Title: Doe v. Plourde

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 109 
Docket: 
Ken-18-479 
Submitted 
On Briefs: June 26, 2019 
Decided: 
July 11, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
JANE DOE1 
 
v. 
 
GLEN PLOURDE 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
 
[¶1]  Glen Plourde appeals from a protection from harassment order 
entered against him in the District Court (Waterville, R.A. French, J.) on the 
complaint of Jane Doe.  See 5 M.R.S. §§ 4653, 4655(1) (2018).  Plourde argues 
that the court abused its discretion in consolidating the hearing on his motion 
to dissolve the temporary protection from harassment order and the final 
hearing on Doe’s complaint, and in issuing a scheduling order that limited the 
time for the consolidated hearing to two hours.  He also argues that the court 
                                         
1  To comply with federal law, we do not identify the plaintiff in this protection from harassment 
action and limit our description of events and locations to avoid revealing “the identify or location of 
the party protected under [a protection] order.”  18 U.S.C.S. § 2265(d)(3) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 
116-19).   
 
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erred in finding credible the testimony of two witnesses and in finding that he 
intentionally sought to harass Doe.  We affirm the court’s judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  In May 2018, Doe first noticed Plourde watching her as she left her 
home.  He made kissing movements and moved his head and body to follow her 
as she drove by him three times that day.  Doe then noticed Plourde smoking 
while he observed and walked by her home multiple times each day from May 
to August.  This caused her to be fearful, feel uncomfortable, and change her 
daily routine to avoid being outdoors.  Plourde later requested copies of the 
blueprints to her home from the town office.  Plourde was arrested after 
entering Doe’s driveway and observing her through the glass portion of her 
door.   
 
[¶3]  On August 30, 2018, Doe filed a complaint for protection from 
harassment against Plourde in the Waterville District Court.  5 M.R.S. § 4653(1) 
(2018).  The court (Mathews, J.) issued a temporary protection from 
harassment order that same day.  Id. § 4654(2) (2018).  On September 18, 2018, 
Plourde filed a motion to dissolve, which was scheduled for a hearing on 
September 27, 2018.  Id. § 4654(6) (2018).  Because Doe was not served with 
the motion to dissolve until the night before the hearing, the court (Davis, J.) 
 
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continued the hearing to October 1, 2018, consolidating it with the final hearing 
on Doe’s complaint.  On October 1, the court (Stanfill, J.) continued the hearing 
on both motions due to the court’s schedule.  Between October 12 and 23, 2018, 
Plourde served witness subpoenas on numerous individuals and filed many 
letters with the court.  After reviewing Plourde’s materials, the court issued a 
scheduling order limiting the time allotted for the consolidated hearing to two 
hours—each party was “limited to one hour for both cross-examination and 
direct presentation of his or her case.”   
 
[¶4]  On October 31, 2018, the court (R.A. French, J.) held the consolidated 
hearing and issued a one-year protection from harassment order on the basis 
that Doe “established stalking” and “established three or more acts of 
intimidation that caused her fear and, in fact, were done with the intent to 
intimidate.”  Plourde timely appealed without filing a motion for further 
findings.  M.R. App. P. 2B(c); M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶5]  Plourde first challenges the court’s decision to consolidate the final 
hearing on Doe’s complaint and the hearing on his motion to dissolve the 
temporary protection from harassment order.  We review the court’s 
procedural decision to consolidate the hearings for an abuse of discretion.  See 
 
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M.R. Civ. P. 42(a); Maietta v. Int’l Harvester Co., 496 A.2d 286, 290-91 (Me. 
1985).  
 
¶[6]  Contrary to Plourde’s argument, the court did not abuse its 
discretion in consolidating the hearings.  First, the court did not improperly 
continue the hearing on Plourde’s motion to dissolve, which had been 
scheduled to be heard on September 27, 2018, after Doe was served only the 
night before.  See 5 M.R.S. § 4654(6).  Second, pursuant to section 4654(6), the 
court has discretion with regard to when to hold the hearing on the motion to 
dissolve.  See id.  In this case, the court quickly rescheduled the hearing to two 
business days later—October 1, 2018—when the parties were already 
scheduled to appear in court for the final hearing on Doe’s complaint.  It is 
within the court’s discretion to consolidate hearings where, as here, there is a 
common question of law or fact.  M.R. Civ. P. 42(a).  In this case, the hearings 
involved common questions of law and fact, namely, whether Doe could 
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Plourde harassed her.  
5 M.R.S. § 4654(1), (6) (2018).  Finally, the court’s decision to consolidate the 
hearings did not disadvantage Plourde.  At both a hearing on a motion to 
dissolve and a final hearing on a complaint for protection from harassment, it 
is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate to the court, by a preponderance of the 
 
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evidence, that a protection order is appropriate.  Id.  The court’s decision to 
consolidate the hearings did not relieve Doe of her burden or otherwise 
disadvantage or prejudice Plourde.  Therefore, the court did not abuse its 
discretion.  See M.R. Civ. P. 42(a); Maietta, 496 A.2d at 290-91.   
 
[¶7]  Plourde next challenges the court’s (Stanfill, J.) scheduling order 
limiting the consolidated hearing to two hours, allotting one hour to each party 
to cross-examine and present its case.  We review a trial court’s scheduling 
order for an abuse of discretion.  M.R. Civ. P. 16A(a).  Contrary to Plourde’s 
argument, the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a scheduling order 
limiting the duration of the consolidated hearing and the issues to be 
considered.  See id.  Pursuant to Rule 16A(a), “the court may issue a scheduling 
order, trial management order, or other order directing the future course of the 
action.”  Id.  Moreover, the “trial court has broad discretion to control the order 
and timing of presentation of evidence and to set and enforce reasonable time 
limits on testimonial hearings.”  Dolliver v. Dolliver, 2001 ME 144, ¶ 10, 782 A.2d 
316.  Based on prior court-related experiences with Plourde, the number of 
subpoenas Plourde filed (few, if any, of which were likely to generate relevant 
evidence), and the relative simplicity of the issues to be decided at the hearing, 
the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the total time for the hearing 
 
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to two hours, nor in explicitly restricting the scope of inquiry to issues relevant 
to the protection from harassment order.  See M.R. Civ. P. 16A(a); Bank of Am., 
N.A. v. Camire, 2017 ME 20, ¶¶ 1, 8-10, 155 A.3d 416 (determining that the trial 
court properly exercised its discretion in managing trial time where the court 
provided advance notice to the parties that the trial would be limited to two 
hours on a claim involving outstanding credit card debt).   
 
[¶8]  Finally, Plourde argues that the court erred in relying on the 
testimony of two particular witnesses and in finding that he intentionally 
harassed Doe.  We review challenges to a witness’s credibility and the court’s 
factual findings for clear error.  See M.R. Civ. P. 52(c); Allen v. Rae, 2019 ME 53, 
¶ 9, 206 A.3d 902; Sloan v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 29, 43 A.3d 978.  We find 
Plourde’s arguments unpersuasive for two reasons.  First, “[b]ecause a trial 
court is not bound to accept testimony and evidence as fact, and because 
determinations of the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence are 
squarely in the province of the fact-finder, we will not second-guess the trial 
court’s credibility assessment of conflicting testimony.”  Allen, 2019 ME 53, ¶ 9, 
206 A.3d 902 (quotation marks omitted).  Second, contrary to Plourde’s 
contention, there is sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that he 
engaged in a pattern of behavior that caused Doe fear and was performed with 
 
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the intent to intimidate her.  5 M.R.S. § 4651(2)(A) (2018).  Therefore, the court 
did not err in issuing the protection from harassment order.  Id. § 4655.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Glen Plourde, appellant pro se 
 
Melissa L. Martin, Esq., Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Portland, for appellee Jane 
Doe 
 
 
Waterville District Court docket number PA-2018-329 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY