Title: Adoption of Joshua S.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
Filed 1/24/08 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
Adoption of JOSHUA S., a Minor. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
) 
ANNETTE F., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
S138169 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
Ct. App. 4/1 
 
 
) 
D045067 
SHARON S., 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. JA46053 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
In Sharon S. v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 417 (Sharon S.), we 
validated a so-called “second parent” adoption, in which the same-sex partner of a 
birth mother adopted the mother’s child, while the mother remained a coparent.  
Subsequently, the prevailing party in that case, Annette F. (Annette), sought 
attorney fees under the “private attorney general” attorney fee statute, Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1021.5,1 to be paid by the losing party, Sharon S. 
(Sharon).  The trial court awarded such fees but the Court of Appeal reversed.  As 
will be explained at greater length below, the court concluded that because of 
Annette’s large personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, she was not acting 
as an authentic private attorney general.  We granted review to address that issue.  
                                              
1  
All statutory citations are to this code unless otherwise indicated. 
2 
 
We subsequently ordered supplemental briefing on the following question:  Does 
section 1021.5 authorize an award of attorney fees against a litigant who has done 
nothing to adversely affect the rights of the public or a substantial class of people 
other than raising an issue in the course of litigation over private rights and 
interests that results in an important appellate precedent adverse to that litigant?   
 
As explained below, we do not decide whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in determining that the extent and scope of the litigation transcended 
Annette’s personal stake in its outcome.  Rather, we hold that section 1021.5 does 
not authorize an award of attorney fees against an individual who has done 
nothing to adversely affect the rights of the public or a substantial class of people 
other than raise an issue in the course of private litigation that could establish legal 
precedent adverse to a portion of the public, and that therefore fees should not be 
awarded in the present case.  As elaborated below, both the language and 
legislative history of section 1021.5 support this interpretation.  We therefore 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal on that basis. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
The facts are for the most part undisputed.  Sharon and Annette were in a 
committed relationship from 1989 through mid-2000.  In 1996 Sharon was 
artificially inseminated and gave birth to Zachary.  While retaining her parental 
rights, Sharon consented to Annette’s adoption of the child.  (Sharon S., supra, 31 
Cal.4th at p. 422.)  
 
In 1999, Sharon was again artificially inseminated by the same sperm donor 
and gave birth to Joshua.  Sharon and Annette made the same agreement allowing 
Annette to adopt Joshua while Sharon retained her parental rights.  Thereafter the 
relationship between Sharon and Annette deteriorated and Annette left the family 
home.  Annette filed a motion for an order of adoption.  Sharon moved for court 
3 
 
approval to withdraw her consent to adopt and to dismiss Annette’s petition. 
Sharon relied on several arguments, including that the form of second parent 
adoption sought was unlawful.  (Sharon S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 422-424.)  
 
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the adoption.  Sharon filed and 
the Court of Appeal granted a petition for writ of mandate, holding that the form 
of second parent adoption sought by Annette was without statutory basis.  We 
granted Annette’s petition for review and reversed, finding that second parent 
adoptions like that sought by her were lawful.  We remanded the matter for 
resolution of factual issues related to Sharon’s claim that her consent to the 
adoption had been gained by fraud and duress and to ensure that the relevant 
administrative and statutory requirements of the second parent adoption had been 
satisfied.  (Sharon S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 445-446.)  
 
Before the resolution of the other issues, Annette moved for an award of 
attorney fees in the amount of $138,939.78 pursuant to section 1021.5.  Annette 
sought the fees for legal services provided by her counsel, Charles Bird of the firm 
Luce, Forward, Hamilton and Scripps (Luce), in the Court of Appeal and Supreme 
Court leading to the decision in Sharon S. 
 
Annette’s supporting papers noted that although the matter was not yet 
fully resolved, Annette had prevailed in the Supreme Court on the second parent 
adoption issue, an issue of benefit to a large class of persons, and argued that she 
was therefore entitled to an award of fees pursuant to the private attorney general 
provisions of section 1021.5 for that portion of the case. 
 
Bird, Annette’s attorney, filed a declaration stating that he was initially 
approached in August of 2001 by someone who had written an amicus curiae brief 
or letter brief on Annette’s behalf, when the matter was pending in the Court of 
Appeal, out of concern that the outcome of the case may have a far-reaching, 
detrimental effect.  Bird eventually decided to represent Annette, and argued on 
4 
 
her behalf in the Court of Appeal.  When the Court decided against Annette solely 
on the ground that second parent adoption was without statutory basis, Bird 
prepared an unsuccessful petition for rehearing and then a successful petition for 
review in this court.  He prepared the briefs and argued the case in this court, 
which included extensive analysis of the legislative history of the relevant statutes, 
a brief responding to the various amici curiae, an answer to Sharon’s petition for 
rehearing and an answer to Sharon’s petition for a writ of certiorari in the United 
States Supreme Court.   
Bird’s declaration further stated that Annette and Luce had entered into a 
written engagement agreement providing for payment of a fee at a described rate 
and for the reimbursement of expenses, with an estimation that the cost of oral 
argument in the Court of Appeal was likely to run between $8,000 and $10,000.  
He discussed with Annette that if she lost in the Court of Appeal, the fees from 
continuing the litigation would likely outstrip her ability to pay, but that he would 
continue to represent her on the second parent adoption issue because of his 
concern for the law made by the case.  He explained that his firm would take the 
chance of prevailing and potentially recovering attorney fees based on the public 
benefit resulting from the work.  
 
The trial court awarded $92,049.15 in attorney fees to Annette.  The court 
found the Supreme Court’s decision conferred a significant nonpecuniary benefit 
on a large class of persons and resolved an important issue of law.  The trial court 
also concluded, for reasons elaborated below, that notwithstanding the fact that 
Annette had a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, the cost of the 
litigation was out of proportion to that stake. 
 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  While not disputing that the litigation 
conferred significant benefits on a large class of persons and resolved an important 
issue of law, the court concluded that Annette’s personal stake in the litigation, 
5 
 
i.e., the vindication of her rights as an adoptive parent, were so large that a private 
attorney general award under section 1021.5 was not justified.  In so concluding, 
the court rejected Annette’s argument that nonpecuniary interests such as hers 
were not to be counted among the personal interests that could defeat a section 
1021.5 award. 
 
We granted review and subsequently sought the supplemental briefing 
described above. 
II.  
DISCUSSION 
A. The Necessity and Financial Burden Requirement 
Eligibility for section 1021.52 attorney fees is established when “(1) 
plaintiffs’ action ‘has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting 
the public interest,’ (2) ‘a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary 
has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons’ and (3) ‘the 
necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the 
award appropriate.’ ”  (Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council 
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 935 (Woodland Hills).) 
There is no question that the litigation here did yield a substantial and 
widespread public benefit.  In Sharon S., supra, 32 Cal.4th at page 437, we 
estimated that there were between 10,000 and 20,000 second parent adoptions in 
                                              
2  
Section 1021.5 provides in pertinent part: “Upon motion, a court may 
award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in 
any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting 
the public interest if:  (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, 
has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the 
necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one 
public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award 
appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the 
recovery, if any.” 
6 
 
the state that would be jeopardized by the Court of Appeal ruling invalidating such 
an adoption.  But Sharon and Annette disagree as to whether the third factor 
applies in the present case. 
 
As this court has elaborated with respect to this third requirement (hereafter 
sometimes referred to as the necessity and financial burden requirement):  “ ‘An 
award on the “private attorney general” theory is appropriate when the cost of the 
claimant’s legal victory transcends his personal interest, that is, when the necessity 
for pursuing the lawsuit placed a burden on the plaintiff “out of proportion to his 
individual stake in the matter.”  [Citation.]’ ”  (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d 
at p. 941.)  A court generally determines whether the litigation places a 
disproportionate burden on the individual by comparing the expected value of the 
litigation at the time it was commenced with the costs of litigation.  (See Los 
Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1, 
9-10 (Los Angeles Police Protective League).) 
 
The above method assumes that a plaintiff has a pecuniary interest in the 
litigation that is more or less quantifiable.  What happens when a plaintiff has no 
pecuniary interest?  Annette argues that when no pecuniary interest is present, a 
plaintiff as a matter of law meets the necessity and financial burden requirement.  
She points to language in Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 321 
(Press), a case in which we determined that a party that enforced a right to gather 
signatures for a statewide initiative petition in front of a supermarket was eligible 
for section 1021.5. fees.  In considering the necessity and financial burden 
requirement, the Press court stated: “That plaintiffs’ personal interests in the 
outcome of the oil profits initiative were sufficient to induce them to bring this 
action is irrelevant.  As the statute makes clear, subdivision (b) of section 1021.5 
focuses not on plaintiffs’ abstract personal stake, but on the financial incentives 
and burdens related to bringing suit.  Indeed, in the absence of some concrete 
7 
 
personal interest in the issue being litigated, the putative plaintiff would lack 
standing to bring an action.”  (Press, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 321, fn. 11.)  Annette 
interprets this language as signifying that when a party has no pecuniary interest in 
the outcome of the litigation, it will automatically satisfy the necessity and 
financial burden requirement. 
 
Sharon disagrees with this interpretation of Press, and points to several 
Court of Appeal cases holding that private, nonpecuniary interests of some kind 
can disqualify a party from eligibility for section 1021.5 attorney fees.  (See 
Punsly v. Ho (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 102, 113-114; Hammond v. Agran (2002) 99 
Cal.App.4th 115 (Hammond); Williams v. San Francisco Bd. of Permit Appeals 
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 961, 970-971; Families Unafraid to Uphold Rural El 
Dorado County v. Bd. of Supervisors (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 505, 516; but see 
Families Unafraid, at pp. 527-528 (dis. opn. of Sims, J.).)   
 
Although Annette argues that nonpecuniary interests may not disqualify a 
party from eligibility for section 1021.5 attorney fees, her defense of her own 
attorney fee award does not depend on that proposition being categorically true.  
Rather, the trial court in the present case, while not ruling out that Annette’s 
personal interest could render her ineligible for section 1021.5 fees, instead 
concluded that the cost of the litigation transcended those interests.  Admitting the 
difficulty if not impossibility of estimating the monetary value of Annette’s 
personal interests in her children, it observed that Annette’s attorney, Charles Bird, 
offered to represent her because of the public significance of the litigation and the 
importance of second parent adoptions for families and children throughout 
California.  It also noted that prior to Bird’s entry in the case, Annette had 
produced only letter briefs that were inadequate for addressing the second parent 
adoption issue.  The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, held, and Sharon now 
argues, that Bird’s motivation is not relevant, and that Annette’s considerable 
8 
 
personal interests in vindicating her parental rights disqualifies her from attorney 
fees. 
 
We need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in holding 
that the costs of the present litigation transcended Annette’s personal interests.  As 
discussed below, we conclude that even if the trial court was within its discretion 
in so holding, section 1021.5 attorney fees may not be awarded in the present case 
for a different reason:  Sharon is not the type of party on whom private attorney 
general fees were intended to be imposed. 
B. Sharon’s Litigation Is Not Within the Scope of Section 1021.5 
Sharon contends that section 1021.5 attorney fees should not be imposed on 
parties such as herself, an individual who has only engaged in litigation to 
adjudicate private rights from which important appellate precedent happens to 
emerge, but has otherwise done nothing to compromise the rights of the public or 
a significant class of people.  We agree. 
In evaluating Sharon’s claim, we are mindful that section 1021.5 is an 
exception to the general rule in California, commonly referred to as the American 
rule and codified in section 1021, that each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily pay 
his or her own attorney fees.  (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 278-279.)  In 
support of the American rule is the argument “that since litigation is at best 
uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a 
lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to 
vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ 
counsel.”  (Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing (1967) 386 U.S. 714, 718.) 
Although not explicit in either the statute or case law, it may be supposed 
that one unspoken justification for departing from the American rule in the case of 
section 1021.5 private attorney general fees is that it is equitable to impose public 
9 
 
interest attorney fees on parties that have done something to adversely affect the 
public interest.  Indeed, although no case has explicitly addressed the matter, our 
review of the case law reveals that in virtually every published case in which 
section 1021.5 attorney fees have been awarded, the party on whom the fees have 
been imposed had done something more than prosecute or defend a private 
lawsuit, but instead had engaged in conduct that in some way had adversely 
affected the public interest.  In Woodland Hills, for example, the plaintiff was 
requesting attorney fees for successfully blocking the City of Los Angeles’s 
unlawful approval of a subdivision.  (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 926-
927.)  In Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, in which this court first endorsed 
the doctrine of private attorney general fees, the historic underlying litigation 
compelled the state to change its method of distributing school funding to comply 
with the equal protection clause of the state Constitution.  In other words, in both 
these cases, public interest litigation obtained a substantial benefit by causing a 
change in the defendant’s behavior, whose actions or failure to act was somehow 
impairing the statutory or constitutional rights of the public or a significant class 
of people.  And so it is in the other published cases we have reviewed.3 
                                              
3  
(See, e.g., Harbor v. Deukmejian (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1078, 1083 [Governor’s 
veto of a part of a nonappropriations bill is unconstitutional]; Saleeby v. State Bar 
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 547, 568 [State Bar failed to provide adequate procedures for 
individuals making claims on the Client Security Fund (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 6140.5)]; People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Seal Beach 
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 591, 602 [city council proposed amendments in violation of 
“meet and confer” requirement under Gov. Code, § 3505]; Folsom v. Butte County 
Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668, 671-673 [county failed to use 
transportation funds to create public transit systems required by the Transportation 
Development Act of 1971]; Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2006) 135 
Cal.App.4th 663, 682-683 [corporation labeled products in violation of false 
advertising law]; Krumme v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 924, 945 
[corporation utilized insurance brokers in violation of statutory requirements]; 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
10 
 
 
To determine whether there is in fact an implicit requirement that the party 
on whom attorney fees are imposed be responsible for adversely affecting the 
public interest, we first look first to the words of the statute, “ ‘because they 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Edgerton v. State Personnel Bd. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1359-1363 [state 
department discharge of employee for positive drug test violated federal 
regulations]; Friends of the Trails v. Blasius (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 810, 825-826 
[landowner retained control over use of a road after the public acquired an 
easement]; Notrica v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 911, 927-928 
[quasi-public agency implemented insurance claim reserve practices resulting in 
plaintiff paying higher insurance premiums and receiving lower dividends, in 
violation of the implied covenant of good faith]; County of San Diego v. Lamb 
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 845, 851 [county improperly required the defendant to 
reimburse funds received from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
program]; City of Fresno v. Press Communications, Inc. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 
32, 43-44 [city enacted an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of advertisements 
in violation of the First Amendment]; Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Aakhus (1993) 
14 Cal.App.4th 162, 169-175 [antiabortion protestors engaged in conduct in 
violation of plaintiff’s constitutional right to privacy]; Beasley v. Wells Fargo 
Bank (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1412 [bank improperly assessed fees against 
credit card customers who failed to make timely payments or exceeded their credit 
card limits]; Sokolow v. County of San Mateo (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 240 
[mounted patrol engaged in sex discrimination in violation of federal and state 
law]; Los Angeles Police Protective League, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1, 6 [city 
improperly disregarded a ruling of its administrative board]; Citizens Against Rent 
Control v. City of Berkeley (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 213, 221 [city enacted an 
ordinance limiting contribution to campaign committees in violation of the First 
Amendment]; Kern River Public Access Com. v. City of Bakersfield (1985) 170 
Cal.App.3d 1205, 1225 [city approved subdivision maps in violation of statute]; 
Slayton v. Pomona Unified School Dist. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 538, 541 [school 
district engaged in conduct in violation of plaintiffs’ rights under California 
statute, state, and federal Constitutions]; Schmid v. Lovette (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 
466, 472-473 [school district required employees to give oath in violation of 
plaintiff’s rights under state and federal Constitutions]; Daniels v. McKinney 
(1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 42, 48-49 [sheriff failed to comply with a court order 
requiring him to provide three hours of exercise time per week to female 
inmates].) 
11 
 
generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ ”  (Murphy v. 
Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103.)  Although the 
statute does not explicitly address the type of conduct that would make a party 
liable for attorney fees, it does suggest what conduct the Legislature had in mind.  
Section 1021.5 authorizes fees for “any action which has resulted in the 
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest . . . .”  (Italics 
added.)  The enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest 
implies that those on whom attorney fees are imposed have acted, or failed to act, 
in such a way as to violate or compromise that right, thereby requiring its 
enforcement through litigation.  It does not appear to encompass the award of 
attorney fees against an individual who has done nothing to curtail a public right 
other than raise an issue in the context of private litigation that results in important 
legal precedent. 
 
We also find support for this interpretation in the legislative history.  
According to one legislative history document, “the purpose of [section 1021.5] is 
to provide statutory authority for an award of attorneys’ fees in public interest 
litigation.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1310 (1977-1978 
Reg. Sess.) as amended May 18, 1977) p. 1.)  Testimony before the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary on behalf of section 1021.5 affirmed that the statute 
would “effectuate the enforcement of laws enacted by the legislature of the state in 
the public interest.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Hearing on Assem. Bill No. 1310 
(1977-1978 Reg. Sess.), testimony of John R. Phillips, p. 15 (Aug. 14, 1977).)  As 
these passages suggest, the Legislature was focused on public interest litigation in 
the conventional sense: litigation designed to promote the public interest by 
enforcing laws that a governmental or private entity was violating, rather than 
private litigation that happened to establish an important precedent. 
12 
 
This conclusion is also consistent with our recent holding in Connerly v. 
State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169.  In refusing to impose section 1021.5 
attorney fees on amici curiae that had unsuccessfully argued in favor of state 
affirmative action policies, we noted that “[g]enerally speaking, the opposing party 
liable for attorney fees under section 1021.5 has been the defendant person or 
agency sued, which is responsible for initiating and maintaining actions or 
policies that are deemed harmful to the public interest and that gave rise to the 
litigation.”  (37 Cal.4th at pp. 1176-1177, italics added.)  We noted also that case 
law has recognized that attorney fees may sometimes be assessed against “real 
parties in interest that had a direct interest in the litigation, the furtherance of 
which was generally at least partly responsible for the policy or practice that gave 
rise to the litigation . . . .”  (Id. at p. 1181, italics added.)  In concluding that the 
state rather than amici curiae should be assessed attorney’s fees, we found critical 
that “the state, through its elected representatives, possessed the power, and indeed 
the exclusive power, to abandon or change the statutory scheme [challenged by the 
underlying litigation].  Because it declined to do so, the burden of paying . . . 
attorney fees is properly imposed on the state, rather than on an amicus curiae 
. . . .”  (Id. at p. 1183.)  Thus, in Connerly we acknowledged that the parties 
against whom attorney fees should be assessed should be those responsible for the 
policy or practice adjudged to be harmful to the public interest. 
 
This is not to say that a party cannot be held liable for section 1021.5 
attorney fees for engaging in litigation.  When a party initiates litigation that is 
determined to be detrimental to the public interest, attorney fees have been 
imposed.  In Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust v. City Council of San Marcos 
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 614, for example, Wal-Mart attacked on technical grounds 
a referendum that was to decide whether it could locate within the city, and the 
city was awarded attorney fees after it prevailed in the litigation.  Wal-Mart thus 
13 
 
sought a judgment that would adversely affect the public interest by preventing the 
city’s electorate from exercising its power of referendum.  (See also Hull v. Rossi 
(1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1763 [§ 1021.5 fees awarded when a party successfully 
defended against litigation that would have restricted its ballot arguments for and 
against two local initiatives].)  Moreover, attorney fees have been awarded to 
those defending against suits by public entities, or those purporting to represent 
the public, that seek to expand the government’s power to curtail important public 
rights.  (See County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance (1986) 178 
Cal.App.3d 848, 866-869 [attorney fees awarded to defendant protesters when suit 
by county and private parties to compel protesters to pay for costs resulting from 
the protest would have chilled defendants’ right to protest].) 
 
In contrast, Sharon was a private litigant with no institutional interest in the 
litigation, and the judgment she sought in the present case would have settled only 
her private rights and those of her children and Annette.  She simply raised an 
issue in the course of that litigation that gave rise to important appellate precedent 
decided adversely to her.4 
                                              
4  
The one case that arguably deviates from this rule is Hammond, supra, 99 
Cal.App.4th 115.  There, Agran’s candidate statement for city council was 
challenged by Hammond, a political rival, partly because the statement was 
allegedly misleading, and partly because the statement articulating Agran’s 
opposition to building an airport was supposedly inconsistent with Elections Code 
section 13307, providing that candidate statements speak of the qualifications of 
the candidate.  Hammond argued that Agran’s views about the airport were not 
“qualifications.”  The court held that Agran could get attorney fees against 
Hammond for his successful litigation establishing that the candidate’s statement 
authorized by section 13307 could include candidates’ views of the issues, 
although it also held that Agran could not obtain attorney fees for litigation 
involving whether or not the statement was misleading, an issue that did not 
transcend Agran’s personal interest.  (Hammond, supra, at pp. 129, 132-135.) 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
14 
 
 
Annette suggests that a requirement that an individual liable for private 
attorney general fees must have done something to compromise the rights of the 
public is inconsistent with the well-established principle that a showing of bad 
faith is not necessary for an award of section 1021.5 fees.  (See, e.g., Citizens 
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 231.)  Not 
so.  We impose no such bad faith requirement, but hold only, consistent with the 
language and evident intent of the statute, that the party against whom such fees 
are awarded must have done or failed to do something, in good faith or not, that 
compromised public rights.  Nor do we deny that in some cases the litigation 
underlying the section 1021.5 award can involve rights or benefits that are 
somewhat intangible, such as clarifying important constitutional principles.  But 
even in such cases, the party against whom the fees are awarded is responsible in 
some way for the violation of those rights and principles.  (See, e.g., Harbor v. 
Deukmejian, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1103 [enforcing limitations on Governor’s veto 
power].)  Nor does the proposed holding in any way contradict the 
incontrovertible proposition that section 1021.5 fees may be sought in the 
appropriate case not only against governmental entities and corporations but 
against private individuals.  (See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Aakhus, supra, 
14 Cal.App.4th 162 [anti-abortion protestors violating privacy rights of clinic 
patrons assessed § 1021.5 fees].) 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
 
Hammond is distinguishable insofar as election law litigation inherently 
implicates public rights.  We need not decide whether Hammond is correct that a 
suit between political rivals that results in significant election law precedent may 
give rise to section 1021.5 fees. 
15 
 
 
Of course, whether litigation generates important appellate precedent is a 
factor courts may consider in determining whether the litigation can be said to 
enforce an important right affecting the public interest.  (See Los Angeles Police 
Protective League, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 12.)  But even when an important 
right has been vindicated and a substantial public benefit conferred, and when a 
plaintiff’s litigation has transcended her personal interest, we conclude that section 
1021.5 was not intended to impose fees on an individual seeking a judgment that 
determines only his or her private rights, but who has done nothing to adversely 
affect the public interest other than being on the losing side of an important 
appellate case.  Because Sharon fits squarely into this category, we affirm the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment reversing the trial court’s attorney fee award.5 
 
III. 
DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C. J. 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
                                              
5  
In light of our disposition of the case, we need not address the 
constitutional and other issues raised by Sharon. 
 
1 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Adoption of Joshua S. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 132 Cal.App.4th 561 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S138169 
Date Filed: January 24, 2008 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Cynthia Ann Bashant 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Blatchley & Blatchley, William E. Blatchley; John L. Dodd & Associates and John L. Dodd for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps and Charles A. Bird for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Jennifer C. Pizer, Brian Chase, Shannon Minter and Courtney Joslin for Children of Lesbians and Gays 
Everywhere, Family Pride Coalition, Los Angeles Gay & Lesbian Center, Lambda Legal Defense & 
Education Fund, Lesbian & Gay Lawyers Association of Los Angeles, National Center for Lesbian Rights, 
Our Family Coalition, Pop Luck Club, San Diego Family Matters and Tom Homann Law Association as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Rose, Bien & Asaro, Andrea G. Asaro and Amy Whelan for American Civil Liberties Union, Bay Area 
Lawyers for Individual Freedom, Legal Services for Children, Western Center on Law & Poverty, Youth 
Law Center and Protection & Advocacy, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, Ellison Folk, Robert S. Perlmutter and Jenny K. Harbine for Planning and 
Conservation League, Natural Resources Defense Council and Baykeeper as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Scott Wm. Davenport and Jason J. Molnar for Los Angeles 
County Bar Association and Beverly Hills Bar Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Judith E. Klein for Minor. 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John L. Dodd 
John L. Dodd & Associates 
17621 Irvine Boulevard, Suite 200 
Tustin, CA  92780 
(714) 731-5572 
 
Charles A. Bird 
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps 
600 West Broadway, Suite 2600 
San Diego, CA  92101-3372 
(619) 236-1414