Title: State v. Uskert

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Uskert, 85 Ohio St.3d 593, 1999-Ohio-289.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. USKERT, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Uskert (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 593.] 
Criminal law — Motor vehicles — Traffic offenses — Driving while intoxicated — 
Administrative license suspension — Reinstatement fee of former R.C. 
4511.191(L)(2) does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
The reinstatement fee of former R.C. 4511.191(L)(2) does not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
or Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
(No. 98-217 — Submitted January 27, 1999 — Decided June 2, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ashland County, No. 97-COA-01219. 
 
On March 6, 1997, following a traffic accident, the defendant-appellee, Scott 
J. Uskert, was arrested and charged with violations of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and R.C. 
4511.19(A)(3), driving with a prohibited concentration of alcohol.  Pursuant to 
R.C. 4511.191, Ohio’s implied consent law, defendant submitted to a breath test, 
and after testing positive for alcohol, defendant was placed under an administrative 
license suspension, and his license was seized pursuant to R.C. 4511.191. 
 
On March 11, 1997, at defendant’s administrative license suspension 
hearing, he entered an initial plea of not guilty.  On March 21, 1997, defendant’s 
petition for occupational driving privileges was granted effective March 28, 1997.  
On April 14, 1997, defendant entered a plea of no contest, and it appears from the 
record that the R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) charge was nolled.  At that time, defendant was 
sentenced to sixty days in jail, with fifty-seven days suspended, placed on 
probation for one year, ordered to pay a fine of $300, and received a judicial 
license suspension of one year, effective April 14, 1997.  Defendant’s occupational 
driving privileges were continued. 
 
 
2
 
On April 22, 1997, defendant filed a motion appealing the constitutionality 
of the reinstatement fee provision of former R.C. 4511.191(L)(2).  Pending 
defendant’s appeal, the reinstatement fee was stayed, and there is no record that the 
fee was paid.  After the Ashland Municipal Court rejected the motion challenging 
the constitutionality of the statute on May 6, 1997, defendant appealed to the Court 
of Appeals for Ashland County, which reversed the decision of the trial court. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor, 
Christopher S. Cook, Assistant Attorney General, and Richard P. Wolfe, Ashland 
City Law Director, for appellant. 
 
Joseph P. Kearns, Jr., for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  The issue presented to this court is whether the 
reinstatement fee paid to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles at the conclusion of an 
administrative license suspension (“ALS”) in the amount of $250, pursuant to 
former R.C. 4511.191(L)(2), is “punishment,” thereby subjecting the defendant to 
double jeopardy.  For the following reasons, we find that the reinstatement fee of 
former R.C. 4511.191(L)(2) is not a “punishment” that would subject the 
defendant to double jeopardy, and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, “nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”  This federal protection is applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Benton v. Maryland (1969), 395 U.S. 
784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707; State v. Gustafson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 
 
 
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432, 668 N.E.2d 435, 441.  Similarly, Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution 
provides that “[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” 
 
As this court recognized recently, “the Double Jeopardy Clause of each 
Constitution prohibits (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, 
(2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple 
punishments for the same offense.”  Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d at 432, 668 N.E.2d 
at 441, citing United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 
1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496. 
 
We considered the double jeopardy implications of the ALS in Gustafson.  
We held that “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution do not 
preclude the criminal prosecution and trial of motorists for driving in violation of 
R.C. 4511.19 based upon, and subsequent to, the imposition of an administrative 
license suspension pursuant to R.C. 4511.191.”  Id., paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
We noted, however, that “the need for administrative remedial suspension 
ends at the point where a criminal conviction of drunk driving is obtained, at which 
time a court has authority to judicially impose a license suspension in accordance 
with law and the individual circumstances of the defendant before it.”  Id. at 441, 
668 N.E.2d at 447.  Thus, we held that “[b]ecause an administrative license 
suspension loses its remedial character upon judicial adjudication and sentencing 
for violation of R.C. 4511.19, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States 
and Ohio Constitutions preclude continued recognition of an administrative license 
suspension following judicial imposition of criminal penalties for driving while 
under the influence of intoxicating drugs, including alcohol.”  Id., paragraph four 
of the syllabus. 
 
The statute in effect at the time of the defendant’s suspension, former R.C. 
4511.191(L), provided that “[a]t the end of a suspension period under this section, 
 
 
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section 4511.196, or division (B) of section 4507.16 of the Revised Code and upon 
the request of the person whose driver’s or commercial driver’s license or permit 
was suspended and who is not otherwise subject to suspension, revocation, or 
disqualification, the registrar shall return the driver’s or commercial driver’s 
license or permit to the person upon the occurrence of all of the following: 
 
“(1) A showing by the person that the person had proof of financial 
responsibility, a policy of liability insurance in effect that meets the minimum 
standards set forth in section 4509.51 of the Revised Code, or proof, to the 
satisfaction of the registrar, that the person is able to respond in damages in an 
amount at least equal to the minimum amounts specified in section 4509.51 of the 
Revised Code. 
 
“(2) Payment by the person of a license reinstatement fee of two hundred 
and fifty dollars to the bureau of motor vehicles, which fee shall be deposited in 
the state treasury * * *.”  (Emphasis added.) Former R.C. 4511.191(L), effective 
October 17, 1996, 146 Ohio Laws, Part V, 9967.1 
I. 
Reinstatement fee does not “continue” the ALS 
 
In this case, the court of appeals based its decision on the premise that the 
$250 reinstatement fee, “if not paid, would operate to continue the administrative 
license suspension,” in violation of our holdings in Gustafson.  (Emphasis added.)  
We disagree. 
 
The length of the ALS is determined by R.C. 4511.191(F), depending upon 
the number, if any, of prior convictions for OMVI.  The ALS terminates at (1) the 
end of the suspension period designated by R.C. 4511.191(F); (2) the initial 
appearance if the judge or referee of the trial court or the mayor of the mayor’s 
court determines that one or more of the conditions specified in divisions (H)(1)(a) 
to (d) of this section have not been met, subject to the imposition of a new 
suspension under division (B) of section 4511.196 of the Revised Code [R.C. 
 
 
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4511.191(H)(2)]; (3) by the registrar upon receipt of notice of the person’s entering 
a plea of guilty to or of the person’s conviction after entering a plea of no contest 
under Crim.R. 11 to OMVI [R.C. 4511.191(K)]; or (4) the violation for which the 
driver was arrested and in relation to which the suspension was imposed is 
adjudicated on the merits by the judge or referee of the trial court or by the mayor 
of the mayor’s court [R.C. 4511.191(H)(2)]. 
 
The suspension ends regardless of whether the driver satisfies the two 
conditions of R.C. 4511.191(L).  The two conditions of R.C. 4511.191(L), proof of 
financial responsibility and payment of the reinstatement fee, are, as the dissent in 
the court of appeals’ decision pointed out, conditions precedent to the return of the 
license by the registrar. 
 
Further, as noted by the same dissent, one who drives after the termination 
of the ALS, but who has not paid his or her reinstatement fee, is in violation of 
R.C. 4507.02(C), whereas one who drives during his or her ALS does so in 
violation of R.C. 4507.02(D)(1). 
 
The appellate court went on to find that “[i]f the reinstatement fee remains 
enforceable, then the administrative license suspension does not terminate until 
payment of the fee.  Thus, presumably, unless the trial court vacates both the 
administrative license suspension and the reinstatement fee upon conviction, then 
the administrative license suspension may survive appellant’s conviction.” 
 
Therefore, as a threshold matter, we find that the failure to pay the 
reinstatement fee of former R.C. 4511.191(L) does not operate to continue the ALS 
because the ALS terminates as prescribed by R.C. 4511.191(F), (H)(2), or (K), 
regardless of whether the driver satisfies the two conditions of former R.C. 
4511.191(L). 
II. 
Double Jeopardy Analysis 
 
 
6
 
We must begin any analysis of a statute by pointing to the well-settled rule 
that an Act of the General Assembly is entitled to a strong presumption of 
constitutionality.  State v. Hochhausler (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 455, 458, 668 
N.E.2d 457, 462; Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163.  
Further, challenged legislation will not be invalidated unless the challenger 
establishes the unconstitutional nature of the statute beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St.3d at 458, 668 N.E.2d at 462. 
 
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal trial will be 
precluded by double jeopardy after a civil sanction has been imposed when the 
civil sanction was “overwhelmingly disproportionate” to the damages caused to the 
state by the defendant’s wrongful conduct.  United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. at 
449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502. 
 
However, in 1997, the United States Supreme Court largely “disavow[ed] 
the method of analysis” used in Halper, 490 U.S. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-1902, 
104 L.Ed.2d at 501, and reaffirmed the previously established rule exemplified in 
United States v. Ward (1980), 448 U.S. 242, 248-249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641-2643, 
65 L.Ed.2d 742, 749.  Hudson v. United States (1997), 522 U.S. 93, 96, 118 S.Ct. 
488, 491, 139 L.Ed.2d 450, 457. 
 
In disavowing Halper, the Supreme Court returned to a two-part test that 
requires the court to examine the purpose of the legislation and its effects in 
determining whether it is “punitive” so as to constitute a double jeopardy violation.  
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. at 493, 139 L.Ed.2d at 459. 
 
Under the two-part test reiterated in Hudson, the court must first ask whether 
the legislature “ ‘in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either 
expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.’ ”  Id., quoting Ward, 
448 U.S. at 248, 100 S.Ct. at 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d at 749.  Second, even in those cases 
where the legislature “ ‘has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we 
 
 
7
have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in 
purpose or effect,’ * * * as to ‘transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil 
remedy into a criminal penalty.’ ”  (Citations omitted.)  Id. 
A. 
Legislative Intent 
 
One need only look to the statute to see that all of the money received under 
R.C. 4511.191(L) is distributed to various remedial drug and alcohol treatment and 
intervention funds, reparations and rehabilitation funds, and drug and alcohol 
education programs.  Former R.C. 4511.191(L)(2)(a)-(e).  Further, the fact that the 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles, an administrative agency, is granted the authority to 
collect the reinstatement fee under R.C. 4511.191(L) is “prima facie evidence that 
[the legislature] intended to provide for a civil sanction.”  (Citations omitted.)  
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103, 118 S.Ct. at 495, 139 L.Ed.2d at 461-462. 
 
This court noted in Gustafson that we have “historically and repeatedly 
characterized driver’s license suspensions imposed pursuant to Ohio’s implied 
consent statutes as being civil in nature and remedial in purpose.”  Gustafson at 
440, 668 N.E.2d at 446.  Further, we have stated that “R.C. 4511.191 * * * was 
enacted to protect innocent motorists and pedestrians from injury and death caused 
by irresponsible acts of unsafe drivers on Ohio streets and highways.  The broad 
purpose of the implied-consent statute is to clear the highways of and to protect the 
public from unsafe drivers.”  Hoban v. Rice (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 111, 114, 54 
O.O.2d 254, 256, 267 N.E.2d 311, 314. 
 
Accordingly, we find that the legislature intended that the reinstatement fee 
of R.C. 4511.191(L)(2) be civil in nature and remedial in purpose.  See Gustafson. 
B. 
Purpose or Effect 
 
Even where the legislature indicates an intent to establish a civil penalty, the 
second part of the Hudson analysis requires the court to inquire as to “ ‘whether the 
statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect’ ” * * * as to “ 
 
 
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‘transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’ ”  
(Citations omitted.)  Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. at 493, 139 L.Ed.2d at 459.  
In order to analyze this prong of the test, it is helpful to refer to the guidelines 
enunciated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963), 372 U.S. 144, 168-169, 83 
S.Ct. 554, 567-568, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, 661:  (1) “[w]hether the sanction involves an 
affirmative disability or restraint,” (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as 
a punishment,” (3)  “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,” (4) 
“whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — 
retribution and deterrence,” (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already 
a crime,” (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it,” and (7) “whether it appears excessive in relation to 
the alternative purpose assigned.”  Further, “ ‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice 
to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil 
remedy into a criminal penalty.”  (Citations omitted.)  Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 
S.Ct. at 493, 139 L.Ed.2d at 459, citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 249, 100 S.Ct. at 2641-
2642, 65 L.Ed.2d at 749. 
1. 
Not an affirmative disability or restraint 
 
We have held that “[i]n Ohio, a license to operate a motor vehicle is a 
privilege, and not an absolute property right.”  Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of Motor 
Vehicles (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 46, 554 N.E.2d 97, paragraph two of the syllabus.  
In fact, it is not a substantial private interest, but a state-regulated privilege.  
Maumee v. Gabriel (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 518 N.E.2d 558, 561.  Further, 
while the driver is prohibited from driving until the fee is paid, it does not 
approach the “ ‘ “infamous punishment” of imprisonment.’ ” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 
104, 118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462, quoting Flemming v. Nestor (1960), 363 
U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1376, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, 1448. 
 
 
9
 
Therefore, the suspension of a privilege voluntarily granted does not 
constitute an affirmative disability or restraint. 
2. 
Not historically regarded as punishment 
 
In Hudson, the United States Supreme Court noted that it has long been 
recognized that “ ‘revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted’ ” (such as a 
driver’s license) is “ ‘characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.’ ”  
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104, 118 S.Ct. at 495-496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462, quoting 
Helvering v. Mitchell (1938), 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed. 917, 
922, and at fn. 2.  Further, the court held that “ ‘the payment of fixed * * * sums of 
money [is a] sanction which ha[s] been recognized as enforceable by civil 
proceedings.’ ”  Id., 522 U.S. at 104, 118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462, quoting 
Helvering at 400, 58 S.Ct. at 633, 82 L.Ed. at 922. 
 
Accordingly, the reinstatement fee cannot be said to have been historically 
viewed as punishment. 
3. 
Scienter not required 
 
Clearly, the reinstatement fee of R.C. 4511.191(L) is required for any driver 
who wishes to reinstate his or her license, regardless of the driver’s state of mind at 
the time of arrest for OMVI.  Accordingly, the reinstatement fee requirement is not 
dependent upon a finding of scienter. 
4. 
Not retribution and deterrence 
 
The court of appeals below compared the reinstatement fee of R.C. 
4511.191(L) to the tax imposed on confiscated illegal drugs in Dept. of Revenue of 
Montana v. Kurth Ranch (1994), 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767.  
The appellate court found that the reinstatement fee represents an attempt to “exact 
an additional monetary penalty from the accused, over and above the statutory fine 
provided for a criminal conviction for OMVI.”  We disagree. 
 
 
10
 
The defendant in Kurth Ranch was required to pay the tax or face the 
imposition of more serious penalties.  Here, the reinstatement fee is voluntary.  The 
driver may choose whether or not to seek reinstatement.  No state, civil, or 
administrative action would be taken against the driver if he or she chose not to 
reinstate his or her driving privileges, as long as he or she did not drive.  See 
Thompson v. State (1997), 229 Ga.App. 526, 528, 494 S.E.2d 306, 308.  If the state 
has the authority to revoke driving privileges as a remedial measure, then the state 
may revoke such privileges subject to ability to reinstate the driving privileges 
upon certain conditions.  See id.  This is no more than the suspension of a privilege 
voluntarily granted. 
 
Accordingly, the reinstatement fee associated with the ALS cannot be said to 
promote retribution and deterrence. 
5. 
Behavior to which it applies is not already a crime 
 
Although OMVI is a criminal offense, the ALS is not a criminal sanction.  
The fact that the OMVI charge may form the basis of the criminal offense does not 
transform the ALS or the resulting reinstatement fee into a criminally punitive 
sanction. See Herbst v. Voinovich (N.D.Ohio 1998), 9 F.Supp.2d 828, 835-836.  
Further, to the extent that the underlying behavior is already a crime, “[t]his fact is 
insufficient to render the money penalt[y] * * * criminally punitive.”  Hudson, 522 
U.S. at 105, 118 S.Ct. at 496, 139 L.Ed.2d at 462. 
6. 
Alternative purpose to which it may be rationally connected 
 
As previously noted, the reinstatement fee is not merely used 
administratively by the BMV to process the return of the license to the driver.  
Instead, the funds generated from the reinstatement fee are deposited into the state 
treasury and credited to driver treatment and intervention programs, the reparations 
fund, the indigent drivers alcohol treatment fund, the Ohio Rehabilitation Services 
 
 
11
Commission, and the state treasury to be used for drug abuse resistance education 
programs.  See former R.C. 4511.191(L)(2)(a)-(e). 
 
Thus, the state has a compelling interest to promptly remove careless drivers 
from the road as a public safety measure.  Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 
17-18, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2620-2621, 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 334.  “[T]he right to operate 
motor vehicles on public roadways of this state may be regulated by the lawful 
exercise of the police power for the benefit of public safety and welfare.”  
Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d at 446, 668 N.E.2d at 450 (Douglas, J., concurring).  This 
unlawful conduct continues to be prevalent, as evidenced by the number of OMVI 
cases that continue to flood the judicial system.  Id., 76 Ohio St.3d at 447, 668 
N.E.2d at 451 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
7. 
Not excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned 
 
The court of appeals found that the reinstatement fee “has no rational 
relationship whatsoever to any remedial aspect and purpose of the implied consent 
statute, which is to prevent persons from driving while a criminal case is pending.”  
While the reinstatement fee of R.C. 4511.191(L) is not used solely for the 
processing of the return of the license to the driver, we find that it is not 
disproportionate to the harm caused by one operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol. 
 
In 1995, there were 17,274 alcohol-related traffic fatalities and 
approximately 300,000 persons injured in alcohol-related crashes.2  In addition, in 
1995, more than 1.4 million people were arrested for driving while intoxicated, 
nearly ten percent of all arrests made that year.3  Approximately three in five 
Americans will be involved in an alcohol-related crash at some point in their lives.4  
Alcohol-related traffic crashes cost society $45 billion annually in hospital costs, 
rehabilitation expenses, and lost productivity.5 
 
 
12
 
“When one considers the staggering costs to enforce our DUI laws, to train 
the officers, to equip them with chemical tests, to pay them to patrol the highways, 
to provide rescue services and medical attention for those who are involved in 
alcohol-related accidents, and to initiate drug and alcohol awareness programs, 
$250 does not seem grossly out of proportion to [the defendant’s] role in 
contributing to this state-wide problem.”  State v. Schrock (Nov. 20, 1998), 
Trumbull App. No. 97-T-0176, unreported. 
 
Therefore, we find that the reinstatement fee of R.C. 4511.191(L)(2) is not 
excessive in relation to the danger posed by impaired drivers. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the reinstatement fee of former R.C. 
4511.191(L)(2) does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 10, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
 
We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
trial court so that it may lift the stay on the reinstatement fee and order that the 
defendant is required to pay it. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
Effective September 16, 1998, the General Assembly amended R.C. 
4511.191 to require only one reinstatement fee of four hundred five dollars if the 
suspension arises from a single incident or a single set of facts and circumstances.  
R.C. 4511.191(L)(2) and (3), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80. 
 
 
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2. 
Alcohol Health & Res. World (Sept. 1, 1996) 219, citing National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration 1996b. 
3. 
Id. 
4. 
Id., citing National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and National 
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 1996. 
5. 
Id., citing National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1995a. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J., dissenting.  No test embraced by this court to 
determine whether a civil sanction is punitive should undermine the basic principle 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same 
offense.  State v. Gustafson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432, 668 N.E.2d 435, 441; 
North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 
L.Ed.2d 656, 664-665.  Because I believe that the $250 reinstatement fee 
sanctioned in former R.C. 4511.191(L) is punitive in nature, it violates this basic 
principle.  Therefore, I would find that the reinstatement fee violates the Double 
Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  I would affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
 
Sanctions imposed in civil proceedings have been found to violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  See Hudson v. United States (1997), 522 U.S. 93, 110, 
118 S.Ct. 488, 499, 139 L.Ed.2d 450, 466-467 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment), and cases cited therein.  The concurring opinion recognized that these 
cases reconfirmed the settled proposition that the government cannot use the civil 
label to escape entirely the Double Jeopardy Clause’s command.  The concurring 
opinion notes that this proposition is extremely important because the states and 
federal government have an enormous array of civil administrative sanctions at 
their disposal.  Thus, this provides government with the capability of punishing 
 
 
14
persons repeatedly for the same offense, violating the bedrock double jeopardy 
principle of finality.  Id. at 110-111, 118 S.Ct. at 499, 139 L.Ed.2d at 466. 
 
Here, in order to get his license back after the administrative suspension, the 
defendant was required to pay the reinstatement fee.  This fee was in addition to 
many other costs an offender is required to pay. R.C. 4511.191(D)(1)(a).  For 
example, a fee was imposed after the court suspension, along with the mandatory 
fine and court costs.  R.C. 4507.45; 4511.99.  Fees are also imposed on the 
impounded license plates.  R.C. 4507.02(F)(1) and (2); 4503.10; 4503.19.  In some 
cases, impoundment/immobilization or vehicle forfeiture penalties may be 
imposed.  R.C. 4507.38; 4511.195.6  Thus, it becomes painfully obvious that the 
additional $250 reinstatement fee cannot be viewed in isolation as just a simple 
$250 fee.  See State v. Gustafson (June 27, 1995), Mahoning App. No. 94 C.A. 
232, unreported, 1995 WL 387619, where that court stressed that the reinstatement 
fee of former R.C. 4511.191(L) is “nothing more than hidden taxes incorporated by 
the legislature without the vote of the people.   * * *  Such costs could legitimately 
consume more than two weeks salary or wages for someone working on a 
minimum wage schedule * * *.” 
 
I recognize, and support, the very laudable purpose of the DUI laws, which 
is to prevent dangerous drivers from being on the road.  However, I am concerned 
with the use of a superficial civil remedy to address the exigencies of the present 
day drunk-driving problem.  See United States v. Ursery (1996), 518 U.S. 267, 
300, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2152, 135 L.Ed.2d 549, 574 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment in part and dissenting in part).  Moreover, I believe that governmental 
action should be scrutinized very closely when government stands to gain with the 
enforcement of a mandatory fee.  See Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), 501 U.S. 957, 
979, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2693, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 854, fn. 9 (“There is good reason to 
be concerned that fines, uniquely of all punishments, will be imposed in a measure 
 
 
15
out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence.  Imprisonment, 
corporal punishment, and even capital punishment cost a State money; fines are a 
source of revenue.  As we have recognized in the context of other constitutional 
provisions, it makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the 
State stands to benefit.”).  The license reinstatement fee cannot withstand close 
scrutiny.  Therefore, I dissent. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
FOOTNOTE: 
6. 
In fact, the fees and procedures involved are so onerous that an attorney 
reference handbook admits that “the procedure for the implementation of these 
penalties is a nightmare that could only have been dreamt by the legislature.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Painter & Looker, Ohio Driving Under the Influence Law (1998 
Ed.)  T.20.1, at 257.