Title: State v. Ross

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 20–0914 
 
Submitted December 15, 2022—Filed February 24, 2023 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
ALEXANDER SHANTEE THOMAS ROSS, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Martha L. Mertz, 
Judge. 
 
The State seeks further review of the court of appeals decision reversing 
the defendant’s convictions for sexual abuse in the second degree based on 
erroneous noncorroboration jury instructions. DECISION OF COURT OF 
APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE 
REMANDED. 
 
Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which McDonald, 
McDermott, and May, JJ., joined. Mansfield, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., joined. 
 
John C. Heinicke of Kragnes & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant. 
 
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
 
2 
 
OXLEY, Justice. 
In State v. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d 487, 490–92 (Iowa 2022), and State v. 
Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 516, 520 (Iowa 2022), we held that it is error in sexual 
abuse cases for a trial court to instruct jurors that “[t]here is no requirement 
that the [alleged victim’s testimony] be corroborated.” Although a correct 
statement of law, such an instruction, without more, unduly emphasizes the 
alleged victim’s testimony. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d at 491–95. The district court in 
this case used a variation of the noncorroboration instruction that had been 
percolating through our court of appeals on a parallel course to the Kraai 
instruction:  
You should evaluate the testimony of [the alleged victim] the 
same way you evaluate the testimony of any other witness. The 
law does not require that the testimony of [the alleged victims] be 
corroborated in order to prove that [they were] sexually abused. 
You may find the Defendant guilty of Sexual Abuse if [the alleged 
victim’s] testimony convinces you of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
We must now decide whether the additions to the instruction cure the errors we 
found in the instruction at issue in Kraai and Mathis. On our careful review of 
the instructions provided in this case, we conclude they do not.  
I. Factual and Procedural History. 
Alexander Ross and Tykeshia McCuen began dating in 2011. Eventually, 
the two moved in together in Patterson, Iowa. Tykeshia and Ross have two 
children together. Tykeshia also has two daughters from a previous 
relationship—L.C. and K.C.—who were babies when Ross moved in with 
 
3 
 
Tykeshia. From the time Ross and Tykeshia began dating until Tykeshia left in 
April 2019, Ross acted as the girls’ stepfather. 
The couple had a tumultuous and physically abusive relationship. On 
April 11, they got into a heated argument, which left Tykeshia afraid for her 
safety. So, in the middle of the night, she left Ross and took the children to 
Westminster, Colorado to stay with her mother, Jackie. According to Tykeshia, 
it was at this point that L.C. and K.C. first accused Ross of having sexually 
abused them. Jackie and Tykeshia reported the allegations to Deputy Don 
Kinney of the Madison County, Iowa Sheriff’s Office, who began an investigation. 
Ross was charged with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse. See 
Iowa Code § 709.3(1)(b) (2019). At trial in March 2020, the State’s primary 
evidence against Ross was the testimony of L.C. and K.C.; no physical evidence 
was presented to corroborate the charges. Each testified that Ross put his private 
part in her private parts (both front and back) on multiple occasions when 
Tykeshia was working night shifts as a nurse. Each testified she told her mother, 
who did nothing. Each also testified to screaming, but Ross put his hand over 
her mouth. In addition, L.C., who was in fourth grade, testified that Ross said 
inappropriate things and described “white stuff” that came out of Ross’s penis 
as “gooey” and “disgusting.” K.C., who was in second grade and is diabetic, 
testified that Ross gave her suckers afterward. Neither girl testified about Ross’s 
abuse of the other. The defense’s only witnesses were: Tykeshia, who testified 
that the girls never made her aware of any sexual abuse prior to the April 2019 
 
4 
 
trip to Colorado and that she had never herself noticed signs of such abuse, and 
a friend of Ross’s, who testified Ross was a good stepparent to L.C. and K.C. 
At the close of trial and over Ross’s objection,1 the court gave jurors 
Instructions 16 and 17, which were identical other than identifying each girl 
separately: 
You should evaluate the testimony of [L.C. or K.C.] the same 
way you evaluate the testimony of any other witness. The law does 
not require that the testimony of [L.C. or K.C.] be corroborated in 
order to prove that she was sexually abused. You may find the 
Defendant guilty of Sexual Abuse if [L.C.’s or K.C.’s] testimony 
convinces you of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The jury deliberated for a little over ninety minutes and returned a guilty verdict 
on both counts. 
Ross was sentenced to two indeterminate, consecutive twenty-five-year 
sentences (with a combined mandatory minimum sentence of thirty-five years), 
along with a lifetime special sentence under Iowa Code § 903B.1. Ross appealed, 
alleging three points of error: (1) insufficient evidence supported the verdict; 
(2) the district court considered an improper sentencing factor; and (3) the 
noncorroboration instructions were improper. 
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court rejected Ross’s 
sufficiency challenge but agreed, over a dissent, that the noncorroboration 
instructions were improper based on our recent decisions in Kraai and Mathis. 
In her dissent, Judge Greer noted that the noncorroboration instructions used 
 
1Ross’s counsel initially asked the court to remove the third sentence of the proposed 
instructions as “lead[ing] the jury to put more emphasis on one witness’s testimony than it does 
on the other witness’s testimony.” He then objected to giving the instructions at all but asked 
that the last sentence be removed if they were included. 
 
5 
 
here were virtually identical to the noncorroboration instruction approved by an 
earlier 
court 
of 
appeals 
panel 
in 
State v. 
Altmayer, 
No. 
18–0314, 
2019 WL 476488 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2019). In Kraai, we cited Altmayer in a 
manner that left Judge Greer uncertain whether the noncorroboration 
instruction at issue in Altmayer would stand up to post-Kraai scrutiny.2  
We granted the State’s application for further review to decide that issue. 
We elect to let the court of appeals’ opinion stand on the sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge. See Farnsworth v. State, 982 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Iowa 2022) 
(“When we grant further review, we may exercise our discretion to let the court 
of appeals decision stand as the final decision on particular issues.” (quoting 
State v. Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 n.1 (Iowa 2019))). Because we affirm the 
court of appeals’ remand for a new trial, we also decline to consider Ross’s 
sentencing challenge. 
II. Noncorroboration Jury Instructions.  
We review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at law. 
State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000) (en banc). Jury instructions are 
considered “as a whole to determine their accuracy” and are “judged in context[,] 
 
2We referenced Altmayer as follows: 
An instruction that stated no witness’s testimony needs to be corroborated 
(with some exceptions not applicable here) would correctly state the law and 
help dispel any misconceptions regarding uncorroborated witness testimony. 
Cf. State v. Altmayer, No. 18–0314, 2019 WL 476488, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. 
Feb. 6, 2019) (approving noncorroboration instruction that provided the jury 
“should evaluate the testimony of [the alleged victim] the same way [it] 
evaluate[d] the testimony of any other witness”).  
Kraai, 969 N.W.2d at 495. 
 
6 
 
. . . not in isolation,” meaning improper instructions “can be cured ‘if the other 
instructions properly advise the jury as to the legal principles involved.’ ” Kraai, 
969 N.W.2d at 490 (first quoting State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 
2021); then quoting State v. Liggins, 557 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Iowa 1996); and then 
quoting Thavenet v. Davis, 589 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Iowa 1999) (en banc)). Where 
an instruction is incorrect as a matter of law and not cured by other instructions, 
we presume prejudice “unless the record affirmatively establishes there was 
no[ne].” Donahue, 957 N.W.2d at 6 (quoting State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 551 
(Iowa 2010)). In the absence of such record evidence, reversal is required. Id.  
A. Propriety of the Noncorroboration Instructions. We repeat the 
challenged noncorroboration instructions as given by the district court:  
You should evaluate the testimony of [L.C. or K.C.] the same 
way you evaluate the testimony of any other witness. The law does 
not require that the testimony of [L.C. or K.C.] be corroborated in 
order to prove that she was sexually abused. You may find the 
Defendant guilty of Sexual Abuse if [L.C.’s or K.C.’s] testimony 
convinces you of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
The court of appeals has previously approved of this same instruction. See 
Altmayer, 2019 WL 476488, at *5. The court of appeals had also approved of a 
similar but truncated noncorroboration instruction that included only the 
second sentence, State v. Barnhardt, No. 17-0496, 2018 WL 2230938, at *4 (Iowa 
Ct. App. May 16, 2018) (approving noncorroboration instruction providing that 
“[t]he law does not require that the testimony of the alleged victim be 
corroborated” (alteration in original)), but we abrogated that decision in Kraai, 
see 969 N.W.2d at 496 (“[W]e hold the district court erred in instructing the jury 
 
7 
 
that ‘[t]here is no requirement that the testimony of a complainant of sexual 
offenses be corroborated.’ ” (second alteration in original)). 
Our “long-standing precedents” provide “that instructions regarding 
witness credibility should apply equally to witnesses for the state and the defense 
and that instructions should not draw attention to specific evidence.” Kraai, 
969 N.W.2d at 495. In Kraai and Mathis, we held that the truncated 
noncorroboration instruction failed on both points—it drew undue attention to 
the victims’ testimony and (or, indeed, because) it omitted discussion of the 
symmetrical principle that no witness’s testimony needs corroboration to be 
believed.3 Id. at 492–93; see also Mathis, 971 N.W.2d at 519–20. Thus, there 
were two problems with the Kraai instruction: (1) it emphasized the victim’s 
testimony, which could lead jurors to conclude that the victim’s testimony 
deserved special consideration; and (2) it provided an incomplete discussion of 
the noncorroboration principle, which could confuse jurors and mislead them 
into believing that although victims’ testimony does not require corroboration, 
other witnesses’ testimony does. The noncorroboration principle applies equally 
to all witnesses, and any instruction on the issue should include this symmetry 
to avoid misleading the jury into believing it applies only to certain witnesses. 
See Kraai, 969 N.W.2d at 493 (“The omission of a symmetrical noncorroboration 
 
3There are some exceptions—not applicable here—where witness testimony requires 
corroboration; for example, under the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, the testimony of an 
accomplice to a crime requires corroboration “tend[ing] to connect the defendant with the 
commission of the offense” in order to convict the defendant. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.21(3). This case 
does not involve accomplices, so an instruction that “no witness’s testimony needs corroboration” 
would have been an accurate statement of the law. 
 
8 
 
instruction may have permitted the jury to infer that Kraai’s testimony required 
corroboration to be believed.”); see also State v. Dever, 508 P.3d 158, 170 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2022) (“[B]y mentioning only the ‘testimony of a witness to a crime,’ the 
jurors could have believed that the testimony of other witnesses, particularly 
Dever, did require corroborating evidence to be believed.”). 
As compared to the Kraai instruction, the first sentence in this instruction 
helps dispel the first improper assumption: that alleged victims’ testimony 
requires special consideration. Cf. Tyler J. Buller, Fighting Rape Culture with 
Noncorroboration Instructions, 53 Tulsa L. Rev. 1, 24 (2017) (“[N]oncorroboration 
instructions can be prefaced with language that tells the jury to evaluate the 
credibility of victims the same way they evaluate other evidence. Including that 
verbiage takes the wind out of the sails for this concern [of singling out victims’ 
testimony].”). The first sentence addresses the way the victims’ testimony is 
evaluated and naturally takes the jurors back to the general instructions that 
they should “[g]ive all the evidence the weight and value [they] think it is entitled 
to receive” and “may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony.” Thus, 
the first sentence reinforced to the jurors the need to consider the victims’ 
testimony in the same way they considered other witnesses’ testimony. 
But whether a witness’s testimony needs corroboration to support a 
conviction is a different issue from how the testimony is evaluated against other 
evidence in the case. And importantly, no other instruction here addressed 
corroboration of any other witness’s testimony, leaving in place the asymmetry 
problem we identified in Kraai. On this point, the second sentence of these 
 
9 
 
instructions is materially indistinguishable from the Kraai instruction in that it 
fails to explain the rest of the noncorroboration principle: that no witness’s 
testimony requires corroboration to be believed. Therefore, as in Kraai and 
Mathis, there is a risk jurors could have inferred that other witnesses’ testimony 
does require corroboration. 
The State argues that the first sentence cures any deficiencies in the 
second sentence that are inconsistent with Kraai and Mathis. Of course, jury 
instructions need not be perfect. See Moser v. Stallings, 387 N.W.2d 599, 605 
(Iowa 1986) (“Although the instructions are not perfect, they did not deprive the 
plaintiff of a fair trial.”). Ultimately, we are looking for whether the “instructions 
are misleading and confusing” when read as a whole. Rivera v. Woodward 
Res. Ctr., 865 N.W.2d 887, 902 (Iowa 2015). “[A]n instruction is misleading or 
confusing if it is ‘very possible’ the jury could reasonably have interpreted the 
instruction incorrectly.” Id. (quoting McElroy v. State, 637 N.W.2d 488, 500 (Iowa 
2001)). “On the other hand, if a review of the instructions ‘leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that the jury could not have misapprehended the issue,’ then the 
challenge is without merit.” Id. (quoting Moser, 387 N.W.2d at 605). 
We are not convinced that the first sentence’s direction to evaluate the 
victims’ testimony the same as other witnesses cures the express reference to 
corroboration of a victim’s testimony in the second sentence. As written, the jury 
could read the second sentence to be an example of the principle contained in 
the first sentence, or it could be read as an exception to that principle. They 
could be read together as: 
 
10 
 
You should evaluate the testimony of [L.C. or K.C.] the same 
way you evaluate the testimony of any other witness. [In other 
words,] [t]he law does not require that the testimony of [L.C. or 
K.C.] be corroborated . . . . 
Or they could be read together as:  
You should evaluate the testimony of [L.C. or K.C.] the same 
way you evaluate the testimony of any other witness. [However, 
(or But,)] [t]he law does not require that the testimony of [L.C. or 
K.C.] be corroborated . . . . 
These examples reflect that the first sentence does not provide the clarification 
the State suggests. Because we do not expect jurors to parse jury instructions 
the same way we parse statutes, we cannot be certain how they attempted to 
navigate the ambiguity. Either interpretation was plausible, but one was legally 
erroneous. 
In any event, we must also consider the third sentence of Instructions 16 
and 17, which was the primary concern Ross raised at trial. That sentence says: 
“You may find the Defendant guilty of Sexual Abuse if [L.C.’s or K.C.’s] testimony 
convinces you of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” As Ross argued in his original 
objection to the district court, the third sentence highlights the girls’ testimony 
over other evidence in the record. The overarching premise of our concern in 
Kraai was that “instructions that set apart, highlight, or accentuate the 
testimony of a particular witness or a particular piece of evidence are improper.” 
969 N.W.2d at 492. The third sentence of Instructions 16 and 17 runs afoul of 
that concern. See, e.g., Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 460–62 (Ind. 2003) 
(holding that jury instruction “unfairly focuse[d] the jury’s attention on and 
highlight[ed] a single witness’s testimony” where it instructed the jury: “A 
 
11 
 
conviction may be based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged 
victim if such testimony establishes each element of any crime charged beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”); Veteto v. State, 8 S.W.3d 805, 816 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that jury instruction singled out the alleged victim’s testimony and 
improperly commented on the weight of the evidence where it informed the jury: 
“The law provides the testimony of the victim alone, if believed by you beyond a 
reasonable doubt, need not be supported by other evidence before a finding of 
guilt can be returned. That is to say, the testimony of [A.L.], standing alone, if 
believed by you beyond a reasonable doubt, is sufficient proof to support a 
finding of guilt.” (alteration in original)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Crook, 248 S.W.3d 172, 176–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).  
Although the truncated noncorroboration instruction in Kraai did not 
include this reasonable doubt sentence, we did consider whether the general 
reasonable doubt instruction cured the taint from the asymmetrical 
noncorroboration instruction. See 969 N.W.2d at 496. Not only did we conclude 
it did not, we reasoned that, “[i]f anything,” it accentuated the error, explaining: 
“While the jury was correctly instructed that the State bore the burden of proving 
Kraai guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury was determining whether the 
State satisfied its burden in light of the noncorroboration instruction that 
uniquely accentuated N.F.’s testimony over all others.” Id. Here, the third 
sentence of the instructions even more directly accentuated the alleged victims’ 
testimony: “You may find the Defendant guilty of Sexual Abuse if [L.C.’s or K.C.’s] 
testimony convinces you of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
12 
 
Review of the other, general jury instructions does not alleviate the 
concern that Instructions 16 and 17 improperly focused the jury on the girls’ 
testimony. Those instructions were the same here as they were in Kraai and 
Mathis, where we concluded they may have actually amplified, rather than cured, 
the error in the noncorroboration instruction. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d at 496 (“If 
anything, the instructional error necessarily was channeled into the general 
instructions. For example, instruction 10 told the jury they could believe ‘all, 
part or none of any witness’s testimony,’ but, in determining which witnesses to 
believe, the jury evaluated [the victim’s] testimony in light of the 
noncorroboration instruction that uniquely accentuated her testimony over all 
others.”).  
Likewise, the instructions here may have compounded any uncertainty 
and pushed jurors to make the improper inference. For example, Instruction 13, 
dealing with expert testimony, contained a clause similar to the first sentence in 
the noncorroboration instructions: “Consider expert testimony just like any 
other testimony.” That instruction did not, however, follow up with a sentence 
explaining that expert witness testimony does not need to be corroborated to be 
believed. When comparing Instruction 13 to the noncorroboration instructions, 
a juror could reasonably conclude that since the instructions started from an 
equal premise (i.e., treat all witness testimony the same) but Instructions 16 and 
17 contained an additional point of law (i.e., the law does not require 
corroboration for victims’ testimony specifically), the additional point about 
noncorroboration was exclusive to L.C.’s and K.C.’s testimony. See State v. 
 
13 
 
Davis, 951 N.W.2d 8, 19 n.1 (Iowa 2020) (“When the marshaling instructions for 
the other nine offenses cross-referenced the insanity defense but not the 
instruction for first-degree murder, the jurors would reasonably conclude that 
omission was intentional and the defense was unavailable.”). We cannot say the 
jurors would necessarily read the first two sentences of Instructions 16 and 17 
to apply the corroboration principle to all witnesses. And more critically, read 
together with the third sentence, those instructions single out the girls’ 
testimony, thereby improperly highlighting some evidence (their testimony) over 
all other evidence. We conclude that Instructions 16 and 17 were misleading or 
confusing to the jury. See Rivera, 865 N.W.2d at 902 (instructions are misleading 
or confusing if it is “ ‘very possible’ the jury could reasonably have interpreted 
the instruction incorrectly” (quoting McElroy, 637 N.W.2d at 500)). 
As in Kraai, we acknowledge the State’s interest in sex-abuse cases in 
dispelling the misconception that alleged victims’ testimony requires 
corroboration to support a conviction.4 969 N.W.2d at 495. But “those interests 
can be advanced by a nonparticularized instruction applicable to all witness 
testimony.” Id. (emphases added); see also Mathis, 971 N.W.2d at 520 (“In the 
absence of any other instruction regarding the uncorroborated testimony of other 
 
4We note, however, that the State’s need to do so here is somewhat questionable. On 
appeal, the State gave examples of three jurors’ responses to voir dire questions about the need 
for victim-witness corroboration to support its position that the noncorroboration instruction 
was necessary here. None of those three jurors were selected for the final jury panel. And the 
State candidly admits that “other panelists said they understood that they could rely on 
testimony as proof that abuse occurred.” Presumably, then, the voir dire process worked as 
intended to remove jurors who harbored such attitudes and were unwilling to set them aside. 
But for the jurors that remained, the State’s repeated emphasis through its voir dire questioning 
on whether corroboration is required may have only worked to sow more confusion than it 
settled.  
 
14 
 
witnesses, the instruction unduly and improperly emphasized the complainant 
witnesses’ testimony.” (emphasis added)). The instructions given here missed 
that mark; they were still particularized to the victims’ testimony, and there was 
still no other instruction telling jurors the noncorroboration principle applies to 
all witnesses. We meant what we said in Kraai: “[a]n instruction that state[s] no 
witness’s testimony needs to be corroborated” would adequately balance the 
competing interests. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d at 495.5 Without endorsing it as an 
exclusive method of doing so, we suggest courts simply use that language when 
the State requests a noncorroboration instruction: “No witness’s testimony needs 
to be corroborated to be believed.” Such an instruction “correctly state[s] the law 
and help[s] dispel any misconceptions regarding uncorroborated witness 
testimony” without unduly emphasizing any witness’s testimony over another’s. 
Id. 
B. Prejudice. Having determined the district court erred by giving an 
improper noncorroboration instruction that inappropriately highlighted the 
 
5On this point, we recognize Kraai’s “cf.” citation to Altmayer caused some confusion as 
to whether we intended to approve of the entire instruction used there. As the majority opinion 
in the court of appeals here correctly concluded, we did not intend to tacitly approve of the entire 
instructions used in Altmayer through a “cf.” citation. That citation is best understood as 
building on Kraai’s earlier discussion of nonparticularized noncorroboration instructions 
generally, where we cited State v. Ludwig, 305 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1981), as an example of a case 
where a court used an instruction that “by its terms [applied] to all witnesses who testif[ied] at 
trial” and therefore “did not carry with it the danger of distinguishing [the] defendant’s testimony 
from that of other witnesses.” Kraai, 969 N.W.2d at 493 (alterations in original) (quoting Ludwig, 
305 N.W.2d at 512).  
In contrast, the instructions used here and in Altmayer contain a sentence that, by its 
terms, applies to all witnesses—“evaluate the testimony of [an alleged victim] the same way [you] 
evaluate the testimony of any other witness,” Altmayer, 2019 WL 476488, at *5—followed by a 
sentence that, by its terms, applies only to the victims’ testimony. Approving the use of the first 
sentence generally does not mean that the second sentence—explicitly disapproved of in Kraai 
and Mathis—becomes proper by association.  
 
15 
 
alleged victims’ testimony, we must address whether that error requires a new 
trial. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d at 496–97. We presume prejudice “unless the record 
affirmatively establishes there was no[ne].” Donahue, 957 N.W.2d at 6 (quoting 
Hanes, 790 N.W.2d at 551). “When [an instructional] error is not of constitutional 
magnitude, the test of prejudice is whether it sufficiently appears that the rights 
of the complaining party have been injuriously affected or that the party has 
suffered a miscarriage of justice.” State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 817 (Iowa 
2017) (quoting State v. Marin, 788 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Iowa 2010), overruled on 
other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016)). Our 
prejudice inquiry “looks . . . to the basis on which ‘the jury actually rested its 
verdict.’ ” State v. Kennedy, 846 N.W.2d 517, 527 (Iowa 2014) (omission in 
original) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)). “The inquiry 
‘is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would 
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in 
this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” State v. Shorter, 945 N.W.2d 
1, 9 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Kennedy, 846 N.W.2d at 527). The presumption of 
prejudice may also be “overcome when the jury received ‘strong evidence’ of a 
defendant’s guilt.” Kraai, 969 N.W.2d at 497 (quoting Plain, 898 N.W.2d at 817). 
In Kraai, this court found “strong evidence of Kraai’s guilt” overcame any 
prejudice that the erroneous instruction may have caused. Id. at 497–99. The 
victim’s testimony in that case was corroborated by several items of physical 
evidence, making “the challenged instruction, in essence, . . . a moot point.” Id. 
at 499 (quoting Garza v. State, 231 P.3d 884, 891 (Wyo. 2010)).  
 
16 
 
In Mathis, on the other hand,  
neither [victim’s] testimony [wa]s corroborated by other evidence. 
Both children testified to separate instances of sex abuse, but 
neither witnessed nor testified about the sex abuse allegedly 
committed against the other child. Both children eventually told 
their mother about the sexual abuse, but there [wa]s no evidence 
their mother independently corroborated the children’s accounts 
of abuse. And there [wa]s no physical evidence of any sort 
corroborating the children’s testimony.  
 
The noncorroboration instruction in th[at] case thus did not 
pertain to a moot point; instead, the noncorroboration instruction 
in th[at] case was a focal point. 
971 N.W.2d at 521. 
The facts of this case put it closer to Mathis than Kraai, meaning the 
presumption of prejudice was not overcome. All of the State’s evidence of guilt 
derived—either directly or indirectly—from L.C.’s and K.C.’s allegations. No 
physical evidence was introduced; in fact, the State’s only exhibits at trial were 
a photo of Ross (used for identification purposes) and the resumes of its two 
expert witnesses. The State’s experts testified only as to issues regarding 
sex-abuse victims generally; neither was even familiar with L.C. or K.C. prior to 
trial. Other than discussing his interview with Ross, in which Ross generally 
denied the charges, Deputy Kinney’s testimony only relayed what he learned 
about the allegations through conversations with Tykeshia, Jackie, and 
investigators in Colorado, all of whom acquired their knowledge of the allegations 
from L.C. and K.C. Although by all accounts Jackie was supportive of the girls’ 
claims, she did not testify at trial. Finally, Tykeshia testified, in Ross’s defense, 
that she had never noticed signs of abuse and that the girls never reported any 
abuse to her until their April 2019 trip to Colorado. Notably, the prosecutor 
 
17 
 
highlighted the noncorroboration instruction during closing argument, telling 
the jury:  
Now, Instruction No. 16. Can everybody read that? Everybody see 
that? “You should evaluate the testimony of [L.C.] the same way 
you evaluate the testimony of any other witness.” The law does 
not require that the testimony of [L.C.] be corroborated in order 
to prove that she was sexually abused. It doesn’t have to be DNA 
evidence. There doesn’t have to be. “You may find the defendant 
guilty of sexual abuse if [L.C.’s] testimony -- if what she told you 
convinces you of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
 
Instruction No. 17 is the exact same instruction except for 
[K.C.]. If you believe [K.C.’s] testimony, if it convinces you beyond 
a reasonable doubt, then you must find Alexander Ross guilty. 
The asymmetrical noncorroboration instructions could have led jurors to believe 
Tykeshia’s testimony needed to be corroborated while also improperly 
highlighting the importance of L.C.’s and K.C.’s testimony over Tykeshia’s. 
Accordingly, although “there is sufficient evidence to sustain [Ross’s] 
convictions” over his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, here, where the 
noncorroboration instruction improperly tainted the jury’s consideration of 
L.C.’s and K.C.’s testimony, and where that consideration was the “focal point” 
of the State’s case, we cannot conclude that the record “affirmatively establish[es] 
the absence of prejudice.” Mathis, 971 N.W.2d at 521. 
III. Conclusion. 
The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Ross’s convictions, but 
the district court erred by giving the jury asymmetrical, particularized 
noncorroboration instructions focusing on the victims’ testimony. Ross’s 
convictions are hereby vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court 
for further proceedings. 
 
18 
 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE REMANDED. 
McDonald, McDermott, and May, JJ., join this opinion. Mansfield, J., files 
a dissenting opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., join. 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
#20–0914, State v. Ross 
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting). 
 
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the sexual abuse convictions of the 
defendant Alexander Ross. I question whether there was any error in the 
instructions; if there was, it was inconsequential and nonprejudicial. There is no 
reason to subject the child victims in this case to a second trial. 
 
In State v. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d 487, 490, 492–94 (Iowa 2022), we 
disapproved of a different jury instruction that said, simply, “There is no 
requirement that the testimony of a complainant of sexual offenses be 
corroborated.” We criticized that instruction because it “focused the jury on the 
testimony of a single witness, [i.e., the complaining witness],” and it 
“particularized [the complaining witness’s] testimony as not requiring 
corroboration in the absence of a universal instruction regarding the 
noncorroboration of all other witness testimony.” Id. at 493. In other words, the 
single-sentence instruction was “asymmetrical and particularized.” Id. 
 
We could have followed a different path in Kraai. We noted in Kraai that 
courts are divided and several jurisdictions have approved of this single-sentence 
instruction. Id. at 494–95. We also observed that the instruction “was a correct 
statement of the law.” Id. at 491–92. Nonetheless, we held that the giving of this 
instruction was error, although in the end we did not disturb the jury verdict 
because we concluded that the error was nonprejudicial and harmless. Id. at 
496, 499. 
 
20 
 
 
This case involves a far less objectionable instruction than the single-
sentence instruction at issue in Kraai. And it’s another case in which the 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt was strong. See id. at 497. Accordingly, I would 
find that any minimal error here—if there was error—was nonprejudicial and 
harmless. 
 
Instructions must be read as a whole. Id. at 490. In the present case, 
Instruction 16 said, 
 
You should evaluate the testimony of [L.C.] the same way you 
evaluate the testimony of any other witness. The law does not 
require that the testimony of [L.C.] be corroborated in order to prove 
that she was sexually abused. You may find the Defendant guilty of 
Sexual Abuse if [L.C.]’s testimony convinces you of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Instruction 17 contained the same directive for K.C.  
 
This form of instruction did not originate in this particular trial. It was 
proposed in a thoughtful 2017 law review article by a prosecutor who now serves 
on our court of appeals. See Tyler J. Buller, Fighting Rape Culture with 
Noncorroboration Instructions, 53 Tulsa L. Rev. 1, 27–29 (2017) [hereinafter 
Buller].  
 
By way of further context, the preamble to all of the instructions stated 
that the State has “the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and 
every allegation of the Trial Information.” Instruction 2 added, “If the State does 
not prove the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, your verdict must be 
not guilty.” Instruction 6 said, “In determining the facts, you may have to decide 
what testimony you believe. You may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s 
testimony.” Instruction 7 told the jury: “You must consider all of the instructions 
 
21 
 
together. No one instruction includes all of the applicable law.” And Instruction 
9 reiterated, “The burden is on the State to prove Alexander Shantee-Thomas 
Ross guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
 
All things considered, I seriously doubt that Instructions 16 and 17 had 
any risk of misleading the jury. Unlike the instruction challenged in Kraai, which 
consisted of only a single sentence highlighting the testimony of the complaining 
witness as not needing corroboration, the instruction here had that sentence 
sandwiched between a statement that “[y]ou should evaluate the testimony of 
[the complaining witness] the same way you evaluate the testimony of any other 
witness” and a statement that “[y]ou may find the Defendant guilty of Sexual 
Abuse if [the complaining witness’s] testimony convinces you of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” In order to go astray, the jury would have had to disobey both 
of these additional sentences.  
 
The majority says that the jury could have understood the second sentence 
as contradicting the first. Respectfully, that makes no sense. “We presume jurors 
follow instructions.” State v. Fontenot, 958 N.W.2d 549, 562 (Iowa 2021). Also, 
we ourselves follow a rule that we try to avoid construing statutes, contracts, or 
whatever so they conflict with each other; shouldn’t we credit a jury of twelve as 
having the same discernment? Not only was the first sentence of Instructions 16 
and 17 clear and unambiguous, but the third sentence also steered the jury back 
to the critical point that the complaining witness’s testimony—uncorroborated 
or not—needed to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify 
a guilty verdict. See Buller, 53 Tulsa L. Rev. at 27–28 (explaining how the first 
 
22 
 
and third sentences of this form of instruction counter any criticism that could 
be leveled at the second sentence). 
 
Notably, Kraai cited an unpublished court of appeals opinion that had 
approved of the same three-sentence instruction: 
An instruction that stated no witness’s testimony needs to be 
corroborated (with some exceptions not applicable here) would 
correctly state the law and help dispel any misconceptions regarding 
uncorroborated witness testimony. Cf. State v. Altmayer, No. 
18-0314, 2019 WL 476488, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2019) 
(approving noncorroboration instruction that provided the jury 
“should evaluate the testimony of [the alleged victim] the same way 
[it] evaluate[d] the testimony of any other witness”). 
969 N.W.2d at 495 (alterations in original). According to The Bluebook, the tea 
leaf “Cf.” means, “The authority is different from the main proposition but 
sufficiently analogous to lend support.” The Bluebook: A Uniform System of 
Citation B. 1.2(a), at 5 (Columbia L. Rev. Ass’n et al. eds., 21st ed. 2020). Thus, 
from our signal, one could conclude that we were blessing the same three-
sentence instruction given in Altmayer; we certainly didn’t suggest it amounted 
to reversible error. 
 
Moreover, there is a key point disregarded by the majority: Ross didn’t take 
the stand and deny the charges. So this wasn’t a situation, as in Kraai, where 
“[t]he omission of a symmetrical noncorroboration instruction may have 
permitted the jury to infer that [the defendant]’s testimony required 
corroboration to be believed.” 969 N.W.2d at 493. This wasn’t a “she said, he 
said” case; it was a “they said” case, and the question was whether “they” should 
be believed beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
23 
 
 
And the State’s case was strong. To recap, at the time of trial, L.C. was ten 
years old; K.C. was nine. They described fairly recent events. To my reading, their 
testimony comes across as quite compelling. But don’t take my word for it. Ask 
the trial judge. As she put it, “[T]hese two little girls . . . were about as credible 
as any child witness I’ve ever heard.” 
 
Here is an example from K.C.’s testimony: 
Q. . . . Where did he touch you?  
A. In my lower area.  
Q. Okay. Do you know what the doctors and teachers call that 
lower area, what the word is for it?  
A. Yes.  
Q. What is it? What’s that word?  
Are you embarrassed to say it?  
A. Yes. 
Q. Why don’t you just tell us anyway.  
If I had you stand up, could you point to it?  
A. No. 
Q. Why not?  
A. Because it makes me feel uncomfortable.  
Q. Okay. Why does it make you feel uncomfortable?  
A. Because -- I don’t know.  
Q. Well, what do you call that part?  
A. The “V” word.  
Q. And what is the “V” word? Can you spell it? Would it be 
easier to spell it?  
 
24 
 
A. I don’t know how to spell it. 
 
The defense took depositions of both girls before trial, yet we did not hear 
anything at trial about those depositions. What does that tell you? Presumably, 
the girls’ deposition testimony was consistent with their trial testimony. 
 
The defense called two witnesses. I do not believe they helped the defense. 
One was a longtime friend of Ross who testified basically that he observed Ross 
to be a good father. The other was the girls’ mother, Tykeshia. She admitted she 
had been working nights as a nurse during the alleged abuse. Therefore, there 
would have been plenty of opportunity for Ross to molest the girls at night, as 
they testified. Tykeshia also admitted that Ross couldn’t hold down a job, that 
he basically hung around the house, and that he had been physically abusive to 
her. She denied that either girl had mentioned the sexual abuse to her (contrary 
to the girls’ testimony). Yet she had a motive to deny that the girls had told her 
about the sexual abuse. Admitting to awareness of sexual abuse would reflect 
poorly on her since she had not done anything about it.  
 
And unlike K.C. and L.C., Tykeshia was impeached. She admitted that she 
had not been honest in her testimony in the child-in-need-of-assistance 
proceeding several months before the criminal trial, where she testified that Ross 
had called her “maybe once or twice.” In fact, there were over one hundred 
complete phone conversations, and she was still telling Ross she loved him. 
 
As I’ve noted, Ross exercised his constitutional right not to testify. But it 
is also significant that he went AWOL after the trial started.  
 
25 
 
 
Trial was supposed to begin on the morning of Wednesday, March 11, 
2020. Ross was not present in the courtroom. His attorney reported that Ross 
claimed his wife and daughter had been in a car accident and he had been 
unable to get a ride.6 The defense asked for a one-day continuance. The 
continuance was not opposed, and the trial court granted it. Ross appeared in 
court the next day, March 12, which was the first day of trial. Jury selection took 
place, opening statements were given, and one witness testified.  
 
But on the second day of trial, March 13, the defendant again was absent. 
Defense counsel reported that the defendant claimed to be ill. The district court 
excused the jury but ordered the defendant to report on Monday, March 16, with 
a note from a doctor explaining his absence. The guardian ad litem objected to 
the delays, noting the stress on the girls, and it was put on the record that the 
girls would be testifying on Monday. 
 
On Monday, March 16, the defendant was again a no-show. Evidence was 
presented that Ross had removed his GPS monitor. The court issued a warrant 
for Ross’s arrest and ordered that the trial proceed in his absence. The girls and 
other witnesses testified. Then, on Tuesday, March 17, Ross again failed to 
appear for the final day of trial, which included more testimony, closing 
arguments, jury deliberations, and the jury’s verdict. 
 
At the prosecution’s request, the district court instructed the jury as 
follows regarding Ross’s absence: 
 
6The prosecutor later made a record that “it was told to [him] that it was a very minor 
accident.”  
 
26 
 
 
The Defendant has a Constitutional Right to be present at his 
trial. The defendant also can choose to waive this right and not 
attend all or part of the trial proceedings. In this case, the 
defendant’s partial attendance at the trial should not be considered 
in the jury’s deliberations. You are to draw no inference of guilt from 
Defendant’s partial attendance. The burden of proof remains upon 
the State to prove the guilt of the defendant. 
 
In my view, this instruction (Instruction 14) was a gift to Ross. Under the 
circumstances here, I think a jury would have been entitled to infer that Ross 
didn’t want to face his accusers. See People v. Tafoya, 833 P.2d 841, 843 (Colo. 
App. 1992) (upholding jury instruction telling jurors they could consider 
defendant’s flight from trial as an indication of guilt); Sorrell v. State, 554 A.2d 
352, 354–55 (Md. 1989) (finding court properly instructed jury that it may infer 
consciousness of guilt from the defendant’s voluntary absence). As Texas’s 
highest criminal court recently put it, “A defendant could be present and still not 
testify, or he could testify and be absent part of the time, so a comment on a 
defendant’s absence from the proceedings is not itself a direct comment on the 
failure to testify.” Sandoval v. State, No. AP–77,081, 2022 WL 17484313, at *39 
(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2022). 
 
I do not fault the prosecutor’s decision to ask for Instruction 14; 
presumably, he wanted to avoid creating an issue for appeal. But I don’t believe 
the defendant was entitled to this instruction. In fact, Instruction 14 is the only 
instruction in the case that actually misstated the law because the defendant 
doesn’t have a “choice” to waive his presence at trial. So to sum up, the court’s 
jury instructions—considered in their entirety—gave Ross more than he was 
entitled to. 
 
27 
 
 
One final point. This case is not like State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 516, 
519–21 (Iowa 2022), where we reversed for a new trial based on the giving of the 
same single-sentence instruction that we condemned in Kraai. The present case, 
of course, doesn’t involve the problematic Kraai instruction. In addition, we have 
different facts. In Mathis, the defendant took the stand and denied the abuse, so 
the case came down to a swearing contest between the alleged victims and the 
alleged perpetrator. Id. at 517–18. In Mathis, it was prejudicial to emphasize that 
the word of the alleged victims didn’t need to be corroborated—without also 
pointing out that testimony of all witnesses should be treated the same and the 
testimony of the alleged victims had to be believed beyond a reasonable doubt to 
support a guilty verdict. Id. at 520. The Mathis circumstances don’t exist here. 
 
For all the reasons stated, I would affirm Ross’s convictions and sentence.7 
 
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., join this dissent. 
 
 
7Ross’s other arguments for reversal—(1) that the evidence was insufficient and (2) that 
the district court considered an improper factor during sentencing—are insubstantial, and I 
would reject them as well.