Title: Maternal Grandmother v. Hamilton County Department of Job & Family Services

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Maternal Grandmother v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., Slip Opinion No. 2021-
Ohio-4096.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-4096 
MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER, ADMR., APPELLANT, 
v. 
HAMILTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Maternal Grandmother v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family 
Servs., Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4096.] 
Civil law—Civ.R. 12(C)—R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b)—Immunity for employees of 
political subdivision—When complaint invokes exception to government 
employee’s immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), notice pleading suffices 
and plaintiff may not be held to heightened pleading standard—Court of 
appeals’ judgment reversed in part and cause remanded to trial court. 
(No. 2020-0705—Submitted April 28, 2021—Decided November 23, 2021.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-180662, 2020-Ohio-1580. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to decide whether claims invoking the 
exception under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) to the immunity afforded to employees of 
a political subdivision are subject to a heightened pleading standard.  For the 
reasons that follow, we hold that they are not.  Instead, we conclude that such claims 
are subject to Ohio’s regular notice-pleading rules, and we reverse in part the 
judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} G.B. died when she was just two years old.  According to her maternal 
grandmother, appellant, Desena Bradley, G.B. was living with cruel, violent, and 
abusive parents at the time. 
{¶ 3} As a result of this tragic—and perhaps preventable—incident, 
Bradley filed suit against appellees, Hamilton County, the county’s commissioners, 
the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (“HCJFS”) 
(collectively the “county defendants”), and the individual HCJFS caseworkers 
involved in her granddaughter’s case. 
{¶ 4} In response to that complaint, the county defendants and the 
caseworkers all filed motions for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that they were 
statutorily immune from such lawsuits.  The trial court agreed with the county 
defendants and the caseworkers and granted their respective motions, dismissing 
Bradley’s claims with prejudice. 
{¶ 5} On appeal, the First District affirmed.  That decision, however, was 
not unanimous in all respects.  While the panel below agreed that the county 
defendants were entitled to immunity as a matter of law, 2020-Ohio-1580, 154 
N.E.3d 225, ¶ 16; id. at ¶ 35 (Crouse, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
there was a split over whether the claims against the caseworkers could move 
forward.  On that issue, the panel’s majority concluded that Bradley’s complaint 
contained unsupported legal conclusions and did not set forth sufficient facts to 
January Term, 2021 
 
3
show that the caseworkers’ conduct amounted to bad faith or willful, wanton, or 
reckless misconduct, such that it would overcome the presumption of immunity 
afforded to the caseworkers under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).  Id. at ¶ 29-33.  In her partial 
dissent, Judge Crouse disagreed with the other members of the panel, finding the 
complaint to be sufficient with respect to the claims against the caseworkers.  Id. at 
¶ 45 (Crouse, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
{¶ 6} Following the First District’s split decision on the immunity issue, 
Bradley appealed the First District’s judgment to this court and we accepted her 
appeal for review.  See 159 Ohio St.3d 1475, 2020-Ohio-4045, 150 N.E.3d 966. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 7} Ohio law generally provides political subdivisions and their 
employees with immunity from lawsuits and liability.  R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) and 
2744.03(A)(6).  That immunity is not absolute, however.  In fact, as relevant here, 
Ohio law permits plaintiffs to sue and hold liable employees of a political 
subdivision if the employees’ acts or omissions during the course and scope of their 
employment were wanton or reckless.  R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). 
{¶ 8} As we have stated before, though, wanton misconduct and reckless 
conduct are not synonymous with negligence, for which an employee of a political 
subdivision is immune from liability.  Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 
2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, ¶ 23.  Wanton misconduct is the “failure to 
exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in 
which there is great probability that harm will result.”  Id. at ¶ 33.  Reckless conduct 
is “the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to 
another that is unreasonable under the circumstances.”  Id. at ¶ 34.  Wanton 
misconduct and reckless conduct thus involve “something more than mere 
negligence.”  See O’Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-Ohio-2574, 889 
N.E.2d 505, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
{¶ 9} The issue here is whether that requirement—that “something more” 
than negligence be proved—results in a heightened pleading standard in a case 
involving R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b)’s exception to immunity for wanton or reckless 
behavior.  We hold that it does not. 
{¶ 10} Ohio is a notice-pleading state.  Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Horn, 142 
Ohio St.3d 416, 2015-Ohio-1484, 31 N.E.3d 637, ¶ 13.  This means that outside of 
a few specific circumstances, such as claims involving fraud or mistake, see Civ.R. 
9(B), a party will not be expected to plead a claim with particularity.  Rather, “a 
short and plain statement of the claim” will typically do.  Civ.R. 8(A). 
{¶ 11} In this context, i.e., a case in which an employee’s allegedly wanton 
or reckless behavior is at issue, these general pleading rules still apply.  See 
Civ.R 9(B) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person 
may be averred generally”).  Accordingly, we hold that when a complaint invokes 
the exception to a government employee’s immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), 
notice pleading suffices and the plaintiff may not be held to a heightened pleading 
standard or expected to plead the factual circumstances surrounding an allegation 
of wanton or reckless behavior with particularity.  Accord Parmertor v. Chardon 
Local Schools, 2016-Ohio-761, 47 N.E.3d 942, ¶ 49-51 (11th Dist.); Thompson v. 
Buckeye Joint Vocational School Dist., 2016-Ohio-2804, 55 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 31 (5th 
Dist.); see also York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-145, 573 
N.E.2d 1063 (1991). 
{¶ 12} With that in mind, we must now address whether Bradley’s 
complaint against the caseworkers involved in her granddaughter’s case was 
sufficient to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
{¶ 13} Our review of a lower court’s decision granting judgment on the 
pleadings under Civ.R.12(C) is de novo.  New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
v. Buehrer Group Architecture & Eng., Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 164, 2019-Ohio-2851, 
133 N.E.3d 482, ¶ 8.  “Dismissal is appropriate under Civ.R. 12(C) when (1) the 
January Term, 2021 
 
5
court construes as true, and in favor of the nonmoving party, the material allegations 
in the complaint and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those allegations 
and (2) it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would 
entitle him or her to relief.”  Reister v. Gardner, 164 Ohio St.3d 546, 2020-Ohio-
5484, 174 N.E.3d 713, ¶ 17, citing State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 
75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). 
{¶ 14} In her complaint, which asserts claims for wrongful death and 
survivorship, Bradley alleges that the caseworkers involved in G.B.’s case 
performed their duties in a wanton or reckless manner.  She also alleges that the 
caseworkers ignored G.B.’s mother’s history of abusing her other children, failed 
to properly investigate a report of neglect or abuse of G.B. from the doctors and 
staff at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center, and overlooked what were 
or should have been clear signs of abuse during a home visit that occurred less than 
a month before G.B.’s death.  In other words, Bradley’s complaint essentially 
alleges that the caseworkers disregarded or were indifferent to a known or obvious 
risk of harm to G.B. that was unreasonable under the circumstances.  See Anderson, 
134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, at ¶ 34. 
{¶ 15} Consequently, while Bradley’s complaint could perhaps have been 
more clearly written, we conclude that it did all that was required at the pleading 
stage by putting the caseworkers on notice of the claims against them and raising 
the possibility that the exception to their statutory immunity under R.C. 
27044.03(A)(6)(b) might apply.  Given that determination and our inability to say 
at this juncture that there is no set of facts that would entitle Bradley to relief after 
taking the material allegations in her complaint as true, see Reister at ¶ 17, 
judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate and the case against the caseworkers 
should proceed on remand. 
{¶ 16} On remand, of course, nothing in this decision should be construed 
as passing judgment on the merits of this case.  In order to prevail, Bradley will still 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
need to prove her claims and demonstrate that the caseworkers’ conduct really was 
wanton or reckless.  See, e.g., O’Toole, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-Ohio-2574, 889 
N.E.2d 505, at ¶ 75; Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 
356, 639 N.E.2d 31 (1994).  Our decision today simply clarifies that Ohio law does 
not put Bradley or similar plaintiffs to that burden at the pleading stage.  York, 60 
Ohio St.3d at 144-145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (“a plaintiff is not required to prove his or 
her case at the pleading stage”). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 17} For the reasons stated above, we hold that when a complaint invokes 
an exception to a government employee’s immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), 
notice pleading suffices and the plaintiff may not be held to a heightened pleading 
standard.  Because the complaint in this case meets the applicable notice-pleading 
standard, we reverse the First District’s judgment in part and remand this matter to 
the trial court for further proceedings. 
Judgment reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by 
KENNEDY, J. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 18} I agree with the majority that under Ohio’s notice-pleading standard, 
the complaint contains sufficient allegations to survive a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings.  I write separately to offer a more complete discussion of Ohio’s 
pleading standard. 
The Question Before Us 
{¶ 19} The majority frames the issue before us as whether claims invoking 
the statutory exception “to the immunity afforded to employees of a political 
January Term, 2021 
 
7
subdivision are subject to a heightened pleading standard?”  Majority opinion at  
¶ 1.  But this is something of a straw man.  The First District Court of Appeals did 
not apply a heightened pleading standard.  See 2020-Ohio-1580, 154 N.E.3d 225, 
¶ 11.  And the caseworkers who are defendants in this action have always asserted 
that they are entitled to judgment in their favor based on Ohio’s notice-pleading 
standard.  The idea of a heightened pleading standard arises only because the 
plaintiff, in seeking review by this court, presented a proposition of law suggesting 
that the court of appeals erred by applying a heightened pleading standard. 
{¶ 20} Because the court of appeals did not apply a heightened pleading 
standard, and because no one advocated for one below, the issue of a heightened 
pleading standard is not before us.  The question we must answer is whether the 
court of appeals erred in concluding that under Ohio’s existing pleading standard, 
Desena Bradley failed to state a claim against the caseworkers. 
Ohio’s Notice-Pleading Standard 
{¶ 21} Civ.R. 8(A) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief.”  Typically 
referred to as “notice pleading,” this standard does not require a plaintiff to prove 
her case at the pleading stage, but merely requires factual allegations that if proved 
would entitle the plaintiff to relief.  Illinois Controls, Inc. v. Langham, 70 Ohio 
St.3d 512, 526, 639 N.E.2d 771 (1994).  In applying this standard, we credit all 
factual allegations in the complaint and give the nonmoving party all reasonable 
inferences.  See Sherman v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 163 Ohio St.3d 258, 
2020-Ohio-4960, 169 N.E.3d 602, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 22} We “incorporate[d]” the notice-pleading standard from the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure as our own.  See York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio 
St.3d 143, 144, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991).  We have often recited that standard by 
quoting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 
41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957): to dismiss a complaint at the pleading 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
stage, it must appear “ ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ”  York at 144, quoting 
Conley at 45.  The majority employs that formulation today. 
{¶ 23} Although the “no set of facts” language is often parroted, it has not 
been strictly applied by this court or other courts in this state.  Such a formulation 
is in tension with Civ.R. 8’s requirement of a statement “showing that the party is 
entitled to relief.”  Indeed, if “no set of facts” were truly the standard, even the most 
cursory complaint could survive dismissal. 
{¶ 24} Imagine a complaint that reads simply: “Jones committed a tort 
against plaintiff.”  Certainly some “set of facts” could establish this bare claim as 
actionable, but such a claim would not provide notice to the defendant and would 
surely be subject to dismissal.  For this reason, this court has often sanctioned 
dismissal of a complaint in circumstances in which one would be hard-pressed to 
call it “beyond doubt” that the plaintiff could not ultimately establish facts to make 
a colorable claim.  See, e.g., Estate of Ridley v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental 
Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 102 Ohio St.3d 230, 2004-Ohio-2629, 809 
N.E.2d 2, ¶ 16, 29 (affirming the dismissal of a wrongful-death claim because the 
complaint failed to allege sufficient facts establishing the defendant’s awareness of 
likely harm). 
{¶ 25} Over a decade ago, the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
this “no set of facts” standard was being routinely misapplied.  See Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).  As 
the court explained, under a “literal” reading, the “no set of facts” formulation 
would allow “a wholly conclusory statement [to survive dismissal] whenever the 
pleadings left open the possibility” that a plaintiff might discover something 
supporting recovery.  Id. at 561.  For this reason, “a good many judges and 
commentators” had balked at applying the literal terms of the passage.  Id. at 562-
563 (citing cases and commentaries). 
January Term, 2021 
 
9
{¶ 26} The Twombly court explained that the conventional understanding 
of the “no set of facts” standard took the language in Conley out of context.  
Twombly at 562-563.  It was more appropriate to understand that language “in light 
of the opinion’s preceding summary of the complaint’s concrete allegations, which 
the Court quite reasonably understood as amply stating a claim for relief.”  Id.  
Nonetheless, “after puzzling the [legal] profession for 50 years,” the Court 
concluded that the phrase had “been questioned, criticized and explained away long 
enough.”  Id.  Having “earned its retirement,” the Conley phrase was discarded by 
the United States Supreme Court.  Twombly at 563.  We should consign the phrase 
to a similar fate in Ohio jurisprudence. 
{¶ 27} In addition to explaining that the “no set of facts” formulation had 
been misunderstood, the Twombly court discussed the appropriate standard for 
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint.  A complaint does not “need detailed 
factual allegations,” but there must be more than “labels and conclusions” or “a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”  Id. at 555.  “Factual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  
Id.  Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need not engage in “heightened 
fact pleading of specifics, but [must supply] enough facts to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”  Id. at 570.  “A claim has facial plausibility,” the court 
later elaborated, “when the plaintiff pleads factual content” that presents “more than 
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). 
{¶ 28} In the years since Twombly and Iqbal were decided, this court has 
never addressed the question whether we should apply a similar plausibility 
standard for complaints.  There are good reasons that we might want to do so, but 
because this case does not squarely present the issue, our consideration must await 
another day. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
{¶ 29} Although we have not explicitly addressed Twombly and Iqbal, we 
have long followed the principle articulated in those cases that labels and bare legal 
conclusions in a complaint are insufficient.  We have made clear that unsupported 
legal conclusions are not entitled to any presumption of truth and are not sufficient 
to survive a motion to dismiss.  See, e.g., Schulman v. Cleveland, 30 Ohio St.2d 
196, 198, 283 N.E.2d 175 (1972); Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 
193, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988); State ex rel. Hickman v. Capots, 45 Ohio St.3d 324, 
544 N.E.2d 639 (1989); State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State, 146 Ohio 
St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 39.  Similarly, Ohio courts have made 
clear that mere speculation, unsupported by operative facts, is not enough to state a 
claim.  See, e.g., Sacksteder v. Senney, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24993, 2012-
Ohio-4452, ¶ 45  (“we have never construed Civ.R. 12(B)(6) as permitting either 
speculation or complaints that are devoid of factual allegations supporting the legal 
claims”). 
{¶ 30} I now turn to the application of Ohio’s pleading standard to 
Bradley’s complaint. 
Bradley’s Complaint Alleges Sufficient Facts to State a Claim 
{¶ 31} Under Ohio’s notice-pleading standard, Bradley needed to allege 
sufficient facts that if taken as true, and with all reasonable inferences in her favor, 
would allow for recovery.  Because the caseworkers could be held liable only if 
their conduct was wanton or reckless, Bradley had to present factual allegations 
supporting at least an inference of recklessness.  See R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). 
{¶ 32} Much of Bradley’s complaint consisted of bare legal conclusions.  
For example, Bradley asserted that the caseworkers “breached their duty to protect” 
G.B. “from harm and to act in her best interest.”  Similarly, Bradley alleged that 
the caseworkers “engaged in reckless misconduct, willful misconduct and wanton 
misconduct, which resulted in the death of the infant child.”  She also asserted that 
in December 2013 the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services 
January Term, 2021 
 
11 
ended protective supervision of G.B. and that “these actions were done in bad faith, 
in a wanton and willful manner, and resulted in the deprivation of the civil rights 
of the infant, * * * and ultimately in her wrongful death.”  Allegations of this sort, 
which are mere legal conclusions, do not suffice.  See Schulman, 30 Ohio St.2d at 
198, 283 N.E.2d 175. 
{¶ 33} But I find one aspect of Bradley’s amended complaint that passes 
muster. Bradley alleges the following facts: that G.B. was admitted to the hospital 
in December 2014 with significant indicia of abuse, including severe 
undernourishment and a host of other problems, and that the caseworkers were 
notified of the possible abuse and called to the hospital to meet with G.B.’s parents.  
“Allegedly,” the department of job and family services made a follow-up visit to 
G.B.’s home on March 4, 2015, and found that everything was fine and that G.B. 
was healthy and happy.  Three weeks later, the two-year-old girl was found dead.  
The coroner’s report identified over 100 injuries, including a hand-stitched gash on 
G.B.’s forehead and other abrasions.  The two-year-old girl weighed only 13 
pounds when she died.  According to the coroner, the cause of death was “Battered 
Child Syndrome with Acute Chronic Intercranial Hemorrhages and Starvation,” 
and the onset of the injuries was “months” before.  The coroner opined that G.B. 
had been abused “her entire pathetic, pathetically short life.” 
{¶ 34} Drawing reasonable inferences in favor of Bradley and accepting her 
pleaded facts as true, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief.  If 
G.B.’s injuries at the time of her death were as pervasive and severe as alleged, one 
can draw an inference that the injuries should have been noticeable to the 
caseworkers at the home-visit three weeks earlier.  And if the injuries would have 
been evident, the most reasonable inferences are either (1) that no home-visit was 
conducted or (2) that the home-visit was inadequate.  Given the caseworkers’ 
awareness of the prior abuse, and with the benefit of discovery, Bradley might be 
able to establish that the caseworkers were reckless in failing to adequately 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
investigate G.B.’s situation after she was discharged from the hospital.  (Of course, 
it is the factfinder’s province to assess the merits of Bradley’s cause of action, and 
nothing said here should be taken as commentary on whether Bradley will 
ultimately be able to prove her claim.) 
{¶ 35} For the reasons that I have explained, I concur only in the majority’s 
judgment reversing the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Rachel S. Bloomekatz; and Robinson Law Firm, L.L.C., and Emmett E. 
Robinson, for appellant, individually and as the administrator of the estate of G.B., 
a deceased minor. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela J. 
Sears and Michael G. Florez, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee Lumadi 
Lavusa. 
 
Laufman & Napolitano, L.L.C., and Paul M. Laufman; and Michael L. 
Tranter, for appellee Shamara Stephens, a.k.a. Shamara Hooks-Ware. 
 
Stephen J. Wenke, for appellee Kassie Setty. 
The Gittes Law Group and Jeffrey P. Vardaro; and Marcia Lowry, Allison 
Mahoney, and Tavi Unger, urging reversal for amicus curiae A Better Childhood. 
Kimberly Payne Jordan, urging reversal for amicus curiae Justice for 
Children Clinic. 
_________________