Title: Gaudette v. Mainely Media, LLC

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2023 ME 36 
Docket: 
Yor-22-93 
Argued: 
January 12, 2023 
Decided: 
 July 6, 2023 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
Majority: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ. 
Concurrence: 
 JABAR, J. 
 
 
NORMAN GAUDETTE et al. 
 
v. 
 
MAINELY MEDIA, LLC, et al. 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
[¶1]  Former Biddeford police officer Norman Gaudette and his wife, 
Joanne Gaudette, appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court (York County, 
Mulhern, J.) entered upon a jury verdict in favor of Mainely Media, LLC; Ben 
Meiklejohn; and Molly Lovell-Keely (collectively, Mainely Media) on the 
Gaudettes’ claims of defamation, false light, and loss of consortium.  In their 
complaint, the Gaudettes alleged that Mainely Media had published false 
information indicating that Gaudette1 had sexually abused minors decades 
earlier, while he was a police officer.  On appeal, the Gaudettes argue that, 
during the trial, the court abused its discretion by refusing to strike a detective’s 
 
1  In this opinion, we use “Gaudette” in the singular to refer to Norman Gaudette. 
 
 
2 
testimony that his investigation of Gaudette in 1990 did not exonerate Gaudette 
because of “clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Gaudette was more likely 
than not a sexual predator.”  We conclude that, in the context of the trial, the 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the detective’s testimony.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  On June 24, 2015, the Gaudettes filed a complaint in the Superior 
Court alleging defamation and five other causes of action, including Gaudette’s 
claim of false light and Joanne Gaudette’s claim for loss of consortium, arising 
from the 2015 publication of news articles in the Biddeford-Saco-Old Orchard 
Beach Courier (the Courier) reporting accusations that Gaudette sexually 
abused multiple teenage boys in the late 1970s and in the 1980s while he was 
a Biddeford police officer.  The complaint alleged that the articles had portrayed 
Gaudette “as a sexual predator who has evaded justice.”  Gaudette named as 
defendants Mainely Media, LLC, the publisher of the articles; Ben Meiklejohn, a 
 
2  Because we affirm the judgment, we do not reach Mainely Media’s argument that the trial court 
erred in denying Mainely Media’s motions for judgment as a matter of law.  We do note that, although 
Mainely Media filed a notice of appeal, it did not have to cross-appeal to preserve its argument that 
the judgment in its favor should be affirmed on alternative grounds.  See M.R. App. P. 2C(a)(1); 
M.R. App. P. 2C Restyling Notes – June 2017. 
 
 
3 
staff writer for the Courier in 2015; and Molly Lovell-Keely, a managing editor 
of the Courier in 2015. 
 
[¶3]  Mainely Media filed a special motion to dismiss the suit pursuant to 
Maine’s statute providing protection from strategic lawsuits against public 
participation, 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2023).  The court (O’Neil, J.) denied the motion, 
and we affirmed that decision in Gaudette v. Mainely Media, LLC, 2017 ME 87, 
160 A.3d 539.  Mainely Media then moved for summary judgment.  The court 
granted the motion in part, leaving for trial Gaudette’s claims of false light and 
defamation regarding the reported accusations of two men (L.O. and R.K.) and 
Joanne Gaudette’s claim for loss of consortium.  The parties proceeded to a jury 
trial on these claims. 
 
[¶4]  The court (Mulhern, J.) held a thirteen-day trial over the course of 
three weeks in March 2022.  The parties submitted several joint exhibits, 
including the two articles that generated Gaudette’s defamation and false light 
claims.  Gaudette challenged information in the articles reporting that (1) L.O. 
claimed that Gaudette had sexually abused him when he was a teenager, 
including by raping him while he was passed out in a camper in Naples and 
(2) R.K. claimed that Gaudette had repeatedly had sexual contact with him 
beginning when he was fifteen years old, including by touching his genitals 
 
 
4 
while he was working for Gaudette cleaning banks after hours and by climbing 
on top of R.K. and putting his hands down R.K.’s pajama pants while R.K. was 
sleeping in a camper. 
 
[¶5]  The Gaudettes called R.K. as a witness in an effort to undermine his 
credibility and offered testimony suggesting that Gaudette had been 
“exonerated” or “cleared” because a grand jury had declined to indict him.  
When the Gaudettes rested their case after presenting voluminous evidence, 
Mainely Media moved for judgment as a matter of law.  See M.R. Civ. P. 50(a).  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Gaudettes, the court 
denied the motion. 
 
[¶6]  Mainely Media then presented documentary evidence and called 
several witnesses, including L.O., a third accuser who had spoken with 
Lovell-Keely, and Michael Pulire, the detective at the Maine Attorney General’s 
Office who investigated multiple accusations against Gaudette in 1990.  At the 
end of the direct examination of Pulire, the following exchange occurred: 
Q  
Now, there’s been some testimony that the Attorney 
General’s investigation exonerated Norman Gaudette.  Did 
your investigation into Norman Gaudette exonerate him? 
 
A  
It did not. 
 
Q  
Why not? 
 
 
 
5 
A  
There was clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Gaudette 
was more likely than not a sexual predator. 
 
The Gaudettes objected and moved to strike Pulire’s final response, citing 
Rule 403 of the Maine Rules of Evidence.3  The court noted, “Well, the term 
exonerated has been rolled out in front of the jury a number of times.  And this 
is the investigating detective, and he was asked his opinion on that, and he 
responded . . . .”  The court overruled the objection. 
 
[¶7]  After presenting its evidence, Mainely Media again moved for 
judgment as a matter of law.  See M.R. Civ. P. 50(a).  The court denied the motion.  
The parties presented closing arguments, and the court delivered jury 
instructions, including an instruction on the use of a special verdict form that 
the court provided to the jury. 
 
[¶8]  The jury found that the Gaudettes had failed to prove defamation, 
false light, or loss of consortium.  In the special verdict form, the jury found that 
the Gaudettes had not proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any of 
the challenged statements made by L.O. or R.K. were false and defamatory, or 
that the published articles placed Gaudette in a false light that would be 
 
3  Rule 403 of the Maine Rules of Evidence provides, “The court may exclude relevant evidence if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence.” 
 
 
6 
offensive to a reasonable person.4  The jury thus did not have to make findings 
about whether the Gaudettes had proved, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that either Meilklejohn or Lovell-Keely published the statements with actual 
malice.5  The court entered a judgment for Mainely Media on April 1, 2022.  The 
Gaudettes timely appealed.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2023); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶9]  The Gaudettes argue that the court abused its discretion in denying 
their motion to strike Pulire’s testimony that his 1990 investigation did not 
exonerate Gaudette because “there was clear and convincing evidence that 
Mr. Gaudette was more likely than not a sexual predator.”  The Gaudettes argue 
that the testimony lacked probative value and that allowing the use of 
terminology regarding standards of proof and the term “sexual predator” was 
highly prejudicial given that it was in the province of the jury—not the 
detective—to determine whether Gaudette or his accusers were credible. 
 
4  See Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶ 26, 941 A.2d 447 (listing the elements of a defamation 
claim); Cole v. Chandler, 2000 ME 104, ¶ 17, 752 A.2d 1189 (listing the elements of a false light claim). 
5  See Plante v. Long, 2017 ME 189, ¶ 10, 170 A.3d 243 (holding that a statement about a public 
figure concerning a matter of public concern related to his official conduct is “subject to a conditional 
privilege . . . that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of [actual malice, i.e.,] 
knowledge or disregard of falsity” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
 
7 
 
[¶10]  “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . .”  M.R. Evid. 403.  
A trial court has broad discretion in weighing the probative value of relevant 
evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice.  See State v. Kimball, 
2016 ME 75, ¶ 16, 139 A.3d 914. 
 
[¶11]  “For purposes of Rule 403, prejudice means an undue tendency to 
move the fact finders to decide the issue on an improper basis.”  State v. Hussein, 
2019 ME 74, ¶ 14, 208 A.3d 752 (quotation marks omitted).  Often, the 
improper basis is an emotional one.  State v. Marquis, 2017 ME 104, ¶ 29, 
162 A.3d 818; see State v. Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶ 26, 82 A.3d 86 (“Prejudicial 
evidence is inherently inflammatory evidence that is likely to arouse the 
passion of the fact-finder.”). 
 
[¶12]  The determination of the probative value of evidence depends on 
the causes of action sought to be proved.  See, e.g., Freeman v. 
Funtown/Splashtown, USA, 2003 ME 101, ¶¶ 7-11, 828 A.2d 752; State v. 
Michaud, 2017 ME 170, ¶ 10, 168 A.3d 802.  Here, the primary claim is for 
defamation, which ordinarily requires the plaintiff to prove the following 
elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(a) a false and defamatory 
statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; 
 
 
8 
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and 
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the 
existence of special harm caused by the publication.”  Morgan v. Kooistra, 
2008 ME 26, ¶ 26, 941 A.2d 447 (quotation marks omitted); see Hudson v. Guy 
Gannett Broad. Co., 521 A.2d 714, 715-16 (Me. 1987).  Due to the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, when a published statement 
discusses a public figure’s official conduct regarding a matter of public 
concern—a type of discussion that “deserves special favor in a democratic 
society”—the statement is “subject to a conditional privilege . . . that can be 
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of [actual malice, i.e.,] 
knowledge or disregard of falsity.”6  Plante v. Long, 2017 ME 189, ¶ 10, 
170 A.3d 243 (quotation marks omitted); see  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
 
[¶13]  Gaudette’s other claim—for false light—requires similar proof: 
“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other 
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of 
 
6  Although the jury here found that the Gaudettes had not proved the ordinary elements of 
defamation by a preponderance of the evidence and therefore never reached the question of whether 
either of the individual defendants acted with actual malice, evidence of actual malice was relevant 
and probative at the time of trial.  See M.R. Evid. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) It has any tendency 
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) The fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.”). 
 
 
9 
his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted 
in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light 
in which the other would be placed.”  Cole v. Chandler, 2000 ME 104, ¶ 17, 
752 A.2d 1189 (quotation marks omitted).  Joanne Gaudette’s claim for loss of 
consortium is a derivative claim that depended on Gaudette’s success on one or 
both of his underlying claims.  See Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 2008 ME 186, 
¶ 23, 960 A.2d 1188.  Thus, due to the causes of action at issue, evidence was 
relevant and had probative value if it made it more or less probable that the 
challenged articles were published with knowledge that they contained false 
information or in negligent or reckless disregard of whether they contained 
false information.  See Morgan, 2008 ME 26, ¶ 26, 941 A.2d 447; Plante, 
2017 ME 189, ¶ 10, 170 A.3d 243; Cole, 2000 ME 104, ¶ 17, 752 A.2d 1189; 
M.R. Evid. 401, 403. 
 
[¶14]  The Gaudettes argue that the court should have stricken Pulire’s 
testimony using the term “sexual predator” when describing the results of his 
investigation under M.R. Evid. 403.  Cf. Needham v. Needham, 2022 ME 7, ¶ 20 
n.6, 267 A.3d 1112 (“Allegations of sexual abuse of children are highly 
 
 
10 
inflammatory.”).7  When emotionally charged language is not significantly 
probative of any conduct at issue, the danger of unfair prejudice may be too 
high for the court to admit it.  See, e.g., State v. Thongsavanh, 2004 ME 126, ¶¶ 3, 
8-10, 861 A.2d 39 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
evidence that the defendant, charged with murder, wore a shirt bearing “the 
highly inflammatory phrase ‘Jesus is a cunt’”); State v. Flood, 408 A.2d 1295, 
1297-99 (Me. 1979) (disapproving of the admission of a police officer’s 
statement to the defendant that her companions were “druggies” in a criminal 
trial on charges of assaulting police officers). 
 
[¶15]  This is not, however, a situation in which the term “sexual 
predator” was only minimally related to the issues being tried; the Gaudettes 
used the term in their complaint, alleging that Mainely Media had falsely 
depicted Gaudette as a “sexual predator” in the challenged articles.  Thus, in 
addition to being probative of whether Pulire’s investigation exonerated 
Gaudette, the challenged testimony was probative of whether the reporters 
acted in negligent or reckless disregard of the falsity of the allegations that 
 
7  In Needham v. Needham, we did not apply Rule 403 but identified the inflammatory nature of 
hearsay indicating that the Department of Health and Human Services had “substantiated” the father 
for sexual abuse of a child and held that the admission of that hearsay was prejudicial.  2022 ME 7, 
¶¶ 3-7, 15-20 & n.6, 267 A.3d 1112. 
 
 
11 
Gaudette had groomed minors for sexual abuse and had committed sexual acts 
against them.  See Morgan, 2008 ME 26, ¶ 26, 941 A.2d 447; Plante, 
2017 ME 189, ¶ 10, 170 A.3d 243; Cole, 2000 ME 104, ¶ 17, 752 A.2d 1189; 
M.R. Evid. 401, 403.  In the unique circumstances of this case, the court could 
properly determine, in its broad discretion, that the probative value of Pulire’s 
testimony about the result of his investigation was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice arising from the use of the 
generally inflammatory term “sexual predator.”  See M.R. Evid. 403; cf. 
Needham, 2022 ME 7, ¶ 20 n.6, 267 A.3d 1112. 
 
[¶16]  As to Pulire’s references to “clear and convincing evidence” and 
the standard of “more likely than not,” although these phrases could suggest 
that Pulire was conveying a formal evidentiary finding reached by the grand 
jury or some other entity, we defer to the broad discretion of the trial judge in 
deciding to admit the testimony, understanding that Pulire was subject to 
cross-examination to clarify the meaning of his testimony.  See Kimball, 
2016 ME 75, ¶ 16, 139 A.3d 914.  Indeed, following the direct examination of 
Pulire, the Gaudettes cross-examined Pulire at length about the extent to which 
he recalled details of the decades-old investigation. 
 
 
12 
 
[¶17]  Finally, although “[o]ne witness’s opinion of another witness’s 
truthfulness is not helpful to the jury when the jury has the opportunity to hear 
both witnesses,” State v. Sweeney, 2004 ME 123, ¶ 11, 861 A.2d 43, Pulire’s 
testimony explained the results of a full investigation and was not a comment 
on the credibility or truthfulness of L.O., R.K., or any of the defendants.  Thus, 
his testimony that the Attorney General’s investigation did not exonerate 
Gaudette, but rather revealed evidence of Gaudette’s misconduct, was highly 
probative of issues raised in the case.  Specifically, the evidence had significant 
probative value in (1) rebutting other testimony suggesting that Gaudette had 
been “exonerated” or “cleared,” and (2) supporting the position that Meiklejohn 
and Lovell-Keely did not act in negligent or reckless disregard of the truth in 
reporting the accusations against Gaudette. 
 
[¶18]  We conclude that, given the particular factual questions before the 
jury in the context of this lengthy trial on a complaint that included allegations 
of defamation and false light, the court did not abuse its broad discretion in 
admitting Pulire’s testimony.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in favor of 
Mainely Media. 
 
 
13 
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
___________________________ 
 
JABAR, J., concurring. 
 
 
[¶19]  I concur in this opinion, but I write separately because I believe 
that the trial court erred by not sustaining Gaudette’s objection and striking 
Detective Pulire’s testimony using the term “sexual predator” to describe the 
results of his investigation.  However, because I believe the error was harmless, 
I join in affirming the jury’s decision. 
I.  RULE 403 
[¶20]  Rule 403 of the Maine Rules of Evidence provides that the court 
may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  M.R. Evid. 403.  Rule 403 “does 
not protect a party from all prejudice, but only serves as a guard against unfair 
prejudice.”  State v. Lipham, 2006 ME 137, ¶ 9, 910 A.2d 388.  “Prejudice, in this 
context, means an undue tendency to move the fact finders to decide the issue 
on an improper basis, commonly, although not invariably, an emotional one.”  
 
 
14 
State v. Dean, 589 A.2d 929, 934 (Me. 1991) (quotations marks omitted); see 
also State v. Renfro, 2017 ME 49, ¶ 9, 157 A.3d 775.  Evidence may be both 
relevant and “of minimal value.”  Kaechele v. Kenyon Oil Co., 2000 ME 39, ¶ 6, 
747 A.2d 167.  Because of this tension, “[t]he court’s decision regarding the 
admissibility of relevant evidence . . . ‘blends imperceptibly into its discretion 
under Rule 403’” and we review this decision for abuse of discretion.  Id. 
(quoting Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 401.1 at 98 (6th ed. 2007)).  This 
decision “involves the weighing of probative value against considerations 
militating against admissibility.”  Rich v. Fuller, 666 A.2d 71, 73 (Me. 1995). 
[¶21]  Here, it is necessary to properly contextualize Pulire’s testimony.  
Gaudette objected to Pulire’s testimony only on Rule 403 grounds and did not 
object on relevancy or foundational grounds, and therefore may have waived 
any objection on relevancy and foundational grounds.8  However, because 
Gaudette objected to the statement’s admission as to Rule 403, it was still 
 
8  Pulire’s testimony was an opinion on the truthfulness of the victims’ testimony and should not 
have been admitted in the first place.  See State v. Sweeney, 2004 ME 123, ¶ 11, 861 A.2d 43.  The 
Court’s opinion acknowledges that “[o]ne witness’s opinion of another witness’s truthfulness is not 
helpful to the jury when the jury has the opportunity to hear both witnesses.”  Id.; Court’s Opinion 
¶ 17.  Mainely Media’s closing argument was a clear attempt to present Pulire’s testimony to support 
the testimony of the two victims in this case.   
 
 
15 
necessary to balance the probative value with the prejudice.9  See M.R. 
Evid. 403. 
[¶22]  The Court’s opinion concludes that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the challenged testimony because the term “sexual 
predator” was related to the issue being tried, raising the probative value of the 
testimony so it was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to 
Gaudette.  Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 15, 18.  However, the fact that the testimony is 
related to the issues being tried is exactly why the testimony should have been 
excluded as unfairly prejudicial. 
[¶23]  One of the primary issues before the jury was whether statements 
about Gaudette’s conduct toward the two victims were false.  Questions one and 
three of the verdict form asked the jurors whether Gaudette proved that one or 
more of the allegations of sexual abuse by witnesses L.O. and R.K. were false 
and defamatory.  The jury was presented with Gaudette’s claim that he never 
sexually assaulted either R.K. or L.O. versus the testimony of the two victims 
who claimed that he sexually assaulted them.  Mainely Media, in its closing 
 
9  I wish to distinguish the present case from a hypothetical situation where Pulire had directly 
told Mainely Media before the publication at issue that he believed his investigation had not 
exonerated Gaudette because there was evidence of Gaudette being a sexual predator.  The probative 
value of that statement in that factual scenario would have outweighed the unfair prejudice of the 
phrase “sexual predator” because it would have gone to Mainely Media’s state of mind before the 
article published. 
 
 
16 
argument, improperly used Pulire’s testimony regarding his investigation to 
vouch for the credibility of the two victims and argue that Gaudette was 
“guilty”: 
Det. Michael Pulire, never would he have talked to them.  That was 
amazing and an honor that we actually got to hear from him, the AG 
lead detective, who’s been doing it for 30 years.   
 
. . . . 
 
But you all go back to the jury form.  If you believe that there 
is ambiguity in the evidence or if you believe he’s guilty, as Michael 
Pulire stated, then your job is going to be pretty easy. 
 
[¶24]  Mainely Media’s closing argument emphasized the testimony of 
Pulire as evidence of Gaudette’s guilt.  The unfair prejudice of an inflammatory 
statement that goes to the heart of this issue by a respected Attorney General’s 
office detective of thirty years is far greater than the probative value of Pulire’s 
testimony. 
[¶25]  The phrase “sexual predator” is highly inflammatory and caused 
unfair prejudice because it could have moved the jurors on an improper, 
emotional basis.  See Needham v. Needham, 2022 ME 7, ¶ 20 n.6, 267 A.3d 1112 
(“Allegations of sexual abuse of children are highly inflammatory.”); Dean, 
589 A.2d at 934.  Although the rebuttal of Gaudette’s claim that the 
investigation exonerated him offers some probative value, this probative value 
 
 
17 
is substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice of the inflammatory 
statement.  Mainely Media’s own closing argument demonstrates the harm of 
the statement; Mainely Media’s attorney told the jury, “[I]f you believe 
[Gaudette] is guilty, as Michael Pulire stated, then your job is going to be pretty 
easy.”  Because the unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative 
value of Pulire’s testimony that there was “clear and convincing evidence” that 
Gaudette was a sexual predator, I believe it was error for the trial court to 
overrule Gaudette’s objection and not give a curative instruction telling the jury 
to disregard the statement. 
II.  HARMLESS ERROR 
 
[¶26]  We must, however, consider whether the error was harmless in 
the context of all of the other evidence offered at the lengthy trial.  “No error in 
either the admission or the exclusion of evidence . . . is ground for granting a 
new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to 
the court inconsistent with substantial justice.”  M.R. Civ. P. 61.  “The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”  Id.  “A 
preserved error is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not affect 
 
 
18 
the judgment.”  Mulready v. Bd. of Real Estate Appraisers, 2009 ME 135, ¶ 20, 
984 A.2d 1285 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶27]  Gaudette challenges the admission of one statement in the context 
of a lengthy trial, and we must consider that context in determining whether 
the error in admitting the reference to Gaudette as a “sexual predator” was 
harmless.  Pulire made the challenged statement at the end of his testimony to 
explain why he did not consider Gaudette to have been “exonerated” by Pulire’s 
investigation.  Although the Gaudettes contend that the statement carried great 
weight because it came at the end of the trial, the Gaudettes cross-examined 
Pulire at length immediately after the challenged testimony, and another 
witness testified after him.  Most significantly, though, during twelve days of 
testimony, the jury heard from multiple other witnesses that Gaudette had 
abused children by grooming them for abuse and escalating his conduct toward 
them over time.  We summarize this testimony to illustrate the context in which 
the challenged testimony was admitted. 
 
[¶28]  R.K. provided detailed testimony about Gaudette offering him a job 
at his cleaning company and giving him gifts when he was about fourteen years 
old.  He testified that, while working together cleaning commercial buildings 
after hours, Gaudette engaged in unlawful sexual contact with R.K.  He testified 
 
 
19 
about an occasion when Gaudette brought him to a camper in Naples, where 
R.K. drank heavily and awoke to find Gaudette engaging in unlawful sexual 
contact with him, at which time he grabbed Gaudette’s gun and aimed it at 
Gaudette to stop him.  R.K. further testified that Gaudette invited him to 
participate in a pornography sting, which R.K. declined to do once he learned 
that it would require him to participate in filmed sex acts with Gaudette.  
According to R.K.’s testimony, Gaudette tried to normalize the behavior by 
reassuring R.K. that their interactions were how people showed love for each 
other and by saying that there was nothing wrong with his conduct. 
 
[¶29]  L.O. similarly testified that Gaudette offered him a job at his 
cleaning company when he was about fifteen years old and bought him gifts and 
clothing and helped him financially.  He testified to one incident where 
Gaudette engaged in unlawful sexual contact with him while in the back room 
on a job site and tried to “wrestle” with him; another incident where Gaudette 
cornered L.O. in a bathroom at a job site and forcibly engaged in an unlawful 
sexual act with him; and that Gaudette brought him camping, where he 
furnished alcohol and sexually assaulted L.O. after he passed out, which L.O. 
realized because, when he awoke, he was sore and his underwear was soiled, 
including with blood.  L.O. testified that Gaudette engaged in sexual acts with 
 
 
20 
L.O. on multiple other occasions and gave L.O. fifty dollars after each 
occurrence. 
 
[¶30]  Another witness testified that he had told Lovell-Keely that at age 
sixteen he went to a hotel to get drugs and alcohol and was filmed there 
engaging in sexual acts with others, including another boy who was sixteen 
years old and Gaudette.  He testified that Gaudette threatened to make his and 
his family’s lives “a living hell” if he ever mentioned what happened. 
 
[¶31]  Meiklejohn testified that R.K. and L.O. told him and Lovell-Keely 
directly that Gaudette had groomed and abused them.  He further testified that 
he received information indicating that Gaudette had made advances toward 
Gaudette’s teenage nephew, which his nephew had rejected, and that Gaudette 
had invited his nephew to participate in a child pornography sting that would 
require him to participate in sex acts.  Meiklejohn testified that he also spoke 
with individuals who had seen Gaudette bring R.K. camping alone, had seen 
Gaudette pick L.O. up to take him to work, and had heard from Gaudette’s 
nephew and the nephew’s relatives about Gaudette’s advances on his nephew.  
Meiklejohn testified that he received reports of other boys being either abused 
by Gaudette or invited to participate in a pornography sting.  He testified that 
Gaudette, when asked about these things, did not deny the allegations. 
 
 
21 
 
[¶32]  Lovell-Keely testified that she received a report from L.O., who had 
not known R.K., that Gaudette had groomed L.O. for abuse by hiring him to clean 
buildings and giving him gifts, then assaulted him while camping and 
repeatedly coerced sexual contact thereafter.  She learned from sources that 
three others had given statements during the investigation of Gaudette in 1990 
that he had sexually assaulted them as teenagers and had given money for 
oral-genital contact.  She also testified that when she approached Gaudette at 
his home to get a comment, he denied that he was Norman Gaudette. 
 
[¶33]  Biddeford police officers testified that both L.O. and R.K. had 
reported Gaudette subjecting them to sexual contact when each of them 
camped alone with Gaudette, consistent with the testimony that they provided 
at trial and the content of the published articles.  Finally, before Pulire made the 
challenged statement, he testified that he had spoken to five accusers, including 
two of the three who testified at trial, when investigating Gaudette, and that his 
report on Gaudette had provided everything that Biddeford’s police chief would 
need to discharge him from duty. 
 
[¶34]  As this summary of the testimony demonstrates, there was 
extensive evidence supporting the jury’s findings, reported in the special 
verdict form, that Gaudette had not proved the falsity of the published 
 
 
22 
statements that Gaudette (1) abused L.O. when he was in his teens during a 
camping trip, and (2) abused R.K. beginning when he was fifteen years old, 
while R.K. was working for him.  The same evidence also supports the jury’s 
findings that neither article placed Gaudette before the public in a false light.  
Given these findings, no loss of consortium claim was viable.  See Brown v. 
Crown Equip. Corp., 2008 ME 186, ¶ 23, 960 A.2d 1188. 
[¶35]  Given the extent of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings, and 
the paucity of evidence—independent of Gaudette’s and his family members’ 
testimony—to suggest that the accusations against Gaudette were false, it is 
highly probable that the error in refusing to strike Pulire’s single statement, 
which Pulire delivered only to explain why he did not consider Gaudette to have 
been “exonerated” through Pulire’s investigation, did not affect the verdict. 
 
[¶36]  In conclusion, although I believe that the trial court erred when it 
did not strike Pulire’s testimony, the error was harmless, and I concur in 
affirming the jury’s decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
Gene R. Libby, Esq. (orally), and Tyler J. Smith, Esq., Libby O’Brien Kingsley & 
Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellants Norman Gaudette and Joanne 
Gaudette 
 
Jonathan W. Brogan, Esq., and Trevor D. Savage, Esq., Norman, Hanson & 
DeTroy, LLC, Portland, and Cynthia Counts, Esq. (orally), FisherBroyles LLP, 
Atlanta, Georgia, for appellees Mainely Media, LLC, Ben Meiklejohn, and Molly 
Lovell-Keely 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number CV-2015-123 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY