Title: State v. Wedelstedt

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

213 N.W.2d 652 (1973) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Edward J. WEDELSTEDT et al., Appellants. No. 1-56081. Supreme Court of Iowa. December 19, 1973. Donald M. Reno, Jr., Champaign, Ill., and David D. Mitchell, Cedar Rapids, for appellants. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Haskins, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David Dutton, County Atty., for appellee. Heard en banc. MOORE, Chief Justice. Defendants-appellants seek reversal of their lower court convictions for violation of Code section 725.3, an obscenity statute, first enacted in 1909. They assert the statute is unconstitutional due to vagueness and overbreadth. We agree. As pertinent here section 725.3 provides: I. On May 8, 1972 Cedar Falls police detective, L. W. Young, filed a search warrant application in the Cedar Falls Municipal Court. In addition to Young's evidence the testimony of James Workman, age 17, was taken before Muncipal Judge Eastman. Workman stated he had viewed a film in an identified coin-operated machine at the Danish Book World, 1828 Waterloo Road, Cedar Falls, Iowa and that it showed a girl committing acts of sodomy on two males and also showed the girl reading a dirty magazine while masturbating. The Judge issued the requested search warrant for the specific film viewed by Workman. The search warrant was immediately executed and the film seized from the identified machine. On May 12, 1972, after notice to the proper parties, a hearing was held to determine if the film should be forfeited as obscene material. At that hearing Judge Eastman viewed it. The Judge found the film to be obscene and ordered forfeiture. He provided the film be held as evidence. Defendant Edward J. Wedelstedt, manager, defendants, David A Cory and Wayne Davis, employees, of Danish Book World, in the search warrant proceeding and subsequent criminal case, contended the film seizure was illegal and unconstitutional because there was no adversary hearing prior to the seizure. They jointly raise that issue by proper assignment of error on this appeal. We first consider that assignment. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2789, 37 L. Ed. 2d 745, decided June 25, 1973, is dispositive of the constitutional question here raised. The Supreme Court stated: Regarding the question of determination of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant in State v. Spier, Iowa, 173 N.W.2d 854, 859, we say: In this case the neutral magistrate did not issue the search warrant based on probable cause until after taking the evidence of Workman in addition to that of officer Young. Under the record, the holding in Heller v. New York, supra, renders untenable defendants' contention the film seizure was illegal and unconstitutional. II. On May 9, 1972, preliminary informations were filed charging Wedelstedt, Cory and Davis with violation of Code section 725.3. County attorney's true informations were filed against each of the three men on June 27, 1972. At defendants' request the three cases were consolidated. After adverse rulings on their joint motions to quash the search warrant and to suppress evidence, defendants were allowed to withdraw their former not guilty pleas and file a joint demurrer. They therein asserted the statute violates both their First (free speech and press) and Fourteenth (due process) Amendment rights under the Constitution of the United States. They attacked section 725.3 as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The constitutionality of a statute under which a party is charged with a crime may be raised by demurrer. State v. Ramos, 260 Iowa 590, 597, 149 N.W.2d 862, 866; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Fachman, 255 Iowa 989, 992, 993, 125 N.W.2d 210, 212. The demurrer was overruled as to each ground thereof. Defendants refused to enter pleas thereafter but chose to stand on their demurrer. Pursuant to Code section 777.10 the trial court found judgment should be entered against them. Defendants requested immediate sentencing. Wedelstedt was sentenced to six months in the county jail and finded $1000. Cory and Davis were each fined $500. At their request defendants' appeals have been consolidated. The constitutionality of section 725.3 is for the first time being challenged in this court. However, during the last two decades the United States Supreme Court in many decisions involving similar state obscenity statutes have declared them unconstitutional in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The vexing problems involved are clearly demonstrated by the lack of uniformity of opinions by the members of the court. During the last fifteen years the Supreme Court failed to file a clear majority holding until the lead case of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, and companion cases of Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446; Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 93 S. Ct. 2680, 37 L. Ed. 2d 492; United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S. Ct. 2665, 37 L. Ed. 2d 500; and United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 93 S. Ct. 2674, 37 L. Ed. 2d 512, all decided June 21, 1973. By five to four holdings on June 21, the court arrived at standards for testing the constitutionality of state legislation regulating obscenity. Citation and discussion of pre-Miller opinions are found therein. See also Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1158, Modern Concept of Obscenity, and 21 Drake L.Rev. 314, (January 1972), The Status of Iowa's Obscenity Laws. Repetition here would unduly lengthen this opinion. We are bound by the latest pronouncements of the Supreme Court bearing on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We therefore quote extensively from Miller: With these pronouncements in mind we consider defendants' attack on Code section *656 725.3 as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Vagueness and overbreath are two separate matters although closely related. In Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-250, 88 S. Ct. 391, 396, 19 L. Ed. 2d 444, 451, the court distinguishes one from the other: For our most recent definition of overbreadth see State v. Farrell, Iowa, 209 N.W.2d 103, 108. All authorities agree that a statute which is vague and overbroad within the above definitions is unconstitutional. The State makes no contention otherwise. III. We first consider the vagueness issue as raised by defendants. They were charged with participating in the exhibition of an "obscene" film which tended to corrupt the morals of youth. "Obscene" as used in section 725.3 is not specifically defined as required by Miller. The statute fails to give fair notice to the average person of what is prohibited. It has not been authoritatively construed and as we point out, infra, we must decline to do so. We therefore hold the statute is unconstitutionally vague. IV. We also hold section 725.3 is unconstitutionally overbroad. It is in direct conflict with the basic guideline established in Miller: "(a) whether `the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." (Our emphasis). The provision in section 725.3, "which shall tend to the corruption of the morals of youth or others" is overbroad. It limits the free speech and press rights of all persons to matters which may tend to corrupt youth or othersperhaps the most susceptible person. A similar statute was declared unconstitutional in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 77 S. Ct. 524, 1 L. Ed. 2d 412. V. The State virtually admits in argument the statute is vague and overbroad. It is urged we construe the statute to include perhaps the suggested specific examples stated in Miller to eliminate vagueness and to somehow adopt the average-person criterion. This would require adding to and striking legislative provisions of the statute. Well-established rules of statutory construction prohibit our doing so. No court under the guise of construction may extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the terms and meaning of a statute. State v. Prybil, Iowa, 211 N.W.2d 308, 311; Northern Natural Gas Company v. Forst, Iowa, 205 N.W.2d 692, 696; Maguire v. Fulton, Iowa, 179 N.W.2d 508, 510; Bergeson v. Pesch, 254 Iowa 223, 227, 117 N.W.2d 431, 433; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 312. It is not our function to rewrite the statute. Snook v. Herrmann, Iowa, 161 N.W.2d 185, 190. In Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Nicholas, 258 Iowa 115, 122, 137 N.W.2d 900, 905, we say: The proper forum for the difficult task of reconstructing Code section 725.3 and our other obscenity statutes is the legislature. Present and future public policy is involved. Modern enlightened legislation is needed. Obscenity is a complex and difficult socio-legal problem. As pointed out in Miller: "State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited." 413 U.S. 23, 93 S. Ct. at 2614, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 430. To pass constitutional muster the general guidelines of Miller must be followed. The judgment entered against each defendant herein is reversed. Reversed. All Justices concur.