Title: Viva! International v. Adidas

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 7/23/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
VIVA! INTERNATIONAL VOICE FOR  
) 
ANIMALS et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
)  
S140064 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
)  
Ct.App. 1/1 A106960 
ADIDAS PROMOTIONAL RETAIL  
) 
OPERATIONS, INC., et al., 
) 
City and County of 
 
) 
San Francisco 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. 420214 
___________________________________ ) 
 
State law prohibits the importation into or sale within California of 
products made from kangaroo.  (Pen. Code, § 653o.)  Defendant adidas 
Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., concedes it imports into and sells in 
California athletic shoes made from kangaroo hide, but argues Penal Code section 
653o is preempted because it conflicts with federal policies intended to influence 
Australian kangaroo management practices.  As section 653o poses no obstacle to 
any current federal policy, we conclude it is not preempted, and we reverse the 
Court of Appeal’s contrary judgment. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The material facts are undisputed.  Defendants adidas Promotional Retail 
Operations, Inc., Sport Chalet, and Offside Soccer (collectively Adidas) are 
California retailers that sell athletic shoes made from kangaroo leather imported 
from Australia.  Specifically, Adidas sells athletic shoes made from the hides of 
 
 
2
three kangaroo species:  the red kangaroo (Macropus rufus), the eastern grey 
kangaroo (Macropus giganteus), and the western grey kangaroo (Macropus 
fuliginosus).  Kangaroos are indigenous to Australia and New Guinea; the three 
species at issue here exist only in Australia.1 
Plaintiff Viva! International Voice for Animals is an international nonprofit 
organization devoted to protecting animals.  Plaintiff Jerold Friedman is a resident 
of Los Angeles County.  Plaintiffs (collectively Viva) sued Adidas for engaging in 
an unlawful business practice by importing and selling athletic shoes made from 
kangaroo leather.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.)  Viva alleged the importation and 
sale of Adidas’s shoes violated Penal Code section 653o, which regulates trade in 
various animal species, including kangaroos. 
Both sides sought summary judgment; the trial court denied Viva’s motion 
and granted Adidas’s motion.  It agreed with Adidas that Penal Code section 653o 
was preempted by the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.) 
because it undermined federal actions taken under the act to influence the 
Australian state and federal governments to preserve threatened kangaroo species. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed.  While acknowledging the preemption 
question was close, it agreed with the trial court that the “statute as applied to 
defendants in this case conflicts with federal law and with substantial federal 
objectives of persuading Australian federal and state governments to impose 
kangaroo population management programs, in exchange for allowing the 
importation of kangaroo products.” 
We granted review to resolve this important preemption question. 
                                              
1  
“Kangaroo” is the common name for the indigenous Australian animal of 
the scientific superfamily Macropodoidea (or macropods).  There are at least 69 
species of macropods. 
 
 
3
DISCUSSION 
We begin by noting what we are not called upon to decide.  The 
Commonwealth of Australia is free to manage its indigenous wildlife populations 
in any manner it sees fit, subject to international treaty obligations.  Likewise, 
California is free to regulate within its own borders unless federal law or the 
United States Constitution requires otherwise.  It is not our role to judge the 
wisdom of Australia’s wildlife management practices, which Adidas and amicus 
curiae the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia defend and Viva and 
amicus curiae the Animal Legal Defense Fund criticize, nor the wisdom of 
California’s wildlife rules or the federal government’s statutes and regulations.  
The only question before us is whether California’s rules can coexist with federal 
law. 
I.   Preemption Principles 
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes a 
constitutional choice-of-law rule, makes federal law paramount, and vests 
Congress with the power to preempt state law.  (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516; Jevne v. Superior 
Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 935, 949.)2  There are four species of federal preemption:  
                                              
2  
We note some controversy over the true source of Congress’s power to 
preempt state regulation.  (Compare Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management 
Assn. (1992) 505 U.S. 88, 108 [preemption doctrine is “derived” from the 
supremacy clause], and Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta (1982) 
458 U.S. 141, 152 [“The pre-emption doctrine . . . has its roots in the Supremacy 
Clause”], with Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States (2005) 33 
Pepperdine L.Rev. 39, 49-51 [arguing that the necessary and proper clause, U.S. 
Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 18, is the true source of the preemption power], and Dinh, 
Reassessing the Law of Preemption (2000) 88 Geo. L.J. 2085, 2091 [arguing 
preemption power is pendant to enumerated powers in U.S. Const., art. I, § 8].)  
While the source of the power may be subject to question, its existence is not. 
 
 
4
express, conflict, obstacle, and field.  (See Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 943, 955.)3 
First, express preemption arises when Congress “define[s] explicitly the 
extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law.  [Citation.]  Pre-emption 
fundamentally is a question of congressional intent, [citation], and when Congress 
has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is 
any easy one.”  (English v. General Electric Co., supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 78-79; 
accord, Jevne v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 949.)  Second, conflict 
preemption will be found when simultaneous compliance with both state and 
federal directives is impossible.  (Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical 
Labs. (1985) 471 U.S. 707, 713; Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
798, 815.)  Third, obstacle preemption arises when “ ‘under the circumstances of 
[a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ”  
(Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 373, quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67; accord, Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 955.)  Finally, field preemption, i.e., “Congress’ intent to 
pre-empt all state law in a particular area,” applies “where the scheme of federal 
                                              
3  
“The categories of preemption are not ‘rigidly distinct.’ ”  (Crosby v. 
National Foreign Trade Council (2000) 530 U.S. 363, 372, fn. 6; accord, Peatros 
v. Bank of America (2000) 22 Cal.4th 147, 158, fn. 1 (lead opn. of Mosk, J.).)  We 
and the United States Supreme Court have often identified only three species of 
preemption, grouping conflict preemption and obstacle preemption together in a 
single category.  (See, e.g., English v. General Electric Co. (1990) 496 U.S. 72, 
78-79; Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare (2004) 32 Cal.4th 
910, 923.)  As conflict and obstacle preemption are analytically distinct and may 
rest on wholly different sources of constitutional authority, we treat them as 
separate categories here.  (See, e.g., Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 
supra, 88 Geo. L.J. at pp. 2102-2105.) 
 
 
5
regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary state regulation.”  (Hillsborough 
County, at p. 713, quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. (1947) 331 U.S. 218, 
230.) 
“ ‘[C]ourts are reluctant to infer preemption, and it is the burden of the 
party claiming that Congress intended to preempt state law to prove it.’ ”  
(Olszewski v. Scripps Health, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 815, quoting Elsworth v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 540, 548; accord, Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 956-957.) 
We consider in turn the state and federal law at issue. 
II.   Penal Code Section 653o and Preemption Presumptions 
Penal Code section 653o was enacted in 1970 and expanded to include 
kangaroos in 1971.  (Stats. 1970, ch. 1557, § 1, p. 3186; Stats. 1971, ch. 1283, § 1, 
pp. 2511-2512.)  Subdivision (a) of section 653o provides in relevant part:  “It is 
unlawful to import into this state for commercial purposes, to possess with intent 
to sell, or to sell within the state, the dead body, or any part or product thereof, of 
any polar bear, leopard, ocelot, tiger, cheetah, jaguar, sable antelope, wolf (Canis 
lupus), zebra, whale, cobra, python, sea turtle, colobus monkey, kangaroo, vicuna, 
sea otter, free-roaming feral horse, dolphin or porpoise (Delphinidae), Spanish 
lynx, or elephant.”  (Italics added.)  Section 653o was passed to prevent the 
extinction of species the Legislature deemed threatened.  (People v. K. Sakai Co. 
(1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 531, 536.) 
In the trial court and Court of Appeal, Adidas argued unsuccessfully that 
Penal Code section 653o should be construed as applying only to those species 
currently federally listed as endangered.  Each court concluded section 653o’s 
plain language dictated a contrary result, as the statute applies to “any . . . 
kangaroo” product, without qualification for federal endangered species status.  
 
 
6
Instead, the statute rests on a legislative judgment that the species listed merit 
special state concern, without regard to their federal status.  Like the Court of 
Appeal, we agree the plain language of the statute extends its scope to all 
kangaroos and does not depend on the vicissitudes of federal protection. 
Penal Code section 653o addresses an area typically regulated by, and 
historically within the traditional police powers of, the states—wildlife 
management.4  Notwithstanding Adidas’s contrary argument, the scope of this 
power has long been recognized as extending even to regulation of foreign 
species:  “[A] state may constitutionally conserve wildlife elsewhere by refusing 
to accept local complicity in its destruction.  The states’ authority to establish local 
prohibitions with respect to out-of-state wildlife has, since the late nineteenth-
century, been recognized by the courts.”  (Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v. State of 
N.Y. (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 658 F.Supp. 1441, 1447; see Maine v. Taylor (1986) 477 
U.S. 131, 151-152 [upholding import restrictions on out-of-state fish as valid 
exercise of state police powers]; A. E. Nettleton Company v. Diamond, supra, 264 
                                              
4 
See Kleppe v. New Mexico (1976) 426 U.S. 529, 545 (“the States have 
broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions” and 
“ ‘may regulate the killing and sale of [wildlife]’ ”); Silz v. Hesterberg (1908) 211 
U.S. 31, 39 (state police power extends to wildlife regulation); Geer v. 
Connecticut (1896) 161 U.S. 519, 522-527, overruled on other grounds by Hughes 
v. Oklahoma (1979) 441 U.S. 322 (tracing history of governmental power to 
control private taking of wildlife under Greek, Roman, and English law); Lawton 
v. Steele (1894) 152 U.S. 133, 138 (“The preservation of game and fish, however, 
has always been treated as within the proper domain of the police power”); People 
v. K. Sakai Co., supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at page 536 (“[I]t cannot be argued that the 
protection of endangered species of wildlife is not within the ambit of the police 
power”); DeHart v. Town of Austin, Ind. (7th Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 718, 722 (“The 
regulation of animals has long been recognized as part of the historic police power 
of the States”); A. E. Nettleton Company v. Diamond (N.Y. 1970) 264 N.E.2d 118, 
122 (“[I]t is almost axiomatic that wildlife conservation has been a matter 
traditionally left to the States”). 
 
 
7
N.E.2d at pp. 121-122 [upholding New York regulation of crocodiles].)  This 
broad power is justified in part by an increased understanding of the deep 
interconnectedness of the global ecosystem, because “ ‘[i]t is now generally 
recognized that the destruction or disturbance of vital life cycles or of the balance 
of a species of wildlife, even though initiated in one part of the world, may have a 
profound effect upon the health and welfare of people in other distant parts.’ ”  
(People v. K. Sakai Co., supra, 56 Cal.App.3d at pp. 535-536 [upholding 
California regulation of whales], quoting Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) 321 F.Supp. 630, 631, affd. (2d Cir. 1971) 440 F.2d 1319.)   
There is a presumption against federal preemption in those areas 
traditionally regulated by the states:  “[W]e start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  (Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., supra, 331 U.S. at p. 230; accord, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC 
(2005) 544 U.S. 431, 449; Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 974 
[in areas of traditional state regulation, a “strong presumption” against preemption 
applies and state law will not be displaced “unless it is clear and manifest that 
Congress intended to preempt state law”]; Olszewski v. Scripps Health, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at p. 815 [presumption against preemption “ ‘provides assurance that the 
“federal-state balance” [citation] will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress 
or unnecessarily by the courts’ ”].) 
However, Penal Code section 653o and the Endangered Species Act of 
1973 also touch on matters implicating foreign affairs.  As previously noted, the 
entire wild kangaroo population is confined to the Commonwealth of Australia 
and Papua New Guinea, and the three species at issue here exist only in Australia.  
Additionally, as we shall discuss, the act itself was passed in part to ensure the 
 
 
8
United States could meet its international conservation treaty obligations.  (See 16 
U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4), (b).) 
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, supra, 530 U.S. 363, the 
United States Supreme Court addressed an exercise of a state’s traditional powers 
(its spending power) in a manner that touched on foreign affairs.  It concluded 
Massachusetts’s policy of not purchasing goods and services from persons doing 
business with Myanmar (Burma) was preempted by a federal act imposing its own 
sanctions on Burma.  In doing so, the high court elected to “leave for another day a 
consideration in this context of a presumption against preemption.  [Citation.]  
Assuming, arguendo, that some presumption against preemption is appropriate,” 
the court nevertheless concluded “the state Act presents a sufficient obstacle to the 
full accomplishment of Congress’s objectives under the federal Act to find it 
preempted.”  (Id. at p. 374, fn. 8.)  Crosby thus left open the possibility that either 
no presumption, or a substantially weakened presumption, should apply in such 
instances. 
In American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi (2003) 539 U.S. 396, the United 
States Supreme Court returned to foreign affairs preemption, this time in the 
context of a putative conflict between executive agreements reached with various 
foreign nations and a California law regulating insurers who had issued Holocaust-
era insurance policies.  The court concluded that under either a field or obstacle 
preemption analysis the law was preempted.  (Id. at pp. 419-420.)  In the course of 
its preemption analysis, it neither referenced nor applied any presumptions, instead 
concluding under neutral analytical principles there was a “clear conflict” between 
state law and federal policy.  (Id. at p. 421.) 
Taking the most conservative course, we read Crosby v. National Foreign 
Trade Council, supra, 530 U.S. 363, and American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 
supra, 539 U.S. 396, as implying that, where a traditional state exercise of the 
 
 
9
police power implicates foreign affairs concerns, no particular presumption 
applies.5  Instead, we turn to the language of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
and allow the statute’s text to guide us under ordinary principles of interpretation.  
(See Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption (2000) 2000 S.Ct. Rev. 
175, 177 [“When a foreign relations statute touches on traditional state 
prerogatives, both canons are implicated, and both lose coherence.  The prudent 
course is for courts to apply ‘ordinary’ principles of preemption without any 
presumption in favor of state or federal law, even when they think the statute 
concerns foreign affairs”].) 
In every preemption analysis, congressional intent is the “ ‘ultimate 
touchstone’ ” (Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470, 485; Jevne v. Superior 
Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 949) and the statutory text the best indicator of that 
intent (Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine (2002) 537 U.S. 51, 62-63).  As a majority of 
the current United States Supreme Court has agreed at one time or another, “pre-
emption analysis is not ‘[a] freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state 
statute is in tension with federal objectives,’ (Gade v. National Solid Wastes 
Management Assn.[, supra,] 505 U.S. [at p.] 111 [conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.]), but 
an inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of state and federal law conflict.”  
(Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 459 (conc. & dis. opn. of 
Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.); accord, Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. 
(2000) 529 U.S. 861, 911 (dis. opn. of Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., Thomas, J. 
                                              
5  
We need not, and do not, formally decide whether this is so.  Even if some 
form of a presumption against preemption survives these cases in situations 
touching on foreign affairs, it does not affect the outcome here because, as we 
shall discuss, even without an antipreemption presumption, we find no basis for 
preemption. 
 
 
10
& Ginsburg, J.) [“In my view, however, ‘preemption analysis is, or at least should 
be, a matter of precise statutory [or regulatory] construction rather than an exercise 
in free-form judicial policymaking’ ”].) 
III.   The Endangered Species Act of 1973 
Responding to rising national and international concern over the impact of 
humans on other species, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
(16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.) (Act), at the time “the most comprehensive legislation 
for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.”  (TVA v. 
Hill (1978) 437 U.S. 153, 180.)  Congress found that various species of fish, 
wildlife, and plants in the United States had been rendered extinct or threatened 
with extinction.  (16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1), (2); H.R.Rep. No. 93-412, 1st Sess., pp. 
1-2 (1973).)  It identified as the purposes of the Act “to provide a means whereby 
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend 
may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered 
species and threatened species,” and to effectuate various international 
conservation treaties and conventions.  (16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).)  “The plain intent of 
Congress in enacting [the Act] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species 
extinction, whatever the cost.”  (TVA, at p. 184.) 
States were to play an essential role in species preservation.  Congress 
declared that “encouraging the States . . . through Federal financial assistance and 
a system of incentives, to develop and maintain conservation programs which 
meet national and international standards is a key to meeting the Nation’s 
international commitments and to better safeguarding, for the benefit of all 
citizens, the Nation’s heritage in fish, wildlife, and plants.”  (16 U.S.C. 
§ 1531(a)(5).)  In section 6 of the Act (16 U.S.C. § 1535 and its subparts), 
Congress defined precisely the respective roles of the federal and state 
governments in carrying out these policies.  It directed the Secretary of the Interior 
 
 
11
to “cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the States.”  (Id., § 1535(a).)  
It further authorized management agreements, pursuant to which the state and 
federal governments would manage conservation areas (id., § 1535(b)), and 
cooperative agreements, pursuant to which the federal government would assist 
states in implementing conservation programs (id., § 1535(c)).   
The Act’s legislative history confirms this vision of a joint cooperative 
state-federal approach to wildlife preservation.  “The Senate believed that a federal 
wildlife program should not preempt similar state regulation.  The committee 
responsible for the Senate bill reported that ‘[w]hile the Federal government 
should protect such species where States have failed to meet minimum Federal 
standards, it should not preempt efficient programs.  Instead[,] it should encourage 
these, and aid in the extension or establishment of others, to facilitate management 
by granting regulatory authority and making available financial assistance to 
approved schemes.’ ”  (Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v. State of N.Y., supra, 658 
F.Supp. at p. 1444, quoting Sen.Rep. No. 93-307, 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 
1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 2989, 2991-2992; see also H.R.Rep. 
No. 93-412, 1st Sess., supra, p. 7; Note, Federal Preemption of State Commerce 
Bans Under the Endangered Species Act (1982) 34 Stan. L.Rev. 1323, 1328-1330 
[analyzing language and legislative history of the Act and concluding it “expressly 
anticipates and authorizes concurrent state regulation as a key element of the 
overall regulatory scheme”].) 
With that background in mind, we turn to the Act’s key provision for our 
purposes, section 6(f) of the Act, codified at 16 U.S.C. section 1535(f) (hereafter 
section 6(f)),6 which expressly spells out the intended preemptive scope of the 
                                              
6  
Where a statute “contains an express pre-emption clause, our ‘task of 
statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
12
Act:  “Any State law or regulation which applies with respect to the importation or 
exportation of, or interstate or foreign commerce in, endangered species or 
threatened species is void to the extent that it may effectively (1) permit what is 
prohibited by this chapter or by any regulation which implements this chapter, or 
(2) prohibit what is authorized pursuant to an exemption or permit provided for in 
this chapter or in any regulation which implements this chapter.”  (§ 6(f), italics 
added.)  The second half of section 6(f) is a savings clause:  “This chapter shall 
not otherwise be construed to void any State law or regulation which is intended to 
conserve migratory, resident, or introduced fish or wildlife, or to permit or prohibit 
sale of such fish or wildlife.  Any State law or regulation respecting the taking of 
an endangered species or threatened species may be more restrictive than the 
exemptions or permits provided for in this chapter or in any regulation which 
implements this chapter but not less restrictive than the prohibitions so defined.”   
Various aspects of the express preemption clause and savings clause are 
significant.  First, these provisions continue the cooperative framework established 
elsewhere in the Act, under which federal and state regulation should be allowed 
to coexist to the extent practicable.  Where Congress establishes a regime of dual 
state-federal regulation, “conflict-pre-emption analysis must be applied sensitively 
. . . so as to prevent the diminution of the role Congress reserved to the States 
while at the same time preserving the federal role.”  (Northwest Cent. Pipeline v. 
Kan. Corp. Comm’n (1989) 489 U.S. 493, 515; see also New York Dept. of Social 
Services v. Dublino (1973) 413 U.S. 405, 421 [“Where coordinate state and federal 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive 
intent.’ ”  (Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, supra, 537 U.S. at pp. 62-63, quoting 
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood (1993) 507 U.S. 658, 664.) 
 
 
13
efforts exist within a complementary administrative framework, and in the pursuit 
of common purposes, the case for federal pre-emption becomes a less persuasive 
one”].) 
Second, section 6(f) demonstrates a congressional intent to preempt only 
narrowly.  (Man Hing Ivory and Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian (9th Cir. 1983) 702 
F.2d 760, 763 [§ 6(f) “allows full implementation of [Penal Code] section 653o so 
long as the state statute does not prohibit what the federal statute or its 
implementing regulations permit”]; Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v. State of N.Y., 
supra, 658 F.Supp. at p. 1444 [§ 6(f) “evince[s] a clear Congressional intent to 
preempt state wildlife conservation laws only to a very limited extent”].)  While 
federal law establishes a regulatory floor for listed (i.e., endangered or threatened) 
species, “[a]ny State law or regulation respecting the taking of an endangered 
species or threatened species may be more restrictive than the exemptions or 
permits provided for in this chapter or in any regulation which implements this 
chapter.”  (§ 6(f), italics added; see also Man Hing Ivory and Imports, Inc., at 
p. 763, fn. 3 [the Act was rewritten to “ ‘make it clear that the states would and 
should be free to adopt legislation or regulations that might be more restrictive 
than that of the Federal government and to enforce the legislation,’ ” quoting 
H.R.Rep. No. 93-412, 1st Sess., supra, p. 7]; Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc., at 
p. 1444 [“ ‘[S]tate law is not pre-empted, but is merely subject to the Federal 
“floor” of regulations under the Act,’ ” quoting H.R.Rep. No. 93-412, supra, 
p. 14].) 
Third, with respect to unlisted species, section 6(f) leaves undisturbed the 
states’ broad traditional regulatory authority.  The text of the section’s savings 
clause preserves state power to enact more stringent regulations even with respect 
to threatened and endangered species, those species for which federal concern is 
greatest.  Neither section 6(f)’s preemption clause nor its savings clause mentions 
 
 
14
any impact on state power over unlisted species; by inference, that power is at 
least as great or greater than over federally regulated endangered or threatened 
species. 
The legislative history confirms as much.  Discussing the effect of section 
6(f), the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries explained:  
“Existing state endangered species programs would, for example, be in a position 
to include species which were not on the Federal list. . . .  [L]aws already passed 
in States such as New York, California and Hawaii, which list additional species 
or prohibit such activities as sales within their jurisdiction[,] would be unaffected.”  
(H.R.Rep. No. 93-412, 1st Sess., supra, p. 14, italics added; id. at p. 8 [with one 
exception, “the State powers to regulate in a more restrictive fashion or to include 
additional species remain unimpaired” (italics added)].) 
The federal courts that have interpreted the Act agree.  Thus, in H.J. Justin 
& Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian (9th Cir. 1983) 702 F.2d 758, a boot manufacturer 
sought preemption of Penal Code section 653o with respect to two unlisted 
species, including the wallaby kangaroo, and one listed species.  The Ninth Circuit 
found no preemption of section 653o as it applied to unlisted species; because the 
species were neither endangered nor threatened, “section 6(f) of the Act has no 
application to state regulations restricting or prohibiting trade in those species.”  
(H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc., at p. 759; see also Man Hing Ivory and Imports, Inc. v. 
Deukmejian, supra, 702 F.2d at p. 763, fn. 3 [“[T]he legislative history of the 
[Act] unequivocally shows that Congress meant for federal law to preempt state 
law pursuant to the first sentence of section 6(f) only where the species was listed 
as endangered on the federal list”]; id. at p. 765, fn. 4 [“the state is free to prohibit 
 
 
15
entirely trade in . . . unlisted species”]; Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v. State of 
N.Y., supra, 658 F.Supp. at pp. 1444-1445.)7 
The only exception to this preservation of state power is for activities 
specifically authorized by a federal exemption or permit.  (§ 6(f) [state may not 
“prohibit what is authorized pursuant to an exemption or permit”]; H.R.Rep. No. 
93-412, 1st Sess., supra, p. 14 [“The only exception to [unfettered state power 
over unlisted species] is contained in the language which expressly prohibits the 
state from voiding actions specifically permitted by Federal agencies”]; Man Hing 
Ivory and Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian, supra, 702 F.2d at p. 763; see 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1539 [authorizing issuance of federal permits and exemptions].)8 
Section 6(f) does not expressly preempt Penal Code section 653o; the Act 
does not occupy the field of kangaroo import and sales regulation (see Jevne v. 
Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 950 [inclusion of savings clause in a statute 
negates field preemption]); and there is no conflict preemption, as simultaneous 
compliance with both federal law, which as a floor matter allows kangaroo trade, 
and state law, which imposes a higher standard and prohibits it, is not a “ ‘physical 
impossibility’ ” (Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., supra, 471 
U.S. at p. 713, quoting Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132, 
143).  Thus, we consider the interplay of section 6(f) and the Act’s implementing 
                                              
7  
Adidas dismisses H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian, supra, 702 F.2d 
758, and Man Hing Ivory and Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian, supra, 702 F.2d 760, as 
addressing only express preemption.  True enough.  But insofar as they construe 
the scope of section 6(f), and insofar as the scope of section 6(f) is relevant even to 
an implied preemption analysis (see post, pt. IV.A.), the Ninth Circuit’s 
conclusions in these cases are instructive and persuasive. 
8  
As well, states may not purport to authorize what federal law forbids, but 
this exception is not implicated here. 
 
 
16
regulations with Penal Code section 653o solely in the context of an assertion of 
obstacle preemption. 
IV.   Obstacle Preemption 
A.   The Role of an Express Preemption Provision in Implied 
Preemption Analysis 
We begin with a point overlooked by the Court of Appeal:  the central role 
of the Act’s express preemption provision even in implied preemption analysis. 
A majority of the United States Supreme Court once suggested that where 
Congress had enacted an express preemption provision, that provision was the 
exclusive and final statement of congressional preemptive intent and thus obviated 
any consideration of implied preemption doctrines.  (Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 
Inc., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 517; id. at pp. 531-532 (conc. & dis. opn. of Blackmun, 
J.); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 484 [“[T]he pre-emptive 
language of [the statute] means that we need not go beyond that language to 
determine whether Congress intended the [statute] to pre-empt at least some state 
law”].) 
A slightly more tempered view of the force of express preemption 
provisions has since prevailed.  In Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick (1995) 514 U.S. 
280, the court clarified the relation between express preemption clauses and 
implied preemption doctrines, explaining that “an express definition of the pre-
emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’—i.e., supports a reasonable inference—that 
Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters,” but the express clause does not 
“entirely foreclose[] any possibility of implied pre-emption.”  (Id. at p. 288; see 
also id. at p. 289 [“Cipollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption 
clause forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule”].)  This 
inference is a simple corollary of ordinary statutory interpretation principles and in 
particular “a variant of the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio 
 
 
17
alterius:  Congress’ enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a 
statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.”  (Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 517.)  The Freightliner view is now well 
established.  (See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 69; 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly (2001) 533 U.S. 525, 541 [“In these cases our task 
is to identify the domain expressly pre-empted, [citation], because ‘an express 
definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute . . . supports a reasonable inference 
. . . that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters’ ”]; Bronco Wine Co. v. 
Jolly, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 988-989 [relying on and applying the inference].) 
The Freightliner inference applies here.  Congress has expressly identified 
the scope of the state law it intends to preempt; hence, we infer Congress intended 
to preempt no more than that absent sound contrary evidence.  Neither 
Freightliner nor any subsequent case has spelled out precisely what force to 
accord this inference, and we need not do so here.  As we shall discuss, Adidas’s 
evidence is insufficient to contradict the inference under any standard.9 
B.   Preemption by Nonregulation 
Here, Adidas asserts preemption by nonregulation.  In the absence of any 
positive statutory provision or regulation governing kangaroos, Adidas relies on 
                                              
9  
We note as well that “Congress has the power to preclude conflict [and 
obstacle] preemption, allowing states to enforce laws even if those laws are in 
direct conflict with federal law or frustrate the purpose of federal law” (Dowhal v. 
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 924; see Geier 
v. American Honda Motor Co., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 872), but it did not exercise 
that power here.  Section 6(f) expressly preserves preemption of state law that 
conflicts with the Act or its enabling regulations and also preempts state law that 
stands as an obstacle to federal policies, at least insofar as those polices are 
expressed in a positively adopted permit, exemption, or regulation. 
 
 
18
the history of the federal government’s involvement with Australian kangaroo 
management practices. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that even the absence of 
federal regulation may give rise to implied preemption.  (Sprietsma v. Mercury 
Marine, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 66; Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, supra, 514 U.S. at 
p. 286; Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Ark. Public Serv. Comm’n (1983) 461 U.S. 375, 
384.)  However, preemption in such circumstances is confined to situations 
“ ‘where failure of . . . federal officials affirmatively to exercise their full authority 
takes on the character of a ruling that no such regulation is appropriate or 
approved pursuant to the policy of the statute.’ ”  (Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 
(1978) 435 U.S. 151, 178, quoting Bethlehem Co. v. State Board (1947) 330 U.S. 
767, 774.)  In essence, Congress or federal authorities may preempt without 
regulating, but only by affirmatively deciding no state regulation is permitted. 
Congress certainly has not done so.  Instead, Adidas argues, and the Court 
of Appeal agreed, that the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s (Fish and 
Wildlife) historical treatment of red, eastern grey, and western grey kangaroos 
demonstrates an affirmative intent to create, with respect to these three species, a 
zone free from state regulation.  According to Adidas, that history shows Fish and 
Wildlife has adopted a “carrot and stick” approach, offering the threat of a ban on 
imports as a stick and access to United States markets as a carrot to induce 
Australian state and federal governments to conserve kangaroos.  Thus, Adidas 
reasons, Penal Code section 653o’s ban stands as an obstacle to federal policy by 
diminishing the size of the carrot Fish and Wildlife can offer. 
We examine the regulatory history mindful of the fact this is an area where 
Congress expressly contemplated a cooperative system of state and federal 
regulation, and where preemption analysis must remain sensitive to preserving the 
respective state and federal roles.  (Northwest Cent. Pipeline v. Kan. Corp. 
 
 
19
Comm’n, supra, 489 U.S. at pp. 514-515.)  As well, we are especially reluctant to 
infer obstacle preemption based on agency actions as opposed to statute.  (Bronco 
Wine Co. v. Jolly, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 992.)  Thus, Adidas must show in the 
history it relies on an “ ‘authoritative’ message of a federal policy against” state 
regulation (Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 67) and “clear 
evidence of a conflict” between state and federal goals (Geier v. American Honda 
Motor Co., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 885). 
C.   Federal Regulation—and Deregulation—of Kangaroos 
The parties do not dispute the outline of Fish and Wildlife’s treatment of 
kangaroos as recited by the Court of Appeal and reflected in the Federal Register.  
We draw from these sources in describing that history. 
In the 20th century, a commercial market developed in Australia for 
kangaroo hides and meat.  By the early 1970’s, the kangaroo population had 
dropped to the point that the Australian state and federal governments instituted 
protective measures such as a ban on exports and species-specific quotas on the 
killing of kangaroos for commercial use.  (39 Fed.Reg. 11903 (Apr. 1, 1974); 45 
Fed.Reg. 40958-40959 (June 16, 1980).) 
In April 1974, Fish and Wildlife proposed listing the red, eastern grey, and 
western grey kangaroo as endangered species under the Act.10  (39 Fed.Reg. 
11903 (Apr. 1, 1974); 45 Fed.Reg. 40958 (June 16, 1980).)  In December 1974, 
after receiving public input and further considering the Act’s criteria, Fish and 
Wildlife instead listed these three species as threatened.11  (39 Fed.Reg. 44990 
                                              
10  
An endangered species is one “in danger of extinction throughout all or a 
significant portion of its range.”  (16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).) 
11  
A threatened species is one “likely to become an endangered species within 
the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”  (16 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
20
(Dec. 30, 1974); 45 Fed.Reg. 40959 (June 16, 1980).)  Such a listing carries with it 
a prohibition on importation of the species, subject to exemptions or permits 
issued under the Act.  (16 U.S.C. §§ 1538, 1539; 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21(b), 17.31(a) 
(2007).)  Fish and Wildlife thereafter formally banned commercial importation of 
the three species, as well as their body parts and products made from the bodies of 
the species.  (45 Fed.Reg. 40959 (June 16, 1980); 60 Fed.Reg. 12888 (Mar. 9, 
1995).)  The ban was to remain in place until those Australian states commercially 
harvesting the three species “could assure the United States that they had effective 
management plans for the kangaroos, and that taking would not be detrimental to 
the survival of kangaroos.”  (60 Fed.Reg. 12905 (Mar. 9, 1995); see 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(d) [authorizing special species regulations]; 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21(b), 
17.31(a) (2007) [import restrictions apply absent special regulation].) 
In 1979, consistent with a provision of the Act requiring periodic 
reappraisal (16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2)), Fish and Wildlife revisited the listing of 
these kangaroo species.  (45 Fed.Reg. 40959 (June 16, 1980).)  It found all three 
remained threatened “because of the susceptibility of these animals to 
overexploitation and because of the difficulty in predicting the severity and 
damage that might be caused by natural or man-made factors affecting them” (46 
Fed.Reg. 23929 (Apr. 29, 1981)), but concluded the four states commercially 
harvesting kangaroo—Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia, and 
Western Australia—had adopted effective management plans and commercial 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
U.S.C. § 1532(20).)  Listing as a threatened or endangered species depends on 
consideration of threatened habitat loss, commercial or other overuse, disease, 
predation, the lack of adequate protective regulatory mechanisms, and any other 
factor affecting continued existence.  (Id., § 1533(a)(1); 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(c) 
(2007).) 
 
 
21
killing within the limits the plans established would “not be detrimental to the 
survival of the species.”  (Ibid.)  On that basis, in April 1981 Fish and Wildlife 
issued a special final rule, subject to reevaluation after two years, lifting the ban on 
commercial importation into the United States of products made from the red, 
eastern grey, and western grey kangaroo.  (Ibid.; former 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.40(a)(1)(i)(B) (repealed 60 Fed.Reg. 12906 (Mar. 9, 1995)).) 
In 1983, Fish and Wildlife reviewed the situation and elected to continue 
allowing commercial importation.  (48 Fed.Reg. 34757 (Aug. 1, 1983).)  It also 
proposed delisting the three kangaroo species.  (48 Fed.Reg. 15428 (Apr. 8, 1983); 
60 Fed.Reg. 12888 (Mar. 9, 1995).)  Subsequently, however, new data from the 
Australian government showed the severe drought of the summer of 1982-1983 
had significantly depleted kangaroo populations.  As a result, Fish and Wildlife 
withdrew its proposal to delist the species.  (49 Fed.Reg. 17555 (Apr. 24, 1984); 
60 Fed.Reg. 12888 (Mar. 9, 1995).) 
In December 1989, Greenpeace USA, with support from other groups, 
petitioned Fish and Wildlife to reinstate the ban on importing the three kangaroo 
species and their body parts and products.  The petitioners argued that Australia’s 
kangaroo management “was inherently flawed and that Australian States did not 
have adequate and effective conservation programs that ensured the protection of 
the threatened species.”  (60 Fed.Reg. 12888 (Mar. 9, 1995).)  In response, Fish 
and Wildlife sent representatives to Australia to evaluate both population levels 
and the Australian states’ implementation of their management programs and to 
prepare a report (the Nichols report).  (60 Fed.Reg. 12888 (Mar. 9, 1995).) 
Fish and Wildlife thereafter published a notice announcing receipt of 
Greenpeace USA’s petition and the availability of the Nichols report and seeking 
public comment.  The Wildlife Legislative Fund of America (Fund) petitioned 
Fish and Wildlife to remove the three kangaroo species from the Act’s list of 
 
 
22
threatened species.  Relying on the Nichols report, the Fund stressed two grounds 
to delist the species:  (1) by “conservative estimates” the population of the three 
species totaled almost 14 million; and (2) “kangaroo conservation programs exist 
within individual range states.”  (60 Fed.Reg. 12888 (Mar. 9, 1995).) 
After soliciting further comment, Fish and Wildlife published a proposed 
rule delisting the three kangaroo species.  (58 Fed.Reg. 5341 (Jan. 21, 1993).)  
Fish and Wildlife found the four Australian states “had developed and 
implemented adequate and effective conservation programs that ensured the 
protection of these species, . . . kangaroo populations were high[,] . . . the three 
species were protected by appropriate legislation, [they] had their populations 
regularly monitored by direct and indirect procedures, and [they] were managed 
by a complex licensing system which regulated the extent of the legal harvest.”  
(60 Fed.Reg. 12888 (Mar. 9, 1995).) 
In March 1995, Fish and Wildlife removed the three kangaroo species from 
the Act’s list of endangered or threatened species.  (60 Fed.Reg. 12888 (Mar. 9, 
1995).)  It “delist[ed] these three species of kangaroos on the basis of their 
successful recovery because the best scientific and commercial information 
available indicates the species are now not likely to become an endangered species 
in the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant part of [their] range.”  (60 
Fed.Reg. 12904 (Mar. 9, 1995); see 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d)(2) (2007) [authorizing 
delisting where a species has recovered].)  It characterized the red, eastern grey, 
and western grey populations as “abundant.”  (60 Fed.Reg. 12889 (Mar. 9, 1995).)  
It simultaneously rescinded the special rule allowing kangaroo importation 
(former 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(a)(1)(i)(B), repealed Mar. 9, 1995, 60 Fed.Reg. 12906 
(Mar. 9, 1995)) and dismissed Greenpeace USA’s petition on procedural grounds; 
as Fish and Wildlife explained, it had “no mechanism to reimpose an import ban 
on these non-endangered, non-threatened species” (60 Fed.Reg. 12904 (Mar. 9, 
 
 
23
1995)).  As required by the Act, Fish and Wildlife also indicated it would monitor 
species populations for at least five years.  (Id. at pp. 12904-12905; see 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(g)(1).) 
Today, the Australian government permits the commercial use of kangaroos 
and the exportation of kangaroo leather and meat, subject to quotas and other 
government regulation.  According to amicus curiae the Government of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, the 2005 population of red, eastern grey, and western 
grey kangaroos was just under 25 million.  The Australian government still 
considers some species threatened or endangered, but not the species at issue 
here.12 
The parties agree that since the three species have been delisted under the 
Act, their importation into the United States is not prohibited by federal law.  (See 
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A); 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21(b), 17.31(a) [import ban applies to 
listed species]; 60 Fed.Reg. 12888, 12906 (Mar. 9, 1995).) 
D.   Analysis 
This history does not establish any “authoritative” policy against state 
regulation.  Fish and Wildlife listed the red, eastern grey, and western grey 
kangaroo in 1974 based solely on the ecological considerations contained in the 
Act.  (39 Fed.Reg. 44990 (Dec. 30, 1974); 45 Fed.Reg. 40958-40959 (June 16, 
1980); see 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1); 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(c) (2007).)  It thereafter 
                                              
12  
At oral argument, Adidas noted that one subspecies of eastern grey 
kangaroo located only on Tasmania, the forester kangaroo (Macropus giganteus 
tasmaniensis), remains endangered.  (See 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (2007); 60 
Fed.Reg. 12906 (Mar. 9, 1995).)  But in its separate statement of undisputed facts, 
Adidas asserted that it does not make its footwear from federally listed endangered 
species, and Viva did not contend otherwise in response.  Hence, importation of 
forester kangaroo products is not at issue, and we need not address preemption as 
it relates to that subspecies. 
 
 
24
reconsidered and retained that listed status, again based solely on the ecological 
considerations in the Act.  (49 Fed.Reg. 17555 (Apr. 24, 1984); 60 Fed.Reg. 
12888 (Mar. 9, 1995).)  Finally, it delisted these species in 1995, not as a “carrot” 
for Australia, in Adidas’s and the Court of Appeal’s carrot-and-stick metaphor, but 
because the three species had, in Fish and Wildlife’s eyes, recovered.  (60 
Fed.Reg. 12904 (Mar. 9, 1995) [“The [Agency], with this action, delists these 
three species of kangaroos on the basis of their successful recovery because the 
best scientific and commercial information available indicates the species are now 
not likely to become an endangered species in the foreseeable future throughout all 
or a significant part of [their] range” (italics added)]; see also id. at p. 12889.)  In 
short, these species of kangaroos were delisted because they received a clean bill 
of health. 
Nor is there authoritative evidence that there exists today a federal 
kangaroo policy implemented by Fish and Wildlife to which Penal Code section 
653o would stand as an obstacle.  Delisting brought to an end federal regulation; 
Fish and Wildlife rescinded the special rule governing importation.  There is no 
current federal concern.13  So long as kangaroo populations remain healthy, Fish 
and Wildlife possesses neither carrots nor sticks, because it cannot regulate species 
that do not meet the Act’s ecological requirements for threatened or endangered 
                                              
13  
As amicus curiae the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia 
confirms, the “Australian Government has not received any approach from the 
United States Government that would suggest that the United States considers 
non-CITES listed kangaroos to be endangered or at risk of becoming endangered.”  
The three species at issue here are not listed as endangered under CITES, the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and 
Fauna, March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249. 
 
 
25
status.14  But the termination of regulation, because federal goals have been met, 
does not preempt further state efforts; instead, it leaves the field open for states to 
act as they individually see fit. 
The Court of Appeal found significant Fish and Wildlife’s 1974 imposition 
of an import ban on kangaroo products, subject to development of Australian 
species management plans, and its 1981 decision to lift the import ban, as 
reflective of a then extant policy to persuade the Australian federal and state 
governments to change their kangaroo management practices.  Fish and Wildlife’s 
actions may well have reflected such a policy (see Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. 
Watt (D.D.C. 1981) 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18548, *6-*9 [discussing purported 
reasons behind Fish and Wildlife’s actions]), and were we presented with this 
                                              
14  
Fish and Wildlife explained as much at the time of delisting.  A commenter 
arguing for continued listing asserted:  “The ‘threatened’ listing was valuable 
because it allowed [Fish and Wildlife] to act as an international watchdog on the 
kangaroo industry.”  Fish and Wildlife replied:  “[Fish and Wildlife] promotes the 
international conservation of species and the international enhancement of 
biodiversity.  [Fish and Wildlife] is obligated to properly classify these species 
based on the criteria stipulated in the Act.”  (60 Fed.Reg. 12890 (Mar. 9, 1995); 
see also id. at p. 12889  [Fish and Wildlife “disagrees that threatened status should 
be retained for these abundant and sufficiently managed species, at this time, to 
ensure that a primary industry behaves or because one day the threatened status 
may somehow be useful in the management of kangaroos.  [Fish and Wildlife] 
believes the lists of endangered and threatened species should only include those 
animals and plants whose current status fit the definitions of the Act”].)  In other 
words, Fish and Wildlife could not use its power to list or delist as a tool of 
international leverage; it was constrained to obey the terms of the Act, which 
confined listing criteria to specified ecological considerations.  Nowhere in the 
delisting decision did Fish and Wildlife express any intent that states be excluded 
from regulating on a going-forward basis.  (See Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, supra, 
33 Cal.4th at p. 992 [“ ‘[W]e can expect that [federal agencies] will make their 
intentions clear if they intend for their regulations to be exclusive,’ ” quoting 
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., supra, 471 U.S. at p. 718, 
italics omitted].) 
 
 
26
preemption question 20 years ago, we might have found these actions similarly 
significant.15  Today, however, they have no relevance.  Species management 
plans have been adopted; the three species have recovered; the special rule 
allowing imports has been rescinded; the species are no longer the subject of 
ongoing federal regulation; and the Government of the Commonwealth of 
Australia professes to have, and Fish and Wildlife believes it sincerely has, an 
independent, strong, ongoing interest in species conservation and in preservation 
of a national symbol.  (60 Fed.Reg. 12889 (Mar. 9, 1995) [Fish and Wildlife 
“believes that the Commonwealth and State governments in Australia have a 
sincere interest in the preservation of their native wildlife species and act in a 
professional manner to manage these kangaroo species so they will occur in 
abundance into perpetuity.  [Fish and Wildlife] has no reason to believe that 
market pressures will one day insidiously drive conservation activities in 
Australia, and notes that the United States and the international community could 
act to limit the trade in kangaroo products, should the status of these three 
kangaroo species be significantly reduced in the future”].)  Fish and Wildlife’s 
actions in 1974 and 1981 do not demonstrate any current policy that states must be 
excluded from regulating. 
The Court of Appeal also found it significant that after delisting, Fish and 
Wildlife would continue to monitor the three kangaroo species’ status and could 
invoke emergency listing procedures if necessary.  However, these are simply 
                                              
15  
Or not.  Even in 1983, when Fish and Wildlife extended the lifting of the 
import ban, it recognized “[t]he U.S. market has been small (less than 5 percent of 
total exported), and has had no effect on kangaroo populations or kill quotas.”  (48 
Fed.Reg. 34757 (Aug. 1, 1983).)  Thus, even then one state’s import ban may have 
posed no obstacle to Fish and Wildlife’s overall conservation goals. 
 
 
27
inherent features of the Act; monitoring is mandatory for all delisted species, and 
the emergency listing procedures apply to all unlisted species, period.  (See 16 
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7), (g)(2) [emergency listing procedures], (g)(1) [monitoring of 
delisted species].)16  They do not imply a policy that states must refrain from 
regulating such species.  Moreover, a reading of these provisions as implying any 
such policy would be at odds with section 6(f), which in describing the scope of 
the Act’s intended preemptive effect left undisturbed the states’ broad regulatory 
authority over unlisted species, and would effectively create field preemption for 
delisted or unlisted species, in contravention of the narrow preemption Congress 
intended.  To the contrary, such species are outside significant present federal 
concern and, so long as they remain unlisted, are left exclusively to state 
regulation.  (See Man Hing Ivory and Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian, supra, 702 
F.2d at p. 765, fn. 4 [“the state is free to prohibit entirely trade in . . . unlisted 
species”]; H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian, supra, 702 F.2d at p. 759 
[holding the Act does not preempt Pen. Code, § 653o’s import ban as applied to 
unlisted kangaroos].) 
In the end, Adidas’s preemption argument rests on the assertion that Penal 
Code section 653o is an obstacle to federal law because the current state of federal 
law allows kangaroo trade.  Not so.  The key here is the meaning of the word 
“authorized” in section 6(f).17  The trial court and Court of Appeal viewed a 
“failure to prohibit” as equivalent to “authorization.”  But if that were so, there 
                                              
16  
Monitoring in this context primarily involves the passive receipt and review 
of reports from the Australian government.  (60 Fed.Reg. 12904-12905 (Mar. 9, 
1995).) 
17  
States may not “prohibit what is authorized pursuant to an exemption or 
permit provided for in this chapter or in any regulation which implements this 
chapter.”  (§ 6(f).) 
 
 
28
would be no room for state regulation, despite an evident federal intention that 
there be significant room for such regulation.  Either an action would be prohibited 
by federal law, in which case state regulation would be superfluous, or it would 
not be prohibited by federal law, in which case state regulation would be 
preempted (in these courts’ views).  The express language and legislative history 
of section 6(f) preclude this reading.  Instead, every action falls within one of three 
possible federal categories.  An action may be prohibited, it may be authorized, or 
it may be neither prohibited nor authorized.  Within this last gray category of 
actions—a category that at present includes the import of products made from 
these three kangaroo species—section 6(f) grants states free room to regulate. 
This case is analogous to Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, supra, 33 Cal.4th 943.  
There, as here, the party arguing preemption contended that state law prohibited 
what federal law authorized and was therefore preempted.  (Id. at p. 992.)  As we 
explained in rejecting this argument, “ ‘[t]here is a difference between (1) not 
making an activity unlawful, and (2) making that activity lawful.’  In our view it is 
more accurate to characterize the state statute as prohibiting . . . what the federal 
[regulation] does not prohibit.”  (Ibid., quoting Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. 
Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 183.)  So too here:  
federal law does not prohibit importation of kangaroo products, while state law 
does.  That arrangement poses no obstacle to current federal policy. 
 
 
29
DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded to 
allow the Court of Appeal to address Adidas’s remaining claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Viva! International Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 134 Cal.App.4th 133 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S140064 
Date Filed: July 23, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: A. James Robertson II and Ronald Evans Quidachay 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Eisenberg, Raisman, Thurston & Wong, Orly Degani; and David Blatte for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Jonathan R. Lovvorn and Rebecca G. Judd for The Humane Society of the United States as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Morgenstein & Jubelirer and Bruce A. Wagman for Animal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Thomas Greene, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Assistant Attorney General, Clifford T. Lee and Tara 
L. Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General, for California Department of Fish and Game as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
McKenna Long & Aldridge, Ann G. Grimaldi and Eric S. C. Lindstrom for The Government of the 
Commonwealth of Australia as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Martin L. Fineman and Sam N. Dawood for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Orly Degani 
Eisenberg, Raisman, Thurston & Wong 
11601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 500 
Los Angeles, CA  90025 
(310) 235-1400 
 
Martin L. Fineman 
Davis Wright Tremaine 
500 Montgomery Street, Suite 800 
San Francisco, CA  94111-6533 
(415) 276-6500