Title: In re Sushchyk

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13077 
 
IN THE MATTER OF PAUL M. SUSHCHYK. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 7, 2021. - March 23, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Judge.  Commission on Judicial Conduct. 
 
 
 
Formal charges filed in the Supreme Judicial Court on 
February 25, 2020. 
 
A hearing was held before a hearing officer appointed by 
this court, a report was submitted by the hearing officer to the 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, and a report and recommendation 
for discipline was submitted by the commission to this court. 
 
 
Howard V. Neff, III, for Commission on Judicial Conduct. 
Michael P. Angelini for the respondent. 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT.  In this case, we decide whether to adopt the 
report and recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Conduct 
(commission) concerning Judge Paul M. Sushchyk (respondent).  
After a three-day evidentiary hearing and receipt of a report 
from a hearing officer, the commission concluded that the 
2 
 
respondent engaged in an intentional, nonconsensual, and 
unwelcome touching of a trial court employee while at a court-
sponsored event and then provided inconsistent and knowingly 
false statements during the resulting investigation and hearing.  
For this, the commission recommends that the respondent be 
censured publicly, ordered to pay the commission's costs, and 
suspended without pay for a reasonable time to permit the 
executive and legislative branches to consider, if they wish, 
whether the respondent should retain his judicial office. 
For the reasons discussed below, we suspend the respondent 
without pay for a reasonable time or until further order of this 
court. 
 
Background.  We take the following facts from the 
commission's factual findings, as supported and supplemented by 
evidence apparent from the record. 
 
On April 25 and 26, 2019, the respondent attended the 
Probate and Family Court's annual spring conference.  The 
complainant, a field coordinator for the Probate and Family 
Court, also attended to assist at the event.  Before the 
conference, the two had met once in person and also had 
communicated electronically, all in a professional capacity. 
On the first evening of the conference, the complainant and 
the respondent were at a restaurant with other conference 
attendees.  The complainant sat on a stool at a high-top table 
3 
 
in the bar area of the restaurant with three colleagues.  She 
saw the respondent make his way toward their table; he 
approached her from behind.  As the respondent passed behind her 
stool, the complainant felt a hand grabbing her left buttock and 
squeezing it for several seconds.  The respondent then joined 
the group at the complainant's table, standing directly to the 
complainant's left, and eventually offered to buy everyone at 
the table a drink. 
Shocked and unsure what to do, the complainant did not 
visibly react to being grabbed and after approximately between 
ten to fifteen minutes excused herself from the table and made 
her way out of the restaurant.  Prior to leaving, she did not 
reveal to anyone what had occurred, although she tried to alert 
one of her colleagues at the table by raising her eyebrows and 
giving the colleague "pointed looks."  The colleague recalled 
that the complainant gave her "a particular look with her eyes 
. . . very wide-eyed" about five minutes after the colleague 
observed the respondent pass behind the complainant and approach 
the table, but the colleague did not understand what the 
complainant was attempting to communicate. 
Upon leaving the restaurant, the complainant got in her car 
and immediately sent a text message to her sister, which stated, 
"OMG.  I think one of the judges grabbed my butt on purpose."  
After her sister responded, the complainant continued, "He's 
4 
 
also carrying a hip flask, so maybe just fell?  Except it was a 
distinct pinch."  Earlier, the respondent had shown the 
complainant and her colleagues at the table a flask he was 
carrying.  Then, in a text message exchange with two friends 
following the second day of the conference, the complainant 
wrote, "I just attended a conference for judges and while at the 
bar after dinner one of the newer judges full palmed my ass.  I 
am still reeling a bit today from it.  Kinda thought maybe it 
was a mistake until today he spent the day hovering 
uncomfortably around me."1 
Several days later, the complainant reported the incident 
to the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Department 
and provided him with a written statement, alleging, "[S]omeone 
grabbed my left buttock while I was seated on a stool at the 
[restaurant] during the Probate and Family Court's Spring 
Judicial Conference.  I believe the person who grabbed me was 
[the respondent] because he had recently come over to the table 
where I was seated and was the only person directly behind me at 
the time of the grab."  In the statement, she went on to 
describe a "grab [that] lasted a few seconds and felt like it 
was made using a full hand." 
 
1 The complainant testified that the respondent moved his 
chair uncomfortably close to her during a lunchtime presentation 
on the second day of the conference.  He denied hovering around 
the complainant. 
5 
 
Approximately a week later, the Chief Justice of the 
Probate and Family Court met with the respondent and presented 
him with the complainant's written statement.  After reading it, 
the respondent responded, "I couldn't have done something like 
that.  I wouldn't do something like that.  I would never hurt 
anyone, especially a woman."  Ten days later, he submitted a 
written statement in response to the allegations, understanding 
that it would be sent to the Chief Justice of this court.  In 
it, he now recalled having unintentionally touched the 
complainant.  According to the statement, he had gone to the 
bathroom after finishing a drink at the table with the 
complainant and her colleagues.  While returning to the table, 
he explained, "I was somewhat unsteady on my feet, feeling the 
effects of past hip replacement surgery, the long day . . . , 
the evening meal and the alcohol consumed.  I recall that as I 
began to pass by [the complainant], to steady myself, I placed 
my hand in the direction of her chair and came into momentary 
contact with a portion of her lower body." 
In July 2019, the commission, having received a complaint 
regarding the incident and determining that there was adequate 
reason to proceed, prepared a statement of allegations and 
presented it to the respondent.  In a written response, the 
respondent stood by his prior version of events and added, "It 
would be tempting to acknowledge that I purposely grabbed [the 
6 
 
complainant's] buttocks and to offer my apology for having done 
so, but I have no such recollection and therefore cannot do so.  
However, I do not dispute that I had physical contact with [her] 
and I acknowledge that it was inappropriate.  I regret what 
occurred and I apologize to [her] for it."  He attached a letter 
of apology to his response and asked that it be given to the 
complainant. 
In February 2020, the commission filed formal charges in 
this court against the respondent, and the court appointed a 
retired associate justice of the Superior Court to preside over 
the statutorily required hearing.  See G. L. c. 211C, § 7 (1).  
At the hearing, the complainant testified, "As [the respondent] 
passed behind me, I felt him grab, slide his hand under my left 
buttock and grab me."  The respondent also testified and, 
contrary to his prior written statements, denied having any 
physical contact, intentional or unintentional, with the 
complainant on the evening in question.2  When asked to explain 
his prior statements, he replied, "I did not think that [the 
complainant] would lie.  In attempting to rationalize what she 
said and recalling the events of the evening, I could then only 
conclude that there was a possibility that I may have had some 
 
2 After denying at the hearing that he had any contact with 
the complainant, intentional or unintentional, the respondent 
went on to allow that there "may have been" some "accidental" 
contact, although he could not recall any. 
7 
 
fleeting contact with her.  Not intentional contact.  Not 
purposeful contact.  But something that had occurred." 
Following the hearing, the hearing officer submitted to the 
commission a report with proposed findings and recommendations.  
See G. L. c. 211C, § 7 (8).  The commission then drafted a 
report and recommendation for submission to this court, adopting 
all but one of the hearing officer's factual findings.  See 
G. L. c. 211C, § 7 (9)-(10). 
In the report and recommendation, the commission concluded 
that the respondent engaged "in an intentional, nonconsensual, 
and unwelcome touching of [the complainant's] buttock."  It also 
concluded that the respondent was not "forthright" in his 
original written response to the complainant's allegations and, 
instead, "generated a statement he knew to be false in which he 
invented out of whole cloth a version of events in which [the 
complainant's] very clear perception of what happened to her 
person was to be dismissed as misimpression or an exaggeration."  
The commission further concluded that the respondent's testimony 
at the hearing, specifically, his "reworked denials" of the 
complainant's allegation and "problematic" explanation for his 
prior false statement, was a "further instance of his failure to 
be truthful in this matter."  As a result, the commission 
recommended that the respondent be censured publicly, ordered to 
8 
 
pay the commission's costs, and suspended without pay for a 
reasonable time. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The 
commission has the burden in these proceedings to prove the 
charges against the respondent by clear and convincing evidence.  
See G. L. c. 211C, § 7 (4).  This standard "is not without 
teeth.  It is a greater burden than proof by a preponderance of 
the evidence, but less than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
required in criminal cases.  The evidence must be sufficient to 
convey a high degree of probability that the contested 
proposition is true" (quotations and citations omitted).  Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 309 (2015).  The respondent argues that not 
only is there not clear and convincing evidence of any wrongful 
conduct on his part, but there also is "no evidence."  He 
further argues that the hearing officer's conclusions, adopted 
by the commission, clearly are erroneous.  We disagree. 
 
The respondent first argues that the finding that he 
intentionally touched the complainant's buttock cannot stand 
because there is no direct eyewitness testimony, including from 
the complainant, to support it.  He further notes that there was 
evidence admitted at the hearing, including from the 
complainant, that other people were present and "milling about" 
in the bar area behind where the complainant sat and, while the 
9 
 
complainant estimated that the "grab" lasted from five to 
fifteen seconds,3 no one testified to seeing him stop behind her 
for even a moment before approaching the table.  "If there is 
any clear and convincing evidence in this matter," he concludes, 
"it is that if anyone pinched or grabbed [the complainant], that 
person was not [the respondent]." 
 
Although it is true that there was no direct evidence that 
the respondent touched the complainant, there was sufficient 
circumstantial evidence from which a fact finder could determine 
that there was a high probability the judge, and not someone 
else, did so.4  It is undisputed that the respondent passed 
behind the complainant -- the respondent and two of the 
complainant's colleagues confirmed as much -- and she maintained 
that he did so at the same moment the unwanted touching 
 
3 When asked at the hearing how long the "grab" lasted, the 
complainant replied, "Geesh.  I don't know, 5, 10, 15 seconds, 
something along those lines."  Previously, at her deposition, 
she had indicated "one to two seconds." 
 
4 A criminal defendant's guilt can be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence alone.  See, 
e.g., Cramer v. Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 106, 110 (1994) 
("Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, even for the conviction of the 
highest crimes").  It stands to reason, therefore, that the 
commission likewise may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove 
judicial misconduct by the lesser standard of clear and 
convincing evidence.  See Adoption of Keefe, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 
818, 825 (2000) (if circumstantial evidence sufficient to 
establish guilt for highest crimes, it is sufficient in child 
custody cases). 
10 
 
occurred.  She testified at the hearing that she noticed the 
respondent coming toward her table.  As noted above, she further 
testified, "As he passed behind me, I felt him grab, slide his 
hand under my left buttock and grab me."  She "paused" before 
she turned around5 and saw the respondent behind her over her 
left shoulder, but was "aware" of her surroundings and, while it 
is possible there were other people in the area behind her, 
"[t]here was no one else directly behind [her] at that time that 
[she] kn[e]w of." 
 
There is also the fact that, ten days after first being 
made aware of the allegations by the Chief Justice of the 
Probate and Family Court, the respondent created and submitted a 
fictional version of events wherein he admitted to touching the 
complainant on the evening in question but tried to pass it off 
as unintentional.  Subsequently, he reaffirmed that version of 
events when he responded to the statement of allegations 
received from the commission.  As the hearing officer concluded, 
this "evinces a consciousness of guilt" and "suggests that he 
did what he was accused of doing and sought to minimize his 
culpability for it."  In criminal cases where the evidence is 
 
5 When asked at the hearing how long she "paused" before 
turning around, the complaint replied, "I don't know.  I don't 
know.  If I had to guess, it was a few seconds."  Previously, at 
her deposition, she said she "paused for a few seconds . . . .  
I mean, within [thirty] seconds." 
11 
 
wholly circumstantial, we have noted that "significant" evidence 
of consciousness of guilt, such as providing a false statement 
in an effort to exculpate oneself, can carry great weight.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 593 (2012), citing 
Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 202–203 (2006).  
Likewise, the respondent's initial, admittedly fictional 
response to the allegations can, and clearly did, carry great 
weight in these judicial misconduct proceedings, where the 
burden of proof is lower. 
The respondent argues in his brief in this court that the 
finding that he was not truthful is "baseless," and he attempts 
to sidestep the issue altogether by noting he was not charged 
formally with being dishonest.  However, at the evidentiary 
hearing the respondent admitted that the version of events he 
provided in his written responses to the complainant's 
allegations was not true.6  Any reasonable person in his position 
 
6 In his brief, the respondent suggests that "he realized 
that the person with whom he had unintentional contact as he 
returned from the mens' room could not have been" the 
complainant after "[b]eing reminded that [the complainant] had 
left the [restaurant]" prior to that.  The suggestion is that 
his original version of events was true, but that he simply was 
mistaken when it came to identifying the person at the 
restaurant whose "lower body" he came in contact with when he 
went to steady himself on his return from the bathroom.  The 
suggestion is not consistent with his testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing, wherein, as noted supra, he suggested that 
he created his original version of events because he "did not 
think that [the complainant] would lie" and "could then only 
 
12 
 
should have known he would be held accountable for his 
admittedly false statement notwithstanding the fact that there 
was no additional charge alleging untruthfulness.  In fact, the 
hearing officer and the commission went on to find that the 
respondent's original version of events was "invented out of 
whole cloth" and, as discussed infra, considered his intentional 
misrepresentations in making findings of fact and deciding what 
sanction to recommend.  Simply put, the finding that the 
respondent was not truthful is anything but baseless.  Rather, 
it is squarely before us in the present proceedings, not only in 
relation to what, if any, sanction should be imposed, but also 
as significant evidence of the respondent's consciousness of 
guilt. 
The respondent also argues that the hearing officer's 
conclusion, adopted by the commission, that the complainant 
"gave a cogent, credible, consistent account of what occurred" 
clearly is erroneous.  In support of this argument, the 
respondent suggests the complainant was inconsistent in her 
description of the unwanted touching, which, in his opinion, 
became increasingly "exaggerat[ed]" over time from a "grab," to 
a "distinct pinch," to a "full palm," to "a grab [that] lasted a 
few seconds and felt like it was made using a full hand," and, 
 
conclude that there was a possibility that [he] may have had 
some fleeting contact with her." 
13 
 
at the hearing, to "slid[ing] his hand under my left buttock and 
grab[bing] me."  Again, we disagree. 
The hearing officer, who observed the witnesses and was in 
the best position to weigh all the evidence, was free to weigh 
the testimony as she thought fit.  See Matter of a Minor, 484 
Mass. 295, 302 (2020) (hearing judge in best position to weigh 
evidence, assess credibility of witnesses, and make findings of 
fact, and reviewing court accepts findings unless clearly 
erroneous); Matter of King, 409 Mass. 590, 604-605 (1991) 
(hearing officer not required to accept contrary evidence).  
Ultimately, she concluded, and the commission agreed, "Based on 
[the complainant's] testimony and my observations of her over 
the hours she testified, including during rigorous cross-
examination, I believe her.  The variations in accounts 
highlighted in defense of [the respondent] do not detract from 
the believability of her version of events."  Having reviewed 
the same record and the same "variations" in the complainant's 
accounts, we cannot conclude that this conclusion clearly was 
erroneous. 
In summary, we agree with the hearing officer and the 
commission that the evidence was sufficient to establish, by the 
standard of clear and convincing evidence, both that the 
respondent engaged in an intentional, nonconsensual, and 
unwelcome touching of the complainant and that he then knowingly 
14 
 
provided a false version of events after being confronted with 
the complainant's allegations.7 
 
2.  Sanction.  As this court has stated in prior judicial 
misconduct proceedings, the "appropriate disposition of 
disciplinary matters of this type depends on the particular 
circumstances."  Matter of Murphy, 452 Mass. 796, 803 (2008), 
quoting Matter of Larkin, 368 Mass. 87, 91 (1975).  Having that 
in mind, we begin by considering the respondent's misconduct. 
 
First, the seriousness of the respondent's intentional, 
nonconsensual, and unwelcome touching of the complainant speaks 
for itself.  The gravity of that act is compounded by the 
respondent's station as a Probate and Family Court judge, the 
complainant's subordinate position within that court, and the 
fact that the incident occurred at a court-sponsored event.  As 
the hearing officer explained: 
"That the incident occurred at a Court event, sponsored and 
conducted by the Court, makes it even more troubling.  The 
judicial and other court-employed attendees at the 
conference were there because of their official positions, 
whether or not they were then performing their usual job 
responsibilities.  The group seated at the table was part 
of a structure in which a judge occupies a position of 
 
7 As previously noted, the hearing officer and the 
commission both concluded that the respondent also was not 
truthful in his testimony at the evidentiary hearing.  We are 
troubled by that, as well.  As the hearing officer appropriately 
stated, "One problem with lying is once it begins, it's hard to 
know when it ends."  The respondent's dishonesty at the 
inception of this matter made it difficult thereafter to take 
him at his word. 
15 
 
unique power.  In that structure, the people who provide 
support function as subordinates, in that their role is 
mainly defined by what a judge needs to perform [his or 
her] duties.  [The complainant] and [her colleagues] at the 
table are high-level professionals who must be afforded the 
respect, courtesy and deference due them and owed all Trial 
Court employees.  [The respondent's] conduct was not in 
keeping with the dignity, regard and professionalism he 
owed them and his position." 
 
Additionally, the respondent's misconduct is aggravated by 
his intentional misrepresentation.  He was untruthful in a 
statement to the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court, 
which he knew would be sent to the Chief Justice of this court, 
and he repeated that fabrication in his response to the 
statement of allegations against him.  As the hearing officer 
explained: 
"[The respondent's] written account to the Chief Justice 
contained deliberate falsehoods, as [he] admitted at 
hearing.  The suggestion that his initial account of 
inadvertent, fleeting touching was concocted in deference 
to his belief in [the complainant's] veracity, fails to 
recognize that his written version of events was a fiction 
that excuses his wrong-doing and falsely attacks [the 
complainant's] perception of reality.  If [the respondent] 
indeed knew he did not do as [the complainant] claimed, he 
was required to tell that truth rather than invent a tale.  
The path he chose supports the conclusion that he was 
attempting [to] evade responsibility for his act." 
 
Judges will not be penalized for defending themselves before the 
commission, but they must not make deliberately false statements 
in the process.  See Matter of Curry, 450 Mass. 503, 532 (2008) 
(in attorney discipline case, "[a] separate aggravating factor 
was the marked lack of candor [the attorney] showed during the 
16 
 
disciplinary proceedings" [quotation omitted]); Matter of King, 
409 Mass. at 610 (in judicial misconduct case, aggravating 
factors included "a general pattern of questionable candor in 
the Judge's testimony indicating that he engaged in some 
stonewalling of the inquiry").  To again quote the hearing 
officer, the respondent's intentional misrepresentation "is 
wholly inconsistent with the oath of office and ethical conduct 
required of a judge." 
In sum, the respondent's intentional wrongdoing -- both the 
unwanted touching of the complainant and the lying that followed 
-- violated the canons of judicial conduct.  See, e.g., S.J.C. 
Rule 3:09, Canon 1, Rule 1.2 (2016) ("A judge shall act at all 
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and 
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety"); 
S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 2, Rule 2.16 (A) & comment 1 (2016) ("A 
judge shall cooperate and be candid and honest with judicial and 
lawyer disciplinary authorities" as it "instills confidence in 
judges' commitment to the integrity of the judicial system and 
the protection of the public").  His misconduct warrants 
discipline.  See G. L. c. 211C, § 2 (5) (b), (d), (e) (judge may 
be disciplined for "willful misconduct in office;" "conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice or conduct 
unbecoming a judicial officer, whether in office or outside of 
17 
 
judicial duties, that brings the judicial office into 
disrepute;" or "any conduct that constitutes a violation of the 
codes of judicial conduct or professional responsibility").  
Accordingly, what remains to be determined is the appropriate 
discipline. 
As mentioned supra, the commission has recommended, most 
prominently, that the respondent be suspended without pay for a 
reasonable time to permit the executive and legislative branches 
to consider, if they wish, whether the respondent should retain 
his judicial office.8  The respondent, in turn, argues that such 
a sanction is "greatly excessive."  He notes that he has already 
been removed from judicial duties for more than two years while 
this matter has been pending.  In addition, he suggests that he 
has been "broadly" and "publicly" vilified and embarrassed 
during the course of these proceedings.  As such, he maintains 
that no further sanctions are warranted.  We agree that the 
sanction recommended by the commission is severe and one that, 
fortunately, has rarely been warranted.  See, e.g., Matter of 
 
8 In Matter of Bonin, 375 Mass. 680, 711 (1978), we noted 
that the question whether a judge "should continue to serve 
. . . is one which is not assigned to the judicial department 
under the Constitution of the Commonwealth."  However, we 
further recognized that, pursuant to our constitutional and 
statutory powers of supervision over the courts, we could, when 
we deemed it appropriate, suspend a judge for a reasonable time 
to allow the executive and legislative branches to consider, if 
they so desired, whether a judge should continue in office.  Id. 
at 711-712. 
18 
 
Bonin, 375 Mass. 680, 711-712 (1978); In re:  Estes, Sup. Jud. 
Ct., No. OE-136, Order (May 24, 2018).  Nonetheless, we also 
agree that this is one of those rare cases where the sanction is 
justified by the misconduct.9 
As this court has previously acknowledged, "[t]hat the 
standards imposed on judges are high goes without saying.  
 
9 The respondent argues that the discipline recommended by 
the commission in this case is disproportionate to that imposed 
in certain other judicial misconduct proceedings.  However, the 
previous dispositions on which he relies did not involve the 
unique combination of misconduct at issue here:  the 
intentional, nonconsensual, and unwelcome touching of a trial 
court employee while at a court-sponsored event, followed by 
dishonesty during the resulting investigation and hearing.  Cf. 
Matter of Brown, 427 Mass. 146, S.C., 427 Mass. 1015 (1998); 
Matter of King, 409 Mass. 590 (1991); Commission on Judicial 
Conduct, Superior Court Judge Reprimanded by Commission on 
Judicial Conduct (June 9, 2010), https://www.mass.gov/news 
/superior-court-judge-reprimanded-by-commission-on-judicial-
conduct [https://perma.cc/38HG-GM9L]; Commission on Judicial 
Conduct, Judge Robert F. Murray Disciplined by the Commission on 
Judicial Conduct (Nov. 28, 2005), https://www.mass.gov/news 
/judge-robert-f-murray-disciplined-by-the-commission-on-
judicial-conduct [https://perma.cc/AV27-9XZR]; Commission on 
Judicial Conduct, Appeals Court Judge Reprimanded by Commission 
on Judicial Conduct (Mar. 19, 2004), https://www.mass.gov/news 
/appeals-court-judge-reprimanded-by-commission-on-judicial-
conduct [https://perma.cc/C6KE-9HMK].  Moreover, as noted supra, 
although "dispositions in prior proceedings and dispositions in 
other jurisdictions generally may offer some guidance, the 
appropriate resolution in these matters depends on the 
particular circumstances.  Because none of our earlier cases is 
on point, our prior judicial disciplinary decisions provide 
little guidance in reaching a conclusion on the facts presented 
in this proceeding."  In re:  Estes, Sup. Jud. Ct., No. OE-136, 
Order, at 3 (May 24, 2018).  Instead, we have considered the 
facts presented, as well as the arguments of the parties, and 
deemed the sanction previously imposed in cases such as Estes's 
to be warranted. 
19 
 
Because of the great power and responsibility judges have in 
passing judgment on their fellow citizens, such standards are 
desirable and necessary and there should be strict adherence to 
them.  Failure on the part of even a few judges to comply with 
these standards serves to degrade and demean the entire 
judiciary and to erode public confidence in the judicial 
process."  Matter of Morrissey, 366 Mass. 11, 16-17 (1974) 
("Anyone who is unwilling to accept and abide by such [high 
standards] should not aspire to or accept the great honor and 
the grave responsibility of serving on the bench").  When, as in 
the present case, a judge strays from those high standards, we 
are mindful that the discipline we impose must "serve[] to give 
assurance to the public that such conduct will not be tolerated 
and that the judiciary itself is ever ready to carry out the 
corrective process when necessary."  Id. at 17.  See In re:  
Estes, Sup. Jud. Ct., No. OE-136, Order, at 3 ("Because 
deference to the judgments of our courts requires that courts 
maintain the public's trust and confidence, our disposition must 
assure the public that judges are held to high standards and 
that the judiciary is worthy of the trust and confidence 
necessary in a society governed by law"). 
Here, the respondent has been found to have committed 
serious acts of misconduct "that implicate fundamental 
principles of integrity . . . and respect for the judicial 
20 
 
office."  Id.  He has brought "undeserved discredit to the 
administration of justice in the Commonwealth."  Matter of 
Larkin, 368 Mass. at 91-92.  "The sanction we impose is severe 
not because we seek to punish [the respondent] severely, but 
because, like the [hearing officer and the c]ommission, we 
seriously question whether he can command the respect and 
authority essential to the performance of his judicial 
function."  In re:  Estes, Sup. Jud. Ct., No. OE-136, Order, at 
5. 
Conclusion.  The respondent is suspended without pay for a 
reasonable time to permit the executive and legislative branches 
to consider, if they wish, whether he should retain his judicial 
office.10  See Matter of Markey, 427 Mass. 797, 804-805 (1998) 
(discussing our authority to suspend judge without pay).  If 
requested, the commission shall be permitted to share with the 
executive and legislative branches any nonimpounded material 
that has been provided to this court in connection with the 
present matter.  A copy of this decision shall be delivered to 
the Governor and the Legislature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
10 We do not adopt the commission's recommendations that the 
respondent be censured publicly and ordered to pay the 
commission's costs because we believe the objectives of those 
sanctions effectively have been achieved by the sanction we have 
imposed.