Title: Kiser v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GEORGE A. KISER, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 600, 2002 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IK99-01-0013 thru  
§  IK99-01-0018 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: December 17, 2002 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: March 25, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and STEELE, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of March 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the State’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, George Kiser, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his first petition for postconviction relief.  The State of 
Delaware has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground 
that it is manifest on the face of Kiser’s opening brief that the appeal is 
without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that a Superior Court jury convicted Kiser in 
1999 of four counts of delivery of cocaine and two counts of second degree 
conspiracy.  The Superior Court sentenced Kiser to a total period of 64 years 
 
2
at Level V incarceration to be suspended after a 60 year mandatory term of 
imprisonment for four years at Level III probation.  This Court affirmed 
Kiser’s convictions and sentence on appeal.1   
(3) 
In his motion for postconviction relief, Kiser asserted that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and pursue a defense 
based on police misidentification.  The Superior Court referred the motion to 
a Superior Court Commissioner. The Commissioner found, as a matter of 
fact, that Kiser’s trial counsel had presented a misidentification defense.  
Accordingly, the Commissioner concluded, as a matter of law, that Kiser 
could not establish cause or prejudice for his failure to raise his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim in the proceedings leading to the judgment of 
conviction.2  The Commissioner therefore recommended that the motion be 
dismissed.  Kiser did not file any objections to the Commissioner’s proposed 
findings and recommendations.3  The Superior Court, after a de novo 
review, adopted the Commissioner’s findings and recommendation and 
dismissed Kiser’s motion.   
                                                 
1 Kiser v. State, 2000 WL 1626992 (Del. 2000). 
2 DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(3) provides that “[a]ny ground for relief that 
was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction…is thereafter 
barred” unless the petitioner can establish cause and prejudice. 
3 See SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 62(a)(5)(ii). 
 
3
 
(4) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief 
under Rule 61 for abuse of discretion.4  The gist of Kiser’s complaint is that 
the undercover officers who identified him as the perpetrator actually 
confused Kiser with his cousin, Lamont.  Kiser asserts that the suspect 
identified by police wore dreadlocks, like Lamont, but Kiser himself never 
wore dreadlocks.  Kiser acknowledges in his opening brief that his trial 
counsel “did present evidence that George Kiser never wore dreadlocks and 
allowed the jury to see Lamont Kiser and compared his appearance to the 
appellant.”  Kiser asserts, however, that his trial counsel’s performance was 
constitutionally deficient because he failed to introduce a photograph of 
Lamont Kiser from the summer of 1997 when the drug sales were alleged to 
have occurred.  
(5) 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
petitioner must establish: (a) that defense counsel’s representation fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness; and (b) that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
                                                 
4 Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 551 (Del. 1998). 
 
4
the case would have been different.5  There is a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct was professionally reasonable.6   
(6) 
Kiser’s claim fails on both prongs.  Kiser cannot establish that 
defense counsel was objectively unreasonable in choosing to present Lamont 
in person to the jury rather than a photograph of Lamont.  Moreover, Kiser 
cannot establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would 
have been different if defense counsel had presented Lamont’s photograph.  
Accordingly, we find that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Kiser’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ E. Norman Veasey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
                                                 
5 Id. at 551-52 (citing the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 688 (1984)). 
6 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988).