Title: STOUT v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STOUT v. STATE2001 WY 11435 P.3d 1198Case Number: 00-314Decided: 12/03/2001

 

OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
   

 

LUKE RAY 
STOUT,

 Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan 
R. Roden, Assistant Appellant Counsel.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

  
            
HILL, Justice.

 [¶1]      Luke Ray Stout 
(Appellant) appeals the denial of his motions to withdraw his guilty plea filed 
prior to sentencing and his request for new counsel.  Appellant also claims that his counsel 
did not adequately represent him at sentencing.  We affirm.

 

[¶2]      Appellant raises 
two issues on appeal:

                        
Issue I

Whether 
the district court abused its discretion in failing to fully explore Appellant's 
request for substitute counsel; in the alternative, the district court abused 
its discretion in not rejecting, on its own motion, Appellant's guilty plea, or 
failing to grant Appellant's motion for withdrawal of guilty plea, as Appellant 
was not adequately advised by appointed counsel?

 

                        
Issue II

 

Whether 
Appellant was adequately represented at his sentencing, in violation of his 
sixth amendment right to counsel?

 

The 
State framed the issues on appeal in slightly different 
language:

I.                     
Did the 
district court properly deny Appellant's motions for substitution of counsel and 
withdrawal of his guilty plea?

 

II.                   
Did 
Appellant receive adequate and effective representation at his sentencing 
hearing?

 

[¶3]      On March 9, 2000, 
Appellant slit Justin Bloxom's throat. Fortunately, Bloxom survived.  Appellant was arrested and charged with 
attempted first-degree murder. On August 16, 2000, Appellant entered into a plea 
agreement with the State.  Appellant 
agreed to plead guilty to attempted voluntary manslaughter and, in exchange, the 
State agreed to recommend a sentence of 10 to 18 years in the penitentiary.  A change of plea hearing was held at 
which Appellant was informed that by pleading guilty he would be waiving certain 
rights, including the right to a jury trial.  Appellant acknowledged that he 
understood the consequences of his plea and expressed his desire to proceed with 
the plea agreement:

 

[Court]: At 
that time [arraignment] I gave you a number of advisements concerning the rights 
that you had in connection with the charge.  I also talked to you about the 
consequences of entering a guilty plea.  
And I believe that I explained to you that if you entered a guilty plea 
you give up some of the rights that we talked about, including the right to go 
to trial, the right to confront State witnesses, the right to present witnesses 
in your defense, the right to object to technical defects in the proceedings, if 
any.

And, of 
course, most importantly, if a person pleads guilty, they subject themselves to 
possible imposition of all the penalties and consequences that, you know, are a 
part of the charge that's filed.

Do you 
have any questions about any of that?

 

[Appellant]: No, 
sir.

 

. . . 
.

 

[Court]: So 
what do you think you want to do, [Appellant], do you think you want to change 
your plea to the amended charge in hopes the Court will approve the plea 
agreement we've talked about or not?

 

[Appellant]: Yes, 
sir.

 

After 
establishing a factual basis for the plea, the district court accepted 
Appellant's guilty plea to attempted voluntary 
manslaughter.

 

[¶4]      On August 28, 
2000, Appellant sent a letter to the district court judge expressing 
dissatisfaction with his counsel and requesting appointment of "an attorney with 
experience."  Appellant also 
requested a meeting with the judge because he had questions.  On September 7, 2000, the district court 
held a hearing on Appellant's letter.  
At the hearing, the district court announced that it was treating 
Appellant's letter as a motion to substitute counsel and as a motion for a 
withdrawal of his guilty plea.  
Appellant cited three reasons for his request: (1) his counsel allegedly 
had informed him that he could go to trial even after changing his plea to 
guilty; (2) counsel allegedly told him that if he did choose to go to trial 
after changing his plea, he would not be able to obtain a different counsel and 
would have to proceed on his own; and, (3) counsel had supposedly told 
Appellant's grandmother that he was certain of Appellant's guilt.  During the course of the hearing the 
following colloquy took place:

 

[Appellant]: The 
main reason for this [the request for new counsel] was [defense counsel's] 
comment after the last hearing, Your Honor.

[Court]: So 
your grandmother, to walk out and say, "We know he did it," that is 

[Appellant]:  -- I don't believe acting 
professional.  That wasn't  wasn't 
something that your attorney, somebody that's supposed to be representing you, 
walks out and says to your family.  
That was  it was  I believe it was very wrong and that 

[Court]: So 
that's what you're relying upon?

[Appellant]: Well, 
no.  I'm not relying on anything, 
anymore.  I don't know all the fancy 
talk and 

[Court]:  But that's  you're thinking that that 
was some sort of an error in the case?  
After you had already pled guilty, some comment made by your lawyer you 
think somehow justifies you changing your plea?

[Appellant]: No. I 
think the error was in his lack of  his lack of counsel when I told him I 
wanted to change my plea, that I didn't want to take the plea, which was before 
the hearing.  I told him I didn't 
want to take the plea, that I wanted to go to trial.  He did not  he did not  he did not 
tell me that something like this may happen.

[Court]: 
Something like what?

[Appellant]: Like 
if I were to take the plea that I didn't have the opportunity for  to go back 
to trial.  When he offered the plea 
to me, that was part of 

[Court]: Wait a 
minute.  I told you that if you pled 
guilty you would give up your right to trial.  I personally told you that before you 
changed your plea.  So I don't know 
what you're talking about off the record, but on the record I told you 
that.

[Appellant]: 
Right.  And I guess off the record  
I might have misunderstood what he said, but I believe he told me that even if I 
changed my plea to guilty that I would still have the option of going  of 
taking that back and going to trial.  
Obviously, I misunderstood. And that's another problem.  I need to know what's going on. I 
haven't  I haven't actually known what's happened since the 
beginning.

[Defense 
Counsel]: Your 
Honor, with regard to [Appellant's] motion to withdraw his plea, I certainly 
don't want to stand in the way of his ability to seek the Court's permission to 
do that.  I did not necessarily 
interpret his letter as a motion here for that, although I can see that 
obviously is his intent.

[Appellant]: No, it 
is not my intent.  My intent was a 
continuance so that maybe I can get representation, representation that I would 
be satisfied with; and then based on what  the reason I was asking for this was 
to get the representation so that somebody might start telling me what's going 
on.

[Defense 
Counsel]: And I 
would suggest that if [Appellant's] reasons for seeking to withdraw his plea are 
having to do with my professional conduct, it puts me in a potential conflict of 
interest in helping him establish the basis to withdraw his plea; and I would 
suggest that it would be most appropriate that another attorney aid him in 
pursuing that goal if that is his goal.  
And perhaps a decision on that matter should be continued until he's had 
a chance to consult with counsel.

[Prosecutor]: Your 
Honor, it seems to me that what [Appellant] is looking for, according to what he 
said, is an attorney that he's satisfied with. I don't know [Appellant], and I 
don't know if such an attorney exists on the face of the earth.  [Appellant] finds himself in a tough 
predicament here.

It seems 
to me that any decision  if what [Appellant] is trying to do is finished 
[sic] private counsel to represent him, we've got  we've got a 
sentencing date now, depending on what happens with any motion to withdraw his 
plea, if that's granted; then we'll have a trial date.

The 
clock has been running.  He 
apparently has known about this since he sent this letter out August 
28th.  He's had  or his 
family has had time to try to find counsel for him.  I think maybe we're better off waiting 
to cross those bridges until we come to it. Let's see if he ever finds an 
attorney that he's satisfied with before we make a decision to grant either a 
motion  well, grant his motion at least for substitute counsel at this time, 
because on the basis of it, from what I've heard, he has yet to produce any 
evidence that would indicate that [defense counsel] has either been incompetent, 
has a conflict of interest or is otherwise incapable of providing effective 
assistance of counsel.

[Appellant]: Your 
Honor, [the prosecutor] is right.  I 
wrote that letter asking for a continuance so that my family might possibly find 
an attorney that would represent me, not anybody else's interests, not  not 
what anybody else thinks.  Wouldn't 
represent his own opinions; he would represent me. But  it sounds like a waste 
of my breath.

[Court]: Well, 
counsel, from the perspective of the criminal justice system, if a defendant is 
carefully advised of his rights, it would be bad policy to automatically allow 
last-minute changes in counsel; and, obviously, we have a lot of case law 
regarding requests to change pleas.

Examining 
the record in this case in particular, and also trying to construe [Appellant's] 
comments here this morning favorably for him, the Court still does not see any 
kind of reasonable or lawful basis that it could conclude that he has not been 
represented adequately throughout these proceedings, nor does the Court find 
anything in the record that would indicate a reason to change the plea that he 
entered back on August 16, 2000.

So the 
Court is going to treat this letter that we've been talking about as a request 
for change of counsel and a request for change of plea and it is going to deny 
both motions.

Also, it 
is going to deny any request for continuance at this time and order that the 
matter will be heard for sentencing October 9, 3:30 p.m. so long as the 
Presentence Investigation Report is available for the [Appellant] at least ten 
days prior to that date.

[Appellant], 
if you want to consult with [defense counsel], you certainly may.  I'm not kicking him off the case.  He's available if you want to talk to 
him.  If you want to talk to any 
other lawyer, feel free to do that.  
If you want some other lawyer to be present for you at your expense at 
the sentencing hearing, that's fine.  
I have no problem with allowing them to participate.  Just be sure if you talk to someone that 
they file a written entry of appearance in this case so that we can send them 
copies of any documents that might be filed.

 

Appellant 
attempted to obtain counsel at his expense but the effort foundered when a 
private attorney declined to represent him after reviewing the 
case.

 

[¶5]      Sentencing on 
Appellant's guilty plea took place on October 9, 2000.  Initially, the district court inquired 
of Appellant if he had any objections or corrections to make to the Presentence 
Investigation Report.  Appellant 
replied that he had read the report and had not seen any inaccuracies in 
it.

 

[¶6]      Next, the 
district court addressed Appellant's counsel.  Prior to the hearing, Appellant's 
counsel had filed a motion to withdraw because Appellant refused to see or speak 
with him.  Appellant's counsel 
raised the issue with the district court at the outset of the sentencing 
hearing:

 

Your 
Honor, [Appellant] has informed me, as he just did the Court, that he doesn't 
disagree with anything in the PSI.

I do 
want to bring to the Court's attention that I earlier filed a motion to withdraw 
as counsel for [Appellant], because he was refusing to talk to me, wouldn't see 
me in the jail; and I have not been able to prepare him for this 
hearing.

[Appellant] 
did consent to speak to me just prior to the hearing today and expressed his 
desire to go ahead with the sentencing; however, because he hasn't been willing 
to communicate with me, I have not been able to properly prepare for this 
hearing on his behalf.  And that was 
the reason for my motion to withdraw.

 

The district court indicated that 
after reviewing the PSI and the facts surrounding the crime, it was ready to 
approve the plea agreement recommendation on the sentence.  The court then asked Appellant if he 
wanted to say anything before sentence was announced. Appellant declined the 
opportunity.  The district court 
then sentenced Appellant pursuant to the plea recommendation to a term of not 
less than 10 years nor more than 18 years, along with 
restitution.

 

[¶7]      Our review of 
Appellant's contentions on appeal necessitates the application of several 
different standards.  A refusal to 
appoint substitute counsel is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard:

 

While a trial court has the power in 
its discretion to appoint substitute counsel, its refusal to do so is not error 
unless an abuse of discretion is shown.  
A factual showing of good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel 
is essential to the demonstration of an abuse of discretion, and good cause is 
to be found in incompetence, commitment to a position or an interest which would 
conflict with the furnishing of an effective defense to the accused, or other 
good reason to conclude that appointed counsel is unable to furnish effective 
assistance.

 

Bell v. 
State, 994 P.2d 947, 951 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1071 
(Wyo. 1978)).  "Judicial discretion 
is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 
960 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985)).

 

[¶8]      The district 
court's discretion is also at issue in determining whether Appellant should have 
been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea:

 

A 
defendant does not enjoy an absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty prior to 
the imposition of sentence. Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777, 788 (Wyo. 
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1331, 79 L. Ed. 2d 726 
(1984); Ecker v. State, 545 P.2d 641, 642 (Wyo. 1976).  The trial court is vested with 
discretion to determine whether to grant a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
made prior to sentencing, and it does not abuse that discretion by denying the 
withdrawal of the plea so long as the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11 were complied 
with at the time the plea was accepted. Kaldwell v. State, 908 P.2d 987, 
990 (Wyo. 1995).  Even when the 
defendant provides a plausible or just and fair reason for withdrawal of the 
plea of guilty, the denial of the defendant's motion does not amount to an abuse 
of discretion if the trial court conducted a careful hearing pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 11 at which the defendant entered a plea or pleas of guilty that was 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Osborn, 672 P.2d  at 
778-79.

 

Nixon v. 
State, 4 P.3d 864, 868-69 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶9]      Appellant also 
alleges that his Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel at 
sentencing was violated.  This claim 
implicates a constitutional right, and as such, requires a de novo 
assessment on appeal. Sidwell v. State, 964 P.2d 416, 418 (Wyo. 1998) 
(citing United States v. McCarty, 82 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 903, 
117 S. Ct. 257, 136 L.E.2d 183 (1996)).

  

[¶10]   Appellant raises two challenges to 
the district court's denial of his request for substitute counsel.  First, he argues that the district court 
failed to "adequately and fully explore, through a formal inquiry, [Appellant's] 
reasons for [requesting] substitute counsel."  Essentially, Appellant complains that 
the district court listened to him and made a decision based on its observations 
of his counsel's performance, which fell below the court's duty to formally 
explore his concerns about his counsel and his reasons for desiring substitute 
counsel. Second, Appellant contends that the district court abused its 
discretion by not granting his request for substitute counsel because he had 
adequately demonstrated a lack of communication, incorrect legal advice, and a 
lack of faith in his counsel's performance.

 

[¶11]   We are at a loss to comprehend 
Appellant's contention that the district court failed to fully and completely 
explore his request for substitute counsel.  The court held a formal procedure  a 
hearing  wherein Appellant was allowed to present the reasons behind his 
request.  The record clearly shows 
that the district court gave Appellant the benefit of the doubt and treated his 
letter as a motion for substitute counsel.  
The hearing on that motion was conducted with Appellant and his counsel 
present.  Appellant was given every 
opportunity to present his case.  
The district court listened to him and asked questions of him and of his 
counsel.  The portion of that 
hearing quoted above in our discussion of the factual and procedural history of 
this case clearly belies Appellant's claim that the district court did not 
afford him a full and adequate opportunity to explain his position.  Furthermore, Appellant's brief fails to 
suggest exactly where the district court failed in making an inquiry into his 
request for substitute counsel.  Nor 
does it suggest what alternative procedure would have been appropriate.  In short, Appellant has completely 
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the district court's 
consideration of his request was procedurally deficient in any 
way.

 

[¶12]   After reviewing the transcript of 
the hearing in conjunction with the record, we are unable to find any reason 
constituting good cause that would support an order substituting counsel.  At the hearing, Appellant pointed to 
three factors influencing his decision to request substitute counsel: (1) 
allegedly incorrect legal advice; (2) a purported comment by counsel to his 
grandmother on the certainty of Appellant's guilt; and, (3) a perceived lack of 
experience.  The district court 
noted that it did not see any reasonable or lawful basis from which it could be 
concluded that Appellant was not provided with adequate representation.1  The district court properly focused on 
whether Appellant had received effective legal 
representation:

 

The 
United State Supreme Court has ruled that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee 
a meaningful relationship with appointed defense counsel.  Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 
13-14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 75 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1983).

[T]he 
purpose of providing assistance of counsel "is simply to ensure that criminal 
defendants receive a fair trial," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and that in evaluating Sixth 
Amendment claims, "the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, 
not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer as such."  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657, n.21, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984).

Wheat v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988).

 

Bell, 994 P.2d  at 951-52.  "The test is 
whether you have an effective, legal counsel representing you." 
Id.

 

[¶13]   The record supports the district 
court's conclusion.  For example, 
prior to Appellant's plea agreement, his counsel made the following filings with 
the district court: a demand for discovery; a motion for prior notice of the 
State's intent to introduce evidence under W.R.E. 404, 608, and 609; a notice of 
intent to introduce expert testimony concerning Appellant's mental condition 
based upon his use of alcohol on the night of the incident in light of his 
history of alcohol abuse and alcohol-induced blackouts; a motion opposing the 
State's use of photographic evidence of the victim's injuries because of their 
inflammatory and prejudicial potential; a memorandum in support of a defense 
expert's testimony regarding Appellant's extreme intoxication that caused 
amnesic blackouts; and a motion opposing the introduction of evidence that 
Appellant had purchased alcohol for minors.  These filings, along with defense 
counsel's arguments during motion hearings, support the district court's finding 
that Appellant was provided effective representation on his behalf.  Indeed, Appellant's defense counsel was 
ultimately able to secure a plea agreement.  This is significant in light of the fact 
that Appellant was charged with attempted first-degree murder, which carries a 
potential sentence of life imprisonment.  
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's request to substitute counsel.2

 

[¶14]   In addition to a request for 
substitute counsel, the district court treated Appellant's letter as a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  During 
the hearing on his letter, Appellant expressly stated that it was not his intent 
to withdraw his plea.  Nevertheless, 
the district court addressed the issue as if it had been raised and concluded 
that Appellant had failed to meet his burden under W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) for 
withdrawing a guilty plea.  On 
appeal, Appellant contends that the hearing on his letter conclusively 
demonstrated that his plea, when originally made, was not knowingly, 
voluntarily, or intelligently given.  
Accordingly, Appellant argues that the district court abused its 
discretion in accepting his guilty plea in the first instance or, in the 
alternative, denying his motion to withdraw his plea.

 

[¶15]   The district court does not abuse 
its discretion by denying a motion made prior to sentencing to withdraw a guilty 
plea if the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11 are complied with at the time the plea 
is accepted.3  Nixon, 4 P.3d  at 868.  We will not disturb the district court's 
decision so long as it could have reasonably concluded as it did.  Nixon, 4 P.3d  at 869.  Like the district court, we will give 
Appellant the benefit of the doubt and address his letter as if it had been a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea despite his explicit statement before the 
court that he had no intention of making such a motion.

 

[¶16]   "A condition precedent to our 
acceptance of the proposition that an accused has effectively changed his plea 
from not guilty to guilty, and thus made up an issue upon which judgment could 
be entered and sentence pronounced, is a showing on the record that [W.R.Cr.P. 
11] has been complied with." Hoggatt v. State, 606 P.2d 718, 724 (Wyo. 
1980).  Pursuant to Rule 11, before 
a district court can accept a guilty plea, it must inform a defendant on the 
record in open court and in the presence of counsel of the 
following:

 

(1)   The 
nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty 
provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law and 
other sanctions which could attend a conviction including, when applicable, the 
general nature of any mandatory assessments (such as the surcharge for the Crime 
Victim Compensation Account), discretionary assessments (costs, attorney fees, 
restitution, etc.) and, in controlled substance offenses, the potential 
loss of entitlement to federal benefits  . . . .

. . . 
.

(2)   The 
defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the 
proceedings and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent the 
defendant;

(3)   The 
defendant has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has 
already been made, the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial the right 
to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, the right to court process to obtain the testimony of other 
witnesses, and the right against compelled 
self-incrimination;

(4)   If a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted by the court there will not be a 
further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere the 
defendant waives the right to a trial; and

(5)   If the 
court intends to question the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the 
presence of counsel, about the offense to which the defendant has pleaded 
guilty, that the defendant's answers may later be used against the defendant in 
a prosecution for perjury or false statement.

 

W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b)(1)-(5).

 

[¶17]   As noted above, our focus is on the 
proceedings at the time Appellant's plea was accepted.  A review of the colloquy between 
Appellant and the district court discloses that the requirements of Rule 11 were 
satisfied during the change of plea proceedings.  The court clearly explained the 
consequences of a guilty plea and the rights Appellant would be waiving if he 
acquiesced in the plea.  Appellant 
acknowledged that he understood the nature of the proceedings and the 
consequences of a guilty plea.  
Appellant fails to point to any specific part of the change of plea 
proceedings indicative of noncompliance with the requirements of Rule 11.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.

 

 

[¶18]   Appellant claims that he was 
effectively denied representation at sentencing because communications with his 
court-appointed counsel had irretrievably broken down.  The result, Appellant claims, was to 
leave him without any legal advice and thus unprepared for sentencing.  Appellant argues that this effectively 
left him to proceed pro se at sentencing without proper warnings 
established in this Court's opinion in Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 
573-75 (Wyo. 2000).  Accordingly, 
Appellant contends this case should be remanded for 
re-sentencing.

 

[¶19]   In Trujillo, the defendant 
repeatedly interfered with his court-appointed counsel's ability to represent 
him.  Trujillo ultimately went 
through four attorneys.  
Understandably frustrated, the district court elected to proceed with 
sentencing without appointing a fifth attorney.  Thus, Trujillo was sentenced without any 
legal representation.  We concluded 
that a defendant's actions could be so dilatory and obstructive that he could be 
deemed to have waived his right to legal representation.  However, in order for that waiver to be 
knowing and voluntary, we required the trial court to warn the defendant that 
his continued misbehavior would result in a wavier of that right.  Trujillo, 2 P.3d  at 
572-75.

 

[¶20]   Our decision in Trujillo is 
not applicable to Appellant's situation.  
Trujillo concerns the procedure a trial court must follow when a 
defendant's dilatory and obstructionist behavior make it impossible for him to 
have legal representation.  Trujillo 
did not have any counsel representing him at his sentencing.  In this case, Appellant was represented 
at sentencing by counsel, who appeared on his behalf and participated in the 
hearing.  Appellant's contention 
that he was "effectively" deprived of representation because of his refusal to 
speak with his counsel prior to the sentencing hearing does not alter the fact 
that he was represented by counsel.  
If one accepts Appellant's position, then his complaint is more properly 
characterized as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  However, Appellant does not make any 
argument on that basis, and we will not make it for him.

 

[¶21]   Furthermore, Appellant makes a 
broad claim that he was unprepared for the sentencing hearing.  However, he utterly fails to articulate 
how he was unprepared.  The record 
discloses that Appellant had reviewed the PSI prior to the hearing and had no 
objections to it.  Appellant also 
declined the opportunity to speak to the court prior to sentencing.  Appellant does not suggest what 
additional preparation he would have undertaken.  He makes no argument that his sentence, 
which was pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, would have been any 
different.  In short, Appellant 
makes no allegation of prejudice or harm.  
Therefore, we find no error in Appellant's 
sentencing.

 

[¶22]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying Appellant's motions to withdraw his guilty plea and 
substitute new counsel.  Appellant 
was adequately represented by counsel at sentencing, and, therefore, we affirm 
the district court's judgment and sentence in its 
entirety.

 

[¶23]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

  1The allegation 
that defense counsel had allegedly provided erroneous legal advice regarding the 
effect of Appellant's guilty plea on his right to a jury trial would certainly, 
if true, be evidence of ineffective representation.  However, as the district court noted, 
Appellant's claim is dubious in light of the fact that Appellant was informed of 
the consequences of his guilty plea at the change of plea hearing.  The district court clearly explained the 
consequences to Appellant who acknowledged that he understood those consequences 
prior to entering his guilty plea.

  
2It should be 
noted that although the district court denied Appellant's request to assign a 
new public defender, the court did give Appellant the option of retaining 
private counsel.

 

   3We recently 
expanded on the factors a district court should consider when deciding whether 
to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea:

 

A defendant has no absolute right to 
withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is imposed, and where the strictures 
of W.R.Cr.P. 11 have been met, and the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and 
voluntarily entered into his plea of guilty, the district court's decision to 
deny such a motion is within its sound discretion.  Burdine v. State, 974 P.2d 927, 
929-30 (Wyo. 1999); 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Criminal 2d § 538 (1982 and Supp. 2001). Seven factors have been suggested 
as pertinent to the exercise of the court's discretion: (1) Whether the 
defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether the government would suffer 
prejudice; (3) whether the defendant has delayed in filing his motion; (4) 
whether withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether 
close assistance of counsel was present; (6) whether the original plea was 
knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would waste judicial 
resources. 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 538 
(Supp. 2001); United States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 
(10th 
Cir. 2000).

 

Frame v. State, 2001 WY 72, ¶ 7, 29 P.3d 86 ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2001).  Our decision in Frame was issued 
after the district court's order in this case.  Accordingly, we review the district 
court's order in the context of our precedent that existed at that time.  The resolution we reach in this case 
would not be markedly different if we examined it under 
Frame.