Title: JOHN E. RADOSEVICH v. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS of the County of Sweetwater, Wyoming; THE BOARD OF THE SWEETWATER COUNTY SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL DISTRICT NO. 1; and JOHNSON, FERMELIA & CRANK, INC., A Wyoming Corporation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOHN E. RADOSEVICH v. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS of the County of Sweetwater, Wyoming; THE BOARD OF THE SWEETWATER COUNTY SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL DISTRICT NO. 1; and JOHNSON, FERMELIA & CRANK, INC., A Wyoming Corporation1989 WY 144776 P.2d 747Case Number: 88-226Decided: 07/03/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHN E. RADOSEVICH, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

THE BOARD OF 
COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF SWEETWATER, WYOMING; THE BOARD OF THE SWEETWATER COUNTY 
SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL DISTRICT NO. 1; AND JOHNSON, FERMELIA & CRANK, INC., A 
WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

John W. James of 
James and James, Rock 
Springs, for 
appellant.

Frank D. Neville 
and Stuart R. Day (argued) of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for Bd. of 
SweetwaterCounty Solid Waste Disposal 
Dist. No. 1.

Ford T. Bussart 
of Greenhalgh, Bussart, West & Rossetti, Rock Springs, for Johnson, Fermelia & Crank, 
Inc.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and ROONEY, J. Retired.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This personal injury 
case arose from injuries appellant John Radosevich received when he fell from 
the top of a wall into a concrete garbage pit. The district court entered 
summary judgment in favor of defendants Sweetwater County Solid Waste Disposal 
District No. 1 (District) and Johnson, Fermelia & Crank, Inc. (JFC). 
Although variously stated by the parties, two main questions are presented by 
this appeal:

1. What legal duty does a 
landowner or occupier owe to an invitee in light of our decision in O'Donnell v. 
City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985); 
and

2. Were there disputed 
issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary 
judgment?

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶3.]     The garbage pit into 
which Radosevich fell is located in SweetwaterCounty on land leased by the county from 
the Bureau of Land Management. It is a concrete pit, approximately 16 feet deep, 
intended for household trash dumping during periods when the primary landfill 
facility is closed. There is a two-foot high concrete wall along one edge to 
prevent vehicles from backing into the pit. Appellant hauled trash to the 
landfill in his pickup, as he had on numerous previous occasions. He backed his 
pickup up to the concrete wall at the edge of the pit. He then climbed onto the 
wall and began to throw trash from his truck into the pit. While doing so, he 
lost his balance and fell into the pit, suffering an ankle fracture. Appellant 
testified that he did not know why he lost his balance but speculated that it 
might have been because of a gust of wind, or because he slipped, or because he 
stepped backwards, or because the wall was narrow.

[¶4.]     Appellant testified 
that he was aware that a person standing on the wall could fall off into the 
pit. He also testified that despite his awareness of the danger, his customary 
practice was to stand on the wall when unloading trash from his truck. Appellant 
contends that the wall was negligently designed in that it was too narrow to 
stand on safely and it should have been wider, or, alternatively, that it should 
have been impossible to stand on the wall. Since his accident, he now unloads 
while standing on the ground outside the wall.

[¶5.]     Appellant sued 
District, JFC, and the Board of County Commissioners of SweetwaterCounty alleging negligent design, 
construction and maintenance of the pit. He also claimed that District, as 
lessee, was liable for an unreasonably dangerous condition on the property. The 
Board of County Commissioners was dismissed from the case prior to this appeal. 
After discovery was completed, the district court granted summary judgment for 
appellees.

DISCUSSION

[¶6.]     Appellant contends that 
his injury demonstrates that the wall was a dangerous condition and that since 
he was aware of the danger, the danger was obvious. He then argues that our 
decision in O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985), created an absolute duty in 
Wyoming to 
remove obvious dangers created by the defendant. He therefore concludes that 
District had a duty to remove the obvious danger; the injury shows that the duty 
was violated; so District must be liable.

[¶7.]     Appellant misinterprets 
the effect of O'Donnell. That decision did not create new legal duties; it held 
that a plaintiff's behavior in choosing to encounter a known and obvious danger 
is evidence of his negligence.1 This negligence is compared to the 
total fault under W.S. 1-1-109 if there is a trial. Jones v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 
898 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶8.]     The "absolute duty" 
rule advanced by appellant would make any landowner or occupier an insurer of 
all invitees. To impose an absolute duty to remove any condition which could 
possibly cause injury would effectively require the removal of all artificial 
structures. All vertical walls would have to be razed in order to prevent the 
obvious danger that someone might walk headlong into one and suffer an injury. 
Similarly, street curbs would have to be removed because someone might trip, 
fall and be injured. At the extreme, any artificial condition which could be 
tripped over, fallen off of, run into, or bounced off of causing injury would, 
according to appellant, be unreasonably dangerous and per se negligently 
designed, constructed or maintained.

[¶9.]     An occupier of land's 
duty is to protect an invitee against unreasonably dangerous conditions, not 
against every conceivable risk of injury. The mere fact that an injury occurred 
does not establish that a condition was unreasonably dangerous, nor does 
testimony that the danger was "known" or "obvious." A departure from what is 
reasonable in design and construction under the circumstances must be shown to 
establish that a condition is unreasonably dangerous.

[¶10.]  Appellant contends that a jury trial is 
needed to compare the negligence of the parties. While it appears from the 
materials presented in support of summary judgment that the plaintiff in this 
case may have been negligent, negligence of the plaintiff alone does not 
automatically require a trial to apportion liability. There must be a question 
of material fact in regard to defendants' negligence; negligence of a defendant 
will not be presumed merely because a plaintiff was 
injured.

[¶11.]  To avoid summary judgment where, as here, 
defendant has established that the pit and wall are simple structures designed, 
constructed and maintained so as to be reasonably safe for its intended use - 
which was to prevent vehicles from backing into the pit - it was incumbent upon 
plaintiff to produce facts which indicate that the condition as designed, 
constructed or maintained was unreasonably dangerous. Plaintiff's response is 
best illustrated by the following excerpt from his deposition 
testimony:

"If the wall was designed 
to stand on, it should have been wider. If the wall was designed not to stand 
on, there should have been a - something to prevent you from standing on 
it."

Bald assertions 
that it should have been possible to prevent the injury or that the condition 
must ipso facto be unreasonably dangerous because someone was injured are not 
sufficient to create a question of material fact. Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388, 
390 (Wyo. 
1988). Giving every favorable inference to appellant as the non-moving party, we 
are unable to discern a genuine issue of material fact or any facts showing that 
the wall was dangerous when used for its intended purpose. There was no danger 
at all until appellant attempted to balance himself on the wall, in a gusty high 
wind, while throwing refuse from his pickup. Simply stated, the wall was not 
shown to be an unreasonably dangerous condition as designed and 
constructed.

[¶12.]  Appellant asserts that numerous disputed 
issues of fact exist. In support, he has presented us with numerous references 
to deposition testimony of Kim Briggs, an administrative assistant to District, 
and of Edward Fermelia, one of the principals of JFC. However, he has not 
presented material facts which create a dispute. He has merely listed facts with 
which he disagrees. A plaintiff may not resist a summary judgment motion merely 
by identifying testimony which is contrary to allegations made in his complaint. 
To demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact requires more than repeated 
assertions that a defendant is liable. After a prima facie showing has been 
made, the opposing party cannot rely solely on allegations or argument to defeat 
the motion. He must produce similar materials which controvert the prima facie 
facts in the moving party's materials. Baldwin, 
751 P.2d  at 388.

[¶13.]  The summary judgment is 
affirmed.

URBIGKIT, J., concurs in the 
result.

ROONEY, J. Retired, filed a 
concurring opinion.

MACY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 The decision preserved a 
distinction between natural and artificial conditions. An owner of property 
still has no duty to his invitees to correct a known and obvious danger 
resulting from natural causes. Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 
1986).

ROONEY, Retired Justice, 
concurring.

[¶14.]  I concur in that said by Chief Justice 
Cardine. Additionally, I affirm for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion 
(joined by Justice Raper, Retired) in O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wy. 
1985).

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶15.]  The majority decision disposes of this 
case by determining that appellees were not negligent as a matter of law; i.e., 
that the dump pit and wall did not present an unreasonably dangerous condition 
for which appellees, as occupiers of the land, owed a duty to invitees to 
protect them from, or at least warn of, the risk of harm. It may be that the 
majority is correct in its assessment of the reasonableness of the risk created 
by the construction, design, and maintenance of the facility. This 
determination, however, which was not clearly made by the district court, would 
be better left to a jury.

[¶16.]  Normally the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of the risk created by a defendant's conduct is a jury 
question, and a plaintiff is entitled to submit to the jury a question of 
whether the conduct of a defendant comports with that of a reasonable man under 
the circumstances, except in the most exceptional cases. DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986); Brockett v. Prater, 675 P.2d 638 (Wyo. 
1984). For this reason we have repeatedly stated that summary judgment is not 
favored in negligence actions. Conway v. Guernsey 
Cable TV, 713 P.2d 786 (Wyo. 1986); O'Donnell 
v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1985). Under the 
facts of this case, reasonable minds could disagree as to whether a sixteen-foot 
deep public dumping pit with a two-foot high concrete barrier created an 
unreasonably dangerous condition, especially where it was apparently designed 
for the public to back their vehicles to the wall so they could throw trash into 
the pit. The foreseeability of members of the public actually standing on the 
wall to throw garbage into the pit similarly presents a jury question. The 
district court, to the extent it so decided, and now this Court have usurped the 
jury's function by deciding these factual questions as matters of 
law.

[¶17.]  In deciding this case in the manner in 
which it does, the majority thereby avoids the necessity of considering the 
actual bases upon which the district court granted summary judgment and the 
actual issues presented by the parties to this appeal. We have said, of course, 
that this Court may decide a case upon any legal ground appearing in the record. 
Litzenberger v. Merge, 698 P.2d 1152 (Wyo. 
1985); Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130 (Wyo. 1985). In the 
instant case, however, had the majority not ill-advisedly decided the jury 
question regarding appellees' negligence, it would have been forced to address 
the issues of governmental immunity for the Waste Disposal District and 
application of the known and obvious danger rule with respect to the liability 
of both appellees. It was upon those grounds that the district court granted 
summary judgment and upon which the parties directed their arguments to this 
Court.

[¶18.]  The district court determined that the 
Waste Disposal District was entitled to the general grant of governmental 
immunity provided by Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-104(a) (1977) of the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act and that appellant failed to produce any evidence which would bring 
the Waste Disposal District within any of the exceptions contained in that Act. 
Although the district court may have been correct in this determination, complex 
questions are presented with respect to the relationship between the Waste 
Disposal District and JFC, the potential direct or vicarious liability of the 
Waste Disposal District, and the effect of Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-108 (1977) and Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-39-111 (1977) (repealed in 1986). The comprehensive inquiry required 
to assess the district court's resolution of those questions will not be here 
undertaken as a search for a legitimate basis to affirm with respect to the 
Waste Disposal District.

[¶19.]  The district court further determined, 
however, that the dangers inherent in the facility were known and obvious to 
appellant, and therefore liability for both the Waste Disposal District and JFC 
was precluded by the obvious danger rule; i.e., the obvious danger rule operated 
as a complete bar to recovery. This rationale of the district court, which is 
also urged as an additional basis for affirmance by the concurring opinion of 
Justice Rooney (Retired), is clearly contrary to our recent decisions on this 
issue.

[¶20.]  In O'Donnell, 696 P.2d 1278, we held that 
those situations in which the obvious danger rule operated to negate a duty on 
behalf of a defendant property owner or occupier were narrowly limited to 
dangers presented by naturally existing conditions and that otherwise the 
obviousness of the danger becomes a factor in apportioning negligence between a 
plaintiff and a defendant under our comparative negligence statute. In Jones v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 898 (Wyo. 1986), we reaffirmed our holding in 
O'Donnell, stating that:

[T]he obvious-danger rule 
does not apply when a dangerous condition is created by the owner or his 
servants. * * * Even if the danger was perfectly obvious to [the plaintiff], it 
is the function of the jury, under the comparative negligence statute, to 
compare his negligence with that of [the defendant].

See also Note, 
Assumption of Risk and the Obvious Danger Rule. Primary or Secondary Assumption 
of Risk?, XVIIILand & Water L.Rev. 373 
(1983); and Note, The Obvious Danger Rule - A Qualified Adoption of Secondary 
Assumption of Risk Analysis, XXILand & Water L.Rev. 251 (1986). The 
reliance by the district court upon the obvious danger rule as an absolute 
defense was erroneous, and, although the majority opinion implies as much, it 
should explicitly say so. The summary judgment in this case cannot be affirmed 
premised alternatively on the obvious danger rule as a complete bar to 
recovery.

[¶21.]  I would reverse the summary judgment and 
remand the case for trial.