Title: State v. Kandutsch

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 78 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1351-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Gregg B. Kandutsch, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 330 Wis. 2d 496, 792 N.W. 2d 239 
(Ct. App 2010 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 19, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 15, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick M. Brady 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J. joins dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant public defender, Madison and oral 
argument by Eileen A. Hirsch. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Steven P. 
Means, assistant attorney general with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general, Madison and oral argument by 
Steven P. Means. 
 
 
2011 WI 78
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP1351-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2007CF30) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gregg B. Kandutsch, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 19, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.    This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 affirming a 
judgment of conviction2 for operating a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of an intoxicant, fifth and subsequent offense, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (2007-08).3 
                                                 
1 State v. Kandutsch, No. 2009AP1351-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2010). 
2 Marathon County Circuit Court Judge Patrick M. Brady 
presided. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
2 
 
¶2 
The interesting feature of this case is that the 
defendant's conviction rests entirely on circumstantial evidence 
because no witness saw him operating a motor vehicle or even 
sitting in a motor vehicle.  The evidence that Gregg Kandutsch 
(Kandutsch) was operating a motor vehicle after heavily drinking 
is based in large part upon inference from a report generated by 
an electronic monitoring device (EMD) that Kandutsch was 
wearing.  The report showed that Kandutsch left a house in Rib 
Mountain at 10:03 p.m.  That house is approximately a 15 minute 
drive away from a house in Wausau where he was arrested at 10:23 
p.m., heavily intoxicated. 
¶3 
Focusing on this timeframe, the State asked a Marathon 
County jury to draw the inference that Kandutsch drove from one 
place to the other under the influence of an intoxicant. 
¶4 
Kandutsch admits driving but he claims the driving 
occurred earlier in the evening——before he began drinking.   He 
challenges both the accuracy and admissibility of computer 
generated reports derived from the EMD.  In this review, he 
presents two issues: 
(A) Did the circuit court err by admitting a computer-
generated report from the defendant's EMD without requiring 
expert testimony to establish that the EMD produced accurate and 
reliable time-based reports? 
(B) Did the circuit court erroneously determine that the 
electronic monitoring report fit within the exception to the 
hearsay rule for records of regularly conducted activity? 
¶5 
We conclude the following: 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
3 
 
(A) Neither the EMD itself nor the report derived from it 
is so "unusually complex or esoteric" that expert testimony was 
required to lay a foundation for the admission of the report as 
evidence.  The testimony of two Department of Corrections (DOC) 
agents was sufficient in this case to provide a foundation for 
the report's accuracy and reliability. 
(B) A computer-generated report is not hearsay when it is 
the result of an automated process free from human input or 
intervention.  Although the EMD report was not hearsay, it was 
subject to the authentication requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 909.015(9).  The report was properly authenticated through the 
testimony of the two DOC agents. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
At 10:23 p.m. on June 19, 2006, several City of Wausau 
police officers and two Marathon County deputies responded to a 
911 call from Kandutsch's estranged wife that someone was trying 
to break into her home.  When the officers arrived on the scene, 
they discovered Kandutsch inside the home, having sustained 
serious injuries from breaking a glass door.   
¶7 
Kandutsch 
was 
transported 
to 
the 
hospital 
for 
treatment of his injuries, and a blood draw there revealed a 
blood alcohol content of .23 percent.  At the hospital, he was 
placed under arrest for operating while intoxicated.  The police 
concluded that Kandutsch had driven a vehicle while intoxicated 
because, 
when 
asked 
how 
Kandutsch 
arrived 
at 
her 
home, 
Kandutsch's wife explained that he would have driven a green 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
4 
 
van, and later she identified the vehicle parked in a nearby 
lot.   
¶8 
Kandutsch was subsequently charged with operating a 
motor vehicle on a highway while under the influence of an 
intoxicant, fifth and subsequent offense, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 346.63(1)(a), 346.65(2)(cm)5., and 939.50(3)(h).4  
¶9 
At 
trial, 
the 
disputed 
issue 
concerned 
whether 
Kandutsch operated the vehicle before or after he consumed 
alcohol.  At the time of the incident, Kandutsch was supervised 
by an electronic monitoring system through the DOC.  The State 
relied on a computer report generated by the EMD that purported 
to show when Kandutsch was in and out of range of a monitor in 
Rib Mountain on the day in question to establish a timeframe 
showing that Kandutsch must have been intoxicated at the time he 
drove to his wife's home.   
¶10 The report included a notation showing that Kandutsch 
was "out of range" at 22:03, or 10:03 p.m., on June 19, 2006.  
The distance between Kandutsch's mother's home, in Rib Mountain, 
to his wife's home, in Wausau, was approximately a 15-minute 
drive.  The 911 call from Kandutsch's wife was received at 10:23 
p.m. on the night in question.  Because Kandutsch was highly 
intoxicated at the time the officers arrived on the scene, 
                                                 
4 Kandutsch was also charged with criminal trespass with a 
domestic abuse enhancer and criminal damage, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 943.14 and 968.075(1)(a).  After a mistrial and an 
interlocutory appeal, Kandutsch pleaded no contest to these 
charges 
and 
was 
convicted. 
 
He 
does 
not 
appeal 
these 
convictions. 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
5 
 
shortly after the 911 call, the State theorized that Kandutsch 
must have been intoxicated before he left his mother's home and 
began driving. 
¶11 The theory of Kandutsch's defense, on the other hand, 
was that he did not become intoxicated until after he had driven 
to his wife's home.  He testified at trial that he left his 
mother's home a little after 9:00 p.m., arriving at his wife's 
home around 9:35 p.m.  When he initially knocked on his wife's 
door, no one answered, so he proceeded to walk to a tavern 
called the Cop Shop about three blocks away.  
¶12 Kandutsch further testified that, once at the bar, he 
consumed $20.00 worth of Southern Comfort whiskey liqueur and a 
pitcher of beer.  After consuming the alcohol, he walked back to 
his wife's home, and it was at that point the break-in occurred.  
Kandutsch testified that, although he was in fact out of range 
at 10:03 p.m., the EMD report was inaccurate, because he had 
actually left his mother's home at 9:10 p.m.  He did, however, 
concede on cross examination that the other times listed on the 
report showing when he went in or out of range were all 
accurate. 
¶13 In laying the foundation for the EMD report to be 
admitted 
into 
evidence, 
Kandutsch's 
probation 
agent, 
Amy 
Klarkowski (Klarkowski), described the program as a system 
consisting of a home monitoring unit and a radio frequency 
device, usually attached to the person's ankle.  Klarkowski 
testified that the monitoring unit has a range of about 150 feet 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
6 
 
and is connected by telephone to an electronic monitoring center 
staffed by the DOC.   
¶14 Klarkowski also testified in detail about how an EMD 
is set up and verified.   
Q: 
What systems are in place to verify that this 
monitoring unit and the RF [radio frequency device] 
are working properly beginning with installation, how 
can you ensure they're working properly? 
A: 
When an individual initially is hooked up on the 
Electronic Monitoring Program . . . I'm going to call 
the monitoring center and personally speak with an 
agent there and verify that the RF has been properly 
placed on the individual's ankle . . . I'm also going 
to verify that this home monitoring unit was properly 
installed and that there are no issues, which is 
called a good hookup. 
 
I'm also going to receive a fax from the home 
monitoring unit directly to my office indicating both 
of those things, that there was a closed strap on the 
RF, and that the home monitoring unit was properly 
installed and there are no issues.5 
¶15 Klarkowski explained that any movement by the radio 
frequency device in and out of the monitoring unit's range is 
noted on computer-generated reports at the DOC monitoring center 
                                                 
5 Klarkowski testified that the EMD assigned to Kandutsch 
was installed on April 11, 2006, and that she received a fax 
confirming its proper installation and functioning the same day.  
Klarkowski further testified that the unit was working properly 
the day before the incident in question, on June 18, 2006.  She 
testified that the monitoring center sent out several "hello" 
signals to Kandutsch's device, but the telephone line was 
reported busy.  A warrant did not issue, however, because the 
DOC and the monitoring center were aware that Kandutsch was in 
jail at the time, from June 15 to June 18, 2006.  Her testimony 
was not fully developed on this subject because the circuit 
court had previously ordered that the subject of Kandutsch's 
probation was not to be introduced before the jury. 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
7 
 
in Madison.  When asked about the system's reliability, 
Klarkowski testified that electronic monitoring is commonly used 
throughout the state, and that she had never had any problems 
with its functioning.  The system is designed to keep working 
despite power outages or attempts to remove the ankle bracelet.  
Klarkowski had been employed by the DOC for five years and had 
personally supervised 30-35 individuals through the electronic 
monitoring system.  She testified that not only had she never 
had any problems with a unit herself, but also had never heard 
of a unit generating a false report.   
¶16 Klarkowski's DOC supervisor, Agent Michael Williams 
(Williams), also testified at trial.  He explained that the 
electronic monitoring system is a routine supervision tool and 
that he has used it for 20 years.6  In that time, he had never 
heard of a faulty unit or report during his employment with the 
DOC.  Williams further testified that the particular EMD unit 
used to supervise Kandutsch had been reissued to supervise 
another individual in Ashland County.  
¶17 After the testimony by Klarkowski and Williams, the 
State moved to introduce into evidence the EMD report from 
                                                 
6 Electronic monitoring was the subject of a comprehensive 
report prepared by the Legislative Reference Bureau as early as 
1988. 
 
Electronically 
Monitored 
Home 
Confinement: 
A 
New 
Alternative 
to 
Imprisonment, 
Legislative 
Reference 
Bureau 
Informational Bulletin 88-IB-6, December 1988.  Wisconsin began 
using electronic monitoring in April 1987 as part of a federally 
funded pilot program designed to evaluate intensive supervision 
of offenders, id., and electronic monitoring has been used by 
the DOC continually since that time.  
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
8 
 
Kandutsch's unit the night of June 19.  The summary reports 
indicated Kandutsch's RF transmitter went out of range at 10:03 
p.m.  Kandutsch objected to the summary reports, arguing that 
the State supplied an insufficient foundation for them, and that 
they were inadmissible hearsay.  The circuit court admitted the 
exhibits after concluding they were properly authenticated and 
generated in the ordinary course of business as an exception to 
the hearsay rule.  At the conclusion of trial, a jury convicted 
Kandutsch of driving while under the influence of alcohol, fifth 
and subsequent offense.  
¶18 On appeal, Kandutsch argued that the circuit court 
erred by admitting the summary reports without any corresponding 
expert testimony establishing the accuracy and reliability of 
the electronic monitoring system.  The court of appeals held 
that the system's operation is not so "unusually complex or 
esoteric" as to demand the assistance of expert testimony.  
Kandutsch, No. 2009AP1351-CR, ¶10.  The court further held that 
the report was not hearsay because it was not made by a human 
declarant.  Id., ¶1.   
¶19 Because the report was not hearsay, the authentication 
requirement was satisfied by the proponent presenting proof 
sufficient to support a finding by the court that "the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims."  Wis. Stat. § 909.01.  
The court of appeals held that the State presented sufficient 
evidence to authenticate the report, because Agents Klarkowski 
and Williams testified that the DOC has used the program since 
1987, relies on it to supervise about 2,000 people on any given 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
9 
 
day, and has never experienced a malfunction.  Kandutsch, No. 
2009AP1351-CR, ¶12.  The court of appeals also noted that there 
was testimony that the DOC takes measures to verify the EMD's 
successful set-up and continual functioning.  Id., ¶¶13-14.  
Klarkowski also testified to the reliability of Kandutsch's 
specific EMD.  Id., ¶15.   
¶20 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
also 
rejected 
Kandutsch's 
argument that the evidence presented was unreliable because 
neither Klarkowski nor Williams were certified in the EMD's use.  
Id., ¶17.  The court said his argument failed because: (1) there 
is no certification process for electronic monitoring; (2) 
certification is not required to use the device; and (3) both 
Klarkowski and her supervisor had a great amount of experience 
with the system.  Id.  
¶21 Lastly, Kandutsch argued that the summary reports were 
inadmissible hearsay.  Id., ¶18.  The court of appeals held, 
however, that hearsay under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(1)-(3) can come 
only from a "person," and the report was merely an automated 
process free of human intervention.  Id., ¶¶18-20.  The court of 
appeals consequently affirmed the circuit court judgment.  Id., 
¶20.   
¶22 Kandutsch petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on January 12, 2011.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶23 Whether expert testimony was required to establish the 
accuracy 
and 
reliability 
of 
the 
EMD 
report 
involves 
an 
evidentiary ruling by the circuit court.  The circuit court has 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
10 
 
"broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence," and its 
decision will be overturned only if there has been an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  State v. Nelis, 2007 WI 58, ¶26, 300 
Wis. 2d 415, 733 N.W.2d 619 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).  We will uphold the circuit court's decision "to admit 
or exclude evidence if the circuit court examined the relevant 
facts, 
applied 
a 
proper 
legal 
standard, 
and, 
using 
a 
demonstrated rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion."  
Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 
N.W.2d 698 (citing Glassey v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 587, 
608, 500 N.W.2d 295 (1993); Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 
414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)). 
¶24 The admissibility of alleged hearsay statements also 
is a discretionary decision.  State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶31, 
301 Wis. 2d 642, 734 N.W.2d 115.  Whether the circuit court 
employed the proper legal standard is a question we consider de 
novo.  Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Golke, 2009 WI 81, ¶18, 319 
Wis. 2d 397, 768 N.W.2d 729 (citing Garfoot v. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co., 228 Wis. 2d 707, 717, 599 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶25 We 
consider 
first 
whether 
expert 
testimony 
was 
required to lay the foundation for the EMD report to be properly 
introduced 
into evidence.  To this end, we review the 
circumstances in which we have adopted or rejected a requirement 
of expert testimony.  We also consider the nature of the 
electronic monitoring system and the EMD itself.  We next 
address whether the report constitutes hearsay. 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
11 
 
A. 
Expert Testimony 
¶26 In Wisconsin, expert testimony is generally admissible 
in the circuit court's discretion if the witness is qualified to 
testify and the testimony would help the trier of fact 
understand the evidence or determine a fact at issue.7  Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02; see also Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 197 
Wis. 2d 365, 378, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995) (citing Kerkman v. 
Hintz, 142 Wis. 2d 404, 422-23, 418 N.W.2d 795 (1988); State v. 
Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987)). 
¶27 Courts have long recognized that certain kinds of 
evidence are more difficult than others for jurors to weigh and 
comprehend without the benefit of expert testimony.  Weiss, 197 
Wis. 2d at 378.  In such circumstances, a circuit court may 
properly grant a party's motion to keep the case from the jury 
unless such expert testimony is provided.  Id. at 378-79.   
¶28 Closing down a trial is not to be taken lightly, which 
is why the requirement of expert testimony is an extraordinary 
one.  Racine Cnty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 2010 WI 25, ¶28, 
323 Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88.  A circuit court should take 
this "extraordinary step" only when the issues before the jury 
                                                 
7 This statement is consistent with the state of the law of 
Wisconsin at the time of Kandutsch's trial and the circuit 
court's evidentiary rulings at issue in this case.  In late 
January 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02 to adopt the Daubert reliability standard embodied in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  Because we do not find 
expert testimony to be required, it is not necessary to consider 
the applicability of newly-amended § 907.02 to the facts of this 
case. 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
12 
 
are "unusually complex or esoteric."  Id. (quoting White v. 
Leeder, 149 Wis. 2d 948, 960, 440 N.W.2d 557 (1989); see also 
Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 186 N.W.2d 
258 (1971); City of Cedarburg Light & Water Comm'n, 33 
Wis. 2d 560, 567, 148 N.W.2d 13 (1967)).  In other words, the 
circuit court must first find that the underlying issue is "not 
within the realm of the ordinary experience of mankind."  Cramer 
v. Theda Clark Mem. Hosp., 45 Wis. 2d 147, 150, 172 N.W.2d 427 
(1969). 
¶29 In 
considering 
what 
constitutes 
the 
"ordinary 
experience of mankind"——i.e., the average juror——courts have not 
tailored this standard to the lowest common denominator.  
Rather, courts attempt to evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether expert testimony is required because the issue is 
outside the realm of lay comprehension.  See, e.g., White, 149 
Wis. 2d at 960.  When an issue can be determined "by common 
knowledge" the circuit court should allow the issue to go to a 
jury without first requiring expert testimony.  Cramer, 45 
Wis. 2d at 154. 
¶30 Even in the context of issues involving medical care, 
this court has not always required expert testimony.  For 
example, in Kujawski v. Arbor View Health Care Ctr., 139 
Wis. 2d 455, 468, 407 N.W.2d 249 (1987), the court concluded 
that expert testimony was not necessary to establish the 
standard of care in the context of a nursing home's decision not 
to restrain a wheelchair-bound patient.  Similarly, in Trogun v. 
Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 601, 604, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973), the 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
13 
 
court relied on the jury's lay comprehension of "material risk" 
when determining what a physician should have disclosed to his 
patient in order to obtain informed consent.   
¶31 In White, the court was presented with the argument 
that technical expert testimony was required to establish causal 
negligence on the part of the owner of a bull that injured the 
plaintiff.  White, 149 Wis. 2d at 960.  At trial, the parties 
vigorously disputed whether the bull was kept or maintained in a 
negligent manner, including whether "ringing the bull and 
placing a chain in its nose" would have made the animal more 
docile and less likely to attack.  Id.  The court rejected the 
argument that expert testimony was required, finding this issue 
squarely within the realm of lay comprehension.  Id.  No inquiry 
was made as to whether the average juror would appreciate the 
nuances of animal psychology or behavior modification or the 
breeding propensities of unringed bulls.  Rather, the court took 
a common sense approach to whether the jury could evaluate the 
conflicting testimony with which it was presented.  See id. at 
959-60. 
¶32 Similarly, the court concluded in Weiss that, in the 
context of a bad faith tort claim, an insured is not required to 
present expert testimony to demonstrate what a reasonable 
insurer would have done under the circumstances.  197 Wis. 2d at 
381-83.  The plaintiff in Weiss brought suit against United 
Fire, his insurer, for bad faith refusal to honor his claim when 
his house was completely gutted by a fire.  Id. at 375-76.  At 
trial United Fire moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claim because 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
14 
 
he 
had 
not 
presented 
expert 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
reasonableness of United Fire's denial of his claim.  Id. at 
376.  The court rejected a categorical rule, relying instead on 
the circuit court's discretion as to whether the claim involved 
facts and circumstances beyond the ken of the average juror.  
Id.  Under the particular facts of Weiss, the court determined: 
The average juror could have determined, without the 
benefit of an expert witness, whether United Fire 
acted reasonably when its own investigator failed to 
report his taking of electrical wires from the scene, 
when it failed to consider the fire chief's conclusion 
that the fire was not caused by arson, when it failed 
to consider the electrical wiring of the house, when 
it failed 
to 
procure full financial information 
concerning the plaintiff, and when it failed to 
consider that the premises were underinsured. 
Id. at 387.  
¶33 Kandutsch argues we should reach the same result as 
the court of appeals did in State v. Doerr, 229 Wis. 2d 616, 599 
N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1999), and hold that the EMD required 
expert 
testimony 
to 
lay 
a 
foundation 
of 
accuracy 
and 
reliability. 
¶34 In Doerr, the court of appeals considered a challenge 
regarding the use of evidence of a preliminary breath test 
(PBT).  Id. at 619.  The defendant challenged the use of PBT 
evidence on the grounds that the State failed to provide expert 
testimony to support the test.  Id. at 623.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the State should have presented evidence 
regarding the accuracy and reliability of the PBT because the 
device was not included on the Department of Transportation's 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
15 
 
list of approved instruments, and further, the PBT was a 
scientific device requiring expert testimony to allow the jury 
to interpret the evidence.  Id. at 624-25. 
¶35 Significantly, the court of appeals pointed out that 
the testimony by one of the officers who administered the PBT 
provided only a conclusory explanation of the device: "It 
measures the amount of blood alcohol that you have in your blood 
system, 
but 
it 
measures 
it 
from 
your 
lungs . . . .[The] 
machine . . . will detect . . . how much alcohol there was in 
the blood from [the] defendant's breath."  Id. at 625.  This 
testimony was deemed insufficient to lay a proper scientific 
foundation for the jury because it did not establish that the 
PBT analysis was "accurate and achieved through an accepted 
scientific method."  Id.   
¶36 As the court of appeals noted, however, the decision 
in Doerr focused primarily on whether the Department of 
Transportation had approved the device for chemical analysis of 
an individual's breath, not the particular complexity of the PBT 
device.  Id. at 624-25; see also Wis. Stat. § 343.305(6)(b).   
¶37 In this case, the technology underlying the EMD and 
the daily summary report is well within the comprehension of the 
average juror. 
¶38 The 
electronic 
monitoring 
system 
at 
issue 
here 
involves the intersection of two processes: (1) transmission of 
a radio signal from the radio frequency device attached to the 
subject's person to the receiver in the home monitoring unit; 
and (2) transmission of information from the receiver in the 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
16 
 
home monitoring unit to the monitoring center in Madison through 
a telephone line.  These technologies intersect when the home 
monitoring unit registers the absence of a radio signal emitted 
from the radio frequency device when that device——attached to 
the supervised individual——goes out of range.  The home 
monitoring unit then communicates the absence of a signal to the 
monitoring center via telephone.  At the monitoring center, the 
information sent via telephone is recorded by a computer.  
Kandutsch argues that, while radio signals and telephone 
connections are well-known technologies easily understood by 
jurors without the aid of experts, the interplay of these 
technologies in effect creates a "new" technology that is not so 
readily understood. 
¶39 We do not find this argument persuasive.  As the court 
of appeals noted:  
The cordless telephone, in existence for over 
three decades, uses the same technologies as the 
electronic monitoring system.  The base station of the 
telephone converts information it receives over a 
standard phone connection to an FM radio signal which 
is then broadcasted to a wireless handset, and vice 
versa. . . . Ultimately, 
the 
telephone 
company 
documents calls placed and received on a bill that, 
like the daily summary reports at issue in this case, 
is generated by computer. 
Kandutsch, 2009AP1351-CR, ¶10 n.3 (citing Craig Freudenrich, 
Ph.D., How Cordless Telephones Work, howstuffworks.com (Dec. 11, 
2000), 
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cordless 
telephone.htm). 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
17 
 
¶40 This analogy is directly on point and provides a 
common sense perspective on the evidence the State sought to 
introduce in this case.  The intersection of radio signals and 
telephone connections does not convert the EMD into an issue so 
"unusually complex or esoteric" that the jury required the aid 
of expert testimony to interpret the information.  Accordingly, 
we decline to take the extraordinary step of requiring expert 
testimony to introduce evidence of the EMD at issue here. 
¶41 Even where expert testimony is not required, the 
proponent of non-testimonial evidence is usually required to lay 
the foundation for the admissibility of that evidence through 
lay witnesses. The admissibility of the EMD report is governed 
by Wis. Stat. §§ 909.01 and 909.015.  A foundation for 
admissibility is laid under § 909.01 "by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what the 
proponent claims."  Section 909.015 provides "[b]y way of 
illustration only, and not by way of limitation," examples of 
how to satisfy the requirements of § 909.01.  Among the examples 
of authentication and identification, the statute suggests: 
(9) Process or system.  Evidence describing a 
process or system used to produce a result and showing 
that the process or system produces an accurate 
result. 
Wis. Stat. § 909.015(9). 
¶42 In State v. Hanson, 85 Wis. 2d 233, 270 N.W.2d 212 
(1978), the defendant had appealed the circuit court's holding 
that judicial notice could be taken of the accuracy and 
reliability of a moving speed radar device.  Id. at 237.  The 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
18 
 
court 
noted 
that 
moving 
radar 
was 
"a 
relatively 
recent 
innovation and at the time of the arrest in this case, moving 
radar had . . . been used in Wisconsin for [only] three months."  
Id. at 239.  While many jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, had 
taken judicial notice of the reliability of stationary radar, 
the court could find only one jurisdiction that had taken 
judicial notice of the reliability and accuracy of a moving 
radar unit.  Id. at 239-40. 
¶43 The Hanson court concluded that judicial notice could 
properly 
be 
taken 
of 
the 
reliability 
of 
the 
underlying 
scientific principles of speed radar detection without expert 
testimony.  Id. at 244.  The State could therefore introduce a 
speed radar reading by laying a foundation through an operating 
law enforcement official who was qualified in the use and 
operation of the unit.  Id. at 244-45.  The moving radar reading 
itself, however, would be entitled to a prima facie presumption 
of accuracy only if: (1) the operating officer had adequate 
training and experience in operating moving radar; (2) the 
device had been appropriately tested, showing that it was in 
proper working order at the time; and (3) the device was used in 
an area with minimum potential for distortion in the results.  
Id. at 245. 
¶44 In other words, the Hanson court distinguished between 
the widely accepted and unassailable scientific principles 
underlying moving radar, and the accuracy and reliability of the 
particular unit that produced the reading offered into evidence. 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
19 
 
¶45 Similar to our decision in Hanson, we conclude that a 
court should not afford a presumption of accuracy to a 
particular report or EMD until the State has put forth evidence 
regarding the installation of the specific device and testimony 
as to its accuracy and reliability by a DOC employee familiar 
with its operation.8 
¶46 Consequently, the State was permitted to authenticate 
and lay a foundation for the EMD report by providing testimony 
describing the electronic monitoring system and the process by 
which the daily summary reports are generated and showing that 
this process produces an accurate result.  This is precisely 
what 
Agents 
Klarkowski 
and 
Williams 
addressed 
in 
their 
testimony. 
¶47 Agent Klarkowski described the electronic monitoring 
system itself and its various components of radio frequency 
device, home monitoring unit, and connection via phone line to 
the monitoring center.  She explained in detail the steps 
involved in setting up a system and the way the system works in 
                                                 
8 Our holding is in accord with a published decision of the 
Arizona Court of Appeals, Arizona v. Rivers, 190 Ariz. 56, 945 
P.2d 367 (Ct. App. 1997).  In Rivers the court held that the 
state provided sufficient foundation and evidence for an 
electronic monitoring system to allow the jurors to reasonably 
conclude that the system was working properly when it reported a 
curfew violation.  Id. at 59.  The testimony concerning the 
system's general accuracy and reliability, and that it was 
correctly installed and in proper working order on the day in 
question was sufficient to provide a foundation for the 
evidence.  Id. 
 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
20 
 
a variety of circumstances——when there is a power outage, if the 
subject attempts to remove the bracelet, when the subject is out 
of range during his authorized schedule, when the subject is out 
of range at an unauthorized time, when the telephone line is 
unplugged, and when summary reports are generated. 
¶48 Both 
Williams and Klarkowski testified to their 
experience with the electronic monitoring system, emphasizing 
its reliability and accuracy.  Both also testified to the 
continuing satisfactory operation of the EMD that had been 
assigned to Kandutsch.  Their testimony was sufficient to 
satisfy the test we set forth today. 
¶49 Kandutsch points to a dearth of case law analyzing 
what foundation is needed for electronic monitoring technology 
as an indication that the technology lacks general acceptance.  
We 
reject 
this 
argument. 
 
As 
Agent 
Williams 
testified, 
electronic monitoring has been used in Wisconsin for more than 
20 years to supervise dangerous criminals and parolees as a 
"routine supervision tool."9  The lack of traditional case law 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., In re Armstrong, Wis. Div. Hearings and 
Appeals, No. 032706-213621-A (April 26, 2006); In re Holmes, 
Wis. Div. Hearings and Appeals, No. 050500-325798-A (July 18, 
2000); In re Robinson, Wis. Div. Hearings and Appeals, No. 
051799-267616-A (Aug. 11, 1999); In re Seekins, Wis. Div. 
Hearings and Appeals, No. 071797-182275-A (Sept. 19, 1997). 
A review of probation and parole revocation decisions 
demonstrates the extent to which electronic monitoring has 
become a fact of life in the criminal justice system——a fact of 
life 
that 
corrections 
officials, 
law 
enforcement, 
and 
administrative law judges alike take for granted.  In Holmes, 
the administrative law judge observed:  
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
21 
 
directly on point is unsurprising when we consider that the vast 
majority of the time, EMD reports are used in probation and 
                                                                                                                                                             
The client denies being out of range on his EMP 
[electronic monitoring program] schedule and indicates 
that an elderly resident who gets confused must have 
answered the phone telling the EMP center that he had 
gone to the hospital.  According to the client, he 
never left the house on that particular day. . . .  I 
do not find the client's explanation to be believable.  
Had the client not gone out of range the EMP Alert 
Center would not have called his residence. 
Holmes, No. 050500-325798-A at 2.   
Similarly, in Robinson the administrative law judge stated: 
 
The client . . . testified that the electronic 
monitoring alerts were the result of a change in his 
work schedule.  He further testified that he believed 
his electronic monitoring schedule had been extended 
to accommodate this change in his work schedule.  This 
testimony is not consistent with the reports from the 
electronic monitoring program. 
Robinson, No. 051799-267616-A at 3-4.  The administrative law 
judge proceeded to discuss the various "transmitter in range" 
and "transmitter out of range" alerts for the given day, and 
concluded, "It is clear that these alerts were not the result of 
the client simply returning late from work.  He was returning to 
the residence and leaving whenever he wanted."  Id. at 4.  These 
decisions confirm that electronic monitoring is a routine tool 
that is heavily relied upon in the criminal justice system. 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
22 
 
parole revocation hearings, not to prove an element of a 
separate criminal offense, as here.10 
                                                 
10 This is not to say, however, that courts are unfamiliar 
with electronic monitoring of the type involved here.  To the 
contrary, a review of cases referring to electronic monitoring 
shows the wide variety of manners in which courts have 
encountered this common tool of the criminal justice system.  
See, e.g., State v. Walker, 2008 WI 34, 308 Wis. 2d 666, 747 
N.W.2d 673 (noting that the circuit court considered the 
defendant's lack of phone service for electronic monitoring a 
factor in a reconfinement hearing); State v. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, 
289 Wis. 2d 34, 710 N.W.2d 466 (listing failure to comply with 
electronic 
monitoring 
rules 
as 
evidence 
of 
lack 
of 
rehabilitation); State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 
606 
N.W.2d 536 
(concluding 
that 
a 
defendant 
released 
to 
electronic monitoring was not in custody for sentence credit 
purposes); State ex rel. Macemon v. McReynolds, 208 Wis. 2d 594, 
561 N.W.2d 779 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the DOC had 
authority to require mandatory release parolees to submit to an 
electronic monitoring bracelet) (cited with approval by State v. 
Schwarz, 2005 WI 11, 278 Wis. 2d 24, 692 N.W.2d 219); State v. 
Harris, 
168 
Wis. 2d 168, 
483 
N.W.2d 808 
(Ct. 
App. 
1992) 
(determining that an individual subject to electronic monitoring 
is not a "jail prisoner" under Wis. Stat. § 302.425(5)). 
Moreover, we find significant the fact that the statutes 
are replete with references to electronic monitoring services.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 20.410(1)(gg) (appropriations for 
electronic monitoring); 301.046(5) (requiring the Department of 
Corrections to use electronic monitoring of individual released 
to community residential confinement); 301.048(3) (electronic 
monitoring as part of an intensive sanctions program); 301.135 
(governing 
electronic 
monitoring, 
generally); 
302.425(3) 
(allowing sheriffs to place prisoners in home detention subject 
to electronic monitoring);  938.21(4m) (a court may order a 
juvenile to submit to electronic monitoring in an order for 
continued custody); 938.34(3g) (a court may order electronic 
monitoring 
as 
a 
disposition 
in 
a 
juvenile 
delinquency 
proceeding); 973.03(4)(a) (allowing a court to place a defendant 
subject to electronic monitoring in lieu of a jail sentence, if 
the defendant agrees).  These provisions demonstrate the 
widespread acceptance of and reliance on the integrity of 
electronic monitoring systems. 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
23 
 
¶50 We conclude that the EMD report does not present an 
issue that is particularly complex or unusually esoteric, and 
additionally, that the EMD involves scientific principles that 
are indisputable and fully within the lay comprehension of the 
average juror.  Expert testimony was not required to properly 
establish 
a 
foundation 
for 
the 
report's 
admissibility.  
Furthermore, the testimony provided by Agents Klarkowski and 
Williams 
fully 
satisfied 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 909.01. 
¶51 Accordingly, the circuit court did not err when it 
declined to require expert testimony regarding the electronic 
monitoring system.  It was proper to admit the report into 
evidence. 
B. 
Kandutsch's Hearsay Objection and Authentication 
¶52 Kandutsch contends that the electronic monitoring 
report was hearsay that should not have been admitted under the 
exception for records of regularly conducted activity.  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 908.01 and 908.03(6). 
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.01 provides the definitions 
relevant to the rules of evidence on hearsay: 
(1) Statement.  A "statement" is (a) an oral or 
written assertion or (b) nonverbal conduct of a 
person, if it is intended by the person as an 
assertion. 
(2) Declarant.  A "declarant" is a person who 
makes a statement. 
(3) Hearsay.  "Hearsay" is a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
24 
 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
Wis. Stat. § 908.01(1)-(3). 
¶54 The court of appeals, in State v. Zivcic, 229 
Wis. 2d 119, 598 N.W.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1999), was presented with 
an evidentiary challenge to a printout from an Intoxilyzer.  The 
defendant argued that the "deficient sample" printout from the 
Intoxilyzer machine was hearsay.  Id. at 131.  Although the 
court of appeals did not set forth its reasoning in any great 
detail, it rejected the defendant's hearsay challenge on the 
basis 
of 
a plain 
reading of Wis. Stat. § 908.01: "The 
Intoxilyzer which produced the 'deficient sample' printout is 
not a declarant.  Rather, the printout is the result of a 
process."  Zivcic, 229 Wis. 2d at 131. 
¶55 The State points to various treatises to support the 
proposition that the hearsay rule encompasses only human 
declarants, not machines or automatic processes.  Professor 
Daniel Blinka notes that, in order to be considered hearsay, 
"The 
'declarant' 
must 
be 
a 
human 
being; 
i.e., 
evidence 
automatically produced by machines (e.g., an "ATM" receipt, a 
car's speedometer reading) is not hearsay."  7 Daniel D. Blinka, 
Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence § 801.1, at 644 
(3rd ed. 2008) (footnotes omitted).  Similarly, McCormick on 
Evidence classifies records that are self-generated by machine 
or computer as non-hearsay.  2 Kenneth S. Broun, et al., 
McCormick on Evidence § 294 (5th ed. 1999). 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
25 
 
¶56 In 
contrast, 
the 
majority 
of 
federal 
courts 
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence governing hearsay 
have considered computer reports as hearsay.  See Adam Wolfson, 
Note, "Electronic Fingerprints": Doing Away with the Conception 
of Computer-Generated Records as Hearsay, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 151 
(Oct. 2005).  When a computer record is admitted, it is 
typically justified by the business records exception.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 452 (6th Cir. 
2001); Hardison v. Balboa Ins. Co., 4 Fed. Appx. 663, 669 (10th 
Cir. 2001); United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 914 (1st Cir. 
1991); United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
¶57 A 
minority 
of 
jurisdictions 
distinguish 
between 
computer-stored records and computer-generated records.  See 
Wolfson, "Electronic Fingerprints", supra 157 & n.46-47 (citing 
cases).  Computer-stored records constitute hearsay because they 
merely store or maintain the statements and assertions of a 
human being.  See State v. Armstead, 432 So. 2d 837, 839-40 (La. 
1983).11  Computer-generated records, on the other hand, are 
those that represent the self-generated record of a computer's 
operations resulting from the computer's programming, "much like 
a seismograph can produce a record of geophysical occurrences, a 
flight recorder can produce a record of physical conditions 
onboard an aircraft, and an electron microscope can produce a 
                                                 
11 See also People v. Holowko, 109 Ill. 2d 187, 486 
N.E.2d 877 (1985); State v. Schuette, 273 Kan. 593, 44 P.3d 459 
(2002); State v. Meeks, 867 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
26 
 
micrograph, which is a photograph of things too small to be 
viewed by the human eye."  Id. at 840 (citing scholarly 
authority). 
¶58 The United States Department of Justice similarly 
distinguishes between computer-generated and computer-stored 
records.  See Computer Crime & Intellectual Prop. Section, 
Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Searching and Seizing 
Computers 
and 
Obtaining 
Electronic 
Evidence 
in 
Criminal 
Investigations, 192-94 (3rd ed. 2009).  In its manual for 
federal prosecutors, the Department explains: 
Hearsay 
rules 
apply 
to 
statements 
made 
by 
persons, not to logs or records that result from 
computer processes. Computer-generated records that do 
not contain statements of persons therefore do not 
implicate the hearsay rules. This principle applies 
both to records generated by a computer without the 
involvement of a person (e.g., GPS tracking records) 
and to computer records that are the result of human 
conduct other than assertions (e.g., dialing a phone 
number or punching in a PIN at an ATM). For example, 
pressing "send" on an email is a command to a system 
(send this message to the person with this email 
address) and is thus non-assertive conduct. See United 
States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580, 586 (2d Cir. 1999) 
("Statements offered as evidence of commands or 
threats or rules . . . are not hearsay."). 
Id. at 193. 
¶59 This court has not previously had an opportunity to 
directly address the hearsay implications in the distinction 
between computer-stored and computer-generated records.  We find 
it appropriate at this time to distinguish between computer-
stored records, which memorialize the assertions of human 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
27 
 
declarants, and computer-generated records, which are the result 
of a process free of human intervention.   
¶60 The hearsay rule is designed to protect against "the 
four testimonial infirmities of ambiguity, insincerity, faulty 
perception, 
and 
erroneous 
memory." 
 
Laurence 
H. 
Tribe, 
Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 957, 958 (March 1974).  
Computer-generated records do not implicate any of these four 
"infirmities" when the evidence is not the product of human 
intervention.  See, e.g., Armstead, 432 So.2d at 840 ("With a 
machine, however, there is no possibility of a conscious 
misrepresentation.").    
¶61 A record created as a result of a computerized or 
mechanical 
process 
cannot 
lie. 
 
It 
cannot 
forget 
or 
misunderstand.  Although data may be lost or garbled as a result 
of some malfunction, such a malfunction would go to the weight 
of the evidence, not its admissibility.12  The record does not 
present the danger of being taken out of context, because the 
opposing party has a right to put it in context.13  Agent 
Klarkowski perhaps summarized it best when she testified 
regarding the EMD, "It doesn't have a mind of its own, it's a 
                                                 
12 See U.S. v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1988). 
13 For instance, both the State and the defense elicited 
testimony regarding the times when Kandutsch was recorded as 
"out of range" prior to 10:03 p.m. on the daily summary report——
that is, the times when he was authorized to be out of range.  
The fact that he was "out of range" shortly before he broke into 
his wife's home was not introduced in a vacuum, but as part of 
the entire daily summary. 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
28 
 
computer device, it's a high-tech device, it reports things when 
they happen."   
¶62 Relying on Zivcic, the court of appeals concluded that 
the daily summary report generated by the EMD was likewise the 
"result of a process, not a statement by a declarant."  
Kandutsch, No. 2009AP1351-CR, ¶19.  Because the report was 
generated as "the result of an automated process free of human 
intervention," it was not hearsay.  Id., ¶20. 
¶63 We agree with the court of appeals conclusion based on 
the distinction we draw between computer-stored records and 
computer-generated records. 
¶64 Because we conclude that the daily summary report was 
not hearsay, we do not reach Kandutsch's argument that the 
report does not fall within the "records of regularly conducted 
activity" 
exception 
to 
hearsay 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 908.03(6).  Consequently, the State had only to satisfy the 
general authentication requirements in Wis. Stat. §§ 909.01 and 
909.015. 
 
As 
discussed 
in 
the 
previous 
section, 
these 
authentication requirements were satisfied through the testimony 
given by Agents Klarkowski and Williams.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court did not err in admitting the evidence over 
Kandutsch's hearsay objection. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶65 We conclude that neither the EMD itself nor the report 
is so "unusually complex or esoteric" that expert testimony was 
required to lay a foundation of accuracy and reliability.  The 
underlying technologies were clearly within the realm of lay 
No. 
  2009AP1351-CR 
29 
 
comprehension.  Accordingly, the testimony of Agents Klarkowski 
and Williams was sufficient to provide a foundation for the 
report's accuracy and reliability under Wis. Stat. § 909.01. 
¶66 We further hold that a computer-generated report is 
not hearsay when it is simply the result of an automated process 
free from human input or intervention.  Because the report is 
not hearsay, it was subject only to the statutory authentication 
requirements, 
and 
was 
properly 
authenticated 
through 
the 
testimony of Agents Klarkowski and Williams. 
 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶67 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Prior to 
the present case, neither the court of appeals nor this court 
has had the opportunity to determine whether a report created by 
this type of electronic monitoring device, specifically a BI 
9000, 
consisting 
of 
a 
radio 
frequency 
bracelet, 
a 
home 
monitoring unit, and a computer program that stores data and 
generates reports, carries a prima facie presumption of accuracy 
at trial.  There is a lack of case law in other states as well. 
¶68 One commentator has tried to explain why the reported 
cases do not adequately reflect the serious reliability issues 
in computer technology.  He explains that because we do not 
understand 
computers, we suspend our healthy common-sense 
skepticism when dealing with them.  "The mere fact that 
computers can do some things at all tends to mask the issue of 
whether computers can do it well.  The 'gee whiz' quality of 
computers may conceal the underlying frailties of the systems."1  
¶69 I do not write because I believe that the underlying 
technology in the present case is unreliable.  Indeed, I believe 
its 
reliability 
could 
have 
been 
demonstrated 
without 
a 
substantial burden on the State.  I write because the evidence 
presented at trial did not demonstrate reliability, and the 
majority does not follow the analysis established by our case 
law.  Our truth-finding process requires that the procedure for 
establishing the reliability of evidence be followed. 
                                                 
1 Robert Garcia, "Garbage In, Gospel Out":  Criminal 
Discovery, 
Computer 
Reliability, and the Constitution, 38 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1043, 1090 (1991). 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶70 I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 
testimony of the two Department of Corrections (DOC) agents was 
sufficient to admit the report generated by the electronic 
monitoring device that was admitted as evidence in the present 
case.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
¶71 When a party seeks to admit evidence that is based on 
scientific principles, the underlying scientific principles must 
be reliable.  Professor Blinka, in his treatise on Wisconsin 
evidence, 
summarizes 
how 
a 
scientific 
principle 
may 
be 
demonstrated to be sufficiently reliable and accorded a prima 
facie presumption of reliability.  In the present case, the 
electronic monitoring device does not fall within any of three 
potential avenues to reach the threshold of reliability.2  
                                                 
2 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin 
Evidence 584 (3d ed. 2008), explains:  
There are a number of ways in which threshold 
reliability may be shown.  First, the legislature may 
provide by statute that certain tests of techniques 
are 
admissible. 
 
Various 
statutes 
provide, 
for 
example, that scientific tests involving DNA, alcohol, 
or speed detection are admissible upon compliance with 
certain conditions.  Second, the trial judge may take 
judicial notice of scientific principles, methods, and 
tests based on case law (precedent) or the terms of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 902.01. 
 
Judicially 
noticed 
or 
statutorily approved tests and principles are accorded 
a prima facie presumption of accuracy.  Nonetheless, 
the proponent must demonstrate that the test or 
procedure was properly carried out in the particular 
case.  The opponent is free to attack both the 
reliability 
of 
the 
underlying 
principles 
and 
methodology as well as their application in the 
particular case. 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶72 One way the reliability of the scientific principles 
underlying a technology can be demonstrated is by pointing to a 
statute providing that certain tests are admissible.  For 
example, Wis. Stat. § 885.235(1g) provides that evidence of the 
amount of alcohol in a person's blood or breath at the time in 
question, as shown by chemical analysis of a sample of the 
person's blood, urine, or breath, is admissible without expert 
testimony under certain circumstances set forth in the statute.   
¶73 There is no statute that provides that evidence 
produced by the scientific technology underlying this electronic 
monitoring device is admissible. 
¶74 A second way the reliability of the underlying 
scientific principles of a technology can be demonstrated is by 
court 
precedent.  
For example, in State v. Hanson, 85 
Wis. 2d 233, 270 N.W.2d 212 (1978), the supreme court declared 
that the courts of this state are authorized to "take judicial 
notice of the reliability of the underlying principles of speed 
radar detection that employs the Doppler effect as a means of 
determining the speed of moving objects.  To this end, expert 
testimony is not needed to determine the initial admissibility 
of speed radar readings."3     
                                                                                                                                                             
Absent a statute or judicial notice, the proponent 
must rely on expert testimony to establish the 
threshold. . . . 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
3 State v. Hanson, 85 Wis. 2d 233, 244, 279 N.W.2d 212 
(1978). 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶75 No case law exists in Wisconsin, and very little case 
law apparently exists in the country, regarding the reliability 
of this kind of electronic monitoring device as evidence at 
trial.4   
¶76 A 
third 
way 
the 
reliability 
of 
the 
underlying 
scientific principles of a technology can be demonstrated is for 
a court to take judicial notice of scientific principles, 
methods, and tests.  Wisconsin Stat. § 902.01(2)(b) allows 
judicial notice of a fact capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned.5  "Courts will take judicial notice of 
'scientific 
facts 
which 
have 
been 
well 
established 
by 
                                                 
4 The State cites to three appellate decisions in support of 
its argument, stating: "Somewhat surprisingly, there are few 
legal authorities that specifically address the evidentiary 
foundation needed to admit evidence of electronic monitoring 
reports."  The cases the State cites are Commonwealth v. 
Thissell, 928 N.E.2d 932 (Mass. 2010); State v. Rivers, 945 P.2d 
367 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); and Ly v. State, 908 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1995). 
5 "Cases show that judicial notice functions in tandem with 
the expert witness rules, permitting courts to determine when 
technical ideas and information have become so generally 
accepted as to make evidence-gathering superfluous."  Lewis W. 
Beilin, Comment, In Defense of Wisconsin's Judicial Notice Rule, 
2003 Wis. L. Rev. 499, 508. 
In State v. Hanson, 85 Wis. 2d at 244, the court concluded 
that the State had failed to show in the trial court that 
judicial 
notice should be taken as to the speed radar 
detection's reliability and accuracy.    
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
authoritative 
scientists 
and 
are 
generally 
accepted 
as 
irrefutable by living scientists.'"6    
¶77 The majority and the State do not point to any sources 
on the reliability of the scientific principles underlying this 
type of electronic monitoring device "whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned," upon which judicial notice can 
appropriately be supported.  
¶78 In sum, the data produced by the electronic monitoring 
device 
is 
not 
admissible 
without 
adequate 
testimonial 
foundation.  The underlying scientific principles have not been 
presumed reliable based upon a statute, in a prior determination 
in our case law, or by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned such that taking judicial notice is 
appropriate.       
¶79 When scientific principles do not fall within any of 
the 
three 
potential 
avenues 
to 
demonstrate 
sufficient 
reliability and be accorded a prima facie presumption, testimony 
is necessary to explain the underlying scientific principles and 
support a determination of its reliability.   
¶80 Expert testimony should be adduced when interpreting 
evidence involves special knowledge, skill, or experience that 
is not within an ordinary person's realm of experience or 
knowledge.  Megal v. Green Bay Area Visitor & Convention Bureau, 
Inc., 2004 WI 98, ¶19, 274 Wis. 2d 162, 682 N.W.2d 857.  The 
lack 
of 
expert 
testimony 
in 
such 
cases 
constitutes 
an 
                                                 
6 George R. Currie, Appellate Courts Use of Facts Outside of 
the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent 
Investigation, 1960 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 41 (quoted source omitted). 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
insufficiency of proof.  State v. Johnson, 54 Wis. 2d 561, 564, 
196 N.W.2d 717 (1972), cited with approval in State v. Doerr, 
229 Wis. 2d 616, 623, 624, 599 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1999). 
¶81 The 
electronic 
monitoring 
device, 
linking 
radio 
frequency devices to a monitoring unit that sends a signal to a 
computer facility, is, as one agent testified, "a high-tech 
device."  The computer generated report introduced in evidence 
in the present case appears to be the output of the interaction 
of 
a 
number 
of 
accepted 
and 
well-known 
technologies.  
Nevertheless, accepted technologies may require expert testimony 
when those technologies are used in combination, for new 
purposes, or are used for the first time as evidence in the 
courts.     
¶82 Neither the circuit court nor the jury was presented 
with testimony regarding the scientific principles underlying 
how the technology worked.  No testimony was presented that 
described the computer processes involved in storing the data 
and producing the report.  No testimony was presented regarding 
the reliability of the software that created the report (except 
for the anecdotal evidence of the DOC agents), the processes 
involved in creating the report, or the verification methodology 
for the output of the system.7  
                                                 
7 The monitoring center employee who created the report at 
the request of Agent Klarkowski was not called to testify.  At 
oral argument, the court questioned defendant's counsel about 
whether the Confrontation Clause was implicated.  Counsel 
suggested that there may be a Confrontation Clause issue in the 
present case.     
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶83 The 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
operation 
of 
the 
electronic monitoring device came from two Department of 
Corrections agents.  They testified about how to work the 
electronic monitoring device, but not about how it works, except 
at the level of the user of the device.   
¶84 To demonstrate the device's reliability, the witness 
must be familiar with computerized records not only as a user 
but also as someone with some working acquaintance with the 
methods by which such records are made.  American Oil Co. v. 
Valenti, 426 A.2d 305, 311 (Conn. 1979), cited with approval in 
State v. Polanco, 797 A.2d 523, 533 (Conn. 2002).  
¶85 Agent Klarkowski, being questioned by the State, 
testified about how the electronic monitoring device works from 
the perspective of the user as follows:  
Q: 
And 
how——you 
indicated 
that 
it 
[electronic 
monitoring 
device] 
keeps 
track 
of 
whether 
an 
individual's at a specific location at any specific 
time; how does it do that? 
A: The home monitoring unit is——I'm sorry, the RF 
[radio frequency bracelet] is going to send a signal 
to the home monitoring unit indicating that a person 
is in range or out of range.  In range means that they 
are 150 feet within that home monitoring unit. 
Q: And this is reporting constantly? 
A: 24 hours a day.  Any movement in and out of that 
range is noted. 
Q: And how is that noted? 
A: It's going to be noted on a daily summary form. 
                                                                                                                                                             
I do not address the confrontation issue because I conclude 
that the evidence was erroneously admitted.  The briefs did not 
address the confrontation issue. 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
Q: How is that form generated? 
A: The electronic monitoring center, which is staffed 
by the Department of Corrections, keeps those forms 
and that notation. 
Q: How does the signal that someone has moved either 
in or out of range get to that monitoring center? 
A: Sure.  The home monitoring unit which is hooked up 
to the phone line, that phone cord is the bridge per 
se to get information from that home monitoring unit 
to the electronic monitoring center.  
¶86 The majority opinion (and court of appeals) explain 
that the technology is similar to that of a cordless telephone, 
though no witness made such an analogy.  Because of this lack of 
evidence in the record explaining the underlying scientific 
principles, the majority (and the court of appeals) resort to 
citing a website (howstuffworks.com) on the basic scientific 
principles of a cordless telephone.  If the technology cannot be 
explained using evidence in the record or accepted scientific 
resources, then the record is insufficient.   
¶87 Both agents testified that they had not personally had 
any problems with this type of device and had not heard of any 
problems of false reports.  The agents' testimony indicated that 
this type of monitoring technology has been used and relied upon 
by the department since 1987.  Agent Klarkowski testified:  "We 
have to rely on this particular device to supervise the 
individuals.  If it wasn't a reliable device, it wouldn't have 
any integrity in court, it wouldn't provide us with the 
supervision that we require out of it." 
¶88 But reliance on a technology, even well understood 
technology, does not necessarily make the evidence produced 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
reliable for purposes of introduction at trial.  For instance, 
statutes allow the use of polygraph technology for certain 
purposes but the results of a polygraph test are not ordinarily 
admissible in court.  See State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 279, 
307 N.W.2d 628 (1981).  Statutes allowing use of a polygraph 
test for certain purposes, including the supervision of certain 
offenders, include:  Wis. Stat. § 51.375(2)(a) ("The department 
may require, as a condition of a community placement, that a sex 
offender submit to a lie detector test when directed to do so by 
the department."); Wis. Stat. § 111.37 ("Use of honesty testing 
devices in employment situations."); and Wis. Stat. § 301.132(2) 
("The department may require a sex offender to submit to a lie 
detector test when directed to do so by the department.").   
¶89 Likewise, that electronic monitoring programs are a 
"fact of life in the criminal justice system" that is taken for 
granted, does not mean that the evidence produced by electronic 
monitoring devices should be taken for granted by the courts.   
¶90 No one disputes that electronic monitoring devices are 
an important tool for the Department of Corrections in its role 
in supervising individuals.  The probation revocation decisions 
cited by the majority,8 however, do not address the reliability 
of 
the 
scientific 
principles 
underlying 
the 
electronic 
monitoring devices.  Furthermore, the procedures applicable to a 
revocation 
hearing 
are substantially different from those 
applicable to a criminal trial.  See Wis. Admin. Code § HA 
                                                 
8 Majority op., ¶49 n.9. 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
2.05(6) (May 2010).9  That the output of electronic monitoring 
devices is used in probation revocation hearings does not 
address the fundamental issue of this case.  
¶91 I 
do 
not 
doubt 
that 
the 
underlying 
scientific 
principles are widely accepted, but the evidentiary process 
requires that the principles be presented to the court before 
the evidence is determined to be reliable.  The process matters.  
The right process was not followed here, but can easily be 
followed.     
¶92 I conclude that expert testimony was necessary in the 
present case to provide the court, in evaluating this technology 
for the first time, with the evidence necessary to ensure the 
reliability of the underlying scientific principles upon which 
this proffered evidence is based.  Absent expert testimony, 
there is, I believe, insufficient foundational testimony in the 
record for the circuit court or this court to decide that a 
presumption of accuracy and reliability exists for a report 
produced by this type of electronic monitoring device.  The lack 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(6)(c) (May 2010) 
("Evidence to support or rebut the allegation may be offered. 
Evidence gathered by means not consistent with ch. DOC 328 or in 
violation of the law may be admitted as evidence at the 
hearing."); Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(6)(d) (May 2010) ("The 
administrative law judge may accept hearsay evidence."); Wis. 
Admin. Code § HA 2.05(6)(e) (May 2010) ("The rules of evidence 
other than ch. 905, Stats., with respect to privileges do not 
apply except that unduly repetitious or irrelevant questions may 
be excluded."). 
Chapter HA 2 governs procedure and practice for corrections 
hearings in the Division of Hearings and Appeals.  
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
of expert testimony therefore constitutes an insufficiency of 
proof in the present case. 
II 
¶93 Even if I were to determine that expert testimony was 
not needed to explain the underlying scientific principles of 
the electronic monitoring device, the State failed to prove that 
the electronic monitoring device was working properly in the 
present case.   
¶94 The proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that 
the evidence is produced by an accurate, functioning device.  In 
other words, the proponent must authenticate the device and 
thereby the data that it produced.10  As this court explained in 
State v. Hanson, 85 Wis. 2d at 245:  "The accuracy of the most 
indisputable scientific theory is subject to its application in 
particular conditions.  The application of any virtually 
undisputed 
scientific 
fact 
to 
the 
immediate 
surrounding 
conditions must be explained in ascertaining its accuracy."    
¶95 The 
majority 
appropriately 
recognizes 
that 
no 
presumption 
of 
accuracy 
as 
to 
the 
particular 
report 
or 
monitoring unit exists.11  The State must present foundational 
evidence as to the production of the specific report it seeks to 
                                                 
10 One method of authentication is Wis. Stat. § 909.015(9):  
To demonstrate authenticity for process-generated records, the 
proponent is required to introduce "evidence describing a 
process or system used to produce a result and showing that the 
process or system produces an accurate result." 
11 Authentication is accomplished "by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims."  Wis. Stat. § 909.01. 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
admit.  But, instead of providing a framework for ensuring the 
reliability of each unit and the particular report produced, the 
majority concludes that the foundational requirements for the 
report in the present case were met by the State's putting forth 
evidence "regarding the installation of the specific device and 
testimony as to its accuracy and reliability by a DOC employee 
familiar with its operation."  Majority op., ¶¶45-48. 
¶96 In the present case, I conclude that the State failed 
to present sufficient foundation to authenticate the report.  
There was not sufficient evidence that the device was in proper 
working condition at the time in question and that established 
methods of testing the proper functioning of the device and 
production of the report were followed.   
¶97 Agent Klarkowski described the procedures used in 
setting up the monitoring unit.  She testified that she had 
received faxes from the monitoring center indicating a good 
"hook-up" 
at 
installation, 
although 
she 
did 
not 
do 
the 
installation.  The installation was done by another DOC agent, 
Tim Glaeser, who was not called to testify.  Similarly, the 
agent's testimony that the unit was functioning at the pertinent 
time was reliant upon confirmation from the system.  There is no 
evidence that a test of the device was performed to show that it 
was functioning correctly at the pertinent time.       
 
¶98 Both agents testified regarding their perceptions of 
the reliability of the monitoring units generally, having never 
personally heard of, or been made aware of, an incorrect report.  
There was limited testimony regarding the internal testing and 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
failsafe mechanisms for the type of electronic monitoring device 
in question.  As with the underlying scientific principles of 
the device, the DOC agents' testimony was at the level of a user 
of the device.  Finally, there was testimony on the particular 
device that was monitoring the defendant, in that it had been 
re-allocated to monitor another individual and the agents did 
not know of any problems with the device. 
¶99 There 
was 
no 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
computer 
processes in receiving and storing the data, nor the processes 
for producing the reports. 
¶100 Common 
experience 
suggests 
that 
the 
underlying 
technology, which the majority equates to the operation of a 
cordless telephone, is not free from glitches or interference 
under certain conditions.  Modern technology has, in most 
instances, succeeded in isolating the reception of only the 
signals desired by a particular device, but anyone that has used 
a baby monitor, a two-way radio, a television with an antenna, 
or a cordless telephone likely knows from experience that 
reception is not perfect.   
¶101 Numerous questions also arise in regard to the 
recorded timestamp that the State purports indicates the 
defendant left his home at the time in question.  How is the 
clock set, and how is the clock maintained?12  It might be that 
                                                 
12 For an interesting discussion on potential disruption in 
the accuracy of clocks, see Seth Borenstein, Power Grid Change 
May Disrupt Clocks, Associated Press, June 24, 2011, available 
at 2001 WLNR 12667232 ("A yearlong experiment with the nation's 
electric grid could mess up traffic lights, security systems and 
some computers——and make plug-in clocks and appliances like 
programmable coffeemakers run up to 20 minutes fast.").  
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
the time is generated by a clock entirely within the home 
monitoring unit.  Alternatively, the clock may be periodically 
updated by receiving signals from a recognized time keeper.     
¶102 What tests and mechanisms are in place to ensure that 
the time entered for an out-of-range event is accurate?  Are 
regular tests of the system run to ensure accuracy, and if so, 
are the tests based only upon internal calibrations? 
¶103 Is it possible that when the radio frequency bracelet 
goes back into range it would not register?13   
¶104 What happens if the home monitoring unit transmits 
data to the monitoring center but it doesn't reach its 
destination?  E-mails are lost, phone calls and faxes are cut 
off.  Agent Klarkowski testified that if the phone line is 
unplugged or busy, the home monitoring unit will store any 
information until the phone connection is re-established.  What 
happens if a message is sent but not received by the monitoring 
center?  Is there a log of information stored in the home 
monitoring unit that could be retrieved to ensure the accuracy 
of the information in the report? 
                                                 
13 See, for example, State v. Rivers, 945 P.2d 367 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1997), one of the few appellate cases from another 
jurisdiction, 
in 
which 
there 
is 
an 
indication 
that 
the 
monitoring device in that case may not have registered or 
transmitted a "late enter" alarm as the system was designed to 
do.  "Although the defendant's ankle bracelet was still attached 
when 
he 
was 
arrested at home several days later, [the 
defendant's parole officer] testified that he did not recall 
having received a late-entry alarm.  However, he was unable to 
ascertain whether such an alarm was received because the 
computer printouts concerning the defendant's curfew violation 
had been destroyed prior to trial."  Id. at 369-70.  
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶105 Some of the questions that I raise may in some cases 
go to the weight of evidence rather than its admissibility.  In 
this case, defense counsel did not raise these questions.  The 
circuit court may not have been presented with a fully developed 
challenge to admissibility.   
¶106 In any event, this court should be looking for the 
right way to admit this evidence.  Presumably this type of 
electronic 
monitoring 
device 
has 
been 
tested 
by 
the 
manufacturer, and even possibly by the Department of Corrections 
as well.  It might be safe to assume that through the results of 
this testing a number of the questions regarding the technology 
that I present may have satisfactory answers. 
¶107 I conclude that this court should provide guidance to 
circuit courts and litigants on the foundational requirements 
for admitting evidence based upon an electronic monitoring 
device such as the one in this case.   
¶108 In the present case the report is, in large part, a 
result of a computerized process.  Assistant United States 
Attorney Timothy M. O'Shea published in the Wisconsin Lawyer 
magazine a helpful checklist for proving the reliability of the 
output of a computer program, which includes:  
——Ability of hardware/program to detect errors 
——Whether the equipment is regularly checked 
——Whether the program and equipment produce a testable 
result 
——Whether 
the 
output 
is 
routinely 
verified: 
automatically 
as 
part 
of 
the 
program; 
by 
a 
complementary system that would not work if errors 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
occurred in the program or equipment producing the 
proposed record; or by other external controls. 
Timothy M. O'Shea, Evidentiary Foundations for Computer Records, 
Wis. Lawyer, Feb. 2008, at 11. 
¶109 These and other factors would provide appropriate 
guidance to circuit courts and litigants in presenting evidence 
resulting from a computerized process to demonstrate that the 
evidence is produced by an accurate, functioning device.  The 
testimony in the present case falls short. 
¶110 Requiring the State to verify the accuracy of the 
particular electronic monitoring device does not impose an 
unreasonable burden on the State.  The State has seemingly done 
just fine complying with the requirements of State v. Hanson.   
¶111 Finally, 
it 
is 
important 
to 
clarify 
that 
the 
majority's conclusion is narrow.  It is limited to the 
technology underlying this type of electronic monitoring device.  
Whether expert testimony is necessary to introduce reports 
produced from data collected by even more technologically 
advanced 
units 
will 
necessarily 
have 
to 
be 
dealt 
with 
individually as those cases arise.  
* * * * 
¶112 I conclude that expert testimony was necessary to 
establish the reliability of the electronic monitoring device 
technology.  I further conclude that the State failed to present 
a sufficient foundation to ensure the reliability and accuracy 
of this report as generated from data acquired by the particular 
electronic monitoring unit.   
¶113 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶114 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.  
 
 
 
No.  2009AP1351-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1