Title: Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12157 
 
KEVIN BRIDGEMAN & others1  vs.  DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE 
SUFFOLK DISTRICT & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 16, 2016. - January 18, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Constitutional Law, Conduct of 
government agents.  Due Process of Law, Disclosure of 
evidence, Presumption.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Superintendence of inferior courts.  Practice, Criminal, 
Postconviction relief, Conduct of government agents, 
Disclosure of evidence, Plea, New trial.  Evidence, 
Certificate of drug analysis, Disclosure of evidence. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on January 9, 2014. 
 
 
The case was reported by Botsford, J. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Yasir Creach and Miguel Cuevas; Committee for Public 
Counsel Services (CPCS), intervener. 
 
 
2 District Attorney for the Essex District, District 
Attorney for the Bristol District, District Attorney for the 
Cape and Islands District, District Attorney for the Middlesex 
District, District Attorney for the Norfolk District, and 
District Attorney for the Plymouth District. 
2 
 
 
Matthew R. Segal (Daniel N. Marx, Adriana LaFaille, & 
Carlton E. Williams also present) for the petitioners. 
 
Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Nancy J. Caplan & Eric Brandt, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, also present) for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services. 
 
Quentin R. Weld, Assistant District Attorney, for District 
Attorney for the Essex District. 
 
Susanne M. O'Neil, Assistant District Attorney, for 
District Attorney for the Norfolk District. 
 
Vincent J. DeMore, Assistant District Attorney, for 
District Attorney for the Suffolk District. 
 
The following were present but did not argue: 
 
Robert J. Bender & Hallie White Speight, Assistant District 
Attorneys, for District Attorney for the Middlesex District. 
 
Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for District 
Attorney for the Plymouth District. 
 
Brian S. Glenny, Assistant District Attorney, for District 
Attorney for the Cape & Islands District. 
 
Aaron M. Katz, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Joseph S. Dowdy & Christine C. Mumma, of North Carolina, 
John Roddy, & Denise McWilliams for New England Innocence 
Project & another. 
 
Janet Moore, of Ohio, & Patricia A. DeJuneas for National 
Association for Public Defense. 
 
Anthony A. Scibelli & Elizabeth A. Ritvo for Boston Bar 
Association. 
 
Daniel K. Gelb, Chauncy B. Wood, Naveen Ganesh, & Peter 
Walkingshaw for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
& another. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  We once again confront the tragic legacy of 
the misconduct of Annie Dookhan when she was employed as a 
chemist at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute 
(Hinton lab).  In Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk 
Dist., 471 Mass. 465, 487 (2015) (Bridgeman I), the petitioners 
and the intervener, the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(CPCS), asked that we exercise our broad powers of 
3 
 
superintendence to vacate the thousands of drug convictions 
affected by Dookhan's misconduct because the time and expense of 
case-by-case adjudication had become "untenable."  We declined 
at that time to adopt their proposed "global remedy."  However, 
the district attorneys have now provided the single justice with 
lists identifying more than 20,000 defendants who could be 
eligible for relief based on Dookhan's misconduct but who have 
not yet sought relief from their drug convictions.  As a result 
of the number of potentially aggrieved defendants, the single 
justice issued a reservation and report to the full court that 
essentially invites us to reconsider whether the time has come 
for a global remedy or whether further steps must be taken to 
realistically implement the remedy of case-by-case adjudication 
of potentially thousands of motions for a new trial. 
 
After such reconsideration, we decline to adopt the 
district attorneys' argument that we should stay the course we 
had previously set and take no further action to protect the 
rights of the "relevant Dookhan defendants."3  We also decline to 
adopt the petitioners' request for a global remedy in which we 
would either vacate the convictions of all relevant Dookhan 
defendants with prejudice, and thereby bar any reprosecution, or 
vacate the convictions without prejudice, and allow the 
                                                          
 
 
3 See note 8 and accompanying text, infra, for the 
definition of the term "relevant Dookhan defendants." 
4 
 
Commonwealth one year to reprosecute, dismissing with prejudice 
all cases not reprosecuted within that time period. 
 
We instead adopt a new protocol for case-by-case 
adjudication, which will occur in three phases, and order its 
implementation by the single justice in the form of a 
declaratory judgment.  In the first phase, the district 
attorneys shall exercise their prosecutorial discretion and 
reduce the number of relevant Dookhan defendants by moving to 
vacate and dismiss with prejudice all drug cases the district 
attorneys would not or could not reprosecute if a new trial were 
ordered.  In the second phase, new, adequate notice shall be 
approved by the single justice and provided to all relevant 
Dookhan defendants whose cases have not been dismissed in phase 
one.  In the third phase, CPCS shall assign counsel to all 
indigent relevant Dookhan defendants who wish to explore the 
possibility of moving to vacate their plea or for a new trial.  
If the number seeking counsel is so large that counsel cannot be 
assigned despite CPCS's best efforts, the single justice will 
fashion an appropriate remedy under our general superintendence 
authority for the constitutional violation, which may include 
dismissing without prejudice the relevant drug convictions in 
cases where an indigent defendant is deprived of the right to 
counsel. 
5 
 
 
We recognize that the implementation of this protocol will 
substantially burden the district attorneys, CPCS, and the 
courts.  But we also recognize that Dookhan's misconduct at the 
Hinton lab has substantially burdened the due process rights of 
many thousands of defendants whose convictions rested on her 
tainted drug analysis and who, even if they have served their 
sentences, continue to suffer the collateral consequences 
arising from those convictions.  And we recognize as well that, 
more than four years after Dookhan's misconduct was revealed, 
more than 20,000 defendants who are entitled to a conclusive 
presumption that egregious government misconduct occurred in 
their case have yet to receive adequate notice that they may 
have been victimized by Dookhan's misconduct, that they may file 
a motion to vacate their drug conviction, and that they have a 
right to counsel to assist them in the preparation of such a 
motion.  The remedy we order, challenging as it is to implement, 
preserves the ability of these defendants to vindicate their 
rights through case-by-case adjudication, respects the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion, and maintains the fairness and 
integrity of our criminal justice system in the wake of a 
laboratory scandal of unprecedented magnitude.4 
                                                          
 
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; the Boston Bar 
Association; the National Association for Public Defense; and 
6 
 
 
Background.  Dookhan began her employment in November, 
2003, as a chemist at the Hinton lab, a forensic drug laboratory 
that was overseen by the Department of Public Health 
(department).  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 338 
(2014); Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 64 (2013).  
Allegations of misconduct regarding her work surfaced in June, 
2011, which triggered an internal review and then a formal 
internal investigation by the department in December, 2011.  
Charles, supra.  The department concluded that "Dookhan failed 
to follow [Hinton lab] protocols for the transfer and 
documentation of samples for testing, and subsequently created a 
false record of said transfers."  Id.  Dookhan was placed on 
paid administrative leave and then resigned from her position, 
effective March 9, 2012.  Id. 
 
In July, 2012, the Legislature transferred oversight of the 
Hinton lab to the State police.  See St. 2012, c. 139, § 56 
(replacing G. L. c. 22C, § 39); St. 2012, c. 139, § 107 
(repealing G. L. c. 111, §§ 12-13).  See also Scott, 467 Mass. 
338.  In August, 2012, the State police initiated a more 
extensive investigation of the Hinton lab, which "revealed 
numerous improprieties surrounding Dookhan's conduct in the 
lab."  Id. at 339.  See Charles, 466 Mass. at 64.  Based in part 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the New England Innocence Project and the North Carolina Center 
on Actual Innocence. 
7 
 
on Dookhan's confession of misconduct on August 28, 2012, the 
State police investigation revealed, among other misconduct, the 
following: 
 Dookhan "admitted to 'dry labbing' for two to three years 
prior to her transfer out of the [Hinton] lab in 2011, 
meaning that she would group multiple samples together from 
various cases that looked alike, then test only a few 
samples, but report the results as if she had tested each 
sample individually."  Scott, supra. 
 She admitted to "contaminating samples intentionally, 
including turning negative samples into positive samples on 
at least a few occasions."  Id. 
 She admitted that she removed samples from the evidence 
locker in breach of Hinton lab protocols, postdated entries 
in the evidence log book, and forged an evidence officer's 
initials.  Id. 
 She falsified reports intended to verify that the gas 
chromatography-mass spectrometer machine used in 
"confirmatory"5 drug testing was functioning properly before 
she ran samples through the machine.  Id. at 339-340. 
 The potential scope of Dookhan's misconduct encompassed 
testing samples in over 40,000 cases.  Id. at 340.  This 
number is so large because Dookhan "reported test results 
                                                          
 
 
5 "Confirmatory" testing is often referred to in our 
opinions as "secondary" testing.  We use the terms 
interchangeably. 
8 
 
on samples at rates consistently much higher than any other 
chemist in the [Hinton] lab."  Id.6 
 
 
A grand jury indicted Dookhan on seventeen counts of 
tampering with evidence, eight counts of obstruction of justice, 
one count of perjury, and one count of falsely claiming to hold 
a graduate degree.  Dookhan pleaded guilty to all of the 
indictments on November 22, 2013, and she was sentenced to from 
three years to five years in State prison, followed by a 
probationary term of two years.  Scott, 467 Mass. at 337 & n.3.  
The revelations regarding Dookhan's misconduct triggered the 
filing of hundreds of motions for a new trial and for a stay of 
execution of sentence in cases where the defendant was convicted 
                                                          
 
 
6 In addition to the State police investigation, the 
Governor requested a top-to-bottom review of the William A. 
Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton lab) to determine 
whether any other employees at the Hinton lab committed 
malfeasance.  The office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
conducted a fifteen-month investigation of the Hinton lab that 
included interviews with more than forty individuals and an 
examination of more than 200,000 documents.  The OIG concluded 
that "Dookhan was the sole bad actor at the [Hinton lab]" and 
that no other chemist at the laboratory knowingly aided her 
misconduct.  But the OIG report described massive deficiencies 
by the Department of Public Health (department) in its oversight 
and management of the Hinton lab.  These deficiencies included a 
lack of accreditation and inadequate chemist training; distant 
or uninterested supervisors; inconsistent testing practices; 
deviation from chain-of-custody guidelines; and faulty security.  
This environment "gave Dookhan the freedom to start making and 
following her own rules."  Even when coworkers began raising red 
flags about Dookhan, directors at the Hinton lab were 
"habitually unresponsive" and "severely downplayed Dookhan's 
major breach in chain-of-custody protocol."  The OIG report 
concluded that "all samples in which Dookhan was the primary 
chemist should be treated as suspect and be subject to careful 
review." 
9 
 
of a drug crime based on a drug analysis conducted by the Hinton 
lab.  Charles, 466 Mass. at 65-66.7  To address this onslaught of 
motions, the Chief Justice of the Superior Court in October, 
2012, assigned specific judges in seven counties to preside over 
special "drug lab" sessions.  Id. at 65.  To assist these judges 
in the adjudication of these cases, the Chief Justice of the 
Superior Court in November, 2012, exercised her authority under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 47, 378 Mass. 923 (1979), to appoint five 
retired Superior Court judges as "Special Judicial Magistrates 
of the Superior Court" to preside over postconviction motions 
related to the Hinton lab.  Id. at 66. 
 
In Scott, 467 Mass. at 337-338, we considered the 
appropriate legal standard where a defendant, in response to 
government misconduct in his or her case, moves to withdraw a 
                                                          
 
 
7 These motions were facilitated by a special task force 
established by the Governor in September, 2012.  The task force, 
led by attorney David Meier, used data from the department to 
identify individuals who could have been affected by Dookhan's 
misconduct.  The task force then shared the lists with 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, "so as to enable 
each of the agencies and offices to respond appropriately."  The 
task force concentrated on identifying individuals most 
adversely affected, such as those in custody, awaiting trial, or 
on probation or parole.  By December, 2012, the task force 
identified approximately 10,000 individuals who fell in these 
priority categories and who had to be notified immediately that 
their cases potentially were affected by Dookhan's misconduct.  
The task force also produced a more comprehensive list of 
approximately 40,000 cases in which Dookhan served as a primary 
or confirmatory chemist.  At the time the task force completed 
its final report, the criminal investigation of Dookhan and the 
OIG's review of the Hinton lab were still ongoing. 
10 
 
guilty plea or an admission to sufficient facts to warrant a 
finding of guilty.  We adopted the two-pronged test in Ferrara 
v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (1st Cir. 2006), which 
requires a defendant who seeks to vacate a guilty plea because 
of government misconduct to show "both that 'egregiously 
impermissible conduct . . . by government agents . . . antedated 
the entry of his plea' and that 'the misconduct influenced his 
decision to plead guilty or, put another way, that it was 
material to that choice.'"  Scott, supra at 346. 
 
In considering whether the defendant had satisfied the 
first prong of this test, we concluded that, because Dookhan 
"made a number of affirmative misrepresentations by signing 
[certificates of drug analysis (drug certificates)] and 
testifying to the identity of substances in cases in which she 
had not in fact properly tested the substances in question," 
Dookhan's misconduct was "egregious."  Id. at 348.  We also 
concluded that, even though there was no indication that any 
prosecutor knew of her egregious misconduct, id. at 350 n.7, her 
misconduct is "attributable to the government" for purposes of a 
motion for a new trial, id. at 350 & n.7, because as a primary 
and secondary chemist she "participated in the investigation or 
evaluation of the case" and "reported to the prosecutor's office 
concerning the case."  Id. at 349, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 824 (1998). 
11 
 
 
We also recognized the dilemma that a defendant would face 
in attempting to prove that the laboratory analysis in his or 
her case was tainted by Dookhan's misconduct.  See Scott, 467 
Mass. at 339, 351-352.  We noted that Dookhan acknowledged "that 
she may not be able to identify those cases in which she tested 
the samples properly and those in which she did not."  Id. at 
339.  "Thus, even if Dookhan herself were to testify in each of 
the thousands of cases in which she served as primary or 
secondary chemist, it is unlikely that her testimony, even if 
truthful, could resolve the question whether she engaged in 
misconduct in a particular case."  Id. at 352.  Because it was 
"reasonably certain . . . that her misconduct touched a great 
number of cases," id., but "may be impossible" for any defendant 
to prove that the drug analysis in his or her case was tainted 
by her misconduct, id. at 351, we recognized that her 
"particularly insidious form of misconduct, which belies 
reconstruction," resulted in "a lapse of systemic magnitude in 
the criminal justice system."  Id. at 352. 
 
To resolve this dilemma, we exercised our power of "general 
superintendence of all courts . . . to correct and prevent 
errors and abuses" under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and held that, where 
Dookhan signed the drug certificate in a defendant's case as an 
assistant analyst, that is, as the primary or confirmatory 
chemist, see Scott, 467 Mass. at 353 n.9, a defendant who seeks 
12 
 
to vacate his or her plea after learning of Dookhan's misconduct 
"is entitled to a conclusive presumption that egregious 
government misconduct occurred in [his or her] case."  Id. at 
352.  The consequence of the conclusive presumption of egregious 
government misconduct is that a defendant can satisfy the first 
prong of the Ferrara test simply by showing that Dookhan signed 
the drug certificate in his or her case as an assistant analyst.  
Id. at 353. 
 
We emphasized in Scott that the "special evidentiary rule" 
of a conclusive presumption is "sui generis" -- "a remedy 
dictated by the particular circumstances surrounding Dookhan's 
misconduct" that was "intended to apply only to this narrow 
class of cases in which a defendant seeks to withdraw his or her 
guilty plea after having learned of Dookhan's misconduct."  Id. 
at 353-354.  We declared that "it is most appropriate that the 
benefit of our remedy inure to defendants" where, as here, there 
is "government misconduct that has cast a shadow over the entire 
criminal justice system."  Id. at 352.  The remedy of a 
conclusive presumption, we concluded, takes into account "the 
due process rights of defendants, the integrity of the criminal 
justice system, the efficient administration of justice in 
responding to such potentially broad-ranging misconduct, and the 
myriad public interests at stake."  Id. 
13 
 
 
We did not relieve a defendant of the burden to satisfy the 
second prong of the Ferrara test by demonstrating that he or she 
suffered prejudice by pleading guilty or admitting to sufficient 
facts without having learned of Dookhan's misconduct, i.e., we 
did not conclusively presume such prejudice.  Id. at 354-355, 
356.  The defendant, therefore, bears the burden of proving "a 
reasonable probability that he [or she] would not have pleaded 
guilty had he [or she] known of Dookhan's misconduct," and 
instead would have chosen to go to trial.  Id. at 355.  We noted 
that, "[u]nlike evidence of the particular scope of Dookhan's 
misconduct, evidence of the circumstances surrounding the 
defendant's decision to tender a guilty plea should be well 
within the defendant's reach."  Id. at 354 n.11. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Francis, 474 Mass. 816 (2016), we 
reviewed the denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial 
where the defendant had been convicted at trial of drug charges 
after drug certificates were admitted in evidence that were 
signed by Dookhan as an assistant analyst.  We concluded that 
the conclusive presumption of "egregious government misconduct" 
is not limited to motions to withdraw guilty pleas, but that, 
where the defendant has been convicted at trial, "[t]he 
consequence of the conclusive presumption is that we deem it 
error to have admitted the drug certificates or comparable 
evidence regarding Dookhan's drug analysis where the defendant 
14 
 
had no knowledge of Dookhan's misconduct and therefore no 
opportunity to challenge the admissibility or credibility of 
that evidence."  Id. at 817. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 475 Mass. 1003, 1003-1004 
(2016), we declined to apply the conclusive presumption of 
"egregious government misconduct" where the defendant had 
pleaded guilty before Dookhan had signed the drug certificate as 
an assistant analyst, because her misconduct cannot be said to 
have affected the defendant's plea where the plea occurred 
before the misconduct. 
 
Consequently, after our opinions in Scott, Francis, and 
Ruffin, the defendants who are entitled to the conclusive 
presumption of "egregious government misconduct" are those who 
pleaded guilty to a drug charge (or admitted to sufficient facts 
to warrant a finding of guilty) or who were found guilty of a 
drug charge at trial after Dookhan signed a drug certificate in 
15 
 
their case as a primary or confirmatory chemist.  We refer to 
these as the "relevant Dookhan defendants."8 
 
In Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 473-494, we considered two 
sets of issues raised by relevant Dookhan defendants who 
potentially were eligible for relief from their convictions 
because of Dookhan's misconduct, but who had not yet moved for 
postconviction relief.  The first set of issues identified 
concerns that were discouraging these defendants from seeking 
that relief.  The most significant was the risk that, if their 
motion for a new trial were granted, the Commonwealth could 
reprosecute them not only on the charge to which the defendants 
had pleaded guilty but also on any charge that was dismissed at 
the time of the plea, and seek a more severe sentence, 
especially where the dismissed charge carried a mandatory 
minimum sentence upon conviction.  Id. at 472-473.  Drawing 
                                                          
 
 
8 The term "Dookhan defendants" was defined in Bridgeman v. 
District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 465, 467 n.4 
(2015) (Bridgeman I), "to refer generally to those individuals 
who were convicted of drug offenses and in whose cases Dookhan 
signed the certificate of drug analysis (drug certificate) on 
the line labeled 'Assistant Analyst.'"  Because Bridgeman I was 
decided before Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 475 Mass. 1003 (2016), 
the term "Dookhan defendants" is broader than the term "relevant 
Dookhan defendants," because it includes those with cases in 
which Dookhan signed the drug certificate after their guilty 
plea or admission to sufficient facts to warrant a guilty 
finding.  In light of our decision in Ruffin, the set of 
defendants entitled to the conclusive presumption of egregious 
government misconduct is limited to the "relevant Dookhan 
defendants," and the relief we order infra is limited to this 
set of defendants. 
16 
 
broadly on the need to "ameliorate [the] damaging effects" of 
Dookhan's misconduct, id. at 474, we held that "a defendant who 
has been granted a new trial based on Dookhan's misconduct at 
the Hinton . . . lab cannot be charged with a more serious 
offense than that of which he or she initially was convicted 
under the terms of a plea agreement and, if convicted again, 
cannot be given a more severe sentence than that which 
originally was imposed."  Id. at 468. 
 
The second set of issues in Bridgeman I concerned the 
fairness and practicability of attempting individually to 
resolve the multitude of motions for a new trial that 
potentially could be brought by the Dookhan defendants.  We 
allowed the motion to intervene filed by CPCS under Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 24 (a), 365 Mass. 769 (1974), recognizing that "[i]t has 
a substantial and immediate interest in these proceedings given 
its current and future responsibility for providing 
representation to thousands of indigent Dookhan defendants who 
want to pursue postconviction relief from their drug 
convictions."  Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 485-486.  We then 
addressed CPCS's contention that, because so many cases were 
affected by Dookhan's misconduct, the "time and expense of 
proceeding on a case-by-case basis has become untenable," and we 
therefore should implement a "global remedy" to resolve these 
cases pursuant to our broad powers of superintendence under 
17 
 
G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Bridgeman I, supra at 487.  Under the global 
remedy that CPCS proposed, we would vacate the convictions of 
all Dookhan defendants.  Id.  CPCS offered two alternatives:  we 
could vacate the convictions with prejudice, and thereby bar any 
reprosecution; or we could vacate the convictions without 
prejudice, and allow the Commonwealth one year to reprosecute, 
dismissing with prejudice all cases not reprosecuted within that 
time period.  Id. 
 
We declined in Bridgeman I to implement a global remedy "at 
this time."  Id.  We noted that "while '[i]t certainly is true 
that we cannot expect defendants to bear the burden of a 
systemic lapse, . . . we also cannot allow the misconduct of one 
person to dictate an abrupt retreat from the fundamentals of our 
criminal justice system.'"  Id., quoting Scott, 467 Mass. at 354 
n.11.  We also noted that we had already provided "meaningful 
solutions" to resolve these cases in Scott and Charles, and 
that, in Bridgeman I, we were removing the barriers that made 
defendants reluctant to file motions to withdraw their guilty 
pleas.  Id. at 480, 487.  And we noted that some district 
attorneys had made progress in providing CPCS with the docket 
numbers of the cases in which Dookhan was the primary or 
confirmatory chemist, and encouraged the remaining district 
attorneys with such cases to assist the single justice in 
18 
 
obtaining docket numbers for their districts.9  Id. at 481.  We 
recognized that "efforts to provide postconviction relief to 
Dookhan defendants [had] been hampered by the inability of CPCS 
to ascertain which cases may have been tainted by Dookhan's 
misconduct," and that "[t]he ability of CPCS to identify clients 
and to assign them attorneys who will represent their interests 
in postconviction proceedings is crucial to the administration 
of justice in the Hinton . . . lab cases."  Id. at 480.  We 
remanded the case to the single justice for further proceedings 
consistent with the opinion.  Id. at 494. 
 
The single justice joined as respondents the district 
attorneys for the Cape and Islands, Middlesex, Norfolk, and 
Plymouth districts, and allowed the motion of the district 
attorney for the Bristol district to intervene.  The single 
justice ordered the district attorneys to produce lists with the 
names, docket numbers, and personal identifying information for 
every "adverse disposition concerning every G. L. c. 94C charge" 
                                                          
 
 
9 Only the district attorneys for the Suffolk and Essex 
districts were parties to Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 481.  They 
provided CPCS with the relevant docket numbers in their 
districts in September, 2014.  Id. at 478 n.20.  The district 
attorneys for the Bristol and Norfolk districts later provided 
CPCS with the relevant docket numbers before the issuance of the 
opinion in Bridgeman I.  Id.  The district attorneys for the 
Cape and Islands, Middlesex, and Plymouth districts had yet to 
do so at the time that opinion issued.  Id. 
19 
 
of the "Dookhan defendants."10  In May, 2016, the district 
attorneys produced lists that contained the names of more than 
20,000 defendants with more than 24,000 cases where they had 
pleaded guilty to a drug charge, had admitted to sufficient 
facts to warrant a finding of guilty of a drug charge, or had 
been found guilty at trial of a drug charge where Dookhan had 
tested the alleged drugs as the primary or confirmatory 
chemist.11 
                                                          
 
 
10 Because the list encompasses the "Dookhan defendants," it 
includes some defendants who are not "relevant Dookhan 
defendants."  See note 8 and accompanying text, supra. 
 
 
11 The lists were the product of the commendable and 
laborious efforts of the Trial Court's information technology 
department, which identified the set of all cases with a G. L. 
c. 94C charge from 2003 to June, 2011, and of the district 
attorneys' offices, which then identified the subset of these 
cases where Dookhan was the primary or confirmatory chemist.  
The district attorneys state that they have identified 
approximately 20,544 defendants in 24,577 cases that featured at 
least some evidence tested by Dookhan and that resulted in an 
adverse consequence.  The CPCS data analyst identified 24,391 
cases in which defendants still face adverse dispositions on 
drug charges where Dookhan was the primary or confirmatory 
chemist.  Both parties contend that the respective tallies are 
not a perfect measure of the remaining pool of cases tainted by 
Dookhan's misconduct.  As earlier stated, these lists include 
defendants who are not relevant Dookhan defendants because they 
pleaded guilty or admitted to sufficient facts before Dookhan 
signed the drug certificate as an assistant analyst.  The 
district attorneys claim that, apart from including the so-
called Ruffin defendants, the lists overcount the number of 
relevant Dookhan defendants because they include some defendants 
who already moved to vacate their pleas, and because they 
include defendants who were codefendants in a case where Dookhan 
was an assistant analyst.  The Bridgeman petitioners and CPCS 
claim that the lists actually undercount the number of remaining 
defendants because of errors in the district attorneys' data.  
20 
 
 
The single justice also asked the parties to attempt to 
agree on the content of a letter of notice to the Dookhan 
defendants informing them that their drug cases had been 
potentially tainted by Dookhan's misconduct.  After the 
submission of the lists, however, the Bridgeman petitioners and 
CPCS12 would not agree to any notice that presumed case-by-case 
litigation, because they contended that, given the large number 
of Dookhan defendants and the limited resources of CPCS, the 
notice could not truthfully inform the Dookhan defendants that 
attorneys were available to represent them in these cases.  They 
asked the single justice to reserve and report to the full court 
the question "whether all cases involving misconduct by Annie 
Dookhan should be dismissed or subjected to a court-ordered 
deadline."  The district attorneys opposed the reservation and 
report, arguing that the notices would provide all Dookhan 
defendants the opportunity to seek relief.  They also contended 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
We need not resolve these differences and ascertain the precise 
number of relevant Dookhan defendants because, even if we were 
to adopt the district attorneys' estimates, there would still be 
close to 20,000 relevant Dookhan defendants who might be 
entitled to postconviction relief. 
 
 
12 For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to both the 
Bridgeman I petitioners and CPCS as the "Bridgeman petitioners" 
for the remainder of this opinion, even though we recognize that 
CPCS is an intervener rather than a petitioner in this case.  We 
refer to the "Bridgeman petitioners" because this is a civil 
case seeking declaratory relief, even though we recognize that 
the Bridgeman petitioners are each Dookhan defendants in 
criminal cases. 
21 
 
that the Bridgeman petitioners "significantly overstate[] the 
apparent degree of interest on the part of the Dookhan 
defendants in revisiting settled cases."  The single justice 
issued a reservation and report on August 16, 2016. 
 
The district attorneys advised the single justice before 
the issuance of the reservation and report that they intended to 
send notices regardless of whether the case was reported to the 
full court.  On August 29, 2016, the district attorneys filed in 
the county court a letter attaching the notice they intended to 
send on or before September 1.  The Bridgeman petitioners 
informed the district attorneys that the notice was misleading 
and poorly translated.  At a hearing on September 6, the single 
justice invited the district attorneys to delay sending the 
notice, but the district attorneys announced that the mailing 
had already begun.  On September 7, CPCS filed an emergency 
motion asking the full court to halt further dissemination of 
the notice; the court denied the motion but ordered the district 
attorneys to keep records of all documents and communications 
arising from the notice. 
 
The notice was mailed in an envelope with the return 
address of "RG/2 Claims Administration LLC," and a post office 
box in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, along with the words 
"IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS" 
22 
 
near the return address.13  The notice informed each defendant 
that, according to court records, he or she was convicted of one 
or more drug offenses in a specified county between 2003 and 
2011; that it has been determined that Dookhan tested the drugs 
in the case; and that Dookhan "admitted to misconduct in her 
work at the [Hinton] lab."  It advised the defendant that, 
because Dookhan tested the evidence, he or she has certain 
rights, specifically, "the right to challenge the drug 
conviction(s) listed in this notice" and that "if [the defendant 
is] tried and convicted again, [he or she] will not face any 
punishment greater than what [he or she] already received."  The 
notice asked the defendant to contact his or her original lawyer 
on the case if he or she has any questions, and also invited the 
defendant to speak with a new lawyer.  The notice further 
invited the defendant, should he or she not know how to contact 
the original lawyer, to get that information at the criminal 
clerk's office where the case was adjudicated, and provided the 
Web site address where the physical address of the relevant 
court can be found.14 
                                                          
 
 
13 RG/2 Claims Administration, LLC, is the vendor who 
contracted with the district attorneys to distribute the notice. 
 
 
14 The full English text of the notice is reprinted below: 
 
"Dear [recipient]: 
 
23 
 
 
A Spanish translation of the notice was included on the 
bottom of the page.  According to the Bridgeman petitioners, 
this translation "contained numerous errors and was not readily 
understandable to a person who speaks Spanish but not English."15  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
"According to court records, you were convicted of one or 
more drug offenses in the [county] between 2003 and 2011.  
It has been determined that chemist Annie Dookhan tested 
the drugs in your case(s), [court name], [docket number] 
 
"Ms. Dookhan admitted to misconduct in her work at the 
[Hinton] lab.  Because Ms. Dookhan tested evidence in your 
case, you have certain rights:  
 
"• You have the right to challenge the drug conviction(s) 
listed in this notice.  If your challenge succeeds, 
your conviction(s) will be undone or 'vacated,' and 
your case will be returned to active status. 
"• The District Attorney's office may decide to try you 
again on the vacated drug charge(s), but if you are 
tried and convicted again, you will not face any 
punishment greater than what you already received.  In 
other words, you cannot be additionally punished for 
choosing to challenge your conviction(s). 
 
"If you have any questions, please contact your original 
lawyer on your case(s).  You may also choose to speak to a 
new lawyer.  If you do not know how to contact your 
original lawyer, you may get that information at the 
criminal clerk's office at the court where your case was 
handled.  Addresses for all of the District and Superior 
courts can be found at [State government Web site]. 
 
"For more information, you may contact the [district 
attorney's office]." 
 
 
15 The Bridgeman petitioners included in the record an 
affidavit from Michael W. O'Laughlin, a qualified Spanish 
interpreter, who attested that "the Spanish translation 
contained within [the notice letter] is not accurate or clear."  
He identified various flagrant errors in the translation of the 
notice, including the following: 
 
24 
 
The district attorneys have not offered any evidence to rebut 
these claims or to defend the quality of the translation. 
 
The district attorneys' vendor mailed 20,916 letters to 
Dookhan defendants.16  The vendor was unable to locate the 
addresses for 1,006 defendants, and 5,767 of the letters that 
were sent were returned undelivered.  For those letters returned 
undelivered, the vendor searched for a secondary address and 
sent out an additional 964 notices.  As of October 24, 2016, the 
over-all response rate to these mailings was extremely low: 
 In the Bristol district, where approximately 2,200 cases 
were identified, the district attorney received thirty-nine 
telephone calls and three motions were filed. 
 In the Cape and Islands district, where approximately 1,300 
cases were identified, the district attorney received 
thirty-nine calls and one walk-in inquiry.  No motions were 
filed. 
 In the Essex district, where approximately 4,200 cases were 
identified, the district attorney received forty-six 
telephone calls and twelve walk-in inquiries.  Seven 
motions were filed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 The word "vacated" was translated in the notice as 
"desocupar," meaning to physically vacate premises, not to 
vacate a judicial decision. 
 The verb tense in the same sentence was changed so that it 
appeared that a successful motion may yield only the 
possibility that the conviction would be vacated. 
 The translation of "criminal clerk's office" described a 
clerk who is himself also a violent felon. 
 
O'Laughlin also described the translation of a crucial sentence 
in the notice explaining the district attorney's ability to 
retry the recipient's case as "unintelligible." 
 
 
16 Because some defendants had cases in multiple counties, 
the number of letters that were mailed exceeded the number of 
defendants identified in the lists. 
25 
 
 In the Middlesex district, where approximately 3,500 cases 
were identified, the district attorney received seventy-
seven telephone calls and seven walk-in inquiries.  Two 
motions were filed. 
 In the Norfolk district, where approximately 2,300 cases 
were identified, the district attorney received 
approximately one hundred inquiries.  Seven motions were 
filed. 
 In the Plymouth district, where approximately 2,000 cases 
were identified, the district attorney received sixty-five 
inquiries, including three walk-ins.  One motion was filed. 
 In the Suffolk district, where approximately 8,600 cases 
were identified, the district attorney received 322 
telephone calls and walk-in inquiries.  In response, the 
office has moved to vacate and enter a nolle prosequi in 
175 of these cases.  No motions to withdraw a guilty plea 
or admission to sufficient facts were filed by defendants. 
 
In sum, in response to approximately 21,000 letters sent by the 
vendor to Dookhan defendants early in September, 2016, as of 
October 24, 2016, only twenty motions for postconviction relief 
were filed by defendants and 175 motions were filed by 
prosecutors.  In other words, the notice triggered applications 
for postconviction relief in less than one per cent of these 
cases.17 
                                                          
 
 
17 The Bridgeman petitioners have filed a motion to expand 
the record to add an affidavit from Nancy J. Caplan, the CPCS 
attorney in charge of its Hinton lab crisis litigation unit 
(unit), which was created in April, 2013, to address indigent 
defense matters relevant to the representation of Dookhan 
defendants.  Caplan attests that, after the district attorneys 
sent the notice, CPCS asked the courts in the eight affected 
counties and all bar advocates to direct all inquiries arising 
from the notice to the unit so that CPCS could "provide counsel 
to indigent Dookhan defendants so long as it had the resources 
necessary to do so."  She declares that, as of October 31, 2016, 
the unit had received inquiries arising from the notice from 139 
Dookhan defendants, who were defendants in 162 cases in which 
Dookhan was the primary or confirmatory chemist. 
26 
 
 
Discussion.  The Bridgeman petitioners argue once again for 
the global remedy that we declined in Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. 
487, to implement "at this time."  They ask that we vacate the 
drug convictions of all Dookhan defendants and dismiss them with 
prejudice or, in the alternative, vacate them without prejudice 
and allow prosecutors one year to reprosecute the cases, 
dismissing with prejudice all that are not reprosecuted within 
one year for violation of the speedy trial rule, Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 36 (b) (1) (D), as amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996).  They 
contend that due process requires such a global remedy because, 
even though four years have now passed since the scope of 
Dookhan's misconduct was revealed, the defendants' entitlement 
to a new trial on their drug convictions has yet to be 
adjudicated in more than 24,000 cases.  They also contend that 
the notice sent by prosecutors to these defendants was "not a 
serious effort to ensure that wrongful convictions will be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
The motion also seeks to expand the record to include a 
"statement" made by "the District Attorneys for all of the 
Commonwealth's Districts" in ten separate criminal cases in 
Hampden County involving misconduct by another chemist, Sonja 
Farak, at the Department of Public Health's State Laboratory 
Institute in Amherst.  In that "statement," the district 
attorneys inform the court that the Commonwealth will not 
contest a finding of "egregious governmental misconduct" by 
Farak in performing her duties at that laboratory under the two-
prong analysis set forth in Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 
(2014).  We allow the motion to expand the record, but recognize 
that the full scope of Farak's misconduct has yet to be 
determined. 
27 
 
addressed through case-by-case litigation," and was "so 
misleading and incomplete" that its harm can be undone only by 
relieving the defendants of the burdens of case-by-case 
litigation.  They claim that a global remedy is a necessary 
exercise of our superintendence authority because a case-by-case 
adjudication of so many cases is "doomed to fail" given the 
limited resources of the Commonwealth's indigent criminal 
defense system. 
 
The district attorneys respond that "[t]here is no 
convincing reason to retreat from the thoughtful remedies-based, 
workable solution designed by the [c]ourt."  They contend that 
the notice mailed to the Dookhan defendants was fair, and that 
the low response to the notice reflects that many defendants 
"may conclude that they face no adverse impact at all from a 
closed chapter in their lives," and "feel no urgency" to reopen 
their case "before an adverse impact actually occurs."  They 
contend that, in light of the Dookhan defendants' response to 
that notice, it is apparent that the Bridgeman petitioners have 
greatly overstated the burden that will arise from case-by-case 
adjudication of motions for a new trial.  They also argue that 
we should not vacate the convictions of Dookhan defendants who 
have not moved to do so, because "mass vacatur would constitute 
a complete abandonment of the careful weighing of the interests 
of defendants, the public, and the criminal justice system that 
28 
 
this [c]ourt set out in Scott, and affirmed in [Bridgeman I] and 
the cases that followed."  They contend that the remedy of 
dismissal with prejudice is not justified as a matter of law, 
and that the remedy of dismissal without prejudice, allowing the 
reprosecution of these cases, would be unfair to impose on 
defendants who did not move for such relief, because it would 
subject them without their approval to a new trial and the risk 
of arrest if they failed to appear.  In short, the district 
attorneys argue that we should stay the course, because 
individual case-by-case adjudication of motions for a new trial 
brought by Dookhan defendants is both practical and fair. 
 
1.  Four relevant principles of our criminal justice 
system.  In Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 487, we recognized that 
"we cannot expect defendants to bear the burden of a systemic 
lapse," but we declined to implement a global remedy "at this 
time" because we would not "allow the misconduct of one person 
to dictate an abrupt retreat from the fundamentals of our 
criminal justice system" (citation omitted).  In revisiting here 
whether the time is now ripe to implement a global remedy, it is 
important to explain four relevant principles of our criminal 
justice system that have guided our prior decisions relating to 
this matter.  First, where there is egregious misconduct 
attributable to the government in the investigation or 
prosecution of a criminal case, the government bears the burden 
29 
 
of taking reasonable steps to remedy that misconduct.  See 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (discussing 
"special role played by the American prosecutor in the search 
for truth in criminal trials" and broad duty to disclose 
exculpatory information); Bridgeman I, supra at 480-481.  Those 
reasonable steps include the obligation to timely and 
effectively notify the defendant of egregious misconduct 
affecting the defendant's criminal case.  See Ferrara, 456 F.3d 
at 293 (government's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to 
defendant "was so outrageous that it constituted impermissible 
prosecutorial misconduct sufficient to ground the petitioner's 
claim that his guilty plea was involuntary"); Mass. R. Prof. C. 
3.8 (d), as appearing in 473 Mass. 1301 (2016) ("The prosecutor 
in a criminal case shall . . . make timely disclosure to the 
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 
offense . . ."). 
 
As applied here, prosecutors had a responsibility timely 
and effectively to disclose Dookhan's misconduct to all affected 
defendants because Dookhan might erroneously have found 
substances that were not controlled substances to be a 
controlled substance, or to be a certain weight, creating the 
risk that a defendant may have been found guilty of a drug crime 
he or she did not commit.  In addition, her egregious misconduct 
30 
 
put in question the accuracy of the drug analysis and the 
ability of the government to prove the nature and weight of the 
alleged drugs beyond a reasonable doubt, which a defendant is 
entitled to consider in making an informed and voluntary 
decision whether to waive the right to trial and plead guilty 
(or admit to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt), or 
to proceed to trial.  The cost of notifying defendants of 
egregious government misconduct must be borne by the prosecuting 
district attorney's office, even if, as here, the fault belongs 
to the Hinton lab and Dookhan, not the prosecutors. 
 
Second, under our criminal rules, relief from a conviction 
generally requires the defendant to file a motion for a new 
trial.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 
1501 (2001) (judge "upon motion in writing may grant a new trial 
at any time if it appears that justice may not have been done" 
[emphasis added]).  See also Scott, 467 Mass. at 354.  "A new 
trial motion under Rule 30(b) is the appropriate vehicle to 
attack the validity of a guilty plea or an admission to 
sufficient facts."  Reporters' Notes to Rule 30 (b), Mass. Ann. 
Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1774 
(LexisNexis 2016). 
 
Third, dismissal with prejudice "is a remedy of last 
resort."  Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 198 (1985).  
Where a motion for a new trial is allowed, the conviction is 
31 
 
vacated, and the prosecutor may retry the defendant on the same 
charge, unless the judge, apart from the vacatur, also dismisses 
the complaint or indictment with prejudice.  We have identified 
"[t]wo parallel legal principles" governing when this last 
resort might be necessary, balancing the rights of defendants 
"against the necessity for preserving society's interest in the 
administration of justice."  Id. at 198-199.  Under one legal 
principle, where a prosecutor fails to disclose evidence the 
defendant is entitled to receive and the defendant is prejudiced 
by the failure to disclose, a motion to dismiss with prejudice 
should be allowed only where there is "a showing of irremediable 
harm to the defendant's opportunity to obtain a fair trial."  
Id. at 198.  Dismissal with prejudice is "too drastic a remedy" 
if the error can be remedied and the defendant can still obtain 
a fair trial.  Id. at 200, and cases cited. 
 
"Under the alternative principle, prosecutorial misconduct 
that is egregious, deliberate, and intentional, or that results 
in a violation of constitutional rights may give rise to 
presumptive prejudice.  In such instances prophylactic 
considerations may assume paramount importance and the 'drastic 
remedy' of dismissal of charges may become an appropriate 
remedy."  Id. at 198-199.  This alternative principle is 
narrowly applied; "the only reason to dismiss criminal charges 
because of nonprejudicial but egregious police misconduct would 
32 
 
be to create a climate adverse to repetition of that misconduct 
that would not otherwise exist."  Commonwealth v. Lewin, 405 
Mass. 566, 587 (1989). 
 
We dismissed drug charges with prejudice based on both 
alternative grounds where two special agents of the United 
States Drug Enforcement Administration spoke after arraignment 
with the defendant without the approval of defense counsel, 
disparaged defense counsel and the manner in which he was 
conducting the defense, and encouraged the defendant to 
cooperate with Federal authorities.  Commonwealth v. Manning, 
373 Mass. 438, 440 (1977).  We concluded that this was "a 
deliberate and intentional attack by government agents on the 
relationship between Manning and his counsel in a calculated 
attempt to coerce the defendant into abandoning his defense," 
id. at 443, and that "the officers' misconduct was so pervasive 
as to preclude any confident assumption that proceedings at a 
new trial would be free of the taint," id. at 444.  We also 
concluded that a "stronger deterrent" than a new trial was 
warranted for this type of misconduct.  Id. 
 
In Scott and Francis, the remedy that we found appropriate 
in cases where a defendant shows prejudice arising from 
Dookhan's misconduct was the allowance of a motion for a new 
trial and the vacatur of the conviction.  We did not order the 
dismissal of the defendant's drug charges with prejudice, or 
33 
 
suggest that was an appropriate remedy for Dookhan's misconduct 
under either of the alternative legal principles.  Although the 
record does not provide us with data as to the number of 
relevant Dookhan defendants who were reprosecuted after their 
motions for a new trial were allowed, we are aware that some 
defendants were retried and that other defendants later pleaded 
guilty or admitted to sufficient facts to support a guilty 
finding. 
 
Fourth, where large numbers of persons have been wronged, 
the wrong must be remedied in a manner that is not only fair as 
a matter of justice, but also timely and practical.  Cf. Green 
v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 439 
(1968) (in redressing school desegregation, school board must 
"come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, 
and promises to realistically work now").  A remedy that is 
perfect in theory is not perfect in fact if it would take too 
long to be accomplished, or if the resources required to 
implement it would overwhelm the limited resources available to 
the courts.  See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786 
(9th Cir. 1996) (affirming special master's award of 
compensatory damages based on statistical methods to determine 
amount owed to class of nearly 10,000 victims and survivors of 
decedents who were tortured, executed, or "disappeared" by 
Philippine military or paramilitary groups during fourteen-year 
34 
 
rule of Ferdinand E. Marcos where "the time and judicial 
resources required to try the nearly 10,000 claims in this case 
would alone make resolution of Hilao's claims impossible").  
Even when the number of persons injured is large and the problem 
is complex, courts endeavor to craft a workable remedy; we do 
not throw up our hands and deny relief because it would be too 
difficult to accomplish.  Cf. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 
(2011) (in addressing prison overcrowding, "[c]ourts may not 
allow constitutional violations to continue simply because a 
remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of [executive] 
administration"); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 
402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971) (when altering school attendance zones to 
prevent racial segregation, "all awkwardness and inconvenience 
cannot be avoided in the interim period when remedial 
adjustments are being made").  Over the course of its history, 
our judiciary has devised ways to provide redress to widespread 
wrongs through such vehicles as class actions, derivative 
actions, the consolidation of multiple related cases, and the 
appointment of special masters and receivers.  See, e.g., Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 23, as amended, 471 Mass. 1491 (2015) (class 
actions); Mass. R. Civ. P. 23.1, 365 Mass. 768 (1974) 
(derivative actions by shareholders); Mass. R. Civ. P. 42, as 
amended, 423 Mass. 1406 (1996) (case consolidation); Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 53, as amended, 423 Mass. 1408 (1996) (appointment of 
35 
 
special master).  In short, we as a judiciary must and do find 
ways to make justice not only fair but workable.  See Demoulas 
v. Demoulas, 428 Mass. 555, 580 (1998), citing 1 D. Dobbs, 
Remedies § 2.1(3), at 63 (2d ed. 1993) ("Equitable remedies are 
flexible tools to be applied with the focus on fairness and 
justice"). 
 
2.  Revisiting the need for a global remedy.  We now 
consider, in light of all that has happened and all that we have 
learned since Bridgeman I, whether we should revisit our 
decision to decline to adopt a global remedy "at this time" to 
resolve the cases of the relevant Dookhan defendants.  
Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 487. 
 
a.  The district attorneys' proposal to stay the course.  
The district attorneys contend that our previous decisions have 
provided an adequate remedy to the relevant Dookhan defendants.  
This argument relies on the key premise that the notice mailed 
to the Dookhan defendants adequately informed them that 
Dookhan's misconduct affected their criminal case and that, as a 
result, they may seek to vacate their drug conviction. 
 
We reject this premise; we agree with the Bridgeman 
petitioners that the notice sent by the district attorneys was 
wholly inadequate to provide the relevant Dookhan defendants 
with the information necessary to knowingly and voluntarily 
decide whether they should explore with counsel the possibility 
36 
 
of withdrawing their plea or moving for a new trial.  The 
shortcomings begin with the envelope itself, which identified 
the source of the letter as "RG/2 Claims Administration LLC," a 
source that would appear inconsistent with the words on the 
envelope, "IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS."  Such an envelope invites the risk that the 
notice might be unopened and discarded as "junk mail." 
 
Among the shortcomings of the letter itself are that it 
failed adequately to inform the Dookhan defendants that the 
Supreme Judicial Court has determined that they are entitled to 
a conclusive presumption that the drug analysis in their case 
was tainted by egregious government misconduct.  Nor did it 
adequately inform them that, as a result, this court has 
determined that they are entitled to withdraw their guilty plea18 
on drug charges if they can show a reasonable probability that 
they would not have pleaded guilty, and instead would have 
decided to go to trial, had they known of Dookhan's misconduct.  
                                                          
 
 
18 We recognize that recipients of the letter include both 
individuals who pleaded guilty to Dookhan-related charges and 
those who admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a guilty 
finding.  Because such an admission is the "functional 
equivalent of a guilty plea" under G. L. c. 278, § 29D, and 
because it exposes a defendant to some of the same collateral 
consequences as a guilty plea, see Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 
437 Mass. 797, 800 (2002), we treat the admission the same as a 
guilty plea for the purposes of a motion for new trial.  Luk v. 
Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415, 418 n.6 (1995).  In the remaining 
discussion we refer to a guilty plea and an admission to 
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty, collectively, 
as a "guilty plea."  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 337 n.1. 
37 
 
Nor did it adequately inform them that, if they had been 
convicted of a drug charge at trial, they are entitled to a new 
trial if the admission in evidence of their drug analysis might 
have significantly influenced the jury in reaching their 
verdict.  The letter explained that, if their challenge to their 
drug conviction were to succeed, their conviction would be 
vacated and their "case will be returned to active status," but 
did not explain what it meant for their case to be on "active 
status."19  The Spanish translation of the letter is so poor that 
the letter might not be understood by persons who speak only 
Spanish. 
 
The letter also failed to inform the Dookhan defendants 
that they had a right to counsel if they sought to withdraw 
their plea or move for a new trial and that, if they could not 
afford counsel, one would be appointed for them.  Instead, it 
invited them to speak to their original lawyer on the case and, 
if they did not know how to contact that lawyer, invited them to 
obtain that information from the relevant criminal clerk's 
office.20  The letter also invited them to contact the office of 
the district attorney who prosecuted them "[f]or more 
                                                          
 
 
19 The letter did explain that, if the district attorney 
decided to try them again on the vacated drug charge, they would 
not face punishment greater than what they had earlier received 
if they were convicted. 
 
 
20 The letter also told recipients that they "may also 
choose to speak to a new lawyer." 
38 
 
information."  It did not provide a telephone number for CPCS or 
for any other entity that conducts criminal defense. 
 
Apart from the deficiencies in the notice, we know that a 
substantial number of the Dookhan defendants did not receive the 
letter, because 5,767 were returned as undeliverable.  An 
additional 964 notices were sent to secondary addresses for 
these individuals in an attempt to locate them, but we do not 
know how many of these letters were returned as undeliverable.  
No public notice, either through the newspaper, television, or 
social media, was attempted to provide notice to those whose 
current address could not be located. 
 
We are skeptical of the district attorneys' explanation 
that so few of the Dookhan defendants chose to respond to the 
letter because most were not interested in "reopening a closed 
chapter in their lives before an adverse impact actually occurs" 
and others believed that "they face no adverse impact at all" 
from this conviction.  We recognize that few, if any, of the 
relevant Dookhan defendants continue to be incarcerated on a 
drug conviction tainted by Dookhan's misconduct, but that does 
not mean that they lack a strong reason to seek to have this 
conviction vacated, given the serious and pervasive collateral 
consequences that arise from a drug conviction.  A noncitizen, 
even one lawfully residing in this country, who is convicted of 
any crime "relating to a controlled substance," which includes 
39 
 
the crime of possession of heroin, cocaine, or more than thirty 
grams of marijuana, is "deportable."  8 U.S.C. § 1227(2)(B)(i) 
(2012).  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368 (2010); 
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 175 (2014).  All 
persons, including United States citizens, who are convicted of 
drug crimes may be barred from public housing and from Federal- 
and State-subsidized private housing.  See 42 U.S.C. § 13661 
(2012); 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.204(a)(1), 982.553(a)(1), (2)(ii); 
G. L. c. 121B, § 32 (State-funded public housing); 760 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 5.08(1)(d) (1996); 760 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 49.03(2)(f) (2012) (Massachusetts Rental Voucher Program); 803 
Code Mass. Regs. § 5.04 (2012).  A drug conviction may bar a 
defendant from many categories of jobs and professional 
licenses.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 6, §§ 172 (c), 172A-172M.  See 
also Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 317 (2014) (collateral 
consequences include homelessness and unemployment).  It may 
also prevent a defendant from receiving government benefits such 
as cash assistance and unemployment benefits.  See G. L. 
c. 151A, § 25 (e) (unemployment benefits); 106 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 701.110(D) (2016) (cash assistance under transitional aid to 
families with dependent children program).  And it may render a 
student temporarily ineligible for Federal financial aid, 
thereby diminishing a defendant's ability to attend college.  20 
U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2012).  A conviction of drug trafficking 
40 
 
results in the automatic suspension of the defendant's driver's 
license, which makes it more difficult to find and keep 
employment.  G. L. c. 90, § 22½, inserted by St. 2016, c. 64, 
§ 1.  A prior drug conviction may also result in a lengthy 
minimum mandatory sentence for those subsequently convicted of 
additional drug offenses, G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32 (b), 32A (b), 
32B (b), 32C (b), 32D (b), 34, or of the illegal possession of a 
firearm.  G. L. c. 269, § 10G.  In short, the adverse 
consequences of an unjust conviction do not end when one 
completes a jail or prison term, or a probationary period.  
Given the inadequacy of the notice provided by the district 
attorneys, the remarkably low response to that notice, and the 
severe collateral consequences of drug convictions, justice and 
fairness do not permit us simply to stay the course set in 
Bridgeman I. 
 
b.  The Bridgeman petitioners' proposal for a global 
remedy.  The Bridgeman petitioners contend that, even with 
adequate notice, no remedy premised on case-by-case adjudication 
can work.  They argue that, because of the severely limited 
resources of CPCS -- the amount of State funding, the number of 
qualified bar advocates, and the legislative limits on the 
number of hours that bar advocates annually may bill to CPCS -- 
CPCS cannot possibly assign qualified counsel to represent all 
the defendants who would file the postconviction motions that 
41 
 
would result from truly adequate notice.  They therefore contend 
that it is both illusory and misleading to inform defendants 
that, if they are indigent, counsel will be assigned to 
represent them, where that will simply not be possible.  They 
contend that the only just and practical alternative under these 
circumstances is the global remedy they propose, in which we 
would vacate the drug convictions of all relevant Dookhan 
defendants and dismiss them with prejudice, or dismiss them 
without prejudice and allow prosecutors one year to reprosecute 
these cases before they, too, would be dismissed with prejudice. 
 
The proposed global remedy, however, is neither as just nor 
as practical as the Bridgeman petitioners claim, and it would be 
inconsistent with some of the principles that we earlier 
articulated.  In Scott and Francis, we granted relevant Dookhan 
defendants a conclusive presumption of egregious government 
misconduct, but we did not grant them a conclusive presumption 
of prejudice; defendants still bore the burden of proving 
prejudice.  Where a relevant Dookhan defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw a plea or for a new trial, and failed to prove 
prejudice, the motion was denied.  The global remedy proposed by 
the Bridgeman petitioners would effectively declare a conclusive 
presumption of prejudice. 
 
Even where a relevant Dookhan defendant proved prejudice, 
the defendant only obtained a new trial under Scott and Francis, 
42 
 
not a dismissal with prejudice.  Dookhan's conduct, serious as 
it was, did not result in "irremediable harm to the defendant's 
opportunity to obtain a fair trial."  Cronk, 396 Mass. at 198.  
Rather, it meant that the Commonwealth had to retest the 
substance claimed to be a controlled substance and offer 
evidence of that new drug analysis at a retrial, or otherwise  
prove that the substance possessed or distributed by the 
defendant was a controlled substance.  Nor, given the absence of 
any evidence of misconduct by a prosecutor or investigator, did 
we place Dookhan's misconduct in the category that requires a 
stronger deterrent than a new trial to avoid the risk of 
repetition.  See Lewin, 405 Mass. at 587; Manning, 373 Mass. at 
444.  A dismissal with prejudice for government misconduct is 
very strong medicine, and it should be prescribed only when the 
government misconduct is so intentional and so egregious that a 
new trial is not an adequate remedy.  We did not prescribe this 
medicine in Scott and Francis, and we are not convinced that it 
is appropriate to do so now.  And if we were to prescribe it 
now, we would equitably have to address the claims of those who 
earlier prevailed in proving prejudice and therefore won a new 
trial, but not a dismissal with prejudice, and subsequently 
either again pleaded guilty to the same or lesser charges or 
were convicted at a new trial of the drug charges.  They could 
43 
 
justly contend that they are as entitled to a dismissal with 
prejudice as are those who did not move for a new trial. 
 
To vacate the convictions of all relevant Dookhan 
defendants without prejudice would present other problems of 
justice and practicality.  We require a defendant to move for a 
new trial for a reason -- without a motion, we cannot be sure 
that a defendant wishes to accept the risk that the Commonwealth 
will retry the defendant rather than issue a nolle prosequi.  
Even though, as a result of our decision in Bridgeman I, 471 
Mass. at 477, a defendant at a new trial would not be risking 
conviction of a more serious crime or a longer sentence, a 
defendant who is retried would still have to appear in court 
when directed by the judge and endure the uncertainty and 
disruption inherent in being a defendant in a criminal trial.  
We might be skeptical of the district attorneys' contention that 
most of the relevant Dookhan defendants do not wish to reopen "a 
closed chapter in their lives," but it would not be surprising 
if some defendants have no wish to relitigate their earlier 
criminal cases and instead simply want to move on with their 
lives. 
 
Although we reject the global remedy proposed by the 
Bridgeman petitioners, we accept two premises of their argument.  
First, in light of the unusual circumstances of the relevant 
Dookhan defendants, all who are indigent and wish to explore 
44 
 
whether to move for a new trial under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b) 
are entitled to appointed counsel.  We recognize that we have 
declared that "an indigent defendant does not have an absolute 
right under any provision of the United States Constitution or 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to appointed counsel in 
preparing or presenting his motion for a new trial."  
Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 261 (1983).  But we 
have also declared that the State must "ensure that indigent 
defendants have meaningful access to this postconviction 
proceeding," id., and that, "when a defendant presents a motion 
for a new trial which raises a colorable or meritorious issue, 
'it is much the better practice to assign counsel.'"  Id. at 
262, quoting Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 448 (9th 
Cir. 1962). 
Generally, the decision whether to appoint counsel to 
represent a defendant in preparing and presenting a motion for a 
new trial rests with the sound discretion of the motion judge.  
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (5), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001).  But in the exercise of that discretion a judge should 
appoint counsel where the failure to do so would deprive an 
indigent defendant "of meaningful access" or result in 
"fundamental unfairness."  Conceicao, supra at 262, citing Ross 
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974), and Lassiter v. Department 
of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981). 
45 
 
Here, all of the relevant Dookhan defendants who move for a 
new trial are entitled under our decision in Scott to a 
conclusive presumption of egregious government misconduct.  The 
district attorneys concede that, given the number of relevant 
Dookhan defendants, we have the authority under our 
superintendence power to order that each relevant Dookhan 
defendant who is indigent is entitled to the assignment of 
counsel.  We so order; we need not wait for each motion judge to 
rule individually on the question of the assignment of counsel 
where it is plain that the absence of counsel under these 
unusual circumstances would deny an indigent defendant 
"meaningful access" or result in "fundamental unfairness," and 
therefore deprive the defendant of his or her constitutional 
rights to due process and to counsel.  The right to appointed 
counsel applies here regardless of whether the relevant Dookhan 
defendant has completed his or her sentence, because the severe 
collateral consequences arising from a drug conviction do not 
end at the conclusion of a defendant's sentence. 
 
Moreover, where an indigent criminal defendant has a right 
to counsel, "[t]he duty to provide such counsel falls squarely 
on government, and the burden of a systemic lapse is not to be 
borne by defendants."  Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden 
Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 246 (2004).  Where a judge finds 
that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel and is indigent 
46 
 
(or indigent but able to contribute), the judge assigns CPCS to 
provide representation for the party.  S.J.C. Rule 3:10, § 6, as 
appearing in 475 Mass. 1301 (2016).  G. L. c. 211D, § 5 (CPCS 
"shall establish, supervise and maintain a system for the 
appointment or assignment of counsel" at any stage of criminal 
proceeding where there is right to counsel and defendant is 
indigent).  If CPCS, despite its best efforts, were unable to 
assign counsel to a defendant in a reasonably timely manner -- 
whether the reason be the absence of necessary funding by the 
Legislature, the inability of CPCS to qualify adequate numbers 
of private attorneys to serve as bar advocates because of the 
low hourly fee mandated by the Legislature,21 the unavailability 
of qualified bar advocates because of the limitation on the 
                                                          
 
 
21 The present statutory hourly rate for bar advocates is 
fifty-three dollars for cases in the District Court and the 
Boston Municipal Court, and sixty dollars for nonhomicide cases 
in the Superior Court.  G. L. c. 211D, § 11 (a).  The only 
change to these hourly rates since 2005 has been that the rate 
applicable for cases in the District Court and Boston Municipal 
Court was increased from fifty dollars to fifty-three dollars in 
2015.  See St. 2015, c. 46, § 119. 
47 
 
number of hours they may bill annually,22 or a systemic overload 
created by an overwhelming number of relevant Dookhan defendants 
filing motions for a new trial (or the combination of all four 
reasons) -- we would have to fashion an appropriate remedy under 
our general superintendence authority for the constitutional 
violation suffered by indigent criminal defendants.  See 
Lavallee, supra at 244.  In Lavallee, where the list of CPCS-
qualified attorneys available to accept assignments in Hampden 
County was inadequate to ensure the provision of counsel to 
those with a right to counsel, the remedy we ordered was that a 
criminal case against an indigent defendant must be dismissed 
without prejudice if an attorney had not filed an appearance 
within forty-five days of arraignment.  Id. at 246. 
 
We recognize that, if a substantial percentage of relevant 
Dookhan defendants were to seek postconviction relief after 
                                                          
 
 
22 The annual cap on billable hours for bar advocates is 
1,650 hours, and a bar advocate may not accept any new 
appointment in a nonhomicide case after having billed 1,350 
hours in that fiscal year.  G. L. c. 211D, § 11 (b), (c).  In 
2016, in response to a shortage of bar advocates in care and 
protection cases and children and family law cases, the 
Legislature enacted legislation allowing the chief counsel of 
CPCS, under certain circumstances, to waive the annual cap on 
billable hours for bar advocates assigned to these cases, 
provided that such a bar advocate not bill in excess of 1,800 
billable hours for the year.  G. L. c. 211D, § 11(d), amended 
through St. 2016, c. 133, § 119.  A comparable increase in the 
annual cap on billable hours potentially could be enacted for 
bar advocates assigned to criminal cases or, alternatively, the 
time devoted to the representation of relevant Dookhan 
defendants could be exempted from the annual cap. 
48 
 
receiving truly adequate notice, the capacity of CPCS to assign 
qualified attorneys to represent these defendants in case-by-
case adjudication would soon be overwhelmed.  Therefore, unless 
the district attorneys were to move to vacate and dismiss with 
prejudice the drug convictions of large numbers of relevant 
Dookhan defendants, case-by-case adjudication poses the 
considerable risk that the demand of indigent Dookhan defendants 
for counsel might outstrip the supply of CPCS-qualified 
attorneys to represent them, and require this court to implement 
an appropriate remedy under our general superintendence 
authority for the constitutional violation suffered by indigent 
criminal defendants who are denied their right to counsel.  If 
past is prologue, that remedy will likely be the dismissal 
without prejudice of their challenged drug convictions.  See 
Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 246. 
 
c.  New protocol for case-by-case adjudication.  The 
extraordinary magnitude of Dookhan's misconduct has left us with 
only poor alternatives.  We continue to believe that, despite 
its considerable risks and burdens, case-by-case adjudication is 
the fairest and best alternative to resolve the drug cases 
potentially tainted by Dookhan's misconduct and the alternative 
most consistent and in harmony with the relevant principles of 
criminal justice that have and continue to guide us in this 
extraordinary situation.  But we recognize that, in light of the 
49 
 
potential need to adjudicate more than 20,000 motions for a new 
trial brought by the relevant Dookhan defendants, case-by-case 
adjudication must be adapted to make it both fair and workable. 
 
The success of case-by-case adjudication will depend on the 
cooperation of the district attorneys, who will have to examine 
each drug conviction of each relevant Dookhan defendant in their 
district and determine which cases they reasonably could and 
would reprosecute if a motion for a new trial were granted, and 
move to vacate and dismiss with prejudice the rest.23  We rely on 
the exercise of the district attorneys' sound discretion to 
reduce substantially the number of relevant Dookhan defendants.  
We note that it appears that the majority of the drug 
convictions of relevant Dookhan defendants were of possession 
                                                          
 
 
23 In a letter to the Governor on September 6, 2012, after 
learning of the investigation of the Hinton lab, the district 
attorneys declared, "If there has been any miscarriage of 
justice due to the actions of Annie Dookhan or anyone else at 
the [Hinton lab], correcting those miscarriages must be the 
first priority."  Press Release, MDAA Letter to Gov. Patrick Re:  
DPH Drug Lab, State House News Serv. (Sept. 11, 2012).  At oral 
argument, the district attorneys similarly assured the court 
that they will exercise their sound discretion in handling 
motions for a new trial brought by the relevant Dookhan 
defendants. 
50 
 
alone,24 that approximately ninety per cent of these convictions 
were obtained in the District Court or in the Boston Municipal 
Court (which means that the drug charges were either 
misdemeanors or felonies for which the district attorney did not 
choose to seek indictments), and that virtually all of these 
defendants have already served the entirety of their sentences 
for these drug convictions. 
 
Its success also depends on the cooperation of CPCS, which 
will have to make best efforts in using the funding appropriated 
by the Legislature to assign counsel to the relevant Dookhan 
defendants who, after new notice, choose to explore the filing 
of a motion for a new trial.  We look to CPCS also for its 
creativity and ingenuity in finding ways to assign attorneys to 
represent as many relevant Dookhan defendants as is reasonably 
possible. 
 
To accomplish case-by-case adjudication of the drug cases 
of potentially more than 20,000 relevant Dookhan defendants, we 
establish the following protocol, to be completed in three 
                                                          
 
 
24 An analysis conducted by Paola Villarreal, a data science 
fellow at the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of 
Massachusetts, revealed that approximately sixty-two per cent of 
the adverse drug dispositions for Dookhan defendants were for 
possession alone.  At oral argument, in answer to a question 
posed by a Justice, a prosecutor stated that he "[did] not know" 
whether a majority of these cases were for "straight 
possession." 
51 
 
phases, and order its implementation by the single justice in 
the form of a declaratory judgment. 
 
i.  Phase one.  Upon the issuance of this opinion, each 
district attorney shall commence an individualized review of 
every Dookhan case in his or her district that was included on 
the list that the district attorney earlier submitted to the 
single justice.  No later than ninety days after the issuance of 
this opinion, each district attorney shall file three letters 
with the county clerk.25 
 
The first letter shall identify all defendants on the list 
who are not relevant Dookhan defendants because they pleaded 
guilty to a drug charge before Dookhan signed the drug 
certification and therefore are not entitled to the conclusive 
presumption of egregious government misconduct.  In short, this 
letter shall identify all of the so-called Ruffin defendants.  
See Ruffin, 475 Mass. at 1003. 
 
The second letter shall identify all of the drug 
convictions on the list that the district attorney moves to 
vacate and dismiss with prejudice as a result of his or her 
individualized review.  These shall include both the convictions 
that the district attorney wishes to vacate and dismiss with 
prejudice, regardless of whether the case could be successfully 
                                                          
 
 
25 We recognize the difference between the date of the 
issuance of our opinion and the date of the rescript, and have 
specifically selected the former as the starting date. 
52 
 
reprosecuted if a new trial were ordered, and the convictions 
that the district attorney could not successfully reprosecute if 
a new trial were ordered.  Once these drug convictions are 
vacated and dismissed with prejudice, the defendants shall be 
notified of the action taken.26 
 
The third letter shall identify all drug convictions on the 
list that the district attorney does not move to vacate and 
dismiss with prejudice.  For each such conviction, the district 
attorney shall certify that, if a motion for a new trial were 
allowed, the district attorney could produce evidence at a 
retrial, independent of Dookhan's signed drug certificate or 
testimony, sufficient to permit a rational jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the substance at issue was the controlled 
substance alleged in the complaint or indictment.  Such 
independent evidence may include, for example, retesting of the 
original drug evidence, a positive field test, or a specific 
admission by the defendant regarding his or her knowledge of the 
nature of the substance that was made before Dookhan signed the 
drug certificate in the case.  Only the relevant Dookhan 
defendants identified in the third letter shall be provided with 
new notice in phase two, discussed infra. 
                                                          
 
 
26 Where a defendant pleaded guilty to multiple charges at a 
plea hearing or was convicted at trial of multiple counts, the 
vacatur of these drug convictions with prejudice will not affect 
any nondrug convictions or any drug convictions where Dookhan 
was not the primary or confirmatory analyst. 
53 
 
 
In light of the massive number of relevant Dookhan 
defendants and the scope of misconduct attributable to the 
government (albeit not to the prosecutors), it is only fair that 
district attorneys make an individualized determination whether 
a conviction warrants burdening the court system with the 
adjudication of a motion for a new trial, CPCS with the 
assignment of counsel for those who are indigent, and the 
taxpayers with payment for the notice and for assigned counsel, 
especially where a defendant has already served the entirety of 
the sentence.  A substantial vetting of the relevant cases by 
the district attorneys will allow our criminal justice system to 
focus its limited resources where they are most needed, and 
diminish the risk that the number of these cases will so 
overwhelm CPCS that the single justice will have to act to 
protect the relevant Dookhan defendants' right to counsel.27 
                                                          
 
 
27 Our focus in the phase one protocol on whether the 
Commonwealth could obtain a drug conviction against the relevant 
Dookhan defendants with evidence untainted by Dookhan's 
misconduct is comparable to the approach taken by New Jersey 
courts following revelations of misconduct by a police officer 
who made numerous drunk driving arrests.  In State v. Gookins, 
135 N.J. 42, 44-45 (1994), three defendants moved to vacate 
their guilty pleas for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol after the police officer involved in their arrests and 
the administration of their breathalyzer tests was convicted of 
falsifying the result of the breathalyzer test he had performed 
on an undercover agent, and of stealing money from drivers whom 
he had stopped.  The defendants had pleaded guilty in reliance 
on the results of their breathalyzer tests.  Id. at 45.  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court vacated their convictions and issued an 
order requiring the prosecution to certify to the trial court 
54 
 
 
ii.  Phase two.  In the second phase of the protocol, no 
later than thirty days after the expiration of the ninety-day 
period in phase one, new notice shall be provided to all 
relevant Dookhan defendants identified in the district 
attorneys' third letters.  The notice shall consist of a mailing 
that is approved by the single justice as to its content, its 
envelope, and its mode of delivery.28  The single justice shall 
also have the authority to order additional forms of public 
notice, such as through newspapers or social media, to enhance 
the effectiveness of the mailing and to attempt to reach those 
who might not receive it. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
"all the evidence that it considers to be untainted that would 
sustain the prosecution of these cases, . . . excluding the 
testimony of [the convicted officer]."  Id. at 51.  The trial 
court was instructed to hold a hearing "to determine whether 
such evidence is sufficient to permit the State to proceed with 
the case."  Id. at 52.  In a separate class action in the United 
States District Court, the State consented to the appointment of 
a special master to review all drunk driving cases of class 
members involving the convicted officer and determine whether 
those convictions should be reversed.  Id. at 51.  The special 
master conducted an individualized review of these cases and 
determined that "the only evidence inculpating the [defendants] 
came from a police officer known to be corrupt."  See Dickerson 
vs. Kane, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 92-2528 (D.N.J. July 17, 1995).  
The District Court judge adopted the findings of the special 
master and ordered the reversal of 151 drunk driving 
convictions.  Id. 
 
 
28 We leave to the single justice the question whether 
certified mail or some other comparable means of delivery is 
appropriate to determine whether the defendant actually receives 
the notice. 
55 
 
 
The new notice shall not only address the deficiencies 
described in the content of the first written notice sent by the 
district attorneys, but also simplify the process for defendants 
to move for a new trial.  The notice should identify the 
telephone number of a "hotline" staffed by CPCS, so that persons 
who receive the notice can seek immediate guidance.  The mailing 
should permit a relevant Dookhan defendant to declare, simply by 
checking a box, that the defendant wishes to discuss with 
counsel whether the defendant should attempt to vacate his or 
her drug conviction by filing a motion for a new trial, and 
should also include a form indigency affidavit for the defendant 
to fill out if he or she claims to be indigent and therefore 
qualifies for the assignment of counsel.  CPCS is encouraged to 
draft and include within the mailing a separate letter providing 
the legal guidance and information that CPCS would generally 
provide to a relevant Dookhan defendant who would telephone its 
hotline.  Because this guidance letter, unlike the notice, 
constitutes legal advocacy and not simply legal information, and 
might encourage relevant Dookhan defendants to move for a new 
trial to eliminate the collateral consequences arising from 
their drug conviction, the content of this letter shall not 
require the approval of the single justice.  Along with the 
notice, the guidance letter, the check-off sheet, and the form 
indigency affidavit, the mailing shall include a stamped, self-
56 
 
addressed envelope so that, once completed, the documents may be 
returned to an address designated by the single justice.  Where 
a relevant Dookhan defendant returns the documents indicating 
that he or she is indigent and wishes to explore with counsel 
the filing of a motion for a new trial, the single justice shall 
make an indigency determination and, where indigency is found, 
shall order CPCS to assign counsel to the defendant.  No action 
shall be taken regarding any relevant Dookhan defendant's 
conviction where he or she does not return the documents or 
otherwise move for a new trial. 
 
The single justice shall also address the challenge created 
by the substantial number of relevant Dookhan defendants who 
have yet to be successfully located.  As it stands now, these 
defendants have yet to be informed that the substance at issue 
in their case was tested by Dookhan in the Hinton lab, that 
Dookhan's misconduct over many years has been found to be 
egregious government misconduct, and that they are entitled to 
the conclusive presumption of egregious government misconduct if 
they were to move for a new trial.  Because they have not yet 
been so informed, they effectively have been denied the 
opportunity to seek redress for this misconduct. 
 
The district attorneys have an obligation to take all 
reasonable steps necessary to provide these individuals with 
notice of Dookhan's misconduct, and that includes reasonable 
57 
 
efforts to locate them, wherever they might be residing.  Where, 
despite reasonable efforts, the district attorneys are unable to 
obtain an address for a relevant Dookhan defendant, or where the 
notice is returned as undeliverable, the single justice shall 
direct the relevant district attorney to locate the current 
address of the defendant's last attorney of record in the case.  
The notice and accompanying documents shall be sent to that 
attorney, with a cover letter asking the attorney to make best 
efforts to locate his or her former client so that effective 
notice can be accomplished.  In addition, the single justice 
shall have the authority to direct the probation department to 
include a notation in the missing defendant's board of probation 
record indicating that the defendant is a relevant Dookhan 
defendant, so that the defendant can receive the required notice 
and related documents if he or she returns to court.  For the 
relevant Dookhan defendants who cannot otherwise be located, the 
single justice shall also have the authority to order the use of 
social or other media to provide the notice and related 
documents, or information regarding them. 
 
The financial burden of notifying defendants of egregious 
government misconduct that affected their criminal cases must be 
borne by the prosecuting district attorney's office, even if, as 
here, the fault belongs to the Hinton lab and Dookhan, not the 
prosecutors.  Therefore, the cost of providing new and adequate 
58 
 
notice, including but not limited to the cost of mailing, of 
locating missing defendants, and of publicity through social and 
other media, shall be borne by the district attorneys, with the 
allocation of those costs to be determined by the single 
justice.  We recognize that this cost could be considerable, but 
that is a consequence of egregious government misconduct that 
affected more than 20,000 defendants.  We also note that a 
district attorney may reduce the amount of this cost by reducing 
the number of defendants identified in the third letter.  The 
failure of a district attorney to bear the district's 
proportionate share of these costs shall be deemed equivalent to 
a failure to provide defendants with exculpatory information, 
with the sanctions appropriate to such a failure. 
 
iii.  Phase three.  In the third phase, CPCS shall identify 
in writing to the single justice all cases, if any, where CPCS 
received an order for the assignment of counsel, but was unable 
within sixty days of the order to assign counsel despite CPCS's 
best efforts.  The single justice shall then make a factual 
finding, after hearing, whether CPCS has made best efforts to 
assign counsel in these cases.  In those cases where the single 
justice makes such a finding, the single justice shall issue an 
order to show cause why the drug conviction of this 
unrepresented defendant should not be vacated, and set a date 
for a show cause hearing where the Commonwealth will have an 
59 
 
opportunity to be heard.  At or after that hearing, if the 
single justice determines that relevant Dookhan defendants have 
been denied their right to counsel because of the inability of 
CPCS, despite its best efforts, to assign counsel to represent 
the defendants, the single justice may order that the drug 
convictions at issue be vacated and dismissed without prejudice, 
unless the interests of justice otherwise dictate.29  See 
Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 246. 
 
Conclusion.  The case is remanded to the single justice for 
the entry of a declaratory judgment as provided in this opinion 
and for further action consistent with this opinion.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
29 We recognize our authority to appoint a special master to 
assist the single justice in his or her exercise of our 
superintendence authority in these cases.  See S.J.C. Rule 2:13, 
as appearing in 382 Mass. 749 (1981). 
 
 
30 Because we recognize the challenges involved in 
implementing the three-phase protocol, the single justice is 
authorized to make necessary revisions if any part of it is 
determined to be impracticable.  In addition, if this protocol 
for any reason were to prove inadequate in practice to remedy 
the wrong despite the best efforts of the parties, the single 
justice may issue a new reservation and report to the full 
court. 
 
 
 
LENK, J. (concurring, with whom Budd, J., joins).  It has 
been over five years since the stunning misconduct of a rogue 
chemist at the State's William A. Hinton State Laboratory 
Institute (Hinton lab) first came to light.  The nature, scope, 
and adverse consequences of that misconduct on the individuals 
directly affected, on our system of justice, and on the 
taxpayers who must foot the bill for this lamentable turn of 
events are all ably recounted in the court's opinion, as well as 
in the dissenting opinion.  I write separately to underscore 
that, in those five years, and despite the time and efforts of so 
many, we have managed to address fewer than 2,000 of the 
estimated 20,000 or more cases involving Annie Dookhan-tainted 
evidence.  We cannot go on this way. 
 
Even as we speak, the myriad ripple effects of one woman's 
misdeeds continue to afflict the relevant Dookhan defendants, 
thousands and thousands of whom already have served their time 
for convictions that we now know to be suspect.  As a result of 
having a prior drug conviction, many of those same people, some 
of whom may not even know to this day of Dookhan's fateful role 
in their lives, may now find themselves unable to get work or 
housing, obtain or keep needed professional and drivers' 
licenses, attend college, receive government benefits, or even 
stay in this country.  Mindful of this, I share the dissenting 
Justice's frustration with the unacceptably glacial systemic 
2 
 
 
response to date and join in her view that extraordinary measures 
are now in order.  For reasons explained in the court's opinion, 
however, I regard the protocol announced today (Bridgeman II 
protocol) as promising to be such a measure, but only if 
implemented in a manner that countenances no further delays.  For 
the protocol to achieve its goals and end this "blight on the 
integrity of our criminal justice system," post at    , there must 
be strict compliance with its stringent timelines and 
requirements.  Only this will forestall the need for a 
"Bridgeman III" and different measures. 
 
While blame for the difficult situation in which we find 
ourselves lies solely with Dookhan and the Hinton lab that 
allowed it to happen -- and it cannot be said too many times that 
fault most certainly does not lie with the prosecutors who, 
without knowing its tainted provenance, in good faith used the 
evidence Dookhan created -- we consistently have recognized that 
her misdeeds must be attributed to the government, and that the 
government must bear the responsibility to put things right.  
Just as the success of the Bridgeman II protocol will depend on 
its timely and rigorous implementation, so too will its viability 
turn, at least initially, on the willingness of the district 
attorneys promptly to dismiss with prejudice a truly significant 
number of the roughly 20,000 relevant Dookhan defendants' 
cases -- at a minimum, those for simple possession in which 
3 
 
 
sentences already have been served.  See ante at note 24.  Not 
doing so in the first phase of the protocol will of necessity add 
to the already staggering human and financial costs of the 
scandal and risk overloading the already strained public defense 
system.  In this regard, we cannot turn a blind eye to the 
potential costs of the looming crisis of thus far undetermined 
magnitude caused in western Massachusetts by Sonja Farak, yet 
another rogue chemist employed by a State laboratory.  And, as to 
the presumably limited number of remaining cases that the 
district attorneys decline to dismiss, truly informative notice 
to the defendants involved, using whatever modes of communication 
will be effective, is vital to achieving the fair and workable 
outcome contemplated by the protocol. 
 
Recognizing what Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., once called 
"the fierce urgency of now," we must act swiftly and surely to 
staunch the damage and to make things as right as we can.  The 
Bridgeman II protocol draws upon the deep roots of our 
jurisprudence to craft a response that, consistent with 
fundamental principles, will bring this deplorable episode 
forthwith to a just resolution once and for all.  May it be so. 
 
 
 
HINES, J. (dissenting).  The petitioners and intervener 
(collectively, petitioners) are before this court once again 
seeking a global remedy for the more than 20,000 defendants 
whose convictions were tainted by Annie Dookhan’s unprecedented1 
and far-reaching misconduct at the William A. Hinton State 
Laboratory Institute.  The court rejects a global remedy, 
adopting the view that "despite its considerable risks and 
burdens, case-by-case adjudication is the fairest and best 
alternative to resolve the cases potentially tainted by 
Dookhan's misconduct."  Ante at    .  I disagree.  Now, more 
than five years after Dookhan's misconduct first came to light, 
the need to adopt a swift and sure remedy for the harm caused by 
her deceit presents itself with palpable urgency.  The time has 
come to close the book on this scandal, once and for all, by 
adopting a global remedy.  While I agree, as the court notes, 
that a global remedy is "strong medicine," ante at    , the 
continuing violation of the rights of the defendants affected by 
Dookhan's misconduct and the damage to the integrity of our 
criminal justice system demand no less. 
 
Contrary to the court's assessment of the case-by-case 
procedure offered as the solution to the problem the court is 
obliged to solve, it is neither the fairest nor the best 
                                                          
 
 
1 An exhaustive search of reported cases yielded not a 
single case involving misconduct comparable to that committed by 
Dookhan. 
2 
 
 
 
alternative for remedying the manifest injustice to the 
defendants caught up in the Dookhan scandal and for restoring 
the integrity to our criminal justice system.  It fails as the 
"fairest" alternative because it flouts the guiding principle 
that "in the wake of government misconduct that has cast a 
shadow over the entire criminal justice system, it is most 
appropriate that the benefit of the remedy inure to the 
defendants."  Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 352 (2014), 
citing Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 
Mass. 228, 246 (2004).  It also fails as the "best" alternative 
because it is simply unworkable as a timely and effective 
mechanism for addressing the due process claims of the thousands 
of defendants now deemed to have been convicted on Dookhan's 
tainted evidence.  In short, the court's solution is too little 
and too late.  The only fitting end to this blight on the 
integrity of our criminal justice system is vacatur and 
dismissal with prejudice of the convictions of all relevant 
Dookhan defendants.  Therefore, I dissent. 
 
 The case for a global remedy.  We have been here before.  
We acknowledged in Scott, 467 Mass. at 352, that Dookhan's 
misconduct caused "a lapse of systemic magnitude in the criminal 
justice system."  Recognizing the "particularly insidious" 
nature of Dookhan's misconduct and that it "belies 
reconstruction," we adopted a conclusive presumption of 
3 
 
 
 
egregious government misconduct as an accommodation to those 
defendants able to establish Dookhan's role in producing the 
evidence upon which their conviction was based.  Id.  Later in 
Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 
465 (2015) (Bridgeman I), we declined the invitation to 
implement a global remedy for the thousands of cases affected by 
Dookhan's misconduct "at this time."  Id. at 487.  Signaling a 
preference for a measured approach rather than the more drastic 
global remedy advocated by the petitioners, we noted that "our 
decisions in Scott and [Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63 
(2013)], have provided Dookhan defendants . . . with meaningful 
solutions for addressing concerns that have arisen as these 
defendants attempt to challenge their drug convictions."  Id. 
 
Since Bridgeman I, however, Scott's promise as a hedge 
against the wholesale violation of the due process rights of 
this class of defendants has been undermined by the sheer 
magnitude of the problem.  Scott was decided without the benefit 
of the investigative reports establishing the scope of Dookhan's 
misconduct.2  The court reasonably assumed, therefore, that the 
jurisprudential shortcut to proving Dookhan's misconduct would 
make a case-by-case approach workable.  Because we now know the 
extent of Dookhan's misconduct and that it has not yet been 
mitigated in any significant respect by the measures in Scott 
                                                          
 
 
2 See ante at note 6. 
4 
 
 
 
and Charles, that assumption is no longer valid.  With a clearer 
eye on the scope of the problem, Scott's characterization of 
Dookhan's misconduct as a "lapse of systemic magnitude" still 
stands as an apt factual and legal context for the petitioners' 
claims.  Scott, 467 Mass. at 352. 
 
In this case, as in Scott, we are called upon to "exercise 
our superintendence power [under G. L. c. 211, § 3,] to fashion 
a workable approach to motions to withdraw a guilty plea brought 
by defendants affected by [Dookhan's] misconduct."  Id.  In this 
undertaking, the appropriate analytical framework is that 
articulated in Scott.3  We noted that in fashioning a remedy for 
the "systemic lapse" caused by Dookhan's misconduct, "[w]e must 
account for the due process rights of defendants, the integrity 
of the criminal justice system, the efficient administration of 
justice in responding to such potentially broad-ranging 
misconduct, and the myriad public interests at stake."  Id.  In 
                                                          
 
 
3 Without clearly explaining why, the court strays from the 
analytical framework we adopted in Scott, relying instead on a 
self-selected set of "principles" explained in elaborate detail.  
Ante at    .  I agree that these principles are firmly rooted in 
our jurisprudence, but they are not necessarily dispositive of 
the issue presented here.  Absent a reason to play by a 
different set of rules from that articulated in Scott, 467 Mass. 
at 352, and reiterated in Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 487, as an 
appropriate standard to apply in "fashion[ing] a workable 
approach" to handling the cases in which Dookhan was the primary 
or confirmatory chemist, I would not spurn the analytical 
approach adopted in Scott.  The problem here is the same as it 
was in Scott:  the need to craft a fair and timely approach to 
the resolution of these cases. 
5 
 
 
 
balancing these factors as discussed below, I am persuaded that 
the case for a global remedy as advocated by the petitioners is 
compelling. 
 
1.  Due process rights.  The due process rights at stake 
here, "the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in 
a meaningful manner'" (citation omitted), Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. 
at 479, weigh heavily in Scott's remedial calculus for two 
reasons:  the serious and ongoing collateral consequences to the 
class of defendants convicted on the strength of Dookhan's 
tainted evidence; and the necessity to avoid unnecessary delay 
beyond the four years that already have elapsed in providing 
these defendants a "meaningful" opportunity to establish 
prejudice from Dookhan's misconduct.  The court, ante at, paints 
a grim picture of how lives are upended by the serious 
collateral consequences of drug-related convictions.  The 
picture is even more grim when one considers that many, if not 
most, of these defendants have already served their sentences.4  
They have paid their debt to society whether they owed one or 
not.  The years spent incarcerated cannot be restored to these 
                                                          
 
 
4 An analysis conducted by a data science fellow at the 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Massachusetts found 
that approximately sixty-two per cent of the convictions in the 
cases tainted by Dookhan's misconduct were for possession only 
and that about ninety-one per cent of these cases were resolved 
in the District Court. These statistics support the assumption 
that most defendants have completed their sentences. 
6 
 
 
 
defendants, but a fair and just resolution can make amends.  
What due process requires then is a remedy that is simple, sure, 
and final.  That means a remedy that is uncomplicated by the 
myriad moving parts built into the court's case-by-case model, 
free of the risk that further delay will prolong the only relief 
that realistically can be offered to defendants who have already 
served their sentences.  This interpretation of what due process 
requires at this point in the effort to solve the Dookhan 
problem is supported by Scott and Bridgeman I. 
 
In Bridgeman I, 471 Mass. at 479, the court declined to 
adopt a global remedy in part based on the "substantial efforts 
that are being made to deal with the impact of Dookhan's 
misconduct."  With at least the prospect of a speedy resolution 
of the cases in which Dookhan was the primary or confirmatory 
chemist, the court was content to delay a more robust remedy to 
allow those efforts to accomplish their purpose.5  Id. at 487.  
Here, however, we have come to an end point in assessing the 
impact of Scott and Charles in resolving the outstanding cases 
of this type.  The district attorneys have identified 24,000 
cases, more or less, that must be adjudicated on the prejudice 
prong of Scott.  Thus, the scope of the current challenge is 
                                                          
 
 
5 The court observed that "[o]ur decision . . . will go a 
long way in resolving additional concerns that have surfaced and 
in moving these cases forward towards resolution."  Bridgeman I, 
471 Mass. at 487. 
7 
 
 
 
clear.  The remedy, in accounting for defendants' due process 
right to a prompt hearing, must have some reasonable prospect 
for immediate resolution of the 24,000 cases to avoid 
exacerbating the serious consequences of delay.  I am not 
persuaded that the court's case-by-case model meets this test in 
circumstances where the defendants' due process rights are 
paramount. 
 
2.  Integrity of the criminal justice system.  It is beyond 
dispute that Dookhan's misconduct, the details of which have 
spread beyond the legal community,6 has undermined public trust 
in the integrity of the criminal justice system.  In a case such 
as this, coming before the court as a consequence of Dookhan's 
serious corruption of our criminal justice system, the court's 
task is not merely to decide the rights of the parties.  The 
court must also act, within the boundaries of the law, to 
restore the public's faith in the integrity of the courts.  
Unlike the right to counsel crisis in Lavallee, Dookhan's 
misconduct is not a problem of the Legislature's making.  See 
Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 246.  The duty to protect, and restore 
when necessary, the integrity of the criminal justice system 
falls squarely upon the court. 
 
With no clear sign from the court that it grasps the scope 
                                                          
 
 
6 See, e.g., Jackman, When a State's Drug Chemist Lies for 
Years, Should All Her Cases Be Thrown Out?,  Wash. Post, Sept. 
29, 2016. 
8 
 
 
 
of the damage and the need for an approach that will eliminate 
"root and branch"7 all of the attendant consequences, the public 
is left to wonder if the process by which a court imposes the 
sanction of a loss of liberty is fair and just.8  Restoring the 
integrity of the criminal justice system requires that the court 
acknowledge and make amends for the shortcomings in a system 
that permitted Dookhan to "go rogue" for so long without 
detection.9  Those shortcomings call into question the integrity 
of the entire criminal justice apparatus for gathering and 
reporting the evidence that juries rely on in deciding a 
defendant's guilt or innocence.  The perceived legitimacy of 
court-imposed restraints on a defendant's liberty rises or falls 
on the integrity of the evidence.  If the mistrust engendered by 
the individual and institutional failures that produced this 
scandal is allowed to remain, it will have far-reaching adverse 
                                                          
 
 
7 See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-438 
(1968)(using phrase to describe obligation to dismantle school 
segregation fourteen years after command to do so in Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 [1954]). 
 
 
8 Over the years, the racial impact of our sentencing 
practices have come under scrutiny.  See e.g., The Sentencing 
Project, The Color of Justice:  Racial and Ethnic Disparity in 
State Prisons, at 3, 5, 7-8 & n.13, 16-18 (2016).  Although 
racial bias has not been documented, members of the public, 
especially those in the communities of color, rarely parse such 
reports in search of the real reason for disparate impact. 
 
 
9 "Dookhan's consistently high testing volumes should have 
been a clear indication that a more thorough analysis and review 
of her work was needed."  See Scott, 467 Mass. at 340. 
9 
 
 
 
consequences for the ability of our courts to maintain the 
public's faith in the promise of equal justice for all.  Because 
I am not persuaded that the case-by-case model adopted by the 
court can accomplish this essential purpose, this factor weighs 
in favor of the global remedy advocated by the petitioners. 
 
3.  Efficient administration of justice.  There is no 
question that, despite the best efforts of the parties, 
thousands of defendants affected by Dookhan's misconduct still 
languish without notice of their rights or even a realistic 
opportunity for redress.  The four-year delay in the resolution 
of the cases tainted by Dookhan's misconduct, as discussed 
above, adequately makes the point that the administration of 
justice has been anything but efficient.  Yet, the court gives 
insufficient weight to this factor in adopting a case-by-case 
adjudication model. 
 
The efficacy of the court's case-by-case model is at best 
questionable, both because it is unworkable and because it is 
likely to perpetuate further delay in providing a remedy to the 
thousands of defendants affected by Dookhan's misconduct.  Not 
only is it lacking in the ability to insure a speedy resolution 
of the 24,000 cases thus tainted, it is vulnerable to failure 
for several practical reasons:  the reliance on voluntary 
cooperation of the district attorneys, and unrealistic 
timetables. 
10 
 
 
 
 
First, the success of phase one, which anticipates a 
substantial culling of the 24,000 cases, depends entirely on the 
voluntary cooperation of the district attorneys.  Ante at    .  
Understandably, the court has not asserted any authority to 
compel the dismissal of cases.  See Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 
414 Mass. 402, 405 (1993) ("Prosecutors have broad discretion in 
determining whether to prosecute a case").  In this respect, the 
court's model does not change the status quo:  the district 
attorneys already have, and have had for the duration of the 
Dookhan crisis, the sole authority voluntarily to dismiss these 
cases.  It is undisputed that the district attorneys have 
cooperated in identifying the defendants presumed to have been 
affected by Dookhan's misconduct.  However, without some basis 
for a reasonable belief that the district attorneys will follow 
through on the suggestion to dismiss thousands of cases with 
prejudice, the court does not inspire confidence in the success 
of the model. 
 
Second, the timetable for the accomplishment of the various 
phases of the case-by-case model is unrealistic and 
unachievable.  The court acknowledges that "substantial vetting" 
is required under phase one.  Ante at    .  Yet, the district 
attorneys are given only ninety days to sift through the 24,000 
cases that have been connected to Dookhan's misconduct.  If past 
is prologue, and taking into account the delays in getting to 
11 
 
 
 
where we are now, accomplishing this task within the ninety-day 
window adopted for the court's model is highly unlikely.  
Likewise, the thirty-day deadline in phase two for notice to the 
defendants whose cases will not be dismissed without prejudice 
is problematic for the same reason.  To the extent that the time 
frames reflect a calculation that absolute compliance by the 
district attorneys and the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
will adequately accommodate the defendants' due process rights, 
I have no confidence that the court's faith in the practicality 
of the process will be rewarded.  Unless the court is prepared 
to declare that reasonable requests for delay, even those based 
on the impracticality of the timetable, will be denied, the more 
likely scenario is that further indeterminable delay will occur. 
 
With the defendants' due process right to a prompt hearing 
hanging in the balance, I cannot accept an untimely, and 
ultimately unworkable, case-by-case model as an appropriate 
resolution of the issue before us. 
 
4.  Other public interests.  None of the other public 
interests at stake here warrants a disposition that prolongs a 
global remedy for the defendants who are presumed to have been 
victims of Dookhan's misconduct.  First, the likelihood that the 
vast majority of the defendants in the cases in which Dookhan 
was the primary or confirmatory chemist have completed their 
sentences mitigates the most compelling public interest at stake 
12 
 
 
 
here:  public safety.  On the other side of the ledger, the 
serious and enduring collateral consequences of these 
convictions remain extant, resulting in manifest injustice to 
those defendants.  The court weighs the rights of the defendants 
"against the necessity for preserving society's interest in the 
administration of justice" and concludes that this factor favors 
the Commonwealth.  Ante at    , quoting Commonwealth v. Cronk, 
396 Mass. 194, 198-199 (1985).  In my view, this calculation is 
demonstrably erroneous.  Society's interest in the 
administration of justice is hardly served by a remedy that 
defers to the Commonwealth in deciding which, if any, cases are 
to be dismissed with prejudice and, in all other respects,  
depends on the defendants to opt into the scheme to benefit from 
the possibility that the case will be dismissed with prejudice.  
Ante at. 
 
In sum, the Scott factors weigh heavily in favor of the 
defendants in the cases tainted by Dookhan's misconduct.  The 
scope and egregiousness of that misconduct, combined with the 
four-year delay in providing relief to the defendants affected 
by it, compels a global remedy.  It is difficult to imagine a 
scenario where, faced with the detritus from a scandal of 
similar magnitude, a court would hesitate to order a global 
13 
 
 
 
remedy.  The question comes to mind, "If not now, when?"10 
                                                          
 
 
10 C. Taylor, Sayings of the Jewish Fathers 7 (2d ed. 1897) 
(quoting Hillel the Elder).