Title: Burrell v. Southern Truss

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after 
the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions 
are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime 
prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. 
Therefore, because the following slip opinion is being made 
available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, it 
cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The 
official copy of the following opinion will be published by the 
Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports 
advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
               Docket No. 81621--Agenda 16--January 1997. 
    JENNIFER PANKY BURRELL, Appellee, v. SOUTHERN TRUSS et al. (Wood 
              River Township Hospital et al., Appellants). 
                      Opinion filed April 24, 1997. 
 
     JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court: 
     Wood River Township Hospital (Wood River), Medical 
Radiological Services, Inc. (Medical Radiological), and Dr. Anthony 
Marrese filed separate liens in the circuit court of Saline County 
against proceeds received by plaintiff, Jennifer Panky Burrell, in 
a settlement with defendants, Joel Kingston and Southern Truss. 
Wood River filed its claim under the Hospital Lien Act (770 ILCS 
35/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)), and Medical Radiological and Dr. 
Marrese filed their separate claims under the Physicians Lien Act 
(770 ILCS 80/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)). The total of these three 
liens exceeded one-third of plaintiff's settlement. The circuit 
court aggregated the lien claims, limited total recovery on the 
liens to one-third of the settlement, and prorated the amounts to 
be dispensed to the lienholders so that the total paid to the 
lienholders did not exceed one-third of plaintiff's recovery. On 
appeal, the appellate court affirmed the distribution to the 
lienholders. 281 Ill. App. 3d 553. We granted leave to appeal (155 
Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the judgments of the appellate and 
circuit courts. 
     Plaintiff filed a complaint based on the negligent or wrongful 
acts of Kingston in the course of his employment with Southern 
Truss. Plaintiff later settled her claims against the defendants 
for a total of $8,500. Plaintiff then filed a petition to 
adjudicate certain outstanding liens, arguing that the total amount 
of the liens exceeded one-third of the settlement. Three of the 
plaintiff's creditors entered appearances in the proceedings. Wood 
River asserted a lien in the amount of $913.65 under the Hospital 
Lien Act. Medical Radiological and Dr. Marrese asserted liens in 
the amount of $473 and $1,529, respectively, under the Physicians 
Lien Act. The Hospital Lien Act provides that "the total amount of 
all liens hereunder shall not exceed one-third of the sum paid or 
due to said injured person on said claim or right of action ***." 
770 ILCS 35/1 (West 1992). The Physicians Lien Act contains 
identical limiting language. 770 ILCS 80/1 (West 1992). Although 
the liens together exceeded one-third of plaintiff's settlement, 
the total amounts claimed under each of the two lien acts did not 
exceed one-third of the settlement. 
     The circuit judge read the Hospital Lien Act and the 
Physicians Lien Act together and limited total recovery by the 
lienholders to one-third of plaintiff's settlement. The judge then 
prorated each lien at 97.17% of its total--an amount that would 
reduce the total of the liens so that they would not exceed one- 
third of the settlement. Thus, Wood River's lien was reduced by 
$25.86, Medical Radiological's lien was reduced by $13.39, and Dr. 
Marrese's lien was reduced by $43.28. 
     Wood River and Medical Radiological appealed, arguing that the 
Hospital Lien Act and Physicians Lien Act each create distinct 
liens and that there exists a separate right under each act to a 
maximum of one-third of plaintiff's settlement. The appellate court 
disagreed and affirmed the decision of the circuit court. 281 Ill. 
App. 3d at 558. The appellate court noted the similarity of the 
language in the different lien acts and believed that the intent of 
the legislature and the practical application of the statutes were 
furthered by reading the statutes together. 281 Ill. App. 3d at 
556-57. Like the circuit court, the appellate court limited 
recovery on the total of all liens under the hospital and 
physicians lien acts to a maximum of one-third of the plaintiff's 
recovery. 
      In construing a statute, courts are required to ascertain and 
give effect to the intent of the legislature. Varelis v. 
Northwestern Memorial Hospital,  167 Ill. 2d 449 , 454 (1995). Courts 
should first look to the language of the statute to determine the 
intent of the drafters. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 
(1996). When the statutory language is clear, no resort is 
necessary to other aids of construction. Henry v. St. John's 
Hospital,  138 Ill. 2d 533 , 541 (1990). We must determine in this 
case whether the hospital and physicians lien acts limit the 
recovery of all lienholders under these acts to a combined one- 
third of plaintiff's recovery, or whether the statutes simply limit 
recovery under each individual lien act to one-third of plaintiff's 
recovery. 
     As we have noted, the Hospital Lien Act provides that "the 
total amount of all liens hereunder shall not exceed one-third of 
the sum paid or due to said injured person on said claim or right 
of action ***." 770 ILCS 35/1 (West 1992). The Physicians Lien Act 
contains the same language. 770 ILCS 80/1 (West 1992). Unlike the 
courts below, we believe that the plain language of these statutes 
limits application of the one-third maximum to each individual act 
and requires aggregation of only those liens filed under that 
particular act. We agree with the lienholders that the phrase "all 
liens hereunder," in limiting the amount of liens that may be 
asserted against a single recovery, refers only to liens filed 
under each act, and does not include liens that are asserted under 
separate provisions. To hold otherwise, as plaintiff suggests, 
would require us to read into the statutes an additional limitation 
that the legislature did not include. 
     This interpretation of the statutory language conforms to the 
long standing construction the appellate court has given this 
language. Wheaton v. Department of Public Aid, 92 Ill. App. 3d 1084 
(1981), dealt with a fact pattern almost identical with the present 
case. In Wheaton, one claimant filed a lien under the Hospital Lien 
Act and two other claimants filed liens under the Physicians Lien 
Act. Wheaton, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 1085. The amount claimed under 
each act was less than one-third of plaintiff's settlement, but the 
total amount asserted under the two acts, together, exceeded one- 
third of the settlement. Wheaton, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 1086-87. The 
appellate court held that the amounts of the hospital's and 
physicians' liens could not be reduced as long as the total amount 
of the liens filed under each separate act did not exceed one-third 
of plaintiff's recovery. Wheaton, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 1086. 
     The same rationale has been followed by every court deciding 
the issue until the present case. See, e.g., Illini Hospital v. 
Bates, 135 Ill. App. 3d 732, 734 (1985) (language of the statute is 
clear and the allowance of liens under the Hospital Lien Act is 
mandatory provided it does not exceed one-third of the total 
recovery); In re Estate of McMillan, 115 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1026 
(1983) (in light of the plain language of section 1 of the Hospital 
Lien Act, reduction of hospital's lien appropriate only if lien 
exceeds one-third of settlement); O'Donnell v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 71 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13 (1979) (under the Hospital Lien Act, the 
court is charged with the responsibility of adjudicating and 
enforcing hospital liens pursuant to a mechanical "one-third of 
proceeds" formula). 
     Although we rest our decision on the plain language of the 
statutes at issue here, we note that our interpretation is 
consistent with the legislative history of related provisions. 
There are five other separate acts providing for liens in favor of 
health-care providers in Illinois. These additional lien acts 
govern dentists (770 ILCS 20/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)), physical 
therapists (770 ILCS 75/1 et seq. (West 1992)), home health care 
agencies (770 ILCS 25/1 et seq. (West 1992)), clinical 
psychologists (770 ILCS 10/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)), and emergency 
medical services personnel (770 ILCS 22/1 et seq. (West 1992)). All 
the acts except the one applicable to dentists were enacted after 
the Wheaton decision. "Where statutes are enacted after judicial 
opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature 
acted with knowledge of the prevailing case law." People v. 
Hickman,  163 Ill. 2d 250 , 262 (1994). We may thus assume that the 
legislature was aware of, and approved, Wheaton's construction when 
it enacted the other lien statutes and continued to use the phrase 
"all liens hereunder" or an equivalent expression, "all liens under 
this Act," in limiting the amount that may be received under each 
act to one-third of the plaintiff's recovery. 
     Further support for our holding may be found in the 
legislative history of one of the post-Wheaton statutes, the Home 
Health Agency Lien Act. Like the provisions applicable to 
physicians and hospitals, at issue here, the Home Health Agency 
Lien Act uses the phrase "all liens hereunder" in limiting the 
amount that may be asserted under that statute against a single 
recovery. During debate on the act, there was discussion regarding 
the distribution of a recovery when the liens of different types of 
health-care providers exceed the money available. 84th Ill. Gen. 
Assem., House Proceedings, June 20, 1985, at 323-24. Representative 
Johnson, explaining that he wished to establish legislative intent, 
offered an example in which, after the attorney's lien had been 
deducted, $60,000 remained of an initial $100,000 recovery and 
separate sums of $30,000 were claimed under the hospital, 
physicians, and home health care lien acts. 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., 
House Proceedings, June 20, 1985, at 323-24 (statements of 
Representative Johnson). In response to questions from 
Representative Johnson, Representative Levin affirmed that all the 
liens should be treated "on the same footing," to use 
Representative Johnson's phrase, and reduced on a prorated basis so 
that each of the three lien categories would be entitled to $20,000 
of the $60,000 remaining from the recovery. 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., 
House Proceedings, June 20, 1985, at 324 (statements of 
Representatives Johnson and Levin). As these remarks demonstrate, 
the amount claimed under each lien act in the example is for less 
than one-third of the settlement. After adjudication, however, the 
lienholders' total recovery would equal an amount that represents 
60% of the total settlement, exceeding one-third of the settlement. 
     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Hospital Lien 
Act and the Physicians Lien Act provide for separate liens, with 
the total amounts that may be claimed under each act limited to 
one-third of plaintiff's settlement. We therefore reverse the 
judgments of the appellate and circuit courts and remand the cause 
to the circuit court of Saline County for entry of judgment 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed; 
                                         circuit court judgment reversed; 
                                                          cause remanded. 
 
     JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: 
     I was against granting the petition for leave to appeal in 
this case, and I still think review by this court was 
inappropriate. The court's decision today does not award Wood 
River, Medical Radiological, or Dr. Marrese a single penny more 
than they were otherwise entitled to. It merely makes it easier for 
them to collect the amount plaintiff already owes by increasing 
their statutory lien rights against her settlement proceeds. The 
increase for all three health care providers totals all of $82.53. 
     Eighty-two dollars and fifty-three cents in additional lien 
rights for three providers for four years of litigation. That is 
all this case is or was ever about. What this shows to me is that 
there is no amount too trivial to warrant the court's intervention 
if my colleagues believe they can make the litigation process more 
difficult for plaintiffs. 
     Wholly aside from these considerations, I believe that the 
majority's opinion is misguided. The appellate court correctly 
noted that if the various liens could be aggregated, as the 
majority here holds, the total lien amount could easily consume the 
plaintiff's entire recovery. The plaintiff would have hired an 
attorney and endured the rigors of litigation and achieved success 
and be left with nothing. I share the appellate court's view that 
the legislature could not have intended such an absurd and unjust 
result. 
     A second flaw in the majority's analysis is that it can yield 
inequitable and absurd results even among the lien holders 
themselves. Because the majority treats each of the lien statutes 
as being independent of the others, the size of a particular health 
care provider's lien may depend on the fortuity of whether the 
other lien holders are governed by the same lien statute or by a 
different one. 
     The anomalies that can result are readily illustrated. Assume, 
for example, that a plaintiff receives a $9,000 recovery and has 
agreed to pay his attorney a one-third contingency fee. If the 
plaintiff had a physical therapy bill of $3,000 and a bill from his 
doctor for $3,000, the majority's approach would mean that the 
therapist and the doctor could each assert liens for the full 
amount they were owed, a total of $6,000. If, however, the 
providers submitting the $3,000 bills were both doctors rather than 
a doctor and a physical therapist, their combined lien rights would 
be limited to $3,000, half as much. Similarly, if there were two 
doctors who both had bills of $3,000 in addition to the physical 
therapist with the $3,000 bill, each of the doctors would have to 
accept liens for a reduced amount, while the physical therapist 
would be entitled to a lien for the full $3,000. 
     I can see no rational basis for such disparate results. The 
appellate court's approach avoids these problems completely. The 
majority's analysis simply ignores them. In so doing, it sets the 
stage for inequities that the legislature could not have intended 
and failed to recognize when it debated and enacted the law. 
     Where the passage of a series of legislative acts results in 
confusion and consequences that the General Assembly may not have 
contemplated, the courts must construe the acts in such a way as to 
reflect the obvious intent of the legislature and permit practical 
application of the law. People ex rel. Community High School 
District No. 231 v. Hupe,  2 Ill. 2d 434 , 448 (1954). The appellate 
court did that here. Its judgement should therefore be affirmed. 
Accordingly, I dissent.