Title: Ex parte W. F., W.L.C., and R. J. J.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

rel: 10/30/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2015-2016
____________________
1131472
____________________
Ex parte W.F., W.L.C., and R.J.J.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: W.F., W.L.C., and R.J.J.
v.
State of Alabama)
(Lowndes Circuit Court, CC-13-35; CC-13-36; CC-13-37;
CC-13-38; CC-13-39; CC-13-40; CC-13-41; CC-13-42; and
CC-13-43;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-13-1188)
MOORE, Chief Justice.
1131472
R.J.J., W.L.C., and W.F. (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the petitioners") were convicted in the
Lowndes Circuit Court of hunting after dark, hunting from a
public road, and hunting with the aid of an automobile. The
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed their convictions by an
unpublished memorandum. W.F. v. State (No. CR-13-1188, Aug.
22, 2014), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014)(table). We
granted their petition for a writ of certiorari to review the
Court of Criminal Appeals' decision.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On January 3, 2013, the petitioners, who were juveniles
at the time, met at R.J.J.'s house. They loaded groceries into
a truck with the intent of taking the groceries to a hunting
cabin in Lowndes County belonging to a relative of one of the
petitioners. W.F. brought his new AR-15 rifle along and placed
it in the backseat of the truck. According to R.J.J., he and
the other two petitioners are "gun enthusiasts," and W.F.
brought the rifle 
along 
for "[s]afety and protection." R.J.J.,
who has a permit to carry a concealed weapon in Alabama,
testified that he carries a gun wherever he goes, including
when he travels at night. He further testified that the
2
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magazine for W.F.'s rifle was on the truck's front center
console.
At approximately 6:30 or 6:45 p.m., the petitioners left
R.J.J.'s house. R.J.J. drove, W.F. was in the front passenger
seat, and W.L.C. was in the backseat. They intended to drop
the groceries off at the cabin and then return immediately to
R.J.J.'s house because R.J.J.'s parents had ordered pizza for
them.
After the petitioners had driven for approximately 15 or
20 minutes, R.J.J. pulled up to a stop sign on Brown Hill Road
at the intersection of Brown Hill Road and Highway 29. W.L.C.
and R.J.J. testified that the truck came to a complete stop
and that they waited at the stop sign to allow a car traveling
south on Highway 29 to pass through the intersection before
proceeding. W.L.C. testified that the windows of the truck
were up at the time and that no shots were fired from the
truck. Both R.J.J. and W.L.C. testified that W.F.'s rifle was
not fired at any time that night.
Russell Morrow, a retired conservation and enforcement
officer for the State of Alabama and a reserve deputy for the
Lowndes County Sheriff's Department, lives on Brown 
Hill Road.
3
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Morrow testified that the area is frequented by wildlife,
including deer. After nightfall at approximately 7:00 p.m. on
January 3, 2013, Morrow was standing next to his vehicle near
his house. From that vantage point, he could see a truck
stopped at the stop sign approximately 140 yards away. The
left turn signal on the truck was engaged. Morrow could not
see any individuals through the windows of the truck. Morrow
testified, in contradiction to W.L.C. and R.J.J., that there
was no southbound traffic on Highway 29 at the time.
Morrow testified that "the truck sat there and sat there.
Then I heard two high powered rounds go off from the vehicle."
Morrow has 25 years of experience in law enforcement and
testified that he was familiar with the sound of a firearm.
Morrow believed, but did not know for sure, that the sounds
came from the driver's side of the truck. Morrow did not see
a muzzle flash and could not see any intended target.
After he heard the shots, the truck turned left and
headed south on Highway 29. Morrow got into his own vehicle
and followed the truck as it traveled south on Highway 29 and
then onto another road before stopping at a gate outside the
hunting cabin. The petitioners got out of the truck to open
4
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the gate, and Morrow got out of his vehicle. Morrow and the
petitioners provided different accounts of the conversation
that ensued.
Morrow testified that he asked the petitioners "what they
were shooting at" and that they denied shooting at anything.
Morrow testified that one of the petitioners "said that it was
firecrackers" that Morrow had heard but that, when Morrow
asked the petitioners to show him the firecrackers, the
petitioners "said it wasn't firecrackers" and acknowledged
that they had a rifle in the truck.
W.L.C., however, testified that Morrow "yelled at us,"
saying "that we shot something back at the stop sign or he
said we shot the stop sign, shot a deer." According to W.L.C.,
Morrow repeatedly stated that the petitioners had fired a
weapon while the truck was stopped at the intersection, and
the petitioners denied doing so. R.J.J. testified that Morrow
first accused the petitioners of shooting a pistol at a stop
sign, but that then Morrow "kind of changed it" and asked
"where was the deer, and things of that nature." R.J.J.
testified that Morrow asked where the pistol was and that
R.J.J. said that they had a rifle. W.L.C. testified that
5
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Morrow asked the petitioners if they had a gun in the vehicle
and that the petitioners said that they did. Morrow told the
petitioners that he was going to call the sheriff's
department.
The petitioners unlocked the gate and drove up to the
cabin. They locked the gate behind them to prevent Morrow from
following them. From outside the gate, Morrow could see
movement and "lights where they were going in and out" of the
cabin, but he could not make out what the petitioners were
doing. W.L.C. testified that he and the other petitioners were
unloading the groceries from the truck and placing them inside
the cabin. Morrow said that the petitioners remained in or
around the cabin for 30 minutes.
While the petitioners were at the cabin, Morrow contacted
Lowndes County Sheriff John Williams, who dispatched two
deputies to the cabin. Before the deputies arrived, the
petitioners pulled the truck up to the gate as if to leave.
Morrow blocked the gate and told the petitioners that they
could not leave until the sheriff deputies arrived. Deputy
Reginald McKitt and Deputy Andrew Bryant were the deputies who
responded to the scene. Deputy McKitt testified that
6
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approximately 30 minutes had passed from the time he was
dispatched until he arrived at the cabin. Morrow told Deputy
McKitt that he had heard gunshots coming from the petitioners'
truck when the truck was stopped on Brown Hill Road. Deputy
McKitt asked the petitioners if there was a weapon in the
truck, and they confirmed that there was. Deputy McKitt asked
for permission to search the truck, and the petitioners
consented to the search.
Deputy McKitt discovered W.F.'s unloaded rifle, with no
magazine inserted, in the rear floorboard of the truck.
Although Morrow testified that the rifle was equipped with a
flash suppressor, R.J.J. said that the rifle did not have a
flash suppressor but that it did have "a compensator that
reduces kick." The deputies testified that the rifle smelled
as though it had been cleaned with cleaning fluid, and Morrow
opined that the rifle had been "freshly wiped down with a
solvent." W.L.C. testified that the rifle was not cleaned that
night.
Deputy McKitt testified that he could not determine if
the weapon had been fired recently. He further testified that
he did not find a magazine in the truck. However, R.J.J. and
7
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W.L.C. testified that the magazine was in the truck and that
the magazine contained tracer rounds. According to W.L.C.,
"tracers are a phosphorous tip that, when shot from a gun, it
glows. You can see it travel like a line through the sky --
through the air, especially at night." Morrow testified that
he had not seen the alleged shots.
Morrow asked the deputies to perform a computer check of
the serial number of the rifle, and he assisted them in
locating the number. Deputy McKitt testified that "nothing
came back in the system about the weapon." The rifle was
returned to the truck, and all parties left the scene. Morrow
testified that, in his opinion, an AR-15 rifle firing
ammunition out of the window of a vehicle would have thrown
the shell casings back into the vehicle. Deputy McKitt did not
find any shell casings in the truck. The next morning, Morrow
searched for but found no shell casings in the area near the
stop sign at the intersection of Brown Hill Road and Highway
29.
On January 7, 2013, Morrow signed out arrest warrants
against the petitioners for hunting after dark, hunting from
a public road, and hunting with the aid of an automobile. The
8
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Lowndes Circuit Court granted the petitioners' request to be
tried as youthful offenders and consolidated their cases for
trial. The circuit court held a bench trial at which Morrow,
the deputies, W.L.C., and R.J.J. testified. At the close of
the State's evidence, the petitioners moved for a judgment of
acquittal, arguing that the State failed to prove their guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The State opposed the petitioners'
motion on the ground that it had established a prima facie
case of the petitioners' guilt under Rogers v. State, 491 So.
2d 987 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985). The circuit court denied the
petitioners' motion. At the close of all the evidence, the
petitioners again moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the
court again denied.
At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court found
the petitioners guilty of hunting at night in violation of §
9-11-235, Ala. Code 1975,  hunting from a public road in
1
Section 9-11-235 provides, in pertinent part: 
1
"It shall be unlawful, except as to trapping as
otherwise provided by law, for a person to take,
capture, or kill, or attempt to take, capture, or
kill any bird or animal protected by the laws of
this state between sunset and daylight of the
following day, except that the Commissioner of
Conservation and Natural Resources may by a duly
promulgated regulation, allow the taking, catching,
9
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violation of § 9-11-257, Ala. Code 1975,  and hunting with the
2
or killing of raccoons or opossums between sunset
and daylight in any county or counties within the
state. ...
"Any person violating this section shall be
guilty of a Class B misdemeanor and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be punished for the first offense by
a fine of not less than two thousand dollars
($2,000) nor more than three thousand dollars
($3,000) and may be imprisoned in the county jail
for a period not to exceed six months. In addition,
the 
court 
shall 
revoke 
all 
hunting 
license
privileges for a period of three years from the date
of conviction."
Section 9-11-257 provides:
2
"Any person, except a duly authorized law
enforcement officer acting in the line of duty or
person authorized by law, who hunts or discharges
any firearm from, upon, or across any public road,
public highway, or railroad, or the right-of-way of
any public road, public highway, or railroad, or any
person, except a landowner or his or her immediate
family hunting on land of the landowner, who hunts
within 50 yards of a public road, public highway, or
railroad, or their rights-of-way, with a centerfire
rifle, a shotgun using slug or shot larger in
diameter than manufacturer's standard designated
number four shot, or a muzzleloading rifle .40
caliber or larger in this state, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be
punished for the first offense by a fine of not less
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), and shall be
punished for the second and each subsequent offense
by a fine of not less than two thousand dollars
($2,000) and shall have all hunting license
privileges revoked for one year from the date of
conviction."
10
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aid of an automobile in violation of Rule 220-2-.11(1), Ala.
Admin. 
Code 
(Department 
of 
Conservation 
and 
Natural
Resources).  The circuit court ordered each of the petitioners
3
to pay $4,000 in fines plus court costs, revoked their hunting
privileges for 3 years, and sentenced them to 6 months in the
Lowndes County jail for the night-hunting conviction, 30 days
for the hunting-with-the-aid-of-an-automobile 
conviction, and
30 days for the hunting-from-a-public-road conviction, the
sentences to be served concurrently. The circuit court
suspended the petitioners' jail sentences and placed them on
unsupervised probation for two years. The petitioners moved
for an arrest of judgment and a judgment of acquittal or, in
the alternative, a new trial. That motion was denied by
operation of law.
The petitioners appealed their convictions and the denial
of their postjudgment motion to the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously affirmed the
Rule 220-2-.11(1) provides: 
3
"It shall be unlawful to concentrate, drive,
rally, molest or to hunt, take, capture or kill or
attempt to hunt, take, capture or kill any bird or
animal from or by the aid of
"(1) Any automobile ...."
11
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judgment of the circuit court in an unpublished memorandum and
denied the petitioners' application for rehearing. The
petitioners then petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari. We granted the petition to consider the argument
that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming
their convictions conflicts with Alabama precedent requiring
the State to prove (1) every element of an offense and (2)
that the accused acted with a culpable mental state.
II. Standard of Review
"A motion for a judgment of acquittal tests the legal
sufficiency of the evidence." State v. Grantland, 709 So. 2d
1310, 1311 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).
"'In 
determining 
the 
sufficiency 
of 
the 
evidence
to sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must
accept as true all evidence introduced by the State,
accord 
the 
State 
all 
legitimate 
inferences
therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution. Faircloth v. State,
471 So. 2d 485 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984), aff'd, 471 So.
2d 493 (Ala. 1985).' Powe v. State, 597 So. 2d 721,
724 (Ala. 1991). It is not the function of this
Court to decide whether the evidence is believable
beyond a reasonable doubt, Pennington v. State, 421
So. 2d 1361 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982); rather, the
function of this Court is to determine whether there
is legal evidence from which a rational finder of
fact could have, by fair inference, found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis v.
State, 598 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. Cr. App. 1992). Thus,
'[t]he role of appellate courts is not to say what
12
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the facts are. [Their role] is to judge whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to allow submission
of an issue for decision [by] the [fact-finder].' Ex
parte Bankston, 358 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Ala. 1978)
(emphasis original)."
Ex parte Woodall, 730 So. 2d 652, 658 (Ala. 1998). "'"This
Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal cases de
novo."'" Ex parte Knox, [Ms. 1131207, June 26, 2015] ___ So.
3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2015) (quoting Ex parte Morrow, 915 So. 2d
539, 541 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d
1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003)).
III. Discussion
The petitioners challenge the sufficiency of the State's
evidence. They contend that the State produced no evidence
indicating that the petitioners had in their possession an
artificial light suitable for night hunting and that the State
produced 
tenuous 
evidence 
indicating 
that 
the 
petitioners 
were
in an area frequented by protected wildlife. The petitioners
also contend that the State's circumstantial evidence failed
to link the petitioners to the shots allegedly fired and that
evidence of two shots fired could not support three hunting
convictions. Finally, the petitioners contend that the State
failed to prove that the petitioners had the intent to hunt.
13
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The State suggests that the petitioners are improperly
challenging the weight of the evidence on appeal. According to
the State, the circuit court was in the best position to make
the findings that the headlights on the truck were suitable
for night hunting and that the area where the shots were
allegedly fired was frequented by wildlife. The State also
argues that the determination of the petitioners' intent was
best left to the circuit court as the finder of fact. 
In opposing the petitioners' motion for a judgment of
acquittal made at the close of the State's evidence, counsel
for the State argued:
"And, Judge, under Rogers v. State[, 491 So. 2d
987 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985)], a prima facie case for
night hunting is established when the State
demonstrates that the accused is in an area where
... deer or other protected animals are thought to
frequent, has in their possession a weapon or other
device suitable for taking, capturing, or killing an
animal protected by State law at night and where the
appella[nt] was discovered after dark in an area
inh[a]bited by deer having in his possession a rifle
suitable for taking deer, that the evidence of
guilty intent is sufficient under Rogers v. State
for that.
"The other charges were hunting from a public
road, which he has testified as to and the Court can
take judicial notice as to Highway 29 and Brown Hill
Road being a public road here in Lowndes County.
14
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"Also, hunting from a vehicle, he has testified
as to the vehicle. So the actual taking is not
required, Judge, to show a prima facie case. Just
the frequented area that has protected animals, the
possession of a weapon, in this case, also a
vehicle, and it being after dark. And he's testified
to the shots being fired from the vehicle."
As demonstrated by counsel's argument, the State pursued a
theory of liability based on Rogers v. State, 491 So. 2d 987
(Ala. Crim. App. 1985), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals
stated:
"We find, based upon the language of § 9-11-235,
Code of Alabama 1975, that a prima facie case for
night hunting is established when the state
demonstrates that the accused (1) is in an area
which deer or other protected animals are thought to
frequent, (2) has in his possession a light, and (3)
has in his possession a weapon or other device
suitable for taking, capturing, or killing an animal
protected by state law, (4) at night."
491 So. 2d at 990 (opinion on return to remand). The State
introduced evidence to show that, at night and in an area
frequented by "protected animals," the petitioners had in
their "possession" "a light," i.e., the headlights or left
turn signal on the truck and that they had in their
"possession" W.F.'s rifle. Under Rogers, the State is not
required to show that an accused fired a weapon: mere
possession of a weapon and a light at night in an area
15
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frequented by wildlife constitutes sufficient proof of night
hunting. Therefore, evidence indicating that shots were fired
from the truck in which the petitioners were traveling, though
referenced by the State on appeal, is not necessary to support
the State's theory of culpability under Rogers.
Although only § 9-11-235 (night hunting) was before the
Court of Criminal Appeals in Rogers, the State in this case
relied on Rogers as support for the charges that the
petitioners violated § 9-11-257 (hunting from a public road)
and Rule 220-2-.11(1) (hunting with the aid of an automobile).
Having offered evidence under Rogers to establish that the
petitioners were hunting after dark, the State sought to
establish prima facie cases of the other charges by
introducing evidence of an additional fact to support each
respective charge: Specifically, the State produced evidence
indicating that the petitioners were in an automobile and on
a public road at the time they "possessed" the rifle and light
at night in an area frequented by wildlife. The State thereby
invoked Rogers to support all three hunting charges.
However, the State argues to this Court, as it argued to
the Court of Criminal Appeals, that the evidence also
16
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supported a finding that each of the petitioners was guilty of
aiding and abetting the others in the commission of the
charged offenses. "A person is legally accountable for the
behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with
the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense
... [h]e aids or abets such other person in committing the
offense ...." § 13A-2-23(2), Ala. Code 1975. "For one to be
convicted as an aider or abettor, evidence showing an offense
to have been committed by a principal is necessary, although
it is not required that the principal be convicted or even his
identity established." Evans v. State, 508 So. 2d 1205, 1207
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
"Complicity 
is 
a 
theory 
for 
imposing 
criminal
culpability, for which aiding and abetting may be an element."
Ex parte Farrell, 591 So. 2d 444, 447 (Ala. 1991). In the
circuit court, however, the State did not pursue a complicity
theory by attempting to prove that each of the petitioners
rendered assistance to the others in the commission of hunting
offenses. Rather, the State pursued a theory under Rogers by
seeking to prove that each petitioner was in possession of a
weapon and a light at night in an area frequented by wildlife.
17
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The State may not advance a new legal theory on appeal that it
failed to argue below. Ex parte Knox, supra. Thus, evidence
that one of the petitioners contrived a story about
firecrackers when questioned by Morrow, while potentially
relevant to an aiding-and-abetting theory, is not relevant to
the theory the State pursued in the circuit court. The
sufficiency of the State's evidence in this case stands or
falls on Rogers.
In evaluating the State's reliance on Rogers, we must
consider whether the elements of a prima facie case of night
hunting as stated in Rogers are consistent with the night-
hunting statute. The night-hunting statute, § 9-11-235,  
makes
it a class B misdemeanor to "take, capture, or kill, or
attempt to take, capture, or kill any bird or animal protected
by the laws of this state between sunset and daylight of the
following day." (Emphasis added.) Thus, under the statute,
attempting to hunt after dark is equivalent to the completed
offense of night hunting. Clearly, under the facts here, where
there is no evidence indicating that a protected bird or
animal was taken, captured, or killed, the State could prove
only an attempt.
18
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"A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
with the intent to commit a specific offense, he does any
overt act towards the commission of such offense." § 13A-4-
2(a), Ala. Code 1975. "An attempt to commit a crime consists
of three elements: First, the intent to commit the crime;
second, the performance of some overt act towards the
committing of the crime; and, third, the failure to consummate
the crime." Ard v. State, 358 So. 2d 792, 793 (Ala. Crim. App.
1978). The elements of night hunting as set out in Rogers do
not include the taking, capturing, or killing of a protected
bird or animal. Consequently, the theory of 
liability advanced
in Rogers, if valid, requires only a showing that the accused
attempted to take, capture, or kill a protected bird or animal
at night.
Therefore, the dispositive issue before us is whether
merely possessing a weapon and a light at night in an area
frequented 
by 
wildlife, 
without 
any 
other 
attendant
circumstances, constitutes attempted hunting at night, a
violation of § 9-11-235. Although one guilty of criminal
attempt must intend to commit the crime, the elements of night
hunting as set out in Rogers do not include a culpable mental
19
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state. Thus, the validity of Rogers depends on whether the
elements set out in that case establish both (1) an overt act
toward the commission of night hunting and (2) specific intent
to hunt at night.
We consider whether possessing a light and a weapon
suitable for hunting, at night and in an area frequented by
wildlife, is an overt act toward the commission of hunting
after dark. In Minshew v. State, 594 So. 2d 703 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1991), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals considered
whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
a 
defendant's
conviction for attempted murder. After repeatedly threatening
to kill the victim, the defendant was later discovered hiding
behind a truck in the driveway of the victim's residence with
a loaded .357 magnum derringer. The court referenced both the
defendant's prior threats and his possession of a loaded
firearm as sufficient indicia of his intent to kill. Also,
because of the defendant's prior threats, "[t]he jury was
therefore warranted in drawing the conclusion that his intent
was to kill, and by lying in wait, armed, at [the victim's]
residence, he had performed an overt act towards the
effectuation of that intent." 594 So. 2d at 712.
20
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Minshew 
considered 
evidence 
indicating 
that 
the 
defendant
possessed a firearm in a place that might yield the
opportunity to commit a crime in light of all the attendant
circumstances; Rogers, however, authorizes trial courts to
consider similar evidence in a vacuum. Whereas 
the 
defendant's
prior threats in Minshew helped make his subsequent conduct an
overt act toward the commission of a criminal offense, the
Court of Criminal Appeals in Rogers determined that certain
conduct always qualifies as an overt act, regardless of the
attendant 
circumstances. 
We 
must 
determine 
whether 
the 
conduct
specified in Rogers, taken by itself, satisfies Alabama's
criterion of an overt act toward the commission of a criminal
offense necessary to constitute an attempt in every
conceivable situation.4
Although 
the 
soundness 
of 
Rogers 
presents 
this 
Court 
with
4
a question of law and not of fact, we are mindful that the
facts of the instant case exemplify the extreme to which the
theory of liability in Rogers may be pushed. Rogers involved
a defendant, with a gun slung over his shoulder, circling a
pasture on his motorcycle and using the headlight of the
motorcycle to pan the pasture. When a conservation officer
attempted to stop the defendant, the defendant gunned the
motorcycle and sped to a nearby house. He went inside and
removed his shirt, shoes, and socks in an apparent attempt to
create the impression that he had not been out of the house.
The defendant was charged with and convicted of hunting at
night. Here, by contrast, the State sought to establish that
riding down a public road in a truck with a weapon inside
21
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"An 'overt act' is more than 'mere intention' or
'preparation' to commit a specific crime. Whiddon v.
State, 53 Ala. App. 280, 283, 299 So. 2d 326, 329-30
(1973). 'The attempt is complete and punishable,
when an act is done with intent to commit the crime,
which is adapted to the perpetration of it, whether
the purpose fails by reason of interruption, or for
other extrinsic cause. The act must reach far enough
towards the accomplishment of the desired result to
amount to the commencement of consummation.' Id.
(Emphasis added.)"
 
Ex parte A.T.M., 804 So. 2d 171, 174 (Ala. 2000).
"'Preparation alone is not sufficient. Something more is
required than mere menace, preparation, or planning.'"
Minshew, 594 So. 2d at 709 (quoting Whiddon v. State, 53 Ala.
App. 280, 283, 299 So. 2d 326, 329-30 (1973)). To prove an
attempt, the State must show that the defendant "made any
move" to perform activity constituting the core of the
underlying offense. A.T.M., 804 So. 2d at 174.
In Ex parte James, 468 So. 2d 889 (Ala. 1984), this Court
considered whether a defendant convicted of first-degree
robbery had committed an overt act toward the commission of
attempted theft. Attempted theft requires "some overt act in
constituted "possession" of a weapon, and that, if the turn
signal or headlights of the truck were engaged, the occupant
was in "possession" of a light for purposes of night hunting.
We consider Rogers as it may be applied to any situation, and
we do so in light of its illustrative application to the
relevant circumstances of the instant case.
22
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furtherance of a completed taking away or carrying away of the
personal property of another." 468 So. 2d at 891. Like
attempted 
night 
hunting 
and 
completed 
night 
hunting, 
attempted
theft and completed theft are one and the same offense. See §
13A-8-40, Ala. Code 1975.
The defendant in James told the assistant manager of a
Winn-Dixie grocery store that another man standing at the
register had a gun, and he instructed the assistant manager to
"do as he says." 468 So. 2d at 890. The Court held that the
defendant's statement did not constitute attempted theft
because "it appears that no property was touched, that the
defendant did not attempt to touch any, and that defendant did
not ask for, or even remotely allude to, any property." 468
So. 2d at 891.
Rogers is inconsistent with the requirement of A.T.M. and
with our application of that requirement in James--that one
committing criminal attempt make some move to perform the
activity forming the core of the underlying offense. Although
the core of theft is asportation of property, the core of
night hunting is the taking, capturing, or killing of a
protected bird or animal. Merely traveling in a vehicle with
23
1131472
a weapon through the habitat of protected wildlife at night
falls short of making a move that amounts to "the commencement
of consummation" of the offense. A.T.M., 804 So. 2d at 174.
Such acts may be "remote preparatory acts not reasonably in
the chain of causation," but they do not constitute attempt.
Huggins v. State, 41 Ala. App. 548, 550, 142 So. 2d 915, 917
(1962).5
In stating the prima facie elements of night hunting in
Rogers, the Court of Criminal Appeals set a lower evidentiary
standard of proof than does the night-hunting statute itself.
However, the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers
precludes the judiciary from changing a criminal 
offense. 
Beck
v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 662 (Ala. 1980). "[A] court may
explain the language [in a statute], but it may not detract
from or add to the statute ...." Water Works & Sewer Bd. of
There must be some showing of intent to commit the crime
5
alleged. For example, to be convicted of the crime of
possession of burglar's tools, § 13A-7-8, Ala. Code 1975, it
is "insufficient to establish that he had a felonious intent"
to show that a defendant merely possesses "common hand tools
such as a hammer, a screwdriver, pliers, etc., which could
facilitate a forcible entry into premises." McGlon v. State,
504 So. 2d 745, 746 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). See also id., 504
So. 2d at 746 (emphasizing it is "the intention to use the
'explosive, tool, instrument or other article' in the
commission of a 'forcible entry' or 'theft by a physical
taking'" that is "the most important element of the offense").
24
1131472
Selma v. Randolph, 833 So. 2d 604, 607 (Ala. 2002) (quoted
with approval in City of Prichard v. Balzer, 95 So. 3d 1, 3
(Ala. 2012)). Appellate courts are "'not at liberty to rewrite
statutes.'" Walker v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 85 So. 3d
1008, 1012 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (quoting Ex parte Carlton,
867 So. 2d 332, 338 (Ala. 2003)).
Because we determine that the conduct specified in Rogers
as constituting a prima facie case of night hunting does not,
by itself and in every case, constitute an overt act toward
the commission of the offense of night hunting, we need not
determine whether such conduct creates the reasonable
inference that the actor intends to hunt after dark. The
theory of night hunting crafted by the Court of Criminal
Appeals in Rogers is inconsistent with the statute making
night hunting a criminal offense.
This Court has never relied upon Rogers. Indeed, this
Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
in the only decision that has referenced Rogers. In Phillips
v. State, 771 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), the Court of
Criminal Appeals held that hunting over a baited field, a
violation of § 9-11-244, Ala. Code 1975, is a strict-liability
25
1131472
offense with no requirement of a culpable mental state. The
court noted that Rogers similarly did not require proof of a
culpable mental state for the offense of night hunting. We
reversed that court's judgment in Ex parte Phillips, 771 So.
2d 1066 (Ala. 2000), holding that a culpable mental state is
an element of hunting over a baited field in the absence of an
express statement in the statute to the contrary. See § 13A-2-
4(b), Ala. Code 1975 ("A statute defining a crime, unless
clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict
liability, states a crime of mental culpability.").
Because our review in the instant case presents this
Court with its first opportunity to address Rogers, we are not
going to decline to pass upon the validity of that case merely
because it is assumed by the parties. See Travelers Indem. Co.
of Connecticut v. Miller, 86 So. 3d 338, 347 (Ala. 2011)
(expressly overruling a case without being asked to do so
because the case was an "aberration" upon which this Court had
not sufficiently relied, and reversing the judgment of the
court below). Accordingly, we decline to follow Rogers.
In determining whether, in the absence of Rogers, the
State made out a prima facie case of each of the charged
26
1131472
hunting offenses, the applicable standard is substantial
evidence: 
Whether 
the 
convictions 
are 
supported 
by 
substantial
evidence, i.e., "evidence of such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can
reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be
proved." American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 624 So. 2d
1362, 1366-67 (Ala. 1993) (quoting West v. Founders Life
Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)).
The State has failed to prove the offenses by substantial
evidence.
The State invoked Rogers as the basis of all the hunting
charges against the petitioners. Because we reject Rogers
today, and because the State has failed to present substantial
evidence that the petitioners are guilty of the charged
hunting offenses, all of the petitioners' convictions must be
vacated. As noted previously, the State did not try the case
below on the theory that each of the petitioners aided and
abetted one another in the commission of the charged hunting
offenses. That theory, therefore, is no longer available to
the State, because "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial
when a conviction is reversed solely on the basis of an
27
1131472
insufficiency of the evidence." Lindley v. State, 728 So. 2d
1153, 1157 (Ala. 1998). We therefore reverse the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand for that court to
instruct the circuit court to vacate the petitioners'
convictions and sentences and to enter a judgment acquitting
the petitioners of all charges.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Parker and Wise, JJ., concur.  
Murdock and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.  
Stuart, Bolin, Shaw, and Main, JJ., dissent.
28
1131472
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
The elements of illegal hunting (or attempted illegal
hunting) as described in Rogers v. State, 491 So. 2d 987 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1985), do not equate to the elements of the
offenses described in §§ 9-11-235 and 9-11-257, Ala. Code
1975, and Rule 220-2-.11(1), Ala. Admin. Code (Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources), specifically in relation
to the elements of intent and an overt act.  I  agree that
this Court should not follow Rogers.  I concur in the result
reached by the main opinion in this case.
29
1131472
STUART, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to
reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
affirming the convictions of W.F., W.L.C., and R.J.J.
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the petitioners")
for various hunting offenses.  The main opinion states: 
"We granted the petition to consider the argument
that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals
affirming their convictions conflicts with Alabama
precedent requiring the State to prove (1) every
element of an offense and (2) that the accused acted
with a culpable mental state."
___ So. 3d at ___.  The judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals affirming the 
trial 
court's denial of the petitioners'
motion for a judgment of acquittal does not conflict with
precedent requiring the State to present sufficient evidence
of every element of the offenses of night hunting, hunting
from a public road, and hunting from a vehicle to sustain the
convictions.  The Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that to
establish a prima facie case of those offenses the State must
present evidence of each element of the offenses, including
the requisite culpable mental state;  conducted a review of
the evidence to determine whether the State had presented
sufficient evidence of every element of the offenses; and
30
1131472
concluded that the evidence in the record established a prima
facie case that the petitioners did engage in night hunting,
hunting on a public road, and hunting from a vehicle.  
The main opinion states:
"In determining whether, in the absence of
Rogers [v. State, 491 So. 2d 987 (Ala. Crim. App.
1985)], the State made out a prima facie case of
each of the charged hunting offenses, the applicable
standard is substantial evidence: Whether the
convictions are supported by substantial evidence,
i.e., 'evidence of such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the
fact sought to be proved.'  American Nat'l Fire Ins.
Co. v. Hughes, 624 So. 2d 1362, 1366-67 (Ala.
1993)(quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989))."
___ So. 3d at ___.
I believe the following is a more complete statement of
the applicable law:
"When a motion [for judgment of acquittal] is
made on the ground that the State has failed to
establish a prima facie case, it is the duty of the
trial court to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence 
to 
sustain 
a 
conviction 
under 
the
indictment.  In its determination, the trial court
should consider only the evidence before the [trier
of fact] at the time the motion is made and must
consider it most favorably to the State.  When there
is legal evidence from which the [trier of fact]
could, by fair inference, find the defendant guilty
[of the offense charged], the trial court should
submit [the case to the trier of fact for
determination]. ..."
31
1131472
Andrews v. State, 473 So. 2d 1211, 1213-14 (Ala. Crim. App.
1985).  Moreover, "[i]n dealing with the sufficiency of the
evidence no conviction should be had upon guesswork and
suspicion, but must be based upon substantial evidence as to
every material element of the crime of such a character as to
convince a fair and impartial jury of the guilt of the
accused."   Blue v. State, 246 Ala. 73, 79, 19 So. 2d 11, 16
(1944).
When a defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal at the
close of the State's case, at the close of all the evidence,
or in a posttrial motion, the defendant is asking the trial
court to determine, as a matter of law, whether the State
presented sufficient evidence of each element of the charged
offense to sustain a conviction.  A conviction is based upon
evidence supporting a finding that the defendant violated a
statutory offense.  The elements the State must prove to
sustain a conviction are provided by the legislature in the
statute defining the offense, not by the judiciary in caselaw
and not by counsel in argument.   As the main opinion
recognizes, "the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers precludes the judiciary from changing a criminal
32
1131472
offense.  Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 662 (Ala. 1980)." ___
So. 3d at ___.  Therefore, because an appellate court is
"'"not at liberty to rewrite statutes,"'" ___ So. 3d at ___,
and "'may not detract from or add to the statute,'" ___ So. 3d
at ___, the elements of an offense can be found only in the
statute charging the offense and cannot be changed by caselaw.
In other words, although an appellate court may interpret a
statute defining an offense, it cannot change the elements
required to prove the offense.  The sufficiency of the State's
evidence to sustain a conviction does not stand or fall on
proof of the elements of an offense as defined in caselaw; the
sufficiency of the State's evidence to sustain a conviction
stands or falls on the proof of the elements of the offense as
provided by the legislature in the statute.  Thus, a trial
court, when determining whether the State has presented
sufficient evidence of each element of an offense to sustain
a conviction, must determine if the State presented
substantial evidence of each element of the offense as the
offense is defined in the statute.  Appellate review of the
trial court's decision likewise rests upon whether the State
presented sufficient evidence of the elements of the offense
33
1131472
as defined by the statute.   See Ex parte Bankston, 358 So. 2d
1040, 1042 (Ala. 1978)("The role of appellate court is not to
say what the facts are.  Our role ... is to judge whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to allow submission of an issue
for decision [by the trier of fact].").
"'In 
reviewing 
a 
conviction 
based 
on
circumstantial evidence, this court must view that
evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution.  The test to be applied is whether the
[the trier of fact] might reasonably find that the
evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except
that of guilt; not whether such evidence excludes
every reasonable hypothesis but guilt, but whether
a [trier of fact] might reasonably so conclude. 
United States v. Black, 497 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. McGlamory, 441 F.2d 130 (5th
Cir. 1971); Clark v. United States, 293 F.2d 445
(5th Cir. 1961).
"'"(W)e must keep in mind that the test to
be applied is not simply whether in the
opinion of the trial judge or the appellate
court the evidence fails to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt;
but rather whether the [trier of fact]
might so conclude.  Harper v. United
States, 405 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1969);
Roberts v. United States, 416 F.2d 1216
(5th Cir. 1969).  The procedure for
appellate review of the sufficiency of the
evidence has been aptly set out in Odom v.
United States, 377 F.2d 853, 855 (5th Cir.
1967):
"'"'Our obligation, therefore, is
to 
examine 
the 
record 
to
determine whether there is any
34
1131472
theory of the evidence from which
the [trier of fact] might have
excluded every hypothesis except
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Rua v. United States, 5 Cir.,
1963, 321 F.2d 140; Riggs v.
United States, 5 Cir., 1960, 280
F.2d 949. In Judge Thornberry's
words,
"'"'"... the standard
utilized by this Court
is not whether in our
opinion 
the 
evidence
and 
all 
reasonable
inferences 
therefrom
failed to exclude every
hypothesis other than
guilt, 
but 
rather
whether 
there 
was
evidence from which the
[trier of fact] might
r e a s o n a b l y  
s o
conclude."  Williamson
v. United States, 5th
Cir., 1966, 365 F.2d
12, 
14. 
(Emphasis
supplied)"'
"'"The sanctity of the [trier-of-fact] function
demands that this court never substitute its
decision for that of the [trier of fact].  Our
obligation is [to] examine the welter of
evidence to determine if there exists any
reasonable theory from which the [trier of
fact] might have concluded that the defendant
was guilty of the crime charged."  McGlamory,
441 F.2d at 135 and 136.'
"Cumbo v. State, 368 So. 2d 871, 874-75 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1978)."
35
1131472
Salva v. State, 885 So. 2d 231, 236-37 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
The petitioners were charged with hunting at night, a
violation of § 9-11-235, Ala. Code 1975; hunting from a public
road, a violation of § 9-11-257, Ala. Code 1975; and hunting
with the aid of an automobile, a violation of Rule 220-2-
.11(1), Ala. Admin. Code (Department of Conservation and
Natural Resources).
The legislature defined the offense of night hunting as
follows:
"It shall be unlawful, except as to trapping as
otherwise provided by law, for a person to take,
capture, or kill, or attempt to take, capture, or
kill any bird or animal protected by the laws of
this state between sunset and daylight of the
following day, except that the Commissioner of
Conservation and Natural Resources may by a duly
promulgated regulation, allow the taking, catching,
or killing of raccoons or opossums between sunset
and daylight in any county or counties with the
state. ...
"Any person violating this section shall be
guilty of a Class B misdemeanor and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be punished for the first offense by
a fine of not less than two thousand dollars
($2,000) nor more than three thousand dollars
($3,000) and may be imprisoned in the county jail
for a period not to exceed six months. In addition,
the 
court 
shall 
revoke 
all 
hunting 
license
privileges for a period of three years from the date
of conviction.
36
1131472
"No 
provision of 
this section 
shall 
be 
construed
to prohibit the nighttime hunting of foxes with
dogs."    
§ 9-11-235, Ala. Code 1975.
The legislature defined the offense of hunting from a
public road as follows:
"Any person, except a duly authorized law
enforcement officer acting in the line of duty or
person authorized by law, who hunts or discharges
any firearm from, upon, or across any public road,
public highway, or railroad, or the right-of-way of
any public road, public highway, or railroad, or any
person, except a landowner or his or her immediate
family hunting on land of the landowner, who hunts
within 50 yards of a public road, public highway, or
railroad, or their rights-of-way, with a centerfire
rifle, a shotgun using slug or shot larger in
diameter than manufacturer's standard designated
number four shot, or a muzzleloading rifle .40
caliber or larger in this state, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be
punished for the first offense by a fine of not less
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), and shall be
punished for the second and each subsequent offense
by a fine of not less than two thousand dollars
($2,000) and shall have all hunting license
privileges revoked for one year from the date of
conviction."
§ 9-11-257, Ala. Code 1975.
The offense of hunting with the aid of an automobile is
defined as follows:
"It shall be unlawful to concentrate, drive,
rally, molest or to hunt, take, capture or kill or
37
1131472
attempt to hunt, take, capture or kill any bird or
animal from or by the aid of
"(1) Any automobile ...."
Rule 
220-2-.11(1), 
Ala. 
Admin. 
Code 
(Department 
of
Conservation and Natural Resources).
Because the foregoing statutes and rule do not include an
express statement of mens rea, § 13A-2-4(b), Ala. Code 1975,
provides the culpable mental state, stating:
"Although no culpable mental state is expressly
designated in a statute defining an offense, an
appropriate culpable mental state may nevertheless
be required for the commission of that offense, or
with respect to some or all of the material elements
thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily
involves such culpable mental state.  A statute
defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a
legislative intent to impose strict liability,
states a crime of mental culpability."
In Ex parte Phillips, 771 So. 2d 1066 (Ala. 2000), this
Court addressed whether evidence of a culpable mental state
was required to sustain a conviction for hunting on a baited
field, see § 9-11-244, Ala. Code 1975.  Like the statutes and
the rule defining the offenses of night hunting, hunting on a
public road, and hunting from a vehicle, the statute defining
hunting on a baited field does not designate a culpable mental
state.  In Ex parte Phillips, this Court held that application
38
1131472
of § 13A-2-4(b), Ala. Code 1975, required that evidence of a
"low level of mental culpability" be presented to sustain a
conviction for hunting on a baited field.  This Court held
that the evidence must show that the defendant "either knew or
should have known that the area over which he was hunting was
baited."  771 So. 2d at 1068. 
Reading §§ 9-11-235, 9-11-257, Rule 220-2-.11(1), and §
13A-2-4(b) in pari materia, a person commits the offenses of
night hunting, hunting on a public road, and hunting from a
vehicle when a person knew or should have known that he was
taking, capturing, or killing, or attempting 
to 
take, 
capture,
or kill a protected bird or animal at night on a public road
and from a vehicle.  Thus, to establish a prima facie case of
night hunting on a public road and from a vehicle, the State
must present evidence that the defendant 1) knowingly 2)
engaged in the taking, capturing, or killing or in the attempt
to take, capture, or kill 3) a protected bird or animal 4)
from a vehicle 5) located on a public road 6) at night.  
6
It is worthy of noting that the legislature when defining
6
the offense of taking deer at night in § 9-11-251, Ala. Code
1975, specifically included as an element of the offense the
use of a light.  Section 9-11-251 provides:  "It shall be
unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to take, capture
or kill deer at night in Alabama by any means or device,
39
1131472
A review of the record establishes that the State
presented sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioners
were hunting at night from a vehicle on a public road. 
Russell Morrow, the retired conservation and enforcement
officer for the State of Alabama and a reserve deputy for the
Lowndes County Sheriff's Department, testified that he 
saw 
the
petitioners, stopped on a public road at night, in a vehicle
with its left turn signal and headlights engaged; that he
heard two high-powered shots fired from inside the vehicle;
that the rural area in which the petitioners had stopped the
vehicle was frequented by wildlife; that the weapon retrieved
from the petitioners' vehicle after they had been in the
hunting cabin for 30 minutes smelled like it had been recently
cleaned; and that, when he asked the petitioners what they
were shooting at, the petitioners initially denied 
shooting 
at
anything, then stated that they were shooting firecrackers,
and later recanted, admitting that they had a rifle in the
truck.  Morrow's testimony that he heard shots fired from the
including but not limited to the use of any type of light." 
Unlike the offense of taking deer at night, the legislature
did not include in its definition of the offense of night
hunting the use of a light as a means of taking, capturing, or
killing or attempting to take, capture, or kill a protected
bird or animal.  
40
1131472
vehicle is evidence indicating that the petitioners knowingly
engaged in an overt act toward the commission of the offenses. 
Evidence of the requisite mens rea may also be inferred from
Morrow's testimony that the petitioners initially stated that
they 
were 
shooting 
firecrackers, 
their 
subsequent 
admission 
to
having a rifle in the truck, and the testimony that the rifle
had recently been cleaned.  From the foregoing evidence,
albeit circumstantial,  the trial court, as the fact-finder,
7
could have concluded that the State had proven all the
elements of night hunting from a vehicle on a public road to
support the petitioners' convictions.
In Ward v. State, 610 So. 2d 1190, 1191-92 (Ala. Crim.
7
App. 1992), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
"Circumstantial 
evidence 
is 
not 
inferior
evidence, and it will be given the same weight as
direct evidence, if it, along with the other
evidence is susceptible of a reasonable inference
pointing unequivocally to the defendant's guilt.
Ward v. State, 557 So. 2d 848 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990). 
In reviewing a conviction based in whole or in part
on circumstantial evidence, the test to be applied
is whether the jury might reasonably find that the
evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except
that of guilt; not whether such evidence excludes
every reasonable hypothesis but guilt, but whether
a jury might reasonably so conclude.  Cumbo v.
State, 368 So. 2d 871 (Ala. Cr. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 368 So. 2d 877 (Ala. 1979)."
41
1131472
Because an analysis of the evidence in the record
supports the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals that
the trial court properly concluded that the State presented
sufficient evidence of each element of the charged offenses to
sustain the petitioners' convictions, I respectfully dissent
from the decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals and to order that the petitioners'
convictions be vacated.
Bolin, J., concurs.
42