Title: Heiner v. Moretuzzo

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

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Heiner, n.k.a. Zucco, Appellant, v. Moretuzzo et al., Appellees.                 
[Cite as Heiner v. Moretuzzo (1995),     Ohio St.3d    .]                        
Torts -- Negligence -- Patient falsely diagnosed HIV                             
     positive -- Ohio does not recognize claim for negligent                     
     infliction of serious emotional distress where the                          
     distress is caused by plaintiff's fear of a nonexistent                     
     physical peril.                                                             
                              ---                                                
Ohio does not recognize a claim for negligent infliction of                      
serious emotional distress where the distress is caused by the                   
plaintiff's fear of a nonexistent physical peril.  (Schultz v.                   
Barberton Glass Co. [1983], 4 Ohio St.3d 131, 4 OBR 376, 447                     
N.E.2d 109, and Paugh v. Hanks [1983], 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 6 OBR                    
114, 451 N.E.2d 759, construed and distinguished; Criswell v.                    
Brentwood Hosp. [1989], 49 Ohio App.3d 163, 551 N.E.2d 1315,                     
approved.)                                                                       
                                                                                 
                              ---                                                
     (No. 94-726 -- Submitted May 9, 1995 -- Decided August 16,                  
1995.)                                                                           
     Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No.                     
16312.                                                                           
     Patricia Heiner, n.k.a. Patricia Zucco, appellant, was                      
interested in conceiving a child through artificial                              
insemination.  On March 8, 1990, appellant visited the office                    
of appellee Dr. Richard W. Moretuzzo, a physician practicing in                  
the specialty areas of reproductive endocrinology, infertility                   
and gynecology.  Appellant sought an evaluation of her physical                  
condition in preparation for artificial insemination.  As part                   
of the evaluation, Moretuzzo requested that appellant undergo                    
blood tests for rubella, hepatitis and the human                                 
immunodeficiency virus ("HIV").                                                  
     Appellant's blood was drawn at the appellee Akron General                   
Medical Center, ("Akron General").  The blood sample was tested                  
by appellee American Red Cross ("Red Cross").  On March 13,                      
1990, Akron General informed Moretuzzo that an initial test of                   
the blood sample indicated that appellant was HIV positive.                      
Subsequently, Moretuzzo informed appellant of the results of                     
the preliminary test.  Additionally, Moretuzzo told appellant                    
that a second test of the blood sample was being administered                    
to confirm the preliminary findings.                                             
     Meanwhile, Red Cross conducted a second test of the                         
original blood sample.  The blood sample again tested HIV                        
positive.  Moretuzzo informed appellant of the test result and                   
referred her to Dr. William Gardner, an infectious disease                       
specialist.                                                                      
     Appellant was examined by Dr. Gardner in May 1990.                          
Appellant's blood was once again drawn and tested for HIV.  The                  
result of the test indicated that appellant was HIV negative.                    
A repeat blood test confirmed that appellant was, in fact, HIV                   
negative.                                                                        
     Appellant commenced this action in the Court of Common                      
Pleas of Summit County against Moretuzzo, Akron General, and                     
Red Cross.  In the complaint, appellant alleged, among other                     
things, that she had been falsely diagnosed HIV positive as a                    
result of appellees' negligence.  Appellant sought recovery                      
from Moretuzzo for medical malpractice.  She sought recovery                     
from each of the defendants for negligent infliction of serious                  
emotional distress.                                                              
     Red Cross filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss                         
appellant's claim against it for negligent infliction of                         
serious emotional distress.  Additionally, Moretuzzo and Akron                   
General filed motions for summary judgment on the claims                         
against them for negligent infliction of serious emotional                       
distress.  In support of their motions, appellees argued that                    
appellant had not been placed in any real physical danger by                     
being falsely diagnosed HIV positive.  In this regard,                           
appellees urged that Ohio does not recognize a right to                          
recovery for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress                  
where the distress is caused by fear of a nonexistent peril.                     
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees,                  
including Red Cross,1 on the claims for negligent infliction of                  
serious emotional distress.  Further, the trial court expressly                  
determined that there was "no just reason for delay"2 of an                      
appeal.  See Civ.R. 54(B).                                                       
     On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of                    
the trial court, stating, in part:                                               
     "In this case, Heiner was not, in fact, infected with the                   
HIV virus when Dr. Moretuzzo informed her of the positive HIV                    
blood test.  Thus, given that the blood test resulted in a                       
'false positive,' Heiner was never in real danger or placed in                   
actual physical peril by the claimed negligent diagnosis.                        
Heiner's recovery then [for negligent infliction of serious                      
emotional distress] could only be based on her appreciation of                   
a nonexistent peril.  As Criswell [v. Brentwood Hosp. (1989),                    
49 Ohio App.3d 163, 551 N.E.2d 1315] makes clear, in Ohio the                    
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress does not                      
encompass the fear of a nonexistent peril.                                       
     "Accordingly, having failed to show that the defendants'                    
alleged negligence placed her in actual physical peril, Heiner                   
cannot recover as a matter of law for the negligent infliction                   
of emotional distress."                                                          
     The cause is now before this court pursuant to the                          
allowance of a discretionary appeal.                                             
                                                                                 
     Allen Schulman & Associates, Allen Schulman, Jr. and                        
Timothy B. Saylor; and Brian L. Zimmerman, for appellant.                        
     Jacobson, Maynard, Tuschman & Kalur and Douglas G. Leak,                    
for appellee Moretuzzo.                                                          
     Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Hugh E. McKay, Richard M.                  
Markus, Patricia A. Screen, David R. Cohen and Joyce D.                          
Edelman, for appellee American Red Cross.                                        
     Roetzel & Andress, K. Richard Aughenbaugh and Thomas A.                     
Pampush, for appellee Akron General.                                             
     Bricker & Eckler, James J. Hughes, Jr. and Catherine M.                     
Ballard, urging affirmance for amici curiae, College of                          
American Pathologists, Ohio State Medical Association, and Ohio                  
Hospital Association.                                                            
     Duvin, Cahn, Barnard & Messerman and Barton A. Bixenstine,                  
urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Civil                   
Trial Attorneys.                                                                 
     Michael R. Thomas, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio                  
Academy of Trial Lawyers.                                                        
                                                                                 
     Douglas, J.     The question before us is whether Ohio law                  
currently recognizes the right of a plaintiff to maintain a                      
cause of action for negligent infliction of serious emotional                    
distress where the defendant's negligence produced no actual                     
threat of physical harm to the plaintiff or any other person.                    
The trial court and court of appeals answered this question in                   
the negative.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the                        
judgment of the court of appeals.                                                
     We begin our discussion with an overview of the scope and                   
limitations of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional                     
distress.  Historically, the law in this state dictated that a                   
plaintiff could not recover for negligent infliction of                          
emotional distress unless the plaintiff was found to have                        
suffered a contemporaneous physical injury.  The historical                      
requirement of contemporaneous physical injury was established                   
in Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R.R. Co. (1908), 78 Ohio                     
St. 309, 85 N.E. 499, paragraph three of the syllabus, wherein                   
this court held that "[n]o liability exists for acts of                          
negligence causing mere fright or shock, unaccompanied by                        
contemporaneous physical injury, even though subsequent illness                  
results, where the negligent acts complained of, are neither                     
willful nor malicious."                                                          
     However, in Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co. (1983), 4 Ohio                   
St.3d 131, 4 OBR 376, 447 N.E.2d 109, we expanded the law of                     
this state to allow more liberal recovery for negligent                          
infliction of emotional distress.  In Schultz, a sheet of glass                  
fell from a truck and smashed into the windshield of a vehicle                   
driven by Schultz, the plaintiff.  Schultz was able to maintain                  
control of his vehicle, but suffered serious emotional distress                  
as a result of the accident.  Schultz sued the owner and driver                  
of the truck and was awarded damages for emotional distress.                     
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the                     
trial court and remanded the cause for a determination whether                   
Schultz had suffered a contemporaneous physical injury.  In                      
Schultz, we reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and                    
held, in the syllabus, that "[a] cause of action may be stated                   
for the negligent infliction of serious emotional distress                       
without a contemporaneous physical injury."  In so holding, we                   
overruled Miller, supra, and its progeny.                                        
     Paugh v. Hanks (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 6 OBR 114, 451                      
N.E.2d 759, was decided on the heels of our decision in                          
Schultz.  In Paugh, Laurie C. Paugh and her two children lived                   
in a residence located directly across from a freeway exit                       
ramp.  One evening, a vehicle proceeded through the stop sign                    
at the end of the exit ramp and crashed into the residence                       
where Paugh and her daughter were sleeping.  Several months                      
later, another vehicle crashed into a fence on the property.                     
The accident caused Paugh to fear for the safety of her                          
children, since the accident took place in an area where the                     
children normally played.  A third vehicle crashed into the                      
house approximately two weeks later, causing Paugh to fear for                   
the safety of her children.  Paugh and her husband sued the                      
drivers of the three automobiles for, among other things, the                    
mental suffering Paugh had experienced as a result of the                        
tortfeasors' negligence.  In Paugh, we found that the                            
plaintiffs had stated an actionable claim for negligent                          
infliction of serious emotional distress.  Id. at 74, 6 OBR at                   
116, 451 N.E.2d at 762.                                                          
     In Paugh, we followed our holding in Schultz by once again                  
recognizing that a cause of action for negligent infliction of                   
serious emotional distress may be maintained without proof of a                  
contemporaneous physical injury.  Paugh at 74-75, 6 OBR at 116,                  
451 N.E.2d at 762-763.  We also attempted to provide some                        
guidance to the bench and bar as to the limitations and scope                    
of Ohio's recognition of the tort of negligent infliction of                     
serious emotional distress.  In Paugh, we held, at paragraphs                    
two through four of the syllabus:                                                
     "2.  A cause of action may be stated for the negligent                      
infliction of serious emotional distress without the                             
manifestation of a resulting physical injury.  Proof of a                        
resulting physical injury is admissible as evidence of the                       
degree of emotional distress suffered.                                           
     "3.  Where a bystander to an accident states a cause of                     
action for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress,                   
the emotional injuries sustained must be found to be both                        
serious and reasonably foreseeable, in order to allow a                          
recovery.                                                                        
     "3a.  Serious emotional distress describes emotional                        
injury which is both severe and debilitating.  Thus, serious                     
emotional distress may be found where a reasonable person,                       
normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with                    
the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case.                 
     "3b.  The factors to be considered in order to determine                    
whether a negligently inflicted emotional injury was reasonably                  
foreseeable include: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near                  
the scene of the accident, as contrasted with one who was a                      
distance away; (2) whether the shock resulted from a direct                      
emotional impact upon the plaintiff from sensory and                             
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with                   
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence; and                   
(3) whether the plaintiff and victim (if any) were closely                       
related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or                    
the presence of only a distant relationship.                                     
     "4.  A cause of action for the negligent infliction of                      
serious emotional distress may be stated where the                               
plaintiff-bystander reasonably appreciated the peril which took                  
place, whether or not the victim suffered actual physical harm,                  
and, that as a result of this cognizance or fear of peril, the                   
plaintiff suffered serious emotional distress."                                  
     In Binns v. Fredendall (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 244, 513                       
N.E.2d 278, we were once again called upon to define the scope                   
of recovery for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional                    
distress.  In that case, the plaintiff, Mary L. Eleyet, was a                    
passenger in an automobile driven by her boyfriend, Donald L.                    
Binns.  Binns was killed and Eleyet suffered personal injuries                   
when the defendant, Fredendall, negligently drove his vehicle                    
into the side of Binns' car.  Binns' head injuries were severe                   
and gruesome, and his head came to rest on Eleyet's shoulder.                    
Eleyet's blouse was soaked with blood, and she remained in the                   
vehicle for some time following the accident.                                    
     The issue presented in Binns was "whether the test we                       
announced in Paugh v. Hanks (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 6 OBR 114,                  
451 N.E.2d 759, for the recovery of damages for emotional and                    
psychiatric injuries applies where the person seeking the                        
damages has also suffered contemporaneous physical injury."                      
Binns at 245, 513 N.E.2d at 279.  We answered this question in                   
the negative. In Binns, at paragraphs one, two and three of the                  
syllabus, we held that:                                                          
     "1.  Negligently inflicted emotional and psychiatric                        
injury sustained by a plaintiff who also suffers                                 
contemporaneous physical injury in a motor vehicle accident                      
need not be severe and debilitating to be compensable.  (Paugh                   
* * * [supra], distinguished.)                                                   
     "2.  The emotional and psychiatric injury arising from an                   
accident may encompass more than the distress associated with                    
the plaintiff's own contemporaneous physical injuries.                           
     "3.  Recovery for negligently inflicted emotional and                       
psychiatric injuries accompanied by contemporaneous physical                     
injury may include damages for mental anguish, emotional                         
distress, anxiety, grief or loss of enjoyment of life caused by                  
the death or injury of another, provided the plaintiff is                        
directly involved and contemporaneously injured in the same                      
motor vehicle and accident with the deceased or other injured                    
person."                                                                         
     A review of the foregoing authorities demonstrates that in                  
Schultz, we expanded the law to allow recovery for negligent                     
infliction of emotional distress without proof of a                              
contemporaneous physical injury for plaintiffs who are directly                  
involved in an accident.  In Paugh, we extended the rule of                      
Schultz to permit recovery for purely emotional injuries for                     
plaintiff-bystanders who were not directly involved in the                       
accident.  However, in Paugh, we set forth certain limitations                   
on the right to recover for emotional injuries by requiring,                     
among other things, that the emotional injuries suffered by the                  
plaintiff must be severe and debilitating and reasonably                         
foreseeable.  Id. at paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.                   
Binns reminds us that a plaintiff who suffers physical injuries                  
in an automobile accident may recover for the emotional                          
distress associated with his or her own injuries, as well as                     
the distress associated with having observed the death or                        
injury of another occupant of the vehicle, whether or not the                    
plaintiff's emotional injuries are severe and debilitating.                      
Id. at paragraphs one, two and three of the syllabus.                            
     In the case at bar, appellant correctly cites Paugh and                     
Schultz for the proposition that a plaintiff seeking recovery                    
for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress need not                  
prove that he or she suffered actual physical harm.  However,                    
appellant further suggests that Paugh and Schultz permit                         
recovery for emotional distress where, as here, the plaintiff                    
neither witnessed nor was exposed to any real or impending                       
physical calamity.  We disagree.                                                 
     Schultz involved a situation where the person seeking                       
recovery for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress                  
had been involved in an actual physical calamity.  See, also,                    
Binns.  Paugh involved a situation where the person seeking                      
recovery for emotional distress had been aware of a real and                     
existing physical peril.  Here, appellant alleged that she had                   
been negligently diagnosed HIV positive and sought recovery for                  
the emotional injuries resulting from the misdiagnosis.                          
However, the claimed negligent diagnosis never placed appellant                  
or any other person in real physical peril, since appellant                      
was, in fact, HIV negative.  Thus, in our judgment, the case at                  
bar differs significantly from those instances in which this                     
court has recognized a right to recover for negligent                            
infliction of emotional distress.                                                
     In High v. Howard (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 82, 85, 592 N.E.2d                  
818, 820-821, overruled on other grounds in Gallimore v.                         
Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 617                        
N.E.2d 1052, we observed that "[i]n the absence of statutory                     
provision therefor, Ohio courts have limited recovery for                        
negligent infliction of emotional distress to such instances as                  
where one was a bystander to an accident or was in fear of                       
physical consequences to his own person.  Paugh v. Hanks                         
(1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 6 OBR 114, 451 N.E.2d 759; Criswell v.                  
Brentwood Hosp. (1989), 49 Ohio App.3d 163, 551 N.E.2d 1315."                    
See, also, Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co. v. Muething                        
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 273, 280, 603 N.E.2d 969, 974.  This                       
statement of the law is a fair characterization of Schultz,                      
Paugh and Binns, because each of these three cases involved a                    
plaintiff who witnessed and/or experienced a dangerous accident                  
or appreciated the physical peril.  The citation to Paugh in                     
High provides clear justification for the statement that                         
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress has                      
been limited to instances where the plaintiff was a bystander                    
to an accident.  Likewise, the citation in High to Criswell                      
lends valuable insight into the statement that a right to                        
recovery has also been recognized in instances where the                         
plaintiff was placed in fear of physical consequences to his or                  
her own person.                                                                  
     In Criswell, a mother took her three-and-one-half-year-old                  
daughter, Veronica, to Brentwood Family Health Center                            
("Brentwood") because the child had been complaining of a                        
vaginal itch and stomach pains.  A physician examined Veronica                   
and noticed a yellow discharge in the vaginal area.  The                         
physician ordered cultures to determine if the child had a                       
sexually transmitted disease.  The cultures indicated that the                   
child had chlamydia, and the hospital notified authorities that                  
the child was a possible victim of sexual abuse.  Subsequently,                  
the child and her family visited a different hospital where it                   
was determined that the child did not have chlamydia.                            
Thereafter, the family initiated suit against Brentwood for                      
negligent infliction of emotional distress.  The trial court                     
granted summary judgment in favor of Brentwood.                                  
     In Criswell, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County                       
affirmed the judgment of the trial court and rejected the                        
notion that Schultz and Paugh permit recovery for negligent                      
infliction of emotional distress in instances where the                          
plaintiff did not witness or experience a violent accident or                    
appreciate a real and existing physical peril:                                   
     "In Paugh and Schultz the plaintiffs either witnessed or                    
experienced a dangerous accident or appreciated the physical                     
peril and, as a result of this cognizance, suffered serious                      
emotional distress.  The claimed misdiagnosis of Veronica [the                   
child] put the child in no physical peril.  Ohio case law has                    
recognized negligent infliction of emotional distress only                       
where there is cognizance of a real danger, not mere fear of                     
nonexistent peril.  See Paugh, supra; Schultz, supra.  * * *                     
     "* * *                                                                      
     "The courts of Ohio have not expanded this cause of action                  
to include apprehension of a non-existent physical peril, nor                    
will we.  * * *"  (Emphasis added.)  Criswell, 49 Ohio App.3d                    
at 165-166, 551 N.E.2d at 1317-1318.                                             
     Thus, the court in Criswell specifically acknowledged that                  
Schultz and Paugh limit recovery for negligent infliction of                     
emotional distress to instances where the plaintiff has either                   
witnessed or experienced a dangerous accident or appreciated                     
the actual physical peril.  Our citation to Criswell in High,                    
64 Ohio St.3d at 85, 592 N.E.2d at 820-821, strongly suggests                    
that we adhere to that interpretation of Paugh and Schultz.                      
Further, our research indicates that the courts throughout this                  
state interpret Paugh and Schultz in a similar manner.  See,                     
e.g., King v. Bogner (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 564, 569, 624                        
N.E.2d 364, 367 (Ohio case law recognizes negligent infliction                   
of emotional distress only where the plaintiff is cognizant of                   
a real physical danger to herself or another.); Massie v.                        
Dayton Power & Light Co. (Sept. 21, 1992), Fayette App. Nos.                     
CA91-10-021 and CA91-11-025, unreported (same); Dawoudi v.                       
Ullman Oil, Inc. (Mar. 25, 1994) Geauga App. No. 93-G-1782,                      
unreported (same); and Huston v. Morris (Mar. 12, 1991),                         
Franklin App. No. 90AP-1009, unreported ("Under Ohio law,                        
claims for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress                    
are cognizable only where the plaintiff or someone closely                       
related to the plaintiff faced actual physical peril.").3                        
     Nevertheless, appellant maintains that Schultz and Paugh                    
recognize the right of a plaintiff to maintain a cause of                        
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress whenever                   
the plaintiff's emotional injuries are serious and a reasonably                  
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence.  Again,                   
we do not interpret these cases that broadly.  Appellant also                    
suggests that permitting recovery for negligent infliction of                    
serious emotional distress only where the plaintiff is                           
cognizant of a real danger to herself or another is arbitrary                    
and unreasonable.  However, we find it difficult to imagine a                    
restriction more reasonable than one which prohibits recovery                    
where the distress suffered by the plaintiff is associated with                  
the plaintiff's fear of a nonexistent peril.  Thus, appellant's                  
arguments are not persuasive.                                                    
     Accordingly, we hold that Ohio does not recognize a claim                   
for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress where                     
the distress is caused by the plaintiff's fear of a nonexistent                  
physical peril.  In so holding, we specifically reject                           
appellant's contentions that such a restriction on the right to                  
recover for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress                   
should be limited to cases where the plaintiff was a bystander                   
to an accident as opposed to a direct victim of the                              
tortfeasor's negligence.  We do not believe that any such                        
distinction is warranted.                                                        
     Appellant also contends that recovery should be allowed                     
for emotional distress even in the absence of real physical                      
peril where, as here, the plaintiff's emotional distress is                      
engendered by a physician's diagnosis of a "fatal disease."                      
However, we are not persuaded on the facts of this case to                       
deviate from the governing law.  Nor are we prepared to create                   
a "subspecies" of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional                  
distress that applies only in the context of the                                 
patient-physician relationship.                                                  
     As a final matter, we do not in any way dispute the                         
legitimacy of appellant's claims that she suffered serious                       
emotional injuries when diagnosed HIV positive.  We have no                      
doubt that the emotional injuries suffered by this appellant                     
were real and debilitating.  However, the facts of this case                     
remind us that not every wrong is deserving of a legal remedy.                   
Appellant was not HIV positive and never faced an actual                         
physical peril as a result of appellees' alleged negligence.                     
While we remain vigilant in our efforts to ensure an                             
individual's "right to emotional tranquillity" (see Paugh, 6                     
Ohio St.3d at 74, 6 OBR at 116, 451 N.E.2d at 763), we decline                   
to expand the law to permit recovery on the facts of this                        
case.                                                                            
     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the                    
court of appeals.                                                                
                                 Judgment affirmed.                              
     Moyer, C.J., Wright, F.E. Sweeney and Hadley, JJ., concur.                  
     Resnick and Pfeifer, JJ., dissent.                                          
     Ronald E. Hadley, J., of the Third Appellate District,                      
sitting for Cook, J.                                                             
                                                                                 
FOOTNOTES:                                                                       
1    We are aware that Red Cross had not moved for summary                       
judgment.                                                                        
2    We recognize that the "no just reason for delay" language                   
was not included in the entry granting summary judgment to Red                   
Cross.                                                                           
3    We note, in passing, that there does exist some case law                    
in this state recognizing certain exceptions to the                              
actual-peril requirement.  See, e.g., Carney v. Knollwood                        
Cemetery Assn. (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 31, 33-34, 514 N.E.2d                      
430, 432-433 (permitting recovery for negligent infliction of                    
emotional distress where defendants were responsible for                         
desecration of a grave).  However, none of the exceptions                        
applies to the case at bar.                                                      
     Alice Robie Resnick, J., dissenting.  As an initial                         
matter, I recognize that any method of HIV testing will, on                      
some occasions, inevitably yield false-positive results.  I                      
further recognize that to allow recovery on a claim for                          
negligent infliction of serious emotional distress each time a                   
false-positive result is reported would in effect be imposing                    
strict liability on those who conduct and interpret the tests,                   
when false-positive test results are produced at times without                   
negligence.  Thus, there can be no recovery for a plaintiff who                  
can prove nothing more than that he or she received a report of                  
a false-positive test, although that report understandably                       
would induce anxiety to that recipient.                                          
     Having set forth my general agreement that some standards                   
are necessary to govern recovery in a case such as this, I                       
cannot agree with the majority that a blanket prohibition of                     
recovery in false-positive cases is appropriate.  Rather, the                    
traditional tort law concepts of duty, breach of duty,                           
proximate cause, and damages can serve to effectively limit                      
recovery to those plaintiffs who deserve it, as in any other                     
negligence case.  In addition, consistent with Paugh v. Hanks                    
(1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 6 OBR 114, 451 N.E.2d 759, additional                   
limitations on recovery for negligent infliction of serious                      
emotional distress ensure that the emotional distress must be                    
both serious and foreseeable before recovery is allowed.                         
Because adequate limits therefore already exist on the tort of                   
negligent infliction of serious emotional distress, I see no                     
reason to impose the additional "real danger" requirement                        
established by the majority.                                                     
     Construing the sketchy facts in this case in a light most                   
favorable to appellant, as we must for purposes of Civ.R.                        
56(C), reveals that appellant alleged more than the mere fact                    
that she received a report of a false-positive HIV test.  She                    
alleged that the testing was negligently conducted, in part                      
because the apparently faulty original sample was retested when                  
a new sample should have been drawn immediately for the                          
retest.  She also alleged that the test results were                             
negligently conveyed to her, in that Dr. Moretuzzo informed her                  
of the devastating news over the telephone, rather than in a                     
face-to-face meeting.  It is evident, therefore, that appellant                  
sufficiently raised a jury question regarding appellees'                         
negligence based on the sparse record that had been developed                    
at the time the trial court granted summary judgment to                          
appellees.  I would reverse the judgment of the court of                         
appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further                     
proceedings, to allow for further development of the record.                     
Because the majority finds that appellant is a member of a                       
class of plaintiffs who cannot recover as a matter of law, I                     
dissent.                                                                         
     Pfeifer, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.