 511 (2001),
regarding a different statute and a different administrative agen cy, is equally applicable
to the Home Improvement Law and the Commission:
“[T]he issue [of statutory interpretation and application] is
obviously a reasonably debatable one.  As the agency charged with
making final administrative adjudications under the procurement
law, the Board of Contract Appeals’ determination of the issue,
embodied in a final decision by the Board, would be helpful prior
to a judicial resolution of the issue.”
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Furthermore, permitting this declaratory judgment action to proceed to judgment
could result in troublesome conflicts.  The Commission is not a party in this declaratory
judgment action and presumably would not be bound by the judgment.  As earlier
discussed, subtitle 3 of the Home Improvement Law does not contain a provision
similar to that in subtitle 4 which directs the Commission to comply with a final
judgment in a court action or a final decision in an arbitration proceeding (see § 8-
405(b)).  On the other hand, the Commission is bound by a final judgment in a court
action judicially reviewing the Commission’s decision.
D.
Finally, the fact that the Commission stayed the administrative proceedings,
because the Foslers had caused judicial proceedings to be instituted, does not excuse
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Commission.  Presumably,
upon the filing of this opinion holding that the Commission has primary jurisdiction,
the Commission will proceed with the case before it.  Moreover, if necessary,
“mandamus . . . may lie to enforce administrative compliance with . . . [the agency’s]
duties.”  MTA v. King, supra, 369 Md. at 287, 799 A.2d at 1253, and cases there cited.
See also Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1997).
Upon remand to the Circuit Court, that court should stay this declaratory
judgment action pending a final decision by the Home Improvement Commission.
State v. State Board of Contract Appeals, supra, 364 Md. at 458-459, 773 A.2d at 511,
and cases there cited.
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIA L
A P P E A L S  
V A C A T E D  
A N D  
C A S E
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
D I R E C T I O N S 
T O  
V A C A T E  
T H E
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
MONTGOMERY COUNTY AND REMAND
THE CASE TO THE CIRCU IT COURT FOR
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
EVENLY 
DIVIDED 
BETWEEN 
THE
PETITIONERS AND THE RESPONDENT.