Title: State v. Woodfall. ICA s.d.o., filed 10/30/2008 [pdf], 119 Haw. 232. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 01/20/2009. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 02/18/2009 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 05/15/2009 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order, filed 07/01/2009 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T
000. z
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent~Appellee, 37|~

  

sOUWY 62 uay|

MICHAEL WOODFALL, Petitioner-Appellant.” 3)”
Se

no, 28838

1

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO, 06-1-0430)

APRIL 23, 2009

MOON, C.J., NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
AND CIRCUIT JUDGE AHN, ASSIGNED ‘BY REASON OF VACANCY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner Michael Woodfall
petitions this court to review the Intermediate

(*Woodfall")
(SICA’s") November 18, 2008 judgment affirming

Court of Appeals’
the October 10, 2007 judgment of the first circuit court!
convicting Woodfall of the offenses of

(“circuit court”),
in violation of Hawai'i

identity theft in the second degree,
Revised Statutes ("HRS") 5 708-839.7 (Supp. 2006),? forgery in

‘The Honorable Richard X. Perkins presided.
+ uns § 208-839.7, entitled “Identity theft in the second degree,”
states, in its entirety:
identity theft in

(2) A person commits the offense of
causes to be made,

the second degree if that person makes oF

either directiy or indirectly, 9
by any oral statement, any

britten statement, oF any statement conveyed by any
Slectronic means, with the intent to commit the offense of
theft in the second degree from any person or entity

 

continue,

o3aus
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

the second degree, in violation of HRS § 708-852 (Supp. 2006),?
and attempted theft in the second degree, in violation of HRS §
705~$00 (1993)* and HRS $ 708-831(1) (b) (Supp. 2006)*. We

accepted Woodfall’s application for a writ of certiorari, and

(2) Identity theft in the second degree ie a class B

felony.
(Emphasis added.)
> nas § 708-852 provides:

(2) A person commits the offense of forgery in the
second degree if, with intent to defraud, the person falsely
makes, completes, endorses, or alters 2 written instrurent,
Of utters s forged instrument, or fraudulently encodes the
agnetic ink character recognition sunbers, which 1s or
purports to be, of which is calculated to become or to,
tf completed, a deed, wiil, codieil, contract,

spt, commercial instrument, of other instrument shich
does or may evidence, cr oF
otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation, or

i2) rorgery in the second degree is a class C felony

  
 

 

+ aes $708.

 

0 provides, An ite entirety:

(2) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crine if
the person:

[al IntentSonally engages in conduct which would constitute
the crine if the attendant cireunstances Were as the person
believes them to ber or

() IntentLonally engages in conduct which, under the
circumstances as the person Believes them to be, constitutes a
Substantial step ina course of conduct intended to culmina
the person's commission of the crime.

(2) when causing a particular result is an element of the
erine, 3 person ie guilty of an attempt to commit the crime if)
acting with the state of mind required to establish lisbilicy with
Fespect to the attendant circurstances specified in the definition
Of the crime, the person intentionally engages in conduct which 1s
2 substantial step ina course of conduct intended of known to
Cause such a result,

[3) Conduct shati not be considered a substantial step under
this section unless lt is strongly corroborative af the
defendant’: criminal intent.

 

 

   

 

* onder ts § 708-851(1) (b), “[a} person commits the offense of
theft in the Te the pergon commits theft” “[olf property of
Services the ‘exceeds $300[.]"

2

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **
oral argunent was held on March 19, 2008.

Woodfall asserts that the ICA gravely erred by
affirming the circuit court's judgment of conviction, inasmuch as
the HRS $ 708-839.7 phrase “transmission of any personal
information of another” prohibits the “transmission of any
personal information” of an actual person, and he transmitted
information associated with a fictitious person.

Because HRS § 708-839.7 is susceptible to two
interpretations, we construe the statute under the rule of lenity
and in favor of Woodfall. Accordingly, we vacate the lower
court's judgment and order and remand the case to the circuit
court for resentencing.

‘BACKGROUND

 

Woodfall Charged With Identity Theft In The Second Degree

 

on March 6, 2006, the State of Hawai'l (“the
prosecution”) filed a complaint alleging that Woodfall committed
the following offenses: (1) identity theft in the second degree,
(2) forgery in the second degree, and (3) attempted theft in the
second degree. The parties did not dispute the facts that led to
this complaint. On February 27, 2006, Woodfall attempted to cash
a check from maker Design Build, Incorporated, payable to
Christopher 8. Bailey -- a fictitious person -~ at the First
Hawaiian Bank located at 438 Hobron Lane, in Honolulu, Hawai'i.
Woodfall identified himself to a bank teller as Christopher 8.
Bailey, presented an Idaho driver's license in the name of
Christopher 8. Bailey, and endorsed the check. when the teller
discovered that the account of the maker had insufficient funds
to cash the check, she subsequently contacted the maker’s bank

3
   

‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST

 

HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

branch. The teller was instructed to detain Woodfall and notify
the police. Upon investigation, the police discovered that the
maker did not issue “Christopher B. Bailey” a check and that
Christopher 8, Bailey was a fictitious person.
B.  Woodfall’s Motion To Dismiss Count T

Woodfali filed a motion to dismiss count I of the
complaint, identity theft in the second degree (“notion to
dismiss"), on December 27, 2006. Woodfall argued that, based on
Hawai'i case law and the HRS § 701-118(8) (Supp. 2006) definition
of “another,” the statutory language of HRS § 708-839.7
prohibiting “a transmission of any personal information of
another,” refers to the “transmission of any personal
information” of an actual person. Woodfall reasoned that he
attempted to assume a fictitious identity but did not attempt to
transmit the “personal information of another.” Therefore, he
urged the court to dismiss this count.

‘The prosecution filed an objection to this motion on
January 17, 2007, highlighting HRS § 708-639.7's phrase “personal
information.” The prosecution pointed out that for purposes of
Chapter 708, “personal information” is defined as “information
associated with an actual or a fictitious person . . . that is
used . . . to confirm the identity of an actual or a fictitious
person." HRS § 708-800. It concluded that the elements “a
transmission of any personal information of another” include “a
transmission of personal information of a fictitious person.”
(Emphasis added.)

At the January 17, 2007 hearing on this motion,
Woodfall argued that “the ‘personal information’ [of HRS 5 708-
{++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

839.7] is now qualified by the words ‘of another.’ The

definition ‘of another’ by statute or by case law is a human

 

being who was born and alive.” Woodfall’s counsel reiterated
that under the plain language of the statute, Woodfall cannot
“legally be found guilty of identity theft when he did not use
the identity of an actual real person.” The prosecution
countered that the statute and the statutory definitions of
“personal information” and “another” provide adequate notice that
the conduct requirement of HRS § 708-639.7 prohibits the
transmission of personal information of an actual or fictitious
person

In an order dated February 23, 2007, the circuit court
denied Woodfali's motion, concluding that the phrase in question
prohibits the transmission of any personal information of an
actual or fictitious person. The court rejected Woodfall’s
narrow interpretation of HRS $ 708-839.7, noting that it would be
“directly at odds” with the HRS § 708-800 definition of “personal
information.” It further held that “it certainly is not clear --
especially in light of [HRS $] 708-800's definition of ‘personal
information’ - that the legislature's use of ‘another! was meant
to exclude fictitious persons.” In denying Woodfall's motion,
the court constructed “another” as follows:

1A construction of the term “another” that would give force to and

Preserve both the legislature's intent to exclude tne tranceiseren

$be°835"7°and’the cincormation associated with a fictitious

person” Language of [HRS §] 108-800" Sefinition of "personal

Enformation” is simply ~~ "any real or fictitious person other
than the person trangaieeing the information.”

 

 

on January 17, 2007, Woodfall pled no contest to
forgery in the second degree and attempted theft in the second

5
   

"+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.
degree. After the court denied Woodfall’s motion to dismiss, on

June 15, 2007, Woodfall pled guilty to the charge of identity

 

theft in the second degree. The court agreed to follow the plea
agreenent between the prosecution and Woodfall, which included
the following terms: (1) Woodfall must serve an open ten year
tezm to run concurrently with counts II (open five year sentence)
and III (open five year sentence) and with any other sentence he
is serving, and (2) Woodfali’s guilty plea in count I is
conditional,‘ and Woodfall preserved the right to appeal the
circuit court’s ruling denying his motion to dismiss.

The court entered final judgment on October 10, 2007.
Woodfall filed @ notice of appeal on November 8, 2007.
C. ICA Affirmed The Circuit Court’s Ruling

on appeal, Woodfall argued that the plain language of
the HRS § 708-839.7 phrase “transmission of any personal
information of another” prohibits the transmission of personal
information from a real person, but not a fictitious person.

Woodfali also maintained that, even assuming that the statute is

 

ambiguous and the court is required to resort to the statute's
legislative history, extrinsic documents verify that the statute
intended to “provide criminal penalties for those who steal the
Adentity of another.” (Quoting Sen. Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 446,
in 2002 House Journal, at 1409-10.) (Emphasis in original.)

‘The prosecution argued that the circuit court's

 

* Onder Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 11(a) (2), “a defendant
nay enter a conditicnal plea of guilty of nolo contendere, reserving in
Writing the right, on appeal from the judgrent, to seek review of the adverse
Setermsnation of any specific pretrial motion, A defendant who prevails on
appeal shall be allawea to withdrew the plea.”

 

6
+ Yo UMC ATION IN WEST'S HANA REORTS AND PACE RORTER
sing a false of Gctitious sities.” (Quoting fee. Cont. Cerm
top. Ho. 25, An 2092 sooge Journ, at 2768.) (Bphasie in
origina.)
Seren ered orice re et es
es Lane et cst “Ere ety ae

with the intent to commit the
‘of theft in the second aegree™

 

 

 

often:

 

(Enphasis added.) Noting that “Woodfail admitted that he used a
fictitious identity with the intent to commit theft in the second
degree," the ICA declined to reverse the circuit court's decision
to deny Woodfall’s motion to dismiss. The ICA filed a judgnent
on appeal on Novenber 18, 2008.

on January 20, 2009, Woodfall filed a timely
application for writ of certiorari.

III, STANDARDS OF REVIEW

AL certiorari

‘The appropriate standard of review for determining

whether to accept or reject an application for writ of certiorari
 

‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

 

is set forth in Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 602-59 (Supp.
2008), as follows:

(a) After sesuance of the intermediate appellate court's
joggment ‘or disnissal order, a party may Seck review of the
Intermediate appellate cours’: Secision and judgment oF
dismissal order only by application to the suprene court for
a writ of certiorari, the acceptance or rejection of which
Shall be discretionary upon the supreme court, —{b) The
application for writ of certiorari shail tersely stave ite
Grounds, which shall include:
1) Grave errors of law oF of facts or (2) Obvious
inconsistencies in the decision of the intermediate:
appellate court with that of the suprene court, federal
Secisions, or its own decision, and the magnitude of those
errors of inconsistencies aictating the need for forther
sppeal.
Statutory Interpretation
“the interpretation of a statute is a question of law
reviewable de novo.” Capua v, Weyerhaeuser Co., 117 Hawai"i 439,
443, 184 P.3d 191, 196 (2008) (citing Flor v, Holguin, 94 Hawaii
10, 76, 9 P.3d 382, 388 (2000)) (brackets, citations, and

ellipses omitted). Statutory construction is guided by the

 

 

following rules:

First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute itself,

Second, where the statutory language 1s plain and
unambiguous, our scle duty is to give effect to ite plain
and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of
Statutory construction 2 our foremost obligation to
Sscertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature, wiich Ls to be obtained primarily from the
Isnguage contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when
there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness
or uncertainty of an expression used ina statute, an
ambiguity exists, “And fifth, in construing an ambiguous
Statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by
Gxanining the context, with which the ambiguous words,
Phrases, and sentences nay be compared, in order to
Sccertain their true meaning.

Carlisle v. One (1) Boat, 119 Hawai'i 245, 256, 195 P.3d 1177,
1188 (2008) (quoting In xe Contested Case Hearing on Water Use
Permit Application, 116 Hawai'i 481, 489-90, 174 P.3d 320, 328-29

 

 

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWA REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

(2007)) (block quotation format altered) .
III. DISCUSSION

As previously stated, Woodfall challenges the ICA's
interpretation of HRS § 708-839.7, arguing that the term “of
another” is a crucial and plain element of the statutory phrase
“transmission of any personal information of another.” He
further maintains, in the alternative, that this interpretation
is supported by the statute's legislative history: the statute's
purpose “is to provide criminal penalties for those who steal the
identity of another . . .” (Quoting Sen. Stand. Com. Rep. No.
2960, in 2002 Senate Journal at 1421.) Woodfall contends that
his use of @ fictitious identity did not satisty the conduct
element of identity theft in the second degree, and he urges this
court to vacate the circuit court’s order denying his motion to
dismiss this charge.
A. Plain Language of HRS § 708-839.7

To analyze HRS § 708-839.7, we begin with the language
of the statute itself. HAS § 708-839.7 provides, in relevant

part:

A person commits the offense of identity theft in the second
Gegree if chat person makes of causss to be made, either
Gizectly or indirectly,

‘a transmission of any personal
formation of ansther by any oral statenent, ony written
Statement, or any statement conveyed by any electronic,
eans, with the intent to sonait the offense of theft in the
Second degree from any person or entity.
(Emphasis added.) Specifically, we focus on the phrase “a
transmission of any personal information of another.”
“(Personal information” is defined in HRS $ 708-800,
for purposes of Chapter 708, as follows:

Antormaticn associated with an actual person of a fictitious

9
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWALI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

Reraon that 1s a name, an address, a telephone nunber, an
Glectronie mail address; a driver's License number, a/ social
Security nonber, an employer, 0 place of employment,
information related to enployment, an employee
identification aunber, a mother’s maiden name, an
identifying number ofa depository account, a bank account
funber, a password used for accessing information, or any
Sther fame, number, oF code that is used, alone or in
Conjunction wien other infermation, Eo sonfiem the identiey
pianactual ora fictitious person

 

(Emphases added.)
Similarly, we apply the HRS § 701-118 (Supp. 2006)
definition of “another” to HRS § 708-839.7, inasmuch as this
definition applies to the entire Hawai'i penal code “unless a
different meaning plainly is required.” We decline to accept the
prosecution’s argument that the HRS § 701-118 definition of
“another” is “special,” and that the identity theft statute
applies the “ordinary” dictionary meaning of “another.”” See HRS
§ 701-118 (defining various terms to apply “[iln this Code,
unless a different meaning is plainly required”); see also HRS §
701-102 (3) (1993) (“The provisions of chapters 701 through 706 of
the Code are applicable to offenses defined by other statutes,
unless the Code otherwise provides.”). Thus, “another,” as
stated in HRS § 708-839.7, employs the HRS $ 701-118 definition,
“any other person,” and “person” is further defined as “any
natural person.”* HRS § 701-118. “[A]nother” in HRS § 708-839.7,

° The prosecution contends that “the legislature desired the term

‘personal information’ ag defined in (HRS § 708-800) to be used in qualifying
the phrase “of another.” It argues that the definition of "personal
information” "is contained in the sane chapter as [HRS § 708-839.7) and
ereated by the same piece of legislation.” However, we aust first construct
the statute based on its plain language before considering extrinsic evidence.

 

 

+ person” is defined in HRS § 701-118's as, “any natural perscn,
including eny natural person whose sdentity can be established by means of
scientific analysis, including but not limited to scientific anslysia of
Geoxyribonucleic acid and fingerprints, whether or not the natural perscn’s
Eontinue...

 

 

10
 

++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +
therefore, refers to any “natural person” other than the person
who “makes or causes to be made, either directly or indirectly, a
transmission of any personal information . . . with the intent to
commit the offense of theft in the second degree from any person
or entity.” (Emphasis added.)

The terms of HRS § 703-839.7, therefore, conflict:
“another” is defined as a “natural person,” but “personal
information” includes “information associated with... a
fictitious person." Based on these differences, Woodfall and the
prosecution dispute the plain meaning of HRS $ 708-839.7.

According to Woodfall, the words “of another" is a
wmoditying term” of “personal information,” and “limit (] the
prohibitions of the statute only to information from a natural,

actual person.”* Therefore, HRS § 708-839.7 requires the

+ ccontinve
ame is known, and, where relevant, a corporation of an unincorporated

associationt]”

 

+ Alchough “another” is already defined in HRS § 708-118 for
purposes of the entire Hawai's penal code, see supra, Woodfall also points to
Hawai'i case law defining "another" for purposes of interpreting HRS’ $ 108
839.7. Woodfall cites to three cases, 1 Haw. Bpp- 13, 25,
613 P.24 1326, 1333 (1980) (determining that tho choice of evils defense vas
ot available co the defendant necause a natural person ~~ and not a delphin ~
“ia'*another,” pursuant to HRS § 701-116), Stace's. garding, 101 Hawa’: 3,
9-10, 61 F.3d 514, 519-20 (App. 2002) (holding that the defendant may not use
the choice of evils defense for protecting an unborn child where t)
Legislature did not Inclue “unborn children” in the definition of “another”
or person"), and stats v, Aiwshi, 109 fawai's 11S, 123 P.3d 1230 (2005),
arguing that’ they each Interpret “another” ag a “natural person” and not a
Fictitious person. Under the sane analysis of Levasseur and Jaxding, =
fictitious person ts not included in the definition of ‘ansther” or “person.”
See Levasseur, 1 Haw. App. at 25, 613 F.2d at 1333; Jarding, 101 Hawai'i at 9-
10, 61 P.3a at 519-20.

woodfall also cites to Aixohi to support his claim that “another”
clearly refers to an actual person. In Aiohi, this court reviewed the
Eequirenents of HRS § 707-702(1) (aj, which states that *(a) person commits the

 

 

 

 

   

 

  

offense of manslaughter if . . . {nje recklessly causes the death of anather
parson.” 109 Hawai at 118-29, 123 P.dd at 1213-24 (emphasis added) «The
continue.

a
   

‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWALI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

transmission of any other natural person's personal information.
In our view, Woodfall presents a strong argument. The words “of
another” appear to qualify the phrase “personal information.”
Woodfall’s interpretation of HRS § 808-839.7, therefore, may be
valid under the plain language of the statute.

‘The prosecution's interpretation of HRS § 708-839.7 is
also persuasive. As the circuit court reasoned, if the phrase

“personal information of another” “refers only to personal
information of a real person, not a fictitious person,” it would
directly contradict the statutory definition of “personal

information.” See HRS § 708-800 (defining “personal information”
as “information associated with an actual person or a fictitious

person”). Presented with these conflicting terms, the circuit

 

 

continue
defendant argued, anong other things, that her manslaughter prosecution
Contragicts the plain language of the manslaughter statute, inasmuch
joa prenatal conduct was directed at her fetus, which ie not a.
Foquires by the statute.” id, at 117, 123 P.34 at 1223. Tais court agreed,
Foling that (1) the manclaughter statute is clear and ambiguous and (2) a
tus does not fit within the RS § 707-700 definition of “person.” Id. at
126-29, 123'P.34 at 1223-24. Woodfall’s reliance of Aiuahi is sisplaced.
Aiwohi!s analysis of HRS $ 707-700's “person” is irrelevant here, where (1) we
are examining the word “another,” not “another person," and (2) the identity
theft statutes are not in Chapter 707 and are not governed by the chapter’ s
Sefinitions
The prosecution counters that Aiuohi actually supports its
interpretation of “another.” In Biuchi, this court noted that “person” is
defined, in two ways ~~ the general awai'l penal code definition ("any natural
jo defined in HRS § 701-118(7}) and the definition governing Le
hnunan being who has been born and is alive,” ae defined an HRS §
and applied the chapter's definition in interpreting the
manslaughter statute. 109 Hawai'i at 118, 123 P-3d at 1213. Based on Aiwohi,
The prosecution argues that “the definitions to be applied shovid come fron
the Sane chapter of the penal code as the charged offense, rather than using
general definitions from other chapters,” and that, here, “personal
Information” as defines in HRS § 108-800 trumps the definition ef "another" in
HRS § 701-118. Although this court applied the spectfic definition of
Sperton” to determing if the term inclodes a fetus, a# opposed to the general
Hguai's penal code definition of “person,” the two definitions did not
conflict. Aiuohi did not suggest ‘that the chapter's definicion trumps the
general pensi code definition:

 

 

    

 

 

   

 

 

   

        

    

 

 

 

12
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
court determined that the word “ancther” must refer to “any real
or fictitious person other than the person transmitting the
information.”

Constructing “another” this way would correspond with
the definition of “personal information,” but doing so would
impermissibly require this court to add terms to the definition
of “another.” See State v, Aiwohi, 109 Hawai‘i 115, 129, 123
P.3d 1210, 1224 (2005) (“(A] criminal statute ‘must be strictly
construed and . . . cannot be extended beyond the plain meaning
of the terms found therein.’ (quoting State v. Johnson, 50 Haw.
525, $26, 445 P.2d 36, 37 (1968)))7 State v, Mueller, 102 Hawai'i
391, 394, 76 P.3d 943, 946 (2003) (*[T]his court cannot change
the language of the statute, supply a want, or enlarge upon it in
order to make it suit a certain state of facts.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). We cannot accept this
construction, inasmuch as it would directly contradict the
definition of the word “another.”

The prosecution also asserts that the statute cannot
prohibit the transmission of “information associated with an
actual person” but not information associated with a fictitious
person because such a result would be absurd. See State v
Rates, @4 Hawai‘i 211, 220, 933 P.2d 48, 57 (1997) ("Provisions
of a penal statute will be accorded a limited and reasonable
interpretation . . . in order to preserve its overall purpose and
to avoid absurd results.”). Tt claims that the identity theft
statutes were “designed to protect individuals and businesses
from loss due to @ defendant's misrepresentation of his actual

identity.” We disagree, As further discussed below, the

3
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *
legislature appeared to be concerned with protecting the person
whose identity was stolen. See Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 446,
in 2002 House Journal, at 1409-10 (expressing concern that
“misappropriation of other people's identification information is
on the rise”); Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 25, in 2002 House
Journal, at 1765 (same); see also infra.

Indeed, in recognition of the harms of identity theft,
the U.S. Congress provided additional criminal penalties for
identity theft “of another person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2004)
(imposing a term of imprisonment of two years to a person
committing certain felony violation and “knowingly
transfer[ring], possesses(sing], or us{ing], without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person”). In
adopting this legislation, the Committee on the Judiciary noted
the increasing problem of identity theft, “crimes in which
someone wrongfully obtains and uses another person's personal
data in some way that involves fraud or deception, typically for
economic or other gain. . . .” H.R. Rep, No. 108-528, at 4
(2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N, 779, 780 (emphasis added).
Tt observed the FTC's random sample survey that suggested that
almost ten million Americans were victims of some form of
identity theft in 2003. Id. It further noted that identity
theft threatens national security and that it cost businesses and
financial institutions $47.6 billion and individual consumers

95.0 billion, and that it harmed the credit rating of the person

4
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
those identity was stolen.” Id. Contrary to the prosecution's
argument, it would not be absurd if HRS § 708-839.7 provided
criminal penalties for transmitting the personal information of
another actual person but not the information of a fictitious
person, with the intent to commit theft in the second degree from
any person or entity.

Because both parties’ construction of the identity
theft in the second degree statute are plausible based on the
statute's plain language, we next consider the legislature's
intent in creating the statute.

B. Extrinsic Aids

As previously quoted,

in the event of anbiguity in a statute, the meaning of the
ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which
the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in
order to ascertain their true aeaning- Moreover, the coures may

Fesort to extringic aids in determining legislative intent, such
a5 legislative history, oF the reason and spirit of the law

 

State v. Baviv, 118 Hawai'i 1, 7, 185 P.3d 186, 192 (2008)
(citing Peterson v. Hawaii Elec, Light Cou, Inc., 85 Hawaii 322,
327-28, 944 P.2d 1265, 1270-71 (1997), superseded on other
grounds by HRS § 269-15.5 (Supp. 1999)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

1. Legislative history of HRS $ 708-839.7

‘The original bill that enacted HRS § 708-839.7, House

Bill 2498, sought to amend chapter 708 by adding new sections

" smples of the danage that people wer:
capable of when stealing another person’ s identity == they used the identities
of other actual people ss part of a pict to blow up Los Angeles International
Airport and to obtain Federal incone tax returns, loans and Lines of credit,
nd government benefits, H.R. Rep. No. 108-S28, at Su6 (2004), reprinted io
200¢°0.5-C.C.A.N. at 781-82.

       

 

 

 

a5
 

HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’
regarding (1) “identity theft,” (2) “obtaining a government-
issued identification document under false pretenses,” and (3)

“deceptive use of a fictitious identity.” H.B, No. 2438, 2ist

 

The Lil sought to add three new sections regarding identity
theft, which were entitied “Identity theft in the first degree,” "Identity
theft ‘in the Second dearee, ana "Identity thefe in the thiza degree.”

ks §.708-839.6 (Supp. 2008), entitled “Identity theft in the first
degree,” provides in relevant pare

 

(2) A person conaits the offense of identity theft in the
first degree if that person makes or causes to be made, either
directly of indirectly, a transniasion of any peracnal information
of another by any oral statement, any written statement, oF any.
Statement conveyed by any electronic means, with the intent cot

a) Facilitate the commission of a murder in any degree, 2
class A felony, Kisnapping, unlawful imprisonment in any degree,
extortion in any degree, any offense Under chapter 134, crininal
property damage in she firet or second degres, scape. in any
Gogree, any offense under part VI of chapter 110, any offense
under Section 711-1103, or any offense under chapter 842; or

(B) Conmit the offense of theft in the first degree from the
person whose personal information is used, or from any other
person or entity.

 

 

 

 

RS § 708-839.8 (Supp. 2008), entitled “Identity theft in the thir
degree,” states:

(2) A person commits the offense of identity theft in the
third degree’ if that person Makes or causes to be made, either
Girectiy or indirectly, a tranemiesion of any personal information
Of another by any oral statement, any written statement, OF any.
Statement conveyed by any electronic means, with the sncent £0
Commit the offense of theft in the third of fourth degree from any
person oF entity.
(2) Tdentity theft in che third degree is a class C felony.

   

% The proposed “Deceptive use of a fictitious identity” anendzent

(2) A person commits the offense of deceptive use of &
fictitious identity if that person, with the intent to deceive the
person or entaty to whom the statement is directed, makes oF
Eouses to be made, either directly or indirectly, by any oral
Statenent, any written statenent, of any statenent conveyed by ani
Slectronie means, a trananisaion of fictitious personal”
Infornation of 2 person purported to be real but who ie
flotitious.

(2) Deceptive use of 2 fictitious identity is a misdensancr,

H.B. No. 2438, 2st Leg., Reg. Sess. (2002).

16
 

* FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Leg., Reg. Sess. (2002).! The legislature passed this act, but
removed the bill's “deceptive use of a fictitious identity”
amendment and the “personal information” definition for HRS
Chapter 710. H.B, No. 2438, H.D. 1, 2ist Leg., Reg. Sess.
(2002); H.B. No. 2438, H.D. 1, S.D. 1, 21st Leg., Reg. Sess.
(2002); #.B. No. 2438, H.D. 1, S.D. 1, C.D. 1, 2ist Leg., Reg.
Sess. (2002).

The Conference Committee report, written by the
committee that last amended House Bill 2438, provided that “(tJhe
purpose of this bill is to provide criminal penalties for
Persons: (1) Committing identity theft of another individual;
and (2) Obtaining identity documents under false pretenses or
using a false or fictitious identity.” Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No.
25, in 2002 House Journal, at 1765. Importantly, the final form
of the bill was intended to criminalize “identity theft of
another individual,” (emphasis added), indicating that the
legislature intended that the identity theft statutes only relate
to the transmission of another actual person's personal
information. Moreover, the legislative intent to criminalize

“using a false or fictitious identity,” appears to relate to the

 

amendnent regarding obtaining a government-issued identification
document under false pretenses, inasmuch as it is juxtaposed with

the purpose of prohibiting a person from “[olbtaining identity

committees on Judiciary and Hawaiian Affaire and
ind Commerce announced that the bill served to criminalize
acts that appear to correspond with those sections: (1) “[s]tealing the
identity of another (first section), (2) “{o]beaining identity documents
under £21se pretenses” (secona section), ana (3) "(u)sing false or
fictitious identity (thira section) Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 446, in 2002
House Journal, at 1408-10 (emphasis added

   

 

   

   

   

uv
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
documents under false pretenses or using a false or fictitious
identity.

Furthermore, in discussing the problem of identity
theft," the House Judiciary and Hawaiian Affairs and Consumer
Protection and Commerce Committee and the Conference Committee

took issue with transmitting any other actual person’s
information. The committees expressed concern that

the penalty for “using a false or fictitious identity,” refers to
tthe criminal statutes fegarding “sbtaining 2 government-issued identification
document under false pretenses” (codified as HRS §§ 710-1016.3-.4 (Supp.
2008))-. HRS $§ 710-1016. 3~.4 provide criminal penalties for’a person who
“obtaiA(s] identity documents =» - using's false or fictitious identity.”
‘These sections. pronibie:

      

obtain(ing) an identification document tesued by the state
oF any political subdivision therect by (a) (mlsking any
satemant, oral or written,

Eolbetrue, “in an application for any identification
Gocument issued by the State or any political subaivision
thereof; or (b) (slubmitting or inviting reliance on any
uriting that the person knows to be falsely mags, completed,
or altered

 

HRS $6 710-1016.3-.4 (emphases added). Under these statutes, 2 person is
prohibited from knowingly falsely identifying him or herself’ as a fictitious
Person to “obtein() an identification document issued by the State or any
political subdivision thereof.” The plain language of the statute inde
Sprovide(s) criminal penalties for persons ... . (obtaining identity
documents under false pretenses oF

Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 25, in 2002 Rouse Journal, at 1763 {emphasis added) .

 

 

1 the Senate committee on Judiciary discussed the broader issues
related to identity theft, as follows:

[t)0 Light of the terrorist attacks of september 11, 2001,
tthe rans fications of identity theft have proven much nore
grave than previously thought. Iéentity theft, » nage
Problem in financial fraud and theft cases, now has.
Inplicacions for national security. This measure. provides a
comprehensive framework of statutes to deal with the various
aspects of identity theft

Sen. Stand. Comm, Rap. No. 2960, in 2002 Senate Journal, at 1421. these
consequences of identity theft are generally the sane so those described by
‘the U.S. Congress when adopting 18 0.5.c. § 1028A (2004), waich imposes a term
of imprisonsent of two years to a person committing a certain felony viclation
and “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, 3
means of identification of another gezson.” "(Emphasis added.) See supra.

18
 

“+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTE!

 

“misappropriation of other people's identification information is
on the rise.” Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 446, in 2002 House
Journal, at 1409-10; Hse. Conf, Comm. Rep. No. 25, in 2002 House
Journal, at 1765 (emphasis added). Based on this specified
problem and the Conference Committee’s report, it follows that
HRS § 708-839.7 relates to @ person from transmitting an actual
person's personal information, but not the information associated
with a fictitious person.

a ing mation”

Though the legislature clearly intended that HRS § 708-

839.7 relate to the transmission of another actual person's
information, this construction renders a portion of the HRS §
708-800 definition of “personal information” superfluous. See
HRS § 708-800 (defining “personal information” as “information
associated with an actual person or a fictitious person. . . to
confirm the identity of an actual or a fictitious person). ‘This
definition is particularly relevant in constructing HRS § 708-
839.7 because it was created in the same legislation as HRS §
708-839.7."* 2002 Haw. Sess. L, Act 224, § 1 at 894-96, In
Light of the “personal information” definition and the expressed
legislative intent of Act 224, it is not entirely clear whether
the identity theft statute is meant to prohibit the transmission
of the information of a fictitious person.
¢. The Rule of Lenity

When a statute is ambiguous, and the legislative

 

In addition, we note that the “personal information” phrase
rs only three times in HRS Chapter 108, specifically in the identity

   

29
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAll REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *
history does not provide sufficient guidance, we follow the rule
of lenity. Aiwohi, 109 Hawai'i at 126, 123 P.3d at 1213 (“In the
absence of clear statutory language, and with no legislative

guidance vis-
is the rule of lenity.” (citing State v. Shimabukuro, 100

Hawai'i 324, 327, 60 P.3d 274, 277 (2002) (stating that “[w)here

 

vis legislative history, the applicable doctrine

a criminal statute is ambiguous, it is to be interpreted
according to the rule of lenity”))); State v. Kaakimaka, 84
Hawai'i 280, 292, 933 P.2d 617, 629 (1997) (stating that
“{almbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity”) (citations omitted). This “means
that the court will not interpret a state criminal statute so as
to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such
an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what
the legislature intended.” State v. Sakamoto, 101 Hawai'i 409,
413 n.3, 70 F.3d 635, 639 n.3 (2003) (quoting State v. Soto, e4
Hawai's 229, 248-49, 933 P.2d 66, 85-86 (1997)). Accordingly,
“{ulnder the rule of lenity, the statute must be strictly
construed against the government and in favor of the accused.”
State v. Kalani, 108 Hawai'i 279, 268, 118 P.34 1222, 1231 (2005)
(quoting Shimabukure, 100 Hawai'i at 327, 60 P.3d at 277)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bayly, 118 Hawai'i
at 15, 185 P.3d at 200 (ruling that, under the rule of lenity, it

 

is "more appropriate to adopt a less expansive meaning of the
tem “collision")

Because HRS § 708-8397 1s ambiguous and the
Legislative history does not provide sufficient guidance, we must

apply the rule of lenity and adopt a less expansive meaning of

20
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
the phrase “personal information of another.” We hold that the
HRS § 708-839.7 phrase “transmission of any personal information
of another” prohibits the transmission of personal information of
an actual person, but not the transmission of information
associated with a fictitious person, Because Woodfall did not
transmit the personal information of an actual person, he did not
satisfy the conduct element of HRS § 708-839.7 and cannot be
convicted of identity theft in the second degree. Therefore, the
circuit court erred when it denied Woodfall’s “Motion to Dismiss
{Identity Theft In The Second Degree].”
IV. concnusroN

Accordingly, we (1) vacate the ICA’s November 18, 2008
judgment, the circuit court’s October 10, 2007 final judgment,
and the circuit court’s February 23, 2007 order denying
Woodfall's motion to dismiss, and (2) remand this case to the
circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

on the briets Cpe

Jon N. Tkenaga,

Deputy Public Defender,
for petitioner-appellant esi Gaetan
Delanie D. Prescott-rate,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, PONS
for respondent-appellee

Yoren£, Duty +

BE

21