Title: ROGER L. WAGNER AND M.C. WAGNER v. FIRST WYOMING BANK, N.A. LARAMIE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ROGER L. WAGNER AND M.C. WAGNER v. FIRST WYOMING BANK, N.A. LARAMIE1989 WY 223784 P.2d 224Case Number: 89-90Decided: 12/20/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROGER L. WAGNER AND M.C. 
WAGNER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

FIRST WYOMING BANK, N.A. 
LARAMIE, 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Georg Jensen of 
Law Offices of Georg Jensen, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Paul D. Schierer 
of Pence and MacMillan, Laramie, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants Roger L. 
Wagner and M.C. Wagner appeal the disposition of competing summary judgment 
motions focused on whether or not certain structures should be included in the 
appraised value of land the Wagners agreed to purchase from Appellee First 
Wyoming Bank, N.A. Laramie.

[¶2.]     We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand.

[¶3.]     The Wagners state the 
issues as:

1. Did the district court 
err in granting summary judgment on the complaint and counterclaim herein based 
upon a selection of evidence between conflicting 
affidavits?

2. Did the district court 
err in including the value of personal property in a judgment for specific 
performance on the purchase of real property?

The bank 
responds with these issues:

I. Did the district court 
err in granting summary judgment in Appellees' favor on the issue of specific 
performance?

II. Did the district 
court err in granting summary judgment in Appellees' favor on the issue of 
rental payments due?

[¶4.]     During the month of 
April 1981, Hardwood Specialties, Inc., a Wyoming corporation, presented an extensive 
loan proposal to the bank, which provided in part:

The proposed action by 
HARDWOOD SPECIALTIES, INC., (owner Roger L. Wagner) is to borrow approximately 
$150,000.00 to be used in the following manner. Eighty two thousand dollars 
($82,000.00) to be used to pay off existing short term construction loans and 
secure first deed of trust for lender against real property and buildings 
located in South Knoll Sub-division, Laramie, Wyoming, which has a current 
appraised value of $219,000.00 plus * * *.

The bank loaned 
the $150,000 to Hardwood Specialties, Inc. and secured the loan with a mortgage 
on that tract of land. The mortgage was signed by the Wagners individually and 
as officers of Hardwood Specialties, Inc.

[¶5.]     Hardwood Specialties, 
Inc. defaulted on the loan and declared bankruptcy. After obtaining relief from 
the automatic stay, the bank judicially foreclosed on the mortgage. Pursuant to 
a stipulation, the foreclosure order allowed the Wagners to rent the foreclosed 
property for one year at a rate of $1,500 per month and to purchase the property 
at an appraised value when the year concluded. This value was to be determined 
either by an appraiser chosen by the parties jointly or by the average of the 
two parties' respective appraisals. The one-year rental period commenced on 
November 1, 1986.

[¶6.]     The Wagners had an 
appraisal performed on the property on October 12, 1987, which assessed the 
property's value at $27,500. The bank's appraisal, dated December 21, 1987, 
estimated the property's value at $126,100. The bank's appraisal included the 
value of certain structures located on the property which were not included in 
the Wagners' appraisal. The Wagners claimed that these structures were personal 
property which were not permanently affixed to the ground or owned by the bank, 
and thus they were not part of the realty the Wagners were to 
purchase.

[¶7.]     The Wagners sued the 
bank for specific performance of their agreement, praying that the court order 
the sale of the property to them for $58,786. The Wagners calculated this figure 
by averaging the bank's appraisal amount, less $36,028 for the value of the 
structures the Wagners claimed were not part of the realty,1 and their appraisal amount. The 
bank counterclaimed, asking the court to order the Wagners to purchase the 
property for its appraisal amount of $126,100. The bank claimed that the 
Wagners' appraisal was improper due to the qualifications of their appraiser and 
prayed for past due rent from July 1, 1987. Both parties moved for summary 
judgment.

[¶8.]     After hearing the 
arguments on the motions for summary judgment and reviewing the supporting 
materials, the court decided that the Wagners' appraisal was defective in that 
the structures in dispute, which were valued at $36,028, were wrongfully 
excluded as personal property. This increased the Wagners' appraisal to 
$63,028,2 and the average of the two 
appraisals was increased to $94,514. The court also concluded that the Wagners 
owed the bank $12,000 in back rent. On March 13, 1989, the court entered its 
order setting the purchase price at $94,514 and awarding judgment for the bank 
and against the Wagners in the amount of $12,000. This appeal is taken from that 
order.

[¶9.]     Summary judgment is 
proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 
(Wyo. 1989); Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431 
(Wyo. 1987). 
We review a summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the 
same materials and following the same standards. Baros, 780 P.2d 341; Roybal v. 
Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989). We examine 
the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may 
fairly be drawn from the record. Baros, 780 P.2d 341; Doud v. First Interstate 
Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927 (Wyo. 1989). A material fact is one which, if 
proved, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element 
of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Albrecht v. 
Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1988); Johnston v. 
Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶10.]  The affidavits and exhibits submitted by 
the parties in support of their respective positions reveal that a question of 
material fact exists as to whether some of the structures on the foreclosed land 
are fixtures or chattels. The materials submitted by the Wagners indicate that 
the structures were temporarily placed on the land and that they are easily 
removable by the owners who were not parties to the loan transaction. Although 
the bank's supporting materials do not allude directly to how these structures 
are attached to the land, they do indicate that the intent was that they become 
part of the security for the loan.

[¶11.]  A chattel becomes a fixture when it 
becomes "so related to particular real estate that an interest in [it] arises 
under real estate law." Wyo. Stat. § 34-21-942(a)(i) (1977). In 
Wyoming State Farm Loan Board v. Farm Credit System Capital Corporation, 759 P.2d 1230, 1234 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Holland Furnace Co. v. Bird, 45 Wyo. 471, 
479-80, 21 P.2d 825 (1933)), we set out the following criteria for determining 
whether a chattel is a fixture:

"`1st. Real or 
constructive annexation of the article in question to the 
realty.

"`2d. Appropriation or 
adaptation to the use or purpose of that part of the realty with which it is 
connected.

"`3d. The intention of 
the party making the annexation to make the article a permanent accession to the 
freehold, this intention being inferred from the nature of the article affixed, 
the relation and situation of the party making the annexation and policy of the 
law in relation thereto, the structure and mode of the annexation and the 
purpose or use of which the annexation has been made.'"

[¶12.]  Of particular importance here is the 
determination of the parties' intent, which requires interpretation of the 
meaning of a number of written instruments, including the 1981 loan proposal, 
the resulting mortgage, and the stipulation reached in the foreclosure 
proceeding. The parties dispute the meaning of these instruments and the facts 
surrounding the formation of these instruments. In such a situation, summary 
judgment is unavailable. Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986); Greaser v. Williams, 703 P.2d 327 (Wyo. 1985). The decision 
on this issue by the finder of fact will determine whether the appraised value 
should include these structures.

[¶13.]  The bank further asserts that the Wagners 
should be estopped from claiming that, regardless of the type of property the 
structures are, they should not be included in the appraisal price. The bank 
premises this assertion upon representations it claims were made by the Wagners 
in the loan proposal. Equitable estoppel may be asserted as a defense or for the 
protection of a right, Gay Johnson's Wyoming Automotive Service Co. v. City of 
Cheyenne, 369 P.2d 863 (Wyo. 1962), and its application depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case. Lewis v. State Board of Control, 699 P.2d 822 (Wyo. 
1985). The party asserting equitable estoppel must show he (1) lacked knowledge 
of the facts, (2) was without a means to discover them, (3) relied upon the 
actions of the party sought to be charged, and (4) changed his position 
accompanying such reliance. Security State Bank of Basin v. Basin Petroleum 
Services, 713 P.2d 1170 (Wyo. 1986); Cheyenne 
Dodge, Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds Company, 613 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1980). The record 
indicates that the district court did not consider the question of estoppel when 
it decided to grant the bank's summary judgment motion. Thus, this remand does 
not preclude the bank from asserting and attempting to prove equitable estoppel 
as an affirmative defense to the Wagners' claim.

[¶14.]  The trial court also awarded $12,000 to 
the bank for past due rent on the property. This amount stems from the parties' 
agreement that the Wagners would pay rent of $1,500 per month for one year. The 
court found that the Wagners did not pay rent for three months during the 
one-year period and that they held over as tenants by sufferance for an 
additional five months. The Wagners do not dispute this finding and only take 
issue with the reasonableness of the rental rate. We conclude that this issue is 
not a genuine issue of material fact. The material facts to the past due rent 
payment action are the period of time the Wagners occupied the property without 
paying rent and the amount of rent they agreed to pay per month. These facts are 
not in issue. The bank was entitled to a reasonable monthly rent, which is the 
amount the parties' had agreed the Wagners would pay. See Lawer v. Mitts, 33 
Wyo. 249, 238 P. 654 (1925). The trial court correctly ruled in favor of the bank on this 
claim.

[¶15.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 This would have put the 
bank's appraisal at $90,072.

2 For some reason not 
readily apparent from the record, the district court decreased the Wagners' 
appraisal from $27,500 to $27,000.