Title: PARKHURST v. BOYKIN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PARKHURST v. BOYKIN2004 WY 9094 P.3d 450Case Number: 03-193, 03-194Decided: 07/23/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                
   

 

NINA 
H. PARKHURST,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff) 
,

 

v.

 

CARL 
D. BOYKIN and DEBBIE BOYKIN,

 

Appellees(Defendants) 
.

 

CARL 
D. BOYKIN and DEBBIE BOYKIN,

 

Appellants(Defendants) 
,

 

v.

 

NINA 
H. PARKHURST,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Kenneth Stebner, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant Nina Parkhurst:

William 
L. Hiser of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellees Carl D. and Debbie Boykin:

Stephen 
H. Kline of Kline Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ, and JAMES, 
DJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Nina H. Parkhurst 
(Parkhurst) seeks review of an order of the district court that found that her 
son and daughter-in-law, Carl D. "Doug" Boykin and Debbie Boykin (the Boykins), 
were entitled to retain 100 bales of hay from Parkhurst's ranch.  Parkhurst also challenges the district 
court's determination that the Boykins, as joint owners of a bank account with 
Parkhurst (who was the primary source of the deposits in the account), could 
withdraw all of the funds from that account without accounting to her or without 
a requirement that she be reimbursed for at least half of the monies 
withdrawn.  This portion of the 
appeal is identified as Case No. 03-193.

 

[¶2]      In their cross 
appeal, the Boykins seek review of an order of the district court that granted 
summary judgment in favor of Parkhurst on their claim that they were entitled to 
a 49% interest in a ranch owned by Parkhurst (the Huston Ranch), as well as some 
personal property associated with the ranch.  The Boykins' claims were premised on 
theories of an oral contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel.  This portion of the appeal is identified 
as Case No. 03-194.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      In Case No. 
03-193, Parkhurst raises these issues:

 

            
A.  Does the evidence support the District Court's ruling that 
Defendants, Carl D. Boykin and Debbie Boykin, may retain 700 [sic] bales1 of hay taken from the Huston 
Ranch?

 

            
B.  May one joint owner of a joint bank account withdraw all of 
the funds from that account without accounting to, or being required to 
reimburse the monies withdrawn to, the other joint [owner] who was the primary 
source of the deposits to the account?

 

The 
Boykins restate the issues thus:

 

A.  Did 
Parkhurst prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to 
damages for conversion of 100 bales of hay taken by the Boykins from the Huston 
Ranch?

 

B.  Did 
Parkhurst prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she has a right to make 
a claim against [the Boykins] for any portion of funds taken by him from an 
account jointly owned by them?

 

[¶4]      In Case No. 
03-194, the Boykins raise these issues:

 

1.  Did 
the District Court commit error in granting [Parkhurst's] motion for summary 
judgment on [the Boykins'] claim that they are entitled to 49% of the Huston 
Ranch and other personal property pursuant to an oral contract between the 
parties?

 

2.  Did 
the District Court commit error in granting [Parkhurst's] motion for summary 
judgment on [the Boykins'] claim that they are entitled to 49% of the Huston 
Ranch and other personal property under the theories of promissory estoppel 
and/or equitable estoppel?

 

Parkhurst's 
response to those claims is:

 

            
A.  Is the Statute of Frauds applicable to this 
case?

 

            
B.  Is there sufficient evidence to allow this matter to 
proceed to trial under the "substantial part performance" exception to the 
Statute of Frauds?

 

            
C.  Is there sufficient evidence to allow this matter to 
proceed to trial under the "promissory and/or equitable estoppel" exception to 
the Statute of Frauds?

 

FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 

[¶5]      Parkhurst 
initiated this litigation by complaint filed on August 13, 2001.  In her first amended complaint, she 
averred that she was the owner in fee simple absolute and was entitled to a 
property known as the Huston Ranch, as well as livestock, machinery, vehicles, 
and other personal property used in the ranch operation.  She stated that the Boykins came into 
possession of a portion of the ranch property and personal property pursuant to 
a license granted by her.  Parkhurst 
professed that she had terminated that license and demanded that possession of 
the real and personal property be restored to her, and that the Boykins refused 
to relinquish the property.  Her 
claims included one to quiet title to the property in her, and to establish that 
the Boykins had no estate, right, title or interest whatsoever in it.2  In addition, she sought to eject the 
Boykins from the ranch.  She 
maintained that the Boykins had trespassed on her property and had converted 
crops and personal property to their own use, for which she sought damages.  She claimed she had loaned the Boykins 
$39,589.00 and they had repaid only $7,500.00, leaving a balance due her of 
$32,089.00.  She demanded repayment 
of that amount.  She also asserted 
that she had maintained a joint checking account with the Boykins, and that the 
Boykins had withdrawn $7,400.00 from that account and converted it to their own 
use.  She sought to be paid all sums 
from that account found to be owned by her or attributable to 
her.

 

[¶6]      In answer to 
Parkhurst's complaint, the Boykins claimed that they were entitled to be on the 
ranch under the terms of an oral contract with Parkhurst, and that the oral 
contract also entitled them to a 49% interest in the Huston Ranch and associated 
personal property.  With respect to 
personal property issues, the Boykins claimed that some of the personal property 
on the ranch belonged to them or was jointly owned by them with Parkhurst.  The Boykins also claimed they were 
justified in withdrawing money from the parties' joint checking account.  The Boykins filed counterclaims which 
included:  A claim for specific 
performance of their alleged oral contract with Parkhurst; breach of that 
contract by Parkhurst; promissory estoppel; equitable estoppel; unjust 
enrichment; quantum meruit; and declaratory and injunctive 
relief.

 

[¶7]      In answer to 
interrogatories propounded by Parkhurst, the Boykins related the following 
sequence of events:

 

            
In November of 1997, Nina Parkhurst came to our house in Encampment, 
Wyoming and told us that she and her sister were splitting the ranch.  She told us that she needed someone to 
manage her half of the ranch and that if we would come out to live on the ranch 
and manage it for a year, she would then deed 49% of the ranch to us at the end 
of that year.  She told us that she 
would also transfer the "NX" brand to us.  
Nina also promised us if we would come manage the ranch that she would 
give us all the off-colored heifer calves produced by her 
herds.

            
Part of the agreement was that we were to be able to continue to run our 
outfitting business from the ranch.  
We discussed the fact that sometimes the outfitting business did well 
financially and when it did well, we wouldn't need to take a monthly draw or 
money from the ranch.  It was agreed 
that we could take a draw whenever we needed one and when we did, Nina would 
write a check.

            
Based on the agreement we had with Nina, we agreed to move out to the 
ranch and manage it.  [Parkhurst] 
also promised us at that time that as time went on, she would gradually deed to 
us the rest of the ranch as she had previously done with Doug's brother Randy 
and the Z< [Z Lazy V] Ranch.  
Nina indicated that she would investigate the best manner in which to 
transfer the rest of the ranch in order to limit inheritance tax.  Nina indicated that she had several 
meetings with Bill Hiser concerning ways for us to avoid paying inheritance tax 
on the ranch.

            
We started moving to the ranch in late December of 1997.  Nina needed our flatbed and our horses 
to operate the ranch, and we brought those to the ranch.  We also bought a small plow, a sweep and 
a small square baler for use on the ranch.  
Additionally, we bought a couple of bulls to use on the cowherd.  We used our own vehicles for ranch 
purposes year round.  We supplied 
the wood-burning stove for the shop.  
We bought veterinary supplies, salt and tubs and little things along the 
way.  We bought ear tags for the 
whole herd ($1.50-2.00 per tag for 200+ cows and calves).

            
After we had been on the ranch for a year, we asked Nina about 
transferring title to the 49%.  Nina 
told us that she didn't have money for attorney fees at that time to accomplish 
the transfer of the 49% but that she would get it transferred when she did have 
the money for a lawyer.  In the 
summer of 1999, Nina told us that she was forming a corporation for the joint 
ownership of the ranch and gave us the unsigned paperwork reflecting that she 
was going to form the corporation.  Later that summer she indicated to us she 
had been to an estate-planning seminar, and she gave us some of the paperwork 
from that seminar.  She indicated 
that she was concerned about the tax consequences of a transfer.  At some point she gave us Nina Huston's 
estate tax return to show us the manner in which the land was transferred to 
Nina Parkhurst and the consequences of the transfer.

During 
much of this time, Nina's husband was ill, and Nina stayed with her husband and 
seldom came to the ranch during that year.  
We did not press the issue of the transfer of the 49% of the ranch that 
year.  However, in 2000 we had many 
more discussions with Nina about the transfer of 49% of the property.  At some point she told [us] that she was 
considering using a limited liability company or an insurance trust 
to transfer the property instead of a corporation.  She typed her thoughts out for us in 
this regard.  She also brought an 
accountant named Dennis Tschacher to the ranch who discussed the consequences of 
the transfer of half of the ranch to us and the sale of the gift and/or sale of 
the remainder (with the purchase price to be forgiven at death) over time.  Nina never denied that she had promised 
us that she would transfer the interest in the ranch, but rather she kept 
indicating to us that she had to consult with her accountant and her lawyer 
about how best to accomplish the transfer.

. 
. . .

When 
[Parkhurst] proposed her arrangement to us, we owned a tree trimming service 
that had existing debt.  We told 
[Parkhurst] that we could not pay the debt if we returned to the ranch.  [Parkhurst] then agreed to give us 
$39,000 to pay off the debt.  That 
payment was made in March of 1998.  
At about the same time that [Parkhurst] gave us the money, she bought 
Randy Boykin a scraper for about $30,000.  
[Parkhurst] told us that she had the $39,000 in the bank and wasn't 
making much interest on it and that she would give Doug the money to be fair to 
both brothers.  Doug told 
[Parkhurst] that he wanted to pay her back but [Parkhurst] indicated she didn't 
care if he did or not.

 

[¶8]      In contrast to 
the Boykins' assertions, Parkhurst gave this description of their working 
relationship in her answers to interrogatories propounded by the 
Boykins:

 

            
I knew I was going to need some help to work the ranch when the Huston 
Family Partnership was dissolved and division of the ranch acreage between my 
sister and myself was completed.  I 
was aware that Doug was out of work, his tree business wasn't doing very well 
and with winter coming on I thought that he might be interested in working on 
the ranch.  Around Thanksgiving, 
1997, I suggested that Doug move to the ranch and help me operate it.  We did not have any real definite terms, 
he was to live on [the] property and help with the ranch responsibilities.  Later, after my husband became ill and I 
needed to spend full time with him making me unavailable at the ranch, I spoke 
with Doug about taking over all of the work and asked him what he would need in 
order to make ends meet with Debbie and his two sons.  Doug requested $2,500 per month.    I spoke  with  my  
accountant about 
how to handle the payment and agreed to pay Doug $2,500 per month for each month 
he worked there full time, noting that he would not be paid for the months he 
took off for guiding or was otherwise unavailable to work.  Doug was to take care of all ranching 
work subject to my direction concerning what work should be done and what work 
was a priority.

. 
. . .

            
I did not have any arrangements with Debbie in regard to the work that 
she performed on the Huston Ranch.  I never asked or directed Debbie to do any 
of the things that she did and I left those issues between Doug and 
Debbie.

            
. . . .

 
Our [Doug's and Parkhurst's] biggest issues came from his [Doug] pressuring me 
to set up a partnership arrangement with him similar to what I had done with my 
other son.3

            
. . . .

            
My intent was to have someone on the ranch to help me, to keeping it 
productive and intact.  Also, it was 
good to have someone in the house as I had a home in Encampment with my husband 
Jack, where I had lived since our marriage in 1985.  I did have hopes that matters might work 
out where Carl D. Boykin might some day own and operate the ranch but I had no 
intentions of transferring the property to him at any specific point or 
time.  My intent was for Carl D. 
Boykin to help me for the time being and we would see how things developed in 
the future.

. 
. . . 

            
No.  I had hopes that things 
might work out that way and Carl D. Boykin and I had conversations about our 
mutual hopes of keeping the ranch in the family in hopes my grandchildren might 
some day share the vision of keeping the "family farm."  Carl D. Boykin and I discussed the 
possibility of doing a "partnership" similar to what I had done with my other 
son, Randy Boykin, but no agreements were reached and no intentions on my part 
were established.

 

[¶9]      Parkhurst filed a 
motion for summary judgment as to all issues before the trial court.  The Boykins contended that none of the 
issues could appropriately be resolved by motion for summary judgment because 
there were genuine issues of material fact that had to be resolved by the fact 
finder.  Ultimately, the district 
court did grant summary judgment in favor of Parkhurst with respect to her quiet 
title action.4  In so doing, the district court applied 
the statute of frauds, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-105 (LexisNexis 2003), which 
provides:

 

§ 
1-23-105. Agreements void unless in writing.

            
(a)  In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:

(i)  Every 
agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one (1) year from the 
making thereof;

(ii)  Every 
special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another 
person;

(iii)  Every 
agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except 
mutual promise to marry;

(iv)  Every 
special promise by an executor or administrator, to answer any demand out of his 
own estate;

(v)  Every 
agreement or contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for 
more than one (1) year;

(vi)  To 
charge any person upon, or by reason of a representation or assurance concerning 
the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade or dealings of another, to the 
intent or purpose that such other may obtain thereby, credit, money or goods. 
[Emphasis added.]

 

[¶10]   The district court's reasoning 
began with its recognition that it was interpreting an alleged oral contract for 
a conveyance of real property and that such contracts must be in writing.  The district court found that the 
statute of frauds was applicable and then proceeded to consider the Boykins' 
assertions that their agreement with Parkhurst fell within an exception to its 
application.  The district court 
declined to invoke the exception of substantial part performance by the Boykins 
because the agreement alleged was too indefinite and uncertain so as to provide 
a basis for determining what "performance" meant under the alleged 
contract.  The district court also 
eliminated the availability of promissory estoppel as an exception to the 
application of the statute of frauds because there was no clear and definite 
agreement between the parties.

 

[¶11]   Only three matters were set for 
trial to the court:  (1) The 
question of whether Parkhurst's $39,859.00 check to Doug Boykin was a loan that 
he was required to repay; (2) whether the Boykins were required to return a 
backhoe to Parkhurst and to pay her for the 100 bales of hay; and (3) whether 
Doug Boykin was required to account for and repay to Parkhurst 50% of the money 
($7,400.00) he withdrew from a joint checking account with Parkhurst.  The district court issued a second 
decision letter after trial.  In 
that decision he concluded that:  
(1) The loan was an interest free loan which Doug Boykin was required to 
repay upon Parkhurst's demand (less $7,500.00 attributed to a payment on that 
loan); (2) the Boykins were required to return the backhoe to Parkhurst;5 (3) the Boykins did not have to pay 
for the hay; and (4) the Boykins had a right to withdraw the $7,400.00 and were 
not required to account for that money or to repay any part of it to 
Parkhurst.

 

[¶12]   We will address the issues raised 
in this appeal in chronological order, addressing Case No. 03-194 first, and 
will include additional facts with our discussion, as 
necessary.

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

 

[¶13]   When we review a summary judgment, 
we have before us the same materials as did the district court, and we follow 
the same standards which applied to the proceedings below.  The propriety of granting a motion for 
summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual findings that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of an 
asserted cause of action or defense.  
We, of course, examine the record from a vantage point most favorable to 
that party who opposed the motion, affording to that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences that fairly may be drawn from the record.  Burnham v. Coffinberry, 2003 WY 
109, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 296, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2003).

 

[¶14]   Because the correct application of 
the statute of frauds plays such a significant role in resolving this case, we 
set out a summary of the central principles applicable to that venerable 
rule:

 

Long 
ago, this Court held that "[w]ith some exceptions, equity as well as the law is 
bound by the statute of frauds."  
Crosby v. Strahan's Estate, 78 Wyo. 302, 324 P.2d 492, 496 
(1958).  In more recent years, we 
have further held that these exceptions should be restricted, rather than 
expanded, even when hardship may result.  
Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502, 504 (Wyo.1997);  Empfield v. Kimbrough, 900 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Wyo.1995);  Turner v. 
Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 696 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo.1985).  At the same time, however, we have held 
that promissory estoppel may avoid application of the statute of frauds.  Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 348 
(Wyo.1993);  Ames v. Sundance 
State Bank, 850 P.2d 607, 610 (Wyo.1993);  B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather 
Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 815 (Wyo.1992).

 

Birt 
v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 
2003 WY 102, ¶ 25, n.25, 75 P.3d 640, ¶ 25, n.25 (Wyo. 
2003).

 

[¶15]   The determination that a given 
agreement is within the statute of frauds is a question of law which we review 
de novo.  However, rote 
application of the statute of frauds is not automatic.  Enforcement of the statute of frauds 
serves significant policy concerns:

 

The 
statute of frauds was enacted to prevent fraud, not to aid it, and should 
receive a reasonable interpretation with that end in view.  The great majority of courts have always 
endeavored to keep that principle uppermost in rendering their 
decisions.

Mead 
v. Leo Sheep Co., 
32 Wyo. 313, 327, 232 P. 511, 515 (1925).

 

In 
re Estate of Maycock, 
2001 WY 103, ¶¶ 12, 19, 33 P.3d 1114, ¶¶ 12, 19 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

"The 
contract for the sale of real estate as contemplated by the statute is one for 
the transfer of property or real estate, for a fixed price in money or its 
equivalent."  Miller v. 
Stovall, 717 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo.1986), overruled on other grounds, 811 P.2d 287, 290 (Wyo.1991) (citing Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 
(Wyo.1976)).  Assuming without 
deciding that the alleged oral agreement between Hovendicks and Ruby involved a 
conveyance of land for proper consideration and is subject to the statute of 
frauds, we note that in Miller we referred favorably to several 
authorities on the law of real property as follows:

[6 
Thompson on Real Property § 3035, p. 508 (1962)] states clearly that "oral 
agreements changing known boundary lines violate the statute of frauds."   The rationale is that " * * * if 
the boundary line is not doubtful or in dispute, an oral agreement for its 
change is invalid, this involving an actual transfer of land, within the 
statute.  * * * "  2 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 
653, p. 679 (3d. ed.1939).  

Miller, 
717 P.2d  at 802.   Hovendicks 
contend that the parties' substantial part performance of the contract makes it 
enforceable despite the statute of frauds.

We 
have held that either full or part performance of a contract for the sale of 
land will avoid the statute of frauds defense.  Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 346 
(Wyo.1993).  The doctrine of part 
performance, however, will not be applied to avoid the statute of frauds unless 
the oral agreement sought to be enforced is just and certain and the elements of 
possession and part or full payment or its equivalent are proved beyond the 
possibility of findings to the contrary.  
Davis, 855 P.2d  at 347.

 

Hovendick 
v. Ruby, 
10 P.3d 1119, 1123-24 (Wyo. 2000); and see 14 Richard R. Powell, The Law 
of Real Property, §§ 81A.02[1] and 81A.02[2] and [3] (The Impact of the 
Statute, Criticized as Too Rigid and Leading to Unfair and Arbitrary Results, 
Has Been Reduced by Requirements of Reasonable Interpretation and Equitable 
Exceptions) (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 1999).

 

[¶16]   Along this same vein, we take note 
of this summary of a line of cases pertinent to the matter at 
hand:

 

An 
oral gift of land is within the statute of frauds and is, therefore, 
unenforceable even as between the donor and the donee.  However, equity will remove an oral gift 
of land from the statute of frauds when, in reliance upon the gift, the donee 
has done something so that a refusal of the court to enforce the gift would 
result in the infliction of an injustice upon the donee.  It had been said that equity will remove 
an oral gift of land from the statute of frauds where not to do so would work a 
fraud upon the donee.

 

John 
S. Herbrand, Annotation, Exceptions to Rule that Oral Gifts of Land are 
Unenforceable Under Statute of Frauds, 83 A.L.R.3d 1294, § 2, at 1298 (1978 
and Supp. 2003).

 

[¶17]   Proof of an oral gift of land must 
be clear and convincing, and the burden is on the donee to prove the existence 
of a donative intent on the part of the donor.  The land in question must be identified 
with reasonable certainty.  
Herbrand, Annotation, Exceptions to Rule that Oral Gifts of Land are 
Unenforceable Under Statute of Frauds, 83 A.L.R.3d 1294, § 2, at 
1298.

 

            
Many jurisdictions recognize that where a donee takes possession of land 
and makes substantial improvements in reliance on a gift, such conduct gives 
rise to an exception to the rule that oral gifts of land are unenforceable under 
the statute of frauds.  Among these 
jurisdictions, there are slight variations in the phrasing of the exception and 
in the requirements of the exception.  
For instance, while some jurisdictions require that substantial 
improvements be made to the land, other jurisdictions require permanent and 
valuable improvements, or significant improvements, or lasting improvements; 
however, despite the differences in phrasing, the underlying requirement is such 
quantum and quality of improvement to the land as would make it inequitable to 
refuse to enforce the gift.  
Furthermore, at least one jurisdiction, in addition to the requirements 
that possession of the land must have been taken and improvements made upon the 
land, requires that the donee must have changed his condition or circumstances 
or been induced to forgo some benefit or assume some liability on the strength 
of the gift.

. 
. . .
  

            
Since 
the underlying principle of exceptions to the rule that oral gifts of land are 
unenforceable is that the refusal of the court to enforce the oral gift would be 
an injustice to or a fraud upon the donee, it is not surprising that other 
circumstances besides the making of substantial improvements have served to 
support such exceptions.  Thus, it 
has been held that where the donees had rendered, without compensation, personal 
services and attention to the aged donor in reliance on the oral gift of land, 
and where the donees had possession of the land in controversy, the services 
rendered were sufficient to warrant an exception to the statute of frauds and 
enforcement of the gift.  And it has 
also been held that a change of residence, accompanied by the donee's possession 
of the land, would support an exception to the rule that oral gifts of land are 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds.

 

Id. 
at 1299-1301.

 

[¶18]   The standard of review applicable 
to oral contracts is also of great importance here.  We have heretofore set out these 
guidelines:

 

The 
basic elements of a contract are offer, acceptance, and consideration.  McLean v. Hyland Enterprises, 
Inc., 2001 WY 111, ¶ 42, 34 P.3d 1262, 1272 (Wyo.2001).  In order for a contract to exist, there 
must be mutual assent to the same terms.  
Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 231 
(Wyo.2000).  Whether a contract 
exists, its terms and conditions and the intent of the parties generally are 
questions of fact to be resolved by the fact-finder.  Ewing v. Hladky Const., Inc., 
2002 WY 95, ¶ 11, 48 P.3d 1086, 1088 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Roussalis, 4 
P.3d at 250).  An express contract 
is one in which the terms are declared by the parties either in writing or 
orally at the time the contract is formed.  
Boone v. Frontier Refining, Inc., 987 P.2d 681, 685 (Wyo.1999); 
Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 
(Wyo.1994).  An express oral 
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law if the terms are shown without 
conflict in the evidence.  
Anderson v. South Lincoln Special Cemetery Dist. ex rel. Bd. of 
Trustees of South Lincoln Special Cemetery Dist., 972 P.2d 136, 139 
(Wyo.1999).

 

Birt, 
¶ 10; and see Carroll v. Bergen, 2002 WY 166, ¶ 10, 57 P.3d 1209, ¶ 10 (Wyo. 2002) ("Whether an oral contract exists is a question of 
fact to be determined by the trier of fact.").

 

[¶19]   We have examined the applicable 
authorities with care, as well as the materials that were available to the 
district court for its evaluation of the motion for summary judgment.  We conclude that the district court was 
correct in its application of the statute of frauds.  At most, Parkhurst and Boykin entered 
into an "agreement to agree" that Parkhurst would consider a transfer of a 49% 
interest in the Huston Ranch at some future time.

 

We 
have said, in a number of different instances and contexts, that we do not 
endeavor to enforce "agreements to agree."  
Lavoie v. Safecare Health Serv., Inc., 840 P.2d 239 (Wyo.1992); 
Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. v. Baker Hughes Tubular Services, Inc., 
812 P.2d 555 (Wyo.1991); Doud v. First Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927 (Wyo.1989); Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., 
714 P.2d 328 (Wyo.1986); Roth v. First Sec. Bank of Rock Springs, 
Wyoming, 684 P.2d 93 (Wyo.1984); Czapla v. Grieves, 549 P.2d 650 
(Wyo.1976).

 

Del 
Rossi v. Doenz, 
912 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Wyo. 1996) (J. Thomas concurring 
specially).

 

[¶20]   While we do not disagree with those 
authorities that counsel vigilance in cases such as this, so as to ensure that 
the statute of frauds is not used to perpetrate a fraud, the Boykins have failed 
in their burden "to show the existence of an oral agreement that is just and 
certain and the elements of possession and part or full payment or its 
equivalent are proved beyond the possibility of findings to the contrary."  See Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342 
(Wyo. 1993); also see Fowler v. Fowler, 933 P.2d 502 (Wyo. 1997) (This 
later case is instructive, however, it was decided on its facts after a trial to 
the district court and this Court reversed, deciding it on the statute of frauds 
as a matter of law; son had left job in Fort Collins, Colorado, moved to 
father's ranch and worked there for 20 years).  The instant case does not demonstrate a 
factual situation that would persuade us to diverge from our longstanding 
commitment to a fairly strict application of the statute of frauds.  We hold that the district court did not 
err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Parkhurst on the basis of 
that statute. 

 

[¶21]   Having concluded that no oral 
contract came into being, we must also address the Boykins' estoppel 
contentions.
  

"Promissory 
estoppel is a doctrine incorporated in the law of contracts."  B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather 
Shield Mfg., Inc., 829 P.2d 809, 813 (Wyo.1992).  Its general theory is that, " '[i]f an 
unambiguous promise is made in circumstances calculated to induce reliance, and 
it does so, the promisee if hurt as a result can recover damages.' "  Id. (quoting Goldstick v. ICM 
Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 462 (7th Cir.1986)).  Promissory estoppel applies, however, 
only if no contract exists.  
Sowerwine v. Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Wyo.2000).  The elements of promissory estoppel 
are:

"(1) 
the existence of a clear and definite promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action by the promisee;  (2) proof that the promisee acted to its 
detriment in reasonable reliance on the promise;  and (3) a finding that injustice can be 
avoided only if the court enforces the promise."

 

City 
of Powell v. Busboom, 
2002 WY 58, ¶ 8, 44 P.3d 63, 66 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Roussalis, 4 P.3d at 
253).  The party asserting 
promissory estoppel has the burden of establishing each element under a burden 
of strict proof.  Busboom, 
2002 WY 58, ¶ 8, 44 P.3d  at 66.   
The first two elements are questions of fact for the fact-finder; the 
third element is a question of law for the court.  Id.; Loya v. Wyoming Partners 
of Jackson Hole, Inc., 2001 WY 124, ¶ 22, 35 P.3d 1246, 1254 
(Wyo.2001).

 

            
For purposes of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a promise is a 
"manifestation of intention to act or to refrain from acting in a specified way 
made so as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been 
made."  Busboom,  2002 WY 58, ¶ 10, 44 P.3d  at 66.   A promise may arise through words 
or conduct, but conduct must be specifically demonstrative of an intention 
respecting future conduct before it can serve as the foundation for a clear and 
definite promise.  Id., 2002 
WY 58, ¶ 10, 44 P.3d  at 66-67.

 

            
 In addition to establishing 
the existence of a clear and definite promise, a plaintiff must also show " 
'action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character' " to satisfy the 
second element of the doctrine.  
Loya, 2001 WY 124, ¶ 22, 35 P.3d  at 1254 (quoting Worley, 1 
P.3d at 624).  Further, such action 
or forbearance must be the result of "reasonable reliance."  Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 348 
(Wyo.1993).  

 

. 
. . .

 

" 
'Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he 
is absolutely precluded from asserting rights which might otherwise have existed 
as against another person who has in good faith relied upon such conduct and has 
been led thereby to change his position for the worse.' "  Snake River Brewing Co., Inc. v. Town 
of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 28, 39 P.3d 397, 407-08 (Wyo.2002) (quoting 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Petsch, 261 F.2d 331, 335 (10th 
Cir.1958)).  "Equitable estoppel 
arises only when a party, by acts, conduct, or acquiescence causes another to 
change his position."  Roth v. 
First Sec. Bank of Rock Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 96 (Wyo.1984).  The elements of equitable estoppel are a 
lack of knowledge, reliance in good faith, and action or inaction that results 
in an injury.  Id. Equitable 
estoppel is similar to promissory estoppel, but equitable estoppel is a tort 
doctrine that requires proof of misrepresentation.  B & W Glass, Inc., 829 P.2d  
at 813.   In Davis, 855 P.2d  at 348, we expanded upon the similarities between these two 
doctrines:

 

      The doctrines of 
promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel are closely related and, as we 
impliedly recognized in [Inter-Mountain Threading, Inc. v.] Baker 
Hughes [Tubular Serv., Inc., 812 P.2d 555 (Wyo.1991)], they often have been invoked together and interchangeably, 
without the benefit of clear distinction.  
Baker Hughes.   
See also Roth v. First Sec. Bank of Rock Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93 (Wyo.1984).  Reasonable reliance 
is an element common to both of these doctrines.  Baker Hughes.   Thus, we find that equitable 
estoppel cases are cited in promissory estoppel cases with respect to this 
common element.  In Wyoming, these 
doctrines most often have been presented in the context of preliminary 
negotiations for commercial agreements.

 

Birt, 
¶¶ 26-28, 34; also see 10 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of 
Contracts, §§ 27:13 and 27:14, esp. pp.136-38 (4th ed. 1999) ("This may be little more than a 
recognition that the less clear an agreement, the less likely the plaintiff's 
reliance will be reasonable and foreseeable, and the less probable will be the 
injustice from refusing to enforce the agreement--concerns which influence 
outcomes with respect to promissory estoppel generally, and not just with 
respect to promissory estoppel as an exception to the Statute of 
Frauds.").

 

[¶22]   We have examined these principles, 
and find they are inapplicable to the circumstances of this case.  With respect to promissory estoppel, the 
Boykins failed in their burden to produce sufficient evidence of a "clear and 
definite "promise so as to avoid the application of the statute of frauds.  It is evident that the Boykins may have 
acted to their detriment (though that is questionable) in reliance on the 
alleged "promise," but under these circumstances we are unable to conclude that 
a fact finder reasonably could have concluded that such reliance was 
"reasonable."  Finally, we are not 
persuaded that an injustice can be avoided only if we were to enforce the 
alleged "promise."  Thus, as a 
matter of law, we conclude that the concept of promissory estoppel cannot be 
used to avoid the application of the statute of frauds.

 

[¶23]   With respect to equitable estoppel, 
we are compelled to conclude that there was insufficient evidence brought 
forward by the Boykins to establish that Parkhurst had persuaded them to change 
their circumstances to their detriment, by use of "misrepresentations" or 
otherwise, so as to warrant submission of that theory of recovery to the fact 
finder.  Thus, equitable estoppel 
will not aid the Boykins in their effort to avoid the rigors of the statute of 
frauds.

 

[¶24]   We hold that the district court did 
not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of Parkhurst on her quiet 
title claims, as well as the Boykins' counter claims in that regard, and that 
portion of the judgment is affirmed.

 

 

 

[¶25]   The remaining issues were decided 
by the district court after a trial to the court.  When a matter has been the subject of a 
bench trial before the district court, we review the factual determinations 
under a clearly erroneous standard and the legal conclusions de 
novo.  Union Pacific Railroad 
v. Trona Valley Federal Credit Union, 2002 WY 165, ¶ 6, 57 P.3d 1203, 
¶ 6 (Wyo. 2002).

 

 

[¶26]   Parkhurst contends that the Boykins 
converted 100 bales of hay to their own use and placed a value on the hay of 
$700.00.6  The parties are in agreement that the 
Boykins took 100 bales of hay from the ranch when Parkhurst ordered them to 
leave.  Parkhurst claims the hay 
belonged to the ranch, and the Boykins contended that they baled it using their 
baler and needed it to feed their horses, which had been used for work that was 
done to benefit the ranch.  We find 
it sufficient to note that there was a conflict in the evidence in this regard, 
and the district court resolved it in favor of the Boykins.  We are unable to conclude that the 
district court's findings are clearly erroneous.  Moreover, the error, if any, is de 
minimus given these circumstances.  
Odegard v. Odegard, 2003 WY 67, ¶ 26, 69 P.3d 917, ¶ 26 
(Wyo. 2003) (de minimus error is considered harmless); see 
W.R.C.P. 61; W.R.A.P. 9.04.

 

 

[¶27]   There is not much conflict in the 
evidence with respect to the joint checking account either.  Parkhurst's testimony was limited to 
this:

 

Q.        Ms. 
Parkhurst, do you have a joint account with Doug Boykin at Community First 
Bank?

A.        I did 
have.

Q.        Has 
that account been closed?

A.        
Yes.

Q. 
       When 
was it closed?

A. 
       Well, 
there was a few dollars in it after he [Boykins] took what was in  most of what 
was in there, and I went ahead and closed it out and I can't tell you a date, 
but not too awful long.

Q.        You 
had a joint account with him prior to that?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        What 
was the purpose of that account?

A.        For 
the deposit and checks to take care of the rent and the stuff on the house that 
we owned jointly.

Q.        Did 
you and Doug talk about using that account for purposes of receiving the rent 
and paying expenses?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        And 
that was your understanding as to what the account was.  And over the history of that account was 
that the only purpose that account was ever used for?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        Was 
it ever used to pay anything, outside expenses for the 
house?

A.        
No.

Q.        Was 
any money ever deposited into that account other than income from the 
house?

A.        
No.

Q.        Do 
you know how much Mr. Boykin took from that account?

A.        
No.

 

[¶28]   Doug Boykin essentially agreed with 
Parkhurst's testimony, and he admitted that he withdrew $7,400.00 from the 
account.  Both Doug Boykin and 
Debbie Boykin also testified, without contradiction, that they used some of that 
money to pay for electrical repairs and possibly some taxes, but they did not 
know the dollar amount of those items.  
The remainder of those funds was used to hire an attorney to handle this 
matter for them.  Doug Boykin 
intimated in his testimony that one purpose of the account was for Parkhurst to 
avoid paying taxes on more than 50% of the income realized from the rental 
property.  In her brief, Parkhurst 
contends that she is entitled to 50% or more of the $7,400.00, but asks that we 
remand to the district court with directions that the Boykins reimburse her for 
not less than $3,700.00.

 

[¶29]   Neither party provides us with 
anything more than scant authority on this subject.  Parkhurst directs our attention to a 
legal encyclopedia, although the discussion there is of only limited value to 
her perspective on this issue:

 

            
A joint and survivorship bank account is an inter vivos contract creating 
a present, equal, joint-vested interest in the parties named therein, whereby 
either party may withdraw the funds at any time.  However, the peculiar features of a 
joint and several bank accounts make it difficult, if not impossible, in most 
cases, to determine what portion of the account belongs to each 
depositor.  A long series of 
deposits which cannot be traced to their source, and a similar series of 
withdrawals which cannot be traced to their destinations, are normally 
involved.  This defect is inherent 
in the severalty feature of such bank accounts wherein each depositor is allowed 
to treat joint property as if it were entirely his own.  A joint bank account of this kind is 
generally a creature of contract between parties avowedly indifferent to the 
exact percentage of ownership between themselves.  It is said that the  law  should take them at their word and give 
effect to their contract without making detailed evidentiary inquiries to 
establish factual ownership.  The 
prevailing view seems to be, however, that while joint accounts are presumed to 
be vested in the names as given in the deposit as equal contributors and owners 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, such presumption is rebuttable, and 
the intention of the parties is the controlling factor.  Where a controversy arises as to the 
ownership of funds deposited in a joint account, evidence is admissible to show 
the true situation.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 

10 
Am.Jur.2d, Banks and Financial Institutions § 671 
(1997).

 

[¶30]   We find this description of a joint 
account to be helpful to our resolution of this matter:

 

            
In the case of a joint and survivorship account to which both (or all) 
depositors have contributed, there seems to be agreement that both (or all) 
depositors have a right to withdraw from the account during their mutual 
lifetimes.  There is disagreement as 
to the portion of the amount standing to the credit of the account at a given 
time that any depositor may withdraw.  
In some cases it has been held that each depositor has the right to 
withdraw the entire amount on deposit to use as he sees fit without accounting 
to any other.  In other cases, 
it has been stated that each depositor can withdraw only his moiety (one-half 
the amount on deposit in the case of two depositors), and must account for any 
sum withdrawn in excess of this fraction.  
Some courts have looked to the motive of the withdrawing depositor or to 
the purpose for which the withdrawal was made, holding that the right would 
extend to the entire amount of the deposit unless the motive or purpose is to 
destroy the equal right of the codepositor.  Obviously, no universal rule can be 
stated for these cases.  Each one 
must be determined by its own facts and by the precedents of the particular 
jurisdiction.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 

7 
POF 2d 311, Ownership of Bank Deposit Made in the Names of Two or More 
Persons, § 15, at 339-40 (1975 and Supp. 2001).

 

[¶31]   We conclude that Parkhurst's 
contentions are not supported by the very limited evidence she adduced at trial, 
nor does the testimony of the Boykins significantly aid her contentions.  Parkhurst did not include with her 
evidentiary submissions and testimony the materials necessary for the district 
court to perform an accounting of the funds at issue.  The authority she relies upon in her 
brief indicates the "presumption" is that the whole of the account may be 
withdrawn by either joint depositor.  
It is the burden of the depositor claiming ownership of the funds to 
rebut that presumption.  Parkhurst 
failed in that burden.  Based on the 
facts available to the district court, its decision cannot be credibly 
challenged.  For this reason, we are 
unable to conclude that the district court's findings were clearly erroneous, 
and we affirm its disposition of this issue.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶32]   The Judgment of the district court 
is affirmed in all respects.

 

FOOTNOTES

   1The record 
establishes that it was 100 bales of hay, with a value of between $250.00 and 
$700.00 (depending upon whether it was valued at the time the Boykins took 
possession of the hay, or at the time of trial).

 

   2See Wyo. 
Stat. Ann §§ 1-32-201 through 216 (LexisNexis 
2003).

 

   3In her 
deposition, Parkhurst explained why she was reluctant in this 
regard:

 

            
This is very hard.  Because 
years before Doug came to the ranch he had been doing his thing however and 
whenever.  Lots of times I had the 
grandsons.  Lots of times I was 
asked to come and help him get home.  
Just lots of little things that added up that I wasn't sure I wanted to 
do what we're talking about doing.  
And until my mind's made up to do that  I'm a stubborn old woman. 

   4The district 
court also granted summary judgment in favor of Parkhurst with respect to Debbie 
Boykin's claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, but that decision is 
not challenged in this appeal.

 

   5Items (1) and 
(2) are not a subject of this appeal.

 

   6Actually, the 
record reflects that at the time of the conversion the hay was worth about 
$250.00, but at the time of trial the value of hay had increased, and 100 bales 
would have gone for about $700.00.  
The only evidence of the hay's value came from the testimony of Debbie 
Boykin.