Title: Haas v. Lee

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
MICHAEL HAAS 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 010310 
March 1, 2002 
 
JACK LEE, WARDEN, KEEN MOUNTAIN 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POWHATAN COUNTY 
Thomas V. Warren, Judge 
 
 
The sole issue that we consider in this appeal is whether 
the circuit court properly dismissed a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus because it was not filed timely pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-654(A)(2).  This statute, which became effective July 
1, 1998, states: 
 
"A petition for writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum, other than a petition challenging a 
criminal conviction or sentence, shall be brought 
within one year after the cause of action accrues.  
A habeas corpus petition attacking a criminal 
conviction or sentence, except as provided in 
§ 8.01-654.1 for cases in which a death sentence has 
been imposed, shall be filed within two years from 
the date of final judgment in the trial court or 
within one year from either final disposition of the 
direct appeal in state court or the time for filing 
such appeal has expired, whichever is later." 
 
 
Michael Haas is incarcerated by the Virginia Department 
of Corrections and detained at the Keen Mountain Correctional 
Center.  He was convicted in 1994 of two counts of sodomy 
against his two sons.  His punishment was fixed at two terms 
of life imprisonment. 
 
On June 30, 2000, Haas filed his petition for writ of 
habeas corpus against Jack Lee, Warden of the Keen Mountain 
Correctional Center.  He alleged, among other things, that his 
due process rights were violated, that his trial counsel was 
ineffective, and that the Commonwealth's Attorney purportedly 
committed acts of misconduct. 
 
The Warden filed a motion to dismiss and asserted that 
because Haas was convicted before the enactment of Code 
§ 8.01-654(A)(2) and more than two years had passed from the 
date of the final judgment in the circuit court, he was 
required to file his habeas corpus petition, pursuant to 
orders entered by this Court, within one year from the 
effective date of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).  The Warden contended 
that Haas' petition must be dismissed because he was required 
to file it on or before June 30, 1999, but he did not do so.  
The circuit court agreed with the Warden and entered a final 
order dismissing the petition.  Haas appeals. 
 
Before the enactment of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2), a prisoner 
could file a habeas corpus petition at any time provided that 
the Commonwealth was not prejudiced in its ability to respond 
because of the prisoner's delay in filing.  See Walker v. 
Mitchell, Warden, 224 Va. 568, 575-77, 299 S.E.2d 698, 702-03 
(1983).  After the enactment of this statute, a prisoner who 
had not been sentenced to death was required to file his 
 
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petition within two years from the date of final judgment in 
the circuit court or one year from either final disposition of 
the direct appeal in the state court or the time for filing 
such appeal has expired, whichever is later.  The statute is 
silent, however, regarding the filing period for prisoners who 
were convicted before the enactment of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).   
 
We have stated the following principles that are 
pertinent here: 
 
"The generally accepted rule is that statutes 
of limitation, or remedial statutes, are not 
retrospective in their application in the absence of 
clear legislative intent.  However, it is the 
settled law of this State that the legislature may 
declare a new or an amended statute dealing solely 
with matters of remedy and procedure, or one not 
affecting vested interests and contractual rights, 
to have a retrospective operation.  Ferguson v. 
Ferguson, 169 Va. 77, 87, 192 S.E. 774, 777 
[(1937)]; Gloucester Realty Corp. v. Guthrie, 182 
Va. 869, 873, 30 S.E.2d 686, 688 [(1944)] . . . .  
Vested interests and contractual rights may not be 
impaired or destroyed, but mere matters of procedure 
and remedy for their enforcement or preservation may 
be altered, curtailed or repealed at the will of the 
legislature so long as reasonable opportunity and 
time are afforded to enforce and protect such 
interests and rights." 
 
Phipps, Adm'r v. Sutherland, 201 Va. 448, 452, 111 S.E.2d 422, 
425 (1959); accord Board of Supervisors v. FCS Building 
Association, 254 Va. 464, 467, 492 S.E.2d 634, 636 (1997); 
Harris v. DiMattina, 250 Va. 306, 311-12, 462 S.E.2d 338, 340 
(1995); Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. 115, 119, 319 S.E.2d 750, 
753 (1984); Fletcher v. Tarasidis, 219 Va. 658, 661, 250 
 
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S.E.2d 739, 740 (1979); Walke v. Dallas, 209 Va. 32, 36, 161 
S.E.2d 722, 724 (1968).  We also held in Duffy v. Hartsock, 
187 Va. 406, 416, 46 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1948), that matters of 
procedure, such as statutes of limitations, may be altered or 
curtailed by the legislature if a reasonable opportunity and 
time are afforded to enforce and protect any interests and 
rights, provided vested interests and contractual rights are 
neither impaired nor destroyed. 
 
As the Warden correctly observes, this Court has 
routinely considered petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
filed within the statutorily prescribed one-year period.  We 
have also dismissed petitions as untimely that were filed by 
prisoners who were convicted before the enactment of Code 
§ 8.01-654(A)(2), but who filed their petitions more than one 
year after the effective date of that statute.  Implicit in 
our prior practice is this Court's recognition that a period 
of one year constitutes a reasonable time in which to permit a 
prisoner who was convicted prior to the enactment of Code 
§ 8.01-654(A)(2) to enforce and protect his rights.  
Therefore, we hold that the statute of limitations contained 
in Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) bars Haas' petition because he was 
provided a reasonable opportunity to enforce and protect his 
right to file his habeas corpus petition. 
 
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We observe that our holding is consistent with the views 
expressed by the United States Courts of Appeals.  Prior to 
the enactment of the statute of limitations contained in the 
Federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
which amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), there was no federal 
statute of limitations that prescribed the time available for 
a prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition.  See 
Brown v. Angelone, 150 F.3d 370, 371 (4th Cir. 1998); Calderon 
v. United States District Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 & n.1 
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099, and cert. denied 
sub nom. Beeler v. Calderon, 523 U.S. 1061 (1998).  However, 
Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the 
United States District Courts permitted a district court to 
dismiss a petition "if it appears that the state . . . has 
been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by 
delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it is 
based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances 
prejudicial to the state occurred."  The various United States 
Courts of Appeals have held that a prisoner whose statutory 
right to seek federal habeas corpus relief accrued before the 
enactment of the one-year statute of limitations must receive 
a reasonable period of time after the statute's effective date 
to file a federal habeas corpus petition and that one year was 
 
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reasonable.  See Brown, 150 F.3d at 374-76; United States v. 
Flores, 135 F.3d 1000, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1998); Burns v. 
Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3rd Cir. 1998); Calderon, 128 F.3d 
at 1286-87; United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 746 (10th 
Cir. 1997).   
 
We find no merit in Haas' contention that because Code 
§ 8.01-654(A)(2) creates a two-year statute of limitations for 
the filing of a habeas corpus petition, a period of two years 
rather than one year must be deemed reasonable.  The issue 
that we must consider is what is a reasonable period of time 
that should be accorded a habeas corpus petitioner whose right 
to file a habeas corpus petition would have been barred 
otherwise by the enactment of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2).  In 
deciding this issue, we are not bound by the time prescribed 
in the statute of limitations.   
 
Additionally, Haas argues that this Court should conclude 
that a period of two years is reasonable because a habeas 
corpus petitioner needs sufficient time to develop a factual 
basis to support his claims.  We find no merit in this 
contention because petitioners, like Haas, had time before the 
enactment of Code § 8.01-654(A)(2) in which to file their 
claims, and they were accorded the additional benefit of the 
one-year reasonable period of time after the effective date of 
 
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the statute.  In this instance, Haas had almost five years in 
which to prepare and file his petition for habeas corpus. 
 
Haas contends that the Suspension Clause contained in 
Article I, § 9 of the Constitution of Virginia requires an 
exception to the statute of limitations when a petitioner 
could not have discovered the factual basis of his petition 
before the expiration of the statute of limitations.  We 
cannot consider Haas' constitutional claim because, as he 
admits in his brief, he failed to assert this claim in the 
circuit court. 
 
In view of our holdings, we need not consider Haas' 
remaining contentions.  Accordingly, the judgment of the 
circuit court will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
 
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