Title: State v. Ronald V. McCallum

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
95-1518 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Ronald W. McCallum, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  198 Wis. 2d 149, 542 N.W.2d 185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
April 18, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
December 4, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
 
Peter Naze 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
Abrahamson, C.J., concurs (opinion filed. 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were 
briefs by Sharon Ruhly, assistant attorney general, and James E. 
Doyle, attorney general and oral argument by Sally L. Wellman, 
assistant attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Steven L. 
Miller and Miller & Miller, Green Bay and oral argument by Steven 
L. Miller. 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
1
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Ronald V. McCallum, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 18, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part, and cause remanded with directions. 
¶1 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J. 
  Ronald 
V. 
McCallum 
(McCallum) was convicted of second degree sexual assault of 
H.L., a minor,  under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).  The prosecution 
was based solely on H.L.’s uncorroborated testimony.  One year 
after McCallum was convicted, H.L. recanted her accusation.  
Relying on H.L.’s recantation, McCallum filed a post-conviction 
motion to withdraw his Alford plea.  Concluding that H.L.’s 
recantation was “less credible” than her original accusation, 
the Circuit Court for Brown County, Judge Peter J. Naze, 
presiding, denied McCallum’s motion.  The court of appeals held 
that the circuit court had applied the wrong legal standard in 
determining whether there was a reasonable probability of a 
different outcome, and reversed and remanded for a new trial. 1  
                     
1 In the case of a conviction subsequent to an Alford plea, the 
“different outcome” to which we refer is the different outcome of 
a trial, not a “new” trial inasmuch as there has never been a 
trial. 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
2
We agree.  The standard is whether there is a reasonable 
probability that a jury, looking at both the accusation and the 
recantation, would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s 
guilt.  However, we reverse that part of the court of appeals’ 
decision granting a new trial.  We remand to the circuit court 
to apply the proper legal standard to determine whether McCallum 
should be allowed to withdraw his plea. 
¶2 
The facts pertinent to this appeal are as follows:  In 
February 1993, McCallum, his girlfriend, Sandra L., and Sandra’s 
daughter, H.L., lived together.  Although Sandra was still 
married to H.L.’s father, they were in the process of divorcing. 
 During this time, H.L. accused McCallum of sexual contact.  She 
reported her accusation to the Green Bay police department.  
McCallum was charged with one count of second degree sexual 
assault.  A preliminary hearing was held at which H.L. was the 
sole witness against McCallum.  She repeated her accusations 
against him.  On May 19, 1993, maintaining his innocence, 
McCallum entered an Alford plea and was convicted of second 
degree sexual assault. 
¶3 
In May 1994, H.L. recanted.  After speaking with her 
mother, H.L. wrote a letter, which was given to McCallum’s 
attorney, stating that she had made up the story of McCallum 
grabbing her breast so she could get him out of her mother’s 
life.  She hoped her parents would reconcile.  In the letter, 
H.L. explained that she set up a situation “so [McCallum] didn’t 
have a witness to back up his story.”  Her letter concluded: 
 
He was arrested on Feb 26, 1993 & was sent to 
jail that weekend.  He was released and had to move 
out because of the case.  He was sentenced to 6 months 
in the County Jail for a crime he didn’t commite 
[sic].  I realize that what I said was not the truth 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
3
and I’m sorry that I said what I said.  I want him to 
be free of all this because I feel that I commited 
[sic] an error so long ago that wasn’t right.  I just 
hope Ron McCallum, the corts [sic] and everybody else 
will forgive me. 
¶4 
Based on H.L.’s recantation of her original statement, 
McCallum filed a post-sentencing motion to withdraw his Alford 
plea.  Sandra and H.L. testified at the post-conviction hearing. 
 During the hearing, Judge Naze explained to H.L. that she had 
“a right to not answer any question that might tend to 
incriminate her” and a right to talk to an attorney.  He also 
explained that if she were to testify that she had lied under 
oath, she would be committing a criminal or delinquent juvenile 
offense.  Consequently, the hearing was interrupted and resumed 
after the court appointed an attorney for H.L. 
¶5 
The facts elicited from H.L. and Sandra’s testimony at 
the post-conviction hearing follow:  McCallum was Sandra’s 
boyfriend with whom she had a six-year relationship.  When she 
heard of H.L.’s allegation, Sandra was skeptical but did not 
accuse H.L. of lying.  Sandra maintained her relationship with 
McCallum throughout the case despite H.L.’s original allegation 
and despite the no contact order.  She would have liked to have 
continued living with McCallum.  Nonetheless, Sandra never 
explained to H.L. that if H.L. would admit that she lied, 
McCallum could live with them again.  When asked whether H.L. 
knew of the no contact order, Sandra answered that she had never 
mentioned it to H.L. 
¶6 
In early 1993, Sandra was in the process of obtaining 
a divorce.  During that period, H.L. was skipping school, coming 
home late, and not obeying house rules.  Because Sandra worked 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
4
nights, and McCallum worked the day shift, he was responsible 
for enforcing the rules and disciplining H.L. 
¶7 
H.L. testified that during this time, she was upset, 
hurt, and angry because her mother and father were going through 
a divorce.  She blamed McCallum for the divorce and felt that he 
was trying to take the place of her father.  She resented the 
fact that he was disciplining her.  At the time H.L. accused him 
of sexual contact, McCallum had “grounded” her for almost three 
months.  She first related her accusation to her sister, Joy, 
because she believed Joy would report the assault to Social 
Services. 
¶8 
In May 1994, H.L. told her mother that she had lied to 
the police and to the circuit court about what happened with 
McCallum, and she wanted to resolve it.  H.L. asked her mother 
what she could do.  Her mother replied that she could talk to 
McCallum’s attorney or write a letter.  On May 3, 1994, H.L. 
handed her mother a letter stating that she had lied.  Sandra 
testified that she neither participated in the letter writing, 
nor knew H.L. was writing it.  At H.L.’s suggestion, the letter 
was witnessed by Sandra and H.L.’s grandmother. 
¶9 
H.L. testified that everything in the letter was true 
and that no one told her what to say or assisted her in any way. 
 She insisted that she had falsely accused McCallum of sexual 
contact; no one influenced her to recant; and she understood 
that she was admitting to perjury.  She confessed her lie to her 
mother and wrote the letter because she felt that McCallum 
“shouldn’t have a criminal record because I lied about the stuff 
– about him supposedly sexually assaulting me.” 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
5
¶10 H.L. further testified that, at the time of her 
accusation, she hoped to get McCallum out of the home so that 
her mother and father would have a chance to get back together. 
 She believed the accusation would accomplish this because her 
friend’s brother had to move out of the house when he sexually 
assaulted his sister.  She made the specific allegation “because 
there were no witnesses and . . . no evidence.” 
¶11 Under cross-examination, H.L. agreed that things were 
“better” when McCallum was living in the home, and she was aware 
that in order for him to return to the home, she would have to 
return to court and recant her accusation. 
¶12 After the hearing, the circuit court denied McCallum’s 
motion to withdraw his Alford plea.  It found H.L.’s recantation 
to be uncorroborated and less credible than her accusations.  
After finding “the victim’s uncorroborated recantation to be 
less credible” than the accusations she made to her sister, to 
the police, and to the circuit court at the preliminary hearing, 
the circuit court concluded that there was no reasonable 
probability that a different result would occur at trial. 
¶13 The court of appeals reversed, ordering a new trial 
and stating that if a reasonable jury could believe the 
recantation, that determination would be sufficient to meet the 
requirement of a reasonable probability of a different result at 
trial.  We agree that the circuit court applied the wrong 
standard of law.  We remand to the circuit court to apply the 
correct standard.  In addition, the court of appeals held that 
corroboration 
is 
required, 
and 
McCallum 
has 
met 
the 
corroboration requirement.  We agree. 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
6
¶14 This case presents three issues:  (1) Whether the 
circuit 
court 
applied 
an 
erroneous 
legal 
standard 
when 
determining that there was not a reasonable probability of a 
different 
outcome. 
 
(2) 
Whether 
the 
recantation 
of 
an 
uncorroborated allegation must be supported by newly discovered 
evidence corroborating evidence of the recantation, and, if so, 
whether that requirement was met.  (3) Whether the appropriate 
remedy, in this case, is remand directing a grant of the motion 
to withdraw the plea, or for redetermination by the circuit 
court, applying the correct legal standard, of McCallum’s 
request to withdraw his plea. 
¶15 After sentencing, a defendant who seeks to withdraw a 
guilty or 
no 
contest 
plea 
carries 
the heavy 
burden of 
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that withdrawal 
of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.  State 
v. Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 241, 249, 471 N.W.2d 599 (1991).  The 
withdrawal of a plea under the manifest injustice standard rests 
in the circuit court’s discretion.  Id. at 250.  We will only 
reverse if the circuit court has failed to properly exercise its 
discretion.  Id.  An exercise of discretion based on an 
erroneous application of the law is an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  State v. Martinez, 150 Wis. 2d 62, 71, 440 N.W.2d 
783, 787 (1989). 
¶16 Newly 
discovered 
evidence 
may 
be 
sufficient 
to 
establish that a manifest injustice has occurred.  Krieger, 163 
Wis. 2d at 255.  For newly discovered evidence to constitute a 
manifest injustice and warrant the withdrawal of a plea the 
following criteria must be met.  First, the defendant must 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:  (1) the evidence 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
7
was discovered after conviction; (2) the defendant was not 
negligent in seeking evidence; (3) the evidence is material to 
an issue in the case; and (4) the evidence is not merely 
cumulative.  If the defendant proves these four criteria by 
clear and convincing evidence, the circuit court must determine 
whether a reasonable probability exists that a different result 
would be reached in a trial.  Finally, when the newly discovered 
evidence is a witness’s recantation, we have stated that the 
recantation must be corroborated by other newly discovered 
evidence.  Zillmer v. State, 39 Wis. 2d 607, 616, 159 N.W.2d 669 
(1968). 
I. 
¶17 The first issue we address is whether the circuit 
court applied an erroneous legal standard when concluding that 
there was not a reasonable probability of a different outcome.  
In determining whether there was a reasonable probability of a 
different 
result, 
the 
circuit 
court 
stated 
that 
H.L.’s 
recantation was less credible than her accusation.  Therefore, 
the court concluded, McCallum could not withdraw his Alford plea 
because “there is no reasonable probability that a different 
result would occur at trial.”   
¶18 The problem here rests with the circuit court’s 
determination that H.L.’s recantation was less credible than her 
accusation.  That is not the appropriate standard.  The correct 
legal standard when applying the “reasonable probability of a 
different outcome” criteria is whether there is a reasonable 
probability that a jury, looking at both the accusation and the 
recantation, would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s 
guilt.  This standard is equally applicable to motions to 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
8
withdraw an Alford plea, motions to withdraw a guilty plea, and 
motions for a new trial.  State v. Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 241, 
255, 471 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1991). 
¶19 The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
there 
was 
no 
reasonable probability that a different result would be reached 
at a new trial because H.L.’s recantation was less credible than 
her accusation.  One does not necessarily follow from the other. 
 A reasonable jury finding the recantation less credible than 
the original accusation could, nonetheless, have a reasonable 
doubt as to a defendant’s guilt or innocence.  It does not 
necessarily follow that a finding of “less credible” must lead 
to a conclusion of “no reasonable probability of a different 
outcome.”  Less credible is far from incredible.  A finding that 
the 
recantation 
is 
incredible 
necessarily 
leads 
to 
the 
conclusion that the recantation would not lead to a reasonable 
doubt in the minds of the jury.  However, a finding that a 
recantation is less credible than the accusation does not 
necessarily mean that a reasonable jury could not have a 
reasonable doubt.  Therefore, in sum, in determining whether 
there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome, the 
circuit court must determine whether there is a reasonable 
probability that a jury, looking at both the accusation and the 
recantation, would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s 
guilt.2  If so, the circuit court must grant a new trial. 
                     
2   Language that appears in the court of appeals’ opinion is 
somewhat problematic.  The court of appeals says at one point:  
“This requirement [there must be a reasonable probability of a 
different result] is met in this case if a reasonable jury could 
accept the recantation as true.” 
Shortly thereafter, the court of appeals says that the standard 
is met “if a reasonable jury could believe the recantation.” 
The question, of course, is not whether the jury could accept the 
recantation as true, or even whether the jury could believe it.  
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
9
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court employed the wrong 
legal standard when determining that there was not a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome.  Therefore, we affirm that 
part of the court of appeals’ decision reversing the circuit 
court. 
II. 
¶20 Next, we consider the issue of corroboration.  The 
rule is that newly discovered recantation evidence must be 
corroborated by other newly discovered evidence.  Zillmer, 39 
Wis. 2d at 616; Rohl v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 443, 219 N.W.2d 385 
(1974).  McCallum argues that the corroboration requirement 
should be abandoned because of the high hurdle it creates for 
the defendant who must corroborate –- with newly discovered 
evidence -- the recantation of an uncorroborated accusation.  
The State of Wisconsin (State) argues that the corroboration 
requirement 
must 
be 
maintained, 
even 
in 
the 
case 
of 
uncorroborated accusations, because recantation testimony is 
inherently unreliable.  Although we agree with the State that 
the corroboration requirement must be maintained, we further 
conclude that it was met in this case. 
¶21 There is sound reason to adhere to the requirement.  
Recantations are inherently unreliable.  Dunlavy v. Dairyland 
Mut. Ins. Co., 21 Wis. 2d 105, 114, 124 N.W.2d 73 (1963).  The 
recanting witness is admitting that he or she has lied under 
oath.  Either the original sworn testimony or the sworn 
                                                                  
A jury does not necessarily have to accept a recantation as true, 
nor believe it, in order to have a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, 
as we state above, and as the court of appeals correctly 
concluded, the question is whether there is a reasonable 
probability that a jury, looking at both the accusation and the 
recantation, would have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s 
guilt. 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
10
recantation testimony is false.  Because of the unreliability of 
recantations, we reaffirm the rule that recantation testimony 
must be corroborated by other newly discovered evidence. 
¶22 Alternatively, McCallum argues that the corroboration 
requirement was satisfied in this case by the newly discovered 
evidence contained in H.L.’s post-sentencing statement regarding 
her motive for the accusation against McCallum. 
¶23 We agree with the court of appeals that the difficulty 
in this kind of case is manifest: How can a defendant 
corroborate the recantation of an accusation that involves 
solely the credibility of the complainant, inasmuch as there is 
no physical evidence and no witness.  McCallum must corroborate 
H.L.’s recantation of her uncorroborated accusation.  The court 
of appeals, recognizing the unique difficulty presented by this 
case, properly concluded that McCallum met the corroboration 
requirement: 
 
[T]he degree and extent of the corroboration 
required varies from case to case based on its 
individual circumstances.  Here, the sexual assault 
allegation was made under circumstances where no 
others witnessed the event.  Further, there is no 
physical evidence that could corroborate the original 
allegation 
or 
the 
recantation. 
 
Under 
these 
circumstances, requiring a defendant to redress a 
false 
allegation 
with 
significant 
independent 
corroboration of the falsity would place an impossible 
burden upon any wrongly accused defendant.  We 
conclude, under the circumstances presented here, the 
existence of a feasible motive for the false testimony 
together 
with 
circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
the 
trustworthiness of the recantation are sufficient to 
meet the corroboration requirement. 
 
¶24 State v. McCallum, 198 Wis. 2d 149, 159-60, 542 N.W.2d 
184 (1995).  We agree.  The rule has been, and remains, that 
recantation testimony must be corroborated by other newly 
discovered evidence.  We hold that the corroboration requirement 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
11
in a recantation case is met if: (1) there is a feasible motive 
for 
the 
initial 
false 
statement; 
and, 
(2) 
there 
are 
circumstantial 
guarantees 
of 
the 
trustworthiness 
of 
the 
recantation. 
¶25 We conclude that McCallum has established a feasible 
motive for H.L.’s accusation.  First, she wanted her divorcing 
parents to reconcile.  Second, she resented McCallum for 
attempting to take the place of her father.  Finally, she was 
angry at McCallum for disciplining her. The newly discovered 
requirement is met inasmuch as the motives for H.L.’s initial 
accusation were unknown until she revealed them when she 
recanted. 
¶26 We 
further 
conclude 
that 
there 
are 
sufficient 
circumstantial guarantees of the trustworthiness of H.L.’s 
recantation.  The recantation is internally consistent, and was 
given under oath.  Furthermore, the recantation is consistent 
with circumstances existing at the time of H.L.’s initial 
allegation, as testified to by H.L.’s mother: that she and 
H.L.’s father were in the process of divorcing, and that 
McCallum had disciplined H.L. for her misconduct involving 
school truancy, coming home late, and not observing rules of the 
house.  Finally, H.L. was advised at the time of her recantation 
that she faced criminal consequences if her initial allegations 
were false.  In sum, McCallum has established newly discovered 
evidence corroborating H.L.’s recantation, and has also provided 
sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness of the 
recantation.  Here, the newly discovered evidence requirement is 
met inasmuch as the motives for the initial accusation were 
unknown to the trier of fact at the time of trial. 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
12
III. 
¶27 McCallum asks us to apply the proper standard and 
conclude that H.L.’s recantation raises a reasonable probability 
of a different outcome, and hence, remand to the circuit court 
for a new trial - a trial in which both H.L.’s recantation and 
her accusation are admissible.  He argues that where, as here, 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by 
applying the wrong legal standard, a new trial is required.  We 
disagree. 
¶28 Although we could apply the proper legal standard to 
the facts of this case and determine whether McCallum should be 
permitted to withdraw his Alford plea,  Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 
2d 121, 129, 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973), our independent review of 
the record indicates that the wiser course, under these facts, 
is to remand this case to the circuit court for a hearing to 
apply the proper legal standard. 
¶29 Recantation, by its very nature, calls into question 
the credibility of the witness or witnesses.  During the 
preliminary hearing, under oath, H.L. accused McCallum of 
pinching her breasts.  During the post-conviction hearing, again 
under oath, she swore that her original sworn testimony was 
false.  During at least one of these hearings, H.L. lied under 
oath.   
¶30 H.L.’s credibility is crucial to the application of 
the proper legal standard, and the circuit court judge is in a 
much better position to resolve the question of whether the 
recantation would raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of a 
jury that is looking at both the recantation and the original 
statement. 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
13
¶31 This court is bound by the cold, appellate record.  We 
have read and reread the testimony of H.L. and her mother.  
Nonetheless, our consideration is limited to the written word 
and rarely can credibility be judged by words alone.  More 
often, credibility, or lack thereof, is revealed by a close 
examination of the witness’s demeanor.  The cold record does not 
reflect the witness’s demeanor and all its facets; the circuit 
court has the advantage of observing them. 
¶32 Because the circuit court is in a better position to 
determine whether a reasonable probability exists that a 
reasonable jury looking at both the recantation and the original 
accusation would have a reasonable doubt as to McCallum’s guilt, 
we defer this determination to the circuit court.  Accordingly, 
the court of appeals’ decision granting a new trial is reversed 
and the cause remanded to the circuit court to apply the proper 
legal standard to determine whether McCallum should be allowed 
to withdraw his plea.3 
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded to the 
circuit court with directions. 
                     
3 McCallum’s motion to strike references to the defendant’s 
presentence investigation report from the State’s brief is 
granted.  See State v. Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 923-25, 485 
N.W.2d 354 (1992). 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
1
 
 ¶33 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (concurring).   I 
agree with the mandate but write separately to elaborate on the 
two major issues I believe are raised in the present case. The 
first is the standard of review applied by an appellate court to 
a circuit court's denial of a motion for a new trial based on 
recantation testimony. The second is the legal standard a 
circuit court applies to determine whether there is a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome were the fact finder to hear 
the evidence presented at the initial proceeding and to hear the 
recantation and other new evidence. I shall address each of 
these issues in turn, but I begin with a general discussion of 
recantation testimony in the context of a motion for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence. 
I. 
¶34 Recantation is not a rare phenomenon in the law. 
Recantation by a prosecution witness, even the sole prosecution 
witness, does not automatically entitle a defendant to a new 
trial. Courts view recantation with great caution because of the 
possibility of undue influence or coercion.  
¶35 The 
policy 
justifying 
retrial 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
recantation is that only guilty persons should be convicted and 
only 
by 
proof 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt. 
Important 
countervailing policies militate against retrial: the integrity 
of the initial fact finding process, the finality of judgments, 
judicial economy, and prejudice to the state caused by delay. 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
2
Accordingly, exacting standards are applied when a defendant 
moves for a new trial.  
¶36 Recantation 
testimony 
has 
proved 
troublesome 
for 
federal and state courts. A rich literature about recantation 
evidence exists in court decisions and in legal commentary but 
it is not discussed in Wisconsin cases. This literature explores 
the tension between the policy concerns which militate for and 
against the grant of a new trial on the basis of recanted 
testimony.4  
¶37 In Wisconsin, recantation evidence is treated as one 
of several types of newly discovered evidence to be analyzed 
under the "manifest injustice" test. The manifest injustice test 
for a new trial has five parts and is derived from a Georgia 
                     
4 See, e.g., Brown v. State, 816 P.2d 818 (Wyo. 1991). For 
collections of cases, see Annot., Tim A. Thomas, Standard for 
Granting or Denying New Trial in State Criminal Case on Basis of 
Recanted Testimony—Modern Cases, 77 A.L.R.4th 1031 (1990 and 
supp.); Annot., Wade R. Habeeb, Recantation by Prosecuting 
Witness in Sex Crime as Ground for New Trial, 51 A.L.R.3d 907 
(1973 and supp.); Annot., Tim A. Thomas, Recantation of Testimony 
of Witness as Grounds for New Trial—Federal Criminal Cases, 94 
A.L.R. Fed. 60 (1989 and supp.). See also Charles Alan Wright, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d §§ 557-557.2 (1982 
and supp.); Christopher J. Sinnott, Note, When Defendant Becomes 
the Victim: A Child's Recantation as Newly Discovered Evidence, 
41 Clev. St. L. Rev. 569 (1993); Sharon Cobb, Comment, Gary 
Dotson as Victim: The Legal Response to Recanting Testimony, 35 
Emory L.J. 969 (1986); Janice J. Repka, Comment, Rethinking the 
Standard for New Trial Motions Based upon Recantations as Newly 
Discovered Evidence, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1433 (1986); Daniel Wolf, 
Note, I Cannot Tell a Lie: The Standard for New Trial in False 
Testimony Cases, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1925 (1985); Minnesota 
Developments, Criminal Procedure: Minnesota Adopts the Larrison 
Standard for Granting a New Trial Because of Newly Discovered 
Evidence: State v. Caldwell, 67 Minn L. Rev. 1314 (1983); Jill A. 
Schwendinger, Survey, Ninth Circuit Adopts Berry Standard for New 
Trials Based Upon Perjured Testimony, 11 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 
171 (1981); Richard C. Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 
Vand. L. Rev. 20 (1952). 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
3
case, Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (Ga. 1851).5 The five elements 
are: (1) The evidence was discovered after conviction; (2) the 
defendant was not negligent in seeking evidence; (3) the 
evidence is material to an issue in the case; (4) the evidence 
is not merely cumulative; and 5) "a reasonable probability 
exists of a different result in a new trial." State v. Krieger, 
163 Wis. 2d 241, 255, 471 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1991). See also 
Wis. Stat. § 805.15(3) (test for new civil trial on basis of 
newly discovered evidence) and § 972.11 (rules of practice in 
civil actions generally applicable in criminal proceedings). 
Unique to Wisconsin, a sixth element is added when the newly 
discovered evidence is recantation testimony: corroboration, 
which is discussed in the majority opinion. 
¶38 Other jurisdictions apply a special rule, the so-
called Larrison test derived from Larrison v. United States, 24 
F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928), to recantation evidence. The 
Larrison test for recantation evidence is based on the theory 
                     
5 In its original form the Berry test required: 
1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since 
the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to want of due 
diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d. That it is 
so material that it would probably produce a different 
verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th. That it 
is not cumulative onlyviz.: speaking to facts, in 
relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 
5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should 
be produced, or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a 
new trial will not be granted, if the only object of 
the testimony is to impeach the character or credit of 
a witness. 
Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 527 (Ga. 1851). 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
4
that perjured testimony affects the integrity of the judicial 
process in a way that other newly discovered evidence does not.6  
¶39 In this case there is no serious dispute that the 
defendant met the first four elements for a circuit court to 
order a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.7 The 
determinative element in this case is the fifth Berry element, 
namely that a defendant’s motion for a new trial will be granted 
only if a reasonable probability exists of a different result in 
a new trial. 
 
II. 
¶40 The first issue is the standard of review of a circuit 
court's determination on a new trial motion. The majority 
                     
6 Under Larrison, a new trial should be granted if (1) the court 
is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a 
material witness is false; (2) without this testimony the jury 
might have reached a different conclusion; and (3) the party 
seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false 
testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of 
its falsity until after the trial. United States v. Larrison, 24 
F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928). The seventh circuit has recently 
stated that the third prong, surprise, is not a sine qua non for 
the grant of a new trial. United States v. Leibowitz, 919 F.2d 
482, 484-85 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 953 (1991).  
Much of the distinction between the Berry and Larrison tests has 
been blurred by the numerous state and federal restatements of 
the tests. For a discussion of the two tests, see the cases and 
articles cited at note 1 above.  
One commentator has concluded that the “tests seem equally 
exacting; the difference is that Berry is more demanding 
regarding the probative value of the recantation while Larrison 
emphasizes the credibility of the witness. Hence, the two tests 
in actuality may present nearly equivalent hurdles to a defendant 
requesting a new trial.” Sharon Cobb, Comment, Gary Dotson as 
Victim: The Legal Response to Recanting Testimony, 35 Emory L.J. 
969, 977-78 (1986). 
7 The State suggests that the complaining witness' motive was 
known or suspected by the defendant at the time of his conviction 
and thus could not support a finding of newly discovered 
corroboration evidence.  
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
5
opinion concludes that a motion for a new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence is addressed to the sound discretion 
of the circuit court and that an appellate court reviews the 
circuit 
court's 
determination 
for 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion.  
¶41 Numerous prior Wisconsin cases state this standard of 
review; precedent is abundant. I find no case, however, that 
sets forth an analysis of the standard of review. Indeed careful 
assessment of the cases reveals that although this standard of 
review is oft repeated, it is not necessarily applied.8 Courts 
have sometimes applied a different standard of review to each of 
the five elements of the newly discovered evidence rule.9 The 
standard may also depend on whether the same trial judge heard 
                     
8 The cases reveal that although the supreme court repeats the 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard of review, it often 
appears to have reviewed the trial courts’ decisions 
independently, determining anew whether there exists a reasonable 
probability of a different result. See, e.g., State v. Sarinske, 
91 Wis. 2d 14, 37-38, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979); State v. Boyce, 75 
Wis. 2d 452, 462-63, 249 N.W.2d 758 (1977). 
Furthermore, other cases seem to say that when a defendant’s 
motion for a new trial is based on new evidence, the defendant is 
in effect alleging a denial of due process on the ground that 
there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction. The 
court of appeals has characterized this question as one of due 
process and declared that whether due process warrants retrial is 
a constitutional question subject to de novo review. State v. 
Coogan, 154 Wis. 2d 387, 394-95, 453 N.W.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Thus as the State’s brief explains, only when a defendant does 
not seek plea withdrawal on the basis of a constitutional 
violation, a circuit court’s determination of the plea withdrawal 
motion is reviewed for erroneous exercise of discretion. Brief 
for State at 15. See, e.g., State v. Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 241, 
249-50, 471 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1991). 
9 In State v. Terrance J.W., 202 Wis. 2d 497, 501-02, 550 N.W.2d 
445 (Ct. App. 1996), while the court of appeals stated that the 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard is the applicable 
standard for review of an order on a motion for a new trial, it 
applied the clearly erroneous standard to the circuit court's 
finding that the recanting witness was incredible. 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
6
both the trial evidence and the recantation and other new 
evidence.10 
¶42 Because a defendant must satisfy each of the five 
elements, State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 38, 280 N.W.2d 725 
(1979); State v. Kaster, 148 Wis. 2d 789, 801, 436 N.W.2d 891 
(Ct. App. 1989), I conclude that a circuit court should make a 
separate finding for each element it considers. Thus I would 
have the standard of review depend on the element being 
considered.  
¶43 The first two elements of the five-part test, whether 
the evidence was discovered after trial and whether the 
defendant was not negligent in seeking evidence, are factual 
determinations. A circuit court's determination of these issues 
should therefore be reviewed by an appellate court using the 
clearly erroneous standard, the standard applied to factual 
findings. Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2) (1995-96).11  
¶44 The third and fourth elements of the five-part test, 
whether the evidence is material to an issue and whether the 
evidence is not merely cumulative to the evidence presented at 
                     
10 The supreme court has said: 
Usually on appeal to review the denial of a motion for 
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence, the test applied is whether the trial court 
abused its judicial discretion. However, as in this 
case, when a judge who decided such a motion did not 
hear the evidence at trial this court on appeal starts 
from scratch and examines the record de novo so that 
it can consider the facts directly on which the legal 
issue raised by motion depends. 
 
State v. Herfel, 49 Wis. 2d 513, 521, 182 N.W.2d 232 (1971) 
(citations omitted). 
11 For a discussion of the clearly erroneous standard see State v. 
Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 634, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985). 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
7
trial, are evidentiary determinations 
that 
ordinarily are 
addressed to the discretion of the circuit court. A circuit 
court's determination of these issues should be reviewed by an 
appellate court using the erroneous exercise of discretion 
standard. State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 257, 378 N.W.2d 
272 (1985); State v. Wollman, 86 Wis. 2d 459, 464, 273 N.W.2d 
225 (1979). 
¶45 I discuss below the standard of review of the fifth 
element of the test, whether a reasonable probability exists of 
a different result in a new trial.  
III. 
¶46 In determining whether a reasonable probability exists 
of a different result when a jury considers both the evidence in 
the initial proceeding and the recantation and other new 
evidence, the circuit court must make two determinations. 
¶47 First, the circuit court makes a preliminary threshold 
determination about the credibility of the recanting witness, 
that is, whether the witness is worthy of belief by the jury. 
Second, if the recantation is not incredible, the circuit court 
determines 
whether 
a 
reasonable 
probability 
exists 
of 
a 
different result at a new trial.  
¶48 The first step is for the circuit court to determine 
whether the recantation is credible, that is, worthy of belief. 
The circuit court does not determine whether the recantation is 
true or false. Such a holding would render meaningless the right 
to have a jury determine the ultimate issue of guilt based on 
all the evidence. The circuit court merely determines whether 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
8
the recanting witness is worthy of belief, whether he or she is 
within the realm of believability, whether the recantation has 
any indicia of credibility persuasive to a reasonable juror if 
presented at a new trial.12  
¶49 A circuit court’s finding that a recanting witness is 
incredible as a matter of law is sufficient to support its 
conclusion that no reasonable probability exists of a different 
result at a new trial. State v. Terrance J.W., 202 Wis. 2d 497, 
502, 550 N.W.2d 445 (Ct. App. 1996).13 
¶50 The circuit court did not find coercion or duress in 
the present case, nor did it find the recantation testimony 
inherently incredible. The State does not assert that the 
recanting witness is inherently incredible.  
¶51 An appellate court should not upset a finding of 
credibility unless it is clearly erroneous. Terrance J.W., 202 
Wis. 2d at 502. This standard of review of the circuit court's 
finding of credibility recognizes that the circuit court is in a 
much better position than an appellate court to resolve whether 
the witness is inherently incredible. 
¶52 Once a circuit court finds that a recanting witness is 
credible, then it must decide whether the defendant has 
                     
12 State v. Brown, 96 Wis. 2d 238, 247, 291 N.W.2d 528, cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980); Gauthier v. State, 28 Wis. 2d 412, 
416, 137 N.W.2d 101 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 916 (1966). 
13 Because the credibility determination is intimately connected 
to the reasonable probability determination it is not strictly 
necessary to conduct a two-part inquiry in the manner I have set 
out. Nonetheless, in the interest of providing guidance to the 
trial court, many courts distinguish the two inquiries and I 
think it is wise to do so. 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
9
satisfied the crux of the fifth element: whether a reasonable 
probability exists of a different result in a new trial.  
¶53 The court has used different language in describing 
the fifth element. In some cases the fifth element is set forth 
as in the majority opinion: "whether a reasonable probability 
exists of a different result in a new trial." Krieger, 163 Wis. 
2d at 255.  
¶54 The element has also been stated as: "it must be 
reasonably probable that a different result would be reached on 
a new trial." State v. Herfel, 49 Wis. 2d 513, 522, 182 N.W.2d 
232 (1971) (emphasis added) (citing Estate of Eannelli, 269 Wis. 
192, 68 N.W.2d 791 (1955)); Estate v. Teasdale, 264 Wis. 1, 4, 
58 N.W.2d 404 (1953) (emphasis added). This formulation is also 
used in the majority opinion. Majority op. at 8.  
¶55 A third phrasing is that "it must be reasonably 
probable that a different result will be reached on a new 
trial." Eannelli, 269 Wis. at 214 (emphasis added) (citing 
Teasdale).  
¶56 The court of appeals in the present case stated the 
standard as whether "a reasonable jury could accept the 
recantation as true" and whether "there is a reasonable 
probability of a different result." State v. McCallum, 198 Wis. 
2d 149, 158, 542 N.W.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶57 Do these various formulations of the fifth element 
differ? Do they give sufficient guidance to the circuit court 
and court of appeals? The majority opinion gathers these 
formulations into one formulation, namely that the probability 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
10
of a different result in a criminal case exists when there is a 
reasonable probability that a jury would have a reasonable doubt 
as to the defendant’s guilt. Majority op. at 9. 
¶58 I would gather these various formulations of the fifth 
element into the test for reversal for prejudicial error with 
which this court has struggled and with which we are all 
familiar. Indeed recantation testimony discovered after trial 
can be recast, for purpose of analysis, as testimony that was 
erroneously omitted from the initial trial.  
¶59 The prejudicial error test states, in language similar 
to that used in manifest injustice cases, that an error is 
prejudicial and reversal of a conviction is required if "there 
is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694-95 (1984), discussed 
in State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). 
Reasonable probability for purposes of prejudicial error is not 
strictly outcome determinative. Reasonable probability does not 
mean that it is more likely than not that a new trial would 
produce a different result.14 The circuit court does not 
determine which of the two statements is more credible; the 
circuit court is not to act as a thirteenth juror.15 "[A] 
                     
14 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-97 (1984); State v. 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 541-45 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985); State v. 
Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 640-42, 369 N.W,2d 711 (1985); State v. 
Ludwig, 124 Wis. 2d 600, 609, 369 N.W.2d 722 (1985). 
15 As the court of appeals explained in the present case: "It is 
the jury's role to determine which of the two contradictory 
statements it believes." State v. McCallum, 198 Wis. 2d 149, 159, 
542 N.W.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1995). See also Terrance J.W., 202 Wis. 
2d at 502. 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
11
reasonable probability of a different outcome is one that raises 
a reasonable doubt about guilt, a 'probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding." Dyess, 
124 Wis. 2d at 544-545, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
¶60 I conclude that a circuit court may usefully apply the 
prejudicial 
error 
inquiry 
to 
the 
fifth 
element 
of 
our 
recantation test. Thus when a witness' recantation and other new 
evidence undermine the circuit court's confidence in the 
correctness of the outcome at the original trial or hearing, a 
new trial should be ordered.  
¶61 On appellate review, I conclude that an appellate 
court should review the reasonable probability determination 
under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard. Having 
heard both the evidence at the original trial or hearing, or 
even just the evidence on the motion hearing, a circuit court is 
in a better position than an appellate court to determine 
whether confidence in the correctness of the outcome at the 
original trial or hearing has been undermined.16 
For the reasons set forth, I write separately.  
 
                                                                  
For a thoughtful discussion of this important point see Brown v. 
State, 816 P.2d 818, 866-68 (Wyo. 1991) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
See also State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 1335, 1340 (Wash. App. 1996), 
rev'd on other grounds, 930 P.2d 917 (Wash. 1997); People v. 
Minnick, 263 Cal. Rptr. 316, 317-18 (Cal. App. 1989). 
16 When an appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion for a new 
trial based on a recantation it is not strictly limited by its 
erroneous exercise of discretion review. An appellate court may 
reverse an order denying a new trial when the appellate court 
determines, after independent review, that the real controversy 
has not been fully tried or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried. Wis. Stat. §§ 751.06 (1995-96) 
(supreme court), 752.35 (1995-96) (court of appeals). 
 
 
No. 95-1518 
 
12