Title: Wailuku Agribusiness Co., Inc. v. Ah Sam. ICA Opinion, filed 08/01/2006 [pdf], 112 Haw. 241. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 01/16/2007 [pdf], 113 Haw. 153. S.Ct. Order of Amendment, filed 04/12/2007 [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 04/19/2007 [pdf], 114 Haw. 55.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'L

 

00"

cana

 

 

WAILUKU AGRIBUSINESS CO., INC.,
Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee

 

HARVEY AH SAM, PATRICK AK SAM, FREDERICK K. BAILEY, JR.,
KENNETH D. KAHCOHANOKANO, RICHERT M. KAMAIOPILT, SUSAN K.
KOEHLER, MAEBELLE M. LIBRANOO, TRADAY U. BAILEY, PATRICK E.K,
BAILEY, PETER L. BAILEY, ROBERT ALLEN BELL, PATRICK K.T. CHU,
ROCHELLE J. GARDANTER, CHARLES KAULUWEHI MAXWELL, SR., JUDITH L.
NAGAMINE, JACQUELINE KUAHINE AMINA RAPOZA, JANICE L. REVELLS,
CLOVIS GYETVAI, ELIZABETH KEALA HAN, GLENN F. KAHOOHANOHANO,
HELENE R. SARONTTMAN, HANNAH E.H. SOUZA, LILLIE LANI BAILEY
MUNDON, CHARLES E. ST. GERMAIN and WAYNE CHUN,
Petitioners/Defendants-Appellants

and

KALAPUNA (k) and his wife, KEKUI (w), KAHOLOLIO (w),
also known as HOLOLIO HENNESSEE (w), HEIRS OR ASSIGNS,
CAROLINE K. GROWN, GAYLE J. SILVA, ELLEN P. PARKER,
AYIEESHYA BONNIE MAPUA MURPHY, JULY SIMEONA, ‘CAROL A.K.
GAYLORD, PEARL LEINOMI KAMAIOPILT, CHARLES PILA,
EDAARD K. AMINA, JOYCE L. ACIDERA, JADE V. MIYAMOTO,
HARMON AH SAM, JOAN L. POWELL, PAMELA ROE, BENEDETTA L.
DAVIDSON, FREDNA YIM COBE-ADANS, MABEL E.H. GRIFFIN,
HERBERT HALUAU SR., SHIRLEY MAILE ‘BELL, BONNIE A. MEYERS,
AND ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN, Defendants

No. 25930

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NO, 02-1-0071(3))

MARCH 30, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBR, AND DUFFY, JJ.

 
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+#

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBAL J.

Petiticners/Defendants-Appellants (Petitioners)* filed
an application for writ of certiorari* on December &, 2006,
requesting that this court review the published opinion of the
Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA),” affirming the March 7,
2003 and April 28, 2003 grants of summary judgment and the
June 2, 2003 final judgment by the second circuit court (the
court)‘ in favor of Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee Wailuku
Agribusiness Co., Inc. (Wailuku or Respondent) on its quiet title
action. See Wailuku Agribusiness Co, v. Bh Sam, 112 Hawai'i 241,
260, 145 P.3d 784, 803 (App. 2006). Wailuku filed a memorandum

in opposition to the application.

+ Fetiticners are Harvey Ah Sam, Patrick Ah San, Frederick K.
Bailey, Je., Kenneth D. Kahcchanchanc, Richert #, Konalopiis, susan
Koehler, Macbelie N. Librando, Iraday U. Bailey, Patrick E-K. Bailey, Peter 1,
Bailey, ‘Robert Allen Gell, Fatrick K.T. Chu, Rochelle J. Gardanier, Charles

ulowehi Maxwell, sr., Jugith lL. Nagamine, Jacqueline Kuahine Aina Rapoza,
nice L. Revelle, Clovis Gyetvai, Elizabeth Keala Hen, Glenn F.
Kahcehanchano, Helene R, Saronitnen, Mannah En, Soura, Lillie
Minden, Charlee E. St. Germain, and’ Wayne Chun.

 

 

 

   
  

Pursuant to Hawas"t Reviced Statutes (HRS) § 602-59 (Supp. 2006) &
party may appesl the decision of the antermedsate appeliace court (tne Ich)
baly ey an application to this court fora writ of certiorari. See HRS 8 602~
59(a).. In detersining whether to accept or reject the application for writ of
Certicrari, this court reviews the ICh decision fer

 

 

 

 

(1) Grave errors of Jaw or of facts or

(2) Gheious Inconsistencies in the decision of the (ZCK)
with that of the suprene court, federal decisions, or
Tee" oun decteson,

and the nagnitode of such errore or inconsistencies

dictating the need for further appeal.

 

HRS § €02-59(b). The grant oF denial of a petition for certiorari ss
Giecretionary with thie court: Ser HRS § 602-59(8)

fon was authored by Fresiding Judge Corinne K.A. Watansbe

2 the op:
He Rakamure

and wae Joined by Associate Judgee Daniel R. Foley and Cr:

 

 

‘the Honcrable Joseph £. Cardoza presided.
 

‘+4F0R PUBLICATION IN MEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®'
We hold that (1) the ICA gravely erred in its

determination that sunmary judgment was proper as to Apane 1 of
the subject property because, viewed in a light most favorable to
Petitioners, there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether a cotenancy exists among Petitioners and Wailuku and, if
a cotenancy does exist, whether Wailuku acted in good faith
towards its cotenants, City & County of Honolulu v. Bennett, 57

Haw. 195, 852 P.2d 1360 (1976); (2) the ICA did not gravely err

 

in determining that no genuine issues of material fact exist as
to Mailuku's adverse possession of Apana 3; and (3) the ICA did
not gravely err in admitting and relying on the affidavits of
Chuck Cando (Dando), Clayton Suzuki (Suzuki), and Avery Chumbley
(Chumbley)
1

‘The following matters are taken from the submissions of
the parties, some verbatim, and from the record.

This ie a quiet title action filed by Wailuku
concerning two parcels of real property located in Waikepd, Maui,
Apana 1 and Apana 3 of Land Conmission Award (LCR) 8672, Royal

[collectively, subject property]. Wailuku

 

Patent (RP) 64
claims, among other matters, title to Apane 2 of the subject

property based, alternatively, upon paper title or adverse

  

possession, and title to Apana 3 of the subject property solely

 

 

through adverse possessiot
 

{FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'Z REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

Originally, pursuant to LCA 8672 dated Septenber 27,
3852, Kaluau (k)* (Kaluay) acquired three parcels of land in
Waikeps, Maui, Apana 1, Apana 2, and Apana 3. Apana 2 is not at
issue in this case. In 1855 or 1856, Kaluau died intestate.
There is no evidence in the record of any transactions,
conveyances, deeds, probates, or court orders transferring
cunership of Apsne 1 or Apana 3 price to Kaluau’s death. Thus,
it appears that when he died, Kaluau was still the owner of
Apanas 1, 2, and 3. Prior to his death, Kaluau did net apply for
a RP for the three parcels granted to him by the Land Conmissicn

852, Only Kalua or his legal heirs could have applied for a

 

RP.’ Kaluau’s survivors included his father, Kalapuna (k)
(Kalapuna), his mother, Kekiu (w) (Kekiu), his sister, Haleamau

(w), alse known as Kahaleamau (Haleamau), his sister Kahololio

 

(#), also known as Hololio Hennessee (Kahololic), and Kalvau-opio
(k) (Haluau-Opio), his deceased brother's son.

According to Wailuku, @ deed dated October 13, 1855
purportedly transferred Apana 1 to # John Richardson

(Richardson). The deed states that “Kalapuna, the own father of

 

Kaluau whe is deceased, and Piena [(k) (Piena)], his brother-in-

Herein, (i) indicates ® female nane ond stands for “wahine,” the
Hawaiian werd for woman, ané (k) indiestes 0 male name ond etands fer “ane,”
the Wowesien word for mo

 

 

joky maintains thet Kelvay
in thet he oie not aie unt)

 

+ tae year of oeath Se in dispute. ta:
Sieg intestate in 1855, while Petitioners mas
Tese.

 

 

Bt is unclear who applied for the, apparently poethuncusly-seeued,
RP. A copy of AP G43 de not Sneluded in the reserd cn appeel

  

 

4
 

{FOR PUBLICATION 10 WEST’ § RAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS*#

law, the heirs of Kaluau mentioned above, Puweuweu [(w)
(Puweuweu)), the wife of Plena mentioned above, sell and convey
absolutely this land descended to us from the deceased person
nentioned above.” This deed was executed by Kalapuna, Piena, and
Puweuweu.

The 1855 deed does not specifically identity the
property as Apana 1 or define the metes and bounds of the land

being conveyed. No mention is made of Apana 3, nor is the deed

 

executed by Kekiu, Kaluau’s nother.’ Petitioners’ translation
states that the property being conveyed was “all of that piece of
land situate at Kusiwa, Waikapy, Maui,” whereas, Wailuku’ s

rendition purports that it is conveying “the entire piece of land

situate at Kuaiwa, Waikapu, Maui.”* The deed was not recorded in
1855.18

According to the law at the tine of Kaluau's death:

If the intestate shall leave no seve, his estate shall
Geecend cre half te hie widex, and the other half te his

er ano mother ae tenanee in cenmons and if he leaves no
iden, nor esue, the whole ehall coseend to nie fether and
other, er to either of them if only ene be elive

   

 

1¢ the Gescent of Property both Real and Person, 1850 Penal
San Jelende, st 161. Thue, because Reluau died without
‘Sppeare to be the case, Nie nother ang fether would inherit his
yreguslly 22 tenants in common. See Hasluky Aorsbusiness Co., 112
148 Psd at 788 (brackets emitted)

   

  
  

 

    

 

Fetitionere quote fron 9 translation of the Richardson deed by
roneletion by Franess N. Frasier

except where noted above

bavid
(Frazier).

  

4s the ICA notes, the deed was not recorded until 1878.

 

tthe deed was signed by Kalepune, Piena, and Pouweumeu by x"
parks, witnessed by Aga Hope. (Hops) and Nelly Richardech
Telly), bot not recorded tmtsl June 10, 1878, after Nelly
personaly appeared before Hawai'i Suprene Court Justice &
fancies Dose nd acknowledges that! (2) cf Cotober 13,

identinved. .)

 

 

 

 

 
 

s*9FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*

 

It appears that Richardson died intestate." Fursuant
to an order filed in Probate No. 1210, the administrators of his
estate conveyed, by deed dated September 7, 1660, what Wailuku
alleges is Apana 1, to James Louzeda (Louzada)

From August through November 1873, Second Circuit Court
Probate No. 649, In Re Estate of Kaluau, wae pending.

Witnesses testified that at Keluau’s death, he was survived by
both his mother and father who were both since deceased. The
decree issued by the Second Circuit designated Kahololic,
Haleamau, and Kaluau-Opio, as Kaluau’s heirs.

On December 15, 1873, eighteen years after Kaluau's
death, RP 6463 was issued to Kaluau for LCA 8672 (Apana 1, 2, and
3). By deed dated January 7, 1875, recorded in the Bureau of
Conveyances, Haleanau, Kaluau’s sister, and Kaluau-Opio, Kaluau's
nephew, and their spouses, conveyed all of their title in LCA
8672 to Kshololio, Fetitioners are the descendants and heirs of

Kehololio, sister to Kaluau.

"(.. scont smues)
Tess, she wae léving with her brother, Richardeon, who was
ow deceased; (2) she saw Kalapuna, Plena, and Pooweuweu,
ow seceaced, place their "x" marks to the deed? and (3)
he and Hopu, she wor now deceased, signed their nanes to
the Seed af subscribing witneeces:

Heiluks korspusiness Cox, 122 Ha

The date of Richardson's desth is not clear but it apparently took
ine between 1855, when he received the deed, and 1860, ahen the
Jolt allegée ie apona 2.

 

 

SL at 245, 145 P.3e at 768

 

 

  

ftrators of his estate conveyed the property ii

 

 

‘The deed fron Richardson te Leuzeds se not contained in the record
on eppeel.
‘se4v0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!
Petitioners argue that, as a result, as of 1875, all of

Kaluau's real property, including Apana 1 and Apana 3, belonged
to Kshololio or her heizs and assigns. Through mesne
conveyances, Wailuku acquired the property it alleges is Apana 1
fon Novenber 20, 1894

n.

a.

on February 7, 2002, Wailuku commenced its quiet title

action. Thereafter, Petitioners filed their answer. On
october 7, 2002, Wailuku filed a motion for sunmary judgment on

matters not pertinent to this petition.

 

on December 31, 2002, Petitioners filed a memorandum in
opposition te that sunmary judgment motion and attached 2
declaration (first declaration) from Patsy Moana Kamaleiiani,
also known as Patey M.K. Kai (Kai). Kai related that she had a
Master’ s Degree in Library Studies and a Certificate in Archives
from the University of Hawai'i at Manos. she also stated that she
“nals} conducted research into land, tax, court, genealogical,
historical, vital statistic records in order to put together a
report/history concerning [LCR] 8672, [RP} 6483, to [Kaluau),
situate at Waikepu, Maui, Hawai'l.” She recounted thet as 2
result of her investigation, she discovered that the Second
Circuit Court, Probate No. 649 declared “Kaluau’s heirs as

two sisters) and (Kaluau-Opio},

 

[kahololio] and [Haleamau) (

 

(hig nephew) since Kaluau’s parents are dead” and that “the
document refers to all three properties of LCA 8672.” She
‘s++¥0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+#

 

further stated that “(iJ January 1678, (Haleamau) and (Kaluau-
opio] conveyed their interests in [Keluau’s] property to
(Kaholelio]." Finally, Kai stated that she “found no information
contained in Wailuku's records which clearly and specifically
articulates the manner in which Wailuku has acquired an interest
in Apenas 3 and 3, when such interest was acquired, from whom the
interest was acquired or other information which would support
its claim to both parcels” and claimed that additional time wes
neceseary to gain more information from Wailuku concerning its
elaine.
B.

On February 4, 2003, Wailuku filed its summary judgnent
Notion on Apana 1, In that motion, Wailuku argued that it was
vested with paper title or title by adverse possession to Apana
2, Wailuku claimed that the declarations of Katsumi Tadakuma
(Tadakuna), Kenao Nochizuki (Mochizuki), Dando, Suzuki, and
Chunbley evidence that (1) “{Wailuku) and ite predecessors
epenly, netoricusly, continuously, and exclusively used Apana 1
for sugar cane cultivation from as early as 1936 to the late

1980's, and for pineapple cultivation from the late 1980's to

 

1997"; and (2)"[Wailuku’s) lessee, Mavi Pineapple Company Ltd.,
has openly, notoriously, continucusly, and exclusively used Apana

1 for pineapple cultivation from 1997 te [the] present."

the articovste
ed at. (Wastuks)

£ Pando, Susubl,
or the prt 26

 
  

and Chuntley,

 

years and. neved a Apena 1.” He further
Geciared what he Knowledge” that "(Z]rom as early a 1974 to the
(eontinded. =)
 

‘s++TOR PUBLICATION IN MESH’ ® HANAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER‘+#

Petitioners thereafter filed their opposition to the

sunmary judgment motion on Apana 1. In their opposition,
Petitioners clined thet there were “genuine issues of material
fact concerning (Wailuku’s] clim to Apana 1” and that “ (Wailuku)
is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Petitioners
aiso “rel(Jed) upen and incorporated) by reference . . . all
evidence and argunents previously raised and filed in opposing
ieiluku’s October 7, 2002 Summary Judgment Motion” and attached a
new declaration of Kai (second declaration) .*

In this opposition, Petitioners also included the

declaration of Taira, a Hawaiian language translator, certifying

Dp. continued)
ate 1966s Ikadlona) and ite predecessors openly, notoricusly, continuously,
snd exclusively used the land for sugar cone cultivation” and *(f]rom the late
isso" to 1987, (Wailuku) and ite predecessors openly notoriously,

iuouslyy, and exclusively eeed the lend for pineapple cultivatios
ys he stevec that “{f]¥om 1987 to [the] present, Maui Pineapple Company,
Lids, Lessee of [Mailake,| nee openly, notoriously, continuously, and
Chclusively used the land for pineapple coltsvation.” Chunbley, as president
Of Fallukuy made the zane assertions ae Cando as te the aqverse postession
Cleneate and clained “knowledge of the facts... based ch recoras end maps
Eegeraing land use.” Suzukiy who deciarea ne had’ “worked at (wailuke) for the
poet 24 years and (was) familiar with the Land seeignated as Apana 1,” also

20. Dano’ ¢ seatenent:

 

 

        

 

 

“tn ite decision, the ICA refers to one of Kai's declarations,
which appears to be the second declaration, and states:

 

The declaration ef [Kai], whe stated that che has a Master's
Degees in Library Studies and s Cersifscate in Archives from
the University of Hawaii at Nance end thet, Based on her

id other government records,
Raluso's mother’s came wae Kekiu, ‘not Mekt. Kai referred
fo number of exhibite attoened te her declaration which
fhe clained raises genuine iseues ef material fact regarding
the validity of the Deed to Richardson from which Malik
Elsined paper title te Apana 1. Koi claimed that these
Socumente Gencnstrated that the Oeed tc Richaraeon wae not
Signed by Kekiu, a2 required fer a valid paper title, and
the dead else did not describe the land being conveyed a=
pans 1 of {LCk] 6092, thut calling into questsen wnich
perce of land was actually conveyed to Richardson,

 

   

 

 

 

 

at 600,

 

tinese Con, 112 Hawal"l at 287, 148 P.

 
 

‘++F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

 

to the truth and correctness of his Hawailan-to-English
translation of (a) the LCA 8672, RP 6483 grant of the subject
property to Kaluaus (b) the deed from Kalapuna and others to
Richardson, dated October 13, 1855; (c) the application by

Kehololio te the Circuit Judge of the “Second District,” seeking

to be appointed as administrator and heir to “all the estate of
[Kaluay], the deceased”; and (d) the deed from Haleanau and
Kaluau-Opio to Kahololio, granting Kahololio all of their “Joint
and individual interests in all the estate of (Kalueu) of
Waikapu, Maui,” dated January 7, 1878, recorded at the State of

Hawai'i Bureau of Conveyances at Liber 51, pages 305-306, all of

which were attached to his declaration.

 

on March 7, 2003, the court's order granting Wailuku's
motion for summary judgment and directing entry of final judgment
on Apana 1, was filed, In its order the court ruled that,
“{hjaving reviewed the menorands and other material submitted,
and having heard oral argument, the [clourt finds that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact as to (Wailuku’s} title
to the land by adverse possession and concludes that (Wailuku) is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Emphasis added.)
c.

on March 19, 2003, Wailuku filed its Summary Judgment
Motion on Apana 3. Wailuku argued that it was the owner of Apana
3 by adverse possession because the testimony referred to supra
“evidences that [Wisiluku] and its predecessors openly,
notoriously, continuously, and exclusively used Apana 3 for sugar

10
FOR PUELICATION IN WEST! § HAKAZ'T REPORTS AXD PACIFIC REPORTERY+#

 

 

cane cultivation from as early as 1938 to the late 1980's, and
for pineapple cultivation from the late 1960's to 1997."*

Petitioners filed their opposition to the summary
judgment motion on Apana 3 and argued thet “(1) (Wailuku) failed
to meet its burden of proof in presenting evidence of notice to
all cotenante not in possession . . . [of its] intent to
adversely possess the subject property"; "(2) {Wailuku} has not
complied with Hawai'i law in establishing quiet title by adverse
possession, and (3) [Petitioners] have a strong interest in
controlling Apana 3.”

on April 28, 2003, the court's order granting
Respondent's sunnary judgment motion and directing entry of final
judgnent on Apana 3 was filed and stated that, “{hlaving reviewed

the memoranda and cther material submitted, and having heard oral

 

azgunent, the [clourt finds that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact as to (Wailuku's) title to the land by adverse
possession and concludes (Wailuku) is entitled to judgment as a
matter of lew." (Emphasis added.) The orders granting summary
judonent regarding Apana 1 and Apana 3 were reduced to a final

Judgment on dune 2, 2003.

 

attached to the sunmary judgnent motion for Apsna 3 we
declarstions of Danse, Suauki, ond Chinbley. Ae with Apsna 2, Cando #imiJerly
testified that ne use equally’ familiar with Apena’2 ang thet *[f]rom a2 eefly
551994 [Wsisko) one $= predecessors cpenly, notoriously, continously, and
Geclusively usea the land for suger cane cultivation” and *[f]rom the lave
TSe0"s to 1997 (Waiiuko} and ite prececessors, openly, netericusiy,
Sontsnvouely, ane exclusively uses the land for pineapple cultivation.”
Susukd end Chuabley also affimmed Dando'e declarations as to Apans

 

 

 

 

 
 

‘*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST! § HAMAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

 

on June 27, 2003, Defendants filed their notice of
appeal. Wailuku did net cross-appeal.
mt.
Before the ICA, Petitioners argued that (1) Wailuke
failed to establish all elements of its clain of adverse

ion as to Apana 1; (2) Wailuku failed to establish all

 

poss
elenents of its claim of adverse possession as to Apana 3 and
(3) Wailuku relied on inadmissible hearsay evidence in its claim
of adverse possessicn of Apana 1 and Apana 3. On August 1, 2006,
the ICA affirmed the court's grant of summary judgment as to both
Apana land Apana 3. Wailuku Agribusiness Co., 112 Hawai'i at
260, 145 P.3d at 603.
wv.
In their application Petitioners raise two questions:
1, Did the ICA er in concluding that summary
judgment was properly granted By [the court) to [Wasloks)

wath respect fo Apana J and Apana 3 of [LCA] €€72, (RP)
eeeze

 

 

2, Did the Ick incerzectiy opply the principles of

(Benneti gupeal, in concluding that’ {Watluka] was entities
toApana and Apana ® by adverse posseseion?

 

In its opposition motion, Wailuku does not directly respond to
the specific questions but argues that (1) “[t)he [ICA]
theroughly addressed the principles of [Bennett)"; (2) “this
appeal does not deal with any issue of first impression...
{but} deals with the elements of adverse possession, which have
been addressed cn numerous occasions by the Hawaii Supreme
Court”; and (3) “this case does not deal with any issue of public

interest.”
“s4B0R PUBLICATION TN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER'+#
Petitioners’ questions together raise the issue of

whether the court correctly granted summary judgment and the ICA
was right in affirming the court. The discussion following,

then, centers on the evidence pertaining first, to Apana 1 and

 

second, to Apana

v.
As to Apana 1, Petitioners contend in their application
that the ICA erred because “(1) [Wailuku failed) to establish by
clear and positive proof ali elements of its claim of adverse
possession to Apana 1” and "(2) genuine issues of material fact”
exist. They maintain (a) “[t]he initial conveyance of Apana 1
from Kalepuna, Piena and Puweuweu to [Richardson] was defective
since none of the grantore had proper right, title or interest te
convey to [Richardson,]” (b) “[a]seuming arguende that
(Richardson properly) acquired {the} iands(,) . . . (t]he (dJeed
conveying ‘all that piece of land situate in Kuaiwa, Waikapu,
Maui,’ arguably, conveyed Apane 2, and not Apana 1[,]” (c) “there
is 2 genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether
{Wailuku} and/or [ite] predecessors in interest were aware and
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been
aware and should have known of the presence of cotenants to Apana
2” and “[Wailuku) failed to provide credible, probative evidence

of any efforts made to notify al] cotenants net in possession of

 

ntent to exercise adverse possession|.]”

 

Emphasizing the last proposition, Petitioners, relying

on Morinove vy, Rov, 86 Hawai'i 76, 83, $47 P.2d S44, 951 (1987),

 
/++FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REFORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER®+#

 

Bennett, §7 Haw. at 209, 552 P.2d at 1390, and Petran v
Allencastre, $2 Hawai'i 545, 548, 985 P.24 1112, 1215 (app. 1999),
argue (1) “Haleamau’s and Ksluau-Opic's Deed dated January 7,
1875, recorded in the Bureau of Conveyances, State of Hawaii, at
Liber 51, pp. 305-306, which legally transferred all of their
Fight, title and interest in LCA 6672 to Kahelolie, effectively
served as notice to all of Kaholclic’s ownership interest”;

(2) “Kahololic’s heirs and descendants, as title owners of public
record to Apana 1 and 3, are and were cotenants who were entitled
to notice”; and (3) “{Wailuku] and/or its predecessors in
interest were aware and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have been evare and should have known that Kahololio
was the owner of Apana 1 and 3."

According to Petitioners, “{Wailuku] argued that there
were no cotenants a a matter of law[,] . . . contendiing) that
‘{Waituku] and its predecessors had no reason to suspect that a
cotenancy existed.'" As Fetiticners note, Kailuku points “to the
1855 (a)eed purportedly conveying Apana i from Kalapuna, et al.,
to [Richardson] as proof because the conveyance of ‘that entire
piece of land at Kuaiwa, Waskepy, Maui’ would not have (led) it
to suspect s cotenancy."" Petitioners assert that, consequently,
“ino evidence supporting [Wailuku's} position was submitted{,
thus t)he ICA and the trial court erred{.]"

Petiticnere further maintain that, contraetingly,

“Kahclolic’s descendants, Jade Miyamoto and Wayne Chun, expressed

 

in declarations submitted to the [court] the absence of any

uu
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST! HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

knowledge or notice that [Wailuku] was intending to exercise
adverse possession over Apana 1” while “[Wailuku’s) claims that
pana 1 and 3 were used . . . ‘openly, notoriously, continuously,
and exclusively . . . for sugar cane cultivation’ [are based on}
statements (that) are conclusory and are not predicated upon
personal knowledge or specific factual knowledge.”
vn.
As to Apana 3, Petitioners maintain the unresolved

“(glenuine iseves of material fact . . . (are) (1) whether

 

Petitioners are cotenants of Apana 3; (2) whether [Wailuku] acted
in good faith by notifying Petitioners of its claim of adverse

} and (3) whether [Wailuku] met all

 

possession to Apana
requirements of proving title through adverse possession.”
According to Petitioners, (a) “{Wailuku's) claim to Apana 3

parently derives from its taking of land in close proximity to

 

other lands possessed by it without regard to ownership or
title(,]" (b) “la] simple title search of the Bureau of
Conveyances would have yielded information concerning the
ownership by the heirs of Kahololio[,]* (c}) “{Petitioners} have
previously contended that Apana 3 contains the burials of their
ancestors(,] - . . (but Wailuku's] alteration of Apana 3 after
the litigation commenced caused the removal and destruction of
identifying characteristics . . . in the determination of burial
sites{,)" and (6) “{Wailuku) relied upon declarations of
(Tadekuna], (Mechizuki], (Dando, Suzuki, and Chumbley] which

contain conclusory statements . . . [barred by Hawai'i Rules of

4s
{s*4F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+*

 

Evidence (HRE)] Rule 602 . . . [and] exhibits . . . not

 

admissible because of the lack of proper foundation and
authentication and noncompliance with (Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure (HRCP)] Rule S€(e)." (Capitalization omitted.)
vir

On appeal, the ICA was required to follow the rule that
“Iain award of sunnary judgment is reviewed de novo under the
sane standard applied by [the court).” french v. Pizza Hut
Ince, 105 Hawai'i 462, 466, 99 P.3d 1046, 1050 (2004) (citing

Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv, Co., 74 Haw. 85, 106, 839

P.2d 10, 22 (1992) (citations omitted)). “summary judgment is

 

appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers te
interrogatories, and adnissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party ie entitled tos judgment as a
matter of law.” sev st og indus.
16, 147 P.3d 785, 800 (2006) (quoting

 

Relations, 113 Hawai'i
Amfac, Inc., 74 Haw. at 104, 639 P.2d at 22 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). "*A fact is material if proof of
that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one
of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense

asserted by the parties.'" Morinoue, 86 Hawai'i at 60, 947 P.2d
at 948 (quoting Hulemen v. Henmeter Dev, Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 61,

647 P.2d 723, 716 (1982)). In @ motion for eunmary judgment,

 

 

“fa}il evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most

 

favorable to the non-moving party." Erench, 105 Hawai'i at 466,

16
 

‘s*+FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

99 P.3d at 1050 (citing Maguire v, Hilton Hotels Comp, 79 Hawai'i
110, 112, 899 P.24 393, 395 (1995))
vant.
At the outset, Petitioners contend that the

declarations of Tadakuma, Mochizuki, Dando, Suzuki, and Chumbley,

 

relied on by the ICA to determine adverse possession of both
Apana 1 and Apana 3, were barred by HRE Rule 602" because they
were “unsupported by any specific information establishing their
personal knowledge of the statements made.” They further

maintain that the exhibits were inadmissible because they did not

comply with HRCP Rule S6(e). As to the declarations, the ICA

 

held that the declarations of “Tadakuma and Mochizuki . . . were
inadmissible under . . . HRCP Rule $6(e).” Wailuku Agribusiness

Cou, 112 Hawai"s at 255, 145 P.3d at 798.
Regarding the declarations of Dando and Suzuki, the ICA
indicated that “the declarations were made on perscnal knowledge,
[as] evidenced by the statements that Dando and Suzuki were
employees of [Wailuku] for twenty-eight and twenty-four years,
respectively, and were ‘familiar with the land designated as

‘" and “stated, based on their personal knowledge, that

 

Apana 1,
Apana 1 was used for sugar cane and pineapple cultivation . . .

g] the [relevant] periods[.)" Id. As to Chunbley

 

idur

 

Geclaration that he is “the President of [Wailuku], [and has)
knowledge of the facts stated [therein based on records and maps
Howai't Rule of Evidence (HRE) Rule #02 provides that “[hlesreay

is not acnissitle except ae provided by these roles, or by other rules
preteribed by the Hawel's tuprene court, or by stetute.”

 

7
 

‘s+0FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER

 

regarding land use,” the TCR, citing Stallard v, Consol. Maus
Inc., 103 Hawai'i 468, 476, 63 F.36 731, 739 (2004), stated that
“facts set forth in an affidavit . . . based on personal
knowledge may be reaconably inferred from the position and nature
of the affiant.” Wailviy Aeribusiness Co., 112 Hawai'i at 256,
1a5 P34 at 799.”

The ICA also indicated that the declaration of Colleen
H, Uahinet (Uahinui) did not satisfy HRCP Rule 56(e) because
“Uahinui did not attach sworn or certified copies of the
docunents she relied on to establish the facts set forth in her
declaration, . . . except{) [for] . . . Frazier’s
translation of the deed from Kalapuna, Piena, and Puuweuweu to
Richardson, which Frazier attested was translated ‘truly and
correctly... .1" Id. A review of the affidavits

ates the ICA’s conclusions. It dees not appear that for

 

substan

 

ely erred in

 

the reasons given in its opinion, the ICA g
affirming adniesion of these documents.
1.
In order to establish title to real property by adverse
possession, 2 claimant “‘mst bear the burden of proving by clear
and positive proof each elenent of actual, open, notorious,

hostile, continuous[,] and exclusive possession for the statutory

» _h copy ef all the exnibite consisting cf map of Apene 1, 2 lease
ef Jang, ang seria photor of D'ana'of an arrigation layout ef Agana 1y
sere attached to Caumbiey"® affiderit, and ey vireue ef hit knowledge oe
President of the company, the exhibite wovle eppesr te be properly
aothentseates.

   

 

18
‘++FOR PUBLICATION J MES®’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS#

 

period." Petran, 91 Hawai'i at $$6-$7, 985 P.2d at 1123-24
(quoting Lad, 58 Haw. at 368-69, S69 P.2d at 387 (brackets
omitted)). Actual, open, and notorious possession is established
where @ claimant shows “‘use of the land to such an extent and in
such a manner as to put the world on notice’ by means ‘so
notoricus as to attract the attention of every adverse
claimant.’ Morinove, 86 Hawai'i at 62, 947 P.2d at 950 (quoting
Cheek v. Wainwright, 269 S.£.2d 443, 445 (Ga. 1980). “The
element of hostility is satisfied by showing possession for
oneself under a claim of right[,]” and “[s]uch possession must
import a denial of the owner’s title.” Petran, 91 Hawai'i at 557,
985 P.20 at 1124 (quoting Okuna v. Nakahuna, 60 Haw. 650, 656,
594 P.2d 128, 132 (1979)}. Continuity and exclusivity of
possession require that the “adverse possessor’s use of a
disputed area . . . rise to that level which would characterize
an average owner’s use of similar property.” Id. (quoting
Tenala, Lid. v. Fowler, $21 P.2d 1114, 1119 (Alaska 1996).

As the ICA noted, “(t]he declarations of Dando, Suzuki,
and Chunbley . . . set forth facts that establish the open,

ssion elements for establishing

 

notorious, and continuous po:

% Between 1698 and 1973, the statutory pericd for establishing titie
te real property by posceteion was ten yesre, Meringue, 66 Hawai'i at
Fi cg, BAT B24 ot S4o m6 felting Lai vs Kakahike, 56 Haws 362, 67 net, 565
P.2g shz, 386\n.4 (1977) (citing 1698 Haw Seee- 1. Act 18)). Although the
xtendes to twenty yeare in 1373, thie change cid net affect
Selonte that hag already matures” prior to that cate. 1d (citing HRS § 669"

1°1578)7 1973 How. Sees. L. Act. 26, 8 € a 32). Therefore, te have
2 prina facie cece ef adverse postessicn for pana 1, waliuka
required £0 show that the sienente cf sdverse persereion hed been sstisiied
fer elther a ten-year period between 2595 {when it alleged st began te use
pana 1 for sugar cane cultivation) and 1973, or for a twenty-year period on 2
Chess Brought sfter 1973, wasiues alleges more than $0 years of continuous
Gee of Apana 1, thue it appears to satisfy elther statutery period.

1s

    

 

 

    

       

    

 

 

 
'FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*#*

title by adverse possession.” Wailuku Agribusiness Co,, 112

Hawai'i at 256, 145 P.3d at 798, Specifically, Wailuku and its

 

predecessors openly, notoriously, continuously, and exclusively
used Apana 1 for sugar cane cultivation from as early as 1935 to
the late 1980's, and for pineapple cultivation from the late
1980's to 1997. Further, Wailuku's lessee, Maus Pinespple
Company Ltd., has openly, notoriously, continuously, and
exclusively used Apana 1 for pineapple cultivation from 1997 to
the present.

The declarations set forth above do not specifically
allege thet Wailuku's claim was hostile. However, as the ICA
noted, where all the other elenents of adverse possession have

been met, there is generally a presumption of hostility.

 

 

ier, and such possession Ts onexpiaitied,
Gitner by showing that it wes under a lease fren cr sther
Gontract with or otherwise by permission ef the true owner,

Ed. at 252, 145 P.3d at 795 (quoting Eioneer Mil] Co, utd. y,

Dow, 90 Hawai'i 289, 299, 978 P.2d 727, 737 (1999) (citation

 

 

omitted) (emphases added)). “Thus, if the presumption of
hostility remains unrebutted by the nonnovant, the presumption of
hostility would satisfy the movant’s burden of proving the
elenent of hostility.” Eioneer Mill Co., 90 Hawai"i at 299, 978
P.2d at 737 (citations omitted).

The ICK, applying the latter presumption, concluded
that because a prima facie case of the other elements of adverse
possession was shown, the elenent of hostility was met. Thus

20
‘se0F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER‘*#

 

based on the declarations, the ICA concluded that adverse

possession was proven:

[Although the (1855) deed {to Richardson], on its face, did

enticn (Alpane 1 or define the metes and
of the ignd being conveyed, the declarations of
Dando, Surukt, and Chonbley that Wailoke or ite
predecessors, under color of the 1655 deed, had been using
Kesna 1 for agricultural purposes for the statutory period
peevide evidence ef hailutu's hostile and exclusive
possession of Apene 1

    

 

fiasluku Acribusiness Co., 112 Hawai'i at 286-57, 145 P.3d at 799-
800. However, as this court has noted, where a cotenancy exists
there is a “special burden in proving hostile possession” that
requires the cotenants making a claim of adverse possession “to
show that they had acted in good faith in relation to their
cotenants.” Morinoue, 86 Hawai'i at 82, 947 P.2d at 950 (citing
Bennett, 57 Haw. at 209, 552 F.2d at 1390).

Betran noted that in Bennett, this court concluded that
“a tenant in common shares a general fiduciary relationship with
his cotenants{.]” 91 Hawai" at $54, 985 P.2d at 1121 (quoting

Haw at 208, $52 P.2d at 1390) (emphasis in

 

Bennett,
original]). Because cf this fiduciary relaticnship, "a tenant in
commen claiming adverse possession must prove that he or she
acted in good faith towards the cotenants during the statutory
period.” Id. (brackets and citation omitted). The requirement

of good faith will, in most cases, “mandate that the tenant

 

adversely must .
heor she is claiming against them.” Id. (quoting Eennett, $7

Haw. at 208, 552 P,2d at 1390) (brackets and citation omitted)

(emphasis in original). But, in certain exceptional

2a
 

{S*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

circumstances the good faith requirement may be satisfied with

 

less than actual notice:

 

Bates a good faith reasonable effort to notify the cotenants
Dut is unable to locate then; or where the actual knowledge
that the tenants out of possession already have actual
knowledge that the tenant in possession 1s cla

adversely t0 their interests

 

    

Id, at 554-55, 985 P.2d at 1121-22 (citation omitted) (enphasi
in original). “In these Limited circumstances, the notice
requirement will be satisfied by constructive notice and ‘ope:
and notorious possession.’ Id. at $58, 985 P.2d at 1122
(citation omitted). Accordingly, if Petitioners are cotenants
with Wailuku in Apana 1, Wailuku was requized, in proving hostile
possession, “to show that (st) had acted in good faith in
relation to [its] cotenants." Morinoue, 86 Hawai'i at 63, 9¢
P.2d at 950 (citing Bennett, $7 Haw. at 209, 562 P.2d at 1390)

 

Additionally, according te Betzan, “(ujnder Bennett,
finding of bad faith’ may be inferred from evidence that the
‘cotenant in possession . . . ought to have known chat there

euisted a cotenancy.'’” Petran, 91 Hawai'i at 956, 985 P.2d at
1123 (quoting Bennett, 57 Haw. at 211, 552 F.2d at 1391)

(ellipses and enphasis in original). In that regard, “publicly
recorded conveyances evidencing the existence of  cotenancy in
land may render a cotenant’s belief that he or she had no reason
to suspect the cotenancy’s existence not objectively reasoneble
under the rule set forth in (Bennett, supra].” Id, ot 548, 98
F.2d at 1125. Thus, the burden is on Wailuku “affirmatively to
‘adduce evidence that there was ‘no reason to suspect that a

22
‘++¥0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*+*

cotenancy exist{ed].‘” Morinove, 86 Hawai'i at 83, 947 P.2d at

951 (citation omitted).

x

aA

Based on the record, genuine issues of material fact

remain as to whether Wailuku acted in good faith towards its
purported cotenants in Apana 1. The court apparently rejected
Wailuku’s paper title argument and made its ruling based solely
on the adverse possession claim. Wailuku did not cross-appeal on
the paper title issue." However, in its motion for sunmary
judgment, Wailuku argued that it had both paper title and title
by adverse possession to Apana 1. Specifically, Wailuku argued
vapana 1 wae granted in 1852 to Kaluau, who died intestate
survived by his mother, [Kekiv] and father(, Kalapuna)." Tt
contended thet Kekiu predeceased Kalapuna and in 1855, Kalapuna
“conveyed ‘that entire piece of land at Kuaiwa, Waikapu, Maui’ to
[Richardson], after which title vested by mesne conveyances in

[Wailukw)." Wailuku assumed for purposes of summary judgment

 

“chat if Kaluau’s property descended to his mother, [Kekiu) and

father, [Kelapuna), equally, and if (Kekiul did not convey during

 

  

Ste dtecuesion of Apana 2, the ICA noted that the court's
aeeunption that paper title did not exist wae not attacked on appeal
the court) essumed that eiloky aid not have valid paper
Since thir assumption hae not been
, our examination focuses on whether
Hailulo eetablisned the matersal fects necessary to
eetablieh the essential elements of ite adverse possession
Glin to (Alpena 1 for which Kailuks sought sumeary Sudguent
fn ite favor

Waiivks Aeribusiness Cou, 152 Hawai's at

    

 

MMS Fad at 798.

 
{S#4F0R FUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+®

 

Life, then title co her 1/2 interest descended equally to her

¢ from whom [Petitsoner:
m (Kal er husband’ e 1855 convevan:

Juhu! decessor w 2
interest.” (Emphasis added.) The foregoing indicates it is
Wailuku's contention that, even assuming Wailuku and/or its
predecessors were cotenants with the heirs of Kaluav’s mother,
summary judgment should nevertheless be granted. However,
assuming a cotenancy existed, it was incumbent upon Wailuku to
prove it acted in good faith towards cotenants upon claiming
adverse possession.

8
Moreover, the 1875 conveyance of Apana 1 by way of the

deed from Haleamau and Keluau-Cpic and their spouses to Kahololio
was filed in the Bureau of Conveyances. Thus, the interest of
Kahololio and her descendants in the subject property was
seeningly @ matter of public record when Wailuku and ite
predecessors clained adversely beginning from 1935 to the late
1980" through sugar cane cultivation, and from the late 1980's

to 1997 for pineapple production. That fact would weigh against

 

4 finding that Wailuku’e belief in the non-existence of a
cotenancy was objectively reasonable. See Bennett, $7 Haw. at
210, $52 P.26 at 138i (stating that “the standard of good faith
includes an objective requirement of reasonableness”). The

recording of deeds ensures that the public, including Wailuku,

would be afforded notice of the property interests detailed in
‘s++F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

 

the deeds and of potential claims to the property. Deeds serve
as notice “*to those who are bound to search the record.’”

Petran, $1 Hawai'i at $86, 985 P.2d at 1123 (quot

 

¢ In ze Nelson,
26 Haw. 608, €20 (1923)).
Even if the 1858 deed to Richardson by Kalapuna,

Kaluau's father, Piena, and Puweuweu, purports to convey Kaluau’s
ventire” piece of property at Waikapu, a question of fact exists
as to whether Wailuku's belief was objectively reasonable in
Light of the 1875 deed on record at the time Wailuku claimed
adverse possession began. See Bennett, 57 Haw. at 211, $52 P.2d
at 1381 (concluding that “[t}he existence or nonexistence of

color of title is one factor for the jury to consider in

 

evaluating whether a party in possession reasonably believed
himself to be sole owner”); see also Morinoue, 66 Hawai'i at 83,
947 P.2d at 961 (determining that where an adverse possessor
ebtained conveyances through quitclaim deeds and neither deed
expressly purported to transfer full title, genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether the plaintiffs should have
known of the existence of cotenants)

Evidence from publicly filed documents, viewed in the

Light most favorable to Petitioners

 

the nonmoving parties,
Exench, 105 Hawai'i at 466, 99 P.3d at 1050, suggests @ cotenancy
may exist among Wailuku and Kahololic’s heirs. Under these

circunetances, there remain genvine issues of material fact as to

whether Wailuku and its predecessors had no reason to suspect the
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

existence of a cotenancy and, thus, were not required to serve

 

notice of a hostile claim to Apana 1.

‘That Wailuku and its “predecessors were totally
ignorant of the cotenancy” would not absolve them of the notice
requirement. Betran, 91 Hawai'i at $55, 985 P.2d at 1122 (quoting
Bennett, 57 Haw. at 210, £82 P.2d at 1381) (brackets omitted).
“Rather, the standard of good faith includes an objective
requirement of reasonableness, in addition to a subjective
requirenent that the claimant believes himself or herself to be
the sole owner.” Id, (citation and brackets omitted). In
Betran, the ICA determined that such questions are to be

determined by the trier of fact and stated:

Whether or not such cersons believed that ther:

 

hevcase,” (ganuete, $7 sow. st 201, S82 Fe20 at Last
nile tthe existence or nonexistence of color of title se
fone factor fer the jury to coneiger in evaluating whether ¢
party in possession reasonably believed hinself for herself]

-_Suidence that the cotenant in
Bossession tnew or oloht “te have known that thereaneted @
selenancy —_ualld go touards tustifvings finding of bad

 

 

 

Eotran, 91 Hawai'i at 555, 985 P.2d at 1122 (citation and brackets
omitted) (emphases added).

Wailuku would be required to prove that “that there had
been no reason for the tenants in possession ({Wailuku) or [its]
predecessors) to suspect the existence of a cotenancy.” Id.
(citation and brackets omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus,

whether or not Wailuku acted in good faith towards its cctenants

 

would be a genuine issue of material fact to be determined by the

26
 

//*POR FUBLICATION IN MEST!§ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

trier of fact and, hence, summary judgment was improperly granted

as to Apana 1, and the CA gravely erred in affirming sunmary
judgment.
xi.

As to Apana 3, Wailuku only clained title to Apana 3
through adverse posession." Therefore it must be shown that
Wiailuks was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law with
respect to Apana 3. In support of its summary judoment motion on
Apans 3, Wailuku submitted evidence similar to that submitted on
Apana 1 and included declarations from Tadakuma, Mochizuki,
Dando, Suzuki, and Chumbley. See supra note 15. As noted
earlier, the ICA determined the declarations from Tadakuna and
Mochizuki were inadnissable and relied on the declarations of
pando, Suzuki, and Chunbley as evidence that Wailuku had
established @ prima facie case of adverse possession of Apana 3.

The declarations of Oands, Suzuki, and Chunbley
attached to Wailuku’s motion for summary judgment indicate that
Wailuku and its predecessors openly, notoriously, continuously,
and exclusively used Apana 3 for sugar cane cultivation from as

early as 1935 to the late 1980's and for pineapple cultivation

In ite opening brief, Fetitionere contended that Wailuku did net
exercise good faith tonards its Cotenante se required by Bennett becasice
SIWolloke! and ite predecestore were aware and knew, oF in the exercise cf
rearonable core, should have seen euare and chould have known of the existence
Ef cetenonts to Apana. 3." Petitioners forther stated that "(Wasluke

Cengesed that it hae no paper title te Apana. 3."

However, Wailuku correctly responded that the “Bennett mandate
he tenant claiming adversely must actualy notary bie cotemante thst he
ng adversely against then’ Ie nct applicable if no record title ie
estes sn the adverse possession tatle cisimant.” Petitioners’ reply was that

“fal Luke) ‘acknowledges it possesses no record title to Apena 3 and “the
recers oh appeal 1s devoid ef any basis fer [Nailuku] te sesert color of title
te Apans 3."

 

 

        

 

       

 

  

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERY#

from the late 1960"s to 1997, Ae noted supra, there is a
presunption of hostility where all the other elenente of adverse
possession have been met. Here, because Wailuku has shown its
open, notorious, continuous, and exclusive possession of Apana 3
for the statutory period,” the presumption of hostility applies.
Petitioners have not rebutted the presumption of hostility, thus,
Wailuku has established @ prima facie case of adverse possession
of Apana 3

As to Petitioners’ argument that they are cotenants
with Wailuku on Apana 3, the ICA noted that “Petitioners set
forth no evidence that Wailuku had any record title to (Alpana 3
that conflicted with (Fetitioners’) inherited interest in Apana
3” and concluded that because there wae no “evidence of a
cotenancy between Wailuku and [Petitioners], the legal principles
governing cotenancy were inapplicable to [A]pana 3 as a matter of
Jaw." Wailuku Agribusiness Co. 112 Hawai'i at 258, 145 P.3d at

802. In holding thusly, the ICA did not gravely err in

 

determining Wailuku was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
fon Apana 3.
xIr.
For the reasons stated sbove, the ICA’s August 1, 2006

published opinion affirming the June 2, 2003 judgment of the

 

\ In order te establish s prime tacie case of adverse possession
for Apans 2, Wailuky woe required to thow that all elements had been eatisvied
for either a ten-year periea between 1935 (when ite alleged use ef Apena 2 for
sugar cone cultivation began) end 1973 or for a twenty-year persed ona claim

ser fee guura note 16 explaining the epplicable statutory

ching title through agverse son). Wailuke alieges

Bore then £0 years of continuous use of Apana 3, thus it appears to eatery
either statueary peri

 

 

    

 

     

    

 

28
‘44F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S WAWAZ'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERY+®

court in favor of Wailuki Agribusiness on the grounds of adverse

possession ag to Apana 1 is reversed and that part of the case is

remanded to the court in accordance with this opinion; the ICA

opinion is affirmed as to Apana 3.

Kevin H.S. Yuen, on the
application for petitioners/
defendants-appellants.

Gary G. Grinmer and
Melissa #. Lambert (Carlemith
Ball LLP), in opposition for

respondent /plaintiff-appellee.

 

Gro

Dharma

Decesees CON teeing ee