Title: Cogswell v. USS YORKTOWN POST 178, VFW

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

143 N.W.2d 45 (1966) Paulyne M. COGSWELL, Appellant, v. U.S.S. YORKTOWN POST 178, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF the UNITED STATES, et al., Respondents. Nos. 39923, 40046. Supreme Court of Minnesota. May 13, 1966. Bonner, Bonner & Clements, Minneapolis, for appellant. Faegre & Benson, Paul McGough and W. James Fitzmaurice, Minneapolis, for respondent. THOMAS GALLAGHER, Justice. Action by Paulyne M. Cogswell against Gopher Pup Tent #2 of the Military Order of the Cootie of the United States, Grand Pup Tent of Minnesota, a corporation, for damages resulting from plaintiff's fall down the basement stairway of a building under defendant's control. The jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor. On appeal from the judgment, it is plaintiff's contention that the court erred in permitting the jury to determine whether plaintiff had assumed the risk from which her damages resulted. *46 The accident happened on December 9, 1961, at approximately 8:30 p.m. while plaintiff was a business visitor in defendant's building located at 2902 Chicago Avenue South, Minneapolis. The stairway to the basement down which plaintiff fell is sufficiently wide so that handrails have been installed on the adjacent walls from the landing to the bottom of the steps. Plaintiff testified that her fall occurred just as she turned from the landing to go down to the basement; that at the time she was aware that the landing was wet and slushy; that as she walked upon it and turned to her right to go down the steps her foot had slipped and at the same time the heel of her shoe had caught on the metal stripping of the landing so that she had fallen forward and down to the bottom step. Her specific testimony on this was as follows: The evidence disclosed that on the day of the accident there had been a snowstorm and that defendant's custodian had mopped the landing and stairway some time before plaintiff's arrival; that when plaintiff and her husband had first arrived to attend a Christmas party on the premises they had used the stairway and observed its wet and slushy condition; and that shortly before the accident plaintiff had replaced the boots she was wearing with shoes that she had brought with her which had spike heels measuring 3 inches from the top to the base of approximately ½ inch in diameter. At the close of the testimony, plaintiff's counsel moved that the court withdraw as an issue any claim that plaintiff had assumed risk of injury in using the stairway on the ground that there could have been no assumption of risk since defendant had failed to provide an alternate route to the basement. This motion was denied, and in its instructions on this issue, the court charged the jury as follows: Later, after the cause had been submitted, the jury returned for additional instructions. The following then took place: The court thereupon again read to the jury the instructions on contributory negligence and those on assumption of risk which are above set forth. Subsequent to the verdict in defendant's favor, plaintiff moved for an order setting it aside and granting a new trial on the ground that the court erred in submitting the issue of assumption of risk. In a memorandum attached to its order denying this motion, the court stated: "Plaintiff * * * had been down into the basement when she first entered the building. She then noticed the snow and slush on the landing and on the steps. She came back upstairs, walked through the slush and up to the second story. Handrails were available to her in going up and down the steps, but not on the landing, although the wall was available to her as a support if that became necessary. She realized when she came down the steps the slushy conditions and the ice and slipperiness which she claimed caused her fall. Having voluntarily chosen to incur it it appears to the court that assumption of risk was properly submitted to the jury." 1. On appeal plaintiff renews her contention that plaintiff could not be charged with assuming the risk of danger in her use of the stairway because no other route was available for her. Ordinarily the defense of assumption of risk is available against a plaintiff who, with knowledge of the risk involved in a course of conduct and having the opportunity to either incur or avoid it, voluntarily chooses to incur it. 13B Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 7041a3. 2. It is true that where a hazardous route is undertaken by a person because no other choice is available the defense of assumption of risk cannot be asserted against him. Donald v. Moses, 254 Minn. 186, 94 N.W.2d 255. In the instant case the jury might reasonably find that plaintiff, aware of the danger involved in stepping on a wet and slushy stairway in spike heel shoes, could easily have avoided the risks attendant upon this situation by simply grasping the handrail adjacent to the stairway on her right-hand side as she prepared to descend. She did not do this but walked some two or three steps beyond the handrail before she turned to go down, thus disregarding the protection it might have afforded her. This situation would seem to make applicable our statement in Syverson v. Nelson, 245 Minn. 63, 68, 70 N.W.2d 880, 883, as follows: Many of the features of the instant case are similar to those in Geis v. Hodgman, 255 Minn. 1, 95 N.W.2d 311, where we held, as a matter of law, that plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury in stepping on a portion of a driveway upon which she knew there were patches of smooth ice, and where she could have avoided any risks by using another portion of the driveway. There we said (255 Minn. 11, 95 N.W.2d 318): *49 Under the foregoing principles and citations, we conclude that the court did not err in submitting the issue of assumption of risk to the jury. See, Lyon v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, Inc., 251 Minn. 285, 87 N.W.2d 651; Vosbeck v. Lerdall, 245 Minn. 164, 72 N.W.2d 371; Lincoln v. Cambridge-Radisson Co., 235 Minn. 20, 49 N.W.2d 1; Jewell v. Blanchett Investment Co., 199 Minn. 267, 271 N.W. 461; Beckjord v. First Presbyterian Church, 196 Minn. 474, 265 N.W. 336. Affirmed.