Title: CIRO PAOLO FORMISANO v. GABE GASTON

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CIRO PAOLO FORMISANO v. GABE GASTON2011 WY 8Case Number: S-1-0138Decided: 01/20/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
CIRO 
PAOLO FORMISANO,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
GABE 
GASTON,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

C. 
John Cotton of Cotton Law Office, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Rebecca 
A. Lewis of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a summary judgment granted to the defendant in a worker's compensation 
co-employee liability suit.  We 
affirm because there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      When viewed in 
the light most favorable to the appellant (Formisano), would the undisputed 
facts of this case allow a reasonable jury to find that the appellee (Gaston) 
intentionally acted to cause physical harm or injury to Formisano, as that 
concept is defined under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) (LexisNexis 
2009)?

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶3]      Motions for 
summary judgment come before the trial court pursuant to W.R.C.P. 56(c) which 
provides that

 
 
[t]he 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
We 
review the granting of summary judgment under the following 
standard:

 
 
On 
appeal, this Court evaluates the propriety of a district court's summary 
judgment ruling by examining the same materials and following the same standards 
as the district court.  We examine 
the record de novo in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 
giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be fairly 
drawn from the record.  If upon 
review of the record, doubt exists about the presence of genuine issues of 
material fact, we resolve that doubt against the party seeking summary 
judgment.  We review questions of 
law de novo without giving any deference to the district court's 
determinations.  If we can uphold 
summary judgment on any proper legal basis appearing in the record, we 
will.

 
 

Heimer 
v. Antelope Valley Improvement, 
2010 WY 29, ¶ 14, 226 P.3d 860, 863 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Wagner v. Reuter, 2009 WY 75, ¶ 11, 208 P.3d 1317, 1321-22 (Wyo. 2009)) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶4]      "The party moving 
for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of 
material fact exist and that [it] is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law."  Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light 
Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Wyo. 1989).  
A material fact is a fact that "if proved, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the claim or defense asserted 
by the parties."  Id.  
If the party seeking summary judgment meets his or her "initial 
burden of establishing a prima facie 
case for summary judgment[,] the party who is opposing the motion for 
summary judgment must present specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue 
of material fact exists.'"  Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 WY 151, 
¶ 9, 148 P.3d 8, 12 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
            
"After a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, 
the opposing party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial 
showing there are genuine issues of material fact.  The opposing party must affirmatively 
set forth material, specific facts in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment, and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings . . ., and 
conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing 
party's burden."

 
 
            
The evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment 
"must be competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be 
entirely eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere 
conjecture or wishful speculation."  
Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or 
even probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material 
fact.

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 9, at 12-13 (quoting Cook v. 
Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 886, 890 (Wyo. 
2006)).

 
 
[¶5]      Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo, without affording deference to 
the district court's determination.  
State ex rel. Wyo. Dep't of 
Revenue v. Hanover Compression, LP, 2008 WY 138, ¶ 8, 196 P.3d 781, 784 
(Wyo. 2008); Union Pac. Res. Co. v. 
Dolenc, 2004 WY 36, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
  
 
 
WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 27-14-104(a) (LEXISNEXIS 2009)

 
 
[¶6]      The statutory 
language at issue in this case is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a), which 
is part of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act:

 
 

            
(a)  The rights and remedies 
provided in this act for an employee including any joint employee, and his 
dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of 
all other rights and remedies against any employer and any joint employer making 
contributions required by this act, or their employees acting within the scope 
of their employment unless 
the employees intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the injured 
employee, 
but do not supersede any rights and remedies available to an employee and his 
dependents against any other person.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶7]      At the time of 
the accident giving rise to this lawsuit, Formisano and Gaston were both 
employed by Western Mine Services, Inc. (Western).  They lived in Gillette, Wyoming.  Formisano, originally from Italy, had 
limited English language skills.  He 
had been in America since 1993, but had worked for Western for less than a 
year.  Gaston, on the other hand, 
although younger than Formisano, was a native of Gillette and had worked for 
Western for about two years.

 
 
[¶8]      Formisano and 
Gaston were on the same work crew, although several crew members, including the 
crew leader, had quit, leaving the crew shorthanded.  Because Gaston had more job tenure than 
did Formisano, Gaston took on some of the crew leader's duties.  Gaston drove the crew's work truck, he 
had the company credit card to purchase gas, and he communicated for the crew 
with company supervisors and work-site supervisors.

 
 
[¶9]      On January 26, 
2005, Formisano and Gaston were sent to the North Antelope Mine south of 
Gillette to work on a truck bed needing repairs.  Gaston got up between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. 
in order to be at the company shop at 5:00 a.m.  Gaston and Formisano left the shop at 
about 5:00 a.m., with Gaston driving the company truck.  Gaston stopped to fuel the vehicle, 
using a company credit card, and then drove to the mine, arriving at about 7:00 
a.m.

 
 
[¶10]   When the two men arrived at the 
mine, Gaston went into the shop, located the mine supervisor, and discussed with 
him the work that needed to be done.  
Gaston then returned to the company truck, where he and Formisano waited 
for the mine truck, which was in a wash bay.  They did not begin working on the truck 
bed until about noon.

 
 
[¶11]   Around 4:00 p.m., Gaston left 
Formisano working on the truck bed and went to call Western for further work 
instructions.  It was normal 
procedure to "call in" at about that time each day to find out the next day's 
assignment.  Formisano testified in 
his deposition that Gaston reported after the call that they needed to finish 
the truck bed repair, no matter how long it took, and that they both had to 
report to work at 5:00 a.m. the next day.  A Western employee testified, to the 
contrary, that Gaston said during the telephone call that Western need not send 
out a night shift crew to finish the truck bed because the work would be done by 
the 7:00 p.m. shift change, or shortly thereafter.1

 
 
[¶12]   Formisano and Gaston finished the 
repair work and headed back to Gillette at about midnight with Gaston 
driving.  Formisano testified that 
they both were "pretty tired," that Gaston looked "pretty white," that Formisano 
told Gaston he did not look well, but that Gaston replied "I'm okay."  At about 1:00 a.m., Gaston fell asleep, 
and the vehicle drifted off the roadway, rolling one-and-a-half times after 
Gaston "overcorrected."  Gaston 
later told Western personnel that he began "nodding off," so he opened the 
window to help himself stay awake, but that he fell asleep and "went into the 
ditch."  Formisano suffered several 
herniated discs in the accident.

 
 
[¶13]   In the week before the accident, 
Gaston was off work on January 20, worked 12 hours on January 21, worked 12 
hours on January 22, was off work on January 23, worked 15 hours on January 24, 
and worked 14 hours on January 25, for a total of 53 hours.  By comparison, Formisano worked 12 hours 
on January 20, 12 hours on January 21, was off work on January 22, was off work 
on January 23, worked 12 hours on January 24, and worked 12 hours on January 25, 
for a total of 48 hours.  Both men 
were "on the clock" from 7:00 a.m. on January 26 until the accident at 1:00 a.m. 
on January 27, which is 18 hours, but neither apparently actually worked between 
about 7:00 a.m. and noon.

 
 
[¶14]   Several Western employees were 
deposed, all of whom testified that Gaston violated company policy by driving 
when he was too tired to do so safely.  
They also testified that Gaston could have called in for night shift 
replacements at 7:00 p.m., or, after the job was finished, he could have called 
in to have someone drive them to Gillette, or he could have obtained permission 
to stay in a motel in Wright, near the mine.

 
 
  
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶15]   To 
place this case in its appropriate legal context, we will reiterate a bit of 
legal history.  To begin, we note 
the well-known proposition that the "rights and remedies" of the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act are "in lieu of" any other rights and remedies a 
covered employee injured "on the job" may have against his or her employer. 
 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-104(a).  That immunity extends 
to co-employees who may have acted to cause the harm, so long as such 
co-employees did not "intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury to the 
injured employee . . . ."  Id.  At its most basic level, the statute 
says that one employee is not liable to another if the former is only 
negligent.

 
 
There 
are four elements to a negligence cause of action: (1) the defendant owed the 
plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care; (2) the defendant 
breached the duty of care; (3) the defendant's breach of the duty of care 
proximately caused injury to the plaintiff; and (4) the injury sustained by the 
plaintiff is compensable by money damages.

 
 

Frost 
v. Allred, 
2006 WY 155, ¶ 8, 148 P.3d 17, 19 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Downtown Auto Parts, Inc. v. Toner, 2004 
WY 67, ¶ 8, 91 P.3d 917, 919 (Wyo. 2004)).

 
 
[¶16]   This definition tells us when a 
co-employee is not liablehe is not liable if he is merely negligent.  The trouble this Court has repeatedly 
faced over the years has been trying to draw the linesomewhere beyond 
negligencethat results in liability.2  In Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, ¶ 
15, 67 P.3d 627, 632 (Wyo. 2003), we relied upon dicta from Harbel v. Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 363 
(Wyo. 1994), to equate the current phrase "intentionally act to cause physical 
harm or injury" with the phrase "willful and wanton 
misconduct":

 
 
This 
discussion implies that the amended standard of "intentionally act to cause 
physical harm or injury" equates to willful and wanton misconduct.  We continue to believe the concept of 
willful and wanton misconduct has essentially the same legal effect as the 
statutory language "intentionally act to cause physical harm or injury."  Well before the 1993 amendment to § 
27-14-104(a), this court expressly defined willful and wanton misconduct in 
terms of intentional actions:

 
 

            
Willful and wanton misconduct is the intentional 
doing of an act, or an intentional 
failure 
to do an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences and under circumstances 
and conditions that a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know that 
such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in harm to 
another.

 
 

Weaver 
v. Mitchell, 
715 P.2d 1361, 1370 (Wyo. 1986) (emphasis added); see also Mayflower Restaurant Company v. 
Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 1987).  

 
 
[¶17]   In Bertagnolli, we went on to 
describe

 
 
the 
key factors in finding co-employee liability under § 27-14-104(a) are a 
co-employee with (1) knowledge of the hazard or serious nature of the risk 
involved, (2) responsibility for the injured employee's safety and work 
conditions, and (3) willful disregard of the need to act despite the awareness 
of the high probability that serious injury or death may 
result.

 
 
2003 
WY 50, ¶ 16, 67 P.3d  at 633 n.2.  We 
then cited Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712 (Wyo. 1995), as requiring that "the co-employee's actions must be 
willful and not merely inadvertent in nature."  Bertagnolli, 2003 WY 50, ¶ 17, 67 P.3d  
at 633.  A plaintiff must prove that 
a defendant "acted with a state of mind approaching intent to do harm or 
committed an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of known or obvious 
risks so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow."  Id. at ¶ 17, at 633 (citing Smith, 893 P.2d at 
714).

 
 
[¶18]   In Bertagnolli, we reversed a summary 
judgment that had been awarded to the defendant co-employee supervisors because 
the district court failed to address the evidence that created genuine issues of 
material fact as to the supervisors' knowledge of the general risks involved in 
the employee's work.  2003 WY 50, ¶ 
26, 67 P.3d  at 635.  Five years 
later, in Hannifan v. American National 
Bank of Cheyenne, 2008 WY 65, ¶ 42, 185 P.3d 679, 695 (Wyo. 2008), we relied 
upon Bertagnolli in affirming a jury 
verdict in favor of a co-employee plaintiff, finding that the instructions 
adequately instructed the jury on the law as to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-104(a).  While recognizing Bertagnolli's declaration that the 
phrase "acted intentionally to cause physical harm or injury" has the same legal 
effect as "willful and wanton misconduct," and while concluding that the 
instructions as given adequately made that point, we suggested that a clearer 
instruction in that regard would aid the jury:

 
 
A 
more simple and direct approach to the instructions could have been more helpful 
to the jury in considering these complex issues.  We would suggest that district courts 
and litigants in the future consider one instruction such 
as:

 
 
A 
co-employee is liable to another co-employee if the employee acts intentionally 
to cause physical harm or injury.  
To act intentionally to cause physical injury is to act with willful and 
wanton misconduct.  Willful and 
wanton misconduct is the intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure 
to do an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences and under circumstances 
and conditions that a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know, that 
such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in harm to 
another.  In the context of 
co-employee liability, willful and wanton misconduct requires the co-employee to 
have 1) actual knowledge of the hazard or serious nature of the risk involved; 
2) direct responsibility for the injured employee's safety and work conditions; 
and 3) willful disregard of the need to act despite the awareness of the high 
probability that serious injury or death may result.

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 34 n.2, 185 P.3d  at 692 n.2.  
We continue to endorse such an instruction.

 
 
[¶19]   In our most recent foray into this 
arena, we affirmed a summary judgment granted to a co-employee supervisory 
defendant where the plaintiff was injured in a mining accident.  Loredo v. Solvay Am., Inc., 2009 WY 93, 
¶¶ 16-18, 212 P.3d 614, 626-29 (Wyo. 2009).  In affirming the summary judgment, we 
quoted at length from the district court's decision letter, which relied heavily 
upon Bertagnolli, and which also made 
the necessary distinction between simple negligence and the "state of mind that 
approaches intent to do harm" required by the statute.  Id. at ¶ 17, 212 P.3d at 627-28; see also McKennan v. Newman, 902 P.2d 1285, 1287-88 (Wyo. 1995) (co-employee's violation of company safety policies 
and OSHA regulations showed only ordinary negligence); Smith, 893 P.2d  at 714 (aggravating 
factor that elevates ordinary negligence to willful and wanton misconduct is 
"state of mind that approaches intent to do harm"); and Cockburn v. Terra Res., Inc., 794 P.2d 1334, 1344 (Wyo. 1990) (supervisor's knowledge of hazardous condition, coupled 
with failure to correct it, shows ordinary negligence, but not culpable 
negligence (decided under old statute)).  
In concluding in Loredo that 
the defendant did not act "willfully, wantonly, or intentionally," we quoted the 
following from the district court's decision letter:

 
 
Willful 
misconduct does not arise merely from "a thoughtless, heedless or inadvertent 
act, or an error in judgment," it is "more than mere mistake resulting from 
inexperience, excitement or confusion . . . or simple inattention," but it is 
"an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of 
danger is apparent."  Smith, 893 P.2d  at 714 (citations and 
quotations omitted).

 
 

Loredo, 
2009 WY 93, ¶ 17, 212 P.3d  at 
627-28.

 
 
[¶20]   The district court issued a 
three-page decision letter in this case in which it analyzed Bertagnolli and Hannifan, and then granted summary 
judgment to Gaston on the following basis:

 
 
            
The court finds that, even assuming all of the facts are as Plaintiff 
alleges, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment because the standard under 
the Worker's Compensation statutes requires conduct beyond what occurred 
here.  Driving while tired is simply 
not the kind of conduct envisioned in the exception to the statutory grant of 
immunity from liability of the Worker's Compensation provisions.  Logic would indicate that Mr. Gaston 
would not have placed himself in the vehicle with Mr. Formisano and driven if he 
had known, with a "high degree of probability," that harm would result.  There is no genuine issue of material 
fact that would permit a jury to find that Defendant's conduct was of a type 
"approaching intent to do harm."

 
 
[¶21]   Perhaps realizing that "falling 
asleep at the wheel," on its face, simply does not reach the high standard of 
misconduct required for co-employee liability under the statute, Formisano 
broadens his accusations in two particulars.  First, he describes several events 
during the work day prior to the accident in which Gaston treated Formisano 
rudely, or Gaston allegedly was untruthful while speaking with Formisano or 
Western supervisors.  Formisano 
speculates that Gaston purposefully misled the supervisors so that he could work 
late to obtain overtime pay.

 
 
[¶22]   Formisano's second appellate theme 
is that Gaston did not just fall asleep while driving; rather, Gaston 
intentionally drove while "sleep deprived."  In support of his theory that driving 
while sleep deprived is misconduct that "approaches intent to do harm," 
Formisano relies upon four cases.  
In Cummings v. ConGlobal 
Indus., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81967, at *2-3 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 14, 2008), an 
unreported case, the trial court denied summary judgment to a driver's employer 
on the issue of punitive damages where the allegations were that the driver: (1) 
was sleep-deprived, having slept only five-and-a-half hours in three days; (2) 
was speeding; (3) was recently cited for other traffic violations; (4) had 
"doctored" his driver's log to show compliance with sleep regulations; and (5) 
was transporting an unauthorized passenger.

 
 
[¶23]   The next case cited by Formisano is 
Meus v. State of Florida, 968 So. 2d 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2007), a vehicular homicide case apparently 
based upon sleep deprivation, where the court remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The evidence was that Meus had been 
driving for almost ten hours in a twenty-four hour period.  Id. at 709.  The underlying issue was counsel's 
alleged failure to interview and call as a witness a "first responder" who was 
of the opinion that the crash was not caused by Meus having fallen asleep.  Id. at 711.

 
 
[¶24]   In DeMatteo v. Simon, 812 P.2d 361 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1991), the Court of Appeals of New Mexico upheld a jury award of 
punitive damages under the following circumstances:

 
 
Evidence 
that DeMatteo drove three to four hours the day before the accident, slept about 
five hours in his car, remained awake for the next twenty hours immediately 
prior to the accident, and then consumed marijuana shortly before the accident 
allowed the jury to conclude that punitive damages were warranted because 
DeMatteo displayed an utter indifference for the safety of others when he 
decided to drive.

 
 

Id. 
at 364.

 
 

[¶25]   Finally, Formisano relies upon Glover v. Transcor America, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Wyo. 1999), where the district court denied summary judgment 
to a driver's employer on the theories of negligent supervision and punitive 
damages.  Significantly, however, 
these causes of action were allowed  to survive against 
the company 
because of its policy that allowed drivers to be in the vehicle for up to 24 
hours with only short breaks, and because of its deliberate decision not to 
equip its prisoner-transport van with seat belts.  Id. at 1249.  As to the driver, the court came to this 
contrary conclusion:

 
 
            
The court finds that there is no basis for the imposition of punitive 
damages against defendant based on the acts of its employee Mr. Dufer.  It is undisputed that the van was not 
equipped with seat belts and therefore it was not Mr. Dufer's actions or 
inactions that resulted in plaintiff not wearing a seat belt.  Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Dufer was 
negligent in falling asleep.  Under 
these circumstances, punitive damages are not appropriate for the imposition of 
punitive damages based upon Mr. Dufer's alleged actions. Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo. 1987) ("Punitive damages are not appropriate in 
circumstances involving inattention, inadvertence, thoughtlessness, mistake, or 
even gross negligence.").

 
 

Id. 
at 1250 (some citations omitted).

 
 
[¶26]   Applying these principles to the 
facts of the present case, we are convinced that the district court got it 
right.  Being tired, but "feeling 
okay," Gaston got in the driver's seat after a long day's work, intending to 
drive home to Gillette, less than two hours away.  Even assuming that some of the late 
hours of work could have been avoided by Gaston, we do not see this conduct as 
meeting the test for co-employee liability under the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act.  While there 
certainly was some possibility of Gaston falling asleep and causing an accident, 
we cannot say that Gaston intentionally acted to cause physical harm to 
Formisano, or that these circumstances were such "that a reasonable person would 
know, or have reason to know, that such conduct would, in a high degree of 
probability, result in harm to another."

 
 
[¶27]   A good portion of Formisano's 
effort in the district court, and in this Court, was directed at presenting 
Gaston as a "bad guy" who treated Formisano poorly.  Formisano also went to great lengths to 
show that Gaston was, in effect, Formisano's supervisor.  Assuming that both assertions are true 
does not change the resolution of this case.  There is no causal relationship between 
Gaston's attitude toward Formisano during the day and the accident in the middle 
of the night.  Also, Gaston admits 
that, as driver of the vehicle, he owed Formisano a duty of due care, whether or 
not he was Formisano's supervisor.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶28]   There are no genuine issues of 
material fact and Gaston is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Gaston's admitted negligence in falling 
asleep while driving simply does not rise to the level of misconduct envisioned 
by the exception to immunity in the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act.

 
 
[¶29]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1When 
working at Western's own shop, employees worked 10-hour shifts, but when working 
at a mine, they generally worked 12-hour shifts, 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., with 
travel time added to that.  It was 
not unusual for a job at a mine to go an hour or two beyond shift 
change.

2Over 
the years, the legislature has described this civil mens rea alternatively as "gross 
negligence," "culpable negligence," and now "intentionally act to cause physical 
harm or injury."  See Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 
50, ¶¶ 12-15, 67 P.3d 627, 631-33 (Wyo. 2003).