Title: Ex parte N.J.J. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: N.J.J. v. Wesfam Restaurants, Inc., d/b/a Burger King)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:10/24/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070173
____________________
Ex parte N.J.J.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: N.J.J.
v.
Wesfam Restaurants, Inc., d/b/a Burger King)
(Madison Circuit Court, CV-05-1732;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2060444)
PER CURIAM.
N.J.J. filed a complaint in the Madison Circuit Court,
seeking 
worker's 
compensation 
benefits 
from 
Wesfam
1070173
2
Restaurants, Inc., d/b/a Burger King ("Burger King").  After
a nonjury trial, the trial court found that N.J.J. had not
sustained a compensable injury under § 25-5-1(9), Ala. Code
1975, because, it reasoned, her injuries were caused by the
acts of third parties who intended to injure her for reasons
personal to her and not directed against her as an employee or
because of her employment.  Specifically, the trial court
found that the attack as a result of which N.J.J. was injured
was racially motivated.  N.J.J. appealed.  The Court of Civil
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, without an
opinion. N.J.J. v. Wesfam Rests., Inc. (No. 2060444, October
12, 2007),     So. 2d     (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)(table).  This
Court granted certiorari review and held oral argument.
However, after reviewing the record and the briefs of the
parties, we now quash the writ.
N.J.J. worked for Burger King for 19 years.  She was a
restaurant manager for 10 of those 19 years.  During the early
morning of August 11, 2002, N.J.J. was assaulted while
attempting to unlock the Burger King restaurant on Memorial
Parkway in Huntsville.  N.J.J. was grabbed by two white males
who pulled her behind the Burger King building.  The two men
1070173
3
physically and sexually assaulted N.J.J.  A third man acted as
a lookout during the assault.  After she was discovered,
N.J.J. was transported by ambulance to Huntsville Hospital,
where she was treated for multiple injuries sustained during
the attack, including abrasions and lacerations to her body,
face, and genitals.
N.J.J. testified that, during the attack, the attackers
repeatedly stated: "We'll show you what we do to nigger
lovers."  N.J.J., who is white, testified that shortly before
the attack she had banned the man who acted as the lookout
from the Burger King restaurant for setting a napkin holder on
fire.  N.J.J. testified that before the attack she had never
seen the two men who attacked her.  N.J.J. identified D.S. as
the man who had acted as the lookout.  N.J.J. testified that,
during the attack, D.S. did not make any statements regarding
his earlier ejection from the Burger King restaurant.  No
evidence was presented of any statements made during the
attack that would indicate that the attack was related to
N.J.J.'s employment.  N.J.J. testified that D.S. asked the two
attackers, who were burning her with a cigarette, not to do so
and ultimately asked the two attackers to leave.
1070173
The polygraph results were admitted as part of the
1
evidence in this worker's compensation case.
4
Records from the Huntsville Police Department contain the
results of a polygraph test administered to D.S. as part of
the investigation of the attack.  During the polygraph test,
D.S. was asked whether he was present when N.J.J. was
assaulted and whether he participated in any manner in the
assault.  He answered in the negative to both questions, and
the test did not indicate any deception.1
The 
standard 
of 
review 
on 
appeal 
in 
a 
worker's
compensation case is well settled:
"'[W]e will not reverse the trial court's
finding 
of 
fact 
if 
that 
finding 
is
supported by substantial evidence--if that
finding is supported by "evidence of such
weight and quality that fair-minded persons
in the exercise of impartial judgment can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact
sought to be proved."'  
"Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So. 2d 262, 268-
69 (Ala. 1996) (quoting West v. Founders Life
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1989)). However, 'an appellate court's review of the
proof and [its] consideration of other legal issues
in a workers' compensation case shall be without a
presumption of correctness.'  Ex parte American
Color Graphics, Inc., 838 So. 2d 385, 387-88 (Ala.
2002) (citing § 25-5-81(e)(1), Ala.Code 1975))."
1070173
5
Ex parte Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 873 So. 2d 1116, 1121
(Ala. 2003). 
The Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975, is intended to make workers' compensation the
exclusive remedy for most job-related injuries.  The Act
excludes from its provisions an injury caused by the act of a
third party who intends to injure the employee because of
reasons personal to the employee and not directed against him
or her as an employee or because of his or her employment or
where the attack had no relationship to the employment. § 25-
5-1(9), Ala. Code 1975; see also Jacobs v. Bowden Elec. Co.,
601 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).  In other words, an
employee's injury caused by the willful act of a third person
arises out the employment and is compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act only if the willful act was directed
against the employee because of his or her employment, and
this requirement is met if there is a causal connection
between the conditions under which the work is required to be
performed and the resulting injury.
In Dean v. Stockham Pipe & Fittings Co., 220 Ala. 25, 123
So. 225 (1929), this Court analyzed § 36(j) of the Workmen's
1070173
6
Compensation Act in effect at that time.  That subdivision was
very similar to § 25-5-1(9), Ala. Code 1975.  Under § 36(j),
an injury was not compensable if it was "'caused by the act of
a third person or fellow employee, intended to injure the
employee because of reasons personal to him, and not directed
against him as an employee, or because of his employment.'"
220 Ala. at 27, 123 So. at 226.  Similarly, § 25-5-1(9),
provides, in pertinent part:
"Injury does not include an injury caused by the act
of a third person or fellow employee intended to
injure the employee because of reasons personal to
him or her and not directed against him or her as an
employee or because of his or her employment."
In Dean, a night watchman was robbed and murdered while
he was on duty.  The trial court denied compensation to the
watchman's widow, holding that the sole motive of the murder
was to rob the night watchman of his personal belongings.
This Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and held
that determining the motive for the injury did not end the
inquiry.  This Court held that the night watchman's injury was
compensable, although the attacker had no motive to injure the
employer, because the peculiar hazards of being a night
watchman not only furnished the occasion and opportunity for
1070173
7
the robbery and the murder, but also suggested the opportunity
for robbery; thus, the Court reasoned, his employment
contributed to the injury.  This Court specifically found a
causal connection between the type of employment and the
robbery/murder.
In the present case, substantial evidence supports the
trial court's factual finding that the assault was not
directed against N.J.J. because of her employment but was
instead instigated by racial motives.  Among other things, the
trial court's finding is supported by the fact that racial
slurs were directed at N.J.J. during the attack and by the
lack of any statements made during the attack that would
indicate that the attack was related to N.J.J.'s employment.
The facts that a restaurant manager is periodically required
to unlock a restaurant in the early morning hours and that the
manager might be forced to confront a customer at the
restaurant as part of his or her duties are not peculiar
hazards that would suggest an unusually high opportunity for
the manager to be the victim of a sexual assault in contrast
to the robbery and murder of the night watchman in Dean.
Where the criminal act is accomplished for reasons personal to
1070173
Although Justice Bolin did not sit for oral argument of
2
this case, he has viewed the video recording of that oral
argument.
8
the victim, though the employment may give the assailant a
convenient opportunity for committing the crime, the injury
does not arise out the employment within the meaning of the
Workers' Compensation Act.  Here, the fact that N.J.J. had to
open the store in the early morning hours gave the assailants
the opportunity to surprise N.J.J. when she was alone and to
commit this grotesque assault, but the trial court's finding
that the assailants acted for personal reasons is supported by
the evidence, including the racial slurs.  
WRIT QUASHED. 
See, Lyons, Stuart, Bolin,  and Parker, JJ., concur.
2
Smith, J., concurs in the rationale in part and concurs
in the result.
Woodall and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
Cobb, C.J., dissents.
1070173
9
SMITH, Justice (concurring in the rationale in part and
concurring in the result).
I concur with the main opinion's holding that the trial
court's factual findings are not due to be disturbed.
In this worker's compensation case the employee, N.J.J.,
seeks worker's compensation benefits as a result of injuries
sustained in a sexual assault that occurred as N.J.J. arrived
at work at an early hour.  Employers often pay workers'
compensation to employees for injuries that occur as the
result of an on-the-job assault--including sexual assaults.
However, this case involves a unique exception to that rule
found in our workers' compensation law.  
Not every injury that occurs on-the-job qualifies as a
compensable injury under our workers' compensation law.  One
such exception applies in this case: An "injury" for purposes
of workers' compensation "does not include an injury caused by
the act of a third person ... intended to injure the employee
because of reasons personal to him or her and not directed
against him or her as an employee or because of his or her
employment."  Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1(9) (emphasis added).
Essentially, when a person assaults a worker for "personal"
reasons and not because she is an employee or because of her
1070173
The time of the attack is unclear from the record.
3
N.J.J. testified at trial that she left home at 3:30 a.m. and
that she lived nearby.  Police investigation records indicate
that N.J.J. stated that she arrived at the restaurant at a
"little before" 4:00 a.m.  The police report indicates that
N.J.J. was assaulted after 4:00 a.m.
The trial court's order inexplicably appears to state
4
that this incident occurred "earlier that day."
10
employment, then our workers' compensation law does not
require the employer to provide benefits.  
In this case N.J.J. was a manager of a Burger King fast-
food restaurant owned by her employer, Wesfam Restaurants,
Inc.  N.J.J. had recently returned to work after suffering a
back injury.  In the early morning hours of August 11, 2002,
N.J.J. was brutally attacked and sexually assaulted while
attempting to enter the restaurant.   
3
N.J.J. identified a patron of the restaurant, D.S., as
the 
lookout 
for 
the 
attackers. 
 
N.J.J. 
told 
police
investigators that although she recognized D.S., who had been
barred from the restaurant, she had not seen him "in a couple
of months."  At trial, however, N.J.J. testified that "in
August of 2002," "shortly" before the attack, she had barred
D.S. from the restaurant because he had set a napkin holder on
fire.   When questioned by police, D.S. produced an alibi for
4
1070173
11
the night of the attack.  Additionally, the police records in
the criminal investigation of the rape, which were admitted
into evidence without objection, contain the results of three
tests conducted during a polygraph examination of D.S.
performed by the Huntsville Police Department.  The results
indicated "no deception" when D.S. was asked if he had
participated in the assault.  Apparently, no charges where
filed against D.S., and N.J.J.'s attackers are still at large.
According to N.J.J.'s complaint, she suffered pain and
other psychological and physical injuries as a result of the
assault.  Wesfam paid N.J.J. temporary-total-disability
benefits until September 2004.  When Wesfam's workers'
compensation carrier eventually stopped paying benefits,
N.J.J. 
filed 
the 
underlying action seeking additional
benefits.
At trial, Wesfam argued that the attack against N.J.J.
was motivated by personal reasons.  Wesfam thus argued that
there was no "injury" as defined by § 25-5-1(9) and that
worker's compensation benefits were not due to be paid.
Specifically, Wesfam pointed to evidence indicating that
N.J.J.'s attackers said to her at the beginning of the attack
1070173
The record indicates that N.J.J. is white and her husband
5
is black.
12
that "they were going to show [her] what they do to nigger
lovers" and repeated similar statements during the attack.5
Here, the trial court was called upon by N.J.J. and
Wesfam to determine whether the attack against N.J.J. resulted
from 
"personal" 
reasons 
and 
not 
because 
of 
N.J.J.'s
employment.  Because this determination of fact was made by
the trial judge based in part on live in-court testimony, the
ore tenus rule applies.  Thus, the trial court's findings are
presumed correct:
"'"The trial court heard this case without a
jury. Where evidence is presented to the trial court
ore tenus, the court's findings of fact are presumed
correct; its findings will not be disturbed except
for a plain and palpable abuse of discretion."'"
Ex parte Squires, 960 So. 2d 661, 664 (Ala. 2006) (quoting
Squires v. City of Saraland, 960 So. 2d 651, 656 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2005), quoting in turn Ex parte Board of Zoning
Adjustment of Mobile, 636 So. 2d 415, 417 (Ala. 1994)).
Furthermore, in a worker's compensation case, this Court "must
view the facts in the light most favorable to the findings of
the trial court."  Ex parte Professional Bus. Owners Ass'n
Workers' Comp. Fund, 867 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Ala. 2003).
1070173
13
Because the trial court's factual findings are presumed
correct under the ore tenus rule, this Court cannot conclude
that the trial court was wrong unless it can say that those
findings "are clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence,
manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the
evidence. Jasper City Council v. Woods, 647 So. 2d 723, 726
(Ala. 1994)."  Carquest Auto Parts & Tools of Montgomery,
Alabama, Inc. v. Waite, 892 So. 2d 422, 424 (Ala. Civ. App.
2004).  Finally, the trial court's findings of fact are not to
be disturbed if those findings are supported by substantial
evidence.  Williams v. Union Yarn Mills, Inc., 709 So. 2d 71,
72 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).  
It was N.J.J.'s burden at trial to prove that she
sustained an injury for purposes of the Workers' Compensation
Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1 et seq.  Additionally, it was
N.J.J.'s burden to establish that the injury was not the
result of "reasons personal" or that the attack was directed
against her as an employee or because of her employment.  In
entering a judgment for Wesfam, the trial court stated:
"After due consideration of all of the evidence
and having observed the demeanor of [N.J.J.] from
the witness stand and in the courtroom and having
made due inquiry into [N.J.J.'s] claim and the
1070173
14
credibility and defenses of [Wesfam], the court
makes the following determination:
"....
"... The Court finds that based upon the
evidence presented at trial, the assault of [N.J.J.]
was motivated by reasons personal to the attackers
and was not directed against [N.J.J.] as an employee
of [Wesfam] or because of her employment with
[Wesfam]."
On appeal, the Court is called upon to decide if the
trial court erred in determining: 
1. That the attackers intended to injure N.J.J.
because of "reasons personal," and
2. that the attack was not directed against N.J.J.
as an employee of Wesfam or because of her
employment with Wesfam.
The evidence presented in this case is sparse: N.J.J.
briefly testified at trial, and the trial court accepted into
evidence--without 
objection--certain 
police 
records 
and
medical records.  After reviewing the record, I cannot
conclude that the trial court's findings "are clearly
erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or
against the great weight of the evidence."  
As to the first finding, testimony at trial indicated
that the attack on N.J.J. was racially motivated.  As to the
second factor, the Chief Justice notes that the record
1070173
15
contains 
substantial 
evidence 
indicating 
that 
N.J.J.'s
employment, which placed her in the restaurant parking lot in
the early morning hours, exposed N.J.J. to an increased risk
of attack.  Specifically, the Chief Justice finds that "it can
readily be inferred" that the parking lot was a place where
N.J.J.'s attackers could more easily carry out the assault.
However, in reviewing ore tenus findings in a worker's
compensation case, this Court is to "view the facts in the
light most favorable to the findings of the trial court,"
Professional Business Owners, 867 So. 2d at 1102, and not to
make inferences of fact that would call the trial court's
findings into question.  Therefore, I cannot make the
inference the Chief Justice makes that N.J.J.'s employment
exposed her to an increased danger of assault.  Further,
N.J.J. testified that the area where she was initially
accosted was "well-lit," requiring her attackers to remove her
to a more concealed place.  The police report indicated that
the "parking lot" in which the attack took place was lighted
by artificial lighting.  Additionally, there is no evidence
indicating that N.J.J. was required to report to work at such
an early hour or that Wesfam even knew she was doing so.  An
1070173
16
assistant manager at the restaurant, who was interviewed by
the police regarding the attack, indicated that N.J.J.
"normally" did not arrive at work until 5:00 a.m., when two
employees would open the restaurant.  Another employee stated
that N.J.J. changed her schedule the day before the attack so
that she would start work at 4:00 a.m. instead of 5:00 a.m.
These facts, viewed with the presumption of correctness
accorded to the findings of the trial court, tend to indicate
that the parking lot posed no increased danger of assault and
that N.J.J.'s employment did not require her to be in the
parking lot at that time.
I voted to grant certiorari review in this case because
I was concerned that the trial court erred in determining that
the attack was not directed against N.J.J. because of her
employment.  Specifically, it appeared to me during this
Court's preliminary examination of the petition for certiorari
review that D.S. could have participated in the attack because
N.J.J. had banned him from the restaurant or that N.J.J.'s
employment had contributed to the attack because she was
required to be in a dangerous place when opening the
restaurant.  In this case, however, the trial court found
1070173
17
otherwise.  There is evidence to support its conclusion.
Although I might have decided the facts differently, the
standard of review does not allow me to substitute my own
judgment for the trial court's.
I am convinced that a female employee who is raped while
reporting to work during early morning hours can demonstrate
at trial that her job exposed her to an increased risk of an
attack.  Given that the trial court's findings in this case
are presumed correct and construing the facts in a light most
favorable to the trial court, I cannot conclude that the trial
court's decision is plainly and palpably wrong, clearly
erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or
against the great weight of the evidence.  Therefore, I must
concur to quash the writ.
1070173
18
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result based on principles articulated in
Dean v. Stockham Pipe & Fittings Co., 220 Ala. 25, 28, 123 So.
225, 227 (1929), including those articulated in the following
queries posed in Dean:
"[D]id the fact and nature of the employment, not
only furnish the opportunity, but suggest the
opportunity?  Did the employment mark the deceased
as the special victim of the robbery? Was he
murdered because he was Mr. Dean, or because he was
a night watchman, an easy mark, because of the
conditions of his employment?"
(Emphasis added.)  
Here, the fact and nature of N.J.J.'s employment may have
"furnished the opportunity" for her attack; they did not
"suggest the opportunity" in the causal sense contemplated by
Dean.  In other words, there was substantial evidence from
which the trial court could conclude that it was not N.J.J.'s
"employment [that] mark[ed her] as the special victim" of the
attack, but that she was attacked because of reasons personal
to her (in the words of Dean, "because [s]he was [N.J.J.]"),
and not "because of the conditions of h[er] employment."
As the Dean court explained:  "'The rational mind must be
able to trace the resultant injury to a proximate cause set in
1070173
19
motion by the employment, and not by some other agency.'"  220
Ala. at 28, 123 So. at 227 (quoting Madden Case, 222 Mass.
487, 111 N.E. 379 (1916)).  Here, the trial court, based on
substantial evidence, traced N.J.J.'s injury not to "a
proximate cause set in motion by her employment," but to one
set in motion by "some other agency," i.e., the personal
animus of N.J.J.'s attackers identified by the trial court. 
1070173
20
COBB, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from this court's decision to
quash the writ in this case.  I would review the decision of
the Court of Civil Appeals.  I believe substantial evidence
demonstrates that N.J.J.'s workplace created an increased
danger of an assault, that no substantial evidence  supports
the trial court's conclusion to the contrary, and that N.J.J.
is entitled to worker's compensation benefits.
In August 2002, N.J.J. was 38 years old and was employed
by Wesfam Restaurants, Inc., d/b/a Burger King ("Burger
King"), as the store manager for the Burger King restaurant on
South Memorial Parkway in Huntsville.  Sometime during August
2002, a shift manager reported to N.J.J. that some teenagers
were making noise in the dining room of the restaurant.
N.J.J. approached the teenagers and saw that one of them had
set a napkin holder on fire.  N.J.J. recognized D.S. as the
one in the group who lit the fire.  N.J.J. told D.S. to leave.
N.J.J. had never talked to D.S. outside the restaurant and did
not know him from anywhere else.
On August 11, 2002, N.J.J. went to work between 3:30 and
4:30 a.m. to do office paperwork.  The record reflects that,
1070173
21
on the days when N.J.J. did not arrive at work early to do
paperwork, she reported to work at 5:00 a.m.  N.J.J. testified
about the reason for her early arrival at work on August 11,
2002, as follows:
"It was on a Sunday morning and I came in early to
do paperwork. We usually have a day manager that
would come in at 7:00 to do the paperwork, but I
came in as a restaurant manager and did it before we
opened -- or planned on doing it before we opened.
So I allowed myself the extra time. I did that
often."
When N.J.J. arrived at work that morning, she drove
around the restaurant looking for suspicious activity.  Seeing
nothing suspicious, she parked her car and began walking to
the doors of the restaurant.  As N.J.J. was attempting to
enter the restaurant, two white males whom N.J.J. had never
seen before grabbed her and forced her behind the restaurant.
The area behind the restaurant between the back of the
building and the dumpster was "a well-lit area," so the men
pushed N.J.J. farther into the dumpster area near some
concrete barriers.  As they forced N.J.J. behind the
restaurant, the two men told N.J.J. they were going to show
her "what they do to nigger-lovers," and they repeated this
statement several times during the attack.  The two men hit,
1070173
22
slapped, and verbally berated N.J.J., ripped and cut her
clothes off, and smashed her face against a wall.  They burned
her with cigarettes and cut her with a knife, and they raped
her.  A third man, whom N.J.J. recognized as D.S., served as
a lookout while the two strangers assaulted her.
 N.J.J.'s attackers did not make any specific statements
during the attack to indicate that they felt she was a "nigger
lover" because of the way she treated employees or customers
at the Burger King restaurant.  N.J.J.'s attackers also did
not make any specific statements during the attack to indicate
that they felt she was a "nigger lover" because she, a white
woman, was married to an African-American man.  The attackers
also did not state whether they knew N.J.J.'s husband was an
African-American.  N.J.J. recognized D.S. solely from her
interaction with him at the restaurant, and she had never seen
the two assailants before.
A 
Burger 
King 
employee 
discovered 
N.J.J. 
lying
unconscious and partially clothed in the shrubbery outside the
dumpster area around 5:15 a.m. on the morning of the attack.
A three-foot-long metal dustpan handle was in N.J.J.'s vagina.
An ambulance took her to Huntsville Hospital, where she was
1070173
23
treated for injuries sustained during the assault.  The
doctors removed the metal dustpan handle from N.J.J.'s vagina
and treated her other injuries, including abrasions and
lacerations to her body, face, and genitals.  N.J.J.
subsequently underwent psychiatric treatment and was treated
for back injuries sustained in the attack.
 N.J.J. believes the attackers assaulted her because she
banned D.S. from the restaurant, although her attackers made
no references to the napkin-burning incident or to the fact
that she had banned D.S. from the restaurant.  During the
ensuing police investigation, D.S. gave police an alibi for
the time of the incident.  The police contacted one of D.S.'s
friends to investigate his alibi.  The friend stated that he
telephoned his girlfriend's house between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m.
on August 11, 2002, and spoke to D.S., who was there.  The
police did not verify D.S.'s alibi for the time of the attack.
D.S. also took a polygraph test, which did not indicate that
he was being deceptive when D.S. denied participating in the
attack.  D.S. was not prosecuted. The only disputed issue of
fact in this case is whether D.S. was present during the
attack.  Burger King questions whether D.S. was present during
1070173
Because the trial court expressly based its findings of
6
fact and conclusions of law both on evidence indicating that
D.S. was present and on evidence indicating that D.S. was not
present, I cannot conclude that the trial court found that
D.S. was not present during the attack.  However, even if the
trial court had so found, such a finding would not affect my
analysis or conclusion.  Although D.S.'s presence or absence
during the attack is relevant to whether N.J.J.'s attack was
motivated by reasons personal to her attackers, it is not
determinative as to whether, by placing N.J.J. in the parking
lot in the early morning hours, N.J.J.'s job "as a restaurant
manager" subjected N.J.J. to a hazard of assault she would not
be exposed to equally apart from her employment.  See Dallas
Mfg. Co. v. Kennemer, 243 Ala. 42, 44, 8 So. 2d 519, 520
(1942).
24
the attack, while N.J.J. testified unequivocally that he was.
The trial court's order makes clear that the trial court did
not resolve this dispute in reaching its findings.  The trial
court noted evidence indicating that D.S. gave the police an
alibi and that a polygraph test indicated no deception when
D.S. denied being present during the attack.  However, the
trial court also noted N.J.J.'s testimony that D.S. was
present and "asked the two attackers not to burn [N.J.J.] with
a cigarette and further asked the two attackers to leave."  
6
 After a nonjury trial, the trial court in N.J.J.'s
worker's compensation action found that N.J.J. did not sustain
a compensable injury under § 25-5-1(9), Ala. Code 1975,
because, it reasoned, her injuries were caused by the acts of
1070173
25
third parties who intended to injure her for reasons personal
to them and not directed against her as an employee or
resulting from her employment.
The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment, without an opinion.  N.J.J. v. Wesfam Rests., Inc.,
d/b/a Burger King (No. 2060444, October 12, 2007), __ So. 2d
__ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)(table). 
I note the following standard of review applies when an
appellate court reviews a worker's compensation case:  "An
appellate court reviews the burden of proof applied at trial
and other legal issues in workers' compensation claims without
a presumption of correctness."  Ex parte USX Corp., 881 So. 2d
437, 441 (Ala. 2003) (citing Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-81(e)(1));
Ex parte Drummond Co., 837 So. 2d 831, 832 (Ala. 2002).
However, "[i]n reviewing pure findings of fact, the finding of
the circuit court shall not be reversed if that finding is
supported by substantial evidence."  § 25-5-81(e)(2), Ala.
Code 1975. 
    Under § 25-5-1(9), Ala. Code 1975, known as Alabama's
"special-assault statute," the Workers' Compensation Act does
not apply to and a claimant will be denied benefits for an
1070173
Now codified as § 25-5-1(9), Ala. Code 1975.
7
26
"injury caused by the act of a third person or
fellow employee intended to injure the employee
because of reasons personal to him or her and not
directed against him or her as an employee or
because of his or her employment."
(Emphasis added.)
By operation of the word "and" in the above-quoted
portion of § 25-5-1(9), Ala. Code 1975, the special-assault
statute will not bar worker's compensation benefits in this
case if N.J.J.'s injuries were not "caused by the act of a
third person or fellow employee intended to injure the
employee because of reasons personal to him or her" or if the
injurious acts were "directed against [N.J.J.] as an employee
or because of ... her employment."  Harris v. Sloss-Sheffield
Steel & Iron Co., 222 Ala. 470, 471, 132 So. 727, 727 (1931)
(noting that the special-assault statute "does not exclude all
cases where the assault is 'intended to injure the employee
because of reasons personal to him,' but adds: 'And not
directed against him as an employee, or because of his
employment'" (quoting Ala. Code 1923, § 7596(J) )); Dean v.
7
Stockham Pipe & Fitting Co., 220 Ala. 25, 123 So. 225 (1929);
1070173
27
1 Terry A. Moore, Alabama Workers' Compensation § 10:31
(1998).
Our courts have developed a test for determining whether
injurious acts of third parties are "directed against [the
worker] as an employee or because of his or her employment."
§ 25-5-1(9), Ala. Code 1975.  "To prove that the assault was
directed at the employee as an employee or because of the
employment, the claimant must show a causal relation between
the employment and the assault."  Moore, § 10:24. "[T]he
assault will be considered an accident arising out of the
employment if the employment subjected the employee to a
hazard of assault he or she would not be exposed to equally
apart from his or her employment."  Id. "The employment may
materially increase the risk of assault in essentially two
ways:  the nature of the employment duties may naturally
expose the employee to a greater probability of being
assaulted or the environment in which the employee works may
subject the worker to an increased risk of assault."  Id. §
10:25 (citing Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, 249 Ala. 675,
32 So. 2d 666 (1947); Dallas Mfg. Co. v. Kennemer, 243 Ala.
42, 8 So. 2d 519 (1942); Howard Odorless Cleaners, Inc.  v.
1070173
28
Blevins, 237 Ala. 210, 186 So. 141 (1939); Republic Iron &
Steel Co. v. Ingle, 223 Ala. 127, 134 So. 878 (1931); Southern
Ry. v. Brown, 223 Ala. 140, 134 So. 643 (1931); Dean v.
Stockham Pipe & Fittings Co., 220 Ala. 25, 123 So. 225 (1929);
and McLaughlin v. Davis Lumber Co., 220 Ala. 440, 125 So. 608
(1929)).
A long history of caselaw in our state has consistently
applied the principle that, in the absence of some causal
connection between the injury and the employment, the mere
fact that the employment put the employee in the place where
he or she was injured is not sufficient to demonstrate that an
employee was attacked "because of his or her employment," §
25-5-1(9), Ala. Code 1975.  See Harris v. Sloss-Sheffield
Steel & Iron Co., 222 Ala. at 471, 132 So. at 727; Jacobs v.
Bowden Elec. Co., 601 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992); and
Dallas Mfg. Co. v. Kennemer, supra.
However, our courts have also long recognized that an
employee is attacked "because of his or her employment,"
within the meaning of the special-assault statute, when the
employment not only furnishes the setting and opportunity for
the attack, but also exposes the worker "to a danger
1070173
29
materially in excess of that to which  people commonly in that
locality are exposed when not situated as [the injured
employee] was in the course of his employment."  Dallas Mfg.
Co. v. Kennemer, 243 Ala. at 44, 8 So. 2d at 520.  Therefore,
when an employee demonstrates that the workplace setting
itself increased the risk that the worker would be the victim
of an of attack or injury caused by a third party, then the
employee has demonstrated the requisite causal link between
the employment and the injury, and the special-assault statute
does not exclude the worker from eligibility for worker's
compensation benefits, even if the attacker's motivation was
entirely personal.  See, e.g., Dean v. Stockham Pipe & Fitting
Co., 220 Ala. at 29, 123 So. at 228 (finding that the
predecessor to the special-assault statute did not bar
recovery where a night watchman was robbed and murdered for
reasons entirely personal to the attacker, because the night
watchman's job placed him alone on the employer's premises at
night with money in his pocket, "thus furnishing an
opportunity for robbery without interference -- a risk beyond
the common risk" (quoting Lanni v. Amsterdam Bldg. Co., 217
A.D. 278, 216 N.Y.S. 763 (1926)); but see Dallas Mfg. Co. v.
1070173
30
Kennemer, supra (holding that no causal relation existed
between the employment and injury where the injured employee
was struck by an errant bullet from the pistol of the angry
wife of another employee who came to the workplace and
attempted to shoot a third employee with whom she had been
having an affair, because the employment did not "specially
expose [the injured employee] to a hazard of this sort"), and
Harris v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., supra (finding
that the predecessor to the special-assault statute barred
recovery where the employee did not show that a workplace
injury was caused by an increased risk of injury inherent in
the workplace); cf. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, 249 Ala.
675, 679-80, 32 So. 2d 666, 679-80 (1947) (noting that "'the
employment caused the exposure to the risk'" of a fatal
gunshot wound caused when a boy playing with a pistol
accidentally shot an employee whose job required him to carry
and be around pistols; the Court reasoned that firearm
accidents are "unquestionably a hazard peculiar to the
employment of a ... person whose duties require the use of
firearms"); Boris Constr. Co. v. Haywood, 214 Ala. 162, 106
So. 799 (1925) (holding that a delivery truck driver's
1070173
31
employment "caused the exposure to the risk" of injury, where
a small boy accidentally shot and killed the truck driver in
front of the employer's place of business while the truck
driver was stepping into his delivery truck to make a delivery
for the employer); and Ex parte Rosengrant, 213 Ala. 202, 104
So. 409 (1925) (holding that a causal relation existed between
an employee's gunshot wound and the employment because the
employee's job, which caused him to be among barges tallying
lumber as it was removed from a barge, exposed him to "hazards
from loafing and working crews" on other boats to which he
would not otherwise have been exposed).
In this case, the trial court found that the attack on
N.J.J. was "racially motivated."  A finding that an attack was
"racially motivated" does not answer the legal question of
whether "the employment subjected [N.J.J.] to a hazard of
assault ... she would not be exposed to equally apart from ...
her employment."  Moore, § 10:24.  If workplace hazards were
a contributing factor in the attack, then, as a matter of law,
the injurious acts were "directed against N.J.J. as an
employee or because of her employment," regardless of whether
1070173
32
the attackers' motivation was "personal to them" and "racial."
See Dean, supra; Harris, supra.
I recognize that N.J.J. could have developed the record
more fully as to whether the dangers inherent in the parking
lot of the Burger King restaurant when she arrived in the
darkness of the early morning were factors that increased her
risk of attack beyond that of a normal citizen not employed as
a manager of a fast-food restaurant.  However, the record
contains 
substantial 
evidence 
indicating 
that 
N.J.J.'s
employment, which placed her in the Burger King parking lot in
the early morning hours, did expose N.J.J. to an increased
risk of attack.  N.J.J.'s undisputed testimony established
that she was acting in her position "as restaurant manager"
when she arrived at the Burger King restaurant between 3:30
and 4:00 a.m. to report to work.  From the facts presented, it
can readily be inferred that the parking lot of the Burger
King restaurant was a place where three men had little
difficulty carrying out an extensive, coordinated, terrible
assault on N.J.J. without detection between 3:30 a.m. and 4:00
a.m.  Moreover, the fact that N.J.J. felt the need to drive
around the parking lot looking for suspicious activity before
1070173
I note, however, unlike the usual rules of tort
8
liability, the Workers' Compensation Act does not require that
injuries must be forseeable to be compensable.  See Moore §
10:4.
33
getting out of her car demonstrates that a reasonable person
who was familiar with the parking lot of the Burger King
restaurant and the surrounding environment would understand
that the parking lot posed an increased hazard of an attack at
that time of the morning.   Thus, although N.J.J. could have
8
developed a more elaborate record as to the fact that the
parking lot posed an increased hazard in the pre-dawn hours,
the record contains substantial evidence indicating that
N.J.J.'s early-morning work environment increased her risk of
being attacked and that her duties "as restaurant manager"
placed her in that environment at that time.
 
Moreover, in similar cases, our courts have not required
expert testimony, local crime statistics, or other such
evidence to establish that, when workplace conditions place
the employee alone on the employer's premises at night, the
workplace creates an increased risk that the employee will be
attacked.  Rather, this Court has stated, as a matter of law
and reason, that "'crimes of violence flourish under cover of
the night and darkness,'" Dean, 220 Ala. at 29, 123 So. at 228
1070173
34
(quoting Heidemann v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 230 N.Y. 305,
308, 130 N.E. 302, 303 (1921) (Cardozo, J.)).  In Dean, for
example, this Court adopted the reasoning of another court
that, where a night watchman's "'employment placed him alone
on the premises with his wages in his pocket,'" the employment
thus 
"furnishe[d] 
an 
opportunity 
for 
robbery 
without
interference -- a risk beyond the common risk."  220 Ala. at
29, 123 So. at 228 (quoting Lanni v. Amsterdam Bldg. Co., 217
A.D. at 279, 216 N.Y.S. at 764); cf., e.g., Bruce, 249 Ala. at
680, 32 So. 2d at 670 ("When guns are handled shooting
accidents can be expected.  Such an accident is unquestionably
a hazard peculiar to the employment of a ... person whose
duties require the use of firearms."); Rosengrant, 213 Ala. at
205, 104 So. at 412 (observing that the injured employee's
"duties ... called him to this place, where ... barges with
crews were coming and going.  This exposed him to hazards from
loafing and working crews on these boats, to which he would
not otherwise have been subjected.").
I also note that N.J.J. could have more fully developed
the record with regard to whether, as the manager of the
Burger King restaurant, she was required to obtain Burger
1070173
35
King's approval of her work hours and whether Burger King
generally made a practice of reviewing or approving her work
schedule in advance.  N.J.J. could also have created a more
complete record as to whether, as is often the case with
restaurant managers, she was responsible for setting the work
schedules of all store employees, including her own.
Nevertheless, I respectfully disagree with Justice Smith's
conclusion that, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the trial court's findings, evidence indicating that N.J.J.
set her own schedule on the day of the attack, combined with
a lack of evidence of whether Burger King acquiesced in
N.J.J.'s practice of "often" arriving at work early to do
paperwork, provides reasonable support for the trial court's
judgment.
In this regard, Justice Smith finds significance in
statements of other Burger King employees included in the
police report of the assault.  Those statements convey that,
before the day of the attack, N.J.J. changed her work schedule
so that she would start work at 4:00 a.m. on the day of the
attack instead of her usual 5:00 a.m. start time.  Although I
agree that this evidence reasonably supports the inference
1070173
As Justice Smith notes, at the trial in this case the
9
entire police report of the investigation into the assault
was admitted into the record without objection.
Moreover, I see no reason to interpret the workers'
10
compensation statute so as to punish an employee for arriving
at work early to perform her duties for the employer's benefit
where there is no evidence that early arrival is prohibited.
Ex parte Ruggs, [Ms. 1061379, August 22, 2008] __ So. 2d __,
__ (Ala. 2008)  ("'"[C]ourts must liberally construe the
workers' compensation law 'to effectuate its beneficent
purposes,' although such a construction must be one that the
language of the statute 'fairly and reasonably supports.'"'").
36
that N.J.J. set her own schedule to arrive early on the day of
the attack,  this evidence simply does not shed any light on
9
whether N.J.J. was (or was not) required to schedule an early
arrival for the day of the attack.  Therefore, I cannot agree
with Justice Smith that such evidence reasonably supports the
inference that N.J.J.'s employment did not require her to be
at work at 4:00 a.m.10
In fact, the only evidence as to whether N.J.J. was
operating within her job responsibilities and requirements as
a restaurant manager in arriving early to complete paperwork
was N.J.J.'s testimony that she "came in as a restaurant
manager and did [the paperwork] before we opened -- or planned
on doing it before we opened.  So I allowed myself the extra
1070173
37
time.  I did that often."  That evidence is uncontradicted and
leaves no room for an inference that N.J.J.'s early arrival
was not a function of her responsibilities "as a restaurant
manager." See § 25-5-1(9), Ala. Code 1975 ("'Injury and
personal injury' shall mean only injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment ....").
Justice Smith and Burger King also rely on testimony from
N.J.J. that the restaurant parking lot was "well-lit" as
substantial evidence indicating that N.J.J. was not exposed to
an increased risk of attack by being in the parking lot
between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m.  However, N.J.J. did not testify
that the parking lot was "well-lit," only that a portion of
the parking lot was "well-lit."  The record contains no
evidence as to whether the level of lighting in the Burger
King parking lot made the parking lot safe for workers
arriving in the pre-dawn hours.  Even if I were to speculate
that the lighting in the parking lot ameliorated the risk of
attack to some degree, the record contains no evidence
indicating that the lighting in the parking lot so reduced the
risk of attack in the pre-dawn hours that N.J.J.'s risk of
attack was no greater than that of other people in the area
1070173
38
"not situated as [s]he was in the course of [her] employment."
Dallas Mfg. Co. v. Kennemer, 243 Ala. at 44, 8 So. 2d at 520
(emphasis added).  Thus, the fact that the parking lot was
"well-lit," even if true, does not reasonably support the
trial court's conclusion that N.J.J.'s injury was not caused
by her employment.
In sum, substantial evidence exists in this record
indicating that, by placing N.J.J., a female, alone in the
Burger King parking lot around 3:30 a.m., N.J.J.'s employment
furnished an opportunity for rape and assault without
interference, a risk that exceeded the risk that N.J.J. would
have been subjected to in other employment.  Cf. Dean, 220
Ala. at 29, 123 So. at 228.  Conversely, the record contains
no evidence to support a finding that the parking lot did not
pose a risk of rape and assault materially in excess of that
faced by ordinary citizens not reporting to work in the
parking lot of a Burger King fast-food restaurant alone at
3:30 in the morning.  See Dallas Mfg. Co. v. Kennemer, 243
Ala. at 44, 8 So. 2d at 520.  On this record, a conclusion by
the trial court that the parking lot did not create an
1070173
39
increased risk of attack would have been unsupported by the
evidence and plainly erroneous.
I share Justice Smith's respect for the ore tenus rule
and her concern that this Court must never substitute its
judgment for the trial court's by failing to draw all
reasonable factual inferences favorable to the trial court's
factual findings.  However, the ore tenus standard of review
does not permit this Court to affirm a trial court's judgment
when, "after considering all the evidence and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, [this Court] concludes
that the judgment is plainly and palpably wrong, manifestly
unjust, or without supporting evidence."  Boggan v. Judicial
Inquiry Comm'n, 759 So. 2d 550, 555 (Ala. 1999) (emphasis
added).  I conclude that the trial court erred in finding that
N.J.J.'s employment did not subject her to an increased risk
of attack because I find no evidence in the record that
reasonably supports that conclusion, not because I have
reweighed conflicting evidence to find that, on balance,
another conclusion or inference is more probable.  See
Friedman v. Friedman, 971 So. 2d 23, 28 (Ala. 2007)
("Appellate courts do not sit in judgment of disputed evidence
1070173
40
that was presented ore tenus before the trial court. ...[I]t
is not within the province of the appellate court to reweigh
the testimony and substitute its own judgment for that of the
trier of fact. ...[A]n appellate court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court.  To do so would be to
reweigh the evidence, which Alabama law does not allow."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Finally, I note that policy concerns do not preclude a
holding that a worker attacked on workplace property while
arriving at (or leaving) work at night is entitled to workers'
compensation benefits if the environment increases the risk of
attack.  Such a holding would be consistent with Alabama law
governing which workplace injuries are compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act.
"Generally, Alabama law has held that injuries
sustained in accidents that occur while an employee
is traveling to and from work are not covered under
the Act because those injuries do not meet the
'arising out of and in the course of employment'
requirement.  Alabama courts have carved out only a
few exceptions to this general rule:
"'Such exceptions include situations where
... 
the 
accident 
occurs 
on the
employer's property
o r  
o n  p u b l i c
property 
that 
is 
tantamount 
to 
the
employee's ingress to and egress from the
employer's property ....'
1070173
41
"An additional exception to the general rule arises
when an employee, during his travel to and from
work, is engaged in some duty for his employer that
is in furtherance of the employer's business."
Ex parte Shelby County Health Care Auth., 850 So. 2d 332, 336
(Ala. 2002) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); cf. Hughes
v. Decatur Gen. Hosp., 514 So. 2d 935, 937 (Ala. 1987) ("Most
courts consider parking lots owned or maintained by an
employer as part of the employer's premises whether the lots
are within the main company premises or separated from it.");
Thompson v. Anserall, Inc., 522 So. 2d 284, 286 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1988) ("'[T]he employment is not limited by the actual
time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and
begins it nor when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time,
space, and opportunity before and after while he is at or near
his place of employment.'"(quoting Barnett v. Britling
Cafeteria Co., 225 Ala. 462, 463, 143 So. 813, 813 (1932)). 
    If the special-assault statute operates to exclude
injuries such as those suffered by N.J.J. from the definition
of injuries compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act,
then employers will be liable for such injuries, if at all,
under the broader remedies afforded by tort law, rather than
for the more limited recovery available under the Workers'
1070173
42
Compensation Act.  Lowman v. Piedmont Exec. Shirt Mfg. Co.,
547 So. 2d 90, 93 (Ala. 1989) ("[I]f an accident is not
compensable because it is outside the coverage of the Act,
then the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act are also
inapplicable. Thus, an employer is protected from tort
liability only as to injuries expressly covered by the
language of the Act."); cf., e.g., Rose v. Cadillac Fairview
Shopping Ctr. Props. (De.) Inc., 668 A.2d 782 (Del. Super. Ct.
1995) (holding that the Delaware workers' compensation statute
was the exclusive remedy and barred the tort action of a Sears
Roebuck & Co. employee who was abducted from her employer's
parking lot and raped when she arrived 55 minutes early to
work).
In conclusion, this case is indistinguishable from Dean.
In Dean, the night watchman had something his attackers wanted
-- his money, which he was carrying on his person.  Because of
his service to his employers, he was in a place of increased
vulnerability that suggested to the robbers the opportunity to
capitalize on their wholly personal desire to rob Mr. Dean.
Likewise, in this case, N.J.J. had something personal to her
that her attackers wanted.  Although evidence exists that
1070173
I note, however, that the record contains absolutely no
11
evidence indicating why the attackers called N.J.J. a "nigger-
lover."  If D.S. was present during the attack, her only
acquaintance with the attackers came from a brief interaction
through her employment that had nothing to do with her
personal life.  If, as Burger King argues, D.S. was not
present during the attack, then the record shows that N.J.J.'s
attackers were entirely strangers to her.  In either case (and
especially if D.S. was not present), there is not substantial
evidence from which to conclude that the attackers could have
known N.J.J. was married to an African-American or how she
treated African-Americans apart from her employment.
43
could support a finding that the attackers wanted to retaliate
against N.J.J. for banning D.S. from the restaurant,
substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion
that N.J.J.'s attackers' motivation was entirely personal,
regardless of whether her attackers wanted to molest her
because she was a female or because of some desire to exact
vengeance on N.J.J. because they perceived her as "nigger-
lover."
  However, the evidence in this case leads only to the
11
conclusion that, because of her service to her employer,
N.J.J. was in a place of increased vulnerability that
suggested to the attackers the opportunity to capitalize on
their personal desire to rape and attack her.  The attackers
knew N.J.J. was alone in an isolated parking lot, and this
exposure incident to her employment furnished and suggested to
1070173
44
the attackers their opportunity, and so had a causal
connection with the assault.  Cf. Dean, 220 Ala. at 28, 123
So. at 227 (distinguishing Common Sch. Dist. v. District
Court, 168 N.W. 555 (Minn. 1918)).  "If the hazard peculiar to
the employment is a contributing cause, it matters not whether
violence was directed to [the employee] as an employee."
Dean, 220 Ala. at 28, 123 So. at 227 (emphasis added).
Therefore, as in Dean, the special-assault statute does not
operate as a bar to worker's compensation benefits.
Because substantial evidence demonstrates that N.J.J.'s
workplace created an increased risk of attack, and because
substantial evidence does not exist upon which the trial court
could have concluded otherwise, I believe the trial court's
judgment is plainly and palpably wrong, and the Court of Civil
Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order denying
N.J.J. worker's compensation benefits based on the special-
assault statute.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.