Title: Del Monte Fresh Produce

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HANAT'I

 

00:

 

2 930 Lane

DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE (Hawaii), INC., Plaintiff-Appelled

 

8
FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY; AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE
COMPANY; AMERICAN RE-INSURANCE COMPANY; COMMERCIAL UNION
INSURANCE COMPANY; LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY; NATIONAL
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY; MOTOR VEHICLE CASUALTY COMPANY,
and LONDON MARKET INSURERS, Defendants-Appellants,

 

and

CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, LUMBERMENS MUTUAL INSURANCE:
COMPANY, CIGNA PROPERTY & CASUALTY COMPANY; PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY
COMPANY, ACCIDENT & CASUALTY COMPANY, ACCIDENT & CASUALTY COMPANY

NO. 2 A/C, ACCIDENT & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY NO. 3 A/C,
ANDREW WEIR INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., ARGONAUT NORTHWEST INSURANCE,
COMPANY, LTD., ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI DI TRIESTE DE VENEZIA,
ASSICURAZIONIS GENERALI S.P.A., BELLAFONTE INSURANCE COMPANY,
BERMUDA FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, BISHOPSGATE INSURANCE
COMPANY, LTD., BRITISHGATE INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., BRITISH
NORTH-WESTERN’ INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., DELTA‘LLOYD NON LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., EDINBURGH ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTO. ,
EXCESS INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., FIDELLIDADE INSURANCE COMPANY,
LTD., HAWK INSURANCE COMPANY, UTD., HELVETIA INSURANCE COMPANY,
LTD., HIGHLANDS INSURANCE COMPANY, LONDON & OVERSEAS INSURANCE
COMPANY, LTD., MENTOR INSURANCE COMPANY, (UK), LTD., MINSTER
INSURANCE CO., LTD., MUTUAL REINSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., NATIONAL
CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA, NEW LONDON REINSURANCE COMPANY,
LTD., RIVER THAMES INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD, ST. HELEN'S INSURANCE
COMPANY, LTD., ST. KATHERINE INSURANCE’ COMPANY, STRONGHOLD
INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., SWISS UNION GENERAL INSURANCE CO., LTD.,
TUREGUM INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., WALBROOK INSURANCE COMPANY,
LTD., WINTERTHUR SWISS INSURANCE COMPANY, WORLD AUXILIARY
INSURANCE CORPORATION, LTD., YASUDA FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE
COMPANY (UK), LTD., CERTAIN’ UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S LONDON,
CERTAIN UNDERWRITING SYNDICATES AT LLOYDS, LONDON, DEL MONTE
CORPORATION, RJR NABISCO, INC., AND DOES 1 THROUGH 2000,
INCLUSIVE, Defendants.

SSS

No. 24647
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NO. 97-3323)

DECEMBER 26, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, AND NAKAYAMA, JJ.,
AND ACOBA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY, WITH WHOM DUFFY, J., JOINS

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
Defendant-Appellant Fireman's Fund Insurance Company
("Pirenan’s Fund”), appeals from the order of the Circuit Court
of the First Circuit (“ezeuit court”) filed August 29, 2001,
granting partial sunmary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee
Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawai'i), Inc. ("Del Monte Fresh”), and
denying Fireman's Fund's motions for summary judgment.’ On
appeal, Firemen’ s Fund presents the following points of error:
(2) the circuit court erred when it chose to apply the law of
Hawai'i rather than Californias (2) even assuming, arguendo, that
Hawai'i law applies, the circuit court misapplied this court's
jurisprudence relating to insurance contracts; (3) the circuit
court misinterpreted and misapplied the word “suits” in its
insurance policies when it determined that Fireman's Fund owed a
duty to defend to Del Monte Fresh; and (4) the circuit court
erred when it determined that Fireman's Fund oved a duty to
indemnify on the basis that costs incurred in administrative
proceedings are covered under the insurance policy as “damages.”
Defendants-Appellants American Home Assurance Company
(“American Home”), Lexington Insurance Company (“Lexington”),

American Re-Insurance Company (“American Re~Insurance”),

 

+ the Honorable Gary W.

 

chang presided.

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'* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *
—EQR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** _

Commercial Union Insurance Company ("Commercial Union”), tiondon
Market Insurers, Motor Vehicle Casualty Company (*Motor
Vehicle"), and National Continental Insurance Company (*National
Continental”) appeal from the circuit court’s separate August 29,
2001 order denying their joinders in Fireman's Fund's motions for
summary judgment. On appeal, these remaining insurers
essentially reiterate the points of error raised by Firenan’s
Fund, with London Market Insurers, National Continental,
Commercial Union, and American Re-Insurance additionally

asserting that, as excess liability insurers, providing coverage

 

is contingent upon the primary insurers’ responsibility to
provide and exhaust their coverages under their respective
policies.

For the following reasons, we hold that the circuit
court erred when it determined that insurance coverage was
assigned by operation of law to Del Monte Fresh. We also hold
that the assignment by contract was invalid inasmuch as none of
the insurers consented to the assignment. Accordingly, the

circuit court’s August 29, 2001 orders are vacated, and the ca:

 

is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor
of Defendent-Appellant insurers and against Del Monte Fresh

consistent with this opinion.

 

A, Factual Background
1. Corporate history

In the 19408, California Packing Corporation began

Pineapple growing operations on the island of C'ah, Hawai'i,
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
California Packing Corporation renamed itself Del Monte
corporation in 1967, In February 1979, Del Monte Corporation
merged with R.J. Reynolds Merger Corp. (a subsidiary of R.J.
Reynolds Industries, Inc.), pursuant to a Plan of Merger dated
Noverber 3, 1978. The surviving corporation, R.J. Reynolds
Merger Corp., renamed itself Del Monte Corporation ("Del Monte
corp.") immediately following the transaction.

Pursuant to a stock and asset purchase agreement dated
‘August 23, 1989, Del Monte Corp. agreed to sell various of its
subsidiary fruit companies along with its operations in Hawai'i
to Profwheel B.V. (a Dutch corporation owned by Polly Peck
International PLC, an English corporation). On October 11, 1989,
PPI Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii) Inc. (“PPI-Del Monte Fresh")
was incorporated in Delaware. ‘Through a Bill of Sale and
Assumption Agreement executed on October 17, 1989, Del Monte
Corp. and its corporate parents transferred the assets and
Mabilities associated with its Hawai'i operations to PPI-Del
Monte Fresh. PPI-Del Monte Fresh removed the “PPI” prefix from
its corporate name on October 14, 1992.

2 ts ice letter”

Fron the early 1940s to at least 1978, Del Monte Corp.
and its predecessors owned and operated a six-thousand acre
pineapple plantation located in Kunia on the island of O'ahu,
Hawai'i, At the time of commencement of the instant case, this
land was operated by Del Monte Fresh. In 1994, this land was
placed on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (“EPA”)

National Priorities List of contaminated sites after an EPA
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
investigation revealed that the land had been contaminated with
fumigants.

‘This investigation revealed that on April 7, 1977, a
“trailer-type container owned by (Dow Chemical Company)”
delivered the fumigant ethylene dibromide to Del Monte Corp.,
which reportedly may have been contaminated with dibrono-3-
chloropropane. While the funigant was being transferred from 2
“trailer-type container” to the on-site storage through a

connecting hose, the connection broke or ruptured. The EPA

 

determined that this caused the release of hundreds of gallons of
fumigant into the soil located in the area on the plantation
known as Kunia Camp, which is in the vicinity of a drinking water
well known as the Kunia Camp Well. The EPA further noted that
“folther releases of fumigants to the soils are believed to have
occurred over time at the Site, during transfer of fumigant fron
bulk storage to supply trucks.”

On April 14, 1980, the EPA collected groundwater
samples from the Kunia Camp Well. Testing of the water samples
indicated that the water contained both fumigant and contaminant
in levels exceeding federal and state limits. Additionally,
testing of the soil by the EPA in the vicinity of the storage
area resulted in the same conclusion. On April 25, 1980, the
Kunia Camp Well was disconnected from the potable water systen.

On April 28, 1995, the EPA issued a “special notice
Letter" to del Monte Fresh as a “potentially responsible party”

 

under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
1+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Liability Act (“CERCLA").? In a separate “special notice letter”
dated on the same day, the EPA also named Del Monte Corp. as a
spotentially responsible party.” EPA asserted that Del Monte
Fresh was liable for cleanup of the site, for reimbursement of
the costs of the EPA investigation, and for conducting a renedial
investigation and feasibility study.” Del Monte Fresh responded
to the EPA and, in September 1995, entered into an
vadministrative Consent Order” with both the EPA and the State of
Hawai'i, whereby Del Monte Fresh agreed to undertake the renedial
investigation and feasibility study. Following its receipt of
the EPA’s “special notice letter,” Del Monte Fresh tendered the
defense of the EPA claim to all liability insurers of the Kunia
land since the 1940s. Most of the insurers denied coverage.
3. The insurers

‘There are several insurers whose policies are relevant

to the instant appeal. It is undisputed that the insurance

policies in the instant case contain a no assignment clause that

 

requires the consent of the insurer to bind it to any assignment

 

+ sa8 42 U.8.C. $8 9601-3675 (2000).
> the EPA noted in its “special notice letter” that it had incurred
400, 622.€0 in estimated response costs related to the Kunia site, and also
that it intended to conduct 2 "Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study” of
the site, where Del Monte and the other potentially responsible parties were
SIfvices” te perticipates This invitetion was co “conduct or finance” the
analyses required for site renediation. The EPA demanded payment for the
aforementioned $60, 622,60 of coats Lt had incurred, and put the potentially
Fespensible parties on notice that they were “potentially liable for all
Expenditures plus interest” with respect to any additional costs the EFA would
SMEcrin the futue. The EPA notice stated that if the potentially
Fesponsibie parties oid not respond, the EPA had the ability to, jater aliar
(i) onlatersily order the potentially responsible parties to perform the
Senediation analysis, of (2) bring civil suit against the potentially
Fesponsible parties

 

 

      

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAM REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **

made by Del Monte Corp., who is the named insured.‘ It is
further undisputed that a1 insurance policies were in effect but
expired prior to the 1989 sale.

Primary liability insurance was provided by both
Fireman's Fund and American Home. The relevant Fireman's Fund's
policies provided continuous coverage to Del Monte Corp. as the
named insured from May 31, 1969, until May 31, 1978. American
Home provided primary liability insurance naming Del Monte Corp.
as the named insured from March 1, 1982, until May 1, 1986.

American Home also provided excess liability insurance
coverage to Del Monte Corp. between March 1, 1982, and December
31, 1985. Excess Liability insurance was provided to Del Monte
Corp. by the remaining Defendant-Appellant insurers during
different periods of time between 1967 and 1982.
Procedural Background

 

On Auguat 13, 1997, Del Monte Fresh filed a complaint
in circuit court seeking, inter alia, a judicial declaration that
numerous insurers owed it duties to defend and indemnify in the
EPA investigation.

On May 10, 2001, Fireman’s Fund filed a motion for

 

<The parties do not dispute that Del Monte Corp. was the named
ingured on all relevant ineurance policies:

+ _,Specifically, remaining Defendant-Appellant sngurers adnit thet
coverage wes provided between the following time Periods: (1) Londen Market
Insurers between 1967 and 1979; (2) Commercial Union between Febraary 26,
1870, and Februsry 22, 1973; (3) American Re-insurance between Haren 10, 1975,
and Hay 31, 1977;"(4)' National Continental Between August 91, 1970, and’ August
31, 1973, ae well a3 between September 23, 1973, ang Septenber 23, 1376) 13)
Lexington Insurence Conpany between Septenber 25, 1976, and Septesber 23,
1979; and (6) Motor Vehicle between September 29, 1979, and September 29,

1982.

 

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WES

 

HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

summary judgment asserting that Del Monte Fresh was not an
insured under the terms of its policies. Fireman’s Fund filed a
second motion for summary judgment on May 10, 2001, claiming that
there was no “suit” and also no “legal damages” that would serve
to trigger coverage for the benefit of Del Monte Fresh under its
policies. All other defendant-appellant insurers filed
substantive joinders in Fireman’s Fund's motions for summary
judgment. Del Monte Fresh responded with corresponding cross~
notions for summary judgment.

The circuit court granted Del Monte Fresh’s cross-
motions for summary judgment and orally explained its reasoning
at a hearing held on August 6, 2001.‘ In particular, the circuit
court expressed the following conclusions: (1) “believeld] it's
not necessary really to make a formal finding on the conflict of
law issue[]s (2) determined that “some or all of the claims . .
. for which (Del Monte) is seeking coverage|] arose at the time
when Del Monte [Corp.] was the insured and . . . arose under (Del

Monte Corp.'s] watch[

 

(3) “where a successor corporation seeks
coverage and that coverage really does not increase the risk to
the [insurance] carrier, then by operation of law, coverage
should be extended to the [claimant] (]”s (4) pursuant to Henkel
corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 88 Cal. App. 4th
876, 106 Cal. Rptr. 24 341 (2001), rev'd, 29 Cal. ath 934, 62

  

circuit court's August 28, 2001 written order denying
Fireman's Fund's notions for summary Judguent and granting Del Monte’ s cross~
notions for sinnary jodgnent did not contain any reasoning

8
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

P.3d 69, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (2003),” and Northern ins, Co. of
New York v, Allied Mut, Ins, Co., 955 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1992),

the insurer's policies were assigned to Del Monte Fresh from Del

 

Monte Corp. by operation of law; and (5) the Defendant-Appellant
insurers had a duty to defend and indemnify Del Nonte Fresh
inasmuch as (a) there was “sone level of ambiguity” as to the
term “suit,” (b) “[t]he [EPA] proceedings . . . are largely the
functional equivalent of civil actions (and) take on all the
characteristics and obligations of those of a lawsuit{,]” such
that “those . . . administrative matters(] are law suits,” and
(c) “the term ‘suit’ is not limited to civil actions only and the
word ‘damages’ is not limited to compensation awarded in a civil
action.”

The circuit court issued two orders on August 29, 2001.
The first order denied Fireman’s fund’s two motions for summary
Judgment and granted Del Monte Fresh’s two corresponding cross-
motions on the “not an insured,” “no suit,” and “no legal
damages” issues. The second order denied a1 joinders in
Fireman's Fund’s motions, except as to Commercial Union's
regarding the duty to defend issue." On October 24, 2001, the
circuit court certified the first summary judgment order for

appeal pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 641-1(b)

 

At the time of the circuit court’s ruling, Henkel wes pending
appeal in the Supreme Court of Caliternis.

  

 

Connercial Unicn is asserting in ite points of error thet the cisculs court
erred in its resolution of the duty to defend Lesue.

8

 
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
(2993).? Certification of the second summary judgment order for
appeal followed on October 25, 2001. All Defendant-Appellant
insurers filed timely notices of appeal on October 25 and 26,
2001.
ITT. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Summary Judgment
on appeal, the grant or denial of summary judgment is

reviewed de nove. See State ex. rel. ity and County of
Honolulu, 99 Hawai'i 508, 514, 57 P.3d 433, 439 (2002); Bitney ve
Honolulu Police Dep't, 96 Hawai's 243, 250, 30 P.3d 257, 264
(2002).

[Slunmary judgment is appropriate 1f the pleadings, depositions,

Enevars to interrogatories, and sdnissions on file, together with

the affidavite, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any aateriai fact and that the moving party 1a entitied to

Judgment az a matter of law. A fact 1 material if proof of that

Fact would have the effect of establishing or refating one of the

fueential elements of a cause of action oF defense asserted by the

farties. The evidence mist be viewed in the Light most. favorable

Eolthe non-noving party. In ather words, we must view all of the

cvicence and inferences draun therefrom in the Light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion

 

 

 

Kahale v. City and County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai" 341, 344, 90
P.3d 233, 236 (2004) (citation omitted).

B. Interpretation of Insurance Policies

 

Hewai"s Revised Statutes (*HRS") § 641-1(b) (1993) provide

 

pon applicetion made within the time provided by the rules of
court, sn appeal ina civil matter may be allowed by a circuit
Sourt’ in ite discretion from an order denying @ moticn to dismice
of trom any interlocutory Judgment, order, or decree whenever the
Gircoit court may think the sane advisable for the speedy
fermination of iitigation before it. The refusal of the circuit
court to sllow an appeal fron an interlocutory Judgment, order, or
Gecree shall not be reviewable by any other court.

 

 

This text was unchanged by the 2004 amendnent to HRS § 642-1,

10
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAH REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

Regarding interpretation of insurance policies, this

 

court has state

 

[Insurers have the sane rights az individuals to Limit their
Liability and to inpose whatever conditions they please on their
cbligaticn, provided they are not in contravention of statutory
inhibitions Sr public policy. "As such, insurence policies are
Subject to the general roles of contract constructions the cerns
Of the polley should be interpreted according to their plain,
ordinary, and accepted sense in connon speech unless it appears
from the policy that a different meaning is intended. Moreover,
every insurance contract shall be construed according to the
entirety of ite terms and conditions as set forth in the policy.

 

Nevertheless, adherence to the plain language and liters) meaning
Of insurance contract provisions se not without limitation. Me
have acknowledged that’ because insurance policies are contcact® of
adhesion and are premises on standard forms prepared by the
insurer's attorneys, we have long subscribed to the principle that
they aust be construed Liberally in fevor of the insured and any.
ambiguities must be resolved against the insurer. Put ancther
ey, the rule is that policies are to be construed in accord with
the’ reasonable expectations of a layperson.

Dairy Rd. Partners v, Island Ine. Co. Ltd., 92 Hawai'i 398, 421-
12, 992 P.2d 93, 106-07 (2000) (citations, quotation marks, and
brackets omitted).

 

 

 

C. Statutory Interpretation
Regarding statutory interpretation, this court has
stated:

First, the fundamental starting point for statutory interpretation

the language of the statute itself. Second, wnere the
statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to
Give effect to its plein and cbvious meaning. Third, implicit in
the task of statutory construction ie our forenost obligation to
ascertain ana give effect to the sntention of the legislature,
hich is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in
the statute itself, Fourth, when there is doubt, doubleness of
eaning, of indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used
inva statute, an ambiguity existe. And fifth, dn construing en
snbiguous statute, the meaning of the anbiquose words may De
Sought by exanining the context, with which the ambiguous words,
phrases, ana sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain
Eneir true meaning.

Awakuni v. Avana, 115 Hawai'i 126, 133, 165 P.34 1027, 1034
(2007) (citation omitted).

 

 

n
 

For

    

IBLICATION IN WES

  

REPORTER
D. Choice of Law

This court has recently stated that “[t]he question of
the choice of law to be applied in a case is a question of law
reviewable de novol.] . . . Therefore, @ choice of law issue is a

question of law we review under the right/wrong standard.”

Mikelson v. United States Auto Ass‘n, 107 Hawai'i 192, 197, 111
P.3d 601, 606 (2005) (quoting and citing Jenkins v. Whittaker

Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 724 (9th Cir. 1986)) (quotation marks,

brackets, and other citations omitted).
IV. DIscussroN

A. Hawai‘ Law Applies To the Instant Ca

 

‘This court discussed its choice of law jurisprudence in
Mikelson, which was decided after the appellate briefs in the
instant appeal were filed. Therein this court observed the
following:

‘This court has moved away from the traditional and rigid conflict-
St-iove rules in favor of the modern trend towards a nore flexible
Gpproach locking te the state with the most significant
Eelotionship to the parties and subject matter. This flexible
approach places prinary emphasis on deciding which state would
Ave the strongest interest in seeing its laws applied to che
Particular case. Hence, this court has said that the interests of
Ete states and applicable public policy reasons should determine
whether jiawas'd Iaw of another state's law should apply. “The
Preferred analysis... would be an sgsesament of the interests
Gnd policy factors involved with s purpose of arriving at
desirable result in each situation.”

   

Mikelson, 107 Hawai'i at 198, 111 P.3d at 607 (citations,
brackets, and some quotation marks omitted) .

In light of this court’s discussion in Mikelson,
Fireman's Fund's reliance on Ball, Stephens Contractors, Inc. vs
Mid American Indem. Ins. Co., 605 F. Supp. 854 (D. Haw. 1992),
Airao, Inc. v. Horizon Cargo Transp., 66 Haw. $90, 670 P.2d 1277,

2
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **¢
1281 (1983), and California Fed, Sav. & Loan Asa’a vs Bell,

Haw, App. 597, 735 P.2d 499 (1987), for the proposition that
Nawas"t courts have consistently applied the factors set forth in
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 168 (2001)? when
confronted with a conflict between the law of Hawaii and that of
another state is not persuasive. First, Fireman's Fund's reading
of Bull, Stephens is inaccurate because the federal court clearly
observed that this court “lookled) to but reject {ed} the
[Restatement (Second)] approach” in Peters v, Peters, 63 Ha
653, 634 P.2d 586 (1961). Pi, Stephens, 805 F. Supp. at 856.

Second, Fireman's Fund’s reading of Bell is also inaccurate

 

inasmuch as the ICA in Bel) did not rely on any provision of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in making its choice of
law decision. See Mikelson, 107 Hawai'i at 201, 111 P.3d at 610
("hile the [ICA] made reference to the Restatement in [Bell],
the ICA decided the underlying choice of law issue utilizing
Professor Leflar’s ‘choice-influencing considerations’ approach
referred to in Betere.”); Bell, 6 Haw. App. at 606, 735 P.24 at

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 provides, in
pertinent part:

  

[2) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an 4
in contract are determined by the local Law of the state which,
to, that issue, has the nost significant relationship
ction and the parties. s+
(2) Ih the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties .
the ‘contacts to be taken into account’. . to determine the
jaw applicable to an issue includ
(a) the place of contracting,
(2) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c} the place of performance,
(4) the Location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the comicil, resigence, nationality, place of
incorporation ahd place of business of the parties.
‘These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular 1

 

 

 

 

  

 

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAN REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTEI

 

505 (applying “Professor Leflar’s ‘choice-influencing
considerations’ ” approach) .

Finally, the parties in Airgo “expressly agreed in both
service agreements that any disputes were to be resolved under
Texas lew.” Ida at 595, 670 P.2d at 1281 (emphasis added). In
Airc, this court was guided by the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 187(1) (1971)" for the proposition that a
choice of law provision provided in a contract between the
parties will generally be upheld “[wJhen . . . the chosen law has
some nexus with the parties or the contract[.]" Aixao, 66 Haw.
at $95, 670 P.2d at 1261, However, because none of the insurance
policies in the instant case contain a choice of law provision,
‘Aixgo is distinguishable.”

In applying the approach articulated by this court in

 

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(1) provide:

5.187, Law Of The State Chosen By The Partin
{athe lew of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
Soneractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular
{Stue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit
provisien in their agreenent directed to thet issue,

 

Porsuent to the Restatenent (Second), Firenan’s Fund argues thet
cauifornia low applies te the instant case because (1) all of the contracting
parties to the insurance policies were located in California, (2) the policies
Rete negetiated in california, (3) the insurance contract would be
"persorniea}" in California by Fireasn’s Fund in the event that policy,
benefits were provided, (4) Del Monte Fresh tendered clains to Fizenan’s Fund
Te"Eilifornie, and (2) California was the principal place of business for all
Sneracticg parties, This argument is without merit because the Restatenen=
(Second) itself provides that the rights created by on insurance contract "are
Sterined by the locel low of the state which the parties understood mas to
be the, ‘daring the term of the policy,
Ghess-uith respect te the particular issue, some other state has » more
Significant reletionship . ..- ." Restatenent (Second) of Conflict of Laws $
153" (Emphasie added) see BLM. Stephens Contractors, 605 F. Supp. at 856 (*the
place of contracting ia relatively insignificant wnen there is no other
Elgniticant relationship Between the transaction and that place."). No other

nificant reletionship between California and the instant case hes been
fered by Fireman's Fund.

        

 

 
    

 

 

 

 

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+** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Mikelson, we hold that Hawai'i has a greater interest in applying
its own law to the instant case for the following reasons.

First, the environmental pollution that engendered the instant

 

case occurred on land located in Hawai'i. Second, the Hawaii
State Department of Health is overseeing the Kunia plantation
site remediation, having (1) entered into @ separate memorandum
agreement with the EPA, and (2) concurred in the EPA/Del Monte
Fresh consent order such that it will not pursue its own
available remedies against Del Monte Fresh so long as it
continues with its site renediation. Finally, the state of
Hewas'i has expressed an interest in favor of protecting its
environment for the public's welfare. HRS § 341-1 (1993)
provides, in pertinent part:

bi the State. the legislature further finds that the determination
of an optimum balance between economic development and

savironment the ost thoughtful consideration,
aud that the ssintenance of the optimum quality of the environsest
Segarves the saat intensive care.

     

(Emphases added.)
In light of the above interests, we hold that Hawai'i
law applies to the instant case.

B. The Circuit Court Erred When It Determined That Insurance
Coverage Was Assigned From Del Monte Corp. to Del Monte
Fresh By Operation Of Law.

‘The threshold issue is whether a valid assignment was
either expressly made or effected by operation of law that placed
Del Monte Fresh as an insured under the insurance policies in

effect prior to the 1989 sale. The circuit court ruled in

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pertinent part:

[THE COURTI: . . . There are basically two approaches that
courts ‘take when construing insurance policies. One is a strict
Construction approach and the other is'a more iiberal type of
Spproach where the court considers various factors, including the
effect of aw upon the contract.

‘This court har slweys been of the mind that when the reason
for the rile cesses, the Tule itself should also cease. And
applying that approach to the issues in this case, the court
Ubked heavily es to uhat the insurance carrier was trying to
aceosplish when it drafted the contrect and really, the provisions
Tequiting the claimant to be an insured and the non-assignment
Erovisions are really designed to Lisit the risk co the carrier
Gnd ery co avoid unanticipated risk to the carrier.

The have a situstion here where sone or all of the
claine that... Del Monte Fresh 18 seeking coverage] arose at
the time when bel Monte [Corp] wae the insured and it arose under
bel Monte’ [Corp.’e] wateh. And I'make particular reference to the
ost recent Keniel c

 

      

 

‘pplying the reason for the rule logic,
that case took on greater appeal to this court and so what this
Sourt concludes is thet shere a successor corporation sgeks

 

Soveraue and that coverase really does not increase the cick ic
ihe eration sutenes

There, Nowever, the successor corporation engages in, conduct
‘hat increases the risk, that 1s, exposes the carrier to risks
that were notin existence when the insured sas ~~ before che
Succescor corporation was creates, then you have the situation
here there is unanticipates risk and therefore, the definition of
Gn insured snd the honvessignment provisions then become very
Stitleal"to'liniting the exposure to the carrier.

And it it primarily for this reason that the court is going
to follow, in this case, the Henkel and urance cases
Father than the Quenssco and Genssa, Accident cases. For this
Feazon, the court is going to deny Fireman's Fund's motion for
Summary judgnent and grant Del Monte Fresh’s cross motion for
Suneaty judgaent with the express intention of entitling Del Monte
Frecn to # cefense for the 1995 E.P.A, agninistrative claim.

      

 

 

(Emphasis added.)
Northern Insurance concerned a dispute between two

insurers, Northern Insurance and Allied Mutual Insurance Company,

wherein Northern Insurance sought contribution from Allied Mutual

for defense costs incurred by Brown-Forman Corp, in a products

Liability tort action. 955 F.2d at 1355-56. The coverage action

was tied to the gestation of a child who was born with fetal

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alcohol syndrome in October 1983. Id, The child's parents
brought suit in November 1987, alleging that the mother’s
consumption of California Coolers during her pregnancy resulted
in the child's suffering from fetal alcohol syndrome. Id. at
1356. Brown-Forman purchased California Cooler in July 1985,
through an asset purchase agreement that, inter alia, “excluded
from the sale the assignment of any contract that required
consent to assign.” Id. at 1355-56. Brown-Forman made tenders
of defense to both Northern Insurance and Allied Mutual. Id. at
1356.

on appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that even though the
asset purchase agreement did not serve to assign Allied Mutual's
Liability policy to Brown-Forman Corp., the policy benefits were
transferred to Brown-Forman by operation of law. Id. at 1357.
specifically, 1t held that as to “presale occurrences,” Allied
Mutual's policy benefits, “including the right to a defense,
transferred by operation of law to Brown-Forman when [it]
purchased substantially all of California Cooler's assets." Id.
at 1358, It observed that California follows the tort rule of
“product-line successor liability(,]" under which “a purchaser of
substantially all assets of a firm assumes, with some
Limitations, the obligation of product liability clains arising
from the selling firm's presale activities. Liability is
transferred irrespective of any clauses to the contrary in the
asset purchase agreement.” Id. at 1357 (citing, inter alia, Ray
vs Alad Corp., 19 Cal.3d 22, 34, 960 P.2d 3, 11, 136 Cal. Rptr.
574, 582 (1977) (holding that “a party which acquires a

v
   

S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of
products under the circunstances here presented assumes strict
tort liability for defects in unite of the same product line
previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from which
the business was acquired”). Because tort liability transfers
from the predecessor company to the successor, the Ninth Circuit
ultimately concluded that the right to a defense transfers as
well, See id, at 1358 ("We agree with the (Eighth Circuit in
Ocean Accident 4 Guar, Co. v, Sw, Bell Tel, Co., 100 F.2d 441
(8th Cir, 1939), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 658, 59S. Ct. 775, 83 Li
Ed. 1056 (1939),] that the rationale for honoring ‘no assignment’
clauses vanishes when liability arises from presale activity.").
Ineurers take account of the nature of the insured when issuing a
Policy. Risk characteristics of the insured determine whether the
Insurer will provi ie, and at what rate, An assignment
could alter drasticsily the in
ature of the nev insured, "Ne protect
against any such unforeseen increase in risk. When the oss
‘occurs before the transfer, however, tI acteristics of the
Successor are of little importance: regardless of any transfer

the insurer still covers only the risk it eveluated when it wrote
the polsey.

 

 

 

 

   

  

Id. (citation omitted).
However, a California appellate court disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit's analysis and application of California law.
In General Accident Insurance Co, of America v. Superior Court,
55 Cal. App. 4th 1444, 1445-46, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 782-83
(2997), Western MacArthur Company, an asbestos distribution
company that had taken over Western Asbestos Company, sought a
declaratory judgment that certain insurers owed it duties of
defense and indemnification. Western MacArthur operated in

essentially the same manner as Western Asbestos post-takeover,

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retaining alnost all of the sane employees, distributing the sane
products, and owning Western Asbestos’ customer Lists and
corporate goodwill. Id. at 1446-47, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783-84.

In the underlying case giving rise to General Accident,
Western MacArthur was found Liable under the successor Liability
rule for Western Asbestos’ product liabilities, which led to the
filing of thousands of asbestos lawsuits against Western
MacArthur due to its predecessor's products. Jd. at 1447-48, 64
cal. Aptr 2d at 783. Western MacArthur's own coverage limits
under ite Mability insurance policy was eventually exhausted.
Id. at 1448, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783. At that point, Western
MacArthur attempted to call upon insurance policies issued to
Western Asbestos. Id, Because Western MacArthur was not a named
insured under any of these policies, the insurers denied
coverage. Id. at 1448, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763-84.

‘The insurers moved for sunmary judgment, arguing that
they end Western MacArthur shared no “insured~insurer contractual
relationship[,]” and also that “Western Asbestos’ insurance
coverage did not transfer to Western MacArthur by operation of
law by virtue of the finding of successor liability [in the
underlying case]. Id. at 1449, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784. In
response, Western MacArthur contended, inter alia, thet “the
insurance policies were transferred by operation of law{,]" and
alternatively, “there was an express assignment of the Western
Asbestos policies” pursuant to a security agreement between the
two companies. Id, The trial court denied summary judgment,

relying on Northern Insurance “for the proposition that ‘(t]he

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTEI

 

benefits of a predecessor's insurance policy may transfer

 

matter of law to a successor corporation if liability for a
predecessor's activity transferred as a matter of law under a
product liability successor theory."" Id.

On appeal, the appellate court disagreed with and
declined to follow Northern Insurance. Id, “(T]he finding of
successor liability in tort does not entitle the successor
corporation, by operation of law, to the insurance coverage of
its corporate predecessor.” Id, at 1454, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
788. After discussing both Northern Insurance and Ocean
Accident, the court opined that the principles of Ocean Accident
“[did) not provide authority for the Northern Insurance
Proposition that insurance coverage transfers by operation of law

by the finding of successor liability for product liability

torts[,]” inasmuch as Northern Insurance improperly intermingled
Ocean Accident’s contract principles with the tort of successor

Liability, Id, at 1450-51, 64 Cal. Rptr. 24 at 785 (concluding
that unlike Northern Insurance, Qcean Accident involved an

express assignment of an insurance policy by the predec

 

corporation to its successor, and the underlying issue was
whether the policy’s “no assignment” clause, which required the
consent of the insurer, was applicable to a loss that preceded
the assignment) .
do Anaured-insurer relationship is a matter of contract.
Successor liability is a aatter of tort duty and lisbility. It is
ene thing to deen the successor corporation 2iable for the
predecessor's torts; it is quite another to deen the successor
Corporation a party to insurance contracts it never signed, aid
for'which it never paid a premium, and to deen the insurer’ to be
in a contractual relationship with 9 stranger.

Ad. at 1451, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785; see Red Arrow Prod.’s Cou,
20

 

 
+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Inc. v. Employers Ins, Co, of Wausau, 607 N.W.2d 294, 301 (Wis
Ct. App. 2000) ("The successor liability rule was intended to
protect an individual who, not being in a contractual
relationship with a manufacturer, cannot otherwise protect
himself or herself from an injury arising from a product

manufactured by a company that no longer exists."). The court

 

thus concluded that “a transfer by operation of law is a
violation of the basic principles of contract and is also bad
public policy.” Id. at 1454, 64 Cal. Rptr 2d at 788.

It is well settled in Hawai'i that “[t]he objectively
reasonable expectations of (policyholders) and intended
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions
would have negated those expectations.” Hawaiian Ins. § Guar
Co. v. Brooks, 67 Haw. 285, 290-91, 686 P.2d 23, 27 (1984)
(alterations in original) (citations and quotation marks
omitted), overruled on other grounds, Dairy Rd, Partners, 92
Hawa

 

4 398, 992 P.2d 93, These “reasonable expectations” are
derived from the insurance policy itself, which is “subject to
the general rules of contract construction{.]" Dairy Rd.
Bartners, 92 Hawai'i at 411, 992 2.24 at 106. This involves
construing the policy “according to the entirety of its terms and
conditions[,]” and “the terms [themselves]. . . should be
interpreted according to their plain, ordinary, and accepted
sense in common speech unless it appears from the policy that a
different meaning wae intended.” Id, (brackets omitted).

“(Blecause insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and are

a
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
premised on standard forms prepared by the insurer's attorneys,
we have long subscribed to the principle that they must be
construed liberally in favor of the insured and any ambiguities
must be resolved against the insurer.” Id. at 411-12, 992 P.2d
at 106-07 (citation, quotation marks, and some brackets omitted).
The foregoing common law framework s consistent with
the plain language of HRS § 431:10-237 (2005), which mandates
that “[elvery insurance contract shall be construed according to
the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the
policy, and as amplified, extended, restricted, or modified by
any rider, endorsement or application attached to and made a part
of the policy.” Furthermore, pursuant to language unchanged from
its enactment in 1987, HRS § 431:10-226(a)" clearly provides
that “[a] policy may be assignable or not assignable, as provided
by ite terms.” (Emphasis added.) Because Hawai'i Law requires
every insurance policy to be subject to the general rules of
contract construction, seg HRS § 431:10-237, and an assignment by

operation of law is merely an extension of the common law tort

Wns § 431:10-228 provides, in its entirety:

(a) & policy may be assignable or not assignable, a8 provided by

(b) Subject to the ters of the policy, any policy providing the
beneficiary say be changed upon the sole request ef the insures,
Say be assigned by either pledge of transfer of title, executed by
Ene insured alone, snd delivered £0 the insurer, regardless of
whether the insured is the pledgee of assignee,’ Any such
assignment shall entitle the ingurer to deal with the assignee as
the owner or pledges of the policy in accordance with the terns of
the ausignnent until the insurer hae received at its nome office
written notice of termination of the assignnent or plesge, oF
written notice by of on behalf of sone other person claiming some
Interest in the policy in conflict with the assignment.

   

 

 

 

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‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
rule of successor liability, see Northern Inaurance, 955 F.2d at
1958, we hold the circuit court erred when it concluded that an
assignment by operation of law is consistent with Hawaii's rules
governing construction of insurance policies.

C. The Assignment By Contract Was Invalid Because Del Monte
Corp. Failed To Obtain Its Insurers’ Consent Pursuant To the
Terms Of the Insurance Polic:

 

‘The pertinent language contained in the Bill of Sale
that transferred Del Monte Corp.'s assets to Del Monte Fresh is

as follows:

2. {Del Monte Corp.) hereby conveys, assigns, transfers and
Soiivere to [pPi-Oei Monte], sll of ite right, title and interest

 

© the concurrence points cut that “several courts have given great
Weight to timing, ‘.e., whether CERCLA was in effect when the policies were
"Ssted Such tnet the insurer could have considered potentis! risks under
CERCLA.” Concurring opinion st 11-12. Although this is true, it has also
been held that the sore germane consideration is whether an insurable loss
existes, notwithstanding the point an times particslar environmental eeatute
was enacted. See Minnesota Mining & Mia, co. x, Travelers Indam, Cou, 457
Niw.24'275, 163" (Minn. 1950) ("The issue of coverage Goes fot depend mere)
the form of action taken against the snsured. - . +. [T]he parties in thes

es were auare of the potential Liability for groundwater contamination at
the tine they entered [into] the insurance policies at issue... «The
Advent of [the Minnesota Environmental Response Liability Act’ (°MERLA")] and
Other environsental statutes have merely changed the form of the Liability for
Groundwater pollution, not che nature of that Isabiitey.°)) Gopher Gil Coys.
Au Heraware Mut, Ing, Co,, 588 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Minn. Ct. ADp. 1993) (IAT
Toss occurs at the tine of contamination, even if the clain is brought under
subsequently enacted legislation. Minnesota Mining ¢ Mfg., 457 N.We2d at 163
(recognizing longstanding prohibition of contamination of groundwater
predating CERCLA and MERLA]-").. To consider tining sesunes that 1iabi1ity
Coola not be isposed Under similar circumstances prior to the enacteent of
CERCA.

   

 

 

     
 

 

Additionally, in the instant case, both Anerican Home end Motor
Vehicle provides 1iability insurance coverage to Del Monte Corp. after CERCLA
was enacted. Specifically, prinary Liability insurance was provided by
Bnerican Hone from March 1, 1982, until May 1, 1966. Excess liability
Snsurance coverage was also provided by Anerican Hone between March 1, 1962,
and December Sl, 1965. Excess liability insurance was provided by Motor
Venkele between Septenber 29,1979, and September 29, 1982. Therefore, the
‘concurrence’ s timing consigeration is inapplicable 22 to then.

Nonetheless, we need not express an opinion as to what constitutes
fan insurable loss io Light of HRS $8 ¢31:10°237 ond 431:10-228 (a) 8s applies
fo the facts and circunstances presented in this case.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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1+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

in and to all the Assets, subject to the releted Liabilities, as

the Same shell exist on the Gate herest. ‘The Assets shall include

S1l of the properties ond assets (reel and personal, cangible and

Intangible) of [0el Monte Corp.) constituting a part of, used ny

arising out of or pertaining or relating in any manner whatsoever

£6 the business of the Del Monte Tropical Fruit Division 1oct

in Hawai! (the “Hawaiian Business”) of every nature, king
jeter, description, absolute, contingent and otherwis

ver located or situated, including, without lin

(a) any and ali other assets of the favatzen Bussnees, Anciding

without Limitation, amy. insurance policies of the
Hawaiian Gusiness, “anv causes of action, iudomente, claims, end
demands of whatever qature of the finwitan pusiness(.1

 

     
 
       

(Emphasis added.)
‘The pertinent language contained in the Assumption
Agreement that transferred Del Monte Corp.’s liabilities to Del

Monte Fresh is as follows:

 

2, [Del Monte Fresh) hereby undertakes, assumes and agrees to
ferform, pay or discharge when due, to the extent not heretofore
Performed, paid or discharged, and subject to che limitations
Eontained ip Paragraph 2 hereof: . ... (vi) all liabilities end
Sbligations arising sut of and relating to the operations of the
Hawaiian Business, including, without Linstation, any and sl

Eater of the use hepeachioriel
(Emphasis added.)

   

 

 

Del Monte Fresh points out that it is not arguing that
the insurance policies were assigned to it as a result of the
above agreenents. Del Monte Fresh instead asserts that Del Monte
Corp.'s transfer of all assets and liabilities to it effectively
assigned to Del Monte Fresh the right to claim and recover under
Del Monte Corp.'s insurance policies in effect prior to the 1989
sale, notwithstanding the no assignnent provisions in the
policies.

It has been said that “insurance is a means of
transferring the risk of loss from the insured to the insurence

company. The insurance company is in the business of evaluating

24
 

++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
risks, assuming risks in return for periodic premiums, and
spreading the costs of the risks.” Elliot vy, Donahue, 485 N.W.2d
403, 407 (Wis. 1992) (footnote omitted). “In return for the
premiums paid by the insured, the insurance company assumes the
contractual duties of indemnification and defense for claims
described in the policy." Id. (emphasis added).

In this regard, this court has stated that “insurance
policies are subject to the general rules of contract
construction[.) . . . [B]very insurance contract shall be
construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions
as set forth in the policy.” Dairy Rd, Partners, 92 Hawai'i at
411, 992 P.2d at 106 (brackets, quotation marks, and citations
omitted). Accordingly, the duties to defend and indemnify arise
under the terms of the insurance policy, and it is through an
interpretation of the terms of the policy that such duties are
deemed to be owed. See Havaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 67 Haw. at
290-91, 686 P.2d at 27 ("[T]he objectively reasonable
expectations of [policyholders] and intended beneficiaries
recarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even
though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have
negated those expectations.” (Alterations in original, emphasis
added, and citations and quotation marks omitted)). Therefore,
under Hawai'i law, it cannot be said, as Del Monte Fresh asserts,
that the duties to defend and indemnify are separable from the

terms of the insurance policy itself, and are assignable as such

25.
 

+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *%
notwithstanding the existence of a no assignment provision.”
HRS § 431:10-228(a) provides that “{a] policy may be
assignable or not assignable, as provided by its terms.”
Furthermore, this court has observed that “liability insurers
have the sane rights as individuals to limit their liability, and
to impose whatever conditions they please on their oblication,
provided they are not in contravention of statutory inhibitions
or public policy.” iret Ins, Co, of Hawaii, Inc. v. State of
Hawaii, 66 Haw. 413, 423, 665 P.2d 648, 655 (1983) (emphasis
added) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The relevant
insurance policies in the instant case contain a no assignment
clause that requires the consent of the insurer to bind it to any
assignment made by the named insured. It is undisputed that Del
Monte Corp. is the only named insured covered by the policies.
Tt As also undisputed that Del Monte Corp. did not obtain any of
the insurers’ consent prior to the 1989 assignment. Because the
policies were assigned by Del Monte Corp. without the insurers’
consent, we hold that Del Monte Fresh is not an insured under any
of the Defendant-Appellant insurers’ policies, and is therefore
not owed duties to defend or indemnify by Defendant-Appellant

insurers."*

© pel Monte Fresh cites to numerous cases from other jurisdictions
An support of its assertion that “courts have repeatedly enforced assignments
of ineurence clains te successor corporations,” inasmuch as a Liability that
Secure prior to an assignment does not involve any increase in risk to che
Snsurer:. However, this argunent is Unpersuasive because it eppears to be
noely an extension of the rationale ciscussed and rejected, supra, in
Connection with the assignsent-by-operation-of-law issue

 

    

 

Mim Light of the foregoing disposition, resolution of the remaining

points of error rsised by Firenan's fund and other defendant-appellant
‘continued.

 

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAM REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER #4

IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the circuit court's
August 29, 2001 orders are vacated, and the case is remanded with
instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Defendant~
Appellant insurers and against Del Monte Fresh consistent with

this opinion.

on the briefs:
Keith K. Hiraoka, April Gi

Luria and Jodie D. Roeca

of Roeca Louie & Hiraoka Bee A Linco
for defendant-appeliant

National Continental Insurance ¥

Company Peete OT iene Te

Peter W. Olson and Stacey Kawasaki
Djou cf Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright
and Ray Tamaddon, (Pro hac vice), of
Berman & Aiwasian for defendant-
appellant Motor Vehicle Casualty
Company on the brief and joinder

W. Thomas Fagan and Kelvin H.
Kaneshiro of Reinwald O'Connor &
Playdon LLP and Patrick A. Cathcart
(pro hac vice), Yvette D. Roland (Pro
hac vice), Gina P. Mak (Pro hac vice),
Michael R. Fischer (Pro hac vice),
Banchnalak T. Abegaze (Pro hac vice)
of Hancock Rothert & Bunshoft LLP for
defendant s-appellants Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's London, and
Certain London Market Insurance
Companies

Paul T. Yamamura and Wesley D. Shimazu

M(, scontinved)
Angurers ‘is unnecessary.

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*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

of Kanae and Yanamura and Jeffrey C.
Segal, (Pro hac vice), and Richard D.
Bremer, (Pro hac vice), of Selman
Breitman LLP for defendant-appellant
Commercial Union Insurance Company

Faye M. Koyanagi and Adrian Y. Chang
of the Law Office of Faye M. Koyanagi
and Donald T. McMillan, (Pro hac vice),
and George J. Keller,’ (Pro hac vice), of
Rivkin Radler LLP for defendant-
appellant Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company

Kevin S. W, Chee, Keith K. Kato and
Jeffrey 'S.'Masatsugu of Chee & Markham
and Maria G. Enriquez, (Pro hac vice),
for defendant-appellant American
Re-Insurance Company on the joinder

Michael A. Lorusso and Brian A.
Kang of Watanabe, Ing & Kewashima
and J. Karren Baker, (Pro hac vice),
of Sinnott, Dito, Moura & Puebla

for defendants-appellants American
Home Assurance Company and Lexington
Insurance Company on the joinder

John R. Myrdal, Scott I. Batterman
and Tred R. Eyerly of Stanton Clay
Chapman Crumpton & Iwamura and
Michael J. Lynch, (Pro hac vice), of
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP for
plaintiff-appellee Del Monte Fresh
Produce (Hawaii) Inc.

28