Title: NORMAN HOWARD WENGER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

NORMAN HOWARD WENGER v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 121163 P.3d 824Case Number: No. 06-90Decided: 08/01/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
NORMAN 
HOWARD WENGER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan 
R. Roden, Senior Assistant Public Defender; Sylvia Lee Hackl, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  A jury convicted Norman Howard Wenger of 
one count of conspiring to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation and one 
count of aiding another person to engage in such an operation.  The trial court sentenced him to two 
concurrent prison sentences of two to eight years.  Mr. Wenger claims the trial court erred 
in failing to merge his convictions for sentencing purposes.  We reverse the judgment and sentence, 
but not for the reason advanced by Mr. Wenger.  Rather, we hold that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1059(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2007), the statute under which he was convicted, 
was intended to 
describe alternative means of committing the same offense and does not support 
separate convictions for each act constituting the offense.  We remand to the district court for 
entry of a judgment and sentence finding Mr. Wenger guilty of one count in 
violation of  § 
35-7-1059(a)(iv) and imposing one sentence.    

            

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  The determinative issue is whether the 
legislature intended § 35-7-1059(a)(iv), which prohibits conspiring with or 
aiding another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, to describe 
alternative means of committing one offense such that it supports only one 
conviction and one sentence.           

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  In December 2004, Mr. Wenger met Robert 
Holzheuser and allowed him to move into an apartment he was renting in 
Rawlins, Wyoming.  
On February 8, 2005, Mr. Wenger was at the apartment when Mr. Holzheuser 
and two companions arrived.  The 
four individuals smoked methamphetamine together.  

 
 
[¶4]  That same evening, Rawlins police 
officer William Hill was conducting surveillance on the apartment in connection 
with reports from two individuals that they had purchased methamphetamine from 
Mr. Wenger.  Officer Hill observed 
Keith Nulle drive up to the apartment, go inside for about ten minutes, and then 
drive away.  Officer Hill checked 
Mr. Nulle's driving record and learned that his license was suspended.  Officer Hill pulled Mr. Nulle over, 
placed him under arrest for driving under suspension, searched him and found 
methamphetamine inside a cigarette pack he was carrying.  

 
 
[¶5]  Based on the information that Mr. Wenger 
had sold methamphetamine to others and the methamphetamine found on Mr. Nulle 
after leaving Mr. Wenger's apartment, Officer Hill obtained a warrant to search 
the apartment.  He and five other 
law enforcement officers executed the warrant later that same night.  The officers knocked on the apartment 
door and, when no one responded, they broke down the door.  Upon entering the apartment, the 
officers found four people in the living room, including Mr. Wenger, and 
arrested them.  The officers also 
found methamphetamine, a mini torch, pipes, a car battery with the caps off 
hooked to a charger, a bottle of acetone, and other material associated with the 
manufacture of methamphetamine.  
Additionally, the officers noticed a strong chemical smell in the 
apartment.    

 
 
[¶6]  Detective Mike Picerno was called to the 
scene.  After inspecting the 
apartment, Detective Picerno was concerned it was being used as a 
methamphetamine manufacturing laboratory.  
He contacted the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), the 
agency trained and experienced in working with clandestine laboratories.  Because of safety concerns, Detective 
Picerno removed everyone from the premises and secured the apartment.  He interviewed Mr. Wenger, who indicated 
the items found in the apartment belonged to Mr. Holzheuser.  Mr. Wenger also stated that he used 
methamphetamine supplied to him by Mr. Holzheuser in exchange for use of the 
apartment.  He also stated that he, 
Mr. Holzheuser and the other two individuals had smoked methamphetamine that 
evening before the police arrived.  
Subsequent searches of the apartment revealed more items associated with 
the manufacture of methamphetamine.

 
 
[¶7]  Mr. Wenger was charged with one count of 
conspiring with another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation in 
violation of § 35-7-1059(a)(iv) and a second count of aiding another to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation in violation of the same statute.  After a two day trial, a jury found Mr. 
Wenger guilty on both counts.  The 
district court sentenced Mr. Wenger to a term of two to eight years in the state 
penitentiary on the conspiracy conviction and a term of two to eight years on 
the aiding conviction with the two terms to be served concurrently.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]  Mr. Wenger claims that the district 
court's failure to merge his convictions at sentencing violated his right to be 
free from double jeopardy because the effect of the sentence is to punish him 
twice for a single offense.   
The State responds that Mr. Wenger was convicted of two separate and 
distinct offenses and the district court properly declined to merge the 
sentences.  Neither party addresses 
the issue we find determinative:  
Whether the legislature intended the statute to describe alternative 
means of committing a single offense supporting a single conviction and 
sentence, or whether the legislature instead intended to punish each act 
described in the statute separately, permitting separate convictions and 
sentences.   

 
 
[¶9]  The statute which was the basis for both 
of Mr. Wenger's convictions provides: 

 
 

(a)   It is 
unlawful for any person to knowingly or  intentionally:

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
(iv) 
Conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation.  

 
 
Section 
35-7-1059(a)(iv).  The jury was 
instructed that in order to find Mr. Wenger guilty of the act of conspiracy 
described in the statute, the State had to prove each of the following elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt:

 
 

1.      
On or 
about the 9th day of February, 2005

2.      
In 
Carbon County, Wyoming

3.      
The 
Defendant, Norman Howard Wenger

4.      
Knowingly 
and intentionally agreed with one or more persons

5.      
That 
they or one of them would commit the crime of engaging in a clandestine 
laboratory operation;

6.      
One or 
more of them did an overt act in Carbon 
County, Wyoming, to 
effect the objective of the agreement.

 
 
The jury 
was further instructed that to find Mr. Wenger guilty of the act of aiding 
described in the statute the State had to prove each of the following elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 

 
 

1.      
On or 
about the 9th day of February, 
2005

2.      
In 
Carbon County, Wyoming

3.      
The 
Defendant, Norman Howard Wenger

4.      
Did 
knowingly or intentionally aid another

5.      
To 
engage in a clandestine laboratory operation.

      

The jury 
found Mr. Wenger guilty of both acts described in the statute.  The district court entered a judgment 
and sentence on the verdict, adjudging Mr. Wenger guilty of one count of 
conspiring with another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation and a 
separate count of aiding another to engage in such an operation and sentencing 
him to two concurrent terms of imprisonment.

 
 
[¶10]  In Duffy v. State, 789 P.2d 821, 825 
(Wyo. 1990) 
(citations omitted), the Court said: 

 
 
The rule 
that we have espoused for resolving the question of whether a defendant has been 
twice placed in jeopardy by virtue of multiple convictions and sentences is to 
look to the intention of the legislature with respect to whether the conduct 
should be punished as a single offense or as more than one. 

 
 
 * * *  

 
 
In 
determining the question of legislative intent, we have examined statutory 
definitions, and we also have evaluated the other circumstance[s] surrounding 
the crimes charged, whether they grow out of different transactions or different 
evidence is required to establish the separate offenses.  

 
 
[¶11]  The 
Duffy 
Court noted specifically:

 
 
If it is 
clear that the legislature intended alternative means of committing a single 
offense, only one conviction can be attained even though different evidence 
would be required to demonstrate the alternative means of committing the 
offense.   

 
 

Id. fn. 4 
(citations omitted).  Later in the 
opinion, the Court reiterated:

 
 
[W]hen 
we have determined that the intention was to create only a single continuing 
offense or to describe alternative means of committing the same offense, the 
State may not structure multiple violations even though some separate evidence 
might support the several charges.

 
 

Id. at 
826.

 
 
            
In those instances in which the language and purpose of the statute 
indicate a legislative intent to structure a single offense with alternative 
methods specified by which the statute may be violated, any violation of the 
statute is a single offense.  
According to the general rule, this is the result even if the evidence 
demonstrates that the statute has been violated in both of the alternative ways 
and, in such an instance, only one conviction can be 
sustained.

 
 

Id. at 827. 

 
 
[¶12]  The first step in our inquiry, 
therefore, is to determine the legislature's intent in enacting § 
35-7-1059(a)(iv).  In making that 
determination, we begin with the plain wording of the statute.  Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 567 
(Wyo. 1989). 
 Section 35-7-1059(a)(iv) contains 
no express statement that the legislature intended a single punishment for 
conspiring with or aiding another in the operation of a clandestine laboratory. 
However, the rules of statutory construction help us to ascertain the 
legislature's intent.

 
 
[¶13]  In Nowack, we said when the legislature 
creates two distinct offenses the presumption is that it intends to permit 
cumulative sentences.  Id. at 567.  Thus, in Nowack, where there were two separate 
offensescausing serious bodily injury to another while driving under the 
influence in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(a) and (g) (Michie 1977), 
and aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(i) (Michie 1977)with separate penalty provisions contained in 
separate titles of the statutes, we concluded the legislature intended to permit 
cumulative sentences.  Here, we have 
one offense with one penalty provision that is contained in a single title of 
the statutes.  

 
 
[¶14]  We also look for guidance in the 
purposes of the statutes.  "Where 
independent but overlapping statutes are directed to separate evils, cumulative 
punishments are intended."  Nowack, 774 P.2d  at 567.  In Nowack, we concluded both statutes were 
directed toward the prevention of bodily injury; however, one statute protected 
against drunken drivers while the other protected against outrageous conduct, 
regardless of the actor's state of sobriety.  We concluded those were sufficiently 
separate purposes to trigger the inference of legislative intent to authorize 
cumulative punishments.

 
 
[¶15]  The purpose of the statute at issue here 
is to prevent the operation of clandestine laboratories which pose a danger to 
human safety. The acts prohibited by the statuteconspiring with or aiding 
another to engage in such an operationwould seem to be directed at preventing 
the same harm and are not sufficiently distinguishable to indicate the 
legislature intended to create separate offenses or authorize separate 
punishments. 

 
 
[¶16]  Legislative history is another source 
from which intent may be inferred.  
Id.  In Nowack, we found no direct legislative 
history concerning the relationship between the two statutes, but concluded from 
the legislature's response to the problems caused by drunk driving that it 
intended to create two separate offenses with two separate punishments.  There is no question that the operation 
of clandestine laboratories is a serious offense which the legislature has taken 
significant steps to prohibit.  
However, keeping in mind that cumulative 
punishment is not authorized without a clear indication of legislative 
intent, Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1352 (Wyo. 1992), we conclude that the legislature intended § 
35-7-1059(a)(iv) to describe alternative means of committing a single offense 
supporting a single conviction and sentence.  

 
 
[¶17]  Our holding is consistent with those of 
other courts that have addressed statutes describing alternative means of 
committing an offense.  In Commonwealth v. Lopez, 663 A.2d 746 
(Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1995), for 
example, the court considered 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a), which criminalized the act 
of committing arson in a manner that places another in danger.  The Court said:  

 
 
[T]he 
word "or," used in its ordinary sense, indicates an alternative between two or 
more unlike actions. Applying that definition to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a), we read 
the statute to mean that any person who either "recklessly places another person 
in danger of death or bodily injury" or "commits the act with the purpose of 
destroying or damaging an inhabited building or occupied structure of another" 
may be prosecuted for and convicted of committing arson endangering persons. 
However, it simply does not follow from this reading that a person who commits 
both of the above acts may be sentenced twice for arson endangering persons when 
only one criminal offense, i.e., starting one fire, has been committed. Not only 
does such a reading ignore the plain meaning of the word "or," but if applied 
could raise grave constitutional issues. See Commonwealth v. Bostic, 500 Pa. 345, 
456 A.2d 1320 (1983) (intent of double jeopardy clause is to prevent courts from 
imposing more than one punishment under particular legislative enactment); Commonwealth v. Ayala, 492 Pa. 418, 424 A.2d 1260 (1981) (where, practically speaking, there was only one offense 
against Commonwealth, defendant may only be punished for one offense, despite 
number of chargeable offenses arising out of single transaction); Commonwealth v. Williams, 344 Pa. Super. 
108, 496 A.2d 31 (1985).

 
 
[¶18]  Similarly, in U.S. v. Levine, 750 F. Supp. 1433 (D. Col. 
1990), the court concluded that the defendants were properly charged in a single 
count with a conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit offenses 
against the United States, alternative language found in 18 USCS § 371.  The court stated:

 
 
"[I]t 
would be strange to infer that Congress intended to punish twice a conspiracy 
that violates both clauses. Where a single conspiracy statute prohibits 
alternative acts, courts should not infer the legislature's intent to impose 
multiple punishment.  The clause 
defraud the United 
States' merely expands the scope of the offense 
by including another object of a conspiracy that might not otherwise be covered 
by the clause any offense.'" 

 
 
Furthermore, 
§ 371 creates a single offense but specifies alternative means to commit the 
offense. 

 
 
[¶19]  We reverse and remand for imposition of 
judgment finding Mr. Wenger guilty of one count in violation of the statute and 
sentencing him to one term of imprisonment.