Title: State v. Sunderland. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by C.J. Moon [pdf]. Dissenting Opinion, by J. Levinson [pdf]. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 10/19/2007 [pdf], 116 Haw. 2.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

' LAW UBRAH

‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

IN THE SUPREME’ COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘T

 

000:

STATE OF HAWAT'L, Plaintiff-Appellee,

JOSEPH SUNDERLAND, Defendant-Appellant.

aqawd

  

Wo, 26641

B16 HY 12 43S LON

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(REPORT NO. H-54084)

SEPTEMBER 21, 2007
NAKAYAMA, J., WITH WHOM DUFFY, J., JOINS:

MOON, C.J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING; LEVINSON, J., DISSENTING:
AND 'ACOBR, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING ‘SEPARATELY
OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COUR?

Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Sunderland ("Sunderland"),
appeals from the third circuit district court's! June 23, 2004
judgment convicting him of the offense of Promoting a Detrimental
brug in the Third Degree, in violation of Hawai‘ Revised
Statutes (“HRS”) § 712-1249? Sunderland’s sole point of error

 

on appeal asserts that his possession of marijuana at home and
for religious purposes was protected by the free exercise clause
of the first amendment to the United States Constitution, as well
as his right to privacy under article I, section 6 of the Hawai'i
Constitution.

For the following reasons, we hold that Sunderland’ s

 

\ the Honorable Colin L.. Love presided:

FURS § 712-1249 (1993) provides that “fal person connits the
offense of promoting a detrimental drug in the third degree if the person
Knowingly possesses any marijuana or any Schedule V substance in any anount.”

 

 
 

"+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *
argument is without merit and affirm the district court's
judgment of conviction.
1. BACKGROUND

‘The material facts of the present case are not in
dispute.

on June 27, 2003, Officer Denise smith (“Officer
smith”) was investigating a report of a missing adolescent.
officer smith was informed that the missing child was known to
retreat to the Sunderland residence. Upon arrival, Officer smith
spotted Sunderland on the lanai and inquired about the child.
Sunderland responded that he did not know and went inside the
house to check. From her vantage point on the lanai, Officer
smith observed three girls sleeping on a futon bed in the living
room, She subsequently observed a six-inch marijuana pipe on the
kitchen table. When Sunderland returned, Officer Smith asked him
to retrieve the pipe. She asked him who the pipe belonged to,
and Sunderland responded, “That's mine. I use it for religious
purposes.” Sunderland then produced a “religious card” from his
wallet indicating his membership in a religious organization
called the “Cannabis Ministry.” Sunderland informed Officer
smith that it was his right to exercise his religious beliefs.
officer Smith instructed Sunderland not to say anything further
and placed him under arrest.

At the police station, Sunderland waived his Miranda
rights and made a statement. He claimed that he had been
practicing his religion since he was sixteen years of age. He

further indicated that he had used the pipe to smoke marijuana
‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

that morning, and he forgot to put it away.’

on January 9, 2004, Sunderland was orally charged with
committing the offense of Promoting a Detrimental Drug in the
Third Degree. Sunderland thereafter filed a "Motion To Dismiss
or Judgment Of Acquittal” asserting that the charged conduct
constituted protected activity pursuant to his constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion.‘ The matter proceeded to
trial on January 23, 2004.

At trial, the prosecution orally charged Sunderland for
fa second time, as follows:

‘The charge is that on or about the 27th day of June, 2003, in the

District of forth Kohala, County and State of Hawaii, Joseph

Sunderland did knowingly possess marijuana, thereby connitting the

offense of Promoting 8 Detrimental Drug in’ the Third Degree, in

Vielation of Section 712-1249, Hawai! Revised Statutes, as

linended.

Following the close of the prosecution’s case in chief,
Sunderland called Reverend Roger Christie ("Christie") to the
witness stand. Christie testified that he was ordained in the

~Religion of Jesus Church,” and that he subsequently organized a

 

sect called the “Hawaii Cannabis Ministry.” Christie explained
that his religion centers around the sacramental ingestion of
cannabis, and that the use of cannabis is mandatory in his

ministry. He pointed to multiple passages from the Bible and

 

interpreted them as indirect references to the cannabis plant.

 

» the parties stipulated that, 1f called as a witness, the
criminologist would testify that the residue in the pipe was marijuana.

«the State of Hawai'i (“prosecution”) filed 2 responsive “Trial
Memorandum” on May 12, 2006. On May 13, 2006, Sunderland fled a
“Supplemental Memorandum In Support Of Motion’ To Dismiss Or Judgnent Or
acquittal.”
 

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For example, Christie claimed that “the word ‘kannabosm’ in the
holy anointing ofl of Moses and the christening oil of Jesus is
cannabis.” According to Christie, cannabis “has a unique way of
elevating the consciousness{,]” distinct from other mind-altering
substances, and that prohibiting the use of cannabis would have a
“devastating” effect on his ministry.

Sunderland subsequently exercised his right to testity.
Sunderland admitted possession of the pipe recovered by officer
smith, and he further admitted that the residue in the pipe was
marijuana. However, Sunderland thereafter testified that he was
2 menber of Christie’s ministry and used marijuana for religious
purposes. Sunderland clained that ingesting marijuana was
religious experience that produced a “very unique state of mind”
that brought him closer to what he considered “God.” Sunderland
explained, “And . . . I believe that -- in part of .
understanding God, I believe that God put the holy herb onto this
earth to help mankind to better understand Hin.”

At the close of the evidentiary portion of trial, the
court rejected Sunderand’s argunent that his constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion precluded his prosecution
for possessing marijuana. First, the court assumed that
Sunderland's religious beliefs were sincere, as follows:

THE COURT: The question of whether or not St Le a
iS%aincet inposeibie’tor a Court to actress: whether or not
scnsboay eincerely believes in a Feligsoue natter: We fight ware
Over who has the Only true God.

1£'3 Judge happened to be an atheist, how would you
mor her

 

   

 

convince

 

(Emphasis added.) The court nevertheless perceived a compelling
 

+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
state interest in precluding the use and possession of illicit

drugs in the presence of minors:

5 using and possessing marijuana in his

there's four
ninore. tate does have @ compelling interest. in
Protecting minors, juveniles, children, from an environment where
Rarijuana se being died, from an environment where its use ss
Gneouraged. because minore use arijuana., And this Court sees
the preblens that weed by that ail the tine.

30 in thie case, not sone other case, in this case
do find 9 compelling state interest in prohibiting the possession
Of uae of marijuana for religious purposes... in the home when
Binors are present.)

 
  

 

 

    

 

‘The court thereafter found Sunderland guilty of the
charged offense, and sentenced him to a $150 fine and $25 in
fees.

Sunderland filed a timely notice of appeal on June 17,
2004.

IT, STANDARD OF REVIEW

Sunderland’s sole point of error on appeal questions
the constitutionality of his prosecution for possessing marijuana
in the privacy of his home for religious purposes. “We review
questions of constitutional law de novo, under the right/wreng
standard.” Qnaka v. Onaka, 112 Hawai'i 374, 378, 146 P.3d 69, 93
(2006) .

XII, DISCUSSION

ve His Right to Privacy Argument

 

As an initial matter, we note that Sunderland failed to

preserve his constitutional right to privacy argusent on appeal.
In his opening brief, Sunderland claims that trial

counsel “franed the constitutional question as a blend of freedom

of religion and privacy interests . . . .” However, that

5
 

 

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assertion is belied by the record. The parties did not address
any right to privacy argument in any of their written submissions
before the circuit court.’ Sunderland attempts to bootstrap a
privacy argument by referring to the following arguments orally
presented before the circuit court at a hearing conducted on May
19, 2004:
‘The next question is: Has the state shown a

compelling interest? “I'say that. the

While you're under the inflvencs of marijvans

fare red herrings because that’s not what this case is about.” This

fese is about someone in his omm hone possessing a small anount of

marijuana for religious purposes, That is the only issue in this

      

 

 

 

Tt As not an iesue in this case whether or not you can
smoke marijuana and drive car, whether or not pregnant women
Should snoke marijuana, any of those others [sic] things. Tals Se
fan adult hale in his cun home snoking sarijuana for religious
Purposes. That ie the iseve, There's no sesue Beyond nat

So whether or not any of these other things 18 @ good

 

idea ien't before this Court, and it's not what we're addressing.
going down the highway at ninety

 

They're not asking, hey, he
Riles an hour snoking # large
Trosble for that. No. He's
Ris hoase.. And that's all the
precedent for doing it sone place els
Feligious purposes.

 

     

only in your own hone for

‘he state -- I'm not here to litigate whether or not
to permit soneone not to drive a car while intoxicated on
marijuana. That's a totally different issue than can you do
fenething at your own house, which would bring ss to this general
idea of wnat isa compelling state interest.

 

+e note that Sunderland cited Ravin vs State, 534 P.2d 494 (Alaska
1975) in nis supplenental remorandum in support of his motion to dismiss of
for a judgeent of acquittal. In Ravin, the Alaska Suprene Court held that the
defendant's personal, non-commercial use of marijuana in his hone was
Constituticnally protected. 1d, at S11. However, Sunderland did not cite
Ravin for the purpose of ssserting a right to privacy ergunent. Rather,
Sunderland cited Ravin for its reasoning that the prohibition on the
possession of marijuana in the privacy of the possessor’s home did not further
f legitimate state interest. Sunderland sought to se the savin court's
Feasoning to buttress his argument chat the prosecution failed to demonstrate
2 compelling state interest in the case at bar.

 

 

 
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This case is only about the use of marijuana in the

home. Supre
ee adsressu “ai Basic
ney hi pat case in faweit, Ans on Level
So T would say that . . . it is not reasonable to say

that there's @ compelling state interest against the religious use
Of nari jucna in your own heme because that’s the only. issue here.
fers found in his home with Just a small amount. It's not 1've
Saye avanall amount in your home, Thats
Noe the dréving

   

 

women shouldn't, all those things could be compelling interest.
Thet's net what we're esking for. We're asking @ very limited
thing here: Only in your omn home Because that's the issue
presented here.

 

(Emphasis added.)
Although Sunderland asserted that he used marijuana for
religious practices in his own home, he did not seek to draw the
conclusion that his right to privacy was implicated. Indeed, as
denonstrated by the afore-enphasized portion of the transcript,
he expressly disavowed any right to privacy argument. Rather,
Sunderland argued that, despite the inability to succeed on
privacy grounds in this jurisdiction, his right to the free
exercise of religion required the prosecution to demonstrate @
compelling state interest justifying a prohibition on the
personal, home-use of marijuana. His focus on the home was meant
only to distinguish other potential compelling state interests in
preventing public harm that may flow from the use of marijuana
outside the home. That argument differs from the argument
that his right to

 

Sunderland now seeks to assert on appeal
privacy encompasses the right to possess marijuana for religious

purposes within the confines of his own hone.

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‘Therefore, inasmuch as Sunderland did not raise his
right-to-privacy argument before the trial court, we do not
address it. See HRS § 641-2 (Supp. 2004) ("The appellate court .
|. . need not consider 2 point that was not presented in the trial
court in an appropriate manner.”); State v, Nacole, 62 Haw. 563,
510, 617 P.2d 820, 826 (1980) (stating that it is well-
established that “an issue raised for the first time on appeal
will not be considered by the reviewing courts”); State ws.
Kahalewai, 56 Haw. 481, 491, 541 P.2d 1020, 1027 (1975)
("Generally, appellate courts will not consider questions which
Territory v. Kelley, 38
Haw. 433, 435 (1949) (*[NJo question of constitutionality of the

 

were not raised in the trial courts.”

ordinance was . . . called to the attention of the trial court
and ruled upon, nor has any failure to rule been preserved by
proper exceptions. No such question, therefore, can be properly
raised for the first time in this court.”); Qnaka, 112 Hawai'i at
386, 146 P.3d at 101 ("[T)he rule in this jurisdiction .
prohibits an appellant from complaining for the first tine on
appeal of error to which he has acquiesced or to which he failed
to object.”) (Ellipses in original.) (Citations omitted.).

B. Enforcement of HRS § 712-1249 Does Not Violate Sunderland’ s
First Amendment Right to the Free Exercise of Religion.

1. The parties’ arguments

Sunderland’ s argument is thus reduced to his assertion

 

that HRS § 712-1249 violates his right to the free exercise of
religion guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States
Constitution ("First Amendment”). Specifically, Sunderland

refers this court to the analysis set forth by the United States
 

“OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
Supreme Court in Sherbert v, Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). He
asserts that under Sherbert, a governmental regulation will be
scrutinized for a compelling interest where the party challenging

 

the regulation’s constitutionality has demonstrated that the
regulation substantially burdens the party's religious practices.
See, e.a., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 ("We must next consider
whether some compelling state interest . . . justifies the
substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right.)
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (2972) ("[I]n order for
Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade
against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice
of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the
State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its
requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the
Free Exercise Clause.”). Sunderland points out that the district
court presumed that the “religious aspect” was met and argues
that the district court erroneously found that the state had a
compelling interest in protecting minors from an environment
where marijuana was used and encouraged. He contends that the
record is devoid of any evidence that (1) the minors present had
actual knowledge of the marijuana pipe, or (2) Sunderland
encouraged the use of marijuana in any way.

‘The prosecution appears to agree with Sunderland that
the Sherbert/Yoder analysis is appropriate. The prosecution
concedes that the district court presumed that the “religious
aspect” was satisfied, but defends the district court’s finding
 

‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

of @ compelling interest based upon the presence of the minors in
close proximity to the marijuana pipe and the ease of access to
it. The prosecution also asserts that in Employment Div., Dep't
of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded
by Religious Freedon Restoration Act (“RFRA”) of 1993, 42 U.S.C.
$ 2000bb-1 (Supp. V 1993), statute invalidated by City of Boerne
vs Flores, $21 U.S. 507 (1997), the United States Supreme Court
later “questioned” the propriety of a compelling interest
analysis where the regulation in question (1) is of general
applicability and (2) interferes with only the right to free
exercise.

In reply, Sunderland asserts, inter alia, that the
prosecution's reliance on Smith is misplaced. sunderland argues
that Congress enacted RFRA in an attempt to expressly supersede
Smith's elimination of the compelling interest analysis in the
context of generally applicable governmental regulation.

Contrary to Sunderland’s assertions, however, Smith
plainly controls.

2. Employment Div.. Dep’t of Human Res, of Oregon vy, Smith

Ordinarily, when evaluating clains advanced under the
free exercise clause of the First Anendnent,

it [1s] necessary to examine whether or not the activity

i0plLinate and sivcerely held religious felist, whether oF net the

Bgulations the eatent of inpast of the reguistion on the parties?

Feligicas practices, snd whether or not the state had s compelling

Interest ih the regulation which Justified such a burde

Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v, Sullivan, 87 Hawai'i 217,
247, 953 P.2d 1315, 1345 (1998) (brackets in original) (citing

 

 

 

10
 

1" FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,
State ex rel. Minami v, Andrews, 65 Haw. 289, 291, 651 P.2d 473,
474 (1982); accord Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-19,

Nevertheless, in Smith, the United States Supreme Court
distinguished governmental regulations of general applicability,
holding that they are, under certain circumstances, immune from
claims or defenses raised under the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment. See discussion infra. Specifically, the Smith
Court addressed the issue whether applicants may be denied
unemployment compensation benefits based upon an Oregon statute
disqualifying persons terminated for work-related misconduct, if
the misconduct relied upon as the basis for disqualification is
the religiously motivated ingestion of a substance prohibited by
oregon’s controlled substance law.

‘The Smith Court first reiterated the well-settled
notion that religious beliefs are beyond the reach of permissible
governmental regulation, to the extent that government may
neither compel nor preclude acquiescence in a particular belief
as such, 494 U.S. at 877 ("The free exercise of religion means,
first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever
religious doctrine one desires.”). Moreover, although attendant
conduct does not enjoy the same degree of immunity, id. at 879
(“laws . . . are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions,
they may with practices . . . .”) (Quotation marks omitted.)
(Some e11ipses in original and some added.) (Citing Reynolds vw.
United States, 98 U.S, 145, 166-67 (1878).), governmental
regulation that targets the religious motivation behind such

nn
 

‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

conduct would not pass constitutional muster. To wit, “a State
would be prohibiting the free exercise of religion if it sought
to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that
they display.” Id. at 877 (quotation marks omitted) (brackets
removed) «

Respondents, however, desired to expand the analysis
fone step further in seeking to preclude interference with
religiously motivated conduct by a governmental regulation that
does not target the religious motivation behind the conduct and
that is concededly constitutional as applied to other persons
seeking to engage in such conduct for non-religious reasons
‘ recreational purposes). Id. at 878. The Court pointed

out that previous opinions have upheld neutral and generally

 

applicable laws against constitutional challenges based upon the
free exercise clause of the Firet Amendment, citing such cases as
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (rejecting a clain
that laws prohibiting polygamy could not be enforced against
those whose religion commanded the practice), Minersville School
Dist, Bd. of Educ, v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940)
("conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or
restriction of religious beliefe."), Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 188 (1944) (holding that child labor laws may
constitutionally be applied to preclude a mother from causing her

children to distribute literature on the streets in spite of her

2
 

)R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.
religious motivation), Braunfeld v, Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
(plurality opinion) (upholding Sunday-closing laws against the

claim that such laws burdened the religious practices of those

 

whose religions precluded them from working on other days),

Gillette v. United states, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding
conscription against a claim asserted by persons who opposed the
war on religious grounds), United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252

(1982) (rejecting a claim for a religious exemption from social
security taxes on the ground that the Amish faith prohibited
participation in governmental support programs, and Hernandez v.
Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (rejecting a claim that the
payment of income taxes burdened the free exercise of religion by
making participation in religious activities more difficult).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-80.

The Court acknowledged that it had, in the past, upheld
First Amendment challenges to the application of neutral and
generally applicable laws to religiously motivated conduct, but
only in such cases where the free exercise clause was inplicated
“in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as
freedom of speech and of the press . . . or the right of parents
|. . to direct the education of their children... .” Id at
881 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Court concluded that
Reynolds and its progeny “plainly controll {ed]” inasmuch as
Oregon's controlled substances law was neutral, generally
applicable, and did not implicate other core constitutional
concerns. Id. at 882.

Respondents also argued that “even though exenption

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from generally applicable criminal laws need not automatically be
extended to religiously motivated actors, at least the claim for
a religious exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test
set forth in [Sherbert].” Id, at 882-83. However, the Court
expressly rejected the application of the Sherbert test to “a
generally applicable criminal law.” Id. at 884. The Court

reasoned as follows:

‘The governnent’s ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitions of socially hermful conduct, 1ike its ability to
Earry out other aspects of public policy, “cannot depend on
measuring the effects of a governnental action on 2 religious
objector's spiritual development." Lynal

4080-8, 439, 451 (19887)
Inaivioual’s obLigetion to obey auch a law contingent upon th
law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the
State's interest 1s Ycompelling"--permitting him, by virtue of his
beliefs, sto becone a law unto himeelf," Reynolds(, 98 U.S. at
167}"-contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.

 

 

   

 

   

 

 

Id. at 885 (footnote omitted)

Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court, concluding that “[b]ecause respondents’
ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because
‘that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with
the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment
compensation when their dismissal results from use of the drug.”
Id. at 990.

 

+ we note, however, that smith left open the possibility that the
Sherbert test might nevertheless retain its vitality where statutory
Eonditions called for “individualized governmental assessment of the r
for the relevant conduct (,]” jd. at 684, thus creating « "mechanism for
Snatvidualized exenptions." 498 0.8. at 883 (Citing Bowen vy. Ray, 476 U.S
693, 108 (1986); gee also Sullivan, 67 Havai'l at 246 nal, 953 P-2d at 1344
n.3i (stating that although SMiGh makes generally appli:

Tegulation inmune fron Firat Anetdnent attack, Suith cai
the regulation creates system of individualized exemptions)

4

 

 

 

 

   
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3. BRERA
As mentioned by Sunderland, in 1993 Congress reacted by
enacting RFRA, which was designed to supersede the Smith decision
and reinvigorate the Sherbert/Yoder analysis.’ See RFRA, Pub. L.
No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1
set forth the following standard:
(a) In generat
Government shell not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even 1f i fren
except as provides in subsection (b) of
this section.
() Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person—~

(2) 42 An furtherance of a compelling governmental,
Anterest) and

 

7 RERA’s stated purposes were to (1) “restore the compelling
Interest test ar set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 274 U.S. 998 (1963) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its applicetion in
Gil cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened{,]” and
(2) “provide a clain or defense to persons whose religious exercise 1s
Nibetantlally bardened by government.” RERA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). Congr
‘adcitionally found that:

 

 

(2) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing fre
exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its
protection in the First Anendment to the Constitutions

(2) tans vneutral* toward religion mey Durden religious
cxgectte! ae sucely 2 lave intended fo interfere with religious

(3) governments should not gubstantially burden religious
exercise without compelling Justification:

(4) in Exploynent Division v. smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
tthe Suprene Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the
Governsent justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
Beutral toward religions and

(s}"the compelling interest test os set forth in prior
Federal court rulings it a workable test for striking sensible
Balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governsental interests.

 

     

 

RERA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000BB(a) .

4s
   

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(2) 4s the Least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest

(Emphasis added.) RFRA purported to make that framework
applicable to “all Federal and State law, and the implementation
of that law, whether statutory or otherwise . . . .” RFRA, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a).

However, this court has already taken note of the fact
that the United States Suprene Court, in Boerne,' invalidated
RFRA insofar as it “exceeded the enumerated powers of Congress
and was, therefore, unconstitutional.” Sullivan, 87 Hawai'i at
246, 953 P.2d at 1344. As a result, RFRA is inoperative as to
the individual states. See Hankins v, Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 105
(2d Cir, 2006) (“The Supreme Court held that the RFRA could not

 

be enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
‘empowers Congress to enforce the Amendnent’s other provisions
against the states.”); Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 403 (éth
Cir. 1999) ("[T]he Supreme Court has declared {RFRA

Denson v. Marshall,
44°F. Supp. 2d 400, 402 (D. Mass. 1999) ("The Supreme Court

 

unconstitutional as applied to the states.”)

recently held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state

governments.”

 

 

  
 

. stated that “RFRA was designed to control
the one before usy but a8 the provisions of
the federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it is
this Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.” S21 U.S. at S36.

 

 

  
   

government. jelvery
Gppellote court that nae squarely addressed t) held that the
RFRA governs the activities of federal officers and agencies.) (Citing
; 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003}.) (Brackets
{noriginal.}-— In 2000, Congress anended RFRA, expressly limiting sts
(Cont inved. ..)

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‘The present matter involves a state criminal statute
prohibiting, inter alia, the possession of marijuana, Thus,
‘Smith, not RFRA, controls.

According to Smith, a generally applicable law is not
subject to First Amendnent attack unless (1) it interferes with
“the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections,” or (2) it creates a mechanism that
calls for “individualized governmental assessment of the reasons
for the relevant conduct (]” (ines, individualized exemptions).
See discussion supra

Here, HRS § 712-1249 falls squarely within the scope of
permissible governmental regulation, consonant with the rule
enunciated in Smith. HRS § 712-1249 is a neutral law of general
applicability to the extent that it purports to prohibit, without
exception, the possession of marijuana and any other substance
defined as a “Schedule V substance” by HRS chapter 329.
Additionally, the statute does not, in this case, also interfere
with other constitutional rights, such as

freedom of speech and of the press, ace Cantwell v, connecticut,

$10 Ur8.5 at 3017207. (invalcating # Licensing systen for

SSLISISEEACUe fadaleceecion to Geny'a License to" any cause he

eee erie Slat Mana PEMD tied tothe

dissenination of religious ideas); Eollett v. HeComick, 322 0.5.

513 (944) (eae), or the right of parents... to direct the
ecocation of their children, see Wisconsin ¥. Yodel, 406 U.S. 205

 

 

    

*(. continued)
applicobiiity te "ell Federal law, and the implementation of that law, whether
stitutery er otherwise... .” Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 stat. 603, 806 (2000).

 

vv
 

‘OR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER.

 

(1872) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied
fo Anish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their
children te school)

 

Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (footnote omitted). Thus, the present
matter does not present the type of hybrid rights situation that
‘Smith implies would merit a strict scrutiny analysis. Rather, we
are faced with “a free exercise claim unconnected with any
communicative activity or parental right.” Id. at 682.

Moreover, HRS § 712-1249 does not create a mechanism for
governmental assessment of individual applicants for exemptions.
Rather, HRS § 712-1249 presents an across-the-board prohibition
on specific conduct deemed to be socially harmful by the
legislature.

‘Therefore, pursuant to Smith, we hold that, under the
circumstances of the present case," the free exercise clause of
the First Amendment is not a viable defense to prosecution under
HRS § 712-1249. See 494 U.S. at 884 (“Even if we were inclined
to breath into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment
compensation field, we would not apply it to require exenptions
from a generally applicable criminal law.”); People v. Tripped,
56 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 1542, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d $59, S65 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997) ("Under Smith, therefore, a state may enact and
enforce generalized criminal sanctions for marijuana possession
and transportation without running afoul of the Free Exercise
clause of the First Amendnent.”); State v, Mevers, 95 F.3d 1475,

* We express no opinion as to what effect a properly preserved
privacy argunent may have had on the analysis, insofar as privacy argument
hoy present the type of hybrid rights scenario that SMith implies would merit
a strict scrutiny analysis.

 

 

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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
1481 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a criminal defendant's claim
that his prosecution for and conviction of the offenses of (1)
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute
marijuana, and (2) aiding and abetting possession with intent to
distribute marijuana violated the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment) -

Iv, concnusrow

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm the

district court's June 23, 2004 judgment.”

Deborah L. Kim,
Deputy Public Defender, 2
for defendant-appeliant late 6 Tawle are

Janet R, Garcia, Yre. eran
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, 7

for plaintiff-appellee

  

% Ag @ technical we note that the district court erred by
‘applying a compelling sinters ci" fevertheless, our disagreenent with the
QieeLice court's methodology does not preclude our affirmance of its ultimate
Conclusion. Seg Aluinum Shake Roofing, Inc, va Hixavasu, 110 Hawai't 246;
S8e, 331 Pr3d 1230, 1298 (2006) ("this coure nay affirm a’ judgnent of 0
Erisi court on any ground in the record which supports affirmance.”) (Quoting
Tavlorsslee state, 91 Hawai’ 60, 73, 979 P.24 1086, 1099 (1998).)
(Quotation marks omitted.)

 

 

   

  

 

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