Title: State v. Buchanan

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 49 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
09AP2934-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Deandre A. Buchanan, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 329 Wis. 2d 712, 790 N.W. 2d 543 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 19, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Trempealeau   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Damon 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Tyler William Wickman and Dallenbach & Anich, S.C. and oral 
argument by Tyler William Wickman. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Thomas J. 
Balistreri, assistant attorney general with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general, and oral argument by 
Thomas J. Balistreri. 
 
 
2011 WI 49
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP2934-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2009CF13) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Deandre A. Buchanan,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals opinion1 that affirmed Deandre 
Buchanan's conviction for possessing marijuana with intent to 
deliver.  The question we address in this case is whether the 
evidence Buchanan unsuccessfully sought to suppress was seized 
in violation of the federal and state constitutional provisions 
barring unreasonable search and seizure.  The threshold question 
is whether the initial protective search of Buchanan and his 
vehicle was valid; if it was valid, we must also address whether 
                                                 
1 State v. Buchanan, 2009AP2934-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2010). 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
2 
 
the piece of marijuana plant that the Wisconsin State Trooper 
discovered on the car floor during the protective search was in 
plain view and whether there was probable cause to justify 
seizing it.2  The United States Supreme Court has held that 
protective searches, or "frisks," must be based on a reasonable 
suspicion that the officer is in immediate danger because a 
suspect may have ready access to a weapon.  In this case, the 
trooper who stopped Buchanan testified that he saw Buchanan make 
furtive movements that indicated that he may have been hiding 
something beneath the driver's seat, and that he noticed that 
Buchanan's hands were shaking as if he were very nervous.  He 
testified that he learned facts from accessing a computer in his 
police car and contacting dispatch about Buchanan's arrest 
record, which included a recent drug delivery arrest and arrests 
for armed robbery, false imprisonment and murder.  The trooper 
called for backup and, after the backup officer arrived, then 
frisked Buchanan and the area inside the car within the driver's 
reach.   
                                                 
2 A field test of the plant stem was positive for the 
presence of THC.  According to information in the record, the 
trooper 
subsequently 
asked 
Buchanan 
whether 
he 
had 
any 
additional marijuana, and Buchanan responded that he had "a bag" 
in his sock and "a couple of pounds" in the trunk.  The 
marijuana was recovered from the trunk. That seizure is not 
directly before us; its validity turns on the validity of the 
prior searches. 
We note that the validity of the initial protective 
searches of Buchanan and his vehicle does not depend on the 
doctrine of plain view. 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
3 
 
¶2 
The State and Buchanan disagree about whether under 
the totality of the circumstances, the observed conduct and 
arrest record on which the trooper relied constitute "specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts"3 create a reasonable suspicion that 
the person with whom he is dealing is armed and dangerous and a 
protective search is justified for the officer's safety.  
Buchanan asks us to reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
on the grounds that the ruling contravenes the holdings in two 
of this court's cases——one that focused on a driver's furtive 
movements and another that focused on a suspect's arrest record—
—both of which held that the evidence in question was not enough 
to justify a protective search.  In the circumstances present in 
those cases, State v. Johnson and State v. Eason, this court 
deemed 
the 
evidence 
insufficient 
to 
establish 
reasonable 
suspicion.4  The State asks us to affirm, arguing that the 
discovery 
of 
the 
arrest 
information 
put 
the 
officer's 
observations into a different context and, in effect, altered 
the inferences he could rationally draw from those facts.   
                                                 
3 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). 
4 See State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶3, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 
N.W.2d 182 (finding insufficient support for a protective search 
where the suspicion was based only on the fact that the officer 
saw the driver "make a strong furtive movement bending down as 
if he was reaching . . . underneath the seat") and State v. 
Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625 (finding 
insufficient support for reasonable suspicion for a no-knock 
entry where the only particularized evidence consisted of the 
suspects' arrest records and ultimately adopting a good-faith 
exception that rendered the evidence of the search admissible). 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
4 
 
¶3 
We hold that under the totality of the circumstances 
in this case, the trooper's observation of Buchanan's furtive 
movements and visible nervousness, a record of arrests for 
violent crimes, and a drug delivery arrest that had occurred 
nearby a short time before the stop constitute "specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts,"5 create reasonable suspicion and 
justify a protective search for the officer's safety.  The 
protective search was therefore justified.  The subsequent 
discovery of contraband was made in the course of the search 
while the item was within plain view; because there was a basis 
for a protective search, the trooper had a right to be in a 
position to view it.  The trooper's recognition of the smell and 
appearance of the marijuana, together with the other suspicious 
circumstances, provided probable cause to believe that it was 
contraband and that he could validly seize it.  There is 
therefore no basis for suppressing the evidence that was 
obtained as a result of these actions.  We consequently affirm 
the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
A Wisconsin State Trooper was on duty on a stretch of 
Interstate 94 in Trempealeau County on the evening of March 4, 
2009.  At about 9:30 p.m., he saw Buchanan driving west on the 
interstate and exceeding the speed limit by about ten miles an 
hour.  The trooper pulled out behind him and signaled for him to 
                                                 
5 Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
5 
 
pull over.  The trooper later testified at the suppression 
motion hearing that when he turned on the siren and lights, 
including 
a 
spotlight 
that 
illuminated 
the 
interior 
of 
Buchanan's car, the vehicle began weaving, and he saw "the 
driver was moving his shoulder and his arm up and down," and it 
looked "like he was stuffing something either underneath the 
seat or under his foot area."  Buchanan then slowed and pulled 
to the side of the road. 
¶5 
The trooper observed when he approached the vehicle 
and spoke to Buchanan that Buchanan's "hands were shaking" and 
he appeared "very nervous."  The trooper returned to his police 
car, ran a check on Buchanan's driver's license, and requested 
that dispatch "run a criminal history on him."  The trooper then 
received responses, via computer, to both his entry of the 
license number and his request to dispatch.  The responses 
informed him "of a pending drug charge from a couple of weeks 
prior from District 6 of the State Patrol, Eau Claire, and 
dispatch advised [him] that [Buchanan] had multiple violent 
arrests in the past such as murder, armed robbery and false 
imprisonment."  The trooper testified that the message he 
received via computer gave him sufficient information to know 
that "[Buchanan] had a recent delivery charge of marijuana on 
his criminal history in Wisconsin in that same area" and that 
the other charges "were from North Dakota and Minnesota."  He 
had no information about the disposition of the charges. 
¶6 
The trooper radioed for backup and waited a few 
minutes.  When asked on direct examination what he planned to 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
6 
 
search when he returned to Buchanan's car, he stated, "Not 
planning on doing any searching of the vehicle, I was planning 
on doing a frisk of the vehicle to ensure there was no weapons 
in the vehicle."  Within ten minutes of the initial stop, an 
officer 
arrived 
as 
backup, 
and 
the 
trooper 
returned 
to 
Buchanan's vehicle with the officer and asked Buchanan to get 
out of the car.  He then frisked Buchanan; he described the 
frisk as "[a] short, cursory pat-down of the waist area, 
anywhere where weapons are commonly hidden."  He found no 
weapon.  He testified that, using a flashlight, he then 
"returned to [Buchanan's] vehicle and conducted a cursory frisk 
of the driver's lunge area6 under the seat and center console 
area."  He found no weapons, but he did see "a piece of green 
plant material" visible on the car floor and he "smell[ed] an 
odor of raw marijuana in the vehicle."  A field test of the 
                                                 
6 There are two types of searches in which one encounters 
the concept of the "lunge area" or "grab area":  a protective 
search and a search incident to a lawful arrest.  The objectives 
differ slightly, but the concept of a search limited in scope is 
common to both, and both focus on the area within the reach of 
the person being detained——the area within which he or she could 
"lunge."  (Compare State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶20, 279 Wis. 2d 
742, 754, 695 N.W.2d 277 ("The scope of a search incident to 
arrest is confined to 'the area from within which [the suspect] 
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence[.]' 
We have understood this to mean the area immediately surrounding 
the arrestee.") with State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 94-95, 492 
N.W.2d 311 (1992) ("The constant refrain in these [protective 
search] cases has been that the need for police to protect 
themselves can justify a limited frisk for weapons.") and 
Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶¶26, 37 n.13 ("The sole justification for 
the [protective] search is the protection of the police officers 
and others nearby."). 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
7 
 
plant was positive for THC, the active ingredient in marijuana.  
The trooper informed Buchanan that he would be doing a further 
search of the vehicle at that point.  Additional marijuana was 
discovered in the vehicle, and Buchanan was subsequently charged 
with 
possession 
with 
intent 
to 
deliver 
THC 
(tetrahydrocannabinols) 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(1m)(h)(3) (2007-08).7   
¶7 
Buchanan moved to suppress the marijuana seized in the 
search on the grounds that there was an insufficient basis for 
reasonable suspicion for a protective search and that the 
protective search was a violation of Buchanan's constitutional 
protections against unreasonable search and seizure.  Buchanan 
specifically argued that the furtive movements, nervousness, and 
the arrest record were not sufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion.  The Trempealeau County Circuit Court, the Honorable 
John A. Damon presiding, denied Buchanan's motion.  Buchanan 
entered a plea of no contest and was convicted.  He appealed the 
circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10).8  The court of appeals affirmed on the 
grounds that the protective search was supported by reasonable 
                                                 
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
8 Wis. Stat. § 971.31 (10) states, "An order denying a 
motion to suppress evidence or a motion challenging the 
admissibility of a statement of a defendant may be reviewed upon 
appeal from a final judgment or order notwithstanding the fact 
that the judgment or order was entered upon a plea of guilty or 
no contest to the information or criminal complaint." 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
8 
 
suspicion that Buchanan was armed and dangerous; it cited 
Buchanan's furtive movements prior to the stop, the unusual 
nervousness Buchanan displayed, the pending drug delivery 
charge, and the arrests for murder, false imprisonment and armed 
robbery.9  Buchanan petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted. 
¶8 
This review presents questions of fact and law.  
Buchanan challenges the constitutionality of the trooper's 
protective search of him and of the area within reach of the 
driver's seat in his vehicle that led to the discovery of 
contraband.  Such limited searches, often referred to as 
"frisks" are "measures to determine whether the person is in 
fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical 
harm."  State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶1, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 
N.W.2d 449 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968)).   
Whether 
the 
facts 
satisfy 
the 
constitutional 
requirement for performing a protective search for 
weapons——that 
an 
officer 
must 
have 
reasonable 
suspicion that a person may be armed and dangerous to 
the officer or others——is a question of constitutional 
law for this court to decide.  We are not bound by a 
circuit court's or court of appeals' decision on this 
question of law, but we benefit from the analyses of 
these courts.   
Id., ¶7.  If the protective search was unconstitutional because 
there was not the requisite reasonable suspicion to support it, 
the evidence ultimately seized as a result of the search must be 
suppressed.  "Evidence obtained as a direct result of an 
                                                 
9 State v. Buchanan, 2009AP2934-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶8 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2010). 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
9 
 
unconstitutional search or seizure is plainly subject to 
exclusion."  Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984).   
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THE PROTECTIVE SEARCH 
¶9 
The question before us is whether there was reasonable 
suspicion to support the trooper's decision to conduct a 
protective search of Buchanan and his car.  Courts "decide on a 
case-by-case 
basis, 
evaluating 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to 
justify a protective search in a particular case."  Kyles, 269 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶5.  We have made the following observation about the 
quantum of evidence necessary to establish reasonable suspicion: 
Although it is not possible to state precisely what 
the 
term 
reasonable 
suspicion 
means, 
it 
is 
a 
"commonsense nontechnical conception(s) that deal[s] 
with 'the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not 
legal technicians, act.'" What is certain is that 
reasonable suspicion is "a less demanding standard 
than probable cause."  The information necessary to 
establish reasonable suspicion can be less in both 
content and reliability than the information needed to 
establish probable cause.  In other words, the 
required showing of reasonable suspicion is low, and 
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.  
Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, ¶19 (citations omitted). 
¶10 We begin by reviewing what occurred just before the 
trooper made the decision to conduct the protective search.  
While on traffic enforcement duty, the trooper had observed 
Buchanan's car traveling in excess of the posted speed limit.  
The trooper testified that when he pulled onto the road behind 
Buchanan's car and activated his vehicle's lights to initiate 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
10 
 
the stop, he observed that Buchanan had started moving his arm 
and shoulder as if he were placing something beneath his feet 
while driving, which appeared to be the reason that the car 
began weaving in the lane as it slowed to pull over.  The car 
had not been weaving before.  The trooper testifed that Buchanan 
had appeared "very nervous" after the stop and his hands were 
shaking noticeably.  The trooper returned to his vehicle, and 
there he obtained additional information from two sources about 
Buchanan's prior police contacts.  The trooper planned to return 
to Buchanan's vehicle to complete the traffic stop and issue 
Buchanan 
a 
speeding 
citation. 
 
In 
determining 
the 
constitutionality of the initial protective search, we consider 
the facts the trooper knew about the driver he would be 
approaching and whether those facts, together with rational 
inferences, support a reasonable suspicion that Buchanan was 
armed and a threat to the officer's safety. 
¶11 First, the trooper had seen the driver make a movement 
that could reasonably be understood to indicate that the driver 
was putting an item out of sight beneath the driver's seat, and 
as the driver did so, the car had weaved in the lane before 
pulling off to the side of the road.  In Johnson, this court 
considered whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify a 
protective search that occurred after the traffic stop was 
resolved.  Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶45.  The basis offered for 
reasonable suspicion in that case was solely the observed 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
11 
 
"furtive movement" of the driver.10  Id. at ¶¶7, 18.  In that 
case, the officer had no further reason to initiate a protective 
search.  As we stated in Johnson, "Depending upon the totality 
of the circumstances in a given case, a surreptitious movement 
by a suspect in a vehicle immediately after a traffic stop could 
be a substantial factor in establishing that officers had reason 
to believe that the suspect was dangerous and had access to 
weapons."  Id. at ¶37.  The question is thus whether the furtive 
movement by Buchanan is a substantial factor in establishing 
reasonable 
suspicion. 
 
Nothing 
in 
Johnson 
bars 
us 
from 
considering such a movement together with other factors. 
¶12 Second, the trooper had observed in his initial 
contact with Buchanan that Buchanan was visibly shaking and 
"very nervous."  As we have previously noted, "[O]ur cases hold 
that unusual nervousness is a legitimate factor to consider in 
evaluating the totality of the circumstances."  Kyles, 269 Wis. 
2d 1, ¶54.  "Nervousness during a routine traffic stop is 
typical, but unusual nervousness of a suspect may indicate 
wrongdoing." State v. Sumner, 2008 WI 94, ¶33, 312 Wis. 2d 292, 
752 N.W.2d 783. 
¶13 The third piece of information the trooper had to 
consider at that point was the information he had obtained via 
                                                 
10 Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶34 ("[T]he State contends that 
Johnson's movement in the interior of the car was a sufficiently 
compelling factor to justify Stillman's protective search of 
Johnson's car. The State asserts that the court of appeals 
improperly concluded this single factor, by itself, was not 
enough to establish reasonable suspicion." (emphasis added)). 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
12 
 
computer concerning Buchanan's arrest record, which included 
arrests for drug delivery, murder, armed robbery and false 
imprisonment.  As with the "furtive movement," it is clear that 
an arrest record by itself would not, without more, support 
reasonable suspicion, but here it is considered in addition to 
other factors.  In Eason, we considered the weight to be given 
to arrest records.  In that case, the question was whether the 
arrest records of two individuals sufficed as the "particular 
facts [that] must be shown to establish reasonable suspicion" to 
justify the issuance of a no-knock warrant.  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 
206, ¶¶20-21.  We noted that  
in the absence of any other particularized evidence, 
and some link between [the defendant's] arrests for 
obstruction and the possible destruction of evidence, 
this approach [combining the fact of three prior 
arrests for obstructing police with an officer's 
statements about the likelihood of destruction of 
evidence] is not sufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion [to support a no-knock warrant].   
Id., ¶23.  The totality of the circumstances presented here, in 
contrast, includes a combination of violent crimes (armed 
robbery, false imprisonment and murder charges) and a recent 
drug 
delivery 
arrest 
in 
a 
nearby 
county, 
as 
well 
as 
particularized evidence of Buchanan's conduct and demeanor 
observed by the trooper.  In considering the evidence required 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
13 
 
to establish reasonable suspicion for a no-knock warrant,11 we 
held in Eason that absent other particularized evidence, 
reasonable suspicion was not established by an arrest record; we 
did not hold that an arrest record is not relevant to a 
calculation of the totality of the circumstances.  Where there 
was no "other particularized evidence," we held that without 
knowledge of the disposition, time and location of the arrests, 
"[t]he arrests . . . provide little guidance" in the reasonable 
suspicion determination.  Id., ¶22.   
                                                 
11 We note that Eason (which recognized a good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule, allowing evidence in that 
case that would otherwise have been excluded due to a flawed 
warrant) concerned a no-knock warrant for a home, not a 
protective search of a driver and vehicle following a traffic 
stop.  Eason therefore involved a situation in which there was 
the heightened protection that the United States Constitution 
affords a person's home, given that "physical entry of the home 
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed."  United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for 
E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).  The 
question presented in Eason was not about a warrant——the basis 
for the warrant itself was not in question——but about whether 
there was justification for the added intrusiveness of a no-
knock entry.  See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 
(1976) (noting that "[the] Court has traditionally drawn a 
distinction between automobiles and homes or offices in relation 
to the Fourth Amendment. . . . [W]arrantless examinations of 
automobiles have been upheld in circumstances in which a search 
of 
a 
home 
or 
office 
would 
not." 
(internal 
citations 
omitted)(emphasis 
added)). 
 
That 
is 
not 
to 
say 
that 
constitutional protections have no application to autos.  The 
Supreme Court stated that a vehicle search was unreasonable 
where "police could not reasonably have believed either that 
[the arrested person] could have accessed his car at the time of 
the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was 
arrested might have been found therein . . . ."  Arizona v. 
Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009). 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
14 
 
¶14 Other jurisdictions have explicitly included arrest 
records when considering whether in the totality of the 
circumstances there is reasonable suspicion for a belief that a 
person is a threat to law enforcement personnel or is concealing 
weapons.  For example, it has been held that reasonable 
suspicion to justify a strip search by jail officials may arise 
from factors such as "the nature of the offense, the arrestee's 
appearance and conduct, and the prior arrest record." Kelly v. 
Foti, 77 F.3d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).  
"[I]ndividualized suspicion sufficient to warrant a strip search 
of the arrestee in [the eight circuits that have invalidated 
blanket strip search policies against nonviolent misdemeanants] 
is based on factors such as the nature of the offense, the 
arrestee's appearance and conduct, and any prior arrest record."  
Amaechi v. West, 87 F. Supp. 2d 556, 565 (E.D. Va. 2000), aff'd 
and remanded, 237 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing to cases from 
the 2d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th circuits). 
¶15 An additional fact known to the court concerns the 
trooper's manifestation of concern for his safety.  The trooper 
testified that before returning to Buchanan's car, he called for 
backup.  He waited until a backup officer arrived and only then 
returned to the car with the second officer.  This provides 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
15 
 
evidence of his stated concern for his safety.12  "[A] court 
may . . . consider a police officer's fear or belief that his or 
her safety or that of others [is] in danger as part of the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances" 
when 
determining 
the 
reasonableness of a frisk.  State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶34, 269 
Wis.2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449.  
¶16 Buchanan argues that without additional information 
about 
the 
disposition 
of 
those 
criminal 
charges, 
it 
is 
unreasonable to suspect that he was armed and dangerous.  The 
State counters that when the trooper received the arrest 
information, it provided additional context13 for the two 
previous observations about the furtive movement and the 
                                                 
12 The trooper testified that his reason for being cautious 
was that in his experience, people who deal drugs are more 
likely to be armed and dangerous than those who possess drugs 
for personal use:  "A lot of people when they deal drugs they 
carry weapons with them, [there's] just personal use of 
different types of drugs, and then there's delivery charges of 
drugs, [Buchanan] had a recent delivery charge of marijuana on 
his criminal history in Wisconsin in that same area." 
13 Buchanan argues that "[t]he State's argument implies that 
anytime a person has a pending drug charge, law enforcement has 
reasonable suspicion the person may be armed and dangerous and 
thus subject to a frisk when otherwise legally stopped."  Pet'r 
Reply Br. at 7.  However, the State specifically disavowed such 
a position:  "The previous arrests had little weight in and of 
themselves in the absence of any information about the facts of 
the offenses or their disposition." Resp. Br. at 18.  Rather, 
the 
State 
argues 
that what is significant here is the 
juxtaposition of the arrest record information with the previous 
conduct: 
 
"The 
newly 
acquired 
information 
and 
the 
new 
significance of previously known information 'gave meaning to 
[Buchanan's] surreptitious attempt to place something beneath 
his seat.'"  Id. at 20. 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
16 
 
nervousness, and when added up, the specific facts and the 
inferences fairly drawn from them did support reasonable 
suspicion.  Stated differently, the State's position is that the 
additional particularized evidence is what distingushishes this 
case from Eason.   
¶17 As this court has noted: 
Our protective search or "frisk" jurisprudence has 
consistently emphasized that the totality of all 
circumstances present and known to the officer must be 
taken into account to assess the legality of the 
procedure. Naturally, some factors will be of greater 
import 
than 
others 
in 
the 
reasonable 
suspicion 
calculus in a particular case.  
Sumner, 312 Wis. 2d 292, ¶ 23. 
¶18 In this case, the factors, considered together, create 
reasonable suspicion that the item Buchanan was seen putting 
under the seat or reaching to retrieve when pulled over could 
have been a weapon.  The factors, considered together, create 
reasonable suspicion that the officer faced danger in returning 
to the car to face a driver who was extremely nervous and who 
had been arrested for murder, delivery of drugs, armed robbery, 
and false imprisonment.  The trooper was not required to ignore 
that information.  As we have frequently noted, traffic stops 
are dangerous for law enforcement, and permitting a limited 
search is a reasonable way to balance the competing interests 
involved:   
"The constant refrain in these [protective search] 
cases has been that the need for police to protect 
themselves can justify a limited frisk for weapons. 
See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie (officers have an interest 
in self-protection which can justify a protective 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
17 
 
sweep); 
Michigan 
v. 
Long 
("Our 
past 
cases 
indicate . . . that protection of police and others 
can justify protective searches when police have a 
reasonable 
belief 
that 
the 
suspect 
poses 
a 
danger...."); Pennsylvania v. Mimms ("What is at most 
a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced 
against 
legitimate 
concerns 
for 
the 
officer's 
safety."); Adams v. Williams ("The purpose of this 
limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, 
but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation 
without fear of violence . . . ").  
Guy, 172 Wis. 2d at 94-95 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).  
See also State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶21, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 
N.W.2d 729 and State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 60-61, 556 
N.W.2d 681 (1996).  As the United States Supreme Court stated, 
[W]e stress that a Terry investigation . . . involves 
a police investigation "at close range," when the 
officer 
remains 
particularly 
vulnerable 
in 
part 
because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, 
and the officer must make a "quick decision as to how 
to 
protect 
himself 
and 
others 
from 
possible 
danger . . . ."  In such circumstances, we have not 
required that officers adopt alternate means to ensure 
their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved 
in a Terry encounter.  
Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 (citations omitted). 
¶19 A holding that reasonable suspicion can be established 
under circumstances that include a furtive movement, unusual 
nervousness, and a troubling arrest record for violent crimes 
and drug trafficking is consistent with this court's precedent.  
It is significant under a totality of the circumstances analysis 
that all of these factors were included here.   
¶20 The trooper who stopped Buchanan was at the point of 
returning to the vehicle to approach the driver as part of a 
continued traffic stop.  There is no allegation that the traffic 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
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stop was prolonged beyond the time necessary to complete the 
investigation of the violation.  See Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 
¶45.  Under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable 
for the trooper to suspect that Buchanan was armed and 
dangerous. 
B.  THE TROOPER'S DISCOVERY OF CONTRABAND 
¶21 As noted above, the trooper found no weapon on 
Buchanan or in the vehicle.  However, he did observe and seize a 
piece of plant material he saw while doing the protective 
search.  Buchanan argues that the piece of plant material was 
not in plain view and that the situation is "akin to having 
something under a car seat" in that "[n]othing needs to be 
moved, but it will not be seen without first entering the 
vehicle and leaning down."  Pet'r Br. at 41.  The State argues 
that the evidence was properly seized because it was in plain 
view during the trooper's protective search and was visible "as 
soon as he bent over and looked down."  Resp. Br. at 25. 
¶22 In Guy, we considered the seizure of a baggie of 
cocaine that was found in the course of a protective search or 
frisk of the defendant.  We described the analysis as follows:  
Having concluded that Officer Zarse constitutionally 
frisked the defendant, we now turn to the subsequent 
seizure of the cocaine. After feeling a soft bulge 
that 
felt 
like 
it 
could 
have 
been 
cocaine 
or 
marijuana, Officer Zarse put her hand into the 
defendant's 
pocket 
and 
pulled 
out 
the 
baggie 
containing cocaine. The scope of a Terry search must 
be limited to a pat-down "reasonably designed to 
discover 
guns, 
knives, 
clubs, 
or 
other 
hidden 
instruments for the assault of the police officer."  
Consequently, because what Zarse felt did not feel 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
19 
 
like a weapon, she exceeded the lawful scope of a 
Terry search when she reached into the defendant's 
pocket. However,  
[a]ssuming the object discovered in the pat-down 
does not feel like a weapon, this only means that 
a further search may not be justified under a 
Terry analysis.  There remains the possibility 
that the feel of the object, together with other 
suspicious circumstances, will amount to probable 
cause that the object is contraband or some other 
items subject to seizure, in which case there may 
be a further search based upon that probable 
cause. 
 
Guy, 172 Wis. 2d at 100 (emphasis added).   
¶23 "This court has frequently stated the rule that 
objects falling within the plain view of an officer who has a 
right to be in the position to have the view are subject to 
valid seizure and may be introduced in evidence."  State v. 
Bell, 62 Wis. 2d 534, 540, 215 N.W.2d 535 (1974).  In Guy, we 
proceeded 
with 
the 
analysis 
by 
setting 
forth 
the 
three 
conditions that must be met in order for the plain view doctrine 
to apply: 
(1) the evidence must be in plain view; (2) the 
officer must have a prior justification for being in 
the position from which she discovers the evidence in 
"plain view"; and (3) the evidence seized 'in itself 
or in itself with facts known to the officer at the 
time of the seizure, [must provide] probable cause to 
believe there is a connection between the evidence and 
criminal activity.'  
Guy, 172 Wis. 2d at 101-02 (quoting State v. Washington, 134 
Wis.2d 108, 121, 396 N.W.2d 156 (1986). 
¶24 In this case, the trooper testified that after he 
conducted "a short, cursory pat-down of the waist area, anywhere 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
20 
 
where weapons are commonly hidden," he "returned to the vehicle 
and conducted a cursory frisk of the driver's lunge area under 
the seat and center console area."  At that point, he testified, 
"I found no weapons, but as soon as I looked down I observed a 
piece of green plant material right underneath the ashtray." 
¶25 In response to questions, the trooper clarified that 
by "underneath," he did not mean that the plant material was 
obscured 
from 
view 
and 
confirmed 
that 
"[t]here 
was 
no 
manipulation done of anything in the vehicle," and that he could 
see the plant material on the car floor just by "bending over 
and looking in there."  When asked if the plant piece was "in 
plain view with the flashlight," he answered, "Yes."  He also 
stated that he "could smell an odor of raw maijuana in the 
vehicle."  He seized the piece of plant material and conducted a 
field test, which indicated the presence of THC.   
¶26 Applying the test set forth above, we first address 
whether the contraband was in plain view.  The evidence is that 
it was.  The trooper testified that "as soon as [he] looked down 
[he] observed" the plant stem.  There was no contrary testimony, 
and Buchanan concedes that "[the trooper] did not need to move 
anything."  Pet'r Br. at 41.  We next address the question of 
whether the trooper had "a prior justification for being in the 
position from which [he] discover[ed] the evidence."  We have 
already resolved that question in the State's favor above.  The 
final question is whether "facts known to the officer at the 
time of the seizure [provide] probable cause to believe there is 
a connection between the evidence and criminal activity."  
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
21 
 
Buchanan argues, on this point, that "[a] green plant stem alone 
is insufficient to give an officer probable cause to believe 
that criminal wrongdoing existed to justify seizing the object."  
Pet'r Br. at 43.  The State responds that the trooper had 
sufficient 
experience 
to 
identify 
the 
plant 
material 
as 
marijuana by its appearance and smell, and that identification 
provided probable cause for him to seize it.  There is no 
evidence in the record that contradicts this.  In Guy, we noted 
the 
relevance 
of 
the 
officer's 
prior 
drug 
interdiction 
experience:  "Zarse had found drugs in over 100 searches. That 
experience would help an officer know how drugs are stored and 
recognize the feel of a baggie containing bindles."  Guy, 172 
Wis. 2d at 102.  The trooper in this case similarly testified 
that he had been doing drug interdiction patrols since he became 
a police officer about five years earlier and had made "probably 
over a hundred drug arrests." 
¶27 The requirements for the application of the plain view 
doctrine are met on these facts.  In this not uncommon set of 
circumstances, contraband was discovered in the course of a 
valid 
protective 
search, 
but 
under 
these 
circumstances, 
suppression is not required.  As the United States Supreme Court 
stated in Michigan v. Long, "If, while conducting a legitimate 
Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer 
should . . . discover contraband other than weapons, he clearly 
cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth 
Amendment 
does 
not 
require 
its 
suppression 
in 
such 
circumstances."  Long, 463 U.S. at 1050.   
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
22 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶28 We hold that under the totality of the circumstances 
in this case, the trooper's observation of Buchanan's furtive 
movements and visible nervousness, a record of arrests for 
violent crimes, and a drug delivery arrest that had occurred 
nearby a short time before the stop constitute "specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts"14 create reasonable suspicion and 
justify a protective search for the officer's safety.  The 
protective search was therefore justified.  The subsequent 
discovery of contraband was made in the course of the search 
while the item was within plain view; because there was a basis 
for a protective search, the trooper had a right to be in a 
position to view it.  The trooper's recognition of the smell and 
appearance of the marijuana, together with the other suspicious 
circumstances, provided probable cause to believe that it was 
contraband and that he could validly seize it.  There is 
therefore no basis for suppressing the evidence that was 
obtained as a result of these actions.  We consequently affirm 
the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—Affirmed. 
 
                                                 
14  Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50. 
No. 
2009AP2934-CR   
 
 
 
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