Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Berk

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Berk, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2167.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2167 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. BERK. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Berk,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2167.] 
Attorney—Misconduct—Neglect of client matters—Eighteen-month suspension 
stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2011-1049—Submitted November 18, 2011—Decided May 17, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-090. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Robert J. Berk of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0001031, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1969.  In 
August 2007, we suspended Berk’s license to practice law for one year, but we 
stayed the entire suspension on conditions, including a requirement that Berk 
serve two years of monitored probation.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Berk, 114 Ohio 
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St.3d 478, 2007-Ohio-4264, 873 N.E.2d 285.  To date, Berk has not applied for 
termination of his probation.  See Gov.Bar R. V(9)(D). 
{¶ 2} In October 2010, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, 
filed a two-count complaint, alleging that Berk’s neglect of two client matters by 
twice failing to attend scheduled conferences in each case resulted in dismissal of 
his clients’ actions. 
{¶ 3} The parties entered into stipulations of fact, and a panel of the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline conducted a hearing in 
which it heard the testimony of Berk and three character witnesses.  The panel 
found that Berk had committed the charged misconduct.  While it recognized 
Berk’s pattern of missed deadlines and court appearances, the majority of the 
panel declined to recommend an actual suspension from the practice of law and 
instead recommended an 18-month fully stayed suspension and two years of 
monitored probation. 
{¶ 4} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct but 
adopted the dissenting panel member’s recommendation that Berk’s license be 
suspended for 18 months, with 12 months stayed.  Berk objects to the board’s 
findings of misconduct and to its recommended sanction, arguing that his conduct 
did not violate Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 and that the charges should therefore be 
dismissed.  Alternatively, he argues that an actual suspension from the practice of 
law is not necessary to protect the public and will cause harm by depriving an 
underserved population of his legal representation. 
{¶ 5} For the reasons that follow, we overrule Berk’s objection to the 
board’s finding of misconduct but sustain his objection to the recommended 
sanction.  Accordingly, we adopt the sanction recommended by a majority of the 
panel and suspend Berk for 18 months, all stayed on conditions. 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
Misconduct 
{¶ 6} In April 2007, Berk filed suit on behalf of Winston and Rachel 
Lewis and Irene Papadelis for damages resulting from an automobile accident.  
The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case later that year but refiled it on 
August 21, 2008. 
{¶ 7} The court scheduled a telephonic case-management conference for 
March 23, 2009, and ordered Berk to initate the call, but he failed to do so.  The 
court continued the matter to April 20, 2009, and stated in its entry that Berk’s 
failure to appear at that conference might result in dismissal of the action.  Berk 
failed to appear at the second conference, and the court dismissed the case without 
prejudice the following day. 
{¶ 8} Berk moved the court for relief from the judgment entry of 
dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), but the court denied the motion.  The denial of 
that motion was affirmed on appeal.  The Lewises and Papadelis then sued Berk 
for malpractice.  Although they voluntarily dismissed their malpractice action in 
February 2011, Berk’s insurance carrier continued to discuss settlement even 
through the time of Berk’s disciplinary hearing. 
{¶ 9} Another client, Kenneth Render, was involved in an automobile 
accident in August 2005.  In July 2007, Berk filed suit against the other driver on 
Render’s behalf.  The trial court scheduled a case-management conference for 
October 24, 2007.  Although Berk was notified of the date, he failed to appear.  
The court subsequently scheduled a settlement conference, with the warning that 
Berk’s failure to appear might result in dismissal of the case.  After Berk failed to 
appear at the settlement conference, the trial judge dismissed the case with 
prejudice. 
{¶ 10} Render obtained new counsel and moved the court for relief from 
judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), but his motion was denied on the grounds that 
Berk had failed to appear at two conferences, had failed to conduct or respond to 
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discovery, and had failed to contact the court to explain his absence.  The Eighth 
District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion and held 
that Render was entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5).  
Render v. Belle, 8th App. No. 93181, 2010-Ohio-2344.  Render’s case was 
subsequently settled and dismissed. 
{¶ 11} The panel found that Berk’s conduct in each of these two counts 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing a client).  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and 
misconduct.  Berk, however, objects to these findings of misconduct, arguing that 
his lack of diligence is nothing more than simple negligence and that it should not 
be considered a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Specifically, he 
contends that the comment to Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 states, “The lawyer disciplinary 
process is particularly concerned with lawyers who consistently fail to carry out 
obligations to clients or consciously disregard a duty owed to a client.”  
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, comment 3. 
{¶ 12} Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 requires a lawyer to act “with reasonable 
diligence and promptness in representing a client,” and negligence is defined as 
“[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person 
would have exercised in a similar situation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1133 (9th 
Ed.2009). While neglect and negligence both involve the absence of reasonable 
care, we have recognized that neglect usually involves a pattern of omissions or 
ignored obligations.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 
191, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995), citing Toledo Bar Assn. v. Dzienny, 72 Ohio St.3d 
173, 176, 648 N.E.2d 499 (1995). 
{¶ 13} It is true that the charged misconduct involves only two clients out 
of the 400 to 450 client matters that Berk claims to handle each year.  But in each 
of these cases, the trial court issued a judgment entry scheduling a new conference 
date after Berk had already missed one conference and warned Berk that his 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
failure to attend might be grounds for dismissal.  Despite those warnings, Berk 
did not appear at a second conference in each case, missing a total of four 
appearances.  Thus the conduct charged in this case is itself sufficient to constitute 
a pattern. 
{¶ 14} Berk’s conduct is also comparable to the conduct that led to his 
first disciplinary sanction.  In that case, Berk failed to file a default motion when 
the defendant did not answer his client’s complaint, and consequently, the trial 
court dismissed the case without prejudice for want of prosecution. Berk, 114 
Ohio St.3d 478, 2007-Ohio-4264, 873 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 5.  When the defendant did 
not answer the refiled complaint, Berk failed to provide requested documents that 
would have allowed the court to grant a default judgment.  Id. at ¶ 6.  
Compounding his neglect and his intentional failure to carry out a contract of 
professional employment, Berk provided financial assistance to the affected 
clients to help them pay for housing and other personal expenses, advised the 
clients that they were unlikely to benefit substantially from their personal-injury 
suit, and paid them $500 each to sign a settlement agreement that attempted to 
exonerate him from his professional malpractice.  Id. at ¶ 7-9.  To sanction Berk 
for that misconduct, we suspended him for one year but stayed the entire 
suspension on the conditions that Berk commit no further misconduct and 
complete a minimum of six hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) on 
effective office-management practices.  We also placed Berk on probation for two 
years in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9).  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 15} We acknowledge that Berk has learned from some of his past 
mistakes.  Rather than attempting to hide his failures as he has done in the past, he 
has accepted responsibility for his actions by obtaining new counsel (at his 
expense) for the affected clients to pursue remedial actions, and he has not 
defended the malpractice action filed by one of the affected clients.  Despite these 
improvements, however, Berk’s underlying misconduct—the neglect of client 
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matters—remains.  Therefore, we conclude that Berk’s conduct is not an isolated 
incident of negligence, but that it is a pattern of neglect that violates his 
obligations not only to the affected clients, but to this court and the profession as a 
whole. 
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we overrule Berk’s objection to the board’s findings 
of fact and misconduct and adopt those findings as our own. 
Sanction 
{¶ 17} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 18} As aggravating factors, the panel found that Berk had a prior 
disciplinary offense and engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple 
offenses: two uncharged incidents involving show-cause orders issued for Berk’s 
failure to attend certain bankruptcy hearings in addition to the misconduct 
charged herein.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (c), and (d).  The panel also 
expressed concern that Berk continued to carry a large caseload, despite his 
efforts to limit his representation to bankruptcy and consumer-debt issues. 
{¶ 19} Mitigating factors found by the panel include the absence of a 
dishonest or selfish motive, Berk’s full and free disclosure to the board, and his 
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(b) and (d).  The panel also found that Berk had made a timely good-faith 
effort to rectify the consequences of his misconduct by paying for his clients’ 
appellate counsel, insisting that appellate counsel blame him for the omissions 
that led to the dismissal of their clients’ claims, and withdrawing his defense to a 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
malpractice action filed by one of the affected clients.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(c).  It also cited four letters from individuals attesting to Berk’s 
reputation and good character, as well as the testimony of three long-term 
professional acquaintances regarding his many years of providing free or low-cost 
legal services to those who could not otherwise afford counsel.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e).  Moreover, the panel found that Berk had completed the 
six hours of continuing legal education in law-office management required by his 
prior sanction and that he had taken steps to improve his calendar system and his 
office organization. 
{¶ 20} Recognizing Berk’s dedication to his clients and his expressed 
remorse, the majority of the panel recommended that Berk’s license be suspended 
for 18 months, all stayed on the conditions that he complete two years of 
monitored probation.  Emphasizing that Berk’s conduct in the Render case 
occurred just two months into his earlier stayed suspension and that he failed to 
report his conduct in both the Render and Lewis matters to his practice monitor, 
the dissenting panel member recommended that only 12 months of the 18-month 
suspension recommended by the majority of the panel be stayed. 
{¶ 21} While the board concurred with the panel’s finding of aggravating 
and mitigating factors, it adopted the dissenting panel member’s recommendation 
that Berk be suspended from the practice of law for 18 months with 12 months 
stayed and that he be required to serve two years of monitored probation. 
{¶ 22} Berk objects to the recommended sanction, first arguing that his 
transgressions are administrative failures that do not involve dishonesty, deceit, 
theft, or a conscious disregard for the Rules of Professional Conduct and therefore 
that they do not warrant an actual suspension from the practice of law.  He 
contends that in Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Norton, 116 Ohio St.3d 226, 2007-Ohio-
6038, 877 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 11, 15, 20, 25, and Allen Cty. Bar Assn. v. Brown, 124 
Ohio St.3d 530, 2010-Ohio-580, 925 N.E.2d 112, ¶ 4, 6, 20, we imposed stayed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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suspensions of six months and one year for comparable misconduct that could be 
attributed, at least in part, to poor organizational skills or office-management 
procedures.  But what Berk fails to acknowledge is that neither Norton nor Brown 
had previously been disciplined for professional misconduct, as he has, and 
neither of them had committed additional misconduct just two months into a 
stayed suspension. 
{¶ 23} Berk also contends that his prior disciplinary sanction has 
accomplished its intended goal of modifying his behavior and challenges the 
board’s reliance on uncharged conduct as an aggravating factor weighing in favor 
of a greater sanction.  As previously mentioned, Berk has refrained from efforts to 
cover up the misconduct at issue in this case and has sought to mitigate the 
damage sustained by the affected clients.  Although he was ordered to attend at 
least six hours of CLE instruction on effective office-management practices, he 
missed several court appearances and admits that the procedures he uses to 
maintain his calendar have changed little. 
{¶ 24} While Berk has engaged in a pattern of neglecting client matters, 
this pattern affected a relatively small number of clients, and it does not appear 
that any of those clients have suffered irreparable harm.  Berk has also provided a 
great deal of free or low-cost legal representation to those who otherwise could 
not afford to obtain such services. 
{¶ 25} Alida Struze, who has retired after 42 years of service with the  
Cleveland Legal Aid Society, testified that Berk accepted well over 200 referrals 
from the Cleveland Legal Aid Society and represented those clients pro bono or 
for a marginal fee.  She never received a complaint from the clients that she 
referred to Berk, and she observed that unlike many other attorneys, Berk would 
often take the time to meet with prospective clients—even if it did not appear that 
they had a very good case. 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 26} The executive director for the Consumer Protection Association, 
Solomon Harge, testified that Berk’s relationship with the association dated back 
to the early 1970s and that some of the association’s counselors continue to send 
him five to eight clients a month.  He related that many of the people who seek 
help from the association are elderly, unemployed, on welfare, mentally disabled, 
or just without money to handle their legal problems.  Harge indicated that Berk 
would not say no when asked to help the disadvantaged, and he expressed his 
belief that the people who seek help from the association would be “severely 
underserved” if Berk could no longer assist them. 
{¶ 27} We have considered an attorney’s history of low- or no-cost legal 
services to underserved clients as a mitigating factor in the past, though we have 
emphasized that “service to indigent clients, while mitigating, does not immunize 
a lawyer from discipline for misconduct.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 124 
Ohio St.3d 65, 2009-Ohio-5930, 919 N.E.2d 180, ¶ 51. 
{¶ 28} We do not condone Berk’s pattern of neglecting client matters.  
Nor do we give him a free pass based upon his extensive pro bono work.  But 
balancing those services, his acceptance of responsibility for his inaction, and his 
excellent character and reputation outside of the charged misconduct against the 
limited instances of his neglect, we conclude that an actual suspension from the 
practice of law is not necessary to protect the public at this time.  Therefore, we 
sustain Berk’s second objection and adopt the sanction recommended by the panel 
majority. 
{¶ 29} Accordingly, Robert J. Berk is hereby suspended from the practice 
of law in Ohio for 18 months, all stayed on the conditions that he commit no 
further misconduct and that he serve a two-year term of probation in accordance 
with Gov.Bar R. V(9)(D) with an experienced monitor who is familiar with the 
disciplinary system and law-office management.  If respondent fails to comply 
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with the conditions of the stay, the stay shall be lifted, and respondent shall serve 
the full 18-month suspension.  Costs are taxed to Berk. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., dissent and 
would impose an 18-month suspension with 12 months stayed and a two-year 
period of monitored probation following the suspension, as recommended by the 
board. 
__________________ 
David O. Simon and Heather M. Zirke, for relator. 
Michael E. Murman, for respondent. 
______________________