Title: The People v. Allen Mack The People v. Joao Fernandez The People v. Edgar Correa

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 115  
The People &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Edgar Correa,
            Respondent.
------------------------
No. 120  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Joao Fernandez,
            Appellant.
-------------------------
No. 137  
The People &c.,
            Appellant,
        v.
Allen Mack,
            Respondent.
Case No. 115:
Joseph N. Ferdenzi, for appellant.
Harold V. Ferguson, Jr., for respondent.
Michael Colodner, for Chief Administrative Judge Ann
Pfau et al., amici curiae.
Case No. 120:
Martin M. Lucente, for appellant.
Jodi L. Mandel, for respondent.
Case No. 137:
Joseph N. Ferdenzi, for appellant.
Harold V. Ferguson, Jr., for respondent.
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GRAFFEO, J.:
Defendants in these three cases challenge the rules
promulgated by the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge
that created either the Bronx Criminal Division or Integrated
Domestic Violence parts in Supreme Court, which resulted in the
transfer of their misdemeanor prosecutions from local criminal
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No. 115, 137, 120
- 2 -
courts to Supreme Court for trial.  Although they did not object
to the transfer procedure in the trial court, they argued on
appeal that Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
their trials and that the rules violate the New York Constitution
and the Criminal Procedure Law.  Rejecting defendants' arguments,
we hold that the administrators of the unified court system were
empowered under our state constitution and the Judiciary Law to
adopt these rules and that Supreme Court -- a court of general,
concurrent jurisdiction -- had the power to adjudicate these
misdemeanor cases.   
Integrated Domestic Violence Parts
In January 2004, after consultation with the
Administrative Board and with the consent of the Court of
Appeals, the Chief Judge of the State of New York promulgated
Part 41 of the Rules of the Chief Judge providing for the
establishment of Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) parts in
Supreme Court.  The rule directed that the specialized part 
"be devoted to hearing and determination, in
a single forum, of cases that are
simultaneously pending in the courts if one
of them is a domestic violence case in a
criminal court and the other is a case in
Supreme or Family Court that involves a party
or witness in the domestic violence case; or
if one is a case in criminal court, Family
Court or Supreme Court and the other is a
case in any other of these courts having a
common party or in which a disposition may
affect the interests of a party in the first
case" (22 NYCRR part 41).  
The intent of the IDV directive was to allow matters involving a
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No. 115, 137, 120
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single family to be resolved in one court by the same jurist,
thereby eliminating fragmented judicial adjudication and
relieving the parties of the burden and costs of having multiple
actions pending in different courts.  In addition to streamlining
the litigation process for litigants and providing better access
to community services for families, the new IDV parts also
increased judicial efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort
by multiple courts, reducing scheduling conflicts and avoiding
inconsistent outcomes.  
Soon after the Chief Judge issued Part 41, the Chief
Administrative Judge implemented the new rule by adopting Part
141 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, which
defined those "IDV-eligible cases" subject to transfer to Supreme
Court.  Under Part 141, cases that meet the criteria are sent to
an IDV part where, within five days, the cases are screened to
determine whether transfer will promote the administration of
justice.  If so, a formal transfer order is issued and the case
is retained by the IDV part for disposition.  If not, the case is
returned to the originating court.  There are currently 44
Supreme Court IDV parts in New York State.
People v Fernandez
In January 2007, defendant Joao Fernandez was charged
by misdemeanor information filed in New York City Criminal Court,
Kings County, with multiple counts of aggravated harassment in
the second degree after he contacted his former paramour by
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No. 115, 137, 120
1 Fernandez has never claimed that his case did not meet the
IDV eligibility criteria set forth in the rules. 
- 4 -
telephone 62 times in one evening and repeatedly threatened her
with physical harm.  Fernandez and the complainant had been
involved in multiple prior family court cases regarding disputes
about their two children.  After his arraignment in New York City
Criminal Court, the case was transferred to the IDV part in Kings
County Supreme Court where a non-jury trial was conducted. 
Fernandez was convicted of three counts of attempted aggravated
harassment in the second degree and sentenced to concurrent terms
of one year probation.  He was also directed to participate in a
variety of domestic violence accountability and other programs.  
Although Fernandez raised no objection in the trial
court to the transfer of his case, in his appeal to the Appellate
Division, Second Department, he argued that the IDV Part -- an
arm of Supreme Court -- lacked the authority to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction over his misdemeanor case because it was
prosecuted by information rather than an indictment or superior
court information issued after waiver of indictment.  Defendant
also contended that the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative
Judge exceeded the scope of their authority when they issued the
IDV directives.1  In addition, he sought reversal based on an
asserted evidentiary error.  The Second Department unanimously
rejected defendant's arguments and affirmed his conviction
(People v Fernandez, 72 AD3d 303).  A Justice of that court
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granted defendant leave to appeal.
The Bronx Criminal Division
About nine months after the IDV directives were issued,
in consultation with the Administrative Board and with the
consent of the Court of Appeals, the Chief Judge promulgated Part
42 of the Rules of the Chief Judge establishing a criminal
division in the Supreme Court in Bronx County.  The new part --
denominated the Bronx Criminal Division (BCD) -- was vested with
the authority to adjudicate cases commenced in the New York City
Criminal Court, Bronx County, when at least one felony or
misdemeanor offense was charged.  The intent was to permit cases
originating in the Criminal Court to be reassigned to the BCD for
trial in order to alleviate a trial backlog that had developed in
the Criminal Court.  The Chief Administrative Judge adopted Part
142 directing, with specified limitations, that certain felony
and misdemeanor cases pending in Criminal Court of the City of
New York in Bronx County be transferred to the BCD Part in
Supreme Court following arraignment, if the cases were not
resolved at arraignment.  By order of the Administrative Judge of
Bronx County, the BCD directives were implemented on November 5,
2004.
People v Correa; People v Mack
In October 2005, defendant Edgar Correa was charged in
a misdemeanor information filed in New York City Criminal Court,
Bronx County, with various class A misdemeanors and harassment in
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No. 115, 137, 120
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the second degree, a violation, resulting from an altercation
with his wife.  After arraignment, his case was transferred to
the BCD and a non-jury trial was conducted.  Correa was acquitted
of the misdemeanor offenses but convicted of the harassment
charge and sentenced to 15 days in jail. 
Defendant Allen Mack was charged in an information with
the misdemeanor offenses of obstructing governmental
administration and assault in the third degree, as well as one
count of harassment in the second degree, a violation, as a
result of disruptive behavior during a parole hearing.  Following
his arraignment in New York City Criminal Court, Bronx County,
Mack's case was transferred to the BCD for a non-jury trial in
August 2006.  He was convicted of attempted assault in the third
degree and harassment for which he received 90-day and 15-day
jail sentences, respectively.
Both Correa and Mack appealed and, in their initial
briefs, neither defendant protested that his trial had been
conducted in the BCD part of Supreme Court.  However, in February
2009, the Appellate Division, First Department, sua sponte
requested that the attorneys in each case brief two additional
issues:
"(1) Whether the establishment of the
Criminal Division of Supreme Court in Bronx
County under Part 142 of the Rules of the
Chief Administrator is consistent with the
Constitution and statutes of the State of New
York?
(2) Whether the Supreme Court possessed
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jurisdiction over a criminal case absent the
filing of an indictment or superior court
information?"  
In response to the inquiry, defense counsel filed supplemental
briefs asserting that unified court system (UCS) administrators
exceeded the authority granted them under the Constitution and
relevant statutes when they issued the BCD directives and that
Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try
misdemeanor offenses prosecuted on an information.  Relying on
CPL 210.05, defendants contended that Supreme Court has the power
to adjudicate misdemeanor offenses only when the Grand Jury has
included them in an indictment or a defendant has waived
indictment and agreed to be prosecuted by a superior court
information (SCI).  The People countered that various provisions
of the Constitution and the Judiciary Law expressly allowed UCS
administrators to issue the rules relating to transfer of
misdemeanor cases to the BCD Part and, as an arm of Supreme
Court, the BCD possessed the requisite jurisdiction to try
defendants' "unindicted" misdemeanor cases.
In February 2009, in a divided opinion, the First
Department reversed the conviction in Correa and dismissed the
accusatory instrument, crediting defendant's jurisdictional
arguments (People v Correa, 70 AD3d 532).  In his dissent,
Justice Acosta disagreed with the majority, finding ample
constitutional and statutory basis for the issuance of the BCD
directives and concluding that, as a court of general, concurrent
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No. 115, 137, 120
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jurisdiction, Supreme Court is empowered to adjudicate
misdemeanor cases, regardless of whether the charge is contained
in an information, an indictment or an SCI.  In a separate
decision, the four justices that comprised the Correa majority
reversed Mack's conviction and dismissed the misdemeanor
information, citing the decision in Correa (People v Mack, 70
AD3d 555). In each case, Justice Acosta granted the People leave
to appeal.
Preservation
Although none of the defendants in these cases timely
objected either in New York City Criminal Court or Supreme Court
to the transfer of their misdemeanor cases, we may consider their
arguments in this Court because each defendant contends that
Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try his case. 
If Supreme Court -- acting through the IDV part or the BCD -- did
not possess the authority to conduct these proceedings, this
would be a fundamental, non-waivable defect in the mode of
proceedings that could be raised by defendants on their direct
appeal despite their failure to comply with preservation
requirements (see People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 365 [2000]; see
e.g. People v Nicomenti, 12 NY2d 428 [1963] [where defendant
argued that Court of Special Sessions lacked the subject matter
jurisdiction to try the offense with which he was charged, claim
could be raised on appeal notwithstanding defendant's failure to
object in the trial court]).  Accordingly, we must address
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No. 115, 137, 120
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defendants' jurisdictional arguments on the merits.
The Authority to Issue the IDV and BCD Directives
We begin by considering the claim that the UCS
administrators exceeded the power granted them in the New York
Constitution and relevant statutes when they issued the
directives creating the BCD and the IDV parts.  In Correa and
Mack, the First Department majority concluded that the rules
adopted by the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge
amounted to ultra vires acts because the transfer of cases to
Supreme Court is a matter of "practice and procedure" that falls
within the exclusive province of the Legislature.  We disagree. 
Article VI of the New York Constitution -- the
Judiciary Article -- created a "unified court system for the
state" (NY Const, art VI, § 1) and vested the Chief Judge with
the authority to administer the system, with the assistance of
the Administrative Board (composed of the Chief Judge and the
Presiding Justices of each Appellate Division) (Art VI, § 28). 
Together, they are empowered to appoint a chief administrator to
"supervise the administration and operation of the unified court
system" and exercise powers delegated by the Chief Judge (Art VI,
§ 28[a],[b]).  The Chief Judge may "establish standards and
administrative policies for general application throughout the
state," which shall be submitted to the Court of Appeals,
together with the recommendations of the Administrative Board,
and approved by the Court (Art VI, § 28[c]).  
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We have previously held that the constitutional
requirement that the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge
consult with the Administrative Board and receive approval from
the Court of Appeals before implementing broad-based
administrative policies ensures critical "multistage, multiperson
review" and is therefore an indispensable component of the
constitutional scheme (see Matter of Morgenthau v Cooke, 56 NY2d
24, 32 [1982]).  When administrative authority is exercised in
conformity with the consultation and approval requirements, UCS
administrators possess broad express and implied powers to take
whatever actions are necessary for the proper discharge of their
responsibilities (see New York State Assn. of Criminal Defense
Lawyers v Kaye, 96 NY2d 512 [2001]).
The Judiciary Article also specifically addresses the
reassignment of cases to and from Supreme Court.  Article VI, 
§ 19(a) states: 
"As may be provided by law, the supreme court
may transfer to itself any action or
proceeding originated or pending in another
court within the judicial department other
than the court of claims upon a finding that
such a transfer will promote the
administration of justice."
The authority of UCS administrators to transfer cases to and from
Supreme Court is also recognized in statute.  Judiciary Law 
§ 211(1)(b) explicitly authorizes the Chief Judge, in
consultation with the Administrative Board and with the consent
of the Court of Appeals, to "establish standards and
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No. 115, 137, 120
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administrative policies for general application to the unified
court system throughout the state, including but not limited to
standards and administrative policies relating to . . . transfer
of judges and causes among the courts."  Thus, the Legislature
included the transfer of cases as one of the administrative
actions that could be taken by the Chief Judge and Chief
Administrative Judge.  Based on Supreme Court's transfer powers
under Article VI, § 19(a) and the broad administrative authority
vested pursuant to Article VI, § 28 and Judiciary Law § 211, we
conclude that UCS administrators were authorized to promulgate
the IDV and BCD directives.  Before the directives were issued,
the Administrative Board was consulted and consent was obtained
from the Court of Appeals.  And although the First Department
majority suggested that the BCD directives merged the Supreme
Court and the New York City Criminal Court, eviscerating the
latter, in reality the BCD and IDV directives accomplished only
two things: they created new "parts" in Supreme Court and they
provided that certain cases be transferred to those parts.  Both
actions were permissible under the relevant constitutional and
statutory provisions. 
No one has disputed the Chief Administrative Judge's
power to create new parts within existing courts -- a prerogative
that appears in Judiciary Law § 212(1)(c).  As for the exercise
of transfer authority, there has long been a question concerning
whether the drafters of Article VI, § 19(a) intended to require
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statutory authorization before Supreme Court may transfer to
itself cases arising in other courts (see e.g. Matter of
Dalliessi v Marbach, 56 AD2d 858 [2d Dept 1977] [concluding that
section 19(a) is not "self-executing" and that statutory
authority is required]).  But even assuming legislative action
was necessary, the statutory predicate for the rules at issue
appears in Judiciary Law § 211(1)(a), which permits the Chief
Judge to transfer cases between courts to further the efficient
administration of justice.  The provision contains no language
preventing the transfer of misdemeanor cases to Supreme Court.  
In determining that the Chief Judge and Chief
Administrative Judge exceeded their constitutional and statutory
powers when adopting the BCD directives, the First Department
majority stated that they "caus[ed] a collapse of the
constitutionally created Criminal Court of the City of New York
in the Bronx" and "impinged on the Legislature's reserved primary
power to alter and regulate jurisdiction, practice and procedure
under State Constitution, article VI, § 30" (Correa, 70 AD3d 532,
534).  Contending that the Legislature has reserved to itself the
power to regulate practice and procedure, the First Department
reasoned that the ability of UCS administrators to direct that
certain cases be heard in Supreme Court invaded that legislative
domain.  Again, we disagree.
The Legislature certainly exercises significant control
over the regulation of practice and procedure in the courts.  But
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Article VI, § 30 does not address or purport to curtail the
transfer authority granted in Article VI, § 19(a) or the
administrative power vested in UCS administrators in Article VI,
§ 28.  And in drafting Judiciary Law § 211, the Legislature made
clear that it does not view the transfer of cases to be strictly
a matter of practice and procedure -- a conclusion that is
especially appropriate given that UCS administrators may decide
to reassign cases to alleviate court congestion (the impetus for
the BCD directives).  Section 211 -- entitled "[a]dministrative
functions of the chief judge of the court of appeals" -- includes
an express reference to the transfer of cases between courts in
the category of "standards and administrative policies" that the
Chief Judge is directed to establish.  The statute does not
characterize transfer as a practice and procedure issue, much
less indicate that policies relating to reassignment of cases
fall within the sole province of the Legislature.  As indicated
in Corkum v Bartlett (46 NY2d 424 [1979]), the Legislature's
decision to classify certain matters as administrative in the
statutory delineation of the powers of UCS administrators is
compelling evidence that it intended to recognize their authority
over such matters.
Given the historical context in which these provisions
were adopted, it is not surprising that the drafters of the
Judiciary Article expressly permitted the transfer of cases to
and from Supreme Court and that, in Judiciary Law § 211, the
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Legislature vested UCS administrators with the authority to
establish and implement transfer policies.  The creation of the
unified court system in 1962 was prompted in part by the uneven
distribution of cases throughout the existing courts, resulting
in some courts being "overburdened, congested and delayed" while
others did not have enough work to engage the staff full-time
(see Report of the State of New York Temporary Commission on the
Courts [1955]).  A state-wide system of court administration was
deemed necessary in order to efficiently marshal judicial
resources and redirect cases to avoid the imbalances in workload
and excessive delays that had plagued the prior system (id.). 
The constitutional and statutory transfer provisions fulfill this
requirement, thereby facilitating the efficient administration of
justice.
Although the First Department was concerned that the
BCD directives rendered the New York City Criminal Court, Bronx
County, a "shell of its former self" (70 AD3d at 538), it appears
that the court continues to have a heavy caseload and performs
important functions in the criminal court system.  That court
still conducts arraignments and other preliminary proceedings on
all informations, including those that charge misdemeanors and
felonies -- a transfer occurs only if a case is not disposed of
at arraignment.  In 2008, 76,631 arraignments were conducted in
that venue and 48.9% of those cases were resolved by plea during
those proceedings.  Thus, the directives did not affect roughly
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50% of the court's caseload.  Of the cases that survived
arraignment, only some met the transfer criteria and a
significant number of those -- any case involving a felony --
would have been divested to Supreme Court for trial anyway, even
absent the BCD directives, since local criminal courts lack trial
jurisdiction over felony charges (see CPL 10.30).  
Although the creation of the BCD certainly impacted the
work of the New York City Criminal Court, we are unpersuaded that
its role has been restricted to the point that it has ceased to
effectively fulfill the role assigned under the New York
Constitution (see NY Const, Art VI, § 15).  Nor, in any event,
did UCS administrators exceed their authority and impermissibly
tread in the legislative domain when they issued the BCD or IDV
directives.  Accordingly, we decline to set aside the rules on
that basis.
Supreme Court Jurisdiction 
Defendants further contend that, even if UCS
administrators had the power under the constitutional and
statutory scheme to reassign cases (as we have concluded), that
authority was exceeded when the BCD and IDV directives were
adopted because cases may only be transferred to a court that
possesses subject matter jurisdiction.  Primarily relying on CPL
210.05, defendants claim that Supreme Court's power to try a
misdemeanor is restricted to cases in which the charge is
included in an indictment or SCI (issued upon waiver of
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indictment), meaning that the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over misdemeanors charged in an information -- 
so-called "unindicted" misdemeanors.  Since none of the
defendants in these cases was indicted or waived indictment and
agreed to be prosecuted by SCI, they argue that their trials in
Supreme Court were a nullity.  This argument lacks merit.
There is no question that the Criminal Procedure Law
generally contemplates that violations and misdemeanors will be
tried in local criminal courts and that felonies, which may be
initiated by the filing of an information or complaint but must
ultimately be prosecuted by indictment or SCI, will be tried in
the superior courts -- County Court or Supreme Court.  But the
issue presented in this case is not whether misdemeanor cases are
typically tried in local criminal courts or even whether, when
adjudicated in Supreme Court, they are usually charged in an
indictment -- the answer to both of these questions is
undoubtedly "yes."  This dispute concerns the extent to which
Supreme Court can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over
misdemeanor trials.  
To determine the scope of Supreme Court's jurisdiction,
we first look to the New York Constitution, which provides: "The
supreme court shall have general original jurisdiction in law and
equity and the appellate jurisdiction herein provided" (NY Const,
art VI, § 7[a]).  Under this provision, Supreme Court "is
competent to entertain all causes of actions unless its
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jurisdiction has been specifically proscribed" (Thrasher v United
States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 NY2d 159, 166 [1967] [statutory
requirement that judgment be served on insured was a substantive
element of claim and not a limitation on Supreme Court's subject
matter jurisdiction]).  We have recognized that, when the
drafters of Article VI created the UCS in 1962 and continued
Supreme Court as a court of general jurisdiction, if anything its
jurisdiction was enlarged to encompass claims that it might not
have heard under the previous constitutional scheme (see Kagen v
Kagen, 21 NY2d 532 [1968] [Supreme Court shares concurrent
jurisdiction with Family Court over child support disputes,
although it could not have heard such cases prior to 1962]).
To be sure, the jurisdiction of Supreme Court is
limited elsewhere in the New York Constitution.  For example, in
preserving the state's historical sovereign immunity from suit,
Supreme Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over claims for money
damages brought against the state, which must be initiated and
tried in the Court of Claims (see Pollicina v Misericordia Hosp.
Med. Ctr., 82 NY2d 332, 338 n 3 [1993]; Kagen, supra, 21 NY2d at
538; see generally NY Const, art VI, § 9).  Similarly, under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Supreme Court
may not hear cases in which exclusive jurisdiction has been
conferred on the federal courts (Pollicina, 82 NY2d at 338 n 3;
see e.g. Financial Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc. v Fiero, 10 NY3d
12 [2008] [state courts lacked jurisdiction to hear action for
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No. 115, 137, 120
2  Until a controversy is "litigable," it may not be heard in
Supreme Court (see Motor Veh. Mfrs. Assn. of U.S. v State of New
York, 75 NY2d 175, 184 [1990] [once Lemon Law claim reaches a
level where litigation is permissible, Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to entertain it]; see Sohn v Calderon, 78 NY2d 755
[1991] [Supreme Court has jurisdiction over causes of action that
may be pursued in UCS courts, but may not resolve in the first
instance controversies the Legislature directed an administrative
agency to address first under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction]). 
3 When there is a fundamental defect in an accusatory
instrument (see e.g. People v Harper, 37 NY2d 96 [1975]), a
different jurisdictional issue is presented than the one we
confront here.  In such a case, it would be improper for any
court to issue a judgment of conviction because there is a
substantive deficiency in the cause of action.  In this case, it
is undisputed that the informations were valid and that
defendants could have been tried and convicted in New York City
Criminal Court.  The controversy we must resolve relates to
Supreme Court's ability to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over
these cases.
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enforcement of disciplinary penalties arising under the
Securities Exchange Act]).  And Supreme Court is subject to the
same substantive limitations imposed on other courts.2  Like
every other court in New York State, Supreme Court may not
convict a defendant of a felony absent compliance with the
indictment and waiver of indictment provisions in Article I, § 6
of the New York Constitution (see e.g. People v Wiltshire, 23
AD3d 86 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 840 [2006]).3  
But, subject to the limitations discussed above, the
New York Constitution vests Supreme Court with the power to hear
any case that any other court in the UCS could hear, which is why
we refer to Supreme Court as possessing both general and
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No. 115, 137, 120
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concurrent jurisdiction over all causes of actions -- hence the
designation "Supreme" Court.  And, in contrast to Article I, § 6
which requires indictment of felony charges (or waiver of
indictment and agreement to be prosecuted on SCI) before any
court may try a defendant for a felony, there is no provision in
the Constitution that imposes any similar limitation on the power
of a court, including Supreme Court, to adjudicate misdemeanor
charges. 
Defendants nonetheless assert that the Legislature has
imposed statutory restrictions on Supreme Court that prevent
trials of misdemeanor charges from being entertained unless they
are contained in an indictment or SCI after waiver of indictment.
According to defendants, although local criminal courts such as
the New York City Criminal Court may try unindicted misdemeanor
cases, Supreme Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over those
matters and, in this respect, its ability to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction with other UCS courts has been curtailed.
If this were in fact the case, a significant
constitutional issue would be presented because we have made
clear in other contexts that "[t]he Legislature cannot by statute
deprive [Supreme Court] of one particle of its jurisdiction,
derived from the Constitution (Art. VI), although it may grant
concurrent jurisdiction to some other court" (Pollicina, 82 NY2d
at 339, quoting Matter of Malloy, 278 NY 429, 432 [1938]). 
Addressing the precise issue raised in these appeals -- whether
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Supreme Court may try an unindicted misdemeanor -- there is
authority for the proposition that it does and that any effort by
the Legislature to "abridge, limit or qualify" the broad
jurisdiction conferred under Article VI, § 7 would be
"unconstitutional and void" (People v Darling, 50 AD2d 1038 [3d
Dept 1975]).
After review of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL)
provisions on which defendants rely, we conclude that the
Legislature has not adopted statutes that purport to oust Supreme
Court of the jurisdiction to try unindicted misdemeanor cases and
we therefore need not determine whether the Legislature could
take such action, had that been its intent.  The CPL divides New
York courts into two categories: superior courts (which include
Supreme Court and County Court) and local criminal courts (which
include city courts, town courts, district courts and, as
relevant here, the New York City Criminal Court).  It also
recognizes two types of jurisdiction: "preliminary jurisdiction"
and "trial jurisdiction."  Preliminary jurisdiction encompasses
conducting arraignments, assigning counsel, setting bail and, in
the case of a felony complaint, conducting a preliminary hearing
if that right is not waived by defendant (see Matter of Molea v
Marasco, 64 NY2d 718, 722 [1984][dissent]).  As the title
suggests, trial jurisdiction includes the authority to resolve
the case on the merits by conducting a trial or accepting a
guilty plea, among other actions such as conducting a suppression
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No. 115, 137, 120
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hearing (see Matter of Michelson v Clyne, 84 AD2d 883 [3d Dept
1981]).  In these appeals, we are concerned only with whether
Supreme Court had trial jurisdiction because, under the BCD and
IDV directives, misdemeanor cases are not transferred to Supreme
Court until after the preliminary proceedings associated with
arraignment have concluded. 
CPL 10.20, entitled "Superior courts; jurisdiction,"
states that superior courts -- which include Supreme Court --
"have trial jurisdiction of all offenses" and further specifies
that they have exclusive trial jurisdiction of felonies and
"[t]rial jurisdiction of misdemeanors concurrent with that of the
local criminal courts."  A reciprocal provision relating to the
jurisdiction of local criminal courts states that they have
"trial jurisdiction of misdemeanors concurrent with that of the
superior courts but subject to divestiture thereof by the latter
in any particular case" (CPL 10.30[1][b]).  Neither statute
conditions the power of a superior court to try misdemeanor cases
on the existence of an indictment or SCI.  To the contrary, both
unqualifiedly state that superior courts possess subject matter
jurisdiction to try all misdemeanor cases, a point that is
evident from the broad language in CPL 10.30(1)(b) recognizing
that a superior court can exercise its divestiture authority "in
any particular case."  In its express language, the CPL
acknowledges that superior courts -- such as Supreme Court --
have subject matter jurisdiction to try misdemeanor cases.
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Nor do the divestiture statutes found elsewhere in the
CPL undermine this conclusion.  CPL 170.20 requires the transfer
of a case to a superior court if the People secure an indictment
and CPL 170.25 permits the defendant to obtain an order from a
superior court directing that a misdemeanor charge be submitted
to the Grand Jury if the interests of justice so require.  These
statutes discuss only the jurisdiction of local criminal courts,
which lose the power to resolve a case if divestiture occurs. 
The provisions neither state nor imply that a superior court
lacks jurisdiction until a case is indicted (or there has been a
waiver of indictment and agreement to be prosecuted on SCI).  
The divestiture statutes address the ability of the
parties -- the People or the defendant -- to effectuate the
removal of a case to a superior court such as Supreme Court. 
They do not address, much less revoke, the transfer powers
granted to Supreme Court and UCS administrators in the
Constitution and Judiciary Law § 211.  To the contrary, the fact
that CPL 170.25 permits a defendant to apply to Supreme Court for
an order requiring a misdemeanor charge that is pending in a
local criminal court to be submitted to a Grand Jury belies
defendants' argument that Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over
such a charge until it is incorporated in an indictment -- if
Supreme Court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over
unindicted misdemeanor charges, it would not be able to entertain
a CPL 170.25 application.
- 23 -
No. 115, 137, 120
- 23 -
Defendants' contention -- credited by the First
Department -- that CPL 210.05 is a jurisdictional provision that
precludes Supreme Court from trying unindicted misdemeanor cases
must also be rejected.  CPL 210.05 directs that "[t]he only
methods of prosecuting an offense in a superior court are by an
indictment filed therewith by a grand jury or by a superior court
information filed therewith by a district attorney."  Defendants
urge us to interpret the provision as a divestiture statute that
prevents Supreme Court from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over any criminal case until there has been an
indictment or defendant has agreed to waive indictment and be
prosecuted by SCI.  But, by its terms, the statute discusses how
a case may be prosecuted, thereby imposing a limitation on
prosecutorial power.  It restricts the methods by which a
prosecutor may pursue charges, precluding the People from seeking
a trial in the superior courts (including Supreme Court) without
first obtaining an indictment or a defendant's consent to waive
indictment and proceed by SCI.  The statute neither mentions nor
purports to curtail the concurrent trial jurisdiction granted to
Supreme court elsewhere in the CPL (see CPL 10.20; CPL 10.30).  
Our determination that CPL 210.05 was intended to do
nothing more than restrict prosecutorial authority is consistent
with the legislative history of the provision, which predated the
CPL.  In 1941, the Legislature amended the predecessor to CPL
210.05 -- Code of Criminal Procedure § 222, entitled "Crimes; how
- 24 -
No. 115, 137, 120
- 24 -
prosecuted" -- to contain substantially the same restriction that
it includes today, directing that "all crimes prosecuted in the
supreme court, or in a county court . . . must be prosecuted by
indictment" (L 1941, ch 255).  The purpose of the restriction was
to conform the statute to our holding in People ex rel. Battista
v Christian (249 NY 314 [1928]), a case decided at a time when
Article I, § 6 unqualifiedly precluded any criminal defendant
from being tried on a capital or felony offense absent indictment
by a Grand Jury (Article I, § 6 was amended in 1973 to permit a
defendant to waive indictment and agree to be prosecuted by SCI
in certain felony cases).  
In Battista, a defendant charged with but not yet
indicted for felony burglary petitioned the court to have an
information filed charging him with that offense and he then
pleaded guilty based on the information.  We concluded that the
conviction must be vacated, reasoning that Article I, § 6
precluded any defendant from being held to answer for a felony
absent indictment and that a defendant could not waive that
protection because the constitutional requirement of Grand Jury
presentment was more than a personal right but existed to protect
the public from prosecutorial excess.  In response to Battista,
the Legislature amended former Code of Criminal Procedure § 222
to delete language that had purportedly allowed a defendant to
waive the constitutional right to avoid felony prosecution absent
indictment, thereby imposing the limitation that was carried
- 25 -
No. 115, 137, 120
- 25 -
forward in CPL 210.05 (see, Bill Jacket, L 1941, ch 255, Mem of
Comm on Crim Courts Law and Procedure of the Assn. of the Bar of
the City of New York, at 3; see also, 7th Ann Rep of Jud Council,
1941 NY Legis Doc No. 23).  
Thus, when it amended the statute in 1941, the
Legislature was concerned with attempts to subvert the then-
existing unqualified constitutional mandate that all felonies be
prosecuted on indictment -- it did not have misdemeanor
prosecutions in mind.  Indeed, since the New York Constitution
has never included a right to prosecution by indictment in
misdemeanor cases, the constitutional analysis underlying
Battista was not applicable to misdemeanors (in the wake of the
1973 amendment to the Constitution allowing waiver of indictment
in some felony cases, Battista is now of limited relevance in the
felony context as well).  There is no basis to believe that, in
amending the predecessor to CPL 210.05 to reflect our decision in
Battista, the Legislature intended to impair Supreme Court's
ability to try misdemeanors.
In light of our conclusion that CPL 210.05 can properly
be read as a non-jurisdictional limitation on prosecutorial
authority, defendants' alternative interpretation would not
control even if it was plausible.  "Where the language of a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, the courts will
adopt that which avoids injustice, hardship, constitutional
doubts or other objectionable results" (Matter of Jacob, 86 NY2d
- 26 -
No. 115, 137, 120
4 Defendants also have not argued that they were
disadvantaged by the fact that their appeals were heard in the
- 26 -
651, 667 [1995][citation omitted]).  As explained above, the
general rule is that the Legislature may not curtail the
concurrent subject matter jurisdiction vested in Supreme Court in
Article VI, § 7.  Were we to adopt defendants' view that CPL
210.05 divests Supreme Court of its power to try unindicted
misdemeanor cases -- cases that the New York City Criminal Court,
another UCS court, is permitted to hear -- a serious question
would be raised about the constitutional validity of CPL 210.05
(see e.g. Darling, supra).  Faced with the choice between an
interpretation that is consistent with the constitution (and the
jurisdictional statutes in the CPL) and one that creates a
potential constitutional infirmity, courts are to choose the
former. 
Given its language and legislative history, we reject
the notion that CPL 210.05 precludes Supreme Court from
exercising trial jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases concurrent
with other UCS courts.  To the extent defendants challenge the
transfer of their cases on equal protection grounds, this
contention also lacks merit because defendants have not
identified any respect in which they received less favorable
treatment in Supreme Court than they would have received had
their non-jury trials been conducted in the New York City
Criminal Court, Bronx County.4   We therefore hold that Supreme
- 27 -
No. 115, 137, 120
Appellate Division rather than the Appellate Term.  To the
contrary, defendants Correa and Mack adopted the First
Department's conclusion that this procedural outcome was, if
anything, a "presumed benefit."   
- 27 -
Court had subject matter jurisdiction over defendants'
misdemeanor cases.
Fernandez
After he was tried in the IDV part of Supreme Court,
defendant Fernandez appealed his attempted aggravated harassment
in the second degree conviction to the Second Department, arguing
that Supreme Court lacked the authority to try his case and
further contending that he was entitled to a new trial based on
the prosecutor's elicitation of uncharged crime evidence.  The
Second Department considered and rejected both arguments.  We
have held that defendant's jurisdictional claim lacks merit and,
since defendant has not briefed his claim of evidentiary error in
this Court, it is deemed abandoned.  An affirmance is therefore
warranted.
Correa and Mack
In separate trials, defendants Correa and Mack were
convicted in the BCD Part of Supreme Court and, in the briefs
initially filed in the First Department, they raised various
arguments concerning the weight and sufficiency of the evidence
presented at trial.  After requesting additional submissions on
the jurisdictional argument, the First Department reversed both
convictions based on the threshold jurisdictional claim and hence
- 28 -
No. 115, 137, 120
- 28 -
did not reach the other contentions.  Having disposed of the
threshold issue, we reverse the orders of the First Department
and remit in each case so that the court can address the
arguments that were not decided.
Accordingly, in Correa and Mack, the order of the
Appellate Division should be reversed and the cases remitted for
consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined
on the appeals to that court.  In Fernandez, the order of the
Appellate Division should be affirmed.
 
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Cases No. 115 and 137:  Order reversed and case remitted to the
Appellate Division, First Department, for consideration of the
facts and issues raised but not determined on the appeal to that
court.  Opinion by Judge Graffeo.  Judges Ciparick, Read, Smith,
Pigott and Jones concur.  Chief Judge Lippman took no part.
Case No. 120:  Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Graffeo.  Judges
Ciparick, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.  Chief Judge
Lippman took no part.
Decided June 3, 2010