Title: Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC v. Division of Hearings & Appeals

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 109 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1823 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC d/b/a Lamar 
Advertising of Central Wisconsin and TLC 
Properties, Inc., 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Division of Hearings & 
Appeals, 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
          Other Party. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 385 Wis. 2d 211,923 N.W.2d 168 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 19, 2019   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 4, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Portage   
 
JUDGE: 
John M. Counsell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioners-appellants-petitioners, there were briefs 
filed by Thomas S. Hornig, Kraig A. Byron, and von Briesen & Roper, 
S.C., Madison. There was an oral argument by Thomas S. Hornig. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Thomas C. Bellavia, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
 
 
2 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Thomas C. Bellavia. 
 
There was an amicus curaie brief filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers & Commerce, Midwest Food Products Association, 
Outdoor Advertising Association of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Cheese 
Makers Association and Wisconsin Dairy Alliance by Robert I. 
Fassbender and Great Lakes Legal Foundation, Madison. There was an 
oral argument by Robert I. Fassbender. 
 
 
 
 
2019 WI 109
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1823 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV196) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC d/b/a Lamar 
Advertising of Central Wisconsin and TLC 
Properties, Inc., 
 
          Petitioners-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Division of Hearings & 
Appeals, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent, 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation, 
 
          Other Party. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
the cause is remanded to the circuit court.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   From time to time an administrative 
agency changes its interpretation of a statute in a manner that 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
2 
 
adversely affects a regulated activity.  Here, an agency developed 
a new statutory interpretation that prohibited the owner of a 
roadside sign from remedying a modification that caused the sign 
to lose its "legal, nonconforming" status.  In this case we address 
whether Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1)(2015-16)1 required the agency to 
promulgate a rule containing the new statutory interpretation 
before applying it against the sign owner.  We conclude that our 
statutes do require promulgation of a new rule under circumstances 
presented by this case, and therefore we reverse the decision of 
court of appeals.2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
On a piece of property next to Interstate 39 in Stevens 
Point, Wisconsin, there is a sign.  It has been there since 1991 
when Orde Advertising obtained a permit to build it.  Upon its 
completion, the sign (we will refer to it as the "Billboard") 
complied with the terms of its permit and all applicable laws (the 
"permit").  The Billboard has two faces and cumulatively measures 
1,344 square feet.  Orde Advertising sold the Billboard to Lamar 
Central Outdoor, LLC ("Lamar") in 1999.3 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals, Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC v. Div. Hearing & Appeals, No. 
2017AP1823, unpublished slip. op., (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018). 
3 The land on which the Billboard exists is owned by TLC 
Properties, Inc. 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
3 
 
¶3 
For purposes of this case, the Billboard came to the 
attention of the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (the 
"Department") in 2012 when Lamar applied for a permit to remove 
vegetation that partially obscured the Billboard from view (the 
"Application").  As part of the permitting process, the Department 
reviewed historical photographs, at least one of which depicted 
the addition of an extension panel that increased the Billboard's 
total advertising area.  But the added panel was temporary, and 
Lamar had already removed it several years before filing the 
Application.  With the panel removed, the Billboard returned to 
its originally-permitted size.  Nothing in the record suggests 
that, at the time Lamar filed the Application, the Billboard failed 
to comply with the terms of the permit or any applicable laws that 
existed at the time the permit issued. 
¶4 
But circumstances have changed, and the laws no longer 
allow the Billboard where it is presently located.  As relevant 
here, the Billboard may exist only on property defined as a 
"business area."  See Wis. Stat. § 84.30 (governing outdoor 
advertising signs).  What qualifies as a business area depends on 
whether the property is adjacent to an interstate highway or, 
instead, a non-interstate highway.  § 84.30(2)(a), (b).  In 1996, 
the stretch of road next to the Billboard was redesignated from 
U.S. Highway 51 to Interstate Highway 39.  The parties agree that, 
although the property on which the Billboard is located qualified 
as a business area when the adjacent highway was designated U.S. 
Highway 51, it no longer qualified once the highway became 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
4 
 
Interstate 39.4  Consequently, the highway's redesignation changed 
the Billboard's status from legal to "legal, nonconforming." 
¶5 
The Billboard's status is important in this case because 
the Department says that "legal, nonconforming" signs like the 
Billboard may not be enlarged.  And if they are enlarged, the 
Department says, they become illegal and are subject to removal.  
On that basis, the Department denied Lamar's Application.  The 
Department's amended decision5 said that "records show this sign 
was 1344 square feet in area when it became nonconforming in 1996. 
Since then, the sign was enlarged, subjecting the sign to removal 
as an illegal sign." 
¶6 
Shortly after denying the Application, the Department 
sent Lamar an order requiring it to remove the Billboard (the 
"Order").  The operative part of the Order said: 
NOTICE:  Under the authority provided in Wisconsin 
Statutes, [§] 84.30(11) and Wisconsin Administrative 
                                                 
4 When property is adjacent to a non-interstate highway, a 
"business area" comprises "any part of an adjacent area which is 
zoned for business, industrial or commercial activities under the 
authority of the laws of this state; or not zoned, but which 
constitutes an unzoned commercial or industrial area as defined in 
par. (k)."  Wis. Stat. § 84.30(2)(b).  However, when the property 
is adjacent to an interstate highway, "business areas" are "limited 
to commercial or industrial zones within the boundaries of 
incorporated municipalities, as those boundaries existed on 
September 1, 1959, and all other areas where the land-use as of 
September 1, 1959, was clearly established by state law as 
industrial or commercial."  Id. 
5 The Department actually issued two decisions denying the 
Application.  The second, dated October 10, 2012, is the same as 
the first except that it denied the Application for the additional 
reason that the vegetation Lamar wanted to clear was not within 
the "viewing zone" as defined by Wis. Stat. § 84.305(l)(i). 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
5 
 
Code, [§] TRANS 201.09, you are hereby ordered to remove 
the above-described outdoor advertising sign within 60 
days of the date of this notice. 
. . . . 
REASON FOR THIS ACTION:  This sign does not comply with 
applicable federal and/or state laws and agreements, as 
detailed below:  This sign has been enlarged, in 
violation of Wisconsin Administrative Code [§] Trans 
201.10(2)(e) and Wisconsin Statute 84.30(5)(bm) . . . .  
This is an illegal sign. 
¶7 
Lamar requested a hearing before the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals (the "DHA") to review the Order and the 
Department's denial of the Application.  The DHA said the Billboard 
lost its "legal, nonconforming" status when Lamar added the 
temporary panel.  It also said that removing the temporary panel 
could not recapture the Billboard's prior status.  Therefore, it 
concluded, Lamar must remove the entire Billboard.6 
¶8 
Lamar filed a petition for judicial review of the DHA's 
decision pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  The circuit court 
affirmed the DHA's final decision "in all respects."7  The court 
of appeals affirmed.  We granted Lamar's petition for review and 
now reverse. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
                                                 
6 The Department conceded, before the DHA issued its decision 
in this case, that a change in the statutory definition of "viewing 
zone" covers the vegetation Lamar wished to clear.  So the DHA 
concluded the second basis for denying the Application, as set 
forth in the Department's decision of October 10, 2012, is no 
longer valid. 
 
7 The Portage County Circuit Court affirmed the order of the 
Division of Hearing and Appeals, the Honorable Jon M. Counsell 
presided. 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
6 
 
¶9 
Our duty in this case is to review the DHA's decision, 
as opposed to that of the circuit court.  Hilton ex rel. Pages 
Homeowners' Ass'n v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶15, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 
N.W.2d 166 ("When an appeal is taken from a circuit court order 
reviewing an agency decision, we review the decision of the agency, 
not the circuit court.").  In performing that review, we do "not 
substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency as to the weight 
of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact," but we do not 
rely on "any finding of fact that is not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record."  Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6).  And we "accord 
no deference to the agency's interpretation of law."  § 227.57(11); 
see also Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶108, 382 
Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 ("We have . . . end[ed] our practice of 
deferring to administrative agencies' conclusions of law.").   
¶10 The specific issue before us also presents a question of 
law.  "Whether an agency's action constitutes a 'rule' under Wis. 
Stat. § 227.01(13) presents a question of law, which we review de 
novo."  Homeward Bound Servs., Inc. v. Office of Ins. Comm'r, 2006 
WI App 208, ¶27, 296 Wis. 2d 481, 724 N.W.2d 380. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶11 Our opinion today addresses whether the Department may 
order Lamar to remove the Billboard because it temporarily exceeded 
its permitted size.  The Department's position on the consequences 
of temporary violations of a "legal, nonconforming" sign's permit 
has morphed over the years.  This is not necessarily problematic.  
It is to be expected that an administrative agency might, from 
time to time, change the manner in which it applies and enforces 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
7 
 
our State's statutes and regulations.  Sometimes a prudential 
reordering of priorities or other discretionary factors prompt the 
change.  But sometimes the change arises from a reevaluation of 
what the agency believes a particular statute or regulation 
requires.  This case implicates the latter circumstance and 
addresses whether it was necessary for the Department to promulgate 
a rule before implementing its new understanding of the applicable 
statute's requirements. 
¶12 The Department says that when Lamar added the temporary 
extensions to the Billboard, the sign's status changed from "legal, 
nonconforming" to "illegal," thereby subjecting it to removal.  
And, more importantly, the Department says the change in status is 
irreversible——that is, the sign owner has no opportunity to "cure" 
the violation.  A permit program supervisor who recently worked 
for 
the 
Department, 
Ms. 
Deborah 
Brucaya, 
explained 
the 
Department's current position.  She said that "if the extension 
was placed on the sign after it became nonconforming and was later 
removed, [the Department's] interpretation [is] that the sign lost 
its nonconforming status" and "became illegal."  According to the 
Department, this result necessarily follows from the terms of Wis. 
Stat. § 84.30(11), which say: 
Any sign erected in an adjacent area after March 18, 
1972, in violation of this section or the rules 
promulgated under this section, may be removed by the 
department upon 60 days' prior notice by registered mail 
to the owner thereof and to the owner of the land on 
which said sign is located, unless such sign is brought 
into conformance within said 60 days. No notice shall be 
required to be given to the owner of a sign whose name 
is not stated on the sign or on the structure on which 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
8 
 
it is displayed, or whose address is not stated thereon 
or is not on file with the department. 
§ 84.30(11) (emphasis added).  Lamar cannot exercise this cure 
option, the Department says, because changed circumstances make it 
impossible to conform the Billboard to the law.  It concludes that, 
because the redesignation of the adjacent highway means the 
property may no longer host signs like the Billboard, "conformance" 
actually requires the sign's removal. 
¶13 Lamar says the Department's current understanding of 
Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11) represents a sharp break from its prior 
practice.  Previously, it says, the Department granted the owner 
of a "legal, nonconforming" sign 60 days to cure whatever condition 
caused the sign to violate the permit.  One of the Department's 
former permit program supervisors, Mr. Robert Hardie, confirmed 
that this is how the Department handled changes to signs like the 
Billboard.  He said that "[i]f a sign was either permitted at a 
certain size or legal nonconforming at a certain size, if an 
extension went up, it would be considered illegal and have to be 
removed or taken back to where it was before."  And if the owner 
removed the extension "within the 60-day period allotted, the 
remainder of the sign could continue unimpeded[.]"  That is, the 
sign returned to the "legal, nonconforming" status it enjoyed 
before the violation.  This practice, the supervisor said, was 
based on the Department's interpretation of § 84.30(11)——the same 
statute on which the Department relies for its current, but 
contradictory, position. 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
9 
 
¶14 Lamar argues that the Department may not eliminate the 
opportunity to cure a violation until it first promulgates a rule 
to that effect using the Wis. Stat. Ch. 227 rulemaking procedure.  
The Department does not deny that its "no-cure" position differs 
from its prior practice, but says no rulemaking is necessary 
because it is simply correcting for a previously erroneous 
understanding of the law. 
¶15 Our resolution of the parties' dispute begins with the 
proposition that every agency must "promulgate as a rule each 
statement of general policy and each interpretation of a statute 
which it specifically adopts to govern its enforcement or 
administration of that statute."  Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1).  A rule 
is "a regulation, standard, statement of policy, or general order 
of general application that has the force of law and that is issued 
by an agency to implement, interpret, or make specific legislation 
enforced or administered by the agency or to govern the 
organization or procedure of the agency."  Wis. Stat. § 227.01(13). 
¶16 The Department tells us there are two reasons it did not 
need to adopt a rule to eliminate the cure option.  First, it says, 
Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1) contains a provision allowing it to adopt 
a new statutory interpretation in contested cases or the resolution 
of particular matters.  Second, it says its current position 
reflects the Department's application of the clear and unambiguous 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11), a circumstance we have 
previously indicated does not require rulemaking.  Schoolway 
Transp. Co. v. DMV, 72 Wis. 2d 223, 240 N.W.2d 403 (1976). 
A.  Of Contested Cases and Particular Matters 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
10 
 
¶17 In the same statute Lamar cited for the rulemaking 
mandate, the Department says it found an exemption applicable to 
circumstances like those at issue here.  The relevant subsection 
says this: 
Each agency shall promulgate as a rule each statement of 
general policy and each interpretation of a statute 
which it specifically adopts to govern its enforcement 
or administration of that statute.  A statement of policy 
or an interpretation of a statute made in the decision 
of a contested case . . . or in an agency decision upon 
or disposition of a particular matter as applied to a 
specific set of facts does not render it a rule or 
constitute specific adoption of a rule and is not 
required to be promulgated as a rule. 
Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1).  The Department concentrates on the second 
sentence, arguing that the Order represents the application of 
Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11) to a specific set of facts in the resolution 
of a particular matter.  Therefore, it concludes, its new 
interpretation was not a "rule" within the meaning of this 
provision. 
¶18 The Department's argument requires us to determine the 
meaning of a statute, specifically the second sentence of Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(1).  The process for doing so is well-known and 
"'begins with the language of the statute.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted source omitted).  "Statutory 
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are 
given their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id. (cited 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
11 
 
source omitted).  But sometimes a statute does not have a plain 
meaning.  "[A] statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being 
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 
senses."  Id., ¶47.  We do not, however, look for ambiguity because 
"[s]tatutory interpretation involves the ascertainment of meaning, 
not a search for ambiguity."  Id. (quoted source omitted); see 
also Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 
Marq. L. Rev. 969, 985 (2017) ("[T]he court must do its own 
independent work to determine whether a statute is ambiguous.  It 
cannot take the easy road, throwing up its hands and declaring, 
'the parties disagree,' or 'the lower courts disagree,' or even 
'the dissenters disagree.'"). 
¶19 The 
Department 
did 
not 
extensively 
discuss 
its 
understanding of the meaning of the second sentence of Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10(1).  Indeed, it gave us only a few sentences-worth of 
explanation to guide our application of its terms.  The gist of 
the argument seems to be that the Department is free to adopt any 
reasonable statutory interpretation it wishes——sans rulemaking——
so long as it does so in a contested case or disposition of a 
particular matter.  Because the Department adopted its no-cure 
position in the process of ordering Lamar to remove the Billboard, 
it concludes that § 227.10(1) exempted it from promulgating a rule. 
¶20 The Department's argument, however, requires that we 
read into Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1) two alternative pathways by which 
an agency may adopt a new interpretation of an ambiguous statute.  
The first pathway requires promulgation of a new rule, a 
requirement found in the first sentence of § 227.10(1) ("Each 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
12 
 
agency shall promulgate as a rule each statement of general policy 
and each interpretation of a statute which it specifically adopts 
to govern its enforcement or administration of that statute.").  
The Department says the second pathway, found in the second 
sentence of § 227.10(1), allows it to adopt a new interpretation 
of an ambiguous statute simply by announcing it in a contested 
case or in the resolution of a specific matter.   
¶21 If the second pathway allowed the Department to change 
its interpretation of an ambiguous statute, it would place Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(1) in unresolvable conflict with itself under such 
circumstances.  While the first sentence requires a rule for each 
statutory interpretation, the Department's position would allow it 
to regularly engage in ad hoc interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes.  According to the Department, it is of no consequence 
that, until a few years ago, it interpreted Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11) 
as allowing the owner of a "legal, nonconforming" sign to cure a 
violation, while today it interprets the same statue as foreclosing 
that opportunity.  And nothing in its explanation of the operation 
of § 227.10(1) would prevent it from returning to the original 
interpretation tomorrow.  Nor would it even preclude the Department 
from employing the "cure" interpretation with respect to one sign 
while 
simultaneously 
applying 
the 
contrary 
"no-cure" 
interpretation against another.   
¶22 All of this would be consistent with Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.10(1), according to the Department's rationale, but only if 
it surprises a sign-owner with the new interpretation of an 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
13 
 
ambiguous statute.8  That is, to escape the rulemaking mandate of 
the first sentence, it must wait for a contested case or some other 
resolution of a specific matter before announcing the new 
interpretation.9  If it instead announced the interpretation prior 
to a contested case or resolution of a specific matter, presumably 
even the Department would agree it would need to engage in 
rulemaking.10  The Department does not describe how, in the context 
of an ambiguous statute, its understanding of the second sentence 
of § 227.10(1) could possibly coexist with the first sentence's 
mandate that it engage in rulemaking when it adopts a new 
interpretation. 
¶23 The plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1), the meaning 
that makes sense of both sentences, is that it describes only one 
pathway by which an agency can adopt a new interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute:  The agency must adopt a rule.  The second 
                                                 
8 That appears to be what happened here.  When asked if the 
Department had ordered other signs removed based on the no-cure 
policy, Ms. Brucaya testified that "this is the only instance that 
[she] was aware of where a sign removal order was issued on [this] 
basis." 
9 Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1) ("A statement of policy or an 
interpretation of a statute made in the decision of a contested 
case, in a private letter ruling under s. 73.035 or in an agency 
decision upon or disposition of a particular matter as applied to 
a specific set of facts does not render it a rule or constitute 
specific adoption of a rule and is not required to be promulgated 
as a rule."). 
10 Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1) ("Each agency shall promulgate as a 
rule each statement of general policy and each interpretation of 
a statute which it specifically adopts to govern its enforcement 
or administration of that statute."). 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
14 
 
sentence, the one on which the Department relies, neither provides 
an alternative path by which to announce a new interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute, nor excuses the Department from the 
requirement imposed on it by the first sentence.  It merely 
recognizes that, in resolving specific matters, agency decisions 
will often contain——but not create——a statement of policy, or 
interpretation of a statute as applied to the matter at hand, and 
that they need not adopt a new rule for each specific matter they 
resolve.11  However, the second sentence does not say that an agency 
need not promulgate a rule embodying the new interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute before implementing it in a specific case.  There 
is nothing in § 227.10(1) that authorizes the Department to adopt 
its "no-cure" interpretation through the simple expedient of 
ordering Lamar to remove the Billboard. 
B.  Correcting Erroneous Statutory Applications 
¶24 The Department also said it could implement its "no-
cure" 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 84.30(11) 
without 
promulgating a new rule because it was simply conforming its 
practice to the statute's requirements.  The Department's 
statement of the principle is correct——we have previously 
explained that when an agency corrects a previously erroneous 
application of a plain and unambiguous statute, it is not 
interpreting the statute, but merely conforming its practice to 
the law.  Schoolway Transp. Co., 72 Wis. 2d at 228 ("When a statute 
                                                 
11 We need not determine the significance or operation of the 
second sentence of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1) in the context of an 
unambiguous statute, and so offer no opinion on that topic. 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
15 
 
is plain and unambiguous, no interpretation is required[.]"); id. 
at 236 ("[T]he duty of the Department [is] to administer the 
statute according to its plain terms and to correct its error.").  
So when an agency brings its practice into conformity with the 
plain meaning of an unambiguous statute, "there is no requirement 
that the department comply with the filing procedures mandated in 
connection with promulgation of administrative rules[,]" even 
though the new statutory application contradicts its previous 
practice.  Id.12  But when an agency changes its interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute, it is engaging in rulemaking.  Id. at 237 
("[W]hen the Department changed its interpretation of [Wis. Stat. 
§] 341.26(2)(h) [which the court had determined to be ambiguous], 
it was engaging in administrative rule making.").  Under those 
circumstances, "[t]hose who are or will be affected generally by 
this interpretation should have the opportunity to be informed as 
to the manner in which the terms of the statute regulating their 
                                                 
12 Schoolway Transp. Co. v. DMV, 72 Wis. 2d 223, 240 
N.W.2d 403 (1976) should not be understood as giving agencies a 
mechanism for adopting new statutory interpretations without 
promulgating a new rule.  The principle enunciated in that case 
arises from an agency's obligation to follow the law as enacted by 
the legislature——an obligation that supersedes any contrary 
interpretations it may have previously adopted.  When an agency 
discovers its interpretation is out of step with plain and 
unambiguous statutory commands, it must conform itself to those 
commands as a matter of course.  Only in such a circumstance may 
the agency change a prior interpretation without promulgating a 
new rule.  Indeed, in such a circumstance the agency must 
immediately 
conform 
its 
interpretation 
to 
the 
statute's 
requirements.  Id. at 229 ("In view of the clear statutory 
requirements, the Department was duty-bound to cease its prior 
practice of allowing dual registration."). 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
16 
 
operations will be applied."  Id.  The agency informs those 
affected by the changed interpretation by promulgating a new rule.  
Id. ("This is accomplished by the issuance and filing procedures 
established by ss. 227.01(4) and 227.023(1).").13 
¶25 Whether the Department needed to adopt its "no-cure" 
position as a rule, therefore, depends on whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.30(11) unambiguously prevents the owner of a "legal, 
nonconforming" sign from recovering the sign's pre-existing status 
by curing the status-altering violation.  So our goal is to 
determine whether there is a clear and plain meaning of § 84.30(11) 
as it relates to this question. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.  We 
use the same process for doing so as we did in discovering the 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1), above. 
¶26 The Department says there are two ways we could conclude 
that its "no-cure" interpretation is the natural and inevitable 
result of unambiguous statutory commands.  The first is that Wis. 
Stat. § 84.30(11)——the provision containing the right to cure——
does not apply at all to signs that were lawfully erected (like 
the Billboard).14  Alternatively, the Department says that if 
                                                 
13 Wis. Stat. § 227.023(1), as cited in Schoolway Transp. Co., 
was repealed in 1986 and renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 227.20 in 1985 
Wis. Act 182. 
14 This subsection says: 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
17 
 
§ 84.30(11) does apply to signs like the Billboard, the cure option 
is available only to those who can conform their signs to the 
applicable laws as they apply to current circumstances.  We will 
address each basis in turn. 
1.  Applicability of Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11) to "legal, 
nonconforming" signs 
¶27 In the space of this one case, the Department has been 
of both minds with respect to whether Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11) 
applies to the Billboard.  Its Order——the one requiring Lamar to 
remove the Billboard——says § 84.30(11) is the underlying source of 
the Department's statutory authority.  See Order ("Under the 
authority provided in Wisconsin Statutes, [§] 84.30(11) and 
Wisconsin Administrative Code, [§] TRANS 201.09[15], you are hereby 
ordered to remove the above-described outdoor advertising sign 
within 60 days of the date of this notice.").  But here, the 
                                                 
Any sign erected in an adjacent area after March 
18, 1972, in violation of this section or the rules 
promulgated under this section, may be removed by the 
department upon 60 days' prior notice by registered mail 
to the owner thereof and to the owner of the land on 
which said sign is located, unless such sign is brought 
into conformance within said 60 days. No notice shall be 
required to be given to the owner of a sign whose name 
is not stated on the sign or on the structure on which 
it is displayed, or whose address is not stated thereon 
or is not on file with the department. 
Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11). 
15 "Any sign erected after October 1, 1972, without a permit 
having been granted therefor, and any nonconforming sign which 
subsequently violates s. 84.30, Stats., or these rules, shall be 
subject to removal as an illegal sign."  Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 
201.09. 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
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Department says § 84.30(11) does not apply to the Billboard because 
its provisions contemplate only signs that, when erected, were in 
violation of controlling law.  It notes that the statute applies 
to "[a]ny sign erected in an adjacent area after March 18, 1972, 
in violation of this section or the rules promulgated under this 
section . . . ."  § 84.30(11) (emphasis added).  Because the 
Billboard complied with all applicable laws when it was built, the 
Department argues, it is outside the universe of signs subject to 
the terms of § 84.30(11).  The Department says this latter position 
(that § 84.30(11) does not apply to the Billboard) means Lamar has 
no statutory source of authority for its claimed right to cure the 
status-altering modification. 
¶28 The Department's conflicting positions with respect to 
whether Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11) applies to the Billboard suggests 
we need to decide which one is correct.  But as it turns out, it 
hardly matters.  If we agree with the position the Department took 
when it issued the Order (that § 84.30(11) does apply to the 
Billboard), our analysis would simply progress to the Department's 
alternative argument, to wit, determining what it means for a sign 
to have been "brought into conformance."  But if we agree with the 
Department's current interpretation of § 84.30(11), the one it 
advanced here, then it wins the battle over the inapplicability of 
§ 84.30(11) while losing the war over whether it was required to 
promulgate a new rule embodying its "no-cure" interpretation. 
¶29 This is necessarily so because, as the parties agree, we 
are addressing this part of the Department's argument under the 
Schoolway Transp. Co. rubric, which excuses the rulemaking 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
19 
 
requirement only if the no-cure interpretation is consistent with 
plain and 
unambiguous statutory commands.16  But if the 
Department's current position is correct, that Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.30(11) does not apply to the Billboard, then it must follow 
that this statute cannot command the Department to adopt a no-cure 
policy with respect to such signs.  That is to say, a statute that 
does not apply to the subject under consideration is entirely 
incapable of plainly and unambiguously commanding the Department 
to adopt a specific policy with respect to that subject.  So if 
the Department wishes to rely on the Schoolway Transp. Co. rubric, 
it must look elsewhere for a plain and unambiguous statutory 
command.  It has not done so. 
¶30 Instead, because the Department could point to no 
statute (other than Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11)) requiring adoption of 
its no-cure policy, it referred us to Wis. Admin. Code §§ Trans 
201.09 and 201.10 as the operative authorities.17  The first of 
                                                 
16 This also means we have no need to disambiguate the statute 
to reach our conclusion.  Under the Schoolway Transp. Co. rubric, 
we have a binary decision before us:  Is the statute, or is it 
not, clear and unambiguous? The answer dictates how the remainder 
of the analysis proceeds.  But no part of that analysis requires 
us to resolve ambiguities, and we express no opinion on which of 
the interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11) is correct. 
17 We determine the meaning of a rule in the same way we 
determine the meaning of a statute.  "These rules of interpretation 
apply with equal force to administrative regulations:  'When 
interpreting administrative regulations the court uses the same 
rules of interpretation as it applies to statutes.'" Kieninger v. 
Crown Equip. Corp., 2019 WI 27, ¶14 n.6, 386 Wis. 2d 1, 924 
N.W.2d 172 (quoting United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 
1473 v. Hormel Foods Corp., 2016 WI 13, ¶30, 367 Wis. 2d 131, 876 
N.W.2d 99). 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
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these provisions says that "[a]ny sign erected after October 1, 
1972, without a permit having been granted therefor, and any 
nonconforming sign which subsequently violates s. 84.30, Stats., 
or these rules, shall be subject to removal as an illegal sign." 
§ Trans 201.09.  The second provision says that "[i]n order to 
lawfully maintain and continue a nonconforming sign . . . the 
following conditions apply . . . [t]he sign must have been lawful 
on the effective date of the state law and must continue to be 
lawfully maintained."  § Trans 201.10(2)(d).  These are, of course, 
rules.  And rules cannot function in the Schoolway Transp. Co. 
rubric inasmuch as it is nonsensical to say that an agency need 
not promulgate a rule to change a prior practice so long as it has 
promulgated a rule adopting the new practice.  
¶31 So the Department's reliance on Wis. Admin. Code 
§§ Trans 201.09 and 201.10 boils down to a simple matter of 
determining whether the rules adopted the Department's "no-cure" 
policy.  They did not.  No one disputes that when a "legal, 
nonconforming" sign (such as the Billboard) violates Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.30 it becomes illegal and subject to removal.  But the 
Department's argument depends on the rule precluding Lamar from 
curing the status-altering violation.  And § Trans 201.09 is 
completely silent on that subject.  Similarly, § Trans 201.10 
requires a nonconforming sign to be lawfully maintained, upon pain 
of losing its status.  But it says nothing about whether curing a 
status-altering violation can recapture the sign's previous 
status.  Finally, not even the Department thought these rules said 
anything about the right to cure——until, that is, it issued the 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
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Order.  These rules have existed in their current form since 1976,18 
a span of time that encompasses the era in which the Department's 
interpretation 
of 
§ 84.30(11) 
allowed 
owners 
of 
"legal, 
nonconforming" signs to cure status-altering violations.  It was 
not until 2012 (when the Department ordered Lamar to remove the 
Billboard) that it suddenly discovered that these rules required 
it to adopt its current no-cure interpretation.  So while these 
rules remained as a fixed point of reference, the Department's 
understanding of what they require fluctuated.  The Department did 
not explain how the rules' unchanging text could engender changing 
interpretations.  For that reason, and because nothing in the text 
of § Trans 201.09 or § Trans 201.10 suggests a no-cure policy, 
these provisions do not answer the question before us. 
¶32 In sum, the Department's argument that its adoption of 
the no-cure policy falls within the Schoolway Transp. Co. 
rulemaking exemption because Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11) does not apply 
to the Billboard must fail inasmuch as it identified no plain and 
unambiguous statutory command necessitating that policy.  The most 
this argument could have accomplished was the undoing of Lamar's 
position that it has a statutory right to cure violations.  But 
eliminating support for Lamar's argument is not the same as 
identifying an unambiguous statutory command requiring the 
Department's new policy.  Further, the Department may not rely on 
Wis. Admin. Code §§ Trans 201.09 or 201.10 as a substitute for a 
                                                 
18 The rules were renumbered from Wis. Admin. Code §§ Hy 19.09 
and 19.10 to Wis. Admin. Code §§ 201.09 and 201.10, respectively, 
in 1980. 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
22 
 
plain and unambiguous statute in the Schoolway Transp. Co. rubric.  
Finally, nothing in those rules indicates the Department had 
adopted a no-cure policy prior to issuance of the Order.  
Therefore, we will proceed to the Department's alternative 
argument, to wit, that § 84.30(11) does apply to the Billboard, 
and that it unambiguously precludes Lamar from curing the 
Billboard's status-altering violation. 
2.  The meaning of "conformance" 
¶33 The Department argues that, even if Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.30(11) applies to the Billboard, the statute's terms make the 
cure option unavailable to owners of "legal, nonconforming" signs.  
So, it concludes, it could adopt its no-cure interpretation without 
a rule (under the Schoolway Transp. Co. rubric) because it was 
just aligning itself with the statute's plain and unambiguous 
requirements.  The provision on which it relies says: 
Any sign erected in an adjacent area after March 18, 
1972, in violation of this section or the rules 
promulgated under this section, may be removed by the 
department upon 60 days' prior notice by registered mail 
to the owner thereof and to the owner of the land on 
which said sign is located, unless such sign is brought 
into conformance within said 60 days. 
§ 84.30(11).  Specifically, the Department directs us to the phrase 
"unless such sign is brought into conformance within said 60 days."  
Id.  Lamar cannot bring the Billboard "into conformance," according 
to the Department, because current law prohibits the erection or 
maintenance of signs like the Billboard in that location.  Indeed, 
the Department says that "conformance" under these circumstances 
actually requires Lamar to remove the Billboard. 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
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¶34 Whether the Department is correct depends on what the 
Billboard must be "in conformance" with.  Unfortunately, Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.30(11) does not provide an immediately obvious answer.  We 
can readily determine that the conformity requirement refers to 
the phrase "this section or the rules promulgated under this 
section," which appears in the first clause of the subsection.  
Id.  But circumstances have changed, and the way the statutory 
section and rules apply to the Billboard is different now.  When 
the permit issued, the Billboard was in conformance because it was 
located in a business area.  But once the adjacent portion of U.S. 
Highway 51 became Interstate 39, the lot on which the Billboard 
resides lost its status as a business area.  So after the 
redesignation, the Billboard obtained something of a hybrid 
status——it was legal because it was in conformance with the laws 
as they applied when the permit issued, but it was not in 
conformance with the same laws as they applied after the 
redesignation.  Lamar says that, with respect to such signs, 
"conformance" in § 84.30(11) refers to the first part of the sign's 
hybrid status, meaning that if the Billboard can be brought "into 
conformance" with the laws as they applied when the permit issued, 
then it has the right to cure the violation.  The Department, on 
the other hand, says "conformance" refers to the second part of 
the Billboard's hybrid status, meaning that there can be no right 
to cure unless the Billboard can be made to comply with the laws 
as they apply today. 
¶35 The Billboard obviously cannot comply with the laws as 
they apply to today's circumstances.  The property on which the 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
24 
 
Billboard is located no longer qualifies as a "business area," and 
there is nothing Lamar can do to remedy that infirmity.  But the 
Billboard can comply with the laws as they applied when the permit 
issued.  Therefore, we need to know which part of the Billboard's 
hybrid status the "conformance" language of Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11) 
implicates.  Under the Schoolway Transp. Co. rubric, the Department 
would not have needed to promulgate a rule only if the statute 
plainly and unambiguously applies to the latter part of the 
Billboard's hybrid status. 
¶36 The language of Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11) does not provide 
any obvious clues as to which part of the Billboard's status it 
implicates, and so we must go beyond Kalal's first step in 
determining the statute's meaning.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 
("[W]e have repeatedly held that statutory interpretation 'begins 
with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'") (quoted source omitted).  
The next step in a plain meaning analysis is looking to the 
statute's scope, context, structure, and purpose to see if they 
provide any helpful direction.19 
                                                 
19 We have previously recognized the following aids in 
determining a statute's meaning: 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
25 
 
¶37 The Department says its new interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.30(11) furthers the general policy objective of eliminating 
nonconforming signs.  It points to § 84.30(5)(b), which says that 
"[a] sign lawfully erected after March 18, 1972 and which 
subsequently does not conform to this section shall be removed by 
the end of the 5th year after it becomes nonconforming."20  That, 
however, is only part of the general policy——the other part 
requires payment of just compensation for the removal of such 
signs: 
The department shall pay just compensation upon the 
removal or relocation on or after March 18, 1972, of any 
of the following signs which are not then in conformity 
with this section, regardless of whether the sign was 
removed because of this section: 
                                                 
Context is important to meaning. So, too, is the 
structure of the statute in which the operative language 
appears. Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in 
the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as 
part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable 
results . . . .  
[S]cope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to 
a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute 
as long as the scope, context, and purpose are 
ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute 
itself, 
rather 
than 
extrinsic 
sources, 
such 
as 
legislative history. 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶¶46, 48, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted). 
20 See also State ex rel. Peterson v. Burt, 42 Wis. 2d 284, 
291, 166 N.W.2d 207 (1969) ("'The spirit of zoning is to restrict 
rather than increase a non-conforming use and to eliminate such 
uses as speedily as possible.'") (quoted source omitted). 
 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
26 
 
. . . . 
(b) Signs lawfully in existence on land adjoining 
any highway made an interstate or primary highway after 
March 18, 1972. 
§ 84.30(6).  So § 84.30(11) operates in the context of a policy 
favoring the expeditious removal of nonconforming signs with 
compensation.  But there is no such policy with respect to 
uncompensated removal of nonconforming signs.  In fact, as far as 
the statutes are concerned, unless and until the Department pays 
just compensation, the law allows a "legal, nonconforming" sign to 
exist indefinitely.21  Consequently, Wisconsin's policy with 
respect to the maintenance of non-conforming signs provides no 
guidance on whether a status-altering violation results in 
permanent illegality as opposed to only a temporary illegality 
that can be remedied by curing the violation. 
                                                 
21 We recognize that the court of appeals has previously said 
that, in the context of a zoning dispute, a status-altering 
violation of a "legal, nonconforming" use cannot be remedied, which 
furthers the elimination of such uses.  See Waukesha Cty. v. 
Pewaukee Marina, Inc., 187 Wis. 2d 18, 31, 522 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. 
App. 1994) ("The violation of the nonconforming use by expansion 
or enlargement which changes the use invalidates the legal 
nonconforming use as well as the illegal change."); Peterson, 42 
Wis. 2d at 291 ("'The spirit of zoning is to restrict rather than 
increase a non-conforming use and to eliminate such uses as 
speedily as possible.'") (quoted source omitted). 
But this is not particularly instructive here because we are 
doing a plain meaning analysis of one part of Wisconsin's sign 
control laws to determine if it unambiguously prevents an owner 
from curing a status-altering violation.  Although Peterson and 
Pewaukee Marina, Inc. may be indicative of a general approach to 
nonconforming uses, they do not instruct us on whether the plain 
meaning of Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11) requires the Department's 
current interpretation.  
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
27 
 
¶38 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
"language 
[of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 84.30(11)] reasonably gives rise to different meanings" with 
respect to whether it prevents the owner of a "legal, non-
conforming" sign from curing a status-altering violation.  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.  Specifically, the phrase "brought into 
conformance" could mean that the Billboard must conform to the 
laws either:  (a) as they applied to the circumstances when the 
permit issued (the "legal" part of the sign's hybrid status); or 
(b) as they apply to current circumstances (the "nonconforming" 
part of the hybrid status).  According to our canons of statutory 
construction, that makes it ambiguous.  Id. ("[A] statute is 
ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more senses.") (citations omitted).  
Therefore, because § 84.30(11) does not plainly and unambiguously 
require the Department's no-cure interpretation, Schoolway Transp. 
Co. does not provide an exemption from the rulemaking requirement.   
* * * 
¶39 We conclude it was necessary for the Department to have 
promulgated its no-cure interpretation as a rule, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 227.10(1), before applying it in this matter.  And should 
the Department promulgate this interpretation as a rule, it may 
not apply it retroactively to cured violations that existed before 
the rule was created.  "A fundamental principle in our legal system 
is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair 
notice of conduct that is forbidden or required."  FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012); id. 
("[R]egulated parties should know what is required of them so they 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
28 
 
may act accordingly.").  It is axiomatic that a new rule cannot 
reach back into history to give a sign owner notice of a 
requirement the Department has not yet adopted. 
¶40 Our statutes tell us we must "set aside or modify the 
agency action if [the court] finds that the agency has erroneously 
interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation compels 
a particular action, or [the court] shall remand the case to the 
agency for further action under a correct interpretation of the 
provision of law."  Wis. Stat. § 227.57(5).  The Department 
erroneously interpreted Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1) as allowing it to 
implement its no-cure interpretation without first promulgating it 
as a rule.  And because the no-cure interpretation was the 
Department's operative justification for denying the Application 
and issuing the Order, those administrative actions are erroneous 
and must be vacated.  Schoolway Transp. Co., 72 Wis. 2d at 237 
("Since this change [in statutory interpretation] constituted 
promulgation of an administrative rule, failure to so file renders 
the rule invalid . . . .").  Consequently, to the extent Lamar has 
cured the status-altering modification to the Billboard pursuant 
to the Department's then-existing "cure" policy, it is once again 
a "legal, nonconforming" sign. 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
29 
 
¶41 Lamar raised other issues for our review,22 but because 
we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 227.10(1) required the Department to 
engage in formal rulemaking when it adopted its no-cure 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 84.30(11), we need not address them 
now.  The failure to engage in rulemaking is dispositive.  See 
Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938) ("As one 
sufficient ground for support of the judgment has been declared, 
there is no need to discuss the others urged."); see also Barrows 
v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 2014 WI App 11, ¶9, 352 Wis. 2d 436, 842 
N.W.2d 508 ("An appellate court need not address every issue raised 
by the parties when one issue is dispositive."). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶42 We reverse the court of appeals and remand this matter 
to the circuit court for entry of judgment setting aside the Order 
and remanding the matter to the Department for further proceedings 
on the Application not inconsistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is reversed 
and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
                                                 
22 Lamar 
raised 
four 
additional 
issues 
unrelated 
to 
rulemaking:  (1) whether the DHA erred in finding that Wis. Stat. 
§ 84.30 and Wisconsin Administrative Code Trans. § 201.10 prohibit 
the enlargement of nonconforming, off-premise signs erected after 
March 18, 1972; (2) whether the DHA misinterpreted and misapplied 
common law authorities relating to nonconforming uses; (3) whether 
the DHA erred as a matter of law by finding that the right to cure 
provision in § 84.30(11) does not apply to Lamar's sign; and (4) 
whether § 84.30(5)(br)(4) applies to this sign. 
 
No. 
2017AP1823   
 
1