Title: McCoy v. Crook County Sheriff's Dept.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

McCoy v. Crook County Sheriff's Dept.1999 WY 126987 P.2d 674Case Number: 98-92Decided: 09/16/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
CATHY L. McCOY, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF 
JOSEPH ARLINT, on behalf of CATHY L. McCOY, THOMAS E. ARLINT, TANYA LEE ARLINT 
CUNDY, and KEELY REBECCA AGLER, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

CROOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S 
DEPARTMENT; TOWN OF HULETT POLICE DEPARTMENT; DAVID L. WOLFSKILL; and JOHN 
McPARTLAND, Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Crook County: The Honorable Dan R. Price II, 
Judge.

Randall T. Cox, 
Gillette, WY; and Jeremy D. Michaels of Michaels & Michaels, Gillette, WY. 
Argument by Mr. Michaels, representing appellants.

John R. Perry, 
Buffalo, WY for Crook County Sheriff's Department and Wolfskill; and Thomas C. 
Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General for Town of Hulett and McPartland. 
Argument by Messrs. Perry and Wilson, representing 
appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* JJ., and DONNELL, 
D.J.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

DONNELL, District 
Judge.

[¶1]      Appellants appeal 
the decision of the district court dismissing their claims for peace officers' 
negligence and wrongful death on summary judgment. The personal representative 
and next of kin of Joseph Arlint sought to receive damages for the wrongful 
death of Arlint, asserting that a deputy sheriff and a police chief were 
negligent in failing to arrest Arlint when they encountered him operating a 
motorbike while intoxicated. Finding that no legally enforceable duty to arrest 
existed on the part of the police officers, we affirm the decision of the 
district court.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellants set 
forth a number of issues for our consideration:

I. 
Duty:

Whether a 
Wyoming peace officer who initiated a lawful traffic stop of an obviously, 
undeniably intoxicated motorist, owed a duty to that motorist to arrest him or, 
in the alternative, to disable or impound the motorist's 
vehicle.

II. 
Causation:

Whether the 
release of an obviously, undeniably intoxicated motorist and his vehicle by a 
Wyoming peace officer after a lawful traffic stop, followed immediately by a 
wreck inflicting fatal injuries, proximately caused the motorist's 
death.

III. 
Immunity:

Whether a 
Wyoming peace officer engaged in patrol functions who failed to arrest an 
obviously, undeniably intoxicated motorist during a lawful traffic stop is 
entitled to common law immunity from liability for the death of the 
motorist.

Appellants query 
with respect to each issue whether "the District Court could resolve the 
foregoing . . . issue on a motion for summary judgment in this case, given the 
disputed facts shown in the record below."

[¶3]      Appellees' issues 
are stated somewhat more succinctly:

a. Were the 
material facts undisputed and supportive of the Court's entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Appellees?

b. Was the 
Court's alternative finding that qualified immunity be applied to Appellees 
appropriate?

FACTS

[¶4]      Considering the 
facts of this case in a light most favorable to the party opposing the Motion 
for Summary Judgment as we are bound to do, the record reveals the 
following:

[¶5]      On June 16, 1994, 
decedent Joe Arlint, age 23, and his friend, Matt Sulephen, were living at the 
home of the Crook County Justice of the Peace, Ron Waugh. Mr. Arlint was the son 
of Judge Waugh's fianci, Cathy McCoy. Judge Waugh and his fianci were out of 
town and, unbeknownst to them, Mr. Arlint and his friends had planned a party in 
their absence. The record indicates that Arlint and Sulephen consumed 
considerable amounts of alcohol during the course of the day. Sometime after 
5:00 p.m., Arlint took an old motorbike from the Waugh residence and traveled to 
Hulett where he visited at least one bar with Sulephen. The two were ejected 
from the premises for being drunk and disorderly.

[¶6]      At about 9:34 
that evening, a telephone call was made to the Crook County Sheriff's Office 
indicating someone was hot-rodding around Hulett on a motorbike, riding across 
lawns and parks. Deputy David Wolfskill responded to the call and immediately 
observed decedent on a motorbike speeding 44 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. zone. He 
initiated a traffic stop and found decedent to be loud, uncooperative and 
verbally abusive. Concluding that he needed additional help, Deputy Wolfskill 
called for backup. Hulett's Chief of Police, John McPartland, who was off duty 
that day, responded to the scene.

[¶7]      Subsequent 
medical evidence and other testimony indicate that decedent was legally 
intoxicated, but the officers state they observed no behavior or other 
indicators that would lead them to believe Arlint was drunk. Rather than arrest 
Arlint, the officers issued four citations to him for speeding, no driver's 
license in possession, no registration and no insurance. No attempt was made to 
check the status of his license, to take the keys, or to impound the motorbike. 
In fact, a records check would have revealed a history of DUI arrests and a 
suspended license.

[¶8]      Arlint apparently 
was told to park the motorbike, but he had a friend across the street in a 
pickup truck and may have asked whether he could put the motorbike in the truck 
and transport it home. The officers made no attempt to see that he did so, but 
did observe him wheeling it across the street to the pickup. The officers then 
adjourned to Chief McPartland's house for ice cream. They cleared the traffic 
stop at about 10:00 p.m.

[¶9]      Sometime between 
10:30 and 11:00 p.m., an unconscious Mr. Arlint was brought into the by-then 
ongoing party at the Waugh residence. He apparently had been riding the 
motorbike after the officers left and was involved in a serious accident. He was 
deposited on the floor in the laundry room and left for several hours 
thereafter. He was finally transported to the Hulett ambulance barn and thence 
to the Crook County Hospital. He was ultimately transported to the hospital in 
Rapid City, South Dakota where he languished in a coma for nearly four months. 
Arlint died on October 5, 1994.

[¶10]   Appellants assert the officers had 
ample reason to arrest Arlint during the traffic stop, but that they failed to 
do so because they feared reprisals from Judge Waugh and because Wolfskill had a 
date in Moorcroft that evening. They argue the officers had a duty to arrest 
Arlint for DUI for his own protection and for the protection of the public in 
general. The district court determined that "[s]ufficient undisputed facts exist 
to permit summary judgment" in favor of defendant. It also determined the 
doctrine of qualified immunity applied to protect the officers, the officers 
owed no duty to Mr. Arlint, and the officers' negligence, if any, was not the 
proximate cause of his death. Appellants dispute all of these 
determinations.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶11]   We have stated the standard of 
review on appeals from summary judgment on many occasions.

Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine 
issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would 
have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of 
action or defense which has been asserted by the parties.

Davis v. State, 
910 P.2d 555, 558 (Wyo. 1996) (citations omitted). The court examines the 
materials relevant to the motion from the vantage point most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion and gives that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which may fairly be drawn from the material. Smith v. Throckmartin, 
893 P.2d 712, 714 (Wyo. 1995). The party moving for summary judgment bears the 
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for a summary judgment. If the 
movant carries this burden, the party opposing the motion must come forward with 
specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. 
Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 569 (Wyo. 1996). "Summary judgment 
is not favored in negligence actions and is subject to more exacting scrutiny. 
However, even in negligence actions, summary judgment may be appropriate, 
especially if a plaintiff cannot establish the existence of a duty on the part 
of a defendant." Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 1995) 
(citation omitted).

[¶12]   "If the evidence is subject to 
conflicting interpretations or reasonable minds might differ as to its 
significance, summary judgment is improper." Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 
609 P.2d 984, 987 (Wyo. 1980). However, "[t]he motion for summary judgment 
should be sustained in the absence of a real and material fact issue considering 
movant's burden, respondent's right to the benefit of all favorable inferences 
and any reasonable doubt, with credibility questions to be resolved by trial." 
Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 640 (Wyo. 1986). We do not accord deference to 
the district court's decision on issues of law. Ahearn v. Tri-County Federal 
Sav. Bank, 948 P.2d 896, 897 (Wyo. 1997).

DISCUSSION

[¶13]   We first consider whether the 
officers in question had a legally enforceable duty or obligation to arrest Mr. 
Arlint. It is well settled that in order to establish a cause of action in tort 
there must first be a "duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the 
actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risks." Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 1979); 
Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, § 30, p. 164 (5th ed. 1984). A recent 
law review article presents a cogent analysis concerning the difference between 
a peace officer's general authority and legal duties which give rise to tort 
liability.

A tort is a 
breach of a duty imposed by law. The general duties of a law enforcement officer 
are provided by statute and obligate the officer to maintain public order and to 
make arrests for violation of the laws of the state or the ordinances of any 
municipality. The statutes provide the boundaries of the police function but do 
not explain where tort liability may arise.

Stephen R. 
McAllister & Peyton H. Robinson, The Potential Civil Liability of Law 
Enforcement Officers and Agencies, 67-Sep. J. Kan. B.A. 14, 16-17 (1998) 
(emphasis added). We have not considered this question in the past, and in so 
doing we now look first to Wyoming's statutory scheme.

[¶14]   Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 7-2-102 (Lexis 
1999), relating to arrests, provides:

(b) A peace 
officer may arrest a person without a warrant when:

(i) Any criminal 
offense is being committed in the officer's presence by the person to be 
arrested;

. . 
.

(iii) The 
officer has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed, 
that the person to be arrested has committed it and that the person, unless 
immediately arrested:

(A) Will not be 
apprehended;

(B) May cause 
injury to himself or others or damage to property; or

(C) May destroy 
or conceal evidence of the commission of the misdemeanor.

(Emphasis 
added.) According to this statute, arrest is discretionary even when the officer 
has probable cause and the person to be arrested "[m]ay cause injury to himself 
or others."

[¶15]   Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 7-2-103 (Lexis 
1999) goes on to state:

(b) A person may 
be released if, after investigation, it appears that the 
person:

(i) Does not 
present a danger to himself or others[.]

One might 
reasonably argue that a person who is drunk and in possession of a motor vehicle 
automatically presents a danger to himself or others. Apparently, however, the 
legislature believes otherwise or it would have made arrest mandatory under such 
circumstances in § 7-2-102. It did not do so.

[¶16]   Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 31-5-1204(d) (Lexis 
1999) provides:

Whenever any 
person is halted by a police officer for any violation of this act . . . the 
person shall, in the discretion of the officer, either be given a traffic 
citation or be taken without unnecessary delay before the proper judge. . . 
.

(Emphasis 
added.) The term "this act" refers to §§ 31-5-101 through 31-5-1214, which 
includes Wyoming's drunk driving statute, Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 31-5-233. Finally, 
Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 31-5-1205(k) (Michie 1997) specifically allows the officer 
discretion to arrest, cite or issue a summons for violation of § 31-5-233. 

[¶17]   Obviously, the statutes authorize 
officers to arrest and detain drunk drivers. However, none of the statutes 
mandate the arrest of such persons. To the contrary, the statutes emphasize 
officer discretion in determining the appropriate action to take with drunk 
drivers.

[¶18]   In Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 115-16 (Wyo. 1992) we stated:

Subsumed within 
the general duty to apprehend, arrest, and remove drunk drivers from Wyoming's 
roadways is the duty to investigate potential DWUI violations. This brings us to 
the precise duty issue raised by this appeal: What is the nature and extent of a 
peace officer's duty to investigate a potential DWUI violation when, during an 
unrelated traffic stop, it is reasonably suspected that the driver has been 
drinking alcoholic beverages. While this case presents the opportunity to define 
specifically a peace officer's duty in this respect, we decline to do so both on 
the ground that it is beyond our arena of expertise and on the ground that rigid 
rules are not consistent with the realities of law enforcement. Consequently, we 
resort to traditional tort principles and hold that a peace officer's duty to 
investigate a potential DWUI violation during an unrelated traffic stop is 
dictated by what a reasonable peace officer of ordinary prudence would do under 
like circumstances.

[¶19]   Keehn bypassed the precise issue of 
whether there is a legally enforceable duty to arrest and stated simply that 
officers had a duty to investigate potential DUI violations. Keehn further 
recognized the fact that rigid rules are simply not compatible with the 
realities of law enforcement in today's society. Wyoming statutes recognize that 
fact as well by granting to peace officers the discretion to arrest or issue a 
traffic ticket as the situation, in the officer's judgment, dictates. Indeed, to 
impose upon peace officers the duty to arrest and detain all potential DUI 
violators would force police to choose between potential liability on the one 
hand for false arrest and on the other hand for failure to make an arrest. Such 
a choice would effectively paralyze the government's right to carry out its 
essential functions free of the threat of undue litigation. See Shore v. Town of 
Stonington, 444 A.2d 1379, 1384 (Conn. 1982).

[¶20]   We hold that the decision to arrest 
is a discretionary function, not mandated by Wyoming statutes, and that, in the 
absence of a legal duty to arrest, the negligence claim against the officers 
must be dismissed. Having determined that appellants' first issue is 
dispositive, we find it unnecessary to address the remaining issues of proximate 
cause and qualified immunity.

[¶21]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed.