Title: Podolak v. Lingle State Bank

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Podolak v. Lingle State Bank1986 WY 215730 P.2d 126Case Number: 86-118Decided: 12/18/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
RONALD F. PODOLAK AND 
DONNA J. PODOLAK, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

LINGLE STATE BANK OF 
LINGLE, WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Goshen County, John T. Langdon, J.

Maren K. Felde 
and Roger C. Elletson of Elletson, Doby and Felde, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Donald E. Jones 
of Jones and Graham Law Offices, Torrington, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellee Lingle State 
Bank filed an action in district court to replevin livestock and attach other 
assets belonging to appellants Ronald and Donna Podolak. The district court 
granted summary judgment for the bank, and appellants have 
appealed.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     From May of 1983, until 
June of 1985, appellants obtained credit from the bank in the principal amount 
of approximately $160,000, plus interest, to finance their ranching operations 
in Goshen County, Wyoming. As evidence of their indebtedness, appellants signed 
a variety of instruments, including a promissory note, two extensions of the 
note, a commercial guaranty, two security agreements, and a financing statement. 
As security for the indebtedness, appellants pledged all of their livestock, 
machinery, and hay. The security agreements provided that if appellants 
attempted to sell or remove the livestock from the county without the written 
consent of the bank or if the bank reasonably deemed itself insecure, the bank 
was entitled to declare the debt immediately due. The last extension note signed 
by appellants provided that payment was due December 24, 
1985.

[¶4.]     On November 7, 1985, 
the bank filed a complaint in which it alleged that appellants had threatened to 
not pay their debt when it became due and were preparing to sell a portion of 
the secured property in violation of the agreements. The district court ordered 
the sheriff to take immediate possession of the property and set the matter for 
hearing. At the hearing on November 13 and 15, 1985, the district court found 
that the bank was entitled to delivery of the secured property and to proceed 
with its replevin action.

[¶5.]     Over the next three 
months, several more hearings were held, numerous pleadings, motions, and 
memoranda were filed, and numerous contentions were raised. The bank claimed 
generally that appellants were intentionally attempting to avoid repaying the 
loan. In support of its claim, the bank pointed to evidence that: (1) appellants 
brought suit in federal court seeking rescission of the debt; (2) they sold and 
attempted to sell secured property outside the county without consent; (3) they 
attempted to place other assets beyond reach of the bank by transferring them to 
family members; and (4) they filed a lien to prevent the bank from obtaining 
possession of the secured property. In contrast, appellants claimed that no debt 
existed because the bank did not loan them "money" and because the bank induced 
them to enter into loan arrangements through fraud, deceit, and 
misrepresentation. In addition, appellants counterclaimed against the bank for 
bad faith in contract, bad faith in tort, intentional interference with a 
contractual relationship, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, lien foreclosure, commercially unreasonable sale, and wrongful 
replevin and garnishment.

[¶6.]     The dispute ended on 
March 24, 1986, when the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
bank on its complaint and against appellants on their 
counterclaim.

[¶7.]     Appellants set forth 
the following issues for our determination:

"I. THE PREJUDGMENT 
ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT STATUTES WERE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO RONALD F. 
AND DONNA J. PODOLAK IN VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION.

"II. APPELLEE WAS GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 56 OF THE WYOMING RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE; 
SAID SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BASED ON THE EXISTENCE OF 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND THE APPELLEE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW."

[¶8.]     These issues are 
identical to two of those presented to this Court in Sturman v. First National 
Bank, Wyo., 729 P.2d 667 (1986). We determined in that case that the issues 
raised did not present grounds for reversal. More specifically, we found that 
the manner in which the prejudgment seizure statutes were applied was not 
unconstitutional and that the appellant therein was afforded ample opportunity 
to present her case. We also found that, despite the array of issues set forth 
by the appellant in support of her claim to the contrary, there simply were no 
genuine issues of material fact making the entry of summary judgment 
improper.

[¶9.]     The present case is, in 
practical effect, indistinguishable from Sturman v. First National Bank. 
Appellants obtained a loan from the bank, pledged their property as security, 
signed agreements setting forth the terms and conditions of the loan, and then 
demonstrated their intent to violate those terms and conditions. As a 
consequence, the bank sought prejudgment judicial relief pursuant to the terms 
of the agreements and the Wyoming statutes. Throughout the lengthy proceedings 
which followed, appellants were afforded ample opportunity to testify, present 
witnesses and exhibits, and generally set forth their claims. In addition, they 
were afforded ample opportunity to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue 
of material fact making summary judgment improper. Because of their failure to 
do so and for all the reasons stated in Sturman v. First National Bank, we find 
no error and affirm the district court's judgment.

[¶10.]  Affirmed.