Title: SUNDANCE MOUNTAIN RESOURT, INC.; and CECIL A. CUNDY V. UNION TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SUNDANCE MOUNTAIN RESOURT, INC.; and CECIL A. CUNDY V. UNION TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation2007 WY 11150 P.3d 191Case Number: 05-300Decided: 01/19/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
SUNDANCE 
MOUNTAIN RESORT, INC.; and CECIL A. CUNDY,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
UNION 
TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCrookCounty

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Cecil A. Cundy of Cundy Law Office, Sundance, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Paul J. Drew of Drew Law Office, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming.                     

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Cecil A. Cundy was held in contempt of 
court for violating a district court order enjoining him and Sundance Mountain 
Resort, Inc. (Sundance) from interfering with Union Telephone Company's 
(Union) access to its leasehold.  Mr. Cundy appeals from the contempt 
order, claiming:  1) the district 
court improperly exercised its jurisdiction when it held the contempt hearing in 
Weston County rather than Crook County; and 2) the injunction sought to be 
enforced by the contempt proceeding exceeded the rights granted in the 
lease.  We affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  In his initial brief, Mr. Cundy states 
the issues as follows:

 
 
            
1.         
Whether or not the district court had jurisdiction for proceedings in 
Weston County, Wyoming in a contempt proceeding affecting an estate in real 
property in Crook County, Wyoming where Defendant/Appellant resided in Crook 
County, Wyoming.

 
 
            
2.         
Whether or not the injunction sought to be enforced exceeded the rights 
granted Appellee in its Communication Site Lease.

 
 

Union concurs 
in Mr. Cundy's initial statement of the issues, but asserts the first issue 
really concerns venue, not jurisdiction.  
In his reply brief, Mr. Cundy acknowledges the distinction between 
jurisdiction and venue and restates his first issue as follows: 

 
 
Whether 
or not the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction by ordering 
Defendants to appear and show cause in WestonCounty 
in contempt proceedings affecting an estate in real property in CrookCounty 
where Appellants/Defendants resided in Crook County, Wyoming. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  This appeal arises from facts we 
previously considered in Cundy v. Range 
Tel. Coop., Inc. and Union Telephone 
Co., 2005 WY 153, 123 P.3d 901 (Wyo. 2005).   As it relates to the current 
appeal, in Cundy we affirmed a 
district court order enjoining Sundance and Mr. Cundy from interfering with 
Union's use of its leasehold on SundanceMountain and access to it across lands 
belonging to Sundance.  The district 
court's order we affirmed in Cundy 
stated in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
IT IS 
THEREFORE ORDERED AND DECLARED by the court that the plaintiff Union Telephone 
Company has the right to ingress to and egress from its leasehold tract 
described above, over and across the above described lands of the defendant 
Sundance Mountain Resort, Inc.  

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
IT IS 
FINALLY ORDERED that the defendants Sundance Mountain Resort, Inc. and Cecil A. 
Cundy be, and they hereby are, enjoined from interfering with the plaintiff's 
ingress to and egress from its above described leasehold across the lands of the 
defendant Sundance Mountain Resort, Inc., and are enjoined from interfering with 
the plaintiff's use of its leasehold tract.

 
 
[¶4]  Prior to our decision in Cundy, but after the district court's 
order enjoining Mr. Cundy, Union attempted to 
arrange for delivery of concrete from Croell Redi-Mix, Inc. (Croell) to its 
leasehold.   Mr. Cundy sent a 
letter to Croell stating in relevant part:

 
 
In no 
circumstances will Sundance Mountain Resort, Inc. grant permission to Union, or any agent thereof, to use the site or the 
right-of-way thereto. The right-of-way is strictly limited to that road which is 
known as the old road. Neither deviation from the course of the old road, nor 
damage to the old road will be tolerated in any circumstance. In particular, no 
travel whatsoever will be allowed upon the new roads constructed by Sundance 
Mountain Resort, Inc.

 
 
Union 
filed a motion for order to show cause why Sundance and Mr. Cundy should not be 
held in contempt for violating the district court's order enjoining them from 
interfering with Union's access to its 
leasehold.  The district court 
entered an order to show cause stating that it appeared Mr. Cundy and Sundance 
had violated the injunction by interfering with Union's access.  
The district court ordered them to appear for a telephone conference on 
August 23, 2005.   

 
 
[¶5]  Several days later, upon the request of 
counsel, the district court vacated the telephone hearing and reset the hearing 
for personal appearance by the parties on the same date, but at the Weston 
County Courthouse in Newcastle, Wyoming.  
The record does not disclose who made the request to reschedule the 
hearing:  counsel for Union, Mr. Cundy, or both. 

 
 
[¶6]  On the day of the hearing, Mr. Cundy 
presented an objection to holding the hearing outside the venue of CrookCounty.  The district court proceeded with the 
hearing as scheduled.  If a 
transcript was made of the hearing, it is not part of the appellate record.  However, it appears that following the 
arguments of counsel the district court found Mr. Cundy had violated the 
injunction by interfering with Union's access to its leasehold, held him in 
contempt and asked Union to prepare a proposed 
order to that effect.  Upon receipt 
of Union's proposed order, Mr. Cundy filed an 
objection to which he attached his own proposed order.  Among other things, Mr. Cundy's proposed 
order stated that the district court had disregarded his objection to venue and 
proceeded with the contempt hearing, stating there was no courtroom available in 
CrookCounty on the date the 
hearing was scheduled.  
Subsequently, the district court entered an order of contempt different 
from Mr. Cundy's proposed order.  We 
paraphrase the district court's findings as follows:

 
 

1.       
The 
court previously enjoined Sundance and Mr. Cundy from interfering with 
Union's access to its leasehold  across Sundance land; 

 
 

2.       
By his 
letter to Croell, Mr. Cundy interfered with Union's access to its leasehold;

 
 

3.       
By 
interfering with Union's access, Mr. Cundy is 
in indirect criminal contempt of this court;

 
 

4.       
Mr. 
Cundy may purge himself of this contempt by allowing Union and its agents, 
including Croell, to access Union's leasehold by the most efficient and 
practical route across Sundance lands, including access by cement trucks as may 
be necessary to Union's construction project on 
the lease.

 
 
The 
district court's order of contempt did not address Mr. Cundy's venue 
objection.  Mr. Cundy timely 
appealed from the order of contempt.  
After Mr. Cundy filed his notice of appeal in the instant case, this 
Court published its opinion in Cundy 
affirming the order enjoining Sundance and Mr. Cundy from interfering with 
Union's access to its leasehold.    

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      Determinations concerning 
venue are within the district court's discretion and we review the denial of a 
motion for change of venue only for abuse of discretion.  Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 25, 99 P.3d 928, 939 (Wyo. 2004).  The 
power to summarily punish for contempt is likewise vested in the district 
court.  Horn v. Welch, 2002 WY 138, ¶ 8, 54 P.3d 754, 758 (Wyo. 2002).  We will not 
overturn a district court contempt order absent an abuse of discretion.  Id. The ultimate question in 
determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred is whether the district 
court could reasonably conclude as it did.  
Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Venue

 
 
[¶8]  Mr. Cundy asserts the district court 
improperly exercised its jurisdiction by holding the show cause hearing in a 
different county than the one in which the action was brought.  Union contends it complied with the 
applicable venue statute by bringing the action in CrookCounty 
and there was nothing improper about convening the show cause hearing in 
WestonCounty.  Despite Mr. Cundy's continued use of the 
word "jurisdiction" in his re-statement of the issues, the parties appear to be 
in agreement that the issue does not concern the district court's jurisdiction 
to hear and decide Union's motion; rather, the 
issue is one of venue.  

 
 
[¶9]  "Venue" as a modern legal concept refers 
to the county, district, or other geographical location in which, "for the sake 
of fairness, convenience, or other commanding policy considerations, a cause is 
to be tried."  77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 1 (2006). 

Venue is 
not a substantive right, but is a procedural matter designed for the convenience 
of the litigant and for allocating judicial resources. A venue provision is not 
a substantive limitation on court power; it neither limits nor creates specific 
powers in a specific court. 

 
 

Id.  As this Court has said, venue does not 
affect the court's power to hear and determine a matter and render a binding 
judgment.  George v. Allen (In re Estate of George), 
2003 WY 129, ¶ 18, 77 P.3d 1219, 1225 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
Venue is 
the place where the power to adjudicate is to be exercised, that is the place 
where the suit may or should be heard.  

 
 
77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 1.

 
 
[¶10]  The instant case began as an action to 
enjoin Sundance and Mr. Cundy from interfering with Union's access to its leasehold.  Thus, it was an action affecting an 
interest in real property and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-5-101 (LexisNexis 2005) was 
the controlling venue provision.  
Section 1-5-101 provides in pertinent part:

 
 
(a)  Actions for the following causes shall 
be brought in the county in which the subject of the action is situate,  . . .:

        
           (i)  
For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest 
therein;

 

[¶11]  In accordance with this provision, Union 
brought the action in the county in which its leasehold is situated, CrookCounty.  All papers concerning the action were 
filed there and, until the show cause hearing, all proceedings involving the 
action were held there.  The 
question, therefore, is whether the district court abused its discretion by 
holding the show cause hearing in a county other than the one in which the 
action was brought.

 
 
[¶12]  Under the circumstances presented, we 
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.  The action was "brought" in the proper 
county.  Until the show cause 
hearing, all proceedings were held in the proper county, including the principal 
proceeding in the case  the summary judgment hearing.  Then, upon the request of counsel, the 
district court vacated the telephone hearing it had initially scheduled on the 
motion to show cause and scheduled a hearing requiring personal attendance of 
counsel.  Again, the record does not 
reflect, and the parties do not disclose, whether Union, Mr. Cundy, or both, requested the change.  In any event, apparently because no 
courtroom was available in CrookCounty, the district court responded to 
the request by setting the hearing in WestonCounty.   

 
 
[¶13]  As we have said, venue normally is 
founded upon convenience to the parties to the litigation.  Estate of George, ¶ 18, 77 P.3d  at 
1225.  The district court's order 
setting the show cause hearing by telephone apparently was not convenient for 
one or both of the parties.  The 
district court responded by setting a "live" hearing in an adjoining county with 
an available courtroom.  Mr. Cundy 
has not argued that the WestonCounty forum was inconvenient.  In the district court and in this Court 
he claimed simply that the district court violated the venue statute by 
convening the hearing in a venue other than CrookCounty.   We find the district court's 
action to be a reasonable decision based upon proper considerations of 
convenience and the allocation of judicial resources.  Under the circumstances, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding with the hearing in WestonCounty over Mr. Cundy's objection.  

 
 

2.                  
The 
Injunction

 
 
[¶14]  In his second issue, Mr. Cundy contends 
Union's easement was confined to the express terms of the lease, which limited 
Union's access across Sundance's land to a 
thirty foot road known by the parties as the "old road."  Mr. Cundy claims his letter to Croell 
was consistent with the rights granted in the lease in that it limited Union and 
its agents to using the old road to access Union's property.  
To the extent the district court's order enjoined him from interfering 
with Union's access by means other than the old 
road, Mr. Cundy asserts the order exceeds the rights granted in the 
lease.

 
 
[¶15]  Union 
argues Mr. Cundy's claim that the injunction exceeded the scope of the lease is 
not properly before this Court in the instant appeal from the contempt order. 
Union asserts the order imposing the injunction 
was previously considered and affirmed in Cundy, 2005 WY 153, 123 P.3d 901.  Additionally, Union contends the scope of the injunction was not an 
issue at the contempt hearing; therefore, Mr. Cundy cannot use the appeal from 
the contempt order to re-challenge the scope of the 
injunction.

 
 
[¶16]  After careful review of the record on 
appeal, it does appear Mr. Cundy failed to raise this argument in the district 
court.  The only pleadings he filed 
in response to the motion and order to show cause were the objection to improper 
venue and the objection to Union's proposed order of contempt.  He did not argue the injunction exceeded 
the scope of the easement in either of those pleadings.  Because no transcript of the contempt 
hearing appears in the record, it is  
impossible for this Court to determine whether he presented the argument 
orally during the hearing.  The 
appellant has the burden to bring a sufficient record to this Court to allow 
review of the district court's discretionary decisions.  White v. Table Mountain Ranches Owners 
Ass'n, Inc., 2006 WY 2, ¶ 10, 125 P.3d 1019, 1021 (Wyo. 2006).  The record the parties designated 
provides no indication that Mr. Cundy made the argument in district court that 
the injunction went beyond the scope of the lease. 

 
 
[¶17]  We have stated repeatedly that we will 
not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal.  BP America Prod. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2006 WY 27, ¶ 18, 130 P.3d 438, 462 (Wyo. 2006).  It simply is 
not appropriate for this Court to reverse a district court ruling on grounds 
that were never presented to it.  Whitten v. State, 2005 WY 55, ¶ 24, 110 P.3d 892, 898 (Wyo. 2005).  This is 
particularly true when our review is for an abuse of discretion because to 
determine whether there was an abuse we necessarily must consider the arguments 
and evidence presented to the district court.  Amoco Prod. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2004 WY 89, ¶ 53, 94 P.3d 430, 449 (Wyo. 2004).  Plainly stated, a party cannot fail to 
present an argument and then argue on appeal that the district court abused its 
discretion in not considering the argument the party did not present.  Because the record before us contains no 
indication Mr. Cundy argued the injunction exceeded the scope of the lease in 
district court, we decline to address the issue.

 
 
[¶18]  The fact that Mr. Cundy did not present 
his argument to the district court is sufficient reason by itself to 
affirm.  However, under the 
circumstances of this case, we are compelled to go further.  As reflected in Cundy, 2005 WY 153, 123 P.3d 901, this 
case arose in 2003 when Union filed its 
complaint for declaratory relief recognizing its right to access its 
leasehold.  Mr. Cundy had the 
opportunity then to argue that Union's access 
was limited to the old road by the express terms of the lease.  Mr. Cundy again had the opportunity to 
present this argument when he appealed the district court's order enjoining him 
from interfering with Union's access.  The only reference we find to this 
argument in either proceeding is in Mr. Cundy's brief in the current appeal, 
which comes after the district court has twice considered the case and after a 
previous appeal to this Court.  
Under these circumstances, where Mr. Cundy has had several previous 
opportunities to present his claim that the injunction exceeded the scope of the 
lease, we decline to address the argument.         

 
 
 [¶19]  Affirmed.