Title: Gannon v. City of Boston

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12136 
 
SEAN GANNON  vs.  CITY OF BOSTON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 8, 2016. - April 18, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ.1 
 
 
Anti-Discrimination Law, Handicap, Employment, Burden of proof.  
Employment, Discrimination.  Handicapped Persons.  
Municipal Corporations, Police.  Public Employment, Police.  
Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Burden of proof. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 27, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on a motion 
for summary judgment, and a motion for reconsideration was 
considered by him. 
 
 
 
Harold L. Lichten (Adelaide H. Pagano also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Nicole I. Taub, Senior Special Assistant Corporation 
Counsel, for the defendant. 
 
Simone R. Liebman & Constance M. McGrane, for the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
Robert S. Mantell, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
 
 
2 
 
GANTS, C.J.  The issue presented on appeal is whether a 
city is entitled to summary judgment on a handicap 
discrimination claim under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), where the 
police department limits an officer to desk duty based on an 
informed, good faith belief that the officer can no longer 
safely patrol the streets because of his perceived handicap.  We 
conclude that summary judgment is not appropriate where there 
are facts in dispute as to whether the officer is a qualified 
handicapped person capable of performing the full duties of a 
patrol officer without posing an unacceptably significant risk 
of serious injury to himself or others.  The city at trial may 
present the evidence that caused the department to believe that 
the officer cannot safely assume the full duties of a police 
officer, but that determination rests with the fact finder based 
on the preponderance of the evidence, not with the department 
based on its informed, good faith belief.  Therefore, we vacate 
the motion judge's entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
city of Boston (city) and remand the case for a trial.2 
 
Background.  The plaintiff, Sean Gannon (Gannon or 
plaintiff), began working for the Boston police department 
(department) in 1996.  For the first decade of his employment, 
Gannon was a patrol officer performing the full range of patrol 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and the 
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association. 
 
 
3 
officer duties.  Gannon is an avid practitioner of mixed martial 
arts (MMA) who has trained since his teenage years in techniques 
including taekwondo, judo and aikido, Brazilian jujitsu, and 
Filipino stick and knife fighting.  He began fighting in MMA 
amateur bouts at night clubs on the South Shore in 2002, before 
making his professional debut in August, 2004. 
 
Gannon suffered repeated head injuries in his professional 
fights.  In his first fight, Gannon received a roundhouse kick 
to his head and afterwards began vomiting and did not feel well.  
An ambulance transported him to a hospital, where he was 
diagnosed with a concussion.  Gannon's next fight came two 
months later, in October, 2004, when he faced off with a widely 
reputed fighter known by the moniker "Kimbo Slice."  Gannon and 
that opponent agreed to a bare-knuckle boxing match governed by 
the traditional London Prize Rules, which permit a fight to 
continue until a fighter is knocked down and cannot return to 
his feet in thirty seconds.  Gannon won the fight by knockout, 
but afterwards he spent several days in the hospital and was 
diagnosed with another concussion.  Gannon's final professional 
fight came on October 7, 2005, where he lost by a technical 
knockout, and broke his right eye socket.  He did not return to 
work until October 14, 2005, and was then placed on restricted 
duty, limited to "inside only" work, and barred from paid 
details.  The restrictions were lifted on October 20, 2005. 
 
 
4 
 
In December, 2005, Gannon was diagnosed with obstructive 
sleep apnea and insomnia.  He was treated for these conditions 
with various medications and procedures.  On February 1, 2006, 
Gannon did not appear for his scheduled shift of police duty, 
and officers went to his home to check on him.  They found him 
in an incoherent and confused state.  Gannon explained that he 
had overslept as a result of the treatment he was undergoing for 
sleep apnea.  After this incident, the department placed him on 
administrative duty, pending a fitness evaluation by the 
department's psychiatrist, Dr. Marcia Scott. 
 
Based on her initial evaluation, Dr. Scott described Gannon 
as "physically very restless" and opined that "[h]is 
restlessness could be associated with brain injury from his 
sport."  Accordingly, Dr. Scott ordered additional 
neuropsychological testing with Dr. Lucinda Doran, who 
administered tests to assess Gannon's intellectual abilities.  
She concluded that, while Gannon appeared to possess "solid 
overall capabilities," his "inability to process information 
quickly clearly reduce[d] his mental efficiency and his ability 
to react and respond appropriately."  Around the same time, Dr. 
Scott reported from her ongoing interactions with Gannon that 
his thinking was impaired, "he ha[d] difficulty focusing, his 
speech [was] pressured and garbled, his face red and twisted."  
Later in 2006, Dr. Scott noted that Gannon remained "on modified 
 
 
5 
duty due to significant mental impairments and reduction in 
mental performance . . . [a]lthough there [had] been some 
improvement over the intervening months."  She continued to 
recommend against Gannon's return to full-duty status, 
explaining in a follow-up report in October, 2008, "Mr. Gannon 
has serious mental deficits that interfere with his ability to 
do the essential functions of an armed police officer."
 
Gannon sought treatment from his own doctors, including Dr. 
Aaron Nelson, a neuropsychologist, and Dr. Tuesday Burns, a 
psychiatrist.  In a 2006 evaluation, Dr. Nelson's testing 
revealed "baseline verbal intellectual ability in the superior 
range and highly variable performance on measures of attention 
and executive function, suggestive of frontal systems 
compromise."  Dr. Nelson opined that Gannon's issues "likely 
related to his history of multiple concussive injuries" and that 
Gannon's anxiety problems were exacerbating his difficulties.  
Two years later, however, Dr. Nelson tested Gannon for a second 
time and reported "stronger performance on a wide range of test 
measures."  Dr. Burns, who had been treating Gannon for anxiety 
and attentional difficulties, subsequently informed the 
department that Gannon had "improved significantly across all 
areas" and that there were no "psychiatric or neurologic 
contraindications to Mr. Gannon being re-instated to full duty 
at the Boston Police Department." 
 
 
6 
 
Dr. Scott, the department's psychiatrist, disagreed with 
Dr. Burns's assessment.  "Mr. Gannon has a serious chronic 
mental disorder as well as a history of repeated head trauma," 
she wrote in January, 2009.  "These impairments interfere with 
his ability to accurately assess situations, communicate 
accurately, make accurate judgments, solve problems and manage 
the stresses involved in the job of an armed police officer." 
 
In 2010, the department retained neuropsychologist Dr. 
Muriel Lezak to review Gannon's testing records.  Dr. Lezak 
evaluated the prior testing results against metanorms developed 
from twenty-eight studies.  She reported that Gannon's response 
or reaction times fell below the fifth percentile for persons 
his age, in the borderline-defective to defective range.  
"[W]hat he appears to be unable to do, when thought or 
concentration is required, is maintain accuracy and respond at a 
normal rate of speed," Dr. Lezak wrote.  Dr. Lezak later tested 
Gannon herself.  Her new results supported her earlier 
evaluation, and led her to conclude, "[I]t is unlikely that an 
intensive remediation program could improve [Gannon's] response 
speed to near normal levels or enable him to develop consistent 
memory recall, both to a level that would allow him to 
perform . . . police functions requiring response speed and 
reliable memory recall." 
 
 
7 
 
In March, 2011, the department filed an application with 
the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) 
to involuntarily retire Gannon.  PERAC rejected the application 
after three physicians performed independent evaluations of 
Gannon and all concluded that he was capable of performing the 
essential functions of his job as a police officer.  Gannon 
remained (and continues to remain) on desk duty, where he serves 
as the booking officer and works at the front desk of the East 
Boston police station.  Gannon is not currently permitted to 
carry a service weapon, which prevents him from obtaining detail 
work and certain overtime opportunities. 
  
In September, 2009, the Boston Patrolmen's Association 
filed a grievance on Gannon's behalf demanding that he be 
permitted to resume the full duties of a patrol officer.  In 
advance of the arbitration proceeding, Gannon solicited an 
assessment from an additional neuropsychologist, Dr. Neal 
McGrath.  Dr. McGrath concluded that Gannon was fit to return to 
full patrol duty, stating that "any cognitive deficits that 
Officer Gannon may have demonstrated in past evaluations ha[d] 
cleared and were therefore more likely related to treatable 
medical conditions such as sleep disorder or mood disorder."  
But Dr. McGrath changed his opinion after reviewing Dr. Lezak's 
testing, recommending "further confirmation of . . . Gannon's 
ability to respond to emergency decisions as a police officer 
 
 
8 
under conditions more closely resembling actual emergencies."  
Consequently, the union hired a police consultant, who performed 
live simulation testing on Gannon.  This testing included a 
"Shoot/Don't Shoot" target drill, and other role-playing 
scenarios.  Gannon performed well, and Dr. McGrath reaffirmed 
his position that Gannon was "fit for full duty as a Boston 
[p]olice officer."  Dr. Lezak stood by her opinion and rejected 
Dr. McGrath's reliance on the simulations, saying that "no 
matter how real you try to make [them]," the simulations were 
not sufficient.  She added, "[Gannon] is not responding while 
running, he's not responding while he is sensing danger for 
himself, he's not responding while there's a whole bunch of 
stuff going on, sirens, and other cars pulling up.  This is 
where my concern is."  In May, 2014, the arbitrator found that 
the union had not "undercut the force of Dr. Lezak's medical 
opinion," and concluded that the department did not act 
unreasonably in placing Gannon on administrative duty because of 
his "neuropsychological problem of speed and accuracy." 
 
In 2012, Gannon brought a complaint with the Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), alleging that the city 
acted in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), by refusing to 
return him to full duty.  After the requisite ninety days, he 
filed a discrimination lawsuit against the city in Superior 
Court.  The city moved for summary judgment in August, 2015, 
 
 
9 
arguing that Gannon did not meet the statutory definition of a 
handicapped person; that he could not perform the essential 
functions of a full-duty police officer; that he had not 
suffered any adverse action; and that, even if he had, the 
adverse action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason.  In ruling on the city's motion, the judge, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Gannon, determined that 
Gannon had met his burden of showing a prima facie case of 
handicap discrimination.  He found that "the evidence . . . 
obviously supports a fact-finder in concluding . . . that the 
[c]ity regards Gannon as having physical impairments . . . that 
curtail[] a 'major' life activity, including brain functions 
such as memory, ability to recall and follow directions, and 
[]ability to make split second decisions," thus satisfying the 
requirement that Gannon prove he has a "handicap" within the 
meaning of G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (17).  The judge also noted, "The 
evidence could hardly be more in conflict on the facts bearing 
on the medical aspects" of the case.  He concluded that, because 
he cannot resolve factual disputes in a motion for summary 
judgment, he must accept as true the reports, testimony, and 
affidavits from Gannon's doctors and other experts that state 
that Gannon can perform the essential duties of a full-duty 
Boston police officer.  The judge also assumed for purposes of 
the motion that the city had taken an adverse employment action 
 
 
10 
against Gannon by assigning him to desk duty rather than full 
duty. 
 
After he concluded that Gannon had made the required prima 
facie showing of discrimination, the judge found that "[t]he 
city [had] met its burden to articulate a non-discriminatory 
reason for its assignment of Gannon to desk duty, namely its 
concern that Gannon's loss of cognitive function and memory 
impairs his ability to do essential tasks, such as responding in 
an emergency and exercising the necessary judgment in high 
stress situations, including those involving the use of 
firearms." 
 
The judge then determined that, even viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to Gannon, he had failed to sustain 
his burden of proving "that the [c]ity's articulated reason is a 
pretext for discrimination."  The judge framed the question of 
pretext as "whether the medical and psychological evidence is so 
thin that a reasonable jury may conclude that the [c]ity could 
not honestly have concerns about Gannon's abilities in critical 
areas, including reactions and decisions during crisis, possibly 
involving firearms."  Finding that "[t]he answer, compelled by 
the record, is 'no,'" the judge allowed the city's motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, claiming that "it 
is illegal disability discrimination for the [c]ity to place 
 
 
11 
Gannon on desk duty because of his perceived handicap if he is 
in fact capable of performing the essential functions of a 
police officer."  The judge denied the motion, declaring that 
"the question of whether the plaintiff was in fact a qualified 
handicapped individual is distinct from whether the [c]ity 
discriminated because of his perceived handicap."  The judge 
found that, where the city had concluded, "with ample expert 
support," that Gannon could not perform the duties of a patrol 
officer, "[t]he stated reason for its action was non-
discriminatory -- the plaintiff's inability to do the job.  It 
did not matter why the plaintiff lacked that ability." 
 
Gannon filed a notice of appeal, and we allowed his 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  Under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16), it is an 
"unlawful practice . . . [f]or any employer . . . to . . . 
refuse to . . . advance in employment or otherwise discriminate 
against, because of his handicap, any person alleging to be a 
qualified handicapped person, capable of performing the 
essential functions of the position involved with reasonable 
accommodation, unless the employer can demonstrate that the 
accommodation required to be made to the physical or mental 
limitations of the person would impose an undue hardship to the 
 
 
12 
employer's business."3  In interpreting the meaning of these 
provisions, we give "substantial deference" to the guidelines 
interpreting G. L. c. 151B promulgated by the MCAD, although we 
recognize that the guidelines do not carry the force of law.  
Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston, 434 Mass. 233, 239 (2001), 
citing Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 
Guidelines:  Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap 
Chapter 151B § II.A.7 (1998) (MCAD Guidelines).  We remain 
mindful that the Legislature instructed that G. L. c. 151B 
"shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its 
purposes."  G. L. c. 151B, § 9.4 
 
There are two general categories of handicap discrimination 
cases, which differ according to the explanation given for the 
adverse employment action by the employer.  In the first, the 
employer denies that the employment action was motivated by the 
plaintiff employee's handicap, and contends that the action was 
                                                          
 
 
3 The law defines the term "handicap" to mean "(a) a 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or 
more major life activities of a person; (b) a record of having 
such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such 
impairment."  G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (17).  "[H]andicapped person" 
means any person who has a handicap.  G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (19). 
 
 
4 Because the language of G. L. c. 151B resembles language 
used in Federal statutes prohibiting discrimination, we also 
look to Federal case law for guidance in our interpretations of 
the scope of our antidiscrimination law.  See, e.g., Russell v. 
Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 437 Mass. 443, 451 n.6 (2002); Cox 
v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 414 Mass. 375, 384 (1993); 
Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 
371 Mass. 130, 137-138 (1976). 
 
 
13 
based on other conduct by the employee, such as insubordination, 
poor job performance, or chronic tardiness, or resulted from a 
reduction in force, that is unrelated to the plaintiff's 
handicap.  See Tate v. Department of Mental Health, 419 Mass 
356, 361 (1995).  In these cases, we follow the framework, 
patterned on that set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), in which the plaintiff employee bears 
the burden of making a prima facie showing of handicap 
discrimination by offering evidence that (1) the employee is a 
"handicapped person" because he or she has "a physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits one or more major life 
activities" (or a record thereof) or because the employee is 
"regarded [by his or her employer] as having such an 
impairment," G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (17), (19) (defining "handicap" 
and "handicapped person"); (2) he or she is a "qualified 
handicapped person" who "is capable of performing the essential 
functions of a particular job, or who would be capable of" doing 
so with reasonable accommodation, G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (16) 
(defining "qualified handicapped person"); (3) he or she was 
terminated or otherwise subject to an adverse action by his or 
her employer; and (4) where, as here, the adverse action is 
prohibiting the plaintiff from assuming the duties of a 
position, the position otherwise remained open to him or her.5  
                                                          
 
 
5 Where the adverse action is termination of the plaintiff 
 
 
14 
See MCAD Guidelines, supra at § IX.A.2.6  Where the plaintiff 
employee makes this prima facie showing, the burden shifts to 
the employer to show with credible evidence that the real reason 
for the adverse employment action was not the employee's 
handicap but a lawful reason that was unrelated to the 
employee's handicap.  See id.  See also Abramian v. President & 
Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 107, 116 (2000); Blare v. 
Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 441-
442 (1995).  Where the employer meets this burden, the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff employee to prove that the adverse 
action was taken "because of his [or her] handicap," G. L. 
c. 151B, § 4 (16), and not for the reason proffered by the 
employer.  See MCAD Guidelines, supra.  See also Bulwer v. Mount 
Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 681 (2016); Abramian, 432 Mass. at 
117; Blare, 419 Mass. at 442-443.  This type of case is often 
labeled a "pretext case" because the plaintiff employee may 
defeat an employer's motion for summary judgment by showing that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
employee, the fourth element requires the employee to show that 
"the position he [or she] had occupied remained open and the 
employer sought to fill it."  See Dartt v. Browning-Ferris 
Indus., Inc. (Mass.), 427 Mass. 1, 3 (1998); Beal v. Selectmen 
of Hingham, 419 Mass. 535, 541 (1995). 
 
 
6 This standard reflects our recognition that proof of an 
employer's true motive can be elusive.  See Wheelock College, 
371 Mass. at 137-138.  We have noted in reference to the final 
element that the necessary showing may vary depending on the 
specific circumstances of each case.  See Beal, 419 Mass. at 
541. 
 
 
15 
there are disputed issues of fact as to whether the employer's 
proffered reason was not the true reason, which permit the 
inference that the employer offered a pretextual reason because 
the true reason was discrimination on the basis of handicap.  
See Bulwer, supra at 681-682; Blare, supra at 444-445.7  
Virtually all cases alleging discrimination on the basis of 
race, gender, and national origin fall into this first category, 
because an employer will rarely concede that the employer's true 
motivation for the employment action was the employee's race, 
gender, or national origin. 
 
In the second category of handicap discrimination cases, 
the employer admits that the adverse action was taken because of 
the plaintiff employee's handicap but contends that the employee 
is not protected under the statute because the employee was not 
capable of performing the essential functions of the job even 
with reasonable accommodation, and therefore is not a qualified 
handicapped person.  In this type of case, the plaintiff 
                                                          
 
 
7 Although a showing of pretext permits a finding of 
discriminatory intent at trial, it does not require such a 
finding.  "The employer may counter the effect of this evidence 
by showing that, even if his articulated reason for the adverse 
action is untrue, he had no discriminatory intent, or that his 
action was based on a different, nondiscriminatory reason."  
Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 432 Mass. 
107, 118 (2000).  See Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. 493, 
508 (2001) (burden-shifting rules and pretext inquiry involve 
questions of law more appropriately left to trial judge; jury 
instructions should focus on ultimate issues of harm, 
discriminatory animus, and causation). 
 
 
16 
employee's burden to make a prima facie showing is 
straightforward:  the plaintiff employee must show that he or 
she suffered an adverse employment action, that he or she has a 
"handicap," as defined in G. L. c. 151B, § 1, that he or she is 
a "qualified handicapped person," as defined in § 1, and that 
the adverse action was taken because of his or her handicap.  
See Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 437 Mass. 443, 450 
(2002).  Accord Ward v. Massachusetts Health Research Inst., 
Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2000).  The plaintiff 
employee need not prove that the employer's stated reason was 
not the true reason for the adverse action, but instead must 
prove that he or she indeed was capable of performing the 
essential functions of the job and therefore was a qualified 
handicapped person.  See Russell, supra; Ward, supra.  
Accordingly, this type of case is best described as a qualified 
handicapped person case, because the crux of the case is not 
whether the employer's explanation was a pretext but whether the 
plaintiff employee was a qualified handicapped person.8 
                                                          
 
 
8 We have at times referred to pretext cases as "indirect 
evidence" cases, and qualified handicapped person cases as 
"direct evidence" cases.  See Lipchitz, 434 Mass. at 501; Wynn & 
Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 431 
Mass. 655, 664-665 (2000).  We find this focus on the nature of 
the evidence unhelpful and a potential source of confusion in 
distinguishing these cases.  In a pretext case, where the 
plaintiff employee must generally rely on circumstantial 
evidence, the plaintiff may still offer in evidence specific 
statements by supervisors reflecting discriminatory animus 
 
 
17 
 
The judge erred in analyzing the evidence in this case as 
if it were a pretext case when it should have been analyzed as a 
qualified handicapped person case.  Where, as here, the city has 
limited the duties of a police officer because it considers him 
or her incapable of performing the essential duties of a patrol 
officer as a result of physical or mental limitations arising 
from the officer's handicap, the adverse employment action is 
"because of his [or her] handicap."  G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16).  
See MCAD Guidelines, supra at IX.A; Labonte v. Hutchins & 
Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 821-822 (1997).  See also Ward, 209 F.3d 
at 37-38.  It does not become a pretext case simply because the 
department contends that the adverse employment action was 
motivated solely by those physical or mental limitations, and 
not by the handicap, where those limitations arise from the 
handicap.  See Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 
84 F.3d 758, 762-763 (5th Cir. 1996) (judge erred by applying 
pretext analysis to school's claim that it demoted hearing-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(which the employer will seek to characterize as "stray 
comments") that might be described as direct evidence.  See 
Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 684-687 (2016) 
(discussing five different kinds of evidence jury might have 
relied on in determining employer's real reasons for 
termination).  See also Johansen v. NCR Comten, Inc., 30 Mass. 
App. Ct. 294, 302 (1991).  Similarly, in a qualified handicapped 
person case, there may be so-called indirect evidence that the 
employer's belief that the employee is incapable of performing 
the essential duties of the job is based on stereotypes and 
assumptions rather than hard facts.  See Labonte v. Hutchins & 
Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 815 (1997). 
 
 
18 
impaired bus driver out of fear that she would not be able to 
hear if student in her bus was choking; relevant question was 
whether plaintiff actually presented safety threat).  For 
instance, where a police department terminates an officer's 
employment because of his or her failing eyesight, it cannot 
defeat a discrimination claim by arguing that it did not fire 
the officer because of the handicap but because he or she could 
not see clearly enough to perform the position's essential 
duties. 
 
This analytical flaw transformed the plaintiff's burden on 
summary judgment in this case.  By mischaracterizing this as a 
pretext case, the judge determined that Gannon could not prevail 
on his claim of handicap discrimination because he had failed to 
rebut the department's contention that the real reason for its 
refusal to return him to full duty was that it "honestly" had 
concerns about Gannon's reaction time and his decision-making 
during crisis.  But where these concerns arose from Gannon's 
handicap, this analysis essentially meant that the department 
prevailed because Gannon failed to present evidence to show that 
the department did not act in good faith in concluding that 
Gannon could not perform the essential duties of his job.  In a 
qualified handicapped person case, however, the employer does 
not prevail simply because it indisputably acted in good faith; 
it can prevail only if the handicapped employee fails to prove 
 
 
19 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was able to 
perform the essential duties of the position with reasonable 
accommodation.  See Dartt v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. 
(Mass.), 427 Mass. 1, 3 (1998).  See also Pushkin v. Regents of 
the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981) ("It 
would be a rare case indeed in which a hostile discriminatory 
purpose or subjective intent to discriminate solely on the basis 
of handicap could be shown.  Discrimination on the basis of 
handicap usually results from more invidious causative elements 
and often occurs under the guise of extending a helping hand or 
a mistaken, restrictive belief as to the limitations of 
handicapped persons"). 
 
As to the issue whether Gannon was capable of performing 
the essential duties of a patrol officer, the judge recognized 
that there was a genuine dispute of material fact, and that 
Gannon had offered substantial evidence from medical and police 
experts indicating that he can perform the essential, full 
duties of a Boston police officer.  Because there remains a 
factual dispute as to whether Gannon can capably perform the 
essential duties of a full-duty police officer, the department's 
motion for summary judgment should have been denied.  At trial, 
the fact finder must determine, not whether the department acted 
on a good faith belief that Gannon cannot capably perform these 
duties because of his handicap, but whether Gannon has proved by 
 
 
20 
a preponderance of the evidence that he can do so.  See Labonte, 
424 Mass. at 822-823.  See also Gates v. Flood, 57 Mass. App. 
Ct. 739, 745 (2003) (it is no defense that employer mistakenly 
judged employee's qualification).  Cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 
U.S. 624, 628-629, 649 (1998) (where patient infected with human 
immunodeficiency virus alleged that dentist discriminated 
against her in violation of Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 12182[a], by refusing to fill her cavities in his 
dental office because he feared for his safety, "[h]is belief 
that a significant risk existed, even if maintained in good 
faith, would not relieve him from liability").  The department 
may offer in evidence all of the tests and expert opinions that 
caused it to conclude that Gannon cannot perform the essential 
duties of a patrol officer, but our law of handicapped 
discrimination grants this determination to the fact finder 
based on the preponderance of the evidence, not to the employer 
based on its good faith belief.  See Cox v. New England Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 414 Mass. 375, 383 (1993). 
 
In order to rebut Gannon's prima facie case, the city bears 
the burden of specifying which essential duty or duties Gannon 
is incapable of performing because of his handicap.  See, e.g., 
Carleton v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 791, 810 (2006).  The 
department appears to contend that it is an essential duty of a 
patrol officer to respond to stressful situations and 
 
 
21 
emergencies with reasonable judgment and speed, and that Gannon 
is not capable of performing these duties because of his 
cognitive limitations and slow reaction time.  Implicit in this 
contention is that, if Gannon were allowed to become a patrol 
officer, he would put the safety of the public, his fellow 
officers, and himself at risk. 
 
Where an employer defends a decision to terminate or not 
hire a handicapped individual (or, as here, to not allow the 
individual to resume being a full-duty patrol officer) because 
"there is a risk of future injury to the employee or others," 
the MCAD Guidelines deem this an affirmative defense for which 
the employer bears the burden of proving "that there is a 
'reasonable probability of substantial harm' to the employee or 
others."  MCAD Guidelines, supra at IX.B.3, quoting Ryan v. 
Lunenberg, 11 M.D.L.R. 1215, 1241-1242 (1989).  Placing this 
burden of proof on the employer is improper for two reasons. 
 
First, it is contrary to our case law holding that the 
burden of proving unlawful discrimination remains with the 
plaintiff "at all times."  See Abramian, 432 Mass. at 118, 
quoting Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 370 Mass. 130, 139 (1976).  See also Cox, 414 
Mass. at 386 (plaintiff had burden to "persuade the judge that 
 
 
22 
he was capable of climbing poles safely" or prove that climbing 
was not essential function of position).9 
 
Second, where, as with a patrol officer, the nature of the 
job will at times place the employee in harm's way, it is 
impossible to divorce the question whether the employee is 
capable of performing the essential functions of the position 
from the question whether the employee can perform those 
functions safely.10  General Laws c. 151B, § 1, defines various 
                                                          
 
 
9 The defendant employer bears the burden of proof only 
where it claims that the reasonable accommodation that might 
enable the employee capably to perform the essential functions 
of the position would impose an undue hardship on the conduct of 
the employer's business.  See Godfrey v. Globe Newspaper Co., 
457 Mass. 113, 120 (2010) ("Once an employee 'make[s] at least a 
facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible,' the 
burden of proof [of both production and persuasion] shifts to 
the employer to establish that a suggested accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship" [citations omitted]).  See also 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, Guidelines:  
Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Handicap Chapter 151B 
§ II.D (1998).  The employer's burden as to this issue is 
imposed by the plain meaning of the language of G. L. c. 151B, 
§ 4 (16), which prohibits discrimination against qualified 
handicapped individuals "unless the employer can demonstrate 
that the accommodation required to be made . . . would impose an 
undue hardship to the employer's business." 
 
 
10 Surveying the Federal decisions in this area, one 
treatise remarks that while "[o]rdinarily a party asserting an 
affirmative defense bears the burden of proof, . . . many courts 
have been reluctant to require the employer to prove [a] direct 
[safety] threat.  Their reasoning is that Congress placed 
burdens on both parties, because the plaintiff must prove that 
he or she is 'otherwise qualified' for the job.  The plaintiff's 
showing of being 'otherwise qualified' encompasses or subsumes 
the issue of direct threat, the argument goes, because a person 
who is a direct threat would not be qualified for the job; being 
qualified implies not being a direct threat."  9 L.K. Larson, 
 
 
23 
terms in c. 151B, but it does not define "capable of performing 
the essential functions of a particular job."  Section 4 (16), 
however, recognizes that the safe performance of a job is part 
of its capable performance, because it requires that a physical 
or mental job qualification requirement "shall be functionally 
related to the specific job or jobs for which the individual is 
being considered and shall be consistent with the safe and 
lawful performance of the job."  See Dahill, 434 Mass. at 240, 
quoting Cox, 414 Mass. at 383-384 ("The public policies 
underlying G. L. c. 151B, § 4 [16], are clear:  to protect 
'handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, 
stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight 
to such legitimate concerns of [employers] as avoiding exposing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Employment Discrimination § 156.03[4][c] (2d ed. 2016) (Larson).  
See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 
135, 143 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Under § 504 [of the Rehabilitation 
Act], it is clear that the question of whether the employment of 
the plaintiff poses risks to the health of others is analyzed as 
a matter of whether the person is "otherwise qualified"). 
 
 
Those Federal courts that take the opposite view and place 
the burden of proof on the employer have emphasized that the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (b), 
provides a defense to a charge of disability discrimination 
where the individual poses "a 'direct threat' to the health or 
safety of him or herself or to others in the workplace."  
Larson, supra, citing Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 571 (8th Cir. 2007); Nunes 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999); 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. AIC Sec. 
Investigations, 55 F.3d 1276, 1283-1284 (7th Cir. 1995).  
General Laws c. 151B, § 4 (16), does not set forth a "direct 
threat" defense; it simply places on the employee the burden of 
proving that he or she is a "qualified handicapped person." 
 
 
24 
others to significant health and safety risks'").  Section 
4 (16) does not recognize a separate affirmative defense of 
"reasonable probability of substantial harm" to the employee or 
others.  See MCAD Guidelines, supra at IX.B.3. 
 
While the handicapped employee ultimately bears the burden 
of proving that he or she can safely perform the essential 
functions of a particular job, the employee need only confront 
this burden where the employer has met its burden of producing 
specific evidence showing that the employee would pose an 
unacceptably significant risk of serious injury to the employee 
or others.11  The employer meets its burden of production where 
it offers evidence showing that it has made "an individualized 
factual inquiry" based on substantial information regarding the 
employee's individual work and medical history.  See MCAD 
Guidelines, supra at § IX.B.3.  See also Knapp v. Northwestern 
Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 484-486 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 
U.S. 1274 (1997).  It may not meet its burden based upon pure 
speculation as to the likely risk of injury.  See MCAD 
Guidelines, supra.  Nor is it sufficient to show simply an 
increased risk of injury.  See id.  See also Mantolete v. 
Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985), quoting S. Rep. No. 
                                                          
 
 
11 We choose the standard of an "unacceptably significant 
risk of serious injury to the employee or others" because we 
recognize that the performance of some inherently dangerous jobs 
might always involve a significant risk of serious injury to the 
employee or others. 
 
 
25 
48, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 16 (1974) ("A mere 'elevated risk' 
standard is not sufficient to insure handicapped people's 'right 
to employment which complements their abilities'").  The 
employer must offer evidence showing an increased risk of 
serious injury that is so significant that it cannot reasonably 
be deemed acceptable by an employer.  See Beal v. Selectmen of 
Hingham, 419 Mass. 535, 543 (1995) (concluding that plaintiff 
who was discharged as police officer has no reasonable 
expectation of demonstrating that she is "qualified handicapped 
person" under G. L. c. 151B "[b]ecause police officers are 
responsible for public safety, and the plaintiff's handicap 
severely compromises her capability to ensure the general safety 
of the public").  See also Burton v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 
244 F. Supp. 2d 252, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (plaintiff not 
qualified to perform essential functions of his bus driver 
position where his health condition posed "unacceptable" risk to 
public). 
 
Where the employer has satisfied this burden of production, 
the plaintiff employee must prove that he or she is capable of 
performing the essential functions of the job without posing an 
unacceptably significant risk of serious injury to the employee 
or others.  In making this determination, the fact finder must 
consider the potential severity of the feared injury and the 
probability that the employee in that position would cause such 
 
 
26 
injury.  An employee may be found incapable of safely performing 
the essential functions of a position, and therefore not 
qualified under the statute, without the risk rising to the 
standard of a "reasonable probability of substantial harm."  
Contrast MCAD Guidelines, supra at § IX.B.3, quoting Ryan, 11 
M.D.L.R. at 1242. 
 
Conclusion.  We reverse the allowance of the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, and remand the case for a trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.