Title: ROBBIE HEYWOOD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROBBIE HEYWOOD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 149170 P.3d 1227Case Number: 06-150Decided: 09/19/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
ROBBIE 
HEYWOOD,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

D. 
Terry 
Rogers, InterimState Public Defender; Donna D. 
Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

 
 

Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. 
Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Eric Johnson, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; 
Geoffrey Gunnerson, Student Director, and Mackenzie Williams and Brian J. 
Hunter, Student Interns.  Argument by Mr. Hunter.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the appellant's convictions on three counts of second-degree sexual 
assault.  The 
appellant contends that the district court erred in refusing to give certain 
lesser-included offense instructions and in failing to answer a question 
presented by the jury during deliberations.  We affirm the district court's decision in 
regard to the lesser-included offense instructions, but we reverse because of 
plain error in failing to answer the jury question.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.  Did the district 
court err in refusing to instruct the jury that third-degree sexual assault and 
sexual battery are lesser-included offenses to the crime of second-degree sexual 
assault?

 
 
            
2.  Did 
the district court commit plain error in declining to answer a question 
presented by the jury during its deliberations asking the court to identify 
which allegation formed the basis for each of the three separate counts?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In May 2005, the 
Laramie County Sheriff's Office received a report that the appellant was 
sexually abusing his stepdaughter (the victim), who was then in the fourth 
grade.  During 
an interview with law enforcement officers, and in her trial testimony, the 
victim described an on-going course of sexual abuse by the appellant over the 
past two years involving countless incidents of vaginal and anal penetration, 
both digital and penile, as well as fellatio and the use of dildos.  The appellant was 
also interviewed and testified at trial.  Although he denied any intentional wrongdoing, 
he did describe three instances during April and May of 2005 in which digital 
sexual intrusion could have accidentally occurred with the victim, an incident 
in which his penis was accidentally exposed to the victim and her sister, and 
another separate incident in which he found the victim using a dildo.

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant 
described the first incident where he might have accidentally penetrated the 
victim as having occurred in a shed.  He stated that the victim had removed her 
pants to ask him a question about her sexual development, and then had sat down 
on his hand, which was on top of his leg.  He was startled by a friend entering the 
shed, and when he stood up, he may have inserted a finger in her rectum.  The second incident 
occurred in April 2005, when he walked into his bedroom and found the victim 
with a very large dildo inserted in her vagina.  The appellant stated that when he grabbed the 
dildo to remove it, he may inadvertently have pushed it in further before 
pulling it out.  
The appellant further told of a second time when he came upon the victim 
in the bedroom, this time with a dildo inserted in her rectum.  He also told of an 
occurrence where the family's dog accidentally pulled down the appellant's 
pajamas, which exposed his penis to the victim and her sister.  Finally, the 
appellant described an incident where he was attempting to remove a sliver from 
the area between the victim's anus and vagina, or in her upper thigh.  He claimed that he 
must have "hit a nerve" and that one of his fingers may have "gone in."

 
 
[¶5]      An Information was 
filed charging the appellant with three counts of second-degree sexual 
assault.  The 
appellant waived a preliminary examination, and the case went to trial on 
January 9, 2006.  
The jury found him guilty of all three counts, and the judge sentenced 
him to three consecutive terms of eight to ten years in prison.  Additional facts 
will be presented as part of the discussion set forth below.

 
 
STATUTES

 
 
[¶6]      To aid in further 
discussion, we will set out each of the relevant statutes as they existed at the 
time of the crimes alleged in this case.1  The three 
second-degree sexual assault charges were based upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-303(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2003):

 
 
(a)    Any actor who inflicts sexual 
intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second degree if, under 
circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first degree:

 
 
         . . 
. .

 
 
(vi)    The actor is in a position of 
authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to cause the 
victim to submit[.]

 
 
[¶7]      The version of 
third-degree sexual assault sought as a lesser-included offense by the appellant 
was found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003):

 
 
(a)    An actor commits sexual assault 
in the third degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in 
the first or second degree:

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
(ii)     The actor is an adult and 
subjects a victim under the age of fourteen (14) years to sexual contact without 
inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing serious bodily 
injury to the victim[.]

 
 
[¶8]      The appellant also 
sought an instruction on sexual battery, as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-313(a) (LexisNexis 2003), as a lesser-included offense:

 
 
(a)    Except under circumstances 
constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, 6-2-502 or 14-3-105, 
an actor who unlawfully subjects another person to any sexual contact is guilty 
of sexual battery[.]

 
 
[¶9]      "Sexual contact" and 
"sexual intrusion" are defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a) (LexisNexis 2003) 
as follows:

 
 
. . . .

 
 
(vi)    "Sexual contact" means touching, 
with the intention of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, of the victim's 
intimate parts by the actor, or of the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or 
of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate 
parts;

 
 
(vii)   "Sexual intrusion" means:

 
 
(A)     Any intrusion, however 
slight, by any object or any part of a person's body, except the mouth, tongue 
or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another person's body if that 
sexual intrusion can reasonably by construed as being for the purposes of sexual 
arousal, gratification or abuse; or

 
 
(B)     Sexual intercourse, 
cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or anal intercourse with or without 
emission.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did the district court err in refusing to instruct the 
jury that third-degree sexual assault and sexual 
battery are lesser-included offenses to the crime  of 
second-degree sexual assault?

 
 
[¶10]   After the evidence was presented, the 
appellant offered two lesser-included offense instructionsthird-degree sexual 
assault and sexual batteryboth of which instructions were refused by the 
district court.  
Wyoming's law governing 
lesser-included offense instructions can be summarized as follows.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-502 (LexisNexis 2007) and W.R.Cr.P. 31(c) provide that a criminal 
"defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense 
charged[.]"  
The right recognized by this rule implicates the defendant's right to the 
due process of law.  
Paramo v. 
State, 896 P.2d 1342, 1344 
(Wyo. 1995).  A lesser-included 
offense is "necessarily included" in the greater offense if its elements are a 
subset of the latter's elements.  Dean v. State, 2003 WY 128, ¶ 14, 77 P.3d 692, 697 (Wyo. 2003).  
However, the jury must be instructed as to the lesser offense only if 
there is at least minimal evidence that could cause the jury to convict on the 
lesser, rather than the greater offense.  Id. at ¶¶ 18-19, 77 P.3d  at 
698-99.  The 
failure to give a lesser-included offense instruction in those circumstances 
constitutes reversible error.  Paramo, 896 P.2d  at 1344.  Whether a 
lesser-included offense instruction should be given is a question of law that we 
review de 
novo.  Dean, ¶ 12, 77 P.3d  at 696.

 
 
[¶11]   We will first consider the third-degree 
sexual assault statute.  For purposes of the present analysis, the 
date and venue of the offense, and the identity of the perpetrator are not 
relevant because they are the same in both statutes.  Elements found in 
the greater offensesecond-degree sexual assaultbut not found in the lesser 
offensethird-degree sexual assaultalso are not relevant, because they do not 
help to answer the question of whether the elements of the lesser offense are a 
subset of elements found in the greater offense.  Therefore, the only relevant element of the 
crime of second-degree sexual assault, as charged in this case, is:

 
 
1.   The appellant inflicted sexual 
intrusion upon the victim.

 
 
[¶12]   The relevant elements of the crime of 
third-degree sexual assault, under the statutory subsection presented by the 
appellant in his proposed lesser-included offense instruction, are:

 
 
1.   The appellant was at least 18 years of 
age.

 
 
2.   The appellant subjected the victim to 
sexual contact.

 
 
3.   The victim was under the age of 14 
years.

 
 
[¶13]   The dichotomy between these two 
statutory subsections leaves little need for further analysis.  This version of 
second-degree sexual assault requires neither that the actor be at least 18 
years of age, nor that the victim be under the age of 14 years.  The only element of 
this version of third-degree sexual assault that might be said to be a "subset" 
of the elements of this version of second-degree sexual assault is sexual 
contact, if  that statutory 
phrase can be seen as necessarily being subsumed in the statutory phrase "sexual 
intrusion."  
Given the elements of third-degree sexual assault, as defined in the 
statute presented for inclusion as a lesser-included offense, third-degree 
sexual assault is not a lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault, 
as charged.  
Consequently, the district court did not err in refusing to give that 
instruction.

 
 
[¶14]   The next question is whether the crime 
of sexual battery is a lesser-included offense to the crime of second-degree 
sexual assault as charged in this case.  Once again, a comparison of the relevant 
elements of the two crimes is necessary.  The relevant element of second-degree sexual 
assault is the same as delineated above.  See supra ¶ 11.  The relevant element of sexual battery 
is:

 
 
1.   The appellant unlawfully subjected the 
victim to sexual contact.

 
 
[¶15]   One way to pose this question is to ask 
whether the appellant must have unlawfully subjected the victim to sexual 
contact in order to inflict sexual intrusion upon her in the manner alleged in 
the second-degree assault statute.  There can be little argument that the words 
"unlawfully subjects" in the crime of sexual battery, and the words "inflicts" 
and "submit" in the crime of second-degree sexual assault, both describe conduct 
by the actor against the will of the victim.  Furthermore, the act of touching the intimate 
parts of the victim, as required for sexual contact, certainly must be 
accomplished as part of the act of intrusion into the genital or anal opening of 
the victim's body, as required for sexual intrusion.2  To that extent, 
sexual battery appears to be a lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual 
assault.

 
 
[¶16]   The further question, however, is 
whether the mens rea 
element of the two statutes is different.  Digital intrusion or intrusion with an object 
such as a dildo is only second-degree sexual assault under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
6-2-303(a)(vi) and 6-2-301(a)(vii)(A) if that "intrusion can reasonably be 
construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or 
abuse." (Emphasis added.)  To the contrary, sexual contact is unlawful 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-313(a) and 6-2-301(a)(vi) if done "with the intention 
of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse." (Emphasis added.)

 
 
[¶17]   We have previously interpreted the 
emphasized language in the definition of sexual intrusion as not creating a 
specific intent crime, and not creating a requirement that the State prove 
that the actor subjectively intended sexual arousal, gratification, or 
abuse.  
Bryan v. State, 745 P.2d 905, 908 
(Wyo. 1987).  In other words, 
second-degree sexual assault, as charged in this case, does not include as an 
element that the appellant specifically intended sexual arousal, gratification, 
or abuse.3  The language of the definition of sexual 
contact, as noted above, is different.  See supra ¶ 9.  Sexual touching, under that definition, is 
only made criminal if done "with the intention of sexual arousal, gratification, 
or abuse."  It 
follows that the State must prove that intention as an element of the crime of 
sexual battery.  
See Bailey v. 
State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2002).  Because the State need not do so to prove 
second-degree sexual assault as charged in this case, the crime of sexual 
battery contains an element not contained in second-degree sexual assault, and 
is, therefore, not a lesser-included offense of that crime.  The district court 
did not err in refusing to give the lesser-included offense instruction.

 
 
Did the district court commit plain error in declining to 
answer a question presented by the jury during its deliberations asking the 
court to identify which allegation formed the basis for each of the three 
separate counts?

 
 
[¶18]   At some time during its deliberations, 
the jury apparently sent a note to the judge seeking information about the 
individual counts of the Information.  We say "apparently," because such a 
handwritten note is in the trial court file, along with what appears to be the 
judge's typed and signed response.  The record does not reflect, however, when or 
whether the note was sent to the judge, whether it was discussed with counsel 
and the appellant, how the responsive language was chosen, whether the jury was 
brought back into the courtroom for reading of the response, or even whether the 
response was read to the jury.  At any rate, the note found in the record 
reads as follows:

 
 
Are the three counts  

 
 
1.   In the shed?

 
 
2.   Use of the sex toys?

 
 
3.   When removing the splinter?

 
 
[¶19]   The court's apparent response to the 
jury's question reads as follows:

 
 
            
The Court is unable to further instruct on this.  You must rely on 
your recollection of the evidence and argument and consider the 
Instructions.

 
 
[¶20]   The parties both contend that the plain 
error standard of review applies to this issue because the record does not 
indicate that the appellant objected to the district court's decision not to 
provide a substantive answer to the jury's question.  We recently stated 
in Magallanes v. 
State, 2006 WY 119, ¶ 18, 142 P.3d 1147, 1152 (Wyo. 
2006), that plain error review requires the appellant to prove the 
following:

 
 
1.   The record is clear as to the alleged 
error.

 
 
2.   A clear and unequivocal rule of law was 
violated in a clear and obvious way.

 
 
3.   The error adversely affected a 
substantial right that materially prejudiced the appellant.

 
 
[¶21]   Before we can even determine what 
standard of review to apply to this issue, we must put the "jury note" in the 
context of the proceedings as they existed at that time.  As mentioned above, 
the Information charged the appellant with three counts of second-degree sexual 
assault.  See supra ¶ 5.  All three counts 
contained the following identical language:

 
 
1.    On or about April 1, 2005, 
through May 27, 2005;

 
 
2.    In the County of Laramie and the State of Wyoming;

 
 
3.    ROBBIE L. HEYWOOD

 
 
4.    Did unlawfully inflict sexual 
intrusion on the victim and the actor was in a position of authority over the 
victim and used this position of authority to cause the victim to submit, to 
wit:  did 
unlawfully inflict sexual intrusion on [the victim], a female minor, and Robbie 
L. Heywood was in a position of authority over her and used this position of 
authority to cause her to submit, in violation of W.S. § 6-2-303(A)(vi), 2003 
Lexis, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Wyoming.

 
 
[¶22]   Clearly, the Information utterly fails 
to distinguish one allegation from another, and does not contain a "plain, 
concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the 
offense charged[,]" as required by W.R.Cr.P. 3(b)(2).  In innumerable 
cases, we have examined allegedly deficient charging documents, primarily in the 
context of the question of whether a defendant was provided sufficient notice of 
the crime charged to enable him to defend himself.  See, e.g., Barker v. 
State, 2006 WY 104, ¶ 29, 141 P.3d 106, 116 (Wyo. 
2006); Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, ¶¶ 14-16, 66 P.3d 703, 709 (Wyo. 
2003); Baumgartner 
v. State, 7 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo. 2000).  A second concern is whether the allegation is 
sufficiently specific so as to protect a defendant from double jeopardy.  See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 7 P.3d 15, 19 (Wyo. 2000); 
Vernier v. 
State, 909 P.2d 1344, 1350 
(Wyo. 1996); Apodaca v. State, 
627 P.2d 1023, 1026 
(Wyo. 1981).  Third, factual 
specificity allows the judge, upon conviction, to sentence "according to the 
right of the case."  
Gonzales v. 
State, 551 P.2d 929, 932 
(Wyo. 1976).4  None of these 
issues were raised below or in this appeal, however, and so they have been 
waived.  
Id.  We mention them 
primarily as background for analysis of the jury question.

 
 
[¶23]   Not only were these issues not raised 
below, but the appellant also waived his right to a preliminary examination in 
circuit court, therefore missing that opportunity to make the allegations more 
certain.  
Likewise, the appellant did not seek a bill of particulars for the 
purpose of making the general allegations more specific.  See Hawkes v. 
State, 626 P.2d 1041, 1043 
(Wyo. 1981).  The appellant's 
arraignment in district court was equally of no use in that regard, being 
limited as it was to the following brief colloquy:

 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Heywood.

 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Morning, Your Honor.  [Defense Counsel] 
for Mr. Heywood.  
He appears here for arraignment.  He would be pleading not guilty.  We would waive 
reading of the information.

 
 
THE COURT:  Good morning, Mr. Heywood.  Appears you're here 
on an information charging you with three counts of sexual assault.  Has this 
information been served on you?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.

 
 
THE COURT:  You're fully aware what the charges against 
you are?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, sir.

 
 
THE COURT:  How do you plead to those charges?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Not guilty.

 
 
THE COURT:  A plea of not guilty is herein entered, trial 
set for Monday, August 8th.

 
 
. . . .

 
 
[¶24]   The next step in these proceedings at 
which the particular factual basis for each count could have been identified 
would have been the instruction conference.  That conference was not reported, so there is 
no transcript thereof in the record, but the record does reflect that defense 
counsel did not object to any of the ten numbered instructions that were read to 
the jury.  
Instruction No. 3 was the elements instruction, and it read in pertinent 
part as follows:

 
 
            
The essential elements of the crime of second degree sexual assault as 
charged in Count I of the Information, are:

 
 
1.   On or about April 1, 2005, through May 
27, 2005,

 
 
2.   In Laramie 
County, Wyoming,

 
 
3.   The Defendant, Robbie L. Heywood,

 
 
4.   Inflicted sexual intrusion on [the 
victim], and

 
 
5.   The Defendant was in a position of 
authority over the victim, and

 
 
6.   The Defendant used that position of 
authority to cause the victim to submit to that sexual intrusion.

 
 
This identical language was used for counts II and 
III.  The 
verdict form, to which there likewise was no objection from defense counsel, 
read as follows:

 
 
            
We, the jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled cause do 
find as follows:

 
 
1.   As to the charge of second degree 
sexual assault as charged in Count I of the Information, we find the defendant, 
ROBBIE L. HEYWOOD,

 
 
      _____  Guilty      
            
_____  
Not Guilty

 
 
2.   As to the charge of second degree 
sexual assault as charged in Count II of the Information, we find the defendant, 
ROBBIE L. HEYWOOD,

 
 
      _____  Guilty                  
_____  
Not Guilty

 
 
3.   As to the charge of second degree 
sexual assault as charged in Count III of the Information, we find the 
defendant, ROBBIE L. HEYWOOD,

 
 
      _____  Guilty                  
_____  
Not Guilty

 
 
[¶25]   This is the procedural context in which 
the jury, apparently, and not surprisingly, sent a note to the judge asking, in 
effect, what crime it was to deliberate upon under each of the three 
counts.  
Although much of the testimony and argument had focused upon the three 
incidents that the appellant had described to the investigating officer, and to 
which both the appellant and that officer had testified, at no time was the jury 
ever specifically told that those were the three crimes at issue, or that the 
first count involved the shed incident, the second count involved the "sex toy" 
incidents, and the third count involved the splinter incident, if that was, 
indeed the intent of the Information, the instruction, and the verdict form.

 
 
[¶26]   It is possible, perhaps probable, that 
the parties knew what particular incidents formed the bases for these 
allegations.  
But that is not sufficient.  The jury must be adequately instructed to 
allow it to apply the law to the facts.  To determine whether that happened, we review 
jury instructions under the following standard:

 
 
Jury instructions should inform the jurors concerning the 
applicable law so that they can apply that law to their findings with respect to 
the material facts, instructions should be written with the particular facts and 
legal theories of each case in mind and often differ from case to case since any 
one of several instructional options may be legally correct, a failure to give 
an instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental 
error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, and the test of whether a 
jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is 
whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the 
crime can be found to have been committed.

 
 

Leyva v. State, 2005 WY 22, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 873, 876 (Wyo. 
2005) (quoting 
Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 
134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 2001) (emphasis added); see also Gabbert v. 
State, 2006 WY 108, ¶ 11, 141 P.3d 690, 695 (Wyo. 
2006); Lopez v. 
State, 2006 WY 97, ¶ 14, 139 P.3d 445, 452 (Wyo. 
2006); Burkhardt v. 
State, 2005 WY 96, ¶ 12, 117 P.3d 1219, 1223 (Wyo. 
2005).  
Further:

 
 
The trial court's ruling on an instruction must be 
prejudicial to constitute reversible error.  Since the function of jury instructions is to 
give guidance regarding the applicable law, prejudice results when the 
instructions confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles 
of law.

 
 

McGuire v. Solis, 2005 WY 129, ¶ 23, 120 P.3d 1020, 1026 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶27]   This jury question, if that is what it 
was, facially reflects the jury's confusion.  Instruction No. 3 informed the jury that 
"[e]ach count is a separate charge, and the proof as to each must stand on its 
own, so you must separately consider and determine what the evidence shows as to 
each count."  
It is easy to surmise that, as the jury began its deliberations, it had 
no idea what the allegation in count I (or count II or count III) was, and 
therefore asked the judge for guidance.  The judge's answer"I can't tell you"was 
inadequate.5  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-11-209 and 7-11-204 
(LexisNexis 2007) clearly permit the judge further to instruct the jury after 
deliberations have begun when a question arises as to the evidence or the law, 
and in numerous cases over the years we have addressed the exercise of that 
discretion.  See, e.g., Carlson v. 
Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 214-15 
(Wyo. 1995); In re CH, 783 P.2d 155, 158 
(Wyo. 1989); Johnston v. State, 
747 P.2d 1132, 1133-35 
(Wyo. 1987); Hoskins v. State, 
552 P.2d 342, 349 
(Wyo. 1976).  

 
 
[¶28]   Beyond the power to answer such 
questions is the duty to answer such questions:

 
 
            
A number of courts have held that if the original instructions are 
incomplete or if the jury, or any of the individual jurors, express confusion or 
lack of understanding of a significant element of applicable law, it is the 
court's duty to give additional instructions.  The refusal of a jury's request for an 
instruction may constitute reversible error.

 
 
75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 944 (2007).

 
 
[¶29]   The foregoing principles of law can be 
summarized for present purposes as follows:  (1) instructions that leave doubt as to the 
circumstances under which the crime was committed are insufficient; (2) 
instructions that confuse or mislead the jury are insufficient; (3) jury 
questions revealing confusion or a lack of understanding should be 
answered.  
Comparison of a few cases will show how these principles have been 
applied in jury question cases.  In Rissler & McMurry v. Snodgrass, 854 P.2d 69, 70-71 
(Wyo. 1993), we found plain error where the district court failed to follow 
statutory mandates in answering a jury question, even though the out-of-court 
procedure it followed was approved by counsel.  To the contrary, we affirmed in Beck v. Townsend, 
2005 WY 84, ¶¶ 14-16, 116 P.3d 465, 472-73 (Wyo. 
2005), even though the district court did not follow statutory procedures, on 
the ground that there was no prejudice because the answer given to the jury's 
question was the only answer that could be given, and left no confusion.   In Natural Gas Processing 
Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1187-88 (Wyo. 1994), we opined that Rissler had not 
"obviat[ed] the need for the harmless error doctrine," and described the type of 
error that we considered to be reversible error in the jury question 
scenario:

 
 
We have searched this record and find no error that, to 
leave uncorrected, "would cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to 
the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process."  [Abdullah v. Gunter, 
242 Neb. 854, 497 N.W.2d 12, 15 
(1993)]; neither are we convinced that the claimed error "possessed a clear 
capacity to bring about an unjust result."  Gluckauf v. Pine Lake Beach Club, Inc., 78 N.J.Super. 
8, 187 A.2d 357, 366 (1963).

 
 

Id. at 1188.

 
 
[¶30]   In light of all we have said above, we 
conclude that the district court committed prejudicial error in failing to 
provide a substantive answer to the jury's question in this case, if the paper 
in the file was, indeed, a jury question.  Even without that error, the instructions 
were inadequate.  
The fundamental problem is that, contrary to law, we are left in doubt as 
to the circumstances under which a crime was found to have been committed under 
any of the three counts.  The jury clearly could have been confused as to 
what the charge was under each count, and the judge apparently did not clear 
up that confusion.  
The reason that the jury could have been confused, of 
course, is the fact that neither the Information, nor the elements instruction, 
nor the verdict form, was properly drafted.  Beyond that, not only is the jury supposed to 
consider the evidence as it applies to each count, one by one, which was 
impossible to do in this case, but the judge is to sentence on each count, with 
the nature of the offense being part of the sentencing consideration.  That was also 
impossible for him to do.

 
 
[¶31]   There was some temptation to affirm the 
three convictions on the ground that there was sufficient evidence of the shed 
incident, the dildo incident, and the sliver incident to justify a finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each of them.  It has to be remembered, however, that there 
was also evidence of fellatio, and twelve to fourteen incidents of vaginal or 
anal intrusion during the two-month period charged in the Information.  From the record, we 
do not know for sure what incidents were charged, and we do not know for certain 
what incidents were found by the jury to have been committed.

 
 
[¶32]   One last note:  we were told by 
both parties to apply plain error analysis because the record did not reflect 
that defense counsel had objected to the district court's decision not to give a 
substantive answer to the jury question.  The trouble is that the record does not 
reflect that defense counsel was ever given an opportunity to object, meaning 
that plain error analysis may or may not be appropriate.  We are mindful of 
the fact that the appellant bears the burden of bringing to this court a record 
sufficient for review.  White v. Table Mountain Ranches Owners Ass'n, Inc., 2006 WY 2, ¶ 10, 125 P.3d 1019, 1021 (Wyo. 
2006).  The 
record is fundamental because this Court does not act as a fact finder.  Williams v. Dietz, 
999 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo. 
2000).   While the present 
record is inadequate to the extent that the Information, the instructions, and 
the verdict form are inadequate, and to the extent that it does not reveal 
whether or not the district court followed mandatory procedures in handling the 
jury question, we are of the opinion that those inadequacies should be laid at 
the doorstep of the State and the doorstep of the district court, more so than 
at the doorstep of the appellant.  The obligation to bring a complete record to 
this Court does not include the obligation to ensure that the State and the 
district court fulfill their obligations during the prosecution.  The problems in 
this case go far beyond the inadequacy of the appellate record, and it is the 
obligation of the State and the district court to provide due process of law to 
a criminal defendant.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶33]   Neither third-degree sexual assault nor 
sexual battery is a lesser-included offense to second-degree sexual assault as 
proposed in this case.  The district court did not err in refusing to 
instruct the jury as to lesser-included offenses.  Reversible error occurred, however, when the 
district court failed adequately to instruct the jury as to the separate crimes 
charged and when it apparently failed to provide the jury with a substantive 
response to its question concerning the charged offenses, because the question 
reflected obvious and understandable confusion as to how to apply the law to the 
facts.

 
 
[¶34]   Reversed and remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The sexual assault statutes were radically amended in 
2007.

 
 

2The phrase "intimate parts" is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-301(a)(ii) as meaning "the external genitalia, perineum, anus or pubes of 
any person or the breast of a female person."

 
 

3As we have noted in other cases, it is often more helpful 
to focus upon intent as a substantive element of a crime, rather than to try to 
distinguish between specific intent and general intent crimes.  See Seymore v. 
State, 2007 WY 32, ¶ 13, 152 P.3d 401, 405 (Wyo. 
2007); Keats v. 
State, 2003 WY 19, ¶¶ 10, 13, 64 P.3d 104, 107, 108 
(Wyo. 2003).

 
 

4For general discussions of the need for factual specificity 
in charging documents, see 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal 
Procedure §§ 
237-38, 265 (13th ed. 1990); Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, & 
Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure §§ 19.2(b), 19.2(c), 19.2(d), 
19.3(b) (2d ed. 1999).

 
 

5Once again, this discussion is based upon an assumption 
founded upon documents located in the record.  The transcript is barren in regard to the 
assumed question from the jury and answer from the 
judge.