Title: State v. Massey

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Massey (97-541); 169 Vt. 180; 730 A.2d 623

[Filed 16-Apr-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.
  

                                 No. 97-541

State of Vermont	                          Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.	                                          District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Edwin J. Massey	                                  January Term, 1999

Robert Grussing, III, J.

       Dan M. Davis, Windham County State's Attorney, and James E. Maxwell,
  Deputy State's  Attorney, Brattleboro, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       David A. Gibson, Brattleboro, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       MORSE, J. 	Defendant, Edwin James Massey, appeals his conviction
  for violating 23  V.S.A. § 1201(a) operating a motor vehicle on a public
  highway while under the influence of  intoxicating liquor.  Defendant
  contends that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to suppress  statements
  he made while in custody for processing; (2) failing to declare a mistrial
  or provide a  limiting instruction to the jury after defendant testified
  about the results of a roadside breath test  (alcosensor); (3) admitting
  the results of a DataMaster breath test; and (4) limiting the jury's 
  consideration of the issue raised by defendant that the police prevented or
  denied him from  obtaining an independent blood test.  We affirm.

       In the town of Rockingham at approximately 1:00 p.m. on the afternoon
  of November 13,  1996, defendant drove his truck off of the road and into a
  telephone pole.  The weather was clear  and the road conditions were good. 
  The impact severed the pole and brought power lines down  across the road. 
  Two law enforcement officers from the Vermont State Police arrived at the
  scene 

 

  shortly after the accident.
  The first officer smelled alcohol on defendant's breath, observed
  defendant's slow,  deliberate movements, bloodshot eyes, and noticeable
  confusion when walking near the downed  power lines.  There was no apparent
  reason for the accident other than driver impairment,  although defendant
  claimed that he lost control of his truck while lighting a cigarette.  The
  officer  administered a roadside alcosensor breath test, the results of
  which fortified his belief that  defendant was under the influence of
  alcohol.  In accordance with V.R.Cr.P. 3(a)(5) (Cum. Supp.  1998), the
  first officer took defendant into custody and transported him to the police
  barracks for  an infrared breath test (DataMaster).  

       On the way to the police barracks, defendant made a number of
  unsolicited statements to  the police that were admitted into evidence at
  trial.  The officer testified that he did not believe  defendant was
  sincere when he stated, "You guys are great.  You guys are special," and
  then told  the officer that he couldn't do their job because he would be
  tougher than they were being with  him.  

       At the barracks, defendant telephoned an attorney and agreed to take
  the DataMaster test.  After the test was administered but before the
  results were obtained, defendant exclaimed "I  didn't have a drink today. 
  I told you that before."  Then he said "I want a blood test.  I'm not 
  answering any questions."  The test results indicated a blood alcohol
  content (BAC) of .195  percent.  During the course of processing, the
  officer provided defendant with information  regarding an independent test: 
  "Since you are being released, if you wish additional tests to be  paid for
  at your own expense, you will have to make your own arrangements.  Do you
  intend to  obtain additional tests?"  In response to defendant's
  affirmative answer, the officer gave him a  blood test kit and a list of
  facilities where he could go to obtain the independent test.  Defendant 
  was then permitted to make phone calls to secure a ride from the barracks. 
  Defendant was unable  to arrange a ride.  At approximately 3:45 p.m.,
  roughly an hour after the processing concluded,  the second officer offered
  defendant a ride home, and he accepted.  The second officer testified  at
  trial that he and 

 

  defendant had a lengthy conversation in the police cruiser and that
  defendant never indicated that  he wanted to be taken to a facility for a
  blood test.  

       At trial, defendant argued that the DataMaster results were flawed. 
  He first claimed that  he had been cleaning his house with ammonia and
  bleach earlier that day and that the resulting  lung irritation may have
  led to the positive test.  Defendant then questioned the procedures the 
  officer followed in administering the test, including whether he had
  followed procedures  recommended by the Vermont Criminal Justice Training
  Council (the Council) in its officer  training manual.  The procedures for
  administering the DataMaster test that appear on the driving  under the
  influence (DUI) processing form mirror the guidelines promulgated by the
  Council in  the manual.  The manual states that officers should observe
  subjects for fifteen minutes prior to  the test and recommends that the
  officer check the subject's mouth for foreign objects.  The  manual also
  states that officers should avoid handling the mouthpiece on the DataMaster
  and that  the machine should be located on a flat, sturdy surface.  

       Defendant maintained that the officer failed to observe him for
  fifteen minutes prior to the  test and failed to mark the appropriate box
  on the processing form noting the observation period.  Defendant also
  claimed that the officer did not check his mouth before the test. 
  Defendant  highlighted the lack of evidence that the DataMaster machine was
  located in a place at the  Rockingham barracks that followed the Council
  recommendations and similar lack of evidence that  the officer handled the
  mouthpiece properly.  Additionally, defendant pointed out that while the 
  officer was certified to administer the DataMaster in 1989, he had neither
  performed the test on  a suspect, nor received any re-certification
  training since then.  Defendant asserted further that  the officers failed
  to transport him to a facility to get an independent test.

       Over defense objection, the court admitted the results of the
  DataMaster.  The court  rejected defendant's arguments that the Council
  training procedures govern admissibility and that  the test should have
  been suppressed because the officers effectively prevented him from
  obtaining  an independent test.  Defendant also objected to the admission
  of the statements that he made to 

 

  the officer while en route to the police barracks.  Defendant moved
  for a mistrial, and in the  alternative, for a limiting instruction, when
  he testified about the alcosensor test result and the  State referenced it
  during closing argument.  The court denied defendant's motions, and the
  jury  returned a guilty verdict.  
                                     I.
       Defendant contends that the trial court committed error by admitting
  the statements he  made following his arrest and during the time he was in
  custody for processing.  Defendant claims  that these statements could not
  be used against him since the officer had not provided Miranda  warnings or
  any notice that what he said could be admitted in court.  Defendant argues
  that, where  police do not interrogate a suspect but hold him in custody to
  obtain an evidentiary breath sample,  simple fairness requires that he be
  informed that anything he utters may be used at trial.

       Defendant argues that our holding in State v. Forcier, 162 Vt. 71,