Title: Custodian of Records for the Legislative Technology Services Bureau v. State

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 65 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-3063-W 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of a John Doe Proceeding 
Commenced by Affidavit Dated July 25, 2001: 
 
Custodian of Records for the Legislative 
Technology Services Bureau, 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin and the Honorable  
Sarah B. O'Brien, presiding  
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 9, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 4, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Sarah B. O’Brien   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner there were briefs by Peter J. Dykman and 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, and Michael L. Reig and 
Legislative Technology 
Services Bureau, 
Madison, 
and 
oral 
argument by Peter J. Dykman. 
 
For the respondent, State of Wisconsin, the cause was 
argued by Alan Lee, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the respondent, the Honorable Sarah B. O’Brien, there 
was a brief by Nancy E. Wheeler and Knuteson, Powers &  Wheeler, 
S.C., Racine, and Robert E. Hankel and Robert E. Hankel, S.C., 
Racine, and oral argument by Robert E. Hankel. 
 
2004 WI 65 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-3063-W  
(L.C. No. 
01 JD 6) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of a John Doe Proceeding 
Commenced by Affidavit Dated July 25, 2001: 
 
Custodian of Records for the Legislative  
Technology Services Bureau,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin and the Honorable  
Sarah B. O'Brien, presiding  
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 9, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
PETITION for supervisory writ.  The supervisory writ is 
granted quashing the subpoena of the John Doe judge.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   This appeal arises out of 
a John Doe investigation, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 968.26 (2001-
02),1 of certain legislators and legislative employees for what 
is suspected to be criminal conduct.  Before us is a writ of 
assistance asking that the John Doe judge's subpoena be quashed.  
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
2 
 
In support of the writ, five contentions are made:  (1) that the 
documents sought are privileged due to the interaction of Wis. 
Stat. § 13.96 and Wis. Stat. § 905.01; (2) that the subpoena 
violates Article IV, Section 16 of the Wisconsin Constitution; 
(3) that the subpoena violates the common law separation of 
powers doctrine; (4) that the subpoena violates Article IV, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution; and (5) that the 
subpoena is overly broad and therefore unreasonable.  We 
conclude that all of the documents requested are not privileged; 
that on this record, we cannot determine how Article IV, Section 
16 of the Wisconsin Constitution relates to the data sought by 
the subpoena duces tecum and that even when Section 16 does 
apply, it provides only use immunity and not secrecy for 
communications of government officials and employees; and that 
neither the separation of powers doctrine nor Article IV, 
Section 8 is sufficient to excuse compliance with a valid John 
Doe subpoena.  However, because we also conclude that the 
subpoena is overly broad and therefore unreasonable, we grant 
the supervisory writ and quash the subpoena.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
This case arises out of a John Doe proceeding 
commenced in July of 2001 by the Dane County District Attorney 
to investigate the political caucuses that once existed for both 
parties in the Assembly and the Senate and to investigate 
whether the relationship of the caucuses to Wisconsin's senators 
and representatives, or the activities of certain legislators, 
contravened criminal laws.  The matter currently before us is a 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
3 
 
challenge to a John Doe subpoena issued to the Legislative 
Technology Services Bureau (LTSB) for electronically stored 
communications2 within the possession of LTSB.  
¶3 
In 1997, as a response to its increasing use of 
technology, the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 13.96, thereby 
creating 
the 
LTSB. 
 
The 
LTSB 
maintains 
legislators', 
constituents' and service agency e-mails; Internet web page 
development and access; office programs such as Word, Excel and 
PowerPoint; 
bill 
drafting 
software; 
geographic 
information 
systems; publishing systems supportive of Wisconsin session 
laws, statutes and the Wisconsin Blue Book; hunting systems 
support; and production of audio and video materials for 
distribution via the Internet.  The LTSB supports approximately 
900 
legislative 
in-house 
computers 
and 
approximately 
160 
legislative notebook computers.  The LTSB also maintains 54 
legislative servers.  Legislative documents are created on the 
1,060 computers and then saved to the Y-Drives or the S-Drives 
on one of the LTSB's 54 legislative servers.  The drives on the 
servers are backed up on backup tapes that are routinely made in 
order to preserve data, should there be an electronic failure.  
The data on these backup tapes include all legislative data that 
existed on the 54 legislative servers that support the entire 
legislative branch of government at the moment in time when the 
backup tapes were made. 
                                                 
2 Throughout this opinion we will use "communications," 
"data" and "documents" interchangeably in reference to the 
electronic databank of the LTSB the subpoena seeks. 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
4 
 
¶4 
In this action, the John Doe judge has ordered the 
LTSB to produce the backup tapes that were made on December 15, 
2001 for all 54 servers, or in the alternative, to extract all 
"documents" for certain named legislators, their aides, and 
every person who worked in the Democratic and Republican 
caucuses for both the Senate and the Assembly.  The subpoena 
duces tecum defined "document" as: 
hard copies or electronic files and e-mails, drafts, 
revisions, 
attached 
"post-it" 
notes 
or 
other 
supplemental material, graphic images, photographic 
images, disks, video recordings, tapes, or written 
materials regardless of how kept or denominated, and 
without regard to whether you consider any document to 
be public or private material. 
¶5 
Mark Wahl as director of the LTSB and custodian of its 
data is the person to whom the subpoena was directed, rather 
than the individual legislators, whose names have remained 
secret throughout these proceedings.  It was Wahl who filed the 
motion to quash the subpoena.  He raised claims of privilege, 
violations of two provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine and the overbroad 
scope of the subpoena, as defenses to the compulsion of the 
subpoena duces tecum.  The John Doe judge denied the motion to 
quash; Wahl filed a petition for a supervisory writ in the court 
of appeals; the court of appeals certified the writ petition to 
us and we accepted certification. 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
5 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶6 
Statutory interpretation, or the application of a 
statute to a known set of facts, presents questions of law that 
we review without deference to the circuit court.  Deutsches 
Land, Inc. v. City of Glendale, 225 Wis. 2d 70, 79-80, 591 
N.W.2d 
583 
(1999). 
 
Similarly, 
we 
decide 
constitutional 
questions, both state and federal, de novo.  See State v. Doe, 
78 Wis. 2d 161, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977).   
B. 
The John Doe Proceeding 
¶7 
To properly analyze the claimed defenses to and 
arguments in support of the subpoena, we must first discuss the 
John Doe proceeding itself.  It is an investigation created by 
Wis. Stat. § 968.26, which provides in relevant part: 
If a person complains to a judge that he or she has 
reason to believe that a crime has been committed 
within his or her jurisdiction, the judge shall 
examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses 
produced by him or her and may, and at the request of 
the district attorney shall, subpoena and examine 
other witnesses to ascertain whether a crime has been 
committed and by whom committed.  
¶8 
The purpose of a John Doe proceeding is to ascertain 
if a crime has been committed and who likely committed it.  
State ex rel. Unnamed Person No. 1 v. State, 2003 WI 30, ¶22, 
260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260; State ex. rel. Reimann v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 214 Wis. 2d 605, 621, 571 N.W.2d 
385 (1997); Wolke v. Fleming, 24 Wis. 2d 606, 613, 129 N.W.2d 
841 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 912 (1965); Wisconsin Family 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
6 
 
Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 670, 676, 291 
N.W.2d 
631 
(Ct. 
App. 
1980). 
 
Though 
it 
involves 
the 
investigation of a crime, a John Doe proceeding need not be 
initiated on probable cause.  Wisconsin Family Counseling 
Servs., 95 Wis. 2d at 674-75.  However, the complainant must 
have "reason to believe" a crime has been committed, and must 
allege "objective, factual assertions sufficient to support a 
reasonable belief" that a crime has been committed, though the 
complainant does not have to name a particular accused.  
Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 623-24.  The result of a John Doe 
proceeding may be a written complaint that is subject to the 
test of probable cause.  Doe, 78 Wis. 2d at 165.   
¶9 
We have held that witnesses in John Doe proceedings 
need not be apprised of the scope of the investigation.  State 
ex. rel. Jackson v. Coffey, 18 Wis. 2d 529, 544, 118 N.W.2d 939 
(1963).  In addition, the secrecy aspect of a John Doe 
proceeding does not infringe upon a witness's First Amendment 
right of free speech, id. at 545-46, for the State has 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
7 
 
legitimate interests in the secrecy of the proceedings.3  Id. at 
546; Wisconsin Family Counseling Servs., 95 Wis. 2d at 677.   
¶10 A John Doe judge has broad, but not unlimited, powers.  
State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 822, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978) 
(stating that a John Doe proceeding is "an inquest for the 
discovery of crime in which the judge has significant powers," 
but a judge has "no authority to ferret out crime wherever he or 
she thinks it might exist").  For example, a John Doe judge does 
not have the power to compel self-incriminating testimony or to 
grant immunity.  Jackson, 18 Wis. 2d at 533; Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.08.  On the other hand, a John Doe judge does have the 
power to subpoena witnesses.  Wis. Stat. § 968.26; Wisconsin 
Family Counseling Servs., 95 Wis. 2d at 675.  We have held that 
when a judge exceeds his or her powers, it is an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 823-24; 
Jackson, 18 Wis. 2d at 545.  Within this framework, we begin our 
consideration of the parties' contentions. 
                                                 
3 The reasons supporting secrecy of the proceedings are:  to 
keep a John Doe target from fleeing; to prevent potential 
defendants from collecting perjured testimony for trial; to 
prevent attempts to thwart the investigation, tamper with 
potential testimony or hide evidence; to free witnesses from the 
threat of retaliation; and to prevent testimony that may be 
mistaken or untrue from becoming public.  Wisconsin Family 
Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State , 95 Wis. 2d 670, 677, 291 
N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1980).  See also State ex rel. Unnamed 
Person No. 1 v. State, 2003 WI 30, ¶60, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 
N.W.2d 260; State v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 279, 252 N.W.2d 
671 (1977). 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
8 
 
C. 
Statutory Privilege 
 
¶11 Wahl contends that Wis. Stat. § 13.96, as it interacts 
with Wis. Stat. § 905.01, creates a statutory privilege that, 
while not expressly stated, is implicit in LTSB's obligation to 
treat all information within its possession as confidential.  
Therefore, as the legal custodian of the information stored by 
the LTSB, he is not required to comply with the subpoena.4  The 
State5 contends that the confidentiality provision of § 13.96 
prevents voluntary disclosure to one who does not have proper 
authorization to receive the stored data, but that it is 
insufficient to excuse noncompliance with a valid John Doe 
subpoena.  We agree with the State. 
 
¶12 When we are presented with a question of statutory 
interpretation, we attempt to ascertain and give effect to the 
meaning of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.  
We begin with the words chosen by the legislature, giving them 
their plain and ordinary meanings.  Id., ¶45.  This is our 
initial focus, because as we have explained, "We assume that the 
                                                 
4 In this argument, Wahl contends that while he is 
privileged from producing the data requested, the legislators 
who created or received the data may not be.  However, in other 
arguments, 
for 
example, 
the 
argument 
under 
Wisconsin 
Constitution Article IV, Section 16, he takes the opposite 
approach and asks us to permit him to raise any defense to 
production that a legislator could raise. 
5 Both the State and the John Doe judge are parties to this 
appeal.  However, since they are united in interest, we will 
collectively refer to them as "the State," unless the context 
requires otherwise. 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
9 
 
legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language."  
Id., ¶44.    We are aided in ascertaining the meaning of the 
statute by the statutory context in which words are placed.  
Id., ¶46.  If the statute's meaning is clear on its face, we 
need go no further; we simply apply it.  Id., ¶45.  However, if 
the statutory language is capable of being understood by 
reasonably well-informed persons in two or more ways, then it is 
ambiguous.  Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶19, 260 Wis. 
2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656.  If the statutory language is ambiguous, 
we may consult extrinsic sources to ascertain legislative 
intent.  Stockbridge School Dist. v. Department of Pub. 
Instruction Sch. Dist. Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 
223, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996).  Here, both positions presented are 
reasonable 
interpretations 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. § 13.96, because 
"confidential" data may, or may not, be privileged, depending on 
the circumstances surrounding the data and the type of request 
made. 
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 13.96 was created by 1997 Wis. Act 
27, § 18m as a response to the legislature's ever-increasing 
reliance on computer-assisted communications.  The LTSB serves 
legislators who belong to all political parties, and it 
warehouses data that the recipients and creators may deem 
confidential.  Section 13.96 provides in relevant part: 
The legislative technology services bureau shall be 
strictly nonpartisan and shall at all times observe 
the confidential nature of the data and information 
originated, maintained or processed by electronic 
equipment supported by it. 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
10 
 
Wahl relies on the § 13.96 mandate of confidentiality as a 
connection to Wis. Stat. § 905.01, which addresses privileges.  
He 
asserts 
this 
mandate 
creates 
an 
"implicit" 
statutory 
privilege.  Section 905.01 provides: 
Except as provided by or inherent or implicit in 
statute or in rules adopted by the supreme court or 
required by the constitution of the United States or 
Wisconsin, no person has a privilege to: 
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or 
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or 
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or 
(4) Prevent 
another 
from 
being 
a 
witness 
or 
disclosing any matter or producing any object or 
writing. 
 
¶14 However, just because data is to be kept confidential, 
it does not necessarily follow that Wahl has a legal privilege 
not to produce it.  The concepts of "confidential" and "legal 
privilege" are very different. 
¶15 "Confidential" data is that which is "meant to be kept 
secret."  Black's Law Dictionary 294 (7th ed. 1999).  Legal 
privilege is a broader concept.  It includes having the legal 
right not to provide certain data when faced with a valid 
subpoena.6  Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 85, 589 N.W.2d 21 
(1999).  As we have held previously, not all confidential data 
is that over which the custodian or owner may assert a 
                                                 
6 Privilege is defined as, "[A] special legal right, 
exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; 
an exception to a duty."  Black's Law Dictionary 1215 (7th ed. 
1999). 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
11 
 
privilege.  See Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 
Wis. 2d 190, 199, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977) (concluding that a 
provision 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Administrative 
Code, 
then 
§ H24.04(1)(n)2., which requires certain reports to be prepared 
in a manner that keeps the names of the patients and physicians 
confidential, creates no privilege to refrain from producing the 
reports); see also Wis. Stat. § 102.33(2)(b)4 (authorizing the 
release of otherwise confidential worker compensation records in 
compliance with a valid subpoena). 
¶16 Additionally, privileges are the exception and not the 
rule; therefore, they are narrowly construed.  Burnett, 224 
Wis. 2d at 85.  To accord a privilege here would simply delay 
the provision of communications that Wahl concedes legislators 
would likely have to provide if individual subpoenas had been 
served on them.7 
¶17 Furthermore, it is a "well-accepted legal principle, a 
fundamental tenet of our modern legal system, . . . that the 
public has a right to every person's evidence except for those 
persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory 
privilege."  State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 505, 326 N.W.2d 
744 (1982).  See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 
(1974).  Wisconsin Stat. § 905.01 reaffirms this fundamental 
legal principle, since it states that testimony and production 
                                                 
7 As we noted earlier (¶11 n.4), Wahl's position about 
whether he would be privileged to refuse to provide the data if 
he was permitted to raise all defenses a legislator could raise 
is not entirely consistent. 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
12 
 
of things requested is the general rule and provides exceptions 
only in very limited circumstances, as we have explained in 
Gilbert.  See Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d at 508.  Furthermore, we 
agree with the reasoning stated in Nixon that "these exceptions 
. . . are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for 
they are in derogation of the search for truth."  Nixon, 418 
U.S. at 710.  Accordingly, we conclude that the confidentiality 
requirement of Wis. Stat. § 13.96 does not create a privilege 
for Wahl to refuse to comply with the subpoena duces tecum of 
the John Doe judge.   
D. 
Wisconsin Constitutional Claims 
1. 
Article IV, Section 16 
¶18 Wahl also contends that he is excused from complying 
with the subpoena because Article IV, Section 16 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides that "[n]o member of the 
legislature shall be liable in any civil action, or criminal 
prosecution whatever, for words spoken in debate."  It is Wahl's 
position that according to State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 341 
N.W.2d 668 (1984), he is entitled to raise Section 16 as a 
defense to the subpoena, even though the communications are not 
his, because he is the agent of the legislators who could raise 
that defense.  On the other hand, the State asserts that the 
John Doe proceeding is an investigation of alleged criminal 
activity that is not closely related to the purpose for which 
Section 16 was enacted; therefore, Section 16 is no defense.   
¶19 For the purpose of our discussion, we shall assume 
that Wahl could argue correctly that he can assert any defense 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
13 
 
that might be available to a legislator under Article IV, 
Section 16.  However, given the state of the record before us, 
we 
cannot 
determine 
whether 
constitutionally 
permissible 
criminal charges are under investigation in the John Doe 
proceeding or whether the allegations are intertwined with 
duties the legislators were elected to perform.  Accordingly, we 
cannot determine how Section 16 relates to the subpoena duces 
tecum.  Furthermore, we conclude that even when Section 16 does 
apply, it provides only use immunity, i.e., immunity from 
prosecution based on use of the communications, and not secrecy, 
for communications of government officials and employees. 
¶20 Section 16 is one of several provisions in Wisconsin's 
constitution that protects the independent functioning of the 
legislative branch.  It ensures that legislators are not 
distracted from nor hindered by other overly aggressive branches 
of government or by private litigants, as they perform the tasks 
for which they were elected.  Beno, 116 Wis. 2d at 142.  Indeed, 
we have recognized that calling legislators into court to defend 
actions they have taken in the course of their official duties 
could impede their legislative functions.  Id.  Furthermore, 
Article IV, Section 16's immunity, where it does exist, is not 
grounded solely in words spoken on the floor of the Assembly or 
the Senate.  Rather, Section 16 reaches "matters that are an 
integral part of the processes by which members of the 
legislature participate with respect to the consideration of 
proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which are 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
14 
 
within the regular course of the legislative process."  Id. at 
143-44. 
¶21 Article IV, Section 16 protects "the legislator not 
only from adverse judgments but also from questioning in a 
judicial proceeding."  Id. at 142.  However, as we have 
explained before: 
The constitution literally protects the member from 
liability for "words spoken in debate."  The clause 
thus focuses upon matters occurring in legislative 
deliberations. 
 . . .  
The 
principle 
accorded 
legislators by [S]ection 16 exists only to the extent 
necessary for the adequate functioning of the state 
legislative body. 
Id.  Notwithstanding these substantial protections, Section 16 
does not endow a legislator with "unlimited absolute personal 
immunity from substantive liability or from any obligation to 
testify in a judicial proceeding."  Id. at 143.  For example, 
Section 16 may not always provide a safe haven for a legislator 
who has committed a criminal or an unconstitutional act, even if 
done during the course of his official duties.  Id. at 143 n.6.   
¶22 As set forth above, our past examinations of Section 
16 focused on use, or potential use, of constitutionally 
protected communications.  However, Wahl seems to argue that 
Section 16's protections go beyond prohibiting use and also 
create a privilege to prevent disclosure.  Wahl develops no 
legal argument to support that contention.  The only case he 
cites in regard to Section 16 is Beno.  But as we have 
explained, Beno concludes that the purpose of Section 16 is to 
limit the use that may be made of "words spoken in debate."  It 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
15 
 
grants immunity for those tasks undertaken in fulfillment of the 
legislator's constitutional functions so as not to chill the 
legislator's efforts on behalf of the electorate.  Id. at 142.  
However, Beno does not address attempts to keep legislative 
communications secret.   
¶23 Because 
Wisconsin 
has 
a 
long 
history 
of 
open 
government that is now provided by statute as well as case law, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31 to 19.39; Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, 
254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811, and because we choose not to 
develop this argument for Wahl, Truttschel v. Martin, 208 
Wis. 2d 361, 560 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1997), we conclude that in 
this case, if it is later determined that Article IV, Section 16 
applies to communications within the possession of the LTSB, it 
provides only use immunity, not a right to keep all legislative 
communications secret.8   
E. 
Separation of Powers and Article IV, Section 8 
 
¶24 Wahl makes two separation of powers arguments that we 
consider together.  First, he asserts that the subpoena intrudes 
into a "core zone" of legislative power thereby violating an 
area constitutionally reserved exclusively to the legislature 
contrary to the separation of powers doctrine.  Second, he 
contends that Wis. Stat. § 13.96 is an Article IV, Section 8 
"rule of proceeding" that may be interpreted only by the 
                                                 
8 We point out, however, that our conclusion in this regard 
should not be read to mean that there is no privilege that a 
legislator 
could 
ever 
raise 
to 
prevent 
disclosure 
of 
a 
particular communication now existing on the backup tapes. 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
16 
 
legislature.  The State counters that it is the prerogative of 
the executive branch to investigate crime and assure the 
faithful execution of the laws, which is the object of all 
aspects of the John Doe proceeding.  It also asserts that 
§ 13.96 is not a rule of proceeding, but even if it were, courts 
may interpret it as not precluding executive inquiry into 
potential criminal acts of the legislature. 
 
¶25 Separation of powers is a foundational principle of 
our tri-partite system of government, wherein each branch has 
equal power and a region of independent authority.  Washington, 
83 Wis. 2d at 825-26.  See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 
(1962).  However, there are many areas of shared power.  Guzman 
v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 2001 WI App 21, ¶13, 240 Wis. 2d 
559, 623 N.W.2d 776.  When an issue exclusively committed to the 
legislative branch is brought before the courts, it is often 
described as a "political question" that is non-justiciable.  
Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶192, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 
388 (Sykes, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part); see 
also Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11.   
¶26 The LTSB has not demonstrated why the use of the data 
it has collected cannot be shared with the executive branch when 
potentially criminal conduct is at issue.  The subpoena is not 
attempting to change the way in which the legislature functions, 
but rather attempting to gather information to investigate the 
commission of a crime.  If all of the documents maintained by 
LTSB 
were 
out-of-bounds 
to 
such 
an 
investigation, 
the 
legislature would have effectively immunized its members and 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
17 
 
employees from criminal prosecution and in so doing usurped the 
role of the executive branch in assuring the faithful execution 
of the laws and the prosecution of crime.  And finally, all of 
the information sought concerns past communications.  It does 
not 
concern 
present 
or 
future 
communications 
within 
the 
legislature. 
¶27 A related question is presented by the LTSB's argument 
that only the legislature can determine if the subpoena is 
enforceable 
because 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 13.96 
is 
a 
"rule 
of 
proceeding." 
 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
8 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution provides that "[e]ach house may determine the rules 
of its own proceedings  . . . ."  The LTSB cites this section of 
the constitution as a "textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment" that the question of the subpoena's enforceability 
is a non-justiciable political question.9   
                                                 
9 The criteria that generally are described as relating to a 
separation of powers argument based on the contention that the 
issue is a political question are: 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a 
lack 
of 
judicially 
discoverable 
and 
manageable 
standards 
for 
resolving 
[the 
issue]; 
or 
the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; 
or 
the 
impossibility 
of 
a 
court's 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing 
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or 
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements 
by 
various 
departments 
on 
one 
question.   
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
18 
 
¶28 Courts generally are unwilling to decide whether the 
legislature adhered to its own rules governing how it operates.  
State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 365, 338 
N.W.2d 684 (1983).  The rationale for this judicial reluctance 
is that a legislative failure to follow the legislature's 
procedural rules is equivalent to an ad hoc repeal of such 
rules, which the legislature is free to do at any time.  Id.  
¶29 At its core, the LTSB's argument depends upon our 
conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 13.96 is a "rule of proceeding" 
within the meaning of Article IV, Section 8 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Therefore, we may exercise our jurisdiction to 
decide whether § 13.96 is a "rule of proceeding" because that 
issue presents as a question of constitutional interpretation.    
State ex rel. Elfers v. Olson, 26 Wis. 2d 422, 426, 132 N.W.2d 
526 (1965); see also Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 
(1963).   
¶30 We note that Wis. Stat. § 13.96 has nothing to do with 
the process the legislature uses to propose or pass legislation 
or how it determines the qualifications of its members.  It 
simply provides for assistance with electronic data and for an 
electronic storage closet for communications created or received 
by 
legislators 
and 
other 
employees 
of 
the 
legislature.  
Furthermore, the legislative history of § 13.96 shows that the 
LTSB was created to relieve the Legislative Reference Bureau of 
performing such technology-centered support duties.10  See 1997 
                                                 
10 The LTSB was formerly known as the Wisconsin Integrated 
Legislative Information System (WILIS). 
No. 
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19 
 
Wis. Act 27, § 18; Cf. Wis. Stat. § 13.92(1)(d) (1996-97) and 
§ 13.92(1) (1997-98). 
¶31 Moreover, the subpoena seeks information in the course 
of an investigation into potentially criminal conduct, a 
function of the executive branch.  And finally, Wis. Stat. 
§ 13.96 is not necessarily in conflict with a John Doe judge's 
statutory authority to investigate whether a crime has been 
committed.  Provision of the communications requested can be 
accomplished in a manner that continues their confidential 
nature until the legislator or legislative employee can be heard 
by a court on the merits of any claim of privilege for 
individual 
communications. 
 
Accordingly, we 
conclude 
that 
neither the separation of powers nor Article IV, Section 8 
provides an absolute defense to the compulsion of a John Doe 
subpoena.  We do not address whether privilege may lie for any 
individual communication because that question is not before us, 
as we have no way of knowing what the tapes may contain. 
F. 
Claim of Overbroad Subpoena 
¶32 We now turn to the scope of the subpoena to the LTSB.  
The subpoena, as modified by the order of November 4, 2002, 
requested "all digital computer information or data maintained 
by" the LTSB, including, but not limited to, the contents of all 
electronic mail boxes (in box, sent items, deleted items), 
electronic calendars, contents of the recycle bin, contents of 
temporary Internet files folder, image files (such as *.jpg 
files), and other file documents (such as *.wpd and *.doc 
files), stored by or on behalf of certain named elected 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
20 
 
officials, any person who had ever been employed in their 
offices, as well as anyone who had ever been employed in the 
legislative caucuses for both parties or, in the alternative, 
the backup tapes from December 15, 2001, for the entire 
legislative branch of government.  The subpoena contained no 
specificity in regard to subject matter or limitation as to the 
dates or periods of time for which the communications were 
sought.   
¶33 The John Doe judge ordered Wahl, as custodian of the 
records at the LTSB, to produce the communications contained on 
backup tapes as of December 15, 2001.11  These backup tapes 
contain all the data stored on computers in the legislature on 
December 15, 2001, for all elected officials and other persons 
who work in the legislature.  This data, the LTSB tells us, goes 
back to at least 1994 and some of it may have originated in the 
1970s.  It is undisputed that the requested backup tapes are the 
equivalent of hundreds of millions of printed pages. 
¶34 When we review a John Doe subpoena, a foundational 
issue may be constitutional in nature.  For example, does the 
issuance of a subpoena in a John Doe proceeding, the sole 
purpose of such proceeding being to investigate alleged criminal 
activity, have the potential to affect Fourth Amendment rights?  
The issue of whether the subpoena is overbroad and oppressive, 
and thus unreasonable, was raised by Wahl.  This is a Fourth 
Amendment concern.  Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 71 (1906) 
                                                 
11 Wahl has stored the backup tapes in a lock-box. 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
21 
 
(noting that a subpoena duces tecum may implicate Fourth 
Amendment rights). 
1. 
Fourth Amendment principles 
¶35 The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
U.S. Constitution, Amend. IV; see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
655 
(1961). 
 
Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence 
expanded 
significantly in the latter part of the twentieth century, as 
law enforcement undertook the investigation of sophisticated 
crimes perpetrated by technologically savvy criminals who use 
electronic communications and advanced technology.  See, e.g., 
Paul Taylor, The Scope of Government Access to Copies of 
Electronic 
Communications 
Stored 
with 
Internet 
Service 
Providers:  A Review of Legal Standards, 6 J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 
109 (Fall 2001) [hereinafter A Review of Legal Standards]; Hon. 
Robert H. Bohn, Jr. and Lynn S. Muster, The Dawn of the Computer 
Age:  How the Fourth Amendment Applies to Warrant Searches and 
Seizures of Electronically Stored Information, 8 Suffolk J. 
Trial & App. Advoc. 63 (2003); Martin Marcus and Christopher 
Slobogin, ABA Sets Standards for Electronic and Physical 
Surveillance, 18 Crim. Just. 5 (Fall 2003).  To understand where 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
22 
 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence stands today relative to the John 
Doe subpoena, we must necessarily begin at the beginning. 
 
¶36 At the time the Fourth Amendment was being drafted, 
searches were based on warrants as a matter of course.12  See 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-27 (1886).  The chief 
evil the founding fathers sought to eliminate with this 
amendment was a search based on a general warrant, sometimes 
known as a writ of assistance.  Id. at 625.  These early 
warrants lacked specificity and allowed government officers in 
the late eighteenth century to enter homes, shops, and other 
places, and in the event the officers encountered resistance, 
they could break down doors and forcibly search closed trunks 
and chests.  Id. (calling writs of assistance, "the worst 
instrument of arbitrary power" since such writs place "the 
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer") 
(internal quotations omitted).  
 
¶37 The Fourth Amendment, then, proscribed "unreasonable 
searches and seizures" not as an independent governing standard 
of search and seizure, but instead with reference to the 
                                                 
12 As the Fourth Amendment plainly states, constitutionally 
sufficient warrants are those "particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
23 
 
illegality of general warrants.13  A Review of Legal Standards, 
supra, at 125.  The "compulsory production of a man's private 
papers [which, the Court noted, was the equivalent of a search 
and seizure], to be used in evidence against him" was an 
"unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment . . . "  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622 (emphasis in 
original), as it extorted from him his own private papers in 
order to connect him with a crime and compel him to be a witness 
against himself.  Id. at 633-34.     
¶38 While the United States Supreme Court construed the 
Fourth Amendment as not preventing a court from compelling 
documentary evidence, either through a warrant or a subpoena 
duces tecum, a demand for such evidence violates the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness test if it lacks "the particularity 
required in the description of documents."  Hale, 201 U.S. at 
77.  In Hale, a grand jury investigating antitrust violations 
                                                 
13 A leading Fourth Amendment commentator noted, "[T]he 
Framers did not address warrantless intrusions at all in the 
Fourth Amendment or in the earlier state provisions; thus, they 
never anticipated that 'unreasonable' might be read as a 
standard for warrantless intrusions."  Paul Taylor, The Scope of 
Government Access to Copies of Electronic Communications Stored 
with Internet Service Providers:  A Review of Legal Standards, 6 
J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 109, 126 (Fall 2001) [hereinafter A Review 
of Legal Standards] (referring to Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering 
the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 552 
(1999)).  As our country developed and crime rose, "courts and 
legislatures drastically expanded the ex officio authority of 
the warrantless officer," A Review of Legal Standards, supra, at 
132, and the analysis of Fourth Amendment claims shifted from 
objections to general warrants to objections to unreasonable 
warrantless searches.  See id. 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
24 
 
issued a subpoena duces tecum demanding from Hale virtually 
every written business document in his possession regarding the 
company for which he served as secretary and treasurer.14  The 
Court, showing a continuing concern for process that holds 
constitutional problems similar to those inherent in a general 
warrant, 
concluded 
that 
after 
"[a]pplying 
the 
test 
of 
reasonableness to the present case, we think the subpoena duces 
tecum is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as 
reasonable."  Id. at 76.  Significantly, the Court stated,  
Doubtless many, if not all, of these documents may 
ultimately be required, but some necessity should be 
shown . . . or some evidence of their materiality 
produced, to justify an order for the production of 
such a mass of papers.  A general subpoena of this 
description is equally 
indefensible as 
a 
search 
warrant would be if couched in similar terms. 
                                                 
14 The subpoena in Hale v. Henkel demanded:  
1.  All understandings, agreements, arrangements, 
or contracts . . . between [the company for which Hale 
worked and six named companies]. 
2.  All correspondence by letter or telegram 
between [Hale's company and the six named companies]. 
3.  All reports made or accounts rendered by [the 
six named companies to Hale's company]. 
4.  Any agreements or contracts or arrangements 
. . . 
between 
[Hale's 
company 
and 
certain 
other 
companies].        
5.  All letters received by [Hale's company] 
since the date of its organization from thirteen other 
companies . . . and also copies of all correspondence 
with such companies.  
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 44-45 (1906). 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
25 
 
Hale, 201 U.S. at 77. 
 
¶39 In 1967, the United States Supreme Court decided Katz 
v. United States.15  Justice Harlan, in his concurrence in Katz, 
was the first to suggest that Fourth Amendment protections arose 
from a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy."  Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (concluding that the 
Fourth Amendment has a "twofold" requirement: first, that a 
person exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy and second, 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as objectively reasonable). 
 
¶40 While private citizens presume they have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in many areas of their lives, the 
question that eventually arose was whether citizens who work for 
the government have similar expectations in their work places so 
that their Fourth Amendment rights should be protected there as 
well.  In O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Supreme 
Court 
recognized 
that 
public 
employees 
have 
reasonable 
expectations of privacy in their offices at work.  The Court 
stated that the expectation of privacy in "one's place of work 
is based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the 
history of the [Fourth] Amendment" and that people "do not lose 
Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the 
government instead of a private employer."  Id. at 716-17 
(citation omitted).   
                                                 
15 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
26 
 
¶41 The 
Supreme Court 
repeatedly has 
explained 
that 
elected officials do not park their constitutional rights at the 
door when they assume public office.  Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 
116 (1966) (concluding that the Georgia legislature could not 
prevent an elected official from taking his seat in the 
legislature because his expression of his anti-war sentiments 
was protected by the First Amendment); see also Chandler v. 
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (concluding that a Georgia 
statute that required candidates for public office, including 
incumbents, to submit to a drug test is an unreasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment because it was not based on an 
"individualized suspicion of wrongdoing"); and Republican Party 
of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (overturning a 
restriction on the speech of candidates for office, including 
incumbents, because the law violates the First Amendment). 
 
¶42 With these concepts in mind, we turn now to the 
specifics of this case to determine if the legislators and their 
employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data 
on the backup tapes at the LTSB.  If there is such a reasonable 
expectation, we must then determine whether the John Doe 
subpoena is overly broad, in violation of the Fourth Amendment's 
requirement of specificity. 
 
2. 
The subpoena to Wahl 
 
¶43 Using 
Justice 
Harlan's 
two-step 
Fourth 
Amendment 
analysis, we conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the data stored on the backup tapes, and that the 
August 14, 2002, John Doe judge's subpoena duces tecum, as 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
27 
 
modified by the subsequent order, is overbroad.  Therefore, we 
also conclude that execution of the subpoena duces tecum, as 
modified, would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure.   
¶44 The first part of the two-step reasonableness test is 
to assess the actual, subjective expectation of privacy.  Katz, 
389 U.S. at 361.  The LTSB is a nonpartisan bureau designed to 
serve the entire legislature.  The statute that created the LTSB 
requires that it "shall at all times observe the confidential 
nature of the data and information originated, maintained or 
processed by electronic equipment supported by it."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 13.96.  The legislature, in creating the LTSB, expressed its 
belief that it was establishing a confidential warehouse for its 
data storage.   
¶45 The State maintains that the records sought are 
records of public officials affected by Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2), 
which provides that at least some of the materials sought are 
public records and, as such, are presumed to be available for 
inspection.  See Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶15.  However, not 
everything a public official creates is a public record, see 
State v. Panknin, 217 Wis. 2d 200, 209-10, 579 N.W.2d 52 (Ct. 
App. 1998) (concluding that personal notes of a sentencing judge 
are not public records), and we have not been apprised of the 
nature of each document stored on the backup tapes.  Therefore, 
the fact that there may be some public records on the backup 
tapes does not undermine the LTSB's assertion that the public 
officials to whom the data belong have a subjective expectation 
of privacy in the data when it is stored by the LTSB.  Stated 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
28 
 
another way, that most, or even all, of the data on the backup 
tapes may be obtainable through a public records request made 
directly 
to 
legislators, 
does 
not 
remove 
the 
reasonable 
expectation of privacy legislators have when the data is sought 
directly from the LTSB. 
¶46 The more difficult question here is whether public 
employees' and elected officials' expectations of privacy in the 
electronically stored data they have created or received at work 
is one society recognizes as reasonable.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 
361. 
 
Not 
all 
expectations 
of 
privacy 
are 
objectively 
reasonable.  As we have explained above, the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized a public employee's expectation of 
privacy in his office space is "reasonable."  O'Connor, 480 U.S. 
at 717.  That privacy expectation is equally applicable even 
when the work space is shared by other employees.  Mancusi v. 
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (holding a union employee who 
shared an office with other union employees had a privacy 
interest in the office).   
¶47 Technology clearly has changed the ways in which we 
work and communicate with others.  The federal government 
recognized that changing technology required changing laws, and 
to 
address 
those 
changes, 
it 
passed 
the 
Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).  Amended as 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510-2521, 2701-2710, 3121-3126 (2001).  The ECPA extended 
the 
privacy 
protections 
that 
have 
been 
given 
voice 
communications to electronic communications such as e-mail.  See 
A Review of Legal Standards, supra, at 117 (indicating that 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
29 
 
Congress concluded that privacy "was in danger of being 
gradually eroded as technology advanced").16  This is a strong 
expression of society's expectation of privacy in electronic 
communications.   
¶48 Legislators 
use 
electronic 
technology 
to 
compose 
budgets, to prepare position papers, and to draft legislation; 
they communicate with each other, with their staff members and 
with their constituents via e-mail and instant messaging.  
According to the LTSB, the legislative e-mail system processes 
more than 60,000 transactions each day.17  Electronic assists to 
communication is the way in which the legislature does its work, 
and all of the data created is stored on the backup tapes at the 
LTSB.  
¶49 These circumstances——the way in which the legislature 
now does 
business; 
that 
the LTSB 
was created 
to 
serve 
legislators on "both sides of the aisle;" and the statutory 
directive of Wis. Stat. § 13.96 that requires that all data 
stored by the LTSB shall be kept confidential——support an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy by legislators in 
                                                 
16 Taylor also noted that Congress wanted to encourage the 
development and proliferation of new communications technology, 
but knew that in order for such development and proliferation to 
succeed, consumers needed to trust that their privacy was 
protected.  A Review of Legal Standards, supra, at 126. 
17 Online petitions and e-mail to legislators are what at 
least one commentator has described as "the Internet-age 
equivalents of traditional techniques like direct mail and paper 
petitions."  National Public Radio, Political Activists Turn to 
the 
Web 
(November 
7, 
2003), 
at 
www.npr.org/display_pages/features/feature_1495180.html.   
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
30 
 
the data on the backup tapes.  Therefore, we conclude that 
society has recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the electronically stored information on the backup tapes.  
Accordingly, we must determine if the subpoena issued by the 
John Doe judge is overbroad.   
¶50 When we examine whether the Fourth Amendment was 
violated, we determine whether the government intrusion was 
reasonable.  O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
Overly broad subpoenas typically are held unreasonable in that 
their lack of specificity allows the government to go on an 
indiscriminate fishing expedition, similar to that provided by a 
general warrant.  Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 
(1927); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625-26.  As the United States Supreme 
Court has explained, a subpoena is "equally [as] indefensible as 
a search warrant would be if couched in similar [general] 
terms."  Hale, 201 U.S. at 77. 
¶51 Here, the subpoena requested all of the data from the 
computer system of an entire branch of state government in order 
to investigate whether a crime has been committed.  It did not 
specify the topics or the types of documents in which evidence 
of a crime might be found.18  The subpoena also did not specify 
any time period for which it sought records.  Some of the 
records on the backup tapes go back to the 1970s.  An open-ended 
                                                 
18 Because the records sought are computer records, a key 
word search would not have been too difficult to incorporate 
into the subpoena.  However, while a key word search may have 
been helpful, the requirements set out in ¶¶53-55 below are also 
necessary to a valid subpoena. 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
31 
 
time span during which the records were produced or received is 
unacceptable.  Accordingly, the overly broad demand of the 
subpoena duces tecum issued here cannot pass Fourth Amendment 
muster, see, e.g., Hale, 201 U.S. at 76-77, and therefore, it 
must be quashed. 
¶52 However, we do not conclude that all documents the 
John Doe judge seeks in order to investigate whether a crime has 
been committed are inaccessible.  We do, however, require more 
than a generalized demand for those documents.  Because it is 
clear that another subpoena likely will issue, and because the 
record before us contains neither the John Doe petition used to 
initiate the John Doe proceeding nor the affidavit or other 
showing the district attorney made to obtain the subpoena, we 
find it necessary to summarize the requirements of the district 
attorney before any further subpoena is issued.  In so doing, we 
point out that it is the district attorney's burden to provide 
support to the John Doe judge for a constitutionally sufficient 
subpoena, as he is the party who commenced the proceeding and 
sought the subpoena.  See Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 624-25.  
 
3. 
John Doe subpoena standard 
¶53 The subpoena power of a John Doe judge is set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 968.26.  It provides in relevant part: 
[T]he judge . . . at the request of the district 
attorney shall, subpoena and examine other witnesses 
to ascertain whether a crime has been committed and by 
whom committed.  . . .  A court, on the motion of a 
district attorney, may compel a person to testify or 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
32 
 
produce evidence under s. 972.08(1),19 . . . subject to 
the restrictions under s. 972.085.  
Section 968.26 generally applies to the acts of a judge who 
conducts a John Doe proceeding.  The provision relative to 
subpoenaing witnesses by a judge does not mention the production 
of documents.  However, the last sentence of § 968.26, which 
applies to a court, not to a judge, does address the production 
of documents to which the immunity afforded under Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.08(1) attaches.  The division of responsibility between a 
judge and a court in these two provisions is consistent with a 
John Doe judge's inability to grant the immunity, see Jackson, 
18 Wis. 2d at 533, that § 972.08(1) requires.  However, Wahl has 
not argued to us that the John Doe judge was without authority 
to issue a subpoena duces tecum and that such a subpoena must be 
issued by a court.  Therefore, we do not decide whether the 
subpoena is void because it exceeds the authority of a John Doe 
judge, if the Hon. Sarah O'Brien issued the subpoena duces tecum 
in that capacity.  Instead, because a John Doe proceeding is a 
criminal investigative tool, Unnamed Person No. 1, 260 Wis. 2d 
653, ¶22, we turn to Wis. Stat. § 968.135 which describes the 
quantum of proof required to issue a subpoena duces tecum in a 
criminal investigation.  
¶54 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 provides in relevant part: 
                                                 
19 Wis. Stat. § 972.08(1) provides immunity from criminal 
prosecution based on the self-incriminating nature of the 
records that one is compelled to produce, thereby affording 
protection for Fifth Amendment rights. 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
33 
 
Upon the request of the . . . district attorney and 
upon a showing of probable cause under s. 968.12, a 
court shall issue a subpoena requiring the production 
of documents, as specified in s. 968.13(2). 
Section 968.135 refers to subpoenas duces tecum issued by a 
court, not by a judge.  It requires probable cause to believe 
that the subpoena duces tecum will produce evidence of a crime.  
See State v. Swift, 173 Wis. 2d 870, 883, 496 N.W.2d 713 (Ct. 
App. 1993); see also 9 Wiseman, Chiarkas and Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice:  Criminal Practice and Procedure § 24.16 (1996) ("The 
probable cause necessary to obtain a subpoena for records is 
essentially the same as that necessary to obtain a search 
warrant.").  Therefore, we conclude that any subsequent subpoena 
duces tecum issued in this proceeding, whether it is issued 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 968.26 or 968.135, must be supported by 
probable cause to believe that the documents sought will produce 
evidence of a crime. 
¶55 Additionally, because the data sought is meant to 
establish criminal conduct and may be data in which a person has 
a 
reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy, 
there 
must 
be 
a 
particularized showing in the affidavit of the district attorney 
requesting a subpoena.  Cf. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 842-44.  
In that regard, the affidavit submitted must:  (1) limit the 
requested subpoena to the subject matter described in the John 
Doe petition, Reimann, 214 Wis. 2d at 622; (2) show that the 
data requested is relevant to the subject matter of the John Doe 
proceeding, Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 843; (3) specify the data 
requested with reasonable particularity, Hale, 201 U.S. at 77; 
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
34 
 
and (4) cover a reasonable period of time.  Washington, 83 
Wis. 2d at 844.  Additionally, all of the communications to the 
John Doe judge must be made a part of the record.  See id. at 
824-25.  
¶56 We conclude by reminding all who participate in John 
Doe investigations that the power wielded by the government is 
considerable.  Accordingly, there is a potential for infringing 
on Fourth Amendment and other constitutional rights.  Hale, 201 
U.S. at 77.  Therefore, an awareness of the individual rights 
that may be affected is necessary as this investigation 
proceeds.  As we explained in State v. O'Connor:  
The final responsibility for the proper conduct of 
such [John Doe] proceedings rests with the presiding 
judge, whose obligation it is to ensure that the 
considerable powers at his or her disposal are at all 
times exercised with due regard for the rights of the 
witnesses, the public, and those whose activities may 
be subject to investigation.   
State v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 284, 252 N.W.2d 671 (1977).  
See also Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 824.  Accordingly, we quash 
the subpoena and remand to the John Doe judge for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
No. 
02-3063-W   
 
35 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶57 We conclude that all of the documents requested are 
not privileged; that on this record, we cannot determine how 
Article IV, Section 16 of the Wisconsin Constitution relates to 
the data sought by the subpoena duces tecum and that even when 
Section 16 does apply, it provides only use immunity and not 
secrecy 
for 
communications 
of 
government 
officials 
and 
employees; and that neither the separation of powers doctrine 
nor Article IV, Section 8 is sufficient to excuse compliance 
with a valid John Doe subpoena.  However, because we also 
conclude that the subpoena is overly broad and therefore 
unreasonable, we grant the supervisory writ and quash the 
subpoena.  
By the Court.-The supervisory writ is granted quashing the 
subpoena of the John Doe judge.   
 
No.  02-3063-W.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶58 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I write 
separately.  I am concerned that the majority opinion addresses 
many issues, but comes to few answers that will provide guidance 
to the litigants and the John Doe judge. 
¶59 The opinion does conclusively decide that the subpoena 
is overbroad.  The majority opinion discusses the Fourth 
Amendment at length, but this discussion is not based on any 
arguments briefed by the parties and is unnecessary to the 
holding of the case.  While I join the court in its conclusion 
to quash the subpoena, I do not join the discussion regarding 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.   
¶60 I also write to comment on the issue of production of 
electronic information.  This case involves a subpoena for 
electronic information and raises many of the same kinds of 
issues that are raised in discovery of electronic information.   
¶61 In 2004, most information is kept in digital form, and 
discovery, 
preservation, 
and 
production 
of 
electronic 
information is one of the leading legal issues facing not only 
corporate America but also government.  Reform in discovery, 
including electronic discovery, is a priority in several 
jurisdictions.  This court has not previously confronted the 
issue of discovery of electronic data. 
¶62 Electronic discovery (or production of electronic 
information) poses the same problems as conventional discovery 
(and production) of documents, but also poses unique problems.  
The volume, number of storage locations, and data volatility of 
electronically stored information are significantly greater than 
No.  02-3063-W.ssa 
 
2 
 
those of paper documents.  In addition, electronic information 
contains non-traditional types of data including metadata, 
system data, and "deleted" data.  Furthermore, the costs of 
locating, reviewing, and preparing digital files for production 
may be much greater than in conventional discovery proceedings.  
These complexities can lead, as they have in the present case, 
to disputes about the scope of discovery (or production), the 
form 
of 
production, 
and 
the 
protection 
of 
privileged 
information.   
¶63 The following are recurring themes in the literature 
on electronic document production:  lawyers and judges must 
become 
better 
educated 
about 
electronic 
information 
and 
discovery thereof; the parties must meet, confer, and seek to 
identify 
the 
information 
management 
system, 
the 
people 
knowledgeable about the system, what information is and is not 
accessible, 
and 
the 
scope 
of 
each 
party's 
rights 
and 
responsibilities; discovery (production) requests should be as 
clear as possible about the data being requested; responding 
parties are in the best position to evaluate the procedures, 
methodologies, and technologies appropriate for preserving and 
producing their own electronic data; and trial courts may need 
to 
be 
more 
active 
in 
managing 
electronic 
discovery 
and 
production than in managing conventional discovery or production 
of information, especially when parties cannot agree about the 
scope of the request for electronic information.  The literature 
on electronic discovery is growing both in print and on the 
Internet.      
No.  02-3063-W.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶64 The majority opinion does not recognize the special 
problems in production of electronic information or give 
guidance to the judge or the parties about these unique issues.   
¶65 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
 
No.  02-3063-W.ssa 
 
1