Title: State v. Andrae D. Howell

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP731 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Andrae D. Howell, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 182 
Reported at:  296 Wis. 2d 380, 722 N.W.2d 567 
(Ct. App. 2006-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 21, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 7, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jean Dimotto   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the dissent. 
 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Ellen Henak, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
2007 WI 75
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP731-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF739) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Andrae D. Howell, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 21, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment 
and order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Jean W. 
DiMotto, 
Judge.1 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied, 
without 
an 
evidentiary hearing, Andrae D. Howell's postconviction motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, holding that the plea colloquy, 
complaint, and sentencing sufficiently demonstrated that Howell 
                                                 
1 State v. Howell, 2006 WI App 182, 296 Wis. 2d 380, 722 
N.W.2d 567. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
2 
 
understood that he was aiding and abetting his cousin Joseph 
Sharp in first degree reckless injury, Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1)(a) 
(2003-04),2 and that there was a sufficient factual basis to 
support the plea.    
¶2 
The issue on review is limited to whether the circuit 
court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on 
Howell's motion to withdraw his plea.  More specifically, the 
issue is whether Howell's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
satisfies, for purposes of granting an evidentiary hearing, the 
requirements of (1) the Bangert line of cases, State v. Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d 246, 
274, 
389 
N.W.2d 12 
(1986); 
(2) 
the 
Nelson/Bentley line of cases, Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 
195 N.W.2d 629 (1972), and State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 
548 N.W.2d 50 (1996); or (3) both lines of cases.  We are not 
asked to decide, and do not decide, whether the circuit court 
should ultimately grant or deny Howell's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea.   
¶3 
This case involves the application of our well-
developed case law on a circuit court's granting an evidentiary 
hearing on a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea.   
¶4 
Confusion 
and 
disagreement 
abound 
about 
whether 
Howell's motion papers present a Bangert or a Nelson/Bentley 
motion.  In the State's original brief to the court of appeals, 
counsel analyzed Howell's plea-withdrawal claim in a Bangert 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
3 
 
framework.  In the State's supplemental brief to the court of 
appeals and the State's response to Howell's petition for 
review, counsel adopted the view of the court of appeals' 
majority that Howell had alleged a Nelson/Bentley claim.   
¶5 
Counsel for the State suggests in this court that upon 
further analysis and reflection, Howell's plea-withdrawal motion 
exhibits features of both a Bangert motion and a Nelson/Bentley 
motion, and is in effect a "dual-purpose motion."  The motion 
alleges that Howell's misunderstanding was a result of problems 
occurring both within and outside the plea colloquy. 
¶6 
The court of appeals did not review Howell's motion as 
a Bangert motion because it concluded that Howell had not 
alleged that the plea colloquy was defective.  The dissenting 
judge in the court of appeals considered Howell's motion to be a 
Bangert motion describing a defective plea colloquy.  
¶7 
For the reasons set forth, we hold that Howell is 
entitled under Bangert to an evidentiary hearing regarding his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  As required by Bangert, the 
motion makes a prima facie showing that the circuit court's plea 
colloquy did not conform with Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and judicially 
mandated procedures and includes the allegation that Howell did 
not know or understand information that should have been 
provided at the plea colloquy.3  In keeping with Bangert, we 
                                                 
3 State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶2, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906 (citing State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶46, 274 
Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14; State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 
274, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986)).   
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
4 
 
examine the record at the plea hearing; we do not confabulate 
about facts and conversations not on the record.  We stay 
focused.  A defendant's right to an evidentiary hearing under 
Bangert cannot be circumvented by either the court or the State 
asserting that based on the record as a whole the defendant, 
despite the defective plea colloquy, entered a constitutionally 
sound plea.   
¶8 
In analyzing Howell's motion under Nelson/Bentley, we 
conclude that the part of the motion that could be considered a 
Nelson/Bentley motion raises the same legal issue as the claim 
under 
Bangert, 
namely 
that 
the 
plea 
was 
not 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary because Howell misunderstood the 
concept of party-to-a-crime liability.  The evidentiary matter 
presented in the Nelson/Bentley portion of the motion, namely 
that Howell misunderstood party-to-a-crime liability based on 
conversations with his attorney, will likely be addressed at the 
Bangert hearing.  Consequently, we need not assess the validity 
of Howell's Nelson/Bentley claim.  Howell's motion entitles him 
to an evidentiary hearing under Bangert on the issue of whether 
his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
¶9 
We thus hold that Howell's motion warrants him an 
evidentiary hearing under Bangert to determine whether he can 
withdraw 
his 
guilty 
plea 
because 
it 
was 
not 
knowing, 
intelligent, or voluntary.  The burden is on the State at the 
evidentiary hearing in the instant case on the Bangert motion to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Howell's plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
5 
 
¶10 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for an 
evidentiary hearing under Bangert to determine whether Howell is 
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.   
I 
¶11 We briefly summarize the facts here.  We discuss the 
plea colloquy and Howell's motion when we examine the legal 
issues relating to Bangert and Nelson/Bentley. 
¶12 On February 8, 2004, Marcus Pearson was shot twice 
while seated in his vehicle.  The defendant, Andrae D. Howell, 
along with his sister Kimberly and his cousin Joseph Sharp, had 
allegedly driven to the scene to find another sister, April, who 
was dating Pearson.  Pearson alleged that Howell exited his 
vehicle, brandished a rifle, and shot him. 
¶13 The State charged Howell with first degree reckless 
injury under Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1)(a).4  On the date originally 
set for trial, Sharp allegedly admitted to Howell's trial 
counsel that Sharp, not Howell, shot the victim.  Howell's trial 
counsel requested an adjournment allegedly in light of this 
information.       
¶14 At the next hearing, the State moved to amend the 
information to add party-to-a-crime liability, on the theory 
that evidence at the trial might show that Sharp, not Howell, 
was the shooter and that Howell "assisted people in putting the 
                                                 
4 The information incorrectly states that the charge is 
first degree recklessly endangering safety under Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.30(1). 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
6 
 
victim" in a place where he could be shot by someone else.  A 
party to a crime is statutorily defined as "a person who 
directly commits the crime"; a person who "intentionally aids 
and abets the commission" of a crime; or a person who "is a 
party to a conspiracy with another to commit it."5  Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court Judge Richard J. Sankovitz allowed the 
amendment.6    
¶15 On the same day the information was amended, Howell 
entered a guilty plea to being party to the crime of first 
degree reckless injury.  Judge Sankovitz conducted the plea 
colloquy, accepted the plea, and convicted Howell of the offense 
charged.  
¶16 At a later proceeding, Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
Judge 
Jean 
DiMotto 
sentenced 
Howell 
to 
fourteen 
years' 
imprisonment with seven years of initial incarceration and seven 
years of extended supervision.   
¶17 Thereafter, Howell filed a postconviction motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.30, 
arguing that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily because he failed to understand the concept of 
party-to-a-crime liability for first degree reckless injury.   
¶18 The 
circuit 
court, 
Judge 
Jean 
DiMotto, 
without 
indicating 
whether 
she 
was 
ruling 
under 
the 
Bangert 
or 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 939.05(1),(2)(b). 
6 It appears that the charge was only constructively amended 
to include a party-to-a-crime modifier; neither the complaint 
nor the information in the record reflects this amendment.   
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
7 
 
Nelson/Bentley line of cases, denied Howell's motion without an 
evidentiary hearing.  The circuit court ruled that "[t]he plea 
in conjunction with the complaint is more than sufficient to 
establish that the defendant acted as a party to a crime in the 
offense 
perpetrated 
against 
Marcus 
Pearson 
and 
that 
the 
defendant 
understood 
that 
he 
was 
aiding 
his 
cousin 
or 
intentionally 
assisting 
his 
cousin 
in 
facilitating 
the 
commission of the offense, whether or not he realized his cousin 
would utilize the weapon" (emphasis in original). 
¶19 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's judgment and order, holding that Howell's motion raised 
a Nelson/Bentley challenge and that Howell's motion contained 
only conclusory allegations that were not "subject to meaningful 
assessment in light of the record."   
¶20 Howell petitioned the court of appeals for a rehearing 
in light of State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 
N.W.2d 14.  The court of appeals withdrew its original unanimous 
opinion to address the alleged inconsistency between its 
decision and this court's decision in Hampton.7   
¶21 Upon rehearing, the court of appeals once again held 
that Howell was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  The court of appeals 
determined that "Howell's motion did not assert that his plea 
colloquy was defective within the meaning of State v. Bangert."8  
                                                 
7 Howell, 296 Wis. 2d 380, ¶10. 
8 Id., ¶9 (emphasis in original). 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
8 
 
The court of appeals applied Nelson/Bentley to Howell's motion 
and again held that Howell's motion included only conclusory 
statements that did not entitle him to an evidentiary hearing. 
The court of appeals rejected Howell's argument that Hampton 
does not require more than a conclusory statement in a 
postconviction motion to withdraw a guilty plea when the 
defendant alleges he misunderstood the nature of the crime 
charged. 
¶22 Court of Appeals Judge Charles Dykman dissented, 
concluding that Howell had in fact raised a Bangert claim and 
alleged sufficient facts to entitle him to an evidentiary 
hearing.  Judge Dykman also concluded that Hampton applied to 
both Bangert and non-Bangert (that is, to Nelson/Bentley) claims 
and that under Hampton, Howell had sufficiently alleged a 
misunderstanding to warrant an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion. 
II 
¶23 "A plea of guilty is more than a confession which 
admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a 
conviction . . . ."9  By pleading guilty or no contest to a 
crime, a defendant waives important constitutional rights, 
including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to 
a jury trial, and the right to confront one's accusers.10  Under 
the United States Constitution, a guilty or no contest plea 
                                                 
9 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
10 Id. at 243; Hampton, 274 Wis.2d 379, ¶22. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
9 
 
"must be affirmatively shown to be knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary."11   
¶24 To warrant an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, the defendant 
must satisfy the requirements of Bangert or Nelson/Bentley.   
III 
¶25 We first analyze Howell's motion under Bangert.   
¶26 Bangert and its progeny govern the circuit court at 
plea colloquies.  A circuit court must address defendants 
personally 
and 
fulfill 
several 
duties 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 971.0812 and judicial mandates to ensure that a plea 
                                                 
11 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶25. 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 provides: 
971.08 Pleas of guilty and no contest; withdrawal 
thereof. 
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following: 
(a) Address the defendant personally and determine 
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding 
of the nature of the charge and the potential 
punishment if convicted. 
(b)  Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
(c)  Address the defendant personally and advise the 
defendant as follows:  "If you are not a citizen of 
the United States of America, you are advised that a 
plea of guilty or no contest for the offense with 
which you are charged may result in deportation, the 
exclusion from admission to this country or the denial 
of naturalization, under federal law." 
(d)  Inquire of the district attorney whether he or 
she has complied with s. 971.095(2). 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
10 
 
of guilty or no contest is constitutionally sound.13  The purpose 
of these duties is to inform the defendant of the nature of the 
charges, to ascertain the defendant's understanding of the 
charge, and to ensure that the defendant is aware of the 
constitutional rights being waived.14  "In a legal sense, the 
purpose of the colloquy is to assure a voluntary and intelligent 
plea, as well as fundamental fairness in the taking of pleas."15  
¶27 A Bangert Motion.  A defendant may invoke Bangert only 
by alleging that the circuit court failed to fulfill its plea 
colloquy duties.16  A Bangert motion warrants an evidentiary 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) If a court fails to advise a defendant as required 
by sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows that the 
plea 
is 
likely 
to 
result 
in 
the 
defendant's 
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization, 
the 
court 
on 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant 
and 
permit 
the 
defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea.  
This subsection does not limit the ability to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest on any other grounds. 
(3) Any plea of guilty which is not accepted by the 
court or which is subsequently permitted to be 
withdrawn shall not be used against the defendant in a 
subsequent action. 
13 The court recently commented on these duties in Brown, 
293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶¶34-36.  We will describe only those duties 
relevant to the instant review.  The remainder are discussed in 
Brown. 
14 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267.   
15 Hampton, 274 Wis.2d 379, ¶44. "In a practical sense, the 
purpose of the colloquy is to promote finality by eliminating 
one of the grounds for plea withdrawal."  Id. 
16 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶36. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
11 
 
hearing if (1) the motion makes "a prima facie showing that 
[the] plea was accepted without the trial court's conformance 
with [Wis. Stat.] § 971.08 or other mandatory procedures,"17 and 
if (2) the motion alleges that in fact the defendant did not 
know or understand the information that should have been 
provided at the plea colloquy.18   
¶28 The requirements for a Bangert motion are relatively 
relaxed because the source of the defendant's misunderstanding, 
the plea colloquy defect, should be clear from the transcript of 
the hearing at which the plea was taken.  We require less from 
the allegations in a Bangert motion because the circuit court 
bears the responsibility of preventing failures in the plea 
colloquy.19  
                                                 
17 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  In Hampton, we explained 
that "the defendant must point to a specific defect in the plea 
hearing which constitutes an error by the court.  The defendant 
will not satisfy this burden merely by alleging that 'the plea 
colloquy was defective' or 'the court failed to conform to its 
mandatory duties during the plea colloquy.'  The defendant must 
make specific allegations . . . ."  Hampton, 274 Wis.2d 379, 
¶57. 
18 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274.  See also Hampton, 274 
Wis.2d 379, ¶46.  A Bangert claim, in essence, "argues that the 
colloquy conducted by the trial court at the plea hearing was 
constitutionally insufficient to ascertain [the defendant's] 
understanding of the nature of the charge and [the defendant's] 
knowledge of which constitutional rights he was waiving."  
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 255. 
19 Bangert 
"requires 
something 
less 
to 
support 
the 
defendant's allegation of his understanding at the time of plea 
[because] the court can head off the problem with a sufficient 
plea colloquy."  Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶65. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
12 
 
¶29 If the defendant's motion meets both prongs of 
Bangert, the State has the burden to prove at the evidentiary 
hearing that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.20   
¶30 Standard of Appellate Review.  This court decides 
whether a postconviction motion to withdraw a guilty or no 
contest 
plea 
under 
Bangert 
entitles 
a 
defendant 
to 
an 
evidentiary hearing independently of the circuit court and court 
of appeals but benefiting from their analyses.21   
¶31 A reviewing court first determines as a matter of law 
whether a defendant's motion "has pointed to deficiencies in the 
plea colloquy that establish a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
or other mandatory duties at a plea hearing."22  The reviewing 
court then determines as a matter of law whether a defendant 
"has sufficiently alleged that he did not know or understand 
information 
that 
should 
have 
been 
provided 
at 
the 
plea 
hearing . . . ."23   
¶32 Howell's Bangert Motion.  Howell and the State agree 
in this court that Howell's motion should be considered under 
Bangert.  They disagree, however, whether the motion entitles 
Howell to an evidentiary hearing under Bangert.  
                                                 
20 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274-75. 
21 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶21.   
22 Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
¶21; 
see 
also 
State 
v. 
Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶25, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.   
23 Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
¶21 
(citing 
Bentley, 
201 
Wis. 2d at 310). 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
13 
 
¶33 Howell contends that his allegations are sufficient to 
entitle him to an evidentiary hearing under Bangert, namely that 
the circuit court did not determine that the plea was made 
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge; did 
not clarify what party-to-a-crime liability entailed; and did 
not correct misleading statements the State made during the plea 
colloquy about party-to-a-crime liability.  He asserts that as a 
result, he did not understand party-to-a-crime liability such 
that his plea was not knowing or voluntary. 
¶34 The State contends that Howell's Bangert motion fails 
because the plea colloquy was not defective.  The State asserts 
that the plea colloquy adequately and accurately informed Howell 
of his criminal liability as an aider and abettor party to a 
crime. 
¶35 Relevant to the instant review are two Bangert duties 
of a circuit court at the plea colloquy.   
¶36 One, "the [circuit] court must address the defendant 
personally and . . . [e]stablish the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the crime with which he is charged and the 
range of punishments to which he is subjecting himself by 
entering a plea . . . ."24  Two, "the [circuit] court must 
address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and . . . [a]scertain 
                                                 
24 Id., 
¶35 
(citing 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 
262; 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a)).   
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
14 
 
personally whether a factual basis exists to support the 
plea . . . ."25   
¶37 Duty to Establish Defendant's Understanding.  We first 
examine the circuit court's duty to establish the defendant's 
understanding of the nature of the crime.  In State v. Brown, 
2006 WI 100, ¶55, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906, the court 
recognized 
that 
party-to-a-crime 
liability 
needed 
to 
be 
addressed by the circuit court during the plea colloquy.  
¶38 In the instant case, as evidenced by the record, the 
circuit court engaged in only a limited exploration regarding 
whether Howell understood the nature of his criminal liability 
as an aider and abettor.   
¶39 We examine the relevant portions of the record, namely 
the transcript of the plea colloquy, to determine whether the 
plea colloquy was defective.  We examine the plea colloquy first 
to determine whether the circuit court informed Howell of the 
nature of the charge and then whether the circuit court 
ascertained Howell's understanding of the nature of the charge.26 
¶40 In permitting the amendment to the charge to include 
the party-to-a-crime modifier at the beginning of the plea 
                                                 
25 Id. 
(citing 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 
262; 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b)).   
26 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 267.  In Bangert, the court 
"characterize[d] this obligation as a duty to first inform a 
defendant of the nature of the charge or, alternatively, to 
first 
ascertain 
that 
the 
defendant 
possesses 
accurate 
information about the nature of the charge.  The court must then 
ascertain the defendant's understanding of the nature of the 
charge . . . ."  Id. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
15 
 
hearing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
characterized 
party-to-a-crime 
liability in the instant case as assisting people in putting the 
victim in a place where he could be shot.  The circuit court 
then engaged in the following exchange with Howell's trial 
counsel and Howell:   
THE COURT: Would it be fair to state that the 
amendment to the information comprises the prospect 
that at trial the evidence might show that Mr. Howell 
didn't pull the trigger, but that he assisted people 
in putting the victim in a place where he could be 
shot by somebody else? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's a correct statement. 
THE COURT: Mr. Howell, do you agree with that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶41 Later 
in 
the 
plea 
colloquy, 
the 
circuit 
court 
described how if Howell went to trial the State would have to 
prove that Howell shot the victim or assisted the person who 
shot the victim, knowing what that person was doing.  The 
circuit court addressed Howell as follows: 
THE COURT: Do you understand that before you can be 
found guilty the State would be required to prove that 
on February 8th of this year someone caused great 
bodily harm to [Pearson].  The State would have to 
prove that whoever did this [shot Pearson] did it by 
criminally reckless conduct.  That means that they 
were engaged in conduct that the person knew at the 
time to create a substantial and unreasonable risk of 
death or great bodily harm to Mr. Pearson, and was 
aware that they were creating such a risk.  The State 
would have to prove that the person who shot him, shot 
him in circumstances which showed utter disregard for 
human life.  And then the State would have to prove 
either that you were the person who did all those 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
16 
 
things or that you intentionally assisted someone else 
who was doing those things, knowing what they were 
doing.   
Do you understand what the State would have to prove? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶42 When prompted by the circuit court, the State, in 
describing the nature of Howell's criminal liability as a party 
to a crime, explained that Howell was with the shooter, observed 
the shooter with the gun as they got out of the car, and would 
have approached the victim in this situation.  This part of the 
colloquy reads as follows: 
THE COURT: So, if the case came to trial what are the 
two possibilities that the State could prove as far as 
Mr. Howell's involvement in the shooting? 
[THE STATE]: The two possibilities would be, Judge, 
that, one, he is the actual shooter, which would have 
been the victim's actual testimony; the other is what 
defense counsel and I have discussed.  His position 
and his argument to the court will be that his cousin 
was the shooter and he was there with him, observed 
him with the gun as they got out of the car and would 
have approached the victim in this situation. 
THE COURT: Are those facts —— or may I accept those 
facts as true? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: We would stipulate to that factual 
basis and those are the facts upon which Mr. Howell 
has indicated his guilt to me as well.  Is that 
correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: So, Mr. Howell, you're not necessarily 
agreeing that you shot Mr. Pearson; that you are 
agreeing that you and your cousin went there and that 
you approached Mr. Pearson and by doing so you 
assisted your cousin in shooting him? 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
17 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
¶43 Although the circuit court, the State, and Howell's 
trial counsel were discussing the factual bases for the crime 
charged, these parts of the plea colloquy have bearing on the 
court's obligation to inform Howell of the nature of the charge. 
 
¶44 Howell's 
motion contends that the plea colloquy 
reinforced Howell's belief that his mere presence and his 
failure to stop the shooting were sufficient to make him a party 
to a crime.  Howell asserts in his motion that he "never would 
have pled guilty had he realized that his mere presence was not 
enough because he maintains he is innocent and did not even know 
there was a gun until Mr. Sharp raised the gun up to shoot." 
¶45 To demonstrate that the circuit court failed to 
explain party-to-a-crime liability adequately, one need only 
compare the circuit court's plea colloquy with the pattern jury 
instruction explaining the liability of a person who aids and 
abets the commission of a crime. 
¶46 Wisconsin Jury Instruction——Criminal 400 (2005) states 
in part as follows: 
A person intentionally aids and abets the commission 
of a crime when, acting with knowledge or belief that 
another person is committing or intends to commit a 
crime, (he) (she) knowingly either: 
assists the person who commits the crime; or 
is ready and willing to assist and the 
person who commits the crime knows of the 
willingness to assist. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
18 
 
To intentionally aid and abet [first degree reckless 
injury], the defendant must know that another person 
is committing or intends to commit the crime of [first 
degree reckless injury] and have the purpose to assist 
the commission of that crime. 
However, a person does not aid and abet if (he) (she) 
is only a bystander or spectator and does nothing to 
assist the commission of a crime.27 
¶47 The circuit court's curt explanation of aiding and 
abetting falls far short of this jury instruction and of any 
other means of informing Howell about the nature of his criminal 
liability. 
¶48 Simply stating that the State would have to prove that 
Howell "assisted" or "intentionally assisted" the shooter was 
not sufficient to explain to Howell aider and abettor party-to-
a-crime liability, either generally or in the context of first 
degree reckless injury.  The circuit court did not explain how 
Howell had been a party to a crime if he "would have approached 
the victim" or if he had "assisted people in putting the victim 
in a place where he could be shot."  In short, the circuit 
court's descriptions of the aiding and abetting aspect of party-
to-a-crime liability do not amount to a clear explanation of the 
charge.  This court cannot and should not speculate about what 
information Howell, counsel, and the circuit court may have 
shared off the record before the plea hearing.  
                                                 
27 The final sentence of the instruction is to be used "if 
supported by the evidence."  Wis JI——Criminal 400 (2005). 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
19 
 
¶49 Accordingly, we conclude that nothing in the plea 
colloquy demonstrates that Howell received correct information 
about this charge from other sources.   
¶50 To satisfy Bangert, the circuit court should have 
established not only that Howell had the proper information but 
also that he understood that information.  The plea colloquy in 
the instant case quoted above failed to establish that Howell 
understood the nature of the charge. 
¶51 This court has recommended that to ascertain a 
defendant's understanding of a charge, a circuit court might 
summarize the nature of the charge by reading the jury 
instructions, might ask defendant's counsel about his or her 
explanation to the defendant and ask counsel or the defendant to 
summarize the explanation, or might refer to the record or other 
evidence of the defendant's understanding of the nature of the 
charge.28  We encourage circuit courts to use these or similar 
methods because "[e]ach method enables a court to ascertain the 
accuracy of the defendant's knowledge; each method gives 
substantive content to a defendant's understanding."29  The 
circuit court did not employ any of these suggested methods or 
any other suitable method to ascertain Howell's understanding of 
party-to-a-crime liability.     
                                                 
28 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 268; Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
¶¶46-51.  These recommendations are not an exhaustive list of 
methods for circuit courts to ascertain a defendant's knowledge 
and understanding of the nature of the charge.   
29 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶56. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
20 
 
¶52 The 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
establish 
Howell's 
understanding of the information it relayed to Howell by 
personally questioning him.  Rather than asking Howell to 
summarize his understanding, the circuit court asked him 
questions that required simple "yes" or "no" responses.   
¶53 As we explained in Bangert, "[a] defendant's mere 
affirmative response that he understands the nature of the 
charge, without establishing his knowledge of the nature of the 
charge, submits more to a perfunctory procedure rather than to 
the constitutional standard that a plea be affirmatively shown 
to be voluntarily and intelligently made."30  By referring simply 
to Howell's "assistance" in the crime and asking Howell for only 
a single word response, the circuit court did not appropriately 
ascertain Howell's understanding.  A defendant must "at some 
point [have] expressed his knowledge of the nature of the 
charge" to satisfy the requirement of Wis. Stat. § 971.08.31 
¶54 The circuit court did not establish that Howell was 
properly advised of the nature of the charge by his trial 
counsel.  The circuit court asked Howell's trial counsel only 
whether he was satisfied that Howell was entering the guilty 
plea knowingly and voluntarily, to which counsel answered "yes."  
                                                 
30 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 269.   
31 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 268-69.  A circuit court may 
tailor a plea colloquy to the individual defendant.  Brown, 293 
Wis.2d 594, ¶58.  In "customizing a plea colloquy, however, a 
circuit court must 'do more than merely record the defendant's 
affirmation of understanding.'"  Id., ¶58 (quoting Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 267). 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
21 
 
This question by the circuit court and Howell's trial counsel's 
response were not adequate.  "A statement from defense counsel 
that he has reviewed the elements of the charge, without some 
summary 
of 
the 
elements 
or 
detailed 
description 
of 
the 
conversation, cannot constitute an 'affirmative showing that the 
nature of the crime has been communicated.'"32 
¶55 We thus agree with Howell that, as demonstrated by the 
record, the plea colloquy was defective in that the circuit 
court failed to inform Howell of the nature of the charge and 
failed to ascertain Howell's understanding of the nature of the 
party-to-a-crime charge.    
¶56 Duty to Ascertain Factual Basis.  We turn now to the 
second alleged defect in the plea colloquy, namely that the 
circuit court failed in its duty to establish the factual basis 
for the charged crime to support Howell's guilty plea.33     
¶57  Howell's motion alleges that the circuit court failed 
to establish a sufficient factual basis for the plea by alleging 
that his conduct did not satisfy party-to-a-crime liability and 
that if he had had the proper understanding he never would have 
pled guilty because he was not a party to the crime of first 
                                                 
32 Id. (quoting Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 268). 
33 Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b); Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35.  
The duty of the circuit court to ascertain whether a sufficient 
factual basis for the plea exists is an important statutorily 
and judicially required duty that cannot be shirked.  State v. 
Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶35, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(citing Brown, 293 Wis.2d 594, ¶35, citing Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 262; Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b)).   
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
22 
 
degree reckless injury.  The State recognizes that party-to-a-
crime liability is an aspect of the factual basis of the charged 
crime when the defendant disavows direct participation in the 
crime and discusses the factual basis requirement in its brief. 
¶58 A 
circuit 
court's 
failure 
to 
fulfill 
the 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b) factual basis requirement entitles the 
defendant to the Bangert procedure, according to our case law, 
although "applying the Bangert procedure for failure to satisfy 
the factual basis requirement is an awkward fit."  State v. 
Lackershire, 2007 WI 74 ¶48, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  
As the court explained in Lackershire, when a substantial 
question exists about the factual basis for a plea of guilty or 
no contest, doubts arise about whether the plea was knowing and 
intelligent.  The focus of the Bangert evidentiary hearing in 
these cases will be on whether the plea was knowing and 
intelligent despite the failure of the circuit court to 
establish whether a factual basis for the plea existed.34  In the 
instant case, as in Lackershire, the facts relating to the 
defendant's conduct remain in dispute because the circuit court 
failed to establish whether the underlying conduct constituted 
the crime to which the defendant pled guilty.35         
¶59 In light of our recent decision in Lackershire, we use 
this opportunity to emphasize the importance of a circuit 
                                                 
34 State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶52, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___. 
35 State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶46, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
23 
 
court's ensuring it is satisfied that the defendant in fact 
committed the crime by engaging in sufficient inquiry at the 
plea colloquy.36 
¶60 The circuit court's discussion of the factual basis is 
limited to the following alleged actions by Howell: that "he 
assisted people in putting the victim in a place where he could 
be shot by somebody else"; that he either shot Pearson or 
"intentionally assisted someone else who was doing those things, 
knowing what they were doing"; that "he was there with [Sharp], 
observed him with the gun as they got out of the car and would 
have approached the victim in this situation";37 and that Howell 
and Sharp "went there and that [Howell] approached Mr. Pearson 
and by doing so [he] assisted [his] cousin in shooting him."   
¶61 No additional details about Howell's role in the crime 
charged appear in the plea colloquy in part because the circuit 
court allowed defense counsel to stipulate that a factual basis 
for the plea existed in the complaint.     
THE COURT:  May I accept as true the facts stated in 
the complaint? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  We would stipulate to the factual 
basis 
for 
the 
plea 
in 
the 
complaint 
with 
the 
understanding as party to a crime. 
¶62 Because the complaint was not amended to reflect 
party-to-a-crime liability, the factual basis for Howell's 
                                                 
36 State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶50, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___; Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1). 
37 Statement by the prosecutor in response to the circuit 
court. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
24 
 
guilty plea to aiding and abetting the crime was absent from the 
complaint.  Thus, defense counsel's stipulation to the factual 
basis in the complaint is insufficient to fulfill the circuit 
court's duty to personally ascertain that a factual basis exists 
for the crime charged.  The complaint simply states that Pearson 
"personally 
observed 
the 
above-named 
defendant 
[Howell] 
approaching him armed with a rifle, point this rifle at him and 
shoot him."   
¶63 The information is even less informative about the 
crime charged and similarly does not reflect party-to-a-crime 
liability.  Even if Howell's counsel stipulated to the facts 
elicited 
at 
the 
preliminary 
hearing, 
that 
testimony 
is 
insufficient to provide a factual basis for the plea.38 
¶64 The circuit court did not inquire into how Howell 
"assisted" Sharp, how "approaching" the victim constituted 
assistance, or how either alleged action was sufficient to 
establish that Howell aided and abetted Sharp in the shooting.  
That Howell observed Sharp with a firearm does not alone subject 
Howell to party-to-a-crime liability.  The circuit court did not 
inquire into Howell's knowledge about Sharp's intentions or when 
Howell first observed the firearm.  The circuit court also did 
not inquire into who procured the firearm or brought it to the 
                                                 
38 At the preliminary hearing, Pearson was the only witness 
and he testified that Howell was the actual shooter.  There is 
no discussion of Sharp's involvement or how Howell and Sharp 
interacted.  There is also no testimony as to why Pearson was at 
the location of the shooting and thus no indication that Howell 
arranged for Pearson to be there. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
25 
 
scene.  Nor did the circuit court determine whether Howell had 
the requisite intent for party-to-a-crime liability.   
¶65 In Brown, we explained that "[p]robing questions may 
not always be necessary, but they help to ensure a defendant's 
understanding and they help to complete the hearing record."39  
Here, the plea colloquy raises more questions than it answers 
about what actually happened regarding Howell, Sharp, and 
Pearson on the day of the shooting.  
¶66 In light of the late amendment to the charge adding 
party-to-a-crime liability and without an accompanying change in 
the factual basis in the complaint, the circuit court, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and Bangert, should have probed deeper to 
ensure that there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea 
that was now based on the theory that Howell may not have been 
the shooter and instead only assisted the shooter.  It was 
important for the circuit court to determine at the plea 
colloquy what assistance Howell provided and whether that 
assistance was provided with the requisite intent, especially 
since the complaint, information, and preliminary hearing did 
not address aider and abettor liability. 
¶67 We repeat our comments in Lackershire:  "[T]he 
obligation that the circuit court establish a sufficient factual 
basis helps ensure that the defendant's plea is knowing and 
intelligent. 
 
The 
factual 
basis 
requirement 
'protects 
a 
defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an 
                                                 
39 Brown, 293 Wis.2d 594, ¶77. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
26 
 
understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing 
that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.'  
 . . . A defendant's failure to realize that the conduct to 
which she pleads guilty does not fall within the offense charged 
is 
incompatible 
with 
the 
plea 
being 
'knowing' 
and 
'intelligent.'"40  
¶68 We thus conclude that Howell's motion satisfies the 
first prong of Bangert by making a prima facie demonstration 
that the plea colloquy was defective in establishing Howell's 
understanding of the nature of his criminal liability as a party 
to a crime and in establishing a factual basis for the crime 
charged.   
¶69 We 
further 
conclude 
that 
Howell's 
postconviction 
motion satisfies the second prong of Bangert. It alleges that 
the plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered.  Howell's motion states that Howell "believed that he 
was guilty as party-to-a-crime simply for failure to stop the 
crime from occurring"; that he "did not know that being guilty 
as party to a crime required more than his presence and his 
failure to act to stop the shooting"; and that he "never would 
have pled guilty had he realized that his mere presence was not 
enough . . . ."  In short, Howell's motion sufficiently alleges 
that he in fact did not know or understand the information that 
                                                 
40 State v. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, ¶35, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
___ N.W.2d ___ (internal citations omitted). 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
27 
 
should have been provided at the plea hearing to support his 
guilty plea.     
¶70 In a Bangert motion, a circuit court and a reviewing 
court examine only whether "a defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing when the court errs at a plea hearing."41  
The 
State 
cannot 
circumvent 
a 
defendant's 
right 
to 
an 
evidentiary hearing under Bangert by arguing that based on the 
record as a whole the defendant, despite the defective plea 
colloquy, entered a constitutionally sound plea.  "If the motion 
establishes a prima facie violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or 
other court-mandated duties and makes the requisite allegations, 
the court must hold a postconviction evidentiary hearing at 
which the state is given an opportunity to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary despite the identified inadequacy of 
the plea colloquy."42  The State will have the opportunity at the 
evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that Howell understood his 
party-to-a-crime liability.   
¶71 In sum, we conclude that Howell's motion is sufficient 
under Bangert and that Howell is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on his Bangert claims.  We remind circuit courts (and 
the State) to ensure that the Bangert requirements are met.  
"'This court cannot overemphasize the importance of the trial 
court's taking great care in ascertaining the defendant's 
                                                 
41 Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶72. 
42 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶40 (emphasis added).   
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
28 
 
understanding' 
of 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
charges 
and 
the 
constitutional rights being waived."43  This court understands 
"that 
most 
trial 
judges 
are 
under 
considerable 
calendar 
constraints, but it is of paramount importance that judges 
devote the time necessary to ensure that a plea meets the 
constitutional standard.  The plea hearing colloquy must not be 
reduced to a perfunctory exchange.  It demands the trial court's 
'utmost solicitude.'"44 
IV 
¶72 Before moving to our second inquiry, namely whether 
Howell's 
motion satisfies Nelson/Bentley, we must briefly 
discuss a defendant's ability to invoke both Bangert and 
Nelson/Bentley in the same motion. 
¶73 A Dual Bangert and Nelson/Bentley Motion.  A defendant 
may 
invoke 
both 
Bangert 
and 
Nelson/Bentley 
in 
a 
single 
postconviction motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest.45  Nelson/Bentley and Bangert, although different, are 
                                                 
43 Id., ¶32 (quoting Bangert, at 270). 
44 Id., ¶33 (quoting Bangert at 278-79 (quoting Boykin, 395 
U.S. at 243-44)). 
45 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶42.  In Brown, we explained: 
When the defendant files a dual purpose motion——that 
is, a Bangert motion combined with a [Nelson/Bentley] 
motion that alleges ineffective assistance of counsel 
or some other problem affecting the plea that is 
extrinsic to the plea hearing record——the court should 
make an initial ruling on whether an evidentiary 
hearing is required and, if it is, what the hearing 
will address.  
Id. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
29 
 
not inconsistent.  Both involve requests for an evidentiary 
hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.  
In both the defendant has the burden of making a showing in the 
motion to withdraw the plea to justify an evidentiary hearing.46   
¶74 The Bangert and Nelson/Bentley motions, however, are 
applicable to different factual circumstances.47  A defendant 
invokes Bangert when the plea colloquy is defective; a defendant 
invokes Nelson/Bentley when the defendant alleges that some 
factor 
extrinsic 
to 
the 
plea 
colloquy, 
like 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel or coercion, renders a plea infirm.48  A 
"dual purpose" motion would include allegations of a defective 
plea colloquy and allegations of some other injustice that 
renders the plea infirm.  We again state that a defendant may 
include both Bangert and Nelson/Bentley claims in a single 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.   
¶75 A Nelson/Bentley Motion.  To entitle a defendant to an 
evidentiary hearing under Nelson/Bentley, a defendant must 
"allege[] facts which, if true, would entitle the defendant to 
relief . . . .  However, if the defendant fails to allege 
sufficient facts in his motion to raise a question of fact, or 
                                                 
46 Hampton, 
274 
Wis. 2d 379, 
¶56 
(discussing 
the 
similarities 
of 
motions 
brought 
under 
Bangert 
and 
Nelson/Bentley). 
47 Id. 
48 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶42. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311 
(ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Basley, 2006 WI 
App 253, ¶9, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 726 N.W.2d 671 (coercion by 
defense counsel).  
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
30 
 
presents only conclusionary allegations, or if the record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief, the trial court may in the exercise of its legal 
discretion deny the motion without a hearing."49  A defendant's 
Nelson/Bentley motion must meet a higher standard for pleading 
than a Bangert motion.50  If the defendant's motion and the 
                                                 
49 Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 N.W.2d 629 
(1972). 
50 We reject Howell's contention that the court changed the 
Bangert and Nelson/Bentley tests when it wrote the following in 
Hampton:  
The defendant must make specific allegations [in a 
Bangert motion] such as "at no point during the plea 
colloquy did the court explain that it was not bound 
by the plea bargain and was free to disregard the 
prosecutor's sentencing recommendation."  In addition, 
the defendant must allege that he did not in fact 
understand that the court was not bound by the plea 
agreement because that information/explanation was not 
provided.  We think a motion of this nature passes the 
test of Nelson and Bentley: a motion to withdraw a 
plea that alleges facts which, if true, would entitle 
the defendant to relief.  The allegation that the 
defendant 
did 
not 
understand 
is, 
admittedly, 
conclusory; but the allegation raises a question of 
fact and perhaps law that requires resolution. 
Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶57 (emphasis added).   
We disagree with Howell's claim that this language renders 
unnecessary 
the 
"non-conclusory" 
requirement 
of 
the 
Nelson/Bentley test.  First, Hampton was a Bangert case, and 
thus did not change the law of the Nelson/Bentley line of cases.  
Second, the language does not eliminate the "non-conclusory" 
requirement of Nelson/Bentley; rather, it explains that certain 
conclusory statements are acceptable in Bangert cases.  See also 
State v. Goyette, 2006 WI App 178, ¶17 n.8, 296 Wis. 2d 359, 722 
N.W.2d 731 (citing to this passage and explaining that "the 
second Bangert prong is satisfied by a conclusory allegation 
that the defendant did not know or understand").   
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
31 
 
record fail to meet these requirements, a circuit court in its 
discretion may grant or deny an evidentiary hearing.   
¶76 In 
other 
words, 
a 
defendant 
first 
must 
allege 
sufficient, nonconclusory facts in his motion that, if true, 
would entitle him to relief.  If the defendant fails to meet the 
pleading requirements, the circuit court in its discretion may 
nevertheless grant or deny an evidentiary hearing.  If the 
defendant meets the pleading requirements, the circuit court 
then must look to the record.   
¶77 A well-pled complaint may be denied without an 
evidentiary hearing if the record as a whole conclusively 
demonstrates that relief is not warranted.51  Unless the record 
                                                 
51 The Nelson court addressed a postconviction motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.06, which 
governs collateral attacks brought after the time for appeal has 
expired.  This statute provides that "[u]nless the motion and 
the files and records of the action conclusively show that the 
person is entitled to no relief, the court shall . . . grant a 
prompt hearing."  Wis. Stat. § 974.06(3)(c).   
The Bentley court extended the Nelson test to other 
postconviction motions to withdraw guilty pleas, including those 
brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.30 and § 974.02.  
The Bentley court, although recognizing the difference between a 
§ 974.02 and a § 974.06 motion, announced that "our standard of 
review is dictated by Nelson."  Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310.  
The Bentley court explained that "the test is the same for a 
direct challenge to the conviction on a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea as for a collateral challenge pursuant to § 974.06."  
Id. at 310 n.6 (internal citations omitted).  
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
32 
 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is entitled to no 
relief, the circuit court must grant an evidentiary hearing.  If 
the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief, then the circuit court in its discretion may 
grant or deny an evidentiary hearing.52 
¶78 Standard of Appellate Review.  Under Nelson/Bentley, a 
reviewing court determines as a matter of law, independently of 
the circuit court and court of appeals but benefiting from their 
analyses, whether a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
"on its face alleges facts which would entitle the defendant to 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Bentley court interpreted Nelson as follows: "If the 
motion on its face alleges facts which would entitle the 
defendant to relief, the circuit court has no discretion and 
must hold an evidentiary hearing." Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310, 
citing Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497 (emphasis added).  In phrasing 
the Nelson test this way, Bentley might be interpreted to make 
an evidentiary hearing mandatory whenever the motion contains 
sufficient, nonconclusory facts, even if the record as a whole 
would demonstrate that the defendant's plea was constitutionally 
sound.  Such an interpretation of Nelson and Bentley, however, 
is not correct.  The correct interpretation of Nelson/Bentley is 
that an evidentiary hearing is not mandatory if the record as a 
whole conclusively demonstrates that defendant is not entitled 
to relief, even if the motion alleges sufficient nonconclusory 
facts. 
52 An adequate and accurate plea colloquy does not foreclose 
a Bentley challenge.  The court of appeals recently explained 
that "[t]he State is simply incorrect that a good and sufficient 
plea 
colloquy, 
one 
that 
concededly 
complies 
with 
the 
requirements of Bangert, can be relied on to deny an evidentiary 
hearing for a defendant who seeks to withdraw his or her plea on 
non-Bangert grounds.  The entire premise of a Nelson/Bentley 
plea withdrawal motion is that something not apparent from the 
plea colloquy may have rendered a guilty or no contest plea 
infirm."  State v. Basley, 2006 WI App 253, ¶15, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 726 N.W.2d 671. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
33 
 
relief,"53 and whether the record conclusively demonstrates that 
the defendant is entitled to no relief. 
¶79 A reviewing court reviews a circuit court's exercise 
of its discretion to grant or deny a hearing when as a matter of 
law the defendant's motion fails to allege sufficient facts 
entitling the defendant to relief or presents only conclusory 
allegations, or the record, as a matter of law, conclusively 
demonstrates the defendant is not entitled to relief.  This 
review 
determines 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised its discretion.54   
¶80 Howell's Nelson/Bentley Motion.  We begin by observing 
that Howell's motion itself did not clearly distinguish between 
the claims under Bangert of a defective plea colloquy and the 
claims under Nelson/Bentley of problems extrinsic to the plea 
colloquy.  Rather, Howell's motion generally alleged that he 
misunderstood the nature of party-to-a-crime liability, listed 
the various sources of this misunderstanding, and requested an 
evidentiary hearing to demonstrate Howell's misunderstanding. 
¶81 We need not examine in the instant case whether 
allegations in the postconviction motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea are sufficient under Nelson/Bentley to entitle Howell to an 
evidentiary hearing.  Several of Howell's claims appropriately 
fall under Nelson/Bentley because they relate to problems other 
                                                 
53 Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310 (citing Nottelson v. DILHR, 
94 Wis. 2d 106, 116, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980) (whether facts 
fulfill a particular legal standard is a question of law)).   
54 Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497-98.  See ¶¶76-78, supra.   
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
34 
 
than a defective plea colloquy.  That part of Howell's motion 
that might be considered a Nelson/Bentley motion raises the same 
legal issue as his Bangert claim, namely that his plea was not 
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because he misunderstood the 
nature of party-to-a-crime liability. 
¶82 The motion asserts that between June 9, the original 
date of trial, and the plea colloquy, Howell spoke with his 
trial counsel about the amended party-to-a-crime charge, and as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
conversation, 
Howell 
developed 
a 
misunderstanding about what was necessary for him to be 
convicted of being party to the crime of first degree reckless 
injury. The evidentiary matter under Howell's Nelson/Bentley 
claim, 
namely 
that 
Howell 
misunderstood 
party-to-a-crime 
liability because of conversations with his attorney, will 
likely be addressed at the Bangert hearing.  At the Bangert 
hearing, both the State and Howell may present evidence 
extrinsic to the record to demonstrate whether Howell properly 
understood the concept of party-to-a-crime liability despite the 
defective plea colloquy.  Consequently, we need not and do not 
assess 
the 
validity 
of 
Howell's 
allegations 
under 
the 
Nelson/Bentley line of cases.  
¶83 We recognize that, under other circumstances, a court 
may have to analyze a defendant's dual purpose motion under both 
the Bangert and the Nelson/Bentley standards to determine 
whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted on those claims and 
the nature of the hearing. 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
35 
 
¶84 In sum, having already recognized that Howell is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Bangert on whether his 
plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because Howell 
misunderstood the nature of party-to-a-crime liability, we need 
not determine whether Howell has made sufficient allegations 
under Nelson/Bentley to warrant an evidentiary hearing under 
Nelson/Bentley.  The allegations in his motion are sufficient 
under Bangert to entitle Howell to the relief sought, that is, 
an evidentiary hearing that will address whether Howell properly 
understood the nature of party-to-a-crime liability. 
¶85 We need write no further.  We do, however, point out 
that were we to consider Howell's motion as a Nelson/Bentley 
motion rather than as a Bangert motion, we would have to 
determine whether as a matter of law the record conclusively 
demonstrates that Howell is entitled to no relief.  Although the 
statements made by Howell's trial counsel at sentencing give 
pause, the record as a whole does not conclusively demonstrate 
that Howell is entitled to no relief.  
* * * * * 
¶86 For the reasons set forth, we hold that Howell is 
entitled under Bangert to an evidentiary hearing regarding his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  As required by Bangert, the 
motion makes a prima facie showing that the circuit court's plea 
colloquy did not conform with Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and judicially 
mandated procedures and includes the allegation that Howell did 
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
36 
 
not know or understand information that should have been 
provided at the plea colloquy.55   
¶87 In analyzing Howell's motion under Nelson/Bentley, we 
conclude that the part of the motion that could be considered a 
Nelson/Bentley motion raises the same legal issue as the claim 
under 
Bangert, 
namely 
that 
his 
plea 
was 
not 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary because Howell misunderstood the 
concept of party-to-a-crime liability.  The evidentiary matter 
presented in the Nelson/Bentley portion of the motion, namely 
that Howell misunderstood party-to-a-crime liability based on 
conversations with his attorney, will likely be addressed at the 
Bangert hearing.  Consequently, we need not assess the validity 
of Howell's Nelson/Bentley claim.  Howell's motion entitles him 
to an evidentiary hearing under Bangert on the issue of whether 
his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
¶88 We 
thus 
hold 
that 
Howell's 
motion 
warrants 
an 
evidentiary hearing under Bangert to determine whether he can 
withdraw 
his 
guilty 
plea 
because 
it 
was 
not 
knowing, 
intelligent, or voluntary.  The burden is on the State at the 
evidentiary hearing in the instant case on the Bangert motion to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Howell's plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
¶89 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for an 
                                                 
55 Brown, 293 Wis.2d 594, ¶2 (citing Hampton, 274 Wis.2d 
379, ¶46; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274).   
No. 
2005AP731-CR   
 
37 
 
evidentiary hearing under Bangert to determine whether Howell is 
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
No.  2005AP731-CR.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶90 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  Judges and justices 
are umpires, not pinch hitters.1  Nonetheless, the majority in 
this case takes their second at-bat this term for a defendant 
that failed to make a motion alleging a lack of a factual basis 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b). 
 
See 
State 
v. 
Lackershire, 2007 WI 74___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.   
¶91 Previously, the plea-withdrawal procedure empowered 
defendants to make a motion alleging how a plea-taking court 
failed to satisfy a plea colloquy duty.  That motion permitted 
the defendants to have the court deal with their allegation 
directly.   
¶92 Now, judges considering defendants' motions have the 
added obligation to be on the lookout for substantial questions 
and red flags in the record.  That role used to be fulfilled by 
the defendants and their counsel.   
¶93 Because I conclude defendants and defense counsel are 
still better suited than judges to spot substantial questions in 
a plea colloquy, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
1 Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., as nominee to be the 
Chief Justice of the United States, stated the following in his 
opening statement: 
Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the 
other way around.  Judges are like umpires.  Umpires 
don’t make the rules, they apply them.  The role of an 
umpire and a judge is critical.  They make sure 
everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited 
role.  Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the 
umpire. 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. 
to be Chief Justice of the United States, 109th Cong. 109-158 
(2005).  
No.  2005AP731-CR.jpw 
 
2 
 
I 
¶94 During a plea colloquy, a circuit court judge has a 
number of duties.  One of the duties is to "[m]ake such inquiry 
as satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime 
charged."  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b).  The court has referred to 
this as the factual basis requirement.  State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 
13, ¶14, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836.  If a defendant 
believes that a court failed to satisfy its § 971.08(1)(b) 
obligation, he or she may allege that failure in a motion to 
withdraw his or her plea.   
¶95 Howell never made a motion that alleged that the plea-
taking court failed to satisfy the factual basis requirement.  
Rather, in his motion, Howell alleged that "he failed to 
understand what the state had to prove to find him guilty as a 
party to a crime of the charge of first degree reckless injury."  
Howell's allegation arises out of an obligation distinct from 
the factual basis requirement of § 971.08(1)(b).  It arises out 
of a plea-taking court's duty under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) to 
"[a]ddress the defendant personally and determine that the plea 
is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the 
charge and the potential punishment if convicted."     
¶96 Nevertheless, the majority here ascribes to Howell's 
motion an allegation that the factual basis accepted by the 
circuit court was insufficient.  Majority op., ¶57.  The 
majority does this in the face of Howell's own argument.  While 
the majority spends pages discussing the § 971.08(1)(b) factual 
basis requirement, Howell did not do so in his brief to the 
No.  2005AP731-CR.jpw 
 
3 
 
court.  Actually, a reference to § 971.08(1)(b) never even 
appears in his brief.  
II 
¶97 Howell never alleged that the judge that took his plea 
failed to satisfy the factual basis requirement.  Nevertheless, 
this court is stepping in on Howell's behalf.  It concludes that 
the judge reviewing Howell's plea withdrawal motion erred in not 
finding 
that 
the 
plea-taking 
judge 
did 
not 
satisfy 
the 
§ 971.08(1)(b) factual basis requirement.  Appellate courts that 
fail to recognize when judges are humbly applying the rules, 
rather than engaging in the work properly left to the advocates, 
undermine the proper role of the judiciary.   
¶98 For the forgoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶99 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion.   
 
 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
 
¶100 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  The world will 
not end if Andrae Howell is given an evidentiary hearing on his 
motion to withdraw his plea.  But the administration of justice 
in Wisconsin courts will suffer because, in awarding Howell a 
Bangert1 hearing, the majority adds a new responsibility for 
judges in a plea colloquy, fudges the distinction between 
Bangert motions and non-Bangert motions for plea withdrawal, 
unfairly shifts the burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing 
to 
the 
State, 
and 
gives 
credibility 
to 
Howell's 
wholly 
unsubstantiated allegations that another person, not Howell, 
shot and injured Marcus Pearson.  For these reasons, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶101 On July 12, 2004, Andrae D. Howell entered a plea of 
guilty to the charge of first-degree reckless injury, as a party 
to the crime.  He was sentenced on August 31, 2004.   
¶102 On March 2, 2005, more than six months after sentence, 
Howell moved to withdraw his plea.  His motion was denied by the 
circuit court without an evidentiary hearing.  This decision was 
affirmed by the court of appeals in a scholarly opinion on 
August 31, 2006. 
¶103 The court of appeals decision is now reversed, and the 
cause is remanded to the circuit court "for an evidentiary 
hearing under Bangert to determine whether Howell is entitled to 
withdraw his guilty plea."  Majority op., ¶89.  "The burden is 
                                                 
1 State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
on the State at the evidentiary hearing . . . to prove by clear 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
Howell's 
plea 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary."  Id., ¶9. 
¶104 In making this decision, the court second-guesses the 
work of several judges and does so on extremely flimsy grounds.   
¶105 Let us go back to the beginning. 
¶106 On Sunday, February 8, 2004, Marcus Pearson, then 23, 
was sitting in his car on the street near 3124 West Oriole Drive 
in Milwaukee.  It was about noon.  Suddenly, a man approached 
Pearson with a rifle, pointed the rifle, and shot him, 
fracturing his right middle finger and right lower leg.  Pearson 
succeeded in driving off, past the shooter, and immediately 
headed to a hospital. 
¶107 On February 12, 2004, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Howell, then 30, alleging that he was the 
shooter in the February 8 incident. 
¶108 On 
February 
20, 
2004, 
Milwaukee 
County 
Court 
Commissioner 
Audrey 
Y. 
Brooks 
presided 
at 
a 
preliminary 
examination at which Pearson was the only witness.  Pearson 
testified that while he was sitting in the driver's seat of his 
car, Howell appeared on the sidewalk near a discarded couch, 
about 30 to 35 feet away.  Pearson said he had known Howell——
"Dray"——for about four years, and that "Dray" shot him with a 
rifle. 
 
"The 
first 
shot 
came 
right 
through 
the 
windshield. . . .  I mean the windshield cracked," he said.  A 
second shot went through the car door as Pearson drove away.  On 
cross-examination Pearson was asked if he was certain that 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
Howell was the person who shot him.  "Positive," he answered.  
"Looked dead at him.  He looked dead at me." 
¶109 After Howell was bound over for trial, the State gave 
defense attorney Michael Backes the Information, an "offer" 
letter, and, to use Backes's words, "sizeable amounts of 
discovery." 
¶110 On March 2, 2004, Milwaukee County Circuit Judge 
Richard J. Sankovitz held a scheduling conference.  He set a 
final pretrial conference for May 17 and a jury trial for June 
9.  This scheduling conference was off the record.  The 
defendant was not present. 
¶111 A year earlier, on March 19, 2003, Andrae Howell was 
convicted of a felony.  On April 15, 2003, he was sentenced to 
one year of confinement in the Wisconsin State Prison, but this 
sentence was stayed and he was placed on probation for three 
years.  Thus, on February 8, 2004, Howell was on probation.  On 
or about April 27, 2004, Howell's probation was revoked in 
response to the Pearson shooting, and he was sentenced to 
prison.  Howell's status is repeatedly alluded to in the record 
of this case, but there is no transcript or written decision 
from the probation revocation proceedings in the record. 
¶112 Attorney Backes represented Howell at the February 20 
preliminary hearing and the July 12 plea.  He represented Howell 
at two hearings between these dates.  Thus, he may have 
represented Howell during probation revocation.  The record does 
not tell us.  In any event, however, Backes would have been 
familiar with the fact that Howell's probation had been revoked.  
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
4 
 
Howell had to be brought from the Dodge Correctional Institution 
for the May 17 hearing and for the June 9 hearing.  At the June 
9 hearing, there was talk of getting Howell appropriate clothes 
for the trial. 
¶113 On May 17, there was a final pretrial conference off 
the record.  Then the court went back on the record.  The court 
said in part, in the presence of Howell: 
 
The parties know who their witnesses are . . . .  
The defense indicated there may be a witness or two 
that needs to be interviewed between now and the trial 
date . . . .  The defense in this case is that Mr. 
Howell was present at the scene, but was not the 
shooter.  The State indicated off the record that it 
had 
advised 
Mr. 
Howell 
at 
the 
outset 
of 
the 
proceedings that if the case can be resolved on the 
charge 
that 
was 
issued 
in 
the 
Information, 
that . . . it would be, but if the case went to trial, 
the 
State 
would 
be 
filing 
additional 
charges . . . [namely] one count of attempted first 
degree intentional homicide while armed and one count 
of being a felon in possession of a firearm.   
(Emphasis added.)  Attorney Backes replied that he had "reviewed 
that 
issue 
with 
Mr. 
Howell 
this 
morning 
again 
and 
he 
understands."   
 
¶114 On June 9, the scheduled date of trial, the court 
indicated that there had been conversations with counsel off the 
record.  On the record, the court said: "[A] witness that Mr. 
Backes has not previously had contact with seems to have 
surfaced here today and has information that Mr. Backes needs to 
explore."  Attorney Backes then responded: 
MR. BACKES: 
I've been informed that the State 
is going to amend charges not only 
upward but also to expand the 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
limits of liability to my client 
by including party to a crime. 
 
My defense of the case has been 
the 
allegation 
that 
he's 
the 
shooter.  My whole theory that 
I've come——that I'm prepared to 
try including providing clothes to 
show that he was not the shooter, 
all my efforts in preparation for 
trial are somewhat meaningless at 
this point.  There's a whole new 
theory. 
 
Of course, in addition, the party 
we've been trying to find is now 
here and I did talk to him and 
he's prepared to testify and that 
is certainly a factor . . .  
THE COURT: 
Would the party to a crime wrinkle 
also 
mean 
that 
there's 
a 
possibility that the case won't 
even be tried? 
MR. BACKES: 
That is a possibility especially 
as I review what Mr. [Sharp] will 
be testifying to. 
(Emphasis added.)  Assistant District Attorney Kenneth Berg then 
interjected: 
MR. BERG: 
The 
statement 
by 
Mr. 
[Sharp] . . . who is the witness 
who's 
here[,] 
was 
also 
freely 
given 
to 
Mr. 
Backes 
in 
the 
statement he gave to the police.  
I understand that apparently this 
case will be adjourned, but I want 
the Court to know that we are 
fully prepared to try the case. 
MR. BACKES: 
Well . . . if they don't want to 
amend charges to include party to 
a crime, I'd now be more than 
happy to reconsider my position. 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
6 
 
THE COURT: 
Party to a crime is not much of a 
surprise.  It might be enough of a 
surprise 
to 
warrant 
an 
adjournment, but I don't think Mr. 
Howell, 
when 
he 
looks 
at 
the 
ultimate resolution of the case, 
should be so surprised by how it 
gets resolved if it goes down as a 
party to a crime. 
 
. . . .  
 
There are a bunch of witnesses 
here who came to see the State put 
on its case today and I know that 
they're disappointed by virtue of 
the fact that the case isn't being 
tried, but given this development 
where the State has a different 
theory for holding you liable on 
evidence that doesn't seem to be 
accounted for by your defense in 
the case, it's quite possible that 
there won't even be a trial in 
this case and I think that it's 
better to let you and Mr. Backes 
digest this change in the charges 
in the case and decide whether you 
really are intent upon a trial. 
 
. . . .  
 
Rather than scheduling the trial 
at this point what I'm going to do 
is set a status date so that you 
and Mr. Backes can talk about the 
case and you can decide whether 
you want a trial or whether you 
want to try to resolve the case in 
a different way. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶115 On July 12, the parties appeared for a plea.  The 
first 
question 
the 
court 
asked 
was: 
"Have 
there 
been 
negotiations?"  Assistant District Attorney Berg responded that 
there had been negotiations.  The State was amending the charge 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
7 
 
to add party to a crime.  However, it was not pursuing other 
charges.  Berg said he understood that the defendant would be 
entering "a plea of other than not guilty.  Both sides will be 
free to argue at sentencing."  Defense attorney Backes agreed to 
the State's summary of negotiations. 
II 
 
¶116 The above stated facts constitute the record of this 
case at the start of the plea colloquy.  The record does not 
include any police report, the statements of any witnesses, the 
statement of the defendant, or a transcript or any documentation 
from the revocation of Howell's probation.  However, all these 
documents would have been available to the defendant and his 
attorney.  The record makes clear that the defendant had 
multiple opportunities over several months to confer with his 
attorney, to digest developments, and to plot strategy. 
 
¶117 Attorney Backes referred to "Joseph" as early as 
February 20 in the preliminary hearing, but the record tells us 
nothing about Joseph Sharp (except that he was a cousin of the 
defendant) or what he might say as a witness.  The clerk noted 
on May 17 that the State intended to call ten witnesses, the 
defense, five.  We do not know whether Joseph Sharp was a State 
witness, a defense witness, or was not listed as a witness.  We 
do know that the parties were in continual negotiation. 
 
¶118 A fair reading of the record is that Howell planned to 
defend against the specific charge that he was the shooter.  
This defense was substantially undermined, however, when the 
State broadened the charge by adding party to a crime, for party 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
8 
 
to a crime would have ensnared Howell, even if he were not the 
shooter, if he conspired to plan the crime or if he knowingly 
assisted another shooter.  The "whole new theory" that Attorney 
Backes referred to was party to a crime, not an allegation that 
Joseph Sharp was the shooter.  There is no evidence in the 
record at this point suggesting that Howell did not know 
anything in advance about the confrontation with Pearson or that 
he was surprised by the shooting. 
III 
¶119 The following selected passages appear in the plea 
colloquy: 
THE COURT: 
Is there any objection to the amendment 
to the information? 
MR. BACKES: 
No. 
THE COURT: 
Would it be fair to state that the 
amendment to the information comprises 
the prospect that at trial the evidence 
might show that Mr. Howell didn't pull 
the 
trigger, 
but 
that 
he 
assisted 
people in putting the victim in a place 
where he could be shot by somebody 
else? 
MR. BACKES: 
That's a correct statement. 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Howell, do you agree with that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
So, there is no objection to the 
amendment? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
Mr. Howell, I'm going to grant the 
State's motion to amend the information 
in this case.  You're now charged with 
being a party to the crime of first 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
degree 
reckless 
injury. 
 
Do 
you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶120 When the court used language "that [Howell] assisted 
people in putting the victim in a place where he could be shot 
by somebody else," the court was likely responding to something 
the parties had said to the court off the record about the 
offense.  The language implies that Howell helped "set up" the 
victim.  Howell's attorney and Howell himself agreed that the 
court's statement was correct. 
¶121 The notion that the Pearson shooting was a "set up" 
was strongly implied at the subsequent sentencing hearing by 
Assistant District Attorney Berg: 
Mr. Pearson always wondered . . . .  This is one 
of these cases where determining exactly all of the 
levels of responsibility is difficult because there 
were clearly people including a girlfriend of his who 
wanted him to go to that location [on Oriole Drive]. 
 
He very accurately has indicated he goes to a 
very specific location to meet a young lady who he's 
had a relationship with.  And at that location, the 
location that this Court can see from the Complaint, 
he's nearly killed.  His car was shot at numerous 
times.  He is hit twice. 
¶122 If this rendition of the facts was shared with the 
court at some point before the plea hearing, it would have made 
perfect sense for the court to suggest that Howell "assisted 
people in putting the victim in a place where he could be shot 
by somebody else." 
¶123 Later in the colloquy, the court explained the offense 
with the extra element of party to a crime. 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
10 
 
THE COURT: 
Do you understand that before you can 
be found guilty the State would be 
required to prove that on February 8th 
of 
this 
year 
someone 
caused 
great 
bodily harm to Marcus, M-A-R-C-U-S, 
Pearson, 
P-E-A-R-S-O-N. 
 
The 
State 
would have to prove that whoever did 
this did it by criminally reckless 
conduct.  That means that they were 
engaged in conduct that the person knew 
at the time to create a substantial and 
unreasonable risk of death or great 
bodily harm to Mr. Pearson, and was 
aware that they were creating such a 
risk.  The State would have to prove 
that the person who shot him, shot him 
in circumstances which showed utter 
disregard for human life.  And then the 
State would have to prove either that 
you were the person who did all those 
things 
or 
that 
you 
intentionally 
assisted someone else who was doing 
those things, knowing what they were 
doing. 
 
Do you understand what the State would 
have to prove? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
(Emphasis added.)  These alternative explanations by the court 
of party to a crime, including that "you intentionally assisted 
someone else who was doing those things [reckless injury], 
knowing what they were doing," are a close analogue to Wis JI——
Criminal 400.  See majority op., ¶46.   
¶124 Then the court went into the facts: 
THE COURT: 
May I accept as true the facts stated 
in the complaint? 
MR. BACKES: 
We would stipulate to the factual basis 
for the plea in the complaint with the 
understanding as party to a crime. 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
11 
 
THE COURT: 
So, if the case came to trial what are 
the two possibilities that the State 
could prove as far as Mr. Howell's 
involvement in the shooting? 
MR. BERG: 
The two possibilities would be, Judge, 
that, one, he is the actual shooter, 
which would have been the victim's 
actual testimony; the other is what 
defense counsel and I have discussed.  
His position and his argument to the 
court will be that his cousin was the 
shooter and he was there with him, 
observed him with the gun as they got 
out 
of 
the 
car 
and 
would 
have 
approached 
the 
victim 
in 
this 
situation. 
THE COURT: 
Are those facts——or may I accept those 
facts as true? 
MR. BACKES: 
We would stipulate to that factual 
basis and those are the facts upon 
which Mr. Howell has indicated his 
guilt to me as well.  Is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: 
So, Mr. Howell, you're not necessarily 
agreeing that you shot Mr. Pearson; 
that you are agreeing that you and your 
cousin 
went 
there 
and 
that 
you 
approached Mr. Pearson and by doing so 
you assisted your cousin in shooting 
him? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
(Emphasis added.)  In this part of the colloquy, defense counsel 
twice stipulates to the facts, and the defendant agrees with 
him.  The Assistant District Attorney set out Howell's own 
theory that he knew his cousin had a gun as they got out of the 
car, as an alternative to the theory that Howell was the 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
12 
 
shooter. 
 
Howell 
confirmed 
this 
theory 
in 
his 
personal 
allocution at sentencing.2   
¶125 Howell pled "guilty" to the offense.  He said he was 
making his decision to plead guilty voluntarily.  His attorney 
said he was satisfied that Howell was entering his plea freely 
and intelligently. 
IV 
¶126 The 
majority 
concludes 
that 
Howell 
has 
made 
a 
successful Bangert motion to withdraw his plea.  Under Bangert, 
a defendant may move to withdraw his plea when the procedures 
outlined in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 are not undertaken or other 
court-mandated duties at the plea hearing are not followed.  
State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶46, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 
N.W.2d 14.  The burden rests upon the defendant to make a 
pointed showing that the plea was accepted without the court's 
conformity with the statute or other mandatory procedures.  
State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).  
When 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
shows 
a 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) or (b) or other mandatory duties and 
alleges that he in fact did not know or understand the 
information that should have been provided at the plea hearing, 
the burden shifts to the State to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶46. 
                                                 
2 Howell stated: "I did not get out of there knowing that he 
had a gun."  (Emphasis added.) 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
13 
 
¶127 A 
pointed 
showing 
means 
pointing 
to 
errors 
or 
omissions in the record to show a defect.  "To obtain an 
evidentiary hearing based upon defects in the plea colloquy, the 
defendant will rely on the plea hearing record."  Id., ¶47.  The 
defendant must point to a specific defect in the plea hearing 
transcript that constitutes an error by the court.  Id., ¶57. 
¶128 There are elements of the plea colloquy that always 
must be present, such as the waiver of enumerated constitutional 
rights.  There are other elements that are employed as 
necessary.  Id., ¶49.  The omission of an explanation or inquiry 
from the colloquy is not a defect unless that explanation or 
inquiry was mandatory because of the facts. 
¶129 Howell filed a motion to withdraw his plea on March 2, 
2005. 
 
His 
motion 
consisted 
of 
17 
numbered 
paragraphs 
accompanied by an affidavit from his attorney.  Only two of the 
paragraphs, ¶5 and ¶6, deal with alleged defects in the plea 
colloquy.  Nothing in the accompanying affidavit identifies a 
defect in the plea colloquy.  Paragraphs 5 and 6 read as 
follows: 
 
5. 
The plea colloquy in this case was brief.  
The Court allowed the state to amend the information 
to add the "party to a crime" modifier.  See 
Transcript of 7/12/04 at 2.  The Court noted that the 
amendment was occurring because the state might be 
able to show that Mr. Howell "assisted people in 
putting the victim in a place where he could be shot 
by somebody else."  Id.  The Court ascertained that 
Mr. Howell understood that the information was being 
added and that he did not object.  Id. at 3.  The 
Court also informed Mr. Howell of the elements of 
reckless injury and that "the State would have to 
prove either that [he was] the person who did all 
those things or that [he] intentionally assisted 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
14 
 
someone else who was doing those things, knowing what 
they were doing."  Id. at 5-6.  None of these 
statements indicated whether simply failing to act to 
prevent the crime was sufficient assistance to be 
guilty as party to a crime. 
 
6. 
Mr. Howell in fact did not understand the 
parameters of party-to-a-crime liability.  He believed 
that he was guilty as party-to-a-crime simply for 
failure to stop the crime from occurring.  See 
Affidavit at 2-3 ¶¶3g-3h.  Moreover, the state at the 
plea 
hearing 
took 
the 
position 
that 
the 
two 
possibilities of Mr. Howell's involvement were either 
that he was the shooter or that, as was Mr. Howell's 
position, "his cousin was the shooter and he was there 
with him, observed him with the gun as they got out of 
the car and would have approached the victim in this 
situation."  Transcript of 7/12/05 at 7.  The state's 
statement reinforced Mr. Howell's belief that mere 
presence was sufficient.   
(Emphasis added.) 
¶130 The critical passage in paragraph 5 is that "[n]one of 
these statements indicated whether simply failing to act to 
prevent the crime was sufficient assistance to be guilty as 
party to a crime."  In effect, Howell claims that the court's 
failure to explain that being at the scene of a crime does not 
make a person a party to the crime, is a defect in the plea 
colloquy, a defect that was solely the judge's fault. 
¶131 There is, in the jury instructions a statement that a 
court may use in certain cases: "[A] person does not aid or abet 
if (he) . . . is only a bystander or spectator and does nothing 
to assist the commission of a crime."  Wis JI——Criminal 400 
EXAMPLE.  The instructions make plain, however, that this 
sentence is to be read "if supported by the evidence."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  In this case, Judge Sankovitz had no reason 
to believe that Howell was claiming mere presence at the scene 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
15 
 
with no prior knowledge of what was going to happen to Pearson.  
Howell acknowledged as correct "putting the victim in a place 
where he could be shot."  He acknowledged seeing a gun as he got 
out of a car.  This evidence did not impose on Judge Sankovitz a 
duty to make inquiry or give explanation that would rule out 
purely innocent conduct. 
¶132 One might argue that evidence outside the plea 
colloquy and after the plea colloquy created the basis for a 
claim of misunderstanding, but that would make Howell's motion a 
non-Bangert motion.  See Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶61.  Nothing 
in the record of the plea colloquy or the record before the plea 
colloquy compels or even suggests that the circuit court was 
required to make the inquiry the majority now demands.  To hold 
that the failure to make such an inquiry was a Bangert violation 
is not justified by the facts and, as precedent, opens many 
otherwise sufficient plea colloquies to new attack. 
¶133 The circuit court's discussion of the evidentiary 
basis for the offense is also not defective.  First, there is a 
longstanding rule that when there is a negotiated plea, as in 
this case, the circuit court need not go to the same length to 
determine whether the facts would sustain the charge as it would 
when there is no negotiated plea.  See State v. Trochinski, 2002 
WI 56, ¶43 n.2, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., dissenting); State v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 27, 549 
N.W.2d 232 (1996); Broadie v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 420, 423-24, 228 
N.W.2d 687 (1975); Wilson v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 508, 513, 204 
N.W.2d 508 (1973). 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
16 
 
¶134 This case involved extensive negotiations and, despite 
unwavering testimony from the victim, the State allowed the 
defendant to enter a plea while disavowing that he was the 
shooter. 
¶135 Second, the defendant could have pled "no contest" or 
entered an Alford plea, agreeing to accept a conviction while 
simultaneously 
maintaining 
his 
innocence. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 971.06; North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970).  When he pled "guilty" with the full concurrence of his 
attorney, 
Howell 
admitted 
that 
all 
the 
factual 
elements 
necessary to sustain a judgment of guilt were true.  See State 
v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶30, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886.  A 
defendant is not precluded from attacking the voluntary and 
intelligent character of his plea.  However, when the basis of 
the attack is the abbreviated discussion of the facts during the 
colloquy, a reviewing court must allow reasonable inferences.  
"Where the trial court has concluded that the evidence did 
provide a sufficient factual basis to support the plea, this 
court will not upset these factual findings unless they are 
contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence."  Broadie, 68 Wis. 2d at 423.  When the court 
evaluates the transcript of the Howell plea colloquy to show 
that it lacks a factual basis for the plea, it is depending on 
allegations outside the record.  A factual basis for acceptance 
of a plea exists if an inculpatory inference can reasonably be 
drawn from the facts, even if an exculpatory inference could 
also be drawn and the defendant asserts that the latter 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
17 
 
inference is the correct inference.  State v. Spears, 147 
Wis. 2d 429, 435, 433 N.W.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1988). 
V 
¶136 Howell's motion should be evaluated as a non-Bangert 
or Bentley-type motion (State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 
N.W.2d 50 (1996)).  When the court determines that Howell's 
motion is a successful Bangert motion, it produces serious short 
term and long term consequences. 
¶137 In the short term, it shifts the burden of proof to 
the State.  In the long term, it adds a new responsibility for 
circuit judges in plea colloquies; that is, it directs judges to 
anticipate and foreclose a defendant's theoretical defenses by 
asking questions that will rule out those defenses.  This will 
require circuit judges to elicit more facts and more admissions 
from defendants which, in turn, will take additional time.  Some 
defendants, especially defendants entering no contest pleas, may 
now be asked questions that they are unwilling to answer 
forthrightly, in public, on the record. 
¶138 Bentley-type motions for plea withdrawal carry more 
stringent 
pleading 
requirements 
than 
Bangert-type 
motions.  
There are several reasons for this difference.  First, Bentley-
type motions usually depend on facts outside the record.  To ask 
a circuit court to examine facts outside the record in an 
evidentiary hearing 
requires a particularized motion with 
sufficient 
supporting 
facts 
to 
warrant 
the 
undertaking.  
Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶61. 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
18 
 
¶139 Second, Bentley-type motions do not shift the burden 
of proof.  The defendant retains the burden of showing a 
manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence.  Id., ¶¶60, 
63.  Thus, the defendant is required to put his cards on the 
table by pleading specific details of what he will prove at the 
hearing and explaining how the proof will add up to manifest 
injustice.  The pleading mirrors the defendant's ultimate burden 
of proof at the hearing. 
¶140 Third, a Bentley-type motion has the capacity to cover 
a wide variety of reasons for claiming that the defendant's plea 
was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  A Bentley-type 
motion may well claim that the judge made some error but not the 
type of error that the judge could have avoided by following the 
plea colloquy's established outline or script.  The latter type 
of error is Bangert-type error.  A judge who follows the plea 
colloquy script does not automatically have the means to 
"virtually eliminate" Bentley-type error.  Id., ¶65. 
¶141 If one applies this analysis to the present case, it 
becomes obvious that Howell's motion is a Bentley-type motion.  
The 
allegations 
of 
significance 
in 
Howell's 
motion 
are 
consistently based outside the record.  For example, Howell's 
motion states: "3. On June 9, 2004, approximately a month prior 
to the plea in this case, Mr. Howell's cousin, Joseph Sharp came 
to court on the jury trial date and indicated that he was the 
person who shot the victim in this case."  Howell points to the 
June 9, 2004, transcript (which is quoted earlier in this 
dissent and does not substantiate this allegation) and Attorney 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
19 
 
Henak's affidavit of what she believes Howell would testify.  
Howell allegedly told Attorney Henak that "Joseph Sharp came to 
court and confessed to Attorney Backes that he shot the victim." 
¶142 The Howell motion continued: 
 
4. 
After June 9, 2004, trial counsel [Backes] 
and Mr. Howell discussed the case in light of the 
"party to a crime" addition.  Based upon these 
conversations, Mr. Howell believed that he was guilty 
as party to a crime if he was there and did not 
prevent it.  He believed that his failure to prevent 
the shooting was sufficient assistance in the case. 
¶143 These are classic "outside the record" allegations.  
There is no record, much less the plea colloquy record, that 
supports 
these 
allegations. 
 
They 
are 
textbook 
examples 
requiring Bentley analysis and Bentley procedure. 
¶144 Even if one were to believe that these allegations 
were sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing, one should be 
reluctant to shift the burden of proof to the State.  The State 
should not be required, on these facts, to straighten out 
Howell's many allegations to prove that Howell's plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
¶145 In his motion, Howell is saying, in essence, that: (1) 
Joseph Sharp, his cousin, is the shooter; (2) his sister, 
Kimberly, who drove Sharp to the scene, may be a party to the 
crime; (3) Howell's only involvement was riding along in a car 
(knowing nothing about an imminent shooting); (4) his attorney 
led him to believe that failure to stop Sharp once Howell saw a 
gun made him guilty as party to a crime; (5) his attorney agreed 
to Howell's plea, even though that attorney had previously 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
20 
 
received Sharp's confession to the shooting; and (6) his 
attorney 
repeatedly 
misrepresented 
Howell's 
involvement 
in 
getting a gun for the shooting, in the attorney's argument to 
the sentencing court.  Putting the burden on the State to sort 
out this soap opera is likely to require testimony from Howell's 
family members, who may assert constitutional rights against 
self-incrimination, 
and 
Howell's 
attorney, 
Michael 
Backes.  
Howell has not alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, but 
Howell's motion has overtones of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Attorney Backes is in a position to clarify many 
factual issues raised by Howell's motion.  However, in the 
absence of an explicit ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
and in view of this court's decision in State v. Meeks, 2003 WI 
104, 263 Wis. 2d 794, 666 N.W.2d 859, the scope of Attorney 
Backes's testimony may be the subject of fierce dispute.  If 
Howell's motion were properly assessed as a Bentley-type motion, 
Howell would maintain the burden of proof, and he would have to 
put his attorney and family members in the witness box. 
VI 
¶146 Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Jean W. DiMotto denied 
Howell's motion in a prompt, incisive written opinion without an 
evidentiary hearing.  Her ruling is reversed on grounds that 
Howell was automatically entitled to a hearing because he 
established Bangert violations. 
¶147 In my view, Judge DiMotto's decision is sound and 
defensible.  However, defending Judge DiMotto's decision raises 
a new set of issues of what a defendant must plead in a non-
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
21 
 
Bangert, Bentley-type motion to earn an evidentiary hearing, and 
what latitude a circuit judge has in reviewing the allegations 
in non-Bangert, Bentley-type motions.   
¶148 In Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 
N.W.2d 629 (1972), the court stated: 
[I]f a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after judgment 
and sentence alleges facts which, if true, would 
entitle the defendant to relief, the trial court must 
hold 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
However, 
if 
the 
defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his 
motion to raise a question of fact, or presents only 
conclusionary 
allegations, 
or 
if 
the 
record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief, the trial court may in the 
exercise of its legal discretion deny the motion 
without a hearing.  It is incumbent upon the trial 
court to form its independent judgment after a review 
of the record and pleadings and to support its 
decision by written opinion. 
¶149 In Bentley the court employed all the language in the 
Nelson formulation, but it created a two-part test which 
necessitated a mixed standard of appellate review.  See Bentley, 
201 Wis. 2d at 309-10.  The court said: 
If the motion on its face alleges facts which would 
entitle the defendant to relief, the circuit court has 
no discretion and must hold an evidentiary hearing.  
Whether a motion alleges facts which, if true, would 
entitle a defendant to relief is a question of law 
that we review de novo. 
Id. at 310 (citation omitted).  The court also uncoupled the 
last sentence in the Nelson test ("It is incumbent upon the 
trial court to form its independent judgment after a review of 
the record") and appeared to limit the circuit court's review of 
the record to "the second prong" where it is permitted to 
exercise discretion.  Id. at 310, 318-19. 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
22 
 
 
¶150 Two years ago in State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶¶68-73, 
284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62 (Prosser, J., dissenting), I 
tried to explain the internal inconsistency I perceived in the 
Bentley decision.  The inconsistency is that the circuit court 
appears to be powerless to deny a requested evidentiary hearing 
when there is a properly pleaded motion, even though the circuit 
court 
has 
compelling 
evidence 
from 
the 
record 
that 
key 
allegations in the motion are not true.   
 
¶151 To illustrate, suppose that a defendant enters a plea 
of guilty to shooting his brother in Milwaukee.  The defendant's 
post-sentencing 
Bentley-type motion to withdraw this plea 
alleges in rich detail that Osama bin Laden shot his brother, 
and that bin Laden threatened to kill the defendant's mother if 
the defendant did not plead guilty to his brother's shooting.  
If this pleading contains "the five 'w's' and one 'h;' that is, 
who, what, where, when, why, and how," see State v. Allen, 2004 
WI 106, ¶23, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433, the circuit court 
appears to have no discretion to rule: "Yes, Mr. Defendant, if 
your allegations were true, you would be entitled to a hearing, 
but based on the record I find that your allegations are not 
true."3 
                                                 
3 Howell's allegations that Joseph Sharp is the shooter, 
that Sharp confessed to Howell's attorney, and that Sharp was 
prepared to testify favorably at Howell's trial, carry the same 
indicia of reliability as the bin Laden hypothetical.  There are 
no personal affidavits from Howell, or Sharp, or Kimberly, or 
Backes.  There is no assertion that the State takes this stuff 
seriously and has prosecuted Sharp.  There is no evidence that 
these allegations should be believed in the face of the 
defendant's statements at the plea colloquy and other material 
in the record. 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
23 
 
 
¶152 To its credit, the majority opinion corrects this 
festering problem.  See majority op., ¶77 ("A well-pled 
complaint may be denied without an evidentiary hearing if the 
record as a whole conclusively demonstrates that relief is not 
warranted.").  The third paragraph of footnote 51 of the 
majority opinion reads: 
 
The Bentley court interpreted Nelson as follows: 
"If the motion on its face alleges facts which would 
entitle the defendant to relief, the circuit court has 
no discretion and must hold an evidentiary hearing."  
Bentley, 
201 
Wis. 2d at 
310, 
citing 
Nelson, 
54 
Wis. 2d at 497 (emphasis added).  In phrasing the 
Nelson test this way, Bentley might be interpreted to 
make an evidentiary hearing mandatory whenever the 
motion contains sufficient, nonconclusory facts, even 
if the record as a whole would demonstrate that the 
defendant's plea was constitutionally sound.  Such an 
interpretation of Nelson and Bentley, however, is not 
correct.  The correct interpretation of Nelson/Bentley 
is that an evidentiary hearing is not mandatory if the 
record as a whole conclusively demonstrates that 
defendant is not entitled to relief, even if the 
motion alleges sufficient nonconclusory facts. 
Majority op., ¶77 n. 51. 
 
¶153 The majority's clarification of the Bentley opinion 
restores to the circuit court the ability "to form its 
independent judgment [on a Bentley plea withdrawal motion] after 
a review of the [entire] record and pleadings."  Nelson, 54 
Wis. 2d at 498.  The problem here is that if the circuit court, 
once again, has the ability to review the entire record in 
evaluating a Bentley-type motion to withdraw a plea, there is 
ample evidence in this record to sustain Judge DiMotto's well 
written opinion. 
VII 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
24 
 
¶154 The majority opinion summarizes the facts: 
On February 8, 2004, Marcus Pearson was shot 
twice while seated in his vehicle.  The defendant, 
Andrae D. Howell, along with his sister Kimberly and 
his cousin Joseph Sharp, had allegedly driven to the 
scene to find another sister, April, who was dating 
Pearson.  Pearson alleged that Howell exited his 
vehicle, brandished a rifle, and shot him. 
 
The 
State 
charged Howell with first degree 
reckless injury . . . .  On the date originally set 
for trial, Sharp allegedly admitted to Howell's trial 
counsel that Sharp, not Howell, shot the victim.  
Howell's 
trial 
counsel 
requested 
an 
adjournment 
allegedly in light of this information. 
Majority op. ¶¶12-13.  The underlined statements are supported 
by sworn testimony or documents from the record.  The other 
statements are simply Howell's version of the "facts."  I 
believe it is a mistake to give credence to Joseph Sharp as the 
shooter of Marcus Pearson without any sworn evidence to support 
Howell's accusation. 
 
¶155 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
¶156 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2005AP731-CR.dtp 
 
 
 
 
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