Title: Commonwealth v. Gibson

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-12159 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DARIUS GIBSON. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 5, 2021. - January 27, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Firearm, Prior misconduct, Inflammatory 
evidence, Corroborative evidence.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Continuance, New trial, Assistance of 
counsel, Witness. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 14, 2012. 
 
The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on January 30, 2020, was heard by 
her. 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant, Darius Gibson, was convicted 
of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty for the death of 
Terrence Kelley, who was shot multiple times as he was being 
2 
 
chased by his assailant down a public street in Boston on a 
sunny afternoon just before Memorial Day in 2010.1  Following his 
conviction, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the 
ground that he located a "newly available" witness who would 
provide impeachment evidence against one of the Commonwealth's 
key witnesses.  The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, 
denied the motion. 
 
In this consolidated appeal, the defendant contends that 
(1) the judge erred in permitting evidence regarding the 
defendant's familiarity with the locus of the shooting and with 
firearms; (2) the judge erred in allowing evidence suggesting 
two witnesses were fearful of meeting with police officers 
following the shooting; (3) the judge erred in denying the 
defendant's request for a continuance to permit trial counsel 
more time to locate a witness who had indicated that one of the 
Commonwealth's key witnesses had fabricated her testimony; 
(4) the judge erred in denying the defendant's motion for a new 
trial; (5) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and 
(6) we should revisit our "corpus delicti" rule to adopt the 
Federal standard, as more fully discussed infra.  In addition, 
the defendant asserts that a reduction in the verdict would be 
more consonant with the weight of the evidence presented and 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of carrying a firearm 
without a license and intimidating a witness. 
3 
 
asks us to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the degree of guilt.  We affirm the defendant's 
convictions and the order denying his motion for a new trial, 
and we discern no reason to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving some details 
for later discussion.  Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 795 
(2021). 
 
On May 28, 2010, prior to the shooting, the defendant 
visited James Austin at a second-floor apartment that Austin 
shared with his mother on Creston Street, located in a building 
between Normandy Street and Blue Hill Avenue, in Boston.  The 
defendant wore a black hat, a black shirt, black pants, and 
glasses; his hair was in flat braids.  Austin's mother testified 
that the defendant had come that day seeking, as he had in the 
past, to purchase "eight balls"2 of cocaine from Austin.  On this 
day, however, no drugs were exchanged; instead, Austin informed 
the defendant that, the prior day, "K-J" (the victim's nickname) 
 
2 An "eight ball" is approximately 3.5 grams, or one-eighth 
of an ounce, of cocaine.  Commonwealth v. Montoya, 464 Mass. 
566, 570 (2013). 
 
4 
 
and others had robbed Austin and Earl Smith3 of, inter alia, 
their supply of drugs.  The theft had taken place just outside 
the Austins' apartment building. 
 
The defendant left the Austins' apartment.  Austin's mother 
did not see the defendant again that day.  She testified that 
after the defendant left, Austin telephoned the victim and asked 
the victim if he could "get his ID back, that's all he wanted 
back was his ID."  The victim agreed. 
 
Meanwhile, the victim had parked his car on the far end of 
Creston Street, near Normandy Street; as he passed the Austins' 
building, Austin's mother saw the victim "walking up and down" 
Creston Street.  The victim was "just bragging" and "screaming," 
"This is my block, this is my block now, this is my block."  
Austin's mother then retired to her room to sleep. 
 
The victim continued walking and then stopped, for a brief 
time, at the home of his childhood friend, who lived with his 
mother on the third floor of a building on the corner of 
Normandy Street and Creston Street, to play video games.  
Thereafter, the friend escorted the victim out; it was a bright, 
sunny afternoon, a bit before 2 P.M. 
 
3 Following the robbery, Smith had "stayed over" at the 
Austins' apartment; Smith was also present during the 
defendant's visit. 
5 
 
 
Immediately after the victim left, the friend's mother, who 
had been home during the victim's visit, heard multiple gunshots 
that sounded like "firecrackers."  The friend, who had returned 
to the apartment, and his mother ran to the apartment's window 
that faced Creston Street and saw the victim leaning against a 
van.  The friend sprinted outside with his brother; when they 
reached the victim, he was spitting blood.  They lifted his 
shirt and saw bullet holes in his body.  The friend helped the 
victim to the ground "because he was so, he was weak and he was 
going down."  The friend used his own T-shirt to put pressure on 
the victim's wounds, as the victim stated in Spanish, "I can't 
breath[e]."  The victim had "blood all over him," and "blood was 
coming out of his mouth." 
 
Austin's mother was awakened by the sound of gunshots.  
Looking out her apartment window, she saw two men running on 
Creston Street toward Blue Hill Avenue.  She then heard her 
buzzer, and Austin said through the intercom system:  "Ma, open 
the door, open the door."  She went downstairs to let him and 
Smith into the apartment building;4 she testified that Austin was 
"scared" and that he said, "K-J got shot."  She looked out her 
window again and saw the victim "by the pole bleeding." 
 
4 Video footage from surveillance cameras at the Austins' 
apartment building showed Austin and Smith standing on the 
stairs outside the building as the victim ran past; thereafter, 
Austin's mother is shown letting them into the building. 
6 
 
 
Charles Slayden, a Creston Street resident, testified that 
just before 2 P.M. on the day of the shooting, as he arrived at 
his home, he saw a man on the corner of Creston and Normandy 
Streets; he later identified the man as "Wizz," who was known to 
spend time with Austin.5  "Wizz" was the defendant's nickname.  
As Slayden arrived home, he heard a male voice saying, "You 
can't run now mother fucker"; Slayden saw two men running (one 
behind the other) and heard multiple gunshots.  Slayden saw the 
second man, who had been in the back, keep going toward Blue 
Hill Avenue.  The victim, who had been the man in the front of 
the chase, stopped and turned around to walk back up Creston 
Street in the direction from which he had come.  The victim's 
legs buckled. 
 
Jenice Peters, another Creston Street resident, was sitting 
on her porch and heard what she thought sounded like 
"firecrackers" coming from the direction of Normandy Street.  
She heard a male voice say, "Go back to where you came from."  
She then saw the victim, who stopped and coughed blood, before 
trying to make his way toward Normandy Street.  The victim "was 
holding his stomach" and "keeled over"; Peters "saw blood coming 
out of his mouth."  Peters saw a second man (whom she described 
 
5 At trial, Slayden denied reporting that he recognized 
"Wizz."  Slayden testified that his son was incarcerated and 
that he was "concerned about his [son's] welfare." 
7 
 
as African-American, with dark skin and braids lying against his 
head, wearing all dark clothes) walk down Creston Street to Blue 
Hill Avenue.  Peters had seen the man once before, about a week 
before the shooting.  Peters retrieved her cell phone to call 
911 but determined not to do so when the second man gave her an 
"ill grill," or a "weird look like you better not do it." 
 
Two other witnesses also offered their eyewitness accounts 
of the shooting.  The first was a Creston Street resident who 
heard a man cry for help.  She looked out her window, heard 
gunshots, and saw an injured man run toward Blue Hill Avenue.  
She also saw a second "young" man also run toward Blue Hill 
Avenue; she described him as having braids and "dark skin" and 
wearing black.  The second witness, who lived a few streets away 
and was driving his scooter at the time of the shooting, 
reported that he was near the corner of Creston Street and 
Normandy Street when he saw two men engaged in a chase on 
Creston Street toward Blue Hill Avenue and heard several 
gunshots.  He then saw the second man in the back break away 
toward Blue Hill Avenue.  The victim, who was the man in front, 
circled back down Creston Street toward the witness (away from 
Blue Hill Avenue).  The victim stopped, leaned against a motor 
vehicle, and dropped to the ground.  The witness called 911 and 
described the shooter as a Hispanic male wearing a white T-
shirt; at trial, this witness testified that he thought he was 
8 
 
describing the victim to the dispatcher at that time and that he 
could not describe the shooter, whom he had only seen from 
behind. 
 
Responding Boston police officers arrived at the scene just 
before 2 P.M.  One officer tried to talk to the victim, but the 
victim was "gargling and bleeding from his mouth" and could not 
speak.  An ambulance arrived and transported the victim to the 
hospital, where he was pronounced dead shortly after arriving.  
An autopsy was performed the day after the shooting.  The 
medical examiner recovered four bullets from the victim's body, 
but the victim had been shot five times -- two times in the 
front of his body and three times in the back.6  Blood was found 
in the victim's lungs, which had made it difficult for him to 
breathe.  The medical examiner determined that the wounds to the 
lung and liver were the most serious injuries and caused the 
victim's death. 
 
Immediately after the victim was transported to the 
hospital, police officers secured the crime scene and began to 
canvas the area for both physical evidence and witnesses.  
Officers recovered six .25 caliber shell casings from Creston 
 
6 One bullet entered the front of the victim's abdomen and 
lodged in his pelvis, one entered his chest near his right 
armpit and exited through his abdomen, one entered his back and 
penetrated his right lung through his ribs, one entered his back 
and lodged in his liver, and one entered his buttock and was 
recovered from the outer part of his thigh. 
9 
 
Street, all of which appeared to have been discharged from the 
same firearm (as evidenced by impression marks on the casings).  
Officers also recovered two bullets from the street, which 
appeared to have been fired from the same firearm as the bullets 
found in the victim's body.7  Officers reviewed video 
surveillance footage captured on cameras from the Creston Street 
building in which the Austins lived.  The footage showed Austin 
and another man, later identified as Smith, on the stoop of that 
building at the time of the shooting; it also showed the victim 
running from the right of the screen to the left (from Normandy 
Street toward Blue Hill Avenue), and then walking back from the 
left to the right a short time later.  Despite the ongoing 
investigation, no arrests were made in 2010. 
 
In 2011, Hilary Holden met with police detectives as part 
of a deal for leniency on a Federal charge against her for 
conspiracy to deal firearms without a license.  Holden offered 
additional information regarding the shooting.8  She testified 
 
7 The six recovered bullets (four from the victim's body and 
two from the street) and the six recovered casings had 
consistent markings.  Because the actual firearm used to shoot 
the victim was not recovered, however, the police detective who 
analyzed the ballistics could not say definitively whether the 
bullets and casings came from the same firearm. 
 
8 At trial, Holden acknowledged that she did not disclose 
this information when she first was arrested in 2010; instead, 
she disclosed the information after a Federal charge for 
conspiracy to deal firearms without a license was brought 
against her in 2011.  In return for her testimony, the 
10 
 
that she met the defendant in June 2010 (after the shooting).  
At the time, Holden explained, she had "exchanged sexual acts" 
for drugs and money and committed robberies with the defendant 
alone9 and also with the defendant and Austin together.  Holden 
testified that eventually Austin became her "boyfriend"; she 
committed another robbery with Austin alone and falsely reported 
to the investigating police officers that the defendant 
committed the robbery with her (even though the defendant, who 
was incarcerated at the time of the robbery, could not have done 
so) to protect Austin.10  At the time of the defendant's trial, 
Holden was incarcerated; she testified pursuant to a cooperation 
agreement with the Commonwealth. 
 
Commonwealth agreed not to charge her for any additional 
criminal activity with the defendant or Austin during June and 
July of 2010 beyond the two armed robberies to which she had 
already pleaded guilty.  Additionally, under the deal, the 
sentences for the Federal conspiracy to deal firearms without a 
license charge and the State armed robbery convictions (to which 
she pleaded guilty) would run concurrently. 
 
9 During one such robbery in July 2010, Holden's hand was 
cut.  When she sought treatment at a hospital, she gave a false 
name. 
 
10 When asked if she "would do anything for [Austin]," 
Holden answered that she would.  She also wrote in a letter to 
Austin's mother, "I'll do whatever I got to do to get my baby 
out," referring to Austin. 
 
11 
 
 
According to Holden, she was driving in a vehicle11 with the 
defendant in the weeks following the shooting when they passed a 
sign posted near the crime scene (on Blue Hill Avenue, across 
from Creston Street) that sought information concerning the 
shooting.  The defendant became "enraged" when he saw the sign 
and stated that the sign was "there because of him."  The 
defendant explained to Holden that he "shot and killed somebody" 
on Creston Street "over a robbery that had gone wrong."  The 
defendant told Holden that the person who committed the robbery 
had "disrespected them in their hood and robbed them"; the 
defendant identified the victim to Holden as "K-J." 
 
Holden further testified that after the defendant saw an 
article online regarding the shooting, which reported that the 
victim had been shot seven times, the defendant told Holden that 
the article was mistaken and that he had shot the victim six 
times.12  The defendant returned to the subject of the shooting 
on another occasion when Holden was driving and both the 
defendant and Austin were passengers in the vehicle.  The 
defendant was "boasting" about the shooting.  Addressing Austin, 
the defendant "was basically saying like, I told you I'd get a 
 
11 Holden had stolen the vehicle from her parents when she 
left Vermont. 
 
12 As discussed supra, the victim was shot five times, 
although six bullets and casings ultimately were recovered. 
12 
 
gun, I told you I would do it and I did it."13  Austin responded 
that initially Austin did not think the victim "got killed" 
because "when [the defendant] shot him, like the blood didn't 
seep through his white tee right away and [he] kept walking 
after he was hit.  And then eventually, he fell."  The defendant 
became "like excited[,] like hype about it." 
 
Following these conversations with the defendant, Holden 
was incarcerated in connection with the robbery she committed 
with Austin.  While incarcerated, she received two letters from 
the defendant.14  The first stated, "[Y]ou know that loyalty is 
my main thing before anything else, and you cannot say that I 
wasn't loyal to you and [Austin] in my hood."15  Holden 
understood the statement as a command that she be loyal to him.  
The letter said, "Now, do I want your head on my trophy wall, 
ha, ha,"16 and "if we don't start back over again and break my 
 
13 During the armed robberies that Holden and the defendant 
committed together, the defendant used a knife. 
 
14 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) recovered from the first 
letter's envelope's seal matched the defendant's DNA profile.  
The letter referenced the defendant's and Holden's first meeting 
at a bar; that Holden "took a blade for [him]" in a robbery, see 
note 9, supra; and a black eye that the defendant apparently 
gave Holden.  These references indicated to Holden that the 
letter was from the defendant. 
 
 
15 Based on our review of the letter, we note that although 
the trial transcript quoted the letter as stating "in my hood," 
the letter itself stated "and my hood." 
 
16 The letter itself stated "hah," not "ha, ha." 
13 
 
heart again, see what will happen."  Holden understood these 
comments as a "blatant threat."  In another section, the 
defendant wrote, "[Y]ou know my style what I do when I am pissed 
off," which Holden understood to refer to "the extreme measures 
he goes to when he's mad," and that "[h]e doesn't have a problem 
killing anybody."  The letter was marked with two cigarette burn 
holes, which she understood to represent bullet holes. 
 
The second letter was a "kite," a correspondence passed 
from the defendant to Holden's cell mate, who saw him in court.  
It said, "[L]oyalty please, don't rat on me," which Holden 
understood to refer to the shooting.  This letter also said, "I 
remember your parents' name and address, N and M, think of your 
daughter," which Holden understood as "definitely a threat." 
 
At trial, the defense was that Holden was not credible and 
that, without her testimony, there was no other evidence tying 
the defendant to the shooting of the victim. 
 
b.  Prior proceedings.  The defendant was indicted on 
charges of murder in the first degree, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 1; carrying a firearm without a license, in violation 
of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); and intimidating a witness, in 
violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B.  As more fully discussed 
infra, trial counsel sought a continuance approximately one week 
before the trial was scheduled to commence to locate a defense 
14 
 
witness.  The judge denied the motion, and the trial commenced 
as scheduled in January 2015. 
 
The jury returned verdicts finding the defendant guilty on 
all the indictments.17  The defendant received the mandatory life 
sentence on the indictment charging murder in the first degree, 
a concurrent sentence of from four to five years on the firearm 
indictment, and a sentence of from five to seven years on the 
witness intimidation indictment beginning after his life 
sentence.  The defendant's timely appeal was stayed to permit 
him to file a motion for a new trial.  We remanded the motion to 
the judge, who denied it after holding a nonevidentiary hearing.  
The defendant's timely appeal from the denial of his motion for 
a new trial was consolidated with his direct appeal. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant contends that the judge made 
evidentiary errors in allowing admission of certain testimony, 
that the judge erred in denying his request for a continuance 
and his motion for a new trial, that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance, and that we should revisit our corpus 
delicti rule to adopt the Federal standard.  In addition, the 
defendant asks us to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
 
17 As stated, the jury found the defendant guilty of murder 
in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
15 
 
§ 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt.  We address each 
contention in turn. 
a.  Evidentiary objections.  We review a judge's 
evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 414 (2020); Commonwealth 
v. Bishop, 461 Mass. 586, 596 (2012).  On appeal, the defendant 
maintains that the judge improperly allowed admission of 
evidence concerning the defendant's possession of and access to 
firearms and ammunition unrelated to the firearm used to kill 
the victim and permitted testimony and argument suggesting 
witnesses feared the defendant.  Both types of evidence, the 
defendant asserts, suggested he engaged in uncharged misconduct, 
were unfairly prejudicial, and require a new trial. 
i.  Admission of firearm and ammunition access.  Over the 
defendant's objection, the judge permitted the admission of 
excerpts of video footage, which was captured four days before 
the shooting by a body camera worn by a confidential informant 
who was working with Special Agent Robert White of the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in connection with a 
separate Federal investigation.18  The footage showed the 
defendant together with Austin on Creston Street.  White, who 
 
18 When this evidence was admitted, the judge instructed the 
jury that the fact that the agent was conducting a separate 
investigation "is being used for a very limited purpose and that 
is . . . to explain to you why that video came about." 
16 
 
had listened to live audio feed captured at the time the footage 
was created, testified to the defendant's statements that he had 
access to certain firearms and ammunition.  Specifically, four 
days before the shooting, the defendant claimed to be in 
possession of .22 caliber ammunition.  In a second conversation, 
which White heard in June (after the shooting), the defendant 
claimed to possess twelve-gauge shotgun ammunition, .40 caliber 
ammunition, and a .22 caliber handgun and ammunition, and to 
have access to additional weapons.  The defendant contends that 
because none of the evidence concerned the weapon or type of 
ammunition used in the shooting (.25 caliber), it was 
irrelevant, serving only to suggest his propensity to commit 
gun-related violence. 
Evidence of a defendant's uncharged criminal acts or other 
misbehaviors is inadmissible "for the purposes of showing [the 
defendant's] bad character or propensity to commit the crime[s] 
charged."  Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 (1986).  
See Commonwealth v. Woollam, 478 Mass. 493, 500 (2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1579 (2018); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 475 Mass. 
775, 783 (2016).  Such evidence, however, may be admissible if 
it is relevant for other purposes.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 532 (2017) (evidence of prior gun theft 
admissible to show defendant had "means of committing the crime" 
charged [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455 Mass. 
17 
 
307, 322-323 (2009) (evidence of defendant's access to guns 
admissible to show familiarity with firearms); Commonwealth v. 
Mullane, 445 Mass. 702, 709-710 (2006) (evidence of prior 
investigation into similar criminal activity admissible to show 
pattern or method of operation). 
Even where such evidence is relevant for other purposes, 
such as to show the defendant's familiarity with and access to 
firearms, see Andre, 484 Mass. at 414, it is inadmissible if 
"its probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant," Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 
228, 249 n.27 (2014) (clarifying that "'other bad acts' evidence 
is inadmissible where its probative value is outweighed by the 
risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, even if not 
substantially outweighed by that risk").19 
In determining whether to admit other bad acts evidence, 
the judge must consider the precise manner in which the evidence 
is relevant and material to the facts of the particular case, as 
well as the risk that the jury will ignore a limiting 
instruction and make the prohibited character propensity 
inference.  Andre, 484 Mass. at 415 (noting this risk is at "its 
zenith in an identification case because the jury may 
incorrectly infer that if the defendant possessed a firearm 
 
19 The defendant's trial took place after our decision in 
Crayton. 
18 
 
previously [or subsequently], he is probably the person who 
committed the crime charged").  The judge should be particularly 
cautious where, as here, the prior bad acts evidence concerns 
firearm-related evidence used to show the defendant's access to 
weapons but does not concern the weapon used in the commission 
of the crime being tried.  Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 
575, 585 (2018).  Once the judge weighs these competing 
considerations, "it is then within the judge's discretion to 
determine whether the probative value of the firearms-related 
evidence is outweighed by the risk of prejudicial effect on the 
defendant."  Andre, supra. 
The judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting the 
evidence, which was relevant not only to establish that the 
defendant was familiar with and had access to firearms, but 
also, as the judge instructed the jury, to show that the 
defendant was familiar with Creston Street, where the shooting 
occurred, and with Austin (from whom the victim allegedly stole 
drugs the night before).  The defendant previously had denied 
any familiarity with the area and disclaimed any association 
with Austin in a custodial interrogation with police 
investigators concerning the shooting.20  Further, the judge 
 
20 The defendant was in custody on different charges at the 
time; he was read his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), signed a form indicating he understood those rights, 
and agreed to speak to the officers. 
19 
 
provided a contemporaneous limiting instruction with the 
testimony to tell the jury to use the evidence, if at all, for 
the limited purpose of inferring the defendant's familiarity 
with the location and with certain individuals.21  The judge also 
provided a limiting instruction in the final jury 
instructions.22,23 
ii.  Admission of evidence regarding witnesses' fear.  The 
defendant also contends that the judge erred by permitting 
Slayden and Peters to testify about their hesitance to come 
forward as witnesses.  Following an exchange on direct 
examination, during which Slayden testified that he could not 
recall whether he had reported to an investigating officer that 
 
21 The contemporaneous instruction stated:  "Members of the 
jury you've heard evidence from this witness about an 
investigation that he was conducting.  That evidence is being 
used for a very limited purpose and that is only, if you accept 
it, that to explain to you why that video came about.  And it's 
relevant only insofar as you may take it if you accept it that 
as to [the defendant's] alleged familiarity with certain 
locations that have been mentioned during the trial and with 
certain individual that have been mentioned during the trial.  
So, other than that you are not to concern yourself or consider 
it in any other way that I have just told you." 
 
22 The instruction stated in part:  "[Y]ou may consider 
[this evidence] solely on the limited issues of the defendant's 
pattern of operation, intent, motive, course of conduct and 
knowledge, as well as the nature of his relationship with Hilary 
Holden, James Austin and Earl Smith.  You may not consider this 
evidence for any other purpose." 
 
23 For these reasons, we also reject the defendant's 
contention that admitting this testimony violated due process.  
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). 
20 
 
he saw a person he knew as "Wizz," the defendant's nickname, on 
Creston Street the day of the shooting, the prosecutor asked 
Slayden whether he was "concerned about his [incarcerated son's] 
welfare."  Slayden testified, "Yes, I'm concerned about his 
welfare."  Subsequently, the investigating officer testified 
that Slayden had "requested confidentiality" in agreeing to 
provide information regarding the shooting; the officer 
suggested they meet in the rear of a grocery store.  The officer 
testified that, at that time, Slayden had reported that he had 
seen Wizz on the day of the shooting on Creston Street.  During 
closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 
"You can't really blame [Slayden] for trying to disavow 
[his identification of the defendant] here.  All of you 
stood on [Slayden's] porch [on] Creston Street.  You took 
note of the view up and down the street.  He's got to live 
there.  You were there for a minute.  His son's in jail.  
He's concerned about him.  Protective of his son." 
 
The defendant did not object to the testimony or argument. 
Peters testified that after she saw the victim collapse, 
she retrieved her cell phone to call 911 but determined not to 
do so when the defendant gave her an "ill grill," or a "weird 
look like you better not do it."  She further testified that her 
roommate requested that the investigating detective meet her on 
a street other than Creston Street.  In closing argument, the 
prosecutor stated that Peters was "also scared" and "[m]et the 
detectives later a block away so she wouldn't be seen going off 
21 
 
with them to Headquarters."  Again, the defendant did not object 
to the testimony24 or argument. 
On appeal, the defendant argues that admitting the evidence 
concerning the witnesses' fear was particularly inflammatory 
given that he was charged with witness intimidation.  Certainly, 
in determining whether to admit evidence concerning a witness's 
fear to come forward, a judge must consider the probative value 
of the evidence as well as its potential prejudicial effect.  
Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2021).  Here, the judge did not abuse her 
discretion. 
"Generally, questions regarding a witness's fear of 
testifying, whether caused by the defendant or not, are 
allowable in the judge's discretion."  Commonwealth v. Auguste, 
418 Mass. 643, 647 (1994).  "[E]ven where . . . the alleged 
other bad act evidence is similar to that with which the 
defendant is charged, the determination regarding admissibility 
is left to a case-by-case determination."  Commonwealth v. Hall, 
66 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 395 (2006).  The evidence with regard to 
Slayden was relevant to explain his hesitance to testify about 
what he saw the day of the shooting.  Auguste, supra.  See 
Commonwealth v. Errington, 390 Mass. 875, 880 (1984) ("A witness 
who has been impeached by a prior inconsistent statement may 
 
24 When the prosecutor asked Peters why the roommate had 
made this suggestion, trial counsel's objection was sustained. 
22 
 
explain why he has made inconsistent statements").  Similarly, 
the testimony regarding the defendant's "ill grill" was relevant 
to Peters's reasons for not calling 911 on the day of the 
shooting and questions regarding Peters's roommate's request 
were relevant to Peters's hesitance to come forward.25  See 
Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 631 (2017) (allowing 
witness to explain earlier hesitance to testify "to respond to 
an obvious avenue of attack on the witness's credibility").  
Compare Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 430 Mass. 529, 539-540 & nn.6-
7 (1999) (concluding it was erroneous to admit witnesses' 
testimony "about their own feelings regarding the defendant's 
presence," including that "there would be trouble" and that 
"there was bad vibes," because there was no relevance to that 
case or charges against defendant).26 
b.  Denial of continuance.  Six days before the trial was 
scheduled to begin, the defendant moved to continue the trial to 
permit him additional time to try to locate Elaine Bell, a 
former inmate in the same facility as Holden who had come 
forward with information that Holden's testimony was fabricated 
 
25 The officer who interviewed Peters testified that she was 
"very nervous" to talk to the officer during the interview. 
 
26 For these reasons, the evidence did not violate due 
process.  See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825; Darden v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 168, 181-182 (1986). 
23 
 
to obtain favor with the prosecution.27  The defendant intended 
to call Bell to impeach Holden.  A few weeks before trial, in 
late 2014, however, defense counsel learned that Bell had been 
released from custody.  He asked a private investigator to try 
to locate her.  Because she was a registered sex offender, both 
thought her location would be readily ascertainable.  While the 
investigator learned Bell might be living in either North or 
South Carolina, the telephone numbers connected to her were not 
in service, and he was unable to find her prior to trial.  The 
judge denied the motion. 
On appeal, the defendant contends that the judge abused her 
discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Super, 431 Mass. 492, 496 
(2000).  When considering whether to grant a continuance, the 
judge should consider "the movant's need for additional time 
against the possible inconvenience, increased costs, and 
prejudice which may be incurred by the opposing party" along 
with "the interest of the judicial system in avoiding delays 
which would not measurably contribute to the resolution of a 
particular controversy."  Commonwealth v. Gilchrest, 364 Mass. 
 
27 Specifically, Bell had written a letter to the Suffolk 
County sheriff's investigative division that stated: 
 
"I Elaine Marie Bell over heard [sic] Miss Hilary Holden 
. . . [say] that she had blame [sic] some kid for a murder 
and was telling it so the D.A. made a deal with her to put 
her back in M.C.I. Framingham so Miss Holden could be back 
with her girlfriend (gross).  Thank you for reading this." 
24 
 
272, 276-277 (1973).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 10 (a) (2), 378 
Mass. 861 (1979) (listing considerations in determining whether 
to allow continuance of trial). 
The judge did not abuse her discretion.  Bell's anticipated 
testimony would have served to impeach Holden, on the basis that 
Holden was fabricating her testimony against the defendant to 
obtain favor.  This suggestion, however, could be (and was) 
explored amply during the trial through evidence and cross-
examination regarding Holden's criminal record28 and her 
relationship with Austin and the defendant, including Holden's 
own admission that she would do anything to get Austin out of 
jail, as well as the deal she made with the prosecution for 
leniency; indeed, evidence was elicited that Holden had 
fabricated information implicating the defendant in a robbery to 
assist Austin.29  See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 456 Mass. 741, 748 
(2010) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying continuance 
where delay would not "measurably contribute to the resolution 
of the case" [citation omitted]); Gilchrest, 364 Mass. at 277 
 
28 Additionally, cross-examination elicited testimony about 
the extensive number of disciplinary reports (between seventy-
five and one hundred, or maybe more) that Holden incurred while 
incarcerated at various facilities. 
 
29 Specifically, Holden lied to police about her accomplice 
in a robbery, falsely implicating the defendant (who was 
incarcerated at the time of the robbery) to protect Austin, her 
then boyfriend. 
25 
 
(finding it not arbitrary to deny continuance where continuance 
"would result in a delay but not in the introduction of any 
significantly new evidence").  More significantly, as the judge 
found, there was no indication at the time of the motion that 
Bell could be found even if a continuance were allowed.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Clark, 454 Mass. 1001, 1002 & n.3 (2009) 
(finding abuse of discretion in denying continuance where 
unavailable witness was, in fact, available and would 
participate at set future time).30 
c.  Denial of motion for a new trial.  The defendant also 
maintains that the judge erred in denying his motion for a new 
trial based on "newly discovered" or "newly available" evidence 
from Bell, whom the defendant was able to locate years after his 
conviction.  The standard of review for denial of a motion for a 
new trial is abuse of discretion or other error of law.  
Commonwealth v. Brown, 470 Mass. 595, 602 (2015).  "In a motion 
for a new trial based on new evidence, the defendant must show 
that the evidence is either 'newly discovered' or 'newly 
available' and that it 'casts real doubt' on the justice of the 
defendant's conviction" (footnote omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
 
30 For these same reasons, we reject the defendant's 
contention that the denial of the motion violated his 
constitutional right to present a defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Miles, 420 Mass. 67, 85-86 (1995); Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 
371 Mass. 46, 51 (1976). 
26 
 
Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340, 350 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. 
Cintron, 435 Mass. 509, 516 (2001), overruled on another ground 
by Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 230, 241 (2009) ("The 
standard applied to a motion for a new trial based on newly 
available evidence is the same as applied to one based on newly 
discovered evidence"). 
A defendant must demonstrate that the evidence is (1) newly 
discovered (or newly available) and (2) credible and material 
and that (3) the evidence casts real doubt on the justice of the 
conviction.  Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 486 Mass. 617, 640 
(2021).  Assuming arguendo that Bell's testimony does, in fact, 
comprise "newly available" evidence31 because, despite trial 
counsel's efforts, she could not be located at the time of the 
trial, the defendant has not shown that the evidence "casts real 
doubt on the justice of the conviction."  Commonwealth v. 
Cameron, 473 Mass. 100, 104-105 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305 (1986).  "The inquiry is not 'whether 
the verdict would have been different, but rather whether the 
new evidence would probably have been a real factor in the 
 
31 Bell's testimony is not "newly discovered," which 
requires the evidence to have been "unknown to the defendant or 
his counsel and not reasonably discoverable by them at the time 
of trial."  Commonwealth v. Raymond, 450 Mass. 729, 733 n.6 
(2008).  See Teixeira, 486 Mass. at 640.  The defendant knew 
about Bell and the evidence she might provide months before 
trial.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 306 
(1986). 
27 
 
jury's deliberations.'"  Cameron, supra at 105, quoting Grace, 
supra at 306. 
Bell's anticipated testimony would have been employed to 
impeach Holden.  While Holden was a key witness for the 
prosecution, the trial record already included substantial 
impeachment evidence, as discussed supra.32  Moreover, Bell 
herself would have been subject to credibility issues, as she 
also had been incarcerated and was a registered sex offender.  
See Cintron, 435 Mass. at 517-518 (upholding denial of new trial 
based on "newly available evidence" where "evidence [defendant] 
sought to admit was cumulative and not credible").33 
 
32 The judge instructed the jury:  "You also may consider 
[the witness's] motive for testifying, whether he or she 
displays any bias in testifying and whether or not he or she has 
any interest in the outcome of the case."  With respect to 
Holden in particular, the judge specifically instructed the jury 
to "examine Ms. Holden's credibility with particular care," and 
that they "may consider [the cooperation agreement] and any 
hopes Ms. Holden may have as to future advantages from the 
prosecution in evaluating her credibility along with all other 
factors I have already mentioned."  See Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 478 Mass. 725, 745 (2018), citing Commonwealth v. 
Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 266 (1989) (requiring such instruction 
when witness testifies under cooperation agreement).  The judge 
also instructed the jury that they "should also consider the 
fact that the Commonwealth does not know whether Ms. Holden is 
telling the truth."  See Fernandes, supra. 
 
33 For these same reasons, the judge did not abuse her 
discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on the 
defendant's motion.  See Commonwealth v. Marrero, 459 Mass. 235, 
240 (2011), quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing 
in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001) (judge may rule on motion for new trial 
"without an evidentiary hearing, 'if no substantial issue is 
raised by the motion or affidavits'"). 
28 
 
d.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
contends that he is entitled to a new trial because he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's 
inability to secure Bell's availability at trial.  Because the 
"statutory standard of § 33E is more favorable to a defendant 
than is the constitutional standard for determining the 
ineffectiveness of counsel," Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 
291, 316 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 
682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014), we analyze this claim 
"under the rubric of § 33E 'to determine whether there exists a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice,'" 
Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 409 (2017), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Frank, 433 Mass. 185, 187 (2001). 
The record does not support the defendant's argument.  
Trial counsel diligently searched for Bell, employing a private 
investigator weeks before trial to try to locate her.  Trial 
counsel reasonably believed Bell, who was a registered sex 
offender, could be located readily.  When these efforts proved 
fruitless, he filed a motion for continuance one week before 
trial was set to begin.  Moreover, as discussed supra, Bell's 
absence at trial did not result in a "substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice."  Facella, 478 Mass. at 409.  Trial 
counsel was able to impeach Holden using the available evidence. 
29 
 
e.  Corpus delicti.  The corpus delicti rule requires 
evidence, besides a confession, that the "crime was real and not 
imaginary."  Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 458 (1984).  
In a homicide case, the rule is satisfied by evidence that the 
alleged victim is dead.34  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Burgos, 470 
Mass. 133, 147 (2014).  The defendant asks us to revisit the 
rule to require, in addition, that there be "substantial 
independent evidence which would tend to establish the 
trustworthiness of the statement," which is the Federal 
standard.  United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 
2006), quoting United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 354 (2d 
Cir. 2000).  In Burgos, supra, we expressly declined to adopt 
that standard, and we see no reason to revisit our decision in 
the circumstances of the present case. 
f.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a review of 
the entire record, we discern no error warranting relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed. 
 
34 The necessary corroboration under the corpus delicti rule 
is present here because "[t]he victim in this case was clearly 
killed as a result of multiple gunshot wounds.  There is 
therefore no issue whether the crime of murder occurred."  
Commonwealth v. Burgos, 470 Mass. 133, 147 (2014).