Title: In re Disqualification of Stuard

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Stuard, 113 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2006-Ohio-7233.] 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF STUARD. 
THE STATE OF OHIO v. JACKSON. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Stuard, 
 113 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2006-Ohio-7233.] 
Judges – Affidavit of disqualification – Disqualification denied. 
(No. 06-AP-102—Decided November 29, 2006.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Trumbull County  
Court of Common Pleas Case No. 2001-CR-794. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Attorney Randall L. Porter – counsel for the defendant – has filed 
an affidavit with the clerk of this court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking the 
disqualification of Judge John M. Stuard from acting on any further proceedings 
in case No. 2001-CR-794 in the Court of Common Pleas of Trumbull County. 
{¶ 2} Porter explains that the defendant was convicted of aggravated 
murder and was sentenced to death in Judge Stuard’s courtroom.  In a related case 
involving a defendant named Donna Roberts – who was likewise convicted and 
sentenced to death by Judge Stuard for her role in the same crime – this court 
recently vacated the death sentence, holding that Judge Stuard erred when he 
“directly involved the prosecutor in preparing the sentencing opinion and did so 
on an ex parte basis.”  State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 
N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 159. 
{¶ 3} Citing Judge Stuard’s statement at a hearing in Roberts that he has 
similarly relied on the prosecuting attorney to prepare paperwork for him in other 
criminal cases, defendant Jackson has asked the trial court for a new sentencing 
hearing akin to the one that we have ordered for Donna Roberts.  According to 
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affiant Porter, Judge Stuard will be a material witness if an evidentiary hearing is 
held on the motion, and Porter asks that the judge be disqualified to avoid any 
appearance of impropriety that might be created by the judge’s decision about his 
own allegedly improper reliance on the prosecuting attorney and his ex parte 
contacts with the prosecuting attorney’s office in connection with the preparation 
of the sentencing opinion in Jackson’s case. 
{¶ 4} Judge Stuard has responded in writing to the affidavit.  He 
acknowledges that he held the same kind of communications with the prosecuting 
attorney’s office in both the Roberts and Jackson capital cases before sentencing 
each of them to death, and he denies that any hearing is needed in his courtroom 
in the Jackson case to establish that fact.  The judge states that he is prepared to 
reconsider the evidence and impose a new sentence in this case just as he has been 
ordered to do in the related Roberts case.  He contends that his ex parte 
communications with the prosecuting attorney’s office were administrative rather 
than substantive, and he states that the prosecuting attorney’s office simply typed 
up his notes after he had independently weighed the evidence and reached a 
decision about the proper sentences for the two defendants. 
{¶ 5} I find no basis for ordering the disqualification of Judge Stuard.  
The judge is entitled to consider the defendant’s motion for relief from judgment 
now pending in the trial court, and if the judge concludes that relief is appropriate, 
he may grant that motion and conduct the new sentencing hearing that he has 
described in his response to the affidavit filed here.  The judge acknowledges the 
factual allegations in the defendant’s affidavit, so the matter of a new sentencing 
hearing akin to the hearing ordered by this court in the Roberts case appears not to 
require the resolution of any factual disputes between the parties but rather turns 
on the legal question whether a new sentencing hearing is warranted for this 
defendant. 
January Term, 2006 
3 
{¶ 6} I have declined to establish a rule “requiring disqualification of a 
judge based solely on suppositions that the judge may be called as a witness or 
allegations that the judge possesses evidence material to the case.”  In re 
Disqualification of Gorman (1993), 74 Ohio St.3d 1251, 657 N.E.2d 1354.  To be 
sure, under Canon 3(E)(1)(d)(v) of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge 
who knows that he or she is “likely to be a material witness in the proceeding” 
must step aside, but “[w]here the evidence concerning the transactions in issue 
may be obtained from witnesses other than the trial judge, then the trial judge is 
not such a material witness as to require a disqualification.”  Bresnahan v. Luby 
(1966), 160 Colo. 455, 458, 418 P.2d 171.  Mere “[f]amiliarity with the 
circumstances surrounding the trial does not render the judge a material witness.”  
Id.  See, also, Wingate v. Mach (1934), 117 Fla. 104, 108, 157 So. 421 (a material 
witness is one who is able to give testimony about a fact “about which no other 
witness might testify”); Coleman v. State (1981), 194 Mont. 428, 435, 633 P.2d 
624 (“the post-conviction court judge should only recuse himself if the petitioner 
shows that the judge is the source of material evidence otherwise unobtainable”); 
Robison v. State (Okla.Crim.App.1991), 818 P.2d 1250, 1252 (trial judge was not 
required to disqualify himself from a post-conviction hearing where his testimony 
would have been “either cumulative * * * or immaterial”). 
{¶ 7} If Judge Stuard concludes that he is likely to be a material witness 
in the proceeding, he can and should disqualify himself, as Canon 3(E)(1)(d)(v) 
directs.  On the record before me, however, I cannot conclude that the judge 
possesses knowledge that he is likely to be such a witness, and the information in 
the affidavit itself would not lead an objective, reasonable observer to harbor 
serious doubts about Judge Stuard’s ability to decide the case impartially. 
{¶ 8} Although the judge does not expressly state that he can consider 
the case fairly and impartially, I conclude that the record before me does not 
compel his disqualification for any alleged bias or prejudice.  To be sure, if a 
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judge’s words or actions convey the impression that the judge has developed a 
“hostile feeling or spirit of ill will,” State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt (1956), 164 
Ohio St. 463, 469, 58 O.O. 315, 132 N.E.2d 191, or if the judge has reached a 
“fixed anticipatory judgment” that will prevent the judge from hearing the case 
with “an open state of mind * * * governed by the law and the facts,” id., then the 
judge should not remain on the case.  There is no evidence in the record before 
me, however, to suggest that the judge has shown any hostility or bias toward 
either party, and there is no indication that he is unable or unwilling to resolve any 
remaining disputed matters with an open state of mind. 
{¶ 9} As I have said, “[a] judge is presumed to follow the law and not to 
be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to 
overcome these presumptions.”  In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 
1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.  Those presumptions have not been 
overcome in this case. 
{¶ 10} For the reasons stated above, the affidavit of disqualification is 
denied.  The case may proceed before Judge Stuard. 
______________________