Title: Wycoff Realty Co. v. Grover

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

198 Kan. 139 (1967)
422 P.2d 943
WYCOFF REALTY COMPANY, a Partnership composed of R.L. Wycoff and Richard Wycoff, Appellant,
v.
GERALD E. GROVER, Appellee.
No. 44,615

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 21, 1967.
Thomas C. Boone, of Hays, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Corwin C. Spencer, of Oakley, argued the cause, and C.A. Spencer, of Oakley, was with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
This is an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate. In the lower court judgment on the pleadings was entered for the defendant, resulting in this appeal. The issue is whether certain correspondence between the parties constituted a contract.
The action was commenced by the filing in the district court of Logan county, Kansas, of plaintiffs' petition in which they alleged they are partners doing business at Russell Springs, Logan county; that defendant, a resident of Modesto, California, owned a quarter section of land in Logan county; that in the fall of 1964 defendant offered in writing to sell this real estate to plaintiff partners, the offer being in words and figures as follows:
"WYCOFF REALTY CO.
"Russell Springs, Kansas.
Plaintiffs alleged they thereafter orally and in writing accepted defendant's offer, but that defendant refused to sell the real estate to them, and plaintiffs ask for specific performance of the sale contract. By an amendment to their petition they alleged their acceptance of defendant's offer to sell was in the form of a letter to defendant dated and mailed November 12, 1964, the letter being as follows:
"November 12, 1964
"Dear Mr. Grover:
Defendant filed his answer admitting his residence and ownership of the land but denying all other allegations of the petition. He expressly denied the mailing by plaintiffs and the receipt by him of the letter of November 12, 1964. Defendant filed a counterclaim against plaintiffs in which he alleged that about October 13, 1964, the plaintiffs solicited a listing for sale of defendant's real estate by means of a post card sent to defendant through the mails which card was as follows:
Defendant further alleged that attached to such post card was a return card which defendant completed and returned to plaintiffs, being that pleaded by them in their petition; that thereafter in response to this reply defendant received a letter from plaintiffs dated November 6, 1964, as follows:
"November 6, 1964
"Dear Mr. Grover:
Defendant alleged that plaintiffs represented themselves to be real estate brokers or agents authorized by law to accept listings for real estate but that such representation was false in that plaintiffs were not licensed real estate brokers or agents; that on November 16, 1964, defendant mailed a letter to plaintiffs stating his land was no longer for sale, such letter being as follows:
"Sir:
"(s) Jerry Grover"
Defendant further pled that the alleged acceptance letter of plaintiffs dated November 12, 1964, was on terms different from those on which the land was offered and that defendant had not at any time accepted those terms; that notwithstanding plaintiffs on December 3, 1964, caused to be filed in the office of the register of deeds of Logan county an instrument entitled "Notice of Lien" wherein they recited an offer and acceptance for the sale of defendant's land, defendant's refusal to convey, and the fact that plaintiffs claim defendant's real estate; that this filing constituted a cloud on defendant's title; that plaintiffs acted fraudulently in seeking to deprive him of his real estate, causing him damage in defending his title, and he asked for equitable relief including actual damages in the sum of $275.00 and exemplary damages of $1,000.00.
In their reply plaintiffs denied they solicited a listing of defendant's real estate; they admitted they were not licensed real estate brokers or agents; they admitted sending the November 6, 1964, letter to defendant, the receipt by them of defendant's November 16, 1964, letter, and the filing of the alleged "Notice of Lien" but denied fraud on their part.
Thereafter defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings upon plaintiffs' alleged cause of action against him. The court sustained this motion, entered judgment for defendant thereon, and continued the case for trial upon defendant's counterclaim against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appeal from the entry of the aforesaid judgment on their cause of action.
Recapitulating chronologically, the pleadings reveal the following writings between the parties:
1. Plaintiffs' solicitation card (October 13, 1964)
2. Defendant's return card offer of sale
3. Plaintiffs' counter offer (November 6, 1964)
The pleadings admit the foregoing except defendant denies receiving plaintiffs' November 12th letter addressed to him. However, *143 for the purpose of defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiffs' factual allegation of the mailing and receipt by defendant of this letter must be taken as true.
At the outset it should be noted that although plaintiffs alleged an oral acceptance in their petition, they make clear in their brief and argument the fact this alleged oral acceptance of defendant's offer to sell was upon the same terms and conditions as those stated in their November 12th letter, the latter being the written confirmation of the oral acceptance. Indeed, plaintiffs state the crux of the lawsuit is the analysis and interpretation to be given that letter. Hence we treat the letter as the acceptance relied upon and the one determinative of this action, and we are not further concerned with the alleged oral acceptance.
It is elemental, of course, that in order to constitute a binding contract resulting from an offer to sell real estate, the terms of the offer must be unconditionally accepted (Spiher v. Johnson, 110 Kan. 339, 203 Pac. 696).
Plaintiffs urge that their November 12th letter constituted an unqualified acceptance of defendant's offer, creating a contract binding upon him. They argue that the mention of an abstract and place and method of payment amounted only to immaterial conditions which would not affect the validity of the acceptance. Defendant urges, and the trial court held, that these items constituted counter proposals by plaintiffs which were never accepted by defendant.
We have precedent on the subject.
In Cox v. Chalfant, 105 Kan. 127, 181 Pac. 548, the owner of land, in answer to an injuiry, wrote a letter to a real estate agent, stating: "I will sell the N.E. 1/4 ... for $2,800 net to me." Thereafter the agent on behalf of the owner attempted to enter into a written contract of sale of the land to another. The contract recited that upon delivery of an abstract to the purchaser he would pay the purchase price to a named bank as agent for both parties. Upon the owner's refusal to convey in accordance with the contract, the would-be purchaser brought suit against him for specific performance. Although there were other grounds for the decision, this court, in affirming judgment for the owner, had this to say:
*144 In the Spiher case, supra, a widow who resided in Illinois owned an undivided half interest in land in Gove county, Kansas. The plaintiff wrote her a letter of inquiry about the land stating, "I have a friend that could use it." The widow replied stating a minimum sale figure for the land. Plaintiff then sent her a telegram and a letter of instructions with a deed to himself to be signed stating he would pay the purchase price to a Gove county bank after the necessary legal steps in probate court had been completed. The widow later sold the land to another, whereupon plaintiff brought suit against her for specific performance of an alleged contract for the sale of the land. This court directed judgment for the widow, saying:
Finally, in Pope v. Pine, 131 Kan. 668, 293 Pac. 396, plaintiff's petition set up correspondence between the parties allegedly constituting a contract to sell real estate in Hamilton county, Kansas. After a preliminary exchange of negotiatory communications in *145 which there was no mention of an abstract of title or place or method of payment, the defendant landowner sent a telegram to the plaintiff buyer as follows:
Plaintiff then sent the following letter to defendant:
"April 20, 1929.
"Mrs. Nettie Pine, Waterloo, Iowa:
..............
Upon defendant's refusal to convey the real estate to plaintiff, the latter brought suit for damages for breach of contract. The lower court sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's petition. Upon appeal the same arguments were made as are made in the case at bar  that there was a complete contract and the so-called acceptance letter did not attempt to impose new terms or conditions, but merely made suggestions as to the manner of consummating the transaction. This court affirmed judgment for the defendant saying:
We think these cases are sound in principle; to follow them here will result in justice. Other cases of like import could be cited. However, those quoted from sufficiently illustrate why we conclude plaintiffs' November 12th letter was not an unqualified acceptance of defendant's offer to sell. Instead the letter introduced, to defendant's disadvantage, new terms and conditions not previously mentioned or agreed upon  the furnishing of an abstract of title and the place and method of payment  all of which were subject to further negotiation between the parties before a binding contract could be reached. Defendant withdrew his offer before it was unqualifiedly accepted; hence there was no contract.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.