Title: Roman Ramirez v. Charles H. Mccravy

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-490 
____________ 
 
ROMAN RAMIREZ,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
CHARLES H. MCCRAVY,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 20, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We initially accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the Third District 
Court of Appeal in Ramirez v. McCravy, 4 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), based 
on express and direct conflict with Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 2000), 
and Sullivan v. State, 913 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).  After further 
consideration, we conclude that jurisdiction was improvidently granted. 
Accordingly, we hereby discharge jurisdiction and dismiss this review proceeding. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion. 
QUINCE, C.J., dissents. 
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
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NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring. 
 
Because the dissent contends that our discharge of jurisdiction should be of 
great concern to litigants, I write briefly to place the holding of the Third District 
opinion in the context of the facts of the case.  If litigants must “beware” of any 
principle of law, it is that this Court’s administrative tolling orders cannot be 
employed to grant a windfall extension to a statute of limitations when the litigant 
has not alleged that he was unable to timely file the lawsuit because of the 
courthouse closure.  Essentially, that is the holding of the Third District in Ramirez 
v. McCravy, 4 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)—that litigants cannot rely on this 
Court’s tolling orders to add days to the statute of limitations established by the 
Legislature when there is no connection between the litigant’s failure to file the 
lawsuit in a timely manner and the emergency that gave rise to the tolling order.  
Clearly, if the courthouse is closed due a weather emergency at the time that 
a litigant is required to file a lawsuit, that day is treated no differently than a 
Saturday, Sunday, or holiday for computation purposes.  Florida Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 9.420(f)(15) makes that computation explicit, and this common-sense 
application (that when the courthouse is closed, a pleading cannot be filed) should 
be made explicit in all other rules. 
 
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In this case, Ramirez filed his lawsuit several days after the four-year statute 
of limitations expired but never alleged that he relied on the courthouse closures in 
failing to timely file his lawsuit.  In fact, the statute of limitations did not expire 
until six months after the last courthouse closure!   
With regard to the Court’s six tolling orders issued because of numerous 
hurricanes and tropical storms in 2004, 2005, and 2006, the facts were set forth by 
the Third District:  
The last administrative order covered the period from August 25 
through August 31, 2006.  Thus, Ramirez had more than six months 
after the last weather emergency forced the closure of the Eleventh 
Judicial Circuit. 
 
Ramirez has not explained how his late filing was attributable 
to any of the six weather emergencies.  He has not alleged that these 
hurricanes or storms in any way “temporarily impeded the ability of 
[his] attorneys . . . in the performance of their duties and obligations 
with respect to” the timely filing of his lawsuit. 
. . . .  
Ramirez has not alleged that he relied on the administrative 
orders, or that they lulled him into inaction.   
 
Ramirez, 4 So. 3d at 693. 
 
 
The Third District “recognize[d] that traditional notions of justice, due 
process and access to courts, all justify the emergency administrative orders 
entered by the chief justices due to the weather emergencies.”  Id. at 694.  
However, under the facts of this case, it concluded: 
To toll means to suspend or interrupt.  There is nothing intrinsic in the 
language that requires tacking extra days at the end of a four year 
period.  Therefore, by strictly construing the administrative orders, we 
 
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find that they have no application to this case, as the weather 
emergencies did not in any way delay Ramirez from promptly filing 
his suit. 
 
 
Id.  
 
 
I originally voted to accept jurisdiction because I was concerned that the 
Third District questioned this Court’s authority to enter administrative orders.  
Upon further review of the decision, the briefing, and oral argument, however, I 
conclude that the Third District provided a reasonable construction of the Court’s 
administrative orders in the context of statutes of limitations and that its decision 
does not conflict with decisions addressing the speedy trial rule or decisions 
regarding equitable tolling.  In my view, the purpose of the administrative orders 
was to assist those litigants and lawyers impacted by the weather emergencies.  
The purpose of the administrative orders would not be served if a litigant could 
tack on days to a statute of limitations where the last weather emergency occurred 
six months before the expiration and the litigant does not allege that the delay in 
filing was based on any of the weather emergencies.   
For all these reasons, I agree with the decision to discharge jurisdiction and 
allow the Third District Court of Appeal decision to stand.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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LEWIS, J., dissenting. 
 
  
I dissent.  The decision below and the principle of law specifically 
announced as the basis for the conclusion is in express and direct conflict with 
every Florida decision that has previously upheld any extension of a statutory time 
period based upon procedural rules or considerations, such as rules which extend 
any statutory time deadline due to the status of governmental facilities being closed 
for weekends, holidays, disasters and otherwise, along with the myriad of other 
practical circumstances and situations that the judicial branch has addressed for as 
long as the judicial system has existed.  There is also misapplication of law conflict 
with Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2000), and express and direct 
conflict with every other decision in Florida that has ever explained the concept of 
“tolling,” all of which are contrary to the decision below.  It appears that my 
colleagues who permit the announced legal reason for the decision below to stand 
find no express and direct conflict with the following principle and Justice Pariente 
attempts to explain away the stated principle of law:  
We reach this conclusion because the six administrative 
orders recite as its authority article V, section 2, of the Florida 
Constitution, which grants the Florida Supreme Court the power to 
“adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts,” not to 
modify statutes.  Furthermore, we have the Florida Supreme Court 
itself in Hearndon specifically declaring that by enumerating eight 
grounds in section 95.051, the legislature has basically precluded 
application of any other tolling provisions that imaginative litigants 
may come up with.  To toll means to suspend or interrupt.       
 
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Ramirez v. McCravy, 4 So. 3d 692, 694 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (emphasis supplied).  
Justice Pariente goes to great effort to assert an unstated subjective intent in 
administrative orders contrary to the specifically stated principle of law articulated 
very clearly by the Third District as the reason and basis for its conclusion.  Justice 
Pariente articulates an intent never voiced by the court below.  When a court 
announces its decision and specifically states “We reach this conclusion because” 
followed by a clearly articulated principle of law, I read the words of the opinion 
rather than suggesting an unstated subjective intent.   
 
Litigants beware!  The principles of law announced in the decision below 
have far reaching consequences.  The principle of law announced by the court 
below may or may not be correct but it must be resolved to avoid the destabilizing 
effect of its application.  Accordingly, I dissent because the destabilizing effect of 
the principles announced should be addressed.   
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D08-676 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Marlene S. Reiss, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
 
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Neil Rose and Jonathan G. Liss of Bernstein, Chackman, Liss and Rose, 
Hollywood, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent