Title: State v. Marsyla

State: minnesota

Issuer: Minnesota Supreme Court

Document:

269 N.W.2d 2 (1978) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Robert Allen MARSYLA, Appellant. No. 46543. Supreme Court of Minnesota. May 26, 1978. *3 C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Stanley Horak, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Keith Brownell, County Atty., Peter Mayrand, Asst. County Atty., Duluth, for respondent. Heard before PETERSON, SCOTT, and IRVINE, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. SCOTT, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of first degree murder pursuant to Minn.St. 609.185(1), wherein it is claimed that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and intent to kill, and that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after the state introduced evidence of prior misconduct which was not covered in its Spreigl notice. We affirm. The grand jury of St. Louis County had indicted defendant in three separate indictments[1] for first degree murder. The county attorney requested the trial court to consolidate all three for trial, reasoning as follows in the affidavit in support of his motion: *4 This motion was denied, and a subsequent request to this court for a writ of prohibition was discouraged on the basis that it would be unlikely for such an order of a district court to be overruled as an abuse of discretion by use of this extraordinary writ. At the time of the incident which resulted in this conviction, defendant, aged 30, was unemployed and living with his father on a farm near Forbes, Minnesota. They had temporarily taken in a family with whom they had been friends for several years, the Nelsons, who needed housing for a few weeks. This family consisted of Viola Nelson, aged approximately 50, and her four children: Gail, 19; Brian, 16; Bruce, 14; and Jimmy, 12. Defendant had been a drinking companion of Viola Nelson's for about 10 years, and had had a sexual relationship with her for 6 or 7 years. On November 20, 1974, Gail, Bruce, and Jimmy went to school while Brian, Viola, and defendant stayed home and drank peppermint schnapps and beer. Beginning at about 10 a. m. they drank a half-pint of brandy, two pints of peppermint schnapps, and three six-packs of beer. Defendant's father, Eino Marsyla, stopped in at about 3 p. m. and found them "drunk or drinking." He was disturbed because defendant's brother was in the hospital in critical condition and gave defendant and Viola a lecture about their drinking at such a critical time. Gail came home from the community college at about 5 p. m. Bruce, who had come home with Jimmy at about 4 p. m., told her about the drinking and she decided to pack a suitcase and leave the farm. She and Brian had a fight over some money she wanted to take with her, during which she bit Brian on the arm. Defendant intervened, and he and Brian pushed Gail. Defendant at this time was considered "drunk" by Gail, "but not as drunk as I have seen him," and Bruce testified that defendant's physical movements and temper were normal. Bruce went upstairs to read. Jimmy came up shortly thereafter and told him that defendant had a gun. They went downstairs, but before they reached the bottom of the staircase, Bruce heard a shot and "[k]ind of a crashing noise." He saw Brian lying dead on the floor in the dining room.[2] Defendant made Bruce and Jimmy move the body to the doorway between the kitchen and the dining room. Gail, who had been in her bedroom packing, came out when she heard the shot. Defendant was holding a gun later identified as a Model 94 30.30 Winchester deer rifle. He was pointing the gun back and forth and fired a shot past the table where Gail and her mother were sitting, into the wall. According to Gail, Viola then said, "`Now that you killed Brian, you might as well kill all of us,'" to which defendant replied, "`Well, I intend to.'" He then shot Gail in the left arm, and shot and killed Viola. When Bruce and Jimmy ran, with Bruce in the lead, defendant shot and killed Jimmy. Bruce was able to hide under a bed and then run to the neighbors for help. Gail testified that defendant then "made me take my clothes off" and "raped me."[3] Defendant was apprehended a few minutes later in Gail's bedroom, with his belt unbuckled and his zipper down. About 1½ hours later defendant's blood alcohol content was tested and found to be .20. At trial, a psychiatrist testified that defendant is an alcoholic and that he was intoxicated at the time of the incident. There was conflicting expert testimony as to the extent of alcohol-induced amnesia suffered by defendant following this incident. On December 12, 1974, defendant was indicted, and trial for the death of Brian Nelson began on October 8, 1975, defendant *5 having waived his right to a speedy trial.[4] The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder. The issues this case presents are as follows: (1) Was the evidence of intent to kill and of premeditation sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of first degree murder? (2) Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial following testimony as to prior misconduct? (3) Did the trial court err in receiving evidence of the sexual assault on Gail? 1. Minn.St. 609.18 and 609.185, which are applicable in determining whether defendant committed first degree murder, state in part: This court has held that intent to kill and premeditation are both subjective elements which cannot be proved directly; they are inferred from objective evidence of the circumstances of a killing. State v. Gavle, 234 Minn. 186, 48 N.W.2d 44 (1951). This task of inference is for the jury. As we held in State v. Norgaard, 272 Minn. 48, 52, 136 N.W.2d 628, 632 (1965): "* * * If the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged, a reviewing court will not disturb its verdict." See, also, State v. Taylor, 258 N.W.2d 615 (Minn.1977); State v. Maloney, 295 Minn. 262, 204 N.W.2d 202 (1973). The reviewing court must assume the jury chose to believe the witnesses whose testimony supports the verdict. The jury's responsibility is qualified, however, by the principle that to sustain a conviction "* * * the sum of the inferences reasonably to be drawn from the circumstances [must be] consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational belief of innocence." State v. Witte, 280 Minn. 116, 118, 158 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1968). With respect to the defense of intoxication in the present case, there is ample evidence to support a jury finding that defendant was not so intoxicated as to be unable to form an intent to kill, or to premeditate. His statement that he "intended" to kill the rest of the family, testified to by Gail, indicates that he was capable of forming the requisite intent. Moreover, there was evidence that on a prior occasion defendant was apprehended with a blood-alcohol reading of .37 while driving a car, nearly twice his blood-alcohol content after the shootings. The question of intent and premeditation is stated well in 9 McCarr, Minnesota Practice, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 1521, p. 187: The defendant attempts to separate Brian's killing from all the surrounding circumstances. To this the state more than adequately replies: With this the jury apparently agreed. The totality of circumstances must always be considered by the trial court, the jury, and this court, in making a determination of intent and premeditation. Chosen facts cannot be isolated for the purposes of this test. The jury had sufficient evidence to support its verdict. 2. On direct examination, Gail testified as follows with respect to a prior incident: This testimony came in response to a series of questions concerning Gail's prior observations of defendant while he was drunk. Defendant's counsel objected to this testimony and moved for a mistrial. The objection was sustained and the jury cautioned to ignore the testimony. The mistrial was denied. The court instructed the jury: The claim that this testimony should have been noticed in advance under State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965), is questionable. Defense counsel in his opening statement indicated his intention to go into defendant's drinking history as one of his defenses, as well as the relationships with his victims. Since this testimony involved such a relationship it may very well have been admissible irrespective of Spreigl. In State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 260, 170 N.W.2d 104, 115 (1969), we stated: Defendant contends that this testimony was inadmissible as to prior misconduct; we, however, do not feel that the questioning went far enough to prejudice defendant and thereby constitute reversible error, especially when coupled with the trial court's clear admonition. 3. Defendant argues that proof that he "raped" Gail was not clear and convincing because there was no testimony as to penetration, an essential element of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. Minn.St. 609.342. Gail was describing all the actions of defendant during the commission of these crimes when she used the term "rape." All this evidence was admissible as part of the totality of the circumstances of the crimes. But in any event, criminal sexual conduct in the second degree does not require penetration, and there was clear and convincing evidence of that crime. See, Minn.St. 609.343. The two offenses are equally probative of defendant's ability to form intent. Under the circumstances, the fact that penetration was not clearly shown was not prejudicial. Affirmed. [1] This crime was committed before the adoption of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure wherein it is made more clear that separate charges may be consolidated. Rule 17.03, subd. 4, Rules of Criminal Procedure. [2] Brian had been shot once in the back of the neck, incurring a wound which caused instantaneous or almost instantaneous death. [3] Corroborative evidence includes the fact that the quilt on Gail's bed had a large bloodstain where her left arm would have been had she lain thereon her back; defendant's sweatshirt was stained on the front of the right shoulder by blood which matched Gail's in three tested respects. Her panties were found by the bed. When the quilt and panties were tested for the presence of semen, however, the results were negative. [4] Gail was being treated by the Range Mental Health Center and her appearance as a witness was delayed pending clearance by the doctors.