Title: Law Offices of Herssein and Herssein, P.A. v. United Services Automobile Ass’n

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC17-1848 
____________ 
 
LAW OFFICES OF HERSSEIN AND HERSSEIN, P.A., etc., et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
 
November 15, 2018 
 
CANADY, C.J. 
 
In this case, we consider an issue regarding the legal sufficiency of a motion 
to disqualify a trial court judge on the basis of a Facebook “friendship.”  This 
Court granted jurisdiction to review the decision of the Third District Court of 
Appeal in Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein, P.A. v. United Services Automobile 
Ass’n, 229 So. 3d 408 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), which held that the existence of a 
Facebook “friendship” was not a sufficient basis for disqualification and which 
expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal in Domville v. State, 103 So. 3d 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
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We hold that an allegation that a trial judge is a Facebook “friend” with an 
attorney appearing before the judge, standing alone, does not constitute a legally 
sufficient basis for disqualification.  We therefore approve the decision of the 
Third District in Herssein and disapprove the decision of the Fourth District in 
Domville on the conflict issue.1 
BACKGROUND 
 
In the case on review, the Law Offices of Herssein and Herssein, P.A., and 
attorney Reuven Herssein “filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge.”  Herssein, 
229 So. 3d at 409.  After the trial judge denied the disqualification motion as 
legally insufficient, the Herssein Firm and attorney Herssein “petition[ed the Third 
District] for a writ of prohibition to disqualify the trial court judge.”  Id.  On 
review of the petition, the Third District explained the basis for the motion to 
disqualify that is relevant here: 
The motion [to disqualify] is based in part on the fact that [Israel] 
Reyes[—an attorney appearing before the trial judge on behalf of a 
potential witness and potential party in the pending litigation—]is 
listed as a “friend” on the trial judge’s personal Facebook page.  In 
support of the motion, Iris J. Herssein and Reuven Herssein, president 
and vice president of the Herssein Firm, signed affidavits in which 
they swore, “[b]ecause [the trial judge] is Facebook friends with 
Reyes, [the executive’s] personal attorney, I have a well-grounded 
fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.  Further, based on [the 
                                          
 
 
1.  The Petitioners have presented certain other issues that we decline to 
address. 
 
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trial judge] being Facebook friends with Reyes, I . . . believe that 
Reyes, [the executive’s] lawyer has influenced [the trial judge].” 
 
Id. (some alterations in original). 
 
 
The Third District expressly acknowledged that “Petitioners raise[d] three 
grounds” for disqualification on review.  Id.  But the Third District “wr[ote] only 
to address the petitioners’ argument that the trial court judge should be disqualified 
because the judge is a Facebook ‘friend’ with a lawyer representing a potential 
witness and potential party in the pending litigation.”  Id.  The Third District 
framed the issue as “whether a reasonably prudent person would fear that he or she 
could not get a fair and impartial trial because the judge is a Facebook friend with 
a lawyer who represents a potential witness and party to the lawsuit.”  Id. 
 
At the outset, the Third District cited authority from this Court and the First 
District Court of Appeal supporting the longstanding general principle of law that 
an allegation of mere friendship between a judge and a litigant or attorney 
appearing before the judge, standing alone, does not constitute a legally sufficient 
basis for disqualification.  Id. at 409-10 (citing MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain 
Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332, 1338 (Fla. 1990); Smith v. Santa Rosa Island Auth., 
729 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)). 
The Third District acknowledged that “this authority does not foreclose the 
possibility that a relationship between a judge and a lawyer may, under certain 
circumstances, warrant disqualification.”  Id. at 410.  The Third District noted that 
 
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the Fourth District in Domville “held that recusal was required when a judge was a 
Facebook ‘friend’ with the prosecutor” based on “a 2009 Judicial Ethics Advisory 
Committee Opinion.”  Id. (citing Fla. JEAC Op. 2009-20 (Nov. 17, 2009)).  The 
Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee (“JEAC”) advised in its 2009 opinion 
that judges were prohibited from adding lawyers who appear before them as 
“friends” on their Facebook pages or from allowing lawyers who appear before 
them to add them as “friends” on the lawyers’ Facebook pages based on the 
JEAC’s conclusion that “a judge’s selection of Facebook ‘friends’ necessarily 
‘conveys or permits others to convey the impression that they are in a special 
position to influence the judge’ ” in violation of Canon 2B of the Florida Code of 
Judicial Conduct.  Id. at 412 (quoting Fla. JEAC Op. 2009-20 (Nov. 17, 2009)).  In 
support of its conclusion, the JEAC zeroed in on the “selection and communication 
process” of Facebook “friendship.”  Id. at 410 (quoting Fla. JEAC Op. 2009-20 
(Nov. 17, 2009)).  The JEAC reaffirmed its advice in 2010.  Id. (citing Fla. JEAC 
Op. 2010-06 (Mar. 26, 2010)). 
The Third District went on to explain that the Fifth District in Chace v. 
Loisel, 170 So. 3d 802 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), subsequently “signaled disagreement” 
with Domville.  Herssein, 229 So. 3d at 410.  Chace expressed “serious 
reservations about the court’s rationale in Domville” in part because “[a] Facebook 
 
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friendship does not necessarily signify the existence of a close relationship.”  Id. 
(quoting Chace, 170 So. 3d at 803-04). 
The Third District agreed with Chace on this point for three reasons.  Id. at 
411.  “First, as the Kentucky Supreme Court noted, ‘some people have thousands 
of Facebook “friends.” ’ ”  Id. (quoting Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215, 
222 (Ky. 2012)).  “Second, Facebook members often cannot recall every person 
they have accepted as ‘friends’ or who have accepted them as  
‘friends.’ ”  Id.  And “[t]hird, many Facebook ‘friends’ are selected based upon 
Facebook’s data-mining technology [suggestions] rather than personal 
interactions.”  Id.  Thus the Third District concluded that “a ‘friend’ on a social 
networking website is not necessarily a friend in the traditional sense of the 
word[—i.e., a person attached to another person by feelings of affection or 
personal regard].”  Id. at 412.  The Third District further concluded that “[a]n 
assumption that all Facebook ‘friends’ rise to the level of a close relationship that 
warrants disqualification simply does not reflect the current nature of this type of 
electronic social networking.”  Id. 
The Third District ultimately “h[eld] that the mere fact that a judge is a 
Facebook ‘friend’ with a lawyer for a potential party or witness, without more, 
does not provide a basis for a well-grounded fear that the judge cannot be impartial 
or that the judge is under the influence of the Facebook ‘friend.’ ”  Id.  
 
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Accordingly, the Third District denied the petition for writ of prohibition.  Id.  The 
Third District acknowledged that its holding was “in conflict” with Domville but 
did not certify conflict.  Id. 
ANALYSIS 
The conflict issue presents a pure question of law that is subject to de novo 
review.  See Daniels v. State, 121 So. 3d 409, 413 (Fla. 2013).  In considering this 
question of law, we first discuss the general standard governing disqualification 
and review the case law addressing the specific issue of judicial disqualifications 
based on a friendship relationship.  We then apply the established principles of law 
to the context of Facebook “friendships.”  Finally, we explain that our conclusion 
that Facebook “friendship,” standing alone, is insufficient to warrant 
disqualification is consistent with the majority view in the other states. 
A.  Legal Standard for Disqualification 
“A motion to disqualify is governed substantively by section 38.10, Florida 
Statutes . . . and procedurally by Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 
2.330.”  Gregory v. State, 118 So. 3d 770, 778 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Gore v. 
State, 964 So. 2d 1257, 1268 (Fla. 2007)).  “The statute requires that the moving 
party file an affidavit in good faith ‘stating fear that he or she will not receive a fair 
trial . . . on account of the prejudice of the judge’ as well as ‘the facts and the 
reasons for the belief that any such bias or prejudice exists.’ ”  Peterson v. State, 
 
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221 So. 3d 571, 581 (Fla. 2017) (quoting § 38.10, Fla. Stat. (2014)).  The rule 
provides that “[t]he judge against whom an initial motion to disqualify . . . is 
directed shall determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass 
on the truth of the facts alleged.”  Pasha v. State, 225 So. 3d 688, 703 (Fla. 2017) 
(quoting Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330(f)).  “The disqualification [statute and] rules 
are designed to keep the courts free from bias and prejudice.”  Tableau Fine Art 
Group, Inc. v. Jacoboni, 853 So. 2d 299, 301 (Fla. 2003).  “[T]he disqualification 
statute and rules are [also] designed to ensure confidence in the judicial system, ‘as 
well as to prevent the disqualification process from being abused for the purposes 
of judge-shopping, delay, or some other reason not related to providing for the 
fairness and impartiality of the proceeding.’ ”  Id. (quoting Livingston v. State, 441 
So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983)). 
“The standard of review of a trial judge’s determination on a motion to 
disqualify is de novo.”  Parker v. State, 3 So. 3d 974, 982 (Fla. 2009).  “A motion 
to disqualify will be dismissed as legally insufficient if it fails to establish a well-
grounded fear on the part of the movant that he will not receive a fair hearing.”  
Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 833 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Correll v. State, 698 So. 
2d 522, 524 (Fla. 1997)).  “Whether the motion is legally sufficient is a question of 
law.”  Mansfield v. State, 911 So. 2d 1160, 1170 (Fla. 2005).  The standard for 
determining the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify is whether the facts 
 
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alleged, which must be assumed to be true, “would place a reasonably prudent 
person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.”  MacKenzie, 565 So. 2d at 
1335 (quoting Livingston, 441 So. 2d at 1087).  “A mere ‘subjective fear[]’ of bias 
[or prejudice] will not be legally sufficient; rather, the fear must be objectively 
reasonable.”  Arbelaez v. State, 898 So. 2d 25, 41 (Fla. 2005) (first alteration in 
original) (quoting Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1986)). 
B.  Traditional “Friendship” 
In the traditional sense, a “friend” is a person attached to another person by 
feelings of affection or esteem.  See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 911 (1993 ed.) (defining the term “friend” as “one that seeks the society 
or welfare of another whom he holds in affection, respect, or esteem”); The 
American Heritage Dictionary 703 (5th ed. 2011) (defining the term “friend” as 
“[a] person whom one knows, likes, and trusts”); Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary 1035 (6th ed. 2007) (defining the term “friend” as “[a] person joined by 
affection and intimacy to another”). 
But “friendship” in the traditional sense of the word does not necessarily 
signify a close relationship.  It is commonly understood that friendship exists on a 
broad spectrum: some friendships are close and others are not.  See, e.g., Black’s 
Law Dictionary 667 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the term “friend” as “[v]arying in 
degree from greatest intimacy to acquaintance more or less casual”); Black’s Law 
 
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Dictionary 600 (5th ed. 1979) (same); Black’s Law Dictionary 795 (4th ed. 1951) 
(same); see also Clark v. Campbell, 133 A. 166, 170 (N.H. 1926) (“Friendship is a 
word of broad and varied application.”).  Thus the mere existence of a friendship, 
in and of itself, does not inherently reveal the degree or intensity of the friendship. 
It follows that the mere existence of a friendship between a judge and an 
attorney appearing before the judge, without more, does not reasonably convey to 
others the impression of an inherently close or intimate relationship.  No 
reasonably prudent person would fear that she could not receive a fair and 
impartial trial based solely on the fact that a judge and an attorney appearing 
before the judge are friends of an indeterminate nature.  It is for this reason that 
Florida courts—including this Court—have long recognized the general principle 
of law that an allegation of mere friendship between a judge and a litigant or 
attorney appearing before the judge, standing alone, does not constitute a legally 
sufficient basis for disqualification.  See, e.g., MacKenzie, 565 So. 2d at 1338 
(“There are countless factors which may cause some members of the community to 
think that a judge would be biased in favor of a litigant or counsel for a litigant, 
e.g., friendship, member of the same church or religious congregation, neighbors, 
former classmates or fraternity brothers.  However, such allegations have been 
found legally insufficient when asserted in a motion for disqualification.”); Ervin v. 
Collins, 85 So. 2d 833, 833-34 (Fla. 1956) (allegations of friendship between three 
 
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supreme court justices and the governor, who was a party, were “not sufficient to 
constitute a legal basis for disqualification”); Ball v. Yates, 29 So. 2d 729, 735 (Fla. 
1946) (allegation of friendship between a supreme court justice and an attorney 
previously employed by the prevailing party was “in fact and in law . . . inadequate 
and insufficient in substance” for disqualification); see also Smith, 729 So. 2d at 
946; Adkins v. Winkler, 592 So. 2d 357, 360-61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Raybon v. 
Burnette, 135 So. 2d 228, 230-31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).2 
With this legal framework in mind, we now turn to address the Facebook 
“friendship” issue. 
C.  Facebook “Friendship” 
Facebook was officially “launched on February 4, 2004.”  Facebook, Inc. v. 
DLA Piper LLP (US), 23 N.Y.S.3d 173, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).  Facebook is a 
social media and social networking service with approximately “1.79 billion active 
users.”  Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).  Facebook 
“permits registered users to do a host of things, among them: posting and reading 
comments, events, news, and, in general, communicating with . . . others.”  United 
                                          
 
2.  Of course, this general rule of law does not suggest that a friendship 
between a judge and an attorney of a determinate nature cannot constitute a close 
or intimate relationship that warrants disqualification.  Nor does it foreclose the 
possibility that a friendship between a judge and an attorney of an indeterminate 
nature may, in conjunction with some additional factor, constitute legally sufficient 
grounds for disqualification. 
 
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States v. Jordan, 678 F. App’x 759, 761 n.1 (10th Cir. 2017); see, e.g., Elonis v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004-07 (2015). 
Facebook provides users with several means of communicating with 
one another.  Users can send private messages to one or more users.  
Users can also communicate by posting information to their Facebook 
“wall,” which is part of each user’s Profile Page.  A Facebook “wall 
post” can include written comments, photographs, digital images, 
videos, and content from other websites. 
 
Shaw v. Young, 199 So. 3d 1180, 1188 n.6 (La. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Ehling v. 
Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 662 (D.N.J. 2013)). 
“Facebook users [primarily] create online profiles to share information about 
themselves with other Facebook users.”  Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695, 698 n.5 
(Md. 2015).  “To create a profile, a person must go to www.facebook.com, enter 
his or her full name, birth date, and e-mail address, and register a password.  
Facebook then sends a confirmation link to the registered e-mail, which the person 
must click on to complete registration.”  Smith v. State, 136 So. 3d 424, 432 (Miss. 
2014).  “Thereafter, the profile may be accessed on any computer or mobile device 
by logging into Facebook’s website using the same e-mail address and password 
combination.”  State v. Buhl, 138 A.3d 868, 874 n.2 (Conn. 2016).  “Once 
registered, a Facebook user can . . . customize her profile by adding personal 
information, photographs, or other content.  A user can [also] establish connections 
with other Facebook users by ‘friending’ them; the connected users are thus called 
‘friends.’ ”  Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 
 
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2016); see Ehling, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (“A Facebook user can connect with 
other users by adding them as ‘Facebook friends.’ ”). 
A Facebook user’s “friend” list appears on his profile page.  See Strunk v. 
State, 44 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); Commonwealth v. K.S.F., No. 2497 
EDA 2011, 2013 WL 11266159, at *1 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2013).  In order 
to “select” a Facebook “friend,” a user must either (1) send a Facebook “friend” 
request to another user to accept or (2) accept a Facebook “friend” request sent by 
another user; a Facebook “friendship” is officially established by the acceptance of 
a previously sent “friend” request.  See Fla. JEAC Op. 2009-20 (Nov. 17, 2009). 
In general, “Facebook users may opt to make all or part of their Facebook 
information private . . . .”  Sluss, 381 S.W.3d at 227 n.12.  But even if a Facebook 
user generally opts to make the user’s profile private, others may still be able to 
view the user’s list of Facebook “friends” on the user’s profile page.  See Chaney 
v. Fayette County Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2013); 
State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 820 n.1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).  Moreover, even if the 
Facebook user specifically opts to make the user’s Facebook “friend” list private, 
the user may still appear as a Facebook “friend” on another’s profile page.  See 
United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); State v. 
Gaps, 316 P.3d 172, 2014 WL 113465, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014).  In this way, it 
could be said that a Facebook user publicly “communicates” the existence of the 
 
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user’s Facebook “friendships” to others.  See Fla. JEAC Op. 2009-20 (Nov. 17, 
2009). 
We now come to the crux of the matter: what is the nature of Facebook 
“friendship?”  “The word ‘friend’ on Facebook is a term of art.”  Chace, 170 So. 
3d at 803.  In its most basic sense, a Facebook “friend” is a person digitally 
connected to another person by virtue of their Facebook “friendship.”  See, e.g., 
Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1063; Ehling, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 662. 
A Facebook “friend” may or may not be a “friend” in the traditional sense of 
the word.  But Facebook “friendship” is not—as a categorical matter—the 
functional equivalent of traditional “friendship.”  The establishment of a Facebook 
“friendship” does not objectively signal the existence of the affection and esteem 
involved in a traditional “friendship.”  Today it is commonly understood that 
Facebook “friendship” exists on an even broader spectrum than traditional 
“friendship.”  Traditional “friendship” varies in degree from greatest intimacy to 
casual acquaintance; Facebook “friendship” varies in degree from greatest 
intimacy to “virtual stranger” or “complete stranger.”  Chace, 170 So. 3d at 803; 
see, e.g., United States v. Tsarnaev, 157 F. Supp. 3d 57, 67 n.16 (D. Mass. 2016) 
(“Over a billion people use Facebook and connect with other users as ‘friends.’  
Some may be friends in the traditional sense, but others are no more than 
acquaintances or contacts or in some cases may even be complete strangers.”); In 
 
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re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., No. 09-CV-769S, 2013 WL 6073635, at *5 
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2013) (noting that “one can be [Facebook] ‘friends’ with 
people known to them, with strangers, with celebrities, with animals, and even 
with inanimate objects”). 
So it is regularly the case that Facebook “friendships” are more casual and 
less permanent than traditional friendships.  See, e.g., Williams v. Scribd, Inc., No. 
09CV1836-LAB WMC, 2010 WL 10090006, at *6 (S.D. Cal. June 23, 2010) (“[It 
is] no secret that the ‘friend’ label means less in cyberspace than it does in the 
neighborhood, or in the workplace, or on the schoolyard, or anywhere else that 
humans interact as real people.”); Quigley Corp. v. Karkus, No. 09-1725, 2009 WL 
1383280, at *5 n.3 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2009) (“Indeed, ‘friendships’ on Facebook 
may be as fleeting as the flick of a delete button.”); Herssein, 229 So. 3d at 411 
(“ ‘[S]ome people have thousands of Facebook “friends.” ’ . . .  Facebook members 
often cannot recall every person they have accepted as ‘friends’ or who have 
accepted them as ‘friends.’ . . .  [M]any Facebook ‘friends’ are selected based upon 
Facebook’s data-mining technology [suggestions] rather than personal 
interactions.” (quoting Sluss, 381 S.W.3d at 222)); State v. Smith, No. M2014-
00059-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 100452, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 7, 2015) 
(“Facebook ‘friendships’ frequently exist between those who are indifferent to one 
another.”).   
 
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It is therefore undeniable that the mere existence of a Facebook “friendship,” 
in and of itself, does not inherently reveal the degree or intensity of the relationship 
between the Facebook “friends.”  Since the creation of a Facebook “friendship” in 
itself does not signal the existence of a traditional “friendship,” it certainly cannot 
signal the existence of a close or intimate relationship.  See McGaha v. 
Commonwealth, 414 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2013) (“It is now common knowledge that 
merely being friends on Facebook does not, per se, establish a close relationship . . 
. .”); Sluss, 381 S.W.3d at 222 (“ ‘[F]riendships’ on Facebook and other similar 
social networking websites do not necessarily carry the same weight as true 
friendships or relationships in the community . . . .”); Kirby v. Wash. State Dep’t of 
Emp’t Sec., No. 70738-8-I, 2014 WL 7339610, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 
2014) (“The words ‘post,’ ‘friend,’ and ‘friending’ used in [the Facebook] context 
merely refer to individuals communicating with those listed on a social networking 
website and do[] not, necessarily, imply any more significant relationship between 
those individuals.”). 
In short, the mere fact that a Facebook “friendship” exists provides no 
significant information about the nature of any relationship between the Facebook 
“friends.”  Therefore, the mere existence of a Facebook “friendship” between a 
judge and an attorney appearing before the judge, without more, does not 
reasonably convey to others the impression of an inherently close or intimate 
 
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relationship.  No reasonably prudent person would fear that she could not receive a 
fair and impartial trial based solely on the fact that a judge and an attorney 
appearing before the judge are Facebook “friends” with a relationship of an 
indeterminate nature. 
As we now explain, our holding is in line with the majority of state judicial 
discipline bodies and judicial ethics advisory committees—which we refer to 
collectively as state ethics committees—that have considered whether Facebook 
“friendship” between a judge and an attorney appearing before the judge creates 
the appearance of impropriety under their respective states’ judicial codes of 
conduct. 
D.  State Ethics Committees 
The clear majority position is that mere Facebook “friendship” between a 
judge and an attorney appearing before the judge, without more, does not create the 
appearance of impropriety under the applicable code of judicial conduct.  See, e.g., 
Ariz. JEAC Op. 14-01, at 4 (Aug. 5, 2014); Ky. Jud. Ethics Comm. Op. JE-119, at 
2-3 (Jan. 20, 2010); Md. Jud. Ethics Comm. Op. 2012-07, at 5 (June 12, 2012); 
Mo. Ret., Removal, & Discipline Comm’n Op. 186, at 1 (Apr. 24, 2015); N.M. 
Jud. Conduct Adv. Comm. Op. Concerning Soc. Media, at 13-14 (Feb. 15, 2016); 
N.Y. JEAC Op. 13-39 (May 28, 2013); Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline Op. 2010-7, at 1-2, 8-9 (Dec. 3, 2010); Utah JEAC Op. 12-01, at 4-7 
 
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(Aug. 31, 2012).  In other words, the majority position is that the mere existence of 
a Facebook “friendship” between a judge and an attorney appearing before the 
judge, without more, does not reasonably convey or permit others to convey the 
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge in violation of 
the applicable code of judicial conduct. 
 
The minority position is that Facebook “friendship” between a judge and an 
attorney appearing before the judge, standing alone, creates the appearance of 
impropriety because it reasonably conveys or permits others to convey the 
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge in violation of 
the applicable code of judicial conduct.  See, e.g., Cal. Judges Ass’n Jud. Ethics 
Comm. Op. 66, at 1, 10-11 (Nov. 23, 2010); Conn. Jud. Ethics Comm. Op. 2013-
06 (Mar. 22, 2013); Fla. JEAC Op. 2009-20 (Nov. 17, 2009); Mass. Jud. Ethics 
Comm. Op. 2011-6 (Dec. 28, 2011); Okla. Jud. Ethics Adv. Pan. 2011-3 (July 6, 
2011). 
Florida’s JEAC was one of the first to advise that judges were prohibited 
from adding attorneys who appear before them as “friends” on their Facebook page 
or from allowing attorneys who appear before them to add them as “friends” on the 
attorneys’ Facebook pages based on the JEAC’s conclusion that a judge’s selection 
of Facebook “friends” necessarily “conveys or permits others to convey the 
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge” in violation of 
 
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Canon 2B of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct.  Fla. JEAC Op. 2009-20 (Nov. 
17, 2009).3  The JEAC has since reaffirmed its support of the minority position and 
extended the reasoning of the minority position to other social media and social 
networking services including LinkedIn and Twitter.  See Fla. JEAC Op. 2013-14 
(July 30, 2013) (extending the reasoning of the minority position to Twitter); Fla. 
JEAC Op. 2012-12 (May 9, 2012) (extending the reasoning of the minority 
position to LinkedIn); Fla. JEAC Op. 2010-06 (Mar. 26, 2010) (reaffirming its 
support of the minority position). 
 
The overarching concern of the JEAC is that a reasonably prudent person 
would fear that he or she could not receive a fair and impartial trial based solely on 
the fact that a judge and an attorney appearing before the judge are Facebook 
“friends” of an indeterminate nature.  For the reasons we have explained, we 
conclude that concern is unwarranted.  The correct approach is that taken by the 
majority position, which recognizes the reality that Facebook “friendship,” 
standing alone, does not reasonably convey to others the impression of an 
inherently close or intimate relationship that might warrant disqualification. 
                                          
 
 
3.  Canon 2B of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge 
shall not “convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a 
special position to influence the judge.” 
 
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In its 2009 Opinion, the JEAC relied on the “selection and communication 
process” of Facebook “friendship” in support of its conclusion that Facebook 
“friendship” between a judge and an attorney appearing before the judge 
reasonably “convey[s] or permit[s] others to convey the impression that they are in 
a special position to influence the judge.”  Fla. JEAC Op. 2009-20 (Nov. 17, 2009) 
(quoting Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 2B)).  But by focusing on the public 
nature of Facebook “friendship,” the JEAC missed the intrinsic nature of Facebook 
“friendship.”  It is commonly understood that traditional “friendship” involves a 
“selection and communication process,” albeit one less formalized than the 
Facebook process.  People traditionally “select” their friends by choosing to 
associate with them to the exclusion of others.  And people traditionally 
“communicate” the existence of their friendships by choosing to spend time with 
their friends in public, introducing their friends to others, or interacting with them 
in other ways that have a public dimension.  Nevertheless, this Court has 
consistently recognized that an allegation of mere friendship between a judge and a 
litigant or attorney appearing before the judge, standing alone, does not constitute a 
legally sufficient basis for disqualification.  See, e.g., MacKenzie, 565 So. 2d at 
1338; Ervin, 85 So. at 833-34; Ball, 29 So. 2d at 735.  If traditional “friendship,” 
without more, does not reasonably convey or permit others to convey the 
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge, then surely 
 
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Facebook “friendship”—which exists on an even broader spectrum than traditional 
“friendship” and is regularly more casual and less permanent than traditional 
“friendship”—does not reasonably convey such an impression.  The JEAC’s 
position simply cannot be reconciled with this Court’s longstanding treatment of 
disqualification motions based on mere allegations of traditional “friendship.” 
CONCLUSION 
In some circumstances, the relationship between a judge and a litigant, 
lawyer, or other person involved in a case will be a basis for disqualification of the 
judge.  Particular friendship relationships may present such circumstances 
requiring disqualification.  But our case law clearly establishes that not every 
relationship characterized as a friendship provides a basis for disqualification.  And 
there is no reason that Facebook “friendships”—which regularly involve 
strangers—should be singled out and subjected to a per se rule of disqualification. 
We approve Herssein and disapprove Domville.   
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, LABARGA, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs with an opinion. 
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., 
concur. 
 
ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED 
WITHIN SEVEN DAYS.  A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION FOR 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MAY BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS 
AFTER THE FILING OF THE MOTION FOR REHEARING/CLARIFICATION.  
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL THIS TIME PERIOD EXPIRES TO FILE A 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring. 
 
I concur with the majority opinion.  However, I write to strongly urge judges 
not to participate in Facebook.  For newly elected or appointed judges who have 
existing Facebook accounts, I encourage deactivation of those accounts.4  As 
explained by the majority, “friendship” on Facebook, without more, does not 
create a legally sufficient basis for disqualification.  Rather, the unique facts and 
circumstances of each case, in addition to the base fact of “friendship,” are what 
will determine whether disqualification is required.   
Nevertheless, as noted by the dissent, participation in Facebook by members 
of the judiciary “is fraught with risk that could undermine confidence in the 
judge’s ability to be a neutral arbiter.”  Dissenting op. at 24.  This is deeply 
concerning because judges are to decide cases solely upon the facts presented to 
them and the law.  The public and the parties expect nothing less.  Therefore, 
judges must avoid situations that could suggest or imply that a ruling is based upon 
                                          
 
 
4.  When a person assumes the significant responsibility of serving as a 
member of the judiciary, they must “accept restrictions on [their] conduct that 
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely 
and willingly.”  Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 2A cmt.  The dissent is absolutely 
correct that “public trust in the impartiality and fairness of the judicial system is of 
the utmost importance.”  Dissenting op. at 31. 
 
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anything else.  Facebook “friendships” fall across a broad spectrum, from virtual 
stranger to close, personal friend.  Because the relationships between judges and 
attorneys can fall anywhere on that spectrum, judges who elect to maintain 
Facebook “friendships” with attorneys who have any potential to appear before 
them are, quite simply, inviting problems.  The Honorable Catherine Shaffer, a 
superior court judge in Washington State and current president of the American 
Judges Association, aptly states that while judges must decide for themselves 
whether to participate in social media “with a careful eye to the ethical 
requirements of their own jurisdiction,” she “steer[s] clear” of it because 
“misperception is all too easy.”  Are Facebook Friends Really Friends? National 
Center for State Courts (Aug. 29, 2018), available at 
https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USNCSC/bulletins/209842b.5   
I recognize that in this day and age, Facebook may be the primary means 
some judges use to stay in touch with family members, actual friends, or people 
with whom they have reconnected after many years.  If this is the case, then at the 
very least, judges should carefully review their Facebook accounts and limit their 
                                          
 
 
5.  Judge Shaffer also expressed the belief that “it is extraordinarily difficult 
to prevent improper ex parte contacts.”  Are Facebook Friends Really Friends? 
National Center for State Courts (Aug. 29, 2018), available at 
https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USNCSC/bulletins/209842b. 
 
- 23 - 
“friendships” to cover only such individuals.  However, I agree with Judge Shaffer 
that the safest course of action is to not participate in Facebook at all.   
PARIENTE, J., dissenting.  
 
 
  I dissent.  I would adopt the view of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in 
Domville v. State, 103 So. 3d 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), that having a lawyer as a 
Facebook “friend” not only “may undermine confidence in the judge’s neutrality” 
but in this case warranted the judge’s recusal based on a “well-founded fear of not 
receiving a fair and impartial trial.”  Id. at 186.  Even more pointedly, as Judge 
Gross explained in his concurring specially opinion in granting the motion for 
certification in Domville:6   
Judges do not have the unfettered social freedom of teenagers.  
Central to the public’s confidence in the courts is the belief that fair 
decisions are rendered by an impartial tribunal.  Maintenance of the 
appearance of impartiality requires the avoidance of entanglements 
and relationships that compromise that appearance.  Unlike face to 
face social interaction, an electronic blip on a social media site can 
become eternal in the electronic ether of the internet.  Posts on a 
Facebook page might be of a type that a judge should not consider in 
                                          
 
 
6.  Following its opinion in Domville, the Fourth District certified the 
following question of great public importance: 
Where the presiding judge in a criminal case has accepted the 
prosecutor assigned to the case as a Facebook “friend,” would a 
reasonably prudent person fear that he could not get a fair and 
impartial trial, so that the defendant’s motion for disqualification 
should be granted? 
Domville v. State, 125 So. 3d 178, 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).  However, this Court 
declined review.  State v. Domville, 110 So. 3d 441 (Fla. 2013).   
 
- 24 - 
a given case.  The existence of a judge’s Facebook page might exert 
pressure on lawyers or litigants to take direct or indirect action to 
curry favor with the judge.  As we recognized in the panel opinion, a 
person who accepts the responsibility of being a judge must also 
accept limitations on personal freedom.  
 
Domville, 125 So. 3d at 179 (emphasis supplied) (Gross, J., concurring specially). 
I wholeheartedly agree.   
While Facebook and other social media sites have become more 
sophisticated, recent history has shown that a judge’s involvement with social 
media is fraught with risk that could undermine confidence in the judge’s ability to 
be a neutral arbiter.  For these reasons, I would adopt a strict rule requiring judges 
to recuse themselves whenever an attorney with whom they are Facebook “friends” 
appears before them.  This rule does little to limit the judge’s personal liberty, 
while advancing the integrity of the judicial branch as the one branch of 
government that is above politics. 
Regardless of the appropriate parameters for a future amendment to the 
Code of Judicial Conduct relating to use of Facebook and other social media, it is 
clear that the judge in this case should have recused herself because, at the time of 
the recusal motion, the only binding opinion was the Fourth District’s in Domville.  
Domville expressly required judges to recuse themselves from cases where they 
were Facebook friends with the lawyer, 103 So. 3d at 185, and the trial judge was 
 
- 25 - 
required to follow that opinion.  See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 
1992).   
More importantly and most respectfully, in my view, any attempt to equate 
Facebook “friendship” with traditional friendship ultimately fails.  The fact that 
both are called “friendship” does not mean they are comparable or can be 
evaluated in the same manner.  Further, obtaining the information required to 
establish a good faith basis to file a motion for recusal would require discovery that 
is both impractical and potentially invasive of both the judge’s and attorney’s 
privacy.   
The premise of the majority opinion is that Facebook friendships and 
traditional friendships are analogous.  But, equating friendships in the real world 
with friendships in cyberspace is a false equivalency.  The existence of a Facebook 
“friendship” may reveal far more information regarding the intimacy and the 
closeness of the relationship than the majority would assign it.  For example, as the 
majority explains, once a person becomes “friends” with another Facebook user, 
that person gains access to all of the personal information on the user’s profile 
page—including photographs, status updates, likes, dislikes, work information, 
school history, digital images, videos, content from other websites, and a host of 
other information—even when the user opts to make all of his or her information 
private to the general public.  Majority op. at 10-12; see also Daniel Smith, When 
 
- 26 - 
Everyone is the Judge’s Pal: Facebook Friendship and the Appearance of 
Impropriety Standard, 3 Case W. Res. J. L. Tech. & Internet 183, 200-06 (2011).  
Additionally, the ease of access to the “friend’s” information allows Facebook 
“friends” to be privy to considerably more information, including potentially 
personal information, on an almost daily basis. 
Social media communication is quickly replacing other modes of casual 
communication.  See Smith, supra, at 200-06.  Moreover, information conveyed on 
social media can range from the frivolous—gossip and what someone ate for 
dinner—to the meaningful—updates on family, friends, or even world events.   
Facebook also gives the public a new way to scrutinize public 
figures.  Politicians, for instance, have become painfully aware of the 
downsides of maintaining an Internet persona.  Numerous candidates 
have been forced to deal with unbecoming photographs coming to the 
public’s attention through either their own Facebook use or postings 
by other users.  One candidate even found himself apologizing for his 
college-aged son’s unremarkable underage drinking.   
 
Id. at 188-89 (footnotes omitted). 
  
Instead of attempting to compare social media communication and 
friendship to traditional communication and friendship when determining the 
appropriate social media policy for the judiciary, this Court should consider the 
elusive and public nature of Facebook “friendship,” as both the Fourth District and 
the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee (JEAC) did.  See Domville, 103 
So. 3d at 185-86; Fla. JEAC Op. 2010-06 (Mar. 26, 2010); Fla. JEAC Op. 2009–20 
 
- 27 - 
(Nov. 17, 2009).  As those opinions correctly concluded, when those differences 
are taken into account, it is clear that judges’ Facebook “friendships” with 
attorneys who appear in their courtrooms can easily cause an appearance of 
impropriety.   
Florida’s Code of Judicial Conduct requires that judges “avoid impropriety 
and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities.”  Fla. Code of 
Jud. Con. Canon 2.  Additionally, Canon 2B states: “A judge shall not lend the 
prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or 
others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that 
they are in a special position to influence the judge.”  Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, 
Canon 2B (emphasis supplied).  The commentary to Canon 2A explains: 
A judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny.  A 
judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge’s conduct that 
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do 
so freely and willingly. 
 
    As the JEAC concluded:  
The Committee notes, in coming to this conclusion, that social 
networking sites are broadly available for viewing on the 
internet.  Thus, it is clear that many persons viewing the site will not 
be judges and will not be familiar with the Code, its recusal 
provisions, and other requirements which seek to assure the judge’s 
impartiality.  However, the test for Canon 2B is not whether the judge 
intends to convey the impression that another person is in a position to 
influence the judge, but rather whether the message conveyed to 
others, as viewed by the recipient, conveys the impression that 
someone is in a special position to influence the judge.  Viewed in this 
way, the Committee concludes that identifying lawyers who may 
 
- 28 - 
appear before a judge as “friends” on a social networking site, if that 
relationship is disclosed to anyone other than the judge by virtue of 
the information being available for viewing on the internet, violates 
Canon 2(B). 
 
Fla. JEAC Op. 2009-20 (Nov. 17, 2009). 
 
This dissent should not be viewed as an attack on the responsible use of 
social media.  I emphasize, as did the JEAC, that the selection and rejection 
function is what causes the potential for the appearance of impropriety, after the 
judge has established the social networking profile that affords the judge the ability 
to accept or reject “friends.”  As the JEAC explained, 
With regard to a social networking site, in order to fall within 
the prohibition of Canon 2B, the Committee believes that three 
elements must be present.  First, the judge must establish the social 
networking page.  Second, the site must afford the judge the right to 
accept or reject contacts or “friends” on the judge’s page, or 
denominate the judge as a “friend” on another member’s page.  Third, 
the identity of the “friends” or contacts selected by the judge, and the 
judge’s having denominated himself or herself as a “friend” on 
another’s page, must then be communicated to others.  Typically, this 
third element is fulfilled because each of a judge’s “friends” may see 
on the judge’s page who the judge’s other “friends” are.  Similarly, all 
“friends” of another user may see that the judge is also a “friend” of 
that user.  It is this selection and communication process, the 
Committee believes, that violates Canon 2B, because the judge, by so 
doing, conveys or permits others to convey the impression that they 
are in a special position to influence the judge. 
 
Id. 
 
Clearly, social media plays an important role in today’s society.  For 
example, this Court and The Florida Bar as well as many other groups have public 
 
- 29 - 
Facebook pages that are useful to disseminate information and enhance the role of 
judges, lawyers, and the judiciary in the public domain.  Significantly, individuals 
may only “follow” these pages, but cannot become Facebook “friends” with either 
organization.  This allows the general public to be privy to any and all information 
posted on the page without the appearance of impropriety that accompanies self-
selection.  Judges could, likewise, create pages that follow this model.7   
As a practical matter, it is unrealistic to require discovery into the extent of 
social media “friendship” as a prerequisite to recusal before a valid motion may be 
filed.  An individual judge’s social media, whether it is Facebook, LinkedIn, 
Instagram, or any other site, is fraught with concerns for the average litigant 
because it is difficult and intrusive for a litigant to determine with whom the judge 
has connected, with whom the judge has declined to connect, and what type of 
communication the judge engages in on these platforms.   
                                          
 
 
7.   “Following” does not involve or require acceptance by the person; it 
only allows you to see what that person decides to post on his or her public “Wall.”  
If you choose to follow someone, that person’s public posts will be automatically 
delivered to your daily feed.  Conversely the person being followed will not see 
what the followers post (unless he or she follows them back), and the followers 
will not be able to access anything else that the person keeps on his or her private 
page.  See Follow, Facebook Help Ctr., 
https://www.facebook.com/help/382751108453953/?ref=u2u (last visited Aug. 30, 
2018). 
 
- 30 - 
If the Court is declining to follow the JEAC advisory opinions, then I urge 
that it at least adopt parameters for judges to follow when engaging with social 
media, similar to those adopted in California.8  And even if the majority does allow 
judges to continue to use social media, then it should institute a rule similar to that 
                                          
 
 
8.  The California Judicial Ethics Committee considers the following factors 
in determining whether the attorney is in a special position to influence the judge 
and cast doubt on the judge’s ability to be impartial:  
 
1) The nature of the social networking site 
The more personal the nature of the page, the greater the likelihood that 
including an attorney would create the appearance that the judge would be in 
a special position to influence the judge, or cast doubt on the judge’s ability 
to act impartially.  
 
2) The number of “friends” on the page 
The greater the number of “friends” on the judge’s page the less likely it is 
one could reasonably perceive that any individual participant is in a position 
to influence the judge.  
 
3) The judge’s practice in determining whom to include 
As with the number of people on the page, the more inclusive the page the 
less likely it is to create the impression that any individual member is in a 
special position to influence the judge.  
 
4) How regularly the attorney appears before the judge 
If the likelihood that the attorney will actually appear before the judge is 
low, the more likely it is that the interaction would be permissible.  On the 
other hand, if the attorney appears frequently before the judge the interaction 
is less likely to be permissible.  
 
See Cal. Jud. Ethics Comm. Op. 66, at 8 (Nov. 23, 2010). 
 
- 31 - 
espoused by Connecticut, which concluded that when new judicial officials wish to 
return to electronic social media following investiture, the judicial official must 
terminate permanently the existing account and start anew.  If this 
course of action cannot be accomplished, the Judicial Official should 
edit his/her profile page upon reactivation to ensure that it is in 
compliance with the conditions of this opinion in every respect.  This 
includes, but is not limited to, removing inappropriate contacts, 
photos, links, comments, petitions, “friending,” and “Check In” 
postings.  A Judicial Official should monitor closely new 
developments with respect to the [electronic social media] and keep 
abreast of applications instituted by the site managers.  The Judicial 
Official also should monitor his/her participation with respect to 
maintaining appropriate dignity as well as insuring the precedence of 
the judicial office. 
 
See Conn. Jud. Ethics Comm. Op. 2013-06 (Mar. 22, 2013). 
Judges in Florida are non-partisan and held to the strictest compliance with 
the Code of Judicial Conduct to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.   
Judges, unlike the general public and even other elected officials, accept the 
responsibility when they take the oath of office and don their black robes that 
many prior activities may have to be limited for the purpose of maintaining the 
integrity of our justice system.  One of these activities should include the use of 
social media to communicate, either actively or passively, with attorneys who 
appear before them.  Because public trust in the impartiality and fairness of the 
judicial system is of the utmost importance, this Court should err on the side of 
caution.   
 
 
- 32 - 
CONCLUSION 
The bottom line is that because of their indeterminate nature and the real 
possibility of impropriety, social media friendships between judges and lawyers 
who appear in the judge’s courtroom should not be permitted.  Under this rule, the 
opposing litigant would not be required to delve into how close the Facebook 
friendship may be, the judge avoids any appearance of impropriety, and Florida’s 
courts are spared from any unnecessary questions regarding the integrity of our 
judiciary.   Regardless, in this case, the judge was required to recuse herself 
because of binding precedent.  Thus, I would quash the Third District Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein, P.A. v. United Services 
Automobile Ass’n, 229 So. 3d 408 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), and approve the Fourth 
District’s decision in Domville.   
 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D17-1421  
 
 
(Miami-Dade County) 
 
Reuven T. Herssein of Herssein Law Group, North Miami, Florida; and Maury L. 
Udell of Beighley, Myrick, Udell & Lynne, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
 
- 33 - 
Suzanne Youmans Labrit, Frank A. Zacherl, and Amy M. Wessel of Shutts & 
Bowen, LLP, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Christina Paylan, St. Pete Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Christina Paylan, M.D.