Title: Darghty v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

530 So. 2d 27 (1988) Edward Lee DARGHTY v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 57621. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 20, 1988. *28 Joe Morgan Wilson, Senatobia, for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman and Mike Moore, Attys. Gen. by Pat Flynn, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ. HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, for the Court: Edward Lee Darghty appeals from his three convictions in the circuit court of Tate County of having felonious carnal knowledge of his step-daughter, and sentence to four years imprisonment for each charge with the sentences to run consecutively. Because of the improper exclusion of the testimony of a defense witness when Darghty had violated Rule 4.06 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice, we reverse. Darghty was born January 4, 1940. On June 10, 1984, he and Mary Alice Compton Darghty were married. Prior to their marriage they had lived together. Mary Alice had two children by a previous marriage, Michael, age 13, and Kathy Lynn Compton, who was born September 15, 1970. The grand jury of Tate County on October 30, 1985, indicted Darghty for having had on June 3, 1985, felonious carnal knowledge of Kathy, his step-daughter, in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-41. On February 3, 1986, Darghty filed a motion for discovery under Rule 4.06 of our Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. The motion asked for extensive discovery, including the names of State witnesses. The State duly responded with written discovery on February 7, and made supplemental discovery thereafter. On June 5, 1985, Darghty signed a written confession admitting having had sexual relations with Kathy on June 3, 1985, as well as other occasions for a period of a year. This written confession was given to, and signed in the presence of J.F. (Jay) Clark, a Mississippi Highway Patrolman with many years of criminal investigative experience, and Eddie Hadskey, a deputy sheriff. On March 21, 1986, the court entered an agreed order consolidating four charges against the defendant for trial. On March 28, 1986, Darghty filed a motion to suppress the confession, which was heard by the court on May 7, the first day *29 of Darghty's trial. In the hearing on the motion to suppress, Darghty made no charge against the officers having violated any of his rights in securing the confession, and insofar as the officers' conduct was concerned, even Darghty made no contention that the confession was not free and voluntary. He did contend, however, that the confession was given as a result of promises made by his wife that if he would sign the motor vehicle title to a pickup truck owned by him, but upon which she had co-signed a promissory note secured by the title to the truck, that she would get the charges reduced so that he would not have to go to jail. He testified as follows: Darghty said the conversation between him and his wife took place at the jail, with Darghty being in a room with several cellmates, and his wife just beyond the door to the cell. They talked through an opening in the door. Darghty said that several other inmates were sitting at the table while he was talking to his wife through the door opening. He recalled Willie Lee Loveberry, Bobby Joe Carter, and Jesse Jones specifically. He said they could easily hear what was being said. Following the hearing the circuit judge ruled the confession to be competent, because anything the wife said could not be attributed to the State. The judge noted that Mary Alice was not an agent or representative of the State, nor was there any proof that she received any encouragement from the State in any respect. The court then concluded as follows: After the court overruled the motion to suppress the confession, the trial proceeded by selection of the jury. Kathy was the first witness and testified about Darghty's having had sexual relations with her. *30 Mary Alice then testified. She was an employee at the local Quick Stop. She admitted having gone to the jail following Darghty's arrest and asking him to sign the title to the pickup truck over to her. She denied, however, agreeing to drop charges or making him any promise if he would do so. Gloria Connelly, a special education teacher, and Rita Amburn, a teaching counselor, testified about attempting to assist Kathy, who dropped out of school subsequent to the charges being made against Darghty. The State then introduced the confession through testimony of Hadskey and Clark. When the State rested, the defense made a motion for a directed verdict, which was overruled. Defense counsel then announced in chambers that the defendant wanted to call as his first witness Willie Lee Loveberry. The State objected to Loveberry on the ground that his name had not been furnished pursuant to Rule 4.06, and the trial judge sustained the objection. The record shows the following: Defense counsel made profert of Loveberry's testimony to the court in chambers. Loveberry testified, as follows, regarding the conversation between Mary Alice and Darghty: Following Loveberry's testimony, the court ruled as follows: Darghty took the stand in his own defense and testified about having had serious heart problems and being hospitalized for this condition. He denied having ever molested Kathy in any way, and charged that the whole matter had been trumped up by his wife as a scheme to get rid of him. He contended that he signed the written confession because his wife had represented to him that he would sign the title over to her and would make this confession, he would get a light sentence and fine and be permitted to leave the state. He said he was a sick man, and did not believe he would live through having to go to jail. The record reveals the following: There is no dispute but that Darghty and his wife did have a conversation in jail, following which she went to the bank which held the motor vehicle title, got the document and returned to the jail, where Darghty signed it and, following this, he was questioned by the officers and signed the written confessions. The only dispute is whether or not Mary Alice made any promises to Darghty that if he signed the title over to her the charges against him would be drastically reduced. Following trial and instructions to the jury, the jury retired and returned a verdict of guilty against Darghty on all three of the indictments. The circuit judge sentenced Darghty to a term of imprisonment of four years. The State in this case made a very strong case on the issue of Darghty's guilt. The judge properly ruled that Darghty's confession was competent because the officers had given Darghty all Miranda warnings, and had treated him courteously prior to taking the statement. There was no proof, or intimation that Mary Alice, even if she made the statements Darghty claimed, did so at the request of any law enforcement officer. Conduct by third parties not connected with the law enforcement officers in the investigation will not vitiate a confession which might be rendered incompetent and inadmissible if such conduct had been committed by a law enforcement officer. See, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986); Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1317 (Miss. 1987); Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.1987). As the circuit judge also held, however, such a promise by the wife would be relevant before the jury who had to weigh the credibility of the confession. Wilson v. State, 451 So. 2d 724 (Miss. 1984); Diddlemeyer v. State, 234 So. 2d 292 (Miss. 1970) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 917, 91 S. Ct. 177, 27 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1970); Brooks v. State, 178 Miss. 575, 173 So. 409 (1937); Brown v. State, 142 Miss. 335, 107 So. 373 (1926). Darghty was entitled to have the jury hear and consider whether or not his wife made any such promise, and whether or not it had any effect upon him in deciding to confess to the criminal charges. This was an integral part of his defense. Whether the jury chose to believe it was another matter, but at least he was entitled to have the jury consider this testimony and evidence. Loveberry's testimony was therefore relevant in corroboration of Darghty's testimony about his wife's promise. The sole issue raised upon this appeal is the claim by Darghty that the court erred by excluding Loveberry's testimony because of a Rule 4.06 violation. We agree. The pertinent portion of Rule 4.06 of the criminal procedure rules states: There is no question but that Darghty violated this Rule. He failed to furnish Loveberry's name as a witness after the State had fully complied with his discovery request. Under a plain reading of the rule, it was a discretionary matter with the circuit court whether or not Loveberry's testimony should have been received. In Coates v. State, 495 So. 2d 464, 466-68 (Miss. 1986), we held within the trial court's authority an order excluding evidence the defense was obligated to produce in discovery but did not. Federal constitutional doctrine announced after Coates appears to limit the exclusion sanction to cases where the defendant's discovery violation was "willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage." Taylor v. Illinois, 474 U.S. ___, ___, 108 S. Ct. 646, 655, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798, 814 (1988). Unfortunately for the State, however, the circuit judge did not follow the procedure we have outlined in previous cases when the prosecution violated the rule. Thus far, all discovery violations we have encountered have been those in which the State was the transgressor. When the defendant has claimed on appeal that the circuit court should have excluded such evidence, we have consistently held that a discovery violation by the State does not automatically justify the exclusion of evidence. Instead, we have required the circuit judge and the defendant to take certain steps before error could be urged on appeal. Subsequent to our decision in Coates, we decided Cole v. State, 525 So. 2d 365 (1987). In Cole the Court said unequivocally, as a matter of state procedural law, that: Box v. State, 437 So. 2d 19 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., specially concurring). See also *33 Griffin v. State, 504 So. 2d 186, 195 (Miss. 1987). Arguably, this was already the law prior to Coates. See Watts v. State, 492 So. 2d 1281, 1290 (Miss. 1986); Hall v. State, 490 So. 2d 858, 859 (Miss. 1986); Gray and Nations v. State, 487 So. 2d 1304, 1313-14 (Miss. 1986); Jones v. State, 481 So. 2d 798, 803 (Miss. 1985); Cabello v. State, 471 So. 2d 332, 343 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S. Ct. 2291, 90 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1986). Today we remove any doubt to the extent it may be inconsistent with what we say this day, Coates stands modified. In this case the circuit judge did not recess court in order for the State to interview Loveberry, and inform the court whether it would be prejudiced by lack of opportunity to interview him. And, of course, the State made no motion for a continuance. The court simply excluded Loveberry's testimony. Even-handed application of the Rule requires the same procedure to be followed when the State objects to testimony because of a defendant's violation as when the defendant objects for the same reason. See Coates v. State, supra, at 467; Acevedo v. State, 467 So. 2d 220, 224 (Miss. 1985). Such proferred evidence cannot be rejected out of hand. Loveberry's testimony being relevant and competent, it was prejudicial error to exclude it without following our procedural guideline. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for another trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur.