Title: BUTCHER v PETRANEK

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14450 I N THE S U P R E M E CWKF O F THE STATE: O F M3NTANA 1979 Plaintiff and Respondent, CISIFUS PEzwNEK and (3M3AGE A. P E ; T R A N E K , Defendants and Appellants. Appeal f m : D i s t r i c t Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Honorable B. W. ThoaMs, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Bradley B. Parrish, mistawn, Montana For Respondent: Morrow, S e d i v y and Olson, Bozeman, Ibntana SutrPTlitted on briefs: February 23, 1979 Decided: APR 2 4 1979 Filed: H P R 2 4 1979 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendants Charles and George Petranek appeal from an o r d e r of t h e District Court, Fergus County, denying t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l . This case involves a d i s p u t e over a f o u r t e e n m i l e roadway a c r o s s p l a i n t i f f Edward Butcher's land which Petraneks, owners of a neighboring t r a c t , had used f o r some y e a r s with Butcher's permission. This same roadway was t h e s u b j e c t of a q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n previously b e f o r e t h i s Court. Taylor v. Petranek (1977), Mont. , 568 P. 2d 120, 34 St.Rep. 905. I n t h a t case, t h i s Court h e l d t h a t Petraneks d i d n o t have an easement i n t h e road. A t t h e t i m e t h e q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n w a s pending i n t h e District Court, Butcher had planted t h e road over with wheat. Although Petraneks w e r e f u l l y aware t h a t t h e m a t t e r was i n l i t i g a t i o n , on May 24, 1976, they t r e s p a s s e d on B u t c h e r ' s land w i t h a road grader and plowed a swath through t h e wheat f i e l d , approximately where t h e road had once been, b e f o r e they w e r e run o f f by Butcher. The swath plowed by Petraneks w a s about one-half m i l e long, twelve f e e t wide, and some f o u r t o s i x inches deep, t h u s s t r i p p i n g t h e t o p s o i l On May 28, 1976, Butcher f i l e d a complaint i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court praying f o r $1000 i n a c t u a l damages t o t h e land, $50,000 i n p u n i t i v e damages f o r i n j u r y t o t h e land, $150 i n a c t u a l damages f o r l o s s of t h e wheat crop damaged by t h e g r a d e r , and $50,000 i n p u n i t i v e damages f o r malicious d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e crops. Butcher a l s o sought i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f , which was granted and i s n o t an i s s u e on appeal. Evidence adduced a t t r i a l i n d i c a t e d t h a t when Butcher e v i c t e d Petraneks from h i s land, a somewhat v i o l e n t alter- c a t i o n took place. Butcher claimed t h a t George Petranek, who w a s d r i v i n g a pickup behind t h e road grader driven by Charles Petranek, rammed t h e horse Butcher w a s r i d i n g with t h e pickup. Butcher a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t both Petraneks and t h e i r h i r e d hand, who was r i d i n g i n t h e pickup, advanced t h r e a t e n i n g l y toward him, with Charles Petranek grabbing f o r Butcher's l e g s as he sat on h i s horse. Butcher t e s t i f i e d he had t o t h r e a t e n Petraneks with a . 2 2 c a l i b e r p i s t o l before they would leave. Other evidence e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t Petraneks had s e v e r a l times i n t h e p a s t c u t Butcher's fences and trespassed across h i s land. I t w a s a l s o shown t h a t Petraneks a r e q u i t e wealthy, having holdings ( c o n s i s t i n g c h i e f l y of ranch and farmlands and r e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s i n Lewistown) t o t a l i n g more than $1,500,000. O n May 5 , 1978, a f t e r a jury t r i a l with t h e Honorable Bernard W. Thomas presiding, a v e r d i c t was returned i n favor of Butcher. The jury awarded $825 a c t u a l damages with $10,000 p u n i t i v e damages f o r damage t o t h e land, and $100 a c t u a l damages with $10,000 p u n i t i v e damages f o r d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e crops. Petraneks subsequently moved f o r a new t r i a l on t h e ground t h a t t h e award of p u n i t i v e damages w a s exces- s i v e and given under t h e influence of passion and prejudice. The District Court denied t h e motion, and Petraneks appeal. The i s s u e on appeal i s simply: Were t h e p u n i t i v e damages awarded t o Butcher by t h e jury excessive? Petraneks argue they w e r e and t h e r e f o r e t h i s Court must e i t h e r reduce them o r order a new t r i a l . I n approaching t h i s i s s u e , w e note t h a t Petraneks are n o t challenging t h e award o r amount of a c t u a l damages, t o t a l i n g $925. Neither a r e they challenging t h e award of punitive damages i t s e l f ; they apparently concede t h a t some award of punitive o r exemplary damages i s proper. What Petraneks a r e challenging i s t h e amount of t h e punitive damages awarded. Their argument e s s e n t i a l l y i s t h a t t h e amount of punitive damages awarded here ($20,000) i s " p a t e n t l y excessive" t o t h e p o i n t t h a t " t h e r e can be no o t h e r conclusion than t h a t t h e jury was influenced by pas- sion, prejudice, o r from improper motive." The law governing punitive o r exemplary damages i s w e l l developed i n Montana and has been followed w i t h unerring consistency by t h i s Court. Since f i r s t enacted i n 1895, s e c t i o n 17-208, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 27-1-221 MCA, has read: " I n any a c t i o n f o r a breach of an o b l i g a t i o n not a r i s i n g from c o n t r a c t , where t h e defendant has been g u i l t y of oppression, fraud, o r malice, ac- t u a l o r presumed, t h e jury, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e a c t u a l damages, may give damages f o r t h e sake of example, and by way of punishing t h e defendant." From t h e numerous cases construing t h i s section, general p r i n c i p l e s f o r its application may be derived. An e a r l y , y e t r e l a t i v e l y complete, statement of t h e s e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s i s found i n De C e l l e s v. Casey (1914), 48 Mont. 568, 576, "The amount t o be awarded i n t h i s c l a s s of cases i s lodged i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e jury; b u t t h i s d i s c r e t i o n i s n o t unlimited o r t o be exercised a r b i t r a r i l y . I t w i l l not do t o say t h a t t h e jury a r e f r e e t o make t h e measure of punishment what- ever they choose, without any j u s t o r reasonable r e l a t i o n t o t h e wrong done. N o d e f i n i t e r u l e can be declared a s t o when t h e c o u r t should i n t e r f e r e and when it should not; y e t s i n c e a new t r i a l may be ordered when it appears t h a t t h e jury have acted under t h e influence of passion and preju- d i c e (Rev. Codes, sec. 6794), it follows t h a t when t h e award i s s o l a r g e t h a t it cannot be ac- counted for on any o t h e r theory and i s wholly o u t of proportion t o t h e wrong done and t h e cause of it, t h e conclusion i s i r r e s i s t i b l e t h a t it was measured by t h e passion and prejudice of t h e jury, r a t h e r than by an estimate made i n t h e e x e r c i s e of t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n , and it becomes t h e duty of t h e c o u r t t o set it aside." Accord, Cornner v. Hamilton (1922), 62 Mont. 239, 245, 204 I n describing t h e necessary elements t o j u s t i f y such an award, t h i s Court a few years later s t a t e d : "A g u i l t y i n t e n t on t h e p a r t of t h e defendants i s a n e s s e n t i a l t o charge them with exemplary damages . . . 'While every l e g a l wrong e n t i t l e s t h e p a r t y i n j u r e d t o recover damages s u f f i c i e n t t o compensate f o r t h e i n j u r y i n f l i c t e d , n o t every l e g a l wrong e n t i t l e s t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y t o recover exemplary damages. To warrant t h e re- covery of such damages t h e a c t complained of must n o t only be unlawful, b u t must a l s o partake somewhat of a criminal o r wanton nature. And s o it i s an almost u n i v e r s a l l y recognized r u l e t h a t such damages may be recovered i n cases, and only i n such cases, where t h e wrongful act complained of i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by some such circumstances of aggravation a s w i l l f u l n e s s , wantonness, malice, oppression, b r u t a l i t y , i n s u l t , recklessness, g r o s s negligence, o r g r o s s fraud on t h e p a r t of t h e de- fendant.' (8 R.C.L. 585, 586.)" Luther v. Lee (1922), 62 Mont. 174, 179, 204 P. 365, 367. The jury may a l s o t a k e i n t o account whether t h e a c t s complained of a r e "of such a c h a r a c t e r as t o i n d i c a t e a r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d of t h e r i g h t s of t h e p l a i n t i f f " i n award- i n g a "reasonable amount" of p u n i t i v e damages. Mosback v . Smith Brothers Sheep Co. (1922), 65 Mont. 4 2 , 46-47, 210 P. Elaborating f u r t h e r on t h e concept of malice, w e s t a t e d i n 1927 t h a t : "'Malice, a s a b a s i s f o r exemplary damages, may be proved d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y ; t h a t i s t o say, by d i r e c t evidence of t h e e v i l motive and i n t e n t o r by l e g i t i m a t e inferences t o be drawn from o t h e r f a c t s and circumstances i n evidence.' (Klind v . Valley County Bank, 69 Mont. 386, 222 Pac. 439.) 'The t e r m "malice," as applied t o t o r t s , does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean that which must proceed from a s p i t e f u l , malignant o r revengeful d i s p o s i t i o n b u t a conduct i n j u r i o u s t o another, though proceeding from an i l l - r e g u l a t e d mind, n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y cautious before it occasions an i n j u r y t o another. I f t h e conduct of t h e defendant was u n j u s t i f i a b l e and a c t u a l l y caused t h e i n j u r y complained of by p l a i n t i f f , which was a question f o r t h e jury, malice i n l a w would be implied from such conduct . . . 1 11 Ramsbacher v. Hohman (1927), 80 Mont. 480, 487-88, 261 P. 273, 276. "Implied malice may be shown by proof t h a t defendant engaged i n a course of conduct knowing it t o be harmful and unlaw- f u l . " Ferguson v. Town Pump, Inc. (1978), - Mont. I I n Ramsbacher, w e went on t o d i s c u s s t h e f a c t o r s prop- e r l y considered by a jury i n s e t t i n g t h e amount of damages and our function i n reviewing t h e award: "Having concluded t h e jury was w i t h i n i t s r i g h t s i n allowing exemplary damages, a r i s e s t h e ques- t i o n , i s t h e amount allowed on e i t h e r cause of a c t i o n excessive? The amount w a s l a r g e l y i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e jury. 'The general r u l e i s t h a t an award of exemplary damages by a jury w i l l n o t b e d i s t u r b e d as excessive, unless its amount, considered i n connection with t h e f a c t s , i s i n d i c a t i v e of passion, p r e j u d i c e o r corrup- t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e jury. * * * The jury should t a k e i n t o consideration - t h e a t t e n d a n t c. slirh a s t h e ma1 ice or wantonness - . circumstanceYr ----I ---- ---- - of t h e a c t , t h e i n j u r y intended, --- t h e a c t , t h e manner i n which it -- - and t h e d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t u p o n o t -- -- cording -- t o t h e general r u l e , it t h e 3ury - t o consider d e f e n d a n F s pecuniary a b i l i t y i n f i x i n g t h e a a e s . ' (17 C . J . 994, 995.) - - - - - - - - --- t h e moti -- was comrni :hers. * * i s proper - , wealth a 'amount o? - ve f o r -- t t e d * Ac- - f o r n d - dam- -- There i s evidence A on a l l those p o i n t s and it i s presumed t h e jury considered it. 'The p u b l i c go* i n t h e r e s t r a of o t h e r -- ment of -- es t i m a t i *s from wrongd -- t h e offender. - - - - exemplary i s t o be --- damages. ' con . - (Wa i n t - a s t h e punish- . - - .sidered i n r d v. ward, 4 1 Iowa. 6 8 6 . 1 B a s e d on those determinative f a c t o r s - .. -- . - and general p r i n c i p l e s , i n t h i s s t a t e t h e r u l e i s t h a t t h e amount of exemplary damages must be reasonable. 'Where t h e a c t s complained of a r e shown t o be wanton, malicious o r oppressive and of such a c h a r a c t e r a s t o i n d i c a t e a r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d f o r t h e r i g h t s of t h e p l a i n t i f f , t h e jury, i n t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n , may award a reasonable amount as t h e p u n i t i v e damages, i n a d d i t i o n t o compensatory damages.' (Mosback v. Smith Brothers Sheep Co., 65 Mont. 42, 210 Pac. 910.) What was reasonable w a s f o r t h e jury t o say, s u b j e c t t o t h e judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t , upon motion f o r new t r i a l , and t h e judgment of t h i s c o u r t , upon appeal. Being a matter f o r t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e jury, w e do n o t see t h a t t h e d i s c r e t i o n w a s abused. W e --- w i l l n o t say t h e award is excessive nor t h a t it i s i n d i c a t i v e of passion or p r e j u d i c e ---- nor t h a t , under a l l t h e circumstances and i n view -- --- of - p l a i n t i f f ' s version _ _ _ - of t h e c a s e (accepted & t h e j u r y ) , it i s even unreasonable." 80 Mont. - --- a t 489-90, 261 P. a t 277. (Emphasis added.) Petraneks argue t h a t t h e amount of p u n i t i v e damages awarded h e r e is p e r se excessive because they a r e approxi- -- mately twenty-two t i m e s t h e amount of t h e a c t u a l damages awarded. W e r e j e c t e d any such "mathematical r a t i o " approach t o c a l c u l a t i n g p u n i t i v e damages i n Johnson v. Horn (1929), 86 Mont. 314, 318-19, 283 P. 427, 429: ". . . The c o u r t s have n o t e s t a b l i s h e d a d e f i n i t e formula t o be followed i n a s c e r t a i n i n g whether a n award f o r exemplary damages i s excessive. A s a consequence many c o u r t s hold t h a t because an award of p u n i t i v e damages i s t e n t i m e s t h e amount of a c t u a l damages awarded, a s here, does n o t of i t s e l f demonstrate t h a t t h e award i s excessive. "An award of $1,000 exemplary damages might be excessive under c e r t a i n f a c t s and as a g a i n s t one of impoverished circumstances, and y e t reason- a b l e under d i f f e r e n t circumstances and a s a g a i n s t one of more favorable f i n a n c i a l condition." Further,punitive damages may be awarded i n cases where only nominal a c t u a l damages a r e awarded o r even where no monetary value i s placed on t h e a c t u a l damages s u f f e r e d . M i l l e r v. Fox (1977), Mont. , 571 P.2d 804, 808, 34 St.Rep. 1367, 1371. I t i s t h e r e f o r e i n c o n s i s t e n t t o e s t a b l i s h some mathematical formula o r r a t i o f o r determining t h e amount of such p u n i t i v e damages. W e have quoted extensively from t h e s e o l d e r d e c i s i o n s (and t h e r e a r e many o t h e r s equally a p p l i c a b l e ) t o i l l u s t r a t e t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s governing t h i s appeal are very w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d and have been c o n s i s t e n t l y applied. Applying t h e s e time-honored p r i n c i p l e s t o t h e f a c t s a t hand, w e conclude t h a t t h e award of $20,000 i n p u n i t i v e damages a g a i n s t Petraneks i s reasonable and supported by t h e evidence. Undisputedly, Petraneks, with f u l l knowledge of r e l e v - a n t pending l i t i g a t i o n and g r o s s d i s r e g a r d f o r t h e r i g h t s and property of Butcher, drove a road grader onto t h e l a t t e r ' s p r o p e r t y and d e l i b e r a t e l y plowed a half-mile long, twelve- f o o t wide swath through h i s growing wheat crop. The j u r y a l s o heard Butcher t e s t i f y t h a t , when he rode up t o confront t h e Petraneks, George Petranek rammed h i s pickup t r u c k i n t o B u t c h e r ' s horse and Charles Petranek grabbed a t Butcher's l e g s a s i f t o p u l l him o f f h i s horse. From t h i s set of f a c t s , t h e jury w a s f u l l y e n t i t l e d t o conclude t h a t t h e Petraneks a c t e d extremely maliciously. Entering i n t o t h e c a l c u l a t i o n of damages a t t h i s p o i n t i s t h e wealth of t h e Petraneks. The jury w a s informed as t o t h e l a r g e holdings of t h e defendants t o t a l i n g more than $1.5 m i l l i o n . I n determining what would b e a s u i t a b l e punishment ( a l e g i t i m a t e s t a t u t o r y purpose) f o r t h e a c t s of t h e Petraneks, t h e jury could reasonably c a l c u l a t e t h a t any smaller award would n o t be s u f f i c i e n t . Such a conclusion was f o r t h e jury t o make, a f t e r l i s t e n i n g t o t h e testimony and weighing t h e evidence. On appeal, w e w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h a t conclusion. F i n a l l y , Petraneks' a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e award of puni- t i v e damages w a s t h e r e s u l t of passion o r p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t of t h e jury i s unsupported by any r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r e c o r d , t o improvident remarks by counsel o r w i t n e s s e s f o r Butcher, t o i n c o r r e c t o r o b j e c t i o n a b l e jury i n s t r u c t i o n s , o r t o any o t h e r source. Petraneks a c c e p t t h a t t h e jury a c t e d reasonably i n a s s e s s i n g t h e t o t a l a c t u a l damages s u f f e r e d by Butcher a t $925 o u t of a prayer f o r $1150. I n t h e absence o f any showing of t h e p o s s i b l e sources of passion o r preju- d i c e , it i s i n c o n s i s t e n t t o assume t h a t a jury, a c t i n g reasonably i n a s s e s s i n g a c t u a l damages s o p r e c i s e l y , sud- denly was overcome by passion and p r e j u d i c e i n a s s e s s i n g p u n i t i v e damages. W e concur: % d 4 Chief J u s t i c e % u @ M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea, deeming himself d i s q u a l i f i e d , d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s decision.