Title: L. G. v. Aurora Residential Alternatives, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
18AP656 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
L. G., by her Guardian, Chippewa Family 
Services, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
State of Wisconsin Department of Health Services 
and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
     v. 
Aurora Residential Alternatives, Inc., Aurora 
Integrated Management, Inc. and Aurora Community 
Services, Inc., 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Aurora 023 Community Based Residential Facility 
and Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 28, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 26, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Dunn 
 
JUDGE: 
Rod W. Smeltzer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHMASON, J. and A.W. BRADLEY, J. withdrew 
from participation.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
defendants-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Donna J. Fudge, Esquire, and Fudge Broadwater, 
P.A., Fond du Lac. There was an oral argument by Donna J. Fudge, 
Esquire. 
 
 
 
2
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Matthew Boller, James E. Biese, and Boller & Vaughan, LLC, 
Madison. There was an oral argument by James E. Biese. 
 
 
 
2019 WI 79
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP656 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV239) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
L. G., by her Guardian, Chippewa Family 
Services, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Health 
Services and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Aurora Residential Alternatives, Inc., Aurora 
Integrated Management, Inc. and Aurora 
Community Services, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Aurora 023 Community Based Residential Facility 
and Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
¶1 
DANIEL KELLY, J.   This case addresses whether a 
circuit court order denying a request to compel arbitration and 
stay a pending lawsuit is final for the purposes of appeal.  We 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
2 
 
hold that it is and so reverse and remand the matter to the 
court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Aurora 
Residential 
Alternatives, 
Inc., 
Aurora 
Integrated Management, Inc., and Aurora Community Services, Inc. 
(collectively, "Aurora") own and operate residential facilities.  
L.G., the respondent, is a mentally disabled resident of one of 
Aurora's facilities.  In October 2012, L.G. accused an Aurora 
employee of sexually assaulting her by forcing her to perform 
sexual acts on him, for which he was convicted of fourth-degree 
sexual assault. 
¶3 
Approximately four years later, L.G. filed a lawsuit 
against Aurora over the incident in the Dunn County Circuit 
Court.1  But L.G.2 had signed an arbitration agreement with 
Aurora that provided, in relevant part: 
Any and all claims or controversies arising out of or 
in any way relating to this Arbitration Agreement, the 
Admission Agreement, and/or any of the Consumer's 
stay(s) at the Home, including disputes regarding the 
making, 
execution, 
validity, 
enforceability, 
voidability, unconscionability, severability, scope, 
arbitrability, 
interpretation, 
waiver, 
duress, 
preemption, or any other defense to enforceability of 
this Arbitration Agreement, whether arising out of 
State or Federal law, whether now existing or arising 
in the future, whether for statutory, compensatory or 
punitive damages and whether sounding in breach of 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Rod W. Smeltzer presided. 
2 Chippewa Family Services, Inc. is L.G.'s legal guardian 
and represents her interests in this matter, just as it did in 
executing the arbitration agreement. 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
3 
 
contract, tort (i.e., negligence or wrongful death), 
or breach of statutory duties (including, without 
limitation, any claim based on Consumers' Rights or a 
claim for unpaid Home charges), irrespective of the 
basis for the duty or of the legal theories upon which 
the claim is asserted, shall be submitted to binding 
arbitration. 
. . . .  
The Parties hereby expressly agree that the Admission 
Agreement, 
this 
Arbitration 
Agreement, 
and 
the 
Consumer's 
stay 
at 
the 
Home 
involve 
interstate 
commerce. The Parties also stipulate that the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 in effect as of July 
1, 2013 ("FAA"), shall apply to this Arbitration 
Agreement 
and 
that 
the 
FAA 
shall 
preempt 
any 
inconsistent state law and shall not be reverse 
preempted. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
¶4 
In response to the lawsuit, Aurora filed a motion to 
compel arbitration and stay the circuit court proceedings 
pending the arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 ("FAA") (the "Motion").  The circuit court 
denied the Motion in a written order (dated February 15, 2018), 
which bore the following statement:  "THIS IS A FINAL ORDER FOR 
PURPOSES OF APPEAL" (the "Order").3 
¶5 
Aurora filed its notice of appeal 46 days later.4  L.G. 
moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because 
                                                 
3 The Order also decided:  (1) Massachusetts Bay Insurance 
Company's motion to bifurcate insurance issues and stay the 
proceedings; and (2) a motion for a protective order related to 
discovery issues. 
4 When no party provides written notice of entry of a final 
judgment or order, the appellant must file a notice of appeal no 
later than 90 days after entry of the order appealed from: 
(continued) 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
4 
 
Aurora was "seeking a review of a non-final order that denied 
their motion to compel arbitration."  L.G. v. Aurora Residential 
Alts., Inc., No. 2018AP656, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. May 
10, 2018).  The court of appeals granted the motion.  It held 
that "because the order denying arbitration does not dispose of 
the entire matter of litigation, it is not a final and 
appealable order as of right under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) 
[(2017-18)][5]."  Id.  The court of appeals also stated that 
Aurora could appeal the Order only pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(2), which governs permissive appeals.  Under that 
procedure, the prospective appellant must file a petition 
requesting permission to appeal no later than 14 days after 
entry of the order to be reviewed.  § 809.50(1).  The court of 
appeals 
dismissed 
the 
appeal 
for 
lack 
of 
jurisdiction, 
concluding that the Order was not final, and Aurora had not 
filed a petition requesting permission to appeal.  L.G., No. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Initiating an appeal.  An appeal to the court of 
appeals must be initiated within 45 days of entry of a 
final judgment or order appealed from if written 
notice of the entry of a final judgment or order is 
given within 21 days of the final judgment or order as 
provided in s. 806.06 (5), or within 90 days of entry 
if notice is not given, except as provided in this 
section or otherwise expressly provided by law.  Time 
limits for seeking review of a nonfinal judgment or 
order are established in s. 809.50. 
Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1) (2017-18) (emphasis in original).  There 
is no notice of entry of final order or judgment in the record. 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
5 
 
2018AP656, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. May 10, 2018).  
Aurora moved the court of appeals to reconsider, specifically 
pointing out the statement on the Order indicating it was final 
for purposes of appeal.  The court of appeals denied the motion, 
concluding that the statement was erroneous because the order 
did "not dispose of the matter in litigation among the parties."  
L.G. 
v. 
Aurora 
Residential 
Alts., 
Inc., 
No. 
2018AP656, 
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. May 31, 2018) (order denying 
the motion for reconsideration).  The court of appeals also 
denied Aurora's alternative request to extend the deadline to 
file a petition requesting permission to appeal. 
¶6 
Aurora filed a petition for review of the court of 
appeals' orders, which we granted.  We now reverse the court of 
appeals' dismissal of Aurora's appeal. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
In the course of this opinion we are required to 
interpret and apply our statutes.  "These are questions of law 
that we review de novo."  Kieninger v. Crown Equip. Corp., 2019 
WI 27, ¶12, 368 Wis. 2d 1, 924 N.W.2d 172 (citing State v. 
Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346).  More 
specifically, the finality of a circuit court's order presents a 
question of law subject to de novo review.  Admiral Ins. Co. v. 
Paper Converting Mach. Co., 2012 WI 30, ¶22, 339 Wis. 2d 291, 
811 N.W.2d 351. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶8 
Whether Aurora may appeal the Order depends entirely 
on whether it was final within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
6 
 
§ 808.03(1).  If it was, then the notice of appeal was timely, 
and the court of appeals should not have dismissed the appeal. 
If not, then the quest must end because Aurora did not file a 
petition requesting permission to appeal the Order, and it does 
not argue otherwise.6  Therefore, the balance of this opinion 
focuses on whether the Order was final within the meaning of 
§ 808.03(1).7 
¶9 
The finality of the Order is outcome dispositive 
because of its jurisdictional consequences.  Our statutes 
provide for an appeal as of right only from final orders or 
judgments:  "A final judgment or a final order of a circuit 
court may be appealed as a matter of right to the court of 
appeals unless otherwise expressly provided by law."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.03(1).  Without finality, there is no jurisdiction for 
such an appeal.  "[T]his court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal 
[as of right] brought from a nonfinal judgment or order."  
McConley v. T.C. Visions, Inc., 2016 WI App 74, ¶3, 371 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(2), in part, provides:  "A 
judgment or order not appealable as a matter of right under 
sub. (1) may be appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a 
final judgment or order upon leave granted by the court[.]" 
7 "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of 
the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry.'  Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (internal citations omitted); see generally Daniel R. 
Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969 
(2017).   
No. 
2018AP656   
 
7 
 
Wis. 2d 658, 885 N.W.2d 816 (quoting Leske v. Leske, 185 
Wis. 2d 628, 630, 517 N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1994)) (alteration in 
original). 
¶10 "Finality," to the extent it concerns us today, has 
two components.  Our statutes say that "[a] final judgment or 
final order is a judgment, order or disposition that disposes of 
the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the 
parties, whether [it is] rendered in an action or special 
proceeding . . . ." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 808.03(1). 
 
The 
first 
component, therefore, relates to whether the order in question 
is part of an "action" or, instead, a "special proceeding."  The 
second component relates to whether the order disposed of the 
entire matter in dispute between the parties. 
A.  "Action" versus "Special Proceeding" 
¶11 We will start with the first component——whether the 
Order denying the Motion to compel arbitration was entered in an 
action as opposed to a special proceeding.  The distinction is 
important because it will define the "matter in litigation" that 
must be resolved before we may consider whether the order was 
final.  If the Motion was part of L.G.'s "action" against Aurora 
for damages stemming from the sexual assault, then there can be 
no disposition of the "entire matter in litigation" until the 
question of Aurora's alleged liability to L.G. has been 
answered.  But if the Motion represents a "special proceeding" 
separate from L.G.'s "action," then we will need to identify the 
"disputed matter" within that special proceeding so that we may 
determine whether the Order entirely disposed of it.  The court 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
8 
 
of appeals' conclusion that the Order had not disposed of the 
entire matter indicates it understood the Motion to have been 
part 
of 
L.G.'s 
action, 
rather 
than 
a 
separate 
special 
proceeding.  This is a question on which we have not yet 
provided any guidance.  See  Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. 
Jones, No. 2011AP2482, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 
5, 2013) ("[T]he finality of orders regarding arbitration 
appears to be an open question."). 
¶12 Although we may not have provided any guidance on this 
question, the Legislature has.  The Wisconsin Arbitration Act 
(Wis. Stat. § 788.01 et seq. (the "Arbitration Act")) governs 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements, and describes how to 
compel arbitration both before a lawsuit has been filed as well 
as when a lawsuit is already pending.  We examine these 
provisions for what they might say about whether a motion to 
compel arbitration represents a special proceeding or, instead, 
a motion integral to a pending action. 
¶13 When a party to an arbitration agreement refuses to 
arbitrate, the other party may apply to our courts for relief.  
If there is no pending lawsuit when the refusal occurs, the 
aggrieved party may "petition" the circuit court for an order 
compelling arbitration:  "The party aggrieved by the alleged 
failure, neglect or refusal of another to perform under a 
written agreement for arbitration may petition any court of 
record having jurisdiction of the parties or of the property for 
an order directing that such arbitration proceed as provided for 
in such agreement."  Wis. Stat. § 788.03.   
No. 
2018AP656   
 
9 
 
¶14 Upon the filing of such a petition, the Arbitration 
Act limits the circuit court's role to determining the existence 
of an enforceable arbitration agreement and any failure to 
comply with it.  If the parties do not dispute those matters, 
the circuit court simply orders compliance:  "The court shall 
hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of 
the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith 
is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the 
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms 
of the agreement."  Wis. Stat. § 788.03.  However, if a party 
does dispute the making of the agreement or performance of the 
parties, the matter proceeds directly to trial——but only on 
those issues.  Id. ("If the making of the arbitration agreement 
or the failure, neglect or refusal to perform the same is in 
issue, 
the 
court 
shall 
proceed 
summarily 
to 
the 
trial 
thereof.").  Upon resolution of those issues, there are only two 
possible outcomes——either the circuit court orders compliance 
with the arbitration agreement according to its terms, or it 
dismisses the proceeding consequent upon a failure to prove an 
enforceable arbitration agreement or deficient performance.  Id.8   
                                                 
8 In the absence of a jury demand, the circuit court decides 
any challenge to the making of the arbitration agreement or 
deficiency in performance.  See Wis. Stat. § 788.03 ("If no jury 
trial is demanded, the court shall hear and determine such 
issue.").  If a jury decides the issues, and finds the 
petitioner's arbitration demand wanting, the circuit court must 
dismiss the petition.  Id. ("If the jury finds that no agreement 
in writing for arbitration was made or that there is no default 
in proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed.").  
However, if the jury finds an enforceable arbitration agreement, 
(continued) 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
10 
 
¶15 The Arbitration Act's tight control on what a circuit 
court may do with a petition under Wis. Stat. § 788.03 suggests 
that a request to compel arbitration is a matter separate from, 
but related to, the parties' underlying dispute.  Resolution of 
a petition under this provision does not, and cannot, reach the 
merits of the matter to be arbitrated.  And the circuit court's 
work on the petition ends before anyone takes any further steps 
to resolve the issues allegedly covered by the arbitration 
agreement.  So the only effect the petition has on the 
underlying dispute is determining the forum in which it will be 
resolved.  Once that is decided, the circuit court's involvement 
in determining the forum in which the dispute will be decided is 
over. 
¶16 The circuit court's role is similarly limited when the 
attempt to enforce an arbitration agreement takes place in a 
pending lawsuit.  The procedure under Wis. Stat. § 788.02 is 
somewhat truncated in comparison to Wis. Stat. § 788.03, but the 
circuit court's responsibility is essentially the same.  Both 
statutes require the circuit court to do nothing more than 
determine whether the parties must arbitrate their dispute, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
and a failure to abide by its terms, the court issues an order 
directing compliance.  Id. ("If the jury finds that an agreement 
for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default 
in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order 
summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration 
in accordance with the terms thereof."). 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
11 
 
then ensure they do.  The primary difference is that the 
determination is made in the context of an existing lawsuit: 
If any suit or proceeding be brought upon any issue 
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing 
for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is 
pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved 
in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration 
under such an agreement, shall on application of one 
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such 
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms 
of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay 
is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration. 
§ 788.02.  The stay issues if the circuit court is "satisfied 
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable 
to arbitration under such an [arbitration] agreement."  Id. 
¶17 An application to stay proceedings under Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.02 addresses issues as discrete as the petition under Wis. 
Stat. § 788.03.  Both mechanisms are limited to determining 
whether there is an enforceable arbitration agreement, and 
ensuring the parties abide by its terms.  The circuit court's 
resolution of the application is entirely self-contained, 
inasmuch as it simply determines the forum for resolution of the 
dispute without addressing the dispute's merits.  And the matter 
does not return to the circuit court "until such arbitration has 
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement."  
§ 788.02.  That is to say, the circuit court's disposition of 
the application is distinct from the dispute the arbitration is 
supposed to resolve, even as it retains some connection to it. 
¶18 The relationship between an application to stay and 
the action in which it is made convinces us the former is a 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
12 
 
special proceeding within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  
This conclusion is faithful to the standard we have long used in 
assaying the difference between actions and special proceedings.  
Over a century ago, we said "[t]he test to be applied in 
determining the nature of any judicial remedy, as regards 
whether it is a special proceeding, is whether it is a mere 
proceeding in an action, or one independently thereof or merely 
connected therewith.  The latter two belong to the special class 
and the other does not."  Voss v. Stoll, 141 Wis. 267, 271, 124 
N.W. 89 (1910). 
¶19 We used the Voss test just last term to help us 
identify the relationship between a pending criminal proceeding 
and a proceeding to determine the defendant's competency.  State 
v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, 382 Wis. 2d 476, 914 N.W.2d 141.  We 
observed that "[t]he competency proceeding resolves an issue 
separate 
and 
distinct 
from 
the 
issues 
presented 
in 
the 
defendant's underlying criminal proceeding."  Id., ¶33.  So we 
said the "competency proceeding is not part of the defendant's 
underlying criminal proceeding," but they were nonetheless 
"'related' or 'connected' to one another."  Id.  We held 
therefore, that "the competency proceeding is properly 'treated 
as being commenced independently of any other action or 
proceeding.'"  Id.  We can gain additional insight into the 
nature of an application to stay under Wis. Stat. § 788.02 by 
considering the types of proceedings that we do not consider 
"special."  Long ago, we said that proceedings are not "special" 
if 
they 
comprise 
"the 
necessary 
and 
ordinary 
steps 
or 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
13 
 
proceedings taken in an action to conduct it to a final hearing 
and judgment."  Ernst v. The Steamer "Brooklyn", 24 Wis. 616, 
617, 1869 WL 3554 (1869).  An application to stay the pending 
action in favor of an arbitral resolution cannot be a 
"necessary" or "ordinary" step in reaching a final judgment, 
inasmuch as it affirmatively seeks to prevent that very result.  
The relationship between a pending lawsuit and an application 
under § 788.02 is in all material respects the same as that 
obtaining 
between 
the 
competency 
proceeding 
and 
criminal 
proceeding at issue in Scott.  As in Scott, an application to 
stay "resolves an issue separate and distinct from the issues 
presented in" the pending lawsuit, but the two proceedings are 
nevertheless "related" or "connected."  382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶33. 
¶20 L.G. rejects this analysis, and points instead to a 
line of cases that describe a special proceeding as "one either 
entirely outside of an action, as a proceeding for contempt or 
to condemn land, or one merely connected with an action as a 
proceeding by a person not a party to an action to be made 
such."  State v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 134 Wis. 335, 336, 113 
N.W. 944 (1907).  We said something similar more recently:  "A 
special proceeding, like an action, is a stand-alone proceeding 
that is not part of an existing case." Alger, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 
¶29.  The authority for that statement was Black's Law 
Dictionary, which defined a proceeding as something "that can be 
commenced independently of a pending action and from which a 
final order may be appealed immediately."  Id. (quoting Black's 
Law Dictionary 1398 (10th ed. 2014)).  Alger also relied on the 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
14 
 
court of appeals for the proposition that "a special proceeding 
[is] 
one 
occurring 
entirely 
outside 
the 
underlying 
action . . . ."  360 Wis. 2d 193, ¶29 (quoting Wellens v. Kahl 
Ins. Agency, Inc., 145 Wis.2d 66, 69, 426 N.W.2d 41 (Ct. App. 
1988)). 
 
One 
may 
understand 
these 
statements 
as 
either 
descriptive or, alternatively, prescriptive.  That is, it is 
possible for these statements to accurately describe various 
special proceedings that occurred entirely outside of the 
underlying actions, while not asserting that special proceedings 
must occur outside of the underlying actions (the descriptive 
reading).  The prescriptive reading, on the other hand, would 
understand these statements as creating a normative rule, to 
wit, that all special proceedings must occur outside of the 
underlying actions. 
¶21 We believe the best reading of Alger, Wisconsin Tel. 
Co., and Wellens is that they describe, but do not prescribe.  
In Alger we relied on Black's Law Dictionary for the proposition 
that special proceedings "can be commenced independently of a 
pending action."  360 Wis. 2d 193, ¶29.  But just because 
something can be commenced in a particular fashion does not mean 
it must be so commenced.  Because Black's Law Dictionary was the 
basis for our statement in Alger that "[a] special proceeding, 
like an action, is a stand-alone proceeding that is not part of 
an existing case," id., it would be most prudent to understand 
it as simply paraphrasing the authority upon which it relied.  
In that sense, the statement describes a subset of special 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
15 
 
proceedings, but does not prescribe a quality that all special 
proceedings must share. 
¶22 Reading Alger as descriptive, as well as Wisconsin 
Tel. Co. and Wellens, harmonizes them with Scott, our most 
recent analysis of this question.  The competency proceeding at 
issue in Scott was most assuredly not "a stand-alone proceeding 
that [was] not part of an existing case."  Alger, 360 
Wis. 2d 193, ¶29.  And yet we concluded it was, nonetheless, a 
special proceeding.  We reaffirm that Voss describes the test we 
use to determine whether something qualifies as a special 
proceeding.  Voss and Scott demonstrate that an "application to 
stay" under the auspices of Wis. Stat. § 788.02 is a special 
proceeding within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  When a 
circuit court addresses such an application it "resolves an 
issue separate and distinct from the issues presented in" the 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
16 
 
pending lawsuit, but which is "related" or "connected" to that 
lawsuit.9  Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶33. 
B.  Finality 
¶23 The second (and final) step in our analysis is 
determining whether the circuit court's order denying Aurora's 
motion to compel arbitration represented a final disposition of 
"the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the 
                                                 
9 L.G. also directs us to several cases in which the court 
of appeals has treated orders disposing of motions to stay an 
action in favor of arbitration as nonfinal.  See, e.g., Midwest 
Neurosciences Assocs., LLC v. Great Lakes Neurosurgical Assocs., 
LLC, 2018 WI 112, ¶1, 384 Wis. 2d 669, 920 N.W.2d 767 (where we 
characterized the circuit court's order denying the motion to 
stay the proceeding and compel arbitration as "non-final"); 
Mortimore v. Merge Techs. Inc., 2012 WI App 109, ¶11, 344 
Wis. 2d 459, 824 N.W.2d 155 (The appellant "filed for leave to 
appeal the circuit court's nonfinal order denying [appellant]'s 
Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration."); Coady v. Cross Country 
Bank, 2007 WI App 26, ¶1 n.1, 299 Wis. 2d 420, 729 N.W.2d 732 
(where the appellant "filed a petition for leave to appeal from 
this non-final order."); Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. 
Jones, 2006 WI 53, ¶24, 290 Wis. 2d 514, 714 N.W.2d 155 ("The 
court of appeals granted Wisconsin Auto Title Loans' request to 
appeal the nonfinal order of the circuit court[.]"); and Madison 
Beauty Supply, Ltd. v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 167 Wis. 2d 237, 481 
N.W.2d 644 (Ct. App. 1992) (which reviewed a circuit court's 
order denying an application to stay the proceedings under Wis. 
Stat. § 788.02 as a non-final order).  
There are two reasons none of these cases are instructive.  
First, in each of these cases the appellant characterized the 
order as nonfinal by filing a petition for permissive review 
under Wis. Stat. § 809.50.  Consequently, the appellants did not 
put the finality of the order at issue.  And second, in each of 
these cases the court of appeals simply accepted, rather than 
analyzed, the appellant's characterization of the order as 
nonfinal. 
 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
17 
 
parties" in the special proceeding.  Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).10  
To make that determination, we need to compare the circuit 
court's order to the scope of matters at issue in the special 
proceeding. 
¶24 We said in a recent case that, in the context of a 
petition to compel arbitration, the potential scope of matters 
the court may address is quite limited:  "In an action to compel 
arbitration under Wis. Stat. § 788.03, the issues are limited to 
the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect 
or refusal to perform under the agreement."  First Weber Grp., 
Inc. v. Synergy Real Estate Grp., LLC, 2015 WI 34, ¶32, 361 
Wis. 2d 496, 860 N.W.2d 498 (internal marks omitted).  Aurora 
filed its motion to stay pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 788.02, 
however, because there was already a lawsuit pending.  But as we 
discussed above, there is no difference between §§ 788.02 and 
788.03 with respect to the scope of issues the circuit court 
considers in such a special proceeding. 
                                                 
10 The 
Arbitration 
Act 
allows 
a 
party 
to 
file 
an 
"application" to stay the trial, Wis. Stat. § 788.02, which 
application is "made and heard in the manner provided by law for 
the making and hearing of motions."  Wis. Stat. § 788.05.  The 
fact that Aurora denominated its filing a "motion" instead of an 
"application" is of no moment because we are governed by a 
document's substance, not its label.  Twn. of Fitchburg v. City 
of Madison, 98 Wis. 2d 635, 647-48, 299 N.W.2d 199 (1980) ("We 
will look beyond the form and the label of the document to the 
substance[.]"); and Wesolowski v. Erickson, 5 Wis. 2d 335, 339, 
92 N.W.2d 898 (1958) ("The mere labeling of a complaint does not 
determine its nature.  The nature of an action is to be 
determined as a whole and all allegations in the complaint must 
be considered."). 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
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¶25 Aurora's Motion presented no issue to the circuit 
court outside the parameters of Wis. Stat. § 788.02.  After 
asserting the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement 
and L.G.'s failure to abide by its terms, the motion asked the 
circuit court "for an Order staying this action and compelling 
the parties to binding arbitration pursuant to the specific 
terms within the Binding Arbitration Agreement and for such 
other relief as this Court deems just and proper."  Although the 
ensuing Order resolved three pending motions, it discretely 
disposed of each one in separate sections.  The section relating 
to Aurora's motion to stay was limited to the subject of 
arbitrability.  It said:  "For the reasons stated at the 
hearing, including the Court's finding that there is not a 
contract to arbitrate this case, the defendants' Motion to 
Compel Arbitration is DENIED."11  The circuit court's discussion 
of the motion on the record was more extensive, of course, but 
did not go beyond whether the matter under consideration was 
subject to an arbitration requirement.  It is clear, therefore, 
that Aurora's Motion, and the circuit court's resolution, both 
                                                 
11 The order also said:  "THIS IS A FINAL ORDER FOR PURPOSES 
OF APPEAL."  Such a statement, while potentially helpful to 
litigants as a warning, has no legal effect.  Wambolt v. West 
Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 35, ¶46 n.19, 299 Wis. 2d 723, 728 
N.W.2d 670 ("[T]here may be cases in which a document states 
that it is final for purposes of appeal under [Wis. Stat.] 
§ 808.03(1), but does not actually 'dispose of the entire matter 
in litigation as to one or more of the parties[.]' . . . Such a 
document cannot be a final order or final judgment under the 
plain language of the statute."). 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
19 
 
remained within the boundaries of the special proceeding 
described by § 788.02. 
¶26 We conclude that the circuit court's Order disposed of 
the entire matter in controversy between L.G. and Aurora in the 
Wis. Stat. § 788.02 special proceeding.  The Order's terms are 
categorical, and they resolve the only question presented by the 
Motion.  Further, the Order does not contemplate any future 
circuit 
court 
action 
with 
respect 
to 
issues 
potentially 
encompassed by § 788.02.  For these reasons, the circuit court's 
Order was final within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).12 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶27 We hold that an application to stay pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 788.02 is a special proceeding within the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  We further hold that a circuit court 
order that disposes of the entire matter in litigation between 
one or more parties in a § 788.02 special proceeding is final 
for the purposes of appeal. 
                                                 
12 Because we conclude that a circuit court order resolving 
an application to compel arbitration pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 788.02 is final for the purposes of appeal, we need not 
address Aurora's argument that the Federal Arbitration Act 
preempted our appellate procedures and by its own force made the 
Order immediately appealable.  Walworth State Bank v. Abbey 
Springs 
Condo. 
Ass'n., 
Inc., 
2016 
WI 30, 
¶13 
n.7, 
368 
Wis. 2d 72, 878 N.W.2d 170 ("Typically, an appellate court 
should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.").  We 
express no opinion on that novel argument. 
 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
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By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶28 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. and ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
withdrew from participation before oral argument. 
No. 
2018AP656   
 
 
 
1