Title: Attorney Grievance v. Shapiro

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Eugene Alan Shapiro, No. 83, 
September Term, 2013 
 
 
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT—DISCIPLINE—INDEFINITE SUSPENSION 
Court of Appeals suspended indefinitely attorney who did not protect adequately a 
client’s claim from expiration as the result of the running of the statute of limitations, 
failed to keep a client informed as to the status of her case, misrepresented the true status 
of the claim to the client for five years, entered into a business transaction with a client 
without advising the client in writing of the desirability of seeking independent counsel 
first, and failed to withdraw immediately after learning of the potential cause of action 
that his client may have had against him.  Such conduct violated Maryland Lawyers’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.8, 1.16, and 8.4(a), (c) and (d). 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
Case No. 24-C-14-000181 
Argued: 5 December 2014 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 83 
 
September Term, 2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
EUGENE ALAN SHAPIRO 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Barbera, C.J., 
  
Harrell, 
Battaglia, 
  
Greene, 
  
Adkins, 
  
McDonald, 
  
Watts, 
 
  
 
JJ. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Harrell, J. 
Battaglia and Watts, JJ., dissent. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Filed:  January 30, 2015 
 
 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 
In this attorney disciplinary action, the Attorney Grievance Commission of 
Maryland (“Petitioner” or “the Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a 
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“PDRA”) against Eugene Alan Shapiro, 
Esquire (“Respondent” or “Shapiro”), charging him with violations of the Maryland 
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) arising from his representation of 
Diana Wisniewski (“Wisniewski”).  Respondent was charged with violating MLRPC 
1.2(a) (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and 
Lawyer),1 1.3 (Diligence),2 1.4 (Communication),3 1.8 (Conflict of Interest: Current 
                                              
1 Rule 1.2(a) provides: 
 
(a) 
Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide 
by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the 
representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the 
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.  A 
lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is 
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.  A 
lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a 
matter. . . . 
 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references in this opinion are to the Maryland 
Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”). 
 
2 Rule 1.3 provides: 
 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing a client. 
 
3 Rule 1.4 provides: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued. . .) 
2 
 
Clients),4 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation),5 8.4(a), (c), and (d) 
(Misconduct).6  The Commission served Respondent on 24 January 2014 with a copy of 
                                                                                                                                                  
(. . . continued) 
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or 
circumstance with respect to which the client’s 
informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is 
required by these Rules;  
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of the matter;  
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information; and  
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation 
on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows 
that the client expects assistance not permitted by 
the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law. 
 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably 
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation. 
 
4 Rule 1.8(a)–(b) provides: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a 
client unless: 
 
 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the 
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing in a manner that can be reasonably 
understood by the client; 
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of 
seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to 
seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the 
transaction; and  
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing 
signed by the client, to the essential terms of the 
transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued. . .) 
3 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
(. . . continued) 
including whether the lawyer is representing the 
client in the transaction. 
 
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to the 
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client 
unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted 
or required by these Rules. 
 
MLRPC 1.8(b), although charged in the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial 
Action, was abandoned apparently by the Petitioner and not considered by the hearing 
judge.  Although Petitioner did not withdraw formally this charged violation, no 
exceptions were filed with regard to the hearing judge’s failure to reach a conclusion as 
to MLRPC 1.8(b).  Accordingly, we will not consider MLRPC 1.8(b) further in this 
opinion.  See Attorney Grievance Commission v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 474 n.8, 813 
A.2d 1145, 1149 n.8 (2002). 
 
5 Rule 1.16(a) and (d) provide: 
 
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not 
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, 
shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: 
 
 
(1) the representation will result in violation of the 
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
or other law;  
(2) the 
lawyer’s 
physical 
or 
mental 
condition 
materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent 
the client; or  
(3) the lawyer is discharged. 
 
* 
 
 
     *  
 
         * 
 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take 
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s 
interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, 
allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering 
papers and property to which the client is entitled and 
refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not 
been earned or incurred.  The lawyer may retain papers 
relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued. . .) 
4 
 
the PDRA, Writ of Summons, and Order for Hearing under Maryland Rule 16-752(a).  
Respondent filed timely an Answer.   
 
The case was assigned to a hearing judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
to conduct an evidentiary hearing and render findings of fact and recommended 
conclusions of law with regard to the charges.  The hearing was conducted on 16 May 
2014.  Respondent was the sole witness called by Petitioner, and testified on his own 
behalf as well.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties submitted proposed written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  In addition, Petitioner responded to 
Respondent’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  In the hearing judge’s 
opinion, the following factual findings were made: 
 
The Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar 
on 14 December 1973.  He currently maintains a personal 
injury practice in Baltimore, Maryland, which consists of 
                                                                                                                                                  
(. . . continued) 
 
 
MLRPC 1.16(d) was abandoned apparently by the Petitioner as well.  See supra 
note 4. 
 
6 Rules 8.4(a), (c), and (d) provide: 
 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or 
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of 
another;  
 
* 
 
 
* 
 
 
*        
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation; [or] 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice[.] 
5 
 
one other practicing attorney and an administrative 
assistant. 
 
In the summer of 2004, the complainant, Diane 
Wisniewski, underwent knee surgery at St. Agnes 
Hospital, which allegedly resulted in an infection.  On 16 
September 2005, Wisniewski retained the Respondent as 
counsel in order to pursue a medical malpractice suit 
against the hospital.  The Respondent agreed to represent 
Wisniewski in accordance with the following fee 
arrangement: the Respondent would receive 33.333% of 
any recovery by settlement without litigation and 40% of 
any recovery awarded following litigation. 
 
Respondent acquired Wisniewski’s medical records 
and sought an expert for the purpose of filing a Certificate 
of Merit.  Respondent testified that he forwarded 
Wisniewski’s medical records to several doctors; however, 
none “seemed to be interested in getting involved.”  
Respondent admits that he did not inform Wisniewski of 
the difficulty he encountered in obtaining an expert to file 
the Certificate of Merit.   
 
On 13 July 2007, Respondent filed a Statement of 
Claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office on behalf 
of Wisniewski in an effort to protect her claim from being 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations date.  At this 
time, the Respondent still had not secured an expert to file 
the Certificate of Merit.  Wisniewski’s claim was 
subsequently dismissed by the Health Claims Arbitration 
Office, as no Certificate of Merit was ever submitted in 
support of the claim.  By the time the Statement of Claim 
was dismissed, the statute of limitations concerning 
Wisniewski’s claim had expired. 
 
Respondent admits that he failed to inform 
Wisniewski that the Health Claims Arbitration Office had 
dismissed her claim and that the statute of limitations on 
the claim had expired.  Respondent concealed this 
information for a period of five years following the 
dismissal of the claim and expiration of the statute of 
limitations, leading Wisniewski to believe that her claim 
was still active.  Respondent admits that he continued his 
representation of Wisniewski during this time, failing to 
inform her of the conflict of interest that existed and her 
right to seek independent counsel. 
6 
 
 
By the fall of 2012, Respondent had still failed to 
inform Wisniewski of the actual status of her case and 
instead told her that a settlement had been reached.  
Respondent could not recall the amount of money for 
which he reported the case had settled.  Respondent then 
met with Wisniewski regarding the fictional settlement, at 
which time he informed her that he did not have the money 
she was to receive from the settlement.  As a result, 
Wisniewski filed a complaint with the Petitioner in late 
October 2012. 
 
Respondent revealed the true status of the medical 
malpractice claim to Wisniewski at some point after 
Wisniewski filed her complaint with the Petitioner.  
Respondent then entered into a “settlement agreement” 
with Wisniewski in December of 2012.  In a handwritten 
note, signed by the Respondent and witnessed by the 
Respondent’s business partner and wife, Ruth M. Schaub, 
the Respondent agreed to pay Wisniewski a lump sum of 
$12,500.00, to be followed by monthly payments of 
$2,000.  The monthly payments were set to begin on 
10 January 2013 and to continue until the total of 
$66,000.00 was paid as “full and final settlement.” 
 
Respondent testified that, at the time of the 
settlement agreement, he orally informed Wisniewski of 
her right to seek independent counsel and offered to 
provide information regarding his malpractice insurance.  
The written agreement, however, lacks any indicia that 
Wisniewski gave her informed consent concerning the 
essential terms of the settlement agreement, Respondent’s 
role in the agreement, or the desirability of retaining 
independent counsel prior to the execution of the 
agreement.  To the extent that any informed consent may 
have been obtained in this regard, it was not confirmed by 
Wisniewski in writing anywhere in this written agreement 
or in the record. 
 
Respondent testified that the $66,000.00 settlement 
amount is what Wisniewski would have netted had the 
case against St. Agnes settled for $100,000.00 (accounting 
for the Respondent’s 1/3 attorney’s fee).  According to the 
Respondent, $66,000.00 represents what Wisniewski 
would have accepted as a settlement had she been 
successful in litigating her claim. 
7 
 
 
Respondent 
testified 
that 
all 
payments 
to 
Wisniewski have been made timely and in accordance with 
the agreement.   
 
(minor alterations added) (citations omitted).  Based on his analysis, the hearing judge 
concluded that the Commission proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Shapiro 
violated MLRPC 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.8(a)(2), 1.16, and 8.4(a), (c), and (d).  The 
hearing judge’s conclusions of law with respect to each of the claimed violations will be 
discussed in turn below.   
Petitioner filed with us a single written exception to the hearing judge’s Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  In its exception, Petitioner argued that the hearing 
judge should have concluded that Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that 
the terms of the settlement agreement were unfair or unreasonable, leading to a violation 
of MLRPC 1.8(a)(1).  Respondent filed no exceptions, timely or otherwise.     
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
 
 
The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters.  
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kremer, 432 Md. 325, 334, 68 A.3d 862, 867 (2013).  
Accordingly, we “conduct an independent review of the record.”  Attorney Grievance 
Commission v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 763 (2002).  “We determine, 
ultimately, whether an attorney has committed the misconduct charged by the Attorney 
Grievance Commission.”  Attorney Grievance Commission v. Maignan, 390 Md. 287, 
292, 888 A.2d 344, 347 (2005).  In accordance with Maryland Rule 16-752, we refer 
petitions for disciplinary action to a circuit court judge to act as our hearing officer, for 
that judge to receive evidence and thereafter present to the Court findings of fact and 
8 
 
recommended conclusions of law.  See Maignan, 390 Md. at 292–93, 888 A.2d at 347.  
Exceptions may be taken by the parties to the findings of fact, proposed conclusions of 
law, or both.  If no exceptions are filed with respect to the hearing judge’s findings of 
fact, we may “treat the findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining 
appropriate sanctions, if any.”  Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A).  If exceptions are filed, we 
must determine whether the findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  Md. Rule 16-
759(b)(2)(B); see Attorney Grievance Commission v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387, 397, 842 
A.2d 42, 47 (2004) (“We . . . accept[] the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless clearly 
erroneous.”). 
When assessing the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we “give due regard to the 
opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”  Md. Rule 16-
759(b)(2)(B).  We review the judge’s recommended conclusions of law without 
deference, a standard referred to sometimes as de novo.  Md. Rule 16-759(b)(1); see 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Greenleaf, 438 Md. 151, 156, 91 A.3d 1066, 1069 
(2014) (“In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error the 
hearing judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference the hearing judge’s 
conclusions of law.”); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Moeller, 427 Md. 66, 73, 46 
A.3d 407, 411 (2012) (“With respect to a hearing judge’s conclusions of law, no 
deference applies and we review those conclusions de novo.”); Attorney Grievance 
Commission v. Patterson, 421 Md. 708, 724, 28 A.3d 1196, 1205 (2011).   
9 
 
Inasmuch as no party filed exceptions to the factual findings of the hearing judge, 
we accept them as established.  We turn then to consideration of the recommended 
conclusions of law and sanction, if necessary. 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. MLRPC 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority  
Between Client and Lawyer) 
 
MLRPC 1.2(a) provides: 
 
(a) 
Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide 
by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the 
representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the 
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.  A 
lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is 
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.  A 
lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a 
matter. . . . 
 
 
The hearing judge concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent 
violated Rule 1.2 “because Respondent’s failure to inform [Wisniewski] that her claim 
before the Health Claims Arbitration Office had been dismissed and that the statute of 
limitations had expired deprived [Wisniewski] of her ability to make an informed 
decision as to the objectives of the representation.”   
 
In order for a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
the representation, the client must be able to make informed decisions as to the objectives 
of the representation.  In order for a client to make informed decisions as to the objectives 
of the representation, an attorney must give the client honest updates regarding the status 
of his or her case.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sperling, an attorney violated 
MLRPC 1.2 when he failed to inform (for several years) a client that her case had been 
10 
 
dismissed.  432 Md. 471, 493, 69 A.3d 478, 491 (2013).  In that matter, an associate 
attorney in a law firm was assigned responsibility for a client’s case and tasked with 
attending pre-trial conferences, drafting discovery, and engaging and interacting with a 
process server.  Sperling, 432 Md. at 475, 69 A.3d at 480.  The defendant in the matter 
was never served with the initial complaint, resulting in dismissal of the suit.  Id.  Two 
years later, Sperling’s father, a partner in the law firm, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
of Dismissal, which was granted.  Id.  The defendant, yet to be served, failed to appear at 
three pre-trial conferences.  Id.  The case was dismissed again.  Sperling, 432 Md. at 
475–76, 69 A.3d at 480.  The attorney did not inform his client of either dismissal.  Id.  
Eight years after the second dismissal—and almost ten years after the firm took the case 
originally—the client emailed Sperling to inquire about the status of her case.  Sperling, 
432 Md. at 476, 69 A.3d at 480.  He responded by assuring his client that the case was 
“still making its rounds with the [court] clerk and she assures me she is working on it,” 
but did not tell her that her case had been dismissed.  Id.   
The attorney argued that this conduct did not violate MLRPC because any 
alternative or choice that the client would have had after the case had been dismissed 
would not have led to a successful outcome for her.  Sperling, 432 Md. at 493, 69 A.3d at 
491.  We held that MLRPC 1.2(a) “does not require that a client’s decision regarding the 
objectives of the representation necessarily result in a successful outcome.  It was [the 
client’s] choice that was offended by [Sperling’s] failure to inform her of the dismissal.”  
Id.  Accordingly, we found that MLRPC 1.2(a) was violated.  Id.   
11 
 
 
In at least three other modern cases, attorneys violated MLRPC 1.2(a) by failing to 
inform clients of the status of their cases.  Attorney Grievance v. Davy, 435 Md. 674, 80 
A.3d 322 (2013); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 44 A.3d 344 
(2012); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209, 892 A.2d 533 
(2006).  In Reinhardt, the attorney took a case, and filed a complaint on behalf of his 
client, but failed to serve the defendant with the summons.  Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 215, 
892 A.2d at 536.  Approximately six months later, the client inquired as to the status of 
her case.  Id.  The attorney did not respond, but instead put the file in a briefcase, and 
later put the briefcase in a closet, not realizing that he had left the file in the briefcase.  Id.  
He did not respond to the client’s repeated inquiries, nor did he take any actions to 
prevent the dismissal of the lawsuit.  Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 215–16, 892 A.2d at 536–37.  
The attorney did not conduct an “aggressive” search for the lost file for approximately 
four years.  Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 216, 892 A.2d at 537.  When he located the file, he did 
not tell his client that he had misplaced it and took no action on her case in four years, but 
rather indicated in a letter to the client that there was an “issue” securing service on the 
Defendants.  Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 216–17, 892 A.2d at 537.  We concluded that this 
behavior constituted a violation of Rule 1.2(a) as the attorney “fail[ed] to follow the 
client’s instruction to pursue [her] case and inform her of the status of the case.”  
Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 220, 222, 892 A.2d at 539–40.   
The misconduct in Brown “mirror[ed] closely” the misconduct in Reinhardt.  
Brown, 426 Md. at 320, 44 A.3d at 357.  In Brown, two cases were dismissed for lack of 
12 
 
prosecution.  Id.  The attorney failed to inform his clients of those dismissals and ignored 
their repeated requests for information.  Id. 
In Davy, an attorney filed a complaint on behalf of a client in the after-hours filing 
box at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  Davy, 435 Md. at 685, 80 
A.3d at 328.  The federal court mailed a rejection of the complaint to the attorney, 
explaining that the complaint was rejected because the attorney failed to renew her 
membership in the federal court’s bar, and also failed to include a cover sheet, summons, 
and disc with the complaint.  Davy, 435 Md. at 686, 80 A.3d at 328.  The attorney called 
the federal court about the rejection of the complaint and spoke with three people 
regarding the rejection, but nonetheless emailed her client telling her that the complaint 
had been filed on time and suggested further that the summons was about to be issued 
and would be served subsequently.  Davy, 435 Md. at 686–87, 80 A.3d at 329.  A few 
weeks later, the client visited the federal court personally, and was told that there was no 
case pending in her name.  Davy, 435 Md. at 687, 80 A.3d at 329.  The attorney 
continued to work on the matter even though the client accused the attorney of breaking 
their agreement and requested her money back.  Davy, 435 Md. at 688–89, 80 A.3d at 
329–30.  Such behavior violated MLRPC 1.2(a).  Davy, 435 Md. at 699, 80 A.3d at 336.   
 
We agree with the hearing judge that Shapiro’s conduct violated MLRPC 1.2(a) as 
he failed to keep Wisniewski informed as to the status of her case and, accordingly, 
deprived her of the opportunity to make informed decisions as to the objective of the 
representation.  In our view, his sustained deceit surpasses the grievous MLRPC 1.2 
13 
 
violations of the attorneys in Reinhardt, Brown, and Davy and rivals that of the attorney 
in Sperling.   
B. MLRPC 1.3 (Diligence) 
MLRPC 1.3 provides: 
 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing a client. 
 
 
The hearing judge concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent 
violated Rule 1.3  
as a result of his failure to promptly act after learning that the 
Health Claims Arbitration Office dismissed Wisniewski’s 
claim and that the statute of limitations had run.  While the 
Respondent could have attempted to reopen the case, 
researched 
whether 
there 
were 
means 
of 
legally 
circumventing the running of the statute of limitations, 
investigated whether there was a basis for asserting that the 
statute of limitations had not tolled, or at the least, informed 
Wisniewski of the situation, he instead chose to do nothing 
but hide the true status of the case from Wisniewski, a clear 
violation of Rule 1.3.  
 
(minor alterations added) (citations omitted). 
 
The “decision to do nothing promptly when [an attorney] learn[s] the case was 
dismissed” violates MLRPC 1.3.  Sperling, 432 Md. at 491, 69 A.3d at 489.  In Sperling, 
when an attorney learned that his client’s case had been dismissed, he failed to file 
immediately a motion to reopen; neither did he research whether there were means to 
circumvent legally the running of the statute of limitations, nor investigate whether there 
was another basis for arguing that the statute of limitations had not tolled.  Id.  His failure 
to take those steps constituted a violation of MLRPC 1.3.  Id.  Moreover, a failure to 
14 
 
protect against the expiration of the statute of limitations regarding a client’s claim may 
violate MLRPC 1.3.  Brown, 426 Md. at 321, 44 A.3d at 358.  In Brown, two clients’ law 
suits were dismissed due to the attorney’s “laggard representation.”  Id.  Prior to the 
dismissal of their suits, the applicable statute of limitations expired on the claims.  Id.  
The failure to take active steps to protect against such an outcome constituted a violation 
of MLRPC 1.3.  Id.  Also, in Kremer, where clients were unable to learn of the status of 
their case after repeated attempts to reach their attorney, we held that the failure to keep 
one’s client informed of his or her case violates MLRPC 1.3 and 1.4.  432 Md. at 335–36, 
68 A.3d at 868–69; see Attorney Grievance Commission v. Walker-Turner, 428 Md. 214, 
229, 51 A.3d 553, 562 (2012) (“Walker-Turner violated MLRPC 1.3 also by failing to 
ascertain the status of his clients’ case after he missed the trial.”); Attorney Grievance 
Commission v. Park, 427 Md. 180, 192–93, 46 A.3d 1153, 1160 (2012) (holding that a 
lawyer’s failure to keep clients informed as to the status of the applications and his failure 
to respond to the clients’ inquiries violated MLRPC 1.3).     
 
In the present case, Respondent violated MLRPC 1.3 by failing to act more 
promptly to prevent the dismissal of Wisniewski’s claim or to reinvigorate the case by 
some other means.  Respondent did not protect adequately Wisniewski’s claim from 
expiring due to the running of the applicable statute of limitations.  Finally, Respondent 
failed to advise Wisniewski of his apparent inability to find a willing doctor, such that 
Wisniewski could make decisions or assist with regard to locating a willing doctor before 
her claim lapsed.  These shortcomings violate MLRPC 1.3. 
   
15 
 
C. MLRPC 1.4 (Communication) 
MLRPC 1.4 provides: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
 
 
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or 
circumstance with respect to which the client’s 
informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is 
required by these Rules;  
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of the matter;  
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information; and  
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation 
on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows 
that the client expects assistance not permitted by 
the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law. 
 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably 
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representation. 
 
 
The hearing judge concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent 
violated Rule 1.4 based on his  
failure to inform Wisniewski that her claim had been 
dismissed, along with the continued misrepresentation over a 
five year period that the case was open and being pursued, 
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.4(a) and (b).  Furthermore, 
Respondent failed to inform Wisniewski that he was having 
difficulty in retaining an expert for the purpose of filing a 
Certificate of Merit.  His failure to keep her informed 
deprived her of the opportunity to seek other counsel who 
may have had success in procuring a Certificate of Merit. 
 
(minor alterations added) (citations omitted).   
 
Attorneys violate MLRPC 1.4 when they fail to communicate with their clients 
and keep them informed of the status of their legal matters.  Attorney Grievance 
16 
 
Commission v. Kwarteng, 411 Md. 652, 658, 660, 984 A.2d 865, 868–69 (2009).  The 
misrepresentation of the status of a case to a client constitutes a violation of MLRPC 
1.4(a).  Sperling, 432 Md. at 494, 69 A.3d at 491; Attorney Grievance Commission v. 
London, 427 Md. 328, 352, 47 A.3d 986, 1000 (2012); Attorney Grievance v. Steinberg, 
395 Md. 337, 368–69, 910 A.2d 429, 447–48 (2006).  The attorney in Sperling concealed 
from his client the fact that her case had been dismissed, instead misrepresenting to the 
client that her case was being pursued.  Sperling, 432 Md. at 494, 69 A.3d at 491.  Such 
behavior violated MLRPC 1.4(a).  Id.; see Brown, 426 Md. at 321–22, 44 A.3d at 358 
(violating MLRPC 1.4(a) by failing to notify various clients of discovery sanctions and 
the dismissal of a claim, as well as by failing to respond to case-status requests).  MLRPC 
1.4(b) is violated similarly by a lack of communication, as clients are unable to make 
informed decisions regarding their cases if their attorney has not communicated fully 
with them.  A failure to inform a client about a pending or granted motion to dismiss 
violates MLRPC 1.4(b), as clients are denied the opportunity to make informed decisions 
regarding the best course of conduct for their claims.  Sperling, 432 Md. at 494, 69 A.3d 
at 491; see Attorney Grievance Commission v. De La Paz, 418 Md. 534, 554, 16 A.3d 
181, 193 (2011) (violating MLRPC 1.4 by failing to inform a client that the case had been 
dismissed), Attorney Grievance Commission v. Fox, 417 Md. 504, 517, 532, 11 A.3d 762, 
769, 778 (2010) (violating MLRPC 1.4 by not knowing that a client’s case was dismissed 
and accordingly not communicating that fact to the client).   
 
Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to communicate with Wisniewski and 
by misrepresenting actively to her for years that her claim was active and still being 
17 
 
pursued.  She was unable to make an informed decision regarding her representation 
because Respondent did not present her with relevant and critical information.   
D. MLRPC 1.8 (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules) 
MLRPC 1.8(a) provides: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a 
client unless: 
 
 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 
acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the 
client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in 
writing in a manner that can be reasonably 
understood by the client; 
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of 
seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to 
seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the 
transaction; and  
(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing 
signed by the client, to the essential terms of the 
transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction, 
including whether the lawyer is representing the 
client in the transaction. 
 
 
With regard to MLRPC 1.8, the hearing judge concluded, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that Respondent 
violated Rule 1.8 as a result of his settlement arrangement 
with Wisniewski.  While the Respondent was not prohibited 
outright from entering into this kind of arrangement with 
Wisniewski, Respondent was required to inform Wisniewski 
in writing of the desirability of seeking independent counsel 
prior to entering into a settlement agreement with 
Respondent.  While Respondent testified that he orally 
advised Wisniewski, there is no indication in the record, nor 
does Respondent anywhere assert, that Wisniewski was ever 
given written notice.  The record is similarly lacking indicia 
that Wisniewski gave her informed consent in writing, as 
18 
 
required by paragraph (a)(3) and in accordance with Rule 
1.0(f).[7] . . . [N]o writing exists in which Wisniewski gives 
her informed consent to the agreement.  The only writing 
offered to this Court pertaining to the settlement arrangement 
was Respondent’s Exhibit 5, an agreement handwritten by the 
Respondent and signed only by the Respondent and his 
business partner. 
 
(minor alterations added) (citations omitted).   
1.  MLRPC 1.8(a)(2)’s Written Disclosure Requirement 
 
The parties disagreed in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
to the scope and level of detail that would have been necessary in a theoretical disclosure 
for Respondent to have acted in accordance with MLRPC 1.8.  The hearing judge felt 
(appropriately) that it was not necessary to address that issue, as there was, in fact, no 
disclosure in writing of any kind.  Thus, we are not compelled to define here the lowest 
threshold for what may constitute an appropriate disclosure.  What is appropriate for us to 
iterate (or reiterate, put more correctly) as guidance is that the transaction and terms of 
such a business transaction must be “fair and reasonable . . . [and] fully disclosed and 
transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client.”  
MLRPC 1.8(a)(1); see Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ober, 350 Md. 616, 627–28, 
714 A.2d 856, 862 (1998) (“We need not address the fairness of the transactions to [the 
                                              
7 Rule 1.0(f) provides: 
 
“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a 
proposed 
course 
of 
conduct 
after 
the 
lawyer 
has 
communicated adequate information and explanation about 
the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to 
the proposed course of conduct.   
19 
 
client] as [r]espondent did not advise [the client] to seek the advice of independent 
counsel with regard to the loan as required by [an older iteration of MLRPC 1.8].”).   
MLRPC 1.8 “is intended to prevent ‘overreaching’ when a lawyer engages in a 
financial transaction with a client, given a lawyer’s skill and training and the relationship 
of trust with a client.”  Attorney Grievance Commission v. Lawson, 428 Md. 102, 115, 50 
A.3d 1196, 1203 (2012).  In Lawson, an attorney and his client entered into a settlement 
agreement concerning a disputed attorney’s fee, which gave the attorney a lien on the 
proceeds of the client’s marital property settlement.  Id.  The client had poor eyesight and 
was unable to understand the relevant law or “legalese” of the agreement itself.  Id.  The 
client was not advised of the desirability of seeking independent counsel, nor was he 
given an opportunity to do so and, accordingly, the client did not give informed consent, 
written or otherwise, to the essential terms.  Id.  Lawson violated MLRPC 1.8 as a result.  
Id.  In Steinberg, an attorney violated MLRPC 1.8 when he sought to have his client, 
without the assistance of independent counsel, execute a release of any legal malpractice 
claims against the attorney.  395 Md. at 365, 910 A.2d at 445.  He neither advised her of 
the desirability of obtaining counsel, nor did he allow her to do so: when she entered the 
room for a meeting with counsel a “Release in Full” was sitting on the table, ready to be 
signed.  Id.   
 
We agree with the hearing judge that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.8 by not 
advising Wisniewski in writing of the desirability of seeking independent counsel prior to 
entering into the agreement with Respondent.  Any advice that may have been given 
20 
 
orally by Respondent falls well short of satisfying the clear requirements of MLRPC 
1.8(a)(2).    
2.  MLRPC 1.8(a)(1)’s “Fair and Reasonable” Requirement 
Petitioner argued implicitly in its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
that the facial terms of the settlement agreement were a violation of MLRPC 1.8(a)(1).  
The hearing judge declined to conclude that the terms of the settlement agreement 
constituted an additional, independent violation of MLRPC 1.8(a)(1).  He refrained from 
reaching such a conclusion of law because:  
[T]here is insufficient information on the record from which 
to evaluate whether the terms of the settlement agreement 
were unfair or unreasonable to Wisniewski.  Petitioner 
offered no evidence as to the specific nature or potential value 
of Wisniewski’s medical malpractice claim against St. Agnes 
Hospital, and therefore, the Court has no objective basis on 
which to make its determination on this theory.   
 
(minor alterations added). 
Petitioner took exception to the judge’s conclusion that Bar Counsel failed to meet 
its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the terms of the settlement 
agreement were unfair or unreasonable to Wisniewski, in violation of MLRPC 1.8(a)(1).  
Petitioner based its exception on “the inherent unfairness concerning the benefit 
Respondent received from the settlement of a claim that arose from his mishandling of 
that client’s case.”  Bar Counsel argues that there was sufficient evidence to compel the 
hearing judge to conclude that the terms of the settlement agreement were unfair patently 
in a way that violated MLRPC 1.8(a)(1).  Bar Counsel rests its argument on three facts: 
(1) Respondent took a 1/3 attorney’s fee from the settlement for services that, according 
21 
 
to Petitioner, he did not perform; (2) the agreement capped Respondent’s liability to 
Wisniewksi as a “full and final settlement,” without including provisions as to the pay-
out period for interest or other consideration for interest-free repayments; and (3) the lack 
of written evidence of Wisniewski’s informed consent, confirmed in writing.   
Petitioner argues in its exception that it satisfied the initial burden of making a 
prima facie showing that the Respondent entered into an unfair business transaction with 
his client and, thus, it became Respondent’s burden to demonstrate in his case-in-chief at 
trial that, notwithstanding the facts and provisions mentioned above, the settlement was 
fair and reasonable.  As Petitioner sees it, because no such evidence was produced at trial 
by Respondent, the hearing judge was wrong not to have concluded that Respondent 
violated MLRPC 1.8(a)(1) based on the terms of the settlement agreement alone.   
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-757(b), Petitioner “has the burden of proving the 
averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.”  We have not had much 
occasion previously to discuss in any depth, with regard to MLRPC 1.8(a)(1), the burdens 
of production and proof regarding whether agreements between attorneys and clients are 
fair and reasonable.  We have noted that, when attorneys and clients enter into contracts, 
“‘the law makes a presumption against the attorney and in favor of the client.  In such 
cases the onus is on the attorney to prove the entire bona fides and fairness of the 
transaction.’”  Attorney Grievance Commission v. Korotki, 318 Md. 646, 666, 569 A.2d 
1224, 1234 (1990) (quoting Merryman v. Euler, 59 Md. 588–90 (1883)).  In questions 
regarding whether the transaction and terms of a business transaction with a client are fair 
and reasonable to the client: 
22 
 
[T]he attorney has the burden of showing, not only that he 
used no undue influence, but that he gave his client all the 
information and advice which it would have been his duty to 
give if he himself had not been interested, and that the 
transaction was as beneficial to the client as it would have 
been had the client dealt with a stranger. 
 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 506, 813 A.2d 1145, 1168 
(2002) (quoting Attorney Grievance Commission v. Snyder, 368 Md. 242, 265–66, 793 
A.2d 515, 529 (2002)).8  The attorney bears also “a significant burden to prove the 
fairness of an agreement concerning fees made with his client after services have been 
rendered in the course of the confidential relationship of attorney and client.”  Attorney 
Grievance v. Eisenstein, 333 Md. 464, 478, 635 A.2d 1327, 1334 (1994).  In situations 
where the client has not been “advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and [was 
not] given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on 
the transaction,” MLRPC 1.8(a)(2), we presume that the agreement between the attorney 
and client is not a fair and reasonable one.  Respondents may overcome this presumption 
                                              
8 In McLaughlin, the respondent violated an earlier iteration of MLRPC 1.8 based on the 
standard terms of his fee agreement, which created loan agreements, when his clients 
were not advised that they should seek the advice of separate counsel.  372 Md. 467, 813 
A.2d 1145.  The earlier iteration of MLRPC 1.8 provided:  
 
A lawyer shall not enter into a business, financial or property 
transaction with a client unless: (1) the transaction is fair and 
equitable to the client; and (2) the client is advised to seek the 
advice of independent counsel in the transaction and is given 
a reasonable opportunity to do so. 
 
McLaughlin, 372 Md. at 505, 813 A.2d at 1167–68. 
23 
 
by adducing a prima facie case that the agreement is fair and reasonable, despite the lack 
of a written disclosure.   
 
In this matter, the hearing judge was disinclined to find a separate violation of 
1.8(a)(1) based on the state of the record before him.  Based on the record and in light of 
the guidance provided above, we need not determine here whether the terms and 
conditions of the agreement between Respondent and Wisniewski were fair and 
reasonable.  Petitioner’s exception is moot, as the hearing judge concluded previously—
and we agree—that Respondent violated clearly MLRPC 1.8(a)(2) by not providing 
Wisniewski with an appropriate written disclosure.  This became a violation of MLRPC 
1.8(a), in and of itself, as the sub-parts of MLRPC 1.8(a) are expressed in the 
conjunctive.  Thus, as charged in the PDRA, Shapiro was found to have violated MLRPC 
1.8(a).  The unit of prosecution under MLRPC 1.8(a) is but a single unit as regards a 
single transaction, regardless of whether all or any one of sub-parts (1), (2), and/or (3) are 
proven. 
E. MLRPC 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation) 
MLRPC 1.16(a) provides: 
 
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not 
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, 
shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: 
 
 
(1) the representation will result in violation of the 
Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
or other law;  
(2) the 
lawyer’s 
physical 
or 
mental 
condition 
materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent 
the client; or  
(3) the lawyer is discharged. 
24 
 
 
The hearing judge concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent 
violated MLRPC 1.16 by “failing to withdraw as counsel once he became aware that the 
statute of limitations had run on Wisniewski’s medical malpractice claim.”   
 
Attorneys must withdraw from representation of a client once their interests 
become “untenably at odds with [their] client[s’].”  Attorney Grievance v. Bleecker, 414 
Md. 147, 173, 994 A.2d 928, 943 (2010).  In Bleecker, the attorney filed accidentally a 
complaint averring that the date an accident occurred was one year later than the actual 
date.  Bleecker, 414 Md. at 159, 994 A.2d at 935.  After he discovered the mistake, and 
realized that the applicable statute of limitations expired actually, he failed to inform her 
of his mistake.  Id.  Nonetheless, he continued to represent the client on other matters.  
Bleecker, 414 Md. at 173, 994 A.2d at 943.  We concluded that the attorney “was 
obligated to withdraw from the representation, when he became aware that the statute of 
limitations had expired,” and he was also “obligated to advise [his client] to seek 
independent counsel concerning a potential malpractice claim.”  Id.; see Attorney 
Grievance Commission v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 581, 595, 876 A.2d 642, 651, 660 
(2005) (violating MLRPC 1.16(a)(1) by “fail[ing] to withdraw from representation of 
[her clients] after her representation gave rise to their cause of action against her”).  Like 
the attorneys in Bleecker and Pennington, Respondent failed to withdraw immediately 
after learning of the potential cause of action that Wisniewski may have had against him.  
This ethical lapse violated MLRPC 1.16.     
 
 
25 
 
F. MLRPC 8.4 (Misconduct) 
MLRPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d) provide: 
 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or 
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of 
another;  
 
* 
 
 
* 
 
 
*        
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation; [or] 
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice[.] 
 
 
In light of his conclusions that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and 
(b), 1.8(a), and 1.16, the hearing judge concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(a).  The hearing judge concluded further that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(c) and (d): 
By his own admission, Respondent concealed from 
Wisniewski the true status of her medical malpractice case 
from late 2007 until late 2012.  In these five years, 
Respondent led Wisniewski to believe that her case was 
active and being pursued by the Respondent.  Respondent 
went even further in misleading Wisniewski in the fall of 
2012, when he informed her that the case had been settled 
when no such settlement had occurred.  Such action 
constitutes a clear violation of paragraph (c) of the Rule.  
Finally, . . . Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d) by neglecting to 
keep Wisniewski informed about the status of her case and to 
perform his duty as counsel with promptness and diligence.  
Such conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice, as 
it “tends to bring the legal profession in disrepute.” 
 
26 
 
(minor alterations added) (citations omitted) (quoting Brown, 426 Md. at 324–25, 44 
A.3d at 360 (quoting Attorney Grievance Commission v. Rose, 391 Md. 101, 111, 892 
A.2d 469, 475 (2006))). 
 
The hearing judge noted appropriately that MLRPC 8.4(a) is violated when other 
Rules of Professional conduct are breached.  See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Van 
Nelson, 425 Md. 344, 363, 40 A.3d 1039, 1050 (2012).  As Respondent violated MLRPC 
1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.8, and 1.16, he violated MLRPC 8.4(a) as well. 
 
MLRPC 8.4(c) “prohibits an attorney from, among other things, making 
misrepresentations to his or her client.”  Brown, 426 Md. at 323, 44 A.3d at 359.  In 
Brown, the respondent told his client that her case was still pending in arbitration when in 
fact it had been dismissed for two years.  Brown, 426 Md. at 324, 44 A.3d at 359–60; see 
Bleecker, 414 Md. at 169, 994 A.2d at 941 (finding a violation of MLRPC 8.4(c) where 
an attorney led his client to believe that her case had not been dismissed).  Direct 
misrepresentations, such as the one that Respondent in this matter made to Wisniewski 
when he led her to believe that her case was still active, violate MLRPC 8.4(c).  The 
attorney in Brown misrepresented the status of a client’s case several times to the client, 
Brown, 426 Md. at 324, 44 A.3d at 360, much as Respondent in this matter continued to 
misrepresent the status of Wisniewski’s case to her for approximately five years.  
 
Attorneys violate MLRPC 8.4(d) when they fail to keep their clients advised of the 
status of the representation and represent diligently their clients’ interests.  See Bleecker, 
414 Md. at 175, 994 Md. at 944–45.  The hearing judge noted rightly that such conduct is 
27 
 
prejudicial to the administration of justice in that it tends to bring the legal profession into 
disrepute.  See Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 222, 892 A.2d at 540–41.  
IV. SANCTION 
 
We now turn to the difficult and serious task of determining the appropriate 
sanction.  Where, as here, MLRPC 8.4(c) is the flagship of a flotilla of violations, our 
cases of arguably similar ilk are strewn over the sanctions landscape.  Petitioner 
recommends that Respondent be disbarred.  Respondent argues that a less severe sanction 
is more appropriate.   
 
We commence by noting some general principles, and shall work from them to 
specific cases.  The chief purpose of any sanction is to protect the public.  Attorney 
Grievance v. Chapman, 430 Md. 238, 277, 60 A.3d 25, 49 (2013); Park, 427 Md. at 195, 
46 A.3d at 1161; Attorney Grievance Commission v. Paul, 423 Md. 268, 283, 31 A.3d 
512, 521 (2011); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Culver, 371 Md. 265, 277, 808 A.2d 
1251, 1258 (2002).  Sanctions protect the public in two ways: “through deterrence of the 
type of conduct which will not be tolerated, and by removing those unfit to continue in 
the practice of law from the rolls of those authorized to practice in this State.”  Attorney 
Grievance Commission v. Usiak, 418 Md. 667, 689, 18 A.3d 1, 14 (2011) (quoting 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 268–69, 920 A.2d 458, 465 
(2007)).  Disciplinary proceedings are  
a catharsis for the profession, intended to ensure the integrity 
of the bar and to prevent the transgressions of an individual 
lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute.  Therefore, the 
public interest is served when sanctions designed to effect 
general and specific deterrence are imposed on an attorney who 
28 
 
violates the disciplinary rules, and those sanctions demonstrate 
to members of the legal profession the type of conduct that will 
not be tolerated.   
 
Brown, 426 Md. at 325, at 360–61 (quoting Paul, 423 Md. at 283–85, 31 A.3d at 521–
22).  Sanctions are also designed to effect general and specific deterrence.  Attorney 
Grievance Commission v. Litman, 440 Md. 205, 216, 101 A.3d 1050, 1057 (2014); see 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 45, 85 A.3d 117, 143 (2014) 
(“Our guiding principle in determining sanctions for ethical violations is our interest in 
protecting the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.”  (internal 
quotations omitted)).  We look not merely to the number of rules broken, but to the 
lawyer’s conduct.  See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Briscoe, 357 Md. 554, 568, 
745 A.2d 1037, 1044 (2000).  “Our selection of an appropriate sanction is guided by the 
nature and gravity of the violation, the intent with which the violation was committed, 
and the particular circumstances surrounding each case, including aggravating and 
mitigating factors.”  Park, 427 Md. at 195, 46 A.3d at 1161. 
We recognize that, while “[m]ost lawyers prize their integrity . . . . [h]uman frailty 
being what it is, not all lawyers tell the truth all the time.  It falls to this Court in its 
capacity as the principal regulator of the legal profession in Maryland to distinguish those 
untruths that violate the MLRPC from those that do not.”  Attorney Grievance 
Commission v. Coppock, 432 Md. 629, 631–32, 69 A.3d 1092, 1093 (2013).  In cases 
where an attorney’s repeated material misrepresentations constitute a pattern of deceitful 
conduct, as opposed to but an isolated instance, the appropriate sanction is often 
disbarment.  See Steinberg, 395 Md. at 373, 910 A.2d at 450 (“We long have held that 
29 
 
repeated acts of dishonest, fraudulent, or misleading behavior may warrant a sanction of 
disbarment.”).  “We have not, however, always found disbarment to be the appropriate 
sanction where there is misrepresentation involved, especially where misappropriation of 
money was not involved.”  Attorney Grievance Commission v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646–
47, 790 A.2d 621, 628 (2002); see Sperling, 432 Md. at 491, 493, 497–98, 69 A.3d at 
489, 491, 493–94; Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 225, 892 A.2d at 542 (“Every 
misrepresentation, however, does not call for disbarment.”). 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Sperling resembles most closely the facts and 
circumstances of the present case.  432 Md. 471, 69 A.3d 478.  In Sperling, after a 
client’s case was dismissed, Sperling failed to research whether there was any way to 
avoid the running of the statute of limitations or whether there was a tolling argument, 
but instead, two years later, he and his supervising partner filed two motions to reopen 
(neither of which was successful).  Sperling, 432 Md. at 475–76, 491, 69 A.3d at 480, 
489.  The respondent did not tell his client that her case had been dismissed initially, or 
that the motions to reopen had been filed.  Id.  Eight years after the case was dismissed a 
second time, when the client inquired as to the status of her case, the respondent told her 
that the case was still active and that the court clerk was working on it.  Id.   
Sperling’s misrepresentations were not limited to the client.  Sperling made 
material misrepresentations to the court when he told a judge that he had contacted the 
court clerk several times to discover the status of the case when he in fact had not.  
Sperling, 432 Md. at 491–92, 69 A.3d at 490.  He submitted motions and affidavits to the 
court repeating these misrepresentations.  Id.  We determined that the respondent made 
30 
 
those misstatements to the court in an attempt to mislead the court into granting the 
motions to reopen.  Id.  We noted several aggravating factors in Sperling: the attorney 
lied to the court in order to “place blame on others [the court clerk],” he lied multiple 
times to multiple parties, he testified falsely during an evidentiary hearing before the 
circuit court, and he downplayed consistently the significance of his misrepresentations to 
his client and the court.  Sperling, 432 Md. at 496–97, 69 A.3d at 492–93.  We concluded 
that an indefinite suspension was the appropriate sanction.  Sperling, 432 Md. at 498, 69 
A.3d at 494.  (“[The respondent’s] misconduct involved one case and one client, but was 
marred by his lack of competence, diligence, and lack of candor with his client and the 
court, certainly grievous actions.”); see Attorney Grievance Commission v. Brown, 415 
Md. 269, 278–79, 281–82, 999 A.2d 1040, 1046–48 (2010) (suspending an attorney for 
90 days who was dishonest deliberately on three separate occasions to his client and Bar 
Counsel, misrepresented actions that he had taken on a client’s case, and mishandled 
client funds, but had no previous instances of misconduct, did not use the client funds for 
personal gain, and took responsibility for his actions ultimately, helping a third party with 
remediation efforts free-of-charge).  But see Bleecker, 414 Md. at 169–76, 994 A.2d at 
941–45 (disbarring an attorney where the case was dismissed and he missed the statute of 
limitations deadline on a client’s claim, but did not tell the client, did not withdraw from 
representation once a conflict of interest arose between himself and his client, failed to 
cooperate with Bar Counsel, and failed to correct a material mistake on pleadings filed 
with the court).  In the present case, Shapiro misrepresented to Wisniewski the true status 
of her case for five years before telling her that her case had “settled.”  Although Shapiro 
31 
 
violated also MLRPC 1.8, his misrepresentations to Wisniewski were for a shorter period 
of time than those in Sperling; he made no misrepresentations to a court; and has not 
attempted to downplay the significance of his violations.  
We deemed indefinite suspension appropriate also where an attorney acted 
dishonestly and made misrepresentations to his client out of “absolute embarrassment.”  
Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 223–24, 892 A.2d at 541.  Reinhardt told his client that he was 
working on the client’s case when actually he had lost the file and had taken no action on 
the matter.  Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 222, 892 A.2d at 540.  Four years passed before the 
attorney found the file and concealed the delay by indicating to the client that there had 
been an “issue” securing service on the defendants.  Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 216–17, 892 
A.2d at 537.  We characterized his actions as “dishonest,” in the sense that the 
“respondent exhibited a lack of probity, integrity and straightforwardness.”  Reinhardt, 
391 Md. at 222, 892 A.2d at 540.  We noted at the outset that “lying to a client reflects 
most negatively on the legal profession.  It goes without saying that a lawyer should not 
lie to the client about the status of the client’s case.”  Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 225, 892 
A.2d at 542.  Reinhardt’s sanction was an indefinite suspension, however, because he 
cooperated fully with Bar Counsel, negotiated a restitution plan, and worked with the 
client to settle the underlying matter.  Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 224, 892 A.2d at 541.  Even 
though there was an aggravating consideration, i.e., Reinhardt had been suspended 
indefinitely previously, we concluded that disbarment was not warranted as there was “no 
evidence that he acted out of fraudulent or selfish motive.”  Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 223–
24, 230 n.4, 892 A.2d at 541, 545 n.4.  Because no misappropriation of funds nor 
32 
 
criminal conduct were implicated, and the misconduct related to but one client in a single 
case context, we determined that an indefinite suspension was appropriate.  Id.  In the 
present matter, Shapiro’s misrepresentations similarly related to one client and one case, 
although spread over several years.  Respondent’s settlement with Wisniewski, although 
handled improperly, indicated a willingness to attain some sort of restitution.   
 
Even when an attorney’s misconduct is committed with respect to more than one 
client, an indefinite suspension is sometimes appropriate.  In Attorney Grievance 
Commission v. Harrington, an attorney failed to pursue two matters that he undertook, 
failed to comply with reasonable requests for information from one client, and failed to 
keep the other informed reasonably regarding the status of the case.  367 Md. 36, 47–48, 
785 A.2d 1260, 1266–67 (2001).  He terminated also a client relationship without taking 
steps to protect the client’s interests, and was very uncooperative with Bar Counsel.  Id.  
And even though he led one of his clients to believe that he filed a suit on her behalf 
when in fact he had not, we concluded that an indefinite suspension was appropriate.  
Harrington, 367 Md. at 51, 785 A.2d at 1269.  In comparison, Respondent in the present 
case failed to file a Certificate of Merit, failed to keep Wisniewski informed as to the true 
status of her case, and violated MLRPC 1.8, but cooperated with Bar Counsel. 
 
Because we “evaluate every attorney grievance matter on its own merits, taking 
into account the facts and circumstances involved,” Bleecker, 414 Md. at 176, 994 A.2d 
at 945, we have not aspired to set out or suggest a formula or rubric to determine what an 
attorney’s sanction will be based on various combinations of violations of the MLRPC.  
Such an aspiration would be unrealistic, given the need to tailor a sanction to the 
33 
 
particular facts and circumstances of each case.  We observe generally, however, that we 
tend to favor disbarment when attorneys’ misrepresentations and deceitful actions are 
committed against multiple clients, are paired with violations of the rules pertaining to 
the proper handling of client or third party money or property, or are joined with a large 
number of other violations (whether of the MLRPC or the Maryland Code).   
The respondent in Lane, whose misconduct was committed against two clients, 
committed himself to a snowballing lie of “the most egregious nature.”  Lane, 367 Md. at 
647, 790 A.2d at 629.  Lane took no action on a client’s case and filed no pleadings of 
any kind, yet told his client that a summons had been issued for the opposing party.  
Lane, 367 Md. at 638–39, 790 A.2d at 623–24.  He met his client at the courthouse and 
told his client that the opposing party failed to appear.  Id.  Lane then took his leave by 
pretending to have a meeting with the judge, and returned to inform falsely his client that 
the judge would rule in his favor.  Id.  He claimed later that the opposing party had filed a 
“stay.”  Id.  With respect to another client, the respondent did not communicate properly 
the terms of their fee arrangement, paid some of the client’s bills from his own funds, and 
did not file appropriate pleadings in order to secure an injunction against a utility 
threatening to turn off the client’s water service.  Lane, 367 Md. at 639–40, 790 A.2d at 
624.  Instead, he claimed to have filed a motion for sanctions against the water company 
for turning off the client’s water ultimately, and then paid his client a sum of money that 
he said came from the company as a result of the sanctions action, but in reality came 
from his own pocket.  Id.  Finally, he told the same client that he filed a motion for 
summary judgment, which was granted, resulting in an award to her of over 11 million 
34 
 
dollars.  Lane, 367 Md. at 640, 790 A.2d at 625.  She was told to come to the courthouse 
with a suitcase and personal security to carry the cash home.  Id.  When she arrived at the 
courthouse, he confessed that he had misled her completely regarding the status of her 
lawsuit and that no money was forthcoming.  Id.  It is of little surprise that Lane was 
disbarred.  Lane, 367 Md. at 647–48, 790 A.2d at 629.  Although the lies of the 
Respondent in the present case are serious, they are not as extreme as those uttered by the 
attorney in Lane. 
In Brown, the attorney committed various acts of misconduct with respect to four 
clients.  426 Md. at 305–06, 44 A.3d at 349.  He failed to pursue a client’s claims in a 
timely manner, which resulted in the statute of limitations expiring before the case was 
dismissed for a failure to prosecute.  Brown, 426 Md. at 320–21, 44 A.3d at 358.  The 
attorney failed also to answer discovery requests and incurred sanctions in another client 
matter.  Id.  Brown did not inform his clients about the dismissal or the sanctions and 
further ignored repeated requests for information from another client.  Brown, 426 Md. at 
320–22, 44 A.3d at 357–59.  Brown did not return documents in his case file to a client in 
a timely manner, and also did not respond to two information request letters from Bar 
Counsel.  Brown, 426 Md. at 322–23, 44 A.3d at 359.  Such conduct violated MLRPC 
1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 3.2, and 8.1(b).  Brown, 426 Md. at 326, 44 A.3d at 361.  We held 
also that the manner in which Brown misled his client violated MLRPC 8.4(c), as Brown 
told one of his clients that the case was pending in arbitration, when in reality it had been 
dismissed two years previously.  Brown, 426 Md. at 324, 44 A.3d at 359–60.  Given the 
“gravity and pervasiveness” of Brown’s misconduct, we concluded that the appropriate 
35 
 
sanction was disbarment.  Brown, 426 Md. at 328, 44 A.3d at 362; see also Kremer, 432 
Md. at 335–36, 340–41, 68 A.3d at 866–69, 871 (disbarring an attorney where he 
committed misconduct with respect to four clients, failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel, 
failed to file bankruptcy petitions for multiple clients, missed hearings, caused a case to 
be dismissed, failed to respond to clients, abandoned cases before completion, and failed 
to return to clients documents and unearned fees).  In comparison, Shapiro’s 
misrepresentations were limited to one case with one client.   
When an attorney’s misrepresentations are paired with violations of the MLRPC 
provisions regarding financial or other property matters, the sanction is most often 
disbarment.  In Lawson, an attorney was disbarred for violations of MLRPC 1.5, 1.8, 
1.15, and 8.4(c) and (d).  428 Md. at 117, 50 A.3d at 1204.  Lawson was dishonest with a 
client about whether an attorney grievance matter was pending against him.  Id.  The 
attorney also charged his client an unreasonable fee and mishandled a subsequent fee 
dispute by inducing a client to enter into a settlement agreement that gave the attorney a 
lien on the client’s settlement proceeds regarding a marital property dispute.  Lawson, 
428 Md. at 115, 50 A.3d at 1203.  The terms of the settlement agreement were not 
communicated in a way that the client could understand, and the client did not give 
informed consent, written or otherwise, as to the essential terms of the transaction.  Id.  
Because Lawson created and then mismanaged client fee disputes, and was motivated by 
a desire to obtain fees to which he wasn’t entitled from an elderly man in poor health 
with limited means, we disbarred him.  Lawson, 428 Md. at 117–19, 50 A.3d at 1204–05; 
see also McLaughlin, 372 Md. at 500–02, 505–06, 813 A.2d at 1164–66, 1168 
36 
 
(disbarring an attorney who received over $70,000 from various clients, but did almost no 
work for them, and created an improper plan for returning unearned fees to clients 
(creating a loan relationship), but did not advise them to seek independent counsel).  
Although Shapiro also entered into an agreement in violation of MLRPC 1.8, nothing in 
the record in this matter indicates that he was motivated by a desire to obtain fees to 
which he was not entitled.  Moreover, MLRPC 1.15 is not implicated here. 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 876 A.2d 642, is 
also instructive.  In that matter, a client’s case was dismissed, but rather than 
communicating the dismissal to the client, Pennington presented a “settlement” of their 
claims (which included false documents) to her clients with the intent that they not learn 
of the suit’s dismissal.  Pennington, 387 Md. at 589–90, 876 A.2d at 656.  Instead of 
disclosing the dismissal of the claim, the respondent attempted to make her clients whole 
by paying them out of her personal funds what she thought they would find agreeable and 
what she perceived to be a fair sum.  Pennington, 387 Md. 572–73, 876 A.2d at 646.  
Also, Pennington denied repeatedly any dishonesty on her part and misrepresented 
intentionally matters in negotiations with a third party health care provider.  Pennington, 
387 Md. at 595, 596, 876 A.2d at 660.  That respondent’s “attempt to purchase a plenary 
indulgence with her own money is more indicative of a selfish plan to conceal than of a 
praiseworthy desire to ‘make the client whole.’”  Pennington, 387 Md. at 597–98, 876 
A.2d at 661.  We determined that, regardless of whether she intended to prevent her 
clients from finding out that they had a potential legal malpractice claim against her or 
whether she acted out of a desire to spare her clients further anguish, “the profession is 
37 
 
harmed when an attorney intentionally misrepresents matters to a client and behaves in 
the manner as did respondent,” and that such behavior warrants disbarment.  Pennington, 
387 Md. at 598, 876 A.2d at 661–62.  By contrast, Shapiro lied to his client about the 
status of her claim, and told her that the case had settled when it had not; yet, his 
misrepresentations were limited to one case and one client and he since took 
responsibility for his actions.    
The attorney in Davy was disbarred for multiple violations of MLRPC (1.1, 1.2, 
1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, and 8.4) where her misconduct involved dishonesty, multiple 
clients, unreasonable fees, and mishandling of client funds.  435 Md. at 683, 711, 80 A.3d 
at 326, 343.  In that matter, the respondent attempted to file a complaint in federal court, 
but it was rejected for being incomplete.  Davy, 435 Md. at 685–86, 80 A.3d at 328–29.  
The suit was dismissed ultimately.  Davy, 435 Md. at 689, 80 A.3d at 330.  When the 
client learned through other channels that the complaint had been dismissed, she asked 
the respondent for return of her retainer.  Davy, 435 Md. at 687–88, 80 A.3d at 329.  
Without the client’s permission, at a time months later when the attorney should have 
known that the representation was over, she filed a corrective motion in federal court and 
asked the client for more money.  Davy, 435 Md. at 688, 80 A.3d at 330.  The respondent 
led falsely her client to believe that the case had been filed, although the attorney knew 
the complaint had been rejected, yet still asked for more retainer payments.  Davy, 435 
Md. at 706, 80 A.3d at 340.  She told another client that a summons had been issued by 
the court when in fact it was not.  Davy, 435 Md. at 687, 80 A.3d at 329.  Even after her 
client learned of the truth of matters and confronted the attorney, Davy attempted to 
38 
 
deflect blame by telling the client that she discovered a technical error with the filing.  
Davy, 435 Md. at 688, 80 A.3d at 329.  She lied further to the client about what 
corrective services for which she would charge.  Davy, 435 Md. at 687–88, 80 A.3d at 
329.  In another client matter, it took the respondent four months to file a petition for 
bankruptcy after being retained, and thereafter failed to correct deficiencies in that 
petition until the bankruptcy court issued a third deficiency notice.  Davy, 435 Md. at 
691, 80 A.3d at 331.  Finally, the respondent mishandled client funds.  Davy, 435 Md. at 
702–03, 704–05, 80 A.3d at 338–339.   
When considering the appropriate sanction for that attorney, we noted that she 
committed misconduct with respect to two clients, was intentionally dishonest on at least 
six occasions, refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct, and had been 
suspended indefinitely previously.  Davy, 435 Md. at 708–10, 80 A.3d at 341–43.  We 
noted further that the respondent showed a dishonest or selfish motive involving the 
receiving and keeping of money, mislead her clients as to the quality of her 
representation, and continued to act on the client’s behalf after the representation had 
ended so as to justify continuing to demand payments from the client.  Davy, 435 Md. at 
711, 80 A.3d at 343.  Davy was disbarred.  Attorney Grievance Commission v. Davy, 434 
Md. 246, 74 A.3d 727 (2013).  Although Shapiro misrepresented to Wisniewski the status 
of her claim, he confessed ultimately his lie to his client and cooperated with Bar 
Counsel. As noted earlier, Shapiro’s misconduct does not implicate MLRPC 1.15.    
In Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 910 A.2d 429, the respondent’s misconduct was 
committed with respect to three different parties (two clients and an attorney colleague).  
39 
 
Steinberg failed to file a petition for bankruptcy on behalf of a client and then failed to 
forestall a foreclosure sale that was the reason for seeking the protection of the 
bankruptcy court.  Steinberg, 395 Md. at 367–68, 910 A.2d at 447.  When asked by the 
client for a status update, he responded dishonestly by saying that he had filed the petition 
(he filed later one without her consent or signature).  Steinberg, 395 Md. at 368–69, 910 
A.2d at 447–48.  In another client matter, Steinberg entered into an agreement that 
limited his liability for professional negligence when his client was not represented 
independently and did not have an opportunity to consider the document or obtain advice 
of counsel.  Steinberg, 395 Md. at 365, 910 A.2d at 445.  Steinberg failed to appear at 
client meetings, and was unprepared during a mediation session.  Steinberg, 395 Md. at 
362, 910 A.2d at 444.  He did not return a file to a client when asked and refused to 
withdraw after a client terminated representation, brought a frivolous suit, and engaged in 
a pattern of delay by not cooperating or complying with discovery agreements with 
opposing counsel.  Steinberg, 395 Md. at 365–66, 910 A.2d at 445–46.  Because 
Steinberg violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(c), 1.8, 1.16, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, and, 
accordingly, 8.1, we disbarred him.  Steinberg, 395 Md. at 371, 376, 910 A.2d at 449, 
452.   
The misrepresentations of Shapiro, on the other hand, were limited to one client, 
although his misrepresentations and the improper agreement were similar to those in 
Steinberg.  The Respondent did not violate MLRPC 1.5, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 4.1 as did 
the respondent in Steinberg.  See also Park, 427 Md. at 196, 46 A.3d at 1162 
(“[D]isbarment is the appropriate sanction when an attorney abandons a client by failing 
40 
 
to pursue the client’s interests, failing to communicate with the client, ignoring a client’s 
repeated requests for status updates, terminating the representation without notice by 
failing wholly to provide effective services, and failing to return unearned fees.  
Respondent did all of this and failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel’s lawful demands for 
information, in violation of MLRPC 8.1.”); De La Paz, 418 Md. at 558, 16 A.3d at 195 
(disbarring an attorney who neglected the affairs of multiple clients, failed to appear at a 
hearing, ignored repeated case status inquiries from clients, moved his office without 
informing his clients, and failed to respond to the lawful inquiries of Bar Counsel for 
information); Fox, 417 Md. at 544–45, 11 A.3d at 785 (“The combination of 
[r]espondent’s violations—in particular, abandonment of his clients, misrepresentation, 
and failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel’s investigation—convinces us that 
[r]espondent is unfit to practice law in Maryland and disbarment is the appropriate 
sanction to protect the public.”). 
In determining an appropriate sanction, we consider also any aggravating or 
mitigating factors.  Kremer, 432 Md. at 339, 68 A.3d at 870.  A respondent bears the 
burden of proving matters of mitigation or extenuation by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Md. Rule 16-757(b). 
On the subject of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, the hearing judge 
noted in the present case: 
Respondent offers very little in the way of mitigation, other 
than his own testimony that he has faithfully complied with 
the terms of his settlement agreement with Wisniewski.  
Respondent maintains that his agreement with Wisniewski 
was more than adequate in making Wisniewski whole.  
41 
 
However, this Court once again notes that no evidence has 
been offered in this case regarding the specific nature or 
potential value of Wisniewski’s medical malpractice claim 
against St. Agnes Hospital.  Therefore, the Court is unable to 
determine the adequacy of such redress. 
 
(minor alterations added). 
In weighing possible aggravating factors, we turn, as we often do, to the suggested 
factors of the American Bar Association: 
(a) Prior disciplinary offenses;  
(b) Dishonest or selfish motive;  
(c) A pattern of misconduct;  
(d) Multiple offenses;  
(e) Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by 
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the 
disciplinary agency;  
(f) Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other 
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; 
(g) Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct;  
(h) Vulnerability of victim;  
(i) Substantial experience in the practice of law;  
(j) Indifference to making restitution;  
(k) Illegal conduct, including that involving the use of 
controlled substances. 
 
American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, § 9.22, 
Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards (2012); see Coppock, 
432 Md. at 648, 69 A.3d at 1103.  Petitioner suggests that factors (a), (b), (c), (d), (h), and 
(i) are implicated here.  First, Respondent was the subject of a previous disciplinary 
action.  The Attorney Grievance Commission reprimanded Respondent on 24 February 
2012 for negligently failing to maintain and remit timely withholding taxes to the IRS 
and the Maryland Comptroller for five quarters beginning 31 December 2007 and ending 
31 December 2008.  But see Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 223–24, 230 n.4, 892 A.2d at 541, 
42 
 
545 n.4 (determining that an indefinite suspension was appropriate even though the 
respondent had been suspended indefinitely previously).  Second, Petitioner argues that 
Respondent’s lies to Wisniewski stem from a dishonest and selfish motive.  The hearing 
judge did not make a specific finding as to Respondent’s motives here, but we note for 
comparison that in Reinhardt we concluded that there was “no evidence that he acted out 
of fraudulent or selfish motive” when an attorney made misrepresentations to his client 
out of “absolute embarrassment.”  Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 223–24, 230 n.4, 892 A.2d at 
541, 545 n.4.  Not wishing to admit his mistakes to her, Shapiro created a lie that 
snowballed over time.  Third, Respondent’s continued misrepresentations to Wisniewski 
over a period of several years constitute undoubtedly a pattern of misconduct.  Fourth, 
Respondent’s conduct involved several distinct violations of the MLRPC.  He failed to 
communicate with Wisniewski regarding his difficulty in obtaining an expert, the 
dismissal of her case, and the expired statute of limitations.  He failed to withdraw from 
the case when he realized that she may have had a cause of action against him.  He lied to 
her about the existence of a fictitious settlement.  Ultimately, his execution of a 
settlement agreement with Wisniewski violated the MLRPC yet again.  Fifth, Petitioner 
suggests that Wisniewski is a vulnerable victim, as the two knew each other, according to 
Respondent’s testimony, “beyond this representation” and had “more than just a lawyer-
client relationship.”  This relationship influenced likely Wisniewski’s trust in him—both 
in his misrepresentations and further in the purported fairness of the settlement 
agreement.  Finally, Respondent has substantial experience in the practice of law, having 
practiced law in Maryland for over thirty years.    
43 
 
Bearing all of the foregoing analysis in mind, we conclude ultimately that 
Respondent’s misconduct warrants the sanction of an indefinite suspension.   
 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY 
THE CLERK OF THE COURT, 
INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO 
MARYLAND RULE 16-761(b), FOR 
WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED 
IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST 
EUGENE ALAN SHAPIRO. 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 83 
 
September Term, 2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
EUGENE ALAN SHAPIRO 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Barbera, C.J., 
  
Harrell, 
Battaglia, 
  
Greene, 
  
Adkins, 
  
McDonald, 
  
Watts, 
 
  
 
JJ. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Battaglia, J. 
which Watts, J., joins. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Filed:  January 30, 2015
 
I respectfully dissent as to the sanction only because disbarment is the appropriate 
sanction in this case, not indefinite suspension. 
 
Shapiro’s conduct amounted to violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.8, 1.16 and 8.4(a), (c) and (d). It is his 
actions, in actively misrepresenting the status of a case to his client for five years, 
constituting a violation of Rule 8.4(c), which propel his sanction into the realm of 
disbarment.  
Intentional violations of MLRPC 8.4(c) constitute “most egregious misconduct.”  
Attorney Grievance v. Davy, 435 Md. 674, 708, 80 A.3d 322, 342 (2013). “[W]hen a 
[lawyer] engages in dishonest or fraudulent conduct as proscribed in M[L]RPC 8.4(c), we 
do not discuss ‘degrees’ of dishonesty, but generally order disbarment, absent compelling 
extenuating circumstances.” Id. at 709, 80 A.3d at 342 (internal quotations omitted).  In 
cases where an attorney’s repeated material misrepresentations constitute a pattern of 
deceitful conduct, as opposed to an isolated instance, the appropriate sanction, as a general 
rule, is disbarment.  See Attorney Grievance v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 373, 910 A.2d 429, 
450 (2006) (“We long have held that repeated acts of dishonest, fraudulent, or misleading 
behavior may warrant a sanction of disbarment.”).  If nothing else, lawyers must be honest:  
Unlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the like, 
intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most 
important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make 
intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse.  
Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in any attorney’s 
character.  Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for 
intentional dishonest conduct.
 
 
2 
 
Id., quoting Attorney Grievance v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 
(2001).  “When attorneys engage in dishonest and deceitful conduct for personal gain, this 
Court does not hesitate to sanction such conduct with disbarment[.]”  Attorney Grievance 
v. Levin, 438 Md. 211, 231, 91 A.3d 1101, 1113 (2014).   
Attorney Grievance v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 876 A.2d 642 (2005), is 
instructive.  In that matter, the clients’ case was dismissed, but rather than communicating 
the dismissal to the clients, Pennington presented a “settlement” of their claims (which 
included false supporting documents) to her clients with the intent that they not learn of 
the suit’s dismissal.  Instead of disclosing the dismissal of the claim, the respondent 
attempted to make her clients whole by paying them out of her personal funds what she 
thought they would find agreeable and what she perceived to be a fair sum.  Also, 
Pennington denied repeatedly any dishonesty on her part and misrepresented intentionally 
matters in negotiations with a third party health care provider.  We described the 
circumstances as the respondent’s “attempt to purchase a plenary indulgence with her own 
money [which was] more indicative of a selfish plan to conceal than of a praiseworthy 
desire to ‘make the client whole.’”  Id. at 598, 876 A.2d at 661.  The Court concluded that, 
regardless of whether she intended to prevent her clients from finding out that they had a 
potential legal malpractice claim against her or whether she acted out of a desire to spare 
her clients further anguish, “the profession is harmed when an attorney intentionally 
misrepresents matters to a client and behaves in the manner as did respondent” and that 
such behavior warrants disbarment.  The facts of the present case are similar to those in 
Pennington.  Here, Shapiro did not communicate to Wisniewski the true status of her 
3 
 
medical malpractice claim, but instead, to hide the facts, told her that he had secured a 
settlement on her behalf.  When Wisniewski met with Respondent to learn more about the 
terms of her settlement, he told her that he did not have the money.  Although the hearing 
judge did not determine if Respondent intended to “come clean” at the latter meeting with 
Wisniewski, or if he would have paid her from his own funds had he the cash on hand, 
Respondent’s deceit is in the same church (if not exactly the same pew) as that of the 
attorney in Pennington.      
In Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 910 A.2d 429, the respondent’s misconduct was 
committed with respect to three different parties (two clients and an attorney colleague), 
yet elements of this case are reminiscent of Shapiro’s case.  Steinberg failed to file a 
petition for bankruptcy on behalf of a client and then failed to forestall a foreclosure sale 
that was the reason for seeking the protection of the bankruptcy court.  When asked by the 
client for a status update, Steinberg responded dishonestly by saying that he had filed the 
petition (he filed later one without her consent or signature).  In another client matter, 
Steinberg entered into an agreement that limited liability for his professional negligence 
where his client was not represented independently and did not have an opportunity to 
consider the document or obtain advice of counsel, in violation of MLRPC 1.8.  These 
actions, in addition to other misconduct (including violations of MLRPC 1.1, 1.4, 1.5(c), 
1.16, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 4.1), warranted disbarment.  As in Steinberg, Shapiro failed to 
file a necessary document, in this case, a Certificate of Merit, and then misled his client as 
to whether he had done so.  Further, Shapiro entered into a settlement agreement with 
Wisniewski, in violation of MLRPC 1.8.    
4 
 
The attorney in Davy, 435 Md. 674, 80 A.3d 322, was disbarred for violations of 
MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16 and 8.4, where her misconduct involved 
dishonesty, multiple clients, unreasonable fees and the mishandling of client funds.  In that 
matter, the respondent attempted to file a complaint in federal court, but it was rejected for 
being incomplete. The suit was ultimately dismissed. When the client learned through other 
channels that the complaint had been dismissed, she asked the respondent for return of her 
retainer.  Without the client’s permission, at a time months later when the attorney should 
have known that the representation was over, she filed a corrective motion in federal court 
and asked the client for more money.  The respondent led her client to falsely believe that 
the case had been filed, although the attorney knew the complaint had been rejected, yet 
still asked for more retainer payments.  She told another client that a summons had been 
issued by the court when in fact it was not. Even after her client learned of the truth of 
matters and confronted the attorney, Davy attempted to deflect blame by telling the client 
that she discovered a technical error with the filing. She lied further to the client about what 
corrective services for which she would charge. In another client matter, it took the 
respondent four months to file a petition for bankruptcy after being retained, and thereafter 
failed to correct deficiencies in that petition until the bankruptcy court issued a third 
deficiency notice.  Finally, the respondent mishandled client funds. 
When considering the appropriate sanction, we noted that the respondent showed a 
dishonest or selfish motive involving the receiving and keeping of money, mislead her 
clients as to the quality of her representation and continued to act on the client’s behalf 
after the representation had ended to justify continuing to demand payments from the 
5 
 
client.  Davy was disbarred.  Unlike Davy, Shapiro was not charged with fiscal misconduct. 
Nonetheless, Respondent, like Davy, failed to file appropriate pleadings and did not take 
responsibility immediately for his failures, but instead misled Wisniewski into thinking 
that her claim was alive and, further, that a settlement had been reached.  
The misconduct in Attorney Grievance v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 994 A.2d 928 
(2010), resembles the misconduct in Shapiro’s matter.  In Bleecker, the respondent did not 
file timely in court his client’s claim and ultimately missed the statute of limitations 
deadline.  Once he became aware of the “blown” statute of limitations deadline, a conflict 
of interest existed between himself and his client, such that he should have withdrawn from 
representation and told his client to seek independent counsel, which he did not.  Moreover, 
he failed to inform his client that her case was dismissed and that the statute of limitations 
expired.  Bleecker failed also to correct a material mistake on filed pleadings, and later, to 
respond to three letters from Bar Counsel seeking information regarding the client 
complaint.  Violations of MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 3.3, 8.1 and 8.4 were found.  We 
concluded that the “gravamen of the misconduct” was the respondent’s concealment from 
his client of the statute of limitations bar, which precluded her from any possible recovery.  
Bleecker’s failure to correct the misrepresentation to the court and his failure to respond to 
Bar Counsel were also significant to the Court in its sanction analysis.  The appropriate 
sanction was disbarment.  The “gravamen” of Shapiro’s misconduct is also his concealment 
of the true status of Wisniewski’s claim from her and his direct misrepresentations to that 
effect, and the improperly obtained settlement agreement.   
6 
 
The respondent in Attorney Grievance v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 647, 790 A.2d 621, 
629 (2002) found himself caught in a snowballing series of lies, similar to that of the 
Respondent in this matter, although the cumulative lies of the attorney in Lane were of “the 
most egregious nature” and the misconduct was committed against two clients.  Lane took 
no action on a client’s case and filed no pleadings of any kind, yet told his client that a 
subpoena had been issued for the opposing party.  He met his client at the courthouse and 
told his client that the opposing party had failed to appear.  Lane then took his leave by 
pretending to have a meeting with the judge, and returned to inform falsely his client that 
the judge would rule in his favor.  He claimed later that the opposing party had filed a 
“stay.”  With respect to another client, Lane did not communicate properly the terms of 
their fee arrangement, paid some of the client’s bills from his own funds, and did not file 
the appropriate pleadings in order to secure an injunction against a utility threatening to 
turn off his client’s water service.  He then said that he filed a motion for sanctions against 
the water company for turning off his client’s water, and paid his client a sum of money 
that he said came from the company as a result of the sanctions action, but, in reality, came 
from his own funds.  Finally, he told the same client that he filed a motion for summary 
judgment, which was granted, resulting in an award to her of over 11 million dollars.  She 
was told to come to the courthouse with a suitcase and security to carry the cash home.  
When she arrived at the courthouse, he confessed that he had misled her completely 
regarding the status of her lawsuit and that no money was forthcoming.  It was little surprise 
that Lane was disbarred.  Like the attorney in Lane, Shapiro misrepresented to Wisniewski 
7 
 
the status of her claim, and then concocted a fictional “settlement” of her claim against the 
hospital.   
In Attorney Grievance v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 44 A.3d 344 (2012), the respondent 
committed various acts of misconduct with respect to four clients.  He failed to pursue a 
client’s claims in a timely manner, which caused the statute of limitations to expire before 
the case was dismissed for a failure to prosecute.  The attorney failed also to answer 
discovery requests and incurred sanctions in another client matter.  Brown did not inform 
his clients about the dismissal or the sanctions and ignored repeated requests for 
information from another client.  Further, Brown did not return documents in his case file 
to a client in a timely manner, and also did not respond to two letters from Bar Counsel 
requesting information regarding the client’s complaint.  Such conduct violated MLRPC 
1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 3.2 and 8.1(b).  We held also that the manner in which Brown misled 
his client violated MLRPC 8.4(c), as he told one of his clients that the case was pending in 
arbitration, when, in actuality, it was dismissed two years previously.  Given the “gravity 
and pervasiveness” of Brown’s misconduct, we concluded that disbarment was the 
appropriate sanction.  Id. at 328, 44 A.3d at 362; see also Attorney Grievance v. Kremer, 
432 Md. 325, 335-36, 340-41, 68 A.3d 862, 866-69, 871 (2013) (disbarring an attorney 
who committed misconduct with respect to four clients, failed to cooperate with Bar 
Counsel, failed to file bankruptcy petitions for multiple clients, missed hearings, caused a 
case to be dismissed, failed to respond to clients, abandoned cases before completion, and 
failed to return documents and unearned fees); Attorney Grievance v. Park, 427 Md. 180, 
196, 46 A.3d 1153, 1162 (2012) (“[D]isbarment is the appropriate sanction when an 
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attorney abandons a client by failing to pursue the client’s interests, failing to communicate 
with the client, ignoring a client’s repeated requests for status updates, terminating the 
representation without notice by failing wholly to provide effective services, and failing to 
return unearned fees.  Respondent did all of this and failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel’s 
lawful demands for information, in violation of MLRPC 8.1.”).   
When an attorney’s misrepresentations are paired with violations of the MLRPC 
provisions regarding unreasonable fees or client or third party property (and especially 
money), the appropriate sanction is most often disbarment.  In Attorney Grievance v. 
Lawson, 428 Md. 102, 117, 50 A.3d 1196, 1205 (2012), an attorney was disbarred for 
violations of MLRPC 1.5, 1.8, 1.15 and 8.4(c) and (d).  Lawson was dishonest with a client 
about whether an attorney grievance matter was pending against him. The attorney also 
charged his client an unreasonable fee and mishandled a subsequent fee dispute by inducing 
the client to enter into a settlement agreement that gave the attorney a lien on the client’s 
settlement proceeds of a marital property dispute.  The terms of the settlement agreement 
were not communicated in a way that the client could understand, and the client did not 
give informed consent, written or otherwise, as to the essential terms of the transaction. 
Because Lawson created and then mismanaged client fee disputes, and was motivated by 
a desire to obtain fees to which he was not entitled from an elderly man in poor health with 
limited means, we disbarred him. The Respondent in the present case executed an 
agreement with Wisniewski that violated the MLRPC in the same critical way as the 
agreement in Lawson: Respondent did not give Wisniewski a written disclosure of the 
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desirability of seeking independent counsel prior to entering into the agreement with 
Respondent.  By the same token, there is no MLRPC 1.15 violation in Shapiro’s case. 
Although Shapiro’s violations do not involve multiple clients and cases, his 
misconduct spans a multiple-year period.  He actively misrepresented the status of the case 
to Wisniewski for five years and failed to inform her of the difficulties he had in finding a 
doctor to execute a Certificate of Merit.  Not only did Respondent lie to Wisniewski about 
the status of her case, his lies spiraled: he told her that the case had settled when no such 
settlement had occurred, but ultimately he did not have the money available to fund the 
“settlement.”  Respondent only told Wisniewski the truth about her case—that it had been 
dismissed, that the statute of limitations had passed, and that no settlement occurred—after 
she filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission.  Respondent violated 
additional MLRPC by settling a potential legal malpractice claim with Wisniewski without 
advising her in writing of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent counsel or 
obtaining her informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the essential terms of the 
transaction.   
Accordingly, I would order Respondent’s disbarment.  
Judge Watts authorizes me to state that she joins the views expressed in this 
dissenting opinion.