Title: Grynberg v. L&R Exploration Venture

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CELESTE C. GRYNBERG d/b/a GRYNBERG PETROLEUM COMPANY, v. L & R EXPLORATION VENTURE, THOMAS L. KEMPNER, and TROF, INC.2011 WY 134Case Number: S-11-0037Decided: 09/21/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
CELESTE 
C. GRYNBERG d/b/a GRYNBERG PETROLEUM COMPANY,Appellant 
(Plaintiff),v.L & R EXPLORATION VENTURE, THOMAS L. KEMPNER, 
and TROF, INC.,Appellees (Defendants).
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County
The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
William 
L. Hiser, Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming; Jon Aimone, Lemich Law 
Center, Rock Springs, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Hiser.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Paula 
A. Fleck, Holland & Hart LLP, Jackson, Wyoming; Steve Andersen, Holland 
& Hart LLP, Boise, Idaho; Christina F. Gomez, Holland & Hart LLP, 
Denver, Colorado.  Argument by Mr. 
Andersen.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]  Celeste C. Grynberg, d/b/a/ Grynberg 
Petroleum Company (Grynberg Petroleum), filed a complaint for declaratory 
relief, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion against L&R 
Exploration Venture and numerous individuals and entities having an interest in 
the venture (collectively L&R).  
In essence, Mrs. Grynberg claimed that L&R owes her compensation for 
services Grynberg Petroleum provided to L&R and she is entitled to payment 
of those amounts.  The district 
court granted summary judgment for L&R and dismissed the complaint on the 
basis of res judicata, finding that Mrs. Grynberg was in privity with parties 
involved in prior litigation in Colorado and New York and her complaint involved 
the same subject matter and issues resolved in those proceedings.  Mrs. Grynberg appeals, claiming the 
district court erred in holding her claims are barred.  We affirm.  
ISSUES
 
[¶2]  Mrs. Grynberg presents two issues, which 
we restate as follows:
 
I.              
Whether 
the district court properly entered summary judgment for L&R when L&R 
failed to file a separate statement of material facts demonstrating the absence 
of a genuine issue for trial as required by W.R.C.P. 56.1.
 
II.            
Whether 
the district court correctly concluded that her claims are barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata.    

 
L&R 
re-states these issues and asks the Court to award it attorney fees and costs in 
defending this appeal. 
 
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]  Mrs. Grynberg and her husband, Jack 
Grynberg, are co-owners of Grynberg Petroleum, a company registered in the State 
of Utah that has been involved in acquiring, exploring, developing, and 
producing oil and natural gas fields.  
L&R Exploration Venture v. 
Grynberg, 31 Misc.3d 1219A, 927 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Table), 2011 WL 1564647 (N.Y. 
Sup.), 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 50732(U) (April 19, 2011).  Mr. Grynberg is the chief operating 
officer of the company.  In 1960, he 
and several individuals entered into a joint venture agreement, L&R 
Exploration Venture, for the purpose of developing oil and natural gas fields 
primarily in Wyoming.  Pursuant to 
the agreement, Mr. Grynberg acted as the chief executive officer of L&R and 
contributed the services, personnel, facilities, and accumulated knowledge of 
himself and the staff of Grynberg Petroleum.  The other participants in L&R 
collectively contributed $250,000 as capital for the joint 
venture.
 
[¶4]  The Nitchie Gulch Gas Field in 
Sweetwater County, Wyoming is among the fields Mr. Grynberg acquired and 
developed and from which he produced and marketed natural gas on behalf of 
L&R.  Originally, Mr. Grynberg 
had a 41.5% interest in the gas field and L&R owned the remaining 58.5% 
interest.  L&R Exploration, 2011 WL 1564647 at 
*1.   In 1994, Mr. Grynberg 
assigned 99% of his interest in the gas field to Mrs. Grynberg.  Id.
 
[¶5]  Over the years, Mr. Grynberg and L&R 
entered into agreements authorizing Grynberg Petroleum to recover damages for 
L&R’s interests in the Nitchie Gulch Gas Field by filing suit against 
various entities.  In exchange for 
pursuing L&R’s claims and advancing the costs and fees of litigation, 
Grynberg Petroleum was to receive a percentage of any amounts recovered for 
L&R.  
 
[¶6]  In 2000, an accountant for L&R 
raised questions concerning Mr. Grynberg’s accountings and payments to the joint 
venture participants.  When Mr. 
Grynberg learned that he was being questioned, he and Mrs. Grynberg filed suit 
against L&R in their home state of Colorado.  The complaint named Mr. and Mrs. 
Grynberg d/b/a/ Grynberg Petroleum as plaintiffs.  They sought a judgment declaring that 
Mr. Grynberg had fully accounted to and paid L&R its share of the proceeds 
from the litigation involving the Nitchie Gulch Gas Field.  They also brought claims for breach of 
contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit claiming L&R owed Grynberg 
Petroleum compensation for its services in developing the gas field and 
recovering damages for the joint venture’s interests in that field. 

 
[¶7]  In response to the Colorado action, 
L&R filed a petition in New York seeking a court order compelling the 
Grynbergs to arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the arbitration provisions 
contained in the joint venture agreement.  
The Grynbergs moved for an order dismissing L&R’s petition and 
transferring the matter to the Colorado state court.1  The New York court granted the motion to 
the extent that it dismissed Mrs. Grynberg from the proceeding, denied the 
motion as to Mr. Grynberg, granted L&R’s arbitration petition and ordered 
Mr. Grynberg “and all others acting on his behalf” to refrain from initiating 
“any court proceeding as to the disputes, including the pending action in the 
District Court of . . . Colorado . . . .”    
 
[¶8]  Consistent with the New York court’s 
order, the Colorado court stayed the Grynbergs’ action there while the New York 
arbitration proceeded.  Mr. Grynberg 
appealed the order compelling arbitration to the New York intermediate appeals 
court and New York’s highest court.  
Both courts rejected the appeal and affirmed the order compelling 
arbitration. 
 
[¶9]  Less than two months after the order 
staying the Colorado action, Mrs. Grynberg filed a complaint in Colorado state 
district court.  This complaint was 
identical to the Grynbergs’ earlier Colorado complaint except that Mrs. Grynberg 
d/b/a Grynberg Petroleum was the sole plaintiff, Mr. Grynberg was referred to in 
the body of the complaint as assignor and Mrs. Grynberg sought damages as his 
assignee.  Finding that the two 
complaints involved “identical claims and facts,” the Colorado court 
consolidated the cases and entered an order staying them until resolution of the 
New York proceedings.  The order 
stated further:  “The Court also 
finds that [Mrs.] Grynberg’s actions have frivolously multiplied the proceedings 
in the case and that an award of attorney’s fees and costs against [her] is 
therefore appropriate.”    

 
[¶10]  After the New York appellate courts 
rejected Mr. Grynberg’s appeals of the order compelling arbitration, the matter 
proceeded to arbitration.  L&R 
asserted that Mr. Grynberg had breached the joint venture agreement, his 
fiduciary duty and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
failing to account to L&R and make distributions to its participants while 
at the same time he had been paying himself from L&R funds.  L&R sought an accounting and payment 
of all sums due and owing to each participant.  Mr. Grynberg generally denied the 
allegations and filed counterclaims against L&R for breach of contract, 
unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claiming, as he and Mrs. Grynberg had in 
the Colorado actions, that L&R owed Grynberg Petroleum compensation for its 
services.    

 
[¶11]  In November of 2008, over seven years 
after the dispute began, the arbitration panel unanimously concluded that Mr. 
Grynberg had violated his fiduciary and accounting responsibilities and awarded 
L&R $3,067,783 plus interest.  
The panel rejected Mr. Grynberg’s counterclaim for $13.7 million except 
for ordering that he be reimbursed $40,000 in payments he had made to an 
accountant on L&R’s behalf.  
L&R filed a motion with the New York Supreme Court to confirm the 
arbitration award.  Mr. Grynberg 
filed a cross motion to partially vacate the award.  The court confirmed the award, denied 
the cross motion, and entered final judgment against Mr. Grynberg.    
 
[¶12]  Mr. Grynberg paid part of the judgment, 
including $1,384,025 to Mrs. Grynberg, the amount owing to her as assignee of 
his interest in L&R.  He failed 
to pay the balance of the judgment and, in 2009, L&R filed an action in 
Colorado to domesticate the judgment in Mr. Grynberg’s home state in order to 
collect the unpaid portion.  Mr. 
Grynberg objected.  The Colorado 
district court rejected the objection and allowed the New York judgment to be 
filed.  Mr. Grynberg appealed.  The Colorado court of appeals 
affirmed.  L&R Exploration Venture v. Grynberg, 
___ P.3d ___ (Colo. App. 2011), 2011 WL 32487.
 
[¶13]  Meanwhile, in 2010, Mrs. Grynberg d/b/a 
Grynberg Petroleum filed the present action against L&R in Wyoming.  She sought judgment declaring that Mr. 
Grynberg had fully accounted to and paid L&R its share of the damages 
obtained in connection with the Nitchie Gulch Gas Field and had no further 
obligation to the joint venture.  
She also claimed L&R breached its agreement to compensate Grynberg 
Petroleum for the value of its services in developing the gas field, obtaining 
damages for L&R and outlay of litigation costs.  Mrs. Grynberg also claimed L&R had 
been unjustly enriched by not paying for the services provided by Grynberg 
Petroleum agents and employees and had converted the amounts owing.  In addition to a declaratory judgment, 
Mrs. Grynberg sought compensatory damages of between $12.5 million and $7.16 
million, pre- and post-judgment interest and attorney fees.      

 
[¶14]  L&R moved to dismiss the complaint 
under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for 
summary judgment under Rule 56.  
L&R asserted that Mrs. Grynberg’s complaint was an improper attempt 
to re-litigate the identical claims that Mr. Grynberg had asserted against 
L&R and lost on the merits in New York.  After a hearing, the district court 
converted L&R’s motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and 
granted it, finding Mrs. Grynberg’s claims barred by res judicata.  The district court issued its decision 
letter on August 13, 2010.  

 
[¶15]  On September 9, 2010, Mrs. Grynberg 
filed a motion to reconsider and an objection to the evidence the district court 
considered in granting summary judgment.  
The next day, L&R filed a motion in New York seeking to have Mr. 
Grynberg held in contempt for violating the earlier order prohibiting him “and 
all others acting on his behalf” from initiating any court lawsuit involving the 
joint venture by filing, through Mrs. Grynberg, the Wyoming action.  While the contempt motion was pending, 
the district court in Wyoming convened a hearing on Mrs. Grynberg’s motion to 
reconsider and objection to evidence.  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied the motion 
and entered an order granting summary judgment to L&R in accordance with its 
decision letter.  Mrs. Grynberg 
timely appealed to this Court.  
After she had filed her appellate brief, the New York Supreme Court 
issued a decision finding Mr. Grynberg in contempt for colluding with Mrs. 
Grynberg to bring this action in Wyoming in violation of its 2005 order to 
refrain from further litigation involving L&R and the issues before the 
arbitration panel.       

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶16]  Summary judgment motions are governed by 
W.R.C.P. 56(c):
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.
 
We 
review a district court’s summary judgment rulings de novo, using the same materials and 
following the same standards as the district court.  The facts are reviewed from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, 
¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006); Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1166 (Wyo. 1996).  The question of whether res judicata 
bars a claim is one of law also subject to de novo review.  Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Wyo. Ins. Guar. 
Ass’n, 2010 WY 21, ¶ 11, 225 P.3d 1061, 1064 (Wyo. 
2010).
 
 
DISCUSSION
 

  The 
  W.R.C.P. 56.1 requirement of a statement of material 
  facts.
 
[¶17]  Mrs. Grynberg asserts L&R failed to 
comply with W.R.C.P. 56.1 and that failure precluded the entry of summary 
judgment in its favor.  Rule 56.1 
provides:
 
Rule 
56.1. Summary judgment – Required statement of material 
facts.
 
            
Upon any motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, in addition to the materials supporting the motion, there shall 
be annexed to the motion a separate, short and concise statement of the material 
facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be 
tried.
 
            
In addition to the materials opposing a motion for summary judgment, 
there shall be annexed a separate, short and concise statement of material facts 
as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be 
tried.
 
            
Such statements shall include pinpoint citations to the specific portions 
of the record and materials relied upon in support of the parties’ 
position.
 
[¶18]  L&R does not dispute that Rule 56.1 
requires a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts 
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue for trial with pinpoint citations 
to the record.  L&R asserts, 
however, that no such requirement exists under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), which is the 
rule pursuant to which it filed its motion.  L&R further contends Mrs. Grynberg 
waived her objection to its alleged non-compliance with Rule 56.1 by failing to 
raise it in response to the motion or during the motion hearing, instead raising 
it for the first time after the district court had issued its decision 
letter.  L&R asserts that in any 
event it provided the district court with sufficient information to support its 
motion.
 
[¶19]  Rule 56.1 is clear that upon filing any motion for summary judgment under 
Rule 56, a separate statement of material facts with pinpoint citations 
supporting the motion is required.  
In the same motion in which it sought a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, L&R 
alternatively sought summary judgment.  
A separate statement of the material facts with pinpoint citations 
supporting its summary judgment motion was required.  
 
[¶20]  Mrs. Grynberg did not object to 
L&R’s noncompliance with Rule 56.1 in her response to the motion or at the 
motion hearing.  After the district 
court issued its decision letter granting summary judgment, however, she filed a 
motion asking the court to reconsider its ruling together with an objection to 
the evidence L&R had submitted in support of its motion.  Specifically, she objected to the 
affidavits L&R attached to its motion as inadmissible hearsay and to 
L&R’s failure to attach a Rule 56.1 statement.  The district court convened a hearing on 
Mrs. Grynberg’s motion and objection at which time she again asserted L&R’s 
affidavits contained inadmissible hearsay and it had not complied with Rule 
56.1.  In ruling on the evidentiary 
objection, the district court stated that no objection was made to the 
affidavits prior to or at the time it heard L&R’s motion and it intended to 
sign the order granting summary judgment.  
Although the district court did not separately address the Rule 56.1 
issue, it is clear it considered Mrs. Grynberg’s objections waived by her 
failure to raise them before or during the summary judgment 
hearing.
 
[¶21]  We said in Kruckenberg v. Ding Masters, Inc., 2008 
WY 40, ¶ 24, 180 P.3d 895, 903 (Wyo. 2008) that a party’s failure to comply with 
Rule 56.1 by pointing out to the district court the facts creating a genuine 
issue of material fact may be fatal to an appeal.  Where, as here, however, the lack of 
compliance with Rule 56.1 was not raised in the district court until after it 
had heard and decided the summary judgment motion and the court ruled the 
objection was waived, we are not inclined on appeal to interfere with the 
ruling.  While we do not condone 
L&R’s failure to comply with Rule 56.1, we conclude the district court 
properly exercised its authority in determining that Ms. Grynberg waived the 
objection to its consideration of L&R’s motion and supporting materials when 
she did not raise it until after the court had considered the materials and 
issued a ruling.  

 
[¶22]  In Conway v. Guernsey Cable TV, 713 P.2d 786 (Wyo. 1986), we held that a party waived an objection to the court’s 
examination of factual support or opposition to a summary judgment motion when 
it was not made until after the motion hearing.  Although in Conway the objection was first made on 
appeal, and Mrs. Grynberg made her objection in the district court, the same 
rationale applies.  No objection was 
made until after the district court considered and ruled on the summary judgment 
motion; therefore, the objection was waived.          

 

  Res 
  judicata.
 
[¶23]  The doctrine of res judicata bars 
re-litigation of previously litigated causes of action or claims.  For the doctrine to apply:  1) the parties must be identical; 2) the 
subject matter must be identical; 3) the issues must be identical and relate to 
the same subject matter; and 4) the capacities of the persons must be identical 
in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them.  Wyo. Med. Ctr., ¶ 15, 225 P.3d  at 
1065.  The “identical parties” 
requirement is met when the parties are the same as, or in privity with, those 
involved in previous proceedings.  
Osborn v. Kilts, 2006 WY 142, 
¶ 10, 145 P.3d 1264, 1267 (Wyo. 2006).  
Privity means a connection or relationship between two parties, each 
having a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter.  Id., n.4.  Privity signifies that the relationship 
between two persons is such that a judgment involving one of them is conclusive 
upon the other, although the other was not a party to the suit.  Black’s Law Dictionary 1237 (Eighth ed. 
2004).  Among the legal 
relationships that bind a nonparty to an earlier judgment are preceding and 
succeeding owners of property, bailors and bailees, assignors and assignees and 
nonparties who are adequately represented by someone with the same interests who 
was a party.  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894, 
128 S. Ct. 2161, 2172, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008).   
 
[¶24]  As reflected in paragraph 6 above, this 
matter began when Mr. and Mrs. Grynberg d/b/a Grynberg Petroleum filed suit in 
Colorado against L&R seeking a declaratory judgment that Mr. Grynberg had 
fully accounted to and paid L&R its share of the damages recovered through 
litigation for L&R’s interest in the Nitchie Gulch Gas Field and claiming 
L&R owed them compensation for services Mr. Grynberg and Grynberg Petroleum 
provided in recovering those damages.  
The Colorado action was stayed by order of the New York court after 
L&R sought an order compelling the Grynbergs to arbitrate the dispute in 
accordance with the arbitration provision of the joint venture agreement.  The arbitration panel had before it the 
same issues and subject matter the Grynbergs raised in the Colorado action, 
essentially, whether Mr. Grynberg fully accounted to and made distributions to 
L&R and whether L&R owed compensation to Mr. Grynberg, d/b/a Grynberg 
Petroleum for the services provided in connection with the Nitchie Gulch Gas 
Field.  The arbitration panel 
resolved those issues in L&R’s favor and two New York courts affirmed that 
result.
 
[¶25]  In her Wyoming complaint, Mrs. Grynberg 
d/b/a Grynberg Petroleum sought a declaration that Mr. Grynberg had fully 
accounted for and paid L&R its share of the revenues recovered in connection 
with the Nitchie Gulch Gas Field litigation and owed nothing more.  She also claimed L&R owed her, as 
the owner of Grynberg Petroleum and the assignee of Mr. Grynberg’s interest in 
L&R, compensation for services Grynberg Petroleum provided in recovering 
those amounts.  These are the 
identical issues and subject matter raised in the New York and Colorado courts 
and resolved in New York after a seven day evidentiary hearing and numerous 
appeals.  
 
[¶26]  Contending otherwise, Mrs. Grynberg 
asserts the issues and subject matter are different in the present case because 
she seeks compensation as the owner of Grynberg Petroleum while the New York 
proceedings involved Mr. Grynberg in his capacity as manager of the company and 
chief executive officer of L&R.  
She further contends the issues and subject matter are different because 
the New York proceedings concerned the joint venture agreement between L&R 
and Mr. Grynberg to which she was not a party.  These assertions are without 
merit.
 
[¶27]  In all of the proceedings—the New York 
arbitration and appeals, the Colorado lawsuits and Mrs. Grynberg’s Wyoming 
action—the issues to be determined were what amounts Mr. Grynberg owed to 
L&R and whether L&R owed Mr. Grynberg and his company compensation.  Those issues have been fully and finally 
resolved.  Whether or not Mrs. 
Grynberg is the owner of Grynberg Petroleum or was a party to the joint venture 
agreement, an order was entered in New York finding that Mr. Grynberg owed 
L&R monies recovered in connection with the Nitchie Gulch Gas Field and 
L&R owed Mr. Grynberg and his company nothing except the $40,000 accountant 
fee.  As the co-owner of Grynberg 
Petroleum, Mrs. Grynberg has no greater right to payment of compensation from 
L&R than the company had.  
Whether or not she was a party to the joint venture agreement, Mrs. 
Grynberg is the assignee of Mr. Grynberg’s interest in L&R and has no 
greater rights against L&R than he had.  See Jones v. Central States Inv. Co., 
654 P.2d 727, 732 (Wyo. 1982) (“The assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor 
and receives all of such right, title and interest as is possessed by the 
assignor . . . .”).   

 
[¶28]  Pursuant to the New York judgment, Mrs. 
Grynberg, as the assignee of her husband’s interest in L&R, received payment 
of her proportionate share of the amount Mr. Grynberg was ordered to pay to 
L&R.  Pursuant to the New York 
judgment, Mrs. Grynberg as co-owner of Grynberg Petroleum was not entitled to 
payment of anything from L&R because the arbitration panel determined, and 
the two courts of appeals confirmed, that L&R owed Grynberg Petroleum 
nothing more than the $40,000 accountant fee.  Mrs. Grynberg is in privity with Mr. 
Grynberg as the assignee of his interest in L&R and with Grynberg Petroleum 
as co-owner of the company and is bound by the prior rulings.2  The district court correctly ruled that 
res judicata bars her claims.  

 

   L&R’s attorney fees and 
  costs.
 
[¶29]  L&R asks this Court to award it 
attorney fees and costs in defending this appeal pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
10.05:
 
Rule 
10.05.  Costs and penalties on 
affirmance.
 
            
If the judgment or appealable order is affirmed in a civil case, appellee 
shall recover the cost for publication of the brief with the cost to be computed 
at the rate allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence.  If the court certifies there was no 
reasonable cause for the appeal, a reasonable amount for attorneys’ fees and 
damages to the appellee shall be fixed by the appellate court and taxed as part 
of the costs in the case.  The 
amount for attorneys’ fees shall not be less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) 
nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).  The amount for damages to the appellee 
shall not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00).
 
[¶30] 
 An appellate court is reluctant to 
grant sanctions and will do so only in rare circumstances.  Budd-Falen Law Offices, P.C. v. Rocky Mt. 
Recovery, Inc., 2005 WY 77, ¶ 8, 114 P.3d 1284, 1291 (Wyo. 2005).  This is one of those rare 
circumstances.  The manner in which 
Mrs. Grynberg and Grynberg Petroleum have approached this case from beginning to 
end has resulted in unnecessary legal expense.  Her pursuit of this appeal was simply 
another example of the Grynbergs’ efforts to prolong this dispute and increase 
costs.  In light of the lengthy New 
York proceedings, the orders staying and prohibiting other proceedings, and the 
contempt order, Mrs. Grynberg d/b/a Grynberg Petroleum had no reasonable cause 
for this appeal.  L&R is 
entitled to attorney fees and costs.    
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶31]  The district court’s order granting 
summary judgment is affirmed.  We 
impose sanctions upon Mrs. Grynberg.  
L&R shall submit a statement of costs and attorney fees associated 
with defending this appeal.  Upon 
review, we will award an appropriate amount.
 
FOOTNOTES
1In addition to filing the motion to dismiss, Mr. Grynberg challenged the 
New York court’s personal jurisdiction over him.  After more than a year of discovery, a 
special referee rejected the defense, finding that Mr. Grynberg had sufficient 
contacts with New York to support the court exercising jurisdiction.    

2In ruling on L&R’s motion to hold Mr. Grynberg in contempt, the New 
York Supreme Court made the following findings: 
 
-          
Mr. 
and Mrs. Grynberg have been husband and wife for fifty years. 

-          
Mr. 
Grynberg and his agents have repeatedly admitted in affidavits, pleadings and 
deposition and hearing testimony that Grynberg Petroleum is his own d/b/a.  
-          
Mr. 
Grynberg is president and co-owner, along with his wife, of Grynberg 
Petroleum.  
-          
Mr. 
and Mrs. Grynberg are partners in L&R.  
Mr. and Mrs. Grynberg were originally co-defendants in the New York 
arbitration action.
-          
The 
New York courts ordered Mr. Grynberg to arbitrate his disputes with L&R and 
enjoined him and “anyone acting on his behalf” from initiating any lawsuit 
relating to those disputes.
-          
Although 
Mr. Grynberg is not a plaintiff in the Wyoming action, Mrs. Grynberg alleges in 
her complaint that she acted by and through him as his agent.  
-          
Mrs. 
Grynberg’s decision to step into her husband’s shoes and commence an action in 
Wyoming was an affirmative act of resistance to the [New York] court’s order. 

-          
Mrs. 
Grynberg’s actions relating to Grynberg Petroleum are indistinguishable from 
those of her husband.  

-          
Grynberg 
Petroleum and Mr. Grynberg are one and the same and the company has no legal 
existence apart from Grynberg himself.  

L&R 
Exploration, 
2011 WL 1564647.