Title: State v. Wiskerchen

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 1 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1541-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Shawn T. Wiskerchen, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 379 Wis. 2d 367, 906 N.W.2d 183  
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 4, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 25, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Faye M. Flancher 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., concurs, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed). 
R.G. BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed and an oral argument by Jeremy A. Newman, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Sopen B. Shah, deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief 
were Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Misha Tseytlin, 
deputy solicitor general.  There was an oral argument by Sopen 
B. Shah. 
  
 
 
2019 WI 1
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP1541-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF742) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Shawn T. Wiskerchen, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 4, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   This is a review of 
an unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the 
circuit court's2 restitution order of $8,487.41 against Shawn T. 
Wiskerchen for losses caused by his burglary of a neighbor's 
residence.   
¶2 
Wiskerchen argues that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
calculating 
the 
amount 
of 
                                                 
1 State v. Wiskerchen, No. 2016AP1541-CR, unpublished slip 
op., (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2017). 
2 The Honorable Faye M. Flancher of Racine County presided. 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
2 
 
restitution.  He argues that the circuit court improperly 
considered alleged prior burglaries of the victim's home, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 973.20 (2015-16),3 which he contends 
limits restitution to losses resulting from a "crime considered 
at sentencing."  We reject his argument in part because 
Wiskerchen misreads what the circuit court decided, and also 
because no evidence was presented at the restitution hearing to 
support a finding that N.D.'s missing property was stolen on any 
date other than May 8, which was the burglary considered at 
sentencing.  
¶3 
First, we conclude that the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20 authorized the circuit court to order restitution 
to the victim in this case.  Second, we conclude that the 
circuit court's finding that the victim met her burden in 
proving the amount of loss resulting from a crime considered at 
sentencing was not clearly erroneous.  The circuit court 
therefore did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
ordering restitution of $8,487.41. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
On May 8, 2015, police responded to N.D.'s home after 
she reported a burglary.  N.D. was visibly upset, crying, 
shaking, and bleeding when the officers arrived.  She told the 
officers she had come home to find all her bathroom cabinets 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
3 
 
open, and had heard noises coming from upstairs.  She went 
upstairs and opened the back bedroom door to find Wiskerchen, 
her neighbor, in the bedroom.   
¶6 
When N.D. discovered that Wiskerchen was inside her 
home, she began yelling, and she and Wiskerchen began pushing 
each other.  During the ensuing struggle, N.D. reported that 
Wiskerchen grabbed her by the arm and threw her down the stairs 
before fleeing the home.  N.D. suffered injuries to her wrist, 
ankle, and shoulder as a result of this fall, and needed to wear 
a brace on her foot as a result of her injuries.  She had 
difficulty sleeping after the home invasion, and has stated that 
she no longer feels safe and secure in her home.  
¶7 
Shortly after arriving at N.D.'s home, police found 
Wiskerchen hiding in a neighbor's backyard.  They searched the 
backyard 
and 
found 
a 
pile 
of 
clothing 
matching 
N.D.'s 
description of what the suspect was wearing, as well as a badly 
bent screwdriver.  Wiskerchen was arrested and charged with 
misdemeanor battery, possession of burglarious tools, burglary 
of 
a 
building 
or 
dwelling, 
and 
second-degree 
recklessly 
endangering safety, all as a repeater.  He eventually pled no 
contest to the burglary charge without the repeater enhancer, 
and was sentenced to five years of initial confinement followed 
by four years of extended supervision.  
¶8 
Police initially had a difficult time discovering 
Wiskerchen's point of entry into N.D.'s home.  It turned out 
that he had drilled a hole into a basement storm window and had 
modified the window so it could be opened from the outside with 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
4 
 
a screwdriver.  N.D. told the presentence investigative report 
(PSI) writer that Wiskerchen may have chosen this particular 
window because it was not facing any neighbors.  An officer 
reported finding fresh sawdust in the grass beneath the storm 
window.  
¶9 
N.D. informed the PSI writer that she had discovered a 
"nest" in the back bedroom closet, where Wiskerchen had 
apparently pulled down clothes and arranged a place where he 
could hide.  She also found liquor bottles in the "nest."  This 
discovery caused N.D. to worry that he may have been hiding in 
her house on prior occasions while she was home, further eroding 
her sense of security.  According to the PSI writer, Wiskerchen 
bragged that he had previously burglarized "100 to 200 homes," 
and had made "more money than any judge or cop" by pawning his 
stolen items in Illinois.   
¶10 After the burglary of May 8, N.D. searched her home to 
take stock of potentially stolen items and collected whatever 
receipts she could find.  She then submitted an itemized 
insurance claim listing her total loss at $32,138.43.  N.D. 
explained that many of the stolen items had deep sentimental 
value to her.  These included her children's nearly 200-year-old 
baby rings from Germany, her grandmother's wedding ring that was 
purchased during the great depression, and a pair of earrings 
her brother had purchased for her in 1977 after taking on odd 
jobs so he could afford to buy her a high school graduation 
gift.  On cross-examination, N.D. said that prior to May 8, she 
did not notice that any of the items listed on her statement of 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
5 
 
loss were missing.  However, the PSI report relates that 
Wiskerchen disputed the number of items that N.D. claimed were 
stolen.     
¶11 At the contested restitution hearing, N.D. asked to be 
reimbursed $32,138.43, the value she placed on her stolen 
property.  The insurance company had depreciated the value of 
the stolen items to $22,279, and eventually paid her $13,791 due 
to her policy limits.  
¶12 N.D. testified that Wiskerchen was wearing a backpack 
on May 8.  However, Wiskerchen's attorney argued "there was no 
backpack that was reported, the only thing that could have been 
-– that he could have concealed, would have been on his person 
somehow or in his hands," implying that restitution must be 
limited to the items found on or near Wiskerchen's person on May 
8.  He also argued against the contention that Wiskerchen had 
previously burglarized N.D.'s home, stating that "other than 
[N.D.'s] opinion of whether he was in [her] house, there's been 
no other reports completed or done with the police department 
regarding any other times he was in [her] house."  This echoed 
his statements at sentencing that "I don't really think there's 
any evidence of [any prior entries]."  He argued that because 
N.D. did not know which items Wiskerchen stole during the May 8 
burglary 
versus 
during 
the 
alleged, 
unevidenced 
prior 
burglaries, Wis. Stat. § 973.20 limited restitution to the items 
she could prove he stole on May 8.  
¶13 The circuit court began by acknowledging that the 
burden of proof is on the victim to show, by a preponderance of 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
6 
 
the evidence, "the amount of loss sustained by a victim as a 
result of a crime considered at sentencing."  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(14)(a).  After reciting the relevant provisions of the 
restitution statute, including the correct statutory definition 
of "crime considered at sentencing," the circuit court made the 
following factual findings:  "[b]ased on the record, I find that 
there is a nexus between Mr. Wiskerchen's conduct and the 
victim's loss, and I find that the victim has met her burden of 
proof [in the amount of $8,487.41]."  
¶14 We granted Wiskerchen's petition for review and now 
affirm. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶15 This case requires us to interpret a statute, to 
review a circuit court's finding of fact, and to review a 
circuit court's discretionary restitution order.  
¶16 "Statutory interpretation and the application of a 
statute to a given set of facts are questions of law that we 
review independently, but benefiting from the analyses of the 
court of appeals and the circuit court."  Marder v. Bd. of 
Regents, 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110. 
¶17 We uphold a circuit court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of 
Wis. Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶34, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615.  A 
circuit court's finding of fact is not clearly erroneous unless 
it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
7 
 
evidence.  Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen's Mill, Inc., 2006 WI 
46, ¶12, 290 Wis. 2d 264, 714 N.W.2d 530. 
¶18 Restitution orders involve discretionary decisions of 
the circuit court.  State v. Fernandez, 2009 WI 29, ¶20, 316 
Wis. 2d 598, 764 N.W.2d 509.  "Reviewing the calculation of 
restitution involves a question of whether the trial court 
misused its discretionary authority."  Id.  This court may 
reverse a trial court's discretionary decision "only if the 
trial court applied the wrong legal standard or did not ground 
its decision on a logical interpretation of the facts."  State 
v. Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43, 58, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1996); 
Fernandez, 316 Wis. 2d 598, ¶20.  "We look for reasons to 
sustain a trial court's discretionary decision."  Farmers Auto. 
Ins. Ass'n v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 2009 WI 73, ¶32, 319 Wis. 2d 
52, 768 N.W.2d 596.  
B.  Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.20 
1.  Whether Wis. Stat. § 973.20 Authorized Restitution 
¶19 The first issue is whether Wisconsin's restitution 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 973.20, authorized the circuit court to 
order restitution to N.D. in this case.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 973.20 states in relevant part: 
(1g)(a) "Crime considered at sentencing" means any 
crime for which the defendant was convicted and any 
read-in crime. 
(b) "Read-in crime" means any crime that is 
uncharged or that is dismissed as part of a plea 
agreement, that the defendant agrees to be considered 
by the court at the time of sentencing and that the 
court 
considers 
at 
the 
time 
of 
sentencing 
the 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
8 
 
defendant for the crime for which the defendant was 
convicted.   
(1r) When imposing sentence or ordering probation 
for any crime . . . for which the defendant was 
convicted, the court . . . shall order the defendant 
to make full or partial restitution under this section 
to any victim of a crime . . . . 
(2) If a crime considered at sentencing resulted 
in damage to or loss or destruction of property, the 
restitution order may require that the defendant: 
. . . . 
(b) . . . pay the owner or owner's designee the 
reasonable repair or replacement cost or the greater 
of: 
1. The value of the property on the date of its 
damage, loss or destruction . . .  
. . . . 
(14)(a) The 
burden 
of 
demonstrating 
by 
the 
preponderance of the evidence the amount of loss 
sustained by a victim as a result of a crime 
considered at sentencing is on the victim. 
¶20 Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  State ex. rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning.  Id.  "If the words chosen for the statute exhibit a 
'plain, clear statutory meaning,' without ambiguity, the statute 
is applied according to the plain meaning of the statutory 
terms."  State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 
N.W.2d 769 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46). 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
9 
 
¶21 "Statutory purpose is important in discerning the 
plain meaning of a statute."  Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., 
2018 WI 12, ¶19, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68 (citing Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48).  "[S]tatutory language is interpreted in 
the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of 
a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Therefore, 
in construing a statute, "we favor a construction that fulfills 
the purpose of the statute over one that defeats statutory 
purpose."  Westmas, 379 Wis. 2d 471, ¶19. 
¶22 The primary purpose of Wis. Stat. § 973.20 is to 
compensate the victim.  State v. Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d 324, 332, 
602 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1999).  The statute "reflects a strong 
equitable public policy that victims should not have to bear the 
burden of losses if the defendant is capable of making 
restitution."4  State v. Canady, 2000 WI App 87, ¶8, 234 Wis. 2d 
261, 610 N.W.2d 147 (citations omitted).  For this reason, 
Wisconsin courts have repeatedly held that "restitution is the 
rule and not the exception," and "should be ordered whenever 
warranted."  Id. (quoting Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d at 333).  In 
light of this important public policy, courts should "construe 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin's strong public policy of supporting victims' 
rights is further reflected in Wis. Stat. ch. 950, which 
contains a bill of rights for victims and ensures that all crime 
victims are "treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and 
sensitivity."  
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
10 
 
the restitution statute 'broadly and liberally in order to allow 
victims to recover their losses as a result of a defendant's 
criminal conduct.'"  Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d at 332 (quoting State 
v. Anderson, 215 Wis. 2d 673, 682, 573 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 
1997)).  We interpret the restitution statute with these 
principles in mind. 
¶23 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 973.20(1r) 
requires 
that 
the 
sentencing court order the defendant to pay restitution to any 
victim of a crime considered at sentencing, unless the court 
"finds substantial reason not to do so and states the reason on 
the record."  If "a crime considered at sentencing" resulted in 
a loss of property, courts are authorized to pay the victim 
either the replacement cost or the property's value.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(2)(b). 
¶24 A "crime considered at sentencing" means the crime of 
conviction and any read-in crime.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(a).  
A "read-in crime" is a crime that meets three criteria:  (1) is 
uncharged or is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, (2) the 
defendant agrees that it will be considered at sentencing, and 
(3) the 
court 
considers 
it 
at 
the 
time 
of 
sentencing.  
§ 973.20(1g)(b). 
¶25 At a restitution hearing, the victim has the burden of 
proving the amount of loss she sustained as a result of a crime 
considered at sentencing.  Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(a).  In 
keeping with Wisconsin's strong public policy of compensating 
victims, Wisconsin courts have interpreted "crime considered at 
sentencing" quite broadly.  The crime encompasses "all facts and 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
11 
 
reasonable 
inferences 
concerning 
the 
defendant's 
activity 
related to the 'crime' for which the defendant was convicted, 
not just those facts necessary to support the elements of the 
specific charge of which the defendant was convicted."  Canady, 
234 Wis. 2d 261, ¶10 (quoting Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d at 333).  The 
victim needs to show that there is a "causal nexus" between the 
crime and the victim's losses, such that the defendant's 
criminal activity was a "substantial factor" in causing the 
losses.  Canady, 234 Wis. 2d 261, ¶9.  The court considers the 
defendant's "entire course of conduct" in committing the crime 
of conviction, not merely the facts necessary to support the 
conviction.  Id., ¶10 (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 205 Wis. 2d 
620, 627, 556 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
¶26 Canady demonstrated the breadth of "crime considered 
at sentencing."  In that case, Canady "put forth quite a 
struggle" when police attempted to arrest him for burglary.  
Canady, 234 Wis. 2d 261, ¶11.  As the officers struggled to 
escort him to the ground, he attempted to grab a pry bar from 
his pocket.  Id.  An officer tossed it out of his reach, 
breaking a glass door behind him.  Id.  Canady was convicted of 
burglary and resisting arrest.  Id., ¶3.  The circuit court 
ordered Canady to pay restitution for the cost of repairing the 
broken door, and the court of appeals affirmed.  Id., ¶12.  Even 
though Canady did not break the door himself, and even though 
this fact was not strictly necessary to convict him of resisting 
arrest, his conduct in committing the crime of conviction was a 
"substantial factor" in causing the damage.  Id. 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
12 
 
¶27 In this case, Wiskerchen was convicted of burglarizing 
N.D.'s home on May 8.  This burglary was a "crime considered at 
sentencing" under Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(a), as it was a crime 
for which the defendant was convicted.  N.D. was the victim of 
the May 8 burglary, as it was her home that was burglarized, so 
she was a victim of a "crime considered at sentencing." 
Therefore, Wis. Stat. § 973.20 authorized the circuit court to 
order Wiskerchen to pay restitution to N.D.  
¶28 Finally, we note that any potential prior burglaries 
were not "read-in crimes."  As mentioned above, one component of 
a read-in crime under Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(b) is that the 
defendant 
agrees 
to 
have 
it 
considered 
at 
sentencing.  
Wiskerchen did not agree to have any potential prior burglaries 
considered at sentencing.  Therefore, they are not read-in 
crimes. 
2.  Restitution Amount 
¶29 We next review the circuit court's finding of fact 
that the victim met her burden of proving a loss of $8,487.41 as 
a result of a crime considered at sentencing.  We conclude that 
although the circuit court did not itemize which stolen items 
were included in the award of $8,487.41, the finding of fact 
that N.D. proved her loss is not clearly erroneous. 
¶30 As noted above, a circuit court's finding of fact is 
not clearly erroneous unless it is against the great weight and 
clear preponderance of the evidence, even if the evidence may 
have presented competing factual inferences.  See Phelps, 319 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶39.  Findings of fact will be affirmed on appeal as 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
13 
 
long as the evidence would permit a reasonable person to make 
the same finding.  Royster-Clark, Inc., 290 Wis. 2d 264, ¶12.  
We search the record not for evidence opposing the circuit 
court's decision, but for evidence supporting it.  Id.  
¶31 In 
this 
case, 
the 
evidence 
presented 
at 
the 
restitution hearing would permit a reasonable person to find 
that N.D. had met her burden to prove "the amount of loss 
sustained."  First, evidence was presented that numerous items 
were stolen from N.D.'s home.  N.D. presented an itemized list 
of missing property that she had submitted to her insurance 
company.  She testified that this document was a "true and 
accurate representation" of the items she found missing after 
the burglary.  There was no evidence presented at the 
restitution hearing to rebut N.D.'s claim.  
¶32 Second, we know Wiskerchen burglarized N.D.'s home on 
May 8.  He pled guilty to this burglary, which was by definition 
a "crime considered at sentencing" pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.20(1g)(a). 
¶33 Third, there was no evidence presented that any of the 
items comprising the amount for which restitution was ordered 
were stolen from N.D.'s home on any date other than May 8.  Only 
Wiskerchen's mother's hearsay statement relayed by N.D. that he 
had been in and out of her house prior to May 8 implied there 
could have been other thefts.5   
                                                 
5 Wiskerchen's mother did not testify at the restitution 
hearing. 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
14 
 
¶34 Next, the "nest" in the bedroom closet could be 
evidence that Wiskerchen may have burglarized N.D.'s home on 
days other than May 8.  However, he also could have hidden there 
and drank liquor on prior occasions, without stealing any of the 
property that N.D. discovered was missing after the May 8 
burglary.     
¶35 Crucially, there was no evidence presented at the 
restitution hearing that either he or anyone else had stolen any 
of the listed items from N.D.'s home on days other than May 8.  
On the contrary, his attorney asked N.D. the following question 
at the restitution hearing:  "other than your opinion of whether 
he was in your house, there's been no other reports completed or 
done with the police department regarding any other times he was 
in your house, correct?"  Shortly thereafter, he asked her:  
"May 8 is the only report that he was in your house, correct?"  
N.D. answered both questions in the affirmative.  Wiskerchen's 
attorney had previously stated at the sentencing hearing that "I 
don't 
think 
there's 
really 
any 
evidence 
of 
[any 
prior 
burglaries]."  
¶36 The consistent theme from the defense was that there 
was no evidence Wiskerchen burglarized N.D.'s home before May 8. 
That said, the finding that N.D. proved a loss in the amount of 
$8,487.41 for which restitution was ordered due to stolen 
property is not against the great weight and clear preponderance 
of the evidence presented to the circuit court.  Therefore, the 
circuit court's finding that N.D. met her burden of proving a 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
15 
 
loss of $8,487.41 as a result of a crime considered at 
sentencing is not clearly erroneous. 
C.  The Circuit Court's Exercise of Discretion 
¶37 Having concluded that restitution was authorized and 
that the circuit court's finding that the victim had met her 
burden of proof was not clearly erroneous, we now review the 
circuit court's discretionary decision to set restitution at 
$8,487.41.  As mentioned above, restitution orders involve 
discretionary decisions of the circuit court.  We may reverse a 
circuit court's discretionary decision "only if the trial court 
applied the wrong legal standard or did not ground its decision 
on a logical interpretation of the facts."  Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 
at 58; Fernandez, 316 Wis. 2d 598, ¶20.  We look for reasons to 
sustain a trial court's discretionary decision.  Farmers Auto. 
Ins. Ass'n, 319 Wis. 2d 52, ¶32. 
¶38 In this case, the circuit court applied the correct 
legal 
standard 
and 
grounded 
its 
decision 
on 
a 
logical 
interpretation of the facts.  The court applied the mandate of 
Wis. Stat. § 973.20 and found that N.D. suffered a loss due to 
Wiskerchen's conduct.  The court knew that Wiskerchen had 
burglarized N.D.'s home on May 8, and no evidence was introduced 
that he or anyone else had stolen N.D.'s property on any other 
date.  Given that this was the evidence presented, the finding 
that Wiskerchen was responsible for N.D.'s loss based on the May 
8 burglary is a logical interpretation of the evidence.   
¶39 Wiskerchen 
contends 
that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals' 
decision applied the wrong law, erroneously considering possible 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
16 
 
prior burglaries in its restitution award.  According to the 
court of appeals, any prior burglaries of N.D.'s home were 
proper subjects of consideration under Wis. Stat. § 973.20, as 
they were part of the same "course of criminal conduct" as the 
May 8 burglary.  State v. Wiskerchen, No. 2016AP1541-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶13 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2017). 
¶40 The court of appeals relied heavily on State v. 
Queever, 2016 WI App 87, 372 Wis. 2d 388, 887 N.W.2d 912, in 
reaching its conclusion.  However, Queever is distinguishable.  
There, a woman suspected that her home was being burglarized 
repeatedly.  Id., ¶3.  She watched her home's security camera 
footage and saw a man with "longer hair and a larger body build" 
entering her home.  Id.  The footage was not clear enough to 
identify the suspect, so she purchased a new security system for 
$2,495.  Id., ¶¶6-8.  The new system was then used to identify 
and capture the suspect, Thomas Queever.  Id., ¶6. 
¶41 The circuit court awarded restitution for the cost of 
the new security system, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
Id., ¶1.  The court held that the circuit court's finding that 
Queever committed the previous burglaries was not clearly 
erroneous, and that the previous burglaries were properly 
considered under Wis. Stat. § 973.20 as "part of the same course 
of conduct as the crime of conviction."  Id., ¶¶16, 25.  
¶42 Relying on Queever, the court of appeals in the case 
now before us held that Wiskerchen's alleged prior burglaries of 
N.D.'s home properly could be considered at Wiskerchen's 
restitution hearing as part of a "single course of criminal 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
17 
 
conduct" related to the May 8 burglary.  Wiskerchen, unpublished 
slip op., ¶13.  
¶43 We reject Wiskerchen's argument.  We review the 
circuit court's exercise of discretion, not the court of 
appeals' reasoning.  See Fernandez, 316 Wis. 2d 598, ¶20.  That 
said, we read the circuit court's decision a bit differently 
than did the court of appeals.   
¶44 The court of appeals assumed the restitution order 
implied that "[t]he circuit court determined that it could 
consider the prior burglaries as conduct related to Wiskerchen's 
May 8 burglary."  Wiskerchen, unpublished slip op., ¶5.  We do 
not read the circuit court's restitution order or the transcript 
from the restitution hearing as necessarily implying this 
conclusion of law.  The circuit court explicitly found only that 
"based on the record . . . the victim has met her burden of 
proof."  Her burden was to prove the amount of her loss.  Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(14)(a).  She proved a loss of $8,487.41.  As 
explained above, this finding of fact is not clearly erroneous.  
We conclude that the circuit court did not apply the wrong law, 
and that its decision was grounded on a logical interpretation 
of the evidence that was presented at the restitution hearing.  
The circuit court therefore did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion by setting restitution at $8,487.41. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶45 Wiskerchen argues that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
calculating 
the 
amount 
of 
restitution.  He argues that the circuit court improperly 
No. 
2016AP1541-CR   
 
18 
 
considered alleged prior burglaries of the victim's home, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 973.20 which he contends limits 
restitution to losses resulting from a "crime considered at 
sentencing."  We reject his argument in part because Wiskerchen 
misreads what the circuit court decided and also because no 
evidence was presented at the restitution hearing to support a 
finding that N.D.'s missing property was stolen on any date 
other than May 8, which was the burglary considered at 
sentencing. 
¶46 First, we conclude that the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20 authorized the circuit court to order restitution 
to the victim in this case.  Second, we conclude that the 
circuit court's finding that the victim met her burden in 
proving the amount of loss resulting from a crime considered at 
sentencing was not clearly erroneous.  The circuit court 
therefore 
did 
not 
misuse 
its 
discretion 
in 
calculating 
restitution at $8,487.41. 
¶47 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
No.  2016AP1541-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶48 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Although I 
agree with the majority's conclusion that N.D. is entitled to 
recover restitution in the amount of $8,487.41, I do not join 
its analysis.  I part ways with the majority because it misreads 
the record and anchors its analysis on a skewed focus of the 
circuit court's factual findings. 
¶49 The majority misreads the record by asserting that 
"there was no evidence presented that any of the items 
comprising the amount for which restitution was ordered were 
stolen from N.D.'s home on any date other than May 8."  See 
majority op., ¶33. 
¶50 Neither the State nor Wiskerchen argued in support of 
the majority's view of the record.  Likewise, neither the 
circuit court nor the court of appeals subscribed to such an 
approach. 
¶51 Rather, the testimony in the circuit court supports a 
contrary assertion, i.e., some of the property likely was stolen 
on dates prior to May 8.  Accordingly, the circuit court found 
"that there is a nexus between Mr. Wiskerchen's conduct and the 
victim's loss, and I find that the victim has met her burden of 
proof." 
¶52 With the actual facts of record and complete circuit 
court finding in hand, I would affirm the court of appeals.  
Relying on our prior case law, I conclude that where a circuit 
court makes specific factual findings regarding uncharged 
conduct that is "related to" the crime of conviction, and there 
is a causal nexus between the conduct and the loss, restitution 
No.  2016AP1541-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
is 
permissible 
for 
uncharged 
conduct. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully concur. 
I 
¶53 The circuit court determined that N.D. was entitled to 
restitution.  It arrived at this determination by explicitly 
referencing Wiskerchen's alleged prior burglaries, how he had 
been in the victim's home many times, and that he built a "nest" 
in 
her 
closet. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
further 
referenced 
Wiskerchen's practice of pawning stolen goods in Illinois.  From 
this evidence, the circuit court actually found "that there is a 
nexus between Mr. Wiskerchen's conduct and the victim's loss, 
and I find that the victim has met her burden of proof" 
(emphasis added). 
¶54 The majority focuses on the second half of the circuit 
court's statement while ignoring the first.  It criticizes 
Wiskerchen for "misread[ing] what the circuit court decided" and 
concludes that "no evidence was presented at the restitution 
hearing to support a finding that N.D.'s missing property was 
stolen on any date other than May 8, which was the burglary 
considered at sentencing."  Majority op., ¶2. 
II 
¶55 Such an assertion is backwards.  It is the majority, 
and not Wiskerchen, that "misreads what the circuit court 
decided." 
¶56 A finding that all of the stolen property was taken on 
May 8 is contrary to the evidence in this record.  There was 
testimony that Wiskerchen used a chisel to gain access to N.D.'s 
No.  2016AP1541-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
home through a storm window and that he repeatedly entered and 
exited in such a fashion.  The record reflects that N.D. claimed 
the loss of over 100 items, including a video game system, 
several coats, a case of wine, dishes, a microwave, a crockpot, 
and a printer.  Further, the record reflects that Wiskerchen was 
carrying only a backpack during the course of the May 8 
burglary.  When asked if Wiskerchen could have fit all of the 
lost items in his backpack, N.D. responded, "Not on that day.  
It was many days that he was in my house." 
¶57 Neither Wiskerchen nor the State argued that every 
item was stolen on May 8.  From the testimony, the circuit court 
understandably determined that there was a nexus between 
Wiskerchen's prior conduct and the May 8 burglary and ordered 
restitution accordingly. 
¶58 Rather 
than 
embrace 
the 
factual 
and 
analytical 
missteps of the majority, I would affirm the court of appeals 
based on restitution principles and statutory interpretation 
gleaned from prior case law. 
¶59 Restitution is governed by Wis. Stat. § 973.20.  
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.20(2)(b), "[i]f a crime considered 
at sentencing resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property, 
the 
restitution 
order 
may 
require 
that 
the 
defendant . . . pay the owner or owner's designee the reasonable 
repair or replacement cost" of the property lost.  A "crime 
considered at sentencing" is defined by statute as "any crime 
for which the defendant was convicted and any read-in crime."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(a). 
No.  2016AP1541-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶60 We are to interpret the restitution statute "broadly 
and liberally in order to allow victims to recover their losses 
as a result of a defendant's criminal conduct."  State v. 
Gibson, 2012 WI App 103, ¶10, 344 Wis. 2d 220, 822 N.W.2d 500.  
The restitution statute "reflects a strong equitable public 
policy that victims should not have to bear the burden of losses 
if the defendant is capable of making restitution."  State v. 
Kennedy, 190 Wis. 2d 252, 258, 528 N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1994). 
¶61 In 
State 
v. 
Rodriguez, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
established that a sentencing court is to take into account "a 
defendant's entire course of conduct" in determining an award of 
restitution.  205 Wis. 2d 620, 627, 556 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 
1996).  Accordingly, we broadly define what constitutes a "crime 
considered at sentencing" for which restitution may be ordered.  
See Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1g)(a); State v. Canady, 2000 WI App 87, 
¶10, 234 Wis. 2d 261, 610 N.W.2d 147. 
¶62 The term "crime" "as used in the restitution statute 
is properly understood as 'encompassing all facts and reasonable 
inferences concerning the defendant's activity related to the 
"crime" for which the defendant was convicted, not just those 
facts necessary to support the elements of the specific charge 
of which the defendant was convicted.'"  State v. Madlock, 230 
Wis. 2d 324, 333, 602 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1999).  Before 
restitution may be ordered, a causal nexus must be established 
between the "crime considered at sentencing" and the damage for 
which restitution is ordered.  Canady, 234 Wis. 2d 261, ¶9.  In 
proving 
causation, 
the 
victim 
must 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
No.  2016AP1541-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
defendant's criminal activity was a substantial factor in 
causing the damage.  Id. 
¶63 Relying on our prior case law, I conclude that where a 
circuit 
court 
makes 
specific 
factual 
findings 
regarding 
uncharged conduct that is "related to" the crime of conviction, 
and there is a causal nexus between the conduct and the loss, 
restitution 
is 
permissible 
for 
uncharged 
conduct. 
 
See 
Rodriguez, 205 Wis. 2d at 627; Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d at 333; 
Canady, 234 Wis. 2d 261, ¶9.  The requirement of specific 
factual findings serves a dual purpose.  First, it provides a 
safeguard to defendants so as to not hold them financially 
responsible for losses that may have occurred to victims not as 
a result of the defendants' conduct.  Second, it avoids an 
unreasonable result that would leave a crime victim with no 
restitution for the sole reason that the victim is unable to 
prove which items were taken on any specific day.  See State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (explaining that statutory language 
is 
to 
be 
interpreted 
"reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results"). 
¶64 Here, the circuit court made such specific factual 
findings.  Citing the presentence investigation report, the 
circuit court found that: 
 "[Wiskerchen] stated that he had burglarized between 
one hundred to two hundred homes and had never been 
caught." 
No.  2016AP1541-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
 "He further told the PSI writer that he would take the 
items that he stole to the state of Illinois where he 
knew a guy who would pawn the stolen goods and would 
not ask for identification." 
 "[The victim] told the PSI writer how Mr. Wiskerchen's 
mother told her how the defendant had been in her home 
many times prior to actually being caught." 
 "[The victim] also reported to the PSI writer how she 
had discovered that the defendant made what she 
referred to as a nest in the back of her closet where 
she discovered liquor bottles, and it appeared that he 
had 
hid 
out 
during 
the 
day 
when 
she 
was 
at 
work . . . ." 
 "Based on the record, I find that there is a nexus 
between Mr. Wiskerchen's conduct and the victim's 
loss . . . ." 
¶65 These factual findings describe a course of conduct 
that is "related to" the May 8 burglary.  The course of conduct 
described is "related to" the May 8 burglary because it involves 
the same house where Wiskerchen created a "nest" in the closet 
and appeared to hide out during the day, the same victim, and 
the same mode of entry.  See State v. Queever, 2016 WI App 87, 
¶22, 372 Wis. 2d 388, 887 N.W.2d 912.  Consequently, in my view 
restitution is appropriate. 
¶66 In sum, I agree with the majority that N.D. is 
entitled to $8,487.41 in restitution.  However, I do not join 
the majority's reasoning because it misreads the record and 
No.  2016AP1541-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
bases its analysis on a skewed focus of the circuit court's 
findings of fact.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2016AP1541.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶68 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Like the 
majority, I would affirm the court of appeals decision affirming 
the circuit court's restitution order.  I join the majority 
opinion in full but I write separately because a textual 
interpretation of the restitution statute, specifically Wis. 
Stat. § 973.20(1r) and (13)(a), supports the circuit court's 
decision. 
I 
¶69 The interpretation and application of a statute begin 
with the language of the statute.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 
110. 
 
Because 
"[c]ontext 
is 
important 
to 
meaning . . . statutory language is interpreted in the context 
in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id., ¶46 (citations omitted).  "Statutory language is 
read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in 
order to avoid surplusage."  Id. 
¶70 The text of Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r) interpreted in the 
context of the surrounding sections of the restitution statute 
shows that subsection (1r) does not constrain the circuit court 
to the crime considered at sentencing when ordering restitution.  
Subsection (1r) requires the circuit court to order the 
defendant to make restitution to any victim of a crime 
considered at sentencing:  "the court . . . shall order the 
defendant to make full or partial restitution . . . to any 
No.  2016AP1541.rgb 
 
2 
 
victim of a crime considered at sentencing[.]"  Subsection (1r), 
unlike several of the other statutory subsections addressing 
restitution, does not restrict the circuit court's order of 
restitution to only crimes considered at sentencing nor does it 
limit the court to ordering restitution for only those losses 
incurred as a result of a crime considered at sentencing.  
Instead, it requires the circuit court to award restitution to 
any victim of a crime considered at sentencing, thereby 
establishing the category of persons to whom the defendant must 
be ordered to pay restitution. 
¶71 In contrast to the text of subsection (1r), the 
language of subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5) imposes limits on 
the 
particular 
types 
of 
restitution 
addressed——namely, 
restitution under these subsections is confined to losses 
arising from the crime considered at sentencing.  For example, 
subsection (3) allows the court to order the defendant to 
"[r]eimburse the injured person for income lost as a result of a 
crime considered at sentencing."  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, 
subsection (5) permits the circuit court to require the 
defendant to "[p]ay all special damages . . . which could be 
recovered 
in 
a 
civil 
action 
against 
the 
defendant 
for 
his . . . conduct in the commission of a crime considered at 
sentencing."  Subsection (1r) is phrased quite differently; it 
simply identifies the group of people to whom the defendant must 
be ordered to pay restitution:  "any victim of a crime 
considered at sentencing."  If the legislature intended to 
confine the scope of restitution orders to losses incurred as a 
No.  2016AP1541.rgb 
 
3 
 
result of a crime considered at sentencing, it certainly could 
have done so by employing the exact language it wrote in 
subsections addressing particular types of losses sustained by 
victims.  Instead, it afforded courts much flexibility in 
crafting restitution orders, so long as restitution is ordered 
to be paid to any victim of a crime considered at sentencing. 
¶72 Additionally, Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(13)(a) directs 
the circuit court to consider five factors in determining 
whether to order restitution and in what amount:   
 1.  The amount of loss suffered by any victim as a 
result of a crime considered at sentencing.   
 2.  The financial resources of the defendant. 
 3.  The present and future earning ability of the 
defendant. 
 4.  The needs and earning ability of the defendant's 
dependents. 
 5. 
 
Any 
other 
factors 
which 
the 
court 
deems 
appropriate. 
The statute specifically requires the circuit court to consider 
the loss suffered by the victim as a result of a crime 
considered at sentencing.  But the statute does not restrict the 
circuit court to ordering restitution only for that loss.  
Subdivision 5 grants to the circuit court the discretion to 
consider 
"[a]ny 
other 
factors" 
the 
circuit 
court 
deems 
appropriate.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶73 Many cases do not involve a defendant's commission of 
repeated crimes against the same victim causing losses with 
potentially unidentifiable dates such as the possible serial 
burglaries in this case, so we address a relatively infrequent 
No.  2016AP1541.rgb 
 
4 
 
if not rare situation perhaps not contemplated by the statutes, 
and one that the legislature may wish to address with more 
specificity.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.20(13)(a)5 gives the circuit 
court great latitude to consider among "other factors" the 
difficulty (if not impossibility) of establishing May 8th as the 
one and only date on which the defendant burglarized the 
victim's home.  While the circuit court must consider the amount 
of loss suffered by the victim as a result of a crime considered 
at sentencing, the circuit court is free to consider any other 
factors the court deems appropriate. 
¶74 Subsection (14) also uses the language "as a result of 
a crime considered at sentencing" in designating the burden of 
proof:   
 (a)  The burden of demonstrating by the preponderance 
of the evidence the amount of loss sustained by a 
victim as a result of a crime considered at sentencing 
is on the victim. 
  . . .  
 (c) The burden of demonstrating, by the preponderance 
of the evidence, such other matters as the court deems 
appropriate is on the party designated by the court, 
as justice requires. 
There is nothing in the statutes requiring the victim to 
identify the date on which her losses were sustained; she must 
only establish by a preponderance of the evidence the loss she 
suffered as a result of a crime considered at sentencing and the 
circuit court's conclusion that she met that burden is not 
clearly erroneous.  Her home was burglarized on May 8th, she 
presented documentation of items that were missing after that 
burglary, and nothing contradicted her evidence. 
No.  2016AP1541.rgb 
 
5 
 
¶75 The 
legislature 
used 
"as 
a 
result 
of 
a 
crime 
considered at sentencing" or similar language tying a victim's 
recovery of particular losses to the crime considered at 
sentencing in certain sections of the restitution statute, but 
not in a way that restricts the circuit court to awarding 
restitution only for losses sustained "as a result of a crime 
considered at sentencing."  In other sections of the statute, 
the legislature did not limit restitution to only those losses 
arising "as a result of a crime considered at sentencing."  Most 
significantly, in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(1r), the legislature 
mandated an order of restitution to be paid by the defendant "to 
any victim of a crime considered at sentencing."  The 
legislature did not command an order of restitution to be paid 
by the defendant for a crime considered at sentencing or as a 
result of a crime considered at sentencing.  Where a statute 
"used one term in one place, and a materially different term in 
another, the presumption is that the different term denotes a 
different idea."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012); Johnson v. City of 
Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 343, 351, 558 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996) 
("When the legislature uses different terms in a statute——
particularly in the same section——we presume it intended the 
terms to have distinct meanings.").  Because the legislature 
used different language in separate sections of the restitution 
statute, we presume distinct meanings and give full effect to 
the language chosen. 
No.  2016AP1541.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶76 Because the text of the restitution statute fully 
supports the circuit court's restitution award, I join the 
majority opinion in affirming the court of appeals decision 
affirming the circuit court's order. 
 
 
 
No.  2016AP1541.rgb 
 
 
 
1