Title: Petition to Vacate an Adoption Decree, in the Adoption of John Doe L.M.B. v. E.R.J.

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 20  
Petition to Vacate an Adoption 
Decree, in the Adoption of John 
Doe,
            Adoptee.
        ------------
L.M.B.,
            Respondent,
        v.
E.R.J.
            Appellant.
Richard A. Greenberg, for appellant.
Bonnie E. Rabin, for respondent.
SMITH, J.:
The parties to this proceeding are former lovers who
never married but who, while they were romantically involved,
brought a Cambodian child to the United States, and planned to
adopt him together.  The adoption proceedings became complicated;
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the couple broke up; and now each claims to be the child's only
parent.
Before us on this appeal is an order of the Surrogate,
affirmed by the Appellate Division, which granted the petition of
LMB, who asserts he is the child's father, to vacate an adoption
decree previously granted to ERJ, who claims the status of
mother.  We agree with the courts below that the adoption decree
must be vacated.
I
Many facts in this case are disputed, but few if any of
the factual disputes are material to the legal issues.  In the
following account, we try to confine ourselves to facts that are
agreed on or, at least, asserted by one party and not
contradicted by the other.
In January 2003, John Doe, apparently about two months
old, was found abandoned in a village market in Cambodia and
taken to an orphanage.  ERJ, a wealthy New York resident who had
taken a philanthropic interest in the plight of Cambodian
orphans, saw him for the first time on a tour of the orphanage in
June 2003.  
LMB, ERJ's then boyfriend, also met John Doe in
Cambodia, in July 2003.  The child suffered from a heart ailment
that could not be properly treated in Cambodia, and in late
August or early September 2003 he was brought to New York on a
six month visa (later extended for another six months) for the
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purpose of receiving medical care.  John Doe has lived at ERJ's
home in New York City since that time.  LMB was, until late 2005,
at least a frequent visitor to the home, if not an inhabitant of
it.  Both parties love the child, and have participated in caring
for him.  
At some point either before or after the child was
brought to the United States, ERJ decided she wanted to adopt
him.  The parties agreed -- either at the outset, or at some
later time -- that LMB would adopt him also.  United States law
presented an obstacle to the adoption, or so the parties
believed; they understood that the United States had put a
moratorium on adoption of Cambodian children, in response to
reports of trafficking in Cambodian babies.  The parties devised
a fairly complicated solution to this problem.  LMB, though a
United States citizen, was born in Trinidad and Tobago.  The plan
was that he would reestablish Trinidadian citizenship (which he
could do without relinquishing United States citizenship); that
he would adopt John Doe in Trinidad and Tobago; and that the
child -- no longer a Cambodian -- could then also be adopted by
ERJ in New York.  
LMB did reclaim his Trinidadian citizenship, and
applied to the Cambodian government for permission to adopt John
Doe.  On June 23, 2004, the Cambodian Ministry of Social Affairs,
Labor, Vocational Training and Youth Rehabilitation (which later
dropped "Labor" from its name, and is referred to as MOSAVY),
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issued a document to LMB approving his request.  In the
translation submitted by LMB, the document is titled "ADOPTION
CERTIFICATE" and says that LMB "is allowed to adopt the orphan
child [John Doe]."  
The parties' plan to arrange a Trinidadian adoption as
a prelude to a New York adoption did not work out.  LMB was
advised (belatedly, it seems) that single men could not adopt
children under Trinidadian law.  Meanwhile, in August 2004, the
romantic relationship between LMB and ERJ ended, though the two
remained, for the time being, on more or less friendly terms.
In the fall of 2004, ERJ was told that it might be
possible for her to adopt John Doe in New York after all, even if
there was no previous Trinidadian adoption.  In an effort to help
her accomplish this, on March 14, 2005 LMB signed, at ERJ's
request, a letter to MOSAVY saying: "I wish to relinquish the
permission that was granted to me by the Kingdom of Cambodia to
adopt the orphan child."  ERJ made her own application to
Cambodian authorities, and on October 11, 2005 MOSAVY issued her
a certificate identical in form to the one it had issued to LMB
in June 2004.  In December 2005, the parties quarreled,
apparently because each disapproved of the other's approach to
bringing up children, and their relations have been hostile since
that time.  
On January 12, 2006, ERJ filed a petition with the New
York County Surrogate to adopt John Doe.  She did not give LMB
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notice of the adoption proceeding.  In her petition, she
characterized the relief she sought as "a re-adoption," a
characterization she later said was mistaken.  ERJ's adoption
petition also contained another flaw, one she later called "a
very stupid error"; she acknowledged that she "was not candid"
with the Surrogate, in that she failed to disclose a recent stay
at an alcohol treatment facility.
The New York adoption ERJ sought was not opposed, and
was granted on April 12, 2006.  On August 1, 2006, LMB, having
learned of the adoption, began the present proceeding to vacate
it.  While this proceeding was pending, the Cambodian government
issued two documents that ERJ now relies on.  The first, a letter
dated October 24, 2006 from MOSAVY to ERJ, states in substance
that the Cambodian government validly granted ERJ permission to
adopt John Doe.  It adds that LMB "also submitted an application"
but "failed to attend a handing over ceremony . . . and he also
submitted a letter of refusal to adopt."  It authorizes ERJ to
"use this letter as you see fit for the best interest of" John
Doe.
The second document, dated December 1, 2006, was issued
by the Cambodian Council of Ministers and is referred to by the
parties as a "Sor Chor Nor" -- a phrase translated by ERJ as
"governmental edict or clarification of rights."  The Sor Chor
Nor refers to and repeats the substance of MOSAVY's October 24,
2006 letter, and adds that LMB's "request to adopt this child is
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considered as null and void."  
After a trial in which experts on Cambodian law
testified for both sides, the Surrogate, in a lengthy and
carefully reasoned decision, granted LMB's petition to vacate the
adoption decree.  The Appellate Division affirmed, with one
Justice dissenting (Matter of Doe, 58 AD3d 186 [1st Dept 2008]). 
The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to this Court, and
we now affirm.
II    
The substance of LMB's argument, which the courts below
upheld, is that he became John Doe's father by virtue of the
certificate issued to him by MOSAVY on June 23, 2004; that his
parental rights have never been effectively relinquished or
extinguished; and that therefore ERJ could not adopt John Doe
without LMB's consent (see Domestic Relations Law §§ 111 [1] [b]
[requiring the consent of parents to the adoption "of a child
conceived or born in wedlock"] and 111 [5] [providing that a
child "who has once been lawfully adopted may be readopted
directly from such child's adoptive parents in the same manner as
from its birth parents"]).  We do not find it necessary to
endorse all of LMB's argument, or all the conclusions reached by
the courts below; but we agree with much of their reasoning, and
agree that the adoption decree issued to ERJ was correctly
vacated.
To explain our conclusion, we discuss five issues: (1)
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the effect under Cambodian law of the June 23, 2004 certificate;
(2) whether comity should be accorded to that certificate under
New York law; (3) the effect, if any, of the "relinquishment"
letter signed by LMB on March 14, 2005; (4) whether the documents
issued by the Cambodian government in 2006 were "acts of state"
nullifying LMB's parental rights; and (5) whether the courts
below should have considered the best interests of the child in
deciding whether to vacate ERJ's adoption.
1.  The effect of the June 2004 certificate under Cambodian law
Whether, under Cambodian law, LMB validly adopted John
Doe in June 2004 was a major issue below, generating a duel
between experts at trial and occupying a large part of the
Surrogate's decision.  But there is no need for us to examine
this question in similar detail here.  The Surrogate concluded
that, under Cambodian law, the June 2004 certificate evidenced
not just "permission to adopt" but a "full and final adoption";
and that neither LMB's failure to participate in a "giving and
receiving ceremony" nor the absence of approval of the adoption
from Trinidad and Tobago altered the Cambodian-law effect of the
adoption.  We find the Surrogate's reasoning on these issues to
be compelling, and ERJ has not challenged the Surrogate's
resolution of the Cambodian law question in this Court.  We are
satisfied that, under Cambodian law, LMB validly adopted John Doe
in June 2004.
2.  The comity issue
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Whether the Cambodian adoption certificate of June 2004
should be given comity by the New York courts -- i.e., whether
being John Doe's father under Cambodian law made LMB his father
under New York law also -- is a question that received less
attention below, but requires more discussion by us here.
It seems from the Surrogate's opinion that ERJ opposed
according comity to LMB's Cambodian adoption solely on the ground
that "New York State and Federal public policy" precluded it.  In
support of this argument, ERJ pointed out that: (1) Cambodian
law, unlike New York law and Federal immigration regulations, did
not require a pre-adoption "investigation by a disinterested
person or by an authorized agency" (Domestic Relations Law § 112
[7]) or "home study" (8 CFR § 204.3 [e]); and (2) Cambodia did
not require approval of an international adoption by the
"receiving State," as does the Hague Convention on Protection of
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (32
ILM 1134 [1993]).  The Surrogate had little difficulty in
disposing of these arguments.  She rejected both of them on the
ground that foreign adoptions should generally be accorded comity
"unless enforcement would result in the recognition of a
transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, or
shocking to the prevailing moral sense" (citing Greschler v
Greschler, 51 NY2d 368, 377 [1980][internal quotation marks
omitted]); and she rejected the second argument on the additional
ground that the United States had not ratified the Hague
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Convention.  Again, the reasoning of the Surrogate on these
issues is convincing, and ERJ takes no issue with it on this
appeal.  
ERJ apparently did not advance, and the Surrogate did
not address, a perhaps better reason for denying comity to LMB's
Cambodian adoption of John Doe: at the time of that adoption,
John Doe and LMB were in New York, not Cambodia.  It is true that
the child was a Cambodian citizen, and that his presence in New
York was theoretically temporary; he was here on a visa,
originally granted for six months and extended for another six
months, for the purpose of receiving medical treatment.  On the
other hand, it is a reasonable inference from the record that, as
of June 2004, John Doe was highly unlikely ever to return to live
in Cambodia.  On these facts, it is not self-evident that New
York should defer to Cambodia to decide the question of whether
John Doe should be adopted, or by whom; arguably, as of June
2004, New York's interest in that subject was not less than
Cambodia's (cf. Barry E. v Ingraham, 43 NY2d 87 [1977]).
Since ERJ has not made this argument, we need not
accept or reject it, and our opinion should not be taken as
expressing any view on it.  We add, however, that even if the
argument had been made and accepted, it might not have altered
the outcome of this case.  To say that a New York court would not
automatically accord comity to the June 2004 Cambodian adoption
is not to say that that adoption is necessarily a nullity.  ERJ
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treated it as a nullity when she petitioned the Surrogate for the
adoption of John Doe in January 2006.  She gave no notice of the
proceeding to LMB, and she apparently did not inform the
Surrogate that the June 2004 adoption had ever happened.  It
would be no great stretch to say that Cambodia's determination,
in June 2004, of the status of its own citizen was entitled to
more respect than this -- that ERJ should not have been allowed
to adopt John Doe without notice to the person who was John Doe's
father under Cambodian law.
3.  The March 2005 letter
For the reasons we have explained, the Surrogate and
the Appellate Division were correct to hold, for purposes of this
proceeding, that LMB became John Doe's father in June 2004, not
only under the law of Cambodia but also under the law of New
York.  Under Domestic Relations Law §§ 111 (1) (b) and 111 (5),
ERJ could not adopt John Doe without the consent of his existing
parent.  The next question is whether LMB effectively gave that
consent in March 2005, by signing a letter saying that he wished
to relinquish the permission to adopt John Doe that the Cambodian
government had granted him.  We agree with the courts below that
no effective consent was given.  
Domestic Relations Law § 115-b provides two methods by
which a parent may consent to a private-placement adoption (i.e.,
an adoption other than through an authorized agency) of his or
her child.  Section 115-b (2) (a) says that such a consent "may
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be executed or acknowledged before any judge or surrogate in this
state having jurisdiction over adoption proceedings."  All
consents not given before a judge or surrogate are subject to the
formal requirements of § 115-b (4), which requires, among other
things, a statement "in conspicuous print of at least eighteen
point type" of the name and address of the court in which an
adoption proceeding has been or is to be commenced (§ 115-b [4]
[a] [i]); an equally conspicuous description of the consenting
parent's right to revoke his or her consent (§ 115-b [4] [a]
[ii]); and execution or acknowledgment of the consent before a
notary public or another officer (Domestic Relations Law § 115-b
[4] [b]).  It is undisputed that the March 2005 relinquishment
letter does not meet the requirements of Domestic Relations Law §
115-b.
ERJ does not defend the validity of the relinquishment
under New York law.  Her sole argument on this issue is that
Cambodian law should govern the question.  She cites no authority
supporting this suggestion, and we reject it.  It may be
debatable, as we explained above, whether parental rights created
by a Cambodian adoption should, under circumstances like these,
be treated as valid in New York.  But once parental rights have
been validly established under New York law, between an adoptive
parent and child who continue to live in New York, the choice of
law governing the parental relationship is much less difficult:
New York law applies.  
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Under established conflict of laws principles, the
applicable law should be that of "the jurisdiction which, because
of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the
parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised
in the litigation" (Babcock v Jackson, 12 NY2d 473, 481 [1963]). 
New York's interest in a parent-child relationship between two of
its residents is plainly greater than the interest of Cambodia in
a relationship between an adult who never lived in Cambodia and a
child who, with the approval of the Cambodian government, has
been adopted by a non-Cambodian and taken to live elsewhere. 
When New York parents have acquired, by virtue of a foreign
country adoption, parental rights that are recognized in New
York, those rights can no longer depend upon the vagaries of a
foreign country's law.  The rule ERJ seeks would create
unacceptable uncertainty for every New York parent raising a
child he or she has adopted in a foreign country.
4.  The Act of State Doctrine
ERJ's main argument on this appeal is that two
Cambodian documents issued during the course of the litigation --
the MOSAVY letter of October 24, 2006 and the Sor Chor Nor of
December 1, 2006 -- are "acts of state" of the Cambodian
government, which must be respected by United States courts and
control the outcome of this litigation.  This argument lacks
merit.  
The Act of State Doctrine is that "the courts of one
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country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another, done within its own territory" (Banco Nacional de Cuba v
Sabbatino, 376 US 398, 416 [1964]).  The inapplicability of this
doctrine to the present case seems obvious.  Assuming that the
MOSAVY letter and the Sor Chor Nor were acts of the Cambodian
government, and that they purported to terminate LMB's parental
rights over John Doe, and to authorize ERJ to adopt him, they
certainly were not acts "done within [Cambodia's] own territory." 
All three of the people that these supposed governmental acts
would have affected -- LMB, ERJ and John Doe -- were living in
New York in 2006.  
ERJ points out that courts have made exceptions to the
territoriality limitation on the Act of State Doctrine (see
Callejo v Bancomer, S.A., 764 F2d 1101, 1121, n 29 [5th Cir
1985]).  But the exceptions are rare.  The only examples that
have been called to our attention involve international banking
transactions of exceptional political sensitivity (United States
v Belmont, 301 US 324 [1937]; In Re Philippine Natl. Bank v
United States Dist. Ct., 397 F3d 768, 773 [9th Cir 2005]).  ERJ
suggests no persuasive reason why this case should be added to
the list of exceptions, and there are excellent reasons why it
should not be.  In the previous section of this opinion, we held
that the continued existence of a parent-child relationship
between two New York residents should be governed by New York
law, because the contrary rule would subject New York parents to
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intolerable uncertainty.  A fortiori, parents living in New York
with their adopted children should not run the risk that those
adoptions can be nullified by the decree of a foreign government. 
5.  The best interests of the child
ERJ's claim that the courts below erred in failing to
consider whether it would be in John Doe's best interests for ERJ
to adopt him misconceives the grounds for their rulings.  
The Surrogate vacated ERJ's adoption of John Doe, and
the Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate's order, because
that adoption was gravely flawed as a matter of law.  Their
decision rested, as does ours, on the failure to give notice to
or obtain the consent of LMB, who for purposes of this proceeding
must be considered John Doe's father.  Other flaws in the
adoption might have compelled the same result: ERJ's adoption
petition represented that she sought a "re-adoption" -- a claim
that she later disavowed -- and failed to disclose a recent
substance abuse problem.
The best interests of a child, important though they
are, do not automatically validate an otherwise illegal adoption. 
In particular, the parental rights of a child's father cannot
simply be ignored because a court thinks it would be in the
child's best interests to be adopted by someone else.  The courts
below were clearly correct in declining to hold the best
interests of the child to be dispositive in this case.
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Of course we do not imply that we are indifferent, or
that we believe the lower courts were or should be indifferent,
to John Doe's best interests.  For all the legal complexities in
this case, no one dealing with it can forget that its subject is
a child, now seven years old, and that that child has lived for
virtually his whole life with ERJ, who he no doubt thinks is his
mother.  
LMB assured the courts below, and has assured us, that
his own first concern is John Doe's best interests, and that he
has no intention of removing the child from the only home he has
ever known.  Indeed, LMB's brief in this Court says that if ERJ
accepts his status as father, he is still willing to agree to a
second-parent adoption by ERJ.  LMB does maintain that, as John
Doe's father and only legal parent, he is legally free to prevent
the boy's adoption by ERJ, and to remove him from ERJ's home, if
he wants to.  But since he says he does not want to, neither we
nor the courts below have had any occasion to decide whether
LMB's rights are as extensive as he claims.  That question is
academic, and we hope it will remain so.
* * *
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in
the affirmative. 
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, with costs, and certified question answered in
the affirmative.  Opinion by Judge Smith.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided February 16, 2010