Title: Commonwealth v. Samia

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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SJC-12023 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ELIAS SAMIA. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     February 10, 2023. - June 1, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Kidnapping.  Joint Enterprise.  
Evidence, Joint venturer, Hearsay, Prior misconduct, 
Relevancy and materiality, State of mind, Redirect 
examination, Inflammatory evidence.  Error, Harmless.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Argument by prosecutor, 
Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 15, 2012. 
 
 
The case was tried before Daniel M. Wrenn, J.; a motion for 
a new trial, filed on March 18, 2020, was heard by him; and a 
motion for reconsideration was considered by him. 
 
 
Richard J. Shea for the defendant. 
Ellyn H. Lazar, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the 
defendant, Elias Samia, was convicted of murder in the first 
degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-
2 
 
murder, with aggravated kidnapping as the predicate felony, in 
connection with the disappearance of the victim, Kevin Harkins, 
in February of 1994.  The defendant appealed and, after his 
appeal was entered in this court, he filed a motion for a new 
trial.  The motion was denied, after which the defendant filed a 
motion to reconsider, which was also denied.  The defendant then 
filed another notice of appeal. 
 
The defendant's consolidated appeal is now before the 
court.  He contends, and the Commonwealth concedes, that, 
because at the time of the offense the felony of aggravated 
kidnapping did not exist, he could not have been convicted on 
the theory of felony-murder in the first degree.  He also raises 
issues relating to the propriety of evidence introduced at 
trial, purportedly improper argument by the prosecutor, and 
ineffective assistance of counsel, ultimately contending that 
these issues entitle him to a new trial. 
Having carefully examined the record, we affirm the 
conviction of murder in the first degree on the theory of 
deliberate premeditation and decline to exercise our authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or to order a 
new trial. 
Background.  "We recite the facts the jury could have 
found, viewing them in the light most favorable to the 
3 
 
Commonwealth and reserving certain details for later 
discussion."  Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487 Mass. 708, 711 (2021). 
On February 15, 1994, the victim walked out of Suney's Pub 
(Suney's) in Worcester.  He left behind a Boston Celtics jacket, 
house keys, a pack of cigarettes, and an unfinished beer.  The 
victim was never seen again, and his disappearance remained 
unsolved for eighteen years.  In 2012, the defendant was 
indicted for the murder along with Matteo Trotto and John 
Fredette. 
 
1.  Illegal drug business and the victim's disappearance.  
The trio charged with the victim's murder were as close as 
brothers, referred to each other as such, and were involved in a 
long-standing illegal drug operation together.  Trotto was the 
leader of the operation, and Fredette and the defendant worked 
under him.  Customers who purchased cocaine from the trio's 
operation included Donald St. Pierre, Robert Beahn, and the 
victim.  Typically, customers would call pager numbers, and then 
the customer would receive a telephone call back to coordinate 
the purchase. 
In late 1993, a few months before the victim's 
disappearance, Fredette was arrested for trafficking in cocaine 
based on information provided to the police by St. Pierre.  
Beahn was also arrested and charged with possession of cocaine 
4 
 
with intent to distribute and possession of marijuana.  Fredette 
and Beahn saw one another at the police station. 
Fredette believed that either Beahn or the victim had 
informed on him to the police, resulting in his arrest.  
Fredette suspected Beahn because Beahn was charged with less 
serious offenses, and he suspected the victim because the victim 
was friends with the police officer who had arrested him.  
Unaware that the actual informant was St. Pierre, Fredette told 
St. Pierre to stay away from both Beahn and the victim because 
they could be working for the police.  Fredette also told St. 
Pierre that he was going to kill the informant. 
 
After being released on bail, Beahn went to Suney's with 
the string from his sweatpants hanging loosely around his neck.  
While there, Trotto grabbed the string around Beahn's neck and 
told Beahn that if he had anything to do with Trotto's "brother" 
being arrested, Trotto would kill him.  After Fredette's arrest, 
Trotto provided the victim with cocaine in exchange for false 
testimony in Fredette's pending criminal trial.  Fredette told 
St. Pierre that, if the victim did not show up to testify, 
Fredette would kill the victim. 
On February 14, 1994, the victim did not appear at 
Fredette's trial.  Fredette then pleaded guilty to a reduced 
offense and was sentenced to State prison, but the execution of 
his sentence was stayed.  After he was sentenced, Fredette said 
5 
 
to the defendant and Beahn, "if I ever catch the motherfucker 
that did this, the things I'm going to fucking do," while the 
defendant stood next to him and put his hand on Fredette's 
shoulder.  The next evening, the victim was inside Suney's when 
Trotto appeared and motioned for the victim to come outside.  
The victim walked out of the bar, leaving behind his cigarettes, 
money, keys, Celtics coat, and half a glass of beer.  The victim 
did not return to Suney's that night and was never seen again. 
 
In the early hours of the morning on February 16, 1994, 
only hours after Trotto had motioned the victim out of Suney's, 
the defendant was driving in his 1985 Chevrolet Impala with 
Fredette as a passenger.  The Impala was originally painted blue 
but had been repainted black.  Millbury police Officer Mark 
Moore observed the Impala speeding and, after calling in the 
Impala's license plate, learned that a blue Impala was 
registered to the defendant.  Moore stopped the car, and when he 
asked the defendant for his license and registration, the 
defendant produced his license but not his registration.  The 
defendant explained that the Impala had recently been painted 
black and that he had given the registration to his insurance 
company.  When Moore asked why he would do that, the defendant 
"was unable to provide an answer."  When Moore asked where the 
defendant was coming from, he said they were coming from a local 
bar, but the answer was inconsistent with where Moore had first 
6 
 
seen the Impala.  The defendant also claimed during his 
conversation with Moore that he going to drop Fredette off.  
After the stop was completed, Moore followed the Impala west on 
Route 20.  He eventually stopped following the Impala and drove 
to the defendant's address.  Moore stayed there for about an 
hour, but the defendant did not return during that time. 
 
James Whalen, an employee of Ace Auto Sales (Ace Auto), was 
called into work at 5:30 A.M. on February 16, 1994, to assist in 
dismantling a car.  When Whalen arrived at Ace Auto, he 
recognized the defendant's Impala;1 Trotto arrived soon 
thereafter.  Trotto told Whalen to get rid of the Impala and 
keep his mouth shut or he and his family would never be safe.  
Whalen and other Ace Auto employees, including Alan Dudley, 
dismantled the Impala.  Dismantling the Impala stood out in 
Dudley's memory because the owner of Ace Auto told him that 
someone had been shot in the Impala.  Parts from the dismantled 
Impala were disposed of in numerous places; some were thrown 
into the pond behind Rusmart Auto Trim (Rusmart), another 
business operated by Ace Auto's owner. 
 
1 Whalen had rebuilt the carburetor in the defendant's car.  
At that time, he put a sticker on the carburetor, which he saw 
while dismantling the Impala.  Additionally, Whalen was aware 
that the defendant had originally bought a blue Impala but that 
it had been painted black.  The Impala's paint was also 
distinctive to Whalen because while the car was black, the 
doorjambs remained blue. 
7 
 
 
2.  Subsequent investigations.  In March 1994, about three 
weeks after the victim disappeared, the defendant was arrested 
as part of the Worcester police department's ongoing 
investigation into the trio's drug enterprise.  When he was 
arrested, the defendant had a licensed gun in his waistband and 
a business card in his wallet.  The business card had what 
appeared to be a vehicle identification number (VIN) written on 
the back.  When police looked up the VIN, it corresponded to the 
Impala.  Thereafter, the police learned about Officer Moore's 
stop of the Impala on February 16, 1994, and contacted him.  The 
police also learned that the defendant had turned in the license 
plate from the Impala to the registry of motor vehicles 
(registry) on February 16, 1994. 
 
Years later, in 2005, authorities conducted a dive of the 
pond behind Rusmart.  The diving team was looking for "car parts 
from a chopped car" "within throwing distance of the shoreline."  
Although the pond was difficult to navigate, a number of car 
parts were retrieved, including a car door and a rear quarter 
panel.  An expert, having examined the parts, testified at trial 
that the door and panel recovered from the pond were consistent 
with a 1985 Impala.  Both blue and black paint were visible on 
the recovered parts.2 
 
2 In addition to the expert testimony regarding the parts, 
both the door and rear quarter panel were admitted in evidence. 
8 
 
 
In 2008, the victim's disappearance came up during a 
conversation between Fredette, the defendant, and Fredette's 
son, Richard Denaris.  Despite Fredette's warnings to "shut up" 
about the "guy in the papers," the defendant said he did what he 
had to do for family.  The defendant explained that Trotto was 
driving while Fredette and the defendant were beating up the 
victim, but that "it got out of control, and [the defendant] had 
to take a gun and shoot [the victim]."  The defendant also 
mentioned being stopped by Officer Moore after shooting the 
victim and said that "the cop was lucky he stopped searching 
when he did."  The defendant also said in front of Denaris that 
the victim's body was "buried in a shallow grave using lime" so 
pigs "would get whatever the lime did not dissolve."  In 2013, 
Denaris was in custody on unrelated charges when he informed the 
police of what the defendant had told him about the victim's 
disappearance. 
 
3.  Defendant's indictment, trial, and posttrial motions.  
In 2012, the trio was indicted for the victim's murder and tried 
separately.  Fredette and Trotto were convicted by the jury in 
their respective trials.3  See Trotto, 487 Mass. at 710; 
 
3 Both Trotto and Fredette were convicted of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of felony-murder, with aggravated 
kidnapping as the predicate felony.  See Trotto, 487 Mass. at 
710; Commonwealth v. Fredette, 480 Mass. 75, 75-76 (2018).  
Because at the time of the offense the predicate felony of 
aggravated kidnapping did not exist, the convictions of murder 
9 
 
Commonwealth v. Fredette, 480 Mass. 75, 75-76 (2018).  The 
defendant was tried before a jury in 2014.  At the conclusion of 
the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the 
first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-
murder, with aggravated kidnapping as the underlying felony.  
Thereafter, he timely appealed.  In March 2020, he filed a 
motion for a new trial, contending that trial counsel was 
ineffective by not introducing historical weather data which 
would have impeached testimony about parts of the Impala being 
thrown in the lake behind Rusmart.  The motion was denied after 
a nonevidentiary hearing.  Thereafter, he filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which was also denied. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Felony-murder.  The defendant contends, 
and the Commonwealth concedes, that his conviction of murder in 
the first degree on a theory of felony-murder was improper 
because the predicate felony of aggravated kidnapping did not 
exist at the time of the killing.  See Trotto, 487 Mass. at 715-
716; Fredette, 480 Mass. at 86-88.  We agree and therefore 
vacate the felony-murder conviction.  However, the defendant's 
 
in the first degree were vacated.  See Trotto, supra at 710-711; 
Fredette, supra at 76-77.  In Trotto, we remanded the matter to 
the Superior Court for entry of a verdict of guilty of murder in 
the second degree and for resentencing.  See Trotto, supra.  In 
Fredette, we remanded the case for the trial judge to determine 
whether a conviction of murder in the second degree should enter 
or whether the defendant was entitled to a new trial.  See 
Fredette, supra at 77. 
10 
 
argument that this error requires either a new trial or reducing 
the verdict to murder in the second degree fails. 
Unlike Trotto and Fredette, who were granted the relief the 
defendant now requests, the defendant was also convicted of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation in addition to a theory of felony-murder.  The 
conviction on the theory of deliberate premeditation was 
supported by the evidence at trial, and as none of the other 
issues the defendant raises are sufficient to warrant relief, 
the conviction of premeditated murder in the first degree must 
stand.  See Commonwealth v. Wadlington, 467 Mass. 192, 208 
(2014). 
2.  Joint venture evidence.  The defendant next takes issue 
with the admission of certain statements by Trotto and Fredette 
that were admitted under the joint venture exemption to the rule 
against hearsay.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E).  These 
arguments hinge on the contention that, to the extent there was 
a joint venture, it was limited to the time immediately 
preceding and subsequent to the kidnapping of the victim.  The 
defendant argues that, because the statements at issue fall 
outside that time frame, the judge erred in admitting such 
statements under the joint venture exemption to the rule against 
hearsay.  Because the defendant objected at trial, we review the 
judge's admission of this evidence for prejudicial error, 
11 
 
Commonwealth v. Chalue, 486 Mass. 847, 873 (2021), and conclude 
that there was no error. 
a.  The challenged testimony.  As relevant to these issues 
of joint venture, there was evidence before the jury that 
collectively the trio was involved in a drug dealing operation 
led by Trotto with Fredette and the defendant working under him.  
St. Pierre testified to buying cocaine from Trotto, and that at 
one point in August 1993, he owed money for cocaine.  St. Pierre 
testified that he arranged to satisfy that debt by doing brick 
work at a tavern owned by Trotto.  St. Pierre told the jury that 
after he had completed brick work on the tavern, Fredette and 
the defendant came outside, and the defendant gave Fredette his 
gun.  At that point, Fredette threatened St. Pierre with the gun 
and told him to leave and that he was not going to be paid for 
the brick work.  St. Pierre also testified that after Fredette 
had been arrested, Fredette told St. Pierre not to deal with 
Beahn or the victim because either one could be the informant 
and he was going to kill the informant.  Fredette also told St. 
Pierre that the victim was going to give false testimony in the 
drug case and if the victim did not do so, Fredette would kill 
the victim.  Additionally, during cross-examination, St. Pierre 
testified that, after Fredette's arrest, all three members of 
the trio threatened the victim.  Over the defendant's objection, 
the judge admitted this testimony as statements of a joint 
12 
 
venturer and instructed the jury on the requirements of 
statements by joint venturers including what the Commonwealth 
was required to prove in order for the statements to be 
attributed to the defendant. 
Michael Davidson testified, over objection, that after 
Fredette and Beahn had been arrested, Trotto choked Beahn with a 
sweatpants string that was around his neck and stated that "if 
[Beahn] had anything to do with [Trotto's] brother being 
arrested the night before, [Trotto would] kill him."  Davidson 
also testified about an incident where Trotto pointed the 
defendant's gun at him, St. Pierre, and the victim, and stated 
that he was going "rabbit hunting," presumably in reference to 
Beahn, whose nickname was "Rabbit."  Before these statements by 
Trotto were elicited from Davidson, the judge again reminded the 
jury of his prior detailed instruction on what was required for 
Trotto's statements to be attributed to the defendant as the 
statement of a joint venturer. 
Beahn testified that, after he had been released on bail 
following his arrest, Trotto threatened him.  Fredette told 
Beahn that he believed the victim was the police informant 
because of his friendship with a police officer who worked as a 
bouncer at Suney's.  Beahn testified further that Fredette asked 
him whether he was the informant and stated that, if he was, "we 
can get this taken care of today."  Beahn's testimony regarding 
13 
 
these statements by Trotto and Fredette, respectively, were 
accompanied by the judge reminding the jury that his full 
instruction on statements by a joint venturer were applicable to 
the statements. 
b.  Joint venture exemption to the hearsay rule.  "We 
recognize an [exemption from] the hearsay rule whereby 
'statements by joint venturers are admissible against each other 
if the statements are made both during the pendency of the 
cooperative effort and in furtherance of its goal.'"  
Commonwealth v. Steadman, 489 Mass. 372, 379 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 426 (2012).  In order to 
be admissible, the Commonwealth must prove the existence of the 
joint venture by a preponderance of the evidence, separate from 
the statements of the joint venturers.  Steadman, supra.  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E).  This exemption to the hearsay 
rule "derives from an analogy between a criminal venture and a 
lawful partnership," Bright, supra, such that "the statement of 
each joint venturer is equivalent to a statement by the 
defendant," Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 Mass. 527, 535 (2009).  
To introduce such a statement, "the Commonwealth must show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that a joint venture existed 
between the declarant and the defendant, and that the statement 
14 
 
was made [during and] in furtherance of the joint venture,[4] 
while the joint venture was ongoing."5  Commonwealth v. 
Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 460 (2019).  "If the judge is 
satisfied that the Commonwealth has met this burden, the 
 
4 Our case law has suggested that in certain narrow 
circumstances, statements of joint venturers may be admissible 
even if the statements preceded the joint venture.  That murky 
case law is of no moment here because we conclude infra that it 
was permissible for the Commonwealth to rely on the drug 
distribution enterprise as the underlying joint venture, and all 
of the statements admitted under the joint venture exemption to 
the rule against hearsay were made during and in furtherance of 
that illegal enterprise.  We recognize that Commonwealth v. 
Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 10-11 (2014), and Commonwealth v. 
McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 241, 248 (2000), suggest that statements 
that preceded the joint venture may fall within the joint 
venture exemption to the hearsay rule, and that Commonwealth v. 
Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 38-40 (2017), and Commonwealth v. 
Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 159, 175-176 (2020), reference this 
exception to the general rule.  To the extent that there is a 
narrow exception to the general rule that statements must be 
made both during and in furtherance of the joint venture in 
order to be admissible and attributed to the defendant, it is 
limited to the circumstances discussed in Rakes, supra, where 
statements involving preparation to enter the joint venture or 
where statements of intent to join a joint venture are relevant 
and necessary to understand the history of the joint venture. 
 
5 We also emphasize that "the joint venture [exemption] to 
the hearsay rule does not apply to statements made after the 
joint venture has ended."  Chalue, 486 Mass. at 875, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 522 (2016).  "However, 
[s]tatements made in an effort to conceal a crime, made after 
the crime has been completed, may be admissible under the joint 
venture [exemption] because the joint venture [remains] ongoing, 
with a purpose to ensure that the joint venture itself remains 
concealed" (quotation and citation omitted).  Chalue, supra.  
"In essence, the inquiry to determine whether a statement was 
made during the pendency of a criminal enterprise and in 
furtherance of it focuses not on whether the crime has been 
completed, but on whether a joint venture was continuing" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Id. 
15 
 
statement[s] may be admitted, and the jury are instructed that 
they may consider the statements only if they find that a joint 
venture existed independent of the statements, and that the 
statements were made in furtherance of that venture" (citation 
omitted).6  Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 521 (2016).  
It is noteworthy that "[b]efore considering the statement [of a 
joint venturer] as bearing on the defendant's guilt, . . . the 
jury must make their own independent determination, again based 
on a preponderance of the evidence other than the statement 
itself, that a joint venture existed and that the statement was 
made in furtherance thereof" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 534 (2017).  "We review 
the decision to admit such statements for abuse of discretion, 
and we view the evidence of the existence of the joint venture 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, recognizing 
 
6 The defendant appears to argue that the judge erred in not 
instructing the jury as to the permissible scope of the joint 
venture, but this argument misses the mark.  Once the judge is 
satisfied with the Commonwealth's showing, "the jury must make 
their own independent determination, again based on a 
preponderance of the evidence other than the statement itself, 
that a joint venture existed."  Chalue, 486 Mass. at 874.  Here, 
upon concluding that the Commonwealth had met its preliminary 
burden, the judge properly instructed the jury on the 
requirements for the statements of Trotto and Fredette to be 
attributed to the defendant.  Implicit in the judge's ruling was 
that the statements fell within the period of the joint venture 
and that, if the jury felt otherwise, they would not have 
considered the statements. 
16 
 
that it may be proved by circumstantial evidence."  Commonwealth 
v. Carter, 488 Mass. 191, 209 (2021). 
c.  Analysis.  i.  Existence of a joint venture.  The 
defendant contends that to the extent there was a joint venture, 
evidence of it should be limited to the kidnapping and murder of 
the victim.  There is no requirement, however, that the joint 
venture upon which the Commonwealth relies to admit statements 
against the defendant be the crime charged so long as the 
Commonwealth meets the requirements for the hearsay exemption by 
demonstrating, independent of the coventurer's statements, (1) 
that a cooperative venture existed and (2) that the statements 
being admitted were made both "during the cooperative effort and 
in furtherance of its goal."  Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E).  
See Commonwealth v. Lowery, 487 Mass. 851, 865 n.15 (2021) ("The 
general rule that declarations by joint venturers are admissible 
against fellow venturers applies where a conspiracy or common 
enterprise is shown to exist even though it is not charged" 
[citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 
544 n.4 (1990) (same).  See also United States v. El-Mezain, 664 
F.3d 467, 502 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 977 (2012) 
(under joint venture exemption to hearsay rule, "it is not 
necessary that the conspiracy upon which admissibility of the 
statement is predicated be" crime for which defendant is charged 
[citation omitted]); United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 
17 
 
1398 (9th Cir. 1988) ("the common enterprise or joint venture on 
which admission of a coventurer's statement is based need not be 
the same as the charged conspiracy, if any"), overruled on other 
grounds by Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 612 n.2 (9th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Miller, 644 F.2d 1241, 1244 n.5 (8th 
Cir. 1981) ("it is well established that the crime of conspiracy 
need not be charged in order to invoke the [joint venture 
exemption to the hearsay rule]"). 
Here, "[t]here [was] ample evidence, apart from the out-of-
court statements themselves, to support an adequate probability 
of the existence of a common [drug distribution] venture, 
between and among [Trotto, Fredette,] and the defendant" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Bright, 463 Mass. at 435.  
The evidence showed that the trio was involved in an illegal 
drug distribution operation led by Trotto and supported by 
Fredette and the defendant.  Drug customers looking for product 
would call pager numbers when looking for drugs and then would 
receive a call back to arrange the purchase.  Evidence of the 
trio working together included testimony from customers who in 
some instances would call Trotto's pager number and then receive 
a call from Fredette.  After Fredette's arrest, the defendant 
and his coventurers concocted a scheme to have the victim offer 
perjured testimony in Fredette's drug tracking case.  But the 
victim never appeared at Fredette's trial, thereby resulting in 
18 
 
Fredette accepting a plea.  Thus, the evidence showed that that 
the trio's involvement in this drug business eventually evolved 
into murder after the group concluded that an informant had 
provided information that led to Fredette's arrest, creating a 
threat to their business.  See, e.g., Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. at 
544 ("[I]t was not essential that murder be part of the original 
plan, if it was one of the probable consequences of the robbery 
which was intended to be effected by the use of a deadly weapon" 
[citation omitted]).  Therefore, the judge did not err in 
determining that Trotto, Fredette, and the defendant were joint 
venturers in an illegal drug distribution enterprise which led 
to the victim's murder.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 468 Mass 
417, 427 (2014) ("the evidence . . . was sufficient for the 
judge to conclude that Team Supreme was an organized drug 
distribution group and, in light of the group's collective 
involvement in the killing and its cover-up, that the murder was 
committed in furtherance of the group's business interests").  
As such, it was permissible for the Commonwealth to introduce 
statements by Trotto and Fredette provided that there was 
sufficient evidence to warrant a determination that their 
statements were made both during the pendency of and in 
furtherance of the drug business, and that the existence of the 
drug business was proved by a preponderance of the evidence 
19 
 
separate from the statements of the joint venturers.  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E). 
ii.  Specific statements.  The first statement at issue is 
St. Pierre's testimony about Fredette threatening him with the 
defendant's gun.  In determining the admissibility of this 
statement, the context of St. Pierre's relationship with the 
trio is key.  St. Pierre, who unbeknownst to the trio ultimately 
became the informant, explained that at the time Fredette 
threatened him, he had been working off a drug debt.  We have 
previously stated that "an illegal drug distribution business 
may see the perception of weakness as potentially fatal to an 
enterprise that wishes to protect its turf against competitors."  
Mitchell, 468 Mass. at 427.  A similar inference can be drawn 
from the situation described by St. Pierre, given that he owed 
money to the trio's drug enterprise and was working off that 
debt at the time that Fredette threatened him with a gun and 
told him that he would not be paid for his work.  "In the 
perverse world of a street drug organization, violence in 
response to perceived threats [to the organization's business 
interests] is often viewed as necessary to maintain its customer 
base."  Id.  "Violence in drug dealing can be viewed as an 
extension of behaviors that are associated with efficiency and 
success in legitimate business" (citation omitted).  Id.  
Therefore, the judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding 
20 
 
Fredette's threat was in furtherance of the ongoing drug 
distribution operation. 
As to the remaining statements that the defendant 
challenges, each one directly referenced punishing and killing 
the informant or threatening and harming the two people that the 
trio suspected of being the informant -- Beahn and the victim.  
Such statements were not only in furtherance of protecting the 
larger drug enterprise, but also within the more limited scope 
of finding and harming the informant.  To the extent that it is 
unclear exactly whether Trotto made his statement about going 
"rabbit hunting" before or after Fredette was arrested, the 
statement was still made during and in furtherance of the trio's 
drug distribution enterprise. 
3.  Evidence of the defendant's drug arrest and the 
subsequent police investigation.  At trial, retired Worcester 
police Officer Brendan Harney, who was involved in arresting 
Fredette in 1993 and the defendant in 1994, testified about an 
investigation into the trio's drug distribution enterprise 
spanning from late 1993 to early 1994.  He described the drug 
operation as being managed by Trotto with Fredette and the 
defendant working under him.  Harney explained that part of the 
operation involved surveillance of the tavern owned by Trotto.  
Harney testified that as part of the surveillance into the drug 
operation, he became familiar with the defendant's Impala, 
21 
 
including that it was originally blue but was later painted 
black.  Harney also testified about his involvement in 
Fredette's 1993 drug arrest and that he arrested the defendant 
for drug distribution related activity approximately three weeks 
after the victim's disappearance. 
Harney testified that when the defendant was arrested, the 
police seized a firearm,7 a cell phone, two pagers, and his 
wallet.  Inside the defendant's wallet, the police recovered a 
business card.  Written on the back of the business card was a 
series of numbers and letters with the word "VIN" written 
underneath it.  Believing the writing to be a VIN, Harney 
searched a registry database and discovered the VIN was attached 
to a 1985 Chevy Impala that was owned by the defendant.  He also 
learned that the Impala had been stopped by the Millbury police 
in the early morning hours of February 16, 1994.  Harney's 
investigation into the VIN also resulted in him learning that 
 
7 To the extent that the defendant takes issue with Harney's 
discussion that the defendant was licensed to carry a firearm 
and had it on his person when he was arrested, the argument is 
of no moment.  There was evidence before the jury, in the form 
of statements attributed to the defendant, that the defendant 
had shot the victim, and "[e]vidence regarding a weapon that 
could have been used in the course of a crime is admissible, in 
the judge's discretion, even without direct proof that the 
particular weapon was in fact used in the commission of the 
crime" (quotation and citation omitted).  Chalue, 486 Mass. at 
873. 
22 
 
the license plate attached to the Impala had been returned to 
the registry on February 16, 1994. 
Over the defendant's objection, the judge admitted the 
evidence as probative for the nonpropensity purpose of showing 
"the defendant's state of mind, his intention, motive, or the 
existence of a plan or scheme in a joint venture."  Prior to 
Harney's detailed testimony, the judge provided a limiting 
instruction. 
"Although the prosecution may not introduce so-called . . . 
bad act evidence to illustrate a defendant's bad character, such 
evidence may be admissible if relevant for a nonpropensity 
purpose."  Chalue, 486 Mass. at 866.  "Even if the evidence is 
relevant for a proper purpose, it will not be admitted if the 
judge determines that its probative value is outweighed by risk 
of unfair prejudice to the defendant, taking into account the 
effectiveness of any limiting instruction," which we "generally 
presume that a jury understand and follow" (citation omitted).  
Id.  Specifically, as to evidence of acts subsequent to a 
charged offense, "[t]he Commonwealth is entitled to 'show the 
whole transaction of which the crime was a part,' including 
uncharged conduct after the crime was committed."  Commonwealth 
v. Cardarelli, 433 Mass. 427, 434 (2001), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Longo, 402 Mass. 482, 489 (1988).  "To be sufficiently 
probative, however, the evidence of postcrime conduct 'must be 
23 
 
connected with the facts of the case or not be too remote in 
time.'"  Caradelli, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 
Mass. 788, 794 (1994).  Here the defendant objected to this 
testimony at trial, "thus we review the judge's decisions to 
determine whether there was an abuse of discretion and, if so, 
whether it amounted to prejudicial error."  Chalue, supra. 
The judge did not expressly weigh on the record the 
probative value of Harney's testimony against the risk of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant.  See Mass. G. Evid. §§ 403, 
404(b)(2).  While certainly not the best practice, the judge's 
failure to do so is not fatal, because "[s]uch a determination 
is implicit in the judge's consideration of the tender of, and 
the objection to, the evidence and the judge's ultimate decision 
to admit it."8  Commonwealth v. Mahan, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 738, 741 
 
8 We take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of 
specificity and precision in the context of ruling on bad act 
evidence.  Practitioners should avoid justifying the admission 
of bad act evidence simply by reciting a list of permissible 
nonpropensity purposes that have been previously accepted by 
this court or discussed in Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) & note.  
Proffering a laundry list of nonpropensity purposes is not 
helpful, nor is it proper.  Indeed, it is counterproductive.  
Rather, counsel proffering bad act evidence should articulate 
the precise nonpropensity purpose for the proffered evidence, 
and the judge should instruct the jury that they may consider 
the evidence only for that narrow nonpropensity purpose. 
 
Thereafter, it falls upon the judge to "articulate the 
precise manner in which the [bad act evidence] is relevant and 
material to the facts of the particular case."  Commonwealth v. 
Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 415 (2020), citing Mass. G. Evid. § 401 
and P.C. Gianelli, Understanding Evidence 168 (5th ed. 2018).  
24 
 
n.1 (1984).  Within the context of this particular case, 
Harney's testimony about the defendant's subsequent arrest had 
probative value as to the continued existence of the drug 
distribution enterprise, which continued after the victim's 
death, and which the Commonwealth argued served as a motive for 
the killing.  See Winquist, 474 Mass. at 523 ("Absent clear 
indication that the venture [has] ended, it is reasonable to 
infer that concealment of the venture [is] ongoing" [citation 
omitted]).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Rousseau, 465 Mass. 372, 389 
(2013) (bad act evidence "represented instances of conduct that 
were part of a larger continuum of behavior constituting a 
single criminal enterprise"). 
Moreover, Harney's testimony about the arrest was episodic 
and necessary to explain how the police investigation evolved 
and led to uncovering the Impala's VIN on the card in the 
 
That the evidence "may be relevant to a specific, nonpropensity 
purpose does not render the evidence admissible."  Andre, supra.  
Rather, it must be admissible for the specific nonpropensity 
purpose argued by the proponent of the evidence.  Thereafter, 
the best practice is for the judge to consider and articulate on 
the record "'the risk that the jury will ignore the limiting 
instruction and make the prohibited character inference' and use 
the evidence for an inadmissible purpose, such as propensity."  
Id., quoting Giannelli, supra.  "Once the judge articulates 
these considerations on the record, it is then within the 
judge's discretion to determine whether the probative value of 
the [bad act evidence] is outweighed by the risk of prejudicial 
effect on the defendant," taking into account the effectiveness 
of a proper limiting instruction (emphasis added).  Andre, 
supra.  See Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 408-409 
(2017). 
25 
 
defendant's wallet, which in turn led the police to discover 
that the Impala was stopped by Millbury police in the early 
hours of the morning on February 16, 1994, and that the Impala's 
license plate was returned to the registry that same day.  See 
Commonwealth v. Marrero, 427 Mass. 65, 67 (1998) ("The 
prosecution [is] entitled to present as full a picture as 
possible of the events surrounding the incident itself" 
[citation omitted]).  The testimony about this chain of events 
was compelling evidence regarding how the police began linking 
the trio to the victim's disappearance.  Given how probative 
this evidence was to the ongoing drug distribution enterprise, 
which the Commonwealth contended led to the murder, and the 
process by which the police began connecting the trio to the 
victim's disappearance, we cannot say the judge abused his 
discretion. 
To the extent that there was a risk of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant, the judge provided a limiting instruction on this 
issue both at the time the evidence was admitted and during the 
final charge.  See Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 480-481 
(2014) (no error in admission of prior bad act evidence where, 
among other things, jury instructions minimized potential for 
prejudicial effect); Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 718 
(2000) (proper jury instructions can render potentially 
prejudicial evidence harmless).  We presume that the jury 
26 
 
followed those instructions.  See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 
Mass. 731, 737 (2019). 
4.  Victim's state of mind.  The defendant next challenges 
the admission of testimony by five witnesses concerning 
statements made by the victim.  The statements were introduced 
in evidence to show the victim's state of mind, namely that he 
feared the defendant, Trotto, and Fredette, such that the victim 
would not have willingly entered the Impala on the night in 
question.  As the defendant objected to these statements, we 
review for prejudicial error.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Sharpe, 454 Mass. 135, 141 (2009). 
First, St. Pierre testified that the victim knew that 
Trotto had previously shot a man in a sandpit and that the 
victim believed Fredette was a killer.  This testimony was both 
preceded and followed by a limiting instruction that the 
statements were to be considered only "for the limited purpose 
of what effect that information had on the state of [the 
victim's] mind when he allegedly left the Suney's Pub on the 
evening of February 15, 1994."  Next, Michael Davidson testified 
about a time when the defendant put his gun on the bar, and 
later that day, Trotto was seen pointing a gun stating that he 
was going "rabbit hunting."  Davidson explained that after this 
incident, the victim told him, "Don't screw with [Trotto] 
because he'll kill you.  He's that type of person."  The judge 
27 
 
again provided a limiting instruction prior to this testimony 
limiting the jury's consideration of the statement to the 
victim's "state of mind on the evening of February 15, 1994," 
when he left Suney's. 
Later in the trial, Daniel Kachadoorian, the manager of 
Suney's, testified, over objection, that the victim told him 
that Trotto and Fredette intended to beat Beahn to find out 
whether Beahn or someone else was the informant that got 
Fredette arrested.  A limiting instruction was provided prior to 
Kachadoorian's testimony about the victim's statement.  Next, 
Beahn testified, over defense counsel's objection, that Beahn 
asked the victim whether the trio was "going to kill [Beahn] 
over" Fredette's arrest and that the victim responded, "Yes.  
They're pissed."  The judge again provided a limiting 
instruction prior to Beahn testifying about the victim's 
statement.  Finally, Dawn Mayotte, a friend of the victim, 
testified that the victim "said that if he did not testify [for 
Fredette at his trial], that Matteo Trotto was going to kill 
him."  This testimony was likewise accompanied by a limiting 
instruction that the statement was "offered for the limited 
purpose of its effect on [the victim's] state of mind" when he 
left Suney's.  Finally, during the final charge, the judge again 
instructed the jury that the evidence described supra was "being 
28 
 
admitted only for the purpose of proving, if it does, [the 
victim's] state of mind on the night of February 15, 1994." 
"Evidence of a victim's state of mind is admissible where 
that state of mind is relevant to an essential element of the 
crime charged."  Trotto, 487 Mass. at 727.  "We also have 
emphasized that a judge must exercise discretion and balance the 
probative value of such evidence against the prejudicial impact 
it may have on the defendant's case" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Id.  "If admitted, the evidence may only be used to 
prove [the victim's] state of mind, and not to prove the truth 
of what was stated or that a defendant harbored certain thoughts 
or acted in a certain way" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Id.  "Here, the Commonwealth had the burden of proving that the 
defendant had confined the victim 'against his will,' G. L. 
c. 265, § 26, in order to establish kidnapping as the predicate 
offense for felony-murder.  All the challenged statements by the 
victim were directly or indirectly relevant to the voluntariness 
of his entry into the Impala . . . , and thus relevant to an 
essential element of the crime of kidnapping."  Id. at 727-728.9 
 
9 While the defendant characterizes portions of the 
testimony outlined supra as inadmissible bad act evidence, such 
testimony was admissible to provide context for the victim's 
statements.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 
671-672 (2017) (no error or abuse of discretion in admitting 
statements describing concern for victim; "witnesses' statements 
were admissible 'to put in context' the victim's statement of 
intent to go inside the bar and have a drink"). 
29 
 
"It is incumbent on judges to weigh the probative value of 
the evidence and the risk of unfair prejudice, and [to] 
determine whether the balance favors admission" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Id. at 728.  Here, the judge consistently 
provided limiting instructions at the time each witness 
testified and provided another instruction during the final 
charge.  And "we ordinarily presume that such instructions are 
understood by the jury and render[] any potentially prejudicial 
evidence harmless" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  
"Given what the Commonwealth was required to prove to establish 
the [predicate] crime of kidnapping,[10] we cannot say that the 
judge's decision to allow the introduction of the testimony, 
mitigated by limiting instructions, was an abuse of discretion."  
Id. 
5.  Dudley's redirect examination.  At trial, Alan Dudley 
was one of the witnesses who testified about the dismantling of 
the Impala.  On cross-examination, the defendant's trial counsel 
asked Dudley numerous questions that called his memory and 
recollection into question.  Defense counsel's questions 
suggested that Dudley's memory was unreliable and that there was 
 
10 We note that while the crime of aggravated kidnapping did 
not exist at the time of the murder, the crime of kidnapping did 
and also required the same showing by the Commonwealth that the 
defendant confined the victim "against his will."  See Trotto, 
487 Mass. at 715-716, 726-728. 
30 
 
no reason why the dismantling of the Impala would stand out in 
his memory.  Specific questions posed by defense counsel 
elicited that Dudley could not remember exactly when he worked 
at Ace Auto, did not recall the month, day, or date that the car 
at issue was dismantled, and could not accurately recall what 
car parts he removed during the dismantling process.  Defense 
counsel also sought to impeach Dudley with inconsistencies 
between his trial testimony in 2014 and his testimony before the 
grand jury in 2012. 
Over objection, on redirect examination, the prosecutor 
asked Dudley whether "it [was] fair to say that taking apart 
this car was memorable because [his boss] told [him] that 
someone had been shot in [the] car?"  To which Dudley responded, 
"Yes."  Prior to the prosecutor's question, the judge provided a 
limiting instruction that had been crafted with defense 
counsel's input.  On appeal, the defendant concedes that this 
single statement by Dudley "was relevant" but contends it was so 
unduly prejudicial that it should not have been admitted. 
"The purpose of redirect examination is to explain or rebut 
adverse testimony or inferences developed during cross-
examination" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Garcia, 470 
Mass. 24, 36 (2014).  Here, by suggesting the Dudley's memory 
regarding the Impala was unclear and inconsistent, "the 
defendant essentially invited the Commonwealth to address the 
31 
 
issue on redirect examination."  Marrero, 427 Mass. at 69.  In 
other words, "[t]he Commonwealth was entitled to rehabilitate 
its witness."  Id.  The statement at issue here was not offered 
for its truth; rather, it was clearly offered for its effect on 
Dudley to rebut defense counsel's inferences that he was an 
unreliable witness with an imprecise memory.  That it rebutted 
defense counsel's inference so powerfully simply reflects its 
considerable probative value. 
"As with cross-examination, a trial judge has considerable 
discretion over the scope of redirect examination."  Garcia, 470 
Mass. at 36.  "A defendant who asserts an abuse of this 
discretion on appeal assumes a heavy burden" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Id.  On this record, we discern no abuse of 
discretion in the judge's implicit determination that that 
statement's probative value was not substantially outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect.  See Garcia, supra at 38, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Stone, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 800, 807 (2007) ("The 
trial judge's offer to give a jury instruction to emphasize the 
limited relevance of [the witness's] testimony shows the extent 
to which he analyzed the prejudicial effect versus the probative 
value before deciding in favor of admissibility").  Moreover, 
the danger of unfair prejudice from the testimony was minimized 
by the judge's pointed limiting instruction, which was given 
32 
 
before the testimony at issue was elicited and which we presume 
the jury followed.  Cf. Garcia, supra. 
6.  Officer Moore's testimony.  At trial, among other 
testimony, Officer Moore testified that when he stopped the 
Impala early in the morning on February 16, 1994, he repeatedly 
asked for the defendant's consent to search the car, and the 
defendant refused.  The defendant contends that this testimony 
violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and arts. 12 and 14 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The Commonwealth 
concedes that this testimony was admitted in error.  Where the 
parties differ is whether the erroneous testimony was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"[T]estimonial evidence of a defendant's refusal to comply 
with a police request may not be admitted against him."  
Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 205 (2006).  Because 
the defendant objected to this testimony at trial, we "examine 
the case to determine whether the erroneous admission was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 
447 Mass. 546, 552 (2006).  "Whether an error is harmless 
depends on many factors, including whether the erroneously 
admitted evidence was merely cumulative of evidence properly 
before the jury.  The essential question is whether the error 
had, or might have had, an effect on the jury and whether the 
33 
 
error contributed to or might have contributed to the verdicts."  
(Quotation and citation omitted.)  Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 
Mass. 539, 549 (1990). 
Within the context of the entire case, this erroneous 
testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  These 
erroneous statements by Moore occupied five lines within the 
approximately thirty-four pages of this witness's testimony.  
The erroneous statement was not echoed in other questions by the 
prosecutor, nor was it discussed in the prosecutor's opening 
statement and closing argument.11  Other admissible aspects of 
Moore's testimony touched on the defendant's other suspicious 
behavior during the stop, such as the direction that the 
defendant was driving being inconsistent with coming from the 
 
11 The defendant's argument that the prosecutor alluded to 
the refusal in closing is not persuasive.  In closing, the 
prosecutor stated:  "[The defendant] know[s] what's inside the 
car.  They know what can be found in the car.  They're the one[] 
who know[s] what's important in the car.  They know why they 
need to get rid of the car." 
 
Read in context, this statement is not alluding to the 
defendant's refusal to let Moore search the car but rather is a 
reference to the plethora of evidence regarding the disassembly 
and disposal of the Impala.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mack, 
482 Mass. 311, 322 (2019) ("during closing argument, a 
prosecutor may not misstate the evidence or refer to facts not 
in evidence . . .  A prosecutor is, however, entitled to marshal 
the evidence and suggest inferences that the jury may draw from 
it. . . .  Statements made during closing argument are to be 
reviewed in the context of the entire closing, the jury 
instructions, and the evidence introduced at trial" [quotations 
and citations omitted]). 
34 
 
bar where the defendant claimed he had been.  Moreover, there 
was compelling evidence of the defendant's guilt that did not 
involve the stop, such as his own statements about shooting "the 
guy in the papers" and the significant consciousness of guilt 
evidence regarding the dismantling of his Impala.  See 
Commonwealth v. Basch, 386 Mass. 620, 625 (1982) ("Evidence of 
consciousness of guilt together with other evidence may support 
a determination of guilt").  As such, on this record we conclude 
that while the testimony was inadmissible, it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Compare Commonwealth v. Vermette, 43 
Mass. App. Ct. 789, 797-799 (1997) (where defendant acknowledged 
presence at crime scene, and evidence of refusal to let police 
search vehicle was not referenced in closing argument or 
instructions, error in admitting refusal evidence was harmless 
beyond reasonable doubt), with Dagraca, 447 Mass. at 554 (error 
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as "[b]y introducing the 
defendant's improperly procured admissions twice during trial 
and then highlighting them in closing argument, the prosecutor 
unmistakably relied on them in a significant way"). 
7.  Pamela DiCicco's testimony.  Pamela DiCicco, the 
defendant's former girlfriend, testified at trial.  She was 
asked by the prosecutor where she first met the defendant, and 
she answered that she had met him at a pub in Worcester.  She 
was next asked how she first met the defendant, and she 
35 
 
responded, "[b]uying drugs."  The defendant objected.  At the 
side bar discussion, the prosecutor explained that the 
relationship between the defendant and DiCicco evolved over time 
and that while the relationship began because DiCicco bought 
drugs from him, the defendant had "an interest in her and she 
starts dating him, then he requires that she stop[] taking 
drugs."  The judge determined that the evidence was being 
offered and was admissible "for a non-bad act purpose to give 
relevance to her testimony."  He discussed a proper limiting 
instruction with counsel and ultimately provided the following 
instruction: 
"[Y]ou hard testimony just now that [the defendant] was 
involved in drug activity.  That is in no way relevant in 
any way to the indictments in this case.  The indictment is 
for murder.  [The defendant] is not charged with any other 
crime.  The testimony is simply offered to you to give 
context to this witness's testimony, for no other purpose, 
and you're not to infer anything else from it other than 
the context that it provides to this testimony." 
 
On appeal, the defendant contends that this testimony was 
inadmissible prior bad act evidence.  Because the defendant 
objected, we review for prejudicial error.12  "Determinations of 
 
12 The Commonwealth argues that this issue was not 
preserved.  While it would have been better practice for trial 
counsel to specify that she was moving to strike the witness's 
answer, it is clear when reading the transcript that trial 
counsel's immediate objection to the witness's testimony 
reflected that trial counsel sought to have the answer struck.  
See Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 721 (2016), quoting  
M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 1.3.1, at 6 
36 
 
the relevance, probative value, and prejudice of [bad act] 
evidence are left to the sound discretion of the judge, whose 
decision to admit such evidence will be upheld absent clear 
error."  Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 158 (2007).  
Here, the judge was likely correct that the evidence of the 
defendant selling drugs to DiCicco had a nonpropensity purpose 
of showing the nature of the relationship between the pair.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 Mass. 741, 752 (2019) ("In sum, 
the drug transactions provided additional context to the 
relationship between the defendant and the victim"); 
Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 550 (2017) ("a 
defendant's prior acts of domestic violence may be admitted for 
the purpose of showing . . . the existence of a hostile 
relationship between the defendant and the victim" [quotation 
and citation omitted]).  However, the fact that their 
relationship prior to dating began with drugs was of minimal 
probative value to the issues at trial.  Admittedly, drug 
distribution was central to the Commonwealth's theory of joint 
venture.  However, unlike the other evidence of drug dealing, 
DiCicco's testimony about drugs had no clear connection to the 
trio's drug business or the victim's disappearance.  Considering 
the focus of DiCicco's testimony, that the brief references to 
 
(8th ed. 2007) ("A motion to strike is the proper means of 
eliminating an answer that is objectionable"). 
37 
 
the defendant's drug dealing had no clear or explicit connection 
to the trio's drug enterprise and was not the proffered reason 
for admitting the evidence or the reason the judge provided in 
his limiting instruction, the probative value of the evidence 
was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  However, 
given the brief nature of the testimony, the judge's limiting 
instruction that the evidence was not admitted for propensity 
purposes, which we presume the jury followed, and the strength 
of the evidence against the defendant, we discern no prejudice 
from its admission. 
8.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant 
challenges a portion of the prosecutor's closing argument that 
dealt with the testimony of Denaris.  "We examine [all] the 
challenged statements 'in the context of the entire closing, the 
jury instructions, and the evidence introduced at trial.'"  
Commonwealth v. Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 801 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 217 (2022).  Because 
"there was no objection to the prosecutor's closing argument, we 
review the challenged statements for error and, if they 
constitute error, for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage 
of justice."  Kapaia, supra. 
"Although 'counsel may argue the evidence and the fair 
inferences which can be drawn from the evidence,' 'a prosecutor 
should not . . . misstate the evidence or refer to facts not in 
38 
 
evidence'" (citations omitted).  Cheng Sun, 490 Mass. at 221.  
"A 'prosecutor may marshal the evidence . . . to "urge the jury 
to believe the government witnesses."'"  Commonwealth v. Rakes, 
478 Mass. 22, 45 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 
23, 39 (2012).  "This is especially so when defense counsel has 
attacked the credibility of a Commonwealth witness."  Rakes, 
supra.  In order to do so, a prosecutor may discuss "the 
evidence presented and the reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from that evidence."  Id.  "The inferences for which 
counsel argues need not be necessary, or inescapable; they only 
need be reasonable and possible."  Id. 
Here, the defendant takes issue with portions of the 
prosecutor's closing argument relating to Denaris's testimony.  
The defendant contends that, when discussing Denaris's 
testimony, the prosecutor's argument mischaracterized events and 
testimony from other witnesses, and "[t]he language used . . . 
risked being misunderstood as Denaris testifying to some 
knowledge of the events recounted by" other witnesses.  In 
essence, the defendant takes issue with the prosecutor's 
inferences that Denaris should be believed because his 
statements were consistent with or similar to other evidence. 
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, when the entire 
passage is read in context, the prosecutor did not impermissibly 
bolster Denaris's credibility and falsely state that his 
39 
 
testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.  Rather, he was 
marshalling the evidence and presenting an inference that could 
be drawn from it.  When the challenged statements are evaluated 
in their proper context, the prosecutor was urging the jury to 
make reasonable inferences from the evidence to "provide[] the 
jury with reasons to credit the account of a key witness."  
Rakes, 478 Mass. at 45.  Such a tactic constitutes permissible 
argument.  The prosecutor did not introduce or allude to 
evidence that was not before the jury.  He never implied that 
Denaris had independent knowledge of information not presented 
to the jury.  Rather, because defense counsel attacked Denaris's 
credibility in her closing, the prosecutor was "respond[ing] to 
an argument made by the defense at closing."  Commonwealth v. 
Mason, 485 Mass. 520, 539 (2020).  By comparing Denaris's 
testimony to other evidence and pointing out consistencies 
between them, the prosecutor was drawing a reasonable inference 
that Denaris's testimony about what the defendant and Fredette 
told him was similar or consistent with other pieces of evidence 
and therefore Denaris "should logically be believed."  
Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 159, 181 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 816 (2003).  On this 
record, we cannot say the prosecutor erred by "point[ing] to the 
logical reasons [Denaris]'s testimony should [have been] 
40 
 
believed" after his credibility had been called into question.  
Commonwealth v. Koumaris, 440 Mass. 405, 414 (2003). 
9.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel centers on the 
testimony of Whalen, who testified that after dismantling the 
defendant's Impala on February 16, 1994, parts of the Impala 
were thrown into the pond located behind Rusmart.  This 
testimony was somewhat contradicted by Dudley, who testified 
that, after it was dismantled, parts from the Impala were left 
next to the dumpster at Rusmart.  But Whalen's testimony was 
corroborated by the admission of car parts consistent with the 
Impala that were fished out of the Rusmart pond and expert 
testimony relating to those parts. 
The defendant alleged in his motion for a new trial that 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce a weather 
report which, the defendant contends, would have shown that the 
pond was frozen on the day that the Impala parts were 
purportedly thrown into it.  The motion was supported by an 
affidavit from trial counsel, who averred that she did not call 
an expert to testify about the weather conditions and did not 
recall investigating the weather conditions for February 16, 
1994.  The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied 
the defendant's motion and subsequently denied his motion for 
reconsideration, to which the defendant had attached an article 
41 
 
about ice growth that the defendant purports supported his claim 
that ice on the pond behind Rusmart "had to have been very 
thick, as much as five feet." 
"In this consolidated appeal, the defendant raises the same 
ineffective assistance of counsel arguments asserted in his 
motion[] for a new trial."  Commonwealth v. Norris, 483 Mass. 
681, 686 (2019).  "Because the statutory standard of [G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E,] is more favorable to a defendant than is the 
constitutional standard for determining the ineffectiveness of 
counsel, we analyze this claim under the rubric of § 33E to 
determine whether there exists a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice" (quotations and citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 489 Mass. 37, 52 (2022).  "Under this 
review, we first ask whether defense counsel committed an error 
in the course of the trial.  If there was an error, we ask 
whether it was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion" 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Denson, 489 
Mass. 138, 151 (2022). 
At its core, the defendant's claim here is that trial 
counsel should have impeached a particular witness whose 
testimony was already in conflict with other testimony.  "We 
apply 'a stringent standard of review to claims of ineffective 
assistance because of failure to impeach a witness.'"  
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 239 (2015), quoting 
42 
 
Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 805 (2011).  "This is 
true even when reviewing the claim under G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  
Commonwealth v. Moore, 489 Mass. 735, 746 (2022).  "In general, 
failure to impeach a witness does not prejudice the defendant or 
constitute ineffective assistance."  Commonwealth v. Bart B., 
424 Mass. 911, 916 (1997).  See Jenkins, supra ("Failure to 
impeach a witness does not, standing alone, amount to 
ineffective assistance").  "Even on the more favorable standard 
of review under § 33E, a claim of ineffective assistance based 
on failure to use particular impeachment methods is difficult to 
establish."  Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 357 (2001).  
"Impeachment of a witness is, by its very nature, fraught with a 
host of strategic considerations, to which we will, even on 
§ 33E review, still show deference."  Id.  "[A]bsent counsel's 
failure to pursue some obviously powerful form of impeachment 
available at trial, it is speculative to conclude that a 
different approach to impeachment would likely have affected the 
jury's conclusion."  Moore, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Garvin, 456 Mass. 778, 792 (2010). 
Here, the defendant failed to provide any support for his 
claim apart from the weather report.  Rather, he contends that 
the weather report for the general area is conclusive evidence 
that the pond would have been frozen and that, as a result, it 
would have been impossible to throw car parts into the water.  
43 
 
Absent expert testimony to this effect or an affidavit in 
support of it, this contention is nothing more than mere 
conjecture, which cannot be sufficient to support a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Commonwealth v. Alicea, 
464 Mass 837, 850-851 (2013) ("A claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failure to call an expert witness is generally 
doomed where [t]he defendant's claim is not supported by any 
affidavits to disclose the content of the omitted expert 
testimony" [quotation and citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 811 (2005) ("Claims of ineffective 
assistance must be shown by specific instances of attorney 
incompetence, not by mere speculation" [quotation and citation 
omitted]); Commonwealth v. Bolduc, 375 Mass. 530, 540 (1978) 
(speculation that facts existed, which if uncovered by further 
investigation might improve defendant's case, was not enough to 
support ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
To the extent that such evidence could have been admitted 
solely for impeachment purposes, on this record, impeachment of 
Whalen based on the purported weather conditions was unlikely to 
have influenced the jury.  This is particularly true given that 
Dudley's testimony was already inconsistent with Whalen's, and 
as a whole, the totality of the evidence connecting the 
defendant and his Impala to the victim's death was overwhelming 
irrespective of the parts found in the pond.  As such, we 
44 
 
conclude that the failure to introduce evidence about the 
weather on February 16, 1994, did not amount to ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
10.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have carefully 
reviewed the entire record, pursuant to our duty under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, and we discern no reason to set aside or reduce 
the verdict or to order a new trial. 
Conclusion.  We affirm the defendant's conviction and the 
orders denying his motions for a new trial and for 
reconsideration. 
So ordered.