Title: Barnes v. Hooper and Harrington Raceway, Inc.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GREGORY L. BARNES and 
AMBER N. BARNES, 
 
 
Plaintiffs Below, 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
KEVIN M. HOOPER and 
HARRINGTON RACEWAY, INC. 
d/b/a HARRINGTON RACEWAY & 
CASINO, 
 
Defendants Below,  
Appellees. 
 
§ 
§  No. 53, 2024 
§ 
§  Court Below: Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  C.A. No. S23C-04-007 
§   
§                         
§   
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  February 8, 2024  
 
 
 
 
  Decided:  March 26, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
After consideration of the notice of appeal from an interlocutory order and the 
exhibits, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Plaintiff-appellant Gregory L. Barnes was severely injured in a traffic 
accident in June 2022.  As alleged in the complaint filed in the Superior Court, 
security personnel of defendant-appellee Harrington Raceway, Inc. (“Harrington”) 
were informed at approximately 7:00 p.m. on June 16, 2022, that defendant-appellee 
Kevin M. Hooper had parked his vehicle in a handicap-parking spot on Harrington’s 
property.  Although Hooper was a frequent patron of Harrington’s facility, he did 
2 
 
not enter the facility on the night at issue, nor does the complaint allege that 
Harrington served Hooper alcohol that night.  At approximately 9:00 p.m., someone 
reported to the security personnel that Hooper was passed out in his vehicle.  The 
security personnel approached the vehicle and saw Hooper asleep inside, with an 
open bottle of vodka between his legs and a large empty beer can in the center 
console.  The security personnel awakened Hooper, removed the alcohol from the 
vehicle, and then allowed Hooper to drive away, without calling the police or trying 
to prevent Hooper from leaving the premises.  Within seconds of exiting 
Harrington’s property onto South Dupont Highway, Hooper’s vehicle struck 
Barnes’s motorcycle, causing catastrophic bodily injury to Barnes. 
(2) 
Barnes and his wife brought suit against Hooper and Harrington.  As to 
Harrington, the complaint alleged that Harrington (i) negligently failed to train its 
security personnel or to exercise reasonable care for the protection of third parties 
when its personnel did not contact the police or otherwise stop Hooper from driving 
away from its premises in an intoxicated state, and (ii) was vicariously liable for the 
alleged negligence of its security personnel.  Harrington moved to dismiss the claims 
against it under Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Superior 
Court granted the motion.  The court held that Harrington did not owe a duty to the 
plaintiffs because (i) the accident did not occur on Harrington’s property and, 
therefore, the complaint did not allege a basis for premises liability, and (ii) under 
3 
 
Delaware law, there is no cause of action against a tavern operator by a third-party 
who is injured off-premises by a person who became intoxicated at the tavern (and, 
in any event, the plaintiffs did not allege that Harrington served Hooper alcohol).1  
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that Harrington assumed a duty to the 
plaintiffs under Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts2 when its security 
personnel intervened by waking Hooper and taking his alcohol.3 
(3) 
The Superior Court denied the plaintiffs’ application for certification of 
an interlocutory appeal.  The court held that its ruling on the motion to dismiss 
decided a substantial issue of material importance because it considered the merits 
of the case, not collateral matters.4  But the court concluded that the considerations 
 
1 Barnes v. Hooper, 2024 WL 165987, at *2-3 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2024); see also id. at *2 
(“It would be illogical for a dram shop to receive greater protections when it serves alcohol to a 
patron than when it didn’t serve alcohol to the patron.”). 
2 Section 324A provides: 
 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his 
things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such  
harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third  
person, or 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third 
person upon the undertaking. 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A. 
3 See Barnes, 2024 WL 165987, at *3 (stating that “[a]ttempts to circumvent the lack of dram shop 
liability using Section 324A have failed in previous cases,” discussing McCall v. Villa Pizza, Inc., 
636 A.2d 912 (Del. 1994), and also concluding that Harrington did not render services to Hooper 
as required for liability under Section 324A). 
4 Barnes v. Hooper, 2024 WL 467378, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2024). 
4 
 
set forth in Rule 42(b)(iii) did not weigh in favor of certification.  The court rejected 
the plaintiffs’ argument that Rule 42(b)(iii)(A)5 supported certification, concluding 
that its decision was consistent with well-established case law regarding premises 
and dram-shop liability and Section 324A of the Restatement.6  The court also 
determined that Rule 42(b)(iii)(G)7 did not support certification because, although 
the interlocutory order terminated the litigation against Harrington, the plaintiffs’ 
claims against Hooper remained pending.8 The court also concluded that 
interlocutory review would not serve considerations of justice9 because, although 
Barnes had suffered serious injuries and incurred hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in medical expenses for which Hooper was underinsured, the court could not “allow 
sympathy to outweigh the well-settled caselaw of this State and to allow a cause of 
action to go forward when the Delaware legislature has declined the opportunity to 
allow for such a cause of action.”10  Finally, the court concluded that the potential 
 
5 See DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(A) (providing that the trial court shall consider whether the 
interlocutory order “involves a question of law resolved for the first time in this State” when 
deciding whether to certify an interlocutory appeal). 
6 Barnes, 2024 WL 467378, at *2. 
7 See DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(G) (providing that the trial court shall consider whether “review 
of the interlocutory order may terminate the litigation” when deciding whether to certify an 
interlocutory appeal). 
8 Barnes, 2024 WL 467378, at *2. 
9 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(H). 
10 Barnes, 2024 WL 467378, at *2. 
5 
 
benefits of interlocutory review did not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and 
cost of an interlocutory appeal.11 
(4) 
We conclude that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case.  
Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound discretion of this 
Court.12  In the exercise of its discretion and giving great weight to the trial court’s 
view, this Court has concluded that the application for interlocutory review does not 
meet the strict standards for certification under Supreme Court Rule 42(b).  
Exceptional circumstances that would merit interlocutory review of the Superior 
Court’s decision do not exist in this case,13 and the potential benefits of interlocutory 
review do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs caused by 
an interlocutory appeal.14  The plaintiffs may seek review of the Superior Court’s 
ruling after the claims against Hooper are resolved. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the interlocutory appeal is 
REFUSED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Chief Justice 
 
11 Id. 
12 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(d)(v). 
13 Id. R. 42(b)(ii). 
14 Id. R. 42(b)(iii).