Title: AMY JEAN BUTTLE V. JOSHUA JOHN BUTTLE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

AMY JEAN BUTTLE V. JOSHUA JOHN BUTTLE 2008 WY 135196 P.3d 174Case Number: S-08-0090Decided: 11/14/2008
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
AMY 
JEAN BUTTLE,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.JOSHUA JOHN 
BUTTLE,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
 
 

Appeal from theDistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Dameione 
S. Cameron and Dean R. Winegar of Parsons & Cameron, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Donald 
A. Cole of Cole & Cole Law Firm, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  In divorce proceedings ending the marriage 
between Amy Jean Buttle (Mother) and Joshua John Buttle (Father), the district 
court ordered that Mother should have primary physical custody for decision 
making purposes but then determined the parties should share physical custody of 
their four-year-old child, meaning each parent would have custody 50 percent of 
the time.  The 
district court declined to make a finding concerning Mother's allegations of 
spousal abuse.  
Mother appeals, claiming the district court abused its discretion in 
ordering shared custody and not considering her claims of spousal abuse as being 
contrary to the best interest of the child.    

  
          

[¶2]      We find no abuse of 
discretion in the manner in which the district court addressed the spousal abuse 
evidence.  We 
reverse the district court's custody order however, because we conclude that it 
abused its discretion in deciding shared custody was in the child's best 
interest.     

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]  The issues for this Court's determination 
are:

 
 

1.                  
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it 
declined to make a finding that spousal abuse occurred and was contrary to the 
best interest of the child.

 
 

2.                  
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it 
awarded Mother and Father shared physical custody. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4]  The parties married on September 6, 2002.  One child, a son, 
was born two and a half years later.  During the marriage, the parties lived on a 
ranch located near LaGrange, 
Wyoming, 45 miles northeast 
of Cheyenne.  Father was employed on the ranch, Mother 
commuted to work in Cheyenne five days per week 
and the child attended day care in LaGrange while Mother was working.  

 
 
[¶5]  Mother filed a complaint for divorce on 
September 11, 2007.  
She sought an order giving the parties joint legal custody of the child 
but awarding primary physical custody to her.  At the time, the parties were still living in 
the home on the ranch property, but Mother had obtained a job in Alabama and planned to move there with the 
child.  In her 
complaint, Mother sought an order allowing Father liberal visitation, taking 
into consideration the potential distance between him and the child.  She asked the 
district court to accept a reasonable "parenting plan"1 that maximized 
the time Father could spend with his son.

 
 
[¶6]  Father answered the complaint and filed a 
counterclaim for divorce in which he asked for joint legal custody and primary 
residential custody, with Mother having liberal "co-parenting"2 time with the 
child.  Father 
also filed a motion for temporary custody of the child and a motion to keep the 
child in Laramie County, asserting the child had lived all but six months of his 
life on the ranch and it was not in his best interest for Mother to disrupt the 
stability of his life by moving him out of state away from family and 
friends.    

 
 
[¶7]  Mother responded to Father's motions and filed 
her own motion for temporary custody.  She asserted that she had been the child's 
primary caretaker since his birth and it was in his best interest to remain with 
her.  
Apparently, the district court held a hearing on the motions on September 
21, 2007, and ordered that the child remain in LaramieCounty 
and the parties share custody until the divorce trial.3  

 
 
[¶8]  The district court conducted the trial on 
October 17, 2007.  
The undisputed evidence showed that Mother had been the child's primary 
caregiver throughout his life.  Both parties testified that Mother got the 
child up and ready in the morning and took him to day care before driving to 
work in Cheyenne.  She also picked the child up from day care in 
the evening when she returned to LaGrange.  Father was frequently not at home in the 
evenings.  
Mother bathed the child and put him to bed at night.  Father testified 
that he worked on the ranch at least part of most weekends during the marriage. 
Mother frequently took the child to Cheyenne for outings or to Saratoga to see her family on weekends.  While Father 
testified that Mother prevented him from spending time with the child, Father 
conceded that he chose to rodeo and drink with his friends when he could have 
been with his family.  

 
 
[¶9]  Mother testified that she was no longer 
planning to move to Alabama 
because the district court had suggested at a prior hearing that she find a job 
in Wyoming or Colorado.4  She testified that 
she was currently living in Cheyenne but planned to move to Saratoga where she had a job offer, could live 
in her sister's house and be close to her parents.  She testified that 
she wanted to move to Saratoga because her 
parents were there, it is a nice community in which to raise a child and, given 
the violence that occurred in the marriage, she thought some distance between 
her and Father would be beneficial.  

 
 
[¶10] Mother testified that the parties' marital problems 
were caused by Father's anger and drinking, which led to physical and verbal 
confrontations.  
She testified that she was afraid of Father and had concerns about how he 
might treat the child during visitation when he was alone with him. Father 
confirmed that the parties fought but not to the degree Mother claimed.  He testified that 
the physical confrontations were before the child's birth and were less violent 
than Mother testified.   He testified that early on in the 
marriage the fights involved both parties trying to "be the head of household." 
 One of the 
verbal fights later on involved Mother's threats to take the child away from 
him. 

 
 
[¶11]  Father testified that in the three weeks 
between trial and entry of the temporary custody order, he and the child spent 
time together.  
He bathed the child, fed him, put him to bed and took him to work with 
him when he could.  
He testified that the child loved being at the ranch and that he and the 
child had "an amazing relationship now."  Father asked for "as close to the 50/50 
[custody] as I can get."  

 
 
[¶12]  After the parties presented their evidence, 
the district court considered the evidence of spousal abuse along with the other 
evidence presented and declined to make a finding that abuse occurred or to 
determine custody based upon such a finding. The district court found that the 
parties should have shared custody and the child should spend equal time with 
each of them.  
The court asked the parties to confer and determine what period of time 
the child should spend with each of them.

 
 
[¶13]  On November 8, 2007, Mother filed a motion 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59(a) asking the district court to re-open the evidence and 
amend the judgment (although no written judgment had been entered) concerning 
visitation.  
Mother alleged that on October 28, 2007, at 2:30 a.m., while the child 
was in Father's care but apparently not with him, Father was arrested for 
driving under the influence and interfering with a police officer.  No ruling on the 
motion appears in the record, although Mother states in her brief that the 
district court denied the motion.  

     

 [¶14]  In January of 2008, the district court entered 
a decree of divorce.  
With regard to custody, the district court found that Mother should be 
the primary custodial parent for final decision-making authority.5  The district court further found that it was 
in the best interest of the child for the parties to have shared custody "with 
each party receiving fifty percent (50%) physical co-parenting time with the 
child with each parent having four days on four days off."  The district court 
further found that it was in the best interest of the child that Mother and 
Father discuss where the child should attend school when he reached school age 
and if they could not resolve the issue then the court would resolve it.  Mother appealed.

 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶15]   We review a district court's custody 
determination according to the following standards:

 
 
Child custody decisions are within the sound discretion of 
the trial court.  

 
 
It has been our consistent principle that in custody 
matters, the welfare and needs of the children are to be given paramount 
consideration.  
The determination of the best interests of the child is a question for 
the trier of fact.  
We do not overturn the decision of the trial court unless we are 
persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of a violation of some legal 
principle.  Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 148 
(Wyo. 1999), quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 
(Wyo. 1998).

 
 

Testerman v. Testerman, 2008 WY 
112, ¶ 8, 193 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
            
A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which 
exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.  Our review entails 
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's 
decision. . . .  
Findings of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, 
or against the great weight of the evidence cannot be sustained.  Similarly, an abuse 
of discretion is present when a material factor deserving significant weight is 
ignored. 

            

Eickbush v. Eickbush, 2007 WY 
179, ¶ 9, 171 P.3d 509, 511 (Wyo. 
2007) (citations omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.                  
Evidence of Spousal Abuse

 
 
[¶16]  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(c) (LexisNexis 
2007) provides: 

 
 
The court shall consider evidence of spousal abuse or child 
abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the children.  If the court finds 
that family violence has occurred, the court shall make arrangements for 
visitation that best protects the children and the abused spouse from further 
harm.

 
 

Mother contends the district court failed to comply with 
this mandatory provision because it declined to consider the evidence that she 
had been physically abused by Father as being contrary to the best interest of 
the child.  
Father maintains that, after considering the parties' testimony, weighing 
their credibility and concluding the majority of the violence occurred before 
the child's birth, the district court properly exercised its discretion and 
determined that neither a finding that domestic violence occurred nor 
a custody determination based upon such a finding was 
appropriate.  

 
 
[¶17]  In support of her claim that spousal abuse 
occurred, Mother testified that Father drank three or four times per week and 
often did not come home until late.  She testified that sometimes they fought when 
he arrived home late.  
On one occasion, Father threw her down on the ground, held her by the 
hair and choked her.  
Another time, she locked herself in the bedroom when they were fighting 
and he kicked the door open.  She tried to leave and he followed her, shoving 
her repeatedly and finally threw her to the ground and kicked her.  She testified that 
he called her derogatory names and on several occasions kicked or hit the 
furniture and walls. She testified that on one occasion, after the child was 
born, Father said he "should beat the ---- out of [her]," maybe that would get a 
reaction, and when she did not respond, he hit the wall next to her head.     

 
 
[¶18]  Father confirmed that the parties fought and 
that their fights "got rough at times."  He denied ever choking or kicking Mother, but 
admitted that he held her down one time during a fight and pushed her down 
another time.  
He testified that Mother was physical with him, too; one time she pushed 
him, on another occasion she threw a phone at him and another time she knocked 
the front storm door down.  Father testified that no physical fights 
occurred after the child's birth but that verbal fights continued.  Father admitted that 
he called Mother names, such as "fat cow" or "pig" and that he had done so 
within ear shot of the child.  Father also confirmed that he drank regularly, 
consuming an average of six or seven beers after work, and that he "probably" 
did not remember things clearly when he was drunk.     

 
 
[¶19]  In addressing the parties' testimony 
concerning the claim of spousal abuse, the district court made the following 
statements from the bench:

 
 
            
I'm aware of the impact that Mr. Buttle's behavior had on you and your 
belief that it was in your best interest from the standpoint of your mental 
status to get away and to leave.  Mr. Buttle to his credit admitted some of the 
horrible things that you say he did.  There's no excuse for that. . . .  [T]he majority of the 
violent things apparently took place before [the child] was born.  That means in my 
mind . . . that it would be inappropriate for me to make a finding that domestic 
violence occurred and that I'm making a decision of noncustody based upon that 
finding.  

            
There are no manuals, there are no guide books you can go to and say, 
okay, this marriage isn't going to work.  What do we do?  Sometimes people know of no other way than to 
react either by silence or removal or by violence and striking out.

            
As I say, Mr. Buttle, there is no excuse for doing the things that you 
did.  But I 
believe you when you say that conduct won't impact your ability to be a good 
parent.  
Obviously, there are irreconcilable differences that were present.

            
And I want to tell both of you also that I have been doing this kind of 
work for way too long, over 30 years.  I can tell you that it is very, very rare for 
a marriage to breakdown because of the conduct of one of the parties.  . . .  [M]y point in saying 
that is I don't want the Decree to say that one person is awarded the divorce.6     

 
 
[¶20]  Addressing Mother's concerns about Father's 
behavior when he is with the child alone, the district court stated:

 
 

I don't get the feeling . . . that the things about which 
you complain will adversely impact your son's welfare.  What I mean by that 
is that I don't believe that when [the child] is with his father that his father 
is going to stay out late at the bars.  I don't believe he is going to be violent with 
him.  I don't 
believe he's going to mistreat him or animals in his presence.  Certainly those are 
things you need to work on, Mr. Buttle.

 
 
[¶21]  From these excerpts it is clear the district 
court considered the evidence of spousal abuse.  Mother's contention, therefore, that the court 
did not consider the evidence is incorrect.  If an abuse of discretion occurred on this 
issue, it involved the district court's statements that it should not make a 
finding that spousal abuse occurred or base its custody determination on such a 
finding.  In 
particular, we note that the district court inferred that Father's admissions 
that he was physically violent with Mother prior to the child's birth were not 
sufficient evidence upon which to base a custody determination.  In that regard, we 
believe such evidence was appropriate for the district court to have considered 
and we see nothing in the record, other than Father's promises to behave 
differently, to insure rehabilitation of Father's inclination to resort to 
violence when frustrated or threatened.

 
 
[¶22] However, considering all of the evidence and the 
district court's statements in their entirety, we hold the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in declining to base its custody determination on the 
evidence of abuse.  
While there is no question from the evidence that the parties fought, 
their fights involved physical confrontations, and such confrontations were 
contrary to the best interest of the child, we conclude the district court could 
have reasonably determined from the totality of the evidence that Mother should 
have primary legal custody subject to liberal visitation by Father.

 
 
[¶23]  In reaching this result, we do not minimize 
the seriousness of spousal abuse.  We are cognizant of the effects domestic 
violence and spousal abuse can have on the victim and family.  As we have said 
before, we are particularly aware of the negative effects this sort of violence 
can have on children.  
Jackson v. Jackson, 2004 WY 99, ¶ 17, 96 P.3d 21, 27 (Wyo. 
2004).  However, 
in determining custody in the best interest of a child, evidence of spousal 
abuse is only one of the factors district courts are required to consider.  

 
 
[¶24]  Pursuant to § 20-2-201(a)(i) through (x), the 
court was required to also consider:  the quality of the child's relationship with 
Mother and Father; the ability of Mother and Father to provide adequate care for 
the child throughout each period of responsibility; the respective competency 
and fitness of Mother and Father; each parent's willingness to accept all 
parental responsibilities; how the parents and child can best maintain and 
strengthen their relationships with each other; how the parents and child 
interact and communicate with each other; each parent's ability and willingness 
to allow the other to provide care and respect the other's rights and 
responsibilities; geographic distance between residences; each parent's physical 
and mental ability to care for the child; and other relevant factors. 

    

[¶25]  While evidence that spousal abuse occurred is 
contrary to the best interest of the child, such evidence must be considered 
along with all of the other factors.  Here, there is no question that the district 
court considered the evidence of spousal abuse.  It is equally clear, however, that it was not 
persuaded from the totality of the evidence that the spousal abuse evidence 
should prevent Father from having liberal visitation.  Given the district 
court's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and hear their testimony in 
person, we are not at liberty to second guess its decision absent a finding that 
it could not reasonably have concluded as it did.  Having carefully considered the testimony and 
the district court's statements, we do not make that finding.  Although we might 
have reached a different conclusion, that is not sufficient grounds for 
concluding the district court abused its discretion.  

 
 
[¶26]  In reaching this result, we are influenced by 
Jackson, ¶ 17, 96 P.3d  at 
27, a case in which we considered a similar claim. There, the wife asserted the 
district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider evidence of 
spousal abuse, which she alleged her former husband had committed against her, 
as contrary to the best interests of the children as required by § 
20-2-201(c).  
Wife had testified that when the police were called to address an 
altercation between her and her husband, he pushed her in the car and she 
grabbed him by the throat; then he grabbed her by the hair, shook her and pushed 
her through a fence.  
Husband testified that he never touched wife unless she physically 
assaulted him first. Wife also testified that husband head-butted her in the 
face.  However, 
husband's sister, who witnessed the incident, testified that wife was the 
aggressor and husband was trying to get away from her.  The sister also 
testified that wife was the aggressor against husband numerous times.

 
 
[¶27]  We said:

 
 
While it is clear from the record that the Jacksons' relationship was volatile, we must 
defer to the district court to determine whether their actions constituted 
spousal abuse such that it should impact the court's custody evaluation.  Again, the trial 
judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and 
weigh their testimony.  
It appears from the record that the district court was not convinced of 
any clear-cut spousal abuse by Mr. Jackson and found the attacks by both parties 
did not rise to a level that should impact its decision as to what was in the 
children's best interests.  Accordingly, we hold the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in the manner in which it considered the conflicting 
testimony regarding spousal abuse.

 
 

Jackson, 
¶ 19, 96 P.3d  at 27-8 (citation omitted).

 
 
[¶28]  The evidence presented in Jackson may have been different 
in degree from that presented in this case; however, in both cases, the district 
court was in the best position to weigh the testimony and assess the witnesses' 
credibility.  In 
contrast, this Court's review is confined to the written record.  In both cases the 
district court was not convinced the evidence of violence rose to a level that 
it should impact its decision concerning the child's best interest.  Like in Jackson, we cannot say the 
district court acted in a manner which exceeded the bounds of reason under these 
circumstances.  
We conclude, therefore, that no abuse of discretion occurred.            

 
 

2.                  
Shared Custody 

 
 
[¶29]  Mother also claims the district court abused 
its discretion when it entered a shared custody order giving each parent equal 
time with the child, specifically four days for Mother and four days for 
Father.  She 
claims the order is contrary to the statutory requirement that custody be 
determined based upon the child's best interest.  She asserts it is not in the child's best 
interest to travel 200 miles between Saratoga and LaGrange every four days, spend a 
significant amount of time each week in the car, attend different day cares and 
travel in dangerous conditions during the winter months.

 
 
[¶30]  Father contends the district court considered 
the particular facts and circumstances of this case, including the geographical 
distance between the parents and their mutual love for the child and fitness as 
parents, and properly concluded that shared custody was in the child's best 
interest.  
Father also maintains that the parties' rural lifestyle accustomed them 
to driving long distances and shared custody did not require significantly more 
travel than the child experienced before the divorce.  Father asserts that 
the district court properly found that stability can be achieved by keeping a 
regular schedule and the child's regular schedule from birth until the divorce 
consisted of living on the ranch, going to the same day care and spending time 
regularly with Father's family and friends.     

 
 
[¶31] In Testerman, ¶ 15, 193 P.3d  at 1145, this Court reviewed 
our precedent concerning shared custody.

 
 
"We have repeatedly said that divided or shared custody is 
not favored by this Court absent good reason therefore."  Eickbush, 
¶ 11, 171 P.3d  at 512.  We have explained that "stability in a child's 
environment is of utmost importance to the child's well-being," Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 
432, while "a measure of instability is inherent" in joint custody 
arrangements.  
Gurney, 
899 P.2d  at 55.  
We have emphasized that the "success of a joint or shared custody 
arrangement hinges on the extent to which the parents are able to communicate 
and agree on the matters relevant to the children's welfare."  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 
433.

 
 
[¶32] When a district court's exercise of discretion in 
custody matters involves splitting custody of children between parents or other 
unconventional custody approaches, we have said it must provide an explanation 
of its reasoning and place its findings on the record so that, upon review, this 
Court can be sure that a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors 
occurred prior to determining custody.  Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶ 17, 22 P.3d 861, 867 (Wyo. 
2001).  In the 
present case, the district court stated its findings in the decree as 
follows:

 
 
6.  
The court finds that it is within the best interests of the minor child 
for the parties to have shared custody with each party receiving fifty percent 
(50%) physical co-parenting time with the child with each parent having four 
days on four days off.  
[Mother] shall be deemed the primary custodial parent for final 
decision-making authority.7

7.  
The court finds that it is in the best interest of the minor child that 
both the [Mother] and [Father] discuss where the child should attend school when 
he attains school age.  
If the parents can not come to a resolution to this matter, this court 
shall make the final decision on the matter.  

 
 
Thus, the decree sheds no light on the district court's 
reasoning for its findings.  

 
 
[¶33] From the record, we discern several considerations 
that seem to have been important to the district court in making its custody 
determination.  
The district court emphasized that it preferred to make its decision 
based upon the "inherent character" of each parent, rather than on things the 
parties may have done that they "wouldn't dream of doing" if they had been 
getting along.  
The district court accepted Father's testimony that the drinking and 
violent conduct he had engaged in during the marriage would not impact his 
ability to be a good parent.  The court stated that it did not believe 
Father would stay out late at the bars when the child was with him or be violent 
with the child.  
The court concluded that Father's past behavior would not adversely 
impact the child's welfare. 

 
 
[¶34] The court concluded that Mother and Father were both 
good parents and had a desire to insure that the child spend significant time 
with the other parent.  
Citing § 20-2-201(a)(iv), which requires consideration of each parent's 
willingness to accept all parenting responsibilities including a willingness to 
accept care for the child or relinquish care to the other parent at specified 
times, the district court found that both parents showed concern for the child's 
best interest in allowing the other parent time with the child.  The district court 
noted specifically Father's decision on one occasion to shorten his time with 
the child because the child was having a difficult time and he thought it was in 
the child's best interest to return to Mother.     

    

[¶35]  The district court concluded that travel time 
did not seem to be an obstacle in this case, stating, "Most of us who live out 
in the rural part of our state accept that as a way of life; we deal with the 
bad roads, we deal with the inconvenience, we deal with the expense."  The court also noted 
that stability can take different forms; it might be the child attending the 
same day care five days per week or it might be having a regular schedule.  The district court 
then stated:

 
 
It's my finding that it is appropriate for [the child] to 
spend equal time with both of you.  And I'm glad to hear that you're prepared to 
facilitate that, [Mother].  The length of time is kind of problematic 
because he is only three and a half.  I think he has to have shorter periods of time 
with . . . both of you which increases the travel, increases the expense, 
increases the inconvenience.

 
 
The district court asked the parties and their attorneys to 
confer and determine what the period of time should be.  It referred to this 
shared custody arrangement as a "stopgap measure" that would not work once the 
child was in school.  
Apparently the parties were not able to agree to a period of time, and so 
the district court entered its shared custody order giving Mother and Father 
each four days with the child until he starts school in the fall of 2009. 

 
 

[¶36]  As we have said, our review of the district 
court's order is limited to deciding whether it abused its discretion in 
ordering shared custody.  In deciding that question, we consider whether 
the evidence the parties presented and the district court's findings supported 
the court's conclusion that shared custody was in the child's best 
interest.  
Specifically, we decide whether the arrangement the district court 
imposed will promote stability in the child's environment, which is of the utmost 
importance to his well-being.  Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 432 
(Wyo. 1998). 

 
 
[¶37] It is clear from the evidence presented in this case 
that the shared custody arrangement the district court imposed requires the 
child to spend at least three hours every fourth day traveling on the highways 
between Saratoga and LaGrange.  In the winter 
months, those hours will likely be extended by weather conditions making travel 
slower and more dangerous.  The arrangement also requires the child to 
attend two different day cares during the course of every week throughout the 
year. Additionally, it requires the four-year-old child to be separated from his 
primary caretaker every fourth day for a four-day period.  

 
 
[¶38]  We see nothing in the record supporting the 
shared custody arrangement, other than the district court's finding that both 
parents were "good parents," a finding that would be true in many, if not most, 
divorces.  That 
fact alone is not sufficient to support a custody arrangement that this Court 
has noted is not favored and carries the potential for disrupting  the child's 
life.  Among the 
most frequently cited contraindications for joint custody is parents who do not 
live in close proximity.  As one child custody authority has said:

 
 
The frequent shifts back and forth in the child's 
environment with the child having two "primary" homes, requires a great deal of 
flexibility and cooperation both on the part of the parents and the child. * * 
*   The 
degree to which a particular arrangement will work may depend not only on 
cooperation and flexibility, but also on proximity of the parents and the 
emotional adaptability of the child.  When parents live near each other, the child 
may not have to face the added adjustment of two different peer 
environments.

 
 
Jeff Atkinson, 1 Modern Child Custody Practice § 6-6, 6-9 (2004).  Here, the parents do 
not live in close proximity.  Under these circumstances, the district 
court's finding that they are both "good parents" does not support shared 
custody.  

 
 
[¶39]  Another important factor for our consideration 
in reviewing the district court's order is the extent to which the parents are 
able to communicate and work together to promote the child's best interest.

 
 
The premise of the joint custody order is the parents' 
ability to resolve between themselves the custodial details.  There can be little 
question that joint custody requires sincere dedication on the part of each 
parent to safeguard the security and stability vital to a child's best 
interest.  When 
the parents are unable to make this cooperative arrangement work, a change of 
circumstances justifying judicial reexamination of the original joint custody 
order is demonstrated.  

 
 

Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995) (citation 
omitted).  
Similarly, when the evidence demonstrates the parents have been unable to 
communicate during the marriage, a joint or shared custody order is not 
appropriate in the first place.  

 
 
[¶40] It is abundantly clear from this record that Mother 
and Father have no history of effective communication or cooperative decision 
making.  
Regardless of which party's testimony is believed as to who was at fault, 
it is undisputed that Mother and Father fought throughout the marriage, 
sometimes violently.  Mother testified that she and Father were never 
really able to communicate.  Father testified they had a tough time 
deciding what they did, where they went, and who was going to be the head of 
household.  They 
clearly disagreed on the sort of lifestyle they wanted to live, with Father 
being away from home frequently drinking with friends and Mother at home alone 
caring for the child.  
It is undisputed that in addition to physical violence, their 
disagreements led to name calling and derogatory words, at least on the part of 
Father.  When 
they made the decision to divorce, they were unable to agree on a custody 
arrangement or even as to the number of days the child would spend with each of 
them under the court ordered shared custody.  Given the parties' inability to communicate 
effectively and agree on matters relevant to the child's welfare, it seems 
unlikely that the shared custody arrangement the district court imposed will 
ensure a stable environment for the child.  

 
 
[¶41]  In addition to these factors weighing against 
the conclusion that the arrangement is in the child's best interest, the 
district court left undetermined how custody will work when the child starts 
school in the fall of 2009.   Rather than awarding primary physical 
custody to one parent and liberal visitation to the other from the date of the 
decree through the child's school years, the current order requires the parties 
to agree on a different arrangement once the child starts school or, failing 
that, return to the district court and let it decide.  The fact that the 
child's future primary residence remains undecided further undermines the 
stability of his environment.       

 
 

[¶42]  While never really articulating its reasoning 
for imposing the joint custody arrangement, the thrust of the district court's 
order appears to have been to ensure that both parents have equal time with the 
child.  
In Testerman, ¶ 17, 193 P.3d  at 1146, where the district 
court's primary reason for ordering joint custody was to enable father and child 
to establish and maintain a relationship, we said, "that was a laudable goal, 
but it falls well short of the good reasons' needed to justify the de facto joint 
custody imposed by the district court."  The same can be said of the district court's 
order in this case.  
A desire to give the child equal time with each parent does not justify a 
shared custody arrangement which requires a four-year-old child to travel long 
distances every fourth day between two residences in different counties and 
attend two day cares.  
A desire to give the child equal time with each parent does not justify a 
shared custody arrangement between parties who were unable to communicate 
effectively or cooperatively resolve disputes during their marriage.  Neither does a 
desire to give the child equal time with each parent justify a shared custody 
arrangement that is temporary and leaves open the question of where the child 
will reside when he reaches school age and requires the same parties, who 
previously were unable to agree, to resolve the issue or return to court in less 
than a year.  
Under these circumstances, a desire to give the child equal time with 
each parent does not outweigh, but in fact undermines, the child's best interest 
and his need for a stable environment.    

 
 

[¶43]  In Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 152 (Wyo. 1999), we quoted the 
Washington Supreme Court as follows:

 
 
The practical result of a marriage dissolution is that 
parenting and family life will not be the same after dissolution. This is 
so even though a trial court may believe it is in the "best interests of the 
child" to continue to live in the same family unit. A child cannot escape the 
reality that his or her family is no longer the same. The trial court does not 
have the responsibility or the authority or the ability to create ideal 
circumstances for the family.  
Marriage of 
Littlefield, 133 Wash. 2d 39, 940 P.2d 1362, 1371 (Wash. 1997).

 
 
When parties have decided to divorce and lead separate 
lives, "the court's objective is not to reconstruct a family that is no more, 
but to provide the framework for a new family that can best serve the 
children."  
Id.  The shared custody 
arrangement imposed here does not provide the framework that best serves the 
child.  The 
district court abused its discretion in ordering shared custody. 

 
 

[¶44]  Neither party appealed the district court's 
order granting Mother primary physical custody for final decision-making 
authority. Consequently, that order remains in effect. We reverse the district court's shared custody order and 
remand with directions to enter an order consistent with this opinion awarding 
Mother primary physical custody, and Father reasonable visitation taking into 
consideration the geographic distance between the parties.  In addition, the 
district court will need to re-calculate the presumptive child support 
obligation on the basis of this new custody arrangement.8         

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The parties and the district court use different 
terminology than that generally used in custody proceedings in Wyoming.  We have commented before in the context of a 
case involving joint custody that loose use of the language causes 
confusion.  Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 54 n. 1 
(Wyo. 1995).  The terms generally used by this Court 
are:  legal 
custody, to denote the party or parties who have the authority to make decisions 
concerning health, education, etc.; physical custody, to denote the party or 
parties with whom the child lives; and visitation to refer to the noncustodial 
parent's right of access to the child.  As used in Mother's complaint, we assume the 
term "parenting plan" refers to Father's visitation.    

 
 

2We assume "co-parenting time" refers to 
visitation.  See n. 1. 

 
 

3No hearing transcript or order on the motions appears 
in the record.  
However, Mother states in her brief that the district court heard the 
motions on September 21, 2007, and ruled from the bench that the child was to 
remain in LaramieCounty and the parties 
were to share custody until the trial.  Mother also states that the district court 
ordered the trial to be expedited.

 
 

4If the district court pressured Mother not to move to 
Alabama and to find a job 
in Wyoming or Colorado, this would be an improper restraint 
on her constitutionally protected right of travel.  Testerman v. 
Testerman, 2008 WY 112, ¶ 18, 193 P.3d 1141, 1146 (Wyo. 2008).  However, Mother did not raise the issue and 
the hearing transcript is not part of the record.  Therefore, we do not address the question of 
whether her right was violated.   

 
 

5Ordinarily, final decision making authority is 
denoted as "legal custody" and primary custody refers to where the child 
resides.  See n. 1.

 
 

6Consistent with this comment, the decree states "the 
parties are equally at fault for the breakdown of this marriage" and "the 
parties are granted an absolute divorce from each other." 

      

7Neither party challenges the portion of the district 
court's order designating Mother as the primary custodial parent for final 
decision-making. The designation would seem to reflect the court's conclusion, 
consistent with the undisputed evidence, that Mother was the child's primary 
caretaker.  

 
 

8Although neither party raised the issue, we are 
compelled to address the district court's finding that because of the de minimus amount of 
Father's child support obligation, i.e. $44.90, it was in the child's best 
interest to deviate from the presumed amount to zero.  This finding, and 
the resulting order, are contrary to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304 (LexisNexis 
2007), which creates a rebuttable presumption that the presumed amount is 
correct, and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307 (LexisNexis 2007), which allows 
deviation from the presumed amount when it would be unjust or 
inappropriate.  
The district court could not reasonably conclude the best interest of the 
child would be served by receiving no child support from Father.  Nor could it 
reasonably conclude that the small amount made it unjust or 
inappropriate.