Title: RAYMOND D. CUSTER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RAYMOND D. CUSTER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 72135 P.3d 620Case Number: 05-136Decided: 06/08/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
RAYMOND 
D. CUSTER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Ken Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; Tina N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Suzannah B. Gambell, 
Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Gambell.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael 
Causey, Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Director, PAP; Jonathan 
Haidsiak, Student Director; William Foster, Student Intern; Orintha Karns, 
Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Karns.                

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Raymond D. Custer 
pled guilty to one count of possession of marijuana and one count of possession 
of methamphetamine while reserving the right to appeal the district court's 
denial of his motion to suppress evidence.  
He claims the district court should have granted his motion to suppress 
because he was seized in violation of Article I, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution 
and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  We conclude Mr. Custer did not properly 
present his state constitutional argument to the district court and, 
consequently, we decline to consider it.  
We agree with the district court's ruling that Mr. Custer's rights under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were not violated and, 
therefore, affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Custer 
articulates the following issues on appeal:

 
 

1.                  
Did the 
trial court err by not suppressing evidence when appellant was seized in 
violation of Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution?

 
 

2.                  
Did the 
trial court err by not suppressing evidence when appellant was seized in 
violation of Amendment 4 of the United States 
Constitution?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues as:

 
 

I.                     
Did the 
officers' initial contact with appellant amount to a "seizure" for purposes of 
Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution?

 
 
II. 
         
Was appellant "seized" for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment before 
the officers had developed reasonable suspicion?

 
 
FACTS

            

[¶3]      At approximately 
6:30 p.m. on July 25, 2004, Officer Joseph Baird and Corporal William Wright of 
the Gillette Police Department were dispatched on a welfare check to investigate 
a claim that juveniles, between the ages of ten and fourteen, had stolen one of 
their parent's blood pressure medication.  
Their investigation led them to a trailer house and Corporal Wright 
knocked on the door.  A man answered 
the door and appeared shocked and nervous about the presence of the 
officers.  Corporal Wright asked him 
about the juveniles and he indicated there was a woman in the house who was in 
charge of one of them.  The man went 
back into the residence to get her.  
A few minutes later, a woman came to the door.  She told the officers she and the man 
who had answered the door were the only persons at the residence.  The officers questioned her about the 
juveniles and she stated they had been there earlier, but had left the residence 
and she pointed toward the direction they might have gone.  Like the man who had answered door, the 
woman appeared nervous and evasive.  

 
 
[¶4]      The officers left 
the home and discussed the strange behavior of the man and woman as they 
returned to their vehicles.  They 
concluded, "there was something possibly criminal going on within the residence 
. . . ."  Shortly thereafter, a 
different man, who was later identified as Mr. Custer, left the residence.  The officers thought this was strange 
because they had been told there was no one else in the residence.  Mr. Custer had a rolled newspaper under 
his arm which he appeared to be attempting to conceal.  He walked across the street and the 
officers could see a yellow object sticking out from the rolled up 
newspaper.    

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Custer 
entered the passenger side of a van parked on the street, shoved the newspaper 
under the seat, and moved over to the driver's side.   Officer Baird approached and knocked on 
the driver's side window.  Mr. 
Custer did not acknowledge him, but, simply looked straight ahead and held the 
steering wheel.  He appeared very 
nervous and was sweating.  The 
officer knocked on the window again and Mr. Custer lowered the window 
approximately three inches.  Officer 
Baird asked Mr. Custer, "what was going on," but Mr. Custer did not answer.  Officer Baird then questioned Mr. Custer 
about the object hidden in the newspaper and Mr. Custer responded saying he 
couldn't go to jail.  He offered to 
give the officer the object in the newspaper if the officer promised he would 
not go to jail.  Officer Baird 
indicated he could not make that promise and asked again what was in the 
newspaper.  Mr. Custer replied it 
was a pornographic magazine.  
Officer Baird told him possession of pornography, alone, would not result 
in his arrest.   

 
 
[¶6]      Officer Baird 
asked Mr. Custer to step out of the van and he responded, "I'll get it for 
you."  He was apparently referring 
to the newspaper parcel.  Officer 
Baird was concerned about Mr. Custer's demeanor and again asked him to exit the 
vehicle.  Mr. Custer did not comply 
and instead, reached down and almost dove down into the passenger side of the 
vehicle and reached under the seat.  
Officer Baird attempted to open the driver's side door, but it would not 
open.  The officer then moved to the 
passenger side door, opened it, took Mr. Custer by the arm, and removed him from 
the vehicle.  Officer Baird released 
Mr. Custer's arm once he was out of the vehicle and Mr. Custer moved to stand by 
Corporal Wright.    

 
 
[¶7]      After Mr. Custer 
was removed from the vehicle, the van's passenger door stood open, allowing 
Officer Baird to see a pair of yellow work gloves sticking out of the 
newspaper.  Inside the gloves, the 
officer saw plastic bags containing a substance which looked like marijuana and 
glass pipes commonly used to smoke methamphetamine.  Officer Baird retrieved the gloves and 
their contents from the vehicle and placed them on the hood of his patrol 
car.  He talked to Mr. Custer who 
stated repeatedly he did not want to go jail.  Officer Baird asked him about the pipes, 
and Mr. Custer reached into his pants pocket, produced a plastic bag of 
methamphetamine and attempted to put it inside the gloves.  Mr. Custer was arrested and charged with 
one count of possession of less than three ounces of marijuana, a third or 
subsequent offense, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) 
(LexisNexis 2005), and one count of possession of less than three grams of 
methamphetamine, a third or subsequent offense, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 35-7-1031(c)(i)(C).    

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Custer filed 
a motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the seizure claiming he was 
illegally seized by the officers.  
The district court held a hearing on his motion and denied it.  Mr. Custer subsequently pled guilty to 
both counts, but reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his 
motion to suppress.  The district 
court sentenced him to serve eighteen to forty months of imprisonment on each 
count to be served consecutively.  
The sentences were suspended and Mr. Custer was placed on probation for a 
period of six years.  He filed a 
timely notice of appeal.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      When reviewing a 
district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to its 
findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous.  Gompf v. State, 2005 WY 112, ¶ 14, 120 P.3d 980, 984-85 (Wyo. 2005).  See also, Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 12, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo. 2004); Gunn v. 
State, 2003 WY 24, ¶ 5, 64 P.3d 716, 719 (Wyo. 2003).  We consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the district court's decision because it is in the best 
position to "assess the witnesses' credibility and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions therefrom.'"  Gompf, ¶ 14, 120 P.3d  at 985, quoting Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Wyo. 2002).  The 
constitutionality of a particular search or seizure is a question of law which 
we review de novo.  Id.  See also, Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 14, 65 P.3d 33, 36-37 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 

A.                
State 
Constitution

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Custer argues the officers 
violated his rights under Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  Article 1, § 4 is identical to the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, except the Wyoming provision 
requires an affidavit to support a warrant.  We have concluded in other contexts 
Article 1, § 4 provides broader protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures than the Fourth Amendment.  
See, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 
(Wyo. 1999); 
O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 
2005).  Mr. Custer argues this 
precedent warrants extension of the constitutional protection against seizure 
under our state constitution to police/citizen encounters which may be 
considered consensual under the federal constitution.  Relying on our decision in O'Boyle, 2005 WY 83, 117 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 
2005), he maintains his acquiescence to the officers' questions and requests did 
not amount to valid consent.  Thus, 
he claims he was illegally seized under the Wyoming Constitution when the 
officers approached and questioned him.

 
 
[¶11]   Mr. Custer's only mention of the 
state constitution in the district court proceedings was a citation to Article 
1, § 4 in his motion to suppress and his argument at the suppression hearing 
focused exclusively on the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  A mere reference to a 
state constitutional provision in the district court is not adequate to justify 
our review of the issue on appeal.  
As we explained in Lindsay v. 
State, 2005 WY 34, ¶¶ 16-17, 108 P.3d 852, 856 (Wyo. 2005), this Court refuses to consider state constitutional 
issues presented for the first time on appeal.1  We stated:

 
 
[W]hen a 
defendant fails to assert a cogent independent state constitutional based 
argument before the district court, a defendant fails to preserve such issues 
for appellate review. 

 

Lindsay, 
¶ 16, 
108 P.3d  at 856.   See also, McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074, 
n. 1 (Wyo. 
1999) (ruling that the defendant's reference to the state constitution, without 
further discussion of his independent state constitutional claim, was 
insufficient to justify judicial consideration of the issue).  

 
 
[¶12]   A corollary rule also applies when 
a defendant has entered a conditional guilty plea.  Lindsay, ¶ 17, 108 P.3d  at 
856.

 
 
In the 
same vein, upon addressing the fact that W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) allows a defendant 
to plead guilty or nolo contendere while reserving the right to seek review on 
appeal of any specified pretrial motion, we set forth in  
Morgan [v. State, 2004 WY 
95], ¶ 24, [95 P.3d 802, 808 (Wyo. 2004)]:

 
 
In Bailey [v. State, 12 P.3d 173, 177 (Wyo. 
2000)], we ruled that a conditional plea of guilty does not provide carte 
blanche permission for the appellant to present any and all arguments on appeal. 
[Bailey,] 12 P.3d  at 177-78.   Instead, the appellant may only 
raise those issues on appeal which were clearly called to the attention of the 
district court.  Id.;  see also, Elder v. Jones, 608 P.2d 654, 660 
(Wyo.1980).  In other words, "[w]e 
will not consider non-jurisdictional issues on appeal unless they have been 
raised before the lower court with at least a minimum effort to present a cogent 
legal argument."  Bailey, 12 P.3d  at 
178.

 
 

Id.  Mr. Custer did not properly raise the 
state constitutional argument in the district court and, consequently, we 
decline to consider his argument on appeal.   

 
 
            
B.        Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution

 
 
[¶13]   The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution states: 

 
 
The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.

 
 
Constitutional 
jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment generally recognizes three levels or tiers 
of interaction between police and citizens.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219-20 
(Wyo. 1994); Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-92 
(Wyo. 
1993).  The least intrusive contact 
between a citizen and police is the consensual encounter which "involves no 
restraint of liberty and elicits the citizen's voluntary cooperation with 
non-coercive questioning."  
Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 220.  The consensual encounter is not a 
seizure and does not engage the Fourth Amendment.  The second tier is the investigatory or 
Terry stop, named after the seminal 
case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  An investigatory detention involves a 
seizure and, consequently, the protections of the Fourth Amendment are 
implicated.  Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 220.  However, because of its limited nature, 
a law enforcement officer must show only "the presence of specific and 
articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime" in order to 
justify the detention.  Id.  The most intrusive encounter between 
police and a citizen is, of course, an arrest.  An arrest "requires justification by 
probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a 
crime."  Id.  

 
 
[¶14]   The district court concluded the 
encounter between Mr. Custer and the officers was consensual until he reached 
under the seat.  At that point, the 
district court ruled the officers had reasonable suspicion under Terry to support an investigative 
detention.  The court 
stated:

 
 
At the 
minute then that the defendant goes under the seat to retrieve or get whatever 
it is, at that point in time it appears to me from the testimony that the 
officer has a valid concern for his safety and the safety of everyone else[], 
and at that point in time it seems to me that the officer did the right 
thing.  You know, he got the 
defendant out, again, not only for the officer's safety, but, quite frankly, 
based on the testimony and what I heard here today, for the defendant's safety 
as well, and that then yields the substances that were seized under the 
seat.  

 
 
Given 
the nature and facts and circumstances of this case, . . . I conclude that the 
initial part of this is consensual.  
I conclude . . .  that there 
wasn't a seizure of this defendant up until the point that he, by his own 
actions, provided objective criteria for the officer to believe that the 
officer's safety was at risk.  At 
that point in time the officer acted properly, and from there the seizure was 
legal.  I'm going to deny the 
motion.

 
 
Mr. 
Custer claims he was actually seized when the officer directed him to exit the 
vehicle and a seizure at that point was illegal because the officer did not have 
reasonable suspicion he had committed a crime. 

 
 
[¶15]   A seizure occurs "when the officer, 
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the 
liberty of a citizen."  Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 220.  The Court judges whether or not a person 
has been seized by considering the totality of the circumstances.  Id. at 221.  See also, Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688 
(Wyo. 
1993).  Thus, the determination of 
whether a person has been seized depends on the specific facts of the 
situation.  Id.  
In making that judgment, we look to the following criteria identified 
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55, 100 S. Ct. 870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980), Stewart J., concurring, 
(footnote omitted and emphasis added):

 
 
We 
conclude that a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, 
a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.  Examples of circumstances that might 
indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the 
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, 
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or 
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be 
compelled.   See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S.  at 19, n. 
16, [88 S. Ct.  at 1878, n. 16];   
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207, and n. 6, [99 S. Ct. 2248, 2253, 60 L.Ed.2d 824];  3 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure 53-55 (1978).  
In the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact 
between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount 
to a seizure of that person.

 
 

Wilson, 
874 P.2d  
at 220.  See also, California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624-28 , 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 
(1991).

 
 
[¶16]   In this case, Officer Baird 
approached Mr. Custer when he was in his vehicle parked on a public street and 
knocked on the window to get his attention.  Mr. Custer did not acknowledge the 
officer, so he knocked on the window a second time.  At that point, Mr. Custer rolled the 
window down a short way and the officer asked him "what was going on."  The officer did not activate the patrol 
car's lights, display his weapon or block Mr. Custer from driving away in the 
van.  

 
 
[¶17]   As we recognized in Rice v. State, 2004 WY 130, ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 371, 379 (Wyo. 2004), a seizure does not occur simply when a police officer 
walks up to a person in a public place and asks a question, provided there is no 
showing of force or indication the person is restrained from leaving.  See also, Innis v. State, 2003 WY 66, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d 413, 419 (Wyo. 2003); Perry v. 
State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Wyo. 1996).  This principle is consistent with our 
ruling in Gompf, 2005 WY 112, 120 P.3d 980, where we stated the Fourth Amendment was not implicated when officers 
approached a person's residence, knocked at the door, and asked questions.  Likewise, there was no violation of Mr. 
Custer's Fourth Amendment rights when Officer Baird approached him and asked 
questions.  

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Custer claims he was seized 
when Officer Baird asked him to step out of the vehicle and the officer at that 
point did not have reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory 
detention.  The officer did not 
display his weapon or touch Mr. Custer when he made the request.  Mr. Custer did not comply with the 
officer's request and, instead, responded, "I'll get it for you."  He was apparently referring to the 
newspaper parcel.  Officer Baird 
requested, a second time, that Mr. Custer exit the vehicle.  Mr. Custer again ignored the officer's 
request and reached down under the seat on the passenger side of the 
vehicle.  Officer Baird attempted to 
open the driver's side door, but could not, so he moved to the passenger side of 
the vehicle, opened the door, and removed him from the vehicle.  

 
 
[¶19]   The fact that an officer asks a 
person to get out of his vehicle does not, alone, amount to a seizure.  See Innis, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d  at 419.  We consider all of the facts and 
circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would have felt free to 
ignore the officer's request and continue on his way.  Officer Baird took no action to indicate 
Mr. Custer could not refuse the request and simply drive away.  Furthermore, Mr. Custer's response to 
Officer Baird's request belies his claim that he was seized because he ignored 
it and, instead, reached under the passenger seat for the newspaper parcel.  As we acknowledged in Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 220, "a seizure based on a 
show of authority does not occur unless the subject yields to the 
authority."  See also, California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.  at 624-28.  Based upon our review of the record, 
none of the district court's findings were clearly erroneous and we agree no 
seizure occurred during the initial encounter.  

 
 
[¶20]   The district court further held 
that when Mr. Custer went down and reached under the passenger seat, the officer 
was justified in seizing him in order to remove him from the vehicle.2  The record also supports that 
holding.  We look to the totality of 
the circumstances to determine whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to 
justify an investigative detention of Mr. Custer.  The events of the day illustrate an 
increasing level of suspicion from the two people in the house falsely stating 
they were the only persons in the residence to Mr. Custer's insistence he could 
not go to jail.  Any of these 
circumstances, alone, may not have justified a Terry stop; however, when the 
circumstances are taken together with his abrupt movement to reach under the 
seat, we conclude Officer Baird had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Custer 
had committed or may be committing a crime and appropriately detained him for 
further investigation.  Furthermore, 
the officer was justified in removing him from the vehicle in order to ensure 
officer safety.  See, e.g., Fender v. State, 2003 WY 96, ¶17, 74 P.3d 1220, 1227 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
[¶21]   In summary, the initial encounter 
between the officers and Mr. Custer was consensual and he was not seized under 
the Fourth Amendment when Officer Baird asked him to step out of the 
vehicle.  He was, however, seized 
when Officer Baird pulled him out of the passenger side of the vehicle, but that 
seizure was justified by reasonable suspicion.  Mr. Custer's rights under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution were not 
violated.

            

[¶22]   Affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This case is different 
from the situation presented in Cotton v. 
State, 2005 WY 115, 119 P.3d 931 (Wyo. 2005) in which we discussed a defendant's 
constitutional claim on appeal even though he had not argued it to the district 
court.  Our reason for addressing 
the issue on appeal was the district court had ruled on the application of the state 
constitution even though the defendant had not presented a state constitutional 
argument and the district court had no obligation to do so.   Cotton, ¶ 15, 119 P.3d  at 934.  In the case at bar, neither the district 
court nor Mr. Custer specifically discussed the state constitution in the motion 
to suppress proceedings.

  

2The district 
court referred to "probable cause" in its oral ruling, rather than reasonable 
suspicion.  This misstatement of the 
standard for an investigatory detention did not in any way impact the validity 
of the district court's factual findings or its ruling that Mr. Custer's Fourth 
Amendment rights were not infringed.