Title: In re Application of FirstEnergy Advisors for Certification as a Competitive Retail Electric Service Power Broker & Aggregator

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Application of FirstEnergy Advisors for Certification as a Competitive Retail Elec. Serv. Power 
Broker & Aggregator, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3630.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-3630 
IN RE APPLICATION OF SUVON, L.L.C., D.B.A. FIRSTENERGY ADVISORS, FOR 
CERTIFICATION AS A COMPETITIVE RETAIL ELECTRIC SERVICE POWER 
BROKER AND AGGREGATOR IN OHIO; OFFICE OF OHIO CONSUMERS’ COUNSEL 
AND NORTHEAST OHIO PUBLIC ENERGY COUNCIL, APPELLANTS; PUBLIC 
UTILITIES COMMISSION, APPELLEE; SUVON, L.L.C., D.B.A. FIRSTENERGY 
ADVISORS, INTERVENING APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Application of FirstEnergy Advisors for Certification as a 
Competitive Retail Elec. Serv. Power Broker & Aggregator, Slip Opinion No. 
2021-Ohio-3630.] 
Public utilities—R.C. 4928.08—Certification of competitive retail-electric-service 
providers—Before it can be certified by the Public Utilities Commission, a 
company must prove, among other things, that it has the managerial, 
financial, and technical fitness and capability to (1) provide competitive 
retail electric service and (2) comply with all applicable commission rules 
and orders—Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-24-10(C)(1) and (C)(2)—Public 
January Term, 2021 
 
2
Utilities Commission must file a written opinion setting forth the reasons 
for certifying a company as fit and capable of providing retail electric 
service and complying with the commission’s rules. 
(No. 2020-1009—Submitted June 29, 2021—Decided October 14, 2021.) 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission, No. 20-0103-EL-AGG. 
____________________ 
 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} Ohio consumers have the option of purchasing electricity in the 
competitive marketplace through a variety of competitive retail-electric-service 
providers.  Before an entity of this type can market its services to customers, it must 
be certified by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”).  R.C. 
4928.08(B).  In this case, we deal with an appeal from a PUCO decision granting 
certification to one such provider, Suvon, L.L.C., d.b.a. FirstEnergy Advisors 
(“FirstEnergy Advisors”). 
{¶ 2} To be certified by PUCO, a company must prove, among other things, 
that it has the managerial, financial, and technical fitness and capability to (1) 
provide competitive retail electric service and (2) comply with all applicable 
commission rules and orders.  Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-24-10(C)(1) and (C)(2).  
Two organizations intervened in PUCO proceedings and objected to the 
certification, raising issues about FirstEnergy Advisors’ relationship with its parent 
company—FirstEnergy Corporation. 
{¶ 3} Despite the objections, PUCO granted the certification request, 
issuing a barebones order that offered no explanation as to how FirstEnergy 
Advisors met the applicable legal requirements.  In regard to FirstEnergy Advisors’ 
relationship with its parent, PUCO concluded that these issues were best deferred 
to be dealt with in another ongoing PUCO proceeding. 
{¶ 4} We now reverse PUCO’s certification decision and remand the matter 
to the commission for further proceedings.  By statute, PUCO must file “findings 
January Term, 2021 
 
3
of fact and written opinions setting forth the reasons prompting the decisions 
arrived at.”  R.C. 4903.09.  The order in this case falls well short of this requirement.  
Further, in deferring consideration of issues relating to FirstEnergy Advisors’ 
relationship with its parent corporation to another proceeding, PUCO violated its 
statutory duty to find, before approving a certification application, that a company 
is fit and capable of complying with all commission rules. 
I.  Background 
{¶ 5} Before we get to the facts, a brief overview of Ohio’s energy 
landscape is helpful.  Consumers have the option of purchasing electricity either 
from their local “distribution utility”—which also provides the infrastructure that 
delivers the electricity to the end-user—or through a host of competitive retail 
electric service providers (“CRES providers”).  See Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. 
Pub. Util. Comm., 110 Ohio St.3d 394, 2006-Ohio-4706, 853 N.E.2d 1153, ¶ 5.  In 
either case, the electricity is delivered over wires owned and maintained by the local 
distribution utility, and that company can continue to charge for the delivery 
service.  Id. 
{¶ 6} A distribution utility may compete on the competitive wholesale 
market by establishing its own CRES provider.  R.C. 4928.01(A)(4), (A)(9), and 
(A)(27); R.C. 4928.17(A)(1) and (2); R.C. 4928.08.  In addition to selling electricity 
directly to customers, CRES providers may offer brokerage and aggregation 
services.  Entities that provide power brokerage services arrange for the sale and 
supply of electricity to consumers, but they do not acquire title to the electricity 
sold.  Electric aggregators bring consumers together in a buying group and 
negotiate with electricity suppliers for better prices and other benefits.1  Public 
 
1. For background on aggregation and brokerage in Ohio’s Energy Choice program see generally 
Ohio Consumer’s Counsel, Energy Choice 101, http://www.occ.ohio.gov/factsheet/energy-choice-
101 (accessed Sept. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9WXW-FRAK]; Public Utilities Commission of 
Ohio, Energy Choice Ohio—What is aggregation, https://energychoice.ohio.gov/Pages/What is 
Aggregation.aspx (accessed Sept. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7GG3-5YZ7]; Public Utilities 
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4
Utility Commission of Ohio, Competitive Retail Electric Service Provider Forms 
and Applications, https://puco.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/puco/utilities/electricity/ 
resources/competitive-retail-electric-service-certification (accessed Sept. 8, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/3Q7M-L8UX].  To prevent a utility-affiliated CRES provider 
from having an unfair advantage in the marketplace, the utility-affiliated CRES 
provider must be fully separate from the distribution utility.  R.C. 4928.17(A)(1).  
And before a company can begin providing such services, it must be certified by 
PUCO.  R.C. 4928.08(B). 
{¶ 7} FirstEnergy Corporation is the parent company of several distribution 
utilities, including the Ohio Edison Company, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating 
Company, and the Toledo Edison Company.  It is also the parent of FirstEnergy 
Advisors, the CRES provider that is the subject of this appeal. 
A.  FirstEnergy Advisors applies to PUCO for certification 
{¶ 8} In January 2020, FirstEnergy Advisors applied for certification to 
provide aggregator and brokerage services as a CRES provider.  In re the 
Application of Suvon, L.L.C., d.b.a. FirstEnergy Advisors, as a Competitive Retail 
Electric Service Power Broker and Aggregator in Ohio, Pub. Util. Comm. No. 20-
0103-EL-AGG.  Applications for certification are automatically approved 30 days 
after filing, unless PUCO or one of its attorney-examiners suspends the application.  
R.C. 4928.08(B) and Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-24-10(A).  The two appellants in this 
action, the Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council and the Ohio Consumers’ 
Counsel (collectively, “the objectors”) moved to intervene before PUCO, as did 
several other parties.  At the same time, the objectors asked PUCO to suspend 
FirstEnergy Advisors’ application and to conduct an evidentiary hearing.  Their 
joint motion was premised on FirstEnergy Advisors’ alleged failure to comply with 
 
Commission 
of 
Ohio, 
Energy 
Choice 
Ohio—Glossary 
of 
Terms, 
https://energychoice.ohio.gov/Pages/Glossary of Terms.aspx (accessed on Sept. 8, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/ZE2J-KK3V].   
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5
requirements that there be “corporate separation,” see R.C. 4928.17, between itself 
and distribution utilities associated with FirstEnergy Corporation. 
B.  A brief detour: the audit case 
{¶ 9} To allow the reader to understand the gravamen of the concerns raised 
by the objectors, we need to provide some background on a separate proceeding, 
which we will call the “audit case.”  To prevent unfair competition, Ohio law 
imposes “corporate-separation” requirements on CRES providers that are affiliated 
with an electric-distribution utility.  See R.C. 4928.17; Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 
4901:1-37.  In 2017, PUCO opened a case to determine whether the three 
FirstEnergy electric-distribution utilities operating in Ohio are complying with 
these legal requirements.  See In re Review of the Ohio Edison Company, the 
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, and the Toledo Edison Company’s 
Compliance with R.C. 4928.17 and the Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4901:1-37, Pub. 
Util. Comm. No. 17-0974-EL-UNC. 
{¶ 10} An independent auditor selected by PUCO prepared a report in 2018 
that focused primarily on the FirstEnergy utilities’ relationship with FirstEnergy 
Solutions Corporation, then a CRES provider affiliated with FirstEnergy.  The audit 
report recommended that the entities modify several practices that provided 
FirstEnergy Solutions with a competitive advantage.  The report found that the 
sharing of certain employees between FirstEnergy Solutions, FirstEnergy 
Corporation, and the FirstEnergy distribution utilities was inappropriate because it 
gave FirstEnergy Solutions access to information and resources not available to 
other market participants.  The audit report also recommended that PUCO require 
FirstEnergy Solutions to stop using the “FirstEnergy” name, to eliminate affiliate 
bias and prevent customer confusion. 
{¶ 11} Before a final report was issued, FirstEnergy Solutions filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  The company later emerged from bankruptcy, 
adopted a new name, and is no longer affiliated with FirstEnergy Corporation.  Pub. 
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Util. Comm. No. 17-0974-EL-UNC, Entry, ¶ 6-7 (Dec. 2, 2020).  Despite this, the 
audit case remains open.  And as we will explain shortly, PUCO is using the case 
as a vehicle to examine the corporate-separation issues relating to FirstEnergy 
Advisors. 
C.  PUCO certifies FirstEnergy Advisors 
{¶ 12} We now return to the FirstEnergy Advisors’ certification 
proceeding.  Relying on information from the audit case, the objectors alleged two 
ways in which FirstEnergy Advisors lacked the “managerial, technical, and 
financial capability” to provide competitive retail electrical services and comply 
with all applicable PUCO rules and regulations.  First, they asserted that by sharing 
corporate officers and directors with FirstEnergy Corporation and the FirstEnergy 
distribution utilities, FirstEnergy Advisors violated the requirement of R.C. 
4928.17(A)(1) that electrical services be provided through “a fully separated 
affiliate of the utility.”  They noted, for example, that Charles Jones—FirstEnergy 
Corporation’s CEO—also served as a manager of FirstEnergy Advisors and as a 
director of FirstEnergy’s regulated utilities.  Likewise, one other senior officer of 
FirstEnergy Corporation held a management position in both FirstEnergy Advisors 
and the regulated utilities and another held a management position with FirstEnergy 
Advisors.  Second, they contended that FirstEnergy Advisors, by using the 
“FirstEnergy” name, was violating Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-37-04(D)(7), which 
prohibits distribution utilities from specifying that a CRES provider is an affiliate.  
In support of their motion, the objectors relied on findings made by PUCO in the 
audit case. 
{¶ 13} The day after the objectors’ filings, an attorney-examiner suspended 
the certification process to allow the commission additional time to investigate 
FirstEnergy Advisors’ application.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 20-0103-EL-AGG, 
Entry, ¶ 5-9 (Feb. 11, 2020). 
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{¶ 14} Several weeks later, PUCO staff issued a two-paragraph report 
recommending approval of the application.  The report states: 
 
[FirstEnergy] Advisors has answered all applicable sections and 
provided all required exhibits as listed in the application form.  In 
addition, [FirstEnergy] Advisors has stated that it intends to comply 
with all commission rules. 
* * *  Staff has thoroughly reviewed and evaluated this 
application, accompanying exhibits, and amendments.  Based on 
this review, Staff believes the application filed by * * * FirstEnergy 
Advisors * * *, as amended * * *, is in compliance with [the] Ohio 
Administrative Code and therefore, Staff recommends that this 
application be approved. 
  
{¶ 15} While PUCO was considering whether to adopt the staff 
recommendation, the objectors served discovery requests on FirstEnergy Advisors.  
FirstEnergy Advisors refused to provide the requested discovery, and the objectors 
responded by filing motions to compel.  FirstEnergy Advisors, in turn, sought a 
protective order to prevent discovery from going forward. 
{¶ 16} A little over two weeks after receiving the staff report and 
recommendation, PUCO entered an order adopting the staff report and approving 
FirstEnergy Advisors’ application.  In regard to the issues raised by the objectors, 
PUCO concluded that issues concerning use of the FirstEnergy name and 
“compliance with corporate separation requirements by FirstEnergy Corp. affiliates 
are best raised in other proceedings, specifically” the audit case.  Pub. Util. Comm. 
No. 20-0103-EL-AGG, Finding and Order, ¶ 20 (April 22, 2020).  Having pushed 
the corporate-separation issues to the side, PUCO next determined that “the only 
relevant issues” were whether FirstEnergy Advisors had the managerial, financial, 
January Term, 2021 
 
8
and technical capabilities to provide electricity aggregator and brokerage services 
in Ohio.  Id. at ¶ 21.  It noted that its staff had “thoroughly reviewed” FirstEnergy 
Advisors’ application and that no “other parties have raised material issues 
regarding [FirstEnergy Advisors’] managerial, technical and financial capability.”  
Id. 
{¶ 17} In granting the application, PUCO found that no hearing was 
necessary.  Id. at ¶ 22.  It also denied as moot the objectors’ motions to compel 
discovery as well as FirstEnergy Advisors’ request for a protective order.  Id. at 
¶ 25. 
{¶ 18} The objectors requested rehearing, which PUCO denied.  Pub. Util. 
Comm. No. 20-0103-EL-AGG, Entry on Rehearing, ¶ 1 (June 17, 2020).  In 
denying rehearing, PUCO noted that the auditor’s finding in the audit case on the 
use of the FirstEnergy trade name “represent[ed] a significant departure from well-
established Commission precedents” and that it would be more efficient to deal 
with that issue, as well as the shared-employee issue, in the audit case.  Id. at ¶ 16.  
As for the objectors’ claim that it had failed to make factual findings and 
conclusions of law as required by R.C. 4903.09, PUCO simply stated: “[W]e find 
that our reasoning, and the factual basis supporting approval of [FirstEnergy 
Advisors’] application, are easily discernable from the [original] Finding and 
Order.”  Id. at ¶ 28. 
{¶ 19} The objectors appealed to this court, each raising several 
propositions of law, some of which overlap.  Generally, they assert that PUCO erred 
by (1) failing to provide a sufficient rationale for its decision, (2) approving the 
application without determining whether FirstEnergy Advisors met corporate-
separation requirements, (3) denying the objectors an opportunity to conduct 
discovery, (4) failing to hold a hearing, and (5) improperly shifting the burden of 
proof to the objectors.  The commission has defended its order, and we granted 
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9
FirstEnergy Advisors’ request to intervene in this appeal.  160 Ohio St.3d 1402, 
2020-Ohio-4481, 153 N.E.3d 97. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  The commission’s order violates R.C. 4903.09 because it fails to explain the 
reasoning and factual grounds for granting FirstEnergy Advisors’ application 
{¶ 20} We take up first the assertion that PUCO violated R.C. 4903.09, 
which requires it to explain the reasoning and factual grounds for its decision.  That 
provision provides: 
 
In all contested cases heard by the public utilities 
commission, a complete record of all of the proceedings shall be 
made, including a transcript of all testimony and of all exhibits, and 
the commission shall file, with the records of such cases, findings of 
fact and written opinions setting forth the reasons prompting the 
decisions arrived at, based upon said findings of fact. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 21} The 
purposes 
behind 
R.C. 
4903.09’s 
requirements 
are 
straightforward.  For a reviewing court to do its job, it needs to have enough 
information to know how the commission reached its result.  Allnet 
Communications Servs., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 70 Ohio St.3d 202, 209, 638 
N.E.2d 516 (1994).  The “statute requires the commission to set forth the reasons 
for its decisions and prohibits summary rulings and conclusions that do not develop 
the supporting rationale or record.”  In re Application of Ohio Power Co., 155 Ohio 
St.3d 326, 2018-Ohio-4698, 121 N.E.3d 320, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 22} Of course, PUCO can adopt reports prepared by its staff and 
incorporate them into its order, but these reports must satisfy the requirements of 
the statute; that is, they must contain sufficient factual findings and conclusions of 
January Term, 2021 
 
10 
law.  MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 32 Ohio St.3d 306, 311, 
513 N.E.2d 337 (1987).  At bottom, PUCO’s order “must show, in sufficient detail, 
the facts in the record upon which the order is based, and the reasoning followed 
by the [commission] in reaching its conclusions.”  Id. at 312.  The order here does 
neither. 
{¶ 23} To approve FirstEnergy Advisors’ application, PUCO was required 
to find that the company was “managerially, financially, and technically fit and 
capable of” (1) “performing the service it intends to provide” and (2) “complying 
with all applicable commission rules and orders.”  Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-24-
10(C)(1) and (C)(2). 
{¶ 24} Neither PUCO’s order nor the staff report it adopts explains how 
FirstEnergy Advisors is managerially, financially, and technically fit to provide 
electricity aggregator and brokerage services.  The staff report simply recites that 
FirstEnergy Advisors provided the requested materials, that PUCO staff 
“thoroughly reviewed” these materials, and that the staff believes that the 
application complies with the Ohio Administrative Code. 
{¶ 25} PUCO did not make any independent findings about FirstEnergy 
Advisors’ managerial fitness and competence to provide competitive retail electric 
services.  Rather than engage in any analysis of whether FirstEnergy Advisors met 
the statutory requirements, PUCO simply noted that none of the intervening parties 
countered the staff report’s findings or “raised material issues” about FirstEnergy 
Advisors’ capability to provide the applied-for services.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 20-
0103-EL-AGG, Finding and Order at ¶ 21 (April 22, 2020).  It did not explain how 
FirstEnergy Advisors established that its managers and employees have the skill, 
experience, and training needed to provide competitive retail electric services to 
Ohio consumers.  See Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-24-10(C)(1).  Nor did it cite any 
facts in the record to support its conclusions. 
January Term, 2021 
 
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{¶ 26} Similar deficiencies arise when we consider the requirement that 
PUCO find that FirstEnergy Advisors is fit and capable of complying with all 
applicable commission rules and orders.  The staff report simply recites that 
FirstEnergy Advisors “has stated that it intends to comply with all commission 
rules.”  That report, however, does not explain how FirstEnergy Advisors’ 
application establishes that the company’s managers and employees possess the 
skill, experience, and training necessary to provide broker and aggregator services.  
Nor is it self-evident how the staff’s recitation of FirstEnergy Advisors’ statement 
that it intends to comply with all commission rules satisfies PUCO’s obligation to 
find that FirstEnergy Advisors is fit and capable of complying with commission 
rules.  Rather than relying on the company’s stated intent, PUCO should have 
identified plans, procedures, and protocols FirstEnergy Advisors has in place that 
show the company is fit and capable of complying with all applicable commission 
rules and orders. 
{¶ 27} In sum, PUCO violated R.C. 4903.09 in two ways.  First, it failed to 
provide a reasoned explanation of the basis of its decision that FirstEnergy Advisors 
met the requirements of Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-24-10(C)(1) and (2).  See In re 
Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., 148 Ohio St.3d 510, 2016-Ohio-7535, 71 
N.E.3d 997, ¶ 19-22; MCI Telecommunications Corp., 32 Ohio St.3d at 311, 513 
N.E.2d 337.  And it failed to identify the facts in the record on which it based its 
decision.  See Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 111 Ohio St.3d 300, 
2006-Ohio-5789, 856 N.E.2d 213, ¶ 22-36; Tongren v. Pub. Util. Comm., 85 Ohio 
St.3d 87, 89-91, 706 N.E.2d 1255 (1999). 
{¶ 28} FirstEnergy Advisors argues that even if PUCO did not comply with 
its obligation to provide a sufficient rationale for its decision, we should not reverse 
PUCO’s order because the objectors have failed to show that they have suffered 
any actual prejudice by PUCO’s certification of FirstEnergy Advisors.  Essentially, 
FirstEnergy Advisors argues that the most the objectors can complain about is the 
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possibility that FirstEnergy Advisors will engage in anticompetitive practices after 
certification and that such a possibility does not constitute prejudice sufficient to 
allow for reversal of the PUCO certification order. 
{¶ 29} Under FirstEnergy’s prejudice theory, a PUCO certification order 
would essentially be unreviewable.  Harm from an improper certification will 
always be speculative until the newly certified CRES provider enters the 
marketplace and engages in harmful behavior.  We are reluctant to read the 
prejudice requirement so broadly that it would swallow up the right to challenge a 
CRES certification altogether. 
{¶ 30} We have also recognized in the context of R.C. 4903.09 challenges 
that PUCO’s failure to provide any rationale for its order may effectively preclude 
a party from showing prejudice.  Tongren, 85 Ohio St.3d at 92-93, 706 N.E.2d 
1255.  In Tongren, we explained that when “[PUCO] fails to provide a record, the 
complaining party is effectively foreclosed from ‘demonstrating’ the prejudicial 
effect of the order.”  Id. at 92.  Thus, 
 
where [PUCO] fails to meet the requirements of R.C. 4903.09 by 
not disclosing the sources of its information to those who most 
require it, thereby preventing the complaining party from 
demonstrating prejudice, the matter must be remanded for 
development of an appropriate record, to leave open the potential 
demonstration of prejudice by a party based upon that record in a 
subsequent appeal. 
 
Id. at 92-93. 
{¶ 31} To be sure, Tongren involved circumstances somewhat different 
from those present here; in that case, PUCO’s order referred to various findings and 
recommendations of staff that were not made part of the record.  But the same 
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principle applies: without knowing why the commission decided what it did, an 
objector faces an almost insurmountable task in showing prejudice.  As a result, we 
conclude that the matter should be remanded for PUCO to make factual and legal 
findings consistent with its obligations under R.C. 4903.09. 
{¶ 32} This is not to say that the application necessarily lacks sufficient 
information.  PUCO may be able to explain on remand how FirstEnergy Advisors 
met the requirements of Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-24-10(C)(1) and (2).  But PUCO 
explained none of these matters, and the stated basis for its decision (the staff 
report) lacks sufficient reasoning. 
B.  PUCO erred by deferring a determination whether FirstEnergy Advisors 
is fit and capable of complying with corporate-separation requirements 
{¶ 33} We also conclude that PUCO violated its duty to find that 
FirstEnergy Advisors was “fit and capable of complying with all applicable 
commission rules” by deferring all consideration of the corporate-separation issues 
to the audit case. 
{¶ 34} An electric utility and a CRES affiliate that provide services within 
the utility’s service area must comply with a detailed set of legal requirements.  
Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-37-04.  A utility is not barred from sharing employees with 
an affiliate, but when it does so, it must comply with a “code of conduct” designed 
to prevent the utility-affiliated company from gaining an unfair competitive 
advantage over other competitors.  Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-37-04(A)(4) and (D).  
The code of conduct prohibits the improper flow of information between shared 
service employees of the electric utility and competitive affiliates.  See Ohio 
Adm.Code 4901:1-37-04(D)(1), (3), and (4). 
{¶ 35} Here, PUCO made no finding at all about FirstEnergy Advisors’ 
capability or fitness to comply with these rules.  There was no examination of the 
shared employees nor of procedures and policies FirstEnergy Advisors had in place 
to prevent information from passing improperly between shared employees.  
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Instead of determining whether FirstEnergy Advisors had shown that it could 
comply with the code of conduct, PUCO deferred all issues regarding corporate-
separation requirements to the audit case.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 20-0103-EL-
AGG, Entry on Rehearing at ¶ 11, 33 (June 17, 2020). 
{¶ 36} This PUCO cannot do.  Under R.C. 4928.08(B), a company cannot 
provide competitive retail electric services to consumers “without first being 
certified.”  And to be certified, PUCO must find that an applicant is “fit and capable 
of complying” with the commission’s rules.  Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-24-10(C)(2).  
These rules provide no flexibility for PUCO to defer a finding about a CRES 
provider’s fitness and capability to comply with the rules until after PUCO has 
certified the applicant. 
{¶ 37} In arguing that the requisite finding was made, FirstEnergy Advisors 
and PUCO point to PUCO’s statement that its staff had thoroughly reviewed and 
evaluated the company’s ability to comply with PUCO’s rules or orders under R.C. 
Chapter 4928.  But this general pronouncement must be read in conjunction with 
PUCO’s explicit statements that the corporate-separation issues are “best raised in 
other proceedings,” Pub. Util. Comm. No. 20-0103-EL-AGG, Finding and Order 
at ¶ 20-21 (April 22, 2020), and that as a result, “the only relevant issues in this 
certification proceeding are whether [FirstEnergy] Advisors has the managerial, 
technical and financial capability to be a CRES broker/aggregator in this state,” id. 
at ¶ 21.  When PUCO’s orders—both its initial order and its order on 
reconsideration—are read as a whole, it is clear that PUCO made no determination 
about FirstEnergy Advisors’ capability and fitness to comply with the corporate-
separation requirements but deferred all consideration of these matters to the audit 
case. 
{¶ 38} To be clear, it was not error for the commission to defer questions 
about FirstEnergy Advisors’ actual compliance with the code of conduct to another 
proceeding once the company had been certified to provide broker and aggregator 
January Term, 2021 
 
15 
services.  But PUCO was required to decide whether FirstEnergy Advisors had 
demonstrated that it could comply with corporate-separation requirements before 
certifying the company to provide service in Ohio. 
{¶ 39} Thus, on remand, before granting certification, PUCO must 
determine whether FirstEnergy Advisors had demonstrated that it is fit and capable 
of complying with all PUCO rules, including corporate-separation requirements.  It 
cannot simply defer resolution of these matters to another proceeding. 
C.  The other issues presented for review may be resolved in short order 
{¶ 40} Given our decision to remand this matter to PUCO, we can resolve 
the remaining issues in short order and provide guidance to the commission on 
remand. 
{¶ 41} First, on remand, PUCO should decide on the merits the discovery 
motions filed by the objectors.  In its order, the commission denied the motions to 
compel discovery as moot because it had approved FirstEnergy Advisors’ 
application on the merits.  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 20-0103-EL-AGG, Finding and 
Order at ¶ 25 (April 22, 2020).  And on rehearing, PUCO provided an additional 
rationale, asserting that the objectors had not “expeditiously prosecute[d]” their 
discovery motions under the expedited review process found in R.C. 4928.08(B) 
(giving the commission 90 days to approve or deny an application for certification 
after an attorney-examiner suspends consideration).  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 20-
0103-EL-AGG, Entry on Rehearing at ¶ 23 (June 17, 2020).  Because our decision 
reverses PUCO’s order granting FirstEnergy Advisors’ application on the merits, 
on remand the discovery issue will not be moot. 
{¶ 42} We have recognized PUCO’s broad discretion to regulate its 
proceedings and manage its docket.  See, e.g., Weiss v. Pub. Util. Comm., 90 Ohio 
St.3d 15, 19, 734 N.E.2d 775 (2000).  But intervening parties in proceedings before 
PUCO also have a statutory right to discovery under R.C. 4903.082.  See also Ohio 
Adm.Code 4901-1-16(B) and (H).  And we have construed these provisions as 
January Term, 2021 
 
16 
allowing broad discovery of nonprivileged matters.  See Ohio Consumers’ Counsel 
v. Pub. Util. Comm., 111 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-5789, 856 N.E.2d 213, ¶ 82-
83.  To be sure, PUCO was under a tight deadline given the expedited review of 
certification applications.  But both objectors requested discovery from FirstEnergy 
Advisors and, when such discovery was not forthcoming, sought PUCO’s 
assistance within the statutory timeframe.  PUCO should have decided whether 
discovery was necessary; not simply decided that discovery was unnecessary 
because it had already made a decision.  On remand, PUCO should rule on the 
merits of the discovery motions before issuing a decision on the certification 
application.  In doing so it will need to balance the statutory right to discovery and 
the constraints imposed by the statutory time frame for ruling on the certification 
application. 
{¶ 43} Second, PUCO will need to rule on the objectors’ request for an 
evidentiary hearing.  The objectors have asserted that PUCO abused its discretion 
by approving the certification application without holding an evidentiary hearing 
on FirstEnergy Advisors’ application.  Our determination to reverse and remand so 
that PUCO can explain its decision renders this proposition of law moot.  On 
remand, PUCO may “[a]t its discretion, set the matter for hearing.”  See Ohio 
Adm.Code 4901:1-24-10(A)(2)(c).  In exercising this discretion, PUCO will need 
to be mindful of the statutory time frame for decision-making and consider the 
extent to which a hearing would be beneficial in view of the materials submitted in 
support of the application and the objections that have been raised. 
{¶ 44} Third, one of the objectors has argued that PUCO improperly shifted 
the burden of proof.  The basis for this argument comes from PUCO’s reliance in 
its order denying reconsideration on the fact that “no party in this case had 
materially disputed Staff’s determination that [FirstEnergy Advisors] had the 
managerial, technical and financial capability to serve as a CRES power broker and 
aggregator.”  Pub. Util. Comm. No. 20-0103-EL-AGG, Entry on Rehearing at ¶ 28 
January Term, 2021 
 
17 
(June 17, 2020).  Our decision to set aside PUCO’s order and remand the case 
renders this proposition of law moot.  In evaluating the application on remand, we 
trust that PUCO will be mindful that it remains the applicant’s burden to 
demonstrate that it meets the statutory requirements for certification regardless of 
whether any other party has disputed the applicant’s qualifications. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 45} For these reasons, we reverse PUCO’s orders and remand the case 
to PUCO for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Orders reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DONNELLY, STEWART, and 
BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
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Bruce Weston, Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, and Angela D. O’Brien, 
Assistant Consumers’ Counsel; and Carpenter, Lipps & Leland, L.L.P., and 
Kimberly W. Bojko, for appellant Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Glenn S. Krassen, and Dane Stinson, for appellant 
Northeast Ohio Public Energy Council. 
 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and John H. Jones, Thomas G. Lindgren, and 
Kyle L. Kern, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., N. Trevor Alexander, and 
Kari D. Hehmeyer, for intervening appellee Suvon L.L.C., d.b.a. FirstEnergy 
Advisors. 
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