Title: Ryan C. Tews v. NHI, LLC

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 137 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP828 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Ryan C. Tews, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
NHI, LLC, J-Star Bodco, Inc. n/k/a 1234 
Wisconsin, Inc.,  
Nasco Holdings, Inc., Nasco Exports, Inc., The 
Aristotle  
Corporation, Geneve Holdings, Inc., Industrie 
Bodco, Inc.,  
Travelers Property Casualty Company of America 
and  
Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company, 
          Defendants, 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company d/b/a WE 
Energies, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 324 Wis. 2d 307, 784 N.W.2d 183 
(Ct. App. 2010-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 21, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
Jacqueline R. Erwin 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: ZIEGLER, J., CROOKS, J. and GABLEMAN, J., 
concur and dissent (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Raymond E. Krek, Chad T. Buehler and Krek & Associates, 
Jefferson, and oral argument by Raymond E. Krek. 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by John E. 
Feldbruegge, Kelly J. Noyes and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by John E. Feldbruegge. 
 
 
2010 WI 137
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP828 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV653) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ryan C. Tews, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
NHI, LLC, J-Star Bodco, Inc. n/k/a 1234 
Wisconsin, Inc., Nasco Holdings, Inc., Nasco 
Exports, Inc., The Aristotle Corporation, 
Geneve Holdings, Inc., Industrie Bodco, Inc.,  
Travelers Property Casualty Company of America 
and Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance 
Company, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company d/b/a WE 
Energies, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 21, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  Plaintiff Ryan C. Tews seeks 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals 
affirming an order of the circuit court which concluded that the 
statute of limitations had run and granted summary judgment in 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
2 
 
favor of the defendant, Wisconsin Electric Power Company 
("WEPCo").1  Tews apparently had difficulty identifying the 
correct legal name of the defendant that allegedly serviced the 
electrical substation where the injury occurred.  His original 
complaint named We Energies and his amended complaint instead 
named Wisconsin Energy Corporation d/b/a We Energies ("Wisconsin 
Energy").  Both were filed within the statute of limitations.  
However, Tews' second amended complaint alleging WEPCo as the 
proper name of the defendant was filed after the statute of 
limitations expired.  Tews contends that WEPCo is not entitled 
to summary judgment because his second amended complaint relates 
back to the date he filed his original or amended complaint.   
¶2 
The purpose of the relation-back statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.09(3),2 is to ameliorate the effect of the statute of 
limitations in a situation where the opposing party has received 
fair notice of the claim.  When a defendant is added as a party 
after the applicable limitations period and all the requirements 
of the relation-back statute are satisfied, fair notice has been 
provided, and the added defendant has been given the full 
benefit of the protections that the statute of limitations was 
intended to provide. 
                                                 
1 See Tews v. NHI, LLC, No. 2009AP828, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2010) (affirming a judgment and order of 
the circuit court for Jefferson County, Jacqueline R. Erwin, 
Judge).    
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
3 
 
¶3 
The relation-back statute as applied here requires 
first that the claim asserted in the second amended complaint 
arose out of the same transaction, occurrence, or event set 
forth in the original complaint.  There is no dispute that this 
requirement is satisfied.  Second, the relation-back statute 
requires that within the time period provided by law for 
commencing an action, WEPCo received such notice of the 
institution of the action that it will not be prejudiced in 
maintaining a defense on the merits.  Third, the relation-back 
statute requires that within the time period provided by law for 
commencing an action, WEPCo knew or should have known that but 
for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the 
action would have been brought against WEPCo.   
¶4 
In reviewing whether WEPCo is entitled to summary 
judgment, we apply well-established methodology.  A court 
initially examines the pleadings to determine whether claims 
have been stated and material factual issues presented.  To make 
a prima facie case for summary judgment, a moving defendant must 
show a defense that would defeat the plaintiff.  If the moving 
party has made a prima facie case for summary judgment, the 
court must examine the affidavits and other proof of the 
opposing party to determine whether a genuine issue exists as to 
any material fact or whether reasonable conflicting inferences 
may be drawn from undisputed facts.   
¶5 
An 
examination 
of 
these 
pleadings 
reveals 
the 
following undisputed facts: The timing of the incident is 
undisputed, the location of the incident is undisputed, and that 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
4 
 
Tews actually suffered injuries as a result of contact with an 
"electrical part" is undisputed.  Likewise, it is undisputed 
that WEPCo has offices at the same location as Wisconsin Energy, 
WEPCo has the same registered agent as Wisconsin Energy, and 
WEPCo has retained the services of same attorney who represented 
We Energies and Wisconsin Energy from the outset of the case.    
¶6 
These undisputed facts raise competing reasonable 
inferences.  One of the reasonable inferences is that the 
requirements of the relation-back statute are satisfied, and 
that Tews' second amended complaint is therefore not barred by 
the statute of limitations.   
¶7 
Although WEPCo made various factual assertions in its 
affidavit, nothing set forth in its affidavit resolves in 
WEPCo's favor the competing inferences raised by the undisputed 
facts in the pleadings.  We therefore conclude that WEPCo is not 
entitled to summary judgment.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals.  
I 
¶8 
Even though the procedural facts of this case are 
complex, the facts giving rise to this lawsuit are relatively 
straightforward.  Tews spent a portion of the evening of 
December 30, 2004 at Lennigan's Bar in Fort Atkinson.  He 
departed the bar on foot and headed home, taking his usual 
shortcut across the parking lot behind the NASCO plant.  Tews 
alleges that he attempted to exit the parking lot through the 
north gate but was unable to do so because it was closed and 
locked.  He allegedly entered an unlit, fenced-in electrical 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
5 
 
sub-station through an unlocked gate.  Once in the sub-station, 
Tews came into contact with part of a transformer.  The injuries 
sustained by Tews are both permanent and severe.  
¶9 
Tews filed suit on September 26, 2007.  Among other 
defendants, he named "WE Energies" in his complaint.3  Tews 
alleged that We Energies is a Wisconsin corporation "with its 
principal place of business located at 231 West Michigan Street, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203."  The record reflects that the 
complaint was served on a legal assistant authorized to accept 
service at 231 W. Michigan Street in Milwaukee.    
¶10 In its answer,  We Energies "den[ied] that We Energies 
is a company, . . . that it is organized and exists under the 
laws of the State of Wisconsin or that it has a principal place 
of business at 231 West Michigan Street, Milwaukee, WI[.]"  It 
asserted that We Energies "lacks capacity to be sued in that it 
is not a legal entity but merely a trade name."   
¶11 Despite We Energies' assertion that it was not a legal 
entity, it retained counsel.  Attorney Feldbruegge filed a 
notice of appearance stating that the law firm of von Briesen & 
Roper, S.C. had been "retained by and appear for the defendant, 
We Energies, in the above-entitled action[.]"  It was Attorney 
Feldbruegge who filed the answer and a motion to dismiss, in 
which We Energies admitted that Tews departed Lennigan's Bar on 
                                                 
3 Against WE Energies, the complaint alleged common law 
negligence for failure to "maintain the electrical sub-station 
in a safe and reasonable manner."  It also alleged causes of 
action for wanton or reckless conduct and for negligence per se.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
6 
 
foot, that the north gate of the parking lot was closed and 
locked, that Tews "contacted an electrical part," and that Tews 
"suffered injuries as a result of said electrical contact."  On 
behalf of We Energies, Attorney Feldbruegge also conducted 
discovery. 
¶12 On December 28, 2007, two days before the statute of 
limitations expired, Tews amended his complaint and named 
"Wisconsin Energy Corporation (d/b/a WE ENERGIES)."  The amended 
complaint 
asserted 
that 
Wisconsin 
Energy 
is 
a 
Wisconsin 
company "with its principal place of business located at 231 
West Michigan Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203."  It further 
asserted that Wisconsin Energy "has as its registered agent, 
Keith H. Ecke, who is located at 231 West Michigan Street, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203."  The amended complaint's factual 
allegations are nearly identical to the factual allegations set 
forth in Tews' initial complaint.4   
¶13 Attorney 
Feldbruegge 
did 
not 
file 
a 
notice 
of 
appearance for the newly named Wisconsin Energy.  Rather, he 
filed an "amended" notice of appearance and then answered the 
amended complaint on behalf of Wisconsin Energy.  In its answer, 
Wisconsin Energy admitted that it was a Wisconsin corporation 
with "a principal place of business located at 231 West Michigan 
                                                 
4 The only differences between the allegations in the 
original complaint and the amended complaint are immaterial for 
the purposes of this appeal.  For instance, instead of alleging 
that Tews was "electrocuted," the amended complaint alleged that 
he had "received a severe electrical burn."  
No. 
2009AP828   
 
7 
 
Street, Milwaukee, WI 53203 and has as its registered agent 
Keith H. Ecke[.]"   
¶14 Like the answer to the complaint against We Energies, 
Wisconsin Energy admitted that Tews left Lennigan's Bar on foot, 
that the north gate of the parking lot was closed and locked, 
that Tews "contacted an electrical part," and that Tews 
"suffered injuries as a result of said electrical contact."  
However, it alleged that Wisconsin Energy's business activities 
"are limited to that of a holding corporation" and that 
Wisconsin Energy "is not liable for the torts of its wholly 
owned subsidiaries."5    
¶15 Several months later, two related motions were filed, 
one by each party.  Wisconsin Energy filed a motion to dismiss, 
and Tews filed a motion asking the court for leave to amend his 
complaint for the second time to add a defendant.     
¶16 Wisconsin Energy filed its motion to dismiss on July 
31, 2008, and asserted that the motion was "based on its lack of 
liability for the torts of its wholly owned subsidiaries."  In 
an attached affidavit, the Executive Vice President of Wisconsin 
Energy averred that "Wisconsin Energy Corporation does not 
engage in the business of generation and/or distribution of 
electric energy but is the owner of 100% of the stock of 
[WEPCo]."  He further identified WEPCo as "the electric utility 
                                                 
5 Among other affirmative defenses, Wisconsin Energy alleged 
laches and that the court lacked jurisdiction over Wisconsin 
Energy on the grounds that the amended summons and complaint 
should have been served on Wisconsin Energy's registered agent 
but instead were served on Attorney Feldbruegge.    
No. 
2009AP828   
 
8 
 
which provides electric service to businesses and residences in 
the southeastern portion of the State of Wisconsin, including 
Fort Atkinson where the accident which is the subject matter of 
this action is located." 
¶17 Tews' motion for leave to amend his complaint by 
adding WEPCo as a defendant was filed four days later on August 
4, 2008.  He asserted that under Wis. Stat. § 802.09(3),6 his 
second amended complaint would relate back to the date of a 
prior filing.    
¶18 Throughout the briefing on the two motions, Wisconsin 
Energy argued that it should be dismissed as a defendant because 
it was not liable for WEPCo's torts, and that Tews' motion to 
amend his complaint by adding WEPCo as a defendant should be 
denied.  It asserted that "there are serious impediments to the 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.09(3), entitled "Relation Back of 
Amendments" provides: 
If the claim asserted in the amended pleading arose 
out of the transaction, occurrence, or event set forth 
or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, 
the amendment relates back to the date of the filing 
of the original pleading.  An amendment changing the 
party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if 
the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the 
period provided by law for commencing the action 
against such party, the party to be brought in by 
amendment has received such notice of the institution 
of the action that he or she will not be prejudiced in 
maintaining a defense on the merits, and knew or 
should have known that, but for a mistake concerning 
the identity of the proper party, the action would 
have been brought against such party. 
 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
9 
 
application of the relation-back doctrine here" and therefore, 
the claims against WEPCo would be barred by the statute of 
limitations.     
¶19 Tews countered that "WE Energies and or Wisconsin 
Energy Corporation knew all along that [Tews] intended to make a 
claim against Wisconsin Electric Power Company[.]"  He further 
contended that WEPCo received notice of the institution of the 
action, would not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the 
merits, and knew or should have known that, "but for a mistake 
concerning its proper identity, this action would have been 
brought against it as well":     
[WEPCo] should have been on notice of this claim as of 
September 26, 2007, when Plaintiff filed the original 
Complaint naming WE Energies as a defendant . . . and 
again December 28, 2007, when Plaintiff filed the 
Amended Complaint naming Wisconsin Energy Corporation 
(d/b/a WE Energies) as a defendant.   
Moreover, Tews asserted, "it appears likely that [WEPCo] will 
utilize the same counsel as Wisconsin Energy Corporation (d/b/a 
WE Energies) in its defense of this action."  
¶20 After a hearing on the two motions and other unrelated 
discovery disputes, the court dismissed "the parent company 
[Wisconsin Energy] on capacity grounds"7 and granted leave for 
Tews to file a second amended complaint adding WEPCo as a 
defendant.  In its oral decision, the court expressly declined 
to rule on the applicability of the relation-back statute: "I'm 
                                                 
7 Tews later filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
court's decision to dismiss Wisconsin Energy, which was denied.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
10 
 
not in a position to be able to say that the new intended party, 
[WEPCo], has not suffered prejudice.  It's premature for me to 
rule on the prejudice to that new proposed party and the 
'relation back' claim . . . . I have no doubt, as counsel 
argued, that [WEPCo] will interpose those defenses."     
¶21 Tews' second amended complaint was filed on October 
29, 2008.  It asserted the same location of the principal place 
of business and the same registered agent as Tews had previously 
alleged. 
¶22 The second amended complaint alleged that WEPCo was a 
Wisconsin company "with its principal place of business located 
at 231 West Michigan Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203" and 
"has as its registered agent, Keith H. Ecke, who is located at 
231 West Michigan Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203."  The 
factual allegations in the second amended complaint were nearly 
identical to the factual allegations in Tews' original and 
amended complaints.  On November 12, the second amended 
complaint was served on an employee at 231 West Michigan Street 
who was authorized to accept service.  
¶23 Attorney Feldbruegge filed a notice of appearance, 
informing the court that von Briesen & Roper had been retained 
by WEPCo.  WEPCo's answer denied that 231 West Michigan Street 
was its "principal place of business."  Nevertheless, it 
admitted that it "has offices at 231 West Michigan Street, 
Milwaukee, WI 53203" and that its registered agent is Keith H. 
Ecke, who is located at that address.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
11 
 
¶24 As had We Energies and Wisconsin Energy, WEPCo 
admitted that Tews departed Lennigan's Bar on foot in the late 
hours of December 30, 2004, that the north gate of the parking 
lot was closed and locked, that Tews "contacted an electrical 
part," and that Tews "suffered injuries as a result of said 
electrical contact."  As an affirmative defense, WEPCo's answer 
alleged that the complaint was time barred by the statute of 
limitations 
for 
personal 
injury 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.54.8   
¶25 On the same day it answered the second amended 
complaint, WEPCo also filed a document captioned "notice of 
motion and motion for summary judgment."  The notice provided 
that the motion would be heard on January 29, 2009, and that it 
was "supported by the pleadings already filed in this matter and 
the enclosed brief."     
¶26 WEPCo's three-page brief made no argument about the 
relation-back statute.  It simply concluded that the action was 
barred by the statute of limitations: 
Plaintiff was injured after he climbed onto an 
electric substation located on private property on 
December 30, 2004. (2nd Am.  Compl.)  Plaintiff filed 
his Second Amended Complaint adding WEPCo on October 
29, 2008.  (Id.)  WEPCo now files this motion for 
summary 
judgment 
on 
Plaintiff's 
Second 
Amended 
Complaint 
based 
on 
the 
three-year 
statute 
of 
limitations contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.54.  As 
Plaintiff failed to file suit against WEPCo within 
                                                 
8 Along with other another affirmative defenses, WEPCo 
alleged laches and also that the court lacked jurisdiction over 
WEPCo on the grounds of improper service of the second amended 
summons and complaint.       
No. 
2009AP828   
 
12 
 
three years after the date of his injury, WEPCo 
respectfully 
requests 
that 
this 
Court 
dismiss 
Plaintiff's claim against it as a matter of law.   
WEPCo did not include any affidavits with its brief. 
¶27 Tews responded timely with a brief in opposition to 
WEPCo's motion for summary judgment, asserting that his second 
amended complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations 
because it related back to his original filings.  His brief set 
forth several allegations about the relationship between We 
Energies, Wisconsin Energy, and WEPCo.  Among other facts, he 
contended that WEPCo and Wisconsin Energy share the same 
registered agent and share the same principal office, located at 
231 West Michigan Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  He asserted 
that WEPCo had retained the same law firm, von Briesen & Roper, 
S.C., and the same lead attorney, John E. Feldbruegge, as had 
been retained by We Energies and Wisconsin Energy.     
¶28 Tews did not include any affidavits with his brief.  
Instead, he attached as "exhibits" several documents from the 
Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions website.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
13 
 
¶29 On January 22 at 3:30 p.m., five business days before 
the hearing,9 WEPCo filed a reply and affidavit.  It asserted 
that the burden to present evidence belonged to Tews, given that 
he was the party seeking the benefit of the relation-back 
statute.  Because he had not submitted any evidence by affidavit 
that the second amended complaint should relate back, WEPCo 
contended that Tews failed to create a genuine issue of material 
fact.    
¶30 WEPCo commented that Tews' brief "refers to numerous 
depositions and deposition testimony as well as to extraneous 
materials obtained from the State of Wisconsin including 
Domestic 
Corporation 
Annual 
Reports 
of 
Wisconsin 
Energy 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin statutes require an adverse party to serve any 
opposing affidavits at least five business days before the 
hearing.  Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08(2) provides: "Unless earlier 
times are specified in the scheduling order, the motion shall be 
served at least 20 days before the time fixed for the hearing 
and the adverse party shall serve opposing affidavits, if any, 
at least 5 days before the time fixed for the hearing."  
Further, Wis. Stat. § 801.15(1)(b) provides: "[I]n computing any 
period of time prescribed or allowed by chs. 801 to 847, . . .  
the day of the act, event or default from which the designated 
period of time begins to run shall not be included. . . . When 
the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, 
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall be excluded in the 
computation."      
No. 
2009AP828   
 
14 
 
Corporation and WEPCo.  None of this material is before the 
court by way of Affidavit and should be summarily disregarded."10   
¶31 Attorney Feldbruegge's affidavit attached the three 
sets of pleadings as well as printouts from the home pages of We 
Energies and Wisconsin Energy.  The printout from the We 
Energies home page explained: "We Energies is the trade name of 
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. and Wisconsin Gas LLC, the 
principal utility subsidiaries of Wisconsin Energy Corporation."   
¶32 The day after he received WEPCo's reply11 and four 
business days before the hearing, Tews filed a document 
captioned "notice of motion to strike reply brief of defendant 
Wisconsin Electric Power Company and Affidavit of John E. 
Feldbruegge."  At that time, Tews also submitted an affidavit of 
Attorney 
Buehler, 
attaching 
various 
court 
documents 
and 
transcripts from depositions, as well as the corporate annual 
reports from the Department of Financial Institutions' website.   
                                                 
10 WEPCO also asserted that the annual reports attached to 
Tews' brief as exhibits, even if considered, were insufficient 
to raise an issue of material fact: "[S]hould the court accept 
those 
exhibits 
for 
consideration 
on 
this 
motion, 
it 
is 
defendant's position that those documents fail to meet the 
requirements of the relation-back statute. . . . [They] merely 
suggest that Wisconsin Energy Corporation, the holding company 
and WEPCo, the wholly owned subsidiary, have some officers and 
directors that are identical. . . .  [Tews] does not explain how 
these facts alone are sufficient to permit the conclusion or 
even inference by WEPCo that Tews intended to sue WEPCo, and 
that he mistakenly sued Wisconsin Energy Corporation or that but 
for that mistake, the lawsuit would have been brought against 
WEPCo."   
11 The court of appeals incorrectly stated that Attorney 
Buehler's affidavit was filed two days after WEPCo's reply 
brief.  Tews, No. 2009AP828, unpublished slip op., ¶5.           
No. 
2009AP828   
 
15 
 
¶33 Tews' motion asked the court to dismiss WEPCo's motion 
for summary judgment and strike WEPCo's reply brief and 
affidavit, or alternatively, to allow Tews more time to file an 
additional affidavit.12  He acknowledged that WEPCo had the 
option to file either a motion to dismiss or a motion for 
summary judgment, and that WEPCo chose summary judgment.  
However, he argued that WEPCo's initial motion for summary 
judgment should be "summarily disregarded" because it was not 
supported by an affidavit.  Tews contended that he had not filed 
any affidavits with his response "because the moving defendant 
filed no affidavit(s) for the plaintiff to oppose with contrary 
facts."   
¶34 It appears that Attorney Feldbruegge raised the issue 
of whether Attorney Buehler's affidavit was untimely.  At the 
January 29th hearing, Tews contended that the circuit court 
should 
nevertheless 
consider 
Attorney 
Buehler's 
affidavit 
because "[w]e cannot file an Affidavit in opposition to what the 
Defendant had filed until after we receive their Affidavit——
[w]hich we did not receive until" the day of the filing 
                                                 
12 Tews also asked the court to shorten the time of notice 
for his motions to actual notice so that they could be heard at 
the January 29th hearing.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
16 
 
deadline.  The court declined to consider Attorney Buehler's 
affidavit, concluding that it was "a little late."13 
¶35 The circuit court denied Tews' motion and turned to 
the merits of WEPCo's motion for summary judgment.  It 
acknowledged that WEPCo's motion had the "flavor" of a motion to 
dismiss.  However, it concluded that WEPCo's motion "is properly 
a summary judgment motion.  It's properly supported by the 
pleadings that are filed."     
¶36 WEPCo argued that there was no evidence in the file 
that would show that WEPCo was not prejudiced by the late filing 
or that WEPCo knew or should have known prior to the expiration 
of the statute of limitations that it was, "but for a misnomer, 
intended to be the Defendant."  Tews argued that once he made 
the claim that the amendment related back to his original 
complaint, the burden shifted back to WEPCo to disprove the 
claim: "I do not see how the Defendant could maintain their 
position that it does not relate back if they don't come forth 
with some evidence to the contrary."     
¶37 The circuit court granted WEPCo's motion for summary 
judgment.  In its written decision, it explained that WEPCo 
"relied on pleadings which supported its time bar claim" but 
                                                 
13 The concurrence/dissent asserts that this court "ought 
not 
second-guess" 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
determination 
to 
disregard 
the 
untimely 
affidavit.  
Concurrence/dissent, ¶98.  Nothing in this opinion suggests that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by 
declining to consider this untimely filing.  Our analysis is not 
based on anything set forth in Attorney Buehler's affidavit. 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
17 
 
that Tews failed to "rely on any pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, admissions on file or affidavits in support 
of his 'relation back' defense until the time period for such 
filing had expired[.]"  Ultimately, the circuit court concluded 
that Tews "has not created a genuine issue of material fact by 
his brief alone."14     
¶38 On appeal, the court of appeals' characterization of 
the procedural posture of this case differed from that of the 
circuit court.  The court of appeals concluded that WEPCo's 
motion had initially been a motion to dismiss: "WEPCo's motion 
raising the statute of limitations was not a motion for summary 
                                                 
14 Tews filed a motion for reconsideration.  For the first 
time, he argued that WEPCo's motion had actually been "a motion 
to dismiss in disguise," and that the motion became one for 
summary judgment only when Attorney Feldbruegge filed an 
affidavit five business days before the hearing.  If Attorney 
Buehler's affidavit was late, Tews contended that it was due to 
excusable neglect.     
He also argued that WEPCo had failed to make a case for 
summary judgment: "There have been answers and there have been 
affidavits in those answers that may have raised issues.  
. . . [T]he real issue that needs to be addressed is whether or 
not the relation back statute applies in this case.  Nowhere 
does WEPCo tell the Court by an affidavit, even the one filed a 
week before the hearing, how it could be that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact regarding the identity of WEPCo, 
personal service on WEPCo, or prejudice to WEPCo caused by the 
filing of the Second Amended Complaint."  
Tews appealed the circuit court order denying his motion 
for reconsideration.  Because our review of the order granting 
summary judgment is dispositive, we need not address Tews' 
arguments regarding the motion for reconsideration.    
 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
18 
 
judgment because it relied exclusively on the allegation in 
Tews' complaint concerning the date of his accident, and the 
filing date of the complaint, without reference to any facts 
outside that pleading."  Tews v. NHI, LLC, No. 2009AP828, 
unpublished slip op., ¶7 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2010) (citing 
Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)).  The court said that "WEPCo's 
labeling of its motion is irrelevant."  Id. 
¶39 However, the court concluded that WEPCo's motion to 
dismiss was converted into one for summary judgment by Tews' 
response, which raised factual issues outside the pleadings.  
Id.  According to the court of appeals, because Tews failed "to 
set forth his evidence" and because his failure was not due to 
excusable neglect, summary judgment was properly entered in 
favor of WEPCo.  Id.       
II 
¶40 This case requires us to determine whether WEPCo was 
entitled to summary judgment.  We do not review the circuit 
court's grant or denial of summary judgment under an erroneous 
exercise of discretion standard.  Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 
136 Wis. 2d 304, 315-17, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).  Rather, our 
review is independent of the determination rendered by the 
circuit court, but we apply the same methodology.  Id.  
¶41 The summary judgment methodology is well established.  
Zielinski v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 2003 WI App 85, ¶6, 263 
Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 491.  "In determining whether to grant a 
motion for summary judgment, the court examines the pleadings to 
determine whether claims have been stated and material factual 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
19 
 
issues presented.  To make a prima facie case for summary 
judgment, a moving defendant must show a defense that would 
defeat the plaintiff.  If the moving party has made a prima 
facie case for summary judgment, the court must examine the 
affidavits and other proof of the opposing party [to determine 
whether summary judgment is appropriate]."  3 Grenig, Wisconsin 
Practice Series: Civil Procedure § 208.3 at 336 (3d ed. 2003) 
(citing Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 
N.W.2d 860; Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 531 
N.W.2d 45 (1995)).   
¶42 Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no 
genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is 
to avoid trials when there is nothing to try.  Rollins Burdick 
Hunter of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Hamilton, 101 Wis. 2d 460, 470, 304 
N.W.2d 752 (1981).  "On summary judgment the court does not 
decide the issue of fact; it decides whether there is a genuine 
issue of fact."  Cody v. Dane County, 2001 WI App 60, ¶19, 242 
Wis. 2d 173, 625 N.W.2d 630.  Further, "summary judgment should 
not be granted if reasonable, but differing, inferences can be 
drawn from the undisputed facts."  Delmore v. American Family 
Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 510, 516, 348 N.W.2d 151 (1984).     
III 
¶43 Tews' petition and brief to this court set forth a 
number of procedural issues.  We begin by addressing a threshold 
matter of the role that affidavits play in a summary judgment 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
20 
 
proceeding.  This discussion helps inform our subsequent 
determination of whether WEPCo was entitled to summary judgment 
in this case.  
¶44 Some may assert that a motion for summary judgment 
always must be supported by an affidavit, and that a proponent 
or opponent of summary judgment cannot prevail without filing an 
affidavit.  Such an assertion is not supported by the language 
of the summary judgment statute or its history, and it is 
inconsistent 
with 
state 
and 
federal 
practice 
guides 
and 
commentary.      
¶45 The procedure for summary judgment proceedings is set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  During a summary judgment 
proceeding, parties may introduce factual matters beyond the 
pleadings. 
 
Factual 
matters 
are 
typically 
introduced 
by 
affidavit.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(3).   
¶46 The express language of the summary judgment statute 
does not always require a party moving for or opposing summary 
judgment to file an affidavit with the court.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) provides: "[T]he motion shall be served . . . and 
the adverse party shall serve opposing affidavits, if any, at 
least 5 days before the time fixed for the hearing."  (Emphasis 
added.)  It also provides: "The judgment sought shall be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis added.)   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
21 
 
¶47 The drafting history of Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) also 
indicates that motions and responses to motions for summary 
judgment need not always be accompanied by affidavit.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 802.08 was modeled in large part after the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and was adopted in 1975 by order of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 630-631 (1975).  The 
Judicial 
Council Committee note accompanying its adoption 
explained that Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) "is virtually identical to 
Federal Rule 56(c)," except that the Wisconsin statute provides 
for different time limits.  Id. at 632.   
¶48 Like the Wisconsin statute, the express language of 
the 1970-1976 version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
does not require a moving party or a party opposing summary 
judgment to file an affidavit with the court: 
(a) For claimant.  A party seeking to recover upon a 
claim . . . may . . . move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor . . . . 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim . . . is asserted . . . may . . . move with or 
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment 
in his favor . . . . 
(c)  Motion and proceedings thereon. . . . The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits.  The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. . . .   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
22 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (1970) (emphasis added).  Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is substantially the same today 
as it was in the 1970s, when Wisconsin's rule was drafted.   
¶49 Finally, 
both state and federal practice guides 
confirm that affidavits are not always required when filing a 
motion for summary judgment.  The Wisconsin Practice Series 
provides: "A motion for summary judgment may be made on the 
basis of the pleadings or other portions of the record in the 
case or it may be supported by affidavits and a variety of 
outside material."  3 Grenig, supra, § 208.4 at 341.  Likewise, 
the treatise Federal Practice & Procedure provides that a motion 
for summary judgment "may be made on the basis of the pleadings 
or other portions of the record in the case or it may be 
supported by affidavits[.]"  Wright, Miller & Kane, 10A Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 2711 at 19 (3d ed. 1998).    
¶50 Accordingly, the court of appeals erred when it 
asserted that WEPCo's motion had initially been a motion to 
dismiss "because it relied exclusively on the [pleadings] 
without any reference to any facts outside that pleading" and 
that "the proceeding did not become one for summary judgment 
until Tews introduced matters outside the pleadings" in his 
brief in response to WEPCo's motion.  Tews, unpublished slip 
op., ¶7.  Both of these assertions rely on the unsupported 
premise that a motion for summary judgment must be based on 
something beyond the pleadings.  Although a motion for summary 
judgment will typically present factual matters beyond the 
pleadings, there is no statutory requirement that it do so.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
23 
 
¶51 In this case, WEPCo's motion was captioned a motion 
for summary judgment, it cited Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), the 
summary judgment statute, and it was pursued by the moving party 
as a motion for summary judgment.  The circuit court correctly 
observed that WEPCo's motion did not rely on anything beyond the 
pleadings, but that it was nevertheless a motion for summary 
judgment.  The circuit court's observation is consistent with 
the language of the summary judgment statute, the statute's 
history, and recognized Wisconsin practice.  
VI 
¶52 We address next whether WEPCo was entitled to summary 
judgment.  The basis of WEPCo's motion is that Tews' claims were 
barred by the statute of limitations.  The parties agree that 
the applicable statute of limitations is three years from the 
date of injury15 and that the injury occurred on December 30, 
2004.  There is no dispute that Tews' original complaint and his 
amended complaint were filed within the statute of limitations, 
but that his second amended complaint was filed after December 
30, 2007.   
¶53 WEPCo was not named as a party until Tews filed his 
second amended complaint.  The parties agree that the claims 
against WEPCo are barred by the statute of limitations unless 
Tews' second amended complaint relates back to the date he filed 
his original complaint or amended complaint.   
                                                 
15 See Wis. Stat. § 893.54. 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
24 
 
¶54 The parties' disagreement centers around whether there 
are genuine issues of material fact regarding the applicability 
of the relation-back statute, Wis. Stat. § 802.09(3).  Although 
the circuit court permitted Tews to amend his complaint by 
adding WEPCo as a defendant, it expressly reserved judgment on 
whether that amendment related back to Tews' original filings.  
See supra, ¶20.  In its brief in opposition to summary judgment, 
Tews argued that the second amended complaint related back 
because WEPCo and Wisconsin Energy share the same registered 
agent and the same principal office, and WEPCo has retained the 
same law firm and lead attorney as We Energies and Wisconsin 
Energy.  See supra, ¶27.  However, he did not set forth these 
facts by affidavit. 
¶55 Here, WEPCo is entitled to summary judgment only "if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," show 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the 
conditions necessary to satisfy the relation-back statute.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).  When reviewing a motion for summary 
judgment, the court begins by examining the pleadings.   
¶56 Based on our review of the pleadings, several facts 
are undisputed.  The timing of the incident is undisputed, the 
location of the incident is undisputed, and that Tews actually 
suffered injuries as a result of contact with an "electrical 
part" is undisputed.  Likewise, it is undisputed that WEPCo has 
offices at the same location as Wisconsin Energy, WEPCo has the 
same registered agent as Wisconsin Energy, and WEPCo has 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
25 
 
retained the services of same attorney who represented We 
Energies and Wisconsin Energy from the outset of the case.   
¶57 In all three complaints, Tews alleged that he was 
injured when he came into contact with the transformer after 
leaving Lennigan's Bar on foot and finding the north gate of the 
NASCO parking lot closed and locked.  In their answers, We 
Energies, Wisconsin Energy, and WEPCo all admitted that Tews 
departed Lennigan's Bar on foot, that the north gate of the 
parking lot was closed and locked, that Tews "contacted an 
electrical part," and that Tews "suffered injuries as a result 
of said electrical contact."   
¶58 WEPCo denied that 231 West Michigan Street was its 
principal place of business, but it admitted that it had offices 
at that address.  Wisconsin Energy (d/b/a We Energies) admitted 
that its principal place of business was located at 231 West 
Michigan Street.  It is therefore undisputed that WEPCo has 
offices at the same location as Wisconsin Energy's principal 
place of business and the same location where the original 
complaint was served.16   
¶59 Likewise, both WEPCo and Wisconsin Energy admitted 
that their registered agent is Keith H. Ecke, who is located at 
                                                 
16 We Energies denied that its principal place of business 
was located at 231 West Michigan Street.  A reasonable inference 
in favor of the non-moving party, see Schmidt v. Northern States 
Power Co., 2007 WI 136, ¶24, 305 Wis. 2d 538, 742 N.W.2d 294, is 
that We Energies' denial is on the grounds of its assertion that 
We Energies was not a legal entity with a primary place of 
business. 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
26 
 
231 West Michigan Street.  It is undisputed that the two 
corporations share a registered agent.  The record reflects that 
the original complaint (as well as the second amended complaint) 
was served on an employee at this address.17     
¶60 One final undisputed fact is apparent.  In this case, 
Attorney 
Feldbruegge 
has 
been 
retained 
to 
represent 
the 
interests of all three defendants in this lawsuit.  Attorney 
Feldbruegge filed a notice of appearance on behalf of We 
Energies, an "amended" notice of appearance on behalf of 
                                                 
17 In its reply brief supporting its motion for summary 
judgment, WEPCo set forth the procedural history of this case.  
It explained that in the answer to the plaintiff's amended 
complaint, Wisconsin Energy raised an affirmative defense that 
as a holding company it was not liable for its subsidiary's 
torts.  It also asserted the affirmative defense that the court 
lacked jurisdiction because of improper service.   
Wisconsin Energy's motion to dismiss was filed and granted 
based on only one ground——that it was not liable for its 
subsidiary's torts.  Wisconsin Energy did not make any motion to 
dismiss the complaint based on the circuit court's purported 
lack of jurisdiction due to improper service.       
Similarly, in its answer to the second amended complaint, 
WEPCo asserted as affirmative defenses that the action was time 
barred by the statute of limitations and also that service was 
improper.  Although WEPCo raised improper service as an 
affirmative defense, it never brought a motion based on improper 
service.  Its motion for summary judgment was based on only one 
ground——the statute of limitations.   
While pursuing the statute of limitations summary judgment 
motion, WEPCo advanced the argument that the second amended 
complaint had "nothing to which to relate back" because service 
of the amended complaint naming Wisconsin Energy was improper.  
WEPCo did not file a motion to dismiss on the basis of improper 
service.  Accordingly, the circuit court made no determinations 
about the propriety of service on Wisconsin Energy or WEPCo.  We 
likewise do not address the issue.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
27 
 
Wisconsin Energy, and a notice of appearance on behalf of WEPCo.  
During the summary judgment motion hearing, the circuit court 
commented to Attorney Feldbruegge: "You're sitting in the same 
chair that you were sitting in when you were here for Wisconsin 
Energies."   
¶61 Having identified the undisputed facts, we turn to the 
applicable 
law. 
 
The 
relation-back 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.09(3), was adopted by Supreme Court Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 
632 (1975).  It provides:  
If the claim asserted in the amended pleading arose 
out of the transaction, occurrence, or event set forth 
or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, 
the amendment relates back to the date of the filing 
of the original pleading.  An amendment changing the 
party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if 
the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the 
period provided by law for commencing the action 
against such party, the party to be brought in by 
amendment has received such notice of the institution 
of the action that he or she will not be prejudiced in 
maintaining a defense on the merits, and knew or 
should have known that, but for a mistake concerning 
the identity of the proper party, the action would 
have been brought against such party. 
Wis. Stat. § 802.09(3).  The statute's purpose is "to ameliorate 
the effect of the statute of limitations in situations where the 
original pleadings provided fair notice to the opposing party of 
the claim or defense raised."  Korkow v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 
117 Wis. 2d 187, 196, 344 N.W.2d 108 (1984).   
¶62 We have stated that pleading should not be "a game of 
skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive of the 
outcome."  Id. at 193.  Therefore, Wisconsin has abandoned the 
highly formal concepts of common law form pleading in favor of a 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
28 
 
more functional concept of "notice" pleading.  Id. at 192-93.  
When a plaintiff seeks to add a defendant and the relation-back 
statute is satisfied, fair notice has been provided and the 
added party has been given "the full benefit of the protections 
statutes of limitations were intended to provide."  Id. at 198.  
¶63 Wisconsin's 
relation-back 
statute 
is 
very 
nearly 
identical to Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Biggart v. Barstad, 182 Wis. 2d 421, 429, 513 N.W.2d 681 (Ct. 
App. 1994).  Like Wisconsin's statute, the purpose of the 
federal rule is to ensure that the statute of limitations is not 
"used mechanically to prevent adjudication of a claim where the 
real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the 
proceedings or were involved in them unofficially from an early 
stage."  Galion v. Conmaco Int'l, Inc., 658 P.2d 1130, 1133 
(N.M. 1983) (quoting 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 
¶15.15[4.-1] (2d ed. 1982)).    
¶64 Just recently, the United States Supreme Court applied 
the federal rule in a case with facts that are indistinguishable 
from the facts before us today.18  See Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 
130 S. Ct. 2485 (2010).  In that case, Krupski was injured as a 
                                                 
18 In Krupski, the Court recognized that there was a split 
in the federal courts about the appropriate relation-back 
analysis.  The Court stated: "We granted certiorari to resolve 
tension 
among 
the 
Circuits 
over 
the 
breadth 
of 
Rule 
15(c)(1)(C)(ii)[.]"  Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 130 S. Ct. 2485, 
2492 (2010).  The concurrence/dissent cites a plethora of lower 
federal 
court 
cases 
in 
support 
of 
its 
argument. 
 
See 
concurrence/dissent, ¶101.  To the extent that these cases are 
inconsistent 
with 
Krupski, 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
recent 
interpretation now controls.         
No. 
2009AP828   
 
29 
 
passenger aboard a cruise ship.  Her ticket identified the 
carrier 
as 
"Costa 
Crociere," 
an 
Italian 
Corporation.  
Nevertheless, Krupski brought suit against a related entity, 
Costa Cruise, alleging that Costa Cruise "'owned, operated, 
managed, supervised and controlled' the ship on which Krupski 
had injured herself."  Id. at 2490.  When she filed her 
complaint, Krupski apparently failed to realize that the proper 
defendant was not Costa Cruise, but rather was Costa Crociere.   
¶65 After the statute of limitations had expired, Costa 
Cruise asserted that it was merely the North American sales and 
marketing agent for Costa Crociere, which was the actual carrier 
and vessel operator.  The District Court granted Krupski leave 
to amend her complaint to add Costa Crociere as a party.  Costa 
Crociere, which was represented by the same attorney as had 
represented Costa Cruise, contended that the amended complaint 
was untimely because it did not relate back under the federal 
rules.  
¶66 Based in part on the fact that Costa Cruise and Costa 
Crociere shared the same counsel, the District Court imputed 
notice of the institution of the action to Costa Crociere.  
Krupski v. Costa Crociere, No. 08-60152-CIV (S.D. Fla., Oct. 21, 
2008).  In support of this proposition, it cited Jacobsen v. 
Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1998) ("notice [for 
purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)] may be imputed to the new 
party through shared counsel") and Chumney v. U.S. Repeating 
Arms Co., Inc., 196 F.R.D 419, 430 (M.D. Ala. 2000) ("when the 
original and the added defendants are represented by the same 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
30 
 
counsel, . . . the institution of the action against one serves 
to provide notice of the litigation to the other").    
¶67 The District Court, nevertheless, concluded that the 
relation-back rule was inapplicable because Krupski had not made 
a "mistake" regarding the proper party.  Krupski at *6.  The 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the 
relevant information was located on Krupski's passenger ticket 
and that Krupski knew or should have known that Costa Crociere 
was the proper defendant.  Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 330 Fed. 
Appx. 892 (11th Cir. 2009).  The Eleventh Circuit explained that 
in light of Krupski's delay in identifying and naming the proper 
defendant, the District Court had not abused its discretion in 
denying relation back.  Id. at 895.         
¶68 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
reversed. 
 
It 
concluded that relation back is not left to the "equitable 
discretion" of a district court, but rather "the Rule mandates 
relation back once the Rule's requirements are satisfied."  
Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2496.  The Court further determined that 
the Eleventh Circuit misinterpreted the Rule.  It clarified that 
relation back depends on what the party to be added knew or 
should 
have 
known, 
not 
on 
the 
plaintiff's 
knowledge 
or 
timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.  Id.  The speed 
with which the moving party moves to amend the complaint after 
receiving leave to do so has no bearing on whether the amended 
complaint relates back.  Id.   
¶69 The Court's analysis relied on an underlying purpose 
of the Rule.  Like the Wisconsin statute, the federal rule 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
31 
 
"balance[s] the interests of the defendant protected by the 
statute of limitations with the preference expressed in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in 
particular, for resolving disputes on their merits."  Id. at 
2494.  The Court elaborated that any other interpretation would 
result in a "windfall":   
A prospective defendant who legitimately believed that 
the limitations period had passed without any attempt 
to sue him has a strong interest in repose.  But 
repose would be a windfall for a prospective defendant 
who understood, or who should have understood, that he 
escaped suit 
during the limitations period only 
because the plaintiff misunderstood a crucial fact 
about his identity.  
Id.   
¶70 When applying the Rule, the Court focused its analysis 
on the pleadings.  No reference is made to any affidavit.  
Rather, the Court imputed knowledge of the claim to the 
subsequently named defendant without the plaintiff demonstrating 
by any affidavit that the relation-back requirements had been 
met.19   
                                                 
19 The concurrence/dissent's assertion that the respondent 
in a summary judgment motion must always file an affidavit is 
inconsistent with Krupski.  The Krupski Court focused its 
analysis on the contents of the complaint without any reference 
to an affidavit: "Because the complaint made clear that Krupski 
meant to sue the company that 'owned, operated, managed, 
supervised and controlled' the ship on which she was injured, 
and also indicated (mistakenly) that Costa Cruise performed 
those roles, Costa Crociere should have known, within the Rule 
4(m) period, that it was not named as a defendant in that 
complaint only because of Krupski's misunderstanding about which 
'Costa' entity was in charge of the ship——clearly a 'mistake 
concerning the property party's identity.'"  Krupski, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2497.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
32 
 
¶71 In 
rejecting 
the 
lower 
courts' 
focus 
on 
the 
plaintiff's conduct and knowledge in the first instance, the 
Court made clear that the question under the relation-back 
statute "is not whether Krupski knew or should have known the 
identity of Costa Crociere as the proper defendant, but whether 
Costa Crociere knew or should have known that it would have been 
named as a defendant but for an error."  Id. at 2493.  The Court 
further explained that when dealing with related corporate 
entities with very similar names, there is a heightened 
expectation that the added party should suspect that, but for a 
mistake concerning its identity, the added party was the 
intended defendant:   
It is also worth noting that Costa Cruise and Costa 
Crociere are related corporate entities with very 
similar names; 'crociera' even means 'cruise' in 
Italian. 
 
This 
interrelationship 
and 
similarity 
heighten the expectation that Costa Crociere should 
suspect a mistake has been made when Costa Cruise is 
named in a complaint that actually describes Costa 
Crociere's activities. 
Id. at 2498. 
¶72 Like 
the 
federal 
rule, 
Wisconsin's 
relation-back 
statute requires the following conditions to be met when an 
                                                                                                                                                             
Based on the "face of the complaint," the Court imputed 
knowledge to Costa Crociere and rejected its contention that the 
amended complaint did not relate back: "Especially because the 
face of the complaint plainly indicated such a misunderstanding, 
[Costa Crociere's] contention is not persuasive.  Moreover, 
[Costa Crociere] has articulated no strategy that it could 
reasonably have thought Krupski was pursuing in suing a 
defendant that was legally unable to provide relief."  Id.  
No. 
2009AP828   
 
33 
 
amendment adding a new party20 is made after the statute of 
limitations has expired: (1) the claim asserted in the amended 
complaint arose out of the transaction, occurrence, or event set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original complaint; 
(2) within the period provided by law for commencing a claim, 
the added party received such notice of the institution of the 
action that he or she will not be prejudiced in maintaining a 
defense on the merits; and (3) within the period provided by law 
for commencing a claim, the added party knew or should have 
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the 
proper party, the action would have been brought against the 
added party.21   
                                                 
20 The relation-back statute also may apply when, rather 
than adding a party to the suit, an amendment to a complaint 
adds a new cause of action.  See State v. One 1973 Cadillac, 95 
Wis. 2d 641, 647, 291 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1980); see also 
Clausen & Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Chapters 801-803, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 64 (1976).    
21 The court of appeals has set forth this inquiry as a 
four-part test.  See Grothe v. Valley Coatings, Inc., 2000 WI 
App 240, ¶9, 239 Wis. 2d 406, 620 N.W.2d 463 (stating that Wis. 
Stat. § 802.09(3) spells out four conditions: "(1) the basic 
claim must have arisen out of conduct set forth in the original 
pleadings; (2) the party to be brought in must have received 
notice so that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining its 
defense; (3) the party knew or should have known that, but for a 
mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought 
against it; and (4) most significantly, the second and third 
requirements must have been fulfilled within the prescribed 
limitations period.").   
The test we set forth in this opinion more closely tracks 
the language of the statute and avoids a redundant inquiry.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
34 
 
¶73 Here, there does not appear to be any dispute that the 
claims asserted in Tews' second amended complaint "arose out of 
the transaction, occurrence, or event" set forth in Tews' 
original or amended complaint.  In all three complaints, Tews 
alleged that he was injured when he came into contact with the 
transformer after leaving Lennigan's Bar on foot and finding the 
north gate of the NASCO parking lot closed and locked.            
¶74 To avoid summary judgment, there also must be facts in 
the record permitting a reasonable inference that WEPCo received 
notice of the institution of the action within the three-year 
statute of limitations such that it will not be prejudiced in 
maintaining a defense on the merits.  Based on the undisputed 
facts, such an inference is reasonable.  
¶75 WEPCo has offices at the same location as Wisconsin 
Energy and the same location where the original complaint was 
served.  It also has the same registered agent as Wisconsin 
Energy.  These undisputed facts permit the reasonable inference 
that WEPCo knew about the institution of the action within the 
three-year statute of limitations.  The fact that WEPCo has 
retained the services of the same attorney who represented We 
Energies and Wisconsin Energy from the outset of the case 
permits the reasonable inferences that not only did WEPCo know 
about the action, but also that its interests have been 
protected so that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining a 
defense on the merits.  These reasonable inferences, if true, 
would preclude the grant of summary judgment.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
35 
 
¶76 Finally, to avoid summary judgment, there also must be 
facts permitting the inference that WEPCo knew or should have 
known that, but for a mistake concerning its identity as a 
proper party, the action would have been brought against WEPCo.  
A review of the first two complaints, both filed within the 
statute of limitations, is helpful in considering whether WEPCo 
knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning its 
identity as a proper party, the action would have been brought 
against WEPCo.  The original complaint alleges that We Energies 
was "the servicer of the electrical sub-station at issue."  The 
first amended complaint alleges that Wisconsin Energy was "the 
servicer, supplier, and/or provider to the electrical substation 
at issue."  From these two complaints, it is apparent that Tews 
intended to file suit against the servicer of the electrical 
sub-station at Fort Atkinson's NASCO plant.         
¶77 The same undisputed facts that are relevant to the 
notice condition are relevant to this condition as well.  As 
discussed above, the undisputed facts permit the inference that 
WEPCo was on notice of the institution of the action within the 
statute of limitations.  If so, WEPCo should have known that, 
but for a mistake concerning the identity of that servicer of 
the electrical sub-station, WEPCo was the intended defendant.  
Again, the admitted facts from the pleadings illustrate that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact.           
¶78 In its brief to the circuit court in support of 
summary judgment, WEPCo argued that given Tews' delay in 
attempting 
to 
amend 
the 
complaint, 
"it 
would 
have 
been 
No. 
2009AP828   
 
36 
 
reasonable for WEPCo to conclude that Tews sued Wisconsin Energy 
Corporation by design, not mistake[.]"  This is an inference 
that may be drawn from the undisputed facts, but it is not the 
only possible inference.   
¶79 As noted above, the purpose of summary judgment is not 
to try issues of fact.  "[S]ummary judgment should not be 
granted if reasonable, but differing, inferences can be drawn 
from the undisputed facts."  Delmore v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 510, 516, 348 N.W.2d 151 (1984).   
¶80 The undisputed facts set forth above raise competing 
inferences. 
 
There 
is 
a 
reasonable 
inference 
that 
the 
requirements of the relation-back statute are satisfied, and 
that Tews' second amended complaint is therefore not barred by 
the statute of limitations.  Although WEPCo made various factual 
assertions in its affidavit, nothing set forth in its affidavit 
resolves in WEPCo's favor the competing inferences raised by the 
undisputed facts in the pleadings.  We therefore conclude that 
WEPCo is not entitled to summary judgment.22   
                                                 
22 In 
his 
petition 
and 
brief, 
Tews 
advanced 
several 
additional issues: whether the circuit court erred by excluding 
Attorney Buehler's affidavit; whether the summary judgment 
deadlines set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) begin to apply on 
the date a "de facto motion to dismiss" is filed; whether Tews 
was required to file an affidavit on the same day that WEPCo 
filed its affidavit or be defaulted; whether the circuit court 
erred when it concluded that Tews' untimeliness was not a result 
of excusable neglect; whether WEPCo created an ex post facto 
summary judgment scheduling order depriving Tews of due process; 
and whether the court of appeals' comment on the sufficiency of 
Tews' relation-back argument constituted dicta.  Because we 
conclude that WEPCo was not entitled to summary judgment, we 
need not address these additional issues.    
No. 
2009AP828   
 
37 
 
¶81 We emphasize that our determination here is not based 
on any reliance on the allegations in Tews' complaints——rather, 
it is based on the admitted and undisputed facts established by 
the defendants' responsive pleadings.  If we were reviewing mere 
allegations or denials, our result would be different.   
¶82 Once the moving party has made a case for summary 
judgment, a party opposing summary judgment may not rest on the 
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings:   
Supporting affidavits need not be filed with the 
motion for summary judgment if the pleadings and other 
papers filed in the action reflect the fact that there 
is no genuine issue for trial.  However, a plaintiff 
may not rely on allegations in the complaint to oppose 
a defendant's summary judgment motion, because the 
complaint is not evidentiary.   
3 Grenig, supra, § 208.4 at 341-42 (emphasis added).  In the 
rare case, however, the pleadings will establish something 
beyond "mere allegations"——the pleadings will establish the 
existence of undisputed facts that preclude entry of summary 
judgment.  This is one such case.23   
                                                 
23 The concurrence/dissent asserts that our opinion "imposes 
an unreasonable burden on the circuit court to scour the 
pleadings for any conceivable genuine issue of material fact 
even 
though 
counsel 
neglected 
to 
properly 
advocate 
that 
position."  Concurrence/dissent, ¶88.  It misconstrues the 
court's opinion.  The concurrence/dissent cites the Coons case, 
attempting to bolster its analysis.  See id., ¶96 n.3 (citing 
Coons v. Indus. Knife Co., 620 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010)).  In 
Coons, the First Circuit stated that judges are not obligated to 
search "sua sponte for issues that may be lurking in the 
penumbra of the motion papers."  Coons, 620 F.3d at 44.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
38 
 
¶83 It bears emphasis that, even though the statute does 
not always require affidavits to be filed in a proceeding for 
summary judgment, the best and safest practice is to do so.  
Attorneys who fail to support or oppose a motion for summary 
judgment with an affidavit do so at their own peril. 
¶84 In sum, we conclude that an examination of the 
pleadings reveals the following undisputed facts: The timing of 
the incident is undisputed, the location of the incident is 
undisputed, and that Tews actually suffered injuries as a result 
of contact with an "electrical part" is undisputed.  Likewise, 
it is undisputed that WEPCo has offices at the same location as 
Wisconsin Energy, WEPCo has the same registered agent as 
Wisconsin Energy, and WEPCo has retained the services of the 
same attorney who represented We Energies and Wisconsin Energy 
from the outset of the case.    
¶85 These undisputed facts raise competing reasonable 
inferences.  One of the reasonable inferences is that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Here, the relevant facts were not "lurking in the penumbra 
of the motion papers."  Rather, they were squarely presented by 
a review of the pleadings and the parties' arguments.  The 
concurrence/dissent acknowledges that the question of whether 
the second amended complaint related back was "not hidden or 
obscure but rather was quite obvious[.]"  Concurrence/dissent, 
¶95.   
At its core, the concurrence/dissent's analysis hinges upon 
Tews' failure to file an affidavit along with his brief.  See 
id. ("[I]t was incumbent upon Tews to set forth specific facts, 
by affidavit[.]"); id., ¶100 ("Tews did not meet his burden of 
setting forth specific facts, by affidavit, demonstrating that 
the second amended complaint related back[.]").  As set forth 
above, an affidavit is not always necessary.   
No. 
2009AP828   
 
39 
 
requirements of the relation-back statute are satisfied, and 
that Tews' second amended complaint is therefore not barred by 
the statute of limitations.   
¶86 Although WEPCo made various factual assertions in its 
affidavit, nothing set forth in its affidavit resolves in 
WEPCo's favor the competing inferences raised by the undisputed 
facts in the pleadings.  We therefore conclude that WEPCo is not 
entitled to summary judgment.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
 
 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
1 
 
¶87 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I concur with the majority opinion that 
the court of appeals erred when it concluded that WEPCo's motion 
raising the statute of limitations defense was not a motion for 
summary judgment.  See majority op., ¶50.  Certainly, the motion 
could have been labeled a motion to dismiss under Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.06(2)(a)9.1 
 
However, 
simply 
because 
WEPCo 
relied 
exclusively on the pleadings did not take the motion out of the 
realm of summary judgment, and as a practical matter, a 
successful motion for summary judgment often has the same effect 
as a successful motion to dismiss.  The plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(2) permits a motion for summary judgment to be 
made on the basis of the pleadings alone.  I therefore join the 
majority opinion in that regard. 
¶88 However, I otherwise dissent from the majority opinion 
because I conclude that the circuit court properly granted 
summary judgment to WEPCo given the state of this record.  I do 
not question that the relation back doctrine has a proper place 
in the law and serves an important purpose: "to ameliorate the 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.06(2)(a) provides in relevant part:  
Every defense, in law or fact, except the defense 
of improper venue, to a claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross claim, 
or 
3rd-party 
claim, 
shall 
be 
asserted 
in 
the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the 
pleader be made by motion: 
 . . . . 
9. Statute of limitations. 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
2 
 
effect of the statute of limitations in situations where the 
original pleadings provided fair notice to the opposing party of 
the claim or defense raised."  Korkow v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 
117 Wis. 2d 187, 196, 344 N.W.2d 108 (1984).  However, the 
legitimacy of the relation back doctrine does not obviate the 
responsibility of counsel to demonstrate that the opposing party 
had the requisite notice.  In this case, it may be that the 
relation back doctrine should be applicable such that WEPCo is a 
proper party; however, the simple truth is that counsel failed 
to demonstrate that the relation back doctrine applies.  The 
majority circumvents counsel's burden and becomes an advocate 
for a position that counsel did not properly set forth.  The 
majority departs from the unambiguous directives of Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08 and imposes an unreasonable burden on the circuit court 
to scour the pleadings for any conceivable genuine issue of 
material fact even though counsel neglected to properly advocate 
that position.   
¶89 There is no question that Tews' injuries are severe, 
and I sympathize with him.  Nevertheless, that sympathy cannot 
drive the result in this case.  This case is a good example of 
bad facts making bad law.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
¶90 Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
3 
 
§ 802.08(2); see also Konneker v. Romano, 2010 WI 65, ¶22, 326 
Wis. 2d 268, 785 N.W.2d 432; Racine Cnty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, 
Inc., 2010 WI 25, ¶25, 323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88.  
¶91 As previously explained, a party may move for summary 
judgment on the basis of the pleadings alone.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  Thus, while WEPCo ultimately filed an affidavit in 
support of its motion for summary judgment, majority op., ¶29, 
the 
motion 
and 
the 
pleadings 
alone 
were 
sufficient 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
had 
run.  
Conversely, the party in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment is not permitted to rest upon the pleadings and must, 
by affidavit, set forth genuine issues of material fact that 
would preclude summary judgment:  
When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this section, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings but the adverse party's 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this section, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
§ 802.08(3); see also Oracular Milwaukee, 323 Wis. 2d 682, ¶30 
n.9; Hinrichs v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 114, ¶13, 
244 Wis. 2d 191, 629 N.W.2d 44 ("To establish a genuine issue of 
material fact, the party opposing summary judgment 'may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must 
file affidavits or other supporting papers based upon personal 
knowledge of specific evidentiary facts that are admissible.'" 
(quoting Helland v. Kurtis A. Froedert Mem'l Lutheran Hosp., 229 
Wis. 2d 751, 764, 601 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1999))); Wis. 
Electric Power Co. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 142 Wis. 2d 673, 683-
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
4 
 
84, 419 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1987); 5 Edwin E. Bryant, Wisconsin 
Pleading and Practice § 38:14, at 554-55 (2004 revised ed.) 
("[W]hen a motion for summary judgment has been made and 
properly supported, the adverse party may not rest on the 
allegations and denials contained in that party's pleadings, but 
require instead that the response set forth, by affidavits, 
depositions or 
answers to interrogatories, specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."  (Internal 
footnotes omitted.)); 3 Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin Practice 
Series: Civil Procedure § 208.4, at 431 (4th ed. 2010) ("If a 
moving party has made a prima facie case for summary judgment, 
the court must then examine the opposing party's affidavits to 
determine whether there are disputed material facts or competing 
inferences arising from undisputed facts.  Evidentiary matters 
in 
affidavits 
are 
deemed 
uncontroverted 
when 
competing 
evidentiary facts are not set forth in counteraffidavits. . . .  
Counteraffidavits are required from the plaintiff only if the 
defense has established by its affidavits those facts required 
to defeat the claim asserted by the plaintiff."  (Internal 
footnotes omitted.)).  "If the adverse party does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against such party."  § 802.08(3) (emphasis added).   
¶92 Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 802.08 sets forth explicit time 
requirements for filing.  Relevant to this case, the adverse 
party must serve its opposing affidavits at least five days 
before the scheduled date of the hearing on the motion for 
summary judgment.  § 802.08(2).  That five-day requirement is 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
5 
 
not only unambiguous but also deliberate.  See Judicial Council 
Committee's Note, 1992, Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) ("The prior 
sub. (2), 
allowing 
service of affidavits opposing summary 
judgment up to the date of hearing, afforded such minimal notice 
to the court and moving party that a plethora of local court 
rules resulted.  Requiring such affidavits to be served at least 
5 days before the hearing is intended to preclude such local 
rules and promote uniformity of practice." (Internal citation 
omitted.)); Hefty v. Strickhouser, 2008 WI 96, ¶44, 312 
Wis. 2d 530, 752 N.W.2d 820. 
¶93 Applying the facts of this case to the plain language 
of Wis. Stat. § 802.08, I conclude that the circuit court 
properly granted summary judgment to WEPCo.   
¶94 On December 26, 2008, WEPCo moved for summary judgment 
on the grounds that Tews' claim was barred by the three-year 
statute of limitations contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.54.2  It is 
undisputed that Tews' second amended complaint was filed against 
WEPCo more than three years after the date of Tews' injury.  
Majority op., ¶53.  Accordingly, WEPCo established a prima facie 
case for summary judgment.  See Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 
338, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980) ("To make a prima facie case for 
summary judgment, a moving defendant must show a defense which 
would defeat the plaintiff.").   
¶95 In response, it was incumbent upon Tews to set forth 
specific facts, by affidavit, demonstrating a genuine issue that 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.54(1) provides that an action to 
recover damages for personal injury "shall be commenced within 3 
years or be barred." 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
6 
 
would preclude summary judgment in WEPCo's favor.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(3).  Because it is undisputed that Tews' second 
amended complaint was not filed within the applicable three-year 
statute of limitations, I agree with the majority that Tews' 
only defense was to demonstrate that the second amended 
complaint related back to the date of the original complaint 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.09(3).  See majority op., ¶53.  
This issue and anticipated defense was not hidden or obscure but 
rather was quite obvious upon a reading of WEPCo's motion for 
summary judgment.  Moreover, the relation back issue had come up 
in court months before WEPCo filed its motion for summary 
judgment, see majority op., ¶¶17-20, so it is clear that Tews 
was well aware of the need to properly address the doctrine's 
applicability. 
¶96 Since WEPCo's motion and the pleadings made clear that 
the statute of limitations had run, Tews then bore the burden of 
demonstrating that the second amended complaint related back to 
the date of the original complaint.  See Farrell v. McDonough, 
966 F.2d 279, 282-83 (7th Cir. 1992).3  Accordingly, to defeat 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 802.09(3) 
is 
patterned 
after 
and 
substantively identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
15(c).  Majority op., ¶47; Korkow v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 117 
Wis. 2d 187, 193-94, 344 N.W.2d 108 (1984); State v. One 1973 
Cadillac, 95 Wis. 2d 641, 647, 291 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1980). 
Recently, when confronted with a procedural posture very 
similar to the case now before this court, the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals explained the burden-shift as follows:  
[The plaintiff] makes one final effort to save 
his forfeited state law argument.  He starts with the 
uncontroversial premise that it was [the defendant's] 
burden, as the moving party below, to show that it was 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
7 
 
WEPCo's prima facie case for summary judgment, Tews was required 
to set forth specific facts, by affidavit, showing that the 
elements of Wis. Stat. § 802.09(3) were met:  
(1) [T]he claim asserted in the [second] amended 
complaint arose out of the transaction, occurrence, or 
event set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original complaint; (2) within the period provided by 
law for commencing a claim, [WEPCo] received such 
notice of the institution of the action that [WEPCo] 
will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  [The 
plaintiff] then posits that [the defendant's] burden 
obligated it to demonstrate that [the plaintiff's] 
claims did not relate back to the original complaint.  
Therefore, the failure to discuss Rule 15(c)(1)(A) 
should be held against [the defendant], not him. 
The premise of [the plaintiff's] argument is 
accurate enough.  A motion for judgment as a matter of 
law "must specify the judgment sought and the law and 
facts that entitle the movant to the judgment."  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2).  But [the defendant] satisfied 
its burden of showing that it was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law by pointing out that, on the 
undisputed facts, the claims against it were filed 
well outside the applicable three-year limitations 
period.  Although it is often good strategy for the 
moving 
party 
to 
anticipate 
and 
respond 
to 
the 
strongest counter-arguments that might be presented, 
as [the defendant] did for the federal relation back 
argument, there is no obligation to do so.  Once [the 
defendant] "established that the time period between 
the plaintiff's injury and the plaintiff's complaint 
exceeded the limitations period set forth in the 
applicable statute," it was [the plaintiff's] burden 
to "allege facts which would take his claim outside 
the statute."   
Coons v. Indus. Knife Co., 620 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(quoting McGuinness v. Cotter, 412 Mass. 617, 620, 591 N.E.2d 
659, 661-62 (Mass. 1992)).  For a similar explanation, see Hope 
for Families & Community Service, Inc. v. Warren, No. 3:06-CV-
1113-WKW[WO], 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66873, at *279-80 n.105 
(M.D. Ala. Jun. 30, 2010). 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
8 
 
merits; and (3) within the period provided by law for 
commencing a claim, [WEPCo] knew or should have known 
that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the 
proper party, the action would have been brought 
against [WEPCo]. 
Majority op., ¶72.   
¶97 On January 13, 2009, over two weeks before the 
scheduled hearing date of January 29, 2009, Tews filed a brief 
in opposition to WEPCo's motion for summary judgment.  Tews 
argued that the second amended complaint related back to the 
date of the original complaint.  To show the relation back, Tews 
attached to its brief online print-outs from the Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Financial 
Institutions 
which 
purportedly 
demonstrated WEPCo's corporate relationship with the defendants 
named in the original and first amended complaint.  However, 
Tews did not attach an affidavit to authenticate these documents 
as required by Wis. Stat. § 802.08(3), and Tews did not timely 
file any other affidavit so as to properly raise genuine issues 
of material fact or show that the relation back doctrine 
answered the call. 
¶98 Because the hearing on WEPCo's motion for summary 
judgment was scheduled for January 29, 2009, Tews was obligated 
to serve any opposing affidavits by January 22, 2009, five 
business days before the date of the hearing.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.08(2).  It is undisputed that Tews did not serve his 
affidavit authenticating the above-mentioned documents until 
January 23, 2009, four business days before the date of the 
hearing.  Because Tews failed to comply with the unambiguous 
five-day requirement of § 802.08(2), the circuit court properly 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
9 
 
disregarded Tews' untimely affidavit.  We ought not second-guess 
that discretionary determination of the circuit court. 
¶99 Accordingly, the circuit court was left to consider 
WEPCo's prima facie case for summary judgment and in response, 
only Tews' bare argument that the second amended complaint 
related back to the date of the original complaint.  For Tews' 
argument to be successful, however, he could not rest upon mere 
allegations that the second amended complaint related back; 
instead, he was required to set forth specific facts, by 
affidavit, demonstrating that the second amended complaint 
related back.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(3).  Because Tews failed 
to comply with the unambiguous directives of § 802.08(3), the 
circuit court properly entered summary judgment against him.4  
                                                 
4 I also conclude that the circuit court appropriately 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
denying 
Tews' 
motion 
for 
reconsideration.  As the basis for his motion, Tews argued that 
WEPCo's motion was "a motion to dismiss in disguise," and 
alternatively, 
that 
Tews' 
failure 
to 
serve 
his 
opposing 
affidavit at least five business days before the hearing was the 
result 
of 
excusable 
neglect 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.15(2)(a).  Majority op., ¶37 n.13.  Both arguments are 
without merit. 
First, Tews cannot credibly argue that he was not put on 
notice of the motion's classification as one for summary 
judgment.  WEPCo filed a "Notice of Motion and Motion for 
Summary Judgment" and framed its supporting brief in terms of 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  Indeed, Tews titled his opposition brief 
"Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant Wisconsin Electric 
Power Company's Motion for Summary Judgment."  Thus, it appears 
that any misunderstanding Tews had was not caused by the 
motion's classification.  Rather, Tews' objection lies with his 
own misreading of § 802.08. 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
10 
 
See id. ("If the adverse party does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against such party."  
(Emphasis added.)). 
¶100 Notwithstanding such a straight-forward application of 
the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 802.08, the majority 
concludes that WEPCo is not entitled to summary judgment.  
Majority op., ¶7.  The majority arrives at its conclusion by 
shifting the burden from Tews to the circuit court.  In my 
opinion, the majority errs by imposing a burden on the circuit 
court to become an advocate instead of placing the burden of 
advocating 
their 
respective 
positions 
squarely 
upon 
the 
litigants.  Tews did not meet his burden of setting forth 
specific facts, by affidavit, demonstrating that the second 
amended complaint related back to the date of the original 
complaint pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.09(3).   
                                                                                                                                                             
Second, Tews' failure to serve his opposing affidavit at 
least five business days before the hearing was the result of 
plain neglect, not excusable neglect.  Excusable neglect is 
defined as "'that neglect which might have been the act of a 
reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.'  It is 
'not synonymous with neglect, carelessness or inattentiveness.'"  
Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 2d 461, 468, 326 N.W.2d 727 
(1982) (quoting Giese v. Giese, 43 Wis. 2d 456, 461, 168 
N.W.2d 832 (1969)).  WEPCo filed its motion for summary judgment 
on December 26, 2008, over one month before the scheduled 
hearing date of January 29, 2009.  Tews then filed his response 
brief on January 13, 2009, over two weeks before the hearing.  
Pursuant to the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), Tews 
had up until January 22, 2009, five business days before the 
hearing, to serve his opposing affidavits.  Tews offered no 
credible explanation as to why he let nearly a month pass from 
the time of WEPCo's notice of motion for summary judgment before 
he finally served his affidavit on January 23, 2009.  The 
doctrine of excusable neglect cannot rescue counsel from his own 
carelessness. 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
11 
 
¶101 Case law demonstrates that for purposes of satisfying 
the relation back doctrine, the plaintiff must set forth 
specific evidence demonstrating that the subsequently named 
defendant had the requisite notice of the claim, even if that 
defendant has some type of a corporate relationship with the 
previously named defendant.  See Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero 
Toledo, 604 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1979) (affirming the district 
court's order granting summary judgment to the defendants 
because the plaintiff's affidavit failed to show that the 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) had been 
met); Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., No. 03-C-4915, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 70030, *2-5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2009) (granting the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff 
merely contended that the defendants had notice of the original 
action but failed to produce any evidence of prior notice); 
Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. Tampa Motel Assocs., Ltd., 154 
F.R.D. 283, 289 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (denying the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment because the plaintiff demonstrated by 
affidavit that the defendant knew or should have known that but 
for a mistake it would have been named in the original suit); 
Jones v. Coleman Co., No. 92-C-3053, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 496, 
*10-14 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 1993) (granting the Coleman Company's 
motion for summary judgment in part because the plaintiff failed 
to 
demonstrate 
that 
Coleman 
and 
Coleman 
Powermate 
were 
substantially identical entities such that the latter received 
sufficient notice of the claim under Rule 15(c)).5 
                                                 
5 The majority relies significantly on the United States 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
12 
 
¶102 Instead of holding Tews to his obligation, the 
majority takes it upon itself, and in turn, upon the circuit 
court, to scour the pleadings to detect any conceivable facts 
that permit an inference that the elements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.09(3) were met.  Majority op., ¶¶56-60.  In particular, 
the majority's effort to scour the pleadings resulted in the 
majority making the inference that WEPCo received notice of 
Tews' claim within the three-year statute of limitations such 
that WEPCo would not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense.  
See id., ¶74.  To arrive at such an inference, the majority 
relies on the answers of the other entities, WE Energies and 
Wisconsin Energy.  See id., ¶¶58-59, 75.  In doing so, the 
majority necessarily and improperly holds WEPCo to the answers 
of separate entities.   
¶103 The majority implies that the circuit court should 
have likewise scoured the pleadings, even though this court 
should be applying the same standards as those used by the 
circuit court.  See Oracular Milwaukee, 323 Wis. 2d 682, ¶24 
(When reviewing a circuit court's order granting or denying a 
motion for summary judgment, "[w]e apply the same standards as 
                                                                                                                                                             
130 S.Ct. 2485 (2010), positing that the facts in Krupski are 
"indistinguishable from the facts before us today."  Majority 
op., ¶64.  To the contrary, in Krupski, there was no dispute as 
to whether the subsequently named defendant had received 
sufficient notice of the action within the applicable time 
period such that the defendant would not be prejudiced in 
maintaining a defense on the merits.  Indeed, the district court 
made a specific finding that the subsequently named defendant 
had notice of the complaint within the time period set forth by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), and the defendant did not 
challenge that finding.  Id. at 2492, 2497.   
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
13 
 
those used by the circuit court.").  Circuit courts are called 
upon to decide motions for summary judgment on a daily basis.  I 
refuse to impose the role of advocate upon the circuit court 
when genuine issues of material fact were not properly set forth 
by the parties.   
¶104 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
¶105 I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK 
CROOKS and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence/dissent. 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP828.akz 
 
 
 
1