Title: Condict v. Lehman

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Condict v. Lehman1992 WY 101837 P.2d 81Case Number: 91-121Decided: 08/21/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Elsie E. CONDICT, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Larry L. LEHMAN, District 
Court Judge, Second Judicial District, State of Wyoming; and Ann Masson, 
District Court Clerk, Second Judicial District, State of 
Wyoming,

 Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court of Carbon County, John T. Langdon, J.

Elsie E. 
Condict, pro se.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., and Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee Larry L. 
Lehman.

Thomas "T.C." 
Campbell, Carbon County Atty. and Pros. Atty., and Wade E. Waldrip, Deputy 
County Atty., Rawlins for appellee Ann Masson.

Before MACY, 
C.J., THOMAS and CARDINE, JJ., and RAPER and BROWN, JJ., Ret.

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      Elsie Elizabeth 
Condict, appellant, filed suit against Larry L. Lehman, District Judge, and Ann 
Masson, former Clerk of the District Court. John T. Langdon, District Judge, 
dismissed this lawsuit for failure to state a cause of action.

[¶2]      Appellant states 
the issues to be:

     A. Whether the interim 
trustee had "jurisdiction" to substitute himself as a plaintiff in Civil 
Action 91C-3?

     B. Whether Judge 
Langdon had "jurisdiction" to allow the interim trustee to be "substituted as 
plaintiff" at the hearing on March 29, 1991?

     C. Whether the court's 
dismissal of the case was "an abuse of discretion"?

     D. Whether Judge 
Langdon denied the "real party in interest", (appellant), due process and access 
to the court?[1]

[¶3]      The questions 
suggested by appellant are phantom issues and obfuscate the simple issue on 
appeal: Whether the Appellant's complaint should have been dismissed because it 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could have been granted.

[¶4]      We 
affirm.

[¶5]      In January 1991, 
appellant filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985 (1988), naming as 
defendants Larry L. Lehman, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and Ann 
Masson, former Clerk of the District Court, Second Judicial District. Appellant 
alleged that Judge Lehman had improperly rendered decisions in several district 
court matters in which she had been a party. The principal complaint of 
appellant against Judge Lehman was the case of Condict v. Condict, Civil Action 
No. 82C-219 (dismissed by the Wyoming Supreme Court February 7, 1990), which was 
an action for a partition and an accounting. Other cases involved actions for 
trespass and assault and battery. The complaint against defendant Ann Masson is 
that she refused to enter a default judgment upon application by appellant in a 
civil action filed earlier in the Second Judicial District, Civil Action No. 
90C-116.

[¶6]      After a hearing 
on a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion on March 29, 1991, the court dismissed appellant's 
complaint against both appellees for failure to state a cause of action upon 
which relief could be granted.2

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶7]      The court must 
accept the facts as alleged in plaintiff's complaint as true, and view them in 
the light most favorable toward the appellant. Kautza v. City of Cody, 812 P.2d 143, 145 (Wyo. 1991); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Board, 
797 P.2d 1171, 1171 (Wyo. 1990). Appellant's pleadings must be liberally 
construed, and the court "will sustain a dismissal of a complaint only if it 
shows on its face that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under any set of 
facts." Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1987). See 
also Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶8]      A motion to 
dismiss will be granted only if the pleadings disclose with certainty the 
impossibility of proving a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fiscus v. 
Atlantic Richfield Company, 742 P.2d 198, 202 (Wyo. 1987). "Dismissal is a 
drastic remedy, and is sparingly granted." Mostert, 741 P.2d  at 1092. "A motion 
to dismiss, even though sparingly granted, is the proper method for testing the 
legal sufficiency of the allegations and will be sustained when the complaint 
shows on its face that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Mummery v. 
Polk, 770 P.2d 241, 243 (Wyo. 1989).

I.

JUDICIAL 
IMMUNITY

[¶9]      Appellant 
purported to bring this action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985; therefore, we 
will examine both federal and state cases on judicial immunity. It has been 
expressly determined that judges enjoy immunity in civil rights litigation. 
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967). In 
judicial immunity litigation, courts need only be concerned with proper 
jurisdiction and the nature of the judge's act. "A judge will not be deprived of 
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was 
in excess of his authority; rather he will be subject to liability only when he 
has acted in the `clear absence of all jurisdiction.'" Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331, reh'g denied 436 U.S. 951, 98 S. Ct. 2862, 56 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1978).

[¶10]   Two factors must be satisfied for a 
defense of judicial immunity to prevail. A judge is immune for his acts if he 
had jurisdiction and a judicial act was involved. Stump, 435 U.S.  at 362, 98 S. Ct.  at 1107. The cases in which Judge Lehman ruled against appellant were 
within his jurisdiction. District judges in Wyoming have the authority to hear 
the type of cases about which appellant complains. See, e.g., Wyo. Const. art. 
5, § 10 and Wyo. Stat. § 1-23-103 (1988).

[¶11]   Judge Lehman's actions also meet 
the second prong of the immunity, that is, his actions were judicial acts. A 
judicial act is a function normally performed by a judge and one in which the 
parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S.  at 362, 
98 S. Ct.  at 1107. Deciding cases of which appellant complains were clearly 
judicial acts. Cf. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228-29, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988) (firing a probation officer is an administrative, rather than 
judicial, act).

[¶12]   Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 1047 
(Wyo. 1980) recognizes that judges are exempt from liability under federal civil 
rights statutes. "[I]t has long been the rule that courts of general 
jurisdiction are exempt from liability of civil action for their official acts 
even if in excess of their jurisdiction." Linde v. Bentley, 482 P.2d 121, 123 
(Wyo. 1971). "Municipal judges, * * * as with all other judges, are clothed in 
the mantle of judicial immunity, and cannot be found liable for any action taken 
while acting, as here, in a judicial capacity." Cotton v. Hand, 563 P.2d 1343, 1344 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶13]   It is clear that Judge Lehman 
enjoyed absolute judicial immunity under the circumstances of this case 
according to both federal and state law.

II.

CLERK OF 
COURT

[¶14]   Although appellant's complaint is 
unclear, the allegations against appellee Ann Masson appear to be that she 
refused to enter a default judgment upon application by appellant in a civil 
action filed earlier in the Second Judicial District, Civil Action No. 90C-116, 
in violation of W.R.C.P. 55. Civil Action No. 90C-116 was an action brought by 
appellant, pro se, in the Second Judicial District, against Aurilla P. Condict, 
Alden R. Condict, and Karen K. Condict.

[¶15]   W.R.C.P. 553 provides in part:

     (a) Entry. - 
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed 
to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to 
appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter his default.

     (b) Judgment. - 
Judgment by default may be entered as follows:

     (1) By the Clerk. - 
When the plaintiff's claim against a defendant is for a sum certain, or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, the clerk upon request of the 
plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for that 
amount and costs against the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to 
appear and if he is not an infant or incompetent person;

     (2) By the Court. - In 
all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the 
court therefor; but no judgment by default shall be entered against an infant or 
incompetent person unless represented in the action by a general guardian, 
guardian ad litem, trustee, or other such representative who has appeared 
therein. If the party against whom a judgment by default is sought has appeared 
in the action, he (or, if appearing by representative, his representative) shall 
be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least 3 days 
prior to the hearing on such application. If, in order to enable the court to 
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or 
to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by 
evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct 
such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper, and 
shall accord a right of trial by jury to the parties when and as required by any 
statute.

[¶16]   Appellant contends that she was 
entitled to a default judgment in Civil Action No. 90C-116 (Carbon County). 
However, she does not cite the record, authorities, or make a cogent argument in 
support of her contention. She fails to demonstrate that she was entitled to a 
default judgment. Appellant did not ask the clerk to enter the default of 
appellees according to W.R.C.P. 55(a), but rather ignored that step and applied 
for a default judgment.

[¶17]   In Civil Action No. 90C-116, 
defendants Alden R. Condict and Karen Conduct apparently did not answer Elsie E. 
Condict's (appellant here) petition within twenty days after service of 
summons.4 However, these defendants did enter 
pleadings and appeared in the action before the expiration of the twenty days by 
filing: (1) "Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint," see United States 
Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., 664 P.2d 121 (Wyo. 1983); (2) "Motion 
to Dismiss and Strike Plaintiff's Motion for Peremptory Disqualification of the 
Honorable Larry Lehman"; (3) "Motion for Admission of Out-of-State Counsel" 
(which was granted); and (4) a brief. Therefore, it cannot be seriously 
contended that Alden and Karen Condict had not pled, defended or appeared in the 
action.

[¶18]   In Elsie Condict's petition in 
Civil Action No. 90C-116 (Carbon County), she demanded judgment against the 
defendants for: (1) $4,921,144.38; (2) $5,000,000 punitive damages; (3) in 
excess of $750,000 for costs and attorney fees; and (4) for other 
costs.

[¶19]   The basic cause of action in Civil 
Action No. 90C-116 was for fraud. The damages claimed could not be computed to a 
sum certain as required by W.R.C.P. 55. An affidavit filed by appellant was not 
filed pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(b)(1) and did not aid in a computation to a sum 
certain. There was nothing in the affidavit with respect to determining damages 
for fraud, punitive damages, attorney fees or costs. The affidavit merely traced 
the history of the parties' litigation and argued the theory of the case. 
Furthermore, because the Condict defendants had made an appearance, they were 
entitled to written notice of application for judgment at least three days prior 
to the hearing on such application pursuant to W.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). Appellant 
admits that she did not give this notice.

[¶20]   In summary, appellant was not 
entitled to a default judgment because of her failure to comply with W.R.C.P. 
55.

[¶21]   The issues raised by appellant on 
appeal are without merit.

[¶22]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 On September 20, 1990, 
appellant Elsie E. Condict filed a petition for bankruptcy relief pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. Ch. 7 (1988) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Wyoming. James T. Dinneen was appointed trustee of the bankruptcy estate created 
upon the filing of said bankruptcy petition. On December 18, 1990, appellant was 
discharged by the bankruptcy court. On February 14, 1991, a Motion to Substitute 
Party Plaintiff was filed by James T. Dinneen; the motion was granted by Judge 
John T. Langdon on February 21, 1991. This dancing around with the bankruptcy 
court has nothing to do with the merits of this case.

2 W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) states 
in pertinent part:

     Every defense, in law 
or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading 
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option 
of the pleader be made by motion: * * * (6) failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted[.]

3 The Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure have since been amended, effective March 24, 1992.

4 Aurilla P. Condict was 
not served with summons. She was "deemed not competent for service."