Title: State v. Raheem Means

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

In May 2002, Means was indicted for separate charges relating to his conduct at a New Year s Eve party on December 31, 2001. Means and Cedric Lewis entered the apartment where the party was held. Holding a gun, Means ordered eight people to line up against the wall while Lewis took their valuables. Means also forced the victims to remove their clothes to see if they had weapons. Means was arrested when he tried to leave the building. He was indicted for five counts of robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary, two counts of aggravated assault, and several weapons offenses. In August 2002, an assistant prosecutor offered a plea agreement to Means relating to the indictments: Means would plead guilty to child endangerment, five counts of robbery, and two weapons offenses in exchange for a recommendation of a thirteen-year sentence and dismissal of the remaining charges. After the plea hearing, the trial court accepted Means s pleas, executed a plea form confirming that it had informed Means it would impose a ten-year sentence, and scheduled sentencing for October 2002. The sentencing hearing was postponed until November 2002. At that time, a supervisor in the Prosecutor s Office moved to vacate Means s pleas, stating that the assistant prosecutor had failed to consult with the victims before making the plea offer. The trial court granted the motion. Six months later, Means entered into a second plea agreement, pursuant to which the prosecutor recommended a fifteen-year sentence. The court accepted the plea and denied a subsequent motion by Means s to withdraw his plea. In February 2004, Means was sentenced to a term of fifteen years. The Appellate Division affirmed Means s sentence. The Supreme Court granted Means s petition for certification. 188 N.J. 219 (2006). HELD: A trial court may not set aside a plea agreement solely because the prosecutor failed to notify the victims prior to entering into the plea agreement. 1. The Victim s Rights Amendment to the New Jersey Constitution provides that crime victims shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system. The Crime Victim s Bill of Rights statute grants crime victims the right to be informed about the criminal justice process, the right to be advised of the progress and final disposition of the case, and the right to make an in-person statement to the sentencing court about the impact of the crime. That statute also requires prosecutors to assist victims in submitting written impact statements, and to consider those statements before accepting negotiated plea agreements. Standards issued by the Attorney General require law enforcement agencies to notify crime victims of negotiated pleas. Those standards recommend that prosecutors consult with crime victims about the process of plea negotiations and take the victim s views into account before reaching a decision. (pp. 8-10) 2. Once a defendant pleads guilty, the prosecutor s ability to withdraw from the plea is limited by due process concerns relating to the defendant s waiver of constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial and the right to cross-examine witnesses. The trial court, in its discretion, may reject a defendant s guilty plea. The trial court may accept a guilty plea only after questioning the defendant and determining that there is a factual basis for the plea, that the plea is voluntary, and that the defendant understands the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea. The court must allow the defendant to withdraw a plea when the interests of justice will not be served by approval of the plea agreement. The prosecutor does not have the same right to withdraw from a plea agreement. Although notions of fairness apply to both sides, the defendant s constitutional rights and interests carry more weight. (pp. 10-13) 3. In this case, the victims rights and the Attorney General s guidelines were violated when the victims were not notified of the plea negotiations and anticipated sentence. The trial court should consider the victims concerns. However, the court may not impinge on a defendant s constitutional rights. When the trial court vacated Means s guilty pleas, it was not in a position to fairly evaluate those concerns without knowing if the victims had an objection to the plea agreement. Rather than granting the State s motion to vacate the pleas, the trial court should have postponed Means s sentence to allow the prosecutor time to notify the victims of the terms of the plea agreement, receive and evaluate their comments, and inform them of their right to speak at sentencing. At the time of sentencing, where the victims may have chosen to appear and to speak, the trial court would have been in a much better position to decide whether to continue to accept the terms of the plea agreement or to inform Means that the plea would be rejected in the interest of justice. (pp. 13-16) 4. In summary, the prosecutor s acknowledgment that the victims were not notified prior to making the plea offer is an insufficient basis to vacate the plea agreement. (pp.16-17) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, the original plea agreement is REINSTATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Court s opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO has filed a separate DISSENTING opinion expressing the view that Means s claims are procedurally barred from consideration on appeal, as he did not preserve the issue of the propriety of the trial court s order vacating the first guilty plea by entering a conditional plea. CHIEF JUSTICE ZAZZALI and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN and HOENS join in JUSTICE WALLACE s opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO filed a separate, dissenting opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 21 September Term 2006 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RAHEEM MEANS, Defendant-Appellant. Argued January 16, 2007 Decided July 11, 2007 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Jay L. Wilensky, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Wilensky and Seon Jeong Lee, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). LeeAnn Cunningham, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Paula T. Dow, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney). Deborah C. Bartolomey, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney). Richard D. Pompelio submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Crime Victims Law Center (Mr. Pompelio, attorney; Mr. Pompelio and Laura Tyson, on the brief). JUSTICE WALLACE, JR. delivered the opinion of the Court. A plea agreement between defendant Raheem Means and the State was set aside after the prosecutor notified the court that the victims had not been informed of the plea agreement. Thereafter, defendant entered into a second plea agreement with the State that was not as favorable as the initial agreement. Defendant appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed. This appeal addresses the issue of whether a trial court may set aside a plea agreement solely because the prosecutor failed to give notice to the victims prior to entering into the plea agreement. We conclude that it was error to grant the State s motion to set aside the plea agreement and we now reverse. Since the plea offer had been made without consulting with the victims, and since [defendant] had not yet been sentenced, I signed an order vacating the pleas and re-instating the not guilty pleas. Defendant s appeal was subsequently scheduled for argument on the Excessive Sentencing Oral Argument Calendar. Following argument, the panel affirmed defendant s sentence. We granted defendant s petition for certification. 188 N.J. 219 (2006). We also granted the motions of the Attorney General and the New Jersey Crime Victim s Law Center to appear as amici curiae. [N.J.S.A. 52:4B-44b(20).] Thereafter, the Attorney General issued standards for all law enforcement agencies to follow in order to protect the rights of crime victims. Notably, one standard requires the agency to notify crime victims of any [n]egotiated plea on all charges. Attorney General Standards To Ensure The Rights of Crime Victims, pt. 2, I.B., at 12-13 (Apr. 28, 1993), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/3victims.pdf. Further, the Attorney General directed that [w]hen appropriate, the views of victims of violent crime should be brought to the attention of the court on . . . plea agreements . . . [and] sentencing[.] Id. at pt. 2, II.I., at 21. The comment to that provision explained in more detail that [i]t is recommended that prosecutors consult with every victim of violent crime, explaining how the plea negotiations process operates, what negotiating posture the prosecution has adopted and why that posture was chosen. Prosecutors should always attempt to take into account the victim s views before reaching a final decision. Victims legitimately view the resolution of and sentencing in a case as an evaluation of the harm done to them. [Id. at pt. 2, II.I., commentary at 22.] Those standards also inform us that [n]othing contained herein should be construed to alter or limit the authority or discretion of the prosecutor to enter into any plea agreement which the prosecutor deems appropriate. Id. at pt. 2, II.F., at 21. [R. 3:9-2.] The prosecutor and defense counsel may engage in discussions relating to pleas and sentences . . . . R. 3:9-3(a). And, with the consent of both sides, the court may indicate the maximum sentence it would impose in the event the defendant enters a plea of guilty, assuming . . . that the information in the presentence report at the time of sentence is as has been represented to the court at the time of the disclosure and supports its determination that the interests of justice would be served thereby. In respect to the rejection or withdrawal of a plea, Rule 3:9-3(e) provides that the court may vacate the plea or the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw the plea if at the time of sentencing the court determines that the interests of justice would not be served by effectuating the agreement . . . or by imposing sentence in accordance with the court s previous indications of sentence[.] Thus, our Rules expressly authorize the trial court to vacate the plea when the interests of justice will not be served by approval of the terms of the plea agreement. We have emphasized that [a]ll plea-bargain jurisprudence recognizes the important interest of finality to pleas. State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 416 (1990). Even so, Rule 3:21-1 expressly authorizes a defendant to move before sentencing to withdraw a plea, and the trial court may grant the motion in its discretion. Ibid. However, a defendant carries a heavier burden to succeed in withdrawing a plea when the plea is entered pursuant to a plea bargain. Ibid. (citations omitted). In any event, the measure of what constitutes fair and just reason for withdrawal must be reposed in the sound confidence of the court. Id. at 417. Our Rules do not contain a corresponding right of the State to withdraw from a plea agreement. Warren, supra, 115 N.J. at 443-44. [A]lthough notions of fairness apply to each side, the State as well as the defendant, the defendant s constitutional rights and interests weigh more heavily in the scale. Id. at 443; see also State v. Moore, 188 N.J. 182, 211 n.13 (2006) (noting that when balance of competing interests between crime victim and defendant is struck, greatest protection goes to a criminal defendant whose liberty interest is at stake ). Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RAHEEM MEANS, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, dissenting. In August 2002, defendant Raheem Means faced two separate sets of criminal charges. The first set of charges resulted from defendant, then a twenty-three-year-old man, engaging in sexual relations with a thirteen-year-old runaway; the second arose from a robbery at gunpoint of five victims. Seeking a consolidated disposition, defendant negotiated a plea agreement: in exchange for the State recommending a thirteen-year term of imprisonment subject to a mandatory period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, defendant would plead guilty to one count of third-degree child endangerment, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); five counts of first-degree robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; one count of third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and one count of second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). On August 16, 2002, when defendant first appeared to enter his pleas, the trial court advised defendant that the sentence to be imposed would be a ten-year term of incarceration, subject to NERA. Defendant pled guilty according to the terms of that plea agreement. At sentencing on November 16, 2002, the State sought to withdraw its consent to defendant s guilty plea because the father of the minor child with whom defendant had sexual intercourse objected to the plea deal. The trial court granted the State s oral motion to vacate the plea. Several months later, on May 2, 2003, defendant was offered -- and he accepted -- a new plea deal: in exchange for a fifteen-year term of imprisonment also subject to NERA, defendant was to plead to one count of third-degree aggravated criminal sexual contact, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3; one count of third-degree child endangerment, in violation of N.J.S.A 2C:24-4(a); three counts of first-degree robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; one count of third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); one count of aggravated assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4); and one count of fourth-degree unlawful possession of hollow-point bullets, in violation of N.J.S.A 2C:39-3(f)(1). Later that same day, defendant entered his guilty pleas without reserving any objection to the earlier vacated plea agreement, and was sentenced in accordance with that plea deal. As of the February 5, 2004 sentencing following his second plea hearing, defendant had made no application to withdraw his plea, causing the trial court to note that it was not aware of any filing of any motion, by the defendant, to withdraw his guilty pleas. It was only after the trial court explained that it was willing to address an oral motion to withdraw that defendant s counsel stated that defendant wishe[d] to withdraw his pleas. Tellingly, the basis defendant advanced for his request to withdraw his guilty pleas was not the reason that animates the majority. Instead, defendant s desire to vacate his pleas was motivated by his claim that his lawyer had lied to him, had withheld evidence from him, and had failed to defend him vigorously. The trial court handily rejected all of defendant s claims, finding that defendant s pleas were knowing and voluntary, and were entered into after defendant understood the charges against him, after he understood the maximum penalties he faced, and after he was represented by competent counsel[.] The trial court concluded: He admitted all of the charges. He entered the pleas freely and voluntarily, after voluntarily waiving his rights to a jury trial, his right to confront [] witnesses against him and his right not to incriminate himself. He was not threatened or forced. And, as I ve said, there was a factual basis established for the entry of the pleas. He understood about all the penalties that would be imposed. And I find, after my review of the transcript, that I m not persuaded otherwise. On appeal, defendant -- for the first time -- sought to vacate his guilty pleas on the basis that he was entitled to the benefit of the first plea deal he struck. By an order, the Appellate Division rejected that argument and affirmed defendant s conviction and sentence. Blending constitutional precepts with principles of contract law, the majority concludes that it was error for the trial court to vacate defendant s August 16, 2002 guilty pleas, which resulted, as the majority describes, in defendant actually receiv[ing] a custodial sentence five years greater than he would have under the first plea agreement. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2007) (slip op. at 6). Because defendant s claims are procedurally barred and the majority s reasoning disregards the proper standard of review, I respectfully dissent. ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RAHEEM MEANS, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 11, 2007 Chief Justice Zazzali PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Wallace, Jr. CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto