Title: State ex rel. York Internatl. Corp. v. Kopis

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. York Internatl. Corp. v. Kopis, 114 Ohio St.3d 442, 2007-Ohio-4556.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. YORK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, APPELLEE, v. 
KOPIS, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. York Internatl. Corp. v. Kopis, 
114 Ohio St.3d 442, 2007-Ohio-4556.] 
Workers’ compensation – Appeal from denial of motion to show cause –  
Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2006-1333 — Submitted June 5, 2007 — Decided September 19, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 04AP-979, 2005-Ohio-3792. 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This case arises from appellate review of the Industrial 
Commission of Ohio’s award of permanent total disability compensation to 
appellant Fay H. Kopis. 
{¶ 2} Appellee-employer York International Corporation (“York”) filed 
an original action in mandamus in the court of appeals asserting, among other 
matters, that the commission abused its discretion by failing to consider whether 
Kopis had voluntarily abandoned the workforce before becoming permanently 
and totally disabled.  The court of appeals agreed with York and issued a writ that 
vacated the commission’s order and remanded for further consideration and an 
amended order. 
{¶ 3} After a new hearing, the commission found that Kopis could work 
and therefore denied her permanent total disability compensation.  Kopis filed a 
motion in the court of appeals to require the commission to show cause, arguing 
that the commission had acted in contempt of the court of appeals’ order.  The 
court of appeals denied the motion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 4} In this appeal as of right, we must determine whether the court of 
appeals erred in denying Kopis’s motion.  We affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
{¶ 5} On June 12, 2003, the commission found that Kopis could not do 
sustained remunerative employment and that she was permanently and totally 
disabled.  York then filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
awarding compensation to Kopis.  The court of appeals found that the 
commission had abused its discretion by failing to address (1) whether Kopis had 
failed to participate in rehabilitation and (2) whether Kopis had voluntarily 
abandoned the workforce before she became permanently and totally disabled.  
The court accordingly granted the writ and ordered the commission “to vacate its 
decision that granted permanent total disability compensation to respondent-
claimant, Fay H. Kopis, and to issue a new order which grants or denies such 
compensation and sets forth the basis for its decision.” 
{¶ 6} The commission reheard the matter on February 16, 2006.  
Following the hearing, the commission found that Kopis could do sustained 
remunerative 
employment 
and 
denied 
her 
permanent 
total 
disability 
compensation.  Rather than challenge the decision through an action in 
mandamus, on May 19, 2006, Kopis filed a motion to show cause “why [the 
commission] should not be held in contempt of this Court’s Order directing the 
Commission to address and determine whether [Kopis] (1) failed to participate in 
a rehabilitation program and (2) voluntarily abandoned the workforce.”  York 
filed a memorandum in response to Kopis’s motion to show cause, and  Kopis 
filed a reply. 
{¶ 7} On June 14, 2006, the court of appeals denied Kopis’s motion, 
stating that “[a] review of the Industrial Commission’s February 16, 2006 order 
reveals a finding of no evidence of attempts at vocational rehabilitation and, while 
January Term, 2007 
3 
the Industrial Commission did not apparently consider the voluntarily 
abandonment issue, failure to so consider same would appear to favor the 
claimant.  Claimant has not demonstrated that an original action challenging the 
Industrial Commission order is not the proper remedy.  Claimant-Fay H. Kopis’ 
May 19, 2006 motion to show cause is denied.” 
{¶ 8} Kopis argues now that the commission was forbidden from 
considering anew her medical ability to work.  She asserts that the commission 
was bound by its June 12, 2003 determination that she could not work and was 
limited to deciding whether she was nevertheless foreclosed from compensation 
by a previous workforce abandonment.1   
{¶ 9} We disagree.  The court of appeals vacated the entire order, not 
just a portion of it.  As a result, the commission was required to re-examine all 
facets of Kopis’s eligibility for compensation.  Once the commission determined 
that Kopis could do sustained remunerative employment, the voluntary-
abandonment issue became moot.  The commission is not in contempt and did not 
abuse its discretion in considering Kopis’s capacity for sustained remunerative 
employment. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Buckley King, L.P.A., and Michael J. Spisak, for appellee. 
Lester S. Potash, for appellant. 
______________________ 
                                                 
1.  Kopis also references the rehabilitation-participation question, but as the court of appeals 
correctly noted, the February 16, 2006 commission order did address the issue.  Consequently, it is 
not relevant to this discussion.