Title: CONCERNED CITIZENS OF SPRING CREEK RANCH, SUYDAM ASSOCIATES LTD. PARTNERSHIP, HARVEST DANCE ASSOCIATES, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, RONALD AND JOAN HARRIS, ADAM AND ELIZABETH MABERLY, DONNA L. FALK V. TIPS UP, L.L.C. and SPRING CREEK HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION and SPRING CREEK ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CONCERNED CITIZENS OF SPRING CREEK RANCH, SUYDAM ASSOCIATES LTD. PARTNERSHIP, HARVEST DANCE ASSOCIATES, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, RONALD AND JOAN HARRIS, ADAM AND ELIZABETH MABERLY, DONNA L. FALK V. TIPS UP, L.L.C. and SPRING CREEK HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION and SPRING CREEK ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE2008 WY 64185 P.3d 34Case Number: S-07-0159Decided: 06/10/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
CONCERNED 
CITIZENS OF SPRING CREEK RANCH, SUYDAM ASSOCIATES LTD. PARTNERSHIP, HARVEST 
DANCE ASSOCIATES, LLC, A UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, RONALD AND JOAN HARRIS, 
ADAM AND ELIZABETH MABERLY, DONNA L. FALK,

 
 
Appellants

(Applicants for 
Intervention)

 
 
v.

 
 
TIPS UP, 
L.L.C.,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff)

 
 
and

 
 
SPRING CREEK 
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION and SPRING CREEK ARCHITECTURAL 
COMMITTEE,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Abigail 
Susan Moore and Joseph F. Moore, Jr., Moore, Myers & Garland, LLC, 
Jackson, Wyoming.  
Argument by Ms. Moore.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee Tips Up:

David B. 
Hooper, Hooper Law Offices, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming; Raymond E. Loughrey, 
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis, LLP, San Francisco, 
California.  Argument by Mr. 
Hooper.

 

Representing 
Appellees Spring Creek Homeowners' Association, and Spring Creek Architectural 
Committee:

Edward 
Frank Hess, Hess Carlman & D'Amours, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming; William 
H. Short, HindmanSanchez, P.C., Arvada, Colorado.  Argument by Mr. 
Short.

 
 
Before GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and 
BURKE, JJ., and ARNOLD, D.J.

 
 

Arnold, 
District 
Judge. 

 
 

[¶1]           
Appellants appeal the district 
court's denial of their motion to intervene in a dispute between their 
homeowners' association and another property owner.  We will affirm.

IssueS

[¶2]           
Proposed 
Intervenors raise the following issues on appeal:

1.   Whether the district court properly 
denied Proposed Intervenors' Motion to Intervene as of 
Right?

2.      
Whether 
the district court properly denied Proposed Intervenors' Motion for Permissive 
Intervention?

Facts

[¶3]           
Tips Up, 
L.L.C. (Tips Up) purchased a fifty (50) percent interest in a parcel of real 
property near Jackson, Wyoming, identified as Lot 5 of the Final Plat for Spring Creek Ranch.  According to Tips Up, it purchased the 
parcel of real property in early 2004 with the intent of subdividing the 
parcel.  After subdividing the 
parcel, Tips Up planned that Aman-style family homes would be built by Alexander 
H. Schilling, a member of Tips Up, and other buyers.  Lot 5 
is benefited and encumbered by Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
(CC&Rs) recorded prior to the acquisition of interest by Tips Up.  The entire Spring Creek Ranch 
development is also governed by Architectural Controls and Design 
Guidelines.  The Spring Creek 
Homeowners' Association and the Spring Creek Architectural Committee were 
created for purposes including, among others, managing and enforcing the 
CC&Rs and the Architectural Controls 
and Design Guidelines.

[¶4]           
Mr. 
Schilling, acting on behalf of Tips Up, submitted a Preliminary Architectural 
Plan to the Architectural Committee in June 2004.  On June 21, 2005, the Architectural 
Committee rejected Mr. Schilling's Preliminary Architectural Plan, finding that 
it did not comply with the Architectural 
Controls and Design Guidelines.

[¶5]           
Mr. 
Schilling appealed the Architectural Committee's decision to the Board of 
Directors of the Spring Creek Homeowners' Association (Board of Directors) on 
July 18, 2005.  On August 15, 2005, 
the Board of Directors remanded the appeal back to the Architectural Committee 
instructing it to make the entire record of the Architectural Committee's 
proceedings available to Mr. Schilling.  
Mr. Schilling, on behalf of Tips Up, again submitted the Preliminary 
Architectural Plan on September 12, 2005.  
After a meeting, the Architectural Committee reaffirmed its previous 
rejection of the Preliminary Architectural Plan. 

[¶6]           
On 
October 26, 2005, Mr. Schilling, on behalf of Tips Up, appealed the 
Architectural Committee's decision to the Board of Directors.  The Architectural Committee responded to 
Mr. Schilling's appeal on November 7, 2005.  Mr. Schilling filed his reply on 
November 21, 2005.  On December 15, 
2005, the Board of Directors upheld the Architectural Committee's decision 
rejecting Tips Up and Mr. Schilling's request.  

[¶7]           
Tips Up 
filed suit against the Homeowners' Association and the Architectural Committee 
on July 10, 2006, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.  Tips Up claims the Board of Directors and 
Architectural Committee failed to act in good faith or with due diligence in 
reviewing its Preliminary Architectural Plan.  On July 28, 2006, the Homeowners' 
Association and the Architectural Committee submitted their collective 
Answer.

[¶8]           
On March 
27, 2007, Concerned Citizens of Spring Creek Ranch, Suydam Associates Ltd. 
Partnership, Harvest Dance Associates, LLC, Ronald and Joan Harris, Adam and 
Elizabeth Maberly, and Donna L. Falk (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
Proposed Intervenors) submitted their Motion to Intervene as New Party 
Defendants.  Proposed Intervenors 
motioned the Ninth Judicial District Court to intervene, as of right or 
permissively, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

[¶9]           
Tips Up 
filed its opposition to the motion to intervene on April 20, 2007.  The Homeowners' Association and the 
Architectural Committee filed its opposition on May 11, 2007.  On May 17, 2007, Proposed Intervenors 
submitted their response to the parties' opposition.

[¶10]       
The Ninth 
Judicial District Court held a hearing on Proposed Intervenors' motion to 
intervene on May 18, 2007.  On May 
25, 2007, the district court entered an Order Denying Motion to Intervene.  The district court found that Proposed 
Intervenors had failed to prove all conditions required by Wyoming law in order to 
intervene as of right.  The Proposed 
Intervenors filed their notice of appeal on June 25, 2007.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶11]       
Two kinds 
of intervention exist: intervention of right and permissive intervention.  W.R.C.P. 24.  In reviewing a denial of intervention of 
right, both questions of law and judicial discretion exist.  Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. 
Gunter, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 5, 167 P.3d 645, 648 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Masinter v. Markstein, 2002 WY 64, ¶ 7, 
45 P.3d 237, 240 (Wyo. 2002)).  In 
order for an applicant for intervention of right to be allowed to participate, 
he or she must meet four conditions, which are discussed in detail below.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Colley, 871 P.2d 191, 194 (Wyo. 1994) 
(citing James S. Jackson Co., Inc. v. 
Horseshoe Creek Ltd., 650 P.2d 281, 286 (Wyo. 1982)).  The first three conditions of 
intervention of right are questions of law.  Halliburton, ¶ 5, 167 P.3d  at 648 
(quoting Masinter, ¶ 7, 45 P.3d at 
240-41).  "This [C]ourt accords no 
deference to a district court's decisions on issues of law."  Masinter, ¶ 7, 45 P.3d  at 240.  Because the first three conditions of 
intervention of right are questions of law, this Court will reverse the district 
court's denial of intervention of right if it erroneously denied intervention of 
right based on the first, second, or third conditions.  Id. 
at 240-41.  The fourth condition, 
however, is a "matter within the discretion of the district court."  Id. 
at 241.

The 
district court is permitted to weigh the timeliness of an application to 
intervene in light of the circumstances of the particular case, including 
whether the applicant may have sought intervention earlier.  Therefore, to prevail on an appeal from 
a finding that an application to intervene is untimely, an abuse of discretion 
must be demonstrated.

Id.  

[¶12]       
The 
district court's denial of a motion for permissive intervention is given 
deference.  Halliburton, ¶ 9, 167 P.3d  at 649.  This Court reviews the district court's 
denial of a motion for permissive intervention for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  

Discussion

A.  Intervention of 
Right

[¶13]       
Intervention is governed by Rule 24 
of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Intervention is defined as "the process by which a non-party becomes a 
party to a lawsuit, either as an additional plaintiff or an additional 
defendant."  Halliburton, ¶ 4, 167 P.3d  at 648 
(citing Black's Law Dictionary 840 
(8th ed. 2004)).  Two kinds of 
intervention exist: intervention of right and permissive intervention.  W.R.C.P. 24.  With regard to the first type of 
intervention, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure provide as 
follows:

(a)    Intervention 
of right. Upon 
timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
action:

            
. . .

            
(2) When the applicant claims an interest relating to    the property or transaction which 
is the subject of the    action 
and the applicant is so situated that the       disposition of 
the action may as a practical matter             
impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is 
adequately       
represented by existing parties.

W.R.C.P. 
24(a)(2).  A party seeking to 
intervene as of right must meet all conditions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2).  Halliburton, ¶ 6, 167 P.3d  at 648 
(citing State Farm, 871 P.2d at 
194).  A party who fails to meet all 
the conditions will not be permitted to intervene as of right.  State Farm, 871 P.2d  at 194.

[¶14]       
To 
satisfy the conditions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2), this Court has 
created a four-part test.  
SeeState Farm, 871 P.2d  at 194.  The conditions of the test are: 1) the 
applicant must claim an interest related to the property or transaction which is 
the subject of the action; 2) the applicant must be so situated that the 
disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the 
applicant's ability to protect that interest; 3) there must be a showing that 
the applicant's interest will not be adequately represented by the existing 
parties; and 4) the application for intervention must be timely.  Id. 
(citing James S. Jackson, 650 P.2d at 
286).  Intervention of right is 
construed broadly in favor of intervention.  Sierra Club v. United States EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. United 
States, 921 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1990)).  The first three conditions are issues of 
law, while the fourth condition is a determination of fact.  State Farm, 871 P.2d  at 
194.

            
i.  Timeliness

[¶15]       
Because 
the fourth condition is a determination of fact, it is a threshold issue.  Platte County School Dist. No. 1 v. Basin 
Elec. Power Coop., 638 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Wyo. 1982).  An application to intervene may be 
denied solely on the basis of timeliness.  
Id.  Whether an application to intervene is 
timely is a "flexible" question.  
Id. (citing 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 
1916, at 572 (1972); McDonald v. 
E. J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970)).  A determination of whether an 
application for intervention is timely is within the sound discretion of the 
trial judge.  Id.  To determine whether an application for 
intervention is timely, the district court must evaluate the totality of the 
circumstances.  State Farm, 871 P.2d  at 197 (citing Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 432 (Wyo. 1985)).  In State Farm, this Court identified four 
factors to be used in determining timeliness.  Id. 
(adopting factors in Stallworth v. 
Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264-66 (5th Cir. 1977)).  These factors are: 1) "the length of 
time the applicant for intervention knew or reasonably should have known of its 
interest in the case before the application for leave to intervene was filed"; 
2) "the extent of the prejudice that the existing parties to the litigation may 
suffer as a result of the applicant's failure to seek intervention as soon as 
the applicant actually knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in 
the case"; 3) "the extent of the prejudice that the applicant for intervention 
may suffer if the application is denied"; and 4) "the existence of unusual 
circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the 
application is timely".  Id.  

[¶16]       
The 
district court held that after "considering the history and nature of the case 
at bar, [Proposed Intervenors'] motion is not timely."  On examination of the record, this Court 
finds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding Proposed 
Intervenors' Motion to Intervene untimely.  
Among other things, the district court based its holding on a finding 
that the application for intervention was untimely because the case had been 
going on for a number of months before the Proposed Intervenors filed their 
application.  Further, they only 
filed their application once they heard that the parties were discussing 
settlement and the Proposed Intervenors suspected that the settlement would not 
be consistent with the interests of the Proposed Intervenors. 

            
ii.  Protectable 
Interest

[¶17]       
In 
evaluating the first two conditions, an applicant seeking intervention of right 
must present a significant protectable interest.  Platte County, 638 P.2d  at 1279.  A significant protectable interest is 
distinguished from a merely contingent interest, an interest shared by members 
of the public at large, or a mere concern in the outcome.  Halliburton, ¶ 6, 167 P.3d  at 648 
(citing State Farm, 871 P.2d  at 194; 
Platte County, 638 P.2d at 
1279).  An applicant seeking 
intervention of right has the burden of demonstrating a significant protectable 
interest.  Platte County, 638 P.2d  at 
1279.

[¶18]       
Proposed 
Intervenors argue that, as land owners within Spring Creek Ranch whose lands are 
benefited and burdened by the CC&Rs and Architectural Controls and Design 
Guidelines for Spring Creek Ranch, they have a protectable interest in the 
underlying litigation.  According to 
Article XIV, § 1(b) of the CC&Rs:

The 
Architectural Committee and any Owner 
shall have the right to enforce by any 
proceeding at law or in equity all restrictions and conditions imposed by, 
pursuant to, or in accordance with the provisions of this Declaration including 
particularly the provisions of Article VI regarding Use Restrictions and the 
provisions of Article VII regarding Architectural Control, and any rules or regulations of the 
Architectural Committee.

Amended 
and Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restriction[s] of Spring 
Creek Ranch, 
Article XIV, § 1(b), at 54 (2001) (emphasis added).  The underlying case, however, involves 
Tips Up's claim against the Board of Directors and Architectural Committee 
regarding their denial of Tips Up's Preliminary Architectural Plan.  It involves the actions of the Board of 
Directors and Architectural Committee and not, strictly speaking, the 
enforcement of the CC&Rs.

[¶19]       
The 
district court held that the Proposed Intervenors failed to demonstrate "a 
significantly protectable interest in the subject of the litigation."  Clearly, the Proposed Intervenors have a 
significant protectable interest in the enforcement of the CC&Rs however, 
any impact on Proposed Intervenors' property interest by the outcome of the 
underlying case is contingent.  
Proposed Intervenors' interests are contingent because the underlying 
case simply involves the Board of Directors' and the Architectural Committee's 
actions in denying Tips Up's Preliminary Architectural Plan.  If the district court finds in favor of 
Tips Up or a settlement agreement is reached, Tips Up must still proceed through 
the formal processes required by the CC&Rs and other laws in order to have 
the full reaches of the Preliminary Architectural Plan approved.  During this process, Proposed 
Intervenors' interests in the enforcement of the CC&Rs become vested.  Because Proposed Intervenors' interests 
are contingent, the district court properly held that they failed to show a 
significant protectable interest which would be affected by the underlying 
litigation.

            
iii.  Adequacy of 
Representation

[¶20]       
With 
regard to the third condition, an applicant for intervention must show that his 
or her significant protectable interest is not adequately represented.  The applicant has the burden of showing 
that his or her interests are not adequately represented by the existing 
parties.  Oregon Envtl. Council v. Oregon Dep't of Envtl. 
Quality, 775 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D. Or. 1991).  An intervenor's burden is only minimal 
in that he or she must only show that his or her interest may not be adequately 
represented.  Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 2001).  In 
Oregon, the 
Court adopted three factors from the Ninth Circuit: 

1) 
whether the interest of a present party is such that the party will undoubtedly 
raise the same arguments as the intervenor; 2) whether the present party is 
capable and willing to make such arguments; and 3) whether the intervenor would 
offer any necessary elements to the proceedings that the existing parties would 
neglect.

775 F. Supp.  at 358-59 (citing California v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1986)).  "Where the intervenor and an existing 
party have the same objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation 
arises."  Id. at 359 (citing American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of 
Chicago v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 148 n.3 (7th Cir. 1989)).  A simple difference between a party and 
an intervenor's motivation in the litigation is not enough to show inadequacy of 
representation.  Id.

[¶21]       
According 
to Article XIV of the CC&Rs:

Each 
Owner hereby vests in and delegates to the [Homeowners' Association] or its 
authorized representatives the right and power to bring all actions at law . . . 
against Owner or Owners . . . for the enforcement of any covenant violations, 
and hereby expressly waives any objection to the enforcement in accordance with 
this Declaration . . . and the rules and regulations of the [Homeowners' 
Association], whether or not suit is actually filed against the 
Owner.

Amended 
and Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restriction[s] of Spring 
Creek Ranch, 
Article XIV, § 1, at 55 (2001).  
Proposed Intervenors argue: 1) the Board of Directors and Architectural 
Committee do not adequately represent them; and 2) they have the authority under 
the CC&Rs to enforce the CC&Rs.  See Amended and Restated Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restriction[s] of Spring Creek Ranch, Article XIV, 
§ 1(b), at 54 (2001).  As discussed 
above, Proposed Intervenors may have the authority to enforce the CC&Rs, but 
this case is not about enforcement of the CC&Rs.  It is about Tips Up's claim against the 
Board of Directors and Architectural Committee for denying Tips Up's Preliminary 
Architectural Plan.  To the extent 
that Proposed Intervenors have any significant protectable interest which may be 
impaired by the trial court's decision to uphold or overturn the denial of the 
Preliminary Architectural Plan, the Homeowners' Association and Architectural 
Committee adequately represent that interest.  Further, to the extent that the 
underlying case might actually involve the enforcement of the CC&Rs, 
Proposed Intervenors, as property owners subject to the CC&Rs, have 
delegated all authority to the Homeowners' Association and the Architectural 
Committee in the enforcement of the CC&Rs and representation of them in 
litigation involving the CC&Rs.  

[¶22]       
The 
district court held the Proposed Intervenors "fail[ed] to show their rights 
[had] been or [would] be inadequately represented by the Architectural Committee 
or the homeowners association (sic)."  
Proposed Intervenors vested the Homeowners' Association and Architectural 
Committee with the authority to represent them in the underlying 
litigation.  The Proposed 
Intervenors failed to demonstrate how the Homeowners' Association and 
Architectural Committee do not adequately represent them in the underlying 
litigation.  Thus, the district 
court's  decision is in accordance 
with law. 

B.  Permissive 
Intervention

[¶23]       
Even if 
an applicant seeking to intervene in a case cannot intervene by right, he or she 
may be allowed to permissively intervene.  
Rule 24 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
reads:

(b) Permissive intervention.  Upon timely 
application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an 
action:

            
(2) When an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a 
question of law or fact in common. . . . In exercising its discretion the court 
shall consider whether the intervention 
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication             
of the rights of the original parties.

W.R.C.P. 
24(b)(2).  Permissive intervention 
may be allowed in the district court's discretion.  Masinter, ¶ 6, 45 P.3d  at 240.  The district court may allow permissive 
intervention "when the intervenor's claim or defense has a question of fact or 
law in common with the main action."  
Id.  In exercising its discretion, the 
district court must determine whether the intervention will unduly delay or 
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties or not.  Id.

[¶24]       
The 
district court denied intervention.  
As discussed above, the district court held Proposed Intervenors' 
application for intervention of right untimely.  Because an application for permissive 
intervention must be timely, if intervention of right was untimely, then, 
presumably, so was permissive intervention.  Therefore, upon examination of the 
record and relying on many of the points raised above, this Court does not find 
any abuse of discretion by the district court in its denial of Proposed 
Intervenors' Motion for Permissive Intervention.

CONCLUSION

[¶25]       
Intervention of right involves both 
questions of law and discretionary judgments.  Proposed Intervenors failed to 
demonstrate how their interests in the enforcement of the CC&Rs would 
directly be affected by the underlying litigation.  If anything, the Proposed Intervenors' 
interests in the enforcement of the CC&Rs are contingent interests.  Most importantly, Proposed Intervenors 
vested the Homeowners' Association and Architectural Committee with the 
authority to represent them in all matters regarding the CC&Rs.  They have not demonstrated how such 
representation does not adequately represent their interests, if they have any, 
in the underlying litigation.  
Further, the district court's decision that the Proposed Intervenors did 
not file a timely motion for intervention was not an abuse of its 
discretion.  Because Proposed 
Intervenors failed to meet any of the four conditions for intervention of right, 
the district court did not err in denying Proposed Intervenors' Motion for 
Intervention of Right.

[¶26]       
Granting 
permissive intervention is within the sound discretion of the district 
court.  The denial of permissive 
intervention will only be overturned if the district court abused its 
discretion.  In the case at hand, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion and, thus, properly denied 
Proposed Intervenors' Motion for Permissive Intervention.

[¶27]       
Affirmed.