Title: People v. Trujeque

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 5/28/15 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S083594 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
  
TOMMY ADRIAN TRUJEQUE, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. VA048531 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
 
In 1999, a jury convicted defendant Tommy Adrian Trujeque of first degree 
murder of Max Facundo (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 second degree murder of 
Raul Luis Apodaca (§ 187, subd. (a)), and second degree robbery of Ronni 
Mandujano and Spartan Burgers restaurant (§ 211).  As to all three counts, it found 
that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, respectively, a 
knife, a screwdriver, and a handgun.  (Former §§ 12022, 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 
12022.53, subd. (b).)  Waiving a jury trial, defendant stipulated to a 1971 prior 
second degree murder conviction alleged as a special circumstance, and admitted 
other prior convictions alleged in the information.  As to both murder counts, the 
jury found true the special-circumstance allegation of multiple murder  
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
noted.    
 
2 
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), while the trial court found true the prior murder special- 
circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)).  After a penalty trial, the jury 
returned a verdict of death.  The court denied the automatic motion to modify the 
verdict (§ 190.4), and imposed a sentence of death, along with an additional 
consecutive term of 25 years to life in prison for the robbery count.  The trial court 
also sentenced defendant to various consecutive sentence enhancements, all of 
which were stayed pending imposition of the death judgment.  This appeal is 
automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)   
 
Defendant‟s 1999 trial took place more than a decade after the murders of 
Facundo and Apodaca, and the delay in prosecution is the subject of various 
claims defendant raises on appeal.  For reasons that follow, we reverse the 
judgment of conviction for the second degree murder of Apodaca, and reverse the 
penalty judgment based on our setting aside both the prior murder and multiple 
murder special-circumstance findings.  (See post, at p 67.)  Although we must 
reverse the penalty judgment, we have included additional factual background as 
necessary to provide context.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution evidence 
a.  Murder of Max Facundo 
 
The prosecution presented evidence that on June 21, 1986, defendant 
stabbed and killed Max Facundo, the abusive boyfriend of defendant‟s cousin, 
Charlene Trujeque.2 
                                              
2  
To avoid confusion, we have used first names when necessary. 
 
3 
 
When Charlene was 16 or 17 years old, defendant began writing letters to 
her while he was incarcerated.  In the letters, defendant asked about his family and 
told Charlene to stay out of trouble.  Charlene‟s mother, Elena Trujeque, read the 
letters defendant had sent and became concerned.  In particular, Elena thought one 
of the letters read more like a “love letter” than a “cousinly” letter because 
defendant said he would protect Charlene if anybody hurt her, and that she 
“mean[t] the world to” him.  He also wrote “you‟ll always be mine and you‟ll 
always be close to my heart.”  Elena also discovered that Charlene was accepting 
collect telephone calls from defendant, who was still incarcerated.  Elena and 
Charlene‟s father, Charlie Trujeque, tried to stop Charlene from getting “too 
friendly” with defendant, but Charlene continued to write to him.    
 
In 1984, when Charlene was about 20 years old, she began dating Facundo 
and often stayed at his house.  Though their relationship appeared fine at first, 
during the final months of their relationship, Facundo began to beat up Charlene 
when she refused to do drugs with him.  She did not tell her parents (defendant‟s 
uncle and aunt) about the beatings, but they would see her bruised face when she 
came home.  Elena recalled seeing injuries on Charlene, including black eyes and 
bruises, on 15 to 20 separate occasions.  Though Charlene lied to her parents about 
how she got her injuries, Elena said “everybody knew” that Facundo beat up their 
daughter.  While Charlene‟s parents were upset and afraid for her life, they voiced 
their concerns only to Charlene, and repeatedly asked Charlene to end her 
relationship with Facundo.  Although Charlie did not verbally threaten Facundo, 
he told Elena that he was going to beat up Facundo and once ran after him with a 
baseball bat.  On one visit, after Facundo refused to let them see their daughter, 
Charlie and Elena went to the police to report the domestic violence.  However, 
the parents were told that the police could not do anything unless Charlene 
reported it herself.     
 
4 
 
After defendant was released from prison in May 1986, he and Charlene 
met for the first time at her parents‟ house.  Charlene did not mention Facundo to 
defendant and she did not have any visible injuries.  According to Elena, the two 
talked all night.   
 
On the evening of June 21, 1986, the day Facundo was killed, Charlene was 
at her parents‟ house and sported a black eye.  Defendant came over with another 
cousin, Raymond Guzman.  Almost as soon as they got there, defendant and 
Raymond called Charlie outside to talk.  They spoke for about five minutes.  
When Elena asked Charlie what they had talked about, Charlie would not respond; 
he seemed nervous and afraid.  However, sometime earlier, Charlie had asked 
defendant to break Facundo‟s leg or arm to teach him a lesson, but not to hurt him 
too badly.   
 
When defendant asked Charlene how she got her black eye and if her 
boyfriend did it, she would not say.  Defendant repeatedly asked Charlene whether 
Facundo would be coming by later because defendant wanted to “meet him and 
talk to him.”  Charlene could tell defendant was angry about her black eye, so she 
asked him to promise not to hurt Facundo.  He replied that promises were made to 
be broken, but that she need not worry because nothing would happen.   
When Facundo came to Charlie and Elena‟s house to pick up Charlene, 
defendant asked Charlene if they would drop off both defendant and Raymond at 
the home of Raymond‟s sister, Pat Perez, in South Gate.  Facundo agreed to do so, 
and the four left in Facundo‟s car.  Defendant and Raymond were seated in the 
back, Charlene was in the front passenger seat, and Facundo was driving.  
Facundo pulled out a cigarette dipped in PCP, began smoking it, and shared it with 
Charlene and Raymond.  At some point, Facundo pulled over to let Charlene  
drive.  They arrived at Pat‟s house around 10:45 p.m.  Charlene exited the car to 
let Raymond out of the backseat.  She and Raymond walked towards Pat‟s home, 
 
5 
and waited for Facundo and defendant to follow.  When she heard yelling, 
Charlene turned around and saw Facundo and defendant struggling.  She ran 
towards them and screamed for them to stop.  Charlene held Facundo, who was 
covered in blood, and they fell onto the ground.  Defendant fled the scene.  
Facundo died of multiple stab wounds to the chest.   
 
When the police arrived at the scene of the stabbing, Charlene was still 
screaming.  The police handcuffed her hands and feet and placed her on her 
stomach in a patrol car.  They eventually transported her to the police station.  
Charlene‟s blouse was ripped and she had cuts on her chest and right forearm.  
Detective Terry McWeeney of the South Gate Police Department interviewed both 
Charlene and Raymond while they were in custody.  Charlene told the detective 
she saw Facundo lying in the street, but did not see defendant or Raymond.  She 
never told the police that defendant had killed Facundo.  
 
Pat called Charlie and Elena and told them that defendant had killed 
Facundo and that the police had already taken Charlene and Raymond to the 
station.  They tried calling the police station, but could not get any information.  
They returned home.  Defendant later called Charlie and Elena‟s house and asked 
for a ride.  According to Elena, they picked defendant up at a 7-Eleven 
convenience store on the corner of Firestone and Atlantic in South Gate.  He asked 
to be dropped off at his mother‟s house in El Sereno.  During the drive, defendant 
told Charlie and Elena that he killed Facundo.  Charlie yelled at him, “ „[W]hy did 
you do it,‟ ” and told defendant he never wanted him to kill Facundo.  Elena 
testified defendant told her, “ „Tia [meaning “aunt” in Spanish], you don‟t have to 
worry anything more about this anymore.‟ ”  Elena also testified defendant told 
her he “had no remorse.  He did it like — like it was nothing.  He didn‟t know the 
guy, like I didn‟t know him.  He had no feelings for him, so he just done [sic] him 
away.”   
 
6 
 
Hours after the murder, around 2 or 3 a.m., Sergeant Russell Beecher of the 
South Gate Police Department received a call from a man identifying himself as 
defendant.  The caller said that he was the one who murdered Facundo and that 
Charlene and Raymond, who were in custody, should be released.  On June 26, 
1986, defendant was arrested at his mother‟s house in El Sereno for the murder of 
Facundo.  The charges, however, were dropped on July 2, 1986 for lack of 
probable cause.   
 
For over a decade, the case remained dormant until 1998 when defendant 
— who at the time was serving a life sentence for an unrelated armed robbery — 
contacted the Los Angeles County Sheriff‟s Department and confessed to 
Facundo‟s murder, along with the murder of Raul Apodaca and another armed 
robbery, in order to receive the death penalty.  In June 1998, he was charged with 
the 1986 murder of Facundo in a three-count complaint.  
b. Murder of Raul Apodaca 
 
At trial, the prosecution also presented evidence that on January 23, 1987, 
defendant and Jesse Salazar3 killed Raul Luis Apodaca at an East Los Angeles 
upholstery shop owned by Richard “Conejo” Rivera.4  Rivera dealt drugs from the 
shop, which also served as a hangout for White Fence gang members.   
                                              
3  
Salazar was originally charged with defendant for Apodaca‟s murder.  On 
December 29, 1987, Salazar pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and 
received a sentence for time served and five years‟ probation.  Though Salazar was 
the main perpetrator, the original prosecutor explained that Salazar received 
voluntary manslaughter “based on the fact that at that time we did not have our 
witnesses, and I believe the public defender thought it was more prudent to take 
the plea just in case we might find them.”   
4  
By the time of defendant‟s 1999 trial, Rivera had died and was therefore 
“ „unavailable as a witness‟ ” (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(3)); thus, his testimony 
from the April 8, 1987 preliminary hearing was read into the record.  
 
7 
 
During the 1999 trial, Robert De Alva testified that he was at the upholstery 
shop drinking and doing drugs the evening of January 23, 1987.  Given his 
admitted drug use, De Alva explained he had a poor memory and could not recall 
many details from that night except that he and six to eight other individuals had 
walked to the upholstery shop from a nearby bar, the Quiet Cannon.  At the shop, 
De Alva had injected heroin and had passed out on a table.  When the prosecution 
asked about Apodaca being killed, he said:  “All I remember is a guy laid on the 
floor and taking him to the hospital and some guys around him and some guys 
leaving, and that‟s all I remember.”  Though he did see some “scuffling,” De Alva 
was “not aware there was a fight” and did not know who was involved.  De Alva 
also did not recall much of the previous statement he had given to Detective Birl 
Adams several days after the murder.  When the prosecution pointed to defendant 
at the defense table and asked if De Alva had seen him that night, De Alva replied:  
“He don‟t look familiar.”  
 
Responding to De Alva‟s prior inconsistent statements, Detective Adams 
testified that when he interviewed De Alva on January 26, 1987, three days after 
the killing, De Alva recounted many details about the night Apodaca was killed.  
De Alva told Detective Adams that he was at the upholstery shop with Rivera, 
Salazar, Apodaca, defendant, and several other individuals.  They were playing 
poker when a fight broke out.  After the fight was broken up, two individuals left 
the shop and De Alva lay down on top of a table in the middle of the shop to sleep.  
Remaining at the shop with Rivera and De Alva were defendant, Salazar, and 
Apodaca.  De Alva woke up when he heard and saw defendant, Salazar, and 
Apodaca fighting.  Suddenly, Apodaca fell to the floor, and defendant and Salazar 
ran out of the shop.  After checking on Apodaca, Rivera told De Alva that 
Apodaca had been stabbed.  They tried to resuscitate Apodaca, and then took him 
to East Los Angeles Doctors Hospital in a van.  De Alva stayed at the hospital 
 
8 
about 15 minutes and then left.  Apodaca later died from a stab wound to the chest.  
De Alva first found out that Apodaca had died during the January 26 interview 
with Detective Adams; he appeared upset.  De Alva had no trouble describing 
either defendant or Salazar to Detective Adams.  Two days later, on January 28, 
1987, De Alva identified defendant and Salazar from a 13-photo array Detective 
Adams showed him.  
 
The upholstery shop‟s owner Richard Rivera (whose testimony from 
defendant‟s April 8, 1987 preliminary hearing was read into the trial record) gave 
a similar account of the events.  (See ante, at p. 6, fn. 4.)  He testified that during 
the poker game, Salazar and Frank Contreras got into a fist fight.  In breaking up 
the fight, Apodaca grabbed and restrained Salazar, and Luis Villalobos grabbed 
Contreras.  After the fight, everyone starting leaving one by one, except for 
Rivera, defendant, Salazar, Apodaca, and De Alva.  Except for De Alva, all had 
been staying at the shop for the past few days.  Rivera went to the bathroom.  
When he came out “a couple minutes” later, Apodaca was lying on his back and 
not breathing.  Rivera and De Alva opened up his shirt and saw that he had a 
puncture wound in his chest.  Rivera did not see either defendant or Salazar in the 
shop, but when he went outside, he saw them walking away quickly.  After Rivera 
and De Alva both tried to give Apodaca mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, they 
dragged him into a van and drove him to a hospital.  Rivera did not call the police 
because he “figured Raul [Apodaca] was going to live, and he could deal with it if 
they questioned him.  I didn‟t think that Raul was going to die.”  He lied to both 
the nurse and Apodaca‟s stepfather, telling them that Apodaca had been stabbed at 
the Quiet Cannon bar and not at his upholstery shop because “I just didn‟t want it 
to go down at the shop, I guess.”  
 
On February 5, 1987, defendant and Salazar were charged with the murder 
of Apodaca.  The case was dismissed a month later.  The prosecution eventually 
 
9 
entered into a plea agreement with Salazar, who pleaded guilty to voluntary 
manslaughter.  On March 25, 1987, the prosecution refiled the first degree murder 
charge against defendant, but after the preliminary hearing, he was held to answer 
for only the lesser offense of manslaughter.  On April 24, 1987, the prosecution 
filed an information again charging defendant with the first degree murder of 
Apodaca.  After the prosecution informed the court that they could not find the 
material witness, De Alva, the murder charge was dismissed on June 23, 1987.  
The case lay dormant until 1998, when defendant confessed to the murder.  
c. Robbery of Spartan Burgers restaurant 
 
The prosecution presented evidence that on January 21, 1998, defendant 
robbed Spartan Burgers restaurant in Huntington Park.  According to the 
restaurant‟s cashier, Ronni Mandujano, defendant came in around 8:00 p.m. and  
first ordered food.  When it came time to pay, defendant pulled out a small black 
handgun and demanded money.  The restaurant‟s owner (who was not identified 
by name) approached Mandujano and defendant, opened the register, and placed 
the cashbox on the counter.  Pointing the gun at Mandujano the entire time, 
defendant asked the owner if he had any other money in the restaurant.  The owner 
said there was additional money in the back.  Defendant ordered Mandujano and 
the owner to the back.  Defendant pushed Mandujano, who could feel defendant 
pressing the gun on her back and head.  After the owner gave him more money, 
defendant left.  Mandujano called the police.  A few months later, on April 29, 
1998, Mandujano identified defendant from a six-pack photo array.  She testified 
that she was “positive” it was defendant and also identified him in the courtroom.   
 
10 
2. Defense evidence 
a. Murder of Max Facundo 
 
Against the advice of counsel, defendant testified on his own behalf.  His 
account of Facundo‟s killing and events surrounding it largely tracked the 
evidence adduced at trial.  (See ante, at pp. 2-6.)  However, defendant‟s version 
differed in these material respects:  Defendant testified that Charlie had asked him 
to kill Facundo not just hurt him, and that Elena was lying about Charlie asking 
him only to break Facundo‟s arms and legs.  On cross-examination, however, 
defendant admitted Charlie never used the words “go kill him” but said to “take 
care of it,” which defendant took to mean “killing Max and getting away with it.”  
Though Charlie never told defendant why he wanted him to kill Facundo, 
defendant thought it was “because he was beating up on my cousin.”  Though 
Elena sent him money while he was incarcerated, defendant did not kill Facundo 
for the money.  Elena also told defendant that Facundo beats up Charlene “just 
about every day.”  Elena also gave him $300 to buy a gun. 
 
Defendant testified he intended to inflict a lethal wound on Facundo by 
using a method of stabbing he learned in prison; he also hoped to inflict at least 
100 stab wounds.  He also admitted he “couldn‟t wait to kill him.  I didn‟t want to 
wait,” and that he “could have done it later if I wanted to.”  Defendant stated he 
had been thinking about killing Facundo since he was released from prison.  When 
Charlie and Elena picked defendant up after the killing, defendant said their 
“troubles are over,” meaning “I don‟t have to watch my back for anyone coming 
after me, and Charlene doesn‟t have to worry about getting any black eyes, so it‟s 
over.”  
b. Murder of Raul Apodaca 
 
Defendant testified that both he and Rivera were members of the White 
Fence gang, and that he and others used to frequent Rivera‟s upholstery shop.  
 
11 
Defendant‟s gang moniker was “Killer”; a piece of wood bearing that name was 
found at the shop.   
  
His account of the events leading up to the killing of Apodaca largely 
tracked eyewitness De Alva‟s trial testimony and Rivera‟s testimony from the 
preliminary hearing.  As to the fight between Salazar and Apodaca, defendant 
testified that he thought that Salazar was getting the worse of the fight, so 
defendant stepped in to help his friend.  Apodaca, who was on top of Salazar, 
struck defendant in the face.  Defendant picked up a screwdriver and stabbed 
Apodaca two or three times.  He saw Salazar stab Apodaca in the chest with 
another screwdriver.  Defendant recalled stabbing Apodaca on the left side, but did 
not remember the exact location or number of stabbings.  Defendant did not know 
who was responsible for the lethal wound.  
c. Robbery of Spartan Burgers restaurant 
 
On cross-examination, defendant denied robbing Spartan Burgers and 
claimed the main witness, Ronni Mandujano, was “wrong.”  Defense counsel did 
not cross-examine Mandujano.  
3. Defendant’s confession to the murders and desire to be prosecuted 
a. 1998 confession to Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputies 
 
The Facundo and Apodaca murder cases lay dormant for over 10 years. In 
February 1998, Los Angeles County Sheriff‟s Deputy Frank Durazo received a 
telephone call from another deputy regarding an inmate, defendant.  Defendant 
was in custody in the San Diego County Jail and claimed to have information 
about two homicides and a robbery.  Deputy Durazo and his partner, Los Angeles 
County Sheriff‟s Deputy Jose Romero, drove to San Diego to interview defendant.  
The February 20, 1998, tape-recorded interview, a transcript of which was 
admitted as an exhibit, was played for the jury but was not simultaneously 
 
12 
transcribed into the record.  Defendant‟s statement to the deputies about the 
Facundo and Apodaca murders and the Spartan Burgers robbery was generally 
consistent with his testimony at trial.  
 
As to the Apodaca murder, however, defendant provided further context.  
According to defendant, before heading to Rivera‟s upholstery shop from the 
Quiet Cannon bar, Salazar had told defendant that he hated Apodaca and wanted 
to kill him.  Salazar said he was going to stab Apodaca and that he wanted 
defendant “ „to have my back, and if — and if — if he starts getting the best of me 
and everything just, you know, just back my play.‟ ”  Later, when Apodaca and 
Salazar started fighting at the upholstery shop and defendant intervened, Apodaca 
hit defendant in the face.  That is when, according to defendant, “automatically my 
— the red light goes on and the alarm goes off and I get, you know, that did it, and 
I said now fuck this mother fucker, I don‟t even know him, he ain‟t done nothing 
to me, but I just don‟t like him, because of the way he is, you know.”  As 
defendant reached for a screwdriver, he saw Salazar on top of Apodaca, stabbing 
him.  Defendant then stabbed Apodaca two or three times on the left side of his 
body.  After defendant was arrested, he “gave [Salazar] up.”  
 
Regarding the Spartan Burgers robbery, which at trial defendant denied 
committing, defendant initially told the deputies that he had robbed the restaurant 
with his cousin, Theodore “Teddy” Trujeque (Charlene‟s brother and Elena and 
Charlie‟s son), because Teddy needed money.  Defendant thought he “got about 
close to $400,” of which he gave Teddy $150 and kept the rest.  Defendant did not 
tell authorities about Teddy‟s involvement for “personal reasons.”  
b. Letter to Los Angeles County District Attorney 
 
Over defense counsel‟s objection, the prosecution introduced a letter 
defendant had written to then Los Angeles County District Attorney Gil Garcetti 
 
13 
(Garcetti letter).  In the over-600-word letter, written shortly before his September 
1998 preliminary hearing and while he was representing himself, defendant 
admitted he murdered both Apodaca and Facundo while “fully aware of all of my 
mental faculties” and urged Garcetti to seek the death penalty against him.  The 
Garcetti letter also stated that “both of those cowards deserved what they got:  
death and an early expiration in life, to say the least!”; that if he “had the 
opportunity to do it over I would cut off their heads and send „em both to their 
family!” 
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Aggravating evidence 
a. Murder of Allen Rothenberg 
 
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that on February 7, 1969, less 
than a month after he turned 16 years old, defendant robbed and fatally stabbed 
Allen Rothenberg.5  Rothenberg was delivering beer for Nate‟s Liquor Store to 
defendant‟s home at 3302 Paola Avenue in Los Angeles.  In a 1969 statement to 
detectives, which was read to the jury, defendant said he called up Nate‟s Liquor 
Store as “Mr. Martinez” and ordered a case of Colt 45 beer.  Defendant stated he 
was talking to a girl in the bedroom when his friend, Bert Gonzalez, told him 
someone was at the door.  Defendant told detectives:  “I already had a knife with 
me because I already had it planned that I was going to rob the guy when he got 
there.”  Defendant “got a knife and put it around [Rothenberg‟s] neck and threw 
                                              
5  
To show the nature and circumstances of defendant‟s prior violent conduct 
(§ 190.3, factor (b)), the prosecution — over defense counsel‟s objection — 
elicited testimony from Officer Sanchez, who knew and lived near the victim and 
his family, that Rothenberg had a “handicap,” i.e., he was both “mentally slow” 
and “physically slow” with one bad leg and a foot that he dragged.      
 
14 
him on the floor and told him this was a holdup. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I just — I kept — I 
just kept stabbing him.”  He stated he did not remember how many times he 
stabbed Rothenberg, but that Rothenberg “kept on giving me a hassle and finally 
he settled down and he just laid there.”  Defendant dragged Rothenberg‟s body 
through the bedroom and down the stairs.  Bert helped defendant throw his body 
over the next yard.  Defendant indicated he cut his hands because his hand “kept 
sliding down the blade” when he was stabbing Rothenberg.  
 
Former Los Angeles Police Officer Ruben Sanchez, who responded to the 
call at 3302 Paola, testified that officers found Rothenberg‟s body in the yard next 
door.  Rothenberg had been stabbed multiple times in the chest and his pants 
pockets were turned inside out.  A trail of blood led back into the house where 
detectives found blood in the dining room, a bloody door knob, and blood splats 
on the wall.  An investigator located a bloody 13-inch kitchen knife at the side of 
the house.  Officer Sanchez identified numerous photographs of the Rothenberg 
crime scene, which were introduced into evidence.  The trial court took judicial 
notice of defendant‟s juvenile court files.  
b. Other offenses 
 
The prosecution presented evidence that defendant committed a number of 
assaults and robberies from 1978 to 1998.   
c. Garcetti letter 
 
Over defense counsel‟s renewed objection, the trial court admitted the 
Garcetti letter at the penalty phase.  This version, which had fewer redactions than 
the version admitted at the guilt phase, included defendant‟s statement that he did 
not “regret my actions in any way, shape, or form” and his threat to kill someone 
in prison if he did not get the death penalty.   
 
15 
2. Mitigating evidence 
a. Family history 
 
Through the testimony of defendant‟s half sister and several maternal aunts 
and uncles, defendant presented evidence of his childhood and his mother‟s family 
history.  On defendant‟s behalf, his ex-wife and their daughter, along with his 
former juvenile probation officer and parole officer, all testified.  Defense counsel 
also presented testimony from a psychiatrist who evaluated defendant as a juvenile 
and from an expert witness on gangs. 
 
b. Medical history 
 
Dr. Marshall Cherkas, who examined defendant for the juvenile court in 
November 1966 and shortly before defendant‟s 1999 trial, testified that he found 
defendant emotionally unstable with borderline organic brain damage and a 
history of treatment for psychomotor epilepsy.   
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Pretrial Issues 
1. The invalidity of the second degree murder conviction underlying 
the prior murder special-circumstance allegation  
 
In support of the prior murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)), 
the prosecution alleged defendant‟s prior conviction for the second degree murder 
of Allen Rothenberg.  In 1971, defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder 
after he was deemed not fit to be tried in juvenile court and was prosecuted in 
adult court.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 707, as amended by Stats. 1967, 
ch. 1357, § 1, p. 3197.)  Before the 1999 trial in the instant matter, defendant 
moved to strike the prior murder conviction and related special-circumstance 
allegation based on the claim that his guilty plea was invalid under Boykin/Tahl — 
that is, he was not advised of, nor did he waive, his constitutional rights to a trial 
and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and his right against self-
 
16 
incrimination.  (See Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 
Cal.3d 122.)  The trial court denied the motion.   
 
On appeal, defendant raises only a double jeopardy challenge.  He argues 
that the high court‟s 1975 decision in Breed v. Jones (1975) 421 U.S. 519, 531 
(Breed), which held that an adult prosecution after a juvenile adjudication for the 
same offense violates double jeopardy, compels the conclusion that he was placed 
at least twice6 in jeopardy.  (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 
15.)  The Attorney General, however, counters that defendant has waived, or more 
accurately, has forfeited this double jeopardy claim because he failed to raise it 
below, and that in any event, he cannot collaterally challenge his prior conviction.  
For reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant has not forfeited the issue nor 
is he estopped from collaterally challenging his 1971 murder conviction. 
a. Procedural background 
 
The facts of Rothenberg‟s killing are discussed above.  (See ante, at pp. 13-
14.)  As relevant here, on February 11, 1969, a petition was filed in juvenile court 
alleging that defendant, a 16-year-old minor, came within the then current 
provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.  (See Stats. 1961, ch. 
1616, § 2, p. 3472; section 602 petition.)  Paragraph I of the petition alleged that 
                                              
6  
Defendant argues that he was actually placed in jeopardy three times.  As 
discussed further below, he adds that jeopardy also attached at the April 7, 1969 de 
novo rehearing where the juvenile court, after considering the March hearing 
transcripts and additional evidence, abandoned the referee‟s findings and 
concluded defendant should be prosecuted as an adult.  (See Jesse W. v. Superior 
Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 41, 48 [“if petitioner is subjected to rehearing de novo 
procedures . . . he would be exposed to jeopardy”].)  For her part, the Attorney 
General counters that Jesse W. may not be applied retroactively or used to 
collaterally challenge the prior conviction.  It is unnecessary to discuss this third 
attachment of jeopardy because, as we explain below, defendant‟s claim that he 
was placed twice in jeopardy has merit.  (See post, at p. 26.)  
 
17 
defendant “did wilfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought murder Allen 
Howard Rothenberg,” in violation of section 187, and paragraph II alleged that 
defendant “did wilfully and unlawfully by means of force and fear” take from 
Rothenberg money, in violation of section 211.  At the request of the public 
defender who was representing defendant, the court appointed a psychiatrist to 
determine whether a plea of guilty by reason of insanity was appropriate or 
whether defendant had diminished capacity.  On February 13, 1969, defendant 
denied all the allegations in the petition.  
 
On March 6, 1969, a juvenile court referee conducted the adjudicatory 
hearing at which the deputy district attorney called eight witnesses and introduced 
numerous exhibits.  Over codefendant Bert Gonzales‟s objection, the hearing was 
treated as a civil rather than criminal matter, thus making the standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt inapplicable.  The next day, defendant‟s counsel informed the 
referee that defendant was willing to admit to a violation of former section 192, 
subdivision 2 (involuntary manslaughter), in exchange for dismissal of paragraphs 
I and II of the petition.  (See Stats. 1945, ch. 1006, § 1, p. 1942.)  Opposing the 
dismissal of any allegations, the deputy district attorney proffered evidence that 
defendant had confessed to stabbing Rothenberg repeatedly, to planning the 
robbery in advance, and to taking money from Rothenberg.  Ultimately, the 
referee ruled that “justice would dictate under present circumstances” deleting the 
malice aforethought allegation.  
 
After defendant admitted he took part in the stabbing of Rothenberg, the 
referee accepted defendant‟s admission, dismissed the more serious allegations of 
paragraphs I and II, and amended the petition to allege involuntary manslaughter 
as follows:  “PARAGRAPH III:  that said minor, on or about February 7, 1969, in 
the commission of an unlawful act killed Allen Howard Rothenberg, thereby 
violating Section 292.2 [sic —former section 192, subdivision 2, now section 192, 
 
18 
subdivision (b)] of the Penal Code.”  In his March 7, 1969 “Findings and Order,” 
the referee explained he relied on the probation officer‟s report that defendant had 
a “history of mental and brain problems plus a long record of delinquent behavior 
not highlighted by assaultive behavior,” and the fact that defendant had only 
recently turned 16 when he committed the crime.  In sustaining the petition, the 
referee recommended that defendant be recommitted to the California Youth 
Authority.  
 
Another juvenile court judge, however, ordered a de novo rehearing of the 
referee‟s adjudication.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 559, added by Stats. 
1961, ch. 1616, § 2, p. 3467 and repealed by Stats. 1976, ch. 1068, § 17, p. 4781.)  
At the April 7, 1969 rehearing before yet another judge, the court considered the 
transcripts from the March 6 and March 7, 1969 hearings, and the parties 
presented additional evidence, including defendant‟s testimony.  This time around, 
the court found the murder and robbery allegations in the petition to be true.  On 
May 14, 1969, defendant was found not fit for juvenile court, his section 602 
petition was dismissed, and he was ordered prosecuted as an adult.    
 
On February 1, 1971, almost two years after the section 602 petition was 
first filed against defendant, he pleaded guilty to second degree murder in superior 
court.  
b. Legal principles 
 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 “extends juvenile court 
jurisdiction to persons who are under 18 years of age when they violate any law 
„defining crime.‟ (§ 602, subd. (a).)”  (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 486.)  
Under present law, on the People‟s motion “made prior to the attachment of 
jeopardy,” a juvenile court may in its discretion determine that the minor is unfit 
for treatment in juvenile court and should be tried instead in criminal court.  (Welf. 
 
19 
& Inst. Code, §707, subd. (a)(1) [referred to as a fitness or transfer hearing].)  If a 
minor is found fit for juvenile court treatment, the court next determines at an 
adjudicatory or jurisdictional hearing whether a crime has been committed.  (See 
In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 403; § 701.)  Any offense alleged in the 
section 602 petition must be proven true “beyond a reasonable doubt” and be 
“supported by evidence, legally admissible in the trial of criminal cases.”  (§ 701; 
see In re Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 487; In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at 
p. 403.)  Once the court sustains a section 602 petition and finds jurisdiction, the 
court conducts a dispositional hearing at which it considers the probation officer‟s 
social study report and other evidence in determining the appropriate disposition 
for the minor.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 702; see In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at 
p. 404; In re Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 487 [“Less exacting rules govern 
disposition.”].) 
 
As relevant here, at the time of defendant‟s 1969 juvenile adjudication, 
Welfare and Institutions Code former section 707 provided that a juvenile court 
could determine — “[a]t any time during” the hearing — that the minor is not fit 
to be treated as a juvenile and should be transferred to an adult court.  (Welf. & 
Inst. Code, former § 707, as amended by Stats. 1967, ch. 1357, § 1, p. 3197; see 
Barker v. Estelle (9th Cir. 1989) 913 F.2d 1433, 1439-1440.)  In 1975, the high 
court examined this statutory scheme and unanimously held that jeopardy attached 
at the adjudicatory hearing, which it described as “a proceeding whose object is to 
determine whether [the juvenile] has committed criminal acts that violate a 
criminal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in 
such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many years.”  (Breed, 
supra, 421 U.S. at p. 529; id. at p. 531 [“Jeopardy attached . . . when the Juvenile 
Court, as the trier of the facts, began to hear evidence.”].)   
 
20 
 
Although a finding of unfitness and the ensuing transfer to an adult court 
could occur not only after, but also before, an adjudication of guilt (see Welf. & 
Inst. Code, former § 707, as amended by Stats. 1967, ch. 1357, § 1, p. 3197), the 
risk of adjudication itself was enough for jeopardy to attach.  (Breed, supra, 421 
U.S. at p. 531 [analyzing an “aspect of the juvenile-court system in terms of the 
kind of risk to which jeopardy refers”]; see Barker v. Estelle, supra, 913 F.2d at p. 
1439.)  As such, the high court emphasized that any decision to transfer a juvenile 
to adult court should be made prior to an adjudicatory proceeding.  (Breed, supra, 
421 U.S. at pp. 536-538 & fn. 18.)  In response, our Legislature repealed and 
reenacted Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 to conform to the 
requirements of the high court‟s decision.  (See Stats. 1975, ch. 1266, § 4, p. 3325; 
see Barker v. Estelle, supra, 913 F.2d at pp. 1439-1440.) 
c. Forfeiture 
 
At the outset, we address whether defendant has forfeited the double 
jeopardy issue.  As noted above, defendant‟s motion to strike the 1971 conviction 
rested mainly on his Boykin/Tahl claim.  However, at the August 10, 1999, 
evidentiary hearing on defendant‟s motion, defense counsel asked the original 
deputy district attorney, John Breault, who had prosecuted defendant in adult 
court, whether he remembered if defendant‟s previous attorney had argued in 1971 
that the proceeding in adult court was in violation of double jeopardy.  Breault 
testified that he did remember, and that he had countered that jeopardy did not 
attach because it was a juvenile proceeding.  
 
Despite initiating the questions on double jeopardy himself, defense 
counsel did not move to strike the prior conviction on double jeopardy grounds, 
and we see no possible tactical reason for counsel not to have done so.  (See 
People v. Jones (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1780, 1783, fn. 5.)  We have previously 
 
21 
considered a double jeopardy issue on appeal that was technically not cognizable 
because a meritorious double jeopardy defense relates to a defendant‟s claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1201; 
People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 824, fn. 1.)  We will therefore address 
the merits of this claim.  Before discussing the claim‟s substance, however, we 
must consider possible procedural hurdles relating to the retroactivity of Breed, 
supra, 421 U.S. 519, and the collateral challenge to a prior judgment.  
d. Retroactivity 
Defendant asserts that although Breed was decided after his 1971 
conviction, its holding applies retroactively because he was subject to the very 
statute that the high court effectively invalidated.  We agree.  As we explain, this 
conclusion is compelled by two lines of cases — In re Bryan (1976) 16 Cal.3d 
782, which dealt specifically with the retroactivity of Breed, and People v. Horton 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1139-1140 (Horton), which involved striking a 
constitutionally invalid prior conviction alleged as the basis for a special 
circumstance.   
 
In In re Bryan, the issue was whether the 1975 holding in Breed applied 
retroactively to the defendant‟s juvenile adjudicatory hearing held in 1971.  In 
concluding that it did, we declined to apply the three-pronged analysis for 
retroactivity of constitutional rules of criminal procedure under Linkletter v. 
Walker (1965) 381 U.S. 618.  We noted:  “ „The guarantee against double 
jeopardy is significantly different from procedural guarantees held in the Linkletter 
line of cases to have prospective effect only.  While this guarantee, like the others, 
is a constitutional right of the criminal defendant, its practical result is to prevent a 
trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern 
the conduct of a trial.‟ ”  (In re Bryan, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 786, quoting 
 
22 
Robinson v. Neil (1973) 409 U.S. 505, 509 [applying new rule retroactively 
because old rule violated double jeopardy; court lacked authority to try 
defendant].)  We found it unnecessary to apply the Linkletter test “in the case of a 
decision compelled by constitutional prohibitions against multiple jeopardy.”  (In 
re Bryan, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 787.)  “Breed is thus to be given retrospective 
application.”  (Ibid.)   
 
The Attorney General‟s attempt to distinguish In re Bryan is unpersuasive.    
She primarily relies on Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 328, in which the 
high court held that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be 
applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not 
yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a „clear 
break‟ with the past.”  (Italics added.)  The Attorney General evidently reasons 
that the phrase “not yet final” embraces an implied holding or negative inference 
that such rules do not apply retroactively to decisions that are final.  Based on this 
reading of Griffith v. Kentucky, the Attorney General argues that because 
defendant‟s 1971 conviction was already final at the time the high court decided 
Breed, the “new rule” in Breed could not be applied retroactively to defendant‟s 
case.  Her reliance on Griffith v. Kentucky is misplaced.   
 
In Griffith v. Kentucky, the high court held that new rules of criminal 
procedure always apply to cases that are not yet final.   It “rejected as unprincipled 
and inequitable the Linkletter standard for cases pending on direct review at the 
time a new rule is announced.”  (Teague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S. 288, 304.)  
Contrary to the Attorney General‟s contention, the court expressed no view in 
Griffith v. Kentucky on whether such rules apply retroactively to cases that are 
already final.  (Griffith v. Kentucky, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 329 (conc. opn. of 
Powell, J.) [retroactivity question regarding habeas corpus petitions is “carefully 
 
23 
left open”].)  It addressed that question of collateral review in Teague v. Lane, 
supra, 489 U.S. 288.   
 
In Teague v. Lane, the high court concluded that new rules of criminal 
procedure do not ordinarily apply retroactively to cases “which have become final 
before the new rules are announced.”  (Teague v. Lane, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 310.)  
However, a new rule may be given retroactive effect if:  (1) the rule is, in fact, 
“substantive,” or (2) it is “ „a watershed rule[] of criminal procedure‟ implicating 
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”  (Schriro v. 
Summerlin (2004) 542 U.S. 348, 351-352, italics omitted; Teague v. Lane, supra, 
489 U.S. at p. 311.)  The Attorney General did not refer to Teague v. Lane‟s 
nonretroactivity principle, and, as such, she did not address whether the rule 
announced in Breed falls within either exception.  We conclude that Breed‟s 
double jeopardy rule is substantive in nature, and that Teague v. Lane poses no bar 
to applying Breed retroactively to cases on collateral review.  (Schriro v. 
Summerlin, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 352, fn. 4 [rules falling under Teague v. Lane‟s 
first exception “are more accurately characterized as substantive rules not subject 
to the bar”].)  
 
As noted above, the “ „practical result‟ ” of the guarantee against double 
jeopardy “ „is to prevent a trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe 
procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial.‟ ”  (In re Bryan, supra, 16 
Cal.3d at p. 786, quoting Robinson v. Neil, supra, 409 U.S. at p. 509; see United 
States v. Johnson (1982) 457 U.S. 537, 550 [“the Court has recognized full 
retroactivity as a necessary adjunct to a ruling that a trial court lacked authority to 
convict or punish a criminal defendant in the first place”].)  Using the high court‟s 
rationale, it seems fair to characterize Breed‟s double jeopardy rule as more 
substantive than procedural because without the rule‟s retroactive application, a 
defendant would otherwise “face[] a punishment that the law cannot impose upon 
 
24 
him.”  (Schriro v. Summerlin, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 352.)  In short, we reject the 
Attorney General‟s argument that the retroactivity rule set out In re Bryan must be 
reconsidered in light of relevant high court decisions. 
 
Nevertheless, the Attorney General maintains that even if In re Bryan 
remains good law, a violation of the constitutional double jeopardy protection may 
not form the basis of a motion to strike a prior murder conviction in a capital case.  
Such a motion, according to the Attorney General, may only be based on certain 
“fundamental constitutional flaws.”  (Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1135.)  She 
suggests that In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, in which the defendant failed to 
show his double jeopardy challenge involved a fundamental constitutional error, 
compels us to conclude that a double jeopardy violation is not the type of 
fundamental constitutional violation that may be asserted in such a motion.  Not 
so. 
In re Reno dealt with specific procedural issues when a habeas corpus 
petitioner collaterally attacks his final conviction and “has reraised all prior 
appellate claims en masse.”  (In re Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 485.)  Regarding 
the petitioner‟s double jeopardy claim which was resolved against him on direct 
appeal, we concluded it was procedurally barred under In re Waltreus (1965) 62 
Cal.2d 218, 225.  The petitioner, we found, failed “to allege any facts suggesting 
the double jeopardy issue falls within” Waltreus‟s narrow exception that the issue 
“involves a fundamental constitutional error.”  (In re Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 
481, italics added; id. at p. 486 [“we ascribe no weight to these assertions, 
unadorned as they are by factual allegations or legal argument”].)  We also pointed 
out that the petitioner failed to allege facts or present argument on why his 
“renewed double jeopardy claim” constituted a structural defect not susceptible to 
harmless error review.  (Id. at p. 487.)  Thus, contrary to the Attorney General‟s 
assertion, our holding in In re Reno, which dealt specifically with the deficient 
 
25 
allegations in that case, did not suggest that a double jeopardy violation does not 
qualify as a fundamental constitutional flaw as a matter of law.  (See id. at pp. 
486-487; see People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909, 917 [suggesting defendant 
“may bring any challenge that undermines the constitutional basis of his prior 
conviction” (italics added)].)   
We recognize that unlike In re Bryan, where the defendant sought relief by 
writ of habeas corpus, defendant here collaterally attacks his prior conviction by 
way of a pretrial motion to strike.  This distinction, however, strengthens our 
conclusion that defendant was permitted to make such a challenge here.  Unlike a 
writ of habeas corpus, a motion to strike does not seek to vacate or extinguish the 
underlying conviction, which would in turn trigger procedural bars.  (Horton, 
supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1138.)  “The purpose of a motion to strike is to challenge 
only the present effect of the prior conviction.”  (People v. Sumstine, supra, 36 
Cal.3d at p. 921.)  Significantly, the collateral challenge here is to a prior 
conviction alleged as a basis for a death-qualifying special circumstance.  (See 
Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1137-1138 [procedural bars do not apply to 
collateral attacks on prior convictions underlying special-circumstance 
allegations].)  “In the capital context, a defendant almost invariably will face much 
graver consequences from the use of the prior conviction, as a predicate for a 
special-circumstance finding, than he or she faced in the earlier criminal 
proceeding; it is because of those grave consequences, of course, that a defendant 
has been accorded special procedural protections and assistance in a capital case.  
In many instances, it may be unfair — and inconsistent with the special need for 
reliability — to deprive a defendant of the right to demonstrate the invalidity of 
the prior conviction in the subsequent capital prosecution simply because in the 
prior proceeding, when much less may have been at stake and the defendant may 
 
26 
not have been accorded the same procedural protections, defendant did not prevail 
on the issue.”  (Id. at p. 1138.)   
For all these reasons, we conclude that defendant may collaterally challenge 
his 1971 second degree murder conviction. 
e. Merits     
 
Turning to the substance of this claim, it is clear that based on Breed‟s 
retroactive application, defendant‟s 1971 second degree murder conviction was 
obtained in violation of the double jeopardy clause.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 14th 
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)  Defendant was placed once in jeopardy at the 
adjudicatory juvenile hearing before the referee, and once again, when he was 
prosecuted for the same offense in adult court where he pleaded guilty.  (Breed, 
supra, 421 U.S. at p. 541 [“We hold that the prosecution of respondent in Superior 
Court, after an adjudicatory proceeding in Juvenile Court, violated the Double 
Jeopardy Clause . . . .”].)  Because the prior conviction‟s constitutional deficiency 
is apparent from the record, thus making it unnecessary for us to remand for a 
hearing, we must set aside this special-circumstance finding (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(2)).  (See Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1139-1140 [declining to remand for 
new hearing on motion to strike prior conviction].)7 
 
Nonetheless, we will not disturb the death judgment unless defendant can 
show prejudice.  (See Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1140.)  Although the death 
judgment here was also supported by the multiple murder special-circumstance 
finding, we conclude below that special-circumstance-allegation finding must also 
                                              
7  
In a separate claim, which is addressed below, defendant also argues that 
this 1971 conviction was improperly used to impeach his trial testimony and, as 
such, his conviction for the Facundo murder should be overturned as well.     
 
27 
be set aside.  (See post, at p. 34.)  Consequently, without either special-
circumstance finding, we must reverse the penalty judgment.   
2. The prosecution’s refiling of the Apodaca murder charge 
 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to 
refile the Apodaca murder charge, which he contends had been previously 
dismissed three times.  (See § 1387 [two-dismissal rule for refiling charges of 
certain violent felonies].)  He asserts that even if the murder charge had been 
dismissed only twice, the court retroactively applied section 1387.1 — which 
became effective January 1, 1988 to allow for a third filing in the case of 
excusable neglect — in violation of the ex post facto clauses of both the state and 
federal Constitutions.  (See U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9; see 
John L. v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 158, 171-172 (John L.) [federal and 
state ex post facto clauses are similarly construed].)  He further argues that the 
multiple murder special circumstance should be vacated because it is based in part 
on the invalid second degree murder conviction for the death of Apodaca.  For 
reasons that follow, we agree with defendant. 
a. Procedural history 
 
The facts of Apodaca‟s killing are discussed above.  (See ante, at pp. 6-9.)  
As relevant here, Apodaca was killed on January 23, 1987.  On February 5, 1987, 
the People charged both defendant and Jesse Salazar for the first degree murder of 
Apodaca (case No. A795989).  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  As to defendant, the felony 
complaint alleged a prior murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)), 
based on his 1971 conviction for the second degree murder of Allen Rothenberg.  
As to Salazar, the complaint also charged him with the September 1985 murder of 
another man, Ronald Eugene Diaz.  In light of the prosecution‟s inability to locate 
 
28 
crucial witnesses, the warrant was recalled and the case was dismissed as to 
defendant on March 13, 1987.   
 
On March 25, 1987, the People refiled the first degree murder charge with 
the prior murder special-circumstance allegation against defendant (case No. 
A798706).  At the April 8, 1987, preliminary hearing, the only eyewitness to 
Apodaca‟s stabbing death, Robert De Alva, failed to appear.  He had apparently 
not been properly served with a subpoena necessary to procure an arrest warrant.  
The magistrate declined to find good cause for a continuance, but permitted the 
prosecution to proceed while it looked for De Alva.  The prosecution next called 
Richard Rivera, the owner of the upholstery shop where Apodaca was killed, who 
testified he did not see the stabbing happen, but only saw Apodaca lying on the 
floor afterwards.  Later at the hearing, the pathologist who performed the autopsy 
of Apodaca, Dr. Sara Reddy, testified that the cause of death was a stab wound to 
the chest.  She also opined that Apodaca suffered from a superficial neck wound 
that was “most likely” caused by a different instrument.  
 
The following day, April 9, the prosecution advised the court that it could 
not locate De Alva.  After questioning whether there was a showing of malice to 
support the murder charge against defendant, the magistrate held defendant to 
answer for the lesser offense of manslaughter.  On April 24, 1987, the prosecution 
refiled the information under section 739, charging defendant with murder under 
the previous case number, A798706, but the information did not include a special-
circumstance allegation.  Ultimately, on June 23, 1987, the trial court granted 
defendant‟s motion to dismiss the information under section 1382 after the 
prosecution advised that it still could not locate De Alva.    
 
More than a decade later, on June 1, 1998, the prosecution filed a three-
count felony complaint, charging defendant in count 2 with the first degree murder 
of Apodaca and alleging special circumstances of multiple murder and prior 
 
29 
murder.  The following year, on July 27, 1999, defendant filed a motion to dismiss 
the Apodaca murder charge, contending that the prosecution had exceeded the 
number of refilings permitted under section 1387.  The prosecution conceded that 
there were two dismissals of the Apodaca murder charge.  However, it argued that 
the third refiling was permissible under section 1387.1, and that there was a 
showing of excusable neglect.  Defendant, however, countered that because 
section 1387.1 became effective after the Apodaca murder charge was dismissed 
for a second time in June 1987, section 1387‟s two-dismissal rule governed and 
precluded any additional refiling.  Otherwise, to allow the prosecution to refile the 
murder charge a decade later in 1998 would amount to a retroactive application of 
section 1387.1 in violation of the ex post facto clause. 
 
Before ruling on these issues, the trial court held a hearing in August 1999 
to determine whether the prior dismissals were due to the prosecution‟s “excusable 
neglect.”  (§ 1387.1.)  The original prosecutor, detective, and investigator on the 
Apodaca murder case each testified that despite their efforts, they could not locate 
eyewitness De Alva in 1987.  The trial court found that the prosecution had shown 
excusable neglect under section 1387.1.  Defendant alternatively argued that 
section 1387.1 was not applicable in the first place because there had been three 
prior dismissals of the Apodaca murder charge:  the dismissal of the February 5, 
1987, complaint on March 13, 1987; the reduction of the murder charge to 
manslaughter in the March 25, 1987, complaint on April 9, 1987; and the 
dismissal of the April 24, 1987, complaint on June 23, 1987.  The trial court, 
however, agreed with the prosecution that because defendant was held over on the 
lesser necessarily included offense of manslaughter, the magistrate‟s refusal to 
hold defendant for murder did not count as a dismissal for purposes of section 
1387.   In denying defendant‟s motion to dismiss, the trial court noted that its 
 
30 
ruling included an implicit finding that section 1387.1 applied retroactively and 
did not violate the ex post facto clause.  
 
Both the Court of Appeal and this court, respectively, denied defendant‟s 
writ of prohibition and petition for review.  The jury subsequently convicted 
defendant of second degree murder.  Defendant renews these claims on appeal.   
b. Legal principles 
 
Under section 1387, felony prosecutions are generally “subject to a two-
dismissal rule; two previous dismissals of charges for the same offense will bar a 
new felony charge.”  (Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1019.)  
Put another way, section 1387 allows for only one previous termination or 
dismissal of a felony.  (People v. Superior Court (Martinez) (1993) 19  
Cal.App.4th 738, 745.)  The Attorney General does not dispute that section 1387 
would have prohibited the 1998 refiling of the Apodaca murder charge, which was 
dismissed twice in 1987.  The point of contention involves section 1387.1, which 
was enacted in 1987 and became effective January 1, 1988.  It provides an 
exception to the “two-dismissal rule”:  it permits the prosecution to file a violent 
felony charge a third time if either of the prior dismissals were due to “excusable 
neglect,” and the prosecution did not act in “bad faith.”  (Ibid.; see Miller v. 
Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 728, 739.)  The question here is whether 
by allowing the third filing of Apodaca‟s murder charge, the trial court applied 
section 1387.1 retroactively in violation of the ex post facto clause.   
Although the Latin term “ex post facto” literally extends to any statute 
passed “ „after the fact‟ ” (Collins v. Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 41), “no 
statute falls within the ex post facto prohibition unless „two critical elements‟ 
exist.”  (John L., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 172.)  The statute must be retroactive, and 
must implicate at least one of the four categories described in Calder v. Bull 
 
31 
(1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390.  (John L., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 172.)  To be 
considered retroactive, the law must “ „change[] the legal consequences of an act 
completed before [the law‟s] effective date,‟ namely the defendant‟s criminal 
behavior.”   (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288; accord, John L., 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 172.)  “In other words, the operative event for retroactivity 
purposes, and the necessary reference point for any ex post facto analysis, is 
criminal conduct committed before the disputed law took effect.”  (Ibid.)  As to 
the second element, the four Calder categories encompass laws that 
(1) criminalize conduct that was innocent when done; (2) aggravate or make 
greater a crime than when committed; (3) change and increase the punishment; 
and (4) alter the rules of evidence to reduce the legal sufficiency necessary to 
support a finding of guilt.  (See Calder, supra, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at p. 390; People v. 
Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 391.) 
c. Application 
As discussed, the parties agree that after the Apodaca murder charge was 
dismissed a second time in June 1987, section 1387‟s two-dismissal rule barred 
any additional refiling.  The Attorney General, however, argues that the 
subsequent enactment of section 1387.1 permitted defendant‟s prosecution for the 
same offense 10 years later.  Defendant counters that this third refiling in 1998 
would amount to a retroactive application of section 1387.1 in violation of the 
federal Constitution‟s ex post facto clause.  Relying on Stogner v. California 
(2003) 539 U.S. 607 (Stogner), defendant argues that section 1387 “operates 
precisely like a statute of limitations,” and that by allowing the prosecution to 
refile a third time under section 1387.1, the trial court unconstitutionally revived 
an otherwise barred prosecution.  We conclude that because a retroactive 
construction of section 1387.1 would violate the ex post facto clause, the statute 
 
32 
does not apply to cases that were twice dismissed before it was enacted.  (Rust v. 
Sullivan (1991) 500 U.S. 173, 190 [a statute “ „ought not be construed to violate 
the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available‟ ”].)   
In Stogner, the high court majority held that a California statute extending 
the limitations period for previously time-barred prosecutions “falls within the 
literal terms” of the second Calder category, i.e., a “ „law that aggravates a crime, 
or makes it greater than it was, when committed.‟ ”  (Stogner, supra, 530 U.S. at 
pp. 615, 613, italics omitted.)  First explaining that this category‟s alternate 
description refers to a statute “that „inflicts punishments where the party was not, 
by law, liable to any punishment,‟ ” the high court articulated why this second 
category fit:  “After (but not before) the original statute of limitations had expired, 
a party such as Stogner was not „liable to any punishment.‟  California‟s new 
statute therefore „aggravated‟ Stogner‟s alleged crime, or made it „greater than it 
was, when committed,‟ in the sense that, and to the extent that, it „inflicted 
punishment‟ for past criminal conduct that (when the new law was enacted) did 
not trigger any such liability.”  (Id. at p. 613, italics omitted.)  Likewise, because 
defendant here was not by law liable for the twice-dismissed murder charges when 
section 1387.1 became effective, any application of section 1387.1 would make 
his crime “ „greater than it was, when committed‟ ” in violation of the ex post 
facto clause.  (Stogner, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 613; id. at pp. 613-614 [second 
Calder category applies “where a new law inflicts a punishment upon a person not 
then subject to that punishment, to any degree”].)    
Seeking to distinguish Stogner, the Attorney General emphasizes that there 
is no statute of limitations on murder and an action “may be commenced at any 
time.”  (§ 799; see People v. Nelson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1242, 1250.)  Because 
section 1387 cannot provide a defendant charged with murder “amnesty” or a 
“complete defense to prosecution” (Stogner, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 632), the 
 
33 
passage of section 1387.1 as an exception to section 1387 would not 
unconstitutionally “revive a long-forbidden prosecution.”  (Stogner, supra, 539 
U.S. at p. 632.)  The Attorney General adds that the application of section 1387.1 
is not contingent on time and is thus “completely unrelated” to a statute of 
limitations; it merely provides a procedural remedial tool to avoid releasing 
dangerous felons.  (See People v. Massey (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 204, 211.)  We 
are not persuaded.  (See Collins v. Youngblood, supra, 497 U.S. at p. 46 [“by 
simply labeling a law „procedural,‟ a legislature does not thereby immunize it 
from scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause”].) 
Though the twice-dismissed action against defendant was not time-barred 
under section 1387, it was nevertheless barred when section 1387.1 was enacted. 
Under Stogner, what matters is the government‟s attempt “to revive a long-
forbidden prosecution,” which the high court described as implicating a 
“predominating constitutional interest.”  (Stogner, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 632, italics 
added; id. at p. 611 [unfairness where “government has refused „to play by its own 
rules‟ ”].)  If section 1387.1 permitted a third refiling of the Apodaca murder 
charge, it would “retroactively withdraw[] a complete defense to prosecution after 
it ha[d] already attached, and it [would do] so in a manner that allow[ed] the State 
to withdraw this defense at will and with respect to individuals already identified. 
[Citation.] „Unfair‟ seems to us a fair characterization.”  (Stogner, supra, 539 U.S. 
at p. 632.)  We therefore construe section 1387.1 as not applying retroactively to 
revive prosecutions that were barred by section 1387 when it was enacted.  As a 
result, the 1998 refiling of the Apodaca murder charge was improper.8 
                                              
8  
Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to decide whether the Apodaca 
murder charge was dismissed twice, as the Attorney General suggests, or three 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
34 
Given that defendant was improperly charged and subsequently convicted 
of Apodaca‟s murder, we must reverse the judgment of conviction for second 
degree murder, set aside the jury‟s true finding regarding the multiple murder 
special circumstance, and, finally, reverse the judgment of death.  Nevertheless, 
we will discuss defendant‟s additional arguments to the extent they challenge the 
validity of his convictions for robbery and the first degree murder of Facundo.  
(See People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 614.)  
3. Trial court’s refusal to sever the murder charges from the robbery 
charge  
 
Before trial, defendant also moved to sever the two murder charges (count 1 
[victim Facundo]; count 2 [victim Apodaca]) from the unrelated robbery charge 
(count 3 [Spartan Burgers restaurant]).  Defendant alleged that the robbery, which 
occurred more than a decade after the murders of Facundo and Apodaca, had 
nothing in common with them.  Further, while the evidence that defendant 
committed the robbery was “overwhelming,” the evidence that he committed the 
two murders, in particular, the murder of Apodaca, was not.  Although the 
prosecution conceded that the evidence regarding the robbery would not otherwise 
be cross-admissible in either murder trial, it argued there was “no real prejudice” if 
the robbery count were not severed.  The trial court denied defendant‟s motion to 
sever, finding that joinder “would not rise to the level of serious prejudice.”  On 
appeal, defendant argues that the trial court‟s refusal to sever the unrelated robbery 
charge denied him a fair trial by improperly bolstering the prosecution‟s weak 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
times, as defendant argues, or whether the prosecution made the requisite showing 
of “excusable neglect” under section 1387.1. 
 
35 
evidence of intent on both murder charges.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 8th and 14th 
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 15, 16.)  For reasons that follow, we disagree. 
 
As relevant here, section 954 permits the joinder of “two or more different 
offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses.”  (§ 954; see People v. Soper 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 771.)  “[B]ecause consolidation or joinder of charged 
offenses ordinarily promotes efficiency, that is the course of action preferred by 
law.”  (Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1220.)  However, a trial 
court in its discretion may order the offenses to be severed “in the interests of 
justice and for good cause shown.”  (§ 954.)   
 
The often-cited factors for severance are:  “(1) whether the evidence 
relating to the various charges would be cross-admissible in separate trials, (2) 
whether some of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the 
defendant, (3) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or with 
another weak case, and (4) whether one of the charges is a capital offense or the 
joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case.”  (People v. Elliott 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 551.)  If cross-admissibility of the evidence is present, that 
is normally enough to justify the trial court‟s refusal to sever the charged offenses.  
(Alcala v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1227.)  However, the lack of 
cross-admissibility is not necessarily dispositive for purposes of severance.  
(People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 440; see § 954.1.)  If there is no cross-
admissibility of the evidence, we evaluate the three remaining factors to determine 
whether they demonstrate the trial court‟s abuse of discretion.  (Alcala v. Superior 
Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1227.)  
 
For purposes of section 954, “[r]obbery and murder are the same class of 
crime [because] both involve a common element of assault on the victim.”  
(People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1243.)  Because the statutory 
requirement for joinder was met, defendant can only establish error based on the 
 
36 
trial court‟s abuse of discretion, in other words, defendant must make a “ „clear 
showing of prejudice.‟ ”  (People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 439; Alcala v. 
Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1220 [abuse of discretion if the court‟s 
ruling falls outside the bounds of reason].)  “We review the trial court‟s exercise 
of discretion in light of the record before it when it ruled.”  (People v. Elliott, 
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 552.)  In the end, even if a trial court‟s ruling on a motion 
to sever was proper at the time it was made, we must still determine whether the 
joinder of charges resulted in “ „gross unfairness depriving the defendant of due 
process of law.‟ ”  (People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 783.)   
 
As the prosecution conceded at trial, evidence of the robbery would not 
have been cross-admissible with evidence of either murder.  However, we 
conclude that consideration of the other three factors do not demonstrate a  
“ „clear showing of prejudice‟ ” based on the joinder of the robbery charge and the 
Facundo murder charge, of which defendant stands convicted.  (People v. 
Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 439.)   
 
In support of severance, defendant argues that the robbery of Spartan 
Burgers was more inflammatory than the Facundo murder because the robbery 
involved the use of a gun against a stranger.  We disagree.  Though it is debatable 
whether a gun or a knife is a more dangerous weapon or whether the perpetrator 
being a stranger or an acquaintance engenders more fear, defendant‟s robbery of 
Spartan Burgers, significantly, did not involve any bodily injury.  In stark contrast, 
defendant brutally stabbed  Facundo during his attack.  Also, contrary to 
defendant‟s contention, evidence of the robbery did not bolster the “weak” 
Facundo murder case with respect to the issue of defendant‟s intent.  Evidence that 
defendant committed the murder was anything but weak.  Though defendant flatly 
denied robbing Spartan Burgers at trial, he confessed both before trial and on the 
stand to killing Facundo.  (See ante, at pp. 11-12.)  As to the forensic evidence, the 
 
37 
pathologist testified that all of Facundo‟s major stab wounds were “lethal.” As the 
Attorney General contends, the location and number of wounds support 
defendant‟s intent to kill his victim..  (See People v. Silva (1953) 41 Cal.2d 778, 
782 [“The extent and location of a knife wound are pertinent to a determination of 
the intent with which it was inflicted.”].)  
 
Because we are reversing the penalty judgment, the factor whether joinder 
of the charges converted defendant‟s case from a noncapital case to a capital one is 
no longer relevant in determining whether defendant suffered prejudice.  Based on 
the foregoing, we conclude that defendant has not made a clear showing of 
prejudice based on the trial court‟s refusal to sever.   
 
In the end, nothing suggests that the joinder of the robbery charge to the 
murder charges resulted in “ „gross unfairness‟ ” depriving defendant of due 
process of the law.  (People v. Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 783.)  Contrary to 
defendant‟s suggestion, with respect to this severance issue, “a heightened analysis 
is no longer called for” in capital cases.  (Alcala v. Superior Court, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 1229, fn. 19; see § 790, subd. (b).) 
4. Trial court’s “revocation” of defendant’s pro. per. status   
 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly terminated his in propria 
persona status by relying on defendant‟s loss of library privileges in jail and the 
seriousness of the charges against him as grounds for revocation.  Alternatively, he 
maintains that he did not “validly” sign the substitution of attorney form because 
he misunderstood that the loss of library privileges would inevitably lead to such 
revocation, and the trial court should have corrected his misapprehension of the 
law.  For reasons that follow, we find this claim meritless. 
  
After appearing in propria persona at his September 1998 preliminary 
hearing, defendant informed the trial court at his arraignment that he wished to 
 
38 
continue in propria persona.  In reviewing his formal request, the trial court noted 
that defendant had represented himself in three 1976 cases involving robbery, 
attempted robbery, and assault with deadly weapon charges, and that he had been 
convicted in two cases and acquitted in one.  After the trial court explained the 
difficulties and dangers of defendant representing himself, defendant confirmed he 
wished to proceed in propria persona despite facing the death penalty.  He, 
however, requested that the court appoint advisory or standby counsel.9  The trial 
court granted defendant‟s petition for in propria persona status at the October 13, 
1998, arraignment hearing.  The written petition included the statement, “I 
understand that misconduct occurring outside of court may result in restriction or 
termination of Pro Per privileges or my Pro Per status,” which defendant initialed. 
 
With Attorney Andrew Stein as advisory counsel, defendant continued to 
represent himself at pretrial hearings until November 1998, when his in-custody in 
propria persona privileges at the Los Angeles County jail were revoked.  A search 
of defendant‟s cell had yielded items from the law library, 750 milligrams of the 
drug methocarbamol, and a black ballpoint pen, the possession of which violated 
jail rules.  On December 3, 1998, defendant appeared in court with Attorney Stein 
after signing a substitution of attorney form.  Stein informed the court that 
defendant told him he was willing to relinquish his in propria persona status.  
Defendant added:  “Involuntarily, by the way.”  Defendant explained that he said 
                                              
9  
The roles of advisory counsel and standby counsel are distinct.  (See People 
v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 725.)  The parties and the court used both terms to 
describe Attorney Stein, though it appears Stein was to serve as advisory counsel.  
(Ibid. [advisory counsel “is appointed to assist the self-represented defendant if 
and when the defendant requests help”].)  In any event, the distinction between 
advisory and standby counsel is not crucial to this issue.  (See People v. Butler 
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 828, fn. 6 [defense counsel served in both advisory and 
standby capacities].) 
 
39 
“involuntarily because I‟ve been told by numerous people that today my pro per 
status was going to be revoked regardless of what transpires today.”  Alleging that 
the Sheriff‟s Department was not treating him fairly, defendant claimed he would 
not get a fair trial representing himself and that “my only recourse is to give up my 
pro per status and go with Mr. Stein.”  
 
Insisting on making an appropriate record, the prosecution emphasized that 
even though defendant had lost his library privileges, this did not mean he could 
not remain in propria persona and that Stein, as advisory counsel, could supply 
any needed research material.  The prosecution, however, added:  “Obviously, 
obviously, the appropriate choice to make on behalf of the defendant is to have a 
lawyer represent him because it is a death penalty case.”  When the trial court 
asked defendant if he had signed the substitution form voluntarily and if he 
understood what the form meant, defendant replied yes to both questions.   
 
Attorney Stein agreed with the prosecution that it was in defendant‟s best 
interest to be represented by counsel and asserted that “without me as his attorney 
or without an attorney, Mr. Trujeque would try to do what Penal Code section 
1018 prohibits him from doing, which is tantamount to pleading guilty to the death 
penalty.”  He added:  “Even with advisory counsel, in a death penalty case when 
you don‟t have access to the law library, you‟re really not in a very good 
position.”  Attorney Stein informed the court he had talked to defendant at length 
about the substitution of attorney form and believed defendant signed it 
“intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily.”   
 
However, when the prosecution later asked defendant what he wanted to 
do, he said:  “I want to represent myself and have access and be allowed to have 
access to the law library.”  After defendant conferred with Attorney Stein off the 
record, Stein said “I think the court already said they‟ve accepted the substitution 
of attorney.”  The prosecution, who was “not happy with the record,” asked that 
 
40 
the court make a ruling on the substitution of attorney, noting that documents 
submitted “indicate that his pro per status should be, in fact, withdrawn from 
privileges at the county jail.”  After recounting why defendant‟s in-custody in 
propria persona privileges had been revoked for cause, the court noted it had 
inquired and confirmed that defendant did not sign the substitution of attorney 
form out of duress or force.  It accepted the form “[b]ased on the seriousness of 
the charges, [and] the fact that a substitution of attorney was voluntarily and 
willingly signed.”  On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erroneously revoked 
his in propria persona status in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  
(U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends; see Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 
(Faretta).)   
 
Under Faretta, a defendant “must be free personally to decide whether in 
his particular case counsel is to his advantage,” even though “he may conduct his 
own defense ultimately to his own detriment.”  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 
834.)  This right to self-representation extends to capital prosecutions.  (People v. 
Elliott, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 592.)  However, the right “once asserted, may be 
waived or abandoned.”  (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 909; see Indiana 
v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, 171 [self-representation right is not absolute].)  
A defendant‟s waiver or abandonment of this constitutional right should be 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent (People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 
284); such waiver or abandonment may be inferred from a defendant‟s conduct.  
(Id. at pp. 284-285; People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 929; People v. 
Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 909.)  A trial court may also revoke a defendant‟s 
right to represent himself if he “deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist 
misconduct.”  (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46; see People v. Carson 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 8-9 [misconduct not limited to in-courtroom behavior].)  
 
41 
 
We first point out that, contrary to defendant‟s assertion, the trial court did 
not in fact revoke defendant‟s in propria persona status.10  Before it accepted 
defendant‟s substitution of attorney form, the court noted only that defendant‟s in 
propria persona privileges had already been revoked at an administrative hearing.  
Defendant‟s chief complaint rather is that he mistakenly believed his loss of 
library privileges would necessarily lead to the revocation of his in propria persona 
status, a misapprehension the trial court failed to correct.  (See People v. D’Arcy, 
supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 286-287 [defendant allegedly relied on court‟s 
misadvisement when relinquishing his Faretta right]; cf. People v. Carter (1967) 
66 Cal.2d 666, 670 [defendant ineffectively waived right to counsel based on 
mistaken belief reinforced by the court that he would have access to library].)  
Thus, notwithstanding the fact he signed the substitution form and told the court 
he understood what this meant, he argues he did not “validly” waive his right to 
self-representation.  At the very least, defendant claims it did not “ „reasonably 
appear[]‟ ” that he wished to abandon his self-representation, and that the trial 
court should have had a “ „personal dialogue‟ ” with defendant to determine 
whether there was a waiver.  (People v. Kenner (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 56, 61.)  
We disagree. 
                                              
10  
Defendant‟s reliance on People v. Butler, supra, 47 Cal.4th 814, is 
therefore misplaced.  In Butler, a trial court terminated a capital defendant‟s self-
representation after concluding the defendant‟s trial preparation and his ability to 
marshal discovery materials in his defense would be limited.  A jury subsequently 
convicted the defendant of murder and sentenced him to death.  We reversed the 
jury‟s judgment and sentence, concluding that under Faretta “inmates still have 
the right to represent themselves even when their ability to prepare is restricted in 
custody.”  (Id. at p. 827.)  In that regard, defendant‟s claim that the trial court 
erroneously relied on the seriousness of the charges to revoke his in propria 
persona status also fails.  
 
42 
 
Assuming that defendant actually misunderstood the consequences of 
losing his library privileges, any misunderstanding he had was sufficiently 
clarified.  (See People v. D’Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 286-287 [no error where 
trial court corrected itself after misadvising defendant he could insist counsel 
present a certain defense if he relinquished right to self-representation].)  The 
prosecution explained to defendant several times that he had “choices,” i.e., either 
he could remain in propria persona because Stein, as advisory counsel, could 
provide him the necessary materials and research, or he could have Stein represent 
him.  Stein also informed the court that he spoke to defendant for “a good 45 
minutes about what it meant” to sign the substitution form and he believed 
defendant signed it “with an intelligent mind, voluntarily and knowingly.”  
 
Although the prosecution and Attorney Stein both made statements 
suggesting defendant would be better off represented by counsel (see ante, at p. 
39), these statements simply recognize the obvious challenges defendant would 
face as a capital defendant proceeding in propria persona.  We conclude they do 
not demonstrate that defendant was compelled to waive his right to self-
representation.  In isolation, defendant‟s own assertions that his “only recourse” 
was to give up his status “involuntarily” may appear troubling;  however, our 
review of the record supports that defendant voluntarily and intelligently 
relinquished his right.  There is “no suggestion that defendant did not understand 
what he was giving up in confirming that he wished to be represented by counsel, 
or that he might in fact have wished to represent himself notwithstanding his 
statements to the contrary . . . .”  (People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 910.)  
 
Contrary to defendant‟s contention, the trial court was not required to 
question defendant further, especially after it had already asked defendant if he 
voluntarily signed the substitution form and if he understood what that meant.   
Defendant was familiar not only with the criminal justice system but with his 
 
43 
rights under Faretta, having represented himself several times and having even 
obtained an acquittal.  Indeed, the record portrays defendant as articulate, 
assertive, and intelligent, capable of arguing fine points relating to investigative 
funds and discovery matters.  Rather than unequivocally expressing a desire to 
represent himself, defendant‟s main concern appeared to be restoring his library 
privileges:  “I want to represent myself and have access and be allowed to have 
access to the law library.”  (See People v. Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 932 
[Faretta right waived unless defendants “ „ “ „articulately and unmistakably 
demand to proceed pro se‟ ” ‟ ”].)  After it became evident that defendant‟s library 
privileges would not be restored, the record does not indicate, nor does defendant 
contend, that he raised the Faretta issue at trial again.  Based on the circumstance 
that defendant accepted Stein as counsel and that he did not renew his request for 
self-representation, “we conclude he must further be found to have ultimately 
abandoned his desire to invoke his Faretta rights in these capital murder 
proceedings.”  (People v. Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 933.) 
B. Guilt Phase  
1. Trial court’s ruling sustaining Charlie and Elena Trujeque’s 
assertions of the Fifth Amendment privilege   
 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by allowing Charlie Trujeque to 
make a blanket assertion of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
at both the guilt and penalty phases without making any inquiry into the validity of 
the asserted right, and without considering defendant‟s constitutional rights to 
present a defense, to compel the presence of witnesses and to present a case in 
mitigation of the death penalty.  (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.)  He 
adds the trial court also erred in permitting Elena Trujeque to assert her own Fifth 
Amendment right at the penalty phase because she had waived the privilege by 
testifying at the guilt phase.  In light of our decision to reverse the penalty phase 
 
44 
judgment, we will address only Charlie‟s assertion of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege at the guilt phase.   
a. Factual background 
1) Guilt phase 
At trial, in support of its argument that defendant had falsely implicated 
Charlie and Elena Trujeque in the Facundo murder and was trying to shift the 
blame to them, the prosecution intended to call both Charlie and Elena as 
witnesses.  Before they testified, the prosecution informed the trial court that the 
Trujeques might need attorneys because “there may be Fifth Amendment issues.”   
The trial court appointed attorneys, Hattie Harris and Anthony Garcia, for Elena 
and Charlie, respectively.  Harris confirmed that she had spoken to Elena and had 
advised her client to take the stand.  
 
 At the guilt phase, Elena testified about Charlene‟s relationship with 
Facundo and her relationship with defendant.  Though first denying that she and 
Charlie had asked defendant to hurt Facundo, she admitted on cross-examination 
that Charlie had told defendant to break Facundo‟s arms and legs.  Elena conceded 
she was “on board for that,” but did not think defendant would “stick a knife in his 
chest.”  She denied promising defendant any money for killing Facundo.   
 
After Elena testified, Charlie‟s appointed attorney, Anthony Garcia, 
informed the court that he had advised his client to assert his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination.  On the stand, Charlie confirmed he was asserting 
this right.  Though it initially allowed the defense to ask Charlie about his 
concerns for Charlene and her relationship with Facundo, and to ask about the 
letters defendant wrote to Charlene, the trial court eventually ruled that it would 
not force Charlie to testify at all in the guilt phase because any questions “taken in 
context with everything that Mrs. Trujeque has said, can incriminate him.”  
 
45 
Defense counsel, however, indicated they wished to call Charlie to the stand 
during the penalty phase as a “family historian” to testify about defendant‟s family 
history.  The trial court reserved the issue.  
2) Penalty phase 
 
As expected, defense counsel called Charlie to the stand at the penalty 
phase and attempted to ask him questions about his siblings, including his 
deceased brother (defendant‟s father), Manuel Trujeque.  Charlie invoked the Fifth 
Amendment privilege through his counsel, and refused to answer any questions.  
The trial court declined defense counsel‟s request to order Charlie to answer 
because it reasoned the questions would “lead to what the prosecution‟s contention 
is, namely, that because of familial relationships, your client did what he did at the 
behest of this witness and his wife.”  The court did, however, allow defense 
counsel to ask Charlie whether the prosecution had offered him immunity in the 
Facundo case for asserting his Fifth Amendment rights.  Both Charlie and the 
prosecutor denied there was any such agreement.    
 
After defense counsel proffered the type of questions they would ask 
Charlie (such as questions about defendant‟s father‟s temper, drug use, and history 
of physical violence toward defendant‟s mother when she was pregnant with 
defendant), Charlie reiterated his intent to assert the Fifth Amendment on all these 
questions.  Defense counsel, however, asserted the jury was entitled to hear this 
information from Charlie about “how Tommy Trujeque got here today.  It‟s 
violence breeds violence.  It‟s drug addicts breed drug addicts.  It all fits in with 
what the expert witnesses would testify, and he is the family historian from the 
Trujeque side.”  Rejecting defendant‟s claim that information on the Trujeque 
family could not have any factual nexus to the Facundo murder, the trial court 
sustained Charlie‟s assertion of the privilege at the penalty phase as well.  
 
46 
 
As an alternative to Charlie testifying about defendant‟s family history, 
defense counsel proposed to call Elena to the stand as a family historian under 
Evidence Code sections 1310 and 1311.  However, her appointed attorney, Hattie 
Harris, was “hit with the bombshell” that defense counsel had suggested Elena had 
perjured herself by denying that she ever visited defendant in prison.  Based on the 
possibility that Elena could “incriminate herself for a new and different charge” of 
perjury, Harris indicated she would advise her client to assert her Fifth 
Amendment privilege to any questions regarding familial relationships at the 
penalty phase.  On the stand, Elena confirmed she would refuse to answer any 
questions about her husband‟s family or defendant‟s childhood.  
 
On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred in permitting Charlie to 
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege at both the guilt and penalty phases, and in 
allowing Elena to assert her privilege at the penalty phase.  He contends that the 
Trujeques‟ assertions of the privilege excluded “critical mitigating evidence”  
about defendant‟s father and his father‟s family history.  In deciding whether the 
trial court erred in sustaining the privileges of these witnesses, we apply an 
independent standard of review.  (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 
(Seijas).)  For reasons that follow, we find no error with respect to Charlie‟s 
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege at the guilt phase.  As noted, given our 
reversal of the penalty judgment, we do not address defendant‟s challenges to 
Charlie‟s and Elena‟s assertions of the privilege at the penalty phase. 
b. Legal principles 
 
“It is a bedrock principle of American (and California) law, embedded in 
various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions, that witnesses 
may not be compelled to incriminate themselves.  In an oft-cited case, the high 
court stated that this privilege „must be accorded liberal construction in favor of 
 
47 
the right it was intended to secure.‟ ”  (Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304, quoting 
Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 (Hoffman).)  The test from 
Hoffman provides that “[t]o sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the 
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive 
answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be 
dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.”  (Id. at pp. 486-487.)  In that 
regard, a witness‟s answers need not in themselves support a conviction under a 
criminal statute, but may “furnish a link in the chain of evidence” needed to 
prosecute the witness for a crime.  (Id. at p. 486.)  Ultimately, a trial court may 
reject an assertion of the privilege only when it appears to the court “ „perfectly 
clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the 
witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency‟ to 
incriminate.”  (Id. at p. 488; Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 305 [Evid. Code, § 
40411 incorporates the Hoffman test construed “broadly in favor of the 
privilege”].) 
 
A witness, however, may not make a blanket assertion of the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  (See U.S. v. Goodwin (5th Cir. 1980) 625 F.2d 693, 
701.)  A witness‟s “say-so does not itself establish the hazard of incrimination.  It 
is for the court to say whether his silence is justified . . . .”  (Hoffman, supra, 341 
U.S. at p. 486.)  In other words, a trial court “must make „a particularized inquiry, 
deciding, in connection with each specific area that the questioning party wishes to 
                                              
11  
The provision states:  “Whenever the proffered evidence is claimed to be 
privileged under Section 940 [the privilege against self-incrimination], the person 
claiming the privilege has the burden of showing that the proffered evidence might 
tend to incriminate him; and the proffered evidence is inadmissible unless it 
clearly appears to the court that the proffered evidence cannot possibly have a 
tendency to incriminate the person claiming the privilege.”  (Evid. Code, § 404, 
italics added.) 
 
48 
explore, whether or not the privilege is well-founded.‟  [Citation.]  Although the 
witness may have a valid claim to the privilege with respect to some questions, the 
scope of that privilege may not extend to all relevant questions.  The witness may 
be totally excused only if the court finds that he could „legitimately refuse to 
answer essentially all relevant questions.‟  [Citation.] ”  (U.S. v. Goodwin, supra, 
625 F.2d at p. 701.)  This has long been the rule in California in both criminal and 
civil proceedings.  (Wadford v. Medeiros (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1045.)    
c. Application  
 
With respect to Charlie‟s privilege, basic questions about his family 
background and his relationship to defendant, though seemingly innocuous, could 
have exposed Charlie to prosecution for solicitation of murder or as an accessory 
to murder.  Defendant testified that Charlie had paid him to kill Facundo, and 
Charlie‟s wife, Elena, confirmed that Charlie had asked defendant to break 
Facundo‟s arms and legs.  As the prosecution explained, the defense theory was 
that Charlie “knew by saying to [defendant], go take care of it, take care of the 
problem, that as a family member, he would do that.  He would do the killing, he 
would take care of the problem for the family. . . . The mere fact that this witness 
is related to [defendant] in any way is incriminating to this witness in the context 
of those facts.”  The trial court added that defendant‟s proposed question, for 
instance, about when Charlie‟s parents died “by itself perhaps can‟t incriminate 
him, but following that question there will be other questions” that will ultimately 
lead to the conclusion that defendant killed Facundo at Charlie‟s request. The 
existence of this family relationship, in other words, provided a “link in the chain 
of evidence” supporting defendant‟s motive in the Facundo murder.  (Hoffman, 
supra, 341 U.S. at p. 486.)  Under these circumstances, it does not clearly appear 
 
49 
that the proffered testimony could not possibly have a tendency to incriminate 
Charlie.  (See Evid. Code, § 404; Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 307.)  
 
Nevertheless, defendant contends that there were other subjects that Charlie 
could have safely testified to, but that the trial court “made no inquiry at all” as to 
the proper scope of the questioning.  The record belies this assertion.  At the guilt 
phase, the trial court explored other possible areas for questioning, specifically 
asking defense counsel, “Other than your desire to question this witness about 
whether or not he read the contents of the letter, what other areas do you want to 
go into with this witness?”  The court initially allowed counsel to ask Charlie 
about Charlene‟s relationship with Facundo.  The court, however, later determined 
that any questions, in light of Elena‟s testimony that Charlie had enlisted 
defendant to hurt Facundo, could incriminate Charlie.  In sum, the record supports 
that the trial court made a particularized inquiry about Charlie‟s assertion of the 
privilege before determining Charlie “could „legitimately refuse to answer 
essentially all relevant questions‟ ” at the guilt phase.  (U.S. v. Goodwin, supra, 
625 F.2d at p. 701.)     
  
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not err in sustaining 
Charlie‟s assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Even assuming that the trial 
court erred, we conclude any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).)  Defendant asserts 
that any error was not harmless because Charlie‟s assertion of the privilege 
prevented the jury from hearing evidence that would have reduced the charge or 
acquitted defendant of first degree murder.  Specifically, defendant claims that had 
Charlie testified, defense counsel could have questioned him on how the murder of 
 
50 
Charlene‟s cousin, Vicki, by an abusive boyfriend12 intensified the concerns 
Charlie and defendant had for Charlene, which in turn would have supported 
defendant‟s claim of imperfect defense of others.  Defendant also sought to elicit 
testimony that Charlie did not believe defendant‟s letters to Charlene were 
inappropriate, thus undercutting the prosecution‟s theory that defendant killed 
Facundo because defendant had feelings for Charlene.    
 
Much of the evidence defendant sought to elicit from Charlie was already 
before the jury.  Elena testified not only that she and Charlie were concerned about 
Charlene‟s abusive relationship with Facundo, but that Charlie had specifically 
asked defendant to hurt Facundo.  The trial court, in excluding evidence of Vicki‟s 
murder under Evidence Code section 352, told defense counsel “you‟ve described 
Mr. Facundo as the despicable, cowardly wife beater that he was, and I think that‟s 
enough.”  Charlie‟s testimony would have simply added to the evidence the jury 
already heard.  (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 576 [Evid. Code, § 352 
“permits the exclusion of evidence on the ground that it is cumulative”].)  As such, 
any error in excluding the testimony of Charlie was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)   
2. Trial court’s refusal to instruct on imperfect defense of another or 
necessity relating to the Facundo murder   
Defendant‟s main argument with respect to the Facundo murder was that he 
acted to protect his cousin, Charlene, from Facundo‟s further abuse and possibly 
from death.  Based on this argument, defense counsel requested that the trial court 
instruct the jury with a series of instructions relating to the imperfect defense of 
another.  (CALJIC Nos. 5.13, 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 5.17.)  Alternatively, the defense 
                                              
12  
The evidentiary issue regarding Vicki‟s murder is discussed separately 
below.  (See post, at pp. 56-57.)  
 
51 
also sought jury instructions on mistake of fact and necessity.  (CALJIC Nos. 4.35, 
4.43.)  When the trial court stated that “based on the evidence that I heard” there 
was no threat of imminent harm, defense counsel repeatedly argued that it was up 
to the jury to decide whether there was imminent harm or not.  However, the trial 
court refused to give any of the requested instructions because it found that based 
on “the totality of the evidence that has been presented” there was no threat of 
imminent danger, and that “[i]f that fear was present, it certainly did not extend to 
the degree of committing a homicide.”  Further, the court also pointed out that 
these instructions were, in fact, “negate[d]” by the evidence, including defendant‟s 
statement to Los Angeles County Sheriff‟s Deputy Frank Durazo.     
 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court‟s failure to give these 
instructions denied him his right to present a defense, his right to a jury trial, and 
his right to a reliable penalty determination in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and analogous provisions 
of the state Constitution.  He reiterates that it was up to the jury, not the court, to 
determine the credibility and validity of the imperfect defense of others.  In 
particular, he maintains that it was the jury‟s province to determine whether he had 
an unreasonable belief that Charlene was in peril.  With respect to his request for 
an instruction on the necessity defense, defendant similarly posits that the factual 
dispute regarding the immediacy of the danger Facundo posed, i.e., whether 
Charlene was injured weeks before the murder or shortly before, should have been 
resolved by a properly instructed jury and not the court.  For reasons that follow, 
we conclude this claim lacks merit. 
a. Imperfect defense of others 
“[O]ne who kills in imperfect defense of others — in the actual but 
unreasonable belief he must defend another from imminent danger of death or 
 
52 
great bodily injury — is guilty only of manslaughter.”  (People v. Randle (2005) 
35 Cal.4th 987, 997 (Randle) [recognizing imperfect defense of others].)  To 
satisfy the imminence requirement, “[f]ear of future harm — no matter how great 
the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm — will not suffice.  
The defendant‟s fear must be of imminent danger to life or great bodily injury. 
„ “[T]he peril must appear to the defendant as immediate and present and not 
prospective or even in the near future.  An imminent peril is one that, from 
appearances, must be instantly dealt with.‟ . . . Put simply, the trier of fact must 
find an actual fear of an imminent harm.”  (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 
783.)  Because the reasonableness (or unreasonableness) of this claim is tested 
from the defendant‟s perspective, however, a trier of fact may consider a victim‟s 
prior threats and violence to corroborate the defendant‟s testimony that he feared 
for his or another‟s life.  (Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 999-1000; see People v. 
Davis (1965) 63 Cal.2d 648, 656 [“The immediate issue was not the truth of the 
matters reported to him but whether he had cause to believe them and, if so, 
whether it was reasonable for him to predicate a fear thereon.”].)     
Imperfect defense of others, like imperfect self-defense, is not a true 
defense, but a shorthand description for a form of voluntary manslaughter.  (See 
People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 134; Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 997 
[defendant lacked malice required for murder].)  It follows that voluntary 
manslaughter arising from the imperfect defense of another is a lesser included 
offense of the crime of murder.  (See Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1003; see also 
People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200-201.)  If supported by substantial 
evidence, a trial court has the duty to instruct on a lesser included offense.  
(People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 561.)  “The duty applies whenever there is 
evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude the defendant 
is guilty of the lesser, but not the greater, offense.  [Citations.]  That voluntary 
 
53 
manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder is undisputed.”  (Ibid.)  
Ultimately, “[i]t is for the court alone to decide whether the evidence supports 
instruction on a lesser included offense.”  (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
1179, 1264.)   
On appeal, we independently review whether a trial court erroneously failed 
to instruct on a lesser included offense.  (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 
705.)  We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing this instruction 
because there was no evidence that defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed 
Facundo presented an imminent threat of physical harm to Charlene when 
defendant killed him.  (See Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 997.)  
By defendant‟s own account (established through both his trial testimony 
and the recorded statement), he was paid by Charlie and Elena to “take care of the 
problem” and kill Facundo, leading to the inescapable conclusion that he had 
planned all along to kill him regardless of any imminent danger or threat Facundo 
posed.  This conclusion is bolstered by evidence that on the day of the murder, 
defendant appeared angry because of Charlene‟s black eye and repeatedly asked 
Charlene whether Facundo would be coming by later because defendant wanted to 
“meet him and talk to him.”  When Facundo came to Charlie and Elena‟s house to 
pick up Charlene, defendant asked if they would drop off him and their cousin, 
Raymond Guzman, at the house of Raymond‟s sister, Pat Perez, which they did.  
Rather than showing any apprehension, much less fear, of Facundo, defendant‟s 
actions demonstrated he wanted to be physically near Facundo and have access to 
him.  Moreover, shortly before defendant struggled with Facundo and fatally 
 
54 
stabbed him, there was no evidence suggesting that the victim had acted in any 
threatening manner.13 
Even without considering whether defendant was paid to kill Facundo, the 
evidence strongly supports that defendant killed him mainly because of Facundo‟s 
past physical abuse of Charlene.  Defendant testified that Facundo “deserved it.  
He had it coming . . . [¶] For beating up my cousin.”  He also admitted he 
“couldn‟t wait to kill him.  I didn‟t want to wait,” and that he “could have done it 
later if I wanted to.”  Defendant‟s plan was “to stab him in the heart.”  “The only 
plan I had was to kill him.  It didn‟t matter where.”  Facundo‟s past abuse of 
Charlene and his threats to her were unaccompanied by any intention or ability to 
carry them out at the time he was killed; thus, they are insufficient to show an 
imminent threat justifying an instruction on manslaughter as a lesser included 
offense.  (See People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1094-1095.)   
Indeed, the record is replete with defendant‟s admissions revealing his 
brazen and single-minded determination to kill Facundo for physically abusing 
Charlene.  In defendant‟s own words, “[t]he only plan I had was to kill him” and 
he “could have done it later if I wanted to.”  In short, there was no evidence that 
defendant actually believed — whether reasonably or unreasonably — that he 
faced an imminent peril that he had to “ „ “instantly deal[] with” ‟ ” when he killed 
Facundo.  (In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 783; see People v. Michaels 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 530-531.)  Thus, his claim based on imperfect defense of 
another necessarily fails.  
                                              
13  
Though Facundo apparently smoked PCP both before picking up Charlene 
and on the drive to Pat‟s house, there is no indication that he either became 
violent, as defendant suggests, or was incapacitated, as the People assert, due to 
his smoking PCP that day.   
 
55 
Even if defendant exaggerated his own culpability in order to receive the 
death penalty, there is no other evidence suggesting that the imperfect defense of 
another was otherwise plausible.  There is nothing to suggest his so-called 
“misguided effort” to protect Charlene from Facundo was based on anything other 
than his desire to punish Facundo for his past abuse.  (See People v. Mendoza 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 174 [“Speculation is insufficient to require the giving of an 
instruction on a lesser included offense.”].) 
b. Necessity 
 
Defendant‟s related claim that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on 
the defense of necessity (CALJIC No. 4.43) is equally meritless. “The defense of 
necessity generally recognizes that „ “the harm or evil sought to be avoided by [the 
defendant‟s] conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law 
defining the offense charged.” ‟  [Citation.]  The defendant, who must have 
possessed a reasonable belief that his or her action was justified, bears the burden 
of proffering evidence of the existence of an emergency situation involving the 
imminence of greater harm that the illegal act seeks to prevent.  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Coffman & Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 100.)  “To justify an 
instruction on the defense of necessity, there must be evidence sufficient to 
establish that defendant violated the law (1) to prevent a significant evil, (2) with 
no adequate alternative, (3) without creating a greater danger than the one avoided, 
(4) with a good faith belief in the necessity, (5) with such belief being objectively 
reasonable, and (6) under circumstances in which he did not substantially 
contribute to the emergency.”  (People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 
1035 [deciding factual predicate of defendant‟s necessity defense “insufficient as a 
matter of law”]; People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1164 [necessity 
defense is “ „very limited‟ ” and “ „represents a policy decision not to punish an 
 
56 
individual despite proof of the crime‟ ”].)  There was no evidence that defendant 
sought to prevent any imminent harm or that he faced any emergency situation 
when he killed Facundo.14      
3. Trial court’s refusal to admit evidence that defendant’s cousin had 
been killed by an abusive boyfriend   
 
During the cross-examination of Elena at the guilt phase, defense counsel 
tried to elicit testimony about the murder of Charlie‟s niece (and Charlene and 
defendant‟s cousin), Vicki, who was reportedly stabbed and killed by an abusive 
boyfriend.  Counsel asserted that because of Vicki‟s murder, Elena and Charlie 
were afraid that Facundo would kill Charlene and talked to defendant about their 
fears, which in turn affected defendant‟s state of mind about the threat he 
perceived Facundo posed to Charlene.  The trial court, however, responded that 
Elena had already admitted that she felt Charlene‟s life was in danger because of 
Facundo.  Further, the prosecution maintained that because Elena was not present 
when Vicki was killed, she lacked personal knowledge about how or why Vicki 
was killed.  
 
Though the trial court sustained the prosecution‟s objections based on lack 
of foundation and hearsay, defense counsel repeatedly tried to question Elena 
about Vicki‟s murder, prompting the court to say:  “I think you‟re plowing the 
same ground until it‟s now very fine sand. . . . [¶] . . . [Y]ou‟ve described Mr. 
Facundo as the despicable, cowardly wife beater that he was, and I think that‟s 
enough.”  While recognizing defendant‟s argument about the relevance of Elena‟s 
state of mind, the trial court ultimately prohibited further questions about Vicki‟s 
                                              
14  
Defendant makes similar claims regarding the imperfect defense of others 
and the necessity defense with respect to the Apodaca murder, which we do not 
discuss given our reversal of the judgment of conviction.  
 
57 
murder under Evidence Code section 352.  On appeal, defendant claims that the 
trial court‟s exclusion of this evidence violated his constitutional right to present a 
defense, i.e., the imperfect defense of another.  (See U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th, 14th 
Amends.)   
 
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the 
questioning about Vicki‟s murder.  (See People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 
1070 [exclusion of evidence under Evid. Code § 352 subject to abuse of discretion 
standard].)  As noted above, Elena testified that she did not know how or why 
Vicki was killed.  Further, she stated defendant never brought up Vicki at any 
time, including when he admitted to Elena that he had stabbed Facundo with a 
knife.  In other words, as the Attorney General argues, Elena “was not the 
appropriate witness to discuss Vicki‟s death, and the details of Vicki‟s death were 
irrelevant and prejudicial because there was no evidence at all that they factored 
into Facundo‟s murder.”  We conclude that the trial court properly excluded 
evidence of Vicki‟s murder under Evidence Code section 352.  (See People v. 
Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1071.) 
 
Contrary to defendant‟s suggestion, by prohibiting questions to Elena about 
Vicki‟s killing, the trial court did not thereby prevent defendant from presenting a 
defense that he had a heightened anxiety that Facundo would kill Charlene.  In 
fact, the jury heard from defendant himself that Vicki‟s boyfriend had stabbed and 
killed her.  Though defendant admitted Facundo “deserved to die because he was 
beating up” Charlene, defendant did not know whether Charlene and Facundo had 
the same kind of relationship as Vicki and her boyfriend.  Thus, by his own 
admission, defendant made no connection between Facundo‟s murder and Vicki‟s 
killing. 
 
58 
4. Trial court’s admission of expert testimony from a pathologist who 
did not perform autopsies of victims 
Relying on Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, and its progeny, 
defendant claims that the forensic pathologist‟s testimony on the two autopsies 
performed by nontestifying pathologists violated his confrontation rights under the 
Sixth Amendment.  Specifically, defendant maintains that the conclusions in the 
autopsy reports were testimonial hearsay, and that the prosecution made no 
showing that the two pathologists who conducted the autopsies were unavailable 
to testify.  He adds that the pathologist‟s surrogate testimony precluded him from 
meaningfully testing the nontestifying pathologist‟s “honesty, proficiency, and 
methodology.”  (Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, 321.)  We 
conclude that we need not decide this claim on the merits because any error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)  
At trial, Dr. Eugene Carpenter, Jr., a forensic pathologist who had worked 
for the Los Angeles County coroner‟s office for 11 years and had performed over 
4,000 autopsies, testified about the autopsies of both Max Facundo and Raul  
Apodaca.  Dr. Carpenter did not perform or attend either autopsy.  Rather, Dr. Eva 
Heuser performed the autopsy on Facundo on June 23, 1986, and Dr. Sara Reddy 
performed the autopsy on Apodaca on January 25, 1987.  Dr. Reddy also testified 
and was cross-examined at the preliminary hearings of both defendant and his 
codefendant at the time, Jesse Salazar, in 1987.  Dr. Heuser and Dr. Reddy had 
both retired from the Los Angeles County coroner‟s office at the time of 
defendant‟s trial in 1999.   
Before testifying, Dr. Carpenter reviewed the autopsy reports on Facundo 
and Apodaca, the reports‟ attachments, and related photographs.  (The record does 
not reflect that either autopsy report was admitted into evidence.)  Dr. Carpenter 
testified that Facundo suffered at least eight stab wounds, mostly to the chest area 
 
59 
and the lungs.  He explained that Facundo‟s pulmonary artery, aorta, and liver 
were all injured and that “[e]ach of these injuries is a lethal wound.  Each one is 
capable of causing death to a body within a minute or so.”  After reviewing the 
autopsy report, photographs, and items contained in the report, Dr. Carpenter 
testified he was “in agreement” with Dr. Heuser‟s conclusion that Facundo‟s cause 
of death was stab wounds.  
As an initial matter, we note that defendant has not forfeited this issue by 
failing to object at trial to Dr. Carpenter‟s testimony, and the Attorney General 
does not argue otherwise.  (See People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 839-840.)  
In Crawford, the high court held that a criminal defendant has the Sixth 
Amendment right to confront and cross-examine any witness who offers a 
testimonial out-of-court statement against the defendant.  (Crawford, supra, 541 
U.S. at pp. 50-56.)  Thereafter, with certain exceptions, the high court extended 
Crawford‟s holding to forensic reports available for use at trial (Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, supra, 557 U.S. 305), and laboratory reports (Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico (2011) 564 U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2705]).  (See People v. Dungo (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 608, 617-619 (Dungo) [identifying two critical components — formality 
and primary purpose — of testimonial out-of-court statements].) 
In Dungo, we explained that statements in an autopsy report describing a 
nontestifying pathologist‟s observations about the condition of the victim‟s body 
are not testimonial because the “primary purpose” of recording such facts does not 
relate to a criminal investigation.  (Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 621, italics 
omitted.)  We also described these statements, which “merely record objective 
facts,” as being “less formal than statements setting forth a pathologist‟s expert 
conclusions” about the victim‟s cause of death.  (Id. at p. 619.)  In Dungo, it was 
unclear whether the pathologist‟s description of the victim‟s body was based 
solely on the autopsy photographs, solely on the nontestifying pathologist‟s 
 
60 
autopsy report, or on a combination of both.  (Id. at pp. 615.)  Nonetheless, 
because the pathologist did not describe the conclusions of the nontestifying 
pathologist, we had no occasion to decide “whether such testimony, if it had been 
given, would have violated the defendant‟s right to confront” the nontestifying 
pathologist.  (Id. at p. 619; but see People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 704-
708.)   
In the present case, Dr. Carpenter gave his own opinions about the causes 
of death of Facundo and Apodaca.  He testified he “made up my own mind” after 
reviewing both the autopsy reports and photographs.  Dr. Carpenter underscored 
that he “never said that I told the jury what [Drs. Heuser and Reddy] saw and what 
they thought.  I just read their autopsy report, not their minds.”  At the same time, 
he also described to the jury these nontestifying pathologists‟ conclusions 
regarding Facundo‟s cause of death, including expressing whether he agreed with 
these conclusions. (See People v. Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 707.)  Dr. 
Carpenter explained that he was “in agreement” with “the conclusion by Dr. 
Heuser that the cause of death [of Facundo] was as a result of stab wounds.”    
Even assuming error, we conclude it was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24.  (See People v. Edwards, 
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 707 [even if testifying pathologist‟s statements about 
another pathologist‟s conclusion violated confrontation clause, there was no 
prejudice]; see also People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 874.)  Regarding 
victim Facundo, because Dr. Carpenter independently agreed with Dr. Heuser‟s 
opinions and because neither the cause of death, i.e., stab wounds, nor the source 
of the wounds, i.e., a knife, was in dispute at trial, “no prejudice was possible 
under any standard.”  (People v. Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 707.)  
Because we are reversing defendant‟s conviction for the second degree 
murder of Apodaca (see, ante, at p. 34), we do not discuss whether Dr. Carpenter‟s 
 
61 
testimony regarding Dr. Reddy‟s findings on Apodaca‟s death was harmless error 
with respect to this murder conviction.  However, with respect to Facundo‟s 
murder and the Spartan Burgers robbery, convictions we are affirming, we 
conclude that any error from the admission of Dr. Carpenter‟s testimony was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. p. 24.)  Dr. 
Reddy‟s findings, to which Dr. Carpenter testified, concerned only Apodaca‟s 
autopsy.  For that reason, the jury‟s guilty verdicts on the Facundo murder and 
robbery counts were “ „ “surely unattributable to the error.” ‟ ”  (People v. Pearson 
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 463.)        
5. Trial court’s admission of defendant’s redacted letter to the Los 
Angeles County District Attorney  
 
Over defendant‟s objections at both the guilt and penalty phases, the trial 
court granted the prosecution‟s request to admit a letter defendant wrote to then 
Los Angeles County District Attorney Gil Garcetti in September 1998.  In the 
letter, defendant admitted he murdered both Apodaca and Facundo while “fully 
aware of all of my mental faculties” and urged Garcetti to seek the death penalty 
against him.   
 
In moving to exclude this letter under Evidence Code section 352, defense 
counsel claimed the letter had little to no probative value and was prejudicial and 
cumulative to other admitted evidence.  The trial court, however, agreed with the 
prosecution‟s assertion that the letter “scream[ed] premeditation and deliberation” 
and spoke “volumes to his mental state.”  It also found defendant‟s letter to be 
“probably one of the most literal and coherent letters and eloquent letter, in its 
own way, that I‟ve read in a long time.”  In the end, although the trial court 
concluded the letter was admissible, it granted defense counsel‟s request to redact 
certain portions for the jury.  At the guilt phase, the trial court redacted those 
portions that discussed defendant‟s lack of remorse for the murders, two other 
 
62 
murders defendant allegedly committed in prison and got away with, his intent to 
kill in prison if he did not get the death penalty, and defendant‟s self-
representation.  Over defendant‟s renewed objection at the penalty phase, the court 
also admitted the letter into evidence, but redacted only that portion discussing 
defendant‟s two other murders that he “didn‟t get caught for.”  
 
Despite the redactions, defense counsel argued the letter still contained 
objectionable statements, most notably the following:  “If I had the opportunity to 
do it over I would cut off their heads and send „em both to their family!”; “both of 
those cowards deserved what they got:  death and an early expiration in life, to say 
the least!”; “the two (2) cowards that I am proud of taking out”; characterizing the 
murders as “all a big game, and the only reason I lost part of the game, is because I 
got caught, that‟s all”; referring to his gang moniker “El Killer De Varrio White 
Fence.”  Ultimately, the trial court agreed with the prosecution‟s argument that 
statements that the victims got what they deserved and that defendant would do it 
again, were relevant to undercut defendant‟s claim that the killings were based on 
provocation or imperfect defense of others.  The court later agreed with the 
prosecution that the “cut off their heads” statement was relevant to prove 
premeditation and to rebut any argument that either murder was voluntary 
manslaughter.    
 
On appeal, defendant renews his claim that this “highly inflammatory” 
letter to Garcetti should have been excluded altogether under Evidence Code 
section 352 and that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to so.  In arguing 
that the letter was “riddled with hyperbole, untruths, and deliberately provocative 
and offensive statements designed to appeal to jurors‟ fears and emotions,”  
defendant claims that his expressed desire to receive the death penalty made the 
letter unreliable and thus diminished its probative value.  (See People v. Coleman 
(1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 85 [victim‟s letter deemed unreliable because she had “a 
 
63 
motive to misrepresent or exaggerate the conduct of the accused”]; see also People 
v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 433 [polygraph evidence‟s doubtful reliability 
outweighed any probative value].)  He asserts that the admission of this letter 
violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to a fair and reliable sentencing.   
(U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.)    
 
A trial court‟s ruling under Evidence Code section 352 is reviewed under 
the deferential abuse of discretion standard.  (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
1100, 1121.)  “[A] court need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative 
value or even expressly state that it has done so,” if the record shows the court was 
aware of its duty and undertook such Evidence Code section 352 balancing.  
(People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1169.)  We conclude that even if the 
court abused its discretion in admitting the letter, any error was harmless.  With 
regard to the Facundo murder and Spartan Burgers robbery, both convictions that 
we shall affirm, there was overwhelming evidence — apart from this letter — that 
defendant committed these crimes.  (See ante, pp. 2-6, 9.)  
         
6. Prosecution’s impeachment of defendant with the Rothenberg 
murder conviction 
 
As discussed earlier, we conclude that defendant‟s 1971 conviction for the 
Rothenberg murder was obtained in violation of the double jeopardy clause, 
requiring us to set aside the prior murder special-circumstance finding.  (See ante, 
at p. 26.)  In a separate claim, defendant asserts that because this constitutionally 
invalid conviction was also used to impeach defendant‟s trial testimony, his 
murder convictions should be reversed as well.  Defendant talks globally about 
reversals of his “convictions,” which include robbery, but he focuses mainly on 
the impeachment‟s impact on his convictions for murder.   
 
After the trial court confirmed with defendant that he wished to testify in 
his defense against the advice of counsel, defense counsel moved to “sanitize the 
 
64 
30-year-old murder conviction” of Rothenberg right after defendant took the 
stand.  Defense counsel argued that the 1971 murder was extremely remote in time 
(and committed when defendant was just 16 years old), not probative of a 
witness‟s credibility, and highly prejudicial because defendant was on trial for two 
other murders.  Based on these reasons, counsel urged the court to preclude this 
impeachment evidence under Evidence Code section 352.  Defense counsel also 
added that there were other “numerous crimes where they can show [defendant‟s] 
readiness to do evil without having to say he has a prior murder conviction.”  In 
denying defendant‟s request to exclude the prior conviction, the trial court 
explained, among other things, that murder is a crime of moral turpitude, and that 
the prior murder was not remote in time because of defendant‟s “pattern of 
continued criminal conduct.”  On cross-examination, the prosecution impeached 
defendant with the 1971 second degree murder conviction, along with a number of 
other felony convictions.   
 
On appeal, defendant claims the prosecution improperly used this 
constitutionally invalid murder conviction to impeach his credibility, and that, in 
any event, the conviction should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 
352.  As with defendant‟s claim regarding the prior murder special circumstance, 
the Attorney General asserts that defendant has forfeited the double jeopardy issue 
by failing to object to the prior conviction specifically on that ground.  As before, 
we reach the merits of this claim. 
 
Turning to the merits, we agree with defendant that there was error:  “We 
are convinced that the use of a constitutionally invalid prior conviction to impeach 
testimonial credibility is improper, and that to allow such impeachment is error 
under California law. . . . We think it equally clear that the utilization of such a 
conviction, at the trial of a subsequent offense, for any purpose leading to a 
conviction for such subsequent offense, is violative of the due process clause of 
 
65 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”  (People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 218-219.)
 
To determine whether we should reverse the remaining murder conviction, 
the issue is what, if any, prejudice defendant suffered as a result of the error.  
Because this error is of “federal constitutional dimension” (People v. Coffey, 
supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 218), the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of prejudice 
under Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18, applies.  (People v. Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d 
at pp. 218-219 [error is not “per se prejudicial”].)  In this context, the Chapman 
“rule requires reversal if, upon an examination of the entire record, it appears 
reasonably possible that the error might have materially influenced the jury in 
arriving at its verdict, and the error must be considered harmless if the likelihood 
of material influence is not within the realm of reasonable possibility.  In the 
circumstances of the instant case, the application of the indicated standard requires 
that we direct our attention to defendant‟s courtroom testimony.”  (People v. 
Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d at pp. 219-220.)  For reasons that follow, we conclude the 
error was harmless.  
 
As noted above, in addition to the invalid Rothenberg murder conviction, 
the prosecution impeached defendant with other felony convictions, which 
defendant testified consisted of “robberies, murder, burglary and assault with a 
deadly weapon.”  Specifically, he admitted on the stand — without reference to 
any specific underlying facts of the crimes — to the following:  a 1977 conviction 
for two counts of assault with a deadly weapon; a 1979 conviction for attempted 
murder; a 1989 conviction for four counts of robbery; and a 1998 conviction for 
robbery.  With respect to the Facundo murder charge he was facing, defendant 
testified (sometimes emphatically) that he killed the victim.  Given defendant‟s 
courtroom admissions and his extensive criminal history, we conclude it does not 
appear “reasonably possible” that the jury‟s consideration of the additional second 
 
66 
degree murder conviction “materially affected” its decision to convict defendant of 
the first degree murder of Facundo.  (People v. Coffey, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 220.)   
 
Although defendant argues that the prosecution improperly used the 
Rothenberg murder conviction to establish his propensity to commit murder, the 
trial court instructed the jury to consider defendant‟s prior convictions “only for 
the purpose of determining the believability of that witness.”  (CALJIC 2.23.)  We 
presume the jury understood and followed this instruction.  (See People v. Homick 
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 873.)  Likewise, defendant‟s Evidence Code section 352 
claim, which is reviewed under the reasonable probability standard for prejudice 
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836), affords him no relief.  Because we 
conclude there was no prejudice under the stricter Chapman standard, there can be 
no prejudice under the Watson standard. 
7. Correction to the abstract of judgment  
 
Defendant contends that the abstract of judgment erroneously lists his 
sentence for the Apodaca murder as 25 years to life under the three strikes 
sentencing law.  This contention (though accurate) is moot because we are 
reversing the judgment of conviction.  Nonetheless, the abstract of judgment also 
indicates that defendant has no credit for time served, which contradicts the 
minute order from that sentencing hearing stating defendant was given total credit 
for 576 days in custody.  On remand, the trial court should make any necessary 
corrections regarding defendant‟s custody credits.  
 
67 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
  
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of conviction for the 
second degree murder of Apodaca, set aside the prior murder and multiple murder 
special-circumstance findings, reverse the judgment of death, and remand to the 
trial court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.  On remand, the trial 
court should consider whether to impose any sentence enhancements that were 
originally stayed pending imposition of the death judgment.   
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR:  
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Trujeque 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S083594 
Date Filed: May 28, 2015 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Patrick Couwenberg 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Christina A. 
Spaulding, Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 
Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster, Joseph P. Lee and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Christina A. Spaulding 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA  94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Eric J. Kohm 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2273