Title: People v. Carter

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 88224-Agenda 35-May 2000.
								THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
								LAWRENCE CARTER, Appellant.
 

	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Vermilion County,
the defendant, Lawrence Carter, was convicted of driving with a
suspended license and of operating an uninsured vehicle and was
acquitted of illegal transportation of alcohol. The defendant filed
a post-trial motion, seeking a judgment of acquittal
notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, a new trial, with
regard to the conviction for driving with a suspended license. At
a hearing, the court orally granted the defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed the public
defender to prepare an appropriate order. The next day, however,
the judge sua sponte vacated the judgment of acquittal
notwithstanding the verdict and ordered a new trial on the charge
of driving with a suspended license.
	The defendant filed a motion to bar the new trial, arguing that
the court's order violated the double jeopardy clauses of the
federal and state constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §10). The trial judge denied the motion. The defendant
then appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the circuit court.
306 Ill. App. 3d 867. We allowed the defendant's petition for
leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the reasons that follow,
we reverse the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit
court.
	The defendant was stopped and ticketed on December 2,
1997, for driving with a suspended license, among other offenses.
During the defendant's trial, in May 1998, Danville police officer
Nathan Howie testified that he stopped the defendant's vehicle
because he believed that the defendant's driver's license had been
suspended. Officer Howie further testified that when he asked the
defendant for identification and for an insurance card, the
defendant was not able to produce either one. The officer then
asked the defendant for his full name and date of birth. The officer
testified that after receiving information regarding defendant from
his communication center, he arrested the defendant for driving
with a suspended license.
	After the officer testified, the State sought to admit into
evidence an abstract of the defendant's driving record. Defense
counsel objected on the ground that the document was hearsay
because it was not a certified copy of the abstract, as required by
statute. The trial judge sustained the objection, and the State
rested. The defendant then moved for a directed verdict, arguing
that the evidence was not sufficient to establish the offense of
driving with a suspended license. The court denied the defendant's
motion, explaining that the elements of the offense were shown by
the officer's testimony that he believed that the defendant's license
had been suspended.
	The defendant testified that he has diabetes. According to the
defendant, on the day he was stopped by the police, he became ill
and needed to go to the hospital because he did not have any
insulin at home. The defendant said that he first attempted to
telephone two friends and a taxi company to obtain a ride to the
hospital. His condition worsened, however, and he then decided to
drive himself.
	The trial judge denied the defendant's request that the jury be
instructed on the defense of necessity. The jury found the
defendant guilty of driving with a suspended license, as well as of
another offense, operating an uninsured vehicle; the jury found the
defendant not guilty of a third charge, the illegal transportation of
alcohol. The defendant filed a post-trial motion, seeking a
judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict with regard to
the conviction for driving with a suspended license, or, in the
alternative, a new trial on that charge.
	At a hearing on June 4, 1998, the trial court granted the
defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the
verdict on the charge of driving with a suspended license. The
judge found that insufficient evidence existed to support a
conviction for that offense. The docket entry from that date states,
in pertinent part:
			"Judgment of acquittal is entered as to the charge of
DAS [driving after license suspension]. Written order to
follow from PD Scott Lerner."
	The next day, June 5, the public defender presented to the
court a written order memorializing the previous day's ruling. The
judge agreed that the proposed order reflected the view he had
expressed the previous day. The judge, however, sua sponte
vacated the judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. The
judge explained that the driving abstract, issued by the Secretary
of State's office, had appeared in a new format unfamiliar to him,
leading him to erroneously exclude it from evidence. The judge
found that without the driving abstract there was insufficient
evidence to support the defendant's conviction for driving with a
suspended license. The judge stated that, in an attempt to correct
his erroneous evidentiary ruling excluding the abstract, he was
going to allow the defendant's motion for a new trial. The
defendant objected to the new trial on grounds of double jeopardy,
but the judge denied the defendant's motion to preclude retrial on
that ground.
	The defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. The
appellate court believed that retrial would not subject the
defendant to double jeopardy. The court construed the trial judge's
actions here as indicating that the judge believed "that the jury's
verdict was merely against the weight of the evidence." 306 Ill.
App. 3d at 873. The appellate court concluded that the new trial
was not barred by double jeopardy, and in support of that
proposition cited Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652,
102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982), which held that retrial may occur if a
reviewing court determines that a conviction is not supported by
the weight of the evidence, rather than the sufficiency of the
evidence. We allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
	The defendant renews here his argument that retrial in this
case would violate the double jeopardy provisions of the federal
and state constitutions. In support of this contention, the defendant
cites Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 57 L. Ed. 2d 43, 98 S. Ct. 2170 (1978), which held that a judgment of acquittal
stemming from an evidentiary ruling, however erroneous, bars
further prosecution on any aspect of the charge. Further, the
defendant argues that the trial judge could not reconsider his
decision to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In support
of that proposition, he refers to this court's opinion in People v.
Van Cleve, 89 Ill. 2d 298 (1982), which ruled that article VI,
section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6)
prohibits the State from appealing a trial court's decision to enter
a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding a guilty verdict. In
response, the State contends that the trial judge had the authority
to reconsider his decision to correct the erroneous evidentiary
ruling without putting the defendant twice in jeopardy. The State
also contends that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
defendant's conviction for driving with a suspended license, and
the State suggests that the proper course in this case is simply to
reinstate the jury's verdict of guilt on that charge.
	At the outset, we reject the State's invitation to determine
whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the
defendant's conviction for driving with a suspended license and,
if it was, to reinstate the jury's verdict on that charge. We believe
that our consideration of that question would be inconsistent with
our decision in Van Cleve, which held that the State may not
appeal from a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict.
The Van Cleve court based its holding on a provision in article VI,
section 6, of the Illinois Constitution, which states that "after a
trial on the merits in a criminal case, there shall be no appeal from
a judgment of acquittal." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6. Although
there is no double jeopardy bar to an appeal by the State from a
judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict (see Smalis v.
Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 n.8, 90 L. Ed. 2d 116, 122 n.8,
106 S. Ct. 1745, 1749 n.8 (1986); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232, 95 S. Ct. 1013 (1975)), article VI,
section 6, separately prohibits such review. We recognize that in
this case the question comes before us as a result of the
defendant's appeal from the order of the circuit court denying his
motion to bar retrial. We believe, however, that our consideration
of the issue would be tantamount to hearing it in violation of the
rule announced in Van Cleve, and therefore we do not believe that
the question is properly before us.
	 Because of our resolution of the question whether the trial
judge could order a new trial under the circumstances here, we
need not decide whether the judge had the authority to reconsider
his order granting a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the
verdict. We would note that the authority barring this court's
review of a judgment of acquittal in those circumstances would
not appear by itself to preclude the trial judge from reconsidering
such an order. But whether or not the trial judge could reconsider
the entry of the judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict,
the order entered by the judge on reconsideration-ordering a new
trial to correct an evidentiary ruling unfavorable to the
prosecution-was improper. Having found the evidence of the
defendant's guilt insufficient, the trial judge could not order a new
trial to correct what he perceived to be the error in his ruling at
trial barring part of the State's evidence. Retrying the defendant on
the charge of driving with a suspended license a second time
would improperly subject defendant to double jeopardy. The fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const., amend. V. Article I, section
10, of the Illinois Constitution similarly provides, in part, that no
person shall "be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §10.
	Unlike the appellate court, we believe that the trial judge in
this case determined that, in the absence of the driving abstract,
there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's
conviction for driving with a suspended license. Here, the trial
judge entered the judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the
verdict, acknowledging that without the admission of the
defendant's driving abstract insufficient evidence existed to
support a charge of driving with a suspended license. See Van
Cleve, 89 Ill. 2d  at 303 ("judgment notwithstanding the verdict
entered by a judge who theretofore denied a motion for a directed
verdict is often regarded as a reconsideration of the order of
denial"). The judge later vacated his judgment of acquittal and
then granted the defendant's motion for a new trial, stating that his
error in excluding the defendant's driving abstract had caused
substantial inequity to the State.
	We believe that the present case is similar to Sanabria v.
United States, 437 U.S. 54, 57 L. Ed. 2d 43, 98 S. Ct. 2170 (1978),
cited by the defendant. In Sanabria, the trial court made an
erroneous evidentiary ruling that resulted in the presentation of
insufficient evidence of the offense charged. At the close of the
prosecution's case, defense counsel made a motion for a judgment
of acquittal, which was denied. Defense counsel next moved to
exclude evidence, and the court also denied that motion. Later,
however, the judge sua sponte reconsidered its ruling on the
motion to exclude evidence. Defense counsel then made a second
motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial judge granted.
Sanabria, 437 U.S.  at 58-60, 57 L. Ed. 2d  at 50-51, 98 S. Ct.  at
2176. The government appealed, and the court of appeals ordered
a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court concluded,
"[W]hen a defendant has been acquitted at trial he may not be
retried on the same offense, even if the legal rulings underlying the
acquittal were erroneous." Sanabria, 437 U.S.  at 64, 57 L. Ed. 2d 
at 54, 98 S. Ct.  at 2179. As this court explained in People v. Mink,
141 Ill. 2d 163, 174 (1990), "The trial court could not give the
State a second opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to
muster in the first proceeding." Yet that is what the trial judge
attempted to do in this case. Thus, we conclude that the trial judge
was barred by principles of double jeopardy from subjecting the
defendant to a second trial as a means of correcting the erroneous
exclusion of the State's evidence at the first trial.
	For the reasons stated, the judgments of the appellate court
and circuit court are reversed. The cause is remanded to the circuit
court of Vermilion County so that the court may reinstate its
judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict on the
defendant's conviction for driving with a suspended license.
Judgments reversed;
cause remanded.