Title: Fairfield v. Maine State Police

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 
2023 ME 12 
Docket: 
Yor-22-186 
Submitted 
On Briefs: December 7, 2022 
Decided: 
February 7, 2023 
Revised: 
April 6, 2023 
Panel: 
STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
KEEGAN J. FAIRFIELD 
v. 
MAINE STATE POLICE 
ERRATA SHEET 
The Court’s opinion certified on February 7, 2023, is revised to correct an 
error in footnote 1 by replacing “Winchester” with “Fairfield.”   
The original decision on the Court’s website has been replaced with the 
decision as revised. 
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 
2023 ME 12 
Docket: 
Yor-22-186 
Submitted 
On Briefs: December 7, 2022 
Decided: 
February 7, 2023 
Revised: 
April 6, 2023 
Panel: 
STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
KEEGAN J. FAIRFIELD 
v. 
MAINE STATE POLICE 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Keegan J. Fairfield appeals from an order entered by the Superior 
Court (York County, Mulhern, J.) affirming the Maine State Police’s (MSP) 
decision to withhold documents Fairfield sought pursuant to a Freedom of 
Access Act (FOAA) request.  See 1 M.R.S. §§ 400-414 (2022).1  The trial court 
correctly interpreted FOAA and did not err in its review of the factual record, 
and, therefore, we affirm the order.  
1  We cite the current statutes because, although FOAA has been amended since the MSP declined 
to release certain requested materials to Fairfield, the amendments are not relevant to the present 
case.  See, e.g., P.L. 2021, ch. 313, § 5 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified at 1 M.R.S. § 412(1) (2022)). 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. 
FOAA Request 
[¶2]  On May 7, 2020, Fairfield submitted a FOAA request to the MSP, 
seeking (1) documentation of MSP Crime Laboratory protocols including 
standing operating procedures; (2) DNA contamination logs; (3) quality 
assurance records; and (4) quality assurance manuals dating back to 2008.  The 
MSP acknowledged receipt of the request later that day.   
[¶3]  The MSP distributed files to Fairfield on September 28, 2020, and
November 11, 2020.  On December 11, 2020, the MSP notified Fairfield that it 
was denying his request as to certain documents that fell within the four 
requested categories.  Specifically, the MSP withheld the DNA contamination 
logs and three types of quality assurance records: (1) corrective action forms; 
(2) testimony review forms; and (3) drying locker logs.2  As of March 4, 2021, 
the MSP had provided approximately 6,800 pages of requested materials in full, 
as well as forty partially redacted pages.  The MSP withheld approximately 
2,700 pages, concluding that they were confidential under state law.  
2  The MSP withheld some of the corrective action forms, all the testimonial review forms, and 
portions of each drying locker log.   
 
3 
B. 
Proceedings Below 
[¶4]  On December 11, 2020, Fairfield appealed the MSP’s decision to 
redact and withhold certain documents to the Superior Court.  See 1 M.R.S. 
§ 409(1).  In an order dated March 4, 2021, the court (Fritzsche, A.R.J.) ordered 
the withheld documents to be presented for in camera review.  Additionally, the 
court scheduled a hearing that was limited, “[u]nless the reviewing Justice 
decides otherwise, . . . to answering any questions the Justice may have about 
the documents and an inquiry into whether the defendant has made a 
comprehensive search for relevant documents and what, if any, types of 
documents were neither disclosed nor subject to in camera [review].” 
[¶5]  Fairfield submitted a witness list for the hearing, revealing that the 
witnesses were expected to testify on alleged deception and data accuracy 
issues at the MSP Crime Laboratory.  At a status conference on July 29, 2021, 
the court (Mulhern, J.) determined that this testimony would go beyond the 
scope of the hearing and vacated the March 4, 2021, scheduling order.  On 
August 2, 2021, Fairfield filed a motion to reconsider the court’s order vacating 
the earlier scheduling order.  The court denied the motion and issued a new 
scheduling order, stating that it would rely exclusively on briefs, an in camera
review, affidavits that the parties were invited to file, and an exceptions log 
4 
prepared by the MSP as the factual record.  The court reserved the right to hold 
a hearing after reviewing the submitted materials.  
[¶6]  Fairfield submitted his brief and additional materials on January 3, 
2022.  The brief was ninety-six single-spaced pages, and none of the materials 
that Fairfield sought to introduce to the court were in the form of affidavits.  The 
MSP filed a reply brief on February 2, 2022, along with affidavits concerning the 
nature of the withheld documents, why the documents were withheld, and 
operations of the MSP Crime Laboratory generally.   
[¶7]  The court issued an order denying Fairfield’s FOAA appeal on 
May 26, 2022, and stated that it did not consider Fairfield’s additional materials 
as part of the evidentiary record.  Fairfield timely appealed.  M.R. 
App. P. 2B(c)(1).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶8]  On appeal, Fairfield challenges the court’s determination that the 
DNA contamination logs and quality assurance records withheld by the MSP are 
confidential under state law.3   
3  Fairfield also argues on appeal that the court’s decision to vacate the March 4, 2022, scheduling 
order and to cancel the hearing violated the “law of the case” doctrine.  The scheduling order was 
explicitly provisional, and provisional orders are not subject to the “law of the case” doctrine.  See 
Raymond v. Raymond, 480 A.2d 718, 721 (Me. 1984).   
 
5 
A. 
Standard of Review 
[¶9]  In reviewing whether a government entity complied with FOAA, we 
review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its interpretation of 
FOAA de novo.  See Anctil v. Dep’t of Corr., 2017 ME 233, ¶ 5, 175 A.3d 660.  Any
exceptions to FOAA’s disclosure requirement are strictly construed to promote 
FOAA’s underlying policies and purposes.  Id.  “When an agency denies a FOAA 
request, the agency bears the burden of establishing that there is just and 
proper cause for the denial.”  Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios LLP v. State Tax 
Assessor, 2014 ME 6, ¶ 10, 86 A.3d 30.   
[¶10]  We have not yet had the occasion to announce a standard of review 
in instances where a party submits a FOAA request that implicates a large 
quantity of records.  In announcing a standard of review today, we look to 
federal interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for guidance.  
See Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 2005 ME 56, ¶ 13, 871 A.2d 523.   
[¶11]  When confronted with a significant volume of withheld and 
redacted documents, federal courts have interpreted FOIA to grant trial courts 
broad discretion in their creation and review of a factual record.  See, e.g., 
Montgomery v. IRS, 40 F.4th 702, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“We have explained on 
numerous occasions that the decision whether to perform in camera inspection 
6 
is left to the broad discretion of the trial court judge.” (quotation marks 
omitted)).  If a trial court orders the submission of documents for in camera
review, “it need not inspect each and every document in question, [and] many 
courts tak[e] the position that an in camera examination in the nature of a spot 
check or random sample of documents is sufficient to determine the propriety 
of the withholding of records.”  Lewis J. Heisman, Annotation, Power of court 
under 5 USCS § 552(a)(4)(B) to examine agency records in camera to determine 
propriety of withholding records, 60 A.L.R. Fed. 416 § 2 (1982); see also NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224 (1978) (“The in camera review 
provision is discretionary by its terms, and is designed to be invoked when the 
issue before the District Court could not be otherwise resolved; it thus does not 
mandate that the documents be individually examined in every case.”).4   
[¶12]  Accordingly, where a requesting party challenges a trial court’s 
determination that a large number of requested documents are confidential,
our approach is two-fold.  First, we analyze de novo whether the trial court has 
4  In announcing our standard of review, we acknowledge that FOIA and FOAA are distinct from 
one another.  However, both statutes provide factfinders with discretion to create a factual record.  
See 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(a)(4)(B) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 117-242); Dubois v. Dep't of Env’t. Prot., 2017 
ME 224, ¶ 10, 174 A.3d 314 (holding that trial courts have “discretion to determine the process 
necessary for the resolution of disputed facts, giving due consideration to the efficacy, costs, and time 
required for each method of presentation of evidence”). 
 
7 
created a sufficient factual record upon which it can determine whether the 
withheld documents are confidential.5  Second, we independently review the 
factual record, including any documents submitted for in camera review, to 
ensure that the court did not commit clear error in its description and 
categorization of the withheld documents.  Cf. Havemann v. Colvin, 537 F. App’x
142, 146 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[W]here FOIA is involved, [appellate] review is 
limited to determining (1) whether the district court had an adequate factual 
basis for the decision rendered and (2) whether upon this basis the decision 
reached is clearly erroneous.” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)).  We 
may satisfy this second step by spot-checking a random selection of any 
withheld documents submitted for in camera review and reviewing other 
components of the factual record.  
B. 
Statutory Framework 
[¶13]  A person has the right to inspect any public record unless 
otherwise provided by statute.  1 M.R.S. § 408-A(2).  Records that are 
5  Although Fairfield challenges the adequacy of the factual record on appeal, the court here 
created a factual record nearly identical to the one we approved in Dubois v. Department of
Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry: an in camera review of the withheld documents, an exceptions 
log, the parties’ briefs, and any additional affidavits submitted by the parties.  2018 ME 68, ¶¶ 11-12, 
185 A.3d 743.  Accordingly, we find that the court here “creat[ed] a fair process for all of the parties 
to present information that . . . create[d] a meaningful and sufficient record on which the court could 
adjudicate the FOAA claim.”  Id. ¶ 12.   
8 
designated confidential by statute are not public records under FOAA, 1 M.R.S.
§ 402(3)(A), and confidential information may be redacted from records that 
would otherwise be subject to disclosure, see Doyle v. Town of Falmouth, 2014 
ME 151, ¶ 9, 106 A.3d 1145.   
[¶14]  The MSP contended, and the trial court agreed, that three different 
statutes rendered certain withheld documents confidential: 16 M.R.S.
§§ 801-809 (2022) (Intelligence and Investigative Record Information Act),6
25 M.R.S. §§ 1571-1578 (2022) (DNA Data Base and Data Bank Act), and 5 
M.R.S. § 7070 (2022) (personnel records provision).   
1. 
Intelligence and Investigative Record Information Act 
[¶15] 
A record that contains intelligence and investigative record 
information is confidential if there is a reasonable possibility that public release 
or inspection of the record would result in an unwarranted invasion of privacy.  
16 M.R.S. § 804(3).  In Blethen Maine Newspapers, Inc., 2005 ME 56, ¶ 14, 871 
A.2d 523, we applied a three-part test to determine if disclosure would result 
in an unwarranted invasion of privacy, considering “(1) the personal privacy 
6  We cite the current statutes because, although the Intelligence and Investigative Record Act has
been amended since the MSP denied portions of Fairfield’s FOAA request, the amendments are not 
relevant in the present case.  See, e.g., P.L. 2021, ch. 353, § 2 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified at 
16 M.R.S. § 806-A (2022)).   
 
9 
interests . . . in maintaining the confidentiality of the records sought by [the 
requesting party]; (2) the public interest supporting disclosure of the records; 
and (3) the balancing of the private and public interests.”   
[¶16]  Intelligence and investigative records often contain sensitive 
personal information that may not have been verified and “[f]ew people wish 
to be publicly associated with investigations of alleged criminal conduct, 
whether as a perpetrator, witness, or victim.”  Id. ¶ 15.  Accordingly, individuals 
referenced in intelligence and investigative records have a significant interest 
in keeping their identities private.  See id.  
[¶17]  As to the public interest prong, the requesting party must 
demonstrate that the information sought is likely to advance a significant public 
interest.  Id. ¶ 33.  We have previously acknowledged, however, that the public 
has a significant interest in “information that might document governmental 
efficiency or effectiveness . . . [and] information documenting governmental 
negligence or malfeasance.”  Id. ¶ 32.  
2. 
DNA Data Base and Data Bank Act 
[¶18]  “All DNA records are confidential and may not be disclosed to any 
person or agency unless disclosure is authorized by [25 M.R.S. § 1577].”  
25 M.R.S. § 1577(1).  Any DNA identification information obtained from DNA 
10 
analysis is a “DNA record.”7  25 M.R.S. § 1572(5).  DNA records with personal 
identifying information may be released only to certain law enforcement 
agencies and personnel, medical examiners, and any individual who seeks their 
own DNA record.  25 M.R.S. § 1577(2), (4).   
3. 
Personnel records provision  
[¶19]  State employee records containing performance evaluations are 
confidential in their entirety.  See 5 M.R.S. § 7070(2)(B).  Similarly, employee 
records containing “information or materials that may result in disciplinary 
action” are confidential and may not be disclosed, if at all, until a final written 
decision relating to disciplinary action is issued.  Id.  § 7070(2)(E); cf. Lewiston 
Daily Sun v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 619, 621 (Me. 1991).8  The provision 
relating to disciplinary action exempts only records relating to potential or 
7  Fairfield appears to assert that a DNA record contains “identification information” only if a lay 
person can use the record to identify its subject.  We have previously held, however, that the statute’s 
safeguards are meant to “minimize the risk that personally identifiable information can be 
inappropriately mined or released.”  State v. Hutchinson, 2009 ME 44, ¶ 25, 969 A.2d 923 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, the statute is intended to protect information that, if released to the public generally, 
could be used to identify the DNA record’s subject.  Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Fairfield’s 
proposed reading of the DNA Data Base and Data Bank Act.  
8  In Lewiston Daily Sun v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 619 (Me. 1991), we interpreted a statute that 
contains nearly identical language to the personnel records provision at issue here, but that applies
to municipal workers instead of state workers.  See 30-A M.R.S.A. § 2702 (Pamph. 1990).  The 
municipal records law has since been amended and is intended to “parallel the same [privacy] 
protections provided for state employees.”  L.D. 1790, Summary (129th Legis. 2019); see P.L. 2019, 
ch. 451, § 3 (effective Sept. 19, 2019) (codified at 30-A M.R.S. § 2702 (2022)).  
 
11 
actual disciplinary action, Me. Today Media, Inc. v. City of Portland, No. AP-13-05,
2013 Me. Super. LEXIS 144, at *6 (June 24, 2013), and the exception must be
narrowly drawn and does not protect all information pertaining to misconduct, 
Guy Gannett Publ’g Co. v. Univ. of Me., 555 A.2d 470, 472 (Me. 1989).   
C. 
Withheld Documents 
[¶20]  We now address the two types of documents that Fairfield 
contends should have been disclosed to him: DNA contamination logs and 
quality assurance records.   
1. 
DNA contamination logs 
[¶21]  DNA contamination logs track all instances of identified 
contamination of DNA samples, and the MSP withheld these records in their
entirety.  The withheld documents contain highly sensitive information 
including the identification of suspects or victims, the nature of the offense, and 
“evidence, such as . . . anal or vaginal swab[s] . . . [and] body fluids.”   
[¶22]  The MSP went through painstaking efforts to create an exceptions 
log detailing the various reasons for each contamination log’s confidentiality.  
Upon our random review of the withheld DNA contamination logs, we hold that 
the court did not err in its determination that the disclosure of certain 
contamination logs would lead to an unwarranted invasion of privacy.  Indeed, 
12 
it is difficult to imagine information more sensitive than the genetic information 
contained in the withheld contamination logs.  See Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc.,
2005 ME 56, ¶ 15, 871 A.2d 523 (“[W]hen the subject of a law enforcement 
record is a private individual, the privacy interest protected by the privacy 
exception is at its apex.”).  While we agree with Fairfield that there is a strong 
public interest in the release of “information as to the integrity and credibility 
of [the MSP’s] work,” we cannot say that the court clearly erred in determining 
that the private interest in keeping the contamination logs confidential 
outweighed the public interest in their release.9 
[¶23]  The MSP also relied on the DNA Data Bank and Data Base Act to 
withhold certain contamination logs.  Our review of the withheld documents 
confirms that the relevant contamination logs contain DNA identification 
information.  Because the presence of DNA identification information renders 
the entirety of the record confidential, the court did not err in relying on the 
DNA Data Base and Data Bank Act to determine that the implicated 
contamination logs were confidential.  See 25 M.R.S. § 1577.   
9  Fairfield argues that the court improperly interpreted the Intelligence and Investigative Record 
Information Act to mean that “any intelligence and investigate record information is confidential.”  
Contrary to Fairfield’s contention, the court noted the “sensitive” nature of the information contained 
in the documents and referenced its responsibility to “balance the need for transparency of 
government action with the protection of sensitive information.”   
 
13 
2. 
Quality assurance records 
[¶24]  The quality assurance records consist of three types of forms 
withheld by the MSP: (a) corrective action forms, (b) testimony review forms, 
and (c) drying locker logs.  
a. 
Corrective action forms 
[¶25]  An MSP affidavit states that corrective action forms “are used to 
identify possible nonconformances in the laboratory . . . [including] inaccurate 
analyses or methods, inaccurate reports, instrument malfunction and 
non-fulfillment of an accreditation or laboratory policy.”  After being filed, the 
lab’s quality manager reviews the corrective actions forms, evaluates the 
employee’s work, and decides whether remedial measures are appropriate.  
Further, corrective action forms document employee performance.  The forms
often contain case-specific information—including the nature of the 
contamination, the name of the alleged victim or suspect, and the name of the 
law enforcement officer—and may identify any relevant employees by name or 
position.  Here, the corrective action forms were withheld only where they 
addressed the performance of staff, and the case-specific identification 
information was redacted on the remaining records.   
14 
[¶26]  Our review of a sample of the withheld corrective action forms 
confirms that the court did not err in its determination that the withheld 
corrective action forms were confidential.  Because the documents clearly 
contain information that may result in disciplinary action, see 5 M.R.S. 
§ 7070(2)(E), and are used to document employee performance, id. 
§ 7070(2)(B), each of the corrective action forms pertaining to employee 
performance is confidential in its entirety.  Because the MSP primarily withheld 
documents pertaining to employee performance, the court did not err in 
deeming the withheld documents confidential.10  
[¶27]  Similarly, the court did not err in classifying the redacted case 
information as confidential.  Following the balancing test set forth in Blethen 
Maine Newspapers, Inc., 2005 ME 56, ¶ 14, 871 A.2d 523, we are satisfied that 
release of the suspect and victim names would result in an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy, particularly because it is unclear how the release of victims’
names would advance the public interest asserted by Fairfield.  See Dean v. State 
10  Two additional corrective actions forms were withheld solely out of concerns for lab security, 
16 M.R.S. §§ 803(7), 804(7) (2022), and one more was withheld solely under the DNA Data Base and 
Data Bank Act, 25 M.R.S. § 1577(1) (2022).  Having reviewed each of these three documents 
individually, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in categorizing each as confidential 
under either the DNA  Data Base and Data Bank  Act or the Intelligence and Investigative Record 
Information Act.  
 
15 
Fire Marshal’s Off., No. CV-2020-129, 2021 Me. Super. LEXIS 35, *8 (Feb. 19, 
2021). 
b. 
Testimony review forms 
[¶28]  Testimony review forms evaluate and document whether MSP
Crime Lab employee testimony is technically accurate, professionally delivered, 
and easy to understand.  Each of these documents were withheld under the 
personnel records provision.  See 5 M.R.S. § 7070(2)(B).   
[¶29]  Upon our random inspection of the testimony review forms, we 
conclude that the court did not error in determining that the withheld 
documents were confidential.  The testimony review forms were fairly 
characterized as performance evaluations and, consequently, are entirely 
confidential under the personnel records provision.   
c. 
Drying locker logs 
[¶30]  Drying lockers are secure locations to store and dry out wet
evidence, such as evidence soaked in bodily fluids.  Drying locker logs track 
“receipt and removal of evidence from the lockers.”  The MSP released all the 
drying locker logs to Fairfield, but it redacted the names of the suspects and 
victims associated with the evidence, concluding that release of the names 
16 
would produce an unwarranted invasion of privacy, rendering the names 
confidential under Intelligence and Investigative Record Information Act.    
[¶31]  Upon our review of the documents, we are satisfied that release of 
the withheld names would result in an unwarranted invasion of privacy.  
Because “[f]ew people wish to be publicly associated with investigations of 
alleged criminal conduct, whether as a perpetrator, witness, or victim,” the 
individuals whose names were redacted from the drying locker logs have a 
strong personal privacy interest in preventing their names from being released 
to the public.  Blethen Me. Newspapers, Inc., 2005 ME 56, ¶ 15, 871 A.2d 523.  
Additionally, as with the corrective action forms, it is unclear how releasing the 
names of the suspects and victims would advance the public interest asserted 
by Fairfield.  Accordingly, we find that the court did not err in finding that the 
suspects’ and victims’ names on the drying locker logs were confidential under 
the Intelligence and Investigative Records Act.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶32]  The court did not err in its creation of a factual record.  Following 
our independent review of the factual record, we further hold that the court did 
not clearly err in determining that the MSP met its burden to show that the 
withheld records were confidential.   
 
17 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
Amy L. Fairfield, Esq., Fairfield & Associates, P.A., Lyman, for appellant Keegan 
J. Fairfield 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Laura A. Yustak, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Maine State Police 
York County Superior Court docket number AP-2020-25 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY