Title: RICHARD MEYER and MIRACLES MEYER V. TONY HATTO and BEN SULLIVAN, individually and TONY HATTO and BEN SULLIVAN d/b/a DESIGN WORKSHOP, a partnership; TONY HATTO and BEN SULLIVAN, individually and TONY HATTO and BEN SULLIVAN d/b/a DESIGN WORKSHOP, a partnership V. RICHARD MEYER and MIRACLES MEYER

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD MEYER and MIRACLES MEYER V. TONY HATTO and BEN SULLIVAN, individually and TONY HATTO and BEN SULLIVAN d/b/a DESIGN WORKSHOP, a partnership; TONY HATTO and BEN SULLIVAN, individually and TONY HATTO and BEN SULLIVAN d/b/a DESIGN WORKSHOP, a partnership V. RICHARD MEYER and MIRACLES MEYER2008 WY 153Case Number: S-07-0223, S-07-0224Decided: 12/23/2008NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
RICHARD 
MEYER and MIRACLES 
MEYER,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.TONY HATTO and BEN 
SULLIVAN, individually and TONY HATTO and BEN SULLIVAN d/b/a DESIGN WORKSHOP, a 
partnership,Appellees(Defendants).

TONY 
HATTO and BEN SULLIVAN, individually and TONY HATTO and BEN SULLIVAN d/b/a 
DESIGN WORKSHOP, a 
partnership,Appellants(Defendants),v.RICHARD MEYER 
and MIRACLES MEYER,Appellees(Plaintiffs)

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Richard Meyer and Miracles Meyer:

Robert 
N. Williams and Pamela T. Harvey of Meyer & Williams, Attorneys at Law, 
P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Williams.

 
 

Representing 
Tony Hatto and Ben Sullivan, 
individually, and Tony Hatto and Ben Sullivan d/b/a Design 
Workshop:

Mark 
Diehl Sullivan of Levy Coleman LLP, Jackson, 
Wyoming, at the time of briefing; and of Mark 
D. Sullivan, P.C., Wilson, 
Wyoming, at the time of oral 
argument.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      These two 
consolidated appeals arise from the dismissal of a complaint for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.  Richard and 
Miracles Meyer reside in Teton 
County, Wyoming.  They own real property in the State of 
Hawaii.  Tony Hatto and Ben Sullivan reside in 
Hawaii.  They are partners in a business known as 
Design Workshop, also based in Hawaii.  
The Meyers entered into a contract with Design Workshop for the design of 
a residence the Meyers intended to build on their Hawaiian property.  

 
 
[¶2]      The contractual 
relationship soured and ultimately the Meyers sued Design Workshop, as well as 
Hatto and Sullivan individually, in Wyoming.  
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal 
jurisdiction over Hatto, Sullivan, and Design Workshop.  In appeal number S-07-0223, the Meyers 
appeal the dismissal.  We affirm. 

 
 
[¶3]      In appeal number 
S-07-0224, Hatto, Sullivan, and Design Workshop (for the sake of simplicity, the 
plurality will hereinafter be referred to collectively as "Design Workshop") 
appeal the denial by the district court of their request for the award of 
attorneys' fees and expenses.  We 
reverse that decision and remand for the determination and award of appropriate 
attorneys' fees and expenses.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶4]      In appeal number 
S-07-0223, the Meyers present three issues:

 
 
1.         
Whether the District Court erred when it dismissed Plaintiffs' claims on 
the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
Defendants?

 
 
2.         
Should the District Court have granted an evidentiary hearing to 
determine the nature, quality, quantity and sufficiency of the contacts that the 
Defendants had with Wyoming before dismissing the case for lack of 
in personam 
jurisdiction?

 
 
3.         
Did Defendants' [sic] submit to the jurisdiction of the District Court by 
claiming affirmative relief in the form of a request for recovery of attorneys' 
fees and costs?

 
 
[¶5]      In appeal number 
S-07-0224, Design Workshop requests this Court review the district court's 
denial of its motion for attorneys' fees and costs for abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶6]      While in 
Hawaii, the 
Meyers were referred to Design Workshop by a local contractor.  The Meyers approached Design Workshop in 
Hawaii to 
enlist its help in designing the residence they planned to build on their 
Hawaiian property.  Even though no 
member of Design Workshop had any connection to Wyoming, whether business or personal, the 
Meyers decided to work with the Hawaiian company.  Mr. Meyer drafted a contract after he 
returned to his residence in Wyoming.  
In September 2004, the Meyers returned to Hawaii to meet again with Design 
Workshop.  Some changes to the 
contract were agreed upon and the "Agreement for Designing Services" (Agreement) 
was executed by the parties.  

 
 
[¶7]      After the 
Agreement was executed, the Meyers returned to Wyoming.  
Mr. Meyer, with the knowledge of Design Workshop, hired a contractor from 
Wyoming.  Eventually, the contractor obtained a 
general contractor's license in Hawaii so he could work on the project 
there.  Mr. Meyer also consulted 
various other tradesmen in Wyoming about the 
Hawaii 
project.  

 
 
[¶8]      The Agreement 
contained terms indicating that the parties thereto would work closely together 
on the project.  For 
instance:

 
 
Designer 
will conduct a pre-design meeting with Meyer and Meyer's contractor.  In this meeting Designer will discuss 
the design program with the team.  
As a team, all parties will then determine an appropriate budget and 
scope of work for the project.  

 
 
According 
to an affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss by Ben Sullivan, such close 
collaboration did indeed occur:

 
 
            
After entering into the Contract, Design Workshop spent 18 months fully 
designing the home in question for the Meyers, working closely with the Meyers 
and their contractor, Bill Swensen, on the program for the home, materials and 
potential cost-saving measures.  
Design Workshop's efforts went far beyond the scope of the Contract, and 
included lengthy and frequent interaction with the Meyers' contractor to select 
materials and building systems, and to save money by exploring extraordinary 
materials sourcing options, such [as] a custom pre-fabricated whole house 
structural system from Bali.  

 
 
These 
contacts were either in person in Hawaii or 
Bali, or by telephone, fax, or regular mail between Design Workshop in 
Hawaii and the Meyers and their contractor in 
Wyoming.  No member of Design Workshop ever 
journeyed to Wyoming.  

 
 
[¶9]      After 
approximately eighteen months of work on the project, differences developed 
between the Meyers and Design Workshop, and the project was halted.  The Meyers filed the instant suit in the 
Ninth Judicial District Court of Wyoming.  
Design Workshop responded with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  The motion to dismiss 
included a request for attorneys' fees and expenses.  Discovery pertaining to the issue of 
personal jurisdiction was allowed.  
After briefing and the submission of documents including affidavits, but 
without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the 
complaint.  

 
 
[¶10]   Design Workshop then submitted a 
motion renewing its request for the award of attorneys' fees and expenses.  As in its motion to dismiss, Design 
Workshop grounded its motion on the fact that the Agreement provided for binding 
arbitration in the event of a dispute and for attorneys' fees and costs to be 
awarded to the prevailing party.  
The district court denied this motion without comment.  These appeals 
ensued.

 
 
APPEAL 
NUMBER S-07-0223

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Lack 
of Evidentiary Hearing

 
 
[¶11]   In their second issue, the Meyers 
contend the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing before 
deciding the motion to dismiss.  
Since this challenges the procedure followed by the district court in 
arriving at its decision, it must be addressed first.  Procedurally, a district court possesses 
extreme latitude in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists.  
The district court may determine the matter on the basis of pleadings 
and other materials called to its attention; it may require discovery; or it may 
conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any apparent factual questions.  Cheyenne Publishing, LLC v. Starostka, 2004 WY 
88, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 463, 469 (Wyo. 2004); Shaw v. Smith, 964 P.2d 428, 433 
(Wyo. 1998); O'Bryan v. McDonald, 952 P.2d 636, 638 
(Wyo. 1998); PanAmerican Mineral Servs., Inc. v. KLS 
Enviro Resources, Inc., 916 P.2d 986, 989 (Wyo. 1996).  The district court has discretion to 
decide the procedural scheme it will follow, and its procedural decisions will 
not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.  

 
 
[¶12]   The Meyers requested an evidentiary 
hearing.  The district court, after 
reviewing the parties' briefs and documentary submissions, sent a letter to the 
parties imparting its preliminary determination of the pertinent undisputed 
basic facts.  The district court 
stated that if any party disagreed, it would hold an evidentiary hearing.  The Meyers sent a letter to the district 
court objecting to certain statements as either false or incomplete.  Design Workshop responded by letter 
stipulating to the basic facts that pertained to the issue of personal 
jurisdiction as itemized in the letter from the Meyers.  Thus, after much ado, there ended up 
being no dispute as to any material, basic fact.  

 
 
[¶13]   Certainly each party put their own 
spin on the basic facts, but that did not put the basic facts themselves in 
dispute.  Under the circumstances, 
we find no error in the district court's decision not to hold a formal 
evidentiary hearing.  The purpose of 
an evidentiary hearing  resolving any factual disputes  had already been 
accomplished, making such a hearing unnecessary.  

 
 
Existence 
of Personal Jurisdiction

 
 
[¶14]   As stated above, after review of 
the record, we find the underlying basic facts are not in dispute, only their 
characterization and application to the law.  The question of whether personal 
jurisdiction can properly be exercised in Wyoming is therefore a question of law to be 
reviewed de novo.  Cheyenne Publishing, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d  at 
469; Eddy v. Oukrop, 784 P.2d 610, 
612 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
[¶15]   Pursuant to Wyoming's long-arm statute, Wyoming courts are authorized to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant on any basis which is not inconsistent with the 
Wyoming or United States 
constitutions.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
5-1-107(a) (LexisNexis 2007).  This 
case involves the question of the existence of personal jurisdiction based on a 
single act.  In such a case, 
personal jurisdiction exists if three conditions are satisfied: 1) the defendant 
must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in Wyoming or of 
causing important consequences in Wyoming; 2) the cause of action must arise 
from the consequences in Wyoming of the defendant's activities; and 3) the 
activities of the defendant or the consequences of those activities must have a 
substantial enough connection with Wyoming to make the exercise of jurisdiction 
reasonable.  Cheyenne Publishing, ¶ 11, 94 P.3d  at 
470; Amoco Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee 
Partnership Co., 886 P.2d 265, 267 (Wyo. 
1994); First Wyoming Bank, N.A., Rawlins 
v. TransMountain Sales and Leasing, Inc., 602 P.2d 1219, 
1221 (Wyo. 
1979).  

 
 
[¶16]   Our analysis begins and ends with 
the first factor.  "Purposeful 
availment is a threshold requirement meant to ensure that a defendant will not 
be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of "random," "fortuitous," or 
"attenuated" contacts.' O'Bryan [v. McDonald, 952 P.2d 636 (Wyo. 1998)] at 639 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 
85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985))."  Goodwin v. Hall, 957 P.2d 1299, 1301 
(Wyo. 
1998).  

 
 
[¶17]   In this case, we agree with the 
well-reasoned opinion of the district court, which states in 
part:

 
 
The 
contacts the Defendants had with the State of Wyoming are two in character.  First, while in Hawaii, they contracted with the Plaintiffs, who were 
Wyoming residents, to design a home to be built 
in Hawaii.  
Second, they communicated with the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs' 
contractors by telephone and email who were in Wyoming.  
There is no evidence that the Defendants came to Wyoming in furtherance of their contractual obligation; 
nor is there any evidence that they solicited business from the Plaintiffs in 
Wyoming.  The telephone and email communications 
were not the fruit of any solicitation of the Defendants in Wyoming. Rather the 
contacts were the product of a contract entered between the parties in 
Hawaii and the choice of the Plaintiffs to 
return to Wyoming and to employ Wyoming contractors.  

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
            
The Defendants' contact with the State of Wyoming through telecommunications are [sic] 
attenuated at best.  These 
"contacts" came about only because the Plaintiffs chose to return to Wyoming after they entered into a contract with the 
Defendants and after the Plaintiffs chose to use building contractors who hail 
from Wyoming.  
The Defendants had no choice in those matters.  The Defendants did not purposefully 
avail themselves to the privilege of acting in Wyoming and whatever contacts they had with people in 
Wyoming came about as a result of Plaintiffs' 
decisions to return to Wyoming and utilized 
[sic] Wyoming 
contractors.

 
 
[¶18]   The Meyers argue that, in entering 
the Agreement, Design Workshop became part of a "design team" based primarily in 
Wyoming.  It is true Design Workshop knew of the 
possibility of extensive contact with various people in Wyoming when it entered 
into the Agreement.  Indeed, 
potentially in anticipation of the added expense of such long-distance 
communications, the Agreement specifically excluded telecommunications and 
mailings from the general fee due Design Workshop.  Instead these expenses were to be 
reimbursed separately.  

 
 
[¶19]   However, Wyoming "does not acquire 
[personal] jurisdiction by being the center of gravity' of the controversy, or 
the most convenient location for litigation. . . . [The issue] is resolved in 
this case by considering the acts of the [defendant]."  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254, 78 S.Ct 1228, 1240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958).  Thus, the 
constitutional right to exercise personal jurisdiction hinges upon a sufficient 
contact initiated by the defendant.  
Affiliations with Wyoming that involve Design Workshop but are 
instituted by the Meyers do not meet the constitutional minimum.  "The unilateral activity of those who 
claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the 
requirement of contact with the forum state."  Id. 
at 253, 78 S. Ct.  at 1239-40. 

 
 
[¶20]   Instead, the analysis regarding the 
existence of personal jurisdiction revolves around the quality and nature of 
Design Workshop's contacts, not the quantity.  Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S. Ct. 154, 160, 90 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1945) (the validity of assertion of personal jurisdiction over a 
nonconsenting defendant who is not present in the forum depends upon "the 
quality and nature of [his] activity" in relation to the forum).  The fact that Design Workshop knew it 
would have to communicate with people in Wyoming in order to fulfill its 
contractual obligations does not qualify as purposeful availment of the 
privilege of doing business in Wyoming.  
See, e.g., Moyer Associates, Inc. v. The Grad 
Partnership, 1082 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15356 (Illinois company may not sue New 
Jersey business in Illinois for 
personal services rendered related to a building project in New Jersey absent broader 
contacts).

 
 
[¶21]   In Anderson v. Shiflett, 435 F.2d 1036 
(10th Cir. 1971), the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals was faced with a similar situation.  An Oklahoma architect, Anderson, entered into a contract with 
a Texas resident, Shiflett, for the design of a 
building in Texas.  
The contract was made in Texas.  
Anderson attempted to sue Shiflett in 
federal district court in Oklahoma.  The district court dismissed the 
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.  In affirming the dismissal, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

 
 
We 
have here a single, isolated transaction in the form of a contract for personal 
service. The totality of the contacts with Oklahoma was the performance of certain phases of the work 
at the plaintiff's Oklahoma 
City office. Nothing in the record discloses the 
reasonable anticipation of contractual consequences in Oklahoma. To support 
jurisdiction, the plaintiff relies on his own unilateral activities. Under the 
decision in Hanson v. Denckla [sic] this is not enough. To become subject to 
Oklahoma 
jurisdiction, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of 
doing business in that state and thereby invoke the benefits and protections of 
its laws. The record before us does not satisfy this requirement. Instead, it 
shows no more than the unilateral performance of contracted personal service in 
the forum. The idea that such performance alone can subject the employer to the 
jurisdiction of the forum has frightening consequences.

 
 

Id. 
at 
1038.  We find the same reasoning 
pertinent here.  In this case, 
Design Workshop simply did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities in Wyoming.  

 
 
Submission 
to Jurisdiction

 
 
[¶22]   Finally, the Meyers argue that 
Design Workshop voluntarily submitted itself to jurisdiction in Wyoming by requesting 
attorneys' fees and costs.  Courts 
in other jurisdictions have gone both ways on the issue of whether a party 
submits to personal jurisdiction by filing a motion for attorneys' fees.  See In re Marriage of Adler, 648 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ill. 1995) (moving for disbursement of escrow funds and attorneys' 
fees and costs is a request for affirmative relief and general appearance); Johnson v. Johnson, 662 P.2d 1178, 1182 
(Kan. 1983) (personal jurisdiction established when attorneys' fees motion filed 
after objecting to court's jurisdiction); Associate Discount Corp. v. Haviland, 
218 So. 2d 59, 61-62 (La. App. 1969) (request for attorneys' fees is general 
appearance because it affirmatively invokes court's jurisdiction).  Compare Heineken v. Heineken, 683 So. 2d 194, 197-98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (attorneys' fees request did not waive 
defense of personal jurisdiction because it was a defensive action rather than a 
request for affirmative relief); Grange 
Ins. Ass'n v. State, 757 P.2d 933, 940-41 (Wash. 1988) (a request for 
attorneys' fees does not waive an objection to personal jurisdiction because the 
request is a defensive action and not a request for affirmative relief). 

 
 
[¶23]   We believe the better approach is 
to conclude that a motion for attorneys' fees is not an affirmative action that 
invokes personal jurisdiction.  
Holding otherwise would allow one contracting party to force the other 
party to subject itself to a foreign jurisdiction or forgo its contractual right 
to attorneys' fees.  Such a result 
does not further the parties' intent, as expressed in the contract, that 
litigation over the contract be undertaken at the risk of having to pay the 
successful party's attorneys' fees. Such provisions are intended to discourage 
litigation, not to encourage it in foreign jurisdictions.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   Design Workshop is a Hawaiian firm 
hired in Hawaii to design a residence to be 
built in Hawaii.  
It did not solicit this contract in Wyoming.  
Its only connection to Wyoming is through the Meyers.  Under these circumstances, we find 
Design Workshop did not purposely avail itself of the privilege of acting in 
Wyoming.  Affirmed.

 
 
APPEAL 
NUMBER S-07-0224

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶25]   In its cross-appeal, Design 
Workshop appeals the district court's decision denying its request for 
attorneys' fees and expenses.  We 
review a district court's decision regarding the award of attorneys' fees and 
costs for abuse of discretion. Snyder v. 
Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Wyo. 1999).  A court abuses its discretion only when 
it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances.  The burden is placed 
upon the party who is attacking the trial court's ruling to establish an abuse 
of discretion.  Shepard v. Beck, 2007 WY 53, ¶ 14, 154 P.3d 982, 988 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶26]   In Wyoming, we apply the American rule which 
holds that each party generally is responsible for his own fees and costs. See, e.g., Rock Springs Land and Timber, Inc. v. 
Lore, 2003 WY 100, ¶ 37, 75 P.3d 614, 628 (Wyo. 2003).  A prevailing party, however, is generally 
entitled to be reimbursed for his attorney's fees and costs when an express 
contractual authorization exists for such an award.  Morrison v. Clay, 2006 WY 161, ¶ 16, 149 P.3d 696, 702 (Wyo. 2006); Ahearn v. 
Tri-County Fed. Sav. Bank, 954 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Wyo. 1998); DeWitt 
v. Balben, 718 P.2d 854, 863 (Wyo. 1986).   There is a 
proviso:

 
 
While 
the general rule is that a valid provision for attorney's fees in a [contract] 
is as much an obligation of the contract as any part of it, the trial court 
still has discretion in exercising its equitable control to allow only such sum 
as it thinks reasonable.  A trial 
court in its discretion may properly disallow attorney's fees altogether on the 
basis that such recovery would be inequitable.  

 
 

Combs 
v. Walters, 
518 P.2d 1254, 1255 (Wyo. 1974) (citing Graves v. Burch, 26 Wyo. 192, 200-01, 
181 P. 354, 357 (1919)); Dewey v. 
Wentland, 2002 WY 2, ¶ 50, 38 P.3d 402, 420 (Wyo. 2002); McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 533-34 
(Wyo. 2000).  

[¶27]   Design Workshop argues it is 
contractually entitled to the award on the basis of language in the Agreement 
and this Court's decision in Morrison v. 
Clay, 2006 WY 161, 149 P.3d 696 (Wyo. 2006).  The dispute resolution provision of the 
Agreement provides:

 
 
In 
the event of a dispute hereunder the parties shall submit the dispute to binding 
arbitration.  Each party shall, at 
its expense shall [sic] select one arbitrator and the two arbitrators thus 
selected shall select a third arbitrator, whose expense shall be shared by the 
parties.  The three arbitrators thus 
selected shall conduct a hearing and render a binding decision as soon as 
practicable.  The losing party in 
such arbitration shall pay all attorneys [sic] fees and other expenses of the 
prevailing party.

 
 
[¶28]   The Meyers never attempted 
arbitration but instead brought a civil suit against Design Workshop.  The Meyers attempt to use their action 
in ignoring the arbitration clause to their advantage.  They argue that, since this was not 
arbitration, the Agreement language does not apply.  

 
 
[¶29]   As the parties predicted, the 
resolution of this issue hinges on our decision in Morrison.  In Morrison, the parties had entered into a 
settlement agreement.  The 
settlement agreement included an arbitration clause:

 
 

Any 
dispute arising out of or relating in any way to this Agreement shall be 
resolved by a majority of the arbitrators agreed to in this Agreement through 
final, binding and non-appealable arbitration 
in accordance with the arbitration rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. The prevailing party in any such dispute shall be entitled to 
recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs (including, without limitation, 
any arbitration fees and costs) from the other party, in addition to any other 
relief to which the prevailing party may be entitled.  

 
 

Morrison, 
¶ 10, 149 P.3d  at 699-700 (emphasis in original).  In a dispute admittedly "arising out of or relating in any way to" the 
settlement agreement, the appellant filed suit instead of submitting to 
arbitration.  The appellee requested 
attorneys' fees pursuant to the arbitration clause in the settlement 
agreement.  This Court upheld the 
award of such fees: 

 
 
[Appellant] 
reasons that because the district court action was not arbitration, that the 
agreement does not authorize an award of attorneys' fees by the district court. 
We reject this reasoning because the obvious intent of the Settlement Agreement 
was to foreclose future litigation between the parties and to award attorneys' 
fees to the prevailing party in any dispute involving the Settlement Agreement. 

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 17, 149 P.3d  at 702.  We see no 
reason to depart from this analysis in this case.  

 
 
[¶30]   The Meyers attempt to distinguish 
Morrison by arguing that the language 
of the arbitration clause in their Agreement is much narrower than that used in 
Morrison.  In Morrison, arbitration was required for 
"[a]ny dispute arising out of or 
relating in any way to this [settlement] Agreement."  The instant Agreement requires 
arbitration "in the event of any dispute hereunder."  Under the facts of this case, we fail to 
see the significance of the distinction.  
The Meyers sued exclusively for breach of the Agreement.  That certainly qualifies as "any dispute 
hereunder."  The "obvious intent of 
the [arbitration clause] was to foreclose future litigation between the parties 
and to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in any dispute."  Morrison, ¶ 17, 149 P.3d  at 702.  While we have not directly addressed 
whether a party who successfully resists personal jurisdiction is a "prevailing 
party" for attorneys' fees purposes, we now so conclude.  See Schaub v. Wilson, 969 P.2d 552 (Wyo. 1998).  Design Workshop, therefore, is 
contractually entitled to the award of attorneys' fees and other 
expenses.

 
 
[¶31]   Since the district court denied 
Design Workshop's motion for attorneys' fees and expenses without discussion, it 
is possible the district court accepted that Design Workshop was contractually 
entitled to the award but denied the motion on equitable grounds.  If so, we find this decision constitutes 
an abuse of discretion.  The 
equities in this case clearly favor an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and 
expenses to Design Workshop.  

 
 
[¶32]   To recap, Design Workshop is a 
Hawaiian company.  It entered into a 
contract to design the Meyers' Hawaiian residence.  The contract required arbitration for 
any disputes arising thereunder.  
Despite the arbitration clause, and also the lack of any general contacts 
between Design Workshop and Wyoming, the Meyers decided to bring the 
instant civil action.  This decision 
was unreasonable under the circumstances.  
The decision unjustifiably forced Design Workshop into a long-distance 
defense simply to extricate itself from an unauthorized civil action.  We find the Meyers took an untenable 
position, placing the equities convincingly in favor of Design Workshop. 

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶33]   The Meyers ignored the arbitration 
clause in the Agreement at their own peril.  The clause was meant to avoid 
litigation.  The Meyers cannot use 
their attempt to litigate instead of arbitrate as a shield against the 
attorneys' fees and other expenses provision of the arbitration clause.  We reverse the decision of the district 
court denying attorneys' fees and other expenses and remand for a determination 
of the reasonable amount to be awarded.  

 
 
[¶34]   Further, since the contract allows 
the award of attorneys' fees and other expenses, the award includes fees and 
expenses incurred on appeal. Kinstler v. 
RTB South Greeley, LTD., LLC, 2007 WY 98, ¶ 13, 160 P.3d 1125, 1129 (Wyo. 
2007); Cline v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 
998 P.2d 946, 953 (Wyo. 2000); Ahearn, 954 P.2d  at 1373; DeWitt, 718 P.2d  at 865. We will 
determine the appropriate sum to be awarded after counsel submits proper 
documentation.