Title: CLAUDE ROBERT CROSBY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CLAUDE ROBERT CROSBY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 44Case Number: No. S-10-0153Decided: 03/10/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

CLAUDE 
ROBERT CROSBY,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Original 
Proceeding

Certified 
Questions from 

The 
District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, Chief 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  The circuit court imposed a sentence on 
Claude Robert Crosby that exceeded the maximum authorized by the relevant 
statute.  After serving part of the 
sentence in the community corrections facility where he had been placed, Mr. 
Crosby left without authorization.  
He was charged with escape and claims the charge is improper because he 
was serving an illegal sentence at the time he left the facility.  Upon the parties' stipulation, the 
district court certified two questions to this Court:

 
 

1.    
Whether the original 
sentence was void ab initio in its 
entirety, or is it an illegal sentence subject to correction under Rule 35(a), 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure?

 
 

2.    
Given that the escape 
charge in the above-captioned matter was filed at a time when the sentence was 
illegal, is it proper to continue the prosecution of the Defendant for escape, 
should this Court find that the original sentence was illegal and subject to 
correction? 

 
 
[¶2]  We answer the first part of question 1 
"no"; the original sentence was not void ab initio in its entirety.  We answer the second part of question 1 
"yes"; the original sentence was subject to correction under W.R.Cr.P. 
35(a).  We answer the second 
question "yes"; it was proper to continue the prosecution of Mr. Crosby for 
escape.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  Mr. Crosby was arrested in Converse 
County, Wyoming on December 6, 2007, for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2009).  He was incarcerated in the 
Converse County Detention Center.  
On December 11, 2007, he was found guilty in circuit court of driving 
under the influence, his third offense.  
The circuit court sentenced him to 365 days in jail with 270 days 
suspended and 5 days credit for time served from his arrest until sentencing, 
leaving a balance of 90 days to be served.

 
 
[¶4]  Mr. Crosby served two more days in the 
detention center and was then transferred to a correctional facility in Campbell 
County to serve the 88 days remaining on his sentence.  Prior to the expiration of the 88 days, 
Mr. Crosby allegedly left the facility for his work site, reported to his 
employer and then left the work site without permission.  He was charged with escape in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a)(ii)(A) (LexisNexis 2009).  On March 4, 2010, he was apprehended and 
brought to the Campbell County detention center.  

 
 
[¶5]  On April 30, 2010, the circuit court in 
Converse County, which had imposed the DUI sentence, filed an Order Nunc Pro 
Tunc reducing Mr. Crosby's sentence of 365 days to 180 days with 90 days 
suspended.  Subsequently, Mr. Crosby 
filed a motion to dismiss the escape charge in Campbell County asserting it 
could not stem from an illegal sentence.  
The State responded, contending the original sentence remained in force 
because it had not been appealed and could not be challenged in a collateral 
proceeding.   The State argued 
further that the circuit court properly corrected the sentence and the 90 days 
Mr. Crosby was ordered to serve was within the maximum sentence authorized by 
the statute.  The district court 
certified the questions set forth in paragraph 1 above to this 
Court.

 
 
 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]  The question of whether a sentence is 
illegal is one of law, which we review de 
novo.  Sarr v. State, 2007 WY 140, ¶ 9, 166 P.3d 891, 894 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]  Mr. Crosby was found guilty of violating 
§ 31-5-233(b)(ii).  It was his third 
conviction under the statute within five years; therefore, pursuant to § 
31-5-233(e), he was subject to a maximum sentence of six months.  The 365 day sentence imposed by the 
circuit court clearly exceeded the six month maximum sentence and was, 
therefore, illegal.  Sarr, ¶ 9, 166 P.3d  at 894 (". . . an 
illegal sentence is one that exceeds statutory limits.").  W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) provides that a court may 
correct an illegal sentence at any time.  
Here, the circuit court properly corrected the illegal sentence after it 
came to its attention.   

 
 
[¶8]  The question this Court must decide is 
whether the illegal sentence was void in its entirety so as to also void the 
escape charge.  Wyoming law is clear 
that when part of a divisible sentence is illegal or improper, it may be 
modified by vacating or striking that part which is illegal or improper and 
affirming the balance.  Engberg v. State, 874 P.2d 890, 891 
(Wyo. 1994); Roose v. State, 753 P.2d 574, 580 (Wyo. 1988); Barnes v. 
State, 670 P.2d 302, 304 (Wyo. 1983); Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1038 
(Wyo. 1979).  When a district court 
exceeds its sentencing authority and the sentence is divisible, we have the 
option of remanding for resentencing or simply mandating that the illegal 
portion be stricken.  Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1365 
(Wyo. 1993).

 
 
[¶9]  Whether this Court will strike the 
illegal portion of a sentence depends upon the circumstances.  In Sorenson and Barnes, the Court declined to do so. 
 The district court in Sorenson had sentenced the defendant to 
incarceration as authorized by statute but then, without statutory authority, 
imposed psychiatric treatment as a mandatory condition of parole.  In Barnes, the district court sentenced the 
defendant to one year in jail and imposed a $1,000 fine as statutorily 
permitted, but also ordered him to make restitution, which neither the 
sentencing statute nor the restitution statute in effect at the time allowed 
except in cases of suspended sentences or probation.  Concluding the district courts might 
have imposed entirely different sentences had they known the sentences they 
fashioned were in part improper, this Court remanded the cases to district court 
for re-sentencing.    

 
 
[¶10]  In Roose, 753 P.2d 574, however, the 
district court sentenced the defendant to the maximum term of imprisonment 
authorized by statute and ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to any 
other sentence imposed upon him in the future.  Similarly in Engberg, 874 P.2d 890, the defendant was 
sentenced to life in prison to run consecutively with the remainder of an 
unexpired life sentence in Missouri and any sentence imposed in Missouri for 
escape.  In both cases, this Court 
affirmed the terms of imprisonment but vacated the portion making the terms 
consecutive to other sentences, concluding the district courts had no authority 
to impose those conditions.     

 
 
[¶11]  Mr. Crosby's situation is more like Roose and Engberg than it is Sorenson or Barnes.  The circuit court was authorized to 
sentence Mr. Crosby to a maximum sentence of six months.  It was not authorized to sentence him to 
serve more than six months.  We 
affirm the term of imprisonment up to six months and strike the remainder.  Mr. Crosby had not yet served six months 
when he allegedly escaped from the correctional facility.  At the time he escaped, he was lawfully 
confined.  The prosecution for the 
escape charge may continue.

 
 
[¶12]  Mr. Crosby asserts that we held 
otherwise in Endris v. State, 2010 WY 
73, 233 P.3d 578 (Wyo. 2010).  
There, Mr. Endris pleaded guilty to driving while under the influence of 
alcohol and the district court imposed a sentence allowing him to be released 
from jail to participate in a treatment program.  The district court advised Mr. Endris 
that during his release for treatment he was on probation and in official 
detention.  Mr. Endris was released 
but he did not attend the treatment program.  His probation was revoked and he was 
convicted of escape.  He appealed 
both the revocation and the escape conviction claiming the original sentence was 
illegal because it subjected him to probation and detention at the same time; 
therefore, he could not be convicted of escape.  

 
 
[¶13]  We reversed, concluding that the statute 
under which Mr. Endris was sentenced did not allow for probation and detention 
at the same time; rather, it allowed the court to impose a split sentence of 
detention followed by probation.  We 
held the sentence imposed on Mr. Endris was illegal.  We said further:

 
 
[The] illegal 
sentence cannot serve as a proper basis for revoking his probation, and so we 
reverse that decision.  In addition, 
the illegal sentence cannot serve as a proper basis for convicting him of escape 
from official detention, and so we reverse that 
conviction.

 
 

Id., ¶ 22, 233 P.3d  at 
583. 

 
 
[¶14]  Mr. Crosby's reliance on Endris is misplaced.  The district court sentenced Mr. Endris 
to a term in prison, suspended that sentence and imposed a split sentence 
requiring Mr. Endris to spend one year in jail and one year on probation.  However, the district court then allowed 
Mr. Endris to be released from jail for alcohol treatment and treated him as 
being in detention and on probation simultaneously while in treatment.  Because he could not be in detention and 
on probation at the same time for the same crime, the sentence was illegal and 
could not serve as a proper basis for revoking his probation, which legally 
could not start until his detention ended, nor could it serve as a proper basis 
for convicting him of escape. 

 
 
[¶15]  In contrast, the statute under which Mr. 
Crosby was sentenced authorized a term of incarceration for up to six 
months.  Under the statute, Mr. 
Crosby was properly incarcerated at the time he escaped.  The legal portion of the 
sentenceincarceration for six monthsis a proper basis for convicting him of 
escape.  We remand this case to the 
district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.1 

 
 
      

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We leave for another day the question of whether a prosecution can 
continue on an escape occurring after the legal portion of a sentence has been 
served.