Title: Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 95643-Agenda 11-November 2003.
MARK LYON, Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 							AND FAMILY SERVICES et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed March 18, 2004. 
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant Department of Children and Family Services (the
Department) indicated a report of abuse against plaintiff, Mark Lyon,
which was entered into the Department's State Central Register pursuant
to the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (the Act) (325 ILCS
5/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Lyon sought reversal of the indicated report
and expungement of the report from the central register through the
administrative appellate process established by the Act, arguing that
procedural violations by the Department violated his due process rights
and that the indicated finding was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
	When his administrative appeal was denied in part, Lyon sought
judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS
5/3-101 (West 2002)) as permitted by the Act. 325 ILCS 5/7.16 (West
1998). The circuit court set aside the remaining indicated findings because
Lyon's due process rights were violated by discovery deficiencies. The
appellate court affirmed the circuit court judgment, but the appellate court
instead found a due process violation in the combination of the standard
of proof used during early stages of the administrative process and the
delays in processing the appeal. 335 Ill. App. 3d 376, 390. We granted
the Department's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and
allowed the filing of an amicus brief by the Chicago Teachers Union,
Local 1, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, in support of Lyon
(155 Ill. 2d R. 345(a)). For the following reasons, we affirm the appellate
court.

BACKGROUND
	The State Central Register records all cases of suspected child abuse
or neglect processed by the Department under the Act. 325 ILCS 5/7.7
(West 1998). The Department investigates all reports and finds them to
be "indicated," "unfounded," or "undetermined." 325 ILCS 5/7.12 (West
1998). An "indicated report" is a report of abuse or neglect that
investigation reveals is supported by credible evidence. 325 ILCS 5/3
(West 1998); 89 Ill. Adm. Code §300.20 (2002). "Credible evidence"
means that "the available facts, when viewed in light of the surrounding
circumstances, would cause a reasonable person to believe that a child
was abused or neglected." 89 Ill. Adm. Code §300.20 (2002).
	The Department appeals the appellate court's holding that when the
Department uses the credible-evidence standard to support an indicated
finding, then it must strictly comply with applicable statutory and regulatory
deadlines in adjudicating the subject's administrative appeal to provide the
subject due process. Lyon answers by alleging that several actions by the
Department violated his due process rights, including: (1) the use of the
credible-evidence standard of proof to support the indicated finding and
the denial of his first-stage appeal; (2) the failure to provide timely
disclosure of the investigative file and the failure to turn over the complete
file; and (3) the violation of statutory and regulatory deadlines concerning
the investigation, the indicated finding, the hearing, and the issuance of the
Director's decision. Lyon also argues that the indicated findings were
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm the appellate
court's judgment affirming the expungement of the indicated findings
because Lyon's due process rights were violated by the standard of proof
used and the delays in the administrative appeal, so we do not reach the
additional constitutional issues raised by Lyon. See People ex rel. Waller
v. 1990 Ford Bronco, 158 Ill. 2d 460, 464 (1994). We summarize the
facts that are relevant to our analysis.
	Lyon was employed as a choral director at Gibson City-Melvin High
School. On February 9, 2000, the Department received a report that
Lyon had abused two students, H.B. and J.N. On April 11, the
Department completed its investigation and determined that the report of
abuse was indicated. On April 17, the indicated report was recorded on
the official investigation form; following supervisor approval and
transmission to Springfield, it was entered into the central register shortly
thereafter. Specifically, the Department found three claims to be indicated:
sexual exploitation of H.B., sexual molestation of H.B., and substantial risk
of physical injury (sexual) of J.N.
	On July 19, 2000, the Department sent to Lyon official notice that it
had entered the indicated report in the central register and explained his
appellate rights. Lyon appealed the indicated report and requested
expungement of the report from the central register on August 29. On
September 13, the Department denied Lyon's expungement request,
concluding that the indicated finding was supported by credible evidence.
Two days later, Lyon requested the second stage of administrative appeal,
a hearing before an administrative law judge.
	The hearing began on November 1, 2000. The hearing was not
completed on that day, so the hearing was scheduled to proceed on
November 13. However, the parties agreed to a continuance until
December 19, because of a scheduling conflict. The hearing again was
continued because the administrative law judge was in an automobile
accident on the way to the hearing. The hearing concluded as scheduled
by the second continuance, on January 24, 2001.
	The administrative law judge issued her recommendation and opinion
on February 9, 2001. After making several findings of fact, she found that
the Department had not met its burden of showing that the indicated
finding of substantial risk of physical injury (sexual) of J.N. was supported
by a preponderance of the evidence, so she ordered that indicated finding
be expunged from the central register. However, the judge affirmed the
indicated finding of sexual exploitation and sexual molestation of H.B.
under the preponderance standard. On March 23, the Director of the
Department issued his decision adopting the conclusions of the
administrative law judge, which constituted the final administrative
decision.
	Lyon filed a complaint for administrative review in the Champaign
County circuit court on April 9, 2001. Lyon alleged that several actions
by the Department violated his due process rights and that the findings of
the administrative law judge were against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Following briefing and argument, the circuit court set aside the
decision of the Department because "[t]he Department's refusal to
provide full and complete discovery to the Plaintiff in a timely manner
violated his due process rights."
	A divided appellate court affirmed the circuit court judgment, but on
different grounds. The appellate court noted that Lyon did not allege that
the Department failed to produce any documents. The court concluded
that there was no due process violation in the lateness of the Department's
transmission of the investigative file because Lyon did not show that it
prejudiced him. Similarly, Lyon did not show he suffered any prejudice
because the Department delayed the sending of the indicated report to the
central register. In addition, the investigation was completed within
statutory and regulatory deadlines. However, the Department did violate
deadlines regarding the issuance of the final decision. 335 Ill. App. 3d at
385-87.
	The appellate court next evaluated the credible-evidence standard of
proof that the Department used in finding the report indicated. The court
discussed cases from different jurisdictions. After noting that being entered
into the State Central Register implicates a liberty interest, the court
applied the test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976), to determine whether this low
standard of proof was adequate. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 389, citing
Cavarretta v. Department of Children & Family Services, 277 Ill.
App. 3d 16, 28 (1996). In light of the Mathews factors, the court
explained, "The credible-evidence standard is fair only if the alleged
perpetrator soon receives a hearing under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and, soon after the hearing, the Department issues a
final decision." 335 Ill. App. 3d at 390. Thus, the court held that Lyon's
due process rights were violated by the combination of the Department's
use of the credible-evidence standard of proof with its failure to strictly
comply with its statutory and regulatory deadlines in processing the
administrative appeal. The court signaled that strict statutory and
regulatory compliance is not required when the Department uses the more
stringent preponderance- of-the-evidence standard of proof. 335 Ill. App.
3d at 390.
	The dissenting opinion noted that the discovery was timely provided,
and the entire appeals process was completed in approximately eight
months. The delays that occurred were reasonable because they were
much shorter than those found unconstitutional in Stull v. Department of
Children & Family Services, 239 Ill. App. 3d 325, 334-35 (1992), and
Cavarretta, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 26-27, and were also shorter than those
found acceptable in S.W. v. Department of Children & Family
Services, 276 Ill. App. 3d 672, 680-81 (1995). 335 Ill. App. 3d at 390-91 (Myerscough, J., dissenting).

ANALYSIS
	The Administrative Review Law provides for judicial review of all
questions of fact and law presented by the entire record. DiFoggio v.
Retirement Board of the County Employees Annuity & Benefit Fund
of Cook County, 156 Ill. 2d 377, 380 (1993), citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983,
ch. 110, par. 3-101, now codified at 735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2002).
Courts cannot consider evidence outside of the record of the
administrative appeal. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2002). An administrative
agency's findings of fact are not reversed unless they are against the
manifest weight of the evidence, and questions of law are reviewed de
novo. DiFoggio, 156 Ill. 2d  at 380-81. We review the issue of whether
Lyon's procedural due process rights were violated under the de novo
standard because it is a legal question. People v. Hall, 198 Ill. 2d 173,
177 (2001).
	We will not reach constitutional questions if a case can be resolved
on other grounds (Waller, 158 Ill. 2d at 464), so we first address Lyon's
assertion that the indicated findings are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if "the
opposite conclusion is clearly evident" or where it is "unreasonable,
arbitrary, and not based upon any of the evidence." Snelson v. Kamm,
204 Ill. 2d 1, 35 (2003). We have reviewed the record in this case, and
we conclude that the indicated finding is not reversible under this standard.
	The due process clause protects fundamental justice and fairness.
People v. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 472 (2002). However, what due
process entails is a flexible concept in that "not all situations calling for
procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 494, 92 S. Ct. 2593,
2600 (1972); see also Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d  at 472. Consequently, what
procedures are required by due process in a particular situation depend
upon " 'the precise nature of the government function involved as well as
the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.' "
Morrissey, 408 U.S.  at 481, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 494, 92 S. Ct.  at 2600,
quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230, 1236, 81 S. Ct. 1743,
1748-49 (1961); see also Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d  at 472. Due process
principles apply to administrative proceedings. Abrahamson v. Illinois
Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 92 (1992).
	Procedural due process claims question the constitutionality of the
procedures used to deny a person's life, liberty, or property. Segers v.
Industrial Comm'n, 191 Ill. 2d 421 (2000). We have explained: "It is a
well-established constitutional principle that every citizen has the right to
pursue a trade, occupation, business or profession. This inalienable right
constitutes both a property and liberty interest entitled to the protection of
the law as guaranteed by the due process clauses of the Illinois and
Federal constitutions." Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate
Services of Illinois, Inc. v. Clayton, 105 Ill. 2d 389, 397 (1985); see
also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 1045, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626 (1923). Generally, the State must act reasonably before
depriving a person of an interest protected by the due process clause.
Rosewell v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 99 Ill. 2d 407, 412 (1984).
	We must first determine whether listing an indicated report about
Lyon on the Department's central register affected an interest protected
by due process. Damage to one's reputation alone is insufficient to claim
deprivation of a due process liberty interest, but stigma plus the loss of
present or future employment is sufficient. Cavarretta, 277 Ill. App. 3d
at 21, citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 702-10, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405,
414-19, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1161-65 (1976). To teach in Illinois public
schools, a person must have a teaching certificate. 105 ILCS 5/21-1
(West 2002). A teacher's certificate can be suspended or revoked when,
after a separate hearing subject to appellate review, an indicated report is
found supported by clear and convincing evidence. 105 ILCS 5/21-23(b)
(West 2002). The Department must find credible evidence to indicate a
report of abuse or neglect on the central register, which is a lower
standard of proof than the clear and convincing evidence needed to justify
suspension or revocation of a teaching certificate. See Bazydlo v. Volant,
164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995) (clear and convincing evidence is more than
a preponderance). However, there is still a substantial risk that a person
indicated on the central register will lose the ability to teach in the public
schools in Illinois.
	In addition, a school employee with an indicated finding may be
terminated and may have difficulty finding other employment in the
teaching profession solely because of the indicated finding. The Act
authorizes school superintendents to access the central register to do
background investigations. 325 ILCS 5/11.1(11) (West 2002). In the
present case, the record does not reveal whether Lyon's teaching
certificate was affected by this situation, but Lyon did in fact lose two
teaching jobs, including his job at Gibson City-Melvin High School,
following the entry of the indicated report into the central register. Thus,
because of the substantial risk that a teacher will be barred from pursuing
his or her chosen occupation, as occurred in the present case, we find that
an indicated report in the central register implicates a protected due
process interest. Cavarretta, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 22; Stull, 239 Ill. App.
3d at 335; Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, 305 F.3d 603, 617 (7th
Cir. 2002) (discussing Illinois law); Dupuy v. McDonald, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (discussing Illinois law); see also In re
Lee TT, 87 N.Y.2d 699, 709, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1250, 642 N.Y.S.2d 181, 188 (1996).
	Next, we must determine whether the procedures provided to Lyon
met the requirements of due process. The United States Supreme Court
has made clear that due process is a matter of federal constitutional law,
so compliance or noncompliance with state procedural requirements is not
determinative of whether minimum procedural due process standards have
been met. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
541, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 503, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1492 (1985). Violation of
state requirements may not indicate a due process violation, and vice
versa, but these requirements are a useful reference because they
represent standards that the General Assembly and the Department
concluded were sufficient.
	Lyon asserts that the Department missed several of its own statutory
and regulatory deadlines concerning the hearing and the issuance of the
Director's decision on appeal. A subject can request an appeal of the
Department's indicated finding, and if the Department fails to act or denies
the request within 10 days then the subject can request an administrative
hearing. 325 ILCS 5/7.16 (West 1998); 89 Ill. Adm. Code §336.40(c)
(2002). Lyon appealed the indicated report on August 29, 2000, which
the Department denied on September 13. Two days later, Lyon requested
a hearing before an administrative law judge. The hearing shall be held
"within a reasonable time" of the subject's request. 325 ILCS 5/7.16
(West 1998). The hearing began on November 1, which is 47 days after
it was requested.
	Although provisions do not otherwise specify when the hearing
should be scheduled, we can infer that the events of this case correspond
to regulatory expectations. As discussed in greater detail below, relevant
provisions specify that the final decision must be released within 45 days
of the end of the hearing (325 ILCS 5/7.16 (West 1998)) and within 90
days of the request for the hearing (89 Ill. Adm. Code §336.220(a)
(2002)). Read together, these provisions envision two considerations: that
the hearing should be conducted within approximately 45 days of the
request for the hearing; and that some flexibility is appropriate so that
some delays in the hearing can be cured by the prompt release of the final
decision and a prompt hearing can compensate for some delays in the
release of the final decision. Thus, considered in isolation, scheduling the
hearing to begin 47 days after it was requested complies with the statutory
requirement that the hearing be held "within a reasonable time." 325 ILCS
5/7.16 (West 1998). However, we note that the timing of the scheduling
of the hearing may implicate due process rights when combined with delay
in the release of the decision. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v.
Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241-42, 100 L. Ed. 2d 265, 279, 108 S. Ct. 1780, 1788 (1988).
	The administrative law judge shall issue her recommendation to the
Director within 90 days of the request for the hearing, and the Director
must issue his final decision accepting or rejecting the administrative law
judge's recommendation within the same 90-day period. 89 Ill. Adm.
Code §336.220(a) (2002). Lyon requested a hearing on September 15,
2000. The administrative law judge issued her decision on February 9,
2001, or 147 days later. The Director issued his final decision on March
23, 2001, which is 189 days after the hearing request. However, some
delays are excusable or attributable to Lyon, and these days shall not be
counted. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §§336.150(c), 336.220(a) (2002). When the
hearing was not completed during its first day on November 1, the hearing
was continued until November 13. The parties agreed to delay the second
day of the hearing until December 19 because of a scheduling conflict, so
the period from November 13 to December 19, 36 days, should not be
counted. In addition, the second day again was continued until January 24,
2001, because the administrative law judge was in an automobile accident
on the way to the hearing. Because a full day of the hearing already had
been held, the option of avoiding further delay through reassignment to a
different judge was less tenable given the relative promptness with which
the second day could be rescheduled. In addition, Lyon did not object to
this continuance. Thus, we decline to penalize the Department for this 36-day delay; the car accident constituted good cause for a continuance. 89
Ill. Adm. Code §§336.150(a), (c) (2002). Thus, the time periods of the
release of decisions from the request for the hearing should each be
reduced by 72 days. With this adjustment, the administrative law judge
released her decision 75 days after the hearing began, and Director of the
Department issued his decision 117 days after the hearing request.
According to regulatory deadlines, only the Director missed the 90-day
deadline, by 27 days.
	The Director also must issue his final decision within 45 days of the
end of the hearing. 325 ILCS 5/7.16 (West 1998). The hearing ended
January 24, 2001, and the Director released the decision on March 23,
which was 58 days after the hearing concluded and 13 days past the
statutory deadline. Due process concerns may be raised by the length of
time the subject waits for the issuance of the final agency decision
concerning his appeal. See Mallen, 486 U.S.  at 241-42, 100 L. Ed. 2d 
at 279, 108 S. Ct.  at 1788.
	The due process clause requires that the opportunity to be heard
occur " 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Mathews,
424 U.S.  at 333, 47 L. Ed. 2d  at 32, 96 S. Ct.  at 902, quoting
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62, 66, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (1965). The United States Supreme Court has explained
the factors courts should consider when evaluating procedural due process
claims:
		"First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail." Mathews, 424 U.S.  at
335, 47 L. Ed. 2d  at 33, 96 S. Ct.  at 903.
The Supreme Court has adapted the general Mathews factors for the
more specific determination of whether a delay in the provision of
procedure offended due process: the importance of the private interest
and the harm to the interest because of the delay; the government's
justification for the delay and its connection to the underlying government
interest; and the likelihood that the interim decision may have been
mistaken. Mallen, 486 U.S.  at 242, 100 L. Ed. 2d  at 279, 108 S. Ct.  at
1788 (examining the constitutionality of the delay in the provision of a
postsuspension hearing for a federal official suspended from his job at a
federally insured bank following his indictment).
	We recognize that Lyon has a significant interest in not having an
indicated report about him entered into the central register because, as
discussed above, an indicated report essentially bars employment in his
chosen profession of teaching. Cavarretta, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 28; Doyle,
305 F.3d  at 618 (applying Illinois law); Dupuy, 141 F. Supp. 2d  at 1135
(applying Illinois law). As permitted by the Act, an indicated report was
entered into the central register before Lyon appealed the indicated
finding. See 325 ILCS 5/7.16 (West 1998). Lyon and other subjects have
a significant interest in obtaining a hearing and a final decision in a prompt
and efficient manner so that indicated reports, if mistaken, are expunged
as quickly as possible to minimize their damaging impact.
	The state has a similarly significant interest in protecting the welfare
of children, and the central register is one mechanism the state uses to
protect children from abuse and neglect. Cavarretta, 277 Ill. App. 3d at
28; Dupuy, 141 F. Supp. 2d  at 1135 (applying Illinois law); Lee TT, 87 N.Y.2d  at 710, 664 N.E.2d  at 1251, 642 N.Y.S.2d  at 189. The
Department justifies delays in the appellate process in this case by
asserting that the time periods were reasonable and that this court should
not require the Department to strictly comply with its own regulations.
	The Department is correct that providing due process is not
automatically synonymous with compliance with state regulations.
Loudermill, 470 U.S.  at 541, 84 L. Ed. 2d  at 503, 105 S. Ct.  at 1492.
Instead, the state must act reasonably when depriving a person of a
protected interest to avoid infringing on the person's due process rights.
Rosewell, 99 Ill. 2d  at 412. Several Illinois cases have evaluated the
reasonableness of delays in the administrative appeals process provided
under the Act. See, e.g., Lehmann v. Department of Children &
Family Services, 342 Ill. App. 3d 1069, 1080 (2003); S.W., 276 Ill.
App. 3d at 680-81; Stull, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 330-31. However, we
agree with the appellate court that this issue cannot be resolved merely by
comparing the lengths of delays because the courts in these cases failed to
consider the related issue of the standard of proof when resolving the due
process claims. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 387.
	The standard of proof applied has a direct influence on the risk of
erroneous judgments. When a higher standard of proof is applied, there
is a reduced risk of finding an innocent person guilty and an increased risk
of acquitting a guilty person. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 379, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1076 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The applicable standard of proof in a particular proceeding, therefore,
should be chosen based on a consideration of what balance of the risk of
these two types of errors is appropriate under the circumstances.
Winship, 397 U.S.  at 371, 25 L. Ed. 2d  at 379, 90 S. Ct.  at 1076
(Harlan, J., concurring). We conclude that the interests of indicated
subjects and the state, on behalf of children, are both significant. However,
we find it is appropriate to place more of the risk of error on adults, who
may suffer mistaken employment hardship, than on children, who may
suffer additional abuse. Thus, we must evaluate whether the use of the
credible evidence standard to support the indicated finding and the
decision in the first stage of appeal distributes the risk of error properly
given the delays in the provision of Lyon's administrative appeal.
	"Credible evidence" means that "the available facts, when viewed in
light of the surrounding circumstances, would cause a reasonable person
to believe that a child was abused or neglected." 89 Ill. Adm. Code
§300.20 (2002). At the hearing on appeal, the Department has the burden
of proving that the indicated finding is supported by a preponderance of
the evidence. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §336.100(e) (2002); see 325 ILCS
5/7.16 (West 1998). "Preponderance of the evidence" is defined as "the
greater weight of the evidence or evidence which renders a fact more
likely than not." 89 Ill. Adm. Code §336.20 (2002).
	In Lyon's case, the indicated finding was determined to be supported
by credible evidence at the completion of the investigation and upon denial
of Lyon's first-stage appeal, which is the standard required by regulation.
89 Ill. Adm. Code §300.110(i)(2) (2002). The decision from the second-stage appeal, the administrative hearing, was evaluated under the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, also in compliance with the
rules. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §336.100(e) (2002). Despite regulatory
compliance, however, we recognize that the use of the credible-evidence
standard of proof in early stages of the administrative appeals process may
raise due process concerns. See Cavarretta, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 28-29,
Doyle, 305 F.3d  at 617-19 (discussing Illinois law); Dupuy, 141 F. Supp. 2d  at 1135-36 (discussing Illinois law); Lee TT, 87 N.Y.2d  at 711-12,
664 N.E.2d  at 1252, 642 N.Y.S.2d  at 190.
	The New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, explained
the dangers of using the minimal credible-evidence standard in a case
analogous to the present case:
		"Abuse frequently involves private conduct and is based upon
the reports of minors or actions of a minor observed and
interpreted by others. There may be no supporting eyewitness
testimony or objective evidence to support the report and
therefore the evaluation of it may involve, to a large degree,
subjective determinations of credibility. Under the present
standard a fact finder in such cases may be tempted to rely on an
intuitive determination, ignoring any contrary evidence. The risk
of error is placed entirely on the subject of the report for there is
no requirement that the fact finder must consider, let alone
evaluate, evidence favorable to the subject.
			Not surprisingly this process results in a disturbingly high
number of false positive findings of abuse." Lee TT, 87 N.Y.2d 
at 711-12, 664 N.E.2d  at 1251-52, 642 N.Y.S.2d  at 189-90.
As in New York, the credible-evidence standard in Illinois does not
require the fact finder to consider contrary evidence. Cavarretta, 277 Ill.
App. 3d at 28. As a result, we agree with the New York Court of
Appeals that the credible-evidence standard places the risk of error
entirely on the subject. This risk of error is not insignificant; New York
and Illinois both have a strikingly high rate of reversal of challenged
indicated findings based on credible evidence. Dupuy, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1135 (applying Illinois law) (noting a 74.6% reversal rate of
appealed indicated findings in Illinois); Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992,
1004 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying New York law) (noting that nearly 75%
of indicated findings are expunged on appeal in New York).
	In contrast, the risk of error under the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard is distributed much more evenly. "Because proof by a
preponderance of the evidence requires that '[t]he litigants ... share the
risk of error in a roughly equal fashion,' [citation], it rationally should be
applied only when the interests at stake are of roughly equal societal
importance." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 787, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 628, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1412 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined
by Burger, C.J., White and O'Connor, JJ.). The final administrative
decision, the Director's decision following a hearing, is conducted under
this higher standard with the Department bearing the burden of proof. 89
Ill. Adm. Code §336.100(3) (2002).
	We again apply the Mathews test to evaluate the standard of proof.
We recognize that Lyon has a significant interest in not having an indicated
report against him in the central register because of its negative impact on
his chosen career. Cavarretta, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 28; Doyle, 305 F.3d 
at 618 (applying Illinois law); Dupuy, 141 F. Supp. 2d  at 1135 (applying
Illinois law). Clearly, this interest is advanced by application of a higher
standard of proof that leads to fewer errors in indicated findings. The state
also has a significant interest in protecting the welfare of children in part
through the administration of the central register. Cavarretta, 277 Ill.
App. 3d at 28; Dupuy, 141 F. Supp. 2d  at 1135 (applying Illinois law);
Lee TT, 87 N.Y.2d  at 710, 664 N.E.2d  at 1251, 642 N.Y.S.2d  at 189.
The state's interest is promoted by application of a lower standard of
proof that allows the state to intervene quickly, possibly preventing
additional abuse, although the state also has a contrary interest in avoiding
mistakes. Lee TT, 87 N.Y.2d  at 710, 664 N.E.2d  at 1251, 642 N.Y.S.2d  at 189. In weighing these opposing interests, we again
recognize that they are similarly important but that we will place more of
the risk of error on the subjects rather than the children.
	In light of these considerations, we conclude that the use of the
credible-evidence standard to indicate a report and to consider a first-stage appeal does not automatically deprive a subject of due process
because the second-stage appeal is conducted under the more stringent
preponderance standard. See, e.g., In re Selivonik, 164 Vt. 383, 389,
670 A.2d 831, 835 (1995). By using a weaker standard of proof, the
state is equipped to respond more quickly to allegations of abuse and
neglect. We find that it is constitutionally acceptable to place the entire risk
of error, through use of the credible-evidence standard, on the subject for
the finite period of the administrative appeal because the appeal is finally
determined under the preponderance standard, which balances the risk of
error equally.
	Nevertheless, this distribution of the risk of error becomes
problematic when the subject is not accorded a prompt appeal. We
conclude that it is constitutionally inappropriate to allow indicated reports
based on credible evidence, with their damaging effects on subjects, to
persist past the deadlines the General Assembly and the Department itself
decided to impose upon the administrative appeals process given the high
risk of error inherent in the use of the credible-evidence standard. Thus,
we agree with the appellate court and hold that a subject's due process
rights are violated by the use of the credible-evidence standard to indicate
a report and to resolve a first-stage appeal when combined with delays in
the final resolution of the administrative appeal. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 390;
Doyle, 305 F.3d 603, 619 (applying Illinois law).
	The Department criticizes this holding of the appellate court, citing the
flexibility of the reasonableness standard for due process claims.
However, we note that applicable provisions themselves contain some
flexibility. For example, a scheduled hearing may be continued for good
cause, and a continuance is not counted toward the deadline tally if the
appellant requests or agrees to it. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §§336.150(a), (c)
(2002). Thus, indicated findings will not be expunged due to unforeseen
excusable delays. Hearings must be scheduled within a "reasonable time"
of the subject's request (325 ILCS 5/7.16 (West 2002)), the very
standard for which the Department argues. In addition, we require strict
statutory and regulatory compliance only if the Department uses the
credible-evidence standard to indicate a report and to consider a first-stage appeal. The department has argued that strict compliance is too
burdensome. If strict compliance is too burdensome, the Department is
free to amend its regulations to, for example, require the preponderance
of the evidence standard throughout to provide subjects with due process.
20 ILCS 505/4 (West 2002) (allowing the Department to make rules).
The Department has a choice: (1) apply the credible-evidence standard
to indicate a report and to decide a first-stage appeal and comply with
applicable statutory and regulatory provisions; or (2) apply the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard during all stages of inquiry and
provide reasonable process, which is not dependent on compliance with
all requirements during the administrative appeal. Either option strikes an
appropriate balance between the competing interests of subjects and
children, by placing the risk of error to a slightly greater degree on
subjects, to reflect our characterization of the societal importance of these
interests. We conclude that this holding incorporates a sufficient measure
of the flexibility inherent in due process analysis.

CONCLUSION
	The Department violated Lyon's due process rights through the
combination of the Department's use of the low credible-evidence
standard to indicate the report against Lyon and to deny his first-stage
appeal and of delays in the provision of the hearing and of the final
administrative decision. Thus, the appellate court properly affirmed the
expungement of the indicated reports against Lyon from the State Central
Register.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
	I write separately because I take issue with the portion of the opinion
offering the Department the "choice" of applying the credible-evidence
standard while strictly adhering to the applicable statutes and regulations
or applying a more stringent preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and
gaining some flexibility in compliance requirements. See slip op. at 14-15.
While I agree that the credible-evidence standard, as currently interpreted
by the Department, is problematic and requires close judicial scrutiny, I
believe that it is unwise for this court to override the legislature's decision.
	Section 3 of the Act establishes that credible evidence is the
appropriate standard for making an indicated finding. 325 ILCS 5/3
(West 1998) (defining an "indicated report" as "a report made under this
Act if an investigation determines that credible evidence of the alleged
abuse or neglect exists" (emphasis added)). In turn, "credible evidence"
is defined in the Department's regulations as "available facts when viewed
in light of the surrounding circumstances [that] would cause a reasonable
person to believe that a child was abused or neglected." (Emphasis
added.) 89 Ill. Adm. Code §300.20 (2000). In my view, consideration of
all the available evidence, not just that evidence tending to supporting an
indicated finding, is necessarily included in any valid application of this
"reasonable person" standard. This standard has, however, been
interpreted to permit an indicated report to be filed without consideration
of any exculpatory evidence. Slip op. at 13. Due process concerns arise,
in part, when "credible evidence" is interpreted as not requiring
consideration of both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence. Slip op. at
13. To overcome these concerns, this court need only alter the
Department's working definition of "credible evidence." Specifically, the
Department could cure the deficiencies by requiring review of the
exculpatory evidence that was reasonably available at the time as part of
the credible-evidence standard. This requirement is already implicit in the
reasonable-person standard currently specified in the Department's
regulations. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §300.20 (2000). We need not create out
of whole cloth an entirely new standard requiring a preponderance of the
evidence without strict compliance with the applicable time limitations.
Moreover, in its effort to override the legislature's mandated "credible
evidence" standard, the majority has addressed an issue that need not be
reached by this court, rendering its opinion purely advisory.
	In Dupuy v. McDonald, No. 97-C-4199 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2003)
(Dupuy II), appeal pending, the federal district court addressed the issue
of the appropriate standard by approving modifications to the
Department's internal procedures. I believe these modifications effectively
reduce the risk that an erroneous indicated report will negatively impact
an individual's employment and, thus, run astray of due process. The
Dupuy II court entered a preliminary injunction imposing a more rigorous
interpretation of the "credible evidence" standard. Under this
interpretation, the Department is required to apply specific investigatory
procedures and to consider both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence
prior to making an indicated report. Dupuy II, slip op. at 4-5. Those
practices comport with due process, reduce the risk of unwarranted
negative consequences due to an indicated finding based on one-sided
information, and maintain a single "credible evidence" standard in all
cases, thus avoiding any potential equal protection problem. Additional
safeguards ordered by the court include mandatory telephonic
administrative review hearings before making and registering indicated
reports in the State Central Registry. These hearings were designed to
afford the subject an appropriate, albeit limited, opportunity to be heard
prior to a deprivation of protected liberty interests by disclosure of
indicated reports to third parties. Dupuy II, slip op. at 5, 7.
	In addition, the federal district court concluded that administrative
hearings requested after an indicated finding "should be completed within
35 days from the date" an appeal is requested. Dupuy II, slip op. at 9.
This is far earlier than the 90 days currently permitted in the Department's
rules (89 Ill. Adm. Code §336.220(a) (2002)). In retaining the 90-day
ceiling, however, the court cautioned that "[s]hould history demonstrate
a pattern of non-compliance, *** the court will entertain a renewed
motion for imposition of some form of self-executing sanction." Dupuy II,
slip op. at 10.
	I share the Dupuy II court's concern that judicial mandates may be
ineffectual in light of delays historically experienced in the Department's
appeal process. I also believe the same concern may apply to this court's
opinion due to its reliance on the 90-day time period imposed by the
Department's own rules (89 Ill. Adm. Code §336.220(a) (2002)). Slip
op. at 8. Since this limit was created by the Department and not the
legislature, the Department may elect to unilaterally extend the permissible
time between a request for a hearing and the release of a final decision
(see 89 Ill. Adm. Code §336.220(a) (2002)) rather than revamp its
procedures to apply a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. Any
additional delay in the administrative appeal process would again raise the
specter of the due process clause. For this reason, I echo the Dupuy II
court's hope that the Department will zealously attempt to resolve "the
overwhelming majority of cases" within the current 90-day time limit.
Dupuy II, slip op. at 10.