Title: Benedict v. National Bank of Commerce

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Nobia BENEDICT v. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE

96-1339                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
              Opinion delivered September 25, 1997


1.   Civil procedure -- new-trial motion -- when deemed denied. --
     Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 provides that the time
     for appeal shall run from the entry of an order granting or
     denying a new trial; if the trial court neither grants nor
     denies the new-trial motion within thirty days of its filing,
     the motion will be deemed denied as of the thirtieth day, and
     the moving party then must file a notice of appeal within
     thirty days from when the parties' motion was deemed denied. 
     

2.   Civil procedure -- appellant argued petition for rehearing
     treated as new-trial motion -- petition not timely filed. -- 
     Even if appellant's argument that, under Ark. R. App. P. 4(b),
     her time of appeal was extended because she had filed a
     petition for rehearing, which in substance was a motion for
     new trial as provided in Rule 59 of the Arkansas Rules of
     Civil Procedure, was correct, appellant failed to file such a
     motion no later than ten days after the entry of judgment as
     is required by ARCP Rule 59(b), so it was ineffective;
     consequently, her motion failed to extend her time to file a
     notice of appeal.

3.   Civil procedure -- appellant required to file notice of appeal
     within thirty days after entry of order -- appeal dismissed as
     untimely. -- Where the trial court entered its order on July
     11, 1996, and appellant delayed in filing her notice of appeal
     until August 15, 1996 -- outside the thirty-day period
     required for filing a notice of appeal under Ark. R. App. P.
     4(a), her appeal was dismissed as untimely.


     Appeal from Union Circuit Court; Carol Crafton Anthony, Judge;
appeal dismissed.
     Depper Law Firm, by:  Robert L. Depper, Jr. and Robin J.
Carroll, for appellant.
     Compton, Prewett, Thomas & Hickey, P.A., by:  William I.
Prewett, for appellee.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     Appellant Nobia Benedict brought this lawsuit against National
Bank of Commerce after her house and lot, including a pin oak tree,
sustained damages as a result of fire.  Benedict's house and lot
adjoined the Bank's property, which contained a dilapidated
structure.  The Bank gave written permission to the El Dorado Fire
Department to conduct a "controlled burn" of the structure on its
property, and the department agreed to burn the structure as a
training exercise.  Although the department established a "water
curtain" between Benedict's and the Bank's adjoining properties,
Benedict's house sustained damages to one of her windows, to some
melted shingles on its roof, and she also suffered loss of an oak
tree and some other vegetation. 
     Because Benedict concluded that she could not successfully sue
the City of El Dorado for its fire department's negligence, she
brought her action solely against the Bank, alleging absolute
liability on the Bank's part, asserting the Bank had engaged in
ultrahazardous activity by "ordering the burning."  The parties'
respective cases were tried to the court, and the court issued a
letter opinion, holding in the Bank's favor and dismissing
Benedict's complaint with prejudice.  On appeal, Benedict contends
the trial court erred in refusing to hold that the Bank's use of
fire was a hazardous activity for which the Bank bore absolute
liability.  However, we are unable to address the merits of
Benedict's argument because Benedict failed to file a timely notice
of appeal.  
     We first note that the trial court issued its letter opinion
on June 27, 1996, and filed it on June 28, 1996.  Before the trial
court entered its order dismissing Benedict's complaint, Benedict
filed on July 3, 1996 a pleading captioned "Petition for
Rehearing."  Without ruling on Benedict's "Petition," the trial
court entered its order on July 11, 1996, and Benedict delayed in
filing her notice of appeal until August 15, 1996 -- outside the
thirty-day period required for filing a notice of appeal under Ark.
R. App. P. 4(a).
     Benedict argues that, under Ark. R. App. P. 4(b), her time of
appeal was extended because she had filed a petition for rehearing
which in substance was a motion for new trial as provided in Rule
59 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Civil Appellate
Rule 4(b) provides that a motion for new trial under ARCP Rule
59(b) may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal if such a
timely motion is filed in trial court, and provision (c) of Civil
Appellate Rule 4 further provides the time for appeal shall run
from the entry of the order granting or denying a new trial.  If
the trial court neither grants nor denies the new-trial motion
within thirty days of its filing, the motion will be deemed denied
as of the thirtieth day, and the moving party then must file a
notice of appeal within thirty days from when the parties' motion
was deemed denied.  See Ark. R. App. P. 4(c).
     Even if we were to agree with Benedict that her "Petition for
Rehearing" was in essence a new-trial motion and, as such, could
possibly extend her time for filing a notice of appeal, Benedict
failed to file such a motion no later than ten days after the entry
of judgment as is required by ARCP Rule 59(b).  See Webster v.
State, 320 Ark. 393, 896 S.W.2d 890 (1995) (where party filed
motion for new trial before the judgment was entered, court held
motion was untimely and ineffective under ARCP Rule 59 and Ark. R.
App. P. 4(b)); Guinn v. State, 323 Ark. 612, 917 S.W.2d 529 (1996)
(court held that to be effective, a motion for new trial under ARCP
Rule 59 must be filed within ten days after the entry of the
judgment); see also Jackson v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 309 Ark.
572,