Title: Whitaker v. M.T. Automotive, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Whitaker v. M.T. Automotive, Inc., 111 Ohio St.3d 177, 2006-Ohio-5481.] 
 
 
 
WHITAKER, APPELLANT, v. M.T. AUTOMOTIVE, INC., D.B.A. MONTROSE 
TOYOTA, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Whitaker v. M.T. Automotive, Inc.,  
111 Ohio St.3d 177, 2006-Ohio-5481.] 
In an action brought under the Consumer Sales Practices Act, all forms of 
compensatory relief, including noneconomic damages, are included within 
the term “damages” in R.C. 1345.09(A) — The actual damages proven, 
whether economic or noneconomic, are subject to trebling under R.C. 
1345.09(B). 
(No. 2005-0331 – Submitted January 11, 2006 – Decided November 8, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 21836, 2004-Ohio-7166. 
_________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  In an action brought under the Consumer Sales Practices Act, all forms of 
compensatory relief, including noneconomic damages, are included within 
the term “damages” in R.C. 1345.09(A). 
2.  The actual damages proven, whether economic or noneconomic, are subject to 
trebling under R.C. 1345.09(B). 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} We accepted this case as a discretionary appeal to clarify what 
damages are available under R.C. 1345.09, the private-remedy section of Ohio’s 
Consumer Sales Practice Act (“CSPA”). 
Facts 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} This dispute, which is between appellant, Craig Whitaker, and 
appellee, M.T. Automotive, Inc., a car dealership doing business as Montrose 
Toyota (“Montrose”), arose from Whitaker’s attempt to lease a vehicle from 
Montrose in October 2001.  Whitaker initially intended to purchase a used truck 
from Montrose.  After discussing the maximum monthly payment that Whitaker 
was willing to make, one of Montrose’s salesmen suggested that Whitaker lease, 
rather than buy, a truck.  The salesman told Whitaker that based on his credit 
report, the lease should be approved.  Whitaker wanted to check with his credit 
union for financing before signing the lease and gave the salesman a $200 deposit. 
{¶ 3} Discovering that his credit union would finance a lease only on a 
new rather than a used truck, Whitaker called Montrose to tell them he was no 
longer interested.  Montrose’s credit manager asked Whitaker whether he would 
be interested in leasing the truck if Montrose could find a bank to finance a lease 
for $230 a month.  Whitaker said he would, and later that day agreed to lease the 
truck for that amount.  The credit manager prepared several documents including 
a “spot delivery”1 agreement, a lease agreement, and a vehicle-service agreement, 
all of which Whitaker signed.  Whitaker informed the credit manager that he 
would come back in two days to pick up the truck. 
{¶ 4} After selling his own truck, Whitaker returned to Montrose.  He 
paid an additional $1,337, which, together with the earlier $200, was his deposit 
on the lease.  Before Whitaker took the leased truck, he arranged to bring it back 
to Montrose the following Monday for repair of some scratches.  He explained 
that he had already sold his old truck and would need to borrow one of 
                                          
 
1.  In a “spot delivery agreement” the seller agrees to let the buyer take a vehicle before the buyer 
receives financing approval and the buyer agrees to return the vehicle to the seller if financing is 
not approved. 
January Term, 2006 
3 
Montrose’s vehicles while the scratches were being fixed.  Whitaker then left with 
the leased truck and had a new stereo installed that weekend. 
{¶ 5} The following Tuesday, when Whitaker went to pick up the truck 
from Montrose following the scratch repairs, he was told that he needed to sign a 
few more documents.  Montrose’s business manager told Whitaker that several 
banks had refused to approve the lease financing but that the dealership finally 
had found a bank to finance the truck’s purchase with payments of $297 per 
month.  When Whitaker refused that deal, it was suggested that he find a cosigner 
on the lease.  The next day, Whitaker’s father, as cosigner, was presented with 
lease papers that increased the monthly payments from $230 to $240 and changed 
certain favorable terms. 
{¶ 6} Because Whitaker would not agree to the increased payments, the 
business manager declared the deal over and took the truck.  Whitaker was told 
that his deposit would not be refunded because he had broken the contract.  When 
Whitaker returned to Montrose a few days later with the duplicate keys and the 
original truck radio as instructed, the truck’s upgraded stereo that he had installed 
was missing from the dealership. 
{¶ 7} Whitaker tried unsuccessfully to recover his deposit and his radio.  
He borrowed money from his parents for a down payment on a new truck, which 
he received approximately ten weeks later, and then sued Montrose for violations 
of R.C. Chapter 1345, the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“CSPA”), and for 
breach of contract, conversion, and fraud.  After Whitaker filed the complaint, 
Montrose returned his deposit. 
{¶ 8} The case proceeded to jury trial.  Montrose received a directed 
verdict on the fraud claim, and Whitaker withdrew his claim for breach of 
contract. The jury returned a verdict for Whitaker in the amount of $367.15 for 
the conversion of his stereo.  It also determined that Montrose had knowingly 
committed 11 separate violations of the CSPA.  For the CSPA violations, the jury 
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awarded Whitaker $105,000 in a general verdict.  The trial court, after finding that 
R.C. 1345.09(B) was satisfied, trebled the CSPA award to $315,000 and awarded 
$155,056.70 in attorney fees and case expenses. 
{¶ 9} Montrose appealed the CSPA damage award, the awarding of 
treble damages, and the award of attorney fees, but did not appeal the findings of 
CSPA violations and conversion.2  Focusing on damages, Montrose argued that 
“Whitaker failed to present evidence that he incurred any ‘actual or real loss or 
injury’ as a result of any claimed violation” of the CSPA.  Whitaker responded 
that he had presented sufficient evidence of both economic and noneconomic 
damages.  The Ninth District Court of Appeals determined, first, that Whitaker 
could not recover noneconomic damages under the CSPA and, second, that there 
was insufficient evidence of economic loss.3  It therefore reversed the trial court’s 
judgment on the CSPA claim and instructed the trial court to issue a judgment 
awarding statutory damages pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(B).4   
Damages under the Consumer Sales Practices Act 
                                          
 
2.  The appellate court affirmed the propriety of the directed verdict on the fraud claim from which 
Whitaker had cross-appealed.  Although Whitaker offers this issue in his brief before this court, 
because he failed to raise it in his jurisdictional memorandum, it will not be addressed.  See In re 
Timken Mercy Med. Ctr. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 81, 87, 572 N.E.2d 673. 
 
3.  Whitaker’s appeal to this court does not address the holding on economic damages, but focuses 
on whether it was improper for noneconomic damages to have been excluded from consideration. 
 
4.   Although the appellate court also reversed the award of attorney fees and remanded the cause 
for the trial court to clearly set forth the basis for the amount awarded, that portion of the judgment 
is not before us. 
 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶ 10} Although we have addressed the CSPA before,5 this is the first 
time we have accepted an appeal that asks us to explain what damages are 
available under R.C. Chapter 1345 and, specifically, whether noneconomic 
damages are included.  The CSPA “prohibits suppliers from committing either 
unfair or deceptive consumer sales practices or unconscionable acts or practices 
as catalogued in R.C. 1345.02 and 1345.03.  In general, the CSPA defines ‘unfair 
or deceptive consumer sales practices’ as those that mislead consumers about the 
nature of the product they are receiving, while ‘unconscionable acts or practices’ 
relate to a supplier manipulating a consumer’s understanding of the nature of the 
transaction at issue.”  Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 106 Ohio St.3d 278, 2005-
Ohio-4985, 834 N.E.2d 791, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 11} The CSPA “is a remedial law which is designed to compensate for 
traditional consumer remedies and so must be liberally construed pursuant to R.C. 
1.11.” Einhorn v. Ford Motor Co. (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 548 N.E.2d 933.  
One of its purposes is to make “private enforcement of the CSPA attractive to 
consumers who otherwise might not be able to afford or justify the cost of 
prosecuting an alleged CSPA violation, which, in turn, works to discourage CSPA 
violations in the first place via the threat of liability for damages and attorney 
fees.” Parker v. I&F Insulation Co., Inc. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 261, 268, 730 
N.E.2d 972. 
Private Remedies for Violation of the Consumer Sales  
Practices Act — R.C. 1345.09 
                                          
 
5.  See, e.g., Marrone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 110 Ohio St.3d 5, 2006-Ohio-2869, 850 N.E.2d 
31; Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 106 Ohio St.3d 278, 2005-Ohio-4985, 834 N.E.2d 791; Maitland 
v. Ford  Motor Co., 103 Ohio St.3d 463, 2004-Ohio-5717, 816 N.E.2d 1061; Parker v. I&F 
Insulation Co. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 261, 730 N.E.2d 972; Einhorn v. Ford Motor Co. (1990), 48 
Ohio St.3d 27, 548 N.E.2d 933; Celebrezze v. Hughes (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 71, 18 OBR 102, 479 
N.E.2d 886. 
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{¶ 12} As part of the overall statutory scheme, R.C. 1345.09 provides the 
consumer remedies available for a CSPA violation, including rescission, damages, 
and equitable relief.  The customer may rescind the transaction within a 
reasonable time or seek damages, which, in certain situations, may include treble 
damages or statutory damages of $200, whichever is greater.  R.C. 1345.09(A) 
through (C).  Equitable relief includes declaratory judgment and injunctions. R.C. 
1345.09(D).  Class actions are possible under R.C. 1345.09(B), and attorney fees 
may also be awarded, pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(F). 
Unrestricted Damages—R.C. 1345.09(A) 
{¶ 13} R.C. 1345.09(A) states: “Where the violation was an act prohibited 
by section 1345.02 or 1345.03 of the Revised Code, the consumer may, in an 
individual action, rescind the transaction or recover his damages.”  The CSPA 
was amended in 1978, and, among other changes, the word “actual” was removed 
from the previous version’s use of the term “actual damages” in R.C. 1345.09(A). 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 681, 137 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3219, 3226-3228.  The title of the 
act stated that the intent was “to prevent unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable 
acts and practices, to provide strong and effective remedies, both public and 
private, to assure that consumers will recover any damages caused by such acts 
and practices, and to eliminate any monetary incentives for suppliers to engage in 
such acts and practices.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 3219. 
{¶ 14} When the word “damages” is used without modification, we have 
held that the term is broad in scope.  “ ‘Damages,’ absent a restrictive modifier 
like ‘compensatory,’ ‘actual,’ ‘consequential’ or ‘punitive,’ is an inclusive term 
embracing the panoply of legally recognized pecuniary relief.”  Rice v. 
CertainTeed Corp. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 417, 419, 704 N.E.2d 1217.  In addition, 
we have consistently held that “[t]he fundamental rule of the law of damages is 
that the injured party shall have compensation for all of the injuries sustained.” 
January Term, 2006 
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Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 601, 612, 597 
N.E.2d 474. 
{¶ 15} In assessing the language employed by the General Assembly, the 
court takes words at their usual, normal, or customary meaning.  Rice, 84 Ohio 
St.3d at 419, 704 N.E.2d 1217.  “Most important, it is the court’s duty to ‘give 
effect to the words used [and to refrain from] insert[ing] words not used.’ ” Id., 
quoting State ex rel. Richard v. Bd. of Trustees of Police & Firemen’s Disability 
& Pension Fund (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 409, 412, 632 N.E.2d 1292.  In order to 
exclude noneconomic damages from R.C. 1345.09, we would have to read the 
term “pecuniary” or “monetary” or “out-of-pocket expenses” into the statute.  
Therefore, we hold that in an action brought under the CSPA, all forms of 
compensatory relief, including noneconomic damages, are included within the 
unrestricted term “damages” under R.C. 1345.09(A). 
Trebling of “Actual Damages” — R.C. 1345.09(B) 
{¶ 16} The trial court trebled the general verdict on Whitaker’s CSPA 
claims.  R.C. 1345.09(B) states: “Where the violation was an act or practice 
declared to be deceptive or unconscionable by rule * * * or an act or practice 
determined by a court of this state to violate section 1345.02 or 1345.03 of the 
Revised Code and committed after the decision * * * has been made available for 
public inspection * * *, the consumer may rescind the transaction or recover, but 
not in a class action, three times the amount of his actual damages or two hundred 
dollars, whichever is greater, or recover damages or other appropriate relief in a 
class action under Civil Rule 23, as amended.” (Emphasis added.)  Because only 
“actual damages” are subject to trebling pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(B), we must 
determine whether “noneconomic damages” are included in the category. 
{¶ 17} We first observe that statutory damages in the amount of $200 are 
an alternative to actual damages, and, thus, $200 is the minimum award for a 
CSPA violation under R.C. 1345.09(B).  In other words, if actual damages are not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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proven or if three times the consumer’s damages is less than $200, then $200 will 
be awarded. 
{¶ 18} “ ‘Actual damages’ are defined as ‘real, substantial, and just 
damages, or the amount awarded to a complainant in compensation for his actual 
and real loss or injury.’ ”  Crow v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 9th Dist. No. 21128, 
2003-Ohio-1293, at ¶ 32, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990) 390.  
When considering whether noneconomic harm may be included as part of “actual 
damages,” this court has stated that “ ‘[a]ctual damages’ is a term synonymous 
with compensatory damages, and covers all loss recoverable as a matter of right.”  
Mouse v. Cent. Sav. & Trust Co. (1929), 120 Ohio St. 599, 610, 167 N.E. 868.  
Likewise, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that “[c]ompensatory 
damages and actual damages mean the same thing; that is, that the damages shall 
be the result of the injury alleged and proved, and that the amount awarded shall 
be precisely commensurate with the injury suffered, neither more nor less * * *.”  
Birdsall v. Coolidge (1876), 93 U.S. 64, 23 L.Ed. 802. 
{¶ 19} In Fantozzi, 64 Ohio St.3d at 612, 597 N.E.2d 474, we defined 
“compensatory damages” in such a way that it includes both economic and 
noneconomic damages: “Compensatory damages are defined as those which 
measure the actual loss, and are allowed as amends therefor.  For example, 
compensatory damages may, among other allowable elements, encompass direct 
pecuniary loss, such as hospital and other medical expenses immediately resulting 
from the injury, or loss of time or money from the injury, loss due to the 
permanency of the injuries, disabilities or disfigurement, and physical and mental 
pain and suffering.”  Usually awarded for pain and suffering, noneconomic 
damages can also include compensation for loss of ability to perform usual 
January Term, 2006 
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functions;6 loss of consortium, mental anguish, or other intangible loss;7 and 
humiliation or embarrassment.8  R.C. 2307.011(E) defines “noneconomic loss” as 
“nonpecuniary harm that results from an injury, death, or loss to person that is a 
subject of a tort action, including, but not limited to, pain and suffering; loss of 
society, consortium, companionship, care, assistance, attention, protection, 
advice, guidance, counsel, instruction, training, or education; mental anguish; and 
any other intangible loss.” 
{¶ 20} Noneconomic damages have been included in awards of actual 
damages under the CSPA.  Damask v. Modern Communications, Ltd. (Sept. 13, 
2000), Lucas C.P. No. CI-99-3859, 2000 WL 33182259 (damages for 
inconvenience, aggravation, frustration, and humiliation for misrepresentations 
and attempts to collect an invalid debt); Becker v. Montgomery, Lynch (Feb. 26, 
2003), N.D.Ohio No. Civ.A. 1:02CV 874, 2003 WL 23335929 (damages for 
frustration, aggravation, humiliation, embarrassment, and inconvenience for 
misleading collection letter); Lamb v. M & M Assoc., Inc. (Sept. 1, 1998), 
S.D.Ohio No. C-3-96-463, 1998 WL 34288694 (evidence of plaintiff’s mental 
stress prevented summary judgment on issue of actual damages). 
{¶ 21} Courts interpreting comparable federal consumer-protection laws 
have also stated that noneconomic damages may be included in actual damages.  
Casella v. Equifax Credit Information Servs. (C.A.2, 1995), 56 F.3d 469, 474 
(“actual damages” may include damages for humiliation and mental distress, even 
in the absence of out-of-pocket expenses, for violation of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act); Bach v. First Union Natl. Bank (C.A.6, 2005), 149 Fed.Appx. 
                                          
 
6.  See Fantozzi, 64 Ohio St.3d 601, 597 N.E.2d 474, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
7.  Galayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 421, 425, 644 N.E.2d 298. 
8.   Mason v. Rainbow Rentals, 2d Dist. No. 19561, 2004-Ohio-265. 
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354  (actual damages for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act may include 
damages for humiliation and mental distress); Butler v. Sterling, Inc. (Mar. 31, 
2000), C.A.6 No. 98-3223 (a persuasive argument exists that consequential 
damages for emotional distress or humiliation are available as part of actual 
damages for a violation of the Truth in Lending Act); Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson 
& Rothfuss, L.P.A. (June 9, 2005), S.D.Ohio E.D. No. 2:02CV0743 (“a plaintiff 
may be awarded actual damages to compensate for out-of-pocket expenses 
incurred and any humiliation, embarrassment, anguish, or emotional distress” for 
a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act). 
{¶ 22} Therefore, because actual damages and compensatory damages are 
equivalent, Mouse, 120 Ohio St. at 610, 167 N.E. 868, and because compensatory 
damages can consist of both economic and noneconomic damages, we hold that 
the actual damages proven, whether economic or noneconomic, are subject to 
trebling under R.C. 1345.09(B). 
{¶ 23} R.C. 1345.09(A)’s use of the unmodified term “damages” seems to 
allow for an award of punitive damages for a CSPA violation committed with 
actual malice.  Any award for punitive damages, however, would not be subject to 
trebling under R.C. 1345.09(B), because punitive damages are not “actual 
damages.”9  Nevertheless, “actual damages” may be trebled as a penalty against a 
supplier if the supplier commits an act already prohibited by rule or by a prior 
court opinion maintained by the Attorney General’s office.  Thus, the entirety of 
Whitaker’s CSPA damage award may be trebled if the evidence supports the 
verdict of $105,000. 
Personal Injury Exception—R.C. 1345.12(C) 
                                          
 
9.  In this case, the jury was not instructed on punitive damages, and there are no special 
interrogatories testing the general verdict on the CSPA violation. 
 
January Term, 2006 
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{¶ 24} In support of its conclusion that noneconomic damages are not 
available under the CSPA, the court of appeals cited Marrone v. Philip Morris, 
USA, Inc., 9th Dist. No. 03CA0120-M, 2004-Ohio-4874, at ¶ 25.10  In Marrone, 
the plaintiffs filed a class-action lawsuit alleging CSPA violations and fraud.  The 
trial court certified a class only on the plaintiffs’ CSPA claims.  Among other 
arguments, the defendant-appellant maintained on appeal that class certification 
was improper because the plaintiffs-appellees did not fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the class because some class members could also have 
personal injury claims, which would be precluded from the case.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the class certification, determining that the certification did not 
result in claim preclusion, since all class members were limited to pursuing only 
economic damages because personal injury claims cannot be litigated in a CSPA 
action.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 25} R.C. 1345.12 lists exceptions to the application of certain parts of 
the CSPA.11  R.C. 1345.12 states:  
{¶ 26} “Sections 1345.01 to 1345.13 of the Revised Code do not apply to: 
{¶ 27} “* * *  
{¶ 28} “(C) Claims for personal injury or death.” 
{¶ 29} Montrose argues that Whitaker’s claims of noneconomic loss were 
for personal injury.  The question now is whether this statute prohibits only claims 
                                          
 
10.  Marrone was recently reversed by this court on different grounds.  See Marrone v. Philip 
Morris USA, Inc., 110 Ohio St.3d 5, 2006-Ohio-2869, 850 N.E.2d 31. 
 
11.  There has been little analysis of R.C. 1345.12(C). See Pomianowski v. Merle Norman 
Cosmetics, Inc. (S.D.Ohio 1980), 507 F.Supp. 435 (court relied on R.C. 1345.12(C) to strike the 
prayer for trebling of personal injury damages in a complaint that alleged that the plaintiff was 
injured due to the supplier’s misrepresentations regarding the quality of mascara); Glassner v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. (June 29, 1999), N.D.Ohio E.D. No. 5:99CV0796, 1999 WL 33591006 
(CSPA count alleging misrepresentation, omissions, and concealments about tobacco product 
dismissed pursuant to R.C. 1345.12(C) because the damages sought were too closely related to 
personal injury damages). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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that arise from personal injuries or whether it prohibits noneconomic damages 
that are also recoverable in personal injury claims.  Put another way, does R.C. 
1345.12(C) bar recovery of certain damages simply because they are the type 
usually sought in personal injury cases?  We answer no, for the General Assembly 
chose the word “claims” instead of “damages” in this section. 
{¶ 30} Because the CSPA is a remedial law and must be construed in 
favor of the consumer, R.C. 1345.12(C) will bar only claims that require proof of 
a personal injury in order to establish a CSPA violation.  In this case, however, 
Whitaker’s complaint alleges that his emotional distress was a consequence of 
Montrose’s CSPA violations.  He does not allege that his emotional distress 
establishes the CSPA violation.  Therefore, R.C. 1345.12(C)’s exclusion does not 
apply. 
{¶ 31} Montrose argues that if Whitaker is allowed to recover damages 
for emotional distress, he should be required to show the same degree of evidence 
that is necessary to prove “serious emotional distress,” as is required to prove the 
torts of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.  We disagree.  
Previously, before either of those torts was recognized, a plaintiff could recover 
under certain circumstances for emotional distress without having suffered a 
contemporaneous physical injury.  See Columbus Fin., Inc. v. Howard (1975), 42 
Ohio St.2d 178, 71 O.O.2d 174, 327 N.E.2d 654 (damages for mental suffering, 
anguish, and humiliation available if the wrongdoer acted with malice in wrongful 
execution of judgment); Housh v. Peth (1956), 165 Ohio St. 35, 59 O.O. 60, 133 
N.E.2d 340 (damages for mental anguish recoverable in an action for invasion of 
privacy); Brownlee v. Pratt (1946), 77 Ohio App. 533, 33 O.O. 356, 68 N.E.2d 
798 (compensatory damages for mental suffering and anguish available for the 
wilful and intentional invasion of the right of burial).  To the extent that the 
evidence shows intentional or malicious actions on the part of Montrose, 
January Term, 2006 
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Whitaker may recover damages for mental anguish or emotional distress as part of 
his CSPA remedy. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} We hold that in an action brought under the CSPA, all forms of 
compensatory relief, including noneconomic damages, are included within the 
term “damages” in R.C. 1345.09(A).  The actual damages proven, whether 
economic or noneconomic, are subject to trebling under R.C. 1345.09(B). 
{¶ 33} The judgment of the Court of Appeals for Summit County is, 
therefore, reversed.  Because the court of appeals did not address whether the 
sufficiency and weight of the evidence support an award of noneconomic 
damages, we remand the case to the Ninth District Court of Appeals for further 
proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded.  
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Young & McDowall, Laura K. McDowall, and Rocco P. Yeargin, for 
appellant. 
 
Brouse McDowell, Clair E. Dickinson, and Joseph T. Dattilo, for appellee. 
 
Willis & Willis Co., L.P.A., Mark C. Willis, and Todd L. Willis, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
Burdge Law Office Co., L.P.A., and Ronald L. Burdge; and Thomas 
Domonoske, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Association of Consumer 
Advocates. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Cooper & Elliott, L.L.C., David A. Brown, and Andrew J. Sonderman, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae the Ohio Automobile Dealers Association 
and Ohio Council of Retail Merchants. 
______________________