Title: EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11920 
 
EVENTMONITOR, INC.  vs.  ANTHONY LENESS.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 3, 2015. - February 4, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, 
JJ. 
 
 
Employment, Termination.  Contract, Employment, Performance and 
breach, Termination, Indemnity.  Indemnity.  Massachusetts 
Wage Act.  Damages, Employment contract. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 30, 2008. 
 
 
The case was heard by Jeffrey A. Locke, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Ronald W. Dunbar, Jr. (Andrew E. Goloboy with him) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Shana I. Kaplan (James E. O'Connell, Jr., with her) for the 
defendant. 
 
David J. Fried, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                 
 
1 Before trial, Anthony Leness voluntarily dismissed all 
claims against third-party defendant Sheldon Chang, who plays no 
role in this appeal. 
2 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  The plaintiff, EventMonitor, Inc. 
(EventMonitor), is a Delaware corporation, established in 2000, 
with headquarters in Boston.  It develops and markets software 
for the financial industry.  The defendant, Anthony Leness, was 
one of the early employees of the company.  Leness was hired as 
EventMonitor's vice-president for business affairs in June, 
2001, upon his graduation from Harvard Business School.  He 
served in that position for approximately six years, until he 
was terminated on December 5, 2007, two months after he had 
proposed a plan to restructure EventMonitor into two related 
entities, a proposal that Sheldon Chang, EventMonitor's 
president and executive director, believed would undermine the 
future of the company.  The termination was characterized as 
"without cause." 
Under the terms of Leness's employment contract, 
EventMonitor therefore was required to pay him one year's salary 
and benefits, plus the value of any accrued but unused vacation 
time.  Section 6(b) of the employment agreement provided that, 
upon termination, Leness was to return "all items containing or 
embodying Proprietary Information (including all copies)."  
Before his departure, Leness returned, among other things, a 
company laptop computer containing proprietary information that 
he had used in the course of his work at EventMonitor. 
3 
 
Soon after Leness's termination, through a forensic 
examination of the laptop computer, EventMonitor discovered that 
Leness had copied all of the data on the computer, including 
EventMonitor's customer information and proprietary business 
plans, to a data backup and storage service accessed over the 
Internet.  Leness had not informed EventMonitor about this 
backup before his termination was effective.  To the contrary, 
Leness had paid the subscription for the data storage service 
with a personal credit card, and also had installed a "cleaning" 
program in an effort (ultimately unsuccessful) to delete from 
the laptop information related to the account subscription.  
EventMonitor deemed Leness's actions to have been a defalcation 
of company assets.  "Defalcation" was one of the only reasons in 
the employment contract that would have allowed EventMonitor to 
terminate Leness "for cause."  And, where a termination was for 
cause, the contract did not require Eventmonitor to make any 
severance payments. 
Retroactively characterizing the termination as having been 
for cause, in mid-February, 2008, approximately five weeks after 
Leness's departure, Eventmonitor stopped paying Leness any 
severance payments, declined to pay him his accrued vacation, 
and filed a complaint in the Superior Court asserting, among 
other claims, breach of contract.  Leness asserted twelve 
4 
 
counterclaims, among them breach of contract; breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; violations of 
the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148 (wage act); and 
indemnification under the terms of the employment contract.2  
Leness argued that EventMonitor had no valid basis for treating 
his termination as one "for cause," and had committed a breach 
of the contract by refusing to pay his severance payments, as 
well as violated the wage act by refusing to pay him the value 
of his accrued and unused vacation. 
After a jury-waived trial, a Superior Court judge found 
that Leness had not engaged in defalcation of EventMonitor's 
assets, and had not committed a material breach of the 
employment contract, and thus that his termination could not 
have been for cause.  Judgment entered for Leness on 
EventMonitor's claims for breach of contract, breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary 
duty.  The judge also entered judgment for Leness on his 
counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of 
                                                 
2 EventMonitor, Inc. (EventMonitor), also filed claims for, 
inter alia, misrepresentation, declaratory judgment, unjust 
enrichment, and negligence.  Leness also filed counterclaims 
alleging breach of fiduciary duty, self-dealing, intentional 
interference with advantageous relations, conflict of interest, 
defamation, a derivative shareholder claim, and a demand for 
access to company books and records.  Prior to trial, the 
parties dismissed all but the four claims and corresponding 
counterclaims at issue on appeal. 
5 
 
good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the wage act, but 
entered judgment for EventMonitor on Leness's claim for 
indemnification.  EventMonitor appealed, and Leness cross-
appealed.  We transferred the matter to this court on our own 
motion. 
EventMonitor contends that the judge erred in finding that 
Leness did not commit a material breach of the employment 
contract and did not engage in a defalcation of company assets.  
In support of its assertion that Leness's employment properly 
was terminated for cause, EventMonitor asks that we adopt the 
"after-acquired evidence doctrine" used in some other 
jurisdictions, which allows an employer to recharacterize the 
nature of an employee's termination on the basis of information 
learned after the termination has taken place. 
In the rare opportunities that this court and the Appeals 
Court have had to consider the issue of after-acquired evidence 
in the context of a termination from employment, neither of the 
courts has adopted, or declined to adopt, this doctrine.  See 
Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 815-
817 (1991); Prozinski v. Northeast Real Estate Servs., 59 Mass. 
App. Ct. 599, 610-612 (2004).  We need not reach the question 
here, because we agree with the trial judge that Leness did not 
commit a material breach of the employment contract, and did not 
6 
 
engage in defalcation of company assets.  Therefore, Leness 
committed no act giving rise to a termination for cause, and the 
after-acquired evidence doctrine would have had no impact on the 
result we reach.  We affirm the judge's conclusion that Leness 
is entitled to severance payments under the terms of the 
contract, and remand the matter for entry of an amended judgment 
correcting certain arithmetic errors in the calculation of 
accrued vacation payments.3 
1.  Facts.  "We recite the essential facts found by the 
judge, which we accept 'unless they are clearly erroneous,' 
. . . and which the parties do not challenge, supplemented by 
other undisputed information from the record."  Boyle v. Zurich 
American Ins. Co., 472 Mass. 649, 651 (2015), quoting Weiler v. 
PortfolioScope, Inc., 469 Mass. 75, 81 (2014). 
In June, 2001, EventMonitor hired Leness as vice-president 
for business affairs.  Leness and EventMonitor entered into a 
written employment agreement detailing how EventMonitor could 
terminate Leness with or without cause.  Termination without 
cause required thirty days' written notice; it also entitled 
Leness to severance payments consisting of twelve months of 
salary and benefits, unless he began full-time employment during 
                                                 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association on behalf of 
Anthony Leness. 
7 
 
that period, and his accrued but unused vacation time.  
Section 5 of the contract specified a very limited number of 
reasons that EventMonitor could terminate Leness's employment 
for cause, including if Leness "engaged in wilful fraud or 
defalcation, either of which involved funds or other assets of 
[EventMonitor]." 
Section 6(b) of the employment agreement, the non-
disclosure provision, required Leness to "hold in confidence and 
not knowingly disclose or, except within the scope of his 
employment, knowingly use any Proprietary Information."  
"Proprietary Information" was defined as: 
"[A]ll [i]nventions and all other business, technical 
and financial information (including without limitation, 
the identity of and information relating to customers, 
investors, vendors, business partners or employees of 
[EventMonitor]) . . . that relate to [EventMonitor] or the 
business or demonstrably anticipated business of 
[EventMonitor] or that are received by or for 
[EventMonitor] in confidence." 
 
The section provided further that, upon termination of his 
employment, Leness was required "promptly [to] return to 
[EventMonitor] all items containing or embodying Proprietary 
Information (including all copies)." 
 
Leness worked at EventMonitor for approximately six years.  
In the early years, the company grew substantially in terms of 
revenue and number of employees.  In the fall of 2007, however, 
8 
 
tensions developed between Leness and Chang over the direction 
of the company.  Those tensions escalated significantly after 
October 17, 2007, when Leness submitted a business proposal that 
would have left Chang to focus on research and development, 
using the existing software as a base product, and would have 
created a spin-off company for sales and support, with Leness in 
charge of that new entity.  The new entity would have taken the 
majority of EventMonitor's revenue, which was derived largely 
from service and licensing agreements with three large clients; 
in exchange, the new entity would have lent EventMonitor startup 
funds to develop several new products that were then being 
considered. 
 
Chang initially agreed to Leness's suggestion that a new 
business plan be considered.  After seeing the proposal, 
however, Chang believed that the plan was developed to further 
Leness's self-interest, and the proposal demonstrated that he 
was not loyal to the company.  Consequently, in December, 2007, 
EventMonitor notified Leness of his termination.  On December 5, 
2007, Chang informed Leness verbally that his employment was 
terminated "without cause," and sent him a copy of a written 
termination letter, via electronic mail, stating that 
EventMonitor was giving thirty days' notice.  As required by the 
employment contract, prior to the effective date of his 
9 
 
termination, Leness provided EventMonitor with information about 
client accounts and agreements, as well as a written explanation 
of the locations on the company computers where he had stored 
proprietary information. 
After Leness's departure, Chang hired a forensic expert to 
examine Leness's work-issued laptop computer.  The examination 
revealed that in early October, 2007, at approximately the same 
time that he submitted the proposal for restructuring 
EventMonitor, Leness paid for a one-year subscription to an on-
line data storage service through a company called Carbonite.  
Carbonite is a professional data storage service that encrypts 
information for purposes of security.  Using this subscription, 
Leness copied all of EventMonitor's files that had been on his 
laptop to Carbonite's data storage system.  The uploaded data 
included EventMonitor's "proprietary information," as defined by 
the contract, including information related to its customers, 
business documents, and financing.  Leness did not tell anyone 
at EventMonitor about the Carbonite account or the copying of 
EventMonitor's proprietary information to Carbonite's storage 
system.4  Indeed, Leness used his personal electronic mail 
                                                 
4 The judge found that Leness otherwise had "cooperated" 
with EventMonitor in his transition from the company, and had 
returned all company equipment, including a "complete set of his 
company files and data." 
10 
 
address, and his personal credit card, to pay for the Carbonite 
subscription.  Leness also downloaded a computer cleaning 
program to the company laptop in an effort to erase evidence of 
the Carbonite account from the laptop. 
When Chang learned of Leness's actions in copying 
EventMonitor's proprietary information to the Carbonite system, 
he retroactively changed Leness's termination to one "for 
cause."  As a result, in early February, 2008, EventMonitor 
stopped making the severance payments required under the 
contract for a termination "without cause."  EventMonitor also 
refused to pay Leness for his unused vacation time, which, under 
the terms of the contract, it was required to pay regardless of 
the type of termination.  Ultimately, Leness informed 
EventMonitor that he would file a claim in the Superior Court if 
his severance payments were not resumed by May 1, 2008.  On 
April 30, 2008, without having made any further payments, 
EventMonitor commenced this action. 
2.  Material breach of the employment agreement.  
EventMonitor argues that Leness committed a material breach of 
the employment agreement by violating section 6(b), which 
required him to maintain the confidentiality of EventMonitor's 
proprietary information and to return all such information, 
including all copies, upon termination. 
11 
 
A breach of a contract is a material breach when it 
involves "an essential and inducing feature of the contract."  
Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 470 
(1991), quoting Bucholz v. Green Bros., 272 Mass. 49, 52 (1930), 
S.C., 290 Mass. 350 (1935).  Whether a party has committed a 
material breach ordinarily is a question of fact.  See Cetrone 
v. Paul Livoli, Inc., 337 Mass. 607, 610 (1958); Coviello v. 
Richardson, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 603, 609 (2010); Prozinski v. 
Northeast Real Estate Servs., LLC, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 609.  
See also 23 Williston on Contracts § 63:3 at 440 (4th ed. 2002).  
But if "the evidence on the point is either undisputed or 
sufficiently lopsided . . . the court must intervene and address 
what is ordinarily a factual question as a question of law."  
See Teragram Corp. v. Marketwatch.com, Inc., 444 F.3d 1, 11 (1st 
Cir. 2006), quoting Gibson v. Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, 736 (1st 
Cir. 1994). 
Thus, we accept a trial judge's findings as to the 
materiality of a breach unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1402 (1996).  "We 
are not bound, however, by the judge's conclusions of law, and 
we must ensure that the judge's ultimate findings and 
conclusions are consistent with relevant legal standards."  
Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 510 
12 
 
(1996).  See Psy-Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697, 710 (2011), 
quoting Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 620-621 (1992) ("In 
reviewing a judge's decision after a jury-waived trial, 
'we . . . scrutinize without deference the legal standard which 
the judge applied to the facts'").  "If a judge's ultimate 
findings are inconsistent with the subsidiary findings, we must 
set them aside."  Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., supra.  
Here, the evidence fully supports the judge's findings, and 
there is no error in his determination, based on these findings, 
that Leness did not commit a material breach of the employment 
contract. 
The judge found that in copying EventMonitor's proprietary 
information to Carbonite's data storage system, not disclosing 
the upload to EventMonitor, and not returning the Carbonite 
files upon his termination from employment, Leness violated 
section 6(n) of the employment contract, in particular because 
he did not return all copies of EventMonitor's proprietary 
information.  Nonetheless, as the judge correctly concluded, 
Leness's failure to return the information, while a "variance 
from complete compliance" with the employment contract, did not 
affect an essential and inducing feature of the contract, and 
therefore was not a material breach. 
The judge found that there was no evidence that Leness had 
13 
 
used the information for any purpose, before or after his 
termination more than five years prior to the date of trial, or 
intentionally had disclosed it to anyone.  The judge stated 
further that, while he did not credit Leness's stated reasons 
for having placed a copy of EventMonitor's proprietary 
information on the Carbonite system (EventMonitor's purportedly 
inadequate backup procedures), he also rejected EventMonitor's 
suggestion that the copying had been done with a malicious 
intent.  Indeed, the judge stated that, given the circumstances 
and the state of the relationship between Leness and Chang in 
October, 2007, when the copies were made, Leness might well have 
wanted the copy in order to be able to demonstrate that he had 
not neglected his duties or acted deliberately to the detriment 
of EventMonitor's interests. 
The judge concluded that the essential purpose of 
section 6(b) is to protect the confidentiality of EventMonitor's 
proprietary information.  A breach of section 6(b) therefore 
becomes material if it undermines that confidentiality.  Because 
there was no evidence or indication that Leness had disclosed 
EventMonitor's confidential information, Leness's breach was not 
material. 
We observe that, while electronic copies of proprietary 
information placed on third-party storage devices potentially 
14 
 
could fall into the hands of competitors, or otherwise become 
public or be disclosed, as the judge found, there was no showing 
that such a result was likely to have, or had, occurred.  
Carbonite maintains its clients' information in a secure and 
encrypted manner, and its business model relies on its clients' 
confidence in this assurance.  EventMonitor did not suggest, let 
alone offer evidence to prove, that its information could more 
readily be compromised because it temporarily had been stored on 
Carbonite's servers.  Indeed, EventMonitor used similar data 
backup services, indicating that it did not view the use of such 
services as endangering the confidentiality of the information 
stored thereon.5 
In any event, the possibility of unintentional disclosure 
is not relevant under the terms of the employment contract.  As 
the judge found, Leness did not "knowingly disclose" or 
"knowingly use" any of EventMonitor's proprietary information.  
Accordingly, because Leness's breach did not endanger the 
confidentiality of EventMonitor's information, the breach was 
not material, and EventMonitor was not entitled to stop making 
severance payments.  See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC 
                                                 
5 We hasten to add that we make no determination regarding 
the level of security provided by Carbonite's systems, or the 
degree of risk that information a client stored there 
inadvertently might be disclosed to, or obtained by, a third 
party. 
15 
 
Assocs., 411 Mass. at 470; Lease-It, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port 
Auth., 33 Mass. App. Ct. 391, 396 (1992); 23 Williston on 
Contracts §  63:3 at 438. 
3.  Whether termination could be amended to one "for 
cause."  Having concluded that Leness did not commit a material 
breach of the employment contract, we turn to EventMonitor's 
argument that Leness's breach nonetheless provided adequate 
grounds for EventMonitor to have converted the termination to 
one for cause.  To support its decision to change the 
termination to one "for cause," EventMonitor asks that we adopt 
the after-acquired evidence doctrine that has been accepted in 
some other jurisdictions.  This doctrine allows an employer 
retroactively to characterize a termination as one for cause if 
the employer shows that:  (1) an employee had committed 
misconduct; (2) the employer learned of the misconduct only 
after the employee's termination from employment; and (3) had 
the employer known of the misconduct prior to the termination 
without cause, the employer instead would have discharged the 
employee for cause on that basis of that conduct.6  See McDill v. 
Environamics Corp., 144 N.H. 635, 640-641 (2000) (citation 
                                                 
6 The United States Supreme Court has prohibited application 
of the after-acquired evidence doctrine when a termination 
without cause has been found to have occurred for impermissible 
reasons, such as discrimination or retaliation.  See McKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 359-360 (1995). 
16 
 
omitted).  As noted, supra, we need not address this argument, 
as we conclude that the information about Leness's activities 
about which EventMonitor learned subsequent to his termination 
without cause would not have supported a decision to terminate 
him for cause. 
Under the terms of Leness's employment agreement, 
defalcation of company assets permitted a "termination for 
cause."7  EventMonitor argues that Leness's actions in uploading 
EventMonitor's proprietary information to the Carbonite data 
storage system constituted a defalcation of company assets, and 
that the judge erred in concluding that there was no 
defalcation. 
The interpretation of the meaning of a term in a contract 
is a question of law, Eigerman v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 450 Mass. 
281, 287 (2007), and thus we review the judge's determination de 
novo.  Trace Constr., Inc. v. Dana Barros Sports Complex, LLC, 
459 Mass. 346, 351 (2011).  "When the words of a contract are 
clear they alone determine the meaning of the contract . . . ."  
Merrimack Valley Nat'l Bank v. Baird, 372 Mass. 721, 723 (1977).  
                                                 
7 The contract provided that Leness could be terminated for 
cause for "wilful fraud or defalcation."  Leness argues that he 
could only be terminated for cause under this provision if a 
defalcation was wilful.  The judge was not required to, and did 
not make, a finding as to willfulness, however, because he found 
that Leness had not engaged in any defalcation. 
17 
 
A reviewing court considers extrinsic evidence only when a term 
in a contract is ambiguous.  See Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale 
Elec. Co. v. Danvers, 411 Mass. 39, 48 (1991). 
Relying in part on a detailed examination of Massachusetts 
appellate decisions,8 and the common meaning of the term "asset," 
the judge determined that "defalcation" within the meaning of 
the employment agreement did not include takings of nonmonetary 
assets.  The judge concluded also that, even if intangible 
assets had been subject to defalcation within the meaning of the 
contract, Leness's actions in uploading information to Carbonite 
did not deprive EventMonitor of the use or value of those 
assets, and that there was no evidence that he had disclosed, 
had intended to disclose, or had made use of the information for 
his own benefit or to the detriment of EventMonitor. 
We agree that there was no defalcation here.  Regardless of 
whether defalcation under Massachusetts law is limited solely to 
the taking of funds, in ordinary usage defalcation requires at 
least a temporary misuse or deprivation of the use or value of 
an asset,9 and the employment agreement does not otherwise define 
                                                 
8 Although EventMonitor is a Delaware corporation, its 
officers are in Boston, and the employment agreement specified 
that it was to be interpreted in accordance with Massachusetts 
law. 
 
9 See Black's Law Dictionary 506 (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
18 
 
the term. 
 The judge found, and the finding is supported by the 
evidence, that Leness did not misuse or deprive EventMonitor of 
its proprietary information.  Leness merely retained a copy of 
the information under circumstances that had no impact on 
EventMonitor's use of its proprietary information, or on the 
value of that information.  If Leness had disclosed or used the 
information, his actions might have allowed a competitor to 
offer a similar product without substantial development costs, 
reduced the standing of the company in the eyes of its clients, 
or provided a competitor with information about EventMonitor's 
customers, any one of which possibly could have resulted in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
defalcation as "fraudulent misappropriation of money held in 
trust; financial wrongdoing involving a breach of trust; 
embezzlement"); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 488 (3rd ed. 1992) (defining "defalcate" as to "misuse 
funds; embezzle"). 
 
Although no Massachusetts case has defined the term 
"defalcation" explicitly, where the term appears, it is used in 
accordance with its ordinary and plain meaning, that is, a 
misuse or deprivation of the use of an asset held in trust.  
See, e.g., Indeck v. Clients' Sec. Bd., 450 Mass. 379, 380-381 
(2008) ("defalcation" describes conduct of attorney who 
misappropriated client funds entrusted for investment); Buster 
v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. 635, 652 (2003) 
("defalcation" used to describe act of misappropriating 
entrusted property, depriving property owner of its use); Matter 
of Driscoll, 410 Mass. 695, 704 (1991) (Greaney, J., dissenting) 
("defalcation" used to describe conduct of attorney who used 
client funds to pay personal debts); Mickelson v. Barnet, 390 
Mass. 786, 790 (1984) ("defalcation" used to describe 
accountant's embezzlement of investors' funds). 
19 
 
loss of revenue.  Such loss did not occur here.  We need not 
decide whether actions that result in a loss of the exclusive 
use of proprietary information could have amounted to a 
"defalcation" within the meaning of the contract, because 
Leness's secure storage of a copy of the proprietary 
information, in the absence of any disclosure or use by anyone 
other than EventMonitor, did not undermine EventMonitor's 
exclusive use of its information. 
4.  Indemnification.  Leness argues that the judge erred in 
concluding that EventMonitor was not required to indemnify him 
for his costs incurred in defending against EventMonitor's 
claims.  Leness's argument that he is entitled to 
indemnification is not supported by the plain language of the 
contract.  The employment agreement's indemnity clause, 
section 10(h), states that EventMonitor must indemnify Leness if 
he 
"is made a party . . . to any . . . action, suit or 
proceeding . . . by reason of the fact that [Leness] is or 
was an employee, officer or director of [EventMonitor] 
. . . in which capacity [Leness] is or was serving at 
[EventMonitor's] request." 
 
Thus, under its plain language, the clause requires 
indemnification only if a claim is brought against Leness as a 
result of actions in his capacity as an employee, acting at 
EventMonitor's request.  Here, Leness was made a party to an 
20 
 
action only after EventMonitor discovered that he had uploaded 
its proprietary information to a third-party data storage 
service.  As the trial judge found, the filing of the lawsuit 
was a direct result of Leness's actions with respect to the 
Carbonite data storage subscription, undertaken in his personal 
capacity and not in his capacity as EventMonitor's employee. 
These findings are well supported in the record and are not 
clearly erroneous.  Leness's conduct in purchasing the 
subscription using a personal credit card and personal 
electronic mail account, uploading the information without 
advising anyone at EventMonitor of his actions or his purported 
reason for doing so (EventMonitor's supposedly inadequate backup 
procedures),10 and then attempting to erase all traces of the 
Carbonite subscription from his computer, supports the inference 
that use of the Carbonite data storage service was undertaken in 
Leness's personal capacity, rather than as an employee.  Leness 
also committed a breach of the employment contract by not 
returning or deleting the copy of EventMonitor's proprietary 
information stored on the Carbonite system before his employment 
ended.  EventMonitor was not required to indemnify Leness for 
                                                 
10 As noted, the judge rejected as not credible Leness's 
explanation that he used Carbonite because he was worried about 
the stability of EventMonitor's internal backup procedures, but 
concluded that the copying was not with malicious intent. 
21 
 
defending against a lawsuit resulting from actions that were not 
undertaken in his capacity as an employee. 
5.  Calculation of damages for violations of the wage act.  
General Laws c. 149, § 148, requires timely payment of wages, 
including payments due under the terms of an agreement for 
accrued but unused vacation time.  The judge determined that 
Leness was entitled to payment for 8.4 days of accrued and 
unused vacation.11  Neither party disputes the judge's 
calculation of the number of days at issue.  In his brief, 
however, Leness contends that the judge's calculation of damages 
for those days, in the amount of $4,732.10, trebled to 
$14,196.30 (as required by G. L. c. 149, § 150), is erroneous 
due to a mathematical error.  We agree that based on a daily 
rate of $673.08, the damages for 8.4 days of accrued vacation 
pay should have been $5,653.87, trebled to $16,961.62.12 
                                                 
11 The contract entitled Leness to fifteen vacation days per 
year, and to accrue unused vacation days. 
 
12 The judge stated that he derived the amount of damages by 
multiplying Leness's daily rate by 8.4 days, then trebling that 
amount.  The result he reached in the initial multiplication 
($4,732.10), however, is mathematically incorrect.  Dividing 
Leness's weekly rate of $3,365.38 by five results in a daily 
rate of $673.08.  Thus, the damages for 8.4 days at a rate of 
$673.08 per day should have been $5,653.87.  That the judge 
calculated a daily rate based on a five-day work week is evident 
from his finding that, in addition to his annual salary, Leness 
was entitled to severance pay of $10,096.15 for fifteen days of 
vacation benefits ($10,096.15 divided by fifteen equals 
22 
 
According to the Superior Court docket sheet, although, in 
2012, Leness's motion pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 59 (e), 365 
Mass. 827 (1974), to amend the judgment in order to add costs 
was allowed, Leness has not filed in the Superior Court a motion 
for relief from judgment for a clerical mistake, pursuant to 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (a), 365 Mass. 828 (1974) or mistake or 
inadvertence pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b).  Nonetheless, 
modification of a judgment to correct an inadvertent error of 
this type, in a mathematical calculation, is appropriately 
raised on appeal.  See Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co. v. 
Springfield, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 108, 113-114 (2000).  Leness is 
entitled to entry of an amended judgment to correct the 
mathematical miscalculation. 
6.  Conclusion.  The judgment is affirmed as to all claims 
and counterclaims other than the amount of damages awarded to 
the plaintiff-in-counterclaim under G. L. c. 149, § 148, of the 
wage act.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
entry of an amended award of damages on the wage act claim, 
consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
                                                                                                                                                             
$673.08).