Title: Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, 
and Powell, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 
 
YELP, INC. 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 140242 
JUSTICE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 
 
 
 
      April 16, 2015 
HADEED CARPET CLEANING, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Yelp, Inc. ("Yelp"), appeals from the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals affirming the order of the Circuit Court of 
the City of Alexandria holding Yelp in civil contempt for 
failing to comply with a non-party subpoena duces tecum served 
upon it by Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc. ("Hadeed").  The 
subpoena duces tecum directed Yelp, a Delaware corporation with 
its principal place of business in California, to produce 
documents located in California in connection with a defamation 
action filed by Hadeed against John Doe defendants.  Because we 
conclude the circuit court was not empowered to enforce the 
subpoena duces tecum against Yelp, we will vacate the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals and the contempt order of the circuit 
court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Yelp operates a social networking website that allows 
registered users to rate and describe their experiences with 
local businesses.  Since Yelp does not require users to provide 
their actual names, users may post reviews under pseudonyms.  
 
2 
Hadeed, a Virginia corporation doing business in Virginia, 
filed a defamation action in the circuit court against three 
John Doe defendants alleging they falsely represented 
themselves as Hadeed customers and posted negative reviews 
regarding Hadeed's carpet cleaning services on Yelp. 
 
Hadeed issued a subpoena duces tecum to Yelp, seeking 
documents revealing the identity and other information about 
the authors of the reviews.  The information provided by users 
of Yelp upon their registration and the Internet Protocol 
addresses used by registered users who post reviews are stored 
by Yelp on administrative databases accessible only by 
specified Yelp employees located in San Francisco.1 Yelp has no 
offices in Virginia. 
 
Although Yelp's headquarters are located in California, 
Yelp is registered to do business in Virginia and has 
designated a registered agent for service of process in 
Virginia.  Hadeed served the subpoena duces tecum on Yelp's 
registered agent in Virginia.  Yelp objected to an initial 
subpoena duces tecum for, among other reasons, Hadeed's failure 
                     
 
1 Specifically, Yelp's "user operations team" is tasked 
with the duty of compiling the data that comprises information 
that would identify its users.  These employees, and "[n]o 
other employees" use "specialized access to this data" to 
compile information that would identify Yelp users in response 
to supboenas for such identifying data. 
 
3 
to comply with the requirements of Code § 8.01-407.1.  Hadeed 
then issued a second subpoena duces tecum that complied with 
the procedural requirements of Code § 8.01-407.1.  That section 
sets forth the procedure that must be followed for any subpoena 
seeking information identifying a tortfeasor "[i]n civil 
proceedings where it is alleged that an anonymous individual 
has engaged in Internet communications that are tortious."  
Code § 8.01-407.1(A).2 
      After Yelp filed written objections to the subpoena duces 
tecum, Hadeed moved to overrule the objections and enforce the 
                     
 
2 Code § 8.01-407.1 was enacted following a study and 
report on the discovery of electronic data pursuant to a Joint 
Resolution of the General Assembly.  The Resolution recognized 
that "Virginia is the center of the Internet, with numerous 
multi-state and multi-national Internet businesses located in 
the Commonwealth" and that motions regarding the discovery of 
electronic data "arise out of cases pending in other states but 
are being heard in the Commonwealth solely because the Internet 
service providers. . . , which may be the custodians of such 
electronic data, are located in the Commonwealth."  S.J. Res. 
334, Va. Gen. Assem. (Reg. Sess. 2001).  In response to the 
directions embodied in the Resolution, the Office of the 
Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia issued a 
report on the disclosure of electronic information "maintained 
by electronic communications service providers in Virginia, 
particularly the legal procedure for [the] subpoena of such 
information and the application of that procedure in cases 
where litigation pending outside the Commonwealth of Virginia 
results in an application to the Virginia courts for orders 
compelling disclosure of information."  Executive Secretary of 
the Supreme Court of Virginia, Report to the Governor and 
General Assembly of Virginia: Discovery of Electronic Data, 
Senate Doc. No. 9, at 1 (2002), available at 
http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/By+Year/SD92002/$file/ 
SD9_2002.pdf (last visited April 10, 2015). 
 
4 
subpoena duces tecum.  The circuit court issued an order 
enforcing the subpoena duces tecum and subsequently holding 
Yelp in civil contempt when it refused to comply.3  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision.  Yelp, Inc. v. 
Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 62 Va. App. 678, 752 S.E.2d 554 
(2014). 
 
With specific regard to the exercise of subpoena power 
over Yelp, the circuit court and Court of Appeals ruled that 
service of the subpoena on Yelp's registered agent in Virginia 
provided the circuit court with jurisdiction to enforce the 
subpoena duces tecum.4  Id. at 709-10, 752 S.E.2d at 569. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
 Yelp contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
that "a Virginia trial court may assert subpoena jurisdiction 
over a non-party California company, to produce documents 
                     
 
3 Following the circuit court's order enforcing the 
subpoena duces tecum, Yelp informed Hadeed that in order to 
appeal the order and protect its users' rights, it would not 
comply with the Order.  Hadeed then moved to have Yelp held in 
contempt.  62 Va. App. at 687-88, 752 S.E.2d 558. 
 
4 Both the circuit court and Court of Appeals relied upon 
Code § 13.1-766(A), which states that "[t]he registered agent 
of a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in 
this Commonwealth shall be an agent of such corporation upon 
whom any process, notice, order or demand required or permitted 
by law to be served upon the corporation may be served," and  
Code § 8.01-301(1), which provides for service of process "on 
the registered agent of a foreign corporation which is 
authorized to do business in the Commonwealth." 
 
5 
located in California, just because the company has a 
registered agent in Virginia."5 
 
In determining whether the circuit court was empowered to 
enforce the subpoena duces tecum against Yelp, we first observe 
that while the General Assembly has expressly provided for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
under certain circumstances, it has not expressly provided for 
the exercise of subpoena power over nonresident non-parties.  
In particular, the General Assembly has provided for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, 
including foreign corporations, through enactment of the long-
arm statute, Code § 8.01-328.1, and has provided a range of 
options for the manner in which nonresident defendants may be 
served when "exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized by 
this chapter." Code § 8.01-329(A).6  When personal jurisdiction 
is based upon the long-arm statute, "only a cause of action 
arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted 
                     
 
5 Yelp asserts additional assignments of error in 
connection with its contention that enforcement of the subpoena 
was inconsistent with the First Amendment to the Constitution. 
In light of our holding that the circuit court lacked the 
authority to enforce the subpoena duces tecum, we need not 
reach these assignments of error. 
 
6 The General Assembly has also recognized that "[a] court 
of this State may exercise jurisdiction on any other basis 
authorized by law."  Code § 8.01-330. 
 
6 
against [the defendant]."  Code § 8.01-328.1(C).7  In contrast 
to the express provisions authorizing the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants and the manner of 
service of process on such nonresident defendants, the General 
Assembly has not expressly authorized the exercise of subpoena 
power over non-parties who do not reside in Virginia.8 
Similarly, our Rules do not recognize the existence of 
subpoena power over nonresident non-parties.  Rule 4:9A sets 
forth the procedure for issuing a subpoena duces tecum to a 
non-party.  The subpoena duces tecum may be issued by the clerk 
                     
 
7 The long-arm statute further provides that "nothing 
contained in this chapter shall limit, restrict or otherwise 
affect the jurisdiction of any court of this Commonwealth over 
foreign corporations which are subject to service of process 
pursuant to the provisions of any other statute." Code § 8.01-
328.1(C).  In this regard, Code § 8.01-301 sets forth the most 
common modes of service upon a foreign corporation depending on 
whether the foreign corporation is authorized to transact 
business in Virginia and the basis for exercising jurisdiction 
over such corporation. 
 
8 The dissent contends that Code § 8.01-301 confers upon 
the circuit courts a general subpoena power extending beyond 
Virginia because the statute lists how process may be served on 
a foreign corporation.  However, there is a fundamental 
difference between the issuance of an enforceable subpoena and 
the manner by which a subpoena may be served.  See Bellis v. 
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 257, 261-62, 402 S.E.2d 211, 214 (1991).  
Service by one of the modes prescribed by law does not make the 
subpoena served enforceable.  Service of process "cannot cure 
defects in the 'process' itself."  Lifestar Response of Md., 
Inc. v. Vegosen, 267 Va. 720, 725, 594 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2004).  
Thus, the General Assembly's authorization of a method of 
service does not make all process served by such a method 
lawful. 
 
7 
pursuant to Rule 4:9A(a)(1) or by an attorney pursuant to Rule 
4:9A(a)(2).  Rule 4:9A does not address the issuance of a 
subpoena duces tecum to persons who reside or have a principal 
place of business outside of Virginia.  Likewise, Rule 4:9A 
does not address the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for 
documents located outside of Virginia.  Rule 4:9A also does not 
address service on the non-party of the subpoena duces tecum or 
service upon a nonresident or foreign corporation.9 
The General Assembly's authorization of the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants does not 
confer upon Virginia courts subpoena power over nonresident 
non-parties.  It is axiomatic that "[t]he underlying concepts 
of personal jurisdiction and subpoena power are entirely 
different."  In re National Contract Poultry Growers' Ass'n, 
                     
9 The Rule does provide that copies of the subpoena duces 
tecum must be served pursuant to Rule 1:12 upon counsel of 
record and parties having no counsel. Rule 4:9A(a)(1) and (2). 
In addition, Rule 4:1(f) provides, in pertinent part, "that any 
notice or document required or permitted to be served under 
this Part Four shall be served as provided in Rule 1:12."  Rule 
1:12 governs service of process after the initial process of 
"[a]ll pleadings, motions and other papers not required to be 
served otherwise and requests for subpoenas duces tecum" and 
provides for service "by delivering, dispatching by commercial 
delivery service, transmitting by facsimile, delivering by 
electronic mail when Rule 1:17 so provides or when consented to 
in writing signed by the person to be served, or by mailing, a 
copy to each counsel of record on or before the day of filing." 
(Emphasis added.) 
  
 
8 
771 So.2d 466, 469 (Ala. 2000).  "Personal jurisdiction is 
based on conduct that subjects the nonresident to the power of 
the [state] courts to adjudicate its rights and obligations in 
a legal dispute."  Id.  "By contrast, the subpoena power of [a 
state] court over an individual or a corporation that is not a 
party to a lawsuit is based on the power and authority of 
the court to compel the attendance of a person at a deposition, 
or the production of documents by a person or entity."  Id.; 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. OKC Ltd. Partnership, 634 So.2d 1186, 
1187 (La. 1994) ("The concepts, and/or underlying purposes, of 
personal jurisdiction and subpoena power are simply 
different."). 
Therefore, the power to compel a nonresident non-party to 
produce documents in Virginia or appear and give testimony in 
Virginia is not based on consideration of whether the 
nonresident non-party would be subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of a Virginia court if named as a defendant in a 
hypothetical lawsuit.10  See, e.g., In re National Contract 
Poultry Growers' Ass'n, 771 So.2d at 469 ("The fact that NCPGA 
may have sufficient contacts with the State of Alabama to 
                     
 
10 While the exercise of subpoena power over nonresident 
non-parties may certainly raise Due Process considerations, the 
issue before us on appeal is whether the circuit court had 
authority to exercise subpoena power in the first instance. 
 
9 
subject it to the jurisdiction of the Alabama courts under the 
Alabama long-arm personal-jurisdiction provisions is irrelevant 
to the question [of whether it is required to respond to a 
subpoena in a lawsuit in which it is not a party]."); Colorado 
Mills, LLC v. SunOpta Grains & Foods Inc., 269 P.3d 731, 734 
(Colo. 2012) (There is no "authority applying our long-arm 
statute, or the long-arm statute of any other state for that 
matter, to enforce a civil subpoena against an out-of-state 
nonparty."); Ulloa v. CMI, Inc., 133 So.3d 914, 920 (Fla. 2013) 
("The long-arm statute does not extend the subpoena power of a 
Florida court to command the in-state attendance of a non-
resident, non-party person or entity, or compel that person or 
entity to produce documents."); Phillips Petroleum Co., 634 
So.2d at 1188 ("Whereas the long-arm statute extends 
Louisiana's personal jurisdiction over persons or legal 
entities beyond Louisiana's borders, there is no similar 
authority for extending the subpoena power of a Louisiana court 
beyond state lines to command in-state attendance of 
nonresident nonparty witnesses."); Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. 
Monsanto Co., 908 So.2d 121 (Miss. 2005) ("[A] Mississippi 
court cannot subpoena a nonresident nonparty to appear and/or 
produce in Mississippi documents which are located outside the 
State of Mississippi, even if that nonresident nonparty is 
subject in another context to the personal jurisdiction of the 
 
10 
court."); Craft v. Chopra, 907 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1995) (rejecting the assertion that "discovery of documents 
from non-resident non-parties by subpoena issued in the State 
of Oklahoma" is permitted "so long as the non-resident has 
sufficient due process 'minimum contacts' with the State of 
Oklahoma").11 
Thus, enforcement of a subpoena seeking out-of-state 
discovery is generally governed by the courts and the law of 
the state in which the witness resides or where the documents 
are located.  See, e.g., In re National Contract Poultry 
Growers' Ass'n, 771 So.2d at 469 (where documents located in 
foreign jurisdiction are sought from non-party foreign 
corporation, subpoena must issue from foreign jurisdiction and 
be served in accordance with law of foreign jurisdiction); 
Colorado Mills, LLC, 269 P.3d at 734 ("enforcing civil 
subpoenas against out-of-state nonparties is left to the state 
                     
 
11 This principle holds true even in states where the 
designation by a foreign corporation of a registered agent for 
service of process is deemed to confer personal jurisdiction 
upon the state court.  See, e.g., Ulloa v. CMI, Inc., 133 So.3d 
at 920 ("[d]esignating an agent for service of process subjects 
a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of the Florida court 
to adjudicate its rights and obligations in a legal dispute," 
but it does not confer subpoena power beyond state lines); 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 634 So.2d at 1188 (although "[a] 
principal consequence of designating an agent for service of 
process is to subject the foreign corporation to jurisdiction 
in a Louisiana court," it does not subject the corporation to 
the subpoena power of the court). 
 
11 
in which the discovery is sought").  In recognition of the 
territorial limits of subpoena power, most states have adopted 
some form of the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery 
Act ("UIDDA"), which sets forth procedures for litigants to 
pursue out-of-state discovery.12 
The Virginia General Assembly enacted the UIDDA, Code §§ 
8.01-412.8 et seq., in 2009.  The Act provides reciprocal 
mechanisms by which discovery of persons and documents in 
Virginia may be obtained in connection with actions pending in 
a foreign jurisdiction through presentment of a subpoena issued 
by the foreign jurisdiction.13  "In applying and construing this 
uniform act, consideration shall be given to the need to 
promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject 
matter among states that enact it."  Code § 8.01-412.14.  Thus, 
                     
12 See Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Interstate 
Depositions and Discovery Act, Legislative Enactment Map, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Interstate 
Depositions and Discovery Act (last visited March 9, 2015). 
 
 
13 Pursuant to Code § 8.01-412.10, a party seeking to 
conduct discovery in Virginia in aid of a lawsuit pending in 
another jurisdiction "shall submit to the clerk of court in the 
circuit in which discovery is sought to be conducted in the 
Commonwealth (i) a foreign subpoena and (ii) a written 
statement that the law of the foreign jurisdiction grants 
reciprocal privileges to citizens of the Commonwealth for 
taking discovery in the jurisdiction that issued the foreign 
subpoena." 
 
12 
[t]he privilege extended to persons in other 
states for discovery under this article shall 
only apply if the jurisdiction where the action 
is pending has extended a similar privilege to 
persons in the Commonwealth, by that 
jurisdiction's enactment of the Uniform 
Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, a 
predecessor uniform act, or another comparable 
law or rule of court providing substantially 
similar mechanisms for use by out-of-state 
parties. 
 
Id. 
 
The UIDDA, as enacted in Virginia, is the successor to the 
Uniform Foreign Depositions Act ("UFDA"), "rooted in principles 
of comity and provides a mechanism for discovery of evidence in 
aid of actions pending in foreign jurisdictions."  America 
Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Pub. Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 360, 
542 S.E.2d 377, 382 (2001) (applying UFDA).  Comity "is a 
matter of favor or courtesy, based on justice and good will. It 
is permitted from mutual interest and convenience, from a sense 
of the inconvenience which would otherwise result, and from 
moral necessity to do justice in order that justice may be done 
in return."  Id. at 361, 542 S.E.2d at 383; see also America 
Online, Inc. v. Nam Tai Elec., Inc., 264 Va. 583, 591, 571 
S.E.2d 128, 132 (2002) (applying UFDA). 
In determining the scope of subpoena power over 
nonresident non-parties, it is important to consider the policy 
underlying the General Assembly's enactment of the UIDDA.  The 
UIDDA provides a reciprocal and fair process that assists out-
 
13 
of-state litigants seeking discovery from non-parties and seeks 
to "promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject 
matter among the states that enact it."  Code § 8.01-412.14.  
The UIDDA affords protection to Virginia citizens subject to a 
subpoena from another state by providing for enforcement of the 
subpoena in Virginia.  In turn, the UIDDA contemplates that 
Virginia courts will respect the territorial limitations of 
their own subpoena power.  Such respect furthers the 
preservation of comity and uniformity among the states, which 
ultimately benefits Virginia citizens.14 
The language of the statute also manifests the intent of 
the General Assembly to respect the territorial limitations of 
out-of-state discovery.  Under the UIDDA, the place where 
"discovery is sought to be conducted" determines which circuit 
court issues and enforces a subpoena.  See Code §§ 8.01-412.10 
and -412.13.  The location of discovery also determines which 
jurisdiction's law governs a non-party's discovery obligations.  
See § 8.01-412.12.  This language indicates the General 
                     
 
14 Consistent with this policy, Rule 4:5(a1)(iii), which 
governs depositions taken in another state, requires 
enforcement matters to be pursued "by process issued and served 
in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction where the 
deposition is taken." 
 
14 
Assembly has not created two mechanisms for obtaining discovery 
from a non-party residing outside of Virginia.15 
 
In sum, we conclude that the circuit court was not 
empowered to enforce the non-party subpoena duces tecum 
directing Yelp to produce documents located in California in 
connection with Hadeed's underlying defamation action against 
the John Doe defendants in the Virginia circuit court.  The 
information sought by Hadeed is stored by Yelp in the usual 
course of its business on administrative databases within the 
custody or control of only specified Yelp employees located in 
San Francisco, and thus, beyond the reach of the circuit 
court.16  Our holding is consistent with the traditional limits 
                     
15 If the UIDDA provided additional authority for Virginia 
courts to exercise subpoena power over nonresidents, this could 
subject non-parties to greater discovery than litigants.  A 
Virginia subpoena that was quashed or limited could be "re-
litigated" under another jurisdiction's law by resorting to the 
UIDDA.  See, e.g. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code 2029.600(a). 
 
16 The dissent argues that Yelp has not proved that user 
operations team members are the only Yelp employees with access 
to the database, or that all other employees with access, if 
any, are only in San Francisco.  This argument misses the 
point.  Regardless of the number of employees who have access 
to the data comprising information that would identify Yelp 
users, such data is maintained in the regular course of Yelp's 
business by employees in California.  For this reason, we 
cannot accept the dissent's position that the concept of out-
of-state discovery is outdated in this "digital era" in which 
data is more easily accessed and disseminated in electronic 
form.  Even data that is maintained in a tangible form can be, 
and has long been, subject to reproduction and dissemination.  
Yet, corporate data, in any form, is necessarily created and 
 
15 
on subpoena power of state courts and the public policy 
established by the General Assembly through enactment of the 
UIDDA.17  Although the General Assembly has expressly authorized 
Virginia courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
nonresident parties, it has not expressly authorized Virginia 
courts to compel nonresident non-parties to produce documents 
located outside of Virginia.  Because the underlying concepts 
of personal jurisdiction and subpoena power are not the same, 
the question of whether Yelp would be subject to personal 
jurisdiction by Virginia courts as a party defendant is 
irrelevant.18  Therefore, subpoena power was not conferred upon 
                                                                 
maintained in the regular course of a corporation's business by 
designated corporate employees who are located at a place that 
is either within Virginia or out-of-state. 
 
17 Thus, our holding does not mean that a Virginia court 
could not compel in-state discovery from a non-party foreign 
corporation that maintains an office in Virginia.  This case 
presents the issue of a Virginia court's power to compel out-
of-state discovery from a non-party foreign corporation. 
 
18 The dissent proposes to subject nonresidents to the 
jurisdiction of Virginia courts even though they have not been 
sued in our courts by extending subpoena power to the limits of 
personal jurisdiction using the minimum contacts analysis.  
However, the minimum contacts analysis is premised upon the 
existence of actual litigation against a nonresident defendant.  
"Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, 
this fair warning requirement is satisfied if the defendant has 
purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, 
and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out 
of or relate to those activities."  Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)(emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 
16 
the circuit court by Yelp's act in registering to conduct 
business in Virginia or designating a registered agent for 
service of process in the Commonwealth. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals, vacate the contempt order of the circuit 
court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.19 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
 
JUSTICE MIMS, with whom JUSTICE MILLETTE joins, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
The majority opinion holds that the General Assembly has 
not provided for the exercise of “subpoena power” over non- 
                                                                 
 
The dissent also assumes an "out-of-state bank" with a 
"pervasive presence" in Virginia would be subject to general 
personal jurisdiction in our courts.  However, general personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation exists only if it is at 
"home" in the forum state.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 
746, 760-62 (2014).  A corporation is not "at home" in "every 
state in which [it] 'engages in a substantial, continuous, and 
systematic course of business.'"  Id. at 760-61. It would be an 
"exceptional case" that "a corporation's operations in a forum 
other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place 
of business [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to 
render the corporation at home in that State."  Id. at 761 
n.19. 
 
19 We will not quash the subpoena duces tecum since Hadeed 
may choose to seek enforcement of the subpoena duces tecum 
through the versions of the UIDDA enacted in California, Cal. 
Civ. Proc. Code §§ 2029.100 et seq.  See also, Delaware, Del. 
Code Ann. Tit. 10, § 4311. 
 
17 
 
 
resident non-parties.  Because the relevant statutory text is 
clear, I disagree. 
The General Assembly has said that a subpoena duces tecum 
is “process.”  Code § 1-237 (defining “process” to include a 
subpoena); Code § 8.01-2(8) (defining “subpoena” to include a 
subpoena duces tecum for the purposes of Title 8.01).  It has 
said that “[u]pon commencement of an action, process shall be 
served in the manner set forth in” Chapter 8 of Title 8.01.  
Code § 8.01-287.  Chapter 8 of Title 8.01 includes Code § 8.01-
301.  In Code § 8.01-301(1), the General Assembly provides that 
a foreign corporation may be served with process through its 
Virginia registered agent.  Nothing in the Code restricts 
service of process if the foreign corporation is a non-party or 
redefines process to exclude subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum 
if the foreign corporation is a non-party.  Finally, the 
General Assembly has said that Virginia courts may use their 
contempt power to punish any person who disobeys lawful 
process.  Code § 18.2-456(5). 
Thus, the General Assembly has provided for the exercise 
of subpoena power over a non-resident non-party, where that 
non-resident non-party is a foreign corporation with a Virginia 
resident agent (as Yelp is in this case).  The majority opinion 
 
18 
overlooks the clear statutory language.1  As far as the General 
Assembly is concerned, if a foreign corporation can be lawfully 
served with process in Virginia, Virginia courts can compel it 
to respond to discovery here.  However, for reasons I discuss 
below, state statutes are not the last word on this subject.  
Rather, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
narrows the broad authority the General Assembly has given 
Virginia courts. 
But before undertaking the constitutional analysis, some 
important observations are in order.  First, in its statement 
of facts, the majority opinion says that Yelp stores IP 
addresses in administrative databases accessible only by 
specified Yelp employees located in San Francisco.  No evidence 
supports this statement.  Rather, through an affidavit by its 
Associate Director of User Operations, Yelp says only that the 
                     
1 In footnote 8, the majority opinion correctly observes 
that valid service cannot make unlawful process lawful.  
However, the majority opinion does not explain why the process 
at issue in this case is unlawful.  Cf. Lifestar Response of 
Md., Inc. v. Vegosen, 267 Va. 720, 724, 594 S.E.2d 589, 591 
(2004) (holding that the amended motion for judgment validly 
served on the defendant was not lawful process because it did 
not include the notice required by Rule 3:3(c)). 
 
Hadeed’s subpoena duces tecum is authorized by Code § 
8.01-407.1.  Nothing in that statute, or any other, says that 
it does not apply to non-resident non-parties.  Accordingly, it 
appears that under the majority opinion, the “lawfulness” of 
process appears to turn not on whether its form and substance 
is authorized by law but on the status of the entity upon whom 
it is served. 
 
19 
user operations team has access to the database, and the user 
operations team is in San Francisco.  This does not establish 
that user operations team members are the only Yelp employees 
with access to the database, or that all other employees with 
access, if any, are only in San Francisco.2 
This misstatement of the evidence is compounded by 
footnote 17, in which the majority opinion states that the 
Court’s holding does not mean that Virginia courts cannot 
compel production in Virginia by a non-party foreign 
corporation that (unlike Yelp) has an office in Virginia.  The 
implication of this footnote is that if the record at issue is 
located in Virginia, Virginia courts can compel the non-party 
foreign corporation to produce it here.  Yet the majority 
opinion’s conclusion makes that impossible.  If the General 
Assembly has not provided for the exercise of subpoena power 
over a non-resident non-party (as the majority opinion says), 
how can Virginia courts acquire this authority based solely on 
                     
2 In footnote 1, the majority opinion correctly notes that, 
according to the affidavit, user operations team members have 
specialized access to the database and only they respond to 
subpoenas seeking that information.  However, this statement 
does not support the majority opinion’s extrapolation that only 
those employees have access to the database. 
 
Despite the majority opinion’s characterization in 
footnote 16, the issue is not whether Yelp proved that only 
employees in California have access to the database.  Rather, 
the issue is that the majority opinion states as a fact that 
only employees in California do, when that proposition is not 
supported by the record. 
 
20 
the location of the record being sought?  The majority opinion, 
which is based solely upon an interpretation of what the 
General Assembly has authorized, cites no statute for this 
proposition. 
Further, to base the courts’ power to compel production on 
the geographic location of a record is simply incompatible with 
the digital era.  The majority opinion appears to presume that 
records are still printed on paper as documents and stored in 
filing cabinets in a file room, where they can be seen and 
touched.  This practice is waning in modern interstate commerce 
and soon only nostalgic vestiges will remain, the lingering 
artifacts of an earlier age.  Now, records are more commonly 
intangible and incorporeal, stored electronically in binary 
form.  Where are such records located?  Only on the device 
where the information is created?  On any device where a copy 
can be found?  On any device that can access it remotely?  
Under the majority opinion, the answers to these questions will 
determine whether the General Assembly has authorized Virginia 
courts to exercise subpoena power.  And the questions cannot be 
answered in the abstract.  Circuit courts throughout the 
Commonwealth will be forced to grapple with them often. 
To illustrate the practical difficulty the majority 
opinion needlessly creates, one can consider a hypothetical 
case where an employer sues a former employee to recover funds 
 
21 
he embezzled by falsely endorsing a customer’s check and 
depositing it in his personal account.  The check is both drawn 
on and deposited into accounts at a national bank incorporated 
in Delaware with its principal place of business in North 
Carolina.  The bank has a registered agent, hundreds of 
branches, and thousands of employees in Virginia.  The employer 
serves a subpoena duces tecum on the bank’s Virginia registered 
agent, seeking production of the check.  The bank routinely 
scans all paid and deposited checks, stores the images 
electronically on a server located at its principal office in 
North Carolina, and destroys the physical check. 
According to the majority opinion, whether the General 
Assembly has authorized Virginia courts to compel this out-of-
state bank, a non-party foreign corporation but with pervasive 
presence in and contacts with Virginia, to produce its 
electronic record depends on where the record is located.  That 
cannot be the case, but it is the effect of the majority 
opinion’s analysis.3, 4 
                     
3 Incidentally, if an attorney wants to issue a subpoena to 
such a foreign corporation, how can he or she do so without 
first knowing where the record is located?  Issuing such a 
subpoena without sufficient knowledge that it is located in 
Virginia would be sanctionable under Code § 8.01-271.1. 
4 Contrary to the majority opinion’s assertion in footnote 
18, this dissent does not assume that Virginia would have 
personal jurisdiction over the hypothetical bank.  Rather, 
whether a Virginia court can compel the bank to produce the 
record depends on whether the bank has constitutionally 
 
22 
Second, the majority opinion states that the General 
Assembly has not authorized courts to exercise subpoena power 
over a non-resident non-party in the long-arm statute, Code § 
8.01-328.1.  However, the long-arm statute is irrelevant.  It 
neither confers nor constrains the power at issue here.  As 
noted above, the authority is provided by Code §§ 1-237, 8.01-
2(8), 8.01-287, 8.01-301, and 18.2-456(5). 
To the contrary, the long-arm statute expressly provides 
that “nothing contained in this chapter shall limit, restrict 
or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of any court of this 
Commonwealth over foreign corporations which are subject to 
service of process pursuant to the provisions of any other 
statute.”  Code § 8.01-328.1(C).  Foreign corporations with 
Virginia registered agents are subject to service of process 
under Code § 8.01-301(1).  The long-arm statute therefore does 
not deny Virginia courts jurisdiction over them, whether they 
are parties or not.  This is consistent with our previous 
holdings that by enacting the long-arm statute, the General 
Assembly intended to confer as much jurisdiction upon Virginia 
courts as constitutional due process allows.  E.g., Peninsula 
Cruise, Inc. v. New River Yacht Sales, Inc., 257 Va. 315, 319, 
                                                                 
sufficient contacts with Virginia, not whether the record is 
located here. 
 
23 
512 S.E.2d 560, 562 (1999); John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern 
Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 740, 180 S.E.2d 664, 667 (1971). 
Third, the majority opinion refers to the legislature’s 
enactment of the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery 
Act, Code §§ 8.01-412.8 to -412.15, as further support for its 
conclusion that the General Assembly has not authorized 
Virginia courts to exercise subpoena power over non-resident 
non-parties.  However, that Act only provides Virginia courts 
with additional authority.5  Nothing in it subtracts from the 
statutory authority the General Assembly has already provided 
Virginia courts in Code §§ 1-237, 8.01-2(8), 8.01-287, 8.01-
301, and 18.2-456(5).  Consequently, Virginia courts had 
authority to compel production by a non-party foreign 
corporation prior to the Act’s enactment, and that authority 
remains. 
Fourth, the majority opinion cites several decisions by 
appellate courts in other states finding that trial courts in 
those states could not enforce a subpoena against a non-
resident non-party.  However, those decisions are not relevant 
in this case because they are interpretations holding that the 
applicable state law did not provide those states’ courts with 
                     
5 Specifically, the Act supplies Virginia courts the 
statutory authority to compel a Virginia resident to produce 
information relevant to litigation pending in another state’s 
courts.  The Act has no effect on Virginia courts’ authority 
over non-residents. 
 
24 
the broad authority the General Assembly has provided Virginia 
courts in Code §§ 1-237, 8.01-2(8), 8.01-287, 8.01-301, and 
18.2-456(5). 
The majority opinion relies principally on In re National 
Contract Poultry Growers’ Ass’n, 771 So.2d 466 (Ala. 2000).  
That Alabama case involved a non-party corporation incorporated 
in Arkansas.  Its principal place of business was in Louisiana 
and it did not have an Alabama registered agent.  A party 
obtained a subpoena against the corporation and served it by 
certified mail at its Louisiana office.  The corporation did 
not respond to the subpoena and the trial court thereafter 
found it in contempt.  Id. at 466-67.  On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of Alabama reversed.  Id. at 470.  It determined that an 
Alabama statute and the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure 
permitted a subpoena to be “served at any place within the 
state.”  771 So.2d at 468-69 (quoting Ala. R. Civ. P. 
45(b)(2)).  Because the subpoena was served by certified mail 
in Louisiana, the subpoena was not served on the corporation 
within the state as Alabama law required.  Id. at 469-70. 
Similarly, Craft v. Chopra, 907 P.2d 1109 (Okla. Civ. App. 
1995), involved a plaintiff suing a doctor in Oklahoma, 
alleging that he sexually abused her while she was under 
anesthesia.  She obtained a subpoena against a Texas hospital 
for letters of recommendation pertaining to the doctor’s 
 
25 
privileges there.  There is no indication of whether the 
hospital had a registered agent in Oklahoma.  Rather, the 
subpoena was served on it by certified mail in Texas.  When the 
hospital resisted the subpoena, the trial court refused to 
enforce it and awarded the hospital damages.  Id. at 1110-11.  
On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.  It 
determined that under the Oklahoma statute, subpoenas could be 
served only within the state.  Id. (construing former Okla. 
Stat. tit. 12, § 2004.1(A)(1)(c)). 
These cases are irrelevant here because Yelp was served in 
Virginia according to Virginia law.  Code § 8.01-301(1). 
Another case cited in the majority opinion, Syngenta Crop 
Prot., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 908 So.2d 121 (Miss. 2005), 
involved three non-party corporations.  All three were 
incorporated in Delaware.  One had its principal place of 
business in North Carolina, another in Minnesota, and the last 
in Indiana.  All had Mississippi registered agents.  Id. at 
124.  The Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that a state 
statute permitted service of process on foreign corporations by 
registered or certified mail but that a rule of court required 
subpoenas to be served personally.  Id. at 127-28 (construing 
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-15.10 and Miss. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)).  
Reconciling these conflicting provisions of Mississippi law, 
the court determined that subpoenas were not process and 
 
26 
therefore could not be served on a foreign corporation through 
its registered agent.  Id. 
This case is not relevant here because a subpoena is 
process under Virginia law and can be served on a foreign 
corporation through its Virginia registered agent.  Code §§ 1-
237 and 8.01-301(1). 
Other cases cited in the majority opinion are also 
irrelevant.  Ulloa v. CMI, Inc., 133 So.3d 914 (Fla. 2013) 
involved criminal defendants charged with driving under the 
influence who sought technical data from the corporation that 
manufactured breathalyzer equipment.  The corporation was 
incorporated in Kentucky.  There is no indication of where it 
had its principal place of business, but it had a Florida 
registered agent.  Id. at 915.  The Supreme Court of Florida 
determined that the applicable Florida statute provided that 
subpoenas in criminal cases ran only within the state.  Id. at 
920-21 (construing Fla. Stat. § 914.001(1)). 
Similarly, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. OKC Ltd. P’ship, 634 
So.2d 1186 (La. 1994), involved a non-party corporation 
incorporated in Texas.  Its principal place of business was in 
Texas, but it had a Louisiana registered agent.  Id. at 1187.  
The Supreme Court of Louisiana determined that the applicable 
Louisiana statute simply did not “provide for the subpoena of a 
 
27 
nonresident witness.”  Id. at 1188 n.3 (construing La. Code 
Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1352). 
These cases are not relevant here because Virginia law 
does provide for the subpoena of a non-resident non-party, if 
that non-party is a foreign corporation with a Virginia 
registered agent that can be served with process. 
Each of these opinions also includes language (recited in 
the majority opinion in this case) rejecting the claims made by 
the parties seeking discovery that the subpoenas should be 
enforced because the courts could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the foreign corporations.  I agree with the 
majority opinion and these out-of-state cases that having 
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident non-party is not 
enough to allow a court to enforce a subpoena; there must also 
be statutory authority enabling a court to exercise that 
jurisdiction by enforcing a subpoena.  Where I part with the 
majority opinion is its conclusion that the General Assembly 
has not provided that authority here, under Virginia law. 
These flaws in the majority opinion are significant and 
problematic.  Nevertheless, it reaches the correct conclusion 
that the circuit court cannot enforce Hadeed’s subpoena duces 
tecum in this case.  However, the reasons are constitutional 
rather than statutory.  Specifically, a state court’s coercive 
judicial power is limited by the Due Process Clause of the 
 
28 
Fourteenth Amendment.  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 
U.S., ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2786-87 (2011).  This extends 
to enforcement of subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum.  Eli 
Lilly & Co. v. Gottstein, 617 F.3d 186, 192 & n.4 (2d Cir. 
2010) (collecting cases); see also United States Catholic 
Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 
76 (1988) (“[T]he subpoena power of a court cannot be more 
extensive than its jurisdiction.”). 
Hadeed argues that Virginia courts may constitutionally 
exercise personal jurisdiction over Yelp because it has a 
Virginia registered agent and therefore has consented to being 
subject to jurisdiction here.  There is historical authority 
supporting the proposition that a foreign corporation consents 
to be sued in a state when it appoints an agent for the receipt 
of process there.  E.g., Railroad Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. 65, 81 
(1871); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735 (1878); Ex parte 
Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1878); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95-96 (1917). 
However, to the extent that these cases are applicable to 
a non-party foreign corporation at all, I believe they have 
been supplanted by the contacts-based theory of personal 
jurisdiction articulated in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186, 212 (1977) (“[A]ll assertions of state-court jurisdiction 
 
29 
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in 
International Shoe and its progeny.”)  Contacts-based 
jurisdiction comes in two forms, general and specific.  Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.15 (1985).  The 
party claiming that a court may exercise jurisdiction bears the 
burden of showing a prima facie case for that claim.  ESAB 
Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 391 (4th Cir. 
2012). 
To be subject to general jurisdiction, a foreign 
corporation must have “‘continuous corporate operations within 
a state . . . so substantial and of such a nature as to justify 
suit on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from’” the activities it purposefully directs there.  
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S.Ct. 746, 761 
(2014) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318) 
(alteration and emphasis omitted).  A corporation has such 
operations in the states where it is incorporated and where it 
has its principal place of business.  Id. at 760.  A 
corporation may also be subject to general jurisdiction in 
other states, provided that the corporation’s operations there 
are “‘so continuous and systematic as to render [it] 
essentially at home’” there.  Id. at 761 & n.19 (quoting 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. ___, 
 
30 
___, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
Yelp is incorporated in Delaware.  Its principal place of 
business is in California.  Hadeed has neither alleged nor 
shown that Yelp has any corporate operations within the 
Commonwealth, much less operations that are sufficiently 
“continuous and systematic,” for the purposes of the Goodyear 
Dunlop test.  Accordingly, I cannot conclude on this record 
that Virginia courts may exercise general jurisdiction over 
Yelp. 
Specific jurisdiction assesses whether a foreign 
corporation has sufficient contacts with a state for its courts 
to constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the corporation 
based on its activity there.  Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472.  
Further, the foreign corporation’s activities must be 
“purposefully directed” at that state.  Id.  Activity is 
purposefully directed at a state if it is “such that [the 
corporation] should reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court there.”  Id. at 474.  “[R]andom, fortuitous, or 
attenuated” activity or “the unilateral activity of another 
party or a third person” is insufficient.  Id. at 475 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The limited record in this case does not establish that 
Yelp has sufficient contacts with the Commonwealth or that it 
 
31 
has purposefully directed activities here such that Virginia 
courts may exercise specific jurisdiction over it.  Neither the 
complaint nor the materials Hadeed submitted in support of the 
subpoena duces tecum alleges any such contacts or purposeful 
direction; rather, each merely states that Yelp operates a 
website with approximately 54 million unique visitors per year. 
Hadeed has not shown whether Yelp has paid subscribers or 
how many of them reside in Virginia.  It has not shown how many 
Virginians view or contribute to Yelp’s website, or that merely 
viewing or contributing to the website would amount to more 
than “the unilateral activity of . . . a third person,” which 
is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction.  Burger King, 
471 U.S. at 475.  It has not shown whether Yelp solicits 
advertising from Virginia businesses or that it has any 
contracts with Virginia residents.  Accordingly, the record 
does not include evidence from which I can conclude that Yelp 
has sufficient contacts with or has purposefully directed 
activity into Virginia so that courts here may constitutionally 
exercise specific jurisdiction over it.6 
                     
6 Hadeed also argues that under Code § 8.01-277.1, Yelp 
waived any objection to jurisdiction because it failed to make 
a special appearance.  Hadeed contends that Yelp’s written 
objections to the subpoena duces tecum are not a motion to 
quash, so they did not preserve a jurisdictional argument under 
Code § 8.01-277(A).  I disagree. 
 
Yelp has done none of the things listed as examples of 
“conduct related to adjudicating the merits of the case” in 
 
32 
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent from the 
majority opinion’s determination that the circuit court lacked 
statutory authority to enforce the subpoena duces tecum against 
Yelp.  However, I conclude that the evidence was insufficient 
to establish that the court could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over Yelp within the limits of Fourteenth 
Amendment due process.  I therefore concur in the judgment 
vacating both the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the 
contempt order of the circuit court. 
                                                                 
Code § 8.01-277.1(A).  The merits of this case involve whether 
the defendants defamed Hadeed and conspired against it in 
violation of Code § 18.2-500, as alleged in the complaint.  
Yelp’s participation in the proceedings is not related to the 
adjudication of those claims.  All Yelp has done is resist the 
enforcement of Hadeed’s subpoena duces tecum in the manner 
expressly provided by Code § 8.01-407.1(A)(4), which includes 
the filing of written objections.  Unlike conducting discovery, 
resisting discovery is not one of the means by which 
jurisdictional objections may be waived under Code § 8.01-
277.1.