Title: State v. John D. Williams

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 1 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0535-CR 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
John D. Williams,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 7 
Reported at: 
241 Wis. 2d 1, 624 N.W.2d 164 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 3, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 16, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ozaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas R. Wolfgram   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: WILCOX, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
CROOKS and SYKES, J.J., join. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Sandra L. Nowack, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by John A. 
Pray and the Frank J. Remington Center, Madison, and oral 
argument by John A. Pray. 
 
 
2002 WI 1 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-0535-CR 
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 27) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
John D. Williams,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 3, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Williams, 2001 WI App 7, 241 Wis. 2d 1, 624 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 
2000).  The court of appeals reversed a judgment of the Circuit 
Court for Ozaukee County, Tom R. Wolfgram, Circuit Court Judge, 
which had denied the motion of John D. Williams, the defendant, 
for resentencing.  The circuit court denied the defendant's 
motion for post-conviction relief, concluding that the State did 
not breach the plea agreement at the sentencing proceeding.  The 
court of appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court, 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
2 
 
concluding that the State did breach the plea agreement at the 
sentencing proceeding, and remanded the cause for resentencing. 
¶2 
Two issues are presented in this case.  First, what 
standard of review applies in breach of plea agreement cases?  
We conclude that the terms of the plea agreement and the 
historical 
facts 
of 
the 
State's 
conduct 
that 
allegedly 
constitute a breach of a plea agreement are questions of fact.  
We further conclude that whether the State's conduct constitutes 
a breach of a plea agreement and whether the breach is material 
and substantial are questions of law. 
¶3 
Second, did the State breach the plea agreement in the 
present case and was the breach material and substantial?  
Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law.  
We conclude as a matter of law that the State breached the plea 
agreement in a material and substantial manner.  We therefore 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals that the cause 
should be remanded to the circuit court for resentencing. 
 
I 
 
¶4 
Our first inquiry is the standard of review this court 
applies in breach of plea agreement cases.  This court clearly 
set forth the standard of review an appellate court is to apply 
in State v. Wills, 193 Wis. 2d 273, 277, 533 N.W.2d 165 (1995).  
¶5 
According to the Wills case: 
(1) The terms of the plea agreement and the historical 
facts of the State's conduct that allegedly constitute 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
3 
 
a breach of a plea agreement are questions of fact.1  
An 
appellate 
court 
reviews 
the 
circuit 
court's 
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard 
of review.2  
(2) Whether the State's conduct constitutes a breach 
of a plea agreement is a question of law.3  The Wills 
case does not explicitly address the standard to be 
                                                 
1 State v. Wills, 193 Wis. 2d 273, 277, 533 N.W.2d 165 
(1995). 
2 Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2) 
(1999-2000) 
("findings of 
fact 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses"); State v. Wills, 193 
Wis. 2d at 277. 
3 State v. Wills, 193 Wis. 2d at 277.  See also United 
States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing United 
States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989)); 
United States v. Schilling, 142 F.3d 388, 394 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(citing United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th 
Cir. 1981)); United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 269 (1st 
Cir. 1992) (whether the government breached its plea agreement 
is a question of law and our review is plenary); United States 
v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1360 (3d Cir. 1989) (whether the 
government's conduct breaches the terms of the plea agreement is 
a question of law and the review is plenary); United States v. 
Calabrese, 645 F.2d at 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) ("If the pleadings 
reveal a factual dispute on the issue of breach, the district 
court must hold a hearing to resolve the factual issues.  If the 
pleadings reveal no disputed factual issues, no hearing is 
necessary and the court may determine the issue of breach as a 
matter of law."); United States v. Cafaro, 1988 WL 138180 
(S.D.N.Y.) ("[I]n this case there is no dispute either as to the 
terms of the agreement or the act occasioning the breach.  
Therefore no hearing is necessary and this Court determines, as 
a matter of law . . . that Cafaro breached his cooperation 
agreement.") (citing United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d at 
1390) (10th Cir. 1981)). 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
4 
 
used to review the issue of whether a breach is 
material and substantial.  When a breach is material 
and substantial, a plea agreement may be vacated4 or 
resentencing ordered.5  We conclude that the question 
of material and substantial breach is one of law 
because the court is determining whether the facts 
fulfill a particular legal standard.6  This court 
determines questions of law independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals, but benefiting 
from their analyses. 
(3) Some breach of plea agreement cases present both 
disputed questions of fact and questions of law.  In 
such cases, this court reviews the facts under a 
clearly 
erroneous 
standard 
of 
review 
and 
then 
determines questions of law independent of the circuit 
court and court of appeals, but benefiting from their 
analyses.7 
¶6 
The parties appear to agree that the Wills case has 
set forth the appropriate standard of review in breach of plea 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 272, 558 
N.W.2d 379 (1997); State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 289, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 414, 216 
N.W.2d 395 (1982). 
5 State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 281. 
6 State v. Brandt, 226 Wis. 2d 610, 618, 594 N.W.2d 759 
(1999); Dep't of Revenue v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 713, 
281 N.W.2d 94 (1979).   
7 State v. Wills, 193 Wis. 2d at 277. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
5 
 
agreement cases.  But the parties disagree about two issues that 
are tangentially related to the standard of review and that are 
related to each other: the "clear and convincing evidence" rule 
and the "close case" rule.  We do not adopt either of these 
rules because they would incorrectly apply an evidentiary 
standard for the burden of persuasion as a standard of review 
for questions of law. 
¶7 
The first issue tangentially related to the standard 
of review is the "clear and convincing evidence" rule.  Several 
cases both before and after Wills appear to promulgate a clear 
and convincing evidence burden of persuasion.  These cases 
declared that a defendant who asserts a breach of a plea 
agreement must show, "by clear and convincing evidence, not only 
that a breach occurred, but also that it was material and 
substantial."8   
                                                 
8 State v. Jorgensen, 137 Wis. 2d 163, 168, 404 N.W.2d 66 
(Ct. App. 1987).  Jorgensen was decided before the Wills case.  
For other cases decided before Wills that use the clear and 
convincing evidence language, see, for example, State v. 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 289 (a party seeking to vacate a plea 
agreement has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing 
evidence both the breach and that the breach was sufficiently 
material to warrant releasing the party from its promises); 
State v. Windom, 169 Wis. 2d 341, 347, 485 N.W.2d 832 (Ct. App. 
1992) (whether a breach of contract exists involves a question 
of law; party asserting a breach of a plea agreement must show 
by clear and convincing evidence, not only that a breach 
occurred, but also that it was material and substantial). 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
6 
 
¶8 
This language intimates that whether a breach exists 
and whether the breach is material and substantial are questions 
of fact to be proved by clear and convincing evidence.  Indeed 
in State v. Jorgensen, 137 Wis. 2d 167, 169, 404 N.W.2d 66 (Ct. 
App. 1987), the court of appeals unambiguously stated that 
"whether a breach of contract exists involves a question of 
fact."  Other court of appeals cases, however, both before and 
after Jorgensen, viewed the question of whether the State 
                                                                                                                                                             
For a case decided after Wills that uses the clear and 
convincing evidence language, see State ex rel. Warren v. 
Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 643, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998).  The 
Warren court concluded that a party seeking to vacate a plea 
agreement must establish by clear and convincing evidence that a 
material and substantial breach of the agreement has occurred, 
citing State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 289, and State v. 
Jorgensen, 137 Wis. 2d at 168.  The Warren court also concluded, 
in apparent conflict with the ruling just stated, that the facts 
relating to the terms of the plea agreement and the prosecutor's 
actions in that case were not in dispute and therefore a 
question of law was presented to be reviewed de novo, citing 
State v. Wills, 193 Wis. 2d at 277, and State v. Ferguson, 166 
Wis. 2d 317, 320-21, 479 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1991).  
The appellate court in these cases did not apply a clear 
and convincing evidence standard as a standard of review.  
Rather, the appellate court made its own determination, as a 
question of law, whether the breach occurred and whether it was 
substantial and material. 
In many cases involving breaches of plea agreements, no 
reference is made to the clear and convincing evidence rule.  
See, e.g., State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258; State v. McQuay, 154 
Wis. 2d 116, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990); State v. Hanson, 2000 WI App 
10, 232 Wis. 2d 291, 606 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. 
Knox, 213 Wis. 2d 318, 570 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d 317; State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d 359, 394 
N.W.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1986). 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
7 
 
breached the plea agreement as a question of law.9  In State v. 
Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d 317, 320-21, 479 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 
1991), a decision rendered after the Jorgensen case and without 
citing Jorgensen, the court of appeals declared that whether the 
State's conduct breached the terms of the plea agreement is a 
question of law reviewed de novo.10  
¶9 
The Jorgensen and Ferguson cases cannot be readily 
reconciled.11  Indeed the State's brief in Wills called the 
court's attention to this conflicting line of cases that 
promulgated two different standards of review and argued in 
favor of the standard of review that the Wills court adopted. 
¶10 The 
Wills 
decision 
explicitly 
declares 
that 
determining the existence of a breach is a question of law, 
resolving the two different standards of review set forth in 
prior cases.  Wills cites Jorgensen for the proposition that 
                                                 
9 For cases prior to Jorgensen, see, e.g., State v. Poole, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 
361 
(concluding 
that 
when 
the 
facts 
are 
undisputed, whether a breach occurred is a question of law).   
For cases after Jorgensen, see, e.g., State v. Knox, 213 
Wis. 2d at 321 (concluding that whether the State breached the 
plea agreement is a question of law). 
10 State v. Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 320-21 (citing State v. 
Poole, 131 Wis. 2d at 361 (facts were undisputed) and United 
States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1360 (facts were disputed)).   
11 For a case after Ferguson that cites Jorgensen (and 
ignores Ferguson) for the proposition that whether a breach of 
contract exists involves a question of fact, see State v. 
Windom, 169 Wis. 2d at 349 (whether a breach of contract exists 
involves a question of fact; party asserting a breach of a plea 
agreement must show by clear and convincing evidence, not only 
that a breach occurred, but also that it was material and 
substantial). 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
8 
 
when there is a dispute about facts, then the appellate court 
gives deference to the factual findings of the circuit court 
unless 
clearly 
erroneous.12 
 
It 
cites 
Ferguson 
for 
the 
proposition that when there are no disputed facts on appeal, the 
question of whether the State breached the terms of the 
agreement is a question of law that is determined de novo.13  
Wills then concludes that if there is both a disputed question 
of fact and a question of whether the facts establish a breach, 
the court must first review the facts under the clearly 
erroneous standard of review and then determine as a matter of 
law under a de novo standard of review whether the State 
breached the terms of the plea agreement.14 
¶11 Nevertheless, 
the 
clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
language continued to have vitality after Wills15 and is 
discussed by the parties in the present case. 
¶12 The State's brief in the present case recognizes that 
clear and convincing evidence ordinarily describes the middle 
burden of persuasion imposed on a party who has the obligation 
to prove facts, but concludes that the language has significance 
for 
appellate 
review 
even 
though 
Wills 
sets 
forth 
the 
controlling standard of review.16  The clear and convincing 
                                                 
12 State v. Wills, 193 Wis. 2d at 277. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 277-78. 
15 See, e.g., Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 643. 
16 State's Brief at 19. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
9 
 
evidence burden of persuasion describes the affirmative proof a 
party must produce to establish a fact at issue.  The clear and 
convincing evidence burden is directed to the trier of facts in 
the circuit court; the clear and convincing evidence burden is 
not ordinarily a standard of review for an appellate court in 
determining questions of law.17   
¶13 The State interprets the clear and convincing evidence 
language used in several cases relating to breach of plea 
agreements 
to 
mean 
that 
the 
defendant 
must 
clearly 
and 
convincingly persuade this court of the correctness of his 
position on the questions of law involved in the present case.  
According to the State, the clear and convincing evidence rule 
provides guidance to the court concerning the degree of 
confidence the court should have in its legal conclusions when 
the issues are whether a party has breached a plea agreement and 
whether the breach is material and substantial.  The State urges 
that for the defendant to succeed in the present case, this 
court must be persuaded clearly and convincingly that the State 
breached the plea agreement and that the breach was material and 
substantial.18   
                                                 
17 "The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the 
fact-finder as to the degree of confidence our society thinks he 
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a 
particular type of proceeding."  Odd S.-G. v. Carolyn S.-G., 194 
Wis. 2d 365, 378, 533 N.W.2d 794 (1995). 
18 It seems that the State is arguing that just as a court 
must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that a law is 
unconstitutional, the court must be clearly and convincingly 
persuaded that a breach occurred and that it was material and 
substantial. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
10 
 
¶14 The State argues that this burden of persuasion for 
the questions of law is correct because it furthers the public 
policy favoring finality of judgments, the free flow of 
information to sentencing courts, the legislative directive 
protecting rights of crime victims, and the importance of 
negotiated pleas in efficiently disposing of criminal cases 
while protecting the public.   
¶15 We 
are 
not 
convinced 
by 
the 
State's 
argument.  
Determinations of questions of law are not ordinarily discussed 
in terms of a burden of persuasion.  Furthermore, the State's 
principal reason for applying the clear and convincing burden of 
persuasion to these questions of law, namely, to support 
finality of judgments, is not persuasive.  Finality is an 
important value in criminal cases, as the State argues, but 
finality must be balanced against an accused's due process right 
to the benefit of a plea agreement.  The State does not offer an 
explanation, and we cannot think of one, to justify why the 
values explicated by the State should outweigh, as a matter of 
law, an accused's due process rights.  Accordingly, we do not 
graft the clear and convincing evidence burden of persuasion to 
the standard of review applied to questions of law in breach of 
plea agreement cases. 
¶16 The second issue tangentially related to the standard 
of review and to the clear and convincing evidence rule is the 
"close case" rule, sometimes referred to as the "close call" 
rule.  The State's principal objection to the court of appeals' 
decision in the present case is to the court of appeals' 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
11 
 
adoption of the close case rule to evaluate whether the State's 
conduct constitutes a breach of the plea agreement and whether 
the breach is material and substantial.  Close cases are those 
in which it is difficult to discern whether the State presented 
information to the circuit court in a way that implied that the 
State had second thoughts about the plea agreement.   
¶17 Under the close case rule, "plea agreements should be 
construed 
in 
favor 
of 
the 
defendants."19 
 
The 
defendant 
interprets the close case rule to create a standard that is 
"lower" than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard.20  
Thus "under the 'close call' rule, a court may rule that the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement even if it is more likely 
that there was no breach, as long as it is 'close.'  In other 
words, if a court is unsure as to whether a breach occurred, but 
it is a 'close call,' then the defendant should prevail."21 
¶18 The defendant argues that this court should follow the 
court of appeals and adopt the close case rule in light of the 
benefits the State derives from plea agreements, the State's 
duty to honor those agreements, and the fundamental rights 
waived by an accused who enters a plea agreement.  The State 
objects to the close case rule, asserting that, under this rule, 
cases would be decided in favor of an accused even when there 
was some question whether a breach occurred. 
                                                 
19 State v. Witte, 245 N.W.2d 438, 439 (Minn. 1976). 
20 Defendant's Brief at 29. 
21 Id. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
12 
 
¶19 We decline to adopt the close case rule as a standard 
of appellate review for several reasons.  First, adoption of the 
rule would be inconsistent with precedent.  Wisconsin courts 
have not applied the close case rule in previous cases.  Second, 
determinations of questions of law are not ordinarily discussed 
in terms of burden of persuasion.  Third, the close case rule 
does not give sufficient recognition to the values described by 
the State in arguing in favor of the clear and convincing 
evidence rule, such as the finality of judgments, the free flow 
of 
information 
to 
sentencing 
courts, 
the 
protection 
of 
legislatively 
mandated 
rights 
of 
crime 
victims, 
and 
the 
importance of negotiated pleas in efficiently disposing of 
criminal cases while protecting the public. 
¶20 For the reasons set forth, we review the circuit 
court's determination of historical facts, such as the terms of 
the plea agreement and the State's conduct that allegedly 
constitutes a breach, under the clearly erroneous standard of 
review 
and 
then 
determine 
whether 
the 
State's 
conduct 
constitutes a substantial and material breach of the plea 
agreement as a question of law.  Consequently, we reject the 
clear and convincing evidence rule and the close case rule. 
 
II 
 
¶21 The parties disagree about the application of the 
standard of review to the present case.  
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
13 
 
¶22 We first review the facts in the present case.  We 
then apply the standard of review to the facts of this case. 
¶23 The defendant was charged with two felony counts of 
failure to pay child support.  The State and the defendant 
entered into a plea agreement.  
¶24 The terms of the plea agreement are not in dispute.  
The defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count of failure to 
pay child support, to pay all arrearages, and to pay current 
child support, in exchange for the State's promise to dismiss 
the other count and recommend a sentence of three years' 
probation with 60 days in the county jail.22  A sentencing court 
is not bound or controlled by any understanding between an 
accused and the State regarding the sentence, and a sentencing 
court may not participate in a plea agreement.23 
¶25 The circuit court accepted the plea and ordered a 
presentence investigation.  The presentence investigation report 
recommended "a medium term of imprisonment."  The circuit court 
sentenced the defendant to 18 months in prison.   
¶26 The State's conduct allegedly constituting a breach of 
the plea agreement is not in dispute.  The State's exact words 
are preserved in the record.  The significant words at the 
sentencing hearing that are alleged to constitute the breach 
                                                 
22 Although 
it 
is 
not 
clear 
that 
the 
jail 
time 
recommendation was part of the plea agreement, the defendant 
does not object to the State's recommendation, and it is not an 
issue in the case. 
23 Young v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 361, 366, 182 N.W.2d 262 
(1971). 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
14 
 
relate 
to 
the 
prosecutor's 
comments 
on 
the 
presentence 
investigation report and on the prosecutor's conversation with 
the 
defendant's 
ex-wife. 
 
We 
set 
forth 
at 
length 
the 
prosecutor's remarks at sentencing, as well as the defendant's 
and circuit court's responses: 
 
Judge, I believe that when [the defendant] entered his 
plea that we had told the Court that we would be 
recommending a presentence investigation.  And that we 
would be recommending that sentence be withheld for a 
period of three years——I am sorry, that he be placed 
on probation for a period of three years, that he pay 
arrearages and pay current child support.  And then as 
a condition of the probation he be incarcerated in the 
county jail for a period of 60 days. 
After reading through the presentence, it appears that 
I think I can best describe my impression of this 
defendant 
as 
manipulative 
and unwilling 
to 
take 
responsibility.  I have had occasion to speak with 
[the defendant's ex-wife].  And she has indicated 
things that she will be presenting to the Court. But 
it was quite a contrast, speaking with her and reading 
and learning about [the defendant].  
Judge, when she [the defendant's ex-wife] speaks to 
you you are going to learn about a mother who has done 
everything she can for her daughter, has taken on the 
obligation, the responsibilities of raising a child, 
and has had to do it on her own because the father of 
that child [the defendant] has done everything to 
completely do the opposite.  He has taken on no real 
meaning in terms of creating a relationship.  And you 
will learn of some of that later on.  It's quite 
frankly disheartening and saddening to know that 
someone could have a daughter who . . . has turned 18, 
and with all the opportunities to have a relationship, 
denied that.  And it hasn't been because the mother 
has denied it, it is the defendant himself.  He always 
had free access and chose——he made the choice not to 
have a relationship.  When we create life we have to 
take on the responsibility.  You will also learn there 
was a time where through the Child Support Agency 
there were many efforts to get Mr. Williams to pay 
child support.  We are talking about a nominal amount 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
15 
 
of money he was ordered to pay, $50 a week.  I don't 
think any of us think that that's extravagant.  That's 
just minimal.  And he was working at a job earning $14 
an hour, had health insurance, but yet never included 
his daughter on it.  And you are going to learn of 
some health problems that the daughter has that the 
health insurance certainly would have been of great 
assistance.  
When speaking with [the defendant's ex-wife], she 
informed me that at one point when she remarried to a 
very caring person who took on Mr. Williams' daughter 
as his own, and when they wanted to adopt her, Mr. 
Williams refused to give up his rights, but yet he 
wouldn't call, he didn't write, he didn't see, he 
wouldn't even pay the support for his daughter.  It 
just is very frustrating to think that someone could 
completely walk away and be so uncaring about a child.  
The presentence writer, we had a conversation on June 
8th with her.  She had indicated she would be in 
court, but I don't see that she has arrived.  She had 
made a few comments that I will relay to the court. 
 . . .  She reiterated to [prosecutor] Mr. Sisley that 
it was her belief that the defendant needs to go to 
prison.  . . .  She had indicated that she was aware 
that the defendant had a cell phone, and the defendant 
had been driving all around and has access to a 
vehicle.  He has been arrested for operating while 
suspended in the past.  . . .  She reiterated to Mr. 
Sisley that it was her belief that the defendant needs 
to go to prison.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
¶27 At this point, the defendant objected and argued that 
the State was undercutting its sentencing recommendation by 
relaying information that did not reflect the State's position 
and that the State was covertly changing its sentencing 
recommendation.  The defense counsel addressed the circuit court 
as follows: 
 
Judge, I am just going to object here.  The state 
seems to be undercutting its recommendation to the 
Court by relaying things that are not the state's 
position, they are an agent's position.  Her comments 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
16 
 
are in the P.S.I.  And I have at a certain point——I am 
not sure where——to object.  But it seems to me that 
the state is in essence seems to be undermining the 
recommendation that was put out and which Mr. Williams 
entered a plea.  So I guess I am just calling——raising 
an objection here and seeing where we are going with 
this.  Because it seems to me that obviously the state 
can make its argument, but I think if it gets to the 
point where the state is basically saying we want to 
change our recommendation, or we think the Court 
should without saying so, that's certainly something 
that is a problem. 
 
¶28 The circuit court responded, "I agree."  Apparently 
the circuit court was agreeing that it would be a problem if the 
State changed its recommendation but was not ruling on defense 
counsel's objection.   
¶29 The prosecutor then explicitly stated that she was not 
changing her recommendation and that she was only relaying 
information from the author of the presentence investigation 
report because the author of the presentence investigation 
report was not present.  The prosecutor's reply to the defense 
counsel's statement is as follows: 
 
And Judge, if I indicated anything other than what our 
recommendation is, the presentence was here.  We were 
prepared to go to sentencing, and the agent relayed 
this information to us.  And I am merely supplying the 
Court with that information.  I am in no means 
suggesting that I am asking the Court to adopt the 
agent's recommendation.  I believe that the sentencing 
court should have all the information necessary.  And 
I am just merely relaying it.  She had indicated she 
would be here, and that was the information she had 
given us.  So again I will reiterate, Judge, we are 
standing by our recommendation, and I have not changed 
that, and that's why I started off by saying we were 
recommending the three years probation.  We had placed 
that on the record when the defendant entered his 
plea, and again today at sentencing. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
17 
 
 
¶30 Thereafter, the defendant's ex-wife addressed the 
court and asked for justice for having been forced to raise the 
child as a single parent without financial assistance from the 
defendant.  She made no recommendation regarding the sentence.  
The defendant then requested that the court follow the State's 
recommendation to place him on probation. 
¶31 The parties disagree about how the prosecutor's words 
at the sentencing hearing should be interpreted, especially the 
words emphasized above.   
¶32 The State argues that the circuit court correctly 
interpreted the prosecutor's words to be a mere summary of the 
presentence investigation 
report and 
the victim's pending 
statement.  The State further argues that the circuit court's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
prosecutor's 
words, 
although 
not 
characterized as a finding of fact by the circuit court, is a 
factual determination to which the clearly erroneous standard of 
review applies.   
¶33 The 
State 
reasons 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
interpretation should be accorded the deference of the clearly 
erroneous standard of review because the circuit court had the 
"vantage point" of being in the room when the prosecutor spoke 
and 
"presumably 
heard 
voice 
inflections, 
observed 
facial 
expressions, and listened to pauses that are not ordinarily 
captured in cold transcripts."24   
                                                 
24 State's Brief at 31. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
18 
 
¶34 The circuit court in the present case did not, 
however, base its interpretation of the prosecutor's comments on 
its recollection of the sentencing hearing, which would have 
included 
memories 
of 
voice 
inflections, 
observed 
facial 
expressions, and pauses in the testimony.25  The post-conviction 
hearing was held seven months after the sentencing proceeding, 
and it is obvious from the record that the circuit court did not 
recollect the sentencing proceedings.  Rather, the circuit court 
interpreted the prosecutor's comments by reading the written 
record of the plea and sentencing hearings.   
¶35 The meaning of words in a document that is not 
dependent on a fact-finder's appraisal of the demeanor or 
credibility of a witness is a question of law to be determined 
independently by the reviewing court.26  Thus, the interpretation 
of the written transcript of the prosecutor's comments in the 
present case is a question of law to be determined independently 
by this court, not a question of fact to be given deference as 
the State asserts. 
 
                                                 
25 The defendant and the defendant's trial counsel testified 
at the post-conviction hearing but their testimony is not 
relevant to the issue discussed here. 
26 Levy v. Levy, 130 Wis. 2d 523, 528-29, 388 N.W.2d 170 
(1986) 
(premarital 
agreement); 
Edlin 
v. 
Soderstrom, 
83 
Wis. 2d 58, 69, 264 N.W.2d 275 (1978) (deed); RTE v. Maryland 
Cas. Co., 74 Wis. 2d 614, 621, 247 N.W.2d 171 (1976) (insurance 
policy); Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 53 Wis. 2d 299, 303, 
206 N.W.2d 152 (1973) (lease); State v. Windom, 169 Wis. 2d at 
348-49 (plea agreement). 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
19 
 
III 
 
¶36 We now apply the standard of review to the facts of 
the present case.  We must determine the questions of law 
presented:  Did the State breach the plea agreement and was the 
breach material and substantial?   
¶37 The principal rule of law applicable to the present 
case is that an accused has a constitutional right to the 
enforcement of a negotiated plea agreement.27  An agreement by 
the State to recommend a particular sentence may induce an 
accused to give up the constitutional right to a jury trial.28  
Consequently, once an accused agrees to plead guilty in reliance 
upon a prosecutor's promise to perform a future act, the 
accused's due process rights demand fulfillment of the bargain.29   
¶38 A prosecutor who does not present the negotiated 
sentencing recommendation to the circuit court breaches the plea 
agreement.30  An actionable breach must not be merely a technical 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 271; State v. 
Scott, 230 Wis. 2d 643, 651, 602 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984)). 
28 State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 271. 
29 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).  See 
also State v. Bond, 139 Wis. 2d 179, 188, 407 N.W.2d 277 (Ct. 
App. 1987) ("Essentially any violation of a prosecutorial 
promise triggers considerations of fundamental fairness and is a 
deprivation of due process.") (emphasis omitted). 
30 State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 272 (citing State v. 
Poole, 131 Wis. 2d at 364). 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
20 
 
breach; it must be a material and substantial breach.31  When the 
breach is material and substantial, a plea agreement may be 
vacated or an accused may be entitled to resentencing.32  A 
material and substantial breach is a violation of the terms of 
the agreement that defeats the benefit for which the accused 
bargained.33  
¶39 In the present case, the State accurately stated 
before the circuit court the terms of the plea agreement that 
were agreed to between the State and the defendant and confirmed 
the State's sentencing recommendation under the plea agreement.  
But the defendant contends that the State breached the plea 
agreement 
when it 
discussed 
the 
presentence 
investigation 
report, which recommended a medium term of incarceration, and 
previewed 
the 
victim's 
statement, 
which 
focused 
on 
the 
defendant's failure to support his child both financially and 
emotionally.  The defendant asserts that the State undercut the 
plea agreement by implicitly conveying the message that it was 
questioning the wisdom of the plea agreement.   
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 643; State v. Smith, 
207 Wis. 2d at 272; State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 289-90. 
32 State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 272; State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 268; State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 414 (1982); 
State v. Windom, 169 Wis. 2d at 349; State v. Jorgensen, 137 
Wis. 2d at 168. 
33 State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 289-90; State v. Knox, 
213 Wis. 2d at 323. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
21 
 
¶40 The courts have explained the responsibilities of the 
State when setting forth the plea agreement to the sentencing 
court in the following variety of ways.   
¶41 As Court of Appeals Judge Neal P. Nettesheim stated in 
his dissent in the present case, a prosecutor must not be the 
proverbial potted plant at a sentencing hearing.   
¶42 While a prosecutor need not enthusiastically recommend 
a plea agreement,34 the court of appeals has stated that he or 
she "may not render less than a neutral recitation of the terms 
of the plea agreement."35  "End runs" around a plea agreement are 
prohibited.36  "The State may not accomplish by indirect means 
what it promised not to do directly, and it may not covertly 
convey to the trial court that a more severe sentence is 
warranted than that recommended."37 
¶43 Neither may a prosecutor agree to keep relevant 
information from the sentencing judge, according to the court of 
appeals.38  Such an agreement is against public policy and cannot 
                                                 
34 State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d at 364. 
35 Id. 
36 State v. Hanson, 2000 WI App 10, ¶24. 
37 Id.; State v. Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 322. 
38 The prosecutor is an officer of the court and holds a 
"quasi-judicial" office.  A prosecutor's interest is not to win 
a case but to see that justice shall be done.  A prosecutor may 
strike hard blows but not foul ones.  State v. Neuser, 191 
Wis. 2d 131, 139, 528 N.W.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1995). 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
22 
 
be respected by the court.39  This rule is intended to protect 
the integrity of the sentencing process by ensuring that the 
court charged with determining the sentence is not intentionally 
deprived of relevant information concerning the accused at the 
time of sentencing.40  At sentencing, pertinent factors relating 
to the defendant's character and behavioral pattern cannot be 
immunized by a plea agreement between the defendant and the 
State.41   
¶44 The State must balance its duty to convey relevant 
information to the sentencing court against its duty to honor 
the plea agreement.  Thus, as the court of appeals has written, 
the State must walk "a fine line" at a sentencing hearing.42  A 
prosecutor may convey information to the sentencing court that 
is both favorable and unfavorable to an accused, so long as the 
State abides by the plea agreement.  That line is fine indeed.  
¶45 The defendant argues that the State stepped over the 
fine line by appearing to adopt as its own view the unfavorable 
information 
about 
the 
defendant 
from 
the 
presentence 
investigation report and the ex-wife, rather than merely 
relaying that information to the sentencing court.  The 
                                                 
39 See Grant v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 243 N.W.2d 186 
(1976), writ of habeas corpus granted, 450 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. 
Wis. 1978). 
40 State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d at 126. 
41 Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 286 N.W.2d 559 
(1980). 
42 State v. Hanson, 2000 WI App 10, ¶27.   
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
23 
 
defendant contends that the State intimated to the court that it 
no longer supported the plea agreement.   
¶46 We must examine the entire sentencing proceeding to 
evaluate the prosecutor's remarks.43  Upon reviewing the State's 
comments in the context of the sentencing hearing, we conclude, 
as a matter of law, that the State stepped over the fine line 
between relaying information to the circuit court on the one 
hand and undercutting the plea agreement on the other hand.  The 
State substantially and materially breached the plea agreement 
because it undercut the essence of the plea agreement.   
¶47 In this case the State's recitation of the plea 
agreement was less than neutral.  In her statements to the 
sentencing court, the prosecutor implied that had the State 
known more about the defendant, it would not have entered into 
the plea agreement.  For example, the prosecutor stated, "After 
reading through the presentence, it appears that I think I can 
best describe my impression of this defendant as manipulative 
and unwilling to take any responsibility.  I have had an 
occasion to speak with [the defendant's ex-wife].  And she has 
indicated things that she will be presenting to the Court.  But 
it was quite a contrast, speaking with her and reading and 
learning about [the defendant]."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶48 The State adopted the information acquired from the 
presentence investigation report after the plea agreement had 
been reached as its own opinion of the defendant.  The 
                                                 
43 Id. at ¶26. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
24 
 
prosecutor's declaration of her personal opinion created the 
impression 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
was 
arguing 
against 
the 
negotiated terms of the plea agreement.  We agree with the court 
of appeals that "what the prosecutor may not do is personalize 
the information, adopt the same negative impressions as [the 
author of the presentence investigation report] and then remind 
the court that the [author] had recommended a harsher sentence 
than recommended.  That is what happened here."44 
¶49 The impression that the State was backing away from 
the plea agreement was furthered by the fact that the prosecutor 
began her comments to the sentencing court by stating, "When Mr. 
Williams entered his plea . . . we had told the Court that we 
would be recommending . . . that he be placed on probation, that 
he pay arrearages and pay current child support."  (Emphasis 
added.)  The words "would be" intimate that a change of the 
State's plans would be revealed.   
¶50 The State did not merely recite the unfavorable facts 
about the defendant to inform the circuit court fully.  Rather, 
the State covertly implied to the sentencing court that the 
additional 
information 
available 
from 
the 
presentence 
investigation 
report 
and 
from 
a 
conversation 
with 
the 
defendant's ex-wife raised doubts regarding the wisdom of the 
terms of the plea agreement.  The State cannot cast doubt on or 
distance itself from its own sentence recommendation.45  Although 
                                                 
44 State v. Williams, 2000 WI App 7, ¶12.   
45 State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d at 364.  See also United 
States v. Canada, 960 F.2d at 269-270. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
25 
 
the State is not barred from using negative information about 
the defendant that has come to light after the plea agreement 
and before the sentencing, the State may not imply that if the 
State had known more about the defendant, the State would not 
have entered into the plea agreement.46  The State was distancing 
itself from the recommendation in the present case by implying 
its reservations about the sentence agreement.   
¶51 The prosecutor's affirmation of the plea agreement was 
not adequate to overcome the prosecutor's covert message to the 
circuit court that a more severe sentence was warranted than 
that which had been recommended.47  After the defendant objected 
to the State's discussion of the presentence investigation 
report and the ex-wife's statements, the State affirmed its 
decision to proceed with the plea agreement.  Despite stating 
its intention to stand by the plea agreement, the State had 
adopted as its own opinion the negative information regarding 
the defendant that was otherwise available to the court.  This 
information was unnecessary to explain or support the agreement 
                                                 
46 State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d at 364. 
47 Contrast the present case with State v. Knox, 213 
Wis. 2d at 322, in which the prosecutor misstated the sentencing 
recommendation as one for consecutive rather than concurrent 
prison terms.  In Knox, the breach was not actionable because 
the prosecutor misstated a term of the plea agreement but 
promptly acknowledged the mistake of fact and rectified the 
error without impairing the integrity of the sentencing process.  
In the present case, the prosecutor did not acknowledge in any 
way that her statements adopting the unfavorable comments about 
the defendant were a less than neutral recitation of the plea 
agreement.  She merely reiterated the plea agreement. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
26 
 
that 
the 
State 
would 
recommend 
the 
minimum 
sentence 
of 
probation; the information supports a more severe sentence of a 
prison term.  
¶52 This case presents a close question.  The overall 
impression from reading the entire record of the sentencing 
hearing is, however, that the State's comments affirming the 
plea agreement were too little, too late.  We agree with the 
court of appeals that "just because the prosecutor says there 
was no breach does not make it so."48  That the prosecutor did 
not intend to breach the agreement or that a breach was 
inadvertent "does not lessen its impact."49 
¶53 The determination of law whether a breach occurred and 
whether the breach was substantial and material requires a 
careful examination of the facts.  It is helpful to examine 
other cases involving breaches of plea agreements to test our 
conclusion about the present case, even though each case turns 
on the respective facts presented.   
¶54 In State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d 359, 389 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. 
App. 1986), the prosecutor and defendant reached a plea 
agreement in which the prosecutor would recommend a monetary 
fine.  At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor recommended the 
fine, but also indicated the agreement was made before other 
information was known.  Although the prosecutor reiterated 
support for the plea agreement, the court of appeals concluded 
                                                 
48 State v. Williams, 2000 WI App 7, ¶14.  
49 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 262. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
27 
 
that the prosecutor functionally told the circuit court that the 
circuit court should ignore or reject the plea agreement.50  The 
court of appeals concluded that the prosecutor impermissibly 
undercut the plea agreement by using qualified language that 
implied reservations about the plea agreement.  The court of 
appeals 
remanded 
the 
cause 
for 
resentencing. 
 
Like 
the 
prosecutor in Poole, the State in the present case also implied 
a lack of support for the plea agreement, despite accurately 
stating 
its 
terms 
and 
reiterating 
support 
for 
the 
plea 
agreement.   
¶55 In State v. Hanson, 2000 WI App 10, 232 Wis. 2d 291, 
606 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1999), the court of appeals concluded 
that the State did not breach the plea agreement by highlighting 
the violent nature of the accused's crime when recommending a 
10-year sentence for an offense with a 15-year maximum.  The 
prosecutor used the violent nature of the crime to justify its 
recommendation of a sentence at the high end of the sentencing 
range.  The prosecutor affirmed the plea agreement in Hanson and 
made no statements that implied that the State no longer adhered 
to the plea agreement.  Unlike Hanson, the State in the present 
case did not use the unfavorable information to support the 
recommendation 
of 
probation. 
 
Rather, 
the 
unfavorable 
information the State supplied undercut the plea agreement to 
recommend probation and appeared to suggest that a harsher 
sentence was appropriate.   
                                                 
50 State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d at 360. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
28 
 
¶56 In State v. Jorgensen, 137 Wis. 2d 163, 168, 404 
N.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals upheld the 
circuit court's determination that the prosecutor did not breach 
a plea agreement to refrain from recommending or commenting at 
the sentencing hearing upon a specific sentence that the circuit 
court should impose.  During the sentencing hearing, the defense 
counsel was factually discrepant in the description of the 
offense.  This factual discrepancy prompted the prosecutor to 
comment on the offense during the sentencing hearing, drawing an 
objection from the accused that the prosecutor's comments 
breached the plea agreement.  The circuit court sentenced the 
accused to 20 months of incarceration and later denied the 
accused's post-conviction motion seeking enforcement of the plea 
agreement.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
denial of the defendant's post-conviction motion, reasoning that 
the prosecutor's comments at the sentencing hearing did not 
breach the plea agreement because public policy prohibited a 
plea agreement from requiring the State to remain totally silent 
at the sentencing hearing.  The court noted that "a plea 
agreement which forces a prosecutor to stand mute regardless of 
the nature or accuracy of the statements made at the sentencing 
hearing runs contrary to the truth seeking purpose of all 
judicial proceedings."51  Unlike Jorgensen, the State's conduct 
in the present case went beyond merely correcting any factual 
inaccuracies presented by the defendant.  The State's adoption 
                                                 
51 State v. Jorgensen, 137 Wis. 2d at 169. 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
29 
 
of unfavorable information in the presentence investigation 
report and the ex-wife's testimony impermissibly undercut the 
State's sentencing recommendation. 
¶57 In State v. Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d 317, 322, 479 
N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1991), the court of appeals upheld a 
circuit court's denial of the accused's motion for post-
conviction relief, stating that the prosecutor's denigrating 
remarks regarding the accused did not breach the plea agreement.  
The plea agreement required the prosecutor to argue for a stayed 
sentence, but the agreement did not prohibit the prosecutor from 
arguing the length of the sentence to be imposed.  The court of 
appeals reasoned that the prosecutor's remarks were appropriate 
in light of the unusual terms of the plea agreement.  Whereas 
the prosecutor in Ferguson complied with the plea agreement when 
arguing for a stayed sentence while seeking the maximum length 
sentence, the prosecutor's statements in the present case 
undercut the plea agreement, resulting in a material and 
substantial breach.   
¶58 In 
State 
v. 
Smith, 
207 
Wis. 2d 258, 
272, 
558 
N.W.2d 379 (1997), this court remanded the cause for new 
sentencing, 
holding 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
materially 
and 
substantially breached the plea agreement by recommending 58 
months of incarceration.  The terms of the plea agreement 
required the State to make no recommendation to the circuit 
court regarding the length of sentence imposed.  The effect of 
the State's conduct in the present case, like the effect of the 
prosecutor's conduct in Smith, was to undercut the plea 
No. 
00-0535-CR   
 
30 
 
agreement, thereby depriving the defendant of the benefit of his 
bargain and rendering the sentencing proceeding fundamentally 
unfair. 
¶59 In 
summary, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
prosecutor's 
statements at the sentencing hearing undercut the defendant's 
plea agreement, resulting in a material and substantial breach 
of the defendant's plea agreement.  Consequently, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the 
circuit court denying the defendant's motion for resentencing, 
and we remand the cause to the circuit court for resentencing.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
No.  00-0535-CR.jpw 
 
 
 
1
 
¶60 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  I agree with the court's holdings in sections I and II.  
However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 
State materially and substantially breached the plea agreement 
in this case.  The majority's decision on that issue gives 
insufficient consideration to the long-standing policy of making 
all relevant information available to a sentencing judge, and it 
will substantially hamper the State's ability to negotiate plea 
agreements in the future.  For these reasons, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶61 As the majority notes, the prosecutor in a case such 
as this has the challenge of negotiating the line between two 
important and competing principles of law.  The public has a 
right to have the judge consider all relevant information during 
a sentencing hearing, Farrar v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 651, 656-57, 
191 N.W.2d 214 (1971), while at the same time the defendant has 
a due process right to get the benefit of any plea agreement 
entered into with the State.  State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 
271, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997).  The prosecutor is at the crux of 
this dilemma.  As a quasi-judicial officer, the prosecutor must 
not only advocate for the State's position, but must also see 
that justice is done.  Koenig v. State, 215 Wis. 658, 659, 255 
N.W. 727 (1934).  We are asked in this case if the prosecutor 
was successful in her attempt to balance these interests.  I 
contend that she was. 
¶62 We have recognized that the sentencing process is a 
search for the truth.  Farrar, 52 Wis. 2d at 657.  Accordingly, 
No.  00-0535-CR.jpw 
 
 
 
2
a sentencing court is entitled to consider "all the factors and 
a recommendation based on all of the facts then in the record."  
Id. at 656 (quoting Young v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 361, 369, 182 
N.W.2d 262 (1971)).  This right to consider all of the relevant 
facts goes beyond the judge's role as an independent sentencing 
authority, 
Melby 
v. 
State, 
70 
Wis. 2d 368, 
385-86, 
234 
N.W.2d 634 (1975), and recognizes that the community has a stake 
in a fair, accurate, and fully-informed sentence as well.  
Farrar, 52 Wis. 2d at 656-57. 
¶63 It is for this reason that the State is not prevented 
from informing the court of pertinent sentencing factors, Elias 
v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 286 N.W.2d 559 (1980), which can 
include negative character traits of the defendant.  State v. 
Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d 317, 325, 479 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1991).  
This principle is important enough that we have held that plea 
agreements 
where 
the 
prosecution 
agrees 
not 
to 
reveal 
information that is relevant to sentencing are against public 
policy and will be rejected by the courts.  Grant v. State, 73 
Wis. 2d 441, 448, 243 N.W.2d 186 (1976); see also State v. 
McQuay, 148 Wis. 2d 823, 826, 436 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1989).  
The prosecutor not only has a right, but a responsibility to 
bring relevant sentencing information to the attention of the 
court. 
¶64 Still, despite our pronouncements that the court 
should consider all relevant information, we have recognized 
that the policy is not unassailable.  When a defendant has 
validly negotiated a plea agreement with the State, the 
No.  00-0535-CR.jpw 
 
 
 
3
defendant has a due process right to receive the benefit of that 
agreement.  Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 271.  Accordingly, the State 
is under certain limitations when carrying out its side of a 
plea agreement.  The State cannot recommend something different 
than what was promised, or explicitly promise to make no 
recommendation, then make one.  Id. at 272-73.  Similarly, the 
prosecutor cannot undermine a plea agreement through the use of 
negative 
or 
qualifying 
language. 
 
State 
v. 
Poole, 
131 
Wis. 2d 359, 364, 389 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1986).  Although the 
prosecutor 
is 
not 
required 
to 
advocate 
strongly 
for 
a 
recommendation, the prosecutor must clearly communicate support 
for the recommendation.  Id. 
¶65 Any breach of the plea agreement must be "material and 
substantial."  Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 272; State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 289, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  That is, the breach 
must deprive the defendant of a material and substantial benefit 
for which he or she bargained.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 290.  We 
have said that a material and substantial breach will amount to 
a "manifest injustice."  Id. at 289. 
¶66 Here, I would hold that the prosecutor successfully 
balanced her competing responsibilities and did not breach the 
plea agreement.  The prosecutor clearly and accurately expressed 
her recommendation, she did not qualify it or back away from it, 
and she did not undermine her recommendation to the court.  I 
would find that the prosecutor clearly delineated the contents 
of the pre-sentence investigation (PSI) and the recommendations 
of the PSI writer from the recommendations of the State.  The 
No.  00-0535-CR.jpw 
 
 
 
4
prosecutor communicated the information from the PSI in a 
neutral manner, and those facts were relevant to the judge's 
sentencing decision. 
¶67 In this case, the prosecutor clearly informed the 
court of the State's recommendation three separate times.  At 
the plea hearing, the prosecutor laid out the agreement: 
 
On a plea to one count the state will dismiss the 
second count.  The state will be recommending that the 
Court impose——withhold sentence, place the defendant 
on three years of probation, that as conditions of the 
probation the defendant be, number one, ordered to pay 
all arrearages, number two, pay all current support, 
and number three, serve 60 days in the county jail as 
condition time. 
The prosecutor then began the sentencing hearing by restating 
the plea agreement: 
 
Judge, I believe that when Mr. Williams entered his 
plea that we had told the Court that . . . we would be 
recommending that sentence be withheld for a period of 
three years——I am sorry, that he be placed on 
probation for a period of three years, that he pay 
arrearages and pay current child support.  And then as 
a condition of probation he be incarcerated in the 
county jail for a period of 60 days. 
And after objection by the defense attorney, the prosecutor 
concluded her sentencing remarks by reiterating the State's 
recommendation one last time: 
 
. . . So again I will reiterate, Judge, that we are 
standing by our recommendation, and I have not changed 
that, and that's why I started off by saying we were 
recommending the three years probation.  We had placed 
that on the record when the defendant entered his 
plea, and again today at sentencing. 
No.  00-0535-CR.jpw 
 
 
 
5
The recommendation of the State could not have been made much 
clearer.  Each time, the State's sentencing recommendation was 
straightforward and unqualified. 
¶68 When the prosecutor discussed the PSI, the language 
and recommendation of the PSI writer were distinguished from the 
recommendation of the prosecutor.  Before discussing the 
contents of the PSI, the prosecutor began with "After reading 
through the presentence," clearly indicating that what she was 
about to relay had been derived from the PSI.  She later stated 
"The presentence writer . . . had indicated she would be in 
court, but I don't see that she has arrived.  She had made a few 
comments that I will relay to the Court."  Again, indicating 
clearly that she was conveying the comments of the PSI writer 
and not her own recommendations. 
¶69 After the defense objection, the prosecutor explicitly 
differentiated the recommendation of the PSI writer from that of 
the State: 
 
[I]f 
I 
indicated 
anything 
other 
than 
what 
our 
recommendation is, the presentence was here.  We were 
prepared to go to sentencing, and the agent relayed 
this information to us.  And I am merely supplying the 
Court with that information.  I am in no means 
suggesting that I am asking the Court to adopt the 
agent's recommendation . . . again I will reiterate, 
Judge, we are standing by our recommendation (emphasis 
added). 
Again, the prosecutor was careful to identify which information 
came 
from 
the 
PSI 
and 
what 
constituted 
the 
State's 
recommendation.  The prosecutor made it clear that the State's 
recommendation had not changed. 
No.  00-0535-CR.jpw 
 
 
 
6
¶70 The 
majority 
takes 
issue 
with 
the 
prosecutor's 
statements "After reading through the presentence, it appears 
that I think I can best describe my impression of this defendant 
as manipulative and unwilling to take any responsibility" and 
"it was quite a contrast."  Majority op. at ¶47.  The majority 
suggests that, primarily through these two phrases, the State 
impliedly adopted the recommendation of the PSI writer and 
abandoned its own.  I disagree. 
¶71 I concede that the prosecutor's statements could be 
characterized as not enthusiastically supportive of the plea 
agreement, 
but 
there 
is 
no 
requirement 
that 
they 
be 
enthusiastic.  Poole, 131 Wis. 2d at 364.  The test is only 
whether 
or 
not 
the 
recommendation 
was 
undercut 
by 
the 
prosecutor's comments——whether the prosecutor explicitly or 
implicitly suggests that she has changed her mind about her 
recommendation.  Reading the record as a whole, it is clear to 
me that the prosecutor did not change her mind, nor did she 
imply that she had.  The recommendation of the State was 
explicitly and accurately repeated on three different occasions, 
and at none of those times was the recommendation qualified or 
contradicted. 
¶72 The 
majority 
also 
criticizes 
the 
prosecutor's 
statement that "we had told the Court that we would be 
recommending . . . " as indicative of the State's intent to 
change its sentencing recommendation.   Majority op. at ¶49.  
Coupled with the repeated description of the prosecutor's 
actions as "covert," majority op. at ¶¶27, 42, 50, the majority 
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seems to suggest that the words "would be" marked the beginning 
of an insidious plot by the State to back out of the plea 
agreement.  I find this proposition difficult to accept.  
Because the assistant district attorney at sentencing was not 
the same attorney who represented the State at the plea hearing, 
I suggest that the words "would be" were at most a verbal 
hesitation to ensure that the prosecutor articulated the precise 
terms of the agreement, rather than the unveiling of some vile 
scheme.  Taken as a whole, I would find that the prosecutor's 
statement accurately reflected the plea agreement. 
¶73 I also disagree with the majority's treatment of the 
line of court of appeals cases that deal with this issue.  For 
instance, in Poole, 131 Wis. 2d 359, the court of appeals 
recognized that the primary transgression in the breach of a 
plea agreement is the use of negative or qualified language when 
making the sentencing recommendation.  Id. at 364.  Similarly, 
any negative facts relayed to the court must not be rendered in 
a less-than-neutral manner.  Id.  In Poole, the prosecutor 
followed his agreed-to sentencing recommendation immediately by 
noting that the recommendation was agreed to "'before we knew of 
the other instances.  But that is our agreement'".  Id. at 360.  
The court held this to be a breach of the plea agreement.  Id. 
at 364. 
¶74 In the present case, this type of qualification simply 
did not occur.  The prosecutor's discussion of the contents of 
the PSI was a neutral recitation of the facts, to which the 
court was entitled.  The recommendation was not couched in 
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qualifying terms, and at no time did the prosecutor suggest that 
her recommendation had changed on account of the information in 
the PSI. 
¶75 I find that this case is much more similar to State v. 
Hanson, 2000 WI App 10, 232 Wis. 2d 291, 606 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. 
App. 1999), than Poole.  In Hanson, the prosecutor stated 
several 
times 
that 
she 
"'certainly 
[stood] 
by 
the 
plea 
agreement'" and that she did not intend to "'contravene the plea 
agreement in any way.'"  Id. at ¶26.  After affirming the 
State's recommendation, the prosecutor went on to describe the 
violent nature of Hanson's crime, then stated: 
 
Judge, there was a plea agreement in this case; I 
stand by the plea agreement. Having said that, this is 
an extremely violent case. This is an individual who 
constitutes a clear and present danger, not only to 
the two women who have been in intimate relationships 
with the Defendant, but also to the community at 
large. I urge the Court to consider all of the 
information that has been presented to the Court, in 
fashioning a sentence that is both fair to the 
Defendant and to the victim. 
Id. at ¶9.  In finding that the State had not breached the plea 
agreement, the Hanson court noted that the prosecution had 
"strongly affirmed the plea agreement and did not make any 
statements that expressly, covertly or otherwise suggested that 
the State no longer adhered to the agreement."  Id. at ¶29.  The 
court held that the remarks had not been "a less than neutral 
statement of its sentencing recommendation under the plea 
agreement."  Id. at ¶30. 
¶76 This is almost exactly what happened in the present 
case.  Here, the prosecutor clearly stated that she supported 
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her plea recommendation, despite the fact that the information 
from the PSI was negative.  At no time did the State back away 
from 
its 
agreement 
or 
express 
reservations 
about 
its 
recommendation, as the majority suggests.  See majority op. at 
¶49.  When a question arose as to whether the State was reneging 
on the plea agreement, the prosecutor clearly restated the 
State's recommendation.  Rather than back away from the 
recommendation, the prosecutor affirmed it. 
¶77 Likewise, in State v. Ferguson, the prosecutor was 
found not to have breached a plea agreement when he spoke at 
some length about the severity of the offense, characterized the 
defendant's actions as "perverted" and "the sickest case I have 
seen," and described the defendant as a "sleaze."  Ferguson, 166 
Wis. 2d at 319-20.  The court held that given the unique 
structure of the plea agreement——that the State had agreed to 
recommend an imposed and stayed sentence, but was allowed to 
argue for the maximum-length sentence——the State could bring 
relevant aggravating factors to the court's attention without 
breaching the plea agreement.  Id. at 324-25.  The Ferguson 
court noted that "pertinent [sentencing] factors relating to the 
defendant's character . . . cannot 'be immunized by a plea 
agreement between the defendant and the state.'"  Id. at 324 
(quoting Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d at 285). 
¶78 The plea agreement here is not nearly as unusual, but 
the prosecutor was similarly able to remain true to her 
recommendation.  Using language much milder language than that 
used in Ferguson, the prosecutor stated her recommendation, and 
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affirmed it several times, despite relaying the negative 
information about Williams from the PSI. 
¶79 State v. Jorgensen, 137 Wis. 2d 163, 404 N.W.2d 66 
(Ct. App. 1987), likewise supports the holding that the State 
did 
not 
breach 
the 
agreement. 
 
Jorgensen 
involved 
the 
interpretation of the terms of a prosecutor's agreement to 
"stand silent" at a sentencing hearing.  Id. at 169-71.  
Applying principles of contract law, the court noted that such 
an agreement did not prevent the prosecutor from commenting if 
the defendant were to make errors of fact or law, as such an 
interpretation would have been against public policy.  Id. at 
170-71.  The majority seems to imply that Jorgensen limits a 
prosecutor to correcting factual errors.  This was not the 
holding in that case.  Rather, Jorgensen further supports the 
principle that the prosecutor is not required to remain silent 
regarding information relevant to the sentencing court. 
¶80 Finally, the majority's comparison of this case to 
State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, is simply unreasonable.  In 
Smith, 
the 
prosecutor 
had 
agreed 
to 
make 
no 
sentencing 
recommendation in exchange for a no contest plea and instead 
recommended a sentence of 58 months at the sentencing hearing.  
Id. at 272.  This was a blatant violation of the unambiguous 
terms of a plea agreement, the likes of which did not occur in 
this case.  Here, the prosecutor agreed to recommend that 
Williams receive three years probation, a payment of all 
arrearages and current child support, and 60 days in jail as a 
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condition of probation.  This is what the State recommended——
three times. 
¶81 In sum, I would hold that the plea agreement was not 
breached, let alone materially and substantially breached, 
because Williams did not lose the benefit for which he had 
bargained.  Williams agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a 
recommendation from the State that he pay all arrearages, 
receive a sentence of probation, and serve 60 days in jail as a 
condition.  This is what he got. 
¶82 By finding that the State materially breached its plea 
agreement with Williams, the court sets a worrisome precedent.  
Despite this court's long-standing affirmation that a trial 
court is entitled to all relevant sentencing information, the 
court today would severely deter prosecutors from bringing 
negative but relevant information to the court's attention.  As 
a result, the courts will be less able to sentence a defendant 
based on a full and fair consideration of the pertinent facts.  
As Judge Nettesheim pointed out in his dissent in the court of 
appeals, the prosecutor should not be turned into the proverbial 
"'potted 
plant'" 
and 
should 
not 
be 
forced 
to 
withhold 
information that is relevant to sentencing.  State v. Williams, 
2001 WI App 7, ¶27, 241 Wis. 2d 1, 624 N.W.2d 164.  Finding that 
the prosecutor breached her agreement to Williams will do 
precisely that. 
¶83 Likewise, this decision will discourage prosecutors 
from providing such information out of a fear of losing the 
benefit of their plea agreements.  By forcing a prosecutor to 
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choose between remaining silent at a sentencing hearing, or 
potentially breaching the plea agreement, prosecutors will 
likely become wary of making information available to the court.  
Furthermore, they may be reluctant to enter into plea agreements 
altogether, and thereby deprive defendants, the public, and the 
criminal justice system of their benefits.  As the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated in Santobello v. New York: 
 
Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not 
only an essential part of the process but a highly 
desirable part for many reasons.  It leads to prompt 
and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; 
it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced 
idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are 
denied release pending trial; it protects the public 
from those accused persons who are prone to continue 
criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, 
by shortening the time between charge and disposition, 
it 
enhances 
whatever 
may 
be 
the 
rehabilitative 
prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately 
imprisoned. 
404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). 
¶84 In conclusion, I would find that the State upheld its 
end of the plea agreement by clearly stating and standing by its 
sentencing recommendation.  Additionally, I would find that the 
prosecutor presented the information from the PSI in a neutral 
manner, and never adopted the recommendation of the PSI writer.  
The information from the PSI was relevant to sentencing, 
however, and its provision was consistent with the strong public 
policy of ensuring that the court is fully informed of all 
sentencing factors.  There was no material and substantial 
breach of the plea agreement.  Accordingly, I would reverse the 
No.  00-0535-CR.jpw 
 
 
 
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decision of the court of appeals and would reinstate Williams' 
sentence as determined by the circuit court. 
¶85 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK 
CROOKS and DIANE S. SYKES join this dissent. 
 
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