Title: PEOPLE OF MI V GEVON RAMON DAVIS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 7, 2005 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 125436 
GEVON RAMON DAVIS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
_______________________________ 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
WEAVER, J.   
The issue presented is whether our Double Jeopardy 
Clause1 prohibits the state of Michigan from prosecuting 
defendant for the theft of an automobile from Michigan 
after defendant pleaded guilty in Kentucky, where he was 
apprehended, to a charge of attempted theft of the 
automobile by unlawful taking. We overrule People v Cooper2 
and hold that our Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar 
1 Const 1963, art 1, § 15. 
2 398 Mich 450; 247 NW2d 866 (1976). 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
defendant’s 
successive 
state 
prosecution 
in 
Michigan 
because the entities seeking to prosecute defendant in this 
case—Kentucky and Michigan—are separate sovereigns deriving 
their authority to punish from distinct sources of power. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial 
court’s order granting defendant’s motion to quash the 
information is reversed and the case is remanded to the 
trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Facts 
It is not disputed that defendant stole a 1999 
Chevrolet 
Malibu, 
valued 
at 
$8,200, 
and 
drove 
the 
automobile 
from 
Michigan 
to 
Kentucky, 
where 
he 
was 
apprehended. 
On August 22, 2001, defendant was charged in Kentucky 
with theft by unlawful taking or disposition of property 
valued at $300 or more.3
 On September 4, 2001, defendant 
pleaded guilty to an amended charge of attempted theft by 
unlawful taking or disposition of property valued at $300 
or more.4
 He was sentenced to 365 days in jail, to be 
suspended during two years’ probation. 
On March 22, 2002, defendant was charged in Genesee 
County, Michigan, with unlawfully driving away a motor 
3 Ky Rev Stat Ann 514.030. 
4 Ky Rev Stat Ann 506.010 and 506.020 address criminal
attempt. 
2 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vehicle and with receiving and concealing stolen property.5 
Defendant moved to quash the information on the basis of 
double 
jeopardy, 
asserting 
that 
the 
double 
jeopardy 
provision of the Michigan Constitution6 and the case People 
v Cooper prohibited a second prosecution in Michigan for 
the theft of the automobile, unless the interests of 
Michigan and Kentucky were substantially different. 
The 
trial court granted defendant’s motion on June 11, 2002, 
and dismissed the charges, concluding that the case was 
controlled by People v Cooper. 
The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam.7  The Court 
of Appeals concluded that Cooper was still the controlling 
law because only three justices from this Court would have 
overruled Cooper in People v Mezy.8 
This Court granted the prosecutor’s application for 
leave to appeal.9 
5 MCL 750.413 and 750.535(3)(a).  
6 Const 1963, art 1, § 15.  
7 People v Davis, unpublished opinion per curiam of the 
Court of Appeals, issued November 25, 2003 (Docket No.
242207). 
8 453 Mich 269; 551 NW2d 389 (1996). 
9 470 Mich 870 (2004). 
3 
 
 
 
 
  
Standard of Review 
Whether the information should have been quashed on 
the basis of double jeopardy is a question of law that this 
Court reviews de novo. 
People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 573; 
677 NW2d 1 (2004). 
In interpreting a constitutional 
provision, 
the 
primary 
rule 
of 
constitutional 
interpretation has been described by Justice Cooley: 
“A constitution is made for the people and
by the people. The interpretation that should be
given it is that which reasonable minds, the
great mass of the people themselves, would give
it. ‘For as the Constitution does not derive its 
force from the convention which framed, but from
the people who ratified it, the intent to be
arrived at is that of the people, and it is not 
to be supposed that they have looked for any dark
or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but
rather that they have accepted them in the sense
most obvious to the common understanding, and
ratified the instrument in the belief that that 
was the sense designed to be conveyed.’”[Traverse 
City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 
390, 405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971)(quoting Cooley’s 
Const Lim 81)(added emphasis omitted).] 
Analysis 
At issue in the present case is whether our Double 
Jeopardy Clause prohibits charging and trying defendant in 
Michigan for the theft of an automobile from Michigan after 
he pleaded guilty in Kentucky, where he was apprehended, to 
attempted theft of the automobile. Answering this question 
requires us to determine whether this Court correctly 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
   
 
construed our Double Jeopardy Clause and correctly applied 
the doctrine of dual sovereignty in People v Cooper.10 
Michigan’s Double Jeopardy Clause provides, “No person 
shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy.” Const 1963, art 1, § 15. The federal provision 
is substantially similar, providing “nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb . . . .” US Const, Am V. In Nutt, supra, 
we explained that the protections provided by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause include: 
(1) protection against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) 
protection against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after conviction, and (3) protection against 
multiple punishments for the same offense. 
Nutt, supra at 
574. 
In Nutt, we further concluded that 
10 Justice Kelly in dissent asserts that the majority
answers the wrong question when it decides whether this
Court “correctly applied the doctrine of dual sovereignty
in People v Cooper.” 
“The appropriate question,” she
asserts, 
“is 
whether 
the 
Cooper 
decision 
correctly
interpreted our state’s constitution.” 
Post at 9. 
The 
dissent is mistaken. 
There is no difference between the 
“question” as phrased by the majority and the “question” as
phrased by the dissent; both are ways of stating the issue
in this case, which is whether Michigan’s Constitution
prohibits charging and trying defendant in Michigan for the
theft of an automobile from Michigan after he pleaded
guilty in Kentucky, where he was apprehended, of attempted
theft of the automobile. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
in adopting art 1, § 15, the people of this state
intended that our double jeopardy provision would
be construed consistently with Michigan precedent
and the Fifth Amendment. [Id. at 591.] 
This conclusion was based, in part, on an examination of 
the record of the constitutional convention in 1961. 
Id. 
at 588-590. In 1835, Michigan’s Constitution, art 1, § 12, 
contained 
language 
similar 
to 
that 
of 
the 
federal 
constitution: 
“No person, for the same offense, shall be 
twice put in jeopardy of punishment.” 
Nutt, supra at 588. 
In 1850 and 1908, the language of this provision was 
changed to “No person, after acquittal upon the merits, 
shall be tried for the same offense.” Const 1850, art 6, § 
29; Const 1908, art 2, § 14; Nutt, supra at 588; 1 Official 
Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 465. At the 1961 
constitutional 
convention, 
it 
was 
proposed 
that 
the 
provision be revised to once again mirror the language of 
the federal constitution. 
Nutt, supra at 589; 1 Official 
Record, 
Constitutional 
Convention 
1961, 
p 
465. 
In 
discussing the proposed amendment at the constitutional 
convention, it was noted by Delegate Stevens that even when 
the language differed from the federal provision in 1850 
and 1908, this Court had “‘virtually held that this means 
the same thing as the provision in the federal constitution 
. . . .’” 
1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 
1961, p 539. 
This historical context supports Nutt’s 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
conclusion that Michigan’s double jeopardy provision should 
be construed consistently with the Fifth Amendment. 
In Bartkus v Illinois,11 the defendant was tried in 
federal district court for the robbery of a federally 
insured savings and loan association and was acquitted. 
After his acquittal, a state grand jury indicted the 
defendant on robbery charges from the same robbery. 
The 
defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 
On appeal, the defendant asserted that his 
state conviction was barred by double jeopardy. The United 
States Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that successive 
state 
and 
federal 
prosecutions 
based 
on 
the 
same 
transaction or conduct were not barred by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 359 US at 122-124.12  The Court reasoned: 
11 359 US 121; 79 S Ct 676; 3 L Ed 2d 684 (1959). 
12 Justice Kelly references the more than thirty years
of case law on which Bartkus was based but then asserts 
that the foundation for Bartkus is “questionable” and that
it was undermined by Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784; 89 S Ct
2056; 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969). 
Post at 3, 5. 
We disagree.
As noted in Bartkus, the body of precedent on which it
relied provided “irrefutable evidence that state and 
federal courts have for years refused to bar a second trial
even though there had been a prior trial by another 
government for a similar offense,” and concluded that “it
would be disregard of a long, unbroken, unquestioned course
of impressive adjudication for the Court now to rule that
due process compels such a bar. 
Bartkus, supra at 136. 
Moreover, the Heath case discussed later in this opinion
makes it clear that the United States Supreme Court meant
what it said in Bartkus. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
It would be in derogation of our federal
system to displace the reserved power of States
over state offenses by reason of prosecution of
minor federal offenses by federal authorities 
beyond the control of the States. [Id. at 137.] 
In People v Cooper, the defendant was acquitted in 
federal court of attempting to rob a bank.  He was then 
tried in state court on charges stemming from the same 
criminal act. 
398 Mich at 453. 
In addressing the 
defendant’s argument that his trial in state court was 
barred by double jeopardy, this Court acknowledged the 
holding in Bartkus that successive prosecutions were not 
barred by double jeopardy, but decided that a “trend in 
United States Supreme Court decisions” suggested “that the 
permissibility 
of 
Federal-state 
prosecutions 
as 
a 
requirement 
of 
our 
Federal 
system 
[was] 
open 
to 
reassessment.” 
Id. at 457. 
The Court opined that the 
trend it perceived required increased scrutiny of the dual 
sovereignty doctrine, and that double jeopardy may bar 
successive prosecutions. 
Id. at 459-460.13
 The Court 
explained: 
13 The Cooper Court cited Elkins v United States, 364 
US 206; 80 S Ct 1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960), and Murphy v 
Waterfront Comm of New York Harbor, 378 US 52; 84 S Ct
1594; 12 L Ed 2d 678 (1964), as cases that undermined the
Bartkus decision. 
But neither case specifically addressed
whether successive prosecutions were barred by double 
jeopardy. 
The issue in Elkins was whether “articles 
obtained as the result of an unreasonable search and 
seizure by state officers, without involvement of federal
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The dual sovereignty notion is predicated on
the belief that state criminal justice systems
should be strong. 
Additionally, there is the
fear that Federal legislation which covers a 
criminal act may involve interests unlike the
interests which state legislation covering the
same criminal act may seek to promote. 
We agree
that where an individual’s behavior violated 
state and Federal laws which are framed to 
protect different social interests, prosecution
by one sovereign will not satisfy the needs of
the other sovereign. 
In such a case, given the
Federal 
government’s 
preemptive 
power, 
the 
inability of the state to vindicate its interests
would truly be an “untoward deprivation of the 
historic right and obligation of the States to
maintain peace and order within their confines.
It would be in derogation of our federal system”.
Bartkus, 
supra, 
at 
137 
(Frankfurter, 
J.).
Therefore, we cannot accept defendant’s proffered
alternative to the dual sovereignty doctrine 
which would prohibit all successive prosecutions
by two sovereigns for the same act. 
However, the interest of the Federal and
state governments in prosecuting a criminal act
frequently coincide. 
When state and Federal 
interests 
do 
coincide, 
prosecution 
by 
one 
sovereign will satisfy the need of the other.
[Id. (emphasis in original).] 
Thus, the Cooper Court held “that Const 1963, art 1, § 15 
prohibits a second prosecution for an offense arising out 
of the same criminal act unless it appears from the record 
that the interests of the State of Michigan and the 
officers, [may] be introduced in evidence against a 
defendant over his timely objection in a federal criminal
trial.” 364 US at 208. 
And the issue presented in Murphy
was “whether one jurisdiction within our federal structure
may 
compel 
a 
witness, 
whom 
it 
has 
immunized 
from 
prosecution under its laws, to give testimony which might
then be used to convict him of a crime against another such
jurisdiction.” 378 US at 53. 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
jurisdiction which initially prosecuted are substantially 
different.” Id. at 461. 
Justice Kelly in dissent makes much of the Cooper 
Court’s statement that its decision rested on Michigan’s 
Constitution. 
Id. at 461. 
But simply stating this 
conclusion does not make it so. 
A close examination of 
Cooper reveals that it was not decided on the basis of 
different language in our Constitution or on the basis of a 
different history behind Michigan’s adoption of a double 
jeopardy bar. 
Indeed, no analysis was made at all 
regarding any of the text or history of art 1, § 15, and 
apart from the conclusory statement at the end of the 
Cooper opinion that the decision was based on Michigan’s 
double jeopardy provision, there is nothing in the opinion 
actually linking this statement to the actual language or 
history of Michigan’s double jeopardy provision. 
Rather, 
the case was decided as it was because the Cooper Court 
simply questioned 
Bartkus and mistakenly perceived a 
“trend” in United States Supreme Court law.14
 Thus, 
although the Cooper Court was wrong in its understanding of 
federal law, it did look to federal law in construing 
14 Similarly, the dissent by Justice Kelly is based on
nothing more that its disagreement with the Bartkus 
decision and its desire to substitute its own double 
jeopardy policy for the double jeopardy analysis that the
language 
and 
history 
of 
Michigan’s 
double 
jeopardy
provision requires. 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Michigan’s double jeopardy provision, just as the majority 
does in this case. 
Nine years after this Court’s decision in Cooper, the 
United States Supreme Court decided Heath v Alabama,15 a 
case that demonstrates that the Cooper Court was incorrect 
about any “trend” narrowing the dual sovereignty doctrine 
or the ability of states to prosecute successively. 
In 
Heath, the petitioner hired two men to kill his wife. 
The 
petitioner met the men in Georgia, just over the border 
from his Alabama home, and led the men back to his home. 
The men kidnapped the petitioner’s wife from the home; her 
body was later found on the side of a road in Georgia. The 
petitioner pleaded guilty in Georgia to a murder charge in 
exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment. 
He was then 
indicted in Alabama for the capital offense of murder 
during a kidnapping, convicted, and sentenced to death. 
474 US at 83-86. 
The petitioner asserted that the Alabama 
prosecution constituted double jeopardy. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the double 
jeopardy issue and “requested the parties to address the 
question of the applicability of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine to successive prosecutions by two States.” Id. at 
87. 
15 474 US 82; 106 S Ct 433; 88 L Ed 2d 387 (1985).
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Heath Court determined that the dual sovereignty 
doctrine permitted successive prosecutions under the laws 
of different states. The Court explained: 
The dual sovereignty doctrine, as originally
articulated and consistently applied by this 
Court, compels the conclusion that successive 
prosecutions by two States for the same conduct
are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on
the common-law conception of crime as an offense
against the sovereignty of the government. 
When 
a defendant in a single act violates the “peace
and dignity” of two sovereigns by breaking the
laws of each, he has committed two distinct 
“offences.” 
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377, 382 (1922). As the Court explained in Moore 
v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19 (1852), “[an] 
offense, in its legal signification, means the
transgression of a law.” 
Consequently, when the
same act transgresses the laws of two sovereigns,
“it cannot be truly averred that the offender has
been twice punished for the same offense; but
only that by one act he has committed two 
offenses, 
for 
each 
of 
which 
he 
is 
justly
punishable.” Id., at 20. 
In applying the dual sovereignty doctrine,
then, the crucial determination is whether the
two entities that seek successively to prosecute
a defendant for the same course of conduct can be 
termed separate sovereigns. 
This determination 
turns on whether the two entities draw their 
authority to punish the offender from distinct
sources of power. 
See, e.g., United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978); Waller v. 
Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 393 (1970); Puerto Rico v. 
Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264-265 (1937); Lanza, 
supra, at 382; Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 
333, 354-355 (1907). 
Thus, the Court has 
uniformly held that the States are separate
sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government
because each State’s power to prosecute is 
derived from its own “inherent sovereignty,” not
from the Federal Government. 
Wheeler, supra, at
320, n. 14. 
See Abbate v. United States, 359 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. 187, 193-194 (1959) (collecting cases); 
Lanza, supra. As stated in Lanza, supra, at 382: 
“Each government in determining what shall
be an offense against its peace and dignity is
exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the
other. 
“It follows that an act denounced as a crime 
by both national and state sovereignties is an 
offense against the peace and dignity of both and
may be punished by each.” 
See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 
(1959); Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256,
258 (1927) (Holmes, J.)(the proposition that the
State and Federal Governments may punish the same
conduct 
“is 
too 
plain 
to 
need 
more 
than 
statement”). 
The States are no less sovereign with 
respect to each other than they are with respect
to the Federal Government. 
Their powers to 
undertake 
criminal 
prosecutions 
derive 
from 
separate and independent sources of power and
authority originally belonging to them before 
admission to the Union and preserved to them by
the Tenth Amendment. [Id. at 88-89.] 
The Court further explained that in cases where it had 
found the dual sovereignty doctrine inapplicable, it had 
done so “because the two prosecuting entities did not 
derive their powers to prosecute from independent sources 
of authority.” 
Id. at 90. 
The Court explicitly rejected 
the balancing of interests approach adopted by this Court 
in Cooper. Id. at 92-93. 
The correctness of the Cooper decision, particularly 
in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heath, has already been questioned.
 In People v Mezy,16 
three justices17 stated that they would overrule Cooper and 
hold that the double jeopardy provisions of the Michigan 
Constitution and the United States Constitution did not bar 
successive state and federal prosecutions. 
453 Mich at 
272. 
The justices noted that the United States Supreme 
Court had consistently held that successive state and 
federal prosecutions did not violate double jeopardy. 
Id. 
at 278-280. 
Further, the justices noted that there was no 
“‘compelling’” reason to afford greater protection under 
the Michigan double jeopardy provision than the federal and 
that the two provisions should be treated as “‘affording 
the same protections.’” 
Id. at 280-281, quoting People v 
Perlos, 436 Mich 305, 313 n 7; 462 NW2d 310 (1990).18 
Consistent with the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Heath and with the reasoning of three justices 
of this Court in Mezy, we now overrule People v Cooper.19 
16 453 Mich 269; 551 NW2d 389 (1996). 
17 The opinion was written by Justice Weaver and signed
by Justices Boyle and Riley. 
18 The justices also noted that, contrary to the Cooper
Court’s decision, the majority of states hold that both the
United States Constitution and their constitutions allow 
for dual prosecutions by the state and federal governments.
453 Mich at 281 n 14. 
19 As recently noted, although we overrule precedent
with caution, the doctrine of stare decisis is not applied
14 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
As noted in Nutt, the common understanding of the people at 
the time that our double jeopardy provision was ratified 
was that the provision would be construed consistently with 
the 
federal 
double 
jeopardy 
jurisprudence 
that 
then 
existed. 
Applying the reasoning of Bartkus, which was 
clearly reaffirmed in Heath, the entities seeking to 
prosecute in this case—Kentucky and Michigan—are separate 
sovereigns deriving their authority to punish from distinct 
sources of power. 
Therefore, the prosecution of defendant 
in Michigan for the theft of the automobile is not barred 
by double jeopardy.20 
mechanically to prevent the Court from overruling previous
decisions that are erroneous. 
We may overrule a prior
decision when we are certain that it was wrongly decided
and “‘less injury will result from overruling than from
following it.’” 
People v Moore, 470 Mich 56, 69 n 17; 679
NW2d 41 (2004), quoting McEvoy v Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich 
172, 178; 98 NW 1006 (1904). 
The United States Supreme
Court decision in Heath clearly demonstrates that the 
Cooper Court was wrong about any “trend” that it thought it
observed in United States Supreme Court case law concerning
dual sovereignty and double jeopardy. 
Further, the Cooper
Court failed to consider the language of our double 
jeopardy 
provision 
or 
its 
historical 
context. 
Additionally, there are no relevant “reliance” interests
involved and therefore overruling Cooper would not produce
any “practical real-world dislocations.” 
See Robinson v 
Detroit, 
462 
Mich 
439, 
466; 
613 
NW2d 
307 
(2000).
Therefore, we overrule the erroneous decision made by the
Cooper Court. 
20 Justice Kelly in asserts that by looking to federal
law to guide the interpretation of our double jeopardy
provision, 
we 
are 
somehow 
giving 
away 
the 
people’s
sovereignty. 
Post at 18. We disagree. Rather, it is the
dissent’s interpretation that would cede this state’s 
sovereignty to another state by foreclosing prosecution in
15 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the 
trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to quash is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
Michigan, when there is no evidence in our constitutional
history that the people of Michigan sought, in adopting
Const 1963, art 1, § 15, to cede any of this state’s
sovereignty to the federal government or another state.
Any abrogation based on double jeopardy principles of 
Michigan’s sovereign power to prosecute offenders is a
decision properly left to the people by amending the 
Constitution, and not to this Court. Further, we note that
the 
Michigan 
Legislature 
has 
statutorily 
forbidden 
successive prosecutions only with regard to prosecutions
concerning illegal drugs. 
MCL 333.7409 provides: “If a
violation of this article is a violation of a federal law 
or the law of another state, a conviction or acquittal
under federal law or the law of another state for the same 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state.”
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 125436 
GEVON RAMON DAVIS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
This Court has granted the prosecutor’s request to 
further weaken the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Michigan 
Constitution. The majority agrees with the prosecutor that 
the state’s Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar this 
Michigan prosecution, despite the fact that Kentucky has 
already convicted defendant of the same crime. 
I dissent. 
Our decision in People v Cooper1 provides 
the appropriate protection against double jeopardy to 
Michigan 
citizens 
and 
to 
others 
within 
the 
state’s 
jurisdiction. 
The majority decision presents yet another 
instance in which this Court's majority disagrees with 
existing precedent, gives it short shrift, and changes 
1 398 Mich 450; 247 NW2d 866 (1976). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan law. 
I strongly disagree with the majority's 
choice to overrule Cooper. 
This case does not present one of those rare occasions 
that requires reversing a previous decision of the Court. 
I would affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals and, in 
doing so, I would follow this Court’s precedent in Cooper. 
I. Facts and Status of the Case 
Defendant allegedly stole an acquaintance’s car or 
acquired it after someone else stole it in Michigan. 
He 
then drove the car to Kentucky, where he was arrested. 
By 
agreement with the Kentucky prosecutor, defendant pleaded 
guilty of attempted theft by unlawful taking or disposition 
of property valued at $300 or more. 
Ky Rev Stat Ann 
514.030. 
Later, defendant was charged in Michigan for the same 
car theft. 
The prosecutor accused him of unlawfully 
driving away a motor vehicle (UDAA), MCL 751.413, and 
receiving and concealing stolen property with a value of 
$1,000 or more but less than $20,000. 
MCL 750.535(3)(a). 
On 
defendant’s 
motion, 
the 
trial 
court 
quashed 
the 
information and dismissed the charges on the basis that 
they violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Michigan 
Constitution. 
Const 1963, art 1, § 15. 
The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision. People v Davis, unpublished 
2  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 
25, 2003 (Docket No. 242207). 
II. Federal Double Jeopardy Jurisprudence 
The United States Supreme Court determined in Bartkus 
v Illinois2 that the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy 
Clause3 allows successive prosecutions by the federal and 
state governments. 
But Bartkus rests on a questionable foundation. The 
opinion is premised on a concept of dual sovereignty that 
the United States Supreme Court began to recognize in dicta 
starting in the mid-nineteenth century.4  The doctrine was 
not applied at common law. 
It was first utilized by the 
Court in 1922, in United States v Lanza, 260 US 377; 43 S 
Ct 141; 67 L Ed 314 (1922). 
2 359 US 121; 79 S Ct 676; 3 L Ed 2d 684 (1959). 
3 The relevant portion of the federal Double Jeopardy
Clause reads, "nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb
. . . ." US Const, Am V. 
4 See Fox v Ohio, 46 US 410; 12 L Ed 213 (1847) (a
state may prosecute for passing false coin; the federal
government may prosecute for counterfeiting; the former is
a private wrong, while the latter is an offense directly
against the federal government); United States v Marigold,
50 US 560; 13 L Ed 257 (1850) (federal statute and federal
prosecution for uttering false coinage was constitutionally
permissible); Moore v Illinois, 55 US 13; 14 L Ed 306
(1852) (Illinois law and federal fugitive slave law 
dissimilar 
in 
essential 
purpose, 
definition 
of 
the 
offenses, and type of punishment each statute authorized). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1937, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment 
did 
not 
incorporate 
the 
Fifth 
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause against the states. 
Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319; 58 S Ct 149; 82 L Ed 288 
(1937), overruled by Benton v Maryland, 395 US 784; 89 S Ct 
2056; 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969). In several earlier cases, the 
Court had allowed multiple state and federal prosecutions 
for the same offense. 
It had permitted the federal 
government to prosecute an offense for which a state court 
had already obtained a conviction. 
Lanza, supra at 382. 
Later, it had allowed states and the federal government to 
criminalize the same conduct. 
Westfall v United States, 
274 US 256, 258; 47 S Ct 629; 71 L Ed 1036 (1927). 
Then, in 1959, the United States Supreme Court in 
Bartkus allowed a state prosecution to proceed after the 
defendant had been acquitted of the charged offense in a 
federal court. It found that the federal Double Jeopardy 
Clause did not prohibit state prosecutions for state 
criminal offenses. 
The reasoning of these cases was based on the argument 
that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause was 
inapplicable to the states. Indeed, this was explicitly 
noted in Bartkus, in which Justice Frankfurter stated his 
4  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
view that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply the first 
eight amendments to the states. Bartkus, supra at 124. 
In 1969, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the 
Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In Benton v Maryland,5 the Court held 
that the Fifth Amendment protection is “a fundamental ideal 
in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to 
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.” 
Benton, 
supra at 794. Because Bartkus was based on the belief that 
the Fifth Amendment had no application to the states, 
Benton undermined the reasoning of Bartkus.6
 See Smith v 
United States, 423 US 1303, 1307; 96 S Ct 2; 46 L Ed 2d 9 
(1975) (Douglas, Circuit Justice). 
5 395 US 784; 89 S Ct 2056; 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969). 
6 At least one commentator has recognized the paradox
created by the dual sovereignty doctrine: 
The doctrine of selective incorporation,
which makes the Double Jeopardy Clause applicable
to the states, . . . depends upon the rationale
that by enacting the Fourteenth Amendment the
states surrendered a part of their sovereignty to
the federal government. Yet, the dual sovereignty
doctrine maintains that both the states and the 
federal government, bound by the same Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause 
because 
of 
their 
shared 
sovereignty, are separate sovereigns for purposes
of assessing possible violations of the Clause.
See, e.g., Heath, 474 U.S. [82; 106 S Ct 433; 88
L Ed 2d 387 (1985)]. 
[McAninch, Unfolding the
law of double jeopardy, 44 SC L R 411, 425 n 104
(1993).] 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
The weak underpinnings of the Bartkus line of cases is 
highlighted when one considers the common law on which our 
system of constitutional jurisprudence is based. As Justice 
Black noted in his vigorous Bartkus dissent, and as legal 
scholars continue to note,7 the English common law did not 
recognize the concept of dual sovereignty. 
Justice Black pointed out that protection from double 
jeopardy is part of the common law of nations. 
Bartkus, 
supra at 154 (Black, J., dissenting), citing Batchelder, 
Former 
Jeopardy, 
17 
Am 
L 
R 
735 
(1883). 
In 
fact, 
international law recognizes that multiple prosecutions by 
separate nations violate fundamental human rights.8 
7 See, for example, Comment, The dual sovereignty 
exception to double jeopardy: An unnecessary loophole, 24 U
Balt L R 177, 180 (1994), citing Comment, Successive 
prosecution by state and federal governments for offenses 
arising out of the same act, 44 Minn L R 534, 537 n 18
(1960); Harrison, Federalism and double jeopardy: A study
in the frustration of human rights, 17 U Miami L R 306
(1963); Grant, Successive prosecutions by state and nation: 
Common law and british empire comparisons, 4 UCLA L R 1
(1956). 
8 
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, art 14(7), 999 UNTS 171, 177 (1976). 
A 
nation may not extradite a person if doing so would expose
that person to subsequent prosecution for the same crime.
1 Restatement Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
3d, § 476(1)(b), p 566. 
The protection from double 
jeopardy has been a part of our western civilization since
at least Greek and Roman times and is a "'universal maxim 
of common law.'" 
Bartkus, supra at 151-153, (Black, J., 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-Bartkus cases also raised questions regarding 
whether the dual sovereignty doctrine on which Bartkus was 
based would survive unscathed. For instance, in Elkins v 
United States,9 the Court rejected the dual sovereignty 
doctrine in the context of search and seizure. 
There, the 
Court held that where state authorities obtained evidence 
during a search that would have violated the Fourth 
Amendment, the evidence must be excluded at the federal 
level. 
 
Likewise, in Murphy v Waterfront Comm of New York 
Harbor,10 the Court refused to apply the dual sovereignty 
doctrine. 
It held that a state may not constitutionally 
compel a witness to testify when that testimony might be 
used against him in a federal prosecution. These decisions 
rejecting the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine 
in other contexts, coupled with the Benton decision, 
prompted comment by many courts, including the Cooper 
Court. 
The question was whether the dual sovereignty 
doctrine would continue to be applied in the double 
jeopardy context. 
dissenting), quoting 2 Cooley, Blackstone's Commentaries,
(4th ed, 1899), p 1481. 
9 364 US 206; 80 S Ct 1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960). 
10 378 US 52; 84 S Ct 1594; 12 L Ed 2d 678 (1964). 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
More recently, though, the United States Supreme Court 
has held that successive prosecutions by individual states 
do not violate the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy 
protection. Heath v Alabama, 474 US 82; 106 S Ct 433; 88 L 
Ed 2d 387 (1985). 
In Heath, the Supreme Court not only 
resurrected the dual sovereignty doctrine, it extended the 
doctrine to successive prosecutions by different states. No 
matter how flawed the reasoning of Bartkus, then, the 
Supreme Court has validated it. 
It has verified that, 
under current federal law, the dual sovereignty doctrine 
allows for successive prosecutions when they are initiated 
by different sovereigns. 
This Court clearly does not have the power to overrule 
United States Supreme Court precedent in interpreting the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. 
On the other hand, we are not bound to adopt that Court's 
analysis of the federal constitution when we interpret the 
Michigan Constitution. This is especially true when the 
analysis is flawed. While the Court's decision regarding a 
similar constitutional provision provides guidance, the 
rights of Michiganians are not tied to what the Court chose 
to do with a federal constitutional provision. 
Although the Michigan Supreme Court commented in 
Cooper on the direction it thought the United States 
8  
 
 
 
Supreme Court was headed, it grounded its decision on an 
interpretation of the Michigan Constitution. 
This was 
fitting. 
When determining the rights guaranteed to people 
in Michigan under the Michigan Constitution, our Court is 
not bound by later interpretations given the federal 
constitution by federal courts. 
III. The Michigan Constitution 
This case is not about the federal constitution’s 
Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection. It is about the 
double 
jeopardy 
protection 
provided 
by 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution to those within the jurisdiction of this 
state. 
The majority claims that it must determine whether 
we "correctly applied the doctrine of dual sovereignty in 
People v Cooper." 
Ante at 5. 
The appropriate question is 
whether the Cooper decision correctly interpreted our 
state's constitution. I assert that it did. 
The Cooper Court rejected the United States Supreme 
Court's one-sided view of dual sovereignty. The current 
majority suggests that the Cooper Court incorrectly applied 
dual sovereignty, whereas the Cooper Court specifically 
rejected it. Instead, it appropriately adopted a rule that 
balances the rights of the state with the fundamental 
rights afforded to the accused. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Justice Denise Johnson of the Vermont Supreme Court 
observed, "[W]e do not need a unique state source to 
justify our differences with the interpretation of the 
federal Constitution. The concept of sovereignty gives 
state courts the right and the justification to disagree." 
Woltson, ed, Protecting Individual Rights: The Role of 
State Constitutionalism, Report of the 1992 State Judges 
Forum (1993), p 43, quoted in Shepard, The maturing nature 
of state constitution jurisprudence, 30 Val U L Rev 421, 
439 (1996). 
[O]ur courts are not obligated to accept
what we deem to be a major contraction of citizen
protections under our constitution simply because
the United States Supreme Court has chosen to do
so. We are obligated to interpret our own organic
instrument of government. [Sitz v Dep't of State
Police, 443 Mich 744, 763; 506 NW2d 209 (1993).] 
In 
interpreting 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution, 
"'the 
provisions for the protection of life, liberty and property 
are to be largely and liberally construed in favor of the 
citizen.'" Lockwood v Comm'r of Revenue, 357 Mich 517, 557; 
98 NW2d 753 (1959), quoting United States ex rel Flannery v 
Commanding Gen, Second Service Command, 69 F Supp 661, 665 
(SD NY, 1946). 
The 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause 
in 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution currently reads, "No person shall be subject 
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy." Const 
10  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
1963, art 1, § 15. To determine the parameters of this 
guarantee, we must examine the history of our state's 
constitutional and common-law heritage. 
Before 
reaching 
statehood, 
Michigan 
accepted 
the 
common law of England as part of its legal heritage. 
The 
common law was applied when Michigan was part of the 
province of Upper Canada in 1792. 
At that time, the 
legislature of Upper Canada repealed Canadian Law and 
declared that "resort should be had to the laws of England 
as the rule for the decision of [real property and civil 
rights]." 
1 Michigan Territorial Laws, Introduction, p 
viii (1871). Likewise, the Northwest Ordinance contained a 
provision indicating that the territories should apply the 
common law. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art II.11 
When the territory that would become Michigan shifted 
possession from England to the new United States of 
America, the common law remained. "It is a principle of 
universal jurisprudence that the laws, whether in writing 
or evidenced by the usage and customs of a conquered or 
ceded country, continue in force till altered by the new 
sovereign. . . . All that occurred here was the mere change 
of the sovereign power, which left all rights and laws as 
11 The 1783 Treaty of Paris finalized the boundaries
between Canada and the United States. 
11  
 
 
 
 
they had been." 1 Michigan Territorial Laws, Introduction, 
pp x-xi (1871). 
Furthermore, in 1795 the Governor and 
judges of the territory adopted an act declaring that the 
common law of England was the applicable law. 
Id. at xi­
xii. 
The common law of England held that protection from 
double 
jeopardy 
extended 
to 
prosecutions 
by 
other 
sovereigns. 
The 
practice 
in 
Great 
Britain 
in 
the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was that prosecution 
by a different sovereign precluded England from retrying a 
defendant. See State v Hogg, 118 NH 262, 265-266; 385 A2d 
844 (1978). 
Michigan adopted its first constitution in 1835. At 
that time, its double jeopardy provision read, "No person 
for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of 
punishment." Const 1835, art 1, § 12. In 1850, the state 
constitution was expanded and reworded to read, "No person 
after acquittal upon the merits shall be tried for the same 
offense." 
Const 
1850, 
art 
6, 
§ 
29. 
Constitutional 
convention notes from 1850 suggest that the proponent of 
12  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
this change considered it to be simply a clarification of 
the provision's language.12 
After the 1850 Constitution was ratified, the Michigan 
Supreme Court had occasion to interpret this new language. 
It determined that the phrase "after acquittal on the 
merits" did not mean that jeopardy attached only after a 
verdict was rendered. Writing for the Court, Justice COOLEY 
stated: 
The present Constitution of this State was
adopted in 1850, when all the tendencies of the
day were in the direction of enlarging individual
rights, giving new privileges, and imposing new
restrictions upon the powers of government in all
its departments. This is a fact of common 
notoriety in this State; and the tendencies 
referred to found expression in many of the 
provisions of the Constitution. Many common-law
rights were enlarged, and given the benefit of 
constitutional inviolability; and if any were 
taken 
away, 
or 
restricted 
in 
giving 
new 
privileges, it was only incidentally done in 
making the general system more liberal, and, as
the people believed, more just. Such a thing as
narrowing the privileges of accused parties, as
they existed at the common law, was not thought
of; but, on the contrary, pains were taken to see
that they were all enumerated and made secure. 
Some were added; and among other provisions
adopted for that purpose was the one now under
consideration. [People v Harding, 53 Mich 481,
485-486; 19 NW 155 (1884).] 
12 "Mr. C. [Delegate Crary] said he considered the
language used in the section indefinite, and his amendment
merely 
proposed 
language 
more 
definite 
and 
better 
understood." Report of the Proceedings and Debates in the
Convention to Revise the Constitution of the State of 
Michigan, p 58 (1850). 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
The Harding Court, therefore, determined that the 
language used in the 1850 Constitution was meant to expand 
the rights our state's citizens had at common law. At 
common law, a person could be retried after an acquittal on 
the merits if the first court lacked jurisdiction. The 
language of the 1850 Constitution was intended to preclude 
this "great hardship." 
Id. at 486. "It was meant to give 
a privilege not existing at the common law; it had no 
purpose to take away any which before existed." Id. 
A constitutional convention was next called in 1908, 
but that convention left the language of the double 
jeopardy 
provision 
untouched. 
During 
the 
1961 
constitutional convention, the double jeopardy provision 
again received attention. 
The convention notes suggest 
that the delegates were concerned only with the issue of 
when jeopardy attached. 
The actual language of the state 
constitution's double jeopardy provision indicated that the 
protection did not attach until a verdict of acquittal had 
been rendered. Yet, in Harding, the Michigan Supreme Court 
had determined that jeopardy attached long before the 
rendering of a verdict. 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
The 
delegates' 
discussion 
revolved 
solely 
around 
conforming the language regarding when jeopardy attached to 
the interpretation the Michigan courts had given it: 
Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman and delegates, the
original wording of this was: "No person, after
acquittal upon the merits, shall be tried for the
same offense." The Supreme Court of Michigan,
however, has virtually held that this means the
same thing as the provision in the federal 
constitution,[13] which is what we have put in: "No
person shall be subject for the same offense to
be put twice in jeopardy." 
It is true that in the opinion of some of
the jurists of the state this might make it a
little bit easier for the state to appeal in some
cases. Otherwise it makes no difference except it
brings the provision of the constitution more
clearly into the practice of this state. [1
Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961,
p 539.] 
And later, Delegate Stevens noted: 
You would think from reading this, probably—
and that is a matter of clarification—a layman
might think that only after a person has been
acquitted on the merits has he been put in 
jeopardy. 
That 
is 
not 
the 
fact 
under 
the 
decisions of the Michigan supreme court. He is 
better protected than that. There is nothing in
here that I believe can be construed to in any
way delete or reduce the rights of the defendant.
[1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 
1961, p 540.] 
13 Interestingly, while this characterized the Michigan
provision as meaning "virtually . . . the same thing as the
provision in the federal constitution" with regard to when
jeopardy attached, the Harding Court made no reference to 
the federal constitution. Its holding was grounded in our
state's unique constitutional history. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference was made to the similarity between the 
proposed provision and the language of the United States 
Constitution, the delegates noting that "[t]he wording 
which we propose is that which is found in the vast 
majority of state constitutions." 
1 Official Record, 
Constitutional Convention 1961, p 540 (Delegate Danhof). 
However, nothing suggests that they meant by the similarity 
in wording that all aspects of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
would be construed the same as other sovereigns’ clauses, 
either then or afterward. 
The only discussion at the convention centered on 
conforming the language of Michigan's Double Jeopardy 
Clause to the interpretation Michigan courts had given to 
that language. 
Silence regarding other aspects of the 
protection should not be construed to mean that the 
delegates considered federal case law the definitive 
authority regarding the meaning of our state provision. 
Rather, this silence should be taken to mean what it more 
likely signifies: 
a lack of consideration of any of the 
aspects of double jeopardy protection beyond the question 
of when jeopardy attaches. 
This specific concern was carried through to the 
people when they voted on the new constitution. The Address 
to the People contains the following language: 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
This is a revision of Sec. 14, Article II,
of the present constitution. The new language of
the first sentence involves the substitution of 
the double jeopardy provision from the U.S. 
Constitution in place of the present provision
which merely prohibits "acquittal on the merits."
This is more consistent with the actual practice 
of the courts in Michigan. [Emphasis added.] 
In addition, the preface to the Address to the People 
states, "Traditional liberties and rights of the people 
were carefully reviewed and changes made are in the 
direction of clarifying and strengthening them." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Given the full history of our constitution, and the 
history of the 1961 constitutional convention, several 
things are clear. 
First, the sole concern in revising the 
Double Jeopardy Clause in our state constitution was to 
clarify that jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn, as our 
courts had interpreted. 
It does not attach when a verdict 
is issued, as appeared from the language of the 1908 
Constitution. Second, the language regarding the United 
States Constitution in the Address to the People simply 
informs us from where that language was derived. 
The change in the Double Jeopardy Clause in the 1963 
Constitution did not signal the people's intent to adopt 
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of all 
aspects of double jeopardy protection, past and future. 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Instead, the people intended to ratify what the Michigan 
courts had already held with regard to when jeopardy 
attaches. 
Despite the history outlined above, the majority in 
People v Nutt14 took this language to mean that the people 
intended to adopt the federal interpretation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 
It assumed that the people knew what the 
United States Supreme Court had interpreted the federal 
Double Jeopardy Clause to mean, and that they agreed with 
it. It assumed that they were willing to accept all future 
interpretations that the federal courts applied to it. 
It 
assumed that they willingly gave away their sovereignty as 
a people and as a state by allowing the federal government 
to interpret our constitution for us. 
I cannot agree with all those assumptions. 
I do not 
presume that the voters of our state intended that 
Michigan’s Double Jeopardy Clause would be interpreted 
exactly as the federal provision is interpreted. 
I have reviewed our common-law history before we 
became a state, our state's constitutional history, and the 
language in the Address to the People. 
It has become 
obvious to me that the people intended that the language of 
14 469 Mich 565; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
the state Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to mean what 
Michigan courts had said it means. See Harding, supra. 
The holding in Cooper was grounded on the Michigan 
Constitution. This was specifically recognized in People v 
Gay,15 in which the Cooper decision was reaffirmed and given 
retroactive effect. As Justice Levin noted, Cooper was a 
“reasoned and careful” analysis of the state constitution. 
People v Mezy, 453 Mich 269, 299; 551 NW2d 389 (1996) 
(Levin, J, dissenting). 
Cooper protects the rights of Michigan's citizens. 
Unlike 
federal 
jurisprudence, 
it 
requires 
that 
the 
government balance those individual rights with the state's 
interest in preserving the public peace and protecting the 
public safety. Cooper held that Michigan's rights as a 
sovereign were generally vindicated when a defendant was 
brought to justice in another jurisdiction. But, it also 
recognized 
that 
there 
would 
be 
times 
when 
another 
sovereign's 
prosecution 
would 
not 
validate 
Michigan's 
interests. In those rare cases, Cooper allowed a successive 
prosecution: 
Const 1963, art 1, § 15 prohibits a second
prosecution for an offense arising out of the
same criminal act unless it appears from the
record that the interests of the State of 
15 407 Mich 681, 710-711; 289 NW2d 651 (1980). 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
Michigan and the jurisdiction which initially
prosecuted are substantially different. Analysis
on a case-by-case basis cannot be avoided. 
[Cooper, supra at 461.] 
The balancing test of Cooper protects a person’s 
rights "to avoid (1) continued embarrassment, expense and 
ordeal; (2) being compelled to live in a continuing state 
of anxiety and insecurity; and (3) the possibility that 
even though innocent he may be found guilty through 
repeated prosecutions." Cooper, supra at 460, citing United 
States v Wilson, 420 US 332, 343; 95 S Ct 1013; 43 L Ed 2d 
232 (1975), and Green v United States, 355 US 184, 187-188; 
78 S Ct 221; 2 L Ed 2d 199 (1957). 
The facts that a court should consider in applying the 
Cooper balancing test include 
whether the maximum penalties of the statutes
involved are greatly disparate, whether some 
reason exists why one jurisdiction cannot be 
entrusted 
to 
vindicate 
fully 
another 
jurisdiction's 
interests 
in 
securing 
a 
conviction, and whether the differences in the
statutes are merely jurisdictional or are more
substantive. [Cooper, supra at 461.] 
The Cooper Court’s rejection of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine as a basis for allowing successive prosecutions, 
without reference to the defendant's fundamental interest 
in being free from double jeopardy, was unanimous.16 
16 
Justice Coleman concurred in the result, but 
believed that Michigan should apply the “same-elements” 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
   
The majority uses Heath to attack the holding in 
Cooper. 
But Cooper does not rest on the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal 
constitution. It rests on the Michigan constitution. It 
depends on balancing the interest of the state in curbing 
criminal activity with the liberty interests of those 
within its jurisdiction. Gay, supra at 693-694. 
As discussed, this is perfectly consistent with the 
intent of the 1961 constitutional convention delegates and 
with the intent of the people. 
Given the rejection of the 
Bartkus one-sided approach to dual sovereignty, later cases 
such as Heath that apply the same one-sided approach have 
no bearing on whether Cooper was correctly decided. 
The 
Cooper rule is necessary to protect the individual's 
interest, as well as the state's interest in rare cases 
where the state’s interest is not vindicated by another 
sovereign’s prosecution. 
The defendant here is being forced to undergo multiple 
ordeals when he should be able to rely on the finality of 
his prosecution in Kentucky. He had an expectation that his 
guilty plea in Kentucky would end governmental action 
test for determining when successive prosecutions are 
brought for the same offense. Cooper, supra at 463 (COLEMAN,
J., concurring). In Gay, the Court unanimously agreed that
the 
Cooper 
decision 
was 
entitled 
to 
retroactive 
application. 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
against him involving the car theft. Instead, the Kentucky 
guilty plea can now be used against him in the Michigan 
proceeding. 
Defendant will again be punished for the same 
activity for which he has already been punished in 
Kentucky. 
Cooper specifically directs a case-by-case inquiry of 
whether the state’s interests have been met. Cooper, supra 
at 461. 
It allows successive prosecutions when the 
interests of the two states are substantially different. 
The court considers the maximum penalties available, facts 
indicating that the other jurisdiction cannot be trusted to 
vindicate fully Michigan’s interests, and whether the 
statutory 
differences 
are 
substantive 
or 
"merely 
jurisdictional." Id. 
There is no evidence in the record before us that 
Michigan’s interests have not been adequately protected by 
the proceedings in Kentucky. 
Defendant pleaded guilty in 
Kentucky to attempted theft of property having a value of 
more than $300. He was sentenced to one year’s probation. 
Defendant is charged in Michigan with UDAA and 
receiving stolen property worth $1,000 or more. 
These 
crimes are felonies punishable by not more than five years’ 
imprisonment. 
Similarly, the Kentucky statute makes theft 
of property with a value of more than $300 a felony 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
punishable by not more than five years’ imprisonment. 
See 
Ky Rev Stat Ann 514.030 and 532.020(1)(a). 
To conserve trial resources, Michigan prosecutors 
frequently offer a "plea bargain" to a defendant to plead 
guilty to a lesser offense. 
The Kentucky prosecutor’s 
willingness to offer defendant a plea to a lesser offense 
cannot 
be 
said 
to 
undermine 
our 
state’s 
interests. 
Furthermore, the Michigan prosecutor in this case does not 
argue that Michigan’s interests were compromised. 
The facts of this case serve to show that Cooper is 
not, in fact, unworkable. The interests sought to be 
protected by each state's law are not substantially 
different. The interests of the state of Michigan are amply 
protected, while the interests of the individual are not 
ignored. The Double Jeopardy Clause was written not to 
protect the state or federal government, but to protect the 
individual. 
To hold that Michigan will allow prosecution in our 
state after a federal or sister state prosecution for the 
identical act is to embrace a system of constitutional 
duality. 
It enables a state to pursue a person who either 
has been found innocent or has paid the price for his crime 
to another sovereignty. 
To harass the innocent, the 
acquitted, or the guilty person who has paid the price for 
23  
 
 
 
 
a crime in money or freedom is not compatible with 
constitutionally legitimate state action. To the contrary, 
it is at just such harassment that our state constitution 
takes aim. 
The policy that weakens double jeopardy protections is 
not validated because both state and federal sovereignties 
combine to embrace it. 
It is incongruous to allow a 
state’s basic constitutional policy, one integral to its 
sovereignty, to be frustrated as a consequence of the 
duality that allows that state to exist. 
Furthermore, it 
is inconsistent and ironic to use that federalism, which 
has been justified in the name of protecting freedom, to 
obliterate a fundamental right. 
Rarely are Michigan's interests not vindicated after 
one fair test of guilt. 
Normally, the cause of justice is 
not served in the second pursuit of one who has been 
subjected to jeopardy for the same act in a different 
jurisdiction. 
To hold otherwise is to require an accused 
either to prove innocence twice or to pay twice for the 
same offense. 
The sole rationale for it is that the acts 
complained of took place where two layers of government 
coincide. 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
For almost thirty years, Cooper and its progeny have 
protected citizens and others subject to the jurisdiction 
of this state from the risk of 
(1) continued embarrassment, expense and ordeal;
(2) being compelled to live in a continuing state
of 
anxiety 
and 
insecurity; 
and 
(3) 
the 
possibility that even though innocent [we] may be
found 
guilty 
through 
repeated 
prosecutions.
[Gay, supra at 694, citing Wilson, supra at 343,
and Green, supra at 187-188.] 
See also People v Herron, 464 Mich 593, 601; 628 NW2d 528 
(2001). Cooper correctly held that Michigan’s Double 
Jeopardy Clause protects us from multiple prosecutions for 
the same crime. 
That protection exists as long as the 
state’s interest is protected by a prosecution for the 
crime in another state or by the federal government. 
The 
Court in Cooper did not need to find a "different history 
behind Michigan’s adoption of a double jeopardy bar"17 to 
conclude that the Michigan Constitution protects us from 
multiple prosecutions for a single crime. 
As explained, 
that protection has been a bedrock principle of our common 
law for decades. 
IV. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
The right to be free from double jeopardy is a 
fundamental right 
17 Ante at 7. 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence . . . . [T]he State with
all its resources and power should not be allowed
to 
make 
repeated 
attempts 
to 
convict 
an 
individual 
for 
an 
alleged 
offense, 
thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and 
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as 
enhancing 
the 
possibility 
that 
even 
though
innocent he may be found guilty. [Green, supra at 
187-188.] 
As Justice Black once observed, "double prosecutions for 
the same offense are so contrary to the spirit of our free 
country that they violate even the . . . Fourteenth 
Amendment." 
Bartkus, 
supra 
at 
150-151 
(Black, 
J., 
dissenting). 
Justice Black recognized that, from an individual’s 
perspective, 
multiple 
punishments 
inflict 
the 
same 
injustice whether levied by officers wearing one uniform or 
several. 
"In each case . . . [one] is forced to face 
danger twice for the same conduct." 
Bartkus, supra at 155 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
It is incompatible with fundamental justice that a 
person who has already faced trial in another court system 
should again be exposed to jeopardy in Michigan's courts. 
The dual threat from the single act is "repugnant to the 
conscience of mankind." 
See Palko, supra at 323. 
If the 
essence of due process, fairness, is to be recognized, one 
of its features must be this guarantee: 
a person may be 
26  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
exposed to the gauntlet of criminal proceedings only once 
for the same misconduct. 
It does not matter to the individual that two separate 
sovereigns are responsible for the proceedings. 
What 
matters is that the government has resources and power the 
individual does not. 
Therefore, the government should not 
be 
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual 
for 
an 
alleged 
offense, 
thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and 
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as 
enhancing 
the 
possibility 
that 
even 
though
innocent he may be found guilty. [Green, supra at 
187-188.] 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution requires a recognition that 
subjecting an individual to a second trial violates the 
fundamental fairness due every citizen of the United 
States. 
V. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
"[S]tare decisis 'promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, 
fosters 
reliance 
on 
judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and 
perceived integrity of the judicial process.'"
[United States v Int'l Business Machines Corp,
517 US 843, 856; 116 S Ct 1793; 135 L Ed 2d 124,
(1996), quoting Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808,
827; 111 S Ct 2597; 115 L Ed 2d 720 (1991). See
also People v Petit, 466 Mich 624, 633; 648 NW2d
193 (2002).] 
27  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
  
To overturn a previous decision of this Court, we must be 
convinced that it was wrongly decided. 
In addition, we 
must conclude that greater injury will result from adhering 
to it than from correcting it. Petit, supra at 634, citing 
McEvoy v Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich 172, 178; 98 NW 1006 
(1904). 
A departure from precedent must be based on a 
"'"special justification."'" 
Dickerson v United States, 
530 US 428, 443; 120 S Ct 2326; 147 L Ed 2d 405 (2000), 
quoting Int'l Business Machines Corp, supra at 856, quoting 
Payne, supra at 842 (Souter, J., concurring), quoting 
Arizona v Rumsey, 467 US 203, 212; 104 S Ct 2305; 81 L Ed 
2d 164 (1984). 
Nine years ago, Justice Weaver's lead opinion in Mezy 
indicated a desire to overrule Cooper.
 Her position did 
not gain the support of a majority of the justices. 
The 
only change that could explain today’s decision to overrule 
Cooper is the change in the make-up of this Court. Justice 
LEVIN'S criticism in Mezy18 of the lead opinion's desire to 
overrule Cooper is just as applicable today as it was when 
18 Because three justices indicated that they would
overrule 
Cooper 
even 
though 
reaching 
the 
issue 
was 
unnecessary, three other justices explained why they would
not overrule the case. Justice Brickley simply indicated 
that Cooper need not be addressed by the Court. 
28  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
written. There has been no intervening showing that Cooper 
was clearly erroneous. 
The majority claims that Cooper is bad law. 
Its 
reason is that the Cooper Court did not apply the doctrine 
of dual sovereignty as articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court and that it misconstrued where the United 
States Supreme Court was headed. 
 
Yet, although Cooper alluded to the track the United 
States Supreme Court appeared to be taking, it specifically 
noted 
that 
its 
decision 
was 
based 
on 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution. 
This majority's constrictive reading of the 
double jeopardy rights our constitution provides disagrees 
with the Cooper approach. 
It overrules Cooper without 
showing in what respect the Cooper analysis of our state 
Double Jeopardy Clause is wrong. 
This lack of an explanation is understandable when one 
considers that there is nothing unworkable about Cooper. 
The majority asserts that less injury will result from 
overruling Cooper than from allowing it to stand. 
I 
believe that less injury will result only if one assumes 
that everyone accused of a crime is guilty. 
More injury 
will result to those our criminal justice system has been 
created 
to 
protect, 
those 
who 
are 
falsely 
accused. 
Hereafter, if one sovereign prosecutes and the accused is 
29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
found not guilty, the sovereign may work with Michigan to 
achieve what it could not, secure conviction. 
The majority's approach ignores the fact that, by 
overruling a dozen or more cases each term, it destablizies 
our state's jurisprudence. 
It suggests to the public that 
the law is at the whim of whoever is sitting on the Supreme 
Court bench. Surely, it erodes the public's confidence in 
our judicial system. Less harm would result from retaining 
Cooper than from reversing it. 
VI. Conclusion 
Because I believe that Cooper provides the correct 
framework, 
based 
on 
the 
Michigan 
Constitution, 
for 
resolving double jeopardy concerns, I would affirm the 
decision of the Court of Appeals. 
I disagree with the majority that Cooper must fall. 
The Cooper decision was not incorrect when it was decided 
or when its holding was unanimously reaffirmed by this 
Court in Gay. 
It is not incorrect today. 
Greater 
injustices will come from its abandonment than from its 
retention. 
One cannot but wonder if this departure from precedent 
will encourage the people of Michigan to "adjust themselves 
to all other violations of the Bill of Rights should they 
30  
 
 
be sanctioned by this Court." 
Bartkus, supra at 163 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
Overturning Cooper strikes at the integrity of our 
justice system. 
It represents a greater threat to public 
security than it does a protection from criminals. 
The 
decisions in Cooper and Gay and the Court of Appeals 
decision in this case should be upheld. 
Marilyn Kelly 
31  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
No. 125436 
GEVON RAMON DAVIS, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I concur with the result reached by Justice Kelly in 
her dissent. 
I also fully concur with the reasoning 
articulated in parts IV, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, 
and V, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, of Justice Kelly’s 
opinion. 
Michael F. Cavanagh