Title: Dorsey v. Angelone

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and 
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 
 
 
MICAH LAVAL DORSEY 
       OPINION BY 
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 000566 
April 20, 2001 
 
RONALD J. ANGELONE, DIRECTOR, 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
Charles E. Poston, Judge 
 
 
In this habeas corpus appeal, the dispositive question is 
whether the trial court correctly ruled that a prisoner's second 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was procedurally barred 
under Code § 8.01-654(B)(2), which controls the filing of 
successive habeas petitions. 
 
On March 13, 1987, appellant Micah Laval Dorsey was 
sentenced to a total of 55 years' confinement for convictions of 
five felonies.  He did not appeal the judgment. 
 
On November 15, 1993, the prisoner filed in the original 
jurisdiction of this Court a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  The sole ground for relief was a claim that he was 
being denied "the proper amount of goodtime credits affecting 
his initial discretionary parole eligibility date." 
 
On January 20, 1994, this Court granted the petitioner's 
motion for leave "to withdraw the petition for writ of habeas 
corpus" and ordered that "the same is considered withdrawn and 
the rule discharged." 
 
On June 10, 1999, the prisoner filed a second habeas 
petition, this time in the trial court, naming the appellee as 
respondent.  In that petition, he assigned seven grounds for 
relief.  One ground alleged denial of the right of appeal due to 
attorney error, and the remaining six grounds alleged denial of 
effective assistance of counsel, for various reasons. 
 
In a motion to dismiss on behalf of the respondent, the 
Attorney General contended the habeas petition was procedurally 
barred by Code § 8.01-654(B)(2).  He argued that when a prisoner 
has been granted leave to withdraw a habeas petition, any 
subsequent petition filed by the prisoner must be limited to the 
claims raised in the first petition.  Alternatively, the 
Attorney General alleged there was no merit to the petitioner's 
substantive allegations. 
 
Following receipt of affidavits addressed to the 
substantive claims and following argument of counsel, the trial 
court denied the habeas petition.  The court ruled that the 
petition was procedurally barred and that the substantive claims 
had no merit.  We awarded the prisoner this appeal from the 
trial court's December 1999 order dismissing the petition. 
 
On appeal, the prisoner contends the trial court erred by 
dismissing the petition as a second or subsequent petition when 
 
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the initial petition "merely challenged Dorsey's time 
computation, and was voluntarily withdrawn."  The prisoner also 
contends the trial court erred in dismissing his substantive 
claims. 
 
We disagree with the prisoner on the procedural issue.  
Thus, we do not reach the substantive questions. 
 
Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) provides: 
"[A petition for habeas corpus] shall contain all 
allegations the facts of which are known to petitioner 
at the time of filing and such petition shall 
enumerate all previous applications and their 
disposition.  No writ shall be granted on the basis of 
any allegation the facts of which petitioner had 
knowledge at the time of filing any previous 
petition." 
 
 
The statutory language is plain and unambiguous, clearly 
limiting the right of a prisoner to file successive petitions 
for writs of habeas corpus.  The key provisions of this 
statutory language focus on "the time of filing" the first 
habeas petition. 
 
The statutory language could not be more explicit; it means 
what it says.  At the time of filing the initial petition, the 
prisoner must include "all" claims the facts of which are known 
to the prisoner.  And, no habeas relief will be granted based 
upon "any" allegation the facts of which the prisoner had 
knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition. 
 
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In this case, the significant facts are that the prisoner 
filed a prior habeas petition that was withdrawn pursuant to his 
motion.  The prior petition only challenged the computation of 
goodtime credits relating to his March 1987 felony sentences. 
 
In the present petition, the prisoner does not attack again 
the time computation.  Instead, he mounts seven new challenges 
to his detention, the facts of which he is bound to have had 
knowledge "at the time of filing" the first petition. 
 
Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) bars this subsequent habeas petition 
raising new claims relating to the March 1987 judgment that 
never were raised in the prior petition.  Because the prior 
petition was voluntarily withdrawn, the prisoner was entitled to 
file another petition.  However, that second petition was 
required to have been limited to the ground assigned in the 
first petition and could not include new and different 
allegations relating to the March 1987 judgment. 
 
Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
dismissing the present habeas petition as procedurally barred, 
and the judgment below will be 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE LEMONS, concurring. 
 
Despite results that are undoubtedly harsh and despite 
inconsistency with prior practice of the Court, I must concur 
with the majority opinion.  As the majority opinion states, the 
 
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text of § 8.01-654(B)(2) “could not be more explicit.”  In the 
absence of legislative history or context that suggests 
otherwise, the plain meaning of the text must guide our 
statutory interpretation. 
 
The majority opinion holds that: 
At the time of filing the initial petition, 
the prisoner must include “all” claims the 
facts of which are known to the prisoner.  
And, no habeas relief will be granted based 
upon “any” allegations the facts of which 
the prisoner had knowledge at the time of 
filing any previous petition. 
 
 
The majority opinion changes prior practice and 
interpretation of the Court.  For example, the Court previously 
has granted a first petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging 
only that counsel failed to file an appeal in a timely manner.  
Thereafter, after an unsuccessful appeal, and despite the 
prisoner’s failure to allege any other basis for the first 
petition, the Court has permitted a second petition alleging 
trial-related claims. 
 
If a prisoner were to challenge by petition for writ of 
habeas corpus only the conditions of confinement or the 
calculation of credits for time served in a local jail, the 
majority opinion will preclude a second petition that raises 
trial-related claims for the first time.  Finally, as in this 
case, a prisoner permitted to withdraw a petition prior to 
adjudication will be precluded from refiling on any basis other 
 
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than those alleged in the withdrawn petition.  Previously, the 
Court has permitted such withdrawal “without prejudice” and has 
considered refiled petitions adding additional claims. 
 
Arguably, so long as the statute of limitations has not 
expired, the majority opinion would permit the amendment of a 
petition to add new claims, a practice previously permitted by 
the Court, but prohibit the withdrawal of a petition and 
refiling with new claims.  The distinction between the two 
procedures is without practical significance. 
 
The hypotheticals posited above reflect the consequences of 
the plain meaning of the text of Code § 8.01-654.  If, as 
suggested by the dissent, the General Assembly did not intend 
such results, it, most likely, will reconsider the provisions of 
the statute. 
 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  I have long labored under the 
impression that there could be no dispute that “to withdraw” a 
legal pleading, such as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
essentially meant to remove or eliminate the pleading from 
consideration by a court; the pleading becomes a nullity.  
Today, however, the majority in this appeal concludes that a 
“voluntarily withdrawn” 1993 petition nevertheless constitutes a 
“first petition” that causes a 1999 petition to become a “second 
 
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petition” for purposes of the prohibition against “successive” 
habeas petitions under Code § 8.01-654(B)(2).  In my view, the 
majority breathes new life into that which has been nullified, 
and by an unwarranted narrow application of this statute defeats 
a merits adjudication of Micah Laval Dorsey’s 1999 claims. 
 
Although Code § 8.01-654 makes no reference to, or 
provision for, a habeas petition being voluntarily withdrawn by 
a prisoner, we granted Dorsey’s motion to withdraw his 1993 
petition which raised a claim that he was being denied the 
proper amount of “goodtime credits” relevant to a determination 
of his discretionary parole eligibility date.  We ordered that 
this petition be considered “withdrawn.”  No adjudication of the 
merits of that petition was made.  Thus, the majority now 
properly holds that because the 1993 petition was withdrawn, 
Dorsey “was entitled to file another petition” in 1999.  Yet, 
the majority further holds that the language in subsection 
(B)(2) that “[n]o writ shall be granted on the basis of any 
allegations of facts of which petitioner had knowledge at the 
time of filing any previous petition” defeats consideration of 
the merits of the allegations in the petition Dorsey is 
permitted to file.  This is so, the majority reasons, because 
Dorsey is bound to have had knowledge of the facts regarding his 
detention that are alleged in his 1999 petition at the time of 
filing the 1993 petition. 
 
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I can find nothing in the statutory language of Code 
§ 8.01-654, and specifically subsection (B)(2), that even 
suggests a legislative intent that supports the reasoning of the 
majority.  Rather, Code § 8.01-654 surely contemplates that a 
timely habeas petition filed by a prisoner receive a merits 
adjudication.  Treating claims that are obviated without an 
adjudication on the merits as a bar to hearing all other claims 
on the merits is inconsistent with this legislative intent.  
Moreover, the prohibition against the so-called “successive” 
petitions is clearly intended to bring finality to judgments of 
criminal convictions or sentences and to prevent a prisoner from 
creating undue delay in the process of collateral review of 
those judgments.  That purpose is not hindered by declining to 
treat a voluntarily withdrawn habeas petition as a first or 
prior petition for purposes of concluding that the present 
petition is a second or successive petition. 
 
Finally, although the federal habeas scheme is different 
from that expressed in Code § 8.01-654(B)(2), it bears noting 
that apparently under the federal rule regarding the prohibition 
against successive habeas petitions a different result would be 
mandated in the present case.  See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 
473, 487 (2000) (prior habeas petition unadjudicated on the 
merits is not a prior petition triggering the bar on subsequent 
or successive petitions for habeas relief). 
 
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For these reasons, I would hold that Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) 
has no application to Dorsey’s 1999 habeas petition because his 
1993 petition was voluntarily withdrawn without a merits 
adjudication and, thus, the 1999 petition was not a second or 
successive petition contemplated by that statute.  Accordingly, 
I would further consider the merits of the allegations in 
Dorsey’s 1999 petition. 
 
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