Title: In re Worth

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  July 1, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of
ANTHONY L. WORTH,
Accused.
(OSB 02-34; SC S50682)
En Banc
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Submitted on the record April 21, 2004.
Anthony L. Worth, Pendleton, filed the brief for himself.
Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
filed the briefs for the Oregon State Bar.  With her on the
briefs was Thomas C. Howes.
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for 120
days, effective 60 days from the date of the filing of this
decision.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar alleged that the accused knowingly made
misrepresentations in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3), engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation
of DR 1-102(A)(4), failed to provide his client with competent
representation in violation of DR 6-101(A), and neglected a legal
matter in violation of DR 6-101(B).  A trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board found that the accused had not made
misrepresentations but that he had committed the other charged
violations.  The trial panel suspended the accused from the
practice of law for 90 days.  
The Bar seeks review of the trial panel's decision,
arguing that the accused knowingly misrepresented facts in
violation of DR 1-102(A)(3).  The Bar also argues that we should
suspend the accused from the practice of law for one year rather
than 90 days.  The accused, for his part, does not challenge the
trial panel's findings that he engaged in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice, that he failed to provide his
client with competent representation, and that he neglected a
legal matter.  He argues, however, that he did not knowingly
misrepresent anything.  On de novo review, we conclude that
the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 6-101(A),
and DR 6-101(B), and suspend him from the practice of law for 120
days.
Because the only contested issue concerning the
accused's conduct is whether he made statements that constituted
misrepresentations, we focus on that inquiry and summarize the
facts necessary to put it in context.  Gayalene Buck rented the
bottom floor of a house in Pendleton to Lupe Pena.  Gayalene's
son, Buddy Buck, moved into the top floor of the house. 
According to Pena, she repeatedly found Buddy in her part of the
house, without her consent, watching her television, eating her
food, and using her telephone to make long distance calls.  Pena
moved out when she could not tolerate Buddy's conduct any longer
and sought legal help from the accused.
On May 10, 2000, the accused filed a complaint against
the Bucks, alleging unlawful entry and violations of the
landlord-tenant laws.  The accused served the defendants in
August 2000.  On August 18, the accused sent a letter to the
defendants' counsel, Michael Collins, asking him to file an
answer.  The letter also stated, incorrectly, that a request for
production was enclosed.  Collins filed an answer on August 25
and notified the accused that, contrary to the statement in his
letter, no request for production had been enclosed.
In early September, the accused gave Collins some
documents that Collins had requested.  On September 20, the trial
court administrator notified the parties that he was assigning
the case to mandatory arbitration.  Under the local rules, the
parties had 21 days in which to select an arbitrator and 49 days
after that to set the case for a hearing before the arbitrator. 
Also, on September 20, the defendants offered Pena $500 to settle
the case.  The accused communicated the offer to Pena, which she
declined.  According to Collins, the accused never communicated
Pena's decision to him.  One other event occurred in September. 
On September 28, the accused sent Collins a letter suggesting
that they call each other regarding the court-ordered
arbitration.
Over the next several months, the accused spoke
informally to Collins about discovery.  On February 20, 2001, the
court sent the parties a notice of intent to dismiss the case
because no action had occurred within the last two months.  The
notice stated that, to avoid dismissal, "a written motion and
order must be submitted by [March 22, 2001]."  On April 4, 2001,
the accused served a request for production on defendants.  That
same day, the accused submitted a motion to retain the case on
the court's docket.  The motion recited that the "[p]laintiff is
continuing to attempt to resolve this matter with the
[d]efendant[s] short of going to trial." 
The defendants objected to the plaintiff's motion and
submitted an affidavit from their lawyer in support of their
position.  In his affidavit, Collins stated that the accused had
not responded to his settlement offer, that no arbitrator had
been selected, and that the case was in essentially the same
posture that it had been when the plaintiff filed it almost a
year earlier.
At a hearing on June 29, 2001, (1) the trial court
considered the parties' positions and discussed discovery issues. 
The trial court told the parties that it would retain the case on
the docket but that it expected the accused to comply with the
arbitration rules and set the case for a hearing before an
arbitrator on or before August 17, 2001.  The local arbitration
rules put the burden on the plaintiff to notify the arbitrator
and arrange for the arbitration.  At some point that day, either
the court or the parties selected Steven Bloom as their
arbitrator.
On July 24, 2001, the accused sent a notice to Collins
that he would take the defendants' depositions on August 14,
2001. (2)  In a cover letter, the accused stated that he had
"arbitrarily selected this date without consultation with
[Collins]" and asked Collins to let him know if the date was
inconvenient.  Collins called the accused on July 25, 2001, the
day he received the accused's letter, and also wrote him a letter
confirming their conversation.  Collins told the accused that he
was going to be out of the office from August 6 through August 17
on a planned vacation.  Collins noted the possibility that he
might be available for depositions on the morning of August 10. 
The parties, however, could not find a mutually convenient date
for the depositions in August, (3) and the accused sent Collins
a letter on September 17, 2001, suggesting that he take the
defendants' depositions in October.
On September 21, Collins moved to dismiss for want of
prosecution.  Collins submitted an affidavit, reciting the
history of the case.  The accused filed an affidavit, dated
October 11, 2001, opposing the motion to dismiss.  In his
affidavit, the accused stated that, since filing the complaint,
he had "been trying to complete discovery in [the] matter," that,
in his view, completing discovery was a prerequisite to settling
the case, and finally that "[t]he last time [p]laintiff scheduled
depositions, counsel for [d]efendants postponed due to his
vacation schedule."
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the accused
told the trial court that he had "bent over backwards" to get the
depositions scheduled, that he had "really tried to push" the
case forward, but that Collins had not cooperated.  The trial
judge noted that, as he remembered, he had told the parties that
they had to set the case for arbitration by August 17, 2001, and
that the accused was responsible for contacting the arbitrator
and "mak[ing] sure that that was done."  In response to that
observation, the accused stated:
"I called Mr. Bloom's office.  I was responded to with
a phone call, not from Mr. Bloom, but from somebody in
his office, asking if discovery was complete, and I had
to say no, and I issued the notice to take
depositions."
The accused explained that he did not believe that it was the
court's intent for the parties "to arbitrate willy-nilly, whether
Mr. Collins defeats my efforts to get discovery or no."
Collins responded that the accused had not sent him a
notice of deposition until almost a month after the court
directed that the arbitration be set within 49 days.  Collins
explained that he had responded immediately to the accused's
request and had attempted to work with him.  He also noted that
"this is the first time I have heard that he's made any attempt
to contact Mr. Bloom's office."  The accused replied that he had
been reasonable in scheduling discovery and "to suggest that we
have to go to arbitration in a situation where I'm systematically
being denied depositions, I just don't think that's correct."  He
then added:
"And it's not coincidental that my notice to take
depositions went out within three days of being told by
Mr. Bloom's office that I needed to do discovery, if I
was going to get it."
The court then called Bloom.  When asked about the
case, Bloom explained that he "d[id] not recognize th[e] case
name and [he] d[id]n't remember ever, or my office, getting a
call from [the accused]."  Bloom explained that, if someone calls
and he cannot take the call, he gets a phone message asking him
to call back.  However, he had not gotten any message on the
accused's case.
In response to Bloom's statements, the accused stated:
"When I called, and my recollection is that I was
called back, but I'm willing to be wrong and willing to
say that during the brief conversation, I was asked if
discovery was complete, and when I responded that it
wasn't, I was told that we should endeavor to complete
discovery before we try to set an arbitration date. 
That made sense to me, so I didn't follow up further
with Mr. Bloom."
The court then asked Bloom whether that would be his
normal procedure, and he answered "no."  Bloom explained:
"We have some very nice, competent legal secretaries in
our office, but they don't know discovery from a hole
in the ground, and they would never, and they certainly
don't have that instruction from me, and this is the
first time I have ever heard anybody direct a question
to a secretary about -- or my secretary coming back and
saying, before Bloom will take an arbitration, is
discovery complete?"
When the accused explained that he had not asked whether Bloom
would take the case but what he needed to do to get the
arbitration set, Bloom responded that he "set[s] all [his] own
stuff.  The secretaries don't do it."  Having heard Bloom's
statements, the court granted the motion to dismiss without
further discussion.
The Bar received a complaint concerning the accused's
conduct, and the trial panel found that, despite numerous warning
signals, the accused failed to take steps to move Pena's case
forward or assure compliance with the trial court's June 29 order
that the case be set for arbitration by August 17.  The trial
panel concluded that this course of conduct constituted neglect
in violation of DR 6-101(B) and prejudiced the administration of
justice in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4).  The trial panel found
that the accused failed to provide Pena with competent
representation in violation of DR 6-101(A).  The trial panel
concluded, however, that the accused had not made a
misrepresentation in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3). (4)
As noted, the accused does not challenge the trial
panel's conclusion that he violated DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 6-101(A),
and DR 6-101(B), and we agree that the accused violated those
rules.  The Bar argues, however, that the accused also made
misrepresentations in his April 4, 2001, motion, in his October
11, 2001, affidavit, and during the November 9, 2001, hearing. 
We turn to those claims.
DR 1-102(A)(3) provides that "[i]t is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to * * * [e]ngage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."  Dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation are related but separate
concepts, see In re Leonard, 308 Or 560, 569, 784 P2d
95 (1989) (stating principle), and the Bar has alleged that the
accused knowingly made misrepresentations in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3).  To establish that proposition, the Bar must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the misrepresentations were
"knowing, false, and material in the sense that the
misrepresentations would or could significantly influence the
hearer's decision-making process." In re Eadie, 333 Or 42,
53, 36 P3d 468 (2001); In re Boardman, 312 Or 452, 456-57,
822 P2d 709 (1991).  The Bar need not prove that the accused
actually misled anyone, however. Boardman, 312 Or at 456-57.
In deciding whether the Bar met its burden of proof, we
review the evidence de novo, giving weight to the trial
panel's credibility findings. In re Gallagher, 332 Or 173,
175-77, 26 P3d 131 (2001).  With that standard of review in mind,
we turn to the first of four statements that, the Bar contends,
constitutes a misrepresentation.
The trial court notified the accused on February 20,
2001, that it intended to dismiss the case unless the accused
showed good cause why the case should be continued.  On April 4,
2001, the accused filed a motion to retain the case on the docket
and recited in the motion that the "[p]laintiff is continuing to
attempt to resolve this matter with the [d]efendant short of
going to trial."  The Bar argues that, because the accused had
taken no steps to resolve the case since September 2000, the
accused "could not have reasonably believed that his statement
was true."
It is true, as the Bar argues, that the accused had not
done very much in the period between September 2000 and April
2001 to justify his statement that he "[wa]s continuing to
attempt to resolve" the case short of going to trial.  The
accused testified, however, that he believed that the case would
settle once he got discovery and that he had spoken informally
with Collins about discovery between September and April. 
Collins, for his part, acknowledged that, between September 20,
2000, and April 4, 2001, he and the accused "may have had some
kind of a brief courthouse steps kind of thing or something
[regarding depositions].  We may have had a couple of
conversations like that somewhere along the line."
Although the accused's efforts to resolve the case
between September and April can hardly be described as vigorous,
he did make some efforts during that time to discuss discovery
and, in his view, work toward the case's resolution.  Given that
evidence, we find that the Bar has not proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused's statement on April 4, 2001
-- that he was "continuing to attempt to resolve" the case short
of trial -- was false.
We turn next to the accused's statements in his October
11, 2001, affidavit.  The Bar focuses on two statements.  The Bar
notes initially that the accused stated that the "[p]laintiff
has, since the filing of the complaint, been trying to complete
discovery in this matter."  Although the Bar contends that this
statement is false, we reach a different conclusion.  The accused
may not have been trying very hard to complete discovery, but he
had been trying.  He had given the defendants' counsel some
documents in September 2000.  He had spoken informally to the
defendants' counsel about discovery in the following months.  He
served a request for production on the defendants in April 2001
and served notices of deposition on them in July 2001.  The Bar
has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
statement that the plaintiff had been trying to complete
discovery is false.
The Bar also notes that, in his October 11, 2001,
affidavit, the accused swore that the "last time plaintiff
scheduled depositions, counsel for [d]efendants postponed due to
his vacation schedule."  As the Bar argues, the accused's use of
the phrase "[t]he last time plaintiff scheduled depositions"
implies that the plaintiff had scheduled depositions on more than
one occasion, an implication that the accused has admitted. (5) 
That implied statement is not accurate.  The accused had
scheduled depositions once, not multiple times.  The statement
also was knowing and material.  If true, the statement implied
that the accused had acted more diligently than he had and could
have affected how the trial court evaluated the defendants'
motion to dismiss. See Eadie, 333 Or at 57-58
(explaining that statement concerning judge's intentions was
material because it could have affected decision-making process). 
We accordingly find that the second statement in the October 11,
2001, affidavit is a misrepresentation.
The Bar argues that the accused made misrepresentations
on a third occasion.  At the November 9, 2001, hearing on the
defendants' motion to dismiss, the accused told the trial court
that, when he called the arbitrator's office, "I was asked if
discovery was complete, and when I responded that it wasn't, I
was told that we should endeavor to complete discovery before we
try to set an arbitration date."  The accused's statement is at
odds with that of the arbitrator.  Bloom testified that his
office had no record or knowledge of Pena's case being assigned
to him for arbitration.  He had not spoken with either the
accused or Collins about the case, nor did his staff remember any
call from the accused.  Bloom also explained, and his staff
verified, (6) that his staff would not have asked about
discovery or discussed scheduling arbitration with a lawyer. 
Rather, they would have taken a message and left that task to
Bloom.
We find that Bloom's staff did not ask the accused if
he had completed discovery, nor did they tell him to do so before
attempting to set the arbitration date. (7)  It follows that,
when the accused made those statements, he knew that they were
not true.  Finally, the statements were material.  If believed,
the statements would have provided the accused with an excuse --
the arbitrator's staff instructed him to delay setting the
hearing date -- for failing to comply with the court's earlier
instructions.  We conclude that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3) when he told the trial court at the November 9, 2001,
hearing that Bloom's staff told him to complete discovery before
scheduling an arbitration date. 
Having concluded that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 6-101(A), and DR 6-101(B), we turn
to the appropriate sanction.  We first consider: (1) the duty
violated; (2) the accused's mental state; and (3) the actual or
potential injury caused by the conduct.  American Bar
Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, 3.0
(1991) (amended 1992); In re Kluge, 332 Or 251, 259, 27 P3d
102 (2001).  We next decide whether any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances exist.  ABA Standard 3.0; Kluge, 332 Or at
259. Finally, we consider the sanction in light of existing case
law. Kluge, 332 Or at 259.
The accused violated his duty to his client by failing
to act diligently on Pena's behalf in prosecuting her case.  ABA
Standard 4.4.  The accused also violated his duty to provide his
client with competent legal service.  ABA Standard 4.5.  In
addition, the accused violated his duty to the legal system to
refrain from making false statements to a court.  ABA Standard
6.1.  Finally, the accused's misrepresentations to the court
violated his duty to the legal profession.  ABA Standard 7.0.
We turn next to whether the accused acted with intent,
knowledge, or negligently. (8)  The Bar does not appear to
argue that the accused acted intentionally when he made
misrepresentations to the court. Cf. Kluge, 332 Or at
263 (recognizing that Bar may establish higher mental state in
sanctions hearings than it alleged in its complaint).  It appears
to argue instead that he acted knowingly, and we agree.  The Bar
also argues that the accused acted knowingly when he failed to
pursue Pena's case in violation of DR 6-101(A), DR 6-101(B), and
DR 1-102(A)(4).  The Bar reasons that the accused "could not have
been unaware that [his conduct] was creating difficulties for his
clien[t]." In re Recker, 309 Or 633, 640, 789 P2d 663
(1990) (internal quotations omitted).  We reach a different
conclusion.  We find that the accused was unaware, until it was
too late, that his inaction would result in the trial court's
dismissing Pena's case.  He did fail, however, to heed a
substantial risk that the trial court would impose that sanction
and thus acted negligently when he failed to pursue Pena's case
in violation of DR 6-101(A), DR 6-101(B), and DR 1-102(A)(4).    
We turn next to the actual or potential harm, if any,
created by the accused's misconduct.  The accused's neglect of
Pena's case caused her potential injury when the trial court
dismissed her case. (9) See In re Worth (Worth I),
336 Or 256, 275, 82 P3d 605 (2003) (recognizing proposition). 
His conduct also caused her actual injury -- viz., the
anxiety and frustration caused by requiring her to seek redress
through the Professional Liability Fund. See In re
Schaffner, 325 Or 421, 426, 939 P2d 39 (1997) (anxiety and
frustration caused by lawyer misconduct considered actual
injury).  Finally, the accused's misrepresentations to the court
on October 11, 2001, and November 9, 2001, caused potential
injury to the court system.  
Under the ABA Standards, suspension is generally
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for 
a client, or engages in a pattern of neglect, and causes injury
to the client.  ABA Standard 4.42.  Although the accused did not
knowingly neglect Pena's case, his repeated failure to pursue
Pena's case reveals a pattern of neglect.  Similarly, under the
ABA Standards,
"[s]uspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knows that false statements or documents are being
submitted to the court * * * and causes an adverse or
potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding."
ABA Standard 6.12.  Our initial analysis leads to the conclusion
that, under the ABA Standards, suspension is the appropriate
sanction.
Having determined the potential range of sanctions, we
consider any aggravating or mitigating factors.  We find four
aggravating factors in this case.  First, the accused has
substantial experience in the practice of law.  He has been
practicing law since 1965.  ABA Standard 9.22(I).  Second, the
accused's client was vulnerable.  Pena had limited financial
resources to pursue her case and little understanding of the
legal system.  ABA Standard 9.22(h).  Third, the accused
committed multiple offenses in that he both failed to pursue
Pena's case and made misrepresentations to the court.  ABA
Standard 9.22(d).  Finally, the record reflects a pattern of
misconduct in that the accused has engaged in similar misconduct
in both Worth I and in this case.  ABA Standard 9.22(c);
see Worth I, 336 Or at 280 (suspending accused for 90
days for neglecting multiple cases and misrepresentation). (10) 

We also find four mitigating factors.  First, the
accused did not act with a selfish motive.  ABA Standard 9.32(b). 
Second, the accused cooperated during the investigation of the
complaint.  ABA Standard 9.32(e).  Third, the accused presented
credible witnesses who testified to his good character and
reputation.  ABA Standard 9.32(g).  Finally, the accused
repeatedly acknowledged during the hearing that his failures had
resulted in the dismissal of Pena's complaint.  ABA Standard
9.32(l). (11)
Although we have found an identical number of
aggravating and mitigating factors, we conclude that the
aggravating factors outweigh slightly the mitigating ones.
See In re Martin, 328 Or 177, 193, 970 P2d 638 (1998)
(stating that court must engage in qualitative balance of
aggravating and mitigating factors).  We note that the purpose of
sanctions is not to penalize the accused but to protect the
public and the integrity of the legal profession. In re
Glass, 308 Or 297, 304, 779 P2d 612 (1989).  Viewed in that
light, the accused's recent pattern of neglect and misstatements
takes on greater weight.  It suggests that, even though the
accused has a long record of service to the public, a longer
suspension may be appropriate to ensure that the more recent
pattern of misconduct in WorthI and this proceeding does
not recur.
Finally, we turn to case law for guidance.  In In re
Butler, 324 Or 69, 921 P2d 401 (1996), the accused lawyer
stipulated that he had violated DR 6-101(B) and DR 1-102(A)(3) by
allowing a client's case to be dismissed with prejudice and then
misleading the client about the status of the case.  The
Butler court found that the accused lawyer knowingly
neglected his client's case and intentionally hid that fact from
his client.  324 Or at 73.  In addition, the Butler
court found that the accused lawyer's misconduct was aggravated
by the fact that he had substantial experience in the practice of
law and that, at the time the misconduct occurred, he was under
investigation for similar misconduct in an unrelated matter.
Id. at 73. (12)  The Butler court suspended the
accused lawyer for a year. Id. at 76.  
This case is both similar to and different from
Butler.  As in Butler, the accused neglected his
client's case, causing it to be dismissed.  Also, as in
Butler, the accused made misrepresentations.  Finally, the
accused's conduct, like Butler's, occurred while he was under
investigation for similar violations in an unrelated matter.  The
cases differ in other respects, however.  The accused's
misrepresentations were knowing while Butler's were intentional. 
In Butler, no mitigating circumstances counterbalanced the
aggravating factors; here, mitigating factors argue for a lesser
sanction.  In light of those differences, we do not agree with
the Bar that a one-year suspension, which the court imposed in
Butler, is appropriate.  Rather, we conclude that a 120-day
suspension will be sufficient to protect the public and the
integrity of the legal profession.
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
120 days, effective 60 days from the date of the filing of this
decision.
1. The court initially set the hearing on the plaintiff's
motion on May 1, 2001.  The accused, however, was going to be out
of the country on that date, and the court reset the hearing to
June 29.
2. The accused dated the cover letter July 19, 2001. 
However, he dated the enclosed notices of deposition July 24,
2001.  Collins received the accused's cover letter and notices of
deposition on July 25, 2001, and we conclude that the accused did
not send them until July 24.
3. After the close of business on August 2, 2001, Collins
faxed a letter to the accused saying that his vacation plans had
changed, that he would be in the office the week of August 13 to
17 and they could take depositions that week, but that he needed
to hear back from the accused by the next morning if the accused
wanted to hold the depositions that week. As Collins explained
at the hearing, he needed to hear back quickly because he was
leaving the next day to go on vacation.  The accused did not
learn of the letter until the afternoon of August 3 and called
Collins on August 6, after Collins had left on vacation.
4. In reaching that conclusion, the trial panel discussed
statements that the accused made in his April 4, 2001, motion to
retain the case on the docket and his October 11, 2001,
affidavit.  It did not discuss the statements that the accused
made during the November 9, 2001, hearing. 
5. In its amended complaint, the Bar alleged that, in his
October 11, 2001, affidavit, the accused "expressed or implied"
that "depositions in the case had been scheduled on more than one
occasion."  The accused admitted that allegation.
6. The accused stipulated that, if the arbitrator's staff
were called to testify, the staff would testify that the
arbitrator handles all decisions on his cases, that the
arbitrator's staff did not remember a telephone conversation with
the accused, that the arbitrator's staff did not remember telling
any person that he or she should get back to the arbitrator when
discovery was complete, that they would not have done so, and
that only the arbitrator would make that decision.  
7. The trial panel did not address this issue explicitly.
We assume that the trial panel implicitly credited the accused's
testimony that his memory was that he had called Bloom's office
and received similar instructions.  Although we give weight to
the trial panel's credibility findings, our review of the record
leads us to a different conclusion. See In re Starr,
326 Or 328, 338 n 4, 952 P2d 1017 (1998) (reaffirming that, on
de novo review, court may draw different conclusion
concerning credibility). 
8. The ABA Standards define "intent" as "[t]he conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result."  ABA
Standards at 7.  "Knowledge" is "[t]he conscious awareness of the
nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result." Id.  "Negligence" is "[t]he failure of a lawyer to
heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result
will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of
care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation." 
Id.
9. In his brief on review, the accused asserts that Pena
has received full compensation for her losses.  Although the
record does not support that assertion, the Bar acknowledges in
its reply brief that the assertion is correct.
10. Because this court had not adjudicated the earlier
charge before the trial panel imposed a sanction on the accused,
the earlier offense is not a prior disciplinary offense within
the meaning of ABA Standard 9.22(a). In re Jones, 326 Or
195, 199-200, 951 P2d 149 (1997).  The earlier misconduct is
relevant, however, because it demonstrates that the accused's
ethical violations in this proceeding are part of a larger
pattern of misconduct.  ABA Standard 9.22(c); see In re
Butler, 324 Or 69, 73, 921 P2d 401 (1996) (stating principle).

11. During the hearing, the accused was suffering from
various physical ailments.  He does not argue, however, that we
should consider those ailments as mitigating factors. See
ABA Standard 9.32(h) (amended 1992) (listing physical disability
as mitigating factor).
12. The Butler court did not find any mitigating
factors.