Title: Busby v. TRUSWAL SYSTEMS CORP., INC.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

596 So. 2d 562 (1991)
Jean BUSBY, et al.
v.
TRUSWAL SYSTEMS CORPORATION, INC.
89-1504.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 7, 1991.
Rehearing Denied March 27, 1992.
Richard W. Bell, Pelham, for appellants.
John W. Clark, Jr. and Judith E. Dolan of Clark & Scott and Judy Whalen Evans and Susan Rogers of Harris, Evans, Berg & Morris, Birmingham, for appellee.
ADAMS, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment based on a directed verdict in favor of Truswal Systems Corporation.[1] The plaintiffs, Jean Busby, Doris Money, Bobbie Pitts, Leisa Livingston Vincent, and Sandra Clements, raise one issue on appeal: whether the trial judge erred in granting the defendant's motion in limine, thereby excluding their testimony with regard to certain transactions and statements made to them by DuWayne Deaton, an employee of the defendant who was deceased at the time of the trial. The defendant, Truswal Systems Corporation (hereinafter "Truswal"), contends that the trial judge did not err because, in light of § 12-21-163, Code of Alabama (1975), otherwise known as the Dead Man's Statute, an interested party is not allowed to testify regarding statements made by a decedent if certain conditions are met. Contending that those necessary conditions were met, Truswal argues that there was no error.
This Court has considered certain issues in this case on a prior occasion. See Busby v. Truswal Systems Corp., 551 So. 2d 322 (Ala.1989). In that case, the plaintiffs (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Busby"), appealed from a summary judgment, arguing that they had offered sufficient evidence to warrant submission to a jury of their claims of invasion of privacy and the tort of outrage. This Court affirmed the summary judgment as it related to the outrage claim; however, it was reversed as it related to the claim for invasion of privacy, and the cause was remanded. See Busby, supra. The facts of the *563 case that are pertinent to this appeal are set forth in our earlier opinion as follows:
Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transportation, 477 So. 2d 364, 365 (Ala.1985).
551 So. 2d  at 323-24 and 326-27. Upon remand, Truswal filed a motion in limine requesting that, pursuant to the Dead Man's Statute, any statements made by Deaton to the plaintiffs be excluded at trial. That motion was granted and, at trial, Truswal's objections to the plaintiffs' attempts to offer such testimony were upheld. The plaintiffs offered no testimony other than that of Jean Busby and Doris Money, and at the close of their case, the trial judge entered the directed verdict.
Section 12-21-163, Code of Alabama (1975), states:
Section 12-21-163 (emphasis added). Truswal contends that because of that portion of the statute emphasized above, the only way the plaintiffs could have offered testimony of statements made to them by Deaton would have been via the testimony of a disinterested third party who overheard Deaton. Because the plaintiffs failed to present such testimony, Truswal contends that it was entitled to the directed verdict.
The plaintiffs' claims against Truswal assert that Truswal ratified the actions of Deaton. Even if the actions of Deaton were outside the line and scope of his employment at the time he allegedly made them, if Truswal is deemed to have ratified those actions and statements, then Truswal should be entitled to the protection of the Dead Man's statute, in particular that portion *565 of the statute that excludes statements made by a deceased party "act[ing] in any representative or fiduciary relation whatsoever" to Truswal. See § 12-21-163, supra. For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
ALMON, J., concurs in the result.
[1]  In the appeal, the parties refer to the trial judge's ruling as a summary judgment; however, the judge's ruling was made after a presentation of evidence had been made by the plaintiff. Therefore, in effect, the judge granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant.