Title: In re Jesusa V.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

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Filed 3/1/04  Reposted to correct minor data corruption; use this version in lieu of earlier posting 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re JESUSA V., a Person Coming 
) 
Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
) 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY  
) 
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 
) 
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S106843 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/7 B151885 
HERIBERTO C.,  
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CK45078 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Jesusa V. became the subject of this dependency action when her biological 
father, Heriberto C., was taken into police custody for beating and raping her 
mother, and her mother, who was pregnant at the time, was hospitalized because 
of her injuries.  At the detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered Jesusa to be 
placed with Paul B., the mother’s husband and the father of her five other children.   
Paul, who was married to the mother at the time Jesusa was born and who 
had received the child into his home and had held her out as his own, promptly 
requested a declaration that he was Jesusa’s presumed father.  (Fam. Code, § 7611, 
subds. (a), (d).)  Nine days later, Heriberto also filed a request to be declared the 
presumed father.  The juvenile court ordered the Los Angeles County Sheriff to 
produce Heriberto, who was incarcerated, for the hearing to identify the presumed 
 
2
father and to adjudicate the dependency petition.  (See Pen. Code, § 2625.)  In the 
interim, however, Heriberto had been convicted of the rape and moved from the 
county jail to North Kern State Prison, rendering the court’s transfer order 
ineffective.  The hearing went forward in Heriberto’s absence but in the presence 
of his attorney.  At that hearing, the juvenile court declared that Paul was Jesusa’s 
presumed father1 under Family Code section 7612 and found that Jesusa was a 
dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 
subdivisions (a) and (b).  With the mother’s consent, the court maintained Jesusa’s 
placement with Paul. 
This set of facts presents three principal issues:  Did the juvenile court err 
in making a declaration of presumed fatherhood at a hearing conducted in 
Heriberto’s absence but in the presence of his attorney?  If not, did the juvenile 
court err in declaring Paul—instead of Heriberto, the biological father—to be 
Jesusa’s presumed father?  And, in any event, did the juvenile court err in 
adjudicating the dependency petition while Heriberto was absent but his counsel 
was present?  We find that the juvenile court erred only in adjudicating the 
dependency petition in Heriberto’s absence, but that the error was harmless.  We 
therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeal.   
BACKGROUND 
On April 1, 2001, Jesusa V., who was not yet two years old, was taken into 
protective custody after her biological father, Heriberto C., raped and beat her 
mother.  The mother, who was seven months pregnant with Heriberto’s child, was 
hospitalized.  The Long Beach police officers who arrested Heriberto reported that 
the motorhome where the three were residing was filthy and unsuitable to live in.   
                                                 
1  
Although “the statutory term ‘presumed father’ is somewhat 
‘cumbersome,’ ” we must “take the statutory nomenclature as we find it.”  
(Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 823, fn. 3 (Kelsey S.).) 
 
3
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 
(DCFS) thereafter filed a dependency petition that, as modified, alleged that 
Heriberto had a long history of violent and aggressive behavior, that Heriberto had 
raped and beaten Jesusa’s mother, that at that time and on other occasions Jesusa 
had been “exposed to violent confrontations” between her mother and Heriberto, 
and that her mother had failed to take action to protect the child.  Jurisdiction was 
alleged under subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code. 
Heriberto was in jail at the time of the detention hearing on April 4, 2001, 
and did not appear.  Jesusa’s mother appeared at the hearing with her husband, 
Paul B.  The couple had been married for nearly 18 years, although they had lived 
apart for the preceding three years.  They had five children together.  Paul, who 
was a sergeant in the United States Air Force in San Diego, promptly requested 
presumed father status under Family Code section 7611 and asked that Jesusa be 
placed with him and her five half siblings.  The mother supported both requests 
and declared in writing that Paul, as well as Heriberto, had held himself out as 
Jesusa’s father and had accepted her into his home. 
Paul testified that Jesusa had lived with him from time to time when her 
mother came to San Diego to visit her other children and that her most recent visit 
had been a month earlier.  The juvenile court found a prima facie basis to detain 
Jesusa and released her to Paul’s custody.  The court also made a tentative finding, 
subject to later rebuttal, that Paul was Jesusa’s presumed father.   
When Heriberto appeared in court about a week later, counsel was 
appointed to represent him.  Heriberto denied the allegations in the petition and 
announced his intent to seek presumed father status.  The juvenile court issued a 
removal order (Pen. Code, § 2625) for Heriberto to attend a hearing on April 30, 
 
4
2001, on presumed fatherhood.  The court also advised counsel to brief the matter 
and to consider having Heriberto file a supporting declaration.    
On April 30, the juvenile court continued the matter to July 17, 2001, and 
again issued a removal order for Heriberto.     
On May 21, 2001, in a separate criminal proceeding, Heriberto pleaded no 
contest to one count of raping Jesusa’s mother on the night in question and was 
sentenced to three years in prison with an immigration hold.  Because of an 
intervening transfer to North Kern State Prison, however, the juvenile court’s 
removal order directed to the Los Angeles County Sheriff was ineffective.  
Heriberto therefore was not present when the parties reconvened on July 17.  
Counsel objected and asked for another continuance, asserting that proceeding in 
Heriberto’s absence would violate due process.  The court, after remarking that it 
had been under the impression the issue of paternity “would be fully decided on 
the briefs and argument on the briefs” without taking testimony (and observing 
that Heriberto had indeed filed such a brief), inquired of counsel what testimony  
Heriberto could provide.  Counsel’s response described evidence that 
encompassed “the extent in which [Heriberto] held out paternity, publicly 
acknowledged paternity for Jesusa, and formal steps he [took] to identify [her as 
his daughter to] . . . government agencies” as well as the truth or falsity of the 
allegations of domestic violence in the dependency petition.  The court then 
explained that, to resolve the issue of presumed fatherhood, it would not be 
making a finding as to the truth of the allegations in the petition and would 
consider only the mother’s statements that she had on occasion sought refuge with 
her husband, Paul.  The court also credited the representations made by counsel—
i.e., that Heriberto was Jesusa’s biological father, that he had held himself out as 
her father, and that he had received the child into his home.  Accordingly, the 
court denied the request for a continuance.   
 
5
After observing that either man—Heriberto or Paul—thus qualified as a 
presumed father, the juvenile court found the weightier interest favored Paul, who 
had been married to Jesusa’s mother at the time Jesusa was conceived and born; 
who was still married to Jesusa’s mother; who had held himself out as Jesusa’s 
father, had received her into his home, and had treated her as his own; who was 
the father of Jesusa’s five half siblings, all of whom still lived with him and also 
had developed a bond with Jesusa; and who had lived with Jesusa for a significant 
period in her young life.  “In other words, there is so much more to being a father 
than merely planting the biological seed.  The man who provides the stability, 
nurturance, family ties, permanence, is more important to a child than the man 
who has mere biological ties. . . .  [¶]  By finding [Paul] is the presumed father, 
this court is protecting and preserving a family unit, the integrity of a family unit.” 
The juvenile court then proceeded to adjudicate the dependency petition, 
again over counsel’s objection that Heriberto was absent.  Based on several DCFS 
reports, the arrest report, and the police follow-up report, the court sustained the 
dependency petition, maintained Jesusa in Paul’s custody, permitted the mother to 
have unmonitored visits with her child and granted her reunification services, and 
ordered Heriberto to have no contact with the child.     
Heriberto appealed.  The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in 
part in a published opinion.  The appellate court affirmed the order identifying 
Paul as Jesusa’s presumed father but reversed the order sustaining the dependency 
petition, reasoning that the lower court had lacked jurisdiction under Penal Code 
section 2625, subdivision (d) to adjudicate the petition in Heriberto’s absence.  
Because this construction of section 2625 created a conflict with two other 
published decisions, In re Rikki D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1624 (Rikki D.) and In 
re Axsana S. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 262 (Axsana S.), and presented other 
important issues concerning presumed fatherhood, we granted review. 
 
6
DISCUSSION 
A 
Although Heriberto was represented by counsel at the presumed fatherhood 
hearing, he claims the trial court violated Penal Code section 2625 and due process 
by proceeding in his absence.  The Court of Appeal, relying on the fact that 
Heriberto was represented at the hearing by counsel, correctly rejected this claim. 
Penal Code section 2625 requires a court to order a prisoner-parent’s 
temporary removal and production before the court only “where the proceeding 
seeks to terminate the parental rights of [the] prisoner” under Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 366.26 or Family Code section 7800 et seq. or “to 
adjudicate the child of a prisoner a dependent child.”  (Pen. Code, § 2625, subds. 
(b), (d); see In re Barry W. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 358, 368-369 & fn. 7.)  A 
proceeding to identify the presumed father, which seeks merely to identify the 
man who has a legal entitlement to reunification services and/or custody (In re 
Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 439), is neither of these.  Even after a presumed 
father is declared, the biological father retains “parental rights that simply differ in 
degree [from] the parental rights conferred on a presumed father.”  (Francisco G. 
v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 596.)  Hence, Heriberto’s 
contention that the declaration of presumed fatherhood is tantamount to a 
termination of his parental rights is exaggerated.     
The hearing on presumed fatherhood was governed instead by Penal Code 
section 2625, subdivision (e):  “In any other action or proceeding in which a 
prisoner’s parental or marital rights are subject to adjudication, an order for the 
prisoner’s temporary removal from the institution and for the prisoner’s 
production before the court may be made by the superior court of the county in 
which the action or proceeding is pending . . . .”  (Italics added; see generally 
Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 920.)  Because the trial court has 
 
7
discretion whether to order the prisoner’s removal in this category of cases, “it 
follows that such a case may proceed without attendance by the prisoner-parent.”  
(In re Barry W., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 370.)2   
The record demonstrates the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in 
proceeding without Heriberto’s personal attendance at the presumed fatherhood 
hearing.  (In re Barry W., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pp. 370-371.)  When asked 
what testimony Heriberto could have provided, counsel’s offer encompassed only 
evidence that established Heriberto’s threshold qualifications for presumed father 
status—i.e., “the extent in which [Heriberto] held out paternity, publicly 
acknowledged paternity for Jesusa, and the formal steps he [took] to identify [her 
                                                 
2  
Our dissenting colleagues rely on the language in Penal Code section 2625, 
subdivision (b) that the court provide notice “of any court proceeding regarding 
the proceeding” to the prisoner and reason that the court must therefore supply 
notice (and order the prisoner’s production) for every hearing in the course of the 
dependency proceeding.  This construction, however, fails to recognize that  
“proceeding” refers not to just any proceeding, but only “where the proceeding 
seeks to adjudicate the child of a prisoner a dependent child of the court.”  (Pen. 
Code, § 2625, subd. (b), italics added.)  In our view, the “proceeding regarding the 
proceeding” language is intended to encompass the jurisdictional hearing, which 
may precede the formal adjudication of the petition at the dispositional hearing, as 
well as the dispositional hearing.  However, it cannot be read so broadly as to 
encompass a presumed fatherhood hearing, which usually arises outside of any 
“proceeding . . . to terminate the parental rights of any prisoner” or “to adjudicate 
the child of a prisoner a dependent child of the court.”  (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. 
(b); see, e.g., Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 936; Barkaloff v. 
Woodward (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 393, 396 [proceeding under the Domestic 
Violence Protection Act, Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.].)  A prisoner-parent’s 
attendance at a presumed fatherhood hearing in these latter circumstances is 
unquestionably governed by subdivision (e) of Penal Code section 2625.  We see 
no indication that the Legislature intended that subdivision (d) apply to an 
identical hearing merely because of the fortuity that a dependency petition is 
pending.  Indeed, under the dissent’s broad reading, subdivision (d) would apply 
even to scheduling hearings or other housekeeping matters in the course of a 
dependency proceeding.  We decline to interpret the statute to reach such an 
absurd result. 
 
8
as his daughter to] . . . government agencies.”3  In response, the court announced 
that it did not intend to determine “what [Heriberto] has done with regard to filling 
out documents with public agencies or government agencies or whatever he has 
done to confirm that he holds himself out as to the father” but would instead 
assume that Heriberto had held himself out as the father and did receive the child 
into his home.  Since the court then declared that “both of these men or either of 
these men could be found to be presumed fathers,” Heriberto’s testimony became 
unnecessary.   
The juvenile court’s approach was also consistent with the California Rules 
of Court, which permit a determination of paternity without an evidentiary 
hearing.  “The court may make its determination of paternity or nonpaternity 
based on the testimony, declarations, or statements of the mother and alleged 
father.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1413(e)(2).)  In this case, for example, the court 
advised the parties to brief the issue of presumed fatherhood—which Heriberto 
did—and instructed Heriberto’s counsel “to consider having him file a 
declaration.”  That Heriberto failed to file a declaration—and that he still has not 
identified any critical testimony he could have offered (see Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 388, subd. (a)) or explained why it could not have been offered by other 
witnesses or by documentary evidence—does not create a statutory right for him 
to personally attend the hearing on his presumed father status.   
                                                 
3  
Counsel conceded that this evidence was intended merely to rebut 
assertions in the minor’s brief that Heriberto had offered insufficient evidence to 
support a threshold finding that he was the presumed father—i.e., that he had 
presented “no evidence that he openly and publicly acknowledged paternity of 
Jesusa,” had “claimed fatherhood of Jesusa to friends, relatives or neighbors,” or 
“took formal steps to identify her to governmental agencies as his daughter.”  As 
counsel for the minor pointed out at oral argument, Heriberto made no offer of 
proof concerning the nature and quality of his bond with the child to supplement 
his biological relationship with her.     
 
9
Heriberto’s constitutional claim fares no better.  Although there is no 
dispute that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts (Payne v. 
Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 914) and that “absent a countervailing 
interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and 
duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard” (Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371, 377), it does not follow that 
prisoners have a constitutional right to be personally present at every type of 
hearing.  Due process guarantees “ ‘notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate 
to the nature of the case.’ ”  (Id. at p. 378, italics added.)  As we have observed, 
due process entitles a biological father a meaningful opportunity to qualify as a 
presumed father.  (Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 840, 843, 849.)  Yet, as with 
other due process rights, “[h]ow that is to be achieved is to be determined by the 
exercise of discretion by the trial court.”  (Payne, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 927.)     
In this case, Heriberto was appointed an attorney to represent him at the 
presumed fatherhood hearing—an accommodation we have deemed sufficient for 
prisoners in other civil proceedings.  (Payne v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d at 
pp. 923-925.)  Through his attorney, Heriberto had the opportunity to call 
witnesses, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to present his own testimony 
in written form.  Admittedly, he did not present any witnesses or submit such a 
declaration—but Heriberto must also acknowledge that his rape conviction 
rendered it improbable the court would have ordered reunification services (Welf. 
& Inst. Code, § 361.5, subds. (b)(12), (c)) and his incarceration made successful 
reunification all but impossible.  (Id., § 361.5, subds. (a)(2), (e)(1); see In re Maria 
S. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1313.)  In addition, Heriberto has not identified 
any facts that could have been presented only through his live testimony.  (See, 
e.g., Fam. Code, § 7674, subd. (b)(1) [mother’s signature is required for a 
voluntary declaration of paternity].)    
 
10
Moreover, it appears that Heriberto was absent for only a portion of the 
presumed father hearing.  Heriberto was present in court on April 13, when the 
court asked, “Do you want to be heard on any paternity issues today?”  His 
attorney promptly responded that he “did discuss the matter” with Heriberto, who 
stated that he had lived with Jesusa’s mother for three years, that he had held the 
child out as his own, and that he would be asking “for presumed [father] status.”  
The court invited counsel to brief the issue, consider having Heriberto file a 
declaration, and “be prepared, then, to argue that matter on April 30th.”  On April 
30, when Heriberto was again present, the court noted that it had recently received 
a brief from the minor in response to Heriberto’s brief and was inclined to 
continue the matter.  No party objected.  On July 17, when the parties discovered 
that Heriberto’s imprisonment had rendered the transfer order ineffective, the 
court made plain its understanding, based on the foregoing, “that the issue of 
paternity would be fully decided on the briefs and argument on the briefs.  No 
testimony to be taken.”  Under the circumstances, we cannot say that Heriberto’s 
involuntary physical absence from that final stage deprived him of a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.            
Our conclusion is consistent with the case law.  In Axsana S., supra, 78 
Cal.App.4th 262, for example, the incarcerated father claimed a violation of due 
process when the juvenile court conducted a dispositional hearing on the 
dependency petition and denied him reunification services while his attorney was 
present but he was absent.  The Court of Appeal held that the father “received 
meaningful access to the courts through his appointed counsel.  In dependency 
cases, as in other civil cases, personal appearance by a party is not essential; 
appearance by an attorney is sufficient and equally effective.”  (Id. at p. 269; see 
also In re Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440, 445.)  Heriberto, like the father in 
Axsana S., “has cited no case law providing incarcerated parents a due process 
 
11
right to be present at dependency proceedings involving their children.”  (Axsana 
S., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 270.)  To the contrary, other state courts have 
“repeatedly held that that the due process rights of a prisoner who has been 
prohibited from participating in a custody hearing are not violated where the 
prisoner was represented by counsel at the hearing and was neither denied an 
opportunity to present testimony in some form on his behalf nor denied the 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.”  (Cook v. Boyd (E.D.Pa. 1995) 881 
F.Supp. 171, 175; see also In re T.N.T. (Ga.Ct.App. 2002) 574 S.E.2d 444, 446-
447.)   
Accordingly, Heriberto was not denied any statutory or constitutional rights 
when the juvenile court proceeded to determine his presumed father status while 
his attorney was present but he was absent. 
B 
As the juvenile court recognized, both Paul and Heriberto satisfied the 
qualifications for presumed fatherhood under Family Code section 7611,4 the 
relevant provision of the Uniform Parentage Act (§§ 7600-7730, hereafter UPA).  
Paul qualified under section 7611, subdivision (a), in that Jesusa was born during 
his marriage to the mother, as well as subdivision (d), in that he had received the 
child into his home and openly held her out as his child.  Heriberto qualified under 
subdivision (d) in that he too had received Jesusa into his home and openly held 
her out as his child.    
Although more than one individual may fulfill the statutory criteria that 
give rise to a presumption of paternity, “there can be only one presumed father.”  
(In re Kiana A. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1115 (Kiana A.); Brian C. v. Ginger 
K. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1223.)  How those competing presumptions are to 
                                                 
4 
All future statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise 
noted.   
 
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be reconciled is set forth in section 7612:  “(a) Except as provided in Chapter 1 
(commencing with Section 7540) and Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) 
of Part 2 or in Section 20102, a presumption under Section 7611 is a rebuttable 
presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate 
action only by clear and convincing evidence.  [¶]  (b) If two or more 
presumptions arise under Section 7611 which conflict with each other, the 
presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of 
policy and logic controls.  [¶]  (c) The presumption under Section 7611 is rebutted 
by a judgment establishing paternity of the child by another man.” 
Heriberto claims that his biological paternity constitutes clear and 
convincing evidence rebutting Paul’s claim to presumed fatherhood under section 
7612, subdivision (a).  In the alternative, he claims that even if Paul’s claim to 
presumed fatherhood is not rebutted, it is outweighed by Heriberto’s claim under 
section 7612, subdivision (b).   
1 
In In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56 (Nicholas H.), we considered 
whether a presumption of fatherhood arising under section 7611 is necessarily 
rebutted under section 7612, subdivision (a) when, as here, the presumed father 
admits that he is not the biological father of the child.  (Nicholas H., supra, at p. 
58.)  We held, in accordance with several Court of Appeal cases, “that a 
presumption arising under section 7611(d) is not, under section 7612(a), 
necessarily rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the presumed father is 
not the biological father of the child.”  (Id. at p. 64.)   
Our holding was based on the text of section 7612.  We observed first that 
subdivision (a) provides merely that a presumption under section 7611 “ ‘may be 
rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.’ ” 
(Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 63.)  Accordingly, the statute did not 
 
13
contemplate a reflexive rule that biological paternity would rebut the section 7611 
presumption in all cases, without concern for whether rebuttal was “appropriate” 
in the particular circumstances.  We found additional support in section 7612, 
subdivision (b), which directs the juvenile court confronted with conflicting 
presumptions to prefer the presumption which on the facts is founded on the 
weightier considerations of policy and logic.  “As a matter of statutory 
construction, if the Legislature had intended that a man who is not a biological 
father cannot be a presumed father under section 7611, it would not have provided 
for such weighing, for among two competing claims for presumed father status 
under section 7611, there can be only one biological father.”  (Nicholas H., supra, 
28 Cal.4th at p. 63.)  
As Heriberto points out, however, Nicholas H. involved an action in which 
no other man claimed parental rights to the child.  The biological father, unlike 
Heriberto, had not come forward to assert his parental rights and could not be 
located.  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 61.)  We therefore found it 
unnecessary to consider whether, under section 7612, “biological paternity by a 
competing presumptive father necessarily defeats a nonbiological father’s 
presumption of paternity.”  (Nicholas H., supra, at p. 70.)  Applying the analytical 
framework developed in Nicholas H. to this question, we now find that biological 
paternity by a competing presumed father does not necessarily defeat a 
nonbiological father’s presumption of paternity.   
As we observed in Nicholas H., the text of section 7612, subdivision (a) 
does not articulate a categorical rule detailing when the section 7611 presumption 
of paternity is rebutted, but instead provides only that the presumption “ ‘may’ ” 
be rebutted “ ‘in an appropriate action.’ ”  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
p. 70.)  This indicates that the Legislature did not envision an automatic 
preference for biological fathers, even if the biological father has come forward to 
 
14
assert his rights.  Indeed, as noted above, “if the Legislature had intended that a 
man who is not a biological father cannot be a presumed father under section 
7611, it would not have provided for such weighing, for among two competing 
claims for presumed father status under section 7611, there can be only one 
biological father.”  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 63, italics added.)  If, on 
the other hand, the Legislature had intended to restrict the weighing process under 
section 7612, subdivision (b) to disputes between competing nonbiological 
fathers, it could easily have said so.    
Our analysis in Nicholas H. also was informed by section 7575, subdivision 
(b), which “permits but does not require” a court to rely on blood test evidence in 
deciding whether to set aside a voluntary declaration of paternity signed on or 
before December 31, 1996.  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 63.)  We 
concluded:  “It is unlikely the Legislature would—without explicitly so stating—
adopt a contrary rule that blood test evidence . . . must defeat the claim of a person 
who claims presumed father status under section 7611(d).”  (Id. at p. 64.)  This 
analysis has equal application when the biological father has been identified and 
asserts a competing presumption of fatherhood.   
Finally, Nicholas H. relied on case law from the Court of Appeal, which on 
balance supported the paternity presumption of the nonbiological father.  
(Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 64-70.)  A review of the case law reveals 
that the weight of authority similarly supports the nonbiological father here.   
In Kiana A., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 1109, as is the case here, two men 
qualified as presumed fathers under section 7611.  The biological father contended 
the juvenile court should have ordered genetic testing “before it commenced the 
weighing process of section 7612, subdivision (b), because one of the competing 
presumptions would have been rebutted based upon the results of the testing.”  
(Kiana A., supra, at p. 1118.)  The Court of Appeal rejected this contention not 
 
15
only on the ground that the biological father had failed to seek genetic testing in 
the juvenile court but also on the ground that even if he had preserved the issue, 
“biological paternity by a competing presumptive father does not necessarily 
defeat a nonbiological father’s presumption of paternity.”  (Ibid.)  As support for 
its position (and in anticipation of our approach in Nicholas H.), the Court of 
Appeal focused on section 7612, subdivision (a), which “states a presumption of 
paternity ‘may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing 
evidence.’  (Italics added.)  Thus, although the results of genetic testing constitute 
clear and convincing evidence, it does not follow that such evidence will rebut the 
presumption in every case.  Rather, the statute seeks to protect presumptions of 
paternity, once they have arisen, from being set aside except upon clear and 
convincing evidence and only in an appropriate case.”  (Kiana A., supra, 93 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1118-1119.) 
Kiana A. also relied on Steven W. v. Matthew S. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 
1108, which upheld a finding of presumed fatherhood in favor of a man who had 
held out the child as his own, even though the competing presumed father was the 
child’s biological father.  “Thus, as between two men, both of whom qualify as 
presumptive fathers, biological paternity does not necessarily determine which 
presumption will prevail under section 7612.”  (Kiana A., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1119.) 
Heriberto cites only one case to the contrary—Brian C. v. Ginger K., supra, 
77 Cal.App.4th 1198—but Brian C. does not go as far as he supposes.  Brian C. 
involved a purported biological father who sought to challenge another man’s 
“conclusive[]” presumption of paternity (§ 7540), which was based on his marital 
cohabitation with the mother during the child’s conception.  The Brian C. court 
found that because the purported biological father qualified as a presumed father, 
he had statutory standing to challenge the conclusive presumption.  (Brian C., 
 
16
supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1220-1221.)  In dictum (and as an aside), the court 
suggested that DNA tests on remand would “probably” render “moot” the need to 
weigh competing presumptions under section 7612, subdivision (b).  (Brian C., 
supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222.)  In the accompanying footnote, the court 
explained that “DNA tests will certainly constitute clear and convincing evidence 
rebutting any of the presumptions that might favor either [presumed father].  
(Under subd. (a) of Fam. Code, § 7612, a presumption shown by § 7611 ‘may be 
rebutted . . . only by clear and convincing evidence.’)”  (Brian C., supra, 77 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1222, fn. 20.)  Brian C., which preceded our opinion in Nicholas 
H., did not quote—and thus did not consider—the critical language in section 
7612, subdivision (a) that the paternity presumption may be rebutted only in an 
appropriate case.  Moreover, its implicit suggestion that genetic tests might rebut 
the presumption in that particular case does not prove that biological paternity 
always rebuts the section 7611 presumption.  (See also Kiana A., supra, 93 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1120 [distinguishing Brian C.].)5 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject Heriberto’s contention that biological 
paternity by a competing presumed father necessarily rebuts another man’s 
presumption of paternity under section 7612, subdivision (a).  A juvenile court 
confronted with such a claim must instead consider whether rebuttal of the 
presumption would be appropriate in the circumstances of the case.  (Cf. Nicholas 
                                                 
5 
We also said in Nicholas H. that the Legislature, by including the limiting 
phrase “ ‘in an appropriate action,’ ” “had in mind an action in which another 
candidate is vying for parental rights and seeks to rebut a section 7611(d) 
presumption in order to perfect his claim.”  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 
70.)  This dictum described a common circumstance in which rebuttal might be 
appropriate, but did not declare that rebuttal was appropriate in all such cases.  
Indeed, the very next paragraph cautioned that we did not reach the question 
whether “biological paternity by a competing presumptive father necessarily 
defeats a nonbiological father’s presumption of paternity.”  (Nicholas H., supra, at 
p. 70.)   
 
17
H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 70.)  This is a matter entrusted to the juvenile court’s 
discretion.  (Id. at p. 59.)   
No abuse of discretion occurred here.  Paul has a substantial relationship 
with Jesusa.  Not only is Paul married to Jesusa’s mother, he is the father of 
Jesusa’s five half siblings, all of whom live with him and have themselves 
established a close relationship with Jesusa.  Although Jesusa and her mother 
resided with Heriberto before his arrest and incarceration, they visited Paul at his 
house nearly every weekend.  Paul also provided shelter to Jesusa and her mother 
during periods of conflict between the mother and Heriberto—periods that 
sometimes lasted as long as a month.  Inasmuch as Jesusa was less than two years 
old at the time Heriberto was arrested, Paul has plainly been involved in a 
substantial portion of the child’s young life and considers Jesusa to be a part of his 
family.  Moreover, the mother supported Paul’s effort to be deemed the presumed 
father.     
The sole facts offered to support Heriberto, on the other hand, were that he 
was Jesusa’s biological father, that he had “received the child into his home and 
openly held himself out as [her] natural father,” and that he had lived with Jesusa’s 
mother prior to the conception and through her infancy.  One must subtract, 
however, at least a three-month period in early 2000, when he was jailed in 
Colorado for assaulting the mother (and subsequently deported), as well as the 
period following his arrest and conviction for the current rape.  During the 
remaining time, Jesusa’s weekends—as well as additional periods of refuge that 
lasted as long as a month—were spent with Paul.  Under the circumstances, the 
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it found this was not an 
appropriate action in which to rebut Paul’s claim to presumed fatherhood. 
 
 
 
18
2 
Based on its finding that Heriberto and Paul each could claim a 
presumption of fatherhood, the juvenile court undertook to identify the 
presumption “which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of 
policy and logic” (§ 7612, subd. (b)) and determined that the scales favored Paul.  
We once again find no abuse of discretion.          
At the outset, we reject the notion that the juvenile court was bound by 
section 7612, subdivision (b) to accord determinative weight to biology.  This 
section, which derives from the UPA, nowhere states that biology is a conclusive 
consideration of policy and logic.  (Doe v. Doe (Hawai’i 2002) 52 P.3d 255, 262 
[“If the genetic presumption ‘controlled’ as a matter of law, then [the statute] 
would plainly say so, and there would be no point in directing the court to consider 
which competing presumption ‘on the facts is founded on the weightier 
considerations of policy and logic’ ”].)  Moreover, other states that have adopted 
the UPA have consistently declined to make biology determinative under their 
analog to section 7612 when confronted by competing presumptions of paternity.  
In N.A.H. v. S.L.S. (Colo. 2000) 9 P.3d 354, for example, the Colorado Supreme 
Court found that “neither the presumption of legitimacy nor the presumption based 
on biology is conclusive” (id. at p. 362) and held instead “that when presumptions 
of paternity arise in more than one potential father, trial courts must take the best 
interests of the child into account as part of policy and logic in resolving 
competing presumptions.”  (Id. at p. 366.)  In Doe v. Doe, supra, 52 P.3d 255, the 
Hawai’i Supreme Court similarly found that “the genetic testing presumption is 
not more important than the other presumptions; it is one of several that must be 
considered . . . .”  (Id. at p. 262.)  In Witso v. Overby (Minn. 2001) 627 N.W.2d 
63, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that even if genetic tests identified one 
man as the biological father, the court must nonetheless “weigh the conflicting 
 
19
presumptions, and ‘the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier 
considerations of policy and logic controls.’ ”  (Id. at p. 69; Matter of Welfare of 
C.M.G. (Minn.Ct.App. 1994) 516 N.W.2d 555, 560 [“Where competing 
presumptions of paternity exists, the determination of paternity is no longer solely 
an issue of biological fact”].)  And, in Love v. Love (Nev. 1998) 959 P.2d 523, 
527, where only the husband’s presumption was at issue and he sought to disclaim 
paternity on the ground he was not the biological father, the Nevada Supreme 
Court observed that “where factors conflict, as they may here, the district court 
must use its discretion to apply considerations of policy and logic to the relevant 
evidence.”  In short, our construction—which permits a court to consider every 
relevant consideration of policy and logic—is in accord with every UPA state to 
have addressed the issue.6     
The juvenile court thus was obliged to weigh all relevant factors—
including biology—in determining which presumption was founded on weightier 
considerations of policy and logic.  We conclude it did so.   
                                                 
6  
Justice Kennard would rely on sections 7541 and 7554, which she concedes 
may be inapplicable here, as proof that the Legislature believes biology is the most 
weighty consideration of policy and logic.  Yet, if the Legislature had wanted to 
make a categorical exception for biology that did not rely “on the facts” of a 
particular case (§ 7612, subd. (b)), it could easily have said so.  (E.g., Wilson ex 
rel. C.M.W. v. Estate of Williams (Tex.App. 2003) 99 S.W.3d 640, 647 [former 
section 160.110(e) of the Texas Family Code included an additional sentence 
providing “ ‘that the weightier presumption of paternity is that of a presumed 
father who is not excluded as the biological father of the child by scientifically 
accepted paternity testing that shows that at least 99 percent of the male 
population is excluded’ ”].)  Moreover, the Legislature’s articulation of a rule of 
rebuttal for the section 7540 presumption that differs from that for the enumerated 
section 7611 presumptions (see § 7612, subd. (a)), and the imposition of a two-
year limit in section 7541 without any corresponding limit on the presumptions at 
issue here, undermines her claim that biology must be deemed the weightier 
consideration in this case.          
 
20
The juvenile court found that Paul was married to Jesusa’s mother; that 
they have five children together; that Jesusa had spent a “considerable amount of 
time” in Paul’s home and had lived with him “for a significant amount of time 
during her young life”; that Jesusa had established a bonding relationship with 
Paul as well as with her siblings, all of whom live with him; and that a family unit 
existed there to protect the child.  The court also found that Jesusa’s mother often 
went to Paul’s home to seek refuge from Heriberto—a fact that tended to confirm 
which father “provides the safety and stability and welfare that this child is 
entitled to have.  [¶]  [Paul] has assumed the parental rights and particularly 
assumed the parental responsibilities of this young child.  He has lived with this 
child.  He has treated her as his own.”     
The facts supporting Heriberto’s presumption, on the other hand, were less 
weighty.  The juvenile court found that Heriberto lived with the mother when the 
child was conceived and born; that he was the biological father; and that he held 
himself out as Jesusa’s father and received her into his home.  Although the parties 
did not then have a copy of the judgment of conviction, the court did note the 
allegation of domestic violence the mother had lodged against Heriberto. 
The juvenile court weighed the “competing interests” as follows:  “[T]he 
court must look to the state interests in rendering its decision.  The state interests 
rest on the policy to preserve and protect developing parent/child relationships 
which give young children social and emotional strength and stability.  This is 
more important than establishing biological ties.  [¶]  In other words, there is so 
much more to being a father than merely planting the biological seed.  The man 
who provides the stability, nurturance, family ties, permanence, is more important 
to a child than the man who has mere biological ties.  [¶]  By finding [Paul] is the 
presumed father, this court is protecting and preserving a family unit, the integrity 
of the family unit.”     
 
21
Heriberto does not challenge the facts or the criteria on which the juvenile 
court relied.  He claims instead that “because Heriberto shares a biological 
connection to Jesusa and has at least an equal, if not greater, relationship with 
Jesusa than Paul . . . the conflict between the paternity presumption[s] must be 
resolved based upon biological paternity.”  As support, he relies on Kiana A., 
supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at page 1120, in which the Court of Appeal stated that 
“where the weight of the interests of the competing presumptive fathers are in 
relatively equal balance, biological paternity might properly be relied upon to 
determine which presumption carried more weight.”  We find Kiana A. unhelpful 
to Heriberto for two reasons.  First, Kiana A. stated only that biological paternity 
might be relied upon to determine paternity where the interests are otherwise in 
relatively equal balance, not (as Heriberto contends) that it must be so used.  
Second, the record here does not support Heriberto’s characterization of his 
interests as equally balanced with Paul’s.  The juvenile court found Paul’s interest 
to be the weightier one on the grounds that Jesusa had established a bond with 
Paul; that Paul was married to Jesusa’s mother, who continued to visit Paul 
regularly and to seek refuge with him as protection from Heriberto; and that Jesusa 
had established a bond with her five siblings, who also lived with Paul.  (Cf. Welf. 
& Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E), 16002.)  Heriberto, on the other hand, 
had a stormy relationship with Jesusa’s mother and did not have custody of any of 
her other children.  Moreover, it is difficult to imagine conduct more destructive of 
the parent-child relationship than Heriberto’s violent rape of Jesusa’s mother while 
Jesusa was present in the home.  (Fam. Code, § 3020, subd. (a) [“domestic 
violence in a household where a child resides is detrimental to the child”].)   
That Heriberto had satisfied the minimum requirements to qualify as a 
presumed father under section 7611 did not compel a finding that his interests and 
Paul’s were equally balanced under section 7612.  Thus, even if the juvenile court 
 
22
might have relied on biological paternity to select between presumptions of equal 
value, such a rule would not have aided Heriberto.   
3 
Heriberto claims next that failing to accord determinative weight to his 
biological relationship to Jesusa violated his due process right to parent Jesusa.  
We disagree.    
Heriberto relies on Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th 816, in which we stated that 
a biological father’s federal constitutional right to due process “prohibits the 
termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a 
parent.”  (Id. at p. 849.)  What Heriberto fails to apprehend, though, is that the 
identification of another man as Jesusa’s presumed father does not terminate 
Heriberto’s parental relationship with the child.  Indeed, neither Heriberto nor our 
dissenting colleagues cite anything to support their assertion that a declaration of 
Paul’s presumed fatherhood has rendered Heriberto a legal stranger to the child.  A 
declaration of presumed fatherhood entitles the presumed father to reunification 
services and custody of the child (In re Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 439) 
but does not itself terminate the biological father’s parental relationship with the 
child.  (Francisco G. v. Superior Court, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 596.)  
Termination of parental rights requires further proceedings.  (See Fam. Code, §§ 
7664, 7800 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; see generally In re Malinda S. 
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 383-384.)  Hence, no showing of Heriberto’s unfitness was 
required before Paul could be declared Jesusa’s presumed father. 
Moreover, it appears that Heriberto, who never executed a voluntary 
declaration of paternity or described any other steps to formalize his role before 
the dependency petition was filed, has not “ ‘sufficiently and timely demonstrated 
a full commitment to his parental responsibilities’ ” to merit constitutional 
protection.  (Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043, 1055.)  Unlike the 
 
23
unwed biological father in Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th at page 822, who filed an 
action two days after the child’s birth to establish his parental relationship with the 
child and was thwarted only because the court’s order granting him custody was 
disobeyed, Heriberto was living with the child’s mother and presumably could 
have obtained her cooperation with any legal steps to formalize his relationship to 
the child.  (See § 7574, subd. (b)(1).)  Yet the record does not reveal any steps he 
took to shoulder legal responsibility for the child until after had he raped the 
mother and the dependency petition was filed.  (Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 
849 [“A court should also consider the father’s . . . prompt legal action to seek 
custody of the child”].)  On this record, Heriberto has not demonstrated that he 
“promptly came forward and demonstrated as full a commitment to his parental 
responsibilities as the biological mother allowed and the circumstances permitted.”  
(Michael H., supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1060, italics added; see also Kelsey S., supra, 
1 Cal.4th at p. 838.) 
To resolve Heriberto’s alternate claim that denying him presumed father 
status unconstitutionally interfered with his right to parent Jesusa, we will first 
assume that Heriberto has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
maintaining his parent-child relationship with Jesusa.  (Cf. Dawn D. v. Superior 
Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 942 [distinguishing between “an unwed father’s 
interest in maintaining and preserving an existing parent-child relationship” and 
“an unwed father’s biological connection alone to a child born to a married 
woman”].)  Then, applying traditional substantive due process principles, we must 
balance the competing private and state interests—i.e., Heriberto’s largely abstract 
interest in being an absent presumed father while he remains in prison for raping 
Jesusa’s mother, subject to deportation upon his release,7 against the substantial 
                                                 
7  
Heriberto thus effectively seeks the rights of fatherhood without any of its 
responsibilities.  But, as we have also noted, “Childhood does not wait for the 
 
24
state interests in familial stability and the welfare of the child.  (Michelle W. v. 
Ronald W. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 354, 360-363; Kiana A., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
1114-1115; see generally In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 989 [“The state has 
a ‘parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child’ ”]; 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202 [purpose of dependency proceedings is to promote 
child’s best interests].)   
This inquiry resembles that already undertaken by the juvenile court in 
determining which paternity presumption was founded on the weightier 
considerations of policy and logic.  (Kiana A., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121 
[alleged father “has been accorded due process through the statutory procedure 
which resulted in the juvenile court’s determination his presumption was entitled 
to less weight”]; see Steven W. v. Matthew S., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1116.)  
Yet, Heriberto offers no reason why the result here should differ from that reached 
by the juvenile court.  Indeed, Heriberto claims only that where both presumed 
fathers “have an equal relationship with Jesusa,” due process requires that 
biological paternity be determinative.  We need not decide here the soundness of 
Heriberto’s legal rule, inasmuch as we have already determined that Jesusa’s 
relationship with him was not the equal of her relationship with Paul.    
4 
The dissenting opinions, which rely on arguments and authorities neither 
mentioned nor discussed by any of the parties, merit separate analysis.   
(a)  Justice Chin asserts that our holding will place at risk the father-child 
relationship for untold thousands of biological fathers “by a court’s subjective and 
                                                                                                                                                 
parent to become adequate.”  (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.)  
“ ‘There is little that can be as detrimental to a child’s sound development as 
uncertainty over whether [she] is to remain in [her] current “home,” . . . especially 
when such uncertainty is prolonged.’ ”  (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 
988.)         
 
25
discretionary determination that some other man who qualifies as a presumed 
father would be a better father.”  (Dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at p. 65.)  But our 
holding does not apply to biological fathers who are married to and cohabit with 
the mother and are therefore conclusively presumed to be the father.  (§ 7540.)  
Nor does it apply to unwed biological fathers who, unlike Heriberto, have sought 
to formalize their legal status by executing a voluntary declaration of paternity.  
(§§ 7571, 7573.)  And it does not apply to unwed biological fathers who, again 
unlike Heriberto, have successfully maintained a parent-child relationship such 
that no other man obtains the opportunity to qualify as a presumed father.  (See 
§ 7611.)  In short, our holding applies only to that small subset of biological 
fathers who have neither married the mother of their child nor otherwise taken any 
steps to formalize their legal relationship with the child prior to the child’s 
formation of a presumptive parent-child relationship with a competing man who is 
interested in asserting his legal rights as a father.  If, in that category of cases, both 
men seek to be declared the presumed father, the court will have to determine, as 
the Legislature has provided, whether it is “appropriate” to rebut the nonbiological 
father’s presumption and which of the two presumptions “on the facts is founded 
on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.”  (§ 7612, subds. (a), (b).)     
(b)  Justice Chin also asserts that the Legislature has “clearly” expressed its 
intent to make biology determinative as between competing presumed fathers.  
(Dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at pp. 5, 10.)  Yet he concedes, as he must, that 
California’s UPA “does not expressly provide that one presumed father’s 
established biological paternity necessarily rebuts the presumption of another 
presumed father under subdivision (a) of section 7611.”  (Dis. opn. of Chin, J., 
post, at p. 8.)  Indeed, the legislative history on which he relies notes merely that 
the UPA presumptions “ ‘may be rebutted . . . by clear and convincing evidence’ ” 
 
26
(id. at p. 26, italics added), not that they must be rebutted whenever such evidence 
is presented.   
Unlike our dissenting colleague, we find this omission significant.  It is 
plain the Legislature knows how to craft a categorical rule for rebuttal of a 
presumption of fatherhood when it wants to.  (Cf. People v. Trevino (2001) 26 
Cal.4th 237, 241.)  In Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c), for example, the 
Legislature has provided that a statutory presumption “is rebutted by a judgment 
establishing paternity of the child by another man.”  But the Legislature did not 
use such unequivocal language in subdivision (a), which states instead that the 
statutory presumption “may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and 
convincing evidence.”  (Italics added.)  The significance of biology under this 
provision is far from clear—especially when compared with statutes from other 
states, which have appended language to govern situations like the one here.  In 
New Jersey, for example, the analog to section 7612, subdivision (c) provides:  
“ ‘The presumption is rebutted by a court order terminating the presumed father’s 
paternal rights or by establishing that another man is the child’s natural or 
adoptive father.’ ”  (N.M. v. J.G. (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1992) 605 A.2d 709, 
714, quoting N.J.S.A. 9:17-43b, italics added.)  Justice Chin in essence asks us to 
interpret our statute as though it included this explicit directive.   
The omission of any mention of biological fatherhood in section 7612, 
subdivision (a) becomes even more significant when we consider the exceptions 
set forth in that provision:  “Except as provided in Chapter 1 (commencing with 
Section 7540) and Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) of Part 2 or in 
Section 20102, a presumption under Section 7611 is a rebuttable presumption 
affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by 
clear and convincing evidence.”  (Italics added.)  In section 7541, the Legislature 
provided that the conclusive presumption under section 7540 is rebutted by 
 
27
evidence of biological fatherhood.  (§ 7541, subd. (a).)  Similarly, in section 7576, 
the Legislature provided that voluntary declarations of paternity signed on or 
before December 31, 1996, under section 7570 et seq. or former section 20102 
would not override a presumption of paternity arising under section 7555, the 
genetic testing provision.  (§ 7576, subd. (e).)  Had it wanted to specify the precise 
weight to be accorded biology for the remaining section 7611 presumptions, the 
Legislature could have crafted an analogous provision, or it could have referenced 
the testing provisions at section 7550 et seq. in the opening “excepting” clause to 
section 7612, subdivision (a).  Indeed, by expressly excepting the marital 
presumption and the voluntary declaration of paternity presumption from the 
operation of section 7612, subdivision (a) and making separate provision for the 
legal effect of biology in those circumstances, the Legislature plainly believed that 
section 7612, subdivision (a) did not necessarily accord primacy to biology.  
Justice Chin’s proffered interpretation would render the “excepting” clause 
meaningless. 
Justice Chin’s analysis also proceeds from a faulty premise.  According to 
the dissent, if a husband’s otherwise conclusive presumption under section 7540 
“is necessarily rebutted by proof he is not the biological father, the rebuttable UPA 
presumptions [in subdivisions (a)-(e) of section 7611] must also be necessarily 
rebutted by such proof; in establishing the limited exception to the conclusive 
presumption, the Legislature did not intend to make that presumption more 
rebuttable than the already rebuttable UPA presumptions.”  (Dis. opn. of Chin, J., 
post, at p. 17.)  But the dissent is comparing apples and oranges.  Unlike the 
presumptions enumerated in section 7611, the conclusive marital presumption in 
section 7540 is not really a presumption at all but is instead a “a rule of substantive 
law.”  (Estate of Cornelious (1984) 35 Cal.3d 461, 464; Kusior v. Silver (1960) 54 
Cal.2d 603, 619.)  The remaining section 7611 presumptions, on the other hand, 
 
28
are presumptions.  In fact, they are presumptions “affecting the burden of proof” 
(§ 7612, subd. (a)) and thus were “ ‘established to implement some public policy 
other than to facilitate the determination of the particular action in which the 
presumption is applied . . . .’ ”  (Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 
695, italics added.)8  We note as well that the enumerated presumptions in section 
7611—unlike the section 7540 presumption—may be rebutted “only by clear and 
convincing evidence.”  (§ 7612, subd. (a).)  We therefore do not agree that the fact 
biology rebuts the section 7540 presumption necessarily dictates the role for 
biology in this case.      
It therefore is not surprising that our dissenting colleague has been unable 
to cite a single case in support of his view.  Indeed, although Justice Chin deems 
the implication “unmistakable” (dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at p. 6), it has thus far 
eluded the justices in Kiana A., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 1109, and Steven W. v. 
Matthew S., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 1108, both of which support our holding, both 
of which Justice Chin would disapprove, and neither of which has provoked a 
corrective response by the Legislature.   
The drafters of the revised UPA, who recently deleted provisions 
equivalent to subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 7612, also fail to support the 
dissent.  According to the drafters, deletion of these provisions was appropriate 
because “[n]owadays the existence of modern genetic testing obviates this old 
approach to the problem of conflicting presumptions when a court is to determine 
paternity.  Nowadays, genetic testing makes it possible in most cases to resolve 
competing claims to paternity.”  (Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act as 
                                                 
8  
In Nicholas H., quoting a Court of Appeal decision, we described that 
policy as the “ ‘state interest in preserving the integrity of the family and 
legitimate concern for the welfare of the child.’ ”  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th 
at p. 65.) 
 
29
Last Amended in 2002 with Prefatory Note and Comments (2003) 37 Fam. L.Q. 5, 
17.)  This commentary implies that the “old” approach—which is still the law in 
California—may have relied on something other than genetic testing to resolve 
competing presumptions.  (See N.A.H. v. S.L.S., supra, 9 P.3d at p. 361, fn. 5 
[“Other jurisdictions that have adopted the UPA have interpreted the presumption 
based on biology in the Act as rebuttable, rather than conclusive”].)     
(c)  Our dissenting colleagues’ proposed interpretation cannot be reconciled 
with Nicholas H., either.  According to Justice Chin, the Legislature 50 years ago 
“directed courts to give controlling weight to evidence conclusively disproving  
the biological paternity of a particular man” (dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at p. 11), 
and “[n]othing” in the interim “suggests that . . . the Legislature intended to alter 
the determinative effect of biological paternity under California law.”  (Id. at p. 
26.)  Thus, “where tests conclusively show that a man is not a child’s biological 
father, ‘it seems intolerable for a court to permit an opposite result to be reached.  
For a court to permit the establishment of paternity in cases where it is 
scientifically impossible to arrive at that result would seem to be a great travesty 
on justice.’ ”  (Id. at p. 11.)   
Yet, we recently—and unanimously—affirmed a declaration of presumed 
fatherhood in favor of a man who could not possibly have been the biological 
father in Nicholas H., relying on section 7612, subdivision (a), which did not exist 
50 years ago.  (See Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 64-70.)  In accordance 
with that provision—the same provision on which we rely today—we found that 
“an action in which no other man claims parental rights to the child, an action in 
which rebuttal of the section 7611(d) presumption will render the child fatherless” 
was not an appropriate action in which to rebut the presumption.  (Nicholas H., 
 
30
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 70.)9  In other words, we relied on the best interests of the 
child and public policy in declining to rebut the willing candidate’s presumption.  
(See In re Salvador M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1357-1358 [“The paternity 
presumptions are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the state’s interest in 
the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family”]; cf. In re Marriage of 
Wendy M. (Wash.Ct.App. 1998) 962 P.2d 130, 133 [the “best interests of the 
child,” including the fact that the child would be left fatherless, are an appropriate 
consideration in a proceeding to disestablish paternity].)  Justice Chin fails to 
explain why the same provision—i.e., section 7612, subdivision (a)—allows us to 
consider the child’s best interest and public policy in determining whether the 
presumption is rebutted in Nicholas H. but not in this case.  Or why courts must 
ignore the child’s best interests in a dependency proceeding, the very purpose of 
which is to protect the child.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202.)     
(d)  Justice Chin—and, to a lesser extent, Justice Kennard—rely on the 
provisions of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (§ 7550 et 
seq.), a statutory scheme that the parties and amici curiae nowhere discuss or even 
cite.  In this case, such reliance is inappropriate and unwise. 
First of all, no blood or genetic tests of any kind were requested, performed, 
or offered in these proceedings.  These provisions therefore have no application 
here.   
Our dissenting colleagues suggest that the failure to obtain genetic tests can 
be excused because the parties stipulated to Heriberto’s paternity, but they offer no 
authority for this proposition.  To the contrary, case law has strictly construed 
                                                 
9 
We also cautioned that the Court of Appeal, in assuming that natural 
necessarily meant biological in sections 7611 and 7612, had “read too much into 
the passages it selected” from our case law.  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 
64.)  Our dissenting colleague appears to have made the same mistake.  (See dis. 
opn. of Chin, J., post, at pp. 29-32.)        
 
31
these testing requirements.  (Rodney F. v. Karen M. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 233, 
240 [“it is irrelevant that the biological father can prove his paternity or even that 
all parties to the proceedings may concede that plaintiff is the biological father”].)  
Moreover, given the extraordinary significance each would accord to biology, it 
seems unwise to allow a judgment that is demonstrably false to be entered solely 
because of an honest mistake as to a child’s biological paternity.  (See, e.g., State, 
Div. of Child Support ex rel. NDB (Wyo. 2001) 35 P.3d 1224, 1226 [all parties 
were mistaken as to the identity of the biological father for nearly six years]; State 
v. Santos (Wash.Ct.App. 1985) 702 P.2d 1179, 1183 [“one study has estimated 
that 18 percent of a group of men who voluntarily admitted to paternity were not 
in fact the fathers of the children in question”].) 
Second, the precise interplay between this statutory scheme and the UPA is 
not immediately apparent.  As one commentator in this area has cautioned, “[a]n 
outmoded and confusing system of presumptions plays a central role in the 
California statutory scheme.”  (Miller, Baseline, Bright Line, Best Interests:  A 
Pragmatic Approach for California to Provide Certainty in Determining 
Parentage (2003) 34 McGeorge L.Rev. 637, 638-639 (Miller).)  “[T]he law in this 
area is exceedingly complex . . . .  It is not always clear how these provisions are 
to be reconciled.”  (Anderlik, Disestablishment Suits:  What Hath Science 
Wrought? (2003) 4 J. Center for Fam., Children & Cts. 3, 5, 6.)  One thus has 
sound reason to doubt that the legislative intent is as clear as our dissenting 
colleagues insist it is—or, whatever the level of clarity, that the Legislature 
intended biology to be conclusive.  (See id. at p. 10 [“The ‘biological imperative’ 
position seems to show up most frequently in concurring or dissenting opinions, 
suggesting that it is somewhat idiosyncratic among judges”]; id. at p. 11 
[California appears to have embraced “a position of biological relevance:  biology 
is not the whole story or even the most important part of the story”]; Miller, supra, 
 
32
34 McGeorge L.Rev. at p. 640 [“While the California statutory scheme has 
gradually expanded the role of genetic testing, the legislative process has stopped 
short of making the genetic-biological relationship the baseline test for 
parentage”].)  In any event, we hesitate to definitively construe the scheme where, 
as here, its provisions are inapplicable and the parties have not invoked it or 
analyzed it.  We therefore do not do so.     
With that caveat in mind, however, we can point out certain logical flaws 
that appear in Justice Chin’s analysis.  For example, he asserts that biology is 
necessarily determinative within the first two years of life.  Yet he admits that 
section 7541, the provision that provides for a two-year time limit, “do[es] not 
apply to the other section 7611 presumptions” (such as Paul’s) and that sections 
7554 and 7555, the implications of which the dissent deems unmistakable, 
nowhere refer to the age of the child.10  (Dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at p. 21.)  
Neither can his construction of section 7554, under which biology necessarily 
rebuts an enumerated section 7611 presumption, be reconciled with Nicholas H.  
The legislative history also fails to support Justice Chin’s interpretation.  
According to his dissent, the purpose of section 7555, which creates a rebuttable 
presumption of paternity if the paternity index is 100 or greater, was to standardize 
the weight accorded to genetic tests in determining biological paternity.  The 
problem, one legislative analysis explained, was that jurors were failing to accord 
                                                 
10  
Under the dissent’s construction of section 7551 et seq., in which genetic 
tests requested by any party or other person “ ‘involved’ ” in the action would 
necessarily and conclusively rebut another man’s presumption under section 7611, 
Heriberto’s status as the biological father would necessarily and conclusively rebut 
Paul’s presumption even if Heriberto were not a presumed father.  (See dis. opn. 
of Chin, J., post, at p. 5.)  This would be inconsistent with Dawn D. v. Superior 
Court, supra, 17 Cal.4th 932 at pages 938-939, in which we held that a biological 
father who was not a presumed father under section 7611 or Kelsey S., supra, 1 
Cal.4th 816, had no statutory or constitutional right to challenge another man’s 
section 7611 presumption. 
 
33
due weight to the tests and were instead relying on less probative markers of 
biological paternity, such as “ ‘the appearance of the natural mother.’ ”  (Dis. opn. 
of Chin, J., post, at p. 11; see Miller, supra, 34 McGeorge L.Rev. at p. 693.)  
Nothing in this snippet of legislative history suggests how a juvenile court should 
proceed when faced with a conflict between the rebuttable presumption of 
biological paternity (correctly determined under section 7555) and a rebuttable 
presumption of paternity under section 7611—although the available case law 
once again rejects the approach endorsed in the dissents.  (See Steven W. v. 
Matthew S., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1116-1117 & fn. 4.) 
The legislative history of section 7541 likewise fails to support either 
dissenting opinion.  According to these materials, the 1990 amendment to section 
7541 was intended to provide unwed biological fathers, who were previously 
foreclosed from challenging the husband’s conclusive presumption of paternity, 
“ ‘the opportunity to establish paternity’ ” when they have demonstrated an 
interest in raising and providing for their children.  (Dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at 
p. 18, italics added.)  A mere opportunity for the unwed biological father to 
establish paternity hardly supports the claim that biology is necessarily 
determinative.  Indeed, in construing a statute similar to section 7541, the 
Colorado Supreme Court observed that the provision “does not state that blood 
evidence is conclusive of fatherhood in all circumstances, or that it automatically 
eliminates other presumptions of fatherhood.”  (N.A.H. v. S.L.S., supra, 9 P.3d at 
p. 361, italics added.)   
(e)  Justice Chin accuses the court of repudiating the policy set forth in 
Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 Cal.4th 84, 93, footnote 10, where we declined to 
“ ‘decide parentage based on the best interests of the child,’ because doing so 
‘raises the repugnant specter of governmental interference in matters implicating 
our most fundamental notions of privacy, and confuses concepts of parentage and 
 
34
custody.’ ”  (Dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at p. 1.)  The dissent has once again 
confused apples and oranges.  In this case, we are not selecting a policy to resolve 
competing claims when the statutory law is silent on the issue, but are instead 
giving effect to the language of the applicable statute.  Because that statute directs 
us to consider whether rebuttal is appropriate and whether policy and logic favor 
one presumption over another, Johnson is not pertinent here.   
In Johnson v. Calvert, we were charged with deciding which woman—the 
egg donor or the birth mother—was the child’s “natural mother” under California 
law.  (Johnson v. Calvert, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 87.)  We discovered that the 
presumptions set forth now in section 7611—the statute at issue here—“have no 
application to this case” but that both women had nonetheless “adduced evidence 
of a mother and child relationship as contemplated by the [UPA].”  (Johnson v. 
Calvert, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 92.)  Unlike the situation here, the conflict was not 
resolved in the UPA itself. (Johnson v. Calvert, supra, at pp. 92-93 & fn. 9; id. at 
pp. 112-113 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  After a careful review of materials 
extrinsic to the UPA, we decided that the parties’ intent would be determinative.  
(Johnson v. Calvert, supra, at pp. 93-97; see also Dunkin v. Boskey (2000) 82 
Cal.App.4th 171, 190, fn. 10 [“the court looked to the writings of several legal 
commentators”]; In re Marriage of Moschetta (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1231 
[“only when the operation of the [UPA] yielded an ambiguous result did the court 
resolve the matter by intent as expressed in the agreement”].)  Under that standard, 
the woman who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to 
raise as her own “is the natural mother.”  (Johnson v. Calvert, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 
p. 93.)  The passage from Johnson v. Calvert quoted by the dissent explained why, 
in selecting among possible criteria for decision, we did not rely on the best 
interests of the child. 
 
35
This case is unlike Johnson v. Calvert.  In this case, the section 7611 
presumptions do apply.  In this case, section 7612 does tell us how presumptions 
can be rebutted—by clear and convincing evidence and only in an appropriate 
case—and how conflicting presumptions are to be resolved—by weighing 
considerations of policy and logic.  Whatever our views as to whether the child’s 
best interests should be considered in making parentage decisions, we cannot 
ignore the Legislature’s directive.11 
C 
In the course of affirming the juvenile court’s determination that Paul 
qualified as Jesusa’s presumed father, the Court of Appeal criticized the juvenile 
court for addressing the issue of presumed fatherhood prior to the jurisdictional 
hearing.  In the appellate court’s view, “the trial court proceeded backward in this 
case because if it found no jurisdiction over the minor the issue of presumed 
fatherhood would be moot.”  DCFS and amici curiae Northern California 
Association of Counsel for Children et al. ask us to disapprove this language and 
declare instead that a juvenile court has discretion to identify the presumed father 
once the dependency petition was filed—and that the juvenile court here did not 
abuse its discretion in doing so.  We agree with DCFS and its amici curiae. 
Where (as here) a child has been taken into temporary protective custody, 
the juvenile court is required to conduct a detention hearing as soon as possible 
and, in any event, no later than the next judicial day.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 315.)  
“At the detention hearing, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the court shall 
                                                 
11 
Under the dissenters’ bright-line rule, in which biology is necessarily 
determinative, a juvenile court would be obliged to favor the biological father over 
any other presumed father, even if the child were the product of a rape.  Like the 
Court of Appeal in In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 802, “ ‘we think it 
highly unlikely the Legislature intended to give a right of reunification services to 
a rapist . . . simply because the man is the biological father of the child.’ ”           
 
36
inquire of the mother and any other appropriate person as to the identity and 
address of all presumed or alleged fathers.”  (Id., § 316.2, subd. (a), italics added.)  
Indeed, under the California Rules of Court, the court should conduct this inquiry 
at the beginning of the initial hearing on the petition.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
1441(a), (b).)  If one or more men are identified as an alleged father, each shall be 
provided notice of the proceeding and informed that it could result in termination 
of his parental rights.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (b).)   
There are two ways the juvenile court may proceed to determine the 
identity of a child’s presumed father if no prior determination has been made.  
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2, subdivision (d) and Family 
Code section 7630, the alleged father may bring an action to be declared the 
presumed father.  The juvenile court where the dependency petition is pending 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear that action from the time the petition is 
filed until the petition is dismissed, the dependency is terminated, or parental 
rights are terminated.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (e).)  Alternatively, the 
juvenile court itself “may make such a determination” even if no action is filed 
under Family Code section 7630.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1413(e).)  The court 
may order the parties to submit to blood tests (rule 1413(e)(1)) or “may make its 
determination of paternity or nonpaternity based on the testimony, declarations, or 
statements of the mother and alleged father” (rule 1413(e)(2)).  Any determination 
made by the juvenile court in either scenario shall be noted in the court minutes.  
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (f).) 
Nothing in these provisions requires the juvenile court to suspend its 
identification of the presumed father until after the dependency petition has been 
resolved.  Indeed, subdivision (e) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2 
endows the juvenile court with exclusive jurisdiction to hear the paternity action at 
any time while the petition is pending.  Heriberto offers no reason for supposing a 
 
37
different rule applies when the juvenile court proceeds on its own to identify the 
presumed father.  Moreover, inasmuch as a dependency action could eventually 
result in the termination of parental rights, a court needs first to know the identities 
of the parents.  The legal parents must be identified so that they may receive notice 
of the hearing; be provided counsel, if necessary; and be accorded a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.  As DCFS points out, “it would not make sense—or be 
possible in many cases—to adjudicate a dependency petition without first 
identifying which man is the child’s father.”  Thus, this seems to be a situation in 
which “the law cannot be judicially applied without a determination of parentage 
when such question is placed in issue.”  (In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 643.)       
Heriberto nonetheless contends that a juvenile court does not have 
jurisdiction to identify the presumed father until after the dependency petition has 
been sustained.  Although evidence must be offered to prove the child comes 
within one or more subdivisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 
before the child may be declared a dependent of the court (e.g., In re Janet T. 
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 391), the juvenile court nonetheless has jurisdiction 
prior to that time “to make such determinations which are incidentally necessary to 
the performance of those functions demanded of it by the Legislature pursuant to 
the Juvenile Court Law.”  (In re Lisa R., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 643.)  This 
responsibility is now articulated in Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2 
and rule 1413 of the California Rules of Court.  But, even before those provisions 
were enacted, we held that “a juvenile court is vested with jurisdiction to 
determine parentage of a minor when that finding is necessary to any ultimate 
determination with which it is charged.”  (Lisa R., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 644.) 
We do agree with Heriberto on one point:  the dependency scheme does not 
require the juvenile court to make a paternity determination prior to adjudicating 
the dependency petition.  As in other types of cases (e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-
 
38
Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 
147), we entrust the sequence of issues to the sound discretion of the trial court.  
Here, we find that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in identifying 
Jesusa’s presumed father before making the ultimate determination that Jesusa 
should be declared a dependent of the court.  
D 
Having exhausted Heriberto’s challenges to the juvenile court’s declaration 
of Paul’s presumed fatherhood, we may now address his objections to the juvenile 
court’s adjudication of the dependency petition.  Once again, Heriberto claims he 
had a statutory and constitutional right to be present at this proceeding.  The Court 
of Appeal rejected the constitutional claim but agreed with Heriberto that Penal 
Code section 2625, subdivision (d) granted him an “absolute right” to be present at 
the jurisdictional hearing.  Holding that the juvenile court had acted “in excess of 
its jurisdiction” by proceeding in Heriberto’s absence, the Court of Appeal 
reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.   
In reversing that part of the judgment, the Court of Appeal focused on the 
word “or” in Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d)’s admonition that no 
dependency petition may be adjudicated without the physical presence of  “ ‘the 
prisoner or the prisoner’s attorney’ ” and determined that “the word ‘or’ in the 
sentence under consideration must be construed in the conjunctive sense to mean 
‘and.’ ”  Reading the word “or” in its conjunctive sense, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that both the prisoner and the prisoner’s attorney must be present before 
the juvenile court may adjudicate a dependency petition.  We agree with the Court 
of Appeal that the statute requires both the prisoner and the prisoner’s attorney be 
present.  We disagree, however, that the violation here deprived the juvenile court 
of jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition.  We instead apply our familiar harmless-
 
39
error analysis and find that Heriberto, who had already been convicted of the rape 
at the time of the hearing, was not prejudiced.  
We begin with the text of the statute.  Penal Code section 2625, subdivision 
(d) states in relevant part:  “Upon receipt by the court of a statement from the 
prisoner or his or her attorney indicating the prisoner’s desire to be present during 
the court’s proceedings, the court shall issue an order for the temporary removal of 
the prisoner from the institution, and for the prisoner’s production before the 
court. . . .  [N]o petition to adjudge the child of a prisoner a dependent child of the 
court pursuant to subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (i), or (j) of Section 300 of 
the Welfare and Institutions Code may be adjudicated without the physical 
presence of the prisoner or the prisoner’s attorney, unless the court has before it a 
knowing waiver of the right of physical presence signed by the prisoner or an 
affidavit signed by the warden, superintendent, or other person in charge of the 
institution, or his or her designated representative stating that the prisoner has, by 
express statement or action, indicated an intent not to appear at the proceeding.”  
(Italics added.) 
DCFS argues, with some force, that a conjunctive construction of the word 
“or” renders superfluous the words “or the prisoner’s attorney” in the statute, since 
it goes without saying that a prisoner who is represented by counsel would have a 
right to have counsel in attendance at any legal proceeding.  On the other hand, 
Heriberto argues, with equal force, that a disjunctive construction of the word “or” 
would make meaningless the statute’s directive that a court order a prisoner’s 
production once the prisoner has indicated a desire to attend.  We therefore agree 
that the statute is ambiguous and turn to additional indicators of the legislative 
intent.  (Arnold v. Hopkins (1928) 203 Cal. 553, 563.)   
In construing statutes, we must rely on “ ‘ “ ‘the usual, ordinary import of 
the language employed in framing them.’ ” ’ ”  (Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 16 
 
40
Cal.4th 23, 32.)  The “ ‘ordinary and popular’ ” meaning of the word “or” is well 
settled.  (Houge v. Ford (1955) 44 Cal.2d 706, 712.)  It has a disjunctive meaning:  
“In its ordinary sense, the function of the word ‘or’ is to mark an alternative such 
as ‘either this or that.’ ”  (Ibid.)  We have also recognized that the word may have 
a conjunctive meaning.  But, as we have long stated, “[r]esort to such unnatural 
construction of the word ‘or’ is sanctioned only when such construction is found 
necessary to carry out the obvious intent of the Legislature in a statute or the 
obvious intent of the parties in a contract, when such intent may be gleaned from 
the context in which the word is used.”  (Ibid.)  That intent appears in the 
legislative history.   
The language currently found in Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d) 
was added to the Penal Code in 1976.  (Stats. 1976, ch. 1376, § 2, p. 6262.)  
According to one legislative analysis, “[t]he purpose of” subdivision (d) “is to 
ensure that prisoner-parents have the opportunity to be present at proceedings . . . 
where taking away custody [and] control of their child(ren), on a temporary or 
permanent basis, is being considered.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Background 
Information to Assem. Bill No. 4354 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.).)  Another analysis 
explained that subdivision (d) “prohibit[s] . . . proceedings” in dependency cases 
“without the presence of the prisoner-parent, a knowing waiver of appearance, or 
an affidavit from the superintendent or representative of the institution that the 
prisoner does not want to attend the hearing.”  (Assem. Com. on Criminal Justice, 
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 4354 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) May 26, 1976.)  Still 
another analysis explained that under subdivision (d), a dependency case “can not 
be disposed of unless the prisoner is either physically present in court, represented 
by counsel or unless he has waived his right to appear.”  (Assem. Com. on 
Criminal Justice, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 4354 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended June 2, 1976, p. 1.)  This last analysis also explained that “the 
 
41
termination of parental rights is a matter of utmost concern to all parties and that 
the . . . presence of all parties is desirable.”  (Ibid.)  These materials reveal a strong 
legislative interest in enabling the prisoner to attend the hearing, an interest that 
would be undermined by interpreting the statute to make the attorney’s presence 
sufficient in every case.    
To interpret the statute to require only the presence of the attorney would 
also undermine the legislative goal of ensuring that prisoners actually receive 
notice of the proceeding.  Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (b) requires the 
court to order notice of a qualifying dependency proceeding to be “transmitted to 
the prisoner.”  According to one legislative analysis, the Legislature added section 
2625, subdivision (d)’s waiver requirement in 1976 to “[e]nsure that adequate 
notice is [actually] given.  [¶] . . . [¶]  [O]ccasionally the notice required . . . to 
adjudicate a child a ward of the court is not received by the inmate in time for that 
person to be present at the hearing.  This bill would solve the problem since the 
hearing could not proceed without some acknowledgement from the prisoner-
parent.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 4354 (1975-1976 
Reg. Sess.) as amended June 3, 1976, pp. 2-3.)  Only by requiring the prisoner 
either to be present or to have executed a waiver of his or her appearance can the 
court ensure the prisoner actually received the notice.  The juvenile court thus 
erred in proceeding without Heriberto’s presence or his waiver of that right.12     
We typically apply a harmless-error analysis when a statutory mandate is 
disobeyed, except in a narrow category of circumstances when we deem the error 
reversible per se.  This practice derives from article VI, section 13 of the 
                                                 
12  
In re Axsana S., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 262, and In re Rikki D., supra, 227 
Cal.App.3d 1624, which held to the contrary without examining this legislative 
history, are disapproved to the extent they are inconsistent with the discussion 
herein.      
 
42
California Constitution, which provides:  “No judgment shall be set aside, or new 
trial granted, in any cause . . . for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, 
after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be 
of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice.”  The Court of Appeal reasoned that this statutory violation was reversible 
per se because, by proceeding in Heriberto’s absence, the juvenile court acted in 
excess of jurisdiction.  We disagree.   
A court acts in excess of jurisdiction “where, though the court has 
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has 
no ‘jurisdiction’ (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain 
kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural 
prerequisites.”  (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 
(Abelleira).)  Whether an act is in excess of jurisdiction or is merely statutory error 
is defined by the Constitution, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by 
the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis.  (Abelleira, supra, at 
p. 291.)  In this case, where Heriberto’s presence was neither constitutionally 
required nor mandated by our rules, we must examine the statute to determine 
whether the Legislature intended it to be jurisdictional.   
At the outset, we observe that we have rarely—if ever—found a statutory 
mandate to be jurisdictional when, as here, the mandate itself provides that it may 
be waived.  (Cf. Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at pp. 288-289; Newman v. County of 
Sonoma (1961) 56 Cal.2d 625, 627.)  Nothing in the text of the statute indicates 
the Legislature intended a different result here.  Rather, it appears the Legislature 
intended merely to grant the prisoner a statutory right to attend the proceedings. 
An examination of the statutes governing a defendant’s appearance at a 
criminal trial is therefore instructive, since Heriberto’s denial of his right to be 
present under Penal Code section 2625 can reasonably be analogized to the denial 
 
43
of a criminal defendant’s right to be present at trial under Penal Code sections 977 
and 1043, which similarly mandate the defendant’s presence at trial unless a 
waiver is submitted.  (See People v. Gutierrez (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1196.)  Despite 
the statutory mandate in sections 977 and 1043, we have regularly applied a 
harmless-error analysis when a defendant has been involuntarily absent from a 
criminal trial.  (E.g., People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1196 [“because this 
nonwaivable right is statutory and not constitutional, error is reversible only if it is 
reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to defendant 
absent the error”]; People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 268-269; People v. 
Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 325.)  We do not believe the Legislature intended a 
different result in the analogous circumstance here, when a prisoner is 
involuntarily absent from a dependency proceeding.  (Cf. Barquis v. Merchants 
Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 120-122.)   
Our conclusion is bolstered by the strong countervailing interest, expressed 
by the Legislature itself, that dependency actions be resolved expeditiously.  
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 352, subd. (b); In re Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 384 
[the state has a “legitimate interest in providing an expedited proceeding to resolve 
the child’s status without further delay”].)  That goal would be thwarted if the 
proceeding had to be redone without any showing the new proceeding would have 
a different outcome.  Indeed, the concern is acute in this case, inasmuch as 
Heriberto had been convicted of the rape at the time of the hearing and has never 
asserted that he was actually prejudiced by appearing at the hearing only through 
his attorney.  We therefore conclude that the Legislature did not intend the 
prisoner’s statutory right to personally attend the adjudication of a dependency 
petition to be jurisdictional.  Applying our familiar harmless-error test, we find 
that Heriberto could not have been prejudiced.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cal.2d 818, 836; In re Melinda J. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1413, 1419.)   
 
44
Independently of any statutory claim, Heriberto also contends that his 
absence from the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing denied him due process, 
but he offers no argument beyond that we have already rejected in part A., ante.  
The relevant issues involved in the dependency action had been explored in 
reports filed months before the hearing; the juvenile court had granted a lengthy 
continuance to permit Heriberto to respond to those points and conduct discovery; 
and the court had advised counsel to consider having Heriberto file a declaration.  
(Cf. Axsana S., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 270.)  Heriberto, however, chose not to 
submit such a declaration.  His attorney made no offer of proof of the testimony 
Heriberto allegedly wanted to present.  Nor did his attorney present the live 
testimony of other witnesses, such as those witnesses he had included on his 
witness list.  In fact, Heriberto has never identified—whether by way of a petition 
for modification (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388, subd. (a)) in the juvenile court or in 
this appeal—the evidence he claims he would have offered had he been present.  
(Cf. Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477, 484-488.)  The 
omission is perhaps unsurprising, given the fact that he had raped the child’s 
mother while the child was present in the motorhome and was in prison at the time 
the petition was adjudicated.  Accordingly, one can say with confidence that “[n]o 
other result was possible” even if he had been present.  (Rikki D., supra, 227 
Cal.App.3d at p. 1632.) 
We observe as well that no denial of due process has been found where the 
prisoner-parent is unable to attend because he or she is in the custody of another 
state or the federal government and is instead represented by counsel.  (E.g., In re 
Maria S., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1312-1313.)  Heriberto offers no 
justification for a different result here.  (State ex rel. Jeanette H. v. Pancake 
(W.Va. 2000) 529 S.E.2d 865, 876 [“we conclude that the same due process 
analysis is applicable regardless of where a parent is confined”].) 
 
45
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed to the extent it reversed 
the order determining Jesusa V. to be a dependent child of the court.  In all other 
respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR:   
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
In this case, a county agency petitioned the juvenile court to have a minor 
child declared a dependent of the court.  Two men met the statutory definition of 
being the child’s presumed father.  One of the men, who was in jail at the time, 
was the child’s undisputed biological father; the other was married to the child’s 
mother when the child was born.  After scheduling a paternity hearing, the court 
ordered the incarcerated biological father transported to court for the hearing.  
When that did not occur, the court nevertheless proceeded with the hearing, ruling 
that the mother’s husband was the child’s legal father and declaring the child a 
dependent of the court.  The majority holds that the biological father had no right 
to be at the paternity hearing, and that legally he is not the child’s father.  I 
disagree on both points.1 
I 
Jesusa V. was born in 1999.  Her mother, also named Jesusa, was married 
to Paul B. and had five other children by him, but they had separated before 
Jesusa’s birth and Heriberto O. was Jesusa’s biological father.  An unusual living 
arrangement evolved after Jesusa’s birth:  Jesusa and her mother both lived with 
                                                 
1  
The majority also holds that the biological father was entitled to be present 
at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings where the juvenile court declared 
the child a dependent of the court, but that the court’s violation of this right was 
harmless.  Although I agree with this analysis, I also conclude, as explained in part 
IV, post, that the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings should be 
reversed for other reasons. 
 
2
Heriberto during the week and with Paul and the other children on weekends.  The 
mother and Heriberto had a tempestuous relationship. 
Before Jesusa’s second birthday, Heriberto was arrested for raping the 
mother.  The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 
petitioned the juvenile court to declare Jesusa a dependent of the court.  The court 
appointed counsel to represent Heriberto, who denied the allegations in the 
dependency petition and asserted that he, not Paul, qualified as Jesusa’s legal 
father.  The court scheduled a paternity hearing and ordered the deputies at the 
county jail, where Heriberto was incarcerated, to transport him to court for the 
hearing. 
Heriberto, however, never made it to the paternity hearing.  Although no 
evidence was presented as to the reason for his absence, it appears that Heriberto 
was not transported to court because he was no longer in county jail but was in 
state prison:  This court has taken judicial notice of records showing that he had 
entered a plea of no contest to the rape.  The juvenile court, over the objection of 
Heriberto’s attorney, held the paternity hearing in Heriberto’s absence and ruled 
that Paul was Jesusa’s legal father.  A jurisdictional hearing on the dependency 
petition followed; Heriberto’s attorney unsuccessfully asserted his incarcerated 
client’s right to be present.   
At the jurisdictional hearing, none of the parties was personally present:  
Jesusa’s mother, distraught at the outcome of the paternity hearing, had walked out 
of the courtroom, followed by Paul.  The court ruled that because it had decided 
that Heriberto was not Jesusa’s legal father but a “mere biological father,” he was 
“not even entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard.”  Because the 
attorneys representing Paul and the mother did not challenge the allegations in the 
dependency petition, the court found them true.  It then turned to the question of 
 
3
disposition.  It ordered Jesusa placed with Paul, allowing the mother to have 
unmonitored visits, and it forbade Heriberto from having any contact with Jesusa.   
Heriberto appealed.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s 
order declaring Paul to be Jesusa’s legal father, but it reversed the order sustaining 
the dependency petition, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
dependency petition in Heriberto’s absence. 
II 
The majority here upholds the juvenile court’s ruling declaring Paul to be 
Jesusa’s legal father.  I disagree. 
I begin by briefly summarizing the pertinent parts of California’s complex 
statutory scheme governing paternity adjudications.  Paternity disputes are 
governed by a conglomeration of three sets of laws:  The Uniform Parentage Act 
(Fam. Code, §§ 7600-7730, hereafter the UPA),2 the Uniform Act on Blood Tests 
to Determine Paternity (§§ 7550-7557), and other Family Code sections enacted 
by the Legislature (§§ 7540-7541, 7570-7577).  Under the UPA, a man is 
“presumed to be the natural father of a child” if he meets certain conditions 
described in section 7611:  He marries or attempts to marry the mother under 
circumstances specified in the statute; he and the child’s mother sign a declaration 
stating that he is the father; he “receives the child into his home and openly holds 
out the child as his natural child” (§ 7611, subd. (d)); or the child is born in a 
country participating in an Orderly Departure Program, and the man acknowledges 
his paternity in a declaration filed under penalty of perjury.  As to most of these 
conditions, the presumption is “a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of 
proof” (§ 7612, subd. (a)), which may be refuted by clear and convincing 
evidence.  This is not the case, however, as to the presumption described in section 
                                                 
2  
Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory citations are to the Family 
Code. 
 
4
7540.  That section states that when a married woman living with her husband 
gives birth to a child, the husband is ordinarily conclusively presumed to be the 
child’s father.  But if blood tests taken in a paternity action before the child is two 
years old show “that the husband is not the father of the child, the question of the 
paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly.”  (§ 7541, subd. (a), italics 
added; see also § 7554 [when blood tests have been taken in any proceeding in 
which paternity is a relevant fact, and “the conclusions of all the experts . . . are 
that the alleged father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity shall 
be resolved accordingly”].)3   
Here, Paul and Jesusa were married when Jesusa was born, but Paul did not 
qualify for the conclusive presumption of paternity (§ 7540) because he and 
Jesusa’s mother were not living together at the time of birth.  Heriberto and Paul, 
however, both qualified as presumed fathers.  (§ 7611.)  Heriberto qualified 
because he received Jesusa into his home and held her out as his natural child.  
Paul qualified because he was married to Jesusa’s mother.4   
When, at a paternity hearing, the court finds that two men are presumed 
fathers, the court must find paternity in favor of the father whose presumption “is 
founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.”  (§ 7612, subd. (b).)  
The juvenile court here construed that statutory phrase as permitting it to decide 
paternity based on the child’s best interests.  It explained:  “The man who provides 
                                                 
3  
Both subdivision (a) of section 7541 and section 7554 are phrased 
negatively; that is, they state the result when a blood test shows that a man is not 
the father of the child.  The reason:  A blood test can only rule out the possibility 
that a man is not a child’s biological father; it cannot show with complete certainty 
that a man is the biological father.  
4  
The majority and Justice Chin’s dissenting opinion disagree as to whether 
Paul also qualified as a presumed father by holding Jesusa out as his natural child.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1, 11; dis. opn. of Chin, J., post, at p. 3, fn. 2.)  I see no 
need to resolve this debate because it does not affect the outcome of this case. 
 
5
the stability, nurturance, family ties, permanence, is more important to a child than 
a man who has mere biological ties.”  Based on these considerations, the court 
adjudicated the question of Jesusa’s paternity in favor of Paul, whom everyone 
agreed was not the biological father. 
The juvenile court may well have been right that Paul rather than Heriberto 
was likely to be a better parent to Jesusa.  That, however, is not dispositive under 
subdivision (b) of section 7612, as becomes clear when other sections of the 
Family Code are considered.   
As noted earlier, section 7541 provides that when a child is under the age of 
two, and a blood test has shown that a man who, like Paul here, is married to the 
child’s mother is not the child’s biological father, the trial court must resolve the 
question of paternity against that man.  Similarly, section 7554 says that when 
blood tests are used to resolve a paternity dispute, those tests are dispositive.  
Thus, sections 7541 and 7554 reflect the Legislature’s view that when a paternity 
dispute between two presumptive fathers involves a child less than two years old, 
biology is the “weightier consideration[] of policy and logic” under section 7612, 
subdivision (b).  The biological father would not prevail if he was not a presumed 
father (see p. 3, ante), because section 7612 applies only to disputes between 
presumed fathers.  But here, because Heriberto – the biological father – was also a 
presumed father and Jesusa was under two years of age, the juvenile court should 
have resolved the question of paternity in his favor. 
The majority insists that sections 7541 and 7554 “have no application here” 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 30) because they merely describe who prevails when a blood 
test shows a husband’s or an alleged father’s lack of paternity.  True, no blood 
tests were ordered here.  But that was because such tests were unnecessary, as the 
parties agreed that Heriberto, not Paul, was Jesusa’s biological father.   
 
6
In any event, the majority acknowledges that dispositive here is what the 
Legislature meant when it said, in subdivision (b) of section 7612, that between 
two statutorily presumed fathers, paternity must be resolved in favor of the man 
whose presumption “is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and 
logic.”  As discussed above, sections 7541 and 7554 show that as to children under 
the age of two years, the Legislature views biology as the “weightier 
consideration.”  Thus, because Heriberto, one of the presumed fathers, was 
undisputedly Jesusa’s biological father, the juvenile court should have adjudicated 
paternity in his favor. 
In upholding the trial court’s contrary ruling, the majority relies on In re 
Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56.  That case is distinguishable, however.  There, 
we held that when a presumed father admits that he is not the child’s biological 
father, the trial court may still decide that he is the child’s father under section 
7612.  But there, unlike here, no one stepped forward as the child’s biological 
father.  We stressed that our decision had no applicability to a case when, as here, 
“another man is vying for parental rights” (In re Nicholas H., supra, at p. 70), and 
adding that “we do not reach” the question “whether . . . biological paternity by a 
competing presumptive father necessarily defeats a nonbiological father’s 
presumption of paternity” (ibid.).  Now, for the first time, this court must confront 
that issue. 
In upholding the juvenile court’s paternity ruling against Heriberto, 
Jesusa’s biological father, the majority violates his due process rights as a 
biological father.  In Adoption of re Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816 (Kelsey), a 
unanimous opinion by the same justice who has authored today’s majority 
opinion, this court held that when a biological father demonstrates “a full 
commitment to his parental responsibilities” (id. at p. 849), the due process clause 
of the federal Constitution bars the state from terminating his parental rights “on 
 
7
nothing more than a showing of a child’s best interest” (ibid.), the test used by the 
juvenile court in this case. 
The majority cites two grounds for rejecting Heriberto’s due process claim.  
Neither is persuasive. 
First, the majority cursorily asserts that the juvenile court did not terminate 
biological father Heriberto’s parental rights when it resolved paternity in favor of 
Paul.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.)  To the contrary!  A court’s paternity decision is 
“determinative for all purposes” except in criminal prosecutions for failure to 
provide child support.  (§ 7636.)  Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 
Cal.App.4th 586, 596, on which the majority relies, does not hold otherwise; it 
says nothing about a single parental right that a man retains after a court has 
resolved the question of paternity against him.   
Second, the majority insists that Heriberto is not entitled to the due process 
protection articulated in Kelsey, supra, 1 Cal.4th 816, because the record does not 
show that he took any “legal steps to formalize his relationship to the child.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  As I explain below, this analysis is faulty.   
Although the majority is right that Heriberto presented no evidence that he 
had tried to “formalize his relationship” with Jesusa, his biological daughter, that 
is only because the juvenile court denied him the opportunity to do so.  Heriberto’s 
lawyer asked the court to continue the paternity hearing so Heriberto could be 
present and testify about the “formal steps” he had taken to identify Jesusa as his 
daughter to “government agencies.”  Responding that such actions by Heriberto 
would have no bearing on the outcome of the paternity hearing, the court went 
ahead with the hearing.  Because the trial court prevented Heriberto from 
testifying that he took such steps, he cannot be faulted for failing to present 
evidence that he did so. 
 
8
Moreover, even if Heriberto had taken no “legal steps to formalize his 
relationship” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 23) with Jesusa, there is nothing in Kelsey to 
suggest that he forfeited his due process rights because of such inaction.  What 
Kelsey does say is this:  “If an unwed father promptly comes forward and 
demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities – emotional, 
financial, and otherwise – his federal constitutional right to due process prohibits 
the termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a 
parent.”  (Kelsey, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 849.)  Here, Heriberto publicly 
acknowledged Jesusa as his child; he took her into his home and raised her for 
almost two years; there is no evidence that he did not treat her in a loving manner. 
Heriberto’s rape of Jesusa’s mother is powerful evidence of his unfitness as 
a parent.  It was, therefore, entirely appropriate for the county agency to seek to 
remove Jesusa from his custody and to have her made a dependent of the juvenile 
court.  But the juvenile court did not consider the rape when making its paternity 
determination.  Nor did it base that determination on a finding that Heriberto was 
an unfit parent.  Rather, the court decided that question based on Jesusa’s best 
interests, a standard that violates our holding in Kelsey, supra, 1 Cal.4th 816.  
There, as I noted above, we held that a court cannot terminate a biological father’s 
parental rights absent a showing of the father’s unfitness as a parent. 
III 
Did the incarcerated Heriberto have a right to be transported to the paternity 
hearing?  Yes, he did. 
In “any proceeding brought under Section 300 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code, where the proceeding seeks to adjudicate the child of a prisoner 
a dependent child of the court . . . the superior court . . . shall order notice of any 
court proceeding regarding the proceeding transmitted to the prisoner.”  (Pen. 
Code, § 2625, subd. (b), italics added.)  If the court receives “a statement from the 
 
9
prisoner or his or her attorney indicating the prisoner’s desire to be present during 
the court’s proceedings, the court shall issue an order . . . for the prisoner’s 
production before the court.”  (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. (d).)  Also, “no petition to 
adjudge the child of a prisoner a dependent child of the court . . . may be 
adjudicated without the physical presence of the prisoner or the prisoner’s 
attorney, unless the court has before it a knowing waiver of the right of physical 
presence signed by the prisoner or an affidavit [from the institution where the 
prisoner is incarcerated] stating that the prisoner has . . . indicated an intent not to 
appear . . . .”  (Ibid.) 
Here, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 
petitioned the juvenile court to declare Heriberto’s biological daughter Jesusa a 
dependent child of the court.  The paternity hearing was a crucial part of the 
dependency proceedings, and Heriberto told the court that he wanted to be present 
at the hearing.  By holding the hearing in Heriberto’s absence, the court violated 
Penal Code section 2625, an error that the majority upholds. 
According to the majority, Penal Code section 2625 entitles a prisoner to be 
present only when the juvenile court decides the issues of jurisdiction and 
disposition, but not when it decides other matters that are part of the dependency 
proceedings, such as the paternity dispute here.  Not so.  Subdivision (b) of section 
2625 says that a prisoner must be notified of “any court proceeding regarding the 
[dependency] proceeding” (italics added); and subdivision (d) of the same section 
says that when, as here, the prisoner asks to attend any such proceeding, the court 
must order the prisoner’s transportation. 
Insisting that Heriberto did not have that right, the majority asserts that 
“section 2625 requires a court to order a prisoner-parent’s temporary removal and 
production before the court only ‘where the proceeding seeks . . . to adjudicate the 
child of a prisoner a dependent child.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)  This 
 
10
adjudication was not made, the majority asserts, at the paternity hearing in this 
case.  But the paternity hearing here was a crucial part of the entire dependency 
proceeding, a proceeding that did “seek[] to adjudicate the child of a prisoner a 
dependent child.”  (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. (b).)  As a result, Heriberto had a 
statutory right to be present. 
IV 
As explained above, the juvenile court erred when it ruled that Heriberto, 
Jesusa’s undisputed biological father, had no right to be personally present at the 
paternity hearing, and when it decided at that hearing that Paul, who was married 
to Jesusa’s mother when Jesusa was born, rather than Heriberto, was Jesusa’s legal 
father.  The court’s erroneous paternity determination also had the effect of 
wrongly denying Heriberto his right to appear, either in person or through counsel, 
at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings that immediately followed the 
paternity determination:  Ruling that Heriberto was not Jesusa’s legal father, the 
court stated he was “not even entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard” at 
those proceedings.  I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and 
remand the matter to that court, with directions to reverse the juvenile court’s 
judgment in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
I CONCUR: 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
Only 10 years ago, in a nearly unanimous decision construing the same 
enactment at issue here—California’s Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) (Fam. Code, 
§ 7600 et seq.)1—we held that where biological parentage is established, courts 
faced with competing claims should not “decide parentage based on the best 
interests of the child.”  (Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 Cal.4th 84, 93, fn. 10 
(Johnson).)  We also cautioned that, under these circumstances, basing parentage 
decisions on a child’s best interests “raises the repugnant specter of governmental 
interference in matters implicating our most fundamental notions of privacy, and 
confuses concepts of parentage and custody.”  (Ibid.)  Today, a majority of this 
court reverses course and makes the very approach we rejected 10 years ago the 
rule in California.   
I dissent from the majority’s decision to abandon our prior construction of 
the UPA.  No statute compels the majority’s conclusion.  On the contrary, the 
majority’s conclusion is inconsistent with California’s statutory scheme, which 
requires courts to determine paternity in accordance with biological fact even 
where a man enjoys a so-called conclusive presumption of paternity.  It is also 
inconsistent with compelling legislative history that clearly shows our 
Legislature’s intent to have parentage determined by biology where possible.  
Through the statutory scheme and its legislative history, the Legislature has 
                                                 
1  
Except as otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the 
California Family Code.  
 
2 
directed us to determine parentage in this case—as opposed to custody—in 
accordance with what everyone concedes is the biological truth:  that Heriberto C. 
is the father of Jesusa V.  Finally, the majority’s conclusion raises serious 
constitutional questions regarding the rights of biological fathers.  For all of these 
reasons, I dissent from the majority’s holding that Heriberto’s status as a presumed 
father and his unquestioned biological paternity do not necessarily rebut or 
outweigh the presumption under section 7611 that Paul B. is Jesusa’s “natural 
father,” and that the determination of paternity depends instead on a trial court’s 
subjective and discretionary assessment of the child’s best interests. 
I also dissent from the majority’s conclusion that when the juvenile court 
determined paternity in Heriberto’s absence, it did not violate Heriberto’s statutory 
right under Penal Code section 2625 to be personally present.  The majority’s 
cramped interpretation of this provision is inconsistent with the statute’s plain 
language. 
On the particular facts of this case, the result of the majority’s conclusion is 
unobjectionable:  Jesusa will remain in Paul’s care and Heriberto will have no 
legal access to her.  However, as we have held, questions of parentage are legally 
separate from questions of custody.  (Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 93, fn. 10.)   
Concerns that Heriberto is not an appropriate father for Jesusa can, and should, be 
addressed through our laws on custody and termination of parental rights, not 
through an initial paternity determination.  Applying those laws, my construction 
will ultimately produce the same result in this case without distorting the statutes 
governing paternity determinations and rendering them unconstitutional. 
Moreover, the majority’s rule applies not just in this case, but in all cases 
involving competing paternity claims of men who qualify under section 7611 as 
presumed “natural father[s]” of a child.  Given the prevalence in today’s world of 
fractured families and the relative ease of qualifying as a presumed “natural 
 
3 
father”—especially under the majority’s analysis in this case—thousands of 
biological fathers in California may now be at risk that, although they have a 
loving, healthy, and well-developed relationship with their children, some court 
may terminate their parental rights based on the conclusion that another man who 
qualifies as a presumed father would be a better father.  Thus, the majority’s 
conclusion has serious implications extending well beyond this case; it permits 
judges making paternity decisions to ignore biological fact because they believe 
someone else would make a better father, and it permits them to do so in the 
biological father’s absence if the biological father is a prisoner.  Because these 
results are not authorized by statute and were not intended by the Legislature, I 
dissent. 
I.  HERIBERTO’S BIOLOGICAL PATERNITY CONTROLS. 
As the majority explains, this case involves a clash of competing 
presumptions under section 7611 that a particular man is Jesusa’s “natural father.”  
The juvenile court found that, in addition to being Jesusa’s “biological father,”  
Heriberto qualified as a presumed father because he “holds himself out as the 
father and has received [Jesusa] into his home.”  The latter finding qualified 
Heriberto for the presumption under subdivision (d) of section 7611, which applies 
where a man “receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as 
his natural child.”  The juvenile court found that Paul qualified as a presumed 
father because he “was married to [Jesusa’s mother] at the time [Jesusa] was 
conceived and born,” even though Jesusa’s mother “was living with” Heriberto 
when Jesusa “was conceived and apparently when [she] was born.”  These 
findings qualified Paul for the presumption under subdivision (a) of section 7611, 
 
4 
which applies where a child is born “during the marriage” of a man “and the 
child’s natural mother.”2   
The UPA provides that the presumptions for which Heriberto and Paul 
qualified are “rebuttable presumption[s]” that “may be rebutted in an appropriate 
action only by clear and convincing evidence.”  (§ 7612, subd. (a).)  The UPA also 
provides that “[i]f two or more presumptions arise under Section 7611 which 
conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the 
weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”  (§ 7612, subd. (b).)  These 
provisions give rise to two separate questions here:  (1) whether Heriberto’s 
unquestioned biological paternity constitutes clear and convincing evidence that 
necessarily rebuts the presumption that Paul is Jesusa’s “natural father” (§ 7611); 
and (2) if Heriberto’s biological paternity does not necessarily rebut Paul’s 
                                                 
2  
The majority states that Paul also qualified for the presumption under 
subdivision (d) of section 7611.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1, 11.)  However, the 
record shows that the juvenile court based its finding regarding Paul only on 
subdivision (a) of section 7611, and that no one argued in the juvenile court that he 
qualified for the presumption under section 7611, subdivision (d).  In this regard, 
citing section 7611, subdivision (a), the Court of Appeal stated that Paul “qualifies 
as a presumed father because he and Jesusa’s mother were married to each other at 
the time of Jesusa’s birth.”  Nor does the record contain sufficient evidence to 
support the majority’s independent finding that Paul met the requirements of 
section 7611, subdivision (d), specifically, that he “openly [held] out [Jesusa] as 
his natural child.”  (Italics added.)  The record indicates that Paul has never 
claimed to be Jesusa’s natural father.  (See Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 
Cal.4th 1043, 1051 [presumption under § 7611, subd. (d) applies only if man 
“openly and publicly admit[s] paternity”]; In re Marriage of Moschetta (1994) 25 
Cal.App.4th 1218, 1226 [presumption under § 7611, subd. (d), found inapplicable 
because woman “never held [child] out as her ‘natural’ child” and “[t]here never 
was any doubt that [woman] ha[d] no biological, natural or genetic connection 
with” child].)  The majority notes that Jesusa’s mother declared in writing that 
Paul had held himself out as Jesusa’s father.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.)  However, 
this hearsay document is contrary to all of the other evidence in the case and, 
according to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 
(DCFS), was not “given any legal weight” in the juvenile court.  My disagreement 
with the majority on this point does not affect my analysis or conclusion. 
 
5 
presumption, whether it nevertheless requires a finding that, “on the facts” of this 
case (§ 7612, subd. (b)), the presumption that Heriberto is Jesusa’s “natural father” 
(§ 7611) is “founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.”  
(§ 7612, subd. (b).)   
In answering these questions, we must construe the statutes not “in 
isolation,” but “ ‘with reference to the entire scheme of law of which [they are] 
part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.’  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 899 (Pieters).)  Moreover, if the statutory 
language permits, then we must adopt a construction that does not render the 
statutes “unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful 
constitutional questions.”  (Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828 
(Miller).)  Applying these principles, I conclude that Heriberto’s undisputed 
biological paternity is controlling in this case. 
A.  The Statutory Scheme and Legislative Intent. 
The relevant statutes and legislative history, most of which the majority 
disregards, clearly demonstrate the Legislature’s intent to make established 
biological paternity determinative as between competing presumed fathers.  Under 
California’s Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (§ 7550 et seq.), 
“[i]n a civil action or proceeding in which paternity is a relevant fact, the court 
may upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any 
person who is involved, and shall upon motion of any party to the action or 
proceeding made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, order the 
mother, child, and alleged father to submit to genetic tests.”  (§ 7551.)  “If the 
court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence 
based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of the child, the 
question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly.”  (§ 7554, subd. (a), italics 
 
6 
added.)  “[I]f the court finds that the paternity index, as calculated by the 
[qualified] experts . . . , is 100 or greater,” then “[t]here is a rebuttable 
presumption . . . of paternity,” which “affect[s] the burden of proof” and “may be 
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.”  (§ 7555, subd. (a).) 
The implications of these provisions for the case now before us are 
unmistakable.  Given the undisputed fact that Heriberto is Jesusa’s biological 
father, genetic tests done pursuant to section 7551 would surely have shown that 
Paul “is not the father of” Jesusa (§ 7554, subd. (a)) and that Heriberto is Jesusa’s 
father.  Based on such results, section 7554, subdivision (a) would have required 
that “the question of [Paul’s] paternity . . . be resolved accordingly” (italics 
added), that is, with a judicial determination that he is not Jesusa’s father.  Such a 
judicial determination would necessarily and conclusively have rebutted the 
presumption under section 7611 that Paul is Jesusa’s “natural father.”3  At that 
point, only Heriberto would have still been a presumed father under section 7611.  
Moreover, based on the test results, Heriberto would also have enjoyed “a 
rebuttable presumption . . . of paternity” under section 7555, subdivision (a), and 
there is no evidence in the record to rebut this presumption.   
The paternity determination should be no different in this case simply 
because testing was not actually performed.  At the very first hearing, Jesusa’s 
mother stated that Heriberto is the biological father, and no one has ever 
contended otherwise.  The juvenile court expressly “made a finding that 
[Heriberto] is the biological father.”  Where, as here, the parties all agree as to 
who the biological father is, we should not insist that they go through pointless 
and invasive test procedures that would involve considerable expense and would 
                                                 
3  
The majority concedes that similar language in section 7541, subdivision 
(a), establishes that a presumption “is rebutted by evidence of biological 
fatherhood.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 26-27.)     
 
7 
significantly delay resolution of dependency actions.  As the majority notes, such 
delays would be contrary to the Legislature’s “goal” that dependency actions “be 
resolved expeditiously.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 43; see In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 368, 384 [noting state’s “interest” in resolving child’s status without 
unnecessary delay]; Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 
1151 [“intent of the Legislature, especially with regard to young children, is that 
the dependency process proceed with deliberate speed and without undue delay”].)  
Moreover, where, as here, one of the presumed fathers is also the biological father, 
the legislative policy decision these statutes reflect—that biological paternity is 
determinative—should be of controlling weight in determining which presumption 
is, “on the facts . . . founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic 
. . . .”4  (§ 7612, subd. (b).) 
                                                 
4  
The majority asserts that these provisions do not apply here because no 
testing was requested or performed and “case law has strictly construed these 
testing requirements.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 30-31.)  However, the case the 
majority cites for the latter proposition is completely inapposite; it declined to 
consider test results to rebut the conclusive presumption under section 7540 
because the person offering the results had no statutory standing to challenge that 
presumption.  (Rodney F. v. Karen M. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 233, 238-240.)  In 
any event, even were the majority correct, as I explain, the legislative policy 
reflected by these statutes and the legislative history support my conclusion that 
Heriberto’s biological paternity is determinative despite the absence of testing.  
Given our duty to construe section 7612 in the context of the entire statutory 
scheme, rather than in isolation, the purported technical inapplicability of the 
testing provisions does not, as the majority asserts, justify its refusal “to 
definitively construe the scheme.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 32.)  Finally, the 
majority fails to explain why it is “unwise” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 31) to apply this 
legislative policy given the trial court’s express and uncontested finding that 
Heriberto is Jesusa’s biological father.  Indeed, the majority’s assertion in this 
regard is inconsistent with its own conclusion that the juvenile court here was 
“obliged” to consider Heriberto’s biological paternity in weighing competing 
presumptions under section 7611.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  If, as the majority 
holds, Heriberto’s biological paternity was sufficiently established to require its 
consideration, then it should be considered as the Legislature has directed. 
 
8 
Although the UPA does not expressly provide that one presumed father’s 
established biological paternity necessarily rebuts the presumption of another 
presumed father under subdivision (a) of section 7611, that conclusion is evident 
from the statutory framework as a whole.  In addition to defining specific 
presumptions in subdivisions (a) through (d), section 7611 of the UPA 
incorporates by reference the presumptions set forth in sections 7540 and 7576.  
Section 7540 establishes a presumption that “the child of a wife cohabiting with 
her husband . . . is . . . a child of the marriage.”  Although the presumption 
purports to be “conclusive[]” (§ 7540), it is not; “[n]otwithstanding” the 
presumption, “if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed 
by the evidence, based on blood tests performed pursuant to [section 7551], are 
that the husband is not the father of the child, the question of paternity of the 
husband shall be resolved accordingly.”  (§ 7541, subd. (a), italics added.)  Parties 
with standing to request such testing must do so within “two years from the child’s 
date of birth.”  (§ 7541, subds. (b), (c).)  Section 7576, subdivision (a), establishes 
a “presumption,” with “the same force and effect as the presumption under Section 
7540,” that the child of a man and woman executing a voluntary declaration of 
paternity before January 1, 1997, “is . . . the man’s child.”  Although this 
presumption also purports to be “conclusive[]” (§ 7576, subd. (a)), it is not; “any 
person” may rebut it “by requesting blood or genetic tests pursuant to” section 
7551 within three years from the date of the declaration’s execution.  (§ 7576, 
subd. (d).)  Thus, the Legislature has expressly provided that, as to young children, 
biological proof necessarily rebuts even the “conclusive[]” presumptions under 
sections 7540 and section 7576, subdivision (a).  Logically, if the Legislature 
provided that proof of biological paternity necessarily rebuts these so-called 
conclusive presumptions, both of which are UPA presumptions, then surely the 
 
9 
Legislature intended that such proof would rebut the nonconclusive UPA 
presumption under section 7611, subdivision (a).5   
These same provisions alternatively show that, in addition to rebutting 
paternity presumptions, biological paternity should be given controlling weight in 
determining which unrebutted presumption is, “on the facts . . . founded on the 
weightier considerations of policy and logic . . . .”  (§ 7612, subd. (b).)  Section 
7576, subdivision (e), provides that if the presumption based on a voluntary 
paternity declaration is not rebutted, it “override[s] all statutory presumptions of 
paternity except a presumption arising under Section 7540 or [Section] 7555.”  
(Italics added.)  By implication, the hierarchy of presumptions established by this 
section affirmatively demonstrates the Legislature’s intent that the presumption 
under section 7555 based on biological paternity would outweigh the 
presumptions under subdivisions (a) through (e) of section 7611.  Logically, if the 
presumption based on a voluntary declaration necessarily overrides the 7611 
presumptions (except the conclusive presumption under section 7540), but does 
not necessarily override section 7555’s biologically-based presumption, then 
section 7555’s biologically-based presumption must also necessarily override 
those section 7611 presumptions.  Thus, the Legislature has expressed its policy 
decision that the presumption of a presumed father who is also the biological 
father is, “on the facts . . . founded on the weightier considerations of policy and 
logic . . . .”6  (§ 7612, subd. (b).) 
                                                 
5  
The same analysis establishes that proof of biological paternity necessarily 
rebuts the other nonconclusive presumptions under section 7611, including the 
presumption under subdivision (d) of that section. 
6  
These provisions show one additional thing:  that the court in In re Raphael 
P. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 716, 734, erred in stating that section 7551 “do[es] not 
authorize courts to order genetic testing of a man who meets the statutory test for 
presumed fatherhood.”  To support its statement, the court reasoned that section 
7611 refers to testing of an “alleged father,” not a “presumed father[].”  (In re 
 
10 
The legislative history of these provisions clearly supports my conclusion.  
The legislative command that paternity questions “shall be resolved” in 
accordance with tests conclusively showing that “the alleged father is not the 
father of the child” (§ 7554, subd. (a)) first appeared in 1953 as part of the Code of 
Civil Procedure (Stats. 1953, ch. 1426, § 1, p. 3013).  It derives from the 
identically-worded section 4 of the 1952 Uniform Act on Blood Tests to 
Determine Paternity (1952 Act).  In a prefatory note, the drafters of the 1952 Act 
explained that where tests conclusively show that a man is not a child’s biological 
father, “it seems intolerable for a court to permit an opposite result to be reached 
. . . .  For a court to permit the establishment of paternity in cases where it is 
scientifically impossible to arrive at that result would seem to be a great travesty 
on justice.”  (9 West’s U. Laws Ann. (1957) Miscellaneous Acts, 1952 Act, comrs. 
note No. 1, p. 103.)  Thus, 50 years ago, our Legislature directed courts to give 
controlling weight to evidence conclusively disproving the biological paternity of 
a particular man.  My conclusion that Heriberto’s undisputed biological paternity 
                                                                                                                                                 
Raphael P., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 734.)  However, as explained above, 
sections 7541 and 7576 provide that testing of a presumed father done “pursuant 
to” section 7551 rebuts their respective presumptions if it shows that the presumed 
father is not the biological father.  (§§ 7541, subd. (a); 7576, subd. (d).)  
Accordingly, the term “alleged father” in section 7551 must include presumed 
fathers; otherwise, the testing of presumed fathers to which sections 7541 and 
7576 refer could not be performed “pursuant to” section 7551.  (§§ 7541, subd. 
(a), 7576, subd. (d); see also Kusior v. Silver (1960) 54 Cal.2d 603, 620 (Kusior) 
[“rebuttable presumptions” of presumed fathers were “conclusively rebutted” by 
“tests taken under” identical language in predecessor of § 7551 (Code Civ. Proc., 
former § 1980.3)].)  Moreover, it is unlikely the Legislature would authorize 
testing of presumed fathers who qualify for the so-called conclusive presumptions, 
but not of presumed fathers who qualify only for a nonconclusive presumption.   
 
In any event, when Paul and Heriberto first appeared in this action and 
alleged that they qualified for a paternity presumption, they were merely “alleged 
father[s].”  (§ 7551.)  They remained so at least until they actually established their 
claim with proof.  Thus, the juvenile court had discretion to order, and the parties 
had a right to demand, testing pursuant to section 7551. 
 
11 
necessarily rebuts Paul’s presumption is consistent with the Legislature’s 
command.  The majority holding’s that Heriberto’s biological paternity is simply a 
“factor[]” that a juvenile court is “obliged” to consider in weighing the competing 
presumptions under section 7611 (maj. opn., ante, at p. 17) overrides that 
command. 
The majority’s conclusion also defeats the Legislature’s intent in 
establishing the “rebuttable presumption . . . of paternity” based on biology that is 
currently found in section 7555, subdivision (a).  In 1986, when it first enacted this 
presumption, the Legislature expressly declared in an uncodified section of the 
enacting legislation:  “It is the intent of the Legislature to standardize the process 
by which paternity is established in order to achieve a greater degree of equity and 
consistency in paternity determinations.  The Legislature finds that the science of 
genetic testing has advanced to the degree that paternity determinations resulting 
from such testing are so reliable that the burden of proof can be shifted to the 
putative father.”  (Stats. 1986, ch. 629, § 1, pp. 2136-2137 [enacting Evid. Code, 
former § 895.5].)  A legislative analysis explained that the section was necessary 
because, “ ‘under existing law, juries, regardless of the biological facts, tend to 
arrive at their decisions because of very subjective factors such as the appearance 
of the natural mother, and the ability of the expert witnesses to explain complex 
matters.  The results of trials on these issues do not always correspond to the 
biological realities, regardless of how overwhelming such evidence may be.  In 
fact, under [one appellate decision], the court is free to ignore blood test evidence.  
This bill should standardize paternity determinations and insure that blood test 
findings are given appropriate consideration.’ ”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis 
of Assem. Bill No. 3326 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) May 28, 1986, pp. 2-3.)  My 
conclusion that Heriberto’s conceded biological paternity necessarily rebuts Paul’s 
presumption is consistent with and implements the Legislature’s stated desire to 
 
12 
“standardize paternity determinations and insure that” such determinations 
“correspond to the biological realities.”  (Id. at p. 3.)  The majority’s conclusion 
that a court need only consider biological paternity as one of several “relevant 
factors” in weighing competing presumptions (maj. opn., ante, at p. 18) is directly 
contrary to and defeats the Legislature’s clearly stated intent. 
In rejecting my conclusion, the majority misstates the legislative history.  
The Legislature’s expressly declared “purpose” in enacting section 7555 was not, 
as the majority states, to standardize “the weight accorded to genetic tests in 
determining biological paternity” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 32), but was to standardize 
“the process by which paternity is established in order to achieve a greater degree 
of equity and consistency in paternity determinations.”  (Stats. 1986, ch. 629, § 1, 
pp. 2136-2137, italics added.)  “The problem” the statute addressed was not, as the 
majority asserts, that jurors were “relying on less probative markers of biological 
paternity” (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 32-33), but that they were making decisions 
“regardless of the biological facts” and “regardless of how overwhelming” 
evidence of “the biological realities . . . may be.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3326 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) May 28, 1986, pp. 2-3.)  
Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, this legislative history says a great deal 
about what a court should do “when faced with a conflict between” a presumption 
under section 7555 based on biology and a presumption under section 7611 that is 
not based on biology (maj. opn., ante, at p. 33); it tells us that, in order to 
implement the Legislature’s expressly stated intent “to standardize the process by 
which paternity is established” and “to achieve a greater degree of equity and 
consistency in paternity determinations” (Stats. 1986, ch. 629, § 1, pp. 2136-
2137), the presumption under section 7555 controls.7 
                                                 
7  
Moreover, the statutes themselves tell courts what to do when faced with 
such a situation.  As explained above, section 7554, subdivision (a), directs that 
 
13 
This conclusion is consistent with a critical fact that the majority’s analysis 
ignores:  whereas the section 7611 presumptions, none of which is based on 
biology, are all subject to the UPA weighing process under section 7612, the 
presumption based on biology under section 7555 is expressly not subject to that 
weighing process.  By its terms, section 7612 requires the weighing of conflicting 
presumptions that “arise under Section 7611.”  As explained above, the 
presumptions that arise under section 7611 are those specified in subdivisions (a) 
through (e) of that section and those incorporated by reference from “Chapter 1 
(commencing with Section 7540) and Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) 
of Part 2.”  All of these presumptions are based on factors other than biology:  
marriage (§§ 7540, 7611, subd. (a)), attempted marriage (§ 7611, subds. (b), (c)), a 
voluntary declaration of paternity (§§ 7576, 7611, subd. (e)), or conduct towards 
the child (§ 7611, subd. (d)).  The presumption based on biology under section 
                                                                                                                                                 
the paternity of a man who qualifies for a presumption under section 7611 “shall 
be resolved according[]” to tests showing that he “is not the father.”  Where a 
presumed father under section 7611 also qualifies for a presumption under section 
7555, testing will show that another presumed father under section 7611 “is not 
the father,” and his “paternity” must be determined “accordingly.”  (§ 7554, subd. 
(a).)  Moreover, as I have explained, the hierarchy of presumptions stated in 
section 7576, subdivision (e), establishes that a presumption under section 7555 
based on biological paternity outweighs the presumptions set forth in subdivisions 
(a) through (e) of section 7611. 
 
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, Steven W. v. Matthew S. (1995) 33 
Cal.App.4th 1108 (Steven W.) did not “reject[]” my approach.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 33.)  There, the only issue the court addressed was whether the “presumed 
father status” of a man who qualifies for a presumption under two subdivisions of 
section 7611 necessarily “controls” over the “presumed father status” of a man 
who qualifies for a presumption under only subdivision (a)(4) of section 7611.  
(Steven W., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1116.)  Although “not[ing]” as an aside in 
a footnote that one of the men “was also entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 
paternity [under section 7555] on the basis of the blood test evidence” (id. at p. 
1116, fn. 4), the court did not consider the effect of that presumption; the parties 
had not raised the issue on appeal or, apparently, in the trial court.   
 
14 
7555 appears in chapter 2 of part 2, not in chapter 1 or chapter 3.  Because the 
presumption under section 7555 based on biology does not “arise under Section 
7611,” it is not subject to weighing under section 7612, subdivision (b); it “may be 
rebutted” only “by a preponderance of the evidence” disproving the biological 
facts (§ 7555) and it necessarily rebuts the presumptions that arise under 
subdivisions (a) through (d) of section 7611.  Moreover, the Legislature’s 
exclusion of the presumption based on biology was clearly intentional, not simply 
an oversight.  Until 1994, the only presumption incorporated by reference into the 
UPA was the presumption in chapter 1 of part 2 based on marriage.  (§ 7540; see 
Stats. 1993, ch. 219, § 176, p. 1670.)  In 1994, the Legislature amended section 
7611 to incorporate the presumption in chapter 3 of part 2 based on a voluntary 
declaration of paternity.  (§ 7576; see Stats. 1994, ch. 1269, § 53, p. 8058.)  
Clearly, the Legislature made a conscious decision to exclude the presumption in 
chapter 2 based on biology (§ 7554) from the UPA’s balancing process under 
section 7612.  This choice reflects the Legislature’s intent that biological paternity 
would control paternity determinations, not that it would be, as the majority 
asserts, simply a factor that a court must weigh. 
Nor does the majority explain how, under its analysis, a juvenile court that 
is “obliged” to consider biological paternity even can take this “factor[]” into 
account (maj. opn., ante, at p. 19) in cases where biological paternity is not 
admitted.  Under the majority’s view, how does the juvenile court determine 
biological paternity where it is not admitted?  If through genetic tests performed 
pursuant to section 7551, then, as explained above, section 7554 expressly tells us 
the effect of results showing that the tested man “is not the father of the child”; we 
must “resolve[]” “the question of [his] paternity . . . accordingly.”  If not through 
such testing, then how?   The majority does not tell us. 
 
15 
Also supporting my conclusion is the evolution and legislative history of 
the “conclusive[]” presumption under section 7540 that “the child of a wife 
cohabiting with her husband . . . is . . . a child of the marriage.”  This presumption 
originally appeared as Evidence Code former section 621.  In 1980, when the 
Legislature first made the presumption rebuttable with tests showing that “the 
husband is not the father of the child,” only “the husband” was given standing to 
move for testing and only within “two years from the date of birth of the child.”  
(Stats. 1980, ch. 1310, § 1, p. 4433 [amending Evid. Code, former § 621, now 
Fam. Code, § 7541, subd. (b)].)  In 1981, the Legislature extended standing to “the 
mother of the child,” subject to the same time limit and only “if the child’s 
biological father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity of 
the child.”  (Stats. 1981, ch. 1180, § 1, p. 4761 [amending Evid. Code, former 
§ 621, now Fam. Code, § 7541, subd. (c)].)  In 1990, the Legislature extended 
standing to a “presumed father” under section 7611 and to “the child,” subject to 
the same time limit and only “for purposes of establishing [the presumed father’s] 
paternity.”  (Stats. 1990, ch. 543, § 2, p. 2855 [amending Evid. Code, former 
§ 621, now Fam. Code, § 7541, subd. (b)].)   
The legislative history regarding these amendments is revealing.  Regarding 
the 1980 legislation that first made the conclusive presumption rebuttable by the 
husband, one legislative analysis explained:  “Under the Uniform Parentage Act 
[citation], a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he comes within 
the purview of Evidence Code [former] Section 621 or meets any of the other 
conditions specified in Civil Code [former] Section 7004 [now, Family Code 
section 7611].  Except for [Evidence Code former] Section 621, all these 
presumptions are rebuttable and may be met by clear and convincing evidence.”  
(Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1981 (1979-1980 Reg. 
Sess.) June 11, 1980, p. 2.)  Thus, “[i]f the conclusive presumption is . . . 
 
16 
eliminated by proof that the parties did not live together as husband and wife, the 
disputable presumption [that arises under the UPA] can then be met by any kind of 
competent evidence.”  (Id. at p. 3.)  The analysis also explained that “an exception 
to the conclusive presumption . . . is needed to prevent in some cases an injustice 
. . . .”  (Id. at p. 2.)  Similar statements appear in the legislative history of the 1981 
amendment that extended standing to mothers if the biological father 
acknowledges paternity by affidavit.  After stating that “all” of the presumptions 
“[u]nder the Uniform Parentage Act . . . are rebuttable” except the conclusive 
presumption under Evidence Code former section 621 (ibid.), one analysis 
explained that the 1981 amendment “would give the child’s mother equal standing 
with the husband” to request testing and to “prevent the [husband’s] conclusive 
presumption of paternity from operating especially where the biological father 
wishes to establish paternity . . . .”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 207 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 11, 1981, p. 2, italics added.) 
These statements demonstrate several important things.  First, they show 
the Legislature’s express recognition that the conclusive presumption now found 
in section 7540 is a UPA presumption and the Legislature’s intent to make that 
UPA presumption necessarily rebutted by proof that the presumed father is not the 
biological father; the amended statute commands that “the question of paternity of 
the husband shall be resolved accordingly,” that is, in accordance with the proof 
that “the husband is not the father of the child.”  (§ 7541, subd. (a), italics added.)  
Second, they demonstrate that, in making the conclusive presumption rebuttable 
by the husband, the Legislature intended to make that presumption more like the 
other presumptions under the UPA, all of which were already rebuttable.  Thus, if 
a husband’s otherwise conclusive UPA presumption of paternity is necessarily 
rebutted by proof he is not the biological father, then the nonconclusive UPA 
presumptions must also be necessarily rebutted by such proof; in establishing the 
 
17 
limited exception to the conclusive presumption, the Legislature did not intend to 
make that presumption more rebuttable than the already rebuttable UPA 
presumptions.  Finally, as especially relevant here, they demonstrate the 
Legislature’s intent that biological paternity would necessarily rebut even an 
otherwise conclusive UPA presumption “where the biological father wishes to 
establish paternity . . . .”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 
207 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 11, 1981, p. 2, italics added.)  That is precisely 
the situation here; Heriberto, the biological father, formally “request[ed] that the 
court enter a judgment of [his] paternity.”8   
The legislative history of the 1990 amendment extending standing to 
presumed fathers is perhaps even more significant.  Regarding the “[n]eed for” 
this change, one legislative analysis explained:  “[T]his measure would rectify 
those situations where unwed biological fathers are foreclosed from establishing 
paternity and precluded from continuing a supportive relationship with a child 
who was born while the mother was married and cohabiting with another man.  
[It] . . . allow[s] a father who has demonstrated an interest in raising and providing 
for his child in a familial relationship the opportunity to establish paternity under 
the above factual circumstances.  [¶]  . . . With more children born out of wedlock, 
to women who may be technically married, but no longer living with their 
husbands, . . . legislation must be adopted which addresses the problems of unwed 
fathers who want to become involved and be responsible for the welfare of their 
children.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2015 (1989-1990 
Reg. Sess.) Mar. 27, 1990, p. 3.)  Another analysis explained that the amendment 
                                                 
8  
Specifically, as contemplated by our statutes and court rules, Heriberto filed 
a form JV-505 stating:  “I believe I am the child’s father and request that the court 
enter a judgment of paternity.”  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (b);  Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 1413(h).)  Thus, the majority errs in stating that Heriberto 
asked only “to be declared the presumed father.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1.) 
 
18 
specifically targeted “those situations wherein a mother, a biological father, and 
child have lived together as a family, and thereupon, the mother departs to return 
to a husband or to live elsewhere and the biological father does not have access to 
the procedures that are otherwise available to a divorced father for determination 
of’ custody or visitation.”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 4, 1990, p. 3.)  The amendment was meant to 
change the fact that, under then-existing law, where a mother’s husband qualified 
for the conclusive presumption under Evidence Code former section 621, a 
biological father who also qualified as “a presumed father [could] be refused 
visitation rights regardless of his established relationship with the child.”  (Assem. 
Com. on Judiciary, Report on Sen. Bill No. 2015 (Apr. 4, 1990) p. 3.)  The 
Legislature passed the amendment despite the contention of opponents that it 
would “seriously erode[]” the “public policy of promoting the integrity of an intact 
family unit, and providing certainty to the relationship of a child in such a family.”  
(Id. at p. 4.)  These statements, and the 1990 amendment itself, demonstrate the 
Legislature’s intent that where a man who is a presumed father under section 7611 
seeks to establish his paternity within a child’s first two years of life, proof of his 
biological paternity conclusively and necessarily rebuts any other man’s UPA 
presumption, even the otherwise conclusive presumption of the mother’s husband.   
The facts here closely match the factual scenario the Legislature 
specifically had in mind when it gave presumed fathers standing to rebut the 
otherwise conclusive UPA presumption of a husband’s paternity under section 
7540.  Jesusa’s mother left Paul, whom she said she “sees . . . as a brother” rather 
than a husband, and moved in with Heriberto three years before the dependency 
proceeding began on April 4, 2001.  She lived with Heriberto when Jesusa was 
conceived and when she was born (May 1999), and the three of them lived 
together until the dependency proceeding began, when Jesusa was less than 23 
 
19 
months old.  Thus, during the relevant events, although Jesusa’s mother was still 
technically married to Paul, she was living with Heriberto.  Moreover, Jesusa’s 
mother reported that Heriberto had “always been very loving and gentle to” 
Jesusa.  Finally, on April 13, 2001, when Heriberto filed a formal request in the 
dependency action for a judgment declaring his paternity, Jesusa was still less than 
two years old.  Thus, this is precisely the type of case where the Legislature 
intended that a UPA presumption—which, by definition, is not based on 
biology—would necessarily be rebutted by proof that another presumed father is 
the biological father. 
 
The majority’s response on this point is erroneous.  Isolating a single 
phrase from the legislative reports—“ ‘the opportunity to establish paternity’ ”—
the majority asserts that “[a] mere opportunity for the unwed biological father to 
establish paternity hardly supports” the conclusion “that biology is necessarily 
determinative.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.)  However, as I have shown, a review 
of the entire legislative history, rather than a single phrase taken out of context, 
demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to make biology determinative where a 
biological father who also is a presumed father under section 7611 seeks to rebut 
another man’s presumption.  Moreover, the majority’s response ignores the fact 
that section 7541, subdivision (a), expressly makes biology determinative, by 
providing that “the question of paternity” of the tested presumed father “shall be 
resolved according[]” to results showing that he “is not the father.”  In this regard, 
and contrary to the majority’s assertion, section 7541 is not at all “similar to” the 
statute the Colorado Supreme Court construed in N.A.H. v. S.L.S. (Colo. 2000) 9 
P.3d 354.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.)  The Colorado statute merely provided 
that a “presumption of legitimacy” that is not based on biology “is overcome” by 
testing showing that the presumed father “is not the parent of the child.”  (N.A.H., 
supra, at pp. 360-361.)  Section 7541, subdivision (a), does not provide that such 
 
20 
testing merely overcomes a presumption; it provides that “paternity . . . shall be 
resolved according[]” to test results showing that the tested presumed father “is 
not the father of the child.” 
 
The majority is incorrect that my construction of these statutes renders part 
of section 7612, subdivision (a), “meaningless.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.)  As 
the majority observes, section 7541 specifies that the section 7540 presumption “is 
rebutted by evidence of biological fatherhood,” and section 7576, subdivision (e), 
specifies that a presumption based on a voluntary paternity declaration “would not 
override a presumption of paternity arising under section 7555, the genetic testing 
provision.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 26-27.)  The majority next correctly observes 
that subdivision (a) of section 7612 provides:  “Except as provided in Chapter 1 
(commencing with Section 7540) and Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) 
of Part 2 . . . , a presumption under Section 7611 is a rebuttable presumption 
affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by 
clear and convincing evidence.”  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.)  However, the 
conclusion the majority reaches based on these provisions is incorrect.  That the 
Legislature “expressly except[ed]” the presumptions under section 7540 and 
section 7576 “from the operation of section 7612, subdivision (a) and [made] 
separate provision for the legal effect of biology in those circumstances” does not, 
as the majority asserts, show the Legislature’s “belie[f] that section 7612, 
subdivision (a) [does] not necessarily accord primacy to biology.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 27.)  Rather, it shows that the Legislature wanted to impose limits with 
respect to these presumptions that do not exist with respect to the other section 
7611 presumptions.  Specifically, as the majority recognizes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 
20, fn. 6), through the “excepting” clause of section 7612, subdivision (a), the 
Legislature imposed time limits for rebutting the presumptions under sections 
7540 and 7576 that do not apply to the other section 7611 presumptions.  (See 
 
21 
§ 7541, subds. (c), (d) [two-year time limit]; § 7576, subd. (d) [three year time 
limit]).  That is, the “excepting” clause takes the section 7540 and 7576 
presumptions out of the general rule that otherwise applies.  Thus, contrary to the 
majority’s assertion, my construction does not render “meaningless” the 
“ ‘excepting’ clause” in subdivision (a) of section 7612.9  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
27.)   
 
On the other hand, the majority’s construction renders meaningless all of 
subdivision (b) of section 7612.  As I have explained, section 7612 gives rise to 
two separate questions:  (1) under subdivision (a), whether a presumed father’s 
presumption is rebutted; and (2) under subdivision (b), where there are competing 
unrebutted presumptions, which one “on the facts is founded on the weightier 
considerations of policy and logic.”  Under the majority’s construction, these 
questions are exactly the same, and a court looks to the exact same factors to 
answer each.  The majority holds that courts must “consider the child’s best 
interest and public policy in determining” under subdivision (a) of section 7612 
“whether [a] presumption is rebutted.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30.)  Similarly, the 
majority holds that a court “ ‘must take the best interests of the child into account 
as part of policy and logic in resolving competing presumptions’ ” under 
subdivision (b) of section 7612.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  Thus, although the 
term “best interests” does not appear in either subdivision (a) or subdivision (b) of 
section 7612, the majority reads that term into both.  In affirming the juvenile 
court’s finding that Paul’s presumption was not rebutted, the majority weighs 
Paul’s “relationship” to Jesusa, her half siblings, and her mother against the fact 
                                                 
9  
The Legislature’s intent to have the general rule apply to the other section 
7611 presumptions also explains why it did not include in section 7612 a provision 
“analogous” to section 7541 or section 7576, and why it did not “reference[] the 
testing provisions at section 7550 et seq. in the opening ‘excepting’ clause to 
section 7612, subdivision (a).”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.)   
 
22 
that Heriberto is Jesusa’s biological father and he lived with her through her 
infancy.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 17.)  Likewise, in affirming the juvenile court’s 
finding that Paul’s presumption is weightier, the majority weighs the exact same 
factors, restated almost verbatim.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  Under the majority’s 
analysis and construction, subdivision (b) of section 7612 is entirely useless; it 
adds nothing that is not already contained in subdivision (a) of the same section.  
Thus, it is the majority’s construction, not mine, that renders part of section 7612 
meaningless.  My construction gives effect to all parts of the statute. 
 
The majority’s construction also produces absurd results.  As noted, the 
“conclusive” presumption under section 7540 is also a section 7611 UPA 
presumption, and the majority concedes that, under section 7541, subdivision (a), 
this “conclusive presumption . . . is rebutted by evidence of biological 
fatherhood.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 26-27.)  However, under the majority’s view, 
the nonconclusive presumptions under section 7611 are not necessarily rebutted by 
evidence of biological fatherhood.  Thus, according to the majority, evidence of 
biological fatherhood necessarily rebuts the “conclusive[]” UPA presumption of a 
husband who is cohabiting with his wife at the time of conception (§ 7540), but 
not the nonconclusive UPA presumption of a husband who is not cohabiting with 
his wife (§ 7611, subd. (a)), or of a man who marries the mother after the child’s 
birth (§ 7611, subd. (c)), or of a man who incorrectly believed he had validly 
married the mother (§ 7611, subd. (b)).  Moreover, test results showing that a 
husband is “not the father” does not merely rebut the presumption under section 
7540, it requires that the husband’s “paternity be resolved accordingly,” that is, 
with a judgment that he is not the father.  (§ 7541, subd. (a).)  Such a judgment 
necessarily precludes the husband from establishing his paternity claim under 
some other provision.  Thus, under the majority’s view, a husband is actually 
better off if he is not cohabiting with his wife at the time of conception and 
 
23 
therefore does not qualify for the “conclusive” presumption under section 7540.  
Under these circumstances, he would qualify for only a nonconclusive 
presumption under section 7611 and, because section 7541 does not apply, he 
could still be declared the father despite another presumed father’s established 
biological paternity.  It is highly doubtful that the Legislature intended these 
absurd results.10 
 
The majority’s attempt to explain these results simply demonstrates the 
absurdity of its construction.  The majority asserts that it is incorrect to 
“compar[e]” the “presumption in section 7540” to the other section 7611 
presumptions because the former, “[u]nlike” the latter, is “not really a presumption 
at all but is instead ‘a rule of substantive law.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.)  
However, the characterization of the section 7540 presumption as a “substantive 
rule of law” is ours, not the Legislature’s.  (Kusior, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 619.)  
Section 7540 provides that the child of a wife cohabiting with her husband is 
“presumed” to be the child of the marriage.  Similarly, section 7611 expressly 
provides that a man “is presumed” to be a child’s natural father “if he meets the 
conditions provided in” section 7540 “or in” subdivisions (a) through (e) of 
section 7611.  Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, section 7540, like 
                                                 
10  
The majority’s analysis is also inconsistent with the Legislature’s treatment 
of presumptions raised by voluntary paternity declarations.  By statute, such 
presumptions “override” all of the other section 7611 presumptions except the 
section 7540 presumption.  (§ 7576, subd. (e).)  However, as I have explained, 
presumptions based on voluntary paternity declarations are subject to section 
7554, which, like section 7541, subdivision (a), requires a court to determine the 
“paternity” of a presumed father “according[]” to test results showing that he “is 
not the father.”  (§ 7554.)  Thus, although the Legislature has declared that the 
section 7576 presumption should be stronger than the other section 7611 
presumptions, under the majority’s conclusion, it is weaker. 
 
24 
subdivisions (a) through (e) of section 7611, creates a paternity presumption.11  In 
any event, even if, as the majority asserts, section 7540 alone states a substantive 
rule of law, then the presumption it establishes should be harder to rebut than the 
other section 7611 presumptions, not easier; yet, under the majority’s 
construction, evidence that necessarily rebuts the section 7540 presumption does 
not necessarily rebut the other section 7611 presumptions.  The majority also errs 
in suggesting that the other section 7611 presumptions are unlike the section 7540 
presumption in that they “were ‘ “established to implement some public policy 
other than to facilitate the determination of the particular action in which the 
presumption is applied.” ’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.)  As we have explained, the 
section 7540 presumption and the other section 7611 presumptions all serve the 
same public policy.  (In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56, 65 (Nicholas H.); 
Estate of Cornelious (1984) 35 Cal.3d  461, 465 (Cornelious).)  Finally, the 
majority’s analysis is not aided by its observation that, “unlike the section 7540 
presumption,” the other section 7611 presumptions “may be rebutted ‘only by 
clear and convincing evidence.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.)  The standard of 
proof for rebutting the section 7540 presumption is actually higher; that 
presumption is overcome only if “all the experts” agree that “the husband is not 
the father.”  (§ 7541, subd. (a), italics added.)  Thus, contrary to the majority’s 
suggestion, the difference in the applicable standard of proof again demonstrates 
that the Legislature intended to make the section 7611 presumption harder to rebut 
than the other section 7611 presumptions, and that proof rebutting the section 
                                                 
11  
Moreover, in 1960, when we first characterized the section 7540 
presumption as “a substantive rule of law,” we based that characterization on the 
fact that the presumption was not rebuttable.  (Kusior, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 619.)  
As explained above, the Legislature subsequently made the section 7540 
rebuttable.  
 
25 
7540 presumption therefore necessarily rebuts the other section 7611 
presumptions. 
My conclusion that, under our current statutory scheme, one presumed 
father’s biological paternity necessarily rebuts another man’s presumption is 
consistent with the law as it existed before the Legislature adopted the UPA in 
1975.  In Kusior, we considered the rebuttable presumption under Civil Code 
former sections 194 and 195 in favor a mother’s husband where the child was born 
within 10 months of the dissolution of marriage.   (Kusior, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 
607.)  Blood tests taken “pursuant to” the California Uniform Act on Blood Tests 
to Determine Paternity—specifically, Code of Civil Procedure former section 
1980.3, which was substantively identical to the first sentence of Family Code 
section 7551 (see Stats. 1953, ch. 1426, § 1, p. 3013)—showed that the mother’s 
husband “could not have been the father of the child . . . .”  (Kusior, supra, 54 
Cal.2d at p. 607.)  We held that, in adopting California’s Uniform Act on Blood 
Tests to Determine Paternity, the Legislature made “a legislative determination . . . 
that blood test evidence is conclusive.”  (Kusior, at p. 619.)  We relied for this 
conclusion on Code of Civil Procedure former section 1980.6, which, in language 
identical to Family Code section 7554, provided that “if ‘the conclusions of all the 
experts . . . are that the alleged father is not the father of the child, the question of 
paternity shall be resolved accordingly.’ ”  (Kusior, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 620, fn. 
omitted.)  “[U]nder th[is] language,” we explained, “where the tests so taken 
establish that the mother’s husband could not be the father of the child the 
rebuttable presumptions of paternity are conclusively rebutted.”  (Ibid., italics 
added.)   
Indeed, under California law before the UPA’s passage, evidence other than 
tests—including an admission of biological paternity—showing that a presumed 
father was not the biological father conclusively rebutted a presumption.  In Baker 
 
26 
v. Baker (1859) 13 Cal. 87, 96 (Baker), the evidence showed that a woman had 
admitted to her brother that her husband was not her child’s biological father.  We 
first held that, absent evidence of collusion, the admission was admissible because 
“the public can have no interest in suppressing the truth.”  (Id. at p. 94.)  We then 
held that the woman’s admission “placed” her child’s paternity “upon a stranger 
beyond a doubt” and, thus, necessarily “overc[a]me” the husband’s rebuttable 
presumption.  (Id. at p. 101.)  Here, of course, not only does Jesusa’s mother 
concede Heriberto’s biological paternity, both Heriberto and Paul do so as well.  
Moreover, there is not even a hint of collusion in this case.  Thus, under California 
law before passage of the UPA, Heriberto’s conceded biological paternity would 
have conclusively and necessarily rebutted Paul’s presumption.  (See also 
Anderson v. Anderson (1931) 214 Cal. 414, 417 [because evidence established 
biological paternity by “a stranger . . . beyond question,” husband’s presumption 
“no longer obtains”]; Hughes v. Hughes (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 781, 784-787].) 
Nothing suggests that, in adopting the UPA, the Legislature intended to 
alter the determinative effect of biological paternity under California law in cases 
involving competing paternity claims.  The UPA’s purpose was not to enact 
fundamental changes regarding the role of biology in the law of paternity, but was 
simply to replace the concept of legitimacy with the concept of the parent and 
child relationship and to specify a procedure for establishing that relationship.  
(Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 347 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) 2 Stats. 1975, 
Summary Dig., p. 344; Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89.)  According to one 
legislative analysis, “[a]ll of the presumptions established by [the UPA] 
correspond[ed] to current law.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
347 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) May 8, 1975, pp. 15-16, italics added.)  For example, 
the rebuttable presumption at issue in Kusior, which we held was conclusively 
rebutted by tests showing that the presumed father was not the biological father, 
 
27 
was the same rebuttable presumption now contained in section 7611, subdivision 
(a).  The legislative history of the UPA also explained that the UPA presumptions 
“may be rebutted . . . by clear and convincing evidence.”  (Assem. Com. on 
Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 347 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 7, 1975, p. 2.)  
Similarly, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
which drafted the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (1973 Act) from which 
California’s UPA was derived (Adoption of Michael H., supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 
1050), explained that the 1973 Act’s presumptions are rebuttable “[i]n accordance 
with current law in most states relating to the rebuttal of a presumption of 
‘legitimacy.’ ”  (9B West’s U. Laws Ann. (2001) U. Parentage Act (1973) com. to 
§ 4, p. 394, italics added.)  As explained above, when this comment was written, 
the law in California provided that rebuttable presumptions were conclusively 
rebutted by proof—such as lack of intercourse, blood tests, the husband’s sterility 
or impotency, or admissions by the mother—that the presumed father was not the 
biological father.12  The law in other states was the same.  (See generally, Annot., 
Proof of Husband’s Impotency of Sterility as Rebutting Presumption of 
Legitimacy (1978) 84 A.L.R.3d 495; Annot., Presumption of Legitimacy, or of 
Paternity, of Child Conceived or Born Before Marriage (1958) 57 A.L.R.2d 729.)  
The majority’s conclusion that, despite one presumed father’s conceded biological 
paternity, a court may decline to find another man’s presumption rebutted based 
                                                 
12  
(Jackson v. Jackson (1967) 67 Cal.2d 245, 247 [conclusive presumption 
does not operate where evidence shows “it was impossible that the child was 
conceived during the period of cohabitation”]; Kusior, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 620 
[blood tests “conclusively rebut[]” rebuttable presumption]; Anderson v. 
Anderson, supra, 214 Cal. at pp. 416-417 [where biological paternity by “a 
stranger is established beyond question,” husband’s presumption “no longer 
obtains”]; Baker, supra, 13 Cal. at p. 101 [husband’s presumption was “met and 
overcome by” mother’s admission that another man was the biological father]; 
Hughes v. Hughes, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d at pp. 784-787.)   
 
28 
on a weighing of policy considerations, constitutes a revolutionary change in terms 
of the law as it existed when California’s UPA and the 1973 Act were drafted and 
approved.  Nothing in the legislative history of the UPA indicates that our 
Legislature even considered, much less intended to make, this revolutionary 
change.  On the contrary, as explained, the legislative history shows that the UPA 
was intended to preserve existing law regarding the determinative effect of 
biological paternity in cases involving competing paternity claims.13   
 
Indeed, the very language of the UPA demonstrates that the majority’s 
construction is inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent.  As noted above, the 
UPA specifies a procedure for establishing “[t]he parent and child relationship” 
(§ 7610), which the UPA defines as “the legal relationship existing between a 
child and the child’s natural or adoptive parents . . . .”  (§ 7601, italics added.)  
The particular UPA procedure at issue here is that for establishing “[t]he parent 
and child relationship . . . [b]etween a child and the natural father.”  (§ 7610, subd. 
                                                 
13  
According to the majority, commentary on the deletion of the 1973 Act’s 
weighing provision “implies” that the 1973 Act “relied on something other than 
genetic testing to resolve competing presumptions.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29, 
italics added.)  I do not contend otherwise; when the 1973 Act was drafted, 
“genetic testing” had not reached the point where it could definitively identify the 
father, although it could, in some cases, conclusively exclude certain men.  As 
explained above, it was not until 1986 that, according to the Legislature, “the 
science of genetic testing ha[d] advanced to the degree that” an affirmative 
presumption of paternity could be based on such testing.  (Stats. 1986, ch. 629, § 
1, pp. 2136-2137; cf. 9 West’s U. Laws Ann., supra, Miscellaneous Acts, 1952 
Act, comrs. note No. 1, p. 102.)  Thus, in 1973, a weighing provision was 
necessary in light of scientific limitations on “genetic testing.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 29.)  This does not change the fact that the focus of the 1973 Act was 
identifying a child’s biological father through whatever means were available.  
Indeed, by emphasizing advances in genetic testing, the recent revisions to the 
1973 Act confirm this fact.  As the cited commentary explains, “[n]owadays, 
genetic testing makes it possible in most cases to resolve competing claims to 
paternity.”  (Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act as Last Amended in 2002 
with Prefatory Note and Comments (2003) 37 Fam. L.Q. 5, 17.) 
 
29 
(b), italics added.)  Under well established principles of statutory construction, in 
construing these provisions, “[w]e look first to the plain meaning of the statutory 
language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1172.)  The usual and ordinary 
meaning of the terms “natural parent” and “natural father” is, respectively, the 
biological parent and the biological father.  (See Lehr v. Robertson (1983) 463 
U.S. 248, 262 [“the biological connection . . . offers the natural father an 
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his 
offspring”].)  As Black’s Law Dictionary explains, the term “natural father” is 
“[a]lso termed biological father” and means “[t]he man who impregnated the 
child’s natural mother.”  (Black’s Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) p. 623, col. 1.)  For 
years, we have construed the term “natural” parent, both in interpreting the UPA 
and in other contexts, in accordance with its common and ordinary meaning, that 
is, as meaning “biological” parent.14  Based on the common and ordinary meaning 
of the terms “natural parent” (§ 7601) and “natural father” (§ 7610, subd. (b)), the 
UPA’s purpose is to specify a procedure for identifying a child’s biological father 
and legally establishing his relationship to his child.  Thus, under the statute’s 
plain meaning, although Paul’s marriage to Jesusa’s “natural mother” initially 
qualified him under section 7611, subdivision (a), for a presumption that he is 
Jesusa’s “natural father,” Heriberto’s conceded biological paternity constitutes 
                                                 
14  
(E.g., In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, fn. 15 [“[a] biological or 
natural father is one whose biological paternity has been established”]; Adoption 
of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 823, fn. 3 (Kelsey) [“ ‘natural father’ . . . 
mean[s] a biological father”]; Cornelious, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 464 [that woman 
had genetic trait for sickle cell anemia “means that either her natural mother or her 
natural father must carry the trait”]; In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 649 
[appellant’s interest “arose from more than the mere biological fact that he is 
[child’s] natural father”]; id. at p. 647; People v. Sorensen (1968) 68 Cal.2d 280, 
289 [husband’s presumption may exist even though he “is not the natural father”].)   
 
30 
“clear and convincing evidence” that necessarily rebuts the presumption.  (§ 7612, 
subd. (a); see In re Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 450, fn. 18 [UPA 
presumption of one man “was rebutted by blood tests establishing that [another 
man] was the biological father”].) 
 
Relevant legislative history confirms that the Legislature understood and 
used the term “natural father” in the UPA in accordance with its ordinary meaning, 
that is, “biological father.”  As explained above, in 1980, the Legislature first 
made the “conclusive[]” presumption under section 7540 rebuttable by giving “the 
husband” standing to obtain testing that would necessarily rebut the presumption.  
(Stats. 1980, ch. 1310, § 1, p. 4433 [amending Evid. Code, former § 621, now 
§ 7541, subd. (b)].)  One legislative analysis of this amendment explained that a 
“consequence” of the “irrebutable presumption [wa]s that the child’s natural 
father, when he is not the husband, [could not] establish paternity.  Thus, the 
presumption prevent[ed] the natural father from establishing a legal father-child 
relationship which is the basis for familial rights . . . .”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1981 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) June 23, 1980, pp. 3-4, 
italics added.)  In these comments, the term “natural father” was clearly being 
used to mean “biological father.”  Legislative analyses of the 1990 amendment 
that extended standing to “presumed father[s]” under the UPA (§ 7541, subd. (b)), 
similarly used the term “natural father” to mean “biological father.”  Several of 
those analyses explained that, under then-existing law, standing to rebut the 
otherwise conclusive presumption under section 7540 was limited to the mother’s 
husband and the mother “if the natural father has filed an affidavit acknowledging 
paternity.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 6, 1990, p. 2, italics added.)  
The statute these reports described actually provides standing to the mother “if the 
child’s biological father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging 
 
31 
paternity . . . .”  (§ 7541, subd. (c), italics added.)  Another analysis explained that 
the amendment enables “a presumed father” under the UPA to obtain blood tests 
“to establish himself to be the biological father.”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, 
Republican Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) July 7, 1990, 
italics added.)  As already explained, the UPA sets forth a procedure for 
establishing a parent-child relationship “[b]etween a child and the natural father 
. . . .”  (§ 7610, subd. (b), italics added.)  Still another analysis explained that the 
amendment addressed problems arising under the high court’s decision in Michael 
H. v. Gerald D. (1989) 491 U.S. 110, where “[t]he dissenting opinions argued that 
a natural father’s biological link to his child combined with a substantial parent-
child relationship maintained between them, guarantees the natural father a liberty 
interest in his relationship with child.”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 4, 1990, p. 4, italics added.)  By 
interchangeably using the terms “biological” and “natural” in discussing one of the 
presumptions under the UPA (§ 7611), these analyses clearly demonstrate the 
Legislature’s understanding and intent that the term “natural father” in the UPA 
(§ 7610, subd. (b)) would be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning, 
that is, “biological father.”  The logical conclusion based on this ordinary meaning 
is that a presumed father’s conceded biological paternity necessarily rebuts the 
presumption that another man is “the natural father” of a child.15  (§ 7611.) 
                                                 
15  
As my analysis amply demonstrates, I have not, as the majority incorrectly 
asserts, merely “assum[ed] that natural necessarily mean[s] biological” based on a 
few “ ‘selected’ ” passages “from our case law.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30, fn. 9.)  
Rather, based on the common and ordinary meaning of the term, legislative history 
demonstrating the Legislature’s understanding of the term, the overall statutory 
scheme, and our historical construction of the term, I have concluded—not 
assumed—that the Legislature intended the term “natural” in the UPA to mean 
biological.  By contrast, the majority simply disregards the term; it makes no 
attempt to determine what the Legislature intended by its use of the term “natural.” 
 
32 
 
This conclusion is consistent with our analysis in Johnson.  There, we had 
to resolve the competing maternity claims of two women:  one who gave birth to 
the child and another who had provided the egg that was implanted into the first.  
(Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 87.)  We first reasoned that the UPA, which 
“applies to any parentage determination,” governed the issue.  (Id. at p. 89.)  We 
then reasoned that, because both women had a biological claim to maternity, “the 
[UPA] presumptions contained in [section 7611] do not apply.”  (Johnson, supra, 
5 Cal.4th at p. 91.)  These presumptions, we explained, “describe situations in 
which substantial evidence points to a particular man as the natural father of the 
child.  [Citation.]”  (Ibid., italics added.)  We then held that, because both women 
had established a biological basis for their claim, “there [was] no need to resort to 
an evidentiary presumption to ascertain the identity of the natural mother.”  (Id. at 
p. 91, italics added.)  We next expressly rejected the very approach the majority 
adopts here:  that courts applying the UPA should “decide parentage based on the 
best interests of the child.”  (Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 93, fn. 10.)  We 
explained that under our statutory framework, “the determination of parentage 
must precede, and should not be dictated by, eventual custody decisions.”  (Ibid.)  
We also explained that concerns about the child’s “best interests” should be 
addressed, not through parentage determinations, but through our “dependency 
laws, which are designed to protect all children irrespective of the manner of birth 
or conception.”  (Ibid.)  We ultimately held that, in resolving the competing 
maternity claims “under the [UPA],” “the parties’ intentions” controlled, rather 
than the child’s best interests.  (Id. at p. 95.)   
 
Our analysis in Johnson confirms that, under the UPA, in resolving 
competing claims of parentage—as opposed to custody—biological parentage 
controls over a mere presumption that is not based on biology, notwithstanding the 
child’s best interests.  Under that analysis, Paul’s UPA presumption does not apply 
 
33 
in this case because Heriberto is Jesusa’s undisputed biological father; if, as we 
held in Johnson, the UPA presumptions do not apply when both claimants 
establish biological parentage, then certainly the undisputed biological paternity of 
one presumed father necessarily rebuts the presumption of another presumed 
father.  Concerns that Heriberto is not an appropriate father for Jesusa should be 
addressed, not through this paternity determination, but through our laws on 
custody and termination of parental rights.  (See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 
supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1226 [§ 7611 presumptions, which “serve the function 
of settling questions of biological parenthood,” are inapplicable where there is “no 
question of biological parenthood” because “[a]ll parties know . . . who is 
genetically related to whom”].) 
 
The majority’s discussion of Johnson is erroneous.  The majority asserts 
that Johnson is not pertinent here because section 7612 contains a “directive” that 
“the child’s best interests should be considered in making parentage decisions.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 35.)  The majority is incorrect; section 7612 does not even 
mention the child’s best interests.  That gloss on section 7612 is solely a creation 
of the majority’s; as explained above, the majority reads the phrase “best interests” 
into both subdivision (a) and subdivision (b) of that section.16  Moreover, contrary 
to the majority’s suggestion, in Johnson, when we held that parentage claims 
should not be based on the child’s best interests, we were not merely “selecting a 
policy”; we were, as we are here, “giving effect to” the UPA.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 34.)  The majority’s holding “repudiate[s]” that statutory construction.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 33.)  Finally, the majority’s discussion ignores Johnson’s 
conclusion that because the purpose of the UPA’s presumptions is to identify “a 
                                                 
16  
Thus, it is ironic that the majority accuses me of “interpret[ing]” the 
statutory scheme “as though it included [a] directive” that is not there.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 26.)   
 
34 
particular man as the natural father of the child,” where the biological evidence 
establishes “the identity of the natural [parent],” the presumptions “do not apply.”  
(Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 91.)  Under that conclusion, because Heriberto is 
Jesusa’s biological father, Paul’s presumption does not apply.17 
 
In rejecting my construction of section 7612, subdivision (a), the majority, 
contrary to governing principles, expressly declines to “construe the [statutory] 
scheme” of which section 7612 is a part.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 32.)  The majority 
also fails to consider most of the legislative history I have discussed, and offers no 
legislative history supporting its own construction.  Nor does the majority consider 
the common and ordinary meaning of the term “natural father” or offer any 
alternative meaning of that phrase.  Finally, the majority disregards Johnson, 
which specifically construed the UPA in the context of competing parentage 
claims.  Instead, in construing section 7612, subdivision (a), the majority relies 
principally on a decision that did not involve competing parentage claims:  
Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th 56.  Purportedly “[a]pplying” Nicholas H., the 
majority concludes that one presumed father’s conceded biological paternity “does 
not necessarily defeat” the competing presumption of another man who is not the 
biological father.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.) 
 
For several reasons, the majority’s reliance on Nicholas H. is misplaced.  
First and foremost, Nicholas H. actually supports my conclusion that, in this case 
of competing paternity claims, Heriberto’s conceded biological paternity 
                                                 
17  
Our conclusion on this point did not, as the majority suggests, derive from 
“materials extrinsic to the UPA.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 34; see Johnson, supra, 5 
Cal.4th at p. 91.)  Nor did our rejection of the majority’s “best interests” approach 
derive from such materials.  (Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 93, fn. 10.)  Indeed, 
even as to our adoption of the “intent” approach, contrary to the majority’s 
assertion, we considered the extrinsic materials the majority cites only after—and 
to “support”—the conclusion we had already reached.  (Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th 
at p. 93.) 
 
35 
necessarily rebuts Paul’s presumption.  The “question” we faced in Nicholas H. 
was “whether a presumption arising under section 7611[] is, under section 7612[, 
subdivision (a),] necessarily rebutted when the presumed father . . . admits that he 
is not the biological father of the child.”  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 58, 
italics added.)  We held that such an admission does not necessarily rebut a 
presumption where the “presumed father is providing a loving home for” the child 
and the child’s “biological father . . . has shown no interest in” establishing his 
paternity or accepting “the privilege and responsibility of fathering” the child.  (Id. 
at pp. 58-59.)  “Rather,” we explained, the kind of action “the Legislature had in 
mind” where a section 7611 would be rebutted is one “in which another candidate 
is vying for parental rights and seeks to rebut a section 7611[] presumption in 
order to perfect his claim . . . .”  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 70.)  Of 
course, the case now before us is precisely the kind of case that, according to 
Nicholas H., “the Legislature had in mind” as one in which a section 7611 
presumption would be rebutted by another man’s biological paternity; Heriberto, 
who is both the biological father and a presumed father in his own right, “is vying 
for parental rights and seeks to rebut” Paul’s section 7611 presumption “in order 
to perfect his claim.”  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 70.)  Thus, contrary to 
the majority’s analysis, Nicholas H. supports the conclusion that Heriberto’s 
conceded biological paternity necessarily rebuts Paul’s presumption.18 
 
Relevant legislative history confirms that the distinction we drew in 
Nicholas H.—between cases where the biological father seeks to establish his 
                                                 
18  
As this discussion demonstrates, Nicholas H. did not, as the majority 
asserts, merely “describe[] a common circumstance in which rebuttal might be 
appropriate.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 16, fn. 5, italics added.)  Rather, it stated that 
“an appropriate action” where the presumption would be rebutted is one “in 
which another candidate is vying for parental rights and seeks to rebut a section 
7611[] presumption in order to perfect his claim . . . .”  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 
Cal.4th at p. 70.)  Such is the case here. 
 
36 
paternity claim and cases where he does not—correctly reflects the Legislature’s 
intent.  As explained above, when the Legislature extended standing to contest 
section 7540’s conclusive presumption to a “presumed father” under section 7611 
and to “the child,” it did so only “for purposes of establishing [the presumed 
father’s] paternity.”  (Stats. 1990, ch. 543, § 2, p. 2855 [amending Evid. Code, 
former § 621, now Fam. Code, § 7541, subd. (b)].)  According to the amendment’s 
legislative history, the Legislature specifically included this limitation to “clarify 
that the purpose for” giving presumed fathers and the child standing was “to 
establish the paternity of the presumed father” and to prevent “a presumed father 
(who may not be the biologic father) or the child [from] fil[ing] a motion to have 
the husband determined as not the biologic father, with no intent of obtaining a 
legal determination to establish paternity in someone else.”  (Assem. Com. on 
Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 4, 1990, p. 
6.)  At the same time the Legislature added this limitation, it rejected a proposed 
amendment that would have deleted the restriction barring a mother from 
contesting the husband’s conclusive presumption unless “the child’s biological 
father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity of the child.”  
(§ 7541, subd. (c).)  One legislative analysis explained that this proposed 
amendment could, “if the mother establishes her husband’s lack of paternity,” 
leave the child “legally without a father,” which “would be contrary to public 
policy.”  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2015 (1989-1990 
Reg. Sess.) Apr. 4, 1990, p. 6.)  This legislative history supports our statement in 
Nicholas H. that the case now before us—in which a biological father who is also 
a presumed father seeks “to perfect his claim” and to rebut the presumption of 
another man—is precisely the kind of case “the Legislature had in mind” as an 
“ ‘appropriate action’ ” where the presumption would be rebutted.  (Nicholas H., 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 70.) 
 
37 
 
Nicholas H. supports my conclusion in another important respect.  The 
child in Nicholas H. was more than four years old when the dependency petition 
was filed (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 59-60), and, in reaching our 
conclusion, we quoted the following statement from Cornelious, supra, 35 Cal.3d 
at pages 465-466:  “ ‘[I]n the case of an older child [over two years of age] the 
familial relationship between the child and the man purporting to be the child’s 
father is considerably more palpable than the biological relationship of actual 
paternity.’ ”  (See Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 65.)  This quotation from 
Cornelious was taken from a discussion explaining why the Legislature, when it 
gave mothers and their husbands the right to contest the conclusive presumption 
under section 7540, required that the right be exercised within two years of the 
child’s birth.  (Cornelious, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 465-466.)  Significantly, that 
discussion also explained that the Legislature’s “probable rationale” for this 
limitation was that, “ ‘[i]n the case of a young child’ ”—that is, a child under two 
years of age—“ ‘the most palpable relation that anyone has to the child is a 
biological relationship.”  (Id. at p. 465.)  This discussion supports my conclusion 
that, at least when the child is less than two years old, the Legislature intended that 
biological paternity would be controlling.  In the case now before us, Jesusa was 
less than two years old when the dependency petition was filed and when 
Heriberto formally asked the court to enter a judgment declaring his paternity.  
Thus, by quoting and relying on the discussion in Cornelious, Nicholas H. 
supports my conclusion that Heriberto’s biological paternity necessarily rebuts 
Paul’s presumption.19 
                                                 
19  
As this analysis demonstrates, the majority errs in asserting that my 
construction “cannot be reconciled” with Nicholas H.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.)   
Moreover, contrary to the majority’s assertion, Nicholas H. did not hold that 
application of section 7612, subdivision (a), requires evaluation of “the best 
interests” of the child.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30.)  On the contrary, Nicholas H. 
 
38 
 
Beyond summarizing Nicholas H., the majority’s actual analysis under that 
decision is as unconvincing and conclusory as it is brief.  After repeating Nicholas 
H.’s observation that section 7612, subdivision (a), provides that a presumption 
“may be rebutted in an appropriate action,” the majority asserts:  “This indicates 
that the Legislature did not envision an automatic preference for biological fathers, 
even if the biological father has come forward to assert his rights.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 13-14.)  The majority’s logic is faulty; the mere fact that section 7612, 
subdivision (a), makes the presumptions rebuttable “in an appropriate action” does 
not indicate a legislative intent not to make biology determinative where “the 
biological father has come forward to assert his rights.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 
13-14.)  On the contrary, as I have explained, in Nicholas H., we stated that this is 
precisely the factual scenario that the Legislature envisioned as “ ‘an appropriate 
action’ ” for rebutting the presumption.  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 70.)  
Moreover, as I have also explained, the overall statutory scheme and the relevant 
legislative history demonstrate the Legislature’s intent to make biology controlling 
in paternity disputes between competing presumed fathers, at least with respect to 
young children like Jesusa.   
 
The majority next asserts that, “ ‘if the Legislature had intended that a man 
who is not a biological father cannot be a presumed father under section 7611, it 
would not have provided for such weighing, for among two competing claims for 
presumed father status under section 7611, there can be only one biological 
father.’  [Citation.]”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13, italics added.)  Again, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
nowhere mentions the child’s “best interests.”  Rather, as I have explained, we 
based our decision in Nicholas H. on what the Legislature “had in mind,” that is, 
the Legislature’s intent.  (Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 70.)  As I have also 
explained, Nicholas H. stated that the kind of action now before us, in which 
competing fathers are “vying for parental rights,” is precisely the kind of action 
the Legislature “had in mind” as “an appropriate action” where a presumption 
would be rebutted.  (Ibid.)   
 
39 
majority’s logic is faulty.  The majority incorrectly assumes that in every case 
involving competing presumptions, one of the presumed fathers will be the 
biological father.  However, because biological paternity is not a requirement of 
any of the UPA presumptions, in some cases, neither of the presumed fathers will 
be the biological father.  In this circumstance, neither presumed father will be able 
to rebut the other’s presumption (assuming the facts underlying the presumptions 
are otherwise established).  The majority’s logic also overlooks the fact that, under 
specified circumstances, two of the UPA presumptions—a husband’s presumption 
under section 7540 and the presumption under section 7576 based on a voluntary 
paternity declaration—are, by statute, not rebuttable.  (§ 7541, subds. (b), (c), (e); 
§ 7576, subd. (d).)  Thus, in some cases, a presumed father who is also the 
biological father may be precluded from rebutting another man’s UPA 
presumption.  Finally, the majority’s logic overlooks the fact that it is possible—
for example, in the case of men who are identical twins—for genetic tests to show 
that more than one man could be the biological father.  In all of these scenarios, 
weighing will be necessary to determine which unrebutted presumption “controls.”  
(§ 7612, subd. (b).)  These possibilities demonstrate that a weighing provision is 
necessary even under my conclusion that one presumed father’s biological 
paternity necessarily rebuts a rebuttable presumption of another man.   
 
For the same reason, the majority errs in asserting that if the Legislature 
“had intended to restrict the weighing process under section 7612, subdivision (b) 
to disputes between competing nonbiological fathers, it could easily have said so.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  As I have just explained, under my conclusion, the 
weighing process under section 7612, subdivision (b), is not applicable only to 
disputes between nonbiological fathers.  Moreover, even were the weighing 
process so limited, because, as I have demonstrated, the Legislature understood 
and intended that one presumed father’s proven biological paternity would, under 
 
40 
section 7612, subdivision (a), necessarily rebut the rebuttable presumption of 
another man, the Legislature had no need to specify that the weighing process 
under subdivision (b) of that section applies only to competing nonbiological 
fathers; that conclusion logically follows from the statutory scheme the Legislature 
put in place.   
 
Nor is the majority correct that section 7575 supports its conclusion.  
According to the majority, section 7575, subdivision (b) “ ‘permits but does not 
require’ a court to rely on blood test evidence in deciding whether to set aside a 
voluntary declaration of paternity signed on or before December 31, 1996.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 14.)  “ ‘It is unlikely,’ ” the majority asserts, that “ ‘the Legislature 
would—without explicitly so stating—adopt a contrary rule that blood test 
evidence . . . must defeat the claim of a person who claims presumed father status 
under section 7611(d).’  [Citation.]”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.) 
 
The majority’s analysis is both unpersuasive and incorrect.  It is 
unpersuasive because it ignores the fact that blood test evidence showing that the 
tested man is not the father does necessarily rebut the presumption of a husband 
who is “conclusively presumed” to be the father under section 7540.  (§ 7541, 
subd. (a).)  To paraphrase the majority, “ ‘[i]t is unlikely the Legislature would—
without explicitly so stating—adopt a contrary rule’ ” that test results do not 
necessarily rebut the nonconclusive UPA presumptions.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
14.)  The majority’s analysis is incorrect because it does not focus on the correct 
statute.  In determining whether Heriberto’s biological paternity necessarily rebuts 
Paul’s presumption under section 7611, we should consider the Legislature’s 
treatment of presumptions based on voluntary paternity declarations.  That issue is 
governed by section 7576, not, as the majority asserts, by section 7575.  As 
explained above, section 7576, subdivision (a), provides that a voluntary 
declaration of paternity completed before January 1, 1997, raises a “presumption” 
 
41 
that the child of the man executing the voluntary declaration “is . . . the man’s 
child.”  As also explained above, section 7576, subdivision (d), provides that “any 
person” may rebut the “presumption” raised by such a declaration by obtaining 
genetic tests pursuant to section 7551.  This provision makes a presumption based 
on a voluntary declaration expressly subject to California’s Uniform Act on Blood 
Tests to Determine Paternity (§ 7550 et seq.), including the direction in section 
7554 that the “question of paternity shall be resolved” in accordance with tests 
showing that the “alleged father is not the father.”  Thus, a presumption based on a 
voluntary declaration, like a section 7540 presumption, is necessarily rebutted by 
test results showing that the presumed father is not the father.  That test results 
necessarily rebut the presumptions under both sections 7540 and 7576 follows not 
just from subdivision (d) of section 7576, but also from subdivision (a), which 
expressly declares that the “presumption” based on a voluntary paternity 
declaration “has the same force and effect as the presumption under Section 
7540.”  (§ 7575, subd. (a).)  This fact supports my construction because, again to 
quote the majority, “ ‘[i]t is unlikely the Legislature would’ ” provide that the so-
called conclusive UPA presumptions under both sections 7540 and 7576 are 
necessarily rebutted by such evidence and, “without explicitly so stating,” “adopt a 
contrary rule’ ” with respect to the nonconclusive UPA presumptions.20  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 14.)   
                                                 
20  
As already explained, also supporting my construction is the fact that the 
hierarchy of presumptions established in subdivision (e) of section 7576 
affirmatively demonstrates the Legislature’s intent that a presumption under 
section 7555 based on biological paternity would outweigh a presumption under 
subdivisions (a) through (e) of section 7611.  Moreover, by statute, the 
requirements for a valid voluntary declaration of paternity include a signed 
statement “by the mother” that the identified father “is the only possible father” 
(§ 7574, subd. (b)(5), italics added) and a signed statement “by the father . . . that 
he is the biological father of the child.”  (Id., subd. (b)(6), italics added.)  Thus, 
contrary to the majority’s analysis, the provisions relating to the presumption 
 
42 
 
The majority is also incorrect in asserting that not “a single case” supports 
my construction of section 7612, subdivision (a) (maj. opn., ante, at p. 28), 
whereas its construction of that subdivision is consistent with the “weight of 
authority” in our Courts of Appeal.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  Brian C. v. Ginger 
K. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1198, supports my conclusion.  There, in discussing 
resolution of competing claims of presumed fathers under the UPA, the court 
observed:  (1) under section 7551, a court “may order blood tests at any time”; (2) 
under section 7612, subdivision (a), a section 7611 presumption “ ‘may be 
rebutted . . . only by clear and convincing evidence’ ”; and (3) “DNA tests . . . 
certainly constitute clear and convincing evidence rebutting any of the 
presumptions that might favor either” of the competing fathers.  (Brian C. v. 
Ginger K., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222, fn. 20.)  The majority offers no 
persuasive reason for discounting this decision. 
 
On the other hand, upon examination, the Court of Appeal decisions on 
which the majority relies turn out not to be “weight[y]” at all.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 13.)  In Steven W., the court discussed only subdivision (b) of what it is now 
section 7612 in concluding that one man’s presumption was controlling; it did not 
even consider whether, under subdivision (a) of section 7612, one presumed 
                                                                                                                                                 
based on a voluntary declaration of paternity are part of an overall statutory 
scheme that demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to make established biological 
paternity the controlling factor in dealing with competing presumptions. 
 
Section 7575, subdivision (b), which the majority incorrectly cites instead 
of section 7576, addresses the rescission or setting aside of voluntary declarations, 
not the rebuttal of presumptions based on such declarations.  Voluntary 
declarations signed after 1996, which are subject to section 7575, do not merely 
raise a presumption of paternity, they “establish the paternity of a child” and “have 
the same force and effect as a judgment for paternity issued by a court.”  (§ 7573.)  
By focusing on section 7575 and ignoring the statute that expressly governs the 
rebuttal of presumptions based on a voluntary paternity declaration—section 
7576—the majority’s analysis “compar[es] apples and oranges.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 27.) 
 
43 
father’s biological paternity necessarily rebuts the other man’s presumption.  
(Steven W., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1115-1117.)  Thus, it provides no support 
for the majority’s construction of the latter subdivision.  In In re Kiana A. (2001) 
93 Cal.App.4th 1109, the entire discussion of the significance of biological 
paternity was dicta; before opining on this issue, the court held that biological 
paternity had not been established in the juvenile court and that the man asserting 
his biological paternity could not raise his “untimely claim” for the first time on 
appeal.  (Id. at p. 1118.)  Moreover, the court’s dicta on this issue contained no 
analysis other than citing Steven W. and citing the language of section 7612, 
subdivision (a).  (Kiana, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1118-1119.)  Finally, like 
Nicholas H. and unlike the case now before us, both Steven W. and Kiana involved 
a child who was more than two years old when the paternity issue arose.  (Kiana, 
supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109 [child over 12 years of age]; Steven W., supra, 33 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1108 [almost 3-year-old child].)  In both cases, the courts relied 
heavily on this fact in reaching their conclusion.  (Kiana, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 1119-1120; Steven W., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1117-1118.)  Thus, these 
cases provide no substantial support for the majority’s construction.21 
 
The majority’s analysis is equally faulty with respect to its conclusion that a 
court need not give “determinative weight” to biology in determining under 
subdivision (b) of section 7612 which presumption “ ‘on the facts is founded on 
the weightier considerations of policy and logic.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  
                                                 
21  
Ironically, notwithstanding its criticism of my analysis, the majority adopts 
a construction of Penal Code section 2625 without citing a single supporting 
decision and, in so doing, disapproves two published Court of Appeal decisions 
because they adopted a “contrary” construction “without examining [relevant] 
legislative history.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 41, fn. 12.)  Steven W. considered no 
legislative history.  Kiana’s dicta regarding subdivision (a) of section 7612 
considered no legislative history, contained virtually no analysis, and depended 
principally on a decision that involved a different provision. 
 
44 
The sum total of the majority’s statutory analysis under California law is the 
following:  Section 7612, subdivision (b) “nowhere states that biology is a 
conclusive consideration of policy and logic.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  Thus, 
the majority completely ignores the overall statutory scheme, which, as I have 
shown, demonstrates the Legislature’s intent, at least with respect to children less 
than two years of age, to make biological paternity the controlling consideration of 
policy and logic in resolving the competing paternity claims of presumed fathers.  
In this regard, the majority’s analysis again violates the principle that we construe 
statutes not “in isolation,” but “ ‘with reference to the entire scheme of law of 
which [they are] part.”  (Pieters, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 899.)   
 
Instead of analyzing California’s statutory scheme, the majority relies on 
decisions from other states.  Specifically, the majority cites decisions from 
Colorado, Hawai’i, Minnesota, and Nevada in which courts purportedly “declined 
to make biology determinative under their analog to section 7612 when confronted 
by competing presumptions of paternity.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)   
 
The non-California decisions on which the majority relies do not support 
the majority’s conclusion because the statutes they construed are significantly 
different from California’s UPA.  As explained above, when our Legislature 
established a presumption based on test results, it excluded that presumption from 
the UPA’s weighing process under section 7612 and specifically declared its 
“intent . . . to standardize the process by which paternity is established in order to 
achieve a greater degree of equity and consistency in paternity determinations.”  
(Stats. 1986 ch. 629, § 1, pp. 2136-2137.)  It thus provided clear evidence of its 
intent to make established biological paternity determinative as to which 
competing UPA presumption is, “on the facts . . . founded on the weightier 
considerations of policy and logic . . . .”  (§  7612, subd. (b), italics added.)  By 
contrast, in Colorado, Hawai’i, Minnesota, and Nevada, the presumption based on 
 
45 
scientific tests is just one of several presumptions stated in their version of section 
7611, that is, their version of section 4 of the 1973 Act.  (Colo. Rev. Stats. § 19-4-
105; Hawaii Rev. Stats. § 584-4(a); Minn. Stat. § 257.55, subd. (1); Nev. Rev. 
Stats. § 126.051(1).)  Notably, in the decisions the majority cites, the courts relied 
on this fact, and the fact that the same statute provided for the weighing of 
conflicting presumptions, in concluding that their state’s presumption based on 
biology does not necessarily overcome the presumptions based on other factors.22  
For example, as one of the cited cases explained, “the original lodestar of 
[Minnesota’s] parentage act” was “biological” paternity; thus, “[w]hen the 
parentage act was first adopted in [Minnesota], . . . the effort was to find the 
biological father and then to adjudicate that person the legal father.”  (Matter of 
Welfare of C.M.G. (Minn.Ct.App. 1994) 516 N.W.2d 555, 560, fn. 8, italics 
added.)  However, “when the [Minnesota] legislature added the presumption 
established under the genetic test presumption, [citation], it . . . treated [that 
presumption] simply as the sixth presumption [under the parentage act].”  (Ibid.)  
This fact “demonstrate[s]” that, in Minnesota, “other considerations ha[ve] since 
made the search something more than a search for a biological father.”  (Ibid.)  
This decision, and the others the majority cites, do not support the majority’s 
conclusion precisely because their analyses depended on the fact that, unlike our 
Legislature, the legislatures in Colorado, Hawai’i, Minnesota, and Nevada 
expressly made their presumption based on biology subject to weighing by placing 
it in the weighing provision of their version of the 1973 Act.23  Indeed, by 
                                                 
22  
(Doe v. Doe (Hawai’i 2002) 52 P.3d 255, 262; Witso v. Overby (Minn. 
2001) 627 N.W.2d 63, 66; N.A.H. v. S.L.S., supra, 9 P.3d at p. 360; Love v. Love 
(Nev. 1998) 959 P.2d 523, 526-527.)   
23  
For the same reason, the majority is incorrect in stating that these non-
California decisions, which construed a statute significantly different from either 
California’s UPA or the 1973 Act, “addressed the issue” now before us under 
 
46 
recognizing that, absent this fact, the “lodestar of the parentage act” is “biological” 
paternity (C.M.G., supra, 516 N.W.2d at p. 560, fn. 8), these decisions actually 
support my conclusion that biological paternity is determinative under California’s 
statutory scheme, at least as to children no more than two years of age.24 
 
B.  Constitutional Considerations 
 
In addition to being inconsistent with the overall statutory scheme and the 
Legislature’s intent, the majority’s conclusion violates the principle that, in 
interpreting statutes, we should avoid constructions that “raise serious and 
doubtful constitutional questions.”  (Miller, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 828.)  Under 
this principle, “[i]f a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will 
render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise 
serious and doubtful constitutional questions, [we] will adopt the construction 
which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, 
will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality . . . .  
[Citations.]  The basis of this rule is the presumption that the Legislature intended, 
                                                                                                                                                 
California’s UPA or even were rendered in a “UPA state.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
19.) 
24  
The majority incorrectly suggests that I would make biology determinative 
only “within the first two years of life.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 32.)   However, as 
my analysis makes clear, I would hold that biology is determinative at least during 
the first two years.  Because Jesusa was less than two years old when Heriberto 
sought to establish his paternity, it is unnecessary here to decide whether biology 
is determinative as to older children.  Thus, my focus on children under two years 
of age is simply an exercise in judicial restraint, not, as the majority asserts, a 
“logical flaw[].”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 32.)  Nor is the majority correct that my 
construction is “inconsistent with” our decision in Dawn D. v. Superior Court 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 932 (Dawn D.).  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 32, fn. 10.)  Contrary to 
the majority’s assertion, my conclusion that biological paternity by a man who 
qualifies as a presumed father under section 7611 necessarily rebuts another 
man’s presumption has no bearing on Dawn D.’s holding that a man who is “not a 
presumed father” lacks standing to challenge another man’s presumption.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 32, fn. 10, italics added.) 
 
47 
not to violate the Constitution, but to enact a valid statute within the scope of its 
constitutional powers.”  (Ibid.)   
 
Contrary to this principle, the majority’s conclusion renders our statutory 
scheme unconstitutional.  In Kelsey, we held that, “if an unwed father promptly 
comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental 
responsibilities—emotional, financial, and otherwise—his federal constitutional 
right to due process prohibits the termination of his parental relationship absent a 
showing of his unfitness as a parent”; a showing that termination is in the child’s 
best interests, which is a lower standard, is simply not constitutionally sufficient.  
(Kelsey, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 849.)  In violation of this constitutional principle, 
the majority sanctions the termination of Heriberto’s parental rights without a 
finding of unfitness, based on the juvenile court’s finding that Jesusa’s best 
interests are served by having Paul declared to be her legal father.   
The majority’s attempt to refute this conclusion fails.  Initially, the majority 
confuses and avoids the issue by insisting that the proceedings here merely 
determined who “the presumed father” is, not who the father is.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 6.)  The majority states that a juvenile court may determine “the identity of a 
child’s presumed father” through an action brought under Family Code section 
7630 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2, subdivision (d).  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 36, italics added.)  However, as we have explained, section 7630 
of the UPA sets forth “the means” by which “[a] man can establish a father and 
child relationship,” not merely his status as a presumed father.  (Johnson, supra, 5 
Cal.4th at p. 90, italics added.)  The plain language of section 7630 confirms this 
fact.  It authorizes “a man presumed to be the child’s father” under section 7611 to 
bring an action to “declar[e]” the actual “existence of the father and child 
relationship” that is merely “presumed under . . . Section 7611.”  (§ 7630, subd. 
(a)(1).)  It also authorizes “[a]n action to determine the existence of the father and 
 
48 
child relationship with respect to a child who has no presumed father under 
Section 7611.”  (§ 7630, subd. (c), italics added.)  The UPA’s legislative history 
also confirms this fact; it explains that the UPA “sets forth a procedure whereby a 
man can be judicially determined to be the father of the child,” and that “[a]ll 
rights of . . . the parents with regard to th[e] child . . . are based on the parent and 
child relationship” established under the UPA’s procedure.  (Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 347 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 
8, 1975, p. 14, italics added.)  Finally, the other statute the majority cites—
Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2, subdivision (d)—also confirms this 
fact; it says nothing about identifying the presumed father, but provides that “[i]f a 
man appears in the dependency action and files an action under Section 7630 or 
7631 of the Family Code, the court shall determine if he is the father.”  (Italics 
added.)  Thus, contrary to the majority’s statement, nothing in either Family Code 
section 7630 or Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2, subdivision (d), 
authorizes a determination of the identity of the presumed father. 
Nor is the majority correct in stating that a court may determine the identity 
of “a child’s presumed father”—as opposed to the child’s father—under California 
Rules of Court, rule 1413.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36, italics added.)  Rule 1413, 
which is entitled “Paternity,” establishes a juvenile court’s “duty” in a dependency 
proceeding “to determine the parentage of” a child—not the child’s presumed 
father—if “parentage” has “not otherwise [been] determined.”  (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 1413(a), italics added.)  It states that if “there has been no prior 
determination of paternity of the child, the juvenile court may make such a 
determination.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1413(e), italics added.)  As commonly 
understood, the terms “parentage” and “paternity” refer to the identity of a child’s 
 
49 
actual father.25  Thus, like Family Code section 7630 and Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 316.2, subdivision (d), rule 1413, by its terms, establishes a court’s 
duty to determine who the father is, not who the presumed father is.  Under these 
statutes, the juvenile court’s finding necessarily denied Heriberto’s formal 
“request that the court enter a judgment of [his] paternity” and necessarily 
established Paul’s paternity, that is, it established Paul as Jesusa’s father, not 
merely her presumed father.  In so doing, it also necessarily terminated Heriberto’s 
rights as a parent.  Under section 7636, a “judgment or order of the court 
determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship is 
determinative for all purposes except” certain criminal prosecutions.26 
 
The record fully supports this conclusion.  At the hearing where Heriberto 
first appeared, the court advised that there would “be an issue on April 30th as to 
determining the paternity.”  On April 30, the court announced that it was 
continuing “the issue as to paternity” to July 17.  On July 17, when counsel 
objected to proceeding in Heriberto’s absence, the court relayed its understanding 
“that the issue of paternity would be fully decided on the briefs and argument.”  
DCFS then argued that the court should “make a finding of paternity or nonfinding 
of paternity” based on what had already been submitted, and it “urge[d] the court 
to go ahead and make its finding as to paternity.”  Jesusa’s counsel then set forth 
her understanding of the court’s tentative ruling:  that both Paul and Heriberto 
were “eligible for presumed status, but that issues of public policy and logic would 
                                                 
25  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “paternity” as “[t]he state or condition of 
being a father, esp. a biological one; fatherhood.”  (Black’s Law Dict., supra, at p. 
1148, col. 2.)  It defines “paternity suit” or “parentage action” as “[a] court 
proceeding to determine whether a person is the father of a child.”  (Ibid., italics 
added.) 
26  
Thus, the majority is incorrect in asserting that I have not cited anything to 
support my conclusion that the juvenile court’s ruling “render[s] Heriberto a legal 
stranger to” Jesusa.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.) 
 
50 
determine that [Paul] should be the father that’s chosen.”  (Italics added.)  After 
the court’s ruling, Jesusa’s counsel argued:  “[I]n the court making a finding that 
[Paul] is the presumed father, that effectively states that [Heriberto] is not the 
father.  [¶]  . . . It’s a finding that he is not the father of this child period, and that 
[Paul] . . . enjoys all the legal rights and responsibilities as a parent to [Jesusa] and 
not [Heriberto].”  The court immediately responded that, as a result of its finding, 
Heriberto “does not have any legal rights to this child other than being noticed for” 
a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, “should this court 
ever get to the stage where” it sets such a hearing.  Thus, despite the language the 
court used in stating its finding—that Paul is “the presumed father”—the juvenile 
court and the parties fully understood and intended the court’s decision to be a 
paternity determination that stripped Heriberto of his parental rights.27   
 
Indeed, although the majority states that the statutes and rules on which it 
relies authorize actions to determine the identity of a child’s presumed father, its 
actual discussion recognizes that the cited provisions pertain to determinations of 
“paternity” and “legal” parenthood.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8, 36, 37.)  Based on 
these statutes, the majority concludes that the juvenile court had discretion “to 
hear [a] paternity action at any time” after the dependency petition was filed.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 36, first italics added.)  More importantly, the majority 
justifies its conclusion on the ground that, in a dependency proceeding, “[t]he 
                                                 
27  
The parties have taken a consistent position in this court.  The brief filed on 
Jesusa’s behalf asserts that “once the juvenile court found that Paul . . . was the 
presumed father, Heriberto was no longer considered a legal parent” and “no 
longer maintained his legal status as Jesusa’s parent.”  At oral argument, DCFS 
stated that a determination of who is the presumed father is a determination of who 
is the legal father, and that the court’s finding that Paul is the presumed father thus 
is the same as a paternity determination and resolved Heriberto’s formal request 
that the court enter a judgment of paternity.  DCFS also argued that the finding 
that Paul is the presumed father means that Paul is Jesusa’s legal father and that he 
has the rights and responsibilities of being a father. 
 
51 
legal parents must be identified” if certain procedural requirements are to be 
observed, and that dependency petitions often cannot be adjudicated “ ‘without 
first identifying which man is the child’s father.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 37, 
italics added.)  “Thus,” the majority concludes,  “ ‘the law cannot be judicially 
applied [here] without a determination of parentage . . . .’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
37, italics added.)  This discussion demonstrates that even the majority recognizes 
the juvenile court here made a paternity determination identifying Paul as Jesusa’s 
legal father.  Also demonstrating this fact is the majority’s failure to explain what 
additional proceedings are necessary to determine the identity of Jesusa’s father—
as opposed to her presumed father—what statute authorizes such proceedings, or 
how, in light of the juvenile court’s ruling, Heriberto can still maintain a paternity 
claim.  
 
Despite Paul’s status as the legal father under the juvenile court’s order, the 
majority insists that Heriberto “retains ‘parental rights that simply differ in degree 
[from]’ ” Paul’s rights.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)  According to the majority, 
actual termination of Heriberto’s “parental rights requires further proceedings.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.) 
 
The majority is incorrect.  Although claiming that Heriberto retains parental 
rights, the majority identifies not a single right that he retains.  Instead, to support 
its assertion, the majority simply cites Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 
Cal.App.4th 586, 596.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6, 22.)  However, like the majority, 
although the court in Francisco made a general statement regarding the rights of a 
biological father, it did not identify a single right that a biological parent has.  
(Francisco, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 590-595.)  Moreover, Francisco is 
completely inapposite; it did not consider whether a biological father retains 
parental rights after a juvenile courts makes a paternity finding in favor of another 
presumed father.  In Francisco, the court considered the statutory reunification 
 
52 
rights in a dependency proceeding of a biological father who was never a 
presumed father; there was no paternity determination and no presumed father.  
(Ibid.)  It was in this context that the court stated, by way of background, that a 
biological father has “parental rights that simply differ in degree [from] the 
parental rights conferred on a presumed father.”  (Id. at p. 596.)  In short, nothing 
supports the majority’s assertion that, notwithstanding the juvenile court’s 
decision, Heriberto “retains ‘parental rights.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)  Nor does 
the majority explain how, in light of the juvenile court’s ruling—which “is 
determinative for all purposes” (§ 7636) —it is possible that Heriberto can retain 
any parental rights after Paul has been declared to be Jesusa’s legal father. 
 
The majority’s assertion that actual termination of Heriberto’s “parental 
rights requires further proceedings” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 22) is also suspect.  
Again, as to this issue, the juvenile court’s paternity finding here is, by statute, 
“determinative.”  (§ 7636.)  Moreover, section 7800 et seq., which the majority 
cites (maj. opn., ante, at p. 22), does not support the majority’s claim.  Section 
7803 authorizes courts to declare children free “from parental custody and 
control.”  However, in light of the juvenile court’s order, this provision does not 
apply to Heriberto.  Section 7802 provides that “[a] proceeding may be brought 
under this part for the purpose of having a minor child declared free from the 
custody and control of either or both parents.”  (Italics added.)  The language of 
this statute—“either or both parents” (§ 7802)—obviously contemplates that a 
child has only two parents.  In this case, under the juvenile court’s ruling, which is 
“determinative for all purposes” (§ 7636), those two parents are Jesusa’s mother 
and Paul.  Because Heriberto no longer qualifies as a “parent[]” under section 
7802, no declaration is either necessary or obtainable as to him.   
 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, which the majority also cites, 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 22), is also inapplicable.  It applies only “to children who are 
 
53 
adjudged dependent children of the juvenile court pursuant to subdivision (c) of 
Section 360.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (a).)  Here, Jesusa was not 
adjudged a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 360, 
subdivision (c).  Moreover, Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, 
subdivision (b), provides for terminating “the rights of the parent or parents . . . .”  
Given the juvenile court’s paternity finding, Heriberto no longer appears to qualify 
as a parent.  Finally, Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision 
(b), provides for terminating parental rights only in connection with adoption.  The 
majority fails to explain how, in light of the finding in favor of Paul and Family 
Code section 7636, adoption proceedings will ever come about in this case.  Like 
Family Code section 7800 et. seq., Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 
simply has no relevance to this case and does not support the majority’s 
conclusion that Heriberto’s parental rights have not been terminated. 
 
Finally, section 7664, which the majority also cites, is also inapplicable for 
two reasons.  First, like Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, Family 
Code section 7664 applies only in the context of adoption proceedings, which will 
never come about in light of the juvenile court’s ruling.  Second, Family Code 
section 7664 applies only to a “natural father.”  However, under the juvenile 
court’s ruling, Heriberto cannot qualify as Jesusa’s natural father.  As explained 
above, a UPA proceeding establishes the “parent and child relationship” between 
“a child and the natural father” (§ 7610, subd. (b)), and the juvenile court’s ruling 
here, which “is determinative for all [relevant] purposes” (§ 7636), establishes that 
Paul, not Heriberto, is Jesusa’s “natural father.”  (§ 7610, subd. (b).)  Thus, the 
majority is incorrect in stating that actual termination of Heriberto’s “parental 
rights requires further proceedings.”28  
                                                 
28  
Even were the majority correct that any of these provisions applies, only in 
the most technical sense could it be said that Heriberto retains any parental rights.  
 
54 
 
Nor is the majority justified or correct in rejecting Heriberto’s due process 
claim based on his purported failure to “execute[] a voluntary declaration of 
paternity or describe[]” on the record “any other steps” he took “to formalize his 
relationship to” Jesusa.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22.)  In the juvenile court, counsel 
for Jesusa asserted in her brief that Heriberto had “signed” a “voluntary 
declaration of paternity.”  Regarding other steps that Heriberto may have taken to 
formalize his relationship, ironically, the lack of evidence in the record the 
majority cites stems directly from a ruling the majority now affirms:  the juvenile 
court’s refusal to continue the matter until Heriberto was present.  Heriberto’s 
counsel requested the continuance specifically so Heriberto could appear to 
present precisely the kind of evidence the majority says is lacking.  As the 
majority notes (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7-8), when the juvenile court asked what 
testimony Heriberto wanted to provide, counsel responded:  “the extent in which 
[he] held out paternity, publicly acknowledged paternity for Jesusa, and the formal 
steps he went to [to] identify” Jesusa as “his daughter” to “government agencies.”  
The juvenile court denied the continuance because it found it did “not need” to 
know “what [Heriberto] ha[d] done with regard to filling out documents with 
public agencies or government agencies.”  The majority affirms that ruling, 
reasoning that Heriberto’s proposed testimony was “unnecessary” in light of the 
juvenile court’s decision to assume that Heriberto qualified as a presumed father.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  Having affirmed the denial of the continuance Heriberto 
sought so he could present this evidence, the majority errs in now rejecting his 
constitutional claim based on the absence of that very evidence in the record.29 
                                                                                                                                                 
At best, the majority’s reliance on the meager rights Heriberto purportedly retains 
under these provisions elevates form over substance. 
29  
Moreover, that other witnesses may have been able to testify on this issue 
(maj. opn., ante, at p. 9) does not justify the majority’s conclusion.  Given the 
juvenile court’s statement that it would not consider such evidence, it is unlikely 
 
55 
 
In any event, the majority errs in holding that Heriberto has no 
constitutional protection absent such a showing.  Contrary to the majority’s 
analysis, neither Kelsey nor Michael H. supports this conclusion or even suggests 
that the taking of steps to formalize the paternal role is an absolute prerequisite to 
constitutional protection.  On the contrary, in Kelsey, we identified “prompt legal 
action to seek custody” as only one of many factors “[a] court should consider.”  
(Kelsey, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 849.)  We more broadly held that, in determining 
whether a biological father has made the showing necessary to trigger due process 
protections, a court should not look to any one factor, but “should consider all 
factors,” including the biological father’s “conduct both before and after the 
child’s birth.”  (Ibid.)  The majority asserts that Heriberto did less than the father 
in Kelsey, who filed an action to establish his parental role only two days after the 
child’s birth.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  However, in terms of demonstrating a 
timely and full commitment to parental responsibilities, Heriberto did far more 
than the father in Kelsey.  The father in Kelsey never lived with or even visited his 
child.  (Kelsey, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 822, 825.)  By contrast, Heriberto lived with 
Jesusa’s mother for a year before Jesusa’s birth, lived with Jesusa and her mother 
as a family until his arrest almost two years after Jesusa’s birth, and acted as 
Jesusa’s father during those two years.  Given these circumstances, and the fact 
that Paul has always conceded that Heriberto is Jesusa’s father, Heriberto had no 
reason to take “legal steps to formalize his relationship” with Jesusa or “ ‘seek 
custody of’ ” her.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  Moreover, during this dependency 
proceeding, Heriberto continues to assert his paternity and acknowledges that, if a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the court would have allowed Heriberto to call other witnesses on the issue.  Nor, 
in light of the juvenile court’s statement, did Heriberto have any reason to offer 
such evidence.  Finally, the other potential witnesses could only testify regarding 
their personal knowledge of Heriberto’s action; they could not testify about any of 
his actions of which they were unaware. 
 
56 
judgment is entered establishing his paternity, he “will have the obligation to 
support” Jesusa until she is at least 18.  Based on his conduct over the entire 
relevant period, Heriberto clearly qualifies for constitutional protection, even 
assuming, as the majority does, he did not take steps to formalize his paternal 
relationship.  The majority errs in concluding otherwise.30  
 
After rejecting Heriberto’s claim that the juvenile’s court’s decision 
unconstitutionally terminated his parental rights, the majority addresses his claim 
that the juvenile court’s decision “unconstitutionally interfered with” those rights.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  Based on a purported “balance” of the competing 
interests, the majority rejects Heriberto’s “substantive due process” claim.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 23.)   
 
The majority’s analysis is incorrect, because it mischaracterizes and 
incorrectly weights the relevant interests to be balanced.  On one side of the scale, 
the majority places Heriberto’s “largely abstract interest in being an absent 
presumed father while he remains in prison.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  
However, Heriberto’s interest is hardly abstract; it arises from the period he lived 
with Jesusa’s mother during her pregnancy and from the actual parental 
relationship he developed with Jesusa during the almost two years he lived with 
her as her father.  As previously noted, according to Jesusa’s mother, Heriberto  
was “always . . . very loving and gentle to” Jesusa during this time.  Moreover, the 
majority takes the short-term, myopic view in focusing only on Heriberto’s 
“interest in being an absent presumed father while he remains in prison.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 23, italics added.)  Heriberto will not be in prison forever; as the 
                                                 
30  
Under the majority’s analysis, even a married man who lives with his wife 
and biological child for two years and fulfills all of his responsibilities as a father 
apparently does not qualify for constitutional protection unless he takes additional 
steps to formalize his paternal relationship.  Thus, little is left of Kelsey under the 
majority’s view. 
 
57 
majority notes, he received “three years in prison” for his rape conviction.  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 4.)  This three-year period will end in May 2004, only a few 
months from now (assuming Heriberto is not released even earlier based on 
custody credits).  We must consider not only Heriberto’s interest while he remains 
in prison, but also his interest in being a father after his impending release.  The 
juvenile court’s paternity determination will seriously interfere with—indeed, it 
will terminate—Heriberto’s rights long after his release.  On the other side of the 
scale, the majority places the “substantial state interests in familial stability and 
the welfare of the child.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.)  In this case, the state’s 
interest in familial stability is “relatively weak[],” given that Jesusa lived with 
Heriberto and her mother as a family until Heriberto’s arrest almost two years 
after Jesusa’s birth, and that Paul has never claimed he is actually Jesusa’s father.  
(Brian C. v. Ginger K., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1217; see also Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., supra, 491 U.S. at p. 120, fn. 1 (plur. opn. of Scalia, J.) [“where the 
husband and wife have not been cohabiting” and husband “already knows the 
child is not his, [it is] less likely that the paternity hearing will disrupt an otherwise 
harmonious and apparently exclusive marital relationship”].)  Moreover, the 
state’s interest in the child’s welfare is amply protected by the separate statutory 
scheme relating to custody issues and termination of parental rights.  For all of 
these reasons, the majority’s rejection of  Heriberto’s due process claim is 
erroneous.31 
                                                 
31  
The majority’s analysis also depends on an obvious nonsequitur.  After 
noting that Heriberto is in prison, the majority states:  “Heriberto thus effectively 
seeks the rights of fatherhood without any of its responsibilities.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 23, fn. 7, italics added.)  However, the conclusion that Heriberto does 
not seek any of the responsibilities of fatherhood does not logically follow from 
his imprisonment.  Moreover, the record affirmatively refutes the majority’s 
statement; in his formal request that the court enter a judgment establishing his 
paternity, Heriberto acknowledged that, if the judgment is entered, he “will have 
 
58 
 
The majority’s conclusion also raises serious and doubtful constitutional 
questions with respect to the equal protection clause.  In Kelsey, we explained that 
when a biological father “has come forward to grasp his parental responsibilities, 
his parental rights are entitled to equal protection as those of the mother.”  (Kelsey, 
supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 849, fn. omitted.)  Contrary to this principle, under the 
majority’s conclusion, the parental rights of a biological father who has made the 
necessary commitment to his parental responsibilities do not receive the same 
protection as the parental rights of a biological mother.  As explained above, we 
held in Johnson that, under the UPA, the parentage claim of a woman who has 
established her biological maternity and who “from the outset intended to be the 
child’s mother” cannot be defeated based on the child’s best interests, even by 
another woman who also establishes a biological basis for parentage.  (Johnson, 
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 93.)  Here, the majority holds that a man in the same 
position—who has established his biological paternity, who moved in with the 
mother a year before the child’s birth and intended from the outset to be the 
child’s father, and who lived with the child and acted as her father for almost two 
years after her birth—does not enjoy the same protection; his parentage claim may 
be defeated if a court concludes that the child’s best interests are served by 
recognizing the paternity claim of someone with no biological basis for his claim.  
Thus, in interpreting the UPA as establishing lesser protection for the rights of a 
biological father, the majority’s holding renders our statutory scheme violative of 
the equal protection clause.  As we explained in Kelsey:  “We simply do not in our 
society take children away from their mothers—married or otherwise—” merely 
because a “best interest” inquiry suggests that “a ‘better’ . . . parent can be found. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the obligation to support the child until the child reaches,” at minimum, “the age 
of 18.”     
 
59 
. . .  [N]o valid reason [exists] why we should be less solicitous of a father’s” 
rights.  (Kelsey, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 846.)   
C.  Policy Considerations 
 
Finally, the majority can offer no persuasive policy basis for adopting a 
construction that fails to implement the Legislature’s intent and renders our 
statutory scheme unconstitutional.  As we explained in Johnson, the determination 
of who a child’s father is under the UPA—that is, “the determination of 
parentage”—is separate from the “eventual custody decision[]”; “[l]ogically, the 
determination of parentage must precede, and should not be dictated by, eventual 
custody decisions.”  (Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 93, fn. 10.)  As we also 
explained, basing the parentage determination on “the best interests of the child,” 
as the majority does, improperly “confuses concepts of parentage and custody.”  
(Ibid.)  If we properly keep these concepts separate, then Heriberto should be 
found to be Jesusa’s father under the statutes governing parentage determinations 
and questions of custody and termination of parental rights should be decided 
under the “dependency laws” that govern such matters.  (Ibid.)  If those 
dependency laws are applied on the facts here, then a juvenile court would surely 
deny Heriberto custody of Jesusa and terminate his parental rights.  (See Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1) [“convict[ion] of a felony indicating parental 
unfitness . . . constitute[s] a sufficient basis for termination of  parental rights” 
unless “termination would be detrimental to the child”].)  Thus, in this case, the 
majority’s construction and my construction will produce the same outcome. 
 
As this discussion demonstrates, the majority errs in asserting that, under 
my construction, “courts must ignore the child’s best interests in a dependency 
proceeding.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30.)  Under my construction, and as we held 
in Johnson, courts must consider the child’s best interests in a dependency 
 
60 
proceeding in determining termination and custody issues, not in determining 
parentage under the UPA.  Moreover, as the majority observes, paternity 
determinations occur in contexts other than dependency proceedings.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 7, fn. 2.)  To paraphrase the majority, our construction of the paternity 
statutes should not be driven by “the fortuity that a dependency petition is 
pending.”  (Ibid.) 
 
The majority is also incorrect regarding the effect of my construction where 
a child is “the product of rape.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 35, fn. 11.)  The majority 
asserts that, under these circumstances, my construction requires a court “to favor 
the biological father over any other presumed father.”  (Ibid.)  However, this 
assertion overlooks the fact that, under my construction, even though a biological 
father qualifies as a presumed father, his parental rights would surely be 
terminated where the child is the product of rape, and another presumed father 
would be able to obtain custody and parental rights through adoption.  The 
majority’s assertion also overlooks the fact that my approach is precisely the 
approach the Legislature, through its statutes, has dictated where a child is the 
product of rape and the rapist qualifies under section 7611 as a presumed father.  
(§§ 7611.5 [prohibiting rapists from becoming presumed fathers only if they do not 
qualify under § 7611]), 7825, subd. (b) [in action for order declaring child free 
from father’s custody and control, that child is product of rape raises “conclusive 
presumption” that “father is unfit to have custody or control”]; Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1) [“convict[ion] of a felony indicating parental unfitness . . . 
constitute[s] a sufficient basis for termination of  parental rights” unless 
“termination would be detrimental to the child”].)  The majority also errs in 
asserting that my construction gives a rapist “ ‘ “a right of reunification services 
. . . simply because [he] is the biological father of the child.” ’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 35, fn. 11.)  The majority’s assertion overlooks the fact that, consistent with 
 
61 
the Legislature’s express intent, my construction applies not to all biological 
fathers, but only to those who otherwise qualify as presumed fathers under section 
7611.  (See § 7611.5.)  More importantly, the majority’s assertion overlooks the 
fact that, even where a rapist qualifies as a presumed father, our statutes expressly 
deprive him of any right to reunification services.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.5, 
subds. (b)(12), (c), (e)(1).)  My construction has no effect on operation of these 
statutes. 
 
So, one may ask, if my construction and the majority’s would produce the 
same result here, then does any of this matter?  Yes; because, as we held only 10 
years ago, courts applying the UPA should not “decide parentage based on the 
best interests of the child,” and should keep parentage and custody decisions 
separate (Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th 84 at p. 93, fn. 10); because, as we also 
cautioned 10 years ago, deciding parentage on the basis of the child’s best interests 
“raises the repugnant specter of governmental interference in matters implicating 
our most fundamental notions of privacy” (ibid.); because we held in Kelsey that 
the “federal constitutional right[s]” of biological fathers like Heriberto “prohibit[]” 
termination of their parental relationship absent a showing of their “unfitness” as 
parents (Kelsey, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 849); and because the majority is 
announcing a rule that applies not only on the tragic facts of this case, but in every 
case where a biological father is confronted by a man who also qualifies as a 
presumed father. 
 
The majority’s claim that only a “small subset” of biological fathers is at 
risk under its holding (maj. opn., ante, at p. 25) is neither accurate nor reassuring.  
The majority errs in asserting that an unwed biological father can necessarily 
escape the effect of its conclusion simply “by executing a voluntary declaration of 
paternity.”  (Ibid.)  A voluntary paternity declaration is not effective without the 
mother’s signature.  (§ 7574, subd. (b)(1).)  Even if the mother signs, she can 
 
62 
rescind the voluntary declaration within 60 days of executing it.  (§ 7575, subd. 
(a).)  Thus, contrary to the majority’s statement, an unwed biological father cannot 
protect himself by unilaterally executing a paternity declaration.  Moreover, many 
biological fathers will, no doubt, fail to recognize the need to formalize their legal 
status by filing a paternity declaration until it is too late.  Here, for example, given 
that Jesusa lived with Heriberto throughout her life and Paul never claimed to be 
her father, Heriberto had no reason to know he needed to file a paternity 
declaration (even assuming, as the majority does, he did not actually do so).  Thus, 
for a variety of reasons, in many cases, the protection a voluntary paternity 
declaration affords will be unavailable.  
 
The majority also errs in asserting that unwed biological fathers can 
necessarily escape the effect of its conclusion by “successfully maintain[ing] a 
parent-child relationship such that no other man obtains the opportunity to qualify 
as a presumed father.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.)  Depending solely on the 
mother’s actions, another man can qualify for a presumption regardless of how 
successfully the unwed biological father maintains the parent-child relationship.  
For example, another man may become a presumed father if the mother either 
marries him or allows him to take the child into his home.  (§ 7611, subd. (c), (d).)  
Thus, contrary to the majority’s statement, its conclusion may apply to an unwed 
biological father notwithstanding his successful efforts to maintain a parent-child 
relationship. 
 
Indeed, the majority’s application of section 7611, subdivision (d), in this 
case amply demonstrates this fact.  The majority finds that, although Paul has 
never claimed to be Jesusa’s natural father, he qualifies as a presumed father under 
section 7611, subdivision (d), because Jesusa’s mother took Jesusa to Paul’s on 
weekends to be with Jesusa’s half siblings.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1, 11.)  Thus, 
under the majority’s analysis, Heriberto could have prevented Paul from 
 
63 
qualifying as a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d), only by 
limiting Jesusa’s time with her mother and half siblings.  Such behavior, which the 
majority’s conclusion encourages, would have been contrary to Jesusa’s best 
interests. 
 
Given today’s world, the substantial risk the majority’s conclusion poses 
for unwed biological fathers is no small matter.  According to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, in 2002, there were 1,365,966 births to unmarried 
women in the United States—more than one out of every three (34 percent)—and 
these numbers are similar to those reported “since 1995.”32   Recent statistics also 
show that 39 percent of children in the United States under the age of 18 live apart 
from their biological fathers.  (Sparling, All in the Family:  Recognizing the 
Unifying Potential of Same-Sex Marriage (2001) 10 Law & Sexuality 187, 202, 
fn. 86.)  Thus, literally thousands of unwed biological fathers are potentially at risk 
under the majority’s conclusion.   
 
Indeed, contrary to the majority’s claim, even biological fathers who 
“married the mother of their child” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 25) are at risk under the 
majority’s conclusion if they were not cohabiting with the mother at the time of 
conception or did not marry the mother until after the child’s birth.  (§§ 7540, 
7611, subd. (a), (c); see also Dawn D., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 935.)  Also at risk 
are biological fathers who thought they were validly married to the mother, but 
were not.  (§ 7611, subd. (b).)  These biological fathers, like the unwed biological 
fathers discussed above, are subject to the majority’s conclusion unless they both 
                                                 
32  
See http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_10.pdf (as of Mar. 1, 
2004). 
 
64 
recognize the need to take formal action and get the mother’s cooperation before a 
dispute arises.33  
 
Thus, the number of biological fathers—both married and unmarried—at 
risk under the majority’s holding is far greater than the majority suggests.  Under 
the majority’s holding, all of these biological fathers—no matter how law-abiding, 
loving and competent and no matter how well developed their relationship with 
their children—are at risk of having their parental rights terminated by a court’s 
subjective and discretionary determination that some other man who qualifies as a 
presumed father would be a better father.  Because the majority’s conclusion is not 
consistent with our statutes, the Legislature’s intent, or constitutional 
requirements, I dissent. 
 
II.  HERIBERTO HAD A STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE PERSONALLY 
PRESENT. 
 
Heriberto claims that under Penal Code section 2625, which sets forth 
certain statutory rights of prisoners with respect to actions involving their parental 
rights, the juvenile court erred in adjudicating the paternity issue and the 
dependency petition in his absence.  Regarding adjudication of the petition, the 
majority agrees and holds that the court erred.  I agree with that holding.34  
                                                 
33  
According to the majority’s own analysis, only one class of biological 
fathers—those “who are married to and cohabit with the mother” at the time of the 
child’s conception—do not need the mother’s cooperation after the child’s birth to 
be protected.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 25.)  Even this proposition is arguable.  
Section 7612, subdivision (b), without qualification, provides for the weighing of 
all presumptions that “arise under Section 7611,” and section 7611 expressly 
incorporates the presumption under “[s]ection 7540.”  Thus, where the husband is 
the biological father, even though his section 7540 presumption cannot be rebutted 
under subdivision (a) of section 7612, under subdivision (b) of that section, it is 
arguably subject to weighing against another man’s presumption. 
34  
I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the juvenile court’s error in 
this regard was harmless.  However, because the court’s error in determining 
paternity affected its disposition, I would reverse the dispositional order. 
 
65 
However, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the juvenile court did not err 
with respect to the paternity determination.  
Regarding the paternity determination, the majority asserts that Penal Code 
section 2625 requires a court to order a prisoner’s production “only ‘where the 
proceeding seeks to terminate the parental rights of [the] prisoner’ under Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 366.26 or Family Code section 7800 et seq. or ‘to 
adjudicate the child of a prisoner a dependent child.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)  
Because a paternity determination “is neither of these,” the majority asserts, the 
statute did not require the juvenile court to order Heriberto’s production.  Instead, 
the majority claims, the court had “discretion” to order his production under 
subdivision (e) of Penal Code section 2625, which provides that “[i]n any other 
action or proceeding in which a prisoner’s parental or marital rights are subject to 
adjudication,” the superior court “may” order the prisoner’s production in court.  
(See maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.) 
The majority is incorrect, because it misconstrues the statutory language.  
As relevant here, section 2625 does not, as the majority states, require the court to 
issue a production order only when the actual adjudication of dependency occurs.  
Rather, it provides that a juvenile court must:  (1) “[i]n . . . any proceeding brought 
under Section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code . . . to adjudicate the child 
of a prisoner a dependent child of the court, . . . order notice of any court 
proceeding regarding the proceeding transmitted to the prisoner” (Pen. Code, 
§ 2625, subd. (b), italics added); and (2) issue a production order “[u]pon receipt 
. . . of a statement from the prisoner or his or her attorney indicating the prisoner’s 
desire to be present during the court’s proceedings” (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. (d)).  
The juvenile court’s paternity determination here was unquestionably a 
“proceeding regarding the [Welfare and Institutions Code section 300] 
proceeding” involving Jesusa.  (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. (b).)  As explained 
 
66 
above, our statutes and court rules confirm this conclusion.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 316.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1413.)  Indeed, the majority acknowledges that 
the dependency petition here could not be adjudicated “ ‘without first identifying 
which man is the child’s father.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 37.)  Thus, under the 
statute’s plain language, because the paternity determination was a “proceeding 
regarding the [section 300] proceeding” involving Jesusa (Pen. Code, § 2625, 
subd. (b)), and because Heriberto asked to be present, the court was required to 
order Heriberto’s production.  (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. (d).)35 
As this discussion demonstrates, my analysis does not, as the majority 
asserts, “fail[] to recognize” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, fn. 2) that, as here relevant, 
Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (a) applies “[i]n . . . any proceeding brought 
under Section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code . . . to adjudicate the child 
of a prisoner a dependent child of the court.”  On the contrary, my analysis 
expressly acknowledges this fact but, unlike the majority’s, it does not focus only 
on this isolated phrase.  My construction gives effect to the entire provision, 
including the requirement that the court “order notice of any court proceeding 
regarding the proceeding transmitted to the prisoner.”  (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. 
(b), italics added.)  Thus, the statutory language itself expressly provides the 
“indication” the majority demands that the Legislature intended the right to appear 
under Penal Code section 2625 to apply to a paternity hearing where “a 
dependency petition is pending.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, fn. 2.) 
Indeed, despite its analysis, in a footnote the majority concedes that a 
prisoner’s right to be present under Penal Code section 2625 is not confined only 
                                                 
35  
The same analysis would apply if this were a proceeding to terminate 
parental rights “brought under Part 4 (commencing with Section 7800) of Division 
12 of the Family Code, and Section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code 
. . . .”  (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. (b).) 
 
67 
to the proceeding where the actual dependency adjudication occurs.  In this regard, 
the majority states its “view” that, under subdivision (b) of Penal Code section 
2625, the right also applies to any “jurisdictional hearing” that “precede[s]” the 
formal adjudication of the petition.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, fn. 2.)  I agree. 
However, the majority fails to justify its conclusion that, under subdivision 
(b) of Penal Code section 2625, the right applies to such jurisdictional hearings, 
but “not to” paternity determinations.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, fn. 2.)  In stating 
that the right also applies to jurisdictional hearings, the majority expressly 
concedes that the phrase “any court proceeding regarding the [Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 300] proceeding” (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. (b)) 
“encompass[es]” more than just the adjudication hearing.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, 
fn. 2.)  However, the majority does not explain why a jurisdictional hearing 
qualifies as “any court proceeding regarding the proceeding” (Pen. Code, § 2625, 
subd. (b)), but a paternity determination, which the majority concedes must be 
made “ ‘in many cases’ ” before the petition is adjudicated (maj. opn., ante, at p. 
37), does not.  The statutory language demonstrates that the majority is incorrect; 
if, as the majority asserts, the Legislature “intended” the statute to “encompass” 
only adjudication and disposition hearings (maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, fn. 2), then the 
Legislature would have said so and would not have broadly required notice in 
“any court proceeding regarding [a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300] 
proceeding.”  (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. (b), italics added.)  The majority cites no 
legislative history to support its narrow reading of this broad language.  Thus, the 
majority’s conclusory analysis is unconvincing.36 
                                                 
36  
The majority’s analysis is suspect for another reason.  It proceeds as if the 
juvenile court did not order Heriberto’s production and the question is whether this 
failure was an abuse of discretion.  However, the juvenile court did order 
Heriberto’s production at the July 17 hearing, and the issue is whether it had 
discretion to proceed despite noncompliance with its order.  Contrary to the 
 
68 
Nor is the majority correct that my construction would produce an “absurd 
result.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, fn. 2.)  The majority asserts that, under my 
conclusion, a juvenile court “must” give notice and order a prisoner’s production 
for “every” hearing in the course of the dependency proceeding.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 7, fn. 2.)  However, by the statute’s express terms, even after giving notice, a 
court must order the prisoner’s production only “[u]pon receipt . . . of a statement 
from the prisoner or his or her attorney indicating the prisoner’s desire to be 
present during the court’s proceedings . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. (d).)  We 
have no reason to believe that a prisoner would request to be present for mundane 
“housekeeping matters,” such as “scheduling hearings.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, 
fn. 2.)  Indeed, wise counsel would advise against such a course, so as not to 
irritate the judge who will be deciding the substantive issues.  Moreover, even 
after asking to be present, a prisoner may waive his right.  Again, wise counsel 
would advise a prisoner to follow this course.  Finally, contrary to the majority’s 
assertion, my construction does not even necessarily require that notice be given—
and the prisoner’s option thus invoked—with respect to all such mundane matters.  
In applying other statutes that mandate a criminal defendant’s presence at trial, we 
have held the presence requirement inapplicable to such matters.  (E.g., People v. 
Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 435.)  A similar limitation would be appropriate 
with respect to Penal Code section 2625.  Of course, as I have explained, the 
paternity determination at issue here was anything but mundane; it determined 
Heriberto’s parental rights and, as the majority concedes, had to be made before 
                                                                                                                                                 
majority’s statement (maj. opn., ante, at p. 6), this question was not answered in In 
re Barry W. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 358.  That decision considered whether the 
juvenile court, on the facts of that case, had discretion to decline to issue a 
production order and whether it had abused its discretion in refusing to issue such 
an order.  (Id. at pp. 363-371.)  That a court has discretion to decline to issue an 
order does not answer the separate question of whether a court has discretion to 
proceed where it has issued a production order and the order has not been obeyed. 
 
69 
the petition could be adjudicated.  Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, my 
construction would not produce an anomalous result.   
The majority’s fallback position—that Heriberto actually “was absent for 
only a portion of the presumed father hearing” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 10, italics 
added)—is simply incorrect.  In support of its assertion, the majority notes that 
Heriberto was present at hearings on April 13 and April 30, and was absent only 
for the July 17 hearing.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.)  However, the April 13 hearing 
was Heriberto’s first appearance in the case—the date he was “arraigned”—and it 
was during this arraignment that he was first advised that Paul was making a 
paternity claim.  This advisement hardly constituted adequate notice to qualify the 
hearing as part of the presumed father hearing.  Moreover, neither Paul nor 
Jesusa’s mother was present at the April 13 hearing; indeed, at a prior hearing, the 
court had directed that neither of them “should appear” at Heriberto’s arraignment.  
Like Heriberto, they were told to appear on April 30, when the court would be 
“determining the paternity.”  Given these facts, the April 17 hearing cannot be 
considered to be part of the paternity hearing simply because the court asked 
Heriberto’s counsel if he “want[ed] to be heard on any paternity issues today.”  
The majority’s reliance on the April 30 hearing is even more misplaced.  At that 
hearing, the court, on its own initiative, “continue[d] the issue as to paternity” to 
July 17 without hearing any argument on the issue.  Thus, contrary to the 
majority’s assertion, the July 17 hearing was not merely “a portion of the 
presumed father hearing” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 10); it constituted the entire 
paternity hearing and Heriberto was absent for all of it.  For all of these reasons, I 
disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Heriberto had no statutory right under 
Penal Code section 2625 to be personally present on July 17 when the juvenile 
court determined paternity.   
 
70 
 
Although I agree with the majority that Heriberto had such a statutory right 
with respect to adjudication of the petition, I have a comment about the majority’s 
analysis; it further demonstrates the majority’s attempt to obfuscate the fact that 
the juvenile court in this case made a paternity finding that terminates Heriberto’s 
rights, not merely a finding as to who “the presumed father” is.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 6.)  As relevant here, Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d), applies, by its 
terms, only where the dependency petition seeks “to adjudge the child of a 
prisoner a dependent child of the court.”  (Italics added.)  If, as I have 
demonstrated, the juvenile court ruled that Paul is Jesusa’s legal father, then 
subdivision (d) is simply inapplicable to the subsequent dependency adjudication; 
under the court’s ruling, Jesusa is not “the child of a prisoner.”  (Pen. Code, § 
2625, subd. (d).)  Indeed, in their briefs, both DCFS and Jesusa make precisely 
this argument.  DCFS asserts that, because “[t]he law allows for only one legal 
father,” once the court found in Paul’s favor, Heriberto no longer qualified as “an 
incarcerated ‘parent’ ” for purposes of applying Penal Code section 2625 and “had 
no standing” with respect to the dependency adjudication.  Similarly, the brief 
filed on Jesusa’s behalf asserts that, “once the court” ruled in Paul’s favor, 
Heriberto “no longer maintained his legal status as Jesusa’s parent” and “Penal 
Code section 2625 did not apply to him.”  The majority completely ignores these 
arguments; avoiding this threshold issue as to whether Penal Code section 2625 
even applies to the dependency adjudication in light of the juvenile court’s 
finding, the majority instead considers whether the presence of counsel satisfied 
the requirements of the statute and the due process clause.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 
38-44.)   
 
The majority’s consideration of the due process issue while remaining 
silent on the threshold issue violates our longstanding rule that we “ ‘ “will not 
decide constitutional questions where other grounds are available and dispositive 
 
71 
of the issues of the case.” ’  [Citations.]”  (Santa Clara County Local 
Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230.)  Under that 
principle, “ ‘we do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to 
do so to dispose of the matter before us.’  [Citations.]”  (Ibid.)  Here, we need not 
reach the constitutional due process issue if Penal Code section 2625 does not 
apply in light of the juvenile court’s paternity determination.  Thus, rather than 
ignore this potentially dispositive threshold issue that the parties have specifically 
raised, the majority should decide the issue before discussing Heriberto’s 
constitutional due process claim.  (Cf. Pearl v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 189, 196, fn. 3 [“[b]ecause” statute “is inapplicable, we need 
not, and do not, decide” claim that its application is unconstitutional]; Dibb v. 
County of San Diego (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1200, 1208 [“before considering” 
constitutional issue, “we must first consider whether” statute applies].) 
 
The majority’s failure to consider this issue, in contravention of our basic 
framework for interpreting statutes, enables the majority to avoid answering the 
crucial question of whether, in light of the juvenile court’s finding in favor of Paul, 
Heriberto is still Jesusa’s father.  In my view, the majority should take a stand on 
this question, because if, as I have explained, the juvenile court’s ruling 
establishes that Heriberto is not Jesusa’s father, then under Kelsey, the juvenile 
court has terminated his parental rights in violation of constitutional requirements.   
III.  CONCLUSION. 
 
Like the majority, I am deeply concerned about the fate of Jesusa.  
However, unlike the majority, I conclude that because Heriberto is both the 
biological father and a presumed father under section 7611, the statutes require us 
to address Jesusa’s fate through provisions governing custody and termination of 
parental rights, not through the paternity determination that occurred here.  Unlike 
the majority, which construes section 7612 in virtual isolation as if no other statute 
 
72 
or legislative history tells us anything about the Legislature’s policy decisions 
regarding biological paternity, I base my conclusion on section 7612 viewed in the 
context of the overall statutory scheme and its legislative history.  My conclusion 
also rests on constitutional considerations that apply in light of what actually 
happened here, but which the majority refuses to acknowledge:  that the juvenile 
court’s order terminated Heriberto’s parental rights.  Thus, although I share the 
majority’s concern, I cannot subscribe to its methods.  The result produced here 
under the majority’s construction ultimately can, and probably would, be produced 
through custody and termination proceedings without distorting our statutes 
governing parentage determinations, ignoring the Legislature’s expressed intent, 
and rendering our statutes unconstitutional.  Finally, unlike the majority, I 
conclude that where a biological father who is a prisoner files a paternity claim in 
a dependency proceeding and asks to be present when the claim is decided, 
permitting a court to reject the claim—and thereby terminate his parental rights—
in his involuntary absence is contrary to statute.  I therefore dissent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Jesusa V. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 97 Cal.App.4th 878 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S106843 
Date Filed: March 1, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Marilyn Kading Martinez, Commissioner 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Lisa A. DiGrazia for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, and Lois D. Timnick, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles, Law Offices of Kenneth P. Sherman, Marissa Coffey and Kenneth 
P. Sherman for Minor 
 
Donna Wickham Furth and Shannan Wilber for Northern California Association of Counsel for Children 
and Legal Services for Children as Amici Curiae on behalf of Minor. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John L. Dodd 
17621 Irvine Blvd., Suite 200 
Tustin, CA  92780 
(714) 731-5572 
 
Lois D. Timnick 
Deputy County Counsel 
201 Centre Plaza Drive, Suite One 
Monterey Park, CA  91754 
(323) 526-6369 
 
Marissa Coffey 
Law Offices of Kenneth P. Sherman 
201 Centre Plaza Drive, Suite 8 
Monterey Park, CA  91754 
(323) 980-8751