Title: Waldron v. Wilson

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

532 N.E.2d 1154 (1989)
Roger Eugene WALDRON, Appellant (Plaintiff below),
v.
Earl WILSON and Max L. Wilson Appellees (Defendants below).
No. 34S02-8901-CV-17.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
January 12, 1989.
Dan L. Clayton, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Daniel J. Gamble, Kokomo, for appellees.
PIVARNIK, Justice.
This cause comes to us on a petition to transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, Second District. Petition is brought by Plaintiff-Appellant Roger Eugene Waldron, who initially appealed the denial of his motion to amend his complaint. He claimed that under Ind.R.Tr.P. 15(C) his amended proposed complaint related back to the date of the filing of his original *1155 complaint. The facts are accurately stated by the court of appeals as follows:
The court of appeals found two issues were raised in the appeal:
The court of appeals found Waldron timely pursued his appeal and we summarily affirm the court of appeals opinion on that issue and adopt it as a part of this opinion. The court of appeals further affirmed the trial court in its denial of Waldron's motion to amend, citing this court's decision in Czarnecki v. Lear Siegler, Inc. (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 299. It is our observation our holding in Czarnecki was contravened and accordingly we vacate the opinion of the court of appeals on this issue and reverse the trial court.
In Czarnecki, the complaint was filed August 31, 1977, one day before the statute of limitations had run. Summons and complaint were served on Hinson Cab Co. on September 2, 1977, clearly after the statute had run. Actually there was no Hinson Cab Co. but the manufacturer of the cab was Royal Industries, Inc., through its Hinson Division. Royal Industries merged into Lear Siegler, Inc., and in the same year the assets of the former Hinson Division of Royal Industries, Inc. were purchased by Hinson Manufacturing Company, Inc. Royal Industries, Inc. was not served and never received notice of the institution of the action. Five years after the accident, on September 12, 1980, a summons addressed to Hinson Cab Co. was served on Hinson Manufacturing Company, Inc. This was the first notice of the action received by Hinson Manufacturing Company, Inc., or its predecessors, Lear Siegler Inc., and Hinson Division Royal Industries, Inc. This court held:
Czarnecki, at 301.
T.R. 15(C)(1) does not require process or that a summons be served before the statute of limitations has expired. What is required is such notice of the institution of the action that the added defendant will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits. In the instant case, Waldron filed his cause on October 14, 1982, the last day within the statute of limitations. The Wilsons received the complaint and summons on October 15, 1982; service would have been effective and proper had it not been for the misnomer. In fact, the Wilsons raised no question about the service for three years. Even though there was a misnomer, however, the newly named defendant clearly would have had notice the action was instituted and would have known, but for the misnomer, they were the intended target defendants. We also note the added defendant had notice the action was instituted before the statute had run. Meridian Mutual Insurance Company, the liability insurance carrier for Max, Earl, and the corporation, was notified by American States Insurance Company, the workmen's compensation carrier for Waldron's employer, of its claim for subrogation. This was done by letters dated May 27, 1981 and July 12, 1982. Thus the necessary parties were notified of the impending action. The trial court improperly denied Waldron's motion to amend. The trial court is in all other respects affirmed.
*1157 DeBRULER and GIVAN, JJ., concur.
DICKSON, J., concurs with separate opinion in which PIVARNIK, J., concurs.
SHEPARD, C.J., dissents with separate opinion.
DICKSON, Justice, concurring.
Trial Rule 15(C) of the Indiana Rules of Procedure qualifies the nature of the notice prescribed as a precondition to relation back. It requires merely receipt of "such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits." While the United States Supreme Court fails to recognize and implement this qualification in its application of the analogous Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) in Schiavone v. Fortune (1986), 477 U.S. 21, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 91 L. Ed. 2d 18, such decision does not compel us to an identical interpretation and application of our rule. See Gumz v. Starke County Farm Bureau Co-op. Assn. (1979), 271 Ind. 694, 395 N.E.2d 257; Celina Mutual Ins. Co. v. Forister (1982), Ind. App., 438 N.E.2d 1007; Hiatt v. Yergin (1972), 152 Ind. App. 497, 284 N.E.2d 834.
Because the filing of the complaint constituted constructive notice to the named defendants Earl Wilson and Max L. Wilson "within the period provided by law for commencing the action," I agree that such notice was likewise sufficient under T.R. 15(C) to timely notify Wilson Livestock Farms, Inc., the farming corporation of which the defendants were the sole officers and directors. The corporation cannot thereby be prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits. See Honda Motor Co. v. Parks (1985), Ind. App., 485 N.E.2d 644; see also 2 W. Harvey, Indiana Practice 62-66 (2d ed. 1987); Harvey, Rules, Rulings for the Trial Lawyer, Res Gestae, July 1987, at 20, 23.
The majority opinion is consistent with the requirement of Trial Rule 1 that the Indiana Rules of Procedure "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."
PIVARNIK, J., concurs.
SHEPARD, Chief Justice, dissenting.
Two years after his injury, plaintiff Roger Eugene Waldon sued Earl and Max Wilson for damages. Nearly four years after his injury he sought to sue Wilson Livestock Farms, Inc. The General Assembly has determined that such actions must commence within two years. Ind. Code § 34-1-2-2(1) (Burns 1986 Repl.). This case tests the extent which the judiciary can permit the lawsuit to be brought later.
The device by which courts have permitted tardy lawsuits to be brought notwithstanding the legislative directive is Trial Rule 15(C), Ind.Rules of Procedure. That rule provides:
Indiana's rule and the identical federal rule were designed to ameliorate the harsh result which obtained when a plaintiff misnamed a defendant or named a defendant in the wrong capacity. For those occasions on which it was clear that the right person had been before the court all along but merely misnamed, justice required a provision permitting amendment.
The opportunity to name new parties, however, is carefully limited by Trial Rule 15(C). Subsection 1 requires that the new party must have received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be *1158 prejudiced in defending. The most respected authorities in the field of civil procedure agree that notice of the incident is not adequate. The party sought to be brought in must have notice, even informal notice, that a lawsuit has commenced. 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice Chapter 15.15[4.-2] (1987); 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1498 (1971).
The question in this case is when the Wilsons and Wilson Livestock Farms, Inc., must have received notice. Trial Rule 15(C) plainly says that a party sought to be added must have received it "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him." It is undisputed that they did not. Because they did not, the rule does not provide a basis for permitting an action against Wilson Livestock Farms, Inc., beyond the statute of limitations. While my brother Dickson asserts that plaintiff's filing of his complaint gave "constructive notice" during the required period, such an interpretation leaves this section of the rule without meaning. After all, every request for amendment to add parties arises in a case in which the plaintiff filed a timely complaint.
To conclude that the corporation is eligible to be added, one would have to accept the idea that someone like the Wilsons could receive notice days or even years after the action was initiated. This Court declined to accept that idea in Czarnecki v. Lear Siegler, Inc. (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 299.
Whether this rule is too liberal or too restrictive is a matter of policy which might be debated. What the rule provides is really not debatable. As Justice Blackmun wrote for six members of his Court in deciding a case identical to the one before us:
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 30-31, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2385, 91 L. Ed. 2d 18, 28-29 (1986).
Appellant cites Professor William Harvey's declaration that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Schiavone is "influential, but not impressive or persuasive." 2 W. Harvey, Indiana Practice, Rules of Procedure Annotated 64 (1987). Notwithstanding this critique, every state appellate court which has considered the meaning of Trial Rule 15(C) in the last three years has reached exactly the same conclusion as our Court of Appeals reached in this case. Kiehn v. Nelsen's Tire Company, 45 Wash. App. 291, 724 P.2d 434 (1986); Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 729 P.2d 1075 (1987); Nolph v. Scott, 725 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1987).
This Court was on a similar track when it decided Czarnecki v. Lear Siegler, Inc. and cited with approval Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133 (7th Cir.1973). 471 N.E.2d  at 300-301. Today's decision takes us off in a different direction  different from the other state courts which have considered the question, different from the U.S. Supreme Court, and different from our own prior pronouncements.