Title: Panesenko v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Panesenko v. State1985 WY 146706 P.2d 273Case Number: 84-166Decided: 09/24/1985JOHANN ALEXANDER PANESENKO, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHANN ALEXANDER 
PANESENKO, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender; Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel; K. Leslie 
Delk, Asst. Public Defender; and James Carbone, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen.; Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen.; John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen.; and David K. Gruver, Legal Intern, for appellee. 

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The primary question 
which must be resolved in this case is whether the exclusionary rule should be 
applied in connection with a probation revocation proceeding. Included within 
the appellant's claim that it should are concerns about a warrantless seizure of 
the appellant's automobile, statements made by the appellant after the seizure 
of his automobile, and prejudice to the appellant arising out of the failure to 
exclude the illegally obtained evidence. There also is a question as to whether 
there was proof of guilt of another criminal offense in order to justify the 
revocation of probation. We conclude that the district court properly refused to 
apply the exclusionary rule, and that there was satisfactory proof of 
justification to revoke the appellant's probation. The judgment of the district 
court is affirmed.

[¶2.]     In his brief the 
appellant raises the following issues:

"I.

"A. WHETHER POLICE 
OFFICER'S WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF APPELLANT'S AUTOMOBILE WAS UNJUSTIFIED AND 
THEREFORE VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS.

"B. WHETHER APPELLANT'S 
STATEMENTS TO POLICE OFFICERS CONCERNING OWNERSHIP OF THE CAR BATTERY MADE IN LIGHT OF THIS SEIZURE WERE `FRUITS' OF THE 
ILLEGAL SEIZURE AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE EXCLUDED.

"C. WHETHER APPELLANT WAS 
PREJUDICED BY THE COURT'S FAILURE TO EXCLUDE THE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED 
EVIDENCE.

"II. WHETHER APPELLANT 
POSSESSED THE REQUISITE INTENT TO PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE THE OWNER OF THE CAR 
BATTERY AND IS THEREFORE GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE OF PETIT LARCENY UNDER W.S. 1982, 
SECTION 6-3-402(a), (c)(iii)."

The state 
submits its own statement of the issues in its brief as 
follows:

"I. THE APPELLANT'S 
STATEMENTS WERE NOT THE FRUIT OF ANY ILLEGAL SEIZURE.

"II. THE EXCLUSIONARY 
RULE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO PROBATION REVOCATION 
HEARINGS.

"III. THE STATE PROVED 
ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF PETIT LARCENY UNDER SECTION 6-3-402(a)(c)(iii), 
W.S. 1977 (June 1983 replacement)."

[¶3.]     Panesenko pleaded 
guilty in 1982 to a charge of burglary in violation of § 6-3-301(a), W.S. 1977, 
and he then was sentenced to a term of not less than three nor more than six 
years in the state penitentiary. The execution of his sentence was suspended and 
he was placed on probation for a period of six years. One of the specific 
conditions of his probation was that Panesenko "not violate any of the laws of 
the nation or any state or any municipality."

[¶4.]     Some twenty-one months 
later Panesenko, who had been having trouble with his car, left it at the home 
of one Ackerly, a band leader with whom Panesenko had auditioned. When Ackerly 
returned several days later he discovered Panesenko and an acquaintance of his 
working on Panesenko's car. They succeeded in starting it and the car was driven 
away. Several days later Ackerly discovered that a battery which he had recently 
purchased for his truck was missing. Ackerly suspected that Panesenko had stolen 
the battery because he had information that Panesenko had been in trouble with 
the law in the past for stealing and he connected Panesenko's working on his car 
with the loss of the battery.

[¶5.]     Ackerly then invited 
Panesenko to return to his home to play music. Panesenko arrived in his 
automobile and Ackerly arranged to have other band members occupy Panesenko 
while Ackerly checked the serial number on the invoice for the battery which he 
had purchased against the serial number on the battery in Panesenko's car. The 
two serial numbers matched and Ackerly reported the theft of his battery to the 
sheriff's department. Following up on that report one of the officers in the 
sheriff's department began to look for Panesenko's car. It was discovered in a 
short time at a private residence, and the sheriff's officer impounded it and 
arranged for one of the residents at the place where it was discovered to drive 
the car down to the sheriff's office so that it would not have to be towed. Two 
days later Panesenko called the sheriff's office to ask if he could talk about 
his car. While he was still on the telephone making that call the officer who 
had impounded the car saw him in the telephone booth and took him to the 
sheriff's office for questioning.

[¶6.]     The record discloses 
that Panesenko was not placed under arrest, but he was furnished advice with 
respect to his constitutional rights under the Miranda decision, and he waived those 
rights. When he was asked if he knew where his car was Panesenko responded that 
he did, and when he was asked if he had any idea why the car was at the 
sheriff's office, Panesenko said "Is it about my battery?"

[¶7.]     At the probation 
revocation hearing Ackerly testified that he had not given Panesenko permission 
to take the battery. Panesenko testified that he had only borrowed it and that 
he did not intend to keep it. According to his testimony he planned to obtain a 
battery for himself and then return Ackerly's battery, but he had never had the 
opportunity to do so. He explained that he had been too embarassed on those 
occasions when he saw Ackerly to explain to him about the battery. Based upon 
the evidence submitted the district court found that Panesenko's actions 
constituted petit larceny; that petit larceny is a violation of the law; and 
that Panesenko had violated his probation. Upon making these findings the 
district court revoked Panesenko's probation and reimposed the original 
sentence.

[¶8.]     In Gronski v. State, Wyo., 700 P.2d 777, 779 
(1985) we stated:

"The great majority of 
courts which have ruled on this question have held that evidence obtained by 
illegal search and seizure is admissible in a probation revocation hearing even 
though it would be inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. See Annotation, 
Admissibility, in State Probation Revocation Proceedings, of Evidence Obtained 
through Illegal Search and Seizure, 77 A.L.R.3d 636, 641 
(1977)."

We then held 
that the exclusionary rule should not be extended to probation revocation cases. 
Consequently, there occurred here no violation of any of Panesenko's rights with 
respect to his automobile or his interrogation which he is entitled to raise as 
prejudicial in a probation revocation proceeding. We do not decide the 
lawfulness of the seizure or the interrogation because in the context of a 
probation revocation proceeding it is immaterial whether the seizure or the 
interrogation occurred unlawfully.

[¶9.]     Panesenko also argues 
that the failure of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his intent to 
permanently deprive Ackerly of his battery prevented the trial court from 
finding his guilt of petit larceny beyond a reasonable doubt, and he contends 
that his probation should not have been revoked because of this error. Under 
well recognized principles the action of the trial court in revoking Panesenko's 
probation was proper even if there was a defect in establishing petit larceny 
beyond a reasonable doubt.

[¶10.]  In order to revoke probation all that is 
required is the court's conscientious judgment after hearing the evidence to the 
effect that a violation of probation has occurred. Longwell v. State, Wyo. (705 P.2d 336, 1985); Gronski v. State, supra; Minchew v. State, Wyo., 685 P.2d 30 (1984). 
Revocation of probation is within the trial court's discretion and the exercise 
of that discretion will not be overturned on appeal except upon a clear showing 
of abuse of that discretion. Longwell v. 
State, supra; Gronski v. State, 
supra; Minchew v. State, supra. Proof 
of a violation of a law of the nation, state or municipality is not required 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and consequently the finding of the trial court that 
Panesenko was guilty of petit larceny beyond a reasonable doubt is not a 
justification to overturn the exercise of the court's discretion. Longwell v. State, supra; Gronski v. State, supra; Minchew v. State, supra, citing Ketcham v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 1356 
(1980). A court can revoke probation on the basis of criminal conduct even in 
the face of an acquittal of criminal charges based on the same conduct. Minchew v. State, supra, quoting Ketcham v. State, supra. The 
determination of whether the defendant has violated the terms of his probation 
is within the trial court's discretion. Longwell v. State, supra; State v. Reisch, Wyo., 
491 P.2d 1254 (1971). As we noted in Ketcham v. State, supra, 
probation can be revoked based upon conduct which is not 
criminal.

[¶11.]  It is not necessary to our decision to 
determine whether the state established beyond a reasonable doubt a violation by 
Panesenko of § 6-3-402(a), W.S. 1977 which provides:

"A person who steals, 
takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to 
deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of 
larceny."

If it were 
necessary for us to do so we would have no difficulty in sustaining the finding 
of the district court the Panesenko had committed petit larceny beyond a 
reasonable doubt.

[¶12.]  The abuse of discretion standard is 
controlling with respect to the revocation of probation. Longwell v. State, supra; Gronski v. State, supra; Minchew v. State, supra. Panesenko 
really does not argue that there occurred here an abuse of discretion in 
violation of the usual standard, and certainly the record will not justify a 
finding of any abuse of discretion.

[¶13.]  The order of the district court revoking 
Panesenko's probation is affirmed.