Title: State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juv. Div.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juv. 
Div, 90 Ohio St.3d 79, 2000-Ohio-35.] 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. PLAIN DEALER PUBLISHING COMPANY v. GEAUGA COUNTY 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, JUVENILE DIVISION. 
THE STATE EX REL. NEW WORLD COMMUNICATIONS OF OHIO, INC. v. GEAUGA 
COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, JUVENILE DIVISION, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Geauga Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas, Juv. Div. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 79.] 
Prohibition — Delinquency proceeding in juvenile court closed to the public and 
news media — No qualified constitutional right of access — Juvenile 
delinquency proceedings are neither presumed open nor closed — Person 
seeking closure has burden of proof that closure is warranted — Abuse of 
discretion shown — Writ granted. 
(Nos. 00-439 and 00-442 — Submitted August 9, 2000 — Decided August 11, 
2000.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
 
These consolidated cases involve the propriety of a decision by respondents, 
Geauga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, and Judge Charles E. 
Henry, to deny the public, including the media, access to a delinquency proceeding 
in the juvenile court.  Relator Plain Dealer Publishing Company (“Plain Dealer”) 
owns and publishes The Plain Dealer, a Cleveland, Ohio newspaper.  Relator New 
 
 
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World Communications of Ohio, Inc. (“New World”) owns and operates Channel 
8, a Cleveland television station.  According to media reports, including those 
issued by relators, the underlying juvenile delinquency proceeding is based upon 
the following facts. 
 
On the night of February 18, 2000, at approximately 11:00 p.m., three 
teenagers, Wesley Pearson (age nineteen), J.H. (seventeen), and Marcus Moorer 
(fifteen), entered a Clark Oil gasoline station and convenience store in Chester 
Township, Geauga County, Ohio, to rob it.  The police reported that the three 
teenagers also planned to kill Danielle Kovacic, the station’s nineteen-year-old 
clerk, and her seventeen-year-old girlfriend, who was present at the station to give 
Kovacic a ride home, because Kovacic and her friend could identify them.  Moorer 
shot Kovacic twice in her chest, followed her as she staggered to a back room, and 
then shot her once more between her eyes, killing her.  Moorer also shot twice at 
Kovacic’s friend, missing her once and grazing her slightly the other time.  When 
Moorer ran out of bullets, he, Pearson, and J.H. took the money from the station 
and fled.  The surviving girl identified them, and they were arrested shortly 
thereafter. 
 
A grand jury indicted Pearson, the nineteen-year-old teenager, on two counts 
of aggravated murder with death-penalty specifications and one count each of 
 
 
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attempted aggravated murder, attempted kidnapping, and aggravated robbery.  
Pearson entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. 
 
Delinquency charges were filed in juvenile court against the other two 
teenagers, J.H. and Moorer, who, unlike Pearson, were juveniles at the time the 
crimes were committed.  J.H. was charged with being a delinquent child because of 
her alleged commission of aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, and 
aggravated robbery.  The Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney moved to transfer 
jurisdiction of the cases involving J.H. and Moorer to the General Division of the 
Geauga County Court of Common Pleas so that they could be tried as adults. 
 
Judge Henry closed access to the public, including the media, for the 
detention hearings in juvenile court concerning J.H. and Moorer and instructed the 
media to submit written requests for access to further proceedings involving the 
juveniles. 
 
On February 25, Judge Henry conducted a hearing on the requests of the 
media, including relators, for access to the delinquency proceedings in the J.H. and 
Moorer cases.  By the time of the hearing, the names of all three teenagers had 
been reported by the media, and pictures of the teenagers had appeared in 
newspapers and on television.  At the hearing, Moorer’s attorney specified that he 
did not object to the media being present for additional juvenile court proceedings.  
Moorer’s counsel stated that Moorer’s privacy and confidentiality concerns had 
 
 
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“already been compromised in the media” and that “access by the media would 
provide more accurate information.”  The prosecuting attorney’s office stated that 
it would leave the issue of closing J.H. and Moorer’s juvenile delinquency 
proceedings to Judge Henry’s discretion. 
 
J.H.’s attorney, however, objected to opening the proceedings involving J.H. 
to the public because he did not believe that it would be in J.H.’s “best interest to 
have the case tried in the newspapers.”  But J.H.’s attorney failed to present any 
evidence in support of his contention.  In fact, no evidence, testimonial or 
otherwise, was presented by either the prosecutor, the juveniles, or the media, 
including relators, during Judge Henry’s closure hearing. 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Henry issued an order opening the 
Moorer case to the public, including the press, subject to certain local rule 
restrictions, and took the issue of whether to close the J.H. case under 
consideration. 
 
On February 29, Judge Henry ruled that “[p]ublic access to the proceedings 
and records of [the J.H.] case [is] denied with the exception that the complaint and 
substantive decisions of [the Juvenile] Court, redacted to remove identifying 
information, shall be made available to the public.”  In so ruling, Judge Henry 
noted that public interest in the case was “understandably intense” because it was 
the first allegation of murder by a local child in over twenty years.  Judge Henry 
 
 
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further noted that in the court’s “institutional memory,” delinquency proceedings 
had always been presumed closed to the public, and the most important protection 
afforded juveniles was the confidentiality of delinquency proceedings.  Judge 
Henry reasoned that although he was not “concerned that public access to the 
proceedings would negatively affect the fairness of the proceedings,” he believed 
that the seventeen-year-old juvenile, J.H., presumed innocent of the delinquency 
charges until a court finding of delinquency, would suffer “self-evident” harm if 
her case were conducted in public.  (Emphasis sic.)  Judge Henry concluded that 
“[i]n weighing the competing interests in this case * * * the state’s interests in 
protecting the juvenile from harm and in preserving the system it has created for 
rehabilitating its youth outweighs the public’s interest in viewing these 
proceedings.” 
 
On March 6 and 7, relators filed these actions for writs of prohibition to 
prevent Judge Henry and the juvenile court from enforcing their February 29, 2000 
order barring the public and the press from the delinquency proceedings involving 
J.H.  On March 9, we granted an alternative writ and issued a schedule for the 
presentation of evidence and briefs.  88 Ohio St.3d 1441, 724 N.E.2d 1154. 
 
We subsequently consolidated the cases and granted relators’ emergency 
motion to amend the alternative writ so that it would also apply to the Moorer 
delinquency case.  88 Ohio St.3d 1455, 725 N.E.2d 672; 88 Ohio St.3d 1494,  727 
 
 
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N.E.2d 919.  The latter amendment was necessitated by Moorer’s subsequent 
attempt to withdraw his prior consent to open proceedings in his case.  On May 2 
and 3, Judge Henry held an amenability hearing in the Moorer case that was open 
to the public, and on May 4, he ordered that Moorer be bound over to the general 
division of the common pleas court to be tried as an adult.  As a result of these 
subsequent developments, relators agreed that their claims in this case do not 
involve the Moorer proceedings.  We denied respondents’ motion to expedite a 
ruling in this case.  89 Ohio St.3d 1445, 731 N.E.2d 1134. 
 
This cause is now before the court for a consideration of the merits. 
__________________ 
 
Baker & Hostetler L.L.P., Louis A. Colombo, Marcia E. Marsteller and 
Jeffrey T. Williams, for relator Plain Dealer Publishing Company. 
 
Walter & Haverfield, P.L.L., Michael T. McMenamin, Frederick W. Whatley 
and Darrell A. Clay, for relator New World Communications of Ohio, Inc. 
 
Bruce C. Smalheer, for respondents. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Relators request a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Henry 
from enforcing his February 29 order denying public access to further juvenile 
court proceedings involving J.H., including her bindover hearing.  Prohibition is 
the appropriate action to challenge trial court orders restricting public access to 
 
 
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pending litigation.  State ex rel. News Herald v. Ottawa Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas, Juv. Div. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 40, 43-44, 671 N.E.2d 5, 7-8; State ex rel. 
Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 457, 75 O.O.2d 511, 
351 N.E.2d 127, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. 
 
Under R.C. 2151.35 and Juv.R. 27, juvenile courts have discretion to 
exclude the general public from juvenile proceedings.  State ex rel. Fyffe v. Pierce 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 8, 9, 531 N.E.2d 673, 674.  Therefore, Judge Henry’s 
decision to close the juvenile proceedings involving J.H. will be upheld unless he 
abused his discretion.  In re T.R. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 21, 556 N.E.2d 439, 453.  
An abuse of discretion implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable 
attitude.  Natl. City Bank, N.E. v. Beyer (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 152, 159, 729 
N.E.2d 711, 717. 
Constitutional Right of Access 
 
Relators initially claim that Judge Henry abused his discretion by applying 
the incorrect standard to determine whether closure was warranted.  Relators assert 
that they, as members of the public, have a qualified constitutional right of access 
to the juvenile delinquency proceedings. 
 
The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses of the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, the analogous provisions of Section 11, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution, and the “open courts” provision of Section 16, Article I of the 
 
 
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Ohio Constitution create a qualified right of public access to court proceedings that 
have historically been open to the public and in which public access plays a 
significantly positive role.  T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 556 N.E.2d 439, paragraph two 
of the syllabus; State ex rel. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas, Juv. Div. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 652 N.E.2d 179, 
181; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986), 478 U.S. 1, 8-9, 106 S.Ct. 
2735, 2740-2741, 92 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11. 
 
If the proceeding meets these “tests of experience and logic,” the proceeding 
is presumed open and may be closed only by findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding interest.  Id., 
478 U.S. at 9, 106 S.Ct. at 2740-2741, 92 L.Ed.2d at 11; State ex rel. The 
Repository v. Unger (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 418, 421, 28 OBR 472, 475, 504 
N.E.2d 37, 40.  This qualified constitutional right of access and its presumption of 
openness apply to most criminal proceedings.  Id., 28 Ohio St.3d at 420-421, 28 
OBR at 474-475, 504 N.E.2d at 39-40. 
 
Juvenile proceedings, however, do not meet these tests of experience and 
logic.  Juvenile court proceedings have historically been closed to the public, and 
public access to these proceedings does not necessarily play a significant positive 
role in the juvenile court process.  T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d at 15-16, 556 N.E.2d at 449.  
For delinquent children, “it is the law’s policy ‘to hide youthful errors from the full 
 
 
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gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past.’ ”  In re 
Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 24, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1442, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 544.  In Ohio, 
we are required to liberally interpret the juvenile delinquency provisions to 
“protect the public interest in removing the consequences of criminal behavior and 
the taint of criminality from children committing delinquent acts and to substitute 
therefor a program of supervision, care, and rehabilitation.”  See R.C. 2151.01(B); 
cf. Juv.R. 1(B)(4). 
 
These traditional interests of confidentiality and rehabilitation prevent the 
public from having a qualified constitutional right of access to juvenile 
delinquency proceedings.  See T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d at 15-16, 556 N.E.2d at 449-
450, where we relied on comparable factors to reject a claimed qualified 
constitutional right of access to juvenile court proceedings involving allegations of 
abuse, neglect, or dependency, or to determine the custody of a minor child.  This 
is consistent with the holdings of other courts.  Florida Publishing Co. v. Morgan 
(1984), 253 Ga. 467, 472, 322 S.E.2d 233, 238 (“[W]e are unable to conclude that 
there is any historically-based constitutional presumption of openness applicable to 
juvenile-court proceedings.”); In re J.S. (1981), 140 Vt. 458, 466, 438 A.2d 1125, 
1128; San Bernardino Cty. Dept. of Pub. Social Serv. v. Superior Court (1991), 
232 Cal.App.3d 188, 205, 283 Cal.Rptr. 332, 343 (“[T]he First Amendment right 
of access does not extend to juvenile dependency proceedings.”).  “Given the 
 
 
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juvenile justice system’s overriding concern with protecting the juvenile offender, 
it is not surprising that claims for a First Amendment-based right of access to 
delinquency proceedings generally have been unsuccessful.”  See, generally, 
Dienes, Levine & Lind, Newsgathering and the Law (2 Ed.1999) 137, Section 3-
3(a). 
 
Therefore, relators do not have a qualified constitutional right of access to 
J.H.’s juvenile delinquency proceedings, including the transfer hearing. 
Presumptions and Standard for Closure in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings 
 
In the absence of a qualified constitutional right of access to juvenile 
delinquency proceedings, there is no presumption of openness in these proceedings 
and closure need not meet the strict standard set forth in Press-Enterprise.  T.R., 52 
Ohio St.3d at 17, 556 N.E.2d at 450.  The issues that next arise are whether these 
proceedings should be presumed closed based on the previously specified 
considerations of confidentiality and rehabilitation, and, if not, whether the less 
stringent closure standard we adopted in T.R. for other juvenile proceedings is 
applicable to delinquency proceedings. 
 
Juvenile delinquency proceedings should not be presumed closed because 
many legitimate interests favor public access to these proceedings.  “Allowing the 
public, including the press, into our courtrooms will enable society as a whole to 
become better acquainted with the functioning of the judicial process and the laws 
 
 
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enacted by the General Assembly that directly impact our minor children.”  State 
ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Lias (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 497, 504, 628 N.E.2d 
1368, 1374.  “Public access to the juvenile court process can promote informed 
public involvement in government and enhance public confidence in the judicial 
branch.”  T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d at 16-17, 556 N.E.2d at 450; McClatchey, Media 
Access to Juvenile Records (1999), 16 Ga.St.L.Rev. 337, 343-345.  In addition, 
access to juvenile delinquency proceedings could serve as a check on potential 
abuse of power by judges and other public officials, and publicity might prove 
beneficial to the juvenile and society by deterring future acts of delinquency and 
alerting parents to responsibilities toward their minor children.  See, generally, 
Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings (1983), 81 
Mich.L.Rev. 1540, 1550, 1558; cf. San Bernardino, 232 Cal.App.3d at 202, 283 
Cal.Rptr. at 341. 
 
In addition, delinquency proceedings in general, and transfer hearings in 
particular, bear a closer resemblance than other juvenile proceedings to criminal 
proceedings, which are generally open to the public.  See T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d at 16, 
556 N.E.2d at 449 (“[T]he public arguably has an interest in delinquency 
proceedings which is analogous to its interest in criminal proceedings.”); United 
States v. A.D. (C.A.3, 1994), 28 F.3d 1353, 1358 (“[D]elinquency proceedings * * 
* are closely analogous to criminal proceedings, and all the public interests in 
 
 
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criminal proceedings * * * seem present and equally cogent here.”); In re D.R. 
(1993), 63 Ohio Misc.2d 273, 278, 624 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (“[D]uring the past 
twenty-five years, the procedures utilized in the adjudicatory, dispositional and 
post-dispositional stages of juvenile delinquency proceedings have become ever 
more analogous to those of the adult criminal system.”). 
 
In fact, we observed in T.R. that the need for confidentiality is less 
compelling in delinquency cases than in cases involving an abused, neglected, or 
dependent child because the “delinquent child is at least partially responsible for 
the case being in court.”  T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d at 16, 556 N.E.2d at 459.  While the 
foregoing statement could be viewed as inimical to the presumed innocence of 
minor children charged with delinquency because it treats them as if they are guilty 
of the charged acts, even the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges has declared that the interest of confidentiality should be relaxed in juvenile 
proceedings: 
 
“ ‘Traditional notions of secrecy and confidentiality should be re-examined 
and relaxed to promote public confidence in the court’s work.  The public has a 
right to know how courts deal with children and families.  The court should be 
open to the media, interested professionals, and students and, when appropriate, the 
public, in order to hold itself accountable, educate others, and encourage greater 
community participation.’ ”  Newsgathering and the Law, at 139, fn. 443, quoting 
 
 
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National Council of Juvenile & Family Court Judges, Children and Family First:  
A Mandate for America’s Courts (1995) 3. 
 
Based on the foregoing, like the abuse, neglect, dependency, and custody 
proceedings in juvenile courts we considered in T.R., juvenile delinquency 
proceedings are neither presumed open nor presumed closed. 
 
After assessing the various interests regarding access to juvenile delinquency 
hearings, we apply the same standard that we adopted in T.R. and Lias for 
determining whether closure is justified.  In these cases, we evaluated comparable 
competing interests, and other Ohio courts have since applied the T.R. test to 
determine the propriety of closing juvenile delinquency proceedings.  D.R.; In re 
N.H. (1992), 63 Ohio Misc.2d 285, 626 N.E.2d 697. 
 
Therefore, under the applicable standard, a juvenile court may restrict public 
access to delinquency proceedings if, after hearing evidence and argument on the 
issue, the court finds that (1) there exists a reasonable and substantial basis for 
believing that public access could harm the child or endanger the fairness of the 
adjudication, (2) the potential for harm outweighs the benefits of public access, and 
(3) there are no reasonable alternatives to closure.  T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 556 
N.E.2d 439, at paragraph three of the syllabus; Lias, 68 Ohio St.3d 497, 628 
N.E.2d 1368, at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
 
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Burden of Proof 
 
In applying the T.R. and Lias standard to juvenile delinquency proceedings, 
the parties disagree on which party, if any, bears the burden of proof.  Relators 
assert that the party seeking closure has the burden of proof regarding the T.R./Lias 
factors whereas Judge Henry contends that either relators have the burden of proof 
because they filed motions seeking access or that no party bears the burden of 
proof in that the proceedings are neither presumptively open nor closed. 
 
Although T.R. and Lias failed to expressly hold which party has the burden 
of proof regarding the listed factors, it is evident that the burden is borne by the 
party seeking closure to the proceeding because in the absence of evidence and 
findings supporting those factors, the juvenile court cannot close the proceedings.  
In other words, if there is no evidence that there exists a reasonable and substantial 
basis for believing that public access could harm the child or endanger the fairness 
of the adjudication, that the potential for harm outweighs the benefits of public 
access, and that there are no reasonable alternatives to closure, a closure order is 
not justified.  Consequently, the risk of non-persuasion is on the party seeking 
closure. 
 
This conclusion comports with the holdings of other courts.  See Ex Parte 
Island Packet (1992), 308 S.C. 198, 201-202, 417 S.E.2d 575, 577-578 (accused in 
 
 
15
juvenile delinquency transfer hearing has the burden of proof to justify closure of 
the hearing); State v. James (Tenn.1995), 902 S.W.2d 911, 914. 
 
Neither of Judge Henry’s contentions requires a contrary result.  In fact, it 
was Judge Henry who initially closed all proceedings and required the media to 
file written requests for access.  He could not thereby shift the burden of proof 
implicitly set in T.R. and Lias.  Cf. In re M.C. (S.D.1995), 527 N.W.2d 290, 292, 
holding that the burden of proof normally follows the pleadings so that the party 
that pleads and relies upon the affirmative of an issue must carry the burden of 
proving the issue. 
 
Although juvenile proceedings, including delinquency proceedings, are 
neither presumptively open nor closed, the concept of burden of proof is distinct 
from rules of presumption.  “ ‘[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom 
it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the 
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the 
risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom 
it was originally cast.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 325, 328, 677 N.E.2d 1197, 
1200, quoting Evid.R. 301.  The absence of a presumption does not result in a 
proceeding without any burden of proof. 
 
 
16
 
Consequently, the person seeking closure of a juvenile delinquency 
proceeding bears the burden of proving the existence of the factors specified in 
T.R. and Lias.  In this case, only one person sought closure of the J.H. delinquency 
proceedings:  J.H.  Therefore, J.H. had the burden of proving that closure was 
warranted. 
Application of T.R./Lias Standard 
 
Judge Henry concluded that even though there would be no danger to the 
fairness of the proceedings, J.H. would suffer “self-evident” harm if her case were 
conducted in public and that the “state’s interests in protecting the juvenile from 
harm and in preserving the system it has created for rehabilitating its youth 
outweighs the public’s interest in viewing these proceedings.” 
 
Judge Henry abused his discretion in so concluding because J.H. did not 
satisfy her burden of proof concerning the T.R./Lias factors.  J.H. introduced no 
evidence to support her counsel’s contention that it would not be in her best 
interest to have the case tried in the newspapers.  See News Herald, 77 Ohio St.3d 
at 41, 671 N.E.2d at 6, where we emphasized in examining the propriety of a gag 
order in a juvenile delinquency bindover hearing that neither the state nor the 
juvenile’s attorney “offered any evidence indicating that opening the juvenile court 
proceedings to the press and public would harm [the child] or jeopardize the 
fairness of the proceedings against him”; Associated Press v. Bradshaw 
 
 
17
(S.D.1987), 410 N.W.2d 577, 580 (writ of mandamus issued to compel court to 
admit media to juvenile delinquency bindover proceedings where court entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that were not supported by evidence in the 
record); News Herald v. Ruyle (N.D.Ohio 1996), 949 F.Supp. 519, 520-521. 
 
The “facts” relied upon by Judge Henry regarding the “self-evident” harm to 
J.H. and the court’s “institutional memory” of presumed closure of delinquency 
proceedings are little more than the personal predilections of the judge that are not 
susceptible of judicial notice and, if accepted as appropriate, would arguably 
justify the closure of all juvenile delinquency proceedings.  See Lias, 68 Ohio 
St.3d at 504, 628 N.E.2d at 1373, quoting State ex rel. Miami Valley Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Kessler (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 165, 167, 18 O.O.3d 383, 385, 413 N.E.2d 
1203, 1205, where we stated that in the absence of an active and meaningful role 
by the parties involved in a juvenile proceeding, the closure hearing “ ‘would 
become meaningless and the resultant decision would merely represent the 
personal predilections of the presiding judge.’ ”  In fact, J.H. introduced no 
evidence at the closure hearing and did not intervene or submit evidence in this 
action.  This case is thus distinguishable from T.R., where the parties submitted 
evidence, including testimony by a psychologist and a social worker, about the 
potential harm to the child from permitting the public to have access to the juvenile 
proceedings.  52 Ohio St.3d at 8-9, 556 N.E.2d at 443-444. 
 
 
18
 
Furthermore, even assuming that Judge Henry properly judicially noticed the 
evidence he relied upon in his closure decision, he abused his discretion in 
concluding that closure was warranted.  Any harm to J.H. was either speculative or 
minimal and was outweighed by the public’s interest in access to the delinquency 
proceedings, including the scheduled transfer hearing. 
 
In this regard, “[t]he closer the alleged delinquent is to the age of eighteen, 
the greater is the public’s interest in access to the proceedings.”  N.H., 63 Ohio 
Misc.2d at 294, 626 N.E.2d at 703; see, also, United States v. Three Juveniles 
(C.A.1, 1995), 61 F.3d 86, 92 (age of juvenile is an appropriate factor to determine 
propriety of closure of federal juvenile delinquency proceeding).  J.H. was 
seventeen years old at the time the charged delinquent acts occurred. 
 
In addition, in the scheduled Crim.R. 30(A) preliminary hearing to 
determine if probable cause exists to believe that J.H. committed the charged 
offenses, there will be less opportunity to divulge confidential information or to 
“delve into the private relations of parents and children.”  Cf. T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 
at 16, 556 N.E.2d at 449-450.  “Information which is normally considered 
confidential in juvenile court proceedings—such as a social history or mental 
examination—is not relevant to the Juv.R. 30 probable cause determination.”  
D.R., 63 Ohio Misc.2d at 277, 624 N.E.2d at 1123. 
 
 
19
 
Further, if the juvenile court finds probable cause that J.H. committed the 
charged offenses, it has a mandatory duty to transfer the case to the general 
division of the common pleas court so that she can be tried as an adult, and the 
proceedings will be presumptively open.  R.C. 2151.26(B)(3).  If this occurs, the 
need for confidentiality will dissipate. 
 
Finally, the public’s interest in observing J.H.’s delinquency proceedings is 
greater due to the severity of the charged crimes.  Taylor v. State (Ind.1982), 438 
N.E.2d 275, 281 (severity of charged offenses supported trial court decision to 
permit public access to juvenile hearing to determine whether he should be tried as 
an adult); Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d at 92-93 (nature of alleged offense is a pertinent 
factor in closure decision). 
 
These factors—the public interest in the juvenile proceedings, J.H.’s near-
adult age at the time of the alleged offenses, the minimal likelihood that the 
probable cause hearing will disclose confidential information of the sort specified 
in T.R., the gravity of the charged offenses, and the fact that J.H. will be subject to 
mandatory bindover to adult court if probable cause is found—outweigh J.H.’s 
attorney’s bare assertion that permitting access would not be in J.H.’s best 
interest.1 
 
Based on the foregoing, Judge Henry abused his discretion by closing 
further juvenile proceedings involving J.H. based on findings that were not 
 
 
20
supported by sufficient evidence and constituted little more than his personal 
predilections concerning closure of juvenile proceedings in general.  Therefore, we 
grant relators a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Henry and the juvenile court 
from barring the public and press from delinquency proceedings involving J.H. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1. 
In so holding, we reject relators’ assertion that because J.H.’s name 
has already been published and will be further publicized in the two proceedings 
against the other teenagers, J.H. cannot be harmed by opening further proceedings.  
Courts, including this one, have uniformly rejected these contentions.  T.R., 52 
Ohio St.3d at 20, 556 N.E.2d at 453, quoting In re J.S. (1981), 140 Vt. 458, 471, 
438 A.2d 1125, 1130 (“[T]his argument would let ‘the news media determine 
which juvenile proceedings will be open to the public by turning up the volume of 
publicity concerning any case which strikes their fancy.’ ”);  Three Juveniles, 61 
F.3d at 93; In re J.D.C. (D.C.App.1991), 594 A.2d 70, 79; In re Hughes Cty. 
Action (S.D.1990), 452 N.W.2d 128, 132. 
 
 
21
 
In addition, relators’ claim that public access would help dispel public 
perceptions of unequal treatment regarding race, gender, and place of residence of 
the teenagers seems disingenuous because relators evidently failed to publicize the 
critical fact that Moorer’s transfer hearing had been ordered open because his 
counsel, unlike J.H.’s attorney, initially agreed that the media should have access 
to such proceeding. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.  The majority has elevated Greener’s law (“Never 
argue with a man who buys ink by the barrel”) over the thoughtful and time-tested 
Ohio law regarding the privacy of delinquency proceedings.  The majority’s 
message today: if the newspaper wants in, it gets in.  We have moved from a point 
where it was in a judge’s discretion whether a delinquency hearing would be 
private to a point where the local media decide whether the hearing is interesting 
enough to cover. 
 
The media should not be blamed here.  They have a role and a job to 
perform—to provide information to the public.  They cannot be faulted for 
attempting to carry out that duty.  However, this court also has a job to do—to act 
as stewards of the judicial system in this state.  We have a duty to see that the 
aspirations of our court system are achieved.  In regard to juvenile courts, we are 
guided by R.C. 2151.01(B), which calls on courts to liberally interpret the juvenile 
 
 
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laws “[t]o protect the public interest in removing the consequences of criminal 
behavior and the taint of criminality from children committing delinquent acts and 
to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care, and rehabilitation.”  R.C. 
2151.35(A) allows for the exclusion of the general public “[i]n the hearing of any 
case.”  Juv.R. 27(A), promulgated by this court as part of its rule-making authority, 
states the same thing.  Judge Henry stayed true to the intent of our juvenile justice 
system in making his decision.  This court, however, has somehow lost its way. 
 
As it applies to J.H., the effect of the majority’s holding is somewhat 
negligible.  Her name and picture have already been published in newspapers.  
However, this case is not just about J.H.; it is about the unique role of our juvenile 
courts as instruments of real rehabilitation.  Yes, there are bad kids who appear in 
juvenile court.  There are also a lot of good kids, who will become good citizens, 
who go through the system.  There are kids whose time before a juvenile judge 
might seem pleasant compared to the unique justice that can be meted out by 
disappointed parents.  Those kids we never see in court again.  And those kids are 
the ones put in the most jeopardy by this court’s ruling today. 
 
For after today, if the local newspaper wants to sit in on a delinquency 
hearing, it probably can.  How many parents can meet the evidentiary burden 
placed upon them by this court?  How many parents will be able to afford the 
psychologist and social worker the majority seems to require to testify about what 
 
 
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we all know—that publicizing a mistake, or an alleged mistake, can be devastating 
to a child?  The whole structure of the juvenile justice scheme is built around that 
premise.  The majority opinion seems to mock Judge Henry’s assertion that the 
harm of being branded a murderer is self-evident. The idea that it is somehow not 
self-evident is incredible. 
 
If the juvenile court finds probable cause to believe that J.H. committed the 
charged offenses, it must transfer her to common pleas court so that she may be 
tried as an adult.  If this occurs, the majority writes, “the proceedings will be 
presumptively open” and “the need for confidentiality will dissipate.”  On the other 
hand, if the trial court does not find probable cause, the need for confidentiality is 
greater, but that confidentiality has been lost if the proceedings were public.  Then 
we are left with an innocent youth who has been publicly associated with a heinous 
crime.  Certainly, Judge Henry knew that if J.H. were bound over, the newspapers 
would eventually get their story.  And if she were not bound over, J.H. could 
escape the unjustified taint of a ruthless killing. 
 
Juvenile judges are given discretion for a reason.  They deal with these 
special cases every day.  They know the public pressures and probable public 
responses of their communities.  They know children and how they react to the 
system, and they have had at least a chance to know a little about the accused.  
Judge Henry employed all of that experience and used all of that information when 
 
 
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he made a brave decision.  He ruled against an ink-stained colossus, and likely 
contravened the wishes of his community, when he determined that J.H. deserved 
to retain her childhood at least until he could determine whether there was probable 
cause to believe that she had committed an egregiously adult act.  Judge Henry 
made a tough decision, not a wrong one. 
 
I regret that a case this important was decided on the briefs without the 
benefit of a court conference.  An important part of how we normally decide cases, 
the interplay and exchange of ideas between justices, was not employed here.  
Regrettably, an emergency vote was called on a case that I believe marks a sea 
change about how we deal with juveniles in this state.  In making this speedy 
decision my colleagues adopt their own corollary to Greener’s Law—“Never make 
a man who buys ink by the barrel wait.”