Title: Twomey v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

256 Ind. 128 (1971)
267 N.E.2d 176
DELBERT D. TWOMEY
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 569S115.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed March 9, 1971.
Rehearing denied April 20, 1971.
*129 Frederick B. Robinson, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, William F. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
ARTERBURN, C.J.
This appeal encompasses three criminal actions commenced by one affidavit and two separate indictments. The affidavit charged the appellant with the offenses of rape and sodomy on or about April 6, 1966. Both of the indictments charged the appellant with rape, sodomy, and kidnapping on or about April 9, 1966, and involved two teen-age girls as victims.
Defendant first contends that the trial court prevented him from having a fair trial and committed a reversible error when that court overruled his Motion for Dismissal and Discharge and Special Plea of Unjustifiable Delay filed by his defense counsel on September 25, 1968. The aforementioned Motion was based upon former Rule 1-4D, the pertinent part of which follows:
In determining that the trial court did not err in overruling defendant's motion for dismissal, we find the following proceedings relevant:
The proceedings indicate that until December 28, 1966, when the Court found the defendant competent to stand trial, his sanity was in issue.
Prior to defendant's motion to be discharged on September 25, 1968, he had asked for continuances on February 23, 1967, and on August 16, 1967. On January 11, 1968, defendant petitioned for his production for medical and psychiatric examinations. Then, a continuance of the sanity hearing was requested by the defendant on January 17, 1968. A further continuance was requested on January 31, 1968. It is therefore apparent that the defendant actively requested and participated in the sanity proceedings and examinations which resulted in his confinement in mental hospitals. Defendant was found to lack sufficient comprehension *132 to assist in his defense in April of 1968. The time period under former Rule 1-4D was tolled by these proceedings in which defendant participated and delayed. Therefore, defendant's Motion for Dismissal and Discharge and Special Plea of Unjustifiable Delay was properly overruled on September 25, 1968. State ex rel. Demers v. Miami Cir. Ct. (1968), 249 Ind. 616, 233 N.E.2d 777.
Dr. John E. Kooiker, a witness called on behalf of the defendant, was questioned by the court as follows:
The defendant thereafter moved that the court declare a mistrial on the basis that the question and answer pertaining to a recurrence of insanity was highly prejudicial to the defendant in that it could conceivably implant in the minds of the jurors that if they turned the defendant loose with temporary insanity, there would be a probability that he would be a menace to society. We note, however, that Instruction Number 48 on the subject of insanity advised the jury to "look to the defendant's entire conduct, his background, and all the evidence introduced in this cause by both the lay witnesses and by expert witnesses and all other surrounding circumstances, facts and evidence that you may find existed at a reasonable time before and at the time of the crimes charged, and within a reasonable time afterwards, together with all the other evidence relating thereto, ..." (Emphasis added) The instruction was given precisely as tendered by the defendant.
Once a plea of insanity is offered by a defendant, all relevant evidence is deemed admissible. In Wilson v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 454, 461, 217 N.E.2d 147, 151, we stated:
Furthermore, in support of this point, the defendant cites only authority from other jurisdictions. In overruling the defendant's objection, the trial judge cited his duty under Burns Indiana Stat. Ann. § 9-1704a:
The judge did not err in propounding the question to the witness.
Defendant next contends that the trial court committed reversible error at law when it overruled his motion for the court to instruct the jury to return a directed verdict in favor of the defendant for the reason that the State had failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane and competent at the time he committed the crimes at issue. In Johnson v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 324, 328, 264 N.E.2d 57, 59, we said:
*134 The jurors who sat and heard the conflicting reports as to the defendant's sanity could reasonably have elected to place greater weight upon the testimony of some of the expert witnesses.
Defendant's fourth contention is that the trial court committed error when it sustained the State's objection to the admission of defendant's Exhibit D, which was a transcript of the evidence of a prior sanity hearing. Defendant's testifying witness, Dr. G.E. Widdifield, had apparently read the transcript before his examination of the defendant. We point out that the exhibit was a classical example of hearsay in that it was a written record not compiled by the testifying witness, nor was the party who did prepare it in the courtroom available for cross examination. Defendant has also failed to cite any authority in support of his position that it was error for the trial court to deny this exhibit as evidence.
The appellant, in tendered instructions numbered twenty-five and twenty-six, claims error in their rejection by the trial court. These instructions, in substance, told the jury that the application of the mouth to the genital parts of the body of another person does not constitute sodomy. In certain instances this Court has held that such acts (oral copulation) do constitute sodomy and for that reason there was no error in the refusal of the trial court to give these instructions to the jury. We recently upheld a conviction of sodomy in Barnes v. State (February 9, 1971), 255 Ind. 674, 266 N.E.2d 617. The constitutionality of this sodomy statute has been previously determined by this Court. Phillips v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 150, 222 N.E.2d 821; Estes v. State (1964), 244 Ind. 691, 195 N.E.2d 471.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Givan, Prentice and Hunter, JJ., concur; DeBruler, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported 267 N.E.2d 176.