Title: People v. Morgan

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 88508, 88513 cons.-Agenda 7-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee, v. JON ROE MORGAN, Appellee and Cross-
Appellant.
Opinion filed October 18, 2001.
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Jon Roe Morgan (Jon), was charged with the
murders of his grandparents, Keith and Lila Cearlock. At the time
of the murders, Jon was 14 years old. Jon's case was transferred
from juvenile court to the adult division of the criminal court.
Following a jury trial, Jon was convicted of the second degree
murder of Keith Cearlock and the first degree murder of Lila
Cearlock. Jon was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 58
years for the first degree murder conviction and 17 years for the
second degree murder conviction, for a total of 75 years
imprisonment.
	On appeal, the appellate court affirmed Jon's second degree
murder conviction, reversed Jon's first degree murder conviction,
and remanded for a new trial as to the murder of Lila Cearlock.
307 Ill. App. 3d 707. Jon and the State each filed petitions for
leave to appeal the appellate court's decision. See 177 Ill. 2d R.
315. This court granted both petitions and consolidated the
appeals.

BACKGROUND
	On April 27, 1995, around 8:30 p.m., officers responded to a
report of shots fired at Seventh and Washington Streets in Lincoln,
Illinois. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Tim Kerns observed
an elderly woman lying face down in the front yard of 1206
Seventh Street, with a gunshot wound in her back. Inside the
home, Officer Kerns saw an elderly man lying on his back with a
gunshot wound in his left temple. The man and woman, who later
died of their injuries, were identified as Keith and Lila Cearlock.
	After the crime scene had been secured with tape around the
perimeter of the house, one of the officers, Deputy Sheriff Bob
Spickard, noticed a young man, later identified as Jon, walking
across the grass and through the crime scene tape. Spickard
ordered Jon to stop, but Jon nonetheless approached Spickard and
handed him a gun and a box of bullets. Jon said to Spickard, "I did
it. I killed them." Upon hearing this, Spickard took Jon to the front
of the house, where Detective Michael Harberts and other officers
were standing. Spickard told Harberts that Jon had turned over the
gun and ammunition and had admitted to the shooting. Harberts
then asked Jon, "Why did you shoot these two people?" Jon
responded, "They pissed me off. I couldn't take it anymore so I
shot them." Harberts then instructed Officer Kerns to arrest Jon.
Jon was handcuffed and placed inside a squad car. Before being
transported to the Logan County jail, Jon was taken out of the
squad car two separate times so that witnesses could identify him.
At the jail, the officers learned that Jon was 14 years old.
	Around 9:05 p.m., Harberts interviewed Jon. Jon told
Harberts that the deceased were his grandparents and that they
were his legal guardians. Harberts attempted to tape record the
interview, but later discovered that the tape had not recorded. With
Jon's consent, Harberts then interviewed Jon a second time.
	At trial, Jon testified that, on the day of the shootings, he
came home from school and fell asleep on his bed. Keith
awakened Jon around 6:30 p.m., demanding an explanation
concerning a detention for tardiness that Jon had received. Keith
screamed at Jon for 10 to 15 minutes. Lila also yelled at Jon about
the detentions. Keith then directed Jon to get Keith's razor strap,
told Jon to bend over and grab his ankles, and, using all his
strength, hit Jon with the razor strap across his buttocks five times.
Keith and Lila then continued to yell at Jon, so Jon yelled back at
them. Keith then swung his fist at Jon. Jon jumped out of the way
and ran to the bathroom.
	Jon went into the bathroom, then went to Keith's closet shelf
to get a gun to protect himself from Keith. Jon took the gun and a
box of ammunition back to the bathroom and loaded eight bullets
into the gun. At that point, Jon started thinking about killing
himself. For some reason, Jon fired at a bottle of Tilex cleaner that
was on the bathtub. Jon then stepped out of the bathroom and saw
Lila screaming. Jon claimed that although he then became scared,
he still was not thinking about killing his grandparents.
	Jon saw Keith coming around the corner and could see that
Keith was very angry. Thinking that Keith was going to beat him
to death, Jon lifted the gun and shot Keith so that Keith could not
get to him. After Jon shot Keith, Lila started to turn around and
run toward the front door. Jon thought Lila was just as dangerous
as Keith because Keith beat Jon only when Lila pressured Keith to
do so. Jon followed Lila as she started to run out the front door
and shot Lila in the back. Lila managed to make it out the front
door, but collapsed in the front yard. Jon followed Lila out the
door and attempted to shoot her again, but his gun jammed.
	Jon then went back inside the house and broke the lock on the
door to Lila's room in order to look for her gun. When he could
not find Lila's gun, Jon changed his clothes and left the house, still
carrying Keith's gun and the box of bullets. Jon walked toward a
friend's house and, as he was walking, attempted to unjam the
gun. The gun accidentally discharged two times. Jon testified that
he walked to his friend's house because he wanted some help and
needed to talk to someone. When he learned that his friend, Steve
Powell, was not home, he decided to walk back home. Jon
testified that he felt he needed some help and thought that the
police would be at his house and could help him. Jon said that he
returned home in order to turn himself in for the shootings.
	Testimony concerning Jon's upbringing revealed that Jon was
born on August 20, 1980, to Glenda and Roe Morgan. Roe drank
heavily and was physically abusive toward his children. When Jon
was in kindergarten in Virginia, he was referred for a
psychological evaluation for behavior problems at school,
including impulsiveness, aggressiveness, and hyperactivity. Jon
was hospitalized at the Psychiatric Institute of Richmond (the
Psychiatric Institute) from March 31, 1986, through May 16, 1986.
Jon was diagnosed as suffering from Attention Deficit Disorder
(ADD) and depression. Jon was prescribed an antidepressant to
target his depression and hyperactivity.
	Jon was admitted to the Psychiatric Institute a second time on
February 18, 1987, where he remained until March 29, 1987. Jon's
discharge summary indicated that Glenda claimed Jon had become
so aggressive that he was unmanageable. Jon was defiant toward
parental authority, had dropped his newborn sister on the floor,
and was aggressive toward his other siblings. Jon again was
diagnosed with ADD and depression. Jon continued taking his
antidepressant medication both during his hospitalization and upon
discharge. Following Jon's second discharge from the Psychiatric
Institute, Glenda Ashworth decided to send Jon to live with her
parents, Keith and Lila Cearlock, in Lincoln, Illinois. At the time,
the marriage of Glenda and Roe was breaking up, and Glenda felt
that the Cearlocks offered a more stable home. Jon had no contact
with his father from the time of his parents' divorce until his arrest
for the Cearlocks' murders.
	Jon moved in with the Cearlocks when he was seven years old
and began attending school at Park Meadows Baptist Church and
Academy (Park Meadows). The Cearlocks and the principal of
Park Meadows agreed that Jon should be taken off his medication.
Jon testified that, when he got into trouble at Park Meadows, he
would receive detentions or was paddled by the principal. Jon also
testified that Keith frequently beat him with a razor strap, usually
at the urging of Lila.
	Jon moved back home with Glenda, now remarried to
Linwood Ashworth, for his fifth- and sixth-grade school years.
Linwood, however, began drinking and became physically abusive
toward Jon and his sisters, so Glenda sent Jon back to Lincoln to
live with the Cearlocks. Jon testified that Keith and Lila had a very
poor relationship and slept in separate bedrooms. Jon also testified
that Keith and Lila were negative and constantly criticized Jon.
Keith frequently told Jon if he ever fought back when Keith was
beating him, Keith would kill Jon while Jon was sleeping. Jon
believed Keith.
	When Jon returned to the Cearlocks' home the second time,
Jon again attended Park Meadows. Jon did well in school and was
on the honor roll nearly every quarter. However, on February 7,
1995, Jon was expelled from Park Meadows after another student
saw Jon kissing a girl outside the girl's house. According to school
policy, students could be expelled for kissing. Despite the policy,
Jon initially was told that he could serve a suspension. Jon refused
to agree to the terms of the suspension. The principal of Park
Meadows tried to arrange for Jon to attend a school in Oklahoma,
but Keith would not agree. After Keith later changed his mind
about the Oklahoma school, Jon refused to go.
	Following Jon's expulsion, Glenda asked Keith to bring Jon
home. Keith drove Jon to Virginia, but before Jon arrived, Glenda
changed her mind and decided that she could not afford to have
Jon in her home. When Keith and Jon arrived in Virginia, Glenda
told Jon that he could not stay. Jon was very upset with this news.
Keith and Jon returned to Lincoln, and Jon attended the public
high school from March 17, 1995, until the time of the murders.
	At his trial, Jon testified that he did not tell the police that
Keith beat him because he did not want to disrespect his
grandparents and did not want to reveal his personal problems. Jon
admitted that he did not bring up the beatings until he met with Dr.
Robert Chapman, who interviewed Jon at the request of the State
to determine Jon's fitness to stand trial. Jon also agreed that he
never told Harberts that Keith had threatened to kill him.
	As noted, Jon was convicted of the first degree murder of Lila
Cearlock and the second degree murder of Keith Cearlock. Jon
appealed his convictions to the appellate court. In that appeal, Jon
claimed that: (1) it was improper to try him as an adult; (2) certain
statements were admitted into evidence erroneously; (3) the trial
court erroneously excluded testimony concerning prior violent
conduct by the Cearlocks; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to
dismiss the felony murder counts; and (5) he should have received
second degree murder instructions with respect to the felony-
murder counts. 307 Ill. App. 3d at 708-09.
	The appellate court agreed with Jon that his initial statement
to Harberts at the scene of the crime should have been suppressed.
See 307 Ill. App. 3d at 710 (unpublished material under Supreme
Court Rule 23). The appellate court also agreed that Jon could not
be found guilty of felony murder where the underlying felonies did
not have an independent felonious purpose. 307 Ill. App. 3d at
712-15. In addition, the appellate court held that Jon should have
received second degree murder instructions as to the charges of
felony murder. 307 Ill. App. 3d at 715-17. Finally, the appellate
court agreed with Jon that the trial court had improperly excluded
the testimony of Glenda and Dr. Hart concerning Glenda's
childhood. See 307 Ill. App. 3d at 710 (unpublished material under
Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court affirmed Jon's
conviction for the second degree murder of Keith, reversed his
conviction for the first degree murder of Lila, and remanded for a
new trial.
	We first address the issues raised by Jon in his appeal. In this
court, Jon again contends that his transfer from juvenile court was
erroneous. Jon also argues that his motion to suppress the
statements he made while in police custody should have been
granted.

TRANSFER FROM JUVENILE COURT
	Jon's transfer hearing took place over three days and included
the testimony of seven witnesses. At the transfer hearing,
Detective Harberts testified on behalf of the State. Harberts
testified that after he asked Jon why he had shot the people,
Harberts told another officer to place Jon under arrest. At the time,
Harberts did not know Jon's age. At the jail, Harberts read Jon his
Miranda rights, and Jon told Harberts what had happened that
evening.
	Jon explained that he had received a detention that day for
tardiness, and his grandparents were complaining to him about the
detention. Jon became angry because his grandparents kept going
on about the detention, so after several minutes of criticism, he
went into the bathroom. He then left the bathroom and went to his
grandfather's bedroom to get his grandfather's gun and
ammunition. Jon took the gun and the ammunition back into the
bathroom and loaded the gun. Jon saw a Tilex bottle sitting on the
bathtub and decided to shoot it.
	After Jon shot the Tilex bottle, he walked out of the bathroom
and down the hall toward the living room. Jon's grandmother,
Lila, was in the living room and saw Jon with the gun in his right
hand. Lila screamed and backed up. Jon's grandfather, Keith, then
came around the corner quickly. As Keith's head came into view,
Jon raised the gun and shot Keith in the left side of the head. Keith
fell to the floor and Lila attempted to run out the front door. Jon
shot Lila in the upper left shoulder and the upper left area of her
back. Lila made it out the door, but after going several steps, she
fell down by a tree. Jon told Harberts that he chased Lila and
attempted to pull the trigger again, but the gun jammed. Jon stood
over Lila where she had fallen and attempted to unjam the gun so
he could continue shooting her.
	Jon then went back into the house to get Lila's gun because he
wanted to shoot her some more. Jon could not find the gun so he
went into his bedroom and changed his clothes. Jon left the house
with the gun and the bullets and went to his friend Steve Powell's
home. Jon discovered that Steve Powell was not home, so he
decided to return to his grandparents' home and give himself up.
	Harberts asked Jon if he recalled what he had said when
Harberts asked Jon why he had shot the two people. Jon said he
recalled saying that "they pissed me off. I couldn't take it anymore,
so I shot them." Harberts then asked Jon if he previously had
thought about killing his grandparents. Jon said that he had
thought about it a few times. Harberts asked Jon if he had figured
out how he would kill his grandparents, and Jon replied that he
would use a gun. When Harberts asked Jon if he had thought about
killing other people, Jon responded that he had, and said that he
would use a gun. Jon explained that he thought about killing other
people if people made him mad. Harberts asked Jon if Jon would
want to kill him if he made Jon mad. Jon said that he would not
want to kill Harberts if he made him mad one time, but if Harberts
made him mad several times, Jon would want to kill him.
	Jon denied any history of mental illness in his family and said
that he had not consumed any illegal drugs or alcohol. After
Harberts concluded his interview with Jon, he discovered that the
tape of the interview did not record and asked Jon if he would do
a second interview. Jon agreed, and a tape was made of the second
interview.
	During the second interview, Harberts again read Jon his
Miranda rights. Jon generally repeated the statements he had made
in the first interview. Jon said that he did not start out the evening
planning to kill his grandparents. He began thinking about it when
his grandfather was talking to him and telling him that people
would not hire him because he was late and that teachers would
not like him because he was tardy. Jon said that at that time, "it
entered my mind that I was getting sick of this." Jon thought about
it for 15 minutes before he went and got the gun. Harberts asked
Jon if Jon remembered telling Harberts during the first interview
that Jon had thought about killing other people. The following
exchange then took place:
			"[Harberts]: When I talked to you earlier you told me
that at times you thought about killing other people, can
you tell me about that?
			[Jon]: No sir.
			[Harberts]: You don't remember saying that?
			[Jon]: I don't want to talk about that."
	Harberts further testified that on May 10, 1995, he had a
conversation with Pastor Davis, the pastor of the church that Jon
and his grandparents attended. Pastor Davis told Harberts that, on
April 2, 1995, he had a conversation with Keith Cearlock and
asked Keith how Jon was doing since he had been expelled. Keith
told Pastor Davis that Jon was not doing well and that Lila was
afraid that Jon was going to physically harm her. Pastor Davis said
that Keith told Jon that if Jon hit him, Keith would not hit back,
but instead would get Jon while he was sleeping.
	Pastor Thomas Bryant then testified on behalf of the State.
Bryant is the associate pastor and the principal of Park Meadows.
Bryant testified that, on April 19, 1995, he, his wife, and Lila
Cearlock were in his wife's office when Lila told them that Jon
had slammed her hand down on the table and had shoved her up
against the wall during a dispute over a television remote. On
April 22, 1995, Bryant had a conversation with Keith concerning
the incident with the remote and told Keith that Keith needed to
discipline Jon or get him out of the home before somebody was
hurt. Keith responded that he "sure wouldn't paddle" Jon because
Jon was too big and strong. Bryant testified that, several times
over the preceding year, Keith mentioned that he did not spank Jon
anymore because he felt Jon was too big.
	Bryant testified that, on February 7, 1995, Jon had been
expelled from Park Meadows. Bryant explained that there were
several incidents leading to the expulsion. Jon had a long history
of discipline problems. After Jon was expelled, however, a group
of students asked Bryant to reconsider the expulsion. Bryant told
the students that they could ask Jon about coming back to school.
The students then spoke with Jon and told Bryant that he had said,
"I have been hurt all my life. I'm not going to be hurt anymore.
From now on I will do the hurting." Bryant also had a
conversation with Jon about returning to school. When Jon refused
to agree to the conditions necessary for his return to school, Bryant
told Jon not to turn his back on God. Jon responded that he
intended "to commit every sin that I want to commit. I'm going to
do anything and everything I want to do, and when I hit rock
bottom, then I will call on God."
	The next witness to testify on behalf of the State was Kim
Turner, a juvenile probation officer for Logan County. Turner
prepared a social investigation report of Jon based upon police
reports, interviews with Jon and his mother and father, psychiatric
information, and school records. Turner noted that Jon had been
hospitalized in the Psychiatric Institute when he was five years old
and again when he was six years old. Aside from an evaluation
concerning his fitness to stand trial, however, Jon had no other
psychiatric treatment or evaluations since he was six years old.
	Turner said that, when Jon first moved in with his
grandparents, records showed that Jon's mother said Jon had
become so aggressive that he was unmanageable. The discharge
summary from Jon's first stay at the Psychiatric Institute indicated
that Jon "was assaultive toward his classmates, constantly goading
and threatening them." Jon also had admitted that he could harm
his mother. Jon's discharge summary from his second stay at the
Psychiatric Institute noted that Jon had been "quite hostile,
threatening, and even aggressive toward peers." In addition, Jon
had been aggressive toward his siblings.
	Turner testified that she did not believe that Jon had an
appropriate support system available to him, as his grandparents
had been killed and his parents were not an option for placement.
Turner checked with a program that takes more violent offenders,
but the director of admissions indicated that Jon would not be
appropriate for their facility. Turner said that, based upon Jon's
lack of support, the lack of a treatment plan, and the nature of his
criminal offenses, Jon's chance of rehabilitation was unlikely. She
did not think that a plan of rehabilitation could be developed, in
light of Jon's inability to change his behavior in the past.
	Turner testified that, if Jon was committed to the Department
of Corrections through the juvenile court, he would go to the
reception center for the Juvenile Department of Corrections, which
provides treatment for any psychological or psychiatric disorders.
The facility also would be able to deal with Jon's ADD. If Jon was
sentenced to the Department of Corrections as an adult, he still
would first go to the Juvenile Department of Corrections, and
would be held there until the age of 21 unless there was some
problem. If Jon was a security risk or a real problem, he could be
transferred to the adult Department of Corrections at age 17 or age
18. If Jon was sentenced through the juvenile system, he would be
released at the age of 21. Turner said that the adult division of the
Department of Corrections had the same services available as the
juvenile division as far as treatment for any psychiatric or
psychological disorders.
	In Turner's interview with Jon, Jon told her that his
grandfather's usual form of punishment was grounding, although
in the past his grandfather had used a strap to spank him. Jon did
not tell Turner that his grandfather had spanked him on the night
of the killings. On cross-examination, Turner said that, in
preparing her report, she took into account the fact that Jon had no
prior history with the police.
	Jon's mother, Glenda Ashworth, then testified on his behalf.
Glenda said that Jon was put on medication for his ADD after both
of his stays at the Psychiatric Institute. The Cearlocks did not like
the fact that Jon was on medication and took Jon off his
medication. Glenda said that Jon told her that on the night of the
shootings Lila had been nagging him all night about his detention.
Keith then told Jon that he would never amount to anything, and
Jon smarted off. Keith then hit Jon five times with his razor strap.
Jon then got the gun and went into the bathroom. While in the
bathroom, the gun went off, and the Cearlocks came running down
the hall. Jon then stepped into the hallway and shot them.
	In addition to the foregoing testimony, a report prepared by
Dr. Robert Chapman was admitted into evidence at the transfer
hearing. Dr. Chapman had conducted a psychiatric evaluation of
Jon to determine his fitness to stand trial. Jon told Dr. Chapman
that his grandparents constantly were negative and complaining.
Jon said that his grandparents did not like Jon's father because
Jon's father was not "Christian perfect." Dr. Chapman noted that
the records from the Psychiatric Institute showed that Jon had been
in the institute for three months when he was five years old and for
two months when he was six years old. Jon was placed on
antidepressant medication during both stays.
	Jon told Dr. Chapman about the events leading to the
murders. Jon told Dr. Chapman that, after Keith hit Jon with the
razor strap, Jon went into the bathroom, left the bathroom to get
Keith's gun, and then returned to the bathroom and began loading
the gun out of anger. Jon then shot a Tilex bottle and came out of
the bathroom again. Lila saw Jon and began backing away. Jon
told Dr. Chapman, "I knew I had to do something or they would
call the police." Jon said he panicked, and when Keith came
around the corner, Jon shot him. As Lila turned to run, Jon shot
her in the back, then tried to shoot her some more but the gun
jammed. Jon claimed that although it had been hard for him to
remember he had received a spanking from Keith on the day of the
murders because he tried to put that "stuff" out of his mind, he
later remembered the spanking and told his attorney.
	In his interview with Dr. Chapman, Jon denied that he had
ever thought about killing his grandparents before. Jon claimed
that he retrieved Keith's gun in order to shoot himself. After Jon
impulsively shot the Tilex bottle, he knew he "had to do
something" because he believed Keith would kill him. Jon said
that he shot Lila because he "knew he had to shoot her to get
everybody's attention." Jon also admitted to intrusive thoughts of
shooting the people at church. Dr. Chapman opined that Jon had
not acted in a premeditated manner at the time of the shootings,
but instead had acted in a state of sudden and intense passion.
	The decision to permit prosecution of a juvenile under the
criminal law is a matter of judicial discretion, although that
discretion is limited and controlled by the Juvenile Court Act of
1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1994)). People v.
M.D., 101 Ill. 2d 73, 83 (1984). Under the provisions of the Act in
effect at the time of Jon's transfer, a juvenile court judge could
enter an order permitting a minor 13 years of age or older to be
prosecuted under the criminal laws of the state if the judge found
that it was "not in the best interests of the minor or of the public
to proceed under this Act." 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(a) (West 1994)
(repealed by Pub. Act 90-590, art. 2001, §2001-15, eff. January
1, 1999, now 705 ILCS 405/5-805 (West 2000)). Pursuant to
section 5-4(3)(b) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(b) (West 1994)
(repealed by Pub. Act 90-590, art. 2001, §2001-15, eff. January
1, 1999, now 705 ILCS 405/5-805 (West 2000))), a trial court was
to consider, among other matters, seven factors in reaching a
decision on whether to prosecute a particular minor as an adult.
M.D., 101 Ill. 2d  at 83-84. Those seven factors were:
		"(i) whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a
grand jury may be expected to return an indictment; (ii)
whether there is evidence that the alleged offense was
committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner; (iii)
the age of the minor; (iv) the previous history of the
minor; (v) whether there are facilities particularly
available to the Juvenile Court for the treatment and
rehabilitation of the minor; (vi) whether the best interest
of the minor and the security of the public may require
that the minor continue in custody or under supervision
for a period extending beyond his minority; [and] (vii)
whether the minor possessed a deadly weapon when
committing the alleged offense." 705 ILCS 405/5-4(3)(b)
(West 1994).
	Looking at the statutory factors, the juvenile court in this case
found that the grand jury would be expected to return an
indictment. The court also found that the alleged offenses had been
committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner. Third, the
court noted that, if Jon were four months older, he automatically
would be transferred to adult court. With regard to Jon's history,
the fourth factor, the court stated that Jon had an unusual and a sad
life, and that his parents and grandparents had failed him by not
seeing that his medication and his treatment for ADD were
continued. The court next found that there were not any facilities
unique to juveniles that were not available to adults, and that, in
any event, even if Jon should be convicted in adult court, he first
would go to the juvenile division. As to the sixth factor, whether
it was in the interest of the minor and the public that custody
continue past Jon's majority, the court observed that if Jon should
be convicted in juvenile court, he would be released at age 21
whether or not he was rehabilitated. Finally, the court found that
Jon did have a deadly weapon when committing the offenses. The
court then stated that after balancing the statutory factors, along
with the fact that if Jon "stood convicted of a couple first degree
murders, that his sentence of mandatory imprisonment would be
imposed," the court concluded that it was in the best interest of the
public that Jon be transferred to the adult division of the courts.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the transfer from juvenile
court to adult court.
	As noted, Jon argues that the appellate court erred in
affirming his transfer from juvenile court to the circuit court. Jon
contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in its
consideration of the factors set forth in section 5-4 of the Act (705
ILCS 405/5-4 (West 1994)). Jon argues that a balancing of those
factors weighs against transfer. Jon also maintains that the juvenile
court misunderstood the sentence that would be imposed if Jon
was tried and convicted as an adult.
	It is clear that the purpose of a transfer proceeding is to
balance the best interests of a juvenile offender, particularly as the
offender's interests relate to his potential for rehabilitation, against
society's legitimate interest in being protected from criminal
victimization perpetrated by minors. People v. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1987). In striking this balance, a juvenile court judge is to
weigh the facts of the alleged crime, particularly whether the crime
was committed in an aggressive and premeditated manner. Clark,
119 Ill. 2d  at 12.
	Jon argues that the juvenile court judge in this case
improperly considered that the crime had been committed in an
aggressive and premeditated manner. Jon denies that there was
evidence he had previously talked about killing his grandparents.
In support of this argument, Jon notes that he was not lying in wait
for his grandparents, that he actually was contemplating suicide
when he retrieved the gun, and that he irrationally shot the Tilex
bottle, causing him to panic and believe that Keith would kill him.
Jon further claims there was a lack of planning as to how he was
going to escape, evidenced by his changing of clothes and walking
toward Steve Powell's house. Jon also cites two cases where a
juvenile's acts were found to be premeditated, and notes that in
those cases, in contrast to his case, the defendants planned the
crime, armed themselves, and made specific plans to cover up
their conduct. See People v. D.B., 202 Ill. App. 3d 194 (1990);
People v. Beck, 190 Ill. App. 3d 748 (1989). Finally, Jon observes
that the appellate court in this case conceded that the shooting of
Keith was not a planned act.
	We find sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial
court's finding that the offenses in this case occurred in an
aggressive and premeditated manner. In contrast to Jon's
statements to Dr. Chapman, Detective Harberts testified that when
he first interviewed Jon, Jon told Harberts that he had thought
about killing his grandparents a few times previously, and figured
he would use a gun. During the second interview, Jon told
Harberts that he did not start the evening planning to kill his
grandparents, but began thinking about it when Keith was yelling
at Jon about his tardiness. Jon never told Harberts that Keith had
beaten him with a razor strap prior to the shootings. Jon said that
he thought about killing his grandparents for around 15 minutes
before he got the gun. Jon also said that he chased Lila out of the
house and attempted to shoot her again, but the gun jammed. Jon
then went into the house to retrieve Lila's gun so that he could
shoot her some more.
	In a transfer hearing under the Act, the State need only present
evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause. People
v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 304 (1979). Here, the State presented
evidence that Jon had thought of killing his grandparents before,
had thought about how he would kill them, and had thought about
killing them for approximately 15 minutes prior to obtaining the
gun. With regard to Lila, the State presented evidence that Jon
tried to shoot her even after she had fallen, and even tried to find
Lila's gun so that he could continue shooting her after Keith's gun
jammed. Moreover, although Jon contends that he was so afraid of
his grandparents that he acted impulsively, Jon did not tell the
officers or Kim Turner that Keith had hit him with a razor strap
prior to the murders. Thus, while Jon's actions may not have been
as planned as those of the defendants in D.B. and Beck, we find the
State's evidence of premeditation was sufficient to sustain a
finding of probable cause.
	In addition to the facts of the alleged crime, including
premeditation and aggressiveness, a juvenile court judge is to
consider the age of the offender and his previous history, is to
ascertain the availability of treatment and rehabilitative services
for the juvenile, and is to determine whether the best interests of
the minor and of the public may require that the minor continue in
custody beyond his minority. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d  at 13. This court
has declined to prescribe a mathematical formula to govern a
judge's discretion in weighing each factor. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d  at
305.
	Jon, however, argues that the juvenile court erred in
considering these factors. For example, Jon claims that the
juvenile court failed to consider his age in light of his sheltered life
experiences, his lack of a prior criminal history, and his tragic life.
Jon distinguishes his case from those where juvenile defendants
were found to be so "streetwise" and experienced beyond their
years that they had ceased being children. See People v. M.D., 101 Ill. 2d 73, 86 (1984) (juvenile was "not a stranger to adult
experiences," including drinking alcohol, using marijuana, and
having sex); In re L.J., 274 Ill. App. 3d 977, 980 (1995) (L.J. had
life experiences of someone "way beyond his age" and, in reality,
had ceased being a minor).
	Rather, Jon claims his case is similar to People v. D.B., 202
Ill. App. 3d 194 (1990), where the denial of the State's motion to
transfer was affirmed, based in part upon the fact that the juvenile
did not exhibit the experience of someone well beyond his years.
Jon also finds close parallels between his case and that of the
minor in In re Burns, 67 Ill. App. 3d 361, 366 (1978), where the
court found that the juvenile's history of neglect, deprivation,
emotional impoverishment and chaos favored treatment as a
seriously troubled adolescent rather than as an adult.
	While we do not read the trial court's ruling as granting the
State's motion for transfer simply because Jon was only four
months shy of an automatic transfer, we note that this case is not
as similar to D.B. and to Burns as Jon represents. In fact, one
highly significant difference is that in both D.B. and Burns, the
juveniles did not personally participate in the killing of the
victims, but instead were held legally accountable. See D.B., 202
Ill. App. 3d at 202 ("although legally accountable for the murder,
respondent did not personally kill"); Burns, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 364
("even though [Burns] may be legally accountable for the murder
which occurred, the evidence also suggests that [Burns] did not
premeditate, or even take part in, the actual stabbing"). Therefore,
we are not persuaded that Jon's case is so similar to D.B. and
Burns that Jon's transfer was an abuse of discretion.
	In any event, in reviewing a juvenile court's order transferring
a minor, this court does not reweigh the factors. Rather, to affirm
an order transferring a minor to criminal court, this court must
determine if there was sufficient evidence in the record as to each
statutory factor to support the transfer order. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d  at
18. Here, the juvenile court received extensive evidence
concerning Jon's history, as presented through the testimony of
Kim Turner and Glenda Ashworth, and the report of Dr. Chapman.
There was significant testimony concerning Jon's sheltered
background, his lack of prior contact with the police, and his
shuttling between his mother's home and his grandparents' home.
Consequently, there was sufficient evidence in the record as to
Jon's age and history.
	Jon also contends that the juvenile court failed to consider
Jon's potential for rehabilitation, and failed to receive and evaluate
information about the type of facilities available for treatment and
rehabilitation. Jon further claims that the juvenile court failed to
make any meaningful analysis of Jon's interest versus society's
interests.
	As discussed, a statutorily proper evaluation of a minor's
history also includes receipt and review of information concerning
the minor's familial support for any possible treatment or
rehabilitation, in addition to any prior involvement in the juvenile
justice system. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d  at 17. A juvenile judge also must
receive and evaluate information concerning the type of facilities
available for the treatment or rehabilitation of the minor, and must
evaluate the likely effectiveness of those facilities in light of the
history and present circumstances of the minor. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 
at 17.
	Here, although Jon disputes the juvenile court's weighing of
these factors, it is clear from the record that Turner's testimony
presented information concerning the type of facilities available
for Jon's treatment or rehabilitation, as well as the likely
effectiveness of those facilities in light of Jon's history and present
circumstances. Turner was of the opinion that Jon did not have
familial support for any possible treatment or rehabilitation. In
fact, Turner's opinion was that Jon's chance of rehabilitation was
unlikely given Jon's lack of support, the lack of a treatment plan,
and the nature of his criminal offenses. Turner also stated that Jon
would first go to the Juvenile Department of Corrections, where
he would receive treatment for any psychiatric disorders and for
his ADD. The adult division of the Department of Corrections had
the same services available.
	In light of this information, we find no merit to Jon's claim
that the juvenile court failed to consider his sheltered life
experiences, his lack of a prior criminal history, and his tragic life.
Nor do we find support for Jon's contention that the juvenile court
failed to consider Jon's potential for rehabilitation, and failed to
receive and evaluate information about the type of facilities
available for treatment and rehabilitation. The juvenile court
simply found that these factors did not outweigh the factors
supporting a transfer. Where a juvenile judge considers evidence
on the statutory factors and any other relevant evidence, the
resulting decision is a product of sound, judicial discretion and
will not be disturbed on review. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d  at 14.
	We also find no merit to Jon's claim that the juvenile court
failed to make any meaningful analysis of Jon's interests versus
society's interests. With regard to this factor, the juvenile court
noted that there was a lot of argument concerning whether Jon
could be rehabilitated before he reached majority, and noted that
if Jon went through the juvenile court, he would be released
whether he had been rehabilitated or not, and there would be no
continued supervision. Although it is clear from the record that
Jon had suffered a tragic life and had been failed by his parents
and grandparents, the fact remains that he committed two
homicides and had admitted to intrusive thoughts of killing those
who angered him. Indeed, it is worth noting that in a later version
of the Act, the legislature amended the statute on discretionary
transfers to add: "In considering these factors, the court shall give
greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the
minor's prior record of delinquency than to the other factors listed
in this subsection." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-805 (West
2000). Here, there was sufficient probable cause to establish that
Jon's interests did not outweigh society's interest in requiring that
Jon continue in custody beyond his majority.
	In addition to Jon's claim that the juvenile court erred in
weighing the statutory factors, Jon also argues that the juvenile
court misunderstood the sentence that would be imposed if Jon
should be tried and convicted as an adult. The juvenile court stated
that if Jon was convicted of a couple of first degree murders, a
sentence of mandatory imprisonment would be imposed. Jon notes
that if he was convicted of one first degree murder in criminal
court, mandatory imprisonment would be imposed (see 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(1) (West 1994)). However, he would face mandatory
life imprisonment if convicted of two first degree murders (see 730
ILCS 5/5-8-1a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1994)). Jon argues that this court's
decision in Clark "mandates that the court be aware and evaluate
a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole upon
conviction for two first degree murders."
	We decline to attribute great weight to the trial court's
statement that if Jon should be convicted of a couple of first
degree murders, a sentence of mandatory imprisonment would be
imposed. As the appellate court observed in affirming the juvenile
court's decision to transfer, a court is presumed to know the law
regarding a potential sentence, and both the State and defense
counsel had informed the juvenile court of the proper sentence.
307 Ill. App. 3d 707 (unpublished material under Supreme Court
Rule 23). Further, this case is distinguishable from our decision in
Clark, where we found that there was "not one scintilla of
evidence in the record of the transfer proceeding that would have
apprised anyone that the transfer could result in a term of natural
life imprisonment." Clark, 119 Ill. 2d  at 16. Here, in contrast,
there is evidence in the record of proceeding that Jon's transfer
could result in a term of natural life imprisonment. Consequently,
we agree with the appellate court that the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion to transfer.



MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS MADE WHILE IN
POLICE CUSTODY
	Jon's second argument on appeal is that the appellate court
erred in affirming the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress
the statements that Jon made while in police custody. At the
hearing on Jon's motion to suppress, Sergeant Darrell Sisk
testified that he is the juvenile officer for the Lincoln city police
department. Sisk said that, on the evening of April 27, 1995, he
received a telephone call from another officer asking if he knew
the minor, Jon, that they had as a suspect. Sisk responded that he
did not know the minor. Sisk said that he was not told the nature
of the juvenile's crime and was not asked to come down to the
station.
	Detective Harberts testified at the hearing on Jon's motion to
suppress. To the extent that Harberts' testimony is duplicative of
his testimony at the transfer hearing, it will not be repeated here.
Harberts said that when Spickard and Jon approached him at the
crime scene, Jon was not handcuffed or restrained in any way.
When Harberts instructed Officer Kerns to handcuff Jon and place
him in a police car, Harberts believed Jon to be 18 or 19 years old.
	After Jon had been transported to the Logan County jail,
Harberts went to Jon's holding cell and asked Jon's name, age,
and relationship to the victims. Harberts then asked Jon if he
would be willing to come to Harberts' office for an interview, and,
when Jon agreed, Harberts took Jon, unrestrained, to his office.
Jon sat at Harberts' desk, across from Harberts. Harberts asked Jon
if he needed something to drink or eat, or needed to use the
restroom. Jon responded "no," and then agreed to speak with
Harberts. Harberts read Jon his Miranda rights and asked Jon if he
understood each right. Jon responded affirmatively. Harberts said
Jon was very cooperative throughout the interview. Jon never
asked Harberts to stop questioning him, did not ask for any adult
presence, and did not request a lawyer. Harberts did not threaten
or coerce Jon, nor did he promise Jon anything. This interview
began at 9:05 p.m. and ended at 9:27 p.m. At the end of the
interview, Jon told Harberts his mother's name and gave Harberts
her telephone number.
	Harberts testified that, at 10:45 p.m., he attempted to call
Glenda Ashworth. He reached Glenda's answering machine and
left a message. After leaving a message for Glenda, Harberts
discovered that his interview with Jon did not record on the tape.
Harberts asked Jon if he would allow Harberts to tape a second
interview, and Jon agreed. During this second interview, Harberts
again read Jon his Miranda rights. Jon did not ask for any adult or
for a lawyer. This interview took place between 11:07 p.m. and
11:30 p.m. Later, around 12:40 a.m., Jon agreed to accompany the
officers back to his grandparents' residence and led the officers
through a video reenactment of what had occurred earlier that day.
Jon was not shackled during the reenactment.
	On cross-examination, Harberts agreed that, after Spickard
and Jon walked up to him at the Cearlocks' home, he would not
have let Jon walk away. Harberts also testified that he did not give
Jon any Miranda warnings before he asked Jon why he had shot
the people. Harberts also said that, when Jon was in the holding
cell at the station, he did not tell Jon that Jon could be detained for
a maximum of six hours. Harberts testified that Jon told him that
the Cearlocks were Jon's legal guardians. When Harberts began
interviewing Jon, he did not tell Jon that Jon could be charged or
tried as an adult.
	Glenda Ashworth testified that, on April 27, 1995, she was
working a 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift. Glenda said that she ran home
around 4 a.m. on April 28, 1995, because her daughter was afraid
someone was trying to break into the house. After she calmed her
children, Glenda noticed the light on her answering machine
flashing. Glenda played the message, then called Harberts, who
told Glenda what had happened and asked her who had custody of
Jon. Glenda told Harberts that she had custody, and also told
Harberts about Jon's medical history and his ADD. Glenda asked
Harberts if Jon had a lawyer. Harberts told Glenda that she would
have to talk to the State's Attorney. On cross-examination, Glenda
acknowledged that she had signed a document giving her parents
custody and guardianship of Jon, but said that the document was
used only to get Jon into school.
	Jon testified at the hearing on his motion to suppress that he
was 15 years old. Jon said that when his grandparents punished
him, he would be grounded, or he would be yelled at, or he would
be spanked. Jon explained that his grandfather would have Jon
bend over and grab his ankles, and then would whip Jon with a
razor strap.
	Jon testified that, when he left Steve Powell's house on April
27, 1995, he decided to walk back to the Cearlock's house because
he needed to get some help and thought the police would be there.
Jon thought the police could help him. At the time, Jon said he felt
confused, scared, hopeless, upset, angry and sad. Jon said that he
gave the gun to Spickard and told Spickard that he was the one
that had shot the Cearlocks. Jon made that statement because that
was what had happened, and because he had to get some help. Jon
said that, after he gave the gun to Spickard, he did not feel like he
could walk away because Spickard was holding Jon's elbow and
told Jon to come with him. Jon said it did not cross his mind to run
because he thought the officers could help him. Jon said that he
answered Harberts' question about why Jon had done it because
he did not feel like he had a choice. Jon testified that he did not
understand the significance of answering the question.
	Jon said that he did not see a tape recorder during the first
interview with Harberts. Jon denied that Harberts read Jon his
Miranda rights before the first interview. Jon testified that when
Harberts began asking him questions, Jon answered the questions
because Harberts was the boss and Jon was supposed to tell
Harberts what Harberts wanted to know. Harberts did not ask Jon
where his mom or dad were and did not tell Jon that a juvenile
police officer was supposed to be there.
	For the second interview, Harberts placed a tape recorder on
the desk, turned the recorder on, and read Jon his Miranda
warnings. Jon claimed that he did not understand his Miranda
warnings and only indicated that he understood them because he
"was just going along with what [Harberts] was saying." Jon said
that he did not feel that he had the right to tell Harberts he did not
want to answer any questions. Jon also said that he participated in
the video reenactment because the officers wanted him to, and Jon
felt that he did not have a choice.
	On cross-examination, Jon agreed that he understood he had
committed a crime and agreed that he wanted to confess to the
crime. Jon also agreed that, during the second interview, when
Harberts asked him a question that he did not want to answer, he
felt free to say no to Harberts. Jon said that the officers did not
threaten him or make any promises to him. Jon testified that he
was doing well in school before he was expelled from Park
Meadows.
	Dr. Robert Chapman testified that Jon found it difficult and
confining to follow the rules of the church and the school. Jon said
he was subjected to harsh criticism by his grandparents and
frequently was subjected to physical discipline. Lila would
impulsively slap Jon with her hand or with objects. Keith would
make Jon bend over and grab his ankles, then would beat Jon on
the buttocks with a board or strap.
	Dr. Chapman's opinion was that Jon suffered from ADD. Dr.
Chapman said that taking into account Jon's age, his background,
his ADD, and the circumstances, Jon was substantially impaired
in his capacity to appreciate the gravity of the situation in waiving
his Miranda rights. Dr. Chapman testified that, on the day of the
shootings, Jon was not suffering from any psychosis or delusions.
	On cross-examination, Dr. Chapman said that Jon was able to
understand the words used by the police officers in giving the
Miranda warnings. Dr. Chapman explained that his opinion
related to Jon's inability to appreciate the legal significance of
talking to the police. Dr. Chapman agreed that Jon talked to the
police because Jon wanted to talk to the police.
	Pastor Thomas Bryant testified that Jon's reading and writing
skills were normal, as were Jon's verbal skills. Pastor Bryant said
that Jon's demeanor in the video of the reenactment and in the
audio tape of his second interview with Harberts was Jon's normal
demeanor, which was very calm. Pastor Bryant said that Jon was
very honest and truthful in admitting when he had done something
wrong. Pastor Bryant denied that Jon had signs of ADD during his
years at Park Meadows, and said that Jon was never referred to any
special school or program for ADD.
	Following a hearing on Jon's motion to suppress, the trial
court found that Jon was of average intelligence, appeared
emotionally stable, and was articulate and familiar with the
English language. The trial court concluded that Jon was aware of
his Miranda rights, understood them, and knowingly waived them.
The trial court noted that no threats or promises were made to Jon,
nor was he abused or denied access to food, drink or the bathroom
during his interrogation. Further, at one point, Jon indicated to the
officer that he did not wish to answer a particular question. The
trial court stated that, "[w]ith regard to the violation of the
Juvenile Court Act, the Courts certainly do not condone such
violation but higher Courts, on review, have made it clear that
such a violation does not cause a per se suppression ***." The trial
court concluded that Jon's statements were made voluntarily. The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of Jon's motion to
suppress the statements made while in police custody.
	On appeal to this court, Jon argues first that his age,
experience and emotional characteristics establish that his
statements were involuntary, even though he had been given and
had waived his Miranda rights. Second, Jon argues that the
circumstances of his arrest, including the officers' failure to
contact Jon's parents or a juvenile officer, also establish that Jon's
statements were not voluntary and should have been suppressed.
	In reviewing a trial court's ruling concerning whether a
confession is voluntary, the trial court's factual findings will be
reversed only if those findings are against the manifest weight of
the evidence. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000). However, a
trial court's ruling on the ultimate question of whether the
confession was voluntary is reviewed de novo. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at
50.
	In determining whether a confession is voluntary, courts look
to the totality of the circumstances, including factors such as the
party's age, intelligence, background, experience, education,
mental capacity, and physical condition at the time of questioning.
G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 54. Other factors include the duration and the
legality of the detention, the duration of the questioning, as well as
any mental or physical abuse by the police, including the existence
of threats or promises on the part of the police. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at
54. No single factor is dispositive. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 54. The test
of voluntariness is whether the individual made his confession
freely and voluntarily, without compulsion or inducement of any
kind, or whether the individual's will was overborne at the time of
the confession. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 54.
	Upon review, we agree with the trial court that the totality of
the circumstances indicate that Jon's confession was voluntary.
We first consider Jon's age, experience, and emotional
characteristics. On this point, the record indicates that Jon was an
average student with normal reading, writing and verbal skills. Jon
was not physically or mentally abused by the police during his
interviews, nor did the police make any threats or promises.
	Although Dr. Chapman testified that Jon was unable to
appreciate the gravity of the situation in waiving his Miranda
rights and was so conditioned to pleasing authority figures that he
automatically would answer the officers' questions, there was
ample evidence in the record to the contrary. For example, as the
trial court noted, Jon did not hesitate in refusing to answer one of
Harberts' questions concerning Jon's thoughts of killing others.
Similarly, there was evidence that Jon had defied authority figures
in the past. Jon had refused to serve his suspension for kissing a
girl, and had refused to go to the school in Oklahoma. Keith had
told Pastor Davis that Lila was afraid of Jon, and Lila herself told
Pastor Bryant that Jon had slammed her hand and had shoved her
up against a wall. When Pastor Bryant told Jon not to turn his back
on God, Jon told Pastor Bryant that he would commit every sin he
wanted to commit. Similarly, when the other students at Park
Meadows asked Jon to reconsider serving his suspension, Jon
refused, saying he now would do the hurting. In addition, as the
trial court noted, Jon "indeed did seem to want to tell what had
happened," both when he first walked up to Spickard at the crime
scene and during his interviews with Harberts.
	We next consider Jon's claim that the coercive nature of his
encounter with the police establishes that his statements were not
voluntary. In support of his claim that Jon's encounter with the
police was coercive, Jon notes that he was handcuffed when he
was taken from the crime scene to the police station, in violation
of the Lincoln police department's policy that a juvenile should be
handcuffed only when necessary to prevent violence or escape.
Likewise, Jon observes that both the Act and the policy of the
Lincoln police department state that no minor under 16 years of
age may be confined in a jail or a place ordinarily used for the
confinement of prisoners in a police station, and that when a minor
of appropriate age is detained in a jail cell, he should be told the
purpose of his detention, the time it is expected to last, and that the
detention cannot exceed six hours. See 705 ILCS
405/5-7(2)(c)(iii), (2)(c)(vi) (West 1994) (repealed by Pub. Act
90-590, art. 2001, §2001-15, eff. January 1, 1999, now 705 ILCS
405/5-410 (West 2000)). Jon argues that, in violation of the Act
and the policy, he was detained in a prisoner holding cell and was
not told that his detention could not exceed six hours. Finally, Jon
notes that he was not advised he could consult with his parents
before being questioned, he was not advised that he could be tried
as an adult, and Harberts did not make a reasonable attempt to
notify Jon's parents or other person legally responsible for Jon's
care or take Jon to the juvenile officer for jurisdiction, as required
under the Act. See 750 ILCS 405/5-6(1) (West 1994).
	The trial court found that the violations of the Act did not
require suppression of Jon's statements, as Jon's waiver of
Miranda was knowingly and intelligently made, and Jon had
voluntarily confessed. We agree with the trial court. Although Jon
was handcuffed when he first was taken to the police station from
the crime scene, Harberts testified that at the time, he thought Jon
was 18 or 19 years old. Likewise, although Jon was not told that
his detention could not exceed six hours, there is no evidence or
allegation that Jon was detained for more than six hours. We do
not deem any of these purported violations significant enough to
render Jon's statements coerced or involuntary.
	Possibly more significant in this case is the officers' failure to
contact Jon's parents or a juvenile officer prior to questioning Jon.
With regard to the confession of a juvenile, this court has
recognized that the taking of such a confession is a " 'sensitive
concern.' " G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 54, quoting People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 476 (1977). Consequently, courts considering the
voluntariness of juvenile confessions consider whether the
juvenile had an opportunity to consult with an adult interested in
his welfare, known as a "concerned adult," either before or during
the interrogation. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 55. In determining whether
a juvenile had an opportunity to confer with a "concerned adult,"
courts consider whether the police prevented the juvenile from
conferring with a concerned adult and whether the police
frustrated the attempts of a concerned adult to confer with the
juvenile. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 55. The "concerned adult" factor is
particularly relevant in situations where a juvenile has
demonstrated trouble understanding the interrogation process, has
asked to speak with either his parents or a concerned adult, or
where the police have prevented the juvenile's parents from
speaking with him. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 55. Nonetheless, a
juvenile's confession should not be suppressed simply because he
was denied the opportunity to confer with a concerned adult either
before or during his interrogation. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 55.
	In G.O., we found that a juvenile's confession was voluntary
even though he was not provided with an opportunity to confer
with a concerned adult because: the juvenile never requested to
speak with a concerned adult; the police never frustrated an
attempt by a concerned adult to speak with the juvenile; the
juvenile's detention was valid; the juvenile was informed of his
Miranda rights and indicated that he understood those rights; the
juvenile was intelligent and did well in school; the juvenile was
questioned only for a short period of time on three or four
occasions; and no coercion or physical threats occurred, nor were
any promises made. G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 56.
	 Based upon the foregoing considerations, we find that any
failure to contact Jon's parents or a juvenile officer prior to
questioning Jon did not render his statements involuntary. With
regard to Jon's parents, we note that Jon told Harberts that his
grandparents were his legal guardians. As Harberts believed that
those legally responsible for Jon's care were deceased, we do not
attribute great weight to the fact that Harberts did not immediately
attempt to contact Jon's parents. In fact, after Harberts had
interviewed Jon the first time and obtained information concerning
Jon's mother, Harberts telephoned Glenda.
	In addition, as in G.O., Jon never requested an opportunity to
speak with a concerned adult and the officers did not prevent any
concerned adult from speaking with Jon. Jon's detention was
valid, and he was informed of his Miranda rights. Further,
although Jon now claims that he did not understand those rights,
the trial court found, and we agree, that Jon did understand his
Miranda rights. Pastor Bryant testified that Jon was intelligent and
did well in school. Jon was not handcuffed in the jail, and was
questioned on only two occasions for approximately 30 minutes
each time. No physical coercion or threats occurred, and no
promises were made. Under the circumstances, we find that the
totality of circumstances indicates that Jon's confession was the
result of his own decision and was not the result of compulsion or
inducement, nor was Jon's will being overborne at the time of his
confession. For those reasons, we affirm the trial court's decision
denying Jon's motion to suppress the statements he made while in
custody. 	We now turn to the issues raised in the State's appeal.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS JON'S INITIAL STATEMENT
	In his motion to suppress, Jon also claimed that his initial
statement to Detective Harberts at the scene of the crime should be
suppressed. As noted above, when Spickard brought Jon over to
Harberts, Harberts asked Jon why he had shot the people. Jon
responded it was "because they pissed me off. I couldn't take it
anymore so I shot them." Jon argued that this statement should
have been suppressed because he had not been given his Miranda
warnings before Harberts asked the question. The trial court
denied Jon's motion to suppress this statement, finding that the
question was an appropriate on-scene general investigative
question. The appellate court reversed the trial court, finding that
the question was not a general on-scene investigative question, but
instead was an interrogation. See 307 Ill. App. 3d at 710
(unpublished material under Supreme Court Rule 23). The
appellate court further found that Jon was in custody at the time
the question was asked, so that the failure to give Miranda
warnings rendered Jon's answer to the question inadmissible.
	The State appeals the appellate court's decision with regard
to Jon's initial statement to Detective Harbert. The State maintains
that Harberts' question was not interrogation. The State further
argues that, in any event, Jon was not in custody when the question
was asked, so that Miranda warnings were not required.
	We need not address whether the appellate court properly
found that Harberts' question was interrogation and that Jon was
in custody because we find that, even if the trial court erroneously
denied Jon's motion to suppress his initial statement to Harberts,
any error was, at most, harmless. During Jon's first and second
interviews with Harberts, after Jon had received his Miranda
warnings, Jon repeated the initial statement he had made to
Harberts at the scene. Specifically, during the second, taped
interview, the following exchange took place:
			"[Harberts]: OK. Then you walked over to me and
[Spickard] told me that you had just walked up and said
that you had shot them or killed the, and, uh, you had
given him the gun, and I asked you why. Can you tell my
[sic] why?
			[Jon]: Yes sir, I said cause they pissed me off. I was
upset and sick and tired of being treated the way I was. I
couldn't take it any longer."
	Even if the initial statement to Harberts had been admitted
into evidence erroneously, it is difficult to conceive of any
prejudice to Jon when he repeated the statement to Harberts two
more times after receiving his Miranda warnings. Although Jon
claimed that any statements he made were coerced because he was
conditioned to respond to authority, we find no evidence in the
record that Jon's response to Harberts was not voluntary. It is
noteworthy that the response came shortly after Jon of his own
initiative confessed to Spickard that he was the shooter.
Consequently, the subsequent reading of Miranda warnings cured
the condition that the appellate court found made the initial
voluntary but unwarned statement inadmissible. See People v.
Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d 436, 452 (1995) (reading of Miranda warnings
cured prior voluntary but unwarned statement), citing Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311-12, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222, 233-34, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1294-95 (1985).
	In Wilson, this court held that, once a defendant is warned of
his rights, he is free to exercise his own decision of whether to
make a second statement. Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d  at 452. We noted that
two hours had passed from the end of the defendant's first,
unwarned statement until he was read his Miranda warnings, and
during that two-hour time period, the defendant was not subject to
police interrogation, force, threats, harassment or questioning.
Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d  at 542.
	Here, Jon's initial statement to Harberts was made shortly
after Harberts arrived on the scene at 8:38 p.m. Jon received his
Miranda warnings and was interviewed the first time from 9:05
p.m. until 9:37 p.m., and received the second set of Miranda
warnings and was interviewed the second time from 11:07 p.m.
until 11:30 p.m. Jon was not subjected to police interrogation,
force, threats or harassment prior to the first interview or between
the time of the first and second interviews. Jon was free to make
his own decision of whether to repeat his initial statement during
the first and second interviews. As those statements, which
repeated and in fact enlarged upon Jon's initial response to
Harberts, were admissible, we find that any purported error in
admitting Jon's initial statement to Harberts was harmless.

FELONY MURDER
	The State next appeals the appellate court's finding that Jon
could not be found guilty of felony murder based upon the
underlying offenses of aggravated battery and aggravated
discharge of a firearm. Jon was indicted on eight counts: Counts
I and II charged the first degree murders of Lila and Keith,
respectively, with intent to kill or do great bodily harm (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1994)); counts III and IV charged the first
degree murders of Lila and Keith, respectively, by knowingly
committing an act causing great probability of death or great
bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1994)); counts V and VI
charged the first degree murders of Lila and Keith, respectively, by
attempting or committing a forcible felony, namely aggravated
battery (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1994)); and counts VII and
VIII charged the first degree murders of Lila and Keith,
respectively, by attempting or committing a forcible felony,
namely, aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3)
(West 1994)).
	Prior to trial, Jon moved to dismiss the counts against him
charging felony murder, arguing that felony murder was not
appropriate because the predicate felonies, aggravated battery and
aggravated discharge of a firearm, were not independent of the
murders themselves. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss
those counts. On appeal, however, the appellate court concluded
that felony murder was limited to cases in which the predicate
felony consisted of conduct other than that inherent in the killing
itself. 307 Ill. App. 3d at 714. The appellate court therefore held
that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury that Jon could
be convicted of first degree murder on a felony-murder theory. 307
Ill. App. 3d at 714. However, because Jon was found guilty of first
degree murder only with regard to Lila, the appellate court's
finding of reversible error was limited to Jon's conviction for
Lila's murder.
	With regard to felony murder, the Criminal Code of 1961 (the
Code) provides:
			"(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful
justification commits first degree murder if, in performing
the acts which cause the death:
* * *
				(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony
other than second degree murder." 720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996).
	The Code defines "forcible felony" as, inter alia, "aggravated
battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or
disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or
threat of physical force or violence against any individual." 720
ILCS 5/2-8 (West 1996).
	In 1975, this court addressed whether aggravated battery
could be the underlying felony in a felony-murder charge where
the aggravated battery was alleged to have been committed against
the person who eventually died. People v. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d 568,
577 (1975). The defendants in Viser had claimed that the
indictments against them failed to properly charge murder where
they alleged that the defendants had each caused the death of the
victim, Hector Jordan, as they were attempting to commit or were
committing a forcible felony upon Hector Jordan, namely,
aggravated battery. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d  at 577. The defendants argued
that the indictments would have been proper only if the
indictments had charged that the defendants killed Hector Jordan
while committing an aggravated battery upon the surviving victim,
Harold Smith. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d  at 578.
	Upon review, this court noted that, at common law, any
unlawful killing occurring during the commission of any felony
was murder. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d  at 578. We noted that the Code
limited the offense underlying felony murder to " 'a forcible felony
other than voluntary manslaughter [now second degree murder],' "
and further noted that aggravated battery is a forcible felony. Viser,
62 Ill. 2d  at 578-79, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par.
9-1(a)(3). This court concluded that what the legislature intended
in establishing the offense of felony murder "was to deter the
commission of any of the enumerated forcible felonies, including
aggravated battery, by holding the perpetrator responsible for
murder if death results." Viser, 62 Ill. 2d  at 580. Consequently, the
indictment charging the defendants with felony murder based upon
the aggravated battery of the deceased victim was not improper.
Viser, 62 Ill. 2d  at 580.
	The State argues that the appellate court's ruling in this case
was in direct conflict with our decision in People v. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d 568 (1975). The appellate court acknowledged that its decision
might seem inconsistent with the Viser opinion, but claimed that
the court in Viser did not consider whether the predicate felony
underlying a charge of felony murder must have an independent
felonious purpose. 307 Ill. App. 3d at 714. The appellate court
held that the predicate felony underlying a felony-murder charge
must have a felonious purpose other than the killing itself. 307 Ill.
App. 3d at 714.
	The appellate court was correct that Viser did not address the
precise issue presented in this case. In Viser, the aggravated
battery serving as the predicate felony for the felony-murder
charge against defendants was based upon an incident where the
defendants struck and beat the victim. Viser, 62 Ill. 2d  at 576. The
victim died two weeks after the beating "of pancreatitis caused by
severe abdominal injuries he received" during the beating. Viser,
62 Ill. 2d  at 576. The charges of felony murder arose from the
cause and effect relationship between the crime
committed-aggravated battery-and the resulting murder. See
People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 322 (1998) ("Felony murder
depends solely on a cause and effect relationship between the
crime committed and the resulting murder to impose liability").
	Here, the cause and effect relationship between the crime
committed and the resulting murder is not so clear. The forcible
felonies underlying the charges of felony murder in this
case-aggravated battery and aggravated discharge of a firearm-
were acts that were inherent in, and arose out of, the fatal
shootings of Keith and Lila. It is arguable that it was not the
predicate felonies which resulted in and caused the murders of
Keith and Lila, but rather that it was the murders of Keith and Lila
which gave rise to the predicate felonies.
	As the appellate court observed, every shooting necessarily
encompasses conduct constituting aggravated battery, i.e., great
bodily harm, as well as conduct constituting aggravated discharge
of a firearm, i.e., discharging a firearm in the direction of another.
307 Ill. App. 3d at 712. Potentially, then, all fatal shootings could
be charged as felony murder based upon aggravated battery and/or
aggravated discharge of a firearm. The result could be to
"effectively eliminate the second degree murder statute" and also
to "eliminate the need for the State to prove an intentional or
knowing killing in most murder cases." 307 Ill. App. 3d at 712.
	Given the foregoing considerations, we agree with the
appellate court that where the acts constituting forcible felonies
arise from and are inherent in the act of murder itself, those acts
cannot serve as predicate felonies for a charge of felony murder.
Because the predicate felonies in this case arose from and were
inherent in the murders of Keith and Lila, the jury should not have
been instructed that Jon could be convicted of first degree murder
on a felony-murder theory. Accordingly, we affirm the appellate
court's finding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
felony murder.
	Our inquiry, however, does not end there. The appellate court
concluded that the trial court's error in instructing the jury on
felony murder constituted reversible error with regard to Jon's
conviction for the first degree murder of Lila.
	We disagree with the appellate court's conclusion that the
error in this case constituted reversible error. In this case, although
the jury was instructed that Jon had been charged with two types
of first degree murder, knowing or intentional murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)) and felony murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996)), only general verdict forms were used at
Jon's trial. The jury received three verdict forms for each victim:
(1) not guilty; (2) guilty of first degree murder; and (3) guilty of
second degree murder. It is well settled that " 'where an indictment
contains several counts arising out of a single transaction, and a
general verdict is returned[,] the effect is that the defendant is
guilty as charged in each count ***.' " People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 455 (1988), quoting People v. Lymore, 25 Ill. 2d 305,
308 (1962). Thus, a general verdict finding a defendant guilty of
murder, where the defendant was charged with intentional,
knowing, and felony murder, raises the presumption that the jury
found the defendant committed the most serious crime alleged,
intentional murder. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d  at 456. In this case
then, we must presume that the jury found Jon guilty of the most
serious crime alleged, intentional or knowing murder, so that any
error in instructing the jury on felony murder did not deprive Jon
of a fair trial. We therefore reverse the trial court's finding that
Jon's conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
	As a final matter, we note that our presumption that the jury
found Jon guilty of intentional or knowing murder rather than
felony murder is supported by the fact that the jury found Jon
guilty of the second degree murder of Keith Cearlock. As more
fully set forth below, second degree murder instructions were
given only on the charges of intentional or knowing murder and
not on the felony-murder charges. Consequently, in convicting Jon
of second degree murder, the jury must have believed Jon was
guilty of the intentional or knowing murder of Keith, but that one
of the mitigating defenses set forth in the second degree murder
statute was present. See 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996).
The jury therefore rejected the State's felony-murder theory as to
Keith.
	Had the jury believed that Jon was guilty of first degree felony
murder with regard to Lila, it would have followed that Jon was
guilty of first degree felony murder with regard to Keith. The
charges as to both Keith and Lila were identical. The felony-murder charges were based upon the predicate felonies of
aggravated battery and aggravated discharge of a firearm, felonies
which were inherent in both killings. Thus, if the jury believed that
the killing of Lila occurred while Jon was attempting or
committing aggravated battery or aggravated discharge of a
firearm, it would follow that Jon also killed Keith while
attempting or committing aggravated battery or aggravated
discharge of a firearm. Because the jury instead found Jon guilty
of second degree murder with regard to Keith, we see no reason to
disregard the presumption that Jon was found guilty of intentional
murder with regard to Lila.

SECOND DEGREE MURDER INSTRUCTIONS
	The State next challenges the appellate court's finding that the
trial court erroneously barred second degree murder instructions
on the felony-murder counts. Relying on People v. Williams, 164
Ill. App. 3d 99 (1987), and People v. Kidd, 295 Ill. App. 3d 160
(1998), the appellate court held that a defendant is entitled to an
instruction on second degree murder where the intent to kill or to
use deadly force in a felony-murder case is formed after the
formation of his belief in the need for self-defense. 307 Ill. App.
3d at 715-16. The appellate court found that this error constituted
reversible error with regard to Jon's conviction for the first degree
murder of Lila.
	The State argues that pursuant to the plain language of the
second degree murder statute (720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1996)), it is
clear that second degree murder does not apply to a felony-murder
count. The second degree murder statute provides:
			"(a) A person commits the offense of second degree
murder when he commits the offense of first degree
murder as defined in paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection
(a) of Section 9-1 of this Code and either of the following
mitigating factors are present:
			(1) At the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden
and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by
the individual killed or another whom the offender
endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes
the death of the individual killed; or
			(2) At the time of the killing he believes the
circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would
justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated
in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable."
720 ILCS 5/9-2(a) (West 1996).
	The State contends that because the second degree murder
statute, by definition, does not encompass felony murder, the
appellate court committed reversible error when it found that the
jury should have been given second degree murder instructions for
the felony-murder counts.
	In Williams and in Kidd, the appellate court held that, where
provocation occurs prior to the time that a defendant forms a
felonious intent or commits an aggravated battery, he is entitled to
a jury instruction on second degree murder. Kidd, 295 Ill. App. 3d
at 165; Williams, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 110. The court in Kidd stated
that barring a second degree murder instruction in a felony-murder
case would effectively eliminate the second degree murder statute
in intentional or knowing murder cases. Kidd, 295 Ill. App. 3d at
165. The second degree murder statute would be eliminated
because prosecutors that had sufficient evidence to defeat a claim
of provocation would charge knowing or intentional murder, while
prosecutors that did not have sufficient evidence to defeat a claim
of provocation would simply bar that claim by charging a
defendant with felony murder. Kidd, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 165-66.
The Kidd court also noted that in Viser, an instruction on the
provocation defense was given. Kidd, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 165.
	In reversing the trial court's order denying defendant's request
for a second degree murder instruction on the felony-murder
charges, the appellate court in this case held that the trial court had
erred in declining to follow the precedent set by the court in
Williams and in Kidd. Because we find the holdings in Williams
and Kidd to be erroneous, however, we reverse the appellate
court's finding that the trial court should have followed the
precedent set forth in those cases and should have given second
degree murder instructions on the felony-murder counts.
	The primary rule in statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 261 (1994). In addition, courts must give the language
of a statute its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 435 (1995). Here, the second degree murder statute
states that a defendant commits second degree murder when he
commits first degree murder as set forth in sections 9-1(a)(1) or
(a)(2) of the Code and certain mitigating factors are present.
Nowhere does the second degree murder statute reference section
9-1(a)(3) of the Code, felony murder.
	In addition, in construing a legislative act, courts should
consider each section in connection with other sections. Bubb v.
Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1995).
Section 9-1(a)(3) of the Code states that a person commits first
degree murder if in performing the acts which caused the death,
"he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than
second degree murder." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3)
(West 1996). It would be anomalous, then, to give a second degree
murder instruction with regard to a charge of felony murder.
Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, it is clear that the
provocation defense of second degree murder is not available to a
charge of felony murder. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate
court's finding that a second degree murder instruction should
have been given on the charges of felony murder, and affirm the
trial court's order declining to give that instruction.

PRIOR VIOLENT CONDUCT
	The final argument raised in the State's appeal is that the
appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court's ruling
excluding evidence of prior violent conduct by Keith and Lila
Cearlock. Following jury selection, but prior to the
commencement of trial, the State moved to exclude testimony by
Glenda Ashworth concerning the physical and emotional abuse she
suffered as a child from her parents, Keith and Lila Cearlock. In
addition, during the testimony of one of Jon's expert witnesses,
Dr. Stuart Hart, the State objected to any testimony concerning Dr.
Hart's interview with Glenda. The trial court sustained the
objection, so Jon made an offer of proof concerning Dr. Hart's
testimony. Jon also presented a written offer of proof of Glenda's
testimony.
	In the written offer of proof, Glenda indicated that as young
as ages four to six, she was beaten with a belt or razor strap. As
she grew older, she had to retrieve the razor strap prior to being
beaten. In addition, Keith and Lila constantly put Glenda down
and referred to her as stupid. Lila spanked Glenda with a belt or
with a yardstick or flyswatter. Glenda claimed that when Keith
beat her, he beat her with his full strength. Glenda also claimed
that Lila pushed Keith into punishing Glenda.
	When Glenda was around 13 to 16 years old, Keith broke
several yardsticks beating her, and began using boards to beat her.
Glenda also said that Keith told her that if she resisted him, he
would kill Glenda in her sleep. Glenda believed Keith. Glenda said
that when Keith brought Jon to Virginia in March or April 1995,
Keith admitted to Glenda that he had been whipping Jon. Glenda
asked Jon about the whippings, and Jon told her that everything
was all right. Glenda stated that she allowed Jon to live with her
parents even though they had abused her because she was looking
for her parents' approval.
	In the offer of proof concerning Dr. Hart's testimony, Dr. Hart
testified that he interviewed Glenda over the telephone for
approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes to see what Glenda knew
about Jon's experiences with the Cearlocks and to learn about
Jon's early development and experiences with Glenda and about
Glenda's experiences as the Cearlocks' child. Glenda told Dr. Hart
that, as a child, she experienced physical and psychological
mistreatment by the Cearlocks which brought her to the point of
considering suicide. Dr. Hart testified that Glenda described a
repetitive and persistent pattern of frequent beatings with a belt, of
repeated criticism, and of battling between Keith and Lila.
	Dr. Hart agreed that he had to consider the passage of time
and that changes may occur within people or families, but he did
not believe any substantial changes had occurred in the Cearlock
home. Dr. Hart found it significant that the experiences described
by Jon were very similar to Glenda's experiences as a child. On
cross-examination, Dr. Hart testified that he had never contacted
or spoken with Glenda's brother Doug in order to corroborate her
statements about her childhood.
	In ruling on the offer of proof concerning Glenda's testimony,
the trial court considered the fact that there was a period of 20 to
25 years between the abuse allegedly suffered by Glenda and the
abuse to which Jon testified. In addition, the trial court stated that
there was no one that could rebut the testimony set forth in
Glenda's offer of proof. The trial court also stated, "this court,
anyway, does not have the indicia of reliability that the court
believes it should have." The trial court declined to find a nexus
between Glenda's testimony concerning events of 25 years ago
and Jon's testimony of events in the past couple years, and
therefore denied the offer of proof. The trial court also held that
Jon could not directly or indirectly bring in Glenda's testimony
through the testimony of Dr. Hart. After Jon made his offer of
proof concerning Dr. Hart's testimony, the trial court stated the
offer contained "nothing the Court hasn't heard before," and
denied the offer of proof.
	On appeal, the appellate court held that it was error for the
trial court to exclude the evidence presented in the offers of proof.
See 307 Ill. App. 3d at 710 (unpublished material under Supreme
Court Rule 23). The appellate court, citing People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194, 199-201 (1984), observed that where a theory of self-defense is raised, evidence of a victim's violent or aggressive
character is relevant (1) to show that the defendant's knowledge
of the victim's behavior and tendencies affected the defendant's
perceptions of and reactions to the victim's actions, and (2) to
support the defendant's version of events where there are
conflicting accounts. Despite its citation to Lynch, the appellate
court then stated that the testimony of Glenda and Dr. Hart was not
offered for either of the two purposes permitted by Lynch, but
instead was offered to corroborate Jon's account of his life in the
Cearlock home. See 307 Ill. App. 3d at 710 (unpublished material
under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	Relying on People v. Robinson, 163 Ill. App. 3d 754 (1987),
the appellate court held that Glenda's corroborative testimony was
admissible. The appellate court also stated that Jon's lack of
knowledge concerning his mother's childhood experiences had no
bearing on the purpose for which her testimony was offered.
Likewise, the appellate court held that Dr. Hart's testimony should
have been admitted to explain his reliance on the family history
provided by Glenda. In support of its finding, the appellate court
noted that an expert witness may base his opinion on information
that has not been admitted into evidence. The appellate court
further concluded that the error was harmless with respect to the
verdict of second degree murder as to Keith, but was prejudicial
error with regard to the verdict of first degree murder as to Lila.
	It is within the trial court's discretion to decide whether
evidence is relevant and admissible. People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 130 (1990). A trial court's decision concerning whether
evidence is relevant and admissible will not be reversed absent a
clear abuse of discretion. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d  at 130. An abuse of
discretion will be found only where the trial court's decision is
" ' "arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable" ' " or where no reasonable
man would take the trial court's view. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991), quoting People v. M.D., 101 Ill. 2d 73, 90 (1984),
quoting Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 1963).
Evidence is considered relevant if it has any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of an action either more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d  at 365-66. However, a trial court
may reject evidence on the grounds of relevancy if the evidence is
remote, uncertain or speculative. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 501 (1993).
	For the reasons that follow, we cannot conclude that the trial
court's ruling excluding the proffered testimony was so arbitrary,
fanciful or unreasonable that no reasonable man would take the
view adopted by the trial court. In so holding, we find the appellate
court's reliance on People v. Robinson, 163 Ill. App. 3d 754
(1987), to be misplaced.
	In Robinson, the court held that, where a theory of self-defense is raised, a victim's violent and aggressive character is
relevant to show who was the aggressor. Robinson, 163 Ill. App.
3d at 772. The Robinson court noted that it generally is a
defendant's right to present evidence of a victim's character for
violence when the defendant alleges that he acted in self-defense
against the victim, because such evidence tends to show
circumstances confronting the defendant, the extent of the
defendant's apparent danger, and the motive influencing the
defendant. Robinson, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 773. Accordingly, the
defendant in Robinson should have been permitted to introduce
evidence of prior threats and violence by the victim against the
defendant, even where the victim was killed when the defendant
and a third man struggled over a shotgun. Robinson, 163 Ill. App.
3d at 774.
	Here, in contrast to Robinson, Jon was allowed to testify
concerning his grandparents' aggressive and violent character. Jon
also testified concerning how his knowledge of that violent and
aggressive character affected his perceptions of and reactions to
his grandparents' behavior after he fired the gun at the Tilex
bottle. Jon claimed that when he saw Keith coming toward him, he
thought Keith was going to beat him to death, and shot Keith "[s]o
he couldn't get to me." Jon further claimed that he shot Lila
because "[s]he was just as dangerous as my grandpa" and because
Keith would never beat Jon without Lila forcing him into it. The
trial jury apparently found Jon to be credible, as the jury found Jon
guilty of second degree murder with respect to Keith.
	Although the appellate court claimed that the testimony of
Glenda and Dr. Hart was not offered for either of the two purposes
permitted by Lynch, the testimony clearly was offered to
corroborate Jon's claim of self-defense. With that in mind, we fail
to see how Glenda's testimony concerning her childhood many
years earlier was relevant to Jon's claim of self-defense. Under
Lynch, one of the purposes for which the Cearlocks' violent and
aggressive character could be introduced was to show how Jon's
knowledge of their character affected his perceptions and
reactions. Because there was no testimony that Jon was aware of
his mother's childhood experiences, however, testimony
concerning Glenda's childhood could not have affected Jon's
perceptions and reactions.
	Likewise, the other purpose for which evidence of a victim's
propensity for violence can be admitted under Lynch is to support
a defendant's version of events where there are conflicting
accounts of what happened. Here, too, the account of Glenda's
childhood was not relevant to Jon's claim of self-defense because
there were no conflicting accounts of what had happened. In fact,
all accounts of what had happened were based upon Jon's
statements and testimony.
	As noted, relevant evidence must have a tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of an action either more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence. We agree with the trial court that any nexus between
testimony concerning Glenda's childhood and Jon's claim of self-defense was remote at best. Indeed, with regard to Lila, we fail to
see how the information concerning Glenda's childhood was
relevant at all.
	When Lila saw Jon with the gun, she screamed and began to
run out of the house, at which point Jon shot her in the back. Jon
then followed Lila as she made it out of the house, and attempted
to shoot her some more when she fell face forward into the grass,
but his gun jammed. Jon then went inside the house to look for
Lila's gun, so that he could go back outside and continue shooting
her. We find no nexus between Glenda's childhood and Jon's
pursuit of a fleeing Lila. Even if Jon feared Lila because she
goaded Keith into beating Jon, that threat had been removed when
Keith was shot first.
	Under the circumstances, we disagree with the appellate court
that the testimony of Glenda and Dr. Hart should have been
admitted to corroborate Jon's account of life in the Cearlock
home. Consequently, we reverse the appellate court's finding that
it was prejudicial error to exclude the evidence set forth in Jon's
offers of proof, and affirm the trial court's ruling excluding the
evidence.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we disagree with the appellate
court's holding that the trial court had committed reversible error
in denying Jon's motion to suppress his initial statement to
Harberts. We agree with the appellate court's holding that the
predicate felony underlying a charge of felony murder must have
an independent felonious purpose, but disagree with the appellate
court's holding that Jon's conviction for the first degree murder of
Lila must be reversed due to the trial court's error in denying Jon's
motion to dismiss the felony-murder counts and in instructing the
jury on felony murder. We also disagree with the appellate court's
holding that the trial court should have given second degree
murder instructions on the counts of felony murder. Finally, we
disagree with the appellate court's holding that the testimony set
forth in Jon's offers of proof should have been admitted at trial.
We agree with the appellate court's holding that Jon was properly
transferred from juvenile court and that the trial court properly
denied Jon's motion to suppress statements he made while in
police custody.
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the judgment of the
circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed.



	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:


	I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court. Unlike my
colleagues, I believe that the circuit court erred in denying
defendant's motion to suppress the statements he made while in
police custody. 
	The totality of the circumstances surrounding a confession is
to be considered in the determination of whether a juvenile
confessed to a crime following a knowing and voluntary waiver of
his Miranda rights. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25, 61 L. Ed. 2d 197, 212, 99 S. Ct. 2560, 2571-72 (1979). Factors to
consider include the juvenile's age, intelligence, background,
experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at
the time of the questioning. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 54 (2000).
Other factors also include the legality and duration of the
detention, the duration of the questioning, and any physical or
mental abuse by police such as threats or promises. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 54. This court has held that the test for voluntariness is
whether the juvenile " 'made the statement freely, voluntarily, and
without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the
[juvenile's] will was overcome at the time he or she confessed.' "
In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 54, quoting People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996). Critically, this court has been mindful of the fact
that "the taking of a juvenile's confession is 'a sensitive
concern.' " In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 54, quoting People v. Prude,
66 Ill. 2d 470, 476 (1977). We have noted that the " 'greatest
care' " must be used in order to assure that the confession was not
coerced or suggested and that " 'it was not the product of
ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.' "
People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 561, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1458
(1967). As we explained in In re G.O., this specialized concern
has led this court to include another factor in the inquiry, i.e.,
whether the juvenile, either before or during the interrogation, had
an opportunity to consult with an adult interested in his welfare. In
re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 54-55. This factor also includes whether the
police prevented the juvenile from conferring with a concerned
adult and whether the police frustrated the parents' attempt to
confer with the juvenile. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 55.
	The court today lists the factors that lead it to conclude that
the circuit court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress.
First among these are the defendant's age, experience, and
emotional characteristics. Slip op. at 24. The court finds
significant the fact that defendant was of average intelligence, with
normal reading, writing, and verbal skills. Slip op. at 24. In my
view, however, the record contains evidence which does not
support the court's conclusion.
	Defendant was 14 years of age at the time of his arrest. He had
no prior experience with the legal system or with police
interrogation. The record reveals that defendant's only brush with
the law came when he and another youth were caught trespassing
on private property by a police officer. Defendant was not arrested
but, instead, was warned by the officer and told to go home. Such
an interaction can hardly be deemed as "experience" that would
prepare a juvenile for the complexities of a double murder
investigation interrogation.
	As for defendant's emotional characteristics, the court's
opinion is devoid of any details with respect to this factor. I find
this lack of detail troubling in light of the evidence contained in
the record pertaining to defendant' emotional health. According to
the testimony, defendant was treated for psychiatric problems at
the time he entered kindergarten. Defendant's problems,
discovered when he was five years old, eventually required
hospitalization at the Psychiatric Institute of Richmond. Defendant
was treated with antidepressants and was later discharged when he
was no longer considered a danger to himself or others. Defendant
was readmitted to the same psychiatric institute later when the
problems continued. The reason for the readmission was
aggression, academic deterioration, and suicidal tendencies.
Defendant was ultimately diagnosed with major depression and
attention deficit disorder. These conditions were treated
successfully with medication.
	The record reveals, however, that when defendant's mother
sent defendant to live with the victims, the course of defendant's
psychiatric treatment changed, and the medicine, which had
controlled defendant's condition, was discontinued. Defendant
was enrolled at Park Meadows Baptist Church and Academy.
According to the principle of the academy, when defendant was
disciplined, he would acknowledge his wrongdoing and accept his
punishment. Defendant appeared to accept the discipline without
any signs of outward rebellion. Dr. Chapman, who interviewed
defendant to determine his fitness to stand trial, testified that
defendant lacked the ability to appreciate the gravity of the
situation when he waived his Miranda rights. Dr. Chapman stated
that defendant's behavior with the authorities the night of his
arrest was consistent with his past behavior of trying to please
authority figures. In light of these facts, I cannot agree that the
evidence supports the conclusion that defendant's age, experience,
and emotional characteristics weigh in favor of the finding of a
voluntary and knowing confession. Contrary to the court's view,
these factors should weigh in favor of suppressing the confession.
	The court next notes that although defendant was handcuffed
when he was first taken to the police station from the crime scene,
in violation of Lincoln police policy, this fact is not relevant
because Detective Harberts testified that, at the time, he believed
defendant to be 18 or 19 years old. Although the court does not
consider this fact "significant enough" to render defendant's
statements coerced or involuntary (slip op. at 25), I disagree. The
record contains several photographs that depict defendant at the
time of his arrest. The photographs, in my view, tend to show a
young boy of high school age. Given the fact that the victims in
this case were known by police to have been defendant's
grandparents, I cannot conceive of a police officer not ascertaining
whether the alleged perpetrator in his custody was a juvenile. This
fact, in conjunction with the officer's failure to contact defendant's
parents or a juvenile officer prior to questioning, raises a serious
question as to whether the police that night were as mindful of the
fact that "the taking of a juvenile's confession" is as " 'sensitive
[a] concern' " as this court has deemed it to be. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 54, quoting People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 476 (1977).
	In this case, when Harberts discovered that defendant was
only 14 years old, he called the Logan County State's Attorney for
advice. The State's Attorney's merely advised Harberts to make
sure that defendant received his Miranda rights and to find out if
the victims were his guardians. Harberts began his interrogation
shortly after 9 p.m. At that time, Harberts did not tell defendant
that he could consult with his parents, nor did he advise defendant
that he could be tried as an adult. Harberts waited until 1 to 1½
hours later to attempt to call defendant's mother. When he finally
did telephone defendant's mother, he received only an answering
machine, on which he left a short message stating only his name
and that defendant was with him and there was an emergency.
When defendant's mother returned the call, she advised Harberts
that defendant suffered from attention deficit disorder and that she
wanted defendant to be provided with a lawyer. This request was
not complied with. Moreover, Harberts did not advise defendant
that he could call the city of Lincoln's juvenile officer.(1)  The
behavior of Harberts certainly suggests that the " 'greatest care' "
might not have been used to assure that the confession was not
coerced or suggested and that " 'it was not the product of
ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.' "
People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 561, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1458
(1967). This is yet another factor that should weigh in favor of
suppressing the confession.
	The foregoing facts, viewed under the totality of the
circumstances, compel me to conclude that defendant's statement
should have been suppressed. As the United States Supreme Court
has recognized:
		"[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is
unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him
when he is made accessible only to the police. That is to
say, we deal with a person who is not equal to the police
in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of
the questions and answers being recorded and who is
unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to
get the benefits of his constitutional rights." Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 8 L. Ed. 2d 325, 328, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 1212 (1962).
In this case, defendant's age, experience, and the lack of a
concerned adult's presence, not to mention the evidence of record
concerning defendant's mental characteristics, raise a genuine
doubt whether the confession which ensued was the product of
free will. For this reason, I disagree with the court's conclusion
that the circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion to
suppress.
	Given my position on the issue of the admissibility of
defendant's confession, I could end this dissent here. However, I
wish to also point out my disagreement with the court's conclusion
that the circuit court's error in instructing the jury on felony
murder does not constitute reversible error with regard to
defendant's conviction for the first degree murder of Lila. See slip
op. at 32. The court bases this conclusion on the fact that the jury's
return of the general verdict raises a presumption that the jury
found defendant guilty of the most serious crime charged, which,
in this case, would be intentional murder. See slip op. at 33.
	I assume that when the court states that the error does not
constitute reversible error (slip op. at 32), the court means that any
error which occurred in this case was harmless. However, the
court's harmless error analysis fails to consider that the prosecutor
in this case argued repeatedly to the jury that it should first
consider the felony murder theory because, if the jury found the
underlying felony proved, then it need not deal with the
considerable amount of evidence relating to defendant's mental
state. Given the State's argument, I believe that the court's reliance
on the presumption is inappropriate. The State's argument
demonstrates that the erroneous instruction may have played a part
in the jury's decision to convict defendant of first, as opposed to
second, degree murder. In this respect, I agree with the conclusions
reached by the appellate court with respect to this issue:
		"The State *** presented general verdict forms, which
obscure the basis for the jury's verdict, and repeatedly
encouraged the jury to deal only with the felony murder
counts and to disregard evidence of [defendant's] mental
state. ***
			***In this case, the prosecutor succeeded in diluting the
intent requirement for knowing or intentional murder by
charging felony murder and, as a result, [defendant] was
denied a fair trial." People v. Morgan, 307 Ill. App. 3d
707, 717 (1999).
For this reason, I disagree with the court's conclusion that the error
in this case was not "reversible error."

1.      1The record reveals that a member of the Lincoln police department
eventually telephoned the youth officer, Sergeant Sisk at 10:30 p.m.
Sisk, who was at home sleeping, was asked if he knew the defendant.
He stated that he did not know "this kid" and went back to bed. Sisk was
not told by the officer that the "kid" in question had been arrested in the
shooting deaths of two people and was currently in custody. This
evidence hardly establishes confidence in the way in which law
enforcement officials attempted to protect this juvenile's rights.