Title: Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc.1984 WY 94687 P.2d 885Case Number: 84-4Decided: 08/28/1984MELODI BAKER AND LORRAINE BELL, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

WENDY'S OF MONTANA, INC., A MONTANA CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS IN WYOMING; WENDY'S INTERNATIONAL, AN OHIO CORPORATION, AND SCOTT SMITH, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
MELODI BAKER AND 
LORRAINEBELL, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

WENDY'S OF MONTANA, INC., 
A MONTANA CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS IN WYOMING; WENDY'S INTERNATIONAL, AN OHIO 
CORPORATION, AND SCOTT SMITH, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

 
 
Stuart S. Healy, 
Sheridan, for 
appellants.

Michael K. 
Davis, Sheridan, and J. Dwaine Roybal of Keefer, Roybal, Hanson, Stacey & 
Jarussi, Billings, Mont., for 
appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN* and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* BROWN, J., did not 
participate in the decision of this case.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The appeal with which 
this opinion is concerned was originated in the trial court by appellants Melodi 
Baker and Lorraine Bell. The relevant portions of the complaint alleged assaults 
and batteries as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress upon the 
appellants by Scott Smith, an employee of appellee Wendy's of Montana, Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as Wendy's), which company was also the appellants' 
employer and contributed to the Wyoming worker's compensation fund in their 
behalf. Wendy's filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted on the 
ground that the claim was barred by the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, § 
27-12-101, et seq., W.S. 1977.

FACTS

[¶2.]     Lorraine Bell's claim 
flowing from alleged assaults and batteries recounts three specific incidents: 
two when Smith allegedly touched her on the breast and one when he is said to 
have touched her buttocks in an offensive manner. Ms. Bell further alleges that 
Smith uttered a particularly obscene remark, which she contends was addressed to 
her, and she also says that he made offensive gestures in her presence. This 
appellant seeks to recover $23 in medical expenses, $355 in damages for past 
lost wages, an undetermined amount for future lost wages and $30,000 for 
emotional and mental injury, which damages, she contends, resulted from these 
intentional improper acts of Mr. Smith.

[¶3.]     Melodi Baker alleges 
that Smith also offensively touched her buttocks twice. She says that these 
touchings caused her to have headaches, and she further charges that Smith made 
sexual advances on at least two occasions. Ms. Baker was especially upset when 
Smith allegedly gave her an order concerning the obscene interplay that he 
wanted her to have with the male customers. As a result of these purported 
improprieties, Ms. Baker seeks to recover $142 damages for past lost wages and 
$40,000 damages for mental anguish.

[¶4.]     In addition, the 
appellants jointly ask $1,000,000 in punitive damages.

[¶5.]     It is urged that the 
liability of Wendy's arises out of its negligent failure to control Scott 
Smith's conduct and its negligent approval, ratification and participation in 
the intentional tortious acts of its managerial agent.

[¶6.]     It is the appellants' 
theory that Wendy's should be held vicariously liable for compensatory and 
punitive damages for Smith's intentionally tortious conduct resulting in injury 
to appellants for the reason that the corporation was made aware of these 
touchings, utterances and other improprieties and did not adequately remedy or 
monitor the situation. The appellants go on to say that, in these circumstances, 
the injuries complained of were not covered by the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act and the contributing employer is not, therefore, immune from suit by its 
employees. 

THE ISSUE AND 
HOLDING

[¶7.]     The principal issue 
which we must resolve is whether or not the exclusive-remedy provision of the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act bars the appellants' claims against Wendy's.1 We will hold that appellants' 
damages arise from "injuries" received in the scope of and arising out of their 
employment and, therefore, their sole remedy is to apply to the worker's 
compensation fund for such relief as it affords. The contributing employer is 
therefore immune from the suits which have been lodged by the 
appellants.

[¶8.]     The summary judgment 
will be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

[¶9.]     In 1914, Art. 10, § 4 
of the Wyoming Constitution was amended to read as 
follows:

"No law shall be enacted 
limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death 
of any person. Any contract or agreement with any employee waiving any right to 
recover damages for causing the death or injury of any employee shall be void. 
As to all extra hazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for 
the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid 
compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each 
person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as 
the result of such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to the 
culpable negligence of the injured employee. Such fund or funds shall be 
accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained in such manner as may 
be provided by law. The right of each 
employee to compensation from such fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the 
place of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing as 
required by law to such fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of any 
such injuries or death." (Emphasis added.)

Prior to the 
1914 amendment, Art. 10, § 4 consisted of only the first two sentences. The 
purpose of the amendment, as expressed by Ch. 124, S.L. of Wyoming 1915, was to 
authorize the establishment of an Industrial Accident Fund - financed by 
industry and underwritten by the state - from which injured employees and the 
dependents of deceased employees who were injured or killed in covered 
employment could recover stipulated sums from the compensation fund without 
regard to fault, save only those instances where injury or death occurred 
through the culpability of the worker.

[¶10.]  Following the amendment to Art. 10, § 4, 
the legislature enacted a worker's compensation law which was the legislative 
embodiment of a compromise between employers and employees who recognized the 
need for a new system to compensate employees for employment-related injuries 
without the employee having to rely upon tort concepts. Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 
641 P.2d 1235, 1237 (1982). See also Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349 (1981); Stephenson v. Mitchell, Wyo., 569 P.2d 95 (1977); Zancanelli v. Central 
Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981 (1918). The statutory 
trade-off for the employers contributing to the fund on behalf of their 
employees was the provision which gave the employer immunity from "all other 
rights and remedies" (§ 27-12-103(a), supra) which the injured employee might 
theretofore have possessed. In return, the covered employees and their dependent 
heirs received the benefit of rapid and certain relief for work-related injuries 
and death in exchange for forgoing their right to bring common-law actions in 
tort against their employers who were contributing to their accounts in the 
worker's compensation fund. Meyer v. 
Kendig, supra, 641 P.2d  at 1238; Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 
Wyo., 641 P.2d 1247, 1249 (1982); Zancanelli v. Central 
Coal & Coke Co., supra, 173 P.  at 988.

[¶11.]  The nature of the law in question is that 
of an industrial insurance act. This court originally placed this interpretation 
upon Wyoming's 
Worker's Compensation Act in Zancanelli 
v. Central Coal & Coke Co., supra, and we have consistently reiterated 
this view. Meyer v. Kendig, supra; Bence v. Pacific Power and Light 
Company, Wyo., 631 P.2d 13 (1981); Barnette v. Doyle, supra; Markle v. 
Williamson, Wyo., 518 P.2d 621 (1974). The industrial-insurance 
concept evolved from the proposition that industrial accidents are a cost of 
production and should be borne by the industry. Zancanelli v. Central 
Coal & Coke Co., supra, 173 P.  at 989.

[¶12.]  In Cottonwood Steel Corporation v. Hansen, 
Wyo., 655 P.2d 1226 (1982), we took time to point out as clearly as we knew how 
that tort law was not to be considered an ingredient of the worker's 
compensation formula because, under our statutes, worker's compensation 
liabilities and obligations are structured within the realm of contract law - it 
is like industrial insurance. As between the employer and the employee, except 
where the employee is culpably negligent, worker's compensation in Wyoming is 
not structured as a tort concept, where duty, breach of duty, injury, proximate 
cause and damages become the concerns of the litigants and the courts. In Cottonwood, we 
said:

"The amendment to Art. 
10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and subsequent enabling legislation did not 
contemplate that tort law would hold any office in the Worker's Compensation Act 
except that the employer could defend against claims of the injured employee on 
the grounds that he or she was culpably negligent. Soon after the amendment to 
Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, this court said that the Wyoming 
worker's compensation scheme was in the nature of an industrial-accident policy. 
Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke 
Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981 (1918). See: Hotelling v. Fargo-Western Oil Co., 33 
Wyo. 240, 238 P. 542 (1925); In re 
Byrne, 53 Wyo. 519, 86 P.2d 1095, 1101 (1939); and Fuhs v. Swenson, 58 Wyo. 293, 131 P.2d 333, 337 (1942). See also Markle v. 
Williamson, supra, where we said:

"`To say that workmen's 
compensation in Wyoming is in the nature of insurance is to say it stems from 
contract. Indeed, the clear implication in Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 
25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 989, is that our Workmen's Compensation Act is in 
contract and not in tort.' 518 P.2d  at 624.

"We have never changed 
our minds about that proposition. Sometimes we have had trouble keeping tort 
concepts out of the worker's compensation law, Stephenson v. Mitchell, Wyo., 569 P.2d 95 (1977), and Meyer v. Kendig, 
supra, but we have never deviated from our adherence to the proposition that the 
worker's compensation law of this state is in the nature of industrial-accident 
insurance." 655 P.2d  at 1236.

[¶13.]  For all the same reasons that an employer 
may not avoid paying a compensation claim where the worker is injured through 
his or her own ordinary negligence, the worker does not have a tort action 
against the employer when he (or it) is negligent and the worker is covered. 
This is so because the act creates liability without fault on the part of the 
contributing employer and likewise provides the employer with absolute immunity 
from tort actions including the employer's violation of his duty of care whether 
the negligence is ordinary or culpable. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 
supra, 641 P.2d  at 1250; Barnette v. 
Doyle, supra, 622 P.2d  at 1352. This is to say that immunity is absolute. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 
supra, 641 P.2d  at 1252 (Rose, C.J., specially concurring). 

[¶14.]  Our various interpretations of § 
27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977, reflect the absolute immunity afforded contributing 
employers under the worker's compensation laws of Wyoming.

"It is clear that the 
language `take the place of any and all rights of action' and `shall be 
exclusive of all other rights and remedies', means just what is said and needs 
no judicial construction. * * * [A]s a general proposition, the exclusive remedy 
of the Wyoming workmen's compensation laws is the only remedy available unless 
the employment was unlawful or illegal." Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, Wyo., 
541 P.2d 39, 48 (1975). "As to a contributing employer, compensation from the 
fund was made the sole and exclusive remedy for a covered workman." Markle v. Williamson, supra, 518 P.2d  at 
625.

THE LAW APPLICABLE TO 
THIS APPEAL

[¶15.]  Appellants set forth several contentions 
which they urge have the effect of removing their claims from the worker's 
compensation law.

The Appellants' 
Contentions

"The appellants contend 
that the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act does not provide absolute immunity to 
an employer for intentional torts of assault and battery and intentional 
outrageous conduct inflicting emotional distress committed by a supervisory 
agent of the employer because:

"1. An intentional act of 
assault and battery or obscene conduct is not an `accident' for which Worker's 
Compensation benefits are provided.

"2. Mental anxiety is not 
an `injury' for which benefits are provided under the Act.

"3. The injuries to 
appellants resulting from the tortious acts of the managing agent of appellee, 
Wendy's of Montana, Inc., while occurring `in the course of' employment did not 
`arise out of' the employment from the standpoint of the statutory 
definitions."

[¶16.]  The single issue for our decision in this 
appeal is: Was the claimed harm - i.e., assault and battery to the persons of 
the appellants and intentional infliction of emotional distress - a covered 
"injury" within the contemplation of the Worker's Compensation Act? If the 
appellants' allegations of harm constitute "injury" as conceived by the Act, and 
if it was inflicted when the appellants were within the scope of their 
employment, there cannot be an independent right of action against Wendy's 
because that company is the contributing employer of the appellants and would 
therefore be absolutely immune from suit.2 The test for determining whether 
the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act operate to 
prevent actions against covered employers for intentional acts of employees is 
whether or not the claimed injury would be compensable under the 
Act.

"In determining whether 
the workmen's compensation statute in general and the exlusivity provision in 
particular preclude an employee from bringing an action at law against his 
employer for fraud, defamation, false imprisonment or the like, most courts have 
inquired whether the injury complained of is one which was compensable under the 
Compensation Act." Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1279, 1282.

[¶17.]  Assuming this to be the test for deciding 
whether the worker's compensation statute, § 27-12-103, provides the workers 
with an exclusive remedy under the facts of this case, it becomes necessary to 
determine whether the kinds of injuries which are claimed by the appellants 
would be compensable under the Worker's Compensation Act.

Emotional Injury Is 
Compensable

[¶18.]  The relevant Wyoming statute provides as 
follows:

"`Injury' means any harmful change in the human organism 
other than normal aging, and includes damage to or loss of a prosthetic 
appliance and death, arising out of and in the course of employment while at 
work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer, 
incurred while at work in places where the employer's business requires an 
employee's presence and which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties 
incident to the business." (Emphasis added.) Section 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 
1977.

[¶19.]  The trial court found that the 
appellants' claims were for "psychic injuries" when the judge 
said:

"It seems to me that the 
balance we have to strike here is that if they're covered, if they could get 
benefits under the Act, then the employer has immunity. And it seems to me that 
that definition is just so broad, any detrimental harm to a human organism, or 
whatever that - short of aging, I think that encompasses psychic 
injuries."

[¶20.]  It is well established that mental 
disorders are compensable under the various worker's compensation acts of the 
country. The Annotation at 97 A.L.R.3d 161 collects cases in which mental 
disorders have been held to be compensable. In Albertson's, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation 
Appeals Board, 131 Cal. App. 3d 308, 182 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1982), the plaintiff 
was employed at a bakery in an Albertson's store. She had problems getting along 
with her supervisor, who threatened to get rid of her, and told her "`"[y]ou 
better get your butt in high gear because there's nothing here to sell."'" The 
plaintiff in that case claimed she was "`so embarrassed that [she] just wanted 
to die,'" and that she was forced to take tranquilizers to compensate for her 
depression and other psychological factors. This is Ms. Bell's claim in the case 
at bar. The court, in Albertson's, held that the claims were 
compensable.

"* * * `. . . In order to 
find a physical industrial injury, a single identifiable traumatic experience 
need not be shown. [Citations.] The disabling injury may be the result of the 
cumulative effect of each day's stresses and strains. [Citation.] We perceive no 
logical basis for a different requirement for a psychoneurotic injury. To one 
experiencing it, such an injury is as real and disabling as a physical injury.' 
* * * (Callahan v. Workers' Comp. Appeals 
Bd. (1978) 85 Cal. App. 3d 621, 628, fn.3, 149 Cal.Rptr 647.)" 182 Cal. Rptr. 
at 307.

[¶21.]  In Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of 
Industry, Labor and Human Relations, 72 Wis.2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976), 
the plaintiff suffered a nervous breakdown which she attributed to the heavy 
workload in the workplace together with the fact that her supervisor 
was

"* * * negative, brusque, 
and belittling, especially to women, and that he challenged and belittled any 
decision [the plaintiff] would make." 240 N.W.2d  at 131.

The Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin held that the injury was compensable, so long as the 
plaintiff's mental disturbances were caused by the stress and strains of her 
employment.

[¶22.]  In Carter v. General Motors Corporation, 
361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960), the plaintiff was working as a machine 
operator in a General Motors plant. When he attempted to follow proper 
procedures in doing his job, he fell behind. When he took shortcuts, he violated 
procedures at the plant, and was berated by his supervisor. As a result of all 
this, he claimed he suffered a disabling psychosis. The Michigan Supreme Court 
held that the injury was compensable.

[¶23.]  See also Todd v. Goostree, Mo. App., 493 S.W.2d 411 (1973); for mental injury resulting from overwork, Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 119 Ariz. 51, 579 P.2d 555 (1978); for shock resulting from 
having found the plaintiff's supervisor's body after he had committed suicide, 
Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 
36 N.Y.2d 505, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 330 N.E.2d 603 (1975); and for disability 
resulting from stress associated with a demotion, Korter v. EBI Companies, Inc., 46 Or. 
App. 43, 610 P.2d 312 (1980). 

[¶24.]  These above-cited cases holding mental 
injury to be compensable under worker's compensation laws are consistent with 
the holding of this court on the subject.

[¶25.]  In Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, Wyo., 
678 P.2d 874 (1984), we held that nontraumatically caused mental injury was 
compensable under certain work conditions. We noted with approval that Larson in 
1B Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 42.20, has delineated three types of psychic 
injury:

(1) a mental stimulus 
which causes a physical injury;

(2) a physical trauma 
which causes a nervous injury; and

(3) a mental stimulus 
which causes a nervous injury.

[¶26.]  In the case at bar, the appellants charge 
that they received both a physical trauma (touching) which caused a nervous 
injury (category (2) of Larson, supra) and a mental stimulus which caused a 
nervous injury (category (3) of Larson, supra).

[¶27.]  In Consolidated Freightways, we addressed a 
set of facts which contemplated category (3) of Larson, supra, i.e., a mental 
stimulus which causes a nervous injury. In holding this category of 
nontraumatically caused psychic injury to be compensable, we said that it must 
have resulted from a situation of greater dimension than the day-to-day mental 
stresses and tensions which all employees must experience, citing Wisconsin 
Supreme Court authority from Swiss 
Colony, Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Health Relations, supra, 
and School District # 1, Village of Brown 
Deer v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis.2d 370, 
215 N.W.2d 373 (1974). We went on to cite other states' authority, all holding 
that nontraumatically induced mental injury is compensable according to the 
distinctions which are described in the opinions cited at 678 P.2d  at 877. We 
then held, in Consolidated 
Freightways, that the facts of that case supported a finding that the 
nontraumatically induced injury resulted from a situation of greater dimensions 
than the worker's day-to-day mental stresses and tensions that were a part of 
his daily work life and therefore his injury was 
compensable.

[¶28.]  In similar fashion, the verbal abuse and 
offensive manners of appellants' supervisor created an employment condition 
characterized by pressures and tensions beyond those usually experienced by 
employees. Under our holding in Consolidated Freightways, the 
psychological injuries resulting from such unusual employment strain qualify for 
compensation under the state Worker's Compensation Act.

[¶29.]  With respect to category (2) of Larson, 
supra, we can find no reason to accept concepts which argue that a physical 
trauma which causes a nervous injury should not be regarded as compensable while 
holding, in Consolidated Freightways v. 
Drake, supra, that a mental stimulus which causes a nervous injury is 
compensable (category (3) of Larson, supra).

[¶30.]  Larson says of category (2), supra, 
physical trauma causing nervous injury:

"Conversely, when there 
has been a physical accident or trauma, and claimant's disability is increased 
or prolonged by traumatic neurosis, conversion hysteria, or hysterical 
paralysis, it is now uniformly held that the full disability including the 
effects of the neurosis is compensable. Dozens of cases, involving almost every 
conceivable kind of neurotic, psychotic, depressive, or hysterical symptom, 
functional overlay, or personality disorder, have accepted this rule."3 Larson, supra, § 
42.22.

Arising Out of the 
Employment

[¶31.]  The parties to this appeal agree that the 
appellants' injuries occurred "in the course of" their employment or "in the 
scope of" their employment, as those phrases have been interpreted by this 
court. Cottonwood Steel Corporation v. 
Hansen, supra; In re Willey, 
Wyo., 571 P.2d 248 (1977); In re 
Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897 (1947). Appellants, however, contend that 
while they suffered their injuries in the course of employment, the injuries did 
not "aris[e] out of" employment within the meaning of § 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 
1977.4 We have held that, in order for 
this section of the Act to be complied with, there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the course of employment, and that the causal connection 
is supplied

"* * * when there is a 
nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or 
requirement of the employment." In re 
Willey, supra, 571 P.2d  at 250.

[¶32.]  We have said:

"* * * [T]he injury is 
compensable if it arises out of and in the course of employment. This requirement emphasizes the need for a 
causal connection between the injury and the employment. Such a causal 
connection is supplied when there is a nexus between the injury and some 
condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment. Parrott v. 
Industrial Commission of Ohio, 145 Ohio St. 66, 60 N.E.2d 660. See, Standard Oil Co. v. Smith, 56 Wyo. 537, 
111 P.2d 132; In re Jensen, supra; Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's 
Compensation Department v. Boston, Wyo., 445 P.2d 548. Cf., White Ditching Company v. Giddeon, Wyo., 
413 P.2d 45. It is this requirement, and only this requirement, which is 
envisioned by the language contained in § 27-311(n) [now § 27-12-102(a)(xii), 
W.S. 1977]." (Emphasis added.) In re 
Willey, supra, 571 P.2d  at 250, quoted in Cottonwood Steel Corporation v. Hansen, 
supra, 655 P.2d  at 1232-1233.

Larson, in his 
treatise, Workmen's Compensation Law, says:

"In practice the `course 
of employment' and `arising out of employment' tests are not, and should not be, 
applied entirely independently; they are both parts of a single test of 
work-connection, and therefore deficiencies in the strength of one factor are 
sometimes allowed to be made up by strength in the other." 1A Larson, supra, at 
§ 29.00, p. 5-354.

[¶33.]  It cannot be seriously argued that the 
facts of this case do not meet the nexus test quoted from our opinions supra. 
According to that test, the injury clearly arose out of the 
employment.

CONCLUSION

[¶34.]  We hold that the injuries complained of 
are compensable from the worker's compensation fund under the Worker's 
Compensation Act; that the injuries do arise out of the employment in question; 
and, therefore, the employer is absolutely immune from the suits brought by 
these appellants.

[¶35.]  Affirmed.

1 Section 27-12-103(a), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"The rights and remedies 
provided in this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] for an employee and his 
dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights and remedies 
against any employer making contributions required by this act or his 
employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the employees are 
culpably negligent, but do not supersede any rights and remedies available to an 
employee and his dependents against any other person." (Emphasis 
added.)

2 See n. 1, 
supra.

3 See n. 68 of § 42.22, 
Larson, supra, for extensive authority.

4 Section 
27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977, provides:

"`Injury' means any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging, and includes 
damage to or loss of a prosthetic appliance and death, arising out of and in the 
course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer, incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. The term does not 
include:

"(A) Any communicable 
disease unless the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the nature of 
the employment;

"(B) Injury caused by an 
employee's intoxication or by his willful intention to injure or kill himself or 
another; or

"(C) Injury due solely to 
the culpable negligence of the injured employee."