Title: Sexton v. Mason

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Sexton v. Mason, 117 Ohio St.3d 275, 2008-Ohio-858.] 
 
 
 
SEXTON ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. CITY OF MASON ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Sexton v. Mason, 117 Ohio St.3d 275, 2008-Ohio-858.] 
Statute of limitations — Damage to real property — Permanent trespass occurs 
when defendant’s allegedly tortious act has been fully accomplished. 
(No. 2007-0305 — Submitted November 27, 2007 — Decided March 6, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Warren County,  
No. CA2006-02-026, 2007-Ohio-38. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal requires us to address issues regarding the statute of 
limitations that is applicable to claims for damage to real property occasioned by 
rainwater draining from adjacent land. 
{¶ 2} Plaintiffs-appellants, Larry and Peggy Sexton, assert that flooding 
and erosion on their property was caused by the defendants’ negligent acts on the 
adjoining property.  The trial court and the court of appeals determined that the 
statute of limitations for appellants’ claims expired prior to the filing of their suit 
because their claims were not based on a continuing trespass but on a permanent 
trespass that had been fully completed more than four years prior to the filing of 
the suit.  A finding of a continuing trespass would have tolled the statute of 
limitations.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
{¶ 3} The Sextons built a home just outside the city limits of Mason and 
moved into the home in 1988.  A creek runs through the Sextons’ property, and 
they built a bridge over the creek in order for their driveway to cross it. 
January Term, 2008 
2 
{¶ 4} In the late 1980s, the development of a subdivision, “Trailside 
Acres,” began on adjacent property within the Mason city limits.  Appellee, 
Rishon Enterprises, Inc. (“Rishon”), was the developer of Trailside Acres.  
Rishon contracted with appellee McGill Smith Punshon, Inc. (“McGill”), an 
engineering company, to design the stormwater drainage system for the 
subdivision.  McGill completed all of its engineering services on the subdivision 
in 1994.  Rishon’s work on the subdivision was completed in 1995. 
{¶ 5} As the development of the subdivision progressed, the Sextons 
began to experience water problems.  The problems worsened in 1992, with water 
rising in the creekbed, going over the bridge, and flooding the Sextons’ property 
in periods of heavy or prolonged rains.  There had been no water problems prior 
to the subdivision construction.  Therefore, the Sextons attributed the problems to 
the development. 
{¶ 6} In 1995, Peggy Sexton wrote a letter to a Mason city official 
expressing the Sextons’ concerns.  That letter stated that the creek at one time had 
been dry most of the summer and that water in the creek had never been very deep 
until approximately one to two years after the Sextons built their home in 1988.  
The letter further stated: 
{¶ 7} “The creek, which is now always running, frequently floods and 
comes over our [bridge] headers * * *.  The force of the flow is eroding our land, 
and killing trees on the bank.  All of this is coming from the * * * Trailside 
subdivision. 
{¶ 8} “* * *  
{¶ 9} “During a storm, I cannot even drive over our bridge, as the water 
comes over walls that are over a foot above the road.  If the creek comes another 
2-3 inches higher than it does on a regular basis (like during a good spring rain) 
our basement will be flooded.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
January Term, 2008 
3 
{¶ 10} In the summer of 2001, after an all-day rain, the Sextons’ basement 
filled with water that entered the house with considerable force.  The water rose to 
a depth of five feet in the basement and damaged the contents.  Prior to that event, 
the Sextons had never experienced flooding inside their home.  The Sextons’ 
driveway was blocked by flooding so deep that firemen who responded to a 911 
call were unable to drive their vehicle up to the house. 
{¶ 11} The Sextons worked with city officials and city employees for a 
number of years in an attempt to address their water issues, but those discussions, 
according to Peggy Sexton, “broke down” in 2003.  On July 14, 2003, the Sextons 
filed a complaint against the city and its engineering department concerning the 
water problems.  On August 27, 2003, the Sextons filed an amended complaint 
that added Rishon and McGill as defendants.  One of the Sextons’ claims was that 
the negligence of the defendants caused the flooding of their property. 
{¶ 12} The city and Rishon separately moved to dismiss the complaint, or 
alternatively, for summary judgment.  McGill also moved for summary judgment.  
Along with other arguments, the defendants urged that the complaint was time-
barred by the four-year statute of limitations of R.C. 2305.09 because the cause of 
action had accrued in 1992 (or at the latest in 1995) but the complaint was not 
filed until 2003. 
{¶ 13} A magistrate issued decisions overruling the motions of the 
defendants.  The magistrate held that the Sextons’ complaint stated a cause of 
action for a continuing trespass and that “the action may be brought at any time 
prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period of 21 years, but recovery may be 
had only for damages sustained within four years prior to the filing of the action.” 
{¶ 14} After the defendants filed objections to the magistrate’s decisions, 
the trial court initially agreed with the magistrate’s reasoning.  The trial court 
stated that “[t]here is no dispute that the Plaintiffs first discovered or became 
aware of the water problems on their property in 1992,” so that the statute of 
January Term, 2008 
4 
limitations began to run at that time.  However, the trial court held that the statute 
of limitations did not bar all of the claims because the Sextons’ complaint stated 
claims for a continuing trespass. 
{¶ 15} The trial court later reconsidered its decision and granted summary 
judgment to all defendants.  In granting summary judgment to Rishon and McGill, 
the trial court ruled that the Sextons’ claims were based on a permanent trespass 
(rather than a continuing trespass as the court had ruled earlier) and that the four-
year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09 applied to bar all claims.  In granting 
summary judgment to the city, the trial court held, inter alia, that the city was 
entitled to sovereign immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744. 
{¶ 16} The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in all 
respects.  In the part of that decision pertinent to this appeal, the court of appeals 
held that this case involves a permanent rather than a continuing trespass and that 
the damage to the Sextons’ property occurred when the subdivision was 
constructed.  The court of appeals further held that because McGill completed its 
work on the project in 1994 and because Rishon completed its work in 1995, and 
there was no ongoing conduct by either defendant after the work was completed, 
even though damages continued, the “tortious act” of each was completed in those 
years and the claims were time-barred. 
{¶ 17} This court accepted for review only one of the Sextons’ 
propositions of law in this discretionary appeal:  “A claim for a continuing 
trespass may be supported by proof of continuing damages and need not be based 
on allegations of continuing conduct.”1  113 Ohio St.3d 1488, 2007-Ohio-1986, 
865 N.E.2d 913. 
II 
                                          
 
1.  This court declined to review the Sextons’ additional proposition of law regarding the court of 
appeals’ affirmance of summary judgment to the city on grounds unrelated to those implicated in 
the proposition of law accepted for review.  Therefore, this appeal involves only the claims against 
Rishon and McGill. 
January Term, 2008 
5 
{¶ 18} In Harris v. Liston (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 203, 714 N.E.2d 377, 
paragraph one of the syllabus, this court held: 
{¶ 19} “Tort actions for injury or damage to real property are subject to 
the four-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D).” 
{¶ 20} Pursuant to Harris, which involved facts similar in many respects 
to those of this case, the four-year statute of limitations of R.C. 2305.09(D) 
clearly applies to the Sextons’ claims. 
{¶ 21} In Harris, we held: 
{¶ 22} “A negligence action against a developer-vendor of real property 
for damage to the property accrues and the four-year statute of limitations of R.C. 
2305.09(D) commences to run when it is first discovered, or through the exercise 
of reasonable diligence it should have been discovered, that there is damage to the 
property.”  86 Ohio St.3d 203, 714 N.E.2d 377, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 23} The record fully supports the trial court’s observation that for 
purposes of the discovery rule stated in Harris’s second syllabus paragraph, the 
Sextons discovered the damage in 1992, so the statute of limitations commenced 
to run at that time.  The record also fully supports that the Sextons were aware 
that the damage to their property was caused by the development of the 
subdivision. 
{¶ 24} Although Harris is factually very similar to this case, the Sextons 
argue that Harris is distinguishable and does not control the result here.  
Conversely, based on the factual similarities of this case and Harris, the 
defendants argue that Harris fully controls the result and that further inquiry is 
unnecessary. 
{¶ 25} In Harris, the plaintiffs claimed that a property developer “had 
been negligent in failing to design and construct an adequate water-management 
system” for the subdivision in which their home was located.  86 Ohio St.3d at 
204, 714 N.E.2d 377.  The plaintiffs’ home had been built by previous owners in 
January Term, 2008 
6 
1985, and the water-management system had been completed prior to that time.  
Id. at 203, 714 N.E.2d 377.  The previous owners were aware in 1985 that a 
“water situation” existed on the property.  Id. 
{¶ 26} In reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
developer, the court of appeals in Harris had held that the plaintiffs’ negligence 
claims were timely filed and that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding 
the design and implementation of the water-management system.  Id. at 204, 714 
N.E.2d 377.  This court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.  After 
establishing, as stated in the syllabus, that R.C. 2305.09(D)’s four-year statute of 
limitations applies to such claims and that the statute commences to run when a 
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the damage, this court applied that 
law to the facts and determined that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred.  Id. at 
207-208, 714 N.E.2d 377. 
{¶ 27} In particular, this court stated:  “Here, from the time the [previous 
owners] moved into the home in 1985, they were aware that standing water 
existed on the property and that the land did not drain properly.  Thus, since the 
damage occurred at least as early as 1985, the time of the initial discovery by a 
purchaser that a problem existed regarding the property, appellees’ negligence 
claims, including their claim that [the developer’s] negligence created a nuisance 
thereon, are time-barred.  The initial discovery of the problem occurred more than 
four years before appellees commenced their lawsuit.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 
207-208, 714 N.E.2d 377. 
{¶ 28} We agree with appellees that Harris largely resolves this appeal.  
However, this case raises an additional issue that was not specifically addressed in 
Harris.  Therefore, further consideration is in order concerning whether the 
Sextons’ claims in this case are based on a permanent completed trespass, or 
whether they are based on a continuing trespass. 
January Term, 2008 
7 
{¶ 29} In Valley Ry. Co. v. Franz (1885), 43 Ohio St. 623, 4 N.E. 88, 
which was not cited in Harris, this court discussed the distinction between a 
permanent and a continuing trespass.  In Valley Ry. Co., the railway company, in 
1874, purposefully diverted the course of the Cuyahoga River, an action that 
caused the river over time to wear away the bank and to change its course even 
further so that the riverbed eventually ran over Franz’s land.  Id. at 625, 4 N.E. 88.  
Franz filed suit in 1881, and the railway company argued that the suit was barred 
by the four-year statute of limitations.  Id. 
{¶ 30} This court determined that the trespass was a continuing one and 
that the statute of limitations had not expired.  Id. at 628, 4 N.E. 88.  This court 
first discussed an ordinary trespass, which typically occurs when a defendant 
enters another person’s land: 
{¶ 31} “When a man commits an act of trespass upon another's land, and 
thereby injures such other at once and to the full extent that such act will ever 
injure him, he is liable at once for this one act and all its effects; and the time of 
the statute of limitations runs from the time of such act of trespass.  To this extent 
only is the case of Kansas Pacific Railway v. Mihlman [(1876)], 17 Kan. 224 
[1876 WL 947], cited here, as the court found that the trespass upon complainant's 
land was a single completed act.  And the same is true of the case of Williams v. 
Pomeroy Coal Company, 37 Ohio St. 583 [1882 WL 23].”  Id. at 625-626, 4 N.E. 
88. 
{¶ 32} This court then discussed how a defendant’s completed act 
undertaken on another person’s land can sometimes be a continuing trespass: 
{¶ 33} “But where the act of trespass is a permanent trespass, as the 
erection of buttresses to support a turnpike road (as in Holmes v. Wilson, 10 Ad. 
& El. 503) or the erection and maintenance of a permanent building (as in 
Thompson v. Gibson, 7 M. & W. 456), it may be said to be a continuing trespass 
or nuisance for which a cause of action accrues, and may be brought at any time 
January Term, 2008 
8 
until, by adverse use or possession, the trespasser has enforced an adverse claim 
that has ripened, and has become a presumptive right or a valid estate.”  Id. at 
626, 4 N.E. 88. 
{¶ 34} This court then discussed the standards applicable to the present 
situation, involving a defendant’s act on the defendant’s land that affects another 
person’s land: 
{¶ 35} “And when the owner of land rightly and lawfully does an act 
entirely on his own land, and by means of such act puts in action, or directs a 
force against, or upon, or that affects another's land, without such other's consent 
or permission, such owner and actor is liable to such other for the damages 
thereby so caused the latter, and at once a cause of action accrues for such 
damages; and such force, if so continued, is continued by the act of such owner 
and actor, and it may be regarded as a continuing trespass or nuisance; and each 
additional damage thereby caused is caused by him and is an additional cause of 
action; and until such continued trespass or nuisance by adverse use ripens into 
and becomes a presumptive right and estate in the former, the latter may bring his 
action.”  Id. at 627, 4 N.E. 88. 
{¶ 36} Finally, this court concluded: 
{¶ 37} “The facts stated in the amended petition show that the Valley 
Railway Company diverted the stream and turned its course and current against 
and over the lands of Franz, and thereby caused the injury complained of.  The 
company remained upon its own land, and cut the new channel and took control 
of the stream, and directed its course when the same passed from its land and its 
control, and has ever since so controlled and directed the stream that has caused 
the damage complained of. 
{¶ 38} “The amended petition states a cause of action that is not barred by 
the statute of limitations provided for such cases.”  Id. at 628, 4 N.E. 88. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
{¶ 39} The court of appeals in the case sub judice applied the reasoning of 
Valley Ry. Co. to hold that “ ‘[a] permanent trespass occurs when the defendant’s 
tortious act has been fully accomplished, but injury to the plaintiff’s estate from 
that act persists in the absence of further conduct by the defendant.  In contrast, a 
continuing trespass results when the defendant’s tortious activity is ongoing, 
perpetually creating fresh violations of the plaintiff’s property rights.’ ”  2007-
Ohio-38, at ¶ 16, quoting Reith v. McGill Smith Punshon, Inc., 163 Ohio App.3d 
709, 2005-Ohio-4852, 840 N.E.2d 226, ¶ 49. 
{¶ 40} In reaching this result, the court of appeals emphasized two 
specific statements from Valley Ry. Co.  The first is that a continuing trespass or 
nuisance exists when force is “ ‘continued by the act of [a defendant] owner and 
actor.’ ”  2007-Ohio-38, at ¶ 14, quoting Valley Ry. Co. at 627, 4 N.E. 88.  The 
second is that the defendant in Valley Ry. Co. “ ‘directed [the stream’s] course * * 
* and has ever since so controlled and directed the stream that has caused the 
damage complained of.’ ”  2007-Ohio-38, at ¶ 15, quoting Valley Ry. Co. at 628, 
4 N.E. 88. 
{¶ 41} The court of appeals further reasoned that “ ‘a continuing trespass 
occurs when there is some continuing or ongoing tortious activity attributable to 
the defendant.  Conversely, a permanent trespass occurs when the defendant’s 
tortious act has been fully accomplished.  * * *  Thus, the determinative question 
centers upon the nature of the defendant’s tortious conduct, not upon the nature of 
the damage caused by that conduct.’ * * * That is, a trespass under Ohio law is a 
continuing trespass only if the trespass itself, and not the ongoing injury or harm 
caused by a past, completed misdeed, is continuing.  Ongoing conduct is the key 
to a continuing trespass.”  2007-Ohio-38, at ¶ 17, quoting Abraham v. BP 
Exploration & Oil, Inc., 149 Ohio App.3d 471, 2002-Ohio-4392, 778 N.E.2d 48, 
¶ 27. 
January Term, 2008 
10 
{¶ 42} The reasoning of the court of appeals is consistent with a number 
of recent decisions from other appellate districts, many of which involved similar 
factual situations.  One such case is Reith v. McGill Smith Punshon, Inc., 163 
Ohio App.3d 709, 2005-Ohio-4852, 840 N.E.2d 226, a decision of the First 
Appellate District that involved facts remarkably similar to those of the case sub 
judice.  In that case, the Reiths believed that flooding on their property was 
caused by construction in the early 1990s of a subdivision across the street from 
their house, and in 2003 sued the developer of the subdivision and McGill (which 
is also a defendant in the present case), the designer of the subdivision’s water-
drainage system.  Id. at ¶ 1, 14. 
{¶ 43} Serious flooding of the property in Reith began in 1993 and 1994, 
so that the four-year statute of limitations began to run “no later than 1994.”  Id. at 
¶ 38, 46.  In affirming the trial court’s conclusion that the claims against McGill 
were barred by the four-year statute of limitations, Reith focused on the 
undisputed fact that McGill had completed its design of the drainage system in 
1994.  Id. at ¶ 50.  The court reasoned:  “With McGill’s allegedly tortious act 
completed, any ongoing injury to the Reiths’ property would have had to be 
considered a permanent trespass.  Under these circumstances, the Reiths were 
required to bring their trespass claim against McGill within four years of McGill’s 
tortious act.”  Id. at ¶ 51. 
{¶ 44} Other recent decisions that are also consistent with the court of 
appeals’ reasoning in this case include Weir v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 7th Dist. No. 01 
CA 207, 2003-Ohio-1229, ¶ 28 (because defendant committed only one tortious 
act and did not retain control over the property or the contaminants, trespass was 
not continuous); Abraham v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 149 Ohio App.3d 471, 
2002-Ohio-4392, 778 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 28 (because defendant’s tortious activity, if 
any, stopped when it vacated the premises and gave up possession and control of 
the property, trespass was not continuous); Hartland v. McCullough Constr., Inc. 
January Term, 2008 
11 
(July 14, 2000), 6th Dist. No. OT-99-058, 2000 WL 966027 (defendants’ tortious 
activity constituted a permanent trespass because there was no ongoing conduct 
by the defendants); Frisch v. Monfort Supply Co. (Nov. 21, 1997), 1st Dist. No. 
C-960522, 1997 WL 722796 (because defendants’ tortious act was completed and 
there was no ongoing conduct by the defendants even though damages to the 
plaintiff’s property continued, trespass was permanent rather than continuing). 
{¶ 45} We fully agree with the reasoning of these courts.  The defendant’s 
ongoing conduct or retention of control is the key to distinguishing a continuing 
trespass from a permanent trespass.  We hold that a continuing trespass in this 
context occurs when there is some continuing or ongoing allegedly tortious 
activity attributable to the defendant.  A permanent trespass occurs when the 
defendant’s allegedly tortious act has been fully accomplished. 
{¶ 46} Our resolution of this issue is supported by our decision in State v. 
Swartz (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 131, 723 N.E.2d 1084, which involved a criminal 
prosecution under R.C. 3767.13(C) for unlawfully obstructing or impeding the 
passage of a stream.  In Swartz, the trial court had dismissed the action as barred 
by the applicable two-year statute of limitations (because more than two years had 
passed since the defendant erected the bridge that was allegedly the source of the 
damage), and the court of appeals had affirmed.  88 Ohio St.3d at 131-132, 723 
N.E.2d 1084. 
{¶ 47} This court reversed and held that the statute of limitations did not 
bar the prosecution, holding at the syllabus:  “Where one creates a nuisance as 
defined in R.C. 3767.13(C) and permits it to remain, so long as it remains, and is 
within the control of the actor, the nuisance constitutes a continuing course of 
conduct tolling the limitations period * * *.”  This court in Swartz recognized that 
although Valley Ry. Co. v. Franz involved a civil cause of action, that case “is 
instructive as to the nature of an act of nuisance that is under the control of the 
actor and continues to cause damage.”  88 Ohio St.3d at 134, 723 N.E.2d 1084. 
January Term, 2008 
12 
{¶ 48} This court in Swartz discussed the Fourth District Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Boll v. Griffith (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 356, 535 N.E.2d 
1375, a “similar case” to Valley Ry. Co. v. Franz, which also involved a nuisance 
that was under the control of a defendant.  In Boll, the plaintiff and defendant 
were adjoining landowners, with each owning a series of row houses connected 
by a common brick wall.  In 1978, a third party hired by the defendant razed the 
row houses on the defendant’s parcel.  More than four years later, the plaintiff 
sued, alleging that remnants of the razed structures remained attached to the 
common wall and that their weight gradually damaged the wall.  The court of 
appeals in Boll reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint as time-barred 
under R.C. 2305.09(D).  This court in Swartz noted that the court of appeals in 
Boll held that “the claim was a continuing trespass, even though the defendant’s 
last act preceded the lawsuit by more than four years, the relevant limitations 
period for that tort, and even though the defendant had sold the property in the 
interim.  The court of appeals also reinstated the plaintiff’s action against the new 
owner who had allowed the condition to continue to exist.”  Swartz, 88 Ohio St.3d 
at 134, 723 N.E.2d 1084, citing Boll, 41 Ohio App.3d at 358, 535 N.E.2d 1375. 
{¶ 49} Although there are several factors distinguishing the present case 
from Swartz (the most significant being that Swartz was a criminal prosecution) 
and although Swartz did not cite or discuss Harris, the broad reasoning of Swartz 
applies here.  Swartz focused on a continuing course of conduct and the control of 
that conduct by the defendant to determine that the statute of limitations had not 
expired.  In this case, that continuing course of conduct is absent.2 
                                          
 
2.  In comparing the situation in this case to the situations in Valley Ry. Co. and State v. Swartz, 
the dissent does not recognize the significance of the defining factor that distinguishes this case 
from those cases.  The dissent states that “[t]he only factual difference” between this case and 
Valley Ry. Co. “is that the trespasser in Valley Ry. Co. continued to own the land from which water 
had been diverted, whereas in this case the trespasser sold the land from which water had been 
diverted.”  The dissent additionally states that “the only apparent reason for the disparate 
outcomes” in this case and in Swartz “is that Swartz retained control over his property, whereas in 
January Term, 2008 
13 
{¶ 50} In arguing that their claims meet the standards for a continuing 
trespass, the Sextons point out that in Nieman v. NLO, Inc. (C.A.6, 1997), 108 
F.3d 1546, 1559, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying in large part on the 
decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeals in Boll, held that “under Ohio 
law, a claim for continuing trespass may be supported by proof of continuing 
damages and need not be based on allegations of continuing conduct.”  However, 
one Ohio appellate court has observed that it was the dissent in Nieman that 
instead properly interpreted Ohio law on this issue.  See Frisch, 1st Dist. No. C-
960522, 1997 WL 722796 (a continuing trespass occurs when the defendant’s 
tortious activity is ongoing, perpetually creating fresh violations of the plaintiff’s 
property rights).  The dissent in Nieman took a very different view of Boll than 
did the Nieman majority, citing Boll as a case in which the defendants’ tortious 
activity was ongoing.  See Nieman, 108 F.3d at 1567 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) 
(in Boll, “the defendant’s continual unlawful act was his failure to extract 
tangible, moveable matter from the plaintiff's real estate which [the defendant] at 
all times had a duty to remove”).  See also Weir, 2003-Ohio-1229, ¶ 27 (the party 
deemed liable for a continuing trespass in Boll retained control over the source of 
the trespass, in that “the defendant had control of the heavy debris that was 
damaging the common wall”). 
{¶ 51} As our discussion in Swartz indicates, Boll did involve a 
continuing course of conduct by the defendants, establishing that it was the 
                                                                                                                   
this case the tortfeasor sold the property.”  These supposedly minor distinguishing features 
downplayed by the dissent go to the precise reason that a continuing trespass is fundamentally 
different from a permanent trespass.  When a defendant retains control over a particular situation 
(as in Valley Ry. Co. and in Swartz), the defendant has the ability to rectify the situation, the 
trespass is therefore a continuing one, and the running of the statute of limitations is tolled.  
However, when a defendant no longer exerts control over a particular situation (as in this case, in 
Harris, and in the appellate cases cited in this opinion), the defendant no longer has the ability to 
rectify the situation.  In the latter circumstance, the trespass is permanent, so that it is entirely 
appropriate for the statute of limitations to run, and, thus, the plaintiff must bring suit within four 
years of the fully completed tortious act. 
January Term, 2008 
14 
dissent in Nieman that took the proper view of Boll and that correctly interpreted 
Ohio law.  Because the reasoning of the majority in Nieman is incompatible with 
our holdings in Swartz and in this case, Nieman’s holding is an inaccurate 
characterization of Ohio law, and the Sextons’ reliance on that decision and its 
interpretation of Boll is misplaced.  Furthermore, Nieman was decided prior to 
this court’s decision in Harris, which also substantially clarified the law in this 
area. 
{¶ 52} Our result is also fully consistent with Harris and readily 
reconciles with the situation in that case.  In Harris, the alleged negligent conduct 
of the defendant was completed prior to 1985, and the defendant exerted no 
further control over the alleged source of the plaintiffs’ damages after that point.  
Similarly, in this case, the conduct of the defendants was completed more than 
four years prior to the filing of the complaint.  We reject the Sextons’ arguments 
that this court should interpret Harris narrowly and that Harris is distinguishable 
because it involved conduct that constituted a nuisance rather than a trespass.  For 
purposes here, that distinction is immaterial. 
{¶ 53} The adoption of the discovery rule in Harris for claims such as 
those raised here eases many of the potential concerns regarding a standard that 
focuses on the ongoing conduct of a defendant to determine whether the statute of 
limitations is tolled.  Under Harris, the statute of limitations does not begin to run 
until a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, damage to the 
property.  Therefore, a plaintiff who could not reasonably have discovered that he 
or she was damaged will not be foreclosed from filing suit within four years of the 
date when the damage becomes evident or should have become evident, even if 
the defendant did not exert continuing control over the alleged source of the 
damage during that period. 
III 
January Term, 2008 
15 
{¶ 54} As noted above, the record establishes that the four-year statute of 
limitations governing the Sextons’ claims began to run in 1992.  So long as 
McGill and Rishon engaged in continuing conduct through their work on 
Trailside Acres, the expiration of the statute of limitations was tolled, with the 
Sextons’ potential recovery on any claims limited to damages only within the 
four-year period that would have preceded the filing of a suit. 
{¶ 55} However, once McGill and Rishon completed their respective 
work on Trailside Acres and no longer exerted control over that property, the 
alleged trespass was completed, and the four-year statute of limitations 
definitively began to run.  Because McGill completed its work in 1994, the four-
year statute of limitations as to it expired in 1998.  Because Rishon completed its 
work on Trailside Acres in 1995, the four-year statute of limitations as to it 
expired in 1999.  The Sextons filed suit in 2003, well after the statute of 
limitations expired.  Their complaint was untimely as a matter of law, and the trial 
court properly granted summary judgment under Civ.R. 56(C). 
{¶ 56} For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 57} I dissent because the majority opinion’s excessive reliance on the 
lower court’s flawed analysis of Valley Ry. Co. v. Franz (1885), 43 Ohio St. 623, 
4 N.E. 88, leads to a holding that is unjust and likely to result in the filing of many 
unnecessary-but-for-this-opinion lawsuits.  The majority opinion concludes that a 
“defendant’s ongoing conduct or retention of control is the key to distinguishing a 
January Term, 2008 
16 
continuing trespass from a permanent trespass.  We hold that a continuing 
trespass in this context occurs when there is some continuing or ongoing allegedly 
tortious activity attributable to the defendant.  A permanent trespass occurs when 
the defendant’s allegedly tortious act has been fully accomplished.”  This is a 
legitimate conclusion that other courts have reached, as the majority opinion 
discusses.  But this conclusion is not supported by Valley Ry. Co., which the 
majority opinion does not overrule. 
{¶ 58} Even though the events in Valley Ry. Co. occurred over 100 years 
ago, they are remarkably similar to the events in this case.  In both cases, water 
was diverted, which initially caused little or no damage.  Id. at 624, 4 N.E. 88.  In 
both cases, the diversion of the water was permanent, required no ongoing action 
by the diverter, and ultimately caused considerable damages.  Id. at 625, 4 N.E. 
88.  In both cases, the damaged party complained shortly after realizing that he 
had been damaged.  Id. at 624, 4 N.E. 88.  In both cases, the damaged party did 
not file suit because the initial damages were modest.  Id.  The only factual 
difference is that the trespasser in Valley Ry. Co. continued to own the land from 
which water had been diverted, whereas in this case, the trespasser sold the land 
from which water had been diverted.  Id.  Despite these factual similarities, the 
majority opinion concludes that Sexton may not proceed with a lawsuit even 
though Franz was allowed to. 
{¶ 59} This conclusion derives from a flawed analysis of Valley Ry. Co.  
The majority opinion cites two statements from the lower court opinion to bolster 
its conclusion that the trespass in Valley Ry. Co. was continuing, not permanent.  
The majority opinion states that “a continuing trespass or nuisance exists when 
force is ‘ “continued by the act of [a defendant] owner or actor.” ’  2007-Ohio-38, 
at ¶ 14, quoting Valley Ry. Co. at 627, 4 N.E. 88.”  The majority opinion also 
states that “the defendant in Valley Ry. Co. ‘ “directed [the stream’s] course * * * 
and has ever since so controlled and directed the stream that has caused the 
January Term, 2008 
17 
damage complained of.” ’  2007-Ohio-38, at ¶ 15, quoting Valley Ry. Co. at 628, 
4 N.E. 88.”  These statements, however, are not supported by Valley Ry. Co., 
which states that “the only act the railway company ever did to cause the injury, 
was done in November, 1874, by changing the channel of the river.”  Valley Ry. 
Co. at 625, 4 N.E. 88.  Valley Ry. Co. is not a continuing trespass case, as the 
majority opinion would have us believe; Valley Ry. Co. is a permanent trespass 
case in which damages but not tortious conduct were continuing. 
{¶ 60} Some of the language from Valley Ry. Co. is confusing — for 
instance, the statement “where the act of trespass is a permanent trespass, * * * it 
may be said to be a continuing trespass or nuisance for which a cause of action 
accrues, and may be brought at any time.”  43 Ohio St. at 626, 4 N.E. 88.  The 
beginning of the quote suggests that the court is discussing permanent trespass, 
but the remainder of the quote, the context, and the holding of the case reveal that 
the court is talking about a trespass that would otherwise be considered permanent 
(because the tortious conduct is complete) but that should be considered 
continuing because the damage is ongoing.  See Kansas Pacific Ry. v. Mihlman 
(1876), 17 Kan. 224, 231, 1876 WL 947 (“There are cases in which the original 
act is considered as a continuing act, and daily giving rise to a new cause of 
action.  Where one creates a nuisance, and permits it to remain, so long as it 
remains it is treated as a continuing wrong, and giving rise, over and over again, 
to causes of action”).  See also Nieman v. NLO, Inc. (C.A.6, 1997), 108 F.3d 
1546, 1555-1556. 
{¶ 61} The majority opinion quotes the key passage from Valley Ry. Co., 
but attributes the wrong meaning to it.  “And when the owner of land rightly and 
lawfully does an act entirely on his own land, and by means of such act puts in 
action, or directs a force against, or upon, or that affects another’s land, without 
such other’s consent or permission, such owner and actor is liable to such other 
for the damages thereby so caused the latter, and at once a cause of action accrues 
January Term, 2008 
18 
for such damages; and such force, if so continued, is continued by the act of such 
owner and actor, and it may be regarded as a continuing trespass or nuisance; and 
each additional damage thereby caused is caused by him and is an additional 
cause of action; and until such continued trespass or nuisance by adverse use 
ripens into and becomes a presumptive right and estate in the former, the latter 
may bring his action.”  Id. at 627, 4 N.E. 88.  It is possible to read this passage to 
support a conclusion that a trespass continues only if the conduct of the original 
actor also continues.  But this reading is strained, and requires us to ignore the 
fact that in Valley Ry. Co. the conduct of the original actor did not continue.  I 
conclude, as have other judges, that “under Ohio law, a claim for continuing 
trespass may be supported by proof of continuing damages and need not be based 
on allegations of continuing conduct.”  Nieman, 108 F.3d at 1559; Wood v. Am. 
Aggregates Corp. (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 41, 45, 585 N.E.2d 970 (statute of 
limitations did not bar suit because damages were ongoing even though allegedly 
tortious conduct was not).  See Hoery v. United States (Colo.2003), 64 P.3d 214, 
222 (a continuing trespass occurred when the United States failed “to stop the 
toxic pollution plume that it created from entering Hoery's property,” even though 
the last tortious act of the United States occurred outside the statute of 
limitations); Graham v. Beverage (2002), 211 W.Va. 466, 477, 566 S.E.2d 603 
(claim allowed as not outside the statute of limitations because there were 
continuing injuries, even though there was no continuing conduct other than a 
failure to correct the problem). 
{¶ 62} The majority opinion also relies on Reith v. McGill Smith Punshon, 
Inc., 163 Ohio App.3d 709, 2005-Ohio-4852, 840 N.E.2d 226.  Reith is factually 
similar, but it doesn’t discuss or mention the seminal Valley Ry. Co. and therefore 
is of no consequence in helping us decide this case. 
{¶ 63} The majority opinion also relies on State v. Swartz (2000), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 131, 723 N.E.2d 1084, from which I dissented.  My seemingly contrary 
January Term, 2008 
19 
position in this case is based on the different principles undergirding a civil statute 
of limitations as opposed to a criminal statute of limitations.  See R.C. 2901.04(A) 
and (B).  In Swartz, this court stated that “where one creates a nuisance * * * and 
permits it to remain, so long as it remains, and is within the control of the actor, 
the nuisance constitutes a continuing course of conduct tolling the limitations 
period * * *.  Thus, because the defendant permitted the nuisance to remain 
despite the plaintiff’s repeated requests to abate, the period of limitations did not 
begin to run until the continuing course of conduct or the accused’s accountability 
for it terminated.”  88 Ohio St.3d at 135, 723 N.E.2d 1084.  In Swartz, the court 
concluded that the statute of limitations was tolled; in this case, the statute of 
limitations is not tolled.  But these disparate outcomes are not the result of the 
distinction between continuing and permanent trespass, as the majority would 
have us believe.  Instead, the only apparent reason for the disparate outcomes is 
that Swartz retained control over his property, whereas in this case, the tortfeasor 
sold the property.  Thus, even though Swartz and the tortfeasor in this case did the 
same thing—they completed an act that affected the flow of water and then did 
not perform another substantive affirmative act with respect to the water flow—
liability is different.  Allowing tortfeasors to avoid responsibility for their bad acts 
by selling their property is not a proper foundation for a legal principle. 
{¶ 64} Valley Ry. Co. allowed a lawsuit for trespass even though the act of 
trespass was not continuing.  So should we.  In this case, we should hold that the 
Sextons may go forward based on damages incurred within the statutory period 
from the day they filed their suit.  They may have difficulty establishing fault, and 
they may be found partially at fault for building a bridge over a waterway, but 
they should have a chance to recover damages for the harm they have suffered. 
{¶ 65} Much of this discussion is arcane, and many of the distinctions are 
fine, but one thing is clear:  the rule espoused in the majority opinion will yield 
the following undesirable effects. 
January Term, 2008 
20 
{¶ 66} (1)  People will continue to suffer significant damages and have no 
recourse because they did not file suit when they incurred modest damages.  In 
this case, the Sextons could have filed suit when the initial puddles formed in 
their driveway.  Instead, they waited until after their basement flooded to file suit.  
Experience indicates that most people will not sue for modest damages or 
inconvenience, even when they suspect that another person is at fault.  Most 
people understand that modest damages and inconvenience are a part of life.  See 
Reith, 163 Ohio App.3d 709, 2005-Ohio-4852, 840 N.E.2d 226, at ¶ 5, 14   (the 
Reiths filed suit after their house flooded, not when water first pooled in their 
driveway). 
{¶ 67} (2)  Tortfeasors will be able to commit torts with impunity because 
most people do not pursue a lawsuit at the first occurrence of modest damages.  
Here, Sexton tried to resolve the flooding problem through the city of Mason.  In 
Reith, the Reiths initially attempted to resolve their problem by contacting county 
agencies.  Id at ¶ 13.  In each case, the attempt to resolve the problem outside the 
court system was part of the reason the lawsuit was not timely filed.  In each case, 
the party at fault escaped liability even though it had performed an act that it 
should not have performed, thereby causing damage to another person.  So much 
for justice. 
{¶ 68} (3)  Developers will have one more incentive to sell property 
quickly:  to begin the running of the statute of limitations relating to their faulty 
drainage systems.  Being able to avoid liability for a faulty drainage system based 
on the statute of limitations’ running may encourage developers to pursue cost 
savings by purposely designing or installing inadequate drainage systems. 
{¶ 69} (4)  Going forward, any person in Ohio who thinks that he or his 
property has been harmed or who thinks that he or his property might be harmed 
by the act of a neighbor will file suit first and ask questions later.  There is no 
other lesson to take from this case.  I dissent. 
January Term, 2008 
21 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Whitaker & Shade, L.L.C., and James A. Whitaker, for appellants. 
 
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., and B. Scott Jones, for appellee 
Rishon Enterprises, Inc. 
 
Herfel Law Firm, L.L.C., and Gary L. Herfel, for appellee McGill Smith 
Punshon, Inc. 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Gary E. Becker, and Melissa L. Korfhage, for 
appellee city of Mason. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P., Richard D. Schuster, and 
Michael J. Hendershot, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Manufacturers’ 
Association. 
______________________