Title: Commission v. Suburban Hospital

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

No. 23, September Term, 1997
State of Maryland Commission on Human Relations v. Suburban Hospital, Inc.
[Involves An Attempt By The State Of Maryland Commission On Human Relations To
Obtain Injunctive Relief Against A Hospital For The Benefit Of A Doctor Who Was
Allegedly The Victim Of Gender Discrimination] 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1997
NO.  23
___________________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RELATIONS
v.
SUBURBAN HOSPITAL, INC.
___________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Wilner
McAuliffe, John F. (retired, specially assigned)
Karwacki, Robert L. (retired, specially assigned)
Thieme, Raymond G. Jr. (specially assigned),
JJ.
___________________________________________
Opinion by McAuliffe, J.
___________________________________________
            
Filed:  January 16, 1998
This case involves an attempt by the State of Maryland Commission on Human
Relations (the Commission) to obtain ex parte and interlocutory relief against Suburban
Hospital, Inc. (the Hospital) for the benefit of Dr. Carol L. Bender.  The Commission
contends that the Hospital is discriminating against Dr. Bender because of her sex by
imposing conditions on the renewal of her staff privileges at the Hospital.
Dr. Bender filed a complaint with the Commission in August, 1993, alleging sexual
discrimination.  In November, 1995, the Commission issued a written finding of “probable
cause” and initiated conciliation efforts.  In February, 1996, after finding that conciliation
attempts had failed, the Commission filed a statement of charges with the State Office of
Administrative Hearings and requested a public hearing.  That administrative proceeding is
pending.
On February 20, 1996, the Commission filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, seeking ex parte and interlocutory injunctive relief, including the
continuation of Dr. Bender’s privileges pending the outcome of the administrative
proceeding.  The Commission, relying on Sections 4 and 16(a) of Article 49B of the
Maryland Code (1957, 1994 Repl. Vol.), alleged that :
The Hospital has engaged in unlawful discriminatory employment
practices by discriminating against Dr. Bender in the terms, conditions
and privileges of her employment, and by interfering with, restricting,
and attempting to foreclose her opportunities for employment with
patients and with other third parties, all because of her sex.
Counsel for the hospital filed a prompt response, arguing, among other things, that an
injunction should not be granted because:
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The Commission cannot meet the four-prong test for the grant of injunctive
relief - likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of greater harm by
denying than granting the injunctive relief, irreparable harm to Dr. Bender, and
serving the public interest.
In particular, the Hospital argued that the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success
on the merits was improbable because Dr. Bender was not an employee of the hospital, and
she was therefore not entitled to the protection of the Maryland Fair Employment Practices
Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1994 Repl. Vol.), Art.  49B, §§ 14-18.  On February 21, 1996,
the Circuit Court acted on the Commission’s request without a hearing.  Judge James Ryan
wrote the word “Denied” across the face of the proposed order submitted by the
Commission, and signed and dated his action.  The Commission appealed on the same day.
In the Court of Special Appeals, the Commission contended that the circuit judge had
abused his discretion in refusing to issue an ex parte injunction and in refusing to issue an
interlocutory injunction.  The Hospital argued that the issues were moot because its Board
of Trustees had denied Dr. Bender’s application for reappointment on February 21, 1996,
and had therefore effectively severed her affiliation with the Hospital.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the appeal from the denial of an ex parte
injunction was moot because, under the circumstances of the case, the issuance of an ex
parte injunction would offer no effective remedy.  Comm. on Human Relations v. Suburban,
113 Md.  App.  62, 78, 686 A.2d 706, 714 (1996).  The court further held that the question
of interlocutory injunctive relief was not moot because the circuit court could effectively
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reinstate the affiliation of the parties pending resolution of the administrative proceedings,
but concluded that Judge Ryan’s order of denial was directed only to the request for an ex
parte injunction.  Accordingly, the intermediate appellate court held that the circuit court had
not acted on the request for an interlocutory injunction and that the Commission’s appeal
should be dismissed.  Id., 113 Md.  App.  at 81, 686 A.2d at 716.
The Court of Special Appeals did not, however, simply dismiss the appeal.  The court
went on to consider at length the Commission’s likelihood of success on the merits, based
upon the allegations of fact contained in the pleadings.  Concluding that the Commission had
no likelihood of ultimate success because the facts as alleged did not demonstrate the
existence of an employment relationship with the Hospital or the interference of an
employment relationship with others, the Court of Special Appeals directed in its mandate
that the circuit court dismiss the Commission’s action.  Id., 113 Md.  App. at 104, 686 A.2d
at 727.
Discussion
We agree, for the reasons stated by the Court of Special Appeals, that under the
circumstances of this case the appeal from the denial of an ex parte injunction is moot.
Moreover, we agree that the circuit judge’s order of denial addressed only the request for ex
parte relief, and that the appeal was therefore properly dismissed.
We do not agree, however, with the action of the intermediate appellate court in
mandating the dismissal of the claim for interlocutory injunctive relief.  As the Court of
Special Appeals properly held, the appeal was only from the denial of an ex parte injunction,
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and that appeal was properly dismissed as moot.  The circuit court had not acted on the
request for interlocutory relief, and nothing was properly before the intermediate appellate
court on that issue.  Although the Court of Special Appeals might well have included a
discussion of the law for the guidance of the lower court on remand, it could not, under the
circumstances,  direct a disposition of issues not before it, and in any event the court should
not have undertaken an examination of the likelihood of success on the merits before the
parties had been given the opportunity to present evidence on the issues.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO DISMISS
THE APPEAL.   COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID
BY SUBURBAN HOSPITAL, INC.