Title: WALLACE A HUGGETT V DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Opinion 
FILED JULY 17, 2001  
WALLACE A HUGGETT and HUGGETT  
SOD FARM, d/b/a MICHIGAN 
CRANBERRY COMPANY,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v  
No. 113463  
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CAVANAGH, J.  
This case requires us to decide whether plaintiffs’  
proposed activities to build and operate a commercial  
cranberry farm in a wetland is exempt from the statutory  
wetland permit requirements, MCL 324.30304, because it is a  
farming activity that is not subject to the permit  
requirements under the farming activities exemption provided  
by MCL 324.30305(2)(e). We conclude that the farming  
activities exemption is not so broad that it encompasses  
plaintiffs’ proposal.  Also, the proposed cranberry farm does  
not fall within the production and harvesting draining  
exemption 
to 
the 
wetland 
permit 
requirements, 
MCL  
324.30305(2)(j), or the existing farming exemption to the  
requirements, 
MCL 
324.30305(3), that we ordered the parties to  
address. Therefore, plaintiffs must obtain a wetland permit  
to proceed with the proposed cranberry farm.  Accordingly, we  
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
I  
The facts of this case surround plaintiffs Wallace  
Huggett and Huggett Sod Farm’s proposal to build a commercial  
cranberry farm on land in Cheboygan County. Plaintiff Huggett  
acquired the 325-acre parcel, all but forty-seven acres of  
which is wetland, after a mortgage on the property was  
assigned to him and he foreclosed the mortgage.  Before  
plaintiff acquired the parcel, which abuts Lake 16, the parcel  
had been the site of a peat farm.  After acquiring title,  
plaintiffs proposed to build a 200-acre commercial cranberry  
farm on the land. To create beds in which cranberries could  
grow, the proposed farm entailed placing fill material in  
wetland areas, excavating and removing soil from wetland  
areas, building dikes and culverts; digging irrigation  
ditches; and constructing a reservoir and pumping station,  
roads, and an airstrip.  
In 
1990, 
plaintiff 
Huggett 
contacted 
defendant 
Department  
of Natural Resources to determine whether he needed a wetland  
permit to proceed with the proposed cranberry farm.  Defendant  
2  
advised him that he did, and plaintiffs applied for a permit  
later that year. However, defendant denied the application.  
Plaintiffs then requested a contested case hearing under the  
Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201 et seq., see MCL  
324.30319(2) (allowing requests for hearings under the  
Administrative Procedures Act), and although the case was  
docketed for a hearing, no such hearing occurred after over a  
year.  Plaintiffs thus filed this action seeking a declaration  
that their proposed cranberry farm is not subject to the  
wetland permit requirements because it is a farming activity  
exempted from the requirements by MCL 324.30305(2)(e).  All  
administrative 
proceedings 
have 
been 
abeyed 
for 
this  
litigation.  
After several hearings, and after addressing matters no  
longer pertinent to this case, the trial court granted  
plaintiffs the declaration they sought.  The trial court’s  
final judgment and order held that plaintiffs’ proposed  
cranberry farm is a farming activity exempt from the wetland  
permit requirements.  That order stated that the farming  
activities exemption “includes all activities necessary to  
commence and to continue farming in a commercially viable  
manner and to bring land into agricultural production.”  
Defendant appealed.  The Court of Appeals reversed on the  
exemption issue, reasoning that “the farming exemption was  
intended to apply to land in established use for agriculture,  
and 
was 
not 
intended 
to 
refer 
to 
new 
farming  
activities . . . .”  232 Mich App 188, 195; 590 NW2d 747  
3  
     
(1998).  Because plaintiffs wanted to establish a new farm  
rather than continue an existing farm, the Court of Appeals  
concluded that plaintiffs must obtain a wetland permit.  
Plaintiffs appealed that conclusion, and this Court granted  
leave, limited to whether the Court of Appeals correctly  
interpreted the farming activities exemption.  Also, we  
ordered the parties to address the applicability of MCL  
324.30305(2)(j) and (3), which concern draining wetland that  
is contiguous to a lake or stream and farming that has been in  
existence since 1980, respectively.  463 Mich 910 (2000). We  
now affirm.  
II  
Part 303 of the Natural Resources and Environmental  
Protection Act governs activities in wetlands.1
 See MCL  
324.30301 et seq. Most importantly, MCL 324.30304 prohibits  
certain acts in wetlands:  
Except as otherwise provided by this part or 
by a permit obtained from the department [of 
Natural Resources] under [other sections of NREPA 
part 303], a person shall not do any of the  
following:  
(a) Deposit or permit the placing of fill 
material in a wetland.  
(b) Dredge, remove, or permit the removal of 
soil or minerals from a wetland.  
1 Formerly, the Wetland Protection Act, MCL 281.701 et  
seq., governed activities in wetlands.  The act was repealed 
by 1995 PA 59, but its provisions were recodified as part 303 
of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act.  
See MCL 324.30301 et seq. (1994 PA 451). 
Because the  
recodified provisions are the same as those provided by the 
original act, which was in effect when this case was filed, we 
will simply refer to the current provisions.  
4  
 
(c) Construct, operate, or maintain any use or 
development in a wetland.  
(d) Drain surface water from a wetland.  
However, part 303 also provides that certain activities are  
not subject to § 30304's prohibitions.  Section 30305 sets  
forth permissible uses of a wetland, and states in pertinent  
part:  
(2) The following uses are allowed in a  
wetland without a permit subject to other laws of 
this state and the owner’s regulation:  
* * *  
(e) 
Farming, 
horticulture, 
silviculture, 
lumbering, and ranching activities, including 
plowing, irrigation, irrigation ditching, seeding, 
cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the 
production of food, fiber, and forest products, or 
upland soil and water conservation practices. 
Wetland altered under this subdivision shall not be  
used for a purpose other than a purpose described 
in this subsection without a permit from the 
department.  
(f) Maintenance or operation of serviceable 
structures in existence on October 1, 1980 or 
constructed pursuant to this part of former Act No. 
203 of the Public Acts of 1979.  
(g) Construction or maintenance of farm or 
stock ponds.  
(h) Maintenance, operation, or improvement 
which 
includes 
straightening, 
widening, 
or  
deepening of the following which is necessary for 
the production or harvesting of agricultural 
products:  
(i) An existing private agricultural drain.  
(ii) 
That 
portion 
of 
a 
drain 
legally 
established . . . which has been constructed or  
improved for drainage purposes.  
(iii) A drain constructed pursuant to other 
provisions of this part . . .  
5  
 
(i) Construction or maintenance of farm roads, 
. . . if the roads are constructed and maintained  
in a manner to assure that any adverse affect on 
the wetland will be otherwise minimized.  
(j) Drainage necessary for the production and 
harvesting of agricultural products if the wetland 
is owned by a person who is engaged in commercial 
farming and the land is to be used for the  
production and harvesting of agricultural products. 
Except as otherwise provided in this part, wetland 
improved under this subdivision after October 1, 
1980 shall not be used for nonfarming purposes 
without a permit from the [DNR]. This subdivision  
shall not apply to a wetland which is contiguous to 
a lake or stream, or to a tributary of a lake or 
stream, or to a wetland that the department has 
determined by clear and convincing evidence to be a 
wetland that is necessary to be preserved for the 
public interest, in 
required. 
which case a permit is 
* * * 
(n) 
Operation
reconstruction of 
or 
maintenance, 
including
of
recently damaged parts,  
serviceable dikes and levees in existence on  
October 1, 1980 or constructed pursuant to this 
part or former Act No. 203 of the Public Acts of 
1979.  
* * *  
(3) An activity in a wetland that was  
effectively drained for farming before October 1, 
1980 and that on and after October 1, 1980 has 
continued to be effectively drained as part of an 
ongoing farming operation is not subject to  
regulation under this part.  
To 
determine 
whether 
the activities necessary to establish and  
operate plaintiffs’ proposed cranberry farm are permissible  
uses exempted from the wetland permit requirements, we must  
construe both the prohibitions and exemptions in part 303 to  
make both viable. When construing statutes, our primary task  
is to discern and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.  We  
begin by examining the statutory language, which provides the  
6  
 
 
 
  
most reliable evidence of that intent.  If the statutory  
language is clear and unambiguous, then we conclude that the  
Legislature intended the meaning it clearly and unambiguously  
expressed, and the statute is enforced as written.  No further  
judicial construction is necessary or permitted.  See In re  
MCI, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). 
Statutory  
construction presents questions of law, which are reviewed de  
novo. Id. at 413.  
A. THE FARMING ACTIVITIES EXEMPTION  
Plaintiffs contend that the activities necessary to  
establish and operate their proposed cranberry farm are not  
subject 
to 
the 
wetland 
permit 
requirements 
under  
§ 30305(2)(e)’s farming activities exemption.  That section  
exempts farming activities, and provides a list of several  
types of farming activities that begins with the term  
“including.”  Plaintiffs argue that by beginning the list with  
“including,” the Legislature intended that the listed  
activities would serve only as examples of the types of  
exempted 
farming 
activities. 
The 
farming 
activities  
exemption, plaintiffs reason, “includes all of the activities  
necessary for farming.” Plaintiffs thus conclude that they  
can engage in all the activities necessary to establish and  
operate their cranberry farm without a wetland permit.  We  
disagree.  
When a statute uses a general term followed by specific  
examples included within the general term, as the farming  
activities 
exemption 
does, 
the 
canon 
of 
statutory 
construction  
7  
     
 
 
 
ejusdem generis applies.  See Belanger v Warren Bd of Ed, 432  
Mich 575, 583; 443 NW2d 372 (1989). This canon gives effect  
to both the general and specific terms by “treating the  
particular words as indicating the class, and the general  
words as extending the provisions of the statute to everything  
embraced in that class, though not specifically named by the  
particular words.” 
Id., quoting 2A Sands, Sutherland  
Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 47.17, p 166.  In light of  
the specific terms, the general term is restricted to include  
only things of the same kind, class, character, or nature as  
those 
specifically 
enumerated.  See Sands Appliance Servs, Inc  
v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 242; 615 NW2d 241 (2000).  
Under § 30305(2)(e), farming activities are generally  
exempt from the wetland permit requirements, but, as  
mentioned, that subsection specifically exempts “plowing,  
irrigation, irrigation ditching, seeding, cultivating, minor  
drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and  
forest products, or upland soil and water conservation  
practices.”  These specific examples of farming activities  
relate 
to 
the 
operation, 
improvement, 
expansion, 
and  
maintenance of a farm, or to the actual practice of farming.2  
Under the canon of ejusdem generis, then, the general  
exemption for farming activities can include activities not  
specifically listed in § 30305(2)(e), but the activities must  
2 We note that harvesting for the production of forest 
products seems to relate to the general exemption for 
lumbering activities.  
8  
 
be of the kind, class, character, or nature of operating a  
farm or practicing farming.  The activities plaintiffs seek to  
exempt, however, are not in the kind, class, character, or  
nature of operating a farm.  
To reiterate, absent a permit, part 303 prohibits the  
following 
activities 
in 
wetlands: 
(a) 
depositing 
or 
permitting  
the placing of fill material in a wetland; (b) dredging,  
removing, or permitting the removal of soil or minerals from  
a 
wetland; 
(c) 
constructing, operating, or maintaining any use  
or development in a wetland; or (d) draining surface water  
from a wetland.  See MCL 324.30304. Nevertheless, a permit is  
not 
required 
to 
engage 
in 
farming, 
horticulture, 
silviculture,  
lumbering, 
or 
ranching 
activities, 
including 
plowing,  
irrigation, irrigation ditching, seeding, cultivating, minor  
drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and  
forest products, or upland soil and water conservation  
practices.  
As is apparent, some of the activities allowed under §  
30305 overlap with the activities prohibited under § 30304.  
For example, § 30304 prohibits draining surface water from a  
wetland, while § 30305 allows minor drainage.  To make both  
sections viable, we must read the allowance for minor drainage  
only to allow drainage that fits within the definition of  
“minor drainage,” or, in other words, only to allow drainage  
9  
     
that is inconsequential.  See MCL 324.30301(b).3  However,  
other activities allowed under § 30305, for example, seeding  
and 
harvesting, 
present no such overlap with the prohibitions.  
When there is no overlap, a person, or his successor, seeking  
to engage in farming, horticulture, silviculture, lumbering,  
or ranching activities can do so without the restrictions  
imposed by the wetland permit requirements.  
With this balanced reading of part 303, some cases may  
leave room for debate whether drainage activities become more  
than “minor drainage.”  However, no such debate is possible in  
this case.  Plaintiffs’ proposed activities unquestionably  
amount to more than “minor drainage” and also entail filling  
and dredging in a wetland, which are prohibited activities.  
These activities, then, do not fit within the farming  
activities exemption to the wetland permit requirements.  
Our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
farming 
activities 
exemption 
does  
not extend to plaintiffs’ proposed activities is further  
supported by other provisions of the wetland permit  
exemptions. Subdivision 30305(2)(g) exempts “[c]onstruction  
or maintenance of farm or stock ponds,” and § 30305(2)(i)  
exempts “[c]onstruction or maintenance of farm roads” in  
certain instances. Were plaintiffs correct that the general  
farming activities exemption encompasses all activities  
3 “Minor drainage” is statutorily defined to mean 
“ditching and tiling for the removal of excess soil moisture 
incidental to the planting, cultivating, protecting, or 
harvesting of crops or improving the productivity of land in 
established use for agriculture, horticulture, silviculture, 
or lumbering.”  
10  
necessary for farming, including constructing a farm, then  
these subdivisions would be surplusage because they would be  
subsumed by the general farming activities exemption. We must  
avoid an interpretation that renders any part of a statute  
surplusage, see MCI, supra at 414, so the general farming  
activities exemption cannot exempt construction from the  
wetland permit requirements. Rather, the farming activities  
exemption covers only activities in the same kind, class,  
character, or nature as those activities enumerated in  
§ 30305(2)(e), and the aspects of plaintiffs’ proposed  
activities that are construction, for example constructing a  
pumping station and an airstrip, are not such activities.  
Though the Court of Appeals came to the correct  
conclusion in this case, we disagree with certain of its  
reasoning.  First, the farming activities exemption is not  
limited to “land in established use for agriculture,” as that  
Court concluded.  232 Mich App at 195.  Though the Legislature  
did condition certain use exemptions on the uses having been  
in existence, see § 30305(2)(f) (structures in existence on  
October 1, 1980); § 30305(2)(h) (existing, established, and  
constructed drains); § 30305(2)(n) (dikes and levees in  
existence on October 1, 1980); § 30305(3) (wetland drained  
before and continuously since October 1, 1980), it did not so  
condition the farming activities exemption.  Thus, when  
considering whether an alleged farming activity is exempted  
from the wetland permit requirements, the inquiry is not  
whether the land in question was in established use for  
farming activities, but whether the activity is of the same  
11  
  
kind, class, character, or nature as the specific activities  
that relate to operating a farm listed in § 30305(2)(e). If  
so, even if the activity was not previously established, it  
will fall within the exemption for farming activities and the  
wetland permit requirements will not apply.  Second, the Court  
of Appeals relied on federal law to reach its conclusion.  See  
232 Mich App 194-195.  Because we can discern the  
Legislature’s intent on this question from the wetland  
provisions themselves, we need not concern ourselves with  
federal law in this case.  For these reasons, we disagree with  
these aspects of the Court of Appeals opinion.  
In 
sum, 
the 
activities necessary to establish and operate  
plaintiffs’ proposed cranberry farm do not fit within §  
30305(2)(e)’s 
farming 
activities 
exemption. 
 
Once 
constructed,  
certain aspects of the proposed farm may involve exempted  
activities, but many of the activities necessary to establish  
and operate the proposed farm do not.  We, therefore, move on  
to consider whether the proposed cranberry farm is within the  
other exemptions to the wetland permit requirements that we  
directed the parties to address.  
B. THE PRODUCTION AND HARVESTING DRAINING EXEMPTION  
When we granted leave, we directed the parties to address  
the applicability of § 30305(2)(j).  This subdivision exempts  
“[d]rainage necessary for the production and harvesting of  
agricultural products if the wetland is owned by a person who  
is engaged in commercial farming and the land is to be used  
for the production and harvesting of agricultural products,”  
but not if the wetland is “contiguous to a lake or  
12  
     
  
stream, . . . or to a wetland that the department has  
determined by clear and convincing evidence to be a wetland  
that is necessary to be preserved for the public interest, in  
which case a permit is required.”  Though this might exempt  
certain aspects of plaintiffs’ proposed cranberry farm if it  
were 
constructed, 
as 
plaintiffs 
concede, 
activities 
other 
than  
drainage, for example certain construction and filling that  
are 
not 
otherwise 
exempted 
from 
the 
wetland 
permit  
requirements, are necessary to have the farm constructed.  
Thus, § 30305(2)(j) does not exempt the proposed farm from the  
wetland permit requirements.4  We, therefore, proceed to  
consider the last exemption we ordered the parties to address.  
C. THE EXISTING FARMING EXEMPTION  
Our grant order also directed the parties to address the  
applicability of § 30305(3). This subsection exempts from the  
permit 
requirements 
activities in wetland that was drained for  
farming before October 1, 1980, and has continued to be  
drained as part of an ongoing farming operation.  Although  
plaintiffs’ land was a peat farm before plaintiffs purchased  
it, they have conceded that the cranberry farm was not an  
ongoing activity in a wetland drained for farming before  
October 1, 1980.  Hence, this subsection also does not exempt  
4 We note that plaintiffs’ land is adjacent to Lake 16. 
However, the trial court did not make a finding whether the 
land is “contiguous” to Lake 16 as that term is used in 
§ 30305(2)(j), which is defined in administrative rules 
promulgated by the Department of Natural Resources.  See 1999  
AC, R 281.921; see also MCL 324.30319(1) (directing the DNR to 
promulgate rules to enforce part 303). Therefore, we do not 
consider whether plaintiffs’ land could fall into the  
exception to the draining exemption.  
13  
  
 
the proposed farm from the wetland permit requirements.  
D. THE WETLAND PERMIT REQUIREMENTS APPLY  
Absent an applicable exemption or a wetland permit,  
§ 
30304 
generally 
prohibits placing fill material in, removing  
soil from, construction in, or draining surface water from a  
wetland.  Plaintiffs’ proposal to build a cranberry farm in a  
wetland entails such activities, yet does not fall within the  
statutory exemptions to the wetland permit requirements.  For  
plaintiffs to proceed with their proposal, they will have to  
obtain a wetland permit from defendant.  Although defendant  
has denied plaintiffs a permit, part 303 provides plaintiffs  
the right to request a hearing on the denial, which is  
ultimately subject to judicial review.  See § 30319. 
As  
mentioned, 
plaintiffs 
have 
already 
begun 
these 
procedures, 
and  
because there is no statutory exemption, we leave plaintiffs  
to any remedies that they may be able to garner through these  
procedures.  
III  
In conclusion, the farming activities exemption does not  
exempt all activities necessary to farm, but only those  
specifically listed in the exemption, or activities of the  
same kind, class, character, or nature as the listed  
activities.  
Because 
the activities necessary to establish and  
operate plaintiffs’ proposed cranberry farm do not fit within  
that exemption, or the production and harvesting draining  
exemption, or the existing farming exemption, plaintiffs’  
proposal is subject to the wetland permit requirements.  
Defendant has already denied plaintiffs a permit, so  
14  
 
plaintiffs are left with the procedures for appealing from  
denials of permits. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is  
affirmed.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN,  
JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
15