Title: Wheatland Irr. Dist. v. Laramie Rivers Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wheatland Irr. Dist. v. Laramie Rivers Co.1983 WY 17659 P.2d 561Case Number: 5780Case Number: 5780Decided: 02/18/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
WHEATLAND IRRIGATION 
DISTRICT, APPELLANT (PETITIONER),

v.

LARAMIE RIVERS 
COMPANY AND THE UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING, AND THE WYOMING STATE BOARD OF CONTROL, APPELLEES 
(RESPONDENTS). 

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Robert A. Hill, 
J.

William R. Jones 
and John P. McBride of Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellant.

Horace M. 
MacMillan, II of Pence & MacMillan, Laramie, for appellee Laramie Rivers 
Co.

George A. Gould, 
Laramie, for appellee The University of Wyoming.

Steven F. 
Freudenthal, Atty. Gen., Walter Perry, III, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lawrence 
J. Wolfe, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee 
Wyoming State Bd. of Control.

Before ROONEY, C.J.,* and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE[fn**] and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice since 
January 1, 1983.

[fn**] Chief 
Justice at time of argument.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The appellant, 
Wheatland Irrigation District (sometimes referred to as Wheatland), filed a 
petition with the Board of Control seeking abandonment of 41,100 of the 68,500 
acre feet of water appropriated under two reservoir permits issued to the 
appellee Laramie Rivers Company (sometimes referred to as Laramie Rivers) for 
the Lake Hattie reservoir near Laramie, Wyoming. The sources of supply for Lake 
Hattie are the Laramie and the Little Laramie Rivers and, if the petition were 
to be granted and the Board of Control's order upheld by the courts, appellee 
Laramie Rivers would be left with a 27,400 acre-foot capacity in the reservoir. 
The appellant, owner of Wheatland Reservoir No. 3 which receives water from the 
same water sources as does LakeHattie, holds a permit junior to those of 
the appellee Laramie Rivers. It is the appellant's theory that the 41,100 acre 
feet should be declared abandoned by reason of the directives contained in § 
41-3-401(a), W.S. 1977,1 on the ground that the appellee had 
failed

"to use the water 
therefrom for the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated * * * during 
any five (5) successive years * * *." § 41-3-401(a), W.S. 1977, supra n. 
1.

As indicated 
supra n. 1, this section of the statute goes on to provide that if the holder of 
the appropriation has not used the water for this period of 
time,

"* * * he is considered 
as having abandoned the water right and shall forfeit all water rights and 
privileges appurtenant thereto."

[¶2.]     The Board of Control 
denied the petition for the reason that substantial work on the reservoir had 
been undertaken prior to its filing. In ¶ 7 of its findings of fact the Board 
said:

"THAT the petition in 
this case was filed on May 23, 1980 with the Board of Control, and the 
contestee, Laramie Rivers Company, was advised of the filing of the petition on 
June 6, 1980. The contestee argues that it had performed a substantial amount of 
work to repair the dam by the time the petition was filed and that therefore, 
the abandonment was not timely filed and should be denied. The Board is 
persuaded by the facts presented by the contestee and finds that substantial 
work had been undertaken to repair the dam as set forth in the following 
paragraphs."2

 

[¶3.]     In ¶ 6 of the 
conclusions of law section of its order, the Board held:

"THAT the Board concludes 
that the abandonment was not promptly asserted in this case and therefore, it 
must be denied. The contestee, Laramie Rivers Company, had undertaken 
substantial work to repair and renovate the dam in order that it might store 
water to its original adjudicated capacity. This renovation work was under way 
at the time the petition was filed and served upon contestee and substantial 
progress had been made. The Board concludes that to grant the abandonment would 
be to deny the contestee the fruits of its efforts to repair the dam and that 
the forfeiture was not promptly asserted and therefore, must be 
denied."

[¶4.]     The grounds for the 
Board's refusal of the petition can be capsulized as 
follows:

The contestee had 
undertaken substantial work to repair the dam by the time the petition was filed 
and therefore the filing was not timely.

[¶5.]     It is to be noted that 
the Board did not consider whether the appropriator had or had not failed to use 
the water for five successive years as contemplated by § 41-3-401(a),3 and therefore this issue has not 
been resolved by the Board of Control or presented to the district court for 
decision. The question may therefore not be considered here. Positions and 
issues not presented to the district court will not be considered by the Supreme 
Court. Wyoming Bank and Trust Company of Buffalo 
v. Bonham, Wyo., 606 P.2d 296 
(1980).

[¶6.]     Wheatland Irrigation 
District filed a petition for review with the district court and it is from the 
court's order in favor of Laramie Rivers that Wheatland lodges its appeal 
here.

[¶7.]     The issues which 
Wheatland assigns for our consideration are these:

"1. DOES UNDERTAKING 
SUBSTANTIAL WORK TO REPAIR A DAM, PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR 
PARTIAL ABANDONMENT, RENDER THE FILING UNTIMELY?

"2. IS THE UNDERTAKING OF 
WORK TO REPAIR A DAM AN ACT WHICH LEGALLY PRECLUDES ABANDONMENT, OR IS THE USE 
OF STORED WATER FOR BENEFICIAL PURPOSES, PRIOR TO FILING A PETITION FOR 
ABANDONMENT, THE ACT WHICH LEGALLY PRECLUDES ABANDONMENT?

"3. IF THE FILING OF 
PETITION FOR PARTIAL ABANDONMENT IS FOUND TO BE UNTIMELY, DOES THAT FACT ALONE 
PRECLUDE THE GRANTING OF A PARTIAL ABANDONMENT?

"4. IS THE BOARD OF 
CONTROL ORDER CORRECT WHEN FOUNDED UPON THE CONCLUSION THAT TO GRANT THE 
PETITION FOR ABANDONMENT, THE LARAMIE RIVER COMPANY WOULD BE DENIED `THE FRUITS 
OF ITS EFFORTS TO REPAIR THE DAM,' (APPROXIMATELY $142,000.00) WHEN THE RESULT 
OF THE ORDER BASED UPON SUCH CONCLUSION DENIES THE WHEATLAND IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
THE FRUITS OF ITS EFFORTS EXPENDED ON RESERVOIR NO. 3 (APPROXIMATELY 
$656,000.00)?"

[¶8.]     Condensed, the only 
question for resolution by this court is:

Does § 41-3-401, W.S. 
1977 authorize the Board of Control to refuse to declare an abandonment for the 
reason that the petition for abandonment was filed after repair work was 
commenced but prior to the application of the questioned Lake Hattie Reservoir 
waters to a beneficial use?

 

[¶9.]     The record in this case 
shows that a restriction to 27,400 feet of storage has been in effect at 
LakeHattie since April 5, 1972 
when it was imposed by the State Engineer because of infirmities in the dam. In 
March of 1980, the state of Wyoming approved a loan to Laramie Rivers so 
that the dam could be repaired, after which, on May 16, 1980, Laramie Rivers 
publicly announced its intentions with respect to dam repair and future water 
storage plans. This was the first Wheatland knew of Laramie Rivers' loan 
approval and dam improvement plans. One week later, on May 23, the abandonment 
petition was filed. Two days before the filing of the petition, soil compaction 
tests had been made and the construction company hired for the repair work was 
placing fill and proceeding with the construction. By July 7, 1980 the work was 
substantially complete.

[¶10.]  According to the record that is available 
to this court, the Laramie Rivers Company had not stored water in LakeHattie, and had not beneficially used any 
water therefrom in excess of the 27,400 acre-foot limitation from April, 1972 
until the time the petition for abandonment was filed on May 23, 1980. In fact, 
no water was stored or beneficially used above the limitation up to the time of 
hearing before the Board of Control on February 17, 18 and 19, 1981, nor had any 
water been stored or used above the limitation when the parties were before the 
district court on July 1, 1982.

[¶11.]  From what we have said we must assume 
that the water in question here was not in the reservoir at any time which is 
relevant to this appeal in consequence of which there was no such application of 
this water to beneficial use and place of use as is contemplated by the 
appellee's appropriation certificate.

[¶12.]  These things being so, we must look to 
the statute to see whether or not the Board of Control was possessed of the 
authority to deny Wheatland's petition for partial abandonment on the ground 
that, at the time of its filing, "substantial work had been undertaken to repair 
the dam," (¶ 7 of Board's findings of fact) and therefore the petition was not 
"promptly asserted" (¶ 6 of conclusions of law).

THE 
LAW

Statutory 
Construction

[¶13.]  We summarized the rules of statutory 
construction by which this court lives when we said in Wyoming State Department of Education v. 
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982):

"* * * First off, it is a 
well-established principle that in construing a legislative enactment we must, 
if possible, ascertain the intent of the legislature from the wording of the 
statute. We are not, however, permitted to assign meaning to a statute which 
would have the effect of nullifying its operation. In the Matter of the Injury to Hasser, 
Wyo., 647 P.2d 66 (1982); McGuire v. 
McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278, 1285 (1980). Also, words utilized in the 
statute are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise 
indicated. Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of 
Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174, 1184 (1981); Jahn v. Burns, Wyo., 593 P.2d 828, 830 
(1979). Similarly, it is well settled that general principles of statutory 
construction calculated to assist the court in ascertaining legislative intent 
are not resorted to unless it can be said that the statute is ambiguous. Sanches v. Sanches, Wyo., 626 P.2d 61, 
62 (1981); Matter of North Laramie Land 
Co., Wyo., 605 P.2d 367, 373 (1980)."

[¶14.]  We subscribe to these rules in analyzing 
§ 41-3-401(a) as it is applicable to the facts of this case. Particularly we are 
bound here by the rule of Sanches v. 
Sanches, Wyo., 626 P.2d 61 (1981) and Matter of North Laramie Land Co., Wyo., 
605 P.2d 367 (1980), which holds that we will not resort to statutory 
construction aids where there is no ambiguity in the statute under 
consideration.

[¶15.]  There are no innuendos or double 
entendres to be found in § 41-3-401(a). The intention of the legislature is 
there expressed in plain English, leaving no room whatever for our seeking out 
any rules of statutory construction except those which direct us to apply the 
statute according to the plain, ordinary meaning of the words to be found 
therein. Board of County Commissioners of 
the County of Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174, reh. denied 627 P.2d 163 (1981).

[¶16.]  What does the statute say? It says that 
where the holder of an appropriation of water for a reservoir water 
source

"* * * fails * * * to use the water there from for 
the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated * * *" (emphasis 
added)

for a period of 
five successive years

"he is considered as having abandoned the 
water right and SHALL forfeit all water rights and privileges appurtenant 
thereto." (All emphasis added.)

[¶17.]  This legislative directive amounts to a 
forfeiture by statute if the facts fit the mandate. It leaves the Board of 
Control and the courts no room to save an appropriator from an abandonment 
petition where his water has not been used for the beneficial purposes for which 
it was appropriated for the "five (5) successive years" contemplated by the 
statute. The statute says that the appropriation "SHALL" (emphasis added) be 
declared abandoned in circumstances where the five-year nonuse showing is made 
even where the failure to make beneficial application of the water is 
unintentional. The applicable legislative enactments do not envision authority 
in the Board of Control or the courts to relieve an appropriator from the 
abandonment statute's violent impact for any of the reasons that the Board 
utilized in denying Wheatland's petition.

[¶18.]  The Board denied the petition on the 
grounds that contestee, Laramie Rivers, had undertaken "substantial work" (¶ 6 
of conclusions of law, supra) to repair the dam when the petition was filed and 
therefore it was not asserted "promptly." (¶ 6 of conclusions of law, supra). 
But where in the statute can language be found which permits the Board such 
leeway as will countenance this holding? It simply is not there. The only thing 
that will save the contestee from the harshness of the abandonment statute's 
dictate is for Laramie Rivers to be able to show - once nonuse for the statutory 
period has been established by the contestant - that the water in contest here 
was not available for application to a beneficial use within the five-year 
period contemplated by the statute. See § 41-3-401(b), W.S. 1977.4 State Board of Control v. Johnson 
Ranches, Inc., Wyo., 605 P.2d 367 (1980).

[¶19.]  It is clear to this court that the Board 
of Control did not apply the appropriate rules of law in coming to its 
conclusions of law, and thus reached an erroneous ultimate 
decision.

[¶20.]  In ¶ 4 of its conclusions of law, the 
Board's order says:

"THAT abandonment and 
forfeiture of water rights are not favored. Sturgeon v. Brooks, 73 Wyo. 436, 281 P.2d 675 (1955). Forfeitures must be promptly asserted, and if not asserted they 
are waived. Sturgeon v. Brooks, 
supra."

and ¶ 5 
says:

"THAT water rights will 
not be set aside unless it is justified by clear and convincing evidence. Wheatland Irrigation District v. Pioneer 
Canal Co., 464 P.2d 533 (Wyo. 1970). The contestant has the burden of 
proving the abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Ramsey v. Gottsche, 51 Wyo. 516, 69 P.2d 535 (1937)."

Referring to ¶ 4 
above, where the Board cites Sturgeon v. 
Brooks, 73 Wyo. 436, 281 P.2d 675 (1955), to the effect that forfeitures are 
not favored in the law, we can only say that this proposition is hardly 
applicable here. Our concern in this appeal necessarily focuses upon a statutory 
interpretation question - not whether the court abhors forfeiture. We cannot 
call up the abhorrence-of-forfeiture rule in order to rescue Laramie Rivers from 
an abandonment of a water right in lieu of requiring that the applicable statute 
pertaining to abandonment be applied and given its plain English-language 
meaning. We are not the legislature. Indeed, we do abhor forfeitures, but it is 
the legislature that has established this rule for forfeiting water rights - not 
the court!!

[¶21.]  The Board of Control has also misapplied 
the rule of Sturgeon v. Brooks, 
supra, where, in conclusion of law ¶ 4, it cites that authority for the 
proposition that

"[f]orfeitures must be 
promptly asserted and if not asserted they are waived."

[¶22.]  We find no language in § 41-3-401 or any 
other applicable statute which suggests that a petitioner's lack of promptness 
will become grounds for penalty at any time before the appropriator's water has 
been applied to a beneficial use. In any case, it hardly seems that this rule 
could come into play to deny this appellant its statutory right to file a 
petition for abandonment when it is remembered that the filing was made within a 
week or ten days from the date of the announcement that the improvements would 
be undertaken - two days after the commencement of the work at the site and in 
all events prior to the assignment of the contested water to the reservoir or to 
any other authorized use contemplated by Laramie Rivers' appropriation 
certificates.

[¶23.]  Even if the above were not convincing for 
the proposition which speaks to the timeliness of the filing, Sturgeon v. Brooks 
is not authority for the Board of Control's decision.

[¶24.]  In Sturgeon v. Brooks, 281 P.2d  at 683-684, 
this court said:

"* * * We might say at 
this point, plaintiff Sturgeon testified that he acquired the land on which the 
reservoir in question is located in 1936 or 1937. The reservoir rights in 
question here had not been put in use for five years previously and were not put 
to use until 1951 or 1952. Yet he waited sixteen or seventeen years before 
bringing an action of forfeiture, and that after the defendant Brooks had twice 
repaired the reservoir and had 
recommenced to use the water. The testimony does not disclose the outlay, 
but judging from the fact that plaintiff Sturgeon had offered to contribute $500 
to the repair of the dam of the reservoir, the expenditure by Brooks must have 
been at least substantial. Waiting sixteen or seventeen years to bring an action 
for forfeiture would, on its face, seem to be an unreasonable time, especially 
in view of the facts just stated." (Emphasis added.)

The court then 
went on to explain that had the reservoir water not been put to use, the result 
might not have been the same when we said:

"* * * It may be conceded 
herein for the purpose of this case, that if the action for forfeiture had been 
brought before Brooks put the reservoir again into use, the court would have 
been justified, if not constrained, to declare a forfeiture." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶25.]  In Wheatland Irrigation District v. Pioneer 
Canal Co., Wyo., 464 P.2d 533 (1970), we were later confronted with a fact 
situation (like the case before the court here) where a forfeiture petition was 
filed before the water had been 
applied to its beneficial use. There, both the Board of Control and the district 
court found that the Pioneer Canal Company should have a reasonable period of 
time to enlarge their reservoir to its appropriated size rather than abandoning 
the right as to any excess over its present capacity. This court reversed the 
district court's affirmance of the Board of Control's order and declared the 
excess of the right to be abandoned. Commenting on Sturgeon v. Brooks, we 
said:

"* * * One of the 
questions dealt with in the case was whether or not the owner had abandoned his 
storage right because of the prolonged disuse of the reservoir. We held he had 
not for the reason no formal declaration of abandonment had theretofore been 
obtained from the board or the district court. It was said, however, `that if 
the action for forfeiture had been brought before Brooks [defendant] put the reservoir again into use, the 
court would have been justified, if not constrained, to declare a forfeiture,' 
281 P.2d  at 684. Inasmuch as there has been no change in the statute relating to 
the matter since that time, see § 41-47, W.S. 1957, the rationale of the case is 
particularly persuasive here, and as indicated above we hold the board and the 
district court erred in granting Pioneer additional time within which to enlarge 
its reservoir." (Emphasis added.) 464 P.2d  at 540-541.

[¶26.]  We subscribe to the rule of Wheatland 
Irrigation District v. Pioneer Canal Co., supra, as suggested in Sturgeon v. 
Brooks, supra, to the effect that § 41-3-401(a) requires forfeiture to be 
declared where the nonuse is shown for the statutory period and the only use 
which will rescue contestees from the gnashing teeth of that statute is the use of the water

"* * * for the beneficial 
purposes for which it was appropriated * * *."

Undertaking 
repairs before filing a petition does not prevent forfeiture. Only the use of 
the water will prevent a forfeiture. § 41-3-401(a), W.S. 
1977.

[¶27.]  The Board further holds, as indicated 
above, that water rights will not be set aside except upon clear and convincing 
evidence, and that the contestant has the burden of proving the abandonment by 
clear and convincing evidence, citing Ramsey v. Gottsche, supra.5

[¶28.]  This rule of law is hardly applicable 
here. As we have noted, ¶ 6 of the Board's conclusion of law 
says:

"THAT the Board 
concludes that the abandonment was not 
promptly asserted in this case and therefore, it must be denied. The 
contestee, Laramie Rivers Company, had 
undertaken substantial work to repair and renovate the dam in order that it 
might store water to its original adjudicated capacity. This renovation work was 
under way at the time the petition was filed and served upon contestee and 
substantial progress had been made. The Board concludes that to grant the 
abandonment would be to deny the contestee the fruits of its efforts to repair 
the dam and that the forfeiture was not promptly asserted and therefore, must be 
denied." (Emphasis added.)

[¶29.]  The Board's "clear and convincing 
evidence" ruling is hard to correlate with ¶ 6 of its conclusion of law. If the 
Board is holding, as ¶ 6 indicates, that the appellant's petition failed because 
it was not "promptly" asserted for the reason that the Laramie Rivers Company 
had

"undertaken substantial 
work to repair and renovate the dam * * *"

then the "clear 
and convincing" evidence rule is not applicable. What clear and convincing 
evidence? If the Board is talking about evidence that will or will not support 
whether substantial work had been accomplished, or whether the questioned water 
had been placed in the reservoir and from there beneficially applied to the 
land, then an erroneous conclusion has been reached because there seems to be 
adequate evidence to support both of these propositions. It does not make any 
difference anyway. We know when the contestant filed its petition; we know what 
work had been done when the filing was made; and we know the water had not been 
applied to beneficial use. These facts are not in dispute. To what "clear and 
convincing evidence" does the Board of Control refer? We really do not know, but 
in any case it is irrelevant.

[¶30.]  Furthermore, we must assume that when the 
Board talks about "clear and convincing evidence," it does not have reference to 
any proof obligations bearing upon the application of water for "five (5) 
successive years," § 41-3-401(a), supra n. 1, because, as we have noted (see n. 
3), the Board entered finding of fact ¶ 25 in which it said that this issue was 
not considered because it was disposing of the matter on other grounds. It 
follows that any reference to "clear and convincing" proof obligations cannot 
have relevance to the application-of-water issue under § 41-3-401(a) or the 
availability-of-water issue under § 41-3-401(b).

CONCLUSION

[¶31.]  We hold that the Wheatland Irrigation 
District's petition was timely filed, and the Board of Control may not, as was 
done in this case, circumvent the clear language of § 41-3-401(a), which 
provides that a forfeiture may only be avoided by application of water to 
beneficial use. Therefore there is left for resolution the question which asks 
whether the contestee has failed to use its water rights to the contested 41,100 
acre feet in the way directed by the laws of this state applicable to such 
matters and, if such use has not been affected, whether there is a defense to 
such nonuse as is contemplated by law.

[¶32.]  Reversed and remanded with directions to 
the district court that it remand to the Board of Control, directing that the 
Board make findings of fact on the basis of the evidence it had before it, and 
to take further evidence if necessary for purposes of determining if there had 
been an abandonment under the provisions of the first sentence of § 41-3-401(a), 
W.S. 1977 and the last sentence of § 41-3-401(b), W.S. 
1977.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 41-3-401(a), 
W.S. 1977 provides:

"(a) Where the holder of 
an appropriation of water from a surface, underground or reservoir water source 
fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to use the water therefrom for 
the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated, whether under an 
adjudicated or unadjudicated right, during any five (5) successive years, he is 
considered as having abandoned the water right and shall forfeit all water 
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. Notwithstanding any provision in this 
section to the contrary, the holder of an appropriation for the diversion and 
storage of water in a reservoir, from which water or a portion thereof has not 
yet been beneficially used for the purposes for which appropriated, may apply to 
the board of control for an extension of time not to exceed five (5) years, 
within which to use water therefrom for the beneficial purposes for which it was 
appropriated. In the application the holder shall demonstrate the exercise of 
due diligence toward the utilization of the appropriation, and that 
notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, reasonable cause exists for 
nonuse. Reasonable cause includes but is not limited to delay due to court or 
administrative proceedings, time required in planning, developing, financing and 
constructing projects for the application of stored water to beneficial use 
which require in excess of five (5) years to complete, delay due to requirement 
of state and federal statutes and rules and regulations thereunder and any other 
causes beyond the control of the holder of the appropriation. Upon receipt of an 
application for extension, the board of control shall proceed under the 
provisions of W.S. 9-276.19 through 9-276.33 [§§ 9-4-101 through 9-4-115] and 
may grant an extension of time as it finds proper, not to exceed five (5) years, 
for the application of the appropriated water to the beneficial use for which it 
was appropriated. A prior grant of extension of time hereunder does not preclude 
the holder from applying for additional extensions of time, each not to exceed 
five (5) years, upon similar application and showing. The granting of an 
extension of time precludes the commencement of an abandonment action against 
the appropriation during the period of extension."

2 "The following 
paragraphs" to which ¶ 7 has reference constitute a laundry list of the efforts 
made by Laramie Rivers commencing February 14, 1980 to borrow money and contact 
contractors, and finally cause contract work to commence on May 2, 1980. The 
list shows the dates of construction progress until July 7, 1980 when the dam 
was complete. The facts enumerated do not show that the water in question was 
ever put to beneficial use. The reason for this is that beneficial utilization 
was never accomplished at any time relevant to the issues in this 
appeal.

3 Paragraph 25 of the 
findings of fact says:

"THAT there was 
substantial testimony in the record as to the availability or nonavailability of 
water during the years in question. However, because of the Board's disposition 
of the matter, this evidence will not be commented upon."

4 Section 41-3-401(b) 
reads in pertinent part:

"* * * The total absence 
of water to divert during an irrigation season precludes the inclusion of any 
period of nonuse resulting therefrom in the computation of the successive five 
(5) year period."

5 We might say 
parenthetically, although the issue is not before us, that if ¶ 5 has reference 
to the burden to prove that water was available during the five-year period in 
question, this task does not fall to the contestant. Matter of North Laramie 
Land Co., supra.