Title: Ex parte Doris Sanders.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: June 26, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1190478
____________________
Ex parte Doris Sanders
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Doris Sanders
v.
Shawn Reaves, Sae Him Chung, and Alfa Mutual Insurance
Company)
(Macon Circuit Court, CV-19-900181)
SELLERS, Justice.
1190478
Doris Sanders petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its March 13,
2020, order transferring the underlying action to the
Montgomery Circuit Court pursuant to § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code
1975, Alabama's forum non conveniens statute.  We grant the
petition and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
On August 22, 2019, Sanders, a resident of Barbour
County, was involved in a multi-vehicle accident on 
Interstate
85 in Macon County.  Sanders sued the drivers of the other two
vehicles, Sae Him Chung and Shawn Reaves,1 in the Macon
Circuit Court, alleging negligence and wantonness and seeking
damages for her accident-related injuries.2 Sanders also
included a claim against her insurer, Alfa Mutual Insurance
1The parties submit that, at the time the trial court
transferred the underlying action to Montgomery County,
Reaves, a resident of Shelby County, had been served with
process but had not filed an answer or otherwise appeared in
the action. 
2According to the allegations in the complaint, the
vehicle driven by Reaves struck the rear of the vehicle driven
by Chung, causing Chung's vehicle to strike the rear of
Sanders's vehicle.
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Company, seeking to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist
benefits.3 
Alfa and Chung (hereinafter referred to collectively as
"the defendants") filed a joint motion for a change of venue
pursuant to § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, the forum non
conveniens statute, requesting that the action be transferred
to Montgomery County in the interest of justice and for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses. The defendants
supported their motion with a copy of the "Alabama Uniform
Traffic Crash Report," indicating, in relevant part, (1) that
the accident occurred in Macon County and was investigated
there; (2) that Sanders was employed by the State of Alabama
Tourism Department, which is located in Montgomery County; (3)
that Chung lived and worked in Montgomery County; and (4) that
Kellie Leigh McElvaine, a witness to the accident, lived and
worked in Montgomery County.
Sanders filed a response in opposition to the motion for
a change of venue, arguing that the case should remain in
Macon County because, she said, the defendants failed to carry
3The materials before us do not include any relevant
information regarding Alfa, other than the fact that it issued
the policy insuring Sanders's vehicle. 
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their burden of showing that a transfer to Montgomery County
was required under § 6-3-21.1. Sanders supported her motion
with her own affidavit stating that litigating the case in
Macon County would be more convenient for her because Macon
County was closer to her residence in Barbour County. Sanders
also stated that she did not work in Montgomery County;
rather, she said, she worked in Macon County at the Macon
County Rest Area.  Finally, she stated that she received
medical treatment for her injuries in Lee County and Barbour
County, both of which are closer to Macon County than to
Montgomery County. Thus, she asserted that her health-care
providers in Lee County and Barbour County would have to
travel farther if the case were transferred to Montgomery
County.  
Following a hearing, the Macon Circuit Court entered an
order transferring the action to Montgomery County. Sanders
petitioned this Court for mandamus review. 
Standard of Review
"The proper method for obtaining review of a
denial [or grant] of a motion for a change of venue
in a civil action is to petition for the writ of
mandamus. Lawler Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Tarver, 492
So. 2d 297, 302 (Ala. 1986). 'Mandamus is a drastic
and extraordinary writ, to be issued only where
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there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner
to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
(4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex
parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala.
1995). 'When we consider a mandamus petition
relating to a venue ruling, our scope of review is
to determine if the trial court [exceeded] its
discretion, 
i.e., 
whether 
it 
exercised 
its
discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner.'
Id. Our review is further limited to those facts
that were before the trial court. Ex parte American
Resources Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 932, 936 (Ala.
1995)."
Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala.
1998).       
Analysis  
Sanders argues that the Macon Circuit Court exceeded its
discretion in transferring the underlying action to the
Montgomery Circuit Court under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.  
Section 6-3-21.1(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in
pertinent part:
"With respect to civil actions filed in an
appropriate venue, any court of general jurisdiction
shall, for the convenience of parties and witnesses,
or in the interest of justice, transfer any civil
action or any claim in any civil action to any court
of general jurisdiction in which the action might
have been properly filed and the case shall proceed
as though originally filed therein."
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It is undisputed that Macon County and Montgomery County
are both proper venues for the underlying action. See 6-3-
2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975. "When venue is appropriate in more
than one county, the plaintiff's choice of venue is generally
given great deference." Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882
So. 2d 307, 312 (Ala. 2003). The party moving for a transfer
has the initial burden of showing that a transfer is justified
under § 6-3-21.1. Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d
at 789. Thus, this Court must determine whether the defendants
met their burden of showing that the interest of justice or
the convenience of the parties and witnesses override
Sanders's choice of venue. 
"The purpose of the doctrine [of forum non conveniens] is
to  prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and also to
protect 
witnesses, 
litigants, 
and 
the public 
against
unnecessary expense and inconvenience." Ex parte New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 952, 956 (Ala. 1995). "[I]n
analyzing the interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1, this
Court focuses on whether the 'nexus' or 'connection' between
the plaintiff's action and the original forum is strong enough
to warrant burdening the plaintiff's forum with the action."
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Ex parte First Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994 So. 2d 906, 911
(Ala. 2008). "[T]he county to which the transfer is sought
must have a 'strong' nexus or connection to the lawsuit, while
the county from which the transfer is sought must have a
'weak' or 'little' connection to the action." Ex parte J & W
Enters., LLC, 150 So. 3d 190, 196 (Ala. 2014). Additionally,
this Court has held that "litigation should be handled in the
forum where the injury occurred." Ex parte Fuller, 955 So. 2d
414, 416 (Ala. 2006).
The defendants argue that the interest of justice
requires a transfer of the action to Montgomery County
because, they say, Chung, one of the defendants, and
McElvaine, a witness to the accident, live and work in
Montgomery County. The defendants also assert that a section
of cable barrier owned by the State of Alabama was damaged in
the accident and that the appropriate witness to testify
regarding the damage is employed in Montgomery County.
Although the Alabama Uniform Traffic Crash Report does
indicate that a "section of cable barrier" owned by the State
of Alabama was damaged as a result of the accident, the State
is not a party to this action, and there is no evidence
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indicating that the State is seeking compensation for the
damaged cable barrier. Further, the defendants have not
identified any specific witness they claim will testify on
behalf of the State. In short, Montgomery County's sole
material contact with this case is that one of the defendants
and an eyewitness reside there. The defendants have not
demonstrated that Sanders's choice of 
venue, Macon County, has
a weak or little connection to this case.  As indicated, the
accident made the basis of this case occurred in Macon County
and was investigated there. Sanders indicated in her affidavit
that litigating the case in Macon County would be more
convenient for her because she works in Macon County, and
Macon County is closer to her residence in Barbour County.
Sanders also asserted that her health-care providers in Lee
County and Barbour County would have to travel farther if the
case were transferred to Montgomery County. Simply put, the
defendants have failed to demonstrate that the interest of
justice overrides the 
deference due Sanders's choice of venue.
In seems apparent from the facts before the trial court that
Macon County has a very strong connection to the action
whereas Montgomery County's connection is weak. 
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We further conclude that the defendants have not met
their burden of demonstrating that a transfer of the
underlying action to Montgomery County is required based on
the convenience of the parties and witnesses. See Ex parte New
England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d at 956 (noting that the
burden is on the defendant to prove to the satisfaction of the
trial court that the transferee forum is significantly more
convenient than the forum selected by the plaintiff).  In this
case, although the defendants rely on the fact that one of the
defendants, a nonparty witness, and a witness from the State
of Alabama all reside or work in Montgomery County, they have
produced no evidence or affidavits from any witnesses
declaring that Montgomery County would be a significantly more
convenient forum for litigating the action or that traveling
to Macon County for trial would be burdensome or otherwise 
inconvenient  for them.  See Ex party Tyson Chicken, Inc., 291
So. 3d 477, 481 (Ala. 2019)(noting that this Court has
declined to order a transfer in cases in which the party
moving for a transfer has failed to present evidence
demonstrating that the transferee forum is significantly more
convenient than the transferor forum). Accordingly, the
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defendants have not met their burden of showing that
Montgomery County is a significantly more convenient forum
than Macon County –- Sanders's chosen forum. 
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Macon
Circuit Court exceeded its discretion in transferring this
case to the Montgomery Circuit Court.  We, therefore, grant
the petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the Macon
Circuit Court to vacate it March 13, 2020, order transferring
this action to the Montgomery Circuit Court. 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Bolin, Wise, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.
Mitchell, J., concurs specially.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw and Stewart, JJ., concur in the
result.
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the majority opinion that venue for this
case should be in Macon County, the location of the automobile
accident in which the petitioner Doris Sanders was injured. 
I caution future litigants, however, against relying too
heavily upon the following quotation from Ex parte Fuller, 955
So. 2d 414, 416 (Ala. 2006), in the majority opinion: 
"'litigation should be handled in the forum where the injury
occurred.'" ___ So. 3d at ___.  Although the general principle
for which Ex parte Fuller is cited applies here, we have
clarified in more recent decisions that the location of the
injury is not the single determinative factor in the forum non
conveniens analysis.  In 2017, this Court emphasized the
importance of the location where the injury occurred, while
recognizing that, in certain circumstances, the interests of
justice may nevertheless dictate that a case be tried in a
different venue:
"[A]lthough we have cautioned that it is not a
talisman, this Court has stated that where the
injury occurred is 'often assigned considerable
weight in an interest-of-justice analysis.'  Ex
parte Wachovia, 77 So. 3d 570, 574 (Ala. 2011).  Our
recent cases bear out this principle.  See, e.g., Ex
parte Tier 1 Trucking, LLC, 222 So. 3d 1107 (Ala.
2016); Ex parte Wayne Farms, LLC, 210 So. 3d 586
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(Ala. 2016); Ex parte Quality Carriers, Inc., 183
So. 3d 937 (Ala. 2015); Ex parte Manning, 170 So. 3d
638 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Morton, 167 So. 3d 295
(Ala. 2014); Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 149 So. 3d 1082 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Southeast
Alabama Timber Harvesting, LLC, 94 So. 3d 371 (Ala.
2012). 
Nevertheless, 
'the 
location 
where 
the
accident occurred ... is not, and should not be, the
sole consideration for determining venue under the
"interest of justice" prong of 6–3–21.1.' [Ex parte]
J & W Enters.[, LLC], 150 So. 3d [190,] 196–97
[(Ala. 2014)]."
Ex parte Elliott, 254 So. 2d 882, 886 (Ala. 2017).  
In sum, I agree with the majority opinion's forum non
conveniens analysis and its conclusion that "the defendants
have failed to demonstrate that the interest of justice
overrides the deference due Sanders's choice of venue." ___
So. 3d at ___.  Despite the quotation from Ex parte Fuller,
however, I do not understand the majority opinion to stand for
the principle that litigation must always be handled in the
forum where the injury occurred.
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