Title: State v. Kuznetsov

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: December 18, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
VENIAMIN N. KUZNETSOV,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC
CR0313871, CR0314194; CA A129452 (Control), A129453, A129454;
SC S055487)
En Banc
On review from the Court of
Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
September 15, 2008.
Kristin A. Carveth, Deputy
Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on
review.  With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, Legal Services Division.
David B. Thompson, Assistant
Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
WALTERS, J.
The decision of the Court of
Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from Clackamas County
Circuit Court, Nancy W. Campbell, Judge.  215 Or App 533, 170 P3d 1130 (2007).
WALTERS,
J.
In
this case, we address whether Article VII (Amended), section 5, of the Oregon
Constitution prohibits a trial court from allowing a substantive amendment to
an information charging a misdemeanor and, if not, whether the trial court has
authority to do so.
The
facts that present those issues arose in April 2003, when defendant drove his
vehicle into the side of victim's minivan, injuring victim severely enough to
require hospitalization.  In December 2003, the state charged defendant by
information with multiple misdemeanor offenses arising out of the collision,
including fourth-degree assault.  ORS 163.160(1) sets forth the elements of
fourth-degree assault and provides, in part:
"A person commits the crime of assault in
the fourth degree if the person:
"(a) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
causes physical injury to another; or
"(b) With criminal negligence causes
physical injury to another by means of a deadly weapon."
The state alleged, under
paragraph (b) of that statute, that defendant, acting with criminal negligence,
injured victim with a deadly weapon -- a vehicle.
After
defendant had failed to appear at multiple hearings resulting in the issuance
of bench warrants, the case was set for trial in May 2005.  On the date of
trial, the state moved to file an "amended information." The state
had determined that the original information contained a potential defect.  ORS
161.015(2) defines a "deadly weapon" as "any instrument * * *
specifically designed for and presently capable of causing death or serious
physical injury."  However, an ordinary road vehicle may not meet that
definition.  See State v. Pachmayr, 344 Or 482, 485, 185 P3d 1103 (2008)
(distinguishing dangerous from deadly weapons and indicating that the state may
be required to adduce evidence to demonstrate that a vehicle is a deadly, as
opposed to a dangerous, weapon).  In its proposed amended information, the
state deleted the allegations that brought the charge under ORS 163.160(1)(b)
-- that defendant had acted with criminal negligence and caused injury by means
of a deadly weapon -- and substituted an allegation that defendant had acted
recklessly, thereby bringing the charge under paragraph (a) of ORS 163.160(1). 

Defendant
opposed the state's motion and argued that the state effectively was seeking to
charge a new crime and was precluded from making that substantive amendment to
the information.  Moreover, defendant asserted, by the time the state sought to
file the amended information, the two-year statute of limitations for bringing
a charge of fourth-degree assault had run.  See ORS 131.125(6)(b) (state
must commence prosecution for fourth-degree assault within two years of the
commission of the offense).  It followed, defendant asserted, that that charge
should be dismissed.    
The state
responded that it was "merely fixing a technical mistake," and the
trial court permitted the amendment.  The trial court determined that the
amendment did not prejudice defendant because he "ha[d] been provided with
* * * all of the discovery * * * which would give [him] notice, factually, of
the various offense[s] that could, in fact, be charged."  It further found
that the statute of limitations had been tolled "by the defendant's
unauthorized departure for a year and a half."  See ORS 131.145(2)
("the period of limitation does not run during * * * [a]ny time when the
accused hides within the state so as to prevent process being served upon the
accused").  Consequently, the trial court allowed the filing of the
amended information.  The jury then convicted defendant of multiple charges,
including fourth-degree assault.
Defendant
timely appealed, arguing that Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), of the
Oregon Constitution precluded the trial court from allowing a substantive
amendment to an information such as the one that the trial court had granted
and, alternatively, that the trial court lacked authority to grant the state's
motion to amend the indictment.  The Court of Appeals held that Article VII
(Amended), section 5, does not prohibit substantive amendments to misdemeanor
informations and declined to consider defendant's alternative argument because
he did not raise it until oral argument.  State v. Kuznetsov, 215 Or App
533, 543, 543 n 4, 170 P3d 1130 (2007).  For the reasons set out below, we
agree with the construction of the Oregon Constitution that the Court of
Appeals adopted.  We also reach defendant's alternative argument and conclude that
the trial court had authority to permit the substantive amendment of a
misdemeanor information. 
Article
VII (Amended), section 5, articulates the constitutional requirements for the
issuance of criminal charges and provides, in part: 
"(3) Except as provided in subsections (4)
and (5) of this section, a person shall be charged in a circuit court with the
commission of any crime punishable as a felony only on indictment by a grand
jury.
"(4) The district attorney may charge a
person on an information filed in circuit court of a crime punishable as a
felony if the person appears before the judge of the circuit court and
knowingly waives indictment.
"(5) The district attorney may charge a
person on an information filed in circuit court if, after a preliminary hearing
before a magistrate, the person has been held to answer upon a showing of
probable cause that a crime punishable as a felony has been committed and that
the person has committed it, or if the person knowingly waives preliminary
hearing.
"(6) An information shall be substantially
in the form provided by law for an indictment. The district attorney may file
an amended indictment or information whenever, by ruling of the court, an
indictment or information is held to be defective in form."
Subsections
(3) to (5) of Article VII (Amended), section 5, set forth the accusatory
instruments required to charge a "crime punishable as a felony."  Those
subsections specify that, when alleging the commission of a felony, the state
either must secure an indictment from a grand jury or file an information.  If
the state proceeds by information, then the defendant is entitled to a
preliminary hearing before a magistrate.  Thus, absent a waiver, the state
cannot charge a defendant with a felony unless persons outside the office of
the prosecutor -- either grand jurors, in the context of an indictment, or a magistrate,
in the context of an information -- determine that the state has probable cause
to move forward with that charge.
Subsection
(6) of Article VII (Amended), section 5, addresses the amendment of those
accusatory instruments and provides that the state may file an amended "indictment
or information" when a court rules that that instrument is "defective
in form."  Although that text is permissive, this court has long
recognized that we must read it in conjunction with subsections (3) to (5) of section
5 and that, when read together, those provisions
impose limits on the power of the prosecutor.  The constitutionally required
roles of the grand jury and the magistrate in felony cases operate as a check
on the power of the district attorney and serve a critical function in protecting
individual liberties.  See Pachmayr, 344 Or at 495; State v. Burleson,
342 Or 697, 703, 160 P3d 624 (2007) (discussing role of grand jury); see
also State v. Freeland, 295 Or 367, 369, 667 P2d (1983) (discussing role of
magistrate).  Thus, this court has held that, although Article VII (Amended),
section 5(6), permits district attorneys to file amended accusatory instruments
to correct defects that are purely matters of form, the state must return to
the grand jury or a magistrate if it wishes to make substantive amendments to felony
indictments or informations.  State v. Wimber, 315 Or 103, 113, 843 P2d
424 (1992).
In
this case, defendant asserts that Article VII (Amended), section 5, also places
constraints on the substantive amendment of a misdemeanor information. 
Defendant argues that those constraints precluded the state from seeking, and
the trial court from allowing, the amendment to the information used to charge
defendant.  Defendant begins with the premise that the state sought an amendment
of substance and not of form.  Amendments to those allegations "that are
essential to the charge" are considered matters of substance; all
"[o]ther nonessential allegations are matters of form."  Pachmayr,
344 Or at 489; see also Wimber, 315 Or at 114 ("A matter that is
essential to show that an offense has been committed is a matter of
substance.").  The state now concedes, and we agree, that the mental state
with which defendant acted is a fact essential to the charge of fourth-degree
assault and, thus, an amendment to the allegation of that fact is substantive
in nature.  
Defendant
next argues that, unlike the subsections that precede it, subsection (6) of
Article VII (Amended), section 5, does not state that it applies solely to
crimes punishable as felonies and that, as a result, the state could seek, and
the court could permit, only amendments to the form of the information.  Defendant's
argument overlooks, however, the source of the constitutional constraints on
substantive amendments to informations.  Those constraints do not flow from section
5(6) alone, but also derive from the requirement of subsections 5(3) to (5) of
Article VII (Amended) that a grand jury or magistrate must authorize the filing
of felony charges.  Because those subsections do not require that a grand jury
or magistrate authorize the filing of an original information charging a
misdemeanor, neither they, nor subsection 5(6), preclude substantive amendments
to such an information.  We hold that there is no constitutional impediment to
a district attorney filing, and a trial court allowing, a substantive amendment
to a misdemeanor information.   
In
reaching that same conclusion, the Court of Appeals related the history of the adoption
of Article VII (Amended), section 5, which was amended to its current form by
voter initiative in 1974.  Before that amendment, Article VII (Amended), section
5, 1973, provided that
"[n]o person shall be charged in any circuit court with
the commission of any crime or misdemeanor defined or made punishable by
any of the laws of this state, except upon indictment found by a grand jury; *
* * Provided further, however, that if any person appear before any judge of
the circuit court and waive indictment, such person may be charged in such
court with any such crime or misdemeanor on information filed by the
district attorney."
(Emphases added.)  The 1974
amendment removed all references to misdemeanors, indicating that one of its purposes
was to free the state from the procedural strictures applicable to felonies
when charging misdemeanors.  Defendant stresses that, prior to the 1974 amendment,
the term "information" had been used to encompass both felony and
misdemeanor accusatory instruments, and that subsection 5(6), as opposed to the
other paragraphs of section 5, continues the use of that general term.  However,
that drafting peculiarity is not dispositive.  Read without reference to subsections
(3) to (5), subsection (6) does no more than grant the district attorney the
authority to file an amended information when a court rules that the original
information is defective in form.  The history of Article VII (Amended), section
5, reinforces our conclusion that that provision does not preclude substantive
amendments of a misdemeanor information.
Defendant
argues, in the alternative, that no law affirmatively authorizes the court to
allow substantive amendments to a misdemeanor information.  Defendant raised
this point for the first time at oral argument at the Court of Appeals, and,
considering the issue unpreserved, that court declined to reach the merits of
the argument.  Kuznetsov, 215 Or App at 543 n 4.  ORAP 5.45(1) provides
that "[n]o matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the
claimed error was preserved in the lower court and is assigned as error in the
opening brief in accordance with this rule * * *." 
Although
we are sympathetic with the stance adopted by the Court of Appeals, we also understand
defendant's perspective.  Defendant's argument at trial was that the state was
precluded from amending the information to charge a new crime.  The state
responded by invoking Article VII (Amended), section 5(6), and argued that it
was "merely fixing a technical mistake."  Consequently, when
defendant briefed his case before the Court of Appeals, he did so under the
assumption that the state would argue as it had below -- that the amendment in
question was not substantive and therefore constitutionally permissible.  At
the Court of Appeals, however, the state changed its position by arguing that subsection
5(6) did not apply to misdemeanors.  Although the appellate rules permit reply
briefs in narrow circumstances,(1)
it was not until oral argument that defendant responded that, if the state were
correct about the limited reach of section 5, then no affirmative authority supported
the trial court's action.  Although defendant could, and perhaps should, have
stated his complete argument in his opening brief or at least have sought leave
to file a reply brief, the issue was introduced at the Court of Appeals and
fully briefed in our court.  We therefore address defendant's argument for the
benefit of bench and bar.  See Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of
Oregon, 331 Or 634, 659-60, 20 P3d 180 (2001) (to promote judicial
efficiency, unpreserved alternative ground for affirmance may be raised on
appeal when, among other considerations, record has been fully developed); Shields
v. Campbell, 277 Or 71, 77-78, 559 P2d 1275 (1977) (noting that guiding
principle behind rules of preservation is "not merely to promote form over
substance but to promote an efficient administration of justice").
In proceeding to the merits of
defendant's argument, we note that, absent some legislative or constitutional
impediment, courts possess inherent authority to issue those rulings necessary
to decide the issues before them.  See, e.g., State v. Robbins,
345 Or 28, 34, 188 P3d 265 (2008) (recognizing that appellate courts' power to
dismiss criminal appeal when defendant has absconded predates statutory
authority to do so); Far West Landscaping, Inc. v. Modern Merchandising, Inc.,
287 Or 653, 658, 601 P2d 1237 (1979) (noting that "there is no doubt but
that under normal circumstances trial courts have inherent authority to vacate
or amend their judgments"); McElwain v. Kabatoff, 275 Or 393, 395,
551 P2d 105 (1976) (affirming trial court's right to enjoin parties from
interviewing jurors after verdict has been reached).  Although we do not take
issue with that principle, we need not rest our decision on it in this instance
because the Oregon legislature has recognized that
trial courts have authority to allow amendments to accusatory instruments in misdemeanor
cases.  
The
legislature provides for two forms of accusatory instruments that the state may
use to charge misdemeanors -- a criminal complaint and an information.  The
legislature has explicitly granted trial courts the authority to amend criminal
complaints.  ORS 133.069(4) provides that a "court may amend a complaint
at its discretion."  That statute does not contain an express grant
of authority for a trial court to amend a misdemeanor information, but the
existence of that authority is implicit in other statutory provisions.  First,
although the legislature refers to a complaint and an information as two
separate accusatory instruments, it provides that they serve identical
functions and requires that they contain precisely the same allegations.  ORS
131.005(3) (for offenses not punishable as a felony, a complaint serves as a
basis for prosecution); ORS 131.005(9)(a) (for offenses not punishable as a
felony an information serves as the basis for prosecution); ORS 133.007
(describing the "[s]ufficiency of information or complaint"); ORS
133.015 (providing the required "[c]ontents of information or
complaint").  When used to charge misdemeanors, the singular
distinguishing feature between the two instruments is that a complaint must be
"verified by the oath of a person and bear[] an indorsement of acceptance
by the district attorney," ORS 131.005(4), while an information must be "a
written accusation by a district attorney."  ORS 131.005(9).  Second, the
legislature assumes that a trial court has authority to permit an amendment to
an information as well as to a complaint and provides for the consequences
should a court decline to exercise that authority.  ORS 135.680 provides that
if, after allowance of demurrer, "the court does not allow * * * an amended
complaint or information [to be] filed, the defendant, if in custody, shall
be discharged."  (Emphasis added.)
While
defendant acknowledges that Oregon statutes contemplate judicial authority to
permit amendments to informations, he asserts that that authority must be
limited to amendments as to form.  If an information is substantively
deficient, defendant argues, the state either must proceed on the original information
or file a new one.  In defendant's words, the state cannot "alter material
elements of the charged offense, type the word 'amended' across the top of the
instrument, and expect to be in the same position as if that had been the
allegation from the very beginning."  
That
argument requires the assumption that the state would expect an amended
information to have the same legal effect as the original information.  However,
the state "heartily agrees" with defendant that "[t]he effect of
a substantive alteration * * * is to create what amounts to a new information,"
and our view is consonant.  The question whether a court has authority to
permit a substantive amendment to a misdemeanor information is analytically
distinct from the question of the effect that the court must give to that amended
instrument.  The state may seek to amend an original information, rather than
to refile it, but an amended information does not necessarily possess all of the
legal attributes of the original.  
To
emphasize his point, defendant further assumes that, for statute of limitations
purposes, a substantive amendment to an information would necessarily relate
back to the date that the original information was filed, and argues from that
assumption that substantive amendments are prejudicial and prohibited.  Defendant's
premise is again mistaken.  While this court has not decided the issue, the
general rule in other jurisdictions is that an amendment of an accusatory
instrument will not relate back to the original for statute of limitations
purposes if it substantively amends the original charges.  See, e.g.,
U. S. v. Schmick, 904 F2d 936, 940 (5th Cir 1990); U. S. v. Elliott,
849 F2d 554, 561 (11th Cir 1988); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Inc., 785 F2d 777, 778 (9th Cir), cert den, 479 US 988 (1986); U.
S. v. Friedman, 649 F2d 199, 204 (3d Cir 1981); State v. Almeda, 211
Conn 441, 446, 560 A2d 389, 392 (1989); State v. Chernotik, 671
NW2d 264, 268 (SD 2003); Benitez v. State, 111 Nev 1363, 1365, 904
P2d 1036, 1037 (1995) (all so holding).
In
this case, the trial court treated the amended information as equivalent to a
newly filed information and not as one that related back to the original filing
date.  Nevertheless, the court determined that the filing of the amended
information was timely because the limitations period had been tolled by
defendant's unauthorized departure.  The trial court correctly analyzed, as
distinct inquiries, its authority to permit amendment of the information and
the legal consequences of its exercise of that authority.  In doing so, the
trial court demonstrated that the label "amended" across the top of
the information did not necessarily place the parties in the same position that
they would have occupied had the new allegations been present at the onset of
the case.  Defendant's argument does not persuade us that the court's authority
to permit amendments to misdemeanor informations is limited to amendments to
form.
In
sum, we conclude that Article VII (Amended), section 5, of the Oregon Constitution
did not prohibit the trial court from granting -- and that the trial court
possessed authority to grant -- the substantive amendment sought by the state
in this case.  
The
decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are
affirmed.
1. ORAP
5.70(3)(a)(ii) provides that, "[e]xcept on request of the appellate court
or on motion of a party that demonstrates the need for a reply brief, reply briefs
shall not be submitted in" criminal cases.