Title: Johnson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
HAYWOOD JOHNSON, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 34, 2019 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID Nos. 1705014383A 
§                      1705014383B 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: April 24, 2019 
Decided: 
May 28, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; SEITZ and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Haywood Johnson, appeals from the Superior Court’s 
denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  The State has filed a motion to 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of 
Johnson’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Officer MacNamara of the Wilmington Police 
Department received a tip from a confidential informant that a man of a certain 
description had been selling drugs from a white conversion van in a particular block 
of Windsor Street and that the informant had observed the subject with a semi-
 
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automatic handgun that was concealed in the van.  Officer MacNamara went to the 
identified block of Windsor Street and saw a man fitting the description provided by 
the informant, sleeping in the back seat of a white van.  Officer MacNamara knocked 
on the window of the van.  As the man, who turned out to be Johnson, opened the 
van door, the officer saw, in plain view, a bag containing what appeared to be heroin 
and marijuana packaged for sale.  Officer MacNamara then ordered Johnson to exit 
the van, which Johnson did.  Johnson then attempted to flee, but was taken into 
custody by other officers.  Another officer, Corporal Lynch, arrived on the scene as 
officers were struggling with Johnson.  Corporal Lynch looked into the open door 
of the van and saw a bag containing what appeared to be bags of heroin and also 
saw, in the top of the cargo pocket on the back of the front passenger seat, a gun that 
was partially obscured from view by a blue towel.  Corporal Lynch prepared an 
affidavit of probable cause to obtain a warrant to search the van.  After obtaining the 
warrant, officers searched the van and found a semi-automatic handgun and illegal 
drugs packaged for sale. 
(3) 
A grand jury indicted Johnson on four counts of Possession or Control 
of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, three counts of Possession or Control of 
Ammunition for a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, Carrying a Concealed Deadly 
Weapon, Aggravated Possession (Heroin) In a Vehicle, Aggravated Possession 
(Cocaine) in a Vehicle, and Resisting Arrest.  Before trial, Johnson’s counsel moved 
 
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to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the search warrant, arguing that Johnson 
was unlawfully seized and arrested and that the search warrant was improper, based 
on Johnson’s claim that certain statements made by Corporal Lynch in the affidavit 
of probable cause were inconsistent with statements made by Officer MacNamara in 
his police report.  On December 1, 2017, the Superior Court held a hearing on the 
suppression motion, at which Officer MacNamara and Corporal Lynch testified.  
The Superior Court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the requirement for 
a search warrant was excused based on the plain view exception and the automobile 
exception, and that therefore any inconsistencies between the facts stated in the 
affidavit of probable cause and those stated in the police report did not warrant 
suppression.  The court further held that had a warrant been required, the affidavit 
demonstrated probable cause for the search even if the purportedly inconsistent 
statements were not considered.  
(4) 
On December 12, 2017, Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of 
Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited and one count of Aggravated 
Possession (Heroin) in a Vehicle.  In exchange for the guilty plea, the State agreed 
to dismiss the remaining charges, as well as not to pursue charges of violation of 
probation that were outstanding at the time of his arrest and that exposed him to up 
to thirty-five years of back time on sentences for prior convictions.  The Superior 
 
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Court sentenced Johnson to a total of thirty years’ incarceration, suspended after 
seven years for probation.  Johnson did not file a direct appeal. 
(5) 
In July 2018, Johnson filed a motion for postconviction relief.  Johnson 
argued that his counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not 
sufficiently investigate the case and because he did not make additional arguments 
that Johnson wanted to make in support of the suppression motion.  Johnson also 
asserted that the search and seizure were illegal and that the State violated Brady v. 
Maryland1 by withholding evidence of misconduct by Carl Rone, a ballistics expert 
who does not appear to have had any involvement in this case.  The motion for 
postconviction relief was referred to a Commissioner for a report and 
recommendation under Superior Court Rule 62.  The State filed a response in 
opposition to the motion, and trial counsel submitted an affidavit and documentation 
detailing the investigation that counsel conducted and addressing the advice 
provided to Johnson regarding the suppression issues and potential trial strategy.  
(6) 
On December 6, 2018, the Commissioner entered a report and 
recommendation in which she concluded that Johnson’s claims other than his claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel were procedurally barred because either they had 
not been raised in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction or because 
                                               
 
1 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 
5 
they had been formerly adjudicated.2  With respect to Johnson’s claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the Commissioner determined that Johnson had neither 
overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct was professionally reasonable, nor 
shown that counsel’s actions were so prejudicial that there was a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, Johnson would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have proceeded to trial.  The Commissioner therefore recommended that the 
court deny Johnson’s motion. 
(7) 
Johnson did not file any objections to the Commissioner’s report.3  On 
January 7, 2019, the Superior Court adopted the report and denied Johnson’s motion 
for postconviction relief.  Johnson has appealed to this Court. 
(8) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.4  Superior Court Rule 62(b) 
provides that a “party . . . appealing the findings of fact and recommendations of a 
Commissioner under subparagraph (5) who fails to comply with the provisions of 
this rule may be subject to dismissal of said . . . appeal.”5  Nevertheless, we have 
                                               
 
2 SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(3), (4). 
3 See SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 62(a)(5)(ii) (setting forth the procedure for objecting to a 
Commissioner’s report and recommendations).   
4 Maniscalco v. State, 2017 WL 443725 (Del. Jan. 10, 2017). 
5 SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 62(b).  See also Maniscalco, 2017 WL 443725, at *2 (“Having failed to 
object to the Commissioner’s report, Maniscalco has waived his objections to the report and cannot 
raise those objections in this appeal.”). 
 
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carefully considered Johnson’s claims and concluded that the Superior Court’s 
judgment should be affirmed. 
(9) 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel within the 
context of a guilty plea, Johnson was required to show that (i) his counsel’s conduct 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for the alleged errors of counsel, the movant would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.6  A defendant must make 
concrete allegations of cause and actual prejudice to substantiate a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.7  Although not insurmountable, there is a strong 
presumption that counsel’s representation was professionally reasonable.8 
(10) In this case, Johnson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
not supported by the record.  Johnson’s counsel moved for suppression and 
conducted a thorough cross-examination of the testifying police officers concerning 
the alleged inconsistencies in their statements.  The Superior Court denied the 
motion to suppress, after which Johnson decided to plead guilty.  Johnson merely 
seeks to repackage his suppression claims as claims of ineffective assistance of 
                                               
 
6 Duffy v. State, 2019 WL 459982 (Del. Feb. 5, 2019). 
7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
8 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
 
7 
counsel;9 he has not shown that counsel’s representation was professionally 
unreasonable, nor has he identified any grounds for a suppression motion that likely 
would have resulted in a different outcome.10  The record also reflects that counsel 
investigated Johnson’s case, including by attempting to obtain any video footage of 
the arrest and by contacting potential witnesses identified by Johnson, who were 
either uncooperative or whose accounts were unhelpful to Johnson. 
(11) Finally, by pleading guilty, Johnson reduced his potential period of 
incarceration by many decades.  Under these circumstances, Johnson cannot 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of his case would have been 
better for him if he had gone to trial rather than enter into a plea agreement.11  We 
therefore conclude that Johnson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
without merit. 
(12) To the extent that Johnson contends that his other claims of error 
warrant reversal separate from his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
those claims are procedurally barred, as determined by the Commissioner, and were 
waived by his guilty plea.  Johnson could have raised the claims at trial if he had 
                                               
 
9 Chattin v. State, 2012 WL 5844886, at *1 (Del. Nov. 16, 2012) (“Chattin’s ineffective assistance 
claim is more properly viewed as a claim of insufficient evidence, which . . . is procedurally barred 
as previously adjudicated.”). 
10 See Robinson v. State, 2006 WL 1041795 (Del. Apr. 18, 2006) (affirming denial of motion for 
postconviction relief because counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion 
that would have been denied, and therefore “counsel committed no error that could have 
undermined [defendant’s] decision to plead guilty”). 
11 Jobes v. State, 2019 WL 949374 (Del. Feb. 25, 2019). 
 
8 
gone to trial, but he did not.  Instead, he chose to enter into the plea agreement.  A 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea waives a defendant’s right to 
challenge any errors occurring before the entry of the plea.12 
(13) During Johnson’s plea colloquy, he indicated that he understood that he 
was waiving certain trial rights by pleading guilty, including his right to require the 
State to prove each element of the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt.  
He also indicated that no one had coerced him into entering the plea, and he 
expressed satisfaction with his counsel’s representation.  Absent clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary, Johnson is bound by his sworn representations 
during the guilty plea colloquy.13 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Gary F. Traynor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                               
 
12 Smith v. State, 2004 WL 120530 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004). 
13 Palmer v. State, 2002 WL 31546531 (Del. Nov. 13, 2002).