Title: 236, 2023

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IIN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
NA-ZER HAYMAN-COOPER, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 236, 2023 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID Nos. 2106007748, 
§  2106008755, 2106008838, 
§  2207010076 
§ 
 
Submitted: December 11, 2023 
Decided: 
January 29, 2024 
 
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, the 
State’s response, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:   
(1) 
In September 2021, the appellant, Nazer Hayman-Cooper, was indicted 
for multiple crimes in Cr. ID Nos. 2106007748 (which arose from a shooting in June 
2021 that paralyzed the victim), 2106008755 (which arose from the theft of a cell 
phone in May 2021), and Cr. ID No. 210600838 (which arose from the theft of a gun 
in June 2021).  In August 2022, Hayman-Cooper was indicted for tampering with a 
witness (the shooting victim in Cr. ID No. 2106007748) in Criminal ID No. 
2207010076.   
 
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(2) 
On March 13, 2023, Hayman-Cooper resolved all of these cases by 
pleading guilty to first-degree assault and possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony (“PFDCF”) in Cr. ID No. 2106007748 and tampering with 
a witness in Criminal ID No. 2207010076.  The State agreed to dismiss the 
remaining charges.  The parties requested a presentence investigation, and the State 
indicated it would be seeking consecutive Level V sentences.  On June 2, 2023, the 
Superior Court sentenced Hayman-Cooper as follows: (i) for first-degree assault, 
twenty-five years of Level V incarceration, with credit for 317 days previously 
served, suspended after seven years for decreasing levels of supervision; (ii) for 
PFDCF, twenty-five years of Level V incarceration, suspended after three years for 
two years of Level III probation; and (iii) for tampering with a witness, six months 
of Level V incarceration to be served day-for-day under 11 Del. C. § 4204(k).  This 
appeal followed. 
(3) 
On appeal, Hayman-Cooper’s appellate counsel (“Counsel”) filed a 
brief and a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  Counsel asserts 
that, based upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no 
arguably appealable issues.  Counsel informed Hayman-Cooper of the provisions of 
Rule 26(c) and provided Hayman-Cooper with a copy of the motion to withdraw and 
the accompanying brief.   
 
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(4) 
Counsel also informed Hayman-Cooper of his right to identify any 
points he wished this Court to consider on appeal.  Hayman-Cooper has submitted 
points for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief 
and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.   
(5) 
When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 
under Rule 26(c), this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (ii) 
conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an 
adversary presentation.1      
(6) 
In most of his points, Hayman-Cooper argues that his trial attorneys 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel.  He contends that his trial attorneys were 
ineffective for waiving the preliminary hearing, failing to maintain consistent 
communications with him, refusing to request bail hearings, mishandling plea 
negotiations, failing to provide him with discovery, failing to learn that the State was 
going to ask for ten years of Level V incarceration, and failing to develop effective 
 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996). 
 
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trial strategies.   This Court does not consider ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
raised for the first time on direct appeal.2 
(7) 
To the extent Hayman-Cooper claims that his guilty plea was 
involuntary and uninformed, the record refutes this claim.  In the Truth-in-
Sentencing Guilty Plea form, Hayman-Cooper indicated that he understood he was 
waiving certain constitutional rights, including his right to a trial, to question the 
witnesses against him, and to present evidence in his defense. During his plea 
colloquy with the Superior Court judge, Hayman-Cooper affirmed that he had 
reviewed the guilty plea forms with his counsel, no one threatened or forced him to 
plead guilty, he understood that he was giving up certain constitutional rights, he  
faced imprisonment of five to fifty-five years, and no one had promised him what 
his sentence would be.  He also affirmed that he committed the crimes of first-degree 
assault, PFDCF, and tampering with a witness.  Hayman-Cooper’s guilty plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.   
(8) 
Finally, Hayman-Cooper argues that the sentencing judge relied on 
false information provided by the State to sentence him, erred in exceeding the 
Sentencing Accountability Commission (“SENTAC”) guidelines, and failed to 
explain why he imposed sentences in excess of the SENTAC guidelines.  These 
 
2 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994).  Typically, a defendant pursues an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim by filing a motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61 in the Superior Court.   
 
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claims are without merit.  In requesting an unsuspended sentence of ten years of 
Level V incarceration, the State highlighted, among other things, that the shooting 
victim was unwilling to come to court because he had been threatened and did not 
feel safe.  Hayman-Cooper did not object to this statement at sentencing.  In now 
claiming that this statement was false, Hayman-Cooper ignores that he pleaded 
guilty to tampering with a witness in Cr. ID No. 2207010076 by knowingly 
intimidating a witness or victim and that the shooting victim was the victim in 
question.   
(9) 
As to Hayman-Cooper’s claims concerning the SENTAC guidelines, 
the guidelines are non-binding and do not provide a basis for appeal where the 
sentence falls within prescribed statutory limits.3  First-degree assault is a class B 
felony with a statutory sentencing range of two to twenty-five years of Level V 
incarceration.4  Under the SENTAC guidelines, the presumptive sentence for first-
degree assault is two to five years of Level V incarceration, which increases if the 
defendant has previous felonies.5  PFDCF is a class B felony with a statutory 
sentencing range of three to twenty-five years of Level V incarceration.6  Under the 
SENTAC guidelines, the presumptive sentence for PFDCF is three to five years of 
 
3 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 845 (Del. 1992). 
4 11 Del. C. § 613(c); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2). 
5 SENTAC Benchbook 2023, at 30, 34-35 available at https://cjc.delaware.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/61/2022/12/Benchbook-2023-120122.pdf. 
6 11 Del. C. § 1447A(a), (b); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2). 
 
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Level V incarceration, which increases if the defendant has previous felonies.7  
Tampering with a witness is a class E felony with a statutory sentencing range of up 
to five years of Level V incarceration.8  Under the SENTAC guidelines, the 
presumptive sentence for tampering with a witness is up to one year of Level II 
probation.9  Hayman-Cooper does not, and cannot, contend his sentences exceed the 
prescribed statutory limits. 
(10) To the extent Hayman-Cooper contends that the sentencing judge 
violated § 4204(n) by failing to explain the basis for imposing a sentence in excess 
of the SENTAC guidelines, he is mistaken.  The sentencing judge explained during 
sentencing that the sentences imposed, including the time to be served under § 
4204(k), were based on the importance of crime victims feeling safe in the court 
system, Hayman-Cooper’s lack of amenability to lesser sanctions (he was on 
juvenile probation and GPS monitoring at the time of the crimes), and the undue 
depreciation of the shooting victim’s serious and permanent injuries if a lesser 
sanction were imposed.  The sentencing judge balanced the aggravating factors with 
Hayman-Cooper’s unaddressed mental health issues.  In this case, the sentencing 
judge sufficiently explained on the record his reasons for departing from the 
SENTAC guidelines.  
 
7 SENTAC Benchbook 2023, at 30, 35, 39. 
8 11 Del. C. § 1263; 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(5). 
9 SENTAC Benchbook 2023, at 55-56. 
 
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(11) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
Hayman-Cooper’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Hayman-Cooper’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly determined 
that Hayman-Cooper could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior  
Court be AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice