Title: Commonwealth v. Fleury

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC–13148 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EDWARD FLEURY. 
 
 
 
Hampshire.     December 8, 2021. - March 31, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Firearms.  Evidence, Firearm.  Search and Seizure, Return.  
Forfeiture Proceeding.  Statute, Construction.  Words, 
"Store," "Keep." 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 16, 2014. 
 
A motion for return of property, filed on September 1, 
2020, was considered by John A. Agostini, J., and a motion for 
reconsideration was heard by him. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Thomas E. Robinson for the defendant. 
Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  This case presents the question whether 
firearms found to be improperly secured, according to the 
requirements of G. L. c. 140, § 131L, are subject to forfeiture 
2 
 
under G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b), which regulates the disposal of 
certain firearms seized during the execution of a search 
warrant.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that they are 
not.  Accordingly, the Superior Court judge's order allowing the 
forfeiture must be vacated and set aside. 
 
1.  Background.  The facts are undisputed; in reciting 
them, we reserve some details for further discussion.  In 2014, 
Edward Fleury, a former chief of police and firearms instructor, 
was charged with assault by means of a dangerous weapon 
following an altercation with a friend.  Police obtained a 
search warrant to search Fleury's home for the firearm allegedly 
used in the altercation.  During the search, officers found that 
some of the firearms in Fleury's extensive collection, which 
featured over 240 firearms, appeared to be improperly secured, 
in violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131L.  Fleury subsequently was 
indicted on twenty-seven counts of improperly securing a 
firearm, one count for each gun the Commonwealth alleged had 
been secured improperly. 
 
The indictments were divided into two groups, and the 
Commonwealth proceeded against Fleury at two separate trials. 
Fleury ultimately was acquitted of the assault and of fifteen of 
the twenty-seven counts of improperly securing a firearm.  He 
was convicted of the twelve charges relating to the other twelve 
firearms, each of which was a "large capacity" firearm within 
3 
 
the meaning of G. L. c. 140, § 121, which provides definitions 
for key terms used throughout G. L. c. 140, §§ 122 to 131Y.1 
 
After Fleury had exhausted all avenues of appellate review 
of his convictions,2 he moved under Rule 61 of the Rules of the 
Superior Court3 for the return of all twenty-seven of the seized 
firearms to a person designated to sell them on his behalf.  A 
designee was necessary because, due to his convictions, Fleury 
is no longer authorized to possess a firearm or to permit the 
storage of a firearm in his home, see discussion, infra.   
 
The Commonwealth agreed to return the firearms seized 
during the execution of the search warrant, except for the 
twelve that had been found to have been improperly secured in 
violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131L.  In reaching this position, 
the Commonwealth relied on the view that G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b), 
 
1 A "large capacity weapon" is "any firearm, rifle or 
shotgun:  (i) that is semiautomatic with a fixed large capacity 
feeding device; (ii) that is semiautomatic and capable of 
accepting, or readily modifiable to accept, any detachable large 
capacity feeding device; (iii) that employs a rotating cylinder 
capable of accepting more than ten rounds of ammunition in a 
rifle or firearm and more than five shotgun shells in the case 
of a shotgun or firearm; or (iv) that is an assault weapon."  
G. L. c. 140, § 121.  
 
 
2 See Commonwealth v. Fleury, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1123 (2020), 
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2517 (2021). 
 
 
3 Rule 61 provides that "[m]otions for the return of 
property . . . shall be in writing, shall specifically set forth 
the facts upon which the motions are based, shall be verified by 
affidavit, and shall otherwise comply with the requirements of 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 13." 
4 
 
which pertains to certain weapons seized during the execution of 
a search warrant, covers firearms that are not stored according 
to the requirements of G. L. c. 140, § 131L.  A Superior Court 
judge agreed with the Commonwealth and ordered that the twelve 
firearms be forfeited and destroyed.  The judge also denied 
Fleury's motion for reconsideration.  Fleury appealed, and we 
transferred this case from the Appeals Court on our own motion. 
 
2.  Statutory overview.  The issue here hinges on the 
relationship between the forfeiture statute, G. L. c. 276, § 3, 
and the storage statute, G. L. c. 140, § 131L. 
 
The forfeiture statute contains guidance for the forfeiture 
of property seized during the execution of a search warrant.  A 
version of the statute first was enacted in 1836, see R.S. 1836, 
c. 142, § 5; after more modest amendments, the statute was 
substantially amended in 1964, to a form very similar to the 
language that remains today, see St. 1964, c. 557, §§ 1-4.  The 
statute last was amended in 1996, when the Legislature modified 
subsection G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b), in a manner not relevant to 
this case.  See St. 1996, c. 151, § 497.  General Laws c. 276, 
§ 3 (b), provides: 
"Rifles, shotguns, pistols, knives or other dangerous 
weapons which have been found to have been kept, concealed 
or used unlawfully or for an unlawful purpose shall be 
forfeited to the commonwealth and delivered forthwith to 
the colonel of the state police for destruction or 
preservation in the discretion of the colonel of the state 
police" (emphasis added). 
5 
 
 
 
The storage statute was enacted in 1998, two years after 
the forfeiture statute was last amended.  See St. 1998, 
c. 180, § 47.  General Laws c. 140, § 131L (a), states: 
"It shall be unlawful to store or keep any firearm, rifle 
or shotgun including, but not limited to, large capacity 
weapons, or machine gun in any place unless such weapon is 
secured in a locked container or equipped with a tamper-
resistant mechanical lock or other safety device, properly 
engaged so as to render such weapon inoperable by any 
person other than the owner or other lawfully authorized 
user. . . .  For purposes of this section, such weapon 
shall not be deemed stored or kept if carried by or under 
the control of the owner or other lawfully authorized 
user."  (Emphases added.) 
 
 
3.  Discussion.  In the Commonwealth's view, the twelve 
firearms that were found to have been improperly secured, in 
violation of G. L. c. 140, § 131L, are covered by the provision 
of G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b), mandating forfeiture of firearms 
"found to have been kept . . . unlawfully."  Fleury argues, by 
contrast, that the forfeiture statute is applicable only to 
firearms that were possessed or used unlawfully, and not, like 
the storage statute, to firearms lawfully possessed but 
unlawfully stored.4  The question before us, then, is whether the 
Legislature intended that firearms found to be improperly 
 
4 The Commonwealth does not allege that Fleury unlawfully 
"used" or "concealed" his firearms, and therefore those 
provisions of the forfeiture statute have no bearing on this 
case. 
 
6 
 
secured under the storage statute be subject to forfeiture under 
the forfeiture statute. 
 
a.  Standards of review.  As with all questions of 
statutory interpretation, we exercise de novo review.5  See 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department 
of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 285-286 (2017). 
 
"[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of 
the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in 
connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be 
effectuated" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 
Mass. 365, 368 (2013).  "If the language is clear and 
unambiguous, we 'must give effect to its plain and ordinary 
meaning and . . . need not look beyond the words.'"  Shaw's 
Supermkts., Inc. v. Melendez, 488 Mass. 338, 341 (2021), quoting 
Doherty v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 486 Mass. 487, 491 (2020).   
 
 
5 Fleury argues that the Appeals Court's decision in 
Commonwealth v. Salmons, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 61 (2019), entitles 
him to a "strong presumption that [he] is entitled to the return 
of his property."  Salmons, however, is inapplicable to this 
case.  There, the property in question was unlawfully seized 
during a warrantless search, and accordingly was not subject to 
G. L. c. 276, § 3.  This distinction, between "lawful seizure of 
property pursuant to a warrant" and property "unlawfully seized 
without a warrant," was made explicitly by the Appeals Court in 
its decision.  See Salmons, supra at 68.   
7 
 
 
Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, however, we 
may seek guidance from "extrinsic sources, including the 
legislative history and other statutes, for assistance in our 
interpretation."  Chandler v. County Comm'rs of Nantucket 
County, 437 Mass. 430, 435 (2002).  We interpret statutes "not 
alone according to their simple, literal or strict verbal 
meaning, but in connection with their development, their 
progression through the legislative body, the history of the 
times, [and] prior legislation" (citation omitted).  
Guardianship of B.V.G., 474 Mass. 315, 321 (2016). 
 
Here, the plain language of the contested provisions is 
ambiguous regarding the statutes' relationship to each other.  A 
thorough examination of both statutes in their entirety, 
however, convinces us that the Legislature did not intend to 
make improperly secured firearms subject to automatic forfeiture 
under G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b). 
 
b.  Plain language.  At first glance, the plain language of 
the forfeiture statute would seem to encompass improper storage 
of a firearm.  The statute authorizes forfeiture of firearms 
"found to have been kept . . . unlawfully," G. L. c. 276, 
§ 3 (b), and the storage statute punishes those who have "stored 
or kept" a firearm without also taking specific security 
measures, G. L. c. 140, § 131L (a).  Both statutes, therefore, 
refer to firearms "kept" unlawfully (although only the storage 
8 
 
statute contains the word "store").  In this view, by their 
plain language, the storage and forfeiture statutes could be 
interpreted to encompass each other.  
 
Closer examination, however, complicates the analysis. 
Neither statute defines "store" or "keep," or their various 
tenses.  When a term is left undefined in a statute, "we give 
the term its 'usual and accepted meaning,' as long as it is 
'consistent with the statutory purpose'" (citation omitted).  
Curtatone v. Barstool Sports, Inc., 487 Mass. 655, 658 (2021).  
"We derive the words' usual and accepted meanings from sources 
presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in 
other legal contexts and dictionary definitions" (citation 
omitted).  Id. 
 
The common definitions of each word reveal significant 
overlap and suggest a critical point of departure -- namely, 
that "store" connotes the placement of an object at a greater 
distance from the owner, and suggests future, rather than 
immediate, use.  For instance, Webster's Dictionary defines 
"store" (among other definitions) as "to deposit in a 
storehouse, warehouse, or other place for keeping;" "to supply 
or stock with something, as for future use;" and "to accumulate 
or put away, for future use (usually [followed] by up or away)."  
Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 1877 (2003).  
"Keep" is defined as "to hold in a given place; store" or to 
9 
 
"retain in one's possession; hold as one's own."  Id. at 1048.   
Black's Law Dictionary defines "store" as "[t]o keep (goods, 
etc[.]) in safekeeping for future delivery in an unchanged 
condition."  Black's Law Dictionary 1717 (10th ed. 2014).  In a 
similar vein, the American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language notes that to store an object means "[t]o reserve or 
put away for future use," or "[t]o deposit or receive in a 
storehouse or warehouse for safekeeping."  American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 1708 (2006). 
 
Accordingly, these definitions suggest that the words 
"store" and "keep" are closely related, but meaningfully 
different.  Many definitions of one of these words reference the 
other, even while suggesting temporal and spatial differences 
between an owner's proximity to objects that are "stored" and 
objects that are "kept."  The line between the two, however, 
undoubtedly is blurry, and the plain language of the storage 
statute provides little guidance in discerning it.  Indeed, all 
of the explicit substantive guidance in the statute pertains to 
a different word, "secured."   
 
The storage statute makes it a crime to "store or keep" any 
gun that is not "secured."  Under G. L. c. 140, § 131L (a), a 
gun is "secured" if it is locked up or equipped with a safety 
device that makes it "inoperable by any person other than the 
owner or other lawfully authorized user."  The statute also 
10 
 
provides that a "weapon shall not be deemed stored or kept if 
carried by or under the control of the owner or other lawfully 
authorized user."  Id.  Nothing in these provisions, however, 
speaks to the difference between the words "store" and "keep," 
or makes any further distinction regarding a firearm's distance 
from its owner or lawfully authorized user.  
 
An examination of the record only makes the analysis more 
difficult.  According to the inventory compiled by police after 
their search of Fleury's home, eleven of the twelve guns at 
issue were found in the attic.  The twelfth was found in "Closet 
3B," but the record is silent about that closet's placement 
within Fleury's home.  Under the ordinary definitions of the 
words, discussed supra, guns placed in the attic may best be 
understood as far enough away from their owner to be considered 
"stored" and not "kept."  But it is just as plausible that an 
object placed anywhere in one's home might be considered close 
enough to its owner to best be deemed "kept," rather than 
"stored."  Thus, the plain language of the statute does not 
provide conclusive guidance regarding whether the twelve guns in 
question were "stored" or "kept" (or both) in violation of G. L. 
c. 140, § 131L.  "Where, as here, the statutory language is 
ambiguous or 'faulty or lacks precision, it is our duty to give 
the statute a reasonable construction.'"  Matter of E.C., 479 
11 
 
Mass. 113, 118 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 
Mass. 507, 511 (2012). 
 
The Commonwealth asks us to resolve this issue by focusing 
exclusively on the similarities between the words "store" and 
"keep," and disregarding the differences.  It posits that, in 
the storage statute, the words "store" and "keep" are 
"synonymous" and should be treated as "functional equivalents."  
For the Commonwealth, this synonymity is crucial, because it 
removes any ambiguity created by the fact that, while the 
storage statute uses both "stored" and "kept," the forfeiture 
statute uses only the word "kept," and makes no mention of 
objects that were "stored." 
 
We cannot accept the Commonwealth's suggestion that we 
treat both words as one.  First, the suggestion disregards what 
appear to be meaningful differences in the definitions of 
"store" and "keep."  See discussion, infra.  Second, adopting 
the Commonwealth's construction would violate the fundamental 
and long-standing principle of statutory interpretation "that we 
must strive to give effect to each word of a statute so that no 
part will be inoperative or superfluous."  Ciani v. MacGrath, 
481 Mass. 174, 179 (2019).  See, e.g., Matter of a Civil 
Investigative Demand Addressed to Yankee Milk, Inc., 372 Mass. 
353, 358 (1977) (rejecting interpretation that "would controvert 
the established principle of statutory construction that every 
12 
 
word in a statute should be given meaning"); Commonwealth v. 
Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 
617, 618 (1967) (noting "well established principle of statutory 
interpretation that '[n]one of the words of a statute is to be 
regarded as superfluous, but each is to be given its ordinary 
meaning without overemphasizing its effect upon the other terms 
appearing in the statute'" [citation omitted]).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Daley, 463 Mass. 620, 623-624 (2012) (rejecting 
interpretation that would have rendered one word superfluous). 
 
"We presume that the Legislature enacts legislation with 
'an aware[ness] of the prior state of the law as explicated by 
the decisions of this court'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 646 (2013).  If, therefore, the 
Legislature had intended "store" and "keep" to mean the same 
thing, there would have been no reason for it to have included 
both words in the statutory text, and it would not have done so. 
 
The Commonwealth acknowledges this bedrock principle of 
statutory construction, but argues that, here, it may be 
overcome by way of an exception for superfluous language that 
exists to allow a statute to "be read harmoniously with existing 
statutes."  The Commonwealth, however, points to nothing that 
suggests that the Legislature intended the "store or keep" 
provision in the storage statute to function in such a manner.  
Indeed, the Commonwealth does not mention any case establishing 
13 
 
its purported exception, and we are unaware of any.  
Accordingly, we decline to adopt the Commonwealth's proposed 
exception to our long-standing presumption against construing 
any word in a statute as superfluous.  
 
Consistent with our long-standing principles, therefore, 
the words "store" and "keep" in the storage statute refer to 
distinct, if undeniably related, actions.  This, in turn, 
necessarily implies that some conduct covered by one word is not 
covered by the other.  In order for the statutory text to be 
dispositive about the relationship between "stored or kept" in 
the storage statute, and "kept" in the forfeiture statute, then, 
the storage statute would have to delineate the places in which 
"store" and "keep" do not overlap.  Because the text does not do 
so, the plain language of G. L. c. 140, § 131L, is ambiguous as 
to its relationship to G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b).6  Thus, we turn to 
 
6 While of course not dispositive, we note that, throughout 
these proceedings, both the parties and the lower court often 
have used language consistent with the view that Fleury's 
convictions were for "stor[ing]" his firearms improperly.  In an 
unpublished opinion upholding Fleury's convictions under G. L. 
c. 140, § 131L, the Appeals Court characterized the charges as 
pertaining to "improper storage" and "firearms [that] were 
improperly stored."  Similarly, in denying Fleury's motion for 
the return of property, a judge of the Superior Court 
characterized the twelve firearms in question as having been 
"deemed to be illegally stored."  In its renewed motion opposing 
the return of those twelve firearms, the Commonwealth described 
Fleury as having been "convicted of twelve of the felony counts 
of improper storage of large capacity rifles/handguns"; in a 
different, related motion, the Commonwealth alleged that "the 
defendant knowingly improperly stored firearms."  Moreover, 
14 
 
consideration of the structure of both the forfeiture statute 
and the storage statute in their entirety, and the relationships 
between their various parts.  See Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 
553, 557 (2020) ("We look at the statute in its entirety when 
determining how a single section should be construed"); 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 482 Mass. 366, 369 (2019), citing 2A 
N.J. Singer & S. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 
§ 46:5 (7th ed. rev. 2014) ("We do not confine our 
interpretation to the words of a single section" [citation 
omitted]). 
 
c.  Structure.  "[A] statute must be interpreted 'as a 
whole'; it is improper to confine interpretation to the single 
section to be construed" (citation omitted).  Chin v. Merriot, 
470 Mass. 527, 532 (2015).   
 
i.  The forfeiture statute.  General Laws c. 276, § 3, sets 
forth the baseline procedures for handling property seized 
during the execution of search warrants, and then details, in 
four subsections, exceptions to those procedures.  The statute 
begins by establishing that, aside from the instances enumerated 
 
while the indictments assert that Fleury "did store or keep a 
large capacity weapon . . . without securing the weapon," as 
required by G. L. c. 140, § 131L, each indictment is titled 
"Improper Storage of a Firearm."  
 
15 
 
below, judges may exercise their discretion regarding the 
disposal of the seized property: 
"If an officer in the execution of a search warrant finds 
property or articles therein described, he shall seize and 
safely keep them, under the direction of the court or 
justice, so long as necessary to permit them to be produced 
or used as evidence in any trial.  As soon as may be, 
thereafter, all property seized under [G. L. c. 276, § 1, 
First,] shall be restored to the owners thereof; and all 
other property seized in execution of a search warrant 
shall be disposed of as the court or justice orders and may 
be forfeited and either sold or destroyed, as the public 
interest requires, in the discretion of the court or 
justice, except [for the exceptions enumerated in G. L. 
c. 276, § 3 (a) to (d)]." 
 
 
The first three of the four enumerated exceptions concern 
specific types of contraband and detail precisely the State 
official to whom that contraband should be forfeited or how it 
should be destroyed.7  General Laws c. 276, § 3 (a), pertains to 
"[d]iseased animals or carcasses" or "unwholesome meat, fish, 
vegetables, produce, fruit or provisions of any kind" that has 
been "kept or concealed with intent to kill, sell, or offer the 
same for sale for food."  This provision mandates that such 
property be "destroyed or disposed of" either by the board of 
health or "by an officer designated by the court or justice" 
acting under board of health regulations, or else by "the 
 
 
7 General Laws c. 276, § 3 (d), the fourth and final 
exception, provides, "Any property, including money seized under 
[G. L. c. 276, § 1], the forfeiture and disposition of which is 
specified in any general or special law shall be disposed of in 
accordance therewith." 
16 
 
division of animal health and department of food and 
agriculture."  
 
General Laws c. 276, § 3 (b), discussed infra, gives 
discretion "for destruction or preservation" of firearms and 
"other dangerous weapons . . . found to have been kept, 
concealed or used unlawfully or for an unlawful purpose" to "the 
colonel of the state police"; G. L. c. 276, § 3 (c), requires 
that money "seized under [G. L. c. 276, § 1, Third]" -- which 
pertains to property "the possession or control of which is 
unlawful, or which [is] possessed or controlled for an unlawful 
purpose" -- "shall be forfeited and paid over to the state 
treasurer." 
 
These three subsections, then, pertain to property that may 
not be possessed under any circumstances, regardless of the way 
in which it is stored, and provide which specific State official 
should dispose of that property. 
 
While the legislative history of the forfeiture statute is 
scant, all of the substantive amendments since 1964 (when the 
statute was rewritten and the first mention of firearms was 
added, see St. 1964, c. 557, § 4) either have added or have 
removed categories of contraband from the enumerated exceptions, 
see St. 1971, c. 1071, § 7 (removing specific types of 
narcotics); St. 1977, c. 556, § 4 (adding "including money 
seized under section one" to G. L. c. 276, § 3 [d]), or have 
17 
 
changed the State entity or official designated to dispose of 
the property, see, e.g., St. 1967, c. 347, § 12 (substituting 
"division of animal health" for "division of livestock disease 
control"); St. 1996, c. 151, § 497 (substituting "colonel of the 
state police" for "commissioner of public safety").  The 
forfeiture statute, therefore, began as a statute unrelated to 
firearms, and all of its modern amendments revolve around the 
proper disposal of contraband.  As discussed infra, this 
development and focus make it significantly different from the 
storage statute.  
 
ii.  The storage statute.  Improper storage of a firearm 
was not a crime until the storage statute was enacted in 1998.  
See St. 1998, c. 180, § 47.  In adopting the forfeiture statute, 
therefore, the Legislature could not have intended that 
unsecured firearms be included within the sweep of the 
forfeiture statute's provision regarding firearms "kept . . . 
unlawfully."  See G. L. c. 276, § 3 (b).  The question, then, is 
whether, in enacting the storage statute, the Legislature 
intended to incorporate the forfeiture statute through its 
provision concerning firearms improperly "stored or kept," see 
G. L. c. 140, § 131L (a).  We conclude that it did not so 
intend, because, while the forfeiture statute pertains to the 
disposal of contraband by particular State officials, the 
storage statute pertains to the proper care of lawfully 
18 
 
possessed firearms and takes as its particular focus the 
prevention of access by children and those adults who are 
ineligible to possess a firearm under the restrictions in G. L. 
c. 140, § 129B (1) (i)-(xi), including, among many others, 
people who have been convicted of a felony and, with some 
exceptions, those who have been committed to a hospital for 
treatment of mental illness within the preceding five years. 
 
Taken as a whole, G. L. c. 140, § 131L, evinces the 
Legislature's concern for gun safety and, in particular, 
children's access to firearms.  First, G. L. c. 140, § 131L (a), 
provides that "weapon[s] shall not be deemed stored or kept if 
carried by or under the control of the owner or other lawfully 
authorized user."  Because guns that are "not . . . stored or 
kept" are not subject to the storage statute, this provision 
means that lawful owners are relieved of the duty properly to 
"secure" a firearm in accordance with the storage statute when 
that firearm is carried on their persons.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Runyan, 456 Mass. 230, 236 (2010) ("[the] 
obligation to secure the firearm in accordance with [G. L. 
c. 140, § 131L,] arises only when the firearm is stored or 
otherwise outside the owner's immediate control").  In this way, 
the storage statute stands in marked contrast to the forfeiture 
statute, which contains no such exception for property that is 
under its owner's control.  
19 
 
 
Moreover, the provisions in G. L. c. 140, § 131L (b) to 
(d), which outline the penalties for violating the storage 
statute, are concerned primarily with two factors:  whether the 
firearm in question is a "large capacity weapon," and whether a 
"person younger than [eighteen] years" old "may have access 
without committing an unforeseeable trespass."8  See, e.g., G. L. 
c. 140, § 131L (c).9  These penalty provisions, therefore, 
underscore that G. L. c. 140, § 131L, is a statute about the 
proper storage of lawfully possessed firearms.10  
 
The legislative history of the storage statute further 
underscores the Legislature's focus on gun safety.  We 
previously have observed that the legislative history of the 
 
 
8 General Laws c. 140, § 131L (c), one of the penalty 
provisions, is limited to weapons "stored or kept in a place 
where a person younger than [eighteen] years of age who does not 
possess a valid firearm identification card . . . may have 
access without committing an unforeseeable trespass." 
 
9 In a similar vein, G. L. c. 140, § 131L (e), provides that 
a violation of the statute "shall be evidence of wanton or 
reckless conduct in any criminal or civil proceeding" if the 
firearm in question is possessed by someone under the age of 
eighteen and lacking the authority to possess it lawfully, "and 
such access results in the personal injury to or the death of 
any person."  
 
 
10 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McGowan, 464 Mass. 232, 241-
242 (2013) (describing statute as "designed to keep firearms out 
of the hands of those not authorized by law to possess a 
firearm, including but not limited to felons, the mentally ill, 
and children"); Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 154 (2006) 
(observing that statute is "illustrative of the societal concern 
with weapons reaching the hands of unauthorized users"). 
 
20 
 
storage statute "leaves no doubt that the measure was intended 
to prevent accidental injuries and deaths resulting from 
firearms falling into the hands of children and other 
unauthorized users, by criminalizing negligent storage" 
(footnote omitted).11  See Commonwealth v. Reyes, 464 Mass. 245, 
250-251 (2013). 
 
These two statutes, therefore, have very different aims:  
the forfeiture statute regulates the disposal of certain types 
of illicit property, while the storage statute is designed to 
ensure that lawfully possessed firearms are accessed only by 
those with the requisite firearms license. 
 
iii.  The 1998 gun control reforms.  The Commonwealth 
acknowledges that the purpose of the storage statute is to 
promote gun safety.  It argues, however, that these safety 
concerns support the view that the Legislature intended 
unsecured firearms to be subject to forfeiture.  This 
 
 
11 In characterizing the legislative history this way, we 
pointed to numerous illuminating statements from legislators, 
including statements discussing the number of unintentional 
deaths in the United States resulting from improperly stored 
guns, State House News Service, House Sess., June 23, 1998; 
extolling the life-saving potential of "lock-box provisions," 
id.; describing the storage statute as an attempt "to keep guns 
out of the hands of people who should not have them," id.; and 
arguing that "attacking the issue of negligent storage of 
firearms is long overdue," State House News Service, House 
Sess., July 20, 1998.  See Commonwealth v. Reyes, 464 Mass. 245, 
251 n.6 (2013). 
 
21 
 
contention, however, fails to acknowledge that the act of which 
the storage statute is a part addresses these safety concerns by 
its plain terms.  The act does so by providing detailed 
procedures for removing firearms from the possession of those 
who have lost their license to own them. 
 
The storage statute was enacted in 1998 as part of an 
extensive package of gun regulations titled, "An Act relative to 
gun control in the commonwealth" (act).  See 1998, c. 180; 1997 
Senate Doc. No. 1985.  One part of the act sets forth a detailed 
scheme for the disposal of guns that no longer may be lawfully 
possessed by their owner.  This scheme was created primarily by 
amendments to two statutory provisions:  G. L. c. 140, § 129B, 
which regulates firearm identification (FID) cards; and G. L. 
c. 140, § 129D, which regulates the surrender of firearms upon 
the loss of the requisite firearms license.  Taken together, 
these provisions indicate that effectuating the safety-promoting 
purposes of the storage statute does not require subjecting 
improperly stored firearms to forfeiture under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 3 (b).  That such a firearm is not subject to the forfeiture 
statute does not mean that it remains in the possession of 
someone convicted of having stored it improperly, risking it 
falling into the hands of a child or other person who has not 
demonstrated sufficient qualifications to possess a firearm.  
The Legislature has established, through its licensing scheme, 
22 
 
that those convicted of improper storage of a firearm may no 
longer lawfully possess any firearm.   
 
A.  Gun licensure.  There are two broad categories of gun 
licenses in Massachusetts.12  An FID card entitles the cardholder 
to possess a rifle or shotgun that is not a large capacity 
weapon, but prohibits the possession of handguns, rifles, or 
shotguns that are capable of accepting large capacity feeding 
devices.  See G. L. c. 140, § 129B (6).  A license to carry 
(LTC), of which there were two types, placed more stringent 
requirements on licensees.  Class B licenses entitled licensees 
to possess handguns and shotguns or rifles capable of accepting 
large capacity feeding devices, see G. L. c. 140, § 131 (b), 
while Class A licenses permitted both possession of a large 
capacity firearm and concealed carry, see G. L. c. 140, 
§ 131 (a).  General Laws c. 140, § 129B, the FID statute, 
provides that licensing authorities "shall issue" an FID card to 
anyone who is not a "prohibited person."  G. L. c. 140, 
§ 129B (1).  Among those considered "prohibited person[s]" is 
anyone who has been convicted of a felony.  See G. L. c. 140, 
§ 129B (1) (i).  "A crime punishable by . . . imprisonment in 
 
 
12 As with the forfeiture statute, the statute on firearms 
licensing was amended after the events here, in ways not 
relevant to any issue in this case.  See, e.g., St. 2017, 
c. 110, § 21; St. 2018, c. 123, §§ 11, 12.  We discuss the 
licensing provisions in effect in 2014.   
23 
 
the state prison is a felony.  All other crimes are 
misdemeanors."  G. L. c. 274, § 1.  Unlike many other types of 
"prohibited person[s]," those who have been convicted of a 
felony are permanently prohibited from becoming an FID 
cardholder.  G. L. c. 140, § 129B (1) (i).  The FID statute 
further provides that an FID card "shall be revoked or suspended 
by the licensing authority . . . upon the occurrence of any 
event that would have disqualified the holder from being issued 
such card or from having such card renewed."  See G. L. c. 140, 
§ 129B (4). 
 
The section of the storage statute under which Fleury was 
convicted provides that "[a] violation of this section" 
involving "a large capacity weapon or machine gun" "shall be 
punished . . . by a fine of not less than $2,000 nor more than 
$15,000 or by imprisonment for not less than [one and one-half] 
years nor more than [twelve] years or by both such fine and 
imprisonment."  See G. L. c. 140, § 131L (b).  Taken together, 
these provisions mean that the moment Fleury was convicted under 
the storage statute, he became permanently prohibited from 
possessing a firearm of any kind.  See G. L. c. 140, 
§ 131 (d), (f). 
 
B.  Surrender of firearms pursuant to G. L. c. 140, § 129D.  
In addition to subjecting those who have been convicted of 
improper storage of a firearm to the loss of their firearms 
24 
 
license, the Legislature has provided detailed procedures by 
which those who have lost their license may dispose of, and be 
compensated for, the firearms that they may no longer possess. 
 
The FID statute provides that, "[u]pon revocation or 
suspension . . . the person whose card is so revoked or 
suspended shall take all action required under the provisions of 
[§] 129D."  See G. L. c. 140, § 129B (4).13  General Laws c. 140, 
§ 129D, mandates that anyone whose FID card or LTC has been 
revoked or suspended "shall without delay deliver or surrender 
to the licensing authority where the person resides all 
firearms, rifles, shotguns and machine guns and ammunition which 
the person then possesses unless an appeal of the revocation or 
suspension is pending."  The section provides, however, that 
"[t]he person or the person's legal representative shall have 
the right, at any time up to [one] year after the delivery or 
surrender, to transfer the firearms . . . to any licensed dealer 
or any other person legally permitted to purchase or take 
possession of the firearms," so long as "the purchaser or 
transferee shall affirm in writing" that he or she will not then 
 
 
13 General Laws c. 140, § 129B, therefore, offers a helpful 
illustration of a situation in which a firearm could be "kept," 
in violation of the forfeiture statute, albeit that the firearm 
was "stored" in accordance with G. L. c. 140, § 131L.  A firearm 
possessed by someone without a valid license would be subject to 
the forfeiture statute, even if it was secured in a locked 
container or otherwise stored properly in compliance with the 
storage statute. 
25 
 
transfer the firearms back to the original (and now ineligible) 
owner.  Id.  
 
Fleury intends to sell the twelve firearms in question, 
through a designee, now that he is permanently forbidden from 
owning or possessing a firearm himself.  General Laws c. 140, 
§ 129D, not only explicitly establishes "the right" to "transfer 
the firearms" to "any other person legally permitted to purchase 
or take possession of" them, but also provides that the 
"licensing authority shall at the time of delivery or surrender 
inform the person in writing" that this right exists. 
 
By its plain terms, G. L. c. 140, § 129D, applies only to 
firearms "deliver[ed] or surrender[ed]," not to those seized 
during a lawful search.  Here, however, the plain language is 
ambiguous regarding the relationship between the storage statute 
and the forfeiture statute.  The statutes regulate different 
types of property in different ways; moreover, improper storage 
was not a crime when the forfeiture statute was last amended.  
Given this, it appears that the Legislature intended lawfully 
owned, improperly stored firearms to be subject to the scheme 
detailed in G. L. c. 140, §§ 129B and 129D, rather than to the 
regulations on the disposal of contraband outlined in G. L. 
c. 276, § 3 (b).   
 
4.  Conclusion.  The order allowing forfeiture of the 
twelve firearms is vacated and set aside, and the matter is 
26 
 
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.