Title: In Re: Colby H.

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In Re: Colby H.,
No. 56, September Term, 2000
Headnote:  Generally, a person in possession of a legal dangerous and deadly weapon may
conceal or store it so long as they are on property, which they own, are a legal resident of,
or are present as an invited guest if the owner has knowledge of the possession of the
weapon.  In the present case, the evidence presented is insufficient to establish “wearing
and carrying” of a dangerous or deadly weapon in violation of Maryland Code (1957,
1996 Repl. vol.), Article 27, section 36, where the evidence presented proves merely that
the police found a shotgun under a mattress in the room in which petitioner resided and that
the shotgun had been earlier purchased elsewhere.  Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of
the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to that court with instructions to vacate
the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City - Division for Juvenile Causes
Case # 698363004
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 56
September Term, 2000
IN RE: COLBY H.
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
         Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
                      Rodowsky, Lawrence F.,
                           retired, specially assigned,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
               Raker, Harrell and Rodowsky, JJ.,
concur in Part One of the Opinion and in the Result
Filed:   February 12, 2001
  At the time of the alleged violations, petitioner was fourteen years of age. 
1
 Petitioner was also charged with possession of a firearm while under the age of
2
21 in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol. 2000 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, section 445 (e),
possession of ammunition while under the age of 21 in violation of Article 27, section 445 (e), and carrying
a shotgun with a barrel of over fourteen inches in violation of Article 19, section 97 of the Baltimore City
Code (currently codified as Baltimore City Code (2000), Article 19, section 59.1).  The juvenile master
found facts not sustained on these three counts. 
  All future references to Article 27, section 36 are references to Maryland Code (1957, 1996
3
Repl. Vol.), Article 27, section 36.
  Petitioner was also instructed to continue receiving drug and alcohol counseling and remain in the
4
education program in which he was already enrolled.
On December 29, 1998, a petition was filed by the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City alleging that
petitioner, Colby H., was a delinquent child based upon four alleged firearm violations.   On January 15,
1
1999, an adjudicatory hearing was held before a master for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City where the
master made a finding of fact that  petitioner was involved in one of the four counts against him  — carrying
2
a concealed weapon in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, section 36.   On
3
February 9, 1999, a disposition hearing was held by the master at which time it was recommended that
petitioner be placed on probation to the Maryland Department of Juvenile Justice for an indefinite period.4
 
Petitioner filed a Notice of Exceptions on February 11, 1999.  On March 8, 1999, these
exceptions were heard by a judge in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  At that hearing, the court held
its decision sub curia so that it could listen to the recording of the master’s adjudicatory hearing.  On April
16, 1999, after listening to the recording, the court overruled petitioner’s exceptions.  A timely appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals was noted on May 3, 1999.  In an unreported decision filed April 17, 2000,
the Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court’s delinquency finding.  We granted petitioner’s Writ of
  The record indicates neither where petitioner’s mother was taken nor how much time elapsed
5
before Officer Sernek returned to 4102 Eierman Avenue.  The record reflects, however, that he did return
the same day he seized the weapon.  Petitioner was found “not involved” with possession of an illegal
weapon.  That issue, therefore, is not before us.
-2-
Certiorari to answer one question:    
Is the evidence sufficient to establish “wearing and carrying” of a dangerous or
deadly weapon in violation of Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 36, where the prosecution
proves nothing more than [that] the police found a shotgun under [a] mattress in
Respondent’s room at a time when Respondent was not even home?  
We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the evidence was insufficient to establish
“wearing and carrying” of a dangerous or deadly weapon in violation of Article 27, section 36.
Accordingly, we shall reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.
Facts
On December 28, 1998, petitioner’s mother, Ms. H., found a shotgun under the mattress in
petitioner’s bedroom and called the police.  Officer Thomas Sernek received the call and responded to
petitioner’s home at 4102 Eierman Avenue in Baltimore City.  Upon his arrival, Officer Sernek was met
by petitioner’s mother who explained that she had found the gun when she was cleaning petitioner’s room.
She led the officer to petitioner’s bedroom where, under petitioner’s mattress, Officer Sernek discovered
a pistol-gripped shotgun.  He seized the weapon and unloaded three shotgun shells from it.  Petitioner was
not home at the time the shotgun was found by his mother nor was he home at the time it was seized by
Officer Sernek.   
After seizing the weapon, Officer Sernek transported petitioner’s mother to another location,
returned to petitioner’s home with another officer, and knocked on the front door.   At this time, petitioner
5
was home and when he answered the door, he was arrested by the two officers and transported to the
-3-
Northern District Police Station for processing.  Officer Sernek testified at the adjudication hearing that
petitioner, after being properly advised of his Miranda rights, voluntarily stated that he had purchased the
shotgun from a “junkie” on a street corner for $20.00. 
At the January 15, 2000 adjudicatory hearing in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the juvenile
master found that petitioner
had purchased the gun and that he had hidden the gun under the mattress. [The master]
made the inference that [petitioner] concealed the gun from the time he bought it until the
time he hid it under the mattress.
Based on this finding of fact, the juvenile master found petitioner not involved on the first three counts and
found petitioner involved on the fourth count against him — carrying a concealed weapon in violation of
Article 27, section 36.  On February 9, 1999, a disposition hearing was held at which time it was
recommended that petitioner be placed on probation to the Maryland Department of Juvenile Justice.  
Petitioner filed a Notice of Exceptions on February 11, 1999.  These exceptions were heard on
March 8, 1999 by a judge in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  At that hearing, the court held its
decision sub curia so that it could listen to the recording of the  adjudicatory hearing.  The court, at the
hearing, overruled petitioner’s exceptions finding that the loaded shotgun was a dangerous weapon and
adopted the master’s finding that petitioner was involved with illegally wearing or carrying it.  The court
agreed with the master’s inference that petitioner “had to wear or carry the shotgun from the street corner
to his home.”  Additionally, the court found that the weapon’s presence under petitioner’s mattress “may
satisfy the ‘in such proximity to him’ requirement as to make it available for his immediate use and therefore
satisfies the standard.”  The court concluded:
-4-
Based on my own independent review, I do believe that it’s a proper inference that
[petitioner] would have to wear or carry the shot gun from the street corner to his home,
and if the shot gun was received [concealed?] or located underneath his mattress, I believe
it satisfies the ‘in close proximity to him requirement’ of the statute.  Really, the next quick
argument raised by [petitioner], is that the person carrying the weapon must have the
general intent to carry the instrument for [its] use as a weapon either offensively or in
defense.  This is a question of fact to be determined by the fact finder based on all the
circumstances. . . .  In this case, the controverted [sic ?] testimony is we have a 14 year-
old hiding a loaded and operable shot gun, with a pistol grip, under his mattress, after
admittedly buying it on a street corner.  I do believe, based on that, that the [c]ourt can
infer the intent necessary under the statu[t]e.  Next, [petitioner] [posits] in his
Memorandum of law, that a conviction cannot lay where a weapon is found in
[petitioner’s] home.  There is a discussion about the statute having potentially far reaching
implications of public policy.  I do think, that it should be clear, as a result of this [c]ourt’s
decision, that a 14 year-old has no legal right to possess and buy a firearm.  He is not an
adult homeowner in legal possession of a shotgun and therefore, it is not needed to protect
his home and his family.  Indeed, the purpose of a pistol grip on a shot gun is to make the
weapon concealable, which is not a concern when a weapon is discovered concealed in
a home. . . . Accordingly, for the aforegoing reasons, and based upon this [c]ourt’s own
independent review of the record, I do find that [petitioner] carried a dangerous and
deadly weapon concealed upon, or about his person, or in such proximity to him as would
make it available for his immediate use, and he did have the general intent to carry the
instrument for [its] use as a weapon, either offensively or defensively.  Accordingly, based
on this [c]ourt’s own independent review of the record, I find that the State had satisfied
[its] burden beyond a reasonable doubt and accordingly, I will deny [petitioner’s]
exception. 
           
The only evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing was petitioner’s statement to the officer that he
bought the weapon on a street corner and the fact that his mother, and the officer, found it under his
mattress in his bedroom in his home.  There was absolutely no other evidence regarding the status of the
shotgun from the time it was purchased to the time that it was discovered by petitioner’s mother.  The
record does not reflect when Colby H. purchased the weapon, the specific location of its purchase, when
the purchase was made, the modality of conveyance of the weapon from the street corner to the place it
was found, or the identity of who conveyed it.     
  The State argued in its brief and during oral argument that we should reverse
6
this portion of the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, thus reinstating the trial court’s ruling.  This
issue was neither subsumed within the question presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari nor was it
raised by the State in a cross-petition.  Therefore, we need not address this issue further as it is not properly
before this Court, although we are in agreement with the Court of Special Appeals in respect to this issue.
-5-
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals rejected as unsupported by fact the juvenile master’s
inference that petitioner “had worn or carried the shot gun concealed ‘on or about his person’ in order to
transport the gun from the street corner where he acquired it to his bedroom.”  That court acknowledged
that the State had directly proved that petitioner had purchased a dangerous weapon on an unnamed street
corner from a “junkie” and that this dangerous weapon was found in petitioner’s bedroom under his
mattress.  However, that court also recognized and held that there was absolutely no evidence presented
that petitioner ever concealed the weapon when he transported it from the corner to his residence.  The
Court of Special Appeals stated:
The record does not disclose either the time of day or the place where [petitioner]
purchased the weapon.  The shot gun could have been purchased ten feet from
[petitioner’s] front door or ten miles away from his home.  The sale could have been made
at 3:00 a.m. when no one else was around, or at high noon when hundreds of people might
have seen [petitioner] if he had dared to carry the weapon openly.  The trier of fact had
no knowledge as to whether [petitioner] walked home with the shot gun or whether he had
someone drive him home.  With so little information, it simply cannot be inferred
legitimately that [petitioner] concealed the weapon when he transported it from the place
of purchase to his home.[6]
We agree.  The Court of Special Appeals did hold, however, that there was sufficient proof to infer
legitimately that the weapon, while under the mattress, was concealed and in such proximity to petitioner
as would make it available to him for immediate use.  Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court and held “that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder
could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [petitioner] violated Section 36(a).”  We disagree with
 We reiterate, Colby H. was exonerated at trial as to illegal, simple possession of the weapon at
7
issue.
-6-
this holding.  The evidence was insufficient to establish that petitioner illegally wore and carried a dangerous
or deadly weapon concealed upon his person in violation of Article 27, section 36.
Part One
Article 27, Section 36
The threshold issue before this court is to determine the scope of Maryland’s concealed weapon
statute and whether it applies to legal weapons  stored in a Maryland resident’s home.  Maryland
7
Annotated Code, (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, section 36 provides:
§ 36.  Carrying or wearing concealed weapon; carrying openly with
intent to injure; carrying by person under eighteen at night
in certain counties.
 
(a) In general. — (1) Every person who shall wear or carry any dirk
knife, bowie knife, switchblade knife, star knife, sandclub, metal knuckles, razor,
nunchaku, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind, whatsoever
(penknives without switchblade and handguns, excepted) concealed upon or about
his person, and every person who shall wear or carry any such weapon, chemical mace,
pepper mace, or tear gas device openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any person
in any unlawful manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or be imprisoned in jail, or sentenced to the Maryland
Department of Correction for not more than three years. [Some emphasis added.]
When attempting to discern the intention of the Legislature in enacting a particular statute, we have
recently said in Edgewater Liquors, Inc. v. Liston, 349 Md. 803, 709 A.2d 1301 (1998):
“In construing the meaning of a word in a statute, the cardinal rule is to ascertain and carry
out the real legislative intention.”  Legislative intent generally is derived from the words of
the statute at issue.  “We are not constrained, however, by . . . ‘the literal or usual
meaning’ of the terms at issue.”  “Furthermore, we do not read statutory language ‘in
isolation or out of context [but construe it] in light of the legislature’s general purpose and
in the context of the statute as a whole.’” 
-7-
Id. at 807-08, 709 A.2d at 1303 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original).  We commented in an
earlier case:
When we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words
of the statute as they are printed in the Annotated Code.  We may and often must consider
other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence,” including a bill’s title and function
paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship
to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental
issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the
particular language before us in a given case.
. . . Thus, in State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327, 524 A.2d 51
(1987), . . . [a]lthough we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that case as
ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or meaning — what Judge
Orth, writing for the Court, described as “the legislative scheme.” . . .  See also Ogrinz
v. James, 309 Md. 381, 524 A.2d 77 (1987), in which we considered legislative history
(a committee report) to assist in construing legislation that we did not identify as ambiguous
or of uncertain meaning.
Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628,
632-33 (1987); see Laznovsky v. Laznovsky, 357 Md. 586, 606-07, 745 A.2d 1054, 1065 (2000);
State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717-19, 720 A.2d 311, 315-16 (1998); see also Williams v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 115-17, 753 A.2d 41, 49 (2000); Riemer v. Columbia
Medical Plan, 358 Md. 222, 235-36, 747 A.2d 677, 684-85 (2000).
The language of the statute at issue creates one offense — the carrying of a dangerous weapon
under either of two circumstances: (1) concealed; or (2) openly with the intent to injure.  Eldridge v.
State, 329 Md. 307, 313, 619 A.2d 531, 534 (1993).  In the case sub judice, we are concerned with
the first way the offense can be committed — by carrying a concealed dangerous weapon.  For our analysis
it will be helpful to reduce the statute to the language of the statute pertinent to the case at bar: “Every
person who shall wear or carry . . . any . . . dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind, whatsoever . . .
  There was, however, discussion (during oral arguments) as to whether Article
8
27, section 36 is the controlling statute.  No evidence was presented during trial from which we could
determine the actual length of the pistol gripped shotgun seized from petitioner’s bedroom.  The only
information provided about the weapon came in respect to the alleged violation of a municipal ordinance
prohibiting the carrying of a shotgun with a barrel of over fourteen inches.  Baltimore City Code, Art. 19,
section 97.  Petitioner was charged with violating that statute as well, but the court found the facts “not
sustained.”   The length of the shotgun is determinative of the applicable statute.  See, generally,
Parrison v. State, 335 Md. 554, 644 A.2d 537 (1994).  Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000
Cum. Supp.) section 36F(b) defines a “handgun” as “any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being
concealed on the person, including a short-barreled shotgun . . .” and section 36F(e) defines
“short-barreled shotgun” as “a shotgun having one or more barrels less than eighteen inches in length and
any weapon made from a shotgun (whether by alteration, modification, or otherwise) if such weapon, as
modified, has an overall length of less than twenty-six inches.”  If the pistol gripped shotgun met this
definition, the applicable statute might have been Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Cum.
Supp.) section 36B.  There was no evidence presented that the shotgun was under 26 inches or that its
barrels were under 18 inches. 
-8-
concealed upon or about his person, . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .” 
Looking to the plain language of the statute we recognize that there are three distinct  elements
necessary to constitute a violation.  First, the weapon in question must be one of the weapons listed or
considered to be a dangerous or deadly weapon.  In Anderson v. State, 328 Md. 426, 438, 614 A.2d
963, 968 (1992), we said:
In order to violate § 36(a) by the concealed wearing or carrying of an instrument
which has not legislatively been declared to be a dangerous or deadly weapon per se, the
trier of fact must first determine whether the instrument constitutes a “dangerous or deadly
weapon.”  The concealed carrying prohibition of § 36(a) is not violated simply because the
instrument can be used to inflict serious or deadly harm.  The person carrying the object
must have at least the general intent to carry the instrument for its use as a weapon, either
of offense or defense.  It is a question of fact, to be decided based on all of the
circumstances.
There is no question in the case at bar that the loaded, operable, shotgun in question falls under the category
as a dangerous and deadly weapon.   
8
Second, the person must be wearing or carrying a weapon.  “Carry,” taken in its plain meaning,
-9-
is defined as “to move while supporting; convey; transport” or “to wear, hold, or have around one.”  The
Random House Dictionary of the English Language 227 (1983).  Similarly, “wear” is defined as
“to carry or have on the body or about the person as a covering, equipment, ornament, or the like.”  Id.
at 1616.  Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States utilized Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition
of “Carry arms or weapons” as “[t]o wear, bear or carry them upon the person or in the clothing or in a
pocket, for the purpose of use, or for the purpose of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive
action in case of a conflict with another person.”  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 130,
118 S. Ct. 1911, 1915, 141 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1998), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed.
1990).  However, the Supreme Court in Muscarello also recognized another “form of an important, but
secondary, meaning of ‘carry,’ a meaning that suggests support rather than movement or transportation,
as when, for example, a column ‘carries’ the weight of an arch.  In this sense a gangster might ‘carry’ a gun
(in colloquial language, he might ‘pack a gun’) even though he does not move from his chair.”  Id. at 131,
118 S. Ct. at 1915-16, 141 L. Ed. 2d 111 (citation omitted).  The statute plainly states that it is a violation
for a person to “wear or carry” a concealed deadly weapon.  The weapon must be concealed and it
must be either worn or carried.  If it is neither worn nor carried, it is not illegal to conceal it.  We hold that
the Legislature merely intended that the weapon needed to be on the body or about the person and
concealed.  It is not necessary that the weapon actually be transported from place to place.         
Third, the weapon must be concealed upon or about the person.  In Corbin v. State, 237 Md.
486, 206 A.2d 809 (1965), we explained the scope of “upon or about” when we said that “[i]n order to
support [a] conviction of the carrying or wearing a dangerous or deadly weapon, it [is] necessary that the
State establish the fact that the accused was carrying the weapon or that it was in such proximity to
-10-
him as would make it available for his immediate use.”  Id. at 491, 206 A.2d at 812 (emphasis
added) (citing Veney v. State, 227 Md. 608, 177 A.2d 883 (1962)).  In Corbin, we held that Corbin
was not in such proximity to two guns, which were concealed in his car while he was standing beside the
car and therefore was not in violation of Article 27, section 36.  It is clear from Corbin that we have
limited the term “wear” to include areas that are in very close proximity to an alleged offender.  
In Corbin, we recognized that a deadly weapon needed to be in such close proximity to the
person so as to be available for his immediate use in order to constitute a violation of Article 27, section
36.  Such an interpretation makes sense in the context where the weapon concealed is in close proximity
to the defendant, and it is “shown that the defendant had at least the ‘general intent’ to carry the instrument
for use as a weapon.”  State v. Brinkley, 102 Md. App. 774, 779, 651 A.2d 465, 467 (1995); see
also Anderson, 328 Md. at 443, 614 A.2d at 971 (“Factors to be considered include (1) the nature of
the instrument, i.e., its size, shape, condition and possible alteration; (2) the circumstances under which it
is carried, i.e., the time, place and situation in which defendant is found with it; (3) defendant’s actions
vis-a-vis the item; and (4) the place of concealment.” (quoting State v. Blea, 100 N.M. 237, 238-39,
668 P.2d 1114, 1115-16 (Ct. App. 1983))).
The State has merely proven that there was a weapon under petitioner’s mattress and that the
weapon was purchased by petitioner.  We do not have any other facts before us concerning the
circumstances surrounding the placement of the weapon beneath the mattress and the State has failed to
demonstrate that petitioner had the general intent of doing anything other than placing the weapon in its
hiding place in the bedroom of his home, presumably a place of safety to him. 
In the case sub judice, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the ruling of the trial judge and
  The placing of a shotgun in a non-transparent gun cabinet and the placing of a knife in a drawer
9
are acts of concealment.
-11-
concluded that “although [petitioner] did not carry the gun while concealed, he concealed it in such close
proximity to himself [under the mattress] that it was available for his immediate use.”  Under this
interpretation of Article 27, section 36, the fact that petitioner was in close proximity with the shotgun at
the time he concealed it under his mattress, although he was nowhere near at the time it was found, is
sufficient to sustain a conviction.  The State has proven, in the courts below, only two instances where the
weapon might have been in close proximity to petitioner and available for his immediate use — when he
bought it and when he placed it under his mattress.  That is not enough to sustain a conviction for possessing
a concealed weapon.      
The Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation of Article 27, section 36 distorts the ruling of Corbin
as it makes it a violation of Article 27, section 36 simply to conceal a deadly weapon.   The weapon was
9
not discovered on petitioner while he was on the street or in a public place.  In fact, as we discussed,
supra, petitioner was not even home at the time the shotgun was found by his mother nor was he home
at the time it was seized by Officer Sernek.  The weapon was discovered and seized inside petitioner’s
place of residence when he was not present.  He was not “carrying” or “wearing” it while it was concealed.
Part Two 
Weapons on Private Property
The true issue in this case is whether a conviction of wearing and carrying a dangerous or deadly
weapon in violation of Article 27, section 36, can be sustained where the weapon in question, otherwise
legal to possess, is found in a place not in open view in the residence of the alleged offender but in close
-12-
proximity to him.  We hold that it cannot.  State v. Brinkley, 102 Md. App. 774, 651 A.2d 465 (1995),
relied on by the State, is distinguishable.
In Brinkley, the Court of Special Appeals first addressed the issue, which is presented today,
“whether the crime of carrying a concealed weapon may be accomplished when the accused is on private
property.”  Id. at 775, 651 A.2d at 465.  Brinkley was a guest at a private residence in Montgomery
County when the Maryland-National Capital Park Police executed a search warrant at the premises.  He
was clearly “wearing” a weapon.  There was no evidence that the owner of the premises knew that
Brinkley had a weapon on his person or anywhere on the property.  During a pat-down search of Brinkley,
the police officers discovered a knife inside his left boot and he was charged with carrying a concealed
weapon in violation of Article 27, section 36.  The trial court dismissed the charge ruling that Article 27,
section 36 does not prohibit the carrying of a concealed weapon when the alleged offender is in a private
residence.  The Court of Special Appeals held:
In our view, application of section 36 to private property is not inconsistent with
[the purposes of Maryland’s criminal concealed weapons statutes].  Applying section 36
to private property would protect those “unsuspecting members of the public” who find
themselves on private property when a dangerous or deadly weapon, previously
concealed, is wielded at them.  There is no reason to believe that members of the public
do not require protection from concealed weapons simply because they are situated on
private property.  We believe section 36 was enacted to protect members of the public
generally, whether they be located on private property or on a public street. 
Id. at 778-79, 651 A.2d at 467 (footnote omitted).  In that case, there was no indication that Brinkley was
the owner of the private property, or that the owner of the property had, in any way, given permission for
Brinkley to carry the weapon there at issue concealed on Brinkley’s person or even upon the property.
An owner of, or a resident in, or a guest invited by the owner or resident, when the owner or resident has
-13-
knowledge of the weapon does not violate the provision of the statute at issue when he is on such private
property and is in possession of a concealed weapon, otherwise legal to possess. 
The State argues in its brief that Article 27, section 36 applies equally to both public and private
property.  It bases its rationale on the premise that a private property exception exists concerning handguns
in the relatively recent Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, section
36B.  The State contends that if the Legislature had wanted a private property exception within section 36
it would have expressly put one in that statute.  We disagree with the State’s reasoning.
Article 27, section 36 has remained substantially the same since 1886.  See 1886 Md. Laws Ch.
375.  In 1886, the corresponding statute provided:
Every person not being a conservator of the peace entitled or required to carry such
weapon as a part of his official equipment, who shall wear or carry any pistol, dirk-knife,
bowie-knife, slung-shot, billy, sand-club, metal knuckles, razor or any other dangerous or
deadly weapon of any kind whatsoever, (penknives excepted) concealed upon or about
his person, and every person who shall carry or wear any such weapon openly with the
intent or purpose of injuring any person, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more
than five hundred dollars or be imprisoned not more than six months in jail or the House
of Correction.  
It is evident from the wording of the statute as originally enacted in 1886 that very little has been done to
change the basic premise behind the statute in over 100 years.  
In 1972, however, the Legislature enacted Article 27, section 36B, concerning the wearing,
carrying, or transporting of a handgun.  The statute’s purpose is outlined as follows:
(a) Declaration of policy. — The General Assembly of Maryland hereby finds
and declares that:
(1) There has, in recent years, been an alarming increase in the number of violent
crimes perpetrated in Maryland, and a high percentage of those crimes involve the use of
handguns;
  Any future references to section 36B are references to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.,
10
2000 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, section 36B.
-14-
(2) The result has been a substantial increase in the number of persons killed or
injured which is traceable, in large part, to the carrying of handguns on the streets
and public ways by persons inclined to use them in criminal activity;
(3) The laws currently in force have not been effective in curbing the more frequent
use of handguns in perpetrating crime; and
(4) Further regulations on the wearing, carrying, and transporting of handguns are
necessary to preserve the peace and tranquility of the State and to protect the rights and
liberties of its citizens.
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, section 36B (emphasis added).10
Article 27, section 36B was designed to accomplish what the then current laws had been unable to
accomplish — to crack down on the increased amount of violent crimes committed, primarily in public
venues, with the use of handguns.  Recognizing this growing problem, the statute included language similar
to then already enacted Article 27, section 36.  Section 36B also provides: 
(b) Any person who shall wear, carry, or transport any handgun, whether
concealed or open, upon or about his person, and any person who shall wear, carry or
knowingly transport any handgun, whether concealed or open, in any vehicle traveling upon
the public roads, highways, waterways, or airways or upon roads or parking lots generally
used by the public in this State shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and it shall be a rebuttable
presumption that the person is knowingly transporting the handgun . . . .
  
Article 27, section 36B prohibits the wearing, carrying or transporting of handguns, whether concealed or
open.  Although it was passed to address a more serious problem and although it demands a stricter
standard than section 36, subsection (c)(4) of 36B nonetheless provides:
Nothing in this section shall prevent a person from wearing, carrying, or
transporting a handgun within the confines of real estate owned or leased by him or upon
which he resides or within the confines of a business establishment owned or leased by
him.  
  We also note that Baltimore City Code (2000), Article 19, section 59-1, the
11
current version of Article 19, section 97 of the Baltimore City Code, under which petitioner was charged
with carrying a shotgun with a barrel over fourteen inches also includes an exception for possession within
the home. 
-15-
Section 36B was an attempt by the Legislature to reduce the use of handguns primarily in the commission
of street crimes of violence.  See Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571, 584, 357 A.2d 360, 368 (1976);
Wright v. State, 24 Md.App. 309, 317, 330 A.2d 482, 487, cert. denied, 274 Md. 733 (1975).
However, apparently, the Legislature did not want its toughened stance on handguns on the street and in
public areas to inadvertently be applied to affect an individual’s right to possess a legal handgun in the
home.  We interpret the Legislature’s addition of this “private property exception” not as support for the
State’s position that the absence of such an exception in section 36 should be interpreted to mean that the
Legislature intended no distinction for shotguns between private and public property under section 36.
Rather, we interpret the “private property exception” to mean that the Legislature recognized that,
generally, a person has a right to possess a legal firearm in the home.   With the enacting of 36B(c)(4), the
11
Legislature, it appears to us, simply wanted to safeguard this general right, to possess weapons in one’s
home, even as to handguns.  The Legislature wanted what was implied in the more lenient section 36 to be
specifically expressed in the stricter section 36B.  Under the State’s position, it would be legal for a person
to have a handgun concealed on his person while standing in the kitchen of his home, but illegal for him to
have the kitchen knives in a closed drawer nearby.  We cannot accept that the Legislature intended such
an incongruous interpretation of these related statutes.
Our rationale is supported by our past recognition of the intertwined relationship between section
36 and section 36B.  We noted in Eldridge, 329 Md. 307, 313-14, 619 Md. A.2d 531, 534-35 (1993),
  In 1894, in an effort to prevent the use of this statute to promote injustice, the
12
Legislature amended the original language of the statute to exclude those persons carrying a concealed
weapon “as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.”  In the preamble to this amendment,
the legislature stated:
It is represented to this General Assembly that the existing law in reference to the offense
of carrying concealed weapons does not make proper discrimination in favor of those who
travel in dangerous localities, or from other imminent necessity, or prudent precaution
in the presence of threatened injury to their lives or persons, may
reasonably arm themselves for self-protection; and the law has been made an
instrument of injustice to those not deserving of punishment . . . . [Emphasis added.]
This exception is currently embodied in Article 27, section 36 (f), which provides in relevant part:
(continued...)
-16-
that an evaluation of section 36B is instrumental in our understanding of section 36: 
Section 36B concerns handguns.  Handguns were expressly excepted from the
provisions of § 36 and § 36B was enacted to fill the void. . . . 
. . . . 
We think that § 36B, concerned with handguns, is, to all intents and purposes, the
counterpart of § 36, concerned with deadly weapons generally, except handguns.  The
proscribed conduct in both § 36(a) and § 36B(b) is the same — the carrying of the
designated weapon.  In view of the similarity of the statutes and our holding in Webb[ v.
State, 311 Md. 610, 536 A.2d 1161 (1988)], we conclude that the unit of prosecution
in § 36(a), as we have found it to be in § 36B(b), is one offense — the carrying of a
deadly weapon, regardless of whether it is carried concealed or openly.
Section 36B is a counterpart to section 36, and serves almost as an extension of the same legislative policy.
Both attempt to crack down on the problem of the use of deadly weapons in the commission of violent
crimes.  Section 36B sets a stricter standard on the use of handguns, yet expressly provides for a limited
private property exception.  It would be contrary to the legislative scheme of both statutes for us to now
apply a stricter standard concerning rifles and shotguns in private residences under the less evolved and less
strict section 36.   We also look to our prior analysis of the purpose of Maryland’s concealed weapon’s
12
(...continued)
12
(f) Exceptions. — Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the
carrying of any of the weapons mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of this section by:
. . . . 
(4) Any person who shall carry such weapon as a reasonable
precaution against apprehended danger, but the tribunal before which any case
arising under the provisions of this section may be tried, shall have the right to judge of the
reasonableness of the carrying of any such weapon, and the proper occasion therefor,
under the evidence in the case. [Emphasis added.]
-17-
statutes.  As we said in Anderson: 
Criminal statutes dealing with concealed weapons serve two related purposes.
First, they seek to protect the public by deterring persons from concealing on or about
their persons weapons of which the public would be unaware, thereby preventing injury
or death to unsuspecting members of the public.  Second, these statutes protect the
wearers or carriers of weapons from themselves, by attempting to deter persons from
having at hand weapons that could be used in the heat of passion.
Anderson, 328 Md. at 432, 614 A.2d at 965 (citations omitted).  The act of placing a shotgun under a
mattress within one’s home is not the type of unrestrained exercise of rights that this statute is attempting
to prevent. 
Section 36 is attempting to prevent incidents on public streets and in publicly accessible areas.  As
the Court of Appeals of Oregon stated, in a factually similar case involving a person convicted of carrying
a concealed weapon (switchblade knife) in his home:
[T]he [S]tate’s interpretation would restrict the manner in which one could carry a legal
weapon from room to room within one’s home and would inhibit an act that is so intrinsic
to ownership and self-defense that it would unreasonably interfere with the exercise of
one’s constitutional right to possess the [deadly weapon].”
       
        
State v. Stevens, 113 Or. App. 429, 432, 833 P.2d 318, 319 (1992).
We recognize that Article 27, section 36 was intended by the Legislature to apply, generally, to
-18-
persons traveling or congregating on public streets or areas generally accessible to the public.  It was not
designed to apply to people on their private property or people who reside in, or are an invited guest on
that property when the owner has knowledge of the weapon.  To apply this statute to people concealing
weapons on such private property who have a legitimate reason for being on that property could lead to
absurd results.       
In statutory construction, absurd results are to be avoided.  In D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md.
534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990), we stated that “construction of a statute which is unreasonable,
illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided.” See also, e.g., Degren v. State,
352 Md. 400, 418, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999) (“[W]e should construe the statute in a manner that results
in an interpretation ‘reasonable and consonant with logic and common sense.’” (quoting Lewis v. State,
348 Md. 648, 654, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998))); Edgewater Liquors, 349 Md. at 808, 709 A.2d
at 1303 (“[W]e approach statutory construction from a common sense perspective.”); Lewis, 348 Md.
at 662, 705 A.2d at 1135 (“We shall not interpret a statute to produce unusual or extraordinary results,
absent the clear legislative intent to enact such a provision.”); Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498
A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985) (“[R]ules of statutory construction require us to avoid construing a statute in a
way which would lead to absurd results.”); Comptroller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 303 Md. 280, 284,
493 A.2d 341, 343 (1985) (“A statute should not be construed by forced or subtle interpretations . . . .”).
Under the State’s theory, a resident or owner of premises would have to keep his knives, his handguns,
his rifles, his shotguns, and every other type of weapon, or potential weapon, in the open; i.e., standing in
the corner, on the coffee table, on the counter, on top of the bed, in the center of the floor.  To conceal a
weapon by hiding it in order to reduce the likelihood that a child will discover it, and use it, would be a
-19-
crime.  That is absurd.
Moreover, the State’s position that a weapon may not be concealed on private property, if it
resulted in weapons being left unconcealed, as it might, would lead to violations of other statutes.
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, section 36K, titled “Access to firearms by minors”
provides in relevant part in subsection (b): “an individual may not store or leave a loaded firearm in any
location where the individual knew or should have known that an unsupervised minor would gain access
to the firearm.”  Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject
to a fine of not more that $1000.  If we were to adopt the State’s position that shotguns may not be
concealed, i.e., that they must be in open view, every hunter in Maryland with small children would be
forced to violate one statute or the other: Keep the shotgun on the counter in violation of section 36K, or
hide it from the child, i.e., conceal it in violation of section 36.
We hold that, generally, a person in legal possession of a dangerous and deadly weapon may
conceal or store it as long as they are on property, which they own, or are a legal resident of, or are an
invited guest who has informed the owner or resident of the presence of the weapon.  To hold otherwise
would turn this statute on its ear.  How could a person place knives into a kitchen drawer without
concealing them and violating this statute upon closing the drawer?  How could a responsible hunter place
shotguns in a gun cabinet without concealing them and violating this statute?  How could an owner, and
invited guests, transport encased shotguns across the “back 40” to the duck hunting blinds along the edge
of the marsh or the deer-stand along the edge of the woods?  How could a homeowner keep weapons for
his protection without having them readily and illegally accessible to children?  Clearly it was not the intent
of the Legislature to make it a misdemeanor to put away silverware or to store a legal firearm.  
-20-
Petitioner was concealing a weapon within his home.  We hold that section 36 does not prohibit
the concealing of otherwise legal weapons in one’s residence, or on one’s property, or on the private
property of others, if the owner of that property is made aware of the presence of the otherwise legal
weapon.  This holding applies to owners, residents, renters, and, as we have indicated, under certain
circumstances and conditions, even invited guests. 
Conclusion
We hold that, generally, a person in possession of a legal dangerous and deadly weapon may
conceal or store it so long as they are on property, which they own, are a legal resident of, or are present
on as an invited guest if the owner has knowledge of the possession of the weapon.  The evidence
presented in the case sub judice is insufficient to establish “wearing and carrying” of a dangerous or
deadly weapon in violation of Article 27, section 36, where the evidence presented proves merely that the
police found a shotgun under a mattress in petitioner’s room where he resided.  Accordingly, we reverse
the decision of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to that court with instructions to vacate
the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
Judges Raker, Harrell and Rodowsky concur in Part One of the opinion and in the result.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
RESPONDENT.