Title: State ex rel. Gardner v. Honorable Timothy J. Boyer

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE ex rel. KIMBERLY M. GARDNER, ) 
CIRCUIT ATTORNEY OF THE CITY OF 
) 
ST. LOUIS, 
) 
) 
Relator, 
) 
) 
v. 
) No. SC97026 
) 
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY J. BOYER,  ) 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
This Court has the authority to “issue and determine original remedial writs.”  Mo. 
Const. art. V, § 4.1.  Relator, City of St. Louis Circuit Attorney Kimberly Gardner 
(“Relator”), seeks a writ of prohibition barring Respondent, Judge Timothy J. Boyer 
(“Respondent”), from enforcing his order disqualifying the entire City of St. Louis 
Circuit Attorney’s Office (“CAO”) in the underlying case.  As in State ex rel. Peters-
Baker v. Round, __ S.W.3d. __ (Mo. banc 2018) (No. SC96931), also handed down this 
date, Respondent’s order fails to comply with this Court’s holding in State v. Lemasters, 
456 S.W.3d 416 (Mo. banc 2015), and will cause irreparable harm if relief is not granted.  
Accordingly, this Court’s preliminary writ of prohibition is now made permanent.   
Opinion issued December 4, 2018
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Background 
In the underlying case, the defendant, Wendell Davis, is charged as a prior 
offender with unlawful use of a weapon, unlawful possession of a weapon, stealing a 
firearm, resisting arrest, and tampering with a motor vehicle.  The probable cause 
statement filed with the complaint indicates Officer A.F. resorted to the use of deadly 
force to apprehend Davis.1  As a result, Officer A.F. was both a witness and a victim to 
the unlawful use of a weapon charge and the resisting arrest charge.  When a prosecution 
involves the use of force by a victim (including police officer victims, such as Officer 
A.F.), it is Relator’s policy to conduct an independent investigation of the victim’s use of 
force.2  The goal of Relator’s investigation is to determine whether the victim was 
justified in using force and whether criminal charges should be filed against the victim.  
Sometime prior to January 2018, in accordance with this policy, Relator initiated an 
investigation into Officer A.F’s use of force against Davis.  
                                              
1   On the night in question, according to the probable cause statement, Officer A.F. noticed a 
truck (in which Davis was the passenger) with a license plate from a stolen vehicle.  When 
Officer A.F. activated his lights and siren, the driver of the truck drove off recklessly.  The truck 
later came to a stop, and the two occupants ran off on foot.  Officer A.F. pursued Davis, who 
eventually stopped running and hid behind a car.  At that point, Officer A.F. drew his gun and 
ordered Davis to get on the ground.  Davis did not comply.  Instead, Davis patted his leg as 
though he was sliding something down the leg of his pants.  Davis then retrieved a gun from the 
ankle area of his pants and pointed it at Officer A.F.  In response, Officer A.F. fired a shot, 
which struck Davis in the back.  Davis was paralyzed as a result of the shooting.   
2   The review and investigation of the victim’s use of force is not conducted by trial attorneys 
who are prosecuting the defendant’s case but, rather, by members of the “public integrity” 
section of the CAO.  
 
3 
Prior to Davis’s preliminary hearing, counsel for Officer A.F. filed a motion to 
disqualify the CAO.3  In the motion, Officer A.F. argued Relator’s independent 
investigation created an appearance of impropriety that would prejudice Officer A.F. 
unfairly.  Officer A.F. claimed an appearance of impropriety existed because, through 
Officer A.F.’s contacts with the CAO as a witness, the CAO might become privy to 
information that could be used against Officer A.F. in the criminal investigation of his 
conduct.  In short, Officer A.F. asserted, when the CAO elects to independently 
investigate police shootings, it ought to be disqualified from simultaneously prosecuting 
the underlying criminal case.  Both Relator and Davis filed a motion to strike Officer 
A.F.’s motion to disqualify.   
Following a hearing on these motions, Respondent entered an order disqualifying 
the CAO from prosecuting Davis’s case.4  Respondent first noted the court had the 
“inherent authority to supervise and regulate the conduct of attorneys who appear before 
it,” which, Respondent claimed, included “the authority to disqualify counsel.”  On the 
merits, Respondent reasoned “a potential conflict of interest may arise when, during the 
prosecution of a specific criminal defendant, the prosecutor has motives or interests other 
than according the defendant in a pending case procedural justice.”  Respondent found 
Relator had not “engaged in any misconduct” and, instead, concluded there was an 
                                              
3   The circuit court permitted Counsel for Officer A.F. to enter a limited appearance in the 
underlying case.  
4   Respondent’s order states he was acting sua sponte and was not sustaining Officer A.F.’s 
motion.  Accordingly, the Court need not address Relator’s argument that Officer A.F. lacked 
standing to seek Relator’s disqualification. 
 
4 
“appearance of impropriety” because the CAO was “actively prosecuting the defendant 
while simultaneously reviewing the conduct of the very officer upon whom [it was] 
relying to effectuate such prosecution.”   
Relator sought a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals, and her petition was 
denied.  Relator then sought the same relief in this Court, and a preliminary writ was 
issued.5  Prior to oral argument in this case, Relator informed the Court the review of 
Officer A.F.’s conduct had been completed and Relator had no intention of bringing 
charges against Officer A.F. regarding his use of force against Davis.  In response, 
Respondent confirmed Officer A.F. was aware the investigation had been completed and 
that he would not be charged criminally.  A few days later, on September 6, 2018, oral 
argument was held and this case was submitted.  It was not until September 18, 2018, 
however, that Respondent vacated his order disqualifying the CAO from Davis’s 
prosecution.6  
Analysis 
“The writ of prohibition, an extraordinary remedy, is to be used with great caution 
and forbearance and only in cases of extreme necessity.”  State ex rel. Douglas Toyota 
III, Inc. v. Keeter, 804 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Mo. banc 1991).  “The essential function of 
prohibition is to correct or prevent inferior courts and agencies from acting without or in 
                                              
5   Shortly thereafter, this Court also granted Davis’s motion to intervene.   
6   Although a motion to dismiss has not been filed, the parties have, in letters filed with the 
Court, addressed the issue of whether this case is moot.  Relator, on the one hand, asserts, despite 
the conclusion of the investigation against Officer A.F., this case should not be dismissed as 
moot because this is an issue of public importance and likely to recur.  Respondent, on the other 
 
5 
excess of their [authority or] jurisdiction.”  Id.  As a result, departure “from the usual 
application of prohibition … requires a peculiarly limited situation where some 
absolute irreparable harm may come to a litigant if some spirit of justifiable relief is not 
made available to respond to a trial court’s order.”  Id. (quotation marks and alteration 
omitted).  Because Respondent’s order wrongfully disqualifying the elected prosecutor 
and her entire office presents one of the uniquely limited situations in which a party will 
suffer “absolute irreparable harm” if writ relief is not granted, this Court’s preliminary 
writ is made permanent.  Id. 
Although no motion to dismiss has been filed, the Court, as an initial matter, will 
address the issue of mootness.  “A case is moot when the question presented for decision 
seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, would not have 
any practical effect upon any then existing controversy.”  State ex rel. Hawley v. 
Heagney, 523 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Mo. banc 2017) (citation omitted).  “There are, however, 
two narrow exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) when a case becomes moot after 
submission and argument; and (2) when the issue raised is one of general public interest 
and importance, recurring in nature, and will otherwise evade appellate review.”  Peters-
Baker, __ S.W.3d. __, Slip Op. at 5 (citation omitted).  “If either of these exceptions 
exist, an appellate court may choose to exercise its discretion to decide the case, 
notwithstanding that it has become moot.”  Id.  
                                                                                                                                                  
hand, argues that, once the order was entered below vacating Respondent’s disqualification 
order, there is nothing left for this Court to decide and the case should be dismissed as moot.   
 
6 
This case was rendered moot when Respondent vacated the disqualification order 
on September 18, 2018, because, after that date, “a decision by this Court ‘would not 
have any practical effect upon any … existing controversy.’”  Id. at 6 (citing Hawley, 523 
S.W.3d at 450).  But, as in Peters-Baker, Respondent in this case did not vacate his order 
until after the case was argued and submitted on September 6, 2018.  Therefore, the first 
exception applies.  As a result, this Court “will exercise its right of unlimited discretion to 
complete its deliberation of the case and prepare an opinion and enter a final judgment on 
the merits.”  Id. (citing State ex rel. Donnell v. Searcy, 152 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Mo. banc 
1941)).7 
Regarding the merits of Relator’s petition, Peters-Baker addresses the question of 
whether and when an entire prosecutor’s office may be disqualified.  There, the Court 
stated: 
[I]n Lemasters, this Court set forth the framework to be applied when the 
disqualification of an entire prosecutor’s office is sought.  First, the court 
must determine whether a particular attorney in the office has a conflict 
                                              
7  “It also appears the second exception, known as the ‘public interest’ exception, applies here.”  
Peters-Baker, __ S.W.3d. __, Slip Op. at 6 n.5.  “First, as explained below, the people of [the 
City of St. Louis] will be harmed if the individual elected to serve as their prosecuting attorney is 
not allowed to fulfill her statutorily authorized duty of representing the interests of the public 
….”  This is an issue of significant public interest and importance.  Further, this case involves the 
interplay between local police agencies and the local prosecuting attorney, an issue that is also of 
public importance.  Second, this situation – i.e., a prosecution in which a police officer is an 
essential witness and also used force in apprehending the defendant − is almost certain to recur.  
For examples of recent cases with similar facts, see State v. Wolford, No. 1522-CR02859-01 
(Cir. Court City of St. Louis); State v. Clerk, No. 1622-CR03791-01 (Cir. Court City of St. 
Louis); State v. Polk, No. 1722-CR03688 (Cir. Court City of St. Louis).  Third, as with Peters-
Baker, “this case is capable of evading review if a circuit court vacates its order disqualifying the 
entire prosecuting attorney’s office prior to the resolution of the case in an appellate court, which 
would render any decision by the higher court meaningless.”  Peters-Baker, __ S.W.3d. __, Slip 
Op. at 6 n.5.  A circuit court might be prompted to do so if, like here, the prosecuting attorney 
concludes the investigation against the officer and determines no charges will be brought.    
 
7 
prohibiting that attorney’s participation in the underlying case.  Lemasters, 
456 S.W.3d at 420.  The Rules of Professional Conduct aid the court in 
determining whether such a conflict exists.  See, e.g., Rule 4-1.7 “Conflict 
of Interest: Current Clients;” Rule 4-1.8 “Conflict of Interest: Prohibited 
Transactions;” Rule  4-1.9 “Duties to Former Clients;” and Rule 4-1.18 
“Duties to Prospective Client.”  Second, if (and only if) such a conflict 
exists, the court then must determine whether that individual attorney’s 
conflict is to be imputed to the entire office.  Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d at 422.  
A conflict can be imputed in one of two ways: either (1) by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, or (2) by the appearance of impropriety test – i.e., 
whether “a reasonable person with knowledge of the facts would find an 
appearance of impropriety and doubt the fairness of the trial” to the 
defendant.  Id. at 422-23.  
Peters-Baker, __ S.W.3d. __, Slip Op. at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).  
Problematically, here − and unlike in Lemasters and Peters-Baker − there is no 
finding (or even an allegation) that any particular attorney employed by the CAO had a 
conflict prohibiting that attorney’s participation in Davis’s case.  In fact, Davis does not 
seek disqualification of Relator or the CAO.  Respondent found Relator had not “engaged 
in any misconduct” and acted to disqualify the CAO only because a “potential conflict of 
interest” existed.8  Absent the existence of an individual conflict, however, a court need 
not proceed to determine whether that conflict should be imputed to the entire CAO, 
either under the Rules of Professional Conduct or the appearance of impropriety test set 
forth in Lemasters and applied in Peters-Baker.  
                                              
8   It is unclear what Rule of Professional Conduct Respondent believed could have been 
violated.  Respondent does not identify any rule on the verge of violation, and a review of the 
rules by this Court reveals no likely candidates.  It seems as though Respondent used the phrase 
“conflict of interest” in an imprecise manner to refer to what Respondent might view as 
undesirable behavior in the underlying investigation.  That is not, however, how the phrase 
“conflict of interest” has been used in the disqualification context.  
 
8 
Under the framework of Lemasters, Respondent should have ceased the analysis 
when he was unable to identify any individual attorney at the CAO with an actual conflict 
of interest.  Instead, Respondent continued the analysis first by explaining “the 
prosecuting attorney must avoid even the appearance of impropriety”9 and then finding 
such an “appearance of impropriety” existed because the CAO was “actively prosecuting 
the defendant while simultaneously reviewing the conduct of the very officer upon whom 
[it is] relying to effectuate such prosecution.”  The conduct Respondent identified, 
however, does not constitute an appearance of impropriety as that phrase is generally 
understood in this context.     
The phrase “appearance of impropriety,” as it is used in the disqualification 
context, was recently addressed by this Court in Lemasters.  There, this Court recognized 
an individual attorney’s actual conflict of interest may be imputed not only under the 
Rules of Professional Conduct but also pursuant to the defendant’s “constitutional right to 
a fair trial.”  Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d at 422 (concluding “even if office-wide 
disqualification is not required by [the Rules of Professional Conduct], it nevertheless is 
necessary if failure to disqualify the entire prosecutor’s office creates an appearance of 
                                              
9   As support for this statement, Respondent relied on comment 1 to Rule 4-3.8, which provides, 
in relevant part, “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice …. to see that the 
defendant is accorded procedural justice …;” and State v. Boyd, 560 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Mo. App. 
1977), which states prosecuting attorneys have a duty to assure a defendant receives a fair trial, 
which requires the prosecuting attorney to avoid impropriety (as well as the appearance of 
impropriety).  Respondent, however, overlooks the focus both statements place on the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial because, significantly, neither Rule 4-3.8 nor Boyd is concerned 
with a general appearance of impropriety unconnected to that right.  Rather, both statements are 
specifically concerned with fairness and procedural justice with respect to the defendant.  In this 
case, Davis has claimed no injury to his right to a fair trial, and the Court perceives no such 
injury. 
 
9 
impropriety and casts doubt on the fairness of the trial” to the defendant).  See also State 
v. Ross, 829 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. banc 1992).  The appearance of impropriety test, therefore, 
arises from the criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.  Lemasters, 456 
S.W.3d at 422 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair 
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”)).  And it is, of course, the circuit court’s 
duty to ensure the defendant receives a fair trial.  State v. Tiedt, 206 S.W.2d 524, 526 
(Mo. banc 1947).10  Accordingly, the key to the appearance of impropriety test is whether 
“a reasonable person with knowledge of the facts would find an appearance of 
impropriety and doubt the fairness of the trial” to the defendant in the case.  Lemasters, 
456 S.W.3d at 423.11   
All considerations of fairness by the circuit court must, therefore, be made through 
the lens of fairness to the defendant, not third parties.  The circuit court does not have the 
authority to ensure every action taken anywhere in the CAO is done in accordance with 
its general notions of fairness.  It is the fairness of Davis’s trial with which the circuit 
                                              
10   While Lemasters holds the appearance of impropriety is not judged “only from the 
defendant’s perspective” but also from the perspective of “a reasonable person with knowledge 
of the facts,” this shift in perspective does not change the relevant inquiry – i.e., whether there is 
“an appearance of impropriety [that] casts doubt on the fairness of the trial” to the defendant. 
Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d at 422-23.   
11   Although it is unnecessary even to reach the appearance of impropriety test (because no 
underlying individual conflict exists), a proper application of the test reveals absolutely no 
appearance of impropriety in this case.  This is best evidenced by Davis’s role in this writ 
proceeding, i.e., he has intervened and joined the position of Relator requesting this Court issue a 
writ prohibiting Respondent from disqualifying the CAO.  Furthermore, in his brief, Respondent 
asserts at least six reasons purportedly giving rise to an appearance of impropriety in the 
underlying case; significantly, however, none of these purported reasons have anything to do 
with Davis or any unfairness he may suffer.  Accordingly, “a reasonable person with knowledge 
of the facts would [not] find an appearance of impropriety” casting doubt on the fairness of the 
trial to Davis.  Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d at 422-23.   
 
10 
court must be concerned.  It is correct to say a circuit court has the “inherent authority to 
supervise and regulate the conduct of attorneys who appear before it,” but that authority 
extends only so far as necessary to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial, particularly 
in the criminal context.12     
This Court has long held that circuit courts have the authority to disqualify an 
attorney when a conflict of interest (such as those provided for in the Rules of 
Professional Conduct) exists with respect to counsel for one of the parties to the case.  
State v. Jones, 268 S.W.83, 85 (Mo. 1924) (“The trial court had inherent power, 
independent of the statute, to appoint a special prosecuting attorney for the state when the 
prosecuting attorney, for any reason, was disqualified.”).  Circuit courts also have the 
authority to disqualify an entire prosecutor’s office when an individual prosecutor’s 
conflict of interest (which prohibits that attorney’s participation in the case) must be 
imputed to the entire office under the Rules of Professional Conduct or under the 
appearance of impropriety test.  Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d at 422.  Therefore, Respondent 
was correct to the extent he believed he had inherent authority to disqualify counsel.  But 
Respondent was incorrect to the extent he failed to recognize the limitations placed on 
                                              
12   Respondent relies on State ex rel. Horn v. Ray, 325 S.W.3d 500 (Mo. App. 2010), as 
authority for extending the circuit court’s authority to all actions of the CAO.  Horn provides no 
such support.  Specifically, Respondent fails to recognize the “inherent authority” referenced in 
Horn is not limitless; rather, it only permits disqualification of an attorney when a conflict of 
interest (as that phrase is normally understood in this context) exists.  Indeed, in Horn, the court 
of appeals found the attorney’s “dual representation violate[d] Rule 4-1.7 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct,” id. at 505, and therefore, entered a permanent writ prohibiting the circuit 
court from denying the state’s motion to disqualify counsel.  Id. at 513. 
 
11 
that authority by the meanings typically given to the phrases “conflict of interest” and 
“appearance of impropriety” in the context of disqualification.  
In addition to the foregoing flaw in Respondent’s analysis, this Court is compelled 
to issue an extraordinary writ in this case because Relator will suffer “absolute 
irreparable harm” absent intervention by this Court.  Douglas Toyota III, Inc., 804 
S.W.2d at 752.  As explained in Peters-Baker, the “harm caused by Respondent’s order is 
two-fold.”  Peters-Baker, __ S.W.3d. __, Slip Op. at 10.  As an initial matter, 
Respondent’s order prevents Relator and her office from exercising Relator’s statutorily 
authorized duties in this case as the elected circuit attorney of the City of St. Louis.  
Under Rule 4-3.8, Relator has an obligation to “refrain from prosecuting a charge [she] 
knows is not supported by probable cause.”  Such an obligation “necessarily requires that 
[s]he investigate, i.e., inquire into the matter with care and accuracy, that in each case 
[s]he examine the available evidence, the law and the facts, and the applicability of each 
to the other.”  State on inf. McKittrick v. Wallach, 182 S.W.2d 313, 318-19 (Mo. banc 
1944).   
Further, Relator “is not a mere lackey of the court nor are [her] conclusions in the 
discharge of [her] official duties and responsibilities, in anywise subservient to the views 
of the judge as to the handling of the State’s case.”  State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith, 258 
S.W.2d 590, 593 (Mo. banc 1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Honeycutt, 96 
S.W.3d 85 (Mo. banc 2003).  Accordingly, the fact Respondent believed the 
simultaneous prosecution of Davis’s case and investigation of Officer A.F.’s conduct 
should have been conducted in a different manner is irrelevant.  Rather, Relator has been 
 
12 
elected to exercise her discretion “to the dictates of [her] own judgment and conscience 
uncontrolled by the judgment and conscience of any other person[,]” including 
Respondent.  McKittrick, 182 S.W.2 313 at 319.  Relator holds one of the most powerful 
positions in our legal system, and Respondent cannot control the way Relator chooses to 
exercise the broad, almost unfettered, discretion conferred upon her by statute.   
The unparalleled authority of the American prosecutor has often been 
attributed to the fact that district attorneys in the United States are elected, 
county-level officials.  Prosecutorial power, in this view, is an outgrowth of 
the peculiar emphasis the United States places on local, democratic control.  
The “locally elected status” of American prosecuting attorneys provides 
them with an “independent source of power” and is the reason they enjoy 
“discretionary privilege unmatched in the world.”   
 
David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 473, 491 (2016) (footnotes omitted). 
But the “harm … does not stop at Relator.”  Peters-Baker, __ S.W.3d. __, Slip Op. 
at 11.  Respondent’s order also affects the people of the City of St. Louis, who, by 
electing Relator as their circuit attorney, “decided Relator’s decision-making skills − i.e., 
her discretion − best represent their interests.”  Id.  Therefore, by disqualifying Relator, 
Respondent’s order “unjustifiably circumvents the voters’ choice to have their interests 
represented by Relator in [Davis’s] case as in any other.”  Id.  
In short, only in rare circumstances should a circuit court interfere with the 
democratic process and override the voters’ choice as to who is best suited 
to represent the interests of the people as prosecuting attorney ….  Unless 
there is an individual attorney with a conflict of interest [(as that term is 
generally understood in this context)] that prevents his or her participation 
in the case, and that attorney’s conflict must be imputed to the entire office 
either under the Rules of Professional Conduct or because “a reasonable 
person with knowledge of the facts would find an appearance of 
impropriety and doubt the fairness of the trial” to the defendant, 
 
13 
[Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d] at 423, circuit courts should not interfere with the 
elected prosecuting attorney’s statutorily authorized duty to represent the 
interests of the public by ordering an unnecessary, office-wide 
disqualification.  Griffin, 258 S.W.2d at 593.   
 
Id. at 12-13 [emphasis added].  As in Peters-Baker, Respondent’s order unnecessarily 
interferes with Relator’s duty to represent the interests of the public. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court’s preliminary writ of prohibition is 
made permanent.  
 
 
_____________________________    
 
Paul C. Wilson, Judge 
 
All concur.