Title: BRENDA BANGS V. ROBERT E. SCHROTH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRENDA BANGS V. ROBERT E. SCHROTH2009 WY 20201 P.3d 442Case Number: S-07-0012Decided: 02/19/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
BRENDA 
BANGS,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.ROBERT E. 
SCHROTH,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

William 
R. Fix and Jenna V. Mandraccia of William R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Mandraccia.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Robert 
M. Shively and Amy M. Taheri of Shively, Taheri & Rochelle, P.C., Casper, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Taheri.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Brenda Bangs, who 
claims that attorney Robert E. Schroth, Sr., undertook and then mishandled her 
legal representation by failing to timely commence medical malpractice 
litigation against two doctors, appeals the district court's grant of summary 
judgment to Mr. Schroth in her legal malpractice action against him.  Because Mr. Schroth has not established 
a prima facie case entitling him to summary judgment on Ms. Bangs' claims of 
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligent 
misrepresentation, fraud, and punitive damages, we reverse the district court's 
summary judgment on those claims.  
We dismiss, however, Ms. Bangs' claim of deceit under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
33-5-114 because it is not legally cognizable under the undisputed facts of the 
case.  W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6).

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      In regard to the 
district court's summary judgment on all claims except deceit under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 33-5-114, the dispositive issue is whether Mr. Schroth properly supported 
his motion for summary judgment as required by W.R.C.P. 56 and our decisions in 
Rino v. Mead, 2002 WY 144, 55 P.3d 13 
(Wyo. 2002); Havens v. Hoffman, 902 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 1995); Roybal v. Bell, 
778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989); and Greenwood 
v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 
[¶3]      In regard to the 
district court's grant of summary judgment to Mr. Schroth on Ms. Bangs' claim of 
deceit under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-5-114, the dispositive issue is whether, as a 
matter of statutory interpretation, that statutory provision applies under the 
facts of this case.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      In the parties' 
appellate briefs here and their legal memoranda submitted to the district court 
in connection with the summary judgment proceedings there, they provide the 
following background information which is helpful to place the issues before us 
in appropriate context.

 
 
[¶5]      On or about May 
22, 2000, Ms. Bangs employed Dr. Robert Bricca in Jackson, Wyoming, for medical 
services in connection with her pregnancy which was then at approximately twelve 
to fourteen weeks.  While in Dr. 
Bricca's care, Ms. Bangs experienced complications and was diagnosed with 
fulminant ulcerative colitis.1  This medical condition required Ms. 
Bangs' transfer from Dr. Bricca's care to the LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and the medical care of Dr. Peter Bossart.  Because of her medical condition and the 
ensuing apparent distress of her unborn infant, Ms. Bangs underwent an emergency 
cesarean section delivery of her twenty-six-week preterm infant before a total 
colectomy on August 18, 2000.  In 
addition, Ms. Bangs underwent numerous subsequent surgical procedures resulting 
from her toxic megacolon secondary to chronic ulcerative 
colitis.

 
 
[¶6]      Following Ms. 
Bangs' medical treatment, she contacted Mr. Schroth for legal representation in 
medical malpractice litigation against Dr. Bricca and Dr. Bossart.  Mr. Schroth drafted the complaints 
against the doctors.  Mr. Schroth 
never filed the complaint against Dr. Bossart, and the statute of limitations 
ran on that claim.  On September 26, 
2003, the district court dismissed the claim against Dr. Bricca, which had been 
filed, because he had not been timely served with the complaint before the 
statute of limitations ran on that claim.

 
 
[¶7]      On February 7, 
2005, Ms. Bangs filed suit against Mr. Schroth, alleging claims of negligence 
(Count I), breach of fiduciary duty (Count II), breach of contract (Count III), 
negligent misrepresentation (Count IV), fraud (Count V), deceit under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 33-5-114 (County VI), and punitive damages (Count VII).  In pertinent part in her complaint, she 
alleged that in December 2000, she contacted Mr. Schroth to represent her in a 
medical malpractice case for injuries and medical problems arising out of her 
pregnancy and the subsequent birth of her child; Mr. Schroth agreed to 
competently and zealously perform his duties as her legal counsel; an 
attorney-client relationship existed between Ms. Bangs and Mr. Schroth; and Mr. 
Schroth told her that his team in San Diego would undertake to review and 
prosecute her claims against all responsible parties and Mr. Schroth assured her 
that she had a viable case.  

 
 
[¶8]      On April 27, 
2005, Mr. Schroth filed his answer to Ms. Bangs' complaint, generally denying 
her claims and liability.  On 
November 9, 2005, District Court Judge Nancy J. Guthrie assigned the case to 
District Court Judge Dennis L. Sanderson, who held a scheduling conference on 
December 6, 2005, and filed the scheduling order on December 16, 2005.  In that scheduling order, the trial 
judge ordered, among other matters, Ms. Bangs' designation of expert witnesses 
to be made by March 15, 2006; Mr. Schroth's designation of expert witnesses to 
be made by May 1, 2006; discovery cut-off to be on October 23, 2006; dispositive 
motions to be filed on or before September 15, 2006; pre-trial conference to be 
held on October 23, 2006; and jury trial to commence on November 13, 
2006.

 
 
[¶9]      On December 27, 
2005, eleven days after the filing of the district court's scheduling order, Mr. 
Schroth filed his motion for summary judgment.  In support of his motion, he relied on 
his own affidavit, the affidavits of Dr. Bricca and Dr. Bossart, and a legal 
memorandum.  On December 30, 2005, 
the district court filed its order setting Mr. Schroth's motion for summary 
judgment for hearing on February 3, 2006.  
On January 10, 2006, Ms. Bangs filed several motions, seeking, among 
other matters, enlargement of time to respond to Mr. Schroth's motion; vacation 
of the motion hearing on February 3, 2006; supplementation of the record with 
depositions and affidavits as discovery progressed; and striking of the 
affidavits of Dr. Bricca and Dr. Bossart because they were self-serving and 
conclusory.  On January 12, 2006, 
the district court held a hearing on Ms. Bangs' several motions; and on January 
13, 2006, the district court filed its order denying those 
motions.

 
 
[¶10]   On January 17, 2006, Ms. Bangs 
filed a legal memorandum in opposition to Mr. Schroth's motion for summary 
judgment. In support of her opposition to that motion, she attached to her legal 
memorandum the affidavit of Henry F. Bailey, Jr., an attorney; Ms. Bangs' 
deposition taken in her failed litigation against Dr. Bricca; Ms. Bangs' 
affidavit; and District Court Judge Nancy J. Guthrie's order dated September 26, 
2003, dismissing Ms. Bangs' litigation against Dr. Bricca.  On January 30, 2006, Mr. Schroth filed 
his reply to Ms. Bangs' opposition to his motion for summary judgment.  On February 1, 2006, Ms. Bangs filed Mr. 
Schroth's deposition which she had taken on January 12, 2006.  On February 3, 2006, the district court 
judge held the hearing on Mr. Schroth's motion for summary 
judgment.

 
 
[¶11]   On May 15, 2006, the district court 
judge filed the order granting Mr. Schroth's motion for summary judgment on Ms. 
Bangs' claims for negligence (Count I), breach of fiduciary duty (Count II), 
breach of contract (Count III), fraud (Count V), and punitive damages (Count 
VII).  In regards to Ms. Bangs' 
claims of negligent misrepresentation (Count IV) and deceit under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 33-5-114 (Count VI), the district court judge desired "further briefing 
and consideration of the causal requirements and the quantity of injury, if 
any," informing the parties that they may submit additional motions and 
briefs.2  In the district court's order granting 
summary judgment on these five claims, the district court judge explained his 
ruling as follows:

 
 
            
Following a review of the pleadings, briefs and supporting materials, and 
having heard the argument of counsel, the court FINDS:

 
 
1.         
The elements in a legal malpractice case are:  (1) the accepted standard of [legal] 
care or practice, (2) that the [lawyer's] conduct departed from the standard, 
and (3) that [the lawyer's] conduct was the legal cause of the injuries 
suffered.  Moore v. Lubnau, [855] P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 
1993)[.]

 
 
2.         
A fact is material if it establishes or refutes an essential element of a 
claim or defense.  Tidwell v. HOM, Inc. 896 P.2d 1322, 1324 
(Wyo. 1995)[.]

 
 
3.         
Defendant has definitively made a showing of undisputed, uncontroverted 
material fact with respect to element number (3) by refuting . . . "that [the 
lawyer's] conduct was the legal cause of the injuries suffered."  Defendant has produced affidavits 
negating the viability of the underlying medical malpractice action.  Even viewing all of the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, no material facts which establish the 
essential element of causation appear in the record before this 
Court.

 
 
4.         
Plaintiff attached no affidavits of physicians attesting to medical 
negligence in the underlying medical malpractice case, as required to rebut the 
Affidavits of Drs. Bricca and Bossart.  
Plaintiff has not provided the Court with affidavits or other competent 
evidence which would give rise to a genuine issue of material fact with regard 
to this element.

 
 
5.         
The mere fact of injury or the occurrence of a bad result, standing 
alone, is no proof of negligence in the ordinary malpractice action.  Harris v. Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747 (Wyo. 
1981)[.]

 
 
6.         
It has long been established in Wyoming that a medical malpractice claim 
in almost all cases, and certainly in a case such as the plaintiff's concerning 
obstetrical care, a qualified medical expert is essential to establishing a 
viable claim of medical malpractice.  
Harris v. Grizzle, Supra.

 
 
7.         
There is no genuine issue of material fact on the subject of legal 
causation upon which this matter can proceed.

 
 
8.         
Summary judgment should follow upon Counts I, II, III, V and VII of the 
plaintiff's complaint.

 
 
 
 
[¶12]   On July 24, 2006, Mr. Schroth filed 
his motion for summary judgment on Ms. Bangs' remaining claims of negligent 
misrepresentation (Count IV) and deceit under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-5-114 (Count 
VI), supporting the motion with a legal memorandum and his own affidavit which 
he had filed in his first motion for summary judgment.  On September 5, 2006, Ms. Bangs filed 
her legal memorandum in opposition to Mr. Schroth's motion, supported by much of 
the record developed in the first summary judgment proceeding.  Mr. Schroth filed his reply legal 
memorandum on September 19, 2006.  
On November 16, 2006, the district court judge filed his order granting 
Mr. Schroth's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Ms. Bangs' complaint 
with prejudice.  Ms. Bangs timely 
filed her notice of appeal of the district court's orders granting summary 
judgment to Mr. Schroth.

 
 

Summary 
Judgment Law

 
 
A.  Procedure

 
 
[¶13]   In light of the issues in this 
case, summary judgment procedure is governed by the following language of 
W.R.C.P. 56(b), (c), and (e):

 
 
(b)  For defending party. -- A party against 
whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment 
is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part 
thereof.

 
 
(c)  Motion and proceedings thereon. -- . . . 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . 
.

 
 
* 
* * * 

 
 
(e)  Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. -- Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein.  
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in 
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.  The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits.  When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's 
pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.  If the 
adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against the adverse party.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
B.  Case Law under W.R.C.P. 56 (b), (c), and 
(e)

 
 
[¶14]   This Court has well-settled case 
law under W.R.C.P. 56(b), (c), and (e) which is particularly applicable to the 
issues in this case.  In Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 
(Wyo. 1987), a medical malpractice action filed by Ms. Greenwood against a 
hospital and an obstetrical doctor for injuries she allegedly received under 
their care in connection with the birth of her child, the hospital moved for 
summary judgment with supporting affidavits of a nurse and a hospital 
administrator.  The affidavit of the 
hospital administrator stated:  

 
 
1. 
        
That he is the Executive Director of Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater 
County, Rock Springs, Wyoming, and makes this Affidavit in behalf of said 
hospital, a defendant in the above-entitled case.

 
 
2. 
        
That affiant has examined the records of Memorial Hospital of 
Sweetwater County as they existed on November 25, 1983, and finds that Dr. J.G. 
Wierdsma was a physician duly licensed to practice in the State of Wyoming, who 
had been granted privileges to practice in Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater 
County, Rock Springs, Wyoming; that there was nothing in said records to 
indicate that Dr. Wierdsma was not qualified to act as an obstetrician and 
gynecologist or that he should not be allowed to be the attending physician in 
childbirth cases.

 
 
3. 
        
To the contrary, the records reflect that Dr. Wierdsma was a 
qualified obstetrician-gynecologist who had in the past and was able to provide 
proper pre and post natal care, as well as deliver babies.

 
 
4. 
        
Based on my experience as a hospital administrator and the records 
pertaining to Dr. Wierdsma, it is my opinion that the Hospital acted with 
the applicable standard of care in the above case; was not negligent in any 
manner; and exercised the skill, diligence and knowledge, and applied the means 
and methods which would be exercised and applied under similar circumstances by 
hospitals. 

 
 

Id. 
at 1085 (emphasis in original).  The 
affidavit of the nurse stated:

 
 
4. 
        
I have reviewed the medical records of the Plaintiff, Betty 
Greenwood, relative to her stay at the Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County, 
as well as Riverton Memorial Hospital.

5. 
        
It appears that on November 24, 1983[,] the Plaintiff was admitted to 
Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County for the delivery of a 
child.

 
 
6. 
        
In connection with that admission, the plaintiff did deliver a baby 
girl.

7. 
        
As a result of the labor progressing quickly at its later stages, it 
became necessary for the nurse on duty to ultimately deliver the baby. Almost 
immediately thereafter, care of the mother was turned over to Dr. 
Wierdsma.

 
 
8. 
        
That the mother received a first degree laceration as a result of the 
delivery. That the laceration was taken care of by Dr. 
Wierdsma.

 
 
9. 
        
That the Plaintiff was thereafter discharged on November 25, 
1983.

 
 
10. 
      From my 
review of the records, it appears that the assessments made and the care and 
treatment rendered by the nursing staff at Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater 
County to the Plaintiff were proper in all respects. In that regard, it is my 
opinion that the nursing staff of Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater County 
exercised the skill, diligence and knowledge and applied the means and methods 
which would reasonably be exercised and applied under similar circumstances by 
members of the nursing profession in good standing. 

 
 

Id. 
(emphasis 
in original).  Ms. Greenwood moved 
to strike the two affidavits, contending they did not conform to W.R.C.P. 56(e) 
which requires the affiant to state facts within personal knowledge and to 
attach to the affidavit those documents in support of those facts on which the 
affiant is relying.  The district 
court denied Ms. Greenwood's motion to strike the two affidavits and granted the 
hospital's summary judgment motion based on the challenged affidavits.  Id. at 1082.

 
 
[¶15]   On appeal, we reversed the district 
court's summary judgment order, ruling that the district court erred by relying 
upon, rather than sustaining Ms. Greenwood's motion to strike, the two 
affidavits which supported the hospital's summary judgment motion. Id. at 1086. Noting that compliance with 
the rules of summary judgment procedure is mandatory, we examined the two 
affidavits in light of the requirements of W.R.C.P. 56(e) that an affidavit (1) 
be made on personal knowledge, (2) set forth facts which are admissible in 
evidence, (3) demonstrate the affiant's competency to testify on the subject 
matter of the affidavit, and (4) have attached to the affidavit the papers and 
documents to which it refers. Id. at 
1084-85. After setting out the contents of the hospital administrator's 
affidavit, we found that the affidavit fell short of W.R.C.P. 56(e) in two 
respects, namely, (1) the documents the affiant reviewed and to which he 
referred were not attached to his affidavit, and (2) his affidavit set forth no 
facts and merely made categorical assertions and stated bald conclusions.  Id. at 1085. Addressing the nurse's 
affidavit, we set out the contents of her affidavit and found that it also 
suffered from both the defects present in the hospital administrator's 
affidavit, namely, (1) the records to which the affiant referred were not 
attached, and (2) the factual basis for the conclusions in her affidavit was 
absent.  Id. We found that none of the general 
facts about Ms. Greenwood's case contained in the affidavit was relevant to or 
supported by conclusion and opinion that the hospital exercised reasonable 
care.  We remarked that the nurse 
failed to explain what happened, why Ms. Greenwood's present condition resulted, 
and what hospital supervision and care existed.  Id. at 1086.  We stated, "When stripped of their 
unsupported conclusions, the affidavits . . . in no way assist the hospital's 
claim for summary judgment."  Id.  We held that, "The affidavits should 
have been stricken or at least disregarded, and the district court's failure to 
do so was error."  Id.  Because the two affidavits were 
insufficient and ineffectual, Ms. Greenwood was entitled to rest upon the 
allegations in her complaint.  Id.

 
 
[¶16]   In Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 
1989), a dental malpractice action, we again considered the adequacies of 
affidavits in light of the requirements of W.R.C.P. 56.  Ms. Roybal filed her action against 
three dentists, including Dr. Bell.  
The other two dentists later dropped out of the litigation, leaving Dr. 
Bell.  He answered the complaint, 
generally denying Ms. Roybal's allegations.  He subsequently filed a motion for 
summary judgment supported by, among other material, his own affidavit; the 
affidavit of Dr. Giovale, one of the two other dentists and who had earlier 
settled out of the litigation; and the affidavit of Dr. Devine.  At the summary judgment hearing, Ms. 
Roybal dropped all claims against Dr. Bell except the claim relating to his 
alleged failure to obtain an informed consent in connection with the oral 
surgical procedure known as an apicoectomy on one of Ms. Roybal's teeth.  Id. at 110.  Dr. Bell's affidavit stated  

 
 
that 
he was aware of the standard required for informed consent for dentists 
practicing his specialty, that he fully informed appellant of the risks 
associated with the apicoectomy on tooth #20, including the risk of nerve 
damage, and further that this disclosure was accomplished by use of a diagram, a 
copy of which was attached to his affidavit.

 
 

Id. 
at 
113.  Dr. Bell's affidavit did not 
delineate, however, what the applicable standard of disclosure required under 
the circumstances.    Dr. 
Giovale's affidavit stated

 
 
he 
was fully familiar with the standard of care required of dentists with regard to 
the disclosures necessary for informed consent in referral situations and that, 
prior to referring [Ms. Roybal] to [Dr. Bell] for the apicoectomy on tooth #20, 
he discussed with her the specific risks involved, including the possibility of 
nerve injury and paresthesia.  Dr. 
Giovale attached to his affidavit a copy of his office charts with notations 
indicating he had apprised [Ms. Roybal] of possible nerve injury and paresthesia 
on this occasion.

 
 

Id.  Dr. 
Giovale's affidavit did not delineate, however, what the applicable standard of 
disclosure required under the circumstances.  In his affidavit, Dr. Devine, a dentist, 
stated

 
 
he 
had reviewed [Ms. Roybal's] dental records and other relevant materials in the 
record, including the pleadings, the affidavits of [Dr. Bell] and Dr. Giovale, 
and an outline of [Ms. Roybal's] deposition.  Dr. Devine said he was familiar with the 
applicable standard of care, although, as with the affidavits of [Dr. Bell] and 
Dr. Giovale, Dr. Devine did not delineate what the applicable standard of 
disclosure required under the circumstances.  Thus, without stating what the standard 
of care required, Dr. Devine stated that, in treating [Ms. Roybal], [Dr. Bell] 
exercised that degree of care ordinarily possessed and exercised by dentists in 
good standing practicing in the community or elsewhere.  With respect to the question of 
proximate cause, Dr. Devine stated:  
"It is unreasonable to believe that a patient being fully informed would 
have elected any other procedure." 

 
 

Id.  The district court granted Dr. Bell's 
summary judgment motion.  On appeal, 
we reversed and remanded for further proceedings because the affidavits  

 
 
are 
defective in that each fails to state the prevailing standard of care by which 
to measure the adequacy of the consent obtained, if any.  The standard of care must be stated with 
specificity sufficient to enable the court to determine if appellee properly 
disclosed the risks and alternatives in conformance with the standard.  Hurtt v. Goleburn, 330 A.2d 134 (Del. 
Supr. 1974).  Because these 
supporting affidavits fail in this important respect, appellee, as movant, did 
not meet his initial burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue of 
material fact.

 
 
            
Since appellee failed to properly support his motion for summary 
judgment, appellant was entitled to rely upon her allegation that she did not 
receive adequate information to enable her to give an informed consent, and she 
had no obligation to present any factual support for her allegation.  Peterson v. Campbell County Memorial 
Hospital District, 760 P.2d 992 (Wyo. 1988); Metzger [v. Kalke], 709 P.2d 414 [(Wyo. 1985)]; 
Hurtt, 330 A.2d 134.  Her unrefuted allegation is sufficient 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the pleadings of the 
parties structure a question of fact as to appellee's alleged negligent failure 
to obtain informed consent.  Peterson, 760 P.2d 992; Metzger, 709 P.2d 414.

 
 

Roybal, 
778 P.2d  at 114.

 
 
[¶17]   In Havens v. Hoffman, 902 P.2d 219 (Wyo. 
1995), a medical malpractice action, Ms. Havens alleged injury attributable to 
Dr. Hoffman's alleged failure to obtain her informed consent in connection with 
certain surgical procedures he had performed on her.  In seeking summary judgment against that 
claim, Dr. Hoffman relied upon Ms. Havens' signed consent form prepared by the 
hospital in which the surgery was performed, and Dr. Hoffman's office 
notes.  Dr. Hoffman placed specific 
reliance upon the following paragraph in the consent form:

 
 
3.  I confirm the following:  That my physician has explained to me 
the nature, purpose, and possible consequences of the procedure(s) as well as 
the risks involved, and the possible complications and/or alternative methods of 
treatment.  I understand that the 
explanation I have received is not exhaustive because of unforeseen 
circumstances that may arise and I have been advised that a more detailed and 
complete explanation of the preceding matter will be given to me if I so 
desire.  Upon reading the previous 
statement, I do not desire such further explanations.  Furthermore, I acknowledge that I have 
received no guarantees or assurances as to the results that may be obtained from 
the performance of this operation or procedure.  

 
 

Id. 
at 221.  Dr. Hoffman's office notes 
contained the following sentences upon which he relied:  

 
 
Procedures, 
findings, indications, risks, benefits and possible complications explained to 
pt's satisfaction.  Pt gives her 
informed consent for both procedures scheduled on 1/28/92.

 
 

Id.  The 
district court granted Dr. Hoffman's summary judgment motion, but the order did 
not reflect the court's rationale.  
Id.

 
 
[¶18]   On appeal, we applied and found 
dispositive the Roybal analysis and 
reversed the summary judgment.  We 
wrote:

 
 
            
Nowhere in the materials filed by Dr. Hoffman in support of his Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant does there appear an articulation of 
the prevailing standard of care by which to measure the adequacy of the 
information furnished to Havens to secure her consent.  Roybal clearly requires such an 
articulation.  Instead, Dr. Hoffman 
relies upon the conclusional statement traceable to his notes that he informed 
Havens of the "procedures, findings, indications, risks, benefits and possible 
complications."  We do not know what 
specific statements he made, nor is there any expert testimony as to what 
specific advice should have been given.  
The Roybal standards are not 
satisfied.

 
 

Id. 
at 
223.

 
 
[¶19]   In Rino v. Mead, 2002 WY 144, 55 P.3d 13 
(Wyo. 2002), a legal malpractice action, Ms. Rino alleged several violations of 
professional duties by her attorney in connection with her divorce 
litigation.  In support of the 
attorney's summary judgment motion, the attorney submitted, among other 
material, her expert witness's affidavit.  
The district court granted the attorney's summary judgment motion because 
it found that the attorney's submittals established a prima facie case that the 
attorney was not negligent.  On 
appeal, we reversed the summary judgment because the submittals, including the 
expert witness's affidavit, did not establish the absence of genuine issues of 
material fact, and, therefore, the burden did not shift to Ms. Rino to produce 
expert testimony.  Id., ¶22, 55 P.3d  at 20.  Although this Court did not quote the 
expert witness's affidavit, it commented upon its shortcomings in this 
passage:

 
 
            
The affidavit of Mead's expert does contain some facts in substantiation 
of its conclusion that Mead's conduct did not fall below the standard of 
care.  For instance, the affidavit 
cites to correspondence that shows Mead had considered the value of McCalla's 
law practice, as well as the issue of alimony.  Beyond that, however, the affidavit does 
not counter Rino's other factual allegations that Mead failed to hire accountant 
and attorney experts as promised, failed to prepare for the mediation session, 
failed to prepare for the trial, and failed to give correct advice as to the 
treatment of McCalla's retirement account in the property division.  With these issues of material fact 
remaining, Mead's expert's opinion that Mead "acted in a reasonable, careful and 
prudent manner with respect to her representation of" Rino is simply 
premature.

 
 

Id.  

 
 
C.        
Appellate Standards of Review of Summary Judgment

 
 
[¶20]   Our standards for reviewing the 
district court's order granting summary judgment are well established.  We treat the summary judgment movant's 
motion as though it has been presented originally to us.  Havens, 902 P.2d  at 220.  We use the same materials in the record 
that was before the district court.  
Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 
2006 WY 151, ¶ 8, 148 P.3d 8, 12 (Wyo. 2006).  Using the materials in the record, we 
examine them from the vantage point most favorable to the nonmoving party 
opposing the motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences 
which may fairly be drawn from the materials.  Rino, ¶ 12, 55 P.3d  at 17.  Summary judgments are especially not 
favored in professional malpractice actions, whether legal or medical.  Jacobson v. Cobbs, 2007 WY 99, ¶ 7, 160 P.3d 654, 656-57 (Wyo. 2007); Gayhart v. 
Goody, 2004 WY 112, ¶ 12, 98 P.3d 164, 168 (Wyo. 2004).  We subject such actions to more exacting 
scrutiny.  Id.  If doubt exists about the presence of 
genuine issues of material fact after we have reviewed the record, we resolve 
that doubt against the movant.  Jacobson, ¶ 7, 160 P.2d  at 656.  The nonmoving party opposing the summary 
judgment motion has no obligation to counter the motion with materials beyond 
the pleadings until the movant has made a prima facie showing that genuine 
issues of material fact do not exist.  
Rino, ¶ 23, 55 P.3d  at 
20.  We review questions of law de novo without giving any deference to 
the district court's determinations.  
Hatton, ¶ 8, 148 P.3d  at 
12.

 
 
[¶21]   Mindful of these foregoing 
principles of summary judgment law and our standards of review applicable to a 
district court's order granting summary judgment, we will now apply those 
principles and standards to the materials in this record to determine whether 
Mr. Schroth was entitled to have summary judgment entered in his favor in this 
case.

 
 
[¶22]   As noted above in the recitation of 
facts, Mr. Schroth supported his summary judgment motion with his own affidavit, 
the affidavit of Dr. Bricca, and the affidavit of Dr. Bossart.  We shall now examine each affidavit in 
light of the well-established principles of summary judgment law identified 
earlier in this opinion.

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Schroth's affidavit 
states:

 
 
1.         
I am a general practice attorney, fully licensed to practice in the State 
of Wyoming.

 
 
2.         
I am familiar with the standard of care applicable to general practice 
attorneys practicing in the State of Wyoming.

 
 
3.         
A copy of my resume is attached to this Affidavit and fully sets out my 
education and experience in the practice of law.

 
 
4.         
I am familiar with the applicable standards of care for review of medical 
malpractice cases such as that I provided for Brenda 
Bangs.

 
 
5.         
It is my professional opinion that I acted within the applicable standard 
of care relative to my review of, decision to not undertake prosecution of, and 
subsequent return to the client, of Brenda Bangs' potential medical malpractice 
case.  My opinion is based on my 
education and experience as described above, as well as my consultation with 
medical experts.

 
 
6.         
It is also my opinion that no attorney-client relationship ever existed 
between myself and Ms. Bangs.

 
 
7.         
It is further my opinion that I referred Brenda in a timely manner to 
other attorneys who might take her case, and informed Ms. Bangs that I was 
unwilling to take it myself.  I 
properly advised Ms. Bangs that her pro se complaint needed to be served within 
sixty days of filing it in order to preserve the statute of 
limitations.

 
 
8.         
It is my opinion, based upon my education, training and experience, and 
consultation with experts, that the physicians Brenda Bangs sought to sue, met 
the standard of care in all respects in their care of Brenda and her 
child.

 
 
9.         
I am also of the opinion that no action or inaction on my part caused or 
contributed to Brenda Bangs' alleged damages in this lawsuit, for the reason 
stated in paragraph seven above. 

 
 
[¶24]   Mr. Schroth's affidavit is 
inadequate in several respects.  He 
fails to state what the standard of care is in paragraphs two and four.  He fails to attach a copy of his resume 
as he stated in paragraph three.  He 
fails to state specific facts about his interaction and conduct with Ms. Bangs, 
and states only categorical assertions of ultimate facts without supporting 
facts in paragraphs five, six, seven, and nine.  Incredibly, in paragraph eight, he 
offers a medical opinion "that the physicians Brenda Bangs sought to sue . . . 
met the standard of care in all respects in their care of Brenda and her 
child."  No evidence exists that Mr. 
Schroth is competent to testify about medical matters; only an expert witness is 
competent to testify about them.   Smyth v. Kaufman, 2003 WY 52, ¶ 27, 
67 P.3d 1161, 1169 (Wyo. 2003); Harris v. 
Grizzle, 625 P.2d 741, 751 (Wyo. 1981).  In regard to Mr. Schroth's bald 
conclusion in paragraph six that no attorney-client relationship even existed 
between Ms. Bangs and him, we recall these words: 

 
 
            
Determining the existence of an attorney-client relationship "depends on 
the facts and circumstances of each case" and "may be implied from the conduct 
of the parties, such as the giving of advice or assistance, or such as failing 
to negate the relationship when the advice or assistance is sought if the 
attorney is aware of the reliance on the relationship."  Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1346 
(Wyo. 1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980).  The determination of whether there is an 
attorney-client relationship is one of fact and, typically, is for the trier of 
fact and cannot be resolved by summary judgment.  2 R.E. Mallen and J.M. Smith, Legal Malpractice §§ 27.10, 27.22 (3d 
ed. 1989).

 
 

Meyer 
v. Mulligan, 
889 P.2d 509, 513-14 (Wyo. 1995).  
The district court erred when it did not strike Mr. Schroth's 
affidavit.  

 
 
[¶25]   Next, we examine Dr. Bricca's 
affidavit.  Dr. Bricca 
states:

 
 
1.         
I am a family practice physician, residing near, and practicing in 
Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
2.         
I am familiar with the standard of care applicable to family practice 
physicians practicing nationally as well as in the State of Wyoming.  

 
 
3.         
A copy of my Curriculum Vitae is attached to this Affidavit and fully 
sets out my training and experience in the field of family 
practice.

 
 
4.         
I am familiar with the applicable standards of prenatal obstetrical care 
such as that I provided to Brenda Bangs.

 
 
5.         
I am also familiar with the applicable standards of care for colon 
problems such as Brenda Bangs suffered during her 
pregnancy.

 
 
6.         
In preparation for my opinions, I have reviewed the 
following:

            
A.        LDS 
Hospital medical records for Brenda Bangs for her hospitalization of August 10, 
2000, through September 10, 2000.

            
B.        St. 
John's Hospital medical records for Brenda Bangs for her hospitalization from 
August 8, 2000[,] through August 10, 2000.

            
C.        
Medical records pertaining to Brenda Bangs from my own office chart dated 
May 22, 2000[,] through August 22, 2000.

 
 
7.         
I am aware of the standard of care for family practice physicians 
performing the type of care rendered by myself to Brenda Bangs during her 
pregnancy in 2000.

 
 
8.         
After reviewing the materials listed above, it is my opinion, to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability, that I acted within the applicable 
standard of care relative to the care rendered to Brenda Bangs between May 22, 
2000, and August 10, 2000, when she was transferred to LDS Hospital in Salt Lake 
City for care throughout the remainder of her pregnancy.  My opinion is based upon my experience, 
training, and review of the medical records.

 
 
9.         
It is further my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability 
that I referred Brenda in a timely manner to an appropriate specialist, Dr. 
Peter Bossart, a colorectal surgeon in Salt Lake City, UT.

 
 
10.       On July 25, 
2000, I wrote a letter of referral to Peter Bossart, M.D., for Brenda 
Bangs.  On August 8, 2000, 
colonoscopy was performed by George Waterhouse, M.D., at St. John's Hospital, 
with a diagnosis of fulminant ulcerative colitis.  On August 10, 2000, Brenda Bangs was 
transferred to LDS Hospital in the care of Bill Hudson, M.D., 
gastroenterologist.  She was seen in 
consultation by Peter Bossart, M.D., and Joe Eyring, M.D., as well as the 
perinatology service at the University of Utah Medical Center.  On August 18, 2000, Brenda underwent a 
Cesarean section delivery of her child prior to a total colectomy.  I was told at this time that she would 
require at least three more procedures.  
Brenda's medical records indicate that prior to the Cesarean delivery of 
the baby, the perinatologist who evaluated Brenda found indications that the 
baby appeared to be in distress.

 
 
11.       I am of the 
opinion, which I hold to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that the 
cause of Brenda Bangs' pregnancy complications which necessitated the preterm 
delivery of her child and her numerous subsequent surgical procedures, was toxic 
megacolon secondary to chronic ulcerative colitis, and were in no way 
preventable by myself.

 
 
11. 
[sic] It is further my opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, 
that no action or inaction on my part caused or contributed to Brenda Bangs' 
pregnancy complications, need for surgeries related to her ulcerative colitis, 
or present condition.

 
 
[¶26]   Dr. Bricca's affidavit is 
inadequate in several respects.  He 
fails to state the applicable standard of care for family practice physicians in 
paragraph two; the applicable standards of prenatal obstetrical care in 
paragraph four; and the applicable standards of care for colon problems like Ms. 
Bangs suffered during her pregnancy in paragraph five.  He fails to state specific facts 
concerning Ms. Bangs' medical problems and his treatment of those problems; 
instead he merely makes categorical assertions and states bald conclusions.  He fails to attach the medical records 
to which he refers and also fails to attach a copy of his curriculum vitae to 
which he refers.  In paragraph ten, 
he has included inadmissible hearsay ("I was told") from an unidentified 
source.  As our precedent makes 
clear, for an expert's affidavit to meet W.R.C.P. 56(e)'s requirements, it must 
state in detail what Ms. Bangs' medical condition and problems were, what 
actions a physician in good standing in the community would undertake under 
similar circumstances, and what actions were taken by the physicians in 
question.  If we do not know these 
matters, we cannot determine whether the physicians in question acted in 
accordance with the prevailing standard of care as they claim to have done.  The district court erred when it did not 
strike Dr. Bricca's affidavit.  

 
 
[¶27]   Finally, we examine Dr. Bossart's 
affidavit.  Dr. Bossart 
states:

 
 
1.         
I am a colorectal surgeon, residing near, and practicing in Salt Lake 
City, Utah.

 
 
2.         
I am familiar with the standard of care applicable to colorectal surgeons 
practicing nationally as well as in the State of Utah.

 
 
3.         
A copy of my Curriculum Vitae is attached to this Affidavit and fully 
sets out my training and experience in the field of colorectal 
surgery.

 
 
4.         
I am familiar with the applicable standards of care for colon problems 
such as Brenda Bangs suffered during her pregnancy.

 
 
6. 
[sic] In preparation for my opinions, I have reviewed the 
following:

            
A.        LDS 
Hospital medical records for Brenda Bangs for her hospitalization of August 10, 
2000, through September 10, 2000.

            
B.        St. 
John's Hospital medical records for Brenda Bangs for her hospitalization from 
August 8, 2000[,] through August 10, 2000.

            
C.        
Medical records pertaining to Brenda Bangs from my own office 
chart.

 
 
7.         
I am aware of the standard of care for colorectal surgeons performing the 
type of care rendered by myself to Brenda Bangs during her pregnancy in 
2000.

 
 
8.         
After reviewing the materials listed above, it is my opinion, to a 
reasonable degree of medical probability, that I acted within the applicable 
standard of care relative to the care rendered to Brenda Bangs in July and 
August of 2000, when she was transferred to LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City for 
care throughout the remainder of her pregnancy.  My opinion is based upon my experience, 
training, and review of the medical records. 

 
 
9.         
In July of 2000, I received a letter of referral from Dr. Bricca for 
Brenda Bangs and subsequently saw her in my office on one occasion.  On August 8, 2000, colonoscopy was 
performed by George Waterhouse, M.D., at St. John's Hospital, with a diagnosis 
of fulminant ulcerative colitis.  On 
August 10, 2000, Brenda Bangs was transferred to LDS Hospital in the care of 
Bill Hudson, M.D., gastroenterologist.  
She was seen in consultation by myself and Joe Eyring, M.D., as well as 
the perinatology service at the University of Utah Medical Center.  On August 18, 2000, Brenda underwent a 
Cesarean section delivery of her child prior to a total colectomy.  Brenda's medical records indicate that 
prior to the Cesarean delivery of the baby, the perinatologist who evaluated 
Brenda found indications that the baby appeared to be in distress.  

 
 
11. 
[sic] I am of the opinion, which I hold to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability, that the cause of Brenda Bangs' pregnancy complications which 
necessitated the preterm delivery of her child and her numerous subsequent 
surgical procedures, was toxic megacolon secondary to chronic ulcerative 
colitis, and were in no way preventable by myself.

 
 
11.       It is 
further my opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that no 
action or inaction on my part caused or contributed to Brenda Bangs' pregnancy 
complications, need for surgeries related to her ulcerative colitis, or present 
condition.

 
 
[¶28]   Dr. Bossart's affidavit suffers 
from the same defects present in Dr. Bricca's affidavit.  He fails to state the standard of care 
applicable to colorectal surgeons practicing nationally as well as in the State 
of Utah in paragraph two and the applicable standard of care for colon problems 
such as Ms Bangs suffered during her pregnancy in paragraphs four and 
seven.  He fails to state specific 
facts concerning Ms. Bangs' medical problems and his treatment of those 
problems; instead, he merely makes categorical assertions and states bald 
conclusions.  He fails to attach the 
medical records to which he refers and also fails to attach a copy of his 
curriculum vitae to which he refers.  
He fails to attach a letter from Dr. Bricca to which he refers in 
paragraph nine.  The district court 
erred when it did not strike Dr. Bossart's affidavit.

 
 
[¶29]   Because the affidavits of Mr. 
Schroth, Dr. Bricca, and Dr. Bossart were legally insufficient under W.R.C.P. 
56(e), Ms. Bangs was entitled to rest upon the allegations contained in her 
complaint.  In the absence of 
legally sufficient supporting affidavits, the motion for summary judgment must 
be confined to a decision under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), dismissal for failure to 
state a claim.  Greenwood, 741 P.2d  at 1086; Landmark, Inc. v. Stockmen's Bank 
& Trust Co., 680 P.2d 471, 473-75 
(Wyo. 1984).  Although we are 
prepared to hold that Ms. Bangs' complaint states causes of action in all counts 
except the claim of deceit under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-5-114, Mr. Schroth 
contends that, in regard to Ms. Bangs' negligent misrepresentation claim, Mr. 
Schroth's alleged misrepresentations are non-actionable statements of future 
intention as recognized in Birt v. Wells 
Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶¶ 47-48, 75 P.3d 640, 657-58 (Wyo. 
2003).  Because we have struck Mr. 
Schroth's several legally insufficient affidavits and Ms. Bangs had no 
obligation to file opposing evidentiary material, the cold record before us is 
in no condition to support Mr. Schroth's argument on this point.  Precisely ascertaining whether a 
statement is one of present fact or future intention is often a difficult task 
even on a complete record.  Here, 
the full evidence of the conversations between Ms. Bangs and Mr. Schroth remains 
to be developed on the record.  That 
record development may well reveal what statements were made by Mr. Schroth and 
how Ms. Bangs as the recipient reasonably understood them under the 
circumstances.  As the matter 
presently stands, we feel the better course is to remand on the negligent 
misrepresentation claim so that full discovery may take place and the record 
fully developed.

 
 
[¶30]   We now turn to Ms. Bangs' claim of 
deceit under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-5-114 and whether it is vulnerable to 
dismissal under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  

 
 

Deceit 
Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-5-114

 
 
[¶31]   The Wyoming Legislature has 
provided:

 
 
            
An attorney and counselor who is guilty of deceit or collusion, or 
consents thereto, with intent to deceive a court or judge, or a party to an 
action or proceeding, or brings suit or commences proceedings without authority 
therefore, is liable to be disbarred, and shall forfeit to the injured party 
treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action. 

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 33-5-114 (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶32]   In order to determine whether Ms. 
Bangs' averments about Mr. Schroth's conduct fit the statutory language, we must 
apply our well-established standard of review applicable to statutory 
language.  That standard 
is:

 
 
"Questions 
of statutory interpretation are matters of law."  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep't of 
Revenue, 2007 WY 43, ¶ 10, 154 P.3d 331, 334 (Wyo. 2007), citing Powder River Coal Co. v. Wyo. Dept. of 
Revenue, 2006 WY 137, ¶ 9, 145 P.3d 442, 446 (Wyo. 2006).  In interpreting statutes, our task is to 
give effect to the legislature's intent.  
We look first to the plain meaning of the language chosen by the 
legislature and apply that meaning if the language is clear and 
unambiguous.  "A statute is clear 
and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree 
on its meaning with consistency and predictability."  RME Petroleum Co. v. Wyo. Dep't of 
Revenue, 2007 WY 16, ¶ 25, 150 P.3d 673, 683 (Wyo. 2007).  "All statutes must be construed in pari materia; and in ascertaining the 
meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the 
same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony."  State ex rel. Dep't of Revenue v. UPRC, 
2003 WY 54, ¶ 12, 67 P.3d 1176, 1182 (Wyo. 2003).  See also, Lance Oil & Gas Co. v. Wyo. 
Dep't of Revenue, 2004 WY 156, ¶ 4, 101 P.3d 899, 902 (Wyo. 2004).  If, however, the wording of a statute is 
ambiguous or capable of varying interpretations, we employ well-accepted rules 
of statutory construction.  Chevron, ¶ 10, 154 P.3d  at 
334.

 
 

State 
Dep't of Corrections v. Watts, 
2008 WY 19, ¶ 13, 177 P.3d 793, 796 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶33]   As we read the language of this 
statute, our attention focuses on the words "with intent to deceive . . . a 
party to an action or proceeding . . . ."  
We hold that those words are clear and unambiguous and their meaning is 
that the alleged deceit must occur in the context of an existing judicial action 
or proceeding.  Other jurisdictions 
interpreting similarly worded statutory language have reached the same 
conclusion.  See, e.g., Baker v. Bloetz, 616 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. 2000), and cases cited therein.  
Because Ms. Bangs' averments in her complaint make clear that Mr. 
Schroth's alleged conduct did not occur when she was a party to an existing 
judicial action or proceeding, her claim under § 33-5-114 fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, and we dismiss that claim under W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6).

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶34]   We reverse the summary judgment in 
favor of Mr. Schroth on all claims except the claim of deceit under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 33-5-114, which claim is dismissed under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  We remand the case to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Ulcerative colitis (UC) is a disease in which the lining of the colon 
(the large intestine) becomes inflamed.  
The immune system inappropriately targets the lining of the colon, 
causing inflammation, ulceration, bleeding and diarrhea.  The inflammation almost always affects 
the rectum and lower part of the colon, but it can also affect the entire 
colon.  Patients with severe 
ulcerative colitis usually have a large region of the colon involved, often the 
entire colon.  Symptoms of severe 
ulcerative colitis include frequent loose stools (more than 10 per day), severe 
abdominal cramps, fever, dehydration, and significant bleeding, frequently 
leading to anemia.  Severe 
ulcerative colitis can lead to rapid weight loss.  Fulminant ulcerative colitis is a 
worsening of severe ulcerative colitis that causes a high white blood cell 
count, loss of appetite, and severe abdominal pain.  See 
http://www.uptodate.com/patients/index.html and enter fulminant ulcerative 
colitis in the search box.

 
 

2Under 
W.R.C.P. 54(b), the district court's order adjudicated fewer than all of Ms. 
Bangs' claims and was not, therefore, a final, appealable 
order.