Title: Derrick Mclean v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-2297 
____________ 
 
DERRICK MCLEAN,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[February 11, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before this Court on appeal from the judgment of the trial court 
convicting Derrick McLean of first-degree murder and sentencing him to death.1  
For the reasons that follow, we affirm his conviction and sentence. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Derrick McLean was sentenced to death for the November 2004 murder of 
Jahvon Thompson.  The jury found McLean guilty of first-degree felony murder, 
attempted home invasion robbery with a firearm, attempted first-degree murder, 
                                          
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.    
 
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kidnapping with intent to commit a felony with a firearm, and attempted robbery 
with a firearm.     
 
The evidence at trial revealed that on November 24, 2004, McLean, along 
with his cousin, Maurice Lewin, and acquaintance, James Jaggon, drove to the 
apartment where the victim, fifteen-year-old Jahvon Thompson, lived with his 
father in Orlando.  McLean, Lewin, and Jaggon planned that morning to rob the 
apartment of marijuana or money or both.  On the way to the apartment, the three 
men agreed that McLean and Jaggon would commit the robbery and Lewin would 
wait in the car.  Although all three men had guns, there was no discussion of 
shooting or killing anyone during the commission of the robbery.  McLean and 
Jaggon, each armed with a gun, knocked on the victim‘s door and, when the victim 
opened the door, rushed into the apartment.  McLean was wearing a black baseball 
cap and batting gloves, and Jaggon was wearing a ski mask.  Lewin remained 
nearby in the car, his gold Buick, and maintained an open line between his 
Samsung cell phone and McLean‘s Nokia cell phone.   
 
Meanwhile, the victim‘s next-door neighbor, Theothlus Lewis, heard loud 
noises he thought might be music coming from Thompson‘s apartment.  Lewis told 
his girlfriend that he was going over to Thompson‘s apartment to ask him to turn 
down the music.  When Lewis knocked on the door, McLean opened the door, 
brandished a gun, and motioned for Lewis to enter the apartment.  When Lewis 
 
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entered the living room area, McLean asked him ―where was the money at,‖ and 
Lewis turned his pockets inside-out, revealing he had nothing.   
 
Then, Lewis saw Jahvon Thompson and Jaggon come from the hallway.  
Both Thompson and Lewis were ordered to sit on the couch.  While McLean 
searched the apartment, Jaggon held Lewis and Thompson at gunpoint.  At some 
point, McLean grabbed a blue pillow sham from a shelf and ordered Jaggon to 
leave the apartment, telling him to shoot the female next door if he saw her.  Lewis 
testified that he sensed danger from the look in McLean‘s eyes, so he dove to the 
floor, crawling toward the back of the apartment.  McLean shot at Lewis, hitting 
him once in the back, and then fired several more shots at Thompson.  The medical 
examiner found that each of the three gunshots to Thompson‘s chest would have 
been fatal.  After waiting for McLean to leave, Lewis returned to his apartment, 
where his girlfriend and her daughter had already called 911.  
Meanwhile, Lewin and Jaggon drove off, McLean left the scene on foot, and 
the three men met up at a nearby restaurant.  McLean, still carrying the blue pillow 
sham from the apartment, got into the car with Lewin and Jaggon, and Lewin 
pulled the car out onto the road.  A police officer, who was driving an unmarked 
car in the vicinity and had been notified of the shooting, saw the gold Buick pass 
by, and he activated his lights and initiated pursuit.  Lewin sped up and attempted 
to elude the officer but soon crashed into the marked patrol car of a sheriff‘s 
 
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deputy who was investigating an unrelated incident nearby.  The deputy, who was 
in his marked car, saw the Buick coming at him and ran from his vehicle in order 
to get out of the way.  Lewin‘s car struck the marked car, sending it into the 
deputy, who was struck in the hip and thrown fifteen to twenty feet.  The deputy 
saw Jaggon sitting in the front passenger seat of the Buick.  He also saw McLean 
running from the Buick.     
Additional law enforcement arrived on the scene of the crash.  Officers who 
searched the area discovered a batting glove, black baseball cap, Nokia cell phone, 
shirt, and handgun discarded in the woods adjacent to the crash.  A blue pillow 
sham containing marijuana was found in the backseat of Lewin‘s Buick.  
McLean‘s DNA was later detected on the shirt, pillow sham, and batting glove.  
The Nokia cell phone discovered in the woods near the crash was determined to be 
registered to McLean‘s girlfriend.  Cell phone records revealed calls between this 
Nokia phone and Lewin‘s phone on the day of the crime.  The Nokia phone also 
contained images of a semiautomatic firearm.   
At trial, Lewin and Jaggon testified that the weapon McLean carried during 
the crimes was a .380.  Eight shell casings found in the victim‘s apartment were 
consistent with having been fired from a .380 Hi-Point semiautomatic.  About six 
months after the crime, law enforcement found a .380 Hi-Point semiautomatic in 
 
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the woods about fifteen feet from the road where the crash had occurred.  This 
handgun appeared to be the weapon in the images found on McLean‘s cell phone.   
 
The day after the crimes, Lewis worked with a police sketch artist to develop 
a composite of his shooter.  Over the next few days, the Orlando Police 
Department showed Lewis three photo lineups—none including McLean, whose 
identity they had not yet learned—but Lewis did not recognize any of the 
individuals as the shooter.  On December 1, Jaggon‘s father told the police that a 
third man, who was Lewin‘s cousin and named Derrick, was involved in the crime.  
A crime line tip also implicated a person named Derrick and provided information 
about where he lived, and this information led police to identify McLean as a 
suspect in the crime.   
On December 9, police showed Lewis another photo lineup—this one 
containing McLean—and Lewis identified McLean as the shooter.  Lewis said he 
was 90% certain about his identification but would be absolutely sure if he saw the 
suspect in person.  Police then took McLean into custody for violation of 
probation, questioned him briefly about the murder, and arranged a live lineup of 
six individuals from which Lewis identified McLean as the shooter.  Lewis also 
made an in-court identification of McLean as the man who shot him. 
 
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At trial, Jaggon and Lewin testified against McLean as part of their plea 
agreements for charges related to the events of November 24, 2004.2  Jaggon and 
Lewin gave consistent accounts of McLean‘s participation in the crime.  Lewin 
also testified that when he asked McLean why he fired shots during the robbery, 
McLean replied that he ―wanted to feel like what it feels like to shoot and kill 
somebody.‖      
During the penalty phase, the defense offered expert testimony regarding 
McLean‘s psychological, mental, and emotional health as well as testimony from 
McLean‘s older brother.  One defense psychologist diagnosed McLean with an 
organic brain impairment, although the psychologist had no medical records or 
diagnostic studies to confirm any brain injury.  Another defense psychologist 
testified that McLean had some history of substance abuse and functioned at the 
emotional level of an adolescent.  Both psychologists diagnosed McLean with 
borderline personality disorder but found that he was of average intelligence.  
McLean‘s brother testified to a history of some family dysfunction.   
The jury voted nine to three in favor of a death sentence.  After conducting a 
Spencer3 hearing, the trial court followed the jury‘s recommendation, finding that 
                                          
 
2.  Jaggon was sentenced to twenty-three years for second-degree murder 
and attempted home invasion robbery.  Lewin received a twenty-year sentence for 
burglary of a dwelling and attempted home invasion robbery.  
 
3.  Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1996).  
 
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the three aggravating factors outweighed several mitigating factors.  Of the 
aggravators, the court found (1) that when McLean committed the murder, he had 
been previously convicted of a felony and placed on felony probation (moderate 
weight); (2) that McLean was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or 
threat of violence, based on McLean‘s prior armed robbery conviction and the 
contemporaneous conviction for the attempted first-degree murder of Lewis (great 
weight); and (3) that McLean committed the murder during the commission of a 
robbery (great weight).  The trial court found two statutory mitigating 
circumstances:  (1) McLean‘s mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the 
crime (little weight); and (2) McLean‘s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law (little weight).  
The court also found six categories of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:  (1) 
mental health issues (no weight); (2) substance abuse issues (little weight); (3) 
disparate treatment of codefendants (no weight); (4) family problems (little 
weight); (5) brain injury (little weight); and (6) miscellaneous factors, such as poor 
grades in high school, good behavior in court, and lack of positive role models in 
his youth (little weight).    
II.  ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
 
McLean claims that (A) the trial court erred by admitting photographic and 
live lineup identifications when law enforcement did not offer assistance of 
 
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counsel; (B) the trial court erred in conducting a portion of the Nelson4 hearing in 
camera, outside McLean‘s presence; (C) the trial court erred in instructing the jury 
on the avoid arrest aggravator; and (D) McLean‘s death sentence is 
disproportionate.5  None of these claims warrant relief. 
A.  Motion to Suppress Lineup Identifications 
 
McLean first claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress photographic and live lineup identifications because law enforcement did 
not offer assistance of counsel.  We disagree.  
Here, the trial court‘s ruling on the motion to suppress was proper.  Because 
both the photographic and live lineups occurred before any charges were filed 
against McLean, they were not critical stages of proceedings and did not trigger a 
right to counsel.  See Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 469-70 (Fla. 2006) (―The pre-
arrest investigatory lineup . . . was not a ‗critical stage‘ of the proceedings because 
when the lineup was conducted, it was not apparent that the government had 
decided to prosecute [the defendant] . . . .‖).  Because McLean was not entitled to 
the presence of counsel during these investigatory lineups, his rights were not 
                                          
 
4.  Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).  
 
5.  McLean also claims that Florida‘s capital sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  We do not need to 
reach this issue because the prior violent felony aggravator applies in this case.  
See Bryant v. State, 901 So. 2d 810, 823 (Fla. 2005) (holding that Ring does not 
apply when one of the aggravating circumstances is a prior violent felony 
aggravator).                                             
 
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violated when law enforcement failed to offer assistance of counsel.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the trial court‘s denial of McLean‘s motion to suppress the results of the 
lineup identifications. 
B.  The Nelson Hearing 
 
Next, McLean argues that that the trial court erred in conducting a portion of 
the Nelson hearing in camera, outside McLean‘s presence.  We disagree. 
Before trial, McLean sent a letter to the trial court requesting that he be 
assigned new counsel, and the trial court held a Nelson hearing to consider 
McLean‘s several grievances.  During the Nelson hearing, McLean told the court 
that he had provided his counsel with the names of alibi witnesses but that ―they 
never wanted to go speak to the people.‖  The trial court allowed defense counsel 
to respond in camera, outside the earshot of McLean or the State, to that particular 
issue so that it would not be on record with the State.  Defense counsel adequately 
explained, to the trial court‘s satisfaction, her investigator‘s discussions with the 
alibi witnesses identified by McLean and her decision not to pursue their use as 
witnesses.     
No error occurred when McLean could not hear a portion of the Nelson 
hearing proceedings because McLean was not entitled to a Nelson hearing on the 
issue being discussed.  This Court has held that a defendant is not entitled to a 
Nelson hearing ―where a defendant presents general complaints about defense 
 
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counsel‘s trial strategy and no formal allegations of incompetence have been 
made.‖  Morrison v. State, 818 So. 2d 432, 440 (Fla. 2002); see also Sexton v. 
State, 775 So. 2d 923, 931 (Fla. 2000) (holding that the defendant was not entitled 
to a Nelson hearing when he ―was merely noting his disagreement with his 
attorney‘s trial strategy . . . and was not asserting a sufficient basis to support a 
contention that his attorney was incompetent‖).  Here, McLean‘s argument 
regarding the alibi issue raised disagreement with trial strategy and did not assert a 
sufficient basis to support a contention that his attorneys were incompetent.  See 
Morrison, 818 So. 2d at 442.  Furthermore, as in Morrison, 818 So. 2d at 442, the 
trial court made ―sufficient inquiry to determine whether there was reasonable 
cause to believe that counsel was not rendering effective assistance.‖  Therefore, 
we find McLean‘s Nelson argument to be without merit. 
C.  Jury Instruction on the Avoid Arrest Aggravator 
 
McLean also claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the 
avoid arrest aggravator, which the trial court ultimately rejected.  We disagree. 
 
Florida law provides that ―evidence may be presented as to any matter that 
the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the 
defendant and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances.‖  § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (2004).  Then, the trial court must instruct 
the jury on any aggravators for which competent substantial evidence is received.  
 
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Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593, 607 (Fla. 2009) petition for cert. filed, No. 
09-7370 (U. S. Aug. 10, 2009). 
The avoid arrest aggravating circumstance applies when ―[t]he capital felony 
was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or 
effecting an escape from custody.‖  § 921.141(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2004).  When the 
victim is not a law enforcement officer, the evidence must demonstrate beyond a 
reasonable doubt that ―the sole or dominant motive for killing was to eliminate a 
witness.‖  Bevel v. State, 983 So. 2d 505, 518 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Buzia v. State, 
926 So. 2d 1203, 1209 (Fla. 2006)).  This Court has held that the evidence 
presented on the avoid arrest aggravator may be in the form of ―circumstantial 
evidence from which the motive for the murders may be inferred.‖  Hoskins v. 
State, 965 So. 2d 1, 19 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla. 
2001)).   
Here, the State presented competent substantial evidence to support the 
avoid arrest aggravator.  The victims were compliant and helpless when McLean 
shot them, and McLean had obtained the marijuana and was exiting the apartment 
when he fired the fatal shots.  Such circumstances suggest that the shooting was 
intended to eliminate the witnesses.  See Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692, 695 
(Fla. 1994) (―Once Thompson had obtained the $1,500 check from Swack and 
Walker, there was little reason to kill them other than to eliminate the sole 
 
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witnesses to his actions.‖).  Also, McLean had instructed Jaggon to shoot the 
woman next door if he saw her, further indicating McLean‘s intent to eliminate any 
potential witnesses.  During the crime, McLean did not wear a mask or otherwise 
disguise his appearance, making a subsequent identification by one of the victims 
likely if McLean did not eliminate the witnesses.   
With these facts presented, the jury instruction on this aggravator was not 
error.  That the trial court later declined to find the aggravator does not render the 
jury instruction improper.  See, e.g., Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 1132 (Fla. 
2005) (rejecting the defendant‘s claim that ―the trial court erred in allowing the 
jury to consider the avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest aggravator when the trial 
court found that this aggravating circumstance did not exist‖); Pace v. State, 854 
So. 2d 167, 181 (Fla. 2003) (―The fact that the state did not prove [the avoid arrest] 
aggravator to the trial court‘s satisfaction does not require a conclusion that there 
was insufficient evidence . . . to allow the jury to consider the factor.‖) (quoting 
Bowden v. State, 588 So. 2d 225, 231 (Fla. 1991)).  Accordingly, the trial court did 
not err in instructing the jury on the avoid arrest aggravator. 
D.  Proportionality 
McLean further claims that his death sentence is disproportionate.  This 
claim is without merit. 
 
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Proportionality review ―is not a comparison between the number of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.‖  Crook v. State, 908 So. 2d 350, 356 
(Fla. 2005) (quoting Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998)).  Instead, the 
Court considers the totality of the circumstances to determine if death is warranted 
in comparison to other cases where the death sentence has been upheld.  Davis v. 
State, 859 So. 2d 465, 480 (Fla. 2003).   
The circumstances of this case reveal murder by shooting, committed during 
the course of a robbery.  Evidence was presented indicating that McLean was of 
average intelligence and suffered from borderline personality disorder.  McLean 
was a felon on probation and was also subject to the prior violent felony aggravator 
based on his previous conviction for armed robbery and for his contemporaneous 
conviction for attempted first-degree murder.  Of these three aggravators, the trial 
court gave ―moderate weight‖ to McLean‘s status as a felon on probation, ―great 
weight‖ to the contemporaneous robbery, and ―great weight‖ to McLean‘s prior 
violent felony convictions.  The trial court gave ―little weight‖ to the statutory 
mental mitigators of McLean‘s mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the 
crime and his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law, ―little weight‖ to the nonstatutory 
mitigators of substance abuse issues, family problems, brain injury, and 
 
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miscellaneous factors, and ―no weight‖ to the nonstatutory mitigators of mental 
health issues and the disparate treatment of codefendants. 
Considering those circumstances, the aggravating and mitigating factors 
weighed by the trial court, and other cases with similar facts, we conclude that the 
death sentence imposed on McLean is proportionate.  See, e.g., Hayward v. State, 
34 Fla. L. Weekly S486 (Fla. Aug. 27, 2009) (death sentence proportionate with 
prior violent felony aggravator and merged committed during a robbery/committed 
for pecuniary gain aggravator and nonstatutory mitigators including academic 
problems, an absent father, some capacity for rehabilitation, and financial stress at 
the time of the crime); LaMarca v. State, 785 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 2001) (death 
sentence proportionate with prior violent felony aggravator and nonstatutory 
mitigators of good behavior at trial, substance abuse issues, and mental disorders); 
Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1997) (death sentence proportionate with 
prior violent felony aggravator and merged pecuniary gain/committed during a 
robbery aggravator and mitigators involving the defendant‘s age, background, and 
character); Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1996) (death sentence proportionate 
with prior violent felony aggravator and pecuniary gain aggravator, statutory 
mitigators of mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime and impaired 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to the 
requirements of the law, and nonstatutory mitigators including that defendant was 
 
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intoxicated, was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance, and acted 
after a disagreement with his girlfriend); Heath v. State, 648 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1994) 
(death sentence proportionate with prior violent felony aggravator and commission 
during a robbery aggravator and mitigators of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance caused by substance abuse, good character demonstrated in prison, and 
disparate treatment of codefendant). 
III.  SUFFICIENCY 
McLean does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, but in death 
sentence appeals, this Court independently reviews the record to confirm that the 
jury‘s verdict is supported by competent, substantial evidence.  See Delgado v. 
State, 948 So. 2d 681, 689 (Fla. 2006). 
The following evidence presented at trial is consistent with McLean‘s guilt:  
(1) McLean‘s two coperpetrators testified against him and described his 
participation in the crimes; (2) one of the victims identified McLean as the shooter 
in both photographic and live lineups; (3) several items containing McLean‘s DNA 
were found discarded near the getaway car; (4) a .380 handgun of the type McLean 
was seen wielding during the crime was found discarded near the getaway car and 
was consistent with the bullets that killed Jahvon Thompson; (5) images of a 
similar-looking handgun were found on McLean‘s cell phone; (6) cell phone 
records revealed calls between McLean and his coperpetrator Lewin on the day of 
 
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the crimes; and (7) Lewin testified that McLean stated his motive for the murder 
was that ―he wanted to feel what it feels like to shoot and kill somebody.‖   
Based on all of the above, we find the evidence sufficient to support 
McLean‘s first-degree felony murder conviction. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm McLean‘s conviction and his sentence 
of death. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
QUINCE, C.J., concurs in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,  
Julie Hions O‘Kane, Judge – Case No. 48-2004-CF-15923-O 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and George D.E. Burden, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Scott A. Browne, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee