Title: P. v. Avila

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 6/15/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S078664 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
JOSEPH AVILA, 
) 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CR-65127 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Defendant Joseph Avila was convicted of the first degree murders of Raul 
Moncada and Robert Navarro, and the attempted murder of David Montoya.  (Pen. 
Code,1 §§ 187, 189, 664.)  The jury also found true the multiple-murder special-
circumstance allegation, and allegations that the murders and attempted murder 
were willful, deliberate, and premeditated, defendant inflicted great bodily injury 
on Montoya, and defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon, i.e., a 
knife, in each crime.  (§190.2, subd. (a)(3), former § 664, subd. (1), now § 664, 
subd. (a), § 1192.7, subds. (c)(8), (23), § 12022, subd. (b), former § 12022.7, now 
§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)  It returned a death verdict, and the trial court entered a 
judgment of death.  This appeal is automatic.  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; § 1239, 
subd. (b).)  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment.   
                                            
1  All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated.   
 
2 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
In the early morning hours of Saturday, January 12, 1991, a group of friends 
including Raul Moncada, Robert (―Bobby‖) Navarro, David Montoya, Jeffrey 
Winn, Anthony Padilla, Manuel Moreno, Luis Robledo, Lawrence (―Larry‖) 
Casas, Anthony (―Tony‖) Pereira, and Ronald Cordova, were socializing in a 
parking lot in Riverside after cruising on Magnolia Boulevard.  They were 
unarmed, and had not consumed drugs or alcohol.  Pereira and Casas were talking 
with three young women they had met that evening, Evelyn Quintana, Pauline 
Mesa, and Joanie Olsen.   
Testimony from various eyewitnesses to the events at issue, including 
Montoya, Winn, Padilla, Moreno, Robledo, and Casas, and the testimony and prior 
statements of Quintana and Mesa, established the following.  
A dark-colored vehicle, identified by Moreno and Mesa as an Impala, pulled 
into the parking lot.  Defendant and one or two other men got out and walked 
toward the group of friends.  The men told at least two of the women to get in the 
car.  The women refused to leave, and defendant became irate.  Padilla heard 
Pereira say ―Carmelos,‖ which Padilla did not recognize, but assumed was a gang 
name.  Defendant said ―Crown Town‖ or ―Corona.‖  Pereira and Montoya briefly 
argued with defendant, and someone from defendant‘s group suggested they go 
―one-on-one.‖  Montoya said defendant was free to take the women, and said 
―[t]here‘s no big problem here.‖  The confrontation appeared to dissipate, and 
Montoya and his friends started toward their vehicles.   
At some point toward the end of the confrontation, defendant broke off from 
the group and went to Magnolia Boulevard.  Moreno testified he saw defendant 
reach inside the Impala, and ―grab something.‖  Moreno and several other 
 
3 
witnesses also observed defendant flag down someone in a different vehicle on the 
street.  That vehicle entered the parking lot, and defendant reached inside it.  He 
then ran behind bushes toward a Honda Prelude in which Montoya sat.  Defendant 
was carrying a large knife with an approximately six-inch blade.  Montoya started 
to roll up the passenger window.  Defendant grabbed the top of the window, 
shattering it.  Defendant stabbed at Montoya more than twenty times, cutting 
Montoya‘s bicep in half, and cutting his leg.  Montoya lay in the driver‘s seat, 
kicking with his feet out the window.  When defendant ran behind the Prelude, 
Montoya escaped out the passenger window, fearing that defendant would attack 
him from the driver‘s side of the vehicle.   
Defendant then ran to Moncada‘s red Ford Escort.  Defendant stabbed 
Moncada, who was standing outside the vehicle, in the heart, killing him.  He tried 
to open the door to Casas‘s vehicle, but it was locked, and the window closed.  
Defendant proceeded to the next vehicle, a black truck in which Navarro was 
sitting in the driver‘s seat.  He stabbed Navarro in the heart through the open truck 
window, killing him.  Defendant was apprehended more than four years later on 
September 19, 1995, at the Los Angeles International Airport.   
Two to three hours after the attacks, Mesa, Quintana, and Olsen were 
separately interviewed by police.  The interviews were tape recorded, and at trial 
played for the jury.  Mesa told police she saw ―Joey‖ stab all three victims, 
Quintana said ―Joey‖ broke ―Manuel‘s‖ car window and tried to ―stab the guy that 
got stabbed in the arm,‖ and Olsen said ―Joey‖ was the only one with a knife.  
Police showed the women a photograph of defendant; they each identified 
defendant as ―Joey.‖  At trial, Montoya identified defendant as his assailant, and 
Padilla testified defendant was the person who went to the passenger side of the 
 
4 
Prelude, and who attacked Moncada.2  Padilla, and Senior Investigator Clark from 
the Riverside County District Attorney‘s Office, testified that Padilla identified 
defendant in a pretrial photographic lineup.   
The examining pathologist testified that stab wounds on Moncada and 
Navarro were consistent with a knife that was approximately five inches in length 
and one inch wide.  Both murder victims had defensive wounds, and toxicology 
analysis of their blood did not show the presence of either alcohol or drugs.   
2.  Defense Evidence 
Defendant presented no evidence.   
 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
Guillermo Gonzalez Valencia testified that he befriended defendant, whom 
he knew as ―Jose,‖ in Mexico.  Gonzalez drove a tractor-trailer truck.  One 
evening at the end of December 1992, defendant was at Gonzalez‘s house, and 
started to roll a marijuana cigarette.  Gonzalez asked him to leave.  The next day, 
at around midnight, Gonzalez heard a noise outside his home.  When he 
investigated, he saw defendant and another man running away.  The tires on 
Gonzalez‘s tractor-trailer had been punctured.   
About six days after this incident, Gonzalez and his friend Guillermo Lopez 
Reynoza encountered defendant outside a church.  Gonzalez asked defendant why 
                                            
2  In addition, Robledo testified that the same person he saw ―sneaking up‖ 
to the Prelude with a knife also attacked Moncada and Navarro.  Casas testified 
that the same person who ran up to the Prelude also attacked Moncada and 
Navarro.  Winn testified that the same person attacked Montoya and Moncada, and 
then headed toward Navarro‘s vehicle.  Moreno testified that the same person 
attacked Montoya and Moncada.   
 
5 
he had cut Gonzalez‘s tires, and asked him to pay for the damage.  Defendant 
refused.  Gonzalez and defendant agreed they did not want to fight.  Defendant 
took out a pencil from his back pocket.  As he did so, Gonzalez said, ―I didn‘t 
come to fight.‖  Defendant reassured Gonzalez it was only a pencil.  Defendant 
then discarded the pencil, pulled out a four-to-six-inch knife, and stabbed 
Gonzalez and Lopez.  Gonzalez was hospitalized for about 10 days, required 
surgery to repair his spleen, and was unable to work for three months.  Lopez was 
hospitalized for nearly two months, and was unable to work for about four months.   
Navarro‘s parents and sister testified regarding his altruism, gregariousness, 
and mechanical ability.  Moncada‘s mother, sister, and cousin testified regarding 
his kindness, maturity, and artistic talent, and his eager anticipation of leaving on a 
mission for The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints later that year.  
Montoya testified regarding the effect the murders had on him and the victims‘ 
other friends.   
 
2.  Defense evidence 
Rosalinda Recendez Corona, defendant‘s mother, testified that defendant was 
born July 12, 1969, when Rosalinda was about 22.  She had four sons, the oldest 
of whom was murdered after the capital crime.  Rosalinda confessed she had not 
been affectionate with defendant and lacked parenting skills.  She beat her 
children ―like animals‖ in order to discipline them.  Rosalinda worked several jobs 
in order to support the family.  Relatives assisted in raising her children.   
Defendant‘s father, Edward Avila, was often incarcerated, and the 
relationship between defendant‘s parents ended after three years.  Edward beat 
Rosalinda, and ―probably‖ did so when she was pregnant with defendant.  The 
family moved frequently until defendant was about four years old.   
 
6 
When defendant was about four years old, he was caught in the axle of a 
vehicle and dragged down the street.  He was bruised all over his body, but had no 
serious injuries.   
Also when defendant was about four years old, Rosalinda began a 
relationship and at some point had a son with Manuel Diaz.  For several years, 
Diaz lived with Rosalinda and her family.  Diaz used heroin, beat Rosalinda, and 
was incarcerated more than once.  He had no relationship with defendant.  
Rosalinda‘s relationship with Diaz ended in the late 1970‘s or early 1980‘s.   
When defendant was about five or six years old, his father Edward began 
visiting him and taking him to amusement parks and other locations.   
When defendant was about seven years old, Rosalinda met and eventually 
married Michael Corona.  This relationship lasted approximately 10 years.  
Michael used and sold heroin, and was not affectionate to defendant.   
In 1982, when defendant was in junior high school, Rosalinda had a son with 
Raymond Salgado.  Salgado used heroin and studied the occult, including 
Satanism.  Once after an argument between Rosalinda and Salgado, Salgado told 
defendant and his brother that if their mother did not come home, he was going to 
kill himself.  Salgado began cutting his arm with a knife.  The boys became 
hysterical, and ran to the location where their mother was staying.  Rosalinda 
called police, who removed Salgado in a straightjacket.  The boys helped 
Rosalinda clean up the pieces of flesh and blood.  On another occasion, Salgado 
slit his stomach open in front of the boys.  Rosalinda was not certain, however, 
whether defendant witnessed this event.  Although Rosalinda obtained a 
restraining order against Salgado, he continued to ―torment[]‖ them, causing 
Rosalinda to move her children from Madero to Corona.   
Rosalinda suffered from nervous breakdowns and used prescription sedatives 
and stimulants before and after defendant was born.  In the 1980‘s, when her 
 
7 
doctor ceased prescribing these medications, she became addicted to heroin for 
about five years.  She also used cocaine and methadone.  She became unable to 
work, and sold heroin and cocaine to support her habit.  In 1983 or 1984, when 
defendant was about 15, she was incarcerated for 14 months for a drug-related 
offense.  After she was released, she began using drugs again.  Rosalinda did not 
know with whom defendant lived while she was incarcerated.  In 1990, Rosalinda 
became paralyzed, and was then able to end her drug addiction.   
Defendant had no unusual medical conditions or learning disabilities growing 
up.  Rosalinda testified he was a good child.  She had no recollection of how he 
performed in school.  It was ―[t]otally out of his character to be violent.‖  
Rosalinda loved defendant and wanted him to live.   
Defendant also presented the testimony of individuals he met in Mexico.  
Juanito Aguirre and his mother, Emilia Dedios, testified about defendant‘s 
kindness toward him.  Juanito had cerebral paralysis, and was confined to a 
wheelchair.  Defendant cooked meals for him, and took him out to eat and for 
walks in the park or downtown.  Juanito testified that defendant was ―like a 
brother to me.‖  Defendant did not tell Juanito he was in Mexico to avoid 
apprehension for murder.   
Jose Gregorio Jimenez Quintero testified that defendant worked for him in 
Mexico for approximately one month on a remodeling project for the military.  
Defendant was one of the best workers Jose ever had, and was respected by his 
coworkers.  Defendant also was generous with Jose and others.   
In 1993, Julian Jimenez Villa was the director of a rehabilitation center in 
Mazatlan.  Defendant participated in a voluntary rehabilitation program in which 
he committed to ―find Christ‖ and try to change who he was.  After three months, 
Julian saw a change in defendant.  He assisted newcomers to the center, studied 
scripture, and discussed his spiritual experience with people living on the street.  
 
8 
Defendant became a counselor at the center, and performed well in this position.  
Julian did not know defendant was hiding in Mexico because he was wanted for 
two murders in the United States.   
Maria Louisa Carajal Moreles knew defendant when he was active in the 
church connected with the Mazatlan rehabilitation center.  Defendant gave Maria‘s 
mother hope that her own son, Maria‘s brother, would change and stop using 
drugs.  Maria‘s brother did change, and was now an attorney.   
3.  Rebuttal Evidence 
Frank Lira testified he was housed in the same area as defendant in the 
Riverside County jail from 1995-1997.  Defendant and several others physically 
assaulted other inmates; on one occasion they beat another inmate and took his 
commissary card.  Once, after defendant and others had beaten an inmate, 
defendant told Lira he ―just had to relieve some stress.‖   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Phase Issues 
 
1.  Denial of Keenan Counsel and Removal of Counsel 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint Keenan 
counsel, refusing to grant a reasonable continuance, and removing his counsel of 
choice, in violation of various constitutional rights.3  (Keenan v. Superior Court 
                                            
 
3  As to this, and almost every other appellate claim, defendant contends the 
alleged error infringed his constitutional rights.  In those instances where he did 
not present constitutional theories below, it appears that either (1) the appellate 
claim is one that required no objection to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments are 
based on factual or legal standards no different from those the trial court was 
asked to apply, but raise the additional legal consequence of violating the 
Constitution.  ―To that extent, defendant‘s new constitutional arguments are not 
forfeited on appeal.‖  (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.)  No 
separate constitutional discussion is required, or provided, when rejection of a 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
9 
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 430 (Keenan) [trial court has discretion under statutes 
governing appointment of counsel to appoint a second defense attorney to assist in 
defense of a capital case].)  We disagree.  
a.  Factual Background 
The capital crimes occurred on January 12, 1991.  Defendant was 
apprehended on September 19, 1995, and initially represented by the Riverside 
County Public Defender.  On June 21, 1996, after receiving numerous 
continuances of the preliminary hearing, the public defender declared a conflict, 
and was removed as counsel.  The criminal defense panel was appointed, and the 
case was assigned to John Aquilina.  The preliminary hearing was held on October 
24, 1996, and defendant was arraigned in superior court on December 19, 1996.  
In December 1997, the parties agreed on an April 6, 1998 trial date, and trial was 
set for that date.   
On March 5, 1998, Aquilina informed the court that he was not ready to 
proceed to trial.  He explained that he was assigned to two other cases, one of 
which, Hartsch, was ready to proceed to trial, and the other, Lee, nearly ready.  
Aquilina stated that earlier that week, the criminal defense panel had attempted to 
reassign the case to a different attorney who was more available, but that ―fell 
through the cracks.‖   
The prosecutor strongly objected to both ―protracted delay‖ of the trial date 
past May 1998, and reassignment of the case to different counsel.  He noted that 
he had grave concerns about the availability of one of his witnesses, a victim‘s 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
claim on the merits necessarily leads to rejection of any constitutional theory or 
―gloss‖ raised for the first time here.  (Ibid.)   
 
10 
parent, who had cancer.  He also noted that the case had previously been assigned 
to different counsel.  Aquilina stated that ―the reason for the attempt to re-assign 
this matter was to speed up the case, not to delay matters.‖  The court responded 
that its ―experience, unfortunately, has been that when that happens, it usually has 
the opposite effect.‖  At a subsequent hearing, the trial date was moved to April 
13, 1998.   
On April 7, 1998, defendant filed a motion to continue the trial to a date after 
May 1, 1999, or more than eight years after the capital crimes occurred.  (§ 1050.)  
In a declaration filed in support of the motion, counsel declared that based on his 
lack of investigation and preparation, he would not be ready for trial for at least 12 
months.  His efforts to obtain second counsel, or to have the case reassigned to 
counsel who would be ready for trial before May 1999, had been unsuccessful.   
At the April 9, 1998 hearing on the motion to continue, Aquilina stated that 
the prosecutor only recently had started to object to defense requests for a 
continuance or insist that the matter proceed to trial.  He also said that he 
organized his capital caseload by working on each case in the order in which it 
was assigned to him.  He received the assignment in Hartsch first, Lee second, and 
this case third, and had worked on them in that order.  He found it ―impossible to 
work on more than one and one-half of these capital cases at any one time.‖  As a 
result, he had ―devoted [his] full attention to the Hartsch matter, partial attention to 
the Lee matter, and very little, if any, attention to the Avila matter.‖  He suggested 
that if the court wanted to discuss the Avila investigation with him, that discussion 
should occur in camera.  The hearing continued in open court.   
The court inquired how long a delay would occur if the case was assigned to 
someone else on the criminal defense panel.  Aquilina stated that it was his 
understanding that each panel attorney was already assigned at least two capital 
cases set for trial.  He further noted that this caseload made it difficult for the 
 
11 
attorneys to act as second counsel for each other‘s cases.  He said that if he were 
able to devote his full-time attention to defendant‘s case, it was ―possible that the 
matter might be able to proceed to trial later this year.‖   
The court acknowledged Aquilina was busy.  It also stated that ―the People 
have a point . . . . [Y]ou‘re representing to me here . . . . [that] you can‘t even 
begin to think about getting ready for this case until you‘ve taken care of, in large 
measure, those other two cases; that you need at least a year, on top of all the time 
you‘ve already had, and on top of the public defender‘s rather large amount of 
time before they were relieved. . . . [T]hese crimes occurred in 1991.‖  While 
defendant‘s absence from the jurisdiction contributed to the delay, the court stated 
it nevertheless had to consider the date of the crimes when ―evaluating the 
problems that the People encounter and the victim‘s family‘s issues.‖  The court 
stated that it needed to know if there was anyone on the panel who could work on 
the case right away, and how soon that person would be ready.  The court was 
concerned that ―if we find somebody else to take over for you, it will make it go 
even longer than if we left it in your hands . . . .‖  Aquilina responded, and the 
court agreed, that the delay ―also obviously affects the defendant.‖   
The court then heard from Mr. Finn, who apparently assisted in running the 
criminal defense panel.  Finn described the panel‘s staffing and workload 
challenges, and then stated: ―[T]he answer to the Court is simply, no, not within 
our current people and within our current budget can we reassign this case.‖   
After further colloquy between the court and Finn, the court stated, ―From 
what you‘re telling me, I essentially only have two options here.  I leave it with 
Mr. Aquilina and give him something approaching the time he says he wants, or 
we relieve Mr. Aquilina and appoint private counsel.‖  The court stated that if 
private counsel were appointed, it had ―no idea whether they can be ready any 
sooner than Mr. Aquilina can be.  If we leave him on the case, at least he has the 
 
12 
advantage of familiarity with the case and the defendant . . . .‖  The court 
subsequently stated that it needed to find out if anyone was available to take over 
the case ―and be ready any faster than Mr. Aquilina can.  And I need to find that 
out before I can make a decision.‖   
The prosecutor stated that the delay was ―working a great injustice‖ to the 
victims‘ families, and that it was ―incumbent upon the Court to . . . find competent 
counsel.‖  He noted defendant‘s case was not ―complicated,‖ and mentioned other 
cases in which counsel had been obtained outside the criminal defense panel.   
After further argument by the prosecutor, and by the apparent prosecutor in 
the Hartsch case, Aquilina observed that one factor for the court to consider in 
determining whether to change counsel was ―whether the defendant consents to a 
change of counsel or objects.‖  The court inquired of defendant whether he would 
like the court to relieve Aquilina and attempt to find someone who could get to 
trial faster, or retain Aquilina, ―hoping he can get to trial as fast as he can in light 
of his heavy caseload of complex homicides and death penalty cases.‖  Defendant 
answered, ―I would like to keep Mr. Aquilina.‖  The court asked, ―Even if it 
means going for a year or more waiting to get to trial?‖  Defendant said, ―Yes.‖   
The court inquired of Aquilina whether appointment of second counsel 
would assist him in getting to trial any faster.  Aquilina responded, ―Obviously 
second counsel would help.‖  The court said, ―Let‘s assume for argument‘s sake 
that you had a second attorney to assist you on this case, not because it‘s a 
complex case, but in order to assist you to get it to trial faster. . . . ―[A]ssuming the 
case was prepared and ready with Keenan counsel, what‘s the earliest you could 
be available?‖  Aquilina responded, ―[W]ith one proviso, I believe January [1999], 
because the Lee matter . . . would probably go some time in November or 
December.  Although yesterday I heard Lee may not go until January.‖  Aquilina 
anticipated Hartsch would be tried in July 1998.  Aquilina stressed that while he 
 
13 
would be physically available to try defendant‘s case, he did not know ―of any 
defense counsel that has tried three capital cases in a 12-month period,‖ and he 
was disinclined to be the first to do so.  The court then inquired whether if Hartsch 
was tried in July 1998, and Lee tried in January 1999, Aquilina could, with ―extra 
help,‖ be ready to try defendant‘s case between these trials, by October 1998.  
Aquilina responded, ―[I]t‘s possible.‖   
The court vacated the April 13, 1998 trial date, and the matter was put over 
so the court could research what attorneys might be available.   
On April 13, 1998, the trial court made findings on the record.  In particular, 
it found that Aquilina ―has had a reasonable time to prepare the case, and that due 
to his . . . heavy caseload and matters beyond his control, he‘s functionally 
unavailable to try the case, under Penal Code [s]ection 987.05.  So as soon as 
private counsel can be found, I‘m going to ask Mr. Aquilina to turn over all his 
discovery to new counsel‖ and return any public funds received for preparation of 
the case.  Aquilina did not object.  The court noted that a new attorney had not yet 
been located and scheduled a hearing in two days.   
At the April 15, 1998 hearing, the court informed the parties that Bruce 
Cormicle was available to take the case and give it ―top priority.‖  The court 
requested Aquilina bring all of his discovery to a hearing on April 17, 1998.  
Aquilina agreed, and again made no objection to the replacement of counsel.  On 
April 17, 1998, Cormicle appeared, confirmed he was available, and stated he 
anticipated he would be ready for trial in less than 13 months.  Aquilina was 
relieved and turned over his discovery, again without objection.   
b.  Analysis 
Defendant contends that Aquilina ―was removed over the objection of both 
Mr. Aquilina and [defendant] on the request of the prosecutor when Mr. Aquilina 
 
14 
requested a five-month continuance with the assistance of Keenan counsel or a 12-
month continuance if he tried the case alone.‖  As the above factual recitation 
demonstrates, while defendant stated he would rather keep Aquilina and delay trial 
than obtain new counsel and go to trial more quickly, no objection was made 
either when the court found that Aquilina should be removed, or when he was 
actually removed.   
Moreover, contrary to defendant‘s assertion, Aquilina never moved for 
Keenan counsel.  Under section 987, subdivision (d), the court may appoint a 
second attorney in a capital case ―upon a written request of the first attorney 
appointed.  The request shall be supported by an affidavit of the first attorney 
setting forth in detail the reasons why a second attorney should be appointed.‖  No 
such written request was made in this case.  Nor did Aquilina orally request 
second counsel.  Rather, the possibility of Keenan counsel was simply discussed 
by Aquilina and the court as one option to accelerate the trial date.  Indeed, 
Aquilina stressed to the court that while he might be physically available sooner 
with the appointment of Keenan counsel, he knew of no one who had tried three 
capital cases in a 12-month period, and he was disinclined to be the first.  Hence, 
because Aquilina did not request Keenan counsel, the trial court never ruled on 
such a request.   
Nor, contrary to defendant‘s assertion, did the trial court err in denying 
Aquilina‘s request for a continuance of at least 12 months, and removing him as 
defense counsel.  ― ‗A court may remove appointed counsel both to ―prevent 
substantial impairment of court proceedings‖ [citation] and when counsel, without 
good cause, does not become ready for trial (§ 987.05).‘  (People v. Cole (2004) 
33 Cal.4th 1158, 1188.)  A trial court‘s removal of appointed counsel for an 
indigent defendant is reviewed for abuse of discretion.‖  (People v. Mungia (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 1101, 1119.)   
 
15 
As noted above, defendant did not object to the removal of counsel, and the 
claim is therefore forfeited.  Indeed, Aquilina had on his own initiative 
investigated whether another panel attorney could take over defendant‘s case.   
Nor, on the merits, is any abuse of discretion demonstrated.  Under section 
987.05, ―[i]n cases where counsel, after making representations that he or she will 
be ready for . . . trial, and without good cause is not ready on the date set, the court 
may relieve counsel from the case . . . .‖  Here, the parties agreed on an April 6, 
1998 trial date, an agreement that implied counsel expected to be ready on that 
date.  Section 987.05 further provides that in establishing a reasonable time to 
prepare for trial, a trial court ―shall not consider counsel‘s convenience, counsel‘s 
calendar conflicts, or counsel‘s other business.‖  It seems appropriate to similarly 
exclude these factors in determining whether counsel has shown good cause for 
his lack of readiness for trial.  Here, the only reason cited by Aquilina for his lack 
of readiness in April 1998, and need for a minimum 12-month continuance, was 
his competing capital caseload.   
The trial court also properly removed counsel to prevent substantial 
impairment of the court proceedings.  (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 
p. 1188.)  The capital crimes occurred in January 1991, defendant was not 
apprehended until September 1995 because he fled the jurisdiction, the public 
defender who first represented defendant sought continuances of the preliminary 
hearing for nearly a year before being conflicted out, and Aquilina, once 
appointed, did little work on the case for nearly two years, and then sought to 
delay trial for at least another year.  Indeed, Aquilina sought to continue the trial to 
a date ―after May 1, 1999.‖  Aquilina thus gave no assurance he would be 
prepared for trial on May 2, 1999, but rather only represented that he would be 
ready at some indeterminate point after a year had passed.  In addition, a 
prosecution witness was battling cancer.  While defendant expressed a preference 
 
16 
for retaining Aquilina, that factor is not dispositive.  (People v. Mungia, supra, 44 
Cal.4th at p. 1124.)  The ― ‗essential aim ―is to guarantee ‗an effective advocate 
for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably 
be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.‘ ‖ ‘ ‖  (Ibid.)4   
Nor, contrary to defendant‘s assertion, did the trial court err in failing to hold 
an in camera hearing on Aquilina‘s defense investigation.  While Aquilina stated 
he did not feel comfortable discussing the details of the defense investigation in 
open court, he never requested a hearing.  Nor was one necessary.  Contrary to 
defendant‘s assertion, Aquilina never ―made an offer of proof that a thorough 
investigation was underway.‖  Rather, counsel represented that, following the 
preliminary hearing, he had done little work on the case and would not be ready 
for trial for over a year because of competing capital case assignments.  These 
were the pertinent facts the trial court considered in determining whether to 
remove Aquilina.  
Defendant asserts he ―is aware of no other capital case where defense counsel 
was removed over the objection of both defense counsel and the defendant on the 
motion of the prosecutor.‖  As noted above, there was no objection, and 
defendant‘s stated preference for Aquilina was not dispositive in determining 
whether defense counsel should be removed.   
Finally, defendant claims judicial bias in the court‘s comments and removal 
of Aquilina.  We have rejected defendant‘s claims the trial court erred in failing to 
appoint Keenan counsel and in removing Aquilina as defense counsel, and our 
review of the court‘s challenged comments reveals no error, let alone evidence of 
                                            
 
4  For the reasons we conclude the trial court acted properly in removing 
Aquilina, there was also no error in denying the motion to continue trial to a date 
after May 1, 1999.   
 
17 
bias.  Moreover, ―a trial court‘s numerous rulings against a party – even when 
erroneous – do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are 
subject to review.‖  (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112.)  Defendant 
fails to demonstrate any judicial misconduct or bias, let alone misconduct or bias 
that was ―so prejudicial that it deprived defendant of ‗ ―a fair, as opposed to a 
perfect, trial.‖ ‘ ‖  (Ibid.) 
2.  Denial of Motion to Exclude Identification Evidence 
Defendant claims that Montoya‘s and Padilla‘s pretrial and in-court 
identifications were tainted by unduly suggestive procedures in violation of his 
right to due process and a fair trial.  Not so.   
a.  Factual background 
On June 14, 1996, Investigator Clark met separately with Padilla and 
Montoya.  In recorded interviews, he discussed at length the events on January 12, 
1991.  At the end of each interview, he showed them two photographic lineups.  
Lineup one contained defendant‘s photograph in the number two position.5  
Padilla identified defendant, and Montoya selected two photographs from lineup 
one, one of which was defendant, and two photographs from lineup two.6   
                                            
 
5  Before examining the lineups, both Montoya and Padilla read and signed 
an admonition that provided:  ―You will be shown a photographic lineup by the 
Riverside County District Attorney‘s Office.  When you examine the photographs, 
please keep in mind that people may or may not alter their appearance while 
committing a crime.  You are under no obligation to identify anyone from this 
photographic lineup and the mere fact that the Riverside County District 
Attorney‘s Office is showing these photographs in no way means that a 
photograph of the person(s) responsible for the crime is/are present.‖   
 
6  At trial, Montoya identified defendant as his assailant and testified 
regarding his uncertainty during the pretrial photographic lineup.  Padilla 
identified defendant as the person who went to the passenger side of the Prelude, 
and who attacked Moncada, and testified regarding his pretrial photographic 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
18 
At a hearing on defendant‘s motion to exclude Montoya‘s and Padilla‘s 
identifications of defendant at trial, Montoya, Padilla, and Investigator Clark 
testified.  As relevant here, Padilla testified that he gave police a description of the 
assailant the morning after the attacks.  He was not sure if he had been shown any 
photographs at that time, but thought ―maybe a series of photographs.‖  He was 
not sure, but did not think he had identified possible suspects from the 
photographs.  He did not recall to whom he spoke or whether the person was 
wearing a uniform, and could not describe the person, except to identify him as 
―male.‖   
Padilla testified he was also shown photographs at his apartment by Clark 
about a year or two before his current testimony.  Padilla was shown about 12 
photographs in two groups of six.  He identified one suspect, and was ―pretty 
certain‖ of his identification.   
Clark testified that he had only shown photographs to Montoya and Padilla 
on June 14, 1996.  He had never heard ―before today‖ that Padilla had been shown 
photographs on January 13 or 14, 1991.  Clark had both Montoya and Padilla read 
and sign the admonition form when he gave them the lineups to review.   
Defense counsel argued without elaboration that the lineup was unduly 
suggestive because defendant‘s photograph was ―distinctive as compared to and 
contrasted to the other individuals.‖  As an ―additional basis,‖ defense counsel 
asserted that Padilla was apparently shown photographs of possible suspects soon 
after the crimes, and these photographs were not preserved ―in any fashion.‖  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
lineup identification of defendant.  Investigator Clark testified regarding 
Montoya‘s and Padilla‘s selections during the photographic lineup.   
 
19 
Counsel therefore argued that Padilla‘s trial identification should be excluded on 
due process grounds.  The prosecutor said that the People were unaware of any 
photographs that were shown to Padilla the night of the capital crimes or on 
January 14, 1991.  He ―had no reports reflecting that type of an interview, nor 
have I been made aware of any photo lineups that were ever shown to Mr. 
Padilla.‖   
The trial court found the lineups were not unduly suggestive given 
defendant‘s photograph was ―very, very similar to [photographs] two through six‖ 
on lineup one.  It observed that defense counsel had not identified as suggestive 
any particular characteristic of the lineup, and the court saw none.  It therefore 
denied the motion on that ground.  The court also found, based on the transcripts 
of the interviews and the hearing testimony, that Investigator Clark did nothing to 
suggest any photograph to either witness.  Rather, Clark had the witnesses read the 
standard admonition, and merely orally confirmed their identifications once made.  
Finally, the court found that Padilla‘s identification in 1996 was not tainted 
because there was no evidence that Padilla was shown defendant‘s photograph 
soon after the 1991 incident and failed to make an identification.  The court left 
open the possibility defendant could raise the issue again if evidence were found, 
but stated, ―I don‘t think the possibility that he was shown a series of photographs 
that he now can‘t recall, and in any event he doesn‘t think he made a[n] 
identification, is sufficient to taint the subsequent photo lineup or any‖ in-court 
identification.   
b.  Analysis 
―Due process requires the exclusion of identification testimony only if the 
identification procedures used were unnecessarily suggestive and, if so, the 
resulting identification was also unreliable.‖  (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 
 
20 
93, 123.)  The question is not whether there were differences between the lineup 
participants, but ―whether anything caused defendant to ‗stand out‘ from the others 
in a way that would suggest the witness should select him.‖  (People v. Carpenter 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 367.)  We independently review ―a trial court‘s ruling that 
a pretrial identification procedure was not unduly suggestive.‖  (People 
v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 609.)   
On appeal, defendant once again points to no particular characteristic of the 
participants in the photo lineups that he contends made the lineups impermissibly 
suggestive.  Nor does our independent review of the lineups reveal any suggestion 
of ― ‗the identity of the person suspected by the police.‘ ‖  (People v. Ochoa 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 413.)   
Rather, defendant contends Clark asked Montoya and Padilla leading 
questions.  Our review of the transcripts reveals no such suggestiveness in Clark‘s 
inquiries.  Both Montoya and Padilla were first admonished in writing that they 
were ―under no obligation to identify anyone from th[e] photographic lineup,‖ and 
―the mere fact that the Riverside County District Attorney‘s Office is showing 
these photographs in no way means that a photograph of the person(s) responsible 
for the crime is/are present.‖  Clark then told each witness that the person‘s 
appearance on the night of the incident might be different from the photograph, 
asked Padilla if he ―recognized anybody,‖ and asked Montoya if he saw the 
perpetrator.  He then confirmed which photographs they selected.   
Defendant further contends the lineups were unduly suggestive because the 
identifications occurred more than five and one-half years after the capital crimes.  
While this fact goes to the reliability of the identification, it does not affect a 
determination whether the lineup was unduly suggestive.  (People v. Kennedy, 
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 608.)  Because we have concluded the lineup was not 
 
21 
unduly suggestive, we need not consider whether it was reliable under the totality 
of the circumstances.  (Ibid.)   
Defendant also contends that the identification procedure was unduly 
suggestive because, while law enforcement may not have told Padilla and 
Montoya that they had evidence defendant committed the crimes, or that defendant 
was in custody, ―the only reasonable inference is that something about the case 
had changed after over five years of inaction‖ on the part of police.  Of course, 
―[a]nyone asked to view a lineup would naturally assume the police had a 
suspect.‖  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 368.)  This circumstance 
does not render the lineup unduly suggestive.  (Ibid.)   
Defendant contends that Montoya‘s preliminary hearing testimony, which 
occurred several months after the photographic lineup, demonstrates the 
identification process was unduly suggestive.  In particular, defendant claims 
Montoya testified he was shown photographs of defendant by the district attorney 
at the time the preliminary hearing was formerly scheduled to be held, and was 
then postponed, and that Montoya believed he identified defendant in those 
photographs.  This assertion misstates the record.  Montoya actually testified that 
the first time he saw defendant after the capital crimes ―was the first preliminary 
hearing that should have been in June or July.‖  There was no testimony about 
viewing photographs at this earlier proceeding.  Rather, Montoya testified that in 
June 1996, Investigator Clark showed him photographs.  Montoya recalled that 
after viewing the photographs, he saw defendant in court.   
Defendant further contends the trial court improperly required the defense to 
prove the lineup evidence was tainted.  Defendant does bear the burden of 
demonstrating the identification procedure was unduly suggestive.  (People 
v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1164; Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 413; 
People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1222.)  In addition, and also contrary to 
 
22 
defendant‘s claim, Padilla did not testify that he was shown photographs on the 
night of the crime and could not identify defendant.  Rather, Padilla said he was 
not certain whether he was shown photographs and, while he was unsure, did not 
think he had identified anyone.  Investigator Clark testified he was unaware 
Padilla had ever been shown photographs in January 1991.   
Defendant further contends without elaboration that because several 
prospective jurors and Pauline Mesa were exposed to pretrial publicity, trial 
counsel was ineffective in failing to ―renew his motion to exclude the eye-witness 
identification once he was clearly aware of the pre-trial publicity without inquiring 
as to whether a photograph was published in any of these articles.‖  While his 
claim is not entirely clear, to the extent he claims Montoya and Padilla might have 
seen a media photograph of defendant before the photographic lineup, he cites 
nothing in the record that would support this assertion, nor how this factor would 
affect our determination that the lineup itself was not unduly suggestive.  For these 
same reasons, he fails to demonstrate any basis on which to conclude trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to renew the motion to exclude Montoya‘s and Padilla‘s 
identifications of defendant following Mesa‘s trial testimony.   
Defendant contends that the trial court demonstrated judicial bias by 
(1) asking Clark whether he read the admonition to Montoya and Padilla or asked 
them to read it to themselves, but not asking questions that assisted defendant such 
as why the prosecution waited more than five years to conduct the lineup, why 
only Montoya and Padilla were asked to participate, and whether the witnesses 
were exposed to any pretrial publicity; and (2) ―trust[ing] the prosecutor‘s 
unsworn testimony over Padilla‘s sworn testimony that he had been previously 
shown photographs of a suspect and was unable to make an identification.‖  Not 
so.  The court acted properly in asking for clarification regarding the admonition 
procedure, which was ambiguous in the transcript of Clark‘s interview with 
 
23 
Padilla.  In addition, the questions defendant now claims the trial court should also 
have asked were irrelevant to a determination of whether the identification 
procedure was unduly suggestive.  We have rejected above defendant‘s claim that 
there was any definitive testimony that Padilla was shown photographs by law 
enforcement in January 1991, and failed to identify a suspect.  Once again, a ―trial 
court‘s numerous rulings against a party – even when erroneous – do not establish 
a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review.‖  (People v. 
Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1112.)  Defendant fails to demonstrate any judicial 
misconduct or bias, let alone misconduct or bias that ―was so prejudicial that it 
deprived defendant of ‗ ―a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.‖ ‘ ‖  (Ibid.) 
3.  Sufficiency of the Evidence of Intent to Kill Montoya  
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence he intended to kill 
Montoya, requiring reversal of his attempted murder conviction.  Not so.   
―When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment 
to determine whether it contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is 
reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of fact 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  (People v. Lindberg 
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)  We determine ―whether, after viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  (Jackson v. 
Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.)  In so doing, a reviewing court ―presumes in 
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably 
deduce from the evidence.‖  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)  ―This 
standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved.‖  (People 
v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139.)  ―[I]t is well settled that intent to kill or 
 
24 
express malice, the mental state required to convict a defendant of attempted 
murder, may . . . be inferred from the defendant‘s acts and the circumstances of 
the crime.‖  (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741.)   
Here, defendant repeatedly attempted to stab Montoya, an unarmed and 
trapped victim, and succeeded in stabbing him in the arm and leg.  This evidence 
alone is substantial evidence of defendant‘s intent to kill.  (People v. Gonzalez 
(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552 [intent to kill demonstrated in part by 
evidence of unprovoked attack that rendered unarmed victim prone and 
defenseless as the defendant repeatedly stabbed him].)  In addition, defendant then 
fatally stabbed Moncada and Navarro, who were members of Montoya‘s group, 
inflicting wounds that were, respectively, approximately four and five inches deep  
and that penetrated their hearts.  (See People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 561 
[―defendant could have had no other intent than to kill‖ when he plunged the knife 
deeply into a ―vital area of the body of an apparently unsuspecting and defenseless 
victim‖]; see also People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1253 [similarities 
between murders support the inference that defendant went to the victim‘s home 
―armed with a knife and with the intent to kill‖].)  The jury convicted defendant of 
first degree murder for these deaths based on a theory of premeditation, and 
reasonably could have inferred defendant had the same intent to kill when, 
immediately prior to the murders, he attacked Montoya in the same manner.7   
                                            
 
7  Defendant claims the evidence of intent to kill in this case is no stronger 
than in People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 695-696, 698.  However, as we 
explained in People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, in Ratliff, we simply held that 
the ―evidence of intent to kill was not so conclusive as to render harmless an 
erroneous failure to instruct on that issue.‖  (Arias, at pp. 129-130, fn. 10.)  Here, 
the jury was instructed that to convict defendant of Montoya‘s attempted murder, 
it had to find defendant acted with the intent to kill.  Substantial evidence supports 
that determination.   
 
25 
Defendant asserts that the evidence of intent to kill is not substantial because 
the injury to Montoya was not serious.  Of course, the degree of the resulting 
injury is not dispositive of defendant‘s intent.  Indeed, a defendant may properly 
be convicted of attempted murder when no injury results.  (See People v. Stone 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 135-136.)  The jury reasonably could infer that Montoya 
avoided further injury solely because he assumed a position from which he could 
kick at defendant and thus protect his vital organs from immediate injury.  (People 
v. Gonzalez, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1552 [that the defendant missed the 
victim‘s ―heart and lungs was fortuitous rather than indicative of the absence of an 
intent to kill‖]; People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945 [that ―the victim 
may have escaped death‖ due to ―poor marksmanship‖ does not vitiate intent to 
kill].)   
Defendant also contends ―there was a reasonable alternative explanation 
other than the intent to kill,‖ because he may have merely wanted to ―prevent 
Moreno from driving away with Quintana,‖ or perhaps simply was ―following 
through with Montoya‘s acceptance of a challenge to engage him in a fight.‖  It is 
not clear how these motivations would be inconsistent with an intent to kill.  
(People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 162 [if ―jury found defendant‘s use of a 
lethal weapon with lethal force was purposeful, an intent to kill could be inferred, 
even if the act was done without advance consideration and only to eliminate a 
momentary obstacle or annoyance‖].)  Even assuming they are inconsistent with 
such intent, ―if the circumstances reasonably justify the jury‘s findings, the 
judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also 
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.‖  (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 107, 143.)  
 
26 
4.  Sufficiency of the Evidence Defendant Stabbed Navarro  
Defendant contends the record contains insufficient evidence he stabbed 
Navarro, necessitating that we vacate his murder conviction and the multiple-
murder special-circumstance finding.  The conviction was supported by substantial 
evidence.   
In her January 12, 1991 taped statement to police, which was played for the 
jury, Pauline Mesa recounted seeing defendant, with whom she was acquainted, 
stab a man in a truck.  The victim in the truck was Navarro.   
Lawrence Casas testified that ―the guy,‖ identified by other witnesses as 
defendant, approached Navarro‘s truck in which Navarro was sitting in the 
driver‘s seat with his window open.  Defendant was carrying a knife with a blade 
at least six inches long.  Casas saw defendant reach into Navarro‘s window or 
doorway and struggle ―back and forth.‖   
Luis Robledo testified that he also saw the assailant, who was the same 
person who attacked Montoya and Moncada, and who was identified by others as 
defendant, go towards the truck after attacking Moncada.  Robledo saw defendant 
make stabbing motions at Navarro through the open truck window.   
This testimony constitutes substantial evidence that defendant stabbed 
Navarro.  Absent exceptions not pertinent here, ―the testimony of a single witness 
is sufficient for the proof of any fact.‖  (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
959, 1030; see People v. Najera (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1132, 1136-1137.)  Contrary to 
defendant‘s implication, lighting conditions on the night of the crimes, 
inconsistencies within certain testimony or with prior statements, differences 
between the witnesses‘ estimates of defendant‘s height and his actual height, and 
whether defendant could physically complete the crimes in the time and manner 
described by certain witnesses, were matters for the jury to determine.   
 
27 
5.  Instructional Issues 
a.  Requested instructions on voluntary manslaughter, attempted 
voluntary manslaughter, and the effect of provocation on 
defendant’s premeditation and deliberation 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on voluntary 
manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of 
murder and attempted murder, and failing to instruct that provocation was a 
circumstance reducing first degree murder to second degree murder.  We find no 
error.   
The jury was instructed that, in order to find defendant guilty of premeditated 
first degree murder or premeditated attempted murder, it must find an intent to kill 
on the part of defendant that ―was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so 
that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden 
heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation.‖  (CALJIC 
Nos. 8.20, 8.67.)  It was also instructed that ―cold, calculated judgment and 
decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and 
rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not deliberation and 
premeditation.‖  (CALJIC Nos. 8.20, 8.67.)  Second degree murder was defined as 
―the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when the 
perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is 
insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation.‖  (CALJIC No. 8.30.)  The 
jury was also instructed on assault with a deadly weapon as to Montoya.  The 
court refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter and related principles, 
including CALJIC Nos. 8.40 (defining voluntary manslaughter), 8.42 (defining a 
sudden quarrel or heat of passion and provocation), 8.43 (the effect of a cooling 
period), 8.44 (no particular emotion alone constitutes heat of passion), 8.50 
(distinguishing murder and manslaughter), 8.72 (defendant given the benefit of 
any reasonable doubt on whether the crime was murder or manslaughter), and 8.73 
 
28 
(jury may consider whether evidence of provocation not sufficient to reduce the 
homicide to manslaughter had any bearing on whether defendant killed with 
premeditation and deliberation).  (§ 192.)  
― ‗The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of 
law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, whether or not the defendant 
makes a formal request.‘ ‖  (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 866.)  
―Conversely, even on request, the court ‗has no duty to instruct on any lesser 
offense unless there is substantial evidence to support such instruction.‘ ‖  (People 
v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1215.)  This substantial evidence requirement is not 
satisfied by ― ‗any evidence . . . no matter how weak,‘ ‖ but rather by evidence 
from which a jury composed of reasonable persons could conclude ―that the lesser 
offense, but not the greater, was committed.‖  (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 
636, 664.)  ―On appeal, we review independently the question whether the trial 
court failed to instruct on a lesser included offense.‖  (People v. Cole, supra, at p. 
1215.) 
1.  Failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter and 
attempted voluntary manslaughter 
―Manslaughter, an unlawful killing without malice, is a lesser included 
offense of murder.‖  (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1086; see § 192.)  
―Although section 192, subdivision (a), refers to ‗sudden quarrel or heat of 
passion,‘ the factor which distinguishes the ‗heat of passion‘ form of voluntary 
manslaughter from murder is provocation.‖  (People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 
59; People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461 [certain mitigating circumstances 
will ―reduce an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary 
manslaughter ‗by negating the element of malice‘ ‖ (italics omitted)].)  ―The 
provocation which incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of 
passion must be caused by the victim [citation], or be conduct reasonably believed 
 
29 
by the defendant to have been engaged in by the victim.‖  (People v. Lee, supra, 
20 Cal.4th at p. 59.)  ―[T]he victim must taunt the defendant or otherwise initiate 
the provocation.‖  (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306; People v. 
Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583-584 (Manriquez).)  The ― ‗heat of passion 
must be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily 
reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances . . . .‘ ‖  (People v. 
Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252 (Steele).)  ― ‗[I]f sufficient time has elapsed 
for the passions of an ordinarily reasonable person to cool, the killing is murder, 
not manslaughter.‘ ‖  (People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 868.) 
Here, there is no substantial evidence of provocation.  The record indicates 
that the victims and their friends, who were not armed, were socializing in a 
parking lot, and that two of the friends, Pereira and Casas, were talking with three 
young women, Quintana, Mesa, and Olsen.  A dark-colored vehicle pulled into the 
parking lot.  Defendant and one or two other men got out and walked toward the 
group of friends.  The men told at least two of the women to get in the car.  The 
women refused to leave, and defendant became irate.  Padilla heard Pereira say 
―Carmelos,‖ which Padilla did not recognize, but assumed was a gang name.  
Defendant said ―Crown Town‖ or ―Corona.‖  Pereira and Montoya briefly argued 
with defendant, and someone from defendant‘s group suggested they go ―one-on-
one.‖  Montoya said defendant was free to take the women, and said ―[t]here‘s no 
big problem here.‖  The confrontation appeared to dissipate, and Montoya and his 
friends started toward their vehicles.  None of these events was sufficient ―to 
arouse feelings of homicidal rage or passion in an ordinarily reasonable person.‖  
(People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 250.)   
Defendant asserts, however, that there was sufficient evidence of provocation 
to warrant instruction on voluntary manslaughter because Pereira was the first one 
to confront defendant, making the victims and their friends the initial aggressors.  
 
30 
Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, Padilla did not so testify.  Rather, Padilla 
testified that as defendant and one or two others started walking toward everyone 
in the group of friends, Pereira ―was the first one to confront them or talk to 
them.‖  This is not evidence Pereira was initially aggressive.  Defendant also relies 
on Padilla‘s testimony that Pereira yelled out ―Carmelos.‖  Padilla had ―no idea‖ 
what this term meant, but assumed it was ―a gang . . . or something like that.‖  
Even assuming it was reference to a gang, and that a gang member might have 
perceived the statement as some sort of a challenge, the requisite provocation must 
be one that would provoke an ordinarily reasonable person.  (People v. Steele, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1252.)  Reasonable people do not become homicidally 
enraged when hearing the term ―Carmelos,‖ even if it is understood as a fleeting 
gang reference or challenge.  
Also contrary to defendant‘s assertion, there is no evidence that during this 
verbal confrontation, blows were exchanged.  Defendant asserts that victim 
―Montoya personally agreed to fight the Corona men.‖  He relies on Casas‘s 
testimony that one person from defendant‘s group said ―they wanted to fight . . . 
one-on-one with one of us, . . . which one of ‘em was man enough to fight him.‖  
Casas could not ―remember for sure,‖ but thought perhaps Montoya had 
responded, ―[A]ll right, you know, if you want.‖  Again, even assuming this 
response was made, it is scarcely a comment that would reasonably incite 
homicidal rage.  Defendant also asserts that Olsen testified ―there was a fight 
which began that could have included a fist fight prior to the stabbing.‖  Olsen was 
asked whether, while the conversation between the two groups occurred, anyone 
got ―into a fight where they were punching each other.‖  She responded, ―[I]t 
could have been . . . I can‘t actually say that I seen this person do anything, 
because I did not actually see anybody do anything.‖  This is not evidence of 
physical contact. 
 
31 
In sum, there was no substantial evidence of provocation to support voluntary 
manslaughter or attempted voluntary manslaughter instructions, and defendant‘s 
request for such instructions was therefore properly denied.  Nor, contrary to 
defendant's assertion, was the jury forced into an ―all or nothing‖ choice between 
murder and acquittal when the court refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter.  
(See Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 637; People v. Benavides (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 69, 103.)  ―[N]o fundamental unfairness or loss of verdict reliability results 
from the lack of instructions on a lesser included offense that is unsupported by 
any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rely.‖  (People v. 
Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 141.)  Moreover, the jury was instructed on 
second degree murder, and accordingly had a choice in evaluating defendant‘s 
culpability.  (Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 646-648 [second degree 
murder instruction sufficient to ensure verdict‘s reliability]; People v. Benavides, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 103.) 
2.  Provocation as reducing the degree of murder instructions 
In a related claim, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury on CALJIC Nos. 8.73 and 8.44, and that this error, combined with 
the prosecutor‘s misleading argument, was prejudicial.  As noted above, CALJIC 
No. 8.73 would have informed the jury that it could consider whether evidence of 
provocation not sufficient to reduce the homicide to manslaughter had any bearing 
on whether defendant killed with premeditation and deliberation.  CALJIC No. 
8.44 provides that ―the heat of passion referred to in the law of manslaughter‖ is 
composed of no particular emotion.   
There was no error in refusing to give these instructions.  We have previously 
held, in a case that like this one lacked substantial evidence of provocation, that 
the court was not required to sua sponte instruct in the language of CALJIC No. 
 
32 
8.73.  (People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1250-1251.)  ―Although the court 
did not use the word ‗provocation‘ in regard to the degree of murder, it did instruct 
on ‗heat of passion.‘  It told the jury that for the killing to be first degree murder, it 
must not have been committed ‗under a sudden heat of passion or other condition 
precluding the idea of deliberation.‘  (CALJIC No. 8.20.)  By specifically referring 
to heat of passion and generally referring to any other condition precluding 
deliberation, the court fully instructed on the law relevant to the actual evidence.  
It did not also have to refer to ‗provocation‘ regarding the degree of murder, which 
would not have fit the evidence.‖  (Id. at p. 1251.)  For these reasons, there was no 
error in failing to instruct in the language of CALJIC No. 8.73 on request or, as 
defendant suggests, to give this instruction as modified by deleting the reference to 
manslaughter.8  (Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1251 [rejecting claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to request CALJIC No. 8.73].) 
Similarly, because there was no substantial evidence defendant committed 
manslaughter, the trial court properly refused to instruct in the language of 
CALJIC No. 8.44, which refers to ―the law of manslaughter.‖  While defendant 
notes here that CALJIC No. 8.44 could have been modified to refer to ―the law of 
                                            
 
8  The Attorney General contends that defendant has forfeited the claim that 
the trial court should have modified CALJIC No. 8.73 by failing to request such 
modification below.  The record is unclear as to whether defendant made such a 
request and whether the trial court refused to modify.  After the trial court stated it 
would not instruct on CALJIC Nos. 8.72 and 8.73 because they were manslaughter 
instructions, the prosecutor asked the court for clarification as to CALJIC No. 
8.73, and whether it found ―insufficient evidence of any provocation to even 
warrant the reduction‖ of first degree murder to second degree murder.  Defense 
counsel said, ―The defense would ask for it.‖  The trial court responded, ―You‘d 
have to modify it and then go into provocation and so forth if you were going to 
use that to reduce it from first to second degree.  It really only goes if you give a 
manslaughter instruction.‖  Given this ambiguity, we address the claim on the 
merits.   
 
33 
premeditation, as defined in CALJIC No. 8.20,‖ rather than to manslaughter, he 
did not request this modification below, and the claim is therefore forfeited.  (See 
People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 757.)  Moreover, such a modified 
instruction was not necessary because, as noted above, the language of CALJIC 
No 8.20 adequately instructed the jury.  (People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 
1251.)   
Defendant contends the trial court evidenced bias by refusing instructions on 
voluntary manslaughter and instructions that would have allowed the jury to 
convict defendant of second degree rather than first degree murder.  Because the 
trial court properly declined to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, and adequately 
instructed on heat of passion as it related to defendant‘s premeditation and 
deliberation, no error, let alone bias, is demonstrated.   
b.  Instruction on lying in wait 
Defendant claims the trial court erred and demonstrated its bias when it 
instructed the jury on lying in wait as a basis for a finding of first degree murder.  
The prosecutor proceeded on two theories of first degree murder, lying in wait and 
premeditated murder.  The jury was instructed that if it found defendant guilty of 
first degree murder, and was unanimous on a theory or theories of murder, it was 
to specify on the verdict forms which theory or theories it chose.  As to both 
victims, the jury expressly found the murders were willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated, but did not find the murders were also by means of lying in wait.  
Therefore, even if the trial court erred in instructing on lying in wait, defendant 
suffered no possible prejudice.  Nor would the mere giving of an instruction 
demonstrate bias.  (See People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1112.)   
 
34 
c.  Instruction on Concealing Evidence 
Defendant contends the court erred and demonstrated its bias by instructing 
the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 2.06.9  Here, the evidence indicated that 
the perpetrator used a knife during the attacks.  The knife was not found at the 
murder scene.   
Defendant contends the ―evidence was insufficient to permit the inference 
that [defendant] hid or concealed evidence.‖  Even assuming error, there was no 
prejudice under any standard.  (People v. Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 
1020.)  The jury was also instructed that ―[w]hether some instructions apply will 
depend on what you find to be the facts.  Disregard any instruction which applies 
to facts determined by you not to exist.  Do not conclude that because an 
instruction has been given, I am expressing an opinion as to the facts.‖  We see no 
prejudice in light of these instructions.  (See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 
1044, 1153.)  Moreover, the instruction does not impermissibly lessen the 
prosecutor‘s burden of proof even when erroneously given.  (People v. Valdez 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 138-139.)  While we assume without deciding that giving 
the instruction was error, so instructing does not demonstrate judicial bias, nor, as 
defendant asserts, that ―the instructions were so one-sided in favor of the 
prosecutor, that a fair trial within the meaning of the federal Constitution was 
impossible.‖   
                                            
 
9  The jury was instructed:  ―If you find that a defendant attempted to 
suppress evidence against himself in any manner, such as by concealing evidence, 
this attempt may be considered by you as a circumstance tending to show a 
consciousness of guilt.  However, this conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove 
guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are for you to decide.‖   
 
35 
d.  Flight Instruction 
Defendant contends the flight instruction was improper under the 
circumstances of this case, and demonstrates judicial bias.  Not so.  
The court gave the jury the standard language of CALJIC No. 2.52.10  In 
general, a flight instruction ―is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant 
departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was 
motivated by a consciousness of guilt.‖  (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 
345; § 1127c.)  Flight requires ― ‗a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested.‘ ‖  
(People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 60.)   
Here, following the capital crimes, defendant fled the scene, and police 
searched unsuccessfully for him in 1991 and 1992.  He was ultimately arrested 
more than four years after the crimes at the Los Angeles International Airport.  
―This is sufficient evidence to warrant instructing the jury to determine whether 
flight occurred, and, if so, what weight to accord such flight.  [Citation.]  
Moreover, the instruction given adequately conveyed the concept that if flight was 
found, the jury was permitted to consider alternative explanations for that flight 
other than defendant‘s consciousness of guilt.‖  (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 
Cal.4th 1005, 1055.)  Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, the instruction properly 
allowed ―the jury to determine to which offenses, if any, the inference [of 
consciousness of guilt] should apply.‖  (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 
180.)  Likewise, and also contrary to defendant‘s assertion, a flight instruction 
does not create an unconstitutional permissive inference or lessen the prosecutor‘s 
                                            
 
10  ―The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or 
after he‘s accused of a crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a 
fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved 
facts in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty.  The weight to which 
this circumstance is entitled is a matter for you to decide.‖   
 
36 
burden of proof, and is proper even when identity is at issue.  (Id. at pp. 179-181; 
People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 942-943.)   
6.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in pervasive prejudicial 
misconduct.  Defendant did not object below to any of these portions of the 
argument or other challenged statements, no exception to the general requirement 
of an objection is applicable, and the claims are therefore forfeited.  (People v. 
Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 286 (Schmeck).)  They are also meritless.  A 
prosecutor commits misconduct when his conduct either infects the trial with such 
unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or 
involves deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the trier of 
fact.  (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 283-284.)   
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly 
involving himself with the selection of counsel to replace Aquilina, and that this 
misconduct warrants either dismissal of all charges or a new trial.  Contrary to 
defendant‘s assertion, while the prosecutor noted nonpanel attorneys had been 
appointed in other cases, he never mentioned who was appointed in those cases, or 
otherwise suggested which attorney should replace Aquilina.  More critically, the 
prosecutor, like the defendant, has a right to a speedy trial.  (Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 29; see § 1050, subd. (a).11)  While defendant claims the prosecutor did not 
assert this right until the prosecutor‘s own trial schedule cleared, he fails to 
demonstrate the prosecutor was thereby estopped to object to a continuance of at 
                                            
 
11  Section 1050, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part:  ―[T]he people, 
the defendant, and the victims and other witnesses have the right to an expeditious 
disposition, and to that end it shall be the duty of all courts and judicial officers 
and of all counsel, both for the prosecution and the defense, to expedite these 
proceedings to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice.‖ 
 
37 
least 12 months in a case already more than seven years removed from the date of 
the capital crimes.  Far from engaging in misconduct, the prosecutor properly 
urged the court to explore avenues, including replacement of counsel, that would 
bring this long-delayed case to trial.   
Defendant further contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
argued what evidence the jury could rely on in finding there was intent to kill 
Montoya.  First, defendant contends the prosecutor relied on false testimony and 
thereby committed misconduct by arguing the jury could find intent to kill based 
on the number of times defendant lunged at Montoya with the knife, and in 
describing Montoya‘s injuries, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due 
process and fair trial rights.  ―Under well-established principles of due process, the 
prosecution cannot present evidence it knows is false and must correct any falsity 
of which it is aware in the evidence it presents, even if the false evidence was not 
intentionally submitted.‖  (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 647.)  
Montoya testified that defendant lunged at him with the knife at least 20 times, 
and that, following the attack, he could not use his arm for six or seven months.  
Defendant asserts that Montoya‘s testimony was inconsistent with his preliminary 
hearing testimony and statement to Clark,12 statements of which defendant was 
aware.  Any inconsistency between Montoya‘s pretrial statements and trial 
testimony does not ineluctably demonstrate his trial testimony was false, or that 
the prosecutor knew it was false.  (See People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 
                                            
 
12  In his statement to Clark, Montoya stated he ―wasn‘t counting,‖ but he 
―would figure . . . a total of at least 13 times [the perpetrator] came at me.‖  At the 
subsequent preliminary hearing, Montoya testified that defendant tried to stab him 
―repeatedly,‖ or ―[m]ore than four times.‖  He also testified that ―[t]hey didn‘t 
believe I was going to be able to use my arm and lift heavy objects with it,‖ but by 
the time of the preliminary hearing nearly six years later, he had regained full 
strength.   
 
38 
1211-1212 [the prosecutor is not responsible for a witness‘s erroneous testimony 
so long as he provided discovery contradicting that testimony and the defendant 
was given the opportunity to point out the discrepancy to the jury].)  Indeed, 
defendant did not even attempt to impeach Montoya with any prior inconsistent 
statements regarding the severity of his injury or the number of times he was 
stabbed.  In any event, defendant‘s intent to kill was demonstrated by his repeated 
attempts to stab Montoya, and his immediately ensuing murders of Moncada and 
Navarro by the same means.  The precise number of times he attempted to stab 
Montoya, or the length of Montoya‘s rehabilitation, was irrelevant.   
Defendant also asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct when he argued 
that defendant‘s conduct in killing Moncada and Navarro demonstrated his intent 
to kill Montoya.  As discussed above, these murders were pertinent to the issue of 
defendant‘s intent when he attacked Montoya; hence, there was no misconduct.  
Nor, for this reason, did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury that 
defendant‘s ―post-crime conduct was ‗irrelevant to ascertaining defendant‘s state 
of mind.‘ ‖   
Defendant asserts the prosecutor also committed misconduct when he argued 
there was no evidence of a fight before defendant‘s violent attacks.  The 
prosecutor actually argued that the killings were not justified:  ―There‘s no 
assertion of self-defense.  There was no fight taking place.‖  This statement was 
supported by the record.  No misconduct is apparent.13   
                                            
 
13  Defendant summarily asserts that there was ―no evidence‖ to support the 
prosecutor‘s argument that Moncada and Navarro were killed because defendant, a 
―young punk, . . . made a decision and acted on that decision to dominate the 
moment, perhaps to impress some girls or perhaps just . . . for the pleasure of 
indiscriminately killing two young men in the prime of their lives.‖  This comment 
appears to be a reasonable inference from the record, which failed to reveal a 
precise motive for defendant‘s murderous assault.  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
39 
Defendant contends the prosecutor falsely argued ―[t]here‘s no evidence 
whatsoever that there [were] two people stabbing.‖  This statement was a 
reasonable inference from the record.  Officer Foy testified that when she ―very 
briefly‖ interviewed Montoya across the street from the scene of the attack he told 
her ―two Mexican males stabbed him.‖  The interview then ceased abruptly 
because ―a female‖ ran across the street ―screaming hysterically that someone had 
been stabbed.‖  Hence Officer Foy had no opportunity to allow Montoya to 
elaborate on this statement.  Montoya, who testified regarding only one attacker, 
had no recollection of making the statement.   
Moreno, who testified that one person came to the side of his Prelude, was 
asked on cross-examination whether he told police the night of the incident that 
― ‗I think it was two guys that came to the car.‘ ‖  Moreno agreed he had made this 
statement, but said, ―I wasn‘t sure, but I can only confirm that there was one, and 
that was the one that was doing the attacking that broke the window.‖  On redirect, 
Moreno clarified that he thought that maybe there were two assailants when he 
heard what sounded like a gunshot, and he ―wasn‘t sure if it was one or two people 
that were doing the shooting.‖  When he got out of his car, however, he saw only 
one person.   
Nor did the prosecutor mislead the jury by arguing that both Montoya and 
Moreno provided explanations for their earlier inconsistent statements.  Rather, the 
prosecutor recounted his redirect examination of Moreno, in which Moreno 
clarified why he originally thought there were two assailants, and noted that 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Cal.4th 468, 522 [―Prosecutors have wide latitude to discuss and draw inferences 
from the evidence at trial‖].)   
 
40 
Montoya ―only saw one person over there, and it was the defendant.‖  Moreover, 
the jury was instructed that ―[s]tatements made by the attorneys during the trial are 
not evidence.‖ 
Defendant also contends the prosecutor misled the jury by arguing that one 
knife caused all of the injuries.  The prosecutor said that there was ―circumstantial 
evidence in the form of the pathologist‘s testimony that one knife did injuries to 
these individuals [that] is consistent with it being inflicted by one knife.  He 
measured the wounds in the heart and in the organs of Bobby Navarro and Raul 
Moncada, and the size of that knife by those slits is consistent with it being made 
by the same knife. . . . And it‘s not just by coincidence that that scar on David 
Montoya‘s arm is approximately one to one and a half inches.  It‘s the same 
knife.‖  The pathologist testified that one knife could have caused the injuries to 
Navarro and Moncada, a knife approximately five inches in length and one inch 
wide was consistent with both victims‘ stab wounds, and that one of Moncada‘s 
stab wounds measured an inch and one-half in length.  Montoya testified that his 
scar was ―[a]bout an inch.‖  The prosecutor‘s argument that the size of Montoya‘s 
scar demonstrated the same knife used to kill the murder victims was also used on 
Montoya was a reasonable inference based on the record.   
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing that 
Quintana, Mesa, and Olsen could not have fabricated statements on the night of 
the crimes.  The prosecutor simply argued that following examination of ―what the 
witnesses said, and how they said it, and the time that they said it, you‘re going to 
see it could not have been fabricated.‖  This was legitimate argument.   
We further reject defendant‘s claims that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct in his argument regarding defendant‘s state of mind.  Viewing the 
argument as a whole instead of the portions defendant cites in isolation, there is no 
reasonable likelihood the jury was misled by the prosecutor‘s argument.  (People 
 
41 
v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 208.)  Hence we reject defendant‘s contention 
that the combination of the court‘s failure to instruct and the prosecutor‘s 
misleading argument means that the ―jury likely convicted [defendant] of first 
degree murder without properly considering the question of his subjective mental 
state.‖   
First, defendant contends that the jury was misled when the prosecutor stated 
that the words ―premeditated‖ and ―deliberate‖ ―mean essentially the same thing.‖  
Prior to making this statement, the prosecutor quoted the definitions of these terms 
in CALJIC 8.20, with which the jury had already been instructed.  He then made 
the statement challenged by defendant:  ―Premeditated and deliberate murder.  The 
words go together.  They mean essentially the same thing.  Considered 
beforehand, thought and considered, arrived or determined upon as a result of 
careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against a proposed course 
of action.‖  This argument, which tracked the standard definitions of the relevant 
terms, was not improper or misleading.   
Second, contrary to defendant‘s assertion, case law did not prohibit the 
prosecutor from arguing that the jury could find defendant premeditated and 
deliberated based on the totality of the circumstances, including the circumstance 
defendant obtained a weapon before the attacks; his choice of weapon; the manner 
in which he held the weapon; the number of wounds he attempted to inflict on 
Montoya; the circumstance that defendant was undeterred in his course of violent 
conduct by Montoya‘s rolling up the window or the seriousness of Montoya‘s 
wound; the circumstance that Moncada and Navarro were stabbed in the heart; the 
passage of time from the end of the argument until the attacks, during which 
defendant was not threatened, there was no fight taking place, and no one spoke to 
him; and defendant‘s flight following the attacks.  (See, e.g., People v. Halvorsen 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 421-422 [absence of provocation and location of gunshot 
 
42 
wounds in head or neck were circumstances in support of premeditation and 
deliberation finding]; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 28 [rejecting claim that 
evidence of flight was irrelevant to whether the defendant premeditated and 
deliberated]; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863 [the jury could have 
concluded that during the time it took to run 178 feet from the first victim to the 
second, defendant considered his options]; People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 
920, 957 [execution-style murder demonstrated premeditation and deliberation]; 
People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517 [jury could have inferred defendant 
went to his car for a weapon before the killings].)  Defense counsel was free to 
argue the same circumstances indicated defendant did not premeditate or 
deliberate, but instead counsel argued defendant was not the perpetrator.  Thus, 
defendant did not even proceed on a theory that he was guilty of second, but not 
first, degree murder.   
Nor, contrary to defendant‘s assertion, did the prosecutor argue that ―the 
‗cold, calculated‘ judgment of murder is the equivalent of deciding whether to stop 
at a yellow light or proceed through the intersection.‖  Rather, the prosecutor used 
the example of assessing one‘s distance from a traffic light, and the location of 
surrounding vehicles, when it appears the light will soon turn yellow and then red, 
and then determining based on this information whether to proceed through the 
intersection when the light does turn yellow, as an example of a ―quick judgment‖ 
that is nonetheless ―cold and ―calculated.‖  He then immediately said, ―Deciding 
to and moving forward with the decision to kill is similar, but I‘m not going to say 
in any way it‘s the same.  There‘s great dire consequences that have a difference 
here.‖   
 
43 
7.  Alleged Judicial Misconduct  
Defendant contends that he was denied the right to a fair trial due to 
pervasive judicial misconduct.  As can be seen above, defendant asserts judicial 
misconduct in connection with nearly every substantive claim raised on appeal.  
But in fact, his arguments are merely of judicial error; he does not come close to 
showing misconduct.  In addition to arguments already discussed, defendant also 
contends that jury voir dire was so permeated with error it ―reach[ed] the level of 
structural error,‖ and that the court demonstrated its pro-prosecution bias by 
approving a constitutionally impermissible in-court identification procedure.  We 
have reviewed each contention, and find no error or evidence of bias.  (People v. 
Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1112.)   
Defendant contends that during voir dire the trial court improperly defined 
mitigating evidence as ―good things‖ about defendant, forcing defendant to prove 
― ‗good things‘ in order to save his life,‖ and making it ―impossible for the jury to 
apply the law and the facts‖ because it ―was completely misinformed regarding 
what constituted mitigation.‖  Not so.  The court also informed prospective jurors 
that they would be given guidelines to follow in making the penalty decision.  
Moreover, ―here the court was conducting voir dire, not instructing the jury; its 
comments ‗were not intended to be, and were not, a substitute for full instructions 
at the end of trial.‘ ‖  (People v. Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 636.)  At the 
penalty phase, the jury was instructed in the language of CALJIC Nos. 8.85, which 
listed the relevant factors for the jury to consider, and 8.88, which defined 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  By these instructions, the jury was 
fully aware what evidence could be considered mitigating.   
Next, defendant contends that during voir dire, the trial court asked the jury 
to not find defendant guilty of second degree murder.  Not so.  Read in context, 
the trial court simply urged the jury not to find defendant guilty of second degree 
 
44 
murder, ―or something less or maybe not guilty,‖ solely to avoid a penalty phase 
of the trial.  This was proper.   
Defendant further contends that the trial court demonstrated a bias in favor of 
Christian jurors by using biblical principles.  First, during voir dire, the court noted 
that a prospective juror had stated on the questionnaire a refusal to follow the law 
if it conflicted with religious beliefs.  The court said to the prospective juror, ―We 
have a saying you render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar‘s and the things to 
God the things that are God‘s.  This is Caesar‘s court here, all right?‖  The 
prospective juror answered, ―Right.‖  The court inquired, ―Do you think that you 
would be able to impose the death penalty under the appropriate circumstances as 
I‘ve indicated them?‖  The prospective juror answered, ―Yes, I can.‖   
Likewise, the court asked a different prospective juror about a notation on the 
jury questionnaire regarding the commandment ―Thou shalt not kill.‖  The court 
stated that there are two ―conflicting sayings that generally come out in 
questionnaires when we do capital cases . . . One is ‗Eye for an eye, tooth for a 
tooth,‘ which some jurors mentioned, and the other is ‗Thou shalt not kill,‘ and 
they‘re biblical commandments and they kind of conflict, don‘t they?  How 
important is that commandment to you?‖  After further discussion with the 
prospective juror, the court again used the saying regarding Caesar, noted ―[t]his is 
Caesar‘s court, the people‘s court basically,‖ and ―[w]e go by the rule of law, not 
by biblical rules.  Can you make the distinction between the two?‖  Nothing in 
either this or the preceding exchange demonstrates an improper court bias toward 
Christian jurors.  (See People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1242 
[prosecutor‘s argument invoking the familiar passage regarding Caesar ―was not 
an argument for using Biblical or religious criteria of justice, but rather quite the 
opposite – an appeal to use secular standards mandated by law to judge 
defendant‖].)   
 
45 
Nor did the trial court exhibit such a pro-Christian bias by suggesting to 
counsel outside the presence of the prospective jurors that a prospective juror who 
was a Jehovah‘s Witness might be impeded by her religion‘s tenet that she could 
not judge others.  Nothing in this comment demonstrates judicial bias.   
Next, defendant contends the trial court demonstrated an extreme hostility 
and bias against young people who were college students.  Not so.  During 
hardship voir dire, the court excused six full-time students.  The court then said, ―I 
should warn those of you who are sticking your hands up in the air if you‘re not a 
full-time student and we check, you‘re under oath.  This is called lying to the 
Court, otherwise known as perjury, which I‘m sure you‘ve heard about recently.‖  
The court then excused two full-time students at the University of California, 
Riverside.  After doing so, the court noted that ―my husband is the academic dean 
at UCR also, so it‘s not that hard to check.‖  The next prospective juror was a full-
time student at California State University, San Bernardino.  The court said, ―All 
right.  Different institution.‖  After excusing the prospective juror, and another 
full-time student, the court commented, ―Now you see why democracy is so hard 
to preserve.‖  These comments, while perhaps somewhat intemperate, do not 
demonstrate a bias against young college students, but a frustration with the 
inherent difficulty of finding prospective jurors who have the time to hear a capital 
trial, and a desire to avoid ―false‖ hardships.  They do not rise to the level of 
judicial misconduct. 
Finally, defendant contends the trial court‘s eagerness to allow Moreno to 
conduct an unconstitutionally suggestive lineup demonstrates its pro-prosecution 
bias.  Not so.  During Moreno‘s testimony, he stated that before trial he had never 
been shown any photographs by police, but he believed he could identify 
defendant.  The prosecutor started to show Moreno a set of 12 photographs.  
Defense counsel objected, and the prosecutor ultimately withdrew the request.  
 
46 
When Moreno‘s examination was completed, the court excused the jury for lunch 
and asked Moreno to return after lunch ―in case we need you back.‖  It then 
suggested to counsel, ―in the event either of you wishes to proceed with this 
procedure,‖ that Moreno be asked if he could identify the assailant in the 
courtroom, and, if he could not, the prosecutor would then show him the photo 
lineup.  Defense counsel said ―I would elect not to do it.‖  The court expressed the 
view that whether Moreno could identify defendant ―could be helpful to either 
side.‖  The prosecutor then said he was disinclined to follow this procedure 
because of ―raising an issue [on appeal] that probably doesn‘t need to be raised.‖  
The court said, ―Fair enough.  I don‘t know your case as well as you do, which is 
why I leave it in your hands.‖  Nothing in this discussion demonstrates improper 
―eagerness‖ or judicial bias.  (See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 
1155 [―Insofar as defendant contends that an in-court identification not preceded 
by a lineup is impermissibly suggestive and prejudicial as a matter of law, he is 
wrong‖].)   
In sum, we conclude there was no error, and no evidence of judicial 
misconduct.   
8.  Cumulative Prejudice  
Defendant asserts that even if the errors alleged above are not in themselves 
reversible, they are so cumulatively.  We disagree.  We have assumed error only in 
the instruction of the jury on concealment of evidence and on lying in wait as a 
theory of first degree murder.  For both of these claims, we concluded there was 
no prejudice under any standard.  Therefore no cumulative prejudice is 
demonstrated.  ―Defendant has merely shown that his ‗ ― trial was not perfect — 
few are. . . .‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 839.)  
 
47 
B.  Penalty Phase Issues  
1.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing 
argument.  Defendant did not object below to any of the cited portions of the 
argument.  Other than as noted below, no exception to the general requirement of 
an objection is applicable, and the claims are therefore forfeited.  (People v. 
Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 286.)  Nor was there prejudicial misconduct, 
either as to the individual contentions or cumulatively.   
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly stated that defendant was 
arrested in September 1995 whereas he in fact turned himself in.  The parties 
stipulated defendant was arrested on September 19, 1995, and defense counsel 
expressly declined to introduce evidence that defendant voluntarily surrendered.  
No misconduct appears.  For the same reason, the prosecutor did not engage in 
misconduct when he asked Navarro‘s father and sister respectively what it was 
like for them during the years before defendant was ―arrested‖ or ―caught.‖  Nor 
can misconduct be attributed to the prosecutor when Montoya testified, ―[w]hen 
they finally caught him, . . . it brought back so much.  It was hard.‖  (Italics 
added.)   
Likewise, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct when he argued, 
―Don‘t forget about David Montoya.  His injuries, the months of therapy and 
recovering that he had to go through, his physical injuries, his mental injuries.  
Think about it.  The anguish of surviving and the guilt that he felt.‖  While there 
was no testimony that Montoya had received therapy for his injuries, he did testify 
he was told by doctors he would never use his arm again, and that he in fact could 
not use it for six to seven months.  The prosecutor‘s statement about therapy 
neither ― ‗so infected the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the 
jury‘s imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process‘ ‖ (Romano v. 
 
48 
Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 12 (Romano)) nor involved deceptive or 
reprehensible methods employed to persuade the trier of fact (People v. Ayala, 
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 284).   
Defendant contends the prosecutor referred to facts not in evidence when he 
argued that the victims suffered before they died, and that the knife made an 
audible sound when it entered their bodies.  These were reasonable inferences 
from the record.   
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing at the 
guilt phase, ―It‘s time that [defendant‘s] held accountable after all these years for 
the mayhem, for the murder that he created that night.‖  He further challenges the 
prosecutor‘s opening statement at the penalty phase in which he said, after noting 
he anticipated that the families of the murder victims would testify, and describing 
the attacks on Gonzalez and Lopez, that ―[t]he accomplishments of [defendant] in 
his life ha[ve] been murder and mayhem.‖  Defendant contends there is no 
evidence defendant committed mayhem, and that the ―argument suggested the 
prosecutor had knowledge that [defendant] had committed heinous conduct not 
supported by any facts in the record.  If the jurors believed that [defendant] had 
disfigured someone, they would have been more likely to sentence him to die.  For 
this reason, the sentence of death should be set aside.‖   
There is no reasonable likelihood the jury would be misled by these brief 
remarks.  The jury was instructed that ―[s]tatements made by the attorneys during 
the trial are not evidence,‖ and that ―[i]f anything concerning the law said by the 
attorneys in their arguments or any other time during the trial conflicts with my 
instructions on the law, you must follow my instructions.‖  We presume the jury 
followed these instructions.  (See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 
 
49 
684.)  Moreover, jurors not instructed on mayhem were unlikely to attribute to that 
word its legal definition,14 or, in particular, to focus on its mention of 
disfigurement.  In any event, we reject defendant‘s argument that in a case in 
which defendant murdered two individuals and stabbed another causing an injury 
that took months to heal, and in which there was aggravating evidence he had 
stabbed and caused severe debilitating injury to two other individuals, there is any 
reasonable possibility a different penalty verdict would result from any belief on 
the part of the jury defendant may have also disfigured one of these individuals.  
Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed Davenport error by 
arguing that the lack of mitigating evidence proved defendant‘s life was not worth 
sparing.  (People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290.)  The prosecutor 
argued:  ―He‘s had eight years . . . since the commission of these brutal murders 
since 1991.  Eight years.  Over three years since the time of his arrest in 
September of ‘95.  He‘s had an attorney, investigators preparing his case, going to 
Mexico to find witnesses and bring them here to court to testify for you.  And 
what you saw is the best that they could do to give you a reason to spare his 
life. . . . Nothing about the defendant‘s childhood, his mother, or good behavior in 
some particular circumstances in Mexico, overcomes the evidence in 
aggravation.‖  Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, there is no reasonable likelihood 
the jury understood the prosecutor to argue that the lack of mitigating evidence 
was aggravating, but rather that the evidence as a whole warranted death.  The 
same analysis applies to the prosecutor‘s other challenged comments.  Nor did the 
                                            
 
14  Section 203 provides that, ―Every person who unlawfully and 
maliciously deprives a human being of a member of his body, or disables, 
disfigures, or renders it useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, 
or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem.‖   
 
50 
prosecutor mislead the jury by saying defendant had ―an attorney‖ for three years, 
when in fact he had three attorneys over that period of time, or by referring to 
―investigators,‖ when defendant only had one investigator at the time of trial.   
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly argued that mitigating factors 
were actually aggravating factors.  We have held that a prosecutor may not argue 
that a defendant‘s section 190.3, factor (k) character and background evidence is 
an aggravating factor.  (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1033.)  No 
such mischaracterization occurred here.  Rather, the prosecutor merely argued that 
defendant‘s lack of prior felony convictions deserved little weight in mitigation, 
that defendant, who was 21 years of age at the time of the offense, was ―[o]ld 
enough to be held personally accountable and responsible for his actions,‖ and that 
―[w]hen you look at the evidence in this case, the evidence in aggravation, and you 
compare it to the evidence that‘s been presented in so-called mitigation, there is no 
comparison.‖  Such argument is entirely appropriate.  (See People v. Jones (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 119, 184.)  Nor, contrary to defendant‘s contention, did the 
prosecutor‘s reference to defendant‘s age tell the jury defendant‘s age should not 
be considered or preclude the jury from determining whether ―21 years was 
youthful.‖   
Defendant also contends the prosecutor misled the jury with respect to the 
consideration of mitigating evidence.  Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, the 
prosecutor did not argue that ―mercy and sympathy had no place in a capital case.‖  
Rather, he properly argued that defendant had not earned the jury‘s pity or 
sympathy, and that a death verdict was compelled by the evidence.   
Nor, contrary to defendant‘s assertion, did the prosecutor during penalty 
argument characterize mitigating evidence as ―good things‖ about defendant.  
Rather, he told the jury it could consider ―things like sympathy and pity for the 
 
51 
defendant,‖ and that the expanded factor (k) instruction was ―a catchall.  Anything 
they want to present to you falls into this category.‖   
Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, the prosecutor did not make an improper 
Biblical reference, or commit Caldwell error15 (Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 
U.S. 320, 336), when he said:  ―You are not here to forgive.  That is for some 
other authority.  You are here to impose punishment – the appropriate punishment 
based on what this defendant deserves by his conduct, by his actions.‖  Nothing in 
these statements misled the jury ― ‗as to its role in the sentencing process in a way 
that allow[ed] the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing 
decision.‘ ‖  (Romano v. Oklahoma, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 9.)  Nor did the 
prosecutor improperly testify by arguing that if defendant received a sentence of 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, he would be fed, have his 
medical and dental needs attended to, and be able to read, write, and enjoy 
friendships.  These circumstances are matters of common knowledge.  (See People 
v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1063-1064 [―it is a matter of common 
knowledge that women are employed as state prison guards‖].)  In People v. Hill 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 838, on which defendant relies, we did not elaborate on 
what argument the prosecutor made regarding prison conditions that while ―brief 
and mild,‖ ―contributed to the overall unfairness of the trial.‖  Nor, contrary to 
defendant‘s contention, were the prosecutor‘s discussion of punishment, his 
statement that a death verdict takes great courage, or his argument that defendant‘s 
crimes warranted death, ―[i]nvitations to the jury to perform a greater social 
purpose‖ or to ―consider prejudicial and irrelevant matters as aggravating factors.‖  
                                            
15  
The claim under Caldwell is cognizable because the trial here occurred 
before our decision in People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704.  (See id. at pp. 
761-762.) 
 
52 
(See People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1177-1179.)  Likewise, arguing 
that life imprisonment is not sufficient punishment does not mislead the jury that it 
is no punishment at all.16  
2.  Instructional Issues  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give three proposed 
instructions.  Not so. 
The first proposed defense instruction17 was properly refused because it 
duplicated other instructions given.  (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 
659.)  Thus, the jury was instructed on the definition of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances,18 and that ―[i]n determining penalty, the jury shall take into 
                                            
 
16  Defendant also claims misconduct in certain statements made by the 
prosecutor in his opposition to the automatic motion for modification of the 
judgment, and at the hearing on that motion.  Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, 
none of the cited comments misstates either the record or what evidence may be 
considered mitigating.  Moreover, the trial court was well aware of the record and 
the applicable law.   
 
17  The first proposed instruction provided:  ―The mitigating circumstances 
that I have read for your consideration are given merely as examples of some of 
the factors that a juror may take into account as reasons for deciding not to impose 
a death sentence in this case.  A juror should pay careful attention to each of those 
factors.  Any one of them may be sufficient, standing alone, to support a decision 
that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case.  But a juror should not 
limit his or her consideration of mitigating circumstances to these specific factors. 
 
―A juror may also consider any other circumstances relating to the case or 
to the defendant as shown by the evidence as reasons for not imposing the death 
penalty.   
 
―A mitigating circumstance does not have to be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  A juror may find that a mitigating circumstance exists if there is 
any evidence to support it no matter how weak the evidence is. 
 
―Any mitigating circumstance may outweigh all the aggravating factors. 
 
―A juror is permitted to use mercy, sympathy and/or sentiment in deciding 
what weight to give each mitigating factor.‖   
 
18  The jury was instructed: ―An aggravating factor is any fact, condition or 
event attending the commission of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity, or 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
53 
consideration pity and sympathy for the defendant.‖  In addition, instructions in 
the language of CALJIC No. 8.85 allowed consideration of ―any other 
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a 
legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant‘s 
character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than 
death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.‖  Moreover, a 
trial court is not required to instruct the jury that mitigating evidence need not be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 
862.)   
Defendant further contends the trial court improperly refused to use the word 
―mercy‖ that appeared in a proposed prosecution instruction.  The trial court 
expressed concern that the word ―mercy‖ indicated ―the jury can do what they like 
regardless of the guided discretion that factors (a) through (k) provide.  . . . 
Therefore, I‘m not going to use the word ‗mercy.‘  I prefer the words ‗sympathy,‘ 
‗pity,‘ et cetera.‖  As set forth in the previous paragraph, the jury was adequately 
instructed on the treatment of mitigating evidence.  Nor, contrary to defendant‘s 
contention, did the trial court forbid the parties from using the word ―mercy‖ 
during argument.   
                                                                                                                                                       
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
adds to its injurious consequences which is above and beyond the elements of the 
crime itself.  A mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event which does 
not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in question, but may be 
considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriateness of 
the death penalty.  [¶] . . . You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic 
value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted 
to consider.‖   
 
54 
Defendant also contends the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the 
jury that:  ―The factors in the above list which you determine to be aggravating 
circumstances are the only ones which the law permits you to consider.  You are 
not allowed to consider any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding 
that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case.‖  We 
recently rejected the same claim in People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 471-
472.  While the prosecution introduced on rebuttal Lira‘s testimony regarding 
defendant‘s jail misconduct, the jury was also instructed that, other than evidence 
of the assaults on Gonzalez and Lopez, ―[y]ou may not consider any evidence of 
any other crime as an aggravating circumstance.‖  That was sufficient.   
3.  Cumulative Prejudice  
Defendant contends that cumulative penalty and guilt phase error requires 
reversal.  We have assumed error only in the instruction of the jury on 
concealment of evidence and on lying in wait as a theory of first degree murder.  
For both of these claims, we concluded there was no prejudice under any standard.  
Therefore no cumulative prejudice is demonstrated.   
4.  Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute  
Defendant contends the death penalty statute violates the United States 
Constitution in numerous respects.  We have repeatedly rejected similar claims, 
and likewise conclude defendant‘s contentions lack merit.  
Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider ―[t]he 
circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present 
proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true 
pursuant to Section 190.1,‖ does not, as applied, violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because those 
 
55 
circumstances differ from case to case.  (People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 
211; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976, 978-979.)  
Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, the death penalty statute does not lack 
safeguards to avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing or deprive defendant of the 
right to a jury trial, because it does not require written findings, unanimity as to 
the truth of aggravating circumstances, or findings beyond a reasonable doubt that 
an aggravating circumstance (other than factor (b) evidence) has been proved, that 
the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.  (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1297-1298; 
People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 212; People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
916, 971-972.)  Nor must a jury be instructed which factors are aggravating and 
which are mitigating.  (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 152-153.)  
―[U]se of unadjudicated criminal activity during the penalty phase is permissible,‖ 
and does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  
(People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217.)   
Defendant claims in the alternative that a preponderance of the evidence 
standard of proof is compelled for the findings that an aggravating factor exists, 
that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, and that death is the 
appropriate sentence.  The jury here was instructed that ―[t]o return a judgment of 
death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so 
substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death 
instead of life without parole.‖  That is sufficient.  (People v. Stevens, supra, 41 
Cal.4th at p. 212; see Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 979.)  ―Unlike 
the guilt determination, ‗the sentencing function is inherently moral and 
normative, not factual‘ [citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof 
quantification.‖  (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79.)  Nothing in 
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 
 
56 
584, or Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, affects our conclusions in 
this regard.  (People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 212; People v. Cox, supra, 
30 Cal.4th at pp. 971-972.)   
The failure to require intercase proportionality does not violate the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments.  (Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 
50-51; People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 970.)  Nor does the circumstance that 
intercase proportionality review is conducted in noncapital cases cause the death 
penalty statute to violate defendant‘s right to equal protection and due process.  
(People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 209; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 
690-691.)  ―[C]apital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and 
therefore may be treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees of 
equal protection of the laws or due process of law. . . .‖  (People v. Manriquez, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 590.)   
We reject defendant‘s argument that the death penalty statute is contrary to 
international norms of humanity and decency, and therefore violates the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  Defendant points to no authority that ―prohibit[s] a 
sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and 
statutory requirements.‖  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 511.) 
5.  Alleged Juror Misconduct  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion, 
asserting the jurors commented on his failure to testify.  There was no prejudicial 
juror misconduct, and the motion was properly denied.  
a.  Factual Background 
On March 2, 1999, a month after the penalty verdict, defendant filed a 
motion to release juror identifying information, or, in the alternative, for an 
evidentiary hearing regarding alleged juror misconduct in discussing defendant‘s 
 
57 
failure to testify.  The parties stipulated, and the court approved, a procedure in 
which all 13 jurors were subsequently summoned to court and examined 
individually under oath.19  At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, Juror No. 8 
recalled that a comment regarding defendant‘s failure to testify was made ―only 
after we had put in our verdict.‖20  Jurors Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 11 testified that 
after the penalty phase deliberations, when the verdict had been reached, and the 
bailiff either called or the verdict was given to the bailiff, someone, identified by 
Jurors Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 11 as Juror No. 8, made a comment wondering why 
defendant had not testified.  Juror No. 3 apparently agreed with the comment or 
made a similar comment.  Juror No. 11 testified she said that was not a factor to 
consider, and Juror No. 12 agreed with her.  Juror No. 9 could not recall whether 
the comment about defendant‘s failure to testify was made after the verdict was 
signed and the jury was waiting to go back into the courtroom, or later when the 
jurors spoke with the attorneys.   
Juror No. 10 testified that at the beginning of the guilt phase deliberations, a 
male juror questioned why defendant did not take the stand.  Juror No. 11 
responded, ―We‘re not supposed to even consider that‖ and ―[i]t was in our 
instructions not to consider it.‖  The issue was not raised again.  Later, someone 
mentioned that the subject had been brought up, and someone said, ―[A]gain, 
we‘re not supposed to consider that.‖   
                                            
19  After the guilt phase, Juror No. 5 was replaced by Juror No. 13, who 
served at the penalty phase.  Both jurors were examined at the post-trial 
evidentiary hearing, for a total of 13 jurors.   
 
20  Juror No. 8 was the first juror to testify regarding the comment being 
made ―after‖ the verdict.  Subsequent jurors testified the comment was made after 
the verdict was reached, but before it was announced in open court.   
 
58 
Juror No. 12 testified that during a break at the end of the guilt phase 
deliberations, Juror No. 8 made a comment to the effect that, ―If it had been me, I 
would have got[ten] on the stand to defend myself.‖  Another juror said, ―Yeah, 
me too.‖  Juror No 12 said ―we were told that‘s not supposed to be considered.‖  
After either the guilt or penalty verdict was read and the jury polled, Juror No. 12 
returned to the jury room and Juror No. 8 said, ―I feel we made the right decision 
because I didn‘t see any remorse.‖  Juror No. 12 believed the comment was made 
after the guilt phase, because while she returned to the jury room after the penalty 
verdict was delivered to collect her belongings, she did not stay to speak to the 
attorneys.   
Juror No. 5, who served only at the guilt phase, heard no comment about 
defendant‘s failure to testify, and Juror No. 13, who served only at the penalty 
phase, heard no such comment prior to the time the penalty verdict was entered.   
The trial court denied the motion for new trial, finding there was no 
substantial likelihood that the vote of any juror was influenced by the comments, 
because the comments made during the guilt phase elicited ―appropriate 
statements . . . that such matters must not be considered,‖ and those in the penalty 
phase were made after the jury had reached a verdict.  The court stated that any 
presumption of prejudice was ―clearly rebutted by evidence of the responses made 
by the other jurors, the context of the comments, the timing of the comments, and 
the fact that the jurors were unanimous in stating that the comments were not ever 
made at a time when they were actually engaged in deliberations.‖   
b.  Analysis 
―[B]y violating the trial court's instruction not to discuss defendant‘s failure 
to testify, the jury committed misconduct.  [Citations.]  This misconduct gives rise 
to a presumption of prejudice, which ‗may be rebutted . . . by a reviewing court‘s 
 
59 
determination, upon examining the entire record, that there is no substantial 
likelihood that the complaining party suffered actual harm.‘ ‖  (People v. Leonard 
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1425.)  ― ‗Whether prejudice arose from juror 
misconduct . . . is a mixed question of law and fact subject to an appellate court‘s 
independent determination.‘ ‖  (People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 303.)  
―However, ‗[w]e accept the trial court‘s credibility determinations and findings on 
questions of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 304.)  
Here, at the guilt phase, the circumstance that only two jurors recalled that 
any juror had commented on defendant‘s failure to testify indicates that the 
discussion was not of any length or significance.  In addition, the offending juror 
was immediately reminded he could not consider this factor and the discussion 
ceased.  (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 749 (Loker).)  ―Transitory 
comments of wonderment and curiosity‖ about a defendant‘s failure to testify, 
although technically misconduct, ―are normally innocuous, particularly when a 
comment stands alone without any further discussion.‖  (People v. Hord (1993) 15 
Cal.App.4th 711, 727-728.)   
At the penalty phase, the comment was not made until the verdict was 
reached and the bailiff contacted.  While the jury had not yet been dismissed, we 
conclude there is no substantial likelihood a passing comment at this stage of the 
proceedings regarding the failure to testify prejudiced defendant in any manner.  
Moreover, the offending juror was reminded that this consideration was not 
permitted.  ―Under these circumstances, the purpose of the rule against 
commenting on defendant‘s failure to testify was served, and the presumption of 
prejudice is rebutted.‖  (People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 749.)   
Defendant further contends that his death sentence should be vacated because 
a juror stated, after either the guilt or penalty verdict was read, that the jury had 
made the right decision because he did not see defendant express remorse.  The 
 
60 
trial court found, however, that the comment regarding remorse recounted by Juror 
No. 12 was consistent with the testimony of other jurors that such a comment was 
made after the penalty verdict had been ―signed, sealed and delivered.‖  
Substantial evidence supports that finding.   
Defendant contends the trial court‘s questioning was not ―even-handed,‖ and 
that the court ―did not adequately question jurors as to the actual statements made, 
while delving into the deliberative process questioning them in a leading manner 
[and] minimizing the misconduct at every opportunity.‖  Defense counsel agreed 
to the trial court‘s intended scope of questioning before the jurors were examined, 
and all but one request he made for further questioning following a juror‘s voir 
dire was honored.21  Indeed, after the first 12 jurors had testified, the parties were 
asked if they wanted to recall any juror for further questioning, but neither counsel 
requested to do so.  Rather, defendant requested that Juror No. 5, who had served 
only at the guilt phase, be examined, a request the court granted.  Defendant has 
therefore forfeited any claim the questioning was inadequate.  Nor does our 
examination of the record reveal any such inadequacy, lack of evenhandedness, or 
an attempt on the part of the court to improperly lead the jurors or minimize any 
misconduct.   
                                            
 
21  The request that was denied was during the questioning of Juror No. 5.  
He testified that during the guilt phase deliberations, another juror made a 
comment about how defendant ―never looked at any of the people around him, he 
just kept looking straight.‖  Juror No. 5 could not remember if anyone responded.  
Juror No. 5 agreed with the court that the comment had nothing ―to do with 
[defendant] not taking the witness stand.‖  At side bar, defense counsel asked the 
court to inquire what the juror remembered being said before and after the 
comment on defendant‘s demeanor.  The court noted the subject of a response had 
been covered, and declined to inquire further because ―[o]bviously it wasn‘t 
anything concerning the defendant‘s failure to testify.‖   
 
61 
Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, the trial court never ―warn[ed]‖ the jurors 
―that unfavorable testimony could result in the reversal of [defendant‘s] 
conviction.‖  We also reject defendant‘s claim the trial court was biased in its 
ruling.  Our review of the record, set forth above, demonstrates no evidence of 
bias.  (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1111-1112.)   
6.  Imposition of $10,000 Restitution Fine 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly imposed a $10,000 restitution 
fine under former section 1202.4 without considering his ability to pay.  Defendant 
concedes he is liable for the minimum statutory amount, and seeks a reduction to 
that amount under the current statute, which is $200.   
At the time the crimes were committed, former section 1202.4, subdivision 
(a) provided that the fine ―shall be ordered regardless of the defendant‘s present 
ability to pay,‖ and former Government Code section 13967, subdivision (a) set 
the fine at a range from $100 to $10,000.  (Stats. 1990, ch. 45, § 2, pp. 256-257, 
261; People v. Saelee (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 27, 30 [―A restitution fine qualifies 
as punishment for purposes of the prohibition against ex post facto laws‖]; see 
People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 361-363 [restitution fines are punishment 
for purposes of double jeopardy]; People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1024 
[restitution fine ―qualifies as punishment‖ for purpose of enforcing plea bargain].)  
Defendant asserts, however, that he should receive the ameliorative benefit of a 
1992 amendment to former Government Code section 13967, subdivision (a) that 
required the court to consider defendant‘s ability to pay.  Defendant is not entitled 
to benefit from the 1992 amendment because it was repealed prior to sentencing in 
his case.  (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305 (Vieira).)   
We have, however, also held that because the current restitution statute 
provides that when imposing a fine in an amount greater than the statutory 
 
62 
minimum the trial court should consider a defendant‘s ―inability to pay‖ (along 
with other relevant factors), a defendant on appeal is entitled to benefit from the 
ameliorative effect of that statute.  (§ 1202.4, subd. (d); People v. Richardson, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1038; People v. Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 305-306.)  
In Richardson and Vieira, we remanded the case to the trial court ― ‗for 
reconsideration of the question of a restitution fine under the currently applicable 
statute.‘ ‖  (Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1038, quoting Vieira, supra, 35 
Cal.4th at p. 306.)   
Defendant does not rely on Vieira, which was decided before he filed his 
reply brief, and which was cited in the respondent‘s brief.  Moreover, in 1999, 
when defendant was sentenced, former section 1202.4 contained language 
regarding a trial court‘s consideration of the defendant‘s ability to pay similar to 
that contained in the current statute.  (Stats. 1998, ch. 587, § 5.5.)  Defendant did 
not assert below that he should benefit from the ameliorative effect of this 
amendment.  
Defendant contends, however, that because he did not have the ability to pay, 
the $10,000 fine was an unauthorized sentence, thus exempting him from having 
to bring his claim to the court‘s attention.  (See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 
331, 354.)  Not so.  Had defendant brought his argument to the court‘s attention, it 
could have exercised its discretion and considered defendant‘s ability to pay, along 
with other relevant factors, in ascertaining the fine amount.  Under the current 
statute, and that in existence in 1999, a fine in any amount greater than the 
statutory minimum, and up to $10,000, is subject to the court‘s discretion.  
(§ 1202.4, subds. (b)(1), (d).)  Moreover, under the statute in 1999 and now, a 
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating his inability to pay, and express 
findings by the court as to the factors bearing on the amount of the fine are not 
required.  (§ 1202.4, subd. (d); see People v. Romero (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 440, 
 
63 
449 [the statute ―impliedly presumes a defendant has the ability to pay,‖ and 
leaves it to the defendant to adduce evidence otherwise].)   
In People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 302-303, we held that a 
prosecutor‘s failure to object to the trial court‘s not stating on the record its 
reasons for not imposing a section 1202.4 restitution fine waived that argument on 
appeal.  Likewise here, in failing to assert below that he should benefit from 
intervening legislative amendments and in not adducing evidence of his inability 
to pay, defendant has forfeited the argument.  Under these circumstances, no 
remand is required. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Avila 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S078664 
Date Filed: June 15, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Vilia G. Sherman 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Christine J. Levin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Sharon L. Rhodes, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Christine J. Levin 
Coleman & Horowitt 
499 W. Shaw Avenue, Suite 116 
Fresno, CA  93704 
(559( 248-4820 
 
Sharon L. Rhodes 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 525-4392