Title: Stan Ray v. Don Frasure Contract sale of real property

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 34311 
 
STAN RAY, an individual; and  
REMINGTON REAL ESTATE, INC., an  
Idaho corporation,                         
                                                    
          Plaintiffs-Respondents,                   
                                                    
v.                                                  
                                                    
DON FRASURE, an individual                          
                                                    
          Defendant-Appellant.                                  
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Boise, September 2008 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No.  17 
 
Filed:  January 30, 2009 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of  
Idaho, Ada County.  Honorable Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded. 
 
Angstman, Johnson & Associates, Boise, for appellant.  Wyatt Johnson argued. 
 
Meuleman Mollerup, Boise, for respondents.   Richard Mollerup argued. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice 
This appeal concerns the validity of a contract for the sale of real property between 
appellant Don Frasure and respondents Remington Real Estate, Inc. (Remington) and Stan Ray 
(Remington and Ray collectively referred to as Respondents).  Frasure appeals the district court’s 
ruling that the physical address in the contract sufficiently described the real property for 
purposes of the statute of frauds.  We reverse the decision of the district court and conclude that 
a property description consisting solely of a physical address does not satisfy the statute of 
frauds.   
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On March 12, 2003, Frasure entered into a contract with Eagle Rim Properties, LLC, 
(Eagle Rim Properties) for the sale of his real property located in Kuna, Idaho.  The contract 
described the property as 2275 W. Hubbard Rd., City of Kuna, County of Ada, Idaho 83634.   
1 
The contract included a space for a legal description.  The parties left this space blank.  The 
contract also provided a check box to indicate that a legal description was attached as an 
addendum.  The parties neither checked the box nor attached a legal description to the contract.  
The parties agreed to close the transaction on or before March 17, 2006 for a price of $264,000. 1  
Ray and Frasure also executed an addendum changing the entity purchasing the property from 
Eagle Rim Properties to Ray Developers, LLC (Ray Developers).  Ray owned both entities.   For 
tax purposes, Ray later assigned Ray Developers’s interest in the property to Remington,2 
another entity he controlled. 
 
On the afternoon of Friday, March 17, 2006, the escrow officer discovered that the Idaho 
Secretary of State did not list Remington as an active entity, and therefore, Remington could not 
close the transaction.  Ray instructed the escrow officer to contact Frasure and ask if Frasure 
would be willing to extend the closing date.  The escrow officer spoke with Frasure’s daughter, 
Sheila Frasure, who, acting on behalf of her father, agreed to extend the closing date to Tuesday, 
March 21, 2006.  Frasure however, denies that he agreed to modify the closing date.  
 
On Tuesday, March 21, 2006, Remington fully performed under the contract and 
deposited all funds due with the escrow company.  That afternoon, Sherry Russell, a real estate 
agent representing Frasure, informed Respondents that Frasure did not intend to perform under 
the contract and had relisted the property for sale.  Frasure eventually accepted an offer to sell 
the property for $750,000 to a different party. 
 
On March 24, 2006, Respondents filed a complaint with the district court seeking specific 
performance, damages, and attorney fees and costs.  The matter was tried before the district court 
on May 4, 2007.  The district court held that Frasure breached his contractual duties to 
Respondents and ordered specific performance of the contract.  The district court also awarded 
Respondents costs in the amount of $6,326.10 and attorneys fees in the amount of $43,541.45, 
for a total award of $49,867.55.  Frasure timely appeals the district court’s decision to this Court. 
                                                 
1 The parties originally contracted for a purchase price of $265,000 with a $10,000 down payment.  The parties, 
however, subsequently executed an addendum that reduced the purchase price to $264,000 and increased the down 
payment to $16,000.  The addendum also changed the closing date from March 12, 2007 to March 17, 2006. 
 
2 Ray Developers entered into a “Contract to Purchase Option on Land” with Remington on March 1, 2006.  
While the contract stated that it was an agreement for the purchase of an “option” to purchase real property from 
Frasure, the contract between Ray Developers and Frasure was not an “option contract.”  We note that this contract 
contained a complete legal description of the property. 
 
2 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review of a trial court’s conclusions from a bench trial is limited to ascertaining whether 
the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the 
conclusions of law.  Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488-89, 129 P.3d 1235, 1237-38 
(2006) (citing Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 812 P.2d 253 (1991)).  Since it 
is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses, this Court will liberally construe the trial court’s findings of fact in 
favor of the judgment entered.  Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 
(1999).  This Court will not set aside a trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly 
erroneous.  Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006); I.R.C.P. 
52(a).  If the trial court based its findings on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is 
conflicting, this Court will not overturn those findings on appeal.  Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 
129 P.3d at 1238.  This Court will not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court.  
Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 4.  However, this Court exercises free review over 
matters of law.  Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002) (citing Bouten 
Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
This Court is asked to decide whether a physical address in a real estate contract 
sufficiently describes the property for purposes of the statute of frauds.  Frasure also appeals the 
district court’s ruling that the parties orally agreed to modify the closing date of the contract and 
that Frasure breached his contractual duties to Ray.  Because we conclude that the contract does 
not meet the requirements of the statute of frauds, we do not address the oral modification or 
Frasure’s duties under the contract to Ray.  We conclude that a property description in a real 
estate contract consisting solely of a physical address does not satisfy the statute of frauds.  We 
vacate the judgment, including the district court’s award of attorney fees and costs and award 
Frasure attorney fees and costs on appeal.  We remand this matter for a determination of the 
amount of attorney fees and costs to which Frasure is entitled for proceedings below. 
A. The district court erred when it concluded that a property description in a real 
estate contract consisting of a physical address satisfies the statute of frauds. 
 
Respondents argue that a property description in a real estate contract consisting of a 
physical address satisfies the statute of frauds and, alternatively, that the statute of frauds is 
inapplicable to the instant case because Frasure judicially admitted the existence of the real estate 
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contract.  Frasure argues that a physical address does not satisfy the statute of frauds and that the 
contract is therefore unenforceable.  Respondents raise the doctrine of judicial admissions for the 
first time on appeal.  This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.  
Barbee v. WMA Sec., Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 397, 146 P.3d 657, 663 (2006).  Therefore, we decline 
to address Respondents’ argument concerning the doctrine of judicial admissions and only 
address the sufficiency of the instant property description consisting of a physical address. 
The statute of frauds renders an agreement for the sale of real property invalid unless the 
agreement or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party 
charged or his agent.  I.C. § 9-505(4).  Agreements for the sale of real property that fail to 
comply with the statute of frauds are unenforceable both in an action at law for damages and in a 
suit in equity for specific performance.  Hoffman v. S V Comp., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 
P.2d 218, 221 (1981) (citing 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 285 (1974); 73 Am. Jur. 2d 
Statute of Frauds § 513 (1974)).  An agreement for the sale of real property must not only be in 
writing and subscribed by the party to be charged, but the writing must also contain a description 
of the property, either in terms or by reference, so that the property can be identified without 
resort to parol evidence.  Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 435, 80 P.3d 1031, 1036 (2003).   
For over 100 years, this Court has held that a contract for the sale of real property must 
speak for itself and that a court may not admit parol evidence to supply any of the terms of the 
contract, including the description of the property.  Kurdy v. Rogers, 10 Idaho 416, 423, 79 P. 
195, 196 (1904).  In Kurdy, the written contract did not include the terms or conditions of the 
sale, the consideration, or a description of the land or even indicate the county or state in which 
the land was located.  Id.  This Court specifically held that parol evidence is not admissible to 
supply any of the terms of the contract.  Id.   
Five years after deciding Kurdy, in a case involving the sale of real property, this Court 
took up the question what constitutes a sufficient description of real property under the statute of 
frauds.  Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909).  In Allen, the contract described the 
real property as “Lots 11, 12, and 13, in block 13, Lemp’s addition,” and “ Lot 27, Syringa Park 
addition, consisting of 5 acres.”3  Id. at 137, 100 P. at 1053.  Absent from the description was the 
city, county, state, or other civil or political division or district in which any of the property was 
                                                 
3 Lots 11, 12, and 13 were actually located in block 14, Lemp’s addition.  Allen, 16 Idaho at 144, 100 P. at 
1056.  The property was located in Ada County, Idaho.  Id. 
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located.  Id.  The Appellant argued that the contract was sufficient to admit oral evidence 
showing the location of the real property.  This Court disagreed.   
In Allen, we reaffirmed our holding from Kurdy that a contract must speak for itself and 
stated that “[i]t is not a question as to what the contract was intended to be, but, rather, was it 
consummated by being reduced to writing as prescribed by the statute of frauds.”  Id. at 145, 100 
P. at 1055.  We also indicated that a contract that references “any record or external or extrinsic 
description from which a complete description could be had” sufficiently describes the real 
property for purposes of the statute of frauds.  Id. at 143, 100 P. at 1055.  The contract in Allen 
neither contained a complete description of the real property nor referred to any external record 
containing a sufficient description.  Therefore, we concluded that there was no complete contract 
before the court.  Id. at 149, 100 P. at 1058. 
A description of real property must adequately describe the property so that it is possible 
for someone to identify “exactly” what property the seller is conveying to the buyer.  Garner, 
139 Idaho at 435, 80 P.3d at 1036.  “A description contained in a deed will be sufficient so long 
as quantity, identity or boundaries of property can be determined from the face of the instrument, 
or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which it refers.”  Id. (quoting City of Kellogg v. Mission 
Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 239, 244, 16 P.3d 915, 920 (2000)).  This rule is 
consistent with our approach in Allen, which required that the contract either contain a sufficient 
description of the real property or refer to an external record containing a sufficient property 
description.   
The contract in Garner described the property as the “‘Bartschi Property, City _____, Zip 
83252, legally described as approx. 500 acres of mountain property.’”  Id. at 434, 80 P.3d at 
1035.  An addendum to the contract further described the property as: “Acreage: As deemed by 
Bear River [sic] County Platt and Tax Notices to be 512 acres.”  Id. (quotations omitted).  We 
held that this description did not satisfy the statute of frauds.  Id. at 436, 80 P.3d at 1037.  
Because the contract referred to certain tax notices, we also analyzed the descriptions of the real 
property in the tax notices for compliance with the statute of frauds.  The property descriptions in 
the tax notices were incomplete and did not allow someone to identify exactly what property the 
seller was conveying to the buyer.  Id. at 435-36, 80 P.3d at 1036-37.  Therefore, we concluded 
that the property descriptions referenced in the tax notices did not satisfy the statute of frauds.  
Id. at 436, 80 P.3d at 1037.   
5 
We most recently addressed the sufficiency of a property description in a contract for the 
sale of real property in Lexington Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 92 P.3d 526 
(2004).  In Lexington Heights, we relied heavily on the analysis from the Allen court indicating 
that a contract must speak for itself and that parol evidence is not admissible to supply the terms 
of a contract.  Id. at 281, 92 P.3d at 531.  We also reaffirmed the rule we relied upon in Garner 
stating, “[a] description contained in a deed will be sufficient so long as quantity, identity or 
boundaries of property can be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference to 
extrinsic evidence to which it refers.”  Id. at 281-82, 92 P.3d at 531-32 (quoting Mission 
Mountain, 135 Idaho at 244, 16 P.3d at 920). 
Respondents rely heavily on In re Miller v. The Provident Bank, et al., 260 B.R. 158 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2001), when arguing that a property description consisting of a physical 
address satisfies the statute of frauds.  That case dealt with the issue whether, under Idaho law, 
the street address associated with a piece of real property sufficiently described the property for 
purposes of the statute of frauds.  The bankruptcy court in that case relied upon Haney v. Molko, 
123 Idaho 132, 844 P.2d 1382 (Ct. App. 1992),  when it stated that a “‘sufficient’ property 
description need only designate the land to be conveyed with reasonable certainty, since the 
purpose of a deed description is not to identify the land, but merely to furnish the means of 
identification.”  In re Miller, 260 B.R. at 163 (quoting Haney, 123 Idaho at 136, 844 P.2d at 
1386).  The court deciding In re Miller did not have the benefit of this Court’s opinion in 
Lexington Heights wherein we reiterated our adherence to the rule expressed in Allen.  
Additionally, this Court has not adopted the language from Haney stating that a property 
description need only designate real property with “reasonable certainty.”  Instead, we have 
required that a property description designate “exactly” what property the seller is conveying to 
the buyer.  Garner, 139 Idaho at 435-36, 80 P.3d at 1036-37.  Accordingly, we do not view In re 
Miller as persuasive authority. 
 
In the instant case, the contract described Frasure’s real property by reference to the street 
address and the city, county, state and zip code in which the property was located.4  The physical 
address is not a sufficient description of the property for purposes of the statute of frauds.  It is 
impossible to determine exactly what property Frasure intended to convey to Respondents 
                                                 
4 The underlined portions of the following description were blank spaces where information was typed into the  
form contract.  The contract described the property as follows:  “‘PREMISES’ COMMONLY KNOWN AS 2275 
W. HUBBARD RD City KUNA County ADA ID, Zip 83634.”      
6 
relying solely on the physical address in the contract.  The physical address gives no indication 
of the quantity, identity, or boundaries of the real property. 
Respondents argue that extrinsic evidence can supply a complete legal description of the 
instant property.  Respondents’ expert, Allan Knight, testified at trial that he entered the physical 
address from the contract into the computer system at the Ada County Assessor’s office.  That 
search revealed the name of the property owner, Don Frasure.  Knight then entered Frasure’s 
name into the computer system at the Ada County Recorder’s Office and obtained a copy of the 
prior deed that conveyed the property to Frasure.  The deed conveying the property to Frasure 
contained a complete legal description of the instant property.  This Court’s precedent from the 
past 100 years permits a party to ascertain a property description from extrinsic evidence only 
when the contract or deed references the extrinsic evidence.  The instant contract does not 
reference the records at the Ada County Recorder’s Office or the prior recorded deed conveying 
the property to Frasure.  Therefore, the statute of frauds does not permit Respondents to 
supplement the real property description in the contract with the proffered extrinsic evidence. 
We are unwilling to create an area of unsettled law by holding that a real property 
description that does not allow a person to determine exactly what property the seller is 
conveying to the buyer satisfies the statute of frauds.  We are equally unwilling to overturn over 
a century’s worth of legal precedent and erase the limits on the use of extrinsic evidence that a 
party may use to supply a missing term from a contract for the sale of real property.  Our current 
approach to extrinsic evidence fulfills the policy behind the statute of frauds by preventing fraud 
and deception and is not overly burdensome on the parties to a contract for the sale of real 
property.  In order to make use of extrinsic evidence in a real estate contract, the parties merely 
need to reference the extrinsic evidence in their contract or deed.  This system has functioned 
well over the past 100 years and we see no need to change it now.  Therefore, we reverse the 
decision of the district court and hold that the property description in the instant case does not 
satisfy the statute of frauds.   
B. Attorney Fees and Costs 
Both parties have sought an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-
120(3).  Because Frasure is the prevailing party in this appeal, he is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to this statute.  P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 
144 Idaho 233, 240, 159 P.3d 870, 877 (2007). 
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The district court correctly determined that the prevailing party is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3).  The district court awarded Respondents attorney fees 
and costs below as prevailing parties.  Because we reverse the district court’s decision, we vacate 
the judgment and remand this matter for the district court to determine an appropriate award of 
costs and attorney fees incurred by Frasure in the proceedings below.    
IV. CONCLUSION 
We vacate the judgment of the district court and hold that a property description 
consisting solely of a physical address does not satisfy the statute of frauds.  We remand this 
matter to the district court for a determination of attorney fees and costs to which Frasure is 
entitled for the proceedings below.  Attorney fees and costs on appeal are awarded to Frasure. 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK and W. JONES CONCUR.  Justice 
Pro Tem KIDWELL dissents without opinion.