Title: Laramie County School Dist. No. One By and Through Brown v. Muir

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Laramie County School Dist. No. One By and Through Brown v. Muir1991 WY 42808 P.2d 797Case Number: 90-134Decided: 04/09/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, State of Wyoming, By and Through its duly elected trustees, 
Richard BROWN, in his official capacity; Gladys Frentheway, in her official 
capacity; Jean Cotton, in her official capacity; Miles Larowe, in his official 
capacity; Keith Rounds, in his official capacity; and Sue Hume, in her official 
capacity, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

Robert G. MUIR and James 
C. Young, individually and f/d/b/a as Muir and Young Architects, Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

Reversed and 
remanded.

Paul J. Hickey, 
John Walker, and Elizabeth A. Rinaldo, Legal Intern, Hickey & Evans, 
Cheyenne, for 
appellants.

Edwin H. 
Whitehead and Sue Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Bernard L. Trott, Colorado 
Springs, Colo., for 
appellee Young.

Tracy J. 
Copenhaver, Copenhaver, Kath & Kitchen, Powell, for amicus curiae 
Wyoming School 
Boards Ass'n. 

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ., and LEIMBACK, District 
Judge.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     The sole issue 
presented by this case is whether a statute of limitations in Wyoming serves to bar an 
action by a school district against a supervising architect employed for a 
school building construction project. The district court, in effect, ruled that 
the statute of limitations was a constitutional enactment and that it did 
foreclose the school district's action premised upon theories of negligence, 
breach of warranty, and breach of an implied warranty of habitability. The 
district court also held that the school district was not insulated from the 
application of the statute of limitations by the doctrine of sovereignty. We 
reverse the decision of the district court, holding that a school district, as a 
governmental entity eligible to claim the status of a sovereign, was not 
foreclosed from its action by the statute of limitations. Because of our ruling 
in this regard, it is not necessary to consider the question of the 
constitutionality of the statute.

[¶2.]     The appellants, Laramie 
County School District No. 1 and its duly elected trustees, frame the issues in 
their brief in this way:

"A. Laramie County School 
District No. 1, State of Wyoming, is not subject to a statute of limitations set 
forth in Wyo. Stat. 1-3-111, (1977 Republished Ed.), when it acts in its 
sovereign capacity in constructing a junior high school building.

"B. Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-111, 
(1977 Republished Ed.) violates Article 1 § 8 of the Wyoming 
Constitution."

The appellee, 
James C. Young, in his Brief of Appellee effectively adopts those same issues, 
but sets them forth in an opposite mode as follows:

"A. Laramie County School 
District Number One is subject to a statute of repose set forth in Wyo. Stat. § 
1-3-111 (1977 Republished Ed.) as it was not cloaked with the sovereign power of 
the state in constructing a junior high school building.

"B. Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-111 
(1977 Republished Ed.) does not violate Article 1 § 8 of the Wyoming 
Constitution."

In an amicus 
curiae brief filed by the Wyoming School Boards Association, the issues 
articulated by the appellants are adopted.

[¶3.]     On July 7, 1972, the 
Board of Trustees of Laramie County School District No. 1 voted to call a 
special election for the purpose of increasing the mill levy. A major reason for 
the enhanced revenue was to construct a new junior high school building to be 
known as McCormickJunior High School. The 
record demonstrates it was necessary to replace the old junior high school 
building because the state fire marshal had issued a report advising the school 
district that the school building was in violation of the fire code. In 
addition, the old McCormickJunior High 
School building had "very little usefulness as an 
educational facility" and was located on a "woefully inadequate" site that did 
not allow for any expansion. The issuance of bonds to accomplish this 
construction project was approved by the voters.

[¶4.]     At a meeting held on 
January 29, 1973, a unanimous vote was cast for a motion to employ the 
architectural firm of Muir and Young (James C. Young is the appellee) to provide 
the architectural services necessary for the construction of the new McCormick 
Junior High School building. A written contract for those architectural services 
agreed upon between the school district and Muir and Young was executed on March 
23, 1973. Construction of the new McCormickJunior High 
School building began on or about November 20, 1973, 
and the new building was completed in 1975. It has been occupied by the school 
district continuously since it was completed.

[¶5.]     There were no 
observable problems attributable to structural flaws in the new school building 
at first. During the winter of 1983-1984, however, gaps began to appear between 
the walls and ceilings, and some ceiling tiles fell to the floor. During that 
same school year, one wall brace sheared from its stabilizing bolts and 
protruded through the ceiling of the building. During the 1985-86 school year, a 
canopy walkway deteriorated and began to crack because of structural stress. The 
school district retained a structural consultant to assist it in dealing with 
these structural problems. On December 14, 1987, he issued a report concerning 
the problems with the school building, and the school district undertook the 
requisite steps to cure these defects. The school district filed its action 
against the architects in the district court on September 14, 1988. Damages were 
sought because of the structural problems in the new McCormickJunior High School building. The theories 
asserted in the complaint for recovery included negligence, breach of contract, 
and breach of implied warranty of habitability.

[¶6.]     Robert G. Muir filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on October 17, 1988. The proceedings have been stayed 
as to him, and he is not a party to this appeal. James C. Young, individually in 
this action, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the action 
was barred by the statutes of limitations found in §§ 1-3-105 and 1-3-111, W.S. 
1977 (June 1988 Repl.).1 The parties in this case have 
focused their arguments on the text of § 1-3-111, but our holding applies with 
equal force to § 1-3-105. The school district responded to the motion to dismiss 
by asserting, inter alia, that it was immune from the application of the 
asserted statutes of limitations because it was acting in a sovereign capacity 
when it entered into the contract for building the new McCormick Junior High 
School and, alternatively, that § 1-3-111 is unconstitutional.

[¶7.]     On March 23, 1990, the 
trial court issued its decision letter in which it ruled, in effect, that the 
school district was not immune from the effect of the statute of limitations and 
that there was no constitutional defect in § 1-3-111. On April 20, 1990, the 
trial court dismissed the complaint of the school district.

[¶8.]     The school district 
asserts that it is exempt from the effect of the statute of limitations in this 
case. Its theory is that a school district acts in its sovereign capacity when 
it builds, or contracts to have built, a school building because it then is 
acting in the interest of the public at large. Young's response is that the 
school district does not enjoy the state's immunity from the application of a 
statute of limitations and should be held subject to the statute. Young contends 
that the school district has all the attributes of a private corporation and 
acts in a proprietary capacity when involved in the construction of a school 
building.

[¶9.]     Our review of the 
pertinent authority discloses no Wyoming cases addressing this particular 
point. In the recent case of Richardson Associates and E.W. Allen & 
Associates, Inc. v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790, n. 12 (Wyo. 1991), the 
court mentioned, but did not resolve, an aspect of this question:

"We do not consider the 
issue in this decision to be whether units of government, other than the state 
itself, enjoy a statute of limitations preclusion. That subject will be left for 
other cases in both statutory and common law analysis."

The case alluded 
to is now before the court.

[¶10.]  Neither party to this appeal attempted to 
argue that the State of Wyoming itself is not exempt from an 
application of statutes of limitations. Instead, the argument focuses completely 
on whether a school district shares the immunity of the state in these 
circumstances. Since we are developing new law in Wyoming, we first will 
review generally the rule of immunity from statutes of limitations as it applies 
to the state before resolving the particular issues in this case. The rule finds 
its genesis in the common law principle "nullum tempus occurrit regi," or "time 
does not run against the king." The history of this principle is set forth in 
the early federal case of United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 
329-30 (D.Mass. 1821) (No. 15,373, 2 Mason 311), as follows:

"[I]t may be laid down as 
a safe proposition, that no statute of limitations has been held to apply to 
actions brought by the crown, unless there has been an express provision 
including it. * * * [I]t was ruled in the Case of Magdalen College, 11 Cooke 68, 
74b, 1 Rolle, 151 that `the king has a prerogative, quod nullum tempus occurrit 
regi, and therefore, the general acts of limitation, or of plenarty, shall not 
extend to him.'"

[¶11.]  In United 
States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 
486, 25 L. Ed. 194 (1878), the United States Supreme Court later explained how 
this principle became applicable in a republican form of government:

"The common law fixed no 
time as to the bringing of actions. Limitations derive their authority from 
statutes. The king was held never to be included, unless expressly named. No 
laches was imputable to him. These exemptions were founded upon considerations 
of public policy. It was deemed important that, while the sovereign was 
engrossed by the cares and duties of his office, the public should not suffer by 
the negligence of his servants. `In a representative government, where the 
people do not and cannot act in a body, where their power is delegated to 
others, and must of necessity be exercised by them, if exercised at all, the 
reason for applying these principles is equally cogent.' (Quotation not 
identified.)

"When the colonies 
achieved their independence, each one took these prerogatives, which had 
belonged to the crown; and when the national Constitution was adopted, they were 
imparted to the new government as incidents of the sovereignty thus created. It 
is an exception equally applicable to all governments." Thompson, 98 U.S.  at 489-90.

In cases decided 
since Thompson, the federal government has been held not subject to any 
standards found in state statutes of limitations. This principle has also been 
applied generally whenever a state brought an action in its sovereign capacity 
and the defendant interposed the statute of limitations.2

[¶12.]  The rule has been applied in varying 
situations in neighboring jurisdictions, and it has been generally held that 
statutes of limitations do not bar an action by a governmental entity acting in 
a sovereign capacity to vindicate public rights. Oklahoma 
City Municipal Improvement Authority v. HTB, Inc., 769 P.2d 131 
(Okla. 1988). 
The right that is asserted must be one belonging to the general public, however. 
Trimble v. American Savings Life Insurance Company, 152 Ariz. 548, 733 P.2d 1131 (Ariz. App. 1986). The rule invoked and applied 
in these cases is that, unless the legislature expressly includes governmental 
bodies as subject to the applicable statute of limitations or those governmental 
bodies are included within the statute by necessary application, the statute of 
limitations does not run against the government. Trimble; City of Medford By and Through Medford Water Commission v. Budge-McHugh Supply 
Company, 91 Or. App. 213, 754 P.2d 607, reh. denied, 306 Or. 661, 763 P.2d 152 
(1988); Berkeley Metropolitan District v. Poland, 705 P.2d 1004 (Colo. App. 1985); In re 
Bogert's Will, 64 N.M. 438, 329 P.2d 1023 (1958).

[¶13.]  Some states have avoided the problem 
completely by expressly including the state within the ambit of their statutes 
of limitations. People ex rel. Skinner v. Graham, 170 Ill. App.3d 417, 120 
Ill.Dec. 612, 524 N.E.2d 642 (1988) (two-year construction defect limitations 
statute expressly applying to any "body politic" included State Capital 
Development Board). Other states have resolved the problem by expressly 
excluding the state from the thrust of the statute of limitations. City of 
El Paso v. Del 
Norte Golf and Country Club, Inc., 614 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980), error 
refused nre (limitations statutes provided that it was not a bar to suits by 
state or governmental agencies). The statutes of limitations in Wyoming that are relied 
upon in this case make no reference to the state. We will, in that light, 
recognize the rule of state immunity from statutes of limitations in Wyoming, in the absence 
of some express statutory pronouncement. We hold this to be the appropriate and 
sound principle of common law.

[¶14.]  The invocation of that rule, however, 
does not resolve the question in this case, which is whether this doctrine of 
the immunity of the state will extend to local governmental agencies in general 
and to school districts in particular. Young offers several arguments to explain 
why this immunity should be extended only to the state and not to a school 
district. He argues first that, had the legislature intended to exempt school 
districts from the operation of the statute of limitations, it would have 
expressly provided for that exemption. We will not presume, as Young does, that 
the legislature must have intended to include school districts because it did 
not specifically exclude them. "Nullum tempus" is a common law doctrine; 
statutes of limitations are legislatively created. The legislature must be 
presumed to have known of the common law doctrine when adopting the statutes of 
limitations. See Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990); Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984); Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481 
(Wyo. 1976). 
We hold that had the legislature intended to include school districts within the 
statutes of limitations, it would have done so by express reference.

[¶15.]  Young's next argument is that, although 
the State of Wyoming may not be bound by a limitations statute unless mentioned 
in it, the school district is bound because "in the absence of a specific 
provision [exempting it] in the statutes * * *, actions by municipalities and 
other governmental subdivisions are not exempted from the operation of general 
statutes of limitations." 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 417 at 889-90 
(1970). As noted above, the policy reason for excluding the king from the 
statute of limitations at common law, unless specifically mentioned therein, was 
that the public should not suffer from the negligence of its servants. Thompson, 
98 U.S.  at 486. We do not see how one 
could conclude that the public suffers in any less measure in an instance in 
which its rights are lost by a subordinate agency of government than it would 
when the default lies with the state itself. The failure of the legislature to 
provide school districts with immunity in the statutes of limitations should not 
bar them from sharing in the state's immunity. 

[¶16.]  We also reject Young's contention that 
the doctrine of "nullum tempus" can only apply to agencies with statewide 
authority. The principal case invoked by Young for this proposition, Ohio Valley 
Contractors v. Board of Education of Wetzel County, 293 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 
1982), appeal on remand 391 S.E.2d 891 (1990), is not persuasive. That case 
involves only the issue of sovereign immunity from suit. Immunity from action is 
a very different subject from the ability of the sovereign to bring an action 
after the statute of limitations has run. Oklahoma City, 769 P.2d  at 131. This 
distinction makes the reasoning from OhioValley inapt with regard to the issues in 
this case. For example, the OhioValley court mentions the ability of local 
school boards to buy liability insurance as a reason for refusing to extend 
immunity from suit to them. OhioValley. That rationale has no pertinence 
with respect to the question of immunity from the application of a statute of 
limitations.

[¶17.]  We are satisfied that the better rule is 
that immunity from the application of statutes of limitations cannot be limited 
to the state itself, or even to those state agencies with statewide authority. 
If a local agency is carrying on a function of protecting public rights that 
citizens receive under our constitution, or is otherwise fulfilling a 
traditional function of government, the statute of limitations preclusion should 
be available.

[¶18.]  The mandate in Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 1, 
that the legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a 
complete and uniform system of public instruction, articulates a sovereign 
function of the state. The method which the legislature has chosen to satisfy 
the constitutional mandate has been the creation of a state department of 
education, a state board of education, and local school districts. Wyoming Education Code of 
1969, §§ 21-1-101 to 21-14-106 W.S. 1977 (July 1986 Repl.). SeeWashakieCountySchool Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 
1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 
(1980).

[¶19.]  Having addressed the arguments propounded 
by Young against extending immunity from the application of statutes of 
limitations to school districts, we are able to identify positive reasons to 
justify invoking that immunity in cases such as this. Authority on this point 
from other jurisdictions is divided, but we find more persuasive those cases 
which have granted immunity from statutes of limitations in similar 
circumstances. In Rowan County Board of Education v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 87 N.C. 
App. 106, 359 S.E.2d 814, reh. denied 321 N.C. 298, 362 S.E.2d 782 (1987), the 
board of education brought an action against an asbestos manufacturer seeking to 
recover the costs involved in removing asbestos from school buildings. Summary 
judgment was granted to the defendants on the grounds that the statute of 
limitations had run and the suit was barred. The court of appeals reversed, 
stating the rule to be that a political subdivision of the state acts in its 
governmental capacity while acting on behalf of the State "`"in promoting or 
protecting the health, safety, security or general welfare of its citizens . . 
."' Rhodes v. Asheville, 230 N.C. 134, 137, 52 S.E.2d 371, 373 (1949)." Rowan, 
359 S.E.2d  at 819. Applying that test to the action by the board, the court 
concluded that:

"* * * [P]laintiff's 
action to recover lost tax dollars, expended in the preservation and maintenance 
of school property and necessitated by a potential health hazard to our school 
personnel and children, is a governmental function exercised in pursuit of a 
sovereign purpose for the public good on behalf of the State." Rowan, 359 S.E.2d  
at 819.

[¶20.]  The Kansas Court of Appeals reached a 
similar conclusion in a case in which a school district brought an action 
against the manufacturer of roofing material whose product, after being 
installed on the roof of a high school building, proved to be defective. Unified 
School District No. 490 v. Celotex Corporation, 6 Kan. App. 2d 346, 629 P.2d 196 (1981). The manufacturer argued that the action was barred by the 
Kansas statute 
of limitations. The Kansas statute of limitations provided that 
the period of limitations ran explicitly against governmental entities when the 
case arose out of the performance of a proprietary function. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-521 
(1983). In ruling in favor of the school district, however, the court 
stated:

"* * * The construction 
of a school building is incidental to and a part of the state's overall duty to 
provide public education for the citizens of the state. * * * The operation of a 
high school building by a school board is a governmental function." Unified 
School District No. 490, 629 P.2d  at 203.

[¶21.]  The Illinois Supreme Court, in Board of Education of City of 
Chicago v. A, C, 
and S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428, 137 Ill.Dec. 635, 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989), was 
confronted with an argument that common law immunity should not apply because 
the school district's interests did not affect the public at large. The court 
rejected this contention, saying:

"* * * This complaint has 
alleged, therefore, an interest in the safety of these public buildings and in 
the safety of a large segment of this State's population which attends the 
public schools and for the children who will in the future attend these schools. 
There is also the interest of the parents, faculty, staff and other people who 
use or will use our public school system. Moreover, unlike `any other property 
owner,' these buildings are owned by the government, maintained with tax 
revenue, and used for mandatory classroom attendance as well as for other public 
functions." A, C, and S, Inc., 137 Ill.Dec. at 656, 546 N.E.2d  at 
601.

The Illinois court then ruled 
that school districts could assert common law immunity from the application of 
the statute of limitations on claims brought by the school districts against 
suppliers of materials containing asbestos. The case before this court does not 
involve the hazards of asbestos, but the public interest is equally present in 
much the same way as the Supreme Court of Illinois found it to be present in A, 
C, and S, Inc.

[¶22.]  The reasoning of the courts in the cases 
cited above is persuasive in this case. The same factors that motivated those 
courts in our sister jurisdictions are recognized in Wyoming. We have earlier 
noted the public duty to provide education as expressed in our state 
constitution:

"The legislature shall 
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform system 
of public instruction, embracing free elementary schools of every needed kind 
and grade, a university with such technical and professional departments as the 
public good may require and the means of the state allow, and such other 
institutions as may be necessary." Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 1.

[¶23.]  We recognized the partnership between the 
state and local authorities in providing for public education in Washakie. In 
that case, we said, "[t]he matter of providing a school system as a whole and 
financing it is a responsibility of the legislature." Washakie, 606 P.2d  at 
337.

[¶24.]  We further said that the question of 
financing the physical facilities necessary to the process of public education 
is part and parcel of the educational package.3 We also said in Washakie, 606 P.2d  
at 333, that "education for the children of Wyoming is a matter of fundamental interest." 
Public education is a governmental function in Wyoming, and the construction of educational 
facilities is a component of that function. We are satisfied that a school 
district that constructs a school building is operating in its sovereign 
capacity for the public welfare and in the interests of the public 
generally.

[¶25.]  We hold, then, that construction of a 
public school building by a school district is a sovereign activity and that a 
suit against a contractor, or more specifically against an architect, for 
damages arising out of that construction is brought to vindicate public rights. 
Under the principle, "nullum tempus occurrit regi," the applicable statutes of 
limitations cannot be invoked to bar the school district from bringing its 
action to protect the public rights that are presented in this manifestation of 
sovereign activities. The order of the district court dismissing this case on 
the ground that the statute of limitations had run must be, and it is, 
reversed.

[¶26.]  The second issue presented by the school 
district is whether § 1-3-111 violates Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 8. Because we have 
resolved this case on the premise that statutes of limitations do not bar the 
action by the School District acting in its 
sovereign capacity, it is not necessary for us to address the constitutional 
claim in this case. We do not decide constitutional issues if there is another 
appropriate ground upon which the case may be decided. Wheeler v. Parker 
Drilling Co., 803 P.2d 1379 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶27.]  Reversed and remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings according to law.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 1-3-105, W.S. 1977 (June 
1988 Repl.), reads, in pertinent part:

"(a) Civil actions other than for 
the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods 
after the cause of action accrues:

     "(i) Within ten (10) 
years, an action upon a specialty or any contract, agreement or promise in 
writing;

     "(ii) Within eight (8) 
years, an action:

"(A) Upon a contract not in writing, 
either express or implied; or

"(B) Upon liability created by 
statute other than a forfeiture or penalty;

* * * * * *

"(iv) Within four (4) years, an 
action for:

* * * * * *

"(C) An injury to the rights of the 
plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated; * * 
*."

Section 1-3-111, W.S. 1977 
(June 1988 Repl.), reads:

"(a) Unless the parties to the 
contract agree otherwise, no action to recover damages, whether in tort, 
contract, indemnity or otherwise, shall be brought more than ten (10) years 
after substantial completion of an improvement to real property, against any 
person constructing, altering or repairing the improvement, manufacturing or 
furnishing materials incorporated in the improvement, or performing or 
furnishing services in the design, planning, surveying, supervision, observation 
or management of construction, or administration of construction contracts 
for:

"(i) Any deficiency in the design, 
planning, supervision, construction, surveying, manufacturing or supplying of 
materials or observation or management of construction;

"(ii) Injury to any property arising 
out of any deficiency listed in paragraph (i) of this subsection; 
or

"(iii) Injury to the person or 
wrongful death arising out of any deficiency listed in paragraph (i) of this 
subsection.

"(b) Notwithstanding the provisions 
of subsection (a) of this section, if an injury to property or person or an 
injury causing wrongful death occurs during the ninth year after substantial 
completion of the improvement to real property, an action to recover damages for 
the injury or wrongful death may be brought within one (1) year after the date 
on which the injury occurs.

"(c) This section shall not be 
construed to extend the period for bringing an action allowed by the laws of 
this state."

2 We have recognized a similar rule 
where estoppel is asserted against the state. See State Highway Commission of Wyoming v. Sheridan-Johnson Rural Electrification 
Association, 784 P.2d 588 (Wyo. 1989).

3 We are aware of Stoddard v. School 
District No. 1, Lincoln County, Wyoming, 429 F. Supp. 890 (D.Wyo. 1977), aff'd 
in part, rev'd in part 590 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1979), in which the United States 
District Court held, in a suit brought by a teacher for wrongful dismissal, that 
Wyoming school districts are not entitled to state sovereign immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. That court, in reaching 
its conclusion, characterized school districts as "more like a county or city 
than * * * an arm of the state." Stoddard, 429 F. Supp.  at 893. The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with this characterization. Stoddard, 590 F.2d 829. The Stoddard case was one involving the immunity of a state from suit in 
the federal courts under the limited provisions of the Eleventh Amendment. 
Immunity from the application of a statute of limitations was not involved in 
that case. We are satisfied that immunity from the application of a statute of 
limitations must, of necessity, have broader parameters than sovereign immunity 
because depletion of the public treasury can be, and easily is, protected by the 
purchase of liability insurance, while the loss of a right to recovery because 
it is barred by a statute of limitations is not similarly 
protected.