Title: Pizzarelle v. Dempsey

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton,1 Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, 
Koontz, and Kinser, JJ. 
 
JAMES W. PIZZARELLE, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 990787  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 3, 2000 
WILLIAM H. DEMPSEY, III, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Marcus D. Williams, Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we address two questions: (1) whether 
an easement has been partially abandoned, and (2) if not, 
whether an encroachment on the easement is too 
insubstantial to warrant injunctive relief.  Because we 
answer both of these questions in the negative, we will 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court denying 
injunctive relief to the dominant owners of the easement. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
The easement at issue in this appeal was established 
in a written “Deed of Easement” recorded in the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County Clerk’s Office in December 1987.  
At that time, Merryhill Joint Venture (Merryhill) owned 
lots in a subdivision known as Walter Heights, designated 
as Lots 1, 2, and 3 in Section B; and Lot 7-B in Section A.  
__________________ 
1 Justice Compton participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 2, 2000. 
 
Merryhill created the easement for the purpose of ingress 
and egress over and across those lots for the benefit of 
the owners of the lots.2  The instrument establishing the 
easement contained the following provisions that are 
pertinent to the present dispute: 
1. The easement shall be used exclusively for the 
purpose of ingress and egress to the Lots. 
 
2. No act shall be performed by any owner of a Lot, 
their tenants, guests, or agents which would in 
any manner affect or jeopardize the free and 
continuous enjoyment of any other owner of a Lot 
in and to the easement. 
 
Merryhill also recorded a plat that depicted the 
location and dimensions of the easement.  The easement runs 
200 feet in length along the northern boundary line of the 
subject lots.  It is 24 feet wide. 
__________________ 
2 In the same instrument, Merryhill also granted 
certain easements to Fairfax County for the purpose of 
constructing and maintaining utilities, and operating 
emergency vehicles.  Merryhill reserved the right to 
construct and maintain roadways over the easements, and to 
make any other use of the easements not inconsistent with 
the rights conveyed to Fairfax County.  However, Merryhill 
agreed “not [to] erect any building or other structure, 
excepting a fence, on the easements without obtaining the 
prior written approval of [Fairfax] County.”  The fact that 
Merryhill retained the right to construct a fence on the 
easements granted to Fairfax County does not affect the 
issues in this appeal because those easements are, in some 
respects, different than the easement granted to the owners 
of the lots. 
 
 
2
The parties to this litigation now own the lots 
previously owned by Merryhill.  William H. Dempsey, III, 
and his wife Karen L. Holzberg (the Dempseys), were the 
first purchasers.  They acquired Lots 2 and 3, Section B, 
in March 1992.  These two lots were the only ones upon 
which a house was already situated.  The other lots were 
unimproved at that time.  During their negotiations with 
Merryhill, the Dempseys requested a restriction limiting 
the paved portion of the easement to a 15-foot strip along 
the northern edge of the easement.  Merryhill agreed to the 
Dempseys’ request, and in 1993, almost one year after the 
Dempseys purchased their lots, Merryhill recorded an 
instrument effecting the restriction.  However, according 
to the terms of that 1993 document, the easement “remain[s] 
in full force and effect.” 
Next, Jeffrey D. Kolker and Pamela M. Kolker (the 
Kolkers), purchased Lot 1, Section B, in October 1994 from 
William R. Goetzen,3 a developer who was a successor in 
interest to Merryhill.  Finally, in July 1995, James W. 
Pizzarelle and his wife Georgie C. Nance (the Pizzarelles), 
acquired Lot 7-B, Section A, from Fairlane Development, 
__________________ 
3 The record contains two different names for this 
individual.  We will use the one found in a joint 
stipulation of facts.  
 
3
Inc., also a successor in interest to Merryhill.  John 
Jordan represented Fairlane in that transaction with the 
Pizzarelles. 
 
The four lots are contiguous and are bounded on the 
south by Dolley Madison Boulevard.  The Dempseys’ property 
is the westernmost parcel and lies at the corner of Dolley 
Madison Boulevard and Buchanan Street.  The Kolkers own the 
next parcel, and the Pizzarelles own the easternmost 
parcel.  So, traveling eastward along the easement from 
Buchanan Street, one would first pass through the Dempseys’ 
property, then the Kolkers’, and finally the Pizzarelles’. 
In an amended bill of complaint filed in February 
1998, the Pizzarelles and the Kolkers alleged that the 
Dempseys are obstructing and interfering with the full use 
of the easement by virtue of certain fences, a rock wall, 
and bushes and trees that the Dempseys placed in the 
easement.4  The Pizzarelles and the Kolkers requested a 
declaration of their rights with regard to use of the 
easement for ingress and egress, as well as an injunction 
directing the Dempseys to remove all obstructions placed in 
__________________ 
4 Originally, only the Pizzarelles instituted this 
action.  On motion of the Dempseys, the court ordered the 
Pizzarelles to add the Kolkers as necessary parties.  The 
Pizzarelles and the Kolkers then filed the amended bill of 
complaint. 
 
4
or along the easement, and restraining the Dempseys from 
any further obstruction of the easement.  The Dempseys 
answered the bill of complaint and also filed two cross-
bills, alleging certain violations of the provisions of the 
easement by the Kolkers and the Pizzarelles.5
At trial, the parties presented evidence through 
testimony, exhibits, and a joint stipulation of facts.  We 
summarize and review that evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Dempseys, the prevailing parties below.  
Prospect Dev. Co., Inc. v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 80, 515 
S.E.2d 291, 294 (1999). 
Some of the trees and shrubs that constitute part of 
the obstructions in the 24-foot easement were first planted 
by the Dempseys after they purchased their lots.  Mr. 
Dempsey acknowledged that he planted several “seeders” 
approximately two to three feet within the easement along 
its southern border, but he testified that he did so with 
the permission of someone at Merryhill. 
__________________ 
5 The circuit court denied the relief requested in the 
cross-bills.  The Dempseys did not assign cross-error to 
that judgment, nor did they file a cross-appeal.  
Accordingly, we will not address the evidence presented in 
support of those cross-bills.  See Rules 5:17(c) and 5:18. 
 
 
 
5
A fence known as the south fence originated with a 
request from the Kolkers when they were negotiating the 
purchase of Lot 1.  They asked “the people who sold [them] 
the house” to erect a fence along the southern boundary of 
the easement.  Mr. Kolker testified that they “asked for 
the fence to delineate the driveway so it would look . . . 
nice as [they] drove in.”  Accordingly, Jordan and Goetzen 
advised the Dempseys about the Kolkers’ request.  The 
Dempseys agreed to the erection of the fence on the 
condition that it be placed no further than 20 feet from 
the back (the northern boundary) of their property, i.e. 
four feet inside the easement on its southern side, 
adjacent to the area where the Dempseys had planted the 
“seeders.” 
However, the fence was not built at the location 
specified by the Dempseys.  Instead, it was erected along 
the southern boundary of the easement, approximately six 
inches inside the 24-foot area encompassed by the easement.  
Consequently, the Dempseys contacted Jordan and advised him 
that the fence was not situated at the location where they 
had agreed.  The next day the fence was moved to the 
location where it now stands, approximately four to five 
feet inside the southern border of the easement. 
 
6
Mr. Kolker testified that he did not give permission 
for the south fence to be moved to its present location, 
but he acknowledged that he saw the Dempseys measuring the 
area and knew that they had the fence relocated from its 
initial position.  However, Mr. Kolker stated that he 
trusted the builder to place the fence in the correct spot 
and did not protest because he wanted to be a good 
neighbor.  In fact, the Kolkers did not protest to anyone 
about the present location of the fence until after they 
were brought into this litigation as necessary parties. 
The south fence is a wooden, picket-style fence.  The 
Dempseys have also erected a chain-link fence at the 
eastern end of the south fence, perpendicular to it, and on 
the boundary line between their property and the Kolkers’ 
lot.6
When the Pizzarelles purchased Lot 7-B, they observed 
the south fence in its present location, and some trees and 
shrubs behind the fence.  Mr. Pizzarelle acknowledged at 
trial that he knew that Jordan, the person from whom he had 
__________________ 
6 There is also another fence, called the north fence, 
that is situated approximately one foot inside the northern 
border of the easement.  That fence runs along the northern 
boundary of all the parties’ lots.  The Kolkers and the 
Pizzarelles are not asking that the north fence be removed. 
 
 
 
7
purchased the property, had built the fence.  He also 
remembered “Mr. Dempsey showing [him] the exact markings 
out there one day with Mr. Jordan [,] the builder.” 
Both Mr. Pizzarelle and Mr. Kolker testified with 
regard to the effect of the obstructions upon their use of 
the easement.  They expressed concern about whether they 
could convey good title to a 24-foot easement if they sold 
their respective lots.  Mr. Pizzarelle and Mr. Kolker also 
questioned whether emergency vehicles could gain access to 
their respective homes because the full 24 feet of the 
easement is not open for the purpose of ingress and egress.  
Finally, Mr. Pizzarelle stated that he had experienced 
difficulty in removing deep snow from the easement because 
of the limited amount of space on each side of the paved 
portion upon which to shovel the snow.  Mr. Pizzarelle 
described the south fence, the chain-link fence 
perpendicular to it, and the trees as a “permanent block to 
anyone getting through that portion of the easement.” 
Based on this evidence, the circuit court found that 
the Kolkers had requested that the south fence be erected, 
and then acquiesced when the builder moved the fence to a 
location deeper within the easement.  Those acts, according 
to the circuit court, established the Kolkers’ intent to 
abandon a portion of the easement.  The court further found 
 
8
that the Pizzarelles’ predecessor in interest, upon 
erecting the south fence, also abandoned the portion of the 
easement south of that fence, thus barring the Pizzarelles 
from acquiring rights to that part of the easement. 
Alternatively, the circuit court found that, if there was 
neither acquiescence nor abandonment, the encroachment was 
insubstantial.  Thus, the court denied injunctive relief to 
the Pizzarelles and the Kolkers.  This appeal followed. 
ANALYSIS 
Our review of this case is guided by well-settled 
principles.  “[W]hen a case is decided by a court without 
the intervention of a jury and a party objects to the 
decision on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, 
the judgment of the trial court shall not be set aside 
unless it appears from the evidence that such judgment is 
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”  Code 
§ 8.01-680.  “It is axiomatic that a chancellor’s finding 
on conflicting evidence, heard ore tenus, will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.”  Ivy Constr. Co. v. Booth, 226 Va. 
299, 301, 309 S.E.2d 300, 301 (1983) (per curiam) (citing 
Rochelle v. Rochelle, 225 Va. 387, 393, 302 S.E.2d 59, 63 
(1983)).  Conversely, “[a] judgment or decree that is 
plainly wrong, or without evidence to support it, cannot be 
 
9
allowed to stand.”  Malbon v. Davis, 185 Va. 748, 757, 40 
S.E.2d 183, 187 (1946). 
On appeal, the Pizzarelles and Kolkers contend that 
the trial court’s finding of abandonment is contrary to the 
evidence because the Pizzarelles’ predecessor in interest,  
as well as the Kolkers, lacked the requisite intent to 
abandon the easement and because there had not been a 
sufficient lapse of time for an abandonment to occur.  They 
also argue that the circuit court erred by concluding that 
the encroachment was insubstantial and thus did not justify 
an award of injunctive relief.  Finally, they assert that 
the circuit court abused its discretion by re-writing the 
terms of the easement and forcing a de facto modification 
of the easement upon the Pizzarelles and the Kolkers. 
 
We will first address the issue of abandonment and the 
principles of law applicable to it. 
[M]ere non-use[] of an easement created by deed, for a 
period however long, will not amount to abandonment.  
In addition to the non-use[,] there must be acts or 
circumstances clearly manifesting an intention to 
abandon; or an adverse use[] by the owner of the 
servient estate, acquiesced in by the owner of the 
dominant estate, for a period sufficient to create a 
prescriptive right. 
 
Lindsey v. Clark, 193 Va. 522, 525, 69 S.E.2d 342, 344 
(1952) (citing Watts v. C.I. Johnson & Bowman Real Estate 
Corp., 105 Va. 519, 525, 54 S.E. 317, 319 (1906)).  The 
 
10
party claiming abandonment of an easement, in this case the 
Dempseys, has the burden “to prove [such abandonment] by 
clear and unequivocal evidence.”  Robertson v. Robertson, 
214 Va. 76, 82, 197 S.E.2d 183, 188 (1973) (citing Lindsey, 
193 Va. at 525, 69 S.E.2d at 344). 
 
With regard to the Kolkers, there is evidence to 
support the court’s factual findings that the Kolkers asked 
that the south fence be erected and did not initially 
object to its relocation four to five feet deeper into the 
easement.  However, when the Kolkers asked for a screening 
fence to be built, they believed that it would be erected 
along, or within six inches of, the southern boundary of 
the easement, not four to five feet inside the easement.  
Thus, the mere fact that they requested the fence is not 
“clear and unequivocal evidence” of an intent to abandon 
part of the easement for the purpose of ingress and egress.  
Robertson, 214 Va. at 82, 197 S.E.2d at 188.  The Kolkers’ 
subsequent failure to object when they saw the fence being 
relocated is likewise not “unequivocal” evidence of an 
intent to abandon, as it is not “free from uncertainty.”  
Blacks Law Dictionary 1529 (7th ed. 1999).  Rather, it is 
“equivocal,” since other evidence indicates a contrary 
intent.  For example, Mr. Kolker testified that they 
trusted the builder to locate the south fence at the 
 
11
correct spot, and Jordan relocated the fence deeper into 
the easement at the sole direction of the Dempseys.  
Additionally, the circuit court found that Jordan was not 
acting as the Kolkers’ agent at that point, and that 
finding is not the subject of any assignment of cross-
error. 
As to the Pizzarelles, the circuit court concluded 
that their predecessor in interest, Jordan, had abandoned 
part of the easement by erecting the south fence at the 
spot specified by the Dempseys.  However, we do not agree. 
Even though Jordan (and Goetzen since he also 
intitially approached the Dempseys about the fence and sold 
Lot 1 to the Kolkers), moved the south fence to a location 
deeper into the easement, the area on the south side of 
that fence was still open and useable for some forms of 
ingress and egress.  That situation changed when the 
Dempseys connected their chain-link fence to the eastern 
end of the south fence.  At that time, the Dempseys 
completely blocked the free and continuous enjoyment of the 
easement by the Kolkers and the Pizzarelles.  Yet, there is 
no evidence in the record that anyone agreed to the 
erection of the chain-link fence.  Thus, we conclude that 
the evidence regarding the intent of the Pizzarelles’ 
predecessor in interest is also “equivocal” and therefore 
 
12
insufficient to establish an intent to abandon.  Robertson, 
214 Va. at 82, 197 S.E.2d at 188. 
However, the Dempseys contend that it is inconceivable 
that Jordan would have erected the south fence, then 
relocated it at the Dempseys’ insistence, and still 
intended all the while to retain, and subsequently convey 
to the Pizzarelles, the right to demand that the fence be 
removed.  In making this argument, the Dempseys point to 
the absence of any testimony from Jordan and Goetzen with 
regard to their intent in erecting the south fence.  We are 
not persuaded by this argument because it overlooks the 
fact that the Dempseys had the burden of proving 
abandonment, id., and they were the owners who completely 
blocked the easement from all forms of ingress and egress 
by erecting the chain-link fence. 
The Dempseys also assert that the facts in the present 
case are remarkably similar to those in Magee v. Omansky, 
187 Va. 422, 46 S.E.2d 443 (1948), where this Court found 
an abandonment.  However, we find that case distinguishable 
from the present one.  In Magee, the primary questions 
presented were first, what easement, if any, did the 
plaintiffs acquire; and second, if the plaintiffs had an 
easement, had it been abandoned.  In answering the first 
question, this Court found that the plaintiffs had not 
 
13
acquired any easement because they failed to show that the 
street in question was servient to their lots in a 
subdivision.  Id. at 429, 46 S.E.2d at 447.  Nevertheless, 
the Court, in dicta, considered the question of 
abandonment.  The facts in Magee with regard to the 
abandonment issue established a long period of non-use of 
the street; the placement of iron stakes in the street; the 
acts of the parties and their predecessors in interest in 
allowing the street to grow up in large trees, dense 
honeysuckle, and bushes; appropriation of the western ten 
feet of the street into the lots bordering the street; and 
erection of a woodshed on the eastern part of the street.  
Id. at 429-430, 46 S.E.2d at 447-48.  We concluded that, 
even if easement rights had been acquired, those facts 
supported the trial court’s finding of abandonment.  Id. at 
430, 46 S.E.2d at 448.  We do not believe that the facts in 
the present case are comparable to those in Magee. 
“Abandonment is a question of intention[,]” and it 
must be established by “clear and unequivocal evidence.”  
Lindsey, 193 Va. at 525, 69 S.E.2d at 344.  We do not find 
such evidence in the record that either the Kolkers, or 
Jordan and Goetzen, intended to abandon approximately four 
to five feet of the easement from all ingress and egress.  
Instead, we believe that the evidence with regard to the 
 
14
present location of not only the south fence, but also the 
Dempseys’ chain-link fence, and the trees and shrubs, 
reflect the Dempseys’ intent to adversely use part of the 
easement for a purpose other than ingress and egress. 
 
This conclusion does not end our discussion.  As 
previously noted, the circuit court made an alternative 
finding that, in the absence of abandonment, the 
encroachment was insubstantial and did not warrant 
injunctive relief.  We do not agree with the circuit court 
because the obstructions in the easement are a material 
encroachment on the dominant owners’ rights. 
 
“The use of an easement must be restricted to the 
terms and purposes on which the grant was based.”  
Nishanian v. Sirohi, 243 Va. 337, 339, 414 S.E.2d 604, 606 
(1992) (citing Robertson v. Bertha Min. Co., 128 Va. 93, 
104, 104 S.E. 832, 835 (1920)).  Thus, injunctive relief is 
available when an easement is being used for a purpose 
other than that originally granted.  Nishanian, 243 Va. at 
339, 414 S.E.2d at 606.  Otherwise, a new and different use 
of an express easement could be established by 
prescription, i.e., “a showing of adverse use under a claim 
of right, a use which is exclusive, continuous and 
uninterrupted and occurs with the knowledge of the land 
owner for at least twenty years.”  Id. (citing Martin v. 
 
15
Proctor, 227 Va. 61, 64-65, 313 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1984); 
Robertson, 214 Va. at 81, 197 S.E.2d at 188).  
 
To affirm the circuit court’s denial of injunctive 
relief in this case would in effect allow the Dempseys to 
appropriate a portion of the easement and reduce a 24-foot 
easement to one of 19 to 20 feet in width.  The Kolkers and 
the Pizzarelles acquired a 24-foot easement, and they are 
entitled to the free and continuous use and enjoyment of 
that 24 feet for the purpose of ingress and egress.  The 
terms of the easement specifically guaranteed that right to 
them and further stated that no owner of a lot shall 
perform any act that interferes with that right. 
 
Unlike some cases, the question here is not one of 
“reasonableness” or whether the easement is now “less 
useful or less convenient.”  Willing v. Booker, 160 Va. 
461, 466, 168 S.E. 417, 418 (1933).  The Dempseys portray 
the easement as not being “less useful” because vehicular 
traffic on the paved portion is not affected by the 
obstructions.  However, the obstructions in the easement 
completely block all ingress and egress on the south side 
of the wooden fence. 
Nor is this a case in which the equities should be 
balanced.  For example, in Mobley v. Saponi Corp., 215 Va. 
643, 212 S.E.2d 287 (1975), a case upon which the Dempseys 
 
16
rely, this Court affirmed the chancellor’s denial of 
injunctive relief after balancing the equities.  There, the 
evidence showed that no significant amount of the Mobley’s 
lakefront, useable property was flooded when the level of 
the lake was raised.  Also, their dock was no less usable, 
and the corporation had reserved a permanent easement 
within ten feet of the shoreline for the benefit of the 
lake.  Id. at 646, 212 S.E.2d at 289-90.  In the present 
case, a significant portion of the easement would be 
rendered unusable for ingress and egress if injunctive 
relief were denied. 
 
Thus, we conclude that the circuit court’s denial of 
injunctive relief, while a matter of discretion, was 
nevertheless plainly wrong in this case.  See Blue Ridge 
Poultry and Egg Co., Inc. v. Clark, 211 Va. 139, 144, 176 
S.E.2d 323, 327 (1970) (decision whether to grant or refuse 
injunction lies within sound discretion of chancellor and 
will not be disturbed on appeal unless decision is plainly 
wrong).  For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of 
the circuit court and remand this cause for entry of an 
injunction directing the Dempseys to remove the south fence 
and other obstructions that are within the 24-foot 
 
17
easement.7  On remand, the circuit court shall also address 
the question whether the Dempseys should bear all the costs 
of removing the obstructions. 
Reversed and remanded. 
__________________ 
7 In light of our decision, we do not need to address 
the remaining assignment of error.  We also will not 
address the Dempseys’ argument with regard to estoppel 
because they did not present that argument to the circuit 
court.  See Rule 5:25.  Similarly, they claim that the 
south fence and the trees adjacent to it are permissible, 
i.e., not an encroachment, under the terms of the easement 
when viewed in light of the 15-foot paving restriction.  
Even though the circuit court concluded that the 
encroachment was insubstantial, it nevertheless found an 
encroachment.  The Dempseys did not assign cross-error to 
that finding.  See Rule 5:18. 
 
18