Title: Prescott v. Bay St. Louis Newspapers, Inc.

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

497 So. 2d 77 (1986) Melvin Alexander PRESCOTT v. BAY ST. LOUIS NEWSPAPERS, INC. No. 55891. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 15, 1986. Rehearing Denied November 19, 1986. John C. Ellis, Hollis C. Thompson, Jr., Gulfport, for appellant. W. Joel Blass, Henry F. Laird, Jr., Mize, Thompson & Blass, Gulfport, for appellee. Before ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, JJ. DAN M. LEE, Justice, for the Court: Melvin Alexander Prescott appeals the summary judgment entered by the trial court against him in this invasion of privacy suit. Prescott brought suit in Hancock County Circuit Court on April 13, 1983. He alleged that Bay St. Louis Newspapers, Inc., owner of The Sea Coast Echo, a twice weekly publication, invaded his privacy by publishing pictures and articles concerning him on October 21, 1982. This complaint was dismissed June 17, 1983 for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. An amended complaint was filed July 7, 1983 alleging basically the same cause of action arising from the same October 21, 1982 publication. Discovery was begun but not completed when Bay St. Louis Newspapers, Inc. moved for summary judgment. A hearing on this motion and other motions interposed by Prescott was held April 20, 1984. Summary judgment was granted May 18, 1984. Prescott appeals assigning as error: Because we agree that Prescott was not placed in a false light as a matter of law, we affirm. On October 21, 1982, The Sea Coast Echo published two news items, each accompanying a picture depicting different aspects of the same one-car traffic accident. The accident was newsworthy because the vehicle struck a utility pole and caused a power outage in Bay St. Louis. *78 One picture and news item appeared on the front page. A utility truck and a repairman using the truck's hydraulic arm lift and basket are pictured. The repairman is working to repair a fallen power line. Also visible in the background is a vehicle. The caption reads: The second picture appears at page 7 in the paper's front section. It depicts a vehicle tangled in what appears to be tree limbs. The vehicle's hood is crumpled and the driver's door is open. A man dressed in a law enforcement uniform is holding a flashlight as if examining the truck. It is dark. The caption reads: Prescott's suit alleged that the pictures and new items, when taken in context, held him out to the public in the false light of a drunkard. Though Prescott's complaint is not crystal clear, counsel for Prescott at oral argument went to the crux of the suit when he indicated that the paper presented this false impression of Prescott by publicizing the Waveland arrest. The complaint alleged this action by the paper caused Prescott to lose his job and suffer actual damages in the amount of $750,000. Prescott also sought punitive damages in the amount of $750,000. In deciding the paper's motion for summary judgment the trial court had before it Prescott's deposition, the deposition of Ellis Cuevas, the paper's editor and publisher, an affidavit from Cuevas with accompanying exhibits and a battery of motions by Prescott. One of these motions sought to strike Cuevas' affidavit for non-compliance with M.R.C.P. 56(e). Because we hold the summary judgment was proper without reference to Cuevas' affidavit, the trial court's failure to address this motion need not detain us. Prescott stated that he had left work between 5 and 6 p.m. on the night of the accident. He recalled drinking a total of about ten beers at two different locations between leaving work and being involved in the accident. Prescott testified that the accident occurred about 10:30 p.m. He testified that he hit the utility pole because his Blazer automobile had broken shock absorbers which caused him to momentarily lose control when he struck a bump. In his deposition, Prescott acknowledged he received a ticket for the October 19, 1982 accident charging him with driving *79 under the influence, reckless driving and leaving the scene of an accident. Later, Prescott was found not guilty of the aformentioned charges but he was found guilty of causing property damage. He was fined $100 and paid restitution of about $625 to the power company. Prescott admitted he was charged October 5, 1982 with driving under the influence and with improper lane usage in Waveland. He pled no contest to the lane usage violation and pled guilty to the DUI charge and was fined $247. Cuevas stated in his deposition that the paper printed an "update" item about the disposition of the charges against Prescott. A copy of that article appears in the record. The article notes Prescott was found not guilty of driving under the influence, leaving the scene of the accident and reckless driving. It notes that Prescott was guilty of property damage and that he paid restitution. It makes no mention of the Waveland charges. Cuevas said those charges were omitted after he received a letter from counsel for Prescott and discussed it with his attorney. As noted, the crux of Prescott's complaint is invasion of privacy by being placed in a false light before the public. The newspaper initially argues that we have not specifically recognized that branch of invasion of privacy called "false light." The paper goes on to urge this Court either to refuse to recognize this theory of recovery, or, at least choose some other case to express its approval. Both parties acknowledge this Court's opinion in Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 326 So. 2d 471 (Miss. 1976), wherein we stated: Though the opinion is not explicit, Deaton appeared to have dealt with invasion of privacy by publication of private facts. Since Deaton we have explicitly or implicitly recognized the theories of intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of another and appropriation of another's identity or "commercial appropriation." Candebat v. Flanagan, 487 So. 2d 207 (Miss. 1986). Apart from acknowledging false light as one recognized theory of recovery, however, we have not confronted the question of whether we will recognize this theory. Section 652E of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1976) delineates the requisites for recovery under the theory of false light. It states: Comment "a" makes clear that "it is essential to the rule stated in this section that the matter published concerning the plaintiff is not true." But, comment "b" expresses the institute's position that the falsity need not be defamatory. It states: The newspaper notes other courts have declined to recognize false light as a separate theory of recovery. See e.g. Sullivan v. Pulitzer, 709 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1986); Renwick v. News and Observer Publishing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405 (1984). There may be little or no reason to recognize false light claims where, as here, the false light alleged is defamatory in nature. See Sullivan, supra; Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir.1983). However, Prosser and Keeton note that the real benefit of false light actions is in providing redress where the publication is false yet does not amount to defamation. Prosser & Keeton On The Law of Torts 866 (W. Page Keeton 5th ed. 1984). It is not important for us to delineate our position regarding recognition of false light here because we are confident that in any event Prescott has failed to present a case as a matter of law. In Rinsley, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that false light actions differ from defamation actions because recovery is for mental distress rather than injury to reputation. 700 F.2d at 1307. We recently took the same position in a defamation context. Fulton v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 498 So. 2d 1215 (Miss. 1986). In Fulton we stated: 498 So. 2d at 1216. We might substitute the word "false" for the word "defamatory" in the preceding passage to resolve this appeal. Like defamation, truth is a defense to false light. Miss. Const. art. III, § 13 (1890), and if the statement is not false, little else matters. We are aware that truthful statements may yet leave a false impression. The context itself may create a false impression. See Brown v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.1984) (accurate photograph of entertainer's act with a "diving pig" published without consent in men's magazine on the same page with overtly sexual material). A false impression may be created by the omission of pertinent facts. See Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978) (inference that shooting victim was engaged in adulterous affair because the story omitted the fact that the shooting occurred during a social gathering). However, to again borrow from our decision in Fulton, we think that 498 So. 2d at 1217. (citing Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So. 2d 271, 275 (Miss. 1984). To state it another way, though false light may occur from the context, this "does not relieve a plaintiff from identifying particular statements or passages that are false and invade his privacy." Rinsley v. Brandt 700 F.2d at 1310. It is clear Prescott can not meet this burden and therefore his suit fails. Prescott admits he was arrested and charged in connection with the traffic accident as the story states. He admits he pled guilty to the driving under the influence charge leveled against him in Waveland the very offense the reporting of which he contends placed him in a false light. He does not seriously question the accuracy of the pictures, though no doubt he considers the publicity excessive. Prescott can only rely on innuendo, speculation or conjecture to make out his case and this is not enough. Far from being placed in a "false light," Prescott was portrayed in the "true light," unfortunately for him, of being a man arrested for two drunk driving violations within a short period of time. The fact that either one or both of these alleged violations would not have been published had not Prescott been involved with a newsworthy accident does not make their publication false. There being no genuine issue of fact concerning the falsity of the publication, the circuit court correctly held that the newspaper was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The judgment is hereby affirmed. AFFIRMED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. GRIFFIN, J., not participating.