Title: Eatherton v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Eatherton v. State1988 WY 108761 P.2d 91Case Number: 87-267Decided: 08/31/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
PATRICK EUGENE EATHERTON, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, WestonCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

Wyoming Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender; Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public 
Defender, and Julie Naylor, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Gerald P. Luckhaupt, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and 
MACY, JJ.

BROWN, Chief Justice.1

1 Chief Justice, Retired, 
June 30, 1988.

[¶1.]     Appellant Patrick 
Eugene Eatherton appeals his conviction for burglary. He presents the following 
issues:

1. Whether it was error 
to refuse Appellant's motion to merge offenses.

2. Whether it was error 
to refuse to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses to 
burglary.

3. Whether it was error 
to order restitution when the jury expressly acquitted Appellant of 
larceny.

[¶2.]     We affirm on the first 
issue, reverse on the second issue and remand the case for a new 
trial.

[¶3.]     When Cable Jones, the 
victim, woke up on the morning of February 8, 1987, he was not alone in his 
bedroom. There was a strange man standing in the room next to his desk holding a 
pair of Jones' pants. After Jones turned on a light, the intruder raised the 
pants to cover his face, and then fled the room. Jones looked out the bedroom 
doorway and saw the man pass through his kitchen. At that point, Jones armed 
himself with a .357 revolver from his closet and followed the man out the front 
door and down the street. Jones yelled "halt" twice and then fired his revolver 
into a nearby pile of dirt to try to stop the fleeing man, but to no avail. The 
intruder finally ran out of sight, and Jones went home to call the police. The 
operator told him that the police were already on their way, so Jones took a few 
moments to put his pants on. While doing that, he noticed that his billfold, 
containing roughly $600, was gone.

[¶4.]     Upon questioning by the 
police, Jones identified the man he had seen in his home as appellant, and he 
said that the man he had chased down the street was slight of build and had 
medium length brown hair. Other evidence presented in the case included the 
testimony of a Ms. Lorna Hansen, one of Jones' neighbors. On the night of the 
incident she had called the police at least two times to report that there was 
an unfamiliar car parked in front of her neighbor's house. She said that she had 
seen a young man walk in front of the headlights of the car and get in. After 
that the car drove away, but it soon returned to the same parking spot. A young 
person got out of the car, walked up to the sidewalk in front of Jones' house 
and ducked into the shadows. Ms. Hansen saw the light go on in Jones' house and 
then heard a sound like a firecracker going off. After that she saw a person 
wearing levis 
and dark clothes running south away from Jones' house.

[¶5.]     Judy Shaffer, a friend 
of appellant's, was called as a prosecution witness. Ms. Shaffer testified that 
in the early morning hours of February 8, 1987, she and a Mr. Jerry Ellis drank 
some peppermint schnapps with appellant and later drove him to the street Ms. 
Hansen lived on. They parked, appellant left the car for a few minutes, 
returned, and they drove to a nearby convenience store for gasoline. At that 
time appellant said he had lost his wallet, so they retraced their steps to look 
for it. They eventually got back to where they had been parked earlier. 
Appellant left the car again, instructing Shaffer and Ellis to wait a few 
minutes and leave without him if he was not back soon. He did not come back and 
they drove away.

[¶6.]     On February 9, 1987, a 
criminal complaint was filed charging appellant with burglary and grand larceny 
in violation of W.S. 6-3-301(a) and W.S. 6-3-402(a) (June 1983 Repl.), 
respectively.2 A warrant issued, and 
appellant was apprehended in Wisconsin. After a preliminary hearing and 
arraignment, he pled not guilty to both counts.

[¶7.]     On May 7, 1987, 
appellant filed a motion seeking an order requiring the state to elect which of 
the two charged offenses it would prosecute in the upcoming jury trial. The 
motion stated that simultaneous prosecution on both counts would violate his 
constitutional rights against double-jeopardy. The trial court denied the 
motion. The jury convicted appellant of burglary, but found him not guilty of 
larceny. After a presentence investigation, appellant was sentenced to seven to 
ten years in the state penitentiary, less credit for time served; fined $2,000; 
and ordered to pay $600 restitution. This appeal followed.

DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY

[¶8.]     Appellant argues that 
he was denied protection under the U.S. Const. amend. V, and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11, 
when the state was allowed to prosecute him for burglary and the lesser included 
offense of larceny in the same prosecution. He claims that placing both charges 
before the jury, when a conviction on both of them would require a merger under 
the state and federal constitutions, unfairly prejudiced him in the eyes of the 
jury.3

[¶9.]     The state may join 
offenses in a criminal prosecution pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a), which 
provides:

(a) Joinder of offenses. - Two (2) or more 
offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate 
count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors 
or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or 
transaction, or on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or 
constituting part of a common scheme or plan.

If a defendant 
feels that a joinder under this rule is prejudicial to his case, he can seek 
relief under W.R.Cr.P. 13, which provides:

If it appears that a 
defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants 
in an indictment or information, or by such joinder for trial together, the 
court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of 
defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a 
motion by a defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecuting 
attorney to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or 
confessions made by the defendant which the state intends to introduce in 
evidence at the trial.

[¶10.]  The trial court has discretion to deny a 
Rule 13 motion. This court will not overturn such a denial unless appellant 
carries his burden to show an abuse of discretion and resultant prejudice. Pote 
v. State, 695 P.2d 617, 624 (Wyo. 1985). See also Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986) (defining judicial discretion). An unsupported assertion of prejudice is 
insufficient to meet appellant's burden under Rule 13. Pote v. State, 695 P.2d  
at 624 (citing Dobbins v. State, 483 P.2d 255 (Wyo. 1971)).

[¶11.]  Appellant presents essentially a single 
legal proposition. He claims that being tried for two charges arising out of the 
same transaction in the same prosecution violates his constitutional protections 
against double-jeopardy. Allowing prosecution on both charges at the same time, 
he tells us, makes the jury think that he must be guilty of at least one of the 
two charged offenses. That argument has failed numerous times before in this 
court, and we continue to reject it here. See Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173, 
185 (Wyo. 1976); Jackson v. State, 533 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 1975); Dycus v. State, 
529 P.2d 979, 980 (Wyo. 1974); Boyd v. State, 528 P.2d 287, 289 (Wyo. 1974), 
cert. denied 423 U.S. 871, 96 S. Ct. 137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1975); Dorador v. 
State, 520 P.2d 230, 231-232 (Wyo. 1974) and cases cited therein. See also 
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 789-790, 105 S. Ct. 2407, 
2417, 85 L. Ed. 2d 764, 778-779 (1985). The state complied with W.R. Cr.P. 11(a), 
when it charged and tried appellant. He has not shown any violation of his 
constitutional rights, an abuse of discretion or prejudice arising out of the 
trial court's denial of his Rule 13 motion. Appellant's merger arguments were 
rendered moot by his acquittal on the larceny charge.

INSTRUCTIONS

[¶12.]  Appellant's second contention is that the 
trial court committed reversible error when it refused to instruct the jury on 
the offense of criminal entry. W.S. 6-3-302 (June 1983 Repl.)4. Criminal entry is a lesser-included offense of 
burglary because the state cannot prove burglary unless it convinces the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made a criminal entry with the specific intent to commit larceny or a 
felony inside the building, structure or vehicle he 
entered.

[¶13.]  Recently, in Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855, 865-866 (Wyo. 1988), we reiterated the five-part test 
that is the established standard for instructing the jury on lesser-included 
offenses:

(1) a proper request [for 
the instruction] is made; (2) the elements of the lesser-included offense are 
identical to part of the elements of the greater offense; (3) there is some 
evidence that would justify conviction of the lesser-included offense; (4) the 
proof on the element or elements differentiating the two crimes is sufficiently 
in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant innocent of the 
greater and guilty of the lesser-included offense; and (5) mutuality exists such 
that the lesser-included charge can be demanded by either the prosecution or the 
defense. Adopted from United 
States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294, 1299 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied 446 U.S. 967, 100 S. Ct. 2947, 64 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1980). See 
also Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 917-918 (Wyo. 1984); and W.R.Cr.P. 
32(c).

When all five 
parts of this test are met, and the lesser-included offense instruction is not 
given, the trial court commits reversible error. Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d  at 
918. Cf. Miller v. State, 755 P.2d  at 865-866.

[¶14.]  A review of this record reveals that part 
(1) of the test was met. Appellant requested an instruction on the crime of 
criminal entry, which was denied. We have also described the identity between 
the elements of criminal entry and burglary, thereby satisfying part (2). The 
mutuality requirement of part (5) was present as well. The remaining questions 
then involve parts (3) and (4). There must be some evidence in the record that 
would negate the specific intent required for the crime of burglary; the proof 
of that specific intent must have been sufficiently in dispute to warrant a 
conviction of criminal entry alone. See Amin v. State, 694 P.2d 119, 123 
(Wyo. 
1985).

[¶15.]  The evidence appellant asserts as 
sufficient to satisfy parts (3) and (4) centers on the fact that he had been 
drinking the evening of the burglary. Judy Shaffer testified that when appellant 
showed up at her house at 3:00 a.m. on February 8, 1987, he brought a half pint 
of peppermint schnapps with him, and he told her he had just left the bar. She 
remembered appellant and Jerry Ellis sitting at her kitchen table and drinking 
from about 3:00 a.m. until 5:00 a.m. She had none of the schnapps herself. Ms. 
Shaffer also testified that she was unsure how much of the bottle each of the 
two men drank, but she did remember that they took it along with them when they 
got into the car. She stated she did not think they drank the whole bottle. When 
asked if appellant acted like he was intoxicated, Ms. Shaffer described 
appellant as "jittery" and she agreed that he seemed confused and mad that 
evening. When defense counsel asked her if it was her testimony that appellant 
was under the influence of alcohol that morning, she agreed. However, she did 
not recall seeing appellant stagger or that she could not have a conversation 
with him. Wanda Junkins, the convenience store clerk who was working when 
appellant, Ellis and Shaffer got gas early in the morning on February 8, 1987, 
also testified that appellant did not stagger or slur his speech when she saw 
him that evening. Ms. Shaffer also testified that she did remember Jerry Ellis 
being drunk after drinking some of the schnapps. When the car was searched 
later, the police did find a half pint schnapps bottle, but there is no 
testimony in the record indicating any amount of schnapps being in the bottle 
when it was seized.

[¶16.]  Based on this evidence, the trial court 
decided that it would be proper to give the jury an instruction that explained 
how self-induced intoxication is not an excuse for the commission of crime, but 
could be considered to determine whether appellant was capable of forming the 
specific intent necessary to steal or deprive a person of their property. W.S. 
6-1-202(a) (June 1983 Repl.); and Naugher v. State, 685 P.2d 37, 41-42 
(Wyo. 1984). 
Neither party objected to the giving of that instruction; consequently, it 
became the law of the case. Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300, 1308 (Wyo. 1988). We must view 
the evidence of drinking described above in a light most favorable to appellant 
because he is contending that an instruction he requested should have been 
given. Stapleman v. State, 680 P.2d 73, 75 (Wyo. 1984). Considering that standard in 
conjunction with the intoxication instruction the trial court gave, we hold that 
parts (3) and (4) of the Chapman test are met in this case. Appellant was 
entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminal entry, and 
the trial court's failure to give it was reversible error.

[¶17.]  Reversed and remanded for a new 
trial.

FOOTNOTES

2 W.S. 6-3-301(a) (June 
1983 Repl.), provides:

(a) A person is guilty of 
burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with 
intent to commit larceny or a felony therein. W.S. 6-3-402(a) (June 1983 Repl.), 
provides: (a) A person who steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away 
property of another with intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is 
guilty of larceny.

3 Appellant cites no 
authority for this argument, but we surmise that it is probably based on Justice 
Marshall's dissent in Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 258-259, 106 S. Ct. 1032, 
1044-1045, 89 L. Ed. 2d 187, 204-205 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).

4 W.S. 6-3-302(a) (June 
1983 Repl.), provides:

(a) A person is guilty of 
criminal entry if, without authority, he knowingly enters a building, occupied 
structure, vehicle or cargo portion of a truck or trailer, or a separately 
secured or occupied portion of those enclosures.