Title: The Florida Bar v. Mark F. Germain

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-947 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
MARK F. GERMAIN,  
Respondent. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-1096 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
MARK F. GERMAIN,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 17, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM.  
 
We review a referee's report recommending that Respondent Mark F. 
Germain be found guilty of unethical conduct and suspended from the practice of 
law for ninety-one days.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For 
the reasons explained below, we approve the referee’s findings of misconduct but 
disapprove the referee’s recommendation of a ninety-one day suspension and 
instead suspend the Respondent from the practice of law for one year. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Florida Bar filed two separate complaints against Germain, which were 
consolidated and tried together before a referee.  Before the hearing, the Bar and 
Germain entered into a stipulation about the facts.  The stipulation established 
many of the facts alleged in the complaints, as well as other facts not alleged. 
 
The referee filed two separate reports.  The first report made factual findings 
and conclusions of guilt in both cases.  The second and final report, issued after a 
separate hearing on the issue of discipline, contained the findings and conclusions 
contained in the first report, factual findings not made in the first report, findings 
concerning aggravating and mitigating factors, and recommendations of discipline.  
The facts, as found by the referee or as established by the stipulation, are 
summarized below. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Case No. SC05-947 
 
 
This case arose from a dispute between Germain and Michael C. Norvell 
concerning ownership of a building called the Lake Law Center (the building) and 
the employment of James Cardona, who was a paralegal first for Germain and then 
 
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for Norvell.  In November 2002, Germain executed a promissory note for $100,000 
for Norvell in exchange for a one-third ownership of the building, where Germain 
and Norvell operated separate law firms.  In April 2003, Norvell offered to 
purchase Germain’s interest for $100,000.  Germain rejected the offer. 
 
In March 2004, Germain fired Cardona, his paralegal.  The following month, 
Norvell increased his offer for Germain’s interest in the building to $140,000.  He 
also offered, in writing, to sell his two-thirds share to Germain for $280,000.  
Germain tentatively accepted the offer to purchase Norvell’s interest, but was 
unable to obtain financing. 
 
That same month, on April 17, Germain filed a police report alleging that 
Norvell had physically attacked him.  The officer reported seeing a “large 
contusion on Mr. Germain’s arm along with several slight abrasions.”  On April 
19, Norvell entered one of the offices in the building, removed Germain’s files, 
and sat behind the desk and in front of the computer.  Germain and Norvell 
disputed ownership of that office.  That same day, Cardona reported to work at the 
building, as Norvell had hired him. Cardona and Germain argued.  Germain 
physically escorted Cardona off the premises. 
 
The next day, April 20, Germain delivered a “no trespass” warning to 
Cardona’s mother.  Germain placed a lock on the door to the disputed office and 
placed a no-trespass warning on the door.  The following day, Norvell removed the 
 
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door from its hinges and entered the office.  Germain called the police, who 
responded.  Germain accused Cardona of trespassing even though he knew 
Cardona had Norvell’s permission to be there and that Norvell owned two-thirds of 
the building.  Germain then filed against Norvell a Petition for Injunction for 
Protection against Repeat Violence (Norvell Petition).  In it, Germain swore that 
Norvell had a “hand gun with ammunition in our office.”   The court entered a 
temporary injunction against Norvell.   
 
Germain also filed against Cardona a Petition for Injunction for Protection 
against Repeat Violence (Cardona Petition).  In it, Germain alleged that “Cardona 
is stalking me and is trying to sabotage my law practice.”  The petition did not 
allege any acts of violence or repeat violence by Cardona, as those terms are 
defined in section 784.046(4)(a)-(b), Florida Statutes (2004), rendering the petition 
meritless.  Cardona responded by filing against Germain a Petition for Injunction 
for Protection against Repeat Violence (Germain Petition). 
 
A week later Norvell filed a suit for partition of the building and other relief 
(Partition Action).  Germain filed an emergency motion in which he swore that 
“Norvell is also a convicted felon and Germain has personally observed Norvell 
handle a loaded pistol in the office.”1 
                                          
 
 
1.  In September 1984, Norvell was granted a disciplinary resignation from 
The Florida Bar after he was suspended for criminal conduct.  The underlying 
criminal conduct was a conviction in federal court of a felony drug offense for 
 
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On June 18, 2004, Germain and Norvell entered into a settlement agreement 
in the Partition Action.  Germain agreed to withdraw the Norvell Petition and to 
execute an affidavit about the firearm allegation (June 18 Affidavit).  The June 18 
Affidavit stated:  “after some thought, I recall that the pistol was actually in 
possession of the office paralegal, Rebecca S. Skipper and not Michael C. 
Norvell.”  It also stated:  “At no time, was the gun ever in Norvell’s office or in 
Norvell’s possession” and “[t]hat sometime in 2001 Rebecca S. Skipper removed 
the gun from the office.”  Germain signed it under oath. 
 
A few days later, Cardona filed a motion to dismiss the Cardona Petition.  
The motion also asked the court to award him $30,390 in attorney’s fees as a 
sanction against Germain for filing a frivolous petition.  The court held a hearing 
on the motion.  Germain subpoenaed the police officer who took Germain’s 
trespassing complaint, but the court would not allow the officer or Germain to 
testify.  The court did allow Germain to proffer the testimony.  The court dismissed 
the petition, finding that it “does not allege facts supporting an injunction for 
protection against repeat violence, and the facts proffered by petitioner failed to 
establish a basis for such an injunction.  There was no evidence of violence or 
imminent fear of violence by respondent toward petitioner.” 
                                                                                                                                        
which he was sentenced to five years in prison.  Norvell was reinstated to the 
practice of law in 1992. 
 
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On July 1, 2004, Norvell paid Germain $140,000 for his one-third share of 
the building.  Two weeks later, the court entered an amended order dismissing the 
Cardona Petition, denying Germain’s motion for reconsideration, and granting 
Cardona’s motion for sanctions.  The court found Germain’s claims were “so 
clearly devoid of merit both on the facts and the law as to be completely 
untenable.” 
 
A week later Germain filed a motion to disqualify the judge in the Cardona 
Petition case.  The motion made sworn allegations that the judge should be 
disqualified, in part, because of a conflict of interest presented by his relationship 
with Lennon Bowen, an attorney, and Bowen’s relationship with Cardona.  Two 
days later he filed a motion for reconsideration of the Cardona Petition’s dismissal, 
arguing the dismissal was improper without an evidentiary hearing.  Germain 
swore the Cardona Petition was not frivolous because “convicted felon Michael C. 
Norvell’s possession of a gun gun [sic] in the office is not frivolous.” 
 
Seven months later, in March 2005, Germain again moved the trial court to 
set aside the order dismissing the Cardona Petition.  The motion alleged that the 
judge who dismissed the petition, who was no longer presiding over the case, had 
been Chief Assistant State Attorney when Germain sued the State Attorney years 
before and that the judge, as an assistant state attorney, prosecuted Germain in a 
contempt proceeding a few years later.  According to Germain, Bowen, who had 
 
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represented Cardona in prior proceedings, was the judge’s campaign manager 
when the judge dismissed the petition.  Germain also alleged the judge had 
solicited a campaign contribution from him while the petition was pending and that 
the solicitation was “inappropriate, if not illegal.”  In fact, Bowen was not the 
judge’s campaign manager and never represented Cardona.  The solicitation was a 
mass-mailed invitation to a fund-raising event mailed by a host committee, not the 
judge. 
  
 
In several pleadings, in hearings before the trial court and the referee, and in 
his brief filed in this Court, Germain referred to Norvell as “a convicted felon,” 
“cunning,” “devious,” and “diabolical.”  He accused Norvell of killing an elderly 
client and threatening to kill him.  Germain referred to Cardona as “a fugitive” and 
accused him of trespassing, stalking, and stealing.2  He described them as “two 
convicted criminals vouching for each other.” 
 
The referee found “that no reasonable person would have feared that Norvell 
would kill, and that no reasonable person would have had a fear that would justify 
giving a false statement under oath.”  He also found the violence between Norvell 
and Germain had declined over time and that Germain had willingly remained in 
the space-sharing arrangement with Norvell.   
                                          
 
 
2.  Cardona received two traffic citations for DUI in Alabama in October 
1986.  A warrant for his arrest was issued after he failed to appear.  In November 
2002, Cardona entered a guilty plea to the first DUI citation.  The second Alabama 
DUI was dismissed.  At that point, Cardona was no longer a fugitive. 
 
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Case No. SC05-1096 
 
The second Bar complaint arose from Germain’s actions in State v. Guerreo, 
No. 2004-CF-2140 (Fla. 5th Jud. Cir. Oct. 26, 2004) (order of contempt).  Germain 
represented the defendant in a proceeding in September 2004.  During that 
proceeding, the judge warned Germain that he was going to cite Germain for 
contempt if he continued to interrupt him.  Despite the warning, Germain 
interrupted twice more.  The judge cited him for two counts of direct criminal 
contempt.  After a hearing, the judge found Germain guilty of two counts of 
contempt and fined him $100.  Germain paid the $100, but filed a motion for 
reconsideration.  The trial judge dismissed the order of contempt, but refused to 
order the refund of Germain’s $100 fine. 
RULE VIOLATIONS 
 
 
The referee concluded that Germain’s conduct violated rule 4-3.1 (failing to 
assert only meritorious claims and contentions), rule 4-3.3(a)(1) (making a false 
statement of material fact or law to a tribunal), rule 4-3.4(c) (knowingly disobeying 
an obligation under the rules of a tribunal), 4-3.5(c) (engaging in conduct intended 
to disrupt tribunal), and rule 4-8.4(d) (engaging in conduct in connection with the 
practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) (three counts) of 
the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.  
 
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The referee found four aggravating factors:  (1) previous discipline, 
including a public reprimand in 1997 for making disparaging remarks in several 
instances about opposing counsel and a judge and failing to follow the rulings of a 
trial judge; (2) a pattern of misconduct as established by the earlier misconduct of a 
similar nature; (3) multiple offenses; and (4) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of his conduct.  The referee found three mitigating factors:  (1) absence of a 
dishonest or selfish motive; (2) personal or emotional problems; and (3) physical 
or mental disability or impairment. 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
 
The referee recommended a ninety-one-day suspension, followed by one 
year of probation after reinstatement; an evaluation by a Bar-approved mental 
health professional and abiding by any recommended treatment or counseling, 
continuing through the probationary period; and reimbursement of the Bar’s costs.  
The referee relied on Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 6.12, 6.22, 
and 8.2, as well as Florida Bar v. Adams, 641 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1994).  
 
Germain petitioned for review of the report.  He contends the referee erred 
in excluding evidence of Norvell’s alleged exploitation of an elderly client, 
challenges several of the findings, questions the application of two of the 
aggravating factors, and argues that the referee erred in failing to find several 
 
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additional mitigating factors.  He also takes issue with the recommendations of a 
mental health evaluation and ninety-one-day suspension. 
ANALYSIS 
 
We first address the exclusion of evidence issue.  A referee’s admission of 
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Fla. Bar v. Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241, 
244 (Fla. 2002).  In this case, the referee excluded testimony about Norvell’s 
alleged actions involving an elderly client.  Germain argues that this evidence was 
relevant to whether his fear of Norvell was reasonable and well-grounded, to 
support his claim that he signed the June 18 Affidavit under duress. 
 
Assuming that Germain’s allegations are true, the facts that Norvell 
unethically made himself a beneficiary under his client’s will and then decided to 
remove her from life support does not tend to prove that he coerced Germain to 
execute the June 18 Affidavit.  The referee did not abuse his discretion in 
excluding it.  See § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005) (providing that similar fact 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible when relevant solely to 
prove bad character or propensity).  Moreover, any error would have been 
harmless.  There is competent, substantial evidence in the record that Germain did 
not sign the June 18 Affidavit under duress.  Germain never advised the court that 
he had been coerced into signing it.  He never sought to have the settlement 
overturned or set aside.  He never filed a police report to the effect that Norvell 
 
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unlawfully possessed a gun.  Germain accused Norvell of having a gun in the 
office only in civil pleadings and civil hearings.  These were not the actions of 
someone who believed he was in danger.  Accordingly, we approve the referee’s 
decision to exclude this evidence. 
 
We next consider the factual findings Germain challenges.  The party 
contending that the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions as to guilt are 
erroneous carries the burden of demonstrating that there is no evidence in the 
record to support those findings or that the record evidence clearly contradicts the 
conclusions.  Fla. Bar v. Carlon, 820 So. 2d 891, 898 (Fla. 2002).  Specifically, 
Germain challenges the following findings:  (1) the Cardona Petition was 
frivolous; (2) Germain’s comments concerning the trial judge, Norvell, and 
Cardona were inappropriate; (3) Germain misled the police officer by not telling 
him that Cardona had Norvell’s permission to be on the premises of the building; 
(4) Germain made false statements under oath; (5) Germain was not under duress 
when he executed the June 18 Affidavit; and (6) Norvell’s violence toward 
Germain had declined over time. 
 
Germain points to contradictory evidence in the record or, presumably, in his 
proffers, to support his claims of error.  He nevertheless fails to meet his burden to 
demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record to support the referee’s 
 
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findings.   The findings are supported in large part by the facts to which Germain 
stipulated.  
 
In the June 18 Affidavit, Germain stated under oath that Norvell never 
possessed the gun, the gun was in the possession of a paralegal, and the paralegal 
had removed the gun from the office in 2001.  Yet, both before and after June 18, 
2004, Germain filed pleadings alleging that Norvell had a gun in the office.  He 
tries to defend the fact that he lied under oath, either in the June 18 Affidavit or in 
the pleadings filed before and after it, by claiming that Norvell coerced him to sign 
the affidavit.  The referee found that “no reasonable person” would have been in 
fear of his life and that “no reasonable person” would have felt compelled to lie 
under oath.   
 
Germain’s failure to advise the court that he signed the affidavit under 
duress is compelling evidence that he was not coerced into signing it.  The 
assertion of duress has other flaws, however.  Accusing Norvell of having 
possession of a gun in subsequent civil pleadings was inconsistent with his 
purported fear of Norvell.  Further, if the building was worth $700,000, as Germain 
claimed in his brief, Norvell would not have offered to sell Germain his two-thirds 
interest for $280,000.  For that matter, Germain would have been able to obtain 
financing for $280,000 if the collateral had been worth over twice that amount.   
 
- 12 -
 
Germain’s points concerning the other disputed factual findings are equally 
flawed and boil down to credibility assessments.  As the referee is in a unique 
position to assess witness credibility, this Court will not overturn his judgment 
absent clear and convincing evidence.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 
975, 978 (Fla. 1999).  There is no evidence that the referee’s judgment is incorrect 
in this case.  Accordingly, we approve these factual findings. 
 
Germain also argues the referee erred in finding the aggravating factor of 
previous discipline based upon a finding that he had been publicly reprimanded for 
disparaging remarks about a judge.  He also challenges the aggravating factor of 
refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  Finally, he faults the 
referee for failing to find the following mitigating factors:  (1) imposition of other 
penalties or sanctions; (2) remorse; and (3) remoteness of prior offenses. 
 
Like other factual findings, a referee’s findings of mitigation and 
aggravation carry a presumption of correctness and will be upheld unless clearly 
erroneous or without support in the record.  Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 848 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 
2003).  A referee’s failure to find that an aggravating factor or mitigating factor 
applies is due the same deference.  See Fla. Bar v. Morse, 784 So. 2d 414, 415-16 
(Fla. 2001); Fla. Bar v. Bustamante, 662 So. 2d 687, 687 (Fla. 1995); Fla. Bar v. 
Hecker, 475 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 1985).  Germain fails to meet his burden. 
 
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Competent, substantial evidence supports the referee’s findings.  As to the 
mitigating factor that other penalties already have been imposed, Germain paid 
Cardona $15,000 to settle an attorney’s fee award greater than $30,000.  Thus, his 
payment was less than half the amount awarded.  Moreover, the Cardona Petition 
is only a small part of the conduct resulting in discipline.  The $100 fine Germain 
paid in the criminal contempt-of-court case is also just a small part of this case.  In 
light of all of Germain’s misconduct, we cannot say the referee erred in failing to 
find that the imposition of these penalties or sanctions constituted mitigation. 
 
Similarly, Germain presented little or no evidence of remorse upon which 
the referee could have based a finding of this mitigating factor.  While Germain 
claims he apologized, both verbally and in writing, to the judge in the criminal 
contempt-of-court case, there is nothing to suggest he experienced any true 
remorse for his conduct, other than that his conduct cost him money.  It is clear 
from his arguments that he still considers himself an innocent victim, first of 
Norvell and Cardona and then of the Bar, and still believes that all of his conduct 
was appropriate and justified. 
 
The mitigating factor of the remoteness of prior offenses also does not apply.  
On June 28, 2001, the Court ordered Florida Bar diversion in Case No. SC96944. 
This case was resolved one year before Germain became embroiled with Norvell 
as a co-owner of the building and only three years before most of the misconduct at 
 
- 14 -
issue here.  Four years before the Florida Bar diversion, this Court publicly 
reprimanded Germain in Case No. SC90589.  See Fla. Bar v. Germain, 705 So. 2d 
11 (Fla. 1997) (table).   
 
These same facts support the finding of the aggravating factor of previous 
discipline.  In 1997, we publicly reprimanded Germain for making disparaging 
comments about opposing counsel and failing to comply with a trial court order.  
(Although the Bar dismissed the charge that he made disparaging comments about 
opposing counsel and a trial judge, the aggravating factor of previous discipline 
still applies.)  The aggravating factor of previous discipline does not require the 
previous offense to be of the same nature.  Rather, previous discipline for the same 
kind of misconduct establishes a pattern of misconduct or multiple offenses or 
increases the weight given to the previous discipline factor.   
 
Germain’s argument that he should not be penalized for continuing to assert 
his innocence in these proceedings is a closer question.  The Court has held that “it 
is improper for a referee to base the severity of a recommended punishment on an 
attorney’s refusal to admit alleged misconduct or on ‘lack of remorse’ presumed 
from such refusal.”  Fla. Bar v. Lipman, 497 So. 2d 1165, 1168 (Fla. 1986); see 
also Fla. Bar v. Karten, 829 So. 2d 883, 889-90 (Fla. 2002); Fla. Bar v. Mogil, 763 
So. 2d 303, 312 (Fla. 2000); Fla. Bar v. Corbin, 701 So. 2d 334, 337 (Fla. 1997).   
 
- 15 -
 
At first glance, these cases seem to be in conflict with the Court’s decision in 
Florida Bar v. Gersten, 707 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1998).  Upon closer examination, 
however, we conclude they are not.  In Gersten, the respondent continued to refuse 
to comply with a court order to submit to the taking of his sworn statement after 
the order had been affirmed on appeal.  Whether the respondent had an obligation 
to comply with the court’s order was a legal issue, not a factual one.  In Lipman, 
Karten, Mogil, and Corbin the respondents disputed the factual findings that they 
had engaged in the conduct giving rise to the rule violations.  These were pure 
findings of fact. 
   
The situation here is like that in Gersten, and unlike the situations in 
Lipman, Karten, Mogil, and Corbin.  Germain has stipulated to most of the facts.  
He does not dispute that he engaged in the conduct.  He nevertheless continues to 
assert that his actions did not constitute unethical conduct.  These are legal issues.  
With a minimum of legal research, Germain could have discovered that his 
conduct did constitute unethical conduct and either curtailed his activities or 
avoided them altogether.  Where the issue rests on a legal question, the aggravating 
factor of failing to acknowledge the wrongfulness of the conduct clearly applies.  
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings concerning aggravating and 
mitigating factors. 
 
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Lastly, we address the recommendation of discipline.  Germain argues that 
the recommendation of a mental health evaluation violates due process because he 
had no notice that his mental health was at issue.  He also argues that the 
recommendation of a ninety-one-day suspension is improper, first, because he 
engaged in no misconduct and, second, because it is too severe. 
 
In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because it is 
ultimately the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  Fla. Bar v. 
Miller, 863 So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla. 2003); Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 
(Fla. 1989); see also art. V,  ' 15, Fla. Const.  Generally, the Court will not second-
guess a referee’s recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in 
existing case law and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  
Miller, 863 So. 2d at 235; Fla. Bar v. Temmer, 753 So. 2d  555, 558 (Fla. 1999). 
 
The nature of Germain’s arguments, the unusual series of events giving rise 
to this case, and Germain’s inability to grasp the problematic nature of his conduct 
are enough to raise the issue of Germain’s mental stability.  The real issue, 
however, is whether Germain was or should have been aware that his mental state 
was at issue. See Carricarte, 733 So. 2d at 979 (approving recommendation of 
mental health evaluation where Bar counsel mentioned a mental health evaluation 
in his closing argument at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the hearing).   
 
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Germain’s own theory of defense made his mental state an issue.  He 
claimed he was the victim of several vicious, unprovoked attacks and that he was 
in fear for his life when he signed the June 18 Affidavit.  In addition, the referee’s 
first report, which preceded the sanctions phase of the hearing, stated: “the 
undersigned finds that no reasonable person would have feared that Norvell would 
kill, and that no reasonable person would have a fear that would justify giving a 
false statement under oath.”  (Emphasis added.)  The referee made several findings 
concerning the incidents of violence between Norvell and Germain and concluded 
that “the violence in these incidents declined over time.  It is notable that after the 
July 2002 incident, Respondent willingly remained in the space-sharing 
arrangement with Norvell.”   
 
These findings and Germain’s own arguments were sufficient to put 
Germain on notice that his mental state was at issue.  Accordingly, we approve the 
recommendation for a mental health evaluation.   
 
Next, we consider the appropriate discipline for Germain’s misconduct. As 
set forth above, we will not second-guess a referee’s recommended discipline as 
long as it has a reasonable basis in existing caselaw and the Florida Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  Having reviewed the standards, the cases involving 
similar misconduct, and the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the 
 
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referee, we disapprove the referee’s recommendation of a ninety-one-day 
suspension and instead suspend Germain for one year. 
 
Standards 6.12, 6.22, and 8.2, which the referee cited, all support a 
suspension.3  To determine the proper length, we obtain guidance from our 
previous cases.  In Adams, 641 So. 2d 399, in a letter and at a hearing before a 
judge the respondent accused three opposing counsel of attempting to suborn 
perjury.  None of the attorneys had done so; although there was cause for 
respondent to suspect one of the attorneys, there was no basis to suspect the others.  
This Court suspended him for ninety days.  Our opinion does not mention 
aggravating or mitigating factors or previous discipline. 
 
When we consider that Germain was previously disciplined for the same 
kind of misconduct and that he lied under oath and engaged in other misconduct, it 
is clear that a longer suspension is warranted here than in Adams.  The Court views 
cumulative misconduct more seriously than isolated instances.  Carlon, 820 So. 2d 
at 899.  This is the second time Germain comes before the Court for making 
                                          
 
 
3.  Standard 6.12 provides:  “Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer 
knows that false statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that 
material information is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action.”  
Standard 6.22 provides:  “Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
violates a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or a 
party, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.” 
Standard 8.2 provides:  “Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer has been 
publicly reprimanded for the same or similar conduct and engages in further 
similar acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the 
public, the legal system, or the profession.”   
 
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disparaging comments about other professionals.  These circumstances alone 
support the recommended ninety-one-day suspension.   
 
However, that Germain lied under oath convinces us that an even longer 
suspension is warranted.  
This court considers a lawyer who intentionally lies 
under oath to have committed an extremely serious 
offense.  Our condemnation of this type of misconduct is 
not of recent vintage.  In Dodd v. Florida Bar, 118 So.2d 
17, 19 (Fla. 1960), this Court stated: 
No breach of professional ethics, or of the 
law, is more harmful to the administration of 
justice or more hurtful to the public 
appraisal of the legal profession than the 
knowledgeable use by an attorney of false 
testimony in the judicial process. 
We have warned that such conduct warrants severe 
discipline and have dealt harshly with those who commit 
this offense. 
Fla. Bar v. Cibula, 725 So. 2d 360, 364 (Fla. 1999) (suspending an attorney for 
ninety-one days after he lied under oath during two court hearings held in 
connection with alimony obligations); see also Fla. Bar v. Nunes, 734 So. 2d 393 
(Fla. 1999) (imposing a three-year suspension for filing a frivolous lawsuit, 
continuing to represent clients after being discharged, making disparaging remarks 
about judges and opposing counsel, and making false representations to a tribunal, 
among other things); Fla. Bar v. Klausner, 721 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998) (imposing a 
three-year suspension for forging signatures on documents submitted to the court 
 
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and lying about the misconduct to the court and in a sworn statement to an 
investigator with the state attorney’s office, among other things); Fla. Bar v. 
Vining, 707 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1998) (imposing a three-year suspension for 
misrepresentations in a stipulation submitted to the court while seeking funds in 
the court registry); Fla. Bar v. Segal, 663 So. 2d 618, 622 (Fla. 1995) (imposing a 
three-year suspension for making a false statement in a petition for discharge 
submitted to the probate court); Fla. Bar v. Kleinfeld, 648 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1994) 
(imposing a three-year suspension for making false statements in an affidavit 
seeking disqualification of a judge in a contempt hearing against the attorney, 
among other things); Fla. Bar v. O’Malley, 534 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (Fla. 1988) 
(imposing a three-year suspension for false testimony in a suit against the attorney 
for return of bond collateral entrusted to him). 
 
These cases support a three-year suspension.  Nevertheless, in light of the 
mitigating factors found by the referee (absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, 
personal or emotional problems, and physical or mental disability or impairment), 
we impose a suspension of one year. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, Mark F. Germain is hereby suspended from the 
practice of law for one year.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the 
filing of this opinion so that Germain can close out his practice and protect the 
 
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interests of existing clients.  If Germain notifies this Court in writing that he is no 
longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this 
Court will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  Germain 
shall accept no new business from the date of this opinion until he is reinstated to 
the practice of law.   
 
Before his reinstatement, Germain must submit proof that he has been 
evaluated by a licensed mental health professional approved by The Florida Bar, 
has complied with any recommended treatment or counseling, and is either 
continuing in treatment or counseling or has satisfactorily completed such 
treatment or counseling. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Mark F. Germain in 
the amount of $4,485.84, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF SUSPENSION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Director of 
Lawyer Regulation, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and JoAnn Marie 
Stalcup, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Orlando, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Mark F. Germain, pro se, Leesburg, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
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