Title: In re L.H.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re L.H.  (95-132); 165 Vt 591; 682 A.2d 969

[Opinion Filed 19-Jul-1996]


                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 95-132

                              APRIL TERM, 1996


In re L.H., Juvenile                 }     APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
                                     }     Windham Family Court
                                     }
                                     }
                                     }     DOCKET NO. 54-3-94WmJv


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Father appeals from an order of the Windham Family Court declaring
  that his daughter is a child in need of care and supervision (CHINS) and
  transfering custody to SRS.  We remand.

       In March 1994, at the request of an SRS social worker, the Windham
  State's Attorney's Office filed a CHINS petition requesting the court to
  find defendant's 15-year-old daughter to be a child in need of care and
  supervision on grounds that the father had punched her in the mouth with a
  closed fist.

                                     I.

       Father moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that although no
  actual prejudice existed, the petition had not been initiated upon the
  request of any person authorized by 33 V.S.A. § 5517(a).  The statute
  states: "Upon the request of the commissioner of social and rehabilitation
  services, . . . the state's attorney . . . shall . . . file a petition
  alleging that a child is in need of care or supervision."  The motion was
  denied.  The court opined that the SRS social worker's power to initiate
  emergency procedures to remove a child from the home necessarily implied
  the power to request the State's Attorney to initiate related CHINS
  proceedings.

       Father argues that the CHINS petition was not properly before the
  court, because only the commissioner had the authority to bring it under 33
  V.S.A. § 5517 and he did not effect a proper delegation of authority under
  33 V.S.A. § 5502(b), which states: "The commissioner of social and
  rehabilitation services . . . may delegate any authority conferred on him
  by statute to any designee named by him in writing."

       Father concedes, however, that the job description for a social worker
  included the statement that a social worker may "initiate emergency
  procedures to remove [a] child from the current living arrangement." 
  Nevertheless, he contends that the word "initiate" should be construed to
  mean, not "to cause or facilitate the beginning of," Webster's Ninth New
  Collegiate Dictionary at 622 (1987), but rather to "inform[] her
  supervisor."

       Defendant's construction is a strained reading of the plain language
  of the statute, and is particularly inapposite in the context of the
  working reality of a sizeable administrative agency.  "Initiate" in the
  context of § 5502(b) reasonably describes the function of asking an
  enforcement agency to act.  See, e.g., Brooks v. Pool-Leffler,