Title: Weiner v. Attorney General

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12885 
 
BENJAMIN LOCKE WEINER & others1  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL 
& another.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 6, 2020. - May 26, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Initiative.  Constitutional Law, Initiative petition.  Attorney 
General.  Alcoholic Liquors. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on November 25, 2019. 
 
 
The case was reported by Lowy, J. 
 
 
 
Robert J. Cordy for the plaintiffs. 
 
Juliana deHaan Rice, Assistant Attorney General (Anne 
Sterman & Kendra Kinscherf, Assistant Attorneys General, also 
present) for the defendants. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Kevin P. Martin & Joshua J. Bone for Wine & Spirits 
Wholesalers of Massachusetts, Inc. 
 
David Hadas for Beer Distributors of Massachusetts, Inc. 
                     
 
1 Ronald T. Maloney, Jr., Cynthia Newell, Sean Barry, 
Tina M. Messina, Maximilian Pano Haivanis, and Steven 
Schechterle. 
 
 
2 Secretary of the Commonwealth. 
2 
 
 
Thomas R. Kiley, Carl Valvo, Meredith G. Fierro, & Matthew 
T. Durand for Cumberland Farms, Inc., & another. 
 
John Sofis Scheft for Massachusetts Prevention Alliance & 
another. 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  On or before August 7, 2019, an initiative 
petition signed by at least ten registered voters, entitled "An 
Initiative Petition for a Law Relative to the Sale of Beer and 
Wine by Food Stores," was submitted to the Attorney General and 
numbered by her as Initiative Petition 19-14.  On September 4, 
2019, the Attorney General certified to the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth (Secretary) that Initiative Petition 19-14 was in 
proper form for submission to the people; that it was not, 
either affirmatively or negatively, substantially the same as 
any measure that was qualified for submission or submitted to 
the people at either of the two preceding biennial State 
elections; and that it contained only subjects that are related 
or are mutually dependent and that are not excluded from the 
initiative process pursuant to art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 2, 
of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.  In 
accordance with the requirements of art. 48, the Attorney 
General prepared a "fair, concise summary" of the measure 
proposed by Initiative Petition 19-14 and transmitted that 
summary to the Secretary with the September 4 certification 
letter.  The proponents of Initiative Petition 19-14 then filed 
it with the Secretary.  Following receipt of the summary and 
3 
 
certification from the Attorney General, the Secretary prepared 
blank signature collection forms and provided them to proponents 
for circulation to members of the public.  On December 20, 2019, 
the Secretary's elections division sent a letter informing the 
proponents of Initiative Petition 19-14 that they had submitted 
a sufficient number of certified signatures pursuant to art. 48, 
The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74 of the 
Amendments, and art. 48, The Initiative, IV, § 2.  The Secretary 
submitted Initiative Petition 19-14 to the clerk of the House of 
Representatives on January 1, 2020.  See 2020 House Doc. No. 
4303. 
Thereafter, seven registered voters of the Commonwealth 
commenced an action in the county court, challenging the 
Attorney General's certification of Initiative Petition 19-14; 
alleging that the measure was not in compliance with the 
requirement that an initiative petition "contain[] only subjects 
. . . which are related or which are mutually dependent," art. 
48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74, and that the 
measure included a "specific appropriation" in violation of art. 
48, The Initiative, II, § 2; and requesting that the Secretary 
be enjoined from placing the measure on the ballot.  A single 
justice reserved and reported the case to the full court on a 
statement of agreed facts.  We conclude that Initiative Petition 
19-14 neither contains unrelated subjects nor includes a 
4 
 
specific appropriation and that the Attorney General's 
certification therefore complied with art. 48.3 
The proposed law.  General Laws c. 138, §§ 15 and 15A, 
govern the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption 
off the premises, for example, by package stores.4  Most licenses 
for such sales are granted by cities and towns, subject to the 
approval of the alcoholic beverages control commission 
(commission).  See G. L. c. 138, § 15.  In most cities and 
towns, the number of available licenses for the sale of 
alcoholic beverages, whether to be consumed on or off premises, 
is set by a quota system based on the municipality's population.  
G. L. c. 138, § 17.  Currently, no one person, corporation, or 
other entity may hold more than nine off-premises licenses (per-
entity limit).  G. L. c. 138, § 15, as amended through St. 2011, 
c. 193. 
If passed into law, section 1 of Initiative Petition 19-14 
would amend G. L. c. 138 by adding § 15D, which would create a 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs of Wine & Spirits 
Wholesalers of Massachusetts, Inc.; Beer Distributors of 
Massachusetts, Inc.; Cumberland Farms, Inc., and New England 
Convenience Store and Energy Marketers Association; and 
Massachusetts Prevention Alliance and Health Foundation of 
Central Massachusetts.  The proponents of Initiative Petition 
19-14 were invited to file a motion to intervene, but did not do 
so. 
 
 
4 Licenses to sell alcoholic beverages for consumption on 
the premises, at establishments such as restaurants and taverns, 
are governed by G. L. c. 138, § 12. 
5 
 
new type of license, known as a "food store license," allowing 
the sale, for consumption off the premises, of wine and malt 
beverages5 by retail food stores.  Food stores eligible for such 
licenses are defined in section 1 of the measure by reference to 
other State and Federal laws.  The number of these food store 
licenses to be granted would be "at the sole discretion of each 
local licensing authority"; food store licenses would be subject 
neither to existing local quotas for off-premises licenses nor 
to the per-entity limit.  Moreover, Initiative Petition 19-14 
would also amend § 15 to gradually increase, and eventually 
eliminate, the per-entity limit on off-premises licenses. 
Section 1 of Initiative Petition 19-14 would also add a new 
§ 15C to G. L. c. 138.  The proposed § 15C would impose new 
procedures to prevent the sale of alcohol to persons under 
twenty-one years of age.  Under current law, although retailers 
face criminal penalties if they sell alcohol to any person under 
twenty-one years of age, G. L. c. 138, § 34, they are not 
obligated to use any particular means to verify the age of any 
                     
 
5 For purposes of G. L. c. 138, "malt beverages" are defined 
as "all alcoholic beverages manufactured or produced by the 
process of brewing or fermentation of malt, with or without 
cereal grains or fermentable sugars, or of hops, and containing 
not more than twelve per cent of alcohol by weight."  G. L. 
c. 138, § 1. 
 
6 
 
person purchasing alcohol.6  The proposed § 15C would require all 
off-premises retailers, whether food stores or package stores, 
to demand certain forms of identification as proof of age for 
any sale.  Eventually, under sections 2 and 11 of Initiative 
Petition 19-14, off-premises retailers would be required to 
check identification using a barcode scanner or "such other 
comparable technology as may be approved by the commission." 
Finally, the measure would provide for additional resources 
for the enforcement of the laws concerning alcoholic beverages.  
Section 8 of Initiative Petition 19-14 would establish "a 
separate fund which, subject to appropriation, shall consist of 
all monies required to be paid into the state treasury under 
[§§] 27 and 62 of said chapter 138 and which, subject to 
appropriation, shall be expended by the commission first for the 
implementation of this Act and second for the ongoing 
administration and enforcement of said chapter 138 generally."  
Under section 9 of the petition, the commission would be 
required to employ at least one investigator for every 250 off-
premises retail licenses granted under § 15 or § 15D, again 
subject to appropriation. 
                     
 
6 Retailers do, however, enjoy a defense if they reasonably 
rely on certain forms of identification.  G. L. c. 138, § 34B, 
second par. 
7 
 
Standard of review.  As noted, the Attorney General 
certified that Initiative Petition 19-14 was in compliance with 
art. 48.  We review that determination de novo.  See, e.g., 
Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 487 (2014).  At the same 
time, "we acknowledge 'the firmly established principle that 
art. 48 is to be construed to support the people's prerogative 
to initiate and adopt laws.'"  Id., quoting Carney v. Attorney 
Gen., 451 Mass. 803, 814 (2008) (Carney II).  See Buckley v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 195, 199 (1976) (art. 
48 establishes "people's process"). 
Relatedness.  Article 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as 
amended by art. 74, requires the Attorney General to certify 
that a proposed measure "contains only subjects . . . which are 
related or which are mutually dependent" before the measure can 
be placed on the ballot.  The plaintiffs argue that Initiative 
Petition 19-14 contains four distinct subjects that they argue 
are unrelated to each other:  the creation of food store 
licenses; the reduction and eventual elimination of the per-
entity limit on all off-premises licenses under G. L. c. 138, 
§ 15; the new age-verification requirements; and the increase in 
funding for enforcement by the commission.  We disagree.  In our 
view, these subjects are all operationally related, as we shall 
explain. 
8 
 
"There is no single 'bright-line' test for determining 
whether an initiative meets the related subjects requirement."  
Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass. 651, 657 (2016), citing 
Abdow, 468 Mass. at 500.  We have said that "the related 
subjects requirement is met where 'one can identify a common 
purpose to which each subject of an initiative petition can 
reasonably be said to be germane.'"  Hensley, supra, quoting 
Abdow, supra at 499.  This purpose "may not be so broad as to 
render the relatedness limitation 'meaningless.'"  Carney v. 
Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 218, 225 (2006) (Carney I), quoting 
Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
384 Mass. 209, 219 (1981).  "At some high level of abstraction, 
any two laws may be said to share a 'common purpose.'"  Carney 
I, supra at 226.  "[R]elatedness cannot be defined so broadly 
that it allows the inclusion in a single petition of two or more 
subjects that have only a marginal relationship to one another, 
which might confuse or mislead voters, or which could place them 
in the untenable position of casting a single vote on two or 
more dissimilar subjects."  Abdow, supra, citing Carney I, supra 
at 224-232.  At the same time, if we construe the relatedness 
requirement too strictly, we risk limiting initiative petitions 
to a single subject, a requirement rejected by the 
constitutional convention that approved art. 48.  See Abdow, 
supra, citing Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, supra at 219-220 & 
9 
 
nn.9, 10.  This would "frustrate the ability of voters to use 
the popular initiative as 'the people's process' to bring 
important matters of concern directly to the electorate."  
Abdow, supra.  We therefore balance these considerations by 
asking two questions:  "First, '[d]o the similarities of an 
initiative's provisions dominate what each segment provides 
separately so that the petition is sufficiently coherent to be 
voted on "yes" or "no" by the voters?' . . .  Second, does the 
initiative petition 'express an operational relatedness among 
its substantive parts that would permit a reasonable voter to 
affirm or reject the entire petition as a unified statement of 
public policy'?"  (Citations omitted.)  Hensley, supra at 658. 
The Attorney General argues that the various provisions of 
Initiative Petition 19-14 all relate to a common purpose:  "the 
lifting of restrictions on the number and allocation of licenses 
for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages to be consumed off 
the premises."  We agree.  The provisions that create the new 
food store licenses would directly implement this purpose by 
expanding the off-premises licenses available to entities in the 
business of selling groceries.  Moreover, food store licenses 
would not count against a municipality's quota on the number of 
retail licenses available, further lifting restrictions on 
licensing.  Initiative Petition 19-14 would also gradually 
10 
 
increase and ultimately eliminate the per-entity limit.  This, 
too, directly implements the measure's purpose. 
The remaining provisions, concerning the new age-
verification requirements and the increased funding for 
enforcement, do not directly lift restrictions on licensing, but 
"anticipate[] and address[] a potential consequence" thereof.  
Oberlies v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 823, 832 (2018).  In 
Oberlies, an initiative petition proposed limits on the number 
of patients assigned to each nurse in health care facilities and 
also prohibited facilities from reducing their remaining 
workforce as a result.  Id. at 831.  We observed that hospitals, 
compelled to hire more nurses to meet the patient assignment 
limits, might respond by eliminating other staff.  Id. at 832.  
The workforce-reduction prohibition sought to mitigate this 
objectionable consequence and thus was operationally related to 
the patient assignment limits.  Id.  Initiative Petition 19-14 
similarly anticipates and mitigates the foreseeable consequences 
of lifting restrictions on licenses.  One might reasonably be 
concerned that granting retail licenses to food stores, a class 
of business having less experience than existing package stores 
in the sale of alcoholic beverages, would result in more 
unlawful purchases of alcohol by underage persons.  Requiring 
age verification before every such purchase might mitigate this 
danger.  Similarly, the expansion of available off-premises 
11 
 
licenses would likely necessitate greater enforcement efforts by 
the commission, requiring additional resources as provided in 
section 8 of Initiative Petition 19-14.  The age-verification 
and enforcement provisions are thus operationally related to the 
other provisions of the measure.  We are persuaded that 
Initiative Petition 19-14 sets forth a unified statement of 
policy and is sufficiently coherent to permit a "yes" or "no" 
vote. 
Our view is bolstered by comparing Initiative Petition 19-
14 to the measure at issue in Hensley.  That measure, which was 
ultimately adopted by the voters as G. L. c. 94G, legalized the 
possession and use of marijuana, in limited amounts, by adults 
over twenty-one years of age; created a comprehensive scheme for 
the licensing, operation, and regulation of marijuana-related 
businesses; provided for the taxation of retail sales of 
marijuana; and permitted medical marijuana treatment centers to 
participate in the retail scheme.  Hensley, 474 Mass. at 653-
655.  Despite the complexity of that measure and its numerous 
different provisions, we held that it "easily satisfie[d] the 
related subjects requirement of art. 48."  Id. at 658.  All of 
its provisions, including the ones pertaining to medical 
marijuana treatment centers, were "piece[s] of the proposed 
integrated scheme."  Id. at 659.  In the same way, each 
provision of Initiative Petition 19-14 is one piece of a 
12 
 
proposed scheme to lift restrictions on off-premises licenses 
for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. 
The plaintiffs argue that this case is distinguishable from 
Hensley because Initiative Petition 19-14 proposes to alter the 
existing statutory and regulatory scheme for retail sales of 
alcohol, whereas the measure at issue in Hensley proposed a 
novel regulatory scheme governing legalized marijuana.  In point 
of fact, the Hensley measure not only created a new scheme for 
the legalization and regulation of recreational marijuana, but 
also altered the existing regulation of medical marijuana.  See 
Hensley, 474 Mass. at 653-655.  More importantly, we have never 
held that relatedness is to be evaluated in terms of an 
initiative's effect on existing law.  Surely, the voters must be 
permitted to amend statutes, not only to enact new ones.  "A 
measure does not fail the relatedness requirement just because 
it affects more than one statute, as long as the provisions of 
the petition are related by a common purpose."  Albano v. 
Attorney Gen., 437 Mass. 156, 161 (2002).  Article 48 requires 
that the subjects in an initiative be related to or mutually 
dependent on each other and says nothing about their 
relationship to other law. 
The plaintiffs also take issue with individual provisions 
of Initiative Petition 19-14.  They note that, although the food 
store licenses would permit only retail sales of wine and malt 
13 
 
beverages for off-premises consumption, other provisions would 
apply more broadly.  The elimination of the per-entity limit and 
the new age-verification requirements would apply to all off-
premises retailers, whether food stores or package stores, and 
to sales of spirits as well as wine and malt beverages.  The 
provisions concerning enforcement -- both as to funding and as 
to the number of investigators -- would apply to the 
commission's enforcement responsibilities generally, not just to 
policing the new food store licensees.  In our view, these 
administrative details go to the scope of the measure and do not 
vitiate the relatedness of Initiative Petition 19-14 as a whole.  
The provisions of an initiative petition need not be "drafted 
with strict internal consistency."  Mazzone v. Attorney Gen., 
432 Mass. 515, 528-529 (2000).  It is sufficient that the 
"similarities . . . dominate what each segment provides 
separately so that the petition is sufficiently coherent to be 
voted on 'yes' or 'no' by the voters."  Oberlies, 479 Mass. at 
830, quoting Abdow, 468 Mass. at 500.  As we have discussed, 
Initiative Petition 19-14 passes this test. 
It is also of no moment that Initiative Petition 19-14 
might have included other provisions related to its purpose.  
"It is not for the courts to say that logically and consistently 
other matters might have been included or that particular 
subjects might have been dealt with differently."  Massachusetts 
14 
 
Teachers Ass'n, 384 Mass. at 220.  So long as the provisions 
that have been included are sufficiently related, the initiative 
petition passes muster. 
Finally, Anderson v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 780 (2018), 
does not require a different result.  In that case, we 
determined that a proposed constitutional amendment did not 
comply with the relatedness requirement, where it would have 
imposed a graduated income tax on incomes over $1 million and 
earmarked all revenues therefrom, subject to appropriation, for 
two disparate purposes:  education and transportation.  Id. at 
784.  Those two purposes, we held, were "not related beyond the 
broadest conceptual level of public good" and were "entirely 
separate from the subject of a stepped rather than a flat-rate 
income tax."  Id. at 798.  The proposed amendment thus contained 
no "common purpose or unified public policy that the voters 
fairly could vote up or down as a whole."  Id.  Voters who 
favored, for example, a graduated tax but not the earmarking 
provisions, or who favored designating funds for transportation 
but not for education, would have been placed in an untenable 
position.  Id. at 799-800.  That is not the case here, where, as 
we have explained, all the provisions of Initiative Petition 19-
14 do relate to the common purpose of lifting restrictions on 
licenses for the retail sale of alcohol.  It presents a unified 
15 
 
statement of public policy on which the voters can fairly vote 
"yes" or "no." 
We conclude that, as the Attorney General certified, 
Initiative Petition 19-14 contains only subjects that are 
related or mutually dependent, in compliance with art. 48. 
Specific appropriation.  Article 48, The Initiative, II, 
§ 2, provides:  "No measure . . . that makes a specific 
appropriation of money from the treasury of the commonwealth, 
shall be proposed by an initiative petition; but if a law 
approved by the people is not repealed, the general court shall 
raise by taxation or otherwise and shall appropriate such money 
as may be necessary to carry such law into effect."  The 
plaintiffs argue that section 8 of Initiative Petition 19-14 
makes a specific appropriation in violation of this provision by 
requiring that certain monies be directed to a new fund for the 
enforcement of G. L. c. 138.  Again, we disagree. 
We discussed the origins of the clause prohibiting specific 
appropriations, and the Legislature's concomitant obligation 
either to repeal a law enacted by initiative or to "raise . . . 
and . . . appropriate such money as may be necessary to carry 
such law into effect," in detail in Bates v. Director of the 
Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 156-160 
(2002).  We determined that the specific appropriations 
exclusion was intended to "preserve the Legislature's power to 
16 
 
appropriate money from the treasury while giving the people 
power to enact meaningful reform legislation in the face of 
legislative recalcitrance, even though such reforms would 
necessarily require the expenditure of public funds."  Id. at 
158-159, citing 2 Debates in the Massachusetts Constitutional 
Convention 1917-1918, at 833 (1918).  In addressing claims that 
a given initiative petition would impermissibly make a specific 
appropriation, we have long adhered to the definition set forth 
in Opinion of the Justices, 323 Mass. 764, 766 (1948):  "To 
appropriate has been defined as 'to set apart from the public 
revenue a certain sum of money for a specified object, in such 
manner that the executive officers of the government are 
authorized to use that money, and no more, for that object and 
for no other'" (citation omitted).  See Associated Indus. of 
Mass. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 413 Mass. 1, 8 (1992), 
and cases cited.  However, merely setting aside public monies 
for a public purpose does not amount to an appropriation.  Id.  
"It is not until the Executive Branch becomes authorized to use 
the monies that the monies are removed from the further control 
of the Legislature.  Merely setting aside the monies, in the 
sense of placing them in a separate fund, does not necessarily 
remove them from the Legislature's control."  Id.  Similarly we 
have said that "[a] general law that directs that funds be used 
for a specific purpose is not an appropriation. . . .  Rather, 
17 
 
an appropriation occurs when, as a result of an appropriations 
bill proposed and adopted according to the constitutional 
requirements of art. 63 [of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution], monies are committed and released by the 
Legislature to the executive branch and are no longer within the 
control of the Legislature."  Mazzone, 432 Mass. at 523.  "The 
essence of a 'specific appropriation' under art. 48 is that 
money is segregated from the public coffers to be used for a 
targeted, narrow purpose. . . .  The crucial determinant of a 
specific appropriation is that its 'direct purpose' is 'to seize 
upon all the revenue received from the designated sources and to 
appropriate it permanently to a specified public use'" (emphasis 
in original).  Bates, supra at 162, quoting Slama v. Attorney 
Gen., 384 Mass. 620, 626 (1981).  "The basic purpose of 
excluding specific appropriation measures is to preserve the 
Legislature's general authority over the State treasury, and to 
preclude special interest groups from attempting to usurp that 
authority through the use of initiatives which might compel the 
expenditure of public funds in a piecemeal fashion. . . .  The 
essential aspect of a specific appropriation is that it removes 
public monies, and the decision how to spend them, from the 
control of the Legislature."  Associated Indus. of Mass., supra 
at 5-6, quoting Slama, supra at 627.  Simply crediting certain 
identified monies "to a statutorily created, earmarked fund 
18 
 
itself [does not] constitute an appropriation."  Gilligan v. 
Attorney Gen., 413 Mass. 14, 17 (1992). 
Moreover, we have consistently held that "the insertion of 
the words 'subject to appropriation' excludes any possibility 
that the initiative is an impermissible 'specific 
appropriation.'"  Bates, 436 Mass. at 161.  See Mazzone, 432 
Mass. at 523 ("Monies directed by operation of a general law to 
a specific purpose that remain 'subject to appropriation' are 
expressly left within the Legislature's control and are not 
appropriations"); Associated Indus. of Mass., 413 Mass. at 7 
("It is difficult to imagine how a measure which states that it 
is 'subject to appropriation' could have been intended to be an 
appropriation in and of itself").  Where a measure expressly 
"condition[s] the use of monies in [a] fund on appropriation by 
the Legislature, [it] preserves the Legislature's power and 
discretion."  Gilligan, 413 Mass. at 19. 
Under these principles, section 8 of Initiative Petition 
19-14 would not make a specific appropriation.  The measure 
would create a fund to provide the enforcement resources that 
would likely be necessary due to the expansion of off-premises 
licenses provided for elsewhere in Initiative Petition 19-14.  
However, the measure would also leave the Legislature's 
authority intact by providing expressly that both the placement 
of public monies into the fund and their expenditure by the 
19 
 
commission would be subject to appropriation.7  The commission, 
that is, would not be authorized to use the monies identified by 
section 8 without further action by the Legislature.  See 
Gilligan, 413 Mass. at 17.  Accordingly, the measure would not 
make a specific appropriation in violation of art. 48. 
Conclusion.  We remand the matter to the county court for 
entry of a judgment declaring that the Attorney General's 
decision to certify Initiative Petition 19-14 was in compliance 
with the requirements of art. 48. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
7 The Legislature also would retain its authority to repeal 
or amend Initiative Petition 19-14 if it is enacted by the 
voters.  Bates v. Director of the Office of Campaign & Political 
Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 155 (2002).  This authority would, of 
course, carry the "attendant consequences of democratic 
accountability to the voters."  Id. at 159.