Title: State ex rel. Jones v. Husted

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Jones v. Husted, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5681.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-5681 
THE STATE EX REL. JONES ET AL. v. HUSTED ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Jones v. Husted, Slip Opinion No.  
2016-Ohio-5681.] 
Elections—Mandamus—County-charter petition—R.C. 307.94 provided an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law—Writ denied. 
(No. 2016-1164—Submitted August 30, 2016—Decided September 6, 2016.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
_________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an election case in which relators seek a writ of mandamus 
requiring respondents, Secretary of State Jon Husted and the Medina County Board 
of Elections, to place a proposed charter for Medina County on the ballot at the 
November 8, 2016 general election.  We conclude that relators are not entitled to 
the writ, because they had an adequate remedy at law.  Under R.C. 307.94, they 
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could have requested that the board of elections file an action before the common 
pleas court to establish the validity of their petition. 
Factual background 
{¶ 2} The charter-petition committee, which included relators, Katharine S. 
Jones, Elizabeth A. Jarrell, Lynn Kemp, Georgia Kimble, and Emilie Ann Judy, 
filed a petition with the Medina County Board of Elections proposing the adoption 
of a county charter under Article X, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 
307.94.  On July 11, 2016, the director of the board of elections reported that the 
petition contained a sufficient number of valid signatures.  The board then voted on 
whether to certify the proposed charter petition to the board of county 
commissioners, which resulted in a two-to-two tie.  On July 14, the board submitted 
the tie vote to the secretary of state for final determination pursuant to R.C. 
3501.11(X). 
{¶ 3} The secretary of state decided the tie vote on August 2, 2016.  In his 
decision, Secretary Husted broke the tie against the motion to certify the proposed 
charter petition to the county commissioners, based on his conclusion that the 
proposed charter does not provide for the performance of all duties imposed on 
county officers by general law and does not establish a structural change in the 
county government and is therefore invalid. 
Procedural history 
{¶ 4} On August 9, relators initiated this action as an expedited election 
matter pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08, which provides an expedited procedure for 
election cases “filed within ninety days prior to the election.”  Because the action 
was filed 91 days before the general election, we granted the secretary of state’s 
motion to reclassify the complaint as a non-expedited case, but we ordered briefing 
to continue under the expedited timeframe.  ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-5396, 
___ N.E.3d ___. 
 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
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Analysis 
{¶ 5} Article X, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution requires a county charter 
to set forth certain information:   
 
Every such charter shall provide the form of government of 
the county and shall determine which of its officers shall be 
elected and the manner of their election.  It shall provide for 
the exercise of all powers vested in, and the performance of 
all duties imposed upon counties and county officers by law. 
 
{¶ 6} We have previously determined that it is within the secretary of state’s 
discretion to determine whether a proposed county charter is invalid on the ground 
that it does not set forth the form of government, “which is the sine qua non of a 
valid charter initiative.”  State ex rel. Walker v. Husted, 144 Ohio St.3d 361, 2015-
Ohio-3749, 43 N.E.3d 419, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 7} The secretary of state contends that the proposed Medina County 
charter is invalid because it does not set forth all the powers and duties imposed on 
the county and its officers and provide for their exercise.  He further alleges that 
the charter is insufficient because it does not alter the form of county government 
to provide for a county executive but instead proposes to retain the offices and 
structures established in statutory law. 
{¶ 8} Relators claim that the charter proposal meets the requirements of 
Article X, Section 3 because it sets forth a form of government and provides for the 
assumption and exercise of all powers of county government.  They further contend 
that there is no requirement that a county charter provide for a county executive 
and argue that the secretary of state exceeded his ministerial authority to review the 
petition. 
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{¶ 9} We need not reach the merits of these arguments, because relators 
have failed to establish that they meet all the requirements to obtain a writ of 
mandamus.  For a writ to issue, relators must “establish a clear legal right to the 
requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the secretary of state 
to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”  
State ex rel. Heffelfinger v. Brunner, 116 Ohio St.3d 172, 2007-Ohio-5838, 876 
N.E.2d 1231, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 10} The secretary of state maintains that relators fail the third portion of 
the test—the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  We 
agree.  R.C. 307.94 provided relators with an adequate means to challenge the 
board’s decision:   
 
If the petition is certified by the board of elections to be invalid 
or to have insufficient valid signatures, or both, the 
petitioners’ committee may protest such findings or solicit 
additional signatures as provided in section 307.95 of the 
Revised Code, or both, or request that the board of elections 
proceed to establish the validity or invalidity of the petition 
and the sufficiency or insufficiency of the signatures in an 
action before the court of common pleas in the county. 
 
{¶ 11} The secretary of state resolved the tie vote of the board under R.C. 
3501.11(X), resulting in a determination by the board that the petition was invalid.  
Relators then had two statutory procedures through which they could have 
challenged the board’s decision: (1) a protest of the board’s decision before the 
secretary of state under R.C. 307.95 or (2) a request that the board bring an action 
in the common pleas court to establish the validity of the petition—which action 
must then be brought within three days—under R.C. 307.94. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 12} Relators argue that filing a protest of the board’s decision when, as 
here, the secretary of state cast the tie-breaking vote is an insufficient remedy, 
because a protest must be heard and decided by the secretary of state.  They claim 
that protesting the secretary’s tie-breaking vote to the secretary would be “illogical 
and redundant.” 
{¶ 13} However, filing a protest that would be decided by the secretary of 
state was not their only alternative.  Relators had, but failed to avail themselves of, 
an alternate procedure.  Pursuant to R.C. 307.94, they could have requested that the 
board bring an action in the common pleas court to establish the validity of the 
petition.  Instead, they filed the instant action seeking extraordinary relief. 
{¶ 14} Because there was an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 
law through which relators could have challenged the board’s decision, we 
conclude that they are not entitled to a writ of mandamus. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
FRENCH, J., concurs in judgment only and would deny the writ on the 
authority of State ex rel. Walker v. Husted, 144 Ohio St.3d 361, 2015-Ohio-3749, 
43 N.E.3d 419. 
_________________ 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 15} In my view, the charter petition at issue fails to even come close to 
being a legitimate effort to create a charter form of county government.  For 
legitimate examples, relators could consult the Cuyahoga County and Summit 
County charters. 
_________________ 
James Kinsman and Terry J. Lodge, for relators. 
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Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Nicole M. Koppitch and Steven T. 
Voigt, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent Secretary of State Jon Husted. 
Dean Holman, Medina County Prosecutor, and William L. Thorne, Brian 
M. Richter, and Lee R. Potts, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondents 
Medina County Board of Elections and its members. 
The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman, urging denial of 
the writ for amici curiae Michael K. Baach, Northern Medina County Chamber 
Alliance, Greater Medina Chamber of Commerce, Medina County Economic 
Development Corporation, and Wadsworth Area Chamber of Commerce. 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., L. Bradfield Hughes, and Kathleen 
M. Trafford, urging denial of the writ for amici curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce, 
Affiliated Construction Trades Ohio Foundation, and the American Petroleum 
Institute. 
McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C., and Donald J. McTigue, urging denial of the 
writ for amici curiae Affiliated Construction Trades Ohio Foundation and the 
American Petroleum Institute. 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Thomas A. Luebbers, and Michael T. Dean, 
urging denial of the writ for amicus curiae County Commissioners Association of 
Ohio. 
Chad A. Endsley, Leah F. Curtis, and Amy M. Milan, urging denial of the 
writ for amici curiae Ohio Farm Bureau Federation and Medina County Farm 
Bureau. 
_________________