Title: Com. v. March

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

528 Pa. 412 (1991) 598 A.2d 961 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Richard MARCH, Appellee. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted March 4, 1991. Decided July 26, 1991. Reargument Denied December 2, 1991. *413 Timothy P. Creany, Dist. Atty. and James A. Nelson, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., Appellate Div., Ebensburg, for appellant. Dennis J. Clark, (court-appointed), Plunkett & Cooney, Detroit, Mich., for appellee. Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ. McDERMOTT, Justice. The appellee, Richard March, was convicted of first degree murder[1] and criminal conspiracy[2] following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County. The convictions arose from a dispute with the victim, Craig Mickens, at Rod's Pub on March 28, 1980. A scuffle between the appellee, his brother Mark, and Craig Mickens, ensued, and a shot was fired. The appellee and his brother were observed pulling guns when they left the bar and they were near the victim at the time of the shooting. The victim subsequently died from the bullet wound. Post trial motions were filed and denied, and the appellee was sentenced to life imprisonment on the first degree murder charge, and a concurrent period of incarceration of from five to ten years on his criminal conspiracy conviction. He appealed his judgment of sentence to the Superior Court which affirmed,[3] and this Court denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal. Subsequent to our denial of his petition, appellee, through present counsel, filed a Petition under the Post Conviction *414 Hearing Act (P.C.H.A.)[4] on November 12, 1985. By Order and Opinion dated September 16, 1987, the court denied appellee relief and he appealed to the Superior Court. The Superior Court agreed with appellee's claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue an intoxication defense and reversed the Order of the Court of Common Pleas. The Superior Court then remanded the case for a new trial. The Commonwealth filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal with this Court, which we granted. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Superior Court applied the proper test in assessing the effectiveness of trial counsel. We hold that the Superior Court did not, and therefore reverse. The Commonwealth argues that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to pursue the defense of voluntary intoxication because, at the time of trial, the available facts did not indicate it to be a viable defense. Additionally, the Commonwealth asserts that the Superior Court did not give proper deference to the determinations made by the P.C.H.A. court. In response, appellee contends that there was sufficient evidence available to trial counsel concerning intoxication, and that this evidence would have reduced his first degree murder conviction to murder in the third degree. As this Court recently stated, the test for determining whether trial counsel was ineffective is as follows: Commonwealth v. Tressler, 526 Pa. 139, 142-143, 584 A.2d 930, 931-932 (1990). The mere allegations by the appellee that counsel was ineffective will not sustain a decision in his favor. As this Court has stated: Commonwealth v. Hentosh, 520 Pa. 325, 334, 554 A.2d 20, 24 (1989). (Citations Omitted). The mitigating defense[5] of voluntary intoxication is recognized in the Crimes Code[6], and provides: 18 Pa.C.S. § 308. Furthermore, this evidence is only admissible if it is offered as proof of defendant's intoxication at the time of the homicide. Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 284-285, 361 A.2d 282, 292-293 (1976). P.C.H.A. op. at 5-6. Reviewing this evidence, it is clear that the appellee did not sustain his burden under Hentosh to demonstrate prejudice, and as demonstrated under Kichline, this evidence alone could not have been an adequate basis upon which to justify a charge to the jury. Thus, the P.C.H.A. court was correct in finding that the evidence available was not sufficient to warrant the raising of the defense of voluntary intoxication. It should be noted that the Superior Court, in its analysis, merely stated that the evidence presented by the appellee should have alerted defense counsel to have investigated the possibility of a voluntary intoxication defense. The court's analysis ended with that conclusion and did not examine the question of prejudice. Superior Court memorandum *417 op. at 5-6. This analysis was contrary to the standard we set forth in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987). We caution the Superior Court that there must always be a separate finding of prejudice in order to have a uniform and consistent application of the test. Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court is reversed and the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County is reinstated. LARSEN and ZAPPALA, JJ., concur in the result. [1] 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501. [2] 18 Pa.C.S. § 903. [3] See Commonwealth v. March, 308 Pa.Super. 343, 454 A.2d 567 (1982). [4] The Post Conviction Hearing Act has been modified in part, repealed in part, and renamed the Post Conviction Relief Act. Act of April 13, 1988, P.L. 336, No. 47, § 3 as amended. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-51. [5] Unlike a justification defense, e.g., self-defense, a mitigating defense cannot excuse the act, but can operate to lessen the degree of culpability. [6] Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 101 et seq.