Title: Town of Lebanon v. East Lebanon Auto Sales, L.L.C.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME 78 
Docket: 
Yor-10-506 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
June 1, 2011 
Decided: 
July 12, 2011 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
TOWN OF LEBANON 
 
v. 
 
EAST LEBANON AUTO SALES LLC, et al. 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  East Lebanon Auto Sales LLC (the LLC) and Linda M. Corbin appeal 
from a judgment of the District Court (Springvale, Fritzsche, J.) entered in favor of 
the Town of Lebanon on the Town’s complaint alleging violations of the junkyard 
and automobile graveyards statute, 30-A M.R.S. §§ 3751-3760 (2010).  Corbin and 
the LLC assert that the court erred in failing to dismiss the complaint for technical 
noncompliance with M.R. Civ. P. 80K and in issuing a judgment against Corbin 
individually, and that the court’s judgment is not supported by the evidence.  We 
vacate the judgment as to Corbin individually, and affirm in all other respects. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  In December of 2009, the Town of Lebanon filed a land use complaint 
against the LLC, Corbin, and Almond J. Cote1 alleging that property owned by the 
LLC in Lebanon constituted an illegal automobile graveyard and illegal junkyard, 
and that the property had an improper subsurface wastewater system.2 
See 30-A M.R.S. §§ 3752(1), (4), 3753; M.R. Civ. P. 80K. 
 
[¶3]  The following evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Town, was established at trial.  See Dowling v. Bangor Hous. Auth., 2006 ME 136, 
¶ 22, 910 A.2d 376, 384.  The LLC owns the Lebanon property, on which another 
business, Lucky Day Auto LLC, operates.  Corbin is the sole member of both the 
LLC and Lucky Day.  
                                         
1  The court later dismissed the complaint as against Cote, whom Corbin states in her brief is her 
brother and a former member of the LLC; Cote is not a party to this appeal.  
 
2  “A person may not establish, operate or maintain an automobile graveyard . . . or junkyard without 
first obtaining a nontransferable permit from the municipal officers of the municipality in which the 
automobile graveyard . . . or junkyard is to be located . . . .”  30-A M.R.S. § 3753 (2010).  “Automobile 
graveyard” is defined as “a yard, field or other outdoor area used to store 3 or more unregistered or 
uninspected motor vehicles, as defined in Title 29-A, section 101, subsection 42, or parts of the vehicles” 
and includes “an area used for automobile dismantling, salvage and recycling operations.”  30-A M.R.S. 
§ 3752(1) (2010).  “Junkyard” is defined as  
 
a yard, field or other outside area used to store, dismantle or otherwise handle:  
 
A. Discarded, worn-out or junked plumbing, heating supplies, electronic or 
industrial equipment, household appliances or furniture; 
 
B. Discarded, scrap and junked lumber; and 
 
C. Old or scrap copper, brass, rope, rags, batteries, paper trash, rubber debris, 
waste and all scrap iron, steel and other scrap ferrous or nonferrous material.  
 
30-A M.R.S. § 3752(4) (2010). 
 
3 
 
[¶4]  In June of 2009, the Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) visited 
the property, where he noticed several hundred vehicles located randomly around 
the buildings.  Some of the vehicles were “just shells, parts vehicles; some were 
nice vehicles; some were repairable vehicles.”  Many of the vehicles had expired 
inspection stickers and/or expired registrations, and many lacked sale tags.  
 
[¶5]  Between June of 2009 and June of 2010, the CEO visited the site 
twenty-two times.  Although there were fewer of the offending vehicles on the site 
each time, the property always contained more than three unregistered or 
uninspected vehicles located outside, even as of the date of the hearing in June of 
2010.  The CEO also noted a “pile of debris” on the property, including vehicle 
carcasses, tires, furniture, and trash.  Neither the LLC nor Lucky Day had a valid 
automobile graveyard permit or a junkyard permit.  See 30-A M.R.S. §§ 3752(1), 
(4), 3753.   
 
[¶6]  The court issued a judgment in favor of the Town against the LLC and 
Corbin individually in the amount of $2000, plus attorney fees of $4000.  Corbin 
and the LLC appeal from the court’s denial of their motion for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and for reconsideration.  In denying the motion, the court did 
note that the LLC and Corbin “are one for purposes of this litigation and 
operationally” and that “[a]ny notice or service issue is one of no consequence, and 
was raised solely to obstruct the progress of litigation.” 
 
4 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  We first address Corbin’s contention that the court erred in issuing a 
judgment against her individually given that the LLC owns the property at issue. 
“Whether the corporate form should be disregarded involves factual findings that 
are reviewed for clear error.”  Advanced Constr. Corp. v. Pilecki, 2006 ME 84, 
¶ 10, 901 A.2d 189, 195.   
 
[¶8]  Pursuant to 31 M.R.S. § 645(1) (2010), a member of a limited liability 
company is not individually liable for the debts or liabilities of the LLC.  In order 
to establish the individual liability of a member, the plaintiff must demonstrate at a 
minimum: “(1) the defendant abused the privilege of a separate corporate identity; 
and (2) an unjust or inequitable result would occur if the court recognized the 
separate corporate existence.”  Johnson v. Exclusive Props. Unltd., 1998 ME 244, 
¶¶ 6-7, 720 A.2d 568, 571 (listing twelve factors to assist in determining whether a 
party has abused the corporate form). 
 
[¶9]  Here, there is no dispute both that Corbin is the sole member of both 
the LLC and Lucky Day, and that the LLC owns the property at issue.  The court 
found that “Corbin and her various corporations and entities appeared to be closely 
inter-connected and fully under her control.”  Nevertheless, the record contains no 
evidence that suggests, and the court’s orders contain no findings, that Corbin 
abused the privilege of incorporating, or that an unjust result would occur if only 
 
5 
the LLC were held liable on the Town’s complaint.3  We therefore vacate the 
decision as to Corbin individually. 
 
[¶10]  The remaining issues raised by the LLC are without merit.  Contrary 
to the LLC’s contentions, the complaint contained fair notice of the nature and 
scope of the Town’s legal claims against the LLC, and afforded the LLC the ability 
to fully defend itself against them.  See Smith v. Hawthorne, 2002 ME 149, ¶ 11, 
804 A.2d 1133, 1138; Richards v. Soucy, 610 A.2d 268, 270 (Me. 1992).  To the 
extent the complaint was served incorrectly, the LLC does not dispute that it 
received actual notice of the complaint, and makes no argument that it was in any 
way prejudiced by any insufficiency in service.  See Ireland v. Carpenter, 
2005 ME 98, ¶ 11, 879 A.2d 35, 38-39.  Finally, the evidence presented at trial, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the Town, is adequate to support the 
court’s determination that the LLC operated an automobile graveyard and a 
junkyard without a permit.4  See 30-A M.R.S. §§ 3752(1), (4), 3753; Town of 
Vassalboro v. Barnett, 2011 ME 21, ¶ 19, 13 A.3d 784, 790; Dowling, 
2006 ME 136, ¶ 22, 910 A.2d at 384. 
                                         
3  Neither is there any evidence or a finding that Corbin undertook any individual acts of wrongdoing 
distinct from those of the LLC.  See Blue Star Corp. v. CKF Props., LLC, 2009 ME 101, ¶ 44, 980 A.2d 
1270, 1280. 
 
4  The LLC does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the claim alleging an 
improper subsurface wastewater system. 
 
6 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated as against Linda M. Corbin 
individually, and affirmed in all other respects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney for East Lebanon Auto Sales LLC 
And Linda Corbin: 
 
E. Chris L’Hommedieu, Esq. 
190 Bates Street 
Lewiston, Maine  04240 
 
 
Attorney for the Town of Lebanon: 
 
Alan E. Shepard, Esq. 
Shepard & Read 
93 Main Street 
Kennebunk, Maine  04043 
 
 
 
 
Springvale District Court docket number CV-2009-491 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY