Title: Williams v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Clarence WILLIAMS v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-33                                           ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 9, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- double jeopardy rights require review of sufficiency
     challenge before review of trial errors. -- Appellant's double
     jeopardy rights required a review of a challenge to the
     sufficiency of the evidence before a review of trial errors.

2.   Motions -- directed verdict -- challenge to sufficiency of evidence. -- A
     motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the
     sufficiency of the evidence.

3.   Evidence -- challenge to sufficiency of -- factors on review. -- When a
     defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
     convicting him, the evidence is viewed in the light most
     favorable to the State; evidence, whether direct or
     circumstantial, is sufficient to support a conviction if the
     evidence is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to
     reach a conclusion one way or the other; only evidence
     supporting the verdict will be considered.

4.   Criminal law -- accomplice liability -- elements. -- Under Ark. Code
     Ann.  5-2-403 (Repl. 1993), an accomplice is one who, with
     the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an
     offense, either solicits, advises, encourages, or coerces
     another person to commit the offense, aids, agrees to aid, or
     attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing the
     offense, or, having a legal duty to prevent the offense, fails
     to make a proper effort to prevent the commission of the
     offense; one's status as an accomplice ordinarily is a mixed
     question of law and fact; one's presence at the crime scene or
     failure to inform law enforcement officers of a crime does not
     make one an accomplice as a matter of law.

5.   Criminal law -- accomplice liability -- sufficient proof that appellant
     assisted in crimes. -- The supreme court concluded that there was
     sufficient proof that appellant assisted in the commission of
     first-degree murder, kidnapping, and attempted first-degree
     murder where there was testimony that he drove the car to the
     river and led the truck to the location where the shootings
     took place; assisted in confining the two victims by opening
     the automobile trunk; and encouraged the shootings by urging
     two others to "waste 'em" because the victims had seen their
     faces; on the basis of the evidence, the jury could well have
     inferred that appellant made the statements and repeatedly
     played a rap song depicting a scenario of kidnapping people,
     putting them in a trunk, and murdering them while stealing
     their car.

6.   Criminal law -- accomplice liability -- sufficient corroborative proof
     offered by victim's testimony and appellant's statement. -- The supreme
     court concluded that the surviving victim's testimony and
     appellant's statement offered sufficient corroborative proof
     that appellant drove the car with the victims in the trunk,
     played the rap music, taunted the captives, and drove them to
     the river in full knowledge that two companions had guns and
     that an armed robbery had already been perpetrated.

7.   Evidence -- Ark. R. Evid. 806 not applicable -- credibility of appellant's
     first statement not attacked -- trial court did not abuse discretion in
     denying introduction of second statement. -- Where appellant argued
     that under Ark. R. Evid. 806, he should have been allowed to
     introduce a second, more expansive and more inculpatory
     statement, given to a deputy sheriff, to shore up his
     credibility, which was placed in issue by the introduction of
     the first statement, given to an FBI agent, the supreme court
     held that Rule 806 did not apply to the facts of the case;
     only if the defendant's credibility is attacked may his
     credibility be supported by other evidence; the credibility of
     a witness cannot be bolstered until that witness has been
     impeached; appellant did not specifically show where the State
     attacked the credibility of his first statement; an
     inconsistency between a witness's testimony and appellant's
     statement was not an attack on the credibility of appellant's
     statement; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
     disallowing the second statement.
8.   Evidence -- residual hearsay exception not applicable -- reliability of
     second statement questioned -- trial court did not err in excluding.  --
     Where appellant contended that the trial court erred in
     refusing to allow his second statement under the residual
     hearsay exception contained in Ark. R. Evid. 803(24), which
     provides that a statement should not be excluded as hearsay,
     even where the declarant is unavailable, when the statements
     are trustworthy and reliable, the supreme court questioned the
     reliability and trustworthiness of the second statement, as
     did the trial court, noting that appellant knew that a co-
     defendant had implicated him and that he had every reason to
     give a self-serving statement to minimize his participation in
     the crimes; there was no error by the trial court in this
     regard.

9.   Witnesses -- use immunity -- granting of discretionary with prosecutor. --
     The granting of immunity is not a constitutional right but
     merely one authorized by statute; it is within the
     prosecutor's discretion to grant immunity when it is in the
     public's interest; the reason for granting immunity is to aid
     in the prosecution of criminals by inducing witnesses to
     testify.

10.  Appeal & error -- appellant failed to adduce apposite authority or make
     convincing argument -- unclear whether appellant obtained ruling -- use
     immunity issue without merit. -- Where appellant failed to cite any
     criminal case law or statute in support of his argument that
     his constitutional rights were infringed, his failure to
     adduce apposite authority or otherwise to make a convincing
     argument was sufficient reason to affirm the trial court's
     ruling on the issue of use immunity; it was also unclear from
     the abstract whether appellant had obtained a definitive
     ruling from the trial court on this matter; the supreme court
     viewed his contention on use immunity to be without merit.

11.  Trial -- mistrial -- drastic remedy -- trial court's discretion. -- A
     mistrial is a drastic remedy that should be granted only where
     the error is so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by
     continuing the trial or where the fundamental fairness of the
     trial itself has been manifestly affected; the trial court is
     afforded broad discretion in making its ruling, and a mistrial
     will not be declared when the prejudice can be removed by an
     admonition to the jury. 

12.  Trial -- mistrial -- trial court did not abuse discretion in denying
     motion for mistrial. -- The supreme court held that the trial
     court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's
     motion for mistrial on the basis of juror bias where the judge
     questioned a juror who had hugged appellant's mother, and the
     juror responded that the relationship would not affect his
     objectivity; moreover, counsel for appellant conceded that the
     judge was "eloquent" in his questioning of the juror; further,
     appellant did not ask for curative relief by striking the
     juror and empaneling an alternate but instead insisted on a
     mistrial declaration.

13.  Jury -- instructions -- not error to refuse nonuniform instruction when
     uniform instruction accurately reflects law. -- It is not error to
     refuse to give a nonuniform instruction when a uniform
     instruction accurately reflects the law; the trial court did
     not err in refusing to give appellant's amended instruction
     concerning accomplice liability.


     Appeal from Mississippi Circuit Court; Samuel Turner, Judge;
affirmed.
     W. Ray Nickle, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Brad Newman, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Following a jury trial, appellant Clarence Williams was found
guilty of first-degree murder, kidnapping (2 counts), and attempted
first-degree murder.  He was sentenced to 20 years for first-degree
murder, 40 years for kidnapping, and 12 years for attempted first-
degree murder, with the sentences for kidnapping and attempted
first-degree murder to run consecutively.  The total term of
imprisonment meted out was 52 years.  He appeals on several
grounds, none of which has merit.  We affirm.
     The State's case at trial was essentially comprised of the
testimony of a co-defendant, William Hunt; a victim, Bradley Davis;
and the statement taken from Williams by William Kucik of the FBI. 
William Hunt, age 20, testified that on April 8, 1995, he was
riding with Antonio Britt and Scotty Hodges in a white Pontiac
Bonneville that belonged to a friend of Britt's.  The three men
drove to Forrest City and then to Osceola where they picked up
Clarence Williams.  The four men ranged in ages from late teens to
late twenties.  They were driving and drinking when they were
approached by two men (later identified as Bradley Davis and
Jonathan Hancock, who were approximately 19 at the time) in a white
truck in Blytheville.  Williams was driving the Pontiac.  One of
the men asked Williams if he had any crack cocaine for sale. 
Hodges yelled that he had some and directed the two men to pull
over into a parking lot.  After they did so, Hodges pulled a gun on
the two men and demanded their money.  Britt then jumped out of the
Pontiac and said that he wanted the truck.  Williams unlocked the
trunk of the Pontiac, and the two men were forced into the trunk.
     Williams drove off in the Pontiac with Hunt and Hodges, and
Britt followed in the pickup truck.  At some point, Britt pulled
over, and Hodges left Williams and joined Britt in the truck.  Hunt
remembered turning up the music at Williams's request, but he could
not remember if the title of the tape was "Lock 'em in the F***in'
Trunk."  He also could not remember if that song was played over
and over.  Williams led the way in the Pontiac down to the
Mississippi River.  Hunt testified that once they reached the
river, Williams unlocked the trunk and grabbed one of the men from
the Pontiac's trunk.  Britt grabbed the other captive.  Britt told
the men to take off their clothes.  At that point, Hunt testified
that Williams said: "You've got to kill them, they've seen our
face, you gotta waste 'em."  Hunt testified that he urged that they
not kill them.  Hodges then hit one of the victims in the head with
his gun, and it discharged, shooting the victim in the leg.  Hodges
then shot him a second time.  Hunt testified that following the
first shooting, he and Williams fled the scene on foot.
     Hunt told the jury that only Hodges and Britt had guns and
that both victims were sitting down and naked when the shooting
began.  Hunt said that he heard four more shots after he began
running.  Hunt ran back to Williams's house, which was about five
miles away, and a friend of Williams drove him to his home the next
afternoon.  He learned that the police were looking for him, and he
turned himself in.
     William J. Kucik works for the FBI in Chicago.  He was
informed by a Jonesboro FBI agent that a warrant had been obtained
against Williams for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution.  He
received an anonymous tip on Williams's location, and Williams was
found in an abandoned apartment building.  Williams initially told
the officers that his name was Willie Morris, and he had Illinois
identification to that effect.  Williams eventually admitted that
the name was false, and he gave a statement to Kucik while being
processed.  He told Kucik that he had come to Chicago three days
after the incident in Mississippi County.  He described to Kucik
how three men came to his home the evening of April 8, 1995.  The
four men then rode in Britt's car, bought alcohol, and returned to
Williams's home to drink.  They next drove to Blytheville, and
Britt showed Williams the liquor store that he had contemplated
robbing.  Williams told Britt that he did not want anything to do
with the robbery.  They next went to a friend's house and then to
a local nightclub in Blytheville.  They left the nightclub in
search of drugs but were unsuccessful.
     In his continued testimony, Kucik testified that Williams told
him a white truck flashed its lights at them.  The four men pulled
up next to the truck at a stop sign.  The passenger of the truck
rolled down his window and asked where he could purchase $40 worth
of crack cocaine.  Britt told the man to pull over in a church
parking lot.  He got out of the car and took the money from the
individuals.  One of the group not named by Williams said the
abducted men had more money, and this unnamed man and Britt forced
the two men into the trunk of the car at gunpoint.
     Williams told Kucik that he drove the white car and started
speeding toward Osceola, hoping that the police would catch them. 
He said that he twice pulled over in order to let the victims out
of the car but was told that nobody was leaving until they got to
the river.  Once at the river, Britt and the other man searched the
victims.  The other man was loudly playing a tape of a rap song
called "I gotta Bop 'em," and announced that he was not going to
leave any witnesses.  That man shot one of the victims in the head
at point-blank range.  The other victim tried to catch the victim
who was shot, and the man fired two or three more shots in the
vicinity of the victims.  Britt then pulled his gun and shot, but
his gun jammed.  The other assailant took the gun from Britt,
unjammed it, and shot at the victims four more times.  Williams
said he left the scene and drove the car halfway to the levee. 
Together with Hunt, he walked home through the woods because he was
afraid that he too would be shot.  Williams told Kucik that Hunt
slept at his house that night and caught a ride home the next day. 
Williams later learned that Hunt had told his mother what happened,
and she made him turn himself in to the police.  Williams then fled
to Chicago.
     The surviving victim, Bradley Davis, also took the stand for
the State.  Davis, who was 21 at the time of the trial, was living
in Gosnell with Jonathan Hancock on April 8, 1995.  He testified
that he and Hancock and two other friends were driving around in
one of the friend's white truck, drinking beer, and "using a little
drugs."  They returned to their house and smoked crack cocaine. 
Later, Davis and Hancock went to Blytheville in search of more
crack cocaine at about 1:00 a.m.  In Blytheville, Davis saw four
men at an intersection.  He testified that though he had had quite
a bit to drink, he remembered being taken from the truck at
gunpoint and put in the trunk of the car.  He handed one of the
gunmen his empty wallet and checkbook.  Before getting in the
trunk, Davis saw two men with pistols and the driver of the white
car, who got out to open the trunk.  He said a fourth person was in
the back seat of the Pontiac on the driver's side.
     Davis testified that they started driving, and periodically
the men in the Pontiac would ask Davis and Hancock if they were
ready to die.  The kidnappers also played a rap music tape and sang
with the music.  The rap music described what was happening to
Davis and Hancock in that the song depicted a scenario of
kidnapping people, putting them in a trunk, and murdering them
while stealing their car.  Davis testified that the car stopped
twice and that the radio was turned up so that they could not hear
the conversations.  The conversations sounded serious, he said, and
he occasionally heard laughter.  He testified that after the second
stop, the assailants played the same rap song repeatedly.
     Prior to the trunk's being opened at the river, Davis
remembered hearing a conversation that one of the guns was jammed
and that one assailant needed bullets.  When they were taken from
the car, he and Hancock said their goodbyes and were told to
undress.  Davis told the kidnappers that they could have the truck
and that he and Hancock would go on about their business.  He
stated that he and Hancock were told to lie down on their backs
naked.  Davis was then shot in the arm and rolled over.  He saw
Hancock get shot in the face, and he waited to be mortally wounded. 
Once the shooting ended, Davis could hear the attackers "getting a
kick out of it."  He next heard the truck drive off.
     Davis added that one of the four men did say before the
shooting that they should let Davis and Hancock go, and once he was
shot, Davis heard someone running off.  He stated he also thought
he heard another vehicle leave, but once he realized that he was
not dead and got up, the white car was still there.  He eventually
ran toward a light on the riverbank.  He woke the people in a
riverboat and had them call 911.  Davis was not able to identify
Williams as the driver of the Pontiac.
     Following the 911 call to the Blytheville Police Department,
Davis was found by the deputies wrapped in a blood-stained sheet. 
He had been shot in the head or neck, arm, and leg.  Dr. Peretti,
Associate Medical Examiner, testified that Hancock died of three
gunshot wounds, including two head wounds, and a blunt force head
injury.  He testified that one of the shots to the head was a
contact wound.
     The State rested its case, and Williams's counsel moved for a
directed verdict on several grounds, including insufficient proof
to make him an accomplice.  The trial court denied the motions.  In
Williams's case in chief, he attacked inconsistencies between
Davis's testimony and his various statements to law enforcement. 
Williams did not testify.  Defense counsel announced to the court
that he intended to introduce a second statement by Williams that
was given to Mississippi County Sheriff's Deputy Ed Guthrie.  The
court ruled that the statement was not admissible.  Williams was
convicted and sentenced.

                 I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
     We first address the sufficiency of the evidence because
Williams's double jeopardy rights require a review of a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence before a review of trial errors. 
Bradford v. State, 325 Ark. 278, 927 S.W.2d 329 (1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 583 (1996); Passley v. State, 323 Ark. 301, 915 S.W.2d 248 (1996).  A motion for directed verdict is treated as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.  Peeler v. State, 326
Ark. 423, 932 S.W.2d 312 (1996).  When a defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence convicting him, the evidence is viewed
in the light most favorable to the State.  Dixon v. State, 310 Ark.
460,