Title: STEPHEN PALMER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STEPHEN PALMER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 129218 P.3d 941Case Number: S-08-0252Decided: 10/22/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
STEPHEN 
PALMER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. 
Westling, Senior Appellate Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. 
Pojman, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Stephen Palmer (Palmer), seeks review of his four convictions for sexual abuse 
of a minor in the second degree.  We 
will affirm.

 
 
[¶2]      Palmer raises 
these issues:

 
 
I.          
Does Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316(a)(i) criminalize sexual contact with a 
person over the age of fifteen years?

 
 
II.         
Is the statute as applied to Mr. Palmer unconstitutionally 
vague?

 
 
III.        Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting uncharged misconduct evidence 
which had not been a part of the State's original W.R.E. 404(b) 
notice?

 
 
The 
State conformed its statement of the issues to that set out 
above.

 
 
ISSUES 
I AND II

 
 
[¶3]      Contemporaneously 
with the publication of this opinion, we also published our opinion in Crain v. State, Case No. S-08-0215, and 
May v. State, Case No. S-09-0002, 2009 WY 128, ___ P.3d ___ (Wyo. 
2009).  In those cases we resolved 
the issues raised by Palmer in Issues I and II and by reference to the Crain and May cases we also apply that same 
reasoning in this case.  Hence, we 
reject both of Palmer's challenges to the affected 
statutes.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶4]      One of the counts 
upon which Palmer was found guilty occurred on September 6, 2007, and the other 
three occurred on September 14, 2007.  
All these events took place in the victim's family home.  The victim was the daughter of a 
coworker of Palmer.  Palmer, the 
victim, and the victim's parents all worked at Little America in Sweetwater 
County, and it was there that Palmer met the victim, who he worked with and 
supervised to some extent.  The 
victim was born in November 1991 and was not yet 16 years old when the criminal 
acts occurred.  The victim was a 
reluctant witness and she testified that her relationship with Palmer was 
entirely voluntary and consensual.

 
 
[¶5]      The only facts 
truly pertinent to this appeal concern an assertion by Palmer that W.R.E. 
404(b)1 evidence was improperly admitted at 
his trial over his objection.  In a 
Scheduling and Discovery Order entered of record on February 13, 2008, the 
district court, inter alia, ordered the State to give notice to Palmer of its 
intent, if any, to offer W.R.E. 404(b) evidence at trial.  That order also provided 
that:

 
 
If 
a motion to suppress or exclude evidence under Rule 404(b) W.R.E. is filed, each 
party shall have at the hearing on this motion proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which cover all of the factors set forth in Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002).  The proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law may be in lieu of a memorandum of law.

 
 
[¶6]      On March 4, 2008 
the State gave notice to Palmer that it intended to offer 404(b) evidence.  The district court conducted a hearing 
on that notice on July 16, 2008.  By 
order entered on August 11, 2008, the district court limited the use of some of 
the proposed 404(b) evidence and denied the admission of some of it 
altogether.  To make a long story 
short, the State proposed to use certain 404(b) evidence, the district court 
limited the use of that evidence, and there was no violation of the district 
court's order in that regard.  
However, a second Rule 404(b) issue became apparent during the course of 
Palmer's trial, and we set out the details of that development 
below.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      The evidence 
which animates the Rule 404(b) issue was not the 404(b) evidence discussed 
above.  Rather it was entirely 
different evidence that defense counsel had not recognized as 404(b) evidence 
until after the trial had begun.  
This sort of issue and the applicable standard of review are quite 
familiar to the Court:

 
 
We 
recently reiterated both the accepted trial court process for determining 
whether to admit uncharged misconduct evidence and this Court's standard for 
reviewing such determinations:

 
 
We 
review a district court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence, including 
uncharged misconduct evidence, for an abuse of discretion, and we will not 
reverse absent a clear abuse of such discretion. Bromley v. State, 2007 
WY 20, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 1202, 
1206 (Wyo.2007). "A trial court abuses its discretion when it could not have 
reasonably concluded as it did." Id. at ¶ 8, at 1206-1207. The 
admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence is governed by W.R.E. 
404(b):

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

 
 
The 
district court is to determine the admission of proffered evidence under this 
rule by applying the following test:

 
 
[B]ecause 
uncharged misconduct evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice, we have 
also adopted a mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility: (1) the 
evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be 
relevant; (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially 
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) upon request, the 
trial court must instruct the jury that the similar acts evidence is to be 
considered only for the proper purpose for which it was 
admitted.

 
 

Gleason 
v. State, 
2002 WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo.2002). 
"Admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b) is not limited to the purposes set forth in 
the rule, and we have adopted a liberal approach toward admitting uncharged 
misconduct evidence." Id.

 
 

Harris 
v. State, 
2008 WY 23, ¶¶ 5-6, 177 P.3d 1166, 1168 
(Wyo.2008).

 
 

Taylor 
v. State, 
2009 WY 31, ¶ 12, 203 P.3d 408, 410-11 (Wyo. 2009); 
Wease v. State, 2007 WY 176, ¶¶ 48-54 ,170 P.3d 94, 109-114 (Wyo. 
2007).

 
 
[¶8]      Palmer's two-day 
trial was held on August 11-12, 2008.  The witness who was to give the asserted 
W.R.E. 404(b) testimony was Brianna Maxfield.  The matter was called to the attention 
of the district court, in the context of a 404(b) issue, just before opening 
statements and just after the jury had been selected and seated on the first day 
of trial.  However, Maxfield's name 
and the substance of her testimony had been included in the State's April 21, 
2008 witness and exhibit list, and defense counsel explained that he had not 
previously perceived it as 404(b)-type evidence because the State had given a 
specific W.R.E. 404(b) notice which did not include her testimony as one of its 
items.  It is apparent that the 
State did not perceive the disputed evidence as coming under the umbrella of 
Rule 404(b) either.  In any event, 
having been given notice that Maxfield would testify and what the gist of her 
testimony was to be (which the record shows was well known to Palmer at an early 
point in the proceedings), Palmer raised no pretrial objection 
below.

 
 
[¶9]      After the victim 
had completed her testimony, the district court let the jury go early for the 
day so that it could address this potential W.R.E. 404(b) evidence matter in 
what it called a "Gleason 
Hearing."  The hearing bears out 
that the district court made an admirably conscientious effort to fulfill all 
the requirements set out in the Gleason case, despite the circumstance 
that the matter came up mid-trial.  
At the core of the district court's reasoning process was this Court's 
decision in Reay v. State, 2008 WY 13, ¶¶ 9-19, 176 P.3d 647, 650-53 (Wyo. 
2008).  One of Palmer's principal 
objections to this testimony was that it was actually developed for use at the 
hearing into a stalking/protection petition filed by the victim's parents 
shortly after the events on September 14, 2007, and was not generated by the 
criminal charges that Palmer ultimately faced.

 
 
[¶10]   Maxfield was also a fellow employee 
of Palmer's from Little America.  
Her testimony was offered for the purpose of showing Palmer had a "guilty 
mind," to rebut the story Palmer gave to the police, and to test his 
credibility.  She testified that 
both Palmer, and the mother of Palmer's child, recruited her to give Palmer an 
alibi for September 14, 2007, by saying in some detail that she was on a date 
with Palmer that day and that he could not have been at the victim's home during 
the times the victim testified he was there.  Maxfield agreed to do that and initially 
she told the story Palmer wanted her to tell to the police.  However, after being informed of the penalties for perjury and some 
detailed questioning about the alibi evidence by sheriff's investigators, she 
admitted that the statement she gave was false and that Palmer and his former 
wife had put her up to it.  The 
importance of this "perjury" was heightened by the coincidence that it tracked 
quite closely with the story Palmer gave the police about what he was doing out 
by the victim's home on one of the days that he was alleged to have had sexual 
relations with her.  Palmer did not 
testify at his trial, but the statement he gave the police early in the 
investigation was admitted into evidence.

 
 
[¶11]   The sheriff recorded the interview 
with Maxfield, but that recording was not made available to Palmer in discovery 
as required by the district court's scheduling and discovery order.  Palmer essentially waived any objection 
to not getting a copy of the entire statement until mid-trial.  The district court concluded that the 
evidence to be offered through Maxfield was admissible under exceptions to 
W.R.E. 404(b).  The district court 
also offered to give a limiting instruction, but Palmer declined 
it.

 
 
[¶12]   At the outset we note our agreement 
with the State's position that Palmer does not specifically identify the 
evidence he challenges herein (although it is not terribly difficult to divine 
what evidence is of concern here), nor does he directly challenge its 
admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b).  
Furthermore, he does not discuss or criticize the position the State took 
at trial, the district court's rationale for admitting the evidence in dispute, 
or the limiting instruction the district court offered to give at trial.  Palmer offers no authority directly in 
support of his contention that it was "bad acts" evidence as contemplated by 
W.R.E. 404(b).  The core of his 
argument is that it was not included in the Rule 404(b) notice, that it was a 
surprise at trial, and that he was unable to adjust his trial strategy to 
counter that damning evidence.

 
 
[¶13]   Those familiar with the practice of 
criminal law are well aware of this Court's efforts to give form and structure 
to the treatment of evidence that comes under the aegis of W.R.E. 404(b), so as 
to ensure insofar as possible that inadmissible evidence is not presented to the 
jury.  We have been especially 
concerned about such evidence being sprung upon a defendant as a surprise at 
trial.  As one follows the mutations 
and permutations this thorny issue has taken over the years, it is evident that 
our efforts have not yet produced a "fail-safe" method to ensure that 404(b) 
evidence receives the sort of scrutiny that is demanded by the guidance provided 
by the rule itself and the case law construing and enlarging upon its broad and 
general, yet still difficult to pin down, goals.  The presiding judge in this case 
expressed his own concerns in that regard.  
At its most elementary level Rule 404(b) is aimed at "excluding" 
character evidence when it is used for an improper purpose, while at the same 
time providing for its admission for several specified purposes which serve as 
examples, but do not necessarily delimit admissibility for many others.  1 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence §§ 
4:21, 4:22 and 4:37 (2007 and Supp. 2009).  
One such unenumerated exception is that which has been categorized as 
evidence which completes the whole story.  
Leyva v. State, 2007 WY 136, ¶¶ 17-30, 165 P.3d 446, 452-54 (Wyo. 2007); 1 
Mueller & Kirkpatrick, infra, § 
4:33.  As we opined in Leyva, such evidence remains subject to 
the analysis we require for the admission of 404(b) evidence.  Finally, of the greatest importance 
here, the State posited from the outset that its intended use of the evidence 
was to show Palmer's "guilty mind."

 
 
            
Guilty mind (policy not 
implicated).  Prior acts by the 
defendant may be admissible to indicate his guilty mind in connection with the 
charged offense, and typically here we are talking about acts that come after the charged crime.  Included is proof that he fled from the 
scene or from the jurisdiction, resisted arrest, offered explanations that 
proved to be untrue (false exculpatory statements), used an alias, or false 
identification.  Such proof does not 
require a general propensity inference.  
The argument is not that conduct shows an inclination, but that it shows 
that the defendant is aware of his guilt, which makes it more likely that he is 
guilty.  The policies of Fed. R. 
Evid. 404 are not implicated in this logic.  [Italics in 
original.]

 
 

1 
Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, §§ 4:37 at 868-69, and see § 4:04, at 
574 ("guilty mind" evidence may include suborning perjury or fabricating 
evidence).  Although 
the district court did not specifically address the question of post-crime, 
"guilty mind" evidence, we conclude that the district court would have been 
correct in admitting the disputed evidence, on the basis that W.R.E. 404(b) 
analysis does not apply to post-crime "guilty mind" evidence such as that 
offered by the State in the instant case.

 
 
[¶14]   We have carefully examined the 
record on appeal and we are unable to conclude that the district court abused 
its discretion in admitting the disputed testimony under the circumstances of 
this case.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   For the reasons set out more fully 
above, the judgment and sentence of the district court are affirmed in all 
respects.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1W.R.E. 404 has been amended since the time of the criminal proceedings in 
this case, but we include it here in its current 
form.

 
 
Rule 404.  Character evidence 
not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other 
crimes.

 
 
            
(a)  Character Evidence 
Generally. -- Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character 
is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except:

                        
(1)  Character of Accused. -- Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same;

                        
(2)  Character of Victim. -- Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness 
of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence 
that the victim was the first aggressor;

            
(3)  Character of Witness. -- Evidence of the character of a 
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.

            
(b)  Other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts.  Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that 
upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence 
it intends to introduce at trial. 
[This rule was amended effective January 1, 2009.  We have included that version of the 
rule here because the amendment does affect the outcome of this 
case.]