Title: Bauchman-Kingston Partnership v. Melven J. Haroldsen Real property sale agreement

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 34551 
 
BAUCHMAN-KINGSTON PARTNERSHIP, 
LP,             
                                               
          Plaintiff-Appellant,                 
                                               
v.                                             
                                               
MELVEN J. HAROLDSEN and JANE DOE 
HAROLDSEN,    
                                               
          Defendants-Respondents.              
                                               
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Twin Falls, November 2008 Term 
 
2008 Opinion No. 120 
 
Filed:  December 8, 2008 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Bonneville County.  Honorable Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge. 
 
District court’s decision on summary judgment is affirmed. 
 
Cox, Ohman & Brandstetter, Chartered, Idaho Falls, for appellant.  John M. 
Ohman argued. 
 
Wright, Wright & Johnson, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for respondents.  David A. 
Johnson argued.   
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice 
 
Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP, sued Melven Haroldsen and his wife for specific 
performance or damages based upon a real property sale agreement.  The district court granted 
summary judgment for the Haroldsens.  Bauchman-Kingston appealed, and we affirm.   
I. 
In May 2000, Melven Haroldsen1 executed an agreement to sell certain real property to 
Bauchman-Kingston.  The agreement contemplated that more than 200 acres of property would 
be sold incrementally over a period of five years.  First, Bauchman-Kingston was to purchase 25 
                                                 
1 Although this suit was filed against Melven and his wife, the agreement was originally signed by Melven alone. 
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acres for $10,000 per acre, described at paragraph 4 in the agreement as: “The Property 
commonly known as 3359 N 5 WEST, IDAHO FALLS, City of IDAHO, [sic] County of 
BONNEVILLE, Idaho legally described as: SO. 25 ACRES OF SE 1/4, SEC. 1, T2N, RANGE 
37E.”  The details of the remaining conveyances were described at paragraph 8:  
BUYER AGREES TO PURCHASE THE REMAINING 175 ACRES AT 
$10,000 PER ACRE AS FOLLOWS:  
50 ACRES ON OR BEFORE MAY 18, 2002 
THE BALANCE, 125 ACRES (more or less), ON OR BEFORE MAY 18, 
2005. 
[remaining provisions handwritten and barely legible] 
54.59 A S ½ NE ¼, 30 A N ½ SE ¼ LESS 6.84 A. SEC 1 T2 N 
LESS 32.75 A + QUANSET [sic] 
RESIDENCE AND 4.9 ACRES TO BE PURCHASED BY MAY 18, 
2005 
 
Regarding the last 4.9 acres, the contract stated at paragraph 26:  
OTHER TERMS: BUYERS AGREE TO PURCHASE SELLERS [sic] 
RESIDENCE AND OUT BUILDINGS LOCATED 3359 N 5 WEST, AT FAIR 
MARKET VALUE WITH TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO SELLER.  PURCHASE 
PRICE SHALL BE BASED ON APPRAISEL [sic] ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH 
SELLER AND BUYER. BUYERS ARE COMPLETING A 1031 EXCHANGE 
WITH PURCHASE OF THIS PROPERTY. 
 
The parties concluded the first three conveyances provided for in the agreement, involving nearly 
200 acres of land.  In an addendum, the parties changed the closing date on the residence and 4.9 
acres to June 1, 2006.  
 
Bauchman-Kingston hired an appraiser to value the 4.9 acre parcel without obtaining the 
approval of Haroldsen.  The appraiser valued the real property, the residence, the “guest house” 
located at 3311 North 5th West, and various outbuildings at $263,000.  Bauchman-Kingston 
tendered payment in the amount of the $263,000 but, because Haroldsen assessed the value of 
the property at $960,000, he refused to convey the property for the amount tendered by 
Bauchman-Kingston.  Due to the dispute regarding the value of the residential property and 
outbuildings, the parties did not complete the sale.     
 
Bauchman-Kingston sued for specific performance and/or damages.  Neither party 
requested a jury trial.  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district 
court granted summary judgment to the Haroldsens on the ground that the property description 
was inadequate. 
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II. 
On appeal we are concerned with three issues: whether the district court erred in 
determining that the property description in the agreement was inadequate, whether the doctrine 
of part performance applies in this case, and whether either party is entitled to attorney fees. 
A. 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this Court is 
the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion.  P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. 
Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007).  Summary 
judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate where the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to 
that party’s case.  Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 327, 48 P.3d 651, 656 (2002).   
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court construes all disputed facts 
and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.  Id.  However, when an action will be 
tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the 
most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant 
summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences.  P.O. Ventures, 144 Idaho at 
237, 159 P.3d at 874.  This Court exercises free review over the entire record that was before the 
district judge to determine whether either side was entitled to summary judgment and reviews the 
inferences drawn by the district judge to determine whether the record reasonably supports those 
inferences.  Id. 
This case requires that we interpret the agreement between the parties.  The interpretation 
of a contract begins with the language of the contract itself. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. 
Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007).  If the language of the contract is 
unambiguous, then its meaning and legal effect must be determined from its words.  Id.  A 
contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations.  Id.  Determining 
whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.  
Id.  Where a contract is ambiguous and the parties’ mutual intent cannot be understood from the 
language, intent is a question for the trier of fact.  Farnsworth v. Dairymen’s Creamery Ass’n, 
125 Idaho 866, 870, 876 P.2d 148, 152 (Ct. App. 1994).  
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B. 
Bauchman-Kingston argues that the property description in the agreement is adequate, or 
can be rendered so by documents in the record, and that the district court erred in determining 
otherwise.  
The statute of frauds renders an agreement for the sale of real property unenforceable 
unless the agreement or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought.  See I.C. § 9-505(4).  At a minimum, land sale contracts 
must typically specify the parties involved, the subject matter thereof, the price or consideration, 
a description of the property and all other essential terms of the agreement.  P.O. Ventures, 144 
Idaho at 238, 159 P.3d at 875.  Agreements for the sale of real property that fail to comply with 
the statute of frauds are unenforceable for obtaining specific performance or damages.  Hoffman 
v. S V Co., 102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 (1981).   
The district court in this case granted summary judgment to the Haroldsens because the 
description of the final 4.9 acres and residence was inadequate.  Generally, “[a] description 
contained in a deed will be sufficient so long as quantity, identity or boundaries of property can 
be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which it 
refers.”  Lexington Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 281, 92 P.3d 526, 531 
(2004) (quoting City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., 135 Idaho 239, 244, 16 P.3d 
915, 920 (2000)).   
A property description that does not allow the court to pinpoint exactly what acreage is to 
be transferred is inadequate.  White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho 1, 3, 644 P.2d 323, 325 (1982).  In White, 
the property description was “all land west of road running south to the Rehn farmstead 
containing 960 acres[.]  Exact acreage to be determined by survey.”  Id.  This Court held that the 
description was ambiguous on its face and could not support an award of damages or specific 
performance.  Id. 
When only part of a parcel is sold, and neither the land to be conveyed nor the portion to 
be retained by the seller is adequately described, the property description is inadequate.  
Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 282, 92 P.3d at 532.  In Lexington Heights, the parties 
contracted to convey “the real property situated in Ada County, Idaho located at 1400 West 
Floating Feather Road, consisting of approximately ninety (90) acres . . . . however excluding the 
residential dwelling (which will include no more than five acres) and improvements identified 
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below.”  Id. at 278, 92 P.3d at 528.  The contract went on to describe how “the precise size, 
location, dimensions and configuration” of the residential parcel would be determined.  Id.  
Although a legal description of the property was ultimately prepared, it was never attached to or 
incorporated in the agreement.  Id.  The Court held that “[t]he legal description in the Agreement 
does not contain a sufficient description of the property to be sold because it does not contain 
any description sufficient to identify the approximate five-acre parcel that is to be excluded from 
the sale.”  Id. at 282, 92 P.3d at 532.  Although the excluded parcel could be generally located, 
the description was inadequate.  Id.     
 
The facts of this case are very similar to those of Lexington Heights.  Here, one parcel of 
property was roughly divided and sold incrementally.  The seller retained approximately 36 acres 
on which a quonset hut stood, as well as the residence and 4.9 acres that are the subject of this 
action.  Although the property descriptions for the first three incremental sales may be adequate, 
just as in Lexington Heights there is no property description for the retained quonset, or for the 
last conveyance comprised of the residence and 4.9 acres.  Bauchman-Kingston failed to supply 
the record with a comprehensible legal description of the 4.9 acres or a means for determining 
the same.   
 
Haroldsen apparently knew how the property was situated, describing it as follows in the 
affidavit he submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment: 
Excluded from the sale was approximately five (5.0) acres situated on the 
southeast corner of my farm.  On this approximate five (5) acres was: 
(a) 
my personal residence, whose address was 3359 North 5th 
West, Idaho Falls, Idaho; 
(b) 
a rental house which I own, whose address is 3311 North 
5th West, Idaho Falls, Idaho; 
(c) 
a large shop for repairing tractors and farm equipment; 
(d) 
a metal clad potato cellar; 
(e) 
nine (9) granaries; and 
(f) 
a couple of other miscellaneous buildings. 
Also, in the Southwest corner of the property sold was and is the property owned 
by Darrell and Marilyn Beck. 
 
However, the record is devoid of any further evidence that would have allowed the district court 
to fashion a decree for specific performance. 
Bauchman-Kingston asserts that a hand-drawn map and a sheet with two hand-written 
legal descriptions, both allegedly made by Haroldsen, were attached to and incorporated into 
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addendum 1. Although Bauchman-Kingston asserts that the two documents were part of the 
agreement, addendum 1 does not reference either document.  Further, printed at the bottom of 
addendum 1 are the words “page 1 of 1.”  Thus, it is not clear if or how these documents became 
part of the agreement.  Even if the documents were part of the agreement, the map is 
incomprehensible and does not depict any 4.9 acre parcel.  At oral argument, Bauchman-
Kingston asserted that the upper right hand corner states “House” and that this designates the 
property.  However, that area contains a notation indicating it is 5.268 acres, not 4.9 acres.  And, 
neither of the legal descriptions identify a 4.9 acre parcel (one describes a 36 acre parcel and the 
other a 13.75 acre parcel).  These documents fail to clarify how they relate to the 4.9 acre parcel.   
At oral argument, Bauchman-Kingston informed the Court that a sufficient description of 
the property could be found in the record at page 4 of exhibit 16.  The pertinent portion of this 
page merely contains a drawing of two rectangles, one inside the other, with tiny illegible 
dimensions.  Such drawing does not render the property description sufficient. 
None of the purported descriptions or drawings adequately describes the 4.9 acres and 
residence.  Therefore, the district court properly ruled that the property description in the 
agreement was inadequate. 
C. 
 
Bauchman-Kingston asserts that even if the property description is inadequate, it is 
entitled to judgment based on the doctrine of part performance.  The Haroldsens argue that the 
doctrine of part performance does not serve as a substitute for an enforceable agreement, but 
merely provides a means for specifically enforcing an agreement that exists but fails to meet the 
statute of frauds.   
The doctrine of part performance provides that when the parties to an agreement fail to 
reduce the agreement to writing, or otherwise fail to satisfy the statute of frauds, the agreement 
“may nevertheless be specifically enforced when the purchaser has partly performed the 
agreement.”  Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 396, 162 P.3d 772, 775 (2007) (quoting Bear 
Island Water Ass’n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994)); see also I.C. 
§ 9-504.  Part performance is predicated on the existence of an agreement.  Bear Island, 125 
Idaho at 723, 874 P.2d at 534.  To specifically enforce a contract to sell real property by 
operation of the doctrine of part performance, the agreement must be complete, definite, and 
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certain in all its terms, or contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to 
certainty.  Id.    
As discussed above, the agreement to convey the 4.9 acres is not an enforceable 
agreement under the statute of frauds because it lacks an adequate property description.  Part 
performance does not substitute for an incomplete agreement, but instead operates to allow an 
agreement to be enforced when it does not comply with the statute of frauds.  Id. (“There can be 
no part performance of an agreement which was never made.”).   
In one case where a real estate contract failed to meet the statute of frauds only because 
of an inadequate property description, this Court permitted parol evidence to clarify an 
ambiguous property description when the parties admitted that they agreed to the conveyance of 
some property in exchange for specific consideration and one of the parties fully delivered that 
consideration. Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 827-28, 11 P.3d 20, 23-24 (2000).  In the 
present case, not only is the property description inadequate, but the parties disagree on what 
constituted full consideration – the price term.  Thus, Simons is distinguishable because the 
consideration tendered by Bauchman-Kingston was merely the value given by its appraiser, and 
not the specific amount to which the parties had agreed.  Although the district court held that the 
agreement unambiguously set the price of the 4.9 acres at the “fair market value,” we disagree.  
To be enforceable, a contract must provide a price or a means of determining the price.  
Garmo v. Clanton, 97 Idaho 696, 699, 551 P.2d 1332, 1335 (1976).  “If the parties provide a 
practicable, objective method of determining [the] price of compensation, not leaving it to the 
future will of the parties themselves, there is no such indefiniteness or uncertainty as will prevent 
the agreement from being an enforceable contract.”  Id. (quoting 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 97 
(1963)).  At the very least, the parties must specify in the agreement a practicable method by 
which the price can be determined by the court without any new expression by the parties 
themselves.  Id.; see also 77 AM. JUR. 2D Vendor & Purchaser § 6 (1975).  An agreement that 
specifies how the parties will arrive at the “present market value” is unambiguous and 
enforceable.  Burnham v. Bray, 104 Idaho 550, 555-56, 661 P.2d 335, 340-41 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(holding that an agreement providing for the price to be set by an appraiser appointed according 
to a specific process was enforceable).   
The price term in the parties’ agreement states “[b]uyers agree to purchase sellers [sic] 
residence and out buildings located 3359 N 5 West, at fair market value with terms acceptable to 
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seller.  Purchase price shall be based on appraisel [sic] acceptable to both seller and buyer.”  The 
price term in the agreement is ambiguous due to the misspelling of the word “appraisel.”  The 
correct word could be either “appraiser” or “appraisal.”  If the misspelled term was appraisal, as 
Bauchman-Kingston contended below, the appraised value would have to be acceptable to both 
parties.  That interpretation is of no avail to Bauchman-Kingston because the Haroldsens did not 
agree to the appraisal Bauchman-Kingston unilaterally obtained.  If the purchase price were to be 
determined by an appraiser acceptable to both parties, as Bauchman-Kingston contended on 
appeal, the agreement would contain a reasonable method for determining the fair market value.  
Bauchman-Kingston cannot prevail on that interpretation, however, because if the appraiser was 
required under the agreement to be acceptable to both parties, Bauchman-Kingston had no right 
to unilaterally select its own appraiser and try to require Haroldsen to accede to that appraiser’s 
valuation.  Haroldsen had the option to reject either the appraiser or the appraisal, depending on 
the interpretation of the misspelled term, and was justified in doing so.   
The result of the ambiguous price term is that the parties had not agreed on what 
consideration supported the agreement, and any attempted performance by Bauchman-Kingston 
was not full performance, distinguishing this case from Simons.  Therefore, the doctrine of part 
performance does not assist Bauchman-Kingston in obtaining either a monetary judgment or 
specific performance. 
D.   
Although it argues equitable estoppel on appeal, Bauchman-Kingston did not argue that 
theory in the summary judgment proceedings before the district court.  An issue raised for the 
first time on appeal will not be considered by this Court, and therefore equitable estoppel need 
not be addressed.  Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 310, 160 P.3d 743, 
749 (2007).   
E.   
 
Both parties have requested attorney fees on appeal.  Bauchman-Kingston is not the 
prevailing party, and is not entitled to attorney fees.  The Haroldsens request attorney fees and 
costs pursuant to paragraph 15 of the agreement, which allows attorney fees and costs to the 
prevailing party, including fees on appeal.  A party may be awarded attorney fees based on an 
agreement so providing, even when the court determines that the agreement is not enforceable.  
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O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 910, 188 P.3d 846, 854 (2008).  Therefore, the 
Haroldsens are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.  
III. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed.  The Haroldsens are awarded attorney fees 
and costs on appeal.  
 
 
Justices BURDICK, W. JONES, HORTON, and Pro Tem TROUT CONCUR.