Title: Ex Parte State Dept. of Human Resources

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

834 So. 2d 117 (2002)
Ex parte STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.
(In re J.P. v. State Department of Human Resources
and
N.F.
v.
State Department of Human Resources).
1001795.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 3, 2002.
*118 J. Coleman Campbell and Lynn S. Merrill, asst. attys. gen., Department of Human Resources, for petitioner.
James C. Alison, Huntsville, for respondent J.P.
Reta A. McKannan, Huntsville, for respondent N.F.
BROWN, Justice.
The Madison Juvenile Court entered an order terminating the parental rights of N.F., the mother, after finding that the children's maternal grandmother was not a viable alternative to termination. We granted certiorari review to determine whether the Court of Civil Appeals erred in reversing that order. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and render a judgment affirming the judgment of the trial court.
In August 1996, the Madison County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") received a report that two minor children, W.R.F. IV and S.F., were being inadequately supervised. After it received an additional report in December 1997, DHR reached an agreement with the mother and placed the children with J.P. ("the maternal grandmother"). In February 1998, the maternal grandmother notified DHR that she could no longer care for the children because she was getting married and her husband-to-be did not want the children living with them. Without DHR's consent, J.P. physically placed the children in the home of a married couple she knew.
The children continued to live with the married couple until May 2000, when the couple began having marital problems and requested that the children be moved. At that time, DHR asked the maternal grandmother if she would again take custody of the children. At the termination hearing, the maternal grandmother testified that she declined custody at that time because her husband was terminally ill and all of her attention was focused on him. However, the social worker testified that the maternal grandmother told her that she was declining custody because her husband was very much opposed to the children's being placed with them. Although DHR then evaluated the maternal great-grandparents as a suitable alternative to terminating the mother's parental rights, DHR determined that the great-grandparents were elderly, that they had a limited support system available to them, and that *119 they had not had any contact with the children or the mother for a number of years.
In May 2000, DHR petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the mother and W.R.F. III (the father). Shortly before the scheduled termination hearing, the maternal grandmother petitioned to intervene in the action, claiming that she could now accept custody of the children because her husband had died.
At the termination hearing, the maternal grandmother testified that she could now devote sufficient time to the children because she no longer had to care for her husband. The maternal grandmother also testified that she lived in a four-bedroom home that would be paid off by mortgage insurance she had had on her husband's life and that each child would have his own bedroom. If the children were allowed to live with her, the maternal grandmother stated, they would be able to attend a good school that is located less than two miles from her home. Because the maternal grandmother works, the children would have to attend after-school care. She testified that she works as a hairdresser and that her schedule is flexible, so the children would have to be in after-school care for only approximately one hour each day. Finally, the maternal grandmother testified that she would have the means to support the children because she earns approximately $35,000 per year and she will be receiving $175,000 as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy on her deceased husband's life.
Following the hearing, the trial court terminated the mother's parental rights, stating:
"Instead, the maternal grandmother appears to have failed her own children and her grandchildren. Her decisions *120 are consistently made for her own selfish interest. She left the state of Kansas and left her daughter in foster care over a matter that appeared to involve her daughter staying out later than she was allowed. The grandmother admitted that she did not raise her own children and thus their drug problems and emotional problems were not her fault. She admitted that [the mother] was either in [the] custody of her father or in foster care for the majority of her life. As well articulated in the opinion of the guardian to the court, dated September 14, 2000,
"`... She must have understood that moving to another state would greatly hinder any effort of hers to regain her daughter's custody. I think it reasonable to conclude that she [the maternal grandmother] had other priorities in her life at that time.'
". . . .
The mother and maternal grandmother appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals; that court reversed the trial court's judgment terminating the mother's parental rights and remanded the case to the trial court "to consider the maternal grandmother's present ability to care for the children in evaluating whether her having custody is a viable alternative to terminating the mother's parental rights." J.P. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 834 So. 2d 111, 114-15 (Ala.Civ.App.2001).
DHR petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Court of Civil Appeals "substituted [its] opinion for that of the trial court regarding the weight and credibility of the maternal grandmother's testimony about her current situation, as well as her ability to provide these children a permanent, and, therefore, viable placement alternative."
Because this case concerns an issue of child custody, this Court presumes that the trial court's findings are correct, and we will not reverse its judgment absent a clear abuse of discretion or plain error. See Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Human Res., 682 So. 2d 459, 460 (Ala.1996).
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Human Res., 682 So. 2d  at 460.
In its opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
J.P. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 834 So. 2d  at 114. Based on its opinion in V.M. v. State Department of Human Resources, 710 So. 2d 915 (Ala.Civ.App.1998), the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's order terminating the mother's parental rights.
In V.M., the Court of Civil Appeals determined that a mother, who had previously experienced bouts of drug and alcohol addiction, had met almost all of the goals DHR had set for her, and it reversed a trial court's order terminating her parental rights. In addition, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's finding that the maternal grandmother was not a viable alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights. The Court of Civil Appeals stated:
710 So. 2d  at 921.
Although the main opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals in the instant case quotes the above-quoted language from V.M., Judge Thompson, joined by Judge Pittman, dissented, noting:
"In this case, DHR attempted to investigate the maternal grandmother's home, but she informed the social worker that she would not take the children. She expressed no interest in obtaining custody of the children until the eleventh hour before the termination hearing.... The trial court did not believe the grandmother was sincere in explaining her refusal to take the children, or, apparently, in testifying that she was, as *122 of that date, in a position to, and was willing to, take care of the children.
"`. . . .'
834 So. 2d  at 117 (Thompson, J., dissenting). Having reviewed the record, we agree with Judge Thompson's conclusion that the facts here are distinguishable from those presented to the Court of Civil Appeals in V.M. Most notably, the maternal grandmother's continued rejection of the children until the death of her husband was a strong indicator of whether she had a present desire to care for these children as late as 10 days before the termination hearing.
The trial court's judgment in this case was based on ore tenus evidence. Moreover, the trial court's determination as to the maternal grandmother's ability to care for the children was based, at least in part, upon the maternal grandmother's often conflicting testimony. Thus, the Court of Civil Appeals was required to apply a presumption of correctness to the trial court's finding that placement of the children with the maternal grandmother was not a suitable alternative to termination. Applying that same presumption to the record now before us, we cannot say that the trial court's conclusion that the maternal grandmother provided no suitable alternative to termination constituted an abuse of discretion or that it was plainly and palpably wrong. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals and render a judgment affirming the judgment of the trial court.
REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, HARWOOD, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
MOORE, C.J., and JOHNSTONE, J., dissent.
[1]  The record reflects that the children were placed with the maternal grandmother in December 1997.
[2]  Although the trial court states that the married couple began having problems in March 1998, the record reflects that the children remained with the married couple until they started experiencing marital difficulties in May 2000.