Title: Phillips v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANTONE V. PHILLIPS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 335, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0901011770 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  July 31, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:     September 16, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 16th day of September 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to 
the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Antone V. Phillips, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s May 28, 2014 order summarily dismissing his second motion for 
postconviction relief.  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the 
judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Phillips’ opening 
brief that his appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm.  
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in January 2009, Phillips was arrested for 
raping two of his younger half-sisters (“NB” and “EB”).2  In March 2009, a grand 
jury indicted Phillips for five counts of Rape in the First Degree, two counts of 
Rape in the Second Degree, Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child, Dangerous 
Crime Against a Child, and two counts of Incest.  On September 3, 2009, Phillips 
pled guilty to one count of Rape in the Second Degree in exchange for the State 
entering a nolle prosequi on the remaining charges and recommending twenty-five 
years of Level V incarceration, suspended after fifteen years for decreasing levels 
of supervision.  The Superior Court sentenced Phillips to twenty-five years of 
Level V incarceration, suspended after fifteen years for decreasing levels of 
supervision.  The Superior Court found that a sentence exceeding the sentencing 
guidelines was appropriate because there were multiple victims and Phillips had a 
prior rape conviction.  Phillips did not file a direct appeal. 
(3) 
On March 1, 2010, Phillips filed his first motion for postconviction 
relief.  Phillips claimed his counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a direct 
appeal.  After receiving affidavits from Phillips’ counsel, a Superior Court 
commissioner concluded that Phillips’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
lacked merit and recommended denial of the postconviction motion.  The Superior 
                                                 
2 Pseudonyms have been assigned to the victims under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
3 
 
Court adopted the recommendation and denied Phillips’ first motion for 
postconviction relief.  Phillips did not appeal the Superior Court’s order. 
(4) 
On May 15, 2014, Phillips filed his second motion for postconviction 
relief, again alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  On May 28, 2014, the 
Superior Court found that Phillips’ second motion for postconviction relief was 
procedurally barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) (“Rule 61”) and 
summarily dismissed the motion.  This appeal followed.     
(5) 
On appeal, Phillips claims that: (i) his counsel was ineffective because 
he failed to discover that Phillips had a defense under 11 Del. C. § 762(d) and he 
incorrectly informed Phillips that the age of his half-sisters meant they could not 
consent to sexual activity with Phillips; and (2) he should be permitted to withdraw 
his guilty plea due to his counsel’s ineffective assistance.   
(6) 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction 
relief for abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.3  The procedural 
requirements of Rule 61(i) must be considered before any substantive issues are 
addressed.4  In this case, Phillips’ claims are untimely under Rule 61(i)(1)5 and 
                                                 
3 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring postconviction motion filed more than one year after 
judgment of conviction is final). 
4 
 
repetitive under Rule 61(i)(2).6  To avoid application of the Rule 61(i) procedural 
bars, Phillips appears to contend that review of his claims is warranted “in the 
interest of justice”7 or because there was a “miscarriage of justice.”8   
(7) 
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance in the context of a guilty 
plea, a defendant must show that: (i) his counsel’s conduct fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness; and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that but for 
counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on 
proceeding to trial.9  A defendant must substantiate a claim of ineffective 
assistance with concrete allegations of cause and actual prejudice or else risk 
summary dismissal.10   
(8) 
Phillips’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based on his 
contention that his counsel should have discovered and informed him that he had a 
defense under 11 Del. C. § 762(d).  Section 762(d) provides: 
                                                 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (barring any ground for relief not asserted in prior postconviction 
motion). 
7 Super Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (providing that repetitive claim can be reviewed in interest of 
justice). 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that barred claims can be reviewed if there is colorable 
claim of miscarriage of justice due to constitutional violation that undermined fairness of 
proceedings). 
9 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Allbury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (1988). 
10 Chattin v. State, 2012 WL 5844886, at *2 (Del. Nov. 16, 2012); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 
556. 
5 
 
Teenage defendant.--As to sexual offenses in which the victim's age is 
an element of the offense because the victim has not yet reached that 
victim’s sixteenth birthday, where the person committing the sexual 
act is no more than 4 years older than the victim, it is an affirmative 
defense that the victim consented to the act “knowingly” as defined in 
§ 231 of this title.  Sexual conduct pursuant to this section will not be 
a crime.  This affirmative defense will not apply if the victim had not 
yet reached that victim’s twelfth birthday at the time of the act.11 
 
“[W]here the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a 
potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ 
inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have 
succeeded at trial.”12   
(9) 
Phillips fails to show that a Section 762(d) defense likely would have 
succeeded at trial.  First, Section 762(d) was not applicable to any sexual acts that 
occurred before Phillips’ half-sisters reached their twelfth birthdays.  Some of the 
charges against Phillips (including one count of Rape in the Second Degree) arose 
from an act that may have occurred before EB turned twelve.  Second, Section 
762(d) is an affirmative defense.  Phillips would have borne the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that his younger half-sisters knowingly 
consented to engaging in sexual conduct with him.13  Phillips fails to identify 
                                                 
11 11 Del. C. § 762(d). 
12 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59 (citing Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir.1984)). 
13 11 Del. C. § 304(a) (“When a defense declared by this Criminal Code or by another statute to 
be an affirmative defense is raised at trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing it by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”). 
6 
 
anything suggesting that he could have satisfied this burden of proof.  Phillips 
obtained a substantial benefit by pleading guilty, instead of facing trial on multiple 
counts of rape.  Under these circumstances, Phillips has not shown that review of 
his claims is warranted in the interest of justice or because there was a miscarriage 
of justice.  Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err in dismissing Phillips’ 
second motion for postconviction relief. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED 
and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice