Title: In Re Moriarty

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-302


In re Grievance of John Moriarty             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             Labor Relations Board

                                             October Term, 1990


Charles H. McHugh, Chairman

Michael R. Zimmerman, VSEA Staff Attorney, Montpelier, for plaintiff-
  appellant

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Michael Seibert, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.),
          Specially Assigned


     GIBSON, J.  John Moriarty, formerly a Vermont State Police Lieutenant,
appeals from a Vermont Labor Relations Board decision that he had failed to
prove that his transfer of duty station was disciplinary rather than admin-
istrative.  We dismiss the appeal as moot.
     On August 11, 1987, Moriarty's supervisors informed him that they were
preferring disciplinary charges.  Minutes later he was told he was being
temporarily transferred from Brattleboro to Waterbury, assertedly for admin-
istrative reasons.  Shortly thereafter, Moriarty learned that the transfer
was permanent.
     Moriarty filed a complaint with the Board on September 10, 1987.  The
purpose was to have the transfer order declared invalid on the ground that
the proper procedures for a disciplinary transfer had not been followed.  He
hoped thereby to continue employment with the State Police in the Brattle-
boro area.  He made no damages claim.  In response, the State argued that
Moriarty was transferred because of a concern that he could no longer
effectively supervise the Brattleboro station due to lack of judgment.  On
May 27, 1988, the Board issued its ruling, holding that Moriarty had failed
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer was not an
administrative transfer made for a legitimate management reason.  After
Moriarty appealed the order to this Court, and while his appeal was pending,
he resigned his position with the State Police.  Pursuant to the parties'
stipulation, we remanded the matter to the Board for findings on the issue
of mootness.  Following hearing, the Board issued findings of fact, but
reached no conclusions of its own on the issue of mootness.  The Board's
procedure accorded with the instructions from this Court.
     On the day after the Board's ruling on the merits, Moriarty applied for
employment at the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont.
In late September, Vermont Yankee offered him employment as security super-
visor.  Moriarty subsequently submitted a written request for a leave of
absence to Public Safety Commissioner A. James Walton, explaining that the
five-hour-per-day commute between his home in Vernon and the Waterbury duty
station was disrupting both his work and family life.  Upon denial of the
request, Moriarty resigned his position with the State Police effective
October 27, 1988, and went to work for Vermont Yankee.
     On appeal, Moriarty continues to argue that his transfer was in fact
disciplinary.  He contends the matter is not moot because (1) the label
attached to the transfer affects his future employment prospects, (2) he
might apply for reemployment with the State Police if he succeeds on appeal,
(3) the underlying issues are important to others who may be similarly situ-
ated in the future, and (4) his resignation was in reality a constructive
discharge.  The State confines its argument to the issue of mootness.  We
hold that inasmuch as there no longer is a justiciable controversy, the
matter has become moot, and we therefore do not reach the merits.
     "The general rule is that a case becomes moot 'when the issues
presented are no longer "live" or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.'"  In re S.H., 141 Vt. 278, 280,