Title: Bowman v. American River Transportation Co.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 99094-Agenda 15-May 2005.
DAVID W. BOWMAN, Appellee, v. AMERICAN RIVER 							

TRANSPORTATION COMPANY et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed October 20, 2005.
	JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the opinion of the court:
	Plaintiff filed suit against defendants in St. Clair County for
injuries suffered while working as a seaman aboard a harbor boat. He
claimed negligence under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. app. §688 et seq.
(2000)), unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. Defendants filed
a timely request for a jury trial, which was stricken by the trial court
on plaintiff's motion, citing the Fifth District opinion in Allen v.
Norman Brothers, Inc., 286 Ill. App 3d 1091 (1997), for the
proposition that only plaintiffs in Jones Act cases can demand a jury
trial. Following a bench trial in which defendants stipulated to liability,
the trial court awarded certain damages to plaintiff, including a
$325,000 judgment for pain, suffering, disability and disfigurement.
Defendants appealed, and the appellate court affirmed in part, finding,
inter alia, that the trial court did not err in its refusal to recognize
defendant's right to trial by jury or in its award of "pain and suffering"
damages. No. 5-03-0439 (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). We granted defendants leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
	Plaintiff's complaint specifically included claims: (1) under the
Jones Act, an in personam action for seamen who suffer injury in the
course of employment due to the negligence of their employer, the
vessel owner, or crew members; (2) for unseaworthiness under
general maritime law based on the vessel owner's duty to ensure that
the vessel is reasonably fit to be at sea; and (3) for maintenance and
cure under general maritime law, based on the vessel owner's
obligation to provide food, lodging and medical services to a seaman
injured while serving the ship. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine,
Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441, 148 L. Ed. 2d 931, 937, 121 S. Ct. 993, 997
(2001). The evidence presented at trial established, inter alia, the
following. Plaintiff worked for defendant American River
Transportation Company (ARTCO) as a deckhand. While laboring
aboard a harbor boat on May 25, 2001, a defective cable broke apart,
struck plaintiff's leg, and broke his right tibia, the bone extending from
the knee to the ankle. Plaintiff underwent surgery which consisted of
inserting a rod inside the broken bone to serve as an internal splint to
maintain alignment of the bone while it healed. The rod was held in
place with one screw below the knee and two above the ankle. The
surgery was completed successfully, without any complications, and
within six months, plaintiff's doctor released him to return to full-time
heavy manual labor. Plaintiff then began working, and has since
continued to work, in the drywall trade.
	As to the issue of plaintiff's pain, suffering, disability and
disfigurement, the evidence showed that the injury involved a
significant amount of force and was incredibly painful. However, there
was no dispute that, at the time of trial, plaintiff was no longer
experiencing excruciating or constant pain. Rather, plaintiff can now
work and engage in whatever recreational activities he performed
before his injury, including running, biking and swimming. Plaintiff did
testify that sometimes his leg is sore after a full day of work or after
playing sports, and thus he does experience moderate pain at times.
	After the trial concluded, the court issued its judgment, awarding
plaintiff $12,000 in past lost wages; $325,000 in pain, suffering,
disability and disfigurement; $7,200 in maintenance and cure; and
$7,200 in attorney fees. On appeal, the panel diminished the
maintenance award from $7,200 to $3,300, and vacated the award of
attorney fees in its entirety. However, as mentioned, the appellate
court affirmed the remainder of the trial court's findings, specifically
the "pain and suffering" award and the striking of defendants' jury
demand. The panel rejected defendants' reliance on an opinion
recently filed in the Fourth District, Hutton v. Consolidated Grain &
Barge Co., 341 Ill. App. 3d 401 (2003), which directly conflicts with
Allen and holds that both parties in a Jones Act case are entitled to
demand trial by jury.  
	Thus, the appeal before us raises two issues: (1) whether the trial
court erred in striking defendants' jury demand in this state court
Jones Act case; and (2) whether the $325,000 judgment for pain,
suffering, disability and disfigurement is supported by the evidence.
We find the dispositive issue to be whether, pursuant to the Jones Act,
a defendant may demand a jury trial in a case filed in this state, or
whether that right is reserved solely for the plaintiff. As this issue
involves the construction of a statute, it is a question of law, and our
standard of review is de novo. Progressive Universal Insurance Co.
of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 128
(2005); People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996). We further
note that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature.
Progressive Universal Insurance, 215 Ill. 2d  at 134; People ex rel.
Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 45 (2002). Thus, before
determining the proper construction of the Jones Act provision at
issue, we believe it helpful to understand the historical background of
this federal legislation and its place in maritime law.
	"Article III, §2, of the United States Constitution vests federal
courts with jurisdiction over all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 codified this grant
of exclusive original jurisdiction, but 'sav[ed] to suitors, in all cases,
the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it.' Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat.77." Lewis, 531 U.S.  at 443,
148 L. Ed. 2d  at 939, 121 S. Ct.  at 998. That jurisdictional statute
now states, with its substance largely unchanged, that " '[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of ... any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled.' 28 U.S.C. §1333(1) (emphasis added)." Lewis, 531 U.S.  at
443-44, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 939,121 S. Ct.  at 998-99. Thus, the federal
"saving to suitors" clause preserves remedies and the concurrent
jurisdiction of state courts over some admiralty and maritime claims.
Lewis, 531 U.S.  at 445, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 940, 121 S. Ct.  at 999.
	In 1903, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 47 L. Ed. 760, 23 S. Ct. 483 (1903),
which halted negligence suits by seamen, and allowed only claims
based on maintenance and cure, and unseaworthiness of the vessel to
proceed. In 1915, Congress, believing that seamen needed a
negligence remedy, responded to the Osceola decision by enacting
section 20 of the Act to Promote the Welfare of American Seamen
(ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1164, 1185 (1915)). However, the language of the
1915 statute did not have the intended effect, and in 1920 Congress
enacted the present Jones Act, which provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
			"Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for
damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such
action all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of
personal injury to railway employees shall apply ***." 46
U.S.C. app. §688(a) (1988).
The railway employees' statutes referred to above comprise the
Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. §§51 through 60
(2000)), which offers, inter alia, a negligence remedy for certain
railway workers against their employers. FELA was incorporated by
reference into the Jones Act. See 45 U.S.C. §§51 through 60 (2000).
	In Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 68 L. Ed. 748, 44 S. Ct. 391 (1924), the United States Supreme Court rejected a claim
that the Jones Act was unconstitutional, and held that its essential
features are as follows: (1) an injured seaman can pursue the FELA-based negligence remedy in admiralty court; (2) alternatively, he can
choose to sue on the law side of federal court on the basis of the Jones
Act's language and the general grant of federal question jurisdiction;
(3) when the seaman chooses the federal question/law side route, he
is deemed to have invoked the permission granted by the general
saving to suitors clause to bring a maritime case in a common law
court; (4) the applicability of the saving to suitors clause to Jones Act
federal question/law side suits entails the conclusion that Jones Act
suits can also be maintained in state courts, and in federal court based
on diversity jurisdiction; and (5) Jones Act cases are characterized as
admiralty cases when they are maintained in federal court on the basis
of admiralty jurisdiction. Johnson, 264 U.S.  at 382-85, 388, 391, 68 L. Ed.  at 751-52, 753, 754, 44 S. Ct.  at 392, 394, 395; D. Robertson
& M. Sturley, The Right to a Jury Trial in Jones Act Cases: Choosing
the Forum Versus Choosing the Procedure, 30 J. Mar. L. & Com.
649, 657-58 (1999). When Jones Act cases are brought on any other
jurisdictional basis, whether in state court or on the law side of federal
court, they, like other saving-clause cases, are deemed to be cases at
common law. Johnson, 264 U.S.  at 382, 388, 391, 68 L. Ed.  at 751,
753, 754-55, 44 S. Ct.  at 392, 394, 395. With this background in
mind, we now examine the Jones Act's language for assistance in
deciding the issue before us.
	As stated earlier, the primary rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Progressive
Universal Insurance, 215 Ill. 2d  at 134; People ex rel. Birkett, 202 Ill. 2d  at 45. "We determine legislative intent by examining the language
of the statute, which is 'the most reliable indicator of the legislature's
objectives in enacting a particular law.' " In re Detention of
Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308 (2002), quoting Michigan Avenue
National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000); see
also Hutton, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 406. Further, when undertaking the
interpretation of a statute, we must presume that, when the legislature
enacted a law, it did not intend to produce absurd, inconvenient or
unjust results. Progressive Universal Insurance, 215 Ill. 2d  at 134.
	The key sentence of the Jones Act at issue here states: "Any
seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at
law, with the right of trial by jury" (46 U.S.C. App. §688(a) (2000)).
We believe that anyone well versed in statutory construction, or even
English grammar, would find the plain language of that sentence
clearly states that the "election" to be made by the seaman pertains to
his choice to maintain an action "at law," and not his election of a
"right of trial by jury." Under the principle of statutory construction
known as the last antecedent doctrine, relative or qualifying words or
phrases in a statute serve only to modify words or phrases which are
immediately preceding and do not modify those which are more
remote. People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 138 (2002); McMahan v.
Industrial Comm'n, 183 Ill. 2d 499, 511-12 (1998); In re Application
for Judgment & Sale of Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989,
167 Ill. 2d 161, 169 (1995); Hutton, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 406.
	In Davis, this court explained that in addition to the last
antecedent doctrine, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is used to
interpret statutes by providing that "when a statutory clause
specifically describes several classes of persons or things and then
includes 'other persons or things,' the word 'other' is interpreted as
meaning 'other such like.' " Davis, 199 Ill. 2d  at 138, quoting Farley
v. Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975). Thus, in
determining whether a pellet/BB gun was a dangerous weapon within
the meaning of the armed violence statute, the Davis court reasoned
as follows:
			"[W]hen defining category I weapons, the armed violence
statute begins by specifically listing firearm-type weapons by
various commonly recognized names, followed by the clause,
'any other firearm.' The definition then goes on to specifically
include 'sawed-off shotgun, a stun gun or taser as defined in
paragraph (a) of Section 24-1 of this Code, knife with a
blade of at least 3 inches in length, dagger, dirk, switchblade
knife, stiletto.' The concluding phrase, 'any other deadly or
dangerous weapon or instrument of like nature,' comes at the
end of the list of blade-type weapons. Applying the doctrine
of ejusdem generis in conjunction with the last antecedent
rule, we find that the phrase 'any other deadly or dangerous
weapon or instrument of like nature' was intended to refer
only to weapons or instruments 'such like' the class of blade-type weapons which immediately preceded the clause in the
provision, i.e., weapons or instrument that are sharp and have
the ability to cut or stab. We do not believe that the clause
'any other deadly or dangerous weapon or instrument of like
nature' was intended to modify all of the named weapons
and, thus, was not intended to include BB guns, pellet guns,
paint ball guns or any other weapons, which are not firearms,
but are of like nature to firearms." (Emphasis in original.)
Davis, 199 Ill. 2d  at 138-39, quoting 720 ILCS 5/33A-1
(West 1992).
	In the case before us, the language of the Jones Act is more
straightforward and thus more easily interpreted than in Davis. "The
Jones Act does not explicitly state only the plaintiff may elect a trial
by jury. This [construction] would be true if the 'election' referred to
in the statute was the election of trial by jury." Hutton, 341 Ill. App.
3d at 406, quoting 46 U.S.C. app. §688(a) (2000). Rather, under the
last antecedent doctrine, the phrase " 'at his election' " modifies
" 'may *** maintain an action for damages at law,' " because the
phrase " 'with the right of trial by jury,' " is separated from the
modifying phrase " 'at his election' " by " 'maintain an action for
damages at law.' " Hutton, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 406, quoting 46 U.S.C.
app. §688(a) (2000). Therefore, the rules of statutory construction
clearly establish that the "election" referred to in the Jones Act is not
the seaman's election of a trial by jury, but his election to proceed "at
law" rather than in admiralty. See Hutton, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 406.
	Plaintiff argues that the Fifth District herein and in Allen, and not
the Fourth District in Hutton, correctly interpret the plain meaning of
this section of the Jones Act, which is to provide only the plaintiff with
a right to elect between a bench trial and a trial by jury. No.
5-03-0439 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), citing
Allen, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1094. However, we find that, in addition to
our reading of the plain language of the Jones Act, which is supported
by the rules of statutory construction, a close inspection of the case
law also leads to the conclusion that it is Hutton which correctly
interprets the statute's meaning.
		Hutton relies in part on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Johnson, 264 U.S.  at 388, 68 L. Ed.  at 753, 44 S. Ct.  at
394, which held, inter alia, that the Jones Act gave seamen the
substantive election between two "alternatives accorded by the
maritime law." The statute "brings into [general maritime] law new
rules, drawn from another system, and extends to injured seamen a
right to invoke, at their election, either the relief accorded by the old
rules, or that provided by the new rules." Johnson, 264 U.S.  at 388,
68 L. Ed.  at 753, 44 S. Ct.  at 394. Hutton further cites Panama R.R.
Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557, 560, 70 L. Ed. 1085, 1087, 46 S. Ct. 596, 597 (1926), wherein the United States Supreme Court stated that
"the procedural provisions [of the Jones Act] have been construed ***
to mean that the new substantive rights may be asserted and enforced
either in actions in personam against the employers in courts
administering common-law remedies, with a right of trial by jury, or
in suits in admiralty *** without trial by jury ." Thus, we agree with
the Hutton court that Vasquez and Johnson hold these "new
substantive rights" created by the Jones Act consist solely of a "new"
maritime remedy whereby a seaman may choose to sue in negligence,
and the right to file that suit either: (1) at law, with the attendant right
to a trial by jury; or (2) in admiralty, where there is no right to trial by
jury. See Hutton, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 407.
	We note that plaintiff also cites the decision in Johnson as
supportive of his belief that the Jones Act provides a plaintiff with the
sole right to demand a jury in an action at common law. However,
instead of looking at Johnson in its entirety, plaintiff concentrates on
one paragraph of the opinion and interprets it completely out of
context. The portion of Johnson to which plaintiff points states:
			"A further objection urged against the statute is that it
conflicts with the due process of law clause of the Fifth
Amendment in that it permits injured seamen to elect between
varying measures of redress and between different forms of
action without according a corresponding right to their
employers, and therefore is unreasonably discriminatory and
purely arbitrary. *** Of course the objection must fail. There
are many instances in the law where a person entitled to sue
may choose between alternative measures of redress and
modes of enforcement; and this has been true since before the
Constitution. But it never has been held, nor thought so far
as we are advised, that to permit such a choice between
alternatives otherwise admissible is a violation of due process
of law. In the nature of things, the right to choose cannot be
accorded to both parties, and, if accorded to either, should
rest with the one seeking redress rather than the one from
whom redress is sought." Johnson, 264 U.S.  at 392-93, 68 L. Ed.  at 755, 44 S. Ct.  at 396.
	This paragraph in Johnson includes, inter alia, the following
propositions: (1) the Jones Act gives the plaintiff a choice between
"varying" or "alternative measures of redress", and (2) the Act gives
the plaintiff a choice between "different forms of action" or
"alternative *** modes of enforcement." Johnson, 264 U.S.  at 392-93, 68 L. Ed.  at 755, 44 S. Ct.  at 396; D. Robertson & M. Sturley,
Understanding Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson: The Supreme Court's
Interpretation of the Seaman's Elections Under the Jones Act, 14
U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 229, 245 (2001-02). There appears to be no debate
that the terms "varying" or "alternative measures of redress" refer to
The Osceola remedies of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure,
versus the "new" negligence action. See 14 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. at 245.
However, the key disagreement between plaintiff and defendant herein
relates to the second proposition. "What did the Court mean by saying
that the Jones Act gives the plaintiff a choice between alternative
'forms of action' ('modes of enforcement')?" 14 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. at
245. Plaintiff argues that these terms refer to a jury trial versus a
nonjury trial, whereas defendants argue the terms refer instead to the
plaintiff's election between bringing a Jones Act suit in admiralty or
on the law side. We agree with defendants.
	As earlier noted, any search for the meaning of this paragraph in
Johnson, and particularly the meaning of the term "forms of action"
and "modes of enforcement" as used therein, must begin by placing
the paragraph in context with the rest of the Court's opinion. Johnson,
264 U.S.  at 392-93, 68 L. Ed.  at 755, 44 S. Ct.  at 396. The Johnson
Court's primary objective was to determine the constitutionality of the
Jones Act. In doing so, Johnson clearly explained that the Act's
purpose was not to remove the negligence right of action from
admiralty jurisdiction and make it cognizable only on the common law
side of the courts, which would indeed raise constitutionality
questions, but rather "the terms of the statute in this regard are not
imperative but permissive." Johnson, 264 U.S.  at 389-91, 68 L. Ed. 
at 754, 44 S. Ct.  at 395. "[The Jones Act] says 'may maintain' an
action at law 'with the right of trial by jury,' the import of which is
that the injured seaman is permitted, but not required, to proceed on
the common-law side of the court with a trial by jury as an incident."
(Emphasis added.) Johnson, 264 U.S.  at 390-91, 68 L. Ed.  at 754, 44 S. Ct.  at 395, quoting 46 U.S.C. app §688(a). The Court further
found that, under this view, the Jones Act leaves the injured seaman
free "under the general law *** of the Judicial Code" to assert his
right of action under the new rules on the admiralty side of the court,
where the issues will be tried by the court, or on the common-law
side, where there will be a right of trial by jury. Johnson, 264 U.S.  at
391, 68 L. Ed.  at 755, 44 S. Ct.  at 395.
	Thus, examining Johnson in its entirety shows that the "forms of
action" choice discussed in the paragraph cited by plaintiff refers to
admiralty actions versus at-law negligence actions. We can find
nothing in the Johnson opinion which suggests that the term "forms
of action" could have been intended to refer to a choice between jury
and nonjury trials in common law actions. Indeed, the jury trial is
explicitly referred to "as an incident" of the choice "to proceed on the
common law side of the court." Johnson, 264 U.S.  at 391, 68 L. Ed. 
at 754, 44 S. Ct.  at 395; see 14 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. at 251. We therefore
conclude that Johnson does not support plaintiff's view that the Jones
Act gave to plaintiffs the unilateral right to elect the form of trial, i.e.,
jury or nonjury, in an action at law.
	This conclusion, however, does not negate the fact that, under
the Jones Act, a plaintiff does control the choice between a bench or
jury trial by using his choice of the forum. That is, the plaintiff desiring
a bench trial may bring his case in admiralty under 28 U.S.C. §1333,
as there, neither party is entitled to a jury trial. See 30 J. Mar. L. &
Com. at 669. On the other hand, the plaintiff desiring a jury trial may
bring his case, pursuant to the saving-to-suitors clause, on the law side
of federal court or in a state court whose law guarantees the right to
a jury trial. See 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. at 669-70. Thus, having the
power to control the forum, the Jones Act plaintiff starts out with full
control over whether the case will be tried to a jury. It is in this sense
that statements to the effect that "the Jones Act gives only the plaintiff
the right to choose a jury trial" are true. However, Johnson and its
predecessor in the Second Circuit make it clear that once the Jones
Act plaintiff has made his forum choice, if defendants in that forum
normally have a right to a jury, then so does the Jones Act defendant.
See 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. at 670, citing Johnson, 264 U.S.  at 391, 68 L. Ed.  at 754, 44 S. Ct.  at 395; Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 289 F. 964 (2d Cir. 1923), aff'd, 264 U.S. 375, 68 L. Ed. 748, 44 S. Ct. 391
(1924).
	Given the foregoing, we agree with defendants that Hutton
correctly found the Jones Act did not express an intention by
Congress to dictate the method of trial in state court. "Based on our
construction of the statute, we conclude the Jones Act does not limit
the right to trial by jury to the plaintiff only." Hutton, 341 Ill. App. 3d
at 407. However, plaintiff argues that the Hutton court's decision is
contrary to the overwhelming weight of both federal and Illinois case
law. See Allen v. Norman Brothers, Inc., 286 Ill App. 3d 1091
(1997); see also Hanks v. Luhr Brothers, Inc., 303 Ill. App. 3d 661
(1999); Hearn v. American River Transportation Co., 303 Ill. App.
3d 619 (1999); Gibbs v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 298 Ill. App. 3d
743 (1998); Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 19 F.3d 472 (9th Cir.
1994); Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480
(5th Cir. 1992); Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.
1986). Plaintiff further argues that because federal court decisions
interpreting a federal act are binding upon Illinois courts, it was
improper for the appellate court in Hutton to interpret a federal statute
contrary to interpretations made by federal appellate courts. See
Hutton, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 408 (Myerscough, P.J., dissenting), citing
Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 195 Ill. 2d 257, 276
(2001).
	We acknowledge that in Rachal, 795 F.2d  at 1215, the federal
district court held that the "Jones Act gives only the seaman-plaintiff
the right to choose a jury trial," and in Craig, 19 F.3d  at 476, the
court found "[t]he plain language of the Jones Act gives a plaintiff the
option of maintaining an action at law with the accompanying right to
a jury trial *** [and] makes no mention of a defendant." (Emphasis in
original.) Further, in Linton, 964 F.2d  at 1490, the court held that "the
Jones Act allows the injured seaman to elect a non-jury trial 'at law'
in a state court." Based upon these federal court decisions, the Fifth
District in Allen and its above-stated progeny established the same
precedent in Illinois. However, this court has now stated its agreement
with the Hutton opinion and, in turn, its disagreement with Rachal and
the line of cases which has furthered its reasoning.(1)
 	Further, we reject plaintiff's claim that we are bound by federal
court decisions on this issue. While in Wilson v. Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co., 187 Ill. 2d 369, 383 (1999), this court stated "federal
decisions are considered controlling on Illinois state courts
interpreting a federal statute" because federal statutes must be given
uniform application, six months later, in Weiland v. Telectronics
Pacing Systems, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 415, 423 (1999), this court held that
it need not follow Seventh Circuit precedent for three reasons-the
United States Supreme Court had not ruled on the issue, there was a
split of authority among the federal circuit courts of appeals, and this
court believed that the Seventh Circuit case was wrongly decided.
Later, in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 197 Ill. 2d 112 (2001),
reversed on other grounds, 537 U.S. 51, 154 L. Ed. 2d 466, 123 S. Ct. 518 (2002), this court attempted to reconcile the Wilson and
Weiland decisions, stating:
			"[A]s we have repeatedly recognized, uniformity of
decision is an important consideration when state courts
interpret federal statutes. [Citations.] *** In the absence of
a decision of the United States Supreme Court, which would
definitively answer the question presented by this case, we
elect to give considerable weight to the decisions of federal
courts of appeals and federal district courts that have
addressed this issue." Sprietsma, 197 Ill. 2d  at 120.
	Accordingly, while a decision of the United States Supreme
Court is binding on this court, federal circuit and district court
decisions were recognized in Sprietsma as merely being persuasive.
See Mekertichian v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., L.L.C., 347 Ill. App. 3d
828, 835 (2004). Further, in Bishop v. Burgard, 198 Ill. 2d 495, 507
(2002), this court held that federal circuit courts of appeals exercise
no appellate jurisdiction over the Illinois Supreme Court, and that we
need not follow their precedent where the United States Supreme
Court has not yet answered the precise question. Here, therefore,
where the Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon the question
presented, i.e., whether a defendant in a state common law Jones Act
case is entitled to demand a trial by jury, we are not bound by the
holding in Rachal or any federal or circuit court rulings on this issue.
Rather, based on our own construction of the statute and cases such
as Johnson and Hutton which have interpreted it, we hold that the
Jones Act does not give an exclusive right to the plaintiff to elect a
trial by jury in an action filed in state court. Allen and its Fifth District
progeny, Hanks, Hearn, and Gibbs, are therefore overruled on this
point.
	Plaintiff's next argument is that federal substantive law, rather
than state procedural law, governs the right to a jury trial in a common
law Jones Act case filed in state court. Plaintiff relies mainly on Dice
v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363, 96 L. Ed. 398, 404, 72 S. Ct. 312, 315 (1952), wherein the Supreme Court
asserted that "the right to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the
rights accorded by [FELA] to permit it to be classified as a mere 'local
rule of procedure' for denial in the manner that Ohio has here used.
[Citation.]" It is true that because the Jones Act incorporates FELA
by reference, FELA decisions are persuasive authority on the meaning
of the Jones Act. See, e.g., Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439, 2 L. Ed. 2d 382, 392, 78 S. Ct. 394, 401 (1958). We,
nevertheless, do not believe that Dice resolves the question here.
	Even if, arguendo, we agreed that Dice should extend to the
Jones Act context, Dice does not suggest that the plaintiff's
"substantial" right to a jury trial would also include the disputed right
under Rachal to insist upon a nonjury trial. See Dice, 342 U.S.  at 365,
96 L. Ed.  at 405, 72 S. Ct.  at 316 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part, joined by Reed, Jackson and Burton, JJ.) (a
state may not "discriminate disadvantageously against actions for
negligence under the [FELA] as compared with local causes of action
in negligence. [Citations.] Conversely *** a state is under no duty to
treat actions arising under [FELA] differently from the way it
adjudicates local actions for negligence, so far as the mechanics of
litigation, the forms in which law is administered, are concerned"). "In
other words, even if one believed that the Jones Act forbids the states
from denying plaintiffs (and even defendants) the right to a jury trial,
there would still be no basis for concluding that the Jones Act
guarantees plaintiffs a state-court bench trial by forbidding the states
from extending to defendants the jury-trial rights that would otherwise
exist." 14 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. at 263. Thus, we find no reason to rely on
Dice and the other FELA cases regarding the type of law governing
the right to a jury trial in state Jones Act cases. See generally Cox v.
Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 209, 99 L. Ed. 260, 263, 75 S. Ct. 242, 243-44
(1955) (in Jones Act cases, the courts are not bound to follow FELA
itself, let alone a decision construing FELA, when its application
appears unreasonable).
	As simply stated in Hutton: "Procedural rules in a Jones Act
claim are governed by the forum in which the claim is filed." Hutton,
341 Ill. App. 3d at 407. Indeed, even Linton held that if the plaintiff
elects to proceed with his Jones Act case "at law" in state court,
" 'whether he, or the defendant, would have a right to trial by jury
would depend on state civil procedure.' " (Emphasis added.) Linton,
964 F.2d  at 1487, quoting Pellegrin v. International Independent
Towing, No. 88-5255, slip op. at 3-4 (E.D. La. March 6, 1989). This
conclusion, we believe, is also the broad message of the Supreme
Court's decision in American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,
127 L. Ed. 2d 285, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994), where, in deciding the
treatment of venue under the Jones Act, the Court quoted Bainbridge
v. Merchants & Miners Transportation Co., 287 U.S. 278, 280-81, 77 L. Ed. 302, 304-05, 53 S. Ct. 159, 159-60 (1932), for the proposition
that "although 46 U.S.C. App. §688(a) contains a venue provision,
'venue [in Jones Act cases brought in state court] should ... [be]
determined by the trial court in accordance with the law of the
state.' " American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 457, 127 L. Ed. 2d 285, 299, 114 S. Ct. 981, 990 (1994). Thus, in American
Dredging Co., as here, the characterization of a state rule as
substantive or procedural is a good indicator of whether federal
preemption exists. See American Dredging Co., 510 U.S.  at 457-58,
127 L. Ed. 2d  at 300, 114 S. Ct.  at 990 (Souter, J., concurring). We
therefore hold that the availability of a jury trial in Jones Act cases is
a question that is properly controlled by the normal laws of the forum.
	Having found that the right to try a Jones Act case in state court
is indeed a matter of state law, we must now determine under what
authority defendants herein may claim this right. Plaintiff contends that
no authority exists under Illinois law providing defendants in this
common law Jones Act case with a trial by jury, and that the lower
courts were therefore correct in rejecting defendants' demand for a
jury trial. We begin by stating our agreement with plaintiff that section
2-1105 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1105 (West
2000)) does not, as the Hutton majority reasoned, establish a Jones
Act defendant's right to a state jury trial. Rather, that section states:
"A defendant desirous of a trial by jury must file a demand therefor
not later than the filing of his or her answer." 735 ILCS 5/2-1105(a)
(West 2000). Thus, this section of the Code of Civil Procedure merely
provides the process by which a party may advise the court of its
desire for a jury trial (Roszell v. Gniadek, 348 Ill. App. 341, 343-44
(1952)), and says nothing about whether a party is entitled to a jury
trial in any given action. Hutton, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 409 (Myerscough,
P.J., dissenting). However, we also agree with defendants that the
right to a jury trial is guaranteed to Jones Act defendants through our
state constitution.
	Article I, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides:
"The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain
inviolate." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §13. The Illinois Constitution of
1870 first employed the phrase "as heretofore enjoyed" when speaking
of the inviolate right of trial by jury. Ill. Const. 1870, art. II, §5;
People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209, 213-14 (1988). Under
this provision, parties to a civil case are entitled to a jury trial when
that right existed at common law. Martin v. Heinold Commodities,
Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 72 (1994); see also Research Hospital v.
Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co., 352 Ill. 510, 521 (1933) ("The
right to a jury trial 'as heretofore enjoyed,' secured by our
constitution, is a jury trial in those tribunals which exercise common
law jurisdiction"). In other words, Illinois courts have construed the
Illinois constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury as adhering
to those actions known at common law at the time the "as heretofore
enjoyed" language was adopted. See People ex rel. O'Malley v. 6323
North LaCrosse Avenue, 158 Ill. 2d 453, 457 (1994); Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d  at 215.
	We note that there is some debate between the parties as to
whether the 1870 or the 1970 constitution is the pertinent time frame
for this determination. However, we need not decide this question
definitively here, as our research reveals that injured seamen were
trying their common law negligence cases to juries in Illinois long
before the Jones Act was adopted in 1920, and even before the "as
heretofore enjoyed" language was first adopted in the constitution of
1870. See, e.g., Western Stone Co. v. Whalen, 151 Ill. 472 (1894);
Schooner "Norway" v. Jensen, 52 Ill. 373 (1869). Thus, by including
the phrase "as heretofore enjoyed" in the jury clause of both the
Illinois constitutions of 1870 and 1970, the framers must have
intended to incorporate the practice of jury trials for injured seamen
which Illinois had employed in the years prior to the adoption of those
constitutions. See Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d  at 221 ("At the time of the
insertion of 'as heretofore enjoyed,' it would seem logical to believe
that the drafters of the 1870 constitution, by that insertion, referred to
the nearly 100 years of trial by jury experience that the people of this
State and territory had enjoyed").
	Finally, plaintiff argues that, irrespective of whether suits by
injured seamen were tried to juries before our constitution adopted the
"as heretofore enjoyed" language, the Jones Act is a "new cause of
action" and a statutory proceeding unknown to the common law.
Therefore, plaintiff contends claims filed under the Act are without a
right to trial by jury in Illinois courts. For this proposition, plaintiff
cites, inter alia, Martin, 163 Ill. 2d  at 76 (because the Consumer
Fraud Act is a statutory proceeding unknown to the common law, our
constitution does not confer the right to a jury trial for a claim made
under the Act), and Brown v. C.D. Mallory & Co., 122 F.2d 98, 101
(3d Cir. 1941) (the Jones Act in effect created a "new cause of action"
at law (as distinguished from admiralty) for seamen with personal
injuries arising by reason of the employer's negligence as distinguished
from the causes of action of ancient origin which arose from defective
equipment or an unseaworthy vessel). We agree with defendants that
this argument is without merit.
	The Supreme Court's decision in The Osceola, which temporarily
halted suits by seamen based on negligence, does not alter the fact that
such suits were indeed tried to juries and were "heretofore enjoyed"
in pre-Osceola days. Indeed, plaintiff's characterization of the Jones
Act as creating a new cause of action contradicts Supreme Court
cases which have recognized that the Jones Act simply removed the
bar to common law suits that The Osceola had created, and allowed
seamen to invoke common law principles like other tort victims. See
McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 354, 112 L. Ed. 2d 866, 881-82, 111 S. Ct. 807, 817 (1991); Panama R.R. Co.
v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557, 561, 70 L. Ed. 1085, 1087-88 , 46 S. Ct. 596, 597 (1926) ("an action in personam to recover damages for tort
is one of the most familiar of the common-law remedies, and it is such
a remedy at law that is contemplated by [the Jones Act] and invoked
in this case"). Thus, while the Jones Act is a statute, its purpose was
to reestablish the long-standing common law right of seamen to sue
for negligence which The Osceola had taken away. As defendants
aptly state, "the essence of a Jones Act suit is still common law
negligence, which has always been the subject of jury trials in Illinois."
	We therefore conclude that Jones Act defendants litigating in
Illinois courts have the right to a trial by jury under our state
constitution. This decision makes it unnecessary to address
defendants' additional argument that the appellate court's
interpretation of the Jones Act creates constitutional problems such as
the right to equal protection under the law. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 492 (1998) (if a case may be decided on other grounds, the
constitutionality of a statute should not be addressed). However, we
agree with professors Robertson & Sturley who, in responding to
arguments made by Jones Act plaintiffs in defending similar claims,
stated:
		"It is nothing short of astonishing to suggest that-in a forum
in which jury trials are generally available at the request of
either party-one party would have a unilateral right to choose
between a jury and a bench trial. Such a unilateral right
would be unprecedented in law *** and contrary to basic
notions of even-handed procedural fairness." 14 U.S.F. Mar.
L.J. at 268.
	Because we have now held that neither the language of the Jones
Act, nor case law interpreting it, nor Illinois law prevent a defendant
in a common law action under that statute to demand a jury trial in
this state, it is clear that the lower courts herein erred in denying
defendants' motion seeking a jury trial on plaintiff's negligence claim.
Defendants are additionally entitled to a jury trial on the
unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure counts of plaintiff's
complaint. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16,
21, 10 L. Ed. 2d 720, 725, 83 S. Ct. 1646, 1650 (1963) (because the
jury is the only tribunal competent to try all types of maritime cases,
a maintenance and cure claim joined with a Jones Act claim must be
submitted to the jury when both arise out of one set of facts). Given
these findings and the necessity that a new trial be held with a jury, it
is unnecessary to address the question of whether the pain, suffering,
disability and disfigurement damages awarded to plaintiff were
excessive.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of both the appellate
court and the circuit court are reversed, and the cause is remanded to
the circuit court for a trial by jury.
Judgments reversed;
cause remanded.
	I agree with the result reached by the majority and with its
analysis except for the reasoning concerning whether Illinois law
provides Jones Act defendants with a right to trial by jury. I believe
that other authority clearly exists supporting the existence of that right
and, therefore, I write separately to explain my view.
	The majority has correctly concluded that "the availability of a
jury trial in Jones Act cases is a question that is properly controlled by
the normal laws of the forum." Slip op. at 14. The opinion, however,
rejects the reasoning of the Hutton majority that section 2-1105 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Code) establishes a Jones Act defendant's
right to trial by jury. Instead, the majority adopts the argument of
dissenting Justice Myerscough and holds that this section "merely
provides the process by which a party may advise the court of its
desire for a jury trial [citation], and says nothing about whether a
party is entitled to a jury trial in any given action." Slip op. at 14.
	The plain language of section 2-1105 compels a contrary
conclusion. The section provides in relevant part:
		"A defendant desirous of a trial by jury must file a demand
therefor not later than the filing of his or her answer.
Otherwise, the party waives a jury. *** If the plaintiff files a
jury demand and thereafter waives a jury, any defendant ***
shall be granted a jury trial upon demand therefor made
promptly after being advised of the waiver ***." 735 ILCS
5/2-1105 (a) (West 2000).
	The waiver provision would, of course, be meaningless unless the
right of any party to a jury trial exists. The section uses the mandatory
term "shall" in commanding the grant of a jury trial to a defendant
asserting that right following a waiver by the plaintiff or another
defendant. All of the provisions in article 2 of the Code apply to
matters of procedure not regulated by other statutes. 735 ILCS
5/1-108(b) (West 2000). Neither the Jones Act nor any other statute
purports to regulate procedure for demanding or waiving jury trial.
Thus, section 2-1105 of the Code necessarily implies Jones Act
defendants, like all tort litigants, have a right to a jury trial.
	In Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127 (1943), this court expressly
recognized the right of defendants to a jury trial in a tort action
seeking money damages. The court found an abuse of discretion in the
trial court's failure to allow a late filing of a jury demand by
defendants when good cause was shown for the delay, emphasizing
the importance of protecting the "jealously guarded right of trial by
jury." Stephens, 383 Ill.  at 135. The court noted that the right to trial
by jury has been guaranteed in Illinois since the state's organization
and has been carried forward in each of our successive constitutions.
Stephens, 383 Ill.  at 132. The court accordingly reversed a substantial
judgment for plaintiffs and remanded the cause for a new trial.
Stephens, 383 Ill.  at 135.
	The Stephens court drew no distinction between a plaintiff's and
a defendant's right to trial by jury, noting that section 5 of article II
the Illinois Constitution of 1870 "gives a litigant a right to a jury
trial." (Emphasis added.) Stephens, 383 Ill.  at 132. Hence, I conclude
that absent an express provision in the Jones Act limiting the right of
jury trial to plaintiffs, the right may be exercised by both plaintiffs and
defendants, just as in other Illinois tort remedies, whether statutory or
at common law. As the majority observes, common law negligence
claims of injured seamen were tried by juries long before the adoption
of the "as heretofore enjoyed" provision in the 1870 constitution. Slip
op. at 15. There is no basis to conclude that Jones Act claims should
be treated differently than common law negligence actions in the
application of section 2-1105 of the Code. Thus, I agree with the
majority's holding, disagreeing only with a portion of its rationale.
	 
	 
1. ï»¿ See 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. at 659-67 
(for a well-reasoned discussion of
Rachal, its history, and the way it and its progeny came to their erroneous
conclusions).