Title: STOWE v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STOWE v. STATE2000 WY 17010 P.3d 551Case Number: 99-285Decided: 08/22/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
THOMAS STOWE, Appellant 
(Defendant),v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County The Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. Hughes, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel.Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, 
Wyoming Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
and Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, J J.

HILL, 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant 
Thomas Frederick Stowe (Stowe) seeks review of the sentence imposed by the 
district court pursuant to his guilty plea. Stowe claims that the prosecution 
reneged on its end of a plea bargain to recommend probation as Stowe's sentence. 
Stowe contends that because the State did not live up to the plea bargain, this 
matter should be remanded to the district court for re-sentencing, placing Stowe 
on probation, or permitting Stowe to withdraw his guilty plea. Stowe also 
contends that the trial court set restitution in an unreasonably high amount, 
which is not supported by the record. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] Stowe 
phrases his issues as follows:

I. Does the State's 
breach of the plea agreement require remand to the trial court for withdrawal of 
the guilty plea or re-sentencing in accordance with the plea 
agreement?

II. Was the amount of 
restitution ordered by the trial court unreasonable?

[¶3] The State 
rephrases those issues:

I. Did the State violate 
its plea agreement with Appellant?

II. Did the district 
court abuse its discretion in setting the amount of 
restitution?

FACTS

[¶4] Stowe 
pleaded guilty to a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-3-402(b) and (c)(i) (LEXIS 
1999), larceny by a bailee, and was sentenced to a prison term of 20 months to 
90 months, as well as to pay restitution of $8,787.58 to Dollar Rent A Car. The 
gravamen of the offense was that Stowe obtained a rented vehicle from Dollar 
Rent A Car and did not return it as agreed. Eventually, the rented vehicle was 
recovered by Dollar Rent A Car, in Nevada, in a damaged condition and missing a 
bench seat. Dollar Rent A Car submitted information, in itemized detail, to the 
Department of Corrections, Division of Field Services, indicating that it was 
damaged in the amount of $8,787.58 by Stowe's actions. That information was 
included in the Presentence Investigation Report. Stowe's guilty plea was 
entered in conjunction with a plea agreement, which had, as its salient feature, 
an agreement by the

[¶5] State to 
recommend probation for Stowe. If that plea agreement was reduced to a written 
form, such did not appear in the record on appeal.

[¶6] At 
sentencing, it was evident from the very outset of that hearing that the trial 
court was not leaning in the direction of probation. The trial court had made it 
clear to Stowe at the guilty plea proceedings that it was not bound by the plea 
agreement when imposing sentence, and Stowe acknowledged that bit of 
information. See W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B).1 The trial court was very skeptical 
about Stowe's willingness to plead guilty and, at the same time, protest his 
innocence. The trial court was disturbed to learn that Stowe did not make the 
proper arrangements with the Department of Corrections to provide information 
for the Presentence Report and, as a result, it was necessary for a warrant to 
be issued for his arrest and for Stowe to be returned to Wyoming and held in 
custody pending sentencing. As a part of the sentencing proceedings, the 
prosecution, in response to a question from the judge, acknowledged that it had 
not been aware of much of the information contained in the Presentence Report, 
and that there was an outstanding warrant for Stowe's arrest in Colorado. Stowe 
himself admitted that he had not lived up to the terms of a probation agreement 
he entered into in Colorado and had his usual list of excuses or "explanations" 
for why that was not really his fault. The prosecution also acknowledged that it 
had agreed to a probation recommendation. 

Did the State Renege on 
the Plea Bargain?

[¶7] The record 
does not bear out Stowe's claim that the State reneged on the plea bargain. The 
State agreed to recommend probation, but it did not agree to stand silent or to 
withhold relevant information from the trial court during the sentencing 
proceedings, particularly in view of the trial court's direct inquiry in that 
regard. See Swingholm v. State, 910 P.2d 1334, 1338 (Wyo. 1996); and Jackson v. 
State, 902 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Wyo. 1995). The State acknowledged its agreement to 
recommend probation, so the trial court was fully aware that that was the plea 
bargain. It is also evident that Stowe's propensity for admitting guilt, but in 
the same breath professing innocence, did not sit well with the trial court. 
Likewise, Stowe's history of not living up to a probation agreement in Colorado 
and his failure to abide by the terms of his bail pending sentencing plainly 
left the trial court with a confidence that Stowe was not a good prospect for 
probation. All of the information, which Stowe claims was volunteered by the 
prosecution, was contained in the Presentence Report. We find no error in this 
regard.

[¶8] Is the 
Amount of Restitution Ordered Supported by Sufficient Evidence? Stowe concedes 
that he owes restitution for a portion of the unpaid rental charges in the 
amount of $2,495.00, but challenges the trial court's determination that the 
other amounts claimed by Dollar Rent A Car are his responsibility. He also 
asserts that there is no credible evidence to support that portion of the 
restitution award. Dollar Rent A Car submitted a victim impact statement to the 
Department of Corrections, which was incorporated into the Presentence Report. 
In that statement, Dollar Rent A Car sought restitution for: Unpaid rental 
charges of $6,266.09; costs of damages, towing and storage totaled $1,571.49; 
and cost of a missing bench seat in the amount of $950.00. The total amount of 
restitution sought was $8,787.58.

[¶9] As a part 
of the sentencing process, the trial court is required to order a defendant to 
pay restitution, if applicable, and if the defendant has the ability to pay or 
if there is a reasonable probability that he will have the ability to pay. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 (LEXIS 1999). Appellate review of ordered restitution is 
confined to a search for procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion. 
Aldridge v. State, 956 P.2d 341, 343 (Wyo. 1998). The amount of restitution 
fixed by the trial court should be supported by evidence sufficient to afford a 
reasonable basis for estimating the loss. Hilterbrand v. State, 930 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Wyo. 1997). A challenge to the amount of restitution set by the court must 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Id. "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously." Brock v. State, 967 P.2d 26, 
27 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998)). As in 
Brock, here, Stowe's only complaint is that there was no credible evidence to 
provide a reasonable basis for ordering restitution. In Brock we held that a 
victim impact statement, such as that incorporated into the Presentence Report 
in this case, is credible evidence upon which a trial court may impose a 
restitution amount. Id. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion under the circumstances of this case, and that the restitution award 
is supported by credible evidence.

[¶10] The 
Judgment and Sentence of the trial court are affirmed in all 
respects.

FOOTNOTES

1 W.R.Cr.P. 
11(e)(2) provides in pertinent part:

If 
the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the court shall 
advise the defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation or 
request, the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw the 
plea.

The 
trial court advised Stowe that it was not bound by the plea agreement, but 
failed to inform Stowe of the information quoted above. No issue is raised in 
this regard, and we will not address the matter further. However, we point out 
this deficiency in order to further educate Bench and Bar of the requirement, 
and that failure to comply with this provision may require reversal of a 
conviction such as the instant one, and remand for the purpose of permitting the 
defendant to withdraw his plea if he so chooses, though it may also be treated 
as harmless error. W.R.Cr.P. 11(h); 1A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminal 3rd § 178, fn. 36 (1999).