Title: LILY M. HARRIS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LILY M. HARRIS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 23177 P.3d 1166Case Number: S-07-0131Decided: 03/03/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
LILY M. 
HARRIS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Donna 
D. Domonkos, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. Morgan, Assistant 
Appellate Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A 
Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Robin Sessions 
Cooley, Deputy Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
C.J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, 
J., files a specially concurring opinion, in which KITE, J., joins.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
appeals from her burglary conviction, raising issues concerning the admission of 
uncharged misconduct evidence and prosecutorial misconduct.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Whether the district court abused 
its discretion by admitting uncharged misconduct evidence?

 
 
           
2.   Whether 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor misstated the evidence in 
the State's proffer of the uncharged misconduct evidence?

 
 
           
3.   Whether 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor argued in rebuttal that 
the jury should ignore the State's burden of proof and should not penalize the 
community if the State had not met its burden of proof?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The appellant was 
employed by Goodwill Industries, Inc., in Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
While working one evening, she set aside a number of clothing items for 
her own purchase.  A later 
review of video surveillance showed that the appellant did not pay for all 
the items that she took.  She was 
confronted by her supervisor on February 22, 2006, and her employment was 
terminated.  Her response was, "I'll 
get you for this, you bitch."

 
 
[¶4]      The Goodwill 
store was burglarized on the night of May 1, 2006.  Items taken included a safe, two pairs 
of roller blades, two or three bicycle helmets, two Apple i-pod accessories, one 
or two Remington razors, and a cell phone.  
Goodwill employees who viewed the surveillance video of the burglary 
identified the appellant as the burglar.  The appellant was charged with burglary 
and convicted by a jury.  Her 
sentence of three to five years incarceration was suspended and she was placed 
on probation for four years.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Whether 
the district court abused its discretion by admitting uncharged misconduct 
evidence?

 
 
[¶5]      We review a 
district court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence, including uncharged 
misconduct evidence, for an abuse of discretion, and we will not reverse absent 
a clear abuse of such discretion.  
Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, 
¶ 8, 150 P.3d 1202, 1206 (Wyo. 2007).  
"A trial court abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably 
concluded as it did."  Id. at ¶ 8, at 
1206-1207.  The admissibility of 
uncharged misconduct evidence is governed by W.R.E. 
404(b):

 
 
            
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court is to determine the admission of proferred evidence under this rule by 
applying the following test:

 
 
[B]ecause 
uncharged misconduct evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice, we have 
also adopted a mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility:  (1) the evidence must be offered for a 
proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the probative value of 
the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair 
prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court must instruct the jury that the 
similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which 
it was admitted.

 
 

Gleason 
v. State, 2002 
WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo. 2002).  "Admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b) is 
not limited to the purposes set forth in the rule, and we have adopted a liberal 
approach toward admitting uncharged misconduct evidence."  Id.

 
 
[¶7]      Prior to 
trial, the State filed a Notice of State's Intent to Introduce Evidence That May 
Be Considered 404(B) Evidence.  The 
identified evidence was (1) the appellant had been terminated from employment 
with Goodwill for suspected theft; (2) at the time of her termination from 
employment, the appellant had threatened retaliation; and (3) as seen in the 
surveillance video of the burglary, the coat being worn by the burglar appeared 
to be identical to a coat allegedly stolen by the appellant at the time she was 
terminated.  The State justified 
admission of this evidence as proof of res gestae, knowledge of the layout of 
the store, motive, and identity.

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court appropriately conducted a pre-trial hearing to determine whether the 
State's uncharged misconduct evidence would be admitted.  In doing so, the court required the State 
to analyze in detail its proferred evidence under the Gleason factors set forth above (see supra ¶ 6), and it allowed the 
appellant's counsel to challenge each of those factors.  In the end, the court declared the 
evidence admissible, finding it relevant to prove both motive and identity.  The court did, however, limit the extent 
to which the State could characterize the appellant's conduct at the time of her 
termination as being a theft.

 
 
[¶9]      In her appellate 
brief, the appellant contends, first, that evidence of prior criminal acts is 
more likely than any other evidence to be unfairly prejudicial to a 
defendant.  See Williams v. State, 2004 WY 117, ¶ 8, 
99 P.3d 432, 436 (Wyo. 2004).  
Second, the appellant alleges that the evidence admitted was not the same 
as the evidence proferred.  
Specifically, the appellant notes that only one of the State's witnesses 
identified the appellant as being the burglar in part by describing the 
burglar's coat as being identical to the one allegedly stolen when the appellant 
was terminated.  Other Goodwill 
employee witnesses identified the person in the surveillance video as being the 
appellant by recognizing her hair style, her stocking cap, her clothing, and her 
boots, and by recognizing the coat as one she customarily wore, rather than the 
one allegedly stolen.

 
 
[¶10]   We cannot agree that the district 
court abused its discretion in admitting this uncharged misconduct 
evidence.  The court performed an 
exhaustive pre-trial analysis of the evidence, applied the appropriate test, 
limited its admissibility to prove particular matters, and limited the extent to 
which the State could emphasize the alleged theft underlying the 
termination.  Under the particular 
facts of this case, the alleged theft of the coat, the resultant termination, 
and the alleged threat of retaliation, were especially probative of motive and 
identity, and the district court reasonably could have concluded that the 
evidence was more probative than prejudicial.1  Furthermore, the district  court gave the jury the following 
limiting instruction in regard to the evidence:

 
 
            
THE COURT:  Before we go 
there, counsel, I need to give the jury a limiting instruction.  Now, you've heard some testimony about 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the firing of the defendant, Lily 
Harris.  In regard to that testimony 
I need to advise you it has a very limited purpose.  You cannot use that to prove the 
character of the defendant.  The 
State isn't trying to get that in for that purpose, or that the defendant acted 
in conformity with that.

 
 
            
It is admissible only for a very limited purpose, that is to show the 
motive at the time of this claimed burglary, that there might be a motive 
involved for burglarizing this business.  
It can only be used for that purpose.  Now, whether or not you believe that 
this evidence shows that such a motive was proven is for you solely to 
determine.  That is your call to 
determine whether or not this evidence of firing and circumstances surrounding 
it points to motive for this claimed burglary.  Thank you.

 
 
Clearly, 
this instruction limited the jury's permissible use of the evidence even beyond 
the court's pretrial order.  As 
instructed, the jury could only consider the evidence to such extent that it 
might prove that the appellant had a motive to burglarize the Goodwill 
store.  This may be a distinction 
without a difference, however, inasmuch as proof of motive generally is intended 
to prove identity.  Mitchell v. State, 865 P.2d 591, 596 
(Wyo. 
1993).  In any event, the jury was 
given this limiting instruction, as required by Gleason, and we presume that juries 
follow the court's instructions.  Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1177 
(Wyo. 1998); Ramirez v. State, 739 P.2d 1214, 1220 
(Wyo. 
1987).

 
 
Whether 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor misstated the evidence in 
the State's proffer of the uncharged misconduct 
evidence?

 
 
[¶11]   This allegation is a follow-up to 
the prior allegation.  The appellant 
contends that the prosecutor misled the district court during the motion hearing 
by proffering that the uncharged misconduct evidence would help identify the 
appellant as the burglar by showing that the burglar was wearing the coat 
allegedly taken by the appellant when she was fired.  The appellant finds this proffer to have 
been misleading and, therefore, prosecutorial misconduct, because as it turned 
out at trial, only one of the State's witnesses identified the appellant as the 
burglar based upon that coat.

 
 
[¶12]   Where there has been an objection 
at trial, we review claims of prosecutorial misconduct under a harmless error 
standard.  Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 386, 389 (Wyo. 2004).  Both 
W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04 provide that "[a]ny error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded[.]" Where there has not been an objection at trial, we review claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct under a plain error standard.  Id., 2004 WY 
131, ¶ 6, 100 P.3d  at 389.  
Fundamentally, both W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05 simply allow errors 
that affect substantial rights to be raised on appeal, even though not raised 
below.  Under either 
standard,

 
 
[a]n 
error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might 
have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred.  To demonstrate harmful error, the 
defendant must show prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play."

 
 

Id., 2004 
WY 131, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d  at 389, quoting Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 10, 
63 P.3d 875, 881 (Wyo. 2003).  To 
obtain plain error review, the appellant must show (1) the record is clear as to 
the alleged error; (2) a clear and unequivocal rule of law was transgressed; and 
(3) the appellant suffered material prejudice to a substantial right.  Id., 2004 WY 
131, ¶ 6, 100 P.3d  at 389.

 
 
[¶13]   The appellant did not object at 
trial on the ground that the testimony did not match the proffer, so we review 
this issue under the plain error standard.  
While we may be able to say that the record is clear as to the alleged 
misconduct, we do so only because there are transcripts of both the motion 
hearing and the trial, allowing comparison of the proffer and the actual 
testimony.  We cannot say, however, 
that the appellant has proven the transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law.  The State's proffer was 
repeatedly interrupted by specific questions from the district court, which 
questions, in turn, led the prosecutor to attempt to limit the proffer to meet 
the court's concerns.  The gist of 
the proffer that evolved was that evidence of the uncharged misconductthe 
alleged theft and terminationwas probative of both motive and identity.  While the trial testimony may have 
turned out to be less than what the State had expected, there is no indication 
that the State intentionally misrepresented what the testimony would be.  Admittedly, only one of the Goodwill 
employees identified the appellant as the burglar on the basis of the suspect 
coat.  But the import of all the 
testimony about the uncharged misconduct was "as advertised"; that is, it all 
tended to prove that the appellant had the motive to commit the burglary, and it 
helped to identify her as the burglar.  
The appellant has failed to prove prosecutorial misconduct in this 
instance.

 
 
Whether 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor argued in rebuttal that 
the jury should ignore the State's burden of proof and should not penalize the 
community if the State had not met its burden of 
proof?

 
 
[¶14]               
            
Our standard of review for claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing 
argument is well established:

 
 
            
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, the 
court looks at the entire record to determine whether the defendant's case was 
so prejudiced by the improper comments as to result in the denial of a fair 
trial.  Capshaw v. State, 10 P.3d 560, 567 (Wyo. 
2000); Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 
910 (Wyo. 2000).  The challenged 
comments are judged in the context of the prosecutor's entire argument, 
considering the context of the statements and comparing them with the evidence 
produced at the trial.  Helm v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 
            
. . .  When an objection is 
launched to a statement made in closing argument, we defer to the trial court's 
ruling in the absence of a clear or patent abuse of discretion.  Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 
(Wyo. 
1998).  Even then, reversal is not 
warranted unless a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the 
appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.  Gayler, [957 P.2d] at 860.  See also Metzger, 4 P.3d  at 910. . . 
.

 
 
            
[When the defendant did not object at trial], we review his claims by 
applying the plain error standard.  
Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 
1064 (Wyo. 2000).  To demonstrate 
plain error, [the appellant] "must show that the record clearly shows an error 
that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a 
substantial right."  Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 16, 17 P.3d 715, [721] (Wyo. 2001).  Reversal of 
a conviction on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, which was not challenged 
in the trial court, is appropriate only when there is "a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Capshaw, 10 P.3d  at 567 (quoting Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 
(Wyo. 
1992)).

 
 

Burton v. 
State, 2002 
WY 71, ¶¶ 11-13, 46 P.3d 309, 313-14 (Wyo. 2002).  There was no trial objection in the 
instant case, so plain error analysis is appropriate.

 
 

Gleason, 2002 
WY 161, ¶ 35, 57 P.3d  at 344-45.  
"We are reluctant to find plain error in a closing argument lest the 
trial court becomes required to control argument because opposing counsel does 
not object.'"  Marshall v. State, 2005 WY 164, ¶ 14, 
125 P.3d 269, 275 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, ¶ 35, 89 P.3d 324, 336 (Wyo. 2004)).

 
 
[¶15]   The appellant did not object at 
trial to the State's rebuttal closing argument.  On appeal, however, she contends that 
the following passage from that argument (1) diluted the State's burden of 
proof; (2) argued facts not in evidence; (3) was not based on reasonable 
inferences from the evidence; (4) presented a community protection or community 
outrage argument; and (5) sought conviction for a reason other than the 
evidence:

 
 
            
Their stories don't add up, folks, especially in light of common 
sense.  When I was preparing this 
case I had a discussion with an individual who was a prior juror.  She said that in her jury service it was 
a drug case.  The defendant was 
charged with three counts of selling drugs.  I said, Well, did you convict?  She said, We convicted on two out of 
three.  I said, Well, what about the 
third?  She said, Well, we knew that 
he did it.  I was like, Why didn't 
you convict then?  And she said, 
Well, we just didn't think that the State did enough or law enforcement did 
enough.  I said, Well, 
okay.

 
 
            
Folks, don't penalize the State of Wyoming for what I have or haven't done.  Don't penalize the State of Wyoming, don't penalize 
this community for what Detective Dafoe has or has not done.  I submit to you if you know the 
defendant did it, then the State has proven the case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Look at everything, all of 
it, what the State did, what Jay said, what the defendant said.  I think there's only one reasonable and 
logical conclusion.  I ask you to 
use your common sense and to find the defendant guilty of burglary.  Thank you all very 
much.

 
 
[¶16]   This rebuttal argument is clearly 
reflected in the record, so the first requirement of plain error analysis has 
been met.  Next, we must ask whether 
the prosecutor's statements violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.  For purposes of this discussion, we will 
assume that all five of the appellant's contentions are based upon what can be 
considered to be clear and unequivocal rules of law.  We cannot assume, however, and we do not 
find, that the statements clearly violated any of those rules of 
law.

 
 
[¶17]   The prosecutor's statements can be 
divided into two parts:  (1) a story 
about a jury that, despite knowing a defendant "did it," acquitted him because 
the State did not "do enough;" and (2) a plea to this jury not to acquit the 
appellant, if it "knows" she "did it," just because the jury thinks the 
prosecutor or the investigator did not "do enough."  The appellant's first contention is that 
these statements "diluted [the] burden of proof."  It is, of course, axiomatic that the 
State bears the burden of proof in a criminal case, and that the prosecutor may 
not, during argument, attempt to shift that burden to the defendant.  White v. State, 2003 WY 163, ¶ 24, 80 P.3d 642, 653 (Wyo. 2003); Lane v. 
State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1066 (Wyo. 2000).  
We do not see that to be the case here.  Rather, the essence of the prosecutor's 
statement was that, if the jury was convinced by the evidence that the appellant 
was guilty, it should not acquit him on the theory that the State could have 
presented more evidence.

 
 
[¶18]   Furthermore, when this portion of 
the State's closing argument is read in the context of the arguments presented 
by both sides, and in the context of the entire trial, it appears that the 
appellant "opened the door" to a discussion of the quality and extent of the 
investigation.   See Fortner v. State, 835 P.2d 1155, 
1158 (Wyo. 
1992) (appellant opened the door to prosecutor's comments regarding failure to 
call witnesses).  The major focus of 
defense counsel's questioning of the State's investigator, and of defense 
counsel's closing argument, was upon what the investigator had not done.  The prosecutor's statement is little more 
than an attempt to re-focus the jury's attention upon the evidence that was 
presented.  We do not perceive this 
to be a case where the prosecutor, by saying "if you know he did it," attempted 
to define the State's burden of proof as anything less than "beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  See Seymore v. State, 2007 WY 32, ¶ 18, 
152 P.3d 401, 408 (Wyo. 2007) (no instruction defining "reasonable doubt" needed 
because the term is self explanatory); Claussen v. State, 21 Wyo. 505, 133 P. 1055, 
1056 (1913) (no definition of "reasonable doubt" would convey any clearer idea 
than the term itself).  

 
 
[¶19]   We will give short shrift to the 
balance of the appellant's contentions because she has failed to develop them 
much beyond the accusatory stage, and because we do not find that the State 
argued facts not in evidence, that the State's argument was not based on 
reasonable inferences from the evidence, that the State presented a community 
protection or community outrage argument, or that the State sought conviction 
for a reason other than the evidence.  
It is not enough for the appellant to make these allegations.  She must follow up the allegations with 
concrete examples of how these rules of law were violated.  For instance, what facts not in evidence 
did the State argue?  That some 
other jury had reached a not guilty verdict based on an expectation of more 
evidence?  The purpose of closing 
argument is to allow counsel, including the prosecutor, to offer ways for the 
jury to view the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom.  Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 48, 73 P.3d 1041, 1089 (Wyo. 2003); Phillips v. 
State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wyo. 1992).  There are innumerable ways for counsel 
to approach closing argument, including comparison by "story-telling."  Where there has been no trial objection, 
and where the trial court has not exercised its discretion to limit the 
argument, we will not interject ourselves and reverse a conviction without a 
more substantial showing of error and prejudice than has been provided in this 
case.

 
 
[¶20]   The same is true as to the 
remaining allegationsthat the prosecutor made a community outrage argument and 
sought conviction for a reason other than the evidence.  The rebuttal argument in this case 
simply does not approach the level of "join the war on crime/send a message to 
criminals" argument that we condemned in Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860-62 
(Wyo. 1998).  See also Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 
15, 46 P.3d 309, 314 (Wyo. 2002), and 
Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 911 (Wyo. 2000).   Neither does it ask the jury to convict 
the appellant for some reason other than the evidence.  As we stated above, the essence of the 
prosecutor's argument was that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 
convict the appellant, and the jury should not acquit just because there might 
have been additional evidence that could have been 
presented.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   
The uncharged misconduct evidence admitted in this case was subjected 
to appropriate pre-trial analysis, was admitted for proper purposes, and has not 
been shown to have been more unfairly prejudicial than probative.  The prosecutor was not guilty of 
prosecutorial misconduct either in proffering the uncharged misconduct evidence, 
or in giving its rebuttal argument.

 
 
[¶22]   We 
affirm.

HILL, 
Justice, 
specially concurring, with whom KITE, 
Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶23]   I submit this special concurrence 
because it is my conviction that the argument made by the prosecutor and quoted 
in ¶ 15 of the opinion was improper and it should be positively identified 
as such.  Whether "the story" used 
by the prosecutor was truly anecdotal, or if it was in the nature of a parable, 
or if it was a part of the lore of prosecutorial experience, it was directly 
aimed at diluting and undermining both the prosecution's burden to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant's right to the presumption of 
innocence.  Therefore, I would 
prefer that the Court identify it as erroneous.  Because it is reviewed under the plain 
error standard, my conclusion would be that, although the record clearly 
presents the incident alleged to be error, and that the incident violated a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law, in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable 
way, Harris was not able to demonstrate that the error denied her a substantial 
right resulting in material prejudice to her.  E.g., Lemus v. State, 2007 WY 111, 
¶¶ 38-41, 162 P.3d 497, 507-8 (Wyo. 2007).  In addition, I am uncomfortable in 
justifying such an error, even in part, on the basis that the defense "opened 
the door" to it, because it cross-examined witnesses, and argued to the jury, 
that the evidence is not sufficient to meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard.  The result I prefer would 
have the salutary effect of deterring, rather than encouraging, the further use 
of this particular "story" in future cases, alerting defense counsel that such 
argument is error to which they should object, as well as in guiding the 
district courts in the always-difficult task of gleaning what this Court views 
as error in the context of closing argument.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Any 
prejudice inherent in this evidence was also lessened by the fact that several 
testifying Goodwill employee witnesses specifically recognized and identified 
the appellant as the burglar.