Title: Mooney v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Christopher Mooney v. State of Maryland, No. 32, September Term, 2023 
 
“REASONABLE 
JUROR” 
TEST 
– 
AUTHENTICATION 
THROUGH 
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS WITH KNOWLEDGE UNDER MARYLAND RULE 
5-901(b)(1) – AUTHENTICATION THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
UNDER MARYLAND RULE 5-901(b)(4) – Supreme Court of Maryland held that 
“reasonable juror” test applies to authentication of videos—i.e., for trial court to admit 
video, there must be sufficient evidence for reasonable juror to find by preponderance of 
evidence that video is what it is claimed to be.  Supreme Court concluded that video can 
be authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4). 
 
Supreme Court held that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting video, as video 
was properly authenticated through combination of testimony of witness with knowledge 
under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1) and circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-
901(b)(4), and reasonable juror could find by preponderance of evidence that video was 
what it purported to be—namely, fair and accurate video of shooting and events 
surrounding it.  
 
Supreme Court concluded that portions of video depicting events that victim saw or 
participated in were properly authenticated through victim’s testimony under Maryland 
Rule 5-901(b)(1), as witness with knowledge of events; and portion of video depicting 
shooting (which victim did not see) was properly authenticated through circumstantial 
evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), as there was circumstantial evidence from 
which reasonable juror could have inferred that video fairly and accurately depicted 
shooting.
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT  
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 32 
 
September Term, 2023 
______________________________________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER MOONEY 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
______________________________________ 
 
Fader, C.J. 
Watts 
Booth 
Biran 
Gould 
Eaves 
Hotten, Michele D. (Senior 
Justice, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
Fader, C.J., concurs.  
Gould, J., dissents. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:  August 13, 2024
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 121280030 
 
Argued: June 3, 2024 
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State 
Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
Gregory Hilton, Clerk 
2024.08.13 
09:43:15 
-04'00'
 
 
In this case, we must determine whether video footage can be authenticated through 
circumstantial evidence rather than by methods that have been described as the “pictorial 
testimony” or the “silent witness” theories of authentication, which require testimony by a 
witness with personal knowledge of the content of the video or testimony concerning the 
method of production of the video, respectively.  More specifically, the question in this 
case is whether video footage was properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence 
where a witness who testified about the content of the video did not have personal 
knowledge of all of the events depicted in the video.  In addition, we must determine 
whether the “reasonable juror” test—under which there must be sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable juror to find in favor of authentication by a preponderance of the evidence—
applies to authentication of videos.  See State v. Sample, 468 Md. 560, 597, 228 A.3d 171, 
194 (2020). 
Maryland Rule 5-901(a) provides that “[t]he requirement of authentication or 
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”  Maryland Rule 
5-901(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of ways to authenticate evidence.  Under Maryland 
Rule 5-901(b)(1), evidence can be authenticated through the testimony of a witness with 
knowledge that the evidence is what it is claimed to be.  Under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), 
evidence can be authenticated through “[c]ircumstantial evidence, such as appearance, 
contents, substance, internal patterns, location, or other distinctive characteristics, that the 
offered evidence is what it is claimed to be.” 
We have previously discussed three theories of authentication for videos.  See Dep’t 
- 2 - 
 
of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Cole, 342 Md. 12, 20-21, 30, 672 A.2d 1115, 1119-20, 
1124 (1996).  First, under the “pictorial testimony” theory of authentication, a video can 
be authenticated where a “witness testifies from first-hand knowledge that the [video] fairly 
and accurately represents the scene or object it purports to depict as it existed at the relevant 
time.”  Id. at 20-21, 672 A.2d at 1119 (cleaned up).  The “pictorial testimony” theory of 
authentication corresponds to Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1). 
Second, under the “silent witness” theory of authentication, a video can be 
authenticated where there is “an adequate foundation assuring the accuracy of the process 
producing” the video.  Cole, 342 Md. at 21, 672 A.2d at 1119-20 (cleaned up).  Such a 
foundation can be laid where, for instance, a witness testifies about “the type of equipment 
or camera used, its general reliability, the quality of the recorded product, the process by 
which it was focused, or the general reliability of the entire system.”  Jackson v. State, 460 
Md. 107, 117, 188 A.3d 975, 981 (2018) (cleaned up).  The “silent witness” theory of 
authentication corresponds to Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(9), under which an exhibit can be 
authenticated through “[e]vidence describing a process or system used to produce the 
proffered exhibit or testimony and showing that the process or system produces an accurate 
result.”1 
 
1We have also explained that a video can be authenticated as a business record.  See 
Cole, 342 Md. at 30, 672 A.2d at 1124.  This theory of authentication corresponds to 
Maryland Rule 5-902(12), under which an exhibit is considered self-authenticating where, 
among other conditions, the exhibit satisfies the requirements for the “business record” 
hearsay exception under Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6).  One of those requirements is 
establishing that “the regular practice of [the] business was to make and keep the” exhibit.  
Md. R. 5-803(b)(6)(D). 
- 3 - 
 
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, after a trial by jury, Petitioner, Christopher 
Mooney, was found guilty of second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, possession of 
a regulated firearm after conviction of a disqualifying crime, wearing, carrying, or 
transporting a handgun, illegal possession of ammunition, and discharging a firearm in 
Baltimore City.  The events underlying the verdict involved the nonfatal shooting of Joshua 
Zimmerman in his vehicle outside of a medical cannabis dispensary in Baltimore City.  As 
a witness for the State, Mr. Zimmerman testified that he was shot in the back while sitting 
in the driver’s seat of his vehicle.  Over objection, during Mr. Zimmerman’s direct 
examination, the circuit court admitted into evidence a video, retrieved by a detective, that 
had been recorded by a camera mounted on the exterior wall of a residence near the site of 
the shooting.2  The video was 1 minute and 51 seconds long. 
Before admission of the video, Mr. Zimmerman testified that, in the months prior 
to the shooting, he had suspected Mr. Mooney of sleeping with his girlfriend, but Mr. 
Mooney had denied the allegation.  Mr. Zimmerman testified that, on the night of the 
shooting, Mr. Mooney walked past his vehicle and the two had a brief exchange of words 
in which he called Mr. Mooney a “b[****].”  Mr. Zimmerman testified that Mr. Mooney 
walked past his vehicle immediately before the shooting and that, after Mr. Mooney passed 
the vehicle, he was shot from behind.  Mr. Zimmerman did not testify that he saw the 
shooter at the time of the shooting.  
 
2In his brief in this Court, Mr. Mooney states that “[t]he incident was purportedly 
captured on a ‘Ring’ camera from a nearby residence and a copy of the video was recovered 
by police.”  The video itself displays the Xfinity logo in the upper-right corner. 
- 4 - 
 
Mr. Zimmerman testified that he had watched the video in preparation for trial and 
that the video was a true and accurate depiction of the events that occurred on the night of 
the shooting and did not appear to have been altered or edited.  After the video was admitted 
into evidence, Mr. Zimmerman identified Mr. Mooney as the person depicted on the video 
in the white shirt “walking around” and confirmed that the footage depicted him exiting 
the vehicle holding his back, because that is where he was shot, and running to a nearby 
McDonald’s.  During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor contended that the video 
showed Mr. Mooney walk past Mr. Zimmerman’s vehicle and shoot him from behind.  
In this Court, Mr. Mooney contends that, although the methods of authentication 
listed in Maryland Rule 5-901(b) are non exhaustive, none of the methods are universally 
applicable.  Mr. Mooney asserts that  the Appellate Court of Maryland erred in concluding 
that video evidence could be authenticated through circumstantial evidence under 
Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) and that this Court’s holding in Sample, 468 Md. at 567-68, 
228 A.3d at 176, and the “reasonable juror” test do not apply to authentication of video 
evidence.  Mr. Mooney’s position is that our decision in Washington v. State, 406 Md. 642, 
652, 961 A.2d 1110, 1116 (2008), stands for the proposition that video footage can be 
authenticated under only two methods, which he summarizes as follows: the “pictorial 
testimony” theory, which “requires a human being to be able to swear they personally 
perceived what the photograph portrayed[,]” and the “silent witness” theory, under which 
“a witness can speak to the reliability and authenticity of the system used to procure the 
video, thus permitting the video to speak for itself.”  (Cleaned up). 
The State responds that the “pictorial testimony” and “silent witness” methods of 
- 5 - 
 
authentication are not the exclusive ways to authenticate video footage.  The State argues 
that “the authentication rule requires only that a ‘reasonable juror’ could find that a 
particular item is what the proponent claims it to be.”  The State maintains that a variety of 
cases from federal and other State courts, as well as decisions of the Appellate Court, 
permit authorization of video footage by means that include circumstantial evidence. 
We hold that, for video footage to be admissible, as with other evidence, there must 
be sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the video is what it is claimed to be.  In other words, the “reasonable juror” test applies 
to authentication of videos—i.e., for a trial court to admit a video, there must be sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable juror to find more likely than not that the evidence is what it is 
purported to be.  In addition, we hold that, like other evidence, video footage can be 
authenticated in a variety of ways, including through circumstantial evidence under 
Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4).  
We conclude that the video footage at issue in this case was properly authenticated 
through a combination of the testimony of a witness with knowledge under Maryland Rule 
5-901(b)(1) and circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), as a reasonable 
juror could have found by a preponderance of the evidence that the video was what it 
purported to be—namely, a fair and accurate depiction of Mr. Zimmerman’s shooting and 
the events occurring before and after it.  The parts of the video depicting the events that 
Mr. Zimmerman saw, or participated in, before and after the shooting were properly 
authenticated through his testimony under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1) as a witness with 
personal knowledge of the events. 
- 6 - 
 
The part of the video depicting the shooting was properly authenticated through 
circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), as there was sufficient 
circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could have inferred that the video 
fairly and accurately depicted the shooting.  The close temporal proximity of the shooting 
to the events occurring immediately before and after the shooting, of which Mr. 
Zimmerman had personal knowledge, gave rise to the reasonable inference that the video 
accurately depicted the shooting.  In addition, Mr. Zimmerman testified that the video 
truthfully and accurately depicted the events that he saw and did not appear to have been 
edited or altered.  There also was evidence of the nature and origin of the video, from which 
a reasonable juror could have inferred that the video was recorded the night of the shooting 
by a source or third party not connected to law enforcement or involved with the shooting, 
as a detective testified that he obtained the video from an individual who lived nearby and 
had a camera mounted on the exterior wall of his residence. 
These circumstances are not intended to be exhaustive or all inclusive of the 
circumstances that may permit authentication of video footage under Maryland Rule 5-
901(b)(4).  The authentication of video footage involves a fact-specific inquiry that will 
vary from case to case.  As with all determinations with respect to authentication under 
Maryland Rule 5-901(b), a trial court must assess on a case-by-case basis whether there is 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude more likely than not that video 
footage is what the proponent claims it to be. 
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the video and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court of 
- 7 - 
 
Maryland.  
BACKGROUND 
Proceedings in the Circuit Court 
The State charged Mr. Mooney with multiple offenses, including attempted first-
degree murder of Mr. Zimmerman.  At trial, as a witness for the State, Mr. Zimmerman 
testified as follows.  He and Mr. Mooney met each other at least approximately a decade 
before trial.  Sometime during the summer of 2021, Mr. Zimmerman asked Mr. Mooney 
whether he and Mr. Zimmerman’s girlfriend, who is also the mother of Mr. Zimmerman’s 
child, were “sleeping around.”  Mr. Mooney responded that they were not, which Mr. 
Zimmerman believed to be a lie because his girlfriend later admitted that she and Mr. 
Mooney were sleeping together. 
On the evening of September 3, 2021, around 8:30 p.m. or 9:00 p.m., Mr. 
Zimmerman purchased medical cannabis from a dispensary on Falls Road in the Hampden 
neighborhood of Baltimore City.  Mr. Zimmerman returned to his vehicle, which was 
parked on Falls Road, and telephoned his girlfriend.  Within a few minutes of finishing the 
call, Mr. Zimmerman saw Mr. Mooney walking down the street toward him.  The area had 
lights.  Mr. Zimmerman had the windows of his vehicle rolled down, and nothing was 
obstructing his view of Mr. Mooney, who was not wearing a face mask.  Mr. Mooney asked 
Mr. Zimmerman: “[W]hat’s up[?]”  Mr. Zimmerman responded: “[Y]ou’re a b[****.]”  
Mr. Mooney “slowed down, like he was about to say something.”  But, instead of 
saying anything, Mr. Mooney kept walking until he was out of Mr. Zimmerman’s sight.  
Mr. Zimmerman thought that Mr. Mooney was going to approach the driver’s side of his 
- 8 - 
 
vehicle, so he opened the door of his vehicle and looked around, but he did not see Mr. 
Mooney.  As soon as Mr. Zimmerman sat back in the driver’s seat, he heard gunshots and 
was shot.  Mr. Zimmerman testified: “I cracked my door and I’m looking out and I didn’t 
see him.  As soon as I sat back that’s when the gunshots happened.”  Mr. Zimmerman 
suffered a wound to his back.  
Before requesting that the video be admitted into evidence, the prosecutor displayed 
an image from the video, which had been marked for identification as State’s Exhibit 1A, 
and asked Mr. Zimmerman whether he recognized it.  Mr. Zimmerman responded that he 
did and explained that the image showed him in his vehicle, the dispensary, a few houses, 
and a parking lot.  Next, the following exchange occurred: 
[PROSECUTOR:] And is this an accurate depiction of the night? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Absolutely. 
 
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay.  And it’s a true depiction of what you recall? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Yes.  
 
[PROSECUTOR:] It doesn’t look like there’s been any alterations or edits 
-- 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Absolutely. 
 
[PROSECUTOR:] -- to it?  Okay.  
 
* * * 
 
[PROSECUTOR:] [T]his is what you know to be the 3900 block of Falls 
Road? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Yes, sir.  
 
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay.  I will play little bit for you as well.  (Playing 1A 
- 9 - 
 
for the witness.)  And does there appear to be any edits or changes to the 
video as I played it for you? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] No.  
 
(Paragraph breaks omitted). 
The prosecutor offered the video, State’s Exhibit 1A, into evidence, and Mr. 
Mooney’s counsel objected.  The circuit court initiated a bench conference, during which 
the following exchange occurred regarding authentication of the video: 
[MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: I mean, there’s no way to know if that 
video’s been altered.  It’s somebody else’s Ring camera.  These aren’t still 
photographs of what happened. 
 
THE COURT: Has he watched it? 
 
[MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: I mean --  
 
THE COURT: I don’t think that’s necessarily --  
 
[MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: And that was other -- 
 
THE COURT: -- a difference between still photographs and[] video.  If he’s 
able to authenticate it, he’s able to authenticate it, but I don’t[ --] 
 
[MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: Right.  But I don’t know that he watched 
the whole thing either --  
 
THE COURT: I don’t know either.  
 
[MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: -- which is what I wanted to voir dire him 
on.  
 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: He has watched it in view, in preparation of this trial, he 
has --  
 
THE COURT: Well, you -- you can ask him all that before, you haven’t laid 
the appropriate foundation for it yet.  I don’t know if that video -- 
- 10 - 
 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: He’s authenticated it as to be the date and the time of the 
incident, it was a true and accurate reflection of that date and time. 
 
THE COURT: There are other questions you need to ask him, like, has he 
watched it. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay.  
 
THE COURT: And is it a fair and accurate representation of what happened.  
I mean, I’m not trying --  
 
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay.  
 
THE COURT: Ask some more foundational questions.  
 
[PROSECUTOR]: Sure. 
 
After the bench conference concluded, the following exchange occurred between 
the prosecutor and Mr. Zimmerman: 
[PROSECUTOR:] Did you watch this video in preparation? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Yes, I did.  
 
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay.  And after seeing that video[,] was that a true and 
accurate depiction of the events that occurred that day? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Yes. 
 
[PROSECUTOR:] And there was nothing that was changed or altered? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] No. 
 
[PROSECUTOR:] From your recollection thereof? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] No.  
 
The prosecutor again offered State’s Exhibit 1A into evidence, and the circuit court stated 
that it would admit the exhibit over objection.  The video, which lasts 1 minute and 51 
- 11 - 
 
seconds, was played for the jury.  
 
In his brief in this Court, Mr. Mooney described the content of the video as follows: 
State’s #1A is a 1 minute and 51 second video showing a black SUV 
parked on the street with what appears to be a person in the front driver’s seat 
of the vehicle.  A person in a white shirt walks up the street, passing by the 
SUV on the passenger side, and then walks past the vehicle.  That person 
appears to stop, turn around, pull something from their waist, walk back 
towards the rear of the black SUV point something at the rear of the SUV, 
raise their hand and a few flashes come from the object in the person’s hand.  
The person then turns and quickly walks off the screen to the right.  The 
person in the driver’s seat of the black SUV gets out of the SUV and walks 
quickly in the other direction off camera crossing the street.  That same 
person returns later to the black SUV and appears to be talking on a phone. 
(State’s #1A “Mooney_Shooting_video.dat”).  
 
While the video was being played for the jury, the following exchange occurred 
between the prosecutor and Mr. Zimmerman: 
[PROSECUTOR:] Now, Mr. Zimmerman, I’m going to ask who is that 
individual in the white shirt walking around? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Uh, that was, um, Christopher Mooney. 
 
[PROSECUTOR:] In the white shirt? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] In the white shirt? 
 
[PROSECUTOR:] Correct. 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] I don’t -- I don’t know.  I just know of him, that’s it. 
 
[PROSECUTOR:] Who was the individual that exited the driver’s seat of the 
SUV? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Oh, that was me. 
 
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] I had a pink shirt on. 
 
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[PROSECUTOR:] Okay.  Pink, my apologies --  
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Yeah, pink --  
 
[PROSECUTOR:] -- my eyes --  
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] -- shirt on.  
 
[PROSECUTOR: Um, and were you holding your back? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Yes. 
 
[PROSECUTOR:] Why were you holding your back? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN: Um, because that’s where I was hit at with the bullet. 
 
After the video had been played, the following exchange occurred: 
 
[PROSECUTOR:] Now, Mr. Zimmerman, we saw you run off the screen in 
State’s Exhibit 1A, correct? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] Yes.  
 
[PROSECUTOR :] Okay.  Where did you run off to?  
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN:] I ran to the McDonald[’]s.  
 
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. 
 
Mr. Zimmerman identified Mr. Mooney as the person in the video wearing the white 
shirt and identified himself as the person in the pink shirt.  The circuit court also admitted 
into evidence, without objection, two other videos, identified as State’s Exhibits 1B and 2, 
and the videos were played for the jury.  Mr. Zimmerman testified that State’s Exhibit 1B 
showed Mr. Mooney in front of an SUV.  State’s Exhibit 1B does not show the shooting.3  
 
3During the State’s closing argument, however, the prosecutor indicated that three 
shots could be heard in State’s Exhibit 1B.  State’s Exhibit 1A did not have audio. 
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Mr. Zimmerman testified that State’s Exhibit 2 showed the inside of the McDonald’s near 
the dispensary, where he went after he was shot.  
As a witness for the State, Detective Victor Liu of the Baltimore Police Department 
testified that, on September 3, 2021, he responded to a report of “a shooting incident in the 
3900 block of Falls Road.”  There, Detective Liu saw an SUV with bullet holes in the back 
and whose rear window had been “shot out.”  Detective Liu testified that Mr. Zimmerman 
said that Mr. Mooney shot him.  
The prosecutor displayed an image from State’s Exhibit 1A and asked Detective Liu 
whether he recognized it.  Detective Liu responded that he did and explained that the image 
was from “the video [that he] recovered from the crime scene.”  Detective Liu testified 
that, when responding to a crime scene, the first thing that officers do is identify “possible 
witnesses and look for cameras[.]”  Detective Liu testified: “[It] just so happened this 
gentleman had a camera that’s mounted on an exterior wall . . . of his residence, so [] I 
spoke with the [] individual who provided that[] footage for me[.]”  
The jury found Mr. Mooney guilty of second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, 
and gun offenses.4  Mr. Mooney was sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment for second-
degree assault, 15 years consecutive for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, 
with the first 5 years to be served without parole, 3 years consecutive for possession of a 
handgun, and 1 year concurrent for both possession of ammunition by a prohibited person 
 
4The jury found Mr. Mooney not guilty of attempted first-degree murder, attempted 
second-degree murder, and first-degree assault. 
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and discharging a firearm in Baltimore City.5  Mr. Mooney appealed.  
Opinion of the Appellate Court of Maryland 
The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed Mr. Mooney’s convictions, explaining 
that the video was properly authenticated through the testimony of a witness with 
knowledge under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1) and under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), which 
provides that evidence can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence.  See Christopher 
Mooney v. State, No. 1561, Sept. Term, 2022, 2023 WL 6783388, at *5 (Md. App. Ct. Oct. 
13, 2023).  The Appellate Court did not adopt Mr. Mooney’s position that the foundational 
requirements for authentication were not met because Mr. Zimmerman could not 
authenticate the video under the “pictorial testimony” method of authentication, as he was 
not a witness to the entirety of the video.  See id. at *4.  The Appellate Court stated that 
“videos may be authenticated under several theories, including the ‘pictorial testimony’ 
theory[.]”  Id. at *2 (cleaned up).  The Appellate Court explained that the test for 
authentication of a video is not as strict as Mr. Mooney contended, as there need only be 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to determine that the video is what the proponent 
claims.  See id. *2, *4.  The Appellate Court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting the video and that, although Mr. Zimmerman did not see the 
shooter at the time that he was shot, that circumstance went to the weight to be given Mr. 
 
5The reckless endangerment conviction merged with the second-degree assault 
conviction for sentencing purposes. 
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Zimmerman’s testimony, not the admissibility of the video.  See id. at *5.6 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
On November 30, 2023, Mr. Mooney petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the 
following issue: “Whether the Appellate Court lowered the requirement for authentication 
of video evidence through the ‘pictorial testimony theory’ of admission when the 
authenticating witness did not witness the entirety of the events depicted in it?”  On 
February 16, 2024, we granted the petition.  See Mooney v. State, 486 Md. 387, 310 A.3d 
651 (2024). 
DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s determination as to 
whether an exhibit was properly authenticated.  See Sample, 468 Md. at 588, 228 A.3d at 
189; Sublet v. State, 442 Md. 632, 676, 113 A.3d 695, 721 (2015); Griffin v. State, 419 
Md. 343, 357, 19 A.3d 415, 423 (2011). 
B. Authentication of Evidence: The “Reasonable Juror” Test 
“[T]he bar for authentication of evidence is not particularly high.”  Sublet, 442 Md. 
at 666, 113 A.3d at 715 (cleaned up).  In Sublet, id. at 638, 113 A.3d at 698, we adopted a 
straightforward test for authentication of social media evidence, holding that, “to 
authenticate evidence derived from a social networking website, the trial judge must 
 
6The Appellate Court also held that Mr. Mooney preserved for appellate review his 
contention that the video was not properly authenticated.  See Mooney, 2023 WL 6783388, 
at *4.  That issue is not before us. 
- 16 - 
 
determine that there is proof from which a reasonable juror could find that the evidence is 
what the proponent claims it to be.”  We applied the “reasonable juror” test to 
authentication of social media evidence in Sublet, and, subsequently, in Sample, 468 Md. 
at 567-68, 228 A.3d at 176, we concluded that the preponderance of the evidence standard 
applies to the “reasonable juror” test. 
The history of the “reasonable juror” test in our case law began even earlier, with 
Griffin, 419 Md. 343, 19 A.3d 415.  In Griffin, id. at 357-58, 19 A.3d at 423-24, we held 
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the social media evidence at issue.7  
We declined to establish a bright-line test for authentication of social media evidence.  See 
id. at 363, 19 A.3d at 427.  Rather, we discussed a variety of ways in which social media 
evidence could be authenticated, such as through testimony of a person with knowledge 
(for instance, the purported author of a post or message), inspecting the device of the person 
who allegedly created the post or profile at issue to determine whether the device was used 
to create the profile or post, or obtaining information from the social media company that 
 
7At trial, the State had attempted to introduce evidence that was purportedly a 
printout from the MySpace page of the girlfriend of the defendant (whose nickname was 
allegedly “Boozy”) to demonstrate that the girlfriend had threatened a State’s witness.  See 
Griffin, 419 Md. at 350, 19 A.3d at 419.  The page contained language stating: “‘FREE 
BOOZY!!!!  JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!!  U KNOW WHO YOU 
ARE!!’”  Id. at 350, 19 A.3d at 419.  The State did not attempt to authenticate the page 
through the testimony of a witness with knowledge, i.e., the girlfriend, but instead 
attempted to authenticate the printout through the testimony of an investigator.  See id. at 
348, 19 A.3d at 418.  We determined that the printout was not sufficiently authenticated 
through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) because a photograph 
of the defendant’s girlfriend and information about her date of birth and the town in which 
she lived on the page were not “distinctive characteristics” that sufficiently indicated that 
the girlfriend created the profile or wrote the post that the State sought to introduce into 
evidence.  Id. at 357, 19 A.3d at 424. 
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would connect the profile or post to the person who created it.  See id. at 363-64, 19 A.3d 
at 427-28.  
In a dissenting opinion joined by the Honorable Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., the 
Honorable Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. stated that he would have adopted the “reasonable juror” 
test used by United States Courts of Appeals for authentication of social media evidence 
because it was consistent with Maryland Rule 5-901.  See id. at 366, 19 A.3d at 429 
(Harrell, J., dissenting).  Judge Harrell explained that, in his view, applying the reasonable 
juror test would have led to the conclusion that the social media evidence at issue was 
properly authenticated.  See id. at 367, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting). 
Four years later, in Sublet, 442 Md. at 637-38, 113 A.3d at 697-98, we adopted the 
reasonable juror test for social media evidence and applied it in the three cases that were 
consolidated for purposes of the opinion: Sublet v. State, Harris v. State, and Monge-
Martinez v. State.  We explained that, in United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 
2014), the Second Circuit had determined that Federal Rule of Evidence 901 “is satisfied 
if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of 
authenticity or identification.”  Sublet, 442 Md. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715 (quoting Vayner, 
769 F.3d at 129-30) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In Sublet, id. at 638, 113 A.3d at 
698, we held that social media evidence is authenticated under Maryland Rule 5-901 where 
a trial court determines that a reasonable juror could find that the evidence is what the 
proponent claims it to be. 
Five years later, in Sample, 468 Md. at 567-68, 228 A.3d at 176, we concluded that 
the “reasonable juror” test is subject to the preponderance of the evidence standard, i.e., 
- 18 - 
 
the more likely than not standard, and we reaffirmed that, under Maryland Rule 5-
901(b)(4), social media evidence may be authenticated through circumstantial evidence.  
We stated that, with respect to the authentication of social media evidence through 
circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), “‘the inquiry is context-
specific,’” and the presence or absence of certain information is not necessarily dispositive.  
Id. at 599, 228 A.3d at 195 (quoting Sublet, 442 Md. at 676-77, 113 A.3d at 721) (brackets 
omitted).  We explained that the proponent of the evidence “‘need not rule out all 
possibilities that are inconsistent with authenticity, or prove beyond any doubt that the 
social media evidence is what it purports to be.’”  Id. at 599, 228 A.3d at 195 (quoting 
Sublet, 442 Md. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715) (brackets omitted).8 
C. Authentication of Videos: Cole, Washington, Jackson, and Other Case Law 
We have previously addressed issues as to authentication of videos in three 
instances.  See Cole, 342 Md. at 27, 672 A.2d at 1123; Washington, 406 Md. at 646, 961 
 
8In a civil case, Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. Pifer, 478 Md. 645, 651, 674-75, 276 A.3d 
533, 536, 550 (2022), we applied the “reasonable juror” test and concluded that 
establishing a chain of custody was not a requirement for authentication of the evidence at 
issue.  We held that containers purchased on eBay were properly authenticated through 
circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) because “a reasonable juror 
[could] find by a preponderance of the evidence that the powder within the containers was 
Strait-Line marking chalk.”  Id. at 651, 678-79, 276 A.3d at 536, 552-53.  We addressed 
the possibility of tampering as follows: 
 
Insofar as negating the possibility of tampering is concerned, there is 
no hard and fast requirement that in a civil case where the issue of tampering 
is raised or where a substance may be susceptible to tampering, the proponent 
of the offered evidence is required to establish a chain of custody for the 
evidence to be admissible. 
 
Id. at 678, 276 A.3d at 552.  
- 19 - 
 
A.2d at 1112; Jackson, 460 Md. at 119, 188 A.3d at 982.  In Cole, 342 Md. at 26-27, 672 
A.2d at 1122-23, as a matter of first impression, we held that the “silent witness” theory of 
authentication can apply to videos and affirmed the admission of a video under that theory.  
In Cole, id. at 18, 672 A.2d at 1118, a correctional officer’s employment had been 
terminated because the officer deliberately injured an inmate while extracting him from a 
cell.  The incident was videotaped.  See id. at 18, 672 A.2d at 1118.  At a hearing before 
an administrative law judge (“the ALJ”), the warden testified that it was the regular practice 
of the prison for extractions of inmates from cells to be recorded by video.  See id. at 18, 
672 A.2d at 1118.  The warden explained that each such videotape was “routinely labelled 
with the date and time of the extraction and the names of the inmate and officers 
involved[,]” was “kept in an individual envelope[,] and [was] stored in a security vault at 
the institution[,] where they [could] be viewed only by signing in and out on a chain of 
custody form.”  Id. at 27, 672 A.2d at 1122.  Over objection, the ALJ admitted into evidence 
the videotape of the correctional officer injuring the inmate.  See id. at 19, 672 A.2d at 
1118.  No witness with knowledge testified that the content of the video fairly and 
accurately depicted the events shown on it.  See id. at 17, 672 A.2d at 1118. 
We explained that the “pictorial testimony” theory of authentication, in which a 
witness with knowledge of the events depicted on the video provides testimony, is not the 
sole method of authenticating video evidence.  See id. at 21, 672 A.2d at 1119.  We held 
that, like a photograph, a video can be authenticated under the “silent witness” theory of 
authentication.  See id. at 26, 672 A.2d at 1122.  We described the “silent witness” theory 
as an alternative way to authenticate video evidence under which a witness with personal 
- 20 - 
 
knowledge of the content of the video is not required.  Id. at 21, 672 A.2d at 1119.  We 
refrained from setting forth rigid prerequisites for the foundation necessary to authenticate 
under the “silent witness” theory, explaining that “[t]he facts and circumstances 
surrounding the making of the photographic evidence and its intended use at trial will vary 
greatly from case to case, and the trial judge must be given some discretion in determining 
what is an adequate foundation.”  Id. at 26, 672 A.2d at 1122 (citation omitted).  We 
concluded that the videotape at issue was sufficiently authenticated under the “silent 
witness” theory based on the warden’s testimony and that the ALJ properly admitted it into 
evidence.  See id. at 27, 672 A.2d at 1123.9 
In Washington, 406 Md. at 644-46, 961 A.2d at 1111-12, where the defendant was 
charged with shooting a person outside of a bar and an unknown technician (who had been 
hired by the owner of the bar) compiled a CD from multiple surveillance cameras and 
transferred information from the CD to a VHS tape which was given to the police, we held 
that the trial court erred in admitting the video and that the error was not harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  The Appellate Court had concluded that the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting the videotape because the State failed to properly authenticate the 
tape but that the error was harmless.  See id. at 648-49, 961 A.2d at 1113-14.10  In reviewing 
 
9We also concluded that authentication as a business record was an independent 
basis for authenticating the videotape because “there was enough evidence elicited at the 
administrative hearing to conclude that a record was made and kept in the course of the 
correctional institution’s regularly conducted business and that the videotape was made 
and kept as a valuable part of that record.”  Cole, 342 Md. at 30, 672 A.2d at 1124. 
10We granted certiorari  with respect to three questions, the third of which was:  
 
 
- 21 - 
 
the issue of harmless error, we discussed in detail how the “silent witness” and “pictorial 
testimony” methods of authentication may be used to authenticate photographs and videos.  
See id. at 652-55, 961 A.2d at 1115-17.  Citing Cole, 342 Md. at 20, 672 A.2d at 1119, we 
explained that “[a] videotape is considered a photograph for admissibility purposes.  It 
is admissible in evidence and is subject to the same general rules of admissibility as a 
photograph.”  Washington, 406 Md. at 651, 961 A.2d at 1115.  We stated that the 
Appellate Court had succinctly set out the rules for admission of photographs and 
quoted the following passage of the Appellate Court’s opinion: 
“Photographs may be admissible under one of two distinct rules.  
Typically, photographs are admissible to illustrate testimony of a witness 
when that witness testifies from first-hand knowledge that the photograph 
fairly and accurately represents the scene or object it purports to depict as 
it existed at the relevant time.  There is a second, alternative method of 
authenticating photographs that does not require first-hand knowledge.  
The ‘silent witness’ theory of admissibility authenticates ‘a photograph as 
a ‘mute’ or ‘silent’ independent photographic witness because the 
photograph speaks with its own probative effect.’” 
 
Id. at 652, 961 A.2d at 1115 (quoting Washington v. State, 179 Md. App. 32, 44, 943 A.2d 
704, 711 (2008)).  After quoting the Appellate Court, we observed that both the “pictorial 
 
Did the [Appellate Court of Maryland] err when it held that the 
introduction of an improperly authenticated surveillance videotape and 
photographs was harmless error, where the videotape and the photographs 
purportedly placed the petitioner at the scene of the crime, where they 
purportedly showed the petitioner committing the crime and where the 
prosecutor, in opening and closing arguments, repeatedly referred to, and 
relied on, those exhibits to argue that the petitioner was not guilty? 
 
Because we reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court on this question, we did not 
address the first two questions, which did not involve authentication of the videotape 
and are not relevant to our discussion in this case. 
- 22 - 
 
testimony” theory and the “silent witness” method of authentication allow photographic 
evidence to be authenticated.  Id. at 652, 961 A.2d at 1116.  We reiterated that, “to satisfy 
the evidentiary requirement for authentication, the proponent of the evidence must show 
that the evidence is ‘sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what 
its proponent claims.’”  Id. at 651, 961 A.2d at 1115 (quoting Md. R. 5-901(a)).   
Before addressing the issue of harmless error, we held “that the trial court erred in 
admitting the videotape and still photographs without first requiring an adequate 
foundation to support a finding that the matter in question [was] what the State claimed it 
to be”   Id. at 655-56, 961 A.2d at 1118.  We did not issue a holding with respect to the 
applicability of either the “pictorial testimony” or “silent witness” method of 
authentication.  In assessing whether the improper admission of the videotape constituted 
harmless error, we concluded that, without the videotape, the State’s identification of the 
petitioner as the shooter depended primarily on the testimony of “a witness who had  
declined on several occasions pretrial to identify petitioner as the shooter[,]” and that 
admission of “the videotape, relied upon so heavily by the State, under these 
circumstances, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 658, 961 A.2d at 1119. 
In Jackson, 460 Md. at 119, 188 A.3d at 982, we held that a surveillance video “was 
properly authenticated” and “serve[d] as a silent witness of the continuous activity at [an] 
ATM” during the twenty-minute period that it showed.  After an alleged home invasion 
robbery, over the course of several hours, the defendant purportedly used a debit card to 
make unauthorized withdrawals at an ATM at a branch of Bank of America.  See id. at 
- 23 - 
 
111, 188 A.3d at 977.  The trial court admitted into evidence two CDs, each with a 
surveillance video of the ATM—one from a twenty-minute period on the night of the 
robbery, and one from a twenty-minute period in the early morning hours on the following 
date.  See id. at 112, 188 A.3d at 978.  The trial court also admitted into evidence two still 
images from surveillance videos.  See id. at 112, 188 A.3d at 978.  Only the surveillance 
video from the twenty-minute period on the night of the robbery was at issue before us—
i.e., in this Court, the defendant did not contend that the other surveillance video or the still 
images were not properly authenticated.  See id. at 112 n.4, 114, 188 A.3d at 978 n.4, 979.  
The surveillance video at issue was recorded by four cameras, each showing the 
ATM from a different angle.  See id. at 118, 188 A.3d at 982.  A protective services 
manager from Bank of America testified that he accessed a digital video recording 
(“DVR”) program and pulled up surveillance videos from the relevant dates, times, and 
cameras.  Id. at 117, 188 A.3d at 981.  The manager testified that the surveillance video at 
issue was among the ones that he watched when he accessed the DVR program.  See id. at 
118-19, 188 A.3d at 982.  The manager testified that, after accessing the DVR program and 
pulling up surveillance videos, he exported them to a digital file, which he emailed to a 
detective.  See id. at 117, 188 A.3d at 981.  The manager testified that he could not “modify, 
cut, paste, or enhance the video in any way[,]” and he “did not even have the ability to copy 
the file directly to another storage device, such as a thumb drive or DVD.”  Id. at 117, 188 
A.3d at 981 (emphasis omitted). 
Based on the manager’s detailed testimony, we affirmed the trial court’s admission 
of the surveillance video, as the video was properly authenticated.  See id. at 119, 129, 188 
- 24 - 
 
A.3d at 982, 988.  We noted that we had “previously explained that, for purposes of 
admissibility, a videotape is subject to the same authentication requirements as a 
photograph.”  Id. at 116, 188 A.3d at 980 (citing Washington, 406 Md. at 651, 961 A.2d at 
1115).  Quoting Washington, 406 Md. at 652, 961 A.2d at 1116, we stated that, “‘so long 
as sufficient foundational evidence is presented to show the circumstances under which 
it was taken and the reliability of the reproduction process,’” a photograph is admissible 
as evidence.  Jackson, 460 Md. at 116-17, 188 A.3d at 981.  We reiterated that “[t]he 
question of authenticity is whether the evidence ‘is what the proponent claims it to 
be[,]’” and concluded that the video surveillance footage was properly authenticated.  
Id. at 118-19, 188 A.3d at 982 (quoting Md. R. 5-901(a)). 
Like this Court, the Appellate Court of Maryland has addressed issues concerning 
the authentication of videos and affirmed the admission of videos under the “silent witness” 
method of authentication.  In Reyes v. State, 257 Md. App. 596, 612 & n.6, 629, 292 A.3d 
416, 425 & n.6, 435 (2023), the Appellate Court of Maryland held that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting a video and still images recorded by a home security 
camera called a Nest camera manufactured and sold by Google.  Reyes, id. at 609, 292 
A.3d at 423, involved a nonfatal shooting that took place near a residential area.  At trial, 
a witness who lived in the area of the shooting testified that he had installed a home security 
camera “in the front window of his house” and explained “that it was Wi-Fi-enabled and 
motion-activated, and sends an alert to his phone when it begins and ends recording.”  Id. 
at 609, 612, 292 A.3d at 423, 425.  According to the witness, around the time of the 
- 25 - 
 
shooting, he received an alert on his phone that the home security camera had begun 
recording.  See id. at 609, 292 A.3d at 423.  The witness testified that he reviewed the 
resulting video, which showed the shooting, and emailed the video to law enforcement.  
See id. at 609, 612, 292 A.3d at 423, 425.  The witness testified that the State’s exhibit 
containing the video was the same as the video that he emailed to law enforcement and that 
it “accurately depicted the conditions on the night of the shooting[s.]”  Id. at 612, 292 A.3d 
at 425.  The victim also testified that still images from the video accurately depicted the 
scene on the night of the shooting.  See id. at 613, 292 A.3d at 425.  Over objection, the 
trial court admitted the video and still images into evidence.  See id. at 613, 292 A.3d at 
425. 
The Appellate Court concluded that the witness’s testimony about the video 
“provided an ‘adequate foundation assuring the accuracy of the process producing [the 
video and still images],’ and as such, the evidence was properly ‘received as a so-called 
silent witness.’”  Id. at 631-32, 292 A.3d at 436-37 (quoting Washington, 406 Md. at 653, 
961 A.2d at 1116) (brackets omitted).  The Appellate Court observed that, because it held 
that the still images were properly authenticated through the witness’s testimony under the 
“silent witness” theory of authentication, it was not necessary to address the State’s 
alternative argument that the still images could be authenticated through the victim’s 
testimony under the “pictorial testimony” theory of authentication.  See id. at 632 n.21, 292 
A.3d at 437 n.21.  The Appellate Court explained that “all photographic evidence, 
including video evidence, may be authenticated under several theories, including the 
‘pictorial testimony’ theory and the ‘silent witness’ theory[.]”  Id. at 630, 292 A.3d at 435 
- 26 - 
 
(citations omitted).11 
D. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions 
Courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that video footage was sufficiently 
authenticated through circumstantial evidence, and, in some instances, courts have 
explained that video footage may be authenticated by various forms of evidence.  In 
Commonwealth v. Davis, 168 N.E.3d 294, 311 (Mass. 2021), the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts held that “circumstantial evidence was sufficient to enable a reasonable 
jury to find that [a] video was what it purported to be.”  A law enforcement officer testified 
that, after responding to the scene of a shooting, he saw a car with its driver’s side door 
open that had crashed into a pole.  See id. at 298-99, 311.  While canvassing the area for 
witnesses and cameras, the officer saw a camera affixed to a residence.  See id. at 299.  The 
officer testified that a person who lived at the residence allowed him to view on a computer 
a video recorded by the camera.  See id.  According to the officer, because the person did 
not know how to download the video or copy it to another device, the officer used his cell 
phone to record the video.  See id.  The defendant challenged only the authenticity of the 
video contained on the computer, not the authenticity of the video recorded by the officer’s 
cell phone.  See id. at 310 & n.22.  Over objection, the trial court admitted into evidence 
the video the officer had recorded on his cell phone, i.e., the officer’s recording of the 
 
11Additional reported opinions in which the Appellate Court has held that videos 
were properly authenticated under the “silent witness” method include Covel v. State, 258 
Md. App. 308, 324, 297 A.3d 1228, 1238, cert. denied, 486 Md. 157, 303 A.3d 969 (2023) 
and Prince v. State, 255 Md. App. 640, 652-54, 284 A.3d 795, 802 (2022), cert. denied, 
482 Md. 746, 290 A.3d 608 (2023). 
- 27 - 
 
surveillance video from the computer.  See id. at 310. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting the surveillance video into evidence.  See id. at 311.  The Court 
observed that a vehicle depicted in the video that had crashed into the pole was the same 
color and body style as a vehicle in photographs taken at the crime scene that the officer 
had testified were fair and accurate representations of the scene of the shooting.  See id.  
The Court also noted that the video and one of the photographs of the scene both depicted 
the same sign advertising a church in front of the car.  See id.  The Court concluded that 
the circumstance that the officer viewed the surveillance video “in the immediate aftermath 
of the shooting[s], after he personally approached the resident to whom the surveillance 
system belonged[,] mitigate[d] concerns that the video could have been manipulated.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  In addition, the Court determined that another witness’s testimony about 
events that she observed at the scene matched information in the video and “provide[d] 
further circumstantial evidence to authenticate the video.”  Id.  The Court explained that 
the “silent witness” and “pictorial testimony” methods are not “the exclusive ways that a 
video can be authenticated” and that evidence can be authenticated by circumstantial 
evidence alone.  Id. at 310-11.12 
Davis is not the only case in which a court in another jurisdiction has held that a 
video was authenticated through circumstantial evidence.  In Holley v. State, 871 S.E.2d 
 
12Despite finding no abuse of discretion in the admission of the video, the Court 
reversed on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence 
related to a GPS device.  Davis, 168 N.E.3d at 298-99. 
- 28 - 
 
13, 18-19 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022), the Court of Appeals of Georgia concluded, under a statute 
providing for authentication through “testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter 
is what it is claimed to be[,]” that there was “ample circumstantial evidence . . . to 
authenticate [a] video” that the defendant allegedly posted on her Facebook page.  (Cleaned 
up).  In Lamb v. State, 246 So. 3d 400, 408-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018), the District Court 
of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, held that a video that one of the codefendants 
allegedly posted on Facebook was properly authenticated because of its “distinctive 
characteristics and content, in conjunction with circumstantial evidence[.]”  In Fowler v. 
State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), the Court of Criminal Appeals of 
Texas concluded that “circumstantial evidence [] authenticate[d]” a surveillance video 
from a store, including the circumstance that the video showed the defendant at the store 
at the date and time identified on a receipt found near a vehicle that the defendant allegedly 
stole. 
E. The Applicable Standard in this Case 
We have not previously addressed whether a video can be authenticated through 
circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) or whether the “reasonable 
juror” test applies to authentication of video evidence—i.e., these are matters of first 
impression.  We now unequivocally hold that the “reasonable juror” test applies to 
authentication of videos, just as it does to authentication of social media evidence and other 
evidence.  See Sublet, 442 Md. at 638, 113 A.3d at 698; Sample, 468 Md. at 568, 228 A.3d 
at 176.  We conclude that, for a trial court to admit a video, there must be sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the video is 
- 29 - 
 
authentic.  We also hold that a video can be authenticated through circumstantial evidence 
under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4).  We agree with the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts that what we have called the “pictorial testimony” and “silent witness” 
theories of authentication are not “the exclusive ways a video can be authenticated[.]”  
Davis, 168 N.E.3d at 310-11.  Video footage can be authenticated under several theories,13 
including through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4). 
We have never held that the “pictorial testimony” and “silent witness” theories of 
authentication—or the “business record” theory, for that matter—are the only ways to 
authenticate a video, or that a video cannot be authenticated through other means.  Such 
reasoning would be at odds with the principle that, without exception, Maryland Rule 5-
901(b)(4) permits a proponent of evidence to authenticate it through circumstantial 
evidence, and with our holdings in Sample, Sublet, and Griffin, which applied Maryland 
Rule 5-901(b)(4) to the authentication of social media evidence.  See Sample, 468 Md. at 
565, 228 A.3d at 174; Sublet, 442 Md. at 677, 113 A.3d at 721; Griffin, 419 Md. at 357, 
19 A.3d at 423-24.  As with social media evidence, Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) applies to 
the admission of video footage, and the question that we must answer in reviewing a trial 
court’s ruling is whether there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find by a 
preponderance of evidence that the video is what it is claimed to be.  
Our discussion of the “silent witness” and the “pictorial testimony” theories in 
 
13As demonstrated in Cole, 342 Md. at 27, 30, 672 A.2d at 1123, 1124, in which we 
concluded that the video at issue could be authenticated as a business record as well as 
under the “silent witness” theory, the “pictorial testimony” and “silent witness” theories of 
authentication are not the only ways to authenticate a video. 
- 30 - 
 
Washington, 406 Md. at 652-55, 961 A.2d at 1115-17, does not stand for the proposition 
that they are the exclusive methods for authentication of video footage.  Our holding in 
Washington, id. at 655-56, 658, 961 A.2d at 1117-18, 1119, was that the video at issue was 
not properly authenticated because the State failed to demonstrate that the video was what 
it purported to be and that the trial court’s improper admission of the video was not 
harmless error.  Although we quoted the Appellate Court’s discussion of the “pictorial 
testimony” and the “silent witness” theories, we expressed no view one way or the other 
as to whether we interpreted the Appellate Court’s discussion to mean that there are only 
two methods for authentication of video evidence.  See id. at 652, 961 A.2d at 1115.  And, 
to the extent that the language in the Appellate Court’s opinion originated from our 
decision in Cole, nothing in Cole indicated that there are two exclusive methods for 
authentication of video evidence.  In Cole, 342 Md. at 26-28, 672 A.2d at 1122-23, we 
adopted the “silent witness” method and determined that the surveillance video at issue 
could also have been authenticated as a business record.   
In addition, unlike in this case, in Washington, the State did not contend that the 
video was properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence.  We did not even 
mention Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) in Washington, much less decline to apply it.  In short, 
Washington does not in any way preclude authentication of a video through means other 
than the “silent witness” and “pictorial testimony” theories of authentication, including 
through use of circumstantial evidence.  
Video footage can be authenticated in different ways under the rules governing 
authentication, including through the testimony of a witness with knowledge under 
- 31 - 
 
Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1), circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), or 
a combination of both, as is the circumstance in this case.  There need not be a witness with 
personal knowledge of every single event depicted in a video for the video to be 
authenticated.  What matters is that the proponent of the video must demonstrate that the 
evidence is sufficient for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the video is what it is claimed to be. 
F. The State Met Its Burden to Prove That the Video Was Authentic 
In this case, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the video at issue because it was properly authenticated through a combination 
of the testimony of a witness with knowledge under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1) and 
circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4).  A reasonable juror could have 
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the video was what it purported to be—
namely, a fair and accurate video of the shooting and the events surrounding it. 
The parts of the video showing the events that Mr. Zimmerman saw were properly 
authenticated under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1) through his testimony as a witness with 
knowledge.  Before the video was admitted into evidence, based on his firsthand 
knowledge, Mr. Zimmerman testified that the video showed him sitting in his vehicle on 
what he knew to be the 3900 block of Falls Road, that the video was a true and accurate 
depiction of the events on the night of the shooting, and that there did not seem to have 
been any alterations or edits to the video.  Mr. Zimmerman testified about the following 
facts that he had personal knowledge of and that were depicted in the video: 
• While Mr. Zimmerman was sitting in his vehicle, Mr. Mooney walked down the 
- 32 - 
 
street toward him on his right.  
• The area had lights, and nothing obstructed Mr. Zimmerman’s view of Mr. Mooney, 
who was not wearing a face mask.  
• At some point, Mr. Mooney slowed down. 
• Mr. Mooney kept walking until he passed where Mr. Zimmerman was sitting in the 
vehicle.  
• Mr. Zimmerman opened the door of his vehicle next to the driver’s seat to look for 
Mr. Mooney. 
• As soon as Mr. Zimmerman sat back in the driver’s seat, he was shot.  
To be sure, Mr. Zimmerman did not testify that he saw the shooting, and he lacked 
firsthand knowledge of who the shooter was.  Even so, the part of the video depicting the 
shooting was properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 
5-901(b)(4), as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable juror 
could have inferred that the video fairly and accurately showed the shooting.  The close 
temporal proximity of the shooting to the events before and after the shooting of which Mr. 
Zimmerman had personal knowledge gave rise to an inference that the video accurately 
depicted the shooting.  Mr. Zimmerman testified that the video was a true and accurate 
depiction of the events that occurred and that the video did not appear to have been edited 
or altered.  And, there was evidence of the nature and origin of the video, indicating that 
the video was obtained from the crime scene from a source not connected to law 
enforcement or the shooting, as Detective Liu testified that he obtained the video from an 
individual with a camera mounted on the exterior wall of his residence near the crime scene.  
- 33 - 
 
With respect to the immediacy of the events, the entire video was short, lasting only 
1 minute and 51 seconds.  The part of the video showing the shooting and the events that 
occurred before and after is even briefer.  The shooting occurred within mere seconds in a 
series of events depicted on the video that Mr. Zimmerman had firsthand knowledge of.  In 
other words, Mr. Zimmerman could verify the accuracy of numerous events depicted in the 
video that occurred mere seconds before and after the shooting.  Mr. Zimmerman had 
personal knowledge of Mr. Mooney walking by his vehicle and Mr. Mooney slowing 
down, and of himself opening the door of his vehicle next to the driver’s seat and being 
shot immediately thereafter.  
The temporal proximity of relevant events can be significant where evidence is 
authenticated through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4).  In 
Sample, 468 Md. at 567-68, 228 A.3d at 176, we determined that “the temporal proximity 
of the attempted armed robbery to the unfriending” was one of the circumstances that 
authenticated social media evidence indicating that the defendant unfriended his 
accomplice after the offense.  In Sublet, 442 Md. at 676, 113 A.3d at 721, we concluded 
that a reasonable juror could have found that tweets were authentic, in part, because of “the 
temporal proximity” between the tweets and direct messages that had already been 
authenticated.  Similarly, in this case, the temporal proximity of the shooting to the events 
before and after that were depicted on the video and that Mr. Zimmerman had personal 
knowledge of gives rise to a reasonable inference that the video more likely than not fairly 
and accurately showed the shooting. 
Mr. Zimmerman testified that he reviewed the video in preparation for trial and that 
- 34 - 
 
the video truthfully and accurately depicted the events that occurred and did not appear to 
have been edited or altered.14  Because Mr. Zimmerman had personal knowledge of events 
that occurred within seconds before and after the shooting and testified that the video 
accurately depicted those events, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the video also 
fairly and accurately depicted the shooting.15  And, although the burden was on the State 
to authenticate the video, it is worth observing that, while Mr. Mooney’s counsel argued in 
the circuit court that “there’s no way to know if that video’s been altered[,]” Mr. Mooney 
did not allege that the video was altered or tampered with. 
Another important circumstance supporting the conclusion that a reasonable juror 
could have found that the video fairly and accurately depicted the shooting involves the 
nature and origin of the video.  Detective Liu testified that, when officers arrive at a crime 
scene, the first thing they do is look for witnesses and cameras, and that he obtained the 
video from an individual with a camera mounted on the exterior wall of his residence.  
Although the record does not reveal the identity of the individual who provided the video 
to Detective Liu, there was sufficient evidence to infer that the video was recorded by a 
camera belonging to a local resident and that it was obtained the same night as the shooting.  
 
14Mr. Zimmerman’s testimony that the video did not appear to be altered or edited 
constituted testimony that the content of the video did not vary or contradict his 
observations of the events that occurred.  Although Mr. Zimmerman’s testimony did not 
verify the manner of production of the video and was not the equivalent of testimony 
required for authentication of a video under the “silent witness” theory, Mr. Zimmerman’s 
testimony confirmed that the events shown on the video truthfully and accurately depicted 
his observations of what occurred. 
15After the video was played, consistent with his testimony that he had watched the 
video and it accurately depicted the events that occurred, Mr. Zimmerman confirmed that 
the video showed him running to McDonald’s after the shooting.  
- 35 - 
 
That the video was recovered the night of the shooting from a source not connected to 
either Mr. Zimmerman or Mr. Mooney, or the police, supports the conclusion that there 
was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the video was what it was claimed to be—a fair and accurate depiction of 
the shooting.  
While there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find in favor of 
authentication in this case, authentication of video footage through circumstantial evidence 
under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4) will generally require more fulsome questioning than the 
type of inquiry typically used to establish the necessary foundation for authentication under 
Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(1), where a witness may be asked if the item is a fair an accurate 
depiction of what it purports to be.  To be sure, in this case, the prosecutor asked Mr. 
Zimmerman whether the video showed what he knew to be the 3900 block of Falls Road 
and confirmed with Mr. Zimmerman that the video showed him in his vehicle.  And, after 
a bench conference at which the circuit court questioned whether a proper foundation had 
been laid for admission of the video, the prosecutor asked Mr. Zimmerman if he had 
watched the video and if the video was a true and accurate depiction of the events that 
occurred on the night of the shooting.  Although these were certainly valid questions and 
are the type of questions typically associated with authenticating evidence under Maryland 
Rule 5-901(b)(1), authentication of video footage through circumstantial evidence will 
generally require more specific questioning tailored to the particular circumstances of the 
case to establish a sufficient foundation for admission of evidence under Maryland Rule 5-
901(b)(4).   
- 36 - 
 
In this case, given the extremely close temporal proximity of the shooting to the 
events before and after the shooting (of which Mr. Zimmerman had personal knowledge), 
Mr. Zimmerman’s testimony that the video was a true and accurate depiction of the events 
that occurred, and the nature and origin of the video, the absence of more specific 
questioning, generating additional circumstantial evidence to corroborate events in the 
video, does not detract from our ability to conclude that the video was properly 
authenticated. 
G. Conclusion 
Video footage, like social media evidence, is susceptible to alteration, and the 
increased availability of new technology, particularly the advent of image-generating 
artificial intelligence, may present unique challenges in authenticating videos and 
photographs.  As we have noted, “[p]hotographic manipulation, alterations and fabrications 
are nothing new, nor are such changes unique to digital imaging, although it might be easier 
in this digital age.”  Washington, 406 Md. at 651, 961 A.2d at 1115.  Nonetheless, at this 
time, video footage can be authenticated through vigilant application of existing methods 
for authentication of evidence.  Like other evidence, video footage can be authenticated by 
circumstantial evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the video is what it purports to be.  As with social media evidence, the 
proponent of the evidence “‘need not rule out all possibilities that are inconsistent with 
authenticity, or prove beyond any doubt that the [] evidence is what it purports to be.’”  
Sample, 468 Md. at 599, 228 A.3d at 195 (quoting Sublet, 442 Md. at 666, 113 A.3d at 
715) (brackets omitted).  What matters is that there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable 
- 37 - 
 
juror to find that more likely than not the video footage is what it is claimed to be.  Because 
that test was met here, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT OF 
MARYLAND AFFIRMED.  PETITIONER TO 
PAY COSTS. 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT  
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 32 
 
September Term, 2023 
______________________________________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER MOONEY 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
______________________________________ 
 
Fader, C.J. 
Watts 
Booth 
Biran 
Gould 
Eaves 
Hotten, Michele D. (Senior 
Justice, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Concurring Opinion by Fader, C.J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:  August 13, 2024
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 121280030 
 
Argued: June 3, 2024 
 
 
I join the Majority opinion in full.  I write separately to express one additional 
thought.  Justice Gould begins his thoughtful dissent with a reference to “the age of 
artificial intelligence” and the growing “risk of fabricated or altered evidence.”  The 
evidentiary concerns associated with the growth and proliferation of artificial intelligence, 
especially generative artificial intelligence, are real and pressing.  Courts should be alert to 
claims that evidence has been altered by the use of artificial intelligence, and artificial 
intelligence technology may ultimately require us to adjust our rules and procedures for 
authenticating electronic evidence.  But the record in this case does not contain any hint 
that artificial intelligence may have played a role, nor was there any suggestion that the 
video may have been altered in any way.  We can expect to need to tackle issues associated 
with artificial intelligence soon, but this is not the case. 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT  
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 32 
 
September Term, 2023 
______________________________________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER MOONEY 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
______________________________________ 
 
Fader, C.J. 
Watts 
Booth 
Biran 
Gould 
Eaves 
Hotten, Michele D. (Senior 
Justice, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Gould, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:  August 13, 2024
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 121280030 
Argued: June 3, 2024 
 
 
 
I respectfully dissent to the Majority’s well-written and thorough opinion. In the age 
of artificial intelligence, the risk of fabricated or altered evidence has never been greater, 
and that risk will only increase as technology advances. The Majority optimistically posits 
that “at this time, video footage can be authenticated through vigilant application of 
existing methods for authentication of evidence.” Maj. Op. at 36.  I hope so, but my 
concerns are that Maryland Rule 5-901 was not vigilantly applied here, when the trial court 
admitted the video into evidence over Mr. Mooney’s objection and that, as a result, the 
Majority is lowering the bar by affirming the trial court’s ruling. In my view, the trial court 
should not have admitted the entire video but instead should have required the State to edit 
out the parts where Mr. Zimmerman lacked personal knowledge, including the footage of 
the shooting. Those critical few seconds were not authenticated by the pictorial testimony 
method, the silent witness method, or with circumstantial evidence. I write separately to 
explain my reasoning. 
 
Before delving into my analysis, I must emphasize that this dissent does not and 
should not be interpreted as calling into question the integrity of the officers, detectives, 
attorneys, or anyone else who may have touched the video exhibit at issue here. I have no 
reason to believe—and thus I do not believe—that the video was altered in any respect. 
But that is irrelevant to the legal issue before us. The relevant issue is whether the State 
satisfied its burden in establishing the authenticity of the video, based on the record 
evidence. Thus, any hypothetical speculation that the video has been fabricated or altered 
is solely to demonstrate what I believe are the weaknesses in the Majority’s reasoning, not 
to suggest that there is any reason to believe such foul play occurred here.   
2 
 
The Pictorial Testimony Method 
 
At trial, the State relied solely on the “pictorial testimony” method of authentication. 
See Mooney v. State, No. 1561, Sept. Term, 2022, 2023 WL 6783388, at *9 n.3 (Md. App. 
Ct. Oct. 13, 2023). Under that method, a video may be authenticated if a witness with 
firsthand knowledge of events testifies that the video fairly and accurately depicts those 
events. See Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs. v. Cole, 342 Md. 12, 20-21 (1996); see 
also Maj. Op. at 2. That the pictorial testimony method was used is evident in the bench 
conference following the defense’s objection to the video’s admission, during which the 
court and the State discussed how to lay a proper foundation for authenticating the video: 
[MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: I mean, there’s no way to know if that 
video’s been altered. It’s somebody else’s Ring camera. These aren’t still 
photographs of what happened. 
 
THE COURT: Has he watched it? 
 
[MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: I mean -- 
 
THE COURT: I don’t think that’s necessarily -- 
 
[MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: And that was other -- 
 
THE COURT: -- a difference between still photographs and, um, video. If 
he’s able to authenticate it, he’s able to authenticate it, but I don’t. 
 
[MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: Right. But I don’t know that he watched the 
whole thing either -- 
 
THE COURT: I don’t know either. 
 
[MR. MOONEY’S COUNSEL]: -- which is what I wanted to voir dire him 
on. 
 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
 
3 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: He has watched it in view, in preparation of this trial, he 
has -- 
 
THE COURT: Well, you -- you can ask him all that before, you haven’t laid 
the appropriate foundation for it yet. I don’t know if that video -- 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: He’s authenticated it as to be the date and the time of the
 
incident, it was a true and accurate reflection of that date and time. 
 
THE COURT: There are other questions you need to ask him, like, has he
 
watched it. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. 
 
THE COURT: And is it a fair and accurate representation of what happened. 
I mean, I’m not trying -- 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. 
 
THE COURT: Ask some more foundational questions. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: Sure. 
 
 
After the bench conference, the State questioned Mr. Zimmerman in the manner 
suggested by the court and the court admitted the video: 
[PROSECUTOR]: Did you watch this video in preparation? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN]: Yes, I did. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And after seeing that video[,] was that a true and 
accurate depiction of the events that occurred that day? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN]: Yes. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: And there was nothing that was changed or altered? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN]: No. 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: From your recollection thereof? 
 
[MR. ZIMMERMAN]: No. 
4 
 
 
[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, the State at this time would move into 
evidence State’s Exhibit 1A. 
 
THE COURT: Over objection, State’s 1A is admitted. 
 
The problem here is that Mr. Zimmerman did not see Mr. Mooney after he walked 
past Mr. Zimmerman’s car. Mr. Zimmerman testified that as Mr. Mooney was walking past 
his car, he thought Mr. Mooney was about to say something because “it looked like he 
slowed down, like he was about to say something.” Mr. Zimmerman explained that: 
. . . I seen him walk, and I didn’t know which way he went and so I’m looking. 
And then, I’m thinking he’s going to come run up to my front side of my -- 
my passen -- or the drive’s seat. . . . And, um, I look out my, I cracked my 
door and I’m looking out and I didn’t see him. As soon as I sat back that’s 
when the gunshots happened.  
 
Mr. Zimmerman gave his account of the incident before the State sought to authenticate 
the video—that is before Mr. Zimmerman answered “yes” when the State asked him if the 
video was “a true and accurate depiction of the events that occurred that day.” By his 
admission, therefore, Mr. Zimmerman’s first-hand knowledge of the events did not include 
the shooting. A reasonable juror would have had no basis to conclude from Mr. 
Zimmerman’s testimony that the depiction of the shooting was true, accurate, and 
unaltered. Thus, that part of the video should have been edited out of the version presented 
to the jury.  
 
 
5 
 
Circumstantial Evidence 
The Majority concludes that the footage depicting the shooting was authenticated 
by circumstantial evidence. One such piece of circumstantial evidence, according to the 
Majority, is the “close temporal proximity” of the relevant events. Maj. Op. at 31-33.  
“Temporal proximity” refers to the amount of time between two or more events. Under the 
Majority’s use of “temporal proximity,” the relevant events are (1) the moments depicted 
in the video leading up to the shooting, (2) the shooting, and (3) the moments after the 
shooting. Mr. Zimmerman had personal knowledge of the first and third events, but not the 
second.1 The Majority reasons that because the video is short and because the second event, 
which lasted just a few seconds, was sandwiched between the first and third events, a 
reasonable juror could infer that the “video fairly and accurately showed” the second event, 
even though Mr. Zimmerman did not see it.  Maj. Op. at 32-33. Put another way: According 
to the Majority, Mr. Zimmerman’s ability to authenticate some of the video provides a basis 
on which a reasonable juror could conclude that another part of the video was neither 
fabricated nor altered. I disagree with the Majority’s reasoning. 
The authentication requirement exists to prevent the admission of tampered 
evidence. If someone wanted to frame Mr. Mooney by tampering with the video, we would 
expect that person to alter the minimum amount necessary to achieve that purpose. Here, 
that could be altering only the appearance of the shooter. So, the fact that Mr. Zimmerman 
can authenticate the parts he did see does not mean the parts he could not see were 
 
1 As to the third event, Mr. Zimmerman’s personal knowledge was limited as well, 
as he did not testify that he saw the shooter leave the scene. 
6 
 
untampered with.  
 
 The Majority relies on two cases for its temporal proximity analysis: Sublet v. State, 
442 Md. 632 (2015) and State v. Sample, 468 Md. 560 (2020). If the Majority’s reliance 
on these cases is limited to the proposition that temporal proximity can theoretically 
provide circumstantial evidence of authenticity in certain contexts—that is, to establish that 
the concept of temporal proximity is potentially relevant in an authentication analysis—I 
do not disagree. But if the Majority relies on Sublet and Sample as precedents to justify 
how it uses temporal proximity here, I disagree. The nature of and relevance of the evidence 
at issue in both cases were different than that of the video at issue here. So too are the 
authentication challenges raised in the respective cases. 
 
In Sublet, this Court decided three cases consolidated for appeal. 442 Md. at 636-37. 
The second case, Harris v. State, involved private messages and public tweets on X 
(formerly Twitter). Id. at 645-52. The State apparently believed that the content of those 
communications was evidence of the defendant’s guilt; that is, what the defendant said in 
those communications was inculpatory. See id. at 645-52, 674-76. But the State had to 
establish that the communications were the handiwork of the defendant. It was in that 
context that temporal proximity came into play: The timing of the communications relative 
to other events connecting the defendant to the alleged crime was circumstantial evidence 
of the defendant’s authorship. Id. at 674-76.  
In Sample, the social media action was the unfriending on Facebook by one 
person—the defendant—of the defendant’s alleged accomplice. 468 Md. at 565-68. The 
State asserted that this act of unfriending was evidence of the defendant’s guilt in that it 
7 
 
showed the defendant was trying to distance himself from his alleged accomplice. See id. 
at 567. The names on the accounts of both the person who did the unfriending and the 
person who was unfriended did not identify the real names of the account holder. Thus, the 
authenticity challenge was twofold: (1) to show that the accounts were held by the 
defendant and the accomplice, respectively; and (2) to show that the defendant, and not 
someone else who might have gained access to the account, committed the act of 
unfriending. Id. In that context, the temporal proximity of the alleged crime to the act of 
unfriending was among the circumstantial evidence from which, we held, a reasonable 
juror could conclude that the unfriending was done by the defendant. Id. at 568, 602-05. 
In both Sublet and Sample, the relevance of the evidence hinged on whether the 
defendant was the person who generated the evidence at issue—in Sublet, the social media 
communications and in Sample, the unfriending. In other words, the authentication issue 
was not so much whether the evidence was real or fake; the issue was whether the defendant 
was the actor who created the evidence. So, the act of generating that evidence was a critical 
piece of the temporal proximity analysis. In contrast, here, the relevance of the piece of 
evidence—the video—does not hinge on who created it, but instead on whether it was real 
or fake. Here, the authentication issue was not to show that a particular person created the 
video; it was whether the State demonstrated that the video was neither fabricated nor 
altered. And the creation of the video was not a relevant event in the Majority’s temporal 
proximity analysis. Accordingly, in my view, Sublet and Sample do not support how the 
Majority uses temporal proximity here.   
 
 
8 
 
Silent Witness Testimony 
The Majority tries to fill the gap left by the pictorial method by using the “silent 
witness” approach to authenticating the video, pointing to “the nature and origin of the 
video.” Maj. Op. at 34. Recall that the State introduced and entered the video into evidence 
through the testimony of Mr. Zimmerman. Detective Liu, who received the video, testified 
after Mr. Zimmerman. So, to begin with, the trial court did not admit the video based on 
the silent witness approach based on Detective Liu’s testimony.  
In any event, Detective Liu’s testimony was insufficient under the silent witness 
approach. Here’s what we know from Detective Liu’s testimony: (1) When officers arrive 
at the scene of the crime, the first thing they do is look for witnesses and cameras; and 
(2) he obtained the video from someone with a camera mounted on the exterior wall of his 
residence. From these two facts, the Majority holds that a reasonable juror could conclude 
that the “video was recorded by a camera belonging to a local resident and that it was 
obtained the same night of the shooting.” Maj. Op. at 34.  
I have no problem with the first inference—that the video was recorded by a local 
resident’s camera. But the second inference is a bridge too far. There is no basis to draw 
any conclusion as to when Detective Liu received the video. Maybe the resident was home 
when Detective Liu canvassed the area; maybe not. Maybe Detective Liu left a card at the 
residence’s front door on the day of the shooting and received a call back the next day, or 
maybe he received a return call in the following weeks or months. The record reveals 
nothing about when Detective Liu received the video.  
There is much we do not know, but should know, to be consistent with the standard 
9 
 
this Court has set for the “silent witness” approach to authenticating photos or videos. 
Which type of camera was used? What media was used to record the images? Where were 
the images from the camera stored? Did Detective Liu receive a copy of the video or the 
original? If it was a copy, who made the copy, and when and how was it made? Was the 
video emailed to Detective Liu? Did he receive a thumb drive? Was Detective Liu given 
access to a cloud account where the video was stored? Was the video recorded in a format 
that made it easy to alter? Who had access to the video before it was provided to Detective 
Liu? Who had access to the video after Detective Liu received it? The inability to answer 
these questions on this record is troubling, in my view, particularly when compared to other 
cases in which video evidence was admitted or excluded.  
In Cole, for instance, this Court held that a videotape of a prisoner’s extraction from 
his cell was properly authenticated. 342 Md. at 27. There, the prison warden testified that 
videotaping cell extractions was a routine practice at the prison, that each videotape was 
routinely labeled with the date and time of the extraction, that each videotape was routinely 
labeled with the names of the prison officers and inmates involved, that each videotape was 
maintained in a security vault, and that each videotape could only be viewed by signing it 
out on a custody form. Id.  
In Jackson v. State, 460 Md. 107 (2018), we held that video footage of an ATM was 
properly authenticated when a bank employee described in detail the process for obtaining 
that footage and providing it to police. The employee testified that the process involved 
accessing a digital video recorder program that prevented him from modifying the video 
or even copying it to an external storage device. Id. at 117. To send the video to the police, 
10 
 
the employee was required to submit a request to bank employees outside of Maryland, 
who would then mail the video directly to the police. Id.  
Finally, in Reyes v. State, 257 Md. App. 596 (2023), the Appellate Court of 
Maryland held that a video taken by a man’s residential security camera was properly 
authenticated when he testified to the camera’s “general reliability” and other pertinent 
facts, including that he had installed the camera in the front window of the residence, that 
the camera was motion-activated and would send an alert to his phone when it began 
recording, and that he received such an alert on the night the video in issue was taken. Id. 
at 612, 631. 
 
In contrast, in Washington v. State, 406 Md. 642 (2008), we held that a video was 
not properly authenticated because an unknown person created the video “through some 
unknown process” by compiling footage from eight surveillance cameras onto a CD and 
then copying that footage to a videotape.  Id. at 655. As we noted, “[t]here was no testimony 
as to the process used, the manner of operation of the cameras, the reliability or authenticity 
of the images, or the chain of custody of the pictures.” Id.  So too here. On this record, 
there was insufficient evidence to authenticate the video using the silent witness method.  
* * * 
 
In sum, the most critical part of the video—the shooting—was not properly 
authenticated using the pictorial testimony method, the silent witness method, or with other 
circumstantial evidence. In my view, that part of the video should not have been admitted. 
I would therefore reverse and remand the case for a new trial.   
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.