Title: Oregon v. Mills

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  October 17, 2013 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
 
STATE OF OREGON, 
Petitioner on Review, 
 
v. 
 
 
KENNETH HERBERT MILLS, 
Respondent on Review. 
 
(CC D100632T; CA A145446; SC S060485) 
 
 
En Banc 
 
 
On review from the Court of Appeals.* 
 
 
Argued and submitted March 12, 2013 at Willamette University College of Law, 
Salem. 
 
 
Ryan Kahn, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the 
brief for petitioner on review.  With him on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney 
General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General. 
 
 
Morgen E. Daniels, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the 
brief for respondent on review.  With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, 
Office of Public Defense Services. 
 
 
LANDAU, J. 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit 
court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.    
 
 
 
 
 
*Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Michael J. McElligott, Judge. 
248 Or App 648, 274 P3d 230 (2012). 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
LANDAU, J. 
1 
 
 
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution provides that, among other 
2 
things, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by 
3 
an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed."  At issue 
4 
in this case is whether that provision implicitly requires the state to treat the location 
5 
where the offense was committed as a material allegation, which it must prove beyond a 
6 
reasonable doubt.  The state contends that nothing in the wording of Article I, section 11, 
7 
requires such proof.  In the state's view, the constitution merely grants a defendant a right 
8 
to object -- or waive objection -- to improper venue, and in this case defendant waived 
9 
that right by failing to assert it before trial.  Defendant argues that, although the state is 
10 
correct that Article I, section 11, itself does not say anything about requiring proof of 
11 
venue as a part of the state's case, this court's cases nevertheless have read the section to 
12 
impose that requirement, and, in this case, the state failed to satisfy it.   
13 
 
 
The Court of Appeals, adhering to those cases, concluded that the state was 
14 
required to establish venue beyond a reasonable doubt and that, in this case, the state 
15 
failed to meet that burden.  State v. Mills, 248 Or App 648, 274 P3d 230 (2012).  The 
16 
court consequently reversed the judgment of the trial court, which had rested on that 
17 
court's conclusion that the state's proof of venue was adequate.   We conclude that our 
18 
earlier cases were mistaken in reading Article I, section 11, to require the state to prove 
19 
venue as a material allegation.  The venue guarantee of that constitutional provision 
20 
recognizes a right to a trial in a particular place, which right must be asserted before trial.  
21 
We further conclude, however, that it would be unfair to hold that defendant in this case 
22 
2 
 
forfeited that right, given that, under the law at the time of trial, he was permitted to raise 
1 
the issue during trial.  We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, reverse 
2 
the judgment of the circuit court, and remand for further proceedings.    
3 
I.  FACTS 
4 
 
 
The relevant facts are few and undisputed.  A City of North Plains police 
5 
officer determined that defendant was driving a vehicle at 80 miles per hour near 
6 
milepost 57 on Highway 26.  The officer pursued defendant and stopped him near 
7 
milepost 56.  The officer asked defendant for his license, and defendant admitted that his 
8 
license was suspended.   
9 
 
 
The state charged defendant with driving while his license was revoked.  
10 
ORS 811.182.  Defendant waived a jury, and the case was tried to the court.  After the 
11 
state rested, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had failed 
12 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed the offense in Washington 
13 
County.  The state argued that the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable 
14 
factfinder to determine that defendant had committed the offense in North Plains, 
15 
between mileposts 56 and 57 on Highway 26, all of which are located in Washington 
16 
County.  The trial court agreed with the state, denied defendant's motion, and ultimately 
17 
convicted defendant of the charged offense.   
18 
 
 
Defendant appealed, arguing that the facts adduced at trial were insufficient 
19 
to satisfy the state's burden of proving venue beyond a reasonable doubt.  The state first 
20 
argued that venue should not be treated as a material allegation of an indictment that must 
21 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  In the alternative, the state argued that the 
22 
3 
 
evidence that it had provided at trial sufficed to meet that burden.   
1 
 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed.  The court first rejected the state's argument 
2 
that venue should not be treated as a material element of the state's case, concluding that 
3 
the argument was foreclosed by this court's contrary case law.  248 Or App at 651 n 1.  
4 
The court also rejected the state's argument about the sufficiency of the evidence, 
5 
concluding that it "would require speculation for a factfinder to infer that North Plains or 
6 
mileposts 56 and 57 on Highway 26 are in Washington County."  Id. at 653. 
7 
II.  ANALYSIS 
8 
 
 
On review, the state renews its argument that it should not be required to 
9 
prove venue as a material allegation.  The state acknowledges that this court has reached 
10 
a contrary conclusion in a number of decisions.  According to the state, we should 
11 
reconsider those decisions because none of them reflects any analysis.  All simply state 
12 
the conclusion that Article I, section 11, requires the state to treat venue as a material 
13 
allegation, which, the state notes, Article I, section 11, does not actually say.  In that 
14 
regard, the state observes that Article I, section 11, declares a number of different rights -
15 
- including a public trial, an impartial jury, a copy of the charging instrument, and the 
16 
ability to meet witnesses face to face -- none of which requires the state to prove anything 
17 
as part of its case.  The state contends that it makes no sense to select one of those rights 
18 
and treat it as a material allegation that must be affirmatively proved at trial.     
19 
 
 
For his part, defendant acknowledges the state's point that the bare text of 
20 
Article I, section 11, does not say anything about treating venue as a material allegation 
21 
that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: 
22 
4 
 
"It is true that nothing in the plain text of section 11 requires the state to 
1 
prove to the jury that a defendant's trial is public or that the jury is 
2 
impartial.  Likewise nothing in the text demands that the prosecution prove 
3 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime took place in the county alleged 
4 
in the charging document."   
5 
Defendant nevertheless maintains that the constitution must be understood implicitly to 
6 
have incorporated that requirement.  According to defendant, in light of the universal 
7 
common-law view that venue was a material allegation that the state was required to 
8 
prove, Article I, section 11, should be understood  to have incorporated that common-law 
9 
rule.  At all events, defendant continues, that has been the manner in which this court has 
10 
long construed the state constitutional venue guarantee, and that line of cases is 
11 
controlling.   
12 
 
 
The parties' arguments thus require us to determine the meaning of a 
13 
provision of the original state constitution, which we accomplish by examining the text of 
14 
the provision in context, the historical circumstances of the adoption of the provision, and 
15 
the case law that has construed it.  Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 
16 
(1992).  It is often stated that our goal is to determine the meaning most likely intended or 
17 
understood by the framers of the constitution.  See e.g., Doe v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 
18 
352 Or 77, 87, 280 P3d 377 (2012) (in interpreting the constitution, the court "attempt[s] 
19 
to understand the provision, if possible, as the framers would have understood it"). That 
20 
should not be understood to mean that the purpose of the Priest analysis is to fossilize the 
21 
meaning of the state constitution so that it signifies no more than what it would have been 
22 
understood to signify when adopted in the mid-nineteenth century.  State v. Davis, 350 Or 
23 
440, 446, 256 P3d 1075 (2011) ("The purpose of that analysis is not to freeze the 
24 
5 
 
meaning of the state constitution in the mid-nineteenth century.").  Instead, as we have 
1 
more recently explained, our goal is to determine the meaning of the constitutional 
2 
wording, informed by general principles that the framers would have understood were 
3 
being advanced by the adoption of the constitution.  State v. Savastano, 354 Or 64, 72, 
4 
___ P3d ___ (2013).   
5 
A. 
Textual Analysis 
6 
 
 
We begin with the text of Article I, section 11, which provides: 
7 
 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to 
8 
public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offen[s]e shall 
9 
have been committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the 
10 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; 
11 
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for 
12 
obtaining witnesses in his favor." 
13 
Or Const, Art I, § 11 (1857).1  The phrasing of that section is significant in at least two 
14 
respects that are pertinent to the issue in this case. 
15 
 
 
First, as the state correctly observes and defendant concedes, nothing in the 
16 
wording of Article I, section 11, itself says anything about requiring the state to prove 
17 
anything, much less requiring the state to prove the location of the commission of the 
18 
offense as a material allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.  By its terms, the 
19 
constitutional provision guarantees an accused in a criminal proceeding a right to have 
20 
the trial occur in a particular place, that is, "the county in which the offen[s]e shall have 
21 
                                              
 
1  
Article I, section 11, was amended in 1932 and 1934 by adding other 
guarantees concerning jury verdicts in first-degree murder trials. 
6 
 
been committed."  It does not specify anything about elements of proof.   
1 
 
 
Second, and relatedly, nothing else in Article I, section 11, says anything 
2 
about matters of proof.  See Davis, 350 Or at 463-64 (particular clauses of Article I, 
3 
section 11, must be construed in the context of the provision as a whole).  To the 
4 
contrary, the provision lists "a panoply of trial-related rights," State v. Harrell/Wilson, 
5 
353 Or 247, 262, 297 P3d 461 (2013), that an accused in a criminal proceeding may 
6 
assert or waive:  the right to a public trial, to an impartial jury, to a trial in the county in 
7 
which the offense was committed, to be heard by defendant or counsel, to demand the 
8 
nature and cause of the accusation, to have a copy of the accusation, to meet witnesses 
9 
face to face, and to have compulsory process.  Each of those rights pertains to the conduct 
10 
of a criminal trial.  None pertains to matters of substantive proof.  See generally Wayne 
11 
R. LaFave, et al., 4 Criminal Procedure § 16.1(g), 744  n 241 (3d ed 2007) (observing 
12 
that those courts reading constitutional venue guarantees to require proof of venue "have 
13 
not explained why the prosecution bears an obligation to prove at trial that the [venue] 
14 
prerequisite is met and not that other constitutional prerequisites are met (e.g., that the 
15 
jury is impartial and that the case was brought to trial promptly enough * * *)").  
16 
 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that there are no words that -- at least by 
17 
themselves -- could reasonably be construed to create a requirement of proof, defendant 
18 
suggests that we should understand Article I, section 11, to function as a "synecdoche."  
19 
A "synecdoche" refers to a rhetorical "figure of speech by which a part is put for the 
20 
whole."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2320 (unabridged ed 2002).  In defendant's 
21 
view, the reference to the subject of venue in Article I, section 11, can fairly be seen as a 
22 
7 
 
"marker" that implicitly incorporates not only a right to a trial in a particular place, as the 
1 
provision actually states, but also a right to require the state to prove the location of the 
2 
commission of the offense as a material element of the offense itself.   
3 
 
 
As other courts have observed, the rhetorical device of synecdoche is ill-
4 
suited for application to matters of legal interpretation.  See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab 
5 
Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 US 471, 482, 119 S Ct 936, 142 L Ed 2d 940 (1999) 
6 
("Not because Congress is too unpoetic to use synecdoche, but because that literary 
7 
device is incompatible with the need for precision in legislative drafting.").  That is 
8 
because of the singular importance of the words included in -- or omitted from -- a given 
9 
provision.  It is simply not the province of the court to rewrite the text of the constitution 
10 
to supply a provision that was not included.  
11 
 
 
That is not a matter of fastidious formalism.  As this court has noted on 
12 
many occasions, in construing the Oregon Constitution, the "best evidence" of what the 
13 
framers of a constitutional provision intended to mean is the wording of the provision 
14 
itself.  See, e.g., Harrell, 353 Or at 255 ("[t]he best evidence of the voters' intent is the 
15 
text and context of the provision itself"); Li v. State of Oregon, 338 Or 376, 388, 110 P3d 
16 
91 (2005) ("the text of the constitutional provision itself provides the best evidence of the 
17 
voters' intent").  Only the text of the constitution received the consideration and approval 
18 
of the voters who approved it, giving it the effect of law.  Cf. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 
19 
171, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) ("there is no more persuasive evidence of the intent of the 
20 
legislature" than a statute's text because "[o]nly the text of a statute receives the 
21 
consideration and approval of a majority of the members of the legislature, as required to 
22 
8 
 
have the effect of law").  Consequently, courts are obliged to respect not only what 
1 
constitutional provisions state, but also what they do not.  See, e.g., George v. Courtney, 
2 
344 Or 76, 85-86, 176 P3d 1265 (2008) (declining to read into Article IV, section 10a, 
3 
limitations on legislative authority that are not stated in its text). 
4 
   
 
Aside from that, the rhetorical device of synecdoche assumes a well-
5 
understood relationship between the part actually stated and the whole that is unstated.  
6 
The classic examples are references to body parts -- "head count," "counting noses," "all 
7 
hands" -- to connote whole persons, references to sailing ships as "sails," and the like.  In 
8 
this case, the relationship between what Article I, section 11, says and what defendant 
9 
suggests it implicitly signifies is not at all so clear.   
10 
 
 
Defendant nevertheless argues that the connection between what Article I, 
11 
section 11, says and what it should be taken to mean becomes clearer when the historical 
12 
circumstances of the adoption of the provision are taken into account.  We turn to 
13 
consideration of those circumstances. 
14 
B. 
Historical Circumstances 
15 
 
 
In defendant's view, at the time of the adoption of the Oregon Constitution 
16 
in 1857, the "dominant rule in force around the country" required the state to prove venue 
17 
as a material element of its case.  In support, defendant cites nineteenth-century treatises 
18 
and some three-dozen examples of mid-nineteenth century trial and appellate court 
19 
decisions, each of which refers to the prosecution's obligation to prove venue as part of 
20 
its substantive case.  In that context, he contends, there can be "little doubt that [the 
21 
framers] intended section 11 to embody that rule."   
22 
9 
 
 
 
The problem with defendant's argument is that it conflates two distinct legal 
1 
rules -- the common-law rule requiring proof of venue to establish the jurisdiction of 
2 
criminal courts and a defendant's constitutional right to insist on trial where the crime 
3 
was committed.  The two rules were derived from different historical sources and were 
4 
developed to accomplish different purposes.   
5 
 
1. 
The Common-Law Rules of Venue and Vicinage 
6 
 
 
At common law, it was long the general rule that proof of venue was 
7 
necessary to establish the jurisdiction of the court presiding over the criminal trial.  The 
8 
rule had its roots in early notions about the authority of juries, which was limited to the 
9 
particular communities from which they were selected.  See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non 
10 
Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U Pa L Rev 781, 798 
11 
(1985) ("The earliest venue rules grew out of the jury system.").   
12 
 
 
The first jurors were witnesses selected precisely because of their 
13 
familiarity with the locality and its inhabitants.  See generally John Marshall Mitnick, 
14 
From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil 
15 
Juror, 32 Am J Legal Hist 201 (1988).  As Coke explained in his First Institutes, jurors 
16 
were drawn from the vicinity of the crime -- the "vicinage" -- because "the inhabitants 
17 
whereof may have the better and more certaine knowledge of the fact."  1 Sir Edward 
18 
Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England *125a.   
19 
 
 
The authority of jurors stopped at the bounds of the county from which they 
20 
had been appointed.  See generally Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the 
21 
Common Law 127 (1956) ("[The jury's] object was either to present the suspicions of the 
22 
10 
 
countryside, or, in the case of a petty jury, to express its final opinion.  Consequently, the 
1 
jury as a whole must come from the county concerned.").  They had no power to "take 
2 
knowledge" of acts or events that might have taken place beyond the county boundaries.  
3 
See Act of Parliament, 1548, 2 & 3 Edw. 6, ch. 24 (Eng.) (jurors under common law 
4 
previously could "take no knowledge" of events in other counties); see also Albert Levitt, 
5 
Jurisdiction over Crimes: The Territorial Commission Theory, 16 J Am Inst Crim L & 
6 
Criminology 316, 327-28 (1925) ("The inquisitorial range of the jury was limited to the 
7 
territorial area inhabited by the community."); Glanville Williams, Venue and the Ambit 
8 
of Criminal Law, 81 L Q Rev 276, 276 (1965) ("The ancient requirement of venue meant 
9 
in effect that the jurisdiction of each court of assize was limited to its own county; and 
10 
the criminal courts as a whole were therefore  limited to what occurred in 'the bodies' of 
11 
the counties[.]'").  Indeed, a jury's pronouncement on matters that took place beyond 
12 
county boundaries was considered grounds for a mistrial.   
13 
 
 
Over time, the role of juries shifted from that of interested witnesses to 
14 
neutral and detached fact finders.  But assumptions about their underlying authority 
15 
remained unaltered: The authority of jurors did not go beyond the boundaries of the 
16 
county from which they were selected.  See generally LaFave, 4 Criminal Procedure § 
17 
16.1(c) (common-law venue rule "is commonly traced to the use of the early jury as a 
18 
factfinding body that relied upon its own knowledge").  Consequently, to establish the 
19 
jury's authority and thus avoid a later mistrial, prosecutors were required to prove that 
20 
venue was proper.   
21 
 
 
The rule became a well-settled principle of nineteenth-century common-law 
22 
11 
 
criminal practice.  See, e.g., J. Chitty, The Criminal Law 557-58 (1819) ("The prosecutor 
1 
must in general be prepared to show that the offense was committed in the county where 
2 
the venue is laid.").  But the rule was a matter of jurisdiction, not of individual right.  
3 
Thus, for example, Wharton's treatise on American criminal law stated that "venue must 
4 
correspond with the jurisdiction of the court."  Francis Wharton, 2 A Treatise on the 
5 
Criminal Law of the United States § 277 (1857).  "It is sufficient," Wharton explained, 
6 
"to prove that [the facts] occurred within the county or other extent of the court's 
7 
jurisdiction, otherwise the defendant must be acquitted."  Id. § 601.2   
8 
 
 
The cases that defendant in this case proffers to this court illustrate the 
9 
point.  Of the several dozen early- to mid-nineteenth century cases that defendant cites, 
10 
not one concerns a state constitutional right to a jury trial in a particular place.  All but 
11 
one concern the common-law rule that venue must be proved to establish the court's 
12 
jurisdiction and the jury's authority.  As the North Carolina Supreme Court explained in  
13 
State v. Fish, 26 NC 219 (1844), "[a]n indictment states the place where the offen[s]e was 
14 
committed, to enable the court to see that it is within its jurisdiction. * * * The 
15 
jurisdiction of crimes is local, and generally the Superior Court of a particular county is 
16 
                                              
 
2  
As LaFave explains, it was common for states not to give all their trial 
courts authority to try the full range of violations of state criminal law.  Some states 
allocated different authority to different courts based on the nature or level of offense, 
while others divided courts into "jurisdictional territories," measured by the county or 
municipal boundaries of their judicial districts.  LaFave, 4 Criminal Procedure § 16.1(a).  
Indeed, that practice is common to this day in states that have not adopted unified state 
judicial systems.  Id.   
12 
 
restricted to offen[s]es committed within that county."  Id. at 220. 
1 
 
 
In Turner v. State, 28 Miss 684 (1855), for another example, the plaintiff 
2 
was convicted of manslaughter in Yazoo County.  On appeal, he argued that the state had 
3 
failed to establish venue, and the Mississippi High Court of Errors and Appeals agreed, 
4 
explaining: 
5 
"[I]t is very clear that the proof was insufficient.  There was no evidence 
6 
offered, either direct or circumstantial, which showed that the death 
7 
occurred in the county of Yazoo, in which the bill of indictment was 
8 
preferred.  This was essential to give the circuit court of that county 
9 
jurisdiction." 
10 
Id. at 685.  Similarly, in Holeman v. State, 13 Ark 105 (1852), the defendant was 
11 
convicted of larceny.  On appeal, she argued that the state had failed to establish venue, 
12 
and the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed, explaining that, "[t]here is an utter failure in the 
13 
proof as to the place where the supposed offense was committed.  This would of itself 
14 
constitute a fatal objection to the judgment, as without such proof there is a manifest 
15 
defect of jurisdiction."  Id. at 106.3   
16 
 
 
The one exception, if it may be called that, is Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga 615 
17 
(1852), which was controlled by a constitutional provision expressly providing that the 
18 
                                              
 
3  
See also Vaughan v. State, 11 Miss 553 (1844) ("It is scarcely necessary to 
add, that the offence must be proved to have been committed in the county, as charged in 
the indictment, in order to bring it within the jurisdiction of the Court."); State v. Chaney, 
43 SCL 438 (1856) (rejecting, based on sufficiency of evidence, defendant's asserted 
"defect in the evidence to show[] that the offen[s]e was perpetrated in the jurisdiction"); 
Commonwealth v. Heikes, 26 Pa 513 (1856) ("As a general rule, place is only essential 
upon the question of jurisdiction."). 
13 
 
criminal jurisdiction of the superior courts extended only to the county in which the crime 
1 
was committed.  In that context, the court noted that, "to give jurisdiction, therefore, it 
2 
was necessary to prove that [the crime] was committed in the County where the Court 
3 
was sitting."  Id. at 616.   
4 
 
2. 
The Constitutional Venue Right 
5 
 
 
Federal and state constitutional provisions concerning venue had a different 
6 
source and were directed at a different concern.  As we have noted, the rule that criminal 
7 
trials must take place where the offense occurred (venue) and that juries must be drawn 
8 
from that area (vicinage) took root in this country early on.  In the years leading up to the 
9 
American Revolution, however, tensions between the colonies -- Massachusetts, in 
10 
particular -- and the British authorities led Parliament first to denounce, in 1768, "daring 
11 
insults offered to his Majesty's authority, and audacious usurpations of the powers of 
12 
government" and later to adopt, in 1769,  a resolution requiring the trial of such 
13 
treasonous acts in England.  See generally William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of 
14 
Criminal Cases, 43 Mich L Rev 59, 62-66 (1944) (detailing history).4  The problem -- 
15 
                                              
 
4  
Specifically, Parliament voted to revive a statute from the days of Henry 
VIII, which authorized trial for treason committed outside the "realm" to be tried before 
the King's Bench, in England.  See generally Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 Okla L Rev 
801, 805-07 (1976).  In 1772 and 1774, Parliament again passed laws in response to its 
dissatisfaction with the way its criminal laws were being enforced in colonial courts.  
One, 12 Geo III, c. 24 (1772), provided that persons charged with destroying shipping 
equipment and supplies outside the realm could be tried in England.  The other, 14 Geo 
III, c. 39 (1774), provided that persons charged with certain capital crimes would also be 
held in England.   
14 
 
from the British point of view -- was that colonial juries "all but nullified the law of 
1 
seditious libel in the colonies."  Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History 
2 
of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U Chi L Rev 867, 874 (1994).   
3 
 
 
Reaction from the colonies was swift.  The Virginia House of Burgesses, 
4 
after hearing the news of Parliament's actions, adopted resolutions, known as the 
5 
"Virginia Resolves," declaring that  
6 
"'all Trials for Treason, Misprison of Treason, or for any Felony or Crime 
7 
whatsoever, committed and done in this his Majesty's said Colony and 
8 
Dominion, by any Person or Persons residing therein, ought of Right to be 
9 
had, and conducted in and before his Majesty's Courts, held within the said 
10 
Colony." 
11 
Blume, 43 Mich L Rev at 64.  Similar resolutions from other colonies soon followed.  Id. 
12 
at 63-65.  Eventually, the Declaration of Independence itself denounced King George III 
13 
"for transporting us beyond Seas, to be tried for pretended offences."   
14 
 
 
The frustration of the colonists with the British practice of transporting 
15 
those accused of treason to England for trial led to the inclusion of a venue provision in 
16 
the United States Constitution, Article III, section 2, which requires that the "Trial of all 
17 
Crimes * * * shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed."  
18 
In addition, the Sixth Amendment includes a vicinage provision, guaranteeing that, in "all 
19 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
20 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."   
21 
 
 
It is widely acknowledged that both those provisions grew out of the 
22 
framers' concerns with the British practice of trying colonists in distant England.  See 
23 
generally Charles Alan Wright & Peter J. Henning, 2 Federal Practice and Procedure § 
24 
15 
 
301 (4th ed 2009) (tracing history of federal constitutional venue and vicinage provisions 
1 
to Virginia Resolves and reaction to deportation of colonists to England for trial); 
2 
Comment, Multi-Venue and the Obscenity Statutes, 115 U Pa L Rev 399, 413 (1967) 
3 
("the dangers the framers sought to guard against were clearly perceived" as responding 
4 
to "a recent history of forced deportations to distant places for trial").  Their purpose was 
5 
avoiding hardship and inconvenience.  As the United States Supreme Court explained in 
6 
Hyde v. Shine, 199 US 62, 25 S Ct 760, 50 L Ed 90 (1905), 
7 
"we do not wish to be understood as approving the practice of indicting 
8 
citizens of distant states in the courts of this District, where an indictment 
9 
will lie in the state of the domicil[e] of such person, unless in exceptional 
10 
cases, where the circumstances seem to demand that this course shall be 
11 
taken.  To require a citizen to undertake a long journey across the continent 
12 
to face his accusers, and to incur the expense of taking his witnesses, and of 
13 
employing counsel in a distant city, involves a serious hardship, to which 
14 
he ought not to be subjected if the case can be tried in a court of his own 
15 
jurisdiction." 
16 
Id. at 78.  There was also concern that requiring an accused to travel great distances for 
17 
trial posed a threat to a fair trial.  Kershen, 29 Okla L Rev at 808 ("it seems clear that 
18 
limitation of venue was considered to be necessary to insure a fair trial for persons 
19 
accused of crime"). 
20 
 
 
State constitutional venue and vicinage guarantees were largely modeled 
21 
after the Sixth Amendment.  See Blume, 43 Mich L Rev at 67 (early state constitutional 
22 
venue provisions "were products of the body of thought which produced the Federal 
23 
Constitution and together with the provisions of that instrument established the patterns 
24 
of language used in the later constitutions").  And their concern likewise was the 
25 
hardship, inconvenience, and unfairness of requiring defendants to travel great distances 
26 
16 
 
for trial.  Id. at 78 ("The problem of the early constitution writers was to guard against the 
1 
dangers of transportation[.]").      
2 
 
 
The constitutional venue and vicinage guarantees were understood as rights 
3 
of a criminal defendant, which the defendant could raise or waive.  Nothing in the 
4 
historical record suggests that the federal constitutional jury guarantees were designed to 
5 
preserve common-law notions of local criminal court jurisdiction.  Likewise, nothing in 
6 
the historical record suggests that the constitutional guarantees were designed, in effect, 
7 
to codify common-law criminal pleading and proof requirements. 
8 
 
 
That is borne out by the nineteenth-century case law.  As we have noted 
9 
above, a number of states' appellate court decisions declare that venue must be pleaded 
10 
and proven.  But those decisions are common-law, not constitutional, decisions.  The 
11 
only mention of the constitutional venue right in antebellum cases concerns whether 
12 
defendants properly invoked or waived their constitutional venue right by moving for a 
13 
change of venue or the constitutionality of statutes authorizing trial in places other than 
14 
the county in which the crime was committed.  As the Missouri Supreme Court explained 
15 
in State v. Wetherford, 25 Mo 439, 440 (1857), "[t]he constitutional right of trial by jury 
16 
of the vicinage is intended for the benefit and protection of the accused," which could be 
17 
"waived, as it was by defendant, and a change of venue was procured."5  Indeed, 
18 
                                              
 
5  
See also Ex parte Banks, 28 Ala 28 (1856) (change of venue); Starry v. 
Winning, 7 Ind 311 (1855) (constitutionality of statute providing for change of venue); 
Manly v. State, 7 Md 135 (1854) (change of venue); State v. Alverez, 7 La Ann 283 
(1852) (change of venue); Ex parte Block, 11 Ark 281 (1850) (constitutionality of statute 
 
17 
 
defendant has not cited a single antebellum state court decision referring to the state 
1 
constitutional venue right as the source of a requirement that the state prove venue as part 
2 
of its substantive case, and we are aware of none.   
3 
 
3. 
Adoption of the Oregon Constitution 
4 
 
 
It was in that context that the framers of the Oregon Constitution drafted 
5 
and adopted Article I, section 11.  The provision was adopted as part of the original state 
6 
constitution in 1857, without recorded debate or discussion.  Charles Henry Carey ed., 
7 
The Oregon Constitution and Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention 
8 
of 1857, 310 (1926); see also Claudia Burton & Andrew Grade, A Legislative History of 
9 
the Oregon Constitution of 1857 -- Part I (Articles I and II), 37 Will L Rev 469, 518 
10 
(2001) (Article I, section 11, adopted without reported discussion or debate).   
11 
 
 
Its wording appears to have been derived from Article I, section 13, of the 
12 
Indiana Constitution of 1851.  W.C. Palmer, The Sources of the Oregon Constitution, 5 
13 
Or L Rev 200, 201 (1926).  The records of the constitutional convention that produced 
14 
the 1851 Indiana Constitution contain no trace of debate or discussion concerning that 
15 
state's constitutional venue guarantee, either.  See The Report of the Debates and 
16 
Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of Indiana 187 (1850).   
17 
 
 
Case law about venue from Indiana before, and even after, the time of the 
18 
                                              
providing for change of venue); State v. Burris, 4 Harr 582 (Del 1847) (change of venue); 
Steerman v. State, 10 Mo 503 (1847) (constitutionality of statute authorizing change of 
venue); Dula v. State, 16 Tenn 511 (1835) (constitutionality of statute authorizing change 
of venue).   
18 
 
adoption of the Oregon Constitution is consistent with the other antebellum cases that we 
1 
have mentioned, in that it consistently refers to the rule requiring proof of venue as a 
2 
common-law rule pertaining to a local court's criminal jurisdiction.  In Jackson v. State, 
3 
19 Ind 312 (1862), for example, the defendant was charged with unlawful sale of 
4 
intoxicating liquor in Grant County, Indiana.  At trial, the evidence showed that the 
5 
transaction took place "in Grant County," without reference to any state.  The Indiana 
6 
Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish venue because 
7 
"the evidence does not show that the sale was within the jurisdiction of the Court."  Id. at 
8 
313.   The decision does not mention the Indiana Constitution.  See also Snyder v. State, 5 
9 
Ind 194 (1854) (citing only common-law venue rule); Harker v. State, 8 Blackf 540 
10 
(1847) (same).  
11 
 
4. 
Significance of the Historical Record 
12 
 
 
The historical context of the venue clause of Article I, section 11, is as 
13 
significant for what it does not show as for what it shows.  It makes clear that defendant 
14 
is incorrect in asserting that there can be "little doubt" that the framers, in adopting the 
15 
venue guarantee, intended to adopt the common-law rule requiring the state to prove 
16 
venue as a material element of its case.  There is actually significant doubt about the 
17 
assertion.  As we have noted, the framers might have understood that the common law 
18 
required the state to establish venue as a jurisdictional prerequisite to prosecution in a 
19 
particular county court.  But there is a complete absence of evidence that they would have 
20 
understood that requirement to be connected in any way to the constitutional venue 
21 
guarantee.     
22 
19 
 
 
 
We are left, then, with constitutional wording that even defendant concedes 
1 
says nothing about requiring proof of venue as a material element of the state's case, as 
2 
well as contemporaneous history that fails even to hint at the possibility that the 
3 
constitution was intended to have that effect.  That leads to the obvious question of how 
4 
this court came to hold -- as defendant correctly observes that it did -- that the venue 
5 
guarantee of Article I, section 11, nevertheless has the effect of constitutionalizing the 
6 
common-law rule of proof.  To address that question, we turn to an examination of this 
7 
court's case law construing Article I, section 11.   
8 
C. 
Oregon Case Law 
9 
 
 
There are only a handful of such cases before the turn of the twentieth 
10 
century.  Consistently with the case law from other jurisdictions that we have described, 
11 
all discuss proof of venue solely in reference to the common-law rule and without 
12 
mentioning Article I, section 11.   
13 
 
 
In State v. Johnson, 2 Or 115 (1864), the defendant stole a horse in the 
14 
Washington territory and rode it into Wasco County, Oregon, where he was apprehended 
15 
and charged with larceny.  At trial in Wasco County, he asked the court to instruct the 
16 
jury that, if it believed that he had stolen the horse in the Washington territory, it could 
17 
not find him guilty of larceny, because venue was an element of the offense.  The trial 
18 
court declined to so instruct the jury, and the defendant was convicted.  On appeal, he 
19 
argued that the trial court had erred in failing to deliver his requested venue instruction.  
20 
This court affirmed on the ground that, at common law, the offense of larceny "continues 
21 
and accompanies the thing stolen, from one State to another, as it does from one county 
22 
20 
 
to another in the same State."  Id. at 116.  The court assumed the applicability of the 
1 
common-law rule that venue must be proved, but ultimately held that the rule had been 
2 
satisfied by proof that the larceny had continued into Wasco County, where the trial 
3 
occurred.  There was no mention of Article I, section 11. 
4 
 
 
To similar effect is State v. Barnett, 15 Or 77, 14 P 737 (1887).  There, the 
5 
defendant came into possession of stolen funds in Umatilla County and then sent the 
6 
money to a bank in Multnomah County.  When authorities discovered that the money was 
7 
not the defendant's, he was charged with larceny and convicted of that offense in 
8 
Multnomah County.  The defendant argued on appeal that the court sitting in Multnomah 
9 
County "was without jurisdiction to try the defendant," because the larceny took place 
10 
outside of Multnomah County.  This court again cited the common-law rule that larceny 
11 
follows the stolen property.  Id. at 79.  As in Johnson, the court in Barnett assumed the 
12 
applicability of the common-law rule requiring proof of venue as necessary to 
13 
establishing the trial court's jurisdiction without mentioning Article I, section 11.  See 
14 
also State v. Chew Muck You, 20 Or 215, 216-21, 25 P 355 (1890) (state satisfied 
15 
common-law rule requiring proof of venue in larceny case). 
16 
 
 
In State v. Branton, 33 Or 533, 56 P 267 (1899), the defendant was charged 
17 
with murder and convicted of the offense.  On appeal he challenged, among other things, 
18 
the adequacy of proof as to venue.  The legislature recently had altered the county lines 
19 
close to where the killing had occurred, and there was some dispute as to which county 
20 
was the site of the murder.  The court resolved the question on the evidence based on the 
21 
common-law rule, ultimately concluding that the facts were sufficient to establish that 
22 
21 
 
"the court had jurisdiction."  Id. at 545.  The court's opinion elsewhere did mention 
1 
Article I, section 11, but only in reference to the defendant's separate contention that he 
2 
had been deprived of his constitutional right to demand the nature and cause of the action 
3 
against him.  Id. at 540-41.  There was no reference to Article I, section 11, in connection 
4 
with the disposition of the defendant's arguments about venue.     
5 
 
 
The first mention of Article I, section 11, as a source of the requirement 
6 
that the state prove venue as a material allegation occurred in the 1923 decision in State 
7 
v. Casey, 108 Or 386, 213 P 771 (1923).  In that case, the defendant was charged with 
8 
and convicted of murder in Multnomah County.  On appeal, he argued, among other 
9 
things, that the state had failed to establish venue.  The court's discussion of that issue, in 
10 
its entirety, was as follows: 
11 
 
"'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to 
12 
public trial * * [*] in the county in which the offense shall have been 
13 
committed.'  Section 11, Article I, Const. 
14 
 
"The place where the crime was committed is a material and 
15 
jurisdictional allegation contained in the indictment, which the plea of not 
16 
guilty made by the defendant puts at issue and requires that the prosecution 
17 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt."   
18 
Id. at 402-03.  Thus, the court's analysis consisted of a quotation from Article I, section 
19 
11, followed by a single sentence summarizing what otherwise would appear to be the 
20 
common-law rule requiring proof of venue to establish jurisdiction.  There was no 
21 
explanation or analysis.  But the juxtaposition of the quotation, followed by the statement 
22 
of the rule, appeared to suggest that the court -- for the first time -- saw a connection 
23 
between the two.   
24 
22 
 
 
 
That, at any rate, is how subsequent cases interpreted Casey.  In State v. 
1 
Harvey, 117 Or 466, 242 P 440 (1926), the defendant challenged venue on appeal.  The 
2 
court rejected the argument, explaining: 
3 
 
"'The accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury 
4 
[* * *] in the county in which the offense shall have been committed.'  Or. 
5 
Const., [A]rt. I, § 11. 
6 
 
"Therefore, the venue of the offense is a material allegation of the 
7 
complaint and must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a 
8 
reasonable doubt."   
9 
Id. at 471 (emphasis added).  The court then reviewed the evidence and found it sufficient 
10 
to satisfy the state's burden.  Id.  Thus, in Harvey, the court for the first time explicitly 
11 
linked the constitutional venue guarantee of Article I, section 11, with the common-law 
12 
rule requiring proof of venue as a material allegation.  But, as in Casey, the court 
13 
provided no explanation for that linkage.  It simply quoted the constitution and stated the 
14 
common-law rule.    
15 
 
 
After that, the court continued to quote Article I, section 11, and recite what 
16 
had earlier been understood to be a common-law rule requiring proof of venue, usually 
17 
followed by a citation to prior cases doing the same thing.  In State v. Miller, 133 Or 256, 
18 
259, 289 P 1063 (1930), for example, the court noted the defendant's argument that the 
19 
state had failed to prove venue, cited Casey and Harvey, and simply stated that "[t]he 
20 
burden of proving the venue as laid, and beyond a reasonable doubt, is upon the state."6  
21 
                                              
 
6  
See also State v. Evans, 143 Or 603, 612-13, 22 P2d 496 (1933) (stating 
rule without citing authority); State v. Jones, 240 Or 129, 130-35, 400 P2d 524 (1965) 
 
23 
 
In none of its later venue decisions did the court explain how the wording of the venue 
1 
guarantee of Article I, section 11, had been transformed into a requirement of substantive 
2 
and jurisdictional proof.   
3 
 
 
Moreover, this court's cases have not been entirely consistent on the point.  
4 
In State v. Lehman, 130 Or 132, 279 P 283 (1929), for example, the issue was the 
5 
constitutionality of a "buffer" statute, by which the legislature provided that, when a 
6 
crime has been committed within one mile of a county line, trial may occur in either 
7 
county.  In that case, the defendant had been charged and tried in Clackamas County for 
8 
selling intoxicating liquor.  The evidence at trial showed that the offense actually had 
9 
been committed in Washington County, approximately 1,000 feet from the Clackamas 
10 
County boundary.  The defendant argued that the matter should have been dismissed for 
11 
want of proof of venue.  This court disagreed.  The court concluded that the statute 
12 
providing for trial somewhere other than where the offense was actually committed was 
13 
"not an unreasonable exercise of legislative discretion."  Id. at 138.  The court buttressed 
14 
its conclusion with a quotation from a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision concerning the 
15 
intended meaning of that state's constitutional venue guarantee, which this court noted 
16 
was identical to this state's guarantee: 
17 
 
"'The object of this provision is to protect the defendant against a 
18 
                                              
(citing Casey, Harvey, Miller, and Evans); State v.Cooksey, 242 Or 250, 251-52, 409 P2d 
335 (1965) (citing Jones); State v. Hutcheson, 251 Or 589, 591-92, 447 P2d 92 (1968) 
(citing Cooksey and Jones); State v. Roper, 286 Or 621, 623-30, 595 P2d 1247 (1979); 
State v. Cervantes, 319 Or 121, 873 P2d 316 (1994) (citing Cooksey and Jones). 
24 
 
spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of our rulers, and against a 
1 
spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part of the people; and also to 
2 
secure the party accused from being dragged to a trial at a distant part of the 
3 
State, away from his friends and witnesses and neighborhood, and thus to 
4 
be subject to the verdict of mere strangers, who may feel no common 
5 
sympathy, or who may even cherish animosities or prejudices against him, 
6 
as well as the necessity of incurring the most oppressive expenses, or 
7 
perhaps, even to the inability of procuring the proper witnesses to establish 
8 
his innocence.'"   
9 
Id. at 136 (quoting State v. Robinson, 14 Minn 447, 450 (1869)).   
10 
 
 
Lehman is anomalous for at least two reasons.  First, if the constitutional 
11 
venue guarantee embodied the common-law rule requiring proof that the trial occurred 
12 
where the offense took place, it would seem that the result should have been different.  
13 
The undisputed evidence in Lehman was that the offense occurred in Washington 
14 
County, while the trial occurred in Clackamas County.  Second, the court dismissed the 
15 
defendant's objections about venue by invoking the justification for the federal 
16 
constitutional venue and vicinage guarantees, not the common-law rule.  See also State v. 
17 
Roper, 286 Or 621, 628-29, 595 P2d 1247 (1979) (tracing origins of constitutional venue 
18 
guarantee not to common law, but to the Virginia Resolves and concerns about British 
19 
deportation of colonists for trial in England).    
 
20 
D. 
Stare Decisis 
21 
 
 
To summarize, our analysis under Priest establishes that the wording of the 
22 
venue guarantee of Article I, section 11, by its terms, expresses a defendant's right to a 
23 
criminal trial in a particular place.  It says nothing about limitations on the jurisdiction of 
24 
circuit courts or about substantive proof of criminal offenses or, for that matter, proof of 
25 
anything at trial.  The context of the venue guarantee -- the other clauses of Article I, 
26 
25 
 
section 11 -- lists other rights of a criminal defendant, none of which has ever been 
1 
interpreted to require particular proof at trial.   
2 
 
 
The historical circumstances fail to show that the framers of the Oregon 
3 
Constitution would have understood the venue guarantee of Article I, section 11, to mean 
4 
something different from what we have noted that its wording suggests.  The historical 
5 
record shows only that the framers would have understood that, while the common law 
6 
may have required proof of venue in order to establish the jurisdiction of the trial court, 
7 
the constitution guaranteed a right not to be dragged away to a distant place of trial -- a 
8 
right that would be subject to waiver if not asserted. 
9 
 
 
This court's past case law nevertheless has concluded that proof of venue as 
10 
a material allegation is required by Article I, section 11.  Those cases, however, reached 
11 
that conclusion without analysis.  Since 1923, the court has simply stated the conclusion.  
12 
Certainly, in no case has this court examined the issue in accordance with the interpretive 
13 
analysis that Priest requires. 
14 
 
 
In Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or 38, 53, 11 P3d 228 (2000), this 
15 
court explained that the question whether to overrule a prior constitutional decision 
16 
entails balancing two competing considerations:  stability in the law and "the need to be 
17 
able to correct past errors."  Sometimes, the court said, the need to correct past errors can 
18 
outweigh the importance of stability.  Id.  "This court," it explained, "is the body with the 
19 
ultimate responsibility for construing our constitution, and, if we err, no other reviewing 
20 
body can remedy that error."  Id.   
21 
 
  
Although this court does not lightly overrule an earlier constitutional 
22 
26 
 
decision, see Farmers Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 350 Or 686, 693-94, 261 P3d 1 (2011) 
1 
(reviewing considerations that warrant overruling prior constitutional case law), it has 
2 
determined that the need to correct past errors may outweigh the importance of stability 
3 
when the application of the court's interpretive analysis in Priest demonstrates that the 
4 
earlier case or cases find little or no support in the text or history of a disputed 
5 
constitutional provision.  Stranahan itself illustrates the point.  At issue in that case was 
6 
whether the court would adhere to a prior decision, Lloyd Corporation v. Whiffen, 315 Or 
7 
500, 849 P2d 446 (1993) (Whiffen II), which read Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon 
8 
Constitution, to create a right to collect initiative petition signatures on private property.  
9 
The court in Stranahan noted that Whiffen II had been decided without engaging in the 
10 
analysis required by Priest and then proceeded to engage in that analysis.  Stranahan, 331 
11 
Or at 55.  The court ultimately concluded that, 
12 
"after considering the text, the relevant case law, and the history of the 
13 
initiative and referendum provisions of Article VI, section I, we have found 
14 
nothing to support the conclusion set out in Whiffen II, viz., that persons 
15 
soliciting signatures for initiative petitions may do so on certain private 
16 
property over the owner's objection.  We therefore hold that Article IV, 
17 
section 1, does not extend so far as to confer that right.  The contrary 
18 
holding of Whiffen II was error, and it is disavowed." 
19 
Id. at 65-66.7    
20 
                                              
 
7  
See also Savastano, 354 Or at 95-96 (overruling prior constitutional 
decision because "application of the court's methodology in Priest for interpreting 
constitutional provisions persuades us that [the prior case] * * * finds little support in the 
text or history" of the constitution); State v. Christian, 354 Or 22, 38-40, 307 P3d 429 
(2013) (overruling prior constitutional case law that was not supported by analysis or 
explanation); Yancy v. Shatzer, 337 Or 345, 362, 97 P3d 1161 (2004) (overruling prior 
 
27 
 
 
 
In this case, we confront a similar line of cases, which adopted an 
1 
interpretation of Article I, section 11, that even defendant acknowledges finds no support 
2 
in the wording of the constitution.  As we have noted, the prior case law also finds no 
3 
support in the historical circumstances of the adoption of the constitutional venue 
4 
guarantee.  Under the circumstances, we conclude that it is appropriate to overrule Casey, 
5 
Harvey, and subsequent decisions holding that the venue guarantee of Article I, section 
6 
11, requires the state to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt as a material allegation of 
7 
every criminal case.8 
8 
 
 
Accordingly, we hold that Article I, section 11, enumerates a defendant's 
9 
right to a trial in a particular place:  "the county in which the offense shall have been 
10 
committed."  It does not codify the common-law rule requiring the state to prove venue 
11 
as a material allegation.  The old common-law rule was one of jurisdiction.  The 
12 
constitutional guarantee is a matter of personal right, which -- like other constitutional 
13 
rights -- may be forfeited if not timely asserted.  Cf. State v. Steen, 346 Or 143, 151, 206 
14 
P3d 614 (2009) (a defendant may be precluded from asserting certain constitutional rights 
15 
not timely asserted). 
16 
                                              
case that recognized exception to mootness doctrine "without undertaking any effort to 
determine whether such an exception was compatible with the scope of the judicial power 
granted under the Oregon Constitution").    
 
8 
Defendant does not argue that, independently of Article I, section 11, there 
is a common law proof of venue requirement that survives the adoption of statutes 
pertaining to jurisdiction and venue in criminal cases.  See e.g. ORS 131.305 to ORS 
131.415.  
28 
 
 
 
There remains the question of when the right must be asserted to avoid 
1 
waiver.  Courts in other jurisdictions that do not treat venue as a material allegation that 
2 
must be proved at trial require a defendant to put venue at issue before trial by an 
3 
appropriate motion; if an issue of fact is raised by such a motion, it is resolved at a 
4 
pretrial evidentiary hearing by the court, with the prosecution bearing the burden of 
5 
proof.  See generally LaFave, 4 Criminal Procedure § 16.1(f) (citing cases).9  The 
6 
Washington Supreme Court, for example, has concluded that its state's constitutional 
7 
venue guarantee generally requires a defendant to raise the issue of venue before trial 
8 
begins -- that is, before the jury is empaneled, in the case of a jury trial, and before the 
9 
                                              
 
9  
There is also an issue of the standard of proof, that is, whether the state 
must establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Other state courts addressing the issue have split.  Some courts hold that the state must 
establish venue beyond a reasonable doubt.  See, e.g., Bulloch v. State, 293 Ga 179, 187, 
744 SE2d 763 (2013) ("Venue is a jurisdictional element of every crime and the state has 
the burden of proving venue beyond a reasonable doubt."); Peterson v. Houston, 284 Neb 
861, 869, 824 NW2d 26 (2012) ("we have held that the State must prove proper venue 
beyond a reasonable doubt"); People v. Jones, 219 Ill 2d 1, 33, 845 NE2d 598 (2006) 
("[V]enue was a material element of the offense and the state was required to prove the 
element beyond a reasonable doubt.").  Others hold that venue may be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Roybal, 139 NM 341, 349, 132 P3d 598 (2006) 
("[B]ecause venue is not an element of the crime charged, it may be established by a 
mere preponderance."); State v. Parker, 116 So 3d 744, 749 (La 2013) ("Objections to 
venue must be raised by a motion to quash to be ruled on by the court in advance of the 
trial.  At the hearing, the burden is on the State to prove venue by a preponderance of the 
evidence."); Fulmer v. State, 401 SW3d 305, 317 (Tex App 2013) ("The State bears the 
burden of proving venue by a preponderance of the evidence.").  Most of the state courts 
concluding that the higher burden of proof applies, however, also hold that venue is a 
material allegation or element; conversely, most of those holding that the lesser standard 
applies conclude that venue is not a material allegation or element.  In light of our 
disposition, we need not resolve that question in this case.   
29 
 
court begins to hear evidence, in a trial to the court.  State v. Dent, 123 Wash 2d 467, 
1 
479, 869 P2d 392 (1994).10    
2 
 
 
That seems to us an appropriate requirement.  First, given that the purpose 
3 
of the right is to protect a defendant from the hardship and potential unfairness of being 
4 
required to stand trial in a distant place, it makes sense that the matter of venue should be 
5 
resolved as soon as possible before the trial itself.  Second, requiring a timely pretrial 
6 
objection precludes a defendant from waiting until the trial has begun to raise the issue of 
7 
venue, thus creating the need to start the trial over again or, worse, spawning potential 
8 
double-jeopardy problems.11       
9 
                                              
 
10  
See also Derry v. Commonwealth, 274 SW3d 439, 442 (Ky 2008) (since 
venue is not "jurisdictional," it is "waived" by failing to raise the issue before trial); State 
v. Wood, 596 SW2d 394, 399 (Mo 1980) ("Having proceeded to trial without objection, 
appellant waived the issue [of venue]."); State v. Allen, 293 NW2d 16, 18 (Iowa 1980) 
("considering first the time for ruling upon a defendant's venue objection, we conclude 
that the defendant must secure a ruling by the trial court before trial after the parties have 
had an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing or he waives the issue of improper venue"); 
Smith v. State, 116 Md App 43, 53, 695 A2d 575 (1997) (improper venue "must be raised 
by motion before trial").   
 
 
Referring to other state cases on matters of criminal trial procedure is not 
always helpful, because they are often controlled not by constitutional guarantees but by 
statutes and rules of criminal procedure.  In that regard, we note that Oregon statutes 
likewise prescribe requirements for challenging venue in criminal cases.  See generally 
ORS 131.305 to ORS 131.415.  In this case, defendant's venue challenge is predicated 
solely on Article I, section 11.  We therefore express no opinion about the 
constitutionality, interpretation, or applicability of those statutes.   
 
11  
Under traditional analysis of the federal double-jeopardy guarantee, most 
courts conclude that dismissal for want of venue does not constitute an acquittal and 
therefore does not bar a retrial.  See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 US 1, 98 S Ct 2141, 
57 L Ed 2d 1 (1978).  But some state courts have concluded that constitutional double-
 
30 
 
 
 
We turn, then, to the disposition of this case.  Consistently with our 
1 
holding, the state was not required by Article I, section 11, to prove that the traffic stop 
2 
occurred in Washington County, given that defendant did not raise the issue of venue 
3 
until trial already had commenced.  Under the circumstances, however, we conclude that 
4 
it would be unfair to defendant to hold that he forfeited the opportunity to challenge 
5 
venue, in light of the fact that the law in effect at the time of trial permitted him to wait 
6 
until the state rested to raise the issue.   
7 
 
 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reverse 
8 
the trial court judgment of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.  If, on 
9 
remand, defendant elects not to challenge venue under Article I, section 11, the trial court 
10 
judgment must be reinstated.  If defendant challenges venue under Article I, section 11, 
11 
the trial court may hold an evidentiary hearing at which the state will have the 
12 
opportunity to establish -- and defendant will have the opportunity to contest -- that 
13 
Washington County is the appropriate venue.  If the court concludes that the state has met 
14 
its burden of establishing venue, the judgment of the circuit court must be reinstated.          
15 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the 
16 
circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further 
17 
proceedings.     
18 
                                              
jeopardy guarantees do preclude a retrial following dismissal for improper venue.  See, 
e.g., Williams v. State, 634 NE2d 849 (Ind App 1994) (dismissal for improper venue 
"brought an end to the jeopardy which had attached when the first witness was sworn").