Title: EDDIE ANGELO FERNANDEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

EDDIE ANGELO FERNANDEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 198172 P.3d 730Case Number: S-07-0120Decided: 12/13/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
EDDIE 
ANGELO FERNANDEZ,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. 
Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Morgan.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Cathleen D. Parker, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Parker.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Mr. Eddie Angelo 
Fernandez appeals the judgment and sentence of the trial court after a jury 
found him guilty of two counts of aiding and abetting the crime of burglary and 
one count of conspiracy to commit burglary, contending that the trial court 
committed judicial misconduct "when it repeatedly instructed defense counsel on 
time management and created an atmosphere during the trial which negatively 
impacted [defense counsel's] defense of his client" and "when it interfered with 
Mr. Fernandez's attorney-client relationship by conducting a hearing, outside 
the presence of the jury [and after the close of evidence but before closing 
arguments], on the effectiveness of [defense counsel]."  We hold that the trial court did not 
commit judicial misconduct as contended by Mr. Fernandez and affirm the trial 
court's judgment and sentence.

 
 

Facts 
and circumstances of the crimes

 
 
[¶2]      At approximately 
4:00 a.m. on July 9, 2006, a woman saw two men stop their car in front of her 
house and inspect a Cadillac parked there.  
She called 911.  Officers 
Amend and Kroeger of the Casper Police Department responded to the 911 
call.  When Officer Amend arrived on 
scene, she observed that the Cadillac's driver's side door was open, and there 
was glass on the ground outside of the door. She then shined her spotlight on 
the Cadillac and saw Mr. Fernandez's leg step out of the door and onto the 
ground. Officer Amend believed that Mr. Fernandez had been lying in the front 
seat, as she was not able to see anybody in the Cadillac when she first pulled 
up to the vehicle.  The officer 
ordered Mr. Fernandez out of the car and began placing him in the back seat of 
her patrol vehicle with the assistance of Officer Kroeger.  

 
 
[¶3]      While placing Mr. 
Fernandez in the patrol vehicle, the officers heard another person hit a 
chain-link fence, and Officer Kroeger began to pursue the other subject on foot. 
  However, the officer was 
unable to apprehend the other subject. During the pursuit, Mr. Fernandez asked 
Officer Amend whether the other officer had gotten "Zach."  

 
 
[¶4]      Inside the 
Cadillac the officers found a fixed-blade knife.  Outside of the Cadillac, on the ground, 
they found a tire iron, a faceplate from the Cadillac's stereo, and a wallet 
containing Zach Paul Anderson's driver's license.  Inside a white 1991 Pontiac, parked in front 
of the Cadillac, the officers found the sheath to the knife and the Cadillac's 
four "spinners."  A "spinner" 
attaches to the wheel cover like a hubcap. The vehicle was registered to Paul 
Zachary Anderson.  

 
 
[¶5]      Officer Seavey 
transported Mr. Fernandez to the police department.  While being transported, Mr. Fernandez 
informed Officer Seavey that he could show him the location of another auto 
burglary. Mr. Fernandez told Officer Seavey that he had burglarized another 
vehicle with a friend. The second location was approximately ten to fifteen 
blocks, about a mile, from the first location. When Mr. Fernandez located the 
vehicle, a 1997 Eagle Talon, Officer Seavey observed that the driver's side 
window was broken out and a stereo appeared to be missing.  The owner of the vehicle also reported 
an IPod, CDs, and headphones were missing from the vehicle.  

 
 
[¶6]      Officer Francisco 
interviewed Mr. Fernandez at the police station, and Mr. Fernandez admitted to 
removing the "spinners" from the Cadillac.  
During the interview, Mr. Fernandez gave Officer Francisco inconsistent 
statements concerning who was driving the Pontiac and why he and his friend were in the 
area of the Eagle Talon.  Mr. 
Fernandez also informed Officer Francisco where the Eagle Talon's missing stereo 
could be located.  Finally, Mr. 
Fernandez admitted to Officer Francisco that he had watched his friend bust both 
vehicle windows.

 
 

Facts 
relevant to the trial court's time management concern

 
 
[¶7]      At the start of 
jury selection on Monday, December 11, 2006, outside of the hearing of the 
prospective jury, the trial court inquired as to prospective juror Dr. Brown's 
schedule.  The following dialogue 
occurred:

 
 
The 
Court:     Doctor, as 
indicated earlier, this will be a two- and perhaps two-and-a-half day 
trial.  And I guess to cut to the 
chase, is there  do you have patients or medical problems that cause a problem 
for you serving that period?

 
 
Prospective 
Juror Brown:   I'm scheduled to 
go to Gillette on Wednesday for a clinic, but it  I  it will be tough, but I 
can do it. 

 
 
The 
prosecutor then asked Dr. Brown questions concerning any possible hardship to 
his patients if he were unable to attend his scheduled clinic.  Because Dr. Brown admitted it would be a 
hardship on his patients to miss the clinic, the prosecutor requested that Dr. 
Brown be excused from jury service.  
When questioned by defense counsel, Dr. Brown admitted his burden would 
be lessened if the trial concluded by Tuesday evening.  Defense counsel requested that Dr. Brown 
not be excused:

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  Your Honor, I guess I 
would  I would see where we are at with it as far as voir dire.  I would like to keep Dr. Brown here for 
voir dire, at least.  And then if it 
appears that we're going to run into a time problem, then I think we  we can 
deal with that down the road.  But 
at this point, I don't believe that we're going to go beyond those two 
days.

 
 
The 
Court:     Okay.  I'm going to take that as kind of a 
commitment, absent something unforeseen, that we'll conclude Tuesday night for 
deliberation.  

 
 
[¶8]      Later during voir 
dire, a couple of prospective jurors complained of trials lasting too long and 
the detriment it caused to their livelihoods.  Thereafter, defense counsel specifically 
inquired of Dr. Brown's time constraints due to his 
practice:

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  And, Dr. Brown, you have a 
relatively busy practice; is that correct?

 
 
Prospective 
Juror Brown:   That's 
correct.

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  Okay.  If  if this  because of the questions 
and because of the case, if this case were to go beyond Tuesday night, would  
or into the wee hours of Tuesday, would it cause you  would you feel like you 
would need to rush to get it done?

 
 
Prospective 
Juror Brown:  
Perhaps.

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  Would it cause you an 
undue hardship to sit on this particular jury at this particular 
time?

 
 
Prospective 
Juror Brown:   If it went into 
Wednesday, it could.  That could 
cause patient problems.  

 
 
Defense 
counsel then asked the other prospective jurors whether they would feel 
pressured to reach a decision if the trial went into Wednesday.  One juror expressed concern that Dr. 
Brown was being favorably treated because he was a doctor:

 
 
Prospective 
Juror Zenow:  I think we all do.  We got stuff to do too, you know.  You can look at it any way you 
want.  My job is important to me, 
and I'm important to my company, too.  
You paid $30 a day, you know; but I feel it is my civic duty to do 
this.  But just because he's a 
doctor and I'm a mechanic  it doesn't matter what you are.  

 
 
[¶9]      Defense counsel 
then moved the trial court to excuse Dr. Brown for cause, asserting that "in 
light of what Dr. Brown had told us previously at the bench and what he's 
answered now, I would ask that  I believe he fits that statutory definition, 
and I ask he be excused for cause."  
The trial court responded by asking defense counsel if he was changing 
his assertion that the trial would be completed by 
Tuesday:

 
 
The 
Court:     Well, I'm 
not sure what you're telling me; that you're now telling me the trial won't [be] 
complete by Tuesday?

 
 
[Defense 
counsel]:  That's a possibility, 
Your Honor.

 
 
The 
Court:     Contrary to 
what you said before and what you told the jury?  Counsel, approach 
please.

 

Outside 
the hearing of the jury, the trial court inquired as to defense counsel's change 
of position.  After defense counsel 
expressed concern that Dr. Brown would be put in a precarious position if the 
trial ran long, the trial court admonished counsel:  "This is exactly the reason I called the 
doctor up early, out of the presence of the jury.  You've now aggravated the jury.  I don't understand your conduct, quite 
frankly, [defense counsel]."  During 
the subsequent hearing on Mr. Fernandez's legal representation, defense counsel 
admitted that excusing Dr. Brown upset one of the other prospective jurors.    

 
 
[¶10]   On this same subject of time 
management, Mr. Fernandez asserts in his appellate brief:

 
 
Later, 
[defense counsel] questioned one of the prospective jurors about his 
schedule.  The prospective juror 
indicated he could rearrange his schedule, "but if it goes longer than three 
days, I'll be in trouble if I can't go next week." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 61) [Defense 
counsel] reiterated, "Okay.  And I 
am fairly confident in saying it shouldn't go any longer than three days."  (Id.)  
The Court notified the prospective juror, "you won't  if it goes longer 
than three days, you won't be the only one in trouble."  (Id.) 

 
 
This 
assertion suggests that the trial court's comment was uttered during defense 
counsel's voir dire and revealed the trial court's displeasure with defense 
counsel.  Indeed, earlier in Mr. 
Fernandez's appellate brief, he states "[t]he trial court created such an 
atmosphere and detrimentally affected [defense counsel's] representation of his 
client through inappropriate remarks and its statement that [defense counsel] 
would be in trouble if the matter exceeded the time indicated."  The State's appellate counsel points 
out, however, that the referenced trial court utterance occurred during the 
prosecution's voir dire, not defense counsel's:

 
 
Prospective 
Juror Amend:  But if it goes longer 
than three days, I'll be in trouble if I can't go next 
week.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Okay. And I am fairly confident in saying 
it shouldn't go any longer than three days.

 
 
The 
Court:     You won't  
it if goes longer than three days, you won't be the only one in 
trouble.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  I can guarantee it won't be the eight 
like you did in the past.  

 
 

Facts 
relevant to the trial court's hearing to address defense counsel's effective 
representation

 
 
[¶11]   After the prosecution and defense 
had rested with respect to the presentation of the evidence but before closing 
arguments, and outside the presence of the jury, the trial court requested that 
defense counsel address its concerns regarding his representation of Mr. 
Fernandez.  The trial court 
expressed concerns about various stages of the trial, 
including:

 
 
1)         
counsel's knowledge of the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 
24;

 
 
2)         
counsel's aggravation of some of the jurors by seeking to excuse Dr. 
Brown;

 
 
3)         
counsel's lack of knowledge as to the testimony of the prosecution's 
witnesses;

 
 
4)         
counsel's lack of discussion of the evidence in his opening 
statement;

 
 
5)         
counsel's failure to comply with the Case Management Order; 
and

 
 
6)         
counsel's lack of preparedness for the jury instructions conference.  

 
 
Defense 
counsel was allowed to respond to each of the trial court's expressed 
concerns.  Following defense 
counsel's response, he stated he was comfortable with his work and had no 
regrets.  The trial court then 
permitted Mr. Fernandez to confer with separate counsel, defense counsel's 
supervisor.  After doing so, Mr. 
Fernandez informed the trial court he wanted "to proceed forward with [defense 
counsel]." 

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Fernandez and the State agree 
that this Court has adopted an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing claims 
of judicial misconduct.  Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 9, 73 P.3d 1041, 1049 (Wyo. 2003).  In Belden, this Court explained that its 
role on appeal is "not to determine whether the trial judge's conduct left 
something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better 
left unsaid," but whether the judge's behavior was so prejudicial that it denied 
a defendant a fair trial.  
Id. at ¶ 9, 73 P.3d  at 1050 (quoting United States v. 
Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 402 (2d Cir 1985)).  A conviction should be reversed only upon 
a showing that the trial court's conduct "so impressed the jury with the trial 
judge's partiality to the prosecution that this became a factor in determining 
the defendant's guilt."  Id.  This Court set forth the standard of 
review analysis as follows:

 
 
The test 
to determine if a judicial comment in the jury's presence constitutes reversible 
error is whether the remark was such that it was reasonably calculated to 
benefit the state or to prejudice the defendant's rights.  For comments by the trial judge to 
constitute reversible error the defendant must show that the remarks were 
prejudicial and that he or she was harmed thereby.

 
 

Id. 
(quoting 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 309 
(1991 & 2001 Supp.)).

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Fernandez scores as 
inappropriate and prejudicial the trial court's remarks concerning his defense 
counsel's voir dire of prospective juror Dr. Brown and the trial court's remark 
during the voir dire of prospective juror Amend that someone would be in trouble 
if the trial exceeded three days.  
The State responds that a fair reading of the trial court's remarks does 
not reflect they were reasonably calculated to benefit the prosecution or to 
prejudice Mr. Fernandez's right to a fair trial.  This Court has carefully read the record 
and considered the trial court's remarks and does not find that those remarks 
were calculated either to belittle and disparage defense counsel or to create 
the impression to the jury that the defense was without merit so as to deprive 
Mr. Fernandez of a fair and impartial trial.  Moreover, with respect to the trial 
court's remarks attending prospective juror Amend's voir dire, the record is 
clear, as the State points out, that the comment about someone being in trouble 
if the trial exceeded three days was not uttered during defense counsel's voir 
dire and could not reasonably be construed to have been directed at defense 
counsel.  We hold that the trial 
court did not err in any of the time management particulars alleged by Mr. 
Fernandez.

 
 
[¶14]   With respect to the trial court's 
hearing concerning defense counsel's effective representation, Mr. Fernandez 
challenges the propriety of such a hearing.  He claims the hearing interfered with 
his attorney-client relationship, but he does not demonstrate that 
interference.  He asserts only that 
"the implications of this interference could have reverberated 
through [defense counsel's] closing, his argument at sentencing, or during any 
advice he provided [Mr. Fernandez] after the hearing." (Emphasis supplied.)  This bald assertion is insufficient to 
demonstrate the alleged interference.  
In response, the State aptly notes that this Court has commended our 
trial courts' concern about possible claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  Belden, ¶ 13, 73 P.3d  at 1056.  We hold that the trial court did not err 
in conducting the hearing in this case.

 
 
[¶15]   We affirm the judgment and 
sentence.