Title: Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Godles

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Godles, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6274.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-6274 
LORAIN COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. GODLES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Godles,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6274.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Failure to communicate with client and notify 
him of failure to maintain liability insurance — Public reprimand. 
(No. 2010-1139 ⎯ Submitted September 15, 2010 ⎯ Decided  
December 27, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-073. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Michael J. Godles of Elyria, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0042398, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989. 
{¶ 2} Relator, the Lorain County Bar Association, filed a complaint 
against respondent for his conduct in representing a client in a personal-injury 
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case and for not informing his client about his lack of professional-liability 
insurance. 
{¶ 3} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline heard the case, issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
found that respondent had violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(1) (requiring a lawyer to 
inform the client of any decision or circumstance for which the client’s informed 
consent is required), 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with the 
client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished), 
1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable 
with the client’s reasonable requests for information), and 1.4(a)(5) (requiring a 
lawyer to consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s 
conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted), 
1.4(b) (requiring a lawyer to explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation), and 
1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform the client at the time of the engagement or at 
any time subsequent to the engagement if the lawyer does not maintain 
professional-liability insurance) and DR 1-104(A) (requiring a lawyer to disclose 
to the client that the lawyer lacks professional-liability insurance).1  The panel 
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for 
six months with all six months stayed.  The board adopted the panel’s findings 
and conclusions, except that it recommended reducing the sanction to a public 
reprimand.  No objections were filed to the board’s report. 
{¶ 4} We adopt the findings and conclusions of the board, and we 
publicly reprimand Michael J. Godles for his misconduct in this matter. 
                                                 
1.  On February 1, 2007, the Rules of Professional Conduct became effective, replacing the Code 
of Professional Responsibility in Ohio.  Respondent’s conduct before February 1, 2007, is 
governed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, and conduct after that date is governed by 
the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
Facts 
{¶ 5} In August 2006, a client hired respondent to represent him in 
regard to a personal-injury claim arising out of an accident that had occurred in 
2004. At the time respondent was hired, only five days remained on the statute of 
limitations for the client’s claim, so respondent quickly filed a lawsuit in the 
Ashland County Court of Common Pleas.  He communicated with the opposing 
counsel regarding a settlement before filing the suit, but the two sides were far 
apart on a settlement value. 
{¶ 6} In September, opposing counsel filed an answer, interrogatories, 
and a request for documents. Respondent did not file a response to the discovery 
request because he knew that the client was still receiving medical treatment and 
that he would eventually be filing a motion for a voluntary dismissal without 
prejudice. The following February, opposing counsel filed a motion to compel a 
response to the discovery requests. The court ordered respondent to respond to the 
discovery request by May 2007, but respondent voluntarily dismissed the case at 
the end of April. The voluntary dismissal gave the client one year to refile the 
case. 
{¶ 7} Respondent testified that he called the client in January 2008 to 
inform him that respondent was going to discontinue his representation of the 
client.  He testified that he explained how long the client had to refile the case.  
He then sent a letter to the client in February to confirm. The client testified that 
this conversation never occurred and that he never received the letter. 
{¶ 8} Neither respondent nor the client refiled the case before the time to 
do so expired in May 2008.  The client tried calling respondent several times 
starting in July 2008, but respondent did not respond until October.  During the 
October discussion, the client stated that he was totally unaware of what was 
happening with his case and had not known that the case had been dismissed.  
Respondent said that he had explained everything to the client in previous 
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discussions.  Within a week of that October conversation, the client hired a new 
attorney to handle his case. 
{¶ 9} Respondent had met the client in-person only at their initial 
meeting.  Except for the letter terminating representation, he did not have any 
written correspondence with the client.  All conversations happened over the 
telephone. Respondent did not send the client copies of the answer, the discovery 
request, the motion to compel, or the dismissal order. Respondent never requested 
or obtained the client’s medical records. 
{¶ 10} The parties stipulated that at all times relevant to the proceedings, 
respondent failed to maintain professional-liability insurance.  The parties also 
stipulated that respondent failed to advise the client that respondent did not 
maintain professional-liability insurance. 
Conclusions of Law 
{¶ 11} Relator charged respondent with violating Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a) 
(requiring a lawyer to abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation and to consult with the client as to means by which they are to be 
pursued), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a 
client), 1.4(a), 1.4(b), and1.16(d) (requiring a lawyer withdrawing from 
representation to take steps reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interest). 
{¶ 12} The panel and board found that respondent had violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(1) through (5) and 1.4(b).  It is unclear how many times 
respondent and the client communicated and what respondent communicated to 
the client.  The panel found that neither respondent nor the client was completely 
credible in their conflicting testimony. What is clear is that respondent did very 
little work on the case and failed to fully communicate with the client regarding 
how the case was being managed and the status of the case.  Therefore, we agree 
with the panel and board that respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(1) through 
(5) and 1.4(b). 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 13} The panel and board recommended dismissing the alleged 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a), 1.3, and 1.16(d) because those violations were 
not proven by clear and convincing evidence.  We agree and dismiss those 
charges. 
{¶ 14} The panel and board also found violations of DR 1-104(A) and 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c).  The parties stipulated to respondent’s lack of professional-
liability insurance and his failure to advise the client of that fact.  Therefore, we 
also find a violation of DR 1-104(A) and Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c). 
Sanction 
{¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  Because each disciplinary 
case is unique, we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule but may take 
into account “all relevant factors” in determining what sanction to impose.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(A) and (B). 
{¶ 16} As mitigating factors, the panel and board found that respondent 
has no prior disciplinary record, that he did not act with a dishonest or selfish 
motive, and that respondent has had other penalties imposed because a 
malpractice action is pending against him.  BCGD Proc. Reg. 10(B)(2) (a), (b), 
and (f). The mere fact that a malpractice suit was pending should not have been 
considered as a mitigating factor, as the suit itself is not a penalty.  Respondent 
has since submitted a notice of restitution, but we do not accept this as a 
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mitigating factor either, because he settled the case with no admission of 
malpractice, which means that respondent did not admit to the misconduct and is 
not technically being penalized for it.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. McCord, 121 
Ohio St.3d 497, 2009-Ohio-1517, 905 N.E.2d 1182, ¶ 47-48 (giving no 
consideration for a separate suspension from the practice of law for the same 
conduct because respondent received legal fees during that suspension and did not 
appear to learn anything from suspension). 
{¶ 17} As an aggravating factor, the panel and board found that the client 
was vulnerable due to his lack of sophistication regarding legal matters.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(h).  The panel further found that the client lost the opportunity 
to pursue damages for his injury. 
{¶ 18} The panel recommended a six-month suspension from the practice 
of law in Ohio, with all six months stayed.  The board recommended a public 
reprimand.  Considering respondent’s long career with no previous disciplinary 
action, we agree with the board.  See Cuyahoga Cty Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 123 
Ohio St.3d 65, 2009-Ohio-4178, 914 N.E.2d 180 (public reprimand for an 
attorney who, in an isolated instance, failed to notify a client of her lack of 
malpractice insurance and neglected a legal matter entrusted to her).  Respondent 
is hereby publicly reprimanded for violating Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(1) through (5), 
1.4(b), and 1.4(c) and DR 1-104(A).  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Wickens, Herzer, Panza, Cook & Batista Co., and Daniel A. Cook, for 
relator. 
Michael J. Godles, pro se. 
______________________