Title: Wuestenberg v. Rancourt

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 25 
Docket: 
Pen-19-107 
Argued:  
January 8, 2020 
Decided: 
February 25, 2020 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.* 
 
 
MICHAEL WUESTENBERG et al. 
 
v. 
 
HARRY J. RANCOURT III et al. 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  The plaintiffs, Michael and Rosemarie Wuestenberg, appeal the 
Superior Court’s (Penobscot County, Mallonee, J.) decision in favor of 
defendants, Harry and Stephanie Rancourt, following a fifteen-day bench trial 
on the Wuestenbergs’ claims against the Rancourts arising from the 
Wuestenbergs’ purchase of the Rancourts’ house.  The trial court’s factual 
findings were supported by the evidence and the court made no legal errors in 
deciding in favor of the Rancourts.  We affirm the decision of the Superior Court.  
                                         
*  Although Justice Alexander participated in the appeal, he retired before this opinion was 
certified. 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The trial court made the following factual findings, which are 
supported by the record.  See Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ben-Ami, 2018 ME 125, 
¶ 2, 193 A.3d 178.  Because the trial court denied the Wuestenbergs’ motion for 
further factual findings, see M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), we consider only the findings and 
conclusions explicitly rendered by the court.  See Ehret v. Ehret, 2016 ME 43, 
¶ 12, 135 A.3d 101.   
 
[¶3]  The Rancourts, though “millwrights by trade,” have carried on a side 
business of building and selling houses for a number of years.  In the early 
2000s, the Rancourts built a family home for themselves that was not intended 
to be sold as part of their business, using design plans, called the “Gardner 
plans,” that they purchased from a southern architectural firm.  The court found 
that the Gardner plans were designed for home construction in the south, 
“where the snow load a house must bear is substantially less than that in 
northern New England; as a result, the house would have been structurally 
inadequate even had it been built exactly as . . . designed.  As finally built, the 
house deviated from [the Gardner] plans in ways that further compromised its 
design integrity.”  Additionally, the court found that the Rancourts’ adjustments 
 
 
3 
further “compromised the safety and durability of the house” and “increased 
the hazard of catastrophic failure.”   
 
[¶4]  After living in the house for more than a decade and raising their 
son there, in March 2013 the Rancourts decided to sell their home and entered 
into a purchase and sale agreement with the Wuestenbergs.  The original 
agreement required that the Rancourts provide “blueprints” of the house.  
Although unclear to the Rancourts at the time the agreement was entered, it 
was later understood that the “blueprints” referred to the Gardner plans.  The 
Gardner plans’ whereabouts were unknown to the Rancourts, however, and the 
parties agreed to substitute building specifications.  The Gardner plans were 
later discovered and turned over during the course of litigation.  Despite the 
fourteen 
pre-closing 
inspections 
that 
the 
agreement 
allowed, 
the 
Wuestenbergs had only one inspection performed before the sale was finalized.  
The home inspector discovered and reported a few minor items needing 
potential remediation, but listed “None” next to Material Defects.   
[¶5]  The house’s deficiencies first came to light shortly after the sale.  
Although the house was “substantially flawed from the tip of the roof to the 
drainage system underneath,” the Rancourts “were as surprised as the 
 
 
4 
Wuestenbergs to learn of the existence and magnitude of the deficiencies 
identified after the transaction.”  (Emphasis added.)  
 
[¶6]  The Wuestenbergs sought to pursue mediation shortly after 
discovering the defects.  Unfortunately, the Rancourts were living and working 
out of state at the time and did not receive the Wuestenbergs’ mediation 
requests until they returned a few months later.  The Wuestenbergs filed a 
complaint in Superior Court in July 2014, alleging counts arising from the 
house’s sale and defects.  As amended in 2016, the complaint included the 
following counts: (1) Fraud—False Representation and Active Concealment; 
(2) Fraud—Failure to Disclose Known Defects; (3) Fraud—Material 
Misrepresentation as to Existence of Gardner Plans; (4) Negligent 
Misrepresentation; (5) Breach of Implied Warranty of Workmanlike 
Construction; (6) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability; (7) Negligence; 
(8) Strict Liability; (9) Violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA); 
(10) Punitive Damages; and (11) Breach of Contract—Purchase and Sale 
Agreement.  During the pretrial process, the court granted summary judgment 
for the Rancourts on Counts 5, 6, and 8.   
[¶7]  The court held a fifteen-day bench trial on the remaining counts in 
2018.  On January 15, 2019, the court issued extensive findings and granted 
 
 
5 
judgment in favor of the Rancourts on Counts 1-4, 7, and 9-11.  Following the 
court’s denial of the Wuestenbergs’ motion for further findings of fact, the 
Wuestenbergs timely appealed.  See M. R. App. P. 2B. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶8]  Our review is confined to the trial court’s explicit findings, see Ehret, 
2016 ME 43, ¶ 12, 135 A.3d 101; M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), which we review “for clear 
error and will affirm . . . if they are supported by competent evidence in the 
record, even if the evidence might support alternative findings of fact.”  
Handrahan v. Malenko, 2011 ME 15, ¶ 13, 12 A.3d 79 (quotation marks 
omitted).  As the party with the burden of proof at trial, the Wuestenbergs must 
establish on this appeal that contrary findings were compelled by the evidence.  
See id. 
[¶9]  The Wuestenbergs purport to raise a number of issues in this 
appeal, but they can be reduced to the pivotal issue of whether the Rancourts 
possessed the requisite knowledge with respect to the Wuestenbergs’ claims.  
The court’s findings that the Rancourts lacked the requisite knowledge are 
amply supported in the record, which includes hundreds of exhibits and 
transcripts from fifteen days of trial.  The Wuestenbergs’ individual arguments 
are addressed in turn. 
 
 
6 
A. 
Count 1 (Fraud—False Representation and Active Concealment) & 
Count 2 (Fraud—Failure to Disclose Known Defects) 
 
 
[¶10]  The Wuestenbergs first argue that the trial court denied their 
claims for false representation and failure to disclose based on an erroneous 
finding that the Rancourts lacked the requisite knowledge of the home’s 
defects.  Specifically, the Wuestenbergs contend that the Rancourts (1) made 
false representations and actively concealed certain defects in the home, and 
(2) failed to disclose known structural deficiencies resulting from their 
construction of the home.  On both counts they contend that the Rancourts 
committed common law fraud and violated 33 M.R.S. § 173(5) (2018).   
[¶11]  The sellers’ knowledge of the defects is a necessary element for 
both counts.  Pursuant to 33 M.R.S. § 173(5), the Rancourts were required to 
disclose to the Wuestenbergs “[a]ny known defects.”  (Emphasis added.)  As the 
trial court noted, “the contested elements of each claim concern the state of [the 
Rancourts’] knowledge of these shortcomings.”  To prove Counts 1 and 2, the 
Wuestenbergs needed to show that the Rancourts had knowledge of the falsity 
of their representations.  See Francis v. Stinson, 2000 ME 173, ¶¶ 38-39, 760 
A.2d 209.  “It is primarily for the factfinder to judge the credibility of witnesses 
and to consider the weight and significance of any other evidence.”  Tonge v. 
Waterville Realty Corp., 448 A.2d 902, 905 (Me. 1982).  We therefore “give due 
 
 
7 
regard to the trier of fact’s determinations on credibility, weight and 
significance of evidence.”  Id.   
[¶12]  Recounting Mr. Rancourt’s twenty-two hours of testimony, the 
trial court observed, “To describe the examination of Mr. Rancourt as thorough 
would be understatement to the point of falsehood.”  The trial court found his 
testimony to be credible and reinforced by other evidence, observing that “Mr. 
Rancourt never directly admitted having spoken falsely or concealed evidence 
of flaws in the house.”  Further “bearing on the court’s assessment of 
Mr. Rancourt’s testimony [was] his stubborn, mistaken, insistence that he had 
built the house ‘to Code.’”  The trial court’s explicit finding that the Rancourts 
“did not have the knowledge and understanding critical to each cause of action” 
is supported by competent evidence in the record.   
B. 
Count 3 (Fraud—Material Misrepresentation) 
 
[¶13]  The Wuestenbergs next argue that the court made erroneous 
factual findings as to whether the Rancourts understood what was meant by 
“blueprints” and whether they had knowledge of the location of the Gardner 
plans.  Liability for material misrepresentation requires that a defendant have 
knowingly or recklessly made a false representation of a material fact.  See 
 
 
8 
Letellier v. Small, 400 A.2d 371, 376 (Me. 1979).  The Wuestenbergs argue that 
the court made erroneous factual findings and erred in denying this claim.   
 
[¶14]  However, there was no error in the court’s finding that the 
“Rancourts did not understand they were being asked at the time of the sale for 
the [Gardner] plans . . . or, if they did understand it, they did not know where 
those plans were.”  The trial court “conclude[d] the Rancourts were to be 
believed when they testified they looked for the Gardner Plans and could not 
find them.”  Even if, as the Wuestenbergs suggest, the evidence might support 
alternative findings of fact, the trial court’s findings regarding the Gardner 
plans are well-supported by competent evidence in the record and not 
erroneous.  See Handrahan, 2011 ME 15, ¶ 13, 12 A.3d 79. 
C. 
Count 4 (Negligent Misrepresentation) & Count 7 (Negligence) 
 
[¶15]  The Wuestenbergs, once again contending that the court made 
erroneous findings regarding the Rancourts’ knowledge of the home’s defects 
and risks, next argue that the court erred in denying their claims for 
negligence.1  More specifically, the Wuestenbergs assert that the Rancourts had 
                                         
1  We have adopted section 552 (1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) as the appropriate 
standard for negligent misrepresentation claims.  See Rand v. Bath Iron Works, 2003 ME 122, ¶ 13, 
832 A.2d 771.  The standard is defined as follows: 
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other 
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the 
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary 
 
 
9 
a duty, pursuant to 33 M.R.S. § 173(5) and the disclosure form, “to use 
reasonable care to inform themselves” and disclose known risks.2   
[¶16]  The trial court did not reach the issue of whether there was a 
breachable duty in this case, because it determined that the Rancourts “did not 
possess the knowledge the Wuestenbergs blame[d] them for not providing, and 
they had no reason to know it in light of their uneventful interaction with 
inspecting authorities,” including the “failure of . . . the building inspector . . . or 
of any other inspecting or licensing authority[] to call the Rancourts’ work into 
question as the house was being built.”  Once again, these findings are 
supported by competent record evidence.   
                                         
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to 
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information. 
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) Torts § 552(1)) (emphasis omitted).  In applying this standard, 
“the fact-finder’s primary task is to ascertain whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable.”  Id.  
The Rancourts assert that this cause of action is precluded by the economic loss doctrine.  See 
Oceanside at Pine Point Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Peachtree Doors, Inc., 659 A.2d 267, 270-71 & n.4 
(Me. 1995).  We need not reach the issue because the trial court found that the Wuestenbergs’ own 
negligence would have precluded any recovery because they “declined an opportunity for diligent 
evaluation, an opportunity which was explicitly recorded in their purchase and sale agreement and 
which they read and evaluated before signing.”   
2  As previously discussed, 33 M.R.S. § 173(5) (2018) required the Rancourts to disclose “[a]ny 
known defects.”  (Emphasis added.)  The Rancourts posit that the statute must bar any negligent 
misrepresentation claim for defects that they allegedly “should have known” of.  We need not reach 
this issue either, because the trial court also found that the Rancourts had no reason to know of the 
defects.   
 
 
10 
D. 
Count 11 (Breach of Contract—Purchase and Sale Agreement) 
 
[¶17]  Finally, the Wuestenbergs argue that the trial court erred in 
denying their claim for breach of contract when it found that “the absence of 
mediation was not predicated on a refusal or any other conduct by [the 
Rancourts] that constituted a breach of contract.”  To obtain relief for a breach 
of contract, the plaintiff must “demonstrate that the defendant breached a 
material term of the contract, and that the breach caused the plaintiff to suffer 
damages.  Similarly, the question of whether there has been a breach of contract 
is a question of fact.”  Tobin v. Barter, 2014 ME 51, ¶ 10, 89 A.3d 1088 (quotation 
marks omitted).   
 
[¶18]  The mediation clause stated in pertinent part that “[i]f a party does 
not agree first to go to mediation, then that party will be liable for the other 
party’s legal fees in any subsequent litigation . . . in which the party who refused 
to go to mediation loses . . . .”  The trial court expressly found that “everyone 
acted in good faith and no one did anything wrong. . . . [T]he absence of 
mediation was not predicated on a refusal or any other conduct by [the 
Rancourts] that constituted a breach of contract.”  This, too, is supported by 
competent evidence in the record.   
 
 
11 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
[¶19]  Contrary to the Wuestenbergs’ arguments,3 the court’s explicit 
findings were comprehensive, detailed, and adequately supported by evidence 
in the record, including testimony and exhibits from the fifteen-day bench trial.  
As the trial court expressed, “[The] finding that there was no actionable 
misconduct by the Rancourts does not minimize the monetary and emotional 
cost of the dispute to the parties.”  Nevertheless, the trial court’s findings were 
supported by the record.  Accordingly, the court committed no error.  See 
Handrahan, 2011 ME 15, ¶ 13, 12 A.3d 79. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Timothy C. Woodcock, Esq. (orally), and David C. Pierson, Esq., Eaton Peabody, 
Bangor, for appellants Michael Wuestenberg and Rosemarie Wuestenberg 
 
David A. Goldman, Esq. (orally), Norman, Hanson & Detroy, LLC, Portland, for 
appellees Harry J. Rancourt, III, and Stephanie J. Rancourt 
 
 
Penobscot County Superior Court docket number CV-2014-129 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
3  We are unpersuaded by the Wuestenbergs’ argument regarding the Maine Unfair Trade 
Practices Act (Count 9), see 5 M.R.S. §§ 205-A – 214 (2018), because the trial court found that the sale 
of the house was not related to the Rancourts’ business.  The punitive damages claim (Count 10) fails 
because there was no underlying tort.  See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985) 
(“[P]unitive damages are available based upon tortious conduct only if the defendant acted with 
malice.”).