Title: Bashara v. Corliss

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

BASHARA_V_CORLISS.92-140; 161 Vt. 1; 632 A.2d 30 

[Filed 17-Sep-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-140


 Frederick Bashara                            Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Washington Superior Court

 David Corliss                                December Term, 1992



 David A. Jenkins, J.

 Craig Weatherly of Gravel and Shea, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

 Jeffry W. White of Theriault & Joslin, P.C., Montpelier, for defendant-
    appellee



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiff appeals from a trial court decision concluding
 that his negligence complaint against defendant was barred by the statute of
 limitations.  We affirm.
      On October 4, 1985, David Corliss, while driving his father's car, was
 involved in a collision with a car in which plaintiff was a passenger.  One
 week before the three-year statute of limitations would have run, plaintiff
 filed a complaint mistakenly naming David's father, Bernard, as the
 defendant-driver.  This complaint was never served.  On October 18, 1988,
 plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming David as the defendant-driver.
 Service was attempted at the address that had been David's residence at the

 

 time of the accident, but David had moved.  On November 7, 1988, plaintiff
 served the complaint against defendant upon the Commissioner of Motor
 Vehicles, pursuant to 12 V.S.A. { 892.  Thus, service was made within sixty
 days of the filing of the original complaint.  See V.R.C.P. 3 (requiring
 service within sixty days after filing complaint).
      David did not receive actual notice of the suit until April 1989, when
 plaintiff was granted judgment by default.  This judgment was sent to
 David's former address, where plaintiff initially attempted service.
 David's father still lived at this address and delivered the notice to
 David.  David then answered the complaint and pled insufficiency of service
 of process and the statute of limitations.  The trial court ruled that the
 action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the
 Amended Complaint did not relate back to the time of filing of the original
 Complaint.  Plaintiff appeals this decision.
      Plaintiff contends that the Amended Complaint relates back to the date
 on which the original Complaint was filed against the defendant's father
 under V.R.C.P. 15(c), which states in relevant part:
           An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is
           asserted relates back if . . . within the period
           provided by law for commencing the action against the
           party, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has
           received such notice of the institution of the action
           that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining the
           party's defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should
           have known that, but for a mistake concerning the
           identity of the proper party, the action would have been
           brought against the party.

 (Emphasis added.)  Plaintiff argues that "the period provided by law for
 commencing the action" includes the time for completion of service of
 process, an additional sixty days.

 

      The plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive in the face of Rule 15(c)'s
 clear mandate.  The language of V.R.C.P. 15(c) unambiguously requires that
 the real party must have notice during the period provided by law for com-
 mencing an action and makes no provision for notice during the period for
 service of process.  Even if the language of Rule 15(c) was not clear, the
 Reporter's Notes unequivocally limit relation back to cases where the new
 defendant had "notice and knowledge of the original proceeding within the
 period of the statute of limitations . . . ."  Reporter's Notes, V.R.C.P.
 15.
      Relying on Justice Stevens' dissent in Schiavone v. Fortune,