Title: Vermont v. Handy

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Handy, Sr. 
(2010-399)
 
2012 VT 21
 
[Filed 23-Mar-2012]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street,
Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that corrections may be
made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2012 VT 21
 
No. 2010-399
 
State of Vermont
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
     v.
Superior Court, Windsor Unit,
 
Criminal Division
 
 
Jay S. Handy, Sr.
October Term, 2011
 
 
 
 
Theresa
  S. DiMauro, J.
 
William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Ultan Doyle and
David Tartter, Assistant Attorneys
  General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
 
Joshua S. O'Hara of Maguire Law Associates, PLC, Essex
Junction, for Defendant-Appellant.
 
 
PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and
Burgess, JJ.
 
 
¶ 1.            
JOHNSON, J.   Following defendant's conviction for a
sex offense, the superior court, criminal division, granted the State's motion
to compel defendant to submit to testing for sexually transmitted diseases
under the authority of 13 V.S.A. § 3256, which does not require probable cause
or a warrant for testing.  On appeal, defendant argues that the statute is
unconstitutional because it does not serve any special need beyond law enforcement
justifying abandonment of the normal probable-cause and warrant requirements
and because, even if such a special need were present, the governmental goals
advanced by the statute do not outweigh his constitutionally protected privacy
interests.  We affirm the trial court's order compelling the testing, but
we remand the matter for the court to issue an order restricting the victim's
disclosure of the test results.
¶ 2.            
In November 2009, defendant was convicted of lewd or lascivious conduct,
in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 2601, as the result of his having had
non-consensual sexual intercourse with the victim in a public place on October
28, 2007.  In March 2010, at the behest of the victim as authorized by §
3256, the State moved for the trial court to order defendant to submit to
testing for sexually transmitted diseases based on his conviction for a crime
involving a sexual act that created a risk of exposing the victim to the
etiologic agent for acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).
¶ 3.            
Upon completion of a brief non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court
issued an order concluding that it was compelled to grant the State's motion
under § 3256, even though it had been nearly three years since the assault
occurred, and that the statute was constitutional.  The court stated that
"[t]he obvious purpose of the statute is to enable the victim of a criminal
sexual act to determine if he or she has been, or will be, further victimized
by contracting AIDS or other sexually transmitted diseases."  According to
the court, "[s]uch information would enable a victim to address his or her
physical and medical condition in a meaningful way."  Regarding
defendant's privacy rights, the court noted that any test results could not be
used against defendant in criminal proceedings and that, if the test results
were positive, the victim had the right to discuss her physical and medical
condition with medical providers, friends, family, and potential intimate
partners.
¶ 4.            
Accordingly, the court ordered that defendant submit to testing for AIDS
and other sexually transmitted diseases, that the test results be disclosed
only to defendant and the victim, and that the test results and the record of
the court proceedings be sealed.  The court also noted that either the
victim or the State on behalf of the victim could seek a civil contempt order
if defendant refused to comply with the court-ordered testing.
¶ 5.            
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by concluding
that the purposes underlying § 3256 represented special needs sufficient to
abandon the warrant and probable-cause requirements under Article Eleven of the
Vermont Constitution, and further that, even if the statute represented such
special needs, those special needs did not overcome his constitutionally
protected privacy rights.
¶ 6.            
Article Eleven is implicated in this case because the taking of a blood
sample or cheek swab is unquestionably a search that triggers constitutional
protections.  See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (recognizing that taking blood sample for alcohol or drug
screening is search under Fourth Amendment); State v. Martin, 2008 VT
53, ¶ 14, 184 Vt. 23, 955 A.2d 1144 (holding "that DNA sampling, by blood
draw or by cheek swab, is subject to constitutional protections"); In re
J.G., 701 A.2d 1260, 1265 (N.J. 1997) ("That the testing of blood for HIV
is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph
7 is uncontroverted.").  Article Eleven, like the Fourth Amendment, "does
not contemplate an absolute prohibition on warrantless searches or seizures,
but circumstances under which warrantless searches or seizures are permitted
must be jealously and carefully drawn."  State v. Welch, 160 Vt.
70, 78-79, 624 A.2d 1105, 1110 (1992).
¶ 7.            
Toward that end, this Court has adopted as part of its Article Eleven
jurisprudence, in the context of administrative searches, the "special needs"
standard of review set forth by Justice Blackman in his dissent in O'Connor
v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).  See State v. Berard, 154 Vt.
306, 310-11, 576 A.2d 118, 120-21 (1990) (adopting "special needs" standard to
review random warrantless searches of inmates' cells); see also Martin,
2008 VT 53, ¶¶ 15-35 (applying "special needs" standard in context of
challenge to constitutionality of statute compelling nonviolent felons to
submit DNA samples for inclusion in state and federal DNA databases). 
Similarly, other jurisdictions have applied a special-needs analysis in
reviewing constitutional challenges to statutes compelling sex offenders to
submit to testing, at the request of the victim, for sexually transmitted
diseases.  See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 131 F.3d 335, 341-42
(3d Cir. 1997) (applying special-needs test in rejecting constitutional
challenge to federal statute allowing victims to obtain HIV testing of sexual
assault perpetrators); State v. Superior Court, 930 P.2d 488, 493-94
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (applying special-needs test in upholding
constitutionality of state statute allowing sexual crime victims to obtain HIV
testing of perpetrators); In re J.G., 701 A.2d  at 1265-71 (same); State
v. Houey, 651 S.E.2d 314, 316-17 (S.C. 2007) (same).
¶ 8.            
Under the standard adopted in Berard, we will abandon the
probable-cause and warrant requirements only under exceptional circumstances
when the State demonstrates that special needs beyond normal law enforcement
make those requirements impracticable and those special needs outweigh
countervailing privacy interests.  154 Vt. at 310-11, 576 A.2d  at
120-21.  It is the State's burden, then, to show both that there are
special needs outside law enforcement making warrants impracticable and that
those needs outweigh any countervailing privacy rights upon which the
warrantless search intrudes.  See id.  "Requiring the State to
demonstrate that it has special needs for a warrantless, suspicionless search
or seizure focuses attention on the nature and extent of those needs and
allows the courts, as the traditional protectors of [Article Eleven] rights, to
pursue the necessary balancing test in a manner calculated to interfere least
with preservation of those rights.' "  Martin, 2008 VT 53,
¶ 9 (quoting Berard, 154 Vt. at 311, 576 A.2d at 121).
¶ 9.            
Section 3256 addresses both the testing of the perpetrator and the
testing and support of the victim of unlawful sexual conduct.  The
sections dealing with the testing and support of the victim are uncontroversial
and are not the subject of this appeal.  Upon the request of the victim
"at any time after the commission of a crime involving a sexual act," the state
"shall" provide to the victim various services, including "counseling regarding
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)," confidential testing "for HIV and other
sexually-transmitted diseases," counseling regarding "the accuracy of the
testing, and the risk of transmitting HIV and other sexually-transmitted
diseases to the victim as the result of the crime involving a sexual act," and
"prophylaxis treatment, crisis counseling, and support services."  13
V.S.A. § 3256(g).  The state is also required to provide "sexual assault
cross-training between sexual assault programs and HIV and AIDS service organizations." 
Id. § 3256(i).
¶ 10.         At
issue in this appeal are the first six subsections of the statute that concern
the testing of convicted sex offenders.  The victim of a sexual act "which
creates a risk of transmission of the etiologic agent for AIDS" may obtain an
order requiring the perpetrator "convicted" of an offense based on that act to
be tested for AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases.  Id.
§ 3256(a)-(b).  If the court determines that the offender has been
convicted of a crime involving a sexual act with the victim, as defined in the
statute, id. §§ 3256(b)(1), 3251(1) (defining "sexual act"), "the court
shall order the test to be administered," id. § 3256(c).  "The
results of the offender's test shall be disclosed only to the offender and the
victim," id. § 3256(d), and the test results and record of the court
proceedings "shall be sealed," id. § 3256(j).
¶ 11.         Defendant
first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that § 3256(a)-(f) serves
special needs beyond law enforcement sufficient to justify the abandonment of
our normal probable-cause and warrant requirements.  We disagree.  As
courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly held in examining similar
statutes, statutes such as these are directed at public health matters, not law
enforcement, and therefore satisfy the first part of the special-needs
standard.  See, e.g., People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574, 581 (Ill.
1992) ("The HIV testing statute is designed to serve a public health goal,
rather than the ordinary needs of law enforcement."); In re J.G., 701 A.2d  at 1266-67 (stating "that the tests are not intended to be used to gain
evidence for criminal prosecutions and do not place offenders at risk of a new
conviction or longer sentence"); In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 847 P.2d 455, 459 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (stating that testing statute "is designed to
protect the victim, the public, and the offender from a serious public health
problem" rather than "to gain evidence for a criminal prosecution" or to place
sexual offenders "at risk for a new conviction or a longer sentence"). 
Indeed, § 3256(c) explicitly states that samples taken of the sexual
offenders "shall be used solely for the purposes of this section," and thus
test results from the samples may not be used for criminal prosecution or other
law enforcement purposes.
¶ 12.         Moreover,
the courts have also recognized that imposing probable-cause and warrant
requirements would be entirely impracticable in this context because many
sexually transmitted diseases, and most particularly the AIDS virus, have no
outward manifestations that would permit a probable-cause determination for
obtaining a warrant.  See In re J.G., 701 A.2d  at 1267 (finding
warrant and individualized suspicion requirements impractical because sexual
offenders have no outward manifestations of infection); Houey, 651 S.E.2d  at 317 (same); In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d  at 459-60 (same). 
Hence, requiring probable cause and a warrant for such searches would
effectively preclude the testing of sex offenders and thus negate the
statute.  See In re J.G., 701 A.2d  at 1267 ("Requiring probable
cause or individualized suspicion before testing could be conducted would
create the proverbial Catch-22 and would frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search." (quotations omitted)).
¶ 13.         Defendant
contends that our decision in Martin is not controlling here because the
DNA-collection regime upheld under the special-needs test in that case targeted
all felons rather than particular individuals.  In defendant's view,
§ 3256 targets particular individuals and therefore must be subject to the
normal probable-cause and warrant requirements.  We find this argument
unpersuasive.  Both statutes permit the testing of a category of persons
based on their offender status.  On this point, Martin is not
distinguishable from the instant case. 
¶ 14.         Having
determined that § 3256 addresses special needs beyond normal law enforcement,
we must engage in a context-specific inquiry in which we balance "the competing
public and private interests at stake."  Martin, 2008 VT 53, ¶
21.  Specifically, we must balance the governmental interests forwarded by
§ 3256 against the privacy interests invaded by the statute.  We
first examine the privacy interests at stake here because they are more
straightforward.  At the outset, we recognize that the statute's targeted
classconvicted sex offendershas greatly diminished privacy interests,
particularly with respect to precluding the testing of bodily fluids forced
upon their victims in criminal sexual acts.  See In re Juveniles,
847 P.2d  at 460 ("For sexual offenders in particular, their expectation in
privacy in bodily fluids is greatly diminished because they have engaged in a
class of criminal behavior which represents the potential of exposing others to
the AIDS virus.").  Moreover, the taking of a blood sample or a cheek swab
is a relatively minimal intrusion on privacy.  See Gov't of the Virgin
Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 901 (D. V.I. 1991) (noting that
courts have long recognized relatively minimal privacy intrusion of routine
blood tests); Adams, 597 N.E.2d  at 582 ("The actual physical intrusion
required by the HIV testing statute is relatively slight and poses no threat to
the health or safety of the individual tested.").
¶ 15.         On
the other hand, courts have recognized "that the information obtained as the
result of a positive HIV test may have a devastating impact on individuals who
would prefer not to know their true status" and that "persons with AIDS are
often stigmatized and subject to social disapproval."  Adams, 597
N.E.2d at 582-83; Roberts, 756 F. Supp.  at 902 (discussing
discrimination and other "devastating consequences" resulting from society's
misunderstanding of AIDS).  "Mandatory testing and disclosure of HIV
status thus threaten privacy interests beyond the taking of the blood sample,
particularly because of the social stigma, harassment, and discrimination often
suffered by individuals who have AIDS or who are HIV-positive."  In re
J.G., 701 A.2d  at 1267.
¶ 16.         The
degree to which convicted sex offenders may be subject to this more significant
invasion of privacy associated with mandatory HIV testing "is a function of how
widely the results are disseminated."  Roberts, 756 F. Supp.  at
902.  "The risk of stigmatic harm therefore speaks not to whether the
search should transpire in the first instance, but rather to the extent to
which the private medical facts learned from the procedure should be
disclosed."  Id.  In short, the only privacy interest of any
significance in this context is the risk of public dissemination of positive
test results.
¶ 17.         We
now examine the other side of the equationthe governmental interest in testing
sex offenders.  On its face, the statute begs several questions.  How
does the testing of sex offenders following conviction contribute to the
state's interest in public health and, more specifically, the well-being of the
victims of sex crimes?  What is the nexus between testing offenders following
conviction and providing relevant information to victims about their risk of
contracting sexually transmitted infectious diseases?  Given that testing
offenders after conviction apparently would not provide any information as to
when a sexually transmitted disease was contracted relative to the timing of
the sex offense for which they were convicted, how does the testing further the
state's public health interest?
¶ 18.         None
of these questions was addressed at the non-evidentiary hearing before the trial
court.[1] 
No evidence, expert or otherwise, was presented by either party regarding the
efficacy or causal nexus of testing offenders with respect to furthering the state's
presumed interest in protecting the health of the victims of sex crimes. 
The trial court concluded that there was no need for an evidentiary hearing or
findings because the victim's right to know "whether or not there is a dormant
sexually transmitted disease trumps any claim of privacy" by defendant.
 According to the court, given our holding in Martin, defendant's
constitutional claim "doesn't even rise to the level of argument from the
Court's perspective."
¶ 19.         Because
this case presents a different context from Martin, and because nothing
in the record informs the balancing test we must perform under Martin,
we examined the legislative history of the bill enacted as § 3256.[2]  As it turns out, the part of § 3256
mandating the testing of sex offenders was a controversial proposition that had
been introduced in various bills and debated and negotiated in legislative
committees over several legislative sessions.  In 2001, the year the bill
finally became law, witnesses before the House and Senate Judiciary Committees,
including a medical doctor specializing in infectious diseases, testified that
testing sex offenders following conviction offered no medical benefit for
victims because health care issues need to be addressed as soon after the
sexual assault as possible and, given the normal lag time between the
commission of the crime and conviction, the victims will have or should have
already been tested themselves for sexually transmitted diseases. 
¶ 20.         The
medical expert testified that HIV testing identifies antibodies that the body
produces to counteract the presence of the virus.  The latency period
between exposure to the virus and the accumulation of sufficient antibodies to
result in a positive test is normally between six weeks and six months. 
For a victim potentially exposed to the AIDS virus to benefit from prophylaxis
treatment aimed at reducing the chances of incurring the virus, the treatment
must commence within a seventy-two-hour period.  Therefore, testing the
offender following conviction cannot inform a decision as to whether to begin
the rigorous prophylaxis treatment.  Nor would such testing normally
precede the six-week-to-six-month latency period during which the victim's own
testing might not yet reveal the presence of the virus.  Hence, neither a
negative nor a positive result from the offender's testing would appear to have
any value for the victim.  Moreover, any positive test result from the
offender would have limited value for the additional reasons that the tests do
not indicate when the virus was incurred and that the chances of passing the
virus on to a sexual assault victim are very small.  Indeed, even those
who testified in support of testing offenders acknowledged that such testing
provided little or no medically useful information for victims of sexual
crimes.
¶ 21.         Faced
with this testimony, the chairs of both the House and Judiciary Committees
acknowledged the apparent lack of medical usefulness in testing offenders, but
explained that the State of Vermont would not be eligible to receive roughly
$175,000 per year in federal grants to fund testing and counseling for sexual
assault victimsas set forth in the second part of § 3256unless the
statute required testing the perpetrators.  This appears to be the
principal driving force behind incorporating in § 3256 the sections compelling
the testing of sex offenders upon the request of the victim.
¶ 22.         If
retaining federal funding were the sole governmental interest supporting the
challenged portion of the statute, then the constitutionality of the law would
be suspect because there would be no nexus between the law's intrusion on even
the diminished privacy interest here and the information obtained from that
intrusion.  That is not the case, however.  There was additional
testimony before the legislative committees in support of testing offenders
unrelated to preserving federal grant money.  The director of Crime Victim
Services testified that sexual assault victims do not necessarily consider the
issue of testing offenders in a logical way as perceived by non-victims. 
While recognizing that testing victims is the only way to determine
definitively whether they have contracted an infectious sexual disease, and in
particular the AIDS virus, the director explained that victims want the peace
of mind that would result from also testing the perpetrator and that they feel
further violated if their attacker refuses to submit to the testing of bodily
fluids forced upon them during a sexual assault.
¶ 23.         Courts
have also recognized the psychological benefit for victims of having the
perpetrator tested even if such testing, as a practical matter, provides little
or no useful medical information to the victim.  See Ward, 131 F.3d 
at 342 (noting that testing perpetrator may provide "peace of mind" to victim
because of possibility that virus would not manifest itself in victim for
years); Roberts, 756 F. Supp.  at 903 (concluding that there is
"considerable medical utility" in testing offender even though results will not
be dispositive for victim, and noting that unpredictable latency period means
that victims who have tested negative may relieve anxiety if perpetrator is
tested); Superior Court, 930 P.2d  at 493-94 (acknowledging that "some
experts regard perpetrator tests as useless," but noting that other experts
"conclude that knowledge of the perpetrator's HIV status, though inconclusive,
may be helpful to the victim").
¶ 24.         We
concur.  One hardly need document the obvious trauma and suffering endured
by victims of sexual assault.  See State v. Bunner, 453 N.W.2d 97,
101-103 (Neb. 1990) (quoting several law review articles detailing
psychological trauma common to rape victims and concluding "it is all too
evident that one need not be specially trained in medicine or psychology to
recognize and appreciate the injury from a forceful sexual intrusion into
another's body and invasion of mind and very personality of another human
being").  Indeed, the nature of a sexual assault furnishes "a basis for a
judicial determination that a sexual assault victim sustain[s] serious personal
injury in the form of extreme mental anguish or mental trauma."  Id.
at 103 (quotations omitted).
¶ 25.         When
that trauma is further exacerbated by a legitimate fear of contracting a
life-threatening sexually transmitted disease, the desire of victims to have
the perpetrator tested to allay their fears is entirely understandable and
real. Therefore, although the consensus among medical experts is that testing
offendersparticularly following conviction after months or even years have
passedhas little or no direct medical benefit to victims, testing offenders
can provide to victims some psychological benefit that outweighs the offenders'
significantly diminished interest in preventing the testing of bodily fluids
forced upon their unwilling victims.  Johnetta v. Municipal Court,
267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 671-72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citing expert testimony that
those exposed to AIDS virus suffer extreme anxiety and thus may benefit
psychologically from even inconclusive testing of offender); In re Juveniles,
847 P.2d  at 461 (accord).
¶ 26.         Accordingly,
as long as the trial court imposes restrictions that comport with the statute's
obvious intent to prevent public dissemination of the perpetrator's test
results, we find no constitutional infirmity to the statute.  Cf. In re
J.G., 701 A.2d  at 1271 (reading confidentiality requirement in testing
statute "to place reasonable restrictions on public dissemination of the
offender's HIV status by the victim").  Section 3256(d) provides that
"[t]he results of the offender's test shall be disclosed only to the offender
and the victim."  Plainly, the Legislature was concerned with the privacy
rights of offenders and chose to strictly limit revelation of their test
results.  In this case, at the hearing on the request for testing, the
prosecutor suggested that a protective order could be issued to preclude the
victim from revealing defendant's test results to anyone other than medical
providers, but the court made no such order.  To safeguard defendant's
privacy interests in not having any potential positive test results
disseminated publicly, we remand the matter for the court to order the victim
not to disclose defendant's test results to anyone except for the victim's
medical provider or counselor, who, in turn, would have an obligation to keep
confidential information revealed by their patients.
           
The order of the Windsor Superior Court, Criminal Division, dated September
22, 2010, is affirmed in all respects, except that the matter is remanded for
the court to impose restrictions, consistent with this opinion, on the victim's
disclosure of any results from the testing of defendant for sexually
transmitted diseases.
 
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 
 
¶ 27.         REIBER,
C.J., concurring and dissenting.   The testing and counseling
statute at issue here, 13 V.S.A. § 3256, is plainly a public health initiative
aimed at giving medical and emotional support to victims of sexual
assault.  Thus, I agree with the majority that the statute does not
violate Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution because it serves a
special need beyond ordinary law enforcement.  An important government
interest is at stake when demand for testing is made by a victim under the
statute in that testing perpetrators may produce information that reduces the
health risks to, and mental anguish of, the victim and thus lessens the chance
of unwitting transmission to others.  Such purpose outweighs the extremely
limited privacy interest an offender has in submitting a sample of bodily
fluids.  The government purpose served by the legislation and its
limitation on disclosure in my view do not compel us to resort to examination
of testimony taken before a legislative committee.  The issue in this case
involves determining the validity of a statute's stated purpose, not deciphering
legislative intent to resolve the meaning of particular statutory
language.  Defendant did not present evidence challenging the link between
testing and the medical or psychological benefit to victims of sexual
assault.  Thus, the majority's analysis of legislative history on this
point is unnecessary and improperly expands our role in conflict with the
exercise of the legislative process.  Furthermore, because the statute
already imposes restraint on the distribution of the results of such testing,
there is no basis to remand for a protective order with further conditions
protecting the perpetrator's privacy.  I would affirm the court's order,
and therefore respectfully dissent.
¶ 28.         The
question of whether 13 V.S.A. § 3256 violates an offender's right under
Article 11 to be free from a warrantless search or seizure is a question of law
that we review de novo.  State v. Martin, 2008 VT 53, ¶ 8, 184 Vt.
23, 955 A.2d 1144.  While Article 11 protects against warrantless searches,
a search may nonetheless be constitutional if its purpose is to fulfill a
special need beyond ordinary law enforcement.  Id. ¶ 9. 
I agree with the majority holding that § 3256 is aimed at public health
and therefore meets this requirement.  If the special need exists, then
"we balance the need served against the privacy intrusion at stake."  Id. 

¶ 29.         The
majority claims that "nothing in the record informs the balancing test we must
perform under Martin," ante, ¶ 19, and proceeds to recite
detailed legislative history, including quoting one of the medical experts who
testified before a legislative committee.  This analysis exceeds the
limits of our review.  It wars with the clear intent of the law and the
limitations of the statute.  Our rules of statutory construction are aimed
at discerning legislative intent.  As we have explained, "legislative
intent is to be ascertained from the act itself, which is presumed to be in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the statutory language," and "[w]here
statutory language is clear and unambiguous in its meaning, as in the present
case, we will look no further in an effort to determine a contrary legislative
intent."  Cavanaugh v. Abbott Labs., 145 Vt. 516, 530, 496 A.2d 154, 163 (1985) (quotations omitted).
¶ 30.         The
constitutional issue in this case is not a question of statutory interpretation
where the meaning of a word or phrase is not clear, but involves determining
whether this statute's authorization of a warrantless search is supported by a
legitimate government interest.  To make such an assessment, we need not
inquire into the Legislature's subjective intent, but instead must determine if
legitimate public interests are served.  See Martin, 2008 VT 53,
¶ 21 (listing interests served without resort to legislative
history).  When reviewing a statute, we "accord deference to the policy
choices made by the Legislature."  Badgley v. Walton, 2010 VT 68, ¶
38, 188 Vt. 367, 10 A.3d 469.  The State does not have the burden to prove
a statute is constitutional; rather, the statute is presumed
constitutional.  Id. ¶ 42.  In this case, defendant
offered little to challenge the State's asserted public interest.  As the
majority notes, neither side presented evidence "regarding the efficacy or causal
nexus of testing offenders with respect to furthering the state's presumed
interest in protecting the health of the victims of sex crimes."  Ante,
¶ 18.  Absent a presentation of concrete evidence from defendant
challenging the statute, I believe that the State had no obligation to
affirmatively make such a showing.  If the court can discern an adequate
interest that is served, which it did in this case, then that is sufficient to
uphold the statute, even if other interests may be furthered.[3]  
¶ 31.         Here,
the statute plainly reveals its purpose is to give supportboth medical and
psychologicalto victims of sexual crimes.[4]  As the majority recognizes, the
psychological injury to a victim of sexual assault is obvious and needs no
special expert analysis.  Ante, ¶ 24.  Even if there is
little medical treatment benefit to victims to receiving the results of a
medical test after conviction, our Legislature rationally concluded that the
mental health aspects are no less important.  There is a psychological
benefit to victims in obtaining the results of a test that outweighs the
perpetrator's small privacy interest in his bodily fluids.  Other courts
have reached the same conclusion.  See In re J.G., 701 A.2d 1260,
1270-71 (N.J. 1997); State v. Houey, 651 S.E.2d 314, 320 (S.C. 2007); In
re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 847 P.2d 455, 460-61 (Wash. 1993).  On
this point, I disagree with the majority's statement that a negative result has
no value to a victim.  Ante, ¶ 20.  A perpetrator's
negative result after conviction can provide a victim with valuable peace of
mind.  In re J.G., 701 A.2d  at 1270 (discussing psychological
benefits of testing, including that negative result would give victim
substantial reassurance); In re Juveniles, 847 P.2d  at 461 (explaining
that assailant's negative result is useful in allaying concerns of victim).
¶ 32.         Even
if some ambiguity in the legislative purpose existed that required resort to
legislative history, the analysis engaged in by the majority is not
reliable.  We have explained that a witness's comments at a committee
hearing are accorded "little weight" in determining legislative intent.  State
v. Madison, 163 Vt. 360, 373, 658 A.2d 536, 545 (1995).  Similarly,
the views of expert witnesses are not determinative indicators of legislative
intent since these experts are necessarily there to present their own
viewswhich may be either accepted or rejected by the Legislature.  Thus,
I disagree with the majority's decision to rely on expert testimony presented
to the committee.
¶ 33.         Finally,
even with the expert testimony, I see no reason to remand this case.  The
majority concludes that to protect the privacy rights of this sex offender, the
court must issue a protective order precluding the victim from disseminating
test results to anyone other than a medical provider.  Ante, ¶
26.  But this limitation is not in the statute, which already includes
several protections of a perpetrator's privacy, including that the results of
the test "shall be disclosed only to the offender and the victim," 13 V.S.A.
§ 3256(d), and that "[t]he record of the court proceedings and test
results pursuant to this section shall be sealed," id.
§ 3256(j).  If the Legislature wanted to extend the scope to a point
intended to prohibit the victim from giving the information to a future partner
or a friend it could have done so.  We should not conclude that the very
limited privacy interest of those convicted of sexual assault under this law
can permit or compel a court to order limits on the victim's use of the
informationinformation that, for example, could inform effective treatment and
inhibit spread of communicable disease.
¶ 34.         An
offender's privacy protections are greatly diminished by this particular
criminal act.  Having sexually assaulted the victim and deposited his DNA
without consentan act of physical harm if not also an implicit, if not
explicit, waiver of confidentialitythe offender's remaining privacy rights are
sufficiently defined by the statute.  What the victim, a private citizen,
does with the information afterwards was of no concern to the Legislature and,
absent legislative direction to the contrary, is no business of this court. 
The law does not call on the courts to prohibit further disclosure. 
Because consideration of additional limits is not constitutionally required, it
amounts to a policy choice and "[o]ur function is not to substitute our view of
the appropriate balance for that of the Legislature."  Badgley,
2010 VT 68, ¶ 24.  I would affirm, and therefore dissent.
¶ 35.         I am
authorized to state that Justice Burgess joins this dissent.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice
 

[1] 
Apparently, the dissent would also avoid these questions based on the
presumption that legislative acts are constitutional.  According to the
dissent, the health benefits of the provision are obvious and do not require
expert analysis, and our examination of legislative history to better understand
the claimed governmental interests in this case "improperly expands our role in
conflict with the exercise of the legislative process," goes beyond "the limits
of our review," and "wars with the clear intent of the law."  Post,
¶¶ 27, 29.   To the contrary, the dissent's position is inconsistent
with our judicial role in reviewing statutes alleged to be in violation of
individual constitutional rights.  The presumption of validity that we
give to legislative acts does not require us to "abdicate our responsibility to
examine a disputed statute independently and ultimately determine its
meaning."  In re MacIntyre Fuels, Inc., 2003 VT 59, ¶ 7, 175 Vt.
613, 833 A.2d 829 (mem.).  Nor are we required to presume as a matter of
faith the existence of a valid governmental interest or to ignore our
responsibility to apply the special-needs test adopted by this
Courtparticularly in a case such as this, where the proffered governmental
interests are not apparent from the record and, in fact, are seriously questioned
by experts and courts.  See Badgley v. Walton, 2010 VT 68, ¶¶ 20,
40, 188 Vt. 367, 10 A.3d 469 (emphasizing that statutes are presumed to be
constitutional, but also noting that, while no legislative record existed, "the
issues are well framed by the national debate" and "the expert evidence in this
case reads like a microcosm of the national debate"); see also Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001) (noting that Court does not
"simply accept the State's invocation of a special need,' " but rather engages
in close review of scheme and considers "all the available evidence in order to
determine the relevant primary purpose").
[2] 
Our special-needs analysis compels us to balance the competing public and
private interests at stake, Martin, 2008 VT 53, ¶ 21, which, in turn,
necessarily requires us to consider the strength of the alleged governmental
interests.  In the absence of any record assisting us in that regard, we
have a responsibility to examine the legislative history of the challenged
statute to better understand those interests.  See In re Dep't of
Bldgs. & Gen. Servs., 2003 VT 92, ¶ 14, 176 Vt. 41, 838 A.2d 78 (noting
that we have frequently relied upon legislative history to discern meaning of statutes). 
The dissent would forego examining legislative history and instead presume that
the challenged provision serves an important government interest in requiring
perpetrators to produce information that may help to "reduce[] the health risks
to, and mental anguish of, the victim and . . . of unwitting transmission to
others."  Post, ¶ 27.  As detailed herein, however, the
legislative history reveals that this was not the governmental interest behind
the challenged provision and that the provision does not in fact serve such an
interest.  The dissent asserts that our examination of the legislative
history is "not reliable" because it considers the comments of a committee
witness, post, ¶ 32, but, as noted, even the chairs of the legislative
committees dealing with the proposed statute recognized the apparent lack of
medical usefulness in testing offenders and candidly acknowledged that the
challenged provision was inserted into the statute to preserve federal funding
rather than to provide doubtful medical benefits to sexual assault victims.
[3] 
Consequently, it is wholly irrelevant that the inclusion of a testing provision
was also a necessary prerequisite for the state to be eligible for federal
grants.  Ante, ¶ 21.
 
[4] 
Indeed, even defendant recognizes this fact.