Title: Gregory v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM GREGORY,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 352, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9811012362 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 17, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided:    September 20, 2010 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 20th day of September 2010, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, William Gregory, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s May 28, 2010 order denying his second motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the Superior 
 
2 
Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
In February 2000, Gregory was found guilty by a Superior 
Court jury of Attempted Murder in the First Degree, Assault in the Second 
Degree, Conspiracy in the First Degree, and two weapon offenses.  He was 
sentenced to a total of 30 years of Level V incarceration, to be followed by 
decreasing levels of supervision.  This Court affirmed Gregory’s convictions 
on direct appeal.2  Gregory subsequently filed a motion for postconviction 
relief, which the Superior Court denied.  This Court affirmed the Superior 
Court’s decision.3 
 
(3) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his second 
postconviction motion, Gregory claims that a) the retroactive application of 
Allen v. State, 970 A.2d 203 (Del. 2009) required his jury to be instructed 
pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§271 and 274, in conformity with the 
evidence presented at trial; b) the evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions; and c) his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 
properly investigate the charges and challenge the medical evidence.  
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Gregory v. State, Del. Supr., No. 278, 2000, Berger, J. (July 25, 2001). 
3 Gregory v. State, Del. Supr., No. 600, 2005, Steele, C.J. (Oct. 17, 2006). 
 
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(4) 
Before addressing the substantive claims made in a motion for 
postconviction relief, the Superior Court must first consider the procedural 
requirements of Rule 61.4  Under Rule 61(i)(1), Gregory was required to file 
his motion within 3 years of the date his conviction became final.  Gregory’s 
conviction became final when this Court issued its mandate on Gregory’s 
direct appeal in August 2001.5  As such, Gregory’s second postconviction 
motion, filed in February 2010, was clearly untimely.   
 
(5) 
Furthermore, each of Gregory’s individual claims is either 
without merit or procedurally barred. His first claim, regarding the 
retroactive applicability of Allen to the jury instructions, is without merit.6  
His second claim of insufficiency of the evidence is procedurally barred 
under both Rule 61(i)(2) and 61(i)(3) because it was raised neither in his 
prior postconviction motion nor in the proceedings leading to the judgment 
of conviction.  Gregory’s third claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4) because it was formerly adjudicated 
in his first postconviction motion.  Moreover, the record before us does not 
support a claim that the procedural bars can be avoided under Rule 61(i)(5) 
due to a miscarriage of justice.           
                                                 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(2). 
6 Richardson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 86, 2009, Ridgely, J. (July 12, 2010) (en Banc) 
(Because Allen does not constitute a “new rule” and is not “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty,” it does not apply retroactively.) 
 
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(6) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice