Title: Wild v. Brooks

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Wild v. Brooks (2003-077); 177 Vt. 171; 862 A.2d 225

2004 VT 74

[Filed 13-Aug-2004]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 07-Sep-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2004 VT 74

                                No. 2003-077

  George Wild, Jr.	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Orange Superior Court

  David Brooks, et al.	                         March Term, 2004

  Amy M. Davenport, J.

  David L. Grayck of Cheney, Brock & Saudek, P.C., Montpelier, for
    Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Stephen J. Craddock, Berlin, for Defendants-Appellees.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiff George Wild initiated this action to
  permanently enjoin the operation of a commercial shooting range that
  borders his property.  The superior court dismissed Wild's suit after
  trial, concluding that, at the time of the trial, the terms of the range's
  Act 250 permit prohibited operations for a period of up to ten years,
  therefore an injunction could not issue because there was no activity to
  enjoin and would not likely be any in the foreseeable future. 
  Alternatively, it ruled that 10 V.S.A. § 5227(b) immunized defendants from
  suits seeking injunctions related to nuisance noise.  On appeal, Wild
  claims that (1) recent revisions to the range's Act 250 permit, which
  allowed the range to re-open as of this spring, rendered the superior
  court's opinion advisory; and (2) the grant of statutory immunity under 10
  V.S.A. § 5227, if valid, effects an unconstitutional taking by depriving
  Wild of a remedy for the claimed nuisance.  We affirm the trial court's
  decision in so far as it was based on the equitable principles governing
  injunctions and justiciability in nuisance suits, and therefore do not
  reach Wild's statutory and constitutional arguments.  

       ¶  2.  The Bull's Eye Sporting Center abuts the land where Wild lives
  and works.  The Bull's Eye is a commercial shooting range permitted under
  Act 250, Vermont's land use law.  The range is approximately one half mile
  from Wild's home.  During its previous seasons of operation which ran from
  April 15 to November 15, Wild could hear shooting from the range at various
  points on his property including his home.    

       ¶  3.  For several years, Wild and his neighbors objected to the
  shooting range  and have appealed Bull's Eye's Act 250 land use permits
  before the District Environmental Commission (DEC) and Environmental Board. 
  The neighbors' efforts succeeded when, on June 23, 2000, the Environmental
  Board found that Bull's Eye's operators, the Brookses, violated their
  permit by logging trees that formed part of the vegetative sound buffer
  between the range and Wild's property.  The Environmental Board revoked
  Bull's Eye's permit, but stated that the Brookses should be given an
  opportunity to cure the violation.  The decision allowed the range to
  operate on an interim basis until the DEC issued a new permit that
  contained conditions addressing the Brookses' violation and effectuating a
  proposed cure.   

       ¶  4.  On May 29, 2001, Wild and some of his neighbors filed a
  complaint in Orange County Superior Court alleging, among other things,
  that the noise from the shooting range created a private nuisance. (FN1)  
  Plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin the range's operation.          
   
       ¶  5.  Meanwhile, the Brookses applied to the DEC for an amended
  permit.  Wild opposed the application before the DEC.  On July 5, 2001, the
  DEC issued an amended permit.  Condition 6 of the permit stated that "[t]he
  'no shooting zone' for firearms at this range shall include the entire
  tract until such time as either sufficient tree growth has occurred to
  restore basal areas in existence prior to the logging performed in
  1996-1998 or a ten year period has elapsed."  This condition effectively
  halted all firearm shooting at the range for an indefinite period of time
  not to exceed ten years.  In August 2001, the Brookses appealed the DEC's
  decision, and Wild cross-appealed.   

       ¶  6.  While the appeal to the Environmental Board was pending, the
  superior court held a trial in Wild's nuisance suit on July 17, 2002.  At
  the close of Wild's case, defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of
  law.  The court granted defendants' motion and dismissed Wild's case,
  ruling that the extraordinary remedy of injunction was inappropriate
  because, under general equitable principles, Wild's right to relief was not
  clear.  By stipulation of the parties, the court had taken judicial notice
  of the ongoing Act 250 proceedings that affected range operations.  In the
  court's view, the fact that the Act 250 process had already suspended range
  operations for an indefinite period that could last as long as ten years
  precluded the need for an injunction.  The Court also ruled that Wild's
  nuisance suit was barred by 10 V.S.A. § 5227(b).  The statute, which was
  amended in June 2001 after Wild filed his complaint in the trial court,
  provides that 

    The owner or operator of a sport shooting range . . . who is in
    substantial compliance with any noise use condition of any issued
    municipal or state land use permit otherwise required by law shall
    not be subject to any civil liability for damages or any
    injunctive relief resulting from noise or noise pollution,
    notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.

  10 V.S.A. § 5227(b).  The court also dismissed Wild's claim for money
  damages because it found that the evidence did not support Wild's damages
  claim. 

       ¶  7.  Pursuant to V.R.C.P. 52(a), plaintiffs filed a request for
  findings of fact, and on August 5, 2002, Wild filed a motion to reconsider
  the ruling on damages, or in the alternative, to reopen the evidence.  In
  its findings of fact and conclusions of law, filed on January 22, 2003, the
  court noted the undisputed fact that the range was not in operation at that
  time and that the range's land use permit prohibited commercial shooting
  for "a period of ten years or such time as is necessary for sufficient tree
  growth to occur 'to restore order basal areas in existence prior to the
  logging performed in 1996-1998.' "  Based on this finding, the court
  concluded that, although both Wild and the Brookses had appealed the permit
  decision, injunctive relief was not available for the same reasons it cited
  in its earlier ruling: the Act 250 ten-year ban and statutory immunity.
  Despite its reliance on the statute as an independent ground for dismissal,
  the court declined to address Wild's argument that, by denying Wild access
  to injunctive relief and monetary damages, the statute effected an
  unconstitutional taking.  The court reasoned that "Plaintiffs' claims fail
  for reasons separate and apart from the immunity provided under the
  statute," because, at the time, the Act 250 process had abated the nuisance
  for the foreseeable future.

       ¶  8.  Wild appealed the court's ruling.  While the case was on
  appeal, subsequent developments in the Act 250 appeals process resulted in
  a ruling that allowed defendants to reopen the shooting range by April
  2004, (FN2) subject to revised hours of operation and several other noise
  mitigation conditions.  Wild argues that this change in the pre-decision
  status quo subsequently rendered the trial court's opinion advisory.  Wild
  also renews his claim that, in the context of this case, 10 V.S.A. §
  5227(b) effected an unconstitutional taking of his property.
          
       ¶  9.  We affirm the trial court's decision to the extent that it
  relied on equitable principles militating against the issuance of an
  injunction to prohibit alleged nuisance activity that was already halted
  indefinitely by a collateral legal process.  In essence, the trial court
  determined that the case was mooted by the involuntary and indefinite
  cessation of range activities.  The fact that the range was permitted to
  reopen after the court had entered final judgment does not invalidate a
  decision that was correct when it was entered.  To the contrary, the court
  avoided issuing an advisory opinion because the trial court could not have
  predicted the results of the Act 250 process and the noise-related changes
  in range operations that it would effect.  Under such circumstances, a
  determination in the fact-sensitive nuisance context would have been
  inappropriate.  Our holding with respect to mootness and justiciability
  precludes our application of the statute. We reserve judgment on its
  constitutionality until such time as the issue is squarely presented in the
  context of a live controversy.
       
       ¶  10.  An injunction is an extraordinary remedy that will not be
  routinely granted unless the right to relief is clear.  Comm. to Save
  Bishop's House v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 136 Vt. 213, 218,