Title: Reed v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Adrian REED v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-661                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 4, 1997


1.   Statutes -- construction of -- acts relating to same subject should be
     reconciled. -- Statutes relating to the same subject should be
     read in a harmonious manner if possible; all legislative acts
     relating to the same subject are said to be in pari materia
     and must be construed together and made to stand if they are
     capable of being reconciled.

2.   Statutes -- construction of -- determination of legislative intent. -- The
     supreme court adheres to the basic rule of statutory
     construction, which gives effect to the intent of the
     legislature, making use of common sense and giving the words
     their usual and ordinary meaning; in attempting to construe
     legislative intent, the court looks to the language of the
     statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished,
     the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, legislative
     history, and other appropriate matters that throw light on the
     subject; the commentary to a statute is a highly persuasive
     aid to construction, although it is not controlling over the
     clear language of the statute.

3.   Statutes -- construction of -- presumptions concerning legislative
     enactments. -- In construing two acts on the same subject, the
     supreme court first must presume that when the General
     Assembly passed the later act, it was well aware of the prior
     act; the court must also presume that the General Assembly did
     not intend to pass an act without purpose; furthermore, the
     General Assembly is presumed to have enacted a law with the
     full knowledge of court decisions on the subject and with
     reference to those decisions.

4.   Statutes -- construction of -- legislature intended to include constables
     within definition of "peace officer." -- Although Ark. Code Ann. 
     16-81-301 (1987) does not contain a definition of "peace
     officer," and the term is not defined within the other
     provisions of the Uniform Act on Intrastate Fresh Pursuit,
     Arkansas has long recognized that constables are peace
     officers; additionally, Ark. Code Ann.  16-81-104 (1987),
     which establishes the procedures for issuing and executing
     arrest warrants, refers to constables as peace officers;
     hence, the supreme court could discern from this provision
     that the legislature was aware of its previous holding and
     intended to include constables within the definition of "peace
     officer." 

5.   Statutes -- construction of -- two statutory provisions concerning
     constable's authority viewed as complementary. -- The supreme court
     viewed Ark. Code Ann.  16-81-301 and Ark. Code Ann.  16-19-
     301(d) as complementary of each other, with the former merely
     broadening or enhancing the authority described in the latter
     section; the plain language of section 16-19-301(d)
     demonstrated that the provision was not an affirmative grant
     of the power of fresh pursuit to constables; rather, that
     section was written in the negative, stating that nothing in
     it should be viewed as preventing a constable's authority to
     engage in the fresh pursuit of suspected felons; section 16-
     81-301, on the other hand, specifically provided to all peace
     officers in the state the authority to engage in the fresh
     pursuit of suspects beyond their particular jurisdictions.

6.   Statutes -- construction of -- supreme court held that two related statutes
     dealing with constable's authority should stand. -- Considering the
     language of Ark. Code Ann.  16-81-301 and Ark. Code Ann. 
     16-19-301, the respective subject matter, and the objectives
     sought to be accomplished by the legislature in passing them,
     the supreme court concluded that although a constable's
     general powers and duties were established by section 16-19-
     301, a constable's authority to engage in the fresh pursuit of
     criminal suspects, whether suspected of committing felonies or
     misdemeanors, was derived from section 16-81-301; given that
     section 16-19-301 did not affirmatively establish a
     constable's authority to engage in fresh pursuit but merely
     provided that the authority to pursue suspected felons should
     not be taken from such officers, the supreme court determined
     that the two related statutes were capable of being reconciled
     and, therefore, that both should stand. 

7.   Sheriffs & constables -- constable acting as peace officer -- had authority
     to pursue appellant beyond township limits. -- The supreme court held
     that the trial court did not err in determining that, under
     the circumstances, the constable was acting as a peace officer
     and, as such, had the authority to pursue appellant beyond the
     limits of his township on the ground that appellant had
     committed an offense in the constable's presence.  


     Appeal from Pope Circuit Court; John S. Patterson, Judge;
affirmed.
     Young & Finley, by: Richard H. Young, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Brad Newman, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Adrian Reed appeals the judgment of the Pope County
Circuit Court convicting him of driving while intoxicated (DWI),
second offense, and sentencing him to nine months in jail,
suspending his driver's license for twelve months, and assessing a
fine of $2,500.  This appeal was certified to us from the court of
appeals on the basis that it presents a question requiring
statutory interpretation; hence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to
Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(d).  Appellant's sole point for reversal is
that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal stop and arrest.  We find no
error and affirm.
     Appellant was arrested for DWI on June 15, 1996.  He was
initially stopped and detained by Constable Bill Parks in Pope
County near Pea Ridge, which is outside the constable's
jurisdiction of Jackson Township.  Appellant moved to suppress the
evidence that resulted from his arrest on the ground that the
constable lacked the authority to pursue a criminal suspect beyond
his jurisdiction without first having a reasonable belief that the
suspect had committed a felony.  The trial court concluded that
Constable Parks was a peace officer and that Ark. Code Ann.  16-
81-301 (1987) authorized him to stop and detain Appellant under the
circumstances, even though the constable admittedly did not suspect
that Appellant had committed a felony.  The trial court accordingly
denied Appellant's motion to suppress, and he was found guilty of
the charge by a jury.    
     On appeal, Appellant challenges Constable Parks's authority to
arrest him outside the constable's jurisdiction.  He contends that
pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  16-19-301 (Repl. 1994) a constable is
not permitted to arrest a person for a misdemeanor offense outside
the jurisdiction of his township.  He asserts that such an arrest
is only permitted if the constable reasonably believes that a
felony has been committed within his jurisdiction.    
     Section 16-19-301, titled "Peacekeeping duties and authority 
-- Neglect of duty," provides in pertinent part:
          (a) Each constable shall be a conservator of the
     peace in his township and shall suppress all riots,
     affrays, fights, and unlawful assemblies, and shall keep
     the peace and cause offenders to be arrested and dealt
     with according to law.

          . . . . 

          (d) Nothing in this section shall prevent the fresh
     pursuit by a constable of a person suspected of having
     committed a supposed felony in his township, though no
     felony has actually been committed, if there are
     reasonable grounds for so believing. "Fresh pursuit" as
     used in this section shall not necessarily imply instant
     pursuit, but pursuit without unreasonable delay. 
     [Emphasis added.]


Appellant asserts that the language in subsection (d) prohibits a
constable from engaging in the fresh pursuit of any person unless
that person is suspected of having committed a felony.      
     The State argues that the trial court correctly ruled that a
constable's authority to freshly pursue a suspect beyond his
jurisdiction is derived from section 16-81-301.  The State argues
that because section 16-81-301 was passed subsequent to the passage
of section 16-19-301, this court should conclude that the later act
controls.  
     Section 16-81-301, which is part of the Uniform Act on
Intrastate Fresh Pursuit, provides:
          Any peace officer of this state in fresh pursuit of
     a person who is reasonably believed to have committed a
     felony in this state or has committed, or attempted to
     commit, any criminal offense in this state in the
     presence of such officer, or for whom the officer holds
     a warrant of arrest for a criminal offense, shall have
     the authority to arrest and hold in custody such person
     anywhere in this state.

The State contends that a constable is included within the
definition of the term "peace officer" as used in section 16-81-
301.  As such, the State asserts that Constable Parks had the
authority to pursue Appellant beyond the jurisdiction of his
township for a misdemeanor offense that was committed in the
officer's presence.  
     The sole issue for our resolution is whether a constable's
authority to engage in the fresh pursuit of a person suspected of
committing a misdemeanor beyond the limits of the constable's
jurisdiction originates from section 16-19-301 or from section 16-
81-301.  Both statutes were passed during the same legislative
session; the act containing section 16-81-301 was passed one day
after the act containing section 16-19-301.  Appellant contends
that because section 16-19-301 specifically addresses the powers
and duties of constables, it should prevail over section 16-81-301,
which, Appellant asserts, only generally addresses the authority of
"peace officers" to engage in fresh pursuit.  We disagree.  
     Statutes relating to the same subject should be read in a
harmonious manner if possible.  City of Ft. Smith v. Tate, 311 Ark.
405,