Title: State ex rel. Bd. of State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Bd. of State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis, 113 Ohio St.3d 
410, 2007-Ohio-2205.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BOARD OF STATE TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF 
OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DAVIS, JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Bd. of State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis, 
113 Ohio St.3d 410, 2007-Ohio-2205.] 
Writ of procedendo — Final appealable order — Civ.R. 50(B) — Judgment 
affirmed. 
(Nos. 2006-2006, 2006-2172, and 2006-2173 ─ Submitted March 13, 2007 ─ 
Decided May 23, 2007.) 
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-060760. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is a consolidated appeal from a judgment granting a writ of 
procedendo to compel a common pleas court judge to conduct a retrial of those 
claims upon which the jury could not reach a verdict in a civil action and denying 
motions to intervene in the procedendo case.  We affirm. 
Board Lawsuit Against Medco and Merck 
{¶ 2} The State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio entered into 
contracts with appellants Medco Health Solutions, Inc. and affiliated companies 
(“Medco”) in 1993, 1996, and 1999, under which Medco acted as a pharmacy 
benefit manager for the retirement system. 
{¶ 3} In December 2003, appellee, the Board of the State Teachers 
Retirement System of Ohio, filed a civil action in the Hamilton County Court of 
Common Pleas against appellants Medco and its parent company, Merck & 
Company, Inc. (“Merck”).  The board alleged that Medco had breached its 
contracts by failing to pay approximately $50 million in rebates that Medco owed 
to the retirement system and by charging mail-order dispensing fees that Medco 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
had agreed not to charge.  The board further alleged that Medco committed fraud 
and breached its fiduciary duty to the retirement system, unlawfully acting to 
benefit Medco and Merck.  The board sought compensatory and punitive damages 
as well as an award of attorney fees against Medco.  The board also claimed that 
Merck was jointly liable for Medco’s actions and that Merck had tortiously 
interfered with the contractual or business relationship between the board and 
Medco. 
{¶ 4} On December 19, 2005, following a four-week trial and many days 
of deliberations, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the board on its claims 
against Medco for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud and awarded 
the board a total of $7,815,000 in compensatory damages.  The jury further found 
that Merck was jointly liable for Medco’s actions. 
{¶ 5} The jury found in favor of Medco on the board’s claim for breach 
of contract concerning the mail-order dispensing fees and in favor of Merck on 
the board’s tortious-interference claim. 
{¶ 6} The jury could not, however, reach a verdict and failed to answer 
special interrogatories on the board’s remaining request for punitive damages and 
breach-of-contract claim concerning rebates.  The jury left interrogatories on 
these matters blank.  Appellant Judge David P. Davis of the common pleas court 
declared the jury hung on these issues and discharged the jury, but he did not 
declare a mistrial or schedule a retrial on the undecided matters.  Judge Davis and 
the parties agreed that the normal time limits for posttrial matters would be 
extended to 45 days. 
Initial Posttrial Matters 
{¶ 7} The board filed proposed entries, including one that would declare 
a mistrial and set a retrial of the unresolved issues.  Medco filed a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on these issues, claiming that the evidence 
was insufficient to support either the board’s claims for breach of contract on 
January Term, 2007 
3 
rebates or punitive damages regardless of the jury’s failure to reach a verdict on 
these issues. 
{¶ 8} At a hearing on the posttrial matters, Judge Davis stated that he 
would deny Medco’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the 
unresolved matters and that the board had waived its right to a retrial of these 
issues because it did not file a motion within 14 days after the jury had been 
discharged. 
February 22, 2006 Entry 
{¶ 9} On February 22, 2006, Judge Davis issued a “final judgment entry” 
in the case, which included the following language: 
{¶ 10} “This action came on for trial before the Court and a jury, and the 
issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly rendered its verdict, 
{¶ 11} “IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff, Board of 
the State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio, recover of the Defendants, Medco 
Health Solutions, Inc. and Merck & Company, Inc., jointly and severally, the sum 
of $7,815,000, and the costs of this action. 
{¶ 12} “Pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 54(B), this Court expressly 
determines that there is no just reason for delay.” 
{¶ 13} Shortly thereafter, Judge Davis issued an entry denying Medco’s 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the unresolved claims. 
Appeals from February 22, 2006 Entry 
{¶ 14} The Court of Appeals for Hamilton County dismissed appeals from 
Judge Davis’s February 22, 2006 entry for lack of a final appealable order and 
denied Medco’s request for clarification regarding whether Judge Davis had erred 
in ruling that the board had waived its right to a retrial of the unresolved issues.  
We declined to accept Medco’s and Merck’s discretionary appeals from the court 
of appeals’ judgment.  Bd. of State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Medco 
Health Solutions, Inc., 110 Ohio St.3d 1466, 2006-Ohio-4288, 852 N.E.2d 1214. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
Additional Posttrial Motions 
{¶ 15} The board filed motions in the common pleas court for a new trial 
on the unresolved issues, or in the alternative, for relief from any judgment on 
these issues, as well as a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new 
trial on the claims that the jury had decided against the board. 
{¶ 16} Medco filed a motion for the common pleas court to journalize 
Judge Davis’s previous oral ruling concerning the board’s waiver of its right to a 
new trial and to amend the court’s February 22, 2006 entry. 
September 5, 2006 Entry 
{¶ 17} On September 5, 2006, Judge Davis issued the following “order 
and final judgment entry”: 
{¶ 18} “This action came on for trial before the Court and a jury, and the 
issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly rendered its verdict, 
{¶ 19} “IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff, Board of 
the State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio, recover of the Defendants, 
[Medco and Merck], jointly and severally, the sum of $7,815,000, and the costs of 
this action. 
{¶ 20} “Plaintiff’s Motion to Submit Supplement Argument for 
Consideration by the Court and Argument is hereby DENIED. 
{¶ 21} “Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial or, in the Alternative for Relief 
from Judgment and a New Trial, on the Hung Jury Issues is hereby DENIED.  
The Court holds that Plaintiff has waived its right to a new trial for failure to file a 
timely motion pursuant to Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure 50(B) and 6(B). 
{¶ 22} “Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
Pursuant to Rule 50(B) and Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59 is hereby 
DENIED. 
January Term, 2007 
5 
{¶ 23} “Medco’s Motion to Journalize the Court’s Ruling on Rule 50(B) 
Waiver and to Amend its Final Judgment Entry Proposed Order and Entry 
Attached, in which Merck & Co., Inc. has joined, is hereby GRANTED.” 
Appeals from Sept. 5, 2006 Entry 
{¶ 24} The board, Medco, and Merck filed separate appeals from Judge 
Davis’s September 5, 2006 entry.  The board filed a motion for extraordinary 
relief and to dismiss its “protective” appeal for lack of a final appealable order.  
The court of appeals issued three separate entries dismissing the appeals for lack 
of a final appealable order. 
{¶ 25} Medco and Merck appealed these entries to this court in case Nos. 
2006-2169 (Medco), 2006-2170 (Merck), and 2006-2171 (Medco and Merck).  
These are all pending before us as discretionary appeals. 
Procedendo Action 
{¶ 26} On September 8, 2006, the board filed a petition in the Court of 
Appeals for Hamilton County for a writ of procedendo or mandamus to compel 
Judge Davis “to proceed with retrial of each claim and issue not previously 
decided by the jury.”  In its petition, the board named Judge Davis as a respondent 
and Medco and Merck as defendants.  A copy of the petition was served on Judge 
Davis, Medco, and Merck. 
{¶ 27} On October 12, 2006, the court of appeals issued entries denying 
Medco’s and Merck’s motions to intervene, denying Judge Davis’s motion to 
dismiss, and granting a peremptory writ of procedendo to compel Judge Davis to 
“proceed with retrial of those claims or causes of action upon which the jury 
could not reach a verdict.” 
{¶ 28} Judge Davis, Medco, and Merck filed appeals as of right from the 
court of appeals’ judgment granting the writ (case No. 2006-2006), Medco 
appealed the court of appeals’ denial of its motion to intervene and the judgment 
granting the writ (case No. 2006-2172), and Merck appealed the court of appeals’ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
denial of its motion to intervene and the judgment granting the writ (case No. 
2006-2173). 
{¶ 29} On December 19, 2006, we consolidated the three direct appeals 
from the writ case:  case Nos. 2006-2006, 2006-2172, and 2006-2173.  State ex 
rel. Bd. of State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis, 112 Ohio St.3d 1411, 
2006-Ohio-6709, 858 N.E.2d 821.  We also consolidated the three discretionary 
appeals from the court of appeals’ dismissal of appeals from Judge Davis’s 
September 5, 2006 entry (case Nos. 2006-2169, 2006-2170, and 2006-2171) for 
lack of a final appealable order and held them for the decisions in the direct 
appeals.  Bd. of State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Medco Health 
Solutions, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 1411, 2006-Ohio-6709, 858 N.E.2d 821. 
{¶ 30} On January 24, 2007, we denied Medco’s and Merck’s motion to 
stay the court of appeals’ judgment granting the writ of procedendo.  State ex rel. 
Bd. of State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis, 112 Ohio St.3d 1438, 
2007-Ohio-152, 860 N.E.2d 764. 
{¶ 31} This cause is now before the court for its consideration of the 
merits of the consolidated appeals from the court of appeals’ issuance of the writ 
of procedendo and denial of Medco’s and Merck’s motions to intervene.1 
Procedendo: Legal Right and Legal Duty 
{¶ 32} Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in granting a writ 
of procedendo to compel Judge Davis to retry the claims upon which the jury 
failed to reach a verdict. 
{¶ 33} In order to be entitled to a writ of procedendo, the board had to 
establish a clear legal right to require Judge Davis to retry the unresolved claims, 
a clear legal duty on the part of Judge Davis to retry these claims, and the lack of 
                                                 
1.  We deny appellee’s motion to dismiss these appeals. 
January Term, 2007 
7 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Weiss v. Hoover 
(1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 530, 531-532, 705 N.E.2d 1227. 
{¶ 34} Regarding the first two requirements for the writ, procedendo is 
the appropriate remedy when a court has either refused to render a judgment or 
has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment.  State ex rel. CNG Financial 
Corp. v. Nadel, 111 Ohio St.3d 149, 2006-Ohio-5344, 855 N.E.2d 473, ¶ 20.  An 
“inferior court’s refusal or failure to timely dispose of a pending action is the ill a 
writ of procedendo is designed to remedy.”  State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 104, 110, 637 N.E.2d 319; State ex rel. Rodak v. Betleski, 
104 Ohio St.3d 345, 2004-Ohio-6567, 819 N.E.2d 703, ¶ 16.  For example, “a 
writ of procedendo will issue to require a court to proceed to final judgment if the 
court has erroneously stayed the proceeding.”  State ex rel. Watkins v. Eighth 
Dist. Court of Appeals (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 532, 535, 696 N.E.2d 1079. 
{¶ 35} Judge Davis did not declare a mistrial and order a retrial of the 
issues upon which the jury failed to answer interrogatories.  Civ.R. 49(B) requires 
a court to “submit written interrogatories to the jury, together with appropriate 
forms for a general verdict, upon request of any party prior to the commencement 
of argument” and further requires the court to “direct the jury both to make 
written answers and to render a general verdict.”  The jury failed to answer the 
interrogatories concerning the board’s claims for punitive damages and breach of 
contract concerning rebates, and the jury’s general verdict included no decision on 
these matters. 
{¶ 36} “The failure of a jury to answer such interrogatories constitutes a 
mistrial and necessitates a new trial.”  Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niemiec (1961), 
172 Ohio St. 53, 15 O.O.2d 94, 173 N.E.2d 118, paragraph four of the syllabus.  
In other words, “[t]he function of a jury is to decide the questions of fact.  Until 
this has been accomplished the trial has not been completed and the case must be 
retried.”  Id. at 55. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶ 37} Judge Davis ruled, however, based on Medco’s and Merck’s 
arguments, that the board had waived its right to a retrial because the board had 
failed to file a timely motion for a new trial within 14 days of the discharge of the 
jury pursuant to Civ.R. 50(B).  This ruling lacks merit because regardless of 
whether a timely motion for a new trial had been filed, a new trial was necessary. 
{¶ 38} “The plaintiff complains that the defendant’s motion for a new trial 
was not seasonably filed.  One difficulty with this contention is that, with or 
without a motion for a new trial, a new trial was necessary since the first trial 
never was completed.”  (Emphasis added.)  Aetna, 172 Ohio St. at 56, 15 O.O.2d 
94, 173 N.E.2d 118. 
{¶ 39} Nothing in Civ.R. 50(B) alters this conclusion.  That rule 
authorizes a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to be filed within 14 
days after the jury has been discharged “if a verdict was not returned” and 
additionally permits a party to file a motion for a new trial in conjunction with the 
motion.  Civ.R. 50(B) reads:  “[I]f a verdict was not returned such party, within 
fourteen days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion.  A motion for a new trial may be joined with this 
motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative.”  But the board never 
filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Civ.R. 50(B) 
on the unresolved matters because it did not believe it was entitled to a final 
judgment in its favor on these unresolved issues.  The board did not need to join a 
new-trial motion to a nonexistent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
on the unresolved claims.  And in any event, Civ.R. 50(B) does not require that a 
party file a new-trial motion in conjunction with a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict; the rule merely permits a party to do so.  
Consequently, the board was not required to file a new-trial motion within the 
time specified in Civ.R. 50(B) in order to preserve its right to a retrial of the 
unresolved claims. 
January Term, 2007 
9 
{¶ 40} Finally, the trial court judge’s citation of Napierala v. 
Szczublewski, Lucas App. No. L-02-1025, 2002-Ohio-7109, in support of its 
finding that the board had waived its right to pursue a new trial is inapposite 
because the claim in that case was of alleged inconsistencies in jury 
interrogatories.  There are no inconsistencies here.  Instead, there is a failure to 
answer some of the interrogatories. 
{¶ 41} Therefore, the board has established a clear legal right to require 
Judge Davis to retry the unresolved matters and a clear legal duty on the part of 
Judge Davis to proceed with the retrial. 
Procedendo: Lack of Adequate Remedy 
{¶ 42} Appellants contend that even if the board has a right to retrial of 
the unresolved claims, the court of appeals erred in granting a writ of procedendo 
to compel the retrial because the board had an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law by way of appeal from either the February 22, 2006 entry or the 
September 5, 2006 entry. 
{¶ 43} Appellants correctly assert that procedendo is not appropriate when 
the party seeking the writ has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, 
e.g., appeal.  See State ex rel. Non-Employees of Chateau Resident Assn. v. 
Kessler, 107 Ohio St.3d 197, 2005-Ohio-6182, 837 N.E.2d 778, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 44} Nevertheless, the September 5, 2006 entry issued by Judge Davis 
is not a final appealable order.  Under Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution, courts of appeals have “such jurisdiction as may be provided by law 
to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of 
record inferior to the court of appeals within the district.”  R.C. 2505.03(A) limits 
the appellate jurisdiction of courts of appeals to the review of final orders, 
judgments, or decrees.  An order is a final appealable order if it “affects a 
substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a 
judgment.”  R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
{¶ 45} “ ‘For an order to determine the action and prevent a judgment for 
the party appealing, it must dispose of the whole merits of the cause or some 
separate and distinct branch thereof and leave nothing for the determination of the 
court.’ ”  State ex rel. Downs v. Panioto, 107 Ohio St.3d 347, 2006-Ohio-8, 839 
N.E.2d 911, ¶ 20, quoting Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Retardation & Developmental 
Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of Ohio (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 147, 153, 545 
N.E.2d 1260.  “ ‘A judgment that leaves issues unresolved and contemplates that 
further action must be taken is not a final appealable order.’ ”  State ex rel. Keith 
v. McMonagle, 103 Ohio St.3d 430, 2004-Ohio-5580, 816 N.E.2d 597, ¶ 4, 
quoting Bell v. Horton (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 694, 696, 756 N.E.2d 1241. 
{¶ 46} As noted previously, because the jury did not answer the 
interrogatories and determine the board’s claims for punitive damages and for 
breach of contract concerning rebates, the trial has not been completed, and a 
retrial must be ordered.  Aetna, 172 Ohio St. at 55, 15 O.O.2d 94, 173 N.E.2d 118.  
Because Judge Davis’s September 5 entry leaves these claims unresolved, it does 
not constitute a final appealable order.  Notably, the board’s request for “ 
‘punitive damages is not a separate claim in itself but rather an issue in the overall 
claim for damages.’ ”  Hitchings v. Weese (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 390, 391, 674 
N.E.2d 688 (Resnick, J. concurring), quoting Horner v. Toledo Hosp. (1993), 94 
Ohio App.3d 282, 288, 640 N.E.2d 857; see, also, Blosser v. Beck (Sept. 18, 
1996), Fairfield App. No. 95 CA 31, 1996 WL 570867, *1 (appeal from entry 
resolving compensatory damages claim dismissed for lack of final appealable 
order because claims for punitive damages and attorney fees had not been 
determined). 
{¶ 47} Moreover, the trial court’s determination of waiver of a new 
trial─in addition to being erroneous─did not effect a final judgment in favor of 
either the board or Medco and Merck on the unresolved claims.  In fact, Judge 
Davis had denied Medco’s and Merck’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
January Term, 2007 
11 
verdict on these claims.  Consequently, the trial court’s waiver ruling did not 
determine the action and prevent a judgment. 
{¶ 48} Further, the mere fact that Judge Davis ruled on various posttrial 
motions in his September 5 entry did not transform the interlocutory order into a 
final appealable order.  See, e.g., Schelich v. Theatre Effects, Inc. (1996), 111 
Ohio App.3d 271, 272, 675 N.E.2d 1349 (“a default judgment which continued 
the matter to determine damages failed to constitute a final, appealable order.  
Thus, any judgment vacating that order was also not a final, appealable order”); 
Pinson v. Triplett (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 46, 9 OBR 49, 458 N.E.2d 461 
(“Because [a default judgment setting a hearing on damages] is not a final 
appealable order * * *, the order declining to vacate it cannot be a final appealable 
order”). 
{¶ 49} Finally, Judge Davis’s February 22, 2006 entry also does not 
support appellants’ contention that an adequate remedy by way of appeal barred 
the board’s procedendo claim.  The court of appeals previously dismissed appeals 
from that entry for lack of a final appealable order, and we declined jurisdiction 
over Medco’s and Merck’s discretionary appeals from those dismissals.  “Under 
the law-of-the-case doctrine, the denial of jurisdiction over a discretionary appeal 
by this court settles the issue of law appealed.”  Sheaffer v. Westfield Ins. Co., 110 
Ohio St.3d 265, 2006-Ohio-4476, 853 N.E.2d 275, syllabus.  The court of 
appeals’ prior determination that the February 22, 2006 entry is not a final 
appealable order remained the law of the case for subsequent proceedings, 
including the procedendo case. 
{¶ 50} Therefore, the board lacked an adequate remedy by way of appeal 
to challenge Judge Davis’s entries. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 51} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals acted properly when it 
granted the writ of procedendo to compel Judge Davis to retry the unresolved 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
claims.  The board established all of the prerequisites for the requested 
extraordinary relief.  Moreover, any error by the court of appeals in denying 
Medco’s and Merck’s motions to intervene in the procedendo case was not 
prejudicial because a consideration of their motions to dismiss would not have 
warranted modification of the court’s judgment granting the writ.  See State ex 
rel. Kline v. Carroll, 96 Ohio St.3d 404, 2002-Ohio-4849, 775 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 28 
(any error in not granting motion to intervene in prohibition action was harmless 
when court of appeals’ judgment granting the writ was appropriate).  Therefore, 
we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur separately. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
{¶ 52} Although I concur in the opinion of the majority, I write separately 
to acknowledge that Judge Davis has complied with the order of the court of 
appeals in that he has ordered a retrial of the issues before a visiting judge. 
{¶ 53} However, that fact does not moot this case, as the underlying issue 
is whether a writ of procedendo was the appropriate legal vehicle by which to 
challenge the issue of requiring a retrial.  Our opinion resolves that legal issue in 
affirming that a writ of procedendo was the appropriate remedy here.  The 
remaining issues may now proceed to a retrial.  Because the legal issue was not 
mooted by the judge’s compliance, I concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley Co., L.P.A., Stanley M. Chesley, 
Paul M. DeMarco, Robert Heuck II, and W.B. Markovits, for appellee. 
January Term, 2007 
13 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christian J. 
Schaefer and Colleen McCarren, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant 
Judge David P. Davis. 
 
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Ronald S. Kopp, and Stephen W. Funk, for 
appellants Medco Health Solutions, Inc. and affiliated companies, and Merck & 
Co., Inc. 
______________________