Title: In re Juvenile

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12860 
 
IN THE MATTER OF A JUVENILE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 3, 2020. - October 1, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Juvenile Court.  Incompetent Person.  Practice, Criminal, 
Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Defendant's competency, 
Transfer hearing, Stay of proceedings, Dismissal.  Due 
Process of Law, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Competency 
to stand trial. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on September 3, 2019. 
 
 
The case was reported by Kafker, J. 
 
 
 
Robert F. Hennessy for the defendant. 
 
Tara L. Johnston, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Sarah Spofford, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case and authored this opinion prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The issue in this case is whether due process 
permits a Juvenile Court judge to conduct a transfer hearing 
pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, where the defendant, now an 
adult, is incompetent to stand trial for a crime allegedly 
committed as a juvenile.  We conclude that it does not and that 
a transfer hearing may be conducted only if and when the 
defendant becomes competent to stand trial.  We further conclude 
that if the defendant indefinitely continues to be incompetent 
to stand trial, due process requires that the charges be 
dismissed at the time the defendant would have become eligible 
for parole if, after the issuance of a criminal complaint, he 
were convicted of the most serious crime charged and received 
the maximum sentence.2 
Background.  1.  Statutory background.  General Laws 
c. 119, § 72A, establishes the procedure for prosecuting a 
defendant who allegedly committed a crime as a juvenile but was 
apprehended after his or her nineteenth birthday.  The statute 
provides in relevant part: 
"If a person commits an offense or violation prior to his 
eighteenth birthday, and is not apprehended until after his 
nineteenth birthday, the court, after a hearing, shall 
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that 
said person committed the offense charged, and shall, in 
its discretion, either order that the person be discharged, 
                                                 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services, Citizens for Juvenile Justice, the 
Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, and the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
3 
 
 
if satisfied that such discharge is consistent with the 
protection of the public; or, if the court is of the 
opinion that the interests of the public require that such 
person be tried for such offense or violation instead of 
being discharged, the court shall dismiss the delinquency 
complaint and cause a criminal complaint to be issued. 
. . .  Said hearing shall be held prior to, and separate 
from, any trial on the merits of the charges alleged." 
 
"[T]he purpose of § 72A is, in part, to give the Juvenile Court 
jurisdiction over cases where a juvenile offender is not 
apprehended until after his [nineteenth] birthday, and if public 
interest requires, transfer the case to the Superior Court," 
where the defendant may be prosecuted for criminal acts that he 
or she committed as a juvenile.  See Commonwealth v. Nanny, 462 
Mass. 798, 804 (2012). 
During a § 72A transfer hearing, a Juvenile Court judge 
must make two determinations.  The first is whether there is 
probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the 
charged offense.  G. L. c. 119, § 72A.  If the judge concludes 
that there is probable cause, the second determination is 
whether the defendant should be tried as an adult on the 
criminal charge or be discharged, thereby ending the 
prosecution.  Id.  "[I]f the court is of the opinion that the 
interests of the public require that such person be tried for 
such offense or violation," the judge shall dismiss the juvenile 
complaint and transfer the defendant to the jurisdiction of the 
District Court, the Boston Municipal Court, or the Superior 
4 
 
 
Court.  Id.  See Nanny, 462 Mass. at 799 (if Juvenile Court 
judge transfers case, it "then proceeds in accordance with the 
ordinary course of criminal proceedings").  If the judge 
concludes that "discharge is consistent with the protection of 
the public," the judge shall discharge the defendant.  G. L. 
c. 119, § 72A.  The judge's decision is entirely discretionary, 
requiring "consideration of the specific crime and the 
particular defendant."  J.H. v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 285, 290 
(2018).  See Commonwealth v. Davis, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 410, 415 
(2002) (there are no "specific evidentiary considerations to 
guide the ultimate decision" in § 72A transfer hearing). 
2.  Facts and procedural background.  In January 2018, the 
Seekonk police department received a referral from the 
Department of Children and Families regarding an alleged series 
of sexual assaults.  The complainant claimed that the defendant 
had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions between August 
2009 and October 2011, when the two lived together in a foster 
home.  At the time of these alleged assaults, the defendant was 
a juvenile, thirteen to fifteen years old; the complainant was 
ten to eleven years old.  Due to the delay in disclosure by the 
complainant, the defendant was a twenty-one year old adult when 
the delinquency complaint was brought. 
On March 5, 2018, the defendant was arrested on a warrant; 
arraigned in the Juvenile Court on charges of indecent assault 
5 
 
 
and battery on a child under fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B, and 
indecent assault and battery on a mentally disabled person, 
G. L. c. 265, § 13F; and released on personal recognizance, with 
an order to stay away from the alleged victim.  At the time of 
his arrest, the defendant was living at a short-term residential 
facility operated by the Department of Mental Health.  Based on 
concerns about the defendant's competency to stand trial, the 
Juvenile Court judge ordered an outpatient evaluation pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a). 
The first evaluation, completed by a forensic psychologist 
retained by defense counsel, found that the defendant 
"suffer[ed] from a substantial disorder of mood, thought and 
perception that grossly impair[ed] his judgment, behavior, and 
capacity to recognize reality."  The forensic psychologist also 
noted that the defendant possessed "a rudimentary understanding 
of some aspects of his case" but demonstrated "substantial 
impairment in his rational understanding of the legal 
proceedings and his ability to assist counsel in his defense, 
including making reasoned decisions about his case."  
Ultimately, the forensic psychologist concluded that the 
defendant was not competent to stand trial. 
The second evaluation was conducted by a Juvenile Court 
clinician, who also concluded that the defendant was not 
competent to stand trial.  Although the clinician determined 
6 
 
 
that the defendant had "sufficient ability to rationally consult 
with defense counsel," she noted her concerns that he would not 
be able to withstand the stress of trial given his "historic 
difficulties with remaining calm and present for brief 
hearings." 
Following these evaluations, the Juvenile Court judge 
declared the defendant legally incompetent to stand trial.  The 
Commonwealth then requested a § 72A transfer hearing.  The 
defendant moved to stay the hearing, and the Juvenile Court 
judge denied the motion without a hearing.  The defendant then 
petitioned a single justice of this court for extraordinary 
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  The single justice 
reserved and reported the matter to the full court. 
Discussion.  1.  Due process rights of an incompetent 
defendant.  "Due process under both the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights prohibits the prosecution from proceeding 
to trial against a criminal defendant or juvenile who has been 
found incompetent to stand trial."  Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 
458 Mass. 24, 27 (2010), citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 
171 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 152 
(2007).  See White v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1118, 1121 (1983) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Due process forbids a State to try 
or convict a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial").  A 
7 
 
 
person accused of a crime is incompetent to stand trial where he 
"lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the 
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist 
in preparing his defense."  Commonwealth v. Prater, 420 Mass. 
569, 573 (1995), quoting Drope, supra.  See Abbott A., supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. L'Abbe, 421 Mass. 262, 266 (1995). 
This prohibition helps to protect the accuracy and 
reliability of criminal and delinquency proceedings by ensuring 
that criminal defendants and juveniles have the ability and 
opportunity to communicate information to others that may reveal 
their innocence or lessen their degree of guilt.  See Drope, 420 
U.S. at 171.  See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *24-25.  It 
also safeguards other constitutional rights, "including the 
right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, 
to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to 
testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without penalty 
for doing so" (citation omitted).  Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 
348, 354 (1996).  Essential to the competency determination, 
therefore, is whether the defendant or juvenile has "sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding."  Commonwealth v. Vailes, 360 
Mass. 522, 524 (1971), quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 
402, 402 (1960). 
8 
 
 
The trial is the pivotal truth-seeking event, so the 
capacity of the defendant or juvenile to communicate and assist 
counsel at that stage in the proceedings is a cornerstone of due 
process.  See Drope, 420 U.S. at 171-172 ("the prohibition 
[against trying an incompetent defendant] is fundamental to an 
adversary system of justice").  Similarly, "accepting a plea 
bargain or waiving one's right to a hearing" are "'strategically 
important' decisions" that require the defendant's comprehension 
and ability to communicate with counsel.  Abbott A., 458 Mass. 
at 33, quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 441 Mass. 499, 506 n.10 
(2004). 
But due process does not necessarily require the cessation 
of all pretrial hearings when the accused is incompetent to 
stand trial.  See Abbott A., supra at 27.  To determine whether 
due process permits a pretrial hearing to proceed where a 
defendant or juvenile has been found incompetent to stand trial, 
we apply a balancing test, set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which considers and weighs three factors: 
"First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation 
of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail." 
 
9 
 
 
Torres, 441 Mass. at 502-503, quoting Spence v. Gormley, 387 
Mass. 258, 274 (1982). 
Under this framework, we have previously concluded that, 
notwithstanding a defendant's incompetency to stand trial, 
certain pretrial hearings may proceed without violating due 
process.  See, e.g., Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 32 (incompetent 
defendant may be subjected to dangerousness hearing, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 276, § 58A); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 583, 589 
(2006) (incompetent defendant may be subjected to hearing and 
commitment as sexually dangerous person [SDP], pursuant to G. L. 
c. 123A, § 14); Torres, 441 Mass. at 499 (incompetent defendant 
may be subjected to bail hearing, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, 
§ 57). 
With § 58A dangerousness hearings and bail hearings, we 
recognized that the defendant's or juvenile's private interest 
at stake at the hearing -- "freedom from restraint pending 
trial" -- was "significant."  See Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 28, 30 
(dangerousness); Torres, 441 Mass. at 503 (bail).  Similarly, in 
proceedings under the SDP civil commitment statute, G. L. 
c. 123A, §§ 12-14, we recognized that "[t]he defendant's 
interest is weighty.  If committed, his loss of liberty would be 
total."  Nieves, 446 Mass. at 590.  Yet, in each of these cases, 
the alternative of staying the proceedings until the defendant 
or juvenile regained competency would have thwarted the strong 
10 
 
 
governmental interest in assuring the defendant's appearance for 
trial or in protecting the public from the danger posed by the 
defendant. 
In Torres, 441 Mass. at 499, cash bail of $5,000 was set at 
arraignment, which the defendant posted, and he was thereafter 
released.  After the defendant was found incompetent, the 
Commonwealth unsuccessfully sought his civil commitment and then 
sought review of the defendant's initial bail order, contending 
that he had become a flight risk now that he was incompetent to 
stand trial but could not be civilly committed.  Id. at 500.  If 
the defendant's incompetency to stand trial had precluded a bail 
hearing, the result would have been that the initial bail order 
would have remained in effect, without consideration of whether 
the defendant's incompetency meant that he was now a flight 
risk.  We declared that, "[a]ssuming that the Commonwealth could 
demonstrate a strong risk of flight, it has a substantial 
interest in ensuring that whatever bail (or other condition of 
release) is set be adequate to ensure [the defendant's] 
appearance in the event -- however probable -- of a trial."  Id. 
at 503 n.5. 
In Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 25, the Commonwealth sought an 
order of pretrial detention based on dangerousness after the 
juvenile was charged with severely beating a man sleeping in a 
city park.  If the juvenile's incompetency had precluded a 
11 
 
 
dangerousness hearing, the Commonwealth would have been limited 
to a bail hearing, where the focus would be only on risk of 
flight, not dangerousness.  Id. at 31 n.9.  We declared, "A 
dangerous defendant's or juvenile's incompetency makes him no 
less of a threat to the safety of others than a defendant or 
juvenile who is dangerous but competent."  Id. at 31. 
In Nieves, 446 Mass. at 587-588, the Commonwealth sought a 
civil commitment as an SDP of a sex offender who had been 
released from prison after being convicted of assault with 
intent to rape.  A judge found probable cause to proceed to 
trial, which meant that the defendant remained in custody 
awaiting trial, but denied the Commonwealth's motion to proceed 
to trial because the defendant was not competent to stand trial.  
Id. at 588-589.  We concluded that the defendant's liberty 
interest "must, with appropriate safeguards, yield to the 
Commonwealth's paramount interest in protecting its citizens" 
and saw "no reason why the public interest in committing 
sexually dangerous persons to the care of the treatment center 
must be thwarted by the fact that one who is sexually dangerous 
also happens to be incompetent."  Id. at 590-591. 
As to the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty 
resulting from the defendant's or juvenile's incompetency, we 
distinguished between two types of error:  factual and 
strategic.  We concluded that "the risk of factual error at a 
12 
 
 
bail hearing" -- a miscalculation in the amount of bail that 
would reasonably assure the defendant's presence at trial -- 
"arising from a defendant's inability fully to assist his 
counsel [was] low" given the "familiar, straightforward, and 
relatively simple" nature of the inquiry.  Abbott A., 458 Mass. 
at 29.  The risk of factual error at a § 58A dangerousness 
hearing was greater, we held, because those are evidentiary 
hearings "where the focus of the inquiry is the defendant's or 
juvenile's dangerousness, which generally rests in large part on 
whether there is persuasive evidence that the defendant or 
juvenile has committed the violent crime charged, obstructed 
justice, or threatened a witness."  Id. at 31.  This increased 
risk of factual error was not so great as to violate due 
process, however, given the many procedural protections afforded 
to defendants.  Id. at 32.  We similarly held that an 
individual's rights "to the assistance of counsel, to present 
evidence and witnesses, and to cross-examine adverse witnesses" 
were sufficient protection from factual error in proceedings to 
civilly commit an incompetent individual based on sexual 
dangerousness.  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 366, 
375 (2008); Nieves, 446 Mass. at 592. 
With regard to strategic error, we explained that this risk 
"is greatest at trial, where the decision to proceed with trial 
rather than plead guilty, perhaps in return for a prosecutor's 
13 
 
 
plea recommendation, may substantially affect the severity of a 
defendant's sentence on conviction."  Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 
29.  In contrast, the risk of strategic error in bail and § 58A 
dangerousness hearings is low "because the defendant's or 
juvenile's interests are clear (to obtain his release on 
conditions and avoid a finding of dangerousness), the hearing 
cannot be waived (because the Commonwealth bears the burden of 
proving dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence), and the 
defendant or juvenile almost never testifies."  Id. at 33. 
We now apply these same factors to determine whether due 
process permits a § 72A transfer hearing to proceed while the 
defendant is incompetent to stand trial. 
2.  Section 72A transfer hearings.  The Commonwealth argues 
that applying the Mathews analysis to § 72A transfer hearings 
should yield the same conclusion as it did with bail hearings, 
dangerousness hearings, and SDP civil commitment proceedings -- 
that the hearings may proceed consistent with due process.  The 
defendant contends that the factors compel the opposite 
conclusion.  We agree with the defendant. 
A defendant's interest in a § 72A transfer hearing is 
greater than in a bail or § 58A dangerousness proceeding, where 
pretrial liberty alone is at stake.  Because a Juvenile Court 
judge at a § 72A hearing has broad discretion to determine 
"whether the prosecution may proceed altogether," Nanny, 462 
14 
 
 
Mass. at 806, what is at stake is not only pretrial liberty but 
also posttrial liberty.  The potential enormity of the stakes at 
a § 72A hearing is clearly apparent in this case.  If the 
Juvenile Court judge finds no probable cause or discharges the 
defendant, the prosecution is over.  If the Juvenile Court judge 
finds probable cause and determines that the public interest 
requires that a criminal complaint issue and that the case be 
tried, the defendant faces the possibility that he will be found 
guilty of the crimes charged, sentenced as an adult for offenses 
that he committed as a juvenile, incarcerated in a State prison, 
and required to register as a sex offender.  See, e.g., J.H., 
479 Mass. at 292 (if transferred via § 72A, "consequences of a 
statutory rape conviction would not be a finding of delinquency 
but the possibility of a life felony").  In fact, if the 
defendant were to be convicted of indecent assault and battery 
on a mentally disabled person, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13F, he would be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 
five years in State prison. 
While the defendant's liberty interest in a § 72A transfer 
hearing is greater than in a bail or § 58A dangerousness 
proceeding, the governmental interest in conducting such a 
hearing where the defendant is incompetent is less, in part 
because the Juvenile Court may conduct a bail or dangerousness 
hearing prior to the § 72A transfer hearing.  Therefore, a 
15 
 
 
defendant likely to flee may be held on bail, and a violent 
defendant may be detained for dangerousness as he awaits the 
§ 72A hearing for a "reasonable period of time necessary to 
determine whether there is a substantial probability that he 
will attain [competency] in the foreseeable future."  Abbott A., 
458 Mass. at 37, quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 733, 
738 (1972).  And if an incompetent defendant is charged with a 
"sexual offense" as defined in G. L. c. 123A, § 1, the 
Commonwealth may, if appropriate, file a petition alleging that 
the person is sexually dangerous "notwithstanding absence of a 
conviction."  Commonwealth v. Curran, 478 Mass. 630, 632 (2018), 
citing G. L. c. 123A, §§ 12, 15.  See Burgess, 450 Mass. at 374 
("the State may indeed impair the liberty interests of a 
defendant who is a sexually dangerous person, even when that 
person may not understand what is occurring and cannot 
communicate with counsel").  Given these options, the safety of 
the public does not require that a § 72A hearing proceed when 
the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. 
Nor does the government interest in solving crimes and 
bringing offenders to justice require that a § 72A hearing 
proceed while a defendant is incompetent.  Even if the § 72A 
transfer hearing were to take place while the defendant was 
incompetent, the Commonwealth would be unable to try the 
defendant and bring the offender to justice until the defendant 
16 
 
 
became competent.  See Prater, 420 Mass. at 573.  There are, in 
effect, two possible alternatives in these circumstances.  The 
first is that the § 72A transfer hearing is stayed, pending the 
defendant's competency.  The second is that the hearing 
proceeds, notwithstanding the defendant's incompetency, at which 
point the Commonwealth will be unable to proceed to trial.  
Either way, the Commonwealth has no choice but to wait until the 
defendant becomes competent to prosecute the defendant for his 
alleged crimes. 
Finally, because a Juvenile Court judge has so much 
discretion in determining whether discharge is consistent with 
the protection of the public, the risk of error is greater in a 
§ 72A transfer hearing than in a bail or dangerousness hearing.  
The decision whether to discharge or transfer requires 
"consideration of the specific crime and the particular 
defendant," and a "thoughtful presentation by defense counsel 
directed at both issues is thus critical."  J.H., 479 Mass. at 
290.  Defense counsel must place the defendant "into a 
developmental context" that allows the court "to understand how, 
if at all, the defendant's more mature development reduces the 
risk of reoffense."  Id., quoting J.D. Blitzman & K.J. King, 
Hearings Pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A:  "Aging Out" of the 
System, in 1 Massachusetts Juvenile Court Bench Book § 12, at 
12–11 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 3d ed. 2011 & Supp. 2014). 
17 
 
 
Because, as characterized by the amici, a transfer hearing 
in many cases is "the whole ball game," and because the 
determinative issue in some cases may not be whether the 
defendant committed the offense but whether the defendant is 
unlikely to recommit an offense, a defense attorney may consider 
calling the defendant to testify at such a hearing, which would 
rarely be the case at a bail or dangerousness hearing.  An 
incompetent defendant cannot meaningfully participate in the 
strategic decision whether to testify.  If the defendant were to 
testify, defense counsel must be able to help prepare him for 
direct and cross-examination, which cannot happen if the 
defendant is incompetent. 
Even where a defendant does not testify, he must be able to 
assist defense counsel in mounting a "thoughtful presentation" 
regarding whether discharge is appropriate.  See Davis, 56 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 416-417 (discharge denied in part because defense 
"adduced no evidence bearing upon whether his discharge was 
consistent with the protection of the public").  This might mean 
providing defense counsel with information bearing on the 
defendant's rehabilitation and evolving maturity in the years 
since the offense, and identifying supporting evidence and 
witnesses, something an incompetent defendant is unlikely to be 
able to do. 
18 
 
 
Moreover, where a Juvenile Court judge at a § 72A hearing 
must determine whether "discharge is consistent with the 
protection of the public," that determination is more 
appropriately made when the defendant has regained competency 
and the case can proceed to trial if transferred.  If the 
determination were made when the defendant was incompetent, the 
Juvenile Court judge would be unable to know when the defendant 
could be tried in adult court if a complaint were to issue.  In 
making this critical discretionary decision, a judge properly 
might consider the age of the defendant at the time of the 
alleged offense (here, between thirteen and fifteen years of 
age) and the age of the defendant when the case would be tried; 
the latter would be unknowable if the defendant were incompetent 
at the time of the § 72A hearing.  Moreover, to the extent that 
the defendant's rehabilitation and evolving maturity might bear 
on that decision, those factors should be considered when the 
defendant is competent and timely may be tried, not when the 
defendant is incompetent and may be years away from trial. 
Where the liberty interest at stake in a § 72A hearing is 
so high, where the government's interest in proceeding with the 
hearing despite the defendant's incompetency is so low, and 
where the risk of factual and strategic error in determining 
whether the case should be transferred or discharged when the 
defendant is incompetent is so great, we conclude that due 
19 
 
 
process requires that § 72A hearings be stayed until such time 
as a defendant becomes competent. 
3.  Dismissal of the delinquency complaint.  Under G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (f), criminal charges must be dismissed against an 
incompetent defendant on the date that he would be "eligible for 
parole if he had been convicted of the most serious crime with 
which he was charged in court and sentenced to the maximum 
sentence he could have received, if so convicted."  The court 
also has the authority to dismiss a criminal charge against an 
incompetent defendant prior to that date "in the interest of 
justice."  Id.  We have previously noted that this statutory 
provision does not apply to a juvenile charged as a delinquent 
"because the juvenile cannot receive a criminal sentence and is 
not eligible for parole."  See Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 39 n.16.  
However, the statutory provision does apply to an adult 
defendant who is charged with crimes committed as a juvenile 
because, if the case were transferred to adult court after a 
§ 72A hearing, the defendant could receive a criminal sentence 
and would be eligible for parole.  In fact, a criminal sentence 
is the only sentence that could be imposed in such 
circumstances.  Here, if the defendant were to become competent 
to stand trial, and if the Juvenile Court judge were to decide 
that a criminal complaint should issue, the defendant might be 
sentenced to ten years in prison if convicted of the charge of 
20 
 
 
indecent assault and battery on a mentally disabled person, and 
would be eligible for parole in five years.  See G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13F; G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f).  Therefore, if the defendant were 
to remain incompetent to stand trial, and the § 72A hearing 
therefore could not be conducted, the charges against the 
defendant would have to be dismissed upon the expiration of that 
five-year period, unless the judge were to dismiss the charges 
earlier in the interest of justice.  See G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f). 
Conclusion.  The Juvenile Court judge's order denying the 
defendant's motion to stay the § 72A hearing until the defendant 
is competent to stand trial is reversed.  The case is remanded 
to the Juvenile Court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.