Title: Hubbard v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Hubbard and Earl, Jr. v. State of Maryland, No. 7, September Term, 2006.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – DOUBLE JEOPARDY – MANIFEST NECESSITY:
Petitioners sought review of a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the trial court’s
granting of a mistrial based on manifest necessity.  The trial judge had declared a mistrial over
Petitioners’s objections because a witness, whose identification testimony against one defendant had
been suppressed, was to be called by the State to testify against the co-defendant in a joint trial.  The
Court of Appeals reversed the intermediate appellate court, and held that the trial judge erred by
declaring that a mistrial was manifestly necessary.  Because a reasonable alternative to declaring the
mistrial existed, that being suppressing the witness’s testimony, the mistrial was not manifestly
necessary.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 7 
September Term, 2006
KEVIN LEON HUBBARD AND
GARY EUGENE EARL, JR.
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   October 17, 2006
Petitioners, Kevin Leon Hubbard and Gary Eugene Earl, Jr., seek review of a
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the trial court’s granting of a mistrial
based on manifest necessity.  The trial judge had declared a mistrial over Petitioners’s
objections because a witness, whose identification testimony against one defendant had been
suppressed, was to be called by the State to testify against the co-defendant in a joint trial.
We shall hold that the judge erred by declaring that a mistrial was manifestly necessary.
I.  Introduction
Petitioners were indicted on December 11, 2002, in a twenty-count indictment in
which they were charged, individually and collectively, with one count of attempted second-
degree murder in violation of Section 2-204 of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code
(2002); two counts of first-degree assault in violation of Section 3-202 of the Criminal Law
Article, Maryland Code (2002); two counts of second-degree assault in violation of Section
3-203 of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code (2002); two counts of robbery with a
dangerous weapon in violation of Section 3-403 of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code
(2002); one count of first-degree burglary in violation of Section 6-202 of the Criminal Law
Article, Maryland Code (2002); one count of third-degree burglary in violation of Section
6-204 of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code (2002); one count of theft over five
hundred dollars in violation of Section 7-104 of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code
(2002); one count of theft under five hundred dollars in violation of Section 7-104 of the
Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code (2002); two counts of robbery in violation of Section
3-402 of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code (2002); one count of use of a handgun
in the commission of a crime in violation of Section 4-204 of the Criminal Law Article,
1
Benson is not a party to this appeal.  Prior to jury selection and impaneling, his case
was severed from the other case.  Subsequently, Benson went to trial and was found guilty
of armed robbery and related charges.  Benson appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,
which affirmed the convictions in an unreported opinion.  
-2-
Maryland Code (2002); and counts for conspiracy to commit first-degree assault, armed
robbery, burglary, theft over five hundred dollars, robbery, as well as conspiracy to use a
handgun in the commission of a crime.  Edward Wallace Benson, III also was charged in
connection with the same crime.1
Subsequently, Petitioners filed separate motions to suppress photograph identifications
made by various witnesses who had identified either or both of them.  The Circuit Court for
Cecil County held a pre-trial suppression hearing, which lasted several days, concerning both
out-of-court and prospective in-court identifications by four witnesses – the two victims,
Damon Twyman and Daniel Draper, and two other eyewitnesses, Alisabel Ortega and
Sabrina Rogers.  Most significant for this appeal, Ms. Rogers photographically identified
seven different individuals at different times before trial as being tied to or involved in the
incident, including the three co-defendants, although the crime purportedly involved only
three individuals.
At the suppression hearing, Ms. Rogers’s out-of-court and in-court identifications of
Earl were ruled to be inadmissible because the photographic identification of Earl was
obtained through impermissibly suggestive procedures and was not independently reliable
enough to permit an in-court identification.  The trial judge noted that Ms. Rogers was shown
six photograph arrays in which she identified six different individuals.  Ms. Rogers was then
-3-
shown a seventh array, which was the same as photo array number three, but modified so that
Earl’s picture was substituted.  During this display, the detective told Ms. Rogers they were
still looking for the third individual involved.  The trial court found that Ms. Rogers’s out-of-
court identification was impermissibly suggestive because of the detective’s comment and
because Ms. Rogers had effectively ruled out every other person in the seventh photographic
array prior to the substitution of Earl’s picture.  The judge also found that Ms. Rogers’s
identification of Earl was not independently reliable enough to allow an in-court
identification because Ms. Rogers had previously identified an individual who was not
involved in the crime as the third suspect, who she also thereafter identified as Earl.
Following the court’s ruling, the State asked for clarification:
[STATE]:  The Court indicated that it was suppressing the
identification of Sabrina Rogers as to both in-court and -- I’m
sorry, both out-of-court and in-court.  I have to say the State did
not feel that there was evidence presented to rise to the level of
taint; therefore, the State did not try to elicit any information
from her as to reliability.  And while the suppression hearing is
concluded and I understand and accept the Court’s ruling with
respect to the out-of-court identification, the concern that I have
is that I believe that the State may be able to establish reliability
as to the in-court identification.
[COURT]:  Well, I think, you know, that I don’t want to have
more process than is due rather than less process than is due
most of the time, but I think your argument was and I think it’s
correct that the burden in the first instance is on the defense to
show constitutional or show impermissible suggestion; but the
burden clearly, by all the case law that everybody has cited and
I’ve looked at in this case indicates that if, in fact, they make it
on that issue, then the burden shifts to the State by clear and
convincing evidence; and in my opinion they did make it on
that.  I understand that in your opinion they did not.  And you
2
On the day of trial, the same judge reconsidered the suppression rulings and also
suppressed Ms. Ortega’s out-of-court identification of Hubbard, but allowed the State to put
Ms. Ortega on the witness stand to attempt to establish a separate and independent basis for
an in-court identification.
-4-
might be righter that I, but nevertheless it did shift and Sabrina
Rogers was here and was, in fact, examined.  And it’s my
finding that the evidence did not meet your burden by clear and
convincing evidence at this point.  Basically the suppression
hearing is over.  
*     *     *
[STATE]:  And to the extent that the exclusion of an out-of-
court identification does not ipso facto exclude an in-court
identification.
[COURT]:  If it’s got a separate basis.
[STATE]:  I want to let everyone know that if that’s the case, I
would certainly be trying to bring it forward at the time of trial.
And, again, I understand the Court’s ruling today and that’s
what we --
[COURT]:  Well, at this point I don’t even know if I’ll be the
trial judge.  So whoever the trial judge is, I suppose if you want
to raise that issue I’ll have to deal with it, but my ruling is that
[the in-court identification is] suppressed.
The judge denied the motion to suppress Ms. Rogers’s identification of Hubbard and denied
both Petitioners’s motions to suppress the identifications from Mr. Draper, Mr. Twyman, and
Ms. Ortega.2  The State persisted in its joint prosecution of Hubbard and Earl.  The jury was
selected and sworn before the same judge that conducted the suppression hearing.  After
opening statements from the State and both Petitioners’s counsels, the State requested the
opportunity to establish a separate and independent basis for an in-court identification of Earl
3
[STATE]:  One other matter, Your Honor, that it appears to me
to be a bit problematic.  That is the court has excluded Ms.
Rogers’s identification of Gary Earl.
[COURT]:  Out-of-court and in-court.
[STATE]:  Both in-court and out-of-court.  It is my assumption
that [Hubbard’s Attorney] will, in cross-examination of Sabrina
Rogers, bring to the attention of the jury that there were
numerous identifications made by Ms. Rogers of persons other
than his client.
(continued...)
-5-
by putting Ms. Rogers on the witness stand.  The trial judge granted the request, and after the
jury was excused for the day, the State called Ms. Rogers to testify, but the trial court ruled
that there was no separate and independent basis for an in-court identification and granted
Earl’s motion to suppress.
The following morning, before the jury was brought into the courtroom, the State
indicated that it was going to call Ms. Rogers as a witness and raised a possible conundrum.
The prosecutor was concerned that when Ms. Rogers testified against Hubbard, Hubbard’s
attorney would cross-examine Ms. Rogers based on her numerous identifications of
individuals other than Hubbard, which was concededly appropriate; the prosecutor insisted
that she should have the ability to rehabilitate Ms. Rogers by showing that she had identified
Earl, an identification which had been suppressed by the trial court.  When Earl’s attorney
objected that such inquiry would be fundamentally unfair to Earl, the trial judge agreed, and
stated that a curative instruction would not be helpful, and ordered that no party ask Ms.
Rogers any questions about identifying Earl.3  
3
(...continued)
While that’s fine for [Hubbard’s Attorney], the situation is that
I would want to try to rehabilitate, if we get to that point of those
questions being asked, rehabilitate Ms. Rogers by showing that,
in fact, she had identified another person who is a defendant in
this case, that being Mr. Earl.  And, of course, that’s obviously
very prejudicial toward Mr. Earl.  And I’m bringing it to the
court’s attention now because, again, obviously in a joint trial,
evidence can be used or heard as against one defendant while it
may not be admissible against another defendant.
[EARL’S ATTORNEY]:  Your Honor, that would require some
sort of curative instruction from you and I don’t know how you
do that and get that through these people’s minds.
[STATE]:  And I agree.
[EARL’S ATTORNEY]:  That’s fundamentally unfair to Mr.
Earl.
[COURT]:  Yeah, I agree, I don’t know how that can be done
and cured.  And while it’s certainly true that if Mr. Earl in his
defense or in his cross-examination of Ms. Rogers opens that
door, then he opens that door, but I’m not going to permit the
State to open the door or the defendant Hubbard to open that
door.  I’m going to order nobody ask her any questions about
identifying Gary Earl, because to do otherwise completely
undoes the suppression ruling.
-6-
The Court, sua sponte, then raised the specter of a severance:
[COURT]:  I think in this joint trial, it’s incumbent upon me not
to let the State or the other defendant undo the suppression
ruling in regard to Gary Earl.  Now, the alternative, let me say,
because we have not yet heard a witness, although we did swear
the jury, might be to sever these trials, but I’m not sure whether
we get that or not.
[HUBBARD’S ATTORNEY]:  I think, Your Honor, that’s the
only, that’s the only alternative, because for the court to tell Mr.
4
[COURT]:  Is there a practical significance between six and
seven.
[HUBBARD’S ATTORNEY]:  Sure.
[COURT]:  I mean you can specifically identify the named
individuals in all but Gary Earl.  Can you do it without naming
the other defendant as the person she identified?
[HUBBARD’S ATTORNEY]:  Oh, sure. I could say to the
witness isn’t it, in fact, true, and list every name except Earl and
then just refer to the identification as Earl and that you also
named another person that is not Kevin Hubbard.  Now, there
may be an implication there that could be M r. Earl, but I can do
it that way and not use Mr. Earl’s name.
Whether or not the court thinks that is, in fact, violating Mr.
Earl’s rights because of the granting of the suppression, if I were
Mr. Earl I would say, yeah, that does.  And I think the only cure
(continued...)
-7-
Hubbard that he can’t bring to the jury’s attention that
identifications were made and seven rather than six were made
by this witness, which is, in fact, the truth, and that is an
exculpatory piece of evidence to my client, to prevent me from
being able to bring that to the jury’s attention is denying my
client’s right of confrontation.
Immediately thereafter, the trial court questioned Hubbard’s attorney regarding whether he
could effectively cross-examine Ms. Rogers without specifically naming Earl.  Hubbard’s
attorney argued that it was possible – he could list every person identified by Ms. Rogers but
refer to Earl’s identification as “another person that is not Hubbard” – however, along with
Earl’s attorney, he questioned whether that limitation would contravene the decision to
suppress the identification because the jury could imply that the un-named identification was
that of Earl.4  
4
(...continued)
for this, the only way to protect Mr. Earl’s rights and Mr.
Hubbard’s rights is to sever these cases, because the prosecution
is asking that if I ask questions which I think I’d be entitled to
ask, that it intends to try to bring out this basically what would
be a violation of what the court’s suppression order is, I think
that -- I think it’s irreconcilable, Your Honor.  Frankly, Your
Honor, I think the court, as far as my client is concerned, would
be unjustified telling me that I can’t bring to the jury’s attention
that all seven identifications were made of three people at the
time in some form.  By the same token, I think it can be
reasonably argued that if I do that, there could be an implication
that Mr. Earl was identified.
*     *     *
[EARL’S ATTORNEY]:  Your Honor, I’ve already said I don’t
want [Ms. Rogers’s identification of Earl] to come in.  I don’t
want it to be any part of the case.  I don’t think that you can cure
that with an instruction to the jury.
[COURT]:  I’m not even going to try to cure it with an
instruction to the jury.  Either we’re going to do it in such a way
that Mr. Earl is not named and is adequately protected in terms
of the suppression or we’re not going to do it.  I’m not going to
allow Gary Earl to be named as a person she identified and then
try to tell the jury to disregard that.  You know, that would be
senseless.
What is your position in regard to whether or not the
examination and cross-examination can be done naming six
people identified and a seventh unidentified -- I mean unnamed,
and whether or not that prejudices Mr. Earl?
[EARL’S ATTORNEY]:  We’ve had this conversation a
number of times.  We can control what happens in here, we
don’t know what happens back there.  And my concern is that by
implication or inference or supposition or however it is they
(continued...)
-8-
4
(...continued)
arrive at a decision, the jury could conclude that was, in fact, a
reference to Gary.  So I would have to -- I’d have to be opposed
to it, although I certainly do understand [Hubbard’s Attorney]’s
argument that prejudices him.  I mean as a defense attorney I
would agree with that.
[COURT]:  [The Prosecutor], what’s your position?
 
[STATE]:  I’m looking for a -- I’m looking for a level playing
field.  I brought the matter to the court’s attention because I
suspected that, you know, that may be where we would be
heading.  And rather than break at that point and have the jury
going back to the jury room, I thought I better bring it up now
because I do think that the State should be entitled to bring that
to the attention of the jury in terms of any potential
rehabilitation of what may be otherwise impeachable stuff.
-9-
The issue of declaring a mistrial was then raised:
[COURT]:  All right, [The Prosecutor], what’s your belief or
position in regard to severance, jeopardy and mistrial?
[STATE]:  Your Honor, I would have to -- I think that it’s
occasion for a mistrial.  I have raised I believe on the record but
I certainly had raised it with all three defense counsel at the time
of the first hearing you all really planning to be heard together,
these cases are going to be heard together, because we have
these identifications that are essentially inextricably intertwined,
I believe.  You know, it has now reared its head one of those
potentials for something that could be used against one but not
used against another.
The only thing that we did yesterday was we reduced the
equation by one, but certainly if the court will recall, I mean
we’ve got the same sort of situation with the other co-defendant,
I believe.  I believe -- may be wrong about that, maybe Benson
ID’s are all in, but nevertheless at this point I think that a
5
[COURT]:  All right.  Now, I need to know from the defense
what your position is in regard to a mistrial, in either order?
*     *     *
[EARL’S ATTORNEY]:  Your Honor, at this point on behalf of
Mr. Earl, this has been hanging for a long time.  He would
prefer that the court not grant a mistrial.
*     *     *
[HUBBARD’S ATTORNEY]:  We’re not asking for a mistrial
either, Your Honor.  That is not to say that it may -- I’m not
arguing for it.  That is not to say that I don’t know what
alternative the court has at this juncture.
*     *     *
[COURT]:  And I think we both know where we are in terms of
jeopardy and retrial and that sort of issue.  The question is am I
going to grant a mistrial over the objection of the defendants or
not?
*     *     *
The State brings this matter to the court’s attention in terms of
expecting cross-examination on the issue of how many total
identifications Ms. Rogers made.  I believe the count is seven,
six of whom were two of the defendants, Mr. Hubbard, Mr.
(continued...)
-10-
mistrial is the appropriate undertaking.
Hubbard’s and Earl’s attorneys both objected to the granting of a mistrial.  The trial
judge, however, instead fashioned his own remedy, ruling that the parties could refer to the
seventh identification, that of Earl, but could not refer to the seventh identification of Earl
by name.5  The prosecutor continued his objection, and insisted that manifest necessity
5
(...continued)
Benson, who is no longer in this case at this time, and four
others who were ruled out, and then a seventh identification
which was Mr. Earl, who -- which I have suppressed.
State wants to attempt to rehabilitate Ms. Ortega -- excuse me,
Ms. Rogers if that question is asked by I think asking her
whether or not she did, in fact, identify Earl as one of these
defendants. 
*     *     *
Well, I’m not going to permit that because that would, in fact,
undo the suppression and it would undo it without Mr. Earl
and/or his attorney having opened that door, so I’m not going to
allow it.  Then [Hubbard’s Attorney] argues that it’s prejudicial
to his client to limit his cross-examination to not permitting any
reference to Mr. Earl by name.  And [Earl’s Attorney] argues
that even reference to the seventh identification of an unnamed
individual may raise a negative inference as to his client.  So
essentially if I don’t declare a mistrial, my remedy is not going
to suit anybody.  Well, I guess we’re going to find out whether
this is a constitutional remedy or not.  
My ruling is [The Prosecutor] can in redirect refer to the seventh
identification, but may not refer to and may not permit the
witness to refer to the name of the seventh individual or
otherwise identify who that individual is as Gary Earl.  And,
[Hubbard’s Attorney], I’m going to impose the same limitation
on you.  If that’s an unconstitutional violation of your
defendant’s due process rights, then the Court of Appeals is
going to let us know that, but I’m not going to declare a mistrial.
I’m going to go forward with this matter with the remedy that
I’ve just fashioned.
-11-
existed for a mistrial because the alternative suggested by the judge would hinder the ability
of the State to rehabilitate Ms. Rogers:
[STATE]:  Your Honor, from the State’s perspective, I don’t see
where that gets anything in terms of potential rehabilitation.  In
-12-
other words, again, the rehabilitation effect I think is evident by
the fact that, yes, she named two of these persons who are
standing trial here today.  As we all know, in fact she named
three of the defendants who are standing trial.  So to simply say
that the State can’t show that she identified Mr. Earl is to say
that bolsters the idea that she made seven identifications
regarding three persons and, again, that only one of those is
before the jury in terms of her being able to say that’s the one I
identified.  
[COURT]:  Well, let me ask you this:  Do you believe that this
is an example of manifest necessity for a mistrial?  You
understand that a retrial will be barred unless there’s manifest
necessity.
[STATE]:  I understand, Your Honor, and that’s why, again,
I brought it to the court’s attention, because I think we need
to have a ruling on this.  I believe on the basis of the position
of the defendants -- and I fully understand the position of
the defendants, but I believe that on the basis of their
respective positions, that it’s manifest necessity because I
think that otherwise it would deny the State the right to
rehabilitate a witness in a manner or rehabilitation that I
think can be effective.
The effectiveness of simply saying that she actually identified
seven people, as I say, that doesn’t rehabilitate her at all.
Rehabilitation comes from saying two of those persons are
seated in this courtroom and that she identified another co-
defendant; therefore, either severance or mistrial.  You know, if
we sever the case, then I can go forward.  I’m not sure.
[COURT]:  Thing is this jury has now had opening statements
having to do with two defendants, has been told various things
about the evidence from the State, intends to proceed against
two defendants.  Severing one of them and continuing with the
other one at this point seems like a very confusing way for the
jury.
[STATE]:  Seems to me -- and, again, I’m not -- foreclosing any
argument from defense counsel, but it seems to me that it may
be prejudicial to one or the other of the defendants, particularly
-13-
the one who is still sitting at counsel table; therein, as I say,
Your Honor, I think lies the necessity, the manifest necessity for
a mistrial.  I’m not saying that’s the -- it’s a Hobson’s choice,
only perhaps three choices rather than the two, but the bottom
line is I don’t see how due process is afforded to both sides
without doing just that.
*     *     *
[COURT]:  Well, [The Prosecutor] is exactly right, it’s a
Hobson’s choice, but if I have one paramount duty that’s more
important than any others, it is to safeguard the rights of parties
before the court, defendants and the State, actually.
Well, I agree that it’s difficult to see how I can fashion a
remedy, although I was in the process of arriving at a remedy,
but upon further reflection, it seems to me that any remedy that
I fashion has got to be prejudicial to somebody, prejudicial to
one of the defendants or to the other or maybe both of them,
and/or prejudicial to the State for that matter.  Clearly the issue
of retrial after mistrial doesn’t have anything to do with the
benefit to who.  I mean, it could be mistrial could have been
declared and have extended a benefit to the defendant, and that’s
not a factor in the analysis.
Upon further consideration of [The Prosecutor]’s argument, I
believe that this is a manifest necessity and I will, therefore,
declare a mistrial in this matter and grant severance on my own
motion of all three of these cases.
(emphasis added)
Earl and Hubbard filed separate motions to dismiss their indictments on double
jeopardy grounds, which were denied after hearings, by the same judge who had declared the
mistrial.  
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed in a reported
opinion.  Hubbard v. State, 166 Md. App. 250, 262, 887 A.2d 1120, 1127 (2005).  The
intermediate appellate court held that because the judge considered the possible alternatives,
-14-
he had exercised his sound discretion to find manifest necessity to declare a mistrial.  Id. at
261-62, 887 A.2d at 1126-27.
We granted Petitioners’s petition for writ of certiorari, which presented the following
question for our review:
Where jeopardy had attached at trial and the trial judge had
granted the prosecutor’s motion for a mistrial over Petitioners’s
objections, did the Court of Special Appeals err in affirming the
trial judge’s decision that the mistrial had been required by
manifest necessity? 
393 Md. 160, 900 A.2d 206 (2005).  We hold that the Court of Special Appeals erred in
affirming the trial judge’s decision that the mistrial was required by manifest necessity.
II.  Discussion
Petitioners contend that the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming the trial
judge’s decision that the mistrial was required by manifest necessity.  They argue that there
was a five-month delay between the suppression of Ms. Rogers’s out-of-court and in-court
identifications of Earl and the trial date, and as a result, the State had ample time to consider
the ramifications of the ruling, which Petitioners described as creating an “obvious imbalance
in the identification evidence.”  Petitioners claim that the result of the suppression rulings
was the foreseeable risk that Ms. Rogers could not be called as a witness against Hubbard
because of the potential prejudicial effect on Earl, and despite this, the prosecution chose to
proceed with a joint trial.  Petitioners contend that this case is analogous to situations
involving deficiencies in the State’s evidence or the absence of a witness, which do not
constitute manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. 
-15-
The State, conversely, argues that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in
affirming the trial judge’s decision to declare the mistrial for manifest necessity because the
decision was within the discretion of the judge, and the judge thoroughly considered the
alternatives before declaring the mistrial.  The State also contends that manifest necessity
existed because the evidentiary problem would adversely affect some combination of the
prosecution and one or both of the defendants, the prosecution was not at fault for the
problem, and Petitioners did not offer any other alternative.
A.  Double Jeopardy
In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), the
United States Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
requiring that “[n]o person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb,” was applicable to state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 796, 89 S.Ct. at 2062, 23 L.Ed.2d at 715.  The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
cumulative punishment as well as successive prosecution.  Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,
165-66, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187, 194 (1977).  As the Supreme Court has stated,
“to subject the individual to repeated prosecutions for the same offense would cut deeply into
the framework of procedural protections which the Constitution establishes for the conduct
of a criminal trial.” United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d
543, 533 (1971).
The Double Jeopardy Clause unequivocally bars the retrial of a defendant after a final
judgment of acquittal.  Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 98 S.Ct. 824, 829, 54
6
When a defendant does not object to the motion for a mistrial, or a mistrial is declared
at a defendant’s behest, the double jeopardy equation is different.  See United States v. Dintz,
424 U.S. 600, 607-08, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079, 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 274 (1976) (stating that
generally, “a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier
to reprosecution”), quoting in turn Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485, 91 S.Ct. at 557, 27 L.Ed.2d at 556.
-16-
L.E.2d 717, 726-27 (1978).  Retrial is not automatically barred, however, when a criminal
proceeding is concluded after jeopardy attaches but without resolving the merits of the case.
As Justice Stevens stated in Arizona v. Washington: 
Unlike the situation in which the trial has ended in an acquittal
or conviction, retrial is not automatically barred when a criminal
proceeding is terminated without finally resolving the merits of
the charges against the accused.  Because of the variety of
circumstances that may make it necessary to discharge a jury
before a trial is concluded, and because those circumstances do
not invariably create unfairness to the accused, his valued right
to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes
subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one
full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial
jury.  Yet in view of the importance of the right, and the fact that
it is frustrated by any mistrial, the prosecutor must shoulder the
burden of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double
jeopardy bar.  His burden is a heavy one.  The prosecutor must
demonstrate ‘manifest necessity’ for any mistrial declared over
the objection of the defendant.
434 U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct. at 830, 54 L.E.2d at 728 (emphasis added).  If granting a mistrial
over objection was manifestly necessary, the defendant may be retried without implicating
the Double Jeopardy Clause; if there were no manifest necessity for the mistrial
determination over objection, the defendant could not be retried.6  
In the present case, the jury had been empaneled and sworn, so that jeopardy had
attached.  See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425,
-17-
433 (1973) (stating that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is empaneled and
sworn); State v. Woodson, 338 Md. 322, 329, 658 A.2d 272, 276 (1995) (same).  Both
Hubbard and Earl objected to the grant of the mistrial.  The sole issue, then, is whether the
judge erred when he declared a mistrial based upon manifest necessity.
B.  Manifest Necessity
Whether manifest necessity to declare a mistrial and avoid double jeopardy exists is
based upon the unique facts and circumstances of each case.  See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 480, 91
S.Ct. at 555, 27 L.Ed.2d at 554 (“[The Supreme] Court has, for the most part, explicitly
declined the invitation of litigants to formulate rules based on categories of circumstances
which will permit or preclude retrial.”).  The concept of manifest necessity was introduced
in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), when the Supreme Court
declared:  
We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested
Courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from
giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity
for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated.  
Id. at 580, 6 L.Ed. at 578.  See also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 506 n.18, 98 S.Ct.
at 830 n.18, 54 L.Ed.2d at 728 n.18; Somerville, 410 U.S. at 461, 93 S.Ct. at 1069, 35
L.Ed.2d at 429; Jorn, 400 U.S. at 481, 91 S.Ct. at 555, 27 L.Ed.2d at 554; Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684, 689-90, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974, 978 (1949).  In Arizona v.
Washington, supra, the Supreme Court declined to categorically formulate a test for manifest
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necessity but instead recognized the “classic formulation” of the term, describing:  
The words ‘manifest necessity’ appropriately characterize the
magnitude of the prosecutor’s burden. . . . Nevertheless, those
words do not describe a standard that can be applied
mechanically or without attention to the particular problem
confronting the trial judge.  Indeed, it is manifest that the key
word ‘necessity’ cannot be interpreted literally; instead, contrary
to the teaching of Webster, we assume that there are degrees of
necessity and we require a ‘high degree’ before concluding that
a mistrial is appropriate.
434 U.S. at 505-06, 98 S.Ct. at 830-31, 54 L.Ed.2d at 728-29 (emphasis added).  To meet the
“high degree” of necessity, the Supreme Court has recognized that there must be no
reasonable alternative to the declaration of a mistrial.  See Somerville, 410 U.S. at 462, 93
S.Ct. at 1069, 35 L.Ed.2d at 430 (“Where . . . the ends of substantial justice cannot be
attained without discontinuing the trial, a mistrial may be declared . . . over [defendant’s]
objection.”), quoting in turn Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 1536,
6 L.Ed.2d 901, 904 (1961); Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487, 91 S.Ct. at 558, 27 L.Ed.2d at 558
(suggesting that a trial continuance would have been a reasonable alternative to declaring a
mistrial).
We have adopted the same framework for the Maryland common law double jeopardy
prohibition.  See Wynn v. State, 388 Md. 423, 429, 879 A.2d 1097, 1101 (2005) (stating the
“well-established” rule that manifest necessity for any mistrial declared over the objection
of the defendant is required to allow retrial); Taylor v. State, 381 Md. 602, 611, 851 A.2d
551, 556 (2004), quoting in turn Woodson, 338 Md. at 329, 658 A.2d at 276 (“Thus, after
jeopardy attaches, retrial is barred if a mistrial is declared without the defendant’s consent
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unless there is a showing of ‘manifest necessity’ to declare the mistrial.”); State v.
Crutchfield, 318 Md. 200, 207-08, 567 A.2d 449, 452 (1989) (quoting “seminal Supreme
Court” decision, Perez, for the double jeopardy manifest necessity requirement); Wooten-Bey
v. State, 308 Md. 534, 542, 520 A.2d 1090, 1094 (1987) (citing framework set forth in
Perez);  In re Mark R., 294 Md. 244, 249-50, 449 A.2d 393, 397 (1982) (quoting extensively
from Arizona v. Washington); Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 317-18, 322 A.2d 880, 884
(1974) (following the principles set forth in Supreme Court case law to determine whether
manifest necessity existed).  
In In re Mark R., supra, this Court iterated that the prosecutor must shoulder a heavy
burden to justify a mistrial if the prosecutor is to avoid the double jeopardy bar, embracing
the maxim that the prosecutor must demonstrate that there is “a high degree of necessity
before concluding that the mistrial is appropriate.”   294 Md. at 249-50, 449 A.2d at 397.  See
also Taylor, 381 Md. at 611, 851 A.2d at 556, quoting in turn Woodson, 338 Md. at 329, 658
A.2d at 276; Crutchfield, 318 Md. at 208, 567 A.2d at 452; Cornish, 272 Md. at 317-18 , 322
A.2d at 884 (stating that manifest necessity is only apparent  “under urgent circumstances,”
or “in very extraordinary and striking circumstances”).  We also confirmed that “a retrial is
barred by the Fifth Amendment where reasonable alternatives to a mistrial . . . are feasible
and could cure the problem.” In re Mark R., 294 Md. at 263, 449 A.2d at 404, quoting in turn
Cornish, 272 Md. at 320, 322 A.2d at 886.  See Crutchfield, 318 Md. at 213, 567 A.2d at
455; Neal v. State, 272 Md. 323, 326, 322 A.2d 887, 889 (1974) (remarking that a mistrial
should only be declared once the judge perceives that trial cannot proceed).  E.g.,  Jourdan
-20-
v. State, 275 Md. 495, 511, 341 A.2d 388, 398 (1975) (noting that there was no reason why
a continuance was not an alternate remedy when the prosecuting attorney became ill). 
Thus, to determine whether manifest necessity to declare a mistrial over defense
objection exists, the trial judge must engage in the process of exploring reasonable
alternatives and determine that there is no reasonable alternative to the mistrial.  Unlike the
rule propounded by the Court of Special Appeals, application of this standard in manifest
necessity cases does not only consider whether alternatives were analyzed, but also goes to
whether a reasonable alternative to a mistrial was available.  If there was no reasonable
alternative, ordinarily the mistrial is manifestly necessary, and retrial is not barred by double
jeopardy principles.  If there is a reasonable alternative, the mistrial is not manifestly
necessary, and a defendant cannot be retried.  Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
defendant.  In re Mark R., 294 Md. at 262, 449 A.2d at 403 (citing Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734, 738, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 1035, 10 L.Ed.2d 100, 104 (1963)).  
In the case sub judice, the decision to grant a mistrial arose because of two mutually
antagonistic decisions made by the State – the first, to proceed against Hubbard and Earl
jointly, and the second, to call Sabrina Rogers to the stand in the joint trial.  Although the
judge suppressed both Ms. Rogers’s out-of-court and in-court identification of Earl, he did
not suppress Ms. Rogers’s out-of-court and in-court identification of Hubbard.  The State
would call Ms. Rogers to testify against Hubbard, and Hubbard would attempt to impeach
her with her identification of six other individuals, including Earl.  The identification of Earl
by Ms. Rogers, however, had been suppressed.   
-21-
We acknowledge that the trial court did explore other various alternatives to a mistrial.
Nevertheless, his exploration is only a part of the equation, because there was a reasonable
alternative to the decision to declare a mistrial against both Hubbard and Earl. 
The exclusion of Sabrina Rogers’s testimony against Hubbard would have remedied
the situation caused by the joint prosecution.  Maryland Rule 5-403 states the general
principal that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.  In Smith v. State, 371 Md. 496, 504-06, 810 A.2d 449, 454-55
(2002), we held that even if evidence of an alleged conspiracy between a witness, a co-
defendant, and the co-defendant’s attorney, was relevant to prove the witness’s bias, it was
inadmissible because its probative value was substantially outweighed by its obvious
prejudice to the co-defendant’s attorney.  See also McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 615, 375
A.2d 551, 557 (1977) (“[I]t is unrealistic to expect jurors to ignore seemingly relevant
evidence which they have already heard.”).  
Other jurisdictions have considered the exclusion of testimony as a reasonable
alternative to declaring a mistrial.  In State v. Dodge, 564 P.2d 312 (Utah 1977), the Supreme
Court of Utah considered whether the trial judge’s denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial
was proper.  The court held that the trial judge correctly declined to grant a mistrial, stating:
“The trial court had other alternatives to the mistrial the appellant requested.  A motion to
strike or exclude the violating witnesses testimony could have been made.”  Id. at 313 (also
noting that defendants should avail themselves of “less drastic means” to limit possible
prejudice before moving for a mistrial).   See also, e.g., McArthur v. State, 671 So.2d 867,
-22-
870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“[W]e find that the trial court [erred] in failing to either
exclude the evidence or in the alternative, grant appellant’s motion for a mistrial.”); People
v. Pondexter, 573 N.E.2d 339, 344 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (reversing order granting a mistrial
because “the trial court stated it only had two alternatives . . . declare a mistrial . . . or bar the
testimony.”); State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d 778, 782-83 (Me. 1984) (dealing with issue of
severance, the court stated that “[m]anifest necessity simply cannot exist where, as here, the
trial justice had a clear alternative – sustaining [defendant’s] objection to the admission of
the . . . statement – that would have both protected . . . [co-defendant’s] rights and preserved
intact the joint prosecution format selected by the state.”).  Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 137, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1628, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 485-86 (1968) (refusing to allow
introduction of defendant’s confession in joint trial because it was facially incriminating
against co-defendant); Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 683 (7th Cir. 1995)
(acknowledging that admission of co-defendant’s statement implicating the other defendant
results in a substantial and unfair prejudice to the other defendant).  
The reluctance of the trial judge to exclude Ms. Rogers’s testimony seemingly was the
result of a concern about the prejudice that the State would suffer.  The State created the
conundrum; it also cannot be the beneficiary of a manifest necessity analysis.  The State
knew five months prior to trial that there were significant problems resulting from calling
Sabrina Rogers to testify against Hubbard that would prejudice Earl if the two were tried
together.  See Downum, 372 U.S. at 737, 83 S.Ct. at 1035, 10 L.Ed.2d at 103 (declaring that
prosecutorial unpreparedness in not assuring witness availability is insufficient to find
-23-
manifest necessity); United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Evidence
that might be admissible under Rule 403 in a trial of one defendant is not inevitably
admissible in a joint trial.  In some situations the danger of unfair prejudice to co-defendants
may be so great that the prosecution must be put to a choice of forgoing either the evidence
or the joint trial.”); Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 117, 345 A.2d 62, 76 (1975) (referring to the
State’s decision to try defendants together as a “tactical decision”).
At oral argument before this Court, the only explanation the State could offer for why
it did not sever the cases was judicial economy, but judicial economy does not supplant the
right of an accused not to be tried twice for the same crime.  See Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485, 91
S.Ct. at 557, 27 L.Ed.2d at 556 (noting that if a defendant’s right to take the case to the jury
is valued, it is enough to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds unless a mistrial was actually
necessary to protect an important public interest); United States v. Chica, 14 F.3d 1527, 1532
(11th Cir. 1994) (“We empathize with the district court’s desire to conserve judicial
resources by having one trial instead of two, but the Double Jeopardy Clause does not contain
a judicial economy exception.”); United States v. Givens, 88 F.3d 608, 614 (8th Cir. 1996)
(observing that trial courts cannot rely upon the “forbidden considerations of judicial
economy” when declaring a mistrial); United States v. Ramirez, 884 F.2d 1524, 1530 (1st
Cir. 1989) (stating that the cost of two trials cannot justify declaring a mistrial instead of
granting a severance); United States v. Bridewell, 664 F.2d 1050, 1051 (6th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (“While we sympathize with [the district court’s] laudable desire to avoid a waste
of federal court resources, we do not think that the possible necessity of a separate trial
-24-
constitutes manifest necessity for purposes of avoiding a double jeopardy bar.”).
In the case sub judice, a reasonable alternative existed to the declaration of a mistrial,
and thus the mistrial was not manifestly necessary.  The trial judge erred by declaring a
mistrial based on manifest necessity.  
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR CECIL COUNTY
AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR CECIL COUNTY
WITH DIRECTIONS TO DISMISS THE
INDICTMENTS.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
CECIL
COUNTY.