Title: RAYMOND BAROS v. EDDIE E. WELLS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RAYMOND BAROS v. EDDIE E. WELLS1989 WY 183780 P.2d 341Case Number: 89-37Decided: 10/05/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
RAYMOND BAROS, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

EDDIE E. WELLS, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, GoshenCounty, John T. Langdon, 
J.

Daniel G. Blythe 
of Borthwick, Blythe & Lewis, Cheyenne, and 
Richard Wolf, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Patrick J. 
Murphy of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, and Stephen H. 
Graham of Jones & Graham Law Office, Torrington, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT, and MACY, 
JJ., and ROONEY, J. (Ret.).

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Eddie E. Wells on appellant 
Raymond Baros' co-employee culpable negligence claim. Baros was injured in the 
course of his employment with the Town of Torrington and received compensation for his 
injuries through worker's compensation. Baros initiated this action, seeking 
further recovery for his injuries from his supervisor/co-employee, Wells, and 
alleging culpable negligence under an exception to the exclusive remedy 
provision of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act as it then existed. The 
district court determined that there were no issues of material fact and that 
Wells was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Baros describes the 
issue simply:

Was there a genuine issue 
of material fact on the question of culpable negligence?

[¶4.]     Summary judgment is 
proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989); Doud v. First Interstate Bank of 
Gillette, 769 P.2d 927 (Wyo. 1989). We review a summary judgment in 
the same light as the district court, using the same materials and following the 
same standards. Roybal, 778 P.2d 108; Johnston v. 
Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1988). We examine the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record. Doud, 769 P.2d 927; Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, 
B.V., 762 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶5.]     The materials submitted 
in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment reveal the 
following facts. At the time of Baros' injury, both parties were employed by the 
Town of Torrington. Wells was superintendent of the 
Torrington water 
and sewer department, and Baros was a laborer/novice equipment operator. On 
Saturday, October 29, 1983, Wells called Baros to assist him in locating a leak 
in a water service line. They began work at approximately 1:00 p.m., with Wells 
operating a backhoe to uncover the leaking line. Baros worked in and out of the 
excavation, guiding Wells' placement of the backhoe bucket and shoveling dirt 
away from the uncovered water line. Baros usually climbed out of the excavation 
when Wells dug with the backhoe. Both Wells and Baros were aware that the arm 
and bucket of the backhoe had a tendency to drift to the left and that repairs 
were needed to correct this problem. Although this tendency to drift had been 
occurring for about six months, it had produced no harmful effect and had been 
easily corrected by the operator. Both men had operated the backhoe previously - 
Wells approximately twice a month for four years and Baros between two and four 
times.

[¶6.]     The accident occurred 
at about 4:00 p.m., and, although it was later discovered that Baros' injuries 
were serious, the work continued for more than an hour after the injury. At the 
time of the accident, Baros was down in the excavation at Wells' direction, 
standing to one side as Wells operated the backhoe. On this occasion, the 
backhoe arm lurched suddenly and violently to the left, striking Baros in the 
abdomen. A post-accident inspection and repair of the backhoe revealed a 
hydraulic system failure was the cause of the sudden movement of the 
machine.

[¶7.]     Materials in the record 
additionally reveal that Wells had consumed one beer prior to going to the job 
site and that Baros observed two beer cans in Wells' pickup. Further, Baros 
claimed that he recognized the danger of being in a ditch while a backhoe is 
operating and that he remained in the ditch only because Wells directed him to 
do so.1 Baros said he felt he would have 
lost his job if he had climbed out of the ditch contrary to Wells' instructions. 
Additional facts will be mentioned as they relate to Baros' specific contentions 
of culpable negligence.

[¶8.]     Prior to its repeal in 
1986, Wyo. Stat. § 27-12-103(a) (1977) provided an exception to the exclusive 
remedy provision of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act for co-employee 
culpable negligence.2 Section 27-12-103(a) 
provided:

The rights and remedies 
provided in this act [§§ 27-12-101 to -804] for an employee and his dependents 
for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other 
rights and remedies against any employer making contributions required by this 
act, or his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the 
employees are culpably negligent, but do not supersede any rights and remedies 
available to an employee and his dependents against any other 
person.

[¶9.]     In Bryant v. 
Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 1986), we discussed this statute, 
stating:

In order to recover 
against a coemployee under this section of the Worker's Compensation Act, a 
plaintiff must establish more than simple negligence; the coemployee's conduct 
must constitute "culpable" negligence. In Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1362 (1981), we defined 
the term "culpable negligence" as "willful and serious misconduct." We defined 
the term "willful" in this context as "`such as is done purposely, with 
knowledge - or misconduct of such a character as to evince a reckless disregard 
of consequences.'" Id., quoting Hamilton v. Swigart Coal Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203, 
206, 149 A.L.R. 998 (1943).

The aggravating factor 
which distinguishes willful misconduct from ordinary negligence is the actor's 
state of mind. In order to prove that an actor has engaged in willful 
misconduct, one must demonstrate that he acted with a state of mind that 
approaches intent to do harm. State of mind, of course, may be difficult to 
prove. Accordingly, courts allow a party to establish that willful misconduct 
has occurred by demonstrating that an actor has intentionally committed an act 
of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so 
great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow.

Id. at 1136 (citations 
omitted), quoted in Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Company, 779 P.2d 1169, 1174-75 (Wyo. 1989), and Johnston, 758 P.2d  at 
568-69.

[¶10.]  Baros argues that the materials in the 
record are sufficient to structure genuine factual issues as to Wells' culpable 
negligence in several respects. First, he asserts that Wells had been drinking 
alcoholic beverages. Wells stated in his deposition that he had not anticipated 
working that day and that he had had one beer at home before being called out on 
the job. Other than his observation of two empty beer cans in Wells' pickup, 
Baros presented no evidence that Wells had been drinking, and he admitted in his 
deposition that he had no knowledge of Wells drinking on the day of the 
accident, even though the men worked side by side for several hours before the 
accident. Baros does not claim that Wells was in any way impaired or under the 
influence of alcohol, and, even given the benefit of all favorable inferences, 
this evidence simply fails to structure a factual issue of willful 
misconduct.

[¶11.]  Second, Baros relies upon Wells' 
deposition testimony that Baros' presence in the excavation was contrary to 
safety policy established by Wells. As previously noted, there is a conflict in 
the testimony as to whether or not Wells directed Baros to remain in the hole at 
the time of the accident. In describing Baros' presence in the excavation, Wells 
testified:

A * * * I should have 
thought of it at the same time but I didn't. We were tired, and it was getting 
late. Ray had been in and out of the hole several times. Ray could have just as 
easily have got out of the hole and then motioned me into the hole as do what he 
did: stayed in the hole, then motioned me into it.

Q He should have stayed 
in the hole?

A No, he should have got 
out of the hole.

Q Why do you say 
that?

A It is standard 
operating practices that if you don't have room enough to get away from a 
backhoe in a hole, stand away at the end of the bucket or whatever, you get out 
of the hole.

Q Is that standard 
operating practice for whom?

A For the city, my 
crew.

Q Where does that policy 
originate?

A From 
me.

Q You are responsible for 
that policy?

A Yes. It is unwritten, 
but everybody knows about it.

[¶12.]  In describing the procedure used to dig 
the hole, Baros testified:

Q So you had not been in 
the ditch at all that day?

A I was coming in and 
out.

Q Coming in and out, and 
you would get out when the backhoe was going to scrape 
dirt?

A When dirt was piled up 
big enough for the backhoe to be in there, I would crawl out of there, and he 
would go in there and clean it out.

* * * * * 
*

Q Was that a standard 
procedure, that you would get the dirt piled up big enough for the backhoe to 
get it out, and then what you would do is you would get out of the ditch and let 
the backhoe do it?

A That's 
right.

With respect to 
his presence in the hole at the time of the accident, Baros 
stated:

I would say he made about 
five or six passes through there, and he stopped. So I went back down there, 
down in the thing, and he told me, he says, "Ray, Hell, I wouldn't be coming in 
and out of there." He said, "Just stand off to one side." And he says, "Hell, I 
won't hit you anyway."

In a later 
affidavit, Baros stated that it was his perception that, if he had climbed out 
of the ditch against Wells' direction, he might have lost his job. At the time 
of his deposition, however, Baros testified:

Q And do you think that 
you would have gotten fired if he had said, "You don't need to get out of the 
ditch," and you did?

* * * * * 
*

A Well, from my 
experience I would say there is a doubtful on that because me and him are good 
friends, but, other places you probably would have.

[¶13.]  We agree with the district court that, 
while this evidence might well establish negligence on the part of Wells and, 
for that matter, Baros, it does not make out a case of culpable negligence 
against Wells. Baros' testimony as to his perception that he would lose his job 
if he came out of the hole has no bearing on the question of whether Wells 
possessed the requisite state of mind for a finding of culpable negligence. The 
evidence indicates the men had been working for several hours and were near the 
end of the task. They were tired, and they, particularly Wells, relaxed the 
usual safety precautions. While Wells' conduct may have been unreasonable, 
culpable negligence "involves more than unreasonable conduct; it involves 
willfulness." Bryant, 728 P.2d  at 1137.

[¶14.]  The same can be said regarding Baros' 
claim that Wells sent him into the hole knowing the backhoe was in need of 
maintenance. The evidence was undisputed that, while Wells (and Baros) had known 
for some time of the tendency of the boom to drift to the left, he had no reason 
to anticipate that it would malfunction in the manner which it did. In his 
deposition, Wells stated that he did not know the problem with the backhoe was 
serious and that the drifting itself was not dangerous. Wells testified that he 
had reported the drifting to the Town's mechanic, but it had not been repaired 
due to work pressures and scheduling conflicts. In his affidavit, Wells stated 
that the sudden jump of the backhoe had never happened before to him or any of 
the other operators. Baros' deposition is to the same effect. He stated that he 
had operated the backhoe and was aware of the drifting but that he had no 
knowledge of any tendency of the backhoe to "jump." Again, the evidence of 
failure to properly maintain, while it undoubtedly would support a claim of 
negligence, does not demonstrate that Wells "intentionally committed an act of 
unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great 
as to make it highly probable that harm will follow." Bryant, 728 P.2d  at 
1136.

[¶15.]  Baros also argued that the evidence 
demonstrates that Wells was hurried and tired. There is nothing in the record 
indicating Wells was in a hurry. While Wells did state that both men were tired, 
we do not believe that fact alone supports an inference that Wells was so 
fatigued as to be incapable of operating the backhoe safely and that, knowing of 
the risk, Wells recklessly disregarded the consequences of Baros. See Johnston, 758 P.2d 566.

[¶16.]  Finally, Baros relies upon an accident 
investigation report prepared for the municipality's director of public works in 
which the investigation committee concluded that the practice of having a worker 
in a hole being excavated by a backhoe is "extremely dangerous."3 Baros apparently contends that the 
conclusion reached by the committee is sufficient to structure a genuine factual 
issue which precludes summary judgment on the question of culpable negligence. A 
party opposing a motion for summary judgment must come forward with specific 
facts to show that there is a genuine issue. Conclusory statements are 
insufficient. Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1987); Stundon v. Sterling, 736 P.2d 317 (Wyo. 1987). Even if we were to agree that this 
activity was extremely dangerous, that does not equate to culpable negligence. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Wells anticipated or realized 
the serious nature of the risk involved or that he willfully disregarded such 
risk.

[¶17.]  Baros argues that the facts in this case 
are analogous to those in Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364 (Wyo. 1988), wherein 
we held that an issue of culpable negligence should have been presented to the 
trier of fact. In that case, the record suggested a supervisor was aware that a 
frac tank contained toxic fumes and nonetheless sent a worker in to clean it. 
The worker died as a result of exposure to the fumes. We determined in Poulos 
that the plaintiff had presented evidence creating a genuine factual dispute as 
to whether the supervisor was aware of the highly dangerous situation. 
Id. at 
367.

[¶18.]  Baros has not made such a showing in the 
instant case. More applicable to the case at bar, in fact, are our comments in 
Poulos with respect to the two defendants for whom we sustained summary 
judgment. We noted that, while the evidence regarding those defendants may have 
indicated negligence, it did not demonstrate a state of mind consistent with 
culpable negligence which requires knowledge of a high probability of harm. We 
said that, although both of those defendants were aware of the possibility of 
harm, there was no evidence suggesting they knew the degree of danger presented 
by the particular frac tank in which the plaintiff died. Id. at 366. Similarly, in 
the case at bar, there is no evidence that Wells was aware of the degree of 
danger presented by the defective backhoe under the circumstances; i.e., that 
there was a high probability of harm. Thus, Baros failed to present a genuine 
factual issue on the requisite state of mind, and Wells was entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law on the claim of culpable 
negligence.

[¶19.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Although Baros stated 
that Wells had directed him to remain in the ditch while the backhoe was 
operating, Wells testified in his deposition that he erred in allowing Baros to 
remain in the hole. For purposes of summary judgment review, we accept the 
version offered by Baros.

2 The current exclusive 
remedy provision of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-104 (1977), eliminates co-employee liability for culpable 
negligence.

3 With respect to this 
report, we note that the investigating committee reported that Baros informed 
them it was common practice for a worker to be in the excavation while the 
backhoe was operating. Additionally, the committee also stated that Baros should 
have known better than to be in the hole in the first place while the equipment 
was in operation.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶20.]  This is another case which upholds a 
summary judgment entered against an injured employee who sued a co-employee for 
culpable negligence. The majority approves the procedural disposition without 
jury trial and I do not. I dissent because the majority confuses the "most 
beneficial inference standard" with the burden of proof which this plaintiff 
must bear at trial. The majority sets up a standard of review for summary 
judgment and then, by result, does not follow the established 
standard.

[¶21.]  The question of culpable negligence being 
decided by summary judgment has been a recent source of considerable review by 
this court commencing with Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981) and 
followed by Bryant v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 1986); Stundon v. 
Sterling, 736 P.2d 317 (Wyo. 1987); Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987); Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1987); Wessel v. 
Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363 (Wyo. 1988); Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566 
(Wyo. 1988); Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364 (Wyo. 1988); and Stephenson v. 
Pacific Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169 (Wyo. 1989). Comparable cases 
considering culpable negligence as a defense to the payment of worker's 
compensation benefits to the employee are Matter of Meredith, 743 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 
1987); Smith v. Brannan Motor Co., 72 Wyo. 1, 260 P.2d 757 (1953); Hamilton v. 
Swigart Coal Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203 (1943); and Fuhs v. Swenson, 58 
Wyo. 293, 131 P.2d 333 (1942).1 Here we must find a place to 
sandwich this case between our affirmed summary judgment cases, Johnston, 758 P.2d 566; Stundon, 736 P.2d 317; and Bryant, 728 P.2d 1132, and our reversed 
summary judgment cases, Stephenson, 779 P.2d 1169; Poulos, 765 P.2d 364; and 
Wessel, 752 P.2d 1363.

[¶22.]  In analysis of intrinsic facts of each of 
these cases, it is my conclusion that the majority cognitively weighs the 
evidence to justify summary judgment and fails to confine the review to 
considering whether an issue of culpable negligence is presented by the evidence 
and any fair inferences to be derived from that evidence. Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1988); Davenport v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987); Greenwood v. 
Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987); Bryant, 728 P.2d 1132. By way of 
quick example, the record shows the superintendent had a beer before being 
called out on the job. The majority misses the point when they say "this 
evidence simply fails to structure a factual issue of willful misconduct." The 
inference most favorable to the plaintiff is the jury could infer the 
superintendent "intentionally committed an act of unreasonable character in 
disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly 
probable that harm will follow" by going onto a potentially dangerous job site 
after drinking. Bryant, 728 P.2d  at 1136. The weight to be given should be a 
jury decision and it could be nominal, modest, or major. The one issue of 
summary judgment review is simply whether there is viable evidence sufficient to 
permit a jury to consider the existence of culpable negligence of the 
co-employee. Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶23.]  This majority accepts as true that the 
superintendent, under the disclosed circumstances, operated a backhoe which he 
knew was malfunctioning and ordered a worker into a hole being cleared by that 
malfunctioning backhoe. That backhoe severely injured the employee. The majority 
upholds the summary judgment against the injured worker after reportedly giving 
him "the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record." See Doud v. First Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927 (Wyo. 1989). The effect of 
that holding is to say a jury could not possibly infer the superintendent 
"intentionally committed an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a 
known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm 
will follow." Bryant, 728 P.2d  at 1136. The record is unchallenged of known 
danger, high probability in accident from unjustified risk, knowing direction, 
and what was written by the stars did then occur. Damage injury followed danger, 
direction and disregard.

[¶24.]  The evidence upon which a jury could find 
more than casual negligence include the superintendent's knowing operation of a 
malfunctioning backhoe after ordering a fellow employee into the excavation hole 
when doing so was a violation of the safety standard for such sewer work. Also 
in evidence was that both participants were tired. The jury might have 
reasonably inferred the superintendent hurried his work while abandoning 
acknowledged safety precautions.

[¶25.]  Clearly, the known history of the 
unrepaired backhoe to "jump" and the "jump" that severely injured the employee 
may have some relation to the superintendent's state of mind or his disregard to 
an obvious danger. The testimony of the supervisor 
explained:

Q. Did you do anything - 
what did you do to cause the injury?

A. What did I do to cause 
the injury?

Q. 
Yes.

A. I made a mistake by 
letting him stay in the hole.

Q. What 
else?

A. That's 
it.

Q. Why did the backhoe 
hit him?

A. It 
malfunctioned.

Q. How did it 
malfunction?

A. It malfunctioned 
hydraulically to where there was no pressure against one cylinder, and the 
backhoe had started to drift, and when I corrected it, it jumped due to the fact 
there was no back pressure against one cylinder that was 
leaking.

[¶26.]  There was an obvious conflict in the 
supervisor's comment that the jump was unexpected and the accident committee's 
investigation report:

It is generally agreed 
that there was a mechanical problem with the backhoe, and that all of the 
operators were aware of it and used it accordingly. In this case, the operator 
overcompensated in trying to correct the "drift" of the bucket, causing it to 
strike the man in the hole. Although the mechanical problem with the backho[e] 
did not actually cause the accident, it was a contributing factor as to why the 
accident occured [sic]. Therefore, in addition to a mechanical problem, there 
was a physical error made, which can be explained.

As explained by 
the employee in the ditch with regard to his directions and as to what occurred 
at the time of his injury:

Q. When you are told you 
[sic] to do something - what did [your supervisor] say?

A. He said, "I wouldn't 
be running up and down this dam [sic] pile of dirt. Just get off to one side. I 
won't hurt you." I didn't say yes or no or nothing, just went up to that little 
corner and stayed there with my shovel, and I just sat there and watched him 
operating it because there was a lot of dirt that had caved in, and he was 
shoveling all that dirt out.

The employee 
also indicated:

A. Well, I learned that 
when we was digging that hole out, it had caved in about three to four more feet 
south of our regular main ditch, so, actually, it left us a wide area to work 
on, so when it did it covered our pipe that had already just discovered. With a 
shovel he came back down there, and he was cleaning. I would say he made about 
five or six passes through there, and he stopped. So I went back down there, 
down in the thing, and he told me, he says, "Ray, Hell, I wouldn't be coming in 
and out of there." He said, "Just stand off to one side." And he says, "Hell, I 
won't hit you anyway." So I said okay, and I started digging, and dug, and I 
went off the one bank. There was a little bank on the corner of that. For 
example, this is the hole. There was a little bank right here, and this is where 
I stood up.

* * * * * 
*

Q. Now, what were you 
doing when you got hit with the backhoe?

A. I couldn't tell you if 
I was standing up or laying down or what. All I can remember is I didn't have no 
- I didn't even know if I was breathing. All I know is I felt a hand here like 
the good Lord had grabbed ahold of me.

Q. Indicating your right 
arm. You felt a hand?

A. 
Yes.

Q. Was that [your 
supervisor's] hand?

A. Yes, because he was 
out on top, and I was catching my wind.

Q. That was after you got 
hit?

A. 
Right.

Q. What were you doing 
when you got hit?

A. I was standing there 
on that corner like I stated before, and I was watching him take the dirt 
out.

Q. Taking the dirt 
out?

A. 
Right.

Q. And you saw the 
backhoe come at you?

A. No, I didn't. I was 
looking at him. When he brought the bucket like this, I was watching 
him.

Thereafter, the 
employee explained in some detail that he was looking up at the operator and 
equipment and never saw the bucket swinging before it hit 
him.

[¶27.]  Before he injured the worker, the 
superintendent violated his own safety policy:

A. It is standard 
operating practices that if you don't have room enough to get away from a 
backhoe in a hole, stand away at the end of the bucket or whatever, you get out 
of the hole.

Q. Is that standard 
operating practice for whom?

A. For the city, my 
crew.

Q. Where does that policy 
originate?

A. From 
me.

Q. You are responsible 
for that policy?

A. Yes. It is unwritten, 
but everybody knows about it.

[¶28.]  I would conclude a case is appropriate 
for a jury to decide when this court begins factfinding during culpable 
negligence review if our frequently stated criteria of summary judgment, 
Davenport, 744 P.2d 1110, is going to be said to have precedence.

[¶29.]  Accordingly, I 
dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 See generally 
Annotation, Willful, Wanton, or Reckless Conduct of Coemployee As Ground of 
Liability Despite Bar of Workers' Compensation Law, 57 A.L.R.4th 888 (1987) and 
Annotation, Right to Maintain Direct Action Against Fellow Employee For Injury 
or Death Covered by Workmen's Compensation, 21 A.L.R.3d 845 (1968).