Title: Vogl v. State

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
MARK D. VOGL,  
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
No.  SC93157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
  ) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JASPER COUNTY 
The Honorable David C. Dally, Judge  
 
Opinion issued August 19, 2014 
 
The motion court dismissed Mark Vogl’s Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction 
relief, without an independent inquiry, after appointed post-conviction counsel filed a 
motion to rescind appointment of counsel that informed the court that Mr. Vogl’s pro se 
motion was stamped “filed” after the last day permitted by the rule.  Thereafter, Mr. Vogl 
filed the motion at issue to reopen his post-conviction proceedings, claiming that his counsel 
abandoned him by failing to investigate the timeliness of his post-conviction motion before 
counsel filed a motion to rescind appointment of counsel.  The motion court entered 
judgment overruling Mr. Vogl’s motion.  Mr. Vogl appeals.  After an opinion by the court 
of appeals, this Court granted transfer.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.  Because the record raises 
the presumption that Mr. Vogl was abandoned by his post-conviction counsel, the motion 
court clearly erred in dismissing Mr. Vogl’s motion.  The judgment is reversed, and the 
cause is remanded.   
1 
 
2 
 
                                             
Facts and Procedural Background 
 
On June 21, 2007, Mr. Vogl pleaded guilty to two felony counts of first-degree 
statutory sodomy under section 566.062.1  He then was sentenced by the circuit court to 15 
years imprisonment on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.  After 
pronouncing the sentence, the circuit court informed Mr. Vogl of his right to seek post-
conviction relief under Rule 24.035.  On September 18, 2007, Mr. Vogl was delivered to the 
Missouri Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to serve his sentence.  He did not appeal his 
conviction. 
Under Rule 24.035, Mr. Vogl had to file a timely Rule 24.035 motion to seek post-
conviction relief.2  In light of his delivery date to the DOC, Mr. Vogl’s post-conviction 
motion had to be filed on or before March 17, 2008.3  The docket sheet and file stamp on 
Mr. Vogl’s motion reflect that his pro se  motion was filed in the Joplin office of the Jasper 
County circuit clerk on March 18, 2008.   
 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2013, unless otherwise specified. 
2 Rule 24.035(b) provides: 
 
A person seeking relief pursuant to this Rule 24.035 shall file a motion to 
vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence substantially in the form 
of Criminal Procedure Form No. 40. 
*          *          * 
If no appeal of such judgment was taken, the motion shall be filed within 180 
days of the date the person is delivered to the custody of the department of 
corrections. 
3 In computing the due date, the date that Mr. Vogel was delivered to the DOC is not 
included in the 180 days.  See 44.01(a); Phelps v. State, 351 S.W.3d 269, 270-71 (Mo. App. 
2011).  The actual last date for Mr. Vogl’s Rule 24.035 motion to be filed would have been 
Sunday, March 16, 2008.  However, Rule 44.01(a) provides that if a period of time ends on 
a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the deadline is extended to the end of the next day that 
is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.  Therefore, the time period for Mr. Vogl to file 
his Rule 24.035 motion ended on Monday, March 17, 2008. 
3 
 
Upon the filing of Mr. Vogl’s post-conviction motion, the motion court appointed 
post-conviction counsel to represent Mr. Vogl in the proceeding.  Thirteen days later, 
Stephen J. Harris, the area district defender for the Missouri State Public Defender, filed a 
motion requesting that the appointment of counsel be rescinded.  In his motion, appointed 
counsel alleged that Mr. Vogl’s Rule 24.035 motion was untimely because Mr. Vogl was 
delivered to the department of corrections on September 18, 2007, and Mr. Vogl’s motion 
was stamped “filed” 182 days later.  The certificate of service indicates that the motion to 
rescind was served only on the prosecuting attorney, and there is nothing in the circuit court 
record to indicate that Mr. Vogl received service or notification of appointed counsel’s filing 
of the motion to rescind appointment of counsel.  Six days later, without a hearing or 
independent inquiry, the motion court entered an order rescinding its previous order 
appointing counsel and dismissing the case with prejudice because the court found that 
“[f]urther review of the file indicates that the motion was not timely filed.”  
On March 17, 2011, Mr. Vogl filed a motion titled “Motion to Reinstate Post-
conviction Action Brought Pursuant To Rule 24.035 On Basis of Timely Filing, And To 
Vacate Order Rescinded [sic] Appointment of Counsel and Dismissing 24.035 Action.”  
Specifically, the 2011 motion claimed that his pro se Rule 24.035 motion was timely filed 
and, even if filed in the wrong court, should have been considered timely filed and 
transferred to the proper court rather than dismissed.  In addition, Mr. Vogl alleged that he 
had been abandoned by his appointed counsel.  On November 4, 2011, the motion court, 
without holding an evidentiary hearing, entered an order refusing to take any further action 
4 
 
                                             
on the basis that Mr. Vogl’s post-conviction proceedings previously had been dismissed 
with prejudice due to untimely filing.4   
On May 11, 2012, Mr. Vogl filed the pro se motion presently at issue requesting that 
the motion court adjudicate his post-conviction proceedings because he was abandoned by 
his appointed counsel.5   In his motion, Mr. Vogl requested that the motion court hold an 
 
 
4 Judge Wilson, in his dissent, would find that the disposition of Mr. Vogl’s March 17, 2011, 
motion precludes consideration of Mr. Vogl’s current motion claiming abandonment by 
post-conviction counsel.  Judge Fischer agrees, using multiple references in his dissent to 
Mr. Vogl’s current motion being the third motion he has filed.  The state did not assert in the 
court of appeals or in this Court that the disposition of Mr. Vogl’s March 17, 2011, motion 
is a procedural bar to the adjudication of his current motion.  Nevertheless, the dissents, sua 
sponte, raise this issue that was not briefed or argued relying on Rule 24.035(l)’s prohibition 
of successive motions.  The context of the prohibition in Rule 24.035(l) makes it clear that 
the rule references only post-conviction motions and not motions raising claims of 
abandonment by post-conviction counsel because Rule 24.035 does not reference or 
establish procedures for claims of abandonment.  Likewise, this Court’s holdings that there 
cannot be a waiver of the mandatory time limits in Rule 24.035 are referencing the deadlines 
for the filing of initial motions for post-conviction relief and were not made in the context of 
motions claiming abandonment by post-conviction counsel.  See Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 
292, 297 (Mo. banc 2014); Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 266-69 (Mo. banc 2012); Smith 
v. State, 887 S.W.2d 601, 602-03 (Mo. banc 1994).  
 
Judge Fischer and Judge Wilson urge in their dissents that this Court deny Mr. Vogl’s claim, 
citing cases that would allow this Court, sua sponte, to find that the doctrine of res judicata 
bars review.  Because the motion court dismissed Mr. Vogl’s current abandonment claim as 
procedurally barred on the ground that his Rule 24.035 action was dismissed with prejudice 
for the untimely filing of his original pro se motion and Mr. Vogl’s claim of abandonment 
never has been adjudicated on the merits, this Court declines to do so. 
 
5 Mr. Vogl titled his pleading a “Motion to Reopen Postconviction Proceeding and Request 
for Hearing.”  In Eastburn v. State, this Court held that the proper terminology for a motion 
claiming abandonment of post-conviction counsel is a motion for post-conviction relief due 
to abandonment and not a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings.  400 S.W.3d 770, 
774 (Mo. banc 2013).  This case, like Eastburn, does not allege active interference in the 
timely filing of the original motion but, rather, that appointed post-conviction counsel 
abandoned him by not proceeding as required by Rule 24.035(e).  The terminology 
suggested by Eastburn has led to confusion between motions claiming abandonment and 
5 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
evidentiary hearing to determine the merits of his claim of abandonment.  For support,     
Mr. Vogl made the following allegations pertaining to the filing of his pro se motion and his 
appointed counsel’s representation:  
● The April 16, 2008 motion to rescind appointment of counsel filed by post-
conviction counsel was filed without any consultation with Mr. Vogl. 
   
● If post-conviction counsel had consulted with Mr. Vogl, he would have 
obtained facts that would have proved the timely filing of Mr. Vogl’s motion.   
 
● Post-conviction counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the circumstances 
surrounding the filing of Mr. Vogl’s Rule 24.035 motion before filing the 
motion to rescind appointment of counsel constituted abandonment and 
noncompliance with Rule 24.035 because he filed neither an amended motion 
for post-conviction relief nor a statement explaining that all facts and claims 
had been asserted in the pro se motion. 
  
● Mr. Vogl never received notification that his counsel intended to file a motion 
to rescind counsel’s appointment.  If he had been notified, he would have 
attempted to contact the court to request a hearing on the motion.  
 
Attached to Mr. Vogl’s motion were two exhibits – letters from the Jasper County circuit 
clerk’s office written in response to Mr. Vogl’s inquiries regarding the Jasper County circuit 
clerk’s office procedures for receiving and forwarding mail from one clerk’s office to the 
other.   
Jasper County maintains two courthouses – one in Carthage, which is the county seat, 
and the other in Joplin.  Mr. Vogl alleges that he mailed his pro se Rule 24.035 motion to 
the Jasper County circuit clerk’s office in Carthage on March 12, 2008, and it arrived there 
on March 17, 2008.  On the same day, after recognizing that the file regarding his criminal 
 
motions for post-conviction relief, as evidenced by the dissents.  To avoid such confusion, 
Mr. Vogl’s motion will be referred to as a motion claiming abandonment by post-conviction 
counsel.  
6 
 
                                             
conviction was at the Joplin office, the Carthage office forwarded the motion to the Joplin 
office without first stamping the motion as filed.  When the Joplin office received            
Mr. Vogl’s pro se motion, it then stamped it “filed” for the first time on March 18, 2008.   
  The first letter attached to Mr. Vogl’s motion articulates the clerk’s office procedure 
when forwarding mail to the correct office location.  The letter states that the Carthage 
office received Mr. Vogl’s motion, determined that it belonged in the Joplin office, and sent 
it to the Joplin office a day later.  Specifically, the letter states: 
1.  Mail is received in whichever office the envelope is addressed to (in the 
above referenced case, Jasper County Clerk – not Jasper County Circuit 
Clerk – two (2) totally different offices); 
2. When mail is opened and determined to belong to a different office in the 
Courthouse, the mail is taken to the correct office (in this case the correct 
office was the Jasper County Circuit Clerk’s office); 
3. Jasper County Circuit Clerk’s Office in Carthage determined your original 
case was handled in the Joplin location and any subsequent filings must 
also be filed in the Joplin location and placed your documents in a basket 
for our “runner” to pick up to deliver to Joplin.  Our “runner” picks up 
every afternoon in Carthage and delivers to the Circuit Clerk’s Office in 
Joplin the following morning.  He also delivers mail received in Joplin that 
needs to go to Carthage. 
 
After receiving the first letter, Mr. Vogl wrote a letter, dated June 27, 2010, to the 
Jasper County circuit clerk asking when his pro se post-conviction motion initially was 
received by the Carthage office, not when the Joplin office received it after the Carthage 
office forwarded it.6  The second letter from the clerk’s office was written in response to  
 
 
6 Consistent with Mr. Vogl’s allegation regarding the handling of his pro se motion, his 
letter was stamped “filed” in the clerk’s Carthage office on July 1, 2010.  That file stamp is 
crossed out.  A second file stamp by the circuit clerk’s Joplin office is dated July 2, 2010.  In 
addition, the fact that Mr. Vogl’s letter was dated June 27, 2010, and stamped as filed for 
the first time on July 1, 2010, supports his contention that a letter leaves the DOC in 
7 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
Mr. Vogl’s June 27, 2010, letter.  It states that, if it takes three days for Mr. Vogl’s motion 
to get from Cameron to the Carthage office as Mr. Vogl had said, then it would follow that 
the Carthage office received his pro se motion on March 17, 2008.  The deputy circuit clerk 
further stated that the envelope containing the original pro se motion was not in the clerk’s 
file.  The actual text of the letter states: 
According to your letter dated March 12, 2008, your Motion was being mailed 
without copies since your housing unit was locked down and it needed to be 
mailed immediately.  It is my presumption that your Motion went out in the 
next morning’s mail, being Thursday, March 13, 2008.  If, as you state, mail 
takes three (3) days from Cameron to Carthage, that would put it being 
received on Sunday, March 16, 2008 on which there is no mail delivery 
subsequently being delivered to our Carthage office on Monday, March 17, 
2008 and received in our Joplin office on Tuesday, March 18, 2008.   
 
On Mondays, when we receive an abundant amount of mail, it is our normal 
procedure for mail to be delivered to another office to stamp one (1) envelope 
with the date received and then rubber band anything else to that piece of 
mail. 
 
The motion court overruled Mr. Vogl’s motion and request for evidentiary hearing.  
The court stated that Mr. Vogl’s post-conviction action previously had been dismissed with 
prejudice as untimely.  Thereafter, Mr. Vogl timely appealed.  The case was transferred to 
this Court after opinion by the court of appeals.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.   
Standard of Review 
 
When a motion court overrules a motion claiming abandonment by post-conviction 
counsel, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the motion court’s 
findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous.  Gehrke v. State, 280 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Mo. 
 
Cameron the day after it is dated and takes three days to be delivered from Cameron to the 
circuit clerk’s office in Carthage. 
8 
 
                                             
banc 2009).  After reviewing the entire record, a motion court’s findings and conclusions are 
clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is “left with the definite and firm impression 
that a mistake has been made.”  Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Mo. banc 2014).7 
Analysis 
Mr. Vogl claims that the motion court erred in overruling, without an evidentiary 
hearing, his motion claiming abandonment by post-conviction counsel.  In his motion,     
Mr. Vogl alleges that post-conviction counsel abandoned him by not investigating to 
ascertain the facts regarding the timeliness of the filing of his pro se post-conviction 
motion.8  Mr. Vogl alleges in his motion that, if post-conviction counsel would have 
 
 
7 In Price, the movant filed a post-conviction motion pursuant to Rule 29.15, which is the 
post-conviction rule applicable to movants convicted of a felony after trial.  Rule 29.15 
contains certain substantive provisions that are identical to provisions in Rule 24.035, 
applicable to movants who have pleaded guilty.  See Rule 29.15.  Accordingly, case law 
interpreting a provision that is identical in both rules applies equally in proceedings under 
either rule.   See Moore v. State, 934 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Mo. banc 1996).  
8 While Judge Fischer’s dissent asserts, sua sponte, that any claim of abandonment should 
be raised during the course of a movant’s initial post-conviction proceeding, this Court has 
held otherwise.  In State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, this Court suggested in dicta that a movant, 
by raising a claim of abandonment, could seek post-conviction relief more than ten years 
after the motion court had overruled the movant’s initial pro se post-conviction motion.  63 
S.W.3d 210, 217-18 (Mo. banc 2001).  Then, in a 2008 decision, this Court addressed the 
issue raised by Judge Fischer’s dissent in this case and expressly held that “the abandonment 
doctrine provides a narrow exception permitting the circuit court to re-open an otherwise 
final post-conviction case.” Taylor v. State, 254 S.W.3d 856, 858 (Mo. banc 2008).  Since 
Taylor, this Court has continued to address claims of abandonment raised in motions that, 
like Mr. Vogl’s, were made after all opportunities to challenge the motion court’s initial 
denial of post-conviction relief, whether it be via a Rule 75.01 motion, direct appeal, or a 
motion for leave to file an appeal out of time, had expired.  See Eastburn, 400 S.W.3 at 774 
(motion claiming abandonment by appointed counsel was filed approximately 13 years after 
the motion court denied initial relief); Gehrke, 280 S.W.3d at 57 (motion claiming 
abandonment by appointed counsel was filed more than seven years after the motion court 
denied relief); Crenshaw v. State, 266 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Mo. banc 2008) (motion claiming 
9 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
contacted him regarding the circumstances of the filing of the pro se post-conviction motion 
rather than relying on the erroneous file stamp, counsel would have learned that the pro se 
motion was, in fact, filed timely.  Specifically, he alleges that appointed counsel would have 
discovered that Mr. Vogl’s motion was received timely by the Jasper County circuit clerk 
but was stamped with an incorrect date by the circuit clerk.   
In Jasper County, there is a courthouse in Carthage, the official county seat.  Jasper 
County maintains a second courthouse in Joplin, as authorized by section 71.300, RSMo 
2000.  The Jasper County circuit clerk has offices in both courthouses.  The documents 
attached to Mr. Vogl’s motion state that the circuit clerk has a practice of stamping 
documents received by the circuit clerk’s office as “filed” only when the document is 
received by the office where the file for the case is physically located.  Under the 29th 
Judicial Circuit’s local court rule, Local Rule 4.3, “all circuit court actions shall be filed 
 
abandonment by appointed counsel was filed more than two years after the motion court 
denied relief).   
Judge Fischer’s dissent concedes that the aforementioned cases from this Court 
permit the filing of a motion to reopen otherwise final post-conviction proceedings.  
Nevertheless, his dissent asserts that the decisions in these cases are not precedent for 
finding that Mr. Vogl’s motion is not procedurally barred.  In reaching that conclusion, 
Judge Fischer misinterprets this Court’s decision in Taylor when he states that Taylor’s 
“pronouncement that abandonment of post-conviction counsel serves as a ‘narrow 
exception’ to [Rule 75.01] . . . was not necessary to the judgment, and is not a ‘holding’ of 
this Court.”  To the contrary, this Court’s holding in Taylor was a consideration of whether 
a motion claiming abandonment filed after a post-conviction judgment is final was 
procedurally barred, and the Court found that it was not.  Taylor, 254 S.W.3d at 858.  The 
Court then ruled on the merits of Mr. Taylor’s claim of abandonment.  Id.  This discussion 
by the Court in Taylor is not dictum.  State ex rel. Anderson v. Hostetter, 140 S.W.2d 21, 24 
(Mo. 1940) (dicta are “expressions of opinion, not in anywise necessary for the actual 
decision of any question before the court”).  
10 
 
                                             
with the Circuit Court Clerk of this County in Joplin or Carthage.”  Because Mr. Vogl’s pro 
se motion was an initial pleading commencing an independent civil action, see Cowans v. 
State, 778 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Mo. App. 1989), he was permitted to file it in either Joplin or 
Carthage per Local Rule 4.3. 
Moreover, the offices are one and the same, and documents are filed when they are 
received by either office.  A pleading is deemed filed at the time it is received by the clerk 
of a circuit court.  Rule 43.02(b).  See also Stephan v. World Wide Sports, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 
264, 269 (Mo. 1973).9  Accordingly, upon receipt of a pleading, the Jasper County circuit 
clerk immediately should stamp the pleading as filed, regardless of whether the clerk 
believes it would go into a file at the clerk’s office in the other Jasper County courthouse.  If 
the clerk did not do so and, instead, forwarded the pleading to a different office location 
without a file stamp, the Jasper County circuit court would have been operating under 
procedures that are contrary to Rule 43.02(b).10  Therefore, if Mr. Vogl can prove that his 
pro se motion arrived at either office of the circuit clerk of Jasper County on or before 
March 17, 2008, the motion was filed timely.  
 In this appeal, Mr. Vogl claims that counsel’s failure to ascertain the true date of 
filing and subsequent failure to file an amended motion alleging facts to prove the timeliness 
 
9 Stephan cites to former Rule 43.01(j), the subject matter of which now is articulated in 
Rule 43.02.  502 S.W.2d at 269.  Rule 43.02(b) provides that “the filing of pleadings and 
other papers with the court as required by Rules 41 through 101 shall be made by filing 
them with the clerk of the court[.]” 
10 On November 18, 2013, Japser County implemented an electronic filing system, which 
likely has eliminated the practice of forwarding court filings to another office location in 
most cases.  Electronic filing is not available to pro se litigants, however, so it will not 
eliminate the practice in post-conviction cases.  
11 
 
                                             
of his pro se motion constitutes abandonment.  He maintains that he is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on his motion claiming abandonment by post-conviction counsel so he 
can have the opportunity to offer proof of the facts alleged in his motion.  Ultimately,      
Mr. Vogl seeks to have his Rule 24.035 claims adjudicated on their merits.11 
Rule 24.035 provides the exclusive procedure by which a person convicted of a 
felony on a guilty plea may seek post-conviction relief.  Rule 24.035(a).  As a threshold to 
achieving post-conviction relief, the movant first must file a timely Rule 24.035 motion.  
Rule 24.035(b).  See also Price, 422 S.W.3d at 296.  When a pro se motion is filed by an 
indigent movant, the court shall cause counsel to be appointed to represent the movant.  
Rule 24.035(e).  Thereafter, appointed counsel must file either an amended motion to 
compensate for any deficiencies in the pro se motion or, in the alternative, a statement 
explaining the actions counsel took to ensure that no amended motion is needed.  Rule 
24.035(e).   
In a motion filed pursuant to Rule 24.035, the movant “must allege facts showing a 
basis for relief to entitle the movant to an evidentiary hearing.  The movant also must allege 
facts establishing the motion is timely filed.”  Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Mo. 
banc 2012).  In addition to making said factual allegations, the movant also must prove 
those allegations.  Id.  The burden of alleging and proving that the motion is timely filed can 
be met by the movant in one of three ways: (1) by filing the original pro se motion timely so 
 
11 If the motion court determines, after an inquiry, that Mr. Vogl was abandoned, the 
appropriate remedy is the appointment of new counsel with the allowance of time for that 
counsel to proceed anew as required by Rule 24.035(e).  Price, 422 S.W.3d at 298; Luleff v. 
State, 807 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Mo. banc 1991). 
12 
 
                                             
that the file stamp on the motion reflects that it is filed within the time limits proscribed in 
the rule; (2) alleging in the original pro se motion and proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the movant’s circumstances fall within a recognized exception to the time 
limits; or (3) alleging in the amended motion and proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the circuit court misfiled the motion.12  Id.  If the timely filing of an original 
post-conviction motion is not proven, the motion court will regard the untimely motion as a 
“complete waiver” of any right to proceed under Rule 24.035.  Rule 24.035(b); Price, 522 
S.W.3d at 296.  
The first two methods to prove timely filing were not available to Mr. Vogl as the 
date of filing reflected on his original pro se motion is a date past the filing deadline and, at 
the time he drafted his pro se post-conviction motion, he could not have been aware of that 
fact.  Therefore, Mr. Vogl was left with only the last method of proving timeliness – filing 
an amended motion alleging facts and then proving that the court misfiled his original pro se 
motion.13  Id.  Because appointed counsel did not file an amended motion, Mr. Vogl was 
deprived of the opportunity to employ this method of proof.   
Unlike an original motion, which the movant is responsible for pleading and filing, 
an amended motion is a final pleading, which requires legal expertise.  Gehrke, 280 S.W.3d 
 
12 It is possible that a movant would not be aware that movant’s circumstances fall within a 
recognized exception to the filing time limits of the post-conviction rules at the time that the 
pro se motion was filed.  Accordingly, a movant is given the opportunity to raise those 
allegations in an amended motion.  
13 When a pro se post-conviction motion is received by a circuit clerk’s office before the end 
of the filing period set by rule but appears to be untimely due to clerk error, the motion is, in 
fact, filed timely.  See Graves v. State, 372 S.W.3d 546, 549 (Mo. App. 2012); Phelps v. 
State, 21 S.W.3d 832, 833 (Mo. App. 1999). 
 
13 
 
at 57.  Therefore, even though the burden of proving that the original pro se motion was 
filed timely continues to rest with the movant, alleging said timeliness through an amended 
motion requires the movant to depend on post-conviction counsel.  This dependency is 
recognized in Rule 24.035, which articulates the duties owed by appointed counsel to a 
movant.  Rule 24.035 reads:  
Counsel shall ascertain whether sufficient facts supporting the claims are 
asserted in the motion and whether the movant has included all claims known 
to the movant as a basis for attacking the judgment and sentence.  If the 
motion does not assert sufficient facts or include all claims known to the 
movant, counsel shall file an amended motion that sufficiently alleges the 
additional facts and claims.  If counsel determines that no amended motion 
shall be filed, counsel shall file a statement setting out facts demonstrating 
what actions were taken to ensure that (1) all facts supporting the claims are 
asserted in the pro se motion and (2) all claims known to the movant are 
alleged in the pro se motion. 
 
Rule 24.035(e) (emphasis added).  
 
As stated by Rule 24.035(e), appointed counsel is charged with the duty to 
“ascertain” whether the pro se motion asserts sufficient facts to support the movant’s claims 
for relief and ensure that the movant has included all claims “as a basis for attacking the 
judgment and sentence.”  Id.  Inherent in the “sufficient facts to support the movant’s claims 
for relief” are facts that would prove the timely filing of the original pro se motion because 
a movant is prohibited from proceeding in a post-conviction action if the original motion 
was filed untimely.  Rule 24.035(b); Dorris, 360 S.W.3d at 267.   
Mr. Vogl asserts that appointed counsel’s failure to ascertain that there were facts 
that would prove the timeliness of his pro se motion and to file an amended motion alleging 
those facts constitutes abandonment sufficient to allow him a remedy.  In Price, this Court 
recently clarified what circumstances will constitute abandonment by post-conviction 
14 
 
                                             
counsel.  422 S.W.3d at 298-307.  Reaffirming Luleff v. State, 807 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. banc 
1991), and Sanders v. State, 807 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. banc 1991), Price held that “a client is 
not bound by the actions or inactions of his counsel [when] . . . the client is an indigent 
inmate who initiates a timely post-conviction proceeding and his court-appointed counsel’s 
failure to fulfill the duties imposed by Rule [24.035] is not merely incompetent but 
tantamount to the motion court having failed to appoint counsel at all.”  422 S.W.3d at 303.  
A movant is abandoned when appointed counsel fails to comply with the requirements in 
Rule 24.035(e) by not filing either an amended motion or a statement setting out facts that 
demonstrate the actions that were taken to ensure that an amended motion is not needed.  Id.  
This Court has outlined when a motion court is required to conduct an independent 
inquiry of a claim of abandonment of a post-conviction movant by appointed counsel.  See 
McDaris v. State, 843 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Mo. banc 1992);14 Moore v. State, 934 S.W.2d 289 
(Mo. banc 1996).  In McDaris¸ appointed counsel filed an amended Rule 24.035 motion two 
days late.  843 S.W.2d 369 at 371.  The state filed a motion to dismiss both the pro se and 
amended motions for post-conviction relief.  Id.  Regarding the state’s allegation that the 
amended motion was filed after the deadline, there was an in-court inquiry by the motion 
court of appointed counsel regarding the reason for the late filing of the amended motion.  
Id.  Counsel advised the motion court that counsel had difficulty getting the amended 
 
14 There has been confusion as to whether McDaris was overruled by State v. Carson, 941 
S.W.2d 518, 520 (Mo. banc 1997).  While the appendix in Carson listing the cases it 
overrules includes McDaris, the reference to McDaris was only for the purpose of indicating 
that State v. Lucas, 809 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. App 1992), which was being overruled by Carson, 
previously was overruled by McDaris on other grounds.  Therefore, the decision in McDaris 
is still good law and of precedential authority.  
15 
 
motion “back from the penitentiary and filing it,” but claimed to have filed it as soon as 
receiving it in the mail from Mr. McDaris.  Id.  The motion court dismissed the amended 
motion and overruled Mr. McDaris’s pro se motion without further inquiry.  Id. 
Mr. McDaris appealed the motion court’s judgment, alleging “that motion counsel 
abandoned him by failing to file the amended motion on time, or at least that the trial court 
did not adequately investigate abandonment.”  Id.  This Court ruled that the motion court’s 
inquiry was insufficient.  Id. at n.1.  The Court held: 
[T]he trial court should, as part of its independent inquiry under Luleff, inquire 
not only of postconviction counsel, but ensure that movant is informed of 
counsel’s response and given an opportunity to reply.  The method of making 
this inquiry may be as formal or informal as the motion court deems necessary 
to resolve the question of abandonment by counsel, including, but not limited 
to, a written response and opportunity to reply, a telephone conference call, or 
a hearing.  However, a sufficient record must be made to demonstrate on 
appeal that the motion court’s determination on the abandonment issue is not 
clearly erroneous.  
 
 Id. 
Two post-conviction movants, Dale E. Moore and Jacob Carr, cited this rule from 
McDaris as support for their assertions that there was not sufficient inquiry by the motion 
courts of their claims that they were abandoned by appointed counsel despite counsel filing 
timely statements that counsel had decided to rely on each movant’s pro se motion.  Moore, 
934 S.W.2d at 290.  The Court stated, “McDaris does not require a response from movants 
when postconviction counsel files a timely statement setting out sufficient reasons for 
counsel’s decision to rely on the pro se motion.”  Id.  The Court stated that, “where the 
record shows on its face that post-conviction counsel did not abandon movant, there is no 
need to proceed to such an inquiry.” Id.  at 292.   
16 
 
                                             
The Court then reviewed the movants’ individual claims that they were abandoned by 
their appointed counsel, who each filed a statement that counsel had decided to rely on 
movant’s pro se motion rather than file an amended motion.  Id. at 290.  The Court reviewed 
the content of the appointed counsels’ statements.  Id. at 290-91.  The Court found that    
Mr. Moore was not abandoned because his appointed counsel’s timely affidavit “declared 
complete familiarity with the record and announced a reasoned decision that counsel would 
not file an amended motion” and “[t]here [was] simply nothing in the record to support a 
claim that postconviction counsel abandoned Moore.”  Id . at 292.15  
In contrast, the Court found that the record in Mr. Carr’s case raised the presumption 
that he was abandoned by his appointed counsel.  Id.  Citing the requirement in Rule 
24.035(e) that counsel is required to “ascertain whether sufficient facts supporting the 
grounds are asserted in the motion and whether the movant has included all grounds known 
to him as a basis for attacking the judgment and sentence[,]” the Court found the statement 
filed by Mr. Carr’s counsel “shows on its face that counsel took neither of the two actions 
required by Rule 24.035(e).”  Id.  The Court found that counsel’s statement that he had 
reviewed Mr. Carr’s file “with the exclusion of the transcripts of the guilty plea hearing . . . , 
the sentencing hearing . . . , and movant’s pro se motion” was “tantamount to a confession 
of abandonment.”  Id. at 290, 292 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court found that 
 
15 The affidavit filed by Mr. Moore’s appointed counsel indicated that counsel “had 
reviewed the record, had inquired of movant regarding the existence of additional claims or 
facts relating to the post-conviction motion, had explained to movant his rights under Rule 
24.035 and determined that Moore's pro se motion ‘includes all colorable post-conviction 
claims known to movant or counsel.’”  Id. at 290.   
  
17 
 
                                             
a McDaris hearing was required because “the face of the record raises the presumption of 
abandonment to which Luleff and Sanders refer.”  Id. at 292.     
Accordingly, when the record raises a presumption of abandonment because 
appointed counsel has failed to comply with the requirements in Rule 24.035(e) that counsel 
file a timely amended motion or a statement setting out facts that demonstrate counsel’s 
actions to ensure no amended motion is needed, a motion court must conduct a sufficient 
independent inquiry of a post-conviction movant’s claim of abandonment.   Moore, 934 
S.W.2d 289, 291-92; McDaris, 843 S.W2d at 371 n.1.  When the record refutes the claim of 
abandonment, however, no independent inquiry is required of the motion court.  Id. 
 
Here, Mr. Vogl’s appointed counsel failed to comply with Rule 24.035(e) because he 
did not file either an amended motion or a statement setting out facts demonstrating that 
counsel took actions to ensure why no amended motion was needed.  Instead, appointed 
counsel filed a motion to rescind appointment of counsel.16  Importantly, appointed 
counsel’s characterization of his request to terminate his representation of Mr. Vogl as a 
“motion to rescind appointment of counsel” rather than a “motion to withdraw” does not 
relieve counsel of his duty to provide Mr. Vogl with the representation required under Rule 
 
16 Mr. Vogl alleges – and the certificate of service and docket sheet reflect – that he never 
was notified that counsel filed the motion to rescind appointment of counsel.  When counsel 
terminates representation of a client, counsel has a duty to protect the client’s interest; 
“[o]ne step necessary to protect a client's interest is giving notice to the client” of the 
attorney’s intention to terminate representation.  In re Coleman, 295 S.W.3d 857, 866 (Mo. 
banc 2009).      
18 
 
                                             
24.035.  No matter the nomenclature, counsel had responsibilities under Rule 24.035(e) that 
arose upon counsel’s appointment that counsel failed to fulfill.17   
The record in this case raises a presumption of abandonment by appointed counsel 
because it reflects that counsel did not comply with the requirements in Rule 24.035(e) by 
filing either an amended motion or a statement setting out facts demonstrating the actions 
taken by counsel ensured that no amended motion was necessary.  Therefore, the motion 
court was required to conduct an independent inquiry of Mr. Vogl’s claim of abandonment.  
It did not do so.  Accordingly, the motion court clearly erred in overruling Mr. Vogl’s 
motion claiming abandonment by post-conviction counsel.  
Conclusion 
In post-conviction proceedings, an essential element of a movant’s claim in attacking 
the movant’s conviction and sentence is that the movant’s original pro se post-conviction 
motion was timely filed.  If a timely filed motion appears to be filed untimely due to 
misfiling by the circuit court, a pro se movant may allege facts that prove the misfiling and 
the timeliness of the original motion in an amended motion filed by appointed post-
conviction counsel.  When the record shows that appointed counsel did not file either an 
amended motion or a statement setting out facts demonstrating what actions counsel took to 
ensure that no amended motion was needed, there is a presumption of abandonment by 
 
17 The court of appeals has held that no abandonment occurs when appointed counsel 
notifies the motion court that a movant’s pro se motion was untimely without filing either 
an amended motion or a statement explaining why no amended motion is needed.  Stewart 
v. State, 261 S.W.3d 678, 679 (Mo. App. 2008); Morgan v. State; 8 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Mo. 
App. 1999).  This Court disagrees.  To the extent Stewart and Morgan incorrectly held such 
inaction by appointed counsel does not constitute abandonment, the cases are overruled.  
19 
 
appointed counsel.  Because the record in Mr. Vogl’s case shows that no amended motion or 
statement was filed by appointed counsel, it raises the presumption of abandonment, and the 
motion court erred in not conducting an independent inquiry.  The judgment is reversed, and 
the cause is remanded.  
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
 
Russell, C.J., Stith, Draper, and 
Teitelman, JJ., concur; Fischer, J., 
dissents in separate opinion filed; 
Wilson, J., dissents in separate  
opinion filed.  Fischer, J., concurs 
in opinion of Wilson, J. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
MARK D. VOGL,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC93157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
) 
Respondent.  
) 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I dissent from the principal opinion.  In my view, the procedural posture of this 
case bars Vogl's requested relief.  Vogl filed his original Rule 24.035 motion in March 
2008.  After sustaining his post-conviction counsel's motion to rescind appointment, the 
motion court dismissed Vogl's Rule 24.035 motion in April 2008.  Vogl did not appeal 
the motion court's dismissal.  Rather, nearly three years later, Vogl filed a motion to 
reinstate his post-conviction proceedings, alleging that he had been abandoned by post-
conviction counsel.  That motion was overruled, and the appeal of his claim of 
abandonment was dismissed.  A year later, and a full four years after his initial motion 
was dismissed, Vogl filed his third Rule 24.035 motion, alleging for the second time that 
his appointed post-conviction counsel had abandoned him.  In my view, this third motion 
is a successive post-conviction motion filed in violation of Rule 24.035(l) and Rule 75.01 
and is barred by res judicata.  Had Vogl wished to assert his claim that he was abandoned 
or his claim that his original motion was timely filed, Vogl either should have filed a 
motion to vacate the motion court's judgment within that court's 30-day post-judgment 
control provided under Rule 75.01 or appealed the dismissal to the court of appeals.  
Vogl also could have filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal within 12 
months after the judgment became final pursuant to Rule 30.03.  Vogl's failure to pursue 
his abandonment claim on direct appeal of the dismissal precludes relief at this time.  
Further, the fact that Vogl has previously sought relief claiming abandonment, which was 
denied at the circuit court and appellate court levels, should result in the dismissal of this 
case based on res judicata.1 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
In 2007, Vogl pleaded guilty to two counts of statutory sodomy in the first degree, 
a felony for which the authorized term of imprisonment is life imprisonment or a term of 
years not less than five years.  Section 566.062, RSMo Supp. 2013.  The circuit court 
sentenced Vogl to two concurrent terms of 15 years' imprisonment.  Vogl does not allege 
that he is actually innocent of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty.  Furthermore, Vogl 
does not allege that his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
entered.  Yet, the principal opinion approves the use of a procedure in direct conflict with 
the express terms of this Court's rules and creates new law—once again muddying the 
abandonment waters.  It does so in order for Vogl, who does not now claim innocence or 
                                             
 
1 The motion court in this case specifically stated as a basis for dismissal of his second 
abandonment claim that it had previously dismissed the original claim of abandonment.    
 
2
challenge the validity of his guilty plea, to have a hearing on the merits of whether he was 
abandoned, despite his failure to raise this claim in the normal course of the procedures 
previously permitted by this Court.  Especially troubling is that this is Vogl's second 
"motion to reopen" his post-conviction proceeding, and nothing in the principal opinion 
would prohibit him from filing yet another motion. 
Abandonment Claims Should Be Pursued on Direct Appeal According to McDaris 
 
It is my view that Vogl was required to raise any abandonment claim in the initial 
motion court or in a direct appeal of the dismissal of his initial post-conviction motion.  
The principal opinion's decision to grant Vogl relief on his "motion to reopen" post-
conviction proceedings, filed several years after his initial motion was overruled, is in 
direct conflict with this Court's rules.  Rule 24.035(l) specifically provides, "The circuit 
court shall not entertain successive motions."  And Rule 75.01 specifically provides that 
the circuit court loses control over any judgment 30 days after entry.  Remanding Vogl's 
case for a merits hearing on Vogl's allegations of abandonment permits a successive 
motion in violation of the clear and express terms of these rules.   
 
As stated above, this is the third Rule 24.035 motion that Vogl has filed (and the 
second motion claiming he was abandoned by post-conviction counsel).  He filed his 
initial motion in March 2008, which the circuit court dismissed as untimely filed.  Three 
years later, in March 2011, Vogl filed a "Motion to Reinstate Post-Conviction Action … 
on Basis of Timely Filing," claiming he was abandoned by post-conviction counsel.  The 
motion court dismissed that motion, stating, "This Court has previously dismissed this 
action with prejudice for failure to file Motion within the time allowed by the rules.  This 
 
3
Court will take no further action on this file."  Vogl appealed the motion court's action, 
and in May 2012, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal because Vogl failed to file the 
record on appeal.  Vogl did not seek transfer to this Court.  The principal opinion fails to 
explain why the failure to proceed with the appeal of that motion does not preclude the 
relief Vogl seeks here. 
The subject of this appeal is Vogl's third Rule 24.035 motion (his second motion 
claiming abandonment), titled "Motion to Reopen Post Conviction Proceeding" and filed 
in May 2012.  The circuit court overruled the motion, stating, "As in my entry of 
November 4, 2011 the Court notes that this action was previously dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to file Motion within the time allowed by the rules.  Motion to 
reopen is overruled."  This case, therefore, represents Vogl's third bite at the post-
conviction apple.2  
 
This Court's rules, as written, outline the appropriate procedures for bringing and 
reviewing post-conviction motions.  These same rules are designed to prevent 
unrestrained relitigation of claims that were, or should have been, brought in earlier 
proceedings.  Specifically, three rules work in concert to achieve these goals. 
                                             
 
2 Honoring Rule 24.035(l)'s prohibition against successive motions is particularly important 
because the only ineffective assistance of counsel claims that may be brought in a Rule 24.035 
motion for post-conviction relief after a guilty plea must allege that, due to counsel's 
ineffectiveness, the movant's guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently.  Stanley v. State, 420 S.W.3d 532, 544 (Mo. banc 2014).  In this case, Vogl's third 
motion merely alleged that he was abandoned by counsel, and his initial motion merely alleged 
that the sentencing judge "did not look at" a number of character reference letters and a letter 
from a doctor stating that Vogl should stay in therapy rather than go to prison.  These allegations 
do not state a claim for relief under Rule 24.035.   
 
4
First, Rule 75.01 gives a circuit court control over a judgment for 30 days after the 
judgment is entered.  That rule states, "The trial court retains control over judgments 
during the thirty-day period after entry of judgment and may, after giving the parties an 
opportunity to be heard and for good cause, vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify its 
judgment within that time."  During this period, a post-conviction movant can move the 
court to reopen his or her case or vacate the judgment on any number of grounds, 
including that the pro se motion had been timely filed or that post-conviction counsel 
failed to file an amended motion or a statement why no amended motion was required.  
After the expiration of this 30-day period, however, the circuit court loses control over 
the judgment and loses the authority to vacate or reconsider the proceeding.  While this 
rule specifically grants the circuit court control over the judgment, it also affirmatively 
cuts off that control after 30 days, prohibiting the circuit court from taking any further 
action on the matter. 
 
Second, a post-conviction movant is also entitled to an appeal of the circuit court's 
judgment pursuant to Rule 24.035(k).  Subsection k permits the appellate courts to review 
the motion court's ruling and to determine whether the findings and conclusions of the 
trial court were clearly erroneous.  If a post-conviction movant believes that the circuit 
court erroneously dismissed his or her Rule 24.035 motion as untimely, then the movant 
is entitled to appeal that determination to the court of appeals.  The movant may argue 
there that the circuit court erroneously dismissed the initial motion as untimely filed, that 
counsel abandoned him, or that the motion court failed to make an abandonment 
determination. 
 
5
 
Lastly, Rule 24.035(l) prohibits the filing of a successive Rule 24.035 motion.  
Under the express terms of this rule, a post-conviction movant is required to bring any 
post-conviction claims in one motion.  Any successively filed motions, including those 
masquerading as "motions to reopen" or "motions claiming abandonment" are 
specifically prohibited by the express terms of this rule.  
Abandonment, as originally conceived, was designed to fit within the framework 
of Rule 24.035(l), which granted an adequate opportunity for review, while also limiting 
the number of motions that could be filed and the time frame for review of an 
abandonment claim.  When this Court created the abandonment doctrine, it also discussed 
the appropriate forum for the evaluation of such claims.  As this Court discussed at length 
in Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2014), the abandonment doctrine in post-
conviction proceedings was introduced in Luleff v. State, 807 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. banc 
1991), and Sanders v. State, 807 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. banc 1991).  Luleff held that counsel's 
complete failure to file an amended motion or a statement why no such amended motion 
is necessary amounts to abandonment by post-conviction counsel.  Luleff also addressed 
the question of the appropriate forum for addressing abandonment claims.  807 S.W.2d at 
497.  Luleff determined that the initial motion court where the initial motion was being 
prosecuted is the correct place to address such claims, stating: 
If presented with an opportunity to address claims regarding postconviction 
counsel, the motion court could appoint new counsel, if necessary, at that 
time.  Should the motion court conclude there is no basis for the movant's 
claim, a finding to that effect would alleviate the need for appellate courts 
to speculate as to what occurred in the circuit court.  This Court holds that 
the appropriate forum for addressing claims regarding a complete absence 
of performance by postconviction counsel on a motion for postconviction 
 
6
relief is in the circuit court where the motion is being prosecuted by the 
movant. 
 
Id.  Furthermore, this Court held that the motion court, during the initial post-conviction 
proceeding, has an obligation to determine whether the movant was abandoned by 
counsel prior to dismissing the initial post-conviction motion.  Luleff stated: 
At such time as the motion court may proceed to rule a postconviction 
motion and there is no record of any activity by counsel on movant's behalf, 
the motion court shall make inquiry, sua sponte, regarding the 
performances of both movant and counsel. … If the court determines … 
that counsel has failed to act on behalf of the movant, the court shall 
appoint new counsel, allowing time to amend the pro se motion, if 
necessary, as permitted under [the post-conviction rules].       
 
Id. at 498 (footnote omitted).   
 
Similarly, in Sanders, this Court determined that the initial motion court is the 
appropriate forum for addressing claims that a movant was abandoned due to counsel's 
failure to timely file an amended motion.  807 S.W.2d at 495.  There, the Court stated: 
For the reasons enunciated in Luleff … it is expedient to address in the 
motion court claims regarding failure of postconviction counsel to comply 
with the time requirements of [the post-conviction rules].  To conduct an 
inquiry into counsel's apparent failure in this regard does not run afoul of 
[the post-conviction rules' prohibition against the filing of successive 
motions].  The appropriate forum for addressing claims regarding failure of 
postconviction counsel to comply with the requirements of [the post-
conviction rules] is in the circuit court where the motion is being 
prosecuted by movant.  
 
Id.    
 
 
In McDaris v. State, this Court outlined the procedure that the initial motion court 
is to follow when conducting the independent inquiry into whether a movant was 
abandoned by post-conviction counsel that Luleff and Sanders required.  McDaris stated: 
 
7
Pending issuance of a Rule change, the trial court should, as part of its 
independent inquiry under Luleff, inquire not only of postconviction 
counsel, but ensure that movant is informed of counsel's response and 
given an opportunity to reply.  The method of making this inquiry may be 
as formal or informal as the motion court deems necessary to resolve the 
question of abandonment by counsel, including, but not limited to, a written 
response and opportunity to reply, a telephone conference call, or a hearing.  
However, a sufficient record must be made to demonstrate on appeal that 
the motion court's determination on the abandonment issue is not clearly 
erroneous. 
 
843 S.W.2d 369, 371 n.1 (Mo. banc 1992) (emphasis added).  This Court has the 
authority to make a rule change, but it has not changed the procedure set out in McDaris.  
 
Following these rules and precedents, there is little doubt that the appropriate 
forum for addressing Vogl's abandonment claims was in the initial circuit court where the 
initial motion was filed.  And there is little doubt that, under these precedents, the initial 
motion court should have made inquiry into whether Vogl was abandoned by counsel.  If 
Vogl believed that the initial circuit court erroneously dismissed his motion, he was left 
with several options.  He could have filed a motion to vacate the judgment within 30 days 
while the circuit court still had control over the judgment, or he could have appealed.  
Notably, and significant to the resolution of this case, Luleff and Sanders both involved 
direct appeals from initial motions in which this Court granted relief.    
Despite this precedent and the language of this Court's rules, the principal opinion 
permits, for the first time, a hearing on the merits of Vogl's abandonment claim raised in 
what is his third motion.  I acknowledge that this Court has made several statements that 
purport to permit the filing of such a "motion to reopen" and that these cases characterize 
abandonment as an "exception" to Rule 75.01.  However, in my view, these cases are not 
 
8
binding on any court because they rely entirely on dicta and have never been necessary to 
resolve the issues presented.  Moreover, these cases conflict with the rules and have led 
to an unending cycle of relitigation of "abandonment" claims, with some filings, as the 
principal opinion acknowledges, coming more than a decade after the initial motion was 
filed.3   
As noted, the concept of the "motion to reopen" post-conviction proceedings first 
appeared in dicta.  The first time this Court mentioned the possibility of a "motion to 
reopen" was in State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d 210, 217-18 (Mo. banc 2001).  In 
Jaynes, an inmate petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his 
appointed post-conviction counsel had a conflict of interest because post-conviction 
counsel had also served as trial counsel.  Id. at 213.  This Court held that the inmate had 
not pleaded sufficient facts to show that he was entitled to habeas corpus relief.  Id.  At 
the end of the opinion, in dicta, the Court stated that, if the inmate could prove that he 
had been abandoned, he "may wish to move to reopen his original motion under Rule 
29.15 in the sentencing court, provided that his original motion was timely filed."  Id. at 
218.  This statement cites no authority for such a motion and does not indicate that the 
Court considered the time limitations on such motions contained in this Court's rules.             
                                             
 
3 The court of appeals recently handed down a case that demonstrates this danger.  In Middleton 
v. State, No. WD75669 (Mo. App. Mar. 4, 2014), an inmate filed a "motion to reopen" his post-
conviction proceedings due to abandonment, which the circuit court overruled.  He appealed, and 
the court of appeals affirmed in a published opinion.  Middleton v. State, 200 S.W.3d 140 (Mo. 
App. 2006).  Several years later, the inmate filed a second "motion to reopen," again claiming 
abandonment, which the circuit court again overruled.  The inmate appealed, and the court of 
appeals again affirmed, but only after oral argument and a second written opinion.            
 
9
Later, in Taylor v. State, 254 S.W.3d 856, 857-58 (Mo. banc 2008), this Court 
stated that the "abandonment doctrine provides a narrow exception permitting the circuit 
court to re-open an otherwise final post-conviction case."  The Court cited the Jaynes 
dicta as its only authority for this proposition.  Id. at 858.  The Court did not engage in 
any analysis regarding Rule 24.035(l)'s prohibition against successive motions.  Nor did 
it examine why "abandonment" should be treated as an exception to any of this Court's 
rules when the requested remedy could be obtained through direct appeal.  Moreover, the 
Court went on to find that Taylor had not been abandoned by his post-conviction counsel.  
Id. at 858.  The Court's pronouncement that abandonment of post-conviction counsel 
serves as a "narrow exception" to the rule, therefore, was not necessary to the judgment 
and is not a "holding" of this Court.      
In Crenshaw v. State, 266 S.W.3d 257, 259 (Mo. banc 2008), decided shortly after 
Taylor, this Court likewise stated, "Under this Court's precedents, the motion court has 
authority to consider a motion to reopen [post-conviction] proceedings when it is alleged 
that a movant has been abandoned by his counsel."  Crenshaw cited a court of appeals 
opinion, Edgington v. State, 189 S.W.3d 703 (Mo. App. 2006), to support that 
proposition.  Edginton, in turn, cited the Jaynes dicta as authority.  189 S.W.3d at 706.  
The Court in Crenshaw did not engage in any analysis regarding what gives the motion 
court such authority.  Moreover, Crenshaw did not grant the movant relief.  266 S.W.3d 
at 260-61.  In fact, the Court in Crenshaw declined to examine whether abandonment had 
occurred.  Id. at 260. 
 
10
In Gehrke v. State, 280 S.W.3d 54, 57 n.3 (Mo. banc 2009), the Court again, this 
time in a footnote, stated that the circuit court has the authority to consider a motion to 
reopen post-convictions proceedings when the movant alleges abandonment.  Gerhke 
cites Crenshaw, which, as noted, relies on a court of appeals opinion that cites Jaynes.  
Much like the other cases, Gehrke contains no analysis concerning the "exception" and 
holds that post-conviction counsel did not abandon the movant.  Id. at 58-59.   
No case that the principal opinion or Vogl cites as authority to support the 
abandonment "exception" to the general rules concerning final judgments actually 
granted relief to the movant.  And never has this Court analyzed the source of such 
"exception" or how that "exception" squares with Rule 24.035(l)'s prohibition against 
successive motions.4          
   
The rules of this Court do not provide for a "motion to reopen."  Nor do they 
provide for a motion for post-conviction relief due to abandonment.  Abandonment, as 
                                             
 
4 Significantly, no case from this Court decided before the errant Jaynes dicta addressed 
abandonment as part of a "motion to reopen" a post-conviction proceeding.  Each pre-Jaynes 
case addresses abandonment during the initial post-conviction proceeding or an appeal of the 
post-conviction motion's overruling without the notion of a "motion to reopen the proceeding."  
See Moore v. State, 934 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. banc 1996) (dealing with two cases in which 
abandonment was addressed at the motion court level prior to denying relief); State v. White, 873 
S.W.2d 590, 596-99 (Mo. banc 1994) (reviewing the motion court's determination during the 
Rule 29.15 proceeding that the movant was not abandoned), superseded on other grounds by rule 
as stated in Glover v. State, 225 S.W.3d 425 (Mo. banc 2007);  McDaris v. State, 843 S.W.2d 
369, 371 (Mo. banc 1992) (reviewing a determination by the motion court that movant was not 
abandoned). 
 
These cases indicate that, before the Jaynes dicta, this Court understood the abandonment 
doctrine to apply only during the original post-conviction proceeding.  No "motion to reopen" 
based on abandonment seems to have existed. This is particularly evident in Luleff, Sanders, and 
McDaris, each of which specifically stated that it was the initial motion court's responsibility to 
conduct an independent inquiry into whether abandonment occurred before ruling on the motion 
in the event of a late or non-filing of the amended motion or statement that no amended motion is 
necessary.   
 
11
judicially created, was to be examined prior to the circuit court's decision on the post-
conviction motion.  The movant was free to argue that certain actions of counsel 
constituted abandonment during post-conviction proceedings or the direct appeal thereof.  
In my view, the cases relying on the Jaynes dicta are incorrectly decided in so far as they 
have suggested the use of a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings, or any motion 
given another name alleging abandonment by appointed post-conviction counsel, without 
determining whether such a motion was a prohibited successive post-conviction motion.5 
 
The principal opinion states that the Rule 24.035(1) prohibition against successive 
motions does not apply to abandonment claims because Rule 24.035 does not establish 
the procedure for abandonment claims.  I could accept that position if the principal 
opinion was willing to follow this Court's holding in McDaris which, pending a rule 
change, required abandonment claims to be made during the appeal of the post-
conviction motion.  McDaris at 371-2.  As stated previously, this Court has not adopted a 
rule providing for an alternative procedure to pursue abandonment claims.   
The truly myopic aspect of the "motion to reopen" due to abandonment of post-
conviction counsel is its complete disregard of the importance of finality of judgments.  
As mentioned, permitting these "motions to reopen" as some kind of exception to both 
Rule 75.01 and Rule 24.035(l) permits an endless cycle of relitigation of the same issue.  
This is exactly what these rules are designed to prevent.  If "abandonment" somehow 
                                             
 
5  It should be noted that untimely post-conviction motions due to what Price termed "third-party 
interference" or "active interference" do not run afoul of the prohibition against filing a 
successive motion.  In those cases, no initial motion will have been filed; therefore, the movant 
needs to file a motion seeking to file the initial post-conviction motion out of time.  See Price, 
422 S.W.3d at 295 n.1, 301-06.   
 
12
serves as an unlimited and unqualified exception to these rules, there is little to stop Vogl 
from filing another "motion to reopen" if he is ultimately unsuccessful on remand.  If this 
Court does not follow its rules as written, there is no limit on the number of times a 
movant may allege abandonment in a "motion to reopen," and there is no limit on the 
timing of such a motion.  
 
Additionally, the puzzling part about the principal opinion's decision to permit 
abandonment claims in a "motion to reopen" is that such a motion is completely 
unnecessary.  Any colorable abandonment claim will be available to the movant in the 
initial motion court or on direct appeal because any successful claim of abandonment will 
be apparent from the record.6  As noted, Price made clear that abandonment only occurs 
in two situations: 1) when appointed post-conviction counsel fails to file an amended 
motion or a statement why no motion is necessary or 2) when such a motion is necessary 
but is untimely filed by appointed counsel.  422 S.W.3d at 297-98.  Either of these 
situations will be apparent from the face of the record in the initial motion court or on 
direct appeal of the initial post-conviction motion.   
 
This is even true in Vogl's case.  The principal opinion ultimately holds that post-
conviction counsel abandoned Vogl by failing to file an amended motion or statement in 
lieu thereof.  There is absolutely no reason that Vogl could not have asserted this claim 
by following the normal procedures permitted by this Court's rules.  Vogl could have 
filed a timely motion to vacate under Rule 75.01 or he could have filed an appeal.  The 
                                             
 
6 In fact, the principal opinion states that the motion court need only investigate abandonment 
"when the record raises" such a presumption and when "the record refutes the claim of 
abandonment" no such inquiry is required.  Slip op. at 16-17 (emphasis added). 
 
13
failure to do so results from Vogl's own lack of diligence at the time his initial motion 
was dismissed.          
There is one additional concern with allowing unfettered "motions to reopen" a 
post-conviction proceeding.  In my view, this Court should refuse to permit "motions to 
reopen" filed outside of the normal time limit to preserve potential relief under federal 
habeas corpus proceedings.  In denying relief in Gehrke, this Court stated as follows: 
Federal habeas corpus proceedings require a movant to exhaust all available 
state remedies, including appeal and postconviction remedies, before 
bringing a federal claim. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 
(1991). State court remedies are exhausted "when they are no longer 
available, regardless of the reason for their unavailability." Woodford v. 
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93 (2006). If the scope of abandonment were 
expanded further, it is foreseeable that federal habeas corpus claims could 
be denied due to a movant's failure to bring a motion to reopen 
postconviction proceedings. This would frustrate the legitimate goals of a 
prompt comprehensive review and finality. 
Gehrke, 280 S.W.3d at 59.     
I understand that this result may appear unsympathetic because Vogl did not have 
counsel to guide him through the appeals process.  However, as the record demonstrates, 
Vogl discovered all of his claims and prepared all of the motions leading to this third 
motion on his own, without counsel.  The record also suggests that, on multiple 
occasions, Vogl reached out to his appointed post-conviction counsel, who answered 
several of Vogl's questions about filing this third motion.  Furthermore, in post-
conviction proceedings, Rule 30.03 allows the movant to seek leave to file a notice of 
appeal out of time within 12 months of the judgment becoming final.7  This gave Vogl a 
                                             
 
7 Rule 30.03 provides: 
 
14
full year to collect all the information that is now the basis for his third Rule 24.035 
motion and seek leave to appeal.8 
The Principal Opinion's Discussion of "Counsel's Failure to Ascertain" is 
Unnecessary 
 
 
Had Vogl asserted his claim in a timely manner, he likely would have alleged 
sufficient facts that, if true, would have proven that he was abandoned by post-conviction 
counsel under this Court's recent definition of "abandonment" in Price v. State, 422 
S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2014).  This Court made clear in Price that "abandonment" by 
post-conviction counsel occurs only in one of two situations: 1) when appointed post-
conviction counsel fails to comply with Rule 24.035(e) by failing to file either an 
amended motion or a statement explaining why no amended motion is required or          
2) when appointed post-conviction counsel files an untimely amended motion.  Id. at 
297-98.  Vogl's third Rule 24.035 motion alleged sufficient facts that, if true, would 
prove that his post-conviction counsel failed to file either an amended motion or a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Where the defendant or the state has the right of appeal including appeals from an 
order in a post-conviction proceeding involving a prior felony conviction, but 
notice of appeal is not filed with the clerk of the trial court within ten days after 
the judgment becomes final, the defendant or the state may file a notice of appeal 
in the trial court if, within twelve months after the judgment becomes final, a 
motion for leave to file such notice is filed in the appropriate appellate court and it 
thereafter sustains the motion and grants such leave. 
(Emphasis added).  
8 In addition to the rule allowing late appeals, Rule 74.06 permits a court to entertain motions 
seeking relief from a judgment or order.  Among the reasons for relieving a party from a final 
judgment are that the judgment "is no longer equitable for the judgment to remain in force" and 
"excusable neglect."  Rule 74.06(b)(1) and (5).  Such motions must be made within a reasonable 
time and, for certain provisions, not more than one year.  This rule has not been cited by any 
party, but it is permitted by this Court's rules.  Even this available procedure would be preferred 
to ignoring this Court's clear and express rule prohibiting the filing of a successive Rule 24.035 
motion.       
 
15
statement explaining why no amended motion was required.  Vogl alleges his post-
conviction counsel's only action was to file a motion to rescind his appointment as 
counsel on the ground that Vogl's initial motion was untimely.  Counsel's motion to 
rescind appointment did not meet the basic requirements of Rule 24.035(e); therefore, 
Vogl's allegations, if proven, would constitute abandonment. 
 
Despite the fact that this straightforward analysis resolves the issue, the principal 
opinion could be misconstrued to extend the abandonment doctrine into an evaluation of 
whether counsel met its "duty to ascertain" whether a movant has timely filed the pro se 
motion required by Rule 24.035.  This analysis is neither necessary for the principal 
opinion's resolution of this case, nor supported by this Court's precedent. 
 
The opinion specifically holds, "Here, Mr. Vogl's appointed counsel failed to 
comply with Rule 24.035(e) because he did not file either an amended motion or a 
statement setting out facts demonstrating that counsel took actions to ensure why no 
amended motion was needed."  This holding renders the principal opinion's discussion of 
the "duty to ascertain" unnecessary, and in my view, the discussion will lead to a 
resurgence of multiple "motions to reopen" or alternatively correctly titled "motions for 
relief due to abandonment" that are nothing more than re-characterized claims of 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel.9   
                                             
 
9 Moreover, Moore v. State, cited by the principal opinion as authority for the proposition that 
appointed post-conviction counsel's "failure to ascertain" all of the facts relevant to a movant's 
pro se motion, does not hold that such a failure actually amounts to abandonment.  Rather, 
Moore stands for the rather unremarkable proposition that when the record shows on its face that 
counsel has failed to comply with the post-conviction rules, counsel will be presumed to have 
abandoned the movant.  934 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Mo. banc 1996).  Moore remanded a case to the 
 
16
Res Judicata Prohibits Vogl's Second Abandonment Claim  
 
The principal opinion suggests that the res judicata issue is raised "sua sponte."  
The principal opinion notes that the State has not asserted that Vogl's prior motions 
constituted a "procedural bar" to the adjudication of his current motion.  However, the 
"failure" to raise this issue at this point does not constitute a waiver of the issue.  The 
post-conviction rules do not require a responsive pleading.  Rule 24.035(g).  In this case, 
the State did not file a responsive pleading because the circuit court swiftly denied relief 
without one, specifically pointing to its previous judgment overruling the original claim 
of abandonment.  Therefore, the State has not "waived" any claim that Vogl was not 
abandoned, including that Vogl's claim is barred by res judicata due to his failure to 
perfect either his original post-conviction appeal or the appeal of his original 
abandonment claim.     
Res Judicata is an affirmative defense.  Ordinarily, the party seeking to 
benefit by it must either plead in an answer, raise it by an amendment to the 
pleadings, or present it by motion to dismiss.  However, it is a defense that 
not only benefits the defending party, but also benefits the court's ability to 
efficiently administer justice. 
 
In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has recognized: 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
circuit court because counsel's statement why no amended motion was filed indicated that 
counsel had done nothing other than to file the statement.  Id.  Moore's holding stems from the 
fact that the Court determined that counsel essentially did nothing at all, not that counsel failed to 
ascertain facts that would have led to a colorable claim.  Id.  Counsel's failure to perform an 
adequate investigation is a matter of the effectiveness of counsel and, therefore, categorically 
unreviewable.  This is perfectly demonstrated by the two cases that the principal opinion 
overrules, Stewart v. State, 261 S.W.3d 678 (Mo. App. 2008), and Morgan v. State, 8 S.W.3d 
151 (Mo. App. 1999).  The movant in each case alleged that post-conviction counsel had 
abandoned him by failing to investigate the timeliness of the pro se motion.  The court of appeals 
in each case held that such an allegation was better characterized as one for ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel.    
 
 
17
 
"if a court is on notice that it has previously decided the issue 
presented, the court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even 
though the defense has not been raised.  This result is fully 
consistent with the policies underling res judicata: it is not 
based solely on the defendant's interest in avoiding the 
burdens of twice defending a suit, but is also based on the 
avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste." 
 
Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000).   
 
Patrick V. Koepke Const., Inc. v. Woodsage Const. Co., 119 S.W.3d 551, 555 (Mo. App. 
2003) (some internal citations omitted).  Moreover, this Court has stated that, although 
res judicata is an affirmative defense, it need not be asserted in a responsive pleading 
because res judicata is in essence an allegation that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted.  Chesterfield Village, Inc. v. City of Chesterfield, 64 
S.W.3d 315, 318 n.1 (Mo. banc 2002).  As such, res judicata may be raised in a motion 
to dismiss.  Id.   
As pointed out in Koepke, while caution should be exercised in applying res 
judicata sua sponte, a well recognized exception to this caution exists when the defense 
arises out of the court's own earlier judgment.  That is exactly what this Court is 
reviewing here—the motion court expressly referenced its previous judgment denying 
abandonment relief in its judgment denying relief on this motion.  Under these facts, it is 
totally inappropriate for this Court to hold that ruling is "clearly erroneous."  In my view, 
the judicially efficient resolution is to deny relief now rather than remand and require the 
State to file a motion to dismiss that the motion court will surely sustain. 
 
18
The principal opinion suggests that the Court should not review, sua sponte, the 
issue of res judicata because the "motion court dismissed Mr. Vogl's current 
abandonment claim as procedurally barred . . . Mr. Vogl's claim of abandonment has 
never been adjudicated on the merits."  However, the motion court's 2011 order states 
that the circuit court would take no action on Vogl's claims of abandonment because 
Vogl failed to timely file his original motion.  Or, in other words, because Vogl had not 
filed a timely original motion, the motion court determined that he could not have been 
abandoned by counsel.  Moreover, any failure to obtain a final adjudication would stem 
from Vogl's own failure to appeal his initial motion and his failure to perfect his second 
appeal.  To state that Vogl has not received a final adjudication of his abandonment claim 
is to: 1) ignore the language of the motion court's order; 2) ignore Vogl's multiple failures 
to pursue his abandonment claims through the procedures available to him; and 3) ignore 
the fact that, until the principal opinion overruled Stewart v. State and Morgan v. State 
today, Vogl's claims were considered claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel and not abandonment.  
As Judge Wilson's dissent points out, even assuming that the motion court's 2011 
order dismissed Vogl's abandonment claims "without prejudice," 
A dismissal without prejudice may operate to preclude the party from 
bringing another action for the same cause and may be res judicata of what 
the judgment actually decided. Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Services, 807 
S.W.2d 503, 506 (Mo. banc 1991). An appeal from such a dismissal can be 
taken where the dismissal has the practical effect of terminating the 
litigation in the form cast or in the plaintiff's chosen forum. City of 
Chesterfield v. Deshetler Homes, 938 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Mo.App.1997).  
 
 
19
Chromalloy American Corp. v. Elyria Foundry Co., 955 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 1997); 
see also Naylor Senior Citizens Housing, LP v. Side Const. Co., 423 S.W.3d 238, 242-43 
(Mo. banc 2014).  Clearly, both Vogl and the court of appeals believed that the circuit 
court's order terminated the litigation in 2011, as evidenced by Vogl's appeal from that 
order.  Because the express terms of the order terminated the litigation so that Vogl 
would have a final judgment to appeal the motion court's ruling, the subsequent 
abandonment litigation is barred by res judicata.   
This Court has an obligation to ensure compliance with its post-conviction rules.  
Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012).  In Dorris, this Court specifically 
held that the time limitations for the post-conviction rules cannot be waived by either 
party.  360 S.W.3d at 270.  This Court held that the time limitations established by the 
rules for post-conviction relief were mandatory to preserve the finality of judgments and 
could not be waived.  Id.  In my view, this same conclusion applies to the post-conviction 
rules prohibiting successive motions.  Because permitting successive motions frustrates 
the post-conviction relief system's need for finality, the State may not "waive" the rule 
violation, either inadvertently or purposefully.  My view that this second abandonment 
claim is barred by res judicata is in accord with this Court's recent statement that parties 
cannot concede or stipulate to legal issues.  State v. Hardin, 429 S.W.3d 417, 421 n.4 
(Mo. banc 2014) (stating that the State could not concede that the defendant had been 
subject to double jeopardy). 
 
Lastly, "this Court will affirm on any ground that supports the circuit court's 
judgment, regardless of the grounds on which the circuit court relied."  Stanley v. State, 
 
20
420 S.W.3d 532, 543 n.9 (Mo. banc 2014); see also Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576, 578 
(Mo. banc 2006).  While it could be argued that the precise grounds on which the motion 
court overruled this third motion are not clear, it appears that the motion court ruled, 
without the issue having been raised by the State, that its rulings on Vogl's prior motions 
prohibited the requested relief.  In light of the docket entry and this Court's ability to 
affirm on any ground that supports the judgment, the determination that Vogl's current 
claim of abandonment is barred by res judicata should be addressed at this time.   
Conclusion 
 
I disagree with the principal opinion's holding that the abandonment doctrine 
entitles Vogl to file a third Rule 24.035 motion.  Vogl had a remedy available to him 
years ago when the motion court dismissed his initial motion.  At that time, Vogl could 
have appealed the dismissal of his motion pursuant to Rule 24.035(k) or sought to vacate 
the judgment within the time period allowed by Rule 75.01.  Because he failed to pursue 
these available remedies, Vogl is not entitled to relief now.  Rule 24.035(l) specifically 
prohibits successive post-conviction relief motions.  To grant Vogl a remand for a merits 
hearing on his allegations of abandonment, whether his motion is characterized as a 
"motion to reopen" or "motion for post-conviction relief due to abandonment" is to ignore 
the plain language of Rule 24.035(l).   
In McDaris, this Court stated that the motion court should examine abandonment 
prior to ruling on the motion by discussing the issue with post-conviction counsel and 
allowing the post-conviction movant to reply.  McDaris stated that this procedure should 
stand until such time as this Court changed its rules.  This Court has not changed its rules 
 
21
 
22
to permit a different procedure for determining abandonment claims despite its authority 
to do so.   
For the reasons stated above, I would affirm the judgment.  I also concur in the 
opinion of Judge Wilson that res judicata bars Vogl from re-litigating his abandonment 
claim.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
MARK D. VOGL,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC93157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
) 
Respondent.  
) 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
The majority opinion holds that, when the counsel appointed to represent an 
inmate pursuant to Rule 24.035(e) does not file an amended motion or a statement 
explaining why no amended motion is necessary, the inmate either can object to such 
“abandonment” in the motion court and/or assert that claim on appeal as the inmates did 
in Luleff v. State, 807 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. banc 1991), and Sanders v. State, 807 S.W.2d 
493 (Mo. banc 1991), or the inmate can wait several years and then file a “motion for 
post-conviction relief due to abandonment.”  Regardless of the merits of this holding, the 
Court is wrong to announce and apply it to Mr. Vogl in this case. 
As explained below, the 2012 motion that the majority opinion holds should have 
been granted by the trial court was Mr. Vogl’s second abandonment motion, not his first.  
His first abandonment motion is identical to the present one in all material respects 
except that it was filed in 2011, more than 14 months before the motion at issue in this 
case.  The trial court denied Mr. Vogl’s first abandonment motion (just as it later denied 
the motion now before this Court), and Mr. Vogl appealed that first denial (just as he now 
appeals the second).  But that is where the similarities end.  Mr. Vogl never filed the 
record in his first appeal and, as a result, it was dismissed.  Because Mr. Vogl already 
took the second chance to raise his abandonment claim that the majority opinion holds he 
should have, there is no need or reason to give him a third.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
The majority opinion recites that Mr. Vogl’s initial post-conviction motion was 
denied as untimely on April 22, 2008, and he concedes that he did not ask the motion 
court to reconsider or vacate that decision under Rules 75.01 or 74.06.  Mr. Vogl also 
made no effort to seek appellate review of this dismissal, either within 10 days after it 
became final (which, because Mr. Vogl made no motion for reconsideration, was 30 days 
after its entry) or anytime within the following year under Rule 30.03 (which allows the 
appellate court to grant leave for such a late filing “for good cause shown”). 
The majority opinion then recites that, in 2012, Mr. Vogl filed a motion alleging 
that he had been abandoned by his appointed counsel in 2008 and seeking to have the 
motion court hear and determine the merits of his Rule 24.035 claims that had been 
improperly dismissed as a result of that abandonment.  Finally, the majority opinion 
recites that Mr. Vogl’s abandonment motion was denied on May 21, 2012, that he 
appealed this denial, and that his appeal is now before this Court pursuant to article V, 
section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. 
 
2
But, between 2008 (when his initial post-conviction motion was denied) and 2012 
(when he filed the abandonment motion that is now before this Court), there was another 
very important chapter to Mr. Vogl’s procedural story.  On March 17, 2011, more than 
14 months before he filed the motion that is now before this Court, Mr. Vogl filed his 
first motion alleging that he had been abandoned by his appointed counsel in 2008 and 
seeking to have the motion court hear and determine the merits of his Rule 24.035 claims 
that were improperly dismissed as a result of that abandonment.1   
Attached to this first abandonment motion are the same exhibits that the majority 
opinion analyzes from his second motion: (a) the 2010 correspondence between Mr. Vogl 
and the Jasper County circuit clerk’s office; (b) the letter and motion from appointed 
counsel requesting the motion court to rescind appointment because Mr. Vogl’s initial 
pro se motion was filed too late under Rule 24.035; and (c) the motion court’s 2008 order 
rescinding counsel’s appointment and dismissing Mr. Vogl’s motion for post-conviction 
relief as untimely.  Mr. Vogl alleges in his first abandonment motion, as he does in his 
second, that his pro se Rule 24.035 motion was not untimely in 2008, that his appointed 
counsel’s concession on this issue was “without proper merit,” and that this abandonment 
by appointed counsel deprived him of meaningful review of the claims he had raised in 
his 2008 motion for post-conviction relief.   
                                             
 
1   Mr. Vogl includes a copy of his first abandonment motion in his legal file for this case, as well 
as the correspondence from the appellate division of the Public Defender System (which did not 
represent Mr. Vogl at the time) stating it had reviewed his motion and recommending he file it. 
 
3
The motion court denied Mr. Vogl’s first abandonment motion on November 4, 
2011, just as it later would deny his second abandonment motion six months later.2  
Mr. Vogl appealed this November 4 denial to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern 
District, where his appeal was assigned Case No. 31797.  Four months later, however, 
Mr. Vogl had not filed his record on appeal.  Pursuant to Rule 84.08, therefore, the 
appellate court warned Mr. Vogl that his appeal would be dismissed unless he filed the 
required documents or demonstrated good cause why dismissal should not be ordered.  
He did neither, and Mr. Vogl’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of his first 
abandonment motion was dismissed. 
Rule 24.035(l) plainly states:  “The circuit court shall not entertain successive 
motions.”  Even if the majority opinion is correct that this language does not prohibit an 
inmate from filing a “motion for post-conviction relief due to abandonment” after having 
previously filed (and been denied) a motion for post-conviction relief, there is nothing in 
the language of Rule 24.035(l) that justifies allowing an inmate to file a second “motion 
for post-conviction relief due to abandonment” when he has previously filed (and been 
denied) a first “motion for post-conviction relief due to abandonment.”   
                                             
 
2   The majority opinion insists that the “motion court dismissed Mr. Vogl’s current [second] 
abandonment claim as procedurally barred on the ground that his Rule 24.035 action was 
dismissed with prejudice for the untimely filing of his original pro se motion and Mr. Vogl’s 
claim of abandonment never has been adjudicated on the merits[.]”  Maj. Op. at 4, n.4.  That is a 
fair reading of the motion court’s order denying Mr. Vogl’s first abandonment motion on 
November 4, 2011, but it is not a fair reading of the motion court’s ruling denying the second 
abandonment motion, i.e., the denial at issue here.  Here, the motion court explicitly notes that it 
denied a previous motion from Mr. Vogl on the same ground seeking the same relief. 
 
4
If Mr. Vogl had managed to file the record in his appeal from the 2011 denial of 
his first abandonment motion (as he managed to do in this case and as pro se inmates 
manage to do in hundreds of post-conviction appeals every year), all that has occurred in 
this appeal could have – and perhaps would have – occurred in that one.  But he did not 
do so, and that appeal was dismissed.  No matter how compelling the issues he might 
have raised then would have been, and no matter how wrong the trial court may have 
been in denying Mr. Vogl’s first abandonment motion in 2011 under the majority 
opinion’s reasoning here, there simply is no justification for ignoring the fact that 
Mr. Vogl did not file his second abandonment motion (the denial of which is now before 
the Court) until after he failed to perfect his appeal from the denial of his first 
abandonment motion.3 
Even assuming that the majority opinion is correct that Mr. Vogl had a right to 
assert an abandonment claim years after failing to assert that claim in the motion and 
                                             
 
3   The majority opinion suggests that the dismissal of Mr. Vogl’s first abandonment motion has 
no preclusive effect because it was not decided “on the merits.”  The trial court denied both 
motions on the same grounds (and, as to Mr. Vogl’s second abandonment motion, on the 
additional ground that the court had denied relief to Vogl regarding abandonment in his first 
motion).  The majority opinion offers no reason why the second denial is appealable but the first 
denial was not.  A dismissal has preclusive effect on any issue it decides, and it is this preclusive 
effect that makes the dismissal appealable.  Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Elyria Foundry Co., 955 
S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 1997).  Accordingly, either: (a) the denial of Vogl’s first abandonment 
motion was preclusive on the question of whether abandonment can be asserted years after the 
post-conviction motion was denied and, because it was preclusive on this point, the dismissal 
was appealable (as the court of appeals plainly concluded it was); or (b) the denial of Mr. Vogl’s 
first abandonment motion was not preclusive on that issue and, because it was not preclusive, it 
was not appealable.  The majority opinion does not choose (b) because, under that approach, the 
denial of Vogl’s second motion also cannot be appealed.  On the other hand, if the answer is (a) 
and the denial of an abandonment motion is appealable – which the majority opinion plainly 
holds it is – then all of the arguments raised and adopted here could have been raised and 
adopted in Mr. Vogl’s appeal from the denial of his first abandonment motion.  The fact that he 
failed to pursue that appeal does not mean it did not happen. 
 
5
 
6
appellate courts in 2008 (or 2009), Mr. Vogl exercised that right in 2011 when he filed 
his first abandonment motion.  It may well have been error for the motion court to deny 
Mr. Vogl’s first abandonment motion just as the majority opinion concludes it was error 
to deny his second; but we will never know.  Mr. Vogl’s failure to perfect his appeal from 
the denial of his first motion waived all claims of error regarding that denial.  He cannot 
simply ignore the disposition of his first abandonment motion in the hopes of relitigating 
the same issues now in a second motion.  Accordingly, the Court is wrong to reach the 
issues it resolves in this case, and I respectfully dissent from its having done so.4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
 
________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul C. Wilson, Judge 
                                                             
 
4   The majority opinion chides the author for raising this issue sua sponte, noting that the state 
did not raise the preclusive effect of Mr. Vogl’s first abandonment motion below.  It is difficult 
to see how the state could have raised this issue when it was under no obligation to file a 
responsive pleading to Mr. Vogl’s second abandonment motion and, as a practical matter, had no 
opportunity to raise that issue (or anything else) before the trial court denied the motion.  
Presumably, it will do so on remand.  There is no need to put the parties through this exercise, 
however, as this Court repeatedly has held that “motion courts and appellate courts have a ‘duty 
to enforce the mandatory time limits and the resulting complete waiver in the postconviction 
rules – even if the State does not raise the issue.’”  Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Mo. 
banc 2014) (quoting Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Mo. banc 2012)).  There is no reason 
this “duty” also should not extend to “enforcing” the clear prohibition against successive post-
conviction motions found in Rules 24.035(l) and 29.15(l).  To say that this prohibition does not 
extend to successive post-conviction motions based on abandonment because nothing in Rules 
24.035 and 29.15 recognizes post-conviction motions based on abandonment simply proves too 
much.