Title: Mendenhall v. Akron

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270.] 
 
 
MENDENHALL ET AL. v. CITY OF AKRON ET AL. 
SIPE ET AL. v. NESTOR TRAFFIC SYSTEMS, INC. ET AL. 
[Cite as Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270.] 
Home-rule authority — Traffic-law enforcement — Civil sanctions — An 
Ohio municipality does not exceed its home-rule authority when it 
creates an automated system for enforcement of traffic laws that 
imposes civil liability upon violators, provided that the 
municipality does not alter statewide traffic regulations. 
(No. 2006-2265 – Submitted September 18, 2007 – Decided January 31, 2008.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
Eastern Division, Certifying State Law Question,  
Nos. 5:06 CV 0139 and 5:06 CV 0154. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An Ohio municipality does not exceed its home rule authority when it 
creates an automated system for enforcement of traffic laws that 
imposes civil liability upon violators, provided that the 
municipality does not alter statewide traffic regulations. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we decide whether a municipality may constitutionally 
use its home-rule powers to authorize a method of traffic enforcement that imposes 
a civil fine on the registered owner of a vehicle identified by automatic camera to 
be speeding in a school zone. 
{¶ 2} We have accepted pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XVIII(6) an issue 
certified by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
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Eastern Division: “Whether a municipality has the power under home rule to enact 
civil penalties for the offense of violating a traffic signal light or for the offense of 
speeding, both of which are criminal offenses under the Ohio Revised Code.”   
Although, as certified by the federal court, the issue embraces both speed-limit and 
red-light enforcement, the record here deals with a single city ordinance involving 
enforcement of speed limits.  We will therefore confine our analysis to comparing 
the ordinance with the state statute dealing with speed regulations, acknowledging, 
however, that the same analysis will dispose of questions concerning red-light 
cameras. 
{¶ 3} The federal litigation giving rise to the certified question involved a 
challenge to an Akron ordinance. 
I.  The Akron Ordinance 
{¶ 4} The facts as presented by the federal court have been stipulated to 
by all parties.  Prompted by the death of a child caused by a hit-and-run accident in 
a school crosswalk, in September 2005, the Akron City Council passed Ordinance 
461-2005, providing for an “automated mobile speed enforcement system.”  This 
ordinance was codified in Chapter 79.0 and Section 79.01 of the city code and 
authorizes the use of cameras in mobile units to identify speed-limit violators in 
school zones. 
{¶ 5} In adopting the ordinance, the city council stated that “an automated 
mobile speed enforcement system will assist the Akron Police Department by 
alleviating the need for conducting extensive conventional traffic enforcement in 
and around school zones.”  To implement the ordinance, the city of Akron entered 
into a contract with Nestor Traffic Systems, Inc. (“Nestor”) to install and 
administer the automated enforcement system. 
{¶ 6} The ordinance creates a system that Akron maintains is purely civil 
in nature.  The system provides for the automated enforcement of existing traffic 
laws and does not modify any speed limits set by the state.  The ordinance 
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authorizes the imposition of civil monetary fines when the posted speed limit in 
the targeted enforcement areas has been violated.  If a vehicle exceeds the posted 
speed limits, the owner of the vehicle receives a “notice of liability,” which 
includes photographs of the vehicle, the vehicle’s license plate, the date, time, and 
location of the violation, the posted speed limit, the vehicle’s speed at the time of 
the violation, and the amount owed as a civil penalty.  The criminal justice system 
is not involved in penalizing violations of the speed limit captured by an 
automated camera.  Unlike those who receive speeding citations from a police 
officer who has observed the infraction, speeders caught by the automated 
enforcement system do not receive criminal citations, are not required to appear in 
traffic court, and do not have points assessed against their driving records. 
{¶ 7} Owners of vehicles receiving notices of civil liability have several 
options.  They may pay the amount owed, sign an affidavit that the vehicle was 
stolen or leased to someone else, or administratively appeal the violation.  Owners 
choosing to appeal have 21 days to complete and return the notice-of-appeal 
section of the notice-of-liability form. 
{¶ 8} Administrative appeals of notices of liability are overseen by a 
hearing officer, who is an independent third party appointed by the mayor of 
Akron.  After administering the oath to any witnesses and reviewing all the 
evidence, the hearing officer determines whether a violation of Section 79.01 of 
the Codified Ordinances of the city of Akron is established by a preponderance of 
the evidence and whether the owner of the vehicle is liable for that violation.  The 
images of the vehicles and their license plates, the ownership records of the 
vehicles, and the speed of the vehicles on the date in question are considered 
prima facie proof of a civil violation and are made available to the appealing 
party. 
II. Complaints Filed 
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{¶ 9} In December 2005, a few months after the automated enforcement 
system was instituted, two lawsuits challenging the ordinance were filed against 
the city and against Nestor, asserting claims that the ordinance exceeded Akron’s 
home rule authority and also violated due process. 
{¶ 10} One such suit was filed by Kelly Mendenhall.  In November 2005, 
Mendenhall received an automated citation, noting her vehicle’s speed of 39 
m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone.  Mendenhall exercised her right to an administrative 
appeal, which was sustained.  The citation was dismissed, and no civil penalty 
was assessed against her because on the day of her citation, the 25 m.p.h. speed 
limit sign was either missing or had been vandalized. 
{¶ 11} Despite dismissal of her citation, Mendenhall filed a complaint and 
class-action lawsuit for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and monetary 
judgment against the city of Akron, the city council members in their official 
capacity, and Nestor.  The city of Akron and Nestor removed the case to the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. 
{¶ 12} The second lawsuit was instituted by three individuals.  Janice A. 
Sipe and Joanne L. Lattur both received single civil citations for speeding, did not 
appeal, and have not paid the fine.  Wayne Burger received two civil speeding 
citations, 20 minutes apart, in the same school zone.  The city dismissed the 
second violation, as it did for others who received two citations in the same day 
during the beginning of the program.  Burger’s administrative appeal was denied 
because he had failed to appear at the hearing.  He also has not paid his fine.  
Sipe, Lattur, and Burger filed a complaint similar to Mendenhall’s. The city and 
Nestor also removed their case to the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio, Eastern Division. 
{¶ 13} In both cases, the federal district court initially ruled that the city 
of Akron had the power under home rule to create the automated speed-
enforcement system because the ordinance creating the system “neither permits or 
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[sic] licenses that which the laws of the Ohio General Assembly either forbid or 
prohibit and vice versa.” See Mendenhall v. Akron (May 17, 2006), N.D.Ohio 
Nos. 5:06 CV 0139 and 5:06 CV 0154, 2006 WL 1371641.  The district court also 
held that “Akron City Ordinance 461-2005 is a proper exercise of the powers 
bestowed on the City of Akron by Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio 
Constitution.”  Id. 
{¶ 14} Following that decision, however, the Court of Common Pleas of 
Trumbull County held, in Moadus v. Girard (July 6, 2006), Trumbull C.P. No. 
05-CV-1927, 2006 WL 4092324, that a municipality’s speed-enforcement system 
using a camera and radar device violated the Home Rule Amendment of the Ohio 
Constitution.  In reaching its decision, the court of common pleas rejected the 
federal district court’s reasoning and determined that the Girard system 
“transform[ed] what the State has defined as criminal conduct into merely a civil 
wrong.” 
{¶ 15} As a result of Moadus, the district court reconsidered its earlier 
decision in the two cases. The court vacated the order finding that Akron’s 
automated speed-enforcement system did not violate the Ohio Constitution and 
certified the question to this court, asking whether a municipality has the power 
under home rule to authorize automated speed-enforcement systems of this type. 
III. Legal Analysis 
{¶ 16} Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution provides that 
municipalities are authorized “to exercise all powers of local self-government and 
to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other 
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” 
{¶ 17} We use a three-part test to evaluate claims that a municipality has 
exceeded its powers under the Home Rule Amendment. “A state statute takes 
precedence over a local ordinance when (1) the ordinance is in conflict with the 
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statute, (2) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local 
self-government, and (3) the statute is a general law.”  Canton v. State, 95 Ohio 
St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, ¶ 9.  Although it may seem that the 
three issues should be taken in sequence as stated, we must examine the two 
legislative enactments before determining whether a conflict exists. Thus, the 
Canton test should be reordered to question whether (1) the ordinance is an 
exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, (2) the statute 
is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute. 
{¶ 18} The first part of the test relates to the ordinance.  As we have held, 
“If an allegedly conflicting city ordinance relates solely to self-government, the 
analysis stops, because the Constitution authorizes a municipality to exercise all 
powers of local self-government within its jurisdiction.” Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. 
Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 23.  If, on the 
other hand, the ordinance pertains to “local police, sanitary and other similar 
regulations,” Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution, the municipality has 
exceeded its home rule authority only if the ordinance is in conflict with a general 
state law. If that ordinance does not relate to local self-government, the second 
part of the test examines the state statute to determine whether it is a general law. 
If the statute is not a general law, the ordinance will not be invalidated.  Only 
when the municipality has not exercised a power of self-government and when a 
general state law exists do we finally consider the third part of the test, whether 
the ordinance is in conflict with the general law. 
A.  The Ordinance 
{¶ 19} It is well established that regulation of traffic is an exercise of 
police power that relates to public health and safety, as well as to the general 
welfare of the public. See Linndale v. State (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 52, 54, 706 
N.E.2d 1227, citing Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Munn Rd. Sand & Gravel 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 579, 583, 621 N.E.2d 696.  Here, there is no dispute that 
January Term, 2008 
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the Akron ordinance is an exercise of concurrent police power rather than self-
government.  Thus, the question remains whether the state statute involved is a 
general law and, if so, whether the Akron ordinance impermissibly conflicts with 
the general law. 
B.  The Statute as a General Law 
{¶ 20} To qualify as a general law, a statute must “(1) be part of a 
statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the 
state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, 
sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit 
legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or 
similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” 
Canton, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, syllabus. 
{¶ 21} We must, therefore, determine whether Ohio’s speed-limit statute 
possesses the characteristics of a general law.  The parties agree that R.C. 4511.21 
governs speed limits in Ohio.  A review of this statute shows that it is 
comprehensive.  A general prohibition appears at the beginning:  “(A) No person 
shall operate a motor vehicle* * * at a speed greater or less than is reasonable or 
proper * * *.”  The remainder of the statute elaborates on that general prohibition 
and includes specific regulations.  Prima facie speed limits for specified locations 
are set forth in subdivisions (1) through (13) of division (B). Division (C) 
provides for no more than a single conviction for a speed violation for the same 
conduct, although it allows violations to be charged alternatively in a single 
affidavit.  Subdivisions (1) through (6) of division (D) establish specific speed 
limits for the type of street, highway, or freeway involved.  Traffic affidavits are 
covered in divisions (E) and (F), and division (G) mandates assessment of points 
for violations. 
{¶ 22} The duties of the director of transportation are specified in several 
divisions. The director is required to maintain appropriate speed limits, pursuant 
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to R.C. 4511.21(H). Speed limits may also be set in conjunction with the local 
authorities, who may request specific speed limits to be approved by the director, 
division (I); or local authorities may themselves alter the limits, subject to the 
director’s approval, division (J).  Township boards of trustees are given authority 
over unimproved highways within the township by division (K).  The director has 
authority to raise the limit of freeways and rural multilane highways to 65 m.p.h. 
with the director of public safety and local authorities pursuant to divisions (L) 
and (M) respectively. Speed limits on highways subject to more than one local 
authority are governed by division (N).  Specific definitions pertinent to the 
section appear in division (O).  Lastly, division (P) sets forth penalties for speed 
violations. 
{¶ 23} As part of R.C. Chapter 4511, which as a whole regulates traffic 
laws and the operation of motor vehicles in the state of Ohio, R.C. 4511.21 is part 
of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment. No part of the state is 
exempt from speed enforcement.  The statute thus satisfies the first and second 
elements of the general-law test established in Canton by being “part of a 
statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment” and by “apply[ing] to all 
parts of the state alike and operat[ing] uniformly throughout the state.” Canton, 95 
Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, syllabus. 
{¶ 24} The statute also satisfies the third element of the Canton general-
law test, for it “set[s] forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than 
purport[ing] only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to 
set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations.” Id.  As already noted, R.C. 
4511.21 has extensive scope and does more than grant or limit state powers. By 
establishing the rules regulating the speed of motor vehicles within Ohio, it is an 
integral part of the state’s traffic laws. 
{¶ 25} The fourth question of the general-law test is whether the state law 
“prescribe[s] a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” Id.  One need look only 
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to R.C. 4511.21(A), which plainly begins, “No person shall operate a motor 
vehicle * * *.” (Emphasis added.)  Thus, the statutory prohibitions apply 
uniformly and without exception.  By using the phrase “no person,” R.C. 4511.21 
extends its application to the citizens of the state generally and does not single out 
any group or class for different treatment.  The statute becomes more specific in 
regard to the speed limits themselves, but the requirement that “[n]o person shall 
operate a motor vehicle * * * at a speed greater or less than is reasonable or 
proper * * *” demonstrates an intention that all the requirements of the section 
apply uniformly throughout the state. 
{¶ 26} Some of the amici argue that not all portions of R.C. 4511.21, 
including the penalty provisions, are general laws. They cite Columbus v. Molt 
(1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 94, 65 O.O.2d 244, 304 N.E.2d 245, in which we held 
summarily that a penalty provision of a municipal ordinance was not in conflict 
with R.C. 4511.06 (uniform application of traffic laws) or R.C. 4511.99(F) 
(penalty section for reckless operation) because the statutes were not general laws.  
Molt, however, is inapplicable. 
{¶ 27} We have since clarified that sections within a chapter will not be 
considered in isolation when determining whether a general law exists. See 
Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 44, 
2 OBR 587, 442 N.E.2d 1278. All sections of a chapter must be read in pari 
materia to determine whether the statute in question is part of a statewide 
regulation and whether the chapter as a whole prescribes a rule of conduct upon 
citizens generally.  Canton, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, 
¶ 38.  When interpreted as part of a whole, R.C. 4511.21 applies to all citizens 
generally as part of a statewide regulation of traffic laws and motor vehicle 
operation. 
C.  Conflict Analysis 
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{¶ 28} Because the statute regarding speed limits is a general law, we 
must finally determine whether, when cities pass ordinances creating automated 
systems of speed-limit enforcement, the municipal ordinances are in conflict with 
the state statute. Home rule jurisprudence has become confused over the years 
because different theories have been used to determine when an ordinance is in 
conflict with a general state law. This confusion is highlighted in the briefs before 
us, where several different theories are set forth in the attempt to prove either the 
presence or absence of a conflict. 
1. Contrary Directives 
{¶ 29} We attempted to clarify how to determine whether an ordinance is 
in conflict with a general state statute most recently in Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. 
Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, and in 
Cincinnati v. Baskin, 112 Ohio St.3d 279, 2006-Ohio-6422, 859 N.E.2d 514. 
There, for purposes of conflict analysis, we adopted as controlling the test of 
“‘whether [an] ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and 
prohibits and vice versa.’ ”  Am. Fin. Servs. Assn., ¶ 40, and Cincinnati v. Baskin. 
¶ 19, quoting Struthers v. Sokol (1923), 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519, at 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  We also explained, “No real conflict can exist 
unless the ordinance declares something to be right which the state law declares to 
be wrong, or vice versa.” Struthers at 268. This test then, which may be labeled 
“contrary directives,” is met if the ordinance and statute in question provide 
contradictory guidance. 
{¶ 30} To determine whether a conflict exists in this case, we first 
examine the actual conduct that both the state statute and the municipal ordinance 
target:  control of vehicle speed. The Akron ordinance does not change the 
existing state speed limits; in that respect, the ordinance prohibits conduct 
identical to that prohibited by state law. The difference between the state statute 
and Akron ordinance regarding prohibited conduct relates to the party ultimately 
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responsible for a speed violation.  While the state statute punishes the driver of 
the vehicle, the Akron ordinance imposes a fine on a vehicle’s owner, who may or 
may not be the driver at the time of the violation.  Ultimately, regardless of the 
actor who performs it, the actual conduct prohibited—exceeding speed limits—is 
the same.  When a municipal ordinance does nothing more than prohibit the same 
conduct prohibited by state statute, there is no conflict between the two. See 
Fremont v. Keating (1917), 96 Ohio St. 468, 470, 118 N.E. 114. The Akron 
ordinance therefore does not conflict with the statute in the strict sense that it does 
not permit that which the statute explicitly forbids or vice versa. 
2. Conflict by Implication 
{¶ 31} Although on occasion a state statute and municipal ordinance will 
directly contradict each other, and thereby make a conflict analysis simple and 
direct, that is not always the case.  It is in the context of more nuanced cases that 
the concept of “conflict by implication” has arisen.  Rather than an independent 
test for identifying a conflict, conflict by implication is a subset of the Struthers 
analysis and recognizes that sometimes a municipal ordinance will indirectly 
prohibit what a state statute permits or vice versa.  Schneiderman v. Sesanstein 
(1929), 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N.E. 158.  In Schneiderman, we struck down a city 
ordinance setting a speed limit at 15 m.p.h., a speed below the statewide limit of 
25 m.p.h.  We concluded that the statewide limit implicitly meant that a vehicle 
could be driven at any speed below 25 m.p.h., which included those speeds that 
the ordinance otherwise prohibited.  Because of this implied conflict, we held that 
the ordinance exceeded the city’s home rule power.  Id. at 90. 
{¶ 32} When determining whether a conflict by implication exists, we 
examine whether the General Assembly indicated that the relevant state statute is 
to control a subject exclusively.  See Baskin, 112 Ohio St.3d 279, 2006-Ohio-
6422, 859 N.E.2d 514, at ¶ 23.  In this case, although the General Assembly has 
enacted a detailed statute governing criminal enforcement of speeding regulations, 
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it has not acted in the realm of civil enforcement.  Indeed, R.C. Chapter 4511, 
which deals broadly with traffic laws, is silent on the matter. 
{¶ 33} The parties challenging the ordinance and their amici argue that 
R.C. 4511.07 provides for exclusive operation of state traffic statutes and limits 
the ability of municipalities to enact their own regulations. R.C. 4511.07(A) 
provides, “Sections 4511.01 to 4511.78, 4511.99, and 4513.01 to 4513.37 of the 
Revised Code do not prevent local authorities from carrying out the following 
activities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within 
the reasonable exercise of the police power.” The statute then proceeds to list ten 
specific areas of regulation, none of which would encompass automated speed 
enforcement. However, we have held that although R.C. 4511.07 “could be 
viewed as very much like a grant of authority to the municipality, the municipality 
does not need the grant of authority because it already possesses it pursuant to its 
home rule powers. The power comes from the Ohio Constitution; it does not come 
from R.C. 4511.07.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 67 Ohio 
St.3d at 584, 621 N.E.2d 696. 
{¶ 34} Thus, R.C. 4511.07 does not expressly signal that the state has 
exclusivity in the area of speed enforcement.  Furthermore, because there is no 
indication that the state has intended to reserve to itself the ability to enforce 
statewide traffic laws through a civil process, we decline to recognize a conflict 
by implication. 
3. Conflict Regarding Decriminalization 
{¶ 35} Our analysis does not end simply because we have determined that 
there is no conflict, either explicit or implied, regarding the directives of the 
ordinance and statute.  Although both prohibit the conduct of excessive speed, we 
have also recognized that a municipal ordinance is in conflict with state law when 
there is a significant discrepancy between the punishments imposed for that 
behavior.  We have held, “When a municipal ordinance varies in punishment with 
January Term, 2008 
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the state statute such ordinance is not in conflict with the statute when it only 
imposes a greater penalty.”  Niles v. Howard (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 162, 165, 12 
OBR 232, 466 N.E.2d 539.  However, we have also held that if the municipal 
ordinance does more than simply impose a greater penalty — by changing the 
character of an offense, for example — the ordinance and statute are in conflict.  
See Cleveland v. Betts (1958), 168 Ohio St. 386, 389, 7 O.O.2d 151, 154 N.E.2d 
917. 
{¶ 36} Those challenging the Akron ordinance argue that the ordinance 
has changed the character of the traffic offense of speeding and therefore conflicts 
with state traffic laws. They argue that civil enforcement of violations identified 
by the automated system decriminalize behavior that is criminal under state law. 
{¶ 37} This argument, however, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the actual effect of the Akron ordinance.  The ordinance does not change the 
speed limits established by state law or change the ability of police officers to cite 
offenders for traffic violations.  After the enactment of the Akron ordinance, a 
person who speeds and is observed by a police officer remains subject to the usual 
traffic laws.  Only when no police officer is present and the automated camera 
captures the speed infraction does the Akron ordinance apply, not to invoke the 
criminal traffic law, but to impose an administrative penalty on the vehicle’s 
owner.  The city ordinance and state law may target identical conduct—
speeding—but the city ordinance does not replace traffic law.  It merely 
supplements it.  Furthermore, a person cannot be subject to both criminal and civil 
liability under the ordinance.  The ordinance states that if a violation is both 
recorded by the automated system and observed by a police officer, then the 
criminal violation takes precedence.  The Akron ordinance complements rather 
than conflicts with state law. 
IV. Other Theories 
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{¶ 38} Some of the parties advance a preemption argument, claiming that 
the state has intended to completely occupy the field of traffic regulation, thereby 
preempting any action by municipalities.  Such a home rule analysis has never 
been adopted by a majority of this court, and we decline to apply such an analysis 
today. 
{¶ 39} Much has been made of the motivation behind the city’s decision 
to adopt an ordinance of this type.  There is disagreement among the parties as to 
whether the city’s decision was motivated by concerns over safety or by a desire 
to increase revenue. Motivation does not play any role in home rule analysis, 
however, and a city has the right to enact “such local police, sanitary and other 
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”  Section 3, Article 
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.  Our state Constitution grants municipalities this 
right, provided that the automated enforcement system does not supplant or 
modify the state traffic laws. 
{¶ 40} Although there are due process questions regarding the operation 
of the Akron Ordinance and those similar to it, those questions are not 
appropriately before us at this time and will not be discussed here. 
V. Conclusion 
{¶ 41} As we observed at the outset, the record before us relates to 
Akron’s ordinance, although the federal court’s certification covered both speed 
and red-light enforcement through automated means. We hold merely that an Ohio 
municipality does not exceed its home rule authority when it creates an automated 
system for enforcement of traffic laws that imposes civil liability upon violators, 
provided that the municipality does not alter statewide traffic regulations. 
{¶ 42} Enactment of Akron’s ordinance is not an exercise of self-
government but of concurrent police power. The statute governing speed limits is 
a general law because it is a comprehensive statewide enactment, setting forth 
police regulations that apply uniformly to all citizens throughout Ohio.  Akron 
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15 
Ordinance 461-2005, which provides for implementation of an automated mobile 
speed-enforcement system, does not conflict with state law because it does not 
alter or supersede state law.  The ordinance provides for a complementary system 
of civil enforcement that, rather than decriminalizing behavior, allows for the 
administrative citation of vehicle owners under specific circumstances.  Akron 
has acted within its home rule authority granted by the Constitution of Ohio. 
{¶ 43} We therefore answer the certified question with a qualified yes.  A 
municipality has the power under home rule to enact civil penalties for the offense 
of violating a traffic light or for the offense of speeding, both of which are 
criminal offenses under the Ohio Revised Code, provided that the municipality 
does not alter statewide traffic regulations. 
So ordered. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, MCFARLAND, KLATT, and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the answer only. 
 
MATTHEW W. MCFARLAND, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for 
O’CONNOR, J. 
 
WILLIAM A. KLATT, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for 
O’DONNELL, J. 
__________________ 
 
Law Offices of Warner Mendenhall, Inc., Jacquenette S. Corgan, and 
Warner Mendenhall, for petitioner Kelly Mendenhall. 
 
Antoni Dalayanis, for petitioners Janice Sipe, Joanne Lattur, and Wayne 
Burger. 
 
Max Rothal, Akron Law Director, and Stephen A. Fallis and Michael J. 
Defibaugh, Assistant Law Directors, for respondent city of Akron. 
 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., Richard Gurbst, Heather Tonsing, 
and Donald W. Herbe, for respondent Nestor Traffic Systems, Inc. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Sutter, O’Connell & Farchione, Thomas H. Terry III and David W. Skall, 
for amici curiae Michael McNamara and State Representative James Raussen. 
 
Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., Patrick J. Perotti, Jonathan T. Stender, 
and Nicole T. Fiorelli, for amici curiae Dawn Rogaskie and State Representative 
James T. Raussen. 
 
James A. Denney, for amicus curiae Dan Moadus. 
 
Fritz Byers and Samuel Z. Kaplan, for amici curiae Ann Lewicki, 
Raymond G. Tobin, and Robert Nash Jr. 
 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., Gregory V. Mersol, and Kristin Ulrich Somich, 
for amicus curiae ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc. 
 
Stephen L. Byron and John E. Gotherman, for amicus curiae the Ohio 
Municipal League. 
 
Patrick J. Bonfield, Dayton Law Director, and John C. Musto, Assistant 
Law Director, for amicus curiae city of Dayton. 
 
Brickler & Eckler, L.L.P., Quintin F. Lindsmith, Vladimir Belo, and 
Natalie T. Furniss, for amicus curiae Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. 
 
Richard C. Pfeiffer Jr., Columbus City Attorney, for amicus curiae city of 
Columbus. 
 
Robert Triozzi, Cleveland Law Director, Thomas J. Kaiser, Chief Trial 
Counsel, and Gary S. Singletary, Assistant Law Director, for amicus curiae city of 
Cleveland. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Carrie M. Dunn, and John W. 
Solomon, for amicus curiae Traffipax, Inc. 
 
John T. Madigan, Toledo Law Director, and Adam Loukx, General 
Counsel, for amicus curiae city of Toledo. 
______________________