Title: State v. Scott L. Stevenson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 71 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Scott L. Stevenson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 28, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 10, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Donald J. Hassin 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
CROOKS, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Elizabeth Cavendish-Sosinski, Daniel P. Fay and Oakton Avenue Law 
Offices, S.C., Pewaukee, and oral argument by Daniel P. Fay. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2000 WI 71 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2110-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Scott L. Stevenson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Donald J. Hassin, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (1997-
98).1  The defendant, Scott L. Stevenson, appeals the circuit 
court's judgment of conviction on two counts of making a 
videotape depicting a person in a state of nudity without the 
person's consent in violation of Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a).2   
                     
1 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
1997-98 volumes unless otherwise indicated.   
2 The defendant appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court for 
Waukesha County, Donald J. Hassin, Judge, convicting him of two 
counts of making a videotape depicting a person in a state of 
nudity 
without 
the 
person's 
consent 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a) and one count of obstructing a police officer 
under Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1).   
FILED 
 
JUN 28, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
2 
Stevenson contends that the statute is facially overbroad under 
the First Amendment.  Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a) suffers from unconstitutional overbreadth, and 
is not amenable to judicial limitation, we reverse the judgment 
of conviction and remand to the circuit court for re-sentencing 
on the charge of obstructing a police officer. 
¶2 
The relevant facts to this appeal are not disputed by 
the parties.  Scott Stevenson and his former girlfriend, R.L.H., 
were involved in a long-term relationship that R.L.H. ended in 
mid-1997.  Subsequent to the end of the relationship, Stevenson 
went to the house where R.L.H. resided with her parents and 
climbed onto the roof outside her bedroom window.  Perched upon 
the roof, he proceeded to videotape R.L.H. in various stages of 
undress as she moved about her bathroom.  Stevenson made this 
videotape without R.L.H.'s knowledge or consent.   
¶3 
Stevenson returned to the house the next evening, this 
time videotaping R.L.H. from a tree outside her bedroom window. 
 Stevenson videotaped his former girlfriend partially nude while 
she stood in front of her mirror changing outfits.  Again, 
R.L.H. neither knew of nor consented to the making of the 
videotape. 
¶4 
Shortly thereafter, the Waukesha Police Department 
received a report of a "peeping Tom" on the roof of R.L.H.'s 
house.  Upon arrival at the scene, police officers chased 
Stevenson from the roof and apprehended him in an alley.  The 
officers then arrested Stevenson for disorderly conduct and 
resisting an officer.  The next day, one of R.L.H.'s brothers 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
3 
recovered a video camera in the alley behind his parents' house 
and contacted the authorities.  This video camera contained the 
tape made by Stevenson depicting his former girlfriend in the 
nude. 
¶5 
The 
criminal 
information 
filed 
against 
Stevenson 
originally charged him with 31 counts, including numerous counts 
of making a videotape depicting R.L.H. nude without her consent 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a).3  In response to 
Stevenson's 
motion, 
the 
circuit 
court 
dismissed 
as 
multiplicitous 21 of the 31 counts charged in the information.   
¶6 
Stevenson also challenged the constitutionality of 
Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a), asserting that the statute was both 
vague for failing to clearly define the unit of prosecution 
under the statute and overbroad for infringing on protected 
expression under the First Amendment.  The circuit court 
rejected the constitutional challenge, finding that Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a) did not implicate First Amendment rights and 
                     
3 This statute provides: 
 
(2) Whoever does any of the following is guilty 
of a Class E felony: 
(a) Takes a photograph or makes a motion picture, 
videotape 
or 
other 
visual 
representation 
or 
reproduction that depicts nudity without the knowledge 
or consent of the person who is depicted nude, if the 
person knows or has reason to know that the person who 
is depicted nude does not know of and consent to the 
taking or making of the photograph, motion picture, 
videotape 
or 
other 
visual 
representation 
or 
reproduction. 
 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
4 
that Stevenson had failed to satisfy his burden of proving that 
the statute was unconstitutional. 
¶7 
Upon 
the 
reconsideration 
of 
the 
constitutional 
challenge and the circuit court's reiteration of its reason for 
rejecting that challenge, Stevenson entered no contest pleas to 
two counts of violating Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) and one count 
of obstructing a police officer in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.41(1).  The circuit court then sentenced Stevenson to the 
maximum of two years in prison on each violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a), to run consecutively, and nine months in county 
jail on the obstruction count.   The sentences were stayed in 
favor 
of 
four 
years 
probation 
with 
specific 
conditions, 
including one-year jail time in the Waukesha County Jail. 
¶8 
Stevenson appealed, asserting the same constitutional 
arguments of vagueness and overbreadth raised before the circuit 
court.  Subsequently, the court of appeals certified to this 
court the following question: Is Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a), 
subjecting a person who "[t]akes a photograph or makes a motion 
picture, 
videotape 
or 
other 
visual 
representation 
or 
reproduction that depicts nudity without the knowledge and 
consent of the person who is depicted nude" unconstitutionally 
overbroad?4 
                     
4 Because we decide this case on overbreadth grounds, we do 
not reach the claim of unconstitutional vagueness under Wis. 
Stat. § 944.205(2)(a).  Additionally, we note that although 
Stevenson raised a vagueness claim before the court of appeals, 
he has not argued or briefed the vagueness challenge before this 
court.    
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
5 
¶9 
The certified question before this court requires us 
to 
examine 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a) 
survives 
constitutional scrutiny.   The constitutionality of a statute 
presents a question of law that we review independently of the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court or the court of 
appeals.  State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 370, 580 N.W.2d 260 
(1998). 
¶10 Statutes generally benefit from a presumption of 
constitutionality that the challenger must refute.  County of 
Kenosha v. C&S Management, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 373, 383, 588 
N.W.2d 236 (1999).  When the statute implicates the exercise of 
First Amendment rights, however, the burden shifts to the 
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute 
passes constitutional muster.  Lounge Management v. Town of 
Trenton, 219 Wis. 2d 13, 20, 580 N.W.2d 156 (1998); City of 
Madison v. Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 668, 470 N.W.2d 296 (1991). 
 Because Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) implicates First Amendment 
rights, the State assumes the burden of proving that the statute 
is constitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶11 We begin our discussion by setting forth the general 
principles 
underpinning 
the 
First 
Amendment 
overbreadth 
framework to illuminate our subsequent examination of Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a).  The genesis of the overbreadth doctrine has 
been attributed to the United States Supreme Court in Thornhill 
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940), which recognized that 
broadly 
written 
statutes 
substantially 
inhibiting 
free 
expression should be open to attack even by a party whose own 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
6 
conduct remains unprotected under the First Amendment.  See 
Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent, 
466 
U.S. 
789, 
798 
(1984); 
Henry 
P. 
Monaghan, 
Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 11-12 (1982). 
¶12 Litigants claiming that a statute suffers from a 
constitutional infirmity generally must have a personal and 
vested interest in the outcome of the litigation, demonstrating 
the statute's unconstitutional application to their individual 
conduct.  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 (1973).  
Yet, in the First Amendment context the traditional rules of 
standing have been modified due to the gravity of a "chilling 
effect" that may cause others not before the court to refrain 
from constitutionally protected speech or expression.  Virginia 
v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 
(1988); State v. Tronca, 84 Wis. 2d 68, 88-89, 267 N.W.2d 216 
(1978).  In light of the critical significance of First 
Amendment rights, challengers may champion the free expression 
rights of others when their own conduct garners no protection. 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Janssen, 219 
Wis. 2d at 372.  
¶13 The prophylactic overbreadth doctrine further serves 
to prevent the selective enforcement of a statute that would 
target and discriminate against certain classes of persons.  
State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 522, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994).  
The danger inherent in overbroad statutes is that such statutes 
provide practically unbridled administrative and prosecutorial 
discretion that may result in selected prosecution based on 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
7 
certain views deemed objectionable by law enforcement.  Little 
v. City of Greenfield, 575 F. Supp. 656, 662 (E.D. Wis. 1983).  
See also Richard H. Fallon Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 
Yale L.J. 853, 884 (1991).  The overbreadth doctrine aims to 
alleviate that danger.  
¶14 Nevertheless, courts should only sparingly utilize the 
overbreadth doctrine as a tool for statutory invalidation, 
proceeding with caution and restraint.  Lounge Management, 219 
Wis. 2d at 22-23.  Although a party may hypothesize situations 
in which the challenged statute reaches too sweepingly, when the 
statute's reach encompasses expressive conduct in addition to 
speech, the overbreadth must be both real and substantial before 
the statute may be invalidated.  Id.; City of Milwaukee v. 
Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d 207, 226, 466 N.W.2d 861 (1991).  Marginal 
infringement or fanciful hypotheticals of inhibition that are 
unlikely to occur will not render a statute constitutionally 
invalid on overbreadth grounds.   
¶15 Having 
determined 
that 
a 
particular 
statute 
is 
overbroad, courts may pursue one of several options.  First, 
courts may apply a limiting construction to rehabilitate the 
statute when such a narrowing and validating construction is 
readily available.  Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 378.  Second, courts 
may 
cure 
the 
constitutional 
defect 
by 
severing 
the 
unconstitutional provisions of a statute and leaving the 
remainder of the legislation intact.  Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 522. 
  Finally, courts may determine that the statute is not amenable 
to judicial limitation or severance and invalidate the entire 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
8 
statute upon a determination that it is unconstitutional on its 
face.  Id.   
¶16 With these general overbreadth principles providing 
contextual 
guidance, 
we 
proceed 
next 
to 
examine 
the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a), the statute at 
issue in this case.  The statute provides: 
 
(2) Whoever does any of the following is guilty 
of a Class E felony: 
 
(a) Takes a photograph or makes a motion picture, 
videotape 
or 
other 
visual 
representation 
or 
reproduction that depicts nudity without the knowledge 
or consent of the person who is depicted nude, if the 
person knows or has reason to know that the person who 
is depicted nude does not know of and consent to the 
taking or making of the photograph, motion picture, 
videotape 
or 
other 
visual 
representation 
or 
reproduction. 
Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a).  At the outset, we note that 
Stevenson's conduct of surreptitiously videotaping his former 
girlfriend in the nude is abhorrent and that such conduct is 
given no protection under the First Amendment.  Stevenson 
concedes as much, yet contends that on its face Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a) overreaches in prohibiting other expression that 
should be sheltered under the First Amendment.   
¶17 Stevenson claims that the State may legitimately 
proscribe his conduct only under a properly drawn statute that 
is narrowly tailored so as to avoid any chilling effect on free 
expression.  Although Stevenson's actions do not fall under the 
protective mantle of the First Amendment, we must be mindful 
that our overbreadth analysis centers on the statute, Wis. Stat. 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
9 
§ 944.205(2)(a), and its potential deterrent effect on others 
not before this court. 
¶18 To 
illustrate 
the 
overbreadth 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a), Stevenson sets forth in his brief a myriad of 
protected 
artistic 
images 
and 
contends 
that 
the 
statute 
criminalizes 
these 
images 
as 
"visual 
representations" 
or 
"reproductions."  Included among these images are: (1) Titian's 
"Venus of Urbino," a 1528 painting of a female nude reproduced 
by the Yale University Press; (2) a 1927 Imogen Cunningham 
photograph of a nude female torso featured in Forbes magazine; 
(3) the New York Times publication of a Pulitzer Prize winning 
photograph that depicts a Vietnamese girl running nude following 
a napalm attack; and (4) a political cartoon appearing in 
Penthouse magazine portraying Kenneth Starr along with partially 
clad Monica Lewinsky and Linda Tripp. 
¶19 Stevenson maintains that on its face Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a) 
prohibits 
artistic 
expressions 
from 
being 
reproduced in books and magazines because the original nude 
subjects did not consent to those specific reproductions.  As to 
the Pulitzer Prize winning photograph and the political cartoon, 
he 
argues 
that 
the 
statute 
prohibits 
these 
original 
representations as well, since the depicted persons did not 
consent to the original representations.   
¶20 Furthermore, Stevenson contends that his attorney's 
decision to include these images in the appellate brief to this 
court subjects his attorney to criminal prosecution under Wis. 
Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) for reproducing the images without the 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
10
consent of the persons depicted nude.   According to Stevenson, 
the State's decision not to prosecute his attorney underscores 
the danger of selective enforcement that the overbreadth 
doctrine seeks to prevent. 
¶21 At oral argument, the State conceded that Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a) is overbroad on its face.  We agree.  The 
statute not only properly prohibits Stevenson's surreptitious 
videotaping of his former girlfriend in the nude, but also 
improperly prohibits all visual expression of nudity without 
explicit consent, including political satire and newsworthy 
images. 
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) does not limit its 
reach to original depictions of nudity but rather overreaches to 
all reproductions.  It chills the ability to include copies of 
masterpieces like Michaelangelo's "David" in a book devoted to 
famous sculptures and also prevents the dissemination of 
materials that may portray nudity for health or educational 
purposes. 
 
Accordingly, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a) 
indiscriminately casts a wide net over expressive conduct 
protected by the First Amendment and is unconstitutionally 
overbroad.      
¶23 Having determined that the statute is overbroad, the 
question that remains is whether the taint of unconstitutional 
overbreadth may be dissipated by this court applying a limiting 
construction to Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a).  In attempting to 
sustain 
its 
burden 
of 
proving 
that 
the 
statute 
is  
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
11
constitutional, the State proffers language as a cure for the 
statute's overbreadth. 
¶24 Adding 
its 
suggested 
language 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a), the State maintains that the statute should 
apply when a person: 
 
Takes 
a 
photograph 
or 
makes 
a 
motion 
picture, 
videotape 
or 
other 
visual 
representation 
or 
reproduction that depicts nudity without the knowledge 
and consent of the person who is depicted nude while 
that person is nude in circumstances where they have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, if the person knows 
or has reason to know that the person who is depicted 
nude does not know of and consent to the taking or 
making of the photograph, motion picture, videotape or 
other visual representation or reproduction (emphasis 
denotes additional language advanced by the State). 
 
¶25 The State argues that Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) is an 
invasion 
of 
privacy 
statute 
aimed 
at 
prohibiting 
the 
surreptitious videotaping or visual representation of a person 
without consent while the person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.5  According to the State, the addition of the proffered 
                     
5 The State refers to a letter in the legislative drafting 
file for the statute and notes that the legislation was 
precipitated by an incident in the city of River Falls, in which 
an adult male secretly videotaped female foreign exchange 
students visiting or residing in his home while the students 
appeared undressed in the bathroom.  See Letter of Chief of 
Police of River Falls to State Representative Sheila Harsdorf, 
October 11, 1993, Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 
1995 Wis. Act 249.  The State notes that although the comments 
of those who propose legislation are not binding as legislative 
intent, the comments nevertheless represent persuasive authority 
as to the intent underlying the statute.  State Pub. Defender v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 184 Wis. 2d 860, 868-69, 517 
N.W.2d 144 (1994).     
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
12
language will rid the statute of its sweeping reach and rein in 
its application to conduct like that in which Stevenson has 
engaged.  
¶26 Stevenson recognizes the tension between the right to 
privacy and the necessity of promoting the free expression of 
ideas.  He acknowledges that the language advanced by the State 
is presently included in the privacy statutes of Missouri and 
Oregon.6  Yet, Stevenson is quick to draw our attention to the 
                     
6 Apparently, three states have enacted privacy statutes 
that contain similar language to Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a). 
The Missouri invasion of privacy statute, Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§ 565.253 (West 1999), provides in relevant part: 
(1) A person commits the crime of invasion of privacy 
if he knowingly views, photographs or films another 
person, without that person’s knowledge and consent, 
while the person being viewed, photographed or filmed 
is in a state of full or partial nudity and is in a 
place where he would have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 
Oregon's privacy statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.700 (1997) 
reads in pertinent part:  
 
(1) Except as provided in ORS 163.702 [enumerated 
exceptions], a person commits the crime of invasion of 
personal privacy if: 
(a) 
The 
person 
knowingly 
makes 
or 
records 
a 
photograph, motion picture, videotape or other visual 
recording of another person in a state of nudity 
without the consent of the person being recorded; and 
(b) At the time the visual recording is made or 
recorded the person being recorded is in a place and 
circumstances 
where the 
person has a 
reasonable 
expectation of personal privacy. 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
13
legislature's 
inclusion of 
the "reasonable 
expectation of 
privacy" language in the Missouri and Oregon statutes and the 
legislature's provision of enumerated exceptions to a similar  
North Dakota statute.  Although no cases appear yet to have 
challenged the constitutionality of any of the three state 
statutes, Stevenson posits that overbreadth concerns such as 
those presented in this case have been apparently addressed by 
the 
legislatures 
of 
the 
three 
other 
states 
without 
the 
judiciary's assumption of a legislative role. 
¶27 While it is this court's obligation to construe a 
statute so as to preserve its constitutionality, Wroten, 160 
Wis. 2d at 233-34, we will not adopt a limiting construction 
                                                                  
The North Dakota statute addressing the possession or 
distribution 
of 
certain 
photographs 
or 
other 
visual 
representations, N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-31-08 (Michie 1997), 
states in relevant part: 
A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if, 
knowing of its character and content, a person 
surreptitiously acquires and knowingly possesses or 
distributes 
any 
photograph 
or 
other 
visual 
representation that exhibits a nude or partially 
denuded human figure . . . without the individual’s 
written consent . . . . This section does not apply to 
any book, . . . photograph, video recording, motion 
picture film, or other visual representation sold in 
the normal course of business through wholesale or 
retail outlets that possess a valid sales tax permit 
or used by a licensed attorney, attorney’s agent, or 
any other person obtaining evidence for a criminal 
investigation or pending civil action, or by a medical 
professional or a peace officer acting within that 
person’s scope of employment. 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
14
unless the language of the statute is "readily susceptible" to 
such construction.  Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d at 532 (quoting Virginia 
v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)). 
 Here, a broad and expansive interpretation is dictated by the 
unambiguous language of Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a). 
¶28 The State's proposed language would have the effect of 
adding two elements to the crime set forth in the existing 
statute: (1) that the person depicted nude have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the place or circumstances in which 
the person is depicted, and (2) that the person depicted be 
contemporaneously 
present 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
depiction.  
However, the State is unpersuasive in its argument that the 
addition of two elements will provide the necessary cure to the 
statute's overbreadth.   
¶29 The addition of two elements would significantly alter 
Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) and would essentially require us to 
rewrite the statute.  Yet, it is for the legislature to rewrite 
§ 944.205(2)(a) and to craft a clear and precise statute that 
reconciles the tension between the core concerns of privacy and 
free expression.  
¶30 "[P]recision must be the touchstone of legislation" 
that implicates the fundamental freedoms underpinning the First 
Amendment.  Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 
(1964).  When the statutory penalty is a criminal felony charge, 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
15
as it is under Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a), statutory precision 
is of greater critical significance.  The legislative arena 
represents the appropriate forum for weighing the myriad policy 
considerations underlying the interplay of fundamental rights. 
If statutes are to withstand constitutional attacks premised on 
the infringement of such fundamental rights, they should reflect 
with utmost clarity and exactitude the reconciliation of 
divergent policy concerns. 
¶31 The State contends that this case differs from prior 
cases in which we have refused to apply a limiting construction 
to the statutes or ordinances at issue, because unlike those 
legislative enactments, Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) does not 
express a legislative intent to apply the statute broadly.  See, 
e.g., Lounge Management, 219 Wis. 2d at 16 n.3; Janssen, 219 
Wis. 2d at 366.  Although there is no parallel language in 
§ 944.205(2)(a) expressing the intent of broad application, the 
State acknowledges that likewise there is no expressed intent to 
narrow the scope of application. 
¶32 The State's recognition of this silence underscores 
the fatal flaw of its argument that we may apply a limiting 
construction without running afoul of the legislative purpose.  
Adopting such a limiting construction would have us substitute 
our judicial intent for legislative intent. 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
16
¶33 In further support of its limiting language, the State 
cites to numerous cases in which courts have supplied a judicial 
construction to salvage a statute's constitutionality.  See, 
e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64 (1994); 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); State v. Collova, 
79 Wis. 2d 473, 255 N.W.2d 581 (1977).  These cases are 
distinguishable. 
¶34 Several of the cases address the addition of a 
scienter element, which is the rule rather than the exception in 
our criminal jurisprudence, benefiting from a presumption in 
criminal statutes.  X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 70; State v. 
Alfonsi, 33 Wis. 2d 469, 476, 147 N.W.2d 550 (1967).  Other 
cases cited by the State permit a limiting construction in the 
face of either guidance from prior judicial construction of 
analogous language or the ready availability of language in the 
plain text of the statute supporting the limiting construction. 
 Here, we have not been asked to supply the element of scienter 
to Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a), and language is not readily 
available in the text of the statute to support the State's 
limiting construction. 
¶35 Stevenson maintains that our adoption of the two 
additional elements advanced by the State would not cure the 
constitutional infirmity inherent in Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a). 
 He argues that a constitutional defect remains unless the terms 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
17
"visual representation" and "reproduction" are excised from the 
statute. 
¶36 According to Stevenson, the statute as judicially 
construed nevertheless criminalizes the drawing of a person in 
the nude as in the political cartoon depicting Monica Lewinsky, 
Linda Tripp, and Ken Starr if the person is depicted in a place 
where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  He 
also claims that the rewritten statute reaches the photocopying 
or reproducing of artistic expressions in which the model is 
depicted in a place of privacy and has not given consent to the 
reproduction of the original portrait. 
¶37 Arguably 
the 
contemporaneous 
presence 
element 
adequately 
addresses 
the 
political 
cartoon, 
subjecting 
a 
cartoonist to criminal prosecution only when the cartoon is 
based on a contemporaneous view of the nude and unconsenting 
person, not on the artist's imagination.  Yet, the term 
"reproduction" continues to pose a vexing problem for the State. 
¶38 The commingling of the State's proffered element of 
required contemporaneous presence and the term "reproduction" 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) would render the statute 
internally inconsistent.  To reproduce is to recreate or 
subsequently produce.  By definition, a reproduction is not 
contemporaneous to the event.  Thus, the second element of 
contemporaneous presence suggested by the State fails to address 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
18
the constitutional dilemma posed by the inclusion of the term 
"reproduction."  The judicial construction of Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a) advanced by the State would then necessarily 
require a severance of the problematic term.  A severance 
coupled with an addition of two new elements reflects the 
considerable degree of the statute's infirmity. 
¶39 As a proposed solution, the State would have us inject 
into Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) implied consent to all future 
reproductions once a person has voiced consent to the original 
representation.  This simply veers too far by further muddying 
the waters and demonstrates the extent of our revision were we 
to apply a judicial construction. 
¶40 The extent of revision necessary to save Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a) would require us to adopt the role of the 
legislature.  We decline to do so.  Ours is not the proper forum 
for the lively debate and discourse necessary to reconcile the 
conflicting demands of the right to privacy and the right of 
free expression.  We leave the drafting of a narrowly tailored 
statute to the legislature, and we refrain from adopting a 
judicial construction to cure the overbreadth of Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a).  The State has thus failed to satisfy its 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute 
survives constitutional scrutiny. 
No. 
98-2110-CR 
 
 
19
¶41 In sum, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) on 
its face is unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibits 
protected expression under the First Amendment.  Additionally, 
the statute is not susceptible to a limiting construction by 
this 
court. 
 
Because 
Stevenson 
was 
convicted 
under 
an 
unconstitutional statute, we reverse the judgment of conviction 
and remand the cause to the circuit court for re-sentencing on 
the charge of obstructing an officer. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded. 
No. 98-2110-CR.jpw 
 
1 
¶42 JON P. WILCOX, J. (dissenting). Even if Wisconsin 
Statute 
§ 944.205(2)(a) 
(1997-98)7 
poses 
any 
danger 
of 
unconstitutional overbreadth on its face, the statutory language 
is readily susceptible to curative judicial construction.  I 
therefore would not strike this statute down on grounds of 
facial overbreadth. 
¶43 Facial challenges to statutes do not succeed when a 
limiting construction is available.  See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). The usual duty of courts is to 
construe statutes "so as to avoid the statutes' potentially 
overbroad reach, apply the statute in that case, and leave the 
statute in place."  Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 119 (1990).  
Moreover, when a statute regulates conduct and not just speech, 
"the scope of the statute does not render it unconstitutional 
unless its overbreadth is not only 'real, but substantial as 
well.'"  Id. at 112 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).  
¶44 The general rule of standing is that a defendant 
cannot attack a statute on the ground that it may be 
unconstitutional as applied to others.  See State v. Thiel, 183 
Wis. 2d 505, 520, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994).  The overbreadth 
doctrine properly establishes an exception to this rule, when 
First Amendment rights are implicated.  See id. at 520-21.  "In 
the First Amendment context, we permit defendants to challenge 
statutes on overbreadth grounds, regardless of whether the 
                     
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes refer 
to the 1997-98 volumes unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 98-2110-CR.jpw 
 
2 
individual defendant's conduct is constitutionally protected."  
Osborne, 
495 
U.S. 
at 112 
and n.8.  
However, 
statutory 
invalidation under the overbreadth doctrine is "manifestly, 
strong medicine" that is meant to be employed only as a last 
resort.  See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.  Therefore, the court 
has a duty not to render the entire statute invalid when the 
language of the statute can be cured by a limiting construction. 
 See Thiel, 183 Wis.2d at 521.   
¶45 In 
a 
challenge 
to 
facial 
validity, 
a 
limiting 
construction to rehabilitate the statute is permitted when such 
a reading is "readily available."  See State v. Janssen, 219 
Wis. 2d 362, 378, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998).  Even when First 
Amendment rights are concerned, if the statute is "'readily 
susceptible' to a narrowing construction that would make it 
constitutional, it will be upheld."  See Virginia v. American 
Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)(citations 
omitted).  A narrow construction is the proper way to guard 
against potential overbreadth in Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a). 
¶46 The clear aim of the statute under attack is to 
protect legitimate privacy interests.  Though there are no 
records of floor or committee debate, a letter in the drafting 
file indicates that the legislature's aim was to prohibit 
conduct exactly like the defendant's conduct in this case.  See 
Letter of Chief of Police of River Falls to State Representative 
Sheila Harsdorf, dated October 11, 1995, in the Wisconsin 
Legislative Reference Bureau bill drafting file for 1995 Wis. 
Act 249.  The statute was drafted in direct response to a letter 
No. 98-2110-CR.jpw 
 
3 
written by the River Falls Chief of Police, which related an 
incident of the same sort of invasive and secretive visual 
recording of nude persons that we have in this case.8  This 
legislative history establishes that the legislature's intent in 
enacting Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) was to protect privacy 
interests in cases just like the one at hand.   
¶47 The invasive act targeted as criminal behavior in this 
case is concededly not protected by the First Amendment.  
Majority at ¶ 16.  Furthermore, the mere fact of nudity depicted 
in a visual media is not proscribed by the statute.  The conduct 
described in the act is constitutionally proscribable, and the 
expressive content of the pictures is not the primary concern of 
the legislature.  Rather, the legislature seeks to proscribe 
obtaining 
nude 
images 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
constitutes 
an 
intolerable invasion of privacy.  See Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1975)(noting that the 
state's ability "'to shut off discourse solely to protect others 
from 
hearing 
it 
is . . . dependent 
upon 
a 
showing 
that 
substantial 
privacy 
interests 
are 
being 
invaded 
in 
an 
                     
8 More specifically, the incident related in the letter to 
Representative Harsdorf explained that the young women were 
foreign exchange students whom the individual was hosting in his 
residence.  They were unaware he was videotaping them while they 
engaged in their bathroom routines.   
This is strikingly similar to the facts in this case.  The 
defendant admits that he secretly positioned himself outside of 
his ex-girlfriend's house, on the roof of the house and in a 
tree.  From these positions, he videotaped her while she was in 
the privacy of her bedroom and bathroom.   
No. 98-2110-CR.jpw 
 
4 
essentially intolerable manner.'")(quoting Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 
15, 
21 
(1971)). 
 
The 
legislature's 
intent to 
criminalize invasions of privacy such as the invasion here is 
evident in the plain language of the statute, which prohibits 
capturing an image that depicts nudity "without the knowledge or 
consent of the person who is depicted nude."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 944.205(2)(a). 
¶48 The majority argues that the language in the statute 
is 
not 
readily 
susceptible 
to 
an 
interpretation 
that 
criminalizes only this narrow category of behavior.  I disagree. 
 The most reasonable interpretation of the statute is not the 
one suggested by the defense, which characterizes the statute as 
prohibiting 
a 
myriad 
of 
conduct 
protected 
by 
the 
First 
Amendment.  Instead, the most reasonable interpretation of the 
statute is the one urged by the State, which only criminalizes 
behavior that constitutes an invasion of privacy. 
¶49 Under this reasonable interpretation, we cannot find 
real and substantial overbreadth.  The overbreadth doctrine 
should not be used to invalidate the statute merely because "'in 
some conceivable, but limited, circumstances the regulation 
might be improperly applied.'"  Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 373, 
(quoting City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d 24, 40, 426 
N.W.2d 329 (1988)).  Especially, we should not attribute to the 
legislature an intent to apply a statute in situations where an 
application would yield unreasonable results.  See State v. 
Timm, 163 Wis. 2d 894, 899, 472 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1991).  The 
language in Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) is "readily available" to 
No. 98-2110-CR.jpw 
 
5 
a construction that serves the privacy interests contemplated by 
the legislature.  
¶50 In 1998 this court invalidated a statute that sought 
to criminalize "defilement" of the American flag on grounds of 
overbreadth.  See Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 387.  The overbreadth 
challenge properly succeeded because there was no construction 
that would make the statute constitutionally permissible: it was 
"a clear attempt to ban speech and conduct based on its 
expressive content." Id. at 385-86.  The legislature's stated 
intent confirmed as much.  See id.  Here, there is no such 
impermissible regulation on the basis of expressive content.  
The statute does not criminalize the visual depiction because it 
depicts 
nudity. 
 
Instead, 
it 
criminalizes 
securing 
such 
depictions by an invasive, secretive method violating privacy 
interests. 
¶51 To bolster this understanding of the statute, the 
State has proposed the following limiting language, which would 
ensure that the statute only applies when the defendant: 
 
Takes 
a 
photograph 
or 
makes 
a 
motion 
picture, 
videotape 
or 
other 
visual 
representation 
or 
reproduction that depicts nudity without the knowledge 
and consent of the person who is depicted nude, while 
that person is nude in circumstances where they have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, if the person knows 
or has reason to know that the person who is depicted 
nude does not know of and consent to the taking or 
making of the photograph, motion picture, videotape or 
other visual representation or reproduction. 
Plaintiff-Respondent's Brief at 13-14.  Construing the statute 
in this manner underscores the statute's susceptibility to 
No. 98-2110-CR.jpw 
 
6 
reasonable interpretation and clarifies the applicable scope of 
the statute.  The language of the statute requiring "knowledge" 
and "consent," coupled with the legislative history, reflect 
that protection of privacy is the fundamental concern.  The 
statute is readily susceptible to a limited application: at its 
core, this statute seeks to protect against invasion of privacy. 
¶52 By applying this reasonable interpretation of the 
statute, the overbreadth concerns fall away.  Under this 
construction, there is no "real" and "substantial" overbreadth 
when "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate 
sweep."  See Lounge Management, Ltd. v. Town of Trenton, 219 
Wis. 2d 13, 34, 580 N.W.2d 156 (1998) (quoting Broadrick, 413 
U.S. at 615).  The examples put forth by the defense and the 
majority to illustrate possible overbreadth are inapposite under 
this construction of the statute.  Models who pose nude have 
granted consent and, therefore, have no reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  News reporters will not be vulnerable under the 
statute if their subjects were in full public view where there 
is no expectation of privacy.  Artistic license will not be 
threatened so long as the depictions are not made while 
surreptitiously observing anyone while they were undressed. 
¶53 The Supreme Court approved of a similar approach to 
curing potential overbreadth in Osborne, when it approved of the 
insertion of limiting language into a statute rather than 
invalidating the statute based on facial overbreadth.  See 
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112.  The Supreme Court held that a narrow 
construction saving a statute from facial invalidation is 
No. 98-2110-CR.jpw 
 
7 
appropriate 
when 
there 
is 
a 
"'"whole 
range 
of 
easily 
identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct."'"  See 
id. at 112 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 n.25 
(1982)).  The Court determined that an otherwise overbroad 
statute prohibiting the possession of "nude" photographs of 
minors could be construed narrowly to avoid "penalizing persons 
for viewing or possessing innocuous photographs of naked 
children."  See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 114.  The Supreme Court 
approved of the Ohio Supreme Court's construction, which 
interpreted the statute to refer only to "'nudity [that] 
constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the 
genitals.'"  Id. at 113.  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
confirmed that it is permissible, when trying to reach a 
curative construction, to add language that is in-step with the 
statutory purpose of the law.  That is precisely what we should 
do here. 
¶54 Limiting this statute to protect only persons who have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy at the moment a visual 
depiction is made does not constitute an improper judicial 
rewriting of the statute.  Instead, this interpretation is the 
most reasonable reading based on the statutory language and 
legislature's aim.  The Osborne court upheld an interpretation 
that did not merely add clarifying language to the statute but 
also grafted on an element of mental state.  See Osborne, 495 
U.S. at 115.  Yet, this was not characterized as "rewriting" the 
statute.  Following Osborne, we should apply a reasonable 
No. 98-2110-CR.jpw 
 
8 
limiting construction to Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) to cure any 
unconstitutional overbreadth. 
¶55 The majority distinguishes the Osborne line of cases 
on the grounds that a scienter element is a presumption in 
criminal law.  However, the concept of "reasonable expectation 
of privacy" is also widespread in criminal law, particularly in 
Fourth Amendment litigation.  Reading a "reasonable expectation" 
requirement into a privacy law is as natural as grafting a 
scienter element onto criminal laws. 
¶56 The State also offers a construction that cures any 
potential 
overbreadth 
relating 
to 
the 
use 
of 
the 
term 
"reproduction."  "Reproduction" can be understood to refer only 
to reproduction of images that were procured without the 
victim's "knowledge" or "consent."  In other words, once a 
person has consented to the obtaining of an image, consent to 
reproduction of that image 
would 
be 
implied. 
 Such an 
interpretation of the statute does not require us to "inject" an 
element of implied consent into the statute.  Majority at ¶ 39. 
 A reasonable reading of the statute, with its express reference 
to "consent," suggests that absent an initial invasion of 
No. 98-2110-CR.jpw 
 
9 
privacy, Wis. Stat. § 944.205(2)(a) was not crafted to apply to 
subsequent reproduction.9   
¶57 Finally, 
the 
defense 
argues 
that 
the 
limiting 
construction proposed by the State is improper because it will 
undermine fair notice.  This concern is not without merit; it is 
important for people to know what the law proscribes.  A 
limiting construction of a statute "'may be applied to conduct 
occurring prior to the construction, . . . [but only if] such 
application affords fair warning to the defendan[t].'"  Osborne, 
495 U.S. at 115 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 
491 n.7 (1965)).   
¶58 In this case, notice concerns do not arise.  Reading 
the statute without the clarifying language proposed by the 
State would have adequately warned the defendant that sneaking 
                     
9 The defense argues that this construction does not cure 
the constitutional defect because the statute might still 
infringe on an artist's right to draw from imagination a person 
nude in a place where the person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  I do not think this construction permits such an 
application, because an individual does not have a right to 
privacy or a reasonable expectation of privacy in an artist's 
imagination.  On the other hand, the state may constitutionally 
prohibit an artist from perching himself outside an individual's 
bedroom window in order to secretly observe and create a 
likeness of that person. 
The 
majority 
also 
argues 
that 
the 
State's 
limiting 
construction 
renders 
the 
statute 
internally 
inconsistent, 
because by definition a person depicted nude in the original 
need not be contemporaneously present during reproduction of the 
image.  Majority at ¶ 38.  However, no inconsistency results if 
"reproduction" is understood to refer only to an image that was 
initially obtained in a violation of privacy during which the 
victim was "contemporaneously present."   
No. 98-2110-CR.jpw 
 
10
onto a roof and videotaping an unknowing victim in her bathroom 
is criminal.  Accepting the State's limiting construction of 
this statute therefore would not deprive this defendant of fair 
notice of what sort of conduct could result in prosecution. 
¶59 The statute is readily susceptible to a limiting 
construction to cure it from potential overbreadth.  Indeed, 
such a limiting construction is the most reasonable reading of 
the statute.  Therefore I respectfully dissent.  
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this dissent. 
 
 
No. 98-2110-CR.jpw 
 
1