Title: Nodine v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CHRISTINE NODINE, Personal Representative of the Estate of DAVID NODINE v. JACKSON HOLE MOUNTAIN RESORT CORPORATION, a Wyoming Corporation2012 WY 72Case Number: S-11-0265Decided: 05/23/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
CHRISTINE 
NODINE, Personal Representative of the Estate of DAVID 
NODINE,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.JACKSON HOLE MOUNTAIN 
RESORT CORPORATION, a Wyoming 
Corporation,Appellee(Defendant).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Andrew 
L. Payne and Shannon T. Hays of Payne Mitchell Law Group, Dallas, Texas; Terry 
W. Mackey of Terry W. Mackey, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming
 
Representing 
Appellee:
James 
K. Lubing and Leah K. Corrigan of Lubing & Corrigan, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming; 
Mikel L. Moore of Moore, Cockrell, Goicoechea & Axelberg, P.C., Kalispell, 
Montana
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Christine Nodine 
(Mrs. Nodine), whose husband was killed by an avalanche on a ski run at Jackson 
Hole Mountain Resort (JHMR), appeals the district court’s summary judgment order 
dismissing her wrongful death action.  
The district court dismissed the action because Mrs. Nodine, although 
duly appointed as personal representative of her husband’s estate in her home 
state of Texas, had not been appointed personal representative by the Wyoming 
state district court upon the filing of her wrongful death action and before the 
two-year period for filing the wrongful death action expired.  We reverse.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Mrs. Nodine 
presents the following issues on appeal:
 
1.         
Did the District Court err by applying the holding of Estate of Johnson, 2010 WY 63, 231 P.3d 873 (Wyo. 2010), to this case given that the opinion provides the ruling would 
have prospective application only and the cause of action in this matter accrued 
long before the publication of Estate of 
Johnson?
 
2.         
If Estate of Johnson applied, 
would the confirmation of Mrs. Nodine as personal representative by the District 
Court have related back to the initial filing of her timely state court 
complaint under the Wyoming Wrongful Death Act?
 
3.         
Did the District Court commit error when it concluded that a personal 
representative lawfully appointed by a Texas probate court, who then timely 
filed her wrongful death complaint, failed to meet the conditions precedent for 
bringing a Wrongful Death Act claim in Wyoming?
 
4.         
Did the District Court err in ruling that JHMR had standing to challenge 
Mrs. Nodine’s capacity?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      On December 27, 
2008, Mrs. Nodine’s husband, David Nodine, was killed by an avalanche on a JHMR 
ski run.  On July 16, 2009, a Texas 
probate court appointed Mrs. Nodine as the Independent Administrator of her 
deceased husband’s estate.  On 
September 17, 2009, Mrs. Nodine filed a wrong death action against JHMR in the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.  
 
[¶4]      On May 18, 2010, 
while Mrs. Nodine’s action was pending in federal court, this Court issued a 
decision holding that the personal representative for purposes of bringing a 
Wyoming wrongful death action must be appointed within the wrongful death action 
by the court with jurisdiction over that action.  See In re Estate of Johnson, 2010 WY 63, ¶ 
21, 231 P.3d 873, 881 (Wyo. 2010).  
On October 5, 2010, Mrs. Nodine filed her Second Amended Complaint, which 
included her continuing allegation that she was the duly qualified and appointed 
personal representative of her husband’s estate and that she was a proper 
wrongful death plaintiff under the Wyoming Wrongful Death Act.  On October 14, 2010, JHMR filed its 
answer to the amended complaint and admitted those allegations.  
 
[¶5]      On November 24, 
2010, after completion of discovery and the filing of summary judgment motions, 
the federal court granted JHMR’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Mrs. 
Nodine’s wrongful death claim, without prejudice.  The federal court found that the forum 
selection clause on a liability waiver signed by Mr. Nodine before his accident 
was binding and required that any action against JHMR be brought in state 
district court in Teton County, Wyoming.  

 
[¶6]      On December 22, 
2010, five days before the two-year filing period expired, Mrs. Nodine filed her 
wrongful death action in state district court in Teton County.  On April 29, 2011, JHMR filed a summary 
judgment motion seeking judgment both on the merits of Mrs. Nodine’s claim and 
on the ground that Mrs. Nodine was not properly appointed as the personal 
representative of Mr. Nodine’s estate for purposes of maintaining her state 
court action under the Wyoming Wrongful Death Act.  On June 3, 2011, Mrs. Nodine requested 
that the district court appoint her personal representative of her husband’s 
estate for purposes of maintaining her wrongful death action.  
 
[¶7]      On September 30, 
2011, the district court entered its Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment.  In dismissing 
Mrs. Nodine’s action, the district court did not rule on the merits of Mrs. 
Nodine’s claims, but instead dismissed on the ground that Mrs. Nodine lacked the 
capacity to maintain her action.  In 
so ruling, the court reasoned (footnotes omitted):
 
11.  In the case at hand, Plaintiff was never 
appointed by this Court as the personal representative for the purposes of this 
wrongful death action, but was only appointed as a personal representative in a 
separate probate action in Texas.  
This violates the clear dictates of Estate of Johnson.  It was only on June 3, 2011, more than a 
month after the filing of Defendant’s summary judgment motion and more than 
three months after Defendant denied in its answer that Plaintiff was a proper 
personal representative, that Plaintiff sought such an appointment.  The Wyoming Supreme Court’s edict in Estate of Johnson is clear: the district 
court must appoint a personal representative for the purpose of filing a 
wrongful death action at the outset of the action.  Id.  Because the appointment of a personal 
representative is a condition precedent to a wrongful death case, Plaintiff’s 
failure to seek and secure that appointment is fatal to her 
claim.
 
12.  Plaintiff’s claim also fails because the 
two-year condition precedent set by statute has lapsed.  Mr. Nodine died on December 27, 2008, so 
the applicable time period lapsed on December 27, 2010.  While both the federal court case and 
this case were timely filed, Plaintiff’s attempt to cure her failure to seek 
appointment as personal representative in June 2011 came well after the 
applicable time period expired. 
 
[¶8]      On October 25, 
2011, Mrs. Nodine timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court’s 
order dismissing her wrongful death claim.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶9]      Motions for summary judgment come before the trial court 
pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides 
that
 
[t]he 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.
 
Formisano 
v. Gaston, 
2011 WY 8, ¶ 3, 246 P.3d 286, 288 (Wyo. 2011).  We review a grant of summary judgment as 
follows:
 
We 
review a summary judgment in the same light as the 
district court, using the same materials and following the same standards.  [Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 
1080 (Wyo. 1999)]; 40 
North Corp. v. Morrell, 
964 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo. 1998). 
We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. Id. 
A material fact is one which, if proved, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense asserted by 
the parties. Id. 
If the moving party presents supporting summary judgment materials demonstrating no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden is shifted to the non-moving 
party to present appropriate supporting materials posing a genuine issue of a 
material fact for trial. Roberts 
v. Klinkosh, 
986 P.2d 153, 155 (Wyo. 1999); 
Downen 
v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 
887 P.2d 515, 519 (Wyo. 1994). 
We review a grant of summary 
judgment deciding a question of 
law de novo and afford no deference to the district court’s ruling. Roberts 
v. Klinkosh, 
986 P.2d  at 156; 
Blagrove 
v. JB Mechanical, Inc., 
934 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Wyo. 1997).
 
Lindsey 
v. Harriet, 
2011 WY 80, ¶ 18, 255 P.3d 873, 880 (Wyo. 2011).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶10]   The district court interpreted this 
Court’s holding in Johnson to require 
that Mrs. Nodine’s wrongful death action be dismissed.  We start then with our holding in Johnson.  
 
[¶11]   Johnson was an appeal from a probate 
court order denying the petition of a decedent’s wife to revoke the appointment 
of the decedent’s father as personal representative of the decedent for the 
filing of a wrongful death claim.  
Johnson, ¶ 3, 231 P.3d  at 
876.  This Court’s analysis in Johnson focused on the different 
functions of the probate code and the Wrongful Death Act.  Id., ¶¶ 10-13, 231 P.3d  at 878-79.  We reached our ultimate holding in the 
case based on the plain language of the Wrongful Death Act, which we found 
contained no requirement that the personal representative in a wrongful death 
action be the personal representative who was appointed for probate 
purposes:
 
We 
must keep in mind the appropriate role of this Court in interpreting statutes. 
In addition to the general rules of statutory construction set forth above 
(see supra ¶ 8), we note the particular admonition that “[w]e will not 
insert language into the statutes that the legislature omitted.” Merrill 
v. Jansma, 
2004 WY 26, ¶ 29, 86 P.3d 270, 285 (Wyo. 2004).  Long ago, the 
federal district court for the District of Wyoming followed that very precept in 
holding that, inasmuch as Wyoming’s wrongful death act does not require the 
personal representative to be a resident of Wyoming, it was not up to the courts 
to insert that requirement. Ashley 
v. Read Constr. Co., 
195 F. Supp. 727, 729 (D. Wyo. 1961). 
Today, we merely expand upon that observation by holding that, inasmuch as Wyoming’s wrongful death act 
does not require the personal representative to be the probate estate’s 
administrator or executor, it is not up to this Court to insert that 
requirement.
 
Johnson, 
¶ 15, 231 P.3d  at 880 (emphasis added).
 
[¶12]   After holding that the Wrongful 
Death Act does not require the personal representative to be the probate 
estate’s administrator or executor, we explained that the appointment of a 
personal representative for purposes of prosecuting a wrongful death claim was a 
discretionary task to be completed within the wrongful death action itself.  Johnson, ¶¶ 17, 21, 231 P.3d  at 
880-81.  Our opinion in Johnson did not define the appointment 
of the personal representative as a jurisdictional prerequisite or otherwise 
discuss the task or its timing as a condition precedent to maintaining a 
wrongful death claim.  

 
[¶13]   That said, we need not address 
those questions of interpretation in the present appeal, because this Court 
directed that its holding in Johnson 
was to have prospective application only.  
Specifically, we stated:
 
Although 
Bircher 
may have been a viable construction of the statutes as they stood at that time, 
it is now clear that a wrongful death action is not to be processed under the 
probate code, but rather is to be processed just like any other civil action. 
Bircher 
is overruled prospectively to the extent that it requires a wrongful death 
action to be brought in probate court, and to the extent that it requires a 
wrongful death personal representative to be the administrator or executor of 
the decedent’s estate in probate. In 
reaching those conclusions, we find Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(a) 
to be unambiguous. The statute, which is part of the civil code and which serves 
a purpose unlike the purposes of the probate code, requires wrongful death 
claims to be brought by one person, called a personal representative of the 
deceased person, rather than by the multitude of persons who may be claimants 
under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-38-102(c).
 
Johnson, 
¶ 14, 231 P.3d  at 879-80 (footnote omitted).
 
[¶14]   Whether to give an opinion 
prospective application only is a determination to be made by this Court.  AT&T Commc’ns of the Mtn. States, Inc. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 768 P.2d 580, 583 (Wyo. 1989).  We have followed the guidance offered by 
the United States Supreme Court in making that 
determination:
 
In 
our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally 
considered three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied 
nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling 
clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, see e.g., Hanover 
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 
supra, 392 U.S. [481], at 496, 88 S.Ct. [2224], at 2233, [20 L. Ed. 2d 1231 
(1968)], 
or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly 
foreshadowed, see, e.g., Allen 
v. State Board of Elections, 
supra, 393 U.S. [544], at 572, 89 S.Ct. [817], at 835, [22 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1969)]. 
Second, it has been stressed that “we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits 
in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its 
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard 
its operation.” Linkletter 
v. Walker, 
supra, 381 U.S. [618], at 629, 85 S.Ct. [1731], at 1738, [14 L. Ed. 2d 601 
(1965)]. 
Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for 
“[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results 
if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 
'injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.”  
 
Adkins 
v. Sky Blue, Inc., 
701 P.2d 549, 552 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 
106-07, 92 S. Ct. 349, 355, 30 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1971)).  
 
[¶15]   Our decision to apply Johnson prospectively is consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s guidance on the operation of new law, and the circumstances 
of the present case further illustrate the wisdom in giving this type of change 
prospective operation only. First, Mrs. Nodine’s cause of action accrued on 
December 27, 2008, and she filed her original wrongful death action on September 
17, 2009, over seven months before this Court decided Johnson.  When Mrs. Nodine’s action accrued, and 
when she filed her action, the law was clear that the personal representative 
for purposes of bringing a Wyoming wrongful death action not only could be but 
was required to be the personal representative appointed by the probate 
court.  See Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901, 903 
(Wyo. 1963), overruled by Estate of 
Johnson, 2010 WY 63, 231 P.3d 873 (Wyo. 2010).  Moreover, the law allowed that personal 
representative to be appointed by a foreign probate court.  Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 728-29 (D. Wyo. 1961).  Our 
holding in Johnson is a departure 
from this long-established precedent, precedent on which Mrs. Nodine had a solid 
basis to rely in filing her wrongful death action.
 
[¶16]   Second, there is little cause for 
concern that allowing only prospective application of Johnson will impair operation of the law 
governing wrongful death actions.  A 
wrongful death action must be brought within two years of the decedent’s date of 
death.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-38-102(d) (LexisNexis 2011).  We 
do not, therefore, anticipate an extended time during which wrongful death 
actions will be brought outside the procedure set forth in Johnson.1
 
[¶17]   Last, we look to the inequity that 
would result in applying Johnson 
retroactively.  Our concern in this 
type of case is that the two-year limitations period on a wrongful death claim 
leaves little room for imposing new procedural requirements to an already 
accrued action.  The present case 
illustrates the substantial injustice such an imposition can create.  The limitations period for Mrs. Nodine’s 
wrongful death action began running nearly a year and a half before this Court 
decided Johnson, and she filed her 
original action, under pre-Johnson 
law, over seven months before our decision in Johnson.  When the federal court dismissed Mrs. 
Nodine’s claim without prejudice, she had only a little over one month remaining 
to file a claim in state court.  
Imposing a new procedural requirement, and elevating that requirement to 
the level of a condition precedent, worked a substantial injustice that our 
prospective application of Johnson 
was intended to guard against.  

 
[¶18]   We are particularly troubled by the 
result in this case, because during the fourteen months Mrs. Nodine’s action was 
pending in federal court, even after she filed a second amended complaint five 
months after our decision in Johnson, 
JHMR never objected to Mrs. Nodine’s capacity to bring the wrongful death 
action.  Instead, JHMR, which can 
claim no harm or prejudice as a result of Mrs. Nodine’s probate appointment as 
the personal representative, waited until the limitations period had expired to 
raise an objection to the manner in which Mrs. Nodine was appointed the personal 
representative.  

 
[¶19]   The dismissal of an already accrued 
wrongful death action was not the harsh result this Court intended with its 
decision in Johnson.  The decision was intended to have 
prospective operation only, and we thus reverse the dismissal of Mrs. Nodine’s 
wrongful death action.2  
 
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶20]   This Court’s decision in Johnson does not apply retroactively to 
strip Mrs. Nodine of her status as a properly appointed personal representative 
in her wrongful death action against JHMR.  
We therefore reverse the district court order dismissing that 
action.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES
1Additionally, we note that in its 2012 session, the legislature acted to 
create a statutory procedure for the appointment of the wrongful death 
representative, which law becomes effective July 1, 2012.  See House Enrolled Act No. 4, 
Sixty-First Legislature, 2012 Budget Session (Eff. July 1, 
2012).
 
   2JHMR contends 
that the question of whether Johnson 
should be applied retroactively is an issue that this Court should not consider 
because Mrs. Nodine did not raise the issue below.  JHMR is correct that we generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. Cooper 
v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1208 (Wyo. 2000). 
We recognize two exceptions to that rule, however, and will consider the issue 
if it raises jurisdictional questions or if it is of such a fundamental nature 
that it must be considered.  Davis v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 
26, 88 P.3d 481, 490 (Wyo. 2004).  
The issue we have been asked to address is whether a decision of this 
Court should be given prospective or retroactive application, with the result 
being something akin to a jurisdictional green light or red light.  Under these circumstances, the issue 
fits within the exception to our rule.