Title: In re Berk

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-542


In re Frank Berk                             Supreme Court

                                             Original Jurisdiction


                                             September Term, 1991


Wendy S. Collins, Bar Counsel, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

P. Scott McGee of Hershenson, Carter, Scott & McGee, Norwich, for
  defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     PER CURIAM.   Attorney Frank Berk appeals from a Professional Conduct
Board ("PCB") conclusion that he violated two provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in conduct involving
moral turpitude) and DR 1-102(A)(7) (engaging in conduct that adversely
reflects on fitness to practice law) and from the board's recommendation
that he be suspended from the practice of law for six months.  We affirm the
board's conclusions and accept its recommendation on sanctions.
     At the time of the relevant events, appellant had been an attorney in
this state for thirteen years and was a senior partner in a law firm.  In
May 1988, he was arrested in New Jersey in the process of purchasing between
six and seven grams of cocaine, which he intended to share with an associate
in his law firm.  He was charged with attempted possession of cocaine but,
after he successfully completed a pretrial diversion program, the charges
were dismissed.
     This incident triggered the filing of the PCB complaint.  The subse-
quent investigation revealed that appellant had completed at least three
similar drug purchases in the prior seven months.  Each purchase was made
from the same friend who lived in New Jersey.  The locations of the drug
purchases varied:  sometimes the friend travelled to Vermont, sometimes
appellant travelled to New Jersey.  On each occasion, appellant collected
money from other friends to buy the drugs and after the purchase shared the
drugs with them.  In the course of the May 1988 drug transaction, appellant
met with his cocaine supplier, who had been arrested on drug charges and
who sought his legal advice.  Appellant told the dealer that he could not
represent him because he was not licensed to practice law in New Jersey, but
he discussed his case in general terms.
     Appellant does not contest the board's findings.  Rather, he argues
that the facts do not support the board's conclusions that he engaged in
conduct involving moral turpitude and adversely affecting his fitness to
practice law.
     The parties raise two preliminary issues:  (1) what standard of review
applies to PCB conclusions and dispositions, and (2) whether the PCB's
conclusions concerning professional misconduct are limited in scope by the
formal charge against him.
                          I.  Standard of Review
     PCB decisions are appealable to this Court under Rule 8(E) of the
Permanent Rules Governing Establishment of Professional Conduct Board and
Its Operation ("Permanent Rules"), A.O. 9.  The same rule provides that the
board's findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."
Id.  The rules do not, however, provide standards of review for the board's
conclusions (mixed findings of fact and law) or its recommendations on
sanctions.
     Prior to the adoption of the rewritten Administrative Order 9
(effective July 1, 1991), the PCB's findings, whether purely factual or
mixed legal and factual, were upheld if they were "'clearly and reasonably
supported by the evidence.'"  In re Rosenfeld, No. 89-513 (Vt. Nov. 1,
1991), slip op. at 6 (quoting In re Wright, 131 Vt. 473, 490,