Title: Ex Parte Northport Health Service, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

682 So. 2d 52 (1996)
Ex parte NORTHPORT HEALTH SERVICE, INC., d/b/a Oak Knoll Nursing Home, a/k/a Estes Oak Knoll.
(In re Terrill Sanders, administrator of the Estate of Pearl Smith, deceased v. NORTHPORT HEALTH SERVICE, INC., et al.).
1950849.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 19, 1996.
*53 Thomas Coleman, Jr. of Smith, Spires & Peddy, P.C., Birmingham, for Petitioner.
Tyrone C. Means and Mark Englehart of Thomas, Means & Gillis, P.C., Montgomery, for Respondent.
Richard J. Brockman and R. Marcus Givhan of Johnston, Barton, Proctor & Powell, Birmingham, for Amicus Curiae Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n, Inc.
M. Christopher Eagan and Elizabeth S. Webb of Starnes and Atchison, Birmingham, for Amicus Curiae Medical Ass'n of State of Ala.
INGRAM, Justice.
Northport Health Service, Inc., d/b/a Oak Knoll Nursing Home a/k/a Estes Oak Knoll (hereinafter "Northport"), petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to vacate a discovery order.
Terrill Sanders, as administrator of the estate of Pearl Smith, sued Northport, alleging breach of contract, negligence, and wrongful death. Sanders sought discovery of personnel documents, including disciplinary records and evaluations, and documents relating to "other acts" evidence, specifically, "evidence of acts of abuse, mistreatment or neglect of residents in the nursing home facilities other than those that resulted in the severe bruising, hospitalization and death of Pearl Smith." On January 3, 1996, the trial judge granted Sanders's motion to compel, with certain limited exceptions. After overruling Northport's "motion for reconsideration" and its motion for a protective order, the trial judge entered the following order on February 15, 1996:
Northport first asserts that the trial judge sua sponte declared § 6-5-551 unconstitutional, and that, therefore, the order is void because the attorney general had not *55 been properly served and afforded an opportunity to be heard.
The constitutional issue in this case is very similar to that presented in Ex parte St. Vincent's Hosp., 652 So. 2d 225 (Ala.1994), which, in fact, involved the same trial judge who entered the order complained of here. In St. Vincent's, the petitioner hospital argued that the trial judge's order declared certain Code sections unconstitutional. In his order in St. Vincent's, the trial judge stated:
652 So. 2d  at 227. (Emphasis added.)
In St. Vincent's, this Court concluded that the trial judge "merely observed that if the statutes were construed to preclude all discovery, the statute[s] would `amount to unequal treatment under the law.'" 652 So. 2d  at 227. Furthermore, this Court noted in St. Vincent's:
652 So. 2d  at 228.
Assuming, but not deciding, that the trial judge ruled that § 6-5-551 is unconstitutional, we note that the attorney general was not served pursuant to § 6-6-227 and Rule 44, Ala.R.App.P. Therefore, any order holding § 6-5-551 unconstitutional is void.
We next must determine whether this case, in substance, is based on claims of malpractice and is therefore governed by the Alabama Medical Liability Act ("the Act").
In Ex parte Golden, 628 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1993), citing Benefield v. F. Hood Craddock Clinic, 456 So. 2d 52 (Ala.1984), this Court stated that the substance of an action, rather than its form, determines whether an action is a medical malpractice action and, therefore, controlled by the Act. Golden involved allegations that a dentist had made misrepresentations to a patient regarding the patient's medical condition. This Court held that although the plaintiff's claims were fraud-based, they were governed by the Act.
Furthermore, although Golden involved a patient-doctor relationship, a nursing home is, based upon § 6-5-481,[1] considered to be a "hospital" and thus, also is covered by the provisions of the Medical Liability Act.
Sanders claimed that employees of Northport's nursing home were abusive to Pearl Smith while she was a resident there. The substance of Sanders's complaint is that employees at the nursing home abused, mistreated, or neglected Ms. Smith. Sanders is attempting to discover evidence of "similar acts" as to other patients of the nursing home. The injuries alleged flow from the treatment or mistreatment of a patient in the nursing home. We conclude that this is a medical malpractice claim and that the Act applies.
Having concluded that Sanders's claim is a medical malpractice claim within the ambit of the Medical Liability Act, we now turn to the question whether § 6-5-551 prevents Sanders from seeking discovery of "similar acts" of abuse. The discovery sought in this case, and to which Northport objects, is essentially "pattern and practice" evidence. Section 6-5-551 provides:
(Emphasis added.)
As previously noted, in Golden this Court determined that the Act applied and that, based upon § 6-5-551, the plaintiff was barred from seeking discovery of "similar acts." Here, we have also determined that the Act applies. Therefore, we can conclude only that Sanders is barred from seeking discovery of "similar acts" evidence or "pattern and practice" evidence. Northport has shown that it has a clear legal right to the relief it requests. Therefore, the writ is due to be granted. The trial court is directed to limit discovery accordingly.
WRIT GRANTED.
HOOPER, C.J., and ALMON, HOUSTON, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, SHORES, and BUTTS, JJ., dissent.
[1]  Section 6-5-481(7) refers the reader to § 22-21-21, stating that the term "hospitals" is defined in that section. Section 22-21-21 does not define "hospitals," but § 22-21-20 does; that section defines "hospitals" to include "long term care facilities such as, but not limited to, skilled nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities, homes for the aged, domiciliary care facilities and related health care institutions when such institution is primarily engaged in offering room, board, laundry and personal assistance with activities of daily living and incidentals thereto."