Title: Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Superior Court of Orange County

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 2/8/18 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SOLUS INDUSTRIAL  
) 
INNOVATIONS, LLC, et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioners, 
) 
 
 
) 
S222314 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/3 G047661 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE 
) 
COUNTY, 
) 
 
) 
Orange County 
 
Respondent; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 30-2012-00581868 
 
 
) 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The Orange County District Attorney brought an action for civil penalties 
under this state’s unfair competition law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) and 
fair advertising law (FAL; id., § 17500) against an employer.  The action alleged 
the employer violated workplace safety standards established by the state 
occupational safety and health law (Cal/OSHA; Lab. Code, § 6300 et seq.) and 
attendant regulations.  The employer contended, and the Court of Appeal 
concluded, that the district attorney’s action was preempted by the federal 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (federal OSH Act; 29 U.S.C. § 651 et 
seq.).   
 
2 
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the federal act does not 
preempt unfair competition and consumer protection claims based on workplace 
safety and health violations when, as in California, there is a state plan approved 
by the federal Secretary of Labor.  The district attorney’s use of UCL and FAL 
causes of action does not encroach on a field fully occupied by federal law, nor 
does it stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal objective of 
ensuring a nationwide minimum standard of workplace protection.  In addition, 
the federal act’s structure and language do not reflect a clear purpose of Congress 
to preempt such claims.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal. 
I.  Background 
A.  Factual and procedural history 
Our statement of facts and procedure is based largely on the opinion of the 
Court of Appeal.   
Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC (Solus) manufactures plastics at its 
Orange County facility.  In 2007, it installed at the facility an electric water heater 
that was designed for residential use.  In March 2009, the water heater exploded, 
killing two employees. 
The Division of Occupational Safety and Health1 investigated and 
“determined the explosion had been caused by a failed safety valve and the lack of 
‘any other suitable safety features on the heater’ due to ‘manipulation and 
misuse.’ ”  In an administrative proceeding, the agency charged Solus with five 
                                              
1  
The Division of Occupational Safety and Health (sometimes hereafter 
Division) functions within the state Department of Industrial Relations.  
Sometimes referred to as Cal/OSHA, the Division holds general authority to 
enforce the state occupational safety and health law.  (See p. 9, post.) 
 
3 
violations of state occupational safety and health regulations.  (Cal. Code Regs., 
tit. 8, § 467, subd. (a) [failure to provide a proper safety valve]; id., § 3328, subds. 
(a) [permitting unsafe operation of machinery and equipment], (b) [improper 
maintenance of machinery and equipment], (f) [failing to use good engineering 
practices], (h) [permitting unqualified and untrained personnel to operate and 
maintain machinery and equipment].)  The Division also cited Solus with a willful 
violation for failing to maintain the water heater in a safe condition.   
In addition, because two employees had died and there was evidence of 
violations of law, the Division forwarded the investigation results to the District 
Attorney of Orange County.  (See Lab. Code, § 6315, subd. (g).)  In March 2012, 
the district attorney filed criminal charges against Solus’s plant manager and its 
maintenance supervisor for felony violations of Labor Code section 6425, 
subdivision (a).   
The district attorney also filed the present civil action against Solus.  The 
complaint alleged four causes of action, “all based on the same worker health and 
safety standards placed at issue in the administrative proceedings.”  Only two of 
the causes of action are at issue here.  One “allege[d] that Solus’s failure to 
comply with workplace safety standards amount[ed] to an unlawful, unfair and 
fraudulent business practice under Business and Professions Code section 17200, 
and the district attorney request[ed] imposition of civil penalties as a consequence 
of that practice, in the amount of up to $2,500 per day, per employee, for the 
period from November 29, 2007, through March 19, 2009.”  The second was a 
claim that Solus “made numerous false and misleading representations concerning 
its commitment to workplace safety and its compliance with all applicable 
workplace safety standards, and as a result of those false and misleading 
statements, Solus was allegedly able to retain employees and customers in 
 
4 
violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500.”  The district attorney 
requested imposition of civil penalties in the same amount for the same period.2  
Solus demurred on the ground that the two causes of action were preempted 
by the federal OSH Act.  (29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.)  The trial court overruled the 
demurrer.  Solus challenged the order and the Court of Appeal summarily denied 
Solus’s petition for writ of mandate.  This court granted the petition for review 
filed by the district attorney and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal 
with directions to issue an order to show cause.  
The Court of Appeal issued its order to show cause and concluded that the 
federal OSH Act preempted the district attorney’s UCL and FAL claims.  Its 
conclusion was based in part on a misapprehension concerning the date that unfair 
competition penalty provisions were enacted compared with the date the federal 
Secretary of Labor approved California’s occupational safety and health plan.  
This court granted review and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal 
for reconsideration in light of former section 3370.1 of the Civil Code, a provision 
enacted in 1972.  As the Court of Appeal acknowledged in its second opinion, this 
statute, which provided penalties for unfair competition, “was in effect when 
California’s plan was approved” by the federal Secretary of Labor.  The Court of 
                                              
2 
The other two causes of action were for:  (1) recovery of civil penalties 
under Labor Code section 6428 for “serious violations” of workplace safety 
standards and (2) recovery of civil penalties under Labor Code section 6429 for 
“willful violation” of workplace safety standards.  The trial court sustained Solus’s 
demurrer without leave to amend with respect to these claims.  The Court of 
Appeal summarily denied the district attorney’s petition for writ of mandate 
challenging this order.  This court granted review and transferred the matter back 
to the Court of Appeal.  In a separate opinion the Court of Appeal affirmed, 
agreeing with the trial court that the district attorney lacked standing to bring those 
two claims.  (People v. Superior Court (Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC) (2014) 
224 Cal.App.4th 33.)  
 
5 
Appeal nonetheless concluded that the UCL and FAL claims were preempted by 
the federal statute.  In its view, federal law preempted any state occupational 
safety and health standard or method of enforcing such a standard that did not 
appear in the California occupational safety and health plan submitted to and 
approved by the federal Secretary of Labor.   
This court granted the district attorney’s petition for review.  
B. Relevant federal and state laws  
 
1.  Federal law 
As explained below, the federal OSH Act (29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.) 
provides that the federal Secretary of Labor shall adopt standards for occupational 
safety and health, but federal law does not preempt state authority when (1) there 
is no federal standard or (2) there is a state plan for occupational safety and health 
that has been approved at the federal level.   
It is settled that the purpose of the 1970 federal enactment was to supply a 
nationwide floor of protection for workers.  (29 U.S.C. § 651(b) [Congress’s intent 
was “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe 
and healthful working conditions”]; United Air Lines, Inc. v. Occupational Safety 
& Health Appeals Bd. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 762, 772 (United Air Lines) [the federal 
act intended “to address the problem of uneven and inadequate state protection of 
employee health and safety” and “establish a nationwide ‘floor’ of minimally 
necessary safeguards”].) 
The federal OSH Act grants the federal Department of Labor the authority 
to provide and enforce mandatory national standards.  (29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3); see 
also id., § 655 [calling for promulgation of standards].)  The federal Secretary of 
Labor has delegated certain authority to the federal Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (hereafter sometimes federal OSHA) to adopt standards.  
 
6 
(Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n (1992) 505 U.S. 88, 92 (Gade) 
(plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).)  If the Secretary of Labor has not promulgated a 
federal standard with respect to an occupational safety or health issue, states may 
supply their own standards.  (29 U.S.C. § 667(a) [“Nothing in this chapter shall 
prevent any State agency or court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over 
any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no standard is in 
effect under section 655 of this title”].)3   
                                              
3  
Solus has identified several standards that it contends apply to the facts of 
this case.  (29 C.F.R. § 1910, subpts. H, M (2017); id., § 1910.147 (2017).)  
Section 1910, subpart H, entitled “Hazardous Materials,” concerns, in part, the 
handling, storage, and use of compressed gas cylinders and tanks (29 C.F.R. 
§§ 1910.101-1910.121 (2017)), but these provisions do not appear to have any 
application to the allegations of the complaint, which assert that Solus removed a 
water heater’s safety features to force it to operate beyond its capacity.  Nor does 
section 1910, subpart M, entitled “Compressed Gas and Compressed Air 
Equipment,” which applies to “compressed air receivers, and other equipment 
used in providing and utilizing compressed air for performing operations such as 
cleaning, drilling, hoisting, and chipping” (29 C.F.R. § 1910.169(a) (2017)), 
appear to apply to these allegations.  Finally, the provisions of 29 Code of Federal 
Regulations section 1910.147 (2017) set forth steps that must be taken to control 
hazardous energy during maintenance of a machine, but it appears from the 
complaint that the explosion occurred as workers arrived to address a problem, 
before any maintenance procedures were undertaken.   
Solus also cites federal OSHA’s general duty clause, which states that an 
employer “(1) shall furnish . . . employment and a place of employment which are 
free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm to his employees.”  (29 U.S.C. § 654(a).)  However, the 
standards to which 29 United States Code section 667, subdivision (a) refers are 
those promulgated by the federal Secretary of Labor under 29 United States Code 
section 655; the general duty clause is not such a “standard.”   
 
Although we are skeptical that the cited standards apply here, we note that 
the case has been litigated based on the view that a federal standard applies to the 
allegations, and we will assume without deciding that there is a federal standard 
relevant to the claims. 
 
7 
Moreover, even when there are federal standards on an issue relating to 
occupational safety and health, a state may assume responsibility for developing 
and enforcing state standards on such issues by developing and submitting to the 
Secretary of Labor a plan to “preempt” federal standards.  In a provision entitled 
“Submission of State plan for development and enforcement of State standards to 
preempt applicable Federal standards,” the federal OSH Act states:  “Any State 
which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for development and 
enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to any 
occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has 
been promulgated under section 655 of this title shall submit a State plan for the 
development of such standards and their enforcement.”  (29 U.S.C. § 667(b).) 
The Secretary of Labor is required to approve a state’s plan or any 
modification of its plan if, in the Secretary’s judgment, a number of conditions are 
met.  (29 U.S.C. § 667(c).)  First, approval is conditioned on the plan designating a 
state agency or agencies to administer the plan throughout the state.  (Id., 
§ 667(c)(1).)  Second, approval is conditioned on the plan providing standards and 
enforcement at least as effective as parallel federal standards.  (Id., § 667(c)(2) 
[the state plan “provides for the development and enforcement of safety and health 
standards relating to one or more safety or health issues, which standards (and the 
enforcement of which standards) are or will be at least as effective in providing 
safe and healthful employment and places of employment as the standards 
promulgated under section 655 which relate to the same issues, and which 
standards, when applicable to products which are distributed or used in interstate 
commerce, are required by compelling local conditions and do not unduly burden 
interstate commerce”].)  Other conditions include that the state plan contain 
satisfactory assurances that the designated administrative agency or agencies 
“have or will have the legal authority and qualified personnel necessary for . . . 
 
8 
enforcement,” and that the state will devote adequate funds to administration and 
enforcement.  (Id., § 667(c)(4) & (5).)  The Secretary must give adequate notice 
and an opportunity for a hearing before rejecting a state plan.  (Id., § 667(d).) 
The Secretary of Labor retains some ongoing authority over state plans.  
For example, the Secretary must “make a continuing evaluation of the manner in 
which each State having a plan . . . is carrying out such plan.”  (29 U.S.C. 
§ 667(f).)  If the Secretary finds, after “due notice and opportunity for a hearing,” 
that the state has failed to “comply substantially” with its plan, the Secretary “shall 
notify the State agency of [the] withdrawal of approval of such plan . . . .”  (Ibid.; 
see also id., subd. (g) [judicial review of withdrawal of approval].)  A federal 
regulation adds that states must submit changes to their plans to the Secretary of 
Labor for approval.  (29 C.F.R. § 1953.4(d) (2017).)  
Finally, the federal OSH Act contains a broad savings clause:  “Nothing in 
this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any 
workmen’s compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other 
manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and 
employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees 
arising out of, or in the course of, employment”  (29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4).) 
 
2.  Cal/OSHA 
Long before the federal enactment, California regulated occupational safety 
and health.  (United Air Lines, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 766.)  As we have recounted:  
“ ‘In 1913 . . . the Legislature enacted a . . . bill creating the Industrial Accident 
Commission, and vested that body, inter alia, with broad authority to adopt 
regulations relating to the safety and welfare of employees.’ ”  (Ibid.)  That 
“ ‘broad authority to regulate safety in places of employment’ ” was transferred to 
another body in 1945 and then, “[i]n 1973, as part of a comprehensive revision of 
 
9 
California’s occupational health and safety statutes in response to the Federal 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the [regulatory board] was 
reconstituted . . . and the division of Occupational Safety and Health was 
designated as the administrative entity.”  (Ibid.)   
The 1973 legislation largely mirrored earlier state enactments.  (Lab. Code, 
§ 6300 et seq.; United Air Lines, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 767.)  The declared 
purpose was to permit California to “assume responsibility for development and 
enforcement of occupational safety and health standards under a state plan 
pursuant to [the federal enactment].”  (Stats. 1973, ch. 993, § 107, pp. 1954-1955; 
see United Air Lines, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 766; California Lab. Federation v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Stds. Bd. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1552 (Cal. 
Labor Fed.).) 
The Department of Industrial Relations (Department) was assigned the 
overall task of administering the state plan for “development and enforcement of 
occupational safety and health standards” relating to issues covered by the federal 
OSH Act standards (Lab. Code, § 50.7, subd. (a); see id., § 6302), and the state 
plan was to be “consistent with the provisions of state law governing occupational 
safety and health, including, but not limited to [Cal/OSHA legislation].”  (Id., 
§ 50.7, subd. (a).)  Within the Department, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Standards Board (Board) has authority to adopt, amend, or repeal standards (id., 
§ 142.3), and the Board’s authority to adopt occupational safety and health 
standards is exclusive.  (Id., § 142.3, subd. (a)(1).)  Also within the Department is 
the Division of Occupational Safety and Health.  The Division is required to study 
federal standards, propose modifications of California standards to the Board, 
evaluate proposed standards for the Board, and, on issues not covered by federal 
standards, “maintain surveillance, determine the necessity for standards, [and] 
develop and present proposed standards to the board.”  (Id., § 147.1, subd. (c); see 
 
10 
id., subds. (a), (b), (d).)  The Division also holds general enforcement powers over 
any “place of employment.”  (Id., § 6307, see also id., §§ 142, 6308.)  
The state law includes various enforcement and civil and criminal penalty 
provisions.  (See Lab. Code, §§ 6317 [citations, abatement, civil penalties], 6425 
[criminal penalties for violations causing death or serious impairment], 6428 [civil 
penalties for serious violations], 6429 [civil penalties for willful or repeated 
violations]; 6430 [civil penalties for failure to correction violations].)  State 
regulations include those governing water heaters.  
The Division’s authority over “places of employment” is not exclusive, and 
does not include places “where the health and safety jurisdiction is vested by law 
in, and actively exercised by, any state or federal agency other than the division.”  
(Lab. Code, § 6303, subd. (a); see also United Air Lines, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
pp. 767, 770-771 [Lab. Code, § 6303, subd. (a) divests the division of jurisdiction 
solely when another agency is under a mandate to provide for worker protection].)  
Cal/OSHA provisions also recognize some concurrent local entity jurisdiction.  
(See Lab. Code, § 6316 [except as otherwise provided in Cal/OSHA, the 
governing bodies of local government entities generally are not deprived of “any 
power or jurisdiction over or relative to any place of employment”]; see id., § 144, 
subds. (a) [authority of agencies other than the Division to “assist in the 
administration or enforcement” of standards “shall be contained in a written 
agreement with the Department . . . .”], (e) [no limitation on local agency authority 
“as to any matter other than the enforcement of occupational safety and health 
standards”]; Coyle v. Alland & Company, Inc. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 664, 669-
670.)  Consistent with this concurrent jurisdiction, the Division’s Bureau of 
Investigations ordinarily must forward its investigative results to local prosecutors 
in cases of serious injury or death.  (Lab. Code, § 6315, subds. (g), (i).) 
 
11 
The Department submitted a Cal/OSHA plan to the federal Secretary of 
Labor, and it was approved in May 1973.  (29 C.F.R. § 1952.7(a) (2017).)4  
Descriptions of the California plan and amendments that formerly appeared in 
federal regulations (see 29 C.F.R. former § 1952.170 (1999)5 have been removed 
by federal OSHA in an effort at streamlining.  (Text removed by 80 Fed.Reg. 
78977 (Dec. 18, 2015) (approving proposal of federal OSHA Aug. 18, 2015); 80 
Fed.Reg. 49897 (Aug. 18, 2015) [“This document . . . amends OSHA regulations 
to remove the detailed descriptions of State plan coverage, purely historical data, 
                                              
4  
The federal regulation provides:  “(a) The California State plan received 
initial approval on May 1, 1973.  [¶] (b) [federal] OSHA entered into an 
operational status agreement with California.  [¶]  (c) The plan covers all private-
sector employers and employees, with several notable exceptions, as well as State 
and Local government employers and employees, within the State.  For current 
information on these exceptions and for additional details about the plan, please 
visit [a federal Department of Labor website].”  (29 C.F.R. § 1952.7 (2017).) 
 
The referenced website contains a very brief summary of the plan, noting 
that the Division “implements the California State Plan’s enforcement . . . .”  
(U.S. Dept. of Labor, OSHA Plans  [as of February 8, 2018].)   
 
The referenced “operational status agreement” notes that the Division “is 
designated as the state agency responsible for administering the State Plan,” that, 
with certain limited exceptions, “concurrent federal enforcement authority was 
suspended with regard to federal occupational safety and health standards in issues 
covered by the State Plan,” and that “concurrent federal enforcement authority 
would not be initiated with regard to any federal occupational safety and health 
standards in issues covered by the State Plan.”  (82 Fed.Reg. 25631 (June 2, 
2017).) 
5  
The former provision referred to enforcement by the Division, and noted 
that then-existing state safety and health standards would be “continued unless 
amended by a State occupational safety and health standards board to be created.”  
(29 C.F.R. former § 1952.170(a) (1999).)  It observed that the state plan “set out 
goals” and acknowledged that certain enabling legislation was still to be enacted 
by the state Legislature.  (Id., former § 1952.170(e) (1999).) 
 
12 
and other unnecessarily codified information . . . . The purpose of these revisions 
is to eliminate the unnecessary codification of material in the Code of Federal 
Regulations . . . .”].)  There appears to be no dispute, however, that the Cal/OSHA 
standards, the violation of which was the basis for the district attorney’s UCL and 
FAL claims, were part of the approved California plan, nor does there appear to be 
any dispute that use of UCL and FAL claims by local prosecutors pursuing civil 
actions was not mentioned in the plan’s enforcement provisions.  (See, e.g., Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 8, § 344.50 [Division of Occupational Safety and Health 
compliance personnel conduct civil inspections and enforcement actions but lack 
authority to initiate criminal proceedings].) 
Cal/OSHA standards have undergone revisions that were submitted for and 
secured federal approval.  For example, in response to a state court action by labor 
representatives, the state Board amended the state standards to reflect the 
requirements of the state’s then-newly adopted Safe Drinking Water and Toxic 
Enforcement Act of 1986.  (Health & Saf. Code § 25249.5 et seq.; see Cal. Labor 
Federation, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1554, 1557-1559; see Dept. of Labor, 
Supplement to California State Plan; Approval, 62 Fed.Reg. 31159 (June 6, 
1997).) 
In 1987, the Governor of California attempted to reassign exclusive control 
over occupational safety and health matters to the federal government.  He notified 
the federal Secretary of Labor of his intent and reduced the Department’s budget.  
(See Cal. Labor Federation, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1552.)  The voters, 
however, in 1988 approved a proposition that defeated the Governor’s plan and 
affirmed the central role of state law in these matters.  (Lab. Code, § 50.7, subd. 
(a), enacted by Prop. 97, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1988).)  The 
proposition’s preamble stated the enactment’s goal:  “It is the purpose of this Act 
to restore California control over private sector safety and health, which the state 
 
13 
has provided for since 1913, and has administered since 1973 through Cal/OSHA.  
Pursuant to Article XIV, Section 4, of the California Constitution, state 
jurisdiction over worker safety and health should not be limited, eliminated or 
otherwise restricted, unless absolutely required by the federal Constitution.”  
(Ballot Pamp. Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1988) text of Prop. 97, p. 75.) 
C.  General preemption principles 
“ ‘The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a 
constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests 
Congress with the power to preempt state law.’  [Citations.]  Similarly, federal 
agencies, acting pursuant to authorization from Congress, can issue regulations 
that override state requirements.  [Citations.]  Preemption is foremost a question of 
congressional intent: did Congress, expressly or implicitly, seek to displace state 
law?”  (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298, 307-308 
(Quesada).) 
We “conduct[] the search for congressional intent through the lens of a 
presumption against preemption.  [Citations.]  The presumption is founded on 
‘respect for the States as “independent sovereigns in our federal system” ’; that 
respect requires courts ‘to assume that “Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt 
state-law causes of action.” ’  [Citation.]  The strength of the presumption is 
heightened in areas where the subject matter has been the long-standing subject of 
state regulation in the first instance; where federal law touches ‘a field that “ ‘has 
been traditionally occupied by the States,’ ” ’ the party seeking to show 
preemption ‘bear[s] the considerable burden of overcoming “the starting 
presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.” ’ ”  (Quesada, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 312-313, see also id. at p. 315 [Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp. (1947) 331 U.S. 218, 230, which first recognized the assumption that the 
 
14 
historic police powers of the state are not superseded, remains good law].)  The 
presumption applies to the scope as well as the existence of preemption.  
(Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003) 30 Cal.4th 798, 815 (Olszewski); see also 
Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1052, 1064.) 
“We have identified several species of preemption.  Congress may 
expressly preempt state law through an explicit preemption clause, or courts may 
imply preemption under the field, conflict, or obstacle preemption doctrines.”  
(Quesada, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 308.)  Implied preemption, for its part, may be 
found “(i) when it is clear that Congress intended, by comprehensive legislation, to 
occupy the entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the states to supplement 
federal law [citation]; (ii) when compliance with both federal and state regulations 
is an impossibility [citation]; or (iii) when state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ”  
(Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943, 955, italics added; see also Farm 
Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1087.)  Because preemption 
questions turn on Congressional intent, a reviewing court begins with the text of 
the federal statute, “the source of the best evidence concerning the breadth of 
Congress’s preemptive intent.”  (Quesada, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 308.) 
D.  Federal OSH Act preemption principles announced by the high 
court 
The United States Supreme Court examined the preemptive effect of the 
federal OSH Act in Gade, supra, 505 U.S. 88.  The high court’s plurality and 
concurring opinions offer helpful interpretive guidance, but as explained below, in 
Gade, there was no approved state plan, so the extent to which an approved state 
plan displaces federal authority was not at issue. 
In Gade, Illinois state laws imposed special requirements for persons 
working with hazardous waste, including training and licensing requirements.  
 
15 
There was a federal occupational safety and health standard in effect concerning 
training and certification of persons working with hazardous wastes.  The stated 
purpose of the Illinois laws was to “ ‘promote job safety’ ” and “ ‘protect life, limb 
and property.’ ”  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 91 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.).)  
Two issues were raised by those laws.  The first was whether, in the absence of an 
approved state plan, the federal OSH Act preempted efforts by the state to 
supplement the existing and applicable federal occupational safety and health 
standards.  The second issue was whether state statutes having an asserted dual 
purpose of protecting public as well as worker safety would be preempted.  A 
majority of the court concluded that the state law was preempted, but there was 
disagreement whether implied or express preemption was involved.  (Id., at 
pp. 91-109 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.); id., at pp. 109-114 (conc. opn. of 
Kennedy, J.).)   
The high court’s plurality opinion used an implied preemption analysis.  
The plurality found that when a federal occupational safety and health standard 
exists and the state has not presented a plan to the Secretary of Labor and obtained 
approval, the application of a state occupational safety and health standard would 
be an obstacle to achieving Congress’s goal that only a single regime of 
occupational safety and health regulation should apply.  The plurality held that 
“nonapproved state regulation of occupational safety and health issues for which a 
federal standard is in effect is impliedly pre-empted as in conflict with the full 
purposes and objectives of the OSH Act.  [Citation.]  The design of the statute 
persuades us that Congress intended to subject employers and employees to only 
one set of regulations, be it federal or state, and that the only way a State may 
regulate a [federally]-regulated occupational safety and health issue is pursuant to 
an approved state plan that displaces the federal standards.”  (Gade, supra, 505 
U.S. at pp. 98-99.)   
 
16 
The plurality opinion relied on 29 United States Code section 667(b), 
specifically the subdivision’s language directing that a state “shall” submit a plan 
for federal approval if a state wishes to “assume responsibility” for development 
and enforcement of occupational safety and health standards when a federal 
standard already exists.  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 99.)  “The unavoidable 
implication of this provision is that a State may not enforce its own occupational 
safety and health standards without obtaining the Secretary’s approval . . . .”  
(Ibid.)  In the plurality’s view, the federal OSH Act as a whole indicated that “a 
State may develop an occupational safety and health program tailored to its own 
needs, but only if it is willing completely to displace the applicable federal 
regulations.”  (Id., at p. 100, italics added.) 
The plurality opinion also pointed to 29 United States Code section 667(a) 
— which acknowledges the authority of states to exercise jurisdiction where there 
is no federal standard — reasoning that the subdivision’s “preservation of state 
authority in the absence of a federal standard presupposes a background pre-
emption of all state occupational safety and health standards whenever a federal 
standard governing the same issue is in effect.”  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 100, 
italics added.)  And pointing to 29 United States Code section 667(c), which 
establishes conditions for plan approval, the Gade decision observed that the 
conditions would be nullified if states could simply adopt their own standards 
without going through the approval process.  (Id., at p. 100.) 
Subdivisions (f) and (h) of 29 United States Code section 667 also 
confirmed the plurality’s view that states cannot act when there is no approved 
state plan but a federal standard does exist.  Because subdivision (f) of section 667 
gave the federal Secretary of Labor the power to withdraw approval of a state 
plan, the decision reasoned that “[o]nce approval is withdrawn, the plan ‘cease[s] 
to be in effect’ and the State is permitted to assert jurisdiction under its 
 
17 
occupational health and safety law only for those cases ‘commenced before the 
withdrawal of the plan.’ ”  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 101.)  This language 
“assumes that the State loses the power to enforce all of its occupational safety and 
health standards once approval is withdrawn.”  (Ibid.)  And the plurality saw the 
“same assumption of exclusive federal jurisdiction in the absence of an approved 
state plan” in subdivision (h), which permits states to enter temporary agreements 
to enforce their own laws in the two years following the passage of the federal 
OSH Act.  (Id., at pp. 101-102.) 
From these provisions, the plurality “conclude[d] that the OSH Act 
precludes any state regulation of an occupational safety or health issue with 
respect to which a federal standard has been established, unless a state plan has 
been submitted and approved pursuant to [ 29 United States Code section 667](b).  
Our review of the Act persuades us that Congress sought to promote occupational 
safety and health while at the same time avoiding duplicative, and possibly 
counterproductive, regulation.  It thus established a system of uniform federal 
occupational health and safety standards, but gave States the option of pre-empting 
federal regulations by developing their own occupational safety and health 
programs.”  (Gade, supra, 505 US. at p. 102, italics added.) 
Addressing the separate question whether preemption — still in the absence 
of an approved state plan — reached state laws that directly regulated occupational 
safety and health but also were intended to protect public safety, the plurality 
concluded that the preemptive effect of the federal law extended to such “dual 
impact” state laws.  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 104-105.)  The state argued that 
its laws, which imposed requirements regarding training, testing, and licensing of 
crane and hazardous waste site workers, were intended to promote both public and 
worker safety, and therefore should not be preempted.  The plurality disagreed, 
declaring that “dual impact state regulation cannot avoid OSH Act pre-emption 
 
18 
simply because the regulation serves several objectives rather than one.”  (Id. at 
p. 106.)  Rather, “[w]hatever the purpose or purposes of the state law, pre-emption 
analysis cannot ignore the effect of the challenged state action on the pre-empted 
field.  The key question is thus at what point the state regulation sufficiently 
interferes with federal regulation that it should be deemed pre-empted . . . .”  (Id. 
at p. 107, italics added.)  The decision concluded that state law that “ ‘constitutes, 
in a direct, clear and substantial way, regulation of worker health and safety’ ” 
would be preempted, whereas “state laws of general applicability (such as laws 
regarding traffic safety or fire safety) that do not conflict with [federal] standards 
and that regulate the conduct of workers and nonworkers alike would generally not 
be pre-empted.  Although some laws of general applicability may have a ‘direct 
and substantial’ effect on worker safety, they cannot fairly be characterized as 
‘occupational’ standards, because they regulate workers simply as members of the 
general public.”  (Ibid., italics added.)   
“In sum, a state law requirement that directly, substantially, and 
specifically regulates occupational safety and health is an occupational safety and 
health standard within the meaning of the [federal OSH] Act. . . .  If the State 
wishes to enact a dual impact law that regulates an occupational safety or health 
issue for which a federal standard is in effect, . . . the Act requires that the State 
submit a plan for the approval of the Secretary.”  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at 
pp. 107-108, italics added.) 
The concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy concluded that the federal law 
expressly preempts state occupational safety and health standards when a federal 
standard is in effect and the state has not submitted a plan for approval, but 
vigorously opposed the plurality’s finding of implied preemption.  (Gade, supra, 
505 U.S. at pp. 109-114 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)  In his view, the plurality’s 
analysis failed to surmount the “high threshold” required for a finding that a law is 
 
19 
preempted because it conflicts with the purpose of a federal law.  (Id. at p. 110.)  
He added that such preemption “should be limited to state laws which impose 
prohibitions or obligations which are in direct contradiction to Congress’ primary 
objectives, as conveyed with clarity in the federal legislation.”  (Ibid.)  The 
concurrence observed no such direct contradiction between federal standards and a 
“concurrent, supplementary state scheme.”  (Ibid.)  Rather, all the inferences from 
29 United States Code section 667(b)’s express terms direct the preemption of 
state occupational safety standards in the absence of a state plan approved by the 
Secretary of Labor.  Absent those express terms, Justice Kennedy “would not say 
that state supplementary regulation conflicts with the purposes of the federal OSH 
Act[] or that it ‘ “interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was 
designed to reach [its] goal.” ’  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 111.)   
According to the concurrence, the plurality opinion failed to comply with a 
presumption that “ ‘historic police powers of the States’ ” are not preempted  
“ ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ”  (Gade, supra, 
505 U.S. at p 111.)  In addition, Justice Kennedy criticized the plurality’s method 
of inferring the congressional purpose, saying that a “freewheeling judicial inquiry 
into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives would undercut the 
principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that pre-empts state law.”  (Ibid.) 
Although Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that 
preemption was implied, he concluded that the plurality’s analysis “amply 
demonstrates” express preemption.  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 112.)  In his 
view, although 29 United States Code section 667(b), which authorizes a state to 
assume responsibility for occupational safety and health issues, lacked the “magic 
words” of preemption (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 112), “[t]he statute is clear:  
When a State desires to assume responsibility for an occupational safety and 
health issue already addressed by the Federal Government, it must submit a state 
 
20 
plan.  The most reasonable inference from this language is that when a State does 
not submit and secure approval of a state plan, it may not enforce occupational 
safety and health standards in that area.”  (Id. at pp. 112-113 [also reading the 
language of 29 U.S.C. 667(b) in conjunction with section 667(a), (c), and (f)].) 
Justice Kennedy found it unnecessary to “reiterate the plurality’s persuasive 
discussion on this point.”  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 113.)  The plurality 
similarly observed that although the two opinions disagreed concerning the 
category of preemption, they agreed on federal OSHA’s preemptive scope, based 
on the language of 29 United States Code section 667.  (Id. at p. 104, fn. 2.) 
II.  Discussion 
The Court of Appeal held that the UCL and FAL claims are preempted by 
the federal OSH Act both expressly and through application of the principles of 
implied preemption.  It concluded that Congress has essentially occupied the entire 
field of workplace safety regulation and enforcement other than workers’ 
compensation and the precise provisions of an approved state plan.  It reasoned 
that “[b]ecause the [federal] OSH Act allows a state to avoid federal preemption 
only if it obtains federal approval of its own plan, it necessarily follows that a state 
has no authority to enact and enforce laws governing workplace safety which fall 
outside of that approved plan.”  In its view, the district attorney’s use of UCL and 
FAL actions based upon violations of approved Cal/OSHA standards was an 
attempt to govern workplace safety without securing approval by the federal 
Secretary of Labor. 
As the Court of Appeal observed, the federal OSH Act expressly states 
what is not preempted — state laws governing workers’ compensation, a broad 
category of statutory and common law actions touching on worker safety, and any 
occupational safety or health issue as to which there is no federal standard.  (29 
U.S.C. §§ 653(b)(4) [workers’ compensation and other laws related to worker 
 
21 
safety], 667(a) [no federal standard].)  As the Court of Appeal’s analysis further 
reflects, the federal OSH Act does not expressly describe what state regulation is 
preempted.  This omission does not preclude a finding of explicit preemption; as 
Justice Kennedy noted in Gade, the high court has “never required any particular 
magic words” to establish express preemption.  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 112.)  
But as illustrated by Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, when a court attempts 
to discern from a statutory scheme the expression of an intent to displace state law, 
the analysis may be substantially similar to an implied preemption analysis.  
Therefore, we will first address whether preemption of the UCL and FAL claims is 
implied.  As will be seen, this analysis also resolves the issue of whether the 
federal scheme explicitly preempts these claims. 
A.  No implied preemption of UCL and FAL claims 
1.  Field preemption 
a.  The field preempted is narrow 
In enacting the federal OSH Act, Congress entered “a field that traditionally 
had been occupied by the States.  Federal regulation of the workplace was not 
intended to be all encompassing, however.”  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 96 (plur. 
opn. of O’Connor, J.); see United Air Lines, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 772 [“Despite a 
broad authorization to [the federal OSH Act] . . . , the act did not foreclose other 
federal agencies or states from exercising . . . jurisdiction” over occupational 
safety and health].)  Unlike some federal statutes, 29 United States Code section 
667 does not employ broad language preempting all state regulation, laws, or 
remedies relating to, concerning, or merely touching on the issue at hand, namely 
occupational safety and health.  (See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) [except as 
specifically provided, “no State . . . may establish or continue in effect with 
respect to [medical devices] any requirement . . . different from, or in addition to, 
 
22 
any requirement [under the specific federal law]”; 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) [ERISA 
preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan”]; 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) [“[A] State . . . may not enact or 
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law 
related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the 
transportation of property”]; id., § 41713(a)(4)(A) [“[A] State . . . may not enact or 
enforce a law . . . related to a rate, route, or service of an air carrier”].)   
Moreover, various elements of the federal OSH Act convince us that the 
preempted field is narrow.  First, we have seen that when there is no federal 
standard, there is no preemption.  (29 U.S.C. § 667(a).)  This provision 
acknowledges that federal authority does not occupy the entire field.  Rather, 
states retain authority freely to apply their own law in the field of occupational 
safety or health when the Secretary has not promulgated an applicable federal 
standard.   
Second, even when there are federal standards, states may “assume 
responsibility for development and enforcement” of state occupational safety and 
health standards, provided the state submits and gains approval for a state plan.  
(29 U.S.C. § 667(b).)  Under the terms of the statute, an approved state plan 
“preempts” federal standards.  (29 U.S.C. § 667(b) [entitled “Submission of State 
plan for development and enforcement of State standards to preempt applicable 
Federal standards”]; see also Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 119 (dis. opn. of Souter, 
J.) [this heading was “enacted as part of the statute and properly [may be] 
considered under our canons of construction”].)  In other words, once the state 
plan is adopted and approved, state law has the effect of broadly preempting 
parallel federal law.  (See Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 96-97 (plur. opn. of 
O’Connor, J.) [observing that 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) “gave the States the option of 
pre-empting federal regulation entirely”]; United Air Lines, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 
 
23 
p. 772 [adoption of an approved plan “removes federal preemption so that the state 
may exercise its own sovereign powers over occupational safety and health”].)  In 
addition, states can provide greater protection if they adopt their own plans with 
standards and enforcement that are at least as protective as federal law.  (29 U.S.C. 
§ 667(c)(2).)  
We acknowledge that the Secretary of Labor has authority to approve 
modifications to a state’s plan (29 U.S.C. § 667(c)) and “shall . . . make a 
continuing evaluation of the manner in which each State having a plan . . . is 
carrying out such plan.”  (Id., § 667(f).)  Notwithstanding these provisions, the 
federal OSH Act as a whole does not suggest that the preempted field 
encompasses all means of enforcement not specifically included in the state’s 
approved plan.  On the contrary, the federal OSH Act encourages states to 
“assume the fullest responsibility for the administration and enforcement of their 
occupational safety and health laws.”  (29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11).)  In addition, it 
directs that the Secretary “shall” approve a conforming state plan or modification, 
and places administrative limits on the Secretary of Labor’s discretion to reject 
state plans.  (Id., § 667(d).)  And as we have observed, once a state plan is 
approved, it is federal, not state, law that must give way.  (29 C.F.R. § 1953.3(a) 
(2017) [federal approval of a state plan “in effect removes the barrier of Federal 
preemption, and permits the State to adopt and enforce State standards,” including 
adopting and implementing modifications].)  Finally, even if any new enforcement 
method that is related to an existing approved standard should be submitted to the 
Secretary — a question we need not answer — it does not follow that the new 
method is preempted until approved.  State modifications to an approved plan go 
into effect immediately, subject to a review by the Secretary.  (67 Fed.Reg. 60122 
(Sept. 25, 2002); see also 62 Fed.Reg., supra, at p. 31165 [a modification “takes 
effect prior to and pending OSHA review of the modification”].) 
 
24 
Third, the federal OSH Act’s savings clause (29 U.S.C.§ 653(b)(4)) leads 
us to infer a narrow field of implied preemption.  That provision disclaims any 
intent to interfere with state law in a broad domain affecting occupational safety 
and health, whether or not there is an approved state plan.  Specifically, 
notwithstanding the existence of federal standards, not only are state workers’ 
compensation actions not preempted, but state tort claims and criminal 
prosecutions also survive, although they may be based on duties established by 
state occupational safety and health standards.  (See Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co. (1st 
Cir. 1991) 942 F.2d 48, 53-54, and cases cited [tort claims not preempted:  “[W]e 
find no warrant whatever for an interpretation which would preempt enforcement 
in the workplace of private rights and remedies traditionally afforded by state laws 
of general application”]; State v. Far West Water & Sewer (Ariz. 2010) 228 P.3d 
909, 919, and cases cited [no preemption of prosecution under state criminal law 
punishing conduct that is also governed by federal occupational safety and health 
standards, the existence of some criminal penalties within the federal act itself 
notwithstanding]; People v. Pymm (N.Y. 1990) 563 N.E.2d 1, 4 [referring to 
“continued viability of State statutory and common-law duties”].)  Indeed, section 
653(b)(4) has been interpreted as a uniquely broad savings clause (In re Welding 
Fume Products Liability Litigation (N.D.Ohio 2005) 364 F.Supp.2d 669, 687, & 
fn. 21), and broad savings clauses may be seen as an indication that the field 
preempted is narrow.  (See Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals v. Adidas 
Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 944.) 
Finally, the provisions we have discussed indicate that the federal OSH Act 
contemplates a cooperative system of workplace safety regulation, not an 
exclusively federal one.  When federal schemes involve cooperation and 
concurrent jurisdiction, this circumstance also suggests that the scope of 
preemption was not intended to be broad.  (Olszewski, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 816 
 
25 
[“ ‘Where . . . coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a complementary 
administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes, the case for 
federal pre-emption becomes a less persuasive one’ ”].)   
b.  The UCL and FAL claims do not fall within this narrow field of 
preemption 
Laws of general application are not ordinarily preempted by the federal act.  
(Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 107 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.); id. at p. 114 (conc. 
opn. of Kennedy, J.).)  As explained below, under state law, actions under the 
UCL or FAL are not considered to be a means of enforcing the law claimed to 
have been violated; rather, they provide a remedy for economic damage suffered 
as a result of violations of a wide array of other laws.  Furthermore, to the extent 
these claims may be a considered an enforcement mechanism with respect to the 
state plan’s substantive standards, these claims merely supplement enforcement of 
state standards.  Federal OSHA’s provisions related to the enforcement of state 
plans are concerned with ensuring enforcement that is at least as effective as the 
federal standards; nothing in the federal act suggests a concern with enforcement 
that exceeds federal requirements.   
The UCL concerns unfair competition, a term that “mean[s] and include[s] 
any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, 
untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by [the false advertising 
law].”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.)  The purpose of the UCL “is to protect both 
consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets 
for goods and services.”  (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949.)  As we 
have said, “the act provides an equitable means through which both public 
prosecutors and private individuals can bring suit to prevent unfair business 
practices and restore money or property to victims of these practices.”  (Zhang v. 
Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 371, italics added.)  The FAL, for its part, 
 
26 
makes actionable “untrue or misleading” statements made to “induce the public to 
enter into any obligation” to purchase goods and services.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17500.)  Actions to enforce the UCL or FAL, which may be brought by 
government officials and by individuals who have suffered injury in fact (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 17203), address the “ ‘ “overarching legislative concern . . . to 
provide a streamlined procedure for the prevention of ongoing or threatened acts 
of unfair competition.”  [Citation.]’ ”  (Zhang, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 371, italics 
added.)  And the remedies are “cumulative . . . to the remedies or penalties 
available under all other laws of this state.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17205.)   
As noted above, under state law, these actions are not considered on their 
face to be a means of enforcing the underlying law.  “ ‘By proscribing “any 
unlawful” business practice, “[the UCL] ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and 
treats them as unlawful practices” that the [UCL] makes independently actionable.  
[Citations.]’ ”  (Rose v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 57 Cal.4th 390, 396.)  We 
have explained that “by borrowing requirements from other statutes, the UCL does 
not serve as a mere enforcement mechanism.  It provides its own distinct and 
limited equitable remedies for unlawful business practices, using other laws only 
to define what is ‘unlawful.’  [Citation.]  The UCL reflects the Legislature’s intent 
to discourage business practices that confer unfair advantages in the marketplace 
to the detriment of both consumers and law-abiding competitors.”  (Id. at p. 397; 
see People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 
772, 783 [Federal Aviation Administration Act does not on its face preempt UCL 
claims against motor carriers for misclassification of drivers]; In re Tobacco Cases 
II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1272 [a federal law governing cigarette sales to minors 
on its face did not expressly preempt the UCL, which “is a law of general 
application, and it is not based on concerns about smoking and health”]; Korea 
Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1150; Cel-Tech 
 
27 
Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 
163, 180; Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 
560, 566 576.)  Thus, the UCL and FAL are laws of general application.  
We acknowledge that in some instances, a UCL claim may fall within a 
field of preemption.  For example, in In re Tobacco Cases II, supra, 41 Cal.4th 
1257, a UCL claim based on advertising activities alleged to violate Penal Code 
section 308 (prohibiting sale of tobacco products to minors and possession of such 
products by minors) was preempted as applied under the particular terms of a 
federal law governing cigarette labeling and advertising.  (Id. at pp. 1272-1273.)  
Under the federal law involved, preemption turned on whether the particular UCL 
claim would impose a duty necessarily and inherently based on concerns about 
smoking and health.  (Id. at p. 1273.)  But here, the UCL and FAL claims are 
based on standards set forth in an approved state plan, and which therefore 
preempt any federal standards.  Because these claims do not impose any duty on 
employers that is subject to federal preemption, they do not come within the 
principles articulated in Tobacco Cases II. 
We also recognize that the federal OSH Act is concerned not only with a 
state’s substantive standards, but also with its enforcement.  (29 U.S.C. § 667(b) [a 
state that wants to assume responsibility for “development and enforcement” of 
standards must submit a state plan for “development of such standards and their 
enforcement”].)  Therefore, when UCL and FAL claims are premised on 
violations of a state’s plan, the UCL and FAL arguably come within the high 
court’s description of an occupational safety and health standard in the context of 
the federal OSH Act:  “a state law requirement that directly, substantially, and 
specifically regulates occupational safety and health.”  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at 
pp. 107 (plur. opn. of O’Connor, J.); id. at p. 114 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) 
 
28 
Notably, however, the federal OSH Act’s concern regarding enforcement is 
only that states provide enforcement “at least as effective” as required under the 
federal OSH Act.  (29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2); see 29 C.F.R. § 1902.3(d) (2017).)  Its 
focus on adequate enforcement, and its silence with respect to enforcement that is 
more than adequate or is pursued through mechanisms other than those set forth in 
a state’s plan, lead us to conclude that the federal OSH Act’s scheme is not “ ‘ “so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it.” ’ ”  (Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 98 (plur. opn. of 
O’Connor, J.).)  California has provided adequate enforcement provisions through 
its plan, and there is no “unavoidable implication” to be derived from the federal 
OSH Act that where a state has met this federal requirement, Congress intended to 
preclude supplemental enforcement of approved standards.  (Id. at p. 99.)   
Our conclusion is consistent with the decision of the federal Department of 
Labor approving California’s Hazard Communication Standard (Standard), which 
incorporated provisions from Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic 
Enforcement Act.  (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 25249.5 et seq.; 62 F.R. § 31159-01.)  
In addition to adopting the substantive standards of Proposition 65, “the 
Cal/OSHA standard incorporate[d] the enforcement mechanism of Proposition 65, 
which provides for supplemental judicial enforcement by allowing the State 
Attorney General, district attorneys, city attorneys, city prosecutors, or ‘any person 
in the public interest’ to file civil lawsuits against alleged violators.”  (62 
Fed.Reg., supra, at p. 31161.)  Some comments regarding the proposed Standard 
contended that Proposition 65’s private right of action violated the federal 
requirement that an agency be designated to enforce the state plan.  The Board’s 
decision noted that “[i]f a State standard is not identical to Federal standards, the 
State standard (and its enforcement) must be at least as effective as the comparable 
Federal standard.”  (62 Fed.Reg, supra,. at p. 31160.)  It also observed, “Although 
 
29 
[the federal OSH Act] does not authorize private enforcement, OSHA State plans 
do not operate under a delegation of Federal authority but under a system which 
allows them to enact and enforce their own laws and standards under State 
authority.  Therefore, nothing in the Act prevents States with approved plans from 
legislating such a supplemental private right of action in their own programs. . . .  
[¶] In the case of Proposition 65, private enforcement is supplemental to, not a 
substitute for, enforcement by Cal/OSHA.  Private enforcement, therefore, should 
not detract from Cal/OSHA’s responsibilities to enforce State standards.”  (Id., 
p. 31167.)   
The federal Department’s consideration of Proposition 65 occurred in the 
context of an approval of a plan amendment, but Congress has not specified (as it 
has elsewhere) that any amendments to the state plan — even as to substantive 
standards — must be submitted to the Secretary of Labor for approval before they 
are implemented.  (See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6507(c)(2) [in context of changes to 
federally-approved supplemental state requirements for organic food certification, 
governing state official, “prior to implementing any substantive change to 
programs approved under this subsection, shall submit such change to the 
Secretary for approval”].)  In addition, as explained above, the federal OSH Act’s 
provisions related to the authority of the Secretary of Labor to approve 
modifications to a state plan and to evaluate a state’s execution of its plan 
(29 U.S.C. § 667(c), (f)) raise the potential that a modification may be rejected or 
that approval of a plan may be withdrawn, but these provisions leave the state plan 
intact and do not preempt state law before a modification is rejected or approval is 
withdrawn.  There is no indication in these provisions that any state deviation from 
the formally approved plan is, by some self-executing feature, without effect until 
it is brought to the Secretary’s notice and formally approved as an amendment.  
 
30 
Federal regulations and commentary are in accord that changes to state 
plans may be implemented immediately, prior to any action by the Secretary of 
Labor or that officer’s designee, federal OSHA:  “Federal OSHA approval of a 
State plan . . . in effect removes the barrier of Federal preemption, and permits the 
State to adopt and enforce State standards and other requirements regarding 
occupational safety or health issues regulated by OSHA.  A State with an 
approved plan may modify or supplement the requirements contained in its plan, 
and may implement such requirements under State law, without prior approval of 
the plan change by Federal OSHA.  Changes to approved State plans are subject to 
subsequent OSHA review.  If OSHA finds reason to reject a State plan change, 
and this determination is upheld after an adjudicatory proceeding, the plan change 
would then be excluded from the State’s Federally-approved plan.”  (29 C.F.R. 
§ 1953.3(a) (2017).)  Federal OSHA explained that this regulation reflects the 
agency’s “longstanding interpretation of the Act to the effect that States which 
have submitted and obtained Federal approval of a State plan under [the federal 
OSH Act] may adopt modifications to their State plan (such as new standards, 
regulations, amendments to State OSHA legislation, or revised enforcement 
procedures) and may implement these modifications upon adoption, without prior 
approval of each particular modification. . . .  OSHA has always viewed its 
enabling statute as not requiring pre-enforcement/pre-implementation Federal 
approval . . . .”  (67 Fed.Reg., supra, at p. 60123, italics added; see also 62 
Fed.Reg., supra, at p. 31165 [“A modification to an approved State plan takes 
effect prior to and pending OSHA review of the modification” and the burden of 
proof rests on the party opposing the modification]; see Florida Citrus Packers v. 
California (N.D.Cal. 1982) 545 F.Supp. 216, 219 [upholding federal OSHA’s pre-
approval enforcement policy]; see also Shell Oil Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor 
 
31 
(D.D.C. 2000) 106 F.Supp.2d 15, 18 [noting in passing that federal OSHA 
routinely applies this pre-approval enforcement policy].)6 
Finally, we reiterate the strong presumption against preemption, arising 
both from the fact that the federal legislation addresses an area that has been the 
long-standing subject of state regulation and from the fact that California has 
assumed responsibility under the federal OSH Act to regulate worker safety and 
health, thereby preempting federal law.  In light of the cooperative character of the 
federal OSH Act, the authority the federal OSH Act grants states that have 
                                              
6 
We are aware of Industrial Truck Ass’n v. Henry (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 
1305, in which the court read the Gade plurality’s implied preemption analysis 
relatively broadly, and concluded that the state regulations promulgated to 
implement California’s Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act were 
preempted by the federal OSH Act in the workplace context until the regulations 
were included in the existing state OSHA standards and approved by the Secretary 
of Labor.  In the Industrial Truck Ass’n case, unlike here, it was undisputed that 
the challenged regulations themselves constituted occupational safety and health 
standards, and that there were inconsistent federal standards on the same issue; 
that case did not present a situation implicating mere additional enforcement 
measures for existing, approved standards.  Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit 
recognized, “[a]n agency’s interpretation of the preemptive effect of its regulations 
is entitled to deference where Congress has delegated authority to the agency, the 
agency’s interpretation is not contrary to a statute, and agency expertise is 
important to determining preemption.”  (Id. at p. 1311.)  In light of this principle, 
the Ninth Circuit should have given deference to the federal Department of 
Labor’s decision approving California’s incorporation of provisions from 
Proposition 65 into a standard under the state plan.  (62 Fed.Reg, supra.)  As noted 
above, that decision reflects the federal agency’s view that a state may modify its 
enforcement mechanisms without prior federal approval.  (62 Fed.Reg., supra, at 
p. 31165.)  Proper consideration of the federal Department’s decision would have 
led to a narrower reading of the federal OSH Act’s preemptive effect.  (See also 
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services (2005) 
545 U.S. 967, 982 [a subsequent agency construction is entitled to deference under 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 
837 unless the court’s prior construction was based on a conclusion that the terms 
of the statute were unambiguous, leaving no room for the agency’s construction].) 
 
32 
assumed responsibility for worker safety and health, the nature of UCL and FAL 
claims, and the strong presumption against preemption, we find no implied 
preemption of the claims in this case. 
2.  Obstacle preemption 
To recall, “Obstacle preemption permits courts to strike state law that 
stands as ‘an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.’  [Citations.]  It requires proof Congress had particular 
purposes and objectives in mind, a demonstration that leaving state law in place 
would compromise those objectives, and reason to discount the possibility the 
Congress that enacted the legislation was aware of the background tapestry of state 
law and content to let that law remain as it was.”  (Quesada, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
p. 312.)  We “conduct our analysis from the starting point of a presumption that 
displacement of state regulation in areas of traditional state concern was not 
intended absent clear and manifest evidence of a contrary congressional intent.”  
(Id. at p. 315; see also Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 348, 388 [a high threshold must be surmounted before obstacle 
preemption will be found].) 
The principal goal of the federal OSH Act’s enactment was to “address the 
problem of uneven and inadequate state protection of employee health and safety” 
by supplying a minimum level of protection throughout the country — a federal 
“nationwide ‘floor’ of minimally necessary safeguards.”  (United Air Lines, supra, 
32 Cal.3d at p. 772.)  Federal approval of the California plan indicates that this 
goal has been met in this state.  Even if we view UCL and FAL actions based on 
Cal/OSHA violations as having a substantial impact on occupational safety and 
health issues, that impact is not an obstacle to achieving the congressional 
 
33 
purpose, nor are additional enforcement mechanisms an obstacle to establishing at 
least a minimum level of worker protection.7   
Similarly, UCL and FAL claims that are premised on Cal/OSHA violations 
do not conflict with the federal OSH Act’s provision that when state standards are 
applicable to products in interstate commerce, the Secretary of Labor must 
determine that the standards “are required by compelling local conditions and do 
not unduly burden interstate commerce.”  (29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2).)  Such claims 
involve the same substantive standards that have been approved by the Secretary, 
and therefore do not impose any greater substantive burdens on interstate 
commerce.  Even if the availability of greater penalties should be incorporated into 
the state plan and submitted to the Secretary of Labor for review of any impact on 
interstate commerce, it does not follow that any change that has not yet been 
incorporated and approved is preempted in the meantime. 
Neither do the UCL or FAL claims obstruct another of the federal OSH 
Act’s purposes, namely to encourage the States “to assume the fullest 
responsibility for the administration and enforcement of their occupational safety 
and health laws.”  (29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1902.1(a) (2017), 
see id. § 1902.1(c)(1) (2017) [after an approved plan gains successful review the 
year following its initial approval, the federal “enforcement authority shall not 
apply with respect to any occupational safety or health issue covered by the 
                                              
7  
The congressional purpose recognized by the plurality opinion in Gade, 
supra, 505 U.S. 88, that there be but a single standard of conduct to which 
employers must adhere (id. at p. 99) was at issue in Gade because there was no 
approved state plan that displaced the federal law.  In contrast, the sole applicable 
relevant standards in this state are the California standards.  The Secretary of 
Labor retains the authority to audit the state’s enforcement of its standards and to 
withdraw federal approval, but until that happens, only the California standards 
govern employer conduct.   
 
34 
plan”].)  “OSHA has interpreted the OSH Act to recognize that States with 
approved State plans retain broad power to fashion State standards” and to 
experiment.  (62 Fed.Reg., supra, p. 31160, italics added.)  The federal OSH Act 
“reflects [a] ‘search for enlightened public policy’. . . by removing the bar of 
preemption through plan approval and, thus, allowing States to administer their 
own workers’ protection laws so long as they meet the floor established by the 
Federal OSHA program.”  (Ibid.)  We can identify no evidence that Congress had 
a “particular purpose[] and objective[]” to restrict state authority to the exact terms 
of the state’s approved state plan.  (See Quesada, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 312.)   
Finally, there is no reason to “discount” Congress’s awareness and 
acceptance of the “background tapestry” of state law in this area.  (Quesada, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 312)  In the federal OSH Act’s savings clause, Congress 
explicitly recognized the continuing applicability of state law in the field.  (See 29 
U.S.C. § 653(b)(4).)  Under that clause, tort litigation could produce large civil 
awards and penalties despite the existence of a more modest state administrative 
enforcement plan, but such litigation is not preempted.  Therefore, the magnitude 
of the potential UCL and FAL penalties compared with the lesser administrative 
penalties imposed under the state plan are not inconsistent with the federal 
scheme.   
Under the circumstances, there is no “clear and manifest evidence” 
(Quesada, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 315) of a congressional intent to displace state 
authority over unfair competition and consumer claims that are premised on 
Cal/OSHA standards. 
B.  No express preemption of UCL and FAL claims 
As noted above, the federal OSH Act does not state that claims such as 
UCL and FAL claims or that enforcement actions beyond those specified in a state 
 
35 
plan are preempted until they are included in a plan and approved by the Secretary 
of Labor.  However, despite the absence of such a statement, express preemption 
may be found where an act’s structure and language reflect a clear purpose of 
Congress to preempt state law.  (See Gade, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 112-113 (conc. 
opn. of Kennedy, J.) [express preemption of state law established by federal OSH 
Act provisions that allow state regulation where there is no relevant federal 
standard, require a state to submit a plan in order to assume responsibility for 
worker safety and health, set forth conditions for approval of a plan, and require 
continuing evaluation of a plan by the Secretary of Labor].)   
As our discussion above of implied preemption reflects, when a state has 
obtained approval of a state plan for the regulation of worker safety and health, 
state law preempts federal law.  Moreover, with respect to the enforcement of 
safety and health standards, the federal OSH Act requires enforcement at least as 
effective as under the federal act; there is no indication in the language or structure 
of the federal OSH Act that states with approved plans cannot supplement 
enforcement of federally-approved standards by means of unfair business practice 
claims.  (See Farm Raised Salmon Cases, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1090 [permitting  
UCL claim to proceed and finding it significant that nothing in the federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act said anything restricting the range of remedies states could 
provide].)  Finally, the federal OSH Act allows a state with an approved plan to 
implement modifications or additions without prior approval of the plan change by 
Federal OSHA.   
In the absence of a clear and manifest congressional purpose to preempt 
claims such as the UCL and FAL claims asserted in this action, such claims are 
encompassed in the presumption against preemption that arises upon a state’s 
assumption of responsibility under the federal OSH Act to regulate worker safety 
and health.  (See Quesada, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 315.) 
 
36 
III.  Disposition 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its order granting the 
petition for writ of mandate and instead to deny the petition for writ of mandate, 
and to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
WE CONCUR:  
 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
MIHARA, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 229 Cal.App.4th 1291 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S222314 
Date Filed: February 8, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Orange 
Judge: Kim Garlin Dunning 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Fox Rothschild, David F. Faustman; Jones Day, Brian A. Sun and Frederick D. Friedman for Petitioners. 
 
Luke A. Wake; Alston & Bird and Damien M. Schiff for National Federation of Independent Business 
Small Business Legal Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Phil Goldberg, Cary Silverman, Patrick Gregory; Manufacturers’ Center for Legal 
Action, Linda E. Kelly and Patrick N. Forrest for National Association of Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
Lawrence H. Kay for Construction Employers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney, and Kelly A. Ernby, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in 
Interest. 
 
Mark Zahner for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in 
Interest. 
 
Christopher Jagard, Mi Kim, Amy D. Martin, Suzanne P. Marria and Kathryn J. Woods for State of 
California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health as Amicus 
Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
David F. Faustman 
Fox Rothschild 
345 California Street, Suite 2200 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 364-5540 
 
Kelly A. Ernby 
Deputy District Attorney 
Post Office Box 808 
Santa Ana, CA  92702 
(714) 834-3600 
 
Mi Kim 
Department of Industrial Relations 
1515 Clay Street, Suite 701 
Oakland, CA  94612 
(510) 286-3800