Title: Haddock v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

298 N.E.2d 418 (1973)
Ottis R. HADDOCK, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 1172S153.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
July 10, 1973.
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender of Ind., Carr L. Darden, Sr., Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Colker, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
HUNTER, Justice.
This is an appeal from final judgment on a petition for postconviction relief denying defendant-appellant a new trial. Appellant was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment on March 12, 1964. His conviction was affirmed by this Court in Haddock v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 669, 207 N.E.2d 813. On January 3, 1972, appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. His motion to correct errors was overruled on August 16, 1972. From the overruling of his motion to correct errors, appellant instituted this appeal.
In his petition for post-conviction relief, appellant alleged that he had been denied a fair and impartial trial. He bases this conclusion from the following claimed errors:
(1) That he was denied competent counsel in that his attorney conferred with him only twice prior to trial.
(2) That he was denied the opportunity to fully present his view of the facts at the former trial.
Post-Conviction Remedy Rule No. 1, § 5, provides that the "petitioner has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." The trial court ruled that appellant failed to sustain this burden of proof at the post-conviction relief hearing. The evidence presented by appellant at the post-conviction relief hearing consisted of his testimony that his trial counsel conferred with him only twice prior to trial. He further testified that the trial judge at the original trial precluded him from telling the whole story in his own words. In response to *419 this testimony, the State presented appellant's former trial attorney, who testified in part as follows:
There is a presumption that the trial counsel appointed or accepted by the trial court is competent. Kelly v. State (1972), Ind., 287 N.E.2d 872. This presumption can be overcome only by a showing that the attorney's actions, or inactions, made the proceedings a mockery and shocking to the conscience of the court. Robbins v. State (1971), Ind., 274 N.E.2d 255. The trial court was entitled to disbelieve appellant's testimony and to accept the testimony of his trial counsel. Harrison v. State (1973), Ind. App., 292 N.E.2d 612. We disagree with appellant's contention that he carried his burden of proof at the post-conviction relief hearing on the issue of his trial counsel's incompetency and on the question of his alleged curtailed testimony.
The appellant is raising here for the first time the question of the competency of the State's prosecuting witness. He contends that the trial court erred in his original trial by allowing the victim of the rape, an eleven-year-old girl, to testify without first undergoing a psychiatric examination. This issue was not raised in the original appeal of his case. It was not mentioned at the post-conviction relief hearing, nor raised in appellant's motion to correct errors. We refer appellant to Lipps v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 141, 145, 258 N.E.2d 622, 625, where this Court said:
In referring to the above quote, we do not mean to cast aspersions upon appellate counsel. They have presented a clear and well-written brief to this Court. However, our Rules of Appellate Procedure must be followed in order to properly insure an orderly system of appeal and review.
We find no error in the post-conviction relief hearing. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.