Title: PATTERSON v. BEALL

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

PATTERSON v. BEALL  PATTERSON v. BEALL 2000 OK 92 19 P.3d 839 71 OBJ 3016 Case Number: 92399 Decided: 11/14/2000 Mandate Issued: 02/02/2001 Supreme Court of Oklahoma JERRY PATTERSON, dba PATTERSON PEST AND WEED CONTROL, Plaintiff/Appellant v. LONNIE and BERNICE BEALL, Defendants/Appellees ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION 4 ¶0 A pest exterminator sued a real estate appraiser in the small claims division of the district court for $105.00 for breach of contract and for violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. The appraiser then paid $105.00 to the pest exterminator and filed counterclaims. After permitting the parties to file motions for summary judgment the trial court resolved all the claims and counterclaims in such a way that neither party received anything else from the other. With respect to the pest exterminator's claim against the appraiser for violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, the trial court granted summary judgment against the pest exterminator, concluding as a matter of law that the appraiser's alleged conduct, even if proven, was not deceptive and did not constitute a trade practice. The pest exterminator appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division 4, affirmed and awarded the appraiser her appeal-related attorney's fees and costs. We previously granted certiorari. THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS IS VACATED; THE AWARD OF APPEAL-RELATED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS REVERSED AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. Justin LaMunyon, Faulkner Law Firm, Enid, Oklahoma, for Appellant. Steven D. Singer, Enid, Oklahoma, for Appellees. BOUDREAU, J: [19 P.3d 841] ¶1 We are presented with two issues on certiorari. First, are summary judgment motions under Rule 13 of the Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma, 12 O.S. (1991), ch. 2, app. (Rule 13), inconsistent with the purpose of the Small Claims Procedure Act, 12 O.S. §§ 1751 et seq. - namely, the efficient and prompt disposition of small claims?1 We may review claims which relate to alleged deprivations of due process of law despite a failure to preserve error. Bottles v. State ex rel. Oklahoma State Bd. of Medical Licensure and Supervision, 1996 OK 59, ¶4 917 P.2d 417, 472; Pettit v. American Nat'l Bank, 649 P.2d 525 , 529 (Okla. 1982). Second, does the appraiser's alleged conduct, if [19 P.3d 842] proven, constitute a deceptive trade practice or an unfair trade practice under the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, 15 O.S. (1991), §§ 751 et seq.? ¶2 We hold that summary judgment motions are inconsistent with the purpose of the Small Claims Procedure Act and that the real estate appraiser's alleged conduct, if proven, constitutes an unfair trade practice. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I FACTS ¶3 Jerry Patterson, dba Patterson Pest and Weed Control (Mr. Patterson), performed a termite inspection for Lonnie and Bernice Beall (collectively, Mrs. Beall). Mr. Patterson billed Mrs. Beall $105.00. She refused to pay the bill because, according to her, she had not asked him to perform a termite inspection but rather had requested merely a free estimate. The dispute escalated. He filed a $105.00 lien against her property. She then asserted she had performed a real estate appraisal for him, demanded payment of $115.00 for the appraisal and attempted to file a $115.00 lien against his property. He denied having requested an appraisal and denied she had performed an appraisal for him. He complained about her to the Oklahoma Real Estate Commission. She complained about him to the Oklahoma Department of Agriculture. Both entities declined to pursue the complaints. He then sued her for $4,500.00 in the small claims division - for breach of contract ($105.00) and for alleged violations of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. She filed counterclaims against him for $4,500.00 - for breach of contract ($115.00), for alleged violations of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, for specific performance and to quiet title. ¶4 Mrs. Beall eventually paid Mr. Patterson $105.00 and both parties released their respective liens. Mrs. Beall also eventually voluntarily dismissed her Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act counterclaim against Mr. Patterson. ¶5 The trial court permitted the parties to file summary judgment motions. In a written order the trial court addressed all remaining claims and counterclaims. With respect to Mrs. Beall's counterclaims, the trial court concluded that the remedies of specific performance and quiet title are outside the scope of the Small Claims Procedure Act. The trial court then granted summary judgment against Mrs. Beall on her counterclaim for breach of contract. Mrs. Beall did not appeal from these adverse rulings. ¶6 With respect to Mr. Patterson's claims, the trial court found the parties settled Mr. Patterson's breach of contract claim when Mrs. Beall paid Mr. Patterson $105.00. The trial court then granted summary judgment against Mr. Patterson on his claim that Mrs. Beall violated the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. The trial court found that Mrs. Beall's alleged conduct was not deceptive and did not constitute a trade practice under the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. Mr. Patterson appealed.2 II STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7 We review the trial court's legal rulings de novo. Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79, 989 P.2d 448 . De novo review requires an independent, non-deferential re-examination of another tribunal's record and findings. III SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS UNDER RULE 13 ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE SMALL CLAIMS PROCEDURE ACT - THE EFFICIENT AND PROMPT DISPOSITION OF SMALL CLAIMS. A The Small Claims Procedure Act ¶8 The Small Claims Procedure Act, 12 O.S. (1991), §§ 1751 et seq. (the Act), [19 P.3d 843] provides a special procedure for certain actions where the amount of money sought to be recovered does not exceed four thousand five hundred dollars ($4,500.00).3 It provides an informal procedure "to facilitate the access of parties to simple, inexpensive and speedy justice." Johnson v. Scott, 1985 OK 50, 702 P.2d 56 , 59 . The unmistakable public policy goal of the Act is to provide small claims forums as "people's courts, uncomplicated by the formal demands of superior courts." Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1980 OK 95, 613 P.2d 1041 , 1044.4 ¶9 In the interest of promoting the prompt and efficient disposition of small claims actions, the Act allows no formal pleadings other than a small claims affidavit and in some circumstances an answer. ¶10 The Act prohibits all depositions, interrogatories and all other discovery procedures except after judgment in aid of execution. ¶11 The Act mentions one pretrial motion only. ¶12 The Act does not allow new parties to be joined and it prohibits other parties from intervening in the action. ¶13 The Act requires that if either party desires a jury the party must notify the court clerk in writing at least two working days before the trial so as not to delay the trial. B Motions for Summary Judgment under Rule 13 ¶14 Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 13 of the Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma, 12 O.S. (1991), ch. 2, app. The standard for a summary judgment specified in Rule 13 is that there is no [19 P.3d 844] substantial controversy as to any material fact as shown by the affidavits and discovery materials attached to the motion. Hamilton v. Allen, ¶15 Rule 13(a) allows a party to serve a motion for summary judgment anytime after the filing of the action, except that if the action has been set for trial the motion must be served at least twenty days before the trial date. The motion must be accompanied by a concise written statement of the material facts as to which the movant contends no genuine issue exists and must explain why the movant believes summary judgment should be granted. The statement must refer to evidentiary materials upon which the movant relies and copies of these materials must be attached to the statement. Rule 13(a). With the exception of affidavits, these materials almost always take the form of discovery responses such as excerpts of depositions, answers to interrogatories and to requests for admissions, and documents that have been produced in response to discovery requests. Id. ¶16 Rule 13(b) allows the opposing party an opportunity, within fifteen days after service of the motion, to serve upon the moving party and file with the court clerk a written statement in response to the motion. The response must include a concise written statement of the material facts as to which the opposing party contends there is a genuine issue and the reasons for denying the motion. Id. The written statement must set forth and number each specific material fact that is claimed to be in controversy and must include references to the specific pages and paragraphs or lines in the attached affidavits and discovery materials upon which the opposing party relies. Id. ¶17 Further, Rule 13(d) allows a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to seek a continuance by submitting an affidavit explaining why he or she cannot present facts essential to justify opposition to the [19 P.3d 845] motion. The trial court may order a continuance to permit the opposing party to obtain affidavits or to conduct additional discovery. C Analysis ¶18 "The primary goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. That intent is to be ascertained from the statute in light of its general purpose and object. It is presumed that the Legislature has expressed its intent in a statute and that it intended what is so expressed." TXO Production Corp. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, ¶19 In our view motions for summary judgment under Rule 13 are inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the Small Claims Procedure Act - the efficient and prompt disposition of claims. ¶20 First, the application of Rule 13's timing requirements to small claims actions would encumber the very purpose of the act. The Act's timing requirements are designed with speed and efficiency in mind. The Act allows a small claims trial to be set as early as ten days after commencement of the action. Any trial setting between 10-20 days after commencement of the action would either preclude Rule 13 motions (since a Rule 13 motion must be filed at least 20 days prior to trial) or would require a continuance of the trial. Any trial setting within thirty days after commencement of the action would undoubtedly, in most instances, also require a continuance. ¶21 Second, the purpose of the Act is to create a simple, uncomplicated "people's court" in which the procedures are informal and the litigants do not need to hire lawyers. In contrast, the procedures of Rule 13 are more technical and complex. Few non-lawyer litigants embroiled in a dispute within the jurisdictional limitations of the small claims division are likely to be aware of Rule 13. It is even less likely that they would understand its timing requirements, its sufficiency requirements with respect to motions and responses, or the effect of not filing a response at all. A non-lawyer litigant faced with a motion for summary judgment is far more likely to need the services of an attorney. ¶22 Third, the Small Claims Procedure Act expressly prohibits discovery. In contrast, summary judgment motions almost always require the use of discovery materials. ¶23 Fourth, the Act relaxes the rules of evidence. In contrast, Rule 13 does not allow the rules of evidence to be relaxed. In order for material facts that are not controverted by the adverse party to be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment, those material facts must be supported by admissible evidence. Rule 13(b). ¶24 Fifth, the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," that the mention of one thing in a statute impliedly excludes another thing, is used to determine legislative intent. PSO v. State ex rel. Corporation Commission, ¶25 Sixth, either party who desires access to the full panoply of pretrial motions has a method to avoid the limited procedures in the small claims division. A plaintiff may simply choose not to sue under the Act in the first instance. A defendant sued under the Act may move, pursuant to ¶26 In conclusion, we hold that motions for summary judgment under Rule 13 are inconsistent with the purpose of the Small Claims Procedure Act - the efficient and [19 P.3d 846] prompt disposition of claims - and are not applicable in small claims actions. IV THE OKLAHOMA CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT A Introduction ¶27 In the 1960's, individual states began to enact consumer protection laws designed to parallel and supplement Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1), which Congress adopted to protect citizens against unfair trade practices. See Leaffer and Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence,48 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 521 (1980). These state laws, generally referred to as consumer protection acts or as unfair and deceptive trade practices acts, derived from various forms suggested to the states by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. ¶28 Oklahoma's Consumer Protection Act (OCPA) is codified at ¶29 Mr. Patterson contends the following conduct by Mrs. Beall violated the OCPA: (a) demanding payment for a real estate appraisal that he never requested and that she never performed and (b) filing a false, retaliatory lien against his property. B Private Right of Action under the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act ¶30 The Federal Trade Commission Act does not provide for a private right of action. Nevertheless, most of the state consumer protection acts, including Oklahoma's, do. See National Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices, app. A (4th ed.1997) (includes citations to and summaries of the states' consumer protection acts). The private right of action in the OCPA is found at 15 O.S. (1991), § 761.1. ¶31 The first element to be proved is that the defendant engaged in an unlawful practice under the OCPA. Unlawful practices are identified in § 753. Subsections (1)-(15) of § 753 declare a number of specific acts to be unlawful practices. Subsections (16)-(19) and (21)-(23) of § 753 refer to other Oklahoma statutes and declare violations of these statutes to be unlawful practices. Finally, pertinent to the instant case, subsection (20) is a catchall provision that declares unlawful the commission of any "unfair or deceptive trade practice as defined in section 752." The second element derives from the introductory phrase of § 753. It requires that the challenged practice must occur "in the course of the person's business." The third element, that the plaintiff as a consumer suffered an injury in fact, derives from § 761.1(A). This subsection gives a private right of action only to "an aggrieved consumer." It requires that an aggrieved consumer sustain damages as a result of the defendant's unlawful practice. The fourth element, causation, also derives from § 761.1(A). This subsection requires [19 P.3d 847] plaintiff to prove that his or her damages were caused by the defendant's unlawful practice. ¶32 A minority of states have adopted a fifth element - that the alleged unlawful practice affects the public interest. See, e.g., Hall v. Walter, C Does Mrs. Beall's Conduct, if Proven, Constitute an Unfair Trade Practice? ¶33 The trial court determined Mr. Patterson failed to establish the first element of his private right of action under the OCPA - an unlawful practice. The trial court concluded that Mrs. Beall's conduct, even if proven, did not violate the OCPA because the conduct did not constitute an unfair trade practice under the OCPA. We disagree.12 ¶34 The OCPA defines an unfair trade practice as follows: (12) "Unfair trade practice" means any practice which offends established public policy or if the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers. ¶35 Whether alleged conduct constitutes an unfair trade practice under the OCPA is a fact question that the trial court must determine on a case by case basis. Under the unique circumstances of this case, we have no difficulty concluding that if Mrs. Beall demanded payment from Mr. Patterson for a real estate appraisal that was neither requested nor performed, and filed or attempted to file a false lien against Mr. Patterson's property, her conduct constituted an unfair trade practice as that phrase is defined in the OCPA. ¶36 Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, reverse the trial court's summary judgment against Mr. Patterson on his OCPA claim, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [19 P.3d 848] V. ¶37 The Court of Civil Appeals awarded Mrs. Beall her appeal-related attorney's fees and costs. Since we vacate the Court of Civil Appeals' decision and reverse the trial court's judgment, we also vacate the award of appeal-related attorney's fees and costs. Thompson v. Independent School Dist. No. 94, VI SUMMARY ¶38 We hold that motions for summary judgment are inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the Oklahoma Small Claims Procedure Act and, therefore, summary judgment motions cannot be filed or considered in the small claims division of the district court. We further hold that if Mr. Patterson's OCPA claim is not otherwise precluded and if he proves Mrs. Beall's conduct as alleged, then Mrs. Beall's conduct constituted an unfair trade practice under the OCPA. THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS IS VACATED; THE AWARD OF APPEAL-RELATED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS IS VACATED; THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS REVERSED AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ¶39 Hodges, Lavender, Kauger, Watt, Boudreau, Winchester, JJ., concur; Summers, C.J., Hargrave, V.C.J., concur in part and dissent in part; Opala, J., dissents from the Court's opinion. FOOT