Title: Levesque v. Androscoggin County

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME  
114 
Docket: 
And-12-102 
Argued:  
September 11, 2012 
Decided: 
October 4, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and 
JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
LISA LEVESQUE 
 
v. 
 
ANDROSCOGGIN COUNTY 
 
 
LEVY, J. 
[¶1]  By her complaint filed in April 2010, Lisa Levesque alleged gender 
discrimination, constructive discharge, and retaliation against her former employer, 
Androscoggin County.  The Superior Court (Androscoggin County, MG Kennedy, 
J.) granted a partial summary judgment in favor of Androscoggin County 
dismissing the counts of constructive discharge and gender discrimination.  The 
retaliation claim proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict for 
Androscoggin County.  Levesque now appeals from the partial summary judgment 
dismissing the constructive discharge claim.  We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  In August 2000, Levesque began working as a corrections officer for 
the Androscoggin County Jail.  During Levesque’s time at the Jail, a female 
coworker filed a harassment complaint against a male coworker, Kevin Harmon. 
The Jail conducted an internal investigation, suspended Harmon, and transferred 
him to the night shift for what was to be a two-year assignment.  
[¶3]  Prior to the end of the two-year assignment, Levesque learned that the 
Jail was moving Harmon back to a daytime assignment.  Levesque worked a day 
shift, and she voiced her opposition to Harmon’s new assignment, both in a 
meeting with Jail administrators and in a letter to the sheriff.  Ultimately, the Jail 
did not transfer Harmon back to the day shift, nor did it do so for the remainder of 
the time Levesque worked at the Jail.   
[¶4]  Following Levesque’s complaint about Harmon’s anticipated return to 
the day shift, a number of interactions took place between Levesque and her 
supervisors at the Jail that Levesque contends gave rise to her constructive 
discharge from employment.  Five days after Levesque’s complaint, the Jail 
adopted a new protocol that, according to Levesque, required her to come to work 
early and skip her breaks.  Levesque complained, and administration officials met 
with her to develop a solution, which Levesque acknowledged “went a long way 
towards” resolving her issues.  Soon thereafter, Levesque received disciplinary 
 
 
 
 
3 
write-ups for three separate incidents.  Finally, Levesque was assigned to new 
duties within the Jail, although management had never previously reassigned an 
officer without first placing the officer on probationary status.  Following her 
reassignment and several smaller incidents, Levesque felt compelled to resign, and 
she did not return to work. 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
[¶5]  We review the grant of a summary judgment de novo.  Golder v. City 
of Saco, 2012 ME 76, ¶ 9, 45 A.3d 697.  “A grant of summary judgment will be 
affirmed if the record reflects that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted).  A defendant who moves for summary judgment is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law if the plaintiff fails to “establish a prima facie case for each 
element of her cause of action.”  Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 
2012 ME 103, ¶ 12, 48 A.3d 774 (quotation marks omitted).   
[¶6]  Levesque contends that the court erred because her statement of 
material facts established a prima facie case for constructive discharge as an 
independent cause of action, despite her failure to prevail on her claims for gender 
discrimination and retaliatory discrimination.  We conclude that Levesque’s 
constructive discharge claim must fail as a matter of law because neither Maine nor 
federal law recognizes a separate cause of action for constructive discharge 
 
 
 
 
4 
independent of proof of some form of unlawful conduct giving rise to the 
constructive discharge.1  
 [¶7]  The doctrine of constructive discharge originated in the context of 
1930s labor law.  See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004).  Under 
then-existing law, it was illegal to discharge an employee for engaging in union 
activity.  See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 8(3), 49 Stat. 
449, 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012)).  However, 
employers sought to sidestep this law by “coerc[ing] employees to resign, often by 
creating intolerable working conditions.”  Suders, 542 U.S. at 141.  To close this 
loophole, the National Labor Relations Board created the doctrine of constructive 
discharge, which extended the definition of “discharge” to include coerced 
resignation.  Id.   
[¶8]  In the decades that followed, courts imported the doctrine of 
constructive discharge to the application of federal anti-discrimination law and its 
state law analogs.2  See, e.g., id. at 143; King v. Bangor Fed. Credit Union, 
611 A.2d 80, 82 (Me. 1992).  In Maine, a plaintiff may use the doctrine of 
constructive discharge to satisfy the elements of “discharge” or “adverse 
                                               
 
1  Therefore, we need not and do not reach Levesque’s argument that disputed issues of material fact 
exist with regard to her constructive discharge claim. 
 
2  Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012), and the Maine 
Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A) (2011), prohibit the unlawfully discriminatory discharge of an 
employee. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
employment action” in an otherwise actionable claim pursuant to section 4572 of 
the Maine Human Rights Act.  See 5 M.R.S. § 4572 (2011); Hernandez-Torres v. 
Intercont’l Trading, Inc., 158 F.3d 43, 47-48 (1st Cir. 1998);3 King, 611 A.2d at 
82.  Accordingly, a constructive discharge may provide a basis for damages where 
unlawful discrimination is shown.  See, e.g., Bodman v. Maine, 720 F. Supp. 2d 
115, 123 (D. Me. 2010) (“A plaintiff who is successful in proving constructive 
discharge may be entitled to recover two sets of damages: damages flowing from 
the [discrimination] itself . . . as well as damages flowing from the loss of her 
job.”).  However, notwithstanding its application in the labor and discrimination 
contexts, constructive discharge does not exist as an independent cause of action 
under Maine statutory or common law.   
[¶9]  Furthermore, treating constructive discharge as an independent cause 
of action would be fundamentally inconsistent with existing employment law.  We 
have long adhered to the doctrine of at-will employment, by which an employer 
may lawfully terminate an employee for any reason not prohibited by statute or 
private contract.  See Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 
1997 ME 194, ¶ 9, 705 A.2d 696.  Thus, far from giving effect to existing 
employment law, an independent cause of action for constructive discharge would 
                                               
 
3  “Federal precedent on Title VII provides useful guidance for our interpretation of the Maine Human 
Rights Act . . . .”  Kopenga v. Davric Me. Corp., 1999 ME 65, ¶ 20, 727 A.2d 906. 
 
 
 
 
6 
be at odds with the general right of employers to discharge employees at will, 
provided that termination is otherwise lawful.  
[¶10]  Nor are we persuaded by Levesque’s contention that constructive 
discharge exists as an independent cause of action under federal law.  The federal 
courts that have directly confronted the question have concluded that constructive 
discharge is not an independent cause of action.  See, e.g., Hogwood v. Town of 
Oakland, No. 11-2396-STA-dkv, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56159, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. 
Apr. 23, 2012); Schmidt v. Medicalodges, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1305 
(D. Kan. 2007); Tardif-Brann v. Kennebec Valley Cmty. Action Program, No. 
04-132-B-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14750, at *44 (D. Me. July 21, 2005); Kroll v. 
Disney Store, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 344, 347 (E.D. Mich. 1995).  
[¶11]  Contrary to Levesque’s assertion, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
did not recognize an independent cause of action for constructive discharge in 
Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2002).  There, an employee 
alleging sexual harassment brought federal law claims for hostile work 
environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge.  Id. at 13.  The court 
concluded that although the employee’s retaliation claim was not actionable, her 
claim for constructive discharge did not “stand or fall with her retaliation claim.”  
Id. at 27-28.  This does not lead to the conclusion, however, that constructive 
discharge is an independent cause of action.  In Marrero, the employee claimed 
 
 
 
 
7 
that she was forced to retire because of “two separate stressors”—sexual 
harassment and retaliation—and the court concluded that her claim for harassment 
was actionable.  Id. at 20, 27-28.  Because the employee could still point to the 
harassment as unlawful conduct that gave rise to her alleged constructive 
discharge, her claim for damages resulting from her constructive discharge 
remained actionable.   
[¶12]  In this case, Levesque has not challenged the summary judgment 
denying her claim for gender discrimination or the judgment entered on the jury’s 
verdict denying her claim for retaliatory discrimination.  Nor has she alleged that 
the actions giving rise to her alleged constructive discharge from employment were 
themselves a form of unlawful discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act.  
As such, Levesque’s claim for constructive discharge fails. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Guy D. Loranger, Esq., Nichols, Webb & Loranger, P.A., Saco, for appellant 
Lisa Levesque 
 
Peter T. Marchesi, Esq., and Cassandra S. Shaffer, Esq., Wheeler & Arey, 
P.A., Waterville, for appellee Androscoggin County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
At oral argument: 
 
Guy D. Loranger, Esq., for appellant Lisa Levesque 
 
Peter T. Marchesi, Esq., for appellee Androscoggin County 
 
 
 
Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number CV-2010-61 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY