Title: State v. Robert L. Artic, Sr.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 83 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP880-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Robert Lee Artic, Sr., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 12 
Reported at: 316 Wis. 2d 133, 762 N.W.2d 436 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy M. Witkowiak   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
filed by Keith A. Findley, James D. Cooley, and the Frank J. 
Remington Center, University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison, 
and oral argument by Keith A. Findley. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Thomas 
J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 83
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP880-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2006CF685) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert Lee Artic, Sr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, State v. Artic, 2009 WI App 
12, 316 Wis. 2d 133, 762 N.W.2d 436, which affirmed the judgment 
of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Timothy Witkowiak, Judge.   
¶2 
Robert Lee Artic, Sr. (Artic) moved to suppress 
evidence discovered during a search of his residence on grounds 
that police obtained the evidence in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The circuit court 
denied the motion, and a jury convicted Artic of one count of 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
2 
 
maintaining a drug trafficking place1 and one count of possession 
with intent to deliver cocaine as party to a crime.2  Artic 
brought a postconviction motion alleging that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to preserve the argument that the police 
manufactured exigent circumstances to enter Artic's house 
without a warrant and for failing to object to testimony by an 
officer of observations she made while she was in Artic's back 
yard.  The circuit court denied this motion, finding that even 
if trial counsel had made those arguments, the court would have 
rejected them because it was reasonable for the police to 
believe that evidence was being destroyed. 
¶3 
Artic appealed.  The court of appeals unanimously 
affirmed 
on 
the 
alternative 
grounds 
that 
while 
exigent 
circumstances to enter Artic's house did not exist, the search 
of his upstairs residence was sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegal entry of the house to purge the taint of that entry. 
¶4 
We are presented with two issues: (1) whether Artic 
voluntarily gave consent for the police to search his upstairs 
residence; 
and 
(2) 
whether 
that 
search 
was 
sufficiently 
attenuated to purge the taint of the illegal entry of Artic's 
house. 
¶5 
We 
conclude 
that 
Artic 
voluntarily 
gave 
police 
officers consent to search his residence, namely, the upstairs 
                                                 
1 Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.42(1) 
(2005-06). 
All 
subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version 
unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)4. and 939.05. 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
3 
 
unit of his house.  We also conclude, based on the three-factor 
attenuation test established in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 
603-04 (1975), that the search was sufficiently attenuated to 
purge the taint of the illegal entry of Artic's house.  For 
these reasons, Artic was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure 
in the suppression motion to raise the argument that the police 
created their own exigent circumstances and to object to 
testimony about observations made illegally from within the 
curtilage of Artic's house.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
The relevant facts are as follows.  On January 29, 
2006, the Milwaukee Police Department was conducting a narcotics 
investigation in the 3200 block of North 15th Street in 
Milwaukee, based on information that a person named Rob would 
pick up a quantity of cocaine at a house on 15th Street and 
deliver it to a confidential informant.  The informant said that 
he had ordered four and a half ounces of cocaine from Rob for 
$3,200.  He described Rob as a black male, approximately six-
foot tall and 280 to 300 pounds, and said that Rob would arrive 
in a teal colored minivan.  According to the informant, Rob 
would arrive in the minivan, go into the house to retrieve the 
cocaine, return to the minivan, and wait for the informant.  Six 
narcotics officers were positioned to observe the house at 3206 
North 15th Street.   
¶7 
At about 7:45 p.m., a van, which the informant 
identified as Rob's vehicle, arrived and parked several houses 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
4 
 
away from 3206 North 15th Street.  Rob, later identified as 
Robert Artic, Jr., the son of Robert Artic, Sr., exited the 
vehicle.  The informant identified him as the person who would 
have the drugs.  The officers then observed Rob walk in the 
front door of 3206 North 15th Street.  He was in the building 
for less than five minutes.  When Rob returned to the minivan, 
he was arrested, and officers obtained two baggies of cocaine 
from the floor of his van.   
¶8 
After arresting Rob, the officers placed him in an 
undercover police vehicle.  They planned to discreetly secure 
the house, obtain a search warrant for it, and talk to Rob at a 
different location so that they would not alert anybody to 
police presence on the block.   
¶9 
Before obtaining a warrant, Detective Mark Wagner and 
Officer David Lopez went to the front door to perform a "knock 
and talk" to determine if anybody was in the house.  Wagner 
knocked on the front door for approximately 20 seconds, 
announcing "Milwaukee Police" in a loud voice.  In the process, 
Wagner noticed that a window was covered with cardboard and that 
a video camera was pointed toward the front porch.  
¶10 Meanwhile, Detective Nicole Davila went around to the 
back of the house to ensure that no one attempted to escape.  
Davila walked into a fenced-in back yard to a door at the rear 
of the house.3  She saw a light on through a small window on the 
                                                 
3 Although Davila did not testify specifically regarding the 
fence, it is clear from photographs in the record that she could 
not have reached the rear door without going within the confines 
of a chain-link fence surrounding the back yard.   
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
5 
 
second floor.  While Wagner was knocking at the front door, 
Davila saw the light go off.  Davila also heard what sounded 
like multiple people scurrying up and down the stairs inside the 
house.  On separate occasions she heard a phone in the upstairs 
unit begin to ring and then stop ringing.  She conveyed these 
observations to Detective Wagner and Officer Lopez, who were at 
the front of the building, by yelling and utilizing a Nextel 
police radio.   
¶11 After Wagner knocked on the door for more than 30 
seconds, and upon hearing Davila's reports of movement, the 
officers decided to force entry into the building.  To enter the 
building, the officers were required to pass through two doors.  
Lopez forced the outer front door open by kicking it.  However, 
he was unable to force the inner door after numerous attempts.  
He then broke the window on the door, reached in, and unlocked 
the inner door from the inside.   
¶12 After opening the inner door, the officers began to 
search the first floor of the building.  They located a person 
named Matthew sleeping in a rear bedroom.  The first floor 
appeared to be in the process of renovation.  The officers found 
a dining room that was being renovated, a bedroom that appeared 
to belong to a female, and a kitchen area that was being 
remodeled.  In the kitchen area they observed drywall, the 
absence of furniture, exposed plumbing, and a garbage can 
containing work supplies and tools.  Just off this kitchen area 
was a newly renovated bathroom.   
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
6 
 
¶13 Wagner followed a separate hallway in the back of the 
first floor that led up to the second floor.  At the top of the 
stairs, he encountered a closed door.  Wagner was unsure whether 
the second floor was a separate unit or part of a single-family 
residence.  Because of his uncertainty, he knocked on the 
upstairs door and announced "Milwaukee Police."  A male voice 
answered "Just a minute," and shortly afterwards, Artic answered 
the door.  Wagner testified that he had his weapon drawn when he 
first entered the building, but holstered it either when he was 
knocking on the upstairs door or when Artic answered the door.  
Artic testified that Wagner had his gun drawn when he answered 
the door, but holstered it after the police entered the upstairs 
unit.   
¶14 Wagner asked if he could come in and talk to Artic; 
Artic responded yes.4  Wagner asked if anyone else was in the 
residence.  Artic responded that he had a lady friend in the 
back room who was not dressed.  Wagner asked Artic to ask her to 
get dressed and come out to the kitchen.  The officers waited 
for the woman, later identified as Winnie Grafton.  After 
Grafton arrived, Wagner began to speak with Artic and Grafton 
while they were seated at the kitchen table.  Wagner asked Artic 
if he owned the building, and Artic replied that he did.  He 
explained that it was a duplex and that he was converting the 
                                                 
4 Artic does not challenge the voluntariness of the consent 
he gave the officers to enter the upstairs unit, but rather the 
voluntariness of the consent he gave the officers to search the 
unit. 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
7 
 
entire building into a single-family residence.  During the 
initial conversation with Artic, Wagner was accompanied by only 
one other officer.  Lopez entered the upstairs unit as Artic and 
Wagner were speaking.  Several other officers entered the unit 
afterwards.  
¶15 Wagner explained to Artic that his son had just been 
arrested with a large amount of cocaine.  He asked whether Artic 
believed his son would have left any cocaine in the house 
because the officers observed him enter and then leave the 
building.  Artic said he did not think his son would do 
something like that and told the officers it was okay for them 
to search the residence.  Artic stated that he had nothing to 
hide and wanted to be forward with the police.  He also 
explained to them that he was on supervisory release.   
¶16 After gaining oral consent from Artic, Wagner asked if 
Artic would consent in writing, and he began writing out a 
consent agreement.  Artic stated that he would not sign anything 
without his lawyer, but reaffirmed that it was okay for the 
police to search.  Wagner testified that he made no promises or 
threats to Artic in order to gain consent.  After Artic refused 
to sign the form, Wagner and Artic continued to speak about 
"family and stuff" in the kitchen.   
¶17 The officers then searched Artic's residence.  During 
the search, they discovered a "California safe" of Gunk Big 
Puncture seal, which was a fake pressurized can with a screw-off 
bottom.  The can contained coffee grounds and a plastic baggie 
containing a white residue.  The officers also recovered 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
8 
 
sandwich baggies, latex gloves, a razor blade, a gold metal 
wire, a gray digital scale, and a shoe box containing suspected 
cocaine residue.  In addition, officers observed white powdery 
fingerprints on Artic's sweater.  The sweater and shoebox were 
later sent to the Wisconsin Regional State Crime Lab and tested 
positive for cocaine residue.   
¶18 On February 3, 2006, Artic was charged with one count 
of maintaining a drug trafficking place, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.42(1), and one count of possession with intent to deliver 
cocaine 
as 
party 
to 
a 
crime, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 961.41(1m)(cm)4. and 939.05.  Artic moved to suppress the 
evidence obtained in the search of the upstairs unit.  The 
circuit court held a suppression hearing at which Artic denied 
giving Wagner consent to search his unit.  The court found that 
Artic's testimony was not credible, that the officers acted 
lawfully 
based 
on 
exigent 
circumstances, 
and 
that 
Artic 
voluntarily consented to the search.  As a result, the court 
denied the motion to suppress.  The case proceeded to a jury 
trial, and the jury found Artic guilty of both counts.   
¶19 After his conviction, Artic filed a motion for 
postconviction relief, alleging, among other claims, that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the 
argument that the police improperly created their own exigent 
circumstances and for failing to object to Davila's testimony 
because it was illegally obtained by her presence within the 
curtilage of Artic's property.  The circuit court said that even 
if trial counsel had made the argument that police created their 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
9 
 
own exigent circumstances, the court would have rejected it, and 
that Davila's observations were lawfully made while she was 
securing the house.  Accordingly, the court found trial 
counsel's actions to be neither deficient nor prejudicial, and 
denied the motion. 
¶20 Artic appealed, seeking reversal of the postconviction 
motion and asking the court of appeals to vacate his conviction.  
On December 9, 2008, the court of appeals affirmed.  The court 
held that the search of the upper-level unit was sufficiently 
attenuated from the illegal entry of the house to be lawful.  
Artic, 316 Wis. 2d 133, ¶19.  It held that there was credible 
evidence to support the circuit court's finding that Artic 
consented to the search.  Id., ¶22.  Regarding attenuation, the 
court applied the three-factor test from State v. Richter, 2000 
WI 58, ¶¶46-54, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29, and held that: 
(1) the time between the illegal entry and the search was 
significant; 
(2) 
there 
were 
meaningful 
and 
significant 
intervening circumstances; and (3) the police action did not 
rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct that they 
sought to exploit.  Artic, 316 Wis. 2d 133, ¶¶25-30.  It 
concluded: "All three attenuation factors favor the conclusion 
that the consensual search was sufficiently attenuated from the 
initial illegal entry."  Id., ¶30. 
¶21 Artic petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on March 2, 2009. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
10 
 
¶22 The threshold issue in this case is whether Artic was 
denied effective assistance of counsel.  Ineffective assistance 
of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law.  State v. 
Fonte, 2005 WI 77, ¶11, 281 Wis. 2d 654, 698 N.W.2d 594.  We 
will not overturn the circuit court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  We review de novo whether 
counsel's performance was deficient and if that performance 
prejudiced the defendant.  Id. 
¶23 With respect to the search, voluntariness of consent 
and attenuation are both questions of constitutional fact.  
State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 195, 204, 577 N.W.2d 794 
(1998).  We review questions of constitutional fact as mixed 
questions of fact and law and apply a two-step standard of 
review.  State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶8, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 
N.W.2d 634 (citing State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶16, 231 
Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552).  We review the circuit court's 
findings of historical fact to determine if they are clearly 
erroneous, 
and 
we 
independently 
apply 
those 
facts 
to 
constitutional principles.  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶24 The issues in this case arise in the context of 
Artic's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  A defendant 
seeking reversal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel 
must prove two components.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984).  First, he must prove that his counsel's 
performance was deficient.  Id.  Second, he must prove that the 
deficient performance prejudiced his defense.  Id.  This 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
11 
 
requires the defendant to "show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome."  Id. at 694.   
¶25 It is not necessary to address whether Artic's trial 
counsel was deficient because Artic was not prejudiced by any 
alleged deficiencies.  We "need not determine whether counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient 
before 
examining 
the 
prejudice 
suffered 
by 
the 
defendant 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
alleged 
deficiencies."  Id. at 697.  The circuit court would have 
properly denied the motion to suppress even if Artic's counsel 
had raised the argument that the police created their own 
exigent circumstances in the motion to suppress and had objected 
to Detective Davila's testimony. 
¶26 In determining whether Artic was prejudiced, we assume 
that the officers' entry into the house was unconstitutional.  
Although the officers acted upon their belief that evidence was 
being destroyed, this belief was based on Davila's observations 
made from within the curtilage in back of Artic's house.  
Detective Davila's presence within the curtilage was not lawful.  
Therefore, the officers' entry into the house based on Davila's 
observations from within the curtilage was unconstitutional.5  
However, because the officers ultimately obtained the evidence 
                                                 
5 We cannot speculate what Detective Davila might have seen 
or might have heard had she been standing outside the curtilage. 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
12 
 
lawfully, Artic was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to 
object to Davila's testimony. 
¶27 Because the officers' entry into the house was 
unconstitutional, the central question in this case is whether 
the officers' search of Artic's upstairs residence was also 
unconstitutional.  To answer this question, we first address 
whether Artic's consent to the search of his upstairs residence 
was voluntary.  We then address whether the officers' search of 
Artic's upstairs residence was sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegal entry of his house to purge the taint of that entry. 
A. 
Voluntariness of Consent 
¶28 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 11.  This court ordinarily construes the 
protections of these provisions coextensively.  State v. 
Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶20, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182. 
¶29 Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject 
to several clearly delineated exceptions.  State v. Faust, 2004 
WI 99, ¶11, 274 Wis. 2d 183, 682 N.W.2d 371.  One well-
established exception to the warrant requirement is a search 
conducted pursuant to consent.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 196; 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
¶30 To determine if the consent exception is satisfied, we 
review, first, whether consent was given in fact by words, 
gestures, or conduct; and, second, whether the consent given was 
voluntary.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 196-97.  The question of 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
13 
 
whether consent was given in fact is a question of historical 
fact.  We uphold a finding of consent in fact if it is not 
contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence.  Id. 
¶31 At the suppression hearing, Wagner testified that 
Artic gave express oral consent to search, while Artic testified 
that he did not give consent.  The circuit court found that 
Artic gave consent in fact.  Based on Wagner's testimony, this 
finding of fact was not contrary to the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence.  Artic now concedes that the 
circuit court's finding that consent was given in fact is not 
clearly erroneous.   
¶32 The second issue is whether the consent given by Artic 
was voluntary.  The State bears the burden of proving that 
consent was given freely and voluntarily, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 222, and it must satisfy that burden by clear and convincing 
evidence, Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 197.  The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that voluntary consent cannot be 
summed up in a "talismanic definition."  Schneckloth, 412 
U.S. at 224.  Instead, "voluntariness" reflects an accommodation 
of complex, somewhat conflicting values.  Id. at 224-25.  Law 
enforcement officers are expected to investigate possible 
illegal conduct, but the criminal law under which they operate 
"cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness."  Id. at 225.  
When a suspect is asked to make a statement or consent to a 
search, the suspect's response must be "an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice," id., not "the product of duress or 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
14 
 
coercion, express or implied," id. at 227.6  The determination of 
"voluntariness" is a mixed question of fact and law based upon 
an 
evaluation 
of 
"the 
totality 
of 
all 
the 
surrounding 
circumstances."  Id. at 226; State v. Vorburger, 2002 WI 105, 
¶88, 255 Wis. 2d 537, 648 N.W.2d 829.  Consent is not voluntary 
if the state proves "no more than acquiescence to a claim of 
lawful authority."  Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-
49 (1968).   
¶33 In considering the totality of the circumstances, we 
look at the circumstances surrounding the consent and the 
characteristics of the defendant; no single factor controls.  
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 197-98; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.  
In 
Phillips, 
this 
court considered multiple non-exclusive 
factors to determine whether consent was given voluntarily: (1) 
whether 
the 
police 
used 
deception, 
trickery, 
or 
misrepresentation in their dialogue with the defendant to 
persuade him to consent; (2) whether the police threatened or 
physically intimidated the defendant or "punished" him by the 
deprivation of something like food or sleep; (3) whether the 
conditions attending the request to search were congenial, non-
threatening, and cooperative, or the opposite; (4) how the 
defendant 
responded 
to 
the 
request 
to 
search; 
(5) 
what 
                                                 
6 See State v. Vorburger, 2002 WI 105, ¶89, 255 Wis. 2d 537, 
648 N.W.2d 829 (a reviewing court must determine that the 
consent was not the result of duress or coercion); State v. 
Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 471, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(consent must be the product of a free and unconstrained 
choice). 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
15 
 
characteristics the defendant had as to age, intelligence, 
education, 
physical 
and 
emotional 
condition, 
and 
prior 
experience with the police; and (6) whether the police informed 
the defendant that he could refuse consent.  Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d at 198-203; State v. Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d 338, 348-51, 
585 N.W.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1998).  Discussion regarding either the 
absence of a search warrant or the possibility of getting one 
bears on several of these factors.  
¶34 Examining 
these factors, we conclude that Artic 
consented to the search freely and voluntarily, in the absence 
of express or implied duress or coercion.  Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d at 197-98; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 248-49. 
¶35 The first factor we examine is whether the officers 
used any deception, trickery, or misrepresentation in obtaining 
consent from Artic.  In Phillips, the court found this first 
factor to weigh in favor of voluntariness because "officers 
disclosed to the defendant almost all of the information they 
possessed concerning their interest in his home."  Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d at 
198-99. 
 
The 
court 
noted 
that 
the 
officers 
acknowledged they did not have a warrant, described their 
purposes for being in the home, and did not "mask their 
identities or misrepresent the purpose for being at the 
defendant's home."  Id. at 199. 
¶36 Here, the officers were forthright with Artic about 
their identities and their reasons for being in the house.  
Wagner testified that he asked for consent to search only after 
explaining to Artic that the officers had arrested his son with 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
16 
 
a large amount of cocaine after observing him enter and leave 
the residence.  Wagner also explained to Artic that the officers 
did not have a warrant.  Artic testified that the officers told 
him that a person had left the house with drugs, although 
Artic's testimony at the suppression hearing and his testimony 
at the jury trial are contradictory as to whether officers 
identified the person as Artic's son.  Artic also acknowledged 
that the officers did not claim to have a search warrant.  
Nothing in this testimony suggests deception, trickery, or 
misrepresentation on the part of the officers.  Therefore, this 
factor weighs in favor of voluntary consent. 
¶37 The second factor is whether the officers threatened, 
intimidated, or in any way "punished" Artic.  Consent may be 
involuntary if the officers "deprive the defendant of any 
necessities, prolong the encounter to wear down the defendant's 
resistance, or employ any other coercive interrogation tactics" 
before obtaining consent.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 200.  There 
is no evidence in the record that the police used any of these 
coercive tactics.  Wagner specifically testified that he made no 
promises or threats to Artic.   
¶38 The two factors bearing on threats or intimidation are 
Wagner's drawn firearm and Artic's testimony that Officer Lopez 
told him that if he did not give consent, the officers would get 
a search warrant or tell Artic's supervised-release officer. 
¶39 There was mutual apprehension when Artic opened the 
door to the second-floor unit because Detective Wagner had drawn 
his weapon.  Artic testified that Wagner holstered his weapon 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
17 
 
after Artic opened his door and gave permission to enter the 
upstairs unit.  The tension inherent in the presence of a police 
officer with his weapon drawn appears to have dissipated quickly 
after the weapon was holstered because it was followed by police 
accommodations and mutual conversation around the kitchen table. 
¶40 Artic testified that Lopez, in effect, threatened to 
get a warrant or to tell his supervised-release officer.  The 
circuit court did not make a specific finding that this 
occurred.  However, the court did find that Wagner did not 
threaten or promise anything to get Artic to give consent. 
¶41 Even if Lopez did tell Artic the officers would get a 
warrant, that fact would not support a finding of involuntary 
consent.  Threatening to obtain a search warrant does not 
vitiate consent if "the expressed intention to obtain a warrant 
is genuine . . . and not merely a pretext to induce submission."  
United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 1992); State 
v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 473, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 
1997).   
¶42 Here, Wagner testified that the officers intended to 
obtain a search warrant, but decided not to because they 
obtained consent from Artic.  The officers had probable cause to 
obtain a search warrant based on the fact that Rob was arrested 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
18 
 
with a substantial amount of cocaine after leaving the house.7  
The police noted suspicious signs at the house, apart from 
Detective Davila's observations, namely, the video camera facing 
the front porch and the window covered with cardboard.  The 
failure of anyone to answer their loud knocking and announcement 
at the door was suspicious once they realized that Artic and 
Grafton were in the house.  Finally, Artic volunteered the fact 
that he was under supervision.  This information could have been 
verified and made specific if the police had sought a search 
warrant.  Therefore, even if Lopez had told Artic the officers 
would obtain a search warrant, it was not a "baseless threat."  
White, 979 F.2d at 542.  This factor weighs in favor of 
voluntary consent. 
¶43 The third factor is whether the conditions at the time 
of consent were non-threatening and cooperative.  In examining 
this factor, we consider whether the officers and the defendant 
"were open and forthright during the encounter, each posing 
questions and providing information."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 
200.  We also examine whether "the police [made] a show of force 
at the time the consent [was] sought, or if the surroundings 
                                                 
7 Professor LaFave states that "a threat to obtain a search 
warrant is likely to be held to invalidate a subsequent consent 
if there were not then grounds upon which a warrant could issue, 
and likely not to affect the validity of the consent if the 
police then had probable cause upon which a warrant could 
issue."  4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.2(c), at 73-
74 (4th ed. 2004). 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
19 
 
[were] coercive in other respects."  4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure, § 8.2(b), at 61-62 (4th ed. 2004). 
¶44 The 
evidence 
in 
the 
record 
suggests 
that 
the 
conditions at the time of consent were non-threatening and 
cooperative.  The officers knocked on Artic's door and waited 
for him to answer.  They waited for Grafton to get dressed and 
arrive in the kitchen before they sought consent from Artic.8  
The officers were candid regarding their lack of a search 
warrant and explained that they wanted to search the residence 
for drugs Rob may have left there.  Artic explained that he 
wanted to be straightforward with officers, informing them that 
he was on supervisory release.  Artic was not intimidated 
inasmuch as he asserted his right not to sign a written consent 
form, but orally gave consent to search, saying he had nothing 
to hide.  Wagner and Artic continued to talk about "family and 
stuff" after consent was given.  All this suggests a congenial 
tone to the encounter at the time Artic gave consent and that 
Artic was neither overcome nor intimidated by the police.  See 
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 200-01 (holding that the fact that the 
defendant gave the agents a magazine when they left was 
"inconsistent with a conclusion that the encounter between the 
agents and the defendant was coercive or that the defendant's 
will was in any way overcome by the agents' tactics").  Artic 
                                                 
8 In this respect, this case is analogous to State v. 
Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d 338, 350, 585 N.W.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1998), 
in which the court of appeals noted that the officers permitted 
the babysitter to enter the room to collect food and clothing 
for the children.   
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
20 
 
testified at his jury trial that neither he nor the officers 
were giving each other a "hard time."   
¶45 Artic relies heavily on the fact that Wagner had his 
weapon drawn to support the claim of involuntariness.  Once 
again, the record is somewhat unclear regarding the role of 
weapons in this encounter.  At the preliminary hearing, Wagner 
testified that he put his gun away when Artic answered the door.  
At the suppression hearing, Wagner testified that he thought he 
holstered the gun either as he was knocking on the door or when 
Artic answered the door, and while he could not be completely 
positive of exactly when, he knew that he had holstered it by 
the time he was sitting with Artic in the kitchen.  Artic 
testified that Wagner had his gun out when he answered the door, 
but holstered it after the police came in, before Artic and 
Wagner had the conversation in which Wagner explained the 
reasons for the police presence.9  The circuit court did not make 
a finding as to when Wagner holstered his gun. 
¶46 Certainly, voluntary consent is less likely when the 
defendant "answers the door to find officers with guns drawn."  
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.2(b), at 63 (4th ed. 
2004).  However, the fact that an officer has a weapon drawn at 
the beginning of an encounter does not prevent the situation 
                                                 
9 Artic argues in his brief that "[w]hen Artic opened the 
upstairs door, he saw a gun pointed directly at him."  At his 
suppression hearing, Artic did not testify that Wagner had 
pointed his weapon at him.  At his trial, however, he testified 
that Wagner pointed his weapon at Artic and then holstered it 
after walking in.   
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
21 
 
from evolving into something non-threatening and relatively 
congenial.   
¶47 In United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374 (8th Cir. 
1992), when the defendant's wife opened the door, the officers 
drew their weapons and told her they were looking for the 
defendant.  Id. at 1375.  She allowed the officers to come 
inside, and they observed evidence that they later used to 
obtain a search warrant.  Id.  The Eighth Circuit upheld the 
finding that consent was voluntary, noting that "[w]hile the 
officers did draw their weapons when [the defendant’s wife] 
opened the door, there was no evidence that they immediately 
demanded entry."  Id. at 1376.  The court also noted that the 
officers had a brief conversation with her, that she never 
refused entry, and that no physical force or threats were used.  
Id.   
¶48 The facts here weigh more strongly in favor of 
voluntariness than the facts in Smith.  Wagner had his gun drawn 
but holstered it before asking Artic for consent to search.  
Like the officers in Smith, he did not demand entry nor use a 
threat or physical force.  Thus, the fact that Wagner had his 
gun drawn when the door was opened does not outweigh the 
substantial evidence that the conditions at the time of consent 
were congenial and non-threatening.  
¶49 Artic compares the facts here to three cases in which 
officers had guns drawn and entered by breaking down a door.  
None of these cases has facts similar to the facts here.  In 
United States v. Medlin, 842 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1988), 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
22 
 
ATF agents entered the defendant's property executing a federal 
search warrant but subsequently seized items beyond the scope of 
the warrant that the ATF deputy believed to be evidence of state 
law violations.  Id.  The court noted that the agents' guns were 
drawn, but emphasized the generally coercive nature of this 
situation: "As a layperson, under such extreme conditions, 
Medlin could hardly be expected to distinguish between that part 
of the search which was authorized by warrant, and for which his 
consent was unnecessary, and that part of the search which was 
unauthorized."  Id. at 1198.  The Medlin situation is unlike the 
situation here, where the officers expressly told Artic they 
lacked a warrant and asked for permission to search.  
¶50 In United States v. Jones, 641 F.2d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 
1981), the officers requested that the resident open her door, 
and when the resident refused, they began to kick the door.  The 
resident allowed the officers in after they began to kick.  Id.  
She extended permission to search only after the officers told 
her they had a "warrant for Earl Jones" without specifying that 
they had only an arrest warrant, not a warrant to search his 
home.  Id.   
¶51 Again, Jones presents a set of facts different from 
those here, where the officers knocked on the door to Artic's 
unit, obtained permission to enter, and revealed that they did 
not have a warrant before requesting consent to search. 
¶52 Finally, Artic cites United States v. McIntosh, 857 
F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1988).  Although the facts of that case are 
not entirely clear, it does not appear that the officers asked 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
23 
 
for consent to enter the residence.  Instead, when the resident 
opened the door, the officers simply "stepped inside."  Id. at 
467.  The court also determined that the resident opened the 
door "because [the officers] had weapons drawn when they 
demanded entry."  Id.   
¶53 Here, there was no testimony about whether Artic knew 
the officers had weapons drawn when they initially knocked on 
the door to his unit.  However, the officers did not "demand 
entry."  The officers waited for Artic when he said "just a 
minute," and after he answered the door, they requested 
permission to enter.   
¶54 Artic also cites Johnson as an example of a situation 
in which consent was not voluntary under more congenial 
circumstances than these.  Johnson, however, is inapposite.  In 
Johnson, the officer did not ask for consent, as was the case 
here; rather, he told the defendant that officers "were going to 
search the vehicle."  Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶19.  This court 
held that the circuit court's finding of consent-in-fact was 
clearly erroneous.  Id.  The court did not use the factors 
outlined in Phillips to determine whether, under the totality of 
the circumstances, consent was voluntary.   
¶55 Here, the circuit court's factual finding that Artic 
gave consent is not clearly erroneous, and Johnson does not 
affect the question of voluntariness. 
¶56 The fourth factor is Artic's response to the request 
to search.  An initial refusal of a request to search will weigh 
against a finding of voluntariness.  Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d at 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
24 
 
472.  Here, Artic initially told the officers that they could 
search the residence.  Although Artic refused to sign a written 
consent form, he explained that he would not sign anything 
without his lawyer.  He then reaffirmed that, while he would not 
sign the consent form, he was still permitting the officers to 
search.   
¶57 The fact that Artic refused to provide written consent 
does not weigh against voluntariness.  Consent need not be 
written to be voluntary, see Vorburger, 255 Wis. 2d 537, ¶¶97, 
99, and refusal to sign a consent form does not vitiate prior 
oral consent, United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 651 (4th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1082 (9th 
Cir. 1988).10  Because Artic initially gave oral consent and then 
reaffirmed that consent, this factor weighs in favor of 
voluntariness. 
¶58 The record also suggests that Artic gave the officers 
consent because he believed that incriminating evidence had been 
eliminated.  In weighing voluntariness, some courts have 
considered 
"the 
defendant's 
belief 
that 
no 
incriminating 
evidence will be found."  United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 
1355 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 
406 (5th Cir. 2006).  Artic replied to Wagner's initial request 
by stating that he wanted to be straightforward with the 
                                                 
10 "[T]he claim that the subsequent refusal to sign a 
consent form operates to make the prior oral consent a nullity 
has been rather summarily rejected by the courts."  4 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.2(f), at 99 (4th ed. 2004). 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
25 
 
officers and had "nothing to hide."  Artic testified at his jury 
trial that, as the police were on their way, Grafton was walking 
into the bathroom with supplies to clean up spilled cocaine.  He 
also testified that he told the officers "just a minute" before 
answering the door because Grafton was disposing of cocaine.  By 
the time Artic gave consent, Grafton had joined Artic and the 
officers in the kitchen.  The fact that Artic believed Grafton 
had disposed of the cocaine supports the conclusion that he 
voluntarily gave consent to search. 
¶59 The 
fifth 
factor 
looks 
at 
the 
defendant's 
characteristics, including youth, lack of education, lack of 
intelligence, physical and emotional condition, and experience 
with the police.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d at 202.  Artic argues that "there is no indication in 
this record that he was exceptionally intelligent or versed in 
the law, or that he previously had any experience with searches 
of 
his 
home." 
 
A 
person 
need 
not 
possess 
exceptional 
intelligence, 
legal 
knowledge, 
or 
experience 
with 
law 
enforcement to give voluntary consent.  We look to whether there 
was evidence "suggesting that the defendant was particularly 
susceptible to improper influence, duress, intimidation, or 
trickery."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 202-03 (emphasis added).  
The record here suggests otherwise.  Artic (DOB: 3-6-46) was 
nearly 60 years old at the time of the search.  Although he 
dropped out of high school, he later obtained his GED.  He also 
previously owned a service station and rental properties.  
Finally, he had a prior drug conviction and was on extended 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
26 
 
supervision at the time of the search.  Based on these 
characteristics, this factor weighs in favor of voluntariness. 
¶60 The sixth factor is whether the officers informed the 
defendant that he could refuse to consent.  While not fatal, 
this factor weighs against voluntariness.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 227; Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 203.  This court and the United 
States Supreme Court have refused to adopt a requirement that 
officers must advise a person of a right to refuse consent.  In 
Schneckloth, the Supreme Court held that "it would be thoroughly 
impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed 
requirements of an effective warning."  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
231.  This court applied Schneckloth in Phillips, holding that 
the State is not required to demonstrate whether "the defendant 
knew . . . he could refuse consent."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 
203. 
¶61 There is no evidence in the record that the officers 
here informed Artic he could withhold consent.  Artic did, 
however, refuse to sign the written consent agreement offered by 
Wagner, creating a reasonable inference that he was aware he 
could withhold consent.  Accordingly, although this factor 
weighs against a finding of voluntariness, it does not weigh 
heavily 
into 
our 
consideration 
of 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances. 
¶62 Summing up, we conclude, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, that Artic freely and voluntarily gave the 
officers consent to search his unit. 
B. 
Attenuation 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
27 
 
¶63 We next address whether the search of Artic's upstairs 
residence was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry of 
his house to purge the taint of that illegal entry.  For this 
analysis, we assume the court of appeals was correct that 
warrantless entry of Artic's house was illegal——that none of the 
clearly delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement apply. 
¶64 Evidence does not become "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
simply because it would not have come to light but for illegal 
actions by law enforcement.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 487-88 (1963).  When illegal police conduct has been 
established, the question still remains whether evidence sought 
to 
be 
suppressed 
was 
obtained 
"by 
exploitation 
of 
that 
illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to 
be purged of the primary taint."  Id. at 488 (quoting Maguire, 
Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)). 
¶65 The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter 
unlawful conduct and to preserve judicial integrity by barring 
the use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained.  Brown, 422 
U.S. at 599-600.  Nonetheless, "the exclusionary rule has never 
been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized 
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons."  Id. at 600 
(quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).  
The object of attenuation analysis is "to mark the point at 
which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action 
become 
so 
attenuated 
that 
the 
deterrent 
effect 
of 
the 
exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost."  Id. at 609 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
28 
 
¶66 In Brown, the Supreme Court applied the rule from Wong 
Sun to determine whether a Miranda11 warning was sufficient to 
purge the primary taint of an unlawful arrest.  Brown, 422 U.S. 
at 600-01.  The Court rejected a per se rule and held that the 
application of Wong Sun "must be answered on the facts of each 
case."  Id. at 603.  To determine whether the primary taint was 
purged, the Brown Court looked to three factors: (1) the 
temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession; (2) the 
presence of intervening circumstances; and, particularly, (3) 
the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.  Id. at 
603-04.   
¶67 Although Brown specifically addressed a confession 
made after an illegal arrest, this court has applied the Brown 
factors to the context of an illegal search.  In State v. 
Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991), the court 
addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained after two 
illegal searches and "reaffirm[ed] that the Brown analysis is 
the proper test to follow in attenuation cases."  Id. at 447.  
More 
recently, 
the 
court 
applied 
the 
Brown 
three-factor 
attenuation test in Phillips and Richter, which had factual 
situations somewhat similar to the facts of this case. 
¶68 In Phillips, three agents from the Metro Drug Unit of 
the Racine County Sheriff's Department went to Phillips' home to 
perform a "knock and talk" encounter based on information from a 
confidential informant that Phillips was involved in the sale of 
                                                 
11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
29 
 
marijuana.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 185-86.  When they arrived, 
the agents saw a man they believed to be Phillips standing near 
the rear of his residence.  The man walked down a staircase into 
the cellar.  Id.  One of the agents stood at the top of the 
stairwell and got Phillips' attention.  Id.  The agents then 
walked down the staircase into the basement area in which 
Phillips lived.  Id.  The agents did not request and never 
obtained permission to enter the basement.  Id. at 187.  Once 
inside, however, they explained to Phillips the information they 
received from the informant and told him that they intended to 
collect illegal items Phillips possessed.  Id.  Phillips walked 
into his bedroom, gave the illegal items to the officers, and 
then gave the officers consent to search the rest of the 
bedroom.  Id. at 187-88.  
¶69 After holding that Phillips voluntarily gave consent 
for the search, this court applied the three-factor Brown 
attenuation test.  Id. at 205-12.  First, it noted that temporal 
proximity weighed against attenuation because only a few minutes 
had passed from the entry, id. at 206, but the court noted that 
the short temporal span was mitigated by the conditions 
surrounding the search, id. at 206-07.  Second, the court held 
that the short discussion between one agent and Phillips was a 
significant meaningful intervening circumstance, because it 
"provided the defendant with sufficient information with which 
he could decide whether to freely consent to the search of his 
bedroom."  Id. at 208-09.  Third, the court concluded that the 
agents' activity was not purposeful or flagrant because there 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
30 
 
was no evidence of bad faith, they did not uncover evidence as a 
result of the illegal entry used to influence consent, and they 
did not go into the basement without individualized suspicion.  
Id. at 210.  The court also noted that the agents did not enter 
the basement through trickery or deception, or "by breaking 
through, unlocking, or even opening a window or door."  Id. at 
211.  Accordingly, the court concluded that the search was 
sufficiently attenuated to purge the taint of the illegal entry.  
Id. at 212. 
¶70 In Richter, this court again took up the three-part 
Brown attenuation test.  An officer was investigating a break-
in, and the victim told the officer that she witnessed the 
intruder run into a trailer.  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶3.  The 
officer went to the trailer, observed signs of forced entry, and 
woke up two occupants of the trailer by shining a flashlight in 
the window and announcing his presence.  Id., ¶¶4-5.  The two 
people had been sleeping on the floor of the trailer.  They woke 
up and came to the door.  Id., ¶6.  The officer entered the 
trailer and woke up Richter, the owner, who told the officer he 
could search the trailer for the intruder.  Id., ¶7.  While 
searching the trailer, the officer discovered marijuana.  Id., 
¶9. 
¶71 This court upheld the search on grounds that the entry 
was justified by exigent circumstances, but went on to clarify 
the application of the attenuation doctrine.  Id., ¶¶44-45.  
First, the court acknowledged the extremely short temporal 
proximity between the entry and the search.  Id., ¶46.  It then 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
31 
 
noted that the facts that the officer was armed and that he woke 
Richter from a deep sleep were not "sufficiently aggravating to 
transform this non-threatening, non-custodial situation into one 
which weighs against attenuation."  Id., ¶47.  Second, the court 
clarified that meaningful intervening circumstances could exist 
even though the officer did not inform the resident that he did 
not have a warrant or that the resident was free to refuse 
consent.  Id., ¶48.  Third, the court found that the officer's 
conduct was not purposeful or flagrant because the investigation 
was not directed at Richter, but rather at a fleeing burglar.  
Id., ¶54.  Accordingly, the court concluded that, even if 
exigent circumstances were not present, Richter's consent was 
sufficiently attenuated from the entry to purge any taint.  Id., 
¶55. 
¶72 We now apply the three Brown attenuation factors to 
the facts of this case.  In doing so, we examine the temporal 
proximity of the illegal entry and the search, the existence of 
meaningful intervening circumstances, and the purposefulness and 
flagrancy of the police conduct.  
1. 
Temporal Proximity 
¶73 The first Brown factor is temporal proximity——the time 
between the illegal entry and the search.  In Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100-01 (1980), a period of 45 minutes 
passed from the beginning of an illegal detention to a 
confession.  The Supreme Court held that "under the strictest of 
custodial conditions such a short lapse of time might not 
suffice to purge the initial taint," but it was necessary to 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
32 
 
examine the nature of the conditions.  Id. at 107.  The Court 
held that the "congenial atmosphere" outweighed the relatively 
short time period.  Id. at 108.  In both Phillips and Richter, 
the temporal proximity was only a matter of minutes.  However, 
the non-custodial and non-threatening nature of the situations 
in those cases mitigated the impact of the short time period. 
¶74 In the present case, the court of appeals analyzed the 
temporal proximity factor and determined that the lapse in time 
between the illegal entry and the request for consent was "more 
than the few minutes present" in Phillips.  Artic, 316 
Wis. 2d 133, ¶25.  The court stated that "the number of events 
that transpired from the entry——start of the search downstairs, 
knocking at the upstairs door, waiting, entry upstairs, more 
waiting 
and 
talking 
at 
the 
kitchen 
table——constitute 
a 
significant temporal distance from the unlawful downstairs 
entry."  Id. 
¶75 Evaluating temporal proximity entails a "measurement 
of the intervening time."  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 213.  How 
much time passed between one event and another?  We think it is 
likely that more time passed between the illegal entry and the 
request for consent in this case than the time that passed in 
either Phillips or Richter.  However, the amount of time that 
passed should not be overstated.  Admittedly, it was relatively 
brief.  The passage of time is important, but time is not 
necessarily of the essence when it is outweighed by other 
factors in an attenuation analysis. 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
33 
 
¶76 Here, the record does not provide the exact time 
period from the illegal entry to the subsequent consent to 
search.  After breaking in the front doors, the officers secured 
the first floor of the residence.  There was no clear indication 
of how long this took.  The officers then proceeded up the 
stairs where they knocked, waited a short period of time for 
Artic to answer, then entered the residence with permission.  
They then waited for Grafton to get dressed and enter the 
kitchen.  It was "very shortly thereafter" that Wagner asked 
Artic for consent.  Therefore, although the time span is 
unclear, it appears from the record that it was not more than 
about five minutes.  This short temporal proximity weighs 
against a finding of attenuation. 
¶77 In this case, as in Rawlings, Phillips, and Richter, 
other circumstances mitigate the short time span.  In Rawlings, 
the Supreme Court found congenial conditions to be a mitigating 
factor even though the officers detained the residents while 
other officers obtained a search warrant.  Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 
107-08.  In both Phillips and Richter, this court considered the 
fact that the conditions were non-custodial when weighing the 
short temporal proximity.  Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 207; 
Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶47.   
¶78 Here, neither Artic nor Grafton was in custody.  
Wagner displayed a weapon at the beginning of the encounter, but 
holstered it shortly afterward.  For the reasons discussed 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
34 
 
earlier,12 the evidence suggests that the incident evolved into a 
relatively congenial and non-threatening encounter, culminating 
in Artic and Wagner discussing "family and stuff" while sitting 
at the kitchen table.  Therefore, while the short temporal 
proximity 
does 
weigh 
against 
attenuation, 
its 
impact 
is 
mitigated by the congenial and non-threatening conditions at the 
time of consent. 
2. 
Intervening Circumstances 
¶79 The second Brown factor is the presence or absence of 
meaningful intervening circumstances.  This factor concerns 
whether the defendant acted "of free will unaffected by the 
initial illegality."  Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 108 (quoting Brown, 
442 U.S. at 603).13  In both Phillips and Richter, significant 
intervening 
circumstances 
existed 
based 
on 
forthright 
conversations that officers had with the people who gave 
consent.  In Bermudez and Kiekhefer, however, the court of 
appeals refused to find meaningful intervening circumstances 
where the officers made unannounced entries that improperly 
surprised, frightened, or confused the defendants.  Bermudez, 
221 Wis. 2d at 355; Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d at 482-83.  Thus, in 
                                                 
12 In examining the nature of the conditions, we note that 
while the analyses of attenuation and voluntariness "overlap to 
a considerable degree, they address separate constitutional 
values and they are not always coterminous."  Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d at 205 n.9 (quoting United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 
F.3d 1046, 1054 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
13 In Rawlings, the sufficiently untainted act of free will 
was the defendant's spontaneous admission that drugs found in 
another person's purse were actually his.  Id. 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
35 
 
addressing 
this 
issue, 
we 
look 
to 
whether 
the 
officers 
"exploit[ed] 
their 
unlawful 
entry . . . by 
surprising 
or 
misleading the defendant into consenting to the search."  
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 209. 
¶80 The 
record 
here 
demonstrates 
the 
existence 
of 
meaningful intervening circumstances following the illegal entry 
on the ground floor. 
¶81 First, the court of appeals concluded that the most 
meaningful intervening circumstance was "the consensual opening 
of the door by Artic."  Artic, 316 Wis. 2d 133, ¶26.  "Even 
Artic's version of events agrees that the police waited after 
knocking and identifying themselves."  Id.  Artic "admits that 
he then opened the door to the police.  They did not force entry 
or threaten to enter.  They knocked and waited."  Id. 
¶82 This record does not support Artic's present argument 
that Detective Wagner made a "demand to open the door."   
¶83 Putting the police entry into context, Artic testified 
at trial that he watched the video monitor and saw the police at 
his front door.  He was therefore not surprised when an officer 
knocked on the door of the second-floor unit.  Artic was 
prepared, and he bought time by replying "just a minute."  He 
opened the door and, upon request, gave Detective Wagner and a 
colleague permission to come in.  
¶84 Second, beginning with the knock on the upstairs door, 
the police made accommodations.  They waited for Artic to open 
the door. Wagner quickly holstered his weapon.  The officers 
waited for Winnie Grafton to get dressed and come into the 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
36 
 
kitchen.  The police did not frisk Artic or Grafton.  They did 
not see any incriminating evidence in plain view and they did 
not find the video monitor until later.  Consequently, they did 
not treat Artic as a suspect or challenge his failure to respond 
to their loud "knock and announce" at the front door.  Overall, 
they made a concerted effort to diffuse a tense situation. 
¶85 To constitute sufficient intervening circumstances, 
the interim facts or evidence must show a "discontinuity between 
the illegal [entry] and the consent such that the original 
illegality is weakened and attenuated."  United States v. 
Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 980 (10th Cir. 1996).  In this case, Artic 
watched the illegality on a monitor and responded with cool 
sangfroid, delaying police entry and delaying any investigation 
until 
the 
arrival 
of 
Grafton, 
while 
orchestrating 
the 
destruction of incriminating evidence.  He and Grafton then 
engaged officers in a congenial conversation. 
¶86 Third, there were two sides to the conversation, with 
each side playing a role.  The officers explained what had 
transpired: their presence in the area, the arrest of Artic's 
son with a large amount of cocaine immediately after he was seen 
leaving the house, their desire to know if his son had left any 
cocaine behind, their lack of a search warrant.  There was 
nothing deceptive in their information, although Artic must have 
believed the police suspected more.  For his part, Artic said he 
could not remember when he had last seen his son, could not 
believe his son would be involved in drugs at his house, and was 
willing to consent to search because he had nothing to hide.  
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
37 
 
Artic did not attempt to withhold what officers easily could 
have discovered and perhaps already knew: that he was on 
supervision for a prior offense.  In short, Artic had the 
presence of mind to delay the police twice, see that evidence 
was destroyed, lie to the police, and decline to sign any 
written consent to search. 
¶87 In one sense, the congenial conversation provided 
Artic with sufficient information to "decide whether to freely 
consent to the search."  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶50 (quoting 
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 208-09).  In another sense, however, 
Artic made a strategic decision, skillfully playing the hand he 
was dealt and consenting to a search in the mistaken belief that 
police would no longer be able to find incriminating evidence. 
¶88 The intervening circumstances in this case are more 
significant than those in either Phillips or Richter because the 
officers in those cases made entry directly into the residence 
that they ultimately received consent to search.  In contrast, 
the illegal entry here occurred in the first-floor unit.  
¶89 The record demonstrates that Artic's upstairs unit was 
separate from the downstairs unit and that the upstairs unit was 
his current residence.  Artic explained that he "lived on the 
second floor" and that at the time of the search, both Matthew 
and Grafton were "living downstairs."  Therefore, the officers' 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
38 
 
decision to knock and announce at the upstairs door constitutes 
a significant intervening circumstance.14 
¶90 Finally, Artic's counsel suggests that this case is 
analogous to Bermudez in that Artic must have been "surprised, 
frightened, or confused" when the officers arrived at his door.  
But Artic's testimony suggests otherwise.  Artic testified that 
he woke up to a loud thump.  He saw people kicking at his front 
door through the monitor for his closed-circuit camera, and he 
suspected they were the police because of the cars outside.  
Artic said that after the officers entered the home, he heard 
Grafton fumbling with something in the bathroom and warned her 
that the police were on their way.  He then deliberately delayed 
answering the door to give Grafton more time to dispose of 
cocaine.  While Grafton was in the bathroom, Artic approached 
the door to his unit to meet the police there.  Although he 
testified that he "panicked," the record does not support the 
conclusion that Artic was surprised, frightened, or confused by 
the 
police 
presence 
in 
a 
way 
that 
would 
diminish 
the 
meaningfulness of the intervening circumstances. 
3. 
Purposefulness and Flagrancy of the Police Conduct 
¶91 The third Brown factor is the purposefulness and 
flagrancy of the police conduct.  This factor is "particularly" 
important because it goes to the heart of the exclusionary 
                                                 
14 Even if the upstairs were not a separate residence, it is 
relevant that the officers treated it as such.  Wagner testified 
that he knocked and announced at the upper door because he "was 
unsure if this was a duplex where there was two separate 
residences."   
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
39 
 
rule's 
objective 
of 
deterring 
unlawful 
police 
conduct.  
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 209 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 604).  
In Brown, the Court determined that an illegal detention was 
purposeful because the detectives arrested the defendant "in the 
hope that something might turn up," in a manner that "[gave] the 
appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, 
and confusion."  Brown, 422 U.S. at 605.  Police conduct may be 
purposeful or flagrant if "the impropriety of the official's 
misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time, that 
his conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it 
nevertheless."  United States v. Carter, 573 F.3d 418, 425 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 
(8th Cir. 2006).  This court has considered "whether there is 
evidence of some degree of bad faith exploitation of the 
situation 
on 
the 
part 
of 
the 
officer." 
 
Richter, 
235 
Wis. 2d 524, ¶53. Conversely, "courts frequently hesitate to 
find that an officer's violation of the law was 'purposeful' or 
'flagrant' when the officer broke the law acting in good faith."  
United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir. 
2004).  
¶92 In this case, the officers entered the house based 
upon their belief that exigent circumstances existed.  Their 
belief 
in 
exigent 
circumstances 
was 
based, 
in 
turn, 
on 
observations 
that 
Detective 
Davila 
made 
from 
within 
the 
curtilage of Artic's residence.  Accordingly, we must examine 
the nature of Davila's presence in the curtilage. 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
40 
 
¶93 Curtilage is the land immediately surrounding a house.  
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 180 (1984).  Because 
curtilage is "the area to which extends the intimate activity 
associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies 
of life,'" it is considered part of the home itself under Fourth 
Amendment analysis.  Id. at 180 (Powell, J., concurring).  The 
curtilage is defined by factors that determine "whether an 
individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately 
adjacent to the home will remain private."  Id.  The existence 
of a fence is an important factor in delineating the curtilage 
of a home.  United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 n.4 (1987); 
Martwick, 231 Wis. 2d 801, ¶37 (noting that the owner did not 
erect a fence when determining that plants were not within the 
curtilage of the home). 
¶94 In this case, the fenced-in area immediately adjacent 
to the back of Artic's house must be regarded as curtilage.  The 
general rule is that law enforcement may not search this area of 
a private residence without "a search warrant (or some exception 
to the warrant requirement)."  Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 
648, 654 (7th Cir. 2001).  Here, Detective Davila did not have a 
warrant to enter the fenced-in area to position herself near the 
rear door.  She did not know whether anyone was in the house.  
Consequently, she did not have probable cause to believe that 
someone would try to escape from the house. 
¶95 Nevertheless, we recognize that officers may sometimes 
enter curtilage to further a "legitimate law enforcement 
objective" when the restriction upon a person's privacy is 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
41 
 
limited.  United States v. Weston, 443 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir. 
2006).  The officer's reason for entering the curtilage must be 
"unconnected with a search of the premises directed against the 
accused."  United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1100 (4th 
Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 
1204 (11th Cir. 2006).  An officer may, for example, come within 
the curtilage in order to serve civil process on the homeowner.  
United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 421 (8th Cir. 2001).  
Some courts have also defined an exception permitting officers 
to enter the curtilage when engaging in a "knock and talk" 
investigation.  See Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp., 416 F.3d 646, 654 
(6th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 
410 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a "knock and talk" is a 
"reasonable investigative tool when officers seek to gain an 
occupant's consent to search or when officers reasonably suspect 
criminal 
activity"). 
 
Several 
courts 
have 
extended 
this 
exception to permit officers to enter the back yard in search of 
a homeowner when nobody answers the front door.15  
¶96 In this case, Detective Davila's purpose for entering 
the curtilage was not to search the area or investigate the back 
                                                 
15 These courts include the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits.  See Hardesty v. Hamburg Township, 461 F.3d 
646, 664 (6th Cir. 2007); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 
497, 520-21 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 
1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 
1296, 1300 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 
1097, 1101 (4th Cir. 1974). 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
42 
 
of the house but to prevent any person in the house from trying 
to escape. 
¶97 Detective Davila's entry into the curtilage of Artic's 
house was not permitted by the Fourth Amendment on the basis of 
information she had at the time.  However, we are not required 
to determine that her presence in the fenced-in portion of 
Artic's back yard was lawful or that her observations there 
permitted other officers to break in the front door based on 
exigent circumstances as a prerequisite to our conclusion that 
police conduct was not "flagrant" or "purposeful."  Securing the 
rear door by entering the curtilage was not, under the 
circumstances, 
flagrant 
conduct. 
 
Entering 
the 
curtilage 
advanced a legitimate law enforcement objective——securing the 
premises in preparation for an anticipated search warrant and 
preventing an escape if someone in the house tried to escape——
without an undue invasion of privacy.  See United States v. 
Scheets, 188 F.3d 829, 840 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Segura v. 
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984)) ("Law enforcement 
officers may seize an area to avoid the destruction or removal 
of evidence when probable cause to search the area exists."); 
United States v. Ruiz-Estrada, 312 F.3d 398, 404 (8th Cir. 2002) 
("The act of securing [an] apartment while awaiting a search 
warrant comports with the Fourth Amendment."). 
¶98 When Detective Davila noticed the upstairs light go 
out as police announced their presence at the front door, and 
when she heard the phone ringing and scurrying movement inside 
the house, she drew the reasonable inference that the occupants 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
43 
 
of the house did not wish to be seen and could very well be 
involved in trying to destroy evidence.  While the resulting 
entry through the front door was illegal, it was neither 
illogical nor unnatural under the circumstances. 
¶99 Once Davila relayed her information to the other 
officers, those officers acted on a reasonable belief that 
evidence might be destroyed.  They had reason to believe drugs 
were in the residence based on the fact that Rob had left the 
residence moments before his arrest.  Wagner observed a camera 
near the front door of the house, which was characteristic of 
houses he had investigated for drugs and drug offenses.16   
Wagner knocked and announced loudly enough that Artic could hear 
him.  At this point, Davila relayed her observations about the 
light turning off, phone ringing, and scurrying footsteps on the 
stairs.  Wagner testified that the officers' forced entry was 
based upon their belief that evidence was being destroyed, and 
nothing in the record suggests that this belief was not genuine.  
The fact that Davila's observations were made unlawfully from 
within the curtilage rendered the officers' subsequent entry 
illegal, but it did not make the entry purposeful or flagrant 
for the purposes of attenuation analysis. 
¶100 The officers did not enter the house after Rob's 
arrest because they were targeting his father.  Davila did not 
                                                 
16 The circuit court found that the presence of the camera, 
coupled with Rob's arrest and the information provided by the 
confidential informant, heightened the officers' suspicion that 
drugs may have been in the home.   
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
44 
 
go to the back of the house to search for evidence against him.  
This was not a circumstance in which she "went in merely to see 
if there was anything worth getting a warrant for."  Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 540 n.2.  Events played out in an 
unexpected fashion.  Similar to Richter, where the officer was 
pursuing a fleeing burglar, there was no evidence "that [the 
officer] entered Richter's home with ulterior motives, to 
undermine Richter's rights, to pressure him to consent, or to 
otherwise exploit the situation in hopes of finding evidence 
against Richter."  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶54.   
¶101 Artic compares the facts of this case to Bermudez, in 
which the court of appeals held that "the facts suggest[ed] an 
orchestrated attempt to collect further incriminating evidence."  
Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d at 357.  In Bermudez, however, the facts 
were inconsistent with the officers' stated purpose for the 
entry.17  Id. at 356-57.  That is not the case here. 
¶102 Nothing in the record suggests the officers acted in 
bad 
faith 
or 
under a pretext.  The officers testified 
extensively regarding their initial investigation, and the 
police presence was consistent with these activities.  Although 
the 
observations 
supporting 
their 
belief 
in 
exigent 
                                                 
17 Specifically, the court of appeals held that it was 
"disingenuous for the officers involved to testify that their 
only purpose in going to the motel room was to inform [the 
defendant's 
wife] 
that 
her 
husband 
had 
been 
arrested."  
Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d at 356.  The court concluded that the 
officers' subsequent actions revealed their "ulterior motive."  
Id. 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
45 
 
circumstances were made illegally, the officers' behavior upon 
entering the residence was consistent with their goal of 
preventing the destruction of evidence.  Furthermore, they were 
specifically investigating Artic's son, not Artic himself.  They 
did not know that Artic was a resident of the building and, in 
fact, were surprised to encounter him.18 
¶103 Finally, Artic argues that the officers' illegal 
activity was purposeful and flagrant because the officers forced 
entry into the house.  He relies on language in Phillips noting 
that the agents in that case did not gain entry by "breaking 
through, 
unlocking, 
or 
even 
opening 
a 
window 
or 
door."  
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 211.  Although the fact that the 
officers forced entry certainly makes their entry more flagrant 
than it would be if they had simply opened a door, the flagrancy 
is mitigated by the fact that the officers forced entry into the 
building generally, not into Artic's upstairs living quarters. 
¶104 Artic cites United States v. Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d 
679 (7th Cir. 2003), which is instructive on this point.  In 
Robeles-Ortega, the Seventh Circuit found the officers' activity 
flagrant where they "literally broke down the door, without 
exigent circumstances and without a warrant, and at least five 
                                                 
18 Wagner testified that when Artic answered the door, 
Wagner "was surprised because he seemed like an elderly 
gentleman, and I wasn't sure——I wasn't sure if this was a duplex 
or a single family.  It was kind of confusing all at once."  
This kind of confusion is inconsistent with an orchestrated plan 
to exploit an illegal entry for the purposes of obtaining 
evidence against Artic. 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
46 
 
agents rushed into the apartment with guns."  Id. at 684.  The 
officers then ordered the occupants to lie on the ground.  Id.  
The Seventh Circuit held that the manner of the entry "gave the 
appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, 
and confusion."  Id. (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 605).   
¶105 While the officers here did break down the front doors 
to the building, there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
their actions were calculated to surprise, frighten, or confuse 
Artic, whom they did not realize was an occupant of the house.  
The officers were furthering a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose, see Scheets, 188 F.3d at 840, acting on a reasonable 
belief that evidence might be destroyed, and not specifically 
targeting Artic.  In sum, the record simply does not suggest 
"bad faith exploitation of the situation on the part of the 
officer[s]."  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶53.  Therefore, their 
actions were neither purposeful nor flagrant, and this factor 
weighs in favor of attenuation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶106 We conclude that Artic's consent to search was given 
freely and voluntarily, and not merely in acquiescence to police 
authority.  We also conclude that the police search of Artic's 
upper-level residence was sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegal entry to purge the primary taint of that entry.  While 
the 
temporal 
proximity 
was 
short, 
meaningful 
intervening 
circumstances took place and the official conduct was neither 
flagrant nor purposeful.  For these reasons, Artic was not 
prejudiced by his counsel's failure in the suppression motion to 
No.  2008AP880-CR 
 
47 
 
raise the argument that the police created their own exigent 
circumstances and to object to testimony about observations made 
illegally 
from 
within 
the 
curtilage 
of 
Artic's 
house.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶107 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority acknowledges that the following occurred in this case:   
• Milwaukee police contemplated obtaining a search 
warrant for Artic's home but specifically chose not 
to do so, instead proceeding without one.  Majority 
op., ¶8. 
• Several 
officers 
approached 
the 
home. 
 
One 
unlawfully entered the curtilage of Artic's property 
behind the house while others aggressively knocked 
and yelled at the front door.  Majority op., ¶¶9-10. 
• When no response was forthcoming, the officers 
forcibly kicked in one door and broke out a window 
in a second to make a forced, warrantless entry.  
Majority op., ¶11.   
• Police 
searched 
the 
downstairs 
portions 
of 
defendant's house before confronting him in his 
upstairs rooms.  Police had weapons drawn during 
this encounter.  Majority op., ¶12-13. 
• Still without seeking a warrant, police had a 
conversation with the defendant for which there are 
conflicting accounts but following which police 
searched the upstairs rooms.   
¶108 Given this undisputed sequence of events, given that 
the State bears the burden of establishing why the fruits of 
this warrantless and unconstitutional entry should be admitted, 
and given the spotty factual record on which the majority's 
analysis relies, it is remarkable that the majority determines 
that 
the 
evidence 
obtained 
following 
a 
concededly 
unconstitutional forced entry to the home was nevertheless 
properly used in court.   
¶109 I cannot agree with the majority's analysis of either 
of the two key inquiries:  the voluntariness of consent and its 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
attenuation from the unlawful police conduct.  I discuss each in 
turn.   
I 
¶110 The majority's conclusion that consent was voluntarily 
given in this case does not, in my view, faithfully apply the 
governing law.  The majority begins its analysis by reciting the 
established principles governing voluntary consent,1 but then 
walks away from these principles when it applies the law to the 
facts of this case.2  In particular, the majority does not take 
seriously 
either 
the 
evaluation 
of 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances or the applicable burden of proof, which is placed 
on the State. 
A 
¶111 Although 
the 
majority 
recites 
that 
determining 
voluntariness turns on the totality of the circumstances,3 the 
majority's analysis then ignores a key, overarching circumstance 
in this case, namely that the encounter between Artic and the 
police was precipitated by a forcible, unlawful, and warrantless 
entry into Artic's home.  In my view the majority's analysis 
thereby ignores the obvious.  In the context of the coercive 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶32. 
2 The circuit court found as a matter of fact that Artic 
gave oral consent to search.  See majority op., ¶31.  The 
question becomes whether consent was given voluntarily, which is 
a question of "constitutional fact."  A reviewing court 
independently applies the constitutional principles to the 
historic and evidentiary facts to determine whether the standard 
of voluntariness has been met.  State v. Phillips, 218 
Wis. 2d 180, 195, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).  
3 Majority op., ¶¶32-33. 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
effect of the forced entry, the majority also significantly 
understates the legal significance of the fact that police 
confronted Artic with weapons drawn.  
¶112 The real question, as the majority acknowledges, is 
whether a statement of consent was the result of express or 
implied 
duress 
or 
coercion, 
majority 
op., 
¶34. 
 
Mere 
"acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority" does not provide 
for a statement of consent that the law considers voluntary.4    
¶113 Viewing 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
more 
candidly than the majority has done, I conclude that any consent 
given by Artic was an "acquiescence" to the assertion of police 
authority, rather than a statement of consent that the law 
treats as willing and voluntary.     
¶114 The majority analyzes the six voluntariness factors 
focused only on events transpiring in the upstairs of Artic's 
residence, as if the encounter between Wagner and Artic began at 
the time Artic opened the upstairs door.5  Of course that is not 
what happened.  The police knocked and yelled very loudly at the 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶32 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 
U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968)). 
5 For example, in addressing whether police threatened or 
intimidated Artic, the majority begins its discussion with the 
moment "when Artic opened the door to the second-floor unit."  
Majority op., ¶39.   
Likewise, when the majority addresses whether conditions 
were "non-threatening and cooperative," it begins its discussion 
at the time officers knocked on Artic's [upstairs] door.  
Majority op., ¶44.  There is nothing non-threatening or 
cooperative about the circumstance where a police officer breaks 
through two locked doors to gain entry to a private house. 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
outside door for between 30 to 60 seconds.6  When there was no 
answer within that time, police made a forced entry.  Police 
therefore reached Artic's upstairs rooms only after they kicked 
down one locked door and broke a window to force entry through a 
second, then passed through and searched the downstairs portions 
of the house with guns drawn.  See majority op., ¶11.7 
¶115 The State has conceded, and the majority concludes, 
that the forced entry into the home was unconstitutional.  
Majority op., ¶26.  But the majority treats the encounter 
upstairs as unrelated to the forced entry that precipitated it.  
The majority therefore does not candidly address the true 
totality of the circumstances.     
¶116 Wouldn't Artic expect that the police approach to the 
upstairs would be the same as their approach downstairs?  By 
their actions downstairs, police had indicated their intent to 
conduct a search and their readiness to do so forcefully and 
without either consent or a warrant.  As the majority elsewhere 
points out, Artic himself watched police kick down the front 
door on closed-circuit video.8 Given how the upstairs encounter 
                                                 
6 At the suppression hearing, Detective Wagner described his 
knocking as "very loud.  At first it was just I would say a 
regular knock, and then it got louder."  Asked about his 
announcements of "Milwaukee Police," Detective Wagner stated, 
"It was shouting."  Detective Davila testified that she yelled 
many times from the back of the house to the officers in the 
front.   
7 At the suppression hearing, Detective Wagner testified 
that his weapon was drawn at the time he entered the residence. 
8 Majority op., ¶90. 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
came to pass, any consent given by Artic amounted to no more 
than an acquiescence to a robust display of police authority. 
¶117 The majority also downplays the coercive effect of the 
officers' being armed and the fact that Detective Wagner has his 
weapon drawn when Artic opened the upstairs door.  "The 'display 
of weapons is a coercive factor that sharply reduces the 
likelihood of freely given consent.'"9   
¶118 In distinguishing the cases cited by Artic in which a 
display of weapons demonstrated that consent was an acquiescence 
rather than a voluntary choice, the majority continues to be in 
denial about the fact that an unlawful entry to the house had 
already taken place.   
¶119 Of course no two cases present identical facts, but 
the cases suggest that a display of weapons inside the home 
after police had already made one forced entry should weigh 
heavily against a determination of voluntary consent here.  The 
majority cites no case that combines these elements.10     
                                                 
9 4 Wayne R. LaFave Search and Seizure:  A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment, § 8.2(b), at 63 (4th ed. 2004) (quoting Lowery 
v. State, 499 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)). 
10 The majority, ¶¶47-48, relies principally on United 
States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 1374 (8th Cir. 1992).  There, officers 
were outside the apartment and obtained consent to enter.  There 
was no unlawful conduct prior to obtaining consent.  Simply, 
officers outside the apartment "'asked' if they could come 
inside and Debra Smith stepped aside and motioned for them to 
come in."  973 F.2d at 1375.  The case is not analogous here 
unless, as the majority does, one treats the upstairs behavior 
in isolation.  The other cases cited by the majority are also 
inapposite.   
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶120 By arbitrarily limiting its factual analysis to events 
that happened upstairs and by downplaying the display of 
weapons, the majority departs from what it has promised to do 
and what the law requires: to evaluate the totality of the 
circumstances.   
¶121 When Artic, aware that several officers had already 
forced entry into his house, opened an inside door to meet a 
police officer who had a gun drawn and who informed Artic that 
he had done all this without a warrant, it hardly stands to 
reason that Artic believed that refusing further search would be 
a realistic option.  Artic's consent was therefore more what the 
law considers an acquiescence to authority than a freely given 
consent.  Police had by then already amply demonstrated their 
willingness and intent to exercise just that authority. 
B 
¶122 Furthermore, the majority misapplies the burden of 
proof on key facts in its analysis of consent.  The majority 
acknowledges that a warrantless search of the home is "per se 
unreasonable" and that the state bears the burden of proving 
voluntary consent by clear and convincing evidence.  The 
majority thus recites but does not take seriously the State's 
burden to prove voluntary consent by clear and convincing 
evidence.   
¶123 In a move critical to its analysis, the majority 
asserts that the "upstairs unit was separate from the downstairs 
unit," and that the upstairs was where Artic lived.11  The record 
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶89.   
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
is far from clear and convincing in support of the majority's 
conclusion.12  Detective Wagner testified that when he was 
knocking on the upstairs door he "wasn't sure" whether the 
building was one residence or two, and that "[i]t was kind of 
confusing all at once."  Evidence that is not sure and is "kind 
of confusing" is not clear and convincing.  The majority thus 
misapplies the burden of proof to improperly reach a critical 
conclusion, which it then construes against the defendant. 
¶124 The majority also resolves vagaries about the role of 
weapons in the encounter in favor of the State.  The majority 
concedes that the record is "unclear" about the role of weapons 
in the encounter but nevertheless concludes that the unclear 
role of weapons did not undermine voluntary consent.  Majority 
op., ¶¶45, 46-53.  "Unclear" evidence is, obviously, not clear; 
it is also not convincing.  The majority brushes past the lack 
of clarity about key factual disputes and resolves uncertainties 
against the defendant.  This analysis does not hold the State to 
its burden. 
                                                 
12 Artic's 
trial 
testimony 
indicated 
that 
both 
his 
girlfriend Winnie and another friend named Matt had bedrooms in 
the downstairs and that neither paid rent.  At oral argument, 
Artic's Attorney summarized the situation as follows:  
Understand, this was Mr. Artic's home, the whole thing 
was his home.  It was a single family dwelling.  He 
happened to have his bedroom upstairs.  There was a 
kitchen upstairs.  There was no kitchen on the first 
floor, there was a shell of a kitchen that had been 
completely removed——no appliances, no plumbing.  This 
was one home, and . . . the encounter began when 
police pounded on the front door . . . .  
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶125 Although the majority concedes that there is "no 
evidence in the record" that police informed Artic he could 
withhold consent, the majority nevertheless infers that Artic 
was aware of this because of his refusal to sign a written 
consent.  This appears to be a factual determination of Artic's 
subjective knowledge, which is not supported by fact finding 
from the circuit court.  The more realistic inference from the 
record, in light of the totality of the circumstances, is that 
whether or not Artic believed that he could refuse consent, he 
had little reason to believe such a refusal would actually deter 
police from completing the search of his house that they had 
already begun.13  Again, the majority infers facts not in the 
record about the defendant's subjective knowledge and construes 
them against the defendant, misallocating the burden. 
¶126 Because the majority fails to candidly assess the 
totality of the circumstances, and particularly the bearing of 
the illegal entry on the encounter in which the circuit court 
                                                 
13 Further compounding its speculation about the defendant's 
subjective knowledge, the majority also asserts as a "fact" 
"that Artic believed that Grafton had disposed of the cocaine."  
Majority op., ¶58.  There was no fact finding along these lines 
in the circuit court.  It is at most a speculative inference 
regarding the defendant's subjective knowledge.    
The majority also determines that "there was mutual 
apprehension" when Artic opened the door," majority op., ¶39, 
and that the "tension" between an obvious criminal suspect and 
the police who had forced entry into his house "appears to have 
dissipated quickly."  No witness testified to the majority's 
conclusions regarding "mutual apprehension."  Such supposition 
of "facts" by an appellate court is contrary to our standard of 
review and further distorts the majority's allocation of the 
burden in this case. 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
found that consent was given, and because in my view the 
majority has misapplied the burden of proof by resolving key 
factual uncertainties in favor of the State, I cannot join the 
majority's conclusion that consent was voluntarily given in this 
case.   
¶127 The State has not met its burden.  Artic "consented to 
the choice at time when he had no real choice, and he had no 
real choice because of police misconduct."  United States v. 
Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2007). 
II 
¶128 Having concluded that any consent given in this case 
does 
not 
meet 
the 
constitutional 
requirement 
for 
being 
voluntarily given, I might dissent on that ground alone.  I 
write further, however, to respond to the majority's application 
of the attenuation doctrine, which, in my opinion, continues to 
be out of sync with the controlling federal interpretations of 
the Fourth Amendment and risks further "making a mockery of the 
attenuation doctrine."14  
¶129 In applying the three-part analysis of attenuation 
from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), the majority 
acknowledges that the passage of time (the "temporal proximity") 
between the illegal entry and the request for consent in this 
case was "relatively brief," "not more than about five minutes."  
Majority op., ¶¶75, 76.  The majority understates the case when 
                                                 
14 State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶64, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 
N.W.2d 29 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
it determines that this short timeframe "weighs against a 
finding of attenuation."  
¶130 The only federal case to which the majority cites is 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100-01 (1980).  There, the 
Court considered a 45-minute period of time to be "a short 
lapse," and indicated that in custodial circumstances it would 
in fact be too short.  See majority op., ¶73.   
¶131 In the present case, the circumstances were custodial 
(a reasonable person in Artic's position would not have felt 
free to leave), and the time was much shorter.  Inexplicably, 
the majority determines that this short time is mitigated by the 
"congenial and non-threatening conditions" which the majority 
has determined existed just minutes after police kicked down 
Artic's front door while he watched on a video monitor.   
¶132 The majority's analysis of timing is not consistent 
with other cases.  In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 
(1979), one and one-half hours was too short.  Likewise, in 
Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982), a confession 
obtained approximately six hours after an illegal arrest was 
determined not sufficiently attenuated.  To the extent that the 
analysis of "temporal proximity" in this case is consistent with 
Wisconsin 
case 
law, 
it 
indicates 
how 
far 
this 
court's 
attenuation 
analysis 
has 
strayed 
from 
the 
controlling 
interpretations of Fourth Amendment doctrine from the United 
States Supreme Court. 
¶133 It is in its analysis of "intervening circumstances" 
that the majority opinion works a novel misapplication of Fourth 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
Amendment law.  The majority asserts that there were "meaningful 
intervening circumstances following the illegal entry on the 
ground floor."  But rather than identify a factual discontinuity 
of the kind previously recognized in the case law, the majority 
focuses on the defendant's conduct and apparently on his state 
of mind.  See majority op., ¶¶80, 85-87.  
¶134 The majority recognizes that a proper intervening 
circumstance "must show a 'discontinuity between the illegal 
[entry] and the consent."  Majority op., ¶85 (quoting United 
States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 980 (10th Cir. 1996)).   
¶135 Here there was no discontinuity in light of the 
question underlying the three Brown v. Illinois factors: 
"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the 
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality . . . ."  Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); majority op., ¶64.  The 
majority treats the encounter in Artic's upstairs kitchen as if 
the encounter itself provides the intervening circumstance that 
makes the subsequent search attenuated.  In my view, it is the 
upstairs encounter itself and the consent given therein which 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
were plainly "come at by exploitation of" the unlawful entry 
into the house in the first place.15   
¶136 The problem is that the majority then fails to 
identify a factual discontinuity or intervening circumstance 
that occurred in this case.  The facts in this case show a 
continuous course of action over "not more than five minutes" 
from when police forced entry through the outside door, swept 
through the lower rooms of the house, moved upstairs, knocked 
and entered Artic's upstairs door and searched the upstairs 
premises.  The majority fails to identify any intervening facts 
or circumstances in the course of the police actions initiated 
by that illegality and culminating in the search. 
¶137 Perhaps because it cannot identify a meaningful 
discontinuity in the circumstances, the majority instead oddly 
focuses on Artic's behavior and subjective state of mind, noting 
his "cool sangfroid," his "presence of mind," his "strategic 
decision[s]" and the fact that he was not surprised, frightened, 
                                                 
15 As Professor LaFave explains regarding the validity of a 
search justified by consent, "While there is sufficient overlap 
of the voluntariness and fruits tests that often a proper result 
may be reached by using either one independently, it is 
extremely important to understand that (i) the two tests are not 
identical, and (ii) consequently the evidence obtained by the 
purported consent should be held admissible only if it is 
determined that the consent was both voluntary and not an 
exploitation of the prior illegality."  4 LaFave, supra note 9, 
§ 8.2(d), at 76.  See also United States v. Robeles-Ortega, 348 
F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he voluntariness of the 
consent is only the first step, and the next inquiry is whether 
the consent was tainted by the entry, in other words, whether it 
was the product of that illegal entry."). 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
or confused.16  An inquiry into the mind of the defendant is 
unrelated to the question whether an intervening circumstance 
created sufficient discontinuity or attenuation to break the 
connection between the unlawful police conduct and the evidence 
thereby obtained.  "Consent alone does not necessarily purge the 
taint of the illegal action."  Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 684.   
¶138 Whether Artic kept his "presence of mind" or merely 
was resigned to the search is not relevant to the determination 
of the circumstances that reveal attenuation.  The same evidence 
that would be suppressed against a panicky defendant is not 
admissible simply because the suspect remained calm. 
¶139 The United States Supreme Court has rejected just the 
type of argument on which the majority relies.  In Taylor v. 
Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982), the petitioner was unlawfully 
arrested and detained.  He was fingerprinted and put in a lineup 
and though he spent most of the time during which he was 
detained by himself, he eventually visited with two friends.  
Following this visit he executed a waiver of rights and a 
                                                 
16 The majority also determines (without explanation) that 
the very brief time in which police knocked on the upstairs door 
and 
"the 
consensual 
opening 
of 
the 
door" 
constitute 
an 
intervening circumstance.  Majority op., ¶81.  Contradicting 
itself, the majority asserts that Artic was "prepared" for 
police to enter his apartment because he had been watching the 
downstairs entry by video.  Majority op., ¶83.  Thus the 
majority corroborates what the time analysis reveals: that the 
entry and search amount to a single, continuous course of police 
conduct.   
The majority goes on to make the additional factual 
assertions that police "did not treat Artic as a suspect," and 
"made a concerted effort to diffuse a tense situation," without 
citation to record facts. 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
written confession.  The State argued, much as the majority 
insinuates here, that the defendant "had every opportunity to 
consider his situation, to organize his thoughts, to contemplate 
his constitutional rights, and to exercise his free will."   
¶140 The 
Supreme 
Court 
rejected 
the 
State's 
characterization 
and 
determined 
that 
the 
confession 
was 
insufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest and that the 
defendant's statement was therefore inadmissible.  This result 
was reached even when the defendant there had several hours' 
time to consider his decision; he had time out of the presence 
of police, as Artic did not; his location changed, as Artic's 
did not; he visited with friends who were not in custody, as 
Artic did not; and he executed two written documents waiving his 
rights and entering a statement, as Artic did not.  Yet none of 
those 
arguably 
intervening 
circumstances 
in 
Taylor 
was 
sufficient for the United States Supreme Court to determine that 
the confession was sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful 
arrest.   
¶141 The United States Supreme Court analysis thus teaches 
that the consent and search of the upstairs rooms here was not 
sufficiently attenuated from the initial unlawful entry to 
render the evidence admissible. 
¶142 The third Brown v. Illinois factor, as analyzed by the 
majority, is the "purposefulness and flagrancy of the police 
conduct."  Majority op., ¶¶91-105.  The majority concludes that 
the police conduct was not "purposeful" or "flagrant."   
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶143 The majority is misguided when it concludes that the 
police conduct was not "purposeful."  See majority op., ¶97.  In 
State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29, 
this court analyzed the police "purpose" in attenuation analysis 
by noting that "Richter was not the target of the officer's 
investigation or search."  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶54.  There 
the 
police 
entered 
the 
home 
for 
reasons 
unrelated 
to 
investigating Richter, believing instead that they were in 
pursuit of a burglar.  Here, by contrast, police entered the 
home with the very purpose which they eventually carried out: 
securing and seizing evidence of drug crimes and apprehending 
any persons involved.17 
¶144 The majority also concludes that the unconstitutional 
entry was not "flagrant," a point which the parties vigorously 
dispute.  Once again, the majority allows its focus on one 
isolated piece of the three-factor attenuation analysis to 
                                                 
17 The majority opinion acknowledges that this was a "knock 
and talk" procedure.  This procedure is described as one in 
which "police approach a house or apartment in which they 
suspect drug dealing . . . [and] listen outside the door . . . . 
[T]hen they knock on the door and attempt to persuade whoever 
answers to give them permission to enter.  If consent is 
forthcoming, they enter and interview the occupants of the 
place; if it is not, they try to see from their vantage point at 
the door whether drug paraphernalia or contraband is in plain 
view.  If it is, then they make a warrantless entry.  As this 
description makes plain, the 'knock and talk procedure typically 
does not involve the prior issuance of a warrant.'"  State v. 
Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶7 n.5, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(quoting United States v. Johnson, 170 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 
1999)).   
Clearly the "purpose" of the knock and talk procedure, in 
general and as employed here, is to secure, if possible, drug 
evidence, without obtaining a warrant. 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
obscure the overarching attenuation inquiry, which, as the 
majority recognizes, aims to discern when "the deterrent effect 
of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost."  
Majority op., ¶65 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 609 
(Powell, J., concurring)).  Here, police deliberately abandoned 
their well-grounded plan to seek a warrant, which all agree they 
had probable cause to obtain.  "Until a valid warrant has 
issued, citizens are entitled to shield 'their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects' from the government's scrutiny.  Exclusion 
of the evidence obtained by a warrantless search vindicates that 
entitlement."  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).  
The majority analysis loses sight of the deterrence and judicial 
integrity goals it purports to effect through the exclusionary 
rule by providing no reason for police to obtain a warrant when 
evidence obtained without one is nevertheless admitted. 
¶145 Police conduct need not be flagrant in order for the 
exclusionary rule to have a meaningful deterrent effect.  Here, 
as the majority recognizes, police not only considered seeking a 
warrant but were planning to do so.  Majority op., ¶8.  As was 
true in Robeles-Ortega, the police decision to proceed without 
first 
obtaining a 
warrant as planned was, in a sense, 
"inexplicable."18  Had police obtained a warrant, there would 
have been no concern with entering the curtilage, no concern 
                                                 
18 United States v. Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d 679, 680 (7th 
Cir. 2003) ("The actions taken by the DEA agents at that point 
in time are inexplicable.  Rather than obtaining a search 
warrant based on that information, within two minutes of the 
[informant's] 
departure 
the 
agents 
forcibly 
entered 
the 
apartment by breaking down the door."). 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
with the forced entry, and no need for multiple rounds of 
appellate litigation addressing detailed suppression doctrines.  
The State would not bear the burden of showing why the evidence 
obtained as a result of unconstitutional police conduct should 
nevertheless be admitted.   
¶146 As 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
court 
of 
appeals 
has 
recognized, police who undertake a "knock and talk" procedure 
take on the risk that they may or may not thereby obtain 
admissible evidence.19  Here, had the police obtained a search 
warrant, they would have been assured that any evidence thereby 
obtained would be lawful and admissible in court.  When they 
chose to approach the house without a warrant, entered the 
curtilage, 
forced 
entry, 
and 
searched 
the 
upstairs 
and 
downstairs of Artic's house without ever seeking or obtaining a 
search warrant, police entered an arena where the law has 
                                                 
19 In United States v. Collins, 510 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 
2007), the Seventh Circuit court of appeals explained that  
[T]here is no legal requirement of obtaining a warrant 
to 
knock 
on 
someone's 
door. . . . But 
the 
risk 
[police] 
take 
in 
proceeding . . . is 
that 
the 
emergency will not materialize——that the occupant of 
the house will calmly open the door and ask to see 
their warrant . . . . The further risk is that no one 
will answer the knock and the government will be 
unable to prove that the police knew the house was 
occupied.   
Here, this is just what unfolded.  Because the observations 
made from the rear of the house were unlawfully made, police 
were unable to prove, by evidence legally admissible in court, 
that the house was occupied.  The majority nevertheless, and 
without explanation, relies on the observations unlawfully made 
by Detective Davila in its analysis of the case.  See majority 
op., ¶¶10-11, 26 & n.5, 42, 99.  
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
maintained strong presumptions of constitutional protection and 
placed the burdens of proof on the state.  It is "axiomatic," 
after all, that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."  
Richter, 235 Wis. 2d at 540 (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 748 (1984)). 
¶147 Because the majority has not candidly assessed the 
totality of the circumstances or properly allocated the burden 
of proof to the State and because the majority distorts the 
attenuation analysis, it has, in my view, incorrectly reached 
the conclusion that the evidence in this case was properly 
admitted and that the defendant therefore suffered no prejudice 
as a result of his counsel's failure to properly argue for its 
suppression.  See majority op., ¶¶25-26.  Although the majority 
concedes that Detective Davila's observations were unlawfully 
obtained, majority op., ¶26, no explanation is offered for why 
Artic 
was 
not prejudiced by her testimony both at the 
suppression hearing and at trial.  The circuit court's crucial 
determination that Artic's own testimony at the suppression 
hearing was not credible relied explicitly on the unlawfully 
obtained Davila testimony.  Nevertheless, the majority continues 
to rely on the credibility finding by the circuit court.20 
¶148 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
                                                 
20 Neither the majority opinion nor the parties' briefs 
separately argue the issue of counsel's deficiency, and neither 
shall I.   
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶149 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
No.  2008AP880-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1