Title: Salinas v. Ramsey

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-823 
____________ 
 
JUAN A. SALINAS, et al.,  
Appellants, 
 
vs. 
 
SUE ANN RAMSEY, et al.,  
Appellees. 
 
[January 25, 2018] 
 
LAWSON, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of a question of Florida law certified 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that is determinative 
of a cause pending in that court and for which there appears to be no controlling 
precedent.  Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has asked us to answer the following 
question:  
WHAT LIMITATIONS PERIOD, IF ANY, APPLIES TO A 
REQUEST FOR POST-JUDGMENT DISCOVERY BROUGHT IN 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT IN FLORIDA ON A JUDGMENT 
ENTERED BY THAT SAME FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT? 
 
Salinas v. Ramsey, 858 F.3d 1360, 1362 (11th Cir. 2017).  We have jurisdiction, 
see art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const., and rephrase the certified question as follows: 
 
 
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WHAT IS THE DEADLINE UNDER FLORIDA LAW FOR 
COMPLETING POST-JUDGMENT DISCOVERY FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF COLLECTING A FEDERAL MONEY JUDGMENT 
ISSUED BY A FEDERAL COURT IN FLORIDA?  
 
As we explain more fully below, such discovery is permitted for a period of twenty 
years from the date the judgment was entered. 
 
On September 23, 2004, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida entered a judgment awarding Juan A. Salinas and Lucila Fuentes 
(the judgment creditors) money damages against Sue Ann Ramsey (the judgment 
debtor).  The procedure on execution or in aid of this federal judgment is governed 
by the rules of Florida.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1).  In accordance with this 
procedure, on May 15, 2015, the judgment creditors filed a motion in the federal 
district court requesting an order compelling the judgment debtor to complete a 
fact information sheet under Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.560 and 1.977.  
The federal district court denied the motion under the authority of Balfour Beatty 
Bahamas, Ltd. v. Bush, 170 F.3d 1048, 1051 (11th Cir. 1999), which holds that 
post-judgment discovery aimed at collecting a money judgment issued by a federal 
court in Florida is governed by the five-year limitations period provided in section 
95.11(2)(a), Florida Statutes. 
 
The judgment creditors appealed the district court’s decision to the Eleventh 
Circuit.  The Eleventh Circuit recognized the applicability of Balfour but observed 
that Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal called Balfour into question in 
 
 
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Burshan v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 805 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2001).  Salinas, 858 F.3d at 1361.  Having developed substantial doubt about the 
correctness of its decision in Balfour, the Eleventh Circuit sought our assistance.  
Id. at 1361-62.  For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Fourth District’s 
holding in Burshan that collection activity on a federal judgment is not governed 
by section 95.11(2)(a), but instead is permitted for the twenty-year life of the 
judgment.1  See 805 So. 2d at 843-44.     
 
The judgment debtor urges us to conclude, as did the Balfour court, that 
post-judgment discovery in aid of enforcing a federal judgment constitutes an 
“action on a judgment” and is, therefore, subject to the five-year limitations period 
applicable to bringing an action on a federal judgment.  See § 95.11(2)(a), Fla. 
Stat. (2014).  However, we explained long ago that such discovery does not 
constitute an “action upon a judgment” under the statute of limitations, as the term 
was then phrased.  Young v. McKenzie, 46 So. 2d 184, 185 (Fla. 1950).  The 
phrase “action on a judgment” in the current statute is equivalent.  As the Fourth 
District observed in Burshan, “[s]ince the nineteenth century, the phrase ‘action on 
                                          
 
 
1.  We, therefore, disagree with Balfour.  Balfour relied on Kiesel v. 
Graham, 388 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), which was criticized in Burshan, 
805 So. 2d at 843-44.  To the extent Kiesel is inconsistent with our holding in this 
case, we disapprove of Kiesel.  
 
 
 
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a judgment’ in the statute has had a precise meaning as a common law cause of 
action.”  805 So. 2d at 840.  An “action on a judgment” is an action independent of 
the original action in which the judgment was obtained, the main purpose of which 
is “to obtain a new judgment which will facilitate the ultimate goal of securing 
satisfaction of the original cause of action.”2  Burshan, 805 So. 2d at 841 (quoting 
Adams v. Adams, 691 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)).  An action on a 
judgment provides an opportunity, when the limitations period has almost run on 
the judgment, to obtain a new judgment that will “start the limitations period 
anew.”  Burshan, 805 So. 2d at 841 (quoting 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 945 
(1995)); accord Desert Palace, Inc. v. Wiley, 145 So. 3d 946, 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2014); Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 61 So. 3d 1285, 1288-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2011); Petersen v. Whitson, 14 So. 3d 300, 301-02 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Marsh v. 
Patchett, 788 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). 
Although many decades have passed since we decided Young, no 
amendment of section 95.11 has provided any reason for us to reconsider our 
                                          
 
 
2.  See, e.g., Crane v. Nuta, 26 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1946) (action by an assignee 
of a judgment to obtain a new judgment in the amount of the original); 
Workingmens Co-op. Bank v. Wallace, 9 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1942) (action by the 
judgment creditor of a Massachusetts judgment to enforce the judgment in Florida 
even though the underlying cause of action might not have been valid in Florida); 
Van Deren v. Lory, 100 So. 794 (Fla. 1924) (action to enforce an Indiana judgment 
in Florida); Whiteside v. Dinkins, 97 So. 517 (Fla. 1923) (action by the devisee of 
a judgment to obtain a judgment for the same amount).   
 
 
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determination that post-judgment discovery does not constitute an “action []on a 
judgment.”  See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 609 
(Fla. 2004) (“The Legislature is presumed to know the judicial constructions of a 
law when amending that law, and the Legislature is presumed to have adopted 
prior judicial constructions of a law unless a contrary intention is expressed.”) 
(citing City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770 So. 2d 1196, 1202 (Fla. 2000)).  The 
judgment debtor attempts to find such a reason in the Legislature’s 1974 enactment 
of section 95.011, which contains a statement of chapter 95’s applicability and an 
explanation of the term “action” as used in the chapter.  Ch. 74-382, § 1, Laws of 
Fla.  Section 95.011, Florida Statutes (2014), explains that the term “action” refers 
to “[a] civil action or proceeding.”  Contrary to the judgment debtor’s assertion, 
this explanation does not express any intention to change the meaning of “action 
[]on a judgment” as we understood it in Young.   
Not only is post-judgment discovery in aid of execution or enforcement not 
an action on a judgment; it is not an “action” at all within the meaning of section 
95.011.  We reach this conclusion by examining the language of section 95.011 
and applying the principle that “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and 
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, . . . the statute must be 
given its plain and obvious meaning,” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 
1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931)), 
 
 
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which “can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary,” Bennett v. St. Vincent’s 
Med. Ctr., Inc., 71 So. 3d 828, 839 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Orlando Reg’l Healthcare 
Sys. v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological, 997 So. 2d 426, 431 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)). 
A “civil action” is “[a]n action brought to enforce, redress, or protect a 
private or civil right; a noncriminal litigation.”  “Civil Action,” Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “action” simply 
as “[a] civil or criminal judicial proceeding” and offers the following 
explanation:  
An action has been defined to be an ordinary proceeding in a court of 
justice, by which one party prosecutes another party for the 
enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a 
wrong, or the punishment of a public offense. . . . More accurately, it 
is defined to be any judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to a 
determination, will result in a judgment or decree.  The action is said 
to terminate at judgment.  
 
Action, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (quoting 1 Morris M. Estee, 
Estee’s Pleadings, Practice, and Forms § 3, at 1 (Carter P. Pomeroy ed., 3d ed. 
1885)).  Another explanatory quotation provided in Black’s Law Dictionary in 
reference to “action” states that when the judicial system recognized a “more 
marked distinction” between “action” and “suit,” an “action” ended when the 
judgment was rendered, and a “suit” included the execution.  Id. (quoting Edwin 
E. Bryant, The Law of Pleading Under the Codes of Civil Procedure 3 (2d ed. 
1899)).  These definitions and explanations establish that a “civil action” is a 
 
 
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process that is intended to result in a judgment or decree and, after the merging of 
“action” and “suit,” may include execution as part of the original “action.”  In 
fact, this Court’s precedent confirms that execution has long been considered a 
continuation of the action in which the judgment was obtained and is “a remedy, 
not an action.”  Massey v. Pineapple Orange Co., 100 So. 170, 171 (Fla. 1924).   
The definitions for “proceeding,” the other expression of “action” under 
section 95.011, are broader: 
1. The regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts 
and events between the time of commencement and the entry of 
judgment. 2. Any procedural means for seeking redress from a 
tribunal or agency. 3. An act or step that is part of a larger action. 4. 
The business conducted by a court or other official body; a hearing. 5. 
Bankruptcy. A particular dispute or matter arising within a pending 
case—as opposed to the case as a whole. 
 
Proceeding, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  An explanatory quotation 
states that “proceeding” is a “more comprehensive” word than “action” and may 
cover a number of concepts, including but not limited to “all ancillary or 
provisional steps, such as . . . garnishment,” “the execution,” “proceedings 
supplementary to execution,” or “the enforcement of the judgment.”  Id. (quoting 
Edwin E. Bryant, The Law of Pleading Under the Codes of Civil Procedure 3–4 
(2d ed. 1899)).  In Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So. 3d 
186 (Fla. 2013), when determining whether arbitration is an “action” under section 
95.11, this Court found that the most relevant definition of “proceeding” is “[a]ny 
 
 
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procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.”  Id. at 190 
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (9th ed. 2009)).  “[R]edress” is “[r]elief” or 
a “remedy,” such as money damages.  Redress, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014). 
While “proceeding” can include any step in the process of obtaining redress, 
even a single hearing, this understanding of “proceeding” does not fit the context 
in which the word “proceeding” is used in section 95.011.  Section 95.011 explains 
that a civil action or proceeding must be “begun within the time prescribed” in 
chapter 95.  If “proceeding” in this context meant any step of a lawsuit, as the 
judgment debtor seems to suggest, then the statute would require any lawsuit to 
both begin and end within the limitations period, as the final hearing or trial would 
be barred if it occurred after the end of the limitations period, even if the action 
began many years earlier.  The Legislature, however, did not say that any civil 
action must “begin and end” within the limitations period or that any discrete 
proceeding within a lawsuit must occur within the limitations period.  The 
Legislature chose the word “begun,” signifying that its concern was with the 
initiation of a new and independent procedural means for obtaining a judgment or 
seeking redress. 
Post-judgment discovery in aid of execution or enforcement of a judgment is 
not a new and independent procedural means for obtaining a judgment or seeking 
 
 
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redress.  Rather, the judgment has been issued and redress in the form of money 
damages has been ordered.  Discovery is part of the collection effort, which occurs 
after the issuance of the judgment as part of the final process for the case.  See Fla. 
R. Civ. P. 1.560(a), 1.570(a) (describing execution and garnishment as the “[f]inal 
process to enforce a judgment . . . for the payment of money”).  Therefore, post-
judgment discovery is not an “action,” and section 95.11 does not establish when it 
must begin. 
Because post-judgment discovery is part of the final process of an action, 
Florida law is not concerned with when it begins, but does dictate when it must be 
completed.  Post-judgment discovery is appropriate as long as the judgment is 
enforceable.  See Young, 46 So. 2d at 185.  Florida judgments have a twenty-year 
“life” during which they are enforceable.  See id. at 185-86; Norwich Union 
Indem. Co. v. Willis, 168 So. 418, 420 (Fla. 1936); § 55.081, Fla. Stat. (2004) 
(providing that a lien imposed under a judgment lasts no longer than twenty years).  
Likewise, a federal judgment issued by a court in Florida has a twenty-year life.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012) (providing that a federal judgment operates as a lien 
on property located in the state where the judgment was issued “in the same 
manner, to the same extent and under the same conditions as a judgment of a court 
of general jurisdiction in such State, and . . . cease[s] to be a lien in the same 
manner and time”); B.A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 14 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla. 1943) 
 
 
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(acknowledging that a federal judgment lien was effective for twenty years from 
the date the judgment was rendered).3  Accordingly, all post-judgment discovery 
efforts aimed at collecting such a judgment must occur—and may be compelled—
within twenty years of entry of the judgment.  
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, and CANADY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit – Case No. 16-10552 
 
J.H. Zidell, Rivkah F. Jaff, Neil Tobak, and Joshua H. Sheskin of J.H. Zidell, P.A., 
Miami Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Lara O’Donnell Grillo of Mark, Migdal & Hayden, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee 
 
 
                                          
 
 
3.  We recognize that our reasoning in Young could lead one to conclude 
that federal judgments issued by courts sitting in Florida are enforceable for only 
five years.  See 46 So. 2d at 185-86.  But, we have stated otherwise, Padgett, 14 
So. 2d at 669, and any other holding would conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).