Title: Noland Health Services, Inc., et al. v. Peter Wright, as the administrator of the estate of Dorothy Willis, deceased

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 05/04/07 Noland Health Services
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1060061
_________________________
Noland Health Services, Inc., et al.
v.
Peter Wright, as the administrator of the estate of Dorothy
Willis, deceased
Appeal from St. Clair Circuit Court
(CV-05-23)
WOODALL, Justice.
Noland Health Services, Inc., The Village at Cook
Springs, LLC ("The Village"), and Ed Stevens appeal from an
order denying their motion to compel the arbitration of an
action by Peter Wright, as the administrator of the estate of
1060061
2
Dorothy Willis, deceased, seeking damages for the personal
injuries and wrongful death of Dorothy Willis.  We affirm.
On March 25, 2004, Willis, accompanied by her daughter-
in-law, Vicky Willis, was admitted to the skilled-nursing
facility at The Village ("the nursing home"), which was owned
and/or operated by Noland Health Services, Inc., and The
Village.  At that time, Dorothy was suffering from dementia
related to Alzheimer's disease.  She was admitted pursuant to
a written agreement ("the agreement"), which provided, in
pertinent part:
"1. References to the Parties
"....
"References to 'we,' 'our,' the 'Facility,' and to
'our Facility' are references to [the nursing home].
"References to 'you' and 'your' are references to
any person signing this agreement as Resident or as
the Responsible Party.
"There are also spaces for this Agreement to be
signed by a Legal Representative and Responsible
Party, if applicable, on your behalf.
"A Legal Representative is an individual who, under
independent legal authority, such as a court
order[,] has authority to act on the Resident's
behalf.  Examples of a Legal Representative include
a guardian, a conservator, and the holder of a
Durable Power of Attorney executed by the Resident.
Documents evidencing a person's Legal Representative
1060061
3
status must be provided to us.  If you have a court
appointed guardian or conservator he or she must
sign this Agreement for it to be valid.
"A. 
Responsible 
Party 
is 
an 
individual 
who
voluntarily 
agrees to honor certain specified
obligations of the Resident under this agreement.
Examples of a Responsible Party include a relative
or a friend of the Resident.  We may not require a
person to sign this agreement as a Responsible Party
unless the person has legal access to or physical
control of the Resident's available income or
resources to pay for the care and services we
provide.  We may decline to admit any Resident who
has no source of payment for all or part of the
Resident's stay.
"2. Limitations on the Obligations
of a Legal Representative and Responsible Party
under this Agreement
"We may not require a third party to guarantee
payment to us as a condition of admission to, of
expedited admission to, or of continued stay in our
Facility.
"3. Obligations of a Legal Representative
or Responsible Party under this Agreement
"If 
you 
sign 
this 
Agreement 
as 
a 
Legal
Representative or Responsible Party you agree to use
the Resident's available income and resources to pay
for the Resident's care and services."
(Emphasis added.)  
The second page of the agreement had blank spaces for
identification of the parties.  In the space for "Resident,"
Vicky wrote in the name of "Dorothy Willis."  Another space
1060061
4
for the designation of "Resident's Legal Representative (if
applicable)" was left blank.  Still another space for the
designation of "Resident's Responsible Party (if applicable)"
contained the signature of "Vicky Willis."  The last page of
the agreement, the signature page, contained lines with the
identical designations.  The signature page contained the
signature of a "Representative of [the] Nursing Facility."
The lines designated for the signatures of the "Resident" and
the "Resident's Legal Representative (if applicable)" were
left blank.  The line designated for the "Resident's
Responsible Party (if applicable)" contained the signature of
Vicky Willis.  
The agreement also contained an arbitration provision,
which provided, in pertinent part:
"[A]ny controversy, dispute, cause of action or
claim now or hereafter existing between or among you
and [the nursing home] or its agents, or which is
asserted by one or more persons or entities
(including, but not limited to, a party to this
Agreement) claiming any rights under this Agreement
... includ[ing] ... any claim arising out of,
relating to, or concerning this Agreement in any
way, and/or the care or treatment of you in the
Facility, whether in contract, tort, based on
statute, equity, ... including, but not limited to,
negligence and wrongful death claims .... shall [be
submitted] to binding arbitration."
1060061
5
In May 2004, Dorothy Willis fell in the nursing home and
broke her hip.  In January 2005, she fell again and broke her
neck.  On January 26, 2005, a complaint styled "Dorothy Willis
individually & Luther and Vicky Willis as her next friends"
was filed in the St. Clair Circuit Court against Noland Health
Services, Inc., The Village, and Stevens, who was the
administrator of the nursing home (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "Noland").  The complaint alleged, among other
things, that Dorothy "was neglected and the care and treatment
she received was substandard and did not meet the standard of
care of the same or similar health care facilities."  It
averred that "[s]aid negligent and wanton conduct on the part
of [Noland], their agents, and/or assigns, was a breach of the
standard of medical care," and that "[a]s a  direct and
proximate 
result 
of 
such negligent, 
wanton, reckless,
malicious and/or intentional conduct, [Noland] caused Dorothy
Willis to suffer medical decline, ... a broken hip, ... and
... a broken neck." It also alleged that Dorothy Willis had
developed pneumonia as a direct result of her injuries and
that she had not received prompt and appropriate emergency
medical care following her injuries.
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Count four of the complaint averred, in toto:
"26. Plaintiff re-adopts and re-alleges and
incorporates 
the allegations in all preceding
paragraphs as if fully set forth herein:
"27. [Noland] and [its] agents and/or assigns
breached 
[its] 
contract 
with 
Plaintiff 
and
Plaintiff's family in that [it] failed to comply
with the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract for admission.  As a direct and proximate
cause of said breach of contract, Plaintiff was
caused to suffer great pain and mental anguish.
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Plaintiff
hereby 
demands 
judgment 
against 
[Noland] 
for
compensatory and punitive damages in a sum to be
determined by the jury."
(Emphasis added.)
On February 2, 2005, Dorothy Willis died.  On February
25, 2005, Noland moved to compel arbitration of the claims
against it based on the arbitration provision in the
agreement. 
On 
February 
28, 
2006, 
Peter 
Wright, 
as
administrator of Dorothy Willis's estate, filed an amended
complaint.  The amended complaint "readopt[ed] and realleg[ed]
each and every claim set forth in [the] original complaint."
It also added a wrongful-death claim, alleging that Willis had
died from the broken neck and pneumonia as a proximate result
of Noland's "negligence and wanton breach of the standard of
care."  
1060061
7
Noland answered the amended complaint, asserting that the
wrongful-death claim was also due to be arbitrated.  On
September 19, 2006, the trial court denied the motion to
compel arbitration.  From that order, Noland appealed.
Our standard of review is well settled.   
"'This Court reviews de novo the denial of a
motion to compel arbitration.  Parkway Dodge, Inc.
v. Yarbrough, 779 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. 2000).  A motion
to compel arbitration is analogous to a motion for
a summary judgment.  TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell,
739 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (Ala. 1999).  The party
seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of
proving the existence of a contract calling for
arbitration and proving that the contract evidences
a transaction affecting interstate commerce.  Id.
"[A]fter a motion to compel arbitration has been
made and supported, the burden is on the non-movant
to present evidence that the supposed arbitration
agreement is not valid or does not apply to the
dispute in question."  Jim Burke Automotive, Inc. v.
Beavers, 674 So. 2d 1260, 1265 n.1 (Ala. 1995)
(opinion on application for rehearing).'"
Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Gantt, 882 So. 2d 313, 315 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d
277, 280 (Ala. 2000)).  "Absent live testimony, the trial
court's findings of fact carry no presumption of correctness
and we will review the trial court's factual and legal
conclusions de novo."   W.D. Williams, Inc. v. Ivey, 777 So.
2d 94, 98 (Ala. 2000); see also Justice v. Arab Lumber &
1060061
8
Supply, Inc., 533 So. 2d 538 (Ala. 1988).  The dispositive
issue on appeal is whether Noland has met its burden of
showing the existence of a contract requiring arbitration of
the claims asserted in this action.  
As a general rule, "a nonsignatory to an arbitration
agreement cannot be forced to arbitrate her claims."  Cook's
Pest Control, Inc. v. Boykin, 807 So. 2d 524, 526 (Ala. 2001).
Nevertheless, 
Noland 
contends 
that 
the 
agreement 
is
enforceable against Wright as Dorothy Willis's personal
representative, "notwithstanding the fact that Dorothy Willis
did not personally sign it."  Noland's brief, at 46.  This is
so, because, Noland argues, "Vicky Willis signed the
arbitration agreement on Dorothy Willis's behalf as Dorothy
Willis's 
'responsible party.'"  
Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 Wright,
however, contends that Vicky's signature on the agreement as
the "responsible party" was ineffective to bind Dorothy to the
agreement.  We agree with Wright.
It is undisputed that when Vicky was given the option to
sign the agreement as a "responsible party" or as a "legal
representative," she chose the former option.  The agreement
explained that "[a] Legal Representative is an individual who,
1060061
9
under independent legal authority, such as a court order[,]
has authority to act on the Resident's behalf" and listed "a
guardian, a conservator, and the holder of a Durable Power of
Attorney executed by the Resident" as examples of legal
representatives.   
Wright contends that at the time of Dorothy's admission
to the nursing home, Vicky "did not hold power of attorney for
Mrs. Willis, was not her guardian, and had never been
appointed by [Dorothy] or by a court of competent jurisdiction
to handle the affairs" of her mother-in-law.  Wright's brief,
at 1-2.
Noland argues that Wright is essentially estopped to
deny that Vicky possessed a power of attorney.  This is so,
because, it insists, in paragraph one of the original
complaint the Willises asserted: "Plaintiffs Luther Willis and
Vicky Willis are her duly appointed attorneys in fact and the
son and daughter-in-law of Dorothy Willis."  See Jones v.
Kassouf & Co., 949 So. 2d 136, 142 (Ala. 2006)(Lyons, J.,
dissenting) ("'Normally, factual assertions in pleadings and
pretrial orders are considered to be judicial admissions
conclusively binding on the party who made them.'"(quoting
1060061
10
White v. ARCO/Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, 1396 (5th Cir.
1983))). 
Wright, however, insists that a durable power of attorney
can be created only in a manner and form consistent with Ala.
Code 1975, § 26-1-2, which provides, in pertinent part: 
"A durable power of attorney is a power of attorney
by which a principal designates another his or her
attorney in fact or agent in writing and the writing
contains the words 'This power of attorney shall not
be 
affected 
by 
disability, 
incompetency, 
or
incapacity of the principal' or 'This power of
attorney shall become effective upon the disability,
incompetency, or incapacity of the principal' or
similar words showing the intent of the principal
that the authority conferred shall be exercisable
notwithstanding 
the 
principal's 
subsequent
disability, incompetency, or incapacity."
(Emphasis added.)  Wright contends that a party may not,
merely through an averment in a pleading, circumvent the
statutory requirements of a writing, which shows the
unmistakable 
intent 
of 
the 
principal 
to 
create 
the
relationship.
We need not, however, resolve the dispute over the
implications of paragraph one of the original complaint.  This
is so, because in executing the agreement Vicky did not sign
Dorothy's name in any purported capacity and did not purport
to be Dorothy's legal representative.  Vicky's signatory role
1060061
11
was, therefore, effectively that of a "next friend," who
"voluntarily agree[d] to honor certain specified obligations"
of her mother-in-law.  (Emphasis added.)  It has long been
established in this State, however, that one who purports to
act merely as a "next friend" of a "non compos mentis" is
"wholly without authority to make any contract that would bind
her of her estate."  Page v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 129
Ala. 232, 238, 29 So. 676, 678 (1901).  
In that connection, the trial court found that "Dorothy
Willis was not competent at the time her daughter-in-law
signed the contract of admission in this case."  (Emphasis
added.)  Indeed, there is no conflict in the evidence, which
includes medical reports as to Dorothy Willis's mental
capacity.  One such report describes Dorothy as "an 86 year
old demented female" (emphasis added), who was "[n]ot oriented
to person, place or time."  In another medical report, she is
described as "always confused."  Thus, we conclude that
Vicky's signature in the capacity of a next friend, or
"responsible party," was ineffective to bind Dorothy or her
personal representative to the agreement.
1060061
12
In arriving at this conclusion, we have not overlooked
Briarcliff v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661 (Ala. 2004), or Owens
v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983 (Ala. 2004),
also cited by Noland.  Those cases are distinguishable.  Owens
involved an action by Linda Owens against the Coosa Valley
Health Care Nursing Home ("Coosa Valley") alleging personal
injuries and wrongful death.  Owens was the daughter and
personal representative of Elma Tucker, who died while in the
care of Coosa Valley.  890 So. 2d at 984.  The only
signatories to any relevant admission documents were Coosa
Valley and Owens.  Id.  However, Owens signed Tucker's name to
the admission documents as Tucker's "Guardian/Sponsor."  890
So. 2d at 986 (emphasis added).  Moreover, the admission
agreement defined, in addition to Coosa Valley as the first
party, "'the undersigned Patient, Guardian and Sponsor
(hereinafter known as "Patient")'" as the second party. 890
So. 2d at 984 (emphasis added).  Thus, the definition of
"patient" included Owens, the plaintiff in the action, who was
a signatory to the admission agreement.  In holding that Owens
was compelled to arbitrate her claims against Coosa Valley, we
explained that it was "undisputed" that Owens signed the
1060061
13
agreement "on behalf of Tucker," as her guardian/sponsor, and
that the "'meaning of "Patient" [included] Patient and ... her
... guardian[], heirs, [and] executor[].'" 890 So. 2d at 987
(emphasis added).  In other words, Owens was personally bound,
and there was no issue regarding Tucker's mental capacity or
Owens's authority to act on Tucker's behalf.
Briarcliff involved consolidated appeals from orders
refusing to compel the arbitration of two wrongful-death
actions in the Shelby Circuit Court, 894 So. 2d at 663, which
orders this Court reversed.  890 So. 2d at 668.  One action
was prosecuted by David Turcotte, as personal representative
of Noella Turcotte, deceased.  894 So. 2d at 663.  The other
action was prosecuted by Kyra L. Woodman, as personal
representative of Sarah Carter, deceased.  Id.  Turcotte and
Carter had died while in the care of a "nursing home owned and
operated by Briarcliff [Nursing Home, Inc., d/b/a Integrated
Health Services at Briarcliff ('Briarcliff')]."  894 So. 2d at
663.  The signatories to the admission agreements were
Briarcliff and each of the personal representatives.  David
Turcotte had signed in his capacity as a "'Fiduciary Party,'"
and Woodman had signed as "'Attorney-In-Fact under [a] validly
1060061
14
executed power of attorney.'" 894 So. 2d at 664.  As in Owens,
there was no issue regarding the authority of either
signatory/personal representative to execute the agreement on
behalf of his or her admittee.
This case differs from Owens and Briarcliff in two
fundamental respects.  First, unlike the plaintiffs in Owens
and Briarcliff, Wright specifically challenges the efficacy of
Vicky Willis's signature to bind Dorothy Willis.  As noted
above, Vicky did not purport to sign the agreement as
Dorothy's "legal representative"; she signed only as one
acting in the nature of a "next friend," who "voluntarily
agree[d] to honor certain specified obligations" of Dorothy.
This fact was obviously known by the nursing home at the time
Dorothy was admitted.
Second, unlike Wright, the plaintiff in Owens and the two
plaintiffs in Briarcliff were signatories to an agreement to
arbitrate.  Although Vicky Willis signed the agreement, she
was never the plaintiff, unlike Owens, Turcotte, and Woodman,
who sued as personal representatives of their decedents.
Moreover, Wright -- who signed no relevant admission document
-- was substituted as the proper plaintiff before the trial
1060061
15
court entered its order denying Noland's motion to compel
arbitration.  
Noland next contends that Wright is bound to arbitrate
because his amended complaint incorporates the breach-of-
contract claim of the original complaint.  This is so,
because, it insists, Wright "manifested assent to the validity
of the arbitration agreement by claiming the benefits of the
[agreement]" through his pleadings.  Noland's brief, at 50
(emphasis added).  For that proposition, Noland cites Lyles v.
Pioneer Housing Systems, Inc., 858 So. 2d 226 (Ala. 2003); and
Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131 (Ala.
2000).  The rule developed in those cases is that a party may
not base an action on provisions in a contract while
repudiating an arbitration clause in the contract.
"In [Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v.] Ard[, 772 So.
2d 1131 (Ala. 2003)], the Ards sued Southern Energy
Homes, the manufacturer of the Ards' mobile home,
alleging a violation of Southern Energy's express
warranty, a violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
-- Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. ('the Magnuson-Moss Act'), and
the negligent manufacture of the mobile home.  The
Ards also alleged fraud.  Southern Energy sought to
compel arbitration of the Ards' claims on the basis
of an arbitration provision contained in its express
warranty. Evidence in the form of an affidavit by
Southern Energy employee Don McNutt indicated that
the Ards had requested and received service under
1060061
16
the warranty on their mobile home from Southern
Energy.  The evidence also indicated that the Ards
did not sign any written agreement with Southern
Energy expressly calling for arbitration.  The trial
court denied Southern Energy's motion to compel
arbitration, and it appealed.  After discussing the
burdens imposed upon Southern Energy to establish
its right to compel arbitration ..., this Court
concluded that the trial court's order denying
arbitration was due to be reversed:
 
"'The Ards are contractually bound to
the arbitration provisions for two reasons.
First, 
the 
affidavit 
of 
Don 
McNutt
establishes, without contradiction, that
the Ards have accepted the benefits of the
warranty 
containing 
the 
arbitration
provisions.  This acceptance constitutes
the Ards' acceptance of the arbitration
provisions themselves.  Rush v. Atomic
Electric Co., 384 So. 2d 1067 (Ala. 1980).
Second, the Ards have sued Southern Energy
on the theory, among others, of express
warranty.  The only express warranty
included in the evidentiary materials is
the 
one 
containing 
the 
arbitration
provisions. 
A 
plaintiff 
cannot
simultaneously claim the benefits of a
contract and repudiate its burdens and
conditions.  Value Auto Credit, Inc. v.
Talley, 727 So. 2d 61 (Ala. 1999); Infiniti
of Mobile, Inc. v. Office, 727 So. 2d 42
(Ala. 1999); Georgia Power Co. v. Partin,
727 So. 2d 2 (Ala.1998); Delta Constr.
Corp. v. Gooden, 714 So. 2d 975 (Ala.
1998); Ex parte Dyess, 709 So. 2d 447 (Ala.
1997).'
 
"772 So. 2d at 1134-35. ...
"In Lyles [v. Pioneer Housing Systems, Inc., 858
So. 
2d 
226 
(Ala. 
2003)], 
the 
Lyleses, 
also
1060061
17
purchasers of a mobile home, sued the mobile-home
manufacturer, Pioneer, alleging breach of contract,
breach of express and implied warranties, breach of
the 
Magnuson-Moss 
Act, negligence, and fraud.
Pioneer sought to compel arbitration based upon an
arbitration provision contained in its express
warranty.  Two months after the motion to compel
arbitration was filed, the Lyleses dismissed their
breach-of-express-warranty claim.  After arguments
on the motion to compel arbitration, the trial court
entered an order granting the motion.  Three days
later 
the 
Lyleses voluntarily dismissed their
Magnuson-Moss Act claim and then filed a motion to
vacate the order compelling arbitration.  The trial
court denied that motion, and the Lyleses appealed.
On appeal, they argued that the trial court erred in
compelling 
arbitration because they had never
entered 
into 
a 
written 
contract 
calling 
for
arbitration.  As in Ard, the Court in Lyles
recognized 
that 
the arbitration provision was
included in the express warranty, which was not a
document that the Lyleses were required to sign, and
it 
considered 
whether 
'the 
Lyleses 
availed
themselves of the benefits of Pioneer's written
warranty, thus manifesting their agreement to the
arbitration provision contained in it.'  858 So. 2d
at 228.  After discussing Ard, the Court analyzed
the situation in Lyles as follows:
 
"'Although 
the 
Lyleses 
voluntarily
dismissed 
their 
express-warranty 
claim
before the trial court ruled on Pioneer's
motion to compel arbitration, they did not
voluntarily 
dismiss 
their 
Magnuson-Moss 
Act
claim until after the trial court had
issued its order compelling arbitration.
Thus, when the trial court entered its
ruling on the motion to compel arbitration
the Lyleses' Magnuson-Moss Act claim was
still pending.
 
"'In their complaint, the Lyleses made
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18
the following allegations in support of
their Magnuson-Moss Act claim against
Pioneer: 
"'"Count Nine: Violation of
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act:
 
"'".... 
"'"37. [Pioneer] failed to
perform 
under 
its 
written
warranties and complete repairs
to the [Lyleses'] mobile home as
guaranteed 
in 
the 
express
warranties. [Pioneer] failed in
its efforts to properly repair
defects in the mobile home in
violation of 15 U.S.C. 2301 et
seq.
 
"'"38. [The Lyleses] timely
advised [Pioneer] of defects in
their mobile home on numerous
occasions and afforded [Pioneer]
reasonable opportunity to comply
with 
[its] 
warranties 
and
complete repairs. 
"'"39. 
As 
a 
proximate
result, [the Lyleses] were caused
damages including but not limited
to, 
actual 
and 
consequential
damages; 
attorneys' 
fees,
inconvenience, 
annoyance 
and
mental anguish."
 
"'The only express or written warranty
in 
the 
record 
is 
Pioneer's 
express
warranty, which contains the arbitration
provision quoted above.  Like the Ards, the
Lyleses purported to claim the benefits of
Pioneer's express warranty by alleging that
1060061
19
Pioneer should be bound to perform its
duties 
under 
the 
warranty, 
while
simultaneously repudiating the condition
contained in the warranty that warranty
disputes would be settled by arbitration.
Because the Lyleses manifested assent to
Pioneer's written express warranty by
availing themselves of its benefits, the
trial court correctly held them to the
conditions of the warranty by compelling
arbitration as to the warranty disputes, as
the arbitration provision found in the
warranty stipulated.'
 
"858 So. 2d at 230 (footnote omitted)."
Springhill Nursing Homes, Inc. v. McCurdy, 898 So. 2d 694,
698-701 (Ala. 2004)(emphasis added).
Noland overlooks a fundamental distinction between this
case and Ard and Lyles on which it relies for its assent-
through-pleading argument.  Those cases did not involve claims
against a health-care provider for redress of medical injuries
allegedly resulting from improper care or treatment.  The
nursing home is, however, "considered to be a 'hospital' [as
defined in Ala. Code 1975, §§ 6-5-481 and -542(1),] and thus,
... is covered by the provisions of the [Alabama] Medical
Liability Act" of 1987, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-540 et seq.
("the Act"), supplementing the Alabama Medical Liability Act
of 1975, § 6-5-480 et seq.  Ex parte Northport Health Serv.,
1060061
20
Inc., 682 So. 2d 52, 55 (Ala. 1996).  Section 6-5-542(2)
provides:
"The standard of care is that level of such
reasonable care, skill, and diligence as other
similarly situated health care providers in the same
general line of practice, ordinarily have and
exercise in like cases.  A breach of the standard of
care is the failure by a health care provider to
comply with the standard of care, which failure
proximately causes personal injury or wrongful
death.  This definition applies to all actions for
injuries or damages or wrongful death whether in
contract or tort and whether based on intentional or
unintentional conduct."
(Emphasis added.)  The coverage of the Act "is broad; it
applies to all actions alleging 'liability' was well as
'error, mistake, or failure to cure, whether based on contract
or tort.' [It] encompasses contract claims alleging breach of
express and implied warranties ...."  Mobile Infirmary v.
Delchamps, 642 So. 2d 954, 957 (Ala. 1994) (emphasis added).
"Although the [Act] applies only to medical-
malpractice actions, a plaintiff cannot avoid
application of the [Act] by 'creative pleading.'
This Court has consistently held that it is the
substance of the action, rather than the form, that
is the touchstone for determining whether an action
is actually one alleging medical malpractice."
Mock v. Allen, 783 So. 2d 828, 832 (Ala. 2000).  Thus, the
essence of any medical-malpractice action, regardless of how
it is pleaded, is compliance with the standard of care set
1060061
21
forth in the Act.  In other words, the scope of the health-
care provider's duties is defined, not by a contract between
the parties, but by the legislature.
This is a medical-malpractice action.  In a nutshell, the
allegations of the amended complaint are that Dorothy suffered
injuries and death as the result of Noland's "breach of the
standard of medical care."  (Emphasis added.)  Unlike the
Magnuson-Moss Act claims in Lyles, namely, that Pioneer
"failed to ... complete repairs to the [Lyleses'] mobile home
as guaranteed," Lyles, 858 So. 2d at 230, which claims arose
under Pioneer's express written warranty, any express or
implied promises in the agreement are encompassed within the
Act, and Wright's medical-malpractice claims are governed by
the standard promulgated by the legislature, rather than
written expressions of the nursing home.
Indeed, Wright's breach-of-contract claim is set forth
only in conclusory and generic terms.  Although it alleges
that Noland "breached [its] contract with Plaintiff and
Plaintiff's family"  (emphasis added), it contains no claims
by the next friends, Luther Willis and Vicky Willis, in their
individual capacities.  Because Wright's cause of action is
1060061
22
governed by the Act -- independent of the agreement -- Wright
cannot be said to have "manifested assent" to specific
provisions of the agreement simply by averring a breach of
that agreement.  Consequently, Wright is not bound by the
agreement or by the arbitration clause therein.
In short, Noland has directed us to no case on point
holding that a nonsignatory personal representative is bound
to arbitrate a medical-malpractice action seeking damages for
the injuries and wrongful death of the nonsignatory decedent.
It is well settled, of course, that, because the right to
arbitrate is contractual, "a party may not be compelled to
arbitrate a dispute, unless it has agreed to do so."  ECS,
Inc. v. Goff Group, Inc. 880 So. 2d 1140, 1145 (Ala. 2003).
See also Ex parte Cain, 838 So. 2d 1020, 1026 (Ala. 2002); Ex
parte Lovejoy, 790 So. 2d 933, 937 (Ala. 2000); A.G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc. v. Clark, 558 So. 2d 358, 361 (Ala. 1990).
Noland has presented no evidence showing that either Wright or
Dorothy Willis expressly agreed to arbitrate claims against
it, and Wright has not manifested an assent to arbitrate
through his involvement in this action.  Noland has,
therefore, failed to carry its burden of demonstrating the
1060061
23
existence of a contract binding Wright or the decedent to an
arbitration provision.
For these reasons, the trial court did not err in denying
the motion to compel arbitration.  That order is, therefore,
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Cobb, C.J., and Parker, J., concur.
Lyons and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
See, Stuart, Smith, and Bolin, JJ., dissent.
1060061
24
SEE, Justice (dissenting).
The complaint filed on Dorothy Willis's behalf alleges
that Noland Health Services, Inc., The Village at Cook
Springs, LLC, and Ed Stevens (hereinafter collectively
"Noland") breached its contract to provide nursing-home
services 
to 
Dorothy. 
 
Vicky 
Willis, 
Dorothy's 
daughter-in-law,
signed the contract admitting Dorothy into the nursing-home
facility.  The main opinion holds that because the underlying
action is in substance a medical-malpractice action and
because the complaint alleges breach of contract in only
"conclusory and generic terms[,] ... [Peter] Wright[, the
administrator of Dorothy's estate,] cannot be said to have
'manifested assent' to specific provisions of the agreement
simply by averring a breach of that agreement." ___ So. 2d at
___.  I disagree; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
In the initial complaint, the plaintiffs -- Dorothy along
with Luther Willis and Vicky Willis, Dorothy's son and
daughter-in-law, as next friends -- alleged that "Plaintiff[]
and Plaintiff's family contracted with [Noland] to provide
[Dorothy] 
with 
twenty-four 
hour 
skilled 
care, 
supervision, 
and
assistance.... Pursuant to said contract ... [Noland] owed a
1060061
25
duty to Dorothy Willis to protect and promote her rights ...
to be free from abuse and neglect and to receive adequate
medical care."  In the first amended complaint, Wright, the
administrator 
of 
Dorothy's 
estate, 
"readopt[ed] 
and
reallege[d] each and every claim set forth in the original
complaint," which necessarily included the factual allegation
that a contractual relationship existed.  The complaint
alleges that "[Noland] and [its] agents and/or assigns
breached [its] contract with Plaintiff and Plaintiff's family
in that [it] failed to comply with the terms and conditions
set forth in the contract for admission."  The only contract
reflected in the record is the admission contract containing
the arbitration provision.  
The main opinion concludes that Wright is not bound by
the arbitration provision in the admission contract because,
it reasons, even though Wright has claimed that Noland
breached the admission contract, Wright did not succeed in
asserting a breach-of-contract claim.  Although it may be
true, as the main opinion asserts, that Wright has put
forward, in substance, a theory of recovery based on medical
malpractice, the issue is not what the claim is in substance,
1060061
26
but, instead, whether Dorothy or Wright had manifested assent
to or ratified the admission contract.  If either manifested
his or her assent to or ratified the admission contract,
Wright must arbitrate the claims as that contract requires. 
The main opinion argues that, although Wright avowed the
contract and asserted a cause of action for the breach of that
contract, Wright did not actually raise a breach-of-contract
claim and, therefore, did not manifest his assent to the
admission contract.  First, I cannot agree that Wright has
failed to assert a breach-of-contract claim because that
claim, although clearly intended to allege a breach of
contract, is phrased in "conclusory and generic terms."  The
plaintiffs specifically alleged that a contract exists.  The
breach-of-contract claim is expressly based on Noland's
"fail[ure] to comply with the terms and conditions set forth
in the contract for admission."  This language, along with the
other factual allegations in the complaint, is sufficient to
state a claim of breach of contract.  See Cain v. Howorth, 877
So. 2d 566, 575 (Ala. 2003) ("[A] complaint is sufficient if
it puts the defendant on notice of the claims against him
...."). 
1060061
27
Second, and more importantly, I also disagree with the
contention that, because the substance of the claim sounds in
tort rather than in contract, Wright did not manifest his
assent to the admission contract and is not bound by it.  In
support, the main opinion cites § 6-5-542(2), Ala. Code 1975,
a part of the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987, § 6-5-540
et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the AMLA"), which provides:
"The standard of care is that level of such
reasonable care, skill, and diligence as other
similarly situated health care providers in the same
general line of practice, ordinarily have and
exercise in like cases.  A breach of the standard of
care is the failure by a health care provider to
comply with the standard of care, which failure
proximately causes personal injury or wrongful
death.  This definition applies to all actions for
injuries or damages or wrongful death whether in
contract or tort and whether based on intentional or
unintentional conduct."
However, in Ex parte Addiction & Mental Health Services, Inc.,
948 So. 2d 533, 535 (Ala. 2006), this Court rejected the
argument that "the AMLA applies to all claims against
health-care providers arising out of the relationship between
the health-care provider and the patient."  Instead, as the
main opinion recognizes, the AMLA 
regulates 
only actions where
the plaintiff alleges to have suffered a "medical injury."  Ex
parte Addiction & Mental Health Servs., 948 So. 2d at 536.  
1060061
28
Further, the AMLA on its face does not bar a plaintiff
from joining a contract claim with a medical-malpractice
claim, nor does it necessarily bar a plaintiff from seeking
recovery for medical malpractice under a breach-of-contract
theory.  See § 6-5-542(2), Ala. Code 1975 ("This definition
applies to all actions for injuries or damages or wrongful
death whether in contract or tort ....").  In Collins v.
Ashurst, 821 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2001), this Court held that
the AMLA did not bar "more than one type of action for medical
malpractice [from being] brought" under it.  In Collins, the
plaintiff attempted to recover for the same injury under three
different theories: medical malpractice, assault and battery,
and trespass to the person.  We held that "the trial court
erred in determining that the AMLA allows for only one cause
of 
action, and, consequently, 
in 
striking 
Collins's counts for
assault and battery and trespass."  Collins, 821 So. 2d at
177.  Although each claim would have to be brought following
the requirements of the AMLA, we held that a plaintiff could
state a claim for the same injury under multiple legal
theories.  We based our reasoning, in part, on the statements
in the AMLA that it applies to actions "whether in contract or
1060061
29
tort."  821 So. 2d at 176.  Thus, it appears that a plaintiff
could join a breach-of-contract claim with a medical-
malpractice claim, or even bring a breach-of-contract claim
based on a breach of the medical standard of care. 
The main opinion relies on our cases holding that a party
may not, through creative pleading, frame a medical-
malpractice claim as a breach-of-contract claim and thereby
avoid the specific requirements of the AMLA.  In Mobile
Infirmary v. Delchamps, 642 So. 2d 954, 956-57 (Ala. 1994),
the plaintiff attempted to avoid the statute of limitations of
the AMLA by alleging fraud and breach of warranty instead of
medical malpractice.  In Mock v. Allen,   783 So. 2d 828, 834-
35 (Ala. 2000), the plaintiff argued that the AMLA did not
apply to his case so that he could avoid the application of §
6-5-551, Ala. Code 1975, which limits the admissibility of
"similar acts" evidence.  In both of those cases, the
plaintiffs attempted to evade the requirements of the AMLA
through creative pleading.
The complaint in the case before us does not attempt to
recast a medical-malpractice claim as a breach-of-contract
claim 
to 
circumvent 
the 
procedural 
and 
substantive
1060061
30
requirements of the AMLA; instead, Wright alleges both breach
of contract and medical malpractice.  That is, in addition to
alleging a medical-malpractice claim, Wright also recognizes
the contract and asserts rights under it.  Under Collins,
Wright was entitled to bring his claims under multiple legal
theories.  Collins, 821 So. 2d at 177.  The two claims are not
necessarily mutually exclusive; however, even if the claims
are redundant, because Wright has not attempted to evade the
substantive and procedural requirements of the AMLA, there is
no reason for, nor any authority to support, this Court's
decision to recast the complaint in this case.  
The plaintiff is the "master of his complaint."  See BP
Chems. Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo Corp., 285 F.3d 677, 685 (8th Cir.
2002) ("One might read the [United States Supreme Court's]
discussion as extending to a district judge broad discretion
to 
recast 
a 
plaintiff's 
claims 
to 
fit 
the 
judge's
understanding of the case.  Yet we can scarcely imagine the
Court intended that result.  Such an expansion of judicial
power is at loggerheads with liberal notice pleading rules and
our settled understanding that a plaintiff is the master of
his complaint.").  If a plaintiff wishes to plead herself out
1060061
31
of court and into arbitration, this Court allows her to do so.
As we recognized in Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So. 2d 303, 306
(Ala. 2004),
"'[i]t is a "well-settled rule that a party is bound
by what it states in its pleadings."' Help At Home,
Inc. v. Medical Capital, L.L.C., 260 F.3d 748, 753
(7th Cir. 2001); Lucas v. Burnley, 879 F.2d 1240,
1242 (4th Cir. 1989); Best Canvas Prods. & Supplies,
Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618, 621
(11th Cir. 1983). Thus, 'a plaintiff can ... plead
himself out of a claim by including unnecessary
details contrary to his claims.' Sprewell[ v. Golden
State Warriors,] 266 F.3d [979] at 988 [(9th Cir.
2001)] (emphasis added) (citing Steckman v. Hart
Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1998)). See
also Soo Line R.R. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry.,
125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997) ('A plaintiff can
"plead himself out of court by alleging facts which
show that he has no claim, even though he was not
required to allege those facts."'); Fraternal Order
of Police, Strawberry Lodge No. 40 v. Entrekin, 294
Ala. 201, 212, 314 So.2d 663, 673 (1975) ('"The
pleader must be careful not to allege facts that
constitute a defense to his claim for relief, or,
for 
that 
matter, 
a 
defense 
to 
his
defense."')(quoting 2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶
8.02)."
In Blankenship, the plaintiff asked this Court to disregard
factual allegations in the complaint that established the
defendant's immunity from suit.  We refused, stating: "In
effect, [the plaintiff] urges this Court to amend her
complaint by striking paragraph seven, in order to the
eliminate the jurisdictional impediment that paragraph
1060061
32
presents to her claim."  893 So. 2d at 306.  We noted that
although she did not need to plead paragraph seven in order to
state a claim, "[h]aving done so, ... she cannot avoid the
legal 
consequences 
of 
those 
factual 
allegations."
Blankenship, 893 So. 2d at 306 (footnote omitted).  Similarly,
here Wright pleaded sufficient facts to establish that there
was a contract, and he similarly should be bound to the legal
consequences of those allegations.
Further, by affirmatively alleging the existence of the
contract, Dorothy Willis and Wright ratified the contract.  In
Georgia Power Co. v. Partin, 727 So. 2d 2 (Ala. 1998), we
dealt with similar circumstances.  Partin sued Georgia Power
after he was injured in a fall from a catwalk on the end of a
railroad car.  Partin alleged that Georgia Power behaved
negligently or wantonly in failing to correct unsafe work
procedures, in maintaining the site where Partin was injured,
and in failing to provide adequate lighting and a crosswalk
over the train.  Partin then amended his complaint to state a
breach-of-contract claim against Georgia Power, arguing that
Georgia Power had breached an operations agreement that it had
entered into with Orba Corporation, which operated the coal-
1060061
33
loading facility on the site.  The operations agreement, which
contained an arbitration provision, provided that Georgia
Power had certain obligations in maintaining the site where
Partin was injured.  The trial court granted permission to
amend; thus, Partin stated a breach-of-contract claim as a
third-party 
beneficiary 
of 
the operations 
agreement as well 
as
his negligence cause of action based on the same injury.
Georgia Power moved to compel arbitration of the claims
pursuant to the arbitration provision.  Partin argued that he
was not bound by the arbitration provision because he was not
a signatory to the operations agreement between Georgia Power
and Orba.  This Court noted the "well-established principle of
Alabama law that a contract made for the benefit of a third
person may, at his election, be accepted and enforced by him."
Partin, 727 So. 2d at 5.  We further stated: "'The law is
clear that a third party beneficiary is bound by the terms and
conditions of the contract that it attempts to invoke.  "The
beneficiary cannot accept the benefits and avoid the burdens
or limitations of a contract."'"  Partin, 727 So. 2d at 5
(quoting Interpool Ltd. v. Through Transp. Mut. Ins. Ass'n
Ltd., 635 F. Supp. 1503, 1505 (S.D. Fla. 1985), quoting in
1060061
34
turn Trans-Bay Eng'rs & Builders, Inc. v. Hills, 551 F.2d 370,
378 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).  The Court held that, because Partin
brought the claim as a third-party beneficiary of the
operations agreement, which he had not signed, he had, in
effect, agreed to all of the terms of the contract, including
the arbitration provision.  
As in this case, the issue in Partin was whether Partin
had assented to the contract by ratifying it.  "'Assent must
be manifested by something.  Ordinarily, it is manifested by
a signature.  [However], [a]ssent may be manifested by
ratification.'"  Ex parte Cain, 838 So. 2d 1020, 1027 (Ala.
2002) (quoting Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Hennis, 776 So.
2d 105, 108 (Ala. 2000)).  Thus, by invoking the contract,
Partin demonstrated that he agreed to its terms and was
willing to be bound by it, even though he did not sign the
contract.  As this Court has held, "[a] party, by his actions
and acceptance of the benefits of a contract and by operating
under that contract, may ratify and confirm it, even though
his actual signature is not affixed."  Lawler Mobile Homes,
Inc. v. Tarver, 492 So. 2d 297,  305 (Ala. 1986).  
1060061
35
Other cases have held that a third-party beneficiary
manifests assent to a contract by pleading a breach of that
contract.  In Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d
1131, 1134 (Ala. 2000), the Ards had purchased a mobile home
manufactured by Southern Energy.  They sued, alleging a breach
of express warranty, a Magnuson-Moss Act violation, and the
negligent manufacture for the mobile home.  Southern Energy
moved to compel the arbitration of the Ards' claims on the
basis of an arbitration provision in the express warranty for
the mobile home.  The trial court denied the motion, finding
that the Ards had not signed the warranty.  This Court
reversed the order denying the motion to compel for two
reasons.  First, the Ards had accepted the benefits of the
express warranty by requesting and receiving service on the
mobile home as provided by the express warranty.  Second, the
Ards had brought their claim on the theory, among others, of
express warranty.  The only express warranty in evidence was
the one containing the arbitration provision.  This Court held
that "[a] plaintiff cannot simultaneously claim the benefits
of a contract and repudiate its burdens and conditions." Ard,
772 So. 2d at 1134.  Therefore, we compelled arbitration.
1060061
36
The main opinion would distinguish Ard by suggesting
that, 
because 
any 
rights asserted under the admission 
contract
were cumulative to those provided in the AMLA, Wright could
not assert any rights under the contract.  However, Partin
suggests that it is the "attempt[] to invoke" the contract
that matters.  Partin, 727 So. 2d at 5.  The inquiry is
whether the plaintiff assented to the terms of the contract.
Here, Wright admitted that there was a binding contract, and
he attempted to sue under it.  In this case, there would have
been no breach-of-contract claims against Noland absent the
contract that provided for Dorothy to be admitted into the
nursing-home facility.  See Ex parte Dyess, 709 So. 2d 447,
451 (Ala. 1997) (plurality opinion) ("Dyess's claims against
American Hardware are so closely related to the insurance
policy that Dyess must follow its terms even though he did not
sign it.  In addition, Dyess's claims would not exist but for
the contract between Jack Ingram 
Motors and American
Hardware.").  Dorothy received the benefits of the contract
because Noland provided nursing-home services to Dorothy
pursuant to the admission contract.  Further, both Dorothy and
Wright brought the action on a breach-of-contract theory.
1060061
37
Thus, like the plaintiffs in Partin and Ard, Dorothy and
Wright have ratified and manifested their assent to the
admission contract, and Wright cannot now "arbitrarily pick
and choose between the provisions in the contract that [are]
advantageous to him and the one provision he [thinks is] not
-- the arbitration provision."  Delta Constr. Corp. v. Gooden,
714 So. 2d 975, 981 (Ala. 1998). 
Further, the mere assertion of a medical-malpractice
claim does not, in itself, render void in its entirety a
contract between the parties, including their agreement to
arbitrate a future dispute.  See, e.g., Owens v. Coosa Valley
Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983 (Ala. 2004) (compelling the
arbitration of a medical-malpractice action against a nursing
home).  Where there is a valid and binding arbitration
agreement, as here, the question is whether the scope of the
arbitration agreement covers the medical-malpractice claim.
Dorothy's admission contract requires the arbitration of any
"claim."  The arbitration provision defines a "claim" as 
"any controversy, dispute, cause of action, or claim
now or hereafter existing ... not limited to ... any
claim arising out of, relating to, or concerning
this Agreement in any way, and/or the care or
treatment of you in the Facility, whether in
contract, tort, based on statute, equity, otherwise,
1060061
38
including, but not limited to, negligence and
wrongful death claims ....  It is the intention of
the parties to encompass within this provision and
the term 'Claim' the broadest possible scope of
claims, controversies, disputes, and causes of
action ...."
The language of the arbitration provision encompasses this
medical-malpractice action.  The claims in the complaint
"aris[e] out of, relat[e] to, or concern ... the care or
treatment of [Dorothy] in the Facility."  Therefore, because
Wright is bound by the admission contract, he must arbitrate
Dorothy's medical-malpractice claim.
Had Wright in these circumstances brought only a breach-
of-contract action and forgone the tort claim, even if the
breach-of-contract claim had 
alleged 
only medical injury, 
I do
not believe that there would be any doubt that under our
caselaw he would be bound by the arbitration provision.  The
claim would have to comply with the AMLA's procedural and
substantive requirements, but there is nothing in the AMLA
that requires the plaintiff to pursue the claim under a
particular legal theory.  See § 6-5-542(2), Ala. Code 1975
("This definition applies to all actions for injuries or
damages or wrongful death whether in contract or tort ....");
Collins, 821 So. 2d at 177 (holding that a plaintiff could
1060061
Such a holding may violate the constitutional provisions
1
prohibiting the impairment of contracts.  See John E. Nowak &
Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 405 (4th ed. 1991)
(noting that the Contracts Clause in the United States
Constitution restricts the power of state or local governments
to substantially impair a contractual relationship unless the
state law is narrowly tailored to promote a significant and
legitimate public purpose). 
39
bring an action for a medical injury under multiple legal
theories). 
 
Yet, 
because 
Wright 
joined 
that 
breach-of-contract
claim with a medical-malpractice claim, the main opinion, in
effect, renders the contract void.  There are therefore two
implicit holdings of the main opinion: (1) that a plaintiff
cannot bring an action based on a medical injury under the
theory of breach of contract, and (2) that a party cannot
contract for a standard of care higher than that specified in
the AMLA.   The first proposition appears to contradict our
1
holding in Collins, discussed above, and I am unaware of
caselaw establishing the second proposition. 
Dorothy Willis benefited from the admission contract, and
her personal representative, Wright, expressly invokes that
contract.  Wright cannot now deny being bound by it.  Because
the arbitration provision of the contract encompasses this
1060061
40
dispute, I believe that the trial court should have compelled
arbitration; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Bolin, J., concurs.