Title: ADAMS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING V CITY OF HOLLAND

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 1, 2001  
ADAMS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC.,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 114919  
CITY OF HOLLAND,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
KELLY, J.  
The issue in this case is whether §§ 39-348(g) and 39­
350(b) of defendant city of Holland's Zoning Ordinance No.  
1100 are invalid under either the Michigan Home Rule City Act  
(HRCA)1 or the Michigan City and Village Zoning Act (CVZA).2  
The circuit court ruled in favor of plaintiff, Adams Outdoor  
Advertising, Inc., holding the sections invalid. The Court of  
Appeals reversed. 234 Mich App 681; 600 NW2d 339 (1999).  
We hold that §§ 39-348(g) and 39-350(b) are valid because  
defendant enacted them as part of its zoning ordinance under  
the CVZA. Hence, the HRCA's provision authorizing cities to  
regulate billboards in their charters, subsection 4i(f), need  
not be considered. Also, whereas subsection 4i(c) provides to  
a city the authority to exercise zoning powers, it is the  
CVZA that furnishes the details of that exercise. It contains  
specific restrictions on the city's authority to zone. Here,  
because plaintiff failed to establish that the sections in  
question completely ban billboards, the sections are not  
invalid under the provisions of the CVZA.  Therefore, we  
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
Defendant is a municipal corporation organized under the  
HRCA. Effective January 5, 1994, it enacted Ordinance No.  
1100, which amended Article IX of its zoning ordinance and  
1MCL 117.1 et seq.; MSA 5.2071 et seq.  
2MCL 125.581 et seq.; MSA 5.2931 et seq.  
2  
 
covered numerous matters involving signs.3 It is undisputed  
that, in enacting Ordinance No. 1100, defendant followed the  
procedures set forth in the CVZA.4  
The first of the two sections of the ordinance at the  
center of this dispute provides that "[b]illboards and  
advertising signs are not permitted." The second states that  
"[n]onconforming signs, billboards or advertising signs may  
not be expanded, enlarged, or extended; however, said signs  
may be maintained and repaired so as to continue the useful  
life of the sign."5  
3Section 39-345 of Article IX states its intent and  
purpose:  
This Article is intended to protect and  
further the health, safety, and welfare of the  
residents of the City of Holland; to further the 
intent of the City of Holland Zoning Ordinance and 
its zoning districts; to prevent traffic hazards; 
to provide safer conditions for pedestrians; to 
improve community appearance; and to promote 
economic 
development 
by 
regulating 
the  
construction, 
alteration, 
repair, 
maintenance, 
size, location and number of signs.  
4Ordinance No. 1100 was originally numbered § 39-152 
through § 39-171. The  sections in dispute were originally 
codified as § 39-155(g) and § 39-157(b). In early 1996, the 
entire ordinance was recodified as § 39-345 through § 39-364. 
With the recodification, the two sections in dispute were 
renumbered § 39-348(g) and § 39-350(b), respectively.  
5Section 39-346 of the ordinance defines "[b]illboard or 
advertising sign" as "[a] sign which contains a message or 
advertises an establishment, product, service, space or 
(continued...)  
3  
 
In June of 1994, plaintiff applied to defendant for a  
permit to construct a new billboard on a right of way in the  
city. Defendant rejected the application, saying billboards  
are not permitted, citing the first of the disputed sections,  
§ 39-348(g). Plaintiff then sought a variance from the city of  
Holland's Zoning Board of Appeals, without success.6  
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the present suit in the  
Allegan Circuit Court.7 In its first amended complaint,  
plaintiff alleged that, because they forbade the erection of  
billboards, the contested sections violated the HRCA.  
Plaintiff alleged, also, that the sections violated § 12 of  
the CVZA because they prohibited the establishment of a land  
use. After a bench trial, the circuit court concluded that §§  
5(...continued) 
activity not available on the lot on which the sign is 
located."  
6In its cross application for leave to appeal, defendant 
claims that, because plaintiff failed to present the zoning 
board 
with 
certain 
information it had requested, its complaint 
is not ripe. Given our disposition in this case today, we need 
not reach the merits of the cross application.  
7Before filing this action, plaintiff sued in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, 
challenging the ordinance under the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, the Michigan Home Rule City Act, 
and the Michigan City and Village Zoning Act. The court 
abstained and dismissed the case without prejudice. 883 F Supp 
207, 208, 210 (WD Mich, 1995).  
4  
 
39-348(g) and 39-350(b) violated both the HRCA and the  CVZA.8  
Regarding the HRCA, the circuit court found that the  
sections had "the chilling effect of eliminating all  
billboards over time," and that defendant had "failed to offer  
sufficient evidence to justify such a stringent zoning  
regulation," its aesthetic concerns being "unpersuasive when  
weighed against the gradual elimination of all billboards."  
Regarding plaintiff's claims under the CVZA, the court  
articulated the test set forth in Eveline Twp v H & D Trucking  
Co, 181 Mich App 25; 448 NW2d 727 (1989). It stated:  
[Plaintiff] has met its Eveline burden. The  
ordinance will result in the gradual elimination of 
all billboards within Holland city limits. [Its] 
billboards are an inexpensive and widespread method 
to carry political, ideological, religious, public 
service 
and 
editorial 
messages 
as 
well 
as  
commercial 
advertisements. 
The 
United 
States  
Supreme Court has recognized billboards as a viable 
medium to publish political and social ideas and 
messages to the public. Metromedia v City of San  
Diego, 453 US 490; 101 S Ct 2882; 69 L Ed 2d 800 
(1981).  
[Defendant's] 
goals 
in 
respect 
to 
the  
residential zones, historic districts, and restored 
business and commercial areas are laudable and  
legitimate. However, the broad prohibition of the 
zoning sign provisions appear [sic] to be a policy  
8Plaintiff's complaint also included a claim that the 
Highway Advertising Act (HAA), MCL 252.301 et seq.; MSA 
9.391(101) et seq., preempted defendant's ordinance. After an 
adverse trial court ruling, plaintiff abandoned the claim on 
appeal.  See Singerman v Municipal Service Bureau, 211 Mich  
App 678, 684; 536 NW2d 547 (1995), aff'd on other grounds 455 
Mich 135; 565 NW2d 383 (1997).  
5  
 
 
 
and philosophical decision that are [sic] the 
result of an impermissible fiat; a whimsical ipsi 
[sic] dixit. See generally Kirk [v Tyrone Twp, 398 
Mich 429; 247 NW2d 848 (1976).]  
The court then enjoined defendant from enforcing the disputed  
sections but left intact the remaining portions of the  
ordinance.  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the lower  
court had erred in concluding that the ordinance  sections  
violated the HRCA and the CVZA. 234 Mich App 684. It reasoned  
that the sections can be distinguished from those we declared  
invalid in Central Advertising Co v Ann Arbor. 391 Mich 533,  
536; 218 NW2d 27 (1974).  
Also, the appellate court found that the trial court had  
erroneously 
placed 
the burden of proof on defendant. Moreover,  
plaintiff had failed to overcome its burden of showing that  
the ordinance did not advance a legitimate governmental  
interest, given the aesthetic concerns underlying it.  
Regarding § 12 of the CVZA, the Court of Appeals first  
noted that other billboards existed in the city. Plaintiff's  
evidence that it would be able to sell advertising space on  
the proposed new billboards was insufficient to demonstrate  
the requisite public need for them. 234 Mich App 698. The  
appeals court found clearly erroneous the circuit court's  
conclusion that plaintiff had met its burden of proving  
6  
illegal exclusionary zoning under § 12.  
We granted plaintiff's application for leave to appeal,  
held 
in 
abeyance 
defendant's 
application 
for 
cross-appeal, 
and  
granted motions to file briefs amicus curiae. 461 Mich 994  
(2000).  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
Statutory interpretation and the applicability of a  
statute are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo.  
See Oakland Co Bd of Rd Comm'rs v Michigan Property & Casualty  
Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich 590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998); Alex  
v Wildfong, 460 Mich 10, 21; 594 NW2d 469 (1999). We review  
findings of fact using the clearly erroneous standard. See  
Sands Appliance Services v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 238; 615 NW2d  
241 (2000); MCR 2.613(C).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A. The Home Rule City Act  
Plaintiff asserts that subsection 4i(f) of the Home Rule  
City 
Act 
invalidates 
§§ 39-348(g) and 39-350(b) of defendant's  
zoning ordinance. Subsection 4i(f) provides:  
Each city may provide in its charter for 1 or 
more of the following:  
* * *  
(f) Licensing, regulating, restricting, and 
limiting the number and locations of billboards  
7  
within the city. [MCL 117.4i(f); MSA 5.2082(f).9]  
Plaintiff 
concludes 
that 
defendant's 
ordinance 
is 
violative 
of  
subsection 4i(f) because the ordinance sections completely  
prohibit billboards.  
Plaintiff's argument fails to recognize the existence of  
a city's zoning power independent of subsection 4i(f). The  
sections involving billboards that plaintiff challenges are  
found in defendant's zoning ordinance. Defendant enacted them  
pursuant to and following the requirements set forth in the  
CVZA.  Therefore, subsection 4i(f) of the HRCA, the provision  
authorizing cities to regulate billboards in their charters  
need not be considered. Cf., Adams Outdoor Advertising v East  
Lansing, 439 Mich 209, 214; 483 NW2d 38 (1992).  
While 
we 
do 
not 
consider whether the ordinance provisions  
at issue were authorized by subsection 4i(f), the HRCA does  
have some relevance to this case. That limited relevance is  
best understood when one considers the history behind a city's  
zoning authority.  
As stated, the challenged provisions in the instant case  
are part of the city of Holland's zoning code. Yet over eighty  
years ago, this Court held that cities do not possess an  
9Although plaintiff cited the relevant subsection of the 
HRCA as MCL 117.4i(5); MSA 5.2082(e), legislative amendments 
have relabeled it subsection 4i(f).  
8  
inherent power to zone. See Clements v McCabe, 210 Mich 207,  
216; 177 NW 722 (1920). In response to this Court's ruling in  
Clements, the Legislature passed two acts: Act 207 and Act 348  
of Public Acts of 1921, approved on May 17 and May 18, 1921,  
respectively. The first, 1921 PA 207, the CVZA, established  
the statutory zoning scheme in detail. This includes the  
extent and limits of municipal zoning power and the procedures  
under which municipalities may exercise that power. The  
second, 1921 PA 348, amended what is now subsection 4i(c) of  
the 
HRCA, 
authorizing cities to provide themselves with zoning  
powers in their charters. See Korash v Livonia, 388 Mich 737,  
742; 202 NW2d 803 (1972).  
Here, the city of Holland has included in its charter a  
provision that grants itself the power to zone, as permitted  
under subsection 4i(c) of the HRCA. Holland City Charter, §  
2.1(10). Pursuant to it, defendant enacted the regulations at  
issue as part of its zoning code. Therefore, the city of  
Holland's power to enact its zoning code is derived from  
subsection 4i(c) of the HRCA.  
That 
fact 
notwithstanding, 
the 
HRCA's 
reference 
to 
zoning  
was enacted as a complementary or companion act to the CVZA  
for the purpose of correcting the deficiencies pointed out in  
Clements. See Korash, supra at 742. Therefore, the reference  
9  
 
 
to zoning in the HRCA must be read in conjunction with the  
CVZA. See id. at 744. More particularly, given that the CVZA  
complements the HRCA by placing specific restrictions on  
cities' zoning authority, the validity of defendant's zoning  
ordinance provisions at issue must be analyzed under the CVZA.  
See East Lansing, supra at 218, stating that "[t]he zoning  
authority under the [HRCA] is clearly subject to many  
restrictions, enumerated by the Legislature in the zoning  
enabling act;" see also Saylor v Kingsley Area Emergency  
Ambulance Service, 238 Mich App 592, 597; 607 NW2d 112 (1999).  
B. The Exclusionary Zoning Claim Under the Zoning Enabling Act  
Plaintiff argues that defendant's zoning ordinance  
violates § 12 of the CVZA. That section provides:  
A zoning ordinance or zoning decision shall 
not have the effect of totally prohibiting the 
establishment of a land use within a city or 
village in the presence of a demonstrated need for 
that land use within either the city or village or 
the surrounding area within the state, unless a 
location within the city or village does not exist 
where the use may be appropriately located or use 
is unlawful. [MCL 125.592; MSA 5.2942.]  
Accordingly, to sustain a claim that a city engaged in  
unlawful exclusionary zoning under § 12 of the CVZA, one must  
show that: (1) the challenged ordinance section has the effect  
of totally prohibiting the establishment of the land use  
sought within the city or village, (2) there is a demonstrated  
10  
 
 
need for the land use within either the city or village or the  
surrounding area, (3) a location exists within the city or  
village where the use would be appropriate, and (4) the use  
would be lawful, otherwise.10  
Regarding the first requirement, plaintiff asserts that  
defendant's ordinance constitutes a complete prohibition of  
billboards. In determining whether a zoning ordinance  
constitutes a complete prohibition, a party must show that the  
prohibition is city-wide in scope. See Fremont Twp, supra at  
204, where no violation existed under MCL 125.297a; MSA  
5.2963(27a) 
of 
the 
Township Zoning Act, unless the prohibition  
was township-wide. See also Guy v Brandon Twp, 181 Mich App  
775, 785; 450 NW2d 279 (1989); Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass'n v  
City of Troy, 171 F3d 398, 407 (CA 6, 1999).  It is undisputed  
that, when plaintiff sought permission without success to  
erect a billboard in Holland, a significant number of  
billboards already had been erected and were in use there.  
Moreover, on its face, the challenged ordinance sections  
do not currently completely prohibit billboards in Holland.  
While new billboards are banned, current billboards may  
remain. Section 39-350(b) specifically permits a billboard  
10Defendant contends that billboards in general do not 
constitute a "use" within the zoning context. Because of our 
resolution in this case, we can assume without deciding that 
billboards constitute such a "use."  
11  
 
 
owner to maintain and repair existing signs so as to continue  
their useful life. Also, § 39-350(e) authorizes a billboard  
owner to remove a sign from its location for repair and  
maintenance and then to replace it.  
Therefore, 
we 
 
hold that, although the ordinance sections  
do limit the number of billboards within the city, they do not  
constitute an impermissible total prohibition of billboards.  
See Ann Arbor, supra; Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass'n, supra at  
407; Gustafson v City of Lake Angelus, 76 F3d 778, 790 (CA 6,  
1996), cert den 519 US 823 (1996); Guy, supra at 785.11  
Because plaintiff failed to show that the challenged  
ordinance 
constitutes a total prohibition on the proposed use,  
its exclusionary zoning claim must fail.  We need not discuss  
the remaining requirements of an exclusionary zoning claim.  
The Court of Appeals properly held that the trial court erred  
when it concluded that plaintiff had met its burden to  
demonstrate exclusionary zoning under § 12 of the CVZA.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
We hold that §§ 39-348(g) and 39-350(b) of defendant's  
11We note plaintiff's contention that, with the passage  
of time, the ordinance might effectively eliminate all  
billboards. 
If 
that 
eventuality arises, our opinion should not 
be construed as foreclosing an "as applied" challenge to the 
ordinance. However, we need not address that contention 
because the present case involves a facial challenge to the 
validity of the ordinance sections under consideration.  
12  
 
 
Zoning Ordinance No. 1100 are valid on their face under the  
HRCA and CVZA. Because defendant enacted them under the CVZA  
as part of its zoning ordinances, the HRCA's provision  
authorizing cities to regulate billboards in their charters  
need not be considered.  
Additionally, plaintiff failed to establish that §§ 39­
348(g) and 39-350(b) are invalid under the CVZA, because the  
sections do not constitute a complete prohibition of  
billboards. Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision that  
vacated the circuit court's injunction precluding enforcement  
of the challenged zoning ordinance provisions.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, 
TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred with KELLY, J.  
WEAVER, J., concurred in the result only.  
13