Title: Vanessa Lynn Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint School Dist. No. 93 This case asks the Court to determine whether a school qualifies as a category two statutory employer and whether the summary judgment order based on statutory immunity can be affirmed on the alternate ground that the injured party was a borrowed employee

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 31188 
VANESSA LYNN CORDOVA,                            
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          Plaintiff-Appellant,                       
                                                     
v.                                                   
                                                     
BONNEVILLE COUNTY JOINT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 93,      
                                                     
          Defendant-Respondent,                      
                                                     
and                                                  
                                                     
R. SAM HOPKINS, in his capacity as a U.S. 
Bankruptcy Trustee,                                            
                                                     
          Intervener-Appellant.                      
Idaho Falls, October 2006 
 
2007 Opinion No. 100 
 
Filed:   July 31, 2007 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Bonneville County.  Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, District Judge. 
District court order on summary judgment, reversed. 
Thomsen Stephens Law Offices, PLLC., Idaho Falls, for appellant.  J. Michael 
Wheiler argued. 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, Boise, for respondent.  Brian K. Julian argued. 
Service, Spinner & Gray, Pocatello, for respondent. 
__________________________________ 
BURDICK, Justice 
This case asks the Court to determine whether a school qualifies as a category two 
statutory employer.  This case also asks the Court to determine whether the summary judgment 
order based on statutory employer immunity can be affirmed on the alternate ground that the 
injured party was a borrowed employee.  We reverse.  
 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Appellant, Vanessa Lynn Cordova, began working for Idaho Falls School District No. 91 
(District 91) in 1996 as a behavioral counselor.  In 2002 Cordova joined a team called the 
Behavioral Support Division and began traveling to various schools.  Cordova spent Mondays 
and Tuesdays at Telford Academy, an alternative junior high school in Bonneville County Joint 
School District No. 93 (District 93).  Students at Telford Academy include students from District 
93 and from District 91.  
Cordova agreed to accompany a group of students from Telford Academy and District 93 
employees on a field trip to Pine Basin Lodge, a former ski lodge that is subject to a 99 year 
lease agreement between District 93 and the U.S. Forest Service.  It is used during the school 
year for various activities and for a summer youth program.  On the day of the field trip, October 
24, 2002, District 93 used Pine Basin Lodge to conduct a “ropes/confidence” course designed to 
build cohesiveness and trust among the students.  An employee of District 93 directed the 
activities for the ropes/confidence course.  Cordova was injured while helping to catch a student 
during a “trust fall” exercise.  
Cordova received worker’s compensation benefits from District 91 and filed a personal 
injury lawsuit against District 93 alleging that District 93 was negligent and liable for her 
injuries.  The district court held that District 93 was not entitled to summary judgment on the 
ground that Cordova was a borrowed employee but granted District 93’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the ground that it was Cordova’s statutory employer and thus immune from tort suit 
under I.C. § 72-223.  The district court denied Cordova’s Motion for Reconsideration.  Cordova 
then timely appealed to this Court. 
II. ANALYSIS 
“This Court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is the 
same standard used by the trial court in originally ruling on the motion.”  Robison v. Bateman-
Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 209, 76 P.3d 951, 953 (2003) (citations omitted).  Summary judgment 
shall be rendered when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”   I.R.C.P. 56(c).  “If the evidence reveals no 
disputed issues of material fact, what remains is a question of law, over which this Court 
exercises free review.”  Robison, 139 Idaho at 209, 76 P.3d at 953 (citation omitted).  
 
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The two main issues in this case are whether District 93 is the statutory employer of 
Cordova and whether the summary judgment order can be affirmed on the alternate ground that 
Cordova was District 93’s borrowed employee.   We turn first to the statutory employer analysis. 
A.  Statutory employer 
Cordova is suing District 93 in tort.  If District 93 is Cordova’s statutory employer, the 
case must be dismissed since under Idaho’s Worker’s Compensation Law Cordova’s exclusive 
remedy is recovery through worker’s compensation.  I.C. §§ 72-209(1), 72-211. 
Idaho Code § 72-223 provides a limited exception to the worker’s compensation 
exclusive remedy rule.  This statute states that even if an injured employee is entitled to 
compensation under the Worker’s Compensation Law, a third party may still have a legal 
liability to pay damages.  I.C. § 72-223(1).  The statute specifically excludes two categories of 
employers from third party liability.  Category one is not at issue.  Category two consists of “the 
owner or lessee of premises, or other person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the 
business there carried on, but who, by reason of there being an independent contractor or for any 
other reason, is not the direct employer of the workmen there employed.”  Id.  
Cordova argues that a statutory employer determination is a question of fact and so was 
improperly decided by the trial court, that she was a volunteer and not an employee, and that 
District 93 does not qualify as a virtual proprietor because the type of work done did not pertain 
to the business of District 93 and because District 93 did not carry on a business for pecuniary 
gain.1  Each issue will be discussed in turn.  
1. District 93’s status as a statutory employer is a question of law in this instance. 
First, Cordova argues that it was improper to grant summary judgment because whether 
someone is a statutory employer is a question of fact.  However, “[i]f the evidence reveals no 
disputed issues of material fact, what remains is a question of law, over which this Court 
exercises free review.”  Robison, 139 Idaho at 209, 76 P.3d at 953 (citations omitted). 
                                                 
1 Cordova also argues that District 93 is not a statutory employer because it made a binding judicial admission that 
Cordova was not an employee of District 93.  However statements in interrogatories and depositions are not “formal 
act[s] or statement[s] made by a party or attorney, in the course of judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the 
effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact.”  See Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 
Idaho 616, 618, 930 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1997).  The purpose of depositions, like that of interrogatories is the 
discovery of facts.  An admission goes to the question of proof of those facts.  See Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 
94 Idaho 917, 923, 500 P.2d 218, 224 (1972) (stating the purpose of interrogatories and their distinct nature from 
admissions). 
 
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In this case, there are no disputed material facts preventing summary judgment.  Both 
parties agree that Cordova was an employee of District 91, who spent part of her time at a 
District 93 school.  Furthermore, the parties agree that on the day of the accident, she was on 
premises leased by District 93 as a field trip supervisor, supervising both District 91 and District 
93 students.  Therefore, whether District 93 was Cordova’s statutory employer is an issue of law. 
See Rhodes v. Sunshine Mining Co., 113 Idaho 162, 164, 742 P.2d 417, 419 (1987) (the record 
failed to disclose any issue of material fact leaving only questions of law including whether 
defendants were statutory employers shielded from tort liability).  If these undisputed facts are 
sufficient to conclude that as a matter of law District 93 is Cordova’s statutory employer, 
summary judgment was proper.  Therefore, we must first determine whether Cordova is an 
employee, and second, whether District 93 is a statutory employer under the Worker’s 
Compensation Law.   
2. Cordova was an employee, not a volunteer. 
Cordova argues that because she received no extra compensation and because her 
attendance at the field trip was optional she was a volunteer and so was not an employee under 
I.C. § 72-223.  That statute governs potential remedies of “workmen.”  I.C. § 72-223(1).  A 
workman, which is synonymous with employee, “means any person who has entered into the 
employment of, or who works under contract of service . . . with, an employer.”  I.C. § 72-
102(12).  For purposes of section 72-223 it is well settled that an employee can have more than 
one employer.  Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 251, 108 P.3d 392, 398 
(2005).  
There is no dispute that at the time of the accident, Cordova was an employee of District 
91; in fact she collected worker’s compensation from District 91.2  While at Pine Basin Lodge, 
she “work[ed] under contract of service” with “an employer,” District 91.3  This makes her a 
                                                 
2 There is an issue of fact as to District 93’s claim that Cordova, after receiving worker’s compensation benefits 
from District 91, would be judicially estopped from now claiming she was not an employee.  Judicial estoppel 
applies when “a litigant, by means of such sworn statements, obtains a judgment, advantage or consideration from 
one party. . . .”  Smith v. U.S.R.V. Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 795, 800, 118 P.3d 127, 132 (2005) (internal quotations 
and citation omitted).  District 93 fails to point to anything in the record showing that Cordova, by means of making 
a sworn statement, obtained a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party.  However, proving judicial 
estoppel is unnecessary, since in this case it is clear that Cordova was an employee at the time of the accident for 
purposes of I.C. § 72-223. 
3 Cordova’s argument that District 93 judicially admitted she was a volunteer lacks sufficient support.  Lloyd 
Becker, the principal of Telford Academy, never said she was a volunteer.  Becker merely said all adults on the field 
trip went on the field trip “voluntarily (without additional compensation).”  That implies she was receiving some 
 
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workman, and since Cordova is a workman under the code, her tort suit against District 93 
depends upon whether District 93 is her statutory employer.  See I.C. § 72-223. 
3.   District 93 is not Cordova’s statutory employer. 
Under category two, a statutory employer must be both the owner or lessee of the 
premises and the virtual proprietor or operator of the business there carried on.  Harpole v. State, 
131 Idaho 437, 440, 958 P.2d 594, 597 (1998).  “To determine who is a virtual proprietor or 
operator, the Court must consider whether the work being done pertains to the business, trade, or 
occupation of the owner or proprietor and whether such business, trade, or occupation is being 
carried on by it for pecuniary gain.”  Robison, 139 Idaho at 212, 76 P.3d at 956.   
District 93 is the lessee of the premises but is not the virtual operator of the “business” 
there carried on.  We exercise free review over the interpretation of a statute.  Carrier v. Lake 
Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006).  Statutory 
interpretation begins with the “literal words of the statute” Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 
Idaho 473, 478, 50 P.3d 488, 493 (2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted), and those 
“words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be construed 
as a whole.”  State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001).   
The plain and ordinary meaning of “business” does not include a non-profit governmental 
entity.  Dictionary definitions of the word “business” include an “[e]mployment, occupation, 
profession, or commercial activity engaged in for gain or livelihood,” Black’s Law Dictionary 
198 (6th ed. 1990), and “a commercial or mercantile activity engaged in as a means of 
livelihood,” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 154 (10th ed. 1993).  Additionally, our 
virtual proprietor test looks at whether the alleged statutory employer is carrying on a business 
for pecuniary gain.  Robison, 139 Idaho at 212, 76 P.3d at 956.   
Pecuniary gain does not necessarily mean one must be making a profit; we have noted 
that sometimes a contractor may finish a job but be out money or be barely even.  Modlin v. Twin 
Falls Canal Co., 49 Idaho 199, 206, 286 P. 612, 614 (1930).  The pecuniary gain requirement 
encompasses a person who supplies a service and receives remuneration for it.  Id.  Nevertheless, 
an entity must have a pecuniary interest in the particular business at hand.  In Jones v. Packer 
                                                                                                                                                             
compensation, and hence is not a volunteer.  “To be a judicial admission a statement must be a deliberate, clear, and 
unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact with that party’s knowledge.”  Strouse, 129 Idaho at 619, 930 
P.2d at 1364. (Ct. App. 1997). 
 
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John Mines Corp., 60 Idaho 653, 95 P.2d 572 (1939), we held that the facts of that case did not 
support a holding that the mining corporation was a statutory employer.   In that case the mining 
corporation entered into a lease with Earl Cantrell under which Cantrell would provide his own 
food and the corporation would provide powder, tools, and timber for mining.  Id. at 655, 95 
P.2d at 572.  Each party would then receive 50% of the net proceeds.   Id.  The injured party, 
Richard Jones began working for Cantrell.  Id.  After unsatisfactory results, Cantrell abandoned 
the lease.  Id.  The corporation then offered Cantrell ten tons of ore out of any place on the 
mining property to compensate for the wasted time spent in mining the poor ore and to give him 
an opportunity to “get even.”  Id.  When Cantrell and Jones began to mine for the gift ore, Jones 
became injured.  Id.  The Court held the corporation did not have any pecuniary interest in the 
gift ore and that the gift ore was being mined solely for the benefit of Cantrell and Jones.  Id. at 
661-62, 95 P.2d at 575.  Thus, the corporation was not the virtual proprietor of the business of 
mining the ten tons of gift ore.  Id. at 662, 95 P.2d at 575. 
In Harpole, we looked at whether the State was a virtual proprietor when Harpole was 
injured while logging timber on State property.  Harpole, 131 Idaho at 438, 958 P.2d at 595.  
The State contracted to sell Potlatch Corporation the timber rights on its property; Harpole was 
an employee of Potlatch.  Id.  We held that though the State may have received pecuniary gain 
for selling timber, that pecuniary gain was not the result of operating a logging business; thus, 
the State was not a virtual proprietor of the logging business even though the logging occurred 
on State property.  Id. at 441, 958 P.2d at 598. 
  We conclude that District 93 is not conducting a business; it is not engaged in activity 
for the purposes of “livelihood,” and operating a public school is not a commercial activity.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence that District 93 is receiving any pecuniary gain in connection 
with operating the school.  Thus, because District 93 is not a “business” in the ordinary meaning 
of the word, it cannot be Cordova’s category two statutory employer.  Hence, District 93 is not 
entitled to immunity from tort suit under I.C. § 72-223. 
B. Borrowed employee 
District 93 asserts that the trial court’s order can be affirmed on the alternate ground that 
Cordova was a borrowed employee, and therefore, District 93 was her statutory employer.  
Cordova argues that the District Court properly decided there was an issue of fact as to whether 
 
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Cordova was a borrowed employee.  Here, the district court correctly concluded there was a 
genuine issue of material fact on the borrowed employee claim. 
A company is not subject to third party liability when it is the employer of a “loaned 
employee.”  Lines v. Idaho Forest Indus., 125 Idaho 462, 464, 872 P.2d 725, 727 (1994).  In 
Lines, we looked primarily at which employer had the right to control the employee and then 
examined whether there existed a contract for hire and whether the work done was essentially 
that of the special employer.  Id.  Important factors of control included whether there was 
exclusive supervision of the employee while on the job site, the right to terminate the worker, 
and whether the borrowing employer paid a fee to the loaning employer for the employee.  Id. at 
463, 872 P.2d at 726.  
In this case, it is unclear whether District 93 or District 91 had the right to control 
Cordova.  Since summary judgment is improper when there is an issue of material fact, we 
decline to affirm on the alternate ground that Cordova was a borrowed employee. 
C. District 93 is not entitled to attorney fees 
District 93 requests an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 6-918A.  Under that statute 
attorney fees may be awarded upon “a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the party 
against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad faith in the commencement, 
conduct, maintenance or defense of the action.”  I.C. § 6-918A.  “Bad faith is defined as 
dishonesty in belief or purpose.”  Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, __, 139 P.3d 732, 
737 (2006) (internal quotations and citation omitted).   It cannot be said that Cordova pursued 
this appeal against District 93 in bad faith.  Thus, we deny District 93’s request for attorney fees. 
III. CONCLUSION 
We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to District 93.  We also 
decline to award District 93 attorneys’ fees.  Costs to Appellant. 
Chief Justice SCHROEDER and Justices TROUT, EISMANN and JONES, CONCUR. 
 
 
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