Title: Turner v. Housing Authority

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

CASENOTE- LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE - CONSENT DECREE– The Circuit Court
has no authority to reinstate a judgment that the Court of Special Appeals has previously
reversed and remanded based on a ruling by a federal district court in another case.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 96127085/CL211737 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 60
   
 September Term, 1999
                                                                            
YOLANDA TURNER 
V. 
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF 
BALTIMORE CITY 
                                                                            
                     Bell, C.J.
                     Eldridge
                   *Rodowsky 
                     Raker
                     Wilner
                     Cathell
                     Harrell
                               JJ.
                                                                          
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
                                                                            
                     Filed:   April 17, 2001
*Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
        In this case, Yolanda Turner, the appellant, in addition to issues relating to the attempts
by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, the appellee, as landlord, to terminate her lease,
presents the question whether, based on a ruling by a federal district court in another case, the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City may reinstate one of its judgments that the Court of Special
Appeals had previously reversed and remanded.  When initially in the Circuit Court, the
appellant argued that the court was without jurisdiction to consider the case, citing in support
a Consent Decree in which the City and a representative of a class had entered into in 1984,
providing for grievance hearings for public housing tenants prior to eviction.  The Circuit Court
determined that the Consent Decree did not apply and proceeded to dispose of the case, on the
merits, in favor of the appellee.  The Court of Special Appeals saw it differently, deciding that
the Consent Decree did, in fact, apply.  Thus it reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court,
where subsequently, the appellee, relying on the intervening decision of the United States
District Court vacating the Consent Decree, moved to have the previous judgment reinstated.
 Agreeing with the appellee, the Circuit Court concluded that it had that authority and so
reinstated its prior judgment.  We shall reverse.
The premises leased by the appellant from the appellee were the subject of a search and
seizure warrant, which, upon execution uncovered “. . . six pink-topped vials with residue, one
purple-topped vial with white powder and a non-conventional smoking pipe as well as personal
papers.”    The appellant was arrested and charged with narcotics violations.    Subsequent
laboratory analysis revealed that the non-conventional pipe contained residue of a controlled
dangerous substance.  Notwithstanding this occurrence, the appellee continued to accept the
appellant’s rent and did so for each of the months remaining on the appellant’s lease.  
Thereafter, in October, less than three months after being charged with the narcotics violation,
        1The  lease which the appellant entered into on October 17, 1995 contained the 
following terms:
“Section 14. Termination of Lease
“a. Management shall not terminate or refuse to renew this Lease other than for
serious or repeated violation of material terms of the Lease, including, but not
limited to, failure to make payments at the time and in the amount they are due
under the Lease, or to fulfill the Tenant obligations set forth in Section 9 of the
Lease, or for good cause.
“b.  Either of the following types of criminal activity by the Tenant, any member
of the Tenant’s household or a guest under the Tenant’s control, shall be cause
for termination of tenancy:
“1)  Any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises by Tenant’s neighbors or other residents.
“2) Any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises/Tenant’s
dwelling unit.
“3) Any criminal activity that threatens the health of employees of management,
which includes Management’s efforts to maintain a drug-free environment.
“c.  Management shall give written notice of termination of this Lease of:
“1) Fourteen (14) days which shall run concurrent[ly] with any local laws, as set
forth in the applicable HUD regulations, in the case of the failure to pay rent;
“2) A reasonable time, not less than thirty (30) days, considering the seriousness
of the situation when the health or safety of neighbors, other tenants, or of
Management employees is threatened, including, but not limited to:
“a) Criminal activity by Tenant, household member or guest under Tenant’s
control, including any drug-related criminal activity on or near Tenant’s
premises/dwelling unit.
“b) Presence of illegal drugs and/or weapons seized in an HABC unit by any law
2
the appellant executed a new lease.1  Less than three months after executing the lease, she
enforcement officer.
“c) Any fire on HABC premises which results from the deliberate action or
inaction of the Tenant, member of the Tenant’s household or a guest under the
Tenant’s control.
“3) Sixty (60) days in all other cases.
“d.  This Lease may be terminated by the Tenant at any time by giving thirty (30)
days advance written notice to Management in the manner specified in Section
13 b above.  Failure to give notice will result in a continuation of the rent charge
not to exceed 15 days from the date the vacancy becomes known to
Management.  
3
received notice to vacate the premises.  The notice alleged violations of material terms of the
appellant’s lease, referring specifically to her arrest and information contained in a police
report and a search and seizure warrant which led to that arrest.   That information indicated that
the appellant was engaging in drug-related criminal activity on or near her leased premises.
Despite being advised that she had no right to a grievance hearing, the appellant asked
for an informal grievance, which was denied.  Thereafter, the appellee filed, in the District
Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore City, an action alleging that the appellant was in breach
of her lease.  That action was removed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, upon the
appellant’s prayer for jury trial.  It was tried in that court without a jury, the appellant having
waived the jury, and judgment was entered for the appellee.  One of the issues addressed in the
Circuit Court was whether the appellee was bound by the Consent Decree in Lacy v. Housing
Authority of Baltimore City, No. 84-2431 (D. Md. 1984).  In that case, a consent decree
entered into by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City and its tenant required, as a matter of
4
due process, that there be a tenant grievance hearing prior to the initiation of eviction
proceedings.  Relying on that consent decree, the appellant moved to dismiss the appellee’s
breach of lease action.  She argued that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case,
the appellee having refused her the administrative grievance hearing before HABC to which she
was entitled.    
Countering, the appellee argued that the consent decree did not apply to this case.  
Noting that the regulation on which the consent decree was based had been amended, it
maintained that the amended regulation, and not the consent decree, applied, the former having
superceded the latter.  The Circuit Court agreed with the appellee and, thus, denied the motion
to dismiss.   It also opined:
“ I am satisfied by-and this in respect to the merits, also, I am satisfied by the
preponderance of the evidence that the tenant in this case, Yolanda Turner, on
or about August 16, 1995, had in her apartment in plain view a pipe with cocaine
residue, and its inferable from that being in plain view and the fact that she left,
that she knew about it or allowed another member of the household or guest
under tenant’s control to have or use of or be in possession of that pipe with
residue.  I therefore find that pipe with residue.  I therefore find  that she was
involved in drug-related criminal activity at or near the premises of the dwelling
unit.  Being in possession of that cocaine-but in any case she is clearly charged
with paraphernalia and that cocaine.  Therefore, I am satisfied that the HABC was
empowered to evict her accordingly.”
The appellant noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.    Although she presented
five issues, only the last, “Did the trial court err by finding that a federal court consent decree
did not apply in this case, thereby depriving Turner of a tenant grievance hearing?,” addresses
the issue before this Court.  Nor did the appellee, so far as this record reveals, ask the court
to determine the effect on this case of a parallel proceeding that it filed in the federal case in
2  According to the United States District Court opinion, the challenge to the
Consent Decree was initiated by the appellee in 1995, when the breach of lease action it
filed against its tenant, Frieda Holloway, was stayed, pending a decision by the Federal
District Court on the issue of the continuing viability of the consent decree it entered.  
Thus,  the proceedings to vacate the consent decree and this case were proceeding on
parallel tracks, but in different courts.  The record does not reflect that there was ever any
attempt in this case to join the issues or, as the District Court had done, to stay pending
decision on the consent decree issue.
3  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District
Court which vacated the Lacy consent decree, albeit after the Circuit Court in this case had
reinstated it prior judgment.  Gilmore v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore City, 170 F.3d. 428 (
4th Cir. 1999).    The court explained:
“In 1990, Congress amended the National Housing Act, eliminating the right
to discovery from the list of procedural protections that must be provided
under state law before a public housing authority can bypass the
administrative hearing requirement, and allowing states to invoke the bypass
provision not just in cases of evictions based on alleged endangerment of the
health and safety of an employee or resent, but also in cases of evictions for
drug-related offenses.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (k) (1990).  The Department
5
the federal court to vacate the consent decree.  The intermediate appellate court, in an
unreported opinion, reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court.   It concluded, “that the Lacy
consent decree applies, and that the federal court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce it;
accordingly HABC is bound by its provisions unless and until the federal court modifies the
consent decree.”  The court’s mandate was “JUDGMENT REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.”
Subsequent to the remand - indeed a little more than a month later - the Lacy consent
decree was vacated by the United States District Court pursuant to the appellee’s Motion to
Vacate Consent Decree.2  Armed with this ruling, and not waiting for the resolution of the
tenant’s appeal, 3 the appellee filed, in the Circuit Court, a motion to reinstate its earlier
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) duly altered the relevant
regulations, and instituted a process whereby states could apply for a ruling
from HUD as to whether their laws satisfied the procedural perquisities of
the bypass provision.  See 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.51 (2) (i), 966.53 (c) (1990).
“In 1992, HUD issued a ruling confirming that Maryland’s tenant laws met
the procedural prerequisites.  As a result of this ruling, Maryland public
housing authorities,  including HABC, obtained the authority to bypass the
administrative hearing requirement in cases of evictions based on alleged
endangerment of the health and safety of an employee or resident, or for
drug-related offenses.  On January 17, 1995, HABC duly revised its Tenant
Grievance Policy and Appeals Procedure in order to remove the right to
obtain administrative hearings in such cases. 
*                    *                    *                     *
“[T]he proper test for determining whether the district court correctly vacated
the consent decree is the two-prong test set out by the Supreme Court in Rufo
v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867, 112 
S. Ct. 748 (1992).  In Rufo, the Court held that a party seeking modification of
a consent decree . . . must first ‘show[] a significant change either in factual
conditions or in law.’  Id. at 384.  Provided that the party meets this initial
burden, the reviewing court must determine whether the proposed modification
of the consent decree  -- in this case, vacatur -- is ‘suitably tailored to the
changed circumstance.’ Id. at 391.
“We agree with the district court that both prongs of the Rufo test were
unambiguously satisfied in the instant case.  First, a significant change in law
occurred between the date of the entry of the consent decree and the date of the
proposed modification:  namely, the amendment of the National Housing Act,
with concomitant changes to the relevant regulations, in 1990.  As a direct result
of these changes, HABC was no longer required to provide administrative
hearings cases of evictions based on alleged endangerment of the health or
safety of an employee or resident, or for drug-related offenses.  Second, the
proposed modification of the decree was suitably tailored to the changed
circumstance:  because the statutory administrative hearing requirement that the
consent decree was originally entered to protect no longer existed, the consent
decree was simply no longer necessary.  Vacatur was therefore the appropriate
modification.  Because the district court correctly applied Rufo in vacating the
6
consent decree, we affirm the district court’s decision.” 
Id. at 430.
7
judgment.     The court granted the motion and, thus, rejected the appellant’s contention that
it was obliged to follow the mandate of the Court of Special Appeals.     It reasoned:
“The problem with that argument is that the underpinning of its decision was
the Court of Special Appeals’ conviction that the due process provisions of
the Lacy consent decree required such a tenant grievance hearing unless and
until the federal court modifies the consent decree.  Therefore, it is illogical
that this Court should ignore the fact that the Lacy consent decree has been
vacated by the federal court and that its due process requirement no longer
applies to the defendant here.” 
Following the appellant’s appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, we issued the writ of
certiorari, on our own motion, before any proceedings in that court.
At the threshold in this case is the issue of the propriety of the Circuit Court’s
reinstatement of its prior judgment, following a judgment by the Court of Special Appeals
reversing and remanding that judgment.  The appellant argues that a trial court may not reinstate
its judgment after that judgment has been reversed on appellate review.    More specifically as
relates to the case sub judice, she asserts that following a judgment by the Court of Special
Appeals, the Circuit Court no longer had jurisdiction to further rule on the issues that the
appellate court’s judgment resolved.  Thus, the appellant says, the vacating of the Lacy consent
decree, after the intermediate appellate court had issued its mandate could not have affected
the court’s decision and, consequently, the ultimate resolution of the case.  She relies on
Buffin v. Hernandez, 44 Md. App. 247, 408 A.2d 383 (1979) and Korotki v. Springer, 218 Md.
4Maryland Rule 8-604 (d) provides, in part, that “upon remand, the lower court shall
conduct any further proceedings necessary to determine the action in accordance with the
opinion and order of the appellate court.” 
8
191, 145 A.2d 767 (1958).
The appellee submits, on the contrary, that the Circuit Court properly reinstated its
judgment.  Citing Md. Rule 8-604 (d)4 and noting that, in addition to holding that the consent
decree applied, the Court of Special Appeals acknowledged the continuing jurisdiction of the
federal court to enforce it and that “HABC is bound by its provisions unless and until the
federal court modifies the consent decree,” it concludes that the Circuit Court was justified
in reinstating its judgment.  Indeed, in the appellee’s view, the Circuit Court acted consistently,
and in accordance, with the mandate of the intermediate appellate court.     
We agree with the appellant - the Circuit Court was not empowered to grant the
appellee’s motion to reinstate its judgment.  This conclusion is required by our cases.
The doctrine of the law of the case is well settled in this State.     In  Waters v. Waters, 28 Md.
11, 22 (1867), we stated:
“No principle is better established than that a decision of the Court of Appeals
once pronounced in any case is binding upon the court below and upon this
Court in the subsequent proceedings in the same case, and cannot be disregarded
or called in question.  It is the law of the case binding and conclusive upon the
parties, not open to question or examination afterwards in the same case.”
More recently, we explained it thusly:
‘“Once this Court has ruled upon a question properly presented on an appeal, or,
if the ruling be contrary to a question that could have been raised and argued in
that appeal on the then state of the record, as aforesaid, such a ruling becomes
the “law of the case” and is binding on the litigants and courts alike, unless
9
changed or modified after reargument, and neither the question decided nor the
ones that could have been raised and decided are available to be raised in a
subsequent appeal.”’  (Citations omitted).
Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 229, 462 A.2d 58, 59 (1983) (quoting  Fidelity-Baltimore Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 217 Md. 367, 372, 142 A.2d 796, 798
(1958)).  See also  Korotki v. Springer, 218 Md. 191, 193-194, 145 A.2d 767, 768 (1958)
(the law of the case applies whether the judgment on appeal is reversed or affirmed and it
applies to “all matters decided by the appellate court”);  Chayt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 178
Md. 400, 404, 13 A.2d 614, 616 (1940) (trial court on remand may not reduce breadth of
appellate-mandated injunction against zoning violation).   Indeed, this Court has described the
law of the case doctrine as “l[ying] somewhere beyond stare decisis and short of res judicata.”
Tu v. State, 336 Md. 406, 416, 648 A.2d 993, 997 (1994), citing 1B J.W. Moore, J.D. Lucas
& T.S. Currier, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.401, at I-2 to I-3 (2d ed. 1993) (footnotes
omitted).  
This view is consistent with the universal application of the doctrine in both federal and
state courts.  See United States v. United States Smelting Refining & Mining Co., 339 U.S.
186, 198, 70 S. Ct. 537, 544, 94 L. Ed. 750, 761 (1950);  Barrett v. Baylor, 457 F.2d 119, 123
(7th Cir. Ill. 1972);  Pincus v. Pabst Brewing Co., 752 F.Supp. 871, 872-873 (E.D.Wis. 1990);
Kowis v. Howard, 838 P.2d 250, 251 (Cal. 1992);  In Re Estate of Baird,  223 P. 974, 978 (
Cal. 1924);  Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co.,  812 P.2d 253, 257 (Idaho 1991);  Stroh
Brewery Co. v. Director of New Mexico Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 816 P.2d 1090,
1096 (N.M. 1991); Gohman v. St. Bernard, 146 N.E. 291, 292 (Ohio 1924).
10
Thus, the cases on which the appellant relies are instructive.   In Buffin v. Hernandez,
the plaintiff, having been found liable on the defendant’s counterclaim, filed at the same time
a Motion to Modify Judgment and an appeal.  Before the trial court ruled on the motion, the
Court of Special Appeals issued its opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment.   The
defendant then sought a ruling on his motion.  Citing Korotki v. Springer, 218 Md. at 194, 145
A.2d at 768, the intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court’s acceptance of
jurisdiction and modification of its prior judgment, holding that a trial court no longer has
jurisdiction to modify a judgment once it has been affirmed on appeal.  See  44 Md. App. at
253, 408 A.2d at 396.     Korotki is to a similar effect.    There, the appellees brought a suit in
equity to rescind the sale of a grocery store which they purchased from the appellants.  The
trial court passed a decree dismissing the bill and the appellees appealed.   This Court reversed,
see Springer v. Korotki, 215 Md. 310, 137 A.2d 655 (1958),  remanding  the case “for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”  218 Md. at 192-93, 145 A.2d at 768.    On
remand, the appellants sought to offer evidence, which they alleged to have been newly
discovered and would disprove the facts found by the Court of Appeals on the previous appeal.
When the court declined to hear the evidence  the appellants appealed.  They contended, on
appeal,  that the evidence proffered showed that the appellees had perpetrated a fraud, or
attempted fraud, upon the court, in violation of the maxim of clean hands, and that the court was
bound to hear it.    This Court did not agree.     We opined:
“‘The cases on the subject are far from clear, but we think they support the
proposition that after a judgment or decree is affirmed on appeal, the lower
court may not entertain a motion to reopen, and the same rule applies to a
11
reversal and remand for further proceedings, as to  matters decided by the
appellate court.’ See Pinkney v. Jay & Mason, 12 Gill & J. 69; McClellan v.
Crook, 7 Gill 333; Young v. Frost, 1 Md. 377; Maryland Steel Co. v.  Marney,
91 Md. 360; Winter’s Executors v. Gittings, 102 Md. 464; United Rys. Co. v.
Corbin, 109 Md. 52; Rent -A-Car Co. v. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Md. 447.”  
218 Md. at 194, 145 A.2d at 768.
There is, to be sure, a difference between this case and Korotki.    While in Korotki, the
parties sought to reopen the case, after appeal, to introduce new evidence that would have, if
accepted and credited, required a different result from that reached by the appellate court, and,
here, the appellee moved to have the judgment of the court in effect prior to the appellate
decision reinstated, the cases are consistent in that in both cases a final judgment had been
entered on appellate review, which judgment would have been overturned had the actions sought
to be taken been allowed.        
It is well settled that the law of the case doctrine does not apply when “one of three
‘exceptional circumstances’ exists: the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially
different, controlling authority has since made a contrary decision on the law applicable to
such issues, or the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”  Smith
Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co.,  759 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also  Gould, Inc. v.
United States, 67 F.3d 925, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1995); United States v. Becerra, 155 F.3d 740, 752-
53 (5th Cir. 1998); Goodwin v. Johnson, 224 F.3d 450, 457-58 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Free
v. Abbott Lab, Inc., 164 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 1999)); United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d
655, 661 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Campbell, 168 F.3d 263, 269 (6th  Cir.  1999);  
People v. Ramos, 689 P.2d 430, 434 (Cal. 1984);  State v. Huffman, 643 N.E. 2d 899, 901
5 Regardless of the merit of this reasoning, it is important to note that the law of the
case doctrine is inapplicable to the Court of Appeals.  See Deshields v. Broadwater, 338
Md. 422, 447, 659 A.2d 300, 312 (1995) (recognizing that the law of case doctrine does
not bind an appellate court on direct review);  Houghton v. County Comm’rs of Kent Co.,
305 Md. 407,414, 504 A.2d 1145, 1149, on reconsideration, 307 Md. 216, 513 A.2d 291
(1986)( acknowledging that law of case doctrine does not apply  to the Court of Appeals); 
In re Levon A., 361 Md. 626, 636, 762 A.2d 572, 577 (2000) (noting that the Court of
Appeals is given statutory authority to review judgments of the Court of Special Appeals); 
Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 234, 462 A.2d 58, 61(1983)( stating that the doctrine does
not apply to the Court of Appeals when asked “to review judgments of subordinate courts”). 
  
12
(Ind. 1994); United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Iowa Dist. Court, 612 N.W. 2d 101, 103-04 (Iowa
2000); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W. 2d 901, 904 (Ky. 1998); Simpson v. State Farm
Fire and Casualty Company, 564 So. 2d 1374, 1376-81 (Miss. 1990);   Paul R. Peterson
Constr. v. Arizona State Carpenters Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 880 P.2d 694, 699 (Ariz.
Ct. App 1994); Gabor v. Gabor, 599 So. 2d 737, 738-739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).  There has
been no subsequent trial, nor any contention that there is substantially different evidence
relative to the issue under review and the appellee does not argue that the decision of the Court
of Special Appeals was clearly erroneous or would work a manifest injustice.   Rather, the
appellee maintains that the law governing the case has changed and, therefore, a different result
is mandated, that “controlling authority has since made a contrary decision on the law
applicable to such issues.”5
At the outset, it is appropriate to consider what the Circuit Court and the Court of
Special Appeals decided and were asked to decide.    Neither court was asked to vacate the
consent decree and, in fact, neither purported to do so.    The Circuit Court did not even find
13
the consent decree applicable under the facts before it, concluding, instead, that the appellant’s
conduct did not fall in the consent decree, that is, her cocaine possession was not a threat to
the health and safety of other public housing tenants or appellee’s employees.    The Court of
Special Appeals commented on the nature of a consent decree, i.e.,
“A consent decree has the same effect as a judgment entered after full
adversarial litigation.  United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114, 52 S. Ct.
460, 76 L. Ed. 999 (1932).    In addition, since consent decrees and orders have
many of the attributes of ordinary contracts, they should be construed basically
as contracts . . . .”  United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223,
236, 95 S. Ct. 926, 934, 43 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1975); see also Michael D.
Friedman, Comment, Consent Decrees: Practical Problems and Legal
Dilemmas, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 431, 448 (concluding that consent decrees
have characteristics of both contracts and judicial acts).”
While, therefore, the intermediate appellate court determined that the consent decree applied,
it simply recognized the existence of the consent decree and that it had not been modified in
any way.  The court simply did not address whether the consent decree should be vacated 
or the standard governing that decision.     
Nevertheless, the appellee’s argument in connection with the motion to reinstate
judgment, and the Circuit Court’s opinion ruling on the motion, relied on the intermediate
appellate court’s statement of its holding:
“We find, therefore, that the Lacy consent decree applies, and that the federal
court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce it; accordingly, HABC is bound by
its provisions unless and until the federal court modifies the consent decree,”
 
the fact that the court relied on Swift & Co., 286 U. S. at 115, 52 S. Ct. at 462-463, 76 L. Ed.
at 1000, and the decision by the Federal District Court to vacate the consent decree.    In
effect, the appellee sees the intervening federal decision as controlling authority, mandating
14
the reinstatement of the earlier Circuit Court judgment.
The appellee is partially correct.  The intervening federal decision is controlling
authority as to the appellee and is binding on it.  Subsequent to that decision, the appellee is
relieved of the obligation of providing its tenants similarly situated to the appellant with a
grievance hearing.  On the other hand, that the federal court subsequently vacated the consent
decree is not controlling authority contrary to the decision of the intermediate appellate court;
its decision did not affect, and indeed could not have, the Court of Special Appeal’s decision,
it having already established the law of the case that is binding on the parties.    Consequently,
and as a matter of fact, the intervening federal decision does not, and could not, mandate the
reinstatement of the Circuit Court judgment. 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED.   CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION.   COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE
APPELLEE.