Title: State v. Morrill

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

282 A.2d 811 (1971) STATE of Vermont v. Richard L. MORRILL. No. 84-70. Supreme Court of Vermont, Chittenden. October 5, 1971. *812 Patrick J. Leahy, State's Atty., and William O. Wuester, Deputy State's Atty., for the State. John W. Brockway and Frederick M. Niland, White River Junction, for defendant. Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and KEYSER, JJ. SHANGRAW, Justice. This is a petition for review of a sentence, brought under the post-conviction relief statute, 13 V.S.A. § 7131. Relief was denied below and petitioner, Richard L. Morrill, has appealed to this Court under the provisions of 13 V.S.A. § 7135. On November 2, 1967, the petitioner, age 36, was convicted by a jury in the Chittenden County Court of the crime of statutory rape and sentenced to be confined in the state's prison in Windsor, Vermont, at hard labor for a period of not less than fifteen, or more than twenty years. This sentence was recommended by the state's attorney. The statute, 13 V.S.A. § 3201, under which sentence was imposed, provides for a maximum imprisonment in the state prison of not more than twenty years or fined not more than $2,000.00, or both. A related statute, 13 V.S.A. § 7031, as it existed at the time petitioner was sentenced, required that the court establish a maximum *813 and minimum term of sentence unless definitely fixed by statute. On appeal to this Court from the conviction, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. State v. Morrill, 127 Vt. 506, 253 A.2d 142. By way of further background to these proceedings, this petition for a review of the sentence was filed on November 3, 1969. On November 5, 1969 it was denied by the Chittenden County Court, without a hearing, upon the ground that the files and records conclusively show that the petitioner was not entitled to the requested relief. By a motion dated November 10, 1969 the defendant requested that the files and records, such as the presentence report, be made available for examination. This motion was disposed of by the court by a written order stating, "No order is made in connection with said motion in view of the fact that as a matter of law all files and records of the Chittenden County Court, except as otherwise ordered, are open to examination by the parties thereto." The petitioner appealed to this Court from the order of November 5, 1969 denying the petition to review the sentence. On April 13, 1970, this Court reversed the order of denial pro forma, with a mandate for appropriate proceedings under 28 V. S.A. § 1003. This section, as applied here, relates to the availability of the presentence report to the petitioner or his attorney. Subsequent to the taking of the appeal, petitioner's counsel was afforded access to this report. The petition sets forth the following grounds for a review and reduction of his sentence. The statute, § 7131, supra, under which this petition is brought reads: The following section, 7132, states that "The motion may be informal, but shall identify the offense, the date of sentencing, and the alleged violation or defect in the sentence." A further related section of the statute, 13 V.S.A. § 7133, provides: The counterpart of sections 7131 and 7133, supra, is found in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. Just prior to the imposition of sentence the trial court stated: The main thrust of petitioner's contention before this Court is that a hearing on his petition for a review of the sentence was improperly denied. In paragraph 2 of the petition it is generally alleged that the presentence investigation report disclosed two prior complaints of a similar nature against two women over the age of sixteen. These complaints were nolle prosequi. Notwithstanding this fact, it is the petitioner's contention that each of the two complaints were considered by the sentencing court with the same force and effect, as if convictions had resulted, in imposing the maximum sentence in the case now considered. As a result, it is urged that the petitioner's constitutional right of due process of law under the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution was violated. Petitioner's contention is not on firm ground. True it is that the sentencing court referred to the two prior sexual assaults, however specific reference was made by the court that in both instances there was an entry of nolle prosequi. In this light it must be presumed that the two above referred to incidents did not improperly contribute to the sentence imposed by the court. Furthermore, at the time of sentence the petitioner raised no question concerning the correctness of the trial judge's remarks. Moreover, in addition to prior convictions, a sentencing court may generally take into consideration other offenses committed by the accused. 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, section 585. Justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and there may be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together *815 with the character and propensities of the offender. Com. of Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55, 58 S. Ct. 59, 82 L. Ed. 43. The knowledge of the life of a man, his background, his family, his past conduct, record and inclinations, is the only proper basis for the determination as to his sentence or treatment. In the case of United States v. Lewis, 4th Cir. 1968, 392 F.2d 440, it was held that where a sentence is within the limit set by statute, a reviewing court is barred, except in most exceptional circumstances, from any inquiry it might otherwise be inclined to make. The presentence investigation report was before the trial court at the time sentence was imposed. It was also a part of the file and records in the case at the time a hearing on the petition for a review of the sentence was denied on November 5, 1969. In its order of denial, the court in part stated: The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949) held that the sentencing judge is not restricted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from considering information obtained through the probation department from witnesses with whom the accused had not been confronted. At pages 249 and 250, 69 S.Ct. at page 1084 of the opinion it was therein stated: "To deprive sentencing judges of this kind of information would undermine modern penological procedural policies that have been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimentation." In Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S. Ct. 1209, 18 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1967), which dealt with the Sexual Offenders Act, the court expressly approved the Williams case, supra. Without a detailed review of the record, it is sufficient to say that it demonstrates a premeditated and planned rape on a female child, age 11 years, resulting in physical injury to the victim. The presentence report reveals no remorse on the part of the petitioner, and further that he does not display any potential for successful rehabilitation under probation supervision. To say the least, the circumstances surrounding the offense were sufficiently revolting and distressing as to leave no room on the part of this Court to disturb the ruling of the court below denying the petition without a hearing thereon. The record supports its action. Due process has not been denied the petitioner. Order denying the petition for a review of the sentence is affirmed.