Title: State ex rel Dewberry v. Kulongoski

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: June 18, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE ex rel SUSAN DEWBERRY,
CAROLE HOLCOMBE, SUZANE DANIELSON and ARNOLD BUCHMAN,
Respondents
on Review,
v.
THE HONORABLE THEODORE R. KULONGOSKI,
Governor of the State of Oregon;
and other EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
in the State of Oregon,
Petitioners
on Review.
(CC
16-03-23044; CA A124001; SC S056410)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
February 25, 2009.
Anna M. Joyce,
Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. 
With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Stephanie L.
Striffler, Special Counsel to the Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General.
Kelly Clark, O'Donnell
Clark & Crew, LLP, Portland, argued the cause for respondents on review. 
With him on the briefs was Kristian Roggendorf.
Craig J. Dorsay,
Dorsay & Easton LLP, Portland; Howard G. Arnett, Dennis C. Karnopp, Karnopp
Petersen LLP, Bend; Wayne Shammel, Roseburg; Dan Hester, Hester & Zehren
LLC, Louisville, Colorado; Kimberly D'Aquila, Tribal Attorney Office, Grande
Ronde; Edmund Clay Goodman, Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, LLP, Portland; 
Brett Kenney, Tribal Attorney, North Bend, and Dirk E. Doyle, Roseburg, filed a
brief on behalf of amici curiae Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of
Oregon, The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, The Cow
Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indians, The Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation,
The Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon, the Klamath
Tribes, and the Coquille Indian Tribe.
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.  
*Appeal from Lane
County Circuit Court, Karsten H.
Rasmussen, Judge. 220 Or App 345, 187
P3d 220 (2008).
DE MUNIZ, C. J.
Relators filed a petition for a writ
of mandamus in Lane County Circuit Court in 2003, challenging the Governor's
authority to enter into a gaming compact with the Confederated Tribes of Coos,
Lower Umpqua, and Suislaw Indians (the Tribes).  Under the compact, the Tribes would
be permitted to open a casino near Florence, Oregon.  On the state's motion, the
trial court dismissed relators' petition on two grounds:  (1) relators had failed
to show that they had no adequate remedy at law; and (2) relators had failed to
join the Tribes in the action, in violation of ORCP 29 A.(1) 
Relators appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.  We allowed
the state's petition for review, and we now affirm the Court of Appeals
decision.  
In 2002, the Governor negotiated an
amended gaming contract with the Tribes, pursuant to ORS 190.110(2)
and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 USC §§ 2701-2721, to operate a casino
near Florence.  That gaming compact was finalized in early 2003.  Relators, who
reside in or near Florence, first challenged that compact by filing a petition
for a writ of mandamus in this court in September 2003.  This court denied that
petition.  
Shortly thereafter, relators filed a
mandamus proceeding in Lane County Circuit Court, naming the Governor of Oregon
and "other executive officers" as defendants.  In that proceeding,
relators argued that, in executing the compact, the Governor had acted
unconstitutionally in two ways:  (1) he had violated Article XV, section 4(12),
of the Oregon Constitution, which, relators argue, prohibits the operation of
casinos in the State of Oregon;(3)
and (2) he had violated the separation of powers provisions of Article III,
section 1, Article IV, section 1, and Article V, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution.(4)
 Relators requested that the court make findings in accordance with those
allegations and to hold that the compact was void.  Relators also requested
that the court command defendants to "ensure that no state agency or any
Executive officer will take any act in furtherance of the Compact[.]"  
The state moved to dismiss relators'
petition on three grounds:  (1) that mandamus relief was not available because
relators had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a declaratory judgment
action; (2) that relators failed to join the Tribes, which, the state argued, were
indispensable parties under ORCP 29; and (3) that relators' petition was not
timely.  As noted, the trial court granted the state's motion on the first two
grounds.  
Relators immediately appealed, but
moved to hold the appeal in abeyance in order to pursue a declaratory judgment
action.  Relators then filed a declaratory judgment action against the state
and the Tribes in Lane County Circuit Court in March 2004.  The state removed
the case to federal court.  The federal district court dismissed the
declaratory judgment action in December 2005, after concluding that relators
lacked standing and that the Tribes enjoyed sovereign immunity.  Dewberry v.
Kulongoski, 406 F Supp 2d 1136 (2005).  Following that dismissal, relators
reactivated their appeal.
Before the Court of Appeals, relators
offered three arguments:  (1) the trial court erred procedurally by not issuing
an alternative writ of mandamus on receipt of relators' petition, as required
by ORS 34.130; (2) the trial court erred in dismissing the petition based on
the availability of a declaratory judgment action, which was not an adequate
remedy at law; and (3) the trial court erred in concluding that ORCP 29 A,
concerning joinder of parties, applied to mandamus proceedings.  In addition to
countering those arguments, the state argued, as an alternative basis for
affirmance, that the relators were precluded from litigating issues that had
already been litigated in the declaratory judgment proceedings in federal
court.  
The Court of Appeals disposed of
relators' first argument by concluding that any error committed by a trial
court in failing to follow the precise procedure set forth in ORS 34.130 was
harmless.  State ex rel Dewberry v. Kulongoski, 220 Or App 345, 350, 187
P3d 220 (2008).  
As to relators' other arguments, the
Court of Appeals first analyzed whether ORCP 29 applies to the circuit court mandamus
proceeding.  Id. at 351.  That court concluded that ORCP 29 A does not
apply to a mandamus proceeding, because the statute governing mandamus actions
specifies a different procedure as to parties.  Id. at 353.  ORCP 1 A,
the court noted, states that the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure apply in "all
civil actions and special proceedings . . . except where a different
procedure is specified by statute or rule."  Id. at 351 (emphasis
added).  After reviewing the procedures governing joinder of parties outlined
in ORCP 29 A and the procedures governing parties outlined in the mandamus
statute, the court concluded that the mandamus provisions "differ[ed] in
substance from the provisions of ORCP 29[.]"  Id. at 353.  ORCP 29
A, the court explained, governs the joinder of a "broad class of persons
-- including persons 'claim[ing] an interest relating to the subject of the
action' whose 'ability to protect that interest' may be 'impair[ed] or
impede[d]' by a disposition in their absence."  Id. (quoting ORCP
29 A).  The court contrasted ORCP 29 A with the mandamus statute, which provides
that the only required parties to a mandamus proceeding are a "relator"
and a "defendant."  Id.  The court also noted that the
mandamus statute provided that "adverse parties" may
participate in mandamus proceedings by way of intervention, but did not require
that they do so.  Id. at 354.  Based on those differences, the court
concluded that ORCP 29 does not apply in mandamus proceedings.  Id.  
The Court of Appeals then addressed
whether the trial court erred in dismissing relators' mandamus petition because
relators have a "'plain, speedy and adequate" alternate remedy, in
the form of a declaratory judgment action under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act.  Id. at 355 (quoting ORS 34.110).  In answering the
question in the affirmative, the Court of Appeals explained that two
circumstances led to its conclusion:  (1) the Tribes' participation in the
declaratory judgment action was a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
availability of an adjudication on the merits of that action and (2) the satisfaction
of that prerequisite was a matter entirely within the Tribes' -- and not
relators' -- control.  Id. at 358-59.  ORS 28.110 requires that "all
persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration[.]"  Id. at 355-56.  The court reasoned
that that requirement was jurisdictional and, therefore, any declaratory
judgment action pursued by relators could not proceed without the Tribes'
participation, as the Tribes are signatories to the challenged compact.  Id.
at 359.  Because the Tribes could invoke sovereign immunity, the Tribes controlled
their participation in the action and, therefore, also controlled the
availability of declaratory relief.  Id.  For those reasons, the Court
of Appeals held that a declaratory judgment action affords relators neither a "plain"
nor "adequate" remedy.  Id.  
Finally, the Court of Appeals
rejected the state's claim preclusion argument, because it was not and could
not have been pleaded before the trial court.(5) 
Id. at 360.  The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred
in dismissing relators' mandamus petition, and, therefore, reversed and
remanded.  Id. at 361.  We allowed the state's petition for review.  
We begin with a brief review of the background
and purpose of the writ of mandamus.  Mandamus has its origins in England,
where the writ was "a command of the central courts, in the name of the
sovereign, requiring a local official to do his duty."  State ex rel Kashmir
Corp. v. Schmidt, 291 Or 603, 608, 633 P2d 791 (1981).  Under Oregon law, the
writ may be issued to "any inferior court, corporation, board, officer or
person to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins[.]" 
ORS 34.110.  A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, awarded upon
equitable principles, and is a special proceeding with pleading and practice
requirements that are different from ordinary legal actions.  Buell v.
Jefferson County Court, 175 Or 402, 408-09, 152 P2d 578, 154 P2d 188
(1944).  This court has stated that "'[t]he primary purpose or function of
a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right, and to enforce a
corresponding imperative duty created or imposed by law.'"  State ex
rel Venn v. Reid, 207 Or 617, 624, 298 P2d 990 (1956) (quoting 55 CJS Mandamus
§ 51).  A writ of mandamus "shall not control judicial discretion"
and "shall not be issued in any case where there is a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."  ORS 34.110.  
Turning to the questions presented, we
first address whether ORCP 29 A applies to mandamus proceedings.  The state
contends that, when a mandamus proceeding does not arise out of judicial or
administrative proceedings, ORCP 29 A governs to determine the necessary
parties.  Relators, on the other hand, contend that the mandamus statutes set
out procedures that are different from and are inconsistent with ORCP 29 A respecting
the necessary parties and, therefore, ORCP 29 A does not apply to mandamus proceedings. 
For the following reasons, we agree with relators and conclude that ORCP 29 A
does not apply to mandamus proceedings.
The Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure "govern
procedure and practice in all circuit courts of this state, * * * for all civil
actions and special proceedings * * *."  ORCP 1 A.  ORCP 1 A also limits
the applicability of the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure by excluding cases "where
a different procedure is specified by statute or rule."  As quoted above, ORCP
29 A governs joinder of necessary parties, requiring that certain parties be
joined in an action in which complete relief cannot be accorded without those
parties, in which those parties' absence may impair their ability to protect
their interest, or in which those parties' absence may leave other parties
subject to inconsistent or multiple obligations.  If the statute governing
mandamus proceedings specifies a "different procedure" than ORCP 29 A
regarding joinder of parties, ORCP 29 A does not apply to mandamus proceedings. 
ORCP 1 A.
ORS 34.105 defines the parties to
mandamus proceedings.  ORS 34.105(4) defines "relator" as "the
beneficially interested party on whose relation a mandamus proceeding is
brought."  A "defendant" in a mandamus proceeding is "the
court, corporation, board, officer or person against whom relief is sought in a
mandamus proceeding."  ORS 34.105(3).  An "adverse party" is a "beneficially
interested party to a judicial or administrative proceeding from which a
mandamus proceeding arises, whose interests are adverse to the relator." 
ORS 34.105(1) (emphasis added).  
ORS 34.130 outlines various procedures
applicable to mandamus proceedings, including filing requirements, service requirements,
and intervention by adverse parties.  As to intervention of parties, ORS
34.130(4)(a) provides that, prior to the return date of an alternative writ, "any
adverse party may intervene in the mandamus proceeding as matter of
right" and, after that date, "the court in its discretion may allow
an adverse party to intervene."  ORS 34.130 does not state that any
parties, other than a relator and a defendant, are required to
participate.  Under the mandamus statute, therefore, the only required parties in
a mandamus proceeding are the relator and the defendant.  Adverse parties are permitted,
but not required, to intervene in the action in all circumstances.  ORS
34.130(4).  Put another way, no party other than the defendant is required
to be joined by the relator in the mandamus proceeding.  
The state contends that the reference
in ORS 34.130(4) to adverse parties concerns only those mandamus actions that
arise from judicial or administrative proceedings.  We agree, insofar as that
is how ORS 34.105(1) defines "adverse party."  The state then goes on
to argue that, because the mandamus statute is silent as to the parties to a mandamus
proceeding that does not arise from a judicial or administrative proceeding,
ORCP 29 A must apply to fill in the gap.  We disagree.  The structure of the
mandamus statute makes clear that an interested party who is not a relator or a
defendant in any mandamus proceeding has, at most, a right to seek to
intervene.  If the state's contention were correct, and the necessary parties
to a mandamus proceeding varied depending on whether that proceeding arose from
a judicial or administrative proceeding, then a "necessary" party to
a mandamus proceeding that did not arise from a judicial or administrative
proceeding would have greater rights to participate in such a case than would an
adverse party to a circuit court proceeding that gave rise to a mandamus
action.  Such a result cannot be what the legislature intended by its reference
to adverse parties in the mandamus statute.
The foregoing construction is
supported by the fact that the legislature included specific references to the
Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure elsewhere in the mandamus statute.  For
example, ORS 34.130(2) requires a relator to "serve a copy of the petition
on the defendant and, if the mandamus proceeding arises from a judicial or
administrative proceeding, on all parties to that proceeding."  That
subsection further states that service is "sufficient if it complies with
ORCP 9 B."  ORCP 9 is invoked again in the subsection governing service of
the writ.  ORS 34.140(1).  No similar reference to ORCP 29 A appears anywhere
in the mandamus statute.(6)
To summarize, ORCP 29 A mandates that
certain persons be joined in an action in circumstances where complete relief
cannot be accorded without the participation of a person or where the person's
ability to protect his or her interests will be impeded or impaired.  The
procedure outlined in the mandamus statute, ORS 34.130(4), on the other hand, allows
interested parties to seek intervention and requires the participation
of only a relator and a defendant.  Because the mandamus statute specifies a a "different
procedure" than the procedure contained in ORCP 29 A, ORCP 29 A does not
apply to mandamus proceedings.  ORCP 1 A.  It follows that the trial court
erred in concluding that ORCP 29 A required that relators join the Tribes in
this mandamus action.
We turn now to whether a declaratory
judgment action is a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law."  ORS 34.110.  If a declaratory judgment action is a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy, then the circuit court properly dismissed the
petition for a writ of mandamus.  The state argues that a declaratory judgment
action provides relators with a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law, even
though the Tribes could assert sovereign immunity in a declaratory judgment
action and obtain dismissal of relators' claims against them.  Relators, on the
other hand, contend that a declaratory judgment action does not afford them a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, because relief in that action depends solely
on the Tribes' discretion in choosing whether to assert sovereign immunity.  For
the reasons that follow, we conclude that a declaratory judgment action does
not provide relators with a plain and adequate alternative remedy.    
We begin our analysis of whether a
declaratory judgment action affords relators a "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy" by analyzing the statutory text and context.  PGE v. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  Words of
common usage are given their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.  Fort
Vannoy Irrigation v. Water Resources Comm., 345 Or 56, 70, 188 P3d 277
(2008).  Statutory terms that have a well-defined legal meaning will be given
that meaning.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Central Point, 341 Or
393, 397, 144 P3d 914 (2006).  Our review of the statutory text and context
includes prior opinions of this court interpreting the same statute.  Id.(7)
This court has provided insight into
the meaning of "plain," as used in the mandamus context.  In State
ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597, 600-05, 932 P2d 1145 (1997), an
original mandamus proceeding, this court addressed whether the state (the
relator in that case) had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal under
the applicable statutes, ORS 138.060(5) and ORS 138.222.  This court explained
that 
"it is the remedy, not the statute creating the remedy,
that must be 'plain.'  If a statute, however ambiguous, grants a right to an
appeal respecting the disputed issue, for example, then the remedy -- appeal --
ordinarily precludes mandamus."
Id. at 600-01 n 5.  After analyzing the applicable
statutes, the court concluded that the state did not have a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy by appeal.  Id. at 608.  A separate partial concurrence
arrived at the same conclusion, but focused on whether the appellate remedy was
plain.  Id. at 631-44 (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  That opinion stated, "[T]he existence of genuine uncertainty about
whether the state legally was entitled to appeal regarding [the] asserted legal
error means that an appeal was not a plainly available remedy in the
ordinary course of law."  Id. at 637 (emphasis added).  In State
ex rel. v. Dobson, 171 Or 492, 499, 135 P2d 794, 137 P2d 825 (1943), the
court quoted 38 CJ 561 with approval and stated that, "'where it is doubtful
whether or not there is an adequate specific remedy in the ordinary course of
law, mandamus will ordinarily issue.'"  (Emphasis added.)  Based on the foregoing,
we conclude that a "plain" remedy is one that is obvious, clear, and
without uncertainty.(8) 
"Plain" does not mean, however, that the remedy needs to be successful
or meritorious for the relator; instead, it requires only that the availability
of the remedy be obvious or clear.  
On several occasions this court has
also discussed the requirement that a legal remedy be "adequate."  In
State ex rel Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Or 413, 425, 255 P2d 1055 (1953), the
court explained that, "to bar mandamus, the law remedy must afford all
relief to which the plaintiff is entitled."  A writ of mandamus may issue even
when other remedies exist, if the other remedies are inadequate or not
sufficiently speedy.  Id.; see also Dobson, 171 Or at 499
("'The mere fact that there is another remedy will not prevent the
issuance of the writ of mandamus if the other remedy is not adequate[.]'")
(quoting 38 CJ 561).  An adequate remedy must provide "relief upon the
very subject matter of the application, and be equally convenient, beneficial,
and effective."  State ex rel. Pierce v. Slusher, 117 Or
498, 501, 244 P 540 (1926) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(emphasis added).  An adequate remedy, therefore, is a remedy that is
sufficient and as equally convenient and effective as mandamus.(9)
As with "plain," "adequate" does not require a remedy to be
meritorious for the relator.
To determine whether a declaratory
judgment action in this case is "plain" and "adequate," we must
review the declaratory judgment statute.  Under the declaratory judgment
statute, courts "shall have power to declare rights, status, and other
legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." 
ORS 28.010.  Regarding parties to declaratory judgment actions, another statutory
section provides:
"When declaratory relief is sought, all persons
shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons
not parties to the proceedings.* * *"
ORS 28.110 (emphasis added).  The statute defines "person"
as "any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated
association or society, or municipal or other corporation of any character
whatsoever."  ORS 28.130.  It is undisputed that the Tribes are persons
who would be required to be made parties under ORS 28.110, because, as parties
to the gaming compact, the Tribes have an interest that would be affected by
any declaration as to the governor's authority to enter into the compact.  It also
is undisputed that the Tribes would be entitled to assert sovereign immunity in
that declaratory judgment action.  See, e.g., Chance v. Coquille Indian
Tribe, 327 Or 318, 321, 963 P2d 638 (1998) ("As 'domestic dependent
nations' with sovereign authority over their members and territories, Indian
tribes are immune from claims in state and federal courts.") (citations
omitted).  In fact, the Tribes did assert sovereign immunity in the declaratory
judgment action that relators filed after the trial court granted the state's
motion to dismiss the mandamus petition, and the federal district court dismissed
relators' claims against the Tribes on that ground.  Dewberry, 406 F
Supp at 1146.  
Under those circumstances, a
declaratory judgment action is neither a plain nor adequate alternative
remedy.  As we stated above, a plain remedy is one that is obvious, clear, and
without uncertainty.  Under ORS 28.110, the Tribes would be required to
participate in any declaratory judgment action.  In fact, as the Court of
Appeals noted, ORS 28.110 sets forth a jurisdictional requirement.  See Stanley,
Adm. v. Mueller, 211 Or 198, 202, 315 P2d 125 (1957) ("[C]ourts have no authority to make a
declaration unless all persons 'who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration' are parties to the proceeding.") (quoting ORS
28.110).  Therefore, if the Tribes chose not to participate by invoking
sovereign immunity, a court would be entirely without authority to decide the
case.  That the Tribes alone possess the authority to determine whether a
declaratory judgment action proceeds to the merits makes the availability of a
declaratory judgment remedy uncertain and unclear.  We therefore conclude that
a declaratory judgment action is not a plain remedy for relators.
Similarly,
a declaratory judgment action does not provide relators with an adequate
remedy.  To be adequate, a remedy must afford to the relators all relief to
which they are entitled.  Ricco, 198 Or at 425.  That remedy must
also be "convenient, beneficial and effective."  Pierce, 117
Or at 501 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  For the same reason
that a declaratory judgment action is not a plain remedy, a declaratory
judgment action is not convenient or effective:  the Tribes alone control the
availability of that remedy.  As noted earlier, the definition of adequate, of
course, does not require that relators prevail on the merits when seeking the alternate
remedy.  However, because the Tribes control its availability, a declaratory
judgment action would not afford relators any relief and is therefore
not an adequate remedy at law that would prevent relators from pursuing
mandamus relief.  
A mandamus action is a special
proceeding used to compel a government official to perform a legal duty.  ORS
34.110.  The only party that a relator must join in a mandamus proceeding is
the government official with the alleged duty of performance.  ORS 34.130(2).  A
declaratory judgment action, on the other hand, is an action to declare "rights,
status, and other legal relations."  ORS 28.010.  A plaintiff in a
declaratory judgment proceeding must join all parties who claim an interest
that would be affected by the declaration.  ORS 28.110.  We acknowledge that a
declaratory judgment may achieve a similar result to a writ of mandamus in
certain cases.  In this case, however, a declaratory judgment action is neither
a plain nor adequate alternative to a mandamus proceeding for compelling the
Governor to perform his official duty with regard to the gaming compact.(10)
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.  The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.  
1. ORCP
29 A provides:
"A
person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in that person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties, or (2) that person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition in that person's
absence may (a) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to
protect that interest or (b) leave any of the persons already parties subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of their claimed interest. If such person has not been so
joined, the court shall order that such person be made a party.  If a person
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, such person shall be made a
defendant, the reason being stated in the complaint."
2. ORS
190.110(1) provides:  
"In performing a duty imposed upon it, in
exercising a power conferred upon it or in administering a policy or program
delegated to it, a unit of local government or a state agency of this state may
cooperate for any lawful purpose, by agreement or otherwise, with a unit of
local government or a state agency of this or another state, or with the United
States, or with a United States governmental agency, or with an American Indian
tribe or an agency of an American Indian tribe.  This power includes power to
provide jointly for administrative officers."
3. Article
XV, section 4(12), states, "The Legislative Assembly has no power to
authorize, and shall prohibit, casinos from operation in the State of
Oregon." 
4. Article
III, section 1, provides:
"The powers of the Government shall be
divided into three seperate [sic] departments, the Legislative, the Executive,
including the administrative, and the Judicial; and no person charged with
official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the
functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided."
Article IV, section 1, provides, in
part:
"(1) The legislative power of the State,
except for the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people, is
vested in a Legislative Assembly, consisting of a Senate and a House of
Representatives."
Article V, section 10, provides:  
"[The Governor] shall take care that the
Laws be faithfully executed."
5. The
state does not assert that argument on review in this court.
6. We
do not imply that only those rules mentioned specifically in the mandamus
statute apply in mandamus proceedings.  Instead, we merely note that the
legislature could have referred to ORCP 29 A in the provisions of the mandamus
statute concerning intervention and parties had it intended that rule to apply
to mandamus actions.
7. Although
our task is to interpret the phrase "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy," we note that whether a declaratory judgment action is
sufficiently "speedy" is not at issue in this case.  Relators do not
argue that a declaratory judgment action is not a speedy remedy.  We therefore
focus on the meaning of the words "plain" and
"adequate."    
8. The
dictionary definition is consistent with that interpretation.  Plain means
obvious or clear.  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1729 (unabridged
ed 2002).  
9. The
dictionary defines adequate as sufficient.  Webster's at 25.
10. We
reserve for future decision whether a declaratory judgment action can, in other
circumstances, be a plain and adequate remedy at law.