Title: Austin v. Kaness

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Austin v. Kaness1997 WY 157950 P.2d 561Case Number: 96-275Decided: 12/22/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

RONALD D. AUSTIN, 

Appellant (Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

JUDY KANESS and RUSSELL KANESS,  

Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from District Court of Campbell County 

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Nicholas H. 
Carter of Carter Law Office, Gillette.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

Kathleen J. 
Doyle and Cameron S. Walker of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, 
Casper.

 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

TAYLOR, Chief 
Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant was 
injured in a car accident involving T.S., a minor. T.S. had been drinking 
alcohol at a party held in appellees' home while they were out of town. 
Appellant filed this lawsuit asserting vicarious liability against appellees on 
theories of respondeat superior and agency. Appellant appeals from the granting 
of appellees' motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

 

I. 
ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Appellant, Ronald 
D. Austin (Austin), raises two issues:

 

Did the district court err in finding that no issues 
of material fact existed as to the appellant's claim against defendants Russell 
Kaness and Judy Kaness on the basis of agency and respondeat 
superior?

 

Did the district court err in finding that no issues 
of material fact existed as to whether Rick Kaness was acting within his scope 
of employment?

 

[¶3]      Appellees, 
Russell and Judy Kaness, phrase the issues somewhat 
differently:

 

I.          
Whether agreeing to feed pets, water plants, and bring in mail for one's 
parent's [sic] over a weekend creates an agency or employment 
relationship.

 

II.          
Whether holding a party at one's parent's [sic] home without their 
consent or knowledge, and expressly forbidden by the parents, is within the 
scope of any agency or employment relationship that may have existed in feeding 
pets, watering plants, and bringing in their mail for a 
weekend.

 

II. 
FACTS

 

[¶4]      On March 12, 
1993, Mr. and Mrs. Kaness went with their younger son to visit a college campus 
in Bozeman, Montana. Typically, Mr. and Mrs. Kaness asked their older son, Rick, 
to feed their cats, water their plants, and bring in their mail and newspapers 
when they went out of town. Rick, an adult who lived in his own home, had a key 
to his parents' home.

 

[¶5]      Sometime prior to 
March 12, 1993, Mike Johnson asked Rick whether he could host a birthday party 
for another friend at Rick's house. Rick offered the use of his parents' home 
because it was larger and had a pool table. The party was held at Mr. and Mrs. 
Kaness' home, and alcohol was served. Rick arrived at the party late in the 
evening to find fifteen to twenty people in attendance. He immediately told 
everyone to leave because there were too many people in the house. While 
cleaning up after everyone was gone, Rick found a "party ball" and keg 
cups.

 

[¶6]      T.S. was in 
attendance at the party, and he consumed a quantity of beer from the "party 
ball." When he left the party, T.S. was driving his father's pickup truck, 
intending to go home when he collided with the vehicle driven by Austin. Austin 
alleges he incurred approximately $200,000.00 in medical damages and lost his 
employment as a result of this accident.

 

[¶7]      Austin's suit 
against Mr. and Mrs. Kaness claimed negligence, agency/respondeat superior, 
negligent entrustment, and sought punitive damages. Mr. and Mrs. Kaness filed a 
motion for summary judgment, along with supporting affidavits. In those 
affidavits, both Mr. and Mrs. Kaness stated a long-standing rule in the Kaness 
household that guests of their children were to be limited in number and alcohol 
was not to be served. They also averred that Rick did not have permission to 
host a party on the weekend of March 12, 1993. Austin conceded judgment on all 
counts except the agency/respondeat superior claim. The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Kaness on the remaining claim. This 
appeal followed.

 

III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hamilton v. Natrona County Educ. Ass'n, 
901 P.2d 381, 383 (Wyo. 1995). On appeal of the granting of summary judgment, we 
review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, affording 
to that party all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the facts 
presented in the record. Id. at 384. 
Where a dispute "exists over a material fact which leads to conflicting 
interpretations or if reasonable minds might differ, then summary judgment is 
improper." Id.

 

IV. 
DISCUSSION

 

A. 
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

 

[¶9]      Under the 
respondeat superior theory, an employer is liable for the negligence of an 
employee acting within the scope of his employment. Hamilton, 901 P.2d  at 385; Combined Ins. Co. of America v. 
Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1042 (Wyo. 1978). The conduct of an employee is 
within the scope of his employment "only if it is of the kind he is employed to 
perform; it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; 
and it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master." Hamilton, 901 P.2d  at 385 (citing Miller v. Reiman-Wuerth Co., 598 P.2d 20, 22 (Wyo. 1979)); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 228 (1958). 
Usually, it is for the jury to determine whether an employee was acting within 
the scope of employment; however, it becomes a question of law when the facts 
lead to only one reasonable inference. Hamilton, 901 P.2d  at 
385.

 

[¶10]   The threshold question is whether 
Rick was his parents' employee on March 12, 1993. There is nothing in the record 
to suggest that Rick performed the housekeeping functions for his parents out of 
any obligation other than respect for his parents nor that he expected to 
receive any remuneration other than familial love. The record supports nothing 
more than a finding that Rick was doing a favor for his parents, as anyone might 
do for a family member or friend. 

 

[¶11]   However, even if Rick was an 
employee of his parents on March 12, 1993, the only reasonable inference to be 
drawn is that he was not acting within the scope of his "employment" when he 
offered the house for the party. There is no dispute that Rick was asked to care 
for his parents' cats and plants and to bring in the mail and newspapers. 
Allowing his friend to host a party is not related to any of these duties, and 
Rick admitted he did not have authority to allow the party. Austin argues that 
Rick's possession of the key to his parents' home and his charge to bring in the 
newspapers to prevent the appearance of vacancy allows the inference that 
hosting a party was within the scope of his employment. This inference requires 
too great a leap in logic to be reasonable.

 

[¶12]   If he was an employee of his 
parents on March 12, 1993, Rick was acting outside the scope of his employment 
when he allowed his friend to host a party in his parents' home. Thus, the 
district court was correct in finding that Mr. and Mrs. Kaness were not liable 
to Austin on a respondeat superior theory, and summary judgment on this issue is 
appropriate.

 

B. 
AGENCY

 

[¶13]   Austin also argues that Rick was 
acting as his parents' agent at the time the party was held. "Agency is a 
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person 
to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control and 
consent." Holliday v. Bannister, 741 P.2d 89, 95 (Wyo. 1987) (citing True v. 
Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1978)). There is no 
presumption that an agency exists, and generally, the existence of an agency and 
the scope of the agent's authority are questions of fact. Hamilton, 901 P.2d  at 386; Holliday, 741 P.2d  at 95. If the 
evidence presented does not create a genuine issue of material fact, the issue 
becomes one of law. Hamilton, 901 P.2d  at 386.

 

[¶14]   Before a principal is held 
vicariously liable for the act of his agent, "there must be evidence the 
principal had knowledge of the act which was being committed by its agent." Hamilton, 901 P.2d  at 386 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Mountain Cement 
Co., 891 P.2d 57, 62 (Wyo. 1995)). Here, it is undisputed that Mr. and Mrs. 
Kaness had no knowledge that their son intended to host a party in their home. 
In fact, Mr. and Mrs. Kaness had no knowledge of the party at all until after 
this lawsuit was filed.

 

[¶15]   In addition, the party held on 
March 12, 1993 violated Mr. and Mrs. Kaness' household rule against this type of 
party. To the extent an agency relationship may have existed between Rick and 
Mr. and Mrs. Kaness, the only reasonable inference from the facts in the record 
is that Rick acted outside the scope of his authority in permitting his friend 
to host a party in his parents' home with fifteen to twenty people in attendance 
and at which alcohol was served. The district court was correct in granting 
summary judgment in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Kaness on this 
issue.

 

V. 
CONCLUSION

 

[¶16]   Having viewed the entire record in 
the light most favorable to Austin, it is impossible to draw reasonable 
inferences in his favor which result in material questions of fact. Summary 
judgment is affirmed.