Title: Mark Vanderbeke v. Jeffrey Endicott

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-0907 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Mark Vanderbeke, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Jeffrey Endicott, Warden, Columbia County 
Correctional Institution, His Agents, Employees, 
or Those Acting By His Direction, Or on His 
Behalf, 
 
Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 11, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 8, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia 
 
JUDGE: 
Lewis W. Charles 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by 
James E. Kachelski and Kachelski & Straub, Milwaukee and oral 
argument by James E. Kachelski. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents the cause was 
argued by Mary V. Bowman, assistant attorney general with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Mark 
Vanderbeke, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Jeffrey Endicott, Warden, Columbia County 
Correctional Institution, His Agents, 
Employees, or Those Acting By His 
Direction, Or on His Behalf, 
 
 
Defendants-Appellants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 11, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Columbia 
County.  Reversed and cause remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This case is 
before the court on certification from the court of appeals, 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1995-96), to review an order of the 
Circuit Court for Columbia County, Lewis W. Charles, Judge. The 
circuit court quashed the writ of habeas corpus brought by Mark 
Vanderbeke seeking his release from incarceration following 
revocation of probation.  
¶2 
Two questions are raised: (1) does a probationer have 
a due process right to a competency determination when at a 
probation revocation proceeding the administrative law judge of 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
2 
the division of hearings and appeals
1 has reason to doubt the 
probationer's competency; and (2) if a probationer has a due 
process right to a competency determination during a probation 
revocation proceeding, what procedures are to be followed and 
what effect does a determination of incompetency have?
2 Each 
presents a question of law which we review independently, 
benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and the 
division of hearings and appeals. 
¶3 
We hold that a probationer has a due process right to 
a competency determination when during the probation revocation 
proceeding the administrative law judge has reason to doubt the 
probationer's competency. Although the statutes do not provide 
for competency proceedings at a probation revocation proceeding, 
                     
1 An administrative law judge in the division of hearings 
and appeals in the department of administration is charged with 
conducting 
probation 
revocation 
hearings. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 973.10(2), 301.035; Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05 (Aug., 1995). 
Appeals may be taken to the administrator of the division. Wis. 
Admin. Code § HA 2.05(9) (Aug., 1995). Hereafter we refer 
generally to the administrative law judge. 
2 The parties also dispute two other issues in this court: 
whether there was reason to doubt Vanderbeke's competency and 
whether Vanderbeke made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his 
right to counsel at the probation revocation hearing.  
The State argues that the record fails to demonstrate 
reason to doubt competency at the probation revocation hearing. 
We conclude that the record leaves little question that the 
administrative law judge had reason to doubt Vanderbeke's 
competency. If on remand the department of corrections continues 
to seek revocation, however, the department will have the 
opportunity 
to 
argue 
whether 
there 
is 
reason 
to 
doubt 
Vanderbeke’s competency. 
Because we afford Vanderbeke the relief sought on other 
grounds we need not reach the issue of whether Vanderbeke made a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
3 
we 
fashion 
a 
competency 
procedure 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
requirements 
of 
due 
process. 
We 
conclude 
that 
when 
an 
administrative law judge has reason to doubt that a probationer 
is competent a competency proceeding should be conducted by the 
circuit court in the county in which the probationer was 
sentenced and that the competency proceeding should adhere to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 971.13 and 971.14 to the extent practicable. 
¶4 
In this case, we conclude that the record, although 
limited, reveals that the administrative law judge had reason to 
doubt Vanderbeke's 
competency; that 
because 
no 
competency 
proceeding was conducted, Vanderbeke was denied due process of 
law; and that the challenge to the probation revocation was 
properly raised by Vanderbeke in the circuit court by writ of 
habeas corpus. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit 
court quashing the writ of habeas corpus and remand the cause to 
the circuit court with directions to vacate the order of 
revocation and remand the matter to the division of hearings and 
appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.  
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
4 
I. 
¶5 
The facts are not in dispute for purposes of this 
appeal. The record on appeal is, however, extremely limited.
3 
¶6 
After 
conviction 
of 
possession 
of 
cocaine 
and 
tetrahydrocannabinol with intent to deliver, Vanderbeke was 
sentenced in March 1990 to two concurrent ten-year terms. The 
sentencing court stayed execution of its sentence and Vanderbeke 
was placed on probation for a period of ten years. In February 
1994 Vanderbeke is alleged to have unlawfully entered his 
parents' home, eaten some food and damaged a door jamb. 
Vanderbeke claims that he went into the house to find $50 that 
belonged to him. 
¶7 
Criminal charges were filed. Although an examination 
to determine Vanderbeke's competency to stand trial pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 971.14 (1991-92) may have been requested by 
Vanderbeke's counsel, no examination was performed. The State 
apparently did not prosecute the criminal charges. Instead the 
department 
of 
corrections 
commenced 
probation 
revocation 
proceedings pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2) (1993-94) before 
an administrative law judge in the division of hearings and 
appeals of the department of administration. 
¶8 
In 
Vanderbeke's 
absence, 
Vanderbeke's 
appointed 
counsel informed the administrative law judge that Vanderbeke 
had not been able to assist in preparing his defense to the 
                     
3 The State suggests that the court dismiss review of this 
appeal as improvidently granted or remand for issuance of a writ 
of certiorari and production of a full record. Because the 
deficiencies in the record do not bear significantly on the 
legal issues we address, we find it unnecessary to adopt either 
of the State's suggested approaches. 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
5 
alleged probation violations and that he had discharged counsel 
more than once. Vanderbeke's counsel also reported that he had 
sought an order for a psychiatric evaluation of Vanderbeke in 
the circuit court but had been told by the clerk of court that 
the circuit court was without jurisdiction. Vanderbeke's counsel 
objected that holding the probation revocation proceeding prior 
to a determination of competency would violate Vanderbeke's due 
process rights.  
¶9 
The administrative law judge, believing he had no 
authority to commit Vanderbeke or any probationer for a 
competency evaluation or for treatment or to suspend the 
revocation proceedings, went forward with the proceedings.  
¶10 When Vanderbeke was brought into the room, the 
following exchange took place: 
 
[Vanderbeke's 
counsel]: 
Good 
afternoon, 
Mr. 
Vanderbeke. 
 
Mr. Vanderbeke: He's fired, by the way. Okay? And 
since 
you 
do 
not 
consider 
me 
competent, 
this 
proceeding should not proceed at all. I don't know 
what to do about that. 
 
. . . . 
 
Administrative law judge: Mr. Vanderbeke, is there 
anything you want to say before we begin with the 
hearing today? 
 
Mr. Vanderbeke: I am not able to cancel the hearing 
and not postpone it because I am firing him. I choose 
to fire him. Period. End of sentence. If Mr. Geske 
[the 
probation officer] 
would like to 
interject 
something, I would like that to happen. Other than 
that, that's fine, sir. 
 
. . . . 
 
Administrative law judge: I want to know if you want 
to represent yourself in this action? 
 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
6 
Mr. Vanderbeke: Oh, no, definitely not. I don't even 
have the knowledge of the subject to what's going on. 
I'm 
mentally 
ill. 
I'm 
schizophrenic. 
I'm 
dual 
diagnosis. You know, I've got –- 
 
. . . . 
 
Administrative law judge: Do you wish to hire an 
attorney to represent you? Do you wish to hire your 
own attorney? 
 
Mr. Vanderbeke: I'm not sure what I should do. I don't 
know what my rights are. Nobody –- nobody can tell me 
my rights, you know? 
 
. . . . 
 
Mr. Vanderbeke: What I'm trying to prevent is going up 
to Dodge and talking to this man if he has –- what he 
has, doesn't he have, has he a program for me. This is 
really stupid. The program –- this is my opinion –- I 
went up there and put my time in one year, get out, 
charges are dropped in front of the judiciary system, 
then the court, which were two charges, and a third -– 
could you tell me, Mr. Geske? Do you remember? You 
know, I was really unresponsive and surprised to see 
him not react because of –- the only thing I could see 
was a pattern. I come out of prison, I'm a jerk, I'm 
looking for money, I go to my parents' house, look for 
my $50 bill in my father -– in my mother's drawers, 
which is from here to the other side of Mr. Geske, 
which is my $50. And if they want to deny it, or 
whatever, you know, I had the money. I wasn't -– it 
was not imaginary, you know –-  
The administrative law judge allowed Vanderbeke to continue with 
the 
hearing 
without 
counsel. 
Vanderbeke's 
former 
counsel 
remained in the hearing room as stand-by counsel.  
¶11 While the administrative law judge believed he had no 
authority to find reason to doubt Vanderbeke's competency, his 
order 
set 
forth 
the 
following 
findings 
and 
conclusions 
indicating his awareness of Vanderbeke's mental health problems: 
 
The client has had many police contacts for nuisance-
related events since being placed on probation. Many 
of the events stem from recurring mental health 
problems experienced by the client. On at least two 
occasions during the last two years he has gone 
through emergency detention procedures because of 
unusual 
behavior 
and 
living 
conditions. . . . In 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
7 
addition, the record amply demonstrates that the 
client is in need of treatment that can best be 
provided in a secure institutional setting and that, 
without 
appropriate 
care 
and 
treatment, 
he 
is 
dangerous to both himself and others.  
¶12 The administrative law judge found that Vanderbeke had 
violated the conditions of his probation and concluded that as a 
consequence of Vanderbeke's mental condition "there [were] no 
reasonable alternatives to revocation of probation." Probation 
was revoked and Vanderbeke was subject to serving the original 
ten-year prison term in its entirety. It appears that Vanderbeke 
has been incarcerated since the events at his parents' home.  
¶13 Vanderbeke challenged his incarceration through a writ 
of habeas corpus and sought an order vacating the revocation of 
probation. Without expressly ruling on Vanderbeke's due process 
challenge, the circuit court quashed the writ and denied relief, 
noting 
that 
probation 
revocation 
proceedings 
are 
neither 
criminal nor civil and that the central, perhaps sole, issue is 
whether rehabilitation is best furthered by confinement or 
continued probation. 
II. 
¶14 We first determine whether a probationer has a due 
process right to a competency determination when during a 
probation revocation proceeding the administrative law judge has 
reason to doubt the probationer's competency.  
¶15 It has long been settled that due process of law 
prohibits the conviction of an incompetent defendant. Pate v. 
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). "[A] person whose mental 
condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the 
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
8 
with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be 
subjected to a trial." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 
(1975). See also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 
(1960) (per curiam) ("test must be whether [the defendant] has 
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understandingand whether he has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him"). 
¶16 The standards and constitutional principles of Drope, 
Dusky and Pate have been incorporated into Wis. Stat. §§ 971.13 
and 971.14. Under these statutes a competency determination must 
be made when there is reason to doubt a defendant's competency 
to proceed at trial, conviction or sentencing. These statutes, 
however, do not apply to a proceeding such as revocation of 
probation that occurs after sentencing. State v. Debra A.E., 188 
Wis. 2d 111, 128 n.14, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994). We must therefore 
look to the nature of a probation revocation proceeding to 
determine 
whether 
due 
process 
guarantees 
require 
that 
a 
probationer 
be 
competent 
during 
a 
probation 
revocation 
proceeding.  
¶17 While on probation a probationer is in the legal 
custody of the department of corrections. Wis. Stat. § 973.10(1) 
(1995-96). A probationer's liberty is conditional. Probation may 
be revoked after a proceeding at which the division of hearings 
and appeals determines both that the probationer violated a 
condition of probation, Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2), and that 
revocation is appropriate. Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(7)(b)3 
(Aug., 1995). The court has said that the ultimate question in a 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
9 
revocation proceeding is whether the interests of community 
safety and of the probationer's rehabilitation are best served 
by continued liberty or by incarceration. State ex rel. Flowers 
v. Department of Health & Social Services, 81 Wis. 2d 376, 385, 
260 N.W.2d 727 (1978).
4 
¶18 The 
revocation 
of 
probation 
is 
not, 
as 
a 
constitutional matter, a stage of a criminal prosecution. Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). Revocation of probation 
is a civil proceeding in Wisconsin. A probationer is therefore 
not entitled to the full panoply of rights accorded persons 
subject to criminal process. It is well settled, however, that a 
probationer is entitled to due process of law before probation 
may be revoked,
5 because probation revocation may entail a 
substantial loss of liberty. A probationer's liberty "includes 
many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its 
termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the [probationer] and 
often on others." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).  
¶19 The 
probation 
revocation 
proceeding 
has 
two 
components: (1) determination of the factual issue whether the 
                     
4 State ex rel. Flowers v. Department of Health & Social 
Services, 81 Wis. 2d 376, 385, 260 N.W.2d 727 (1978), involved a 
parolee rather than a probationer. Yet in Flowers and other 
cases the court has considered the due process rights of 
parolees and probationers to be substantially equivalent. See 
State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 545, 185 N.W.2d 
306 (1971). The United States Supreme Court has reached the same 
conclusion: "Petitioner does not contend that there is any 
difference relevant to the guarantee of due process between the 
revocation of parole and the revocation of probation, nor do we 
perceive one." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). 
5 Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 781-82; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 481-89 (1972). 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
10
probationer acted in violation of one or more of the conditions 
of probation; and (2) if a condition of probation was violated, 
determination of what action is appropriate to protect society 
and improve the chances of the probationer's rehabilitation. 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479-80.  
¶20 The minimum requirements of due process which the 
Morrissey Court identified, and the Scarpelli Court held 
applicable to probation revocation, include: (1) written notice 
of the claimed violation(s) of probation; (2) disclosure to the 
probationer of evidence against him or her; (3) the opportunity 
to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary 
evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good 
cause for not allowing confrontation); (5) a neutral and 
detached hearing body, members of which need not be judicial 
officers or lawyers; and (6) a written statement by the fact 
finder regarding the evidence relied on and the reasons for 
revoking probation. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 786; Morrissey, 408 
U.S. at 489.
6  
¶21 In State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 548, 
185 N.W.2d 306 (1971), decided prior to Morrissey, the Wisconsin 
supreme court held that probation cannot be revoked unless the 
probationer has been provided "a reasonable opportunity to 
                     
6 The regulations of the division of hearings and appeals 
enumerate Morrissey rights and others. Wis. Admin. Code § HA 
2.05(3) (Aug., 1995).  
Because probation revocation is not a criminal proceeding 
there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, although counsel 
must be provided under certain circumstances.  
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
11
explain away the accusation that he had violated the conditions 
of his probation or parole."
7 
¶22 The 
question 
then 
arises 
whether 
a 
probation 
revocation proceeding can satisfy these minimum standards of due 
process when an administrative law judge has reason to doubt a 
probationer's competency. Notice and hearing are meaningless 
guaranties to a probationer who is incompetent and as such 
unable to understand the notice of the claimed violations of 
probation, the evidence against him or her, or the written 
statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and 
the reasons for revoking probation. Nor can an incompetent 
probationer present witnesses and documentary evidence, confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses, dispute the accusation of 
violation of the conditions of probation, explain mitigating 
factors, or argue the appropriateness of revocation.  
¶23 The core of the process due at a probation revocation 
proceeding, the opportunity for a meaningful hearing on the 
facts of the alleged violation and the appropriate disposition 
of 
the 
probationer, 
is 
not 
available 
to 
an 
incompetent 
probationer.  
¶24 Accordingly we conclude that when an administrative 
law judge during a probation revocation proceeding has reason to 
                     
7 The United States Supreme Court has also held that due 
process of law requires an express finding that a condition of 
probation has been violated before probation may be revoked. 
Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973) (per curiam). 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
12
doubt that a probationer is competent,
8 the revocation proceeding 
is to be stayed until a determination of competency is made. 
Unless it is determined under these circumstances that a 
probationer 
is 
competent 
to 
continue 
with 
a 
revocation 
proceeding, the revocation proceeding violates the minimum 
standards of due process of law. 
¶25 This conclusion is consistent with the majority of 
courts in other jurisdictions which have addressed the question.
9 
                     
8 Competency is a contextualized concept; the meaning of 
competency in the context of legal proceedings changes according 
to the purpose for which the competency determination is made. 
Whether a person is competent depends on the mental capacity 
that the task at issue requires. State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 
2d 111, 124-25, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994). A probationer should 
have, for example, the mental capacity to understand the 
proceedings and act or assist in his or her own defense, should 
be able to develop a factual basis for challenging the alleged 
ground for revocation, and should be able to evaluate and 
recommend proposed alternative dispositions.  
9 State v. Qualls, 552 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); 
People v. Davis, 468 N.E.2d 172, 180 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); 
People v. Martin, 232 N.W.2d 191, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).  
Cf. People ex rel. Newcomb v. Metz, 409 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556-
57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (due process requires consideration of 
competency but determination of competency is not condition 
precedent to revocation); Pierce v. Department of Social & 
Health Services, 646 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Wash. 1982) (due process 
requires that parolee who has been found to have violated 
condition 
of 
parole 
must 
have 
opportunity 
to 
challenge 
competency before court decides whether to revoke parole in 
light of the violation).  
Other courts have found a statutory or common law right to 
a competency determination at a probation revocation hearing. 
Hayes v. State, 343 So. 2d 672, 672-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1977); State ex rel. Juergens v. Cundiff, 939 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. 
1997); State v. Singleton, 472 S.E.2d 640, 641 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1996); Casey v. State, 924 S.W.2d 946, 948-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1996). 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
13
A Michigan court has held that the rationale of Pate applies to 
any proceeding in which there is a risk of loss of liberty, 
regardless of whether the statutes so provide. People v. Martin, 
232 N.W.2d 191, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975). The court explained: 
"[T]he hearing must be conducted in a meaningful way. It would 
be fundamentally unfair to require a revocation hearing and then 
not ensure the safeguard that defendant understands the nature 
and object of the proceedings against him and that he is able to 
assist in his defense in a rational way." Martin, 232 N.W.2d at 
194 (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. 402).  
¶26 We are persuaded by this reasoning and we adopted 
similar reasoning in Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111. In Debra A.E. 
the court determined that although Wis. Stat. § 971.14 governing 
competency proceedings does not apply to a postconviction relief 
proceeding, a circuit court should determine a defendant's 
competency in such a proceeding when it has reason to doubt that 
the defendant is able to assist counsel or to make decisions 
committed by law to the defendant with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding. The Debra A.E. court reasoned that the 
meaningful exercise of rights by persons seeking postconviction 
relief required that the courts consider the competency of the 
individual. 
¶27 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
guarantee of due process of law requires that a probationer be 
afforded a competency proceeding when an administrative law 
judge has reason to doubt the probationer's competency during a 
probation revocation proceeding. 
III. 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
14
¶28 In Wisconsin an administrative agency rather than the 
circuit court conducts revocation proceedings.
10 We must now 
determine the appropriate roles of the administrative law judge 
and the circuit court when, as in this case, an administrative 
law judge has reason to doubt a probationer's competency during 
a probation revocation proceeding.  
¶29 Neither 
an 
administrative 
law 
judge 
nor 
an 
administrator in the division of hearings and appeals has 
statutory authority to order a competency determination. The 
statutes set forth a detailed procedure for a circuit court to 
follow in assessing competency in court proceedings in criminal 
matters but this procedure does not, by its terms, apply to 
probation revocation proceedings.  
¶30 Because we conclude that the constitutional guarantee 
of due process of law requires the state to provide competency 
proceedings for persons who are the subjects of probation 
revocation proceedings, we must craft a procedure to afford 
probationers their constitutional rights. The procedure must 
balance a probationer's due process rights at a probation 
revocation proceeding and the legitimate interests of the state, 
including the safety of the public. 
                     
10 Wisconsin appears to be the only jurisdiction in which 
probation revocation hearings are entrusted to the executive 
branch rather than the judiciary. See State v. Arispe, No. 94 CM 
398 
(Circuit 
Court 
for 
Kenosha 
County, 
Feb 
28, 
1997), 
unpublished order at 9-10, 1997 Westlaw 153838 (citing statutes 
of 49 states, the District of Columbia and the United States). 
In Arispe the circuit court ruled that Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2) 
violates Wis. Const. Art VII, § 2 in that it grants authority to 
the executive branch to lift a stay of sentence ordered by the 
judicial branch. We intend no comment on the correctness of the 
circuit court's ruling. 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
15
¶31 As a first step, the administrative law judge must 
determine whether there is reason to doubt the probationer's 
competency. Reason to doubt that a probationer is competent may 
arise at any time during a probation revocation proceeding and 
may be raised by a probationer, the probationer's counsel, the 
department of corrections or the administrative law judge. No 
formal motion is necessary. 
¶32 When reason to doubt that a probationer is competent 
arises, the administrative law judge should apply the standard 
developed in cases concerning reason to doubt competency to 
stand trial. Thus, the administrative law judge must determine 
whether there are facts giving rise to doubt about the 
probationer's competency. State v. McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d 582, 
594-96, 223 N.W.2d 550 (1974). As the United States Supreme 
Court has made clear, there are "no fixed or immutable signs 
which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to 
determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult 
one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances 
are implicated." Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. The Court further 
advised: 
 
[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his 
demeanor . . . and 
any 
prior 
medical 
opinion 
on 
competence . . . are 
all 
relevant 
in 
determining 
whether further inquiry is required, but . . . even 
one of these factors standing alone may, in some 
circumstances, be sufficient. 
Id. 
¶33 If the administrative law judge determines that there 
is 
no 
reason 
to 
doubt 
the 
probationer's 
competency 
the 
revocation proceeding may continue. If the administrative law 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
16
judge determines that there is reason to doubt the probationer's 
competency the revocation proceeding and all applicable time 
limits are stayed and a competency proceeding held. The 
probationer should continue in physical custody (if he or she is 
in physical custody) to the extent consistent with Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.14.  
¶34 Because an administrative law judge, unlike a circuit 
court, has no statutory power to conduct competency proceedings 
and has no experience conducting such proceedings, we conclude 
that a circuit court should conduct competency proceedings for 
probationers who are the subjects of probation revocation 
proceedings. The appropriate circuit court to conduct the 
competency proceeding will ordinarily be the circuit court in 
the county in which the probationer was sentenced. 
¶35 To 
initiate 
the 
competency 
proceeding 
the 
administrative law judge shall promptly forward a written 
request for a competency determination to the appropriate 
circuit court, along with a copy of the papers on file in the 
revocation proceeding and the administrative law judge's written 
statement explaining the grounds for finding reason to doubt the 
probationer's competency. The administrative law judge should 
act expeditiously, consistent with the intent of § 971.14. 
¶36 The 
circuit 
court 
shall 
proceed 
to 
determine 
competency, adhering to Wis. Stat. §§ 971.13 and 971.14 to the 
extent practicable. Section 971.14 sets forth in detail the 
procedures for circuit courts to follow when there is reason to 
doubt a defendant's competency to proceed at trial, conviction 
or sentencing. The statute provides for the appointment of 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
17
experts to examine a defendant, the authority of the circuit 
court to commit an incompetent defendant, the process for 
resuming the criminal proceeding when a defendant regains 
competence, and the procedure for initiating civil commitment 
when a defendant is found unlikely to become competent within 12 
months. A circuit court shall adapt Wis. Stat. § 971.14 to the 
extent practicable to fit a determination of competency to 
proceed with a probation revocation proceeding.  
¶37 In keeping with the requirements of due process, we 
have concluded that a competency proceeding shall be held for a 
probationer when during a probation revocation proceeding there 
is reason to doubt the probationer's competency. We have further 
provided a procedure for conducting such hearings. The State's 
brief correctly notes that special problems may arise when a 
probationer is detoured into a competency proceeding. Such 
problems 
include 
whether 
inpatient 
evaluation 
should 
be 
conducted in the Wisconsin Resource Center, an institution of 
the department of corrections, or in a civil facility, and what 
entity should pay for the various costs incurred. We cannot 
attempt to provide responses to the questions the State raises, 
nor can we foresee the variety of other questions that may 
arise. These questions will have to be addressed as they arise, 
either by the entities involved or by the courts.  
IV. 
¶38 We now turn to the proper procedure for seeking 
judicial review of revocation of probation. The legislature has 
exempted probation revocation proceedings from the procedural 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
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requirements of Wis. Stat. ch. 227, the administrative procedure 
act. Wis. Stat. § 227.03(4) (1995-96).  
¶39 Vanderbeke sought review of the division's order by 
means of a writ of habeas corpus. The State suggests that 
certiorari may be the more appropriate procedure, principally 
because certiorari review requires a more complete record.  
¶40 The court has stated that in the absence of statutory 
provisions for judicial review of a revocation of probation, the 
"right of review of a revocation hearing is by certiorari 
directed to the court of conviction." Cady, 50 Wis. 2d at 549-
50. The court of appeals has held, however, that habeas corpus 
review of a probation revocation is available in circumstances 
in which certiorari is not available, State ex rel. McMillian v. 
Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 278-79, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986), 
and that habeas rather than certiorari is the appropriate 
procedure for an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel 
at a probation revocation proceeding when additional evidence is 
needed. State v. Ramey, 121 Wis. 2d 177, 181-82, 359 N.W.2d 177 
(Ct. App. 1984).  
¶41 On the basis of these cases, we hold that habeas 
corpus was a proper method for Vanderbeke to challenge his 
probation revocation on the grounds of violation of due process 
because of incompetency and lack of counsel. Recognizing the 
State's concern for an adequate record on review, we caution 
that the parties are responsible for providing the courts with 
an adequate record so that the review is expeditious and 
accurate. 
 
 
No. 95-0907 
 
 
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¶42 In sum, we conclude: (1) that a probationer has a due 
process right to a competency determination when during the 
probation revocation proceeding the administrative law judge has 
reason to doubt the probationer's competency; (2) that, when the 
administrative law judge has reason to doubt the probationer's 
competency, a competency determination should be made by the 
circuit court in the county in which the probationer was 
sentenced and the competency proceeding should adhere to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 971.13 and 971.14 to the extent practicable; and (3) 
that judicial review of revocation of probation in this case may 
be by habeas corpus. 
¶43 Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit court 
quashing the writ of habeas corpus and remand the cause to the 
circuit court with directions to vacate the order of revocation 
and remand the matter to the division of hearings and appeals 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.  
By the Court.—The order quashing the writ of habeas corpus 
is reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
 
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