Title: CHRIS R. OLSEN V. DAVID M. KILPATRICK and NIKKI V. MALCOM, husband and wife

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CHRIS R. OLSEN V. DAVID M. KILPATRICK and NIKKI V. MALCOM, husband and wife2007 WY 103161 P.3d 504Case Number: 06-190Decided: 06/28/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
CHRIS 
R. OLSEN,Appellant(Defendant),v.DAVID M. KILPATRICK 
and NIKKI V. MALCOM, husband and 
wife,Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 
 
Appeal 
from theDistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Daniel 
E. White of Woodard & White, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Gay 
Woodhouse and Lori L. Brand* of Gay Woodhouse Law Office P.C.  Argument by Ms. 
Woodhouse.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, JJ, and DONNELL, 
DJ.

 
 
*Order 
Granting Motion to Withdraw as Co-counsel entered January 5, 
2007.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Chris 
R. Olsen, challenges a district court ruling in favor of Appellees, David M. 
Kilpatrick and Nikki V. Malcolm, husband and wife.  Appellees requested declaratory relief 
finding Appellant in violation of the covenants of their subdivision and 
injunctive relief requiring Appellant to cease work on a pheasant farm he was 
constructing in his backyard.  
Appellant has removed the remnants of the pheasant farming operation but 
takes issue with the declarations of the district court with respect to the 
covenants governing the subdivision.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]     1.   Did the district court abuse its 
discretion when it entered an injunction against Appellant prohibiting him from 
violating the protective covenants of the subdivision where Appellant and 
Appellees own property?

 
 
2.   Did the district court err by 
refusing to join all landowners in the subdivision in a declaratory judgment 
action regarding the construction and validity of the covenants for that 
subdivision?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties to 
this suit own homes in a subdivision in LaramieCounty, the protective covenants for which 
were recorded in 1973.  In April 
2005, apparently under the impression that those covenants had expired, 
Appellant began erecting a structure in his back yard to house pheasants for a 
pheasant-farming operation.  
Appellant subsequently realized that the covenants had not expired, but 
continued to build his pheasant pen.  
Appellees brought suit to enjoin Appellant from continuing work on the 
pheasant operation and eventually amended their complaint to seek a declaratory 
judgment that Appellant was in violation of the covenants.

 
 
[¶4]      Appellees, in 
their original and amended complaints, alleged that Appellant was in violation 
of paragraphs 8 and/or 12 of the restrictive covenants for the subdivision.  Those paragraphs state as 
follows:

 
 
            
8.     No 
business nor activity of a noxious nature may be conducted upon any lot in this 
subdivision, nor shall any activity be permitted which may be or may become a 
nuisance or annoyance to the neighborhood.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
12.   No animals, 
livestock or poultry of any kind shall be raised, bred or kept on any lot, 
except that horses, dogs, cats or other household pets may be kept, provided 
that they are not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose.  

 
 
[¶5]      Appellees did not 
make any claims related to paragraph 4 of the covenants and did not include the 
text of paragraph 4 in the argument portion of their amended complaint, however, 
the covenants in their entirety were attached to the amended complaint as an 
exhibit.  Appellant asserted a 
counterclaim alleging, inter alia, 
that Appellees were in violation of paragraph 4 of the covenants, which states 
as follows:

 
 
            
4.     No 
structure other than one private single family dwelling together with a private 
garage and suitable barn or shed for horses for use in connection with said 
single family dwelling shall be erected, placed or permitted to remain on any of 
the residential lots.  No lot within 
a designated block may be subdivided into smaller lots.

 
 
[¶6]      Appellant 
requested dismissal of his counterclaim on the eve of trial.  In the trial summary where he requested 
that dismissal, Appellant alleged that he was dismissing his counterclaim 
because the covenants for the subdivision had been abandoned "due to multiple 
persistent violations of the protective covenants that have allowed [sic] to 
proliferate in the subdivision."  
Appellant's counterclaim was dismissed and the matter proceeded to 
trial.  Appellant did not present 
any evidence of abandonment of the covenants at trial.  In fact, other than cross examining 
Appellees' witnesses, Appellant did not present any evidence.  Appellant's argument was that Appellees 
had not met their burden for obtaining injunctive relief, rendering it 
unnecessary for Appellant to present any affirmative evidence.  The district court found in favor of the 
Appellees.  The court issued an 
injunction preventing Appellant from continuing work on his pheasant farm and 
requiring him to remove poles he had placed on his land as part of the 
project.  The district court found 
that Appellant was in violation of paragraphs 4, 8, and 12 of the protective 
covenants.  This timely appeal 
followed.

 
 
PERMANENT 
INJUNCTION

 
 
[¶7]      Appellant's first 
claim is that the district court improperly enjoined 
Appellant:

 
 
            
1.     From 
conducting preliminary work, preparation for, or construction of any game bird 
housing facility or game bird pen proposed by [Appellant] on the 
property;

            
2.     From 
maintaining on the property any structure, whether completed or uncompleted, 
placed or erected on the property for the purpose of constructing any game bird 
housing facility or pen, including but not limited to, the existing large wooden 
"telephone poles" still placed upon the property as of April 25, 
2006;

            
3.     From 
breeding, keeping, raising, or housing any poultry or game bird of any kind on 
the property;

            
4.     From 
displaying signs on the subject property for public view advertising a game bird 
facility[.]

 
 
[¶8]      The Permanent 
Injunction also affirmatively ordered that Appellant "[r]emove within thirty 
(30) days of April 25, 2006, all structures from the property, whether completed 
or uncompleted, which were constructed to house game birds, including but not 
limited to, the existing large wooden telephone poles' currently placed upon 
the property."

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      "Although actions 
for injunctive relief are authorized by statute, Wyo. Stat.§§ 1-28-101 
to -111 (1988 & Supp. 1996), they are, by nature, requests for equitable 
relief which are not granted as a matter of right but are within the lower 
court's equitable discretion."  Polo Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 15, 
¶ 26, 61 P.3d 1255, 1264 (Wyo. 2003).  
We will, therefore, review the district court's decision to grant 
injunctive relief for abuse of discretion.  
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously."  Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 
2003 WY 126, ¶ 11, 77 P.3d 412, 416 (Wyo. 2003) (citation omitted).  

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Appellant's main concern appears to 
be that he feels the district court improperly relied on paragraph 4 of the 
protective covenants in ordering him to remove the nascent pheasant pen 
structure from his property.1  However, this Court "may affirm a 
district court's decision on any proper legal grounds supported by the 
record."  Del Rossi v. Doenz, 912 P.2d 1116, 1119 
(Wyo. 1996) 
(citation omitted).  

 
 
[¶11]   Covenants are contractual in nature 
and are therefore interpreted and enforced according to the principles of 
contract law.  Goglio v.   Star  Valley Ranch Ass'n, 2002 WY 94, ¶ 18, 
48 P.3d 1072, 1079 (Wyo. 2002).  "We 
consider the contract as a whole, taking into consideration the relationship 
between the various parts."  Polo Ranch, ¶ 24, 61 P.3d  at 1263.  We are, therefore, not convinced that 
the district court erred in relying on paragraph 4 in issuing its 
injunction.  Our law of contract, 
under which the covenants must be interpreted, plainly states that a contract is 
to be interpreted as a whole.  
Id.  Appellant contends that it was improper 
for the district court to rely on paragraph 4 because Appellees did not 
specifically allege a violation of that portion of the covenants and because the 
district court had dismissed the counterclaim, the only pleading to mention 
paragraph 4, before trial.  However, 
the covenants were before the court in their entirety, having been properly 
entered into evidence at trial.  
Appellees entered photographs of the pheasant pen into evidence at 
trial.  The district court relied on 
the photographs, which were in evidence, to determine that the pheasant pen 
violated paragraph 4, the text of which was also in evidence.  While the issue may not have been 
squarely before the court, the court's consideration of paragraph 4 does not 
appear to constitute an abuse of discretion under these circumstances.  However, we need not enter into an 
in-depth analysis of the district court's discretion in this area because the 
court's order can be upheld on another basis in the 
record.

 
 
[¶12]   "Where an agreement is in writing 
and the language is clear and unambiguous, the parties' intent is to be secured 
from the four corners of the contract."  
Id.  Paragraph 12 of the covenants prohibits 
"poultry of any kind" from being "raised, bred or kept on any lot, except that 
horses, dogs, cats or other household pets may be kept, provided that they are 
not kept, bred, or maintained for any commercial purpose."  The common usage definition of poultry 
is "domesticated birds that serve as a source of eggs or meat and that include 
among commercially important kinds chickens, turkeys, ducks, and geese and among 
kinds chiefly of local interest guinea fowl, peafowl, pigeons, pheasants, and 
others."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1777 (2002).  A 
pheasant farming operation, commercial or otherwise, is clearly a violation of 
paragraph 12 of the covenants.  No 
evidence attacking the validity or construction of paragraph 12 was properly 
before the court at trial.2  We can therefore uphold the district 
court's decision to issue injunctive relief prohibiting Appellant from 
continuing with his operation based on the clear violation of paragraph 12 
alone.  As for the affirmative 
requirement that Appellant remove the pheasant pen from his land, it was not an 
abuse of discretion for the court to consider the pen a part of the overall 
pheasant farm violation3 and order its removal from 
Appellant's land.

 
 
[¶13]   Appellant implies in his argument 
that the district court should not have granted the injunction because Appellant 
had complied with the temporary injunction in place during the litigation and 
because he had evinced intent to pursue only lawful means to implement his 
pheasant farming operation.  However 
"[a]n action for injunction does not become moot merely because there is 
compliance with the injunction.  The 
equitable jurisdiction of the district court will not be reversed absent a 
strong showing of abuse.  A 
defendant carries a heavy burden of persuasion."  Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun Oil Co., 638 P.2d 147, 151 n.2 (Wyo. 1981) (citations omitted).  Appellant's intention to comply with the 
covenants does not predate this litigation, or even the preliminary injunction 
entered by the trial court.  
Evidence was introduced at trial that, before being sued, Appellant 
continued to build his pheasant pen after he realized that the covenants in his 
subdivision had not expired.  The 
district court also placed weight on the fact that Appellant had repeatedly 
promised to take down the structural poles for the pheasant pen but had failed 
to remove those poles as of the date of the litigation.  Given the evidence on record showing 
that Appellant had previously been disposed to run afoul of the subdivision's 
covenants, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
injunctive relief, even in the face of Appellant's compliance with the 
preliminary injunction.

 
 
DECLARATORY 
RELIEF

 
 
[¶14]   "[W]e need not address issues 
regarding the propriety of a judgment premised on Wyoming's version of the 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act where there was in the record another proper 
basis for upholding the judgment of the trial court."  Revelle v. Schultz, 759 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Wyo. 
1988).  In Revelle, this Court found 
that

 
 
[t]he 
trial court did, indeed, include in its order a provision declaring the rights 
of the parties vis-a-vis the covenant as coordinate with the injunctive 
prayer.  However, the trial court 
also found the covenant to govern the relations of these parties insofar as the 
controversy between them was concerned and, in addition, granted injunctive 
relief[.]

 
 

Id.  That is exactly the case here as 
well.  The trial court provided 
effective relief through injunction; it was unnecessary to go further.  "Wyoming has long held that a declaratory 
judgment action should only be maintained where it would serve a useful 
purpose."  Morris v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 771 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Wyo. 1989).  We, therefore, reverse the portions of 
the district court's judgment that constitute declaratory relief as the 
injunctive relief provided effectively resolves the dispute between these two 
parties.    

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting injunctive relief because Appellant was in clear 
violation of paragraph 12 of the covenants the court found to be in effect 
between the parties.  We will not 
address the jurisdictional issues related to declaratory relief because the 
district court's injunction provided full and effective relief to Appellee and 
effectively determined the rights of the parties to this 
action.

  

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law accompanying the Permanent Injunction 
state that the "proposed game bird pen was intended to house 500 pheasant 
chicks, and the existing erected structure consisting of a ring of large 
'telephone poles' are the type of improvement that the covenant drafters 
intended to prohibit and this structure violates paragraph 4 of the Declaration 
of Protective Covenants[.]"

 
 

2Appellant 
did attempt to cross-examine several witnesses as to the possible existence of a 
child's 4H project in the subdivision involving several chickens, against which 
the covenants had never been enforced.  
However, as none of the witnesses had any firsthand knowledge of such a 
violation of paragraph 12, none of that evidence was admissible and the court 
could not have properly considered it.

 
 

3The 
covenants permit enforcement against any attempted as well as actual violation 
of the covenants.  Appellees argued 
that the poles represented a continuing attempt to violate the covenants as 
their only purpose was as part of the pheasant farming operation.  Appellant did not refute that argument 
except to continue to assert his intention to remove the 
poles.