Title: State v. Jennifer K. Matejka

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 5 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Jennifer K. Matejka,  
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  230 Wis. 2d 748, 603 N.W.2d 34 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
February 6, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
September 6, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Portage 
 
JUDGE: 
Frederic Fleishauer 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BABLITCH, J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by James B. Connell and Crooks, Low, Connell & 
Rottier, S.C., Wausau, and oral argument by James B. Connell. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued 
by Jennifer E. Nashold, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2001 WI 5 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0070-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
Jennifer K. Matejka, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.   The issue in this case is 
whether, under the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement, a driver's consent to a police officer's 
search of a vehicle extends to a passenger's jacket left in the 
vehicle at the time of the search.  Defendant Jennifer Matejka 
was one of several passengers in a van that was stopped by a 
state trooper for a traffic violation.  The trooper obtained the 
driver's consent to search the van and ordered everyone out 
while he conducted the search.  Matejka left her jacket behind, 
and 
the 
trooper 
eventually 
searched 
it, 
finding 
drug 
paraphernalia and marijuana.  Additional drug paraphernalia, 
FILED 
 
FEB 6, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
2 
marijuana, and LSD were discovered during a custodial search of 
Matejka and her belongings after her arrest. 
¶2 
The 
circuit court 
suppressed the 
drug 
evidence, 
finding a Fourth Amendment violation because Matejka had not 
personally consented to the search of her individual property 
within the van.  The court of appeals reversed, concluding that 
the driver's consent to the search of the van encompassed the 
jacket Matejka had left in it.  We agree, and therefore affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals which reversed the circuit 
court's suppression of the drug evidence in this case. 
FACTS 
¶3 
On March 16, 1997, Wisconsin State Trooper David 
Forsythe observed a van traveling on a Portage County highway.  
The van had no front license plate, so he pulled it over.1   
¶4 
The van had windows all the way around the exterior.  
From his squad car, Forsythe could see the driver and a 
passenger in the front seat.  As he pulled the van over, 
Forsythe noticed the driver "leaning over to his right and going 
down lower as if he was either trying to hide something or 
retrieving something."  Forsythe said he thought the driver 
might have been "going for a weapon or hiding a weapon or a 
                     
1 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 341.15(1) 
(1995-96) 
directs 
that 
"[w]henever 2 registration plates are issued for a vehicle, one 
plate shall be attached to the front and one to the rear of the 
vehicle."    
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
3 
multitude of other possible options."  As a result, Forsythe 
approached the van with "heightened awareness."   
¶5 
As he walked along the driver's side of the van, 
Forsythe looked through a side vent window and observed several 
other passengers covered with blankets and pillows on the back 
floor of the van.  Forsythe told the passengers to put their 
hands where he could see them and asked the driver to step out 
of the van.  The driver, Anthony Miller, did so, and handed 
Forsythe his driver's license.  Forsythe told Miller he was 
concerned about his movements in the front seat of the van and 
asked him if "there was anything he should be aware of."  Miller 
said no, but consented to a frisk for weapons, which produced 
nothing. 
¶6 
Forsythe then checked the area around the driver's 
seat for weapons and noticed a backpack.  Inside the backpack 
Forsythe discovered a toy handgun and a postal scale.  Forsythe 
testified that he first thought the gun was an actual firearm, 
but on closer inspection realized it was not.  Miller told 
Forsythe he used the scale to weigh mail.  Forsythe suspected 
the scale was used to weigh illegal drugs. 
¶7 
Forsythe told Miller he was going to give him a 
warning for the license plate violation.  He then asked Miller 
to open the back hatch of the van so he could watch everyone 
inside while he wrote the warning in his squad car.  After the 
hatch 
was 
opened, 
Forsythe 
asked 
the 
passengers 
for 
identification.  Forsythe then returned to his squad car, where 
he called for back-up and ran criminal history checks on the 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
4 
van's 
occupants. 
 
Forsythe 
learned 
that 
several 
of 
the 
passengers, including Matejka, were on probation and that 
Matejka had a drug-related criminal history.   
¶8 
While Forsythe prepared the warning and ran the 
checks, Trooper Parrott arrived as back-up.  Forsythe returned 
to the van, gave Miller the warning, and told him he was free to 
go.  Forsythe then asked Miller if there was anything he should 
"be aware of in the van as far as any other guns, drugs, 
anything illegal at all."  Miller said no.  Forsythe then asked 
for permission to search the van.  Miller consented. 
¶9 
Forsythe told the passengers he was concerned about 
contraband in the van and explained that the driver had 
consented to a search of the vehicle.  Forsythe asked the 
passengers to get out of the van while he conducted the search. 
 As they did so, Forsythe asked about "any weapons, knives, 
guns, razor blades," or anything else he should be aware of, and 
asked for consent to frisk for weapons.  Each consented, 
including Matejka, and no weapons were discovered. 
¶10 Forsythe searched the van while Trooper Parrott waited 
outside with the driver and passengers.  It was a cold March 
day, and some asked for their jackets.  Parrott asked Forsythe 
to bring the jackets out of the van.   
¶11 Forsythe got the jackets out of the van, checking each 
one for weapons.  Forsythe said he did not know which jacket 
belonged to whom, although Matejka testified that each passenger 
was asked to describe his or her jacket.  In any event, Forsythe 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
5 
found a "wooden dugout type container" containing marijuana in 
the pocket of the jacket Matejka identified as hers. 
¶12 Forsythe took Matejka aside, told her what he had 
discovered, and arrested her.  Forsythe put Matejka in the back 
of the squad car and returned to his search of the van.  He 
found more drug paraphernalia and drugs belonging to other 
passengers in the van.  Forsythe also searched a clutch-type bag 
belonging to Matejka and found a tweezers with burnt marijuana 
resin on the ends.   
¶13 During a custodial search at the Portage County jail, 
officers found another small baggie containing marijuana in 
Matejka's jacket pocket.  They also found two hits of LSD in her 
wallet.  Matejka admitted she had purchased the LSD at a concert 
in Minneapolis.   
¶14 Matejka was charged with two counts of misdemeanor 
drug possession.  She moved to suppress the drug evidence, 
arguing 
that 
the 
warrantless 
search 
violated 
her 
Fourth 
Amendment rights because she had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in her personal property in the van and never gave 
Forsythe permission to search her jacket.  Portage County 
Circuit Court Judge Frederic W. Fleishauer granted the motion, 
concluding that the search was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment because Matejka had not consented to the search of her 
individual property in the van.  
¶15 The court of appeals, in a one-judge decision by Judge 
Patience D. Roggensack, reversed.  State v. Matejka, No. 99-
0070-CR, unpublished slip op. (Sept. 2, 1999).  Judge Roggensack 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
6 
relied on United States Supreme Court precedent regarding 
consent and vehicle searches and concluded that it was not 
unreasonable for Forsythe to search Matejka's jacket based on 
the driver's consent. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 We 
apply 
a 
two-step 
standard 
of 
review 
to 
constitutional search and seizure inquiries.  State v. Martwick, 
2000 WI 5, ¶21, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552.  In reviewing a 
motion to suppress, we uphold the circuit court's findings of 
evidentiary 
or 
historical 
fact 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous.  State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 541, 577 N.W.2d 
352 (1998).  We then independently evaluate those facts against 
a constitutional standard to determine whether the search was 
lawful.  Martwick, 2000 WI 5 at ¶18.   
¶17 Searches conducted without a warrant are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.2  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); 
                     
2 The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution is 
identical in substance to the Fourth Amendment and provides: 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
7 
State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 196, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998). 
 Exceptions to the warrant requirement include voluntary third-
party consent.  Id.  There is no challenge to the voluntariness 
of the driver's consent to search here; the issue involves the 
scope of that consent.  The State bears the burden of 
establishing, clearly and convincingly, that a warrantless 
search was reasonable and in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment.  Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 541-42. 
ANALYSIS 
¶18 The question of whether a driver's consent to the 
search of a vehicle justifies the warrantless search of a 
passenger's belongings within the vehicle has not been addressed 
by the United States Supreme Court and is a matter of first 
impression in this state.3   
                                                                  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized.   
We traditionally follow the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in construing the search 
and seizure provision of the state constitution.  State v. 
Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶28, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568. 
3 Other jurisdictions that have addressed this question have 
gone both ways.  Some courts have concluded that searches of 
passengers' property based upon the driver's consent are 
constitutional: United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845 (1999) (driver's consent 
extended to passenger's luggage in back seat; passenger aware of 
driver's consent to the search, but did not object to the search 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
8 
¶19 The Supreme Court recently held that when an officer 
has probable cause to search a vehicle, he or she may search the 
vehicle itself and any items within it that are capable of 
containing the object of the search, including items of personal 
property belonging to passengers.  Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295, 307 (1999); see also State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, ¶70, 236 
                                                                  
of luggage); United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1169 (1995) (passenger's paper bag 
found under front seat; passenger aware that driver had given 
consent); United States v. Dunson, 940 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941 (1992) (search of passenger's duffel 
bag in trunk); United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171 (3d Cir. 
1988) (search of passenger's bags in trunk and under front seat; 
passenger aware of search); State v. Walton, 565 So. 2d 381 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (search of passenger's luggage in 
trunk); State v. Frizzel, 975 P.2d 1187 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) 
(search of passenger's backpack in truck); State v. Rawls, 552 
So. 2d 764 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (search of passenger's luggage in 
trunk). However, other courts have held such searches to be 
unconstitutional: United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 
1996) (search 
of 
passenger's suitcases; consenting 
driver 
informed officer that suitcases were not his); United States v. 
Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498 (1st Cir. 1994) (search of passenger's 
briefcase found in trunk; consenting driver informed officer 
that briefcase belonged to passenger); United States v. Welch, 4 
F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1993) (search of passenger's purse in trunk); 
People v. James, 645 N.E.2d 195 (Ill. 1994) (search of 
passenger's purse in vehicle; passenger unaware that driver had 
consented to vehicle search); State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (search of passenger's purse located in 
backseat); State v. Caniglia, 510 N.W.2d 372 (Neb. Ct. App. 
1993) (search of passenger's makeup bag found under passenger's 
seat); State v. Suazo, 627 A.2d 1074 (N.J. 1993) (search of 
passenger's bag removed from trunk; officer aware that bag 
belonged to passenger); State v. Williams, 616 P.2d 1178 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1980) (driver's consent did not extend to search of 
passenger's cassette tape case; driver unaware of passenger's 
possessions in the vehicle); State v. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d 624 
(S.D. 1991) (driver's consent to vehicle search did not extend 
to search of wife's purse located in passenger compartment). 
 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
9 
Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568.  The Supreme Court long ago held 
that officers may conduct warrantless searches based upon a 
third-party's 
consent, 
where 
the 
third 
party 
has 
common 
authority over the premises to be searched.  United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-71 (1974).   
¶20 So we know it is constitutionally reasonable for an 
officer conducting a probable cause search of a vehicle to 
search and seize passenger property.  We also know it is 
constitutionally reasonable for an officer conducting a third-
party consent search of a premises to seize items belonging to 
one who is not asked to consent, provided common authority over 
the premises is established. 
¶21 This case, however, is something of a hybrid.  It 
involves neither a probable cause automobile search nor a third-
party consent premises search.  Instead, it involves a third-
party consent automobile search.  The question of the legality 
of the search is best resolved, therefore, by reference to the 
principles underlying both the automobile and consent exceptions 
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.   
Automobile Searches 
¶22 The contents of automobiles generally receive reduced 
Fourth Amendment protection for two reasons.  First, the "ready 
mobility" of an automobile makes it more likely that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will vanish during the time needed to 
comply with the warrant requirement.  Pallone, 2000 WI 77 at ¶60 
(citing Houghton, 526 U.S. at 304).  Second, because traveling 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
10
in an automobile exposes passengers and items in the vehicle to 
public view, there is a reduced expectation of privacy in the 
automobile and its contents.  Id.   
¶23 The Supreme Court first recognized the automobile 
exception in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-56 
(1925), and concluded that law enforcement officers may search 
an entire motor vehicle without a warrant if there is probable 
cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.  The 
Court clarified Carroll in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 
825 (1982), and recognized that the scope of such a probable 
cause search extends to "every part of the vehicle and its 
contents that may conceal the object of the search," including 
closed containers. 
¶24 The Supreme Court recently applied the Ross holding to 
a search of passengers' property in Houghton, 526 U.S. at 295-
96.  Sandra Houghton was a passenger in a car stopped for 
speeding by the Wyoming Highway Patrol.  Id. at 297-98.  During 
the stop, the officer noticed a syringe in the driver's pocket. 
 Id. at 298.  When asked about the syringe, the driver admitted 
he used it to take illegal drugs.  Id.  Based on the driver's 
admission, the officer conducted a probable cause search of the 
car for contraband.  Id.  During the search, the officer found 
Houghton's purse on the back seat and searched it, discovering 
drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine.  Id.  
¶25 Houghton challenged the search.  The Court held that 
"police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect 
passengers' belongings found in the car that are capable of 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
11
concealing the object of the search."  Id. at 307.  The Court's 
opinion was a logical extension of the Ross doctrine.   
¶26 In reaching its conclusion, the Court weighed the 
degree of intrusiveness of the search against the governmental 
interests at stake.  Id. at 303-04.  The Court noted that 
although searches of the person, like the Terry4 weapons frisk, 
constitute "a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished 
personal security," the same "traumatic consequences are not to 
be expected" during a search of personal property in a vehicle. 
 Id. at 303.  The Court also observed that "[p]assengers, no 
less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with 
regard to the property that they transport in cars," because 
cars traveling on public roads are exposed to public scrutiny 
and pervasive governmental controls.  Id. at 303. 
¶27 On the other side of the scale, the Court considered 
the government's interest in effective law enforcement: (1) the 
"ready 
mobility" 
of 
the 
automobile 
creates 
a 
risk 
that 
contraband will be permanently lost while authorities obtain a 
warrant; (2) automobile passengers will often be engaged in 
common enterprise with the driver and thus will have the same 
interests in concealing their wrongdoing; and (3) a criminal 
might hide contraband in a passenger's belongings as readily as 
in other containers in the vehicle.  Id. at 304-05.  The Court 
concluded that a probable cause automobile search encompasses 
                     
4 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
12
any items of passenger property within the automobile that may 
contain or conceal the object of the search.  Id. at 303, 307. 
¶28 As we have already noted, this case is not directly 
governed by the automobile exception because it does not involve 
a search based upon probable cause.  However, these cases 
reflect the Supreme Court's judgments about the expectation of 
privacy that attaches to property in an automobile, the level of 
intrusiveness 
of 
a 
personal 
property 
search, 
and 
the 
individual's interests as against the government's in this 
context.  As such, they are highly relevant to our evaluation of 
the reasonableness of the consent-based automobile search in 
this case.  And the cases establish that the Supreme Court 
considers the expectation of privacy to be much diminished, the 
level of intrusiveness to be slight, and the governmental 
interests to outweigh the individual's under circumstances such 
as these.5 
                     
5 The dissent is entirely correct about the distinctions 
between probable cause and consent searches.  We have been 
careful to note that this was not a probable cause based search 
and therefore the automobile exception does not resolve the 
question of its legality.  However, because the ultimate inquiry 
is the reasonableness of the search, the principles underlying 
the Supreme Court's automobile exception jurisprudence are 
certainly noteworthy and relevant.  We do not agree that this 
constitutes an inappropriate "mix and match" approach that 
impermissibly 
"muddles" 
Fourth 
Amendment 
principles.  
Furthermore, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we do not 
"disregard[] the established line of analysis for consent 
searches" or neglect to address the driver's common authority 
over items of passenger property left behind in the vehicle.  
Rather, these issues receive extensive treatment in ¶¶ 29-42, 
infra.  
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
13
Consent Searches 
¶29 The 
leading 
case 
on 
the 
consent 
search 
of 
an 
automobile is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).  
In Schneckloth, an officer stopped a vehicle for equipment 
violations.  Id. at 220.  There were six men in the car.  Id.  
One of the passengers told the officer the car belonged to his 
brother, who was not present.  Id.  That passenger consented to 
a search of the vehicle.  Id.  Under one of the rear seats, the 
officer discovered three stolen checks belonging to another 
passenger, Robert Bustamonte.  Id.   
¶30 The Court upheld the search, concluding that it was 
justified based upon the voluntary consent of the automobile 
owner's brother.  Id. at 248.  Although the analysis in 
Schneckloth focused on the voluntariness of the consent, its 
holding implicitly recognized that pursuant to the valid consent 
of a person with some possessory interest in the vehicle, law 
enforcement officers may search and seize property in the 
vehicle belonging to a passenger who has not consented.   
¶31 In Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170-72, the Supreme Court 
explored the boundaries of third-party consent to search in the 
context of a home search.  William Matlock was a suspect in a 
bank robbery.  Id. at 166.  Officers went to his home and 
arrested him in the front yard.  Id.  At the time of the arrest, 
the officers did not ask Matlock whether he would consent to a 
search of his home.  Id.  Instead, the officers were admitted by 
Matlock's live-in girlfriend, who gave them permission to search 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
14
the home, including the bedroom she said she shared with 
Matlock.  Id.  During the search, the officers discovered cash 
in a diaper bag in the bedroom closet.  Id. 
¶32 The Court upheld the search, based upon a review of 
its precedent, including Schneckloth, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 487-90 (1971), and Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 
(1969).  The Court concluded that common authority over the 
premises to be searched confers third-party capacity to consent: 
 
[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless 
search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not 
limited to proof that consent was given by the 
defendant, but may show that permission to search was 
obtained from a third party who possessed common 
authority over or other sufficient relationship to the 
premises or effects sought to be inspected. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  
The Court said that the inquiry into common authority does not 
depend upon the law of property, but upon  
 
mutual use of the property by persons generally having 
joint access or control for most purposes, so that it 
is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-
inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in 
his own right and that the others have assumed the 
risk that one of their number might permit the common 
area to be searched. 
Id. at 171 n.7 (emphasis added). 
¶33 This court adopted these principles in Kieffer, 217 
Wis. 2d at 542, although we concluded in that case that a 
father-in-law had no common authority to consent to the search 
of his daughter and son-in-law's apartment.  The apartment was 
located above a detached garage behind the father-in-law's 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
15
house, but he possessed neither a key nor generalized permission 
to enter from his daughter or son-in-law.  Id. at 545-46. 
¶34 Although Matlock concerned third-party consent to 
search a home, we conclude its principles are fully applicable 
to the evaluation of third-party consent automobile searches.  
See, e.g., United States v. Beshore, 961 F.2d 1380, 1382 (8th 
Cir. 1992); Liu v. Delaware, 628 A.2d 1376, 1383 (Del. 1993).  
Indeed, given that the expectation of privacy in property in an 
automobile is significantly less than that in a home, it is 
logical and reasonable to apply the Matlock analysis to these 
facts.  
¶35 Here, the state trooper received consent to search the 
van from Miller, who, as the owner and driver of the vehicle, 
had obvious possessory authority over the vehicle and therefore 
the capacity to consent to its search.  This authority extended 
in common to the jacket that Matejka brought on board and then 
left behind in the van, by virtue of the joint access and mutual 
use of the interior of the van shared by the driver and his 
passengers.  Under Matlock, and by implication Schneckloth, 
Miller's consent to search the van encompassed Matejka's jacket, 
found inside it. 
¶36 Matejka argues that 
the 
search was 
unreasonable 
because Miller did not have common authority over the jacket 
itself.  However, under the circumstances of this case, as in 
Matlock and Schneckloth, the inquiry focuses not necessarily on 
the 
third-party's 
authority 
over 
the 
specific 
object 
in 
question, but the third-party's authority over the premises in 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
16
which that object is located.  See also Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740 
(refusing to engage in "metaphysical subtleties" regarding a 
third-party's authority over certain compartments in a shared 
duffel bag, instead concluding that the dispositive factor was 
that the defendant had allowed the third party to use the bag 
and had left it in the third-party's house, thereby assuming the 
risk that the third party would allow someone to look inside).  
This was not, for example, a locked suitcase or briefcase or 
other such item of private, personal property which might give 
rise to a different focus for the common authority analysis.6 
¶37 Our conclusion is strengthened by the fact that 
Matejka, unlike Matlock, was present and aware of the fact that 
Miller had consented to the search of the common area, the 
interior of the van, and yet made no attempt to circumscribe the 
scope of the search to exclude her jacket.  A consent search is 
subject to certain limitations in scope that do not apply to a 
probable cause search.  The scope of consent to search may be 
limited by the terms of its authorization.  Walter v. United 
States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980).  One who consents to a search 
"may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to 
which he consents."  Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 
(1991).  Neither Miller nor Matejka attempted to delimit the 
scope of this search in any way. 
¶38 In Jimeno, the United States Supreme Court established 
the analytical framework for evaluating the scope of a consent 
                     
6 Matejka's purse was searched after she was arrested. 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
17
search of a vehicle for constitutional purposes.  Enio Jimeno 
was stopped for a traffic violation.  Id. at 249.  The 
investigating officer had reason to believe that Jimeno was 
transporting narcotics, told Jimeno of his suspicion, and asked 
for consent to search the car.  Id.  After receiving Jimeno's 
consent, the officer opened the passenger door and observed a 
folded brown paper bag on the floorboard.  Id. at 250.  Inside 
the bag was a kilogram of cocaine.  Id. 
¶39 Jimeno argued that his consent to search his car did 
not extend to the closed paper bag inside the car.  Id.  The 
Court applied an objective test to measure the scope of Jimeno's 
consent: 
"what 
would 
the 
typical 
reasonable 
person 
have 
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" 
 Id. at 251.  The Court, citing Ross, noted that the scope of a 
search is generally defined by its expressed object.  Id.  In 
Jimeno, it was narcotics.  Thus, the Court concluded, it was 
objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude that Jimeno's 
consent to search the car included the consent to search 
containers within the car that might contain narcotics.  Id. 
¶40 The Court noted that "[a] reasonable person may be 
expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some 
form of a container.  'Contraband goods are rarely strewn across 
the trunk or floor of a car.'"  Id. (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 
820).  The Court held that while "[a] suspect may of course 
delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he 
consents . . . if his consent would reasonably be understood to 
extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
18
no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization."  Id. at 
252.   
¶41 Applying Jimeno's objective test here, we conclude 
that the scope of Miller's consent extended to Matejka's jacket, 
which she had left behind in the van.  Forsythe asked Miller if 
there were any guns, drugs, or other contraband in the van, and 
then asked if he could search.  A reasonable person under these 
circumstances would understand that the officer intended to 
search for guns, drugs, and other contraband and that the search 
would therefore include an inspection of anything capable of 
holding these things. 
¶42 Forsythe also told the passengers, including Matejka, 
that he had permission from the driver to search the van for 
contraband, and asked them about the presence of guns, drugs or 
contraband, thus putting them on similar notice.  Matejka's 
jacket pockets were certainly capable of containing drugs, guns, 
or other contraband.  Significantly here, the consent to search 
was not limited in any way by Miller or Matejka.  Thus, the 
officer's search of Matejka's jacket was well within the proper 
scope of the consent to search in this case and was therefore 
reasonable. 
¶43 Accordingly, based upon the Supreme Court's decisions 
in Houghton, Schneckloth, Matlock, and Jimeno, and in light of 
the reduced expectation of privacy that attends property in an 
automobile, we conclude that the search of Matejka's jacket 
based upon the driver's consent to search the vehicle was 
No. 
99-0070-CR 
 
 
19
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, we affirm the 
court of appeals.7   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
7 Because we conclude that the search of the jacket was 
lawful based upon the driver's consent to the search of the van, 
we do not address the State's alternative justifications for the 
search: that the scope of Matejka's consent to the pat-down 
search of her person extended to her jacket left behind in the 
van, that Forsythe's search of Matejka's jacket was part of a 
lawful Terry frisk of Matejka, or that the search of the jacket 
was permissible as part of a Terry frisk of the van.   
99-0070.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶44 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). Today's decision 
undermines the distinction between the consent search and the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The majority takes established consent search 
principles and crossbreeds them with the principles underlying 
the automobile exception to create a heretofore unknown "hybrid" 
exception to the warrant requirement: the third-party automobile 
consent search.  The result is an expansive concept of a third 
party's authority to consent to search the property of the 
passengers 
of 
a 
vehicle 
that 
is 
both 
unprecedented 
and 
constitutionally unsupportable.  
¶45 At issue today is the authority of a third party to 
grant consent to search the property of another under the Fourth 
Amendment.  No new formulations are needed to answer this 
question.   
¶46 When examining the legitimacy of a third-party consent 
search, the established first inquiry is whether the third party 
who granted consent to search "possessed common authority over 
or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects 
sought to be inspected."  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164, 171 (1974); State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 547, 577 
N.W.2d 352 (1998).  If the third party is without actual 
authority, the consent may be valid if it was reasonable for an 
officer to conclude that such authority exists.  Illinois v. 
99-0070.awb 
 
2 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990); Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 
548.   
¶47 The automobile exception to the warrant requirement is 
not at issue in this case.  The warrantless search of an 
automobile is justified only when the police have probable cause 
to believe that an automobile contains evidence of a crime.  
State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 607, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997).  
This exception to the warrant requirement is grounded in the 
reduced expectation of privacy one has in an automobile and the 
government's interest in preventing the evidence for which 
probable cause exists from being whisked away while a warrant is 
being obtained.  California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-93 
(1985).   
¶48 Based solely on the fact that the consent search at 
issue was that of an automobile, the majority disregards the 
established line of analysis for consent searches.  Rather than 
address the realities of Miller's common authority over the 
jacket or his relationship to it, the majority invokes the 
specter of an individual's reduced expectation of privacy in an 
automobile and an alleged overriding governmental interest.  By 
imbuing consent search principles with those underlying the 
automobile exception, the majority attempts to justify the leap 
it makes from the driver's possessory authority over the vehicle 
to authority to consent to the search of items belonging to all 
persons within the interior of the vehicle.   
¶49 The majority's "mix and match" approach to Fourth 
Amendment doctrine ignores the fundamental differences between 
99-0070.awb 
 
3 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and consent 
searches.  On the one hand, the automobile exception is premised 
on the notion that a certain quantum of evidence, i.e., probable 
cause, in conjunction with other considerations justifies the 
state's intrusion into an individual's sphere of privacy without 
a warrant.  On the other hand, the power to conduct a consent 
search flows not from a governmental interest deriving from a 
level of suspicion that overrides an individual's privacy 
interests, but rather flows from the individuals themselves.   
¶50 Courts examining the validity of a consent search are 
not concerned with expectations of privacy or competing state 
and individual interests.  The relevant considerations are the 
voluntariness of the consent and the authority to grant consent. 
 The court's decision today should simply be an inquiry into the 
latter.   
¶51 Moreover, the concerns implicated under the automobile 
exception cannot be severed from probable cause.   The Supreme 
Court explained the automobile exception in California v. 
Carney: 
 
[T]he 
pervasive 
schemes 
of 
regulation, 
which 
necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy 
[in an automobile], and the exigencies attendant to 
ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse 
to the authority of a magistrate so long as the 
overriding standard of probable cause is met.   
471 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added). 
¶52 In the Fourth Amendment context, no governmental 
interests are relevant in the absence of probable cause (or in 
other 
contexts, 
reasonable 
suspicion). 
 
The 
governmental 
99-0070.awb 
 
4 
interest specific to the automobile exception is grounded in the 
risk that evidence or contraband for which probable cause exists 
will be driven away before a warrant can be obtained.  Id. at 
390.  Logically, that governmental interest cannot exist in the 
absence of probable cause.   
¶53 More importantly, by the very nature of a consent 
search, no governmental interests are implicated.  The focus of 
a third-party consent search inquiry is not on the individual's 
relationship vis-à-vis the state, but on the individual's 
relationship to the property searched vis-à-vis the third party. 
 The dispositive question is whether there is common authority 
to consent.  No consideration of governmental interests arises 
in answering this question.  
¶54 Similarly, a reduced expectation of privacy has no 
bearing in the consent search context.  Again, the issue is the 
power to approve of the search of another's property.  Implicit 
in the majority's holding is that one's expectation of privacy 
is inversely proportional to the authority of others to grant 
consent.  I fail to see, and I am not told, how the two bear any 
relation to one another.   
¶55 Rather than address these analytical inconsistencies, 
the majority concludes that because this case involves a search 
of an automobile the automobile exception principles are "highly 
relevant."  However, in the absence of probable cause, none of 
these considerations is relevant and the automobile exception 
cases cited by the majority are wholly inapplicable.  
99-0070.awb 
 
5 
¶56 Notably absent from the majority's discussion of its 
"hybrid" approach is any citation or analysis suggesting that 
the Supreme Court would sanction such an approach.  Also missing 
from the majority opinion is a single citation to any other 
court that would support such an approach.  
¶57 Applying principles sanctioned by the United States 
Supreme Court, there is no evidence in the record to suggest 
that Miller had any common authority over or any special 
relationship to Matejka's jacket.  Nor is there anything to 
suggest that it was reasonable for Officer Forsythe to believe 
that Miller possessed such authority.  In fact the evidence 
points to the contrary. Officer Forsythe knew the jackets that 
he was handing out belonged to the passengers and not to Miller 
himself.8 
¶58 Even if I were to accept the framework constructed by 
the majority in this case there are too many unanswered 
questions under the new automobile consent search exception to 
the warrant requirement.  While it is suggested that an 
exception may exist for "private, personal property," we are 
                     
8 I also conclude that the State's alternative arguments in 
support of the search fail to establish that the search was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  The State's alternative 
arguments are premised upon a valid frisk of the jacket as part 
of a Terry search of the vehicle or Matejka or part of the 
consent pat-down of Matejka.  Yet nothing in the record suggests 
that it was immediately apparent to Officer Forsythe that the 
contents of Matejka's jacket pocket was contraband.  Therefore 
Forsythe's removal of the contents of the pocket exceeded the 
permissible bounds of a pat-down search under the plain feel 
doctrine of Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).   
99-0070.awb 
 
6 
given no answer as to why a jacket does not qualify for that 
exception.  
¶59 An even larger question looms as to why it is 
incumbent upon the individual to speak up to curtail a driver's 
consent to search, even where the officer conducting the search 
is aware that the property belongs to a passenger.  The majority 
puts the onus on the individual to confront the officer, rather 
than requiring the officer to carry the simple burden of 
requesting the consent of the passengers. 
¶60 The 
majority's 
approach 
muddles 
Fourth 
Amendment 
principles and in the end allows an otherwise unreasonable 
search to be deemed reasonable.  Employing an unprecedented and 
unconstitutional approach, the majority improperly expands a 
driver's authority to consent to the search of a passenger's 
personal property.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
¶61 I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, 
CHIEF JUSTICE and WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. join this dissenting 
opinion. 
 
 
99-0070.awb 
 
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