Title: JOAN COZORT LAWRENCE, a/k/a JOAN LAWRENCE, a/k/a JOAN COZORT V. CITY OF RAWLINS, a municipal corporation and TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOAN COZORT LAWRENCE, a/k/a JOAN LAWRENCE, a/k/a JOAN COZORT V. CITY OF RAWLINS, a municipal corporation and TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION OF WYOMING2010 WY 7Case Number: S-09-0134Decided: 01/25/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
JOAN COZORT LAWRENCE, a/k/a JOAN LAWRENCE, a/k/a JOAN 
COZORT,Appellant(Defendant),v.CITY OF RAWLINS, a 
municipal 
corporation,Appellee(Plaintiff),andTRANSPORTATION 
COMMISSION OF WYOMING,Appellee(Third-Party 
Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from the District Court of Carbon 
County

The Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, 
Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Bruce T. Moats, Law Office of Bruce T. Moats, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellee City of Rawlins:

Daniel T. Massey and Amy L. Bach of City of Rawlins, City Attorney's 
Office, Rawlins, Wyoming.  Argument 
by Mr. Massey.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee Transportation Commission of Wyoming:

No appearance.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ, and ARNOLD, 
D.J.

 
 
VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]    This is an 
appeal from two related district court orders in a declaratory judgment action 
between the Appellant and the City of Rawlins (City) over a junkyard, which 
action was consolidated with the appeal of the Appellant's municipal court 
conviction for violation of a nuisance ordinance.  The first order granted the City partial 
summary judgment.  The second order 
was entered after a bench trial on the issues left undecided by the summary 
judgment.  We will affirm in part 
and reverse in part, remanding for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]    1.  Whether the district court erred as a 
matter of law in concluding that the Appellant was bound by a certain settlement 
agreement?

 
 
          
2.  Whether the Appellant has 
a "grandfathered" right to use as a junkyard certain areas of her property not 
zoned industrial?1

 
 
          
3.  Whether the Appellant has 
abandoned or discontinued the use as a junkyard of certain areas of her property 
zoned industrial?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]    Tom Lawrence 
began operating a junkyard in the contested area in 1958.  Mr. Lawrence and the Appellant were 
married in 1972, after which they jointly operated the junkyard in the same 
location.  The Appellant became sole 
owner and proprietor of the business after her husband's death in 1999.  The record is unclear as to the exact 
location of the junkyard over the years, nor does it explain how the Lawrences 
began operation of the junkyard several years before they purchased any of the 
parcels upon which the junkyard was being operated or had previously been 
operated at the time of trial.2

 
 
[¶4]    The Lawrence 
property is comprised of eight parcels, generally configured as 
follows:

 
 

[Image]

 
 
[¶5]    The City 
first adopted a zoning ordinance in 1973.  
That ordinance was readopted in 1989 after the district court found it 
invalid, in an unrelated matter, due to lack of publication.3  In the interim, two matters of 
significance had occurred.  In 1979, 
at Mr. Lawrence's request, the City redesignated a large part of his property as 
an industrial zone.  This area 
included all of parcels 1, 2, and 5, the western part of parcel 3 (south of 
parcel 5), and all but the northern portions of parcels 4 and 6.  Under the 1973 ordinance, the northern 
portions of parcels 4 and 6 were zoned residential.  Parcel 7 and the eastern portion of 
parcel 3 (the area south of parcels 1, 2, and 6) were zoned highway 
business.  Parcel 8 was zoned 
industrial.

 
 
[¶6]    The second 
significant occurrence between 1973 and 1989 was that in 1982, the City and Mr. 
Lawrence settled a lawsuit over the operation of the junkyard by filing a 
Settlement Agreement.  In the 
Settlement Agreement, Mr. Lawrence agreed never to deny the validity of the 1973 
zoning ordinance, agreed that he had no "grandfathered" rights in certain areas 
zoned residential and highway business, and agreed to fence and otherwise 
organize his business, known as Tom's Body Shop, located on parcel 8 shown 
above.  See supra ¶ 4.  The Settlement Agreement also provided 
that its terms would be considered covenants running with the land described in 
attached exhibits.  It is notable 
that this lawsuit was filed shortly after the 1979 zoning change, and that the 
effect of the Settlement Agreement was Mr. Lawrence's admission that he had no 
right to operate the junkyard in the areas not contained in the industrial zone 
defined in that zoning change, and in parcel 8, which was also zoned 
industrial.

 
 
[¶7]    At some 
unspecified time, Mr. Lawrence erected a fence running generally east-and-west 
along a hilltop, approximately halfway between the north and south borders of 
parcels 5 and 6, south of parcel 4, and just south of the northern border of 
parcel 2, shown by a dotted line on the above sketch.  See supra ¶ 4.  The main portion of the junkyard lies 
south of this fence and north of the south border of parcel 3.  Perhaps the most significant aspect of 
this fence, as it relates to these proceedings, is that it created an area in 
the northern part of parcel 5, in the northern part of parcel 6 south of the 
residential zone, in the part of parcel 4 not in the residential zone, and in 
the very northern part of parcel 2, all of which area is in the industrial zone, 
but which is outside of the fenced area of the 
junkyard.

 
 
[¶8]    In 2007, the 
City issued the Appellant a citation in municipal court for violation of a 
nuisance ordinance for having "derelict vehicles" and junk on parcel 7.  The Appellant's defense to that citation 
was that she had a grandfathered right to use parcel 7 in her junkyard 
business.  That defense was 
rejected, and she was convicted.  
She appealed to the district court, where her appeal was stayed by 
stipulation of the parties so that it could be heard along with this 
action.

 
 
[¶9]    Both parties 
filed motions for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action.  The district court's Order Granting 
Partial Summary Judgment contained the following findings and 
conclusions:

 
 
1.  Genuine issues of material 
fact exist as to whether the Appellant has abandoned her use of the 
property.

 
 
2.  Genuine issues of material 
fact exist as to whether the junkyard was a legal use at the time the zoning 
ordinance was adopted in 1989.

 
 
3.  The 1982 Settlement 
Agreement is, as a matter of law, valid and enforceable against both 
parties.

 
 
4.  The Appellant is subject 
to the City's abatement of dangerous building 
ordinances.

 
 
5.  Genuine issues of material 
fact exist as to whether the junkyard violates the City's licensing 
ordinance.

 
 
6.  The Wyoming Junkyard 
Control Act, found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-19-101 through 33-19-110 (LexisNexis 
2009), applies to the junkyard.

 
 
Based upon these findings and conclusions, the Appellant was ordered to 
suspend operations in, and remove inventory from, any residential areas, and to 
comply with the Wyoming Junkyard Control Act.

 
 
[¶10]  Subsequently, the 
district court heard the issues left remaining after the summary judgment 
order.  A two-day bench trial took 
place on May 28-29, 2008.  In its 
decision letter thereafter, the district court made the following findings of 
fact and reached the following conclusions of law:

 
 
1.  The 1989 zoning ordinance 
prohibits junkyards in residential zones and the Appellant therefore is 
prohibited from operating her junkyard in the northern 200 feet of parcels 4 and 
6, which area is zoned residential.

 
 
2.  The junkyard is not a 
legal use of parcel 7 or the eastern portion of parcel 3 because both are zoned 
highway business, where junkyards are not permitted, and, as to the eastern 
portion of parcel 3, for the additional reason that, in the 1982 Settlement 
Agreement, Mr. Lawrence gave up any grandfathered right to operate a 
junkyard.

 
 
3.  The junkyard was, in 1989, 
a legal use in the industrially zoned areas of parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 
8.  The Appellant's failure to 
obtain a junkyard license and failure to comply with the Junkyard Control Act 
did not render the use illegal.  
Consequently, the junkyard is a grandfathered use in the industrially 
zoned areas.

 
 
4.  Under the applicable 
municipal ordinances, the City failed to prove that the Appellant has abandoned 
her junkyard business "as a whole."

 
 
5.  Under the applicable 
municipal ordinances, the City has proved that the Appellant abandoned her use 
of, and relinquished her grandfathered right to, the industrially zoned areas of 
parcels 4 and 6 north of the fence.

 
 
6.  The City's nuisance and 
dangerous building ordinances apply to the Appellant and her property, but the 
nuisance ordinance may not be utilized to prohibit the storage of derelict 
vehicles on premises lawfully used as a junkyard where such vehicles are 
necessary to operation of the business.

 
 
7.  The junkyard is subject to 
compliance with the Junkyard Control Act, and the Appellant immediately must 
contact the Transportation Commission of Wyoming to determine the requirements 
of compliance, particularly in regard to screening.

 
 
8.  Because parcel 7 has never 
been zoned industrial, and because the Appellant has no grandfathered 
nonconforming use rights, her operation of a junkyard on that parcel is 
unlawful, meaning that her municipal court nuisance conviction should be 
affirmed.

 
 
[¶11]  An Order based upon the 
decision letter was entered on June 26, 2008.  Though not essential to resolution of the 
issues involved herein, we will note that the district court subsequently 
granted the Appellant's motion to join the Transportation Commission of Wyoming 
as a party defendant for the purpose of determining its obligations in regard to 
the Junkyard Control Act, and later issued a summary judgment order requiring 
the Commission to participate in the decision whether the Appellant's property 
should be screened at the Commission's expense or she should be ordered to 
relocate the salvage materials.

 
 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]  "Summary judgment may 
be the appropriate resolution in a declaratory judgment action."  Coffinberry v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the 
County of Hot Springs, 2008 WY 110, ¶ 3, 192 P.3d 978, 979 (Wyo. 
2008).

 
 
          
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if proven, would establish or refute an essential element 
of a cause of action or a defense that a party has asserted.  Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, [1055] (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
          
We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same 
standards and by examining the same material as the district court.  Id.  We examine de novo the record, in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, affording to that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the record.  Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, 
Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 229 (Wyo. 2000).  
If upon review of the record, doubt exists about the presence of issues 
of material fact, that doubt must be resolved against the party seeking summary 
judgment.  Id.  We accord no deference to the district 
court's decisions on issues of law.  
Metz, ¶ 
9.

 
 
Linton 
v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 
2005 WY 63, ¶¶ 6-7, 113 P.3d 26, 28 (Wyo. 2005).  We "may affirm the summary judgment on 
any legal grounds appearing in the record."  Wyo. Cmty. Coll. Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. 
Coll. Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶ 11, 31 P.3d 1242, 1247 (Wyo. 
2001).

 
 
[¶13]  Our standard for 
reviewing findings made and conclusions reached after a bench trial differs from 
our standard for reviewing a summary judgment:

 
 
          
After a bench trial, we review the trial court's factual findings under a 
clearly erroneous standard and its legal conclusions de novo.  Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 
165, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 215, 218 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Rennard v. Vollmar, 977 P.2d 1277, 1279 
(Wyo. 1999)).  We do not substitute 
ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to the 
trial court's findings unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as 
a matter of law.  Deroche v. R.L. Manning Co., 737 P.2d 332, 336 (Wyo. 1987).  Although the 
factual findings of a trial court are not entitled to the limited review 
afforded a jury verdict, the findings are presumptively correct.  Piroschak v. Whelan, 2005 WY 26, ¶ 7, 
106 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
          
This Court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the 
record, but we do not reweigh the evidence.  Forshee, et ux. v. Delaney, et ux, 2005 
WY 103, ¶ 6, 118 P.3d 445, 448 (Wyo. 2005).  Due regard is given to the opportunity 
of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses.  We accept the prevailing party's 
evidence as true and give to that evidence every favorable inference which may 
fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.  
Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, 
¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. 
Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 389 (Wyo. 2003)).  Findings may not be set aside because we 
would have reached a different result.  
Harber,¶ 7, 97 P.3d  at 60 
(citing Double Eagle Petroleum & 
Mining Corp. v. Questar Exploration & Production Co., 2003 WY 139, ¶ 6, 
78 P.3d 679, 681 (Wyo. 2003)).  A 
finding will only be set aside if, although there is evidence to support it, 
this Court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.  
Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty 
Trust, 2006 WY 14, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 909, 916 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 
Snelling 
v. Roman, 
2007 WY 49, ¶¶ 7-8, 154 P.3d 341, 345 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in concludingthat 
the Appellant was bound by a certain settlement 
agreement?

 
 
[¶14]  The question of the 
validity of the 1982 Settlement Agreement that ended the lawsuit between the 
Appellant's husband and the City was determined in the present case in the 
district court's Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment.  Accordingly, our standard for the review 
of summary judgments applies.  In 
that regard, the Appellant does not suggest that summary judgment was 
inappropriate due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact, but 
insists that the district court erred as a matter of law.  In taking that position, the Appellant 
presents two theories in this appeal, one of which was raised below, and one of 
which was not.  The legal theory 
raised below is the doctrine of mutual mistake.4  The legal theory not raised below is 
that the City cannot seek enforcement of the 1982 Settlement Agreement because 
the Settlement Agreement was based upon an ordinance later declared 
invalid.

 
 
[¶15]  We have said many times 
that we will not consider on appeal issues not raised below.  Wyo. Bd. of Land Comm'rs v. Antelope Coal 
Co., 2008 WY 60, ¶ 16, 185 P.3d 666, 670 (Wyo. 2008); Adams v. State, 2005 WY 94, ¶ 27, 117 P.3d 1210, 1219 (Wyo. 2005); Meima v. 
Broemmel, 2005 WY 87, ¶ 56, 117 P.3d 429, 447 (Wyo. 2005).  We continue to adhere to that policy, 
and we will not consider the Appellant's argument as to the non-enforceability 
of the Settlement Agreement due to its being based on an ordinance later 
declared invalid.5  As will be seen, however, that argument 
is so inter-twined with the mutual mistake argument, that it is, in effect, 
determined by resolution of that issue.

 
 
[¶16]  Turning our attention 
to the doctrine of mutual mistake, we will first identify its 
substance:

 
 
This court has previously set forth the elements of mutual 
mistake:

 
 
          
The essential elements of mutual mistake in a written instrument for 
which a court of competent jurisdiction may grant appropriate relief are that 
there was an antecedent agreement which the written instrument undertakes to 
evidence; that a mistake occurred in the drafting of the instrument and not in 
the antecedent agreement which it undertakes to evidence; and that in the 
absence of fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of one of the parties, the 
mistake was mutual.

 
 
Hansen 
v. Little Bear Inn Co., 
9 P.3d 960, 964 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Mathis [v. Wendling,] 962 P.2d [160], 164 [(Wyo. 
1998))].

 
 
Hutchings 
v. Krachun, 
2002 WY 98, ¶ 20, 49 P.3d 176, 183 (Wyo. 2002), overruled in part on other grounds by White 
v. Allen, 2003 WY 39, ¶ 12, 65 P.3d 395, 399 (Wyo. 2003).  The party claiming mutual mistake must 
prove its existence by clear and convincing evidence.  Pfister v. Brown, 498 P.2d 1243, 1245 
(Wyo. 1972).

 
 
[¶17]  The Appellant contends 
that the mutual mistake in this case was the belief by both her husband and the 
City that the 1973 zoning ordinance was valid.  Our analysis of this issue needs to go 
little further than that assertion.  
In the litigation that resulted in the Settlement Agreement, the City 
alleged that Mr. Lawrence's junkyard violated the City's zoning ordinance in 
several particulars.6  Mr. Lawrence pled as an affirmative 
defense that the zoning ordinance was invalid and unenforceable, and in a 
request for admissions, he asked the City to admit that the ordinance was not 
published as required by law.  
Clearly, one of the centrally contested issues in that litigation was the 
validity of the zoning ordinance.

 
 
[¶18]  After reciting that the 
parties desired amicably to settle the litigation, the Settlement Agreement 
contained as its first provision Mr. Lawrence's agreement to admit and be 
estopped from denying the validity of the zoning ordinance.  The Appellant has not produced one shred 
of evidence that such was not the parties' antecedent agreement, correctly 
reduced to writing.  The district 
court appropriately identified this flaw in the Appellant's reliance upon the 
doctrine of mutual mistake by noting that the parties to the Settlement 
Agreement actually had been "keenly aware" of the potential validity 
issue.

 
 
[¶19]  The City believed its 
ordinance was valid and enforceable.  
Mr. Lawrence believed it was not.  
The two parties agreed to settle that controversy, as part of the overall 
settlement of the litigation, by having Mr. Lawrence agree not to contest the 
validity and enforceability of the ordinance.  The doctrine of mutual mistake simply 
does not fit that scenario, and the district court did not err in so 
finding.

 
 
[¶20]  In what might be 
described as a "fallback" position, the Appellant makes a brief argument that an 
attachment to the Settlement Agreement that apparently contained the legal 
descriptions of the properties discussed in the main document cannot be located, 
therefore rendering the Settlement Agreement unenforceable.  The district court made the following 
specific finding to the contrary:

 
 
          
Mrs. Lawrence also mentions that a certain Exhibit A to the Agreement is missing.  Apparently this document cannot be 
located in the court files or elsewhere.  
She argues that the Agreement 
is unenforceable without Exhibit A, as the parties are uncertain as to which 
properties or parcels are subject to the Agreement.  The Court disagrees.  The Agreement, taken in the context of 
Carbon County Civil Action No. 80C-425 as a whole, and read in its entirety, 
sufficiently explains the parcels at issues [sic] and the agreement of the 
parties as to those parcels.  
Accordingly, the Agreement 
remains enforceable as against the City and Mrs. 
Lawrence.

 
 
[¶21]  We conclude that the 
Appellant's generalized and unsubstantiated claim in regard to the attachment is 
insufficient to overcome the district court's determination.  The district court had all the available 
documentation, including the voluminous materials filed by both parties in 
support of their respective motions for summary judgment.  The Appellant simply has not shown that, 
in utilizing those materials and the arguments of counsel, the district court 
was not able to determine what parcels of land were at issue.  Perhaps most compelling is the fact that, 
in both the earlier litigation and in the present litigation, there has been no 
suggestion of a dispute as to (1) what parcels the Lawrences owned or leased; 
(2) what parcels were zoned residential; (3) what parcels were zoned industrial; 
and (4) what parcels were zoned highway business.  Furthermore, there has never been a 
suggestion that there was some land at issue other than the eight parcels 
identified hereinabove.  See supra ¶ 4.  Beyond that, the summary judgment 
decision letter and order reach only two conclusions of substance as concerns 
this appeal:  that the Appellant 
could not continue her junkyard in residentially zoned areas, and the Settlement 
Agreement was enforceable.  Finding 
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the "how's and where's" of 
those findings, the district court left all remaining issues for determination 
at trial.  Consequently, even if we 
read the Settlement Agreement in the light most favorable to the Appellant, we 
cannot find that the district court erred as to its enforceability.  Basically, the summary judgment rejected 
the applicability of the doctrine of mutual mistake, concluded that the Junkyard 
Control Act applied to the Appellant's junkyard, and left all remaining 
questions for the bench trial.  We 
see no error in that resolution.

 
 
Whether the Appellant has a "grandfathered" right to useas a junkyard 
certain areas of her property not zoned 
industrial?

 
 
[¶22]  Application of a 
particular standard of review to this issue is a bit complicated, inasmuch as it 
was determined in part by the district court via summary judgment, and in part 
by the decision letter and order entered after the bench trial.  That difficulty is alleviated somewhat, 
however, because discussion of this issue requires a parcel-by-parcel analysis, 
and the two district court orders are clear as to which parcel is being 
addressed at any given time.

 
 
[¶23]  There is an additional 
complication.  As stated earlier 
herein, this case was at the district court level a consolidation of two 
cases:  the Appellant's appeal of 
her municipal court nuisance ordinance violation, and the City's declaratory 
judgment action.  In municipal 
court, the Appellant was convicted of having two derelict vehicles on parcel 
7.  Her affirmative defense to that 
allegation was that she had a grandfathered right to maintain a junkyard on that 
parcel.  In its bench trial decision 
letter, the district court affirmed the municipal court conviction, holding as 
part of its overall resolution of the case that the Appellant did not have a 
grandfathered right to use the parcel as part of her junkyard.  The complication arises from the fact 
that the Appellant appealed to this Court from both the summary judgment order 
and the bench trial order, but did not file a petition for review of the 
municipal court affirmance, as could have been done under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
5-2-119 (LexisNexis 2009) and W.R.A.P. 13.  
As a result, that conviction stands, even though the Appellant's 
defenseher grandfathered rightscontinued to be litigated in the declaratory 
judgment action.7

 
 
[¶24]  To begin this 
discussion, we will note some undisputed material facts about the several 
parcels at issue.  First, the 
junkyard began its existence in 1958.  
Second, all of the parcels except parcel 8 were purchased by the 
Lawrences prior to the 1979 zoning change and prior to the 1982 Settlement 
Agreement and, therefore, prior to the 1989 effective date of the readopted 
zoning ordinance.  Parcel 8 was 
leased from the Union Pacific Railroad Company throughout the same period.  Under both zoning ordinances, parcels 1, 
2, 5, and 8 were zoned industrial.  
Parcel 7 was zoned highway business.  The northern 200 feet of parcels 4 and 6 
was zoned residential, with the balance being zoned industrial.  The portion of parcel 3 lying south of 
parcels 1, 2, 4, and 6 was zoned highway business, while the portion of parcel 3 
lying south of parcel 5 was zoned industrial.  While the exact nature and dates of use 
of the various parcels was controverted at trial, it is clear that, at one time 
or another, the Lawrences used all of the parcels in their junkyard 
business.

 
 
[¶25]  The specific question 
now at hand involves only those parcels that are not zoned industrial.  The importance of the distinction 
between the industrially zoned areas of the junkyard and the nonindustrially 
zoned areas of the junkyard emerged periodically during the district court 
proceedings, but eventually was muddled and lost in the City's effort to 
convince the district court that the Appellant had abandoned the junkyard 
business "as a whole."  The problem, 
of course, is that the twin concepts of abandonment or discontinuation of use, 
both under the general law of zoning and the applicable municipal ordinances, 
apply only to nonconforming uses, not to conforming uses.  Snake River Brewing Co. v. Town of 
Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 397, 403 (Wyo. 2002); 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 611 (2003); Rawlins, Wyo., Municipal Code §§ 
19.52.020, 19.52.040, 19.52.050, available at 
http://www.rawlins-wyoming.com/code.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).  As was mentioned above (see supra ¶ 2 n.1), it is the nonconforming 
use that may obtain a "grandfather" exception.  Conforming uses have no such 
need.

 
 
[¶26]  It has never been 
suggested in this case that the junkyard is not a conforming use, in the zoning 
sense, in the industrially zoned areas of the Appellant's property.8  Consequently, the questions of whether 
the Appellant has grandfathered rights to the continued operation of her 
junkyard, or whether she has abandoned or discontinued that use, apply only to 
the residentially zoned portions of parcels 4 and 6, the highway business zoned 
portion of parcel 3, and parcel 7.  
In that regard, we do not agree with the district court's conclusion 
that, because junkyards never were authorized in residential or highway business 
zones, the Appellant's junkyard never was legal in those zones.  The junkyard was "legal" in those areas 
before zoning occurred, to the extent that there was nothing to forbid the 
use.  The junkyard remained "legal" 
in those areas after zoning occurred, to the extent that a grandfather exception 
applied.

 
 
[¶27]  We conclude that we do 
not need to reach the question of whether the Appellant abandoned or 
discontinued her use of the junkyard in the residentially zoned portions of 
parcels 4 and 6, or the highway business zoned portion of parcel 3, because we 
do agree with the district court's conclusion that any grandfathered rights to 
such nonconforming use in those areas were relinquished by Mr. Lawrence in the 
1982 Settlement Agreement.9  As a result, when the zoning ordinance 
was readopted in 1989, the junkyard was not a legal use in those areas, and had 
no grandfathered status.  The 
junkyard there is a nonconforming use and the City has the right to enforce its 
ordinances accordingly.

 
 
[¶28]  The same cannot be said 
of parcel 7.  There is no mention of 
parcel 7 in the Settlement Agreement, even though the evidence indicates that 
the Appellant and her husband used parcel 7 as part of their junkyard business 
from the time they purchased it in 1971.  
In fact, one of the most-repeated grievances voiced by the City during 
the district court proceedings was that junked cars located on that parcel had 
been there for so long that they had "40-year-old trees" growing up through 
them.  The ineluctable fact is that 
the junkyard existed on parcel 7 at the time that parcel was zoned highway 
business, and that such use became a grandfathered nonconforming use at that 
time.  The district court erred as a 
matter of law in concluding that the Appellant could not use parcel 7 for 
junkyard purposes because it had never been zoned industrial.  The right to use parcel 7 as a junkyard 
arose long before the parcel was zoned, and survived zoning due to its 
grandfathered status.

 
 
[¶29]  The district court's 
conclusion that the Appellant never had a grandfathered nonconforming use on 
parcel 7 prevented it from reaching the determinative issue in regard to that 
parcel, which determinative issue is whether the City proved discontinuance or 
abandonment of that use under the laws of the state and relevant municipal 
ordinances.  Ironically, the very 
fact presented by the City to prove that the Appellant maintained a nuisance on 
parcel 7the parking of junked carsis the very fact that is sufficient to prove 
that she did not abandon or discontinue her use of the parcel as part of the 
junkyard.  Caster v. West Valley City, 2001 UT App 
220, ¶ 6, 29 P.3d 22, 24 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) ("Thus, storing or keeping motor 
vehicles on a property constitutes the minimum activity required for continued 
use of the property.").  See also River Springs Ltd. Liability Co. v. 
Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Teton, 899 P.2d 1329, 1334-35 (Wyo. 
1995) (reduced level of operation of a quarry for over 40 years did not 
constitute abandonment).

 
 
[¶30]  In summary, we conclude 
as follows:  any grandfathered right 
to have the junkyard in the residential portions of parcels 4 and 6, and the 
highway business portion of parcel 3 were specifically relinquished and 
abandoned by Mr. Lawrence in the 1982 Settlement Agreement.  The grandfathered right to use parcel 7 
in the junkyard business has not been abandoned or 
discontinued.

 
 
Whether the Appellant has abandoned or discontinued the useas a 
junkyard of certain areas of her property zoned 
industrial?

 
 
[¶31]  The answer to this 
question comes relatively more simply than the answers to the foregoing 
questions.  The City's entire case 
presented below rested upon the assumption that the concepts of abandonment or 
discontinuation of a nonconforming use, as enunciated in its ordinances, somehow 
applied to those portions of the Appellant's property that are zoned 
industrial.  That assumption is just 
not correct. The junkyard was a conforming use in the industrial zone.  Moreover, the district court found, and 
we agree, that the junkyard use was not made "illegal," in the zoning sense, by 
the Appellant's failure to obtain required permits, or her failure to abide by 
the dictates of the Junkyard Control Act.  
The junkyard was a legal conforming use in the industrial zone, both 
before and after the 1989 zoning ordinance adoption.10  All of parcels 1, 2, 5, and 8 were zoned 
industrial.  The portion of parcel 3 
south of parcel 5, and the portions of parcels 4 and 6 south of the residential 
zone, also were zoned industrial.  
The Appellant has not abandoned or discontinued her junkyard use in those 
areas.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶32]  The Appellant's 
junkyard is a conforming use, as a matter of zoning, in those areas that are 
zoned industrial:  all of parcels 1, 
2, 5, and 8, the portion of parcel 3 south of parcel 5, and the portions of 
parcels 4 and 6 south of the residential zone.  The concepts of abandonment or 
discontinuation of a nonconforming use are not applicable to those areas, and 
the district court orders must be reversed to the extent that they contradict 
that conclusion.  Pursuant to the 
1982 Settlement Agreement, the district court ordered the Appellant to screen 
parcel 8, and we affirm that order.

 
 
[¶33]  Any grandfathered right 
for the existence of the junkyard as a nonconforming use in the residential 
zoned areas in parcels 4 and 6, and the highway business zoned area of parcel 3 
was relinquished in the 1982 Settlement Agreement.  The junkyard is not a legal 
nonconforming use in those areas, and the order of the district court to that 
effect is affirmed.  The junkyard 
is, however, a grandfathered nonconforming use on parcel 7, which use has not 
been abandoned or discontinued.  The 
order of the district court is reversed to that 
extent.

 
 
[¶34]  Finally, we will note 
the following:  First, this Court is 
not called upon to determine the validity or applicability of the City's 
"amortization ordinance," because the City did not implement its provisions in 
this case.11  Second, this case must be remanded to 
the district court for a determination of the Appellant's particular 
obligations, as well as the obligations of the Transportation Commission of 
Wyoming, under the Junkyard Control Act.

 
 
[¶35]  Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1

A 
non-conforming use is a use which, although it does not conform with existing 
zoning regulations, existed lawfully prior to the enactment of the zoning 
regulations.  These uses are 
permitted to continue, although technically in violation of the current zoning 
regulations, until they are abandoned.  
An exception of this kind is commonly referred to as a "grandfather" 
exception.

 
 

Snake 
River Brewing Co. v. Town of Jackson, 
2002 WY 11, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 397, 403 (Wyo. 2002) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).

 
 

2Of 
the parcels at issue, the Lawrences purchased two in 1965, one in 1969, one in 
1971, one in 1972, and two in 1974.  
An eighth parcel has been leased from the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company.

 
 

3The 
City contends that, in 2007, it was discovered that the ordinances had, indeed, 
been published as required by law, but that is of no consequence to 
determination of the issues in this action.

 
 

4Technically, 
mutual mistake is not a legal cause of action or defense; 
rather, its existence may lead to equitable relief in the form of reformation or 
rescission of an instrument.  W.N. McMurry Constr. Co. v. Cmty. First 
Ins., Inc., 2007 WY 96, ¶ 18, 160 P.3d 71, 77 (Wyo. 2007); Kipp v. Agee, 457 P.2d 673, 675 (Wyo. 
1969).  "Requests for equitable 
relief are matters over which the district court exercises broad 
discretion."  Jacoby v. Jacoby, 2004 WY 140, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 852, 855 (Wyo. 2004).  That 
raises the question of whether our review in this instance ought to be for an 
abuse of discretion, rather than de novo 
review for an error of law.  
Because we will determine that mutual mistake did not occur (see infra ¶¶ 17-22), it was neither an 
abuse of discretion nor an error of law for the district court not to apply the 
doctrine.

 
 

5In 
her reply brief, the Appellant insists that she raised this issue in the 
district court, both in her Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and in her Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment.  We have examined those 
briefs however, and find that any references to this issue are vague and 
unsupported by citation to authority, and are made only as part of the mutual 
mistake argument.  The issue was 
not, in substance, raised below.

 
 

6Attached 
to the Appellant's brief, although not contained in the record on appeal, is a 
copy of the Amended Petition for Permanent Injunction filed by the City in that 
litigation.  The Appellant urges 
this Court to take judicial notice of the pleading, and the City does not appear 
to object.  See Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857, 858-59 (Wyo. 
1987).

 
 

7The 
decision letter after the bench trial indicated that the municipal court 
conviction was "affirmed in all respects," but the Order that followed did not 
mention the municipal court case.  
In addition, the former, but not the latter, carried both case 
headings.  Therefore, even though no 
such order is in the record, we assume that a separate order was entered in the 
district court appeal affirming the municipal court conviction.  That is the order from which no petition 
for review was filed.  At any rate, 
the Appellant conceded below that the fine levied against her had been upheld 
and that she would have to pay it because she did not bring that judgment and 
sentence before this Court.

 
 

8The 
district court rejected the City's contention that, even though conforming, the 
junkyard had become an "illegal" use because of licensing failures or the 
failure to meet the Junkyard Control Act.  
That determination was not appealed.

 
 

9For 
each parcel covered by the Settlement Agreement, Mr. Lawrence agreed that he 
"has no grandfather or pre-existing use rights" therein.  If intent to abandon had to be proven 
outside the existence of the Settlement Agreement, Mr. Lawrence's exclusion of 
these areas from his 1979 request that the City industrially zone his junkyard 
certainly would be convincing proof of such intent.

 
 

10The 
Appellant testified that the purpose behind the 1979 zone change request was to 
return the junkyard to its former 
industrial status.  The record is 
not clear in this regard; the Appellant testified that "[i]t was industrial when 
we bought it, and we asked that it be returned to industrial."  If the City's first zoning ordinance was 
passed in 1973, and the property was purchased before that date, we can only 
assume that the area at the time of purchase was industrial as a matter of fact, 
rather than as a matter of zoning.

 
 

11The 
Rawlins Municipal Code § 19.52.020 requires the termination or relocation of 
certain non-conforming uses, based upon a schedule determined by the value of 
the business.  See 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning §§ 621-24 
(2003).