Title: State of Maine v. Adams

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
STATE OF MAINE  
 
v.   Record No. 080987 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
February 27, 2009 
RICHARD L. ADAMS, JR. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
R. Terrence Ney, Judge 
 
This appeal concerns an action to quiet title to a copy of 
the Declaration of Independence (the Declaration) that was 
printed in July 1776.  We consider whether the circuit court 
erred in holding that a Virginia resident who purchased this 
document had superior title than that claimed by the State of 
Maine, which contended that the document was a public record 
owned by the Town of Wiscasset, Maine. 
 
In July 1776, after the Second Continental Congress 
approved the Declaration of Independence, each of the colonial 
delegations was charged with informing its residents about the 
colonies’ decision to separate from England.  The Massachusetts 
Executive Council (the Executive Council), an entity that shared 
governing responsibility with the Massachusetts legislature, 
issued an order directing that copies of the Declaration be 
printed and delivered to the ministers of all churches in 
Massachusetts so that the document could be read to the 
ministers’ congregations.1 
 
The Executive Council commissioned E. Russell, a private 
printer in Salem, Massachusetts, to print these copies of the 
Declaration.  Such copies of documents intended for widespread 
distribution were commonly referred to as “broadsides.” 
 
The broadsides that Russell printed contained the 
Declaration’s text and the Executive Council’s order directing 
distribution and promulgation of that document.  The broadsides 
also included the Executive Council’s additional order requiring 
that the ministers, after reading aloud the Declaration, deliver 
the broadsides to the town clerks.  The order directed the town 
clerks to record the Declaration’s text in their respective town 
record books “to remain as a perpetual Memorial thereof.”  
Neither the Executive Council’s order nor any other law directed 
the town clerks regarding the proper disposition of the 
broadsides after their contents were transcribed in the town 
record books. 
 
The broadside at issue in this case (the print) bears a 
handwritten notation on its reverse side stating that the print 
was delivered to the Reverend Thomas Moore in the Town of 
Pownalborough and read to his congregation.  An additional 
                     
1 In 1776, Massachusetts encompassed an area of land that 
today includes both Massachusetts and Maine. 
 
2 
 
notation indicates that the Reverend Moore later delivered the 
print to the Reverend John Murray, pastor of a church in Booth 
Bay, Massachusetts, about 11 miles from Pownalborough. 
 
Also appearing in handwritten text on the reverse side of 
the print is the following notation: 
To [Pownalborough] Town Clerk according to the with in 
[sic] Authority having read the within Proclamation.  I 
return it to you to be Recorded as ye law directs.  Thos. 
Moore.  Pownalborough October 19th, 1776. 
 
On November 10, 1776, Edmund Bridge, the town clerk of 
Pownalborough, transcribed the text of the Declaration into the 
official town book in accordance with the Executive Council’s 
order. 
 
There is no direct evidence regarding the location of the 
print in the years immediately after Bridge recorded the text of 
the Declaration.  However, certain handwritten entries on the 
reverse side of the print state: “from 1776 to 1784 Warrants 
[etc.],” “Town Warrants [etc.],” “Pownalborough,” “Declaration 
of Independence, July 1776,” and “Loose Papers no Taxes.” 
 
The location of the print remained unknown until 1995, when 
Harold Moore, an auctioneer hired by the estate of Anna Holbrook 
Plumstead (Anna), discovered the print in the attic of Anna’s 
home in Wiscasset, Maine.  The print was folded in a box 
containing minutes from a Pownalborough town meeting held in 
1795, personal family receipts, and other papers unrelated to 
 
3 
 
town business.  Wiscasset, Maine (the town) was formerly known 
as Pownalborough, Massachusetts.  The town’s name was changed 
from Pownalborough to Wiscasset in 1802, and Maine became a 
state in 1820. 
 
Anna was the daughter of Solomon Holbrook, who served as 
the town clerk from 1885 until his death in 1929.  Pownalborough 
and Wiscasset have had a total of 41 town clerks during the 
period between 1760 and the date of trial, and Holbrook was the 
28th clerk in order of service to hold that position.  Although 
Holbrook once owned Anna’s house where the print was found, 
Holbrook never lived in that house. 
 
After Harold Moore discovered the print in Anna’s house in 
1995, Seth Kaller of Kaller Historical Documents, Inc. purchased 
the print at auction for $77,000.  In 2001, Kaller sold the 
print to Simon Finch, a rare book dealer in London, England, for 
$390,000.  In 2002, Richard L. Adams, a Virginia resident, 
purchased the print from Finch for $475,000. 
 
In 2005, the State of Maine (Maine), on behalf of the town, 
sought to recover the print from Adams based on Maine’s 
assertion that the print was a public record owned by the town.  
Adams filed an action in the circuit court to quiet title to the 
print contending that he was its lawful owner.  The case 
proceeded to a bench trial. 
 
4 
 
 
The evidence at trial showed that until 1967, the 
Pownalborough and Wiscasset town clerks performed the duties of 
their part-time position from their homes.  In 1967, the town 
began conducting its business from a public town office.  The 
current town clerk testified that although a library was built 
in the town in 1805, it is unknown when the library began 
storing certain town records that now are housed there. 
 
Jonathan S. Kiffer, Senior Vice President of Sotheby’s, 
testified as an expert on the subject of rare documents created 
around the time the print was made.  Kiffer stated that 
broadsides like the print in question were printed as news 
releases or bulletins and were in the category of documents 
referred to as “ephemera,” or items produced to serve only a 
brief purpose.  According to Kiffer, once the news contained in 
a broadside was disseminated, the broadside had fulfilled its 
purpose and could be discarded. 
 
Maine presented the expert testimony of Albert H. Whitaker, 
Jr., a former Massachusetts State Archivist who was familiar 
with colonial records.  Whitaker stated that in his opinion, the 
standard practice for a town clerk in 1776 would have been to 
retain the print as a town record.  Whitaker testified that he 
based his opinion on the fact that the print was directed to the 
town clerk’s attention and the town clerk actually received the 
print. 
 
5 
 
 
Whitaker also testified that a town generally would retain 
a document whose contents were recorded in a town book because 
the original document was considered a superior form of written 
instrument.  However, Whitaker stated that this particular 
town’s record keeping was inconsistent regarding documents other 
than those relating to births, deaths, marriages, real property, 
elections, and town meetings. 
 
In his testimony, Whitaker also discussed the handwritten 
entries appearing on the reverse side of the print.  As set 
forth above, those entries stated: “from 1776 to 1784 Warrants 
[etc.],” “Town Warrants [etc.],” “Pownalborough,” “Declaration 
of Independence, July 1776,” and “Loose Papers no Taxes.”  
According to Whitaker, these entries indicated that the print 
continued to “reside” with the town’s clerks for “at least a 
short period of time” after 1776.  However, Seth Kaller, the 
dealer in rare documents who purchased the print at auction in 
1995, testified that these particular entries suggested “endless 
possibilities” regarding who made these entries and when they 
were made. 
 
After considering the evidence, the circuit court issued a 
letter opinion explaining its ruling in favor of Adams.  
Addressing Maine’s argument that the print was a “public record” 
under Maine statutory law, the circuit court held that the 1973 
statutory definition of that term was inapplicable because it 
 
6 
 
did not have retroactive effect.2  However, the circuit court 
also addressed the merits of Maine’s statutory argument, ruling 
that even if that statutory definition did have retroactive 
effect, Maine failed to establish that the town “maintained” the 
print as required by that statutory definition. 
 
In addition, the circuit court determined that the print 
did not meet the common law definition of a “public record” 
because a public officer did not create the print.  The circuit 
court also found that Maine failed to prove that the town “kept” 
the print as a town record. 
 
Finally, the circuit court concluded that Maine failed to 
prove that even if the town clerk had once possessed the print, 
the print later was converted.  The circuit court found that 
Maine presented no evidence that the print was wrongfully 
removed or converted.  The circuit court stated that any 
conclusion regarding when and how the print left the town’s 
possession would be conjecture. 
 
Based on these findings, the circuit court held that 
because Maine failed to establish ownership of the print, Adams 
had superior title to the print as a bona fide purchaser and the 
party in possession of the print.  The circuit court entered a 
final judgment order incorporating its letter opinion.  Maine 
appeals. 
                     
2 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2212(3)(1973). 
 
7 
 
 
Maine argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that 
Adams established superior title to the print.  Maine begins its 
analysis by arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to 
apply a preponderance of the evidence standard and in assigning 
Maine the burden of proving “conclusively” that the print was 
kept or maintained by the town.  Maine contends that, to the 
extent that it had a burden of proof, Maine proved that the town 
is the true owner of the print because the print meets the 
definition of a “public record” under Maine statutory law. 
 
In the alternative, Maine asserts that the print qualifies 
as a public record under the common law.  Maine contends that 
the evidence demonstrated that the town kept the print for a 
sufficient period of time, after its delivery to the town clerk 
in 1776, so as to render the print a public record.  Maine 
contends that the evidence showed that town records were kept by 
town clerks at their homes in the 18th, 19th, and 20th 
centuries, and that this evidence explains the location of the 
print in the home of a daughter of a former town clerk. 
 
Maine additionally asserts that the circuit court erred in 
ruling that the common law requires that a public record be 
created by a public official.  Maine contends that the print 
qualified as a public record under the common law because 
although Russell was a private printer, he created the 
broadsides at the direction of the Executive Council. 
 
8 
 
 
In response, Adams argues that the circuit court correctly 
decided that Adams established superior title to the print.  
With respect to Maine’s common law argument, Adams contends that 
Maine failed to prove that the town owned the print under the 
common law definition of “public record” because the print was 
not a written memorial made by a public officer.  Adams 
maintains that under the common law definition, the copy of the 
Declaration that the town clerk transcribed into the town book 
is the only public record established by the evidence. 
 
Adams also argues that Maine was unable to show that the 
town “kept” the print, within the meaning of the common law.  
Adams contends that the evidence regarding Holbrook’s connection 
to the print is speculative, because the evidence failed to show 
that the print had been transferred from town clerks to their 
successors, or that Holbrook ever had possession of the print. 
 
Addressing Maine’s statutory argument, Adams asserts that 
Maine’s position is defaulted on procedural grounds.  Adams 
argues that Maine failed to assign error to the circuit court’s 
holding that Maine statutory law defining a “public record” does 
not have retroactive effect.  According to Adams, Maine’s 
failure to assign error to that holding bars this Court from 
considering whether the circuit court correctly decided that 
matter. 
 
9 
 
 
In resolving these issues, we first observe that an action 
to quiet title is based on the premise that a person with good 
title to certain real or personal property should not be 
subjected to various future claims against that title.  Neff v. 
Ryman, 100 Va. 521, 524, 42 S.E. 314, 315 (1902); John L. 
Costello, Virginia Remedies § 20.07 at 20-38, 20-39 (3d ed. 
2005).  Thus, in a quiet title action, a plaintiff asks the 
court to declare that he has good title to the property in 
question and compels any adverse claimant to prove a competing 
ownership claim or forever be barred from asserting it.  Black’s 
Law Dictionary 32 (8th ed. 2004); see City of Staunton v. The 
Augusta Corp., 169 Va. 424, 429-32, 193 S.E. 695, 696-97 (1937) 
(city failed to carry burden to show it owned certain real 
property); Costello, Virginia Remedies § 20.07 at 20-38, 20-39. 
 
At trial, each party asserted that it had superior title to 
the print.  Accordingly, each party bore the burden of proving 
those facts necessary for the court to rule in its favor.  See 
Sachs v. Horan, 252 Va. 247, 250, 475 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1996); 
United Dentists, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 347, 355, 173 
S.E. 508, 511 (1934); 9 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law § 2485, 283-86 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). 
The common law provides that possession of property 
constitutes prima facie evidence of ownership until a better 
title is proven.  Smith v. Bailey, 141 Va. 757, 776, 127 S.E. 
 
10 
 
89, 95 (1925); see Tate v. Tate, 85 Va. 205, 214, 7 S.E. 352, 
356 (1888); Willcox v. Stroup, 467 F.3d 409, 412-13 (4th Cir. 
2006).  We have explained that possession of personal property 
is presumptive proof of ownership because individuals generally 
own the personal property that they possess.  Saunders v. 
Greever, 85 Va. 252, 289, 7 S.E. 391, 410 (1888); see Willcox, 
467 F.3d at 412. 
This common law presumption of ownership based on 
possession requires that the party not in possession of the 
disputed personal property produce evidence of superior title.  
If the party not in possession is able to produce such evidence 
of superior title, the presumption of ownership in the possessor 
is defeated.  Willcox, 467 F.3d at 413; see Brunswick Land Corp. 
v. Perkinson, 146 Va. 695, 708, 132 S.E. 853, 857 (1926).  
However, if the party not in possession fails to establish 
superior title to the property, the presumption of ownership 
based on possession prevails and relieves a court from having to 
preside over “a historical goose chase.”  Willcox, 467 F.3d at 
413. 
 
Maine seeks to establish superior title to the print on the 
basis that the print is a “public record” kept and maintained by 
the town.  In making this assertion, Maine relies both on the 
common law definition of “public record” and on Maine’s own 
statutory definition of that term. 
 
11 
 
We first examine the common law component of Maine’s claim.  
The parties agree that both Maine and Virginia recognize the 
same definition of a “public record” under the common law.  This 
definition, adopted in many jurisdictions, provides that a 
“public record” is 
‘a written memorial made by a public officer authorized by 
law to perform that function, and intended to serve as 
evidence of something written, said or done.’  It must be 
‘a written memorial,’ must be made by ‘a public officer,’ 
and that officer must be ‘authorized by law’ (not required) 
to make it. [The public official] must have authority to 
make it; but that authority need not be derived from 
express statutory enactment.  Whenever a written record of 
the transactions of a public officer in his office, is a 
convenient and appropriate mode of discharging the duties 
of his office, it is not only his right but his duty to 
keep that memorial, whether expressly required to do so or 
not. 
 
Coleman v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 865, 881 
(1874)(emphasis and citation omitted); see White v. United 
States, 164 U.S. 100, 103 (1896); Treat v. McDonough, 367 P.2d 
587, 589 (Colo. 1961); Branch v. State, 80 So. 482, 485 (Fla. 
1918); People v. The Dime Savings Bank, 183 N.E. 604, 607 (Ill. 
1932); Robison v. Fishback, 93 N.E. 666, 668-69 (Ind. 1911); 
State v. Hanlin, 110 N.W. 162, 164 (Iowa 1907); State v. Chase, 
330 A.2d 909, 911-12 (Me. 1975); State v. Donovan, 86 N.W. 709, 
711 (N.D. 1901); State v. Kelly, 143 S.E.2d 136, 139 (W.Va. 
1965). 
 
In the present case, the evidence showed that Russell was 
not a public officer, but was a private printer who printed 
 
12 
 
between 200 and 300 broadsides at the direction of the Executive 
Council.  The fact that the Executive Council authorized Russell 
to print the broadsides did not transform his employment status 
from that of a private printer to one of a public officer.  
Russell was not executing the duties of public office at the 
time he printed the broadsides. 
The duty that the common law assigns public officers to 
make a written record of governmental action reflects the 
importance of public records in providing accurate and 
transparent accounts of governmental acts.  The serious nature 
of this responsibility is such that the duty may be required 
under the sanction of official oath.  See Coleman, 66 Va. at 
882.  Public officers are charged with the duty to keep written 
records of governmental action affecting the citizens of their 
jurisdictions, and the record entries made by those public 
officers serve as the “public record” on which the citizens can 
rely. 
In the present case, the duty of the town’s clerk to create 
a public record of the Declaration emanated from the Executive 
Council’s order directing that the clerks of the various towns 
record the text of the Declaration in their town books “there to 
remain as a perpetual Memorial thereof.”  This order of the 
Executive Council reflected the importance of the clerks’ acts 
of transcription and the fact that the written entries they 
 
13 
 
created were to be the perpetual record of the Declaration in 
the various town books. 
In addition, one of the handwritten notations on the 
reverse side of the print provided evidence that the print was 
not intended to be a public record of the town.  According to 
that notation, after the print was sent to Reverend Moore in 
Pownalborough, the print was delivered to Reverend Murray in 
Booth Bay before it was received by the town clerk in 
Pownalborough. 
The evidence before us shows that Edmund Bridge, the town 
clerk of Pownalborough in 1776, created a public record of the 
Declaration for Pownalborough when he transcribed the words of 
the Declaration into the official town book.  The fact that the 
print was critical to Bridge’s transcription of the text of the 
Declaration did not render the print a public record.  Instead, 
the only public record of the Declaration under the common law 
was the actual transcription that Bridge entered in the town 
book in accordance with the Executive Council’s order. 
We do not reach the common law issue whether the print was 
“kept” by the clerks of the town after the Declaration’s text 
was transcribed into the town book.  The fact that the print was 
not made by an authorized public officer and was not intended to 
be the official memorial of the Declaration precluded the print 
from qualifying as a “public record” under the common law, 
 
14 
 
irrespective whether the print later was “kept” by the town’s 
clerks.  Coleman, 66 Va. at 881; see White, 164 U.S. at 103; 
Treat, 367 P.2d at 589; Branch, 80 So. at 485; Dime Savings 
Bank, 183 N.E. at 607; Robison, 93 N.E. at 668-69; Hanlin, 110 
N.W. at 164; Chase, 330 A.2d at 911-12; Donovan, 86 N.W. at 711; 
Kelly, 143 S.E.2d at 139.  Thus, we hold that the print was not 
a public record of the town under the common law.3  See Coleman, 
66 Va. at 881; White, 164 U.S. at 103; Treat, 367 P.2d at 589; 
Branch, 80 So. at 485; Dime Savings Bank, 183 N.E. at 607; 
Robison, 93 N.E. at 668-69; Hanlin, 110 N.W. at 164; Chase, 330 
A.2d at 911-12; Donovan, 86 N.W. at 711; Kelly, 143 S.E.2d at 
139. 
Maine argues, nevertheless, that the print is a “public 
record” as defined under Maine statutory law.  The circuit court 
rejected that argument holding, among other things, that the 
                     
3 Based on this holding, we do not address Maine’s other 
arguments concerning whether the documents were kept by the town 
clerk, including the circuit court’s allocation of the burden of 
proof regarding how and when the print left the town’s 
possession, the circuit court’s statement that Maine had the 
burden to prove “conclusively” that the print was kept by the 
town, the circuit court’s consideration whether other towns 
currently maintain broadside prints, the circuit court’s ruling 
that no law required the town to keep the print after it was 
transcribed into the town book, and the circuit court’s 
consideration whether a library was built in Wiscasset in 1805 
to store town records.  As stated above, Maine’s failure to 
prove that the print was a written memorial made by an 
authorized public officer precludes the print from qualifying as 
a “public record” under common law, irrespective whether Maine 
produced any evidence that the town clerks kept the print. 
 
15 
 
print “pre-dates Maine’s 1973 definition of ‘public records,’ 
and Maine did not produce evidence that Maine’s legislators 
intended for this definition to apply retroactively to all of 
the documents that ever entered the state of Maine.  Therefore, 
the 1973 definition of ‘public record’ does not apply to this 
case.” 
We are unable to consider the merits of Maine’s statutory 
argument.  A party who asks this Court to consider whether a 
circuit court’s holding was erroneous is required to assign 
error to the challenged holding so that it may be identified 
properly for our consideration.  Rule 5:17(c); Friedline v. 
Commonwealth, 265 Va. 273, 278-79, 576 S.E.2d 491, 494 (2003); 
Kirby v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 440, 444-45, 570 S.E.2d 832, 834 
(2002); Chesapeake Hosp. Auth. v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 551, 556 
n.2, 554 S.E.2d 55, 57 n.2 (2001).  Thus, when a party fails to 
assign error to a particular holding by the circuit court, that 
holding becomes the law of the case and is binding on appeal.  
See Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 722, 652 S.E.2d 129, 144 
(2007); Chesapeake Hosp. Auth., 195 Va. at 565, 554 S.E.2d at 
62; Trustees v. Taylor & Parrish, Inc., 249 Va. 144, 154, 452 
S.E.2d 847, 852 (1995). 
Maine did not assign error to the circuit court’s holding 
that Maine’s 1973 statutory definition of public “record” was 
not intended to have retroactive application to documents such 
 
16 
 
as the print.4  Therefore, we hold that the circuit court’s 
determination that Maine’s statutory definition of public 
“record” was not intended to have retroactive effect has become 
the law of this case.  See Little, 274 Va. at 722, 652 S.E.2d at 
144; Chesapeake Hosp. Auth., 195 Va. at 565, 554 S.E.2d at 62; 
Trustees, 249 Va. at 154, 452 S.E.2d at 852. 
Our decision that Maine’s statutory definition of “public 
record” is procedurally barred from review also removes from our 
consideration Maine’s various arguments based on that statutory 
definition.  Thus, we do not consider those issues, including 
whether the circuit court erroneously employed a “conclusive” 
standard of proof regarding whether the print was “maintained” 
by the town within the meaning of the statutory definition.
 
Finally, we find no merit in Maine’s argument that 
regardless whether the print met the definition of a “public 
record” under the common law or statutory law, the circuit court 
erred in holding that Wiscasset did not own the print.  Maine 
bases this argument on its contention that because the print was 
delivered to the town clerk in 1776, the print immediately 
became the property of the town.  Maine asserts that Solomon 
                     
4 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2212(3)(1973).  We also 
observe that Maine agreed during oral argument of this case that 
the current statutory definition of the term public “record,” 
found in Title 5, Section 92-A(5) of the Maine Revised Statutes 
Annotated, is substantially the same as the 1973 version 
addressed by the circuit court. 
 
17 
 
Holbrook’s family wrongfully converted the print, and that Maine 
as the true owner of the print may recover it from Adams 
irrespective whether he was a bona fide purchaser for value. 
Even if we assume, without deciding, that the town owned 
the print by virtue of having had the print in its possession 
more than 200 years ago, the record does not establish that the 
print was converted.  “Conversion is the wrongful assumption or 
exercise of the right of ownership over goods or chattels 
belonging to another in denial of or inconsistent with the 
owner’s rights.”  Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 259 Va. 806, 814, 
528 S.E.2d 714, 719 (2000); see Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. 
Kaplan, 198 Va. 67, 75-76, 92 S.E.2d 359, 365 (1956); accord 
Withers v. Hackett, 714 A.2d 798, 800 (Me. 1998); Leighton v. 
Fleet Bank of Maine, 634 A.2d 453, 457 (Me. 1993). 
Maine produced no evidence supporting its theory of 
conversion but merely asks us to speculate that because the 
print was found in Holbrook’s daughter’s attic, Holbrook or a 
member of his family converted the print.  We will not engage in 
such speculation and conclude as a matter of law that Maine did 
not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the print was 
converted by Holbrook or his family. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not err 
in holding that Adams established superior title to the print.  
In reaching this conclusion, we need not consider whether Adams 
 
18 
 
was a bona fide purchaser of the print because after Adams 
established prima facie title to the print, Maine failed to 
prove under any theory that Maine owned the print or had 
superior title.  See Smith, 141 Va. at 776, 127 S.E. at 95; 
Tate, 85 Va. at 214, 7 S.E. at 356; Willcox, 467 F.3d at 412-13. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment and enter final judgment declaring that Richard L. 
Adams, Jr. has good title to the print. 
Affirmed. 
 
19