Title: State v. Fulghum

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

138 So. 2d 569 (1962) 242 La. 767 STATE of Louisiana v. Roy Winford FULGHUM. No. 45837. Supreme Court of Louisiana. February 19, 1962. Rehearing Denied March 26, 1962. *570 Thomas M. Comegys, Jr., Herbert C. Harrison, J. Bennett Johnston, Jr., Shreveport, for defendant-appellant. Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., John A. Richardson, Dist. Atty., Albert S. Lutz, Jr., C. J. Bolin, Jr., Asst. Dist. Attys., Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellee. HAMLIN, Justice. The defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the murder of William Massey, Jr. LSA-R.S. 14:30. He appeals to this Court from the conviction and sentence, presenting for our consideration seventeen bills of exceptions reserved during the course of trial. The trial judge sets forth the facts of this case in his Per Curiam to Bills of Exceptions Nos. 7 and 8;[1] we believe it appropriate to quote his recitation at the beginning of this opinion. Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved to the trial court's overruling of a demurrer and motion to quash filed by the defendant. The demurrer and motion to quash, filed prior to arraignment, averred that the indictment found against the defendant was apparently drawn under LSA-R.S. 15:235, and that insofar as the statute relates to the crime of murder it is unconstitutional, null, and void for the reason that it does not require the recital of any facts constituting a crime under the laws of Louisiana. Defendant contended that that part of the statute relating to murder deprived him of due process of law as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution of Louisiana of 1921, LSA. Defendant further contended that the statute violates Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of Louisiana in that it does not require that a defendant be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation found against him. The contentions advanced by defendant have been previously raised and decided adversely to his averments; the constitutionality of LSA-R.S. 15:235 has been set at rest. This Court has found that a murder indictment, drawn in short form, adequately informed the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation. State of Louisiana v. James, 241 La. 233, 128 So. 2d 21; State of Louisiana v. Delbert W. Eyer, 237 La. 45, 110 So. 2d 521; State of Louisiana v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 46 So. 2d 262. Bill of Exceptions No. 1 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved to the overruling of defendant's objection to the excusing of the prospective jurors Curtis O. Baker and Louis Jackson Nelson for "business reasons" and the denial of a request for attachment. Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was reserved when the trial court overruled defendant's objection to going to trial until such time as the jurors Neal Holt Womack, James Howard Jolley, George Edward Harper, John P. Brown, Richard W. Lodge, and John Simon LeBlanc were attached and brought into court. Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was reserved to the trial court's overruling defendant's objection to the calling of any tales jurors until such time as the jurors on the regular venire had been duly attached in accordance with Article 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, LSA-R.S. 15:346 and their attendance enforced in the court at that time. Bill of Exceptions No. 6 was reserved to the overruling of defendant's objection to the calling of any tales jurors until attachments were made against absent jurors and some cause shown for the absence of the jurors on the regular venire. Defense counsel averred that this bill was taken in order to preserve defendant's rights under Bills of Exceptions Nos. 2, 3 and 4. In his Per Curiam[2] to the above bills, the trial judge sets forth the following circumstances leading to their reservation: Counsel for the defendant contend that he was deprived of his rights under LSA-R.S. 15:XXX-XXX-XXX-XXX by the trial judge's rulings; these statutes recite: In the case of State v. Gould, 155 La. 639, 99 So. 490, the required panel was seventy-five jurors; thirty-seven were excused by the trial judge. In upholding the exercise of the trial judge's discretion this Court stated: In the case of State v. Jugger, 217 La. 687, 47 So. 2d 46, Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were based upon the asserted error of the trial judge in overruling defense counsel's objection to the commencement of the trial on the ground that of the fifty names included on the jury panel only eighteen appeared for service, the judge having previously excused the others for cause. Subsequently, when the jury panel was exhausted, counsel objected to the order of the court that the tales jury box be opened and summons issued. This Court found no merit in the bills and stated: Under the circumstances of the present case, as they existed at the time the bills were reserved, we do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion in his rulings, nor do we find that the defendant suffered prejudice (LSA-R.S. 15:557) or injury from fraud or collusion. At the inception of trial defense counsel did not demand an attachment of the missing jurors; it would have impeded the trial of the case if the sheriff, who did call the names of the missing jurors at the Court House door, had gone out to look for them at the time the bills were reserved. Likewise, at the commencement of trial the judge was satisfied that the jury panel was sufficient; only later did it become necessary to summon tales jurors. The rulings of the trial judge were in accord with the quoted jurisprudence and shall not be disturbed. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 6 are therefore without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 5 was reserved when the trial court overruled defendant's objection to the court's excusing the prospective juror J. E. Shaw on the ground that he did not satisfy residence requirements. LSA-R.S. 15:172. *575 Shaw was transferred by his company; when he left Caddo Parish he thought the transfer was permanent, but he filed no affidavit nor intention to change his domicile at his new location; he was transferred back to Caddo Parish approximately six months before the instant trial. Defense counsel contended that Shaw was a duly qualified elector and juror for Caddo Parish, relying on Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised Civil Code, LSA. We do not find that the trial judge abused his discretion or committed reversible error in excusing the prospective juror J. E. Shaw because he had not been a bona fide resident of Caddo Parish for one year next preceding the instant trial, nor do we find that the defendant suffered prejudice by his ruling. Bill of Exceptions No. 5 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 7 was reserved to the overruling of defendant's objection to the admission in evidence of a question and answer statement, admitting culpability to the instant crime, made by the defendant at approximately 4:00 A.M., June 16, 1960, to Dr. Stuart DeLee, Deputy Coroner, Caddo Parish. It is the contention of defendant that he was laboring under a condition of extreme emotional upset and was in no physical or mental condition to make any intelligent statement. LSA-R.S. 15:451-452. Defense counsel contended that a tape recording made immediately prior to the giving of the statement discloses defendant's condition, and that it also shows that the alleged confession, or statement of the defendant, was not transcribed in its entirety, being in contravention of Article 450[3] of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. Defense counsel submitted that it was incumbent upon the State, when it was shown by questions propounded by counsel for defendant, to offer some reasonable explanation as to what occurred during the times when the tape recorder was allegedly cut off and no record was made of what the defendant or the coroner said during that period of time. Because of the importance of this bill, we quote the following colloquy outside of the presence of the jury at the time that it was reserved: "THE COURT: I will listen. "(Tape played to Court) "We object to the filing of that statement. "(D-1 filed in evidence) Bill of Exceptions No. 8 was reserved to the overruling of defendant's objection to the admission in evidence of an additional statement, admitting the commission of the instant crime, made by the defendant at 11:15 A.M., June 16, 1960, in the Coroner's Office in the presence of Sgt. J. S. Hoppe, Sgt. Paul O. Sandlin, and Dr. W. P. Butler; and a Police Statement, admitting guilt, allegedly typed and signed at one sitting at 6:30 A.M. on June 16, 1960. Counsel for the defendant contended that the statements were inadmissible for the same reasons set forth, supra, in Bill of Exceptions No. 7, and for the additional reason that they were not the best evidence of what they purported to contain, the tape recording being the best evidence. The following statement[4] is contained on the tape which counsel for the defendant offered in evidence and precedes the defendant's confession or question and answer statement made at 4:00 A.M., June 16, 1960, to Dr. DeLee (Bill of Exceptions No. 7): The above quoted transcription consumes approximately one minute, ten seconds. In his Per Curiam to Bills of Exceptions Nos. 7 and 8, the trial judge explains as follows his reason for admitting in evidence the three statements, supra: Counsel for the defendant do not deny that the defendant made the three statements involved; they do not deny that the testimony recited by the trial judge in his Per Curiam was given;[5] they do not deny that the events described by the trial judge as taking place after the shootings and killings occurred; they contend that defendant could have been coerced during the pause and after the click on the tape (the averment is made that the tape was cut off), but during the hearing on the admissibility of the statements and during trial they presented no evidence other than the tape, supra, to prove defendant's mental and emotional condition at the time the statements were given. "* * * It occurs to us that the shackling or handcuffing of a prisoner *581 who is to be charged with the serious crime of murder is an ordinary and customary procedure and counsel have not referred us to any decision by any court in which such an act would be considered as the use of force, threat, or intimidation which would invalidate an incriminatory statement made by a prisoner." State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So. 2d 496. See, State v. Joseph, 217 La. 175, 46 So. 2d 118. The reasons set forth by the trial judge in his Per Curiam, supra, for admitting the three statements in evidence, clearly show that he properly applied the principles of law stated in the foregoing cases. We find that the preponderance of evidence was to the effect that the three statements were voluntarily given by the defendant; that a proper foundation was laid for their admission; and that weight and effect (as well as the tape) were considered by the jury. Under these circumstances, we find that the rulings of the trial judge were correct and that he properly overruled the objections of counsel for the defendant to the admissibility of the statements in evidence. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 7 and 8 are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 9 was reserved when the trial court overruled defendant's objection to the offering in evidence of State's Exhibit No. 10, a picture of the victim of the instant homicide, William Massey, Jr. Defense counsel submitted that the picture was gruesome in nature served no useful purpose, and had no probative value, being designed only to inflame the jury and prejudice the defendant. Counsel contended that the position of the body was of no importance in proving the State's case since they thought the mere fact of death was sufficient. In his Per Curiam to Bill of Exceptions No. 9, the trial judge describes the picture as follows: The trial judge further states: We have examined this picture which was submitted to this Court as a part of the evidence attached to this bill of exceptions, and we do not find it gruesome, morbid, or of any other character as would prejudice the jury. State v. Miller, 237 La. 266, 111 So. 2d 108. The trial judge further sets forth in his Per Curiam that the District Attorney stated that "the probative value of the picture was to show the location of the person who was later the deceased for whose death the accused was on trial, and by that location to show in connection with any possible claim of self defense, that the young Massey boy was lying in bed at the time the shooting took place, and further to assist the jury in locating the various items within the house, including the position of the people at the time the shooting occurred." Bill of Exceptions No. 9 is without merit. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 10, 11 and 12 were reserved when the trial judge overruled the objections of counsel for the defendant to similar questions propounded to Dr. W. A. McBride, Jr., Dr. Andrew J. Mullen, and the Parish Coroner, Dr. Willis P. Butler. The circumstances connected with the reservations of the bills were to the effect that the defendant was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity at the Time of the Alleged Commission of the Crime Charged." A Sanity Commission was appointed to examine the accused and report to the court, according to law, its findings as to defendant's present mental condition and as to the mental condition of the accused at the time of the commission of the crimes. (On this appeal, we are considering only one of the crimes.) The report of the Sanity Commission concluded: During trial (outside of the presence of the jury) the following question was propounded to Dr. McBride: After objection, the State rephrased the question to ask: Counsel for the defendant objected to the rephrased question, contending "* * * that that is the ultimate question to be decided by the jury. It is a legal question, just in different phraseology, and is not a psychiatric question at all." Substantially the same rephrased question as was propounded to Dr. McBride was propounded to Drs. Mullen and Butler; counsel for the defendant raised the same objections, which were overruled. In brief, counsel for the defendant submit: LSA-R.S. 14:14 recites: We find that the trial judge, in finding that the question followed the language of LSA-R.S. 14:14, correctly overruled the objections of defense counsel; we agree with his reasons, which recite: Bills of Exceptions Nos. 10, 11 and 12 are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 13 was reserved when the trial court refused to give Special Charge No. 12 requested by the defendant, which read as follows: When this charge was requested, the jury had retired but had not started to deliberate. After the jury commenced its deliberations, it returned to the courtroom for further instructions; the trial court then read specifically the requested charge Special Charge No. 12. Counsel for the defendant argue: In his Per Curiam to Bill of Exceptions No. 13, the trial judge states that he refused to give the special charge because he did not think that it was wholly pertinent. State v. Morris, 222 La. 480, 62 So. 2d 649; State v. Swails, 226 La. 441, 76 So. 2d 523. We do not believe that it is necessary for us to pass upon the above reasoning of the trial judge; he gave the requested charge when the jury returned for further instructions. Under such circumstances, the defendant suffered no prejudice (LSA-R.S. 15:557) and no reversible error was committed. Bill of Exceptions No. 13 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 14 was reserved to the trial court's refusal to give Special Charge No. 14 requested by defense counsel, which read: Bill of Exceptions No. 15 was reserved to the trial court's overruling the objection of defense counsel to the following portion of the general charge, which was given immediately after the trial judge had read the definitions of murder and manslaughter (LSA-R.S. 14:30-31)[6] to the jury: Counsel for the defendant contended that requested Special Charge No. 14 was copied from the following statement made in the case of State v. Adams, 210 La. 782, 28 So.2d 269: Counsel contended that the trial judge's general charge, supra, gave the impression that the only difference in the two sections of LSA-R.S. 14:30 was in the nature of the several crimes being committed; they further contended that he disregarded the element of "intent." While it is true that the foregoing statement was made in the case of State v. Adams, supra, it was not necessary to the decision of the case. In that matter, we held that a verdict of "guilty of attempted negligent homicide," was not responsive to a charge of attempting to commit murder. We also held that the verdict acquitted the defendant of the crime charged, attempted murder, and of the included crime, attempted manslaughter. In his Per Curiam to Bills of Exceptions Nos. 14 and 15, the trial judge states that the matters complained of had been passed upon by the following statement from the case of State v. Sears, 220 La. 103, 55 So.2d 881: Counsel for the defendant contend that we have returned to the holding of State v. Adams, supra, and State v. Harper, supra, on which the defendant's requested Special *586 Charge No. 14 was based, as inidicated by the following statement from State of Louisiana v. James, 241 La. 233, 128 So.2d 21: We do not agree with counsel's contention; the statement in the James case, supra, does not make the requested charge correct. The trial judge covered specific intent when he read to the jury the definition of murder as set forth in LSA-R.S. 14:30. Bills of Exceptions Nos. 14 and 15 are without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 16 was reserved to the trial judge's overruling the objection of defense counsel to the following portion of the written general charge to the jury: In objecting to the above charge, counsel for the defendant stated: In brief filed in this Court, counsel for the defendant submit: As we understand it, counsel's contention, in short, is that the jury should not accept the law as stated by the trial judge, but that the jury, itself, should judge the law. In his Per Curiam to Bill of Exceptions No. 16, the trial judge remarks that the argument was being made that the definition of "insanity" was out of date, drawn before psychiatrists became known, and new conditions developed to determine sanity. LSA-R.S. 15:385 provides: We find no merit in counsel's contentions; the trial judge followed the mandate of the law in instructing the jury as to the principles of law applicable to the theory of the case. Bill of Exceptions No. 16 is without merit. Bill of Exceptions No. 17 was reserved to the trial judge's overruling the objection of defense counsel to the following portion of the written general charge to the jury: In Bill of Exceptions No. 17, defense counsel averred: The same contention was advanced in appellant's brief. In his Per Curiam to Bill of Exceptions No. 17, the trial judge states: Just prior to giving the portion of the charge objected to by defense counsel, the trial judge stated in his written general charge: "Article 14 of the Criminal Code reads as follows: We note that Special Instructions Nos. 8 and 9 requested by the defendant, and which were read to the jury, set forth what is meant by a preponderance of evidence. We find that in the above portion of his charge immediately preceding the portion of his charge objected to by defense counsel, the trial judge correctly stated the law with respect to the burden placed upon a defendant who pleads insanity at the time of the commission of the offense. "Preponderance of the Evidence" is the rule (State v. Stewart, 238 La. 1036, 117 So. 2d 583, and authorities cited and quoted therein; State v. Chinn, 229 La. 984, 87 So.2d 315), and this was repeatedly stated to the jury by the trial judge. Even in the portion of the charge objected to, the trial judge mentioned the weight of the evidence. After considering the special instructions read to the jury and the general charge as a whole, we interpret the portion of the general charge objected to by defense counsel to mean that if the jury was undecided and doubted that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the offense charged, then the defendant had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at that time. There was nothing in the general charge to indicate to the jury that the defendant had to prove insanity at the time of the commission of *589 the crime beyond a doubt or a reasonable doubt. The written general charge was complete, lengthy, and detailed; it covered the facets of the law with respect to insanity. We conclude that the defendant was not prejudiced by the use of the word "doubt" and that its use did not constitute reversible error. Bill of Exceptions No. 17 is without merit. No bills of exceptions were reserved to the trial court's overruling a motion in arrest of judgment and a motion for a new trial filed by counsel for the defendant; they presented nothing new for the court's consideration. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. [1] The complete testimony taken in connection with the Bills of Exceptions was not transcribed. [2] The trial judge discussed his rulings on the four bills in one per curiam. [3] "Every confession, admission or declaration sought to be used against any one must be used in its entirety, so that the person to be affected thereby may have the benefit of any exculpation or explanation that the whole statement may afford." LSA-R.S. 15:450. [4] The author of this opinion transcribed the statement from the tape recorder; the recording was played in open court during oral argument and later played several times during study of the appeal. [5] The record does not contain a transcription of the testimony to which the trial judge referred. [6] LSA-R.S. 14:30: "Murder is the killing of a human being, "(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or "(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill. "Whoever commits the crime of murder shall be punished by death." LSA-R.S. 14:31: "Manslaughter is: "(1) A homicide which would be murder under subdivision (1) of Article 30 (murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed; or "(2) A homicide committed, without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm. "(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in Article 30, or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person; or "(b) When the offender is resisting lawful arrest by means, or in a manner, not inherently dangerous, and the circumstances are such that the killing would not be murder under subdivision (1) of Article 30. "Whoever commits manslaughter shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than twenty-one years." [7] In brief, counsel contend, "Thus if we interpret the charge correctly and as the judge in his per curiam interpreted it, it is an instruction to the jury that the accused had the burden of proving insanity beyond doubt."