Title: HAMILTON v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIV.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HAMILTON v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIV.2001 WY 2018 P.3d 637Case Number: 00-91Decided: 02/27/2001
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2000

                                                                                                           
February 27, 2001

 

 

                          
IN THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S                           

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:

 

NANCY 
L. HAMILTON,

Appellant

(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel.,

WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND

COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

Appellee

(Respondent).

  

W.R.A.P 
12.09(b) Certification from the District Court of Big Horn 
County

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge 

  

Representing 
Appellant:

H. 
Richard Hopkinson of Gorrell & Hopkinson, P.C., Worland, 
Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
Gerald L. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.

 

 Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS,* GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 * 
concurred prior to retirement

 GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
The 
primary issue in this appeal is whether a worker compensation claimant's 
inconsistent reports of the cause of her injury entitle a hearing examiner to 
determine an injury is not work-related.  
We affirm the hearing examiner's decision.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Appellant 
Nancy L. Hamilton presents this single issue for our 
review:

 

Did the 
Wyoming Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) act arbitrarily, capriciously, 
or otherwise unlawfully in the meaning of the Wyoming workers' compensation law 
and contrary to substantial evidence when it entered, on December 30, 1999, a 
final order, denying appellant, Nancy L. Hamilton's claim for workers' 
compensation benefits in ruling that she had not satisfied her burden of proof 
in establishing that she had suffered a work-related accident on July 14, 1999, 
while employed by Crazy Woman Safety Enterprises, Inc.?

 

The 
Division contends that the issues are:

 

I.  The Employee gave several accounts about 
the onset of her injury, and the Hearing Examiner denied benefits because he did 
not believe the injury occurred at work.

A.                 
Should 
the Court defer to the Hearing Examiner's credibility 
determination?

B.                 
Did the 
Employee fail to prove a material aggravation?

C.                
Was the 
second compensable injury rule unavailable?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
Hamilton 
was employed as a flagger for Crazy Woman Safety Enterprises.  Hamilton claims that on July 14, 1999, 
while lifting a barrel, she injured her back.  She told her supervisor, left work at 
12:30 p.m. and rested the remainder of the day.  The next morning her pain was severe, 
and she was taken to the emergency room.  
She was admitted to the hospital, administered pain relievers overnight, 
and discharged the next day.  Tests 
showed that she had a herniated disc.  
Her timecard on the date of discharge shows that she worked a ten-hour 
day and worked a normal schedule after that.

 

[¶4]           
On July 
21, 1999, she filed a claim for injury.  
The employer objected to her claim that she had suffered a work-related 
injury, and the Division denied benefits.  
At a hearing, the evidence showed that Hamilton filled out timecards on a 
daily basis that required her to mark a box "yes" or "no" if she had been 
harassed or injured.  All of her 
timecards from July 14 through July 22 were marked "no." Although the date of 
the timecard marked July 14 was altered, Hamilton testified that she had 
initialed the "no" box to indicate that she had not been harassed. 

 

[¶5]           
The 
employer produced evidence that Hamilton had begun seeing a chiropractor for 
lower back pain on May 12, 1999, and reported that her pain had begun on May 4 
while tying her shoe at home.  
Hamilton saw the same chiropractor on July 13, 1999.  The doctor's notes indicate that the 
visit was for left lower back pain that radiated into the left leg at the 
highest possible pain rating; however, Hamilton claimed that it was another 
visit to correct pain in her hip that she had been experiencing since May 
4.  

 

[¶6]           
Hamilton's 
coworker testified that he heard her express pain on July 14, and she told him 
that she had hurt her back.  He did 
the rest of the lifting that day and observed that she appeared to be in pain 
and was unable to lift barrels.  
Hamilton argued that the employer altered the date of the timecard to 
produce one showing that she had initialed "no" to the question of whether she 
had been injured for that day.  The 
employer contended no evidence showed that it had altered the timecard.  It pointed to medical reports in the 
record showing that Hamilton's injury had been suffered months earlier at home 
and was not work-related.

 

[¶7]           
The 
hearing examiner found that, on July 15, 1999, Hamilton reported to the 
emergency room physician that her pain had begun two months earlier while 
leaning over to place cones on the highway.  Despite her testimony at the hearing 
that she was seeing the chiropractor for other reasons, the chiropractor's notes 
indicated he was seeing her for lower back pain that was progressively 
worsening.  The hearing examiner 
also found that on July 21, 1999, Hamilton reported to a physician's assistant 
that she had been experiencing the lower back pain for two months after placing 
cones on the highway and stated that the pain had never really resolved in that 
time.  She had an acute worsening of 
symptoms on July 15 that required admission to the hospital. 

 

[¶8]           
The 
hearing examiner concluded that Hamilton's statements to her doctors 
contradicted her testimony that she suddenly experienced the onset of different 
symptoms following a work-related injury.  
It concluded that the chiropractor's deposition testimony--that since May 
of 1999, he had been treating Hamilton for lower back pain symptoms similar to 
what she now complained of and she had stated then that the symptoms were by an 
injury suffered while tying her shoe at home--was significant.  These several discrepancies and 
observation of her demeanor led the hearing examiner to find that Hamilton's 
credibility was suspect and conclude that she had failed to prove she had 
suffered a work-related injury on July 14, 1999.

 DISCUSSION

 

Standard of Review

 

[¶9]           
When 
reviewing a hearing examiner's decision that a worker's compensation claimant 
has failed to meet the burden of proof, we apply the following 
principles:

 

A 
claimant for worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the 
essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the 
contested case hearing.  Martinez 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo. 
1996).  When an agency decides that 
the party charged with the burden of proof has failed to meet that burden, the 
case is reviewed under the "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law" language of Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) 
(1990).  City of Casper v. 
Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995).  
On appeal the complainant . . . has the burden of proving arbitrary 
administrative action.  Knight v. 
Environmental Quality Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); 
Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974); 
Marathon Oil Co. v. Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo. 1963); Whitesides 
v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957).  The agency, as the trier of fact, is 
charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of 
witnesses.  Utech, 895 P.2d  
at 451, and cases therein cited.  
The deference normally accorded to the findings of fact by a trial court 
is extended to the administrative agency, and the agency's decision as to the 
facts will not be overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence.  Wyoming 
Steel & Fab., Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994).  

 

Pederson 
v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997); see also, Nissen v. Cheyenne Frontier Days, 
Inc., 983 P.2d 722, 724-25 (Wyo. 1999); Carrillo v. State ex rel. 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 987 P.2d 690, 692-93 (Wyo. 
1999).   

 

[¶10]       
On 
appeal, Hamilton contends that the hearing examiner's decision is not supported 
by substantial evidence because it failed to consider that an x-ray taken on May 
12, 1999, by her chiropractor failed to disclose a disc herniation and none was 
present when she presented to the chiropractor on July 13, 1999.  Hamilton also contends that the hearing 
examiner failed to consider whether the facts presented a second compensable 
injury or a material aggravation of a preexisting condition.  

 

[¶11]       
Having 
examined the entire record, we begin by upholding the hearing examiner's 
decision to believe the chiropractor's deposition testimony that he was treating 
Hamilton for lower back pain symptoms.  
Hamilton's testimony that she was not being treated for lower back pain 
directly contradicted the chiropractor's testimony.  Credibility determinations are the 
unique province of the hearing examiner, and we eschew re-weighing those 
conclusions.    
Carrillo, 987 P.2d  at 693. Although Hamilton contends that 
upholding the credibility determination is contrary to our decision in 
Ikenberry v. State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div., 5 P.3d 799 
(Wyo. 2000), this case does not pose the same concerns as Ikenberry where 
irrelevant inconsistencies led to an irrational finding that the claimant had 
not suffered a work-related injury.  
Id. at 809.  
Ikenberry distinguished between the facts it was considering and a 
proper denial of benefits because of contradictions by the claimant.  Id.  Specifically, it found that when the 
claimant's benefit claim is based on a report of injury caused by work 
activities and the immediate onset of pain symptoms, and this claim directly 
contradicts statements made to doctors that the pain could not be attributed to 
any work-related episode and was reported as progressive over a period of time, 
denial of benefits is proper.  
Id. at 810.  That 
situation is very similar to Hamilton's.  
Her statements to her chiropractor indicated that she suffered an injury 
at home resulting in lower back pain and began treatment for it in May 
1999.  She received another 
treatment on July 13, 1999, for the same symptoms.  Her symptoms on July 15 that required 
hospitalization were not different.  
The hearing examiner's decision that these inconsistencies resulted in 
Hamilton's failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she suffered 
a work-related injury is affirmed.

 

[¶12]       
Hamilton 
next contends that she could have been awarded benefits for a material 
aggravation of a preexisting condition.  
She had the burden to prove the material aggravation.  The evidence showed that her symptoms in 
May were the same as those she suffered on July 15 which subsided and allowed 
her to be discharged on the July 16 and work a ten-hour day that same day.  We find that the hearing examiner's 
decision is supported by substantial evidence.

 

[¶13]       
Finally, 
Hamilton contends that her statements to the physician's assistant on July 21 
indicate that she had suffered a compensable injury in May placing cones on the 
highway and suffered another on July 14 while lifting the barrels.  The hearing examiner determined that 
Hamilton reported to her chiropractor in May that her symptoms were caused by 
the shoe-tying incident which is not a first compensable injury.  The hearing examiner's decision not to 
consider this a second compensable injury is supported by substantial 
evidence.  

 

[¶14]       
We 
affirm the order denying benefits.