Title: Galkin v. Town of Chester

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Galkin v. Town of Chester  (97-026); 168 Vt. 82; 716 A.2d 25

[Filed 12-Jun-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 97-026

Irwin Galkin                                 Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       Windsor Superior Court

Town of Chester                              December Term, 1997

Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

       Spencer R. Knapp and Molly K. Lebowitz of Dinse, Erdmann, Knapp &
  McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

       Thomas S. Durkin of Kramer & Durkin, P.C., Brattleboro, for
  Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.   Galkin appeals from an order of the Windsor Superior
  Court granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Chester.  He argues
  that the trial court erroneously determined that (1) his interest in glebe
  lands located in Chester is a leasehold and not a fee, (2) the leasehold
  does not include the right to mine talc deposits on the subject property,
  and (3) Chester is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees.  We affirm
  the judgment, except for the award of attorney's fees to Chester, which we
  reverse.

       Until shortly before this lawsuit, the parties believed the subject
  property was held in fee simple by Chester as public or "glebe" lands, and
  that Galkin was the lessee.  Galkin brought this suit challenging that
  assumption so that he could sell or lease the mineral rights to the
  property to a third party.

       Galkin's chain of title in the subject property dates back to 1947
  when the Town of Chester leased the land to one Edward Holt under a durable
  lease, which provided that the lessee would pay annual rent in return for a
  tenancy that was to last "as long as wood grows and water

 

  runs."  The lease also provided that "Edward E. Holt does further agree to
  use said property in good and husband-like manner."

       Holt quitclaimed his interest in the property to Proctor Reels, Inc.,
  from whom Galkin's business, the 251 Corporation, acquired title at a
  judicial foreclosure sale in 1960.  Galkin then transferred title from the
  corporation to himself by warranty deed in 1969.  He later conveyed the
  property to the Cypress Mining Corporation in early 1984.  Later the same
  year, Cypress Mining Corporation entered into an option agreement with the
  Town of Chester.  The agreement acknowledged that Chester owned the rights
  to any mineral deposits, and, in exchange for $25,000, Cypress received the
  exclusive right to purchase Chester's rights for the sum of $350,000. 
  After Cypress declined to exercise its option, it conveyed the property
  back to Galkin.

                                     I.

       Galkin first contends that the trial court erroneously determined that
  Chester, rather than he, holds title to the subject land in fee simple. 
  His claim turns on an analysis of historical events relating to the Chester
  Town charter.

       Chester's first charter (Wentworth I) was issued in 1754 by New
  Hampshire's colonial Governor, Benning Wentworth, and it named the Town
  "New Flamstead."  New Hampshire's colonial government later rescinded this
  charter, but Governor Wentworth issued a second, virtually identical
  charter (Wentworth II) in 1761.  Both of the Wentworth charters reserved
  "glebe and school" lands to be used for educational and religious purposes.

       New York's colonial government disputed New Hampshire's claim to the
  land that now comprises the State of Vermont, and New York issued its own
  land grants and charters (called "patents") covering these lands.  In 1766,
  New York issued a land grant patent for the lands already controlled by the
  Wentworth II charter.  The New York land grant renamed the area Chester and
  was issued to individuals who were largely different from those listed
  under Wentworth II.  Unlike both Wentworth charters, the New York patent
  for Chester did not

 

  reserve public lands to be used for educational or religious purposes.

       In 1779, Thomas Chandler, a proprietor under both the Wentworth II and
  the New York patent, filed a petition with the Vermont General Assembly
  seeking to resolve the apparent conflict between Wentworth II and the New
  York patent.  The petition requested that "the Original Proprietors [of the
  town] or those that purchased of them ought to hold their Lands by Virtue
  of the New Hampshire Grants, without any Reguard [sic] to the New York
  Patent."  1 Journals and Proceedings of the Vermont General Assembly,
  reprinted in 3 State Papers of Vermont, at 61-62 (1924).  The petition also
  requested that the town be renamed Chester.  In response to the petition,
  the Vermont General Assembly passed a resolution stating "[o]n Petition of
  Thomas Chandler . . . Resolved that the township formerly granted by the
  Governor of New Hampshire by the name of New Flamstead as described in said
  petition be and is hereby established by the name of Chester."  Petitions
  for Grants of Lands, 1778-1911, reprinted in 5 State Papers of Vermont, at
  61 (Mary Greene Nye ed.) (1939).

       Galkin claims that Chester is governed by the New York patent rather
  than Wentworth II and because the New York patent does not preserve lands
  for public uses, that Chester does not actually own any lease lands.  He
  therefore concludes that Chester does not hold title to either the property
  or the minerals at issue.  Although as a durable lessee of Chester's fee,
  this conclusion would seem to defeat his interest in the property, Galkin
  contends that he holds title to the property in fee simple by virtue of the
  Marketable Record Title Act, 27 V.S.A. §§ 601-610.  We disagree with both
  of these assertions.

       In support of his claim, Galkin argues that New York required the
  surrender of New Hampshire grants prior to issuing New York patents.  Thus,
  after the issuance of the New York patent, Wentworth II was no longer
  Chester's governing charter because it had been surrendered to New York. 
  Moreover, Galkin disputes the trial court's finding that the General
  Assembly's resolution responding to the Chandler Petition bypassed the New
  York patent and ratified Wentworth II.  He argues that there is an inherent
  contradiction in the General Assembly's

 

  resolution responding to the petition; the "township formerly granted by
  the Governor of New Hampshire" is significantly different from the land "as
  described in said petition."  The former consisted of 23,000 acres with
  reserved public lands, while the latter contained 31,700 acres and did not
  reserve public lands.

       Galkin contends that given the "petitioners' self-serving
  motivations," the petitioners sought the ratification of the New York
  patent, and not Wentworth II, because the New York patent provided for more
  acreage and did not provide for the reservation of public lands.  He
  further contends that we should assume the General Assembly was responsive
  to the petitioners' request.  Under this reading, Galkin argues, the
  reference in the resolution to the "township formerly granted by the
  Governor of New Hampshire by the name of New Flamstead" is simply meant to
  refer back to the way in which the Chandler Petition erroneously called the
  lands it described.  The resolution, he contends, actually established the
  Town of Chester by granting the lands "as described in said petition,"
  which are the lands granted under the New York patent.  Galkin therefore
  concludes that the Assembly resolution did not ratify Wentworth II, and the
  New York patent remains in effect.

       The trial court concluded that the General Assembly's response to the
  Petition demonstrates its intent that Wentworth II be Chester's governing
  charter.  We agree.  The Chandler Petition asked that their land holdings
  be ratified "by Virtue of the New Hampshire Grants without any Reguard
  [sic] to the New York Patent."  In response, the General Assembly passed a
  resolution providing that the "township formerly granted by the Governor of
  New Hampshire by the name of New Flamstead as described in said petition .
  . . is hereby established."  In light of the fact that the petition
  expressly requests that the Assembly ratify the New Hampshire Grant, we
  conclude that had the Assembly intended to ratify the New York patent
  instead, it would have said so.  Yet the Assembly omitted any reference to
  the New York patent.

       Galkin next claims that, in any event, the New York patent was
  ratified by a 1790

 

  agreement between New York and Vermont.  The 1790 agreement provided that
  in return for Vermont's payment of $30,000 to New York, "all New York
  grants, other than those confirming Wentworth grants, were extinguished." 
  W.T. Bogart, The Vermont Lease Lands, at 45 (1950). Galkin argues that the
  New York patent for Chester confirmed Wentworth II, and the patent was
  therefore ratified by the Vermont Legislature as of 1790.  We disagree.

       Even assuming arguendo that the New York patent confirmed Wentworth II
  for purposes of the 1790 agreement, we conclude the General Assembly's
  approval of the Chandler Petition in 1779 demonstrated the Assembly's
  intent that Wentworth II be the operative charter.  Absent more compelling
  evidence to the contrary, we decline to hold that the 1790 agreement was
  intended by the Legislature, some eleven years later, to essentially
  reverse the General Assembly resolution approving the Chandler Petition,
  and to reinstate the New York patent.

       Moreover, from the exhibits introduced at trial we note that the
  historical records of the Town consistently indicate the existence of glebe
  and school lands, and that the Town has regularly leased the subject
  property for more than one hundred and fifty years.  In light of this long
  history and absent other evidence of the Legislature's intent, we hold that
  whatever legal significance the New York patent might have enjoyed prior to
  the General Assembly's resolution ended in 1779 with Wentworth II remaining
  in effect as the governing charter.  Cf. Town of Readsboro v. Town of
  Woodford, 76 Vt. 376, 378, 57 A. 962, 963 (1904) ("When a municipal
  corporation has assumed under color of authority, and exercised for a
  considerable time with the consent of the state, the powers and privileges
  of such corporations, a private party in private litigation cannot question
  the legality of its existence.").  The parties concede that all glebe and
  school lots are held in fee by the townships in which they are located, and
  that the subject property is located within the glebe and school lots
  designated in Wentworth II.  Consequently, we conclude that Chester owns
  the subject property in fee and that Galkin's interest is limited to that
  of a durable leasehold.

       Having determined that Chester owns the fee in the subject property,
  we reject Galkin's

 

  claim that he owns it under the Marketable Record Title Act, 27 V.S.A. §§
  601-610.  As the trial court concluded, Galkin does not and has never held
  record title to the fee in the property and, consequently, he does not
  state a claim under the Marketable Record Title Act.  See id. § 601 (to
  assert claim party must hold unbroken chain of title of record to the
  interest for forty years).

                                     II.

       Galkin next argues that even if Chester owns the fee in the property,
  the town is precluded from claiming mineral rights because he owns the
  rights by virtue of his durable lease. Galkin first asserts that 24 V.S.A.
  § 2403 precludes town selectmen from reserving royalties for minerals
  extracted from public lands.

       When interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain meaning; "[i]f
  the meaning is plain, we will enforce it according to its terms."  State v.
  Ashley, 161 Vt. 65, 67,