Title: L.A. Unified School District v. Superior Court

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 
Respondent; 
JANE DOE, 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
S269608 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Three 
B307389 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC659059 
 
 
June 1, 2023 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Evans concurred. 
 
1 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
SUPERIOR COURT 
S269608 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
Some statutory schemes provide for the recovery of treble 
damages, meaning that actual compensatory damages awarded 
to a prevailing plaintiff are multiplied by three.  Here we 
consider a statute that, as recently amended by the Legislature, 
provides for up to treble damages when a plaintiff suing in tort 
for childhood sexual assault proves that the assault “was as the 
result of a cover up” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (b)(1) 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as section 340.1(b)(1))) by the 
defendant, with a “ ‘cover up’ ” being defined as “a concerted 
effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault” (id., 
subd. (b)(2)).  The specific issue before us is whether enhanced 
damages can be awarded under section 340.1(b)(1) against a 
public entity named as a defendant in a lawsuit for childhood 
sexual assault, or whether such awards are prohibited under 
Government Code section 818 (hereinafter sometimes referred 
to as section 818), a provision within the Government Claims 
Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), which specifies in relevant part 
that a public entity may not be held liable in tort for “damages 
imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of 
punishing the defendant.”  (§ 818.) 
The Court of Appeal below determined that section 818 
shields public entities from liability for enhanced damages 
under section 340.1(b)(1).  Based on our review of both 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
provisions, we agree with the Court of Appeal.  We therefore 
affirm the judgment.   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The following facts are taken from the first amended 
complaint (hereinafter, complaint) and are assumed true in 
light of this case’s procedural posture.  (See Turman v. Turning 
Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) 
Real party in interest and plaintiff below Jane Doe 
(hereinafter, plaintiff) was a student at Daniel Pearl Magnet 
High School, operated by petitioner and defendant below Los 
Angeles Unified School District (the District).  Daniel Garcia 
was an employee at the school when plaintiff enrolled in the 
ninth grade for the 2014–2015 academic year.  Garcia began to 
give special attention to plaintiff.  He acted affectionately 
toward her at school, rubbing her legs and holding her hand.  
Garcia also sent plaintiff flirtatious and sexual text messages.1  
In November 2014, Garcia sexually assaulted plaintiff.  Plaintiff 
later told her parents about Garcia’s actions.  Her parents 
immediately contacted the police.  In May 2016, Garcia was 
arrested and charged with criminal offenses associated with his 
misconduct. 
 
1  
The complaint also describes Garcia’s improper conduct 
toward other female students at Jane Doe’s high school, 
including an allegation that a student complained to the school’s 
administration that Garcia had inappropriately touched her.  
Despite this misbehavior, the complaint alleges, Garcia was 
allowed to remain employed at the school, and “to continue his 
grooming conduct directed at Plaintiff, and . . . to sexually abuse 
her.”   
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
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3 
Before these events occurred, the District had learned in 
February 2014 that Garcia — who at the time worked as an aide 
at a different school — was involved in a “boyfriend-girlfriend” 
relationship with another female student, H.M.  According to 
the complaint, this relationship began while Garcia was 
employed by the District.  The District did not fire Garcia upon 
learning of this relationship, but instead transferred him to the 
high school where he would encounter plaintiff.  The District 
also created a false report stating that Garcia and H.M. had met 
and dated before Garcia’s employment with the District 
commenced.  The complaint alleges that this falsehood 
represented “an effort to cover-up Garcia’s prior sexual assault 
of minor female students within the” District and resulted in the 
sexual assault of plaintiff later that same year. 
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims for sexual abuse, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and sexual 
harassment against Garcia.  Against the District, plaintiff 
advances various negligence theories and a claim for failing to 
report suspected child abuse.  In addition to economic and 
noneconomic damages, plaintiff seeks punitive and exemplary 
damages from Garcia and an award of up to treble damages 
under section 340.1(b)(1) from the District. 
The District brought a motion to strike the portions of the 
complaint reciting allegations of a cover up, as well as the 
request for up to treble damages.  The District argued that the 
allegations and request should be stricken pursuant to 
section 818.  The superior court denied the motion.  It concluded 
from the legislative history before it that section 340.1(b)(1)’s 
treble damages provision was intended to be compensatory, not 
punitive. 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
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4 
The District then sought writ relief from the Court of 
Appeal.  After issuing an order to show cause, the Court of 
Appeal granted the writ petition and directed the trial court to 
enter an order granting the District’s motion to strike the treble 
damages request and related allegations.  (Los Angeles Unified 
School Dist. v. Superior Court (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 549, 567 
(Los Angeles Unified School Dist.).) 
In granting the petition, the Court of Appeal determined 
that section 818 protects public entities from the imposition of 
enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1).  The Court of 
Appeal reasoned that because plaintiffs suing for childhood 
sexual assault should receive full compensation for their injuries 
in any event should they prevail at trial, the additional damages 
authorized under section 340.1(b)(1) are primarily punitive and 
thus cannot be assessed against a public entity.  (Los Angeles 
Unified School Dist., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 561–562.)  
According to the Court of Appeal, plaintiff had not articulated 
“any injury from a childhood sexual assault or coverup for which 
normal tort damages fail to provide full compensation” (id. at 
p. 561), and the court itself had not identified any harm that 
might be uncompensated or undercompensated without a 
damages enhancement (ibid.).  As for any other nonpunitive 
purpose that might exist, the Court of Appeal rejected the notion 
that the treble damages provision could be characterized as 
nonpunitive because the possibility of enhanced damages might 
incentivize lawsuits by victims of childhood sexual assaults.  (Id. 
at p. 566.)  Summing up, the Court of Appeal explained that 
“The treble damages provision in [Code of Civil Procedure] 
section 340.1 does not have a compensatory function; its primary 
purpose is to punish past childhood sexual abuse coverups to 
deter future ones.  While this is a worthy public policy objective, 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
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5 
it is not one for which the state has waived sovereign immunity 
under the Government Claims Act.”  (Id. at p. 567.) 
We granted review.  Since that time, other Courts of 
Appeal also have determined that enhanced damages under 
section 340.1(b)(1) are not recoverable against public entities.  
The appellate court in X.M. v. Superior Court (2021) 
68 Cal.App.5th 1014, review granted December 1, 2021, 
S271478 (X.M.) opined that “[i]t is the rare treble damages 
provision that isn’t primarily designed to punish and deter 
misconduct” (id. at pp. 1019–1020) and “treble damages will be 
considered punitive when they apply to intentional misconduct 
or morally offensive behavior, and the Legislature has not 
clearly indicated an additional, compensatory purpose” (id. at 
p. 1024).  Regarding section 340.1(b)(1) specifically, the court 
concluded that “the primary purpose of section 340.1’s treble 
damages provision is punitive because it was designed to deter 
future cover ups by punishing past ones,” with “the economic 
and noneconomic damages available under general tort 
principles . . . already [being] designed to make childhood sexual 
assault victims whole — both for the physical and emotional 
harm from the abuse itself, as well as for any additional 
emotional harm from learning the abuse was the result of a 
cover up.”  (X.M., at p. 1019.)  The court in X.M. regarded 
section 818 as foreclosing application of section 340.1(b)(1) even 
if enhanced damages might confer additional compensation 
upon victims of childhood sexual assault or provide an incentive 
for these individuals to bring lawsuits.  (X.M., at pp. 1026‒
1030.)  Despite such possibilities, the court determined, 
“nothing in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 340.1 or its 
legislative history convinces us the Legislature intended the 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
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6 
increased award to be more compensatory (or incentivizing) 
than deterrent.”  (Id. at p. 1020; see also id. at pp. 1027, 1030.)   
Even more recently, the court in K.M. v. Grossmont Union 
High School Dist. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 717 also concluded that 
section 818 precludes the application of section 340.1(b)(1) to 
public entities.  (K.M., at p. 742.)  The K.M. court’s reasoning 
generally aligned with that of the X.M. court and the Court of 
Appeal below.  (Id. at pp. 742–750.)  
II.  DISCUSSION 
In deciding the issue before us, we first examine the 
language 
of 
and 
rationales 
behind 
Government 
Code 
section 818, as well as our case law applying this provision.  We 
then turn to 
section 340.1(b)(1) 
and 
consider whether 
section 818 prohibits an award of enhanced damages under this 
provision against a public entity, and we conclude that the 
answer is yes.   
A.  Government Code Section 818 
Our first task is to identify the kinds of damages awards 
to which section 818 applies.  Plaintiff argues that this provision 
prohibits only the imposition of damages that are “simply and 
solely punitive.”  (People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 
16 Cal.3d 30, 39 (Younger).)  We conclude that section 818 is not 
so limited, and instead immunizes public entities from damages 
awarded under Civil Code section 3294 and from other damages 
that would function, in essence, as an award of punitive or 
exemplary damages.   
1. Statutory Language and Purpose 
Government Code section 818 provides, in full, as follows:  
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is 
not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of 
example and by way of punishing the defendant.”2   
To ascertain this provision’s reach, we follow our well-
established principles of statutory interpretation.  “ ‘ “When we 
interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine 
the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.  We 
first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and 
commonsense meaning.  We do not examine that language in 
isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a 
whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to 
harmonize the various parts of the enactment.  If the language 
is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a 
literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the 
Legislature did not intend.  If the statutory language permits 
more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider 
other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and 
public policy.’  [Citation.]  ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of 
a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory 
scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, 
phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the 
legislative purpose.’ ” ’ ”  (Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, 
LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 844, 856–857.) 
 
2  
Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) provides, “In an 
action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, 
where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the 
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover 
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the 
defendant.” 
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8 
Government Code section 818 clearly shields public 
entities from punitive damages, which are also sometimes 
referred to as exemplary damages.  Punitive damages are 
distinct from compensatory damages.  While compensatory 
damages “ ‘are intended to redress the concrete loss that the 
plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful 
conduct,’ ” punitive damages “ ‘operate as “private fines” 
intended to punish the defendant and to deter future 
wrongdoing.’ ”  (Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. (2016) 
63 Cal.4th 363, 371; see also State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. 
Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 416 [differentiating 
between compensatory damages and punitive damages].)  The 
California Law Revision Commission comment to section 818 
corroborates this reading of the statute, explaining that “[t]his 
section exempts public entities from liability for punitive or 
exemplary damages.”  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32 pt. 1 
West’s Ann. Gov. Code (2012 ed.) foll. § 818, p. 322.)3   
 
3  
In enacting this statute, the Legislature apparently 
recognized that although punitive and exemplary damages are 
“imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of 
punishing the defendant” (§ 818), they also could be perceived 
as having additional, secondary functions.  (Accord, Hofer v. 
Lavender (Tex. 1984) 679 S.W.2d 470, 474–475 [reviewing 
different purposes that courts have assigned to awards of 
punitive damages]; Perry v. Melton (W.Va. 1982) 299 S.E.2d 8, 
12–13 [describing various interests served by punitive 
damages]; Walker v. Sheldon (N.Y. 1961) 179 N.E.2d 497, 498 
[noting that the possibility of a punitive damages award “may 
not infrequently induce the victim, otherwise unwilling to 
proceed because of the attendant trouble and expense, to take 
action against the wrongdoer”].)  Although we had previously 
described punitive damages as being awarded “purely as 
 
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9 
Yet section 818’s plain language also establishes that its 
prohibition can extend to more than just what are 
conventionally referred to as “punitive damages.”  In providing 
that “a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under 
Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed 
primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the 
defendant” (§ 818, italics added), the statute, with its focus on 
the practical operation of a damages provision, conveys that it 
also captures other kinds of damages when they function, in 
essence, as awards of punitive or exemplary damages. 
This interpretation of section 818 comports with the 
history behind this provision and the role it plays within the 
statutory scheme.  The majority rule in the United States long 
has been that public entities are not liable for punitive damages 
arising out of the acts or omissions of their employees, at least 
without a clear expression of contrary legislative intent.  (See, 
e.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. (1981) 453 U.S. 247, 259–
261; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases (1931) 44 Harv. 
L.Rev. 1173, 1204.)  This rule has been premised on various 
policy rationales, including a sense that “[t]he money in the 
[public] treasury is derived from the pockets of taxpayers who 
have comparatively little to say about the actual management 
of the [public] corporation’s business.  It is not likely that the 
political employee will be punished when the power of punishing 
him is in the hands of his political patron, because of the 
outcome of a damage suit against the city.  Assessment of 
punitive damages against a city would probably impoverish the 
 
punishment and by way of example” (Gudarov v. Hadjieff (1952) 
38 Cal.2d 412, 417), the Legislature was free to incorporate a 
different understanding of these damages into section 818. 
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10 
public treasury without serving the admonitory function.”  
(Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, at p. 1204; see also Newport, 
at pp. 266–271 [detailing the policies that counsel against 
allowing punitive damages against municipalities]; City of 
Sanger v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 444, 450 
[“Requiring . . . public entit[ies] to pay punitive damages would 
punish the very group imposition of punitive damages was 
intended to benefit”]; City of Gary v. Falcone (Ind.Ct.App. 1976) 
348 N.E.2d 41, 42 [reciting explanations for the general rule 
that public entities are immune from punitive damages].)  The 
disinclination to subject public entities to punitive and 
exemplary damages has extended to treble damages in 
circumstances where these damages are imbued with a 
sufficiently exemplary character.  (See, e.g., Hunt v. City of 
Boonville (1877) 65 Mo. 620, 624–625; cf. Newport, at p. 261 
[discussing Hunt].)4   
We read section 818 as codifying this common law rule.  
The Government Claims Act as a whole reflects an awareness 
that although tort claims can draw from public coffers and may 
impose additional burdens on taxpayers, to the extent these 
awards are necessary to compensate plaintiffs with meritorious 
claims for their injuries, they simply reflect the loss-distributing 
function of tort law at work.  (See Recommendation Relating to 
Sovereign Immunity, No. 1 — Tort Liability of Public Entities 
and Public Employees (Jan. 1963) 4 Cal. Law Revision Com. 
 
4  
We note that “exemplary” damages are sometimes framed 
by statute as a multiple of actual damages incurred, whether 
the multiplier serves as a base (e.g., Civ. Code, §§ 891, subd. (a), 
1695.7, 2945.6, subd. (a)), ceiling (e.g., id., § 3426.3, subd. (c)), or 
amount (e.g., id., § 3336.5, subd. (b)) of the “exemplary” damages 
that can be recovered.   
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11 
Rep. (1963) pp. 810, 817.)  Section 818, however, manifests an 
appreciation that when additional impositions upon a public 
entity are “primarily for the sake of example and by way of 
punishing the defendant” (ibid.), they further drain the public 
fisc, create a liability that will be borne not by the immediate 
wrongdoers but by taxpayers, and may not effectively achieve 
the goals of retribution and deterrence — and for these reasons, 
such awards should not be permitted, at least without a clear 
indication by the Legislature that they may be imposed.  As the 
California Law Revision Commission explained in its report 
transmitting the proposed law to the Legislature, “Public 
entities should not be liable for punitive or exemplary damages.  
Such damages are imposed to punish a defendant for 
oppression, fraud, or malice.  They are inappropriate where a 
public entity is involved, since they would fall upon the innocent 
taxpayers.”  (Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 
at p. 817; cf. Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 1164, 1196, fn. 20 (Wells) [describing “the purpose 
behind the statutory ban on punitive damages against public 
entities” as “to protect their tax-funded revenues from legal 
judgments in amounts beyond those strictly necessary to 
recompense the injured party”]; accord, Paulson v. County of De 
Kalb (Ill.App.Ct. 1994) 644 N.E.2d 37, 40 [construing Illinois 
law as prohibiting the imposition of treble damages on a public 
entity].)5   
 
5  
Whether this court would agree or disagree with these 
policy arguments if presented to us as a matter of first 
impression is of no consequence; what matters here is that the 
Legislature apparently endorsed this reasoning when it enacted 
what is now known as the Government Claims Act.   
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2. Case Law Construing Government Code Section 818 
Section 818 therefore conveys that a damages provision 
cannot be applied against a public entity if it functions, in 
essence, as an award of punitive or exemplary damages.  Yet, 
except for its reference to Civil Code section 3294, the statute 
does not explain how punitive and exemplary damages are to be 
distinguished from other kinds of awards.  Our case law 
interpreting Government Code section 818 provides insight into 
how the statute should be applied.  We glean a series of helpful 
guidelines from our prior decisions in this area, which we 
discuss next.  
In Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 
2 Cal.3d 1, we upheld the trial court’s refusal to allow a public 
entity defendant sued in tort to introduce evidence that some of 
the plaintiff’s medical bills had already been paid through 
insurance.  (Id. at pp. 4–6.)  Explaining why the trial court’s 
ruling, which implicated what is known as the “collateral 
source” rule, was consistent with section 818, we regarded the 
principle allowing plaintiffs to recover in tort against a 
defendant notwithstanding a prior first-party insurance payout 
as having “several legitimate and fully justified compensatory 
functions.”  (Helfend, at p. 13.)  Our decision in Helfend 
emphasized that “[t]he collateral source rule as applied here 
embodies the venerable concept that a person who has invested 
years of insurance premiums to assure his medical care should 
receive the benefits of his thrift.  The tortfeasor should not 
garner the benefits of his victim’s providence.”  (Id. at pp. 9–10, 
fn. omitted.)  We also reasoned that “[t]o permit the defendant 
to tell the jury that the plaintiff has been recompensed by a 
collateral source for his medical costs might irretrievably upset 
the complex, delicate, and somewhat indefinable calculations 
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13 
which result in the normal jury verdict.”  (Id. at pp. 11‒12.)  Our 
decision further explained that given the likelihood of a 
contingency fee arrangement under which a plaintiff’s recovery 
would be reduced by the amount owed to counsel, “[t]he 
collateral source rule partially serves to compensate for the 
attorney’s share and does not actually render ‘double recovery’ 
for the plaintiff” (id. at p. 12); in this respect, the rule “partially 
provides a somewhat closer approximation to full compensation 
for his injuries” (id. at p. 13).   
The next year, in State Dept. of Corrections v. Workmen’s 
Comp. App. Bd. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 885 (State Dept. of Corrections), 
we considered the relationship between Government Code 
section 818 and Labor Code section 4553.  The latter statute is 
part of the state workers’ compensation scheme, “pursuant to 
which the employer assumes liability for industrial personal 
injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for 
limitations on the amount of that liability.”  (Shoemaker v. 
Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16.)  Labor Code section 4553 provides 
that the amount recoverable as workers’ compensation for an 
accident “shall be increased one-half, together with costs and 
expenses not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250), where 
the employee is injured by reason of the serious and willful 
misconduct” of the employer.  We explained in State Dept. of 
Corrections that Labor Code section 4553 “is designed to provide 
more nearly full compensation to an injured employee rather 
than to penalize an employer.”  (State Dept. of Corrections, at 
p. 889.)  “Although an employer against whom an increased 
award is made under [Labor Code] section 4553 is penalized in 
the sense that he is required to pay a higher amount of 
compensation by reason of his serious and wilful misconduct 
than he would have been compelled to pay if his conduct were 
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less culpable,” we observed, “the employee does not receive more 
than full compensation for his injuries.  Thus the increased 
award is not a penalty in the sense of being designed primarily 
to punish the defendant rather than to more adequately 
compensate the plaintiff.”  (Id. at p. 890.)   
Our subsequent decisions addressing section 818 also 
involved contextual assessments of the particular awards under 
review.  In Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d 30, an enforcement action 
brought by the state, we assumed that section 818 was 
implicated insofar as the action was brought against a public 
entity, but held that the statute did not preclude the imposition 
of penalties to be paid into the State Water Pollution Cleanup 
and Abatement Account (Wat. Code, § 13440) and dedicated to 
the remediation of the unquantifiable harms associated with oil 
spills.  (Younger, at pp. 37–39.)  We based this conclusion on our 
determinations that these penalties “operate to more fully 
compensate the people of this state and are not beyond an 
amount equivalent to the harm done.”  (Id. at pp. 38–39; see also 
San Francisco Civil Service Assn. v. Superior Court (1976) 
16 Cal.3d 46, 50–51 (San Francisco Civil Service Assn.) 
[applying Younger’s reasoning in an action brought under 
§ 13385 of the Wat. Code, also seeking civil penalties].)   
Kizer v. County of San Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139 (Kizer) 
similarly determined that section 818 did not prevent the state 
from seeking statutory penalties from a county-run health care 
facility in an enforcement action brought under the Long-Term 
Care, Health, Safety, and Security Act of 1973 (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 1417 et seq.).  (Kizer, at pp. 145–146.)  Whereas our 
decision in Younger had assumed that a Government Code 
section 818 inquiry was implicated, in Kizer we explained that 
section 818 was simply inapplicable to the sort of enforcement 
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15 
action that was before us.  Stressing that the Government 
Claims Act is concerned with liability for claims that involve an 
“ ‘injury’ ” (Kizer, at p. 145, quoting Gov. Code, § 810.8), we 
found “nothing in the . . . Act to suggest that . . . section 818 was 
intended to apply to statutory civil penalties designed to ensure 
compliance with a detailed regulatory scheme, . . . even though 
they may have a punitive effect.”  (Kizer, at p. 146.)  
Having concluded that the Legislature did not intend for 
“the immunity created by Government Code section 818 to apply 
to statutory civil penalties expressly designed to enforce 
minimum health and safety standards” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d 
at p. 146), our opinion in Kizer then went on to explain why, in 
any event, the penalties sought in that case were not primarily 
punitive.  In this portion of our decision, we stressed that unlike 
punitive damages, the penalties at issue did not require any 
showing of actual harm, were “imposed according to a range set 
by statute irrespective of actual damage suffered,” could be 
imposed without a showing of malfeasance or state of mind 
commonly understood to be deserving of punishment, and were 
“to be applied to offset the state’s costs in enforcing the health 
and safety regulations” involved.  (Id. at p. 147.)  We determined 
that “[w]hile the civil penalties may have a punitive or deterrent 
aspect, their primary purpose is to secure obedience to statutes 
and regulations imposed to assure important public policy 
objectives” (id. at pp. 147–148), which we described as an 
essentially “preventative” function (id. at p. 148, italics 
omitted). 
These decisions, read together, establish that section 818 
requires a fact-specific inquiry concerning the damages 
provision or principle being applied.  Our cases also yield some 
guidance for this analysis.  The statutory text and basic 
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16 
objective characteristics of the award at issue provide a starting 
point.  In some situations, as with an assessment of punitive 
damages under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) at one 
extreme and the conventional imposition of actual compensatory 
damages at the other, it may easily be determined whether a 
particular award is or is not barred under Government Code 
section 818.  When further inquiry is necessary, relevant 
considerations may include, without limitation, whether the 
damages involved go beyond those necessary to fully 
compensate the plaintiff (State Dept. of Corrections, supra, 
5 Cal.3d at p. 890); whether a damages remedy functions to 
offset some otherwise applicable restriction on compensatory 
damages (id. at pp. 888–890); whether the challenged form of 
damages is conditioned on morally culpable conduct, beyond 
mere negligence (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 147); whether 
there is an element of discretion by the fact finder in the award 
of damages (ibid.); and whether in the normal course actual 
damages are likely to be difficult to establish or quantify 
(Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 37).  Whenever this inquiry 
occurs, the ultimate question remains whether, by virtue of 
being imposed “primarily for the sake of example and by way of 
punishing the defendant” (§ 818), the damages before the court 
function, in essence, as a form of punitive or exemplary 
damages. 
3. Government Code Section 818 Cannot Reasonably 
Be Construed as Concerned Only with Damages 
That Are “Simply and Solely” Punitive 
In arguing that section 818 applies only to damages 
provisions that are simply or solely punitive, plaintiff relies on 
language appearing in Younger, San Francisco Civil Service 
Assn., and Kizer.  As explained below, although plaintiff’s 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
reliance on these decisions is understandable, we conclude that 
the phrasing plaintiff focuses upon mischaracterizes the 
section 818 inquiry.  We further conclude that these decisions 
therefore must be overruled insofar as they articulate a 
standard whereby the section 818 inquiry hinges on whether a 
damages provision is deemed solely punitive in nature.  
Our analysis in Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d 30 began with 
the general observation that “[d]amages which are punitive in 
nature, but not ‘simply’ or solely punitive in that they fulfill 
‘legitimate and fully justified compensatory functions,’ have 
been held not to be punitive damages within the meaning of 
section 818 of the Government Code.”  (Id. at pp. 35‒36.)  We 
ultimately concluded “that the civil penalties imposed pursuant 
to [Water Code section 13350] are not simply and solely punitive 
in nature but fulfill legitimate compensatory functions and are 
not punitive damages within the meaning of Government Code 
section 818 so as to preclude the recovery of such moneys against 
public entities.”  (Id. at p. 39, italics added.)  In a footnote, 
Younger distinguished a federal district court decision, People ex 
rel. Cal. Reg. W. Q. C. Bd. v. Department of Navy (N.D.Cal. 1973) 
371 F.Supp. 82, by stating that the applicable federal standard 
at that time, “unlike the California standard set forth in Helfend 
and State Dept. of Corrections which provides immunity only if 
the damages are simply punitive, grants immunity to the 
federal government for damages ‘which do not merely 
compensate’ [citation], or where the ‘impact of [the] section is 
more punitive than compensatory.’ ”  (Younger, at p. 37, fn. 4.)  
We explained that “[s]ince the federal standard for ascertaining 
punitive damages for federal government immunity purposes 
varies so significantly from the California standard,” under 
which “the critical question is whether [the penalty] is simply, 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
that is solely, punitive,” the federal decision was inapposite.  
(Ibid., italics added.)   
Relying on Younger, our decision in San Francisco Civil 
Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d 46 described the section 818 
analysis as turning on whether the penalties addressed by that 
court were “simply and solely punitive in nature or fulfill 
compensatory functions so as to remove them from the class of 
punitive damages covered by section 818 of the Government 
Code.”  (San Francisco Civil Service Assn., at p. 50.)  Kizer, 
meanwhile, described the Younger approach as concerned with 
whether damages “are not simply or solely punitive in that they 
fulfill legitimate and fully justified compensatory functions.”  
(Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145.)   
Plaintiff reads Younger, San Francisco Civil Service Assn., 
and Kizer as firmly establishing that only damages that are 
“simply and solely punitive” (San Francisco Civil Service Assn., 
supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50; Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or 
“simply or solely punitive” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145) run 
afoul of section 818, and that a damages award that could 
operate to incentivize lawsuits, offset or provide redress for 
otherwise uncompensated harms or expenditures, or advance 
some other policy goal does not meet this standard.  As plaintiff 
puts it, “damages which are punitive in nature but also aim to 
more fully compensate the victim or encourage victims to bring 
civil actions or otherwise achieve a non-punitive public policy 
objective are not solely punitive and thus fall outside of the 
ambit of Government Code section 818.” 
There are multiple problems with this interpretation of 
the statute.  Among them, it collides headlong with the text of 
section 818 providing that “a public entity is not liable for 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other 
damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way 
of punishing the defendant.”  (Italics added.)  “Primarily” (ibid.) 
on the one hand, and “simply and solely” (San Francisco Civil 
Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50; Younger, supra, 
16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or “simply or solely” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d 
at p. 145) on the other, carry substantially different meanings, 
and the Legislature’s use of the former term within section 818 
communicates that the statute extends to damages that may 
have secondary functions beyond punishment and the setting of 
an example.   
Indeed, no form of damages — not even punitive damages 
awarded under Civil Code section 3294 — would qualify as 
“simply and solely punitive” (San Francisco Civil Service Assn., 
supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50; Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or 
“simply or solely punitive” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145) 
under the standard plaintiff asks us to endorse.  Some kind of 
assertedly nonpunitive function can always be hypothesized for 
any award of damages, whether it be the incentivization of 
lawsuits by holding out the prospect of a larger return, the 
recovery of expenditures on attorney fees or litigation expenses, 
or something else.  The language of section 818 appears to 
recognize the possibility that such secondary functions might be 
assigned even to conventional punitive damages.  To stay true 
to the Legislature’s intent, then, the standard announced in 
Younger, San Francisco Civil Service Assn., and Kizer cannot 
supply the test for applying section 818.  A contrary approach 
would 
artificially 
and 
drastically 
limit 
this 
section’s 
applicability in a manner inconsistent with its language and 
evident purpose.  
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
The decisions upon which plaintiff relies also include 
express qualifications that damages will not be regarded as 
simply or solely punitive when they “fulfill compensatory 
functions” (San Francisco Civil Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d 
at p. 50) or “they fulfill legitimate and fully justified 
compensatory functions” (Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145; see 
also Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 35‒36).  Charitably read, 
these qualifications could bring the standards articulated in 
Younger, San Francisco Civil Service Assn., and Kizer closer to 
conformity with section 818.  On balance, however, we find it 
necessary to foreclose future invocation of language so clearly at 
odds with that of the statute it purports to apply.  We therefore 
overrule People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court, supra, 
16 Cal.3d 30; San Francisco Civil Service Assn. v. Superior 
Court, supra, 16 Cal.3d 46; and Kizer v. County of San Mateo, 
supra, 53 Cal.3d 139 insofar as these decisions articulate a 
standard whereby the section 818 inquiry hinges on whether a 
damages provision is deemed simply and solely, or simply or 
solely, punitive.  To repeat, the test under section 818 is whether 
damages would be awarded under Civil Code section 3294, or 
would otherwise be “imposed primarily for the sake of example 
and by way of punishing the defendant” (Gov. Code, § 818) such 
that they would function, in essence, as punitive or exemplary 
damages.6 
 
6  
In concluding that the state’s Uninsured Employers Fund 
(UEF) was not liable for penalties under Labor Code 
section 5814 for unreasonable delay in the payment of workers’ 
compensation, our decision in DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals 
Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382 referenced Government Code 
section 818 and explained that “[i]n light of the partially penal 
 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
Plaintiff’s other arguments in favor of a narrow reading of 
section 818 fare no better.  She argues that our construction of 
this section should be informed by the United States Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of language within the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq.) providing that the federal 
government is not liable for “punitive damages” (id., § 2674).  
The high court has construed this term as it appears within the 
Federal Tort Claims Act as bearing its “widely accepted 
common-law meaning” — and not as connoting “ ‘damages 
awards that may have a punitive effect.’ ”  (Molzof v. United 
States (1992) 502 U.S. 301, 306.)  Plaintiff also argues that 
textual clues within section 818 and elsewhere in the 
Government Claims Act convey the Legislature’s intent to 
prohibit only a limited array of damages.  Specifically, plaintiff 
assigns significance to section 818’s repetition of the “for the 
sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant” 
language appearing in Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), 
and to a reference within Government Code section 825, part of 
the Government Claims Act that is concerned with the payment 
 
nature of [Labor Code] section 5814, we believe that application 
of the statutory penalty provision to the UEF is not permitted, 
absent express legislative authorization.”  (DuBois, at p. 398.)  
At oral argument, counsel for the District asserted that this 
discussion in DuBois manifested an understanding regarding 
Government Code section 818’s purview, i.e., that section 818 
applies to damages awards that are at least partially penal.  It 
is not clear whether this passage in DuBois, read in context, 
carries this implication.  In any event, our decision today makes 
clear the standard for determining whether section 818 
precludes the imposition of damages upon a public entity is 
whether the award would function, in essence, as an award of 
punitive or exemplary damages, and we reject any contrary 
approach. 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
of judgments, that describes section 818 as concerned with 
“punitive damages.”  (Gov. Code, § 825, subd. (e).) 
These arguments do not persuade us to interpret 
section 818 as applicable to only a subset of the damages awards 
captured by its language and rationale.  Whatever the scope of 
the Federal Tort Claims Act’s prohibition on punitive damages 
may be — an issue we need not delve into here — it is the 
language of section 818, read in context, and not the federal 
statute that provides the touchstone for our analysis.  Likewise, 
the evident import of section 818 is not altered by the fact that 
it incorporates certain language from Civil Code section 3294, 
subdivision (a), or that another provision within the 
Government Claims Act describes Government Code section 818 
as applicable to “punitive damages.”  (Gov. Code, § 825, 
subd. (e).)  This borrowing and reference are consistent with our 
interpretation of section 818, and do not convey a legislative 
intent that this section should be interpreted in a manner that 
would be inconsistent with its plain language and fail to fully 
vindicate its apparent goals.  
B.  Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 
Having determined that in enacting Government Code 
section 818 the Legislature intended to shield public entities 
from damages under Civil Code section 3294 and damages that 
function, in essence, as punitive or exemplary damages, we now 
apply 
this 
standard 
to 
Code 
of 
Civil 
Procedure 
section 340.1(b)(1). 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
1. The Enhanced Damages Authorized by 
Section 340.1(b)(1) Amount to Punitive Damages for 
Purposes of Section 818 
Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1 is, for the most part, 
a statute of limitations.  We have described “the intent that 
illuminates section 340.1 as a whole” as an aim “to expand the 
ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold to account 
individuals and entities responsible for their injuries.”  (Doe v. 
City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 536.)  Since its original 
enactment in 1986 (Stats. 1986, ch. 914, § 1, pp. 3165–3166), the 
statute has been amended on multiple occasions to extend the 
filing periods for claims alleging childhood sexual assault and 
revive otherwise time-barred claims.   
One such amendment occurred through the enactment of 
Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 
No. 218) in 2019.  (Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1.)  This revision made 
several changes to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.  Among 
these adjustments, Assembly Bill No. 218 extended the time for 
filing claims for childhood sexual assault (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 340.1, subds. (a), (c)) and created a revival window for lapsed 
claims (id., subd. (q)), which included relief from the claim 
presentation deadlines within the Government Claims Act.  
(Gov. Code, § 905 et seq.)  The 2019 amendment also revised 
section 340.1(b)(1) to provide that in an action seeking damages 
suffered due to childhood sexual assault, “a person who is 
sexually assaulted and proves it was as the result of a cover up 
may recover up to treble damages against a defendant who is 
found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor, unless 
prohibited by another law.”  (Ibid., as amended by Stats. 2019, 
ch. 861, § 1.) 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
Our application of section 818 to section 340.1(b)(1) begins 
with the obvious fact that the latter statute provides for an 
award of up to treble damages.  While not dispositive, the fact 
that it is a treble damages provision before us is nonetheless 
significant.  This court and others have frequently characterized 
treble damages as exemplary or punitive.  (Scholes v. Lambirth 
Trucking Co. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1094, 1108 [“Many states, 
including California, ‘provide[d] for exemplary damages in the 
form of double or treble damages, or penalties, for the unlawful 
cutting of timber on the land of another or on public land’ ”]; 
Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 
394 [“Treble damages are punitive in nature”]; Harris v. Capital 
Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1172 [describing 
the treble damages authorized by Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (a) for a 
denial of civil rights as “an exemplary award” that “reveals a 
desire to punish intentional and morally offensive conduct”]; 
Circle Oaks Sales Co. v. Smith (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 682, 684–
685 [“a treble damages award is punitive in nature, imposed as 
punishment against the defendant, rather than compensation to 
the plaintiff”].)  In adding the treble damages provision to 
section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Legislature 
presumably was aware of our prior decisions so characterizing 
treble damages and understood that the provision could be 
perceived similarly.  (See Harris, at p. 1155 [courts “generally 
presume the Legislature is aware of appellate court decisions”].)  
Moreover, in authorizing damages that, by definition, may go 
well beyond those necessary to provide full compensation for a 
plaintiff’s legally recoverable actual damages, treble damages 
provisions such as the one before us implicate a central concern 
behind section 818:  the protection of “tax-funded revenues from 
legal judgments in amounts beyond those strictly necessary to 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
25 
recompense the injured party.”  (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
p. 1196, fn. 20.)   
Yet we have also suggested that treble damages may serve 
nonpunitive purposes, as well.  (See, e.g., Miller v. Municipal 
Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 839 [favorably referencing case law 
that described a treble damages provision within a federal 
statute as having a remedial component].)  Similarly, other 
courts have determined that particular treble damages 
provisions, understood in their respective statutory contexts, 
possess an essentially remedial or otherwise nonpunitive 
character.  (See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 
Inc. (1977) 429 U.S. 477, 486 [explaining that § 4(a) of the 
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15(a)) “is designed primarily as a 
remedy”].)  Therefore, the fact that we are concerned here with 
a treble damages provision, though significant, is not conclusive 
on the characterization question.  (Accord, Alea London Ltd. v. 
American Home Services, Inc. (11th Cir. 2011) 638 F.3d 768, 777 
(Alea London Ltd.) [“Whether treble damages under a given 
statute are considered compensatory or punitive is an intensely 
fact-based inquiry that may vary statute-to-statute”]; see also 
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book (2003) 538 U.S. 401, 405 
[noting that the high court’s precedents “have placed different 
statutory treble-damages provisions on different points along 
the spectrum between purely compensatory and strictly 
punitive awards”]; Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler 
(2003) 538 U.S. 119, 130 [observing that with treble damages 
provisions, “the tipping point between payback and punishment 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
26 
defies general formulation, being dependent on the workings of 
a particular statute and the course of particular litigation”].)7 
Therefore, we undertake a closer examination of 
section 340.1(b)(1).  In doing so, we assign some significance to 
the fact that section 340.1(b)(1) provides for up to treble 
damages “unless prohibited by another law.”  This caveat is 
reasonably read as having section 818 in mind.  Plaintiff has not 
identified any law other than section 818 that this language 
plausibly might be referring to, and even if there is such a 
statute, section 818 is clearly “another law” that could function 
 
7  
Courts have wrestled with the categorization of treble 
damages in a variety of situations.  Classification issues have 
arisen not only when a public entity claims immunity from 
treble damages on the ground that they are tantamount to 
punitive damages, but also in other contexts, including when it 
is claimed that allowing both treble damages and punitive 
damages would amount to an impermissible double recovery 
(e.g., Marshall v. Brown (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 408, 419); that a 
reference to punitive or exemplary damages in an agreement 
implicitly includes treble damages (e.g., Alea London Ltd., 
supra, 638 F.3d at pp. 776–777); or that treble damages require 
the same malice or malfeasance that is demanded for an award 
of punitive damages (e.g., District Cablevision Ltd. v. Bassin 
(D.C. 2003) 828 A.2d 714, 727).   
In each of these scenarios, the classification analysis has 
been framed by the statutory scheme or common law principles 
involved and the precise legal issue presented.  The outcome of 
these inquiries may depend on whether a provision is regarded 
as entirely, primarily, or only partially punitive in nature.  
These subtleties make it conceivable that a particular treble 
damages remedy will be regarded as sufficiently punitive to 
trigger some consequence, but not so thoroughly punitive as to 
bring about another. 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
27 
to prohibit damages under section 340.1(b)(1) in an appropriate 
case.  Although this language within section 340.1(b)(1) stops 
short of expressly stating that enhanced damages under the 
statute cannot be imposed against a public entity, at the very 
least, it cuts against any assertion that the Legislature 
affirmatively sought to avoid a section 818 analysis.   
Next, the damages authorized under section 340.1(b)(1) 
have substantial punitive qualities beyond the simple fact that 
they may go well beyond actual damages.  These objective 
characteristics confirm that enhanced damages under the 
statute function, in essence, as punitive or exemplary damages 
by serving “to punish past childhood sexual abuse coverups to 
deter future ones.”  (Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 
64 Cal.App.5th at p. 567; see also Adams v. Murakami (1991) 
54 Cal.3d 105, 110 [“the quintessence of punitive damages is to 
deter future misconduct by the defendant”].)   
Several of the pertinent features of the damages available 
under section 340.1(b)(1) were described by the court in X.M., 
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 1014, review granted.  In determining 
that section 818 prohibited the imposition of enhanced damages 
under section 340.1(b)(1) against a public entity, the X.M. court 
observed, “First, the statute authorizes treble damages only 
upon proof of morally offensive behavior on behalf of the 
defendant.  A plaintiff receives actual (that is, economic and 
noneconomic) damages if they prove they were the victim of 
childhood sexual assault.  But the statute authorizes an award 
of three times their actual damages if they can also prove their 
assault was the result of the defendant’s cover up of a previous 
sexual assault of a child.  [Citation.]  Second, even if the plaintiff 
presents the requisite proof, the decision to increase the damage 
award beyond actual damages lies entirely with the fact finder.  
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
28 
And third, if the fact finder does decide to increase the damage 
award, the amount by which it does so, though capped, is not 
fixed.  As a result, the fact finder is free to increase the damage 
award up to three times the plaintiff’s actual damages based on 
factors specific to the defendant.”  (X.M., at p. 1026.)  The 
features described by the X.M. court are important insofar as 
they convey that the assessment of enhanced damages under 
section 340.1(b)(1) will commonly resemble the imposition of 
punitive damages, with the blameworthiness of a defendant’s 
conduct and the need for punishment and example-setting 
informing the amount of a discretionary damages award that is 
additional to an award of actual damages.   
In short, the enhanced damages authorized under 
section 340.1(b)(1) are recognizable as punitive or exemplary 
damages for purposes of a section 818 analysis as a matter of 
both substance and procedure.  These awards require the 
existence of actual injury, but may go substantially beyond the 
amounts necessary to fully compensate plaintiffs for the injuries 
they have suffered; they are premised on morally culpable 
behavior by defendants, namely, participation in “a concerted 
effort to hide evidence relating to childhood sexual assault” 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (b)(2)); and they are assessed on 
a case- and fact-specific manner in much the same way that 
punitive damages are, albeit being subject to a cap.  With their 
punitive and exemplary character having been shown, we now 
consider whether damages under section 340.1(b)(1) are 
nonetheless sufficiently distinguishable from punitive damages 
as to fall outside the scope of section 818. 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
29 
2. No Nonpunitive Characteristic or Function 
Sufficiently Distinguishes Damages Under Code of 
Civil Procedure Section 340.1(b)(1) from Punitive 
Damages 
Plaintiff offers several reasons why section 340.1(b)(1) 
should be regarded as applicable to public entities.  Some of her 
arguments essentially assert that in adopting this enhanced 
damages provision, the Legislature did not intend for a 
section 818 analysis to apply at all.  Her other contentions 
assume that such an analysis applies, but characterize damages 
under section 340.1(b)(1) as sufficiently nonpunitive in nature 
that they may be imposed upon a public entity.  We conclude 
that all of these arguments are unpersuasive. 
First, plaintiff argues that cover ups occurring in schools 
featured so prominently in legislative dialogue concerning 
Assembly Bill No. 218 that it would be nonsensical to regard 
section 340.1(b)(1) as inapplicable to public entities such as 
school districts.  But the legislative history materials manifest 
a concern with childhood sexual assaults occurring not only at 
public schools, but also at private schools, sporting leagues and 
organizations, religious institutions, and wherever else they 
may occur.  (See, e.g., Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 25, 2019, pp. 1, 
2; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218 
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, pp. 1, 3, 4, 
7.)  A Senate analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 referred to “the 
systematic incidence of childhood sexual assault in numerous 
institutions in this country and the cover-ups that accompanied 
them.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Office of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis 
of Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Aug. 30, 2019, p. 5, italics added.)  There being significant 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
30 
cohorts of defendants that might be subject to treble damages 
for engaging in cover ups even if public entities are not, and with 
section 340.1(b)(1) providing on its face that enhanced damages 
are available “unless prohibited by another law,” we cannot 
conclude that the Legislature intended to avoid a section 818 
analysis altogether.8   
Second, plaintiff contends that the treble damages 
provision within section 340.1(b)(1) must be construed as 
applicable to public entities, or else it would merely duplicate 
plaintiffs’ existing right to pursue punitive damages against 
private defendants.  Such an interpretation, plaintiff argues, 
would render the provision mere surplusage.  (See Brennon B. 
v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 691 [courts aim 
to interpret statutes in a manner that avoids surplusage].)  But 
our interpretation has no such effect.  At a minimum, 
section 340.1(b)(1) establishes that enhanced damages may be 
awarded to plaintiffs who prove that they were the victims of 
sexual assaults that result from cover ups, regardless of whether 
these plaintiffs also specifically demonstrate the “oppression, 
fraud, or malice” that Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) 
requires for an award of punitive damages.  And even if we were 
to assume for sake of argument that the evidence necessary to 
prove a cover up under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, 
 
8  
Plaintiff also argues that a reference in section 340.1(b)(1) 
to 
claims 
authorized 
under 
Code 
of 
Civil 
Procedure 
section 340.1, subdivision (a) implies an intent to make public 
entities subject to treble damages, because subdivision (a) refers 
to actions “for liability against any person or entity.”  (Id., 
§ 340.1, subd. (a)(2), (3).)  This argument fails to account for the 
significance of section 340.1(b)(1)’s “unless prohibited by 
another law” language. 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
31 
subdivision (b)(1) and (2) is always sufficient to establish the 
“oppression, fraud, or malice” that must be shown by clear and 
convincing 
evidence 
under 
Civil 
Code 
section 
3294, 
subdivision (a), “Legislatures are free to state legal principles in 
statutes, even if they repeat preexisting law, without fear the 
courts will find them unnecessary . . . .”  (Reno v. Baird (1998) 
18 Cal.4th 640, 658.)  The enhanced damages provision is 
therefore not surplusage, even as applicable only to private 
entities. 
Third, in arguing that the Legislature must have intended 
for the treble damages provision to apply to public entities, 
plaintiff observes that an analysis of Assembly Bill No. 218 that 
circulated after the “unless prohibited by another law” language 
was added to the proposed text of section 340.1(b)(1) by a bill 
amendment (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 
Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 2019) explained that the measure “applies 
equally to abuse occurring at public and private schools and 
applies to all local public entities” (Assem. Conc. in Sen. 
Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Aug. 30, 2019, p. 2).  Plaintiff also notes that bill 
analyses published before and after this amendment included 
statements by a contingent of opponents, including but not 
limited to public entities, lamenting the treble damages 
provision’s potential financial impact and seeking its removal.  
(E.g., id., at pp. 2–3; Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 218, supra, as amended Mar. 25, 2019, p. 2; Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218 (2019–2020 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Mar. 25, 2019, pp. 12–13.)   
These snippets of legislative history carry little weight.  
The description of Assembly Bill No. 218 as equally applicable 
to public and private entities, read in context, appears directed 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
32 
at the bill’s statute of limitations and claim-revival provisions.  
Meanwhile, the views of the bill’s opponents found in committee 
and floor analyses regarding this measure shed little light on 
the Legislature’s intent, which is the focus of our analysis.  (See 
American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland (2005) 
34 Cal.4th 1239, 1264 [“this restatement of an argument made 
by certain industry groups does not purport to reflect debate 
within 
the 
Legislature”]; 
Purifoy 
v. 
Howell 
(2010) 
183 Cal.App.4th 166, 179, fn. 14 [describing a statement by an 
opponent of a bill as “not evidence of the Legislature’s collective 
intent”]; accord, Labor Board v. Fruit Packers (1964) 377 U.S. 
58, 66 [cautioning “against the danger, when interpreting a 
statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents”].)  
Even when taken into consideration, the continued entreaties of 
opponents to remove the treble damages provision might have 
reflected a preference for the certainty that would come from 
having the treble damages provision deleted from the measure 
entirely (which would be of particularly clear benefit to the 
private entities that joined their public counterparts in lobbying 
against the bill), over the possibility that a court might later 
reject a claim of immunity under section 818 and find both 
public and private defendants subject to enhanced damages 
under section 340.1(b)(1).  
Fourth, plaintiff argues that enhanced damages under 
section 340.1(b)(1) serve important nonpunitive functions that 
distinguish them from conventional punitive or exemplary 
damages.  In particular, plaintiff hypothesizes that the damages 
authorized under this provision might compensate plaintiffs for 
the stress associated with pursuing a claim for childhood sexual 
assault in court, or incentivize claims for childhood sexual 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
33 
assault that might not otherwise be expected to lead to 
substantial damages awards.  
Plaintiff claims to find support for these rationales in the 
legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 218.  She points to 
multiple analyses of this measure that quoted its author as 
stating, in relevant part, that Assembly Bill No. 218 “would also 
confront the pervasive problem of cover ups in institutions, from 
schools to sports league[s], which result in continuing 
victimization and the sexual assault of additional children.  The 
bill would allow for recovery of up to treble damages from the 
defendant who covered up sexual assault.  This reform is clearly 
needed both to compensate victims who never should have been 
victims — and would not have been if past sexual assault had 
been properly brought to light — and also as an effective 
deterrent against individuals and entities who have chosen to 
protect the perpetrators of sexual assault over the victims.”  
(Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218, 
supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4, italics added; see also 
Assem. Conc. in Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as 
amended Aug. 30, 2019, p. 2; Assem. 3d reading analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as amended Mar. 25, 2019, p. 2.)  
Plaintiff also observes that legislators were made aware of 
instances in which schoolteachers engaged in a course of 
misconduct, some of which may not have led to substantial 
actual damages if it had become the subject of a lawsuit.  The 
treble damages provision, she argues, could have been designed 
to address these scenarios, providing an inducement to present 
what otherwise might constitute low-value claims and by doing 
so, avoid future assaults.  
We conclude that plaintiff fails to sufficiently distinguish 
the enhanced damages authorized under section 340.1(b)(1) 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
34 
from punitive or exemplary damages.  As a threshold matter, we 
discern that enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1) 
represent an awkward and somewhat ineffective way to achieve 
the functions plaintiff assigns to them.  Because enhanced 
damages are available only when a sexual assault “was as the 
result of a cover up” (§ 340.1(b)(1)), they are available in only a 
subset of the cases identified by plaintiff, involving litigation-
related trauma or low compensatory damages.  What is more, 
unlike other facts relevant to a claim for childhood sexual 
assault, the existence of a prior cover up may be unknown to a 
prospective plaintiff until after a lawsuit is filed, blunting any 
incentivizing effect.  These circumstances make it difficult to 
perceive any clear connection between the provision of enhanced 
damages for a sexual assault that results from a cover up and 
the policy goals that plaintiff assigns to these damages, casting 
doubt on whether section 340.1(b)(1) was designed to serve these 
ends.   
In any event, nothing associated with section 340.1(b)(1) 
conveys that a nonpunitive purpose or purposes are sufficiently 
implicated here as to allow public entities to be held liable for 
enhanced damages under this provision.   
We do not perceive any clear indication in the text of the 
statute or in its legislative history that legislators intended for 
enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1) to compensate 
plaintiffs suing for childhood sexual assault for litigation-
related stress that would otherwise go unremedied.  Regarding 
the more generic references to compensation in legislative 
analyses (e.g., Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill 
No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4) and the 
broader function of providing larger recoveries for prevailing 
plaintiffs, as the Court of Appeal below recognized (Los Angeles 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
35 
Unified School Dist., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 561–562), 
conventional damages principles already provide for full 
compensation for victims of childhood sexual assault who prove 
their claims at trial.  With or without a cover up, individuals 
who establish that they were victimized by a childhood sexual 
assault are entitled to actual, compensatory damages in an 
“amount which will compensate for all the detriment 
proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been 
anticipated or not.”  (Civ. Code, § 3333; see also id., § 3282 
[defining “[d]etriment” as “a loss or harm suffered in person or 
property”].)  These damages may, as appropriate, include 
compensation for mental suffering.  “[I]t is settled in this state 
that mental suffering constitutes an aggravation of damages 
when it naturally ensues from the act complained of, and in this 
connection mental suffering includes nervousness, grief, 
anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation and indignity as well as 
physical pain.”  (Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425, 
433; see also X.M., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1028, review 
granted; Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 561.)  Enhanced damages are therefore not necessary here 
to fill an obvious gap or deficiency in compensation.  
The legislative history materials that plaintiff draws from 
must be understood in this light.  With plaintiffs already being 
entitled to full compensation for their injuries, the assertions 
within the legislative analyses that additional damages under 
section 340.1(b)(1) would function to “compensate” some 
prevailing plaintiffs (e.g., Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4) fail 
to sufficiently distinguish these awards from the assessment of 
punitive damages.  Such references could well have used 
“compensate” in the colloquial sense of providing plaintiffs with 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
36 
greater monetary recoveries.  But, as we have already 
explained, all damages — even punitive damages under Civil 
Code section 3294 — have that effect.  If a bare acknowledgment 
of this fact by legislators considering a proposed law were 
enough to make section 818 inapplicable, the statute would be 
eviscerated.   
Additionally, the significance of any references to 
compensation within legislative history materials is lessened by 
the fact that these same analyses also reveal an appreciation 
among legislators that the enhanced damages available under 
section 340.1(b)(1) would function to punish defendants who 
engage in cover ups.  As excerpted above, analyses prepared 
during the Legislature’s deliberations coupled mentions of the 
need to “compensate” victims of sexual assault with references 
to the essentially punitive deterrent effect that the imposition of 
enhanced damages would have.  (E.g., Assem. Com. on 
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced 
Jan. 16, 2019, p. 4.)  To similar effect, a committee analysis of 
Assembly Bill No. 218 explained that “[t]he bill also exposes 
those who cover up the sexual abuse of children to additional 
punishment.  In addition to extending the statute of limitations 
for childhood sexual assault, reviving old claims, and removing 
the protections of the [Government Claims Act] from local public 
entities, this bill allows a victim of childhood sexual assault to 
recover tremble [sic] damages against a defendant if the victim’s 
assault was the result of a cover-up by the defendant of a prior 
sexual assault of a minor.”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
37 
of Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 9, 
boldface omitted.)9   
Ultimately, we conclude that the legislative history of 
Assembly Bill No. 218 does not provide substantial support for 
plaintiff’s view that the enhanced damages authorized under 
section 340.1(b)(1) are meaningfully distinguishable from 
punitive or exemplary damages on the ground that they 
recognize and provide redress for litigation-related trauma.  
This is not a situation where, in the words of the court in X.M., 
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 1014, review granted, the Legislature has 
“clearly indicated an additional, compensatory purpose” (id. at 
p. 1024) of sufficient magnitude that it would allow us to regard 
a treble damages provision as outside of section 818’s purview.   
There is also no clear indication in the text of 
section 340.1(b)(1), its practical application, or its legislative 
history that legislators sought to use the possibility of enhanced 
damages to incentivize the filing of claims that might involve 
relatively modest damages awards.  We presume that such cases 
are possible; the statutory definition of “ ‘[c]hildhood sexual 
assault’ ” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (d)) captures a range of 
conduct.  (Cf. People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 442 
[construing Pen. Code, § 288], 447 [discussing Court of Appeal 
 
9  
The reference within the above-quoted committee analysis 
to “removing the protections of the [Government Claims Act] 
from local public entities” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis 
of Assem. Bill No. 218, supra, as introduced Jan. 16, 2019, p. 9), 
read in context, appears to refer to the bill’s lifting of the act’s 
claim-presentation deadline incident to the revival of lapsed 
claims (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q)), and not to 
Government Code section 818.   
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
38 
decisions applying that statute].)  Still, the fact remains that 
childhood sexual assaults that implicate Code of Civil Procedure 
section 340.1 would not normally be expected to yield only 
minimal damages, and the fact that members of the Legislature 
may have been aware of counterexamples does not establish 
that these circumstances were a significant motive behind the 
treble damages provision.10   
Even if we were to sum the various nonpunitive rationales 
advanced 
by 
plaintiff 
or 
otherwise 
capable 
of 
being 
hypothesized, and indulge the possibility that, in practice, the 
prospect of enhanced damages will have an incentivizing effect 
on some lawsuits and provide additional recoveries to plaintiffs 
that may offset litigation-related expenditures or contribute to 
their financial recoveries, that would not alter our conclusion.  
We remain convinced that the enhanced damages authorized 
under section 340.1(b)(1) are “imposed primarily for the sake of 
example and by way of punishing the defendant” (§ 818), and 
therefore are incapable of being imposed upon a public entity.  
As has been explained, the objective characteristics of these 
awards establish that they qualify as a form of punitive or 
exemplary damages for purposes of a section 818 analysis, and 
 
10  
In supplemental briefing filed shortly before oral 
argument, plaintiff asserted that a recent amendment (Stats. 
2022, ch. 442, § 3) to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16, 
which prescribes the statute of limitations for claims of sexual 
abuse suffered as an adult, and legislative history materials 
associated with this amendment provide additional indications 
of the nonpunitive intentions behind the 2019 revision of Code 
of Civil Procedure section 340.1 through Assembly Bill No. 218 
to add its treble damages provision.  Having reviewed these 
materials, we do not regard them as probative of the 
Legislature’s intent in this respect.   
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
39 
there are no clear indications within the statutory text, the 
expected application of section 340.1(b)(1), or otherwise of a 
nonpunitive purpose or purposes that carry sufficient force here 
as to compel a different characterization.  
3. Case Law Cited by Plaintiff Is Distinguishable 
Plaintiff asserts that several Court of Appeal decisions 
support her view that section 818 does not preclude the recovery 
of enhanced damages under section 340.1(b)(1) from a public 
entity.  We conclude that those matters are all fundamentally 
distinguishable from the circumstances before us and thus do 
not provide significant support for plaintiff’s position.  These 
distinctions also mean we need not pass on whether those cases 
were properly decided, or entirely correct in all their particulars.   
Hill v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1281 did not 
involve Government Code section 818 or a treble damages 
provision.  It instead addressed whether the double damages 
authorized under Probate Code section 859 for the improper 
taking, concealment, or disposal of a vulnerable person’s 
property were a kind of punitive or exemplary damages that, 
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.42, cannot be 
recovered against the successor of a deceased defendant.  (Hill, 
at pp. 1285–1286.)  Hill, like this case, involved a prohibition on 
the recovery of certain enhanced damages.  But here we are 
concerned with the availability of treble damages, not double 
damages (cf. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United 
States ex rel. Stevens (2000) 529 U.S. 765, 784 [regarding an 
amendment to the federal False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729 et 
seq.) that increased the available damages from double damages 
to treble damages as making its remedies “essentially 
punitive”]), and we are construing an altogether different pair 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
40 
of statutes.  The court in Hill perceived Code of Civil Procedure 
section 377.42 as recognizing a strict distinction between 
“ ‘punitive or exemplary damages’ ” (Hill, at p. 1285, quoting 
Code Civ. Proc., § 377.42) on the one hand and a “statutory 
penalty,” including treble damages, on the other (Hill, at 
p. 1286).  Here, as explained previously, the language of 
section 818 and the intent behind this text call for a more 
functional analysis that does not cleave in quite the same 
manner.  Under the analysis that applies here, enhanced 
damages under section 340.1(b)(1) may be regarded as “other 
damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way 
of punishing the defendant” (§ 818) and thus incapable of being 
recovered against a public entity.   
Next, the issue presented in Beeman v. Burling (1990) 
216 Cal.App.3d 1586 and Kelly v. Yee (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 336 
was whether an award of treble damages authorized under a 
local rent ordinance was preempted by Civil Code section 3294.  
These courts concluded that there was no conflict warranting a 
finding of preemption because the ordinance’s automatic 
trebling of damages awards and the role of this trebling in 
promoting enforcement of the rent ordinance distinguished the 
treble damages provision from punitive damages awarded under 
Civil Code section 3294.  (See Beeman, at pp. 1597–1598 
[discussing the character of the ordinance’s treble damages 
provision]; Kelly, at p. 342 [explaining that trebling of actual 
damages serves to “promote effective enforcement of the 
ordinance on behalf of low-income tenants”].)  In light of the 
differences between the legal issues, treble damages provisions, 
and underlying claims involved in those cases and this one, 
there is no manifest inconsistency between the outcomes in 
Beeman and Kelly and our determination that enhanced 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
41 
damages under section 340.1(b)(1) are “imposed primarily for 
the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”  
(§ 818.)   
In LeVine v. Weis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 201 (LeVine), the 
court concluded that section 818 did not prohibit an award of 
double back pay under Government Code section 12653, part of 
the state False Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 12650 et seq.), against 
a public entity.  (LeVine, at p. 209.)  In so holding, the court 
emphasized that Government Code section 12653 expressly 
distinguishes between back pay and punitive damages in its 
description of available remedies, and lists back pay among the 
kinds of relief necessary to make an employee “ ‘whole.’ ”  
(LeVine, at p. 209, quoting Gov. Code, § 12653, former subd. (c).)  
These features persuaded the Court of Appeal that “the statute 
treats double backpay as remedial” (LeVine, at p. 209), and serve 
to distinguish the section 818 question that was before that 
court from the one we address here.  
Marron v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1049 
involved a claim that a defendant was “guilty of recklessness, 
oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of [elder or 
dependent adult] abuse . . . .”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.)  
Upon a sufficient showing of such misconduct, the plaintiffs 
could recover attorney fees and costs as well as pain and 
suffering damages that otherwise would have been prohibited 
under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34.  (Welf. & Inst. 
Code, § 15657, subds. (a), (b).)  The Court of Appeal in Marron 
determined that Government Code section 818 did not prohibit 
holding a public entity liable for these awards, reasoning that 
“[p]unitive damages are dissimilar to pain and suffering and 
other compensatory damages” (Marron, at p. 1063), that the 
pain and suffering damages provided compensation for the 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
42 
decedent’s “actual loss or injury” (id. at p. 1062), and that the 
relevant legislative history and codified findings established 
that 
Welfare 
and 
Institutions 
Code 
“[s]ection 
15657’s 
authorization of awards of attorney fees and costs was intended 
to act as an incentive for attorneys to accept elder or dependent 
adult abuse cases that involve recklessness or more egregious 
conduct” (Marron, at p. 1064).  The court also saw nothing in the 
statute or its history to suggest “that awards of reasonable 
attorney fees and costs under [Welfare and Institutions Code] 
section 15657 are intended to punish defendants.”  (Id. at 
p. 1065.)  Marron thus involved different kinds of awards from 
those involved in this case — one of which simply removed an 
otherwise applicable limitation on compensatory damages — 
and there the Legislature appears to have provided more 
evidence of nonpunitive intent than exists here.11   
Similarly 
distinguishable 
is 
Los 
Angeles 
County 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Superior Court (2004) 
123 Cal.App.4th 261 (Los Angeles Transportation Authority), in 
which the court considered a challenge to the imposition of 
statutory penalties under Civil Code section 52 for violations of 
Civil Code section 51.7, the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976.  The 
Court of Appeal in Los Angeles Transportation Authority 
determined that these penalties could be imposed upon a public 
 
11  
The Legislature recently amended Code of Civil Procedure 
section 377.34 to provide that “in an action or proceeding by a 
decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest on 
the decedent’s cause of action, the damages recoverable may 
include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement if the 
action or proceeding was granted a preference pursuant to [Code 
of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 36 before January 1, 2022, or was 
filed on or after January 1, 2022, and before January 1, 2026.”  
(Id., subd. (b), added by Stats. 2021, ch. 448, § 1.)   
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
43 
entity, Government Code section 818 notwithstanding.  (Los 
Angeles Transportation Authority, at pp. 263–264.)  Among the 
distinctions between this case and Los Angeles Transportation 
Authority, Civil Code section 52 separately authorizes both 
exemplary damages (id., subd. (b)(1)) and penalties (id., 
subd. (b)(2)) for violations of Civil Code section 51.7; the 
penalties authorized under section 52 are fixed at $25,000, and 
not tethered to actual damages (id., subd. (b)(2)); and there were 
more compelling indications that legislators regarded penalties 
under Civil Code section 52 as having an important nonpunitive 
function than appears in the legislative history for Assembly 
Bill No. 218 (Los Angeles Transportation Authority, at pp. 268–
271).12 
 
12  
We note that portions of the analysis in Los Angeles 
Transportation Authority, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 261 relied 
heavily on our characterization of section 818 as concerned 
exclusively with damages that are “simply and solely punitive” 
(San Francisco Civil Service Assn., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 50; 
Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 39) or “simply or solely punitive” 
(Kizer, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 145), an understanding of the 
statute 
that 
we 
have 
rejected 
today. 
 
(Los 
Angeles 
Transportation Authority, at pp. 272–275.)  Similarly, the court 
in LeVine, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 201 drew from our now-
repudiated analysis of section 818 in Younger in characterizing 
double back pay as having “a legitimate and fully justified 
compensatory function,” to wit, serving “to more fully 
compensate the employee for the incalculable risk he takes 
when he threatens to disclose or discloses his employer’s false 
claim.”  (LeVine, at p. 209.)  Although such reliance on Younger 
and its progeny is no longer permitted, we do not otherwise 
believe it necessary to review the reasoning of these decisions 
beyond what we have discussed in the main text.   
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
44 
To summarize, due to differences in the issues they 
involved, the statutes they interpreted, and the prominence and 
plausibility of the nonpunitive rationales they considered, the 
Court of Appeal decisions described above neither conflict with 
our holding today nor suggest that we should interpret or apply 
section 818 differently than we have.   
In closing, we observe that our decision today does not in 
any way minimize the trauma that victims of childhood sexual 
assault must endure.  Yet our job is to interpret Code of Civil 
Procedure section 340.1 as written, relying on the guideposts the 
Legislature has provided and our own interpretive tools.  As it 
appears before us, the statute, read in conjunction with 
Government Code section 818, does not reveal an intent to have 
section 340.1(b)(1) apply to public entities.  The Legislature may 
as a matter of course choose to revisit the issue if it believes that 
these entities should potentially be held liable for enhanced 
damages when a childhood sexual assault is the result of a cover 
up.   
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
45 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We hold that Government Code section 818 prohibits the 
imposition of enhanced damages under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 340.1, subdivision (b)(1) against a public entity.  We 
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.   
 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  Los Angeles Unified School District v. Superior 
Court 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 64 Cal.App.5th 549 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S269608 
Date Filed:  June 1, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Shirley K. Watkins 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Gutierrez, Preciado & House, Calvin House and Arthur C. Preciado for 
Petitioner. 
 
Leone Alberts & Duus, Louis A. Leone and Seth L. Gordon for 
Northern California Regional Liability Excess Fund, Southern 
California Regional Liability Excess Fund, Statewide Association of 
Community Colleges and School Association for Excess Risk as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
Meyers Fozi & Dwork, Golnar J. Fozi and Daniel S. Modafferi for 
Association of Schools for Cooperative Insurance Programs, Public 
Risk Innovation, Solutions, and Management and California 
Association of Joint Powers Authorities as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Petitioner. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Cummings, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Associates and Ryan D. Miller for 
Hesperia Unified School District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Respondent. 
 
Taylor & Ring, David M. Ring, Natalie L. Weatherford; Esner, Chang 
& Boyer, Holly N. Boyer, Kevin K. Nguyen and Kathleen J. Becket for 
Real Party in Interest. 
 
The Zalkin Law Firm and Devin M. Storey for National Center for the 
Victims of Crime as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
Alan Charles Dell’Ario for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Calvin House 
Gutierrez, Preciado & House, LLP 
3020 East Colorado Boulevard 
Pasadena, CA 91107 
(626) 449-2300 
 
Holly N. Boyer 
Esner, Chang & Boyer 
234 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 975 
Pasadena, CA 91101 
(626) 535-9860