Title: WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. STEVEN POTVIN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. STEVEN POTVIN2011 WY 17Case Number: No. S-10-0125Decided: 02/04/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,Appellant (Respondent),v.STEVEN 
POTVIN,Appellee (Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael T. 
Kahler, Assistant Attorney General; and Jackson M. Engels, Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Gerard 
R. Bosch and Mark J. Longfield, Law Offices of Jerry Bosch, LLC, Wilson, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Appellant, 
Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT), challenges a district court order 
which reversed an order of an independent hearing examiner (hearing examiner) to 
the effect that Appellee, Steven Potvin (Potvin), was required to surrender his 
driver's license because of the effect of the implied consent suspension 
statute.  That statute provides for 
the suspension of a driver's license based upon a person's refusal to submit to 
a chemical test for the purpose of ascertaining if that person's blood 
alcohol/controlled substance content exceeds the statutory limit.  The request for such a test is usually 
made when a person is arrested, and the arresting officer has probable cause to 
believe that the arrested person was either driving, or in actual physical 
control, of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled 
substance.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-233(b) (LexisNexis 2009).  If a 
person refuses the request to be subjected to a chemical test, then that 
individual's driver's license can be suspended on the basis of that 
refusal.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-102(a), (d) and (f) (LexisNexis 2009).  Potvin's driver's license was suspended 
under that statute.  The suspension 
of his license was stayed in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-6-103 and 
36-7-105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009) when he requested a hearing on the implied 
consent suspension.  At the close of 
Potvin's hearing, the hearing examiner was required to order that the suspension 
be either rescinded or sustained.  
In this instance, the hearing examiner sustained the suspension of 
Potvin's driver's license.

 
 
[¶2]      Potvin filed a 
petition for review in the district court in accordance with W.R.A.P 12.  The district court reversed the hearing 
examiner's decision on the basis that WYDOT failed to present substantial 
evidence at the hearing into this matter so as to establish that the police 
officers had probable cause to believe that Potvin had been driving, or was in 
actual physical control, of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway 
while under the influence of alcohol.  
We will reverse the district court's order and reinstate that of the 
hearing examiner.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      WYDOT raises this 
issue:

 
 
Was 
there substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's finding that 
Officer Horsely had probable cause to arrest [Potvin] for driving while under 
the influence of alcohol?

 
 
Potvin 
posits these issues:

 
 
I.  The 
[hearing examiner's] finding that a reasonable articulable suspicion existed is 
not supported by substantial evidence that is admissible, reliable or 
trustworthy.

 
 
II.  The 
[hearing examiner's] finding that probable cause existed is not supported by 
substantial evidence that is admissible, reliable, or 
trustworthy.

 
 
III.  The 
[hearing examiner's] unsubstantiated selection of evidence is arbitrary and 
capricious.

 
 
WYDOT 
identifies two additional issues based on the content of Potvin's 
brief:

 
 
I.  Is 
there substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's finding that 
reasonable suspicion existed to contact [Potvin] based on a hit and run 
investigation?

 
 
II.  Did 
the [hearing examiner] properly rely on the certified record submitted by 
[WYDOT] in upholding the suspension of [Potvin's] driver's 
license?

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶4]      We apply the 
standard of review we articulated in Dale 
v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶¶ 8, 22-24, 26, 188 P.3d 554, 
557, 561-62 (Wyo. 2008):

 
 
When 
we consider an appeal from a district court's review of an administrative 
agency's decision, we give no special deference to the district court's 
decision.  Instead, " we review the 
case as if it had come directly to us from the administrative agency.' " 
(Citations omitted.) 

 
 
.

 

[I]n 
the interests of simplifying the process of identifying the correct standard of 
review and bringing our approach closer to the original use of the two 
standards, we hold that henceforth the substantial evidence standard will be 
applied any time we review an evidentiary ruling.  When the burdened party prevailed before 
the agency, we will determine if substantial evidence exists to support the 
finding for that party by considering whether there is relevant evidence in the 
entire record which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  If the hearing 
examiner determines that the burdened party failed to meet his burden of proof, 
we will decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency's 
decision to reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by considering 
whether that conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
in the record as a whole.  See, Wyo. Consumer Group v. Public Serv. Comm'n 
of Wyo., 882 P.2d 858, 860-61 (Wyo.1994); Spiegel, 549 P.2d  at 1178 (discussing 
the definition of substantial evidence as "contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence").  If, in the 
course of its decision making process, the agency disregards certain evidence 
and explains its reasons for doing so based upon determinations of credibility 
or other factors contained in the record, its decision will be sustainable under 
the substantial evidence test.  
Importantly, our review of any particular decision turns not on whether 
we agree with the outcome, but on whether the agency could reasonably conclude 
as it did, based on all the evidence before it.

 
 
            
The arbitrary and capricious standard remains a " safety net' to 
catch agency action which prejudices a party's substantial rights or which may 
be contrary to the other W.A.P.A. review standards yet is not easily categorized 
or fit to any one particular standard."  
Newman, ¶ 23, 49 P.3d  at 
172.  Although we explained the 
"safety net" application of the arbitrary and capricious standard in Newman, we will refine it slightly here 
to more carefully delineate that it is not meant to apply to true evidentiary 
questions.  Instead, the arbitrary 
and capricious standard will apply if the hearing examiner refused to admit 
testimony or documentary exhibits that were clearly admissible or failed to 
provide appropriate findings of fact or conclusions of law.  This listing is demonstrative and not 
intended as an inclusive catalog of all possible circumstances.  Id.

 
 
            
There will be times when the arbitrary and capricious standard appears to 
overlap with some of the other standards.  
For example, a decision against the great weight of the evidence might 
properly be called arbitrary or capricious in everyday language.  However, the words "arbitrary" and 
"capricious" must be understood in context as terms of art under the 
administrative review statute and should not be employed in areas where the more 
specifically defined standards provide sufficient relief.

 
 
.

 
 
As 
always, we review an agency's conclusions of law de novo, and " [w]e will 
affirm an agency's legal conclusion only if it is in accordance with the law.' 
"  Diamond B Servs., Inc. v. Rohde, 2005 WY 
130, ¶ 12, 120 P.3d 1031, 1038 (Wyo.2005), quoting DC Prod. Serv. v. Wyo. Dep't of Empl., 
2002 WY 142, ¶ 7, 54 P.3d 768, 771 (Wyo.2002).

 
 
Also 
see, In re Hittner, 2008 WY 91, ¶ 11, 
189 P.3d 872, 876 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
Findings 
and conclusions of hearing examiner

 
 
[¶5]      WYDOT's 
presentation of evidence consisted of the submission of 23 pages of 
documentation from the files of the Jackson Police Department.  Two police officers were involved in the 
investigation, as well as the eventual questioning and arrest of Potvin.  That documentation explains the events 
leading up to the arrest of Potvin and the police officers' request that he 
submit to chemical testing.  Wyoming 
statutes and our case law recognize that this is an accepted practice, although 
we have criticized it tangentially.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(g); see Hittner, 189 P.3d  at 875 
n.3.

 
 
[¶6]      Potvin's evidence 
consisted of the transcript from the administrative hearing.  At that hearing, Potvin admitted that on 
the date in question, he drank only "most" of a single beer before driving and 
denied that he had made any admissions to the contrary to the police 
officers.  He admitted that he slid 
off the road at the scene of an accident that is central to this case.  The hearing examiner found Potvin's 
testimony, and the very limited testimony of his roommate, to be not 
credible.

 
 
[¶7]      The events at 
issue in this case took place in "the evening hours" of January 11, 2008.  The police officers could have been more 
diligent in recording the timeline of the evening, especially the times of the 
significant events included in the narrative of the investigation.  The report indicates that they were 
dispatched to the scene of an incident wherein a truck slid off the road and hit 
a fence.  The record reflects that 
the dispatch was received by the investigating officers at 8:48 p.m., but the 
times the accident occurred, or was reported to dispatch, are not in the 
record.  From this point forward, 
the police narrative does not include any additional times except that Potvin 
was arrested at 10:50 p.m.

 
 
[¶8]      The vehicle 
involved in the accident was described in the initial report as a black 
truck.  The police located the scene 
of the reported incident and found evidence that a vehicle had gone off the road 
and that a stop sign was found "on the other side of the fence" at that 
scene.  The police also found a 
small piece of black plastic in the snow at the scene.  The police surmised that it came from 
the vehicle which had been involved in the accident.  The report further indicated that the 
officers drove around the neighborhood looking for a vehicle with front end 
damage, but did not find one.

 
 
[¶9]      "About 45 minutes 
later" (no precise time given), police dispatch received another report on the 
incident.  This report described the 
vehicle involved as a "black F-250 type vehicle (Ford) with a snowmobile in the 
back."  The police officers 
continued their search for such a vehicle and found a black Dodge pickup with a 
snowmobile on a trailer attached to it.  
That pickup was parked in a somewhat irregular manner, suggesting 
impaired driving ability.  The front 
end of that vehicle had a piece of plastic broken off its license plate bracket, 
and the piece of plastic found at the scene fit the missing piece.  However, the piece of plastic was not 
included in the record on appeal.  
The Dodge pickup had snow packed in the grill and front 
wheels.

 
 
[¶10]   The police officers knocked on the 
door of the house where the pickup was found, and after "several minutes," they 
heard a noise that "sounded like someone falling out of bed or on the 
floor."  Potvin then answered the 
door.  The police asked if he owned 
the pickup outside the residence, and Potvin denied it.  The police indicated that they knew he 
was lying, and Potvin then admitted it was his.  The police requested permission to come 
inside, and Potvin allowed them to do so.  
Under questioning from the police, Potvin admitted that he had the 
accident in question.  He also 
admitted that he drank seven drinks that night before driving home.  In addition, Potvin said that he had no 
alcoholic beverages to drink since he had been home.

 
 
[¶11]   Based upon these admissions, the 
police determined that Potvin could be a DUI.  He was given field sobriety testing, 
which he failed.  His eyes were 
bloodshot and glassy.  His speech 
was slow and slurred.  He had 
trouble keeping his balance and answering simple questions.  Potvin admitted that he drank three 
beers and three whiskeys at a restaurant before driving home.  Potvin smelled of alcoholic 
beverages.

 
 
[¶12]   When Potvin testified in his own 
behalf, he stated that on the day in question, he was snowmobiling from 10:00 
a.m. until "dark."  He then went to 
a restaurant to have something to eat and drink.  He had not been drinking during the day 
and had only "most" of one beer while eating at the restaurant.  He conceded that he slid off the road at 
the location which was called in as an accident by anonymous callers.  He said he then went home and did all 
the rest of his drinking after he arrived home, shortly after 8:30 p.m.  Potvin's roommate corroborated that part 
of the story that occurred after 8:30 p.m., as well as other portions, of 
Potvin's testimony.

 
 
[¶13]   At 10:50 p.m., Potvin was arrested 
for drunk driving.  The police 
officer's report indicated that he had "recorded the audio of the [field 
sobriety] tests" and that he had "burned a copy for evidence and a copy for the 
County Attorney."  That audio tape 
does not appear in the record on appeal.  
Potvin was requested to submit to chemical testing and he 
refused.

 
 
[¶14]   The hearing examiner concluded that 
Potvin and his roommate were not credible witnesses, and that the police 
department records contained credible documentation supporting Potvin's arrest 
and the request for him to submit to a chemical test.

 
 
The 
district court's order reversing the hearing examiner

 

[¶15]   We need not set out the district 
court's findings because they are just as comprehensive as those made by the 
hearing examiner.  However, the 
district court concluded that there was not substantial evidence that Potvin had 
been driving or had been in actual control of a motor vehicle upon a street 
while under the influence of alcohol.  
This was largely premised on the testimony given by Potvin, when sober 
and under oath, as opposed to the statements made to police officers while he 
was very intoxicated and awakened from sleep hours after the reported accident 
occurred.

 
 
[¶16]   We take note here that 1 Weil's 
Code Of Wyoming Rules, 270 000 001-8 Office of Administrative Hearings, Chapter 
6, Special Rules Relating to Driver's 
Licenses, Section (b) (2008), provides:

 
 
            
(b)  For any contested case hearing concerning Implied Consent 
 Administrative Per Se suspension (WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-6-101 through 
31-6-107), of Commercial Driver's License Implied Consent disqualification  
blood alcohol concentration of four one-hundredths of one percent (0.04%) or 
more (WYO.STAT. ANN. § 31-7-307), the Wyoming Department of Transportation's 
certified record shall consist of:

                        
(i)  The peace officer's signed statement of probable 
cause;

                        
(ii)  The notice of suspension or 
disqualification;

                        
(iii)  A copy of the temporary license, if 
issued;

                        
(iv)  The operational checklist or chemical test result 
provided by the Wyoming Chemical Testing Program, Division of Health and Medical 
Services;

                        
(v)  A copy of the peace officer's certification if 
applicable;

                        
(vi)  All other evidence which is material to the 
matter.

 
 
[¶17]   The broken piece of the license 
plate holder was material evidence in this case because it was used to identify 
Potvin's pickup as the offending vehicle, but not Potvin as the offending 
driver.  The only evidence that 
Potvin drove, or was in actual physical control of, the vehicle was Potvin 
himself.  Likewise, the audio 
recording of the field sobriety test does not appear in the record on appeal, 
although it too is very certainly material evidence.  Moreover, it demonstrated that the 
investigating police officers had the capacity to tape-record the entirety of 
the interaction between them and Potvin.  
These failings serve to undermine WYDOT's report, which is the only 
evidence both the hearing officer and the district court had to rely upon to 
sustain WYDOT's case.

 
 
[¶18]   Nonetheless, given the entirety of 
the facts and circumstances called to the hearing examiner's attention, we 
conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's 
ultimate finding that the police had probable cause to contact Potvin, to 
question him about the accident, and eventually to request that he voluntarily 
submit to a chemical breath or blood test, which Potvin refused.  Likewise, the record contains 
substantial evidence to support the hearing examiner's findings that Potvin and 
his roommate were not credible witnesses.  
We also note that the hearing examiner's conclusions were not arbitrary 
and capricious in light of the evidence we have set out 
above.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   We conclude that we must reverse 
the order of the district court and sustain the determination made by the 
hearing examiner.  This matter is 
remanded to the district court with directions to the district court to further 
remand to the hearing examiner to accomplish that result.