Title: News America Marketing In-Store, Inc. v. Marquis

State: connecticut

Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court

Document:

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NEWS AMERICA MARKETING IN-STORE, INC.
v. STEVEN MARQUIS ET AL.
(SC 17362)
Borden, Norcott, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
Argued October 20—officially released November 29, 2005
A. Robert Fischer, with whom was Jeffrey M. Vona,
for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael N. LaVelle, with whom, on the brief, was
Jonathan Orleans, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, News America Marketing
In-Store, Inc., appeals, upon our grant of certification,
from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the
trial court’s judgment in favor of the defendants, Steven
Marquis and Floorgraphics, Inc. (Floorgraphics).1 We
affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The plaintiff, a company in the in-store advertising
and promotional products industry, brought this action
alleging that Marquis, the plaintiff’s former vice presi-
dent of retail marketing for the north central region of
the United States, breached his duty of loyalty to the
plaintiff, converted the plaintiff’s property and violated
General Statutes §§ 53a-2512 and 52-570b3 by engaging
in unauthorized access to, and misuse of, its computer
system. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Marquis,
prior to submitting his resignation, solicited one of its
employees to work for his new employer, Floorgraph-
ics, a business competitor of the plaintiff, and took
copies of certain business related materials, some of
which he had obtained by gaining access to com-
puter files.
The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s breach of loyalty
claim, which was based on Marquis’ removal of the
materials from the plaintiff’s premises and from the
plaintiff’s computer system and on the solicitation of
one of the plaintiff’s employees, because there was no
evidence that Floorgraphics had, through Marquis’
actions, acquired any secret information or that Marquis
had disclosed any trade secret material to Floorgraphics
and because the employee whom Marquis solicited did
not leave the plaintiff’s employ. The court also deter-
mined that, because the plaintiff, which had withdrawn
any claims for injunctive relief, had not proved that it
suffered an injury or loss, it was not a prevailing party
under § 52-570b (e) and therefore was not entitled to
attorney’s fees or costs under the statute.
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Appel-
late Court agreed that there was no breach of the duty
of loyalty, holding that ‘‘proof of a specific loss is an
essential element in a cause of action for breach of the
duty of loyalty owed by an employee to his employer.’’
News America Marketing In-Store, Inc. v. Marquis,
86 Conn. App. 527, 534, 862 A.2d 837 (2004). In so
concluding, the Appellate Court rejected the plaintiff’s
claim that money the plaintiff had expended on an inves-
tigation for purposes of the present action constituted
damages. Id., 536–37. The court also agreed with the
trial court’s analysis of the plaintiff’s claim for costs
and attorney’s fees under § 52-570b, concluding that the
plaintiff had failed to show that it was a person who had
suffered injury, as required by § 52-570b (c).4 Id., 548–49.
Our examination of the record and briefs and our
consideration of the arguments of the parties persuade
us that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be
affirmed on the certified issues. See id., 533–38, 546–49.
Those issues were resolved properly in the Appellate
Court’s concise and well reasoned opinion. Because
that opinion fully addresses all arguments raised in this
appeal, we adopt it as a proper statement of the issues
and the applicable law concerning those issues. It would
serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion
contained therein. Miller’s Pond Co., LLC v. Rocque,
263 Conn. 692, 697, 822 A.2d 238 (2003).
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
1 We granted certification to appeal limited to the following issues: ‘‘1.
Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that proof of injury is an essential
element of a claim for breach of duty of loyalty to an employer?
‘‘2. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that the plaintiff was not a ‘prevailing party’ under General
Statutes § 52-570b?’’ News America Marketing In-Store, Inc. v. Marquis,
273 Conn. 905, 868 A.2d 744 (2005).
2 General Statutes § 53a-251 (b) defines unauthorized access to a computer
system as follows: ‘‘(1) A person is guilty of the computer crime of unautho-
rized access to a computer system when, knowing that he is not authorized
to do so, he accesses or causes to be accessed any computer system without
authorization. . . .’’
General Statutes § 53a-251 (e) defines misuse of computer system informa-
tion as follows: ‘‘A person is guilty of the computer crime of misuse of
computer system information when: (1) As a result of his accessing or
causing to be accessed a computer system, he intentionally makes or causes
to be made an unauthorized display, use, disclosure or copy, in any form,
of data residing in, communicated by or produced by a computer system;
or (2) he intentionally or recklessly and without authorization (A) alters,
deletes, tampers with, damages, destroys or takes data intended for use by
a computer system, whether residing within or external to a computer
system, or (B) intercepts or adds data to data residing within a computer
system; or (3) he knowingly receives or retains data obtained in violation
of subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection; or (4) he uses or discloses any
data he knows or believes was obtained in violation of subdivision (1) or
(2) of this subsection.’’
3 General Statutes § 52-570b provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any aggrieved
person who has reason to believe that any other person has been engaged,
is engaged or is about to engage in an alleged violation of any provision of
section 53a-251 may bring an action against such person and may apply to
the Superior Court for: (1) An order temporarily or permanently restraining
and enjoining the commencement or continuance of such act or acts; (2)
an order directing restitution; or (3) an order directing the appointment of
a receiver. . . .
‘‘(b) The court may award the relief applied for or such other relief as it
may deem appropriate in equity.
‘‘(c) Independent of or in conjunction with an action under subsection
(a) of this section, any person who suffers any injury to person, business
or property may bring an action for damages against a person who is alleged
to have violated any provision of section 53a-251. The aggrieved person
shall recover actual damages and damages for unjust enrichment not taken
into account in computing damages for actual loss, and treble damages
where there has been a showing of wilful and malicious conduct.
‘‘(d) Proof of pecuniary loss is not required to establish actual damages
in connection with an alleged violation of subsection (e) of section 53a-251
arising from misuse of private personal data.
‘‘(e) In any civil action brought under this section, the court shall award
to any aggrieved person who prevails, reasonable costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees.
‘‘(f) The filing of a criminal action against a person is not a prerequisite
to the bringing of a civil action under this section against such person. . . .’’
4 The Appellate Court also addressed three issues that are not before us
in this certified appeal, concluding that: (1) the plaintiff could not prevail
on its claim that the defendants had violated the uniform trade secrets act
(act), and therefore was not entitled to attorney’s fees under the act, because
the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the requisite actual loss under the
act; see News America Marketing In-Store, Inc. v. Marquis, supra, 86 Conn.
App. 538–43; (2) because the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that it had
suffered a loss, it also could not prevail on its claim for conversion and,
therefore, was not entitled to treble damages under General Statutes § 52-
564; see id., 543–46; and (3) the plaintiff was not entitled to nominal damages
as to any of its claims, because for each of those claims, the plaintiff had
failed to demonstrate the defendants’ liability. See id., 549–50.