Title: DELORES M. THOMAS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING ; DELORES M. THOMAS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DELORES M. THOMAS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING ; DELORES M. THOMAS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 224784 P.2d 237Case Number: 88-202, 88-203Decided: 12/21/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
DELORES M. THOMAS, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

DELORES M. THOMAS, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

Leonard Munker, 
State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid 
Program, and S. Gregory Thomas (argued), Student Intern, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Maryrobin Burney (argued), Student Extern, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Delores 
Thomas was convicted after a jury trial of transferring a forged prescription 
for Percodan, a Schedule II controlled substance. Thomas has appealed the 
conviction, presenting the following issue:

"Did the court below err 
in refusing to instruct the jury upon request as to the dangers of eyewitness 
testimony and the possibility of error (1) where the sole issue for the jury 
under the defendant's theory of the case was the accuracy of that 
identification; (2) where the testimony of the sole witness to the criminal 
transaction suggested irregularities in the identification process; and (3) 
where there was expert testimony explaining the process of identification and 
the possibility of mistaken recall?"

We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶2.]     On June 18, 1986, Rick 
Svoboda came to appellant's house seeking pain pills. She said she did not have 
any, so Svoboda suggested that she get some from her doctor. That afternoon 
appellant, using the alias Delores Burgess, visited Dr. Richard Whalen's office 
complaining of abdominal pain. She testified that she intended to get some pain 
pills and that she planned to share them with Rick Svoboda, who she described as 
a drug addict. As she did not have an appointment, she waited for the doctor in 
an examining room where she had access to Dr. Whalen's blank prescription pads. 
When Dr. Whalen did examine her, he prescribed Tagament and Bentyl for the 
abdominal pain, although he noted that the pain could be contrived. When 
appellant left Dr. Whalen's office, Rick Svoboda was waiting for her. He asked 
her if she had obtained any pain pills, and she said no. He called her a liar, 
and she showed him the prescriptions she had received. They argued, appellant 
tore up the prescriptions, and Svoboda left.

[¶3.]     Later that same day, a 
woman walked into a Casper pharmacy and presented a prescription 
for Percodan, a narcotic drug, made out to a Dawn Gilbert. The prescription was 
written on a form from Dr. Whalen's office and bore the purported signature of 
Dr. Whalen. The pharmacist, Oscar Ray, filled the prescription. However, the 
next day he examined the prescription more closely and grew suspicious that it 
might be forged. He called Dr. Whalen, who said he had not written any such 
prescription and that he did not have a patient named Dawn Gilbert. Mr. Ray then 
contacted the police. Subsequently, the police assembled a photo lineup from Mr. 
Ray's description, and he identified a picture of appellant as the woman who 
presented the prescription. Dr. Whalen also identified her from the photo lineup 
as the "Delores Burgess" he examined. Both also identified appellant at 
trial.

[¶4.]     Appellant testified at 
trial that she did not pass the forged prescription. She said that after she was 
arrested, Rick Svoboda told her that a woman named Carol Burnett had passed the 
forged prescription. She described Burnett as someone who probably has the same 
hair color and body frame as herself. She contends that the similarity in 
appearance between herself and Carol Burnett raises a question as to the 
accuracy of Oscar Ray's identification of her as the 
perpetrator.

[¶5.]     Appellant also offered 
the testimony of a psychologist, George Blau, who testified as an expert witness 
on information processing, perception and recall. Blau's testimony dealt 
primarily with problems associated with eyewitness perception and memory 
recall.

DISCUSSION

[¶6.]     At the close of the 
evidence, appellant offered the following instruction, which was 
refused:

"One of the most 
important issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crime. The Government has the burden of providing [sic] 
identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the witness 
himself be free from doubt as to the correctness of the statement. However you, 
the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the 
identification of the defendant before you may convict him. If you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the 
defendant was [sic] the person who committed the crime, you must find the 
defendant not guilty.

"Identification testimony 
is an expression of belief or impression of the witness. Its value depends on 
the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time of the 
offense and to make a reliable identification later.

"In appraising the 
identification testimony of a witness, you should consider the 
following:

"1. Are you convinced 
that the witness had the capacity and an adequate opportunity to observe the 
offender?

"Whether the witness had 
an adequate opportunity to observe the offender at the time of the offense will 
be affected by such matters as how long or short a time was available, how far 
or close the witness was, how good were lighting conditions, whether the witness 
had had occasion to see or know the person in the past.

"(In general a witness 
bases any identification makes [sic] on his perception through the uses [sic] of 
his senses. Usually the witness identifies an offender by the sense of sight - 
but this is not necessarily so, and he may use other 
senses.)

"2. Are you satisfied 
that the identification made by the witness subsequent to the offense was the 
product of his own recollection? You may take into account both the strength of 
the identification, and the circumstances under which the identification was 
made.

"If the identification by 
the witness may have been influenced by the circumstances under which the 
defendant was presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the 
identification with great care. You may also consider the length of time lapsed 
between the occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to 
see defendant, as a factor bearing on the reliability of the 
identification.

"(You may also take into 
account that an identification made by picking the defendant out of a group of 
similar individuals is generally more reliable than one which results from the 
presentation of the defendant alone to the witness.)

"3. You may take into 
account any occasions in which the witness failed to make an identification of 
the defendant, or made an identification that was inconsistent with his 
identification at trial.

"4. Finally you must 
consider the credibility of each identification witness in the same way as any 
other witness, consider whether he is truthful, and consider whether he has the 
capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the matter covered in 
this [sic] testimony.

"I again emphasize that 
the burden of proof on the prosecutor extends to every element of the crime 
charged, and this specifically includes the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime 
with which he stands charged. If after examining the testimony, you have a 
reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of identification, you must find the 
defendant not guilty."

This proposed 
instruction is essentially the same as the "Model Special Instructions on 
Identification" adopted by the United States Court of Appeals, District of 
Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558 
(1972).

[¶7.]     The Telfaire 
instruction contains two separate components: burden of proof of identity and 
credibility of eyewitness identification testimony. The trial court in this case 
gave separate and appropriate instructions to the jury on burden of proof, 
reasonable doubt, and witness credibility. Appellant contends, nevertheless, 
that the Telfaire instruction should also have been given in order to present 
her theory of the case.

[¶8.]     The trial court's 
refusal to give the instruction can be affirmed on either of two theories. 
First, even if defendant asserts that it represents her theory of the case, a 
court may refuse an instruction which is argumentative or unduly emphasizes one 
aspect of the case. Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149, 154 (Wyo. 1989); Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1218 
(Wyo. 1982). 
In Prime we considered language of an instruction which was virtually identical 
to part of the instruction requested here and concluded that it represented "a 
skillful effort to induce the trial court to argue the case for the defense 
through its instructions." 767 P.2d  at 154.

[¶9.]     The rhetorical 
questions "Are you convinced * * *?" and "Are you satisfied * * *?" may be 
appropriate in argument but not as part of the court's charge to the jury. 
Further, the instruction emphasizes the identification as one of "the most 
important issues" in the case and repeatedly stresses that identification is an 
element to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with those courts which 
hold that general instructions on reasonable doubt and credibility of witnesses 
are sufficient. See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 
652 P.2d 174, 179 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Hefner, 70 Ill. App.3d 693, 27 
Ill.Dec. 96, 99, 388 N.E.2d 1059, 1062 (1979).

[¶10.]  Second, a defendant seeking a theory of 
the case instruction must satisfy two requirements. The defendant must offer an 
instruction which is sufficient to apprise the court of his theory of the case, 
and that theory must be supported by competent evidence. Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739, 744 (Wyo. 
1987), and cases cited therein.

[¶11.]  Here, the theory is not supported by 
competent evidence. The requested instruction directs the jury to consider a 
list of factors which might affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification 
testimony. Even if we assume for purposes of argument that there is a causal 
connection between certain physical factors and effect on reliability of 
identification, there is little or no evidence of the physical factors 
themselves in the record. For example, the instruction states that the jury 
should consider "how long or short a time was available," "how far or close the 
witness was" and "how good were lighting conditions" at the time the witness 
observed the offender. However, the record contains no direct evidence on any of 
these points, leaving only inference and speculation for a juror attempting to 
follow the instruction.

[¶12.]  The case cited to the trial court as 
support for giving the instruction, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), and 
the source of the instruction itself, Telfaire, 469 F.2d  at 555-57, stand for 
the proposition that eyewitness identification testimony is inherently suspect 
in all cases. We decline to adopt this view. We prefer dealing with questions 
actually presented by the evidence. While defendant's trial counsel was free to, 
and in fact did, argue to the jury that the evidence raised a possibility of 
mistaken identity, we find no basis for instructing the jury to consider 
possible factors not found in the evidence.

[¶13.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶14.]  I concur in affirming the conviction of 
appellant and generally concur with the decision of this court, but write 
further to express concern about developments in the Wyoming law on the 
validity of eye-witness identification. Next to bad acts evidence, expert 
witness testimony and jury instructions on that subject have become some of the 
most prolific sources of appellate argument in this nation's criminal 
prosecution. 

[¶15.]  This is not a good case for exhaustive 
pursuit since appellant was previously known by the pharmacist, was previously 
seen by the doctor where the prescription blanks were used, and the 
identifications were founded on time and place components which connoted 
certainty. Additionally, the eye-witness expert was permitted to testify about 
the questionable characteristics of eye-witness identifications for support of 
the defense to establish reasonable doubt.

[¶16.]  On appeal, appellant, although permitted 
use of the expert witness, now challenges denial of the theory of the 
eye-witness instruction questioning use of what has generally come to be 
described as the Telfaire instruction.1 Consideration of all Wyoming cases on 
eye-witness identification provides little direction or stability. Unresolved is 
whether the defendant in defense of identification is entitled to an expert 
witness, an instruction of the Telfaire nature, both or neither. Is it purely a 
question of trial court discretion without regard for the strength or weakness 
of the issue within the trial court presentation? I can hardly believe the last 
choice of neither provides the stability and counseling that due process demands 
unless the exercise of discretion is clearly founded on a rationally 
differentiated factual basis in the individual case.

[¶17.]  In national perspective, some courts use 
a Telfaire instruction2 and some courts allow the expert 
witness.3 On occasion, both are permitted, 
and at least generally some courts tend to allow neither. Superimposed on 
exercised discretion and its constituent is the seriousness and the validity of 
the defense presented. If it is a neighbor that has lived next door to the 
identifying witness for ten years, functionality of the defense itself is 
clearly less than de minimis.

[¶18.]  I find no error here within the current 
state of Wyoming law since use of the expert witness 
was permitted and rational doubt further justifying a special instruction on 
identification was not persuasively presented. In a case like this with 
appropriately active final argument, use or nonuse of the instruction could 
hardly have mattered to the jury. In concurrence with the result in this case as 
properly exercised discretion, I remain dissatisfied with the absence of clear 
principles for cases of severe contest where either issues of expert witness or 
special instruction become serious ingredients in the determination of guilt or 
innocence. Concern also exists about any approach which would deny an 
instruction to the defendant on any legitimate theory of defense. B-T Ltd. v. 
Blakeman, 705 P.2d 307 (Wyo. 1985); Goodman v. 
State, 573 P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶19.]  I do not accept attribution from this 
decision that Wyoming should not adopt a general standard of 
utilization of the special instruction on eye-witness identification as has been 
done by many other states and particularly so if the trial court denies use of 
the alternative, the expert witness. Superimposed on all discussion of contested 
eye-witness identification is a failure to differentiate that function of 
credibility which is deliberate and intended from capability and capacity which 
encompass physical limitations of the testifying witnesses as an actual, even 
though perhaps unintended, constituent of invalidity. This court should not 
ignore the well-documented frequency of mistake which occurs in eye-witness 
identification with regard for what should be appropriate in the tough cases.4 I do not find undone justice on 
this occasion and consequently concur even if the instruction addressing the 
thesis of defense could have also been properly given. People v. Wright, 45 Cal. 3d 1126, 248 Cal. Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049 (1988). See 
California 
Supreme Court Survey - May 1988-July 1988, 16 Pepperdine L.Rev. 431 
(1989).

FOOTNOTES

1 United States v. 
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

2 Kansas, Rhode Island, 
Utah, and West Virginia are examples. SeeState v. 
Wheaton, 240 Kan. 345, 729 P.2d 1183 (1986); State v. Warren, 230 
Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981); State v. 
Mastracchio, 546 A.2d 165 (R.I. 1988); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); and State v. Watson, 318 S.E.2d 603 (W. 
Va. 1984). See 
also Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony and The Need For Cautionary Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 Wn. U.L.Q. 1387 (1983).

3 State v. Chapple, 135 
Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983); People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709 (1984).

4 The prevalence of cases 
and law review analyses are almost beyond count. See Annotation, Admissibility, 
at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Testimony on Reliability of Eyewitness 
Testimony, 46 A.L.R. 4th 1047 (1986) and Annotation, Necessity of, and 
Prejudicial Effect of Omitting, Cautionary Instruction to Jury as to Reliability 
of, or Factors to be Considered in Evaluating, Eyewitness Identification 
Testimony - State Cases, 23 A.L.R. 4th 1089 (1983).