Title: Moore v. Lubnau

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Moore v. Lubnau1993 WY 98855 P.2d 1245Case Number: 92-151Decided: 07/15/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Susan 
Marie MOORE, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Thomas 
E. LUBNAU, II,

 Appellee (Defendant).

 

 

James 
P. Castberg, Sheridan, for appellant.

Patrick 
J. Murphy and Richard L. Williams of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

Golden, 
J., filed a concurring opinion.

MACY, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      The trial court 
entered a summary judgment in favor of Appellee Thomas E. Lubnau II after 
Appellant Susan Marie Moore failed to submit opposing expert testimony in 
support of her legal malpractice claim. Ms. Moore appeals from the district 
court's order denying her motion for a rehearing of the motion for summary 
judgment.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Ms. Moore 
presents the following issues for our review:

     The trial court erred 
in granting the appellee's motion for summary judgment

Based 
upon the pleadings and the discovery, this case is not one that can be 
determined by summary judgment

Appellant's 
failure to timely designate her expert witness was not sufficient grounds for 
granting appellee's motion for summary judgment

Appellant's 
failure to ultimately designate an expert witness until after summary judgment 
had been entered against her constituted excusable neglect

Appellee's 
delay in timely completing his deposition constitutes such excusable neglect as 
to afford appellant relief

Counsel 
for appellee's conflict of interest does not constitute sufficient grounds to 
grant summary judgment 

The 
district court erred in granting summary judgment because of appellant's failure 
to have a designated expert witness

Has 
the specter of Jetty Lee Harvey unduly influenced the judiciary so that 
appellant is unable to obtain a fair trial?

[¶4]      Ms. Moore and her 
husband were granted a divorce on October 12, 1989. Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 255, 256 (Wyo. 1991). On February 21, 1991, Ms. Moore initiated a legal 
malpractice action, claiming that Mr. Lubnau negligently represented her in the 
divorce proceeding. She brought the malpractice claim after she failed to obtain 
primary custody of her daughter and allegedly failed to receive an equitable 
distribution of the marital property. In her complaint, Ms. Moore claimed that 
Mr. Lubnau departed from acceptable professional standards because he failed to 
call lay and expert witnesses whose testimony would have been relevant to the 
custody of her daughter, failed to introduce evidence of the husband's sexual 
practices which were relevant to the daughter's custody, failed to impeach or 
rebut testimony of the husband and his witnesses, failed to present evidence 
which would have resulted in her receiving a greater share of the marital 
property, and failed to conform the divorce decree to the transcript of the 
court's ruling from the bench. Mr. Lubnau denied all the allegations of 
negligence.

[¶5]      As the litigation 
progressed, the trial court entered a scheduling order requiring Ms. Moore, 
among other things, to designate her expert witnesses by October 15, 1991. The 
court subsequently amended its order to grant a new deadline of November 1st. On 
November 4th, Ms. Moore filed a motion requesting the court to allow her until 
November 15th to designate her expert witnesses. No hearing was held concerning 
this motion, and the trial court never entered an order extending the November 
1st deadline. Ms. Moore finally designated two expert witnesses on December 
13th.

[¶6]      On December 20, 
1991, Mr. Lubnau filed a motion for summary judgment together with supporting 
affidavits, depositions, and various other documents. Included in the supporting 
materials was the expert testimony of Mr. Lubnau and the judge who had tried the 
case (he subsequently entered into private practice). Ms. Moore filed a traverse 
to the motion for summary judgment supported by her own affidavit as well as by 
affidavits from other lay witnesses. She did not submit an affidavit from either 
of the experts whom she designated on December 13th. One expert apparently 
withdrew because he had a conflict of interest with Mr. Lubnau's attorney. Ms. 
Moore's second expert was originally designated to discuss Mr. Lubnau's "failure 
. . . to raise an objection to certain matters which arose" in the underlying 
divorce action. It is not clear why she did not submit an affidavit from this 
expert. Rather than submitting her own opposing expert testimony, Ms. Moore 
merely claimed that the testimony of Mr. Lubnau's experts contained factual 
inconsistencies.

[¶7]      The testimony of 
Mr. Lubnau's experts demonstrated that Mr. Lubnau's conduct met the requisite 
standard of care for legal practice. Consequently, in order to create a genuine 
issue of material fact, Ms. Moore had to submit expert testimony demonstrating 
that Mr. Lubnau's representation fell below that standard of care. The court 
concluded that Ms. Moore's lack of countervailing expert testimony indicated 
that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that summary judgment was 
appropriate. Significantly, the court also found that Ms. Moore did not move for 
additional time under either W.R.C.P. 56(f) or W.R.C.P. 6(b) in which to procure 
her own expert testimony.

[¶8]      On April 6, 1992, 
Ms. Moore moved for a rehearing pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59 on the summary judgment 
motion. She based her motion on the fact that she had found an expert witness 
who would testify in support of her legal malpractice claim. Ms. Moore alleged 
that this witness could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence prior 
to the summary judgment hearing. Her motion was supported by the affidavits of 
her attorney and the newly discovered expert. The court denied her motion 
because the expert's affidavit did not constitute newly discovered evidence and 
because allowing the expert's affidavit would have effectively nullified the 
original scheduling order. The court also found that Ms. Moore did not make a 
sufficient showing of her efforts to find an expert prior to the hearing and 
that W.R.C.P. 59 did not provide an appropriate method for seeking additional 
time in which to procure witnesses.

[¶9]      Ms. Moore raises 
a long list of issues in her appeal from the trial court's decision. These 
issues can essentially be reduced to (1) whether a genuine issue of material 
fact existed to preclude the trial court's entry of a summary judgment and (2) 
whether the court erred in denying Ms. Moore's motion to rehear the motion for 
summary judgment.

[¶10]   Our standard of review in cases 
where summary judgment has been granted is:

"We 
review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the 
same materials and following the same standards. Summary judgment is proper only 
when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (citations omitted.)"

Zmijewski 
v. Wright, 809 P.2d 280, 282 (Wyo. 1991) (citations omitted). . . .

"`A 
motion for summary judgment places an initial burden on the movant to make a 
prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that 
summary judgment should be granted as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the 
party opposing the motion to present specific facts showing that a genuine issue 
of material fact does exist. We analyze challenges to a grant of summary 
judgment by reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing 
the motion giving him all favorable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. 
Conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient, however, to satisfy an 
opposing party's burden. (citations omitted.)'" TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber 
of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987)) (citations omitted).

Clark 
v. Industrial Company of Steamboat Springs, Inc., 818 P.2d 626, 628 (Wyo. 
1991).

[¶11]   The foregoing standard required Mr. 
Lubnau, as the moving party, to make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue 
of material fact existed. Our prior cases have not discussed what an attorney 
must show to prove the absence of legal malpractice. See Hickey v. Burnett, 707 P.2d 741 (Wyo. 1985). However, on several occasions we have discussed the 
elements necessary for establishing a prima facie case of medical malpractice. 
After establishing a duty, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice 
case

"`has 
the obligation to establish (1) the accepted standard of medical care or 
practice, (2) that the doctor's conduct departed from the standard, and (3) that 
his conduct was the legal cause of the injuries suffered.' 
[Citation.]"

Metzger 
v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414, 421 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Harris v. Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747, 751 (Wyo. 1981)). We conclude that the test applicable in our medical 
malpractice cases should also apply in the analogous situation of a legal 
malpractice claim.

[¶12]   Under the Harris test, Mr. Lubnau 
was required to demonstrate that his conduct conformed to the accepted standard 
of legal care. We have not previously defined a standard of care for attorneys, 
although the required degree of care is really just a matter of applying the 
familiar "reasonable person" test to attorneys. Most jurisdictions follow some 
variation of the standard articulated in Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 
73 Wn.2d 393, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968): A lawyer is held to "that degree of 
care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a 
reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this 
jurisdiction." See Annotation, Attorney's Liability for Negligence in Preparing 
or Conducting Litigation, 45 A.L.R.2d 5, 12 (1956); and 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & 
JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE ch. 15 (3d ed. 1989). This level of care is 
generally consistent with our standard for medical doctors, Siebert v. Fowler, 
637 P.2d 255, 257 (Wyo. 1981), and we adopt it as the standard for attorneys in 
Wyoming.

[¶13]   A party trying to establish the 
standard adhered to by a "reasonable, careful and prudent" lawyer must typically 
use expert testimony. See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, 
Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to Standards of Practice 
and Negligence in Malpractice Action Against Attorney, 14 A.L.R. 4th 170 at 
§ 4 (1982); and Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768 (Wyo. 1981), after remand, 658 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1983) (medical malpractice). Expert testimony is necessary 
because most lay people are not competent to pass judgment on legal questions. 
An exception exists, however, when a lay person's common sense and experience 
are sufficient to establish the standard of care. Schmidt v. Hinshaw, 
Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, 75 Ill. App.3d 516, 31 Ill.Dec. 357, 
361-62, 394 N.E.2d 559, 563-64 (1979). In this case, Ms. Moore has not claimed 
that any of Mr. Lubnau's alleged breaches fell within this "common knowledge" 
exception. Consequently, we must determine whether Mr. Lubnau's expert testimony 
satisfied his burden of establishing the standard of care and whether his 
conduct conformed to that standard.

[¶14]   In support of his motion for 
summary judgment, Mr. Lubnau offered his own affidavit and deposition, the 
deposition of the judge who tried the case, and the opposing attorney's 
affidavit. Mr. Lubnau's affidavit addressed each of Ms. Moore's allegations and 
meticulously explained his actions. He concluded:

I 
am familiar with the standard of care for attorneys handling divorce cases and 
trials in the Sixth Judicial District, Campbell County, Wyoming. In my opinion, 
I met or exceeded the standards of practice, and the standard of care, for 
attorneys practicing in the Sixth Judicial District, Campbell County, Wyoming. 
Every action I took, and every decision I made, was done with much thought and 
effort, all to the benefit of my client. In my opinion, I exercised the skill, 
diligence and knowledge, and I applied the means and methods, which are 
reasonably exercised and applied under similar circumstances by practicing 
divorce attorneys in Campbell County, Wyoming.

[¶15]   The initial issue raised by Mr. 
Lubnau's affidavit is the viability of the so-called locality rule; i.e., 
whether merely satisfying the standard of care ordinarily exercised by attorneys 
in Campbell County was sufficient. Wyoming has moved away from the locality rule 
in the field of medical malpractice. Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989); 
Vassos, 625 P.2d 768. In Vassos, we said: "Negligence cannot be excused on the 
grounds that others practice the same kind of negligence." 625 P.2d  at 772. 
Commentators have applied similar reasoning to the field of legal 
malpractice:

The 
ability of the practitioner and the minimum knowledge required should not vary 
with geography. The rural practitioner should not be less careful, less able or 
less skillful than the urban attorney. The fact that a lower degree of care or 
less able practice may be prevalent in a particular local community should not 
dictate the standard of care.

1 
MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra, § 15.5 at 873. We agree with this 
reasoning and conclude that an attorney's required level of skill and ability is 
not defined by the individual locality in which he practices. The state is the 
more logical and generally accepted territorial limitation on the standard of 
care. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986); Kellos v. 
Sawilowsky, 254 Ga. 4, 325 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1985); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wn. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238, 1247 (1975); 1 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, 
supra. All attorneys must satisfy certain minimum requirements before being 
allowed to practice law in Wyoming. The level of knowledge required for 
admission to the bar does not vary from community to community. Altering the 
requisite degree of knowledge and care because an attorney begins practicing in 
a certain community makes little sense. Accordingly, we hold that an attorney is 
held to that degree of care, skill, diligence, and knowledge commonly possessed 
and exercised by a reasonable, careful, and prudent lawyer in 
Wyoming.

[¶16]   Our rejection of the locality rule 
renders Mr. Lubnau's affidavit insufficient because he only claimed to satisfy 
the standard of care for attorneys in Campbell County. Therefore, we must 
determine whether the judge's expert testimony established that Mr. Lubnau's 
conduct conformed to a statewide standard of care. The judge's deposition read 
as follows:

Q. 
Having been the trial court up in Campbell County for a little over five and a 
half years, are you familiar with the standard of care for practicing divorce 
trial attorneys in that judicial district?

A. 
Yes, I believe I am.

Q. 
Are you also familiar with the standard of care for practicing divorce trial 
lawyers throughout the State of Wyoming?

A. 
I believe I am. I practiced in a different part of the state, of course, 
primarily when I was on the bench - before I was on the bench and practiced 
divorce trials. And when I was on the bench, had the opportunity to hear cases 
in various parts of the state. . . . Now, not all of those cases were divorce 
cases, but I think - I mean, some of them were, so I tried - as a judge, tried 
cases in, I think, [all] but about two districts of the state.

Q. 
Do you have an opinion as to whether Tom Lubnau met or breached the standard of 
care for a practicing divorce lawyer in [the] Moore versus Moore 
trial?

A. 
Yes, I do.

Q. 
What is your opinion?

A. 
My opinion is that he more than met the standards of practice in the Sixth 
Judicial District and in the State of Wyoming.

. 
. . .

Q. 
And in evaluating the standard of care for a practicing trial lawyer, would you 
agree that there is - that the parameters in which lawyers can practice and 
present their cases and still meet the threshold of a standard of 
care?

A. 
Certainly.

Q. 
Is it your opinion that Mr. Lubnau operated within those parameters?

A. 
Yes, it is.

[¶17]   The judge also commented on some of 
Ms. Moore's specific allegations. One of her claims was that Mr. Lubnau should 
have called the psychologist as a witness who wrote a report which favored 
granting custody of the daughter to Ms. Moore. Instead of calling that witness, 
Mr. Lubnau entered the report into evidence by stipulation. The judge thought 
that Mr. Lubnau acted properly because, by stipulating the report into evidence, 
he avoided possible impeachment of the report. Another claim was that Mr. Lubnau 
should have introduced evidence of Mr. Moore's purchase of sexual items from a 
catalog. The judge thought that the purchases were irrelevant as long as they 
were not connected to the child.

[¶18]   The judge's testimony is arguably 
flawed because it does not specifically state the applicable standard of care. 
Ideally, the judge would have described Ms. Moore's allegations of wrongful 
conduct, stated the ordinary manner in which Wyoming attorneys handle each 
situation, and then stated whether or not Mr. Lubnau's conduct conformed to that 
standard. The difficulty with such a scenario in this case is that it was 
virtually impossible to describe a standard of care for each alleged wrongdoing. 
Ms. Moore's long list of claims primarily concerned Mr. Lubnau's tactical 
errors. A typical example was her claim that Mr. Lubnau should have introduced 
evidence of the husband's purchase of sexual items from a catalog. Whether to 
introduce such evidence was essentially a matter of judgment. Some attorneys 
might have viewed it as being evidence of poor character and considered it to be 
relevant to the custody determination. Other attorneys would have viewed it as 
being a private matter and irrelevant if it did not involve the child. The 
decision as to whether to introduce the evidence would also depend upon which 
judge was hearing the case. A reasonable, careful, and prudent attorney would 
have sound reasons for choosing either option. An expert witness could not state 
that the standard is to do one thing or another. When the attorney's acts are a 
matter of judgment, the expert must simply decide whether, in his opinion, the 
attorney's conduct was or was not reasonable under the circumstances of the 
individual case. This is what the judge did in this case, and we conclude that 
his testimony adequately demonstrated that Mr. Lubnau met the standard of care 
for attorneys in Wyoming.

[¶19]   Once Mr. Lubnau met his initial 
burden of proof, Ms. Moore was obligated to demonstrate through expert testimony 
that his conduct was not that of a reasonable Wyoming attorney. Metzger, 709 P.2d  at 423. Her failure to submit countervailing expert testimony established 
that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that summary judgment was 
appropriate. Rice v. Hartman, Fawal & Spina, 582 So. 2d 464, 465 (Ala. 1991); 
Boigegrain v. Gilbert, 784 P.2d 849, 850 (Colo.Ct.App. 1989).

[¶20]   Ms. Moore's second issue on appeal 
is that the judge erred by not granting her motion for a rehearing of the 
summary judgment motion.1 We review the lower court's denial 
of a W.R.C.P. 59(e) motion for an abuse of discretion. 6A JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, 
ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 59.16 (2d ed. 1989); Backlund v. Barnhart, 
778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1985).

[¶21]   The court explained in an opinion 
letter why it denied Ms. Moore's motion for a rehearing:

     The expert's affidavit 
now provided in support of the rehearing motion is not newly discovered 
evidence. If it were, no cause of action would ever be concluded. [Ms. Moore] 
was to designate an expert months earlier and failed to do so. For the Court to 
allow it now as newly discovered evidence would make scheduling orders without 
any force or effect.

     There was insufficient 
showing of excusable neglect or due diligence. This Court would have entertained 
time enlargement requests at the summary judgment hearing. Rule 59 is not 
designed as a substitute. The Court is without knowledge as to the efforts of 
[Ms. Moore] to locate an expert or why [Ms. Moore] was unsuccessful.

[¶22]   Ms. Moore argues that her failure 
to locate opposing expert witnesses was partially due to delays in taking Mr. 
Lubnau's deposition. Her potential expert witnesses apparently wanted to read 
his deposition before agreeing to testify. Our rules of civil procedure provide 
appropriate sanctions for dealing with parties who do not cooperate in 
discovery. See W.R.C.P. 37. If Ms. Moore encountered unreasonable delays in 
taking Mr. Lubnau's deposition, she could have availed herself of these 
sanctions.

[¶23]   Ms. Moore also attributes her lack 
of expert witnesses to the fact that Wyoming attorneys are reluctant to testify 
against one another, and we are sensitive to this claim. This hesitancy is not 
surprising in a bar as small and as cordial as Wyoming's. The facts of this 
case, however, do not support her claim that she could not find an expert to 
testify. Ms. Moore designated two expert witnesses on December 13, 1991. One 
witness withdrew but she could have submitted an affidavit from the remaining 
witness. As to the witness she found after the hearing, nothing in the record 
suggests that this expert could not have been located prior to the 
hearing.

[¶24]   Even if we assume that Ms. Moore 
could not procure an expert witness in the time required, her proper procedure 
would have been to seek additional time under our rules of civil procedure. 
Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 56(f), she could have submitted an affidavit setting forth 
the reasons why she was unable to file an opposing affidavit. Harris, 625 P.2d  
at 750. Alternatively, she could have filed a motion pursuant to W.R.C.P. 6(b) 
requesting additional time in which to file her affidavits. Id. Ms. Moore did 
not avail herself of the relief provided in either W.R.C.P. 56(f) or W.R.C.P. 
6(b), and the trial court properly found that W.R.C.P. 59(e) is not a substitute 
for these rules when a person is seeking additional time.

[¶25]   Mr. Lubnau argues that he is 
entitled to receive the maximum fees allowable under W.R.A.P. 10.05 because no 
reasonable cause existed for this appeal. W.R.A.P. 10.05 requires that, in order 
for Mr. Lubnau to receive those fees, this Court must certify that no reasonable 
cause existed for Ms. Moore's appeal. We are persuaded that a reasonable cause 
for appeal existed, and we, therefore, decline to make the necessary 
certification.

[¶26]   Affirmed.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice, specially concurring.

[¶27]   Although I agree with the decision 
of the majority to affirm the trial court's summary judgment order, I reach that 
result by a route differently traveled from the route traveled by the 
majority.

[¶28]   In June, 1989, the plaintiff hired 
the defendant to represent her in divorce proceedings filed against her by her 
husband. Of paramount concern in that action were custody of the parties' minor 
daughter and a fair distribution of the marital property. The defendant's legal 
representation of the plaintiff ended in late September, 1989, about a week 
after a one and one-half day trial. Conducting the trial was district court 
judge Timothy Judson. As a result of the trial, the judge granted primary 
custody of the parties' minor daughter to the plaintiff's husband; he also 
divided the property.

[¶29]   Dissatisfied with the results of 
the divorce trial, the plaintiff pursued an appeal1 and filed an action against the 
defendant in February, 1991, in which she alleged legal malpractice2 and unlawful execution and seizure 
of a motor vehicle to satisfy delinquent legal fees.3 With regard to the plaintiff's 
legal malpractice charge, she alleged in her complaint that her divorce lawyer 
had departed from accepted professional standards in the following 
particulars:

·        
· 
failure to call at the trial expert and lay witnesses known to the defendant 
whose testimony would have been relevant to the determination of the custody of 
the plaintiff's minor daughter;

·        
· 
failure at the trial to introduce testimony and exhibits as to the sexual 
practices of her husband which were relevant in determining the child's 
custody;

·        
· 
failure at the trial to impeach or rebut the testimony of her husband and his 
witnesses by use of available depositions and witnesses whose testimony was 
known to the defendant;

·        
· 
failure at the trial to present evidence available to the defendant which would 
have resulted in the trial court awarding her a greater share of the marital 
property than was awarded to her; and

·        
· 
failure to ensure that the divorce decree embodied the trial court's decision as 
it appears in the trial transcript.

[¶30]   Following the defendant's answer, 
which denied the allegations of negligence and unlawful execution and seizure, 
the parties engaged in discovery. On May 23, 1991, the plaintiff answered the 
defendant's written interrogatories. In her answers she listed and described all 
of the acts, errors and omissions of the defendant which she contended fell 
below the standard of care for a practicing Wyoming divorce attorney. Her list 
and description was about seven pages in length and can be divided into two 
discrete categories: trial and nontrial allegations. In the "nontrial" category 
fall the charges that the defendant failed to consult the plaintiff about the 
selection of an appraiser to appraise the value of the marital property; the 
inspection outside her presence of her papers and records by her husband's 
attorney; and the hearing to determine whether a certain attorney, against whom 
the plaintiff had negative feelings, would be appointed guardian ad litem for 
her daughter.

[¶31]   In the "trial" category fall the 
charges that the defendant failed to discredit the plaintiff's husband on 
cross-examination concerning prior inconsistent testimony and statements, his 
drinking problem, his abuse of animals, his unusual sex habits, and his violent 
temper; failed to call witnesses on the plaintiff's behalf who would have 
testified about her care of and bonding with her daughter; failed to present 
evidence to support her position as to a fair distribution of the marital 
property; failed to call as a favorable witness a certain child psychologist who 
had evaluated the parties and their daughter; and failed to object to, and move 
for a mistrial because of, an ex parte communication between the trial court 
judge and the child's guardian ad litem.

[¶32]   In July, 1991, at the plaintiff's 
request, the trial court set a date for a scheduling conference. As a result of 
that conference, the trial court entered a scheduling order. In pertinent part, 
the order required the plaintiff to designate expert witnesses by October 15, 
1991, and the defendant to complete the depositions of those expert witnesses by 
October 31, 1991. The order further required the defendant to designate his 
expert witnesses by November 15, 1991, and required all discovery to be 
completed by December 16, 1991. Finally, the order established a trial date of 
March 30, 1992.

[¶33]   In late September, 1991, again at 
the plaintiff's request, the court entered an amended scheduling order which 
extended by fifteen days the dates on which the parties were to designate expert 
witnesses and the defendant was to have completed the depositions of the 
plaintiff's experts. The other dates in the scheduling order remained 
unchanged.

[¶34]   On November 4, 1991, a few days 
beyond the date on which the designation of the plaintiff's expert witnesses was 
due according to the amended scheduling order, the plaintiff filed a motion 
dated November 1, unaccompanied by supporting affidavit, seeking the trial 
court's order extending to November 15, 1991, the date on which the plaintiff 
must designate her expert witnesses. The plaintiff did not seek a hearing on 
this motion, none was held, and the trial court never entered on order extending 
the November 1 deadline.

[¶35]   Not until December 13, 1991, more 
than forty days after the plaintiff's expert witness designation was due, did 
the plaintiff file her expert witness designation. In the intervening time 
period, the defendant had timely designated his three expert witnesses who 
included the defendant himself and Timothy J. Judson, the trial court judge who 
had presided at the subject divorce trial and later returned to private law 
practice.

[¶36]   On December 20, 1991, the defendant 
filed his summary judgment motion with supporting materials which included 
testimony of his three expert witnesses in the form of either affidavits or 
deposition transcripts. Although the plaintiff opposed the defendant's motion, 
her supporting material included only lay testimony from herself and other lay 
witnesses, but not expert testimony. Noticeably absent from her supporting 
materials was any testimony from the expert witnesses she had designated 
tardily.

[¶37]   Following a hearing in late 
January, 1992, the trial court, in early February, 1992, issued its decision 
letter in which it announced it was granting the defendant's motion. In its 
decision the trial court correctly observed, among other things, that in this 
legal malpractice case, as with medical malpractice cases, expert testimony is 
necessary to establish, as fact, that the defendant lawyer's conduct fell below 
the standard of care which would have been exercised by a reasonable prudent 
attorney in the same or similar circumstances. The trial court remarked that the 
plaintiff had failed both to offer expert testimony on that crucial issue of 
fact and to seek relief under the relevant rules of civil procedure to obtain 
additional time in which to obtain such testimony. Finding that no expert 
testimony had been presented to suggest that the defendant had departed from 
recognized standards of legal practice, the trial court granted the defendant's 
motion. The order was entered shortly thereafter.

[¶38]   We review a summary judgment de 
novo and may affirm the judgment on any proper legal ground, even one not used 
by the trial court. Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 706 
(Wyo. 1987). The majority affirms the judgment based on the sufficiency of the 
testimony of the defendant's expert witness, Timothy Judson. I would hold that 
Mr. Judson's testimony was deficient4 because it does not contain 
statements of the recognized standards of care applicable to the several 
allegations of negligence made by the plaintiff in her complaint, in her answers 
to interrogatories, and in her deposition testimony.

[¶39]   In past decisions we have taken a 
firm stand on what we require of an expert witness in a professional negligence 
case. We have made it clear that an expert witness must establish what the 
standard of care is and in what way the professional deviated from or complied 
with that standard. See, e.g., Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989) (dental 
malpractice); Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987) (hospital 
negligence malpractice); Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414 (Wyo. 1985) (hospital 
and medical malpractice); Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768 (Wyo. 1981) (medical 
malpractice). If the supporting materials were deficient, we did not hesitate to 
refuse to grant summary judgment.

[¶40]   The majority acknowledges that the 
Judson expert testimony "is arguably flawed because it does not specifically 
state the applicable standard of care." Op. at pg. 1250. But then the majority 
justifies its departure from this court's usual swift reaction to such deficient 
expert testimony by declaring, without either evidentiary or legal support, that 
the plaintiff's allegations "primarily concerned Mr. Lubnau's tactical errors." 
Op. at p. 1250. Such tactical errors, the majority explains, are a matter of 
judgment as to which the expert witness may simply state his or her opinion 
whether the defendant attorney acted reasonably under the circumstances. I have 
grave concerns with the majority's departure from our long-standing case law and 
placing the court on such a slippery slope without the benefit of either 
evidentiary support or legal support. When the majority in a legal malpractice 
case is willing to so easily, and upon such minimal consideration of the 
plaintiff's numerous allegations, identify the defendant's various acts and 
omissions as matters of judgment, it runs the risk of being perceived as having 
established a double standard, i.e., it applies a "matter of judgment" standard 
for the legal profession but a "reasonable care" standard for the other learned 
professions. This court has rejected the notion of permissible errors of honest 
judgment in the context of allegations of medical malpractice. Kobos v. Everts, 
768 P.2d 534, 536-39, 549-50 (Wyo. 1989) (Cardine, C.J., specially concurring). 
I would feel much more comfortable with the majority's treatment of the 
defendant's alleged "tactical errors" if the defendant's expert witnesses had 
provided appropriate opinion testimony identifying the plaintiff's numerous 
allegations as falling within the category of trial tactics as to which the 
ordinary practicing attorney must exercise good faith judgment. Indeed, 
authority exists that a trial lawyer is immune from liability for alleged 
tactical errors made in good faith during the course of a trial. See, e.g., 
RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, §§ 24.7, 24.34 (3d 
ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992) and cases cited therein; AMBROSIO AND McLAUGHLIN 
supra, n. 2, at 1367-68 and cases cited therein; JOHN J. THOMASON, A Plea for 
Absolute Immunity For Errors in Trial Judgment, 14 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 369 (1978); 
and JODY KEYS, The Use of Expert Testimony in Actions Against Litigation 
Attorneys, 14 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 425 (1978). Although a good number of the 
plaintiff's allegations fall under the "trial tactics" umbrella, some do not; 
the majority opinion fails to discuss those. Thus, the majority opinion does not 
seem to cover the defendant's alleged failures to consult the plaintiff about 
the selection of an appraiser to appraise the value of the marital property; the 
inspection of her papers and records by opposing counsel; and the hearing to 
determine the guardian ad litem for her daughter.

[¶41]   Because of my foregoing concerns, I 
prefer to uphold the judgment below on a different ground. The trial court 
ordered and held a scheduling conference which resulted in a scheduling order. 
As Wyo. R.Civ.P. 26(f) provides, "[f]ollowing the discovery conference, the 
court shall enter an order * * * establishing a plan and schedule for discovery 
* * *." The plaintiff failed to comply with the amended scheduling order when 
she did not timely designate her expert witnesses. The trial court appropriately 
recognized that this legal malpractice case was one in which the testimony of 
expert witnesses was necessary to establish, as factual matters, the standards 
of care with respect to each allegation of wrongdoing, whether the defendant's 
conduct complied with or deviated from those standards of care, and causation. 
We have not heard the plaintiff claim that some or all of her allegations were 
of such nature that the standard of care and defendant's compliance or deviation 
were within the lay person's common knowledge, rendering unnecessary expert 
testimony. Since expert testimony was necessary for the plaintiff to present her 
case and since she had violated the trial court's amended scheduling order with 
regard to designating expert witnesses, when the trial court held the summary 
judgment hearing the plaintiff was unable to present her case. Under the 
provisions of Wyo.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C), if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under Rule 26(f), the trial court may, among other things, make an order 
rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party. The trial court 
exercises broad discretion with regard to such sanctions. Matter of Estate of 
Mora, 611 P.2d 842, 846 (Wyo. 1982); see also, Gooder v. Roth, 788 P.2d 611, 614 
(Wyo. 1990).

[¶42]   I would consider the trial court's 
judgment as a default judgment. I would affirm that judgment as I find the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances. Other jurisdictions 
have upheld summary judgments in legal malpractice actions under similar 
circumstances. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Hinshaw, 75 Ill. App.3d 516, 31 Ill.Dec. 
357, 363, 394 N.E.2d 559, 565 (1979). See also, Lipscomb v. Krause, 87 Cal. App. 3d 970, 151 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1978) (affirmed trial court's order 
granting attorney's motion for nonsuit when plaintiff failed to present expert 
testimony); Shanley v. Barnett, 168 Ill. App.3d 799, 119 Ill.Dec. 592, 595-96, 
523 N.E.2d 60, 63-64 (1988) (plaintiff's failure to obtain expert testimony to 
establish attorney's negligence rendered summary judgment for attorney 
appropriate); and Fishow v. Simpson, 55 Md. App. 312, 462 A.2d 540, 544 
(1983).

FOOTNOTES

1 Ms. Moore's motion for a rehearing relied upon W.R.C.P. 59 without 
identifying any particular section of that rule. Mr. Lubnau's brief analyzes the 
motion as it if were for a new trial under W.R.C.P. 59(a). Obviously, the motion 
was not for a new trial because no trial had occurred. 6 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE 
& JEREMY C. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56.26-1 (2d ed. 1988). We 
interpret the motion as being brought under W.R.C.P. 59(e), which provides a 
means for the trial court to alter or amend a judgment. Other courts have 
interpreted W.R.C.P. 59(e) as encompassing a motion to reconsider a summary 
judgment. Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 
1985).

Footnotes 
for the Concurrence

1 
Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261 (Wyo. 1991).

2 
For an overview of such an action, see MICHAEL P. AMBROSIS & DENIS F. 
McLAUGHLIN, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Establishing Liability in Legal 
Malpractice Cases, 61 TEMPLE L.REV. 1351 (1988); and WILLIAM D. FARBER, Legal 
Malpractice in Domestic Relations, PROOF OF FACTS, 44 AM. JUR.2D 377 (1986 & 
Supp. 1992).

3 
The issue concerning the alleged unlawful execution and seizure of a motor 
vehicle is not raised on appeal. We deem it waived.

4 
Similarly, I would hold that the other expert testimony offered by the defendant 
was, for the same reason, also deficient.