Title: Lawrence A. Kruckenberg v. Paul S. Harvey

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 43  
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1813 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Lawrence A. Kruckenberg,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Paul S. Harvey,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 133 
Reported at:  274 Wis. 2d 424, 685 N.W.2d 844 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 14, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 1, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Green Lake   
 
JUDGE: 
William M. McMonigal   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
William H. Gergen and Gergen, Gergen & Pretto, S.C., Beaver Dam, 
and oral argument by William H. Gergen. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Jim D. 
Scott and Wood Law Offices, LLC, Oxford, and oral argument by 
Daniel G. Wood. 
 
 
 
2005 WI 43  
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1813  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 112) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Lawrence A. Kruckenberg,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Paul S. Harvey,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 14, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming 
a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for Green Lake County, 
William M. McMonigal, Judge.  The circuit court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant, Paul S. Harvey, dismissing 
plaintiff Lawrence A. Kruckenberg's action alleging trespass and 
conversion and seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the 
location 
of 
the 
boundary 
line 
between 
their 
respective 
                                                 
1 Kruckenberg v. Harvey, 2004 WI App 133, 274 Wis. 2d 424, 
685 N.W.2d 844. 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
2 
 
properties.  The circuit court's order denied reconsideration of 
the judgment.  The court of appeals affirmed the judgment and 
order of the circuit court. 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether the doctrine of claim 
preclusion bars the plaintiff's action.  The prior action 
brought by the plaintiff's predecessor in title against the 
defendant was for failing to provide lateral support; the 
defendant had dug a ditch.  The prior action ended in a judgment 
of dismissal on the merits.  The plaintiff's present action 
against the defendant is for trespass and conversion (the 
cutting and taking of trees) and for a declaratory judgment 
regarding the location of the boundary line between the 
plaintiff's and defendant's land.  
¶3 
We conclude that the case at bar presents a special 
circumstance to which the doctrine of claim preclusion will not 
apply, namely, when a prior action between parties or their 
privies does not explicitly determine the location of a boundary 
line between their properties, claim preclusion will not bar a 
later declaratory judgment action to determine the location of 
the boundary line.2  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.  
I 
                                                 
2 The 
trespass 
and 
conversion 
claim, 
based 
on 
the 
defendant's conduct after the 1982 action and on a determination 
of the location of the boundary line between the plaintiff's and 
defendant's properties, may also go forward. 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
3 
 
¶4 
For purposes of deciding how to apply the doctrine of 
claim preclusion to the present case, we set forth the following 
facts derived from the record on the motion for summary 
judgment.   
¶5 
The question of claim preclusion in the present case 
arises from a lawsuit brought by Donald A. Czyzewski, the 
plaintiff's predecessor in title, against the defendant in 1982.  
According to the 1982 complaint, the defendant dug a ditch along 
the northern boundary of his property, altering the topography 
and natural watershed, causing Czyzewski's soils and trees to 
collapse, causing the line fence to collapse,3 and causing the 
water level of Czyzewski's pond to subside.     
¶6 
Czyzewski's 1982 complaint alleged that the defendant 
breached a duty of lateral support and a duty to maintain a line 
fence and that his conduct was contrary to Wisconsin Statutes4 
§§ 844.01-.21, relating to physical injury to or interference 
with 
real 
property; 
§ 101.111 
relating 
to 
protection 
of 
adjoining property and buildings during excavation; and chapter 
90 relating to fences.  For the alleged violations, Czyzewski 
requested: (1) restoration of the line fence, (2) restoration of 
the eroded portion of his property, (3) restoration of the water 
level, and (4) $10,000.  
                                                 
3 "Line fence" generally refers to a fence separating two 
parcels of land. 
4 1981-82 version. 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
4 
 
¶7 
The defendant's answer to the 1982 complaint admitted 
that the defendant and Czyzewski owned adjoining parcels and 
that the defendant had dug the ditch along the northern boundary 
of his property.  The defendant denied all other allegations of 
the complaint.   
¶8 
On April 6, 1983, on stipulation of the parties, the 
circuit court entered an order dismissing the Czyzewski suit on 
its merits.  The defendant agreed to pay Czyzewski $1,500 and 
plant rye grass along the drainage ditch to prevent erosion.  
¶9 
Czyzewski's sale of his parcel to the plaintiff was 
completed after the 1982 lawsuit was dismissed, and the 
plaintiff claims he did not know about the lawsuit.  
¶10 The plaintiff had his land surveyed in 2000 and 
learned that the "line fence" was not on the boundary line; the 
fence was 16 feet north of his property's southern boundary.  In 
other words, the survey showed that the plaintiff's property 
included a strip of about 16 feet wide that was previously 
thought to belong to the defendant and on which the defendant 
had dug a ditch.  
¶11 Peace between the parties was disturbed in "late 
winter and early spring of 2001" when the defendant decided to 
harvest some trees on the south side of the fence; according to 
the 2000 survey, the trees were on the plaintiff's property.  
The plaintiff asked the defendant not to cut the trees.   
¶12 After the defendant removed the trees, the plaintiff, 
armed with his new survey, sued the defendant for trespass and 
conversion (cutting and taking the trees), failure to provide 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
5 
 
lateral support (failing to plant rye grass continually to 
prevent erosion), and a declaratory judgment regarding the 
location of the boundary line between their properties.  The 
defendant denied many of the allegations of the complaint, 
asserted the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel, and 
counterclaimed on the ground that the defendant and his 
predecessors in title had acquired title by adversely possessing 
the disputed 16 feet for the requisite period of time. 
¶13 The circuit court granted summary judgment in the 
defendant's favor and dismissed the action.  The circuit court 
ruled that the plaintiff could not challenge the location of the 
line fence as not being the boundary line because of the 
doctrine of claim preclusion.  The circuit court found that the 
line fence was an issue in the 1982 lawsuit and in effect placed 
the boundary line at the line fence.  The circuit court also 
ruled that the issue of lateral support was litigated in 1982 
and that the doctrine of issue preclusion therefore barred this 
count.5     
¶14 A divided court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's judgment of dismissal, also on the ground that the 
lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.6  The 
dissent reasoned, in part, that the application of claim 
                                                 
5 The lateral support cause of action is not at issue in 
this review. 
6 Kruckenberg, 274 Wis. 2d 424, ¶20. 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
6 
 
preclusion to Kruckenberg, given the facts of this case, was 
unfair.7 
II 
¶15 This court reviews a grant of summary judgment using 
the same methodology as the circuit court.8  A motion for summary 
judgment will be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2001-02).9  
¶16 In the present case no genuine issue of material fact 
exists.   
¶17 The only question presented is one of law, namely 
whether the defendant is entitled to judgment on the ground of 
claim preclusion.  This court determines this question of law 
                                                 
7 Kruckenberg, 274 Wis. 2d 424, ¶24 (Nettesheim, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I would hold that 
the application of the doctrine against Kruckenberg does not 
pass the fairness test of the inquiry."). 
8 Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 230 Wis. 2d 212, 
222, 601 N.W.2d 627 (1999). 
9 See Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 222.  All subsequent references 
to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to the 2001-02 version unless 
otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
7 
 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals, 
benefiting from their analyses.10     
III 
¶18 To decide this case we must determine the application 
of the doctrine of claim preclusion.11  
¶19  The doctrine of claim preclusion provides that a 
final judgment on the merits in one action bars parties from 
relitigating any claim that arises out of the same relevant 
facts, transactions, or occurrences.12  When the doctrine of 
claim preclusion is applied, a final judgment on the merits will 
                                                 
10 Lindas v. Cady, 183 Wis. 2d 547, 552, 515 N.W.2d 458 
(1994) (citing DePratt v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Wis. 2d 
306, 310, 334 N.W.2d 883 (1983) ("On review of a determination 
as to whether the doctrine of res judicata applies, we are 
presented with a question of law." (citation omitted)). 
11 In Wisconsin, the "term claim preclusion replace[d] res 
judicata; 
the 
term 
issue 
preclusion 
replace[d] 
collateral 
estoppel."  Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 232 n.25 (citing N. States 
Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723 
(1995)).   
Although the trend has been to replace the phrases "res 
judicata" and "collateral estoppel" with the clearer terms 
"claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion" respectively, some 
commentators and cases still retain the older language.  This 
mix of terminology has no doubt complicated the discussion of 
the 
preclusion 
doctrines. 
 
See 
David 
L. 
Shapiro, 
Civil 
Procedure: 
Preclusion 
in 
Civil 
Actions 
9 
(2001) 
("'Res 
judicata,' said one wry observer of the field, 'is hard enough.'  
And it is made even harder by the failure of courts and 
commentators to agree on the appropriate terminology——even on 
the proper use of the term 'res judicata' itself." (citation 
omitted)). 
12 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 233 (citing N. States Power Co., 
189 Wis. 2d at 550; DePratt v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Wis. 
2d 306, 311-12, 334 N.W.2d 883 (1983)). 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
8 
 
ordinarily bar all matters "'which were litigated or which might 
have been litigated in the former proceedings.'"13     
¶20 Claim preclusion thus provides an effective and useful 
means to establish and fix the rights of individuals, to relieve 
parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, to 
conserve judicial resources, to prevent inconsistent decisions, 
and to encourage reliance on adjudication.14  The doctrine of 
                                                 
13 In contrast, an element of the doctrine of issue 
preclusion is that the issue was actually litigated in a prior 
action.  Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 233 (quoting DePratt, 113 Wis. 2d 
at 310, and citing Lindas, 183 Wis. 2d at 558).  The parties and 
the court agree that the defendant is not barred by the doctrine 
of issue preclusion in the present case; the issue of the 
boundary line between the properties was not litigated in 1982. 
14 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 235 (quoting N. States Power Co., 
189 
Wis. 2d at 
559); 
Warren 
Freedman, 
Res 
Judicata 
and 
Collateral Estoppel 12 (1988) (citing Allan D. Vestal, Res 
Judicata/Preclusion V5-V6 (1969)); Robert C. Casad & Kevin M. 
Clermont, Res Judicata: A Handbook on its Theory, Doctrine, and 
Practice 31 (2001). 
One of the reporters of the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments, Professor David L. Shapiro, has posited: 
 
If a final, valid judgment served only as the 
tribunal's advice on how a controversy should be 
resolved, leaving it to other tribunals (or even other 
officials) to consider the controversy anew if they 
and the parties wished, it would be hard even to think 
of the initial tribunal as a "court" in the accepted 
sense.  And indeed, the need to recognize the finality 
of judgments . . . is fundamental to the status of the 
federal courts under Article III of the Constitution 
and of the courts of many states.   
Shapiro, supra note 11, at 14.  
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
9 
 
claim preclusion recognizes that "endless litigation leads to 
chaos; that certainty in legal relations must be maintained; 
that after a party has had his day in court, justice, 
expediency, and the preservation of the public tranquillity 
requires that the matter be at an end."15 
¶21 In Wisconsin, the doctrine of claim preclusion has 
three elements: 
"(1) identity between the parties or their privies in the 
prior and present suits;  
(2) prior litigation resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits by a court with jurisdiction; and  
(3) identity of the causes of action in the two suits."16 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also Casad & Clermont, supra note 14, at 4 ("At a more 
profound level, res judicata does much more.  It is essential to 
judicial operation, to the orderly working of the judicial 
branch.  If disputants could just reopen their adjudicated 
disputes, there would be no end to litigation, nor any beginning 
of authority."). 
15 Allan D. Vestal, 
Preclusion/Res 
Judicata 
Variables: 
Nature of the Controversy, 1965 Wash. U. L. Q. 158, 158 (quoting 
Schroeder v. 171.74 Acres of Land, 318 F.2d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 
1963)). 
16 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 233-34 (citing N. States Power Co., 
189 Wis. 2d at 551).  Wisconsin's articulation of the elements 
of claim preclusion is consistent with other jurisdictions and 
commentators.  See, e.g., Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Claim 
Preclusion: Judgment for the Claimant, 62 NW. U. L. Rev. 357, 
357-58 (1967-68) (quoting Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98 
(1948)); Freedman, supra note 14, at 12-17 (listing identity of 
parties, identity of claim or cause of action, and finality of 
judgment of award as essential elements of res judicata, that 
is, claim preclusion). 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
10 
 
¶22 In effect, the doctrine of claim preclusion determines 
whether matters undecided in a prior lawsuit fall within the 
bounds of that prior judgment.17  
¶23 The parties do not dispute, and we agree, that the 
first two elements of claim preclusion have been satisfied in 
the case at bar.  The identities of the parties or their privies 
are the same in the present and the prior suits.  The plaintiff 
was the successor in interest to the property owned by 
Czyzewski, and the two are in privity for the purposes of claim 
preclusion.18   
The 1982 litigation resulted in a final judgment 
on the merits by a court with jurisdiction, satisfying the 
second element of claim preclusion.19 
                                                 
17 Kevin M. Clermont, Common-Law Compulsory Counterclaim 
Rule: Creating Effective and Elegant Res Judicata Doctrine, 79 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1745, 1745 (2004). 
18 See S.S. Kresge Co. v. Garrick Realty Co., 209 Wis. 305, 
310, 245 N.W. 118 (1932) ("[A]djudication is res adjudicata and 
binding on the plaintiff as the privy of its assignor."); 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 43 (1982) ("A judgment in an 
action 
that 
determines 
interest 
in 
real 
or 
personal 
property . . . [w]ith respect to the property involved in the 
action . . . [h]as preclusive effects upon a person who succeeds 
to the interest of a party to the same extent as upon the party 
himself."); Casad & Clermont, supra note 14, at 153 ("A 
transferee of an interest in property, who received the interest 
after the commencement of an action concerning the property 
between the transferor and a third party, is in privity with the 
transferor and so is bound or benefited by the adjudication 
relating to that property interest.").   
19 See Werner v. Riemer, 255 Wis. 386, 403, 39 N.W.2d 457 
(1949): 
The fact that part of the adjudication was based upon 
a stipulation of the parties does not affect its 
finality. . . . The final adjudication is conclusive, 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
11 
 
¶24 The parties' disagreement focuses on the third element 
of the doctrine of claim preclusion, namely, the requirement 
that there be an identity of the causes of action or claims in 
the two suits.   
¶25 Wisconsin has adopted the "transactional approach" set 
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments to determine 
whether there is an identity of the claims between two suits.20  
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a valid and final 
judgment in an action extinguishes all rights to remedies 
against a defendant with respect to all or any part of the 
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which 
the action arose.21  The transactional approach is not capable of 
a "mathematically precise definition,"22 and determining what 
factual grouping constitutes a "transaction" is not always easy.  
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (2) (1982) explains 
that 
the 
transactional 
approach 
makes 
the 
determination 
pragmatically, considering such factors as whether the facts are 
related in time, space, origin, or motivation.  Section 24 (2) 
provides as follows:  
(2) What 
factual 
grouping 
constitutes 
a 
"transaction", 
and 
what 
groupings 
constitute 
a 
                                                                                                                                                             
in a subsequent action between the same parties, as to 
all matters which were litigated or which might have 
been litigated in the former proceedings. 
20 DePratt, 113 Wis. 2d at 311-12. 
21 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982). 
22 Id. § 24(2), cmt. b.   
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
12 
 
"series", are to be determined pragmatically, giving 
weight to such considerations as whether the facts are 
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether 
they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their 
treatment 
as 
a 
unit 
conforms 
to 
the 
parties' 
expectations or business understanding or usage.  
¶26 The goal in the transactional approach is to see a 
claim in factual terms and to make a claim coterminous with the 
transaction, regardless of the claimant's substantive theories 
or forms of relief, regardless of the primary rights invaded, 
and regardless of the evidence needed to support the theories or 
rights.23  Under the transactional approach, the legal theories, 
remedies sought, and evidence used may be different between the 
first and second actions.24  The concept of a transaction 
connotes a common nucleus of operative facts.25   
¶27 The 
transactional 
approach 
to 
claim 
preclusion 
reflects "the expectation that parties who are given the 
capacity to present their 'entire controversies' shall in fact 
do so."26  One text states that the pragmatic approach that seems 
most consistent with modern procedural philosophy "looks to see 
if the claim asserted in the second action should have been 
presented for decision in the earlier action, taking into 
                                                 
23 Id. § 24(2), cmt. a. 
24 Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Jendall, 617 A.2d 544, 547 (Me. 1992) 
(applying a transactional test). 
25 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2), cmt. b (1982). 
26 Id. § 24(2), cmt. a. 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
13 
 
account practical 
considerations relating mainly 
to 
trial 
convenience and fairness."27     
¶28 At first blush the events giving rise to the two 
actions (1982 and 2001) do not appear part of the same 
transaction, as they are separated by time, space, origin, and 
motivation.  The 1982 suit was prompted when the defendant dug a 
ditch and allegedly caused Czyzewski to claim erosion to his 
property and damage to the line fence.  The 2001 suit was 
prompted when the defendant cut trees; this time the plaintiff 
claimed trespass on his property and sought a declaratory 
judgment concerning the location of the boundary line between 
the properties.   
¶29 Because the trees were not cut until 2001, obviously 
neither Czyzewski nor the plaintiff could have brought a claim 
for tree cutting and taking (trespass and conversion) in 1982.  
The plaintiff reasons that the 2001 claim is therefore not part 
of the same transaction as the 1982 claim, and he should not be 
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.       
¶30 The plaintiff makes a good point, but he overlooks 
that the aggregate operative facts in both the 1982 and 2001 
claims are the same, namely the defendant's conduct in relation 
to the location of the boundary line.  The facts necessary to 
establish the location of the boundary line between the 
plaintiff's and defendant's properties were in existence in 
1982.   
                                                 
27 Casad & Clermont, supra note 14, at 66. 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
14 
 
¶31 Czyzewski's 1982 claims and judgment depended on who 
owned the property south of the line fence upon which the ditch 
had been dug.  Czyzewski's 1982 claim was that the defendant dug 
a ditch on the defendant's property, injuring Czyzewski's 
property by removing lateral support.28  In 1982, both parties 
were mistaken about the location of the boundary line and the 
ownership of the property upon which the defendant had acted 
when he dug the ditch.  
¶32 Similarly, the plaintiff's 2001 claims depend on who 
owned the property south of the line fence upon which the 
defendant cut trees.  The plaintiff's 2001 claim is that the 
defendant cut trees on the plaintiff's property, an action that 
constitutes trespass and conversion.   
¶33 Even though the 1982 litigation did not determine the 
boundary line, the two lawsuits have such a measure of identity 
of claims that a judgment in the second in favor of the 
plaintiff would appear to impair the rights or interests 
established in the first judgment.       
¶34 The plaintiff's 2001 action might well be precluded 
under the well-settled claim preclusion analysis.  We need not 
decide that difficult question, however, because even if claim 
                                                 
28 "The only proof necessary [to establish a failure to 
provide lateral support] is of the making of the excavation and 
of the injury to the adjoining land in consequence. . . . The 
doctrine of lateral support is applicable only as between 
different landowners."  2 George W. Thompson, Commentaries on 
the Modern Law of Real Property § 415 at 610-11 (Grimes 1980 
replacement). 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
15 
 
preclusion were to apply here, we conclude that the plaintiff's 
2001 lawsuit should proceed under a narrow exception to the 
doctrine of claim preclusion. 
¶35 The parties' current dispute over the common boundary 
line illustrates that claim preclusion in the present case 
presents the "classic struggle between the need for clear, 
simple, and rigid law and the desire for its sensitive 
application."29  Claim preclusion is a harsh doctrine; it 
necessarily results in preclusion of some claims that should go 
forward and it may fail to preclude some claims that should not 
continue.30 
¶36 Judicial 
formulation 
of 
the 
doctrine 
of 
claim 
preclusion should seek to minimize the over-inclusion of the 
doctrine through exceptions that are narrow in scope.31  This 
court has previously stated that "[e]xceptions to the doctrine 
of claim preclusion, confined within proper limits, are 'central 
to the fair administration of the doctrine.'"32 
¶37 Exceptions to the doctrine of claim preclusion are 
rare, but in certain types of cases "the policy reasons for 
                                                 
29 Casad & Clermont, supra note 14, at 40. 
30 Id. at 41. "Flexible or even ad hoc exceptions should 
work 
to 
remedy 
any 
remaining 
over 
inclusion 
of 
[claim 
preclusion] in particular circumstances, but the exceptions 
should be small in scope even if necessarily considerable in 
number." Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236 (quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Judgments § 26, cmt. i). 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
16 
 
allowing an exception override the policy reasons for applying 
the general rule."33      
¶38 Recognizing these truths, the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments 
describes 
exceptions 
to 
the 
doctrine 
of 
claim 
preclusion.  The present case falls within the "special 
circumstances" exception set forth in § 26(1)(f),34 which reads 
as follows: 
(1)  When any of the following circumstances exists, 
the general rule of § 24 does not apply to extinguish 
the claim, and part or all of the claim subsists as a 
possible basis for a second action by the plaintiff 
against the defendant: 
 . . . . 
(f) It is clearly and convincingly shown that the 
policies favoring preclusion of a second action are 
overcome for an extraordinary reason, such as the 
apparent invalidity of a continuing restraint or 
condition having a vital relation to personal liberty 
or the failure of the prior litigation to yield a 
coherent disposition of the controversy. 
¶39 We apply Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(f) 
in the present case.  We conclude that in the present case the 
policies favoring preclusion are overcome for an "extraordinary 
reason," namely, "the failure of the prior litigation to yield a 
coherent disposition of the controversy."35   
                                                 
33 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 235-36 (quoting Patzer v. Bd. of 
Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
34 See Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236-37. 
35 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1)(f) (1982).  
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
17 
 
¶40 In 
Sopha 
v. 
Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas 
Corp., 
230 
Wis. 2d 212, 601 N.W.2d 627 (1999), this court adopted a 
§ 26(1)(f) "special circumstances" exception, addressing the 
narrow issue of multiple injuries with long latency periods that 
result from exposure to asbestos.36  The court recognized that to 
"blindly apply" the doctrine of claim preclusion without 
exceptions does not further a policy of claim preclusion to 
render justice, but rather undermines it.37     
¶41 The exception we adopt is as follows:  When an action 
between parties or their privies does not explicitly determine 
the location of a boundary line, the doctrine of claim 
preclusion will not bar a future declaratory judgment action to 
determine the proper location of the boundary line.   
¶42 The narrowly drawn exception we adopt today serves 
important policy considerations.  
¶43 First, strict application of the doctrine of claim 
preclusion in the present case may result in over-litigation in 
                                                 
36 Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 236-37 ("A holding that claim 
preclusion bars a second action would force claimants to choose 
between seeking recovery for non-malignant asbestos-related 
injuries . . . or waiting for the development of more serious 
malignant injuries.  [The earlier claims of those who wait would 
likely be barred by applicable statutes of limitations.]"). 
37 Id. at 235-36. 
"Wisconsin law does not treat [claim preclusion] as an 
ironclad rule which must be implacably applied whenever its 
literal requirements are met, regardless of any countervailing 
considerations."  Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 235 (quoting Patzer v. 
Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
18 
 
cases involving real property disputes.38  Faced with the 
prospect that they will forever be foreclosed from having 
boundary lines judicially determined in the future if they fail 
to litigate the issue in even the most simple lawsuit involving 
real property, parties will litigate the issue, even when it is 
apparently not in dispute.   
¶44 There is no shortage of everyday situations that may 
implicate the location of a boundary line.  The plaintiff's  
counsel mentioned just a few at oral argument: a pet strays onto 
a neighbor's property; a child throws his or her ball into the 
neighbor's flowerbed; trees overhang the neighbor's shed; guests 
at a party wander onto the neighbor's property.  If any of these 
situations results in a final judgment on the merits without a 
determination of the boundary line, the parties (and their 
privies) would, under the defendant's theory of the present 
case, forever be precluded from determining the location of the 
boundary line.39   
¶45 Second, strict application of the doctrine of claim 
preclusion in the present case may discourage individuals from 
promptly settling lawsuits relating to real property.  Parties 
may fear that without adequate discovery, any stipulated 
                                                 
38 Developments in the Law Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 
818, 820 (1952). 
39 Further, application of claims preclusion without an 
exception would seem to conflict with Wis. Stat. § 841.01, 
whereby any person, at any time, may seek a declaration of 
interests in real property "against any person claiming a 
conflicting interest . . . ." 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
19 
 
dismissal on the merits could terminate rights or claims they 
had yet to even discover were potentially implicated. 
¶46 Lastly, strict application of the doctrine of claim 
preclusion in the present case places process over truth.  The 
boundary line is important to the parties in the present 
litigation and future owners of the properties and should be 
decided on the merits once and for all.  Allowing litigation 
about the boundary line will produce a final judgment that 
definitively settles the issue and can be recorded to put the 
public on notice.  The legal system should, in the present case, 
be more concerned with deciding the location of the boundary 
line 
than 
with 
strictly 
applying 
the 
doctrine 
of 
claim 
preclusion.  
¶47 The parties in the 1982 action believed the boundary 
line was at the line fence.  A survey in 2000 showed the line 
fence was not on the boundary line.  Neither the parties to the 
present litigation, nor their predecessors in title, have ever 
litigated the location of the boundary line.  The boundary line 
can be determined in the present case, without repeating prior 
litigation.  
¶48 Claim preclusion is grounded on a desire to maintain 
reliable and predictable legal relationships.  Public policy 
seeks to ensure that real estate titles are secure and 
marketable, and therefore the doctrine of claim preclusion 
ordinarily will apply in property cases.  But the strict 
application of the doctrine of claim preclusion in the present 
case creates uncertainty.  The policies favoring preclusion of 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
20 
 
the 2001 action are overcome, because the 1982 action, in the 
words of Restatement (Second) of Judgments, "failed to yield a 
coherent disposition of the controversy"40 and "has left the 
parties not in a state of repose but in an unstable and 
intolerable condition."41     
¶49 We hold that barring the declaratory judgment action 
(and the trespass and conversion action) to determine the 
location of the boundary line, when that line has not been 
previously litigated, undermines the policies that are at the 
foundation of the doctrine of claim preclusion.  The unique 
nature of a claim to identify the location of a boundary line 
warrants this narrow exception. 
¶50 We therefore conclude that important policy concerns 
exist that favor creation of a narrowly drawn exception in the 
present case, namely that when a prior action between the 
parties or their privies does not explicitly determine the 
location of a boundary line between the properties, the doctrine 
of claim preclusion will not bar a later declaratory judgment 
action to determine the location of the boundary line.   
¶51 Thus the present action is not barred by the doctrine 
of claim preclusion, and the action may proceed. 
IV 
                                                 
40 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26 (1)(f) (1982). 
41 Id. § 26, cmt. i, illus. 9. 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
21 
 
¶52 Before we conclude, we must briefly address some 
confusion in decisions in the court of appeals about applying a 
fairness element in the doctrine of claim preclusion.  The 
concept of fairness underlies the doctrines of both claim and 
issue preclusion.42  Fairness is an element in the doctrine of 
issue preclusion,43 but this court has not adopted fairness as a 
factor in the doctrine of claim preclusion.44  
                                                 
42 Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 198 Wis. 2d 
738, 743, 543 N.W.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1995) ("The doctrines of 
[issue preclusion and claim preclusion] are founded upon 
principles of fundamental fairness."). 
Similar statements about fairness being a policy underlying 
the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion appear in 
court of appeals decisions.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Hawazen 
Establishment v. Town of Linn, No. 94-3237, unpublished slip op. 
at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1995) ("Second, and more 
importantly, [claim preclusion] is an equitable doctrine founded 
on principles of fundamental fairness."). 
43 N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 551, 525 
N.W.2d 723 (1995); Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 686, 
495 N.W.2d 327 (1993). 
44 Although the court has discussed fairness in claim 
preclusion cases, the discussion has not adopted fairness as an 
element of the doctrine.  For example, in In re Custody of 
D.M.M., 137 Wis. 2d 375, 381-82, 404 N.W.2d 530 (1987), the 
court wrote that "fairness is one aspect of the application of 
res judicata."  However, the opinion suggests that the court was 
discussing issue, not claim, preclusion.   
Fairness 
has 
also 
been 
discussed 
in 
relation 
to 
a 
determination of whether privity existed between parties for 
application of the doctrine of claim preclusion. In determining 
the application of the doctrine of claim preclusion, courts ask 
whether the nonparty has had a full and fair opportunity to 
determine the issue.  
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
22 
 
¶53 The theory is that the doctrine of claim preclusion 
rests on justice (fairness) being served by attributing finality 
to judgments rather than by allowing courts to make second 
efforts at improved results.45  A court's final judgment on the 
merits orders parties' legal rights and duties with respect to 
the particular transaction or known set of facts that gave rise 
to the first suit.46  Individuals cannot act or plan in the 
absence of certainty as to those rights and duties.  Thus claim 
preclusion is strictly applied.     
                                                                                                                                                             
For example, in Pasko v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI 33, 
¶22, 252 Wis. 2d 1, 643 N.W.2d 72, the court was faced with 
whether police officers and the Milwaukee Police Association 
were in privity, the officers having brought the first suit, the 
union the second.  The court concluded that the interests of the 
officers and the union were different and the two were not in 
privity, stating, "We have therefore recognized that, when 
deciding whether to apply claim preclusion to a nonparty's 
action, it is appropriate to consider whether such application 
will result in unfairness to the nonparty."  The discussion 
makes clear that the Pasko court was discussing the "privity" 
requirement of claim preclusion.  
In McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 611, 91 N.W.2d 194 
(1958), a discussion of fairness in the application of res 
judicata was also in the context of discussing privity.  See 
also Hernke v. Coronet Ins. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 170, 178, 240 
N.W.2d 382 (1976) (citing McCourt: "Fairness is one aspect of 
the application of res judicata.").  
These cases should not be read to graft a "fundamental 
fairness" element onto the doctrine of claim preclusion.   
45 "Fairness 
further 
argues 
for 
the 
predictable 
and 
consistent application of relatively wooden preclusion rules 
without overly sizable or flexible exceptions.  Such a scheme 
enables a person to rely on prior adjudication, while ensuring 
even-handed treatment by the doctrine."  Casad & Clermont, supra 
note 14, at 33.  
46 Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion V-8-9 (1969). 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
23 
 
¶54 The United States Supreme Court has expressed this 
view, stating that "fairness" is not an element of claim 
preclusion, as follows:  
The doctrine of res judicata [claim preclusion] serves 
vital public interests beyond any individual judge's 
ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular 
case.  There is simply "no principle of law or equity 
which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of 
the salutary principle of res judicata."  The Court of 
Appeals' reliance on "public policy" is similarly 
misplaced. 
This 
Court 
has 
long 
recognized 
that 
"[p]ublic policy dictates that there be an end of 
litigation; that those who have contested an issue 
shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that 
matters once tried shall be considered forever settled 
as between the parties."47 
 
¶55 This reasoning makes clear that an ad hoc exception to 
the doctrine of claim preclusion cannot be justified simply by 
concluding that it is too harsh to deny an apparently valid 
claim by balancing the values of claim preclusion against the 
desire for a correct outcome in a particular case.48  Case-by-
case exceptions to the application of the doctrine of claim 
preclusion based on fairness "weaken the repose and reliance 
                                                 
47 Federated Dep't Store v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) 
(citation omitted).  
48 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 4415, at 380 (2002). 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
24 
 
values of [claim preclusion] in all cases."49  Nevertheless, 
narrow, 
clear, 
special 
circumstances 
exceptions 
to 
claim 
preclusion have been recognized; they are viewed as less likely 
to undermine certainty in the doctrine of claim preclusion than 
are case-by-case determinations based on fairness. 
¶56 In contrast, fundamental fairness plays a significant 
role in the application of issue preclusion to bar re-
litigation.50  The fundamental fairness standard in the doctrine 
of issue preclusion emerged in Wisconsin and federal courts out 
of a general loosening of the formal requirements of issue 
preclusion.51  Formalistic requirements have been abandoned in 
favor of a looser, equities-based interpretation of the doctrine 
                                                 
49 18 Wright et al., supra note 48, § 4415 at 364 ("But for 
the most part, it is better to avoid weakening claim preclusion 
out of sympathy for the plight of particular plaintiffs and lack 
of sympathy for particular defendants.  The whole doctrine of 
claim preclusion rests on the determination that justice is 
better served by attributing finality to judgments that may be 
wrong than by second efforts to improve results.  Ad hoc 
exception for a few individual cases may not rend the protective 
fabric of claim preclusion for all cases, but there must be some 
better justification for depriving particular defendants of the 
protection afforded most."). 
50 Michelle 
T., 
173 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
687-88 
("Formalistic 
requirements . . . have gradually been abandoned in favor of a 
looser, equities-based interpretation of the [issue preclusion] 
doctrine.").  See also Lindas, 183 Wis. 2d at 559 ("[C]ourts 
consider 
an 
array 
of 
factors 
in 
deciding 
whether 
issue 
preclusion is [fair and] equitable in a particular case."); 
Shapiro, supra note 11, at 48. 
51 Michelle T., 173 Wis. 2d at 689-91.  
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
25 
 
of issue preclusion.52  Wisconsin courts have adopted a flexible 
approach toward the application of issue preclusion.53      
¶57 The different treatment of issue preclusion and claim 
preclusion is based on the differences in the two doctrines.54  A 
precluded issue under issue preclusion does not necessarily 
terminate the subsequent litigation, whereas the subsequent 
litigation ceases when the doctrine of claim preclusion applies.  
When issue preclusion is applied, the rights of persons not 
parties to the original litigation may be implicated; nonparties 
                                                 
52 Michelle T., 173 Wis. 2d at 687-88 ("Today, federal and 
state courts balance competing goals of judicial efficiency and 
finality, 
protection 
against 
repetitious 
or 
harassing 
litigation, and the right to litigate one's claims before a jury 
when deciding whether to permit parties to collaterally estop 
one another."); see also Lindas, 183 Wis. 2d at 559 ("[C]ourts 
consider 
an 
array 
of 
factors 
in 
deciding 
whether 
issue 
preclusion is [fair and] equitable in a particular case."). 
53 Michelle T., 173 Wis. 2d at 690. 
54 For a discussion and chart comparing the rules and 
exceptions to claim preclusion and issue preclusion, see Casad & 
Clermont, supra note 14, at 43-45.  
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
26 
 
(except those in privity with a party in the prior action) are 
not implicated in claim preclusion.55   
¶58 As a consequence of these differences between the two 
doctrines, the policies of finality and repose play a weaker 
role in issue preclusion than in claim preclusion.  The elements 
of issue preclusion are therefore often interpreted with 
flexibility to limit issue preclusion and to exclude issue 
preclusion when its application would be unfair.56    
¶59 We raise the differences between issue preclusion and 
claim preclusion and the application of fairness to the doctrine 
of issue preclusion because, as the defendant correctly points 
out, the court of appeals in this case, and in other cases, has 
improperly added fairness as a fourth element in the doctrine of 
claim preclusion.  Both the majority and dissenting opinions in 
the present case in the court of appeals incorrectly refer to 
"fairness" as an element of claim preclusion.  The majority 
opinion opined: "However, even where these requirements [of 
                                                 
55 For discussions of issue preclusion, see N. States Power 
Co., 189 Wis. 2d at 550 ("Issue preclusion refers to the effect 
of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation in a subsequent action 
of an issue of law or fact that has been actually litigated and 
decided in a prior action."); Michelle T., 173 Wis. 2d at 687 
(issue 
preclusion 
"is 
a 
doctrine 
designed 
to 
limit 
the 
relitigation of issues that have been contested in a previous 
action between the same or different parties."); Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982)("When an issue of fact or law 
is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final 
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, 
the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between 
the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."). 
56 Shapiro, supra note 11, at 46-48.  
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
27 
 
claim preclusion] are satisfied, the ultimate application of 
claim or issue preclusion must also satisfy the additional 
factor of fairness."57  The dissenting opinion explained: "In my 
judgment, the majority opinion represents an unduly rigid 
application of claim or issue preclusion.  I would hold that the 
application of the doctrine against Kruckenberg does not pass 
the fairness test of the inquiry."58 
¶60 Several other published decisions of the court of 
appeals appear to adopt fairness as the fourth element in the 
                                                 
57 Kruckenberg, 274 Wis. 2d 424, ¶8 (citing Steffen v. 
Luecht, 2000 WI App 56, ¶28, 233 Wis. 2d 475, 608 N.W.2d 713). 
"As 
we 
indicated 
previously, 
even 
when 
the 
threshold 
requirements for claim preclusion are satisfied, we still must 
determine whether the application of the doctrine is fair to 
Kruckenberg."  Kruckenberg, 274 Wis. 2d 424, ¶20. 
58 Kruckenberg, 274 Wis. 2d 424, ¶24 (Nettesheim, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
28 
 
doctrine of claim preclusion,59 as do several unpublished 
decisions of the court of appeals.60 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., Menard v. Liteway Lighting Prods., 2004 WI 
App. 95, ¶29, 273 Wis. 2d 439, 685 N.W.2d 365, review granted, 
("Claim preclusion does have fairness as an essential principle 
and must never be applied to deprive a party of the opportunity 
for a full and fair determination."); Steffen v. Luecht, 2000 WI 
App 56, ¶28, 233 Wis. 2d 475, 608 N.W.2d 713 ("Even where the 
threshold requirements of claim preclusion are satisfied, the 
ultimate application of the claim preclusion rests on an 
important additional factor——fairness."); Haeuser v. Haeuser, 
200 Wis. 2d 750, 762, 548 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1996) ("Res 
judicata, like divorce, is also equity based, relying on 
principles of fundamental fairness." (citing Desotelle v. Cont'l 
Cas. Co., 136 Wis. 2d 13, 21, 400 N.W.2d 524 (1986)); Stuart v. 
Stuart, 140 Wis. 2d 455, 461-62, 410 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1987) 
("In applying the doctrine of [claim preclusion], the essential 
principle 
is 
fairness. . . . Here, 
applying 
the 
[claim 
preclusion] doctrine would violate the principle of fairness."). 
60 See, e.g., In re Termination of Parental Rights to 
Genesis M., Nos. 04-2379, 04-2380, unpublished slip op. at 1 n.4 
(Wis. Ct. App., Jan. 19, 2005) ("While Michelle T. references 
issue preclusion only, both parties here suggest that [the 
fairness analysis] applies equally to a consideration of 
applying claim preclusion."); Isermann v. Isermann, No. 03-0354, 
unpublished slip op. at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2003) 
("However, even where these requirements are satisfied, the 
ultimate application of claim or issue preclusion must also 
satisfy the additional factor of fairness."); Mark Schlise 
Revocable Trust v. Beaver, No. 94-0155, unpublished slip op. at 
3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 1994) ("Most important of all, fairness 
is one aspect of the application of [claim preclusion]. Thus, 
the defense of [claim preclusion] cannot be raised even where it 
is 
applicable, 
if 
it 
is 
unfair." 
(citation 
omitted)); 
Centnarowicz 
v. 
Park 
Falls 
Credit 
Union, 
No. 
88-0375, 
unpublished slip op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1988) 
("Finally, 
even 
if 
[claim 
preclusion] 
would 
bar 
the 
Centnarowiczes' suit, the trial court should have declined to 
impose the doctrine in the interest of fairness because they did 
not 
fully 
litigate 
their 
claims 
in 
the 
foreclosure 
proceedings."); Bruha v. Goodman, No. 87-1334, unpublished slip 
op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1988) ("In applying [claim 
preclusion], the essential principle is fairness."). 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
29 
 
¶61 The source of a "fairness element" in the doctrine of 
claim preclusion in court of appeals decisions appears to be 
Desotelle v. Continental Casualty Co., 136 Wis. 2d 13, 400 
N.W.2d 524 (1986).  In Desotelle, the court of appeals noted 
that to apply the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion in 
that case would be grossly and manifestly unfair.  Desotelle 
cites an issue preclusion case, Crowall v. Heritage Mutual 
Insurance Co., 118 Wis. 2d 120, 125-26, 346 N.W.2d 327 (Ct. App. 
1984), for the proposition that in claim preclusion cases the 
fundamental fairness element applies. 
¶62 The court of appeals decisions requiring a court to 
conduct a "fundamental fairness" analysis in applying the 
doctrine of claim preclusion import the fairness concept from 
issue preclusion cases without articulating a rationale for the 
importation.  Furthermore, the importation of a fairness 
analysis 
to 
claim 
preclusion 
contravenes 
basic 
policies 
underlying the doctrine of claim preclusion.  Under these 
circumstances, the efficacy of these court of appeals decisions 
as precedential or persuasive authority is limited.  For these 
reasons, we depart from stare decisis61 and disavow any language 
in the decisions of the court of appeals to the extent that the 
language requires a court to conduct a "fundamental fairness" 
analysis in applying the doctrine of claim preclusion or allows 
litigation of an otherwise barred claim to continue simply 
                                                 
61 See Johnson Controls v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 
108, ¶¶94-100, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.   
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
30 
 
because in that particular case, application of the doctrine of 
claim preclusion might appear unfair. 
* * * * 
¶63 We conclude that the case at bar presents a special 
circumstance to which the doctrine of claim preclusion will not 
apply, namely when a prior action between parties or their 
privies does not explicitly determine the location of a boundary 
line between their properties, claim preclusion will not bar a 
later declaratory judgment action to determine the location of 
the boundary line.62  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for 
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.     
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 The 
trespass 
and 
conversion 
claim, 
based 
on 
the 
defendant's conduct after the 1982 action and on a determination 
of the location of the boundary line between the plaintiff's and 
defendant's properties, may also go forward. 
No. 
2003AP1813   
 
 
 
1