Title: Survivors of Young v. Island Feelings, Inc. ICA Opinion, filed 03/18/2005 [pdf], 109 Haw. 287. S.Ct. Order Granting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 04/25/2005 [pdf], 107 Haw. 84. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 01/26/2006 [pdf]. 109 Haw. 255

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRANY
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

00.

 

 

SURVIVORS OF ROY W. C. YOUNG,
Petitioner /Clainant-Appellant,

ISLAND FEELING, INC., and TIG P&C INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent /Employer/Insurance Carrier-Appellee,

 

and 2
SPECIAL COMPENSATION FUND, S =
Respondent /Appellee. =
No. 25661

 

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CASE NO. AB 2001-238 (2-88-19920))

DECEMBER 28, 2005

MOON, C.J.) LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, 99
OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J
In this workers’ compensation death benefits case,

Petitioner/Claimant-Appellant Shirlyn Young (Petitioner) and her
son, Bronson Young (Bronson) [hereinafter, collectively,
Petitioners}, as the survivors of the employee, the late
Roy H.C. Young (Young), appealed the February 12, 2003 decision
of the Labor and Industrial Relations Board (LIRAB), which used
the date-of-injury maximum weekly benefit rate (NWBR) to
calculate their death benefits as opposed to the date-of-death

MWBR urged by Petitioners. On March 18, 2005, the Intermediate
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

Court of Appeals (ICA) issued a published opinion affirming the
LIRAB’s decision in Young v. Island Feeling, Inc., 2005 WL 628879
(App. March 18, 2005) (hereinafter, ICA’s Opinion or Young I].
Petitioners filed a timely application for a writ of certiorari
(Application)

We granted Petitioners’ Application for the sole
purpose of addressing whether workers’ compensation death
benefits are calculated using the MWBR on the date of injury or
the date of death. Based on the following, we hold thet death
benefits are calculated using the MWBR when the right arises: on
the date of death.’ Accordingly, we reverse.

1. BACKGROUND

on July 7, 1988, Young, the president and Manager of

 

Island Feeling, Inc., a Havai'i-based clothing manufacturing
company, suffered a ruptured cerebral aneurysm in the course of

his employment and lapsed into a semi-conatose state. At the

 

time of his injury, Young was married to Petitioner and together

they had a son, Bronson. On November 16, 1988, Petitioner filed

{Employer asserts that because Petitioners did not appeal their weekly

benefit anount of death benefits, they cannot appeal the aggregate weekly
benefit amount. Ordinarily, an appellate court “will not consider ue
pot raised below unless Justice co requires.”

Bape, 96 Hawai'i 243, 261, 30 P24 289, 268 (2001) texting 5

Geo e. Mark Conste. Ina, ‘56 Han. 466, 475-76, S40 0.24 976, ¥BS {1BTS))
Justice #0 Fequires in the instant case. By holding that the date-of-aeath
WER should be used in calculating desth benefits, we hold thee the date-of-
Geath MIE should be used in determining the aggregate weekly Benefits
payable, the funeral and burial allowance, as well as the weekly benefit

 

     

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

for temporary total disability (TTD) workers’ compensation
benefits on behalf of her husband. In a decision dated

Decenber 5, 1991, the Director of the Department of Labor and
Industrial Relations (Director) ordered Young's employer, Island
Feeling, Inc., through its insurance carrier, Transamerica
Insurance Company [hereinafter, collectively, Employer], to pay
Young TTD benefits.

Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 386-31(b) (1985)
provides that where an employee suffers a work-related injury
which causes temporary total disability, the employer must pay
the employee “a weekly benefit at the rate of sixty-six and two-
thirds per cent of the employee’s average weekly wages, subject
to the limitations on weekly benefit rates prescribed in
subsection (a)[.]” Id, Subsection (a) states the following
Limitation: “Beginning January 1, 1975, and during each
succeeding twelve-month period thereafter, not more than the
state average weekly wage last determined by the director{.]”
HRS § 386-31(a) (1985). Young’s average weekly wage (AWW) at the
time of his injury was $644.23, Sixty-six and two-thirds per
cent of this amount is $429.51, However, the State AWN in 1988
was $334.00, and the Director limited Young’s TTD benefits
accordingly. The LIRAB affirmed this decision on January 18,

1994.
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

on May 11, 1995, the Director held a follow-up hearing
to evaluate updated medical reports regarding Young's physical
condition. In a decision dated June 26, 1995, the Director
awarded Young permanent total disability (PTD) benefits starting
January 10, 1981. The relevant statute for PTD benefits, HRS

§ 386-31 (a) (1993), provides that where a work-related injury
causes PTD, the employer must pay the employee “a weekly benefit
equal to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the employee's
average weekly wages, subject to the following limitation:
Beginning January 1, 1975, and during each succeeding twelve-
month period thereafter, not more than the state average weekly
wage last determined by the director(.]" The Director calculated
Young's PTD benefits based upon the date-of-injury MNBR of
$334.00 per week. The Director also awarded Young a weekly

benefit adjustment of $103.00 beginning January 1, 1992, pursuant

 

to HRS § 386-35(1) (1993)

+ uRs § 386-35, entitled “Benefit adjustne
part:

provides in relevant

 

(a) Effective January 1, 1992, and January 1 of every tenth
year thereafter, any employee whose date of work injury 18
Before Jenuary 1, 1992, and January 1 of every tenth year
thereafter, and who is’ at any tine after the work injury
Geternines to be permanently and totally disabled shall be
Paid, without applicetion, » supplemental allowance by the
Fesponsible employer calculated in accordance with the
following provisions
(2) "in any case where the employee is entities to
receive the maximum weekly income Benefit
applicable on the date of the work insury, the
Stpplenental allowance shall be an ancunt which
‘when added to the benefit will equal the maxinan
weekly benefit as of January 1, 1992, and
January 1 of every tenth year thereafter(.)

4

 

 

 

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

On May 18, 2000, Young died of complications from his
work-related injury. On June 23, 2000, Petitioners filed a claim
for death benefits as Young's dependents, under HRS § 386-41
(Supp. 2000), including @ funeral and burial allowance and a
weekly benefit.

On April 19, 2001, the Director held a hearing to
determine death benefits for Petitioners. In a decision dated
May 14, 2001, the Director calculated their death benefits based
on the date-of-injury MWBR of $334.00. Thus, pursuant to HRS
§ 386-41 (a), Petitioners were avarded a total of $5,010.00 for
funeral and burial expenses--$3, 340.00 for funeral expenses
(5334.00 x 10 = $3,340.00) and $1,670.00 for burial expenses
(3334.00 x 5 = $1,670.00). Pursuant to HRS $5 386-41 and -43
(1993 & Supp. 2000), the Director also awarded aggregate weekly

benefits of $104,208.00 ($334.00 per week x 312 w

 

ks). On
Nay 23, 2001, the Director issued an amended, supplenentai
decision that apportioned the obligation to make death benefit
payments equally between Employer and the Special Compensation
Fund (SCF) (hereinafter, collectively, Respondents], pursuant to
their compromise agreement.

on May 24, 2001, Petitioners appealed the Director's

May 14 and 23, 2001 decisions to the LIRAB. The two relevant
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

issues to be determined,’ as stated in the August 3, 2001
Pretrial Order, were:

a. Whether the rate of compensation used te calculate
funeral and burial expenses is based on the rate for
the year injured employee died. ©

b.  fhether the agoregate weekly Denefite payable for
Seath benefits, pursuant to Section 386-43, HRS.) te
based on the rate of compensation for the year injured
employee died.

 

on February 12, 2003, the Board filed its decision and
order affirming the Director's May 14 and May 23, 2001 decisions.

‘The Board concluded, in relevant part

 

It 4g clear from our reading of HRS § 386-43(b) & (cl,
and RS. § 386-43(b), that the basis for computing
Gependents’ weekly benefits is the deceased employee’ s Att
[average weekly wages] subject toa statutory maximum and
ininan,

Since there is no dispute that AIM for the purpose of
calculating disability benefits is limited in #RS.§ 966-31
fo the State aNW at the tine of the work iojury, and since
both HRS § 386-42(5) & (c) and HRS § 386-83{b) cite or refer
to the listtation prescrived in HRS § 366-31, 1 follows
then that the AKW for the purpose of calculating Geath
Benefits 1a also Linited by the state Alf at the time of the
NOrk injury that caused the subsequent death.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we conclude as
follows: {1) che maximum benefit rate uscd to calculate
foneral and burial expenses 1s based on the rate for the
jear the injury or accident is sustained; and (2) the
Aggregate weekly benefits payeble for death benefits,
pursuant co aks § 386-43 (b), i¢ based on the maximum’ benefit
Fate for the year the injury or aceldent is sustained.

 

   

 

> A third iseue relating to apportionment between Eaployer and SCP was

subsequently withdrawn at trial.

+ on Novenber 14, 2002, Petitioners filed an Application for correction

of Board's Pretrial Order, stating thet issue “a” should have included weekly
benefits along with foneral ond burial expenses, The LIRAB denied the
Spplication, Petitioners appealed the denial to the ICA, which affirmed, See.
inkza note 5.

   

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Petitioners appealed, and on March 18, 2005, the ICA
issued its published opinion affirming the LIRAB. Specifically,
‘the ICA concluded:

RS § 386-41 (2), governing funeral and burial
allowances, HRS §§ 386-41(b) and ~41(c), governing weekly
benefits, and HRS § 386-43(b), governing aggregate weekly
benefits, 31] cap their respective death benefits by express
of implied reference to "the maximum weekly benefit rate
prescribed in section 386-31(.)" "HRS § 386-41 (0); HRS §
Ste-43(b). There i9 no other colorable statutory reference
The MOR frescribes in HRS § 386-31 48, sn turn, “the seate
average weekly wage last determined by the director(s]". HRS
@'Seer21 (a). ‘Because HRS $5 386-31(a) and -31(b) provide
for PID and TTD benefits, respectively, that is, dieabiit
benefits for employees injured on the job, the State average
lWeekly wage referenced therein must perforce be determined
fas at the date of the employee's injury. Climbing back up
the chain of inference, we conclude that the celevletion of
Workers’ ‘compensation death benefits mst likewise be based
pen the datesof-injury MMBR, Crowley ¥_ Cle

y i00 Hawai 1, Tinie, 38 F.3d
Tey Ts-16 (app. 2002) {ih consteuing @ statute, “our
fotenost responsibility 1s to ascertain and give effect to
tthe intention of the legistature, cbteined primarily from
the languge itself. Further, we must read the statutory
Language in the context of the entire statute and construe
it'in's manner consistent with its purpose” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) |; Gray vw. Admin. Gir. of
he Court, 64 Hawai'i 136, 148, 931 9.23 560, 590 T2997) in
Construing an ambiguous statute, “‘the meaning of the
fanbiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with
which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sent
Compared, in order to ascertain their true
(brackets and block quote fornst omitted) (quoting HRS $
3-15(2) (1993)); HRS § 1-16 (1993) (“Laws in pari materia,
or upon the same subject matter, shall De construed with
Feference to each other. ‘what ig clear in one statute may
be called in oid to explain what is doubtful in ancther.")

 

 

 

 

 

 

   
   

Young I at +5.*
We granted Petitioners’ Application, and we now

 

5 the ICA also addressed Petitioners’ contention that the Beard sbused
its discretion in refusing Petitioners’ applicetion to correct the pretrial
order. The ICR disagreed, but Petitioners did not raise this as an erzor in
their Application.
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IT, STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate review of the LIRAB’s decision is governed by
HRS § 91-14(g) (1993), which provides:

(G)__Upon review of the record the court my affirm
tthe decision of the agency or renand the case with
Enstructions for further proceedings; or it may reverse or
modify the decision and order if the substantaal rights of
the petitioners nay have been prejudiced because the
Suninistrative findings, canclusicns, decisions, or orders

 

 

(2) In violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions? oF

 

(2) Tnexeese of the statutory authority oF
SUciedietion of the agency: oF

(3) lade upon unlaweul procedure; or

(a) Affected by cther error of law: or

(8) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
Fecora; or

(6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by

Sbuse of discretion or clearly unwarrented
exercise of discretion

“(U)nder HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under
subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural
defects under subsection (3); findings of fact under subsection

(5)1 and an agency’s exercise of discretion under subsection

(6)." Inve Hawaiian Elec. Go, Inc., 81 Hawai's 459, 465, 918
P.2d S61, 567 (1996) (citing Qutdoor Circle v, Harold K.L, Castle
‘Trust Estate, 4 Hew. App. 633, 638, 675 P.2d 784, 789 (1963).

Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewable de novo.

State v. Levi, 102 Hawai's 282, 285, 75 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2003)
(quoting State v. Arce, 84 Hawai'i 1, 10, 928 P.2d 643, 852

(1996)) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

TIT. — piscussion
‘The statutes at issue in this appeal are HRS § 386-41,
which addresses death benefits, including a funeral and burial
allowance and weekly benefits, and HRS § 386-43, which limits the
total amount dependents may receive in weekly death benefits.
HRS § 386-41, entitled “Entitlement to and rate of
compensation,” provides in relevant part:

(a) Funeral and burial etlowence. Where a work injury
causes death; the employer shall pay,

 

 

Ben ey uly penetit rate to the
mortictan and
Bexinus eekly penefit-rate to the conetery:

(b) Weekly benefits for dependents. in addition, the
enployer shall pay weekly benefits to the deceased's
Gependents at the percentages of the deceased's average
Weekly wages specified below, taking inte account pot pare
{han the saximun weekly benefit vate prescribed in settian
BEGG divided BY .G667 and not less than the minimum
Preseribed in the Section aivided by -6667

 

(¢) Maximum weekly amounts. The sun of a1 weekly
benefits payable to the dependents of the decessed employes
shall not exceed sixty-six and tworthirds per cent of the
enployse’s average weekly wages, computed by cheering the

Site snecified in aubascticn ibi if necessary, the
Gneividual benefits shall ee proportionally reduced,

(Emphases added) .
HRS § 386-43(b) provides thet “[t]he aggregate weekly

benefits payable on account of any one death shall not exceed the

product of 312 times the effective maximum weekly benefit rate

prescribed in section 386-31{.]”
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

A. The Rights of Dependents to Statutory Workers’ Compensation
Desh Genelits are enacate Fron the Bishts of the Insured

Petitioners assert that a claim for death benefits
under the statutes at issue in the instant case is @ separate,
discrete claim fron the claim of the injured worker. We agree,

In Gambalan v. Kekaha Sugar Co., 39 Haw. 258, 263
(1982), this court stated that “(t]he right to enforce the
dependency [death] benefits asserted attached at the tine of
death and not at the inception of or during the employment
relationship prior thereto." Additionally, numerous
jurisdictions recognize that a claim for death benefits is an
independent, separate claim fron that of the injured employee.
See, fics, Richards v, Richards ¢ Richards, 664 P.2d 254, 255
(Colo, App. 1983) (“Disability benefits awarded to a worker and
death benefits awarded @ worker’s dependents are entirely
independent of one another. This results in ‘two distinct
Fights--one for the benefit of the workman, the other for the
benefit of his dependents.’” (citations omitted)); &.Q. Smith
Corp. v. Indus, Comm'n, 485 N.E.2d 335, 337 (T11. 1985)
(distinguishing between claims arising from injury versus those
arising from death and stating that “a cause of action created in
favor of [an employee's] dependents for his injuries resulting in

death . . . . does not come into existence until his death from

such injuries”); Am. Steel Foundries v. Indus, Comm'n, 198 N.E.

10
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

687, 690 (11. 1935) ("The claim for compensation on behalf of
the dependents is not derivative of the employee, but is an
independent right of recovery for compensation created by the
statute for the exclusive benefit of the dependents[.)”"
(Superceded on other grounds)); Tran v. Avondale Shipvards, Inc.,
665 So. 2d 507, 509 (La. App. 1995) (“[A] cause of action for
death benefits accrues] upon the death of the injured party.")7
Qwens ex rel. Ovens v. Water Gremlin Co., 605 N.W.2d 733, 735
(inn. 2000) (“The rights of the employee's dependents or
potential heirs . . . are separate inchoate rights(.]”); Booker
wa Duke Med, Ctr,, 256 5.£.2d 189, 195 (N.C. 1979) (“[T]he
dependents’ right to compensation [is] separate and distinct from
the rights of the injured employee[.]”); Wray v. Carolina Cotton
Woolen Mills Co., 172 S.E. 487, 488 (N.C. 1934) (stating that

Jendents’ “right to compensation did not arise until his death,

 

and... [t]he basis of their claim was an original right
which was enforceable only after his death”); Sizemore v, State
Workmen's Comp, Comm’r, 219 $.£.2d 912, 915 (W. Va.

 

1975) (*[TIhe
dependents’ rights are truly separate and distinct from the
injured enployee’s rights{.1").
2. sane senets eat

ie Must to Calcu, = fits. “

Because Petitioners’ statutory right to death benefits

arose at the time of Young’s death, it follows that the law in

n
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

effect on that date must be utilized to determine their death
benefits. A number of other jurisdiction have so held. See,
2.a., Peterson v. Fed. Mining & Smelting Co., 170 P.2d 611, 613
(Idaho 1946) ("[A]s to benefits and liabilities arising because
of the employee's death, they become fixed at the time of the
death.”); Quens ex rel, Owens v. Water Gremlin Co., 605 N.W.2d
733, 735 (Minn. 2000) ("The rights of the employee's dependents
or potential heirs . . . are separate inchoate rights and are
governed by the law in effect on the date of the employee's
death.”); In.ze Death of Knight, 877 P.2d 602, 604-05 (Ok1. 1994)
("Since this statutory right [to death benefits] does not arise
until death, it follows that the right which vests must be
determined under the law in effect on that date.”); Silver King
Coalition Mines Co, v. Indus, Comm'n, 268 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah
1954) ("[W]here the statute confers upon the dependents a new and
independent right to compensation on account of his death, it is
generally held that the right to such compensation is governed by

the law in force at the time of death rather than at the time of

 

injury, when the two events are separated in time.” (Quoting 58
‘Am, Jur. Workmen's Compensation § 73)); Sizemore v, State
Workmen's Comp, Comms, 219 S.£.2d 912, 915-16 (W. Va. 1975)

[S}ince the rights of the dependents accrue at the tine of

 

death, the statute in effect at the time of death should control

as to such rights. No vested rights are impaired by applying the

2
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

statute in force at the time of death because, until death
occurs, the surviving dependents have no rights and the employer
has no fixed Miability.”)

Consequently, we hold that workers’ compensation death
benefits must be calculated using the law in effect at the time
of death. We now turn to the language of the statutes at issue.

ce. kers’ ne:
‘Statute

With regard to statutory interpretation, this court has

 

 

stated:
When construing a statute, cur forenost obligation is
to ascertein and give effect to the intention of the
Iegisiature, which is to be obtained primarily from the
igaguage contained in the statute itself, And we sust read
statctory language in the context of the entire statute and
Gonstrve it in a manner ‘consistent with its purpose.
State Ferm Mut, Auto. Ins, Co, v. Gepava, 103 Hawai'i 142, 145,
80 P.3d 321, 324 (2003) (quoting Trover v. Adams, 102 Hawai'i
399, 409, 77 F.3d 83, 93 (2003)). This court has previously

discussed the purpose of Hawaii's Workers’ Compensation Laws,
including HRS $$ 386-31, -41, and -43:

A large nunber of cages have recognized that our workers!
Compensation statute has a beneficent purpose and should be
Sftorded liberal construction in favor’ of the emplo

folfill the humanitarian purposes for which it was
Indeed, since the supreme court's first look at’ Ha
then new workers’ compensation statute in 1926, analyses in
these Kinds of cases have been grounded on the Nunanitarien
purposes premise

Korsak v. Havaii Permanente Med. Group, 94 Hawai'i 297, 306-07,

12 P.3d 1238, 1247-48 (2000) (internal brackets, citations, and

 

 

 

 

quotation marks omitted) .

13
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

HAS $$ 386-41(b) and (c), and ~43(b) cap death benefits
by reference to “the maximum weekly benefit rate prescribed in
section 386-31." As correctly noted by the ICA, “The MiBR
prescribed in HRS § 386-31 is, in turn, ‘the state average weekly
wage last determined by the director(.]' HRS § 386-31 (a).”
Young I at *5. Since the right to death benefits arises at the
time of death and the death benefits statute must be interpreted
as of the date of death, it follows that the MWBR used to
calculate death benefits is the state average weekly wage last
determined by the director at the time of death. This
interpretation is consistent with the statute’s humanitarian and
beneficent purposes.

Indeed, the LIRAB utilized the date-of-death MWBR to
calculate death benefits in ite decision end order in Teputepy vy
M, _Shore Detective & Sec, Agency, Inc., Case No. AB 75-170, at 5
(1976). In Teputepu, the LIRAB faced the same issue we face in

the instant case: “(Whether the law in effect on the date of

 

the worker's injury or the law in effect on the date of the the
[sic] worker’s death determines the benefits to which the
dependents of the deceased worker who died from an injury which
arose out of and in the course of his employment are entitled.”
Id. at 1-2. The LIRAB recognized that “it is the death itself
which is the compensable event, although the dependents’ right to

death benefits arose out of the compensable injury.” Id. at 4;

uu
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
see also Flor v. Holguin, 94 Hawai'i 70, 63, 9 P.3d 382, 395
(2000) ("A compensable injury is an injury for which compensation

is payable, and the date of such injury is not the time of the

accident or the occurrence causing the injury, but the time .
he ri mnpens: rues.” (Quoting Ince Palama,

34 Haw. 65, 71 (1937)) (emphases added). The LIRAB therefore
concluded that the MMBR at the time of his death, which was
greater than the MWBR at the tine of his injury, should be used
to calculate death benefits, stating that “the effective date for
the application of the statute is the date of death.” Teputepy
at 5.

Consistent with the LIRAB's prior decision in Teputepu,
and based upon the plain and unambiguous language of the statutes
at issue, we hold that death benefits should be calculated
utilizing the date-of-death MWBR.

Legislative Intent

 

‘The statutes’ lack of ambiguity in instructing the use
of the date-of-death MWBR to calculate death benefits is
confirmed by a review of the legislative history of Hawaii's

Workers’ Compensation statutes.

 

1, Legislative history of section 386-35.
SCF asserts that the legislative history of section
386-35 indicates the legislature's intent to calculate death

benefits at the tine of injury, SCP points to the fact that, as

15
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

first introduced in 1979, the bill proposed supplemental benefits
to “provide economic relief to totally disabled workers and
dependents of deceased workers who receive low weekly
compensation benefits based on previously legislated maximum
benefit rate.” Hse. Stand. Com. Rep. No. 663, in 1979 House
Journal, at 1486 (emphasis added). The Finance Committee then
“amended the bill by deleting all references to death benefits.”

Id. SCF asserts that the codification of HRS § 386-35 without

 

reference to death benefits “nilitates against Dependents’
contention that the legislature intended to protect dependents
against the negative effects of inflation.” We disagree. while
it may have been the legisleture’s intent not to provide
supplemental benefits to dependents of deceased workers after
their death benefits had been calculated, it does not necessarily
follow that it was not the legislature’s intent to use the date
of-death MWaR for the initial calculation of death benefits.
Indeed, the Employment Opportunities and Labor

Relations Committee, addressing the same bill prior to deletion

 

 

of references to death benefits, stated: “Considering today’s
economy, a totally disabled worker who was injured many years
ago, or a deceased worker's dependents receiving compensation
benefits based on benefit rates at the time of the injury or

Seath, would be in need of financial assistance.” Hse. Stand.

Comm. Rep. No. 187, in 1979 House Journal, at 1229. This

16
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

statenent clearly indicates the legislature’s understanding that
a totally disabled worker was receiving disability benefits based
on the rates at the tine of injury, whereas a deceased workers’
Gependents were receiving death benefits based on benefit rates
at the time of death.

2, Legislative history of section 386-41 (a!
burial expenses.

 

In 1971, the Hawai'i Legislature amended HRS § 386-41
to increase the maximum amount for funeral and burial expenses to
$1,000 and $500, respectively (1971 Haw. Sess. L. Act 24, § 1 at
27), because the then-present maximum allowance was “inadequate
to meet current funeral and burial costs." Sen. Stand. Conn.
Rep. No. 220, in 1971 Senate Journal, at 680. The House Standing
Committee Report for the sane bill stated that “an adjustment of
the maximum allowance should be made to closely reflect the
actuel funeral and burial costs which must be incurred by the
families of the deceased workers.” Hse. Stand. Conm. Rep. No.
563, in 1971 House Journal, at 932. In 1982, the legislature
again amended HRS § 386-41, by extending funeral expenses to a
“maximum of ten ties the weekly benefit rate and [extending]
burial expenses to five times the maximun weekly benefit rate(,1”
which is the language applicable to the instant case and still in
effect today. 1982 Haw. Sess. L. Act 52, § 1 at 587 Hse. Stand.

comm. Rep. No. 745-82, in 1982 House Journal, at 1239. The

v
*** FORPUBLICATION ***

 

Standing Comittee Report stated that the amendnent would “bring
the allowances more in line with the current average cost of @
funeral and burial.” Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 745-82, in 1982
House Journal, at 12397 see also Sen. Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 338
82, in 1982 Senate Journal, at 1090.

In the instant case, Petitioners’ actual funeral and

burial costs were $14,262.07. Using the date-of-injury MWBR,

 

they received $5,010.00; had the date-of-death MWaR been used,
they would have received $7,935.00 ($529.00 x 10 + $529.00 x 5).
Although still well below their actual expenses, using the date-
of-death MWBR would reflect the legislature’s intent to “bring
the allowances more in line with the current average cost of a

funeral and burial.”

   

3. Legislative history of sections 381
Weekly benefits.

1(b) and (c)

In 1974, the legislature amended sections 386-31, -41,
and -43 by, inter alia, increasing the maximum weekly benefit
amount, which had been set at $112.50, to the level of the State
AWW, with annual adjustments of the maximum anount “to reflect
changes in the All thereafter.” Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 755-
74, in 1974 Senate Journal, at 1039-40; 1974 Haw. Sess. L. Act
153, 851, 2, 4, 5 at 281-86. The Standing Conmittee Reports
stated that this change would “remove part of the inequity of

injured workers and dependents of deceased workers receiving less

38
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

than 2/3rds of the weekly wages of the injured or deceased
workers, the intended benefit amount.” Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep.
No. 755-74, in 1974 Senate Journal, at 1040 (emphasis added);
Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 44-74, in 1974 House Journal, at 590
(emphasis added) .

Another House Standing Committee Report stated:

linen the weekly maximum of $112.50 wae by law established in
1965, the sum exceeded the State average weekly wage as
determined snnsally By the Director nd the Bsximun

 

 

Sof the work forse. Toasy, however, many
Of the injured are Feceiving cofsicersbly lese than 2/3 of
their wages Decause of the weekly maximum Limit

Hise. Stand. Conm. Rep. No. 262-74, in 1974 House Journal, at 655
(emphasis added). The report further stated that pursuant to the
amendment, the weekly limits would be automatically adjusted

annually, which would “benefit the permanent total disability and

death cases because the aggregate limit of $35,100 will be

 

increased{.]" Id.

‘This legislative history evidences the legislature's
intent to annually adjust the maximum amount payable for
disability and death benefits in order to more closely reflect
the employee's intended benefit, two-thirds of the employee's
AWW. Utilizing the date-of-death MMBR to calculate death

benefits is thus consistent with the legislature’s intent.

19
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

MWBR should be used to calculate death benefits

we hold that the date-of-death

We therefore

reverse the ICA’s Opinion and remand this matter to the LIRAB for

calculation of Petitioners’ death benefits using the date-of-

death NWBR and issuance of an order awarding such benefits.

Herbert R. Takahashi
and Rebecca L. Covert

(of Takahashi, Masui &
Vasconcellos) for petitioner/
claimant-appellant Survivors
of Roy W, C. Young on the writ
and supplenental brief

Robin R. Horner
for respondent /employer/
insurance carrier-appellee
Island Feeling, Inc. and
TIG P&C Insurance Company
on the supplemental brief

Frances £. H. Lum
and Robyn N. Kuwabe,
Deputy Attorneys General,
for respondent/appellee
Special Compensation Fund
on the supplemental brief

20

Gm
Maa Resimee

Resse 6 eae

oee™*N

owen £. Dabliys fos