Title: Ex parte John Michael Ward. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO Death THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: John Michael Ward v. Penalty State of Alabama)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 6/1/07 Ex parte Ward
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1051818
____________________
Ex parte John Michael Ward
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: John Michael Ward
v.
State of Alabama)
(Baldwin Circuit Court, CC-97-799.60;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-0655)
SEE, Justice.
1051818
2
Facts and Procedural History
John Michael Ward was convicted of murder made capital
because the victim was under the age of 14.  See § 13A-5-
40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975.  The victim was Ward's four-month-
old child.  Ward was sentenced to death.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed Ward's conviction and sentence.
Ward v. State, 814 So. 2d 899 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), cert.
denied, 814 So. 2d 925 (Ala. 2001), and cert. denied, 535 U.S.
907 (2002).
Ward challenges his conviction and sentence in this
appeal from the dismissal of his Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  Since
his trial, Ward has been represented by nine different
attorneys during his direct appeal, his Rule 32 petition, and
his federal habeas corpus petition.  One of these attorneys,
David Nichols, was appointed by the trial court to represent
Ward on direct appeal.  In May 1999, Nichols informed the
trial court that Ward had viable claims for postconviction
relief, and the trial court appointed Nichols to represent
Ward in any Rule 32 petition that would be filed.  However,
Nichols never filed a Rule 32 petition.  In November 2000,
1051818
3
this Court appointed James Russell Pigott to represent Ward,
and, in March 2001, the Alabama State Bar suspended Nichols's
license to practice law.  Nichols did not inform Ward that he
had been suspended from practicing law and that he would not
be able to represent Ward in his Rule 32 proceedings.
Ward was aware that the time limit was approaching for
filing a Rule 32 petition.  He filed a pro se motion
requesting that the trial court order Nichols to send Ward's
records to Drew Colfax, the attorney who had prepared Ward's
petition for the writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court in his direct appeal.  After learning that
Colfax could not represent him in filing a Rule 32 petition,
Ward asked the trial court to order Nichols to send him his
file.  Ward claimed that his attorneys had lost large portions
of his records and that Nichols had never forwarded Ward's
file to Colfax.  The trial court did not order Nichols to
forward the files to Ward.
Ward filed another pro se motion in July 2002, asking for
a copy of the pertinent records in the case so that he could
file his Rule 32 petition.  The trial court did not respond.
That same month, Ward's family hired Al Pennington to
1051818
See Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., "Court Comment of
1
January 27, 2004, to Amendment to Rule 32.2 Effective August
1, 2002."  The Court of Criminal Appeals issued its
certificate of judgment on September 7, 2001; thus, Ward had
one year from August 1, 2002, within which to file his Rule 32
petition.
4
represent Ward.  Pennington informed Ward that he would file
the Rule 32 petition "in the very near future, in order that
there can be no questions as to its timeliness...."  Petition
at 6.  Pennington never filed the Rule 32 petition in the
trial court; instead, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court.  Ward moved in the
district court for a substitution of counsel, claiming that
Pennington had 
been working to "circumvent 
[his] 
best interest
...."  Petition at 7.  After Ward's motion for substitution of
counsel was denied, he requested its reconsideration, stating
that "Pennington has outright deceived me by filing the Habeas
Corpus as I was led to believe that he was to file the Rule 32
petition."  Petition at 8.  The time for filing Ward's Rule 32
petition expired on August 1, 2003.   
1
Ward filed a complaint with the Alabama State Bar
regarding Pennington's representation.  Pennington responded
as follows to the complaint: "I took the position from the
1051818
5
outset that the Rule 32 as the facts were postured was
futile"; Pennington stated that he had made no representation
that he would file a Rule 32 petition.  The State Bar
concluded that no further investigation was warranted.  
In October 2004, the State moved to dismiss the petition
for the writ of habeas corpus filed in the federal district
court, alleging that the petition had been filed three days
late.  Ward filed a second motion to disqualify Pennington,
and Pennington moved for leave to withdraw as Ward's counsel.
The federal 
district 
court 
appointed Greg 
Hughes as substitute
counsel.  Hughes filed a response to the State's motion to
dismiss, asking that Ward's petition for the writ of habeas
corpus be stayed to allow Ward to pursue a newly discovered
"actual innocence" claim in the Baldwin Circuit Court.  Ward's
attorney during the criminal trial, Spencer Davis, Jr., had
had an expert, Dr. Chris Sperry, 
"review portions of the discovery provided by the
State of Alabama dealing with the cause of the death
of the infant that gave rise to Mr. Ward's charges.
[Dr. Sperry] advised that in his opinion the cause
of the child's death was more likely Sudden Infant
Death Syndrome (SIDS) than suffocation as opined by
the State's expert."
  
1051818
The limitations period in Ward's case was actually
2
slightly less than two years.  See note 1.
6
Davis did not pursue this avenue further because "[he] did not
have authorization to hire the expert.  The trial had
previously been continued and [he] was concerned with
receiving the trial judge's anger by asking for more money
and/or a continuance."  The federal court granted the stay,
and Hughes filed the Rule 32 petition on November 2, 2005.  
However, the Rule 32 petition did not assert that there
was newly discovered 
evidence 
of 
Ward's 
innocence; 
instead, 
it
relied solely on ineffective assistance of counsel as the
basis of his petition.  On December 15, 2005, the State moved
to dismiss the Rule 32 petition, and Ward, acting pro se,
moved for leave to "add to and to expand upon the issues set
forth within the Rule 32 petition."   On December 19, 2005,
the trial court dismissed the petition as untimely, finding
that "Ward's Rule 32 petition was filed ... far beyond the
two-year limitation period in former Rule 32.2(c)
 and
[2]
contains only nonjurisdictional allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel."  On January 5, 2006, the federal
district court granted Hughes's motion to withdraw and
1051818
7
appointed the Federal Defenders for the Middle District of
Alabama to represent Ward in the federal habeas corpus
proceeding.  On or about January 9, 2006, Hughes filed in the
Baldwin Circuit Court a notice of appeal and a motion to
withdraw.  On January 10, 2006, the Baldwin Circuit Court
granted Ward's pro se motion to amend his Rule 32 petition.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court
erred in granting Ward's motion to amend his Rule 32 petition,
and it affirmed, without an opinion, the summary dismissal of
Ward's Rule 32 petition.  Ward v. State (No. CR-05-0655,
August 18, 2006), ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)
(table).  We granted Ward's petition to review two issues:
first, whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding
in its unpublished memorandum that the trial court had no
power to grant a motion to amend filed after the entry of the
judgment and in holding that the trial court could not have
construed the motion to amend as a motion for reconsideration;
and, second, whether the limitations period in Rule 32.2(c),
Ala. R. Crim. P., is jurisdictional, and, if not, whether this
Court should adopt the doctrine of equitable tolling.   
Analysis
1051818
8
I.
Ward first argues that the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals, holding that the trial court erred in
granting Ward's motion to amend his Rule 32 petition after the
notice of appeal had already been filed, presents a material
question of first impression for this Court.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals rejected Ward's contention that the trial
court construed Ward's motion to amend as a motion to
reconsider (and it also rejected his contention that, when the
trial court granted the motion to amend, it effectively
withdrew its order denying his Rule 32 petition).  The Court
of Criminal Appeals noted that Ward had mailed his motion to
the trial court before the trial court had denied his Rule 32
petition; therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded,
"Ward could not possibly have requested reconsideration of a
ruling that had not yet occurred." 
Further, according to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the
motion to amend in substance requested permission to amend the
Rule 32 petition, and it concluded that there was no evidence
in the record indicating that the trial court intended to set
aside its summary dismissal of the Rule 32 petition.  Because
1051818
9
Rule 32.7(b), Ala. R. Crim P., allows amendments to pleadings
only "prior to the entry of judgment," the Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the trial court erred in granting the motion
to amend the Rule 32 petition after it had denied the
petition.  Because, it reasoned, granting the motion was not
the equivalent of setting aside the denial of the petition,
the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the notice of appeal
conferred jurisdiction upon it to hear the appeal.
Ward argues that the trial court could, and did, construe
the motion to amend as a motion to reconsider.  First, he
notes that a trial court retains jurisdiction over a Rule 32
petition for 30 days after the entry of judgment.  See Loggins
v. State, 910 So. 2d 146, 148 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) ("It is
well settled that a circuit court generally retains
jurisdiction to modify a judgment for only 30 days after the
judgment is entered.").  He then points out that Rule
32.10(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., allows any party to appeal the
decision of the trial court on a Rule 32 petition according to
the procedures of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 4(b)(1), Ala. R. App. P., provides that when a timely
postjudgment motion has been filed, a notice of appeal filed
1051818
10
while the postjudgment motion is pending is treated as having
been filed on the date the court denies that motion.  A motion
to amend may not be made after a judgment is entered on a Rule
32 petition, Rule 32.7(b), Ala. R. Crim P., and thus such a
motion is not a postjudgment motion under Loggins or Rule
4(b)(1), Ala. R. App. P.  Ward argues that the trial court
construed the motion to amend as a motion to reconsider.
According to Ward, if a motion to reconsider the ruling on his
Rule 32 petition was pending, the Court of Criminal Appeals
lacked jurisdiction to affirm the summary dismissal, and the
trial court could still entertain the Rule 32 petition.
Ward contends that the motion to amend must be construed
as a motion to reconsider because otherwise the trial court's
action in granting permission to amend would be "pointless and
nonsensical."  Petition at 20.  Because trial courts are
presumed to know and to follow existing law, Stuart v. State,
730 So. 2d 1203, 1221 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996), and because we
will affirm the judgment of the trial court if it was correct
on any rationale, Kilgore v. State, 643 So. 2d 1015, 1018
(Ala. Crim. App. 1993), Ward argues, we must presume that the
trial court intended to grant a motion to reconsider.
1051818
11
The State responds, first, that Ward had no authority to
file the pro se motion to amend when he was represented by
appointed counsel at the time.  Second, the State argues that
the motion to amend could not reasonably be considered a
motion for reconsideration and that, because Rule 32.7(b),
Ala. R. Crim. P., permits amendments in Rule 32 proceedings
only "prior to the entry of judgment," the motion to amend
should have been denied.  Third, the State points out that
none of the trial court's actions are consistent with the
theory that the trial court intended to reconsider its
dismissal of the petition; the State points out that "[t]he
circuit court has not attempted to hold any additional
hearings, status conferences, or otherwise suggest that it
believes jurisdiction still lies in that [c]ourt."  Answer at
16.  The State also notes that the judgment was never ordered
to be set aside on the case-action-summary sheet, and Ward's
counsel of record also treated the petition as denied and
pursued an appeal.    
Ward appears to be correct that this Court has never
addressed the propriety of a trial court's construing an
untimely motion to amend a Rule 32 petition as a motion to
1051818
12
reconsider.  However, the facts of this case do not
demonstrate that the trial court so construed Ward's motion to
amend.  In Ward's pro se motion, entitled simply "Motion,"
Ward asked the trial court to "grant permission for defendant
to add to and expand upon the issues in the petition on file."
Ward stated that he needed more time to convey to his attorney
"the complex nature of the details [of the issues raised in
the petition] without running out of time."  The trial court's
only 
statement 
in 
granting 
Ward's 
motion 
was 
"motion 
granted."
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that
"Ward could not possibly have requested reconsideration of a
ruling that had not yet occurred," the question is whether the
trial court could have construed the motion as one requesting
reconsideration of the petition.  In Water Works & Sewer Board
of Talladega v. Consolidated Publishing, Inc., 892 So. 2d 859,
864 (Ala. 2004), we stated: 
"This Court has long held that it may consider
court filings according to their substance, not
their label. ...  
"'... This Court has stated that it is
"committed to the proposition that it will
treat a motion (or other pleading) and its
assigned 
grounds 
according 
to 
its
substance."  Further, the Court has held
1051818
13
that "[t]he substance of a motion and not
its style determines what kind of motion it
is."'"
(Citations omitted.)  A motion to reconsider is generally a
request that the trial court take a second look at what has
already come before it; such a motion generally does not
encompass a movant's presentation of new facts or new evidence
not previously presented to the trial court.  See Ex parte
Dowling, 477 So. 2d 400, 403 (Ala. 1985) (construing a motion
for relief from judgment under the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure as a motion for reconsideration because the facts
alleged in the second postjudgment motion were known to the
movant when he filed his original postjudgment motion); see
also Adkison v. Adkison, [Ms. 2040542, March 3, 2006] ___ So.
2d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) ("Because the husband's
second postjudgment motion asserted as its basis the very same
facts as his first postjudgment motion instead of asserting
facts that were unknown to the husband when he filed his first
postjudgment 
motion, 
his 
second 
postjudgment 
motion 
in 
reality
constituted a motion to reconsider the denial of the husband's
first postjudgment motion rather than a Rule 60(b) motion.").
Here, Ward's motion stated that he wanted to supply new
1051818
14
facts and arguments for the trial court to consider; Ward
requested the opportunity to "add to and expand upon the
issues set forth within the Rule 32 petition."  Because Ward
sought to present new information -- not to have the prior
information reconsidered -- the trial court could not
reasonably have construed the motion to amend as a motion for
reconsideration.  For this reason, it does not appear that the
Court of Criminal Appeals improperly held the trial court in
error for granting Ward's motion to amend after judgment had
been entered.  See Rule 32.7(b), Ala. R. Crim. P. ("Amendments
to pleadings may be permitted at any stage of the proceedings
prior to the entry of judgment.").  The Court of Criminal
Appeals therefore had jurisdiction to consider Ward's appeal.
II.
Ward argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in
affirming the trial court's summary dismissal of Ward's
petition on the basis that it was untimely.  First, he argues
that the limitations period provided in Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.
Crim. P., is not jurisdictional.  Second, he argues that
equitable tolling is available to suspend the running of the
limitations period in Rule 32.2(c).  The Court of Criminal
1051818
15
Appeals 
held 
that 
the 
limitations 
period 
is 
jurisdictional 
and
that equitable tolling therefore is not available under Rule
32.  Both issues raise questions of first impression for this
Court's resolution.
A.
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently
held that the limitations period set forth in Rule 32.2(c),
Ala. R. App. P., is jurisdictional, this Court apparently has
never squarely addressed the issue.  See Ex parte Hutcherson,
847 So. 2d 386, 388 (Ala. 2002) (suggesting that the
limitations period in Rule 32.2(c) is a "defense"); see also
847 So. 2d at 388 (Johnstone, J., concurring specially)
(asserting that no case from this Court has held that Rule
32.2(c) creates a jurisdictional bar). 
Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides that "the court
shall not entertain any petition" brought under certain
specified grounds unless the petition was timely filed.  Ward
points out, however, that the Alabama Constitution, in
empowering this Court to promulgate court rules, specifically
provides that any such rule "shall not ... affect the
jurisdiction of circuit and district courts."  Amendment No.
1051818
The State does not squarely address Ward's argument that
3
Art. VI, § 150, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), prevents this
Court from holding that Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P.,
affects the jurisdiction of the trial court.  Instead, the
State argues that, "[a]lthough courts are required to 'say
what the law is' when presented with legislation or executive
orders of questionable constitutionality, a circuit court
cannot overrule, modify, or otherwise supersede a ruling of
this Court. ...  [A] circuit court is an inferior court that
must apply this Court's rules as written."  Answer at 20.  The
State cites Marshall v. State, 884 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 2003), for
the proposition that only this Court, and not the Court of
Criminal Appeals, may amend rules of practice and procedure,
arguing that the Court of Criminal Appeals had no option but
to obey Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., and to affirm the
summary dismissal of the petition. 
16
328, § 6.11 (Art. VI, § 150, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.)).
To 
interpret 
Rule 
32.2(c) as establishing 
a jurisdictional bar
prohibiting out-of-time petitions, he argues, runs afoul of
this constitutional provision.   We agree.
3
The Court of Criminal Appeals has suggested that the
limitations 
provision 
found 
in 
Rule 
32.2(c) 
is 
not
jurisdictional.  See Howard v. State, 616 So. 2d 398 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993) (holding that the State had waived the
limitations defense found in Rule 32.2(c) by failing to raise
it), overruled by Williams v. State, 783 So. 2d 135 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2000); Jackson v. State, 612 So. 2d 1356, 1357
(Ala. 
Crim. 
App. 1992) ("Generally, 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations
1051818
Rule 32.2(c) was amended effective August 1, 2002, to
4
change the limitations period to one year.
17
is an affirmative defense that must be affirmatively pleaded
or it is waived.").  However, the Court of Criminal Appeals
later held in Williams that "the failure to file a Rule 32
petition within the two-year limitations period is a
jurisdictional defect that can be noticed at any time and is
not waived by the failure of the State to assert it."  783 So.
2d at 137.  Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals has
interpreted Rule 32.2(c) as depriving the trial court of
jurisdiction to hear an untimely Rule 32 petition.  See, e.g.,
Williams, 783 So. 2d at 137 ("In this case, the appellant
filed his Rule 32 petition more than two years
 after this
[4]
court issued a certificate of judgment.  Therefore, his
petition was not timely, and the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction to grant him relief pursuant to Rule 32.1(f),
Ala. R. Crim. P. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.").
None of the cases on which the Court of Criminal Appeals
relied 
in 
Williams, 
however, 
support 
that 
court's 
holding 
that
the limitations provision in Rule 32.2(c) is jurisdictional.
Instead, it appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals in
1051818
18
Williams and its progeny conflated statutes of limitations
with procedural limitations periods such as the one in Rule
32.2(c).  The court relied primarily on Hines v. State, 516
So. 2d 937, 938 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), in which the
petitioner challenged his conviction on the ground that the
three-year statutory limitations period established by the
legislature for the prosecution of the offense of incest had
expired.  The Court of Criminal Appeals held that, because
"the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional matter," the
petitioner had stated a valid claim for relief.  The court in
Williams also cited Ex parte Campbell, 784 So. 2d 323 (Ala.
2000), in support of its holding.  However, Campbell likewise
dealt with the statute of limitations for prosecuting a
criminal case, and we stated that "[b]ecause the statute of
limitations 
is 
jurisdictional 
and 
an 
indictment 
returned 
after
the expiration of the limitations period of the statute is
void, Campbell's guilty plea did not waive this issue."  784
So. 2d at 325.  Finally, the court in Williams cited Hunt v.
State, 642 So. 2d 999, 1018 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), another
case involving the statute of limitations applicable to a
criminal offense.  See Hunt, 642 So. 2d at 1018 ("A statute of
1051818
19
limitations 
defect 
is 
considered 
'jurisdictional' 
in 
the 
sense
that the trial court is not authorized to pronounce the
accused guilty of a time-barred offense."). 
The Court of Criminal Appeals' holding that the
limitations 
provision 
in 
Rule 
32.2(c) 
is 
jurisdictional 
cannot
be reconciled with Art. VI, § 150, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.
Recomp.) (added by Amendment No. 328, § 6.11), which provides:
"The supreme court shall make and promulgate
rules governing the administration of all courts and
rules governing practice and procedure in all
courts; provided, however, that such rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive right of
any party nor affect the jurisdiction of circuit and
district courts or venue of actions therein ....
These rules may be changed by a general act of
statewide application."
As we have consistently held:
"'"The 
Constitution 
of 
Alabama, 
like 
that 
of 
the
nation and of the other states, is the supreme law
within the realm and sphere of its authority.
Subject only to the restraints resulting from the
Constitution of the United States, the Constitution
of Alabama is the highest form and expression of law
that exists in the state."'" 
 
Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890, 896 (Ala. 1993) (quoting
Gafford v. Pemberton, 409 So. 2d 1367, 1374 (Ala. 1982),
quoting in turn Johnson v. Craft, 205 Ala. 386, 393, 87 So.
375, 380 (1921)).  For this reason, in Ward v. State, 540 So.
1051818
20
2d 1350, 1351 (Ala. 1988), we recognized that Amendment No.
328, § 6.11 (now § 150 (Off. Recomp.)), limits our ability to
promulgate court rules that enlarge or restrict the
jurisdiction of the circuit court, and we noted the general
rule that a court rule cannot "enlarge or restrict" the
jurisdiction of the courts. 
"'"In construing a constitutional provision, the courts
have no right to broaden the meaning of words used and,
likewise, have no right to restrict the meaning of those
words."' This Court is '"not at liberty to disregard or
restrict the plain meaning of the provisions of the
Constitution."'" City of Bessemer v. McClain, [Ms. 1031917,
November 3, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006) (on second
application 
for 
rehearing) 
(quoting 
City of Birmingham v. City
of Vestavia Hills, 654 So. 2d 532, 538 (Ala. 1995), quoting in
turn McGee v. Borom, 341 So. 2d 141, 143 (Ala. 1976)).
Section 150 states that this Court may not promulgate rules
that "affect" the jurisdiction of the circuit court.  Thus,
the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding that a petitioner's
failure to comply with the timeliness requirement of Rule
32.2(c) deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to hear his
1051818
In Clemons, we held that the preclusion grounds set out
5
in Rule 32.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., are affirmative defenses
available to the State, not jurisdictional bars that deprive
the trial court of the power to hear a Rule 32 petition.  ___
So. 2d at ___.  Under the reasoning of Clemons, the
limitations provision of Rule 32.2(c) is also an affirmative
defense that may be waived by the State rather than a
jurisdictional bar and may be raised by the appellate court
sua sponte "[o]nly in extraordinary circumstances."  Clemons,
___ So. 2d at ___. 
21
petition runs afoul of § 150, Ala. Const. 1901.  See Ex parte
Clemons, [Ms. 1041915, May 4, 2007] ____ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala.
2007) (holding that in light of Art. VI, § 150, Ala. Const.
1901, the grounds of preclusion set forth in Rule 32.2(a),
Ala. R. App. P., do not limit the jurisdiction of the trial
court).   We, therefore, hold that the limitations provision
of Rule 32.2(c) is an affirmative defense and not a
jurisdictional bar.5
B.
Because 
the 
State 
raised 
the 
expiration 
of 
the
limitations period in its motion to dismiss Ward's Rule 32
petition, we must address Ward's argument that equitable
tolling is available under Rule 32.2(c).  The Court of
Criminal Appeals, in its unpublished memorandum, held that
equitable tolling is unavailable to suspend the running of the
1051818
22
Rule 32.2(c) limitations period.  Ward appears to be correct
that this Court has never addressed this issue.  
Although we today hold that the limitations provision in
Rule 32.2(c) is not a jurisdictional bar, it is nonetheless
written in mandatory terms.  Rule 32.2(c) provides that "the
court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a
conviction or sentence" that is not timely.  In prior cases in
which it concluded that equitable tolling is unavailable, the
Court of Criminal Appeals based its holding on the mandatory
"shall" language found in Rule 32.2(c) and the fact that no
Alabama court has ever held that there is an exception to the
limitations period.  See, e.g., Arthur v. State, 820 So. 2d
866, 889-90 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (holding that there is no
exception to Rule 32.2(c) and that the limitations period is
jurisdictional).  However, this Court has never held that
equitable tolling is not available in a case such as this one.
Moreover, because Rule 32.2(c) does not establish a
jurisdictional bar, the trial court has the power to hear an
untimely petition because the running of the limitations
period would "not divest the circuit court of the power to try
the case."  Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536, 539 (Ala. 2006).
1051818
23
Further, as Ward points out, under federal habeas corpus
practice, the federal courts have held that equitable tolling
is available for a § 2244 petition, notwithstanding that the
word "shall" appears in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (establishing
procedures for petitions for the writ of habeas corpus).  See,
e.g., Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir.
2003) (holding that equitable tolling may be available where
the attorney's behavior was outrageous or the attorney's
incompetence was extraordinary); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d
796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing equitable tolling where the
petitioner's attorney failed to file the petition and failed
to 
return the petitioner's 
file despite 
multiple 
requests 
from
the petitioner); Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269 (11th
Cir. 
1999) 
(allowing 
equitable 
tolling 
in 
cases 
of
extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner's control
and unavoidable even with the exercise of diligence). 
We 
hold 
that 
equitable 
tolling 
is 
available 
in
extraordinary circumstances that are beyond the petitioner's
control and that are unavoidable even with the exercise of
diligence.  We recognize that "[i]n a capital case such as
this, the consequences of error are terminal, and we therefore
1051818
24
pay particular attention to whether principles of 'equity
would make the rigid application of a limitation period
unfair' and whether the petitioner has 'exercised reasonable
diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims.'"  Fahy
v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Miller v.
New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998)).
Nevertheless, "the threshold necessary to trigger equitable
tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule."
United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.
2000).  
Finally, we must address the petitioner's burden of
demonstrating that he or she is entitled to the relief
afforded by the doctrine of equitable tolling.  Rule 32.7(d),
Ala. R. Crim. P., allows the trial court to summarily dismiss
a Rule 32 petition that, on its face, is precluded or fails to
state a claim, and we have held that the trial court may
properly 
summarily 
dismiss 
such 
a 
petition 
without 
waiting 
for
a response to the petition from the State.  Bishop v. State,
608 So. 2d 345, 347-48 (Ala. 1992) ("'Where a simple reading
of a petition for post-conviction relief shows that, assuming
1051818
25
every allegation of the petition to be true, it is obviously
without merit or is precluded, the circuit court [may]
summarily dismiss that petition without requiring a response
from the district attorney.'").  Although the Rules of
Criminal Procedure initially place the burden on the State to
plead any ground of preclusion, the ultimate burden is on the
petitioner to disprove that a ground of preclusion applies.
Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. P.  
Because the limitations provision is mandatory and
applies in all but the most extraordinary of circumstances,
when a petition is time-barred on its face the petitioner
bears the burden of demonstrating in his petition that there
are 
such 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
justifying 
the
application of the doctrine of equitable tolling.  See Spitsyn
v. Moore, 345 F.3d at 799 (holding that the burden is on the
petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus to show that the
exclusion applies and that the "extraordinary circumstances"
alleged, rather than a lack of diligence on his part, were the
proximate cause of the untimeliness); Drew v. Department of
Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002) ("The burden of
1051818
26
establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly
rests with the petitioner.").  Thus, when a Rule 32 petition
is time-barred on its face, the petition must establish
entitlement to the remedy afforded by the doctrine of
equitable tolling.  A petition that does not assert equitable
tolling, or that asserts it but fails to state any principle
of law or any fact that would entitle the petitioner to the
equitable 
tolling 
of 
the 
applicable 
limitations 
provision, 
may
be summarily dismissed without a hearing.  Rule 32.7(d), Ala.
R. Crim. P. 
Conclusion
The trial court could not reasonably have construed
Ward's motion to amend as a motion to reconsider that would
have held the notice of appeal in abeyance; therefore, we
affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision that it had
jurisdiction to consider Ward's appeal.  
We 
conclude, however,
that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that Rule
32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., creates a jurisdictional bar that
precludes application of the doctrine of equitable tolling;
therefore, we reverse its judgment in that respect and remand
1051818
27
the cause for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, and
Murdock, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.