Title: Friends of College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo Cmty. College Dist.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 9/19/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
FRIENDS OF THE COLLEGE OF  
) 
SAN MATEO GARDENS, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S214061 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/1 A135892 
SAN MATEO COUNTY COMMUNITY  ) 
COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., 
) 
 
) 
San Mateo County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CIV 508656 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
To ensure that governmental agencies and the public are adequately 
informed about the environmental impact of public decisions, the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) 
requires a lead agency (id., § 21067) to prepare an environmental impact report 
(EIR) before approving a new project that ―may have a significant effect on the 
environment.‖  (Id., § 21151, subd. (a).)  When changes are proposed to a project 
for which an EIR has already been prepared, the agency must prepare a subsequent 
or supplemental EIR only if the changes are ―[s]ubstantial‖ and require ―major 
revisions‖ of the previous EIR.  (Id., § 21166.)  Guidelines promulgated by the 
state Natural Resources Agency (Resources Agency) extend this subsequent 
review framework to projects for which a negative declaration was initially 
adopted, and no EIR prepared, because the agency had concluded the project 
2 
would have no potentially significant environmental effects.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 
14, § 15162; hereafter CEQA Guidelines.)   
 
In this case, a community college district proposed a district-wide facilities 
improvement plan that called for demolishing certain buildings and renovating 
others.  The district approved the plan after determining that it would have no 
potentially significant, unmitigated effect on the environment.  Years later, the 
district proposed changes to the plan.  The changes included a proposal to 
demolish one building complex that had originally been slated for renovation, and 
to renovate two other buildings that had originally been slated for demolition.  The 
district approved the changes after concluding they did not require the preparation 
of a subsequent or supplemental EIR under Public Resources Code section 21166 
(section 21166) and CEQA Guidelines section 15162.  The Court of Appeal 
invalidated the district‘s decision, finding it ―clear‖ as a matter of law that the 
district‘s proposed demolition of the building complex was not merely a change to 
its previously approved project, but a new project altogether.  The court ruled that 
the district‘s proposal was therefore subject to the initial environmental review 
standards of Public Resources Code section 21151 (section 21151) rather than the 
subsequent review standards of section 21166 and CEQA Guidelines section 
15162. 
 
We conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in its application of this new 
project test.  When an agency proposes changes to a previously approved project, 
CEQA does not authorize courts to invalidate the agency‘s action based solely on 
their own abstract evaluation of whether the agency‘s proposal is a new project, 
rather than a modified version of an old one.  Under the statutory scheme, the 
agency‘s environmental review obligations depend on the effect of the proposed 
changes on the decisionmaking process, rather than on any abstract 
characterization of the project as ―new‖ or ―old.‖  An agency that proposes project 
3 
changes thus must determine whether the previous environmental document 
retains any relevance in light of the proposed changes and, if so, whether major 
revisions to the previous environmental document are nevertheless required due to 
the involvement of new, previously unstudied significant environmental impacts.  
These are determinations for the agency to make in the first instance, subject to 
judicial review for substantial evidence.  
I.  
A. 
―In CEQA, the Legislature sought to protect the environment by the 
establishment of administrative procedures drafted to ‗[e]nsure that the long-term 
protection of the environment shall be the guiding criterion in public decisions.‘ ‖  
(No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 74 (No Oil).)  At the 
―heart of CEQA‖ (CEQA Guidelines, § 15003, subd. (a)) is the requirement that 
public agencies prepare an EIR for any ―project‖ that ―may have a significant 
effect on the environment.‖  (§ 21151, subd. (a); see id., §§ 21080, subd. (a), 
21100, subd. (a).)  The purpose of the EIR is ―to provide public agencies and the 
public in general with detailed information about the effect which a proposed 
project is likely to have on the environment; to list ways in which the significant 
effects of such a project might be minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a 
project.‖  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21061.)  The EIR thus works to ―inform the 
public and its responsible officials of the environmental consequences of their 
decisions before they are made,‖ thereby protecting ― ‗not only the environment 
but also informed self-government.‘ ‖  (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of 
Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 564, quoting Laurel Heights Improvement 
Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392 (Laurel 
Heights).) 
4 
Under CEQA and its implementing guidelines, an agency generally 
conducts an initial study to determine ―if the project may have a significant effect 
on the environment.‖  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (a).)  If there is 
substantial evidence that the project may have a significant effect on the 
environment, then the agency must prepare and certify an EIR before approving 
the project.  (No Oil, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 85; see also Pub. Resources Code, 
§§ 21100 [state agencies], 21151 [local agencies].)  On the other hand, no EIR is 
required if the initial study reveals that ―there is no substantial evidence that the 
project or any of its aspects may cause a significant effect on the environment.‖  
(CEQA Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (b)(2).)  The agency instead prepares a 
negative declaration ―briefly describing the reasons that a proposed project . . . 
will not have a significant effect on the environment and therefore does not require 
the preparation of an EIR.‖  (Id., § 15371; see id., § 15070.)  Even when an initial 
study shows a project may have significant environmental effects, an EIR is not 
always required.  The public agency may instead prepare a mitigated negative 
declaration (MND) if ―(1) revisions in the project plans . . . before the proposed 
negative declaration and initial study are released for public review would avoid 
the effects or mitigate the effects to a point where clearly no significant effect on 
the environment would occur, and (2) there is no substantial evidence in light of 
the whole record before the public agency that the project, as revised, may have a 
significant effect on the environment.‖  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21064.5.)  
For many projects, this is the end of the environmental review process.  But 
like all things in life, project plans are subject to change.  When such changes 
occur, section 21166 provides that ―no subsequent or supplemental environmental 
impact report shall be required‖ unless at least one or more of the following 
occurs:  (1) ―[s]ubstantial changes are proposed in the project which will require 
major revisions of the environmental impact report,‖ (2) there are ―[s]ubstantial 
5 
changes‖ to the project‘s circumstances that will require major revisions to the 
EIR, or (3) new information becomes available.  (§ 21166.) 
Although section 21166 does not, by its terms, address cases in which a 
negative declaration or an MND, rather than an EIR, has been prepared, CEQA 
Guidelines section 15162 provides that no subsequent EIR is required either 
―[w]hen an EIR has [previously] been certified or [when] a negative declaration 
[has previously been] adopted for a project,‖ unless there are substantial changes 
to a project or its circumstances that will require major revisions to the existing 
EIR or negative declaration.  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (a), italics added; 
see also § 21166.)  ―If changes to a project or its circumstances occur or new 
information becomes available after adoption of a negative declaration,‖ and if no 
subsequent EIR is required, the agency ―shall determine whether to prepare a 
subsequent negative declaration, an addendum, or no further documentation.‖  
(CEQA Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (b).)  CEQA Guidelines further provide that an 
agency must prepare an addendum to a previously certified EIR ―if some changes 
or additions are necessary but none of the conditions described in Section 15162 
calling for preparation of a subsequent EIR have occurred.‖  (Id., § 15164, subd. 
(a).)  An addendum to an adopted negative declaration ―may be prepared if only 
minor technical changes or additions are necessary or none of the conditions 
described in Section 15162 calling for the preparation of a subsequent EIR or 
negative declaration have occurred.‖  (Id., § 15164, subd. (b).) 
B. 
This case arises from a series of proposed facilities improvements to a 
college campus in San Mateo County.  In 2006, the San Mateo Community 
College District and its Board of Trustees (collectively, District) adopted a 
facilities master plan (Plan) proposing nearly $1 billion in new construction and 
facilities renovations at the District‘s three college campuses.  At the College of 
6 
San Mateo (College), the District‘s Plan included a proposal to demolish certain 
buildings and renovate others.  The buildings slated for renovation included the 
College‘s ―Building 20 complex,‖ which includes a small cast-in-place concrete 
classroom and lab structure, greenhouse, lath house, surrounding garden space, 
and an interior courtyard.   
In 2006, the District published an initial study and mitigated negative 
declaration analyzing the physical environmental effects of implementing the 
Plan‘s proposed improvements at the College, including the proposed 
rehabilitation of the Building 20 complex.  The MND stated that, with the 
implementation of certain mitigation measures, the Plan would not have a 
significant effect on the environment.  In 2007, the District certified its initial 
study and adopted the 2006 MND.   
When the District later failed to obtain funding for the planned Building 20 
complex renovations, it re-evaluated the proposed renovation.  In May 2011, the 
District issued a notice of determination, indicating that it would instead demolish, 
rather than renovate, the ―complex and replace it with parking lot, accessibility, 
and landscaping improvements.‖  The District also proposed to renovate two other 
buildings, buildings 15 and 17, that had previously been slated for demolition.   
The District concluded a subsequent or supplemental EIR was not required.  
It instead addressed the change through an addendum to its 2006 initial study and 
MND, concluding that ―the project changes would not result in a new or 
substantially more severe impact than disclosed in the 2006 [initial study and 
mitigated negative declaration].  Therefore, an addendum . . . is the appropriate 
CEQA documentation.‖  (San Mateo County Community College Dist., CEQA 
Addendum:  Evaluation of Project Change to Building 20 Complex (May 2011) 
p. 20.)   
7 
The newly proposed demolition of the Building 20 complex, and 
particularly the demolition of the complex‘s associated gardens, proved 
controversial.  Certain members of the public, as well as a number of College 
students and faculty, vocally criticized the demolition proposal at public hearings.  
The District nevertheless approved demolition of the Building 20 complex in 
accordance with the addendum. 
Plaintiff Friends of the College of San Mateo Gardens filed suit challenging 
the approval.  The District thereafter rescinded its original addendum and issued a 
revised addendum in August 2011.  The revised addendum reiterated the original 
addendum‘s conclusion but bolstered its analysis.  On August 24, 2011, after 
public comment and discussion, the revised addendum was adopted and 
demolition of the Building 20 complex was reapproved.  Plaintiff voluntarily 
dismissed its prior suit and filed the present action, challenging the revised 
addendum and the reapproval of the demolition.  Plaintiff sought a peremptory 
writ of mandate ordering the District to set aside its approval of the Building 20 
complex demolition and to fully comply with CEQA, including preparing an 
adequate EIR and adopting feasible alternatives and mitigation measures.  The 
trial court found that the demolition project was inconsistent with the previously 
approved plan and that its impacts were not addressed in the 2006 mitigated 
negative declaration.  The trial court thus granted plaintiff‘s petition for a writ of 
mandate, ordering the District to refrain from taking further action adversely 
affecting the physical environment at the Building 20 complex pending the 
District‘s full compliance with CEQA.  
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  Relying primarily on Save Our 
Neighborhood v. Lishman (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1288 (Save Our 
Neighborhood), the court concluded, as a threshold matter of law, that the 
proposed building demolition was a new project, rather than a project 
8 
modification.  The court accordingly concluded that the agency is required to 
engage in an initial study of the project to determine whether an EIR is required 
under section 21151.   
In so holding, the Court of Appeal deepened a disagreement among the 
appellate courts concerning the reasoning of Save Our Neighborhood, supra, 140 
Cal.App.4th 1288.  In Save Our Neighborhood, the Court of Appeal invalidated an 
agency‘s approval of a proposed modification to a project that had previously been 
approved via negative declaration.  Although the original project and the proposed 
modification involved ―the same land and . . . similar mixes of uses,‖ there were a 
number of differences.  (Id. at p. 1300 [the original project was a 106-unit motel 
that included some 15,000 square feet of other retail uses; the purported 
modification was a 102-unit hotel that did not include any separate retail uses and 
was sponsored by a different developer than the original project].)  The court held 
that the agency had erroneously relied on the statutory and regulatory provisions 
governing the preparation of subsequent or supplemental EIRs because the 
proposal was not a modification at all but rather a ―new project altogether.‖  (Id. at 
p. 1301.)  The court concluded that whether the proposal constituted a ―new 
project‖ was ―a threshold question‖ of law and rejected the agency‘s determination 
to treat the proposal as a modification after reviewing that question de novo.  
(Ibid.) 
Save Our Neighborhood was criticized in Mani Brothers Real Estate Group 
v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1400 (Mani Brothers).  In 
Mani Brothers, the agency certified an EIR for an original project consisting of 
―five buildings with . . . offices, a 550- to 770-room hotel, retail facilities, and an 
optional cultural center.‖  (Id. at p. 1389.)  Fifteen years later, the project‘s 
developer proposed to revise the project, including by ―reduc[ing] much of the 
[o]riginal [p]roject‘s office and retail space, and eliminat[ing] the optional culture 
9 
use component, while maintaining the hotel component and adding residential 
components,‖ which increased the overall size of the project from ―approximately 
2.7 million square feet to a maximum of just over 3.2 million square feet.‖  (Id. at 
p. 1391.)  The Mani Brothers court affirmed the agency‘s determination that the 
proposal was a modification of an existing project and found the agency‘s 
conclusion that no supplemental EIR was required to be supported by substantial 
evidence.  (Id. at pp. 1398–1399.)  The court distinguished Save Our 
Neighborhood, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th 1288, on the ground that it ―involved an 
addendum to a previously certified negative declaration and not . . . an addendum 
to a previously certified EIR.‖  (Mani Brothers, at p. 1400.)  But the court also 
opined that, even if it were not distinguishable, Save Our Neighborhood‘s 
―fundamental analysis is flawed.‖  (Mani Brothers, at p. 1400.)  The court 
explained that Save Our Neighborhood‘s threshold ― ‗new project‘ test . . . 
inappropriately bypassed otherwise applicable statutory and regulatory 
provisions,‖ and ―undermine[d] the deference due the agency.‖  (Mani Brothers, at 
pp. 1400–1401; see also Pub. Resources Code, § 21083.1.) 
The Court of Appeal in this case acknowledged the disagreement between 
Save Our Neighborhood and Mani Brothers.  It concluded, however, that ―in the 
narrow circumstances of the present case, where it is clear from the record that the 
nature of the project has fundamentally and qualitatively changed to the point 
where the new proposal is actually a new project altogether,‖ the approach 
adopted in Save Our Neighborhood ―is both workable and sound.‖1  Here, the 
                                              
1  
Shortly after issuing its decision in this case, the same division of the Court 
of Appeal issued a decision in which it declined to apply the Save Our 
Neighborhood new project test to review a city‘s determination that changes to a 
previously approved project did not require a supplemental or subsequent EIR.  
(Latinos Unidos de Napa v. City of Napa (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 192, 201–202.)  
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
10 
court observed, the District‘s 2011 addendum ―changes ‗renovation‘ of the 
Building 20 complex to ‗demolition‘ of the complex‘s buildings and a substantial 
portion of the gardens.‖  The court concluded:  ―[A]t least under the 
straightforward facts of the present case we can decide, as a matter of law, that the 
demolition project is a ‗new project.‘ ‖ 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged the District‘s argument that the 
proposal to demolish the Building 20 complex is only one component of the 
District‘s project, which, as revised, now proposes to renovate two buildings that 
had previously been slated for demolition.  Relying on Sierra Club v. County of 
Sonoma (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307 (Sierra Club), however, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that when an agency initially adopts a broad, large-scale environmental 
document — such as the 2006 MND here — that addresses the ―environmental 
effects of a complex long-term management plan‖ (id. at p. 1316), a court can find 
a material alteration regarding a particular site or activity covered by that plan to 
be a new project triggering environmental review under section 21151. 
II. 
Once a project has been subject to environmental review and received 
approval, section 21166 and CEQA Guidelines section 15162 limit the 
circumstances under which a subsequent or supplemental EIR must be prepared.  
These limitations are designed to balance CEQA‘s central purpose of promoting 
consideration of the environmental consequences of public decisions with interests 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
Explaining that ― ‗a court should tread with extraordinary care before reversing a 
local agency‘s determination about the environmental impact of changes to a 
project,‘ ‖ the court instead ―elect[ed] to evaluate the City‘s decision to proceed 
under section 21166 using the substantial evidence test.‖  (Id. at p. 202.) 
11 
in finality and efficiency.  (See Bowman v. City of Petaluma (1986) 185 
Cal.App.3d 1065, 1074 (Bowman).)  Thus, as both Save Our Neighborhood and 
Mani Brothers explained:  ―The purpose behind the requirement of a subsequent 
or supplemental EIR or negative declaration is to explore environmental impacts 
not considered in the original environmental document. . . .  The event of a change 
in a project is not an occasion to revisit environmental concerns laid to rest in the 
original analysis.  Only changed circumstances . . . are at issue.‖  (Save Our 
Neighborhood, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1296; accord, Mani Brothers, supra, 
153 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1398–1399.) 
Consistent with these principles, section 21166 and CEQA Guidelines 
section 15162 provide that an agency that proposes changes to a previously 
approved project must determine whether the changes are ―[s]ubstantial‖ and ―will 
require major revisions of the previous EIR or negative declaration due to the 
involvement of new significant environmental effects or a substantial increase in 
the severity of previously identified significant effects.‖  (CEQA Guidelines, 
§ 15162, subd. (a)(1).)  If the proposed changes meet that standard, then a 
subsequent or supplemental EIR is required. 
Drawing on the reasoning of Save Our Neighborhood, plaintiff argues that 
implicit in the statutory and regulatory scheme is a threshold inquiry that 
determines whether the subsequent review provisions properly apply in the first 
place.  Because section 21166 and CEQA Guidelines section 15162 both refer to 
substantial changes to ―a project‖ — and not, as the Save Our Neighborhood court 
observed, changes to ―a new project proposed for a site where a similar project 
was previously approved‖ — a court reviewing an agency‘s proposed approval of 
project changes must first satisfy itself that the project remains the same project as 
before, rather than an entirely new project, before proceeding to evaluate whether 
the changes call for a subsequent or supplemental EIR under CEQA‘s subsequent 
12 
review provisions.  (Save Our Neighborhood, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297.)  
Plaintiff further argues that whether an agency‘s proposal qualifies as a new 
project is a question of law for courts to decide based on their independent 
judgment.  The premise of plaintiff‘s argument is sound, but its conclusions are 
not. 
Plaintiff is correct that the subsequent review provisions can apply only if 
the project has been subject to initial review; they can have no application if the 
agency has proposed a new project that has not previously been subject to review.  
But plaintiff‘s approach would assign to courts the authority — indeed, the 
obligation — to determine whether an agency‘s proposal qualifies as a new 
project, in the absence of any standards to govern the inquiry.  Plaintiff does not 
suggest any standards, nor do the cases on which it relies.  The Save Our 
Neighborhood court simply asserted that the modified project proposal at issue 
was a new project, pointing out that while the ―projects‖ at issue involved the 
―same land‖ and a ―similar mix[] of uses,‖ they ―ha[d] different proponents and 
there [was] no suggestion the latter project utilized any of the drawings or other 
materials connected with the earlier project . . .‖ (Save Our Neighborhood, supra, 
140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300).  The court neither purported to give any content to 
the determination whether a proposal counts as a new project, nor did it explain 
why the distinctions it identified make any difference for purposes of CEQA, 
whose aim is simply to ―compel government . . . to make decisions with 
environmental consequences in mind.‖  (Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com. 
(1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 283.)  The Court of Appeal in this case likewise offered no 
standards to guide the inquiry, simply declaring it ―clear‖ that the proposal at issue 
constituted a ―new project.‖ 
In the absence of any benchmark for measuring the newness of a given 
project, the new project test plaintiff urges would inevitably invite arbitrary 
13 
results.  As the Court of Appeal in Mani Brothers observed, to ask whether an 
agency proposal constitutes a ― ‗new project‘ ‖ in the abstract ―does not provide an 
objective or useful framework.  Drastic changes to a project might be viewed by 
some as transforming the project to a new project, while others may characterize 
the same drastic changes in a project as resulting in a dramatically modified 
project.  Such labeling entails no specific guidelines and simply is not helpful to 
our analysis.‖  (Mani Brothers, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1400.) 
What is more, to ask whether proposed agency action constitutes a new 
project, purely in the abstract, misses the reason why the characterization matters 
in the first place.  The central purpose of CEQA is to ensure that agencies and the 
public are adequately informed of the environmental effects of proposed agency 
action.  The subsequent review provisions, as Save Our Neighborhood recognized, 
are accordingly designed to ensure that an agency that proposes changes to a 
previously approved project ―explore[s] environmental impacts not considered in 
the original environmental document.‖  (Save Our Neighborhood, supra, 140 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1296.)  This assumes that at least some of the environmental 
impacts of the modified project were considered in the original environmental 
document, such that the original document retains some relevance to the ongoing 
decisionmaking process.  A decision to proceed under CEQA‘s subsequent review 
provisions must thus necessarily rest on a determination — whether implicit or 
explicit — that the original environmental document retains some informational 
value.  If the proposed changes render the previous environmental document 
wholly irrelevant to the decisionmaking process, then it is only logical that the 
agency start from the beginning under section 21151 by conducting an initial study 
to determine whether the project may have substantial effects on the environment. 
It follows that, for purposes of determining whether an agency may proceed 
under CEQA‘s subsequent review provisions, the question is not whether an 
14 
agency‘s proposed changes render a project new in an abstract sense.  Nor does 
the inquiry turn on the identity of the project proponent, the provenance of the 
drawings, or other matters unrelated to the environmental consequences associated 
with the project.  (Cf. Save Our Neighborhood, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1300.)  Rather, under CEQA, when there is a change in plans, circumstances, or 
available information after a project has received initial approval, the agency‘s 
environmental review obligations ―turn[] on the value of the new information to 
the still pending decisionmaking process.‖  (Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources 
Council (1989) 490 U.S. 360, 374 (Marsh).)2  If the original environmental 
document retains some informational value despite the proposed changes, then the 
agency proceeds to decide under CEQA‘s subsequent review provisions whether 
project changes will require major revisions to the original environmental 
document because of the involvement of new, previously unconsidered significant 
environmental effects. 3   
                                              
2  
In this respect, CEQA resembles the federal statute on which it was 
modeled.  (See Marsh, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 374 [agencies employ a ― ‗rule of 
reason‘ ‖ in determining whether to issue a supplemental environmental impact 
statement under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 
et seq.]; Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 52 Cal.3d 553, 
565, fn. 4 [―CEQA was modeled on the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA)‖ and ― ‗we have consistently treated judicial and administrative 
interpretation of the latter enactment as persuasive authority in interpreting 
CEQA.‘ ‖].)   
3  
As a practical matter, if proposed modifications have rendered the prior 
environmental review wholly irrelevant to the ongoing decisionmaking process, 
and if the modifications create potentially significant environmental impacts, the 
two inquiries will yield substantially the same result:  the agency must prepare an 
EIR.  Although CEQA distinguishes ―subsequent EIRs‖ (§ 21166) from initial 
EIRs (see § 21151), both types of EIRs are subject to the same general procedural 
and substantive requirements.  (See generally Pub. Resources Code, § 21061 
[defining environmental impact report]; see also id., §§ 21100, 21100.1 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
15 
This understanding of the relevant statutory framework supplies the 
benchmark missing from the Court of Appeal‘s application of the new project test 
in this case.  It also exposes the court‘s error in treating the new project inquiry as 
a question for the court‘s independent determination under a de novo standard.  
Plaintiff, seeking to defend the court‘s chosen standard of review, likens the new 
project inquiry to the inquiry whether a particular activity qualifies as a project 
within the meaning of CEQA.  (See Save Our Neighborhood, supra, 140 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1297; cf. Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 
116, 131; Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 372, 382; Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of 
Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 795–798.)  The comparison fails.  Whether a 
proposed activity is a project within the meaning of CEQA is, as we have 
recognized, a predominantly legal question, for it depends on whether ―undisputed 
data in the record on appeal‖ satisfy the detailed statutory definition of the term 
―project.‖  (Muzzy Ranch Co., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 382, citing Pub. Resources 
Code, § 21065 [defining ―project‖ as ―an activity which may cause either a direct 
physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical 
change in the environment‖].)  But whether an initial environmental document 
remains relevant despite changed plans or circumstances — like the question 
whether an initial environmental document requires major revisions due to 
changed plans or circumstances — is a predominantly factual question.  It is thus a 
question for the agency to answer in the first instance, drawing on its particular 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
[information to be included], 21104, 21153 [consultation requirements], 21091–
21092 [public notice and comment].)  
16 
expertise.  (Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife 
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, 215.)  A court‘s task on review is then to decide whether 
the agency‘s determination is supported by substantial evidence; the court‘s job 
― ‗ ―is not to weigh conflicting evidence and determine who has the better 
argument.‖ ‘ ‖  (Ibid.) 
We expect occasions when a court finds no substantial evidence to support 
an agency‘s decision to proceed under CEQA‘s subsequent review provisions will 
be rare, and rightly so; ―a court should tread with extraordinary care‖ before 
reversing an agency‘s determination, whether implicit or explicit, that its initial 
environmental document retains some relevance to the decisionmaking process.  
(Moss v. County of Humboldt (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052, fn. 6.)4  But 
this is only the first step.  Once a court determines that substantial evidence 
supports an agency‘s decision to proceed under CEQA‘s subsequent review 
provisions (see § 21166; CEQA Guidelines, § 15162), the next — and critical — 
step is to determine whether the agency has properly determined how to comply 
with its obligations under those provisions.  In particular, where, as here, the 
agency has determined that project changes will not require ―major revisions‖ to 
its initial environmental document, such that no subsequent or supplemental EIR is 
required, the reviewing court must then proceed to ask whether substantial 
evidence supports that determination.  As explained below, judicial review must 
reflect the exacting standard that an agency must apply when changes are made to 
a project that has been approved via a negative declaration.   
                                              
4  
As noted, an agency‘s decision to proceed under CEQA‘s subsequent 
review provisions necessarily incorporates an implicit conclusion that the original 
environmental document retains at least some degree of relevance.  Nothing in the 
statute requires the agency to make an explicit finding to that effect. 
17 
III. 
Perhaps anticipating our disagreement with the Court of Appeal‘s 
formulation and application of Save Our Neighborhood‘s new project test, 
plaintiff asks us to affirm the judgment below on the alternative ground that 
CEQA‘s subsequent review provision, section 21166, applies only to projects for 
which an initial EIR was prepared.  Plaintiff urges us to hold that CEQA 
Guidelines section 15162 is invalid to the extent that it extends the section 21166 
subsequent review framework to projects that were initially approved via negative 
declaration, like the campus improvement project at issue in this case.5 
The Resources Agency, as the ―agency with primary responsibility for 
statewide implementation of CEQA,‖ promulgated CEQA Guidelines section 
15162 in accordance with its statutory obligation to establish guidelines for 
CEQA‘s implementation.  (California Building Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air 
Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 378; see Pub. Resources Code, 
§ 21083.)  These Guidelines, we have said, are ―central to the statutory scheme‖; 
they ―serve to make the CEQA process tractable for those who must administer it, 
those who must comply with it, and ultimately, those members of the public who 
must live with its consequences.‖  (California Building Industry Assn., supra, 62 
Cal.4th at pp. 384–385.)  Although we have ―not [yet] decided . . . whether the 
Guidelines are regulatory mandates or only aids to interpreting CEQA‖ (Laurel 
                                              
5 
Plaintiff did not raise this issue in its response to the petition for review, 
and indeed conceded in its opening brief that the ―point has not been at issue in 
this case.‖  At oral argument, however, both parties focused on this issue rather 
than on the issue on which we had granted review.  Concluding that a full response 
to the issue presented requires resolution of plaintiff‘s claim that CEQA 
Guidelines section 15162 is invalid as applied to projects initially approved by 
negative declaration, we solicited supplemental briefing from the parties and the 
Resources Agency to address it. 
18 
Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 391, fn. 2), we have nevertheless concluded that 
the Guidelines are owed deference insofar as they reflect the agency‘s specialized 
knowledge and expertise and were adopted through a process of notice and public 
comment under the California Administrative Procedure Act.  (California Building 
Industry Assn., supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 381, 389–390.)  Thus, we afford the 
Guidelines ―great weight‖ unless a provision is ―clearly unauthorized or erroneous 
under the statute.‖  (Id. at p. 381.)   
Plaintiff argues that CEQA Guidelines section 15162 is clearly erroneous 
because section 21166 is, by its terms, limited to projects for which an EIR has 
been prepared.  Plaintiff argues that the omission of any reference to negative 
declarations reflects a legislative intent to exclude projects initially approved via 
negative declaration from the subsequent review framework of section 21166, and 
instead to require a new round of initial study each time changes are proposed in 
project plans or circumstances.  We disagree. 
To begin with, the omission of any reference to negative declarations in 
section 21166 is less revealing than plaintiff suggests.  At the time section 21166 
was enacted in 1972, no provision of CEQA referred to negative declarations; the 
category of negative declarations originated with the Resources Agency‘s 
promulgation of the first set of CEQA implementation guidelines the following 
year.  (See No Oil, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 74 and fn. 2, citing former Cal. Admin. 
Code, tit. 14, § 15083 [adopted 1973].)  The Legislature subsequently ratified this 
innovation in 1976, when it amended CEQA to direct the Resources Agency to 
―include objectives and criteria for . . . the preparation of environmental impact 
reports and negative declarations.‖  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21083, subd. (a), as 
amended by Stats. 2004, ch. 689, § 1, p. 5239, italics added.)  Because, at the time 
of section 21166‘s enactment, EIRs were the only type of environmental document 
expressly referenced by CEQA‘s text, the Legislature could not have used the 
19 
phrase ―environmental impact report‖ in section 21166 with any specific intent to 
exclude negative declarations from its scope. 
Plaintiff directs our attention to the Legislature‘s 1977 amendments to 
CEQA in Assembly Bill No. 884 (AB 884), which, among other things, amended 
section 21166 to add a provision for the preparation of subsequent or supplemental 
EIRs based on the discovery of new information.  (See Stats. 1977, ch. 1200, § 16, 
p. 4003.)  Plaintiff observes that while the Legislature did not amend section 
21166 to add a reference to negative declarations, it did add two statutory 
provisions that do specifically refer to negative declarations.  (See Pub. Resources 
Code, § 21080.1 [―The lead agency shall be responsible for determining whether 
an environmental impact report [or] a negative declaration . . . shall be required for 
any project which is subject to [CEQA].  That determination shall be final and 
conclusive on all persons . . . unless challenged as provided in Section 21167.‖]; 
id., § 21080.3, subd. (a) [―Prior to determining whether a negative declaration or 
environmental impact report is required for a project, the lead agency shall consult 
with all responsible agencies . . . .‖].)  Plaintiff argues that the Legislature‘s failure 
to add a similar reference to section 21166 demonstrates its intent to limit section 
21166‘s reach to projects initially approved via EIR, and to treat any and all 
changes to projects initially approved via negative declaration as though they were 
entirely new projects for purposes of section 21151 review. 
Plaintiff here places more weight on the 1977 amendments than they can 
bear.  Given that the Guidelines had already authorized the use of negative 
declarations without express statutory authorization — a development the 
Legislature had ratified the previous year — the Legislature simply may not have 
perceived a need to add an express reference to negative declarations in section 
21166.  But in any event, when the 1977 amendments did refer to negative 
declarations, it was in order to affirm that a lead agency‘s decision to proceed by 
20 
negative declaration is entitled to the same degree of finality as a decision to 
proceed by EIR.  (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080.1.)  In light of that provision, 
plaintiff‘s reading of the 1977 amendments — as implicitly requiring agencies to 
start the environmental review process over each time there is a change in plans or 
circumstances, no matter how minor — is an unlikely one. 
 
Ultimately, plaintiff‘s argument simply highlights a gap in CEQA‘s 
statutory structure.  No provision of CEQA directly addresses the subsequent 
environmental review obligations for projects that were initially approved via 
negative declaration.  CEQA authorizes the Resources Agency to fill such gaps 
in the statutory scheme, so long as it does so in a manner consistent with the 
statute.  (See Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21082–21083; City of Santa Ana v. City 
of Garden Grove (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 521, 529 [the CEQA ―statute 
empowers [the] administrative agency to exercise a judgment of high order in 
implementing legislative policy‖].)  And in the year following the 1977 
amendments, the Resources Agency filled that gap by extending the predecessor 
to CEQA Guidelines section 15162 to projects initially approved by negative 
declaration.  (See former Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 15067 [adopted 1978].)   
 
Limiting agencies‘ postapproval review obligations for projects that were 
initially approved via negative declaration is wholly consistent with a statutory 
scheme in which negative declarations, no less than EIRs, are entitled to a 
presumption of finality once adopted.  (See Pub. Resources Code, § 21080.1, subd. 
(a).)  As explained in Benton v. Board of Supervisors (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 
1467, 1479–1480 (Benton):  ―In a case in which an initial EIR has been certified, 
section 21166 comes into play precisely because in-depth review of the project has 
already occurred, the time for challenging the sufficiency of the original CEQA 
document has long since expired, and the question before the agency is whether 
circumstances have changed enough to justify repeating a substantial portion of 
21 
the process.  [Citations.]  These same principles apply with even greater force in a 
case such as this,‖ in which the project ―initially raised so few environmental 
questions that an EIR was not required, but a negative declaration was found to 
satisfy the environmental review requirements of CEQA.‖  The alternative that 
plaintiff proposes — which would restart the CEQA process every time plans or 
circumstances change, or whenever new information comes to light — ―would 
render agency decisionmaking intractable, always awaiting updated information 
only to find the new information outdated by the time a decision is made.‖  
(Marsh, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 373; see also Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at 
p. 396 [noting the original environmental review process includes consideration of 
reasonably foreseeable future expansions to the project, and that subsequent EIRs 
are necessary when evaluating future action not considered in the initial review].)  
The Resources Agency did not act unreasonably in concluding that the statutory 
scheme calls for some limitations on postapproval environmental review of 
projects initially approved via negative declaration. 
 
Plaintiff‘s stronger arguments do not concern the Guidelines‘ limitations of 
postapproval environmental review as such, but instead focus on the substance of 
the limitations the Guidelines prescribe.  As plaintiff points out, when an agency 
initially proposes a project, an EIR is required ―whenever it can be fairly argued 
on the basis of substantial evidence that [a] project may have significant 
environmental impact.‖  (No Oil, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 75; see Pub. Resources 
Code, § 21082.2, subd. (a) [requiring an EIR when a project ―may‖ have a 
significant effect on the environment]; accord, § 21151, subd. (a).)  Thus, when a 
reviewing court evaluates an agency‘s initial determination whether to proceed 
with an EIR, the court‘s function is ―to determine whether substantial evidence 
supported the agency‘s conclusion as to whether the prescribed ‗fair argument‘ 
could be made.  If there was substantial evidence that the proposed project might 
22 
have a significant environmental impact, evidence to the contrary is not sufficient 
to support a decision to dispense with preparation of an EIR . . . because it could 
be ‗fairly argued‘ that the project might have a significant environmental impact.‖  
(Friends of “B” Street v. City of Hayward (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 988, 1002; see 
Bowman, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 1073 [― ‗fair argument‘ ‖ test is a question 
of law, permitting the court‘s independent analysis of the sufficiency of the 
evidence].)  By contrast, when an agency proposes changes to a previously 
approved project, CEQA Guidelines section 15162 generally prohibits the agency 
from requiring a subsequent or supplemental EIR unless the agency determines, 
―on the basis of substantial evidence in the light of the whole record,‖ that 
―[s]ubstantial changes . . . will require major revisions of the previous EIR or 
negative declaration due to the involvement of new significant environmental 
effects or a substantial increase in the severity of previously identified significant 
effects.‖  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (a).)  Plaintiff argues that application 
of this substantial evidence standard to projects initially approved via negative 
declaration creates a loophole in the statutory scheme, allowing agencies to evade 
their obligation to prepare an EIR based on the more demanding ―fair argument‖ 
standard, so long as the potential environmental effects of the project are caused 
by changes in the project after a negative declaration had been approved. 
 
Plaintiff‘s argument would have force if the Guidelines did, in fact, create 
such a loophole.  But the substantial evidence test referred to in the Guidelines 
does not, as plaintiff supposes, refer to substantial evidence that the project, as 
modified, will necessarily have significant environmental effects.  It instead refers 
to substantial evidence that the proposed modifications will involve ―[s]ubstantial 
changes‖ that ―require major revisions of the previous EIR or negative declaration 
due to the involvement‖ of new or significantly more severe environmental 
effects.  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (a); see id., § 15384 [defining 
23 
―substantial evidence‖].)  The distinction is important here, because whether 
―major revisions‖ will be required as a result of project changes necessarily 
depends on the nature of the original environmental document.  A negative 
declaration is permitted when ―there is no substantial evidence that the project or 
any of its aspects may cause a significant effect on the environment‖ (CEQA 
Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (b)(2), italics added; see also Pub. Resources Code, 
§§ 21151, 21064.5), whereas an EIR is required when a project and project 
alternatives may have significant effects (id., § 21002.1, subd. (a)).  When there is 
a proposal to modify a project originally approved through EIR, no ―major 
revision‖ to the initial EIR is required if the initial EIR already adequately 
addresses any additional environmental effects that may be caused by the 
proposed modification.  In contrast, when a project is initially approved by 
negative declaration, a ―major revision‖ to the initial negative declaration will 
necessarily be required if the proposed modification may produce a significant 
environmental effect that had not previously been studied.  (CEQA Guidelines, 
§ 15162.)  Indeed, if the project modification introduces previously unstudied and 
potentially significant environmental effects that cannot be avoided or mitigated 
through further revisions to the project plans, then the appropriate environmental 
document would no longer be a negative declaration at all, but an EIR.6   
                                              
6  
We recognize that language in the appellate cases might be read as applying 
a different rule.  In Benton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d 1467, for example, the Court of 
Appeal considered whether a proposal to relocate a winery that had previously 
been approved via negative declaration required the preparation of a subsequent or 
supplemental EIR.  Benton held that, under CEQA Guidelines section 15162, the 
question whether a subsequent or supplemental EIR was required depended on the 
effect of the proposed relocation; the changes were not an occasion to reopen the 
original environmental review of the winery project.  (Benton, at pp. 1482–1484.)  
As the Court of Appeal in Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012) 205 
Cal.App.4th 650 later observed, ―the central premise of Benton [is] that it makes 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
24 
 
In short, the substantial evidence standard prescribed by CEQA Guidelines 
section 15162 requires an agency to prepare an EIR whenever there is substantial 
evidence that the changes to a project for which a negative declaration was 
previously approved might have a significant environmental impact not previously 
considered in connection with the project as originally approved, and courts must 
enforce that standard.  (See Friends of “B” Street v. City of Hayward, supra, 106 
Cal.App.3d at p. 1002.)  It therefore does not permit agencies to avoid their 
obligation to prepare subsequent or supplemental EIRs to address new, and 
previously unstudied, potentially significant environmental effects.  So 
understood, CEQA Guidelines section 15162 constitutes a valid gap-filling 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
little sense to set a lower threshold for further environmental review of a project 
that is determined not to have a significant effect on the environment than section 
21166 sets for a project that may have significant effects on the environment.‖  
(Abatti, at p. 673 [agreeing with the ―central premise‖ of Benton].)  Benton‘s 
longstanding interpretation has been followed by courts and the Resources Agency 
and is a correct statement of the law insofar as it recognizes that negative 
declarations, like EIRs, are entitled to a presumption of finality; it would, as 
Benton says, be ―absurd‖ to require agencies to restart the entire process of 
environmental review from scratch each time the agency proposes any change, no 
matter how minor, simply because the project was previously approved by 
negative declaration.  (Benton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1480.)  But Benton 
went on to conclude that no subsequent or supplemental EIR was required in that 
case because, among other things, substantial evidence supported the agency‘s 
conclusion that ―[t]he environmental impacts of the modification were not 
significant . . . .‖  (Id. at p. 1483.)  As seen, however, the inquiry prescribed by the 
Guidelines is not whether the environmental impacts of the modification are 
significant, but whether the modification requires major revisions to the negative 
declaration because of the involvement of new, potentially significant 
environmental effects that had not previously been considered in connection with 
the earlier environmental study. 
25 
measure as applied to projects initially approved via negative declaration, 
including the project at issue in this case. 
IV. 
Finally, plaintiff contends that both section 21166 and CEQA Guidelines 
section 15162 are inapplicable because the District‘s initially approved project is 
akin to a plan, a phased project, or a program rather than a simple project.  Relying 
on Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 1307, plaintiff argues that the District‘s 
proposed changes to the plans for the Building 20 complex should therefore be 
treated as a new site-specific project that triggers new environmental review under 
CEQA‘s provisions for so-called ―tiered‖ EIRs.  (See Pub. Resources Code, 
§§ 21068.5, 21094.)  The Court of Appeal appeared to accept this argument as 
further support for its conclusion that the project changes at issue may be 
considered a new project under a de novo standard of review.  The argument also 
fails, however, because the tiering provisions — and therefore Sierra Club, supra, 
6 Cal.App.4th 1307 (involving a tiered EIR) — have no direct application here. 
Unlike ―[p]roject EIR[s],‖ which ―examine[] the environmental impacts of 
a specific development project‖ (CEQA Guidelines, § 15161), the CEQA 
provisions governing tiered EIRs ―permit[] the environmental analysis for long-
term, multipart projects to be ‗tiered,‘ so that the broad overall impacts analyzed in 
an EIR at the first-tier programmatic level need not be reassessed as each of the 
project‘s subsequent, narrower phases is approved.‖  (Vineyard Area Citizens for 
Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 429 
(Vineyard Area Citizens); see CEQA Guidelines, § 15152 [― ‗Tiering‘ refers to 
using the analysis of general matters contained in a broader EIR (such as one 
prepared for a general plan or policy statement) with later EIRs and negative 
declarations on narrower projects; incorporating by reference the general 
26 
discussions from the broader EIR; and concentrating the later EIR or negative 
declaration solely on the issues specific to the later project.‖].)   
―The standard for determining whether to engage in additional CEQA 
review for subsequent projects under a tiered EIR is more relaxed than the 
prohibition against additional review imposed by Public Resources Code section 
21166 for project EIR‘s.‖  (Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes 
Redevelopment Agency (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 511, 528.)  For project EIRs, of 
course, a subsequent or supplemental impact report is required in the event there 
are substantial changes to the project or its circumstances, or in the event of 
material new and previously unavailable information.  (Ibid., citing § 21166.)  In 
contrast, when a tiered EIR has been prepared, review of a subsequent project 
proposal is more searching.  If the subsequent project is consistent with the 
program or plan for which the EIR was certified, then ―CEQA requires a lead 
agency to prepare an initial study to determine if the later project may cause 
significant environmental effects not examined in the first tier EIR.‖  (Ibid., citing 
Pub. Resources Code, § 21094, subds. (a), (c).)  ―If the subsequent project is not 
consistent with the program or plan, it is treated as a new project and must be fully 
analyzed in a project—or another tiered EIR if it may have a significant effect on 
the environment.‖  (Friends of Mammoth, at pp. 528–529.) 
In Sierra Club, on which plaintiff relies, a county approved a project 
through a program EIR, a type of tiered EIR where the agency first analyzes 
―general matters contained in a broader [initial] EIR . . . with later EIRs and 
negative declarations [analyzing] narrow projects.‖  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15152, 
subd. (a); see id., § 15168.)  The Sierra Club court concluded that when a program 
EIR is employed, if a later proposal is not ―either the same as or within the scope 
of the project . . . described in the program EIR,‖ then review of the proposal is 
not governed by section 21166‘s deferential substantial evidence standard.  (Sierra 
27 
Club, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321, citing CEQA Guidelines, § 15168, subd. 
(c)(5).)  Instead, under Public Resources Code section 21094, the agency is 
required to apply a more exacting standard to determine whether the later project 
might cause significant environmental effects that were not fully examined in the 
initial program EIR.  (Sierra Club, at p. 1321; Pub. Resources Code, § 21094, 
subd. (c).)   
 
Unlike the program EIR at issue in Sierra Club, the 2006 initial study and 
MND were not a tiered EIR.  The District‘s 2006 initial study and MND did not 
purport ―to defer analysis of certain details of later phases of long-term linked or 
complex projects until those phases are up for approval.‖  (Vineyard Area Citizens, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 431.)  The District‘s initial environmental review 
documents instead expressly concluded that ―all potential impacts‖ of the entire 
project — including every building on the campus — had ―been mitigated to a 
point where no significant impacts would occur, and there is no substantial 
evidence the project would have a significant effect on the environment.‖  (San 
Mateo County Community College Dist., Proposed Mitigated Negative 
Declaration (Dec. 20, 2006) p. 2; see also San Mateo County Community College 
Dist., Initial Study and Mitigated Negative Declaration for Facility Improvements 
at College of San Mateo (Dec. 2006) p. 2 [describing the project and various 
encompassed improvements, including those related to the Building 20 complex].)  
To now entertain the argument that the 2006 MND should be treated as a tiered 
EIR would disregard the substance of the District‘s conclusions in order to permit 
plaintiff to raise an untimely challenge as to the adequacy of the MND, as well as 
the District‘s decision to proceed by MND in the first place. 
V. 
Our conclusion today does not end this case.  Plaintiff argues that even if 
the proposed changes to the earlier-approved project do not render it a new project 
28 
altogether, the District abused its discretion in approving the Building 20 complex 
demolition based on the 2006 MND and the 2011 addendum.  Plaintiff also argues 
that CEQA Guidelines sections 15162 through 15164 improperly authorize lead 
agencies to approve certain proposed project modifications through the use of 
addenda without public comment, rather than requiring the issuance of a 
subsequent or supplemental EIR or negative declaration.  The Court of Appeal did 
not address these questions, nor are they fairly encompassed by the question on 
which we granted review, and we accordingly express no view on them. 
VI. 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Friends of College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo Co. Community College 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 9/26/13, 1st Dist., Div. 1 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S214061 
Date Filed: September 19, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Mateo 
Judge: Clifford Cretan 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Eugene Whitlock, County Counsel; Remy Moose Manley, James G. Moose, Sabrina V. Teller and John T. 
Wheat for Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Cox, Castle & Nicholson, Andrew B. Sabey and Linda C. Klein for California Building Industry 
Association, Building Industry Association of the Bay Area and California Business Properties Association 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Michael W. Graf for High Sierra Rural Alliance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Downey Brand, Christian L. Marsh, Andrea P. Clark and Amanda M. Pearson for League of California 
Cities, California State Association of Counties and Association of California Water Agencies as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Charles F. Robinson, Kelly L. Drumm; Holland & Knight, Amanda Monchamp and Joanna Meldrum for 
The Regents of the University of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. 
 
Brandt-Hawley Law Group and Susan Brandt-Hawley for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Chatten-Brown & Carstens, Jan Chatten-Brown , Amy Minteer and Josh Chatten-Brown for California 
Preservation Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Law Office of Sara Hedgpeth-Harris, Inc., and Sara Hedgpeth-Harris for Association of Irritated Residents, 
Madera Oversight Coalition, Revive the San Joaquin and Sierra Club as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Robert W. Byrne, Assistant Attorney General, Tracy L. Winsor and 
Jeffrey P. Reusch, Deputy Attorneys General, for California Natural Resources Agency and Governor‘s 
Office of Planning and Research as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Sabrina V. Teller 
Remy Moose Manley 
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 800 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 443-2745 
 
Susan Brandt-Hawley 
Brandt-Hawley Law Group 
P.O. Box 1659 
Glen Ellen, CA  95442 
(707) 938-3900