Title: State v. Braunschweig

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 113 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1261-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Justin A. Braunschweig, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 380 Wis. 2d 511, 913 N.W.2d 516  
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 21, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 12, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
Randy R. Koschnick 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by 
Michael C. Witt and 
Criminal Defense & Civil 
Litigation, LLC, Jefferson.  There was an oral argument by 
Michael C. Witt. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Sopen B. Shah, deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief 
was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Ryan J. Walsh, chief 
deputy solicitor general. There was an oral argument by Sopen B. 
Shah.
 
 
2018 WI 113
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2017AP1261-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2016CT412) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Justin A. Braunschweig, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 21, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 State v. Justin A. 
Braunschweig, No. 2017AP1261-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Feb. 1, 2018), affirming the Jefferson County circuit 
court's2 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
of 
defendant 
Justin A. 
                                                 
1 This appeal was decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 752.31(2)(f) (2015-16).  All subsequent references to 
the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-16 version unless 
otherwise indicated. 
2 The Honorable Randy R. Koschnick presided. 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
2 
 
Braunschweig ("Braunschweig") for Operating While Intoxicated 
("OWI") as a second offense.3  
¶2 
The court is now presented with two overriding issues.  
First, we consider whether a prior expunged OWI conviction 
constitutes a prior conviction under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1), 
when determining the penalty for OWI-related offenses.4  We 
conclude that a prior expunged OWI conviction must be counted 
under § 343.307(1).   
¶3 
Second, we consider the State's burden of proving the 
prior OWI conviction in second offense OWI-related offenses.  We 
conclude that the State must prove this prior OWI conviction, 
which is not here an element of the offense charged, by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Thus, we affirm the court of 
appeals.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
In 2011 Braunschweig was convicted of injuring another 
person by operation of a vehicle while intoxicated, contrary to 
                                                 
3 Braunschweig was convicted of both an OWI count and a 
prohibited alcohol concentration ("PAC") count, each as a second 
offense, and the court imposed sentence on only the OWI second 
offense count pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(c). 
4 "OWI-related offenses" have been referred to as "drunk 
driving" offenses in prior opinions by this court.  See, e.g., 
State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3, ¶¶1-2, 373 Wis. 2d 1, 889 N.W.2d 423.  
Here, "OWI-related offenses" concerns those offenses referenced 
above in footnote 3.  In prior opinions, this court has 
sometimes 
referred 
to 
these 
offenses 
as 
"drunk 
driving" 
offenses.   
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(2)(a)1. (2011-12)5 ("2011 conviction").  It 
is undisputed that the Jackson County circuit court ordered 
expunction of Braunschweig's 2011 conviction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015, the Expunction Statute.6  The propriety of that 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63 (2011-12), "Operating under 
influence of intoxicant or other drug," in relevant part, 
provided: 
(2)  (a)  It is unlawful for any person to cause 
injury to another person by the operation of a vehicle 
while: 
1.  Under the influence of an intoxicant, a 
controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or 
any 
combination 
of 
an 
intoxicant, 
a 
controlled 
substance and a controlled substance analog, under the 
influence of any other drug to a degree which renders 
him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the 
combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug 
to a degree which renders him or her incapable of 
safely driving. 
§ 346.63(2)(a)1. (2011-12). 
6  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.015 provides, in relevant part:  
[W]hen a person is under the age of 25 at the time of 
the commission of an offense for which the person has 
been found guilty in a court for violation of a law 
for which the maximum period of imprisonment is 6 
years or less, the court may order at the time of 
sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful 
completion of the sentence if the court determines the 
person will benefit and society will not be harmed by 
this disposition.  This subsection does not apply to 
information 
maintained 
by 
the 
department 
of 
transportation regarding a conviction that is required 
to be included in a record kept under s. 343.23(2)(a). 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
4 
 
decision——to order expunction——is not at issue in this case.  
Rather, this court is called upon to consider whether an 
expunged conviction is considered a predicate offense and what 
burden of proof must the State meet to establish this prior 
offense.   
¶5 
On September 2, 2016, nearly five years after his 2011 
conviction, 
Braunschweig 
was 
arrested 
for 
driving 
while 
intoxicated with a PAC of .16.  Braunschweig was subsequently 
charged with criminal misdemeanor offenses: one count of OWI, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a), and one count of 
operating with a PAC, contrary to § 346.63(1)(b), both as second 
offenses, see Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)2.  The State relied on 
Braunschweig's expunged 2011 conviction as the prior predicate 
offense under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1) in order to charge him 
with second offenses, making them criminal instead of civil.7  
The 
State 
submitted 
a 
certified 
copy 
of 
Braunschweig's 
Department of Transportation ("DOT") driving record to establish 
the prior conviction.  
¶6 
Before trial, Braunschweig filed a motion challenging 
the State's use of the 2011 conviction as a predicate offense 
                                                                                                                                                             
§ 973.015(1m)(a)1.  In 2013 the legislature revised Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.015.  See 2013 Wis. Act 362, §§ 48-50.  The revisions were 
unrelated to the statute's language we quote in this opinion.  
For the sake of consistency, we refer only to the 2015-16 
version.  
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65(2)(am) makes the first offense 
for OWI or PAC a civil offense, but OWI and PAC offenses become 
criminal as second offenses. 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
5 
 
under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1), because the 2011 conviction was 
expunged.  Braunschweig argued that once the 2011 conviction was 
expunged by the circuit court, it no longer qualified as a 
predicate offense in second offense OWI and PAC cases.  The 
circuit court ruled against him.  Braunschweig then waived his 
right to a jury trial and the matter was tried to the court.   
¶7 
Before trial, Braunschweig argued that the existence 
of at least one prior conviction is a status element in a second 
offense case, and that absent a stipulation, the prior OWI must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact.  The 
circuit 
court 
rejected 
this 
argument. 
 
Braunschweig 
was 
convicted of both counts and was sentenced the same day.  The 
circuit court stayed his sentence pending appeal.  
¶8 
Braunschweig filed a notice of appeal and the court of 
appeals 
affirmed 
the 
circuit 
court. 
 
Braunschweig, 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR, unpublished slip op.  On February 27, 2018, 
Braunschweig filed a petition for review in this court.  On 
June 11, 2018, we granted the petition. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶9 
"The interpretation and application of a statute 
present questions of law that this court reviews de novo while 
benefitting from the analyses of the court of appeals and 
circuit court."  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 
Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 (citing State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 
73, ¶37, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238).  Thus, we review de 
novo whether an expunged conviction must be counted as a 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
6 
 
conviction under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1), and therefore, serve 
as a predicate offense under Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am).   
¶10 Similarly, the "[d]etermination of the appropriate 
burden of proof in this case presents a question of statutory 
interpretation."  Shaw v. Leatherberry, 2005 WI 163, ¶17, 286 
Wis. 2d 380, 706 N.W.2d 299.   Thus, we also review de novo what 
burden of proof the State must meet in order to prove the prior 
conviction's existence. 
¶11 Furthermore, this case requires the interpretation of 
our prior case law.  "[S]tare decisis concerns are paramount 
where a court has authoritatively interpreted a statute because 
the legislature remains free to alter its construction."  
Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶45, 281 
Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 (citing Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. 
Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)).  "When a party asks this 
court to overturn a prior interpretation of a statute, it is his 
'burden . . . to show not only that [the decision] was mistaken 
but also that it was objectively wrong, so that the court has a 
compelling reason to overrule it.'"  Id.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Statutory Interpretation 
¶12 We begin our analysis with a review of the language of 
the statutes.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "[T]he 
purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the 
statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and 
intended effect."  Id., ¶44.  If the meaning of the statute is 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
7 
 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry and give the language its 
"common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical 
or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical 
or special definitional meaning."  Id., ¶45. 
¶13 Context and structure of a statute are important to 
the meaning of the statute.  Id., ¶46.  "Therefore, statutory 
language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not 
in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language 
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id.  Moreover, the 
"[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id.  "A 
statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its 
plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-
related statutes——that is, from its context or the structure of 
the statute as a coherent whole."  Id., ¶49. 
¶14 "If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear 
statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute 
is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning."  
Id., ¶46.  If statutory language is unambiguous, we do not need 
to consult extrinsic sources of interpretation.  Id.  "Statutory 
interpretation involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a 
search for ambiguity."  Id., ¶47.   
1.  OWI-related statutes 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
8 
 
¶15 Wisconsin 
Statutes 
govern 
OWI-related 
offenses.  
Unique to Wisconsin, a first offense is deemed to be a civil, 
not a criminal offense.8  The legislature has instituted criminal 
penalties for repeat offenses.  See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am); 
see also Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1).  These statutes generally 
embody a system of increased penalties depending on the number 
of offenses and after the offenses increase to a certain number, 
the permissible alcohol concentration allowable for a repeat 
offender decreases significantly.  § 346.65(2)(am); see also 
§ 343.307(2).9  As a result, while the State must prove certain 
elements in certain repeat OWI-related offenses beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we confine our analysis to the statutes as 
they pertain to a second offense with which Braunschweig finds 
himself charged and convicted.10  We now turn our analysis to the 
relevant statutes at issue in this case. 
                                                 
8 See Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)1.  See also, Bill Leuders, 
Under the Influence: Why Wisconsin Has Weak Laws on Drunken 
Driving, 
Urban 
Milwaukee 
(Nov. 
10, 
2014), 
https://urbanmilwaukee.com/2014/11/10/under-the-influence-why-
wisconsin-has-weak-laws-on-drunken-driving; 
Nina 
Kravinsky, 
Wisconsin DUI policies lag behind other states' in severity, 
Badger Herald (Dec. 4, 2014), https://perma.cc/E3HZ-X768.  If a 
defendant, however, has at least one prior relevant offense, the 
OWI becomes a criminal offense.  See § 346.65(2)(am)2. 
9 The Wisconsin Statutes also enhance penalties for other 
reasons not pertinent to our analysis.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(f) (passengers under age 16). 
10 Compare Wis. Stat. § 340.01(46m); Wis JI-Criminal 2600, 
at 11-13 (2011) ("Operating While Intoxicated:  Introductory 
Comment . . . V. D.  Operating With a [PAC]. PAC level and 
penalties for third and subsequent offenses"); id., at 13-16 
("VI.  Prior Offenses . . . an Element of the 0.02 Offense") 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
9 
 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(1) states "No person may 
drive or operate a motor vehicle while . . . [u]nder the 
influence 
of 
an 
intoxicant," 
§ 346.63(1)(a), 
or 
with 
a 
"prohibited alcohol concentration," § 346.63(1)(b).  Convictions 
of both, as was the case here, count as only one conviction for 
purposes of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am), the OWI/PAC penalty 
enhancement statute.  See § 346.63(1)(c) ("A person may be 
charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon a complaint based 
upon a violation of any combination of par. (a), (am), or (b)" 
and "[i]f the person is found guilty of any combination of par. 
(a), (am), or (b) . . . there shall be a single conviction."). 
¶17 The OWI/PAC penalty enhancement statute at issue here 
provides for increased minimum and maximum potential penalties 
for defendants convicted of OWIs based upon a delineated list of 
prior "suspensions, revocations, and other convictions."  Wis. 
Stat. § 346.65(2)(am).  The penalties are increased for a 
defendant 
who 
has 
a 
prior 
"conviction[] 
counted 
under 
s. 343.307(1)," § 346.65(2)(am)2., which includes "[c]onvictions 
for 
violations 
under 
s. 
346.63(1) 
[and] . . . under 
s. 346.63(2)."  Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1)(a), (1)(c).  There is no 
meaningful debate that Braunschweig's 2011 conviction, if not 
expunged, would be deemed a prior counted conviction under this 
                                                                                                                                                             
with Wis JI-Criminal 2660C (2007) ("Operating A Motor Vehicle 
with 
a 
[PAC]-Criminal 
Offense-More 
than 
0.02 
grams-
§ 346.63(1)(b)") and Wis JI-Criminal 2663 (2006) ("Operating a 
Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of an Intoxicant-
Criminal Offense-§ 346.63(1)(a)"). 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
10 
 
section.  The issue is whether that prior expunged conviction 
counts as a prior predicate offense.  As a result, we turn to 
the words of the statute as defined.  
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 340.01 defines "words and phrases" 
that appear in Chapter 346.  Section 340.01(9r) defines 
"Conviction" as "an unvacated adjudication of guilt."  Hence, we 
next consider whether an expunged "conviction" is an "unvacated 
adjudication of guilt." 
2.  Expunction and vacatur 
¶19 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 973.015, 
entitled 
"Special 
Disposition," governs expunction in Wisconsin, and grants courts 
the discretionary authority to expunge an offender's conviction 
for a crime for which the maximum period of imprisonment is six 
years or less if that offender is under 25 years of age at the 
time the crime was committed.11  "The court may order at the time 
of sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful 
completion of the sentence if the court determines the person 
will 
benefit 
and 
society 
will 
not 
be 
harmed 
by 
this 
disposition."  § 973.015(1m)(a)(1).  "Upon successful completion 
of the sentence the detaining or probationary authority shall 
issue a certificate of discharge which shall be forwarded to the 
court of record and which shall have the effect of expunging the 
record."  § 973.015(1m)(b) (emphasis added).  Thus, when 
expunction is ordered, the clerk of court seals the case and 
                                                 
11 Other statutes may use the term expunction but are not 
pertinent to our analysis.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 938.355(4m). 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
11 
 
destroys the court records.  State v. Allen, 2017 WI 7, ¶9 & 
n.3, 373 Wis. 2d 98, 890 N.W.2d 245. 
¶20 In contrast, Wisconsin Stat. 974.06(1) instructs that 
a defendant seeking postconviction relief "may move the court 
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the 
sentence."  A court "shall vacate and set the judgment aside" if 
the court finds that the judgment was rendered without 
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not 
authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral 
attack, or that there has been such a denial or 
infringement of the constitutional rights of the 
person as to render the judgment vulnerable to 
collateral attack. 
§ 974.06(3)(d).  Such relief, however, is designed to address 
such defects with respect to the conviction or the sentence 
imposed, not to provide a second chance or a fresh start as is 
intended by the expunction statute.  State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, 
¶¶19, 20, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811. 
¶21 Vacatur, unlike expunction, removes the fact of 
conviction.  See State v. Lamar, 2011 WI 50, ¶¶39–40 & n.10 
(stating that when a judgment has been vacated, "the matter 
stands precisely as if there had been no judgment," and that 
vacating a judgment renders it "nullified and no longer in 
effect").  A vacated conviction, unlike expunction, does not 
result in a court record being hidden from public view nor are 
court records destroyed because of a vacated conviction.  See 
SCRs 72.01 and 72.06.  To "vacate" has been defined generally as 
"[t]o nullify or cancel; make void; invalidate."  Vacate, 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
12 
 
Black's Law Dictionary 1782 (10th ed. 2014) (employing "the 
court vacated the judgment" as an exemplary use of the term).   
¶22 Vacatur invalidates the conviction itself, whereas 
expunction of a conviction merely deletes the evidence of the 
underlying conviction from court records.  Expunction, unlike 
vacatur, does not invalidate the conviction.  
¶23 Notably, Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m), the Expunction 
Statute, references that it is inapplicable to the DOT which is 
charged with the responsibility to maintain its own records.  
The Expunction Statute specifically states, "This subsection 
does not apply to information maintained by the department of 
transportation regarding a conviction."  § 973.015(1m).  Thus, 
the legislature specifically acknowledged the separate and 
distinct responsibility for recordkeeping in the executive 
branch as opposed to that in the judicial branch. 
¶24 The next section of the Expunction Statute provides 
additional confirmation that the legislature deemed vacatur and 
expunction to be distinct court actions.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 973.015(2m)12 
states 
the 
court 
"may . . . vacate 
the 
conviction . . . or 
may 
order 
that 
the 
record 
of 
the 
violation . . . be expunged."  The legislature's use of the 
terms "vacate the conviction" or "order the record . . . be 
expunged" in the disjunctive demonstrates the legislature's 
decision 
to 
distinguish 
vacatur 
from 
expunction 
as 
two 
                                                 
12 This statute is limited in its application to "a victim 
of trafficking for the purposes of a commercial sex act . . . ." 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
13 
 
alternative, independent options.  See Milewski v. Town of 
Dover, 2017 WI 79, ¶50, 377 Wis. 2d 38, 899 N.W.2d 303 (deciding 
that the use of the word "or" in a list created alternative 
options); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 116 (2012) ("Under the 
conjunctive/disjunctive canon, and combines items while or 
creates alternatives.").  If "vacat[ing] . . . the conviction" 
and "order[ing] that the record of the violation . . . be 
expunged" are to have the same meaning, one of options would be 
rendered mere surplusage.  See Milewski, 377 Wis. 2d 38, ¶50 
n.21 ("[I]f the second option really means nothing more than the 
first, then the legislature acted frivolously when it added that 
option to the statute.  We try not to treat legislative 
enactments as surplusage." (citation omitted)); Scalia & Garner, 
supra at 174-79 (footnote omitted) ("If possible, every word and 
every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectu sunt 
accipienda).  None should be ignored.  None should needlessly be 
given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another 
provision or to have no consequence.").  Here, the use of 
vacatur and expunction as distinct alternative options confirms 
the legislature's unambiguous determination that a vacated 
adjudication of guilt, is not the same as an expunged 
conviction. 
¶25 In sum, while the expunction of court records of a 
conviction is intended to benefit a young offender, one of the 
benefits is not that the underlying conviction is vacated.  
Therefore, under a plain meaning analysis, a conviction, even 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
14 
 
though expunged, remains "an unvacated adjudication of guilt" 
and thus, must be counted for purposes of supporting a prior 
conviction in OWI-related offenses. 
3.  State v. Leitner 
¶26 We now examine whether our statutory analysis is at 
odds with State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 
N.W.2d 341.  Braunschweig argues that Leitner prohibits an 
expunged 
conviction 
from 
being 
considered, 
even 
if 
the 
conviction is certified in a DOT record.  We disagree and 
conclude that the plain language interpretation of the statute 
is consistent with this court's past precedent, including 
Leitner. 
¶27 In Leitner, this court determined that the "court 
records 
of 
expunged 
convictions 
cannot 
be 
considered 
by 
sentencing 
courts," 
including 
for 
"repeater 
sentence 
enhancement."  253 Wis. 2d 449, ¶¶39, 44 (emphasis added); see 
id., ¶39 ("An expunged record of a conviction cannot be 
considered at a subsequent sentencing; an expunged record of a 
conviction cannot be used for impeachment at trial under [Wis. 
Stat.] § 906.09(1); and an expunged record of a conviction is 
not available for repeater sentence enhancement."). 
¶28 However, Leitner explicitly contemplated use of other 
non-court records of prior convictions whose court records had 
subsequently been expunged for repeater sentence enhancement.  
Id., ¶40.  Specifically, the court stated: 
Furthermore, 
district 
attorneys 
and 
law 
enforcement 
agencies 
have 
significant 
ongoing 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
15 
 
interests in maintaining case information, even when a 
court record of a conviction has been expunged under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.015.  Case information may assist in 
identifying suspects, determining whether a suspect 
might 
present 
a 
threat 
to 
officer 
safety, 
investigating and solving similar crimes, anticipating 
and disrupting future criminal actions, informing 
decisions about arrest or pressing charges, making 
decisions about bail and pre-trial release, making 
decisions 
about 
repeater 
charges, 
and 
making 
recommendations about sentencing. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶29 Further, this court has since clarified that Leitner's 
holding does not stand for the proposition that a DOT record of 
conviction is precluded from use.  In Allen, this court stated: 
As discussed in Leitner, expunction requires the 
destruction of the court record of conviction.  It is 
the court record, with all of its contents, which 
cannot be considered at a subsequent sentencing.  The 
facts underlying an expunged record of conviction, if 
obtained from a source other than a court record, may 
be considered at sentencing. 
Allen, 373 Wis. 2d 98, ¶41. 
¶30 As a result, Leitner does not lend support to 
Braunschweig's cause.  A certified DOT record is a "source other 
than a court record" that may be considered to prove the 
predicate expunged offense.  While Wis. Stat. § 973.015 may 
allow the expunction of court records, the statute explicitly 
says it does not apply to DOT records.  See § 973.015(1m)(a).  
Further, nothing in the DOT's grant of authority to maintain the 
records prevents them from being used in this fashion.  The 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
16 
 
enumerated purposes13 do not provide an exclusive list.  It is 
instead additional support for the fact that the DOT was 
required to keep such records regardless of their expunction. 
¶31 In sum, the plain meaning of the statutes and our 
prior precedent both dictate that a certified DOT record which 
contains an expunged conviction can establish a predicate 
offense for purposes of OWI-related offenses.  
 
B.  Prior Convictions Must Be Proven By A Preponderance 
Of The Evidence. 
¶32 We last turn to the question of the burden of proof 
the State must meet in proving a prior conviction in a second 
offense OWI-related case.  Wisconsin Stat. § 346.65 does not 
provide a standard of proof for the penalties assigned.  See 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 343.23 and 343.24 designate some uses 
of the records.  For instance, § 343.23, in relevant part, 
provides: 
The information specified in pars. (a) and (am) must 
be filed by the department so that the complete 
operator's record is available for the use of the 
secretary in determining whether operating privileges 
of such person shall be suspended, revoked, canceled, 
or withheld, or the person disqualified, in the 
interest of public safety. 
§ 343.23(2)(b).  Another example is in § 343.24, which provides: 
The department shall upon request furnish any person 
an abstract of the operating record of any person.  
The abstract shall be certified if certification is 
requested.  Such abstract is not admissible in 
evidence in any action for damages arising out of a 
motor vehicle accident. 
§ 343.24(1). 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
17 
 
Carlson & Erickson Builders, Inc. v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 190 
Wis. 2d 650, 658 n.6, 529 N.W.2d 905 (1995) ("Where Congress has 
not prescribed the appropriate standard of proof and the 
Constitution does not dictate a particular standard, we must 
prescribe one." (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 
U.S. 375, 389 (1983)).  Braunschweig argues that proof of 
predicate priors in both OWI and PAC cases must be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  He argues that the holding in State v. 
McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d 532, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982), that a 
predicate prior is not an element the State has to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt, is ripe for reconsideration.  On the other 
hand, the State argues that a prior conviction is not here an 
element of the OWI/PAC penalty enhancement statute and thus, the 
appropriate burden of proof is the preponderance of the 
evidence.  We conclude that the appropriate burden of proof here 
is preponderance of the evidence, and that the State met its 
burden in this case by introducing the certified DOT record.14 
¶33 Almost 
40 
years 
ago 
in 
McAllister, 
this 
court 
concluded that the State may prove prior convictions through 
"certified copies of conviction or other competent proof" when 
                                                 
14 The holding that preponderance of the evidence is the 
burden of proof applies only when the prior convictions are not 
an element of the offense, such as in second offense OWI cases, 
but not so when the prior convictions become an element of the 
offense as in some PAC cases where the prior convictions lower 
the "[p]rohibited alcohol concentration."  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 340.01(46m)(c); see also State v. Alexander, 214 Wis. 2d 628, 
640–41, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997). 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
18 
 
proof of a prior is not an element of the offense.  107 Wis. 2d 
at 539; State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, ¶32, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 
649 N.W.2d 263.  Braunschweig argues that substantial changes in 
the law since McAllister, however, militate in favor of 
overturning the decision.  We disagree, reaffirm McAllister, and 
conclude that when a predicate prior offense is not, as here, an 
element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it need 
be proven by only a preponderance of the evidence.  See 
McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 533 ("Unquestionably, the state has 
the burden of proving each essential element of a crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
¶34 Wisconsin's statutes for OWI-related offenses impose 
increased penalties for repeat offenders.  Competent proof of 
the prior conviction primarily concerns sentencing as it impacts 
the penalty that can be imposed and here, is not an element of 
the offense to be proven.  The elements of a second offense OWI 
are: 
1.  The defendant (drove) (operated) a motor 
vehicle on a highway. . . .  
2.  The defendant was under the influence of an 
intoxicant 
at 
the 
time 
the 
defendant 
(drove) 
(operated) a motor vehicle.  
Wis. 
JI-Criminal 
2669, 
at 
2 
(2015); 
see 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a).  The elements of a second offense PAC are: 
1.  The defendant (drove) (operated) a motor 
vehicle on a highway.   
2. The 
defendant 
had 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration at the time the defendant (drove) 
(operated) a motor vehicle.   
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
19 
 
"Prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration" 
means 
.08 
grams or more of alcohol in 210 liters of the person's 
breath. 
Wis. JI-Criminal 2669, at 3 (2015); see § 346.63(1)(b); see also 
Wis. Stat. § 340.01(1v)(b), (46m)(a).  In neither of these 
crimes is the prior offense an element. 
¶35 In McAllister, this court stated: 
The legislative directive concerning the law of 
repeater and penalty enhancers is clear and has been 
upheld by this court.  The application and impact of 
such 
provisions 
has 
been 
repeatedly 
defined.  
Consistent with this development of the law, we hold 
that the fact of a prior violation, civil or criminal, 
is not an element of the crime of [OWI] either in the 
ordinary sense of the meaning of the word element, 
i.e., the incidents of conduct giving rise to the 
prosecution, or in the constitutional sense. 
McAllister, 107 Wis. 2d at 538.15  "An indictment . . . need not 
set forth factors relevant only to the sentencing of an offender 
                                                 
15 "This court follows the doctrine of stare decisis 
scrupulously because of our abiding respect for the rule of 
law."  State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶40, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 
N.W.2d 592 (quoting Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. of 
Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶94, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257); 
Hilton v. S.C. Public Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) 
("Time and time again, this Court has recognized that 'the 
doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the 
rule of law.'" (quoting Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and 
Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987) (plurality opinion))).  
"[A]ny departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands 
special justification."  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶94 
(quoting Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 
653 N.W.2d 266). 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
20 
 
found guilty of the charged crime."  See, e.g., Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228, 243-44 (1998). 
¶36 Braunschweig 
asserts 
that 
the 
law 
has 
changed 
significantly since McAllister, so to undermine its conclusions.  
As support, he refers to the creation of the PAC charge under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63,16 including some PAC offenses wherein the 
predicate prior is an element of the offense, the fact that OWIs 
and PACs are often charged together, see § 346.63(1)(c), as well 
as that these are serious offenses with serious penalties noting 
that some such offenses are now felonies.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)4.  The changes in the law that Braunschweig 
highlights,17 however, do not warrant overturning McAllister as 
they do not "undermin[e] the rationale behind [the] decision."  
                                                                                                                                                             
We recognize that stare decisis, is a "'principle of 
policy' rather than 'an inexorable command.'"  Hohn v. United 
States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 
501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).  One circumstance that can "satisfy 
the demanding standards for departing from precedent" is 
"changes or developments in the law [that] have undermined the 
rationale behind a decision."  Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 
¶98. 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63, in relevant part, provides that 
"[n]o person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while . . . [t]he 
person has a prohibited alcohol concentration."  § 346.63(1)(b). 
17 In this case, increased potential punishment because of 
this expunged prior does not transform the predicate offense 
into an element as "[b]oth the certainty that procedural 
safeguards attached to any 'fact' of prior conviction, and the 
reality that [Braunschweig] did not challenge the accuracy of 
that 'fact' in his case, mitigated the due process and Sixth 
Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to 
determine a 'fact' increasing punishment."  See Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000). 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
21 
 
See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 
108, ¶98, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  We acknowledge that 
in some PAC cases the predicate prior will be an element of the 
crime, but that is not the case before this court.18 
¶37 The United States Supreme Court has provided guidance 
with regard to what burden of proof satisfies competent proof of 
a predicate conviction.  In this case, the prior offense 
pertains in large part to the penalty at sentencing.  The 
Supreme Court has "held that application of the preponderance 
standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process."  United 
States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997).  In McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, the Court had "little difficulty concluding that 
in this case the preponderance standard satisfies due process" 
after determining "that States may treat 'visible possession of 
a firearm' as a sentencing consideration rather than an element 
of a particular offense."  477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).   
¶38 In line with the United States Supreme Court, numerous 
federal circuits have consistently applied a preponderance of 
the evidence standard at sentencing.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Lacouture, 835 F.3d 187, 189–90 (1st Cir. 2016) ("It is the 
government's 
burden 
at 
sentencing 
to 
prove 
sentencing 
                                                 
18 As noted, this standard does not apply when the prior 
conviction defines part of the offense, as in some PAC 
circumstances.  Given the Wisconsin Statutes regarding PAC 
cases, courts may nonetheless decide to make a record of whether 
the burden of proof meets the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard, although it is not required as the preponderance of 
the evidence standard applies. 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
22 
 
enhancement 
factors 
by 
a 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence . . . ."); United States v. Romans, 823 F.3d 299, 316 
(5th Cir. 2016) ("In general, facts relevant to sentencing need 
only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence."); United 
States v. Mustafa, 695 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating 
that "we have repeatedly held that due process never requires 
applying more than a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for 
finding sentencing facts"); United States v. Krieger, 628 F.3d 
857, 862 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Sentencing factors need not be 
charged nor proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but may instead be 
found by the court at sentencing by a preponderance of the 
evidence."). 
¶39 We likewise conclude that the State must prove this 
prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence.  Here, 
unlike some PAC charges, the prior OWI conviction is not an 
element of the charged offenses and need not be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.19  
                                                 
19 Our conclusion is not in conflict with State v. Van 
Riper, 2003 WI App 237, 267 Wis. 2d 759, 672 N.W.2d 156, and 
State v. Bonds, 2006 WI 83, 292 Wis. 2d 344, 717 N.W.2d 133.  In 
Van Riper, the court concluded that the certified Wisconsin 
driving record proved the existence of the defendant's prior 
convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.  Van Riper did not 
analyze or answer whether a lower burden would have been 
sufficient. 
 
See 
Van 
Riper, 
267 
Wis. 2d 759, 
¶¶18, 
21.  
Similarly, in Bonds, the court concluded that Consolidated Court 
Automation Program (CCAP) was insufficient to prove a prior 
conviction under Wis. Stat. § 939.62.  Bonds, 292 Wis. 2d 344, 
¶49.  However, Bonds too involved an entirely different statute 
than that which we consider today, and because the parties in 
Bonds agreed that beyond a reasonable doubt was the proper 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
23 
 
¶40 In sum, the State must prove this prior conviction by 
a preponderance of the evidence which can be satisfied with a 
certified DOT record. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶41 The court is presented with two issues.  First, we 
consider whether a prior expunged OWI conviction constitutes a 
prior conviction under Wis. Stat. § 343.307(1), when determining 
the penalty for OWI-related offenses.  We conclude that a prior 
expunged OWI conviction must be counted under § 343.307(1).   
¶42 Second, we consider the State's burden of proving the 
prior OWI conviction in second offense OWI-related offenses.  We 
conclude that the State must prove this prior OWI conviction, 
which is not here an element of the offense charged, by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Thus, we affirm the court of 
appeals.  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
burden, the court did not analyze or answer whether a lower 
burden would have been sufficient.   Id., ¶33.   
No. 
2017AP1261-CR   
 
 
 
1