Title: State v. Moore

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2015 WI 54 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP127-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Raheem Moore, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 675, 846 N.W.2d 18) 
(Ct. App. 2014 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2014 WI App 19 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 16, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 23, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
David Borowski 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J., ROGGENSACK C.J., concur. (Opinion 
Filed.) 
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, BRADLEY, JJ. Dissent. (Opinion 
Filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Eileen A. Hirsch. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Keith A. Findley, 
Wisconsin Innocence Project, Frank J. Remington Center at the 
University of Wisconsin Law School, and Steven A. Drizin, Laura 
H. Nirider, and Northwestern University School of Law, on behalf 
of the Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 WI 54
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2013AP127-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2008CF5160) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Raheem Moore, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals,1 which affirmed a judgment 
convicting Raheem D. Moore (Moore) of second-degree reckless 
homicide as party to a crime.2  Moore pled guilty to the charge 
                                                 
1 State v. Moore, 2014 WI App 19, 352 Wis. 2d 675, 846 
N.W.2d 18. 
2 Contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.06(1) and 939.05.  All 
subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
2 
 
after the Milwaukee County Circuit Court denied his motion to 
suppress certain statements he made during police questioning.3 
¶2 
This case presents issues related to our decision in 
State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 
N.W.2d 110, and the Wisconsin Legislature's subsequent enactment 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.195, 
which 
requires 
that 
custodial 
interrogation of juveniles be recorded except under limited 
circumstances.  Moore contends that his confession to police was 
involuntary.  Alternatively, he contends that the incriminating 
statements he made that were not recorded during his custodial 
interrogation as a juvenile were inadmissible because he did not 
"refus[e] to respond or cooperate" with detectives as required 
by an exception to the recording statute.  Accordingly, he 
requests that he be allowed to withdraw his plea. 
¶3 
Moore, then 15 years old, was arrested on October 10, 
2008, after being implicated in a Milwaukee homicide.  Police 
detectives questioned Moore for approximately five and a half 
hours over a period of nine hours from 2:49 p.m. until 11:44 
p.m. 
¶4 
On two occasions during this questioning, Moore asked 
the 
detectives 
to 
turn 
off 
the 
device 
recording 
his 
interrogation.  After the detectives complied with Moore's 
second request, he confessed to being the shooter in the 
                                                 
3 Judge David L. Borowski presided over the plea hearing and 
entered judgment.  Judge Jeffrey A. Conen presided over the 
motion to suppress hearing. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
3 
 
homicide.  Thereafter, the detectives covertly recorded Moore 
reaffirming his confession. 
¶5 
Moore was initially charged with first-degree reckless 
homicide.  The circuit court held a Miranda4/Goodchild5 hearing 
to review the voluntariness of Moore's statements made while the 
recording device was turned off as well as the voluntariness of 
his later statements that were covertly recorded.6  The circuit 
court determined that Moore had voluntarily waived his Miranda 
rights and was intelligent enough to request that the recording 
device be turned off.  Thus, Moore's statements were not 
suppressed.  Following this ruling, the State amended the charge 
to second-degree reckless homicide as party to a crime.  Moore 
pled guilty to the amended charge and was sentenced to 11 years 
of initial confinement and nine years of extended supervision. 
¶6 
Moore appealed the circuit court's decision on the 
admissibility of his statements.  The court of appeals ruled 
Moore's statements were voluntary.  It also concluded that Moore 
refused to cooperate with the detectives, which permitted them 
to turn off the recording device. 
¶7 
Moore successfully petitioned this court for review. 
                                                 
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5 State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 
N.W.2d 753 (1965). 
6 Moore does not contend that the statements he made prior 
to 10:42 p.m.——the time at which the recorder was deliberately 
turned off——were involuntary. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
4 
 
¶8 
We 
agree 
with 
the 
circuit 
court 
that 
Moore's 
statements were voluntary.  However, we conclude that Moore did 
not "refus[e] to respond or cooperate" with police during his 
interrogation.  Consequently, it was a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.195 for police to cease recording the interrogation. 
¶9 
Nevertheless, the error, if any, in not suppressing 
some of Moore's statements, was harmless.  Moore admitted to 
participating in the crime prior to the recording device being 
turned off, and he repeated his unrecorded confession that he 
was 
the 
shooter 
after 
the 
device 
was 
turned 
back 
on.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶10 Police responded to a reported homicide at 2626 North 
23rd Street in Milwaukee at approximately 9:26 p.m. on October 
8, 2008.  When officers arrived, they found James W. Parish 
(Parish) face down on the sidewalk.  He was pronounced dead at 
the scene.  An autopsy revealed that Parish was shot in his 
right flank, the bullet remained in his heart, and loss of blood 
from the gunshot wound caused his death. 
¶11 Milwaukee 
Police 
Detective 
Christopher 
Blaszak 
interviewed Ronald Franklin (Ronald) on October 10, 2008.  
Ronald said that Moore came to his girlfriend's residence with 
Ronald's 
brother, 
Raynard 
Franklin 
(Raynard), 
after 
the 
shooting.  According to Ronald, Moore told him that he and 
Raynard had attempted to rob a victim and that Moore shot the 
victim when he became uncooperative. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
5 
 
¶12 Moore was arrested shortly after 12:00 p.m. that day 
and was questioned by two pairs of police detectives.  The first 
pair, Scott Gastrow and Charles Mueller, began their questioning 
at 2:49 p.m.  The second pair, Paul Lough and David Salazar, 
took 
over 
the 
interrogation 
at 
about 
8:30 
p.m. 
 
The 
interrogations were audio recorded, with the exception of the 
brief periods discussed below. 
A. 2:49 p.m. 
¶13 Moore's interrogation took place on the fourth floor 
of the Criminal Investigation Bureau in Milwaukee.  When 
Detectives Gastrow and Mueller began their questioning of Moore, 
they asked him basic questions about where he lived, his family, 
and his personal background, including his age, criminal 
history,7 and education.8  Detective Gastrow also asked Moore 
whether he had any mental or learning problems.  Moore answered 
                                                 
7 Moore told the Detectives that he had been arrested 
previously 
for 
possession 
of 
marijuana, 
possession 
of 
a 
dangerous weapon, and forgery. 
8 During this early questioning, the detectives asked Moore 
for his father's phone number and address, which Moore supplied.  
They also asked Moore about his mother.  Moore indicated his 
mother was at Community Corrections for a drug addiction 
problem.  Detectives also asked Moore whom they should contact 
in case of an emergency.  Moore listed his father and aunt. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
6 
 
that he did not have mental problems and that he coped with his 
learning problems.9 
¶14 Detectives Gastrow and Mueller furnished Moore with a 
written copy of his Miranda rights.  They read him his rights 
one at a time and stopped to ask him if he understood each 
right.  During this colloquy, Detective Gastrow also asked Moore 
to explain the right to end questioning without a lawyer.  Moore 
stated, "That mean like, if I'm talking to you all, then I don't 
want to say no more, I can just, um, don't say nothing."10 
¶15 After the detectives read Moore his Miranda rights, he 
agreed to talk to them.  The detectives asked Moore about what 
happened on October 8. 
¶16 Initially, Moore told the detectives that he was not 
involved in the shooting.  He told them that he had been on 
Ronald's girlfriend's porch at the time of the shooting.  When 
the detectives told Moore that witnesses said otherwise, Moore 
changed his story and said that he had been walking near the 
porch with three friends when he heard the gunshot.  Again, the 
                                                 
9 Doctor 
David 
W. 
Thompson 
(Dr. 
Thompson), 
a 
child 
psychologist, 
testified 
on 
Moore's 
behalf 
at 
the 
Miranda/Goodchild hearing.  Dr. Thompson was concerned with 
Moore's confession based on his age, functionally low IQ, and 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.  Moore's IQ tests 
indicated he was in a "borderline range of intellectual 
functioning." 
10 Detective Gastrow testified at a later hearing that Moore 
appeared to understand his Miranda rights. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
7 
 
detectives challenged Moore's story, but Moore insisted that he 
was not involved in the shooting. 
¶17 The detectives showed Moore a photo array that 
included both Ronald and Raynard Franklin and asked Moore who 
"Jevonte" was.11  Moore identified Ronald, but indicated that he 
did not know Raynard.  Moore also said that he knew someone 
named Jevonte, but did not see him pictured in the array. 
¶18 The detectives took a break from the interrogation at 
4:02 p.m.  They allowed Moore to use the restroom and provided 
him with bologna sandwiches, a bag of chips, and water.  The 
break ended at 4:30 p.m. 
¶19 After the break, Moore admitted some involvement in 
Parish's death.  Moore said he was with someone named Jevonte, 
but that Jevonte was not in the photo array he had been shown.  
Moore claimed that Jevonte shot Parish after robbing him, but 
that Moore was "just part of it" as a "party to a crime."  Moore 
said he was supposed to get some of the money from the robbery. 
¶20 Moore provided the detectives with a detailed story of 
the shooting, including the location, his position at the scene, 
the type of gun used, and the fact that the victim was 
purchasing drugs from the back window of a house.  He stated 
                                                 
11 Moore was arrested after police interviewed Ronald 
Franklin.  The record is not clear whether the detectives 
obtained the name "Jevonte" from some source like Franklin, or 
whether the detectives hypothesized the name as a technique in 
interrogation.  See  ¶¶31, 34, infra. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
8 
 
that the robbery had been Jevonte's idea and that Jevonte had 
provided the gun. 
¶21 Moore said that, although he did not see Jevonte fire 
the gun, he did see the flash of the gun when Jevonte fired it.  
He stated that after the gunshot, he and Jevonte fled the scene.  
According to Moore, he met up with Jevonte a short time later, 
then went to Ronald's girlfriend's house. 
¶22 Moore also provided specific details about Jevonte, 
saying that he was 15 or 16 years old12 and five feet ten inches 
tall with a medium build.  However, Moore could not provide the 
detectives with Jevonte's last name, where he lived, what school 
he went to, whether he had brothers, his mother's name, or his 
phone number. 
¶23 Moore admitted that his earlier stories were lies.  
Still, the detectives challenged Moore's new story, suggesting——
among other things——that Moore could not have seen the flash of 
the gun from where he claimed to have been standing.  The 
detectives also told Moore that Ronald and others had named 
someone else as the shooter; Moore told them that Ronald and the 
others did not know Jevonte. 
                                                 
12 Later, Moore stated that Jevonte was 18 or 19 years old. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
9 
 
¶24 The recording ceased at approximately 5:15 p.m. due to 
a malfunction.13  Detectives Gastrow and Mueller ended their 
questioning at approximately 6:00 p.m. 
B. 8:28 p.m. 
¶25 Detectives David Salazar and Paul Lough began to 
question Moore at 8:28 p.m.  Detective Salazar asked Moore 
whether he would be willing to go to the crime scene with them, 
and Moore agreed.  Detective Salazar read Moore his Miranda 
rights again and Moore indicated he understood. 
¶26 At approximately 8:39 p.m., Moore and the detectives 
left for the crime scene.  Detective Salazar sat in the back 
seat of a police vehicle with Moore, and Detective Lough drove. 
¶27 Moore directed them to the crime scene.  During the 
drive, Detective Salazar asked Moore about school, his favorite 
classes, and potential career paths after high school.  When 
they arrived at the scene, Moore explained his story of what 
happened.  Moore said that Parish had walked down an alley and 
crossed a gangway.  Moore stated he was at the mouth of the 
alley while Jevonte was in the yard near Parish.  According to 
Moore, Jevonte called to Parish, telling him that "somebody 
wanted him at the window" of the house where Parish had 
purchased drugs.  Moore said that Jevonte then shot Parish. 
                                                 
13 At the suppression hearing, the parties agreed that 
"malfunctions happen from time to time, it was not done 
purposefully and was not actually known until after the fact."  
Moore does not suggest that the malfunction implicates the 
admissibility of his statements. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
10 
 
¶28 After the shooting, Moore said, they ran west down the 
alley and crossed 23rd Street and made it to 24th Street.  
Eventually, Moore and Jevonte separated.  Moore went to Ronald's 
girlfriend's house, while Jevonte went home. 
¶29 Detective Salazar asked Moore why people in the 
neighborhood did not know Jevonte.  Moore suggested that those 
people were lying.  Detective Salazar pointed out that Moore's 
father also said he never met Jevonte, which Moore said was 
probably true.14 
¶30 Moore 
was 
given 
time 
to 
eat 
dinner 
under 
the 
supervision of police officers.  The interrogation resumed at 
9:47 p.m. 
¶31 Detective Salazar told Moore that police knew Jevonte 
was not real and that Moore had already been identified as being 
at the crime scene.  Moore responded that he was worried the 
other person involved "might try to kill [him] or something."  
Detective Salazar assured Moore that no one would kill him. 
¶32 At this point, Moore asked that the recorder be turned 
off: 
MOORE: 
Ah you mind take that thing off. 
SALAZAR: What thing off? 
MOORE: 
Ah what you call it? 
                                                 
14 Although Moore had provided his father's phone number 
earlier in the day, it is unclear whether or to what extent 
police actually contacted him. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
11 
 
SALAZAR: The recorder?  Well the reason why we don't 
want the recorder turned off [is] because we don't 
want somebody . . . coming in here and saying that we 
beat you.  Okay.  You know what I mean?  That we 
did . . . any misconduct.  You know what I'm saying?  
You know how in the movies where they take the phone 
book out and beat people?  Okay. . . .  You've seen 
the movies[,] right[?] 
LOUGH: 
Are you worried we would play that for him? 
MOORE: 
Hmmm. 
LOUGH: 
No.  We don't do that.  Okay. 
SALAZAR: Okay.  That recorder's there mainly for my 
protection and my partner's protection.  Now if you 
want it turned off because you asked for it, I will 
turn it off.  But I just wanted to explain to you why 
it's on. 
MOORE: 
Hmm. 
SALAZAR: Okay.  It's completely up to you.  But that 
is why it's there.  Okay. 
¶33 Despite Detective Salazar's invitation to turn off the 
recorder at Moore's request, Moore did not make that request.  
The 
detectives 
did 
not 
turn 
off 
the 
recorder, 
and 
the 
interrogation continued. 
¶34 Moore then told the detectives that Raynard was 
involved, not Jevonte.  Moore said he had gotten the name 
"Jevonte" from the detectives he spoke to earlier.  Moore said 
that Ronald threatened to kill him if he told police that 
Raynard was involved. 
¶35 Moore said that Raynard had the gun, and Moore 
conceded that he had held it on October 8 and 9.  Moore also 
admitted he was in the backyard of the house where Parish was 
purchasing drugs, but maintained that he left the backyard when 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
12 
 
Raynard called Parish back to the window.  Moore then changed 
his story again and admitted that he had called Parish back to 
the window.  Moore explained that Parish had come back to the 
window, then Parish ran and Raynard shot him.  Moore continued 
to deny that he shot Parish or had the gun. 
¶36 Detectives took a break and stopped the recording at 
10:07 p.m.  The interrogation and recording resumed at 10:20 
p.m. 
¶37 After the break, the detectives asked Moore to explain 
again how the events unfolded.  Moore again provided a detailed 
account.  He stated that he had lured Parish back to the window 
where Parish had just purchased drugs, but maintained that he 
had not fired the gun. 
¶38 Then Moore mentioned the recorder again: 
MOORE: 
What ah do you want ah like talk on there? 
SALAZAR: You want me to turn that off? 
MOORE: 
Yeah. 
SALAZAR: Just tell me why you want me to turn this 
off? 
MOORE: 
Cause I don't feel safe [INAUDIBLE] that. 
SALAZAR: Okay.  So you're asking me to turn it off.  
And you realize that we want to keep it on.  Right?  
Yes, no?  I need you to answer yes or no.  How's that? 
MOORE: 
Yes. 
SALAZAR: Okay. 
LOUGH: 
Who are you afraid of . . . ?  Us? 
MOORE: 
Uh huh. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
13 
 
LOUGH: 
Who then? 
MOORE: 
Raynard. 
LOUGH: 
Raynard?  Okay. 
SALAZAR: So you realize that we're not asking to turn 
it off?  Okay.  And we're not encouraging you to turn 
it off?  Is that right? 
MOORE: 
Mmm. 
SALAZAR: Yes or no? 
MOORE: 
Yes. 
SALAZAR: Okay.  The only reason you want us to turn 
it off is because it's your own choice?  Is that 
right?  Yes or no. 
MOORE: 
Yes. 
SALAZAR: Okay.  Any other things you need to put on 
this before I turn it off? 
LOUGH: 
No.  We're gonna turn it off at 10:42 PM. 
SALAZAR: And that's at his request.  Is that true? 
MOORE: 
Yes. 
¶39 At this time, the detectives turned off the recorder. 
C. 11:20 p.m. 
¶40 At 11:20 p.m., the recording resumed.  Detective 
Salazar began the recording by saying——outside the interrogation 
room——that Moore had just "admitted he was the shooter and that 
he didn't want Raynard to get in trouble for what he did and 
that he explained why he shot and how it made him feel and 
everything . . . ." 
 
Detective 
Salazar 
then 
concealed 
the 
recorder in an envelope and took it into the interrogation room. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
14 
 
¶41 On the recording, Moore indicated he was scared 
earlier and lied about not shooting Parish.  Moore explained 
that he shot Parish because "he moved too quick and stuff."  
Moore told the detectives he "didn't shoot to kill, [he] tried 
to hit him," and that he turned his head away when he shot. 
¶42 Moore said that he and Raynard ran away from Parish 
after the shooting and met at 24th Street.  At 24th Street, the 
two separated, Moore went to Ronald's girlfriend's house, and he 
told Ronald about what happened.  Moore said he returned the gun 
to Raynard later on October 8. 
¶43 The detectives asked Moore if he was telling the 
truth, and Moore replied that he was.  The recording ended at 
11:44 p.m.15 
D. Proceedings In Court 
¶44 On October 13, 2008, Moore was charged with first-
degree reckless homicide, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.02(1).  
On October 15, Moore's initial appearance was held before 
Circuit Court Commissioner Kevin Costello, who set cash bail at 
$100,000.  On December 1, a preliminary hearing was held in 
criminal court before Circuit Court Judge Glenn H. Yamahiro.  
                                                 
15 At no time during the interrogation did Moore request to 
speak to either of his parents. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
15 
 
Judge Yamahiro found probable cause for the charge and bound the 
case over for trial.16 
¶45 On December 10, 2010, a suppression hearing was held 
before 
Judge 
Jeffery 
Conen 
based 
on 
Jerrell 
C.J., 
283 
Wis. 2d 145, and Wis. Stat. § 938.195.  Detective Salazar 
testified about Moore's request to turn off the recording device 
during part of his interrogation because of Moore's fear of 
retaliation.  Detective Salazar explained that while the 
recorder was turned off, Moore told him that he shot Parish.  
After Moore's confession, they took a break, then covertly 
brought the recorder back into the interrogation room. 
¶46 On cross–examination, Detective Salazar indicated he 
was alone with Moore when he confessed.  After this confession, 
Detective 
Salazar 
spoke 
with 
his 
supervisor 
about 
the 
possibility of a covert recording, as the Department had not 
previously encountered such a situation.  Detective Salazar 
stated his rationale for making the covert recording: "I didn't 
want to be accused of all kinds of nonsense, to be honest with 
you." 
¶47 On January 24, 2011, Judge Conen found that the 
request to turn off the recorder came from the defendant, and 
"it came from the defendant twice."  "[A] reasonable person 
could view the actions and statements of Mr. Moore as a request 
                                                 
16 Between the December 1, 2008, preliminary hearing and the 
December 10, 2010, suppression hearing, there were multiple 
proceedings including an unsuccessful challenge to Moore's 
competency and an unsuccessful reverse waiver hearing. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
16 
 
to turn off the recording device before he wanted to go further 
with some discussion about certain aspects of the case." 
¶48 Judge Conen ruled that Moore's first request to turn 
off the recorder was not a refusal because Moore continued to 
talk.  He reasoned, however, that because Moore was making the 
request a second time, the detectives may have thought Moore 
would 
not 
answer 
their 
questions 
with 
the 
recorder 
on.  
Therefore, the court determined there was a proper refusal and 
denied Moore's suppression motion. 
¶49 On December 6, 2011, a plea hearing was held before 
Circuit Judge David Borowski after the State filed an amended 
information reducing the charge from first-degree reckless 
homicide to second-degree reckless homicide as party to a crime.  
Moore's plea agreement with the State was that there would be no 
presentence investigation, the victim's family would be allowed 
to speak at sentencing, the State would anticipate recommending 
a maximum prison term and restitution, the defendant would 
submit to the court's criminal jurisdiction, and the defendant 
would not seek alterations based on his juvenile status.  Moore 
pled guilty to the amended charge.  Judge Borowski accepted the 
plea, finding that it was freely, knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily given. 
¶50 On February 17, 2012, Judge Borowski sentenced Moore 
to 11 years of initial confinement and nine years of extended 
supervision.  The court also required Moore to pay restitution 
in the amount of $2,583.00.  Moore was credited with 1,226 days 
of presentence incarceration. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
17 
 
¶51 Moore appealed his conviction on grounds that his 
incriminating statements to police should have been suppressed.  
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, concluding that 
Moore refused to cooperate based on his two requests to turn off 
the recording device.  State v. Moore, 2014 WI App 19, ¶¶46–48, 
352 Wis. 2d 675, 846 N.W.2d 18.  The court also concluded that 
Moore's 
statements 
were 
voluntary 
based 
on 
his 
previous 
encounters with police, his ability to concoct the fake Jevonte 
story, and his ability to comprehend "party to a crime" 
liability.  Id., ¶32. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶52 We 
must 
determine 
the 
voluntariness 
of 
Moore's 
statements to police.  Whether Moore's statements were voluntary 
is a question of constitutional fact.  Our review of questions 
of constitutional fact follows a two-step analysis.  State v. 
Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶20, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 
(citing State v. Henderson, 2001 WI 97, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 345, 
629 N.W.2d 613).  First, we accept the circuit court's findings 
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Second, we 
independently apply constitutional principles to those facts.  
Id. 
¶53 This case also requires us to interpret Wisconsin 
statutes relating to recording the interrogation of juveniles.  
We interpret statutes de novo, without deference to the circuit 
court and court of appeals.  State v. Lindsey A.F., 2003 WI 63, 
¶8, 262 Wis. 2d 200, 663 N.W.2d 757 (citing State v. Setagord, 
211 Wis. 2d 397, 405–406, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997)). 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
18 
 
¶54 Finally, this case requires us to determine whether 
the error, if any, in the circuit court's decision not to 
suppress Moore's statements, was harmless.  Whether an error is 
harmless is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.  
Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶43, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816 
N.W.2d 191. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Voluntariness of Confession 
¶55 A 
defendant's 
confession 
must 
be 
voluntary; 
the 
State's use of an involuntary confession for purposes of 
prosecution violates the defendant's due process rights.  See 
Jerrell C.J., 283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶17; Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 
534, 540 (1961).  A defendant's confession is voluntary if it is 
"the product of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting 
deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of a 
conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures 
brought to bear on the defendant by representatives of the State 
exceeded the defendant's ability to resist."  State v. Lemoine, 
2013 WI 5, ¶17, 345 Wis. 2d 171, 827 N.W.2d 589 (citing State v. 
Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶36, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 407).  The 
government bears the burden of establishing——by a preponderance 
of the evidence——that a confession was voluntary.  State v. 
Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 179–80, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999) (citing 
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972)). 
¶56 Voluntariness is evaluated in light of all the 
circumstances surrounding interrogation and decided under a 
totality of the circumstances, weighing the suspect's personal 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
19 
 
characteristics17 against the actions of the police.  Lemoine, 
345 Wis. 2d 171, ¶18 (citing Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶38).  
"[I]n order to justify a finding of involuntariness, there must 
be some affirmative evidence of improper police practices 
deliberately used to procure a confession."  State v. Clappes, 
136 Wis. 2d 222, 239, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987).  In other words, a 
suspect's personal characteristics alone cannot form the basis 
for finding that the suspect's confessions, admissions, or 
statements are involuntary. 
¶57 We review police conduct for, among other things, "the 
length of questioning, general conditions or circumstances in 
which the statement was taken, whether any excessive physical or 
psychological pressure was used, and whether any inducements, 
threats, methods, or strategies were utilized in order to elicit 
a statement from the defendant."  State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, 
¶20, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236 (quoting State v. Davis, 
2008 WI 71, ¶37, 310 Wis. 2d 583, 751 N.W.2d 332).  The age of 
the suspect may affect how we view police tactics; "the younger 
the 
child 
the 
more 
carefully 
we 
will 
scrutinize 
police 
questioning tactics to determine if excessive coercion or 
intimidation or simple immaturity that would not affect an adult 
has tainted the juvenile's confession."  Jerrell C.J., 283 
                                                 
17 "The relevant personal characteristics of the defendant 
include 
the 
defendant's 
age, 
education 
and 
intelligence, 
physical and emotional condition, and prior experience with law 
enforcement."  State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶39, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 
661 N.W.2d 407 (citations omitted). 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
20 
 
Wis. 2d 145, ¶26 (quoting Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 765 
(7th Cir. 2002)).  When a suspect is a juvenile, "special 
caution" must be taken with the methods of interrogation used 
when "a parent, lawyer, or other friendly adult" is not present.  
Id., ¶21 (quoting Hardaway, 302 F.3d at 762). 
¶58 We begin, as the court of appeals did, with Moore's 
personal characteristics.  At the time of questioning, Moore was 
15 years old.  He attended eighth grade at Travis Academy in 
Milwaukee.  He indicated to police that he did not have any 
mental problems, had never attempted suicide, and coped with 
whatever learning problems he had.  When asked whether he was 
sick or under the influence of drugs or alcohol, Moore stated 
that he was not. 
¶59 Moore's answers in early questioning also indicated 
that he had a significant amount of prior police interaction.  
Moore told police that he had been arrested previously for 
possession of marijuana, forgery, and possession of a dangerous 
weapon.  Moore said he was on probation for the dangerous weapon 
charge and provided police with the name of his probation agent. 
¶60 Although Moore was only 15 years old at the time of 
his questioning, he had more experience with police and law 
enforcement than most people his age.  Moore demonstrated that 
he was able not only to develop a story about his non-
involvement in the shooting but also to adapt the details of 
that story to information——either true or untrue——possessed by 
the police.  For example, when detectives suggested that 
"Jevonte's" age did not make sense, Moore changed it from 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
21 
 
between 15 and 16 to between 18 and 19.  When they asked why 
nobody in the neighborhood knew "Jevonte," Moore said that those 
people either did not know him or were lying.  When detectives 
told Moore that he would not have been able to see the flash of 
the gun from where he claimed to be standing, he changed his 
supposed position at the crime scene. 
¶61 In sum, Moore's ability to concoct and modify a story 
"on the fly" suggests a level of sophistication and adaptability 
perhaps not accounted for by a standard IQ test.18  Thus, his 
below-average intellect "does not justify a conclusion that 
[his] mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to 
official coercion, should . . . dispose of the inquiry into 
constitutional 'voluntariness.'"  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 
157, 164 (1986).  Rather, it must be taken into consideration 
and weighed against the conduct of police. 
¶62 The tactics used by the detectives interrogating Moore 
do not suggest that his confession was involuntary.  Although 
Moore was with police for nearly 11 hours after his arrest, his 
interrogation took place over shorter periods of time with 
breaks for food, trips to the restroom and the crime scene, and 
a shift change.  Moore's actual questioning lasted about five 
and a half hours. 
                                                 
18 "IQ 
test 
scores 
are 
approximations 
of 
conceptual 
functioning, but may be insufficient to assess reasoning in 
real-life situations and mastery of practical tasks."  American 
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-V) 37 (5th ed. 2013). 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
22 
 
¶63 Additionally, Moore was read his Miranda rights at 
least twice.  Early on, Moore indicated to the detectives that 
he was aware of his Miranda rights and had read them two or 
three times in the past.  Nevertheless, the detectives informed 
Moore of each of his rights separately and waited for Moore to 
verify that he understood.  Moore also was furnished with a 
written copy of his rights as the warnings were read to him.  
Moore explained his right to end questioning to detectives. 
¶64 It is true that the detectives used tactics such as 
minimizing, suggesting that Parish's death may have been an 
accident, and telling Moore that other witnesses were saying he 
shot Parish, to elicit a confession from him.  Although these 
tactics may have influenced Moore, they are tactics that courts 
commonly accept.  E.g. State v. Triggs, 2003 WI App 91, ¶¶15–17, 
264 Wis. 2d 861, 663 N.W.2d 396 (citation omitted).  See also 2 
Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.2(c), at 629-36 
(3d ed. 2007). 
¶65 We conclude that Moore's confession was voluntary 
because the pressures placed on him by interrogation did not 
"excee[d his] ability to resist."  Lemoine, 345 Wis. 2d 171, 
¶17.  The detectives took care to ensure that Moore understood 
his Miranda rights.  They fed him, gave him water, took breaks, 
and treated him with decency and respect.  Moore's age and 
intellectual capacity, while significant, are not dispositive.  
Thus, although the detectives persuaded Moore to confess that he 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
23 
 
shot Parish, Moore's decision to do so was a voluntary 
decision.19 
B. Interpretation of Recording Statutes 
¶66 We now turn to the issue of whether, under the 
relevant Wisconsin statutes, Moore's questioning should have 
been recorded in its entirety.  We look to Wis. Stat. § 938.195 
to determine whether, and to what extent, the statutory 
protections that require the recording of juveniles apply here. 
¶67 This court held in Jerrell C.J. that a juvenile's 
custodial interrogation must be recorded.  Jerrell C.J., 283 
Wis. 2d 145, 
¶¶57–58. 
 
The 
court 
said: 
"All 
custodial 
interrogation 
of 
juveniles 
in 
future 
cases 
shall 
be 
                                                 
19 Although the parties discussed at some length the absence 
of Moore's father during the interrogation, the record contains 
no express allegation that there was a violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.19(2) ("Notification of Parent, Guardian, [or] Legal 
Custodian") in this case.  In fact, the record supports at least 
a circumstantial determination that police did contact Moore's 
father.  Short of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 938.19(2) or some 
evidence that police purposefully cut Moore off from his parent 
or another "friendly adult" in order to secure a confession, we 
hesitate to say that Moore's father's absence can be considered 
an "improper police practice" to be weighed against his personal 
characteristics.  Thus, although we take Moore's father's 
absence into account as a part of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding Moore's confession, his absence does 
not change the outcome. 
The Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth and the 
Wisconsin Innocence Project, as amicus, ask us to adopt a per se 
rule excluding statements made by juveniles when they are denied 
the opportunity to consult with a parent or other friendly 
adult.  In Jerrell C.J., we were asked to adopt a similar rule.  
We declined to do so in Jerrell C.J., 283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶59, and 
we decline to do so here. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
24 
 
electronically recorded where feasible, and without exception 
when questioning occurs at a place of detention."  Id., ¶58.   
¶68 The legislature appeared to codify this holding as 
part of 2005 Wis. Act 60, which was approved subsequent to the 
Jerrell C.J. decision.  The Act created Wis. Stat. § 938.195, 
which reads, in part, as follows: 
 
(2) WHEN REQUIRED. (a) A law enforcement agency 
shall make an audio or audio and visual recording of 
any custodial interrogation of a juvenile that is 
conducted at a place of detention unless a condition 
under s. 938.31(3)(c)1. to 5. applies. 
 
 
(b) If feasible, a law enforcement agency 
shall make an audio or audio and visual recording of 
any custodial interrogation of a juvenile that is 
conducted at a place other than a place of detention 
unless a condition under s. 938.31(3)(c)1. to 5. 
applies. 
 
3. 
NOTICE NOT REQUIRED.  A law enforcement 
officer 
or 
agent 
of 
a 
law 
enforcement 
agency 
conducting a custodial interrogation is not required 
to inform the subject of the interrogation that the 
officer or agent is making an audio or audio and 
visual recording of the interrogation. 
¶69 Act 60 also amended Wis. Stat. § 938.31, creating 
subsection 
(3) 
to 
implement 
the 
above-stated 
directive.  
Subsection (3) reads in part: 
 
 
(b) Except as provided under par. (c), a 
statement made by the juvenile during a custodial 
interrogation is not admissible in evidence against 
the juvenile in any court proceeding alleging the 
juvenile to be delinquent unless an audio or audio and 
visual recording of the interrogation was made as 
required under s. 938.195(2) and is available. 
 
 
(c) A 
juvenile's 
statement 
is 
not 
inadmissible in evidence under par. (b) if any of the 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
25 
 
following applies or if other good cause exists for 
not suppressing a juvenile's statement under par. (b): 
 
 
1. 
The juvenile refused to respond or 
cooperate in the custodial interrogation if an audio 
or audio and visual recording was made of the 
interrogation so long as a law enforcement officer or 
agent 
of 
a 
law 
enforcement 
agency 
made 
a 
contemporaneous audio or audio and visual recording or 
written record of the juvenile's refusal. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.31(3)(b)-(c) (emphasis added). 
 
¶70 Act 60 also created Wis. Stat. § 968.073 in the 
chapter 
entitled 
"Commencement 
of 
Criminal 
Proceedings."  
Section 968.073 deals with "Recording custodial interrogations."  
This section somewhat parallels Wis. Stat. § 938.195(2), but it 
is not nearly as comprehensive.  Section 968.073(2) reads: 
 
(2) It is the policy of this state to make an 
audio or audio and visual recording of a custodial 
interrogation of a person suspected of committing a 
felony unless a condition under s. 972.115(2)(a)1. to 
6. applies or good cause is shown for not making an 
audio 
or 
audio 
and 
visual 
recording 
of 
the 
interrogation. 
¶71 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.115(2)(a)1. reads: 
 
1. 
The person refused to respond or cooperate 
in the interrogation if an audio or audio and visual 
recording was made of the interrogation so long as a 
law enforcement officer or agent of a law enforcement 
agency made a contemporaneous audio or audio and 
visual recording or written record of the subject's 
refusal. 
¶72 Notably, Wis. Stat. § 972.115(2)(a) provides a remedy 
for a recording violation that is different from the remedy in 
Wis. Stat. § 938.31(3)(b).  It provides: 
If a statement made by a defendant during a custodial 
interrogation is admitted into evidence in a trial for 
a felony before a jury and if an audio or audio and 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
26 
 
visual 
recording 
of 
the 
interrogation 
is 
not 
available, upon a request made by the defendant as 
provided in s. 972.10 (5) and unless the state asserts 
and the court finds that one of the following 
conditions applies or that good cause exists for not 
providing an instruction, the court shall instruct the 
jury that it is the policy of this state to make an 
audio or audio and visual recording of a custodial 
interrogation of a person suspected of committing a 
felony and that the jury may consider the absence of 
an audio or audio and visual recording of the 
interrogation in evaluating the evidence relating to 
the interrogation . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 972.115(2)(a). 
¶73 These 
several 
statutes 
present 
two 
questions 
in 
relation to this case: 
 
1. 
Did Moore refuse to respond or cooperate with 
detectives in his custodial interrogation if the detectives did 
not discontinue the audio recording of the interrogation?  
Moore's refusal would justify the officers turning off the 
recorder. 
 
2. 
If Moore did not refuse to respond or cooperate 
in his custodial interrogation, were the statements he provided 
to police during the time he was not being recorded inadmissible 
against him in a criminal proceeding? 
¶74 These 
questions 
present 
issues 
of 
statutory 
interpretation. 
¶75 Interpreting a statute requires us to "faithfully give 
effect to the laws enacted by the legislature . . . ."  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Words and phrases in the statute 
are given their "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning" unless 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
27 
 
they are technical or defined in the statute.  Id., ¶45.  We 
also consider "the scope, history, context and purpose of the 
statute" as a part of this plain–meaning analysis.  Id., ¶48 
(quoting State ex rel. Cramer v. Schwarz, 2000 WI 86, ¶18, 236 
Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 591). 
¶76 Normally, if our analysis finds a plain meaning in the 
language of the statute, the inquiry ends there.  Id., ¶46.  
Normally, we are "not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear 
words of the statute."  Id. (quoting State v. Pratt, 36 
Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967)).  If, on the other hand, 
the statute is ambiguous we may examine extrinsic sources, such 
as legislative history.  Id., ¶¶47, 50. 
¶77 In this case, the statute is not ambiguous.  Thus, 
interpretation of the phrase "refused to respond or cooperate" 
represents an ordinary case of statutory interpretation.  With 
respect to the remedy for a violation of the statute, however, 
we are presented with a dilemma.  A literal reading of the 
statute appears to undermine the purpose of the statute for 
juveniles who are prosecuted in adult criminal court and to 
produce a result that is in direct contravention of this court's 
ruling in Jerrell C.J.   
¶78 We address first the question of whether Moore refused 
to respond or cooperate. 
¶79 Neither Wis. Stat. § 938.31 nor Wis. Stat. § 938.195 
defines "refused."  We therefore consider the commonly accepted 
definition of the word.  "Refuse" may be defined as "to express 
oneself as unwilling to accept . . . [or] to show or express 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
28 
 
unwillingness to do or comply with something . . . ."  Webster's 
New Collegiate Dictionary 972 (5th ed. 1977).  A "refusal" is 
"The denial or rejection of something offered or demanded."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1285 (7th ed. 1999). 
¶80 A suspect who "refuse[s] to respond or cooperate" must 
do more than request or express a preference that a recording 
device be turned off.  Rather, the plain meaning of the statute 
is that the recording device may be turned off only when the 
suspect expresses or shows that he or she will no longer 
participate in the interrogation unless the recording device is 
turned off.  A refusal must be affirmative; it is not enough for 
officers to assume that the interrogation will yield better 
results if the recording device is turned off. 
¶81 It is clear from the record that Detectives Lough and 
Salazar stopped recording their interrogation of Moore based on 
Moore's stated preference, not on his refusal to respond or 
cooperate.  Immediately prior to the recorder being shut off, 
Detective Salazar emphasized that he and Detective Lough were 
not asking or encouraging Moore to have the recorder shut off, 
and that shutting it off was Moore's "choice."  We must note 
that Detective Salazar previously offered to turn off the 
recorder if Moore asked for him to do so. 
¶82 We do not ascribe any improper motives to the 
detectives' decision to turn off the recording device in this 
case.  The detectives' decision appears to be exactly what Moore 
wanted.  Nonetheless, giving juvenile suspects the "choice" of 
whether to have their questioning recorded would defeat the 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
29 
 
purpose of the statute, which is to ensure that police do not 
use unfair tactics to elicit confessions from juveniles.  In 
cases of questionable police conduct——however rare they may be——
courts would be able to analyze only the police tactics used to 
induce, euchre, or coerce the juvenile into "choosing" to have 
the recorder turned off, and would be able merely to draw 
inferences about the tactics used to obtain the juvenile's later 
statements and admissions. 
¶83 After Moore's original request to turn the recording 
device off, he continued making statements and answering 
questions.  His second request was similar to the first.  Moore 
never told the detectives he would end the interrogation or stop 
answering questions if the recorder was left on.  Detectives 
Salazar and Lough may have felt that they were getting 
incomplete or dishonest answers from Moore due to the recorder's 
presence, but that suspicion, coupled with Moore's request, was 
not enough to determine that Moore "refused to respond or 
cooperate."20 
¶84 A majority of the court concludes that Moore did not 
refuse to respond or cooperate unless the recorder was turned 
                                                 
20 Although this may seem at first to be an additional 
hurdle for law enforcement to clear in its pursuit of criminal 
suspects, we note that despite initial resistance to mandatory 
recording laws nationwide, an overwhelming majority of police 
departments prefer to record interrogations.  See William A. 
Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, in Nat'l 
Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Research in Brief 1, 10 
(Mar. 1993). 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
30 
 
off.  We recognize and appreciate the view that Moore should not 
benefit from being granted his stated wish, as long as his 
subsequent confession was voluntary. 
2. Remedy for Violation of Recording Statues 
¶85 Having determined that the failure to record parts of 
Moore's interrogation violated Wis. Stat. § 938.195, we now turn 
to 
the 
question 
of 
remedy. 
 
Once 
again, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.31(3)(b) provides that "a statement made by [a] juvenile 
during a custodial interrogation is not admissible in evidence 
against the juvenile in any court proceeding alleging the 
juvenile to be delinquent unless an audio or audio and visual 
recording of the interrogation was made as required . . . and is 
available."21 
¶86 The problem is that subsection (3)(b) speaks of "any 
court proceeding alleging the juvenile to be delinquent" and 
that this subsection is part of a section on the "fact-finding 
hearing"——e.g., the trial——in juvenile delinquency cases. 
¶87 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.115(2)(a) provides a different 
remedy in felony criminal cases, namely, a jury instruction 
that it is the policy of this state to make an audio 
or 
audio 
and 
visual 
recording 
of 
a 
custodial 
interrogation of a person suspected of committing a 
                                                 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.02(3m) defines "delinquent" as "a 
juvenile who is 10 years of age or older who has violated any 
state 
or 
federal 
criminal 
law, 
except 
as 
provided 
in . . . [§] 938.183 . . . ."  Section 938.183, in turn, gives 
adult courts original jurisdiction over certain offenses alleged 
to have been committed by juveniles, including second degree 
reckless homicide.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.183. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
31 
 
felony and that the jury may consider the absence of 
an audio or audio and visual recording of the 
interrogation in evaluating the evidence relating to 
the investigation. 
Wis. Stat. § 972.115(2)(a). 
¶88 One way of reading these statutes reveals troubling 
incongruities in the statutory scheme.  For example, if a 
juvenile's unrecorded statement would be excluded in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings but is admissible in adult court, the 
state will often have the power to overcome the consequences of 
an improper failure to record custodial interrogation by 
charging the juvenile with a specific felony or by seeking to 
waive the juvenile into adult court. 
¶89 Permitting the use of unrecorded juvenile statements 
in major felony cases is plainly inconsistent with the court's 
decision in Jerrell C.J.  However, determining whether such a 
result 
is 
what 
the 
legislature 
authorized 
and 
intended 
implicates the legislature's authority to supersede this court's 
exercise of superintending authority. 
¶90 Resolving the question of remedy here would yield no 
satisfactory answer.  Fortunately, that is not necessary on the 
facts of this case. 
¶91 This court is highly mindful of the separation of 
powers.  It does not engage in direct confrontation with another 
branch of government unless the confrontation is necessary and 
unavoidable.  Here the potential confrontation is avoidable.  No 
four members of this court agree on the proper remedy for a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 938.195 in the criminal prosecution of 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
32 
 
a person under the age of 17, but a majority does agree that any 
error in admitting Moore's confession was harmless in this case. 
C. Harmless Error 
¶92 Assuming, arguendo, that Moore's unrecorded statements 
should have been suppressed by the court, we turn to whether any 
error was harmless.  Wisconsin's statutory harmless error test 
is laid out at Wis. Stat. § 805.18.  It states: 
The court shall, in every stage of an action, 
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or 
proceedings which shall not affect the substantial 
rights of the adverse party. . . . No judgment shall 
be reversed or set aside or new trial granted in any 
action 
or 
proceeding 
on 
the 
ground 
of . . . the 
improper admission of evidence . . . unless in the 
opinion of the court to which the application is made, 
after 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
entire 
action 
or 
proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained 
of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to 
secure a new trial. 
¶93 Although 
a 
part 
of 
Wisconsin's 
codified 
civil 
procedure, Wis. Stat. § 805.18 applies to criminal proceedings 
as well.  State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 368 n.36, 588 
N.W.2d 606 (1999).  We have previously adopted the test in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as the test for 
harmless error analysis.  See Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d at 368-69; 
see also State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 544–45, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985). 
¶94 The harmless error inquiry asks whether "the error 
complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to secure a new 
trial."  Wis. Stat. § 805.18.  Stated differently, the question 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
33 
 
is "whether it was 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'"  
State v. Magett, 2014 WI 67, ¶29, 355 Wis. 2d 617, 850 N.W.2d 42 
(quoting State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶47, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 
N.W.2d 115).  Cf. State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 
717 N.W.2d 74. 
¶95 Under this framework, plea withdrawal is not warranted 
in this case.  Moore pled guilty to second-degree reckless 
homicide as a party to the crime.  Even if the statements Moore 
made while the recorder was turned off had been suppressed, it 
is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that he would have pled 
guilty to the reduced charge. 
¶96 "[T]he 
second-degree 
reckless 
homicide 
statute 
requires 'both the creation of an objectively unreasonable and 
substantial risk of human death or great bodily harm and the 
actor's subjective awareness of that risk.'"  State v. Neumann, 
2013 WI 58, ¶74, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560 (citation 
omitted); see also Wis. Stat. § 940.06.  The party to a crime 
statute imposes criminal liability on "whoever is concerned in 
the commission of a crime," including those who "aid and abet" 
the commission of the crime and those who are "party to a 
conspiracy with another to commit it . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.05. 
¶97 Moore's statements made from 2:49 p.m. through 10:52 
p.m., with a brief exception, are all recorded.  He does not 
contend 
that 
statements 
made 
during 
this 
period 
are 
inadmissible, as he received the statutory protection and 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
34 
 
benefit of a recording during most of that time.  His statements 
were voluntary. 
¶98 Statements made by Moore prior to 10:52 p.m. include 
the following: 
- He was "part of" the incident as "party to a crime" 
- He knew Raynard had a gun 
- He knew Raynard planned to rob someone 
- He was supposed to get a portion of the money obtained in 
the robbery 
- He acted as lookout and would have alerted Raynard if 
police had approached 
- He lured Parish back to the window where Parish had 
purchased drugs just before Raynard shot Parish 
- Raynard shot Parish, and they both fled on foot. 
Moore provided detectives with numerous details to support this 
version of events. 
¶99 Furthermore, detectives recorded Moore confessing to 
firing the gun himself after they covertly brought the recording 
device back into the interrogation room.  Although this 
confession took place after the recording device had been turned 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
35 
 
off for a brief period, it was still admissible and had 
virtually the same content as Moore's unrecorded confession.22  
¶100 Moore's situation at the pleading stage was virtually 
the same regardless of any possible error made by the circuit 
court in denying suppression of Moore's unrecorded statements.  
The State still had ample evidence to support the party to a 
crime charge that Moore ultimately pled to.23  Because we are 
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Moore would have pled 
guilty to the same charge, we hold any error discussed herein to 
be harmless. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶101 We agree that Moore's incriminating statements were 
voluntary.  However, Moore did not "refus[e] to cooperate" with 
police during his interrogation.  It was therefore a violation 
                                                 
22 Moore contends that his confession after the recorder was 
turned back on should be inadmissible, relying on State v. 
Dionicia M., 2010 WI App 134, 329 Wis. 2d 524, 791 N.W.2d 236.  
Dionicia M. is distinguishable in a number of ways, primarily 
because it involved a police interrogation of a juvenile suspect 
that was unrecorded from the beginning until the suspect's 
confession.  Only after the suspect confessed did police record 
her statements.  Where, as here, a recording "bookends" the 
questioning with only a short period of time unrecorded in the 
middle, concerns about police coercion are far less prevalent. 
23 It is plausible that Moore's changing story throughout 
his interrogation is at least part of the reason the State 
amended the charge from first-degree reckless homicide to 
second-degree 
reckless 
homicide 
as 
a 
party 
to 
a 
crime.  
Regardless of which version of Moore's story the State relied 
upon, by 5:00 p.m. he had provided the detectives with details 
of his involvement sufficient to find criminal culpability under 
the amended charge. 
No. 
  2013AP127-CR 
 
36 
 
of Wis. Stat. § 938.195 for police to cease recording the 
interrogation. 
¶102 Nevertheless, the error, if any, in not suppressing 
some of Moore's statements, was harmless.  Moore admitted to 
participating in the crime prior to the recording being turned 
off, and he repeated his confession that he was the shooter 
after the recording was turned back on.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2013AP127-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶103 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with the majority opinion that all of Raheem Moore's statements 
to the detectives were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  I 
join the majority opinion in that respect.  I write separately 
because I believe that the majority opinion should take this 
opportunity to conclude that suppression of a juvenile's 
unrecorded statements under Wis. Stat. § 938.31(3)(b) is not an 
available remedy if a juvenile is in adult court.  While a 
juvenile's statements during a custodial interrogation generally 
must be recorded, this case was an adult criminal court 
proceeding, not a juvenile court delinquency proceeding.  My 
conclusions are based upon a plain meaning statutory analysis.   
¶104 I write separately to clarify that this case has a 
somewhat unique posture.  I hope to clarify that we should not 
conflate procedures and remedies available in juvenile court 
with those in adult court.  To be clear, had the case been tried 
to a jury in adult court, Moore could have requested a jury 
instruction under Wis. Stat. § 972.115(2)(a), but relief under 
Wis. Stat. § 938.31(3)(b) would not be available.  Moore was in 
adult and not juvenile court; hence, suppression of his 
unrecorded statements under § 938.31(3)(b) is not available to 
him because his case was not a "court proceeding alleging the 
juvenile to be delinquent."  See Wis. Stat. § 938.31(3)(b).  
Moreover, a jury instruction is of little significance since 
Moore pled guilty in adult court.  I write separately because 
the majority opinion stops short of clearly concluding that the 
No.  2013AP127-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
only available remedy to Moore would be a § 972.115(2)(a) jury 
instruction and that suppression under § 938.31(3)(b) is not 
available to Moore because he was in adult court.  
¶105 "[W]e 
have 
repeatedly 
held 
that 
statutory 
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted source 
and citations omitted).  "Statutory language is given its 
common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id. (citation omitted).  "Where 
statutory language is unambiguous, there is no need to consult 
extrinsic 
sources 
of 
interpretation, 
such 
as 
legislative 
history."  Id., ¶46 (citations omitted).  "'In construing or 
interpreting a statute the court is not at liberty to disregard 
the plain, clear words of the statute.'"  Id. (quoting State v. 
Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967)).  "We should 
not read into the statute language that the legislature did not 
put in."  Brauneis v. LIRC, 2000 WI 69, ¶27, 236 Wis. 2d 27, 612 
N.W.2d 635 
(citing 
In 
the 
Interest 
of 
G. & 
L.P., 
119 
Wis. 2d 349, 354, 349 N.W.2d 743 (1984)).  The majority opinion 
correctly 
recognizes 
these 
principles 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  Majority op., ¶¶75-76. 
¶106 The majority opinion holds that the failure to record 
the 
entire 
custodial 
interrogation 
violated 
the 
recording 
requirement in Wis. Stat. § 938.195.  Majority op., ¶¶84-85.  
No.  2013AP127-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
That statute provides: "A law enforcement agency shall make an 
audio 
or 
audio 
and 
visual 
recording 
of 
any 
custodial 
interrogation of a juvenile that is conducted at a place of 
detention unless a condition under [§] 938.31(3)(c)1. to 5. 
applies."  Wis. Stat. § 938.195(2)(a).  I do not quarrel with 
the legislative call to record a juvenile's statements during a 
custodial interrogation.  
¶107 I also do not question that the remedy for a violation 
of the recording requirement is suppression under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.31.  However, the legislature also determined that 
suppression under § 938.31 is available only in a juvenile court 
delinquency proceeding.  This statute provides, in relevant 
part:  
Except as provided under par. (c), a statement 
made by the juvenile during a custodial interrogation 
is not admissible in evidence against the juvenile in 
any court proceeding alleging the juvenile to be 
delinquent unless an audio or audio and visual 
recording of the interrogation was made as required 
under [§] 938.195(2) and is available.   
Wis. Stat. § 938.31(3)(b) (emphasis added).  The majority 
opinion 
seems 
to 
avoid 
the 
inevitable 
conclusion 
that 
suppression under that statute is unavailable in adult court.  
Majority op., ¶¶86-91.  We should adhere to the legislation's 
plain language.  
¶108 Moore is not entitled to suppression under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.31(3)(b) in adult court.  By this statute's plain terms, 
the suppression remedy applies in a "court proceeding alleging 
the juvenile to be delinquent."  Wis. Stat. § 938.31(3)(b).  A 
criminal prosecution in adult court is not a "court proceeding 
No.  2013AP127-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
alleging the juvenile to be delinquent."  Therefore, this 
statute's 
suppression 
remedy 
for 
a 
juvenile 
delinquency 
proceeding does not apply in adult court, even if the adult 
court defendant is a juvenile.  A court would have to 
impermissibly read language into this statute in order to 
determine that its suppression remedy applies in adult court.  
See Brauneis, 236 Wis. 2d 27, ¶27 (citation omitted) ("We should 
not read into the statute language that the legislature did not 
put in."). 
¶109 I recognize that, had Moore chosen to have a jury 
trial in adult court, he could have requested a jury instruction 
under Wis. Stat. § 972.115 regarding the fact that the entire 
custodial interrogation was not recorded.1  If given, such a jury 
instruction would not, however, find its basis in the juvenile 
code.  Wisconsin. Stat. § 972.115 does provide: 
If a statement made by a defendant during a 
custodial interrogation is admitted into evidence in a 
trial for a felony before a jury and if an audio or 
audio and visual recording of the interrogation is not 
available, upon a request made by the defendant as 
provided in [§] 972.10(5) and unless the state asserts 
and the court finds that one of the following 
conditions applies or that good cause exists for not 
providing an instruction, the court shall instruct the 
jury that it is the policy of this state to make an 
audio or audio and visual recording of a custodial 
interrogation of a person suspected of committing a 
felony and that the jury may consider the absence of 
an audio or audio and visual recording of the 
interrogation in evaluating the evidence relating to 
                                                 
1 I do not mean to suggest that a jury instruction is always 
required. 
No.  2013AP127-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
the 
interrogation 
and 
the 
statement 
in 
the 
case . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 972.115(2)(a) (emphases added).  This statute, 
unlike Wis. Stat. § 938.31(3)(b), does not distinguish between 
adult and juvenile defendants.  Instead, this statute allows for 
a jury instruction, under certain circumstances, in a felony 
prosecution tried before a jury in adult court.  This statute 
plainly provides that Moore's potential remedy for the failure 
to record his entire custodial interrogation would have been to 
request a jury instruction, had his case been tried to a jury in 
adult court.  He did not proceed to jury trial.  A jury 
instruction is, thus, of little import in the case at issue.   
¶110 Why the majority opinion seems to shy away from 
expressly holding that suppression was not available to Moore is 
unclear to me.  Specifically, the majority opinion states that 
if a juvenile's unrecorded statement would be excluded 
in juvenile delinquency proceedings but is admissible 
in adult court, the state will often have the power to 
overcome the consequences of an improper failure to 
record 
custodial 
interrogation 
by 
charging 
the 
juvenile with a specific felony or by seeking to waive 
the juvenile into adult court.   
Majority op., ¶88.  This proposition is too cavalier for me.  
Waiver of a juvenile into adult court is not such an automatic 
result.  Moreover, a prosecutor and a court should be highly 
suspect if waiver is being sought to avoid suppression of an 
unrecorded statement.  In many instances, the State will not 
have the option of charging a juvenile with a crime that may be 
prosecuted in adult court.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.18 (authorizing 
certain juvenile offenses to be waived into adult court if 
certain conditions are met); Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1) (listing 
No.  2013AP127-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
juvenile offenses over which adult courts have "exclusive 
original jurisdiction").  "The decision to waive juvenile court 
jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 938.18 is committed to the sound 
discretion of the juvenile court."  In re Tyler T., 2012 WI 52, 
¶24, 341 Wis. 2d 1, 814 N.W.2d 192 (citations omitted).  I do 
not agree that law enforcement would flout the statutory 
recording mandate, thinking either that the prosecutor will 
"cover" for their disregard of the recording requirement by 
prosecuting a juvenile in adult court or that a juvenile court 
would waive a juvenile into adult court to avoid suppression 
under § 938.31(3)(b).  In fact, recordings are the suggested 
practice under Wis. Stat. §§ 968.073(2) and 938.195(2) in either 
court. 
¶111 Importantly, law enforcement officers already possess 
sufficient incentive to record an entire custodial interrogation 
of a juvenile because the officers do not know whether the case 
will proceed in adult or juvenile court.  In fact, the vast 
majority of juvenile cases proceed in juvenile court, not adult 
court.  Most officers would not risk suppression and would 
recognize that unrecorded statements of a juvenile could be 
suppressed under Wis. Stat. § 938.31(3)(b) in a juvenile 
delinquency proceeding.  Thus, we need not fear that officers 
will be cavalier with respect to their statutory duty to record 
a custodial interrogation of a juvenile, given the fact that at 
the time of the recording, officers will not have any assurance 
that the case will be tried anywhere but juvenile court. 
No.  2013AP127-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
¶112 Also, the majority opinion states that it avoids a 
"direct confrontation with another branch of government" by 
declining to determine whether the suppression remedy under Wis. 
Stat. § 938.31(3)(b) applies in adult court.  Majority op., ¶91.  
The majority opinion reflects that "[p]ermitting the use of 
unrecorded juvenile statements in major felony cases is plainly 
inconsistent with the court's decision in [In re Jerrell C.J., 
2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110]."  Majority op., 
¶89.  In Jerrell C.J., the court held that a written confession 
made by a juvenile during a custodial interrogation was 
inadmissible as evidence in that juvenile court proceeding.  
Jerrell C.J., 283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶¶3, 36.  The court went further 
to require recording of a juvenile's statements during a 
custodial interrogation and did so pursuant to its "supervisory 
authority."  Id., ¶¶47, 49, 58.  Subsequently, the legislature 
created § 938.31(3)(b), presumably to implement the holding from 
Jerrell C.J.  Majority op., ¶¶68-69.  In the present case, a 
separation-of-powers issue is not before the court, and the 
majority 
opinion 
should 
not 
decline 
to 
resolve 
whether 
suppression under § 938.31(3)(b) applies in adult court because 
the legislature has spoken.  I would not use our supervisory 
authority to now create additional relief, and I believe that 
the legislation's plain language deserves its due.  
¶113 Further, I conclude that the circuit court did not err 
by denying Moore's suppression motion.  The majority opinion 
undertakes an analysis as if the circuit court erred in denying 
Moore's suppression motion.  Specifically, it states that, 
No.  2013AP127-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
"[a]ssuming, arguendo, that Moore's unrecorded statements should 
have been suppressed by the court, we turn to whether any error 
was harmless."  Majority op., ¶92.  It goes on to hold that "any 
possible error made by the circuit court in denying suppression 
of Moore's unrecorded statements" was harmless.  Majority op., 
¶100.  Because the circuit court did not err, I would not assume 
for the sake of argument that the circuit court erred.   
¶114 The circuit court denied Moore's suppression motion on 
the grounds that suppression under Wis. Stat. § 938.31(3)(b) was 
unavailable to Moore because he was being tried in adult court.  
The circuit court reasoned that Wis. Stat. ch. 938 "deals with 
juveniles in delinquency proceedings."  Wisconsin Stat. ch. 972, 
the circuit court explained, "deals with defendants in adult 
proceedings.  Not adult defendants.  Defendants."  Thus, the 
circuit court held that, "if I find that there was [not a] 
refusal, that [sic] what would happen is the statement would be 
admissible, but there would be a——an instruction that would be 
given explaining the ramifications of that."   
¶115 In sum, the circuit court correctly denied Moore's 
suppression motion on the grounds that, because Moore was tried 
in adult court, suppression under Wis. Stat. § 938.31(3)(b) was 
not available to him.  Because the circuit court did not err by 
denying the suppression motion, there is no need to undertake a 
harmless error analysis.  
¶116 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶117 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence. 
No.  2013AP127-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶118 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  When the 
defendant was 15 years old, he was interrogated by the police 
about a murder that had recently taken place.  After roughly 11 
hours in custody, the defendant confessed to the crime.  The 
defendant now seeks to suppress his confession. 
¶119 The defendant argues that admission of his confession 
would violate the federal and state constitutions because the 
confession was not voluntary.1  The defendant further argues that 
admission of his confession would violate Wis. Stat. § 938.195 
(2007-08),2 which requires that "any custodial interrogation of a 
juvenile that is conducted at a place of detention" be recorded.3 
¶120 I conclude that the defendant's confession was not 
voluntary under the federal and state constitutions.  Because 
admission of the confession was not harmless error, the 
confession should be suppressed. 
¶121 A confession is voluntary if it is "the product of a 
free 
and 
unconstrained 
will, 
reflecting 
deliberateness 
of 
choice, as opposed to the result of a conspicuously unequal 
confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on the 
                                                 
1 See State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, ¶17, 283 
Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110 (explaining that if a defendant's 
confession is constitutionally "involuntary," then its admission 
violates the defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the federal constitution and Article I, Section 8 
of the Wisconsin Constitution).  See also majority op., ¶55. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Because my analysis of the constitutional issue is 
dispositive, I would not reach the recording statute issue. 
No.  2013AP127-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
defendant 
by 
representatives 
of 
the 
State 
exceeded 
the 
defendant's ability to resist."4 
¶122 Whether 
a 
confession 
is 
voluntary 
and 
thus 
constitutionally 
valid 
depends 
on 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances surrounding the confession.5  In conducting this 
totality-of-the-circumstances 
review, 
a 
court 
weighs 
a 
defendant's personal characteristics (including the defendant's 
"age, education and intelligence . . . and prior experience with 
law enforcement") against the interrogation methods employed by 
the State (including "the length of questioning"; the presence 
of a parent, attorney, or other interested adult; and "whether 
the defendant was informed of the right to counsel and right 
against self-incrimination").6 
¶123 Courts must exercise "special care" when assessing the 
voluntariness of a juvenile's confession,7 as children are 
"uncommonly susceptible" to suggestive and coercive police 
interrogation techniques.8 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶¶55, 65 (quoting State v. Lemoine, 2013 WI 
5, ¶17, 345 Wis. 2d 171, 827 N.W.2d 589).  See also Jerrell 
C.J., 283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶16. 
5 Majority op., ¶56; Jerrell C.J., 283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶20. 
6 Majority op., ¶56 & n.17.  See also Jerrell C.J., 283 
Wis. 2d 145, ¶30; State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶39, 261 
Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 407. 
7 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967); Haley v. Ohio, 332 
U.S. 596, 599 (1948).  
8 Jerrell C.J., 283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶26. 
No.  2013AP127-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶124 In the instant case, I weigh the relevant personal 
characteristics of the defendant against the interrogation 
methods employed by the State as follows: 
• The defendant was 15 years old when he confessed.  His 
young age is a factor weighing against the voluntariness 
of the confession. 
• The defendant was in eighth grade at the time of his 
confession.  His relatively low education level is a 
factor 
weighing 
against 
the 
voluntariness 
of 
the 
confession. 
• The 
defendant 
exhibits 
borderline 
intellectual 
functioning.9  The defendant's low intelligence level is 
a factor weighing against the voluntariness of the 
confession. 
• The defendant has a history of learning disabilities.  
The defendant may therefore have struggled to understand 
his Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them.  
Consequently, 
this 
factor 
weighs 
against 
the 
voluntariness of the confession. 
                                                 
9 An evaluation of the defendant performed at the State's 
request 
determined 
that 
the 
defendant 
functions 
in 
the 
"borderline" range of intelligence, meaning his intelligence 
quotient (IQ) score is between 71 and 84.  An evaluation of the 
defendant 
performed 
at 
the 
defendant's 
request 
similarly 
concluded that the defendant's IQ score falls between 69 and 79.  
Intellectual disability, also known as mental retardation, is 
commonly defined as an IQ score of 70 or below.  See MedLine 
Plus, U.S. Nat'l Library of Medicine, "Intellectual disability" 
(last 
updated 
May 
10, 
2013), 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001523.htm. 
No.  2013AP127-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
• The defendant was diagnosed with at least three mental 
health issues:  attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, 
mood disorders, and conduct disorders.  In addition, he 
has previously displayed problems with substance abuse.  
The defendant's mental health issues and behavioral 
problems are factors weighing against the voluntariness 
of the confession. 
• The 
defendant 
had 
previous 
experience 
with 
law 
enforcement at the time of his confession——namely, two 
prior 
arrests 
that 
both 
resulted 
in 
misdemeanor 
delinquency 
findings. 
 
His 
experience 
with 
law 
enforcement was not extensive and does not weigh in favor 
of voluntariness. 
• The defendant was in custody for about 11 hours before he 
confessed. 
 
During 
that 
time, 
the 
defendant 
was 
repeatedly interrogated by two sets of detectives for a 
total of nearly six hours.10  The duration of the 
interrogation weighs against the voluntariness of the 
confession. 
• The defendant did not confer with a friendly adult at any 
point during the interrogation.  The absence of a parent, 
attorney, or other interested adult at the defendant's 
                                                 
10 "Police complete nearly all interrogations of juveniles 
and adults in less than one or two hours.  By contrast, they 
extract the vast majority of false confessions only after 
interrogating suspects for six hours or longer . . . ."  Barry 
C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study 
of Policy and Practice, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 219, 308 
(2006). 
No.  2013AP127-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
interrogation weighs against the voluntariness of the 
confession.11 
• The defendant did not demonstrate that he understood his 
right to counsel.12  At one point, a detective stated as 
follows:  "If you decide to answer questions now without 
a lawyer present, you have the right to stop questioning 
at any time you wish and the right to ask for and to have 
a lawyer at any time you wish, including during 
questioning."  The detective then asked, "What does that 
mean in your own words?"  The defendant replied by 
stating:  "That mean like, if I'm talking to you all, 
then I don't want to say no more, I can just, um, don't 
say nothing." 
                                                 
11 The record does not reveal whether the police actually 
contacted the defendant's parents, although they informed the 
defendant that they had.  It is undisputed, however, that the 
defendant had no opportunity to confer with a friendly adult 
during the interrogation.  "[T]he failure 'to call the parents 
for the purpose of depriving the juvenile of the opportunity to 
receive advice and counsel' will be considered 'strong evidence 
that coercive tactics were used to elicit the incriminating 
statements.'"  Jerrell C.J., 283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶43. 
12 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Jerrell 
C.J., 283 Wis. 2d 145, ¶20 (stating that courts determining the 
constitutional validity of confessions should consider "whether 
the defendant was informed of the right to counsel and right 
against self-incrimination"). 
A forensic evaluation of the defendant performed at the 
request of the defendant's attorneys concluded that "significant 
questions exist as to [the defendant's] competence to waive his 
Miranda rights" and that "significant concerns exist regarding 
the reliability of [the defendant's] confession." 
No.  2013AP127-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
The defendant explained his right to stop speaking 
but did not demonstrate that he understood he could ask 
for an attorney or have an attorney present at any time 
(including during questioning).  This exchange, which 
suggests the defendant did not fully grasp his Miranda 
rights, 
weighs 
against 
the 
voluntariness 
of 
the 
confession. 
• The detectives' conduct in interrogating the defendant 
was 
not 
egregious.13 
 
The 
detectives 
spoke 
in 
a 
conversational tone and were not unduly aggressive in 
their demeanor while they isolated the defendant in the 
interrogation room.  However, the detectives employed 
psychological tactics to which juveniles and those with 
low 
intelligence 
are 
especially 
vulnerable.14 
 
For 
example, 
the 
detectives 
continually 
challenged 
the 
defendant's denials of culpability, urged the defendant 
to tell the truth, and misinformed the defendant about 
various aspects of their investigation.  The use of these 
psychological techniques in the instant case exceeded the 
defendant's ability to resist and weighs against the 
voluntariness of the confession. 
                                                 
13 "[T]he totality of the circumstances standard does not 
require 
that 
egregious 
or 
outrageous 
police 
conduct 
be 
present. . . ."  Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶58. 
14 "When used against vulnerable suspects, standard police 
interrogation techniques are especially apt to lead to false 
confessions.  Juveniles and the mentally retarded are the most 
vulnerable to modern psychological interrogation techniques."  
Jerrell 
C.J., 
283 
Wis. 2d 145, 
¶104 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring). 
No.  2013AP127-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
• The cumulative effect of these factors under the totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
test 
weighs 
against 
the 
voluntariness of the confession. 
¶125 In sum, the defendant, a 15-year-old eighth grader of 
borderline intelligence, was in custody for roughly 11 hours; 
was interrogated for periods totaling nearly six hours; was 
subject to psychological interrogation methods; had no parent, 
attorney, or interested adult present during his interrogation; 
and did not demonstrate an understanding of his Miranda rights 
before making incriminating statements to the police. 
¶126 The personal characteristics of the defendant and the 
interrogation 
methods 
employed 
in 
the 
present 
case 
are 
substantially similar to those in State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 
105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110, and the same result should 
ensue.  The confession in Jerrell C.J. was suppressed. 
¶127 Considering the factors outlined above and the court's 
holding in Jerrell C.J., and exercising special care as the case 
law compels me to do, I conclude that the defendant's confession 
was not voluntary and thus is not constitutionally valid.  
Because admission of the confession was not harmless error,15 the 
confession should be suppressed.  I would reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals and remand the cause for further 
proceedings. 
                                                 
15 An error is harmless if the beneficiary of the error 
(here the State) proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the result.  State v. Hale, 
2005 WI 7, ¶60, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637. The State 
cannot meet its burden of proof in the instant case. 
No.  2013AP127-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶128 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶129 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2013AP127-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1