Title: The Florida Bar v. Omar Javier Arcia

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC01-952
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
OMAR JAVIER ARCIA,
Respondent.
[May 29, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a referee's report and recommendation regarding
attorney Omar Javier Arcia’s ethical breaches.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §
15, Fla. Const.
I. FACTS
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Arcia claiming that he violated an
agreement between Arcia and the law firm that employed him.  The referee granted
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the Bar’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, stating that the sole issue to be
determined at the final hearing was the discipline to be imposed.  After the final
hearing, the referee issued a report containing the following findings and
recommendations.
Arcia was employed as an associate at Zarco and Pardo, P.A. (the firm)
from about 1995 until he was fired on September 8, 2000.   His employment
agreement provided him a base salary and a potential bonus each year.  Arcia was
given a copy of the firm's manual, which warned that attorneys were prohibited
from independently representing the firm’s clients or prospective clients.  The firm
advised Arcia that he could represent family members and friends, but any fees
were payable to the firm.  
In about December 1998, Arcia formed Omar J. Arcia, P.A. (the Arcia P.A.),
of which he was the sole shareholder and employee.  During his employment with
the firm, Arcia represented some clients for the benefit of the Arcia P.A., and not
the firm, thus violating his employment agreement.  Arcia solicited about ten to
twenty clients or potential clients by, among other things, intercepting telephone
calls directed to the firm.  On several occasions, Arcia deposited fees he had
obtained in representing the firm's clients or prospective clients into the Arcia P.A.
bank account.  Further, even though the firm’s practice was for a partner to open
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all mail, Arcia would sometimes intercept the mail and take checks made payable to
the Arcia P.A.  Arcia effected the transfers to the Arcia P.A. bank accounts without
the firm’s consent or knowledge.   
Arcia also induced some of the firm's clients to deliver payments of fees to
the Arcia P.A. by claiming he was a partner of the firm, and by preparing
misleading documents such as stationery and other materials suggesting a
relationship between the Arcia P.A. and the firm.  On many occasions, Arcia
executed retainer agreements with clients in which he listed Arcia P.A. and the firm
as the attorneys retained.  Arcia never advised the firm of the existence of Arcia
P.A. and never provided the firm with any portion of the fees he received.  At least
once, Arcia filed a pleading in federal court suggesting that he and a partner of the
firm were representing a client when, in fact, the partner had no knowledge of the
representation.  
Arcia used firm resources during office hours to conduct his fraudulent
activities, and admitted that he viewed the firm as a competitor of the Arcia P.A. 
Finally, when Arcia received fees from representing friends or family, he never
advised the firm. 
Arcia admitted to depriving the firm of about $62,000 in legal fees.  During
the 1½ to 2-year span of Arcia's misconduct, the firm paid him bonuses. 
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Arcia's misconduct accelerated until he was fired.  One of the reasons for
this acceleration, besides greed, was his wife's loss of income.  Arcia's wife left her
job when she became pregnant.
On three different dates, the firm afforded Arcia the opportunity to admit to
his conduct, but he failed to do so.  In particular, on September 8, 2000, Arcia
refused to admit to his improprieties until the firm confronted him with clear
evidence of its knowledge.  When asked why he engaged in such fraud, Arcia
responded that it was the result of his greed.
The firm sued Arcia and obtained a temporary restraining order against him. 
The firm and Arcia later settled the case.  He agreed to repay the firm $60,000. 
Arcia requested that the following language be included in the agreement: "Neither
Zarco & Pardo, P.A. nor any of its employees, shall initiate contact or provide any
further evidence to [T]he Florida Bar in connection with the Bar Complaint
instituted against Omar J. Arcia for the allegations contained in the Subject Lawsuit,
except as specifically required by law."
The referee concluded that Arcia's actions constituted a theft of firm funds
and possibly client funds.  The firm could have requested payment from these
clients for the unpaid fees Arcia had deceptively collected.  The referee further
found that the firm had been harmed by Arcia's actions, noting that the firm lost
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numerous H&R Block franchisees as clients.  Arcia also agreed, without the firm’s
knowledge, to represent a client that created a conflict of interest.  The referee
noted that on the eve of the final hearing, Arcia made full restitution to the firm –
about two years earlier than the deadline in the settlement.  
The referee recommended that Arcia be found guilty of violating Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar 4-8.4(b) (providing that a lawyer shall not commit a
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects) and 4-8.4(c) (providing that a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation).   The
referee recommended that Arcia be suspended for three years, followed by three
years’ probation.  The referee noted that "[if] not for the fact that [Arcia] is young
and has two very young children plus some other mitigating factors, this referee's
recommendation would be five year disbarment."  As conditions of probation, the
referee recommended: (1) supervisor reports regarding Arcia's client files, (2)
passing the ethics portion of the Bar exam, (3) reports on Arcia's trust accounts by
a certified public accountant, and (4) entrance into a rehabilitation contract with
Florida Lawyers Assistance, Inc., for mental health counseling.  Finally, the referee
recommended that the Bar be awarded its costs.
The referee found in aggravation (1) a dishonest or selfish motive, (2) a
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pattern of misconduct, (3) multiple offenses, (4) vulnerability of victim, noting that
the firm trusted Arcia and provided him with access to its clients, and (5) bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with
rules or orders of the disciplinary agency.  In support of this final aggravator, the
referee cited the paragraph in the settlement order that bars employees of the firm
from contacting or providing evidence to the Bar.  In mitigation, the referee found:
(1) lack of a disciplinary history, (2) personal or emotional problems (Arcia testified
that he experienced family and financial problems especially after his wife left her
job), (3) timely restitution (however, the referee noted that "[t]he full consequences
of his misconduct cannot be stated with specificity"), (4) character or reputation
(the referee stated that "a few attorney friends" testified as to Arcia's character and
reputation), (5) interim rehabilitation, and (6) remorse.  
The referee's choice of words in finding the rehabilitation and remorse
mitigators demonstrates that the referee did not give them much weight.  Regarding
rehabilitation, the referee stated that Arcia “has provided little evidence to show that
he has been rehabilitated from his dishonesty although he has built up a practice in
the past year and has been referred cases by other attorneys who have been
satisfied with his work."  As to remorse, the referee stated that he "saw little if no
outward appearances of remorse or emotion.  However, [Arcia] testified that he
1.  Arcia did challenge the referee's finding that he established the P.A. with
the intent to divert funds from the firm.  Given that Arcia remained with the firm for
almost two years after forming the P.A. and that within about six months of the
incorporation he began diverting funds into the P.A., this finding is not clearly
erroneous. 
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was remorseful and so did his friends."  Earlier in the report, the referee stated:
"[Arcia] still thinks that he is very clever and 'slick'.  As an example, [Arcia]
testified that he thought that what he did was simply 'moonlighting'.  After
questioning, he did a backpedal and admitted it may have been more than just
moonlighting."   
Arcia challenges the aggravating and mitigating factors the referee found, as
well as the recommended discipline.
II. ANALYSIS
Neither party contests the referee's recommended findings of fact or
recommendations as to guilt for the violations of rules 4-8.4(b) and 4-8.4(c).1 
Therefore, we approve the referee's findings of fact and recommendations of guilt
without further discussion.
A. Aggravators and mitigators
Arcia first challenges various aggravators and mitigators the referee found. 
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We have held that a referee's findings of fact carry a presumption of correctness
that should be upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record. 
See Florida Bar v. Summers, 728 So. 2d 739, 741 (Fla. 1999).  This standard
applies in reviewing a referee's findings of mitigation and aggravation.  See, e.g.,
Florida Bar v. Wolis, 783 So. 2d 1057, 1059 (Fla. 2001); Florida Bar v. Hecker,
475 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 1985).  Having reviewed the record below, we
conclude that the referee's findings of aggravators and mitigators are supported by
the record and are not clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, we approve the referee's
findings.  
B. Recommended discipline
Arcia next challenges the referee's recommended discipline.   He argues that
in other cases involving theft of firm funds we have imposed a maximum discipline
of only one-year suspensions.  See Florida Bar v. Ward, 599 So. 2d 650 (Fla.
1992); Florida Bar v. Farver, 506 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1987).  He also argues that we
have found theft of firm funds to be less serious than theft of client funds, thus
warranting lesser discipline.  
In client misappropriation cases, we have held that a presumption of
disbarment exists.  See Florida Bar v. Bailey, 803 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2001).  We also
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have held that "when a lawyer steals from someone other than a client, th[e] special
'public trust' is not violated to the same extent as if the lawyer has stolen money
from his or her client."  Ward, 599 So. 2d at 652.  While the public trust may not
be violated to the same extent, however, it is violated nonetheless.  Conduct such
as Arcia's (i.e., an attorney stealing from a law firm) has been held to constitute
grand theft.  See Rigal v. State, 780 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 800
So. 2d 615 (Fla. 2001).  We conclude that, for purposes of attorney discipline,
theft of firm funds is serious enough to warrant disbarment under most
circumstances.  While theft of client funds rends the fundamental bond between a
lawyer and the client, theft of firm funds breaches the trust that law firms must
place in their attorneys as professionals to act as representatives of the firm.
In this case, while in proceedings before the referee the Bar sought
disbarment, it has not cross-appealed the referee's recommended discipline of a
three-year suspension.  We therefore defer to the referee's recommendation and
impose a three-year suspension to be followed by a three-year probationary period,
to begin upon Arcia's reinstatement.  We emphasize, however, that future cases
involving theft of firm funds will carry a presumption of disbarment.
Accordingly, Omar Javier Arcia is hereby suspended from the practice of
law for three years.  The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of
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this opinion so that Arcia can close out his practice and protect the interests of
existing clients.  If Arcia notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing
and does not need the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an
order making the suspension effective immediately.  Arcia shall accept no new
business from the date this opinion is filed until the suspension is completed and
Arcia is reinstated to the practice of law in Florida.  If Arcia is reinstated to the Bar
following his suspension, he shall immediately be placed on three years’ probation
with the conditions outlined in the referee's report.  
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street,
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Omar Javier in the
amount of $4,284.90, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ.,
and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Staff
Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida; and William Mulligan, Bar Counsel, Miami, Florida,
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for Complainant
John A. Weiss of the Law Offices of Weiss and Etkin, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent