Title: BURD v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BURD v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2004 WY 10897 P.3d 802Case Number: 03-207Decided: 09/15/2004
April 
Term, A.D. 2004

 
 

WILLIAM 
BURD,

 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Richard 
R. Wilking, Casper, WY.  

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Steven 
R. Czoschke, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kristi M. Radosevich, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      William Burd 
(Burd) appeals the Wyoming Medical Commission's (Commission) denial of worker's 
compensation benefits.  The 
Commission concluded that Burd failed to meet his burden of proof that the 
treatment he received after October 21, 2001, was related to his work 
injury.  The district court 
subsequently affirmed this decision on review.  Burd also appeals the district court's 
order awarding attorney fees that were lower than the amount claimed and the 
later denial of a petition for rehearing on the matter.  We affirm.  

 

 

[¶2]      Burd phrases the 
issues on appeal as:

 

1.  Was there substantial evidence to support the findings 
of fact and the decision of the Medical Commission?
 

2.  Was 
there an abuse of discretion by the Medical Commission in arriving at its 
decision dated September 6, 2002?

 

3.  Was 
the decision of the Medical Commission arbitrary or 
capricious?

 

4.  Did 
the District Court, Seventh Judicial District, err in affirming the decision of 
the Medical Commission?

 

5.  Did 
the District Court err in awarding only $2,500 for attorney fees where the bill 
for attorney fees was $6,030?

 

6.  Did 
the District Court err in denying the Motion for Rehearing on the issue of 
attorney fees?

 

[¶3]      Burd worked for 
Dennis M. McCoy & Sons Construction Company (McCoy) as a scraper operator 
removing overburden dirt from a coal seam from the end of May 2001 until 
September 27, 2001.  On August 21, 
2001, Burd apparently began to feel chest pains while at work and was taken by 
company ambulance to the hospital.1  Burd indicated on his time card that he 
had not sustained a work-related injury when he signed out from work that 
day.  However, Burd later explained 
that on August 21, 2001, he did not know at that time that he might have had a 
work-related injury.  Burd's 
supervisor, Frank Farris, provided a written statement recounting that Burd 
stated that he was having chest pains which he had experienced similarly before, 
"as in months," and that Burd thought he had strained his shoulder and did not 
mention any back-related injury.  

 

[¶4]      Upon examination 
at the hospital, Burd complained of chest pain with impaired use of his left arm 
but did not report any back or shoulder pain.  He also reported having similar chest 
pain in prior years.  Burd was 
released from the hospital that day and returned to work on his next scheduled 
shift, three days later.  Burd 
further testified that sometime after August 21, 2001, he reported to a family 
practice clinic in Casper, Wyoming with complaints of lower back pain, but 
admitted that he did not complain of any chest pain.2 

 

[¶5]      Burd continued to 
work at his normal position with McCoy until September 27, 2001, in some cases 
working more hours than normal.  
According to a secretary at McCoy, on Monday, October 1, 2001, Burd 
called McCoy and advised that he had injured his back over the weekend and would 
not be back to work until he saw a doctor.  
This secretary further stated that Burd had not previously complained 
about a back-related injury, nor had he reported any injury or problem other 
than the chest pains he experienced on August 21, 2001.  Burd, however, stated that he advised 
McCoy that the pain in his back which began while he was at work and caused him 
to only work half of his shift on September 27, 2001, had gotten worse over the 
weekend.  On October 16, 2001, Burd 
spoke with McCoy's manager, William Burke by telephone.  Mr. Burke testified that Burd stated he 
would not return to work due to his wife's difficult pregnancy, the fact that 
his son had recently undergone surgery in Denver, Colorado, his need to stay 
home with his children, and his own back injury.  Burd also stated that he could not work 
out of town due to these family issues.  
Burd did not mention any work-related injuries and did not provide a date 
that he would be able to return to work.  
These same facts were noted in a statement made by the secretary at McCoy 
who also spoke with Burd over the telephone on October 16, 2001. 

 

[¶6]      On October 21, 
2001, Burd's brother and a friend brought two deer to Burd's home because his 
brother wanted to hang the deer in Burd's shed.  According to Burd, when he tried to 
assist his brother by throwing a rope over a rafter in his shed, he experienced 
terrible chest pain similar to what he had felt on August 21, 2001 at work.  Burd reported to the emergency room and 
it was recorded that Burd indicated that the chest pain began "after he helped 
drag out a deer."  Burd also stated 
that he had experienced a similar episode two months previously, but did not 
report that the past episode was work related.  Records of this visit also indicate that 
Burd reported that he had previously gone to Wyoming Family Practice for a back 
injury.  The emergency room 
diagnosis was acute chest wall pain and left shoulder pain.  Burd was then discharged and referred to 
an orthopaedic physician.  Later, 
Burd denied advising the hospital that he had "helped drag out a deer," but 
merely experienced his severe chest pain after he attempted to throw a rope over 
a rafter to hang the deer.  He 
further testified that he had been experiencing some ongoing chest pain prior to 
the incident, but felt a significant increase in his chest pain, arm tingling, 
and hand numbness upon throwing the rope over the rafter. 

 

[¶7]      On October 23, 
2001, complaining of pain in his chest, Burd saw Dr. Thomas Landon, an 
orthopaedic physician.  Burd stated 
that two months previously he began to experience this pain while he was driving 
heavy equipment, but Burd did not identify any specific history of this 
injury.  Upon conducting an MRI, Dr. 
Landon ruled out a suspected rotator cuff injury.  He then referred Burd to Dr. Mary 
MacGuire for evaluation of chest wall pain.  Burd reported no particular trauma for 
the cause of his chest pain, although he reported his chest pain began in August 
2001, when he awoke with chest pain.  
Upon examination of Burd's chest wall, Dr. Mary MacGuire could not 
isolate the cause of Burd's chest pain.  
She then referred Burd to her sister, Dr. Anne MacGuire, a 
rheumatologist. 

 

[¶8]      On November 20, 
2001, Burd filed a report of injury with the State.  The State paid temporary total 
disability benefits and medical care and treatment benefits through October 23, 
2001.  Later, on December 10, 2001, 
Dr. Anne MacGuire wrote the State a letter advising that when Burd reported to 
her office, he explained that he instantly felt an explosion in his chest and 
neck and his left arm went numb while he was at work on August 21, 2001.  In her report, Dr. MacGuire also 
indicated that Burd had been experiencing chest pain since August 21, 2001, 
"which is anterior and posterior straight through to about T7."  An MRI of the cervical spine was 
unremarkable so Dr. MacGuire treated Burd with trigger point injections and 
returned Burd to work at full duty without restrictions. 

 

[¶9]      In January of 
2002, Dr. Anne MacGuire wrote another letter to the State.  In this letter, Dr. MacGuire indicated 
that Burd had clearly been injured on the job on August 21, 2001.  However, she questioned whether Burd's 
current treatments were related to that injury or an October 21, 2001, incident 
wherein Burd assisted his brother and a friend with some deer.  Dr. MacGuire also suggested that a 
thoracic MRI be performed, but questioned if that test should be covered by the 
State. 

 

[¶10]   On January 16, 2002, the State 
rendered a final determination denying benefits that Burd had claimed after 
October 21, 2001.  On January 23, 
2002, Burd saw Dr. Robert Narotzky, a neurosurgeon at Central Wyoming 
Neurosurgery.3  A thoracic MRI, CT scans, and a 
discogram were performed which showed a syrinx cavity from T3 through T7, small 
central disk protrusion and annular fissures and tears.  In particular, it was noted that there 
were annular fissures with leaking primarily on the left side with no contrast 
extravasation at T4 through T5 with no pain response, annular fissures with 
contrast leakage at T5 through T6 with a partial concordant pain response, 
leaking of contrast through annular tears with discordant pain response at T6 
through T7, and a dorsal annular fissuring bilaterally more pronounced on the 
right side and small right sided annular tear with leaking contrast at T7 
through T8.  In April 2002, Burd saw 
Dr. Tuenis Zondag, also of Central Wyoming Neurosurgery, whose area of expertise 
included occupational and pain medicine.  
For the first time, Burd then complained of a radiating pain that ran 
down his left leg. 

 

[¶11]   During his deposition, Dr. Zondag 
stated that it was his expert medical opinion that Burd's thoracic disc problems 
were caused by his work at McCoy.  
He further stated that this opinion would not change based upon any heavy 
equipment work Burd may have performed in the past, any activity involving 
dragging a deer, and the syrinx condition of Burd's thoracic spine.  However, cross-examination revealed that 
Dr. Zondag lacked knowledge of Burd's post-August 21, 2001 incident, Burd's work 
history, and other non-work activities.  
After epidural injections were unsuccessful, it was determined that 
surgical intervention would be required. 

 

[¶12]   After hearing, the Commission 
entered its decision finding that Burd's demeanor at the hearing was 
inconsistent with his pain complaints.  
The Commission also found that Burd's symptoms and pain complaints were 
not medically consistent with any thoracic spine abnormalities.  Specifically, it was concluded that 1) 
Burd's arm and hand symptoms were not medically consistent with the radiographic 
findings of abnormalities in the thoracic spine, 2) the majority of abnormal 
findings in the thoracic spine were right sided while Burd's complaints involve 
the left side, 3) no electrodiagnostic testing of the thoracic spine had been 
performed to determine if any abnormalities in the thoracic spine were causing 
the claimed symptoms, and 4) Burd's low back and lower extremity radicular 
symptoms were not consistent with any thoracic spine abnormalities.  The Commission also noted that 
substantial evidence had been presented to indicate that Burd's complaints may 
not be attributable to the incident that occurred on August 21, 2001, while he 
was working at McCoy.  Therefore, 
the Commission concluded that Burd had failed to prove he was entitled to 
worker's compensation benefits after October 21, 2001.  This determination was affirmed by the 
district court. 

 

[¶13]   At the conclusion of the district 
court proceedings, Burd's counsel submitted a request for the payment of fees 
and costs in the amount of $6,030.00.  
The district court found that the requested fee substantially exceeded 
other fees in similar cases and that the issues presented on appeal were neither 
novel nor complex.  Hence, the 
district court reduced the fees and costs award to the amount of $2,500.00.  Subsequently, the district court denied 
the petition for rehearing on the matter filed by Burd's counsel.  This appeal followed.         

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶14]   We stated the applicable standard 
of review in Ludwig v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Div., 2004 WY 34, ¶¶5-6, 86 P.3d 875, ¶¶5-6 (Wyo. 2004) (footnote in 
original):

 

            
The parameters for judicial review of an agency action are found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114.4  Serda v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2002 WY 
38, ¶18, 42 P.3d 466, ¶18 (Wyo. 2002).  
Our standard of review when reviewing administrative agency action was 
clarified and refined in the case of Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Div., 2002 WY 91, 49 P.3d 163 (Wyo. 2002).  That case held that "the substantial 
evidence test is the appropriate standard of review . . . when factual 
findings are involved and both parties submit evidence."  Newman, at ¶22.  

 

            
In appeals where both parties submitted evidence at the hearing below and 
the dispute is over the soundness of the factual findings of the agency, Newman mandates the appellate review be 
limited to application of the substantial evidence test.  Id.  This is true regardless of which party 
appeals from the agency decision.  
The substantial evidence test provides:

 
In 
reviewing findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support an agency's findings.  If the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  

 

Newman, 
at ¶12 (quoting State 
ex rel. Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Jensen, 
2001 WY 51, ¶10, 24 P.3d 1133, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001)).  This 
court is required to review the entire record in making its ultimate 
determination on appeal. Newman, at 
¶¶19 and 24-26. 

 

 

 

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 

[¶15]   Burd presents four separate 
arguments that he is entitled to worker's compensation benefits.  However, upon our review, we find that 
Burd essentially asserts that insufficient evidence existed to support the 
Commission's ruling, which was later affirmed by the district court.  Thus, Burd argues that both the 
Commission and the district court erred in rendering their respective 
decisions.  

 

[¶16]   Initially Burd argues the 
Commission accepted Dr. Anne MacGuire's opinions and based its ultimate decision 
thereon, despite the fact that these opinions were rendered without benefit of 
the critical medical tests and founded upon a faulty assumption.  Hence, Burd contends that Dr. Anne 
MacGuire's testimony must be considered irrelevant and cannot be used as the 
basis for the Commission's determination.  
A closer look at the Commission's determination, however, evidences that 
it was not totally based on the opinion of Dr. Anne MacGuire, but multiple 
factors.  In its decision, the 
Commission recognized that Burd indicated on his time card of August 21, 2001, 
that he had not incurred a work injury on that date when he signed out from 
McCoy and that no worker's compensation claim report was submitted by Burd until 
November 2001.  In addition, the 
Commission stated that according to Burd's immediate supervisor, Mr. Farris, 
Burd noted on August 21, 2001, that he had similar chest pains previously, "as 
in months," and that he could have strained his shoulder.  Further, Mr. Farris stated that Burd did 
not mention any back-related injury on that date.  Burd then returned to work at McCoy for 
approximately one month with no complaints and on October 1, 2001, reported that 
he had hurt his back over the weekend at home.  Finally, on October 16, 2001, Burd gave 
several non-work related reasons for not returning to work, which included the 
back injury that occurred during his off time. 

 

[¶17]   The Commission also referred to the 
secretary's statement.  The 
Commission noted the secretary advised that Burd had telephoned McCoy on October 
1, 2001, stating that he had hurt his back over the prior weekend and that he 
would not be returning to work until he saw a doctor.  In a later telephone conversation, the 
secretary advised that Burd stated he would not be able to return to work 
because of his wife's pregnancy, his having to tend to his other children, his 
son's surgery, and his back injury.  
Additionally, this secretary noted that Burd had not previously 
complained of back pain.  Burd also 
spoke with Mr. Burke, McCoy's manager, on October 16, 2001.  Burd similarly advised Mr. Burke.  Burd did not mention any work-related 
injury at that time. 

 

[¶18]   When reporting to the hospital on 
August 21, 2001, Burd reported that he had felt similar chest pains years 
previously, but denied any radiating pain or shoulder or back pain.  Burd testified that days later he went 
to see a family practice clinic in Casper for complaints of lower back pain, but 
admitted that he did not complain of any chest pain.  On October 21, 2001, Burd reported to 
the emergency room at the Wyoming Medical Center in Casper, the city in which 
Burd resided.  At this time, the 
hospital recorded that Burd began to experience chest pain that day after "he 
helped drag out a deer."  It was 
also recorded that Burd had experienced similar pains two months earlier, 
however, no mention was made that this prior episode was work related.  Later, Burd testified that he did not 
"drag out a deer," but felt severe chest pain when he threw a rope over a rafter 
to hang a deer.  This chest pain was 
accompanied by his arm tingling and hand numbness.  Two days later, Burd reported to Dr. 
Landon with chest pain, and stated that two months previously he began having 
pain in his chest.  Nevertheless, 
Burd did not recount any specific history of an injury. 

 

[¶19]   The Commission further noted that 
on November 27, 2001, Burd was seen by Dr. Mary MacGuire for chest pain.  She reported that Burd had no particular 
trauma for the cause of his pain and that Burd's difficulty began on August 21, 
2001, when he awoke with this pain.  
Burd was then seen by Dr. Anne MacGuire on December 10, 2001, where he 
recounted for the first time that his scraper was hit by another scraper doing 
thirty miles an hour whereupon he instantly felt an explosion in his chest and 
neck and his left arm went numb.  
Later, on December 12, 2001, Burd complained of stiffness in his neck, 
reduced range of motion in his cervical spine without pain, and back pain.  Burd's back pain was improved with a 
trigger point injection, and Dr. MacGuire returned Burd to work. 

 

[¶20]   No records were presented of Burd's 
consultation with Dr. Narotzky.  Dr. 
Zondag reported that Burd had tried to return to heavy equipment work but was 
only able to work a couple of weeks before his pain became so bad that he was 
unable to continue.  However, this 
testimony was contrary to other evidence presented, including Burd's own 
testimony.   Later, when Burd 
returned to see Dr. Zondag on May 1, 2002, Burd reported that the last epidural 
he received reduced his mid-back pain.  
However, Burd reported new lower back pain without radiation into his 
legs.  At that time, Burd showed 
minimal pain in his thoracic spine and discomfort in his lower lumbar 
region.  Dr. Zondag then diagnosed 
Burd's lumbar pain as muscular and felt that Burd could return to work in 
approximately two weeks.  On May 16, 
2002, Burd reported relief from his prior epidural injection for only a few 
days.  He then complained of lower 
back pain radiating into his legs.  
Dr. Zondag later opined that Burd's injury was clearly work related.  Nonetheless, Dr. Zondag admitted on 
cross-examination that he was unaware of Burd's post August 21, 2001, work 
history, and was not familiar with his prior employment or Burd's non-work 
activities. 

 

[¶21]   Finally, the Commission found that 
Burd's physical actions during the hearing were inconsistent with his reported 
physical difficulties, that Burd's arm and hand symptoms were not medically 
consistent with the radiographic findings of abnormalities in the thoracic 
spine, and that the majority of abnormal findings in the thoracic spine were 
right sided, while Burd predominantly complained of left side problems.  The Commission also held that there was 
not sufficient electrodiagnostic testing of Burd's thoracic spine to determine 
if any abnormalities in that area were in fact causing the claimed symptoms, and 
that Burd's complaints of low back pain and lower extremity radicular symptoms 
were not consistent with any thoracic spine abnormalities. 

 

[¶22]   We conclude the Commission relied 
upon the many inconsistencies that appeared throughout the hearing, and did not 
exclusively rely upon the opinion of Dr. Anne MacGuire.  Moreover, our review of the entirety 
substantiates each of the facts recognized by the Commission.  These facts fully support the 
Commission's ultimate conclusion that Burd did not meet his burden of proof that 
his injuries were work related.  
Although we readily admit that some of the evidence presented did support 
Burd's contention that his injuries were attributable to the August 21, 2001 
incident while at work, most notably the testimony of Dr. Zondag, we cannot 
conclude that the Commission erred in its determination.  Substantial conflicting evidence was 
presented that Burd's injuries may have not been work related as claimed.  Likewise, we must also conclude that the 
district court correctly affirmed the Commission's decision for the same 
reasons.

 

[¶23]   Burd argues that the Commission 
relied upon irrelevant, inconsequential, and conflicting evidence to support its 
determination.  We do not agree with 
this characterization.  To the 
contrary, this evidence, in its totality, constituted substantial evidence to 
support the denial of benefits.  It 
is well established in Wyoming that:

 

            
An employee-claimant in a worker's compensation case has the burden to 
prove all the statutory elements which comprise a compensable injury by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
Hanks v. City of Casper, 2001 WY 4, ¶6, 16 P.3d 710, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2001); Sherwin-Williams Company v. Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 963 (Wyo. 
2000); Thornberg v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 
913 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1996). This includes establishing the cause of the 
condition for which compensation is claimed and proving that the injury arose 
out of and in the course of employment.  
Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, ¶10, 19 P.3d 500, ¶10 
(Wyo. 2001); Hanks, ¶6; State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division v. Espinoza, 924 P.2d 979, 981 (Wyo. 1996).  Put another way, the claimant has the 
burden of following procedures and rules contained within the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act in order to establish entitlement to worker's compensation 
benefits. Sherwin-Williams Company, 994 P.2d  at 963; Pittman v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 917 P.2d 614, 617 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

            
To meet the preponderance standard, the claimant must present evidence 
which leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of the contested fact 
is more probable than its non-existence. Sherwin-Williams Company, 994 P.2d  at 963.

 

Bruns 
v. TW Services, Inc., 
2001 WY 127, ¶¶12-13, 36 P.3d 608, ¶¶12-13 (Wyo. 2001).  We have similarly established that upon 
our review of the entire record, if the agency's decision is supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the 
agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Ludwig, at ¶6.  Thus, we will not substitute our 
judgment here.

 

 

[¶24]   As stated previously, after the 
district court affirmed the Commission's determination on appeal, Burd's counsel 
submitted a request for attorney fees and costs in the amount of $6,030.00.  The district court reduced the fees and 
costs award to $2,500.00.  Later, 
the district court denied the petition for rehearing.  Burd contends that the district court 
abused its discretion in making these rulings.

 

[¶25]   When faced with a request for the 
payment of attorney fees and costs, the district court must first apply the 
"lodestar" test, which starts with the determination of the fees calculated as a 
product of reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable rate.  Thereafter, the court may make 
discretionary adjustments to the "lodestar" amount upon consideration of the 
following factors:

 

1.   The 
novelty and difficulty of the questions posed in the case;

2.   The 
skill requisite to perform the legal services properly;

3.   The 
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the 
case.

4.   The 
customary fee;

5.   Whether 
the fee is fixed or contingent;

6.   Time 
limitations imposed by the client or other circumstances;

7.   The 
amount involved and the results obtained;

8.   The 
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney 
involved;

9.   The 
undesirability of the case;

10.  The 
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
and

11.  Awards 
received in similar cases.

 

See 
Moncrief v. Harvey, 
816 P.2d 97, 109 (Wyo. 1991).

 

[¶26]   On August 15, 2003, Burd's 
counsel filed a very summary motion for award of attorney fees and costs that 
included an accounting of the services rendered and the time incurred for those 
services.  The total hours submitted 
were sixty-seven, with this time being billed at the rate of $90.00 per hour, 
for a total of $6,030.00.  This 
motion was unopposed.  However, the 
district court entered its order on September 4, 2003, reducing the award of 
attorney fees to $2,500.00.  On 
September 9, 2003, the district court explained its ruling in a decision 
letter.  That letter explained that, 
after considering the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway 
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 
1974) and Moncrief, 816 P.2d  at 109, it had determined that the questions 
presented by the case were neither novel nor difficult, characterizing the issue 
as a sufficiency of the evidence argument.  
The district court also found that the applicable case law was relatively 
straightforward, that Burd did not prevail, and the requested fees substantially 
exceeded other fees in similar cases.  
Finally, the district court stated that the other Moncrief factors 
were either not significant or were non-existent. 

 

[¶27]   Following the district court's 
order granting attorney fees and costs, Burd's counsel filed a petition for 
rehearing and brief in support of the petition.  Included with the petition was the 
affidavit of an independent attorney attesting to the reasonableness of the 
requested attorney fees and an affidavit prepared by Burd's counsel further 
explaining the attorney fees charged with a detailed billing.  The State submitted a response and an 
affidavit in opposition.  
Thereafter, the district court, without hearing, denied the petition 
because it found the petition submitted no new information or authority and it 
was not convinced that its previous analysis was erroneous. 

 

[¶28]   We hold there was adequate evidence 
presented for the district court to conclude as it did.  The district court specifically 
indicated that it applied each of the factors set forth in Moncrief v. 
Harvey, 816 P.2d  at 109.  The 
fact that the district court did not specifically enumerate its findings on each 
separate factor, but simply stated that it found 1) that the questions presented 
by the case were neither novel nor difficult, 2) that the applicable case law 
was relatively straight forward, 3) that Burd did not prevail, 4) that the 
requested fee substantially exceeded other fees in similar cases, and 5) that 
the other Moncrief factors were either not significant or were 
non-existent, adequately explained the district court's ruling.  We, therefore, hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when rendering its decision and affirm the 
award of attorney fees. 

 

[¶29]   Likewise, we hold that the district 
court correctly found that the petition for rehearing filed by Burd's counsel 
offered no new information or authority.  
We further conclude that even upon review of the petition, no additional 
information was presented to show that the district court's initial analysis as 
to attorney fees was in error. 

 

[¶30]   We have often set forth that 
judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions 
drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to 
what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  In the absence of an 
abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the district court's 
determination.  Kitzke v. 
State, 2004 WY 9, ¶5, 84 P.3d 950, ¶5 (Wyo. 2004).

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶31]   We conclude that sufficient 
evidence existed to support the Commission's determination, and the district 
court did not err when it affirmed the Commission's decision.  We also hold that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion when it reduced the request for attorney fees and costs 
and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration.

 

[¶32]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1During a later medical examination, it was recorded that Burd first began 
to have these pains that morning while at home in bed. 

 

2No documentary evidence of this medical visit was presented to the 
Commission at hearing.

 

3No documentation from Dr. Narotzky was provided at the 
hearing.

 

4Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2003):

 

(c)   To the extent necessary to make a decision and when 
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

(i)  Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed; and

 

(ii)  Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and 
conclusions found to be:

 

(A)  Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise 
not in accordance with law;

 

(B)  Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

 

(C)  In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or 
limitations or lacking statutory right;

 

(D)  Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

 

(E)  Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on 
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.