Title: CAM CONSTRUCTION V LAKE EDGEWOOD CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 12, 2002  
CAM CONSTRUCTION,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 116751  
LAKE EDGEWOOD  
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CAVANAGH, J.  
We granted leave to consider whether a party may appeal  
an adverse summary disposition judgment on one count of a  
multicount action after accepting a case evaluation rendered  
under MCR 2.403.  The plain language of MCR 2.403(M)(1)  
provides that a party’s acceptance of a case evaluation  
disposes of “all claims in the action.”  We conclude,  
therefore, that, upon acceptance of a case evaluation under  
MCR 2.403, a party may not subsequently appeal an adverse  
summary 
disposition 
on 
one 
count 
in 
the 
action.  
     
     
I. Facts and Proceedings  
In August 1998, plaintiff CAM Construction filed a four­
count complaint against defendant Lake Edgewood Condominium  
Association for damages stemming from defendant’s failure to  
pay plaintiff for services rendered and breach of contract.  
In counts I, II, and III, plaintiff alleged that defendant  
owed $9,110 for services rendered pursuant to an agreement  
between the parties.  In count IV, plaintiff alleged that  
defendant reneged on a separate contract, worth $183,450, by  
preventing plaintiff from performing roof construction work  
for defendant.  
Defendant moved for summary disposition on count IV,  
claiming the contract was void under the statute of frauds.  
MCL 566.132(1)(a).  The circuit court granted defendant’s  
motion in December 1998 and plaintiff did not appeal that  
decision.  
The case was then submitted to case evaluation, for which  
both parties submitted mediation summaries.1  The summaries  
briefly referred to the dismissal of count IV2; however, the  
1 At the time this case arose, the term “mediation” was used
to define the process.  The current term that defines the 
process, “case evaluation,” was adopted in 2000. 
2 Plaintiff’s mediation summary stated the following about
count IV: 
Rather, CAM had agreed with Lake Edgewood to  
2 
 
 
      
parties debate whether it was only the remaining counts the  
case evaluation panel discussed.3
 The panel recommended  
defendant pay plaintiff $5,400, which both parties accepted.  
Defendant then asked for an order dismissing the entire case  
with prejudice under MCR 2.403(M)(1), which states:  
If 
all 
the 
parties 
accept 
the 
panel’s 
evaluation, judgment will be entered in accordance 
with the evaluation, unless the amount of the award 
is paid within 28 days after notification of the 
acceptances, in which case the court shall dismiss 
the action with prejudice. 
The judgment or  
dismissal shall be deemed to dispose of all claims 
in the action and includes all fees, costs, and 
interest to the date it is entered.  
Plaintiff responded that it had reserved its right to  
appeal the summary disposition on count IV.  Arguing that the  
case evaluation summaries had focused on the claims in counts  
perform roofing repairs under the warranty work 
stated above, and Lake Edgewood, in essence, 
breached this agreement and did not allow CAM to 
perform this work (this allegation has been  
dismissed by the Court, due to there being no  
signed agreement for services which were allegedly 
to have occurred over a three year period.)  
Defendant’s mediation summary stated the following about 
count IV:  
The Complaint also included a claim for breach 
of a December 1997 agreement for roof construction 
work.  By order dated December 17, 1998, this Court 
dismissed that claim.  
3 Plaintiff asserts that the case evaluation panel did not
discuss count IV.  Defendant states that because the decision 
was made outside the lawyer’s presence, no one can be sure
whether the panel discussed count IV. 
3  
      
I-III, plaintiff asserted that the $5,400 case evaluation  
award covered only that portion of the case.  
The circuit court agreed with plaintiff and ordered the  
parties to:  
Craft a judgment here that preserves the 
appellate issue on the issue that I decided and 
otherwise dismisses the case and shows this to be a  
final order in the–the final order in this case.[4]  
Plaintiff, thereafter, appealed the summary disposition  
on count IV.  
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in the  
following order:  
[T]he claim of appeal is dismissed because 
appellant is not an aggrieved party. Under Reddam  
v Consumer Mortgage Corp, 182 Mich App 754; 452 
NW2d 908 (1990), a party cannot appeal an earlier 
order entered after a subsequent acceptance of the  
4 This judgment stated: 
Plaintiff having brought this action, with its 
breach 
of 
contract 
count 
dismissed 
through 
Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Disposition 
prior to Mediation, the cause being mediated as to 
the remaining issues, the parties having mutually 
accepted mediation on those issues, the amount of 
the award having been paid within 28 days after 
notification of the acceptances, and the Court, 
being otherwise advised in the premises:  
It is ordered that this matter is hereby 
dismissed, with prejudice, relative to the counts 
of the Complaint, which survived Defendant’s Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, with no interest, 
costs, or attorney fees awarded to either party. 
This is the final judgment in this matter.  
4 
     
  
 
mediation award.5  
Plaintiff applied to this Court for leave to appeal.  
II. Standard of Review  
We review de novo decisions on summary disposition  
motions. Sewell v Southfield Pub Schs, 456 Mich 670, 674; 576  
NW2d 153 (1998). Similarly, interpretation of a court rule,  
like a matter of statutory interpretation, is a question of  
law that this Court reviews de novo.  Marketos v American  
Employers Ins Co, 465 Mich 407, 413; 633 NW2d 371 (2001).  
III. Analysis  
Plaintiff contends that it can appeal an earlier partial  
summary 
disposition 
ruling 
where 
the 
parties 
have 
subsequently  
accepted a case evaluation award.  We reject plaintiff’s  
contention because it is contrary to the plain language of MCR  
2.403(M)(1).  
In Grievance Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich 188,  
193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000), we articulated the proper mode  
5 Initially, the Court of Appeals issued an order dismissing
the appeal because there was no docket entry showing that the
trial court had dismissed count IV of the complaint.
Unpublished order, entered October 19, 1999 (Docket No.
221987).  Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing, which 
contended that the trial court made a clerical error. 
Defendant answered, arguing that dismissal was proper because
no appeal lies from an earlier partial summary disposition
ruling where the parties have subsequently accepted a 
mediation award.  The Court of Appeals granted the motion and
dismissed the appeal.  Unpublished order, entered January 13,
2000 (Docket No. 221987). 
5  
 
 
of interpreting a court rule:  
When called on to construe a court rule, this 
Court applies the legal principles that govern the 
construction and application of statutes. McAuley  
v General Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 
282 (1998).  Accordingly, we begin with the plain 
language of the court rule. When that language is 
unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning expressed, 
without 
further 
judicial 
construction 
or  
interpretation.
 See Tryc v Michigan Veterans’  
Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). 
Similarly, common words must be understood to have 
their everyday, plain meaning.  See MCL 8.3a; MSA  
2.212(1); see also Perez v Keeler Brass Co, 461 
Mich 602, 609; 608 NW2d 45 (2000).  
MCR 2.403(M)(1) provides that, upon both parties’  
acceptance 
of 
a 
case 
evaluation, the judgment entered pursuant  
to that evaluation “shall be deemed to dispose of all claims  
in the action and includes all fees, costs, and interest  
. . . .”  The plain meaning of the words at issue is as  
follows:  
A “claim” is defined as:  
1. The aggregate of operative facts giving 
rise to a right enforceable by a court . . . . 2.  
The assertion of an existing right; any right to 
payment or to an equitable remedy, even if  
contingent or provisional . . . .  3. A demand for  
money or property to which one asserts a right 
. . . . [Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed).]  
An “action” is defined as:  
1.  The process of doing something; conduct or 
behavior.  2. A thing done . . . .  3. A civil or  
criminal judicial proceeding. [Id.]  
Thus, according to the plain meaning of these words, a claim  
6  
     
     
 
 
 
consists of facts giving rise to a right asserted in a  
judicial proceeding, which is an action.  In other words, the  
action encompasses the claims asserted.  
The language of MCR 2.403(M)(1) could not be more clear  
that accepting a case evaluation means that all claims in the  
action, even those summarily disposed, are dismissed.6  Thus,  
allowing bifurcation of the claims within such actions, as  
plaintiff 
suggests, 
would be directly contrary to the language  
of the rule.  We, therefore, reject plaintiff’s position  
because it is contrary to the court rule’s unambiguous  
language that upon the parties’ acceptance of a case  
evaluation all claims in the action be disposed.  
Plaintiff cites numerous decisions of the Court of  
Appeals as supporting its position that it may except a claim  
from an action submitted to case evaluation under MCR 2.403.  
In Reddam, the Court of Appeals examined the former, less  
explicit version, of MCR 2.403,7 and explained that acceptance  
6 This conclusion is mirrored in MCR 2.403(A)(1), which
explains that it is the civil action, not the claims within
the civil action, that is submitted to case evaluation: 
A court may submit to case evaluation any 
civil action in which the relief sought is  
primarily money damages . . . .  
7 
Before March 31, 1990, MCR 2.403 (M)(1) provided: 
If 
all 
the 
parties 
accept 
the 
panel’s 
evaluation, judgment will be entered in that  
7 
 
  
 
 
of a case evaluation is essentially a consent judgment, but  
that the parties may show they submitted less than all claims  
of an action to case evaluation.  
The entry of a judgment pursuant to the 
acceptance of a mediation evaluation is, in  
essence, a consent judgment. 
See Pelshaw v  
Barnett, 170 Mich App 280, 286; 427 NW2d 616 
(1988), modified on other grounds 431 Mich 910; 433 
NW2d 77 (1988).  Furthermore, one may not appeal 
from a consent judgment, order or decree. Dybata v  
Kistler, 140 Mich App 65, 68; 362 NW2d 891 (1985). 
Finally, we agree with defendant that the mediation 
rule, MCR 2.403, envisions the submission of an 
entire civil action to mediation where monetary 
damages are involved and that the mediators shall 
evaluate the total valuation of the case. That is, 
absent a showing that less than all issues were 
submitted to mediation, a mediation award covers 
the entire matter and acceptance of that mediation 
award settles the entire matter.  Accordingly, 
plaintiff’s acceptance of the mediation award  
settled all claims, including those which had been 
dismissed by partial summary disposition. [Reddam  
at 756-757.]  
These principles were followed in subsequent Court of  
Appeals cases that construed the current version of MCR  
2.403(M)(1).  See Joan Automotive Industries, Inc v Check, 214  
Mich App 383, 386-390; 543 NW2d 15 (1995), Bush v Mobil Oil  
Corp, 223 Mich App 222, 227; 565 NW2d 921 (1997), and Auto  
Club Ins Ass’n v State Farm Ins Cos, 221 Mich App 154, 166;  
561 NW2d 445 (1997).  
These decisions improperly allow a party to make a  
amount, which includes all fees, costs, and  
interest to the date of judgment.  
8 
 
showing that “less than all issues were submitted” to case  
evaluation.
 Allowing the parties involved in the case  
evaluation process to make such a showing has no basis in the  
court rule. Even if Reddam permitted such an approach under  
the less detailed language of former MCR 2.403(M), there  
plainly is no warrant for proceeding in that manner under the  
language of the current version of MCR 2.403(M)(1):  
If 
all 
the 
parties 
accept 
the 
panel’s 
evaluation, judgment will be entered in accordance  
with the evaluation, unless the amount of the award 
is paid within 28 days after notification of the 
acceptances, in which case the court shall dismiss  
the action with prejudice. 
The judgment or  
dismissal shall be deemed to dispose of all claims  
in the action and includes all fees, costs, and 
interest to the date it is entered. [Emphasis 
added.]  
As we have explained, this unambiguous language evidences our  
desire to avoid bifurcation of civil actions submitted to case  
evaluation.  To the extent that Reddam and its progeny have  
been read to suggest that parties may except claims from case  
evaluation under the current rule, these cases are overruled.  
If all parties accept the panel’s evaluation, the case is  
over.  
In the present case, both parties accepted the panel’s  
case evaluation, and defendant sent the required check within  
twenty-eight days.  In those circumstances, the circuit court  
should have granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, without  
9  
  
 
condition or reservation.  Thus, because the circuit court  
should have dismissed this case in its entirety, the Court of  
Appeals did not err when it dismissed the plaintiff’s claim of  
appeal. 
Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal order of the  
Court of Appeals. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
10  
     
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CAM CONSTRUCTION,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 116751  
LAKE EDGEWOOD  
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I believe that the judge's statements on the record make  
clear 
that 
he 
intended 
plaintiff's 
appellate 
rights 
respecting  
count IV be preserved in the final order.  It is obvious to  
me, also, that both the judge and plaintiff reasonably relied  
on the interpretation of MCR 2.403(M)(1) made by Reddam8 and  
its progeny. Therefore, it is unjust to apply a more strict  
reading of the court rule to this plaintiff's appeal.  I would  
remand to the Court of Appeals for review of the summary  
disposition ruling on its merits.  
8Reddam v Consumers Mortgage Corp, 182 Mich App 754; 452 
NW2d 908 (1990).