Title: State v. Crosby

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 119,824 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
EMMANUEL ELIJAH CROSBY, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
The crimes in this case, committed within a year of each other, are factually 
similar enough to satisfy the "same or similar character" statutory condition set forth in 
K.S.A. 22-3202(1) for the purpose of joinder. 
 
2. 
In order to convict a defendant of distribution of a controlled substance under 
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5705(a), the State must present sufficient evidence of possession 
as a necessary part of the crime.  
 
3.  
A jury instruction that omits specific facts alleged in the complaint does not 
expand the elements of the crime. As long as the elements described by the jury 
instruction accurately match the statutory language for the charged offense, there is no 
error. 
 
 
 
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Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; KEVIN J. O'CONNOR, judge. Opinion filed January 15, 
2021. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
Peter Maharry, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the brief for appellant.  
 
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
STEGALL, J.:  Emmanuel Crosby was charged with 10 crimes stemming from two 
separate incidents on October 15, 2015 and November 1, 2016. Crosby was charged with 
felony murder, distribution of a controlled substance, two counts of attempted aggravated 
robbery, two counts of criminal possession of a weapon, attempted murder in the second 
degree, criminal discharge of a firearm, aggravated battery, and aggravated burglary. The 
district court consolidated Crosby's cases, and a jury found Crosby guilty as charged. 
 
Crosby directly appeals his convictions arguing the district court erred by 
consolidating his cases. He also claims there was insufficient evidence to support his 
distribution conviction and that the jury instructions on his attempted aggravated robbery, 
felony murder, and criminal possession of a firearm charges were erroneous. In the end, 
Crosby argues that cumulative error deprived him of his right to a fair trial and that his 
convictions must be reversed.  
 
We reverse Crosby's distribution conviction because the State failed to provide 
sufficient evidence of Crosby distributing or intending to distribute the marijuana during 
the October 2015 incident. But because we find no other errors, we affirm the rest of 
Crosby's convictions. 
 
 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
On October 15, 2015, Crosby was with his friend Diego Larraga when Crosby told 
Larraga he wanted some weed. Larraga believed his ex-girlfriend Megan Wells could sell 
Crosby some weed, so he called her. Wells confirmed that her boyfriend, David Ingram, 
could sell them 2 ounces of weed for $500. So Crosby and Larraga arranged to meet 
Wells and Ingram behind a convenience store to carry out the transaction.  
 
 
Wells arrived behind the convenience store driving with Ingram in the passenger 
seat. Upon arrival, Larraga and Crosby entered the backseat of the vehicle and Wells 
started to drive around the block. Crosby asked if he could see the weed, and Ingram 
placed a bag on the center console. Crosby said that the weight looked "shaky," but 
Ingram assured him it was all there. Larraga and Wells were having a conversation when 
they heard Crosby tell Ingram to "give it up." Wells then heard Ingram say "all right, all 
right" and turned to see Ingram with his hands up. As Wells tried to put the car in park, 
Crosby fired five to six shots into Ingram's head and upper body. Crosby and Larraga 
jumped from the vehicle and fled, leaving the drugs behind.  
 
Ingram died as a result of the gunshot wounds. About an hour later, police 
apprehended Larraga and Crosby at Larraga's brother's home. The State brought charges 
associated with this incident on October 20, 2015, but they were later dismissed because 
the State could not locate a witness. 
 
Then, on November 1, 2016, Crosby contacted Phillip Saunders about getting a 10 
pack of ecstasy. Saunders told Crosby it would cost $60, and the two agreed to meet at a 
residence. When Saunders pulled up to the residence, Crosby was already outside of the 
residence with a man named Gene Johnson. Saunders remained in his car as the two 
approached his window. Johnson showed Saunders a computer that Johnson and Crosby 
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wanted to trade in exchange for the ecstasy pills. Saunders refused the deal and explained 
to them that the computer was not worth as much as the ecstasy pills.  
 
Crosby and Johnson became irritated and started threatening Saunders. Crosby 
retrieved a gun from the porch and pointed it at Saunders stating "[w]ell, you're going to 
give up what you got." Saunders told Crosby "I'm not giving up nothing." Crosby then 
reached into Saunders' car with his free hand, and Saunders pushed Crosby off. Both 
Crosby and Johnson started firing as Saunders put the car into reverse and sped off. As 
Saunders was driving off, he looked down and realized he had been shot. Saunders drove 
to a general store where he was able to get someone to call an ambulance. Saunders 
sustained serious injuries from the shooting but survived.  
 
The next day, the Wichita Police Department identified Crosby as a suspect in 
Saunders' shooting. Officers successfully located and apprehended Crosby. Upon arrest, 
the arresting officers found eight cartridges of ammunition matching a spent cartridge 
casing found in Saunders' vehicle. Police also found a laptop at the residence containing 
Crosby's fingerprints.  
 
Ultimately, the State charged Crosby with 10 crimes between the two incidents. 
For the October 15, 2015 incident, the State charged Crosby with first-degree murder, 
distribution of a controlled substance, attempted aggravated robbery, and criminal 
possession of a firearm. For the November 1, 2016 incident, the State charged Crosby 
with attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, attempted murder in the second 
degree, criminal discharge of a firearm, aggravated battery, and criminal possession of a 
weapon by a convicted felon.  
 
Crosby moved to sever the charges. But the court denied this request finding that 
the evidence established similar crimes in which Crosby lured individuals into a drug  
 
5 
 
deal to rob them. The court also noted that "joinder is the rule rather than the exception" 
and held that Crosby failed to show joinder was prejudicial. Thus, the charges from 
October 2015 and November 2016 were consolidated for trial. A jury found Crosby 
guilty as charged.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Crosby first challenges the district court's decision to join the cases. A district 
court is statutorily permitted to order two or more cases tried together if the crimes 
involved could have been joined in a single complaint, information, or indictment. K.S.A. 
22-3203. Two or more crimes may be charged in separate counts of the same complaint, 
information, or indictment if the crimes:  (1) are of the same or similar character; or 
(2) are based on the same act or transaction; or (3) are based on two or more acts or 
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. K.S.A. 
22-3202(1). Here, Crosby contends the district court erroneously concluded the crimes 
here met the statutory condition of being of the same or similar character. We disagree. 
 
We review potential joinder errors using a three-step process, applying a different 
standard of review at each step. 
 
"'When analyzing an issue of joinder, an appellate court determines which of the 
three conditions precedent the district court relied on (same or similar character; same act 
or transaction; or two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts 
of a common scheme or plan); whether there is substantial competent evidence to support 
the district court's findings of fact, using a deferential standard; whether the district court 
properly concluded that a condition precedent had been met, using a de novo standard; 
and whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing joinder.'" State v. Cruz, 
297 Kan. 1048, 1054, 307 P.3d 199 (2013) (quoting State v. Gaither, 283 Kan. 671, Syl. 
¶ 4, 156 P.3d 602 [2007]). 
 
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Crosby does not challenge the district court's factual findings. Rather, Crosby 
argues that the legal conclusion should have been that the facts did not establish that the 
crimes were of the "same or similar character" or "connected together," an issue over 
which we exercise unlimited review. Cruz, 297 Kan. at 1054. Additionally, Crosby 
argues the district court abused its discretion in considering judicial economy when 
weighing whether joinder was appropriate. We review the district court's decision to join 
the cases under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Ritz, 305 Kan. 956, 961, 389 P.3d 
969 (2017). 
 
First, we disagree with Crosby's argument that the district court erroneously found 
that a condition precedent under K.S.A. 22-3202(1) was met. Crosby argues the charges 
are not of the same or similar character because the offenses occurred a year apart, were 
in different locations, and the crimes were committed with different accomplices. 
According to Crosby, beyond generalities inherent in violent crimes, there were 
insufficient similarities to warrant consolidation.  
 
We find Crosby's argument that the time between the October 2015 incident and 
the November 2016 incident precludes the court from finding the crimes were of similar 
character unpersuasive. Indeed, in the past we have found crimes occurring more than a 
year apart were "of the same or similar character." In Cruz, for example, this court found 
that two crimes occurring 17 months apart were of the same or similar character. 297 
Kan. at 1057. The Cruz court even mentioned that the 17-month interval between the 
crimes "pale[d] in comparison" to other cases in which this court found joinder 
appropriate. 297 Kan. at 1056-57. See State v. Bunyard, 281 Kan. 392, 403, 133 P.3d 12 
(2006) ("[T]he time span between all three incidents occurred within slightly over 1 year 
and, accordingly, the time span is not significant for severance considerations."); State v. 
Cromwell, 253 Kan. 495, 512, 856 P.2d 1299 (1993) (finding joinder appropriate where  
 
7 
 
four years passed in between the two murders). So we find Crosby's claim that the one-
year time difference makes these crimes dissimilar unpersuasive.  
 
Crosby correctly notes, however, that the crimes must be factually similar. See 
Ritz, 305 Kan. at 964 (holding that an overlap in the crimes charged is not enough to 
establish that crimes are of the same or similar character—there must be other factual 
similarities). See also State v. Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. 132, 157, 340 P.3d 485 (2014) 
("On the first statutory condition, crimes of the same or similar character, we note that 
earlier Kansas cases that have held consolidation or joinder to be appropriate have 
generally had multiple commonalities, not merely the same classification of one of the 
crimes charged."). But while Crosby points out the differences between the two crimes—
different location and different accomplices—he fails to mention the factual similarities.  
 
Here, both of the victims were drug dealers. During both transactions Crosby 
threatened the victims with a firearm and attempted to take the drugs without payment. 
And, of course, both drug transactions ended with Crosby firing his weapon at the 
victims. The circumstances of Crosby's case remind us of past cases with crimes 
involving drug dealer victims, the same type of weapon used, and robbery as a motive—
all leading us to conclude the crimes were of the same or similar character. See State v. 
Gaither, 283 Kan. 671, 687, 156 P.3d 602 (2007) (both victims drug dealers; defendant 
on quest for drugs during both; both victims shot with 9 mm handgun; both occurred in 
private dwellings; five-day time span); State v. Barksdale, 266 Kan. 498, 506-10, 973 
P.2d 165 (1999) (both crimes murder; victims killed in similar manner; robbery common 
motive); State v. Crawford, 255 Kan. 47, 48, 53-54, 872 P.2d 293 (1994) (both crimes 
robbery; victims identified defendant; similar modus operandi). Accordingly, we find the 
district court correctly held that Crosby's two crimes were of the same or similar 
character.  
 
8 
 
Having determined that one or more of the statutory conditions were present, this 
court must determine whether the district court abused its discretion by consolidating 
Crosby's cases. State v. Hurd, 298 Kan. 555, 561, 316 P.3d 696 (2013). A judicial action 
constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is 
based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State v. Ingham, 308 Kan. 
1466, 1469, 430 P.3d 931 (2018). Here, Crosby bears the burden of showing such abuse 
of discretion as the party asserting abuse. See State v. Thomas, 307 Kan. 733, 739, 415 
P.3d 430 (2018). 
 
Crosby argues the district court's consideration of judicial economy as a reason for 
consolidation was an error of law. Although the district court did briefly discuss joinder 
being the rule rather than the exception for the sake of judicial economy, the majority of 
the court's discussion centered on the factual similarities between the crimes. The court 
found that in Crosby's cases, both victims were lured to a designated location for drug 
transactions. The court also noted the use of a telephone to arrange these meetings and 
the use of a handgun in both incidents. The court then compared these facts to those in 
other cases contemplating joinder before concluding that joinder was proper in Crosby's 
case. Thus, we find that Crosby failed to meet his burden of establishing the district court 
abused its discretion in consolidating the two cases for trial, after finding that the crimes 
were of the same or similar character. As a result, we affirm the district court's order of 
consolidation. 
 
There is insufficient evidence to support Crosby's distribution charge.  
 
 
Next, Crosby argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his distribution 
conviction. Crosby was convicted of distributing 54 to 56 grams of marijuana in 
connection with the October 15, 2015 shooting. Crosby claims that the State failed to 
produce evidence sufficient to convict Crosby of distribution under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 
21-5705.  
9 
 
 
"'When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard 
of review is whether, after reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, the appellate court is convinced a rational factfinder could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, 
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations.'" State v. 
Chandler, 307 Kan. 657, 668, 414 P.3d 713 (2018). 
 
 
Before reaching the sufficiency issue, we must discuss an issue of statutory 
interpretation raised by the parties. Crosby and the State argue over whether a person 
who possesses a drug by receiving a distribution from another can be convicted of 
violating K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5705(a). We need not resolve this particular statutory 
dispute, however, because under any conceivable theory, possession is an element of the 
crime of distribution. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law over which 
appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Downing, 311 Kan. 100, 103, 456 P.3d 
535 (2020).  
 
"And when interpreting a statute, the court begins its 'analysis with the touchstone of 
statutory interpretation:  legislative intent. The best and safest rule for discerning this 
intent is the plain language of the statute. Only when the statutory language is unclear or 
ambiguous [does the court] move on to consider tools of statutory construction.'" State v. 
Davis, 312 Kan. 259, 267, 474 P.3d 722 (2020) (quoting State v. Lundberg, 310 Kan. 
165, 170, 445 P.3d 1113 [2019]). 
 
Under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5705: 
 
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to distribute or possess with the intent to 
distribute any of the following controlled substances or controlled substance analogs 
thereof: 
 
 
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. . . .  
 
(4) any hallucinogenic drug designated in subsection (d) of K.S.A. 65-4105, 
subsection (g) of K.S.A. 65-4107 or subsection (g) of K.S.A. 65-4109, and 
amendments thereto." 
 
Because K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5705(a) includes the alternatives "distribute" or 
"possess with the intent to distribute" it raises the question whether a person can ever be 
convicted of distribution of a controlled substance without first possessing the controlled 
substance as a matter of law. The most natural reading of the statute is that possession is 
an assumed prerequisite to distribution. See Black's Law Dictionary, Distribute, 597 
(11th ed. 2019) ("To apportion; to divide among several. . . . To arrange by class or order. 
. . . To deliver. . . . To spread out; to disperse."); Black's Law Dictionary, Distribution, 
597 (11th ed. 2019) ("The act or process of apportioning or giving out."). This reading 
gains added force when we look to the statutory definitions of distribution and 
possession.  
 
Distribute is defined as "the actual, constructive or attempted transfer from one 
person to another of some item whether or not there is an agency relationship." K.S.A. 
2019 Supp. 21-5701(d). This "includes, but is not limited to, sale, offer for sale or any act 
that causes some item to be transferred from one person to another." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 
21-5701(d). Possession is defined as "having joint or exclusive control over an item with 
knowledge of and intent to have such control or knowingly keeping some item in a place 
where the person has some measure of access and right of control." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 
21-5701(q). We conclude it is impossible to "transfer" a controlled substance "from one 
person to another" without having "joint or exclusive control over" the controlled 
substance first. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5701(d); K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5701(q). As a 
definitional matter, a person cannot transfer something one does not control. Therefore,  
 
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in order to convict a defendant of distribution of a controlled substance under K.S.A. 
2019 Supp. 21-5705(a), the State must present sufficient evidence of possession as a 
necessary part of the crime.  
 
The evidence here was simply insufficient to establish that Crosby ever possessed 
the drugs. The State's evidence established that Crosby and Larraga entered the backseat 
of Wells' vehicle with Ingram in the front passenger seat. Once Crosby and Larraga were 
inside the vehicle, Crosby asked Ingram if he could see the marijuana. Ingram then 
placed the bag of marijuana on the center console. Shortly after, Crosby demanded 
Ingram to hand over the bag of marijuana, pointing a gun at Ingram. Crosby then shot 
Ingram, and Crosby and Larraga fled the scene leaving the bag of marijuana behind. 
After calling the police for help, Wells threw the bag of marijuana still sitting on the 
center console into the back of the vehicle. When officers inspected the crime scene, they 
found a baggie covered in blood containing 2 ounces of marijuana sitting on a pair of 
jeans in the back. Thus, the State failed to establish Crosby actually possessed the bag of 
marijuana. Because one must possess the substance in order to distribute it, we find the 
evidence insufficient to convict Crosby of distribution.  
 
The jury instructions on Crosby's attempted aggravated robbery, felony murder, and 
criminal possession of a firearm charges were not erroneous.  
 
 
Crosby also claims the jury instructions given on his robbery, felony murder, 
and criminal possession of a firearm charges were erroneous. First, Crosby argues the 
jury instructions were overbroad because they contained elements of the crimes charged 
not specifically alleged in the complaint. Second, Crosby argues the criminal possession 
of a firearm charge associated with the October 15, 2015 shooting was factually 
inappropriate. After reviewing both claims we find that the instructions were legally and 
factually appropriate.  
 
12 
 
 
We review both these jury instruction claims under our normal three step 
framework:  
 
"When analyzing jury instruction issues, we follow a three-step process:  
 
'(1) determining whether the appellate court can or should review the issue, i.e., 
whether there is a lack of appellate jurisdiction or a failure to preserve the issue 
for appeal;  
 
'(2) considering the merits of the claim to determine whether error occurred 
below; and  
 
'(3) assessing whether the error requires reversal, i.e., whether the error can be 
deemed harmless.'" State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 317, 409 P.3d 1 (2018). 
 
The district court did not err by giving jury instructions that were broader than the facts 
alleged in the complaint.  
 
Crosby admits he did not properly preserve his first jury instruction issue for 
appeal. Thus, we will only reverse if an error occurred and the court is firmly convinced 
that the jury would have reached a different verdict if the instruction error had not 
occurred. The party claiming a clear error has the burden to show the necessary prejudice. 
307 Kan. at 318. 
 
But first, this court must complete the second step to determine whether an error 
occurred. At the second step, this court considers whether the instruction was legally and 
factually appropriate. 307 Kan. at 318. Appellate courts use unlimited review to 
determine whether an instruction was legally appropriate. State v. Johnson, 304 Kan. 924, 
931, 376 P.3d 70 (2016). Here, Crosby argues the instructions were legally inappropriate 
because they failed to include specific facts alleged in the State's complaint.  
 
13 
 
Generally, a jury instruction on the elements of a crime that is broader than the 
charged crime is erroneous. State v. McClelland, 301 Kan. 815, Syl. ¶ 4, 347 P.3d 211 
(2015). The charging document sets out the specific offense alleged to inform the 
defendant of the nature of the accusation, to permit the development of a defense to meet 
that accusation, and to protect against conviction based on facts not contemplated in the 
accusation. 301 Kan. 815, Syl. ¶ 4. Accordingly, the State is bound by the wording of its 
charging document. 301 Kan. 815, Syl. ¶ 4. And if a jury instruction on the elements of a 
crime adds alternate statutory elements that were not contained within the language of the 
complaint or information charging the defendant with the crime, the instruction is overly 
broad and, thus, erroneous. 301 Kan. 815, Syl. ¶ 5. 
 
In the final amended information filed by the State, Count One set forth the 
offense of felony murder stating:   
 
"Emmanuel Elijah Crosby did then and there unlawfully kill a human being, to wit:  
David J. Ingram." 
 
 
At trial, the jury instruction on felony murder stated:   
 
 
 
"The defendant or another killed David J. Ingram." 
 
 
Counts Three and Five of the amended information charged Crosby with 
attempted aggravated robbery stating:  
 
"Emmanuel Elijah Crosby did commit any overt act, to-wit:  pointed a gun and demanded 
David J. Ingram to give him the marijuana." 
 
"Emmanuel Elijah Crosby did commit any overt act, to-wit:  pointed a gun at PLS and 
demanded cash." 
 
14 
 
At trial, the instructions on attempted aggravated robbery for both charges read: 
 
"The defendant performed an overt act toward the commission of aggravated 
robbery." 
 
 
Counts 4 and 10 of the State's amended information charged Crosby with unlawful 
possession of a firearm: 
 
"Emmanuel Elijah Crosby did then and there unlawfully possess a weapon, to-wit:  
handgun." 
 
 
At trial, the court provided the following instruction on Crosby's unlawful 
possession of a firearm charges: 
 
"The defendant possessed a weapon. . . . 'Possession' means having joint or 
exclusive control over an item with knowledge of or intent to have such control." 
 
 
Crosby claims the district court committed clear error by failing to include the 
same specific facts set forth in the State's charging document. In doing so, Crosby cites to 
cases where we found that the instructions were overly broad and erroneous because they 
added alternate statutory elements of a crime that were not included in the complaint or 
information. See, e.g., State v. Hart, 297 Kan. 494, 508, 301 P.3d 1279 (2013) (finding 
overbroad jury instruction requiring crime of indecent liberties be committed with intent 
to arouse the sexual desires of the victim or defendant or both, but complaint only alleged 
intent to satisfy the sexual desires of the defendant); State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 803, 
217 P.3d 15 (2009) (jury instructions allowing the jury to convict the defendant of 
"displaying or procuring or producing" explicit photographs or videos of a child despite 
only being charged with "displaying" such videos was clearly erroneous). 
 
15 
 
 
The instructions here, however, did not contain an alternate statutory element that 
was not included within the language of the charged crime. Instead, the instructions 
omitted specific facts alleged in the complaint. An omission of specific facts in the 
instruction is not an expansion of the elements of the crime. The elements required by the 
jury instructions accurately matched the statutory language for the charged offenses.  
 
 
Further, the instruction on felony murder was not clearly erroneous because it 
included the language that the murder was committed by Crosby "or another." We have 
consistently held that the State is not required to charge aiding and abetting in the 
charging document to pursue a theory of accomplice liability at trial. See, e.g., State v. 
Dupree, 304 Kan. 377, 384-85, 373 P.3d 811 (2016) (Under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5210 
the State is not required to use the words "aiding and abetting" in the charging document 
in order to pursue a theory of accomplice liability at trial.). Similarly, the State was not 
required to allege overt acts in the complaint charging defendant with attempted 
aggravated robbery. State v. Humphrey, 252 Kan. 6, 28, 845 P.2d 592 (1992). 
 
 
Thus, we find that the instructions on felony murder, attempted aggravated 
robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm charges were legally appropriate. As a 
result, we find no error in the district court's instructions on felony murder, attempted 
aggravated robbery, and the possession of a firearm charge associated with the November 
2016 charge.  
 
The instruction on Crosby's unlawful possession of a firearm charge associated with the 
October 15, 2015 shooting was factually appropriate. 
 
 
Crosby additionally argues that the instruction on his unlawful possession of a 
firearm charge was factually inappropriate because there was no evidence of joint 
possession of a firearm. In determining whether an instruction was factually appropriate, 
this court must determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most 
16 
 
favorable to the requesting party that would have supported the instruction. State v. 
Williams, 303 Kan. 585, 598-99, 363 P.3d 1101 (2016). Here, that party is the State.  
 
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the 
instruction was factually appropriate. The State introduced evidence that on October 15, 
2015, Crosby and Larraga got into a car with Ingram to complete a drug transaction and 
subsequently attempted to rob Ingram. When Ingram failed to comply with Crosby's 
request to hand over the marijuana, Crosby shot Ingram multiple times. Crosby's defense 
strategy, however, attempted to inculpate Larraga or a third, unidentified individual as the 
shooter.  
 
 
Given the competing theories of who had the gun, we find that the instruction was 
factually appropriate. Thus, we find no error.  
 
Cumulative error does not warrant reversal.  
 
 
Lastly, Crosby claims that cumulative error requires reversal. But because we only 
find one error, we find no cumulative error. As a result, we affirm Crosby's convictions 
of felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, criminal possession of a firearm, 
attempted murder in the second degree, criminal discharge of a firearm, aggravated 
battery, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. We reverse Crosby's 
distribution of a controlled substance conviction.  
 
BEIER, J., not participating.  
MICHAEL E. WARD, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Ward was appointed to hear case No. 119,824 
under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the vacancy on 
the court by the retirement of Chief Justice Lawton R. Nuss.