Title: Azar v. Olson

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

61 N.W.2d 188 (1953) AZAR v. OLSON et al. No. 7408. Supreme Court of North Dakota. November 10, 1953. J. K. Murray, Bismarck, for defendant-appellant, Katie Haggard. Register & Thompson, Bismarck, for plaintiff-respondent. MORRIS, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from an order denying a motion of the defendant, Katie Haggard, to vacate a default judgment entered in an action to quiet title to two quarter sections of land in Sioux County. A summons and a verified complaint setting forth a statutory action to quiet title were filed in the *189 Office of the Clerk of the District Court of Sioux County on July 7, 1952. An affidavit for service by publication, accompanied by a sheriff's return, was filed July 14, 1952. The return recited that the sheriff had made diligent search and inquiry for the defendants in the action, and each of them, for the purpose of serving the summons, notice, and complaint upon each of the defendants and that the sheriff had been unable to make personal service on any of the defendants in the action. The summons, together with the attached notice setting forth a description of the property involved and stating that the purpose of the action was to determine adverse claims to this property and that no personal claim was made against any of the defendants, was published in a newspaper as provided by law, Section 28-0622, NDRC 1949 Supp., on July 24, July 31, and August 7, 1952. On September 24, 1952, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment were signed by the court and on the same day judgment was entered quieting title in the plaintiff. On February 23, 1953, the defendant, Katie Haggard, served on plaintiff's attorney a notice of motion to vacate the default judgment upon five grounds, among them being. After hearing, the motion to vacate the judgment was denied and Katie Haggard appeals. Our code contains three sections which bear upon the subject of relief from default judgments. In the chapter dealing with service of process we find Section 28-0627, which, in part, reads as follows: The statute further provides that if any defendant has received a copy of the summons and complaint, either by mail or by personal service outside of the state, he shall be deemed to have had notice of the pendency of the action and of the judgment entered therein. In the chapter dealing with relief from defaults and hardships, Section 28-2901 provides: The chapter dealing with actions to quiet title and determine claims to real estate contains Section 32-1713 which provides: Statutes such as ours are generally held to be remedial in nature and entitled to a liberal construction and application. 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, § 766, page 303; 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 335, page 641; Withers v. Miller, 140 Kan. 123, 34 P.2d 110, 104 A.L.R. 692; Board of County Commissioners of Wyandotte County v. Axtell, 134 Kan. 304, 5 P.2d 1078. This court views with favor the trial of cases upon their merits. Tooz v. Tooz, 76 N.D. 492, 37 N.W.2d 493; Citizens' National Bank v. Branden, 19 N.D. 489, 126 N.W. 102, 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 858. The complaint in this action is in the statutory form to determine adverse claims. Chapter 32-17 NDRC 1943. The relief sought by the defendant Katie Haggard is governed by Section 32-1713, NDRC 1943, quoted above. The other sections which we have quoted, while having no direct bearing upon this controversy, are indicative of a legislative policy which distinguishes between relief from default judgments obtained after actual notice and relief from judgments obtained after constructive service concerning which the defaulting defendant had no knowledge. Section 32-1713, NDRC 1943 was formerly Section 8156, C.L.1913. It has been before this court in but one case since it was originally enacted as a part of Chapter 5, SLND 1901. In that case, Hart v. Hone, 57 N.D. 590, 223 N.W. 346, 348, it is said: That case involved an attack upon tax deed proceedings, and the court further said: This court then upheld the trial court's refusal to vacate the judgment. We now proceed to examine the defendant's motion and showing which she claims entitles her to be relieved from the default judgment and the countershowing made by the plaintiff. The motion is accompanied by the affidavit of the defendant, Katie Haggard, stating that for more than twenty years she has been the owner of the property in question and believes that the plaintiff claims title through a tax deed from Sioux County and that she believes the tax deed is void for certain reasons, among them being Katie Haggard's affidavit also shows that she stated all the facts to her attorney who informed her that she has a good and substantial defense on the merits to plaintiff's action; that the affiant resides in California and that her sons and daughters for a good many years have resided in Mandan, North Dakota, and that they knew at all times where their mother resided; that she did not receive any notice or knowledge of the pendency of plaintiff's action or that such an action had been commenced until November 20, 1952, when she was informed thereof by her children; that she thereupon communicated with her attorney at Bismarck by letter and that she never received any notice of the tax deed proceedings or of the expiration of the period of redemption for the payment of taxes assessed against the land. Her statements with respect to the employment of her attorney are corroborated by his affidavit, which is as follows: The motion was also accompanied by an answer and counterclaim setting forth challenges to the validity of the tax deed that include allegations which, if established on trial, would render the deed void. None of the criticisms of the showing on the merits in Hart v. Hone, supra, apply to this case. Here facts stating a defense to plaintiff's action to quiet title are set forth in both the affidavit and the answer of the defendant Katie Haggard. The plaintiff's countershowing contains the affidavits of the plaintiff and her attorney in which both state that they never knew Katie Haggard and did not know her address at the time the proceedings resulting in the default judgment were conducted. The countershowing also includes a letter written by Katie Haggard's attorney to the attorney for the plaintiff, dated October 9, 1952, in which the former stated that he represented Katie Haggard with reference to the land in question and had learned about two weeks previously that the attorney was representing Mrs. Azar but had not been able to get in touch with him. It further stated: The trial court in his order denying the motion gives great weight to this letter and from it reached the conclusion that Katie Haggard had actual notice and personal information or knowledge of the pendency of the action "two months prior to October 9, 1952this fact being established by the letter, marked `Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.'" He also found as untrue her statements in her affidavit that she "never had nor received any notice or knowledge of the pendency of the above entitled action, nor that any such action was ever commenced until Nov. 20, 1952, she was informed by one of her sons or daughters in the city of Mandan, and that she thereupon, on or about November 20, 1952, communicated with her said attorney * * *." The judgment was entered September 24, 1952. The letter is dated October 9, 1952. It contains this statement: We find nothing in the letter, or otherwise in the record, to indicate that Katie Haggard had knowledge of the pendency of the action two months before the date of the letter or that she knew of the pendency of the action in time to employ an attorney and interpose an answer before default or before the judgment was entered. Her affidavit is to the contrary and stands uncontroverted except for such implications as may be drawn from the letter of her attorney. At the time the letter was written her attorney's information regarding the action appears to have been meager. There is no indication that he received such information as he did have from her. We do not conclude that this letter establishes that she knew of the pendency of the action prior to the entry of judgment. She has sworn positively that she did not have such knowledge. It is admitted that she did not receive a copy of the summons and complaint. *193 None was ever attempted to be served upon her. Neither the plaintiff nor her attorney knew this defendant's whereabouts. The affidavit of merits is sufficient to show that Katie Haggard has a defense and the defense is pleaded in an accompanying proposed answer. The application to vacate the judgment was instituted within five months after its entry. Under the showing made there appears to be no lack of reasonable diligence. The showing is ample to entitle the defendant Katie Haggard to have the judgment set aside and to interpose her defense. The order appealed from is reversed and the district court is directed to enter an order setting aside the judgment and permitting Katie Haggard thirty days from the entry thereof in which to serve her answer upon the plaintiff. GRIMSON, CHRISTIANSON, SATHRE and BURKE, JJ., concur.