Title: Meerscheidt v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Meerscheidt v. State1997 WY 2931 P.2d 220Case Number: 96-26, 96-33, 96-27, 96-28Decided: 01/08/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

Troy MEERSCHEIDT, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). Matt BENNETT, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). Nate DOBSON, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). Mike DAVID, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas 
G. Kalokathis, J.

Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Deborah 
Cornia, Appellate Counsel; and Donna D. Domonkos, Assistant Appellate Counsel, 
for Meerscheidt and David.

James W. Gusea of Gusea, Pattno & White, 
P.C., Cheyenne, for Bennett.

Ronald G. Pretty, Cheyenne, for 
Dobson.

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director of the Prosecution Assistance Program; and T. Alan Elrod and Michael A. 
Iozzo, Student Interns for the Prosecution Assistance Program, for 
State.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      These cases arose 
out of the same criminal conduct and were consolidated by this Court for oral 
argument and decision. Appellants Troy Meerscheidt, Matt Bennett, and Nate 
Dobson appeal from the judgments and sentences which the district court entered 
after each of them pleaded guilty to two counts of felony property destruction. 
Appellant Mike David appeals from the judgment and sentence which the district 
court entered after he pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree 
arson.

[¶2]      We affirm in 
part, reverse in part, and remand.

ISSUES

Meerscheidt presents the following issues 
for our review:

ISSUE I

Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion when it ordered the appellant to pay for the victims' loss 
of enjoyment of life?

ISSUE II

Did the trial court 
err when it ordered the appellant to pay for the replacement of the Kelly[s'] 
dining room table?

ISSUE III

Did the trial court 
err when it declared the insurance companies to be victims without determining 
subrogation rights?

ISSUE IV

Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion when it placed unreasonable and improper conditions of 
probation on the appellant?

[¶3]      Bennett and 
Dobson present identical issues in their appellate briefs:

I.

Was restitution in 
the amount of $8,000.00 to the Lanes and $16,000.00 to the Kellys for loss of 
enjoyment of life proper?

II.

Was restitution to 
the Kellys in the amount of $3,293.84 for replacement of a table and chairs 
proper when only the table top was damaged and the cost to repair the table top 
was already included in other restitution amounts?

III.

Is possible restitution in an unknown amount 
for future moving expenses proper?

IV.

Is the requirement 
that the appellant pay an additional $1,500.00 to the crime victim's 
compensation account, if restitution for loss of enjoyment of life is 
overturned, proper?

[¶4]      David phrases his 
issues on appeal as follows:

ISSUE I

Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion when it ordered the appellant to pay for the victims' loss 
of enjoyment of life?

ISSUE II

Did the trial court 
err when it ordered the appellant to pay for the replacement of the Kelly[s'] 
dining room table?

ISSUE III

Did the trial court 
err when it declared the insurance companies to be victims without determining 
subrogation rights?

FACTS

[¶5]      In the early 
morning hours of July 11, 1995, David suggested that the appellants drive to the 
Kellys' house and the Lanes' house because he was upset with certain members of 
those households. Although David provided directions to the two houses, the 
record is not clear as to whether he actually accompanied the other appellants 
to the residences. In any event, the appellants threw rocks and broke a window 
in each house, and then they threw lighted "Roman candles" into the houses 
through the broken windows. Both houses were damaged by the rocks and the 
fireworks.

[¶6]      Pursuant to plea 
agreements, Meerscheidt, Bennett, and Dobson each pleaded guilty to two counts 
of felony property destruction. The district court held their pleas in abeyance 
and deferred their sentences. It placed them on probation pursuant to WYO. STAT. 
§ 7-13-301 (1995) and ordered them to pay restitution for their crimes. David 
pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to two counts of first-degree arson. The 
district court sentenced David to serve a term of not less than three years nor 
more than five years in the Wyoming Department of Corrections, recommending that 
he be placed in the Wyoming Boot Camp. The district court also ordered David to 
pay restitution. Each appellant subsequently appealed to this 
Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Restitution for Loss of Enjoyment of 
Life

[¶7]      At the sentencing 
hearings, the victims testified that, as a result of the incidents, they were 
having trouble sleeping, they could not use the damaged rooms, and they worried 
about their families' safety. The district court ordered the appellants to pay 
$16,000 to the Kellys and $8,000 to the Lanes in restitution for their loss of 
enjoyment of life. The appellants contend that the district court erred by 
awarding that restitution because such awards are not authorized by the relevant 
statutes.

[¶8]      We need to 
examine the applicable statutes in order to determine whether the district court 
properly ordered the appellants to pay restitution for the victims' loss of 
enjoyment of life. WYO. STAT. § 7-9-103(a) (1995) provides in pertinent 
part:

(a) The court shall 
require restitution by a defendant if it determines or finds that the defendant 
has or will have an ability to pay or that a reasonable probability exists that 
the defendant will have an ability to pay. If restitution is ordered, or at the 
time the defendant is placed on probation, the court shall fix a reasonable 
amount as restitution owed to each victim for actual pecuniary damage resulting 
from the defendant's criminal activity, and shall include its determination of 
the pecuniary damage as a special finding in the judgment of conviction or in 
the order placing the defendant on probation under W.S. 7-13-301. In determining 
the amount of restitution, the court shall consider and include as a special 
finding, each victim's reasonably foreseeable actual pecuniary damage that will 
result in the future as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activity.

Restitution is defined as "full or partial 
payment of pecuniary damage to a victim." WYO. STAT. § 7-9-101(a)(iv) (1995). 
Pecuniary damage is

all damages which a 
victim could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
same facts or event, including damages for wrongful death. It does not include 
punitive damages and damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish and loss of 
consortium[.]

WYO. STAT. § 7-9-101(a)(iii) 
(1995).

[¶9]      We endeavor to 
interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent. State Department 
of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). We begin 
by making an "`inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle 
Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia. 845 P.2d  at 1042.

When the words used 
are clear and unambiguous, that language establishes the rule of law. A statute 
is ambiguous only where its meaning is vague or ambiguous and subject to varying 
interpretations. Only if the wording is ambiguous or unclear to the point of 
demonstrating obscurity with respect to the legislative purpose or mandate do we 
resort to additional construction.

Rivera v. State, 846 P.2d 1, 6 (Wyo. 1993) 
(citations omitted). Penal statutes must be strictly construed and "cannot be 
enlarged by implication or extended by inference or construction." Smith v. 
State, 902 P.2d 1271, 1284 (Wyo. 1995). "We also recognize that ambiguity in a 
criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity." ALJ v. State, 836 P.2d 307, 310 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶10]   The statutes generally allow a 
district court in a criminal case to award those damages as restitution which 
are available in a civil case. Sections 7-9-101(a)(iv), -103(a). Certain types 
of damages, however, may not be awarded: punitive damages and damages for pain, 
suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium. Section 7-9-101(a)(iv). The 
statutes do not directly address whether damages for loss of enjoyment of life 
may be awarded as restitution. Although those damages are available in civil 
cases, Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 11-13 (Wyo. 1980), they are akin to the 
damages for pain, suffering, and mental anguish which are expressly excluded in 
criminal cases. We are convinced, therefore, that an inherent ambiguity exists 
in the statutory pecuniary damages definition and warrants a further 
investigation into the legislature's intent.

[¶11]   Damages for pain, suffering, and 
mental anguish are general damages. Mariner, 610 P.2d  at 11. General damages 
are

"those which may 
not be fixed with any degree of pecuniary exactitude but which, instead, involve 
mental or physical pain or suffering, inconvenience, the loss of gratification 
of intellectual or physical enjoyment, or other losses of life or life-style 
which cannot really be measured definitively in terms of 
money."

Id. (quoting Anderson v. Welding Testing 
Laboratory, Inc., 304 So. 2d 351, 352 (La. 1974)) (emphasis omitted). Damages for 
loss of enjoyment of life also fall within the definition of general damages. 
Id.

[¶12]   Section 7-9-103(a) allows for the 
award of restitution for actual pecuniary damages. Pecuniary damages are 
generally defined as those damages which "can be estimated in and compensated by 
money." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (5th ed. 1979). In contrast, general damages 
are, by definition, incapable of being fixed with any degree of "`pecuniary 
exactitude.'" Mariner, 610 P.2d  at 11.

[¶13]   We believe that the legislature 
intended to exclude any damages which remedy pain, suffering, or mental anguish. 
Even though damages for loss of enjoyment of life may be a separate element of 
general damages, they are intended, in some measure, to compensate injured 
parties for their pain, suffering, and mental anguish. Mariner, 610 P.2d  at 
11-12. This Court recognized that damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, 
and loss of enjoyment of life are interrelated when we 
stated:

Since loss of 
enjoyment of life is compensable, the fact finder in a case in which loss of 
enjoyment of life is proved may either make a separate award for loss of 
enjoyment of life or take into consideration the loss of enjoyment of life in 
arriving at the total general damages.

Mariner, 610 P.2d  at 12. See also 2 MARILYN 
MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 8.01 (1991). Consequently, looking at 
the entire context of the statutes and applying our rule of lenity, we conclude 
that the legislature intended to exclude damages for loss of enjoyment of life 
from the definition of actual pecuniary damages. The district court, therefore, 
erred by awarding restitution to the victims for their loss of enjoyment of 
life.

B. Restitution for the Kellys' Dining Room 
Set

[¶14]   The Kellys' dining room table was 
damaged by the appellants' criminal actions. The appellants contend that they 
should not be required to pay $3,293.84 in restitution to replace the entire 
dining room set when only the table was damaged. They insist that the proper 
measure of damages was the difference between the dining room table's value 
before the incident and its value after the incident or the cost for repairing 
the table. The State counters that the appellants waived their rights to contest 
the restitution amount on appeal because they agreed in their plea agreements to 
pay the restitution. The State also argues that, in any event, the restitution 
amount was appropriate.

[¶15]   A criminal defendant may waive any 
personal right "`so long as there is no violation of public policy and the 
public's interests are not thereby jeopardized.'" Kahlsdorf v. State, 823 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851, 859 (Wyo. 1980)). 
Such a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently given. Id. Therefore, when a 
criminal defendant knowingly and intelligently agrees in a plea agreement to pay 
restitution, he may not be heard to complain at a later date about the 
provision. See State v. Ball, 255 Kan. 694, 877 P.2d 955, 958, 960 (1994); see 
also Daniels v. State, 909 P.2d 972, 974 (Wyo. 1996); Kahlsdorf, 823 P.2d at 
1191-92; King v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 959 (Wyo. 1989). A corollary to the waiver 
rule is the principle that a criminal defendant may not raise an issue for the 
first time on appeal. See Kennedy v. State, 890 P.2d 37, 38 (Wyo. 
1995).

[¶16]   In the respective plea agreements, 
each appellant agreed to pay restitution for the damages caused by the crimes. 
When the appellants entered their guilty pleas, the restitution amount was 
estimated to be in the range of $9,000 to $10,000. The presentence reports 
indicated that the final restitution amount was $10,031.18 and that the 
appellants were willing to make restitution. The $10,031.81 amount included 
$513.62 for the Lanes, $3,991.25 for the Lanes' insurance company, $3,793.84 for 
the Kellys, and $1,732.47 for the Kellys' insurance 
company.

[¶17]   On October 20, 1995, the district 
court held a proceeding to sentence Meerscheidt. The following colloquy took 
place at that hearing:

[MEERSCHEIDT'S 
ATTORNEY]: . . . There is an agreement to restitution. We looked through the 
report. We don't find anything substantial incorrect, and we would ask the Court 
to follow the recommendation by the parties . . . in this matter. I think that 
the victims did want to make a statement.

THE COURT: Is the amount of restitution 
accurate?

[MEERSCHEIDT'S 
ATTORNEY]: Reasonably so, your Honor. I'm not sure - there is only one issue 
that I'd like [to] refer to the Court, which is at page - I guess , including 
the cover sheet. Under the victim's impact statement. One of the victims, the 
Kellys, there is [a] $500 deductible and $1732.47 to State Farm Insurance. There 
is also 3,000 in damages not covered by the insurance 
company.

I don't know what 
those are for. I guess I can ask the Court if we can have leave to take a look 
at any documents they have. We don't have any objection at this point to see 
what the background on that loss is.

. . . .

[MEERSCHEIDT'S 
ATTORNEY]: . . . We don't dispute it, your Honor. We just want to see what the 
basis for it is.

Mr. Kelly stated that the Kellys' claim was 
for the amount of the actual damage to their home that was not covered by 
insurance. He explained that the destruction totaled $5,526.31 and that they had 
received $1,732.47 in insurance proceeds.

The district court 
decided to postpone sentencing Meerscheidt so that all the appellants could be 
present. It scheduled another hearing for that purpose.

[¶18]   David was sentenced on November 3, 
1995, at which time he indicated that his presentence report set forth the 
accurate restitution amount. Meerscheidt, Bennett, and Dobson were sentenced on 
November 20, 1995. At that time, Dobson and Bennett each stated that their 
respective presentence reports were accurate. When the district court asked 
whether Meerscheidt's presentence report was accurate, Meerscheidt's attorney 
did not restate his earlier concern about the restitution amount. Instead, he 
stated: "[W]e don't have any substantial corrections [to the presentence 
report]. Obviously, we need to address sentencing and 
restitution."

[¶19]   At the sentencing hearings, the 
district court ordered the appellants to pay, jointly and severally, the 
$10,031.181 restitution 
amount which was specified in the presentence reports. The appellants did not 
object to the district court's orders.

[¶20]   The appellants knowingly and 
intelligently agreed in their respective plea agreements to pay restitution for 
the victims' damages. Such agreements do not violate public policy. See Daniels, 
909 P.2d at 973-74; Kahlsdorf, 823 P.2d  at 1191-95. The appellants were aware of 
the approximate amount of the damages at the time they entered their pleas, and 
they did not object to the restitution amount when the district court announced 
its decisions. By agreeing in their plea agreements to pay restitution for the 
property damage and by failing to object to the restitution amount, the 
appellants waived their rights to contest the restitution awards on appeal. They 
are, therefore, bound by the terms of their plea agreements and cannot now claim 
on appeal that the restitution amount was improper.

[¶21]   Further, the record supports the 
amount of the district court's restitution award. Pursuant to § 7-9-103(a), 
defendants are obligated to pay for the actual pecuniary damage which results 
from their criminal activity. "Proof of the restitution amount as a question of 
sentence need only be proved by credible evidence, by a preponderance, or burden 
of the evidence." Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 493 (Wyo. 1990). In cases where 
property is destroyed, the proper damage amount is the item's market value at 
the time it was destroyed. Reposa v. Buhler, 770 P.2d 235, 238 (Wyo. 1989). The 
retail market value is used when the victim intends to replace the property. 
Id.

[¶22]   Mrs. Kelly testified about the 
damage which the appellants had done to her home; i.e., broken window, burned 
carpet and tables, and damaged walls. In specifying her damages, she indicated 
that she was requesting an additional $3,793.842 in damages 
to cover the amount which her insurance company would not pay and that she had 
gotten an estimate to establish the dining room set's value. She explained that 
the insurance company would only pay to resurface the table top and that simply 
resurfacing the table top was not an adequate remedy because the resurfaced 
table top would not match the base or the chairs and she would not have a 
matched set.

[¶23]   The appellants claim that the 
Kellys received a double recovery for their dining room set because they 
received $1,732.47 from their insurance company to resurface the table top and 
they were also awarded $3,793.84 in restitution to replace the entire dining 
room set. The record does not support the appellants' claim. The Kellys' home 
suffered $5,526.31 in damages. Although their insurance company had agreed to 
pay to resurface the table top, the record does not show that the insurance 
company actually gave the Kellys any insurance proceeds for the dining room 
table. The record suggests that the $1,732.47 paid by the insurance company was 
for repairing the other damage which was done to the home; i.e., the broken 
window and the damaged carpet and walls. That would account for the total of 
$5,526.31 in damages - $3,793.84 for the dining room set and $1,732.47 for the 
other damages. Therefore, ample evidence existed in the record to support the 
district court's order which required the appellants to pay to replace the 
Kellys' dining room set.

C. Insurance Companies as 
Victims

[¶24]   The presentence reports identified 
the Kellys' and the Lanes' insurance companies as victims because they had paid 
insurance proceeds to the Kellys and the Lanes. The reports also set forth the 
restitution amounts claimed by the insurance companies. The district court 
ordered the appellants to pay restitution to the victims in accordance with the 
presentence reports. Meerscheidt and David insist that the district court erred 
by identifying the insurance companies as victims and awarding them restitution 
because the district court did not make findings under WYO. STAT. § 
7-9-101(a)(v) (1995) as to whether the insurance companies had subrogation 
rights.

[¶25]   WYO. STAT. § 7-9-102 (1995) directs 
courts to order criminal defendants to pay restitution to the victims of their 
crimes. See also § 7-9-103(a). Section 7-9-101(a)(v) defines "victim" 
as

a person who has 
suffered pecuniary damage as a result of a defendant's criminal activities. An 
insurer which paid any part of a victim's pecuniary damages shall be regarded as 
the victim only if the insurer has no right of subrogation and the insured has 
no duty to pay the proceeds of restitution to the insurer.

The plain language of § 7-9-101(a)(v) allows 
an insurer to be considered as a victim, and therefore eligible to receive 
restitution payments, only if it does not have a subrogation 
right.

[¶26]   The parties have not directed us to 
any evidence, and we have not found any evidence in our perusal of the record, 
which indicates whether the insurers in this case did or did not have 
subrogation rights. In light of the absence of evidence, we are compelled to 
reverse the district court's awards of restitution to the insurers. We remand 
the case and direct the district court to modify the judgments and sentences so 
that the entire restitution amount is awarded to the Lanes and the Kellys. Our 
ruling does not reduce the amount which the appellants are required to pay in 
restitution because, whether they pay the restitution to the true victims or to 
the insurance companies, they are still responsible for the actual pecuniary 
damage caused by their criminal activities. Although only Meerscheidt and David 
presented this issue in their appeals, Bennett and Dobson are entitled to gain 
the benefit of our decision because the cases have been consolidated and the 
appellants are jointly and severally liable to reimburse the victims for their 
property damages. See Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 407 (Wyo. 
1990).

D. Future Moving 
Expenses

[¶27]   The Lanes and the Kellys testified 
that they may move from Cheyenne because of the appellants' attacks upon their 
families. The district court included provisions in Meerscheidt's, Bennett's, 
and Dobson's judgments and sentences which stated that they were responsible, 
jointly and severally, for "any moving expenses incurred by the Kelly[]s and the 
Lane[]s if they move within the next eighteen (18) months." The district court 
did not, however, specify the restitution amount. Bennett, Dobson, and 
Meerscheidt maintain that the district court erred by awarding restitution for 
the victims' potential future moving expenses without setting a specified 
amount.

[¶28]   Section 7-9-103(a) provides that, 
"[i]n determining the amount of restitution, the court shall consider and 
include as a special finding, each victim's reasonably foreseeable actual 
pecuniary damage that will result in the future as a result of the defendant's 
criminal activity." The language in this section does "not permit the trial 
court to order restitution in an amount to be determined at some later date." 
Leger v. State, 855 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo. 1993). A district court must fix a 
specific amount of restitution at the time of sentencing for reasonably 
foreseeable future damages which may result from a defendant's criminal conduct. 
Section 7-9-103(a); Leger, 855 P.2d  at 362; see also Daniels, 909 P.2d  at 
974.

[¶29]   Because the district court failed 
to designate the restitution amount, we reverse its order and remand the case 
for a determination of the specific amount, if any, of restitution which the 
appellants must pay for the victims' future moving expenses. In making that 
determination, the district court must decide whether the victims' potential 
moves are "reasonably foreseeable actual pecuniary damage[s] that will result in 
the future" because of the appellants' criminal actions. Section 
7-9-103(a).

E. Crime Victims' Compensation 
Account

[¶30]   Bennett, Dobson, and Meerscheidt 
assert that the district court erred by ordering each of them to pay an 
additional $1,500 to the crime victims' compensation account in the event that 
the awards for loss of enjoyment of life are not allowed by this 
Court.

[¶31]   The district court ordered Bennett, 
Dobson, and Meerscheidt to

pay to the Victim's 
Compensation Fund, as required by W.S. 1-40-119(a), 1977 Republished Edition, 
the sum of $50.00 by cash, certified check or money order payable to the Clerk 
of the District Court, Third Floor, County Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming, within 
10 days of this Order and in such event that the Loss of Enjoyment [of Life 
restitution] is not awarded, the defendant[s] will pay an additional $1500.00 
toward the Victim's Compensation Fund, to be paid in full over the term of the 
defendant[s'] probationary period; If the Loss of Enjoyment restitution is 
awarded, the additional $1,500.00 victim's compensation is null and 
void.

The district court made it very clear that 
the additional $1,500 surcharge was simply an alternate way of ordering the 
appellants to pay for the victims' loss of enjoyment of life. We have determined 
that the restitution awards for loss of enjoyment of life were improper. We will 
not allow the district court to make such awards through the back door under the 
guise of awarding victims' compensation surcharges.

[¶32]   The district court's order was 
improper for another reason as well. The district court did not specifically 
find that the appellants had the ability to pay the additional surcharge. We 
stated in Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350, 359 (Wyo. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1045, 114 S. Ct. 693, 126 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1994), that, under WYO. STAT. § 
1-40-119(c) (Supp. 1996), the district court must make a finding with regard to 
the criminal defendant's ability to pay before ordering him to pay a victim's 
compensation surcharge. Since the district court did not make those findings in 
this case, the surcharges were improper.

F. Probation Condition

[¶33]   The district court placed 
Meerscheidt on probation under § 7-13-301. Meerscheidt asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion when it ordered him to surrender his driver's 
license as one of the conditions of his probation. He argues that the district 
court did not have the authority to revoke his license. Meerscheidt also argues 
that the probation condition was not reasonably related to his crime and placed 
an undue burden upon him.

[¶34]   WYO. STAT. § 7-13-304 (1995) allows 
a district court to impose any condition of probation upon a defendant. Under § 
7-13-301(a)(iv), a defendant must "[c]onform his conduct to any other terms of 
probation the court finds proper."

The district court 
has wide discretion in determining appropriate conditions of probation. A 
probation condition is valid if it is "reasonably related to . . . 
rehabilitation"; it should be deleted if it is "unrelated to the criminal 
conduct for which [the probationer] was convicted and is not reasonably related 
to future criminal conduct." Hamburg v. State, 820 P.2d 523, 531 (Wyo. 
1991).

Leyba v. State, 882 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 
1994) (some citations omitted). "As a general rule, probation and parole 
conditions restricting access to vehicles are upheld when the offense involves 
the improper use of an automobile." NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW 
OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 6.25 at 267 (1983).

[¶35]   Meerscheidt maintains that 
suspensions and revocations of drivers' licenses are accomplished in civil, as 
opposed to criminal, proceedings. It is true that in Wyoming "proceedings to 
suspend or revoke a driver's license are civil and not criminal in nature." 
Johnson v. State Hearing Examiner's Office, 838 P.2d 158, 179 (Wyo. 1992). This 
case, however, did not involve a suspension or revocation of Meerscheidt's 
driver's license. The district court ordered Meerscheidt to surrender his 
driver's license. By restricting his driving privileges, the district court 
merely required Meerscheidt to conform his conduct to certain standards while he 
was on probation. In that regard, this condition was not any different than the 
other conditions of his probation which forbade him from using or possessing 
alcohol and from having any contact with the victims. See, e.g., Wlodarczyk v. 
State, 836 P.2d 279, 286, 294 (Wyo. 1992) (probation condition forbade the 
appellant from consuming alcohol); Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 955-56 (Wyo. 
1996) (probation condition forbade the appellant from having any contact with 
the victim).

[¶36]   Meerscheidt also argues that the 
probation condition was not reasonably related to his crime. The district court 
expressly found otherwise when it stated:

You, likewise, will 
surrender your driver's license as a further condition of probation. This 
incident occurred because there was a car involved. So you will not be allowed 
to do that.

The appellants traveled by car to and from 
the victims' homes. The incident may not have occurred if the appellants had not 
had access to a vehicle. The probation condition which required Meerscheidt to 
surrender his driver's license was reasonably related to his crime and to 
ensuring that he would not engage in future criminal 
conduct.

[¶37]   Further, we are not convinced by 
Meerscheidt's argument that the probation condition placed an undue burden upon 
him. He contends that he will be unable to comply with the other conditions of 
his probation if he cannot drive; i.e., meeting his curfew, maintaining 
full-time employment, and performing his community service obligation. His 
contention is speculative; the record does not contain any evidence which 
reveals that it will be impossible for him to comply with his other probation 
conditions because he cannot drive. Additionally, Meerscheidt may petition the 
district court at any time to modify his probation conditions if they prove to 
be overly burdensome. Section 7-13-304(a). Meerscheidt has, therefore, failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to surrender 
his driver's license as a condition of his probation.

CONCLUSION

[¶38]   We hold that the district court 
properly required the appellants to pay to replace the Kellys' dining room set 
and did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Meerscheidt to surrender his 
driver's license as a condition of his probation. We hold, however, that the 
district court erred by ordering the appellants (1) to pay restitution for the 
victims' loss of enjoyment of life, (2) to reimburse the insurance companies 
without making findings as to whether they had subrogation rights, (3) to pay 
for the victims' future moving expenses without making an express restitution 
award at the sentencing hearing, and (4) to pay the additional crime victims' 
compensation surcharges.

[¶39]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded for further proceedings which are consistent with this 
opinion.

Footnotes

1 At the sentencing hearing, the district court 
ordered Meerscheidt, Bennett, and Dobson to pay $10,031.18 in restitution. The 
written orders indicate that the restitution amount was $10,081.18. The 
$10,031.18 amount corresponds with the presentence reports and with the 
restitution amount specified in David's written order. We assume, therefore, 
that the $10,081.18 figure in the written orders was simply a clerical 
error.

2 We assume that the appellants are contesting only 
$3,293.84 of the $3,793.84 award because they are not opposed to reimbursing the 
Kellys for their $500 deductible.