Title: Capelle v. Orange County

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: All the Justices 
 
JOHN J. CAPELLE, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 040569   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 14, 2005 
ORANGE COUNTY, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY 
Daniel R. Bouton, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in holding that a zoning ordinance permitted construction of an 
access road to transport mined materials across land zoned for 
residential use. 
The land in question is part of a 139-acre lot (the 
property) located near Barboursville in Orange County.  A large 
portion of the property is zoned for agricultural use and a 
smaller part is zoned for limited residential use.  On the part 
of the property zoned for agricultural use, a mining operation 
is permitted by special use permit. 
The residential use portion of the property is situated 
between the agricultural use portion and Route 738, a public 
highway.  The complainants are Orange County residents (the 
landowners) who own adjoining land or nearby properties.  
Several of the landowners live in the same limited residential 
zoning district that includes a portion of the property. 
 
Defendant General Shale Brick, Inc. (General Shale) owns a 
brick manufacturing plant near the property and contracted to 
 
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purchase the property to obtain mining materials for its brick 
production.  In December 2001, General Shale, with the property 
owners’ permission, applied for a special use permit to perform 
mining activities on the part of the property zoned for 
agricultural use.  Although the special use permit request 
applied only to the part of the property located in the 
agricultural zoning district, the “operation plan narrative” 
that General Shale submitted with its application included a 
proposal to construct an access road across the portion of the 
property zoned for limited residential use to transport raw 
materials from the mining site to Route 738. 
 
After conducting public hearings, the Orange County 
Planning Commission forwarded General Shale’s application for a 
special use permit to the Board of Supervisors of Orange County 
(the Board) without recommendation.  The Board approved the 
application with certain conditions.  General Shale then 
purchased the property to engage in the mining activities 
described in the special use permit. 
 
The landowners filed an amended bill of complaint in the 
circuit court against General Shale and Orange County alleging 
that the special use permit violated both the Orange County Code 
(the County Code) and the Code of Virginia, and that the Board’s 
approval of the special use permit was arbitrary and capricious, 
and was unreasonable.  The landowners sought a declaratory 
 
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judgment that the Board’s decision was illegal, and requested an 
injunction to prevent the Board from issuing the special use 
permit. 
 
After hearing argument on the parties’ cross-motions for 
summary judgment, the circuit court denied the motions.  The 
court held that the road was permitted as an accessory use in 
the limited residential district incident to the special use 
permit for mining in the agricultural district, because all the 
uses occurred on the same “lot.”  However, the court concluded 
that a trial was necessary to resolve the issue whether the 
process of transporting mined materials over an access road was 
part of the mining activity itself or was an accessory use to 
the mining activity. 
 
At trial, each defendant made a motion to strike the 
evidence at the conclusion of the landowners’ case.  The circuit 
court granted the defendants’ motions, holding that the 
landowners had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove 
their allegations that General Shale’s intended use of the 
access road was a mining activity in itself, and that the 
Board’s decision to issue the special use permit was 
unreasonable.  The landowners appeal from the circuit court 
judgment. 
 
The primary issue in this appeal involves several sections 
of the County Code, which are part of the County’s zoning 
 
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ordinance.  County Code § 70-277 states that “[a]ny use not 
expressly permitted or permitted by special use permit in a 
specific district is prohibited.”  County Code § 70-302, which 
applies to land zoned for agricultural use, permits as a matter 
of right seven listed uses “and any accessory use that is 
customarily incidental to such uses.”  County Code § 70-303, 
which also applies to land zoned for agricultural use, allows 
the operation of a “[m]ine or quarry” by special use permit. 
 
In limited residential zoning districts, the County Code 
permits as a matter of right five specified uses and “any 
customarily incidental accessory use.”  County Code § 70-332.  
“Accessory use,” a term applicable to both agricultural and 
limited residential districts, is defined as “a secondary and 
subordinate use or structure customarily incidental to, and 
located upon the same lot occupied by, the main use or 
structure.”  County Code § 70-1.  A “lot” is defined as “a 
parcel of land having fixed boundaries, recorded by the clerk of 
the circuit court as an individual unit of real estate for the 
purpose of ownership, conveyance or taxation.”  Id. 
 
The landowners argue that the circuit court erred in 
holding that the zoning ordinance provisions allow, as an 
accessory use to mining conducted in an agricultural district, 
the extension of an access road into a limited residential 
district.  The landowners assert that zoning district 
 
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boundaries, rather than lot lines, dictate which uses are 
permissible on each portion of the property.  Thus, the 
landowners argue that even if the transportation of mined 
materials is considered an “accessory use” to the mining 
operation, such accessory use is not allowed on the portion of 
the property zoned for limited residential use. 
 
In response, the defendants argue that the circuit court 
properly applied the plain language of the County Code.  The 
defendants first rely on County Code § 70-332, and its language 
permitting “any customarily incidental accessory use” in a 
limited residential zoning district.  The defendants also rely 
on the County Code definition of “accessory use,” which defines 
the term in relation to the same lot as the main use.  County 
Code § 70-1.  Thus, the defendants contend that General Shale’s 
proposed access road crossing the limited residential zoning 
district is permitted as an accessory use to the mining use 
under the terms of County Code § 70-332 because the main use, 
the mining operation, is conducted on the same lot. 
The defendants further assert that it would be absurd to 
prohibit from limited residential districts those accessory uses 
that are incidental to agricultural uses on the same lot.  For 
example, the defendants contend that under the landowners’ 
interpretation of the zoning provisions, a cattle farmer could 
 
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not transport cattle to market over a section of his farm zoned 
for limited residential use. 
In considering the parties’ arguments, we first state 
certain established principles that govern the construction of a 
zoning ordinance.  We employ the plain and natural meaning of 
the words contained in the ordinance.  Donovan v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals of Rockingham Co., 251 Va. 271, 274, 467 S.E.2d 
808, 810 (1996); McClung v. County of Henrico, 200 Va. 870, 875, 
108 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1959).  Although we give consideration to 
the purpose and intent of the ordinance, we are not permitted to 
extend the ordinance provisions by interpretation or 
construction beyond such intent and purpose.  Donovan, 251 Va. 
at 274, 467 S.E.2d at 810; Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 575, 90 
S.E.2d 171, 174 (1955). 
The issue in this appeal requires us to harmonize certain 
County Code provisions that arguably are facially conflicting 
when applied to the facts of this case.∗  When one County Code 
provision addresses a subject in a general way and another deals 
with a part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the 
two provisions should be harmonized, if possible, and where they 
conflict, the more specific provision prevails.  Frederick Co. 
 
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School Board v. Hannah, 267 Va. 231, 236, 590 S.E.2d 567, 569 
(2004); Halifax Corp. v. First Union National Bank, 262 Va. 91, 
102, 546 S.E.2d 696, 704 (2001); County of Fairfax v. Century 
Concrete Servs., 254 Va. 423, 427, 492 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1997); 
Virginia National Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 340, 257 S.E.2d 
867, 870 (1979). 
 
In this case, the more general provision addressing 
accessory uses appears in the definition section of the County 
Code that pertains to zoning.  As indicated above, that 
provision defines “accessory use” as “a secondary and 
subordinate use or structure customarily incidental to, and 
located upon the same lot occupied by, the main use or 
structure.”  County Code § 70-1.  This definition section, 
however, also contains a limiting provision stating that the 
defined words and phrases “shall have the meanings ascribed to 
them in this section, except where the context clearly indicates 
a different meaning.”  Id. 
In conjunction with those provisions, we also consider the 
more specific County Code provision that employs the term 
“accessory use” in the express context of limited residential 
                                                                  
∗ Because the landowners did not assign error to the circuit 
court’s ruling that the hauling of mined material is an 
accessory use to the principal activity of mining, and does not 
constitute mining itself, we will assume, without deciding, that 
such ruling was correct for purposes of our analysis. 
 
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zoning districts.  In that provision, County Code § 70-332, 
permitted uses are defined as follows: 
 
In the limited residential district, land may be 
used for the following uses, and any customarily 
incidental accessory use, including home occupations: 
 
(1) Single-family dwelling. 
(2) Agriculture, except keeping of any animals other 
than those customarily kept as household pets. 
 
(3) Place of worship. 
(4) Public use such as school, park, library, fire 
and rescue station, public utility, or 
maintenance facility. 
 
(5) Sign subject to [certain other sections]. 
 
When we consider the term “accessory use” in the context of 
this disputed provision, we conclude that the term refers to 
uses customarily incidental to the listed permitted uses in 
limited residential zoning districts.  The very language of the 
provision signals this construction, because the phrase “and any 
customarily incidental accessory use” immediately follows, 
without qualification or distinction, language referring only to 
permitted uses in limited residential zoning districts.  Thus, 
we conclude that this phrase, and the County Code section in 
which the phrase appears, deals exclusively with permitted uses 
in a limited residential district.  See County Code § 70-332. 
The defendants' contrary construction is untenable because 
it would allow in a limited residential district any accessory 
 
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use to a main use located on a differently-zoned part of the 
same lot, irrespective of the nature and intensity of that main 
use.  Thus, under the defendants’ construction of this 
provision, a solid waste weighing station, as a secondary 
structure customarily incidental to the operation of a sanitary 
landfill, and an access road to the landfill site, could both be 
located on a lot in a limited residential zoning district, 
provided that the landfill itself was operated by special use 
permit on the portion of the same lot zoned for agricultural 
use.  Plainly, the drafters of the County Code did not intend 
such a result, as reflected by their provision that the “limited 
residential district . . . protects [low-density residential] 
areas from the traffic, noise and other effects of [more 
intensive uses] and avoids conflicts with agricultural uses.”  
County Code § 70-331. 
Our conclusion is further reinforced by County Code § 70-
277, which states that “[a]ny use not expressly permitted or 
permitted by special use permit in a specific district is 
prohibited.”  Here, a mining operation is not an expressly 
permitted use in a limited residential zoning district, as 
evidenced by County Code § 70-332 set forth above, and is not 
allowed by special use permit in a limited residential zoning 
district.  The County Code restricts uses permitted by special 
use permit in a limited residential zoning district to: 
 
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(1) Elder care center, child day care center, or 
nursery school. 
 
(2) Keeping of animals other than those customarily 
kept as household pets. 
 
(3) Office of less than 4,000 square feet gross floor 
area, including professional or contracting 
office. 
 
(4) Private cultural, recreational or institutional 
use. 
 
County Code § 70-333.  Therefore, because a mining operation is 
not a permitted use, or a use allowed by special use permit in a 
limited residential zoning district, the access road to the 
mining operation, which is an accessory use to the main use, 
also is prohibited in a limited residential zoning district. 
We find no merit in the defendants’ argument that because 
the County Code specifically restricts accessory uses in 
agricultural districts to “such uses” permitted in those 
districts, but employs the phrase “any customarily incidental 
accessory use” when referring to accessory uses in limited 
residential districts, the proposed access road is allowed as an 
accessory use in a limited residential district.  The 
defendants’ argument violates a basic rule of statutory 
construction, namely, that in construing legislative enactments 
we are not permitted to isolate single phrases but must consider 
them in the context in which they are found.  See Herndon v. St. 
Mary’s Hosp., 266 Va. 472, 476, 587 S.E.2d 567, 569 (2003); 
 
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Shelor Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 479, 544 S.E.2d 345, 
348 (2001); Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 
496 (2001). 
The term “such uses” appears in the provision dealing only 
with permitted uses in agricultural districts, County Code § 70-
302, which does not include mining operations like the one 
proposed by General Shale and, therefore, the term is irrelevant 
to our analysis.  Further, as we have already observed, the term 
“any customarily incidental accessory use” appears in the County 
Code provision dealing only with permitted uses in limited 
residential districts.  County Code § 70-332.  Therefore, when 
considered in the context of the County Code sections in which 
they appear, neither term identified by the defendants supports 
their position under the facts before us. 
 
The defendants correctly note, however, that this 
construction of the various County Code provisions limits the 
agricultural uses that may coincide with limited residential 
uses on the same lot, when road access to the agricultural 
portion of the property must pass through the limited 
residential part of the property.  Nevertheless, this 
observation cannot affect our analysis, which is restricted by 
the language of the zoning provisions themselves.  The choices 
that must be made in drafting local zoning ordinances are 
subjects for legislative consideration, and are not subjects for 
 
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action by the courts.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit 
court erred in holding that the County Code permitted the 
proposed access road as an accessory use in the limited 
residential district incident to the special use permit for 
mining in the agricultural district. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment regarding the proposed access road, affirm the 
remainder of the judgment that is not challenged in this appeal, 
and enter final judgment. 
 Affirmed in part, 
 reversed in part, 
and final judgment.