Title: Driskill v. State

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
JESSE DRISKILL 
     ) 
     ) 
Appellant, 
     ) 
     ) 
v. 
     ) 
No. SC98259 
     ) 
STATE OF MISSOURI  
     ) 
     ) 
Respondent. 
     ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LACLEDE COUNTY 
The Honorable Matthew P. Hamner, Judge 
Jesse D. Driskill appeals the circuit court’s judgment overruling his Rule 29.15 
motion for postconviction relief.  He was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, 
one count of first-degree burglary, one count of forcible rape, one count of forcible 
sodomy, and five counts of armed criminal action.  Driskill was sentenced to death for 
each murder count.  He also received a consecutive 15-year sentence for the burglary 
count and seven consecutive life sentences for all remaining counts.  Driskill asserts the 
State committed multiple Brady violations and trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in various respects during the original proceedings.  Because the circuit court’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are not clearly erroneous, the judgment denying 
postconviction relief is affirmed. 
Opinion issued June 1, 2021, and modified on 
the Court's own motion August 31, 2021
2 
 
Background 
 
In the light most favorable to the verdict,1 the evidence demonstrates that, in July 
2010, Driskill and Jessica Wallace were at the Prosperine River Access on the Niangua 
River.  They did drugs and had sex.  A police officer interrupted, and Driskill ran into the 
woods with a gun.  Wallace returned home once she spoke to the police.  At the same 
time, roughly 1.5 miles from the Prosperine River Access, J.W. and C.W. (collectively, 
the “victims”) were celebrating their 59th wedding anniversary at their home. 
 
When family members became concerned about the victims’ whereabouts, they 
went to the house.  The victims’ car was not there.  Because the doors were locked, a 
relative entered through a window, finding the inside of the house was smoky and smelly.  
The family member also saw C.W.’s feet under smoldering blankets.  After the relative 
opened the front door, the victims’ son entered the home.  The two individuals found 
J.W.’s body under a pile of blankets and chairs.  Blood had pooled around the victims’ 
heads.   
The police were called and began investigating the scene and collecting evidence.  
Signs of forced entry were not apparent.  The area near the victims smelled of accelerant.  
C.W. had burn marks on the top portion of her body and wadded paper towels had been 
burned in her groin area.  A clear fluid and blood could be seen draining from her vaginal 
and anal areas.  The skin beneath C.W.’s eyes was blackened, and she had a wound above 
her right eyebrow.  Aside from his shoes, J.W. was naked.  A plastic bag covered his 
                                              
1 McFadden v. State, 619 S.W.3d 434, 444 & n.1 (Mo. banc 2020). 
3 
 
head, and a wound was visible on his face.  C.W.’s purse had been dumped onto the 
floor.  A can of gasoline was also located in the hallway.  As the police investigated the 
home, a burning vehicle was located near Conway, Missouri, and later determined to 
belong to the victims. 
 
Meanwhile, Driskill called Wallace twice, ultimately asking her to pick him up on 
Highway N in Conway.  Wallace attempted to do so but could not locate Driskill.  Seeing 
first responders heading toward smoke, she left the area.  In Conway, Driskill went to 
Hannah’s General Store in an unsuccessful attempt to charge his cell phone.  Later, 
Driskill went to a Budget Inn and used the telephone.  He called Jessica Cummins, who 
agreed to get him.  During the drive, Cummins believed Driskill was mad at her.  He also 
mumbled during the drive, stating he had “messed up” and shot someone.  Cummins 
believed Driskill mentioned he had used some drugs.  After dropping Driskill off at Codi 
Vause’s apartment, Cummins left.  Vause and Calvin Perry were in Vause’s apartment 
when Driskill arrived. 
 
Driskill appeared exhausted and anxious.  He stated he needed help and suggested 
he was being chased by the authorities.  Driskill also said he needed new clothes and had 
killed a couple of people that day.  Wallace—after Driskill contacted her and stated he 
perpetrated a home invasion, robbery, and double homicide—drove to Vause’s 
apartment.  Driskill explained to Wallace, Perry, and Vause that he was going through a 
shed or garage when an elderly couple found him.  Driskill brandished his gun and 
ordered the couple to go inside.  He then asked for money but was not satisfied with the 
amount.  Driskill proceeded to shoot J.W. and rape C.W.  Driskill initially shot C.W. in 
4 
 
the head.  She survived, and, when she tried to get away, he shot her two more times.  
Driskill further stated he put a plastic bag down C.W.’s throat and a pillow over her head.  
He explained he attempted to clean up the evidence by burning it and using bleach.  He 
also stated he stole, and later burned, the victims’ vehicle.  Driskill said his shoes were 
filled with blood.  Wallace went to a store after hearing Driskill’s story.  A police officer 
at the store noticed she was upset and approached her.  Wallace told the officer what 
Driskill had told her. 
 
Cummins later returned to Vause’s apartment.  She found Driskill using the 
kitchen sink to wash his shoes.  After changing his clothes, Driskill directed Vause to 
dispose of them, and she placed them in a trash bag.  Driskill subsequently fell asleep on 
the couch.  At that time, the other individuals relayed Driskill’s story to Cummins.  They 
called the police.  Shortly thereafter, the police attempted to arrest Driskill while he was 
sleeping at Vause’s apartment.  Driskill resisted arrest and obtained a laceration on his 
head during the scuffle.  He was eventually tasered and arrested.  The officers seized the 
trash bag containing Driskill’s clothes and took him to the hospital for treatment. 
 
As the police investigated the crimes, they executed a search warrant and obtained 
various evidence, including Driskill’s clothing, an unlabeled pill bottle, and a pack of 
cigarettes.  A sexual assault kit was conducted on Driskill.  J.W.’s and C.W.’s bodies 
were autopsied.  C.W. was shot once near her jawline and once above her left eye.  The 
latter shot was fatal.  C.W. had a laceration from blunt trauma above her right eyebrow.  
She also had injuries consistent with sexual assault, such as tears at the entrance of her 
vagina and rectum.  Vaginal swabs were collected from C.W.  DNA testing eliminated 
5 
 
J.W. as a contributor and revealed a mixture from C.W. and Driskill.  J.W. was shot once 
near his right cheek.  This wound was potentially fatal.  Yet the cause of death was listed 
as asphyxiation resulting from a wadded-up plastic bag that was found in J.W.’s throat. 
 
At trial, Driskill was represented by Sharon Turlington and Cynthia Dryden.  
During the guilt phase, the State adduced the evidence described above as well as other 
evidence, and Driskill presented evidence from two witnesses.  The jury found Driskill 
guilty on all counts.  During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence of Driskill’s 
prior convictions and victim impact statements from three family members.  Driskill 
called multiple expert and lay witnesses.  These individuals testified about how Driskill’s 
mental health issues, genetic predisposition toward violence, and difficult past, including 
physical abuse as a child, impacted his actions.  The jury recommended death sentences 
for each first-degree murder count.  Nine statutory aggravators were found regarding 
C.W.’s murder, and eight statutory aggravators were found regarding J.W.’s murder.  The 
circuit court adopted the jury’s recommendation.  It also imposed a consecutive, 15-year 
sentence for the burglary count and seven consecutive life sentences for all remaining 
counts.  This Court affirmed the judgment of convictions on direct appeal.  See State v. 
Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 433 (Mo. banc 2015). 
 
Driskill proceeded to seek postconviction relief under Rule 29.15.  An evidentiary 
hearing was held.  The case originally was assigned to a first judge, who presided over 
part of the hearing.  After Prosecutor Jon Morris testified, however, the first judge 
6 
 
recused himself, and a second judge was appointed.  The second judge heard the 
remaining evidence and denied postconviction relief.  Driskill appeals.2 
Standard of Review 
 
Review of a circuit court’s judgment denying postconviction relief is “limited to a 
determination of whether the findings and conclusions . . . are clearly erroneous.”  Rule 
29.15(k).  Appellate courts presume the circuit court’s findings are correct.  Deck v. State, 
381 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Mo. banc 2012).  “A clear error is a ruling that leaves the appellate 
court with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.”  Id.  
Additionally, “[t]his Court defers to ‘the motion court’s superior opportunity to judge the 
credibility of witnesses.’”  Shockley v. State, 579 S.W.3d 881, 892 (Mo. banc 2019).  The 
circuit court is “entitled to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented at the post-
conviction hearing.”  State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850, 863 (Mo. banc 1992). 
A movant must satisfy the test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984), to obtain postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Anderson v. State, 564 S.W.3d 592, 600 (Mo. banc 2018).  The test requires a 
movant to demonstrate 1) deficient performance by counsel and 2) prejudice as a result of 
that deficient performance.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Deficient performance is 
measured in terms of “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”  Id. at 688.  
This Court gives great deference to counsel’s performance, recognizing the multitude of 
approaches available to defend a client, and a movant must overcome the presumption 
                                              
2 Because Driskill was sentenced to death, this Court has jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. 
7 
 
that counsel’s course of action might be considered sound strategy.  Id. at 689.  Prejudice 
requires a “show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  Id. at 694. 
“[D]ue process is violated where the prosecutor suppresses evidence favorable to 
the defendant that is material to either guilt or punishment.”  Anderson v. State, 196 
S.W.3d 28, 36 (Mo. banc 2006) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).  
Even without request, prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence, which includes 
material that can impeach State witnesses.  Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 733 (Mo. 
banc 2003).  “A Brady claim has three components: 1) the evidence at issue must be 
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; 2) 
the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; 
and 3) prejudice must have ensued.”  Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 761 (Mo. banc 
2014). 
Analysis3 
I. 
Alleged Guilt Phase Errors 
A. Failure to Disclose Purported Deal with Calvin Perry 
Driskill contends the State violated Brady by failing to disclose an alleged deal 
with Perry.  Specifically, he argues the State and Perry reached a tacit, unwritten 
                                              
3 This Court takes note of Appellant’s counsel’s failure to utilize normal spacing conventions for 
citations in the briefing.  The word limits mandated by Rule 84.06(b) should not be sidestepped 
through such ploys. 
8 
 
agreement, providing that Perry’s prison sentence4 would be reduced in exchange for his 
trial testimony.  While addressing a pretrial motion to reveal agreements, Assistant 
Attorney General Kevin Zoellner noted that he and Prosecutor Jon Morris had not 
reached any deals with witnesses.  Zoellner, however, also stated the defense might want 
to question Perry, as Zoellner’s office had received a telephone call indicating Perry 
would not cooperate if he was not released in time to attend an upcoming family funeral.   
As evidence of an agreement, Driskill cites Perry’s deposition testimony, in which 
Perry expressed reservations because, even though he was doing the “right thing” by 
testifying, he was not receiving any favors or promises.  Perry went on to suggest this fact 
impacted his actions.  Zoellner asked for Perry’s trust and stated he would do whatever he 
could.  Perry, however, was not satisfied with this answer because the parole board had 
already made a decision, and he believed help might come too late.  In the midst of a 
lengthy exchange spanning roughly eight pages of transcript, Perry, while voicing his 
concerns, stated: 
I’m not asking for favors.  I’m not asking for anything.  I’m asking for at the 
point that I was told not to worry about doing the right thing.  I’m not asking 
for the whole six months.  I’m asking from the point I went on the abscond 
that this happened to the 122 days later that I was picked up. 
 
Zoellner then replied, “Yes.”  Perry’s trial testimony recounted Driskill’s explanation of 
the crimes and suggested Driskill enjoyed describing details that made others 
                                              
4 In December 2007, Perry pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine and received a 
five-year sentence.  Execution of his sentence, however, was suspended, and he was placed on 
probation.  In February 2009, after multiple violations, Perry’s probation was revoked, and the 
circuit court executed his five-year sentence.  Perry was on parole in July 2010 when Driskill 
committed the murders but returned to prison before Driskill’s trial. 
9 
 
uncomfortable.  Perry explained he was asking the State for favors, namely being 
released from prison, but said he never “snitched” in exchange for favorable treatment.   
During the postconviction proceedings, Morris, the prosecutor who advocated for 
Perry’s time-credit, testified he may have interacted with Perry prior to trial, but he does 
not recall.  Further, he did not attend Perry’s pretrial deposition, although he reviewed the 
deposition at some point.  Immediately after Perry testified, Morris spoke to Perry while 
leaving the courthouse.  Morris knew Perry and his family, mostly from his time as a 
prosecutor but also personally.  At that time, he learned the details of Perry’s request and 
stated he would look into the issue after trial.  Morris did not make any specific promises 
to Perry at that time.  After the trial concluded, Morris reviewed the case, determined 
Perry deserved the time-credit, and took appropriate steps to ensure Perry’s early release.   
Because a circuit judge was not always present in Laclede County, Perry’s file was 
taken to another county to assure the request was granted before Perry’s sentence 
concluded.  Morris also acknowledged: 1) his office typically does not assist offenders in 
this fashion; 2) the request was granted, even though Perry had behaved poorly on 
probation; 3) Morris’s relationship with the Perry family played a role in his decision, as 
a family member had recently died and the family was experiencing difficulties; and 
4) Perry was assisted more out of courtesy to Perry’s mother.  Perry was deposed as part 
of the postconviction proceedings, but he answered “no comment” to all questions 
besides stating his name.  The circuit court found, in part, “There is some evidence from 
which one could infer that [] Perry had a subjective hope that his testimony might result 
10 
 
in some benefit to his legal issues. There is not, however, credible evidence of any 
agreement between [] Perry and the prosecution prior to trial[.]” 
 
Under Brady, the State must disclose agreements with, or promises of leniency 
made to, its witnesses because this material is helpful impeachment evidence.  Middleton, 
103 S.W.3d at 733.  Unwritten deals can also create this obligation.  See id.  “Yet, the 
mere fact that a witness desires or expects favorable treatment in return for his testimony 
is insufficient; there must be some assurance or promise from the prosecution that gives 
rise to a mutual understanding or tacit agreement.”  Akrawi v. Booker, 572 F.3d 252, 263 
(6th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original).  Driskill believes the above facts establish the 
existence of an unwritten understanding.  Citing Perry’s deposition, Driskill relies heavily 
on the portion in which Perry showed frustration regarding the lack of preferential 
treatment and noted this was “swaying” his decisions.  Zoellner’s office also received a 
telephone call stating Perry’s testimony may depend on beneficial treatment.  According 
to Driskill, this shows Perry’s willingness to testify was wavering.  During the deposition, 
however, Perry stated “I want to do the right thing. . . . And I’m going to irregardless 
[sic].”  While Perry was disgruntled, he was willing to testify in the absence of a deal. 
 
Driskill points to Zoellner’s “[y]es” response, which occurred after Perry detailed 
what he hoped to gain from testifying.  Yet this seemed to signify an understanding of 
what Perry hoped to receive, rather than acknowledgment that a deal existed.  Zoellner 
repeatedly emphasized he could not make any specific promises.  Instead, he stated he 
would do what he could and Perry would have to trust him.  A single “[y]es” amidst an 
eight-page discussion cannot establish the existence of mutual understanding or a tacit 
11 
 
agreement, especially when many other portions of the deposition directly rebut that 
implication. 
 
Driskill asserts an adverse inference should be drawn from Perry’s unwillingness 
to answer questions at his postconviction deposition.  “[A] trial judge may draw an 
adverse inference from a litigant’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege in a civil 
case.”   State v. Spilton, 315 S.W.3d 350, 356 n.8 (Mo. banc 2010).  The use of “may,” 
though, indicates courts are not required to draw adverse inferences in this scenario.  See 
Allen v. Bryers, 512 S.W.3d 17, 36 (Mo. banc 2016) (“[T]he fact-finder in a civil case is 
permitted to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s assertion of his or her Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent[.]” (emphasis added)).  Such an inference is 
inappropriate here.  In his postconviction deposition, Perry stated his name for the record, 
but he answered “no comment” to every other question, which covered various topics 
such as why Perry was participating in this deposition, where he currently lives, and his 
criminal record.  Additionally, at the evidentiary hearing, Morris explained he had spoken 
with Perry either before or after the postconviction deposition, and Perry indicated he did 
not want to answer any questions.  Perry was simply an uncooperative witness. 
 
Driskill focuses on Morris’s prior relationship with Perry as well as his family and 
the unusual nature of this assistance.  But none of these facts establish the existence of 
mutual understanding or a tacit agreement.  Zoellner and Morris continually maintained 
they never made a deal with Perry.  Rather, they explained to Perry that they would do 
what they could, while making no promises.  In fact, even when speaking with Perry after 
he had testified, Morris merely stated he would look into the matter after trial.  These 
12 
 
factors may have impacted Morris’s ultimate decision to advocate on behalf of a 
time-credit, but they fail to show mutual understanding or a tacit agreement.   
 
Driskill relies on the fact that Perry actually received a time-credit.  The existence 
of preferential treatment by a prosecutor cannot alone establish a promise of leniency was 
given for favorable testimony.  Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003).  
However, “the fact that a witness actually received favorable treatment may be relevant 
in establishing the existence of undisclosed promises of leniency when considered with 
other facts . . . such as a state court’s finding that the prosecutor’s account was not 
credible.”  Id. at 165 n.6.  Although, Perry ultimately received favorable treatment, the 
arguments raised by Driskill, as explained above, are unpersuasive and do not establish 
the circuit court’s findings were without support in the record.  The mere fact Perry 
received favorable treatment fails to establish a deal.  As the circuit court found, the 
evidence may indicate Perry had a subjective hope of receiving favorable treatment, but a 
mutual understanding and tacit agreement has not been shown.  Without a deal, Driskill 
was not harmed, as trial counsel and the jury knew Perry was asking for favors.  
Sufficient evidence supported the circuit court’s determination that there was no Brady 
violation, and denying relief on this claim was not clear error. 
B. Failure to Present Evidence Cummins Did Not Notice Blood on Driskill 
Driskill argues his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to elicit Cummins’s 
testimony that she did not notice blood on Driskill when she picked him up from the 
Budget Inn.  Throughout trial, there was various evidence that Driskill’s clothing was 
bloody after committing the murders.  Wallace testified Driskill’s shoes were “filled with 
13 
 
blood,” and Cummins referenced Driskill washing his shoes at Vause’s apartment.  
Cummins also testified Driskill changed his clothes and asked for the others to be thrown 
out.  Moreover, police property records stated blood stains were apparent on Driskill’s 
clothing.  Despite this evidence, the clothes tested negative for blood, and Cummins, in 
her deposition, stated she did not notice any blood on Driskill when she picked him up.  
She also suggested the motel employee did not seem to have seen anything.  According to 
Driskill, his trial counsel should have used this testimony to rebut the State’s theory that 
Driskill’s clothes were blood-free because he successfully washed them. 
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified they made a decision not to ask 
Cummins about this subject, but they could not recall a specific rationale.  Turlington 
explained trial preparation consisted of reviewing police reports as well as depositions 
and discussing the best way to approach each witness.  She stated that, after a specific 
discussion, they decided not to mention the potential presence of blood on Driskill.  
Turlington could not remember exactly why they made this decision.  She noted they did 
present helpful evidence of a laboratory test, which showed Driskill’s clothes tested 
negative for blood. 
 
Driskill believes remand—to allow the circuit court to address whether trial 
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to introduce Cummins’s testimony 
about not noticing blood on Driskill—is appropriate, as the circuit court did not make 
findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding this claim.5  Circuit courts “shall issue 
                                              
5 To support this argument, Driskill cites Green v. State, 494 S.W.3d 525 (Mo. banc 2016), in 
which this Court noted that, if a judgment does not dispose of all claims in a case, it is not final 
14 
 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented[.]”  Rule 29.15(j).  Yet 
every claim need not be addressed individually.  Baumruk v. State, 364 S.W.3d 518, 539 
(Mo. banc 2012).  “Instead, ‘[g]eneralized findings are sufficient so long as they permit 
the appellate court an adequate record for appellate review of movant’s claims.’”  Id. 
(alteration in original).  In this case, the circuit court thoroughly discussed a distinct, but 
similar, claim—that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to impeach Cummins’s 
testimony by showing Driskill’s clothing to the jury.  While addressing that claim as well 
as others, the circuit court provided information helpful to adjudicate the current issue.  
For example, the judgment provided a summary of Cummins’s trial testimony about 
giving Driskill a ride and noted trial counsel prepared for Cummins’s testimony, even 
though they could not recall specific decisions regarding the cross-examination.   
 
Furthermore, even if a circuit court fails to enter findings of fact or conclusions of 
law on an issue, remand might not be required because there are some common-sense 
exceptions to the general rule.  White v. State, 939 S.W.2d 887, 903 (Mo. banc 1997).   
[A]n appellate court will not order a useless remand to direct the motion court 
to enter a proper conclusion of law on an isolated issue overlooked by the 
motion court where it is clear that movant is entitled to no relief as a matter 
of law and will suffer no prejudice by being denied a remand. 
 
                                              
and the appeal must be dismissed.  Id. at 533.  Green, however, is distinguishable.  The circuit 
court never adjudicated claims raised in Green’s pro se motion, as the judgment’s conclusion 
addressed only claims contained in the amended motion.  Id. at 530.  As a result, Green was 
distinguished from a prior case that used broad language and stated the movant had not 
established entitlement to the relief requested in both the pro se and amended motions.  Id. at 
530-31.  Here, the claim at issue was raised in Driskill’s amended motion, and the judgment 
addressed all claims raised in that pleading, concluding: “Having reviewed all of the evidence in 
this matter, and each of the claims raised by Movant in his Amended Motion to Vacate, 
Movant’s Motion is denied.”  Green does not bar review. 
15 
 
Id.  This exception governs here, and review by this Court is appropriate.6 
 
Driskill is not entitled to relief on this claim.  Failure to recall a strategic rationale 
for a decision does not overcome the presumption that the decision was part of a 
reasonable trial strategy.  See Bullock v. State, 238 S.W.3d 710, 715 (Mo. App. 2007).  At 
the evidentiary hearing, Turlington testified counsel made a decision not to ask Cummins 
whether she saw blood on Driskill when she picked him up.  Trial counsel also decided 
not to mention that Driskill had blood on him.  Driskill has failed to overcome the 
presumption that trial counsel employed reasonable trial strategy.   
 
Additionally, “[i]t is not ineffective assistance of counsel to pursue one reasonable 
trial strategy to the exclusion of another reasonable trial strategy.”  McFadden, 619 
S.W.3d at 446 (alternation in original).  On cross-examination, trial counsel focused on 
undermining Cummins’s credibility, noting Cummins lied to the police about giving 
Driskill a ride until the police threatened to arrest her and suggesting she was upset with 
                                              
6 At multiple points in his brief, Driskill condemns the circuit court for allegedly failing to 
conduct an independent review before adopting the State’s proposed findings.  He further argues 
many of the circuit court’s findings were erroneous and adopted without record support.  “This 
Court has held the process by which a court adopts a party’s proposed findings of fact raises no 
constitutional problems so long as the court actually makes the findings proposed after 
independent review.”  Hosier v. State, 593 S.W.3d 75, 83 n.2 (Mo. banc 2019).  To be affirmed, 
the findings must also be supported by the evidence.  Id.  “Accordingly, adopting a proposed 
finding that is not supported (and, in fact, is contradicted by) the evidence wastes judicial 
resources and strongly demonstrates why the practice of wholesale adoption of a party’s 
proposed findings is discouraged.”  Id.   
 
Although the Supreme Court has also criticized this practice, see Jefferson v. Upton, 560 
U.S. 284, 293-94 (2010), “[a] trial court judgment will be affirmed if cognizable under any 
theory, regardless of whether the reasons advanced by the trial court are wrong or not sufficient.”  
Hosier, 593 S.W.3d at 83 n.2 (alteration in original).  As explained throughout this opinion, the 
circuit court’s disposition of Driskill’s claims was not clearly erroneous, so the independent 
review issue need not be addressed further. 
16 
 
Driskill because she wanted a relationship and he did not.  Asking Cummins to testify 
Driskill did not have blood on him when she picked him up would run counter to this 
strategy because trial counsel would be asking the jury to believe Cummins’s testimony 
about an important issue while suggesting she is not credible.  Focusing on impeachment 
rather than sending this mixed message was reasonable.   
 
Moreover, the testimony was relatively unhelpful.  While Cummins noted she did 
not see any blood and suggested the individual from the motel lobby did not either, she 
also stated that “honestly when I picked him up, I mean, he looked wet, but I also didn’t, 
you know, like do a search on him or anything.”  Presenting this testimony would not 
have altered the outcome of trial.  The circuit court did not clearly err in determining trial 
counsel were not ineffective for failing to adduce this testimony. 
C. Alleged Destruction of a Fiber and Hairs in C.W.’s Hand 
 
Driskill believes the State destroyed allegedly exculpatory evidence—an orange 
fiber and hairs stuck between C.W.’s fingers—in bad faith.  An autopsy photograph 
showed this material in C.W.’s hand, and the autopsy report mentioned the fiber and 
hairs, stating the latter appeared to be of pet origin.  The report noted this evidence was 
given to Laclede County deputies.  The orange fiber and hairs, however, were never sent 
to the crime laboratory for testing, and the deputies did not have a record of retaining this 
evidence.  Further, Driskill’s postconviction counsel did not find the material while 
reviewing the evidence.  All of this demonstrates the material was misplaced or lost.   
According to Driskill, the fiber and hairs were exculpatory because Driskill, at the 
time of his arrest, had a shaved head and dark facial hair, which did not match the 
17 
 
material.  Driskill further argues the State was aware of Driskill’s appearance and the 
discrepancy between his hair color and the material found in C.W.’s hand.  As a result, 
the State supposedly knew the fiber and hairs were exculpatory when they went missing, 
showing the evidence was destroyed in bad faith.  The fiber, hairs, and autopsy 
photograph were not entered into evidence at trial, and no witnesses mentioned the 
material.  Kimberly Hardin, an employee at the Missouri State Highway Patrol 
(“MSHP”) Crime Laboratory, testified at trial that some dining chairs removed from the 
crime scene had pet hair on them. 
 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, highway patrol trooper Jason Trammel, 
who attended C.W.’s autopsy to collect evidence, testified.  Trammel recalled taking 
photographs of C.W.’s hand but did not remember seizing or receiving the fiber and 
hairs.  He recollected seeing a piece of orange carpet on C.W.’s hand and noted 
Dr. Anderson, who conducted the autopsy, believed the hairs were of pet origin.  
Turlington testified that, while she did not remember if she saw the orange fiber and hairs 
when reviewing evidence for trial, she conducted a review of all autopsy photographs 
before trial.  She indicated counsel did not raise the issue at trial because she knew the 
victims had multiple cats.  Dryden, who prepared an evidence chart before trial, testified 
the orange fiber and hairs were not listed on this document, likely because a property 
receipt was not generated for this evidence.  She was also certain the fiber and hairs were 
not present when viewing evidence or else they would have been placed on the chart.  If 
the material was preserved, Dryden would have liked to have investigated further. 
18 
 
 
Under Brady, “when the State suppresses or fails to disclose material exculpatory 
evidence, the good or bad faith of the prosecution is irrelevant: a due process violation 
occurs whenever such evidence is withheld.”  Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 
(2004).  To be “materially exculpatory,” “evidence must both possess an exculpatory 
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that 
the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably 
available means.”  California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984).  But, when 
evidence is only potentially useful, meaning, at most, it could have been tested and the 
results may have exonerated the defendant, due process is not violated, unless the 
defendant can show the State acted in bad faith.  Fisher, 540 U.S. at 547-48.  Bad faith 
exists when the material is destroyed “for the purpose of depriving the defendant of 
exculpatory evidence[.]”  State v. Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d 99, 110 (Mo. banc 1999).  To 
meet this test, the person “destroying . . . evidence must, at a minimum, have some 
knowledge that evidence is important to a pending criminal prosecution.”  State v. Cox, 
328 S.W.3d 358, 365 (Mo. App. 2010). 
 
Here, the fiber and hairs are not materially exculpatory, as they did not possess 
exculpatory value that was apparent before destruction.  The orange fiber appeared to be 
a carpet strand, and the hairs appeared to be of pet origin, which is consistent with the 
victims’ ownership of cats.  These determinations were reasonable, and both conclusions 
call the exculpatory nature of the evidence into question.  The fiber and hairs were only 
potentially useful because, at most, they could have been tested and may have been 
19 
 
helpful to Driskill.  For these reasons, Driskill must show the evidence was destroyed in 
bad faith to establish a due process violation. 
 
Driskill contends bad faith has been established because the fiber and hairs were 
physical evidence obtained from a victim’s hand.  The officers were also allegedly aware 
Driskill had a shaved head and dark facial hair at the time of arrest, so they knew the light 
hair was not Driskill’s.  Because of these facts, the officers purportedly knew the material 
was important to a pending criminal prosecution.  Even assuming the officers knew this 
evidence was potentially important, Driskill has not shown bad faith, as the Cox Court 
explained understanding the evidence was relevant to a pending criminal prosecution is a 
baseline requirement.  See id.  In fact, the Supreme Court has noted the absence of 
“official animus towards [a defendant] or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory 
evidence” can impact the bad faith analysis.  Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488.  Cox also 
referenced these factors, stating animus and a purpose to deprive the defendant of 
evidence did not exist.  328 S.W.3d at 364-65.   
No evidence suggests the fiber and hairs were destroyed in bad faith to prevent 
Driskill from obtaining exculpatory evidence.  The officers do not recall receiving this 
evidence.  While the evidence was lost or misplaced at some point, there is no evidence 
this occurred because of animus towards Driskill or to hinder his defense.  The evidence 
was also shown in the autopsy photograph and referenced in the autopsy report, further 
undermining the contention that the State destroyed this evidence to prevent Driskill from 
using it.  The circuit court did not clearly err in denying this claim. 
 
20 
 
D. Failure to Present Expert Testimony on Potential Contamination of DNA Evidence 
Driskill argues his trial counsel were ineffective for not presenting expert 
testimony, such as Dr. Dean Stetler, to establish DNA evidence was likely contaminated.  
Ruth Montgomery, a DNA analyst employed at the MSHP Crime Laboratory, testified at 
trial about developing a DNA profile from an unknown sample.  She testified that the 
basic process involves using chemicals to break open the cells to access the DNA; 
isolating the DNA; quantifying the DNA; amplifying the DNA; using an instrument to 
create a profile of the signals from the amplifications stage; and comparing that DNA 
profile to a known DNA profile. 
Montgomery performed the DNA analysis of C.W.’s two vaginal swabs from the 
sexual assault kit.  Microscopic examination detected intact sperm cells on the swabs.  
Portions of the swabs were then placed in tubes for DNA analysis.  “Swab 1” was 
subjected to differential extraction.  A DNA profile was developed, and a mixture of at 
least two individuals was found.  The major component of the mixture profile was 
consistent with the profile from C.W.  The minor portion was consistent with the profile 
from Driskill.  Additional analysis of the sample revealed the specific piece of DNA 
examined had been observed in one in 15,124 people in the US Y-STR database, which is 
used to calculate the occurrence of a profile within the population, and occurs in 
approximately one in 1,000 DNA samples. 
The remainder of “Swab 1,” after again being determined to have a minor 
component consistent with the profile from Driskill, was analyzed through the FBI Pop 
Stats database, which showed the observed mixture profile was 94.97 billion times more 
21 
 
likely to occur under the scenario it was a mixture of DNA from C.W. and Driskill as 
opposed to the scenario it was from a mixture of the DNA from C.W. and an unknown, 
unrelated individual in the population.  At this point, the swab had been completely 
consumed.7 
On cross-examination, Dryden elicited testimony “Swab 1” was tested multiple 
times.  Driskill’s boxers were also tested multiple times.  A partial profile from the inside 
of Driskill’s boxers was obtained.  The major component matched Driskill, but the minor 
component did not match C.W.  During closing argument, Driskill’s trial counsel 
attacked the DNA evidence.  They questioned why all tests were not presented and why 
the tests had different outcomes.  Trial counsel also suggested DNA cross-contamination 
was present, arguing the DNA sample was contaminated because Montgomery tested 
Driskill’s boxers and C.W.’s vaginal swab at the same time on one of the quantification 
steps.  They argued retesting was not possible because the swab was completely 
consumed. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Dr. Stetler testified he was retained by 
Driskill’s postconviction counsel.  Dr. Stetler reviewed the DNA analysis conducted by 
Montgomery and her trial testimony.  He testified the presence of DNA in the reagent 
blanks in one of the quantification procedures was evidence of contamination.  He stated 
                                              
7 “Swab 2” was not differentially extracted.  “Swab 2,” according to Montgomery’s 
postconviction deposition, indicated an autosomal profile that was consistent with C.W. and that 
Driskill was eliminated as a source of that profile.  A partial Y chromosome haplotype was 
developed that was consistent with the Y chromosome haplotype from Driskill at the alleles 
present. 
22 
 
that, because the reagent blank contained DNA, it would have been reasonable to perform 
a second quantification, which occurred here.  At this quantification, cuttings from 
Driskill’s boxers and “Swab 1” were placed on the same plate and run at the same time.  
Dr. Stetler posited that the boxers, because they contained Driskill’s DNA profile, should 
not have been processed at the same time as the vaginal swabs.  He could not say there 
was a high probability of contamination, but he said that there was “certainly a 
probability.” 
Dryden testified she was aware DNA was found in the reagent blank, which is 
used to ensure there is no cross-contamination, for the first vaginal swab cutting.  She 
was also aware that, during the quantification step, cuttings from Driskill’s boxer shorts 
were run at the same time as the portion of the vaginal swab.  Dryden further testified she 
had consulted with an expert from Ohio who would have been able to testify 
contamination could have occurred.  Dryden stated that counsel had a strategic reason for 
not calling a DNA expert to testify and that the subject had been discussed many times.  
She was concerned the State may have tried to correct the error in some way, including 
possible retesting.  Ultimately, trial counsel consciously decided to cross-examine 
Montgomery to attempt to show the results were unreliable. 
During Montgomery’s postconviction deposition, she noted that the lab followed 
standard practices and that she made specific efforts to avoid cross-contamination.  She 
testified about the timeframe in which evidence was handled and the steps taken to avoid 
contamination.  Montgomery stated that, although the reagent blank revealed a quantity, 
when its value should have been zero, the quantity could have come from simple 
23 
 
fluorescence in the instrument or dust.  Per the laboratory’s protocol, the level of DNA 
found on the reagent blank was not considered high enough to amount to contamination.  
When the reagent blanks were amplified, Montgomery testified there was not anything 
there.  Montgomery also explained the second extraction and quantification was 
performed to get additional autosomal information and not because of potential 
contamination.  Driskill’s boxers and the vaginal swabs were run at the same time 
because that was in accord with the scientifically accepted policy of the laboratory to test 
unknown samples.  To contaminate anything at that point, the analyst would have to 
reenter the tube with the extracted DNA or reenter the well on the plate containing the 
sample. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call a 
witness, the defendant must show: “(1) counsel knew or should have known 
of the existence of the witness; (2) the witness could be located through 
reasonable investigation; (3) the witness would testify; and (4) the witness’s 
testimony would have produced a viable defense.” 
 
McFadden v. State, 553 S.W.3d 289, 305 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting Deck, 381 S.W.3d at 
346).  Because selection of witnesses is presumptively a choice of strategy, it typically 
cannot form the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Id.  “A trial strategy 
decision may only serve as a basis for ineffective counsel if the decision is 
unreasonable.”  Id. at 306 (quoting McLaughlin v. State, 378 S.W.3d 328, 337 (Mo. banc 
2012)).  “The question in an ineffective assistance claim is not whether counsel could 
have or even, perhaps, should have made a different decision, but rather whether the 
decision made was reasonable under all the circumstances.”  Johnson v. State, 406 
24 
 
S.W.3d 892, 901 (Mo. banc 2013) (quoting Henderson v. State, 111 S.W.3d 537, 540 
(Mo. App. 2003)). 
Driskill argues trial counsel’s alleged strategy to not call an expert was based upon 
the unreasonable assumption that, had they done so, the State could have retested the 
evidence.  As trial counsel admitted at the hearing, the State could not have done so 
because it was completely consumed during testing.8  However, trial counsel’s decision 
to not call an expert was reasonable strategy to prevent corrective actions by the State.  
“Counsel may choose to call or not call almost any type of witness or to introduce or not 
introduce any kind of evidence for strategic considerations.”  Shockley, 579 S.W.3d at 
908 (quoting Vaca v. State, 314 S.W.3d 331, 337 (Mo. banc 2010)).  Had a DNA expert, 
such as Dr. Stetler or the Ohio expert who was consulted before trial, testified, the State 
would have been able to argue the expert could not say contamination occurred.  Each 
expert would have testified contamination was possible but would not be able to state the 
likelihood with any certainty.  Trial counsel’s strategy to not present such inconclusive 
testimony was reasonable.  Further, the testimony would have permitted the State to call 
Montgomery to provide testimony similar to that she gave in her postconviction 
deposition, which concluded that she was confident there was no contamination.   
Balanced with the unfavorable testimony from the others to whom Driskill related 
his story, there is not a reasonable probability that Dr. Stetler’s testimony, which was far 
less decisive than Montgomery’s testimony, would have changed the outcome of the trial.  
                                              
8 Dryden recalled one of the swabs was used up during testing.  
25 
 
The circuit court did not clearly err in finding trial counsel were not ineffective in failing 
to call an expert to establish DNA evidence was likely contaminated. 
E. Failure to Impeach Wallace 
1. Inconsistent Statements to the Police 
Driskill argues his trial counsel were ineffective for not investigating and 
impeaching Wallace’s testimony that she could not find Driskill near Conway despite 
initially telling law enforcement she found and picked him up there.  At trial, Wallace 
testified she and Driskill were at Prosperine on the Niangua River before the murders.  
She stated she “did a pill earlier in the day.”  At the river, she and Driskill had sex, and, 
when law enforcement interrupted, Driskill ran off into the woods with a gun.  After 
talking to the law enforcement officer, Wallace went home. 
Wallace further testified Driskill called her the following day, needing a ride.  She 
drove to Conway to pick up Driskill on N Highway but could not locate him.  After 
observing smoke in the distance and seeing first responders heading toward that area, 
Wallace left.  Driskill later called her and related that he “pulled a home invasion and a 
robbery and a murder, a double homicide.”  Seeking guidance about what to do, Wallace 
went to Vause’s apartment to talk to Vause’s mother, Juanita Haught.  Instead, Wallace 
encountered Driskill and heard more of his confession.  Wallace testified that, after 
leaving Vause’s apartment, she went to a gas station in Lebanon in hopes of finding 
Haught.  As she entered the store, she encountered a police officer who, upon seeing her 
upset, inquired if something was wrong.  The officer took Wallace to the sheriff’s office 
and Sergeant Henry Folsom interviewed her. 
26 
 
On cross-examination, Driskill’s trial counsel questioned Wallace about her sexual 
relationship with Driskill while also having a boyfriend, with whom she had a child, at 
the time.  Wallace admitted she was cheating on and lying to her boyfriend.  They 
questioned Wallace about the details of the evening at the river, including drug use.  Trial 
counsel also questioned Wallace on her late contact with police, given Wallace’s 
supposed knowledge of what Driskill told her about the crimes.  Additionally, the 
cross-examination delved into potential inconsistences with statements about Wallace’s 
phone calls. 
In Sergeant Michael Mizer’s reporting officer’s narrative, which documented 
Wallace’s first contact with law enforcement, he described encountering Wallace inside 
the gas station.  He said Wallace was “crying hysterically.”  He further reported: 
Koontz9 stated she received a phone call from Jesse Driskill stating he needed 
a ride from Conway, Mo back to Lebanon.  Koontz stated Driskill told her 
he was on N Highway.  Koontz stated she then responded to that area where 
she picked Driskill up.  Koontz stated Driskill had blood all over him.  
Koontz further stated Driskill began to admit to her what he had done earlier 
in the evening. 
 
Trial counsel did not impeach Wallace with this statement, which indicated she 
actually picked up Driskill in Conway.  Trial counsel deposed Mizer prior to trial.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, Mizer testified that, had he been called to testify, he would have 
testified consistently with his report.  Folsom, who assisted with the investigation of the 
case, testified he interviewed Wallace at the sheriff’s department.  Wallace told Folsom 
                                              
9 Koontz was Wallace’s last name at the time. 
27 
 
that Driskill requested to be picked up at a rural location, she left when she saw first 
responders and met Driskill later at a residence. 
Trial counsel testified they did not remember why they did not impeach Wallace 
with her statement to Mizer that she picked up Driskill.  Although impeachment was 
discussed and counsel indicated they would have wanted to impeach Wallace’s 
credibility, neither attorney remembered the reason for not using the statement.  The 
circuit court found, upon a review of the trial transcript, it was reasonable for trial 
counsel to prefer to keep the jury focused on Wallace’s delay in speaking with the police 
and her mental state, instead of whether she picked up Driskill.   
“Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill-fated they appear in 
hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.”  Anderson, 196 
S.W.3d at 33.  Although trial counsel could not articulate the rationale for not impeaching 
Wallace with the prior statement, focusing on Wallace’s delayed contact with law 
enforcement was reasonable.  Establishing Wallace was lying was part of trial counsel’s 
strategy, but the impeachment value of her statement that she picked up Driskill was 
minimal.  Wallace was in a state of extreme distress and incidentally stated she picked up 
Driskill.  This alleged statement is refuted by Folsom’s interview in the sheriff’s 
department with Wallace and her trial testimony, both of which were removed from the 
initial hysteria in the store.  The circuit court did not clearly err in finding trial counsel 
were not ineffective on this ground. 
 
 
28 
 
2. Testimony Driskill Shaved C.W.’s Pubic Area 
 
Driskill claims his trial counsel were ineffective for not impeaching Wallace’s 
testimony that Driskill told her he “shaved” C.W.’s pubic area.  During voir dire, the 
State claimed C.W.’s pubic area was shaved to cover up evidence.  Wallace testified at 
trial as to what she heard Driskill say at Vause’s apartment.  She said Driskill tried to 
clean up evidence, including shaving C.W.’s pubic area and pouring bleach inside of her.  
He then used gasoline.  No other witness from Vause’s apartment who heard Driskill 
recount his actions testified that C.W.’s pubic area was shaved.   
At trial, Sergeant Folsom testified about his involvement in the murder 
investigation.  He processed the crime scene.  He noted there were burnt paper towels and 
other items between C.W.’s legs.  He testified he did not notice any pubic hairs in the 
region, but that “[t]hey were very faint once [he] observed it and looked at it later.”  
Folsom also testified he interviewed Wallace after the crimes.  On cross-examination, 
trial counsel referenced the interview with Wallace, asking questions about her telephone 
calls with Driskill.  The telephone calls were not verified or investigated by law 
enforcement. 
Dr. Russell Deidiker, a forensic pathologist, reviewed the autopsy reports as well 
as photographs and testified at trial that there appeared to be sparse pubic hair.10  He 
could not say C.W. had been recently shaved.  A picture of C.W.’s pubic region was 
shown.  Dr. Deidiker testified the amount of pubic hair was difficult to determine because 
                                              
10 The doctor who performed the autopsy passed away before trial. 
29 
 
of thermal injuries.  On cross-examination, Dr. Deidiker testified that people lose some 
pubic hair as they begin to age.  In closing argument, Driskill’s trial counsel noted there 
was no evidence C.W.’s pubic area was shaved.  Specifically, trial counsel noted the 
medical examiner testified that sparse pubic hair occurs with aging, that there was no 
evidence from the medical examiner C.W. was shaved, and that no razor was found with 
hair in it.  The State made no mention of whether C.W. was shaved in closing argument. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Folsom testified he prepared an 
affidavit requesting a sexual assault kit be performed on Driskill.  In the affidavit, Folsom 
stated it appeared that “[t]he pubic hair had been removed from [C.W.’s] vaginal area” 
and that there was an attempt to start a fire in that area.  He thought Wallace had told him 
about Driskill shaving the victim during the interview he conducted.11  Folsom’s affidavit 
recounts that a witness contacted law enforcement and related that Driskill stated he 
“shaved the female’s vaginal area and cleaned her vaginal area with bleach.”   
Also testifying was Jenny Smith, a forensic chemist with the MSHP Crime 
Laboratory.  She stated the pubic hair from C.W.’s sexual assault kit indicated charring or 
heat damage.  She further stated the number of pubic hairs was typical to what would be 
obtained as part of pubic hair combings from a sexual assault kit.  Upon questioning, she 
confirmed the length of the hairs was typical or did not strike her as outstanding. 
                                              
11 The transcript of the interview also reveals Wallace related this detail. 
30 
 
Turlington testified she could not recall anything about C.W.’s pubic region being 
shaved, but she had some recollection about there being evidence the hair was sparse.  
She testified she would have wanted to impeach Wallace’s credibility.   
Dryden testified that neither Folsom nor Wallace was impeached about the 
inconsistent statements as to whether C.W.’s pubic region was shaved.  She said she had 
no trial strategy reason for failing to impeach the two witnesses about the pubic hair.  She 
further noted she and Turlington had “missed the timeline”—i.e., they did not recognize 
events occurred in the following order: 1) Folsom was at the crime scene and saw the 
body; 2) Folsom interviewed Wallace, and 3) Wallace testified at trial that Driskill 
shaved C.W.  The circuit court found, in part, that, regardless of whether C.W.’s pubic 
area was shaved, there was ample evidence to support the conclusion Driskill raped 
C.W., and it was reasonable for trial counsel to prefer to minimize any testimony that 
highlighted that alleged detail of the crime. 
Trial counsel operated pursuant to the theory that Driskill did not commit the 
crime.  It was reasonable to cast doubt on the passing reference from one witness that 
C.W.’s pubic area was shaved by arguing, in closing, a lack of evidence.  This reasonable 
strategy cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance.  Anderson, 196 S.W.3d at 33.  
The alternative, detailed questioning about the precise manner in which the perpetrator 
attempted to remove evidence, could reasonably be deemed unwise by competent, skilled 
counsel.  Regardless, the jury was aware of the thermal injuries to C.W.’s pubic region 
and the sparse hair.   
31 
 
Wallace testified about the version of the crime she heard Driskill detail.  The 
physical evidence C.W. was not shaved, which is far from dispositive, did not contradict 
whether Driskill made the statement that he shaved C.W.  As a result, the impeachment 
value of this evidence is minimal.  Considering the other evidence in this case, both 
physical evidence and accounts of witnesses who heard Driskill describe the crime, there 
is not a reasonable likelihood that impeaching Wallace on this detail would have resulted 
in a different outcome of the trial.  The circuit court did not clearly err in denying this 
claim. 
F. Failure to Impeach Vause’s Testimony J.W. Was Tied up 
Driskill claims his trial counsel were ineffective for not investigating and 
impeaching Vause’s testimony.  On direct examination, Vause testified Driskill said he 
“tied the older man up” during the rape of C.W.  In a follow-up question from the State, 
Vause repeated the statement.  Driskill argues this testimony should have been 
impeached with the autopsy report showing no ligature marks.  The possibility that J.W. 
may have been tied up was not referenced again.   
On cross-examination, trial counsel focused on who was present in the apartment 
during Driskill’s alleged confession.  Vause testified she recalled that it was only her and 
Perry.  Vause further testified she did not notice Driskill was covered in blood when he 
entered the apartment. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Turlington testified she did not 
remember if they had a trial strategy for failing to impeach Vause with the fact that no 
ligature marks were found on J.W. at the autopsy.  Dryden testified she had no strategy 
32 
 
for not impeaching Vause.  The circuit court found, in part, that trial counsel were 
reasonable in concluding impeaching Vause on the point was not a significant area 
worthy of cross-examination.   
The value of impeaching Vause regarding the existence of ligature marks with the 
autopsy report is questionable.  Vause testified to Driskill’s statement about J.W. being 
bound, and the autopsy report would not contradict whether Driskill made that statement.  
Cross-examination about this topic would also detract from Vause’s testimony that was 
potentially helpful to the defense: Driskill made his statement solely to her and Perry, and 
Driskill was not covered in blood when he entered the apartment.   
There is not a reasonable probability that impeaching Vause with the autopsy 
report would have changed the outcome of the trial.  Overall, Vause’s description of 
Driskill’s statements were largely consistent with the testimony of other witnesses and 
the physical evidence.  The fleeting reference to J.W. being bound was not highlighted by 
the State.  No other witness referenced that detail.  The circuit court did not clearly err in 
finding trial counsel were not ineffective on this ground. 
G. Failure to Introduce Evidence Vause Purportedly Used Victims’ Last Name When 
Calling 911 
 
Driskill claims Vause referred to the victims’ last name when she called 911, even 
though the witnesses at Vause’s apartment never claimed to have heard Driskill mention 
the victims’ last name.  There was no testimony from any of the people at Vause’s 
apartment, where Driskill told his story, that he revealed the last name of the victims.  In 
33 
 
Detective John Young’s incident report, he discussed all aspects of the investigation.  
One paragraph stated: 
Laclede County 911 received a separate call from a subject stating that Jessie 
Driskill is passed out inside a residence located [at] 713 Parkhurst in 
Lebanon, Laclede County, Mo.  The caller advised that Driskill is the person 
responsible for the [victims’ last name] case.  The caller also stated that 
Driskill had changed clothes and would be able to provide the clothing to us. 
 
Trial counsel moved for disclosure of the 911 recordings referenced in Young’s 
report, but they received only the recordings of two other calls from the case.  Because 
trial counsel were aware 911 recordings were destroyed after varying amounts of time, 
they recalled making a further inquiry at some point about the call and being told it was 
destroyed. 
Driskill alleges effective counsel would have requested and obtained the 911 
recording before it was destroyed or presented the statement of Detective Young that “the 
caller advised that Driskill is the person responsible for the [victims’ last name] case.”  
Driskill claims the fact Vause used the victims’ last name is impeaching because it 
suggests she received the name from someone other than Driskill. 
Trial counsel requested the recordings and made further inquiry about the missing 
call.  The actions of trial counsel appear to be reasonable in relation to the minimal 
impeachment value of the recording.  The reference to the victims’ last name in Young’s 
report is potentially the product of Young’s familiarity with the case while writing the 
report with the knowledge of the victims’ identities.  Or it could be the result of 
summarizing what a dispatcher relayed to Young, again with the name provided by a 
party other than the caller.  The content of the recording is speculation, and Driskill 
34 
 
cannot demonstrate prejudice based on speculation of the content of the 911 call.  The 
circuit court did not clearly err in holding trial counsel’s actions did not constitute 
ineffective assistance. 
H. Failure to Show Driskill’s Clothing and Shoes to the Jury 
Driskill argues his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to show 
his clothing to the jury.  Authorities seized a pair of jeans and a shirt from Vause’s 
apartment.  A pair of shoes was collected at the hospital.  Various evidence in this case 
suggested blood was apparent on Driskill’s clothes and shoes.  Police property records 
describing the clothes indicated blood stains were present.  Wallace testified Driskill’s 
shoes were “filled with blood,” and Cummins stated Driskill washed his shoes at the 
apartment.   
At trial, the jeans, shirt, and shoes were admitted in evidence, but they were not 
shown to the jury.  Instead, Montgomery testified that, after testing, she did not find any 
blood on the shirt or jeans.  The shoes were not tested.  While the negative test results 
were referenced at trial, Driskill argues the clothes should have been shown to the jury, 
so they could see the absence of blood firsthand, which would have altered the result of 
the trial. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Turlington stated she did not recall a 
specific reason for failing to show Driskill’s clothes to the jury, but she also noted the 
DNA report showing no blood could have impacted the decision.  Dryden acknowledged 
that forensic testing is more persuasive than merely viewing the item.  She further 
testified, trial counsel determined the laboratory result was the best evidence to show the 
35 
 
absence of blood.  The circuit court found, after observing the clothes, that overt, visible 
signs of blood were not present.  It determined introduction of the laboratory test was 
more compelling and unimpeachable than showing Driskill’s clothes to the jury. 
 
Typically, the decision to introduce evidence is a question of trial strategy that is 
virtually unchallengeable.  Johnson v. State, 333 S.W.3d 459, 463-64 (Mo. banc 2011).  
Trial counsel’s determination that the forensic test results constituted better evidence than 
exhibiting Driskill’s clothes was a reasonable strategic decision.  Even if trial counsel did 
not specifically recall the strategic reason behind utilizing the test results rather than 
showing the actual clothes, this cannot overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s 
actions were based on sound strategy.  See Bullock, 238 S.W.3d at 715.  The circuit court 
did not clearly err in determining trial counsel were not ineffective regarding this matter. 
I. Failure to Introduce Evidence Regarding Size of the Cigarette Run 
Driskill contends his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to investigate and 
present evidence regarding the size of the Decade cigarette run.  The victims’ son 
testified his father smoked “Decades.”  When his father went to Lebanon, he would 
purchase a carton of the cigarettes.  A package of Decade Menthol 100 cigarettes was 
found in the basement of the victims’ residence.  A package of Decade Menthol 100 
cigarettes was also taken from Driskill’s clothing after he was taken to the hospital 
following his arrest.  Both packages had the same manufacturing run numbers.  
Testimony at trial showed Corporal Scott Mertens contacted the company that 
manufactured Decade cigarettes.  The manufacturer “indicated that it was a very small 
run” and that the run had been distributed to a store in Lebanon. 
36 
 
In opening statements, the State referenced the Decade cigarettes with the same 
run number being found at the victim’s house and in Driskill’s clothing after he was 
taken into custody.  The defense, in closing argument, suggested the Decade cigarettes 
from Driskill’s clothing were not his because he changed clothes at Vause’s apartment.  
The State’s closing again referenced the run of cigarettes as part of the evidence 
establishing proof beyond a reasonable doubt: 
And these cigarettes incredibly -- incredibly, it would seem -- come from the 
same manufacturing run.  Each pack, the one collected from the crime scene 
and the one taken from the Defendant’s pocket, have the same run number 
on the side of the packet which is produced by a very small run of cigarettes 
made by the Cheyenne Cigarette Company, meaning that there is a high 
likelihood that the Defendant took one of those packs of cigarettes from the 
scene of the crime on the night in question. 
 
Dean Ramsey Stacy, the quality director at the company that manufactures the 
Decade cigarettes, provided an affidavit during the postconviction proceedings.  Stacy 
averred that the specific lot number from the cigarettes in this case contained a run of 
43,200 packs of cigarettes.  This was equivalent to 4,320 cartons or 72 cases. 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified they did not recall 
contacting the manufacturing company to determine how many packs of cigarettes 
contained the same run number.  Turlington believed some inquiry was made about the 
topic.  She stated she had some trial strategy for not obtaining the information, but she 
could not recall it.  Dryden testified the manufacturer was not contacted and she did not 
specifically recall a trial strategy reason for failing to do so.  Dryden further noted there 
was an unsuccessful attempt to determine what shops in the area sold that run of 
37 
 
cigarettes.12  The circuit court, upon review of the testimony and record, was confident 
the jury understood the limited value of this evidence and that other packages of 
cigarettes with the same run number existed.  It further found trial counsel were not 
ineffective for failing to prove the exact number of packages of cigarettes with the same 
lot number. 
Driskill argues the fact the run of cigarettes contained more than 43,000 packs 
refuted one of the pillars of guilt the State relied on to show no reasonable doubt existed.  
He contends showing the number of packs of cigarettes would negate the State’s 
argument that he was present in the victims’ home because he had the same cigarettes.  
But evidence of the approximate number of packages contained in the run would not 
negate the inference that Driskill took the package from the victims’ home.  The 
circumstantial evidence provided by the matching run numbers would not be enhanced 
nor diminished by establishing the exact quantity in the run.  Driskill was not prejudiced 
by trial counsel’s failure to present evidence of the quantity of cigarettes in the run.  
Moreover, trial counsels’ apparent strategy was to suggest Driskill obtained the package 
of cigarettes in the clothing from the apartment.  Accordingly, there would have been no 
value added by further investigation into the exact quantity of cigarettes in the run.  The 
circuit court did not clearly err in its findings. 
 
                                              
12 Mertens’s original inquiry to the manufacturer resulted in the manufacturer faxing a list of 
distributors who received the cigarettes with the particular run number.  Trial counsel would 
have had access to this list.  The run was distributed to stores in multiple states, including a 
distributor in Lebanon. 
38 
 
J. Failure to Object to Voir Dire Questioning 
During voir dire, the State repeatedly noted the crime was “horrible.”  Driskill 
argues his trial counsel were ineffective for not objecting to these comments.  At the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing, trial counsel could not recall a reason for not making 
the objections.  The circuit court found the State described the crime using the terms it 
chose in an effort to determine if each juror could properly consider the legally available 
sentences.  It found these statements were not objectionable or prejudicial to Driskill.  
The references to the “horrible” crime occurred in the context of the State 
questioning jurors about whether, knowing the facts of the case, they could equally 
consider imposing a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment.13  The prosecutor 
frequently stated jurors may be able to think of crimes they considered more horrible.  
Contrary to Driskill’s suggestion, these repeated statements to the venire panels did not 
serve to inform the jury that Driskill’s case was among the worst and warranted the death 
penalty.  Rather, the statements recognized the nature of the crime and served to inquire 
of jurors whether they could fairly consider the legally available penalties.   
                                              
13 After describing the crime in general terms, the prosecutor posited: 
Now, to me, that might be one of the most horrible—there’s more horrible crimes 
than that, but that’s a pretty horrible crime.  Sir, I don’t know what the most horrible 
crime for you or the other jurors is, but what I need to ask you is even though you 
can consider a death sentence, knowing those facts, can you give equal 
consideration to a life sentence? 
(Emphasis added).  Driskill’s brief focuses on 24 examples of similar references to the 
“horrible” crime, although this is the sole example of the prosecutor stating it is, to him, 
“one of the most horrible” crimes.  Notably, the prosecutor immediately corrected 
himself.  
39 
 
Driskill also notes that a prosecutor’s statement of personal opinion or belief not 
based on evidence is improper.  See State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 901 (Mo. banc 
1995).  But the prosecutor did not go so far as to inject his personal opinion in the 
instances highlighted in Driskill’s brief.  The characterization of the crime as horrible 
was, like all murders, an apt description.  Moreover, the brief factual scenario discussed 
by the prosecutor during voir dire did not rely on facts that went beyond the evidence to 
be presented at trial.  Because the prosecutor’s statements during voir dire were not 
improper, trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to object.  The circuit court did not 
clearly err in rejecting this claim. 
II. 
Alleged Penalty Phase Errors 
A. Failure to Call a Psychiatrist to Testify at Penalty Phase Regarding Driskill’s 
Complex PTSD 
 
 
Driskill alleges his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to call an expert witness 
to testify, at the penalty phase, about certain aspects of his mental health.  While some 
mental health testimony was presented during the penalty phase, Driskill contends 
testimony that he has complex post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) resulting from 
childhood trauma and sexual abuse would have created a stronger defense under the 
mitigating factors in section 565.032.3.14   
                                              
14 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000.  Section 565.032.3 provides, in part:  
Statutory mitigating circumstances shall include the following: 
. . . 
(2) The murder in the first degree was committed while the defendant was under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
. . . 
40 
 
 
Driskill called multiple experts during the penalty phase.  Dr. Robert Hanlon, a 
clinical neuropsychologist, analyzed Driskill’s cognitive functions after reviewing 
records, interviewing family as well as friends, meeting with Driskill for eight hours, and 
conducting tests.  He testified Driskill had 1) been diagnosed with psychiatric disorders, 
including intermittent explosive disorder, bipolar disorder, and an anxiety disorder, 2) a 
history of suffering panic attacks, and 3) suffered abuse from his mother as a child.  
Dr. Hanlon also stated Driskill had a cognitive disorder, which impaired his cognitive 
functions.  After testing, Dr. Hanlon concluded Driskill had neurocognitive deficits, such 
as executive dysfunction, memory disturbance, and visual reaction time, which were 
impacted by his bipolar disorder, a history of multiple concussions, and chronic 
polysubstance abuse.  The deficits also made Driskill less able to control his behavior and 
impacted decision-making. 
 
Dr. William Bernet, a professor emeritus of psychology, also testified in 
mitigation.  He specialized in forensic psychiatry, with an emphasis in how genetics 
impact criminal or violent behavior.  Dr. Bernet reviewed records, statements from 
family, friends, as well as a treating physician, and had Driskill undergo a genetic test.  
He mentioned records showed Driskill suffered abuse as a child.  Dr. Bernet explained 
that the abuse, in connection with a low-activity version of a specific gene, makes it more 
likely an individual will be violent or arrested for committing a violent crime.  As a 
                                              
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. . . . 
At Driskill’s trial, a jury instruction was provided for section 565.032.3(6) but not 565.032.3(2). 
41 
 
result, Driskill was significantly more likely to act violently, have trouble controlling his 
behavior, struggle conforming his behavior to typical expectations, and overreact to mild 
stressors.  Dr. Reed Wouters, Driskill’s treating physician, presented testimony during the 
penalty phase.  He noted Driskill had been abused by his mother as a child and explained 
the abuse, in connection with other issues, caused Driskill to experience anxiety, 
paranoia, and mistrust.  He previously diagnosed Driskill with a probable anxiety 
disorder, likely some depression, explosive behavior disorder, and anger issues. 
 
At the postconviction hearing, Driskill presented evidence from Dr. Stephen 
Peterson, a forensic psychiatrist.  Dr. Peterson reviewed numerous records, including 
academic, medical, psychiatric, law enforcement, and correctional documents; 
interviewed individuals familiar with Driskill; and conducted two in-person interviews 
with Driskill.  He diagnosed Driskill with complex PTSD, intermittent explosive 
disorder, and polysubstance dependence disorder.  Driskill’s PTSD is complex because 
he has suffered multiple traumas.  Dr. Peterson analyzed Driskill’s mental health before, 
around, and after the offense.  He noted Driskill’s early life was difficult, as he had an 
unstable home environment, was physically and emotionally abused by his mother, spent 
time in the Illinois juvenile justice system, and endured sexual abuse.  According to 
Dr. Peterson, many behaviors Driskill exhibited before the offense—including anxiety, 
depression, suicidal ideation, and behavioral as well as emotional control problems—
were consistent with PTSD.  Further, some of these behavioral issues are often 
incorrectly ascribed to other disorders, such as bipolar disorder or schizophrenia, if a full 
history for a patient is not kept. 
42 
 
 
Dr. Peterson further opined professionals often treat the symptoms of an issue 
rather than reaching the root cause.  He suggested this occurred with Driskill, which 
explained why he had not been previously diagnosed with complex PTSD.  Dr. Peterson 
stated that, in the records he reviewed, he did not see any close questioning about 
Driskill’s history of sexual, physical, or emotional abuse and how this impacted his 
day-to-day functioning.  He testified that records created after the offense supported his 
opinion.  Specifically, Dr. Peterson reviewed the examination conducted by Dr. Hanlon.  
He also analyzed competency evaluations completed by Dr. Linda Gruenberg, an anxiety 
disorder expert, and Dr. Robert Fucetola, a neuropsychologist.  Dr. Peterson did not lodge 
any complaints about the other experts’ evaluations, but he felt they were asking different 
questions.  For example, Dr. Hanlon and Dr. Fucetola are neuropsychologists, who focus 
on brain function rather than the causes of such behavior.  Thus, a neuropsychological 
exam is not necessarily used to obtain a specific psychiatric diagnosis, although such an 
exam can help inform a psychiatric diagnosis.  Dr. Gruenberg also focused on Driskill’s 
competency to stand trial instead of the source of his mental illness.  According to 
Dr. Peterson, all these factors explained why he diagnosed Driskill with complex PTSD 
while others did not. 
 
During interviews with Driskill, Dr. Peterson also learned Driskill was sexually 
abused multiple times as an adolescent.  The abuse was perpetrated by an older male and 
female.  Driskill mentioned the sexual abuse in the first interview, but he was very 
guarded regarding the topic, stating he had not planned to share this information with 
anyone.  Driskill terminated the interview when Dr. Peterson further questioned him 
43 
 
about the subject.  Driskill was agitated and nervous after the interview and requested to 
be placed in isolation.  Dr. Peterson testified sexual abuse victims are often reluctant to 
disclose the incident, as they often feel they are to blame.  Driskill also seemed worried 
about the possibility of another inmate hearing of the sexual abuse.  At the second 
interview, Driskill provided more details.  Dr. Peterson explained the abusers forced 
Driskill to engage in sexual activity through threats to him and his brother and through 
use of seductive behavior.  Dr. Peterson also speculated why other professionals were not 
able to discover Driskill’s allegations of sexual abuse, positing 1) patients are usually not 
asked about sexual abuse in emergency situations because it often is not a base symptom 
unless the abuse just occurred; 2) patients do not mention sexual abuse because help 
likely will not be provided and this is a serious topic; and 3) professionals tend to ask 
about sexual abuse generally but drop the subject when told abuse has not occurred. 
 
Dr. Peterson testified that Driskill’s complex PTSD and intermittent explosive 
disorder could have caused him to be under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance at the time of the crime and substantially impaired his ability to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law.  
Dr. Peterson, however, acknowledged he did not specifically ask Driskill about the 
murders.  Instead, he focused on the potential presence of a mental disease relevant to his 
conduct, not about criminal responsibility at the time of the offense.  Dr. Peterson could 
not offer an opinion regarding the latter issue, but he clarified that Driskill’s mental 
health problems were operative at the time of the offense, which would have impacted 
Driskill’s thinking.  Dr. Peterson also admitted Driskill took steps to cover up the crimes, 
44 
 
indicating Driskill understood what he was doing was wrong and could be investigated 
by others. 
 
Turlington testified that trial counsel’s penalty phase theory was based on 
Driskill’s mental health issues, genetic predisposition toward violence, and history of 
physical abuse.  She acknowledged that, while they did not call a psychiatrist, it would 
have been consistent with their theory.  Turlington, however, articulated a strategic 
rationale for failing to call a psychiatrist—trial counsel believed they were presenting 
evidence regarding Driskill’s mental health and history of abuse by other avenues.  She 
noted Driskill’s sexual abuse was not mentioned at trial, but other types of abuse and 
trauma were presented.  Turlington stated that trial counsel investigated a lack of capacity 
defense by arranging a neuropsychological evaluation, a genetic test, and talking to a 
family doctor who treated Driskill for anxiety and depression.  Moreover, trial counsel 
had two competency evaluations performed.  Turlington also said they made a strategic, 
intentional decision not to call every mental health expert who had prepared information 
for, or was consulted by, the defense, as those experts had harmful information or could 
not present relevant material.  She also explained she preferred to present mitigation 
evidence, when possible, from lay witnesses because her experience, as well as studies, 
show juries respond better to these witnesses. 
 
Dryden testified that evidence regarding Driskill’s PTSD and sexual abuse would 
have been helpful at the penalty phase.  She stated there was no strategic reason for 
failing to call a psychiatrist.  The circuit court, in part, reiterated trial counsel consulted 
multiple mental health experts, including two psychiatrists, while preparing for Driskill’s 
45 
 
case.  Dr. Peterson acknowledged these experts were competent and capable.  The circuit 
court also found Dr. Peterson’s testimony at the postconviction hearing was not 
persuasive or particularly credible because he implied Driskill might not have understood 
the wrongfulness of his conduct but did not specifically say that was true during the 
offenses.  Further, he did not discuss the crimes with Driskill. 
A “viable defense” for the penalty phase portion of a death penalty trial is 
established if there is a reasonable probability the mitigation testimony would have 
outweighed the aggravation evidence, leading the jury to impose a sentence other than the 
death penalty.  McFadden, 553 S.W.3d at 308.  “In a death penalty case, trial counsel has 
an obligation to investigate and discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence[.]”  
Id.  Yet trial counsel is not required to continue investigating when there is reason to 
believe further inquiry will be unhelpful and results will be unfruitful.  Id.  Because of 
real world constraints on time and human resources, trial counsel is entitled to great 
deference regarding the pursuit of witnesses.  Id. at 309.  Finally, “[d]efense counsel is 
not obligated to shop for an expert witness who might provide more favorable 
testimony.”  Johnson, 333 S.W.3d at 464. 
 
Trial counsel’s selection of penalty phase experts was reasonable.  Turlington 
testified they made intentional decisions regarding the mental health testimony presented.  
Trial counsel believed evidence regarding Driskill’s history of abuse was adduced via 
other avenues, such as lay witnesses, which Turlington’s experience and studies have 
shown is more impactful.  They also strategically decided not to call every potential 
expert.   Further, trial counsel made these decisions after investigating a lack of capacity 
46 
 
defense, consulting multiple qualified experts, subjecting Driskill to neuropsychological 
as well as genetic tests, and analyzing Driskill’s medical history.  Trial counsel engaged 
in due diligence, and their decision as to which witnesses to call was not unreasonable.  
Driskill has failed to overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel acted reasonably 
and rendered proper assistance. 
 
The circuit court found Dr. Peterson’s opinion was not credible, noting he did not 
speak with Driskill about the murders.  This Court defers to the circuit court’s credibility 
findings.  Shockley, 579 S.W.3d at 892.  Driskill contends Dr. Peterson did not need to 
discuss the crimes with him because the issue is whether the testimony would support the 
statutory mitigators.  The mitigators utilized by Driskill, however, are assessed at the time 
of the crime.  See section 565.032.3(2) (“The murder in the first degree was committed 
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance[.]”); section 565.032.3(6) (“The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired[.]”).  Dr. Peterson acknowledged Driskill attempted to cover up 
the murders, indicating he knew his actions were wrong and likely to be investigated.  
Dr. Peterson opined Driskill was suffering from mental health issues before the crime and 
that these issues likely persisted during the murders.  Yet Dr. Peterson’s failure to ask 
about the offenses limits the helpfulness of his testimony. 
 
Dr. Peterson’s testimony was also largely cumulative of other evidence presented.  
Driskill claims Dr. Peterson’s testimony was crucial and stronger than evidence presented 
at trial because it explained Driskill had complex PTSD and experienced sexual abuse as 
47 
 
a child.  During the penalty phase, Dr. Hanlon testified that Driskill had been previously 
diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder, bipolar disorder, and an anxiety disorder.  
He also stated Driskill had a history of polysubstance dependence.  Dr. Wouters 
reaffirmed Driskill struggled with anxiety, paranoia, and mistrust, explaining he 
diagnosed Driskill with a probable anxiety disorder, likely some depression, explosive 
behavior disorder, and anger issues.  Both experts, as well as Dr. Bernet and multiple lay 
witnesses, testified Driskill was physically abused by his mother as a child.  In contrast, 
Dr. Peterson diagnosed Driskill with complex PTSD, intermittent explosive disorder, and 
polysubstance dependence disorder.  He also learned Driskill, in addition to physical 
abuse by his mother, was sexually abused during his childhood.   
 
Despite these differences, the conclusions reached by the experts were similar.  
Dr. Hanlon explained Driskill was less able to control his behavior or make good 
decisions due to neurocognitive deficits.  Dr. Bernet testified Driskill was more likely to 
act violently and less able to control his behavior or conform his actions to typical 
expectations because of his genetics and history of abuse.  Dr. Peterson concluded 
Driskill’s mental health issues could have caused him to be under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime and substantially 
impaired his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law.  Even though the specific mental health problems might have 
differed, all experts reached the conclusion that these issues impacted Driskill’s behavior.  
Given the weaknesses in Dr. Peterson’s testimony, its similarity to other penalty phase 
evidence, and the circuit court’s finding that Dr. Peterson was not credible, Driskill has 
48 
 
not established Dr. Peterson’s testimony would have persuaded the jury to impose a life 
sentence.  The circuit court did not clearly err in determining trial counsel were not 
ineffective for failing to call a psychiatrist during the penalty phase. 
B. Failure to Call Mitigation Witnesses 
 
Driskill alleges his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to call four additional 
mitigation witnesses—Johnnie Gates, Michelle Clark, Peyton Stokesberry, and Jesse 
Simmons.  Supposedly, these witnesses would have provided important background 
information regarding Driskill’s mental health issues and demonstrated Driskill had a 
loving relationship with his children.   
 
At the penalty phase, Driskill presented mitigating evidence from Amanda 
Warner, Crystal Fortune, and other lay witnesses.  Warner, who dated Driskill’s brother 
when she was 15, testified Driskill had a difficult childhood.  She explained Driskill’s 
father was an alcoholic, and Driskill’s mother abused the boys.  Warner stated she knew 
Driskill was bipolar; had issues with anxiety, even describing an instance where he 
blacked out as a result of a panic attack; and struggled with drugs.  She stated Driskill 
was good with her children when medicated.  Warner maintained contact with Driskill 
while he was in prison and planned to continue doing so.   
 
Driskill’s seventh grade teacher, Crystal Fortune, also testified.  She suspected 
Driskill had been abused because he came to school with bruises.  Fortune reported her 
suspicions to the principal, who believed this was not an abuse situation.  Fortune 
disagreed and placed a letter of disagreement in Driskill’s file.  Trial counsel read a letter 
from Driskill’s younger brother, which provided that Driskill served as a protector during 
49 
 
their childhood.  The brothers spent a lot of time together, and Driskill was always 
available to help. 
1. Johnnie Gates 
 
Gates was incarcerated in the Illinois Juvenile Justice System starting in 1989.  At 
the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Gates testified about the conditions in those 
facilities, stating they were worse than adult correctional institutions in Missouri.  He 
explained fights were common, stronger individuals preyed on weaker individuals, and 
sexual abuse occurred.  According to Gates, gangs were present and non-members were 
treated poorly.  He further stated residents lived in a constant state of fear, unless they 
were in solitary confinement, because guards were unhelpful.  Gates acknowledged he 
and Driskill were not in the system at same time.  Instead, he met Driskill at a Missouri 
correctional institution sometime after 2008.  Gates testified he could tell Driskill had 
been in the Illinois juvenile justice system by his demeanor.  He later confirmed this 
hunch was correct, determining Driskill had been in at least the same intake facility.  
Both Turlington and Dryden testified they attempted to obtain Driskill’s Illinois juvenile 
records, but they had been destroyed.  They could not recall a strategic reason for not 
presenting evidence regarding the above conditions.  The circuit court, in part, noted 
Gates and Driskill were not in the same facilities at the same time and determined his 
testimony would not have changed the outcome of trial. 
 
This Court previously rejected a similar claim.  See McFadden, 553 S.W.3d at 
310.  There, McFadden claimed trial counsel should have called two lay witnesses to 
testify about the terrible living conditions in his childhood neighborhood.  Id. at 298, 310.  
50 
 
Because those witnesses, however, did not know McFadden and could only testify about 
general social conditions, their testimony was speculation.  Id. at 310.  Moreover, gangs 
were responsible for much of the violence in the area.  Id.  The prosecution could have 
used this information on cross-examination to suggest McFadden was a member, rather 
than a victim, of the gangs, which would have been harmful.  Id.  Similarly, Gates and 
Driskill were incarcerated in the Illinois juvenile justice system at different times.  Gates 
could only speculate regarding the conditions Driskill experienced.  His testimony would 
also open the door for potentially harmful cross-examination.  Because Gates said 
non-gang members were treated poorly and stronger individuals preyed on weaker 
individuals, the prosecution could have utilized this information to suggest Driskill was a 
gang member or a perpetrator of violence instead of a victim. 
2. Michelle Clark 
 
Clark had a romantic relationship with Driskill when she was 15 and he was 17.  
During the postconviction proceedings, she explained their relationship began well.  
Clark testified Driskill revealed he had been sexually abused to her.  She stated Driskill 
showed extreme paranoia, such as delusions or hallucinations, and provided an example 
of this behavior.  Clark also explained she had a child with Driskill.  One morning, later 
in her pregnancy, she went to Driskill’s home and found him with another woman.  At 
that point, Driskill said he was finished with Clark and suggested she have an abortion.   
 
Turlington believed Clark was contacted, but she was not extensively interviewed.  
Dryden thought Driskill did not want Clark contacted.  The circuit court noted Driskill 
51 
 
ended his relationship with Clark and suggested she abort her child, holding Clark did not 
present evidence that would have caused the jury to impose a different sentence. 
 
Multiple penalty phase witnesses explained Driskill suffered from anxiety, 
paranoia, and other mental health issues.  As a result, some of Clark’s testimony would 
have been cumulative.  To the extent the evidence was not cumulative, Clark’s testimony 
would have allowed for damaging cross-examination.  The prosecution could have 
utilized this information, which would have been harmful to Driskill. 
3. Peyton Stokesberry and Jesse Simmons 
 
Stokesberry believed Driskill was her father until around 2014 when she 
discovered that was not true.  Despite this, she still considers him as her father and feels 
their relationship is important.  Stokesberry acknowledged Driskill was frequently in 
prison during her childhood, but she stated that, when he was not in prison, he was a good 
father who often spent time with his children, taking them to the movies, to get ice cream, 
or spending the night with them.  Stokesberry indicated she has stayed in contact with 
Driskill while he has been incarcerated by writing letters, making regular phone calls, and 
visiting.  Driskill also has given her fatherly advice.  While Stokesberry lives in 
Tennessee, she planned to visit Driskill and would remain involved in his life if he 
received a sentence of life without parole.  Stokesberry believed trial counsel attempted 
to reach her.  She would have testified, but her grandmother resisted because the family 
was being harassed. 
 
Simmons is Driskill’s son.  At the evidentiary hearing, he testified he did not see 
Driskill much because he was often in prison.  Yet he enjoyed spending time with 
52 
 
Driskill, and they were sometimes together on holidays and special occasions.  Driskill 
also provided fatherly advice.  Simmons intended to maintain his relationship with 
Driskill and would continue to do so if a sentence of life without parole was imposed.  
Simmons believed trial counsel attempted to reach him, and he would have testified if 
asked. 
 
Turlington did not remember interviewing Stokesberry or Simmons.  Dryden 
recalled attempting to contact Stokesberry, but Driskill did not want to involve her.  
Driskill’s mother, with whom Stokesberry was living, prohibited trial counsel from 
contacting the child.  Dryden further explained they could have subpoenaed Stokesberry 
but did not do so because there were concerns, after discussions with Driskill, she would 
be harmed if she testified.  Dryden explained Simmons was also living with Driskill’s 
mother at the time.  Trial counsel had similar experiences attempting to have Simmons 
testify, and he was not called for the same reasons.  The circuit court noted trial counsel 
contemplated calling the children as witnesses, but they decided not to because their 
grandmother was resistant.  The circuit court also found the children, because of their 
minimal contact with Driskill, could offer only limited testimony. 
 
The decision not to call Driskill’s children was reasonable.  “Trial counsel will not 
be found ineffective for failing to call an uncooperative witness.”  Anderson, 564 S.W.3d 
at 611.  While the children themselves were willing to testify, other relatives were 
resistant.  Both children were living with Driskill’s mother and, as the individual 
responsible for the children, she prevented trial counsel from speaking to the children.   
Driskill himself did not want the children to testify due to concerns for their safety.  
53 
 
These fears were legitimate, as the family had already been subjected to harassment.  
Further, the children spent limited time, and had a limited relationship, with Driskill 
because he was often in prison.  Due to these circumstances, Driskill did not establish 
calling his children would have persuaded the jury to impose a life sentence.  The circuit 
court did not clearly err in rejecting this claim. 
III. 
Constitutional Validity of Postconviction Time Limits 
Driskill alleges Rule 29.15’s time limits are unconstitutional, as postconviction 
counsel is unable to adequately investigate and prepare an amended motion in the allotted 
time.15  To support this contention, Driskill references the extensive trial record from this 
case and notes postconviction counsel were representing individuals in two other capital 
postconviction cases at the same time.  Driskill notes his amended petition challenged the 
constitutional validity of the time limits.  The circuit court rejected the claim, noting, in 
part, the time limits have been upheld by this Court. 
Rule 29.15(b) provides that, if a conviction is affirmed on appeal, a motion for 
postconviction relief must be filed within 90 days after issuance of the appellate court’s 
mandate.  In turn, Rule 29.15(g) specifies the time limit for filing an amended motion.  
This Court has consistently held that Rule 29.15’s time limits are constitutional.  Price v. 
State, 422 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Mo. banc 2014); State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 929 (Mo. 
banc 1992).  The limitations, which serve the important purposes of “avoiding delay in 
                                              
15 Driskill maintains seven additional, untimely claims should be considered.  While the circuit 
court heard evidence on one claim—that the State committed a Brady violation by failing to 
disclose contamination and technical error logs from the MSHP Laboratory—it noted Driskill 
admitted the claim was not pleaded. 
54 
 
the processing of prisoners[’] claims and prevent[ing] the litigation of stale claims[,]” are 
also reasonable.  Day v. State, 770 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Mo. banc 1989).16   
Driskill briefly argues postconviction counsel cannot provide effective assistance 
of counsel within Rule 29.15’s time limits.  Driskill raises only cursory allegations and 
fails to specifically demonstrate how he has been prejudiced by these time limits.  
Without pointing to a certain portion or page of the opinion, he cites Martinez v. Ryan, 
566 U.S. 1 (2012), to contend postconviction counsel must be effective and raise all 
meritorious claims to comply with due process.  Martinez, however, addressed a different 
issue and did not create such a requirement.  See id. at 8-9.  This Court has said “[t]he 
lack of any constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings . . . precludes 
claims based on the diligence or competence of post-conviction counsel (appointed or 
retained) and such claims are ‘categorically unreviewable.’”  Price, 422 S.W.3d at 297 
(citation omitted).  Driskill’s attempt to transform his time-limit argument into an 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel argument fails.  The claims were not 
asserted in a timely filed amended motion.  The circuit court properly determined Rule 
29.15’s time limits were constitutional, and failure to consider the additional claims was 
not clear error. 
 
 
                                              
16 Driskill notes this Court, in Rule 29.16(e), recently extended the time limit for filing a 
postconviction relief motion in capital cases.  The provision of additional time, however, does 
not establish the previous requirement was unconstitutional. 
55 
 
Conclusion 
The circuit court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are not clearly 
erroneous.  The judgment denying Driskill postconviction relief is affirmed. 
 
 
______________________________ 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
 
Draper, C.J., Wilson, Powell, Breckenridge 
and Fischer, JJ., concur.