Title: In re I.P.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-134 
No. 124A21 
Filed 5 November 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: I.P. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 15 
February 2021 by Judge J.H. Corpening, II in District Court, New Hanover County. 
This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 30 September 
2021 but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 
30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
 Garron T. Michael for petitioner-appellee. 
 
No brief filed for Guardian ad Litem.  
 
Richard Croutharmel, for respondent-appellant. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his 
parental rights to “Ivey,”1 a minor child born on 27 November 2018. After careful 
review, we hold that there was no error in the trial court’s determination that grounds 
existed to support the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights to Ivey and 
there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that it would be in 
                                            
1 We use a pseudonym to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading.  
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2021-NCSC-134 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Ivey’s best interests to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights. Accordingly, 
we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to 
Ivey.  
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
¶ 2 
 
Prior to Ivey’s birth, all of her older siblings had been taken into nonsecure 
custody by the New Hanover County Department of Social Services (DSS), with Ivey’s 
mother eventually relinquishing her parental rights to each of these children. Ivey 
tested positive for cocaine at her birth on 27 November 2018 and was taken into 
custody by DSS. Ivey’s mother identified three men as possible fathers of Ivey; one of 
them was respondent-father. On 11 December 2018, DSS filed a juvenile petition 
alleging that Ivey was a neglected juvenile. Following a hearing conducted on 31 
January 2019 and by order filed on 25 February 2019, the trial court adjudicated Ivey 
to be neglected. On disposition, the trial court ordered Ivey’s mother to comply with 
a case plan to effect reunification with Ivey and ordered the putative fathers 
identified by Ivey’s mother to submit to DNA testing in order to confirm the identity 
of Ivey’s biological father.  
¶ 3 
 
On 30 May 2019, the trial court adjudicated respondent-father as Ivey’s 
biological father. At a hearing held on 3 October 2019 and in an order entered on 13 
November 2019, the trial court directed respondent-father to comply with a case plan 
to effect placement of Ivey with him. The trial court changed Ivey’s primary 
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2021-NCSC-134 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
permanent plan to adoption after an 8 July 2020 hearing and the entry of a 22 July 
2020 order. Ivey’s mother relinquished her parental rights to Ivey on 10 July 2020. 
On 1 September 2020, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent-father’s parental 
rights to Ivey. Following a hearing conducted on 26 and 29 October 2020 and by an 
order filed on 15 February 2021, the trial court terminated respondent-father’s 
parental rights to Ivey. In its termination of parental rights order, the trial court 
found that three grounds existed to permit the termination of respondent-father’s 
parental rights: neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), willful failure to make 
reasonable progress to correct the matters which caused Ivey to be in an out-of-home 
placement for at least 12 months under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), and abandonment 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Respondent-father appeals.  
¶ 4 
 
On 17 June 2021, appellate counsel for respondent-father filed a brief, stating 
that “[a]fter a conscientious and thorough review of the record and the relevant law 
and consultation with other experienced appellate attorneys, [appellate counsel for 
respondent-father was] unable to identify any issues with sufficient merit on which 
to base an argument for relief on appeal.” Pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 3.1(e), appellate 
counsel for respondent-father identified two general issues for this Court’s review 
that might potentially support relief on appeal. Appellate counsel for respondent-
father also sent to respondent-father copies of counsel’s brief, the record on appeal, 
and the transcript, along with a letter explaining respondent-father’s right to file his 
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2021-NCSC-134 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
own pro se brief and instructions on how to do so. Respondent-father did not submit 
his own brief or any other filing to the Court.  
¶ 5 
 
The brief filed in this Court by appellate counsel on behalf of respondent-father 
only analyzes the ground for termination of parental rights found under N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1111(a)(2)—failure to make reasonable progress—as a sufficient basis for the 
termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. The trial court made the following 
findings concerning respondent-father’s failure to make reasonable progress:  
129. That the Court finds that Respondent-Father lacks 
credibility.  
  
130. That the Court finds that Respondent-Father clearly 
fabricated his pay stubs and lease. The lease is suspect at 
best. The Court struggles to believe that this is a lease for 
that address.  
  
131. That the Court finds that Respondent-Father’s 
testimony about the quality of his visits with [Ivey] are not 
credible.  
  
. . . . 
  
134. That this Court questions anything said by 
Respondent-Father and any documents provided by 
Respondent-Father.  
  
135. That Respondent-Father is unfit to parent and is 
acting contrary and contradictory to his parental rights.  
  
136. That this Court has no confidence that things will 
change any more than they have in the past twenty-three 
months that the child has been in care.  
  
137. That Respondent-Father is not in a position to parent 
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[Ivey] almost two years after she came into care and at 
least eighteen (18) months since he learned that he was her 
biological father.  
  
. . . . 
  
146. That Respondent-Father has made periodic progress 
on his case plan but cannot remain consistent nor has 
addressed 
his 
significant 
mental 
health 
issues. 
Respondent-Father is partially compliant, at best, after 
two years and instead of focusing on completing the 
objectives of his case plan spent more time creating a 
façade of progress.  
  
147. That the concerns that originally brought [Ivey] into 
care remain unaddressed by Respondent-Father. He lacks 
understanding of the detrimental effects of his decision-
making and its lasting effects on [Ivey]. Respondent-Father 
has not complied and has failed to actively engage in most 
services designed to address the issues of neglect that 
brought [Ivey] into care and support reunification efforts. 
Respondent-Father continues to have ongoing and 
longstanding issues that impact the care and supervision 
of the child. He disengaged from his child for the first year 
of her life and then after three visits, disengaged with her 
again until the plan changed to adoption and the [TPR] 
Petition was filed.  
  
148. That Respondent-Father has not made reasonable 
progress in correcting those conditions which led to the 
removal of the minor child based on his conduct. . . .   
Respondent-Father’s lack of credibility does not show 
progress in being able to parent this child safely as 
Respondent-Father continues to put his needs ahead of 
hers.  
  
. . . . 
  
151. That Respondent-Father is not in a position to parent 
today. Respondent-Father would need significant therapy 
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and verified stable income and housing before he would be 
in a position to reunite with [Ivey].  Respondent-Father has 
had the luxury of additional time to complete his case plan 
with the six-month hiatus of this case due COVID-19 and 
still has not accomplished the necessary objectives to 
reunite with [Ivey]. [The social worker and the guardian ad 
litem] do not see Respondent-Father being in a position to 
safely parent or complete his recommended treatment in 
the near future and this Court agrees. 
 
Respondent-father’s appellate counsel represents that he cannot refute these findings 
of fact as they apply to the ground of respondent-father’s willful failure to make 
reasonable progress to reunify with Ivey after she had been in an out-of-home 
placement for at least twelve months, specifically in light of evidence in the record 
that: (1) there was a question as to respondent-father’s veracity during the 
termination hearing; (2) there was some doubt as to whether respondent-father had 
stable employment, adequate and stable housing, and adequate and stable income; 
(3) there was a question as to whether respondent-father had another newborn child 
and romantic relationships with multiple women; (4) respondent-father failed to visit 
Ivey from June through November 2019 and January through July 2020, with 
questionable reasons for not visiting; (5) respondent-father’s failure to consistently 
visit Ivey undoubtedly led to his inability to form a stronger bond with her; and (6) 
respondent-father never developed the parenting skills necessary to assuage Ivey’s 
anxiety in his presence despite multiple parenting classes. It is well settled that “a 
finding of only one ground is necessary to support a termination of parental rights.” 
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In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194 (2019).  
¶ 6 
 
After a careful review of the record on appeal in this matter, we agree with the 
candid assessment of respondent-father’s appellate counsel and with the 
determinations of the trial court in this case. As this Court has noted, “[a] 
respondent’s prolonged inability to improve [his] situation, despite some efforts in 
that direction, will support a finding of willfulness regardless of [his] good intentions, 
and will support a finding of lack of progress sufficient to warrant termination of 
parental rights.”  In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 815 (2020) (extraneity omitted). Here, 
respondent-father has not achieved reasonable progress under his case plan and has 
not demonstrated an intention and commitment to do so. Based upon the evidence 
adduced in the trial court and upon the entirety of the record, we affirm the trial 
court’s determination that grounds existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) to support 
termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. 
¶ 7 
 
Further, during the disposition phase of the termination of parental rights 
hearing, the trial court made findings of fact which addressed evidence concerning 
the specifically enumerated factors contained in the disposition statute, N.C.G.S. § 
7B-1110(a):  Ivey’s age, her likelihood of adoption, her permanent plan, her bond with 
respondent-father, her relationship with her current caregivers, and other relevant 
considerations. The evidence showed that Ivey was adoptable and that her foster 
parents were interested in adopting her, that Ivey was bonded with her foster 
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parents, that Ivey did not have a bond with respondent-father, that Ivey lived in the 
foster home with a half-sister, and that the foster parents encouraged the paternal 
grandmother to bring Ivey’s half-brother to the foster home so that Ivey could visit 
with him. This evidence amply supported the trial court’s determination that 
termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in Ivey’s best interests. 
¶ 8 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, the trial court’s order terminating the 
parental rights of respondent-father is affirmed. 
AFFIRMED.