Title: Koschkee v. Evers

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 82
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This order is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports.   
 
 
 
No.   2017AP2278-OA 
 
 
Kristi Koschkee, Amy Rosno, Christopher 
Martinson and Mary Carney, 
 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Tony Evers; in his official capacity as 
Wisconsin Superintendent of Public Instruction 
and Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction,   
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court entered the following order on this date: 
 JUNE 27, 2018
 
¶1 
This original action is before the court for the 
determination of preliminary motions related to two issues:  (1) 
whether the respondents in this action, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction Tony Evers and the Department of Public Instruction, 
are entitled to counsel of their choice or whether they must be 
represented by the Department of Justice; and (2) whether 
Governor Scott Walker is a necessary party to this action. 
¶2 
We conclude that Evers and the Department of Public 
Instruction are entitled to counsel of their choice and are not 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
2 
required to be represented by the Department of Justice.  
Further, we conclude that the governor is not a necessary party 
to this action.  Accordingly, we grant Evers' and the Department 
of Public Instruction's motion to deny substitution of counsel 
and to disqualify the attorney general from appearing on behalf 
of respondents and deny the Department of Justice's cross-motion 
to strike the appearance by attorneys Ryan Nilsestuen and 
Benjamin R. Jones.  We further decline to order that the 
governor be joined as a necessary party. 
I 
¶3 
In 
this 
original 
action, 
petitioners 
seek 
a 
declaratory judgment that Superintendent of Public Instruction 
Tony Evers (Evers) and the Department of Public Instruction 
(DPI) must comply with the REINS Act, 2017 Wis. Act 57.  
Generally, the REINS Act requires an agency proposing an 
administrative 
rule 
to 
submit 
the 
proposed 
rule 
to 
the 
"department of administration, which shall make a determination 
as to whether the agency has the explicit authority to 
promulgate the rule as proposed in the statement of scope and 
shall report the statement of scope and its determination to the 
governor who, in his or her discretion, may approve or reject 
the statement of scope."  2017 Wis. Act 57, § 3; Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.135(2). 
¶4 
The record reflects that, upon the filing of the 
original action petition, a dispute arose between DPI and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding which entity would provide 
representation for Evers and DPI in this case.  On the same day 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
3 
the original action petition was filed, DPI's in-house counsel 
initiated correspondence with DOJ regarding representation.  DOJ 
indicated that it was of the position that the REINS Act applies 
to Evers and DPI.  This position is contrary to that taken by 
Evers and DPI. 
¶5 
DPI in-house attorneys filed a notice of appearance 
with the court, and notified DOJ that they would not be 
referring this matter to DOJ for representation.  DOJ responded 
by filing its own notice of appearance and substitution of 
counsel.  Further, DOJ informed DPI attorneys that the governor 
had requested that DOJ take over representation of Evers and 
DPI.  By letter, Evers notified the attorney general that he was 
terminating DOJ's representation. 
¶6 
Evers and DPI filed a motion to deny substitution of 
counsel and to disqualify the attorney general from appearing on 
their behalf.  In response, DOJ filed a cross-motion to strike 
the appearance by DPI's in-house counsel, Ryan Nilsestuen and 
Benjamin R. Jones.  We address both of these motions in this 
order.  Additionally, the court sua sponte raised the issue of 
whether the governor is a necessary party to this action and we 
also address that issue. 
II 
¶7 
We address first who will represent Evers and DPI in 
this action.  Specifically, we examine whether Evers and DPI 
should be represented by counsel of their choice or by DOJ.  
Evers and DPI assert that they are entitled to be represented by 
their own counsel.  Conversely, DOJ argues that it is to take 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
4 
over the representation of Evers and DPI and to determine Evers 
and DPI's litigation position. 
¶8 
This court is vested with authority by the Wisconsin 
Constitution.1  Specifically, this court has "superintending and 
                                                 
1 The dissent fails to acknowledge the focus of our 
discussion.  This order does not address the constitutional 
authority of the superintendent of public instruction.  Rather, 
it addresses the authority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  
Unlike the dissent, we save for another day the substantive 
issues 
addressing 
the 
constitutional 
authority 
of 
the 
superintendent of public instruction. 
This court possesses inherent power, which includes the 
court's superintending authority.  Our inherent power includes 
"all judicial powers essential to carry out the judicial 
functions delegated to [us]."  In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 
517, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975).  The dissent's disclaimer of our 
exercise of superintending authority here is inconsistent with 
the court's inherent power to appoint an attorney in a civil 
case.  This power, although most often exercised to preserve the 
constitutional rights of indigent criminal defendants, is not 
limited to constitutional or statutory grace, to criminal cases, 
or to litigants who are indigent. 
A court's inherent power to appoint counsel is not 
derived from an individual litigant's constitutional 
right to counsel, but rather is inherent to serve the 
interests of the circuit court. . . .  In rare cases a 
court 
may 
find 
a 
compelling 
judicial 
need 
for 
appointment of an attorney for a party even though 
that party may have neither a constitutional nor a 
statutory right to counsel.  A court may use its 
inherent discretionary authority to appoint counsel in 
furtherance of the court's need for the orderly and 
fair presentation of a case. 
 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
5 
administrative authority over all courts."  Wis. Const. art. 
VII, § 3.  Our superintending power is "as broad and as flexible 
as necessary to insure the due administration of justice in the 
courts of this state."  In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 520, 235 
N.W.2d 409 (1975).  "If this power were strictly limited to the 
situations in which it was previously applied, it would cease to 
be superintending, since this word definitely contemplates 
ongoing, continuing supervision in response to changing needs 
and circumstances."  Id. 
¶9 
"[T]he primary duty of the courts as the judicial 
branch 
of 
our 
government 
is 
the 
proper 
and 
efficient 
administration of justice."  In re Integration of the Bar, 5 
Wis. 2d 618, 622, 93 N.W.2d 601 (1958).  Essential to such a 
duty is the inherent supervisory power over the practice of law.  
Herro, McAndrews & Porter, S.C. v. Gerhardt, 62 Wis. 2d 179, 
184, 214 N.W.2d 401 (1974).  "The practice of law in the broad 
sense, both in and out of the courts, is [] a necessary part of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Joni B. v. State, 202 Wis. 2d 1, 10-11, 549 N.W.2d 411 (1996) 
(internal citations omitted).  Furthermore, "the legislature may 
not place an unreasonable burden on or substantially interfere 
with the judiciary's exercise of that power," id. at 10, and 
this authority is not limited, as the dissent suggests, to the 
appointment of amicus counsel.  This is indeed an exceptional 
case, and one in which the superintendent and DPI's request for 
independent counsel furthers the court's need for the orderly 
and fair presentation of the case.  Moreover, where, as here, we 
sit as the trial court in an original action, exercising our 
authority to appoint counsel is entirely logical; that is, we 
are 
not, 
as 
the 
dissent 
suggests, 
merely 
"supervis[ing 
ourselves]."  See dissent, ¶42. 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
6 
and is [] inexorably connected with the exercise of the judicial 
power . . . ."  In re Integration of the Bar, 5 Wis. 2d at 622. 
¶10 "[T]he regulation of the practice of the law is a 
judicial power and is vested exclusively in the supreme court" 
by way of Article VII of the Wisconsin Constitution.  State ex 
rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 206, 109 N.W.2d 685 
(1961); see State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 
Wis. 2d 94, 105-06, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990).  Once an attorney has 
been "admitted to practice law, he or she is subject to the 
judiciary's inherent and exclusive authority to regulate the 
practice of law."  Fiedler, 155 Wis. 2d at 103. 
¶11 This 
case 
presents 
a 
dispute 
regarding 
the 
representation of a client.  Representation of a client before 
this court is most certainly the "practice of law."  See SCR 
23.01(3) 
(defining 
the 
practice 
of 
law 
to 
include 
"[r]epresentation of another entity or person(s) in a court").  
It is thus within the purview of our superintending authority to 
decide a question of representation.   
¶12 Our supervisory authority is not to be invoked 
lightly.  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶15, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 
647 N.W.2d 142.  Whether we choose to exercise our supervisory 
authority in a given situation is a matter of judicial policy 
rather than one relating to the power of this court.  In re 
Phelan, 225 Wis. 314, 320, 274 N.W. 411 (1937).  However, the 
"necessities 
of 
justice" 
require 
us 
to 
exercise 
our 
superintending authority here.  See Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 
Wis. 2d 217, 225, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996).  We determine that our 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
7 
superintending authority over the courts and over the practice 
of law gives this court the power to resolve disputes regarding 
representation.  Accordingly, on the facts of this case, we 
exercise our superintending authority to determine that Evers 
and DPI are entitled to counsel of their choice and are not 
required to be represented by DOJ. 
¶13 We reach this conclusion because we are concerned 
about the implications of DOJ's argument.  First, accepting 
DOJ's argument would foist upon Evers and DPI an attorney they 
do not want (and have discharged), taking a position with which 
they do not agree.  This could have ethical implications for DOJ 
attorneys.2  Second, accepting DOJ's argument would give the 
attorney general breathtaking power.  It would potentially make 
the attorney general a gatekeeper for legal positions taken by 
constitutional officers, such as the governor or justices of 
this court sued in their official capacity.3  DOJ's position 
would not allow a constitutional officer to take a litigation 
position contrary to the position of the attorney general.  We 
decline to adopt this view. 
                                                 
2 See SCR 20:1.16(a)(3) ("a lawyer shall not represent a 
client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw 
from the representation of a client if . . . the lawyer is 
discharged."). 
3 Such a result appears to be at odds with this court's 
practice of appointing counsel for a "court, for judges sued in 
their official capacity . . . and for boards, commissions and 
committees appointed by the supreme court."  See SCR 81.02(1). 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
8 
¶14 This case serves as a good example as to why DOJ's 
position cannot be accepted.  On its merits, this suit is about 
the constitutional scope of the superintendent's power.  The 
superintendent cannot protect such power without a lawyer to 
argue his position.  DOJ has indicated that it will not argue 
the superintendent's position, but its own.  Accepting DOJ's  
position would leave no way to determine the scope of the powers 
vested in a constitutional officer and would essentially leave 
the attorney general, and not this court, to decide the scope of 
the superintendent's constitutional authority. 
¶15 Thus, we grant Evers and DPI's motion to deny 
substitution of counsel and to disqualify the attorney general 
from appearing on behalf of respondents and deny DOJ's cross-
motion to strike the appearance by attorneys Ryan Nilsestuen and 
Benjamin R. Jones. 
III 
¶16 We address next whether the governor must be joined as 
a necessary party to this action.  The parties direct us to two 
possible statutory bases for our consideration.  We examine each 
in turn. 
A 
¶17 DOJ directs us to Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1), which 
provides that a party shall be joined if any of three criteria 
apply:  (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be 
accorded among those already parties; (2) the person claims an 
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action in the person's 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
9 
absence may as a practical matter impair or impede the person's 
ability to protect that interest; or (3) the disposition of the 
action would leave any of the persons already parties subject to 
a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations by reason of his or her claimed 
interest. 
¶18 None 
of 
the 
criteria 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 808.03(1) is fulfilled.  First, complete relief can be 
afforded even in the governor's absence.  See § 803.03(1)(a).  
In examining this prong of the statute, we look to the requested 
relief for guidance.  This is a declaratory judgment action 
seeking a declaration that Evers and DPI must comply with the 
REINS Act.  Although the governor does have a role to play in 
the promulgation of rules pursuant to the REINS Act, a 
declaration would have the same effect on him whether he 
participates as a party or not. 
¶19 The REINS Act, Wis. Stat. § 227.135(2), sets forth a 
task for both the Department of Administration and the governor.  
Pursuant to § 227.135(2), an agency seeking to promulgate a rule 
"shall present the statement [of scope] to the department of 
administration, which shall make a determination as to whether 
the agency has the explicit authority to promulgate the rule as 
proposed in the statement of scope and shall report the 
statement of scope and its determination to the governor who, in 
his or her discretion, may approve or reject the statement of 
scope."  Similarly, § 227.185 provides a responsibility for the 
governor:  "After a proposed rule is in final draft form, the 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
10 
agency shall submit the proposed rule to the governor for 
approval.  The governor, in his or her discretion, may approve 
or reject the proposed rule." 
¶20 This case raises the question of whether DPI must 
submit a scope statement to the governor in the first instance.  
It does not raise the question of what the governor does with a 
scope statement if submitted.  A declaration in this case will 
not affect the governor's responsibilities under the REINS Act.  
The governor will still review a scope statement if he receives 
one whatever the outcome of this case. 
¶21 Second, not participating as a named party in this 
case will not as a practical matter impair or impede the 
governor's ability to protect his interest.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.03(1)(b)1.  Although case law does not state a clear test 
for 
when 
one 
has 
an 
"interest" 
in 
the 
context 
of 
§ 803.03(1)(b)1., we take guidance from Dairyland Greyhound 
Park, Inc. v. McCallum, 2002 WI App 259, ¶15, 258 Wis. 2d 210, 
655 N.W.2d 474.  "The relevant inquiry in Wisconsin is thus not 
whether a prospective party has a legal or legally protected 
interest in the subject of an action, but whether the person or 
entity has an interest of such direct and immediate character 
that the [prospective party] will either gain or lose by the 
direct operation of the judgment."  Id. (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). 
¶22 As stated above, the governor will neither gain nor 
lose by direct operation of the judgment here.  His obligation 
remains the same no matter the outcome—to review a scope 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
11 
statement if presented.  The governor therefore has no legally 
protectable "interest" that would require necessary party status 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)1.4  Finally, the governor's 
absence will not leave any person who is already a party subject 
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations.  See Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1)(b)2. 
¶23 In sum, none of the criteria set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 803.03(1) is fulfilled.  Accordingly, § 803.03(1) cannot serve 
as authority for joining the governor as a necessary party. 
B 
¶24 We address next DPI's argument that the governor is a 
necessary party pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 806.04(11) states in part:  "When declaratory 
relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or 
claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, 
and no declaration may prejudice the right of persons not 
parties to the proceeding." 
¶25 "[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act does not require 'the 
joinder as parties, in a declaratory action to determine the 
validity of a statute or ordinance, of any persons other than 
the public officers charged with the enforcement of the 
                                                 
4 This is not to say that the governor cannot participate as 
amicus curiae in this case.  Further, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 
806.04(11), "[i]f a statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged 
to be unconstitutional, the attorney general shall also be 
served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be 
heard."  It appears that the attorney general and the governor 
are in accord as to their position in this case. 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
12 
challenged statute or ordinance.'"  Helgeland v. Wisconsin 
Municipalities, 2008 WI 9, ¶140, 307 Wis. 2d 1, 745 N.W.2d 1 
(citing White House Milk Co. v. Thomson, 275 Wis. 243, 249, 81 
N.W.2d 725 
(1957)). 
 
The 
court 
has 
not 
construed Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) to 
require 
"that 
where 
a 
declaratory judgment as to the validity of a statute or 
ordinance is sought, every person whose interests are affected 
by the statute or ordinance must be made a party to the 
action."  Id. (citing Town of Blooming Grove v. City of Madison, 
275 Wis. 328, 334, 81 N.W.2d 713 (1957)).  If the statute "were 
so construed, the valuable remedy of declaratory judgment would 
be 
rendered 
impractical 
and 
indeed 
often 
worthless 
for 
determining the validity of legislative enactments, either state 
or local, since such enactments commonly affect the interests of 
large numbers of people."  Id.  As with Wis. Stat. § 803.03(1), 
we determine that the governor is not a necessary party pursuant 
to § 806.04(11).  Although the governor has a role to play 
pursuant to the REINS Act,  "every person whose interests are 
affected" need not be made a party.  Helgeland, 307 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶140 (emphasis added). 
¶26 In sum, we conclude that Evers and DPI are entitled to 
their own counsel and are not required to be represented by DOJ.  
We further conclude that the governor is not a necessary party 
to this action.  Accordingly, we grant Evers and DPI's motion to 
deny substitution of counsel and to disqualify the attorney 
general from appearing on behalf of respondents and deny the 
Department of Justice's cross-motion to strike the appearance by 
No.  2017AP2278-OA 
13 
attorneys Ryan Nilsestuen and Benjamin R. Jones.  We further 
decline to order that the governor be added as a necessary 
party. 
IT IS ORDERED that the Respondents' motion to deny 
substitution of counsel and to disqualify the attorney general 
from appearing on behalf of Respondents is GRANTED.  
 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department of Justice's 
cross-motion 
to 
strike 
the 
appearance 
by 
Attorneys 
Ryan 
Nilsestuen and Benjamin R. Jones is DENIED. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the governor is not a necessary 
party to this action. 
 
 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
14 
 
¶27 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring in part; 
dissenting in part).  "The courts must declare the sense of the 
law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of 
JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of 
their pleasure to that of the legislative body."  The Federalist 
No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961).  On one issue before us, the court correctly applies 
statutory law and concludes that the Governor is not a necessary 
party; I therefore concur in that part of the court's order.  On 
the second issue, the majority ignores governing statutory law 
and instead invokes its ever-evolving "superintending authority" 
to substitute the majority's preference for that of the 
legislature.  The majority's conclusion that the Superintendent 
of Public Instruction, Tony Evers, may select his own lawyer to 
represent him in an action in which he has been sued in his 
official capacity is grounded not in the rule of law but in a 
judicial policy predilection.  The Wisconsin Constitution and 
the applicable statutes unmistakably require the Department of 
Justice to represent Evers.  The majority's decision on 
representation flatly disregards the text of our constitution 
and statutes and threatens the separation of powers.  I dissent.   
I 
 
¶28 Petitioners Kristi Koschkee, Amy Rosno, Christopher 
Martinson, and Mary Carney (collectively, "Koschkee") filed a 
petition in this court on November 20, 2017, seeking leave to 
commence an original action.  The petitioners ask this court to 
declare 2017 Wis. Act 57 constitutional; require respondents, 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
15 
 
Tony Evers, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Public 
Instruction ("Evers" or the "Superintendent"), and the Wisconsin 
Department of Public Instruction ("DPI") to comply with Act 57; 
and enjoin Evers and DPI from proposing or promulgating any 
rules without complying with Act 57.1   
¶29 That same day, Attorney Ryan Nilsestuen, Chief Legal 
Counsel for DPI, sent a copy of the petition and petitioner's 
memorandum in support of it to the Department of Justice 
("DOJ").  Subsequent communications between DPI's attorneys and 
DOJ revealed a deep rift between them on the underlying issue.  
Evers and DPI contended the petition was frivolous and Act 57 
was unconstitutional based on this court's recent decision in 
Coyne v. Walker, 2016 WI 38, 368 Wis. 2d 444, 879 N.W.2d 520, in 
which 
the 
lead 
opinion 
held 
a 
similar 
statute 
to 
be 
unconstitutional.  The DOJ and the Attorney General, on the 
other hand, maintained that they would advocate for the 
"State's" position in support of Act 57's constitutionality.  
Further 
communications 
showcased 
that 
because 
of 
this 
fundamental 
difference 
of 
opinion 
as 
to 
Act 
57's 
constitutionality, DPI and DOJ were at odds as to who actually 
represented the DPI and Evers in his official capacity as 
Superintendent.   
                                                 
1 At this stage, we do not decide the merits of the 
petition, which are scheduled for oral argument during the 
court's 2018-19 term.  The background facts are provided solely 
to facilitate understanding of the underlying dispute.   
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
16 
 
¶30 On November 22, Attorney Nilsestuen hand-delivered a 
letter to this court, informing it that he and Attorney Benjamin 
R. Jones would represent Evers in the matter.2  He then sent an 
email to the DOJ notifying it that DPI would not be requesting 
DOJ's representation, as provided in Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6).  
The DOJ replied to that email, attaching a copy of a notice of 
appearance and substitution of counsel, which stated that the 
Attorney General, by Solicitor General Misha Tseytlin and Chief 
Deputy Solicitor General Ryan Walsh, was replacing Attorney 
Nilsestuen as counsel for Evers in his official capacity as 
superintendent and the Attorney General, by Assistant Attorney 
General Maura F.J. Whelan, was also replacing him as counsel for 
DPI.  Assistant Attorney General Daniel Lennington also sent an 
email to Attorney Nilsestuen stating the DOJ had received a 
request from the Governor for the DOJ to represent both DPI and 
the superintendent.  
¶31 Attorney Nilsestuen asked for a copy of the request, 
which was not immediately provided.  However, a confirmation 
email was sent to Assistant Attorney General Walsh on December 
5, 2017, in which Katie Ignatowski, Chief Legal Counsel to the 
Governor, confirmed that she, on behalf of the Governor, had 
requested "that the Department of Justice appear for and 
represent 
the 
Department 
of 
Public 
Instruction 
and 
                                                 
2 This letter did not state that Attorneys Nilsestuen and 
Jones also sought to represent DPI, although that seemed to be 
their intention based upon communications with this court and 
those between DPI and DOJ.   
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
17 
 
Superintendent Tony Evers in his official capacity . . . in 
accordance with Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1m)."   
¶32 On November 28, 2017, Evers wrote to inform Attorney 
General Brad Schimel that he was "terminating any representation 
provided by the Wisconsin Department of Justice in this matter 
pursuant to SCR 20:1.16(a)-(c)."  On November 29, 2017, Evers and 
DPI filed a motion to deny substitution of counsel and to 
disqualify the Attorney General from appearing on their behalf.  
¶33 On December 11, 2017, DOJ filed a cross-motion to 
strike the appearances by Attorneys Nilsestuen and Jones.  Along 
with it, the Attorney General filed a joint response to Evers and 
DPI's motion to deny substitution of counsel and a memorandum in 
support of its cross-motion to strike the appearance of Attorneys 
Nilsestuen and Jones.  On December 18, 2017, Evers and DPI filed a 
motion for leave to file a response to DOJ's cross-motion to 
strike.   
¶34 This court, in an order dated February 14, 2018, ordered 
responses from both Evers and DPI and DOJ on a number of issues, 
including 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 165.25(1m) 
prohibits 
the 
Superintendent and DPI from selecting their own litigation 
counsel.3  Following receipt of these responses, on April 13, 
2018, we granted Koschkee's petition to commence an original 
action and scheduled oral argument for May 15, 2018, on the 
                                                 
3 Pursuant to the February 14th order, Evers and DPI's 
lawyers filed a response brief on March 5, 2018 and DOJ filed a 
reply brief on March 12, 2018.  
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
18 
 
issues of representation as well as whether the Governor is a 
necessary party in these proceedings.    
II 
¶35 The Wisconsin Constitution in Article X, Section 1 
provides:  "The supervision of public instruction shall be 
vested in a state superintendent and such other officers as the 
legislature shall direct; and their qualifications, powers, 
duties 
and 
compensation 
shall 
be 
prescribed 
by 
law."  
"Article X, section 1 confers no more authority upon those 
officers than that delineated by statute."  Fortney v. Sch. 
Dist. of W. Salem, 108 Wis. 2d 167, 182, 321 N.W.2d 225 (1982).  
Even in the fractured Coyne opinion, a majority of this court 
concluded that the Superintendent possesses no powers or duties 
beyond those specifically provided by the legislature.  See 
Coyne, 368 Wis. 2d 444, ¶70 (lead opinion) ("As a result, the 
Legislature may give, may not give, and may take away the powers 
and duties of the [Superintendent] and the other officers of 
supervision of public instruction."); id., ¶¶36-37 ("There were 
no common law duties and powers that the [Superintendent] or any 
other 
officers 
of 
supervision 
of 
public 
instruction 
had 
traditionally possessed prior to the adoption of the Wisconsin 
Constitution because neither the office of the [Superintendent] 
nor a uniform system of public instruction existed prior the 
adoption of our constitution in 1848 . . . . Consequently, any 
rulemaking power the [Superintendent] and DPI has is clearly a 
delegation 
of 
power 
from 
the 
Legislature, 
not 
from 
the 
constitution."); 
id., 
¶189 
(Roggensack, 
C.J., 
dissenting) 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
19 
 
(joined by Justices Annette K. Ziegler and Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley) ("Article X, Section 1 plainly granted the legislature 
control over both the power that the Superintendent could 
exercise 
and 
the 
duties 
that 
the 
Superintendent 
must 
undertake."). 
¶36 The 
constitution 
creates 
the 
role 
of 
a 
state 
Superintendent 
and 
gives 
the 
Superintendent 
authority 
to 
supervise public instruction.  That is all the constitution 
confers upon the Superintendent.  The constitution is silent on 
whether the Superintendent may hire his own lawyer if he is sued 
in his official capacity.  Rather, the constitution says the 
Superintendent's powers and duties shall be what the legislature 
prescribes.  Accordingly, the constitution obligates us to 
examine the statutes to ascertain the Superintendent's powers 
and duties.4 
                                                 
4 The 
majority 
misunderstands 
my 
analysis 
of 
the 
constitution, stating that "[t]he dissent fails to acknowledge 
the focus of our discussion.  This order does not address the 
constitutional 
authority 
of 
superintendent 
of 
public 
instruction."  Unfortunately, the majority's order ignores not 
only the constitution, but also the statutes requiring DOJ to 
represent the Superintendent and DPI in this matter, instead 
subordinating Wisconsin law to its whim.  The point of examining 
the constitution is to determine whether it confers independent 
litigation authority on the Superintendent.  It does not.  The 
constitution provides that the legislature prescribes the 
Superintendent's powers.  The legislature has not included 
appointment of counsel among the Superintendent's powers.  What 
the legislature has done, which the majority defies, is enact a 
law mandating that DOJ represent the Superintendent and DPI in 
this suit.  While I consult the law in determining whether the 
Superintendent and DPI may choose their own lawyer, the majority 
aggressively extends its superintending authority to override 
controlling law and approve counsel to advance the interests of 
(continued) 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
20 
 
¶37 No Wisconsin Statute gives the Superintendent the 
power to hire his own lawyer in this case——or to fire DOJ.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
ch. 
115, 
subch. 
II——entitled 
"State 
Superintendent 
of 
Public 
Instruction"——describes 
the 
"qualifications, 
powers, 
duties 
and 
compensation" 
of 
the 
Superintendent.  Wholly absent from that chapter is any mention 
of litigation authority.   
¶38 The statutes, however, affirmatively and definitively 
place the duty of representation on DOJ.5  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 165.25 (2015-16)6 provides as material:   
Duties of department of justice.  The department of 
justice shall: 
(1) Represent state in appeals and on remand.  Except 
as provided in ss. 5.05 (2m) (a), 19.49 (2) (a), and 
978.05 (5), appear for the state and prosecute or 
defend all actions and proceedings, civil or criminal, 
in the court of appeals and the supreme court, in 
which the state is interested or a party, and attend 
to and prosecute or defend all civil cases sent or 
remanded to any circuit court in which the state is a 
party.  Nothing in this subsection deprives or 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Superintendent instead of the interests of the people of 
Wisconsin. 
5 The Attorney General is also a constitutional officer, 
recognized 
in 
Article 
VI, 
Section 
3 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution: 
 
"The 
powers, 
duties 
and 
compensation 
of 
the . . . attorney general shall be prescribed by law."  Under 
the constitution, "the attorney general's powers are prescribed 
only by statutory law."  State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, 
¶24, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526. 
6 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
21 
 
relieves the attorney general or the department of 
justice of any authority or duty under this chapter. 
 
(1m) Represent state in other matters.  If requested 
by the governor or either house of the legislature, 
appear 
for 
and 
represent 
the 
state, 
any 
state 
department, 
agency, 
official, 
employee 
or 
agent, 
whether required to appear as a party or witness in 
any civil or criminal matter, and prosecute or defend 
in any court or before any officer, any cause or 
matter, civil or criminal, in which the state or the 
people of this state may be interested.  The public 
service commission may request under s. 196.497 (7) 
that 
the 
attorney 
general 
intervene 
in 
federal 
proceedings.  All expenses of the proceedings shall be 
paid from the appropriation under s. 20.455 (1) (d). 
(6)(a)  Attorney for the state.  At the request of the 
head of any department of state government, the 
attorney general may appear for and defend any state 
department, or any state officer, employee, or agent 
of the department in any civil action or other matter 
brought before a court or an administrative agency 
which is brought against the state department, or 
officer, employee, or agent for or on account of any 
act growing out of or committed in the lawful course 
of an officer's, employee's, or agent's duties.  
Witness fees or other expenses determined by the 
attorney general to be reasonable and necessary to the 
defense in the action or proceeding shall be paid as 
provided for in s. 885.07.  The attorney general may 
compromise and settle the action as the attorney 
general determines to be in the best interest of the 
state.  Members, officers, and employees of the 
Wisconsin state agencies building corporation and the 
Wisconsin 
state 
public 
building 
corporation 
are 
covered by this section.  Members of the board of 
governors created under s. 619.04 (3), members of a 
committee or subcommittee of that board of governors, 
members 
of 
the 
injured 
patients 
and 
families 
compensation fund peer review council created under s. 
655.275 (2), and persons consulting with that council 
under s. 655.275 (5) (b) are covered by this section 
with respect to actions, claims, or other matters 
arising before, on, or after April 25, 1990.  The 
attorney general may compromise and settle claims 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
22 
 
asserted before such actions or matters formally are 
brought 
or 
may 
delegate 
such 
authority 
to 
the 
department of administration.  This paragraph may not 
be construed as a consent to sue the state or any 
department thereof or as a waiver of state sovereign 
immunity. 
(Emphasis added.)  Nothing in the constitution or the statutes 
grants litigation authority to Evers or DPI, but there is a very 
specific statute placing that power upon DOJ.  "Absent [a] 
special statute with respect to individual departments . . . or 
absent appointment of special counsel in appropriate matters," 
DOJ lawyers "are the only attorneys authorized to appear in the 
courts of the state in state matters."  52 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 
394, 402 (OAG 1963). 
III 
¶39 It is undisputed that the Governor requested DOJ to 
represent DPI and Evers in this suit.  It is also undisputed 
that the petitioners sued Evers in his official capacity as the 
head of DPI.  "[A] suit against a state official in his or her 
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather 
a suit against the official's office.  As such, it is no 
different from a suit against the State itself."  Will v. Mich. 
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citation 
omitted).  This action, then, is a suit against the State——Evers 
is simply a nominal party, named solely because he is currently 
the individual occupying the office of the Superintendent.   
¶40 Because the Governor requested DOJ representation, 
this action falls squarely under Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1m), which 
explicitly says DOJ "shall" represent the State.  In § 165.25, 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
23 
 
the 
legislature 
placed 
the 
responsibility 
of 
legal 
representation with DOJ.  The legislature did not give any 
authority to the Superintendent to deviate from § 165.25 and 
hire an attorney of his own choosing.  And, because the 
legislature circumscribes the qualifications, powers, and duties 
of 
the 
Superintendent, 
the 
disposition 
of 
the 
legal 
representation issue should have been as simple as reading and 
applying the text of § 165.25.7  The power to "protect and guard 
the interests and rights of the people" by controlling state-
party litigation resides in DOJ by virtue of this statutory 
authority.  See Orton v. State, 12 Wis. 567, 569 (1860). 
¶41 The majority neglects to even mention this statute and 
instead exercises the court's supervisory authority over the 
court system to proclaim that Evers may hire the lawyer of his 
choosing 
when 
he 
is 
sued 
in 
his 
official 
capacity 
as 
Superintendent, even though the people of Wisconsin said 
otherwise——through their legislative representatives who enacted 
Wis. Stat. § 165.25.  While the constitution gives the court 
"superintending and administrative authority over all courts," 
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3, this authority should not be 
exercised lightly.  State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶15, 252 
                                                 
7 Evers suggests Wis. Stat. § 20.930 grants litigation 
authority for his in-house lawyers to represent him instead of 
DOJ.  Section 20.930, however, is simply a fiscal statute 
authorizing payment of the in-house lawyers.  It does not 
authorize Evers to hire his own lawyer when he is sued in his 
official capacity. 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
24 
 
Wis. 2d 228, 
647 
N.W.2d 142. 
It 
certainly 
should 
not 
be 
exercised contrary to controlling law.  And it never should be 
exercised in a manner that elevates the interests of public 
officials over the interests of the people who elect them.  This 
court is not above the law and unless the statute is 
unconstitutional, we are bound to apply it.  See Rhinelander 
Paper Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 216 Wis. 623, 258 N.W. 384 (1935) 
(court cannot order lower court to do something it has no power 
to do because it would violate applicable statute); Baker v. 
State, 84 Wis. 584, 54 N.W. 1003 (1893) (court has no power to 
suspend rules having the force of a statute until abrogated by 
competent authority).   
¶42 Historically, the court's superintending authority was 
exercised exclusively over lower courts.  "The power of 
superintending control is the power to 'control the course of 
ordinary litigation in inferior courts,' as exercised at common 
law by the court of king's bench, and by the use of writs 
specifically mentioned in the constitution and other writs there 
referred to or authorized."  Seiler v. State, 112 Wis. 293, 299, 
87 N.W. 1072 (1901).  See also State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 
105, ¶¶137-153, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110 (Prosser, J., 
dissenting), which exhaustively analyzes the original meaning of 
the court's superintending authority and contrasts it with the 
"incredibly elastic power the court now employs."  Id., ¶146.  
The court's supervisory authority is ordinarily exercised when a 
party asserts error by the circuit court causing "great and 
irreparable" "hardship."  Application of Sherper's, Inc., 253 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
25 
 
Wis. 224, 226, 33 N.W.2d 178 (1948); State ex rel. Wis. State 
Dep't of Agric. v. Aarons, 248 Wis. 419, 423, 22 N.W.2d 160 
(1946).  Superintending authority, as the majority acknowledges, 
means supervisory power.  The text of the constitution limits 
this 
court's 
superintending 
authority 
to 
"the 
courts."  
Superintending authority has no place in this original action, 
in which the court illogically exercises its authority to 
ostensibly supervise itself. 
¶43 The majority creates a dangerous precedent.  It 
brandishes its superintending authority like a veto over laws it 
does not wish to apply.  In doing so, it thwarts the will of the 
people.  "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is 
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and 
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in 
every particular case that comes before them."  The Federalist 
No. 78, supra ¶1, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 165.25 could not be clearer in mandating DOJ representation of 
DPI and Evers in this case, yet the court does not apply it.  
The majority's decision promotes the interests of an elected 
public official and the department he heads over those of the 
people of Wisconsin, whose interests are supposed to be 
represented in this litigation by the attorneys charged with 
advancing them——the Attorney General and DOJ.  Long ago, the 
people of Wisconsin gave the Attorney General the duty——and the 
exclusive authority——to appear for the people in order to 
"protect and guard the interests and rights of the people" in 
litigation involving state actors.  Orton, 12 Wis. at 569.  The 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
26 
 
majority casts aside the statutorily-expressed will of the 
people but "[t]he people of Wisconsin have never bestowed this 
kind of power on the Wisconsin Supreme Court."  Jerrell C.J., 
283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶155 (Prosser, J., dissenting). 
¶44 Ironically, 
as 
it 
wields 
a 
boundless 
power 
to 
disregard the law, the majority decries the "breathtaking power" 
accorded 
to 
the 
Attorney 
General 
if 
DOJ 
represents 
the 
superintendent and DPI.  The majority claims that if DOJ 
represents these parties, the court would have "no way to 
determine the scope of the powers vested in a constitutional 
officer" and somehow, the court fears, "the attorney general, 
and 
not 
this 
court" 
would 
"decide 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
superintendent's constitutional authority."  Nonsense.  The 
Attorney General's power is of course restricted to advocacy; it 
is this court's duty to say what the law is, and the court alone 
possesses the power to decide.  "No aspect of the judicial power 
is 
more 
fundamental 
than 
the 
judiciary's 
exclusive 
responsibility to exercise judgment in cases and controversies 
arising under the law."  Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 
2017 WI 67, ¶37, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384.  This is true 
regardless of who represents a party.  If the majority's concern 
is ensuring a full adversarial presentation of the issues, it 
should exercise a power it actually does possess and appoint 
counsel selected by Evers and DPI as amicus to advance arguments 
that Act 57 is unconstitutional while DOJ defends the law. 
¶45 Rather than take this lawful course, the majority 
inexplicably invokes its inherent power to appoint counsel for a 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
27 
 
party that lacks one.  But this power is utterly misplaced in 
this case.  The Superintendent and DPI do not lack counsel——
their hand-picked attorneys made an appearance and continue as 
counsel of record——and the majority does not actually appoint 
counsel at all.  Instead, the majority strikes the appearance of 
the Attorney General on behalf of these state parties, which the 
law requires be represented by DOJ, and then disqualifies the 
Attorney General from representing the Superintendent or DPI.  
The majority characterizes this as an "exceptional case."  
Indeed, it is exceptional for the majority's shocking exercise 
of raw power to arrogate unto itself the authority to decide who 
shall represent a party when the legislature has already spoken.  
The people of Wisconsin decided that the Attorney General shall 
represent their interests in litigation involving state parties 
but the majority instead foists upon the people lawyers they do 
not want——lawyers who will not represent their interests. 
¶46 The majority identifies perceived ethical conflicts if 
the Attorney General represents Evers, but its concerns are 
unwarranted.  No ethical conflicts exist.  As the nominal party 
without any constitutional or statutory litigation authority, 
Evers lacks power to advocate independently for what he wants 
the law to be.  His sole interest with respect to Act 57 or any 
other law is a determination of what the law says so that he can 
fulfill his responsibility to follow it.  The people of 
Wisconsin did not assign the Superintendent the task of deciding 
what the law is.  The constitution ascribes that duty to the 
judicial branch.  See Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
28 
 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d __ ("Only the judiciary may 
authoritatively interpret and apply the law in cases before our 
courts."); Gabler, 376 Wis. 2d 147, ¶37 ("By vesting the 
judicial power in a unified court system, the Wisconsin 
Constitution 
entrusts 
the 
judiciary 
with 
the 
duty 
of 
interpreting and applying laws made and enforced by coordinate 
branches of state government."); see also Operton v. LIRC, 2017 
WI 46, ¶73, 375 Wis. 2d 1, 894 N.W.2d 426 (R. Grassl Bradley, 
J., concurring) ("the court's duty to say what the law is" 
constitutes a "core judicial function"); In re Appointment of 
Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 598, 124 N.W. 670 (1910) ("[I]t is the 
exclusive function of the courts to expound the laws . . . .").   
¶47 Evers complains that DOJ disagrees with his position 
on what the law should be and that the Rules of Professional 
Conduct prohibit representation by a lawyer who insists on 
advocating a position contrary to what the "client" wants.  That 
is true when the "client" is a private party.  The problem with 
Evers' complaint is that the legislature has already decided 
that Evers' individual standpoint when sued in his official 
capacity is irrelevant.  Evers has not been sued personally; he 
was named only in his official capacity as the head of DPI.  The 
Attorney General is "the law officer of the government" and was 
"elected for the purpose of prosecuting and defending all suits 
for or against the State."  Orton, 12 Wis. at 569.  When the 
Governor (or the legislature) asks DOJ to represent a party 
under Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1m), DOJ does not represent the 
individual 
person 
who 
currently 
occupies 
the 
office——it 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
29 
 
represents the officer and agency as state parties.  If the 
agency or officer acting in his official capacity was not a 
state party, the Governor could not obtain DOJ representation 
under § 165.25(1m). 
¶48 Evers argues that because the legislature did not 
include in Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1m) language explicitly granting 
litigation-decisional control to the Attorney General, the 
Attorney General must advance the state officer's personal 
position in the case even if it conflicts with the Attorney 
General's interpretation of the law.  Evers makes this argument 
based on the litigation-decisional control language in Wis. 
Stat. § 165.25(6)(a), which is the statutory section applicable 
when the department head (rather than the Governor) requests DOJ 
representation.8  
¶49  Evers' argument defies logic.  Why would a department 
head who does not ask for DOJ representation be able to control 
the Attorney General's litigation position but a department head 
who does seek DOJ representation cannot?  A consistent reading 
of these statutes suggests the express grant of settlement 
authority is unnecessary in sub. (1m) because the legislature or 
Governor requested the representation on behalf of the official 
or department.  In contrast, under sub. (6)(a), the department 
                                                 
8 The specific sentence, emphasized earlier in the body of 
this opinion setting forth Wis. Stat. § 165.25(6)(a), provides: 
"The attorney general may compromise and settle the action as 
the attorney general determines to be in the best interest of 
the state." 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
30 
 
head requests DOJ representation; therefore, it is important to 
emphasize that despite the department head's initiation of the 
representation, the Attorney General must nevertheless act in 
"the best interest of the state" rather than take litigation 
instructions from the department head.   
¶50 When an agency and an official acting in his official 
capacity are sued, and the Governor asks DOJ to provide 
representation, DOJ is in charge of litigation strategy because 
the State is the real party in interest, not the nominal 
figurehead.  The Attorney General represents the interests of 
the State——which, it bears emphasizing, means the interests of 
the people.  The Attorney General is not Evers' private, 
personal lawyer as in a typical lawyer-client relationship.  
Wisconsin's 
Rules 
of 
Professional 
Conduct 
recognize 
the 
difference:  "[T]he responsibilities of government lawyers may 
include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily 
reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships."  
SCR 20 Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities, n.18.9  Rather, the 
representation relationship here is based on a provision of 
statutory law, namely Wis. Stat. § 165.25(1m).   
                                                 
9 Note 18 specifically references the Attorney General in 
this regard:  "For example, a lawyer for a government agency may 
have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon 
settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment.  Such 
authority in various respects is generally vested in the 
attorney general and the state's attorney in state government, 
and their federal counterparts . . . ." 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
31 
 
¶51 The legislature also enacted Wis. Stat. § 14.11(2)(a)2 
to allow for "special counsel" in certain circumstances, i.e., 
when the Attorney General has an interest truly adverse to the 
State, which is not the case here.  Id. (allowing the Governor 
to appoint "special counsel" "[t]o act instead of the attorney 
general in any action or proceeding, if the attorney general is 
in any way interested adversely to the state").  In this case, 
Evers did not make a request for "special counsel" under Wis. 
Stat. § 14.11(2)(a)2 despite emails between DPI and DOJ lawyers 
discussing that option.     
¶52 If Evers does not like the statutes prescribing this 
representation scheme, he should take it up with the legislature 
to amend them.  Until then, he is bound by the statutes as 
currently written.  The law requires the Attorney General to 
represent Evers and DPI.  The majority permits Evers to exercise 
unbridled, independent litigation authority in his own interests 
rather than the interests of the people of Wisconsin.  The 
majority's 
extraordinary 
exercise 
of 
its 
superintending 
authority elevates the Superintendent and his department to a 
specter fourth branch of Wisconsin government.  The constitution 
does not authorize this representation.  The statutes prohibit 
it.  The majority errs in disregarding both.   
¶53 I concur in part and dissent in part.10  
                                                 
10 I would follow the United States Supreme Court practice 
when DOJ's position on representation is a confession-of-error.  
In this case, I would appoint DPI lawyers as amicus and have 
them submit briefs and argue the adversarial position asserting 
the unconstitutionality of Act 57.  
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
32 
 
¶54 I am authorized to state that Justices MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN and DANIEL KELLY join this concurrence/dissent. 
 
No.  2017AP2278.rgb 
 
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