Title: Comm. of Labor v. Bethlehem Steel

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No.  131
  September Term, 1995
___________________________________
COMMISSIONER OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY
v.
BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION
___________________________________
    *Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
Rodowsky, Chasanow, and Raker, JJ.,
concur and dissent.
___________________________________
      Filed:  November 14, 1996    
            
*Murphy, C.J., now retired, participated in
the hearing and conference of this case while
an active member of this Court; after being
       Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references shall hereinafter be
1
to the Maryland Occupational Safety Act of 1973, formerly codified in Article 89 of
the Maryland Code, as it was in force at the time of the events prompting this
litigation.  The Act is currently codified at Md. Code (1991), § 5-101 et seq. of
the Labor and Employment Article.
      COMAR 09.12.31.U-1(1) incorporates by reference 29 C.F.R. § 1910.304(b)(1),
2
effective November 9, 1981 (8:22 Md. R. 127).
recalled 
pursuant 
to 
the 
Constitution,
Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
I.
The issue presented in this case is whether the Respondent,
Bethlehem 
Steel 
Corporation 
(hereinafter 
"Bethlehem"), 
by
permitting a deteriorating toaster oven to exist and remain in an
employee lunch room, committed both a serious and a repeated
violation of Maryland's Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973,
Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 1990 Cum. Supp.),  Article 89
1
§§ 28-49B and, specifically, COMAR 09.12.31.U-1(1) to (2) and 29
C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1).  
2
II.
The facts are generally undisputed.  On August 17, 1990,
Bethlehem employee Raymond Pritts, along with three other co-
workers, left their work stations to cool down in the Tundish Lunch
Room located in Bethlehem's Sparrows Point plant.  The room
contained an ice machine next to a floor-mounted air conditioner on
top of which was a Hamilton Beach toaster oven.  Bethlehem
      Pritts apparently had a history of heart trouble and was scheduled for
3
bypass surgery in the near future.
       Only that citation alleging a serious and a repeated violation of 29
4
C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) is here at issue.
employees supplied the oven several years earlier for their own use.
Pritts, who fellow employees described as "perspiring
heavily," sat down on a wooden bench next to the air conditioning
unit and rested his arm on the toaster oven.  According to
witnesses, he then stood straight up, began shaking, and quickly
collapsed to the floor.  Responding paramedics found Pritts in full
cardiac arrest and immediately began CPR.  After approximately
thirty minutes, Pritts was transported to the Francis Scott Key
Medical Center where he was later pronounced dead.  The cause of
death was cardiac arrest induced by electrocution.3
Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(hereinafter 
"MOSHA") 
inspector 
James 
Barry 
conducted 
an
investigation that same day.  Subsequently, both Barry and Craig
Lowry, Chief of MOSHA Services, concluded that due to the toaster
oven's condition, its exterior was capable of carrying a lethal
electric charge.
Based upon its investigation, MOSHA issued four citations,4
including 
one 
for 
an 
alleged 
violation 
of 
29 
C.F.R.
§ 1910.303(b)(1), which provides in pertinent part:
"Examinations, installation, and use of
equipment — (1) Examination.  Electrical
equipment shall be free from recognized
hazards that are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to employees. . . ."
-3-
      Appointment of a hearing examiner is authorized by Art. 89 § 37(d).  In its
5
opinion in the instant case, the Court of Special Appeals erroneously referred to
the hearing examiner as an Administrative Law Judge.
MOSHA concluded that the citation was a serious and a repeated
violation under § 40(a) & (b), which provide:
"(a)  Willful or repeated violations. —
Any employer who willfully or repeatedly
violates any provision of this subtitle or any
rule, 
regulation, 
standard, 
or 
order
promulgated pursuant to this subtitle may be
assessed a civil penalty not to exceed
$10,000.00 for each violation.
(b)  Serious violations. — Any employer
who has received a citation for a serious
violation of any provision of this subtitle,
or of any rule, regulation, standard, or order
promulgated pursuant to this subtitle shall be
assessed a civil penalty not to exceed
$1,000.00 for each such violation.
For purposes of this subsection, a
serious violation shall be deemed to exist in
a 
place 
of 
employment 
if 
there 
is 
a
substantial probability that death or serious
physical harm could result from a condition
which exists or from one or more practices,
means, methods, operations, or processes which
have been adopted or are in use in such place
of employment unless the employer did not and
could not with the exercise of reasonable
diligence, know of the presence of the
violation."
MOSHA accordingly assessed a penalty of $3,460.00.  Bethlehem
contested the citations, and the Commissioner appointed a hearing
examiner to conduct a hearing on the charges.   The hearing
5
examiner recommended that three of the citations, including the one
for an alleged violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1), be
dismissed.  Rejecting that recommendation, the Commissioner held
-4-
that the hearing examiner erroneously limited the application of
§ 1910.303(b)(1) to the installation of electrical equipment and
concluded that "the most logical reading of the standard is that an
employer keep equipment free from recognized hazards throughout its
life in the plant and not merely at the moment it is installed."
The Commissioner also noted that the toaster oven's condition would
have alerted a reasonably prudent employer to the presence of an
electric shock hazard, necessitating repair or replacement of the
device.
Upon judicial review, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
reversed the Commissioner's ruling that Bethlehem committed a
serious and a repeated violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) and
remanded the case to allow the Commissioner to prove whether
Bethlehem committed a "non-serious" violation.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed that judgment, opining
that the circuit court "supplant[ed] its conclusion for that of the
Commissioner," but remanded the case so that MOSHA would have the
opportunity to prove whether Bethlehem "knew or should have known
of the hazard through reasonable diligence."  The court further
held that "a finding of substantial similarity between the
violations is necessary before enhanced penalties may be sanctioned
for a `repeated' violation."  We issued a writ of certiorari to
address the important evidentiary questions raised in this case.
-5-
III.
The purpose of Maryland's Occupational Safety Act is to
"assure as far as possible every working man and woman in the State
of Maryland safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve
our human resources[.]"  § 28(c).  In that regard, employers are
required to "(1) furnish each of his employees employment and a
place of employment which are safe and healthful as well as free
from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to his employees, and (2) comply
with the rules, regulations, standards and orders promulgated under
this subtitle."  § 32(a).
Consonant with these objectives, the Commissioner of Labor and
Industry is empowered to, among other things, "prescribe such rules
and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out his
responsibilities."  § 30(a).  In addition, the Commissioner, or his
authorized representative, has the authority to issue citations to
non-complying employers, § 36(a), and if necessary, assess civil
penalties against those employers to enforce compliance.   
§ 37(a)-(b).
An employer cited under the Act is entitled to contest the
citation before the Commissioner or a Commissioner-appointed
hearing examiner.  § 37(c).  Following a request from the employer,
or upon the Commissioner's own initiative, the hearing examiner's
-6-
      The hearing examiner's decision becomes a final order of the Commissioner
6
after 15 days if neither party seeks review of that decision.  § 37(d).
report is subject to further review by the Commissioner himself.6
§ 37(d).  As with most administrative decisions, the Commissioner's
decision is subject to "substantial evidence" review.  § 38(a).
Therefore, an order of the Commissioner of Labor and Industry must
be upheld on judicial review if it is not legally erroneous and
reasonably based upon substantial evidence.  See Younkers v. Prince
George's County, 333 Md. 14, 18-19, 633 A.2d 861, 863 (1993) (and
cases cited therein).  In short, reviewing courts must not
substitute their fact-finding for that of the Commissioner when the
latter's conclusions are substantially supported by the evidentiary
record.  With these principles in mind, we shall now address the
Commissioner's conclusion that Bethlehem engaged in both a serious
and a repeated violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1).
Serious Violation
A.
Although an issue earlier raised, at this juncture neither
party 
seriously 
disputes 
the 
applicability 
of 
29 
C.F.R.
§ 1910.303(b)(1) to the facts of the instant case.  We nonetheless
feel compelled to address the regulation's general applicability
for the reason that substantial evidence review is unnecessary if
the agency failed to apply the correct statutory or regulatory
-7-
      The Court of Special Appeals erroneously cited to Md. Code. (1974, 1991
7
Repl. Vol.), § 5-104(a) of the Labor and Employment Article.  As we have said,
however, Md. Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol., 1990 Cum. Supp.), Art. 89, § 32(a) was the
general duty clause in force at the time of the subject citations.  The differences
between the two clauses are substantively insignificant.
standard to the facts before it.  Cf. Younkers, supra, 333 Md. at
19, 633 A.2d at 863 (reviewing court is under no constraint to
reverse an administrative decision which is premised solely on an
erroneous 
conclusion 
of 
law). 
 
While 
we 
hold 
that the
Commissioner's reliance upon 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) in the case
sub judice was proper, an explanation will serve future cases well.
The Commissioner posits that all electrical equipment present
and in use in the employer's workplace falls within the ambit of
the regulation, while Bethlehem would draw a distinction between
"industrial" and "non-industrial" equipment, such as, in this case,
employee-owned personal appliances.
Rejecting Bethlehem's position, the Court of Special Appeals
reasoned:
"[w]e think it is clear that ownership is not,
nor should it be, the determinative factor in
cases involving appliances brought into the
workplace by employees.  To conclude otherwise
would be in direct conflict with the intent of
the general duty clause contained in Md. Code
(1974, 1991 Repl. Vol.) Title 5, Subtitle
1, § 5-104(a) of the Labor and Employment
Article,
 which requires that `each employer
[7]
shall provide each employee of the employer
with employment and a place of employment that
are: (1) safe and healthful[.]'"
Commissioner of Labor & Indus. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 106 Md.
App. 243, 255, 664 A.2d 411, 417 (1995).  We agree.  29 C.F.R. §
-8-
      In his opinion, the Commissioner cogently said:
8
"[w]ell settled principles of occupational safety and
health law permit an employer to be held liable for a
safety violation created by one of its employees.  As a
practical matter, it is often an employee who creates a
hazard for which an employer is cited.  For example, it is
typically an employee who fails to shore a trench or
install a guardrail."
1910.303(b)(1) fails to draw any distinction between electrical
hazards created by employers versus those created by employees.  It
simply commands that "[e]lectrical equipment shall be free from
recognized hazards that are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to employees."  If an employer fails to abate an
electrical hazard that it knows or should know creates a risk of
substantial injury or death to its employees, the employer has
committed a serious violation of the Act under § 40(b), and is
subject to the Act's penalty provisions.  Notice, either actual or
constructive, is the gravamen of employer responsibility under the
Act; notice of risk, regardless of source, creates a concomitant
responsibility to abate the risk.8
The intermediate appellate court, however, did caution that:
"[i]t would be an undue burden to make the
employer responsible for [personal items
brought to the workplace by employees]. . . .
We think a practical standard would be that
the employer would not be responsible under
the [Act] for personal items brought to the
workplace by an employee for the exclusive
personal use by that employee if the employer
has no actual or constructive knowledge that
the item is being used by or is available for
or used by other employees.  Falling within
that exception would be such things as desk
lamps, desk clocks, radios, and other common
-9-
workplace accessories that other employees
would ordinarily recognize as being for the
personal use and under the owner's personal
control and not for the common use or
operation by other employees."
106 Md. App. at 256-57, 664 A.2d at 418.  We reject the notion that
29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) excludes any particular group of
employee-owned devices from its operation.  The unambiguous
language of the regulation does not, and we cannot, make exception
for such devices.  Cf. Dodds v. Shamer, 339 Md. 540, 554, 663 A.2d
1318, 1325 (1995) (citing Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 540, 341
A.2d 789, 793 (1975)).
Without question, the Act places the onus of general workplace
safety squarely on the employer's shoulders, § 32(a), and 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.303(b)(1) specifically charges an employer with the duty to
see that "[e]lectrical equipment shall be free from recognized
hazards that are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
employees."  Where an employer lacks actual or constructive
knowledge that an employee-owned device poses such a threat to
workplace safety, § 40(b) liability fails to exist.  As we shall
discuss, infra, there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion that Bethlehem did possess such knowledge, putting it on
notice that in order to comply with 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1),
remedial measures were necessary.
B.
-10-
Turning to the question of whether substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner's conclusion that Bethlehem knew or
should have known that the toaster oven posed a risk of serious
injury or death to Bethlehem's employees, testimony taken before
the hearing examiner is illustrative.  Describing photographs of
the toaster oven he took immediately following the incident, James
Barry testified that the oven was wrapped in duct tape, rusting,
and oozing overcooked materials from the rear.  Barry also noted
that the oven employed neither a grounded nor a polarized plug,
which, in the event of a short circuit (such as the one that killed
Pritts), would "trip out the circuit breaker," cutting off the flow
of electricity to the unit.  Barry also testified that, based on
his investigation, he learned that Bethlehem supervisory personnel
regularly entered the Tundish lunch room to retrieve ice and that
the oven was in plain view of anyone entering the room.  Bethlehem
employee William Fischer similarly testified that supervisors
would:
"come in [the Tundish lunch room] every
morning to put the — on the bulletin board — I
mean on the blackboard, they put on there what
job everybody's got and what tonnage they're
going to be working on.  Plus they come in
there to get ice and they come there to give
our safety meetings once a week."
Based upon photographs he took of the toaster oven and his own
examination, Craig Lowry also testified that the oven was wrapped
in duct tape.  He opined that carbon build-up on the unit's
cleaning hatch and a collection of other materials on its interior
-11-
      Lowry did not offer an opinion as to why he thought the foreign insulation
9
had been installed in the oven.
was indicative that the unit "may not have been cleaned for a long
time."
Lowry also noted that the unit contained a piece of insulation
not part of the original product, but installed by someone other
than the manufacturer.   Most importantly, Lowry testified that  a
9
glass tube containing the oven's heating element was fractured,
allowing the element probe to dislodge from its ceramic insulator
and contact the oven's surface.  As a result, electricity was
permitted to flow to the oven's exterior.  Lowry indicated that a
grounded plug may have prevented the accident.
In a memorandum dated August 17, 1990, Lowry related his
observations and findings to James Barry.  In that memorandum, he
concluded that:
"[t]he Hamilton Beach Toaster Oven/Broiler . .
. was in disrepair and capable of producing
the flow of electrical energy to the normally
non-current carrying exterior metal case.
Current flowing from a standard 120 vac to 15-
20 amp receptacle through the metal case of
this appliance in a fault situation would have
been more than adequate to cause the death of
an individual."
Based upon the above testimony and documentary evidence, the
Commissioner concluded that:
"the outer condition of the toaster oven was
sufficiently dilapidated to put a reasonable
person on notice that the device should be
examined. . . .  Had [Bethlehem] responded to
this obvious warning of poor condition, it
-12-
could have discovered easily that the lower
heating element was sagging, permitting its
electrical probe to touch the outside case.
That discovery would have been sufficient to
put [Bethlehem] on notice that the device
presented a shock hazard and should be
repaired or removed from service."
The circuit court disagreed.  Noting that the Commissioner
based his finding that the toaster oven was a serious violation
under the Act on the unit's neglected condition, the court faulted
the Commissioner's conclusion that "[t]he [duct] tape still served
as a signal of deterioration or damage and, given that the device
was electrical in nature, such a signal warrants further
investigation."  Although the court agreed that the tape served as
a signal of deterioration, it thought unreasonable to:
"conclude 
that, 
based 
solely 
upon 
the
existence of that duct tape, an employer
exercising due diligence must assume that the
oven's interior might also have deteriorated
or been damaged to such an extent that it was
"electrifying" its exterior.  It is common
knowledge that duct tape is not used to
insulate 
a 
surface 
from 
transmitting
electrical impulses whereas it frequently is
used 
to 
simply 
hold 
things 
together.
Therefore, an argument could be made that the
existence of the duct tape contra-indicated
the 
likelihood 
of 
electrical 
shock."
(Emphasis added).
Both the circuit court and the Commissioner agree that the
oven's exterior was deteriorating, but disagree on the inferences
to be drawn from that deterioration.  The Commissioner concluded
that a reasonably prudent employer would have inspected the device
further, and upon inspection, would have discovered the displaced
-13-
heating coil.  In short, Bethlehem had constructive knowledge of
the electrical hazard.  The circuit court, however, thought it
unreasonable "that an employer exercising due diligence must
assume" that exterior deterioration signals a corresponding
interior deterioration sufficient to pose an electric shock threat.
We think, however, the Commissioner merely suggests that had
Bethlehem exercised due diligence, it would have had to assume
nothing; the threat was easily discernable.  Although the
inferential step between a deteriorating toaster oven and the
threat of an electrical hazard may be long, we are not prepared to
say that it is unreasonable.  Indeed, the circuit court expressly
acknowledged that the point was "arguable," or that conflicting
inferences could be drawn from the oven's physical appearance.  The
Commissioner was entitled to draw the inferences that he did and
the circuit court should have accorded those inferences due
deference.  Cf. Younkers, supra, 333 Md. at 19, 633 A.2d at 863;
Snowden v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 224 Md. 443, 448, 168
A.2d 390, 392 (1968) (agency is the one to whom is committed the
drawing of whatever inferences reasonably are to be drawn from the
factual evidence).
Viewing the record as a whole, and in the Commissioner's favor
as we must, Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lindsay, 309 Md. 557, 563, 525
A.2d 1051, 1054 (1987); Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md.
505, 513, 390 A.2d 1119, 1124 (1978), we hold that it contains
-14-
      The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA") is codified
10
at 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (1994).
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's finding that
Bethlehem 
engaged 
in 
a 
serious 
violation 
of 
29 
C.F.R.
§ 1910.303(b)(1) and that the Court of Special Appeals correctly
concluded that "the trial court erred by supplanting its conclusion
for that of the Commissioner."  Bethlehem Steel, 106 Md. App. at
259, 664 A.2d at 419.  Unlike the intermediate appellate court, we
see no need to remand this portion of the case for further
proceedings.  It is clear from the record that the Commissioner
correctly recognized that the burden to prove the violation fell to
MOSHA, and that MOSHA met that burden.
IV.
Repeat Violation
A.
In addition to charging Bethlehem with a serious violation of
29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1), MOSHA also cited the company for a
repeated violation of that same regulation under § 40(a).  As we
have said, § 40(a) provides for a civil fine of up to $10,000 if an
employer "willfully or repeatedly violates any provision of" the
Act. 
The Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Act is modeled
after its federal counterpart  and we therefore look to federal
10
-15-
      29 U.S.C. § 666(a) provides that:
11
  "Any employer who willfully or repeatedly violates the
requirements of section 5 of this Act [29 U.S.C. § 654],
any standard, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to
section 6 of this Act [29 U.S.C. § 655], or regulations
prescribed pursuant to this Act may be assessed a civil
penalty of not more than $70,000 for each violation, but
not less than $5,000 for each willful violation."
cases for guidance.  Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Comm'r of Labor and
Industry, 339 Md. 323, 328,  662 A.2d 256, 258 (1995);  J.I. Hass
Co. v. Dep't of Licensing & Regulation, 275 Md. 321, 330, 340 A.2d
255, 260 (1975).  Section 40(a) of the Maryland Act mirrors 29
U.S.C. § 666(a) of the federal Act.    Neither act, however,
11
defines "repeatedly."  
Uniformally, the jurisdictions that have considered the
question agree that "a violation is `repeated' if (1) the same
standard has been violated more than once and (2) there is a
`substantial similarity of violative elements' between the current
and prior violations," and (3) the prior citation on which the
repeated violation is based has become a final order of the
Commissioner.  D & S Grading Co., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 899
F.2d 1145, 1147 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing J.L. Foti Constr. Co. v.
OSHRC, 687 F.2d 853, 856-57 (6th Cir. 1982); Dun-Par Engineered
Form Co. v. Marshall, 676 F.2d 1333, 1337 (10th Cir. 1982); Bunge
Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 638 F.2d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1981);
George Hyman Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 582 F.2d 834, 839 (4th Cir.
1978); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 566 F.2d 1327,
-16-
       The civil fine under both the Maryland and Federal Occupational Safety and
12
Health Acts for willful or repeated violations has a current maximum of $70,000, but
a minimum of $5000 for willful violations.  Md. Code (1957, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1996
Cum. Supp.) Labor and Employment § 5-810(a)(2) to (3); 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1996).
     
 The court in Kent Nowlin Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 648 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir.
13
1981) based its conclusion upon H.R. Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 26
(1970) wherein the committee, in discussing the enhanced penalty provisions, stated
that "[o]ther than willful violations, the violator's intent should not be a
pertinent factor in the original assessment of penalties."  648 F.2d at 1282.
1330, n.5 (9th Cir. 1977)).  See also Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90
F.3d 854, 856 (3rd Cir. 1996); Kent Nowlin Constr. Co. v. OSHRC,
648 F.2d 1278, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1981).  We agree.
During the relevant period, § 40(a) of the Maryland Act and 29
U.S.C. § 666(a) provided for a $10,000 civil fine if any employer
willfully or repeatedly violated the acts' requirements.   A
12
literal reading of both acts reveals that the enhanced penalty
provision was aimed at violations that are either willful or
repeated.  George Hyman Constr. Co., supra, 582 F.2d at 839.  The
use of the disjunctive "or" suggests two alternative theories upon
which an enhanced penalty may be predicated.  Id.  Such a
construction is consistent with Congressional intent to "permit
enhanced penalties when employers permit violations of the same
standard to occur several times, even though the employer's intent
or negligence falls short of the `willful' level."  Kent Nowlin
Constr. Co., supra, 648 F.2d at 1281.   The purpose of 29 U.S.C.
13
§ 666(a), and by implication, Maryland's § 40(a), is to, inter
alia, encourage employers who have previously been cited for a
violation to take adequate remedial measures to prevent recurrence
-17-
of the violation.  648 F.2d at 1282.  Under this construction,
enhanced penalties should come into play whenever an employer fails
to adequately respond to a citation, Dun-Par Engineered Form,
supra, 676 F.2d at 1337, regardless of whether the failure was
"willful." 
B.
The instant fray is joined over the parties' respective
burdens of proof when a § 40(a), or a repeated citation, is
challenged.  Prior to the August 17, 1990 incident which gave rise
to the citation(s) challenged here, Bethlehem was thrice cited for
violations of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1).  Citations issued on
December 14, 1987 and June 17, 1990, respectively alleged that
wiring on an overhead crane was frayed and dry rotted, and on the
latter citation, panel wiring improperly spliced.  A January 19,
1989 citation alleged that Bethlehem improperly exposed two 440-
volt floor-mounted electric motors to water and chemicals.  All
three citations alleged that the hazards were "likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to employees."
In his opinion, the Commissioner noted that "[t]he record
shows that on [at least] two prior occasions MOSHA had cited
[Bethlehem] for violating Standard 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) by
having electrical equipment with recognized hazards."  Relying on
Potlatch Corp., 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1061 (R.C. 1979), he concluded
-18-
that "[t]his is sufficient to make a prima facie case that the
violation alleged here was repeat."  Despite Bethlehem's argument
that the conditions giving rise to the 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1)
hazard were so disparate from the earlier citations so as to
preclude notice to Bethlehem of a repeat violation, the
Commissioner opined that:
"[t]he courts have recognized, however, that
where an employer has been previously cited
for a particular hazard, a subsequent citation
for 
the 
same 
hazard 
is 
appropriately
characterized as repeat, even if different
conditions gave rise to the hazard. . . .
Accordingly, the Commissioner will affirm the
violation as repeat."  (Emphasis added).
We disagree.  The federal cases clearly hold that in order to
sustain a repeated violation citation under 29 U.S.C. § 666(a),
there must be a "substantial similarity of violative elements
between the current and prior violations."  See D & S Grading
supra, 899 F.2d at 1147.  The crux of the present matter is to whom
falls the burden of proving "substantial similarity" and what is
necessarily required to meet that burden. 
In Potlatch, a majority of the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission for the first time construed the word
"repeatedly," as used in 29 U.S.C. § 666(a).  In so doing, the
Commission stated:
"[t]he Secretary may establish a prima facie
case of [substantial] similarity by showing
that the prior and present violations are for
failure to comply with the same standard.  It
is important to recognize that occupational
-19-
     
 5 U.S.C.A. § 551 et seq. (1988 ed., Supp. V) is otherwise known as the
14
federal Administrative Procedure Act.
safety and health standards range from those
that designate specific means of preventing a
hazard or hazards to those that either do not
specify the means of preventing a hazard or
apply 
to 
a 
variety 
of 
circumstances.
Accordingly, in cases where the Secretary
shows that the prior and present violations
are for an employer's failure to comply with
the 
same 
specific 
standard, 
it 
may 
be
difficult for an employer to rebut the
Secretary's prima facie showing of similarity.
This is true simply because in many instances
the two violations must be substantially
similar in nature in order to be violations of
the same standard. However, in cases where
both violations are for failure to comply with
the 
same 
general 
standard, 
it 
may 
be
relatively undemanding for the employer to
rebut the Secretary's prima facie showing of
similarity."
Potlatch, 7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1063.  In order to rebut such a
prima facie case, the employer must show "disparate conditions and
hazards associated with [the] violations of the same standard."
Id.
The Commissioner invites this Court to adapt the Potlatch
approach to the Maryland Act.  We decline that invitation.  As the
Fifth Circuit observed in Bunge, supra, "[u]nder 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 556(d),
 the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of
[14]
proof, except as otherwise provided by statute.  Absent a different
allocation of the burden of persuasion by the substantive statute,
the burden of production and persuasion remain with the Secretary,"
-20-
who must show the similarity of conditions associated with the
present and antecedent violations.  Bunge, 638 F.2d at 838.
The Commissioner correctly points out that the Bunge court
predicated its holding on 5 U.S.C.A. § 556(d), for which there is
no Maryland counterpart.  This is of no moment.  We have previously
held "that the burden of proof is generally on the party asserting
the affirmative of an issue before an administrative body."
Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm'n, 221 Md. 221, 231, 156 A.2d 657,
662 (1959).  Section 556(d) coincidentally reflects in the federal
Administrative Procedure Act what has long been the law of this
State with respect to burdens of proof in administrative hearings.
As the Commissioner acknowledges in his Reply Brief, federal
law fails to make clear whether proving "substantial similarity"
in the repeated violation context requires proving the similarity
of the conditions giving rise to the hazard that the standard seeks
to abate, the similarity of the hazard itself, or a combination of
the two.  The answer to this question requires resort to the
structure of the Act itself and the purpose underlying the enhanced
penalty provisions.
The universe of OSHA and MOSHA rules and regulations is large
and diverse.  As the Potlatch Commission noted, safety standards
may be quite specific, such as those that require the installation
of handrails at construction sites, see J.L. Foti Constr. Co.,
supra, 687 F.2d  at 855 n.1, or quite general, such as those that
-21-
     
 In Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864 (10th
15
Cir. 1975), the court said that "hazard, as such, need not be shown in order to show
non-compliance with [29 C.F.R. § 1910.22(c) requiring handrails to prevent the
hazards of open pits].  The standard presupposes the obvious, namely, that an open
unguarded pit necessarily presents the hazard that someone may fall into it."  511
F.2d at 869.
require workplace cleanliness and sanitation.  See Bunge Corp.,
supra, 638 F.2d at 833 n.1.  Similarly, certain of the Act's rules
and regulations proscribe specific hazards, such as 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.303(b)(1), at issue in the instant case, which requires
employers to keep electrical equipment "free from recognized
hazards likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
employees."  Others simply proscribe certain conditions, the hazard
being presumed.  Cf. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of
Labor, 511 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1975).   For example,  29
15
C.F.R. § 1926.500(d)(1), which requires that "[e]very open-sided
floor or platform 6 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground
level shall be guarded by a standard railing . . . ," is just such
a regulation, the presumptive hazard being that of an employee
fall.
We think the better approach is to burden MOSHA with proving
substantial similarity between the conditions giving rise to the
hazard in order to sustain a repeated violation under the Maryland
Act.  Clearly, when a rule or regulation mandates or proscribes
very specific conduct, the burden is slight.  A repeated violation
under a very specific standard requires the present and antecedent
conditions to be almost identical.  If an employer is cited twice
-22-
for failing to construct proper railing on a construction site, the
conditions giving rise to the presumed hazard of an employee fall
are going to be virtually synonymous, i.e., the failure to
construct proper railings.  As the rule or regulation becomes more
general in character, however, the burden will concomitantly
increase.  Thus, although 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) proscribes
electrical equipment hazards, the conditions which can give rise to
such hazards may be limitless.
The dissent relies heavily upon our holding in Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. Commiss'r of Labor and Industry, 339 Md. 323, 662 A.2d 256
(1995)(hereinafter Bethlehem I), wherein we held that the
Commissioner properly placed the burden of proof upon Bethlehem to
prove that compliance with a specific safety standard was not
feasible.  The dissent suggests that Bethlehem I is analogous, if
not controlling.  We respectfully disagree for three reasons.
First, although Bethlehem I addressed the relative burdens of
proof between the Commissioner and the cited employer, it did so in
the context of proving the feasibility of compliance with the
general and specific duty clauses of the Maryland Occupational
Safety and Health Act.  See Md. Code (1991, 1991 Repl. Vol., 1991
Supp.), §§ 5-104(a)(1)-(2) & 5-104(b)(1) of the Labor and
Employment Article.  We there held that when an employer is cited
for violation of the general duty clause, the burden falls upon the
Commissioner to prove that compliance with the rule or regulation
-23-
is feasible.  Bethlehem I, 339 Md. at 328, 662 A.2d at 258.  The
same is true for an alleged violation under the specific duty
clause, when the implicated rule or regulation fails to specify the
means of compliance.  Id. at 329, 662 A.2d 259.  Such a rule "is
driven by the concern that absent fair notice of what is required
or prohibited, there may be a violation of due process."  Id., 662
A.2d 259 (and cases cited therein).  When, however, a specific duty
standard contains the method for abating workplace hazards, the
burden of proving the infeasibility of the particular standard
under the circumstances falls to the employer.  Id., 662 A.2d 259.
In the instant case, the feasibility of compliance with 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.303(b)(1) was neither raised nor argued below.  In that
regard, Bethlehem I is inapposite.
Second, even assuming arguendo that issue was raised below,
29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) fails to prescribe the method of abating
workplace electrical hazards.  Under our holding in Bethlehem I,
the burden of proving the feasibility of compliance would have
fallen to the Commissioner in any event.
Finally, due process concerns aside, saddling the employer
with the burden of proving the feasibility of compliance in those
instances where the alleged violation was of rule or regulation
prescribing a specific method of hazard abatement is perfectly
consistent with the position we adopt in the instant case.  Indeed,
infeasibility is in the nature of an affirmative defense.  As the
-24-
party asserting the affirmative, the employer would naturally have
the burden of proof.  See Part II. B., supra.
As we said in Part IV. A. supra, the purpose of the enhanced
penalty provision of § 40(a) of the Maryland Act is to ensure
adequate employer response to previous citations.  We think it is
impossible to determine the propriety of an employer's response
without first considering the underlying conditions that gave rise
to the violation in the first instance.  In situations where the
conditions prompting the present citation are so disparate from
those of the antecedent violation that the employer would not be on
notice that his compliance efforts are insufficient, application of
the enhanced penalty provisions would serve only to punish an
employer who has made a good faith effort to observe the relevant
regulation and correct any deficiencies brought to its attention.
We do not think that this is the intent of the General Assembly in
enacting § 40(a).
This is not to suggest that an employer may turn a blind eye
to workplace hazards.  To the contrary, a citation and abatement
order apprises an employer of the necessity of corrective action
and of seeking out and preventing similar hazards.  §§ 36, 37 and
40.  See also Dun-Par Engineered Form, supra, 676 F.2d at 1337
(citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 666(a), (b), and (j)).  We simply here
recognize that while the Act requires employers to comply with its
provisions and assure, as far as practicable, a safe working
-25-
environment for its employees, it does not require employer
omniscience in the area of workplace safety.  Cf. Brennan v. OHSRC,
511 F.2d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that not requiring the
Secretary to establish that an employer knew or should have known
of the existence of an employee violation would in effect
improperly make the employer strictly and absolutely liable for all
violations).  We can perceive of some situations where,
notwithstanding a prior citation under a particular safety
standard, an enhanced penalty would no more encourage employer
compliance than if the original citation had never been issued.
We therefore hold that in order to establish a "repeated
violation" under § 40(a), the Commissioner must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the substantial similarity between
the conditions giving rise to the present and antecedent
violations.  A final order of the Commissioner under the same
standard does not establish a prima facie case of a "repeated
violation" in the Commissioner's favor.  The burden of persuasion
and burden of production remain firmly fixed upon the Commissioner
throughout the administrative proceeding.  Bunge, supra, 638 F.2d
at 838.
In light of the principles articulated in this opinion, we
shall affirm the intermediate appellate's court decision to remand
the "repeated violation" portion of the case to allow the
Commissioner the opportunity to apply the correct evidentiary
-1-
standard to the facts of this case and to hear more evidence if
necessary.  This will necessarily involve determining whether the
conditions leading to Bethlehem's most recent citation for
violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.303(b)(1) were substantially similar
to those for its previous violations of that same standard.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
AFFIRMED 
IN 
PART 
AND
REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED TO
THAT 
COURT 
WITH 
DIRECTIONS 
TO
FURTHER REMAND THE CASE TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND IT TO
THE 
COMMISSIONER 
OF 
LABOR 
AND
INDUSTRY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
DIVIDED
EQUALLY 
BETWEEN 
PETITIONER 
AND
RESPONDENT.
Concurring Opinion follows next page:
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Chasanow, J.:
I concur with the majority's holding that the Commissioner
was correct in finding that the toaster oven that electrocuted
Raymond Pritts had "recognized hazards that are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to employees" and that this was
a "serious" violation.  My dissent is from the portion of the
-2-
     This federal standard is in effect in Maryland.   Maryland
1
operates a federally approved State Occupational Safety and
Health Plan, and the Commissioner of Labor and Industry has
adopted the federal safety standards for enforcement in
Maryland.  Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 9.12.31.
(1977, Supp. 15-20).  Hereafter, in citing to the federal
Occupational and Health Safety Standards, I shall omit the
citation to Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations.  
For example, the standard in the violation charged in this
case becomes § 1910.303(b)(1).
majority's opinion that analyzes the procedure by which a
"repeated" violation should be determined and from the failure
to affirm the Commissioner's finding that Bethlehem Steel
Corporation committed a repeated violation.
I. THE PRIOR VIOLATIONS
At the evidentiary hearing Maryland Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (MOSHA) introduced three prior
citations 
for 
Bethlehem's 
violation 
of 
29 
C.F.R. 
§
1910.303(b)(1) .  That provision is a subsection of § 1910.303
16
which provides, in relevant part:
General requirements.
"(a) Approval.  The conductors and
equipment required or permitted by this
subpart shall be acceptable only if approved.
(b) Examination, installation, and use of
equipment--(1) 
Examination. 
 
Electrical
equipment shall be free from recognized
hazards that are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to employees.  Safety of
equipment shall be determined using the
following considerations:
(i) Suitability for installation and use
in conformity with the provisions of this
subpart.  Suitability of equipment for an
identified purpose may be evidenced by listing
or labeling for that identified purpose.
(ii) Mechanical strength and durability,
including, for parts designed to enclose and
-3-
protect other equipment, the adequacy of the
protection thus provided.
(iii) Electrical insulation.
(iv) Heating effects under conditions of
use.
(v) Arcing effects.
(vi) 
Classification 
by 
type, 
size,
voltage, current capacity, specific use.
(vii) Other factors which contribute to
the practical safeguarding of employees using
or likely to come in contact with the
equipment."  (Emphasis added).
Section 1910.303(b)(1) is a standard designed to prevent the
hazard of electric shocks that are capable of causing death or
serious physical harm.  The standard seems to require two related
duties of an employer.  First, prior to installing electrical
equipment, an employer should verify that the equipment is free
from recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious physical
harm.  Second, electrical equipment with recognized hazards that
are capable of causing death or serious physical harm should be
made safe; this is the portion of the standard at issue in the
instant case as well as in the prior violations.  There may also be
a third duty under this subsection that may require an employer to
conduct reasonable inspections of electrical equipment.  In
addition to the violations at issue in the instant case, Bethlehem
was also charged with failure to inspect the toaster oven.  The
Commissioner of Labor and Industry found that this violation was
-4-
not proven.  In his written opinion, the Commissioner stated:
"There is no other evidence [about inspections].  Accordingly, the
Commissioner concludes that MOSH failed to show a failure to
inspect."  What the instant citation and the prior citations
charged, however, was the failure to abate recognized hazards, not
the failure to inspect electrical equipment.
Bethlehem had been issued three citations prior to the
citation at issue.  Each of those prior citations was issued for
violating the same standard as the citation in the instant case.
Taking the prior citations in inverse chronological order, the
third prior citation was for a violation on May 14, 1990.  The
violation charged:
"29 CFR 1910.303(b)(1):  Electrical equipment
was not free from recognized hazards that were
likely to cause death or serious physical harm
to employees."
The equipment listed in the violations was two overhead bridge
cranes and the conditions were "250 volt main hoist panel wiring
was found to be dry rotted" and "250 volt power lead wiring in rear
of bridge panel box was found to be frayed and dry rotted."
The second prior citation was for a violation occurring on
August 4, 1988.  The violation charged was: 
"29 CFR 1910.303(b)(1):  Electrical equipment
was not free from recognized hazards that were
likely to cause death or serious physical harm
to employees."
 
-5-
The equipment listed was two 440 volt electric motors and the
condition was "(2) floor mounted electric motors are exposed to
water & chemical solution that may become energized."
The first prior citation was for a violation occurring on
October 6, 1987.  The violation charged was:
"29 CFR 1910.303(b)(1):  Electrical equipment
was not free from recognized hazards that were
likely to cause death or serious physical harm
to employees."
The equipment involved was three overhead bridge cranes and the
conditions were "main hoist panel wiring was found to be dry rotted
and corroded," "bridge panel wiring was improperly spliced," and
"bridge panel wiring was found to be dry rotted and corroded."
Each of these three prior violations was found to be a serious
violation and each resulted in a fine, which Bethlehem paid.
At the evidentiary hearing in the instant case, James C.
Barry, who had been an Occupational Safety and Health Inspector for
17 years, testified.  When asked if the three prior violations were
"substantially similar" to the violation in the instant case, Mr.
Barry answered in the affirmative and stated:
"Certainly dry rotted wiring and corroded
wiring could produce pretty much the same
situation 
which 
would 
be 
contact 
with
energized electrical parts and in such produce
a serious injury to an employee."
II. REPEATED VIOLATIONS
-6-
Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol.) Article 89, § 40(a)
2
provides in relevant part:
"(a)  Willful or repeated violations.
— Any employer who willfully or repeatedly
violates any provision of this subtitle or
any rule, regulation, standard, or order
promulgated pursuant to this subtitle may
be assessed a civil penalty not to exceed
$10,000.00 for each violation."
Since the time of the violations at issue in this case, Art.
89 § 40(a) has been recodified as Md. Code (1991, 1996 Supp.),
Labor & Employment, § 5-810(a)(2) and now permits a civil
penalty not in excess of $70,000 per violation. 
Under Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol.), Article 89, §
40(a), any employer who "repeatedly violates" any rule, regulation,
or standard may be fined up to $10,000.00.   "Repeatedly" is not
17
defined in the statute and has been the subject of some
controversy.  My disagreement with the majority is not in how it
defines "repeatedly," but in its rejection of the Commissioner's
determination, made in accord with the overwhelming weight of
authority, that a prima facie case of a repeat violation was
established by Bethlehem's prior violations of the same standard.
The definition of repeated violations adopted by the majority
was formulated in the seminal case of Secretary of Labor v.
Potlatch Corp., 1979 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 23,294 (R.C. 1979).  Potlatch
synthesized a definition of "repeated violation" which was later
adopted by the overwhelming majority of courts.  See Reich v. D.M.
Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 857 n.8 (3d Cir. 1996)(stating that
-7-
"[s]ince Potlatch, every other court of appeals which has addressed
this issue has adopted the Potlatch definition").  The Potlatch
definition of repeated violations is also adopted by the majority
in the instant case.  Potlatch both defined "repeated" violations
and, as an integral part of the definition, established the
procedure for determining how a repeated violation is established.
Potlatch stated:
"Inasmuch as the announcement of authoritative
guidelines is an important matter, we have
thoroughly re-examined this issue in light of
the 
decisions of 
the 
Fourth 
and 
Ninth
Circuits, and we now announce the following
principles.
  
A violation is repeated under section
17(a) of the Act if, at the time of the
alleged repeated violation, there was a
Commission final order against the same
employer 
for 
a 
substantially 
similar
violation."
Potlatch ¶ 23,294 at 28,171.  Immediately following the definition
of repeated violation, the Potlatch opinion explained the procedure
for proving a substantially similar violation. 
"The Secretary may establish substantial
similarity in several ways.  In cases arising
under section 5(a)(2) of the Act, which states
that 
each 
employer 
shall 
comply 
with
occupational safety and health standards, the
Secretary may establish a prima facie case of
similarity by showing that the prior and
present violations are for failure to comply
with the same standard.  It is important to
recognize that occupational safety and health
standards range from those that designate
specific means of preventing a hazard or
hazards to those that either do not specify
the means of preventing a hazard or apply to a
-8-
variety of circumstances.  Accordingly, in
cases where the Secretary shows that the prior
and present violations are for an employer's
failure to comply with the same specific
standard, it may be difficult for an employer
to rebut the Secretary's prima facie showing
of similarity.  This is true simply because in
many instances the two violations must be
substantially similar in nature in order to be
violations of the same standard.  However, in
cases where both violations are for failure to
comply with the same general standard, it may
be relatively undemanding for the employer to
rebut the Secretary's prima facie showing of
similarity.  * * *
   In the absence of evidence that the
antecedent and present violations concern
non-compliance with the same standard, the
Secretary must present other evidence that the
violations 
are 
substantially 
similar 
in
nature.  In this regard, we think that
evidence that the violations involve similar
hazards would be relevant.  We assign weight
to the similarity of the hazards for two
reasons. First, a failure to do so would
re-cast the phrase `section 5 of this Act' in
section 17(a) to read `section 5(a)(2)' and
thus preclude the possibility that an employer
could repeatedly violate section 5(a)(1).
Second, to hold that characterization as
repeated is limited to subsequent violations
of the same standard could lead to patently
absurd results.  For example, if two employees
performing construction work such as painting
were exposed to a 20 foot fall from an
unguarded scaffold, the employer would be in
violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(a)(4); a
subsequent citation based on exposure of the
same employees to a 20 foot fall while using
the same unguarded scaffold to replace light
bulbs would be a violation of 29 C.F.R. §
1910.28(a)(3).  Under the `same standard'
restriction, however, the subsequent violation
could 
not 
be 
classified 
as 
repeated."
(Footnotes omitted).
Potlatch ¶ 23,294 at 28,171-72.
-9-
As previously noted, federal appellate courts that have
confronted the issue have almost uniformly adopted the Potlatch
definition, and there is no reason to believe that they would
reject the Potlatch procedure of holding that there is a prima
facie repeated violation when there is a second violation of the
same standard.  See Dun-Par Engineered Form Co. v. Marshall, 676
F.2d 1333, 1338 (10th Cir. 1982)(holding that a repeat violation is
prima facie established by showing that the prior and present
citation are for violation of the same standard). 
Federal administrative decisions have uniformly adopted the
Potlatch definition of repeated violations as well as the Potlatch
decision holding that there is a prima facie violation when there
is a prior violation of the same standard.  See, e.g., Amerisig
Southeast, Inc., 1996 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 31,081 at 43,362 (R.C.
1996)("The Secretary may establish a prima facie case of
substantial similarity by showing that the final order alleged a
failure to comply with the same standard. The burden then shifts to
the employer to rebut that showing."); Mautz & Oren, Inc., 1993
OSHD (CCH) ¶ 29,986 at 41,069 (R.C. 1993)("Recently, the Commission
reaffirmed the holding in Potlatch that the Secretary establishes
a prima facie case of similarity by showing that both violations
are of the same standard, as long as the standard at issue is not
a general standard."); Kulka Construction Management Corp., 1992
OSHD 
(CCH) 
¶ 
29,829 
at 
40,687-88 
(R.C. 
1992)(citation
-10-
omitted)(stating "Kulka had previously been cited for violations of
the same standards at issue here ..., [which] is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case that the violations alleged here were
repeated"); Dole v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.,
No. 89-3055 at 7 (O.S.H.R.C. Nov. 7, 1990)(available from
CCH)(noting "[t]he Secretary establishes a prima facie case by
showing that both violations are of the same standard").
The sole authority cited by the majority for rejecting the
portion of the Potlatch decision pertaining to a prima facie
violation is the fifteen-year-old case of Bunge Corp. v.
Secretary of Labor, 638 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1981).  The
quotation from Bunge relied on by the majority is:  "Under 5
U.S.C.A. § 556(d), the proponent of a rule or order has the burden
of proof, except as otherwise provided by statute.  Absent a
different allocation of the burden of persuasion by the substantive
statute, both the burden of production and persuasion remain with
the Secretary."  ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (Majority Op.
at ___)(quoting Bunge, 638 F.2d at 838).  That statement,
incidently, is dicta because Bunge sustained the finding of a
repeated violation.  638 F.2d at 837.
There are several reasons why the only case cited by the
majority should not be considered persuasive authority in
Maryland.  It is obvious from the quotation that the statutory
-11-
authority that is cited and relied on by the Bunge Court is 5
U.S.C.A. § 556(d).  As the majority acknowledges, there is no
Maryland counterpart to that cited federal statute.  Further,
the majority cites no other court or administrative decision
that follows Bunge, and as I have indicated, there are many,
many decisions that disagree with Bunge's rejection of
Potlatch's holding that a prima facie case of a repeated
violation is established by a second violation of the same
standard.
In addition, Bunge's rejection of Potlatch may no longer
be good authority as a result of the Supreme Court's decision
in Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 1730, 135
L.Ed.2d 25 (1996).  In 1976, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. O.S. & H.R. Com'n, 540 F.2d
157, 162 (3d Cir. 1976), adopted a definition of a "repeated"
violation that differed from the Potlatch definition.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Smiley v. Citibank,
supra, the Third Circuit repudiated its prior decision and
adopted the Potlatch definition.  In Reich, supra, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals explained why it was no longer
following its decision in Bethlehem Steel and instead was
following Potlatch stating:
-12-
"Recently, 
the 
Supreme 
Court
reemphasized that courts must defer to an
agency's interpretation of statutes that
the agency is charged with administering,
explaining why such a high degree of
deference is owed:
`It is our practice to defer to
the 
reasonable 
judgments 
of
agencies 
with 
regard 
to 
the
meaning of ambiguous terms in
statutes they are charged with
administering.... 
 
We 
accord
deference to agencies ... not
because of a presumption they
drafted 
the 
provisions 
in
question, or were present at the
hearings, 
or 
spoke 
to 
the
principal sponsors; but rather
because of a presumption that
Congress, when it left ambiguity
in 
a 
statute 
meant 
for
implementation 
by 
an 
agency,
understood that the ambiguity
would be resolved, first and
foremost, by the agency, and
desired the agency (rather than
the courts) to possess whatever
degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.... [T]he whole point of
Chevron is to leave the discretion
provided by the ambiguities of a
statute with the implementing
agency.'
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.,
___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 1730, 1733-34,
135 L.Ed.2d 25 (1996)."
Reich, 90 F.3d 859-60.  It is conceivable that the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals may reexamine its prior decision,
-13-
which differs from Potlatch, in the same manner that the Third
Circuit reexamined its prior decision that differed from
Potlatch.
The final reason why Bunge should be rejected in Maryland
is that, less than three weeks after the Court of Special
Appeals handed down its opinion in the instant case, this Court
rejected the foundation for the Bunge holding in Bethlehem
Steel v. Comm. of Labor, 339 Md. 323, 662 A.2d 256
(1995)(hereinafter Bethlehem I).  The foundation for the Bunge
opinion is its view that "[a]bsent a different allocation of
the burden of persuasion by the substantive statute, both the
burden of production and persuasion remain with the Secretary."
Bunge, 638 F.2d at 838.  This is not the law in Maryland.  In
Bethlehem I, an analogous, if not controlling, case involving
the same employer, Bethlehem Steel Corp., this Court expressly
sanctioned shifting the burden of production and persuasion
from the Secretary to the employer by, in effect, implying a
prima facie case.  
In Bethlehem I, the issue was similar, if not identical,
to the issue in the instant case; we held that when an employer
is charged with a violation of a MOSHA specific duty safety
standard that contains a method by which work hazards could be
-14-
abated, the burden of proof could be shifted from the
Commissioner to the employer to prove the impossibility or
infeasibility of compliance with the standard's abatement
method.  We made it clear that the issue was whether the burden
of production could be shifted to the employer, and we stated:
"The issue is whether, under a citation
charging violation of the machine guarding
requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(1),
the burden is on the employer to prove
infeasibility 
of 
compliance 
as 
an
affirmative defense."
   
Bethlehem I, 339 Md. at 325, 662 A.2d at 257.  In determining
that the burden of persuasion and production could be shifted
to the employer, we followed the federal administrative
practice, stating:
"MOSHA and the federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29
U.S.C. 
§§ 
651 
through 
678, 
are
substantially similar.  When interpreting
federal regulations enforced under MOSHA,
we look to federal cases for guidance.
J.I. Hass Co. v. Department of Licensing &
Regulation, 275 Md. 321, 330, 340 A.2d 255,
260 (1975)."  (Footnote omitted).
Bethlehem I, 339 Md. at 328, 662 A.2d at 258.
Our holding in Bethlehem I should be our holding in the
instant case.  In Bethlehem I, our specific holding was:
"Applying the weight of authority under the federal precedents,
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we hold that the Commissioner correctly placed on Bethlehem the
burden of proof that is in dispute."  339 Md. at 340-41, 662
A.2d at 264.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, when an employer
has previously been adjudicated guilty of violating a safety
standard and is subsequently adjudicated guilty of violating
the same safety standard,  it makes sense to say that the
second violation is at least prima facie evidence of a repeated
violation and the burden ought to be on the employer to show,
as an affirmative defense, why the second violation should not
be found to be a repeated violation.  Twice before Bethlehem
was adjudicated in violation of the same safety standard for
failure to correct recognized hazards in electrical equipment
that were capable of electrocuting its employees.  When again
Bethlehem Steel failed to correct a recognized hazard in a
piece of electrical equipment that in fact electrocuted an
employee, it is appropriate to conclude that there is at least
a prima facie repeated violation, and the burden ought to be
on Bethlehem to establish, as an affirmative defense, that its
prior and present violations of the same standard are not
substantially similar.  These standards are designed to protect
employees, and the third instance of ignoring equipment with
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a recognized risk of causing death or serious physical injury
by electrocution ought to at least establish a prima facie case
of a repeated violation.  There is no reason to reverse the
Commissioner's finding of a repeated violation.  I respectfully
dissent.
Judges Rodowsky and Raker have authorized me to state that
they join in the views expressed in this concurring and
dissenting opinion.