Title: Brochu v. McLeod

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 146 
Docket: 
Cum-15-427 
Argued: 
June 9, 2016 
Decided: 
September 20, 2016 
Corrected: 
February 14, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
CATHERINE E. BROCHU 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD A. MCLEOD 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  Catherine E. Brochu, formerly known as Catherine McLeod, 
appeals from an order of the District Court (Portland, Eggert, J.) granting, 
based on the affirmative defense of laches, Richard A. McLeod’s motion to 
dismiss Brochu’s motion to enforce nearly forty years’ overdue child and 
spousal support payments.  On appeal, Brochu contends that the court erred 
by (1) concluding that laches is a viable defense in child or spousal support 
cases; (2) finding that the elements of laches were satisfied; and (3) 
interpreting the parties’ settlement agreement to limit the term of spousal 
support to eighteen months.  We vacate the judgment. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s 
judgment, the record supports the following facts.  Young v. Lagasse, 
2016 ME 96, ¶ 4, --- A.3d ---.  Brochu and McLeod married on 
November 4, 1970.  They had two children, born in 1970 and 1972.  On 
June 6, 1977, Brochu and McLeod executed a separation agreement, which 
provided that McLeod “shall pay to [Brochu], for her support, the sum of $160 
per month during the joint lives of the parties, and so long as [Brochu] does 
not remarry or cohabit for a maximum of eighteen months from the date of 
this Agreement.”  Brochu did not remarry or cohabitate during the eighteen 
months following the agreement.  From the date of the separation agreement 
in 1977 to present, McLeod has never made a child or spousal support 
payment. 
 
[¶3]  McLeod went into hiding in 1977, shortly after he and Brochu had 
executed the separation agreement.  At that time, McLeod was in the 
United States Marine Corps.  Brochu called his military base in an attempt to 
locate him, but was advised that McLeod was absent without leave.  Brochu 
also consulted some of McLeod’s family members about his whereabouts, but 
they too did not know where he had gone. 
 
3 
 
[¶4]  On August 9, 1979, the court issued a divorce judgment 
incorporating the settlement agreement.1  Brochu remarried in October of 
that year and legally changed her sons’ surnames to match her new husband’s 
surname.  Brochu completely stopped looking for McLeod after the divorce in 
1979. 
 
[¶5]  In 1996, the United States Marine Corps instituted an action 
against McLeod for his unauthorized absence dating back to 1977, and he was 
given a bad-conduct discharge as a result.  There is no indication that Brochu 
was aware of McLeod’s trial or whereabouts in 1996. 
[¶6]  In 2014, the parties’ son, then forty-two years old, asked Brochu 
for information about his biological father.  Brochu conducted a Google search 
of McLeod’s name and in less than five minutes was able to find McLeod’s 
address in California. 
[¶7]  On March 30, 2015, Brochu filed a motion to enforce the nearly 
forty years’ overdue child and spousal support payments.  McLeod filed a 
motion to dismiss on July 6, 2015, asserting the affirmative defense of laches, 
                                         
1  The divorce action was served by publication due to McLeod’s unknown whereabouts. 
 
4 
among other things.2  The District Court held a hearing on July 29, 2015, at 
which both Brochu and McLeod testified. 
[¶8]  The following exchange occurred regarding Brochu’s efforts to 
locate McLeod over the years: 
THE COURT:  Let me cut to the chase.  Were you able to learn 
during the late 1970s and into the ‘80s while your children were 
still living with you where [McLeod] was? 
[BROCHU]:  No, I had no idea where he was . . . 
THE COURT:  And what efforts did you make after the divorce was 
granted to find out where he was? 
[BROCHU]:  Well, after the divorce . . . it just became . . . a 
non-issue.  Again, at that time I still didn’t know how to go about 
finding him, even beginning to know where he could possibly be. 
THE COURT:  So you were just willing to move along within life 
knowing that you had your two kids and you were going to have 
to provide for them? 
[BROCHU]:  That—I accepted that, yes. 
 
. . . . 
 
[MCLEOD’S ATTORNEY]:  So after the divorce was finalized in 
1979 to 2014, you in fact made no effort to locate [McLeod]? 
[BROCHU]:  No, I didn’t. 
 
Brochu also explained that she thought she lost any right to pursue child 
support once both of her children had attained the age of majority in 1990.  
                                         
2  In his motion to dismiss, McLeod argued, as he does on appeal, that Brochu's claim was also 
barred by the defenses of waiver and equitable estoppel.  The trial court’s decision on the motion 
observed in passing that those defenses were “possibly” established, but the court did not rule on 
the issue directly.  Because we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings, it would 
be premature to address the issue in advance of the trial court’s full consideration of it. 
 
5 
After locating McLeod in 2014, however, she soon consulted an attorney and 
instituted this action against McLeod. 
[¶9]  McLeod’s testimony at the hearing was limited.  McLeod 
contended that he never paid child or spousal support because Brochu had 
left him and he was unable to find her or their children.  McLeod also testified 
that the only time he looked for their children was in the 1970s.  McLeod 
offered no information as to his assets or income; whether he would have 
done anything differently had he known that he would ultimately have to pay 
the child support arrearages; or whether he had any additional children. 
 
[¶10]  At the hearing, the court took the defense of laches under 
advisement.  With regard to the interpretation of the parties’ settlement 
agreement, the court concluded that the agreement did not require spousal 
support payments for life, instead interpreting the language to limit the 
payments to a term of eighteen months.  The court reasoned that “[t]here was 
absolutely no intention that there be lifetime alimony.  There are meant to be 
18 months of spousal support, after a short marriage, and that even wouldn’t 
be paid if one of them died or if she remarried or cohabitated during that 
18[-]month period.” 
 
6 
[¶11]  With regard to the amounts owed by McLeod, the principal sum 
of the child support arrears is $29,200, and the spousal support owed is about 
$3,000.  Brochu contends that, after assessing both pre- and post-judgment 
interest, McLeod owes her over $400,000. 
[¶12]  In its order dated August 3, 2015, the court granted McLeod’s 
motion to dismiss, concluding that (1) laches is available as a defense in child 
support arrearage cases, and (2) the elements of laches were satisfied.  Brochu 
appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶13]  “Laches is negligence or omission seasonably to assert a right.  It 
exists when the omission to assert the right has continued for an 
unreasonable and unexplained lapse of time, and under circumstances where 
the delay has been prejudicial to an adverse party, and where it would be 
inequitable to enforce the right.”  Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Bell, 
1998 ME 123, ¶ 7, 711 A.2d 1292 (quotation marks omitted).  We review 
de novo whether the doctrine of laches bars a claim.  Cloutier v. Turner, 
2012 ME 4, ¶ 11, 34 A.3d 1146. 
 
7 
A. 
Whether Laches Applies to Child Support Arrearages  
[¶14]  Brochu contends that the court erroneously granted McLeod’s 
motion to dismiss because laches is not a viable defense to delinquent child 
support obligations.  We have, in some instances, assumed arguendo that 
laches could apply to claims for child support arrearages, see id., but we have 
never conclusively answered this question, see, e.g., Estate of Sawyer, 
2000 ME 3, ¶ 7 n.2, 742 A.2d 943 (“Because we find this action time-barred . . . 
we need not address the laches issue.”); Glew v. Glew, 1999 ME 114, ¶ 14, 
734 A.2d 676 (“Assuming that laches may apply to defeat a claim for child 
support arrearage, [the defendant] has failed to establish the requisite 
elements to bar [the] action.”); Bell, 1998 ME 123, ¶ 7, 711 A.2d 1292 
(“Assuming laches may be available to defeat a claim for a child support 
arrearage brought within the limitations period for paternity actions, [the 
defendant] has failed to prove the elements required for its applicability in 
this case.” (footnote omitted)); Trimble v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Human Servs., 
635 A.2d 937, 939 (Me. 1993) (“The question of whether laches, waiver, or 
estoppel can defeat an action for child support arrearages is one that we have 
declined to answer in two recent cases.”); Schneider v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
617 A.2d 211, 212 (Me. 1992) (“[W]e recently left unanswered the question 
 
8 
whether the defense of laches can defeat an action for child support 
arrearage.”). 
 
[¶15]  We announce today that the doctrine of laches does not apply to 
child support arrearages. 
[¶16]  There are several rationales underlying the inapplicability of 
laches to child support obligations.  First, child support arrearages are money 
judgments.  Carter v. Carter, 611 A.2d 86, 87-88 (Me. 1992).  We have 
previously explained that “the right to the payment of [child] support 
becomes vested as it becomes due,” id. at 87, and that a child support order is 
“essentially a judgment in monthly installments,” id. (quotation marks 
omitted).  Child support arrearages, therefore, are not subject to a statute of 
limitations.3  See Cloutier, 2012 ME 4, ¶ 9, 34 A.3d 1146; Carter, 611 A.2d at 
87-88 & n.2. 
[¶17]  As the United States Supreme Court observed, “[s]tatutes of 
limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in their conclusive effects are 
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”  Order of 
                                         
3  Money judgments are, however, subject to a statutory presumption of payment after twenty 
years.  14 M.R.S. § 864 (2015). 
 
9 
R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).  In 
the context of enforcement of money judgments, however, these 
considerations are, more often than not, incidental, if relevant at all.  By virtue 
of its status as a money judgment, a child support arrearage is not subject to 
the defense of laches.  See Lombardi v. Lombardi, 862 N.E.2d 436, 442 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (“Because [the husband’s] failure to make child support 
payments became vested as judgments by operation of law, the defense of 
laches is not available to him.” (alteration in original) (quotation marks 
omitted)); Hammond v. Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 201-203 (Wyo. 2000) 
(holding that laches does not apply to unpaid child support because “child 
support payments are judgments arising by operation of law” (quotation 
marks omitted)); Dep’t of Revenue, Child Support Enf’t Div. v. Valdez, 
941 P.2d 144, 152 (Alaska 1997) (concluding that the equitable defense of 
laches is unavailable in a child support collection case because child support 
arrearages are money judgments and therefore result in disputes that are 
legal rather than equitable in nature). 
[¶18]  Second, a growing number of jurisdictions—including California, 
Massachusetts, Indiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Vermont—have 
 
10 
similarly concluded that the doctrine of laches does not apply to child support 
arrearage cases.4 
[¶19]  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, compelling public policy 
considerations support our conclusion.  Allowing the assertion of laches in 
child support arrearage cases has the inevitable dual consequence of 
financially rewarding a parent for shirking his or her obligation to the child 
and penalizing the child for a parent’s delay in seeking support.  The child’s 
needs are the primary focus of an order awarding child support, not the 
diligence of the parent. 
                                         
4  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boswell, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“[T]he 
defense of laches only applies to child support owed to the state.”); Trent v. Trent, 829 N.E.2d 81, 87 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“This court has held the doctrine of laches simply does not apply to child 
support cases.” (quotation marks omitted)); Knaus v. York, 586 N.E.2d 909, 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) 
(same); Lombardi v. Lombardi, 862 N.E.2d 436, 442 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (“Because [the husband’s] 
failure to make child support payments became vested as judgments by operation of law, the 
defense of laches is not available to him.” (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)); 
Cook v. Miller, 771 N.Y.S.2d 779, 779-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (noting that New York statutes 
prevent courts from considering laches and that “[t]he purpose of those provisions is to preclude[] 
forgiveness of child support arrears to ensure that respondents are not financially rewarded for 
failing either to pay the order or to seek its modification” (quotation marks omitted) (second 
alteration in original)); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 638 (Pa. 2003) (“[L]aches has no 
application in support or paternity cases.” (quotation marks omitted)); Lyon v. Lyon, 466 A.2d 1186, 
1188 (Vt. 1983) (“Defendant next argues that plaintiff is barred from recovering arrearages by her 
laches and/or the doctrine of equitable estoppel.  However, we hold that these affirmative defenses 
are not available in an action brought to secure enforcement of a child support order.”). 
 
 
11 
B. 
Whether Laches Applies to Spousal Support Arrearages 
[¶20]  In contrast to child support arrearages, however, we conclude 
that the doctrine of laches is a viable defense in spousal support arrearage 
cases. 
[¶21]  Our refusal to apply the same broad rule is principally rooted in 
both the practical and public policy considerations that differentiate child 
support from spousal support obligations.  Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 1653(12)(A) (2015), a child support order typically terminates when the 
child “[a]ttains 18 years of age.”  Unlike child support orders, however, 
spousal support orders can, in some instances, be awarded for much longer 
durations, potentially the lifetime of the payee.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A) 
(2015).  Because the duration of a child support order is necessarily limited, 
but that of a spousal support order is not, spousal support obligations have a 
greater potential to accrue to exorbitant amounts over extended periods of 
time. 
[¶22]  Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, there are markedly 
different public policy considerations concerning whether laches should apply 
to overdue spousal support obligations as opposed to child support 
arrearages.  As we have discussed, one of the principal considerations in 
 
12 
disallowing the application of laches to claims involving child support 
arrearages is that the child should not be penalized for his or her parent’s 
nonfeasance with regard to seeking the overdue support.  In claims for 
spousal support arrearages, however, it is the same person who had the onus 
of seeking enforcement who suffers the consequences of a failure to seek 
enforcement in a timely fashion. 
C. 
Laches and Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest 
[¶23]  We turn next to the related determination of whether laches may 
apply to pre- and post-judgment interest in both child and spousal support 
arrearage cases.  We have previously made clear that the pre- and 
post-judgment interest statutes, see 14 M.R.S. §§ 1602-B, 1602-C (2015), are 
applicable to child support arrearages, Walsh v. Cusack, 2008 ME 74, ¶ 4, 
946 A.2d 414, and to spousal support arrearages, Brown v. Habrle, 
2010 ME 72, ¶ 19, 1 A.3d 401.  Pursuant to sections 1602-B(5) and 1602-C(2), 
“[o]n petition of the nonprevailing party and on a showing of good cause, the 
trial court may order that interest awarded by this section be fully or partially 
waived.”  A showing of good cause, therefore, can avert the assessment of both 
pre- and post-judgment interest. 
 
13 
[¶24]  Our decision that laches is inapplicable to child support 
arrearages is limited to the principal sum of the child support arrearages, and 
therefore does not preclude the application of laches to the accumulation of 
both pre-and post-judgment interest.  With regard to spousal support 
arrearages, we conclude that the doctrine of laches may be applied to both the 
principal sum and any interest that has accrued thereon. 
[¶25]  In sum, we conclude that the doctrine of laches may not be 
asserted as a defense to claims for the principal sum of child support 
arrearages, but may be asserted as a defense to the principal of overdue 
spousal support.  See id. 
D. 
Whether the Court Properly Applied the Doctrine of Laches to the 
Spousal Support Arrearages 
 
[¶26]  Having concluded that laches may be asserted as a defense to 
spousal support arrearages, the next question is whether the court properly 
concluded that McLeod satisfied both elements of laches. 
[¶27]  With regard to the first element of laches, the trial court found 
that Brochu’s thirty-five-year delay was unreasonable because “[t]he 
possibility of locating [McLeod] without undue effort existed well prior to 
2014.”  At the hearing, Brochu admitted that she made no effort to find 
McLeod from 1979 until 2014, when she searched his name on Google and 
 
14 
found him within minutes.  Brochu explained that she did not look for McLeod 
because “after the divorce[] . . . it just became . . . a non-issue” and because she 
“didn’t know how to go about finding him.” 
[¶28]  The court noted that because McLeod was tried in 1996 for being 
AWOL from the Marines, his location was discoverable from at least that point 
forward.  Indeed, with the advent of internet search engines like Google 
shortly after that, coupled with the sheer ease with which Brochu obtained 
McLeod’s contact information upon actually trying, the court found that 
Brochu was complacent and therefore unreasonable in not undertaking any 
effort to locate McLeod. 
[¶29]  The court did not err in concluding that Brochu’s thirty-five-year 
delay was unreasonable.  The first few years—and potentially even the first 
decade—of Brochu’s delay in seeking enforcement of the judgment were 
undoubtedly justified because McLeod’s whereabouts remained unknown 
despite Brochu’s efforts to find him, but after 1979, as the court found, she 
made absolutely no effort to look for him.  Although it is uncertain whether 
she would have found McLeod if she had looked before 1996, from at least 
that point forward the U.S. government knew of his whereabouts and 
presumably could have relayed that information to her.  Moreover, the ease 
 
15 
with which Brochu found McLeod’s information upon actually looking 
supports the court’s finding that Brochu unreasonably delayed seeking 
enforcement for the nearly twenty-year period between 1996 and 2014. 
 
[¶30]  With regard to the second element of laches, the court concluded 
that Brochu’s delay prejudiced McLeod because “[e]nsuing prejudice 
necessarily follows upon the passage of so very many years, exacerbated by 
the continuing accrual of interest far beyond the support ordered.”  The 
court’s finding, however, directly conflicts with our holding in Schneider v. 
Dep’t of Human Servs. that “[l]aches cannot be predicated on delay alone.”  
617 A.2d 211, 212 (Me. 1992). 
[¶31]  In support of its prejudice finding, the court cited the following 
from Dean v. Dean, 665 So. 2d 244, 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (citations 
omitted): 
Indeed, we are cited to no case in Florida or in any other 
jurisdiction in which a laches defense has been rejected where the 
wife, as here, has delayed thirty years before instituting 
proceedings for child support arrearages.  Although delay alone 
does not in itself establish the requisite prejudice, a delay of this 
magnitude under the circumstances of this case lends some 
credence to the husband’s claims of prejudice.  To face after thirty 
years—long after he has materially changed his position by 
getting on with his life and long after his children have attained 
majority so that the present action in no way affects their 
welfare—the enormous child support arrearage award made in 
this case [in which the interest exceeds the actual arrearages] 
 
16 
strikes us as an injustice to the husband and a corresponding 
windfall to the wife.  We certainly hold no brief for errant 
husbands who shirk their child support obligations, but under the 
circumstances of this case, the equities lie with the husband. 
 
 
[¶32]  Although there are some similarities between Dean and the 
instant case—namely the length of the delay and that the children are now 
well beyond the age of majority—Dean is nonetheless distinguishable because 
the facts in that case provided an ample basis for a prejudice finding, whereas 
here there is no such basis. 
[¶33]  In Dean, a mother sought child support arrearages in 1993, 
nearly thirty years after the debt started to accrue in 1964.  665 So. 2d at 245.  
The father asserted a laches defense.  Id.  In assessing whether the mother’s 
unreasonable delay prejudiced the husband, the court examined whether the 
father had changed his position based on a reliance that the mother had 
abandoned any child support claim.  See id. at 248.  The court found that the 
father, in fact, was prejudiced by the thirty-year delay, reasoning that 
[t]he husband has remarried three times over the past 
thirty years (1964-93), has had three additional children for 
whom he currently pays child support, and is now raising two 
children belonging to his new wife; moreover, he recently gave 
two expensive wedding gifts to the parties’ adult son, to wit; a 
$28,000 condominium and an $11,000 ring.  The husband 
expressly testified—and there is utterly no substantive or 
impeachment evidence to the contrary—that he would not have 
incurred such large financial obligations, especially the expensive 
 
17 
wedding gifts, if he had known that he would have to pay for the 
enormous child support arrearages ultimately ordered in this case, 
namely $35,847 plus interest of $52,743 for a total of $88,590.84.  
Given the husband’s limited financial resources, the large sum of 
child support arrearages which the husband has been ordered to 
pay, the uncontradicted assumption of substantial financial 
obligations during this time, part of which he would not, at least in 
part, have otherwise incurred, we cannot agree that no showing of 
any prejudice has been made by the husband. 
 
Id. at 248-49 (emphasis added).  In short, the Dean court found that the 
thirty-year delay coupled with the father’s assertions satisfied the prejudice 
element of laches. 
[¶34]  In this case, unlike in Dean, McLeod offered no testimony about 
anything he would or would not have done differently.5  McLeod’s testimony 
at the motion hearing was extremely limited; there was no testimony about 
many pertinent matters, such as (1) any obligation that he would not have 
incurred had he known that he would ultimately have to pay the child and 
spousal support arrearages; (2) his current living and family circumstances, 
including whether he had any additional children; or (3) his current financial 
                                         
5  The inquiry in Dean into the father’s financial decisions and circumstances to assess any 
prejudice he may have suffered due to the delay is consistent with our precedents stating that the 
defendant must have undertaken some action or inaction that he or she otherwise would not have.  
Trimble v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Human Servs., 635 A.2d 937, 939 (Me. 1993) (“The record is devoid of 
any evidence showing the kind of detrimental reliance, change of position, or prejudice to the payor 
spouse resulting from the payee spouse’s delay in requesting full payment of the child support 
owed her to constitute laches.”); Carter v. Carter, 611 A.2d 86, 87 (Me. 1992) (“[T]he doctrine of 
laches requires a showing that the delay caused prejudice to him, and defendant has not shown that 
he undertook any obligation that he would have forsaken.”). 
 
18 
status, including any assets and income.  In fact, when McLeod was asked 
about his current work status by Brochu’s attorney, McLeod’s attorney 
objected and the court sustained the objection.  Shortly thereafter, McLeod’s 
attorney attempted to recall McLeod as a witness so that he could be asked 
about his income and work status, but Brochu’s attorney objected and the 
additional testimony was excluded. 
 
[¶35]  Thus, unlike the extensive testimony in Dean about the father’s 
current financial obligations and the obligations that he contended he would 
not have undertaken had he known that he would have to pay child support 
arrearages, the instant case involves no testimony about prejudice to McLeod.  
Aside from the accumulation of interest, there is no evidentiary basis in the 
record for any other ground of prejudice.  Dean is therefore readily 
distinguishable as persuasive authority because here the passage of time and 
accumulation of interest has not been coupled with any assertion of prejudice. 
E. 
Interpretation of Settlement Agreement 
[¶36]  “Settlement agreements are analyzed as contracts, and the 
existence of a binding settlement is a question of fact.”  2301 Cong. Realty, LLC 
v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 2014 ME 147, ¶ 10, 106 A.3d 1131 (quotation marks 
omitted).  The interpretation of a settlement agreement, and the 
 
19 
determination of whether it is ambiguous, is reviewed de novo as with 
contract interpretation.  Flaherty v. Muther, 2013 ME 39, ¶ 17, 65 A.3d 1209. 
 
[¶37]  The settlement agreement here states, in pertinent part, that 
McLeod “shall pay to [Brochu], for her support, the sum of $160 per month 
during the joint lives of the parties, and so long as [Brochu] does not remarry 
or cohabit for a maximum of eighteen months from the date of this 
Agreement.” 
[¶38]  The court concluded that the settlement agreement did not 
entitle Brochu to spousal support payments for life, saying that “the court is 
not persuaded by [Brochu’s] argument, and finds that, rather than lifelong 
spousal support, the provision entitles [Brochu] to monthly spousal support 
for a period of eighteen months, so long as during that period neither party 
dies and [Brochu] does not remarry or cohabit.” 
[¶39]  On appeal, “[i]f we determine that a contract is unambiguous, 
then its interpretation is [] a question of law.  On the other hand, if the 
contract is ambiguous, then its interpretation is a question of fact for the 
factfinder, in which case we review the trial court’s conclusion for clear error.”  
Testa’s, Inc. v. Coopersmith, 2014 ME 137, ¶ 11, 105 A.3d 1037 (quotation 
marks and alteration omitted).  In the latter case, the trial court’s task is to 
 
20 
“determine the intent of the parties in entering [the] contract” using extrinsic 
evidence, if appropriate.  Estate of Barrows, 2008 ME 62, ¶ 3, 945 A.2d 1217 
(quotation marks omitted); see Estate of Barrows, 2006 ME 143, ¶ 23, 
913 A.2d 608. 
[¶40]  The court’s reading of the settlement agreement implies a comma 
between the words “cohabit” and “for,” illustrated in the following: McLeod 
“shall pay to [Brochu], for her support, the sum of $160 per month during the 
joint lives of the parties, and so long as [Brochu] does not remarry or 
cohabit[,] for a maximum of eighteen months from the date of this 
Agreement.”  Without this comma, there is ambiguity as to the term of the 
award, and the court therefore properly looked to the fact that Brochu and 
McLeod’s marriage lasted seven years to inform its interpretation.6  See id. 
[¶41]  It is quite unlikely that after a relatively short marriage the 
parties contemplated a lifetime spousal support award.  The court did not 
clearly err in interpreting the settlement agreement as establishing a spousal 
support award that was limited to an eighteen-month period upon the 
conditions that Brochu neither remarry nor cohabitate during that time. 
                                         
6  Notwithstanding a settlement agreement, the current spousal support guidelines (which were 
not in effect at the time of the settlement agreement and divorce judgment in this matter) provide 
that a rebuttable presumption exists against the award of general spousal support if the marriage 
lasted less than ten years.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A)(1). 
 
21 
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶42]  Although the court did not err in determining that the provisions 
of the settlement agreement, as incorporated in the divorce judgment, limit 
Brochu to a maximum of eighteen months of spousal support, we vacate the 
order of dismissal to the extent that the court’s conclusions are founded upon 
the application of the doctrine of laches.  On remand, the court may conduct 
further hearings, or rehearings, as it may deem appropriate, to consider the 
issues of support arrearages, interest, and the defense of laches consistent 
with our decision today. 
 
The entry is: 
Order of dismissal vacated.  Remanded to the 
District 
Court 
for 
further 
proceedings 
consistent with this decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs and at oral argument: 
 
Joe Lewis, Esq., Port City Legal, Portland, for appellant 
Catherine E. Brochu 
 
Brett N. Gabor, Esq., Hallett, Zerillo & Whipple P.A., 
Portland, for appellee Richard A. McLeod 
 
 
 
Portland District Court docket number 1056/78-79 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY