Title: The Florida Bar v. Phillip J. Brutus

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-2499 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
PHILLIP J. BRUTUS,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 4, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Respondent, 
Phillip J. Brutus, be found guilty of professional misconduct in violation of the 
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar Rules) and suspended from the practice of 
law for ninety days, followed by one year on probation.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  We approve the referee’s findings of fact and 
recommendations as to guilt.  As discussed in this opinion, we disapprove the 
referee’s finding, as an aggravating factor, that Brutus’s misconduct in this case 
was the result of a dishonest or selfish motive.  Nonetheless, we conclude that his 
failure to maintain funds entrusted to him, together with other acts demonstrating 
 
 
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negligence in managing his trust account, constitutes serious misconduct 
warranting a suspension longer than ninety days.  We disapprove the referee’s 
recommended sanction, and instead suspend Brutus from the practice of law for 
one year followed by two years on probation. 
FACTS 
 
In December 2014, The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Brutus, 
alleging that he engaged in misconduct in violation of the Bar Rules.  A referee 
was appointed to consider the matter.  In the proceedings before the referee, Brutus 
and the Bar jointly submitted a stipulation as to the facts.  The referee then held a 
final hearing to address the alleged rule violations, and a separate hearing to 
address sanctions.  Following these hearings, the referee submitted her report for 
the Court’s review, in which she made the following findings and 
recommendations. 
 
As stipulated by the parties, Brutus represented a client, the wife, in a 
dissolution of marriage proceeding.  The couple’s marital residence was the only 
asset at issue in the case.  Brutus learned that the former husband had taken out a 
$100,000 home equity loan against the property, and spent $40,000 of the funds.  
Brutus filed a motion in the trial court to preserve marital assets.  As a result, the 
presiding judge issued an order directing that the remaining funds, approximately 
$60,000, be deposited into Brutus’s trust account. 
 
 
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The former husband provided the $60,000 for deposit on March 3, 2008.  At 
that time, there was no court order or settlement agreement indicating how the 
money would be distributed.  Nonetheless, beginning on March 13, 2008, Brutus 
began disbursing the funds—he disbursed $46,128.55 to the client, $12,475 to 
himself in attorney fees, and the remainder to pay costs.  Brutus asserts that he 
made these dispersals based on his genuine understanding of Florida’s equitable 
distribution principles, believing that his client held a fifty percent equitable 
interest in the marital home or any proceeds derived from the home, including 
prior refinances and equity loans.   
On September 15, 2009, the parties entered into a marital settlement 
agreement.  Pursuant to this agreement, the client agreed to return $12,000 of the 
money disbursed to her; the refund would be applied as a credit toward the former 
husband’s child support obligations.  The trial court did not require Brutus to re-
deposit any funds into the trust account because the court concluded that the 
dispute had been resolved in the marital settlement agreement.  However, the court 
did refer the matter to the Bar for investigation. 
 
Additionally, during the course of the Bar’s investigation, the Bar’s staff 
auditor found several examples indicating that Brutus did not properly maintain his 
trust account in accordance with the trust accounting rules.  In one instance, 
records indicated that as of June 2010, Brutus was holding $32,583.62 in the trust 
 
 
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account on behalf of a client, and that he should have maintained this amount 
through April 2011.  However, the Bar’s investigation revealed eight different 
occasions during this period when the balance in the trust account was less than the 
amount that should have been held just for this client.  In a second example, in 
September 2008, Brutus deposited earned fees in the trust account, commingling 
his own funds with those of his clients.  And finally, the Bar discovered at least 
three overdrafts from the trust account during the period from July 30, 2010, 
through September 14, 2010.1  However, no bank reported to the Bar any check 
returned for insufficient funds, and no client or other person has filed any 
complaint against Brutus.  Brutus has acknowledged the shortages in the trust 
account, and he concedes that he did not properly maintain the account. 
 
Based on these facts, the referee recommends that Brutus be found guilty of 
violating the following Bar Rules: 4-3.4(c) (a lawyer must not knowingly disobey 
an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an 
assertion that no valid obligation exists); 5-1.1(a) (a lawyer must hold in trust, 
separate from the lawyer’s own property, funds and property of clients or third 
persons that are in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation); and 
                                          
 
 
1.  It appears that, in the case of at least one overdraft, when Brutus learned 
of the shortage, he immediately deposited the funds back into the trust account.  
Brutus also asserts that one overdraft occurred when he mistakenly wrote a check 
from the wrong account. 
 
 
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5-1.1(b) (money or other property entrusted to an attorney for a specific purpose is 
held in trust and must be applied only to that purpose). 
 
The referee found six aggravating factors in this case: (1) dishonest or 
selfish motive; (2) pattern of misconduct; (3) multiple offenses; (4) refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct; (5) vulnerable victim; and (6) 
substantial experience in the practice of law.  The referee also found three 
mitigating factors: (1) no prior disciplinary record; (2) good character and 
reputation in the community; and (3) interim rehabilitation. 
 
Ultimately, based on her findings of fact, recommendations as to guilt, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors found, and the Florida Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions and case law, the referee recommends that Brutus be suspended 
from the practice of law for ninety days, followed by one year on probation.  
During his probation, the referee recommends that Brutus be required to: (1) retain 
the services of a certified public accountant to review his trust account records on a 
monthly basis; (2) submit quarterly statements to the Bar, prepared by the certified 
public accountant, specifying whether Brutus is in compliance with the trust 
accounting rules, with attached monthly reconciliations, copies of the bank 
statements, and a list of clients with their individual trust account balances; (3) pay 
a $100 quarterly monitoring fee to the Bar; and (4) attend and successfully 
complete the Florida Bar’s Ethics School and Trust Accounting Workshop.   
 
 
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The Bar has filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Review of Report of Referee, 
challenging the referee’s recommended sanction; it argues a one-year suspension is 
the appropriate discipline.  Brutus has filed a cross-notice of review, challenging 
the referee’s findings in aggravation and mitigation, as well as the recommended 
sanction.  Brutus urges the Court to order a public reprimand. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Because the parties stipulated as to the facts, we approve the referee’s 
findings of fact without further discussion.  We also approve the referee’s 
recommendations as to guilt.  On cross-review, Brutus asks the Court to 
disapprove several of the referee’s findings as to aggravating factors and to find 
additional mitigating factors.  This Court has stated, “[l]ike other factual findings, a 
referee’s findings of mitigation and aggravation carry a presumption of correctness 
and will be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record.  A 
referee’s failure to find that an aggravating factor or mitigating factor applies is 
due the same deference.”  Fla. Bar v. Germain, 957 So. 2d 613, 621 (Fla. 2007) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 
Brutus first contends there is not competent, substantial evidence to support 
the referee’s finding that he acted with a dishonest or selfish motive.  We agree.  
The referee’s report, based upon the joint stipulation as to the facts, indicates that 
Brutus disbursed marital asset funds from his trust account to his client based on 
 
 
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his “genuine understanding” of Florida law, believing that his client was entitled to 
a fifty percent equitable interest in the marital home.  Brutus now acknowledges 
that the disbursements were improper, and that he had an obligation to hold the 
marital assets in trust pending a settlement agreement and court order in the 
dissolution case.  He also testified before the referee that he did not intentionally 
seek to violate the trial court’s order, and that his actions were “reckless” and 
“irresponsible” rather than intentionally dishonest.  The Bar argues in support of 
the referee’s finding that, because Brutus disbursed money from the trust account 
to pay his own attorney fees, his motives were inherently selfish.  However, there 
is no evidence to indicate that Brutus was not entitled to fees in his representation 
of the client, and the Bar did not allege that the fee was prohibited or excessive in 
violation of Bar Rule 4-1.5.  Collecting a legally proper attorney’s fee, without 
more, is not itself a selfish or dishonest act.  The Bar also points out that Brutus has 
admitted to violations of the trust accounting rules for his negligent bookkeeping 
practices, resulting in shortages in the account.  However, the Bar is not alleging 
that Brutus misappropriated client funds, only that he was negligent in maintaining 
his trust account.  Brutus testified before the referee that the shortages likely 
occurred because his office would write checks to cover court costs and filing fees 
before depositing the checks from clients written to cover those disbursements.  
While we find these careless trust accounting practices concerning, they do not 
 
 
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evidence a dishonest or selfish motive.  Accordingly, we disapprove the referee’s 
finding that Brutus acted with a dishonest or selfish motive.  
 
Brutus next contends there is no evidence to support the referee’s finding 
that he has refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his actions.  He alleges 
that his testimony does demonstrate his understanding and acceptance that he made 
a serious mistake.  The referee necessarily weighed Brutus’s testimony, evaluated 
his credibility, and ultimately concluded that he had not fully acknowledged the 
wrongful nature of his actions.  This Court has long held, “[t]he referee is in a 
unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses, and his judgment regarding 
credibility should not be overturned absent clear and convincing evidence that his 
judgment is incorrect.”  Fla. Bar v. Tobkin, 944 So. 2d 219, 224 (Fla. 2006) 
(quoting Fla. Bar v. Thomas, 582 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 1991)).  We do not find 
clear and convincing evidence that the referee improperly considered this 
aggravating factor, and we approve the finding.   
Finally, Brutus contends there is no evidence to support the finding that the 
victim of his misconduct, the client, was vulnerable.  However, Brutus himself 
testified before the referee that his client needed help, that she could not afford to 
pay much money to secure a divorce, and that she was homeless.  He has also 
acknowledged that, as a part of the marital settlement agreement with her former 
husband, the client was required to return $12,000 to the former husband, credited 
 
 
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toward his child support obligations.  Brutus’s client relied on him to make 
decisions in her best interest, and his improper disbursements could have caused 
her serious harm.  Accordingly, we approve the referee’s remaining findings in 
aggravation and the findings in mitigation in full. 
We next address the referee’s recommended sanction, a ninety-day 
suspension.  In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, this Court’s scope 
of review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, 
ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  However, generally speaking, this Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).   
The Court has long held that the misuse of client funds “is one of the most 
serious offenses a lawyer can commit. . . .  However, in imposing discipline for 
trust account violations, this Court’s case law suggests a clear distinction between 
cases where the lawyer’s conduct is deliberate or intentional and cases where the 
lawyer acts in a negligent or grossly negligent manner.”  Fla. Bar v. Weiss, 586 So. 
2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1991).  Here, the stipulated facts indicate that Brutus did not 
intentionally misappropriate client money for his own personal use.  Still, we find 
 
 
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his negligent conduct troubling.  Brutus has repeatedly failed to ensure that his 
own conduct, and his law firm’s trust accounting practices, are in strict compliance 
with the ethical and trust accounting rules.  In the dissolution of marriage 
proceeding, Brutus clearly was aware of the court’s order directing that marital 
funds be held in his trust account; nonetheless, he deliberately disbursed the funds 
to his client, without an order resolving the matter and without the court’s 
knowledge or authorization.  Additionally, Brutus has admitted to negligence in 
maintaining his trust account—his poor record keeping was such that Brutus could 
not determine when funds held on behalf of a client dropped below the balance that 
should have been maintained in the account; he commingled trust account funds 
with earned fees; and there is evidence of three overdrafts from the trust account 
during a two-month period in 2010.  
Given Brutus’s serious misconduct, we conclude that the referee’s 
recommendation of a ninety-day suspension is not supported.  Our prior decisions 
make clear that even negligence in maintaining a trust account warrants a lengthier 
suspension requiring proof of rehabilitation.  See Fla. Bar v. Mason, 826 So. 2d 
985, 986-87 (Fla. 2002) (suspending attorney for two years for errors in her trust 
accounting, rather than intentional misappropriations, resulting in shortages in the 
account); Fla. Bar v. Neu, 597 So. 2d 266, 266-67, 270 (Fla. 1992) (suspending 
attorney for six months who was appointed guardian of an incapacitated person 
 
 
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and withdrew funds from the guardianship account without the court’s 
authorization, and who comingled personal and client funds, where the Court 
found no evidence that attorney intended to convert client funds or that conduct 
was dishonest or deceitful). 
Considering Brutus’s conduct in violation of his obligation to the trial court 
and his repeated negligence in maintaining his trust account, together with the 
aggravating and mitigating factors discussed above, we conclude that a one-year 
suspension is appropriate.  Additionally, upon his reinstatement, Brutus is ordered 
to serve two years on probation, during which time he must comply with the terms 
and conditions of probation set forth in the referee’s report. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, Phillip J. Brutus is hereby suspended for one year; upon 
reinstatement, Brutus shall serve two years on probation under the terms and 
conditions set forth in the referee’s report.  The suspension will be effective thirty 
days from the date of this opinion so that Brutus can close out his practice and 
protect the interests of existing clients.  If Brutus notifies this Court in writing that 
he is no longer practicing and does not need the thirty days to protect existing 
clients, this Court will enter an order making the suspension effective immediately.  
Brutus shall fully comply with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h).  Further, 
 
 
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Brutus shall accept no new business from the date this opinion is filed until he is 
reinstated. 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Phillip J. Brutus in the 
amount of $11,787.50, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 
and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; 
Jennifer R. Falcone, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Miami, Florida; and Adria E. 
Quintela, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar, Sunrise, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Keven Leveille of The Law Office of Keven Leveille, P.L., Sunrise, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent