Title: Dickens v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KEVIN L. DICKENS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 425, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID 0906012589 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: May 4, 2012 
  Decided: July 31, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 31st day of July, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, their 
supplemental memoranda, and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Following a six day trial, a Superior Court jury convicted Kevin 
Dickens of two counts of Assault in a Detention Facility and acquitted him one 
count of Assault in a Detention Facility.1  Upon motion by the State, the Superior 
Court declared Dickens to be a habitual offender and sentenced him to a total 
period of sixteen years at Level V incarceration to be followed by a six month term 
of probation.  This is Dickens’ direct appeal. 
                                                 
1 Dickens requested, and was permitted, to represent himself at trial with the assistance of 
standby counsel.  He continues to represent himself in this appeal. 
 
2
(2) 
  The evidence presented at trial fairly established that on March 28, 
2009, Dickens was an inmate held in an isolated housing unit at the James T. 
Vaughn Correctional Center.  Around 8:00 that morning, two correctional officers, 
Michael Bryan and Nicholas Mohr, were passing out supplies to inmates in 
Dickens’ housing area.  The officers approached Dickens’ door and opened a flap 
in the cell door to pass supplies to Dickens.  Dickens threw a mixture of feces and 
urine toward the open flap, striking both officers in their faces and on their shirts.2   
The officers reported the incident to their lieutenant, who then received 
authorization from his superiors to retrieve Dickens from his cell and place him in 
restraints for a 24-hour observation period.  A Quick Response Team (QRT) was 
assembled and approached Dickens’ cell.  Dickens was asked to turn around and 
be handcuffed, but he refused to cooperate.  When the cell door was open, Dickens 
resisted and attacked QRT members.  Eventually, Dickens was subdued, placed in 
restraints, and put into an observation room.  An examination of his cell after the 
incident revealed feces on the floor and feces wrapped in plastic and toilet paper in 
and around the sink and toilet. 
                                                 
2 The officers testified that they had had no confrontation or exchange of words with Dickens 
that morning prior to his assault. 
 
3
(3) 
Thereafter, on April 15, 2009, correctional officers were conducting 
random “shakedown” searches of cells on Dickens’ tier.3  As part of their standard 
operating procedure, the officers asked Dickens to turn around and be handcuffed 
while the officers conducted their search.  Dickens refused to comply.  Again, a 
QRT was assembled to respond to Dickens’ cell.  Bryan was the first correctional 
officer through the cell door.  Dickens began throwing punches and feces, striking 
Bryan and attempting to grab his throat and wrench his neck.  Bryan received 
scratches and bruising to his neck and had feces smeared over the back of his head, 
neck and shirt.  After Dickens was subdued and placed in observation, Bryan was 
seen by an outside doctor for the injuries he received during the incident.  An 
examination of the cell after the incident revealed a mixture of urine, feces and 
toilet paper in the sink, as well as fecal matter on the walls and floor. 
(4) 
At trial, Dickens called several witnesses and also took the stand in 
his own defense.  Shortly after taking the stand, however, Dickens chose to remove 
himself from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial.  The jury ultimately 
convicted Dickens of the March 28, 2009 assault on Mohr and the April 15, 2009 
assault on Bryan.  The jury acquitted Dickens of the March 28, 2009 assault charge 
on Bryan.  Thereafter, the Superior Court declared Dickens to be a habitual 
                                                 
3 The testimony established that a shakedown search is a search of an inmate’s cell in order to 
monitor safety, sanitation and security in the cell.  The searches are conducted during each shift, 
and the cells to be searched are randomly selected. 
 
4
offender and sentenced him to sixteen years at Level V imprisonment followed by 
six months probation. 
(5) 
Dickens enumerates nine issues in his opening brief on appeal.  First, 
he contends that both the prosecution and the trial court violated his Eighth 
Amendment rights because, throughout the trial, they failed to respond to his 
claims of assault and intimidation by DOC personnel.  Second, Dickens contends 
that the trial judge erred in failing to recuse himself because of an appearance of 
bias.  Third, Dickens contends that the Superior Court erred in sentencing him as a 
habitual offender and in ordering him to pay restitution.  Fourth, Dickens contends 
that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct.  Fifth, Dickens asserts that the trial 
court abused its discretion by not allowing him to present evidence of his state of 
mind at the time of the offense.  Sixth, Dickens contends that trial court abused its 
discretion by not requiring the prosecutor to articulate race-neutral reasons for 
using two of its peremptory challenges against black jurors. Seventh, Dickens 
argues that he was denied his right of self-representation and constructively denied 
his right to counsel.  Eighth, Dickens argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by making witnesses swear on a Bible before allowing them to testify 
and by not allowing Dickens to possess a Bible.  Finally, Dickens contends that the 
Superior Court erred in denying his request for transcripts.  
 
5
(6) 
Dickens’ first argument is that he was subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment during the course of the trial because the trial judge ignored his 
complaints about alleged mistreatment by prison officials.  Dickens’ reliance on 
the Eighth Amendment in this context is misplaced.  The Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishment.”4  Dickens’ Eighth 
Amendment argument raises no complaint about his sentence, however, which was 
the punishment imposed by the Superior Court.  In fact, Dickens is complaining 
about alleged pre-conviction behavior of prison personnel.  This behavior is not 
associated with the punishment imposed by the Superior Court and thus is not a 
cognizable claim in this direct appeal from his criminal convictions and sentence. 
(7) 
Next, Dickens contends that the Superior Court judge erred in failing 
to recuse himself upon Dickens’ request.  Dickens argues that the trial judge’s bias 
is evidenced by: (i) Dickens’ prior complaints about the judge in other cases; (ii) 
the judge’s unfair rulings in the present case; (iii) the judge’s lack of regard for 
Dickens’ complaints about his safety; (iv) the judge’s failure to provide Dickens 
with a Bible; and (v) the judge’s familial relationship with the namesake of the 
prison where Dickens is incarcerated. 
                                                 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII;  DEL. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 
6
(8) 
In addressing a motion to recuse, a judge must engage in a two-step 
analysis to determine whether disqualification is appropriate.5  First, the judge 
must be satisfied as a subjective matter that the judge can proceed to hear the case 
without bias.6  Next, the judge must determine as an objective matter whether 
recusal is appropriate because of an appearance of bias sufficient to cast doubt on 
the judge’s impartiality.7  In this case, the judge applied the two-part test and 
concluded that, subjectively, he had no bias for or against Dickens.  The judge also 
found that the only arguable appearance of bias was based on the judge’s adverse 
rulings in the case.  Because the rulings were based upon the judge’s application of 
the law and did not stem from any personal bias toward Dickens, the judge denied 
Dickens’ motion for recusal.  Under the circumstances, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the Superior Court’s subjective analysis nor do we find any 
appearance of bias sufficient to cast doubt on the judge’s impartiality.  The trial 
court’s adverse rulings simply form no valid basis for the judge’s disqualification 
in this case.8 
(9) 
Dickens next argues that the Superior Court erred in sentencing him 
as a habitual offender and in ordering him to pay restitution.  In moving to declare 
a defendant to be a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), the State must 
                                                 
5 Jones v. State, 940 A.2d 1, 18 (Del. 2007). 
6 Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384-85 (Del. 1991). 
7 Id. at 385. 
8 See In re Wittrock, 649 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Del. 1994) (citing Liteky v.United States, 510 U.S. 
540, 555 (1994)). 
 
7
establish that a defendant has three prior felony convictions and that the defendant 
had some chance of rehabilitation following sentencing on each prior conviction.9  
“Some chance of rehabilitation” means only that some period of time must have 
elapsed between sentencing on a prior conviction and the commission of the 
offense resulting in the later conviction.10  In its supplemental memorandum, the 
State concedes that the Superior Court erred in granting its motion to declare 
Dickens to be a habitual offender because the offenses relied upon by the State 
overlapped, and Dickens did not have the requisite opportunity for rehabilitation 
between each of the offenses.  Accordingly, it is clear that Dickens’ sentence must 
be vacated and this matter must be remanded for resentencing as a result of this 
error.11  Given our remand for resentencing, we need not address Dickens’ other 
claims of sentencing errors. 
(10) Dickens’ fourth claim on appeal is prosecutorial misconduct.  
According to Dickens, the State’s prosecution of him was malicious and was in 
retaliation for Dickens’ repeated complaints to authorities regarding Bryan’s 
abusive behavior.  Dickens also alleges that the prosecutor in his case spread false 
                                                 
9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(b) (2007). 
10 Kirby v. State, 1999 WL 734743 (Del. Sept. 9, 1999) (citing Hall v. State, 473 A.2d 352, 357 
(Del. 1984)). 
11 The State argues that Dickens still qualifies as a habitual offender because of other offenses in 
his criminal history that were not relied upon by the State in its habitual offender motion.  We do 
not address this argument because the State did not raise it to the Superior Court in the first 
instance.  See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2012). 
 
8
and disparaging rumors about him in a 2008 case, which subsequently led State 
officials to conspire against him to seek retaliation. 
(11) Dickens’ allegations are pure speculation and conjecture.  There is 
nothing in this record to substantiate his claim of defamation.  Moreover, the 
evidence established probable cause to charge Dickens with assault in this case.  
As long as probable cause exists to believe an accused has committed a criminal 
offense defined by statute, the decision to prosecute and what charges to bring are 
matters within the prosecutor’s discretion.12  We find no malicious prosecution in 
this case. 
(12) Dickens’ fifth argument is that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion by not allowing him to present evidence of his state of mind at the time 
of the offense and by not allowing him to introduce portions of a State psychiatric 
report for purposes of impeachment.  With respect to the latter issue, the Superior 
Court denied Dickens’ request to admit the psychiatrist’s report during Dickens’ 
direct testimony on the grounds that it was inadmissible hearsay.13  The mental 
health evaluation had been prepared at the trial court’s direction in order to 
determine Dickens’ competency to stand trial and whether there was the possibility 
of a defense based on mental illness.  Dickens sought to admit the report, even 
though the psychiatrist was not a witness at trial, in order to challenge the 
                                                 
12 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 61 (Del. 1988). 
13 Del. Unif. R. Evid. 801(c) (2012) 
 
9
conclusion that he was not suffering from a cognizable mental illness at the time of 
the offenses.  The trial court held that Dickens’ hearsay statements to the 
psychiatrist could not be admitted during Dickens’ direct testimony but might 
possibly be admissible if the State’s cross-examination impliedly charged Dickens 
with recent fabrication.14  After a few moments on the stand, however, Dickens left 
the courtroom and chose to absent himself for the remainder of the trial.  Under the 
circumstances, we find no error in the Superior Court’s ruling that Dickens’ 
statements to the court-appointed psychiatrist were inadmissible hearsay. 
(13) With respect to “state of mind” evidence, the Superior Court had ruled 
that Dickens could only argue justification as a defense to the charges if the 
evidence showed that Dickens believed “that such force was immediately 
necessary for the purpose of protecting [himself] against the use of unlawful force 
by the other person on the present occasion.”15  The evidence at trial, however, 
showed that Dickens’ assaults were preemptive strikes on correctional officers who 
were lawfully performing their duties on the present occasion.16  Accordingly, we 
                                                 
14 Id. 801(d)(1)(B). 
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(a) (2007) (emphasis added). 
16 See id. § 1254(a).  Section 1254(a) defines the crime of Assault in a Detention Facility and 
provides: “(a) Any person who, being confined in a detention facility, intentionally causes 
physical injury to a correctional officer, other state employee of a detention facility acting in the 
lawful performance of duties, any other person confined in a detention facility or any other 
person at a detention facility or other place having custody of such person shall be guilty of a 
class D felony.” 
 
10
find no error in the Superior Court’s ruling that Dickens’ “state of mind” evidence 
was irrelevant.17   
(14) Dickens next argues that the Superior Court erred in not requiring the 
State to articulate race-neutral reasons for using two of its peremptory challenges 
to strike African-American jurors in accordance with Batson v. Kentucky.18  To 
establish a Batson violation, the defendant must first make a prima facie showing 
that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. If the 
requisite showing has been made, then the State must offer a race-neutral reason 
for the juror strikes.  Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant 
has sustained his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.19   
(15) In this case, Dickens did not raise his Batson claim until the jury was 
seated and the trial was in its second day of testimony.  In considering his belated 
objection, the Superior Court noted that during the seating of the first twelve 
jurors, the State struck one African-American male, one Caucasian female, and one 
Caucasian male.  During the seating of the alternates, the State struck one African-
American male.  Thus, of the four peremptory challenges that it used, the State 
struck two African-American jurors and two Caucasian jurors.  The final jury of 
twelve included seven African-American members.  In light of these facts, the 
                                                 
17 See Dickens v. State, 2008 WL 880162 (Del. Apr. 2, 2008) (affirming the trial court’s refusal 
to instruct the jury on the defense of justification). 
18 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the State must not exercise its peremptory challenges on the 
basis of race). 
19 Robertson v. State, 630 A.2d 1084, 1089 (Del. 1993). 
 
11
Superior Court denied Dickens’ Batson claim on the ground that he had failed to 
make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor had exercised his peremptory 
challenges based on race.   
(16) We agree.  Contrary to Dickens’ argument, the State is only required 
to offer a race-neutral reason for its peremptory strikes if the defendant first makes 
a prima facie showing that the challenges were based on race.  The State did not, 
despite Dickens’ contention, utilize its challenges to strike a disproportionate 
number of African-Americans from the jury.  Based on the trial record, we find no 
relevant circumstances to support even an inference that the State used its 
challenges to exclude jurors based on race.20  Accordingly, we find no merit to this 
claim. 
(17) Dickens next claims that the Superior Court denied him the right to 
represent himself and also constructively denied him the right to counsel.  Most of 
Dickens’ specific complaints relate to his contention that the Superior Court denied 
him the right to present a defense by refusing to allow him to present evidence of 
prior abuse by the guards, which reflected on Dickens’ state of mind at the time of 
the assaults.  Dickens asserts in his opening brief that the trial court’s “prohibition 
against any form of retaliation is unreasonable under a person’s constitutional and 
human rights.”  We already have discussed the evidentiary standards necessary to 
                                                 
20 See Roberston v. State, 630 A.2d at 1089. 
 
12
establish a justification defense and ruled that a jury instruction on justification 
was not warranted because the evidence did not support a finding that Dickens’ use 
of force was immediately necessary on the present occasion.21  Dickens’ contention 
that retaliation should be a permissible defense is not supported by the law. 
(18) Dickens also contends that he was denied his right to self-
representation when the Superior Court refused to declare a mistrial due to 
inclement weather.  According to Dickens, the Superior Court should have 
declared a mistrial as soon as the Governor of Delaware declared a state of 
emergency because of a snow storm.  Dickens argues that no juror should have 
been required to report for trial due to the bad weather and that requiring the jurors 
to report under such unreasonable circumstances led to one sitting juror having to 
be replaced by the first alternate juror.  
(19) We find no merit to this claim.  A mistrial should only be declared 
when there are no practical or meaningful alternatives to that remedy.22  A mistrial 
due to bad weather obviously was not necessary in this case given that 11 out of 
the 12 jurors were able to report for duty.  The Superior Court’s decision to seat the 
first alternate juror in place of the one sitting juror who could not report was a 
reasonable alternative.  Dickens makes no credible claim that replacement of one 
juror with an alternate juror denied him the right to self-representation in any way. 
                                                 
21 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(a) (2007). 
22 Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Del. 1987). 
 
13
(20) Dickens also contends that the Superior Court constructively denied 
him the right to counsel when it failed to appoint stand-by counsel to act on his 
behalf after Dickens voluntarily chose to leave the courtroom during the middle of 
his own testimony.  We disagree.  After Dickens announced his decision to leave, 
the Superior Court questioned him and was satisfied that the decision was made 
knowingly and voluntarily.  The Superior Court handed Dickens a copy of the jury 
instructions and informed him that he could return to the courtroom any time he 
wished. Standby counsel remained for the prayer conference, the State’s brief 
rebuttal, closing arguments, and the verdict.  Dickens returned only for a juror’s 
note.  Under these circumstances, Dickens presents no credible claim that he was 
constructively denied his constitutional right to counsel. 
(21) Dickens’ eighth argument is that the Superior Court erred by requiring 
witnesses to swear on a Bible before testifying and also for refusing to provide him 
with a Bible to have during the course of the trial.  With respect to the first issue, 
Delaware law requires that each witness, prior to testifying, must either swear on 
the Bible or declare and affirm the truthfulness of the witness’ testimony.23  If any 
witness refuses, as a non-Christian, to swear on the Bible, the witness is given the 
opportunity to be sworn according to the tenets of that witness’ religion.24  Dickens 
acknowledges that, in compliance with the statutory requirements, each witness in 
                                                 
23 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5321-23 (2007). 
24 Id. § 5324. 
 
14
his case was given the opportunity either to affirm the truthfulness of their 
testimony or to swear on the Bible prior to testifying.  He contends, without citing 
any authority, that this method of swearing witnesses is unconstitutional.  We find 
absolutely no merit to this suggestion given that the witnesses have the choice not 
to swear on a Bible.  Moreover, Dickens cites no authority for his suggestion that 
the Superior Court violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him with 
a copy of the Bible for his personal use throughout the trial.  Accordingly, we 
reject this claim. 
(22) Dickens’ final argument on appeal is that the Superior Court abused 
its discretion in denying his request for transcripts at State expense.  The record 
reflects that Dickens’ received the trial transcript.  His argument relates to the 
Superior Court’s failure to specifically transcribe the sworn oath administered to 
each witness.  He also argues that he should have been provided with a transcript 
of jury selection.  In response to Dickens’ supplemental motion for transcripts, the 
Superior Court deferred ruling on his request, indicating that Dickens needed to 
supplement his motion with the specific reasons he needed the requested 
transcripts.  Dickens, however, failed to supplement his motion as instructed.   
(23)  Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 9(e), in a class A felony, noncapital 
case, the Superior Court must direct the court reporter to prepare the transcript of 
the entire trial, excluding “opening and closing arguments of counsel and jury 
 
15
selection.”25  We find no abuse of the Superior Court’s discretion in deferring a 
ruling on Dickens’ motion for the transcript of jury selection until Dickens’ 
provided more information about the necessity of the transcript.  Moreover, we 
find no error in the failure of the court reporters to transcribe the standard oath 
administered to each and every witness given our finding that administration of the 
standard, statutorily-mandated oath did not violate Dickens’ rights in any way. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the sentencing order of the 
Superior Court is VACATED.  The matter shall be REMANDED for resentencing.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED in all other respects.   
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
25 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 9(e) (2012).