Title: State of Florida v. Freddie Lee Williams

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC94989
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Cross-Appellee,
vs.
FREDDIE LEE WILLIAMS,
Cross-Appellant.
[August 23, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
The State originally appealed the trial court's order vacating Freddie Lee
Williams’ death sentence and granting a new sentencing proceeding pursuant to
Williams’ Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion.  Although the State
later voluntarily withdrew that appeal, Williams cross-appeals the denial of his
remaining 3.850 claims.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1)
and (9) of the Florida Constitution.  For the following reasons, we affirm the trial
court's order in its entirety.
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Williams was convicted in 1981 for the first-degree murder of Mary
Robinson.  The facts of the crime, as stated by this Court’s opinion on direct
appeal, are as follows:
The victim was Mary Robinson, Williams' longtime
girlfriend.  On the night of the murder, the victim went to
her sister's house and there received a number of
upsetting telephone calls from Williams.  After these calls,
the victim and her sister went to jai alai and returned to
the Williams-Robinson apartment around eleven o'clock. 
The sister left;  Williams soon arrived and shortly
thereafter called the sister to report that something had
happened to the victim.  When the sister returned, the
police were already present.
Earlier that evening, Williams had borrowed a
neighbor's handgun, telling him that he was going
gambling.  He testified that he left the gun on the dresser
in a bedroom at home when he went out and that upon
his return, the victim staggered toward him, already shot. 
He called the police and an ambulance.  He also testified
he did not want the police to find the weapon in his
possession since he was on parole;  he thus went into the
bedroom and took the pistol from the dresser and threw it
outside under a bush.
The state's case revolved around long-standing
domestic arguments between Williams and the victim and
in particular Williams' anger over the victim's supposedly
taking a shower that night, a sign he took to mean that the
victim was cleaning up after being with a boyfriend.
Williams v. State, 437 So. 2d 133, 133-34 (Fla. 1983).  During the guilt phase of the
trial, Williams testified that the murder was committed by an unknown assailant. 
According to Williams, the victim was already wounded when he entered the
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apartment.  The jury, however, convicted Williams of first-degree murder.  At the
conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended death by a vote of eight to
four and the trial court imposed the death sentence.  The trial court found two
aggravators:  the murder was committed while the defendant was under a sentence
of imprisonment, and the defendant was previously convicted of another capital
felony or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to another.  The trial court
did not find any statutory mitigators and concluded that the proffered nonstatutory
mitigating evidence did not “rise to a non-statutory mitigating circumstance which
could offset the aggravating circumstances.”  This Court affirmed the conviction
and sentence on direct appeal.  See id.  
In 1985, Williams sought permission to file a petition for writ of error coram
nobis concerning allegedly newly discovered evidence.  The request was denied by
this Court.  See Williams v. State, 478 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1985).  Subsequently,
Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel.  That petition was also denied by this Court.  See Williams v.
Wainwright, 503 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1987).
Williams filed his first 3.850 motion in 1986 and an amended motion was
filed in 1987.  Williams raised ten issues in the motion, five of which related to
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The State’s response was not filed until 1991. 
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Williams moved to strike the State’s response as untimely but the motion was
denied.  In 1996, Judge Michael F. Cycmanick granted an evidentiary hearing for
Williams’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. 
However, Judge Cycmanick summarily denied Williams’ claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel during the guilt phase, finding that the claims did not meet
both prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Judge Cycmanick
concluded that the remainder of the claims were procedurally barred.
The case was later transferred to Judge Jay Paul Cohen and an evidentiary
hearing was held in 1998.  In 1999, Judge Cohen granted Williams’ motion in part,
finding that defense counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase and that
Williams was prejudiced as a result.  Accordingly, Judge Cohen granted Williams a
new penalty phase proceeding. 
The State initially filed a notice of appeal of Judge Cohen’s order but later
voluntarily withdrew that appeal.  Williams cross-appeals, alleging that Judge
Cycmanick erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on the claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase. 
The specific issue before the Court in this case is whether the trial court
erred in denying Williams’ ineffective assistance of guilt-phase counsel claim
without an evidentiary hearing.  In Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.
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2000), this Court provided the following standard for determining whether an
evidentiary hearing is required in a postconviction proceeding:
[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a
postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files,
and records in the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a
particular claim is legally insufficient.  The defendant
bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based
upon a legally valid claim.  Mere conclusory allegations
are not sufficient to meet this burden.  However, in cases
where there has been no evidentiary hearing, we must
accept the factual allegations made by the defendant to
the extent that they are not refuted by the record.  We
must examine each claim to determine if it is legally
sufficient, and, if so, determine whether or not the claim
is refuted by the record.
(Citations omitted.)  In the present case, the trial court gave the following reason for
summarily denying Williams’ claim of ineffective assistance of guilt-phase counsel: 
“The Court finds that none of these claims meet both requirements of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).”  The two prongs that the trial court was
referring to are: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient.  This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
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whose result is reliable.  Unless a defendant makes both
showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death
sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.    Prejudice is shown only if there is a reasonable
probability that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."  Id. at 694.  The Strickland court added
that there is "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance."  Id. at 689.  This Court has stated that
the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's representation was
unreasonable under prevailing professional standards and was not a matter of
sound trial strategy.  See Jones v. State, 732 So. 2d 313, 319 (Fla.1999). 
In his 3.850 motion, Williams alleged that counsel was ineffective during the
guilt phase for (1) failing to argue and present an intoxication defense and request a
voluntary intoxication instruction, (2) failing to investigate the possibility of another
person committing the murder, (3) inadequately investigating the gun powder
residue evidence and inadequately cross-examining on this issue, (4) failing to
object to a comment on Williams’ right to remain silent, (5) failing to investigate the
validity of the State’s blood spatter evidence and inadequately cross-examining on
this issue, (6) failing to object to the State’s examples of premeditation, (7) failing
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to investigate that the “Mary” referred to by witnesses was not the victim but
another Mary, and (8) suggesting to the jury that he did not believe his own client’s
version of events.  In his brief before this Court, Williams groups these arguments
into three categories: (1) defense counsel’s failure to investigate and request a
voluntary intoxication instruction, (2) defense counsel’s rejection before the jury of
Williams’ claims of innocence and presentation of an incompatible avenue of
defense, and (3) defense counsel’s failure to object to the State’s improper
definition and examples of premeditation.  We address each of these categories in
turn.
Voluntary Intoxication
Williams claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the voluntary
intoxication defense at trial.  However, Williams testified during the trial that he did
not commit the crime.  As pointed out by this Court in Williams v. Wainwright, 503
So. 2d at 891 n.1, “[I]ntoxication was not presented at the penalty phase as it
would have been totally inconsistent with petitioner's theory that he did not commit
the murder.”  See also Lavado v. State, 469 So. 2d 917, 920 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
(stating that voluntary intoxication defense concedes the commission of the act but
requests the jury to excuse the conduct because the accused was incapable of
forming or entertaining the intent necessary to commit the crime charged), quashed
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on other grounds, 492 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1986).       
In Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1988), overruled on other
grounds by Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh
Circuit held that an attorney was not ineffective for failing to request an intoxication
instruction when such an instruction was inconsistent with the defendant’s theory
of the case.  In Harich, the defendant took the stand and testified that, although he
was with the victim the evening of the murder, he was innocent of wrongdoing.  He
also indicated that he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol that evening. 
Armed with these facts, defense counsel adopted the defense strategy of asserting
chiefly factual innocence.  The defendant suggested later that defense counsel
should have employed the alternative defenses of voluntary intoxication. The Harich
court held, however, that a defendant must prove that the approach taken by
defense counsel would have been used by no professionally competent counsel
and that the approach taken by counsel was one which did not fall "within the
objective yardstick that we apply when considering the question of ineffectiveness
of counsel." Id. at 1471.  The Harich court specifically noted that "[a]lthough
inconsistent and alternative defenses may be raised, competent trial counsel know
that reasonableness is absolutely mandatory if one hopes to achieve credibility with
the jury." Id. at 1470 (quoting Harich v. Wainwright, 813 F.2d 1082, 1105 (11th
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Cir. 1987) (Fay, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part, concurring in part)).  The Harich
court concluded that suggesting to the jury that Harich was so drunk that he could
not have intended the consequences of his acts would have totally undermined the
position taken by Harich himself when he testified.
Similarly, we conclude that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing
to pursue the voluntary intoxication defense as such a defense would have been
inconsistent with Williams’ theory of the case.  See Gavilan v. State, 765 So. 2d
308, 308-09 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“The defense of intoxication that could have
negated proof of specific intent to commit the crimes was inconsistent with [the
defense that the defendant did not commit the crime].”).  Generally, 
“[c]ounsel may make a tactical decision not to pursue a voluntary intoxication
defense, but a trial court's finding that such a decision was tactical usually is
inappropriate without an evidentiary hearing.”  Kitchen v. State, 764 So. 2d 868,
869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).  Nevertheless, as the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
stated in McNeal v. Wainwright, 722 F.2d 674, 676 (11th Cir. 1984), counsel’s
strategy in this case “amounted to a tactical argument well within the discretion of
counsel, so obvious from the record that no evidentiary hearing was necessary.”   
Counsel’s rejection before the jury of Williams’ claims of innocence and
presentation of an incompatible avenue of defense 
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Next, Williams claims that counsel was ineffective for rejecting Williams’
claims of innocence.  During closing arguments, Williams’ attorney made the
following statements:
Now, Freddie Williams was not [in the room] when all of
this occurred.  If you choose to believe that, you should
find him not guilty.  But, if you should choose to believe
that Freddie Lee Williams was not telling the truth, I ask
you not to be vindictive, not to be upset and not be mad
at Freddie Lee Williams for lying to you, but consider
instead what motive he would have for lying.  Obviously,
he knows he is in a great deal of trouble, but because he
doesn’t tell you the truth, don’t vest [sic] your
displeasure on him by finding him guilty of something the
state has not proven.  The state has to prove him guilty. 
He does not have to prove anything.  No matter how
many lies he may have told you, he doesn’t have to prove
anything.  The state does.  
. . . .
Now, we have a reasonable theory should you
decide Freddie Lee Williams was the one that pulled the
trigger.  That is the two of them got intoxicated and had
gotten into an argument over one thing or another; that
Freddie Lee Williams had a fit of rage.  He got the gun
and pointed the pistol in her direction and pulled the
trigger.  
. . . .
I submit what happened in that scuffle, Freddie Lee
Williams was there and he was trying to help her.  He
shot the gun off.  Maybe it was to scare her.  Maybe it
was to hurt her.  She was wounded very badly.  He was
there trying to help her.  If he had wanted to kill her, he
would have shot her again and again and again, but he
didn’t do that.  
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After the reviewing these statements, it is clear that counsel did not reject Williams’
claims of innocence–counsel merely offered alternative theories to the jury.
This case is distinguishable from Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla.
2000), wherein this Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
counsel’s ineffectiveness.  In that case, counsel conceded his client’s guilt to the
crime charged (first-degree murder) during opening statements.  In contrast, in the
present case, counsel did not concede his client’s guilt to the crime charged. 
Rather, counsel in effect told the jury, “If you believe my client’s version of events,
then you must find him not guilty; if you do not believe him, then he still is not
guilty of first-degree murder, but only of a lesser-included offense.”  
Moreover, counsel’s comments in the present case were made during closing
arguments after all of the evidence had been presented.  During the trial, the State
presented the following evidence.  Williams and the victim had been arguing on the
night in question.  Williams borrowed a neighbor’s gun.  Williams testified that he
left the gun on the dresser in the bedroom and left the house, and upon his return,
the victim staggered towards him, already shot.  He stated that since he was on
parole, he did not want the police to find the weapon in his possession, so he went
into the bedroom and threw the gun outside under a bush.  Ballistics tests revealed
that the gun was the murder weapon.  Rosa Lee Jones testified that she took
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Williams home on the night in question, and upon going inside, Williams observed
the victim taking a shower, and returned to Jones’ car and told her that the victim
was cleaning up because she had probably been with another man.  The State’s
theory was that Williams’ suspicion that the victim had been with another man
drove him to commit the crime.  Based on all of this evidence, it cannot be said that
counsel’s decision to offer alternative theories, neither of which conceded the crime
charged, amounted to representation that was unreasonable.  
Our conclusion on this issue is consistent with a recent case decided by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal on a similar issue.  See Harris v. State, 768 So. 2d
1179, 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“The trial record reflects that [Harris’s]
attorney’s concessions [of lesser included offenses] constituted a reasonable
tactical decision made in consideration of the overwhelming inculpatory evidence of
appellant’s statement to the police and other trial testimony.”).  See also McNeal,
722 F.2d 674 (holding that argument by defense counsel suggesting guilt on charge
of manslaughter rather than first-degree murder was tactical decision); Faraga v.
State, 514 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1987) (holding that trial counsel's concession of
defendant's guilt of murder, but not capital murder, during closing arguments in
face of overwhelming proof was tactical decision).  Therefore, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in denying Williams an evidentiary hearing on this claim.  See
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McNeal, 722 F.2d at 676 (“[Counsel’s strategy] amounted to a tactical argument
well within the discretion of counsel, so obvious from the record that no evidentiary
hearing was necessary.”). 
Williams also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a
gunpowder residue expert, failing to investigate the validity of the State’s blood
spatter testimony, neglecting to investigate the possibility that the “Mary” referred
to by several witnesses was actually another “Mary” who lived at the complex, and
failing to investigate the validity of Gloria Davis’s testimony as well as other leads
concerning the possibility that Williams was not the perpetrator.  We conclude that
the trial court did not err in summarily denying these claims, as Williams has failed
to allege specific facts to support these claims. 
State’s definition and examples of premeditation
Finally, Williams claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the State’s improper definition and examples of premeditation.  Williams complains
about the following comments made by the State during closing argument:
Anytime anybody takes a gun, a .38 caliber gun and
shoots another person in the head, that is premeditated. 
That is intent to kill. . . . Mr. Jones can argue to you until
he is blue in the face, but shooting somebody in the head
is about as solid and convincing evidence of intent to kill
as there can be.
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Later in the argument, however, the prosecutor also stated:
Now, this premeditation we are talking about is the intent
to kill.  That is all it is, a conscious intent or decision to
do so.  There is no instruction that will tell you that it is a
fixed period of time on which this must occur.  It just
says there must be a reflection.  That is all it is, a
moment.  
At the close of the arguments, the trial court read the following instruction to the
jury regarding premeditation:
Killing with premeditation is killing after consciously
deciding to do so.  The decision must be present in the
mind at the time of the killing.  The law does not fix the
exact period of time that must pass between the formation
of the premeditated intent to kill and the killing.  The
period of time must be long enough to allow reflection by
the defendant.  The premeditated intent to kill must be
formed before the killing.  
To support his position on this issue, Williams relies on Waters v. State, 486
So. 2d 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).  During the voir dire in Waters, the prosecutor
defined premeditation as "killing after consciously deciding to do so" and
"operation of the mind."  Id. at 615.  The prosecutor’s definition failed to include
any reference to reflection, “the integral second requirement for premeditation.”  Id. 
The district court held that the trial court erred by “allowing the prosecutor to
follow this line of questioning over defense counsel's objection and permitted an
improper definition of premeditation to form in the jury's mind.”  Id.
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We find that the present case is distinguishable from Waters.  First, as
pointed out above, the State did refer to the element of reflection in its closing
argument.  Second, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the definition of
premeditation.  Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Williams an
evidentiary hearing on this issue, as the motion, files, and record in the case
conclusively show that Williams was entitled to no relief.          
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that the trial
court did not err in summarily denying Williams’ claim of ineffective assistance of
guilt-phase counsel.  We affirm the trial court's order in its entirety. 
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs with an opinion.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., concurring.
I concur in the majority’s opinion.  I write to quote a portion of Judge
Cohen’s order, which I believe needs to be broadly published:
On December 29, 1986, Defendant filed a postconviction
motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 which
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was subsequently amended.  An order was entered on March 8, 1996
on Defendant’s amended motion.  That order granted an evidentiary
hearing on claims II, III, and IV in which Defendant raised allegations
of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel.  Those claims will
be addressed seriatim herein.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the inordinate and
unacceptable passage of time between Defendant’s conviction and
issuance of this Order.  In particular, the file shows a seven year span
from May 1989 to March 1996 during which apparently nothing was
done to resolve this matter.  The problem of undue delay is not novel
to this case.  It is virtually endemic in death penalty cases.  Even now,
Defendants are raising claims that extended confinement on death row
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  Thus far those challenges
have been rejected.
As a result of the backlog of death penalty cases, the Florida
Supreme Court has taken steps to closely monitor postconviction
death penalty cases with tight time constraints.  As trial judges, we are
resistant and even resentful of orders that require us to drop everything
else we are doing and respond to a Supreme Court mandated hearing. 
This case demonstrates why it has become necessary for the Supreme
Court to take this approach.  Justice Wells has written that such an
extended time frame as seen in this case to finally rule on a
postconviction motion “is totally unacceptable and is this Court’s and
the State’s prime responsibility to correct.”  Knight v. State, 721 So.
2d 287 (Fla. 1998) (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  While it is not this Court’s intention to place blame, it is
apparent that defense counsel, the prosecution, and the court each
bear responsibility.
Certainly, Defendant himself has little motivation to expedite his
own execution.  Nevertheless, it is both defense counsel’s and the
prosecution’s “professional duty honestly and ably to assist the courts
in securing the efficient administration of justice.”  In re the Florida
Bar, 316 So. 2d 45, 48 (Fla. 1975).  Therefore, once it became
apparent that no action, for whatever reason, was being taken on
Defendant’s postconviction motion, each attorney involved in this
case, whether defense or prosecution, was obligated at the very least
to inquire about the motion’s status.  Clearly this was not done.
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Still, it is perhaps the court which was most at fault.  Florida
courts are quick to admonish defendants who stymie the efficient
procession of cases through our courts by the invidious filing of
frivolous, meritless, and impermissibly successive postconviction
motions.  These admonishments become hypocrisy when, as in this
case, we contribute to the morass of capital cases by our own hand
through neglect.  Such dereliction undermines public confidence in our
system of justice, risks prejudicing defendants, and reduces our capital
punishment system to one “that seems unable to function except as a
parody of swift or even timely justice.”  Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 669 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).  This case serves as an
example of why it is incumbent upon our courts to remain vigilant in
the administration of swift justice, and for judges to be particularly
mindful of our ethical responsibility to “dispose of all judicial matters
promptly, efficiently, and fairly.”  Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon
3B(8). 
State v. Williams, No. CR80-5117, Div. 10, order at 2-3 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. order
filed Feb. 1, 1999) (emphasis added).  I commend Judge Cohen for addressing
frankly this problem.
All involved in the further processing of this case–the courts, the
prosecutors, the defense counsel–need to make this case a priority.  This case was
tried in October 1981, which means that in more than nineteen years this case has
not even been processed through its penalty phase.  There can be no satisfactory
explanation or excuse for the passage of that period of time.  We can only work
steadfastly and with due focus toward completing the processing of this case and
to be vigilant against this occurring in other cases.
1Further, as this Court has noted many times, trial courts should err on the side
of granting hearings, especially in death penalty cases, where the hearing will be the
only opportunity a death-sentenced defendant will have to challenge the work done on
his behalf by his lawyer.  Of course, the grant of such a hearing will also eliminate the
frequent delay that occurs when such a hearing is denied and that determination is
overturned on appeal.  There is little downside to granting an evidentiary hearing on
postconviction relief in a death penalty case.  Delay is minimized and the quality of the
process is greatly enhanced.
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ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I cannot agree that the appellant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
his claim of the ineffectiveness of counsel during the guilt phase since it is apparent
that a facially valid claim has been stated and the record does not conclusively
refute the claim.1  We often forget that this is the test for entitlement to a hearing
that we have explicitly set out in rules 3.850 and 3.851. 
As the majority notes, Williams asserts three instances of counsel error
within his ineffective assistance of guilt-phase counsel claim: (1) defense counsel’s
failure to investigate evidence of a defense of voluntary intoxication and to request
a voluntary intoxication instruction; (2) defense counsel’s confusing and ineffective
presentation to the jury by his rejection of Williams’ claims of innocence before the
jury, as well as counsel’s failure to present a viable alternative defense; and (3)
defense counsel’s failure to object to the State’s use of improper definitions and
examples of premeditation to the jury.  
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INTOXICATION
Interestingly, the transcript of the evidentiary hearing on the penalty-phase
ineffectiveness claim demonstrates without dispute an entitlement to an evidentiary
hearing on the intoxication issue.  Further, Judge Cohen’s factual findings on the
defendant’s intoxication explicitly support the defendant’s claim that his counsel
failed to adequately address this issue at the guilt phase of the trial:
      Witnesses Willie “Wink” Brown and Willie “Blue” Brown
essentially testified that they were drinking buddies with Defendant and
that Defendant consistently drank large quantities of alcohol and was
frequently intoxicated.  This was corroborated by witness Carol
Henson who testified that Defendant normally drank alcohol
throughout the day.  More importantly, witnesses Willie “Blue” Brown
and Rosa Lee Jones testified that Defendant had been drinking the day
he murdered the victim.  From this evidence, a reasonable juror might
have found that Defendant was likely intoxicated at the time of the
murder and could have weighed Defendant’s intoxicated state as a
mitigating factor before imposing the death penalty.  Whether the jury
would or would not find voluntary intoxication a mitigating factor is
not the issue before the Court.
      Dr. Berland offered testimony that the use of alcohol by a person
often exacerbates any mental illness that person might be suffering. 
Thus, Defendant might also have used his intoxication as a mitigating
factor by attempting to show the jury that the murder was committed
during an episode of mental illness that was substantially intensified by
his use of alcohol.   
Order on Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief at 11-12 (emphasis added). 
Judge Cohen expressly concluded that “a reasonable juror might have found that
Defendant was likely intoxicated at the time of the murder.”  This finding
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conclusively demonstrates that there is an issue as to whether counsel properly
handled the intoxication issue on behalf of his client.  Obviously, if a similar finding
were made during an evidentiary hearing concerning the issue of whether guilt-phase
counsel was ineffective, Williams would have a basis to argue an entitlement to a
new trial because of counsel’s failure to address this issue.  
Of course, at this time we must only decide whether Williams was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on this claim.  In cases where there has been no evidentiary
hearing, this Court must accept the factual allegations made by the defendant to the
extent that they are not refuted by the record.  See Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253,
257 (Fla. 1999);  see also Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000).  It
has now been made apparent that Williams’ claim is legally sufficient because his
allegations are sufficient and the record affirmatively supports rather than refutes his
claims.  
The majority’s suggestion that counsel could not be deemed ineffective for
not asserting the intoxication defense because it would be inconsistent with the
actual theory of defense presented is explicitly contradicted by the record.  The
record reflects that counsel himself gave short shrift to defendant’s claim of
innocence and actually attempted, albeit inadequately, to raise an intoxication
defense.  Hence, the defendant has not only had his own counsel abandon his
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defense of innocence, his counsel has also failed to advance an alternative defense
that the record reflects could have been advanced based on the facts.
    COUNSEL’S REJECTION OF WILLIAMS’ CLAIMS OF INNOCENCE
Williams asserts that guilt-phase counsel was also ineffective during his
closing arguments for rejecting Williams’ testimony that he was innocent, but
offering no viable alternative defense.  In his argument to the jury Williams’ attorney
conceded problems with Williams’ credibility and actually appears to attempt,
albeit incompletely and awkwardly, to invoke an intoxication defense:
Now, Freddie Williams was not [in the room] when all of this
occurred.  If you choose to believe that, you should find him not
guilty.  But, if you should choose to believe that Freddie Lee Williams
was not telling the truth, I ask you not to be vindictive, not to be upset
and not be mad at Freddie Lee Williams for lying to you, but consider
instead what motive he would have for lying.  Obviously, he knows he
is in a great deal of trouble, but because he doesn’t tell you the truth,
don’t vest [sic] your displeasure on him by finding him guilty of
something the state has not proven.  The state has to prove him guilty. 
He does not have to prove anything.  No matter how many lies he may
have told you, he doesn’t have to prove anything.  The state does.  
      . . . .
      Now, we have a reasonable theory should you decide Freddie Lee
Williams was the one that pulled the trigger.  That is the two of them
got intoxicated and had gotten into an argument over one thing or
another; that Freddie Lee Williams had a fit of rage.  He got the gun
and pointed the pistol in her direction and pulled the trigger.  
      . . . .
      I submit what happened in that scuffle, Freddie Lee Williams was
there and he was trying to help her.  He shot the gun off.  Maybe it
was to scare her.  Maybe it was to hurt her.  She was wounded very
2This case is somewhat analogous to Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253 (Fla.
1995), where the defense attorney conceded guilt during opening statements but
argued for the lesser included crime of second-degree murder.  On appeal from the
denial of the 3.850 motion, this Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing:
Harvey argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in the
guilt phase of the trial when without his consent, defense counsel
conceded Harvey's guilt in the opening argument.  Harvey maintains that
this concession nullified his fundamental right to have the issue of guilt
or innocence presented to the jury as an adversarial issue.  Because the
record before us is unclear as to whether Harvey was informed of the
strategy to concede guilt and argue for second-degree murder, we
remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.   
Id. at 1256.
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badly.  He was there trying to help her.  If he had wanted to kill her, he
would have shot her again and again and again, but he didn’t do that.  
(Emphasis added.)  Initially, it is important to note that counsel’s argument
provides further record support for the need of an evidentiary hearing on the
intoxication issue.  However, while mentioning intoxication, counsel sought no
instructions from the court providing guidance to the jury as to how the intoxication
issue should be treated.  Hence, contrary to the majority’s position, counsel’s
argument supports appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective since he
essentially abandoned Williams’ own claim of innocence but offered to the jury an
incomplete theory of defense based on intoxication.2  In addition, counsel failed to
object to the State’s erroneous explanation to the jury of the legal meaning of
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premeditation, an explanation very similar to the one found harmful by the district
court in Waters v. State, 486 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).  
All of this simply illustrates the need for an evidentiary hearing to sort these
matters out.  When all three assertions of incompetency are viewed together, it is
apparent that an evidentiary hearing was required since Williams has asserted that
he received virtually no defense, and that, in fact, his counsel affirmatively damaged
his case in his confusing presentation to the jury.
PARIENTE, J., concurs.
Notice of Cross-Appeal in and for Orange County,
Jay Paul Cohen, Judge - Case No. CR80-5117
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Cross-Appellee
Chandler R. Muller and Stephanie H. Park of the Law Offices of Chandler R.
Muller, P.A., Winter Park, Florida,
for Cross-Appellant