Title: Griffin v. The Spacemaker Group

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
HOPE GRIFFIN 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
v. Record No. 961851 
JUNE 6, 1997 
 
THE SPACEMAKER GROUP, INC., 
 T/A RICHMOND CLARKLIFT COMPANY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
 
This is an appeal in an action asserting negligent servicing 
and reconditioning of an industrial lift truck resulting in 
personal injury to the plaintiff.  We consider whether the trial 
court properly excluded certain expert testimony offered by the 
plaintiff. 
 
Background
 
When summary judgment is based upon the granting of a motion 
to strike a party's evidence, we view the evidence and the 
inferences reasonably raised thereby in the light most favorable 
to the party whose evidence has been stricken.  See Meador v. 
Lawson, 214 Va. 759, 761, 204 S.E.2d 285, 287 (1974). 
 
This case involves a Clarklift three-wheel TW-25 lift truck 
(forklift).  Three of the operational and safety features of that 
model forklift are relevant to the issue we address here.  
Although the record contains extensive technical descriptions of 
these features, for our purposes the essential details can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
The TW-25 forklift's two drive wheels are operated by an 
electric motor.  The forklift's accelerator assembly consists of 
a pedal and mechanical shaft.  When the pedal is depressed, the 
shaft activates a switch which sends electric current from the 
batteries to the motor.  The shaft of the accelerator assembly 
shares its housing with two hydraulic hoses which are part of the 
forklift's cargo handler control system.  These hoses can make 
periodic contact with the accelerator assembly and may become 
abraded as a result.  It is not disputed in this case that the 
accident occurred because one of these hoses made contact with 
the accelerator assembly and caused it to stick in the depressed 
or "on" position. 
 
The forklift's primary braking system is operated by 
depressing either of two brake pedals which rotate a shaft with 
two arms.  One arm activates a brake drum rod, causing friction 
brakes to be applied to the drive wheels; the shaft's other arm 
activates an electrical cut-off switch which interrupts the flow 
of electricity to the motor. 
 
Under the operator's seat of the forklift is a "deadman's 
switch" which serves as a redundant emergency braking system.  
Sufficient weight must be placed on the operator's seat to cause 
a connection in the switch which allows electricity to flow to 
the motor.  If the weight is removed, spring tension causes the 
seat to rise, breaking the connection in the switch and 
interrupting the flow of electricity to the motor.  Removing the 
weight on the seat also causes a mechanical parking brake to be 
applied. 
 
In late 1992, Stanley Hardware Division (Stanley), part of a 
multi-state corporation with a manufacturing and warehouse 
facility in the City of Richmond, acquired five TW-25 forklifts 
as part of the purchase of another company.  The forklifts had 
been in service for over twenty years at the time they were 
acquired.  Stanley determined that the forklifts required 
servicing and reconditioning prior to being added to the fleet of 
seven other forklifts already in use in its Richmond facility.  
Stanley contracted with The SpaceMaker Group, Inc., trading as 
Richmond Clarklift Co. (Clarklift), to bring the forklifts "to a 
level of dependability" including the replacement of all parts as 
necessary. 
 
The forklifts were in Clarklift's possession for four and a 
half weeks during which time they were serviced by different 
employees.  Jerald LaMaskin, owner of Clarklift, testified that 
the reconditioning of a forklift would include examining the 
safety features of the accelerator and brake assemblies and the 
deadman's switch, and repairing or replacing any defective parts 
which were discovered. 
 
Clarklift returned the forklifts to Stanley in April 1993, 
and Stanley placed them into service.  Because of the number of 
other forklifts available, forklift No. 5, the forklift involved 
in the accident, received relatively light use, with only 
approximately 101 hours of operation being recorded on its 
service meter over a six and a half month period.  LaMaskin 
testified that 20 to 30 hours of operation per week would be 
common use for this model forklift. 
 
On November 1, 1993, Hope Griffin was working at Stanley's 
facility operating a packaging machine.  Stephanie Ghee, another 
Stanley employee, was operating forklift No. 5, bringing 
materials to the packaging machine.  After transporting a pallet 
with materials to be packaged to the work floor near the 
packaging machine, Ghee began to back the forklift away from the 
pallet.  Griffin was facing the packaging machine with her back 
to Ghee and the forklift. 
 
Ghee testified that when she depressed the accelerator pedal 
"the forklift just went all out of control."  Griffin was struck 
by the rear of the forklift and pinned against the packaging 
machine.  Although Ghee applied the foot brake, the forklift's 
drive wheels continued to spin.  Ghee attempted several times to 
move the forklift's gear shift from reverse to neutral and then 
to forward.  After Ghee had made several attempts to change 
gears, the forklift moved forward freeing Griffin.  Ghee then 
jumped off the forklift which continued to travel forward and 
struck another piece of machinery on the work floor.  Another 
employee then boarded the forklift and turned off its ignition 
switch. 
 
An inspection of the forklift's accelerator assembly housing 
showed that the hydraulic hoses were loose inside the assembly in 
such a way that they would make periodic contact with the 
accelerator linkage.  One of the hoses had caught on the 
accelerator linkage, causing it to stick in the depressed or "on" 
position.  The hoses showed signs of abrasion indicating repeated 
contact with the accelerator linkage. 
 
An inspection of the foot brake assembly showed that the arm 
which would have activated the electrical cut-off switch did not 
reach the switch when the brakes were applied.  This defect was 
the result of excessive wear in the connection between the arm 
and the rotating brake shaft.  Similarly, the deadman's switch 
mechanisms were misadjusted so that neither the electrical cut-
off switch nor the parking brake would be activated by removal of 
weight from the operator's seat. 
 
Griffin filed a motion for judgment alleging that Clarklift 
was negligent in the manner in which it reconditioned the 
forklift.  Relevant to this appeal, the principal disputed issue 
at trial was whether the abrasion of the hydraulic hoses was such 
that it would have been apparent at the time the forklift was 
serviced, putting Clarklift on notice that the hoses needed 
replacing and tying down in order to avoid their catching on the 
accelerator linkage.  Clarklift maintained that the condition of 
the hoses at the time it serviced the forklift was a matter of 
conjecture due to the passage of time between the reconditioning 
and the accident. 
 
At trial, LaMaskin testified that had the abrasion been 
discovered during the reconditioning, the hoses would have been 
replaced and "rerouted," though not necessarily tied down.  
LaMaskin further testified that the "abrasion did not happen in 
one day, that it happened over a period of time, and it could 
[have been] several months." 
 
Griffin sought to introduce expert testimony from Curtiss 
Owen, a forklift mechanic with 15 years experience, and Charles 
Crim, a materials engineer employed by an independent testing 
lab, concerning the length of time it would take for the abrasion 
of the hydraulic hoses to occur and whether that defective 
condition, and the other defects previously mentioned, would have 
been obvious at the time of the reconditioning.  In each 
instance, Clarklift objected to such testimony on the ground that 
it would be mere speculation to attempt to determine, from its 
condition some months later, the condition of the forklift at the 
time it was reconditioned.  In each instance the trial court 
sustained the objection. 
 
Griffin proffered testimony from the two experts that the 
abrasion of the hoses could not have occurred entirely during the 
101 hours of use following the reconditioning.  Each expert noted 
that the exterior rubber coating and the interior steel mesh 
housing of the hoses were extremely durable.  Crim stated that 
the hoses would have been in substantially the same condition at 
the time of the reconditioning as they appeared following the 
accident.  Owen estimated the level of abrasion indicated that it 
had occurred over "[t]he life of the machine." 
 
At the conclusion of Griffin's evidence, Clarklift made a 
motion to strike Griffin's evidence on the ground that it failed 
to show that the defective condition of the hydraulic hoses, the 
foot brake assembly, and the deadman's switch existed at the time 
Clarklift serviced the forklift and that Clarklift was aware of 
these conditions.  Although stating that it did so "with great 
reluctan[ce]," the trial court sustained Clarklift's motion to 
strike because "there would be at most rank speculation to figure 
out how long . . . these conditions existed."  We awarded Griffin 
this appeal. 
 
The Expert Testimony
 
The thrust of the expert testimony excluded by the trial 
court was that the abrasion of the hoses could not have occurred 
entirely during the 101 hours of use following the 
reconditioning, and, thus, that the defective condition existed 
during the time Clarklift serviced the forklift.  In Tittsworth 
v. Robinson, 252 Va. 151, 475 S.E.2d 261 (1996), we summarized 
the circumstances under which expert testimony is to be 
permitted: 
 
 
Generally, expert testimony is admissible in civil 
cases if it will assist the fact finder in 
understanding the evidence.  Such testimony, however, 
must meet certain fundamental requirements.  Such 
testimony cannot be speculative or founded upon 
assumptions that have an insufficient factual basis.  
Such testimony also is inadmissible if the expert has 
failed to consider all the variables that bear upon the 
inferences to be deduced from the facts observed. 
Id. at 154, 475 S.E.2d at 263 (citations omitted). 
 
Contrary to Clarklift's contention that the two experts 
based their opinions solely on their observation of the end 
condition of the hoses, the record shows that each considered the 
structure and design of the hoses and the force necessary to 
cause abrasion of their exterior coating and interior lining.  
These factors are not matters of common knowledge; thus the 
experts' opinions would have been of benefit to the jury in 
understanding the evidence.  Moreover, the experts' assumption 
that the abrasion of the hoses occurred through repetitive 
contact of moderate force over a long period of time, rather than 
constant contact during the 101 hours the forklift was in 
service, was premised upon a sufficient factual basis established 
by their inspection of the forklift and their knowledge of its 
mechanical operation.  Although Clarklift could challenge the 
weight to be given to this assumption on cross-examination, we 
hold that the trial court erred in excluding the expert 
testimony.  Moreover, this evidence alone is sufficient to raise 
a jury question whether Clarklift was negligent in not 
discovering and repairing the defective condition of the 
forklift. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand the case for a new trial. 
 
Reversed and remanded.