Title: State ex rel. Coulter v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Coulter v. Indus. Comm., 91 Ohio St.3d 254, 2001-Ohio-33.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. COULTER, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Coulter v. Indus. Comm. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 254.] 
Workers’ compensation — Permanent partial disability compensation — 
Claimant’s change-of-election motion denied by Industrial Commission 
— Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of mandamus reversed and 
commission ordered to consider further claimant’s motion and issue an 
amended order. 
(No. 99-1510 — Submitted January 30, 2001 — Decided April 11, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 98AP-732. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. Appellant-claimant Roberta C. Coulter suffered two 
industrial low back injuries in the early 1980s.  Two laminectomies followed.  
After her second surgery in 1982, Dr. Richard M. Ward concluded that claimant 
could not return to her former job as a nurse’s aide. 
 
Claimant worked a series of jobs thereafter with periods of work 
interspersed with allegedly injury-induced absences.  In 1985, claimant moved 
appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for determination of a percentage of 
permanent partial disability (“PPD”) under former R.C. 4123.57.  The 
commission assessed a ten percent PPD.  Given the choice of receiving 
compensation as a lump sum PPD award under former R.C. 4123.57(B) or as 
weekly compensation for impaired earning capacity (“IEC”) pursuant to former 
4123.57(A), claimant selected the first option. 
 
Claimant’s work continued to be only intermittent until late 1990, and her 
income reflected it.  Claimant has apparently not worked since November 29, 
1990, allegedly due to injury. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
In 1997, claimant sought to change her election of compensation.  A 
district hearing officer denied the change for lack of good cause.  A staff hearing 
officer (“SHO”), in a confusing order, reversed the finding of no good cause, but 
sustained the denial of compensation nonetheless after concluding that claimant 
did not have an actual IEC: 
 
“Pursuant to [State ex rel.] Simpson v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 62 O.S.3d 
162 [580 N.E.2d 779], the transformation of a nonwork-preventive injury into a 
work-prohibitive one is changed circumstances sufficient to be considered 
unforeseen changed circumstances.  Per the 12/01/82 report of Dr. Ward the 
claimant was initially able to return to her former job after this injury and 
resulting surgery.  After a second injury in 1981 she was unable to return to her 
former job but was able to do lighter work.  The wage records from the Social 
Security Administration show the claimant was able to return to lighter work and 
did so up until sometime in 1990.  However, these records reflect no wages since 
1990.  The 05/26/95 report of Dr. Verma notes the claimant was not working at 
that time.  The 07/25/97 re-employment Advisor report of Betty Sparkman 
indicates the claimant has not worked in at least 2 years.  These records support 
the claimant’s contention that she has not worked since 1990.  The report of Ms. 
Sparkman goes on to indicate [that an] active job search with a goal of return[ing] 
to work does not appear to be a viable option at this time.  The claimant made her 
election on 09/18/85 at which time she was working. After that time her 
condition, due to this claim, deteriorated to the point [that] she could not return to 
the lighter work jobs she was doing.  This is shown by the report of Ms. 
Sparkman as well as the 10/20/97 report of Mr. Burr which notes [that] the 
claimant’s 06/05/90 medical disability release was due to her chronic low back 
condition.  Therefore, the claimant has shown the necessary transformation and/or 
unforeseen circumstances. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
“However, per [State ex rel.] McEndree v. Consolidation Coal Co. (1994), 
68 O.S.3d 325 [626 N.E.2d 674], the claimant must show actual impaired earning 
capacity, which includes proof of a desire to earn over the period for which 
impaired earning capacity is alleged. 
 
“If the claimant can not work at all she is not entitled to an award under 
4123.57(A) as she would be alleging a permanent and total disability which is 
covered under statute section 4123.58.  Section 4123.57 is entitled partial 
disability compensation not total disability compensation.  Partial disability 
indicates there must be some ability to work.  If there is some ability to work then 
there must also be shown a desire to work.  In this case it is found the claimant 
has not proven his [sic] desire to work or earn.  There is no evidence of any job 
search or any attempt to work since 1990.  The claimant was not present to testify 
as to any search or attempts to work.  The fact the claimant has been on social 
security disability since 1990 (per her counsel) also indicates a lack of desire to 
work.  Therefore, the claimant has not proven an actual impairment of earning 
capacity and the C-86 is denied.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
 
Further appeal was refused.  Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in 
the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission had 
abused its discretion in denying her change of election.  The court of appeals 
denied the writ, prompting claimant’s appeal to this court as of right. 
 
Former R.C. 4123.57 offered two types of compensation: IEC benefits 
under subsection (A) and compensation based on the percentage of permanent 
partial disability under subsection (B).  Once partial disability was assessed, a 
claimant chose one of the two forms of compensation.  The statute allowed, 
however, that “for good cause shown,” a claimant could change that election.  138 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 1733. 
 
“Good cause” requires a showing of “(1) unforeseen changed 
circumstances subsequent to the initial election, and (2) actual impaired earning 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
capacity.”  State ex rel. Combs v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1992), 62 Ohio 
St.3d 378, 381, 582 N.E.2d 990, 992.  Because the SHO found unforeseen 
changed circumstances, the only issue is the existence of actual IEC.  On this 
question, the commission’s order merits further consideration. 
 
A poorly written SHO order hampers review.  Among the instances of 
ambiguity is that surrounding the extent of claimant’s disability.  While the order 
initially suggests an inability to do sustained remunerative work, its denial of IEC 
relies, in part, on the existence of a residual capacity for labor. 
 
The ambiguity, at first seems harmless, since the SHO seemingly covered 
all bases by offering two theories of denial, covering claimants who can and 
cannot work.  Both theories, however, are flawed, which necessitates a 
clarification of claimant’s extent of disability. 
 
The SHO initially declared that a claimant who cannot work cannot 
receive IEC, “as [she] would be alleging a permanent and total disability.”  This 
statement, however, incorrectly assumes that all claimants who cannot work have 
a permanent disability.  It ignores the many workers whose complete inability to 
work is only temporary. 
 
The SHO’s other stated basis for denial was claimant’s lack of a desire to 
earn.  This requirement was first discussed in State ex rel. CPC Group, Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 209, 211-212, 559 N.E.2d 
1330, 1333: 
 
“R.C. 4123.57(A) requires a comparison of claimant’s pre- and post-injury 
earning capacity.  Consideration of post-injury earning capacity assumes, at a 
minimum, a desire to earn during the period in which an impairment has been 
alleged.  Receipt of compensation for impaired earning capacity when that desire 
is absent is inconsistent with Johnson’s [State ex rel. Johnson v. Indus. Comm. 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 384, 533 N.E.2d 775] requirement that a claimant prove 
actual impaired earning capacity.”  (Emphasis sic.) 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
In concluding that claimant had no desire to earn, the SHO cited 
claimant’s lack of a job search and receipt of Social Security disability benefits.  
This is problematic because the order strongly implies that claimant is incapable 
of sustained remunerative employment, and, per State ex rel. Evenflo Juvenile 
Furniture Co. v. Hinkle (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 74, 742 N.E.2d 124, a job search is 
not required of claimants who cannot do sustained remunerative employment. 
 
Clarification of claimant’s ability to work is, therefore, critical.  If 
claimant cannot work, the commission’s reliance on the lack of a job search and 
receipt of Social Security disability benefits is an abuse of discretion.  If she is 
employable, then the commission’s order may well be supported by some 
evidence. 
 
Two smaller issues can be quickly resolved.  Claimant is indeed correct in 
contending that nonmedical disability factors must be considered in determining 
IEC.  Claimant is also correct in asserting that her motion to change her election 
alleged an impaired earning capacity from 1983 forward, not 1990, as stated by 
the appellate court.  There is, accordingly, no issue of waiver. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. We order the 
commission to further consider claimant’s motion and issue an amended order. 
Judgment reversed 
and limited writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
 
Gloria P. Castrodale and James T. Sullivan, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Craigg E. Gould, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________