Title: Wolfgang Mau v. North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 134 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1369-CQ 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Wolfgang Mau and Ena Mau,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, a  
corporation,  
 
Defendant, 
National Union Fire Insurance Company of  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, a corporation,  
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM THE  
SUPREME COURT OF NORTH DAKOTA 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 21, 2001   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 13, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and BRADLEY, J.J., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs by Duane A. 
Lillehaug and Lee Hagen Law Office, Ltd., Fargo, North Dakota, 
and 
Dana 
J. 
Weis 
and 
Habush, Habush, Davis 
& Rottier, 
Rhinelander, and oral argument by Dana J. Weis. 
 
For the defendant-appellee there was a brief by William P. 
Harrie and Nilles, Hansen & Davies, Ltd., Fargo, North Dakota, 
and Frank L. Steeves, Patrick L. Wells and Crivello, Carlson, 
Mentkowski & Steeves, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Patrick L. Wells. 
 
 
2001 WI 134 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-1369-CQ  
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wolfgang Mau and Ena Mau,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, a  
corporation,  
 
          Defendant, 
 
National Union Fire Insurance Company of  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, a corporation,  
 
          Defendant-Appellee. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 21, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION of a question of law from the Supreme Court 
of North Dakota.  Certified question answered and cause 
remanded. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the Supreme Court of North Dakota pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 821.01 (1995-96).1  The parties dispute whether 
Wolfgang Mau is covered under an underinsured motorist policy.  
The specific question before the court is:  Is Endorsement #1 in 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-1996 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
2 
 
the International Extended Protection (IEP) Option valid under 
Wisconsin law to preclude underinsured motorist coverage to one 
who rents a car from Alamo, purchases the IEP Option, and is 
injured while sitting in a different car?  Based on our 
interpretation of language in the excess policy, we find that 
Mau is a named insured under the excess policy and that the 
occupancy requirement in Endorsement #1 is not valid under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32. 
I 
¶2 
The facts in this case are not in dispute.  Wolfgang 
Mau and Dieter Jung (Jung), residents of Germany, arranged with 
a German travel agent to rent a car from Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. 
(Alamo) in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for three weeks.  Wolfgang Mau 
and Jung arrived in Milwaukee on April 4, 1997, and rented the 
car from Alamo.  The rental voucher specifically names "Mr. 
Mau/Wolfgang" as "Renter" and Wolfgang Mau signed the rental 
documents on the line indicated "Renters' Signature."  After 
renting the car from Alamo, Wolfgang Mau and Jung began 
traveling west across the United States. 
¶3 
On April 5, 1997, due to slippery road conditions, 
Wolfgang Mau lost control of the rental car on I-94 near 
Casselton, North Dakota.  The rental car slid off the road and 
came to rest with its front wheels over the shoulder. 
¶4 
A Cass County deputy sheriff arrived at the scene and 
parked his squad car on the shoulder of the road, about thirty 
feet from the rental car.  The deputy asked Wolfgang Mau and 
Jung to get into his patrol vehicle as he was helping them make 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
3 
 
arrangements to get the rental car pulled out.  Jung sat in the 
front seat of the patrol car and Wolfgang Mau sat in the rear 
seat of the patrol car. 
¶5 
Shortly thereafter, Bette Mashburn (Mashburn) was 
heading east 
on I-94 and 
lost control of 
her vehicle.  
Mashburn's vehicle struck the patrol car, pinning Mau up against 
the security barrier between the front and rear seats of the 
patrol car.  Wolfgang Mau suffered serious injuries. 
¶6 
Wolfgang Mau and his wife, Ena Mau, (hereafter 
collectively referred to as "Mau") settled the liability claim 
against Mashburn for her insurance policy limit of $100,000.  
Mau then sued the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund ("NDIRF"), 
which insured the patrol car, and National Union Fire Insurance 
Company of Pittsburgh (National Union), Alamo's insurer.  The 
NDIRF coverage had underinsured motorist (UIM) policy limits of 
$1,000,000.  Mau settled his claim against NDIRF for $715,000.  
The certified question in this case relates to Mau's continued 
claim for UIM coverage against National Union. 
¶7 
Information 
about 
Mau's 
insurance 
coverage 
was 
provided in the rental documents he received from Alamo, and in 
policies issued to Alamo by National Union.  The Alamo rental 
voucher states: 
 
THE FOLLOWING PRODUCTS, AS DESCRIBED IN THE RENTAL 
JACKET, ARE INCLUDED: 
 
 . . . . 
 
- 
EP WITH BODILY INJURY LIABILITY LIMIT AND UM LIMIT 
OF 1 MILLION 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
4 
 
¶8 
Under "TERMS FOR RENTING AN ALAMO CAR," the rental 
agreement provided: 
 
Other Options: . . . Extended Protection (EP),  . . .  
and other such options are offered where permitted and 
are described and limited on the rental agreement 
jacket that I received from you and in any underlying 
policy. 
The rental agreement jacket provided: 
 
 
This 
is 
your Rental 
Agreement Jacket 
which 
contains important information about options you may 
purchase.  The benefits are only as described in this 
Rental 
Agreement 
Jacket 
and 
in 
any 
underlying 
insurance policy covering the rental and are subject 
to the express terms and conditions of your Rental 
Agreement.  Alamo offers no "full coverage" option. 
 
 . . .  
 
LIABILITY INSURANCE SUPPLEMENT (LIS) 
 
 
If LIS is purchased, you and authorized drivers 
are provided up to an aggregate single limit of 
$500,000 for claims that may be made by others against 
you or authorized drivers for bodily injury or death 
and/or property damage arising out of the use or 
operation of our rental car. . . .  
 
UNINSURED MOTORIST (UM) 
 
 
UM provides benefits to you and any family 
members up to an aggregate single limit of $100,000.  
These benefits are provided to you or any family 
member who, while physically occupying the Alamo 
rental car when it is being driven by you or an 
authorized driver, suffers bodily injury or death by a 
negligent motorist, a negligent underinsured motorist 
or a negligent hit and run driver. 
 
EXTENDED PROTECTION (EP) 
 
 
If purchased, EP provides . . . UM protection as 
described above.  EP does not include any additional 
UM coverage above $100,000, except to the extent, if 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
5 
 
any, required by state law, and you and Alamo reject 
such additional UM coverage to the extent permitted by 
law. 
 
 . . .  
 
The purchase of EP, LIS, and UM is entirely optional; 
no purchase is required in order to rent our car.  The 
purchase is not an application for insurance.  Alamo's 
policy is issued by National Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, PA ("National Union"). 
(Emphasis in original.) 
¶9 
Mau was covered under two policies in relation to the 
Alamo rental car: RMCA 1432406, the "Commercial Auto" policy 
("the underlying policy"); and RMCA 1432440, an "Excess Auto 
Liability (IEP)" policy ("the excess policy").  Coverage under 
the excess policy was available to Mau because he purchased the 
International Extended Protection (IEP) Option.    
¶10 The declarations page of the excess auto policy 
provides:  "[T]his policy shall follow all the terms and 
conditions of Policy Number RMCA 1432440 . . . . NAMED INSURED:  
SEE ENDORSEMENT #1."  Endorsement #1 states:   
 
It is agreed Section II – LIABILITY COVERAGE, A. 
COVERAGE, 1. WHO IS AN INSURED of the Business Auto 
Coverage Form is amended to read: 
 
1. 
Who Is An Insured 
 
a. 
Only while occupying the Alamo rental vehicle, 
any 
rentee/lesee 
[sic] 
who 
purchases 
the 
International Extended Protection (IEP) Option, 
but only while the Alamo vehicle is being driven 
by the rentee/lessee or an "Alamo Authorized 
Additional Driver" and all terms and conditions 
of the Rental Agreement have been met. 
 
 . . .  
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
6 
 
¶11 Mau's claim against National Union is based on the 
underinsured motorist coverage provided by the excess policy.  
Mau had underinsured motorist coverage because, under the IEP 
Option, he was entitled to benefits for "bodily injury or death 
by . . . a negligent underinsured motorist." 
II 
¶12 The Supreme Court of North Dakota asks this court to 
decide whether specific provisions of the excess policy are 
valid under Wisconsin law.  Our understanding of the Supreme 
Court of North Dakota's certified question is whether, under 
Wisconsin law, an underinsured motorist policy can define a 
named insured by requiring occupancy of a specific vehicle.  It 
is unclear, however, whether the Supreme Court of North Dakota 
is asking this court to assume that Mau is a named insured under 
the excess policy,2 or if the Supreme Court of North Dakota is 
asking this court to interpret the contract and decide if Mau is 
a named insured.  To answer the certified question, therefore, 
we find that we must first decide whether Mau is a named insured 
by interpreting specific provisions of the excess policy.  The 
interpretation of language in an insurance policy presents a 
                                                 
2 "Relying on the declarations page and Endorsement #1 to 
the National Union excess policy, it may be argued Mau is a 
named insured under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(b)(2)."  Mau v. N.D. 
Ins. Reserve Fund, 610 N.W.2d 761, 766 (N.D. 2000). 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
7 
 
question of law that we review de novo.3  Smith v. Atlantic Mut. 
Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 808, 810, 456 N.W.2d 597 (1990). 
¶13 We apply the same rules of construction to the 
language in an insurance policy as to the language in any other 
contract. Taylor v. Greatway Ins. Co., 2001 WI 93, ¶10, 245 
Wis. 2d 134, 628 N.W.2d 916; Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Employers 
Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 735, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984).  The 
objective in interpreting and construing a contract is to carry 
out the true intention of the parties.  Kremers-Urban, 119 
Wis. 2d at 735.  The language of an insurance policy is 
ambiguous when it is "susceptible to more than one reasonable 
construction."  Smith, 155 Wis. 2d  at 811.  Whether ambiguity 
exists in a contract is a question of law.  Kremers-Urban, 119 
Wis. 2d at 735.  We construe ambiguities in coverage in favor of 
the insured and narrowly construe exclusions in coverage against 
the insurer.  Smith, 155 Wis. 2d  at 811.  The test is not what 
the insurer intended the words to mean, but what a reasonable 
person in the position of the insured would have understood the 
words to mean.  Dowhower v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, 
¶35, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557.  However, when the 
language of the policy is plain and unambiguous, we will enforce 
the policy as written and not engage in construction.  Danbeck 
v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001  WI 91, ¶10, 245 Wis. 2d 186, 
629 N.W.2d 150. 
                                                 
3 We recognize that, in the context of this case, we are not 
reviewing the interpretation of a lower court.  We simply note, 
however, that the standard of review is the same. 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
8 
 
¶14 The declarations page of the excess policy states, 
"NAMED INSURED:  SEE ENDORSEMENT #1."  Endorsement #1 defines 
"Who Is An Insured" by listing three definitions.4  The first 
definition potentially includes Mau, and therefore, is the only 
definition at issue. 
¶15 Neither Mau nor National Union argue that Endorsement 
#1 to the excess policy is unambiguous and plain on its face.  
In fact, we find the excess policy is ambiguous in defining 
"named insured" because the language is susceptible to more than 
one reasonable construction.  Mau contends the language in 
Endorsement #1 lists three definitions for named insured under 
the excess policy.  In the alternative, National Union argues 
that Endorsement #1 does not define named insured, but merely 
amends the definition of insured in the underlying policy.   
¶16 We find the excess policy ambiguous because it fails 
to clearly convey who is a named insured.  The declarations page 
refers to the definitions in Endorsement #1 for defining "named 
insured;" however, the language in Endorsement #1 refers only to 
"insured."  Furthermore, the amending language in Endorsement #1 
amends "Section II – LIABILITY COVERAGE, A. COVERAGE, 1. WHO IS 
AN INSURED of the Business Auto Coverage Form."  The difficulty, 
however, is that the excess policy does not contain a section 
entitled "Section II – LIABILITY COVERAGE."  The amending 
                                                 
4 We recognize that the heading in Endorsement #1 states, 
"Issued to Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc."  However, rather than relying 
on the heading to determine who is a named insured, we look to 
the substance of Endorsement #1, the definitions, to define 
named insured. 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
9 
 
language in Endorsement #1, therefore, on its face, refers to 
the underlying liability policy, not the excess policy.   
¶17 Applying the canons of interpretation for insurance 
contracts, as noted previously, we interpret the policy based on 
what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would 
have understood the words to mean.  Dowhower, 2000 WI 73, ¶35.  
Mau asserts that a reasonable insured would have understood he 
was a named insured under the excess policy, because he 
affirmatively decided to buy more insurance than Alamo provided 
with the standard rental agreement.  Mau claims that by virtue 
of paying a fee for the excess policy, Mau is a named insured, 
rather than an occupancy insured.  National Union argues that a 
reasonable insured would have understood that Mau is not a named 
insured, but that he is covered only as an "occupancy insured."  
Mau was covered under both the underlying liability policy and 
the excess policy, National Union contends, but only while 
occupying the Alamo rental car.   
¶18 National Union makes two arguments in support of its 
position.  First, relying on Meyer v. City of Amery, 185 
Wis. 2d 537, 518 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1994), National Union 
contends that Mau is not a named insured because the definition 
of named insured in the underlying policy controls, and the 
underlying policy defines the named insured as Alamo, not Mau.  
Second, National Union argues that Mau did not purchase an 
insurance policy from Alamo.  Mau's purchase of the IEP option 
meant only that the additional limits of the IEP option were 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
10 
 
available to Mau as an occupancy insured.  We address each of 
these arguments in turn. 
¶19 First, National Union argues that Meyer controls this 
case because the underlying policy unambiguously lists Alamo as 
the named insured.  Because the excess policy was meant to 
follow the terms and conditions of the underlying policy, 
National Union contends that Mau is not a named insured under 
the excess policy.5  In Meyer, the court of appeals denied 
coverage for a police officer under a commercial fleet policy 
issued to the city.  185 Wis. 2d at 547.  The officer was not a 
named insured under the policy because the policy unambiguously 
referred only to the city as the named insured.   Id. at 544.  
The court of appeals concluded that finding the officer covered 
as a named insured would stretch the coverage of the commercial 
fleet policy and would essentially "rewrite the policy."  Id. at 
546 (quoting Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Perry, 134 S.E.2d 418, 420 
(Va. 1964)).   
¶20 Justice Sykes’ dissent also relies on the court of 
appeals decision in Meyer, but Meyer is not persuasive here 
because the fleet policy in Meyer did not involve the language 
                                                 
5 The language of the declarations page of the excess policy 
states:  "[T]his policy shall follow all the terms and 
conditions of Policy Number RMCA 1432440  . . . ."  However, 
Policy Number RCMA 1432440 is the policy number of the excess 
policy, not the underlying policy.  The language of the excess 
policy itself states that it provides coverage "in accordance 
with the applicable insuring agreements, terms, conditions and 
exclusions of the Underlying Policy # RMCA 1432406."  The UM/UIM 
endorsement to the excess policy provides that "this endorsement 
modifies insurance provided under the following:  RMCA 1432406." 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
11 
 
of an endorsement altering the policy.6  In this case, the 
declarations page of the excess policy states, "NAMED INSURED:  
SEE ENDORSEMENT #1."  Based on this language, a reasonable 
insured would rely on the definitions in Endorsement #1 to 
define named insured under the excess policy.7 
¶21 In Greene by Schoone v. General Casualty Co., 216 
Wis. 2d 152, 576 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals 
determined the effect of an endorsement.  The terms of a 
business auto policy were modified by an endorsement amending 
"WHO IS AN INSURED."  216 Wis. 2d at 158-159.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the endorsement modified the policy to 
                                                 
6 Meyer v. City of Amery, 185 Wis. 2d 537, 518 N.W.2d 296 
(Ct. App. 1994) is also not persuasive here because Meyer sought 
coverage under an underlying fleet policy naming the City of 
Amery as the named insured.  185 Wis. 2d at 544.  In contrast, 
Mau is seeking coverage under an excess policy which does not 
identify Alamo as a named insured. 
7 We rely on the declarations page because in construing the 
contract, we must give meaning to all provisions in the 
insurance policy.  See Maas v. Ziegler, 172 Wis. 2d 70, 80, 492 
N.W.2d 621 (1992);  see also Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 
Couch on Insurance 3d (12/95), § 21:19 ("All its words, parts, 
and provisions must be construed together as one entire 
contract, each part interpreted in the light of all the other 
parts, in connection with the risk or subject matter.").  The 
declarations page is appropriately considered part of the 
insurance policy and accordingly, is interpreted as part of the 
policy.  See Brunson v. Ward, 2001 WI 89, 245 Wis. 2d 163, 629 
N.W.2d 140; Dowhower v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, ¶40, 
236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557 (Bradley, J., concurring).  
("Arguably, the Declaration page is the most crucial section of 
the policy for the typical insured . . . "); Petrowski v. 
Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co., 237 F.2d 609, 610 (7th Cir. 1956) ("All 
three documents, policy, declarations, and special endorsement, 
were stapled together and comprised one unit when issued."). 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
12 
 
cover the persons listed in the endorsement as named additional 
interests. Id. at 159.  The endorsement amended the policy 
language to provide coverage for the people listed in the 
endorsement.  Id.  Like the endorsement in Greene, here 
Endorsement #1 modified the excess policy by providing coverage 
to those who fall within the definitions in Endorsement #1.  The 
plain language of the declarations page establishes that 
Endorsement #1 specifically defines who is a named insured.  
Anyone falling within the definitions in Endorsement #1, 
therefore, is covered as a named insured under the excess 
policy. 
¶22 Second, National 
Union argues that 
although Mau 
purchased the IEP option, Mau was not purchasing an insurance 
contract covering him as a named insured.  National Union 
contends that purchasing the IEP option means only that the 
additional limits of the IEP option were available to Mau as an 
occupancy insured.  
¶23 To support its position, National Union relies on 
other cases involving rental cars.  Specifically, National Union 
cites Canedy v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 126 F.3d 100, 105 
(2d Cir. 1997), rejecting the proposition that a rental car 
customer who requests liability insurance from a rental car 
company is a named insured.  Canedy, however, does not apply to 
the facts of this case.  The court in Canedy was faced with 
policy terms completely different from the terms in the National 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
13 
 
Union excess policy8.  Furthermore, Canedy focused on gratuitous 
coverage, not an excess policy for which the rental car customer 
paid an additional premium.   
¶24 National Union also cites Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
cases that are likewise inapplicable.  The court of appeals has 
addressed only limited issues relating to rental car agencies 
and insurance contracts.  In Classified Insurance Co. v. Budget 
Rent-A-Car, 186 Wis. 2d 478, 483, 521 N.W.2d 177 (Ct. App. 
1994), the court held that a rental car company, a self-insured 
entity, is not statutorily required to provide or offer UM or 
UIM coverage under its rental agreements.  See also Prophet v. 
Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 2000 WI App 171, ¶18, 238 Wis. 2d 150, 
617 N.W.2d 225 (no statute requires a self-insured entity to 
provide 
uninsured 
motorist 
coverage 
as 
part 
of 
optional 
insurance offered customers); Janikowski v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 187 Wis. 2d 424, 429, 523 N.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 
1994) (out-of-state rental car agency not required to provide UM 
                                                 
8 
In 
Canedy, 
the 
Second 
Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
specifically held that the rental car customer did not fall 
within the policy's definitions of "an insured."  For purposes 
of UIM coverage, the policy defined "an insured" as: 
1. 
You. 
2. 
If you are an individual, any family member. 
3. 
Anyone else occupying a covered auto . . . .  
4. 
Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover 
because of bodily injury sustained by another insured. 
Canedy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
14 
 
coverage). 
Because 
Mau 
is 
not 
claiming 
that 
Alamo 
was 
statutorily required to provide or offer UM or UIM coverage, 
Classified does not apply. 
¶25 We reject National Union's arguments.  We find that a 
reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
position 
of 
the 
insured 
would 
understand that the declarations page of the excess policy 
clearly instructs the reader to go to Endorsement #1 to 
determine who is a named insured.  We now look to Endorsement #1 
to determine if Mau falls within one of the definitions listed. 
¶26 Endorsement #1 lays out three definitions for named 
insured.  Mau falls under the first definition because the 
parties do not contest that Mau is a "rentee/lesee [sic] who 
purchases the International Extended (IEP) Option."9  Mau's name 
was designated as "renter"10 on the rental agreement and he 
signed the rental documents on the line indicated, "renter's 
signature."  It is also undisputed that Mau requested and 
purchased the IEP option.   
                                                 
9 For the limited purpose of interpreting the insurance 
contract to determine if Mau is a named insured, we do not 
consider, now, the occupancy requirement.  The validity of the 
occupancy requirement is the basis for the certified question 
and we consider the certified question, directly, in Part III. 
 
10 Mau is both the "renter" and "rentee" because the two 
terms have the same meaning.  Black's Law Dictionary defines 
rentee as "A tenant."  Black's Law Dictionary 1300 (7th ed. 
1999).  American Heritage Dictionary defines renter, "One who 
pays rent for the use of another's property; tenant."  American 
Heritage Dictionary 1047 (2d College ed. 1985).  It is 
undisputed that Mau rented the Alamo rental car; Mau is 
therefore, both a renter and a rentee.   
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
15 
 
¶27 Based on our interpretation of the excess policy, we 
find that Mau falls within definition 1.a. in Endorsement #1, 
which refers to a rentee/lessee who purchases an IEP Option, as 
Mau did in this case.  Consequently, Mau is a named insured 
under the excess policy.11  We next turn to the occupancy 
requirement in the definition of named insured and determine the 
validity of this provision under Wisconsin law. 
III 
¶28 The Supreme Court of North Dakota specifically asks 
this 
court 
to 
determine 
the 
validity 
of 
the 
occupancy 
requirement 
in 
Endorsement 
#1 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32.12  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we decide 
independently.  Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 41, ¶9, 
234 Wis. 2d 587, 610 N.W.2d 467.  The primary goal is to discern 
the intent of the legislature.  Id. 
                                                 
11 Justice Sykes’ dissent claims that finding Mau is a named 
insured under the excess policy "goes beyond what the parties 
obviously intended" and that Mau's purchase of the excess policy 
merely provided him with "increased coverages."  Dissent at ¶66.  
We disagree.  We interpret the excess policy based on what a 
reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
position 
of 
the 
insured 
would 
understand who is a named insured.  See Dowhower v. W. Bend Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, ¶35, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557.  
Based on the language of the declarations page, viewed by a 
reasonable person in the position of the insured, we conclude 
that Endorsement #1 to the excess policy defines named insured 
and Mau is a named insured because he falls within the first 
definition. 
12 Although Endorsement #1 lists three definitions for named 
insured, we examine only the first, 1.a., because it relates to 
Mau.  Regardless, the occupancy requirement is identical in all 
three definitions. 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
16 
 
¶29 Before we engage in statutory interpretation, we need 
to examine the excess policy at issue in this case, in relation 
to the omnibus statute, Wis. Stat. § 632.32.  Mau's claim 
against National Union is for underinsured motorist coverage 
under the excess policy.  Terms of the excess policy, as laid 
out in the Rental Agreement Jacket, provide benefits for "bodily 
injury or death by . . . a negligent underinsured motorist." 
(emphasis supplied).  The IEP option, therefore, provides Mau 
with underinsured motorist coverage.   
¶30 To determine the validity of the occupancy requirement 
for 
underinsured 
motorist 
coverage, 
we 
look 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32, 
which, 
except 
as 
otherwise 
provided, 
applies to all motor vehicle insurance policies issued or 
delivered in Wisconsin.  Clark v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 218 
Wis. 2d 169, 173, 577 N.W.2d 790 (1998).  Some earlier cases 
suggest that certain provisions of § 632.32 apply only to 
liability policies, not indemnity insurance.13  See Martin v. 
                                                 
13 Liability coverage "requires the insurer to shield the 
insured from making payment on a claim for which the insured is 
liable."  Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 2000 WI 41, ¶38, 234 
Wis. 2d 587, 610 N.W.2d 467.  "In contrast, uninsured motorist 
coverage [indemnity coverage] seeks to compensate the insured 
after the insured has sustained an actual loss."  Id.  Similar 
to uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage 
is indemnity coverage. 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
17 
 
Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Wis. 2d 759, 770, 433 N.W.2d 1 
(1988); 
Peabody 
v. 
American 
Family 
Mut. 
Ins. 
Co., 
220 
Wis. 2d 340, 350, 582 N.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1998).  However, the 
plain language of several subsections in § 632.32 demonstrate 
the applicability of those sections to indemnity insurance.  See 
§ 632.32(4) ("Required Uninsured Motorist . . . Coverage[s]"); 
§ 632.32(4m) ("Underinsured Motorist Coverage"); § 632.32(5)(g) 
("uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage"); § 632.32(5)(i) 
("uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage"); § 632.32(5)(j) 
("any coverage").  Furthermore, this court has applied § 632.32 
to indemnity insurance.  Blazekovic, 2000 WI 41, ¶42 (applying 
§ 632.32(5)(j) to uninsured motorist coverage); see also Brunson 
v. Ward, 2001 WI 89, ¶24, 245 Wis. 2d 163, 629 N.W.2d 140 
(applying § 632.32(4m)(d) to underinsured motorist policy); 
Dowhower, 
2000 
WI 
73, 
¶20 
(applying 
§ 632.32(5)(i)1 
to 
underinsured motorist coverage); Theis v. Midwest Sec. Ins. Co., 
2000 WI 15, ¶39, 232 Wis. 2d 749, 606 N.W.2d 162 (applying 
§ 632.32(4) to uninsured motorist coverage); Hull v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 2d 627, 648, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) 
(applying § 632.32(4) to uninsured motorist coverage); Clark v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Here 
the 
distinction 
between liability 
and 
indemnity 
coverage does not change our conclusion as to the applicability 
of Wis. Stat. § 632.32.  The excess policy falls within the 
scope of § 632.32 because it is a liability policy.  Mau was 
covered under the excess policy because he bought the IEP 
Option. 
 
According 
to 
the 
rental 
jacket, 
"EP 
[Extended 
Protection] provides both LIS [Liability Insurance Supplement] 
and UM protection."  The excess policy, therefore, is a 
liability 
policy with 
uninsured and 
underinsured motorist 
coverage. 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
18 
 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Wis. 2d 169, 173-175, 577 
N.W.2d 790 (1998) (examining validity of territorial exclusion 
in uninsured motorist coverage under § 632.32(6)).   The excess 
policy was both issued and delivered in Wisconsin; therefore, we 
are satisfied that it is appropriate to use the provisions in 
§ 632.32, discussed herein, to determine the validity of the 
occupancy requirement for underinsured motorist coverage.   
¶31 Since we have determined that Mau is a named insured, 
the issue now becomes whether defining a named insured by 
requiring occupancy of the Alamo vehicle is valid under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32. 
 
We 
recognize 
that 
§ 632.32 
allows 
insurance 
companies 
to 
provide 
exclusions 
in 
automobile 
policies.  See Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(e).14  In Clark, 218 
Wis. 2d at 174, this court found § 632.32(5)(e) unambiguous.  
"[T]he [legislative] intent is to provide that an insurance 
contract may include exclusions not specifically listed in 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6) or prohibited by other applicable law."  
Id.   
¶32 To 
determine 
the 
validity 
of 
the 
occupancy 
requirement, 
we 
follow 
the 
established 
two-part 
test.  
Blazekovic, 2000 WI 41, ¶12; Clark, 218 Wis. 2d at 174.  First, 
we look to Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6) and decide whether the 
occupancy requirement fits the description of any of the 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(5)(e) states:  A policy may 
provide for exclusions  not prohibited by sub. (6) or other 
applicable 
law. 
 
Such 
exclusions 
are 
effective 
even 
if 
incidentally to their main purpose they exclude persons, uses or 
coverages that could not be directly excluded under sub. (6)(b). 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
19 
 
enumerated prohibitions.15  Clark, 218 Wis. 2d at 174.  If it 
does, the matter is resolved and the occupancy requirement is 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(6) provides in full:   
PROHIBITED PROVISIONS. 
(a) No policy issued to a motor vehicle handler may 
exclude coverage upon any of its officers, agents or 
employes when any of them are using motor vehicles 
owned by customers doing business with the motor 
vehicle handler. 
(b) No policy may exclude from the coverage afforded 
or benefits provided: 
 
1. 
Persons related by blood or marriage to the 
insured. 
 
2. 
a.  Any person who is a named insured or 
passenger in or on the insured vehicle, with 
respect to bodily injury, sickness or disease, 
including death resulting therefrom, to that 
person. 
 
b. 
This subdivision, as it relates to 
passengers, does not apply to a policy of 
insurance for a motorcycle as defined in s. 
340.01(32) 
or 
a 
moped 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 
340.01(29m) 
if 
the 
motorcycle 
or 
moped 
is 
designed to carry only one person and does not 
have a seat for any passenger. 
 
3. 
Any person while using the motor vehicle, 
solely for reasons of age, if the person is of an 
age authorized to drive a motor vehicle. 
 
4. 
Any use of the motor vehicle for unlawful 
purposes, or for transportation of liquor in 
violation of law, or while the driver is under 
the influence of an intoxicant or a controlled 
substance or controlled substance analog under 
ch. 961 or a combination thereof, under the 
influence of any other drug to a degree which 
renders him or her incapable of safely driving, 
or under the combined influence of an intoxicant 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
20 
 
invalid.  Blazekovic, 2000 WI 41, ¶13.  If it does not, we 
examine any "other applicable law" that may prohibit the 
provision.  Clark, 218 Wis. 2d at 174.  Absent any other 
applicable law prohibiting the occupancy requirement, it remains 
valid.  Blazekovic, 2000 WI 41, ¶13. 
¶33  Before applying the two-part test, we recognize that 
the occupancy requirement in the excess policy is not couched as 
an exclusion.  Although the occupancy requirement is part of the 
definition of named insured, for our analysis, we treat the 
definition the same as an exclusion.  The purpose of the 
occupancy requirement is to exclude coverage for persons not 
occupying the Alamo rental car.  The occupancy requirement, 
therefore, produces the same result as an exclusion.  "To treat 
the definition differently from the exclusion merely because it 
is couched in the definition section of the policy would be to 
exalt 
form 
over 
substance . . ." 
 
Rodey 
v. 
Stoner, 
180 
Wis. 2d 309, 313, 509 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1993). 
¶34 Although Mau does not argue that the occupancy 
requirement falls within the enumerated prohibitions under 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6), we 
look closely 
at 
the 
prohibited 
provision 
in § 632.32(6)(b)2.a. 
 
Section 
632.32(6)(b)2.a. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and any other drug to a degree which renders him 
or her incapable of safely driving, or any use of 
the motor vehicle in a reckless manner.  In this 
subdivision, "drug" has the meaning specified in 
s. 450.01(10). 
 
(c) No policy may limit the time for giving notice of 
any accident or casualty covered by the policy to less 
than 20 days. 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
21 
 
prohibits an exclusion for "[a]ny person who is a named 
insured."16  We have already determined that Mau is a named 
insured under the excess policy.  The occupancy requirement, if 
applied to Mau will exclude coverage for Mau, a named insured.  
Based on our analysis, we find that the occupancy requirement 
violates § 632.32(6)(b)2.a., because the occupancy requirement 
excludes coverage for a named insured.   Our inquiry, however, 
does not end.  Mau's argument centers on the second part of the 
test and focuses on why the occupancy requirement is invalid 
under other applicable law.  Because we choose to address Mau's 
arguments, our analysis continues, to determine whether, in 
addition to § 632.32(6)(b)2.a., other applicable law prohibits 
the occupancy requirement. 
¶35  Mau argues that the occupancy requirement violates 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) because it is a breed of "drive other 
car" exclusion.  Blazekovic, 2000 WI 41, ¶28.  Section 
632.32(5)(j) states: 
 
A policy may provide that any coverage under the 
policy does not apply to a loss resulting from the use 
of a motor vehicle that meets all of the following 
conditions: 
 
1. 
Is owned by the named insured, or is owned by the 
named insured's spouse or a relative of the named 
insured if the spouse or relative resides in the 
same household as the named insured. 
 
                                                 
16 We do not look to or apply the phrase, "or passenger in 
or on the insured vehicle" in Wis. Stat. § 632.32(6)(b)2.a., 
because this phrase does not modify "named insured." 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
22 
 
2. 
Is not described in the policy under which the 
claim is made. 
 
3. 
Is not covered under the terms of the policy as a 
newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle. 
¶36 In Blazekovic, 2000 WI 41, ¶¶15-22, this court 
recently 
applied 
the 
two-part 
test 
and 
examined 
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) as "other applicable law" prohibiting 
an exclusion.  In Blazekovic, we found an endorsement excluding 
coverage when the insured was using a "non-owned emergency type 
vehicles in connection with his or her employment, occupation, 
or profession" invalid as a "drive other car" exclusion.  Id. at 
¶¶3,42.  We found that § 632.32(5)(j) applies to "drive other 
car" exclusions in the uninsured motorist context.  Id. at ¶33.  
Furthermore, we held that a "drive other car" exclusion is valid 
only if it meets all three conditions listed in § 632.32(5)(j).  
Id. at ¶27.  The first condition requires the exclusion be 
directed 
to 
a 
vehicle 
owned 
by 
the 
named 
insured.  
Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j)1. 
 
Because 
the 
emergency 
vehicle 
endorsement was directed to a non-owned vehicle, the endorsement 
did not meet all three conditions in § 632.32(5)(j)17 and was an 
invalid "drive other car" exclusion.  Id. at ¶42. 
¶37 National Union argues Blazekovic is not controlling 
because the occupancy requirement is not a "drive other car" 
exclusion.  National Union also repeats its arguments that Mau 
is not a named insured because he is not the owner of the 
                                                 
17 The second and third conditions were not at issue because 
the emergency vehicle exclusion failed to meet the first 
condition. 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
23 
 
vehicle or the purchaser of the policy.  We disagree.  As 
already decided above, Mau is a named insured under the excess 
policy.  Furthermore, the occupancy requirement, while not 
couched in terms of an exclusion, is a "drive other car" 
exclusion because it has the effect of excluding coverage for a 
named insured not occupying the rental vehicle.   
¶38 Applying Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(j) to Endorsement #1, 
we find that the occupancy requirement is invalid.  Limiting 
coverage for a named insured "only while occupying the Alamo 
rental vehicle" amounts to a "drive other car" exclusion.  And 
just like the emergency vehicle exclusion in Blazekovic, the 
occupancy requirement is directed to a non-owned vehicle.  The 
occupancy requirement, therefore, fails the first condition of 
§ 632.32(5)(j) and is invalid because it is a "drive other car" 
exclusion 
that 
fails 
to 
meet 
all 
three 
conditions 
in 
§ 632.32(5)(j).   
¶39 We do not address the remainder of the named insured 
definition in Endorsement #1 1.a., "only while the Alamo vehicle 
is being driven by the rentee/lessee," because the occupancy 
requirement makes the definition invalid under Wisconsin law. 
IV 
¶40 We conclude that Mau is a named insured under the 
excess policy.  Because it is unclear whether the Supreme Court 
of North Dakota had already decided if Mau was a named insured, 
we have interpreted relevant portions of the insurance contract 
to determine that Mau is a named insured.  The declarations page 
and Endorsement #1 are ambiguous in defining named insured, 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
24 
 
because the policy is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
construction.  Applying canons of interpretation, we find that 
the declarations page directs the reader to the definitions in 
Endorsement #1 to determine who is a named insured.  Because it 
is undisputed that Mau is a "rentee/lessee who purchase[d] the 
 . . . (IEP) Option," we hold that Mau is a named insured under 
Endorsement #1 to the excess policy.   
¶41 Next, we have examined the question certified by the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota, specifically, the validity of the 
occupancy 
requirement. 
 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
occupancy 
requirement violates both Wis. Stat. §§  632.32(6)(b)2.a. and 
632.32(5)(j).  The occupancy requirement violates the prohibited 
provision 
in 
§ 632.32(6)(b)2.a. 
because, 
if 
applied, 
the 
occupancy requirement excludes coverage for a named insured.  
The occupancy requirement also violates § 632.32(5)(j).  The 
occupancy requirement has the same effect as a "drive other car" 
exclusion and, because it does not meet all three conditions of 
§ 632.32(5)(j), the occupancy requirement is invalid under 
Wisconsin law. 
¶42 Our answer to the certified question is definitive 
without going any further; therefore, there is no need to 
address 
additional 
arguments 
raised 
by 
the 
parties.18  
                                                 
18 We disagree with Justice Wilcox’s dissent and do not 
address 
whether 
Wolfgang 
Mau 
was 
occupying 
the 
vehicle.  
Furthermore, we do not address whether the excess policy 
contains an exhaustion clause or what, if any, impact Danbeck v. 
American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 2001 WI 91, 245 Wis. 2d 
186, 629 N.W.2d 150, might have on this case. 
No. 
00-1369-CQ   
 
25 
 
Endorsement #1 in the excess policy is not valid under Wisconsin 
law in its attempt to preclude underinsured motorist coverage to 
Mau. 
By the Court.—Question answered and cause remanded to the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
No.  00-1369-CQ.jpw 
 
 
 
1
 
¶43 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  Although I join 
Justice Sykes' dissent, which would hold that Mau was an 
occupancy insured rather than a named insured under Wisconsin 
law, I write separately because I think the court should go on 
to decide the question of whether Mau was "occupying" the rental 
vehicle when the collision occurred. 
¶44 Both the majority opinion and Justice Sykes' dissent 
conclude that the question of whether Mau was occupying the 
vehicle was not certified to this court.  Majority op. at ¶42 
n.18, Justice Sykes' dissent at ¶58 n.1.  I do not read the 
certified question that way.  In its certification to this 
court, the Supreme Court of North Dakota states: 
 
[W]e respectfully certify the following question to 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court: 
 
Is Endorsement #1 defining an "Insured" as "Only 
while occupying the Alamo rental vehicle, any 
rentee/lessee who purchases the International 
Extended Protection (IEP) Option, but only while 
the 
Alamo 
vehicle 
is 
being 
driven 
by 
the 
rentee/lessee" 
valid 
under 
Wisconsin 
law 
to 
preclude underinsured motorist coverage to one 
who rents a car from Alamo, purchases the IEP 
Option, and is injured while sitting in a 
different car? 
 
 
We invite the justices of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court to reformulate our question if they deem it 
appropriate.  We do not intend anything in this 
certification 
to 
limit 
the 
scope 
of 
their 
inquiry. . . . 
Mau v. N.D. Ins. Reserve Fund, 610 N.W. 2d 761, 766-67 (N.D. 
2000) (emphasis added).  Earlier in its certification, the North 
Dakota court also notes "Mau has not shown he was occupying or 
No.  00-1369-CQ.jpw 
 
 
 
2
using the rental car under Wisconsin law when he was injured."  
Id. at 766. 
¶45 I do not read these sections as preventing us from 
reaching the occupancy question.  Rather, I read them as 
recognizing that the question of whether Mau was an occupant of 
the insured vehicle has not been decided under Wisconsin law and 
is an integral part of what the Supreme Court of North Dakota 
has asked us to decide.  Therefore, because I would find that 
Mau was an occupancy insured under the contract, I would also 
find it necessary to address the question of whether Mau was an 
occupant of the insured vehicle.  I analyze this question now. 
¶46 In the insurance contract at issue, "occupying" is 
defined as "in, upon, getting in, on, out of or off the rental 
vehicle"——a typical definition in insurance contracts.  However, 
because this court has recognized that commonly used terms like 
"upon," "in" and "entering into or alighting from" may be 
ambiguous, 
Moherek 
v. 
Tucker, 
69 
Wis. 2d 41, 
45-46, 
230 
N.W.2d 148 (1975), and because this language normally varies 
only slightly from contract to contract, Wisconsin courts have 
tended to apply a standardized meaning to the term "occupy." 
¶47 In general, Wisconsin courts have tended to interpret 
the term "occupy" rather liberally.  It is obvious that when a 
person is in the passenger compartment of a vehicle, that person 
is occupying it.  However, we have held that in some cases, 
occupancy extends beyond the inside of the vehicle.  In 
Wisconsin, "'a person has not ceased "occupying" a vehicle until 
he has severed his connection with it——i.e., when he is on his 
No.  00-1369-CQ.jpw 
 
 
 
3
own without any reference to it.  If he is still vehicle-
oriented, as opposed to highway oriented, he continues to 
"occupy" the vehicle.'"  Id. at 47 (quoting State-Wide Ins. Co. 
v. Murdock, 254 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1969)). 
¶48 This court and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals have 
recognized that to be "vehicle-oriented," a person does not have 
to be inside, or even touching the vehicle.  For instance, an 
individual can "occupy" a vehicle while waiting on the street 
corner to be picked up by the vehicle because that person is 
vehicle-oriented.  Kreuser v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 158 
Wis. 2d 166, 169, 461 N.W.2d 806 (Ct. App. 1990).  Similarly, a 
plaintiff who has exited the insured car and is injured when a 
second car hits the insured car and pushes it into the plaintiff 
is still vehicle-oriented and is therefore "occupying" the 
insured car under our rule.  Sentry Ins. Co. v. Providence Wash. 
Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 457, 458-61, 283 N.W.2d 455 (Ct. App. 
1979).  However, our cases have not pushed the definition of 
"vehicle-orientation" as far as Mau asks us to in this case. 
¶49 I would hold that the limit of vehicle-orientation was 
reached here.  Despite our generally liberal construction of the 
term "occupy," I would hold that Mau fell outside of our 
definition while he was sitting in the police vehicle.  I would 
base this on the common-sense principle that a person cannot 
occupy two vehicles at the same time.  When a person is sitting 
in one car, that person logically cannot be occupying another. 
¶50 I am persuaded by the reasoning of the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court in General Accident Insurance Company of America 
No.  00-1369-CQ.jpw 
 
 
 
4
v. D'Alessandro, 671 A.2d 1233 (R.I. 1996).  The facts of 
D'Alessandro, as they pertain to the occupancy question, are 
very similar to those in the present case.  D'Alessandro's 
vehicle had broken down and she had pulled into the breakdown 
lane of the highway.  A Rhode Island state police officer 
stopped to assist D'Alessandro, parking his patrol vehicle 
behind her car.  D'Alessandro was waiting in the officer's 
patrol vehicle for a tow truck to arrive when another motorist 
collided with the police cruiser, injuring D'Alessandro and the 
officer. 
¶51 In the resultant lawsuit, the question arose of 
whether D'Alessandro was "occupying" her own vehicle at the time 
of the collision.  Despite the fact the Rhode Island court 
affords a liberal interpretation to the term "occupy", see, 
e.g., Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Olivier, 574 A.2d 1240, 
1241 (R.I. 1990), the court held that D'Alessandro was not 
occupying her car in this instance.  The court held that it 
would be clearly impossible for D'Alessandro to "occupy" two 
vehicles at the same time.  D'Alessandro, 671 A.2d at 1235.19  I 
agree with this conclusion, and I find it applicable in this 
case. 
¶52 Mau points out that many other jurisdictions have 
taken the same "liberal" approach to defining occupancy as we 
have in Wisconsin.  See, e.g., Genther v. Progressive Cas. Ins. 
Co., 681 A.2d 479, 480 n.1 (Me. 1996) (listing cases in a number 
                                                 
19 The Montana Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in 
Chilberg v. Rose, 903 P.2d 1377, 1379 (Mont. 1995) ("Obviously, 
Chilberg can only 'occupy' one car at a time."). 
No.  00-1369-CQ.jpw 
 
 
 
5
of jurisdictions that use a liberal definition of "occupy").  
However, Mau is unable to show us a jurisdiction that has 
extended the definition of occupancy to include an individual 
sitting in another car, and I am not persuaded that we should be 
the jurisdiction that does so. 
¶53 Therefore, in addition to finding that Mau is not a 
named insured, I would also reach the question of whether Mau 
was occupying the rental vehicle.  In answering that question, I 
would hold that at the time of the collision, Mau did not occupy 
the vehicle for the purposes of the insurance contract. 
¶54 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  00-1369-CQ.dss 
 
 
 
1
 
¶55 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  The majority's 
invalidation of the occupancy restriction in the insurance 
policy in question in this case is based upon its conclusion 
that the plaintiff, Wolfgang Mau, is a "named insured" under the 
policy.  I conclude that Mau is an occupancy insured, not a 
named insured. 
¶56 Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. insured its fleet of rental cars 
with National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh 
pursuant to a business auto insurance policy, which provided 
liability coverage, and a $1 million excess insurance policy, 
which 
provided, 
among 
other 
things, 
uninsured 
(UM) 
and 
underinsured (UIM) motorist coverage.  Mau rented a car from 
Alamo in Milwaukee, and, as part of the transaction, elected to 
pay for the International Extended Protection (IEP) Option, 
which provided UM and UIM coverage under the excess policy.  Mau 
seeks to recover the proceeds of the UIM policy as a result of 
injuries sustained in an accident in North Dakota. 
¶57 The excess policy makes it clear that it provides 
coverage only to rental car customers who purchase the IEP 
Option, and only while they are "occupying the Alamo rental 
vehicle."    The question certified by the North Dakota Supreme 
Court is whether the occupancy restriction in the National Union 
policy is valid under Wisconsin law.20  As the majority notes, 
                                                 
20 The parties briefed the question of whether Mau was 
legally "occupying" the rental car for insurance coverage 
purposes even though he was seated in the deputy sheriff's squad 
car at the time of the accident.  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court, however, did not certify this question to us, and the 
court does not decide it.  See, majority op. at ¶42 n.18. 
No.  00-1369-CQ.dss 
 
 
 
2
the answer depends on whether Mau is a named insured under the 
excess policy. 
¶58 The excess policy, by its terms, provides coverage "in 
accordance with the applicable insuring agreements, terms, 
conditions, and exclusions of the Underlying Policy #RMCA 
1432406."  The UM/UIM endorsement to the excess policy provides 
that "this endorsement modifies insurance provided under the 
following: RMCA 1432406."  The Underlying Policy #1432406 is the 
business auto liability policy paid for by and issued to Alamo 
to insure its fleet of rental cars.  The declarations page of 
that policy specifies Alamo as the named insured, and the policy 
also provides that "[t]hroughout this policy the words 'you' and 
'your' refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations," 
that is, Alamo. 
¶59 
Endorsement 
#1 
to 
the 
liability 
policy 
further 
specifies "WHO IS AN INSURED," and sets forth four categories of 
insureds: "you" (meaning Alamo, the named insured, pursuant to 
the above-cited language); and three categories of persons who 
are insured "only while occupying" the Alamo vehicle.  The first 
two of these categories encompass persons who lease Alamo's 
rental cars, and the third pertains to Alamo's employees.  
Significantly, the endorsement does not say "who is a named 
insured"; the endorsement reiterates that the policy is issued 
to Alamo, and Alamo is listed on the declarations page as the 
named insured. 
¶60 Endorsement #3 of the liability policy contains a 
lengthy listing of "Named Insureds," starting with Alamo, 
No.  00-1369-CQ.dss 
 
 
 
3
followed by a list of corporate entities apparently related to 
Alamo, as well as certain individuals apparently associated with 
Alamo's management.  This endorsement does not include in its 
listing of named insureds persons who lease Alamo's rental cars.  
Endorsement #11 of the liability policy rejects UM/UIM coverage 
in states in which it is permissible to do so, and lists the 
applicable UM/UIM coverages in states which require it.  This 
endorsement also contains similar occupancy restrictions as 
Endorsement #1 for purposes of the liability policy's UM/UIM 
endorsement. 
¶61 The declarations page of the excess policy states 
"NAMED 
INSURED: 
SEE 
ENDORSEMENT 
#1" 
and 
"ADDRESS: 
SEE 
ENDORSEMENT #2."  Endorsement #1 of the excess policy states 
that it is "[i]ssued to Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc.," and, following 
the language "Who Is An Insured," lists three categories of 
rentee/lessee insureds.  The first of these is implicated here, 
and provides excess coverage to a rentee/lessee who purchases 
the IEP Option, but "[o]nly while occupying the Alamo rental 
vehicle."  Endorsement #2 of the excess policy provides that 
"[i]t is agreed that Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. shall act on behalf 
of all persons and organizations insured under this policy with 
respect to all matters pertaining to the insurance afforded by 
this policy," but does not list an address. 
¶62 The majority concludes that because the "Named Insured" 
line on the declarations page of the excess policy refers the 
reader to Endorsement #1 of the excess policy, all those listed 
as "insureds" in Endorsement #1 must necessarily be "named 
No.  00-1369-CQ.dss 
 
 
 
4
insureds."  I disagree.  Considering the excess policy and the 
underlying policy to which it relates as a whole, it is clear to 
me that one who leases a car from Alamo and elects to purchase 
the IEP Option does not acquire "named insured" status, but 
merely retains his "occupancy insured" status consistent with 
the underlying policy, but is entitled to the higher coverage 
limits of the excess policy. 
¶63 Meyer v. City of Amery, 185 Wis. 2d 537, 518 N.W.2d 296 
(Ct. App. 1994), supports this conclusion.  In Meyer, the 
plaintiff, Mark Meyer, a City of Amery police officer, was 
injured in the line of duty by an uninsured motorist after 
having exited his squad car to investigate a complaint.  The 
City's fleet of squad cars was insured by Wausau Insurance 
Company under a policy that specified the City as the named 
insured and persons "occupying" a covered auto as additional 
insureds.  Meyer sought recovery of the policy's UM benefits. 
¶64 The circuit court in Meyer awarded coverage, but the 
court of appeals reversed, noting that the City's policy with 
Wausau Insurance was a commercial fleet policy, and concluding 
that Meyer was an occupancy insured, not a named insured, under 
the policy.  Id. at 544.  The court of appeals further concluded 
that the policy language restricting the availability of UM 
coverage to the named insured and those injured while occupying 
a covered auto was not invalid under Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4), 
which requires auto insurance policies in this state to provide 
UM insurance in certain minimum amounts.  Id. at 547. 
No.  00-1369-CQ.dss 
 
 
 
5
¶65 The court of appeals in Meyer took particular note of 
the fact that courts have construed UM/UIM coverage to be 
"personal and portable" and available whether the insured is 
injured in relation to the covered automobile or otherwise.  Id. 
at 545.  The court then concluded that to find coverage under 
the policy and the statute "would result in each commercial 
fleet policy providing UM coverage to all of [the City's] 
employees and their families, whether they were injured in the 
course of their employment or in a situation completely 
unrelated to work.  This is a result not intended by the 
contracting parties, nor the legislature."  Id. at 547. 
¶66 I reach a similar conclusion here.  To interpret the 
policies in this case as providing "personal and portable" 
UM/UIM coverage to anyone who rents an Alamo rental car and 
elects the IEP option——that is, coverage for damages caused by 
uninsured or underinsured motorists in situations completely 
unrelated to the use of the rental car——goes beyond what the 
parties obviously intended.  Mau's election of the IEP option 
provided him with the increased coverages of the excess policy, 
but did not convert his status to that of a "named insured" 
under either the excess or the underlying liability policies. 
¶67 
The 
majority's 
conclusion 
that 
the 
occupancy 
restriction violates Wisconsin law depends upon its conclusion 
that Mau is a named insured under the excess policy.  There is 
nothing in Wisconsin law that prohibits an occupancy restriction 
for those who are not named insureds.  Because I conclude that 
No.  00-1369-CQ.dss 
 
 
 
6
Mau is an occupancy insured, not a named insured, I respectfully 
dissent.   
¶68 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion.   
 
 
No.  00-1369-CQ.dss 
 
 
 
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