Title: ODEGARD v. ODEGARD

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ODEGARD v. ODEGARD2003 WY 6769 P.3d 917Case Number: 02-138Decided: 05/29/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                
        

 

MICHAEL 
DUANE ODEGARD,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

BRENDA 
KAY ODEGARD,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Peggy 
Taylor, Gillette, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Robert 
W. Brown of Lonabough and Riggs, Sheridan, Wyoming

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, 
Michael Duane Odegard (husband), seeks review of the district court's divorce 
decree, which ended the marriage between him and Appellee, Brenda Kay Odegard 
(wife).  Husband claims that the 
district court:  Erred in the 
division of the marital property; used inadmissible evidence in valuing property 
subject to division; failed to admit evidence pertinent to the property 
division; erred in awarding attorney's fees to wife; made mathematical errors in 
computing the property division; erred in requiring husband to pay 7% interest 
on the unpaid portion of the property settlement; and failed to credit husband 
in the property division for amounts paid to wife as support pending the 
finalization of the divorce.

 

[¶2]      We will 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Husband presents 
these issues:

 

A.  The 
district court erred in including in the division, property which was not a 
product of the marital union and was not acquired during the course of the 
marriage by the joint efforts of the parties.

            
1.  It was error not to consider the testimony and letter of 
Theta Lester offered under the exception to hearsay rule.

            
2.  The District Court erred when it failed to follow Wyoming 
Statute § 20-2-114 by not considering the condition in which the parties will be 
left and the burdens imposed on the property for the benefit of either party and 
children.

            
3.  The Court erred in ignoring the parties' 
stipulation.

            
4.  The District Court erred when it failed to follow Wyoming 
Statute § 20-2-114 by not considering "the party through whom the property was 
acquired."

 

B.  It 
was error for the District Court to partially consider the inadmissible 
appraisal of Bob Zabel in setting values on the Home 
Place.

 

C.  The 
District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees of 
$5,000.00.

 

D.  The 
District Court erred mathematically in making its 
division.

 

E.  The 
District Court erred in requiring [husband] to pay seven per cent interest on 
the property settlement, even though there was no evidence to support 
it.

 

F.  The 
District Court erred in not applying the support paid to [wife] against the 
property settlement.

            
1.  The support provided was more than [wife] needed to defend 
and carry on the case.

            
2.  The court erred because it failed to consider the tax 
effects of the distribution.

            
3.  The court erred in failing to consider the ability of 
[husband] to pay.

            
4.  The court erred because it ignored its own temporary 
order.

 

Although 
wife does not provide a separate statement of the issues in her brief, we glean 
this as her rendition of the issues:

 

A.  Husband's 
arguments ignore the standard of review.

 

B.  The 
trial court may exercise wide discretion in dividing the parties' property and 
debts.

 

C.  Property 
given to the parties by third persons is also properly subject to 
division.

 

D.  The 
trial court properly refused to receive into evidence Theta Lester's 
"Disclaimer" letter.

 

E.  The 
parties did not have a stipulation regarding ownership of or restrictions on the 
Recluse Place.

 

F.  The 
trial court did not improperly consider the appraisal of wife's expert, Robert 
Zabel, in setting values on the Home Place.

 

G.  The 
trial court did not err in awarding $5,000.00 in attorney's fees to 
wife.

 

H.  The 
court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the cash which husband is to 
pay to wife over a period of time bear interest at the rate of 
7%.

 

I.  The 
district court did not err in declining to count the temporary support paid to 
wife during the pendency of this action against the property 
settlement.

 

J.  The 
trial court did not err by failing to consider the condition in which the 
parties will be left when it divided the property.

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      The parties were 
married on November 11, 1978.  
Throughout the marriage the parties lived on the Odegard family 
ranch.  Husband worked side-by-side 
with his father on the ranch, doing ranch and farming work, while wife primarily 
worked in the home raising the children, although she did do some ranch work and 
worked part time outside the home on several occasions.  Wife initiated the divorce proceedings; 
however, that was done at husband's insistence and because he did not want to 
continue the marriage.

 

[¶5]      Although a number 
of issues are raised in this appeal, the focal point is the district court's 
decision to award wife a ranch property referred to as the "Recluse Place."  Husband objects to wife's possession of 
what he considers Odegard "ancestral" lands, though wife made clear it is her 
desire and specific intention that the Recluse Place eventually go to the 
parties' sons when she no longer has need for the income she receives from that 
property.

 

[¶6]      The district 
court found that the parties had acquired substantial real property during the 
marriage.  They purchased the 
"Coones Place" in September of 1995, for $805,000.00.  The down payment on the Coones Place, as 
well as the annual payments toward the mortgage on that property, were made with 
funds received by the parties during the marriage.  During the marriage, the parties 
received several gifts of real property from husband's grandmother, Theta 
Lester, including a 310-acre tract of land known as the "Jones Place" in 1991, a 
4/7 interest in the lands and dwellings constructed on the "Home Place" in 1991 
(the Jones Place and the Home Place are known collectively as the "Home Place"), 
and a large tract of land known as the "Recluse Place" (also known as the 
"Lester Place") in 1998.  The 
parties built a house on the Home Place using approximately $120,000.00 in funds 
deposited in an investment account by husband's father.  Although that account was in the names 
of husband and his father, husband's father conceded that those funds were 
actually wages paid to husband during the course of the 
marriage.

 

[¶7]      Husband received 
other gifts of land from his grandmother, which were made to him and his father, 
but did not include wife.  Those 
properties were not included in the property division.

 

[¶8]      Wife had a close 
personal relationship with husband's grandmother, and the district court 
concluded that all gifts were made in an "intelligent and unequivocal 
fashion."  The properties given as 
gifts to the parties by the grandmother were included in the property division 
over husband's objections.

 

[¶9]      The district 
court concluded that the parties owned equity in the Coones Place of 
$587,192.00, the Recluse Place was worth $515,430.00, and the parties' interest 
in the Home Place was worth $114,000.00.  
In accordance with wife's request, but over husband's objection, the 
district court awarded the Recluse Place to wife and the Coones Place and the 
Home Place to husband.  The district 
court found that:

 

            
In order to achieve equity in this case, it is necessary to set over to 
[wife] some of the parties' real property.  
The "Recluse Place" was not property which historically belonged to the 
Odegard family.  It was, in fact, 
received by Theta Lester after her marriage to Mayne Lester, a marriage which 
occurred later in her life.  It is 
physically separated from the rest of the Odegard family lands.  It is appropriate that [wife] receive 
this property as part of her share of the marital estate for the value stated 
above.

 

In 
addition to the Coones Place and the Home Place, husband was awarded all the 
cattle and ranch equipment.  In 
order to make the property settlement equal, i.e., approximately 50/50, 
the district court made this adjustment:

 

            
[Husband] should pay to [wife] the sum of $232,898.50 (one-half of 
$465,797.00) in ten (10) equal, annual installments of $33,159.51, said annual 
payments including interest at the rate of seven percent (7%), starting on 
December 1, 2002, and continuing on December 1 of each year thereafter until 
fully paid.  [Husband] may prepay 
the principal balance due hereunder at any time, without penalty, provided, 
however, that any such prepayment will be credited first to accrued interest and 
then to principal.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶10]   There are few rules more firmly 
established in our jurisprudence than the proposition that the disposition of 
marital property is committed to the sound discretion of the district 
court.  Judicial discretion is made 
up of many things, including conclusions reached from objective criteria, as 
well as exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  We are required to ask ourselves whether 
the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether or not any facet 
of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  
In accomplishing our review, we consider only the evidence in favor of 
the successful party, ignore the evidence of the unsuccessful party, and grant 
to the successful party every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the 
record.  Holland v. Holland, 
2001 WY 113, ¶8, 35 P.2d 409, ¶8 (Wyo. 2001).  Moreover,

 

We 
apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing divisions of marital 
property and, recognizing that property settlements present complex problems 
requiring the trial court to assess the respective merits and needs of the 
parties, we will not disturb the result absent a manifest abuse of that 
discretion.  France v. 
France, 902 P.2d 701, 703 (Wyo.1995);  
Neuman v. Neuman, 842 P.2d 575, 578 (Wyo.1992);  Kennedy v. Kennedy, 456 P.2d 243, 
247 (Wyo.1964).  We will find an 
abuse of discretion when the disposition shocks the conscience of the court and 
appears so unfair and inequitable that reasonable persons could not abide 
it.  France, 902 P.2d  at 
703.

 

Mann 
v. Mann, 
979 P.2d 497, 500 (Wyo. 1999).

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶11]   Husband contends that some of the 
property included as marital property was not a product of the marital union and 
was not acquired during the marriage by the joint efforts of the parties.  As set out in the facts above, it was 
husband's contention that all gifts of real property made to husband and wife by 
husband's grandmother should not be included in the marital estate.  Husband also contended that cattle owned 
by him at the time he entered into the marriage should be excluded from the 
property settlement.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2001) is the primary source of guidance to the 
district court in this regard:

 

§ 
20-2-114. Disposition of property to be equitable; factors; alimony 
generally.

In 
granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the 
parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits 
of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the 
party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the 
property for the benefit of either party and children.  The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability to pay and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either 
party.

 

[¶12]   As was true in the Holland 
case, here husband's arguments are, for the most part, based upon a view of the 
record which gives credence only to the evidence favorable to husband, and 
ignores the evidence favorable to wife.  
Husband has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence adduced before 
the district court did not support the property division as a whole.  Holland, ¶9.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-201 (LexisNexis 
2001) provides that married persons may retain as their separate estate, 
property that a spouse owns at the time of the marriage (together with its 
increased value).  Property owned 
jointly by the parties is, as a general rule, considered a part of the marital 
estate.  Indeed, although married 
persons may retain their separate estates while married, upon the filing of a 
complaint for divorce, that right is adjusted.  As a part of the divorce, the 
jurisdiction of the district court is invoked to provide for an equitable 
distribution of the property of the parties and, accordingly, a married person's 
separate property is subject to distribution by the court, as well as jointly 
owned property.  Metz v. 
Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶8, 61 P.3d 383, ¶8 (Wyo. 2003); Mann, 979 P.2d  at 
499.

 

[¶13]   Husband's argument in this regard 
is based largely upon the case of France v. France, 902 P.2d 701 (Wyo. 
1995).  That case is faithful to the 
standard of review we have set out above, but is distinguishable from the 
circumstances of the instant case.  
First, of course, it must be recognized that in France we affirmed 
the trial court's division of the Frances' marital property, finding that it was 
not an abuse of discretion.  Thus, 
the facts emphasized in our opinion are those that were most favorable to the 
wife.  Secondarily, the property at 
issue in the France case was inherited by wife, from her parents, a few 
years before the divorce, and the gift of stock from wife to husband was made on 
the assumption that the marriage would endure; was made almost exclusively to 
avoid estate taxes associated with the nearly simultaneous death of wife's 
parents, and wife wished to preserve that inheritance for the benefit of the 
parties' daughter, who was unable to provide for herself.  We held that the property division was 
"fair, just, and manifested an exercise of discretion that is 
unassailable."  France, 902 P.2d  at 706.  As our further 
discussion will bear out, the property division fashioned by the district court 
in the instant case was designed to implement as nearly as possible a 50/50 
split, and is also "fair and just, and manifested an exercise of discretion that 
is unassailable."

 

 

[¶14]   As set out more fully above, 
husband's grandmother made gifts of real property to the parties.  At trial, husband offered as evidence a 
letter purportedly written by Theta Lester.  The letter is not dated and reads as 
follows:

 

I 
Theta H. Lester gifted and deeded land to my grandson Michael D. Odegard and his 
wife Brenda K. Odegard with the intention that it would not be sold or 
divided.  It was also my intention 
that Brenda would not get any of the land in case of divorce.  Her name was added as an estate planning 
tool to allow for a larger gift.

 

The 
district court declined to admit the letter as evidence.  It is agreed by both parties that the 
letter constitutes hearsay evidence and is in the nature of parol evidence.  The admission of evidence, including the 
admission of hearsay, is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we 
will not disturb evidentiary rulings unless a clear abuse of discretion is 
demonstrated.  Young v. HAC, 
LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶6, 24 P.3d 1142, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶15]   Husband contends that the letter 
was admissible because it met the requirements of W.R.E. 804(b)(6) (also see 
W.R.E 803(24)):

 

Rule 
804.  Hearsay exceptions; declarant 
unavailable.

. 
. . .

            
(b)  Hearsay Exceptions. -- The following are not excluded by 
the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness:

            
. . . .

         
(6)  Other Exceptions. -- A statement not specifically covered 
by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact;  
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable 
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of 
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.  However, a statement may not be admitted 
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party 
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant.

 

Although 
the letter may have had some marginal utility as evidence of a material fact, 
the deeds signed by Lester were unequivocal and were the most probative evidence 
on point.  Moreover, the letter 
lacked the requisite circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.  In addition to the fact that the letter 
was not dated, husband conceded that he wrote the body of the letter, and his 
grandmother signed it. The record bears out the district court's conclusion that 
Lester knew what she was doing, and the consequences of those gifts and the 
deeds should be taken at face value, i.e., that the gifts were marital 
property.  See Snyder v. 
Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1086 (Wyo. 1999) (extrinsic evidence not 
admissible to contradict plain meaning of terms used).  The district court did not err in 
disallowing the letter as evidence contradicting Theta Lester's 
gifts.

 

 

[¶16]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 requires 
that the district court consider the condition in which the parties will be left 
by the divorce.  The district court 
made a specific finding in this regard, noting that husband would continue to 
have a substantially higher income than wife, who works as a bank employee.  In 2000, the parties enjoyed an adjusted 
gross income of over $300,000.00, most of which will continue to go to 
husband.

 

[¶17]   Husband contends that the Recluse 
Place is an integral part of the family ranching operation and will work a 
hardship on him.  Perhaps more to 
the point, because no "hardship" to husband is evident in the record, he 
contends that, "[i]n one devastating blow, the District Court ended a tradition 
in the Odegard family ranch being passed down to the boys.  Giving [wife] the Recluse place 
effectively took out 3,735 acres of ranching land out of the family.  The ruling may have ruined her son[s'] 
chances at becoming  rancher[s] as well."  
As we have noted above, the property division was equitable in all 
respects, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a 
division that provided some security for wife in the form of the Recluse 
Place.  However, it is significant 
that husband ignores that wife specifically testified that she intended to pass 
on the ranch to "the boys," who were her sons too, and the likelihood of them 
continuing in the ranch business does not appear any less likely with the ranch 
in wife's hands, than it was when in husband's hands.

 

 

[¶18]   Only a brief comment is required 
with respect to this argument.  
There was no stipulation.  
Based upon their testimony at trial, husband contends that he wanted the 
Recluse Place to go to the parties' sons, and wife wanted the Recluse Place to 
go to the parties' sons eventually, and, therefore, there was a stipulation 
which the district court ignored, contrary to the rule which favors such 
stipulations.  Since there was no 
stipulation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in this 
regard.

 

 

[¶19]   The district court did consider 
this factor, which derives from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114.  This argument is a variation on earlier 
arguments that wife should not receive any real property gifted to the parties 
by husband's grandmother.  The 
district court found that both parties received the real property from the 
grandmother and that grandmother's gift to wife was based on a close personal 
relationship between the two, thus making the gift both logical and reasonable 
given all of the relevant circumstances.

 

[¶20]   Husband takes this argument one 
step further, asserting that because husband used his father's equipment for the 
ranching operation, and because husband's father placed a part of husband's 
wages in an investment account, which was later used to build a house on the 
Home Place, wife isn't really entitled to much of anything.  In light of our conclusion that this 
property distribution was equitable and well within the trial court's 
discretion, we cannot afford any credence to this argument.  We discern no abuse of discretion in 
this regard.

 

 

[¶21]   Both parties obtained appraisals on 
the real property at issue.  Bob 
Zabel did an appraisal for wife.  In 
appraising some of the real property, Zabel used an unconventional method to 
assess its value.  Because that 
property produced considerable income from surface damage payments and CRP 
payments, he appraised it at a value considerably higher than did husband's 
appraiser.  Because the methodology 
used by Zabel with respect to that property was unconventional, the district 
court did not consider it.  However, 
with respect to the Home Place, the district court chose to rely on Zabel's 
appraisal.  Zabel's appraisal was 
considerably higher than that done by husband's appraiser.  This argument is based in part upon the 
parties' ownership of an undivided 4/7 interest in the Home Place, a 
circumstance that serves to devalue the property because it makes the property 
virtually unmarketable.  The 
district court's decision appears to be based upon a realistic view of its value 
as the parties' home, which was a factor at the core of Zabel's appraisal. 

 

[¶22]   As noted above, the district court 
enjoys considerable latitude and broad discretion with respect to the admission 
or exclusion of evidence.  We have 
reviewed the evidence relating to the appraisals in detail and conclude that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a portion of Zabel's 
appraisal and utilizing it in valuing the Home Place.

 

 

[¶23]   Wife's evidence with respect to 
attorney's fees was admitted without objection from husband.  We have held as follows with respect to 
this issue:

 

The 
purpose of attorney fees in a divorce case is to assist the party, as necessary, 
so that the party can carry on or defend the action.  Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Wyo.1978);  
Prentice v. Prentice, 568 P.2d 883, 886 (Wyo.1977).  The party seeking to recover attorney's 
fees bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the fees and must 
submit an itemized bill reflecting the time and rate charged.  Pekas v. Thompson, 903 P.2d 532, 
536 (Wyo.1995) (quoting Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907, 915 
(Wyo.1991)).  Even though Hessel and 
Black are both independently wealthy, the statute does not require that Hessel 
establish financial necessity for the award of attorney's fees and costs.  Rocha, 925 P.2d  at 234.   Hessel attached an itemized list 
of her expenses to her Reply to Defendant's Response and Objection to 
Plaintiff's Bill of Costs and Attorney's Fees.  That document was sufficient to 
establish reasonableness in light of the expenditures Black made to create his 
elaborate presentations in this case.  
Hessel's expenses under the circumstances were reasonable and necessary 
to a defense against the attack mounted by Black on the Decree of Divorce.  We find in this record more than 
sufficient information to permit the district court reasonably to decide as it 
did, and nothing indicates that the decision was arbitrary or capricious.  In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we affirm the order awarding Hessel attorney fees and 
costs.

 

Black 
v. DeBlack, 
1 P.3d 1244, 1252-53 (Wyo. 2000); Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 
1355-56 (Wyo. 1997).  Under the 
circumstances of the instant case we find no abuse of discretion in the award of 
attorney's fees.

 

 

[¶24]   Husband contends that the district 
court erred in calculating the value of livestock and grain, which cost husband 
between $4,000.00 (using figures most favorable to wife) and $18,000.00 (using 
figures most favorable to husband) in the property division process.  The district court's math process is not 
set out in detail in the decree; however, it appears that a mathematical error 
may have occurred.

 

[¶25]   We begin our analysis by noting 
that there were some delays in finalizing this divorce because the district 
court's criminal docket was crowded.  
After the trial was completed, in an effort to expedite the process of 
finalization, the district court asked the parties to submit proposed decrees 
and he would then fashion them into a final decree.  The decree, as entered, was not 
submitted to the parties for approval before it was entered.  Husband did not attempt to correct the 
problem he now complains of on appeal by filing a motion for new trial or a 
motion for relief from the decree.  
W.R.C.P. 59 and 60.  Thus, 
the trial court has not had an opportunity to consider its error, if indeed, 
there is an error.

 

[¶26]   It is apparent that the district 
court rounded various sums up or down in the process of dividing what amounted 
to a marital estate valued at between $1.5 million and $2 million.  Husband concedes that this argument 
could result in an increase in his share of that settlement of only 
$4,000.00.  Assuming for purposes of 
discussion that husband's assertion is correct, we conclude that remand to 
correct the error is unnecessary because the asserted error is de minimus and, 
thus, is harmless.  W.R.C.P. 61; 
W.R.A.P. 9.04.  And see Butler 
and Butler, 981 P.2d 389, 395 (Or.App. 1999) (de minimus error in 
calculating award on property did not affect fairness of overall property 
division); Peterson and Peterson; 918 P.2d 858, 860 (Or.App. 1996) 
($20,450.00 error does not require adjustment where division ended up being 
$169,827.00 for husband and $182,444.00 for wife); In re Marriage of 
Binsfield, 888 P.2d 889, 894 (Mont. 1995) ($1,424.70 error in division of 
estate totaling $1.2 million harmless error); Olivas v. Olivas, 780 P.2d 640, 647 (N.M.App. 1989) (de minimus errors will not be examined); In re 
Marriage of Holden, 81 S.W.3d 217, 222-23 (Mo.App. S.D. 2002) (error of only 
"several thousand dollars" and less than 1% of estate of about one million 
dollars, minimal/harmless error); and Sateren v. Sateren, 488 N.W.2d 631, 
634 (N.D. 1992) ($4,500.00 difference in division of estate of $56,000.00 not de 
minimus).

 

Did 
the District Court Err in Awarding 7% Interest on Husband's Cash Payment to 
Wife

 

[¶27]   Husband contends that the district 
court erred in requiring husband to pay 7% interest on the judgment it entered 
against husband in the amount of $232,898.50, the amount which the district 
court determined would make the property settlement equitable.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-102(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001) provides that " all decrees and judgments for the 
payment of money shall bear interest at ten percent (10%) per year from the date 
of rendition until paid."

 

[¶28]   Husband did not object to the 
decree or otherwise raise this issue below, nor did wife, and we will not 
consider it further other than to suggest that the interest rate imposed is set 
at a level that does not shock the conscience of the court.  See Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 
69, ¶48, 28 P.3d 838, ¶48 (Wyo. 2001).  
The decree specifically allows husband to prepay this sum of money, 
without penalty, and thus it appears that husband is not harmed in any way 
should he wish to prepay the judgment with money borrowed at a more favorable 
interest rate than 7%.

 

Should 
the District Court Have Included Support Payments as Part of the Property 
Division

 

[¶29]   Husband contends that wife received 
an excessive amount of money as support during the pendency of the divorce and, 
therefore, the district court abused its discretion in not crediting that excess 
payment to the lump sum payment husband must make to wife, in order to make the 
settlement equitable.  The amount at 
issue was awarded to wife as support pending the divorce and not as a part of 
the property settlement.  The 
divorce action was pending for almost two years.  Although no abuse of discretion is 
apparent, we will note at this juncture that neither cogent argument nor 
pertinent authority supports this argument.  We have consistently refused to address 
claims not supported by cogent argument or citation to pertinent authority 
whether a pro se litigant or counsel files the brief.  Walton v. State ex rel. Wood, 
2002 WY 108, ¶11, 50 P.3d 693, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002).

 

 

[¶30]   Husband contends that the district 
court ignored the tax consequences of the decree in the sense that husband made 
support payments to wife during the pendency of the divorce and also paid taxes 
on all income received during that time period.  In the decree, the district court gives 
full credit to husband for all taxes he paid prior to entry of the decree.  We perceive no abuse of discretion in 
this regard.

 

 

[¶31]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 provides 
that the district court may decree alimony to a party out of the estate of the 
other, " having regard for the other's ability to pay."  The district court did not award alimony 
in this case, and the argument that this language should apply to the property 
division is not supported by cogent argument or pertinent authority.  For this reason, we decline to address 
the issue further.

 

 

[¶32]   We are unable to discern from 
husband's brief the purport of this contention.  A review of the record does not indicate 
that the district court ignored its original support order or, if it did, that 
it had any significance insofar as the equitable distribution of the marital 
estate is concerned.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶33]   We hold that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate of the parties on an 
approximately 50/50 basis.  When 
considered as a whole, the property distribution is fair and 
equitable.