Title: State Ex Rel. Brode v. Hatcher

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

97 So. 2d 422 (1957) 233 La. 636 STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Chester A. BRODE v. Embry HATCHER. No. 43381. Supreme Court of Louisiana. June 28, 1957. Rehearing Denied October 8, 1957. *423 Obier & Middleton, Plaquemine, for relator and appellant. Ponder & Ponder, Amite, for respondents-appellees. HAMLIN, Justice ad hoc. This matter involves a controversy over the custody of the minor, Emmie Sue Brode, born in 1946 of the union of Chester A. Brode and Mamie Sue Hatcher Brode, whose marital domicile was at Plaquemine, Louisiana, Iberville Parish. Mrs. Brode died on April 5, 1956, from a lingering illness of cancer. Prior to her death, she was confined for approximately a year in a hospital in Clinton, Louisiana, the home of her family. Relator gave his consent for Emmie Sue to accompany her mother and be near her bedside during her last illness. During this time, Mrs. Brode's brothers and stepmother, who were devoted to her, cared for Emmie Sue, enrolling her in school and looking after her personal necessities. Relator visited his wife at intervals during her last illness, although the record reflects that their marital life had not been peaceful due to constant conflicts between Mrs. Brode and Mr. Brode's sister, Miss Ollie Brode, who resided with them. After his wife's funeral, Mr. Brode acceded to Monroe Hatcher's request that Emmie Sue remain a few days in Clinton *424 with the Hatcher family. On April 8, 1956, he further consented to permit Emmie Sue to remain in Clinton to complete the school term. The Hatchers then refused to release Emmie Sue to him. Relator filed habeas corpus proceedings against Monroe Hatcher and Mrs. Embry Hatcher in June, 1956, alleging that they were detaining his child against his will and wishes. Monroe Hatcher filed an exception of misjoinder of defendants, averring that Emmie Sue Brode was in the custody, control, and under the supervision of her maternal uncle, Embry Hatcher. Mrs. Embry Hatcher filed an exception of no right or cause of action. Relator then filed a second petition, naming Embry Hatcher as defendant and praying that Embry Hatcher be ordered to release and deliver Emmie Sue Brode to him. Hearing was set for August 8, 1956. The defendant filed an answer on that day, the most cogent averments being: After hearing, the trial judge recalled the writ of habeas corpus previously issued and dismissed relator's suit. In his reasons for judgment, he stated: Relator has appealed to this court, alleging that the trial court erred in reaching the following conclusions: 1. That a parent does not have the paramount right of the custody of his or her child. 2. That because Mr. Brode is engaged in business, he is not the proper person to raise his own child. 3. That because a small child preferred to remain with her uncle and aunt, the father should be deprived of her custody. 4. That Emmie Sue feared Miss Ollie Brode, sister of relator. 5. That Miss Ollie Brode, who was not a party to this suit and was not advised that she would be made an issue, should have been in court. We agree with the trial judge that in a case of this kind, involving the custody of a child, someone will be very badly hurt. However, our jurisprudence is well settled that: *426 In Heitkamp v. Ragan, 142 La. 81, 76 So. 247, we clearly stated: We reiterate that which we have held on many occasionsordinarily, parents have the natural and legal right to the custody and care of their minor children. Therefore, it follows that relator does have the paramount right to the custody of his minor child, Emmie Sue. However, his right in this respect is not unquestionable. State ex rel. Conerly v. Sonier, 209 La. 138, 24 So. 2d 290. Relator was seventy-two years of age at the time of trial in 1956. The record discloses that he owns property and receives an adequate income to support his daughter. He lives in a comfortable home, which was renovated through the efforts of his deceased wife. Five witnesses testified as to his good character and business ability. Frank C. Grosch, a building contractor and owner of a Western Auto Store, testified that relator attended Sunday School and in the past had brought his daughter with him. Sheriff C. A. Griffon of Iberville Parish testified that relator was a fit person to raise his own child. Nowhere in the voluminous testimony of the defendant's witnesses do we find any evidence that would lead us to a conclusion that relator is not a good man. There is evidence in the record that he became excited during one of the hearings in this matter and used the words, "God-damned liar", but we do not believe that this is sufficient to hold that he is not a good father. However, relator himself testified that he was engaged in business which necessitated his being out of his home at times. He said that his sister, Miss Ollie Brode, lived with him and that her mental condition was good. He denied that she had ever threatened his child. Mrs. Zack Hatcher, stepmother of the deceased Mrs. Brode, testified as follows: Mrs. Zack Hatcher's testimony is somewhat corroborated by some of the witnesses for the defendant, and we are confronted with the question of whether Emmie Sue will be exposed to improper influences. State ex rel. Martin v. Garza, supra; Ex parte Lincoln, 128 La. 278, 54 So. 818. Plaintiff's witnesses testified that Miss Ollie was a down to earth woman, and Sheriff C. A. Griffon testified that she was normal. However, they did not testify as to her ability to raise a child of such tender years as the minor herein involved. Relator made no statement as to his plans for the physical and moral upbringing of his child, and he repeatedly referred to the fact that his sister (Miss Ollie) had assisted in raising Emmie Sue during the time she was at home with him. We infer from his testimony that his sister would continue to exercise some control over his daughter. The trial judge and counsel for relator and counsel for defendant met in the judge's chambers and questioned Emmie Sue. The court's report is as follows: *429 "Mr. Ponder: Some particular children. Then, on this other occasion when the Court and Mr. Obier asked if she was allowed to play with children and she said yes but that Aunt Ollie always fussed. Since the right of the State is superior to that of the parent, and since we have not had the benefit of Miss Ollie's testimony, we feel that it would be detrimental to Emmie Sue's welfare to order her returned to her father without a legal determination of Miss Ollie's qualifications, if Miss Ollie is to take care of her. Therefore, we think that the trial court should have the right to observe and question Miss Ollie. On the other hand, if Miss Ollie is not to take care of Emmie Sue, it should be shown by relator what arrangements he intends to make for her care. Under the circumstances of this case, we agree with relator that the trial court was in error regarding Miss Ollie's absence on the day of hearing of the habeas corpus proceeding. Hearing was set for and took place on August 8, 1956, and the defendant filed his answer on that day. It was in his answer that defendant attacked the ability of Miss Ollie to take care of Emmie Sue. As stated in State ex rel. Martin v. Garza, supra, the burden of proof is on those resisting the parent's qualifications and fitness. Here, the burden was on the defendant. This is not the type of case where a presumption should be asserted against relator for not producing his sister as a witness. We also find that during the trial of the proceeding, counsel for the defendant requested an instanter subpoena for Miss Ollie and then withdrew his request. Relator stated that it would not injure her health for her to appear in court. The record also indicates that the trial judge was anxious to finish hearing the case on the day of trial, because of a crowded docket.[1] *430 The record is replete with evidence as to the moral and financial ability of the defendant and his wife to take care of Emmie Sue, and we have no doubt that she would enjoy a life befitting a girl of her years if she made her home with them. The testimony and the conclusions of the trial judge also indicate that Emmie Sue is happy with her Uncle Embry and his wife. However, these factors are only to be weighed. They cannot be controlling of the custody of the child. The only fair and equitable decree we can render is to remand the case to the lower court, in order that it may hear the relator's testimony as to his plans for taking care of his daughter and hear the testimony of Miss Ollie Brode as to her actions toward Emmie Sue in the past and what her actions will be toward her in the future. This will determine whether Emmie Sue will be exposed to proper or improper influences were she to be returned to her father. In commenting further upon the reasons for judgment of the trial judge, we would like to observe that while it is true that relator is an elderly man, this is not a ground for depriving him of the custody of his child. It is clear that he loves his daughter dearly, and we cannot help but remark that efforts should be made for him to visit with Emmie Sue during the interim of this remand. As to the statement of the trial judge to the effect that relator has not attempted to see his child since she has been in Clinton, the record is clear that friction exists between him and the Hatcher family and that he is reluctant to go to their residences, although defendant's witnesses testified that he is welcome. The trial judge remarked that he had urged relator to visit his child, and we believe that all parties should assist in carrying out this request. As to the statement of the trial judge to the effect that relator has not written his child but two or three or four letters since she has been in Clinton, relator testified that he stopped writing to his daughter because he did not believe she received his letters, although the Hatcher family testified that they delivered his letters to her unopened. Evidently relator did not receive letters from Emmie Sue, as the record does not clearly show how often she wrote her father. However, these observations by the trial judge are not sufficient to deprive relator of the custody of his child. For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from dismissing relator's suit is reversed, annulled, and set aside, and it is now ordered that the case be remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed. All costs of this appeal are to be borne by appellee, Embry Hatcher; all other costs are to await the final disposition of the cause. PONDER, J., absent. McCALEB, J., dissents in part. McCALEB, Justice (dissenting in part). I am in accord with the reversal of the decision of the trial judge and the ruling that relator, under the law and the evidence, is entitled to the custody of his daughter. But I think relator should be granted relief on the record as presented here and can see no substantial reason for remanding the case in order to permit the collateral relatives to further inquire into relator's qualifications *431 to reassume his status as father of the child in the paternal home (see Civil Code, Article 218) which no one doubts he has properly occupied since her birth. The remand serves only to further the injustice which has been visited upon this father by the relatives of his late wife and to withhold from him unjustifiably the present exercise of his legal and natural rights. The facts, which have been fairly and painstakingly set forth in the main opinion, demonstrate that this not a case in which a father has, following the death of his wife, turned over his child to the wife's collateral relatives or has impliedly surrendered custody by long silence and inaction, or has committed any act which would lead the court to believe that he did not care for his child. On the contrary, the record shows that this father was prevailed on by his late wife's relatives to leave his child temporarily in their care on the plea that it would be to her best interest to remain in Clinton to complete her school term. But, actually, these relatives had no intention of ever returning the child, the circumstantial proof establishing that they had deliberately planned to keep her permanently, deceiving relator as to her whereabouts to the extent that he filed a habeas corpus proceeding against Monroe Hatcher, only to learn that she was in the household of another brother, Embry Hatcher. Their conduct does not commend itself to judicial reward and, in my opinion, the child's interest is not well served by leaving her in defendant's care even temporarily. But, say the majority, there is some evidence that relator's sister, "Aunt Ollie", who has lived in his household for many years, has a mental affliction. Of course, this claim, like the other contentions of defendant, has not been established, the evidence consisting of speculative hints and opinions given by unqualified witnesses. Still, the majority seize upon these unproved charges to form the predicate for a remand of the case, unwittingly concluding that, although defendant has failed to carry the burden of proving that relator is unfit to have the custody of his child, relator should produce more testimony "as to his plans for taking care of his daughter" and the judge should "hear the testimony of Miss Ollie Brode as to her actions towards Emmie Sue in the past and what her actions will be toward her in the future". In other words, the burden which rested on defendant is now shifted to relator and, apparently, he and Aunt Ollie must now satisfy the district judge that it will be safe to restore the child to his custody. It is well settled that the judiciary is not authorized to interfere with a parent's authority over his child unless the evidence is such as to convince the court that he or she will neglect the child or expose it to improper influences. Ex parte Lincoln, 128 La. 278, 54 So. 818; State ex rel. Martin v. Talbot, 161 La. 192, 108 So. 411; State ex rel. Bethany v. Corley, 172 La. 266, 134 So. 87 and State ex rel. Perdue v. Carkuff, 182 La. 920, 162 So. 729. And, while it appears that this Court has on two occasions remanded custody cases for additional evidence, its action has been limited to matters wherein the record as presented on appeal left grave doubt as to the father's financial ability or moral fitness to care for his child. See State v. Robin, 193 La. 789, 192 So. 349, and State v. Taylor, 210 La. 1004, 29 So. 2d 43. It would seem that the power to administer social justice in derogation of the law (Articles 216 and 250 of the Civil Code), which the Court has assumed, should, like all unbridled power, be sparingly employed and confined to those cases in which there is a clear and foreseeable danger to the child in returning it to its parental home. This, in my opinion, is not such a case. [1] Mr. Ponder: "If the Court please, the question is the fitness of the parent, and in order to determine the fitness, it is naturally incumbent upon the Court to determine the place of abode of the person who is asking for the custody. I would like an instanta subpoena to be issued for Miss Ollie Brode, since the question is going to come up about that. "I would like to see if she will come to Court. Now, if she can come to Court today, I would like to use her. If we complete the trial of this case and she's not here, I realize I cannot insist on the Court holding the case open for her testimony. But since this question has come up,I don't know this ladybut the information I have is certainly to the effect that as long as she is in the home she needs someone to take care of her, and it certainly wouldn't be a fit place for the child to be." Mr. Obier: "If the Court please, I did not anticipate particularly that they were going to attack the mental capacity of anyone. I think that we have quite a few people here in the Court, reputable people, the Sheriff of the Parish of Iberville, who know Mr. Brode and who know his sister and who can testify, and I don't think that it is necessary." The Court: "Mr. Ponder, if you feel like you've got to have this witness, I will send after her, but now, I don't want to do anything to injure her health or anything to' Mr. Brode: "It won't injure her health." Mr. Ponder: "Judge, suppose we put it this wayI'll go ahead with my questions, and I'll withdraw my request for a subpoena right now for her, and if it develops later on that we need her, we'll get it." Court: "I will also warn you gentlemen thisI hopewe may not be able to do itbut I hope to complete this case today. If I don't I have criminal cases for Thursday, Friday, and Saturday I have another civil case. In fact, it's a civil case of this nature that I have to try. If we do not complete this case today, it will be at least the middle of next week before I can continue. I would like to finish today, but I don't know whether we can do it or not. I also state this, that I'm prepared to go into a night session if necessary."