Title: In re Arthur H., Jr.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 96457-Agenda 5-May 2004.
In re ARTHUR H., JR., A Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, 							
Appellant, v. Arthur H., Sr., Appellee).
Opinion filed October 28, 2004. 
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	The circuit court of Winnebago County adjudicated Arthur H.,
Jr. (Arthur Jr.), a neglected minor and made him a ward of the court.
A majority of the appellate court reversed the finding of neglect and
remanded this cause to the circuit court for a dispositional hearing.
338 Ill. App. 3d 1027. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
holding of the appellate court reversing the finding of neglect with
respect to Arthur Jr. We reverse the appellate court's judgment
remanding this cause to the circuit court.

BACKGROUND
	Lorraine H. (Lorraine) is the mother of five children: Niya N.
(born July 18, 1994), Arthur H., Jr. (born November 30, 1996),
Jaquane H. (born May 22, 1998), Lora H. (born July 20, 1999), and
Earl H. (born May 21, 2000). The instant appeal involves only Arthur
H., Jr., and is brought by his biological father, Arthur H., Sr.
(respondent).
	On March 23, 2001, the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) took emergency temporary custody of the four
children who were found in Lorraine's home on that date. The State
filed a three-count petition alleging that these children were neglected
because they resided in an injurious environment which placed them
at risk of harm, pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court
Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2000)). The
petition asked the circuit court to declare the children wards of the
court. Arthur Jr. was not present in Lorraine's home at the time that
DCFS took temporary protective custody of her other four children,
and he was not named in the petition to adjudicate wardship.
 	Count I of the petition alleged that the minors' environment was
injurious to their welfare and that they were placed at a risk of harm
because their "sibling had a hernia approximately 2½ to 3 inches in
diameter and the mother had previously failed to follow the doctor's
treatment and administer medication." Count II alleged that the
children were in an injurious environment and faced a risk of harm
because "the minors were dirty and wearing dirty clothing that smelled
of urine, and the minor's [sic] sibling was allowed to drink from a
dirty bottle with curdled milk in it." Finally, count III of the petition
alleged that the minors' "sibling displayed lethargy, an inability to
move, imbalance, jittery eyes, and neck twitches," which created an
injurious environment placing the children at risk of harm.
	On that same day, the circuit court held a temporary shelter care
hearing with respect to the State's petition. The circuit court found,
based upon Lorraine's stipulation to the allegations in the petition,
that there was probable cause to believe that each of the four children
named in the petition was a neglected minor. Thereafter, a discussion
commenced with respect to Lorraine's fifth child, Arthur Jr., and the
following colloquy ensued:
			"[Assistant State's Attorney Biagi]: [T]here is a further
minor who is not presently in the State of Illinois and was not
in the State of Illinois at the time that protective custody was
taken. His name is Arthur H[]. *** His father's name is
Arthur H[], Sr. And what we would be looking for is an
order against the mother that any contact with that minor be
the same restrictions as with these minors, and we also would
be seeking an order of cooperation with the mother for
locating that minor ***.
			THE COURT: Clarify for me, does Arthur reside with
someone in Milwaukee or was Arthur just in Milwaukee at
the time that protective custody was taken of the other four
in that he was to come back to Rockford and live with mom
except under these circumstances?
			MS. GLORIA [DCFS investigator]: I came to the home
the first time and [Lorraine] said that the minor was in
Milwaukee and she didn't know when he's gonna come back,
he was residing-he is residing with his father and she doesn't
have a way to get him back because she doesn't have
transportation. *** I found out *** the child is residing with
father and the father is asking for custody of this child in the
court in Milwaukee, a thing that I did not know through
Lorraine. She didn't inform me of that. That's all I know.
			THE COURT: I guess I would ask all parties to cooperate
in attempting to locate Arthur H[], Sr. and Jr., would direct
the State to prepare a petition on Arthur so I have
jurisdiction over Arthur, which I do not have at this time. I
would ask you to get that on file by the close of business
today."
In addition to sua sponte ordering the assistant State's Attorney to
prepare and file a neglect petition with respect to Arthur Jr., the court
further ordered that the parties cooperate in locating the child. The
temporary shelter care hearing was then continued until March 29,
2001.
	Pursuant to the order of the circuit court, later in the day on
March 23, 2001, the State filed a three-count neglect petition
captioned "In the Interest of Arthur H., Jr." This petition contained
allegations of neglect identical to those contained in the petitions filed
with respect to Lorraine's other four children. In addition, this petition
also alleged that Arthur Jr. was 4 years of age, that his "place of
residence is Winnebago County, Illinois," and that Arthur Jr. "is
presently in the custody of the Department of Children & Family
Services." The petition listed respondent, "Arthur H[ ]," as Arthur
Jr.'s father, and stated that respondent resided in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin.
	On March 29, 2001, the court resumed the temporary shelter care
hearing. Nancy Rice, an investigator for DCFS, informed the court
that it was her belief that Arthur Jr., was living in Milwaukee with his
father. However, Lorraine was unable to provide the address of
respondent's residence in Milwaukee. Rice also stated that respondent
was one of three fathers of Lorraine's children who lived in
Milwaukee, and that Lorraine was also unable to provide the
addresses of the other two fathers as well. The court then inquired of
Lorraine as to the whereabouts of Arthur Jr. Lorraine told the court
that Arthur Jr., was in Milwaukee with his father, but that she did not
know their address. She explained that when she went to Milwaukee,
she stayed at her mother's home, and she only saw respondent when
he came to that location; Lorraine did not visit respondent's home.
The circuit court judge found Lorraine in direct contempt of court for
withholding information about Arthur Jr., and for failing to cooperate
with DCFS in locating him. The court ordered that Lorraine was to
remain in custody until Arthur Jr., was located.
	On March 30, 2001, the parties reconvened in court for a status
hearing. Christina Gloria, a DCFS investigator, stated that she had
spoken to Lorraine's mother in Milwaukee, and the mother stated that
she would "go and look for Arthur." The court was also informed that
DCFS had found an address for respondent in Milwaukee. The court
requested that it be informed when Arthur Jr., was located, and
remarked that Lorraine was being held in custody "because we don't
have [Arthur Jr.]. And I'm not going to release her until he is found
and his safety is evaluated."
	On April 3, 2001, Nancy Rice of DCFS informed the court that
she had a telephone conversation with respondent. According to Rice,
respondent stated that Arthur Jr., had been with him in Jackson,
Mississippi, for the past three weeks, where respondent had been
tending to his own ailing father. Rice also informed the court that
respondent told her that Arthur Jr. had lived with him since the child
was eight months old, and that the child only visited with Lorraine on
occasion. The court set a pretrial conference for May 25, 2001, and
ordered that respondent appear in court on that date with Arthur Jr.
The record also indicates that respondent had not been served prior to
this date. The court then released Lorraine from custody.
	On April 24, 2001, DCFS prepared a service plan for Lorraine
and the four children taken into temporary custody. The service plan
detailed the progress of the four children and Lorraine since the time
the children were removed from Lorraine's home, and contained
recommendations for services for the family. The service plan
contained virtually no mention of Arthur Jr., it did not list him as being
a member of Lorraine's household, and it did not direct any tasks or
services for him.
	When court reconvened on May 25, 2001, DCFS investigator
Teresa Munson stated that Arthur Jr., was with his father in
Milwaukee, and that she "assumed that was okay." The court
immediately issued a juvenile custody warrant for Arthur Jr., noting
that "the instructions to the last caseworker were to make contact
with Arthur Sr., Arthur Jr. in Milwaukee and make sure that Arthur
Jr.'s placement was a safe and stable placement. That has not been
done." The juvenile custody warrant alleged that "the conduct of and
behavior of the minor may endanger the health, person, welfare or
property of himself or others," that "the circumstances of his/her home
environment may endanger his/her health, person, welfare or
property," and that "there is reasonable cause to believe the minor has
absconded from his/her place of residence." The warrant instructed
the sheriff to take the minor into custody.
	The court also set a new pretrial conference date for August 10,
2001, and noted that "[b]ecause we were unaware of Arthur, Jr.,
when a temporary shelter care was held [sic], there is no temporary
custody order transferring [guardianship and custody] to DCFS.
Maybe that is why there is some confusion with the department with
the discretion to place with relative placement or foster care." The
court then entered a written order placing guardianship and custody
of Arthur Jr. with DCFS.
	On June 27, 2001, the parties reconvened for a status hearing.
The court was informed by the State that Arthur Jr., had been taken
into custody in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, when respondent brought the
child to the local police station. The assistant State's Attorney
represented that "[t]he child is in foster care. You gave [guardianship
and custody] to DCFS at the last court date." The court entered a
written order quashing the juvenile custody warrant, and instructed
that summons be issued to respondent.
	On August 10, 2001, the parties appeared for a pretrial
conference. Respondent was present in court, and was provided with
a copy of the petition for adjudication of wardship. In addressing
respondent, the circuit court noted that "[t]he allegations in the
petition are all directed at conduct on the part of Arthur's mother,
Lorraine. There's nothing in here that is directed specifically towards
you." The court then continued the pretrial conference.
	On October 25, 2001, the parties were back in court. During
discussions, it was noted by counsel that the "counts in the petition are
ambiguous as to exactly whom the allegations are towards," and
requested that the State clarify the counts prior to pretrial. The State
responded that it "would file the amended petition *** and would
make the counts less ambiguous."
	On December 18, 2001, it was represented to the court that a
preliminary home study had been done in Wisconsin that indicated that
Arthur Jr.'s clothes and toys were at respondent's home. Counsel for
respondent stated that this appeared to confirm the fact that Arthur Jr.
had resided primarily with respondent and had occasionally visited
Lorraine.
	On January 30, 2002, the State filed a three-count amended
petition for adjudication of wardship with respect to all five children.
Counts I and III of the amended petition were identical to the
corresponding counts in the original petition, alleging that the children
were neglected because they were subject to a risk of harm due to
their injurious environment, pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Act
(705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2000)). The only change made in the
petition was to count II. Previously, this count alleged that the minors
were placed at risk of harm due to an injurious environment. After
amendment, the count alleged that the minors were placed at a risk of
harm due to inadequate supervision, pursuant to section 2-3(1)(d) of
the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(d) (West 2000)), "in that the minor's
mother left the minor in the care of a 14 year old for an unreasonable
amount of time and the minor's [sic] were dirty and were wearing
dirty clothes that smelled of urine, and the minor's [sic] sibling was
allowed to drink from a dirty bottle [containing] curdled milk."
	On May 23, 2002, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on
the State's amended petition. The State's first witness was Angela
Harris, a child protection investigator with DCFS, whose testimony
related solely to a DCFS investigation of Lorraine which occurred
several months prior to the series of events leading up to the filing of
the instant petition for adjudication of wardship. Harris testified that
DCFS received a hotline call on August 15, 2000, that Lorraine,
without the authorization of a physician, had removed her son Earl
from his apnea monitor. Harris stated that, in addition, the caller
alleged that Lorraine had missed Earl's doctor's appointments for the
apnea clinic. Within 24 hours of the call, Harris went to Lorraine's
home to investigate the allegations.
	Harris testified that on that occasion, all five of Lorraine's
children, including Arthur Jr., were in her home. According to Harris,
at the time of the visit, the children were all appropriately dressed and
were watching television and playing. Harris testified that Lorraine
admitted that she had removed Earl from the apnea monitor.
However, when Harris explained the importance of the monitor,
Lorraine reattached it to Earl. Harris further testified that Loraine
stated that she missed the apnea clinic appointments because she had
no transportation to the clinic. Harris stated that she made some
referrals to help Lorraine get to the doctor's appointments. According
to Harris, the children were not removed from Lorraine's home at that
time because Lorraine had links and support within the community.
Harris explained that there were three other agencies which had access
to Lorraine's home to see her, and to make sure that Earl was getting
the medical help that he needed. Harris further testified that she was
unaware of any hernia problem with respect to Earl. Harris did not
testify as to whether the visit led to an "indicated" report.
	As its next witness, the State called Christina Gloria, another
DCFS investigator. Gloria testified with respect to the events
immediately leading up to the State's filing of the petition for
adjudication of wardship at issue in this case. On February 7, 2001,
Gloria investigated an allegation of medical neglect against Lorraine.
According to Gloria, when she went to Lorraine's apartment, all of
Lorraine's children were present except for Arthur Jr., who was living
with respondent in Milwaukee. At the time of her visit, Gloria
observed that Earl "was alert, smiling," and that he "appeared to be
developmentally on target." However, she also observed stains on his
shirt. Gloria's examination of Lorraine's home revealed that, although
the home's kitchen was clean, there was "garbage" in the home, which
Gloria described as "dirty diapers folded on the floor."
	Gloria testified that she spoke to Lorraine about Earl's apnea
monitor and whether his immunizations were current. According to
Gloria, Lorraine told her that the doctor stated that Earl was to use
the apnea monitor until he was six months old. Because Earl had
reached eight months of age, Lorraine discontinued using the device.
Gloria also stated that Lorraine told her that she was getting ready to
take the children to the doctor to get their immunizations. Gloria
testified that prior to meeting with Lorraine, she reviewed Lorraine's
case file, and discovered that the prior DCFS investigation by Harris
ended in an "indicated" report. Gloria stated that, before she left
Lorraine's home on that day, she told Lorraine to arrange to have the
children immunized.
	Gloria testified that, about one month later, on March 13, 2001,
she returned to Lorraine's home to investigate information that
Lorraine had not taken Earl to get his immunizations. According to
Gloria, Lorraine stated that she could not take the children to the
doctor because she did not have transportation. Gloria testified that,
during that visit, she observed that Earl's shirt was dirty and that he
"was kind of wheezing." In addition, Gloria noted that the kitchen had
an odor of urine. Lorraine told Gloria that some of the pipes had
broken, and that someone was scheduled to come out and fix them.
Gloria testified that she decided to get Lorraine a family educator,
who would link Lorraine to resources of help within the community.
There was no testimony that Arthur Jr., was present in the home at
this time.
	Two days later, on March 15, 2001, Gloria returned to Lorraine's
home with a family educator. Gloria testified that the purpose of this
visit was to introduce Lorraine to the family educator and inform her
about the family educator's role. In addition, Gloria had made a
doctor's appointment for Earl. Gloria stated that she instructed the
family educator to transport Lorraine and Earl to the appointment,
make sure that Lorraine scheduled a follow-up visit, and ascertain that
Lorraine understood what had to be done. Again, there was no
testimony that Arthur Jr., was present in the home at this time.
	Gloria testified that she returned to Lorraine's home on March
21, 2001, because Lorraine did not follow through with a doctor's
appointment for Earl. Gloria stated that, on that day, Arthur Jr. was
not in Lorraine's home. Upon arriving at the home, Gloria discovered
that Lorraine had left the four children in the care of a boy who was
14 years of age. The boy stated that Lorraine had left to buy diapers.
Gloria testified that, on this occasion, Earl was dirty and wore a soiled
diaper, and the boy was giving him a dirty bottle with curdled milk.
Another child, Niya, smelled like urine and her clothes were very dirty.
Gloria testified that she waited in the home for 40 minutes, but that
Lorraine did not return. Gloria stated that she then took the four
children into protective custody and transported the children to the
DCFS office. When they were at the office, Gloria noticed that Niya
was acting lethargic and did not have balance. The children were then
immediately given a physical examination. Gloria stated that she was
present when the doctor examined Earl, and that she observed a
protrusion out of his belly button about the size of a lemon.
	At the conclusion of Gloria's testimony, she was asked by the
State about the difficulty that DCFS had in locating Arthur Jr. The
following colloquy took place:
		"[Assistant State's Attorney Currie]: Okay. Can you please
describe the difficulty that you had in locating Arthur Jr.?
			MR. RARIDON [attorney for respondent]: Well, judge, I
would object at this point. There's been no testimony that he
was present at any of these occurrences.
			MS. HUGHES [attorney for Lorraine]: Judge, it's also not
relevant to this petition.
			THE COURT: Counsel, why are you going into it?
			MS. CURRIE: I just wanted to indicate he was part of this
family and that normally he was in mom's custody and care,
but-I can-
			THE COURT: Well, but you haven't established that, and
asking this question doesn't establish that.
			MS. CURRIE: Okay.
			THE COURT: I'm going to sustain *** the objection."
The State rested after introducing copies of Earl's medical records
into evidence.
	At the close of the State's case, Lorraine's attorney moved for a
directed verdict as to counts I and III of the amended petition. With
respect to count I, counsel argued that the State did not meet its
burden to show that the minors were placed at risk of harm due to a
hernia as to which the mother failed to follow doctor's treatment
advice. Counsel argued that the State presented no evidence that Earl
had a hernia, or that Lorraine failed either to follow a doctor's
treatment advice or to administer medication with respect to a hernia.
As to count III, counsel argued that the only evidence that Niya
displayed imbalance and lethargy came from Gloria. Thus, counsel
asserted, the State also failed to meet its burden of proof on that
count.
	The State responded that count I addressed not only the presence
of the hernia, but also Lorraine's failure to follow through with Earl's
apnea treatment. The State did admit, however, that the wording in
count I was "a bit vague" and "unclear." The State did not respond to
the arguments made by Lorraine's counsel with respect to count III
of the amended petition. The circuit court reserved ruling on the
motion, pending examination of Earl's medical records.
	The attorney for respondent then moved to dismiss the amended
petition in its entirety as it related to his son, Arthur Jr. Counsel first
argued that although the petition stated that Arthur Jr.'s place of
residence was Winnebago County, Illinois, the State had failed to offer
any proof to support this assertion. To the contrary, counsel argued,
the only testimony adduced by the State was that Arthur Jr. resided
with his father in Milwaukee. Thus, counsel asserted, the State failed
to prove that Arthur Jr. had residence in Illinois, and, therefore, the
jurisdiction of the court had not been established. Counsel further
argued that the State had failed to present evidence to show that the
environment of Arthur Jr. was injurious to his welfare, because there
was no evidence adduced by the State that Arthur Jr. was in the
environment during any of Gloria's visits to Lorraine's home. The
circuit court denied the motion.
	Lorraine then testified briefly on her own behalf. She stated that
Earl had apnea monitor appointments every two weeks at a clinic.
Lorraine admitted that she missed some doctor's appointments, but
explained that it was because she lacked a baby-sitter and
transportation.
	 The next witness to testify was respondent. According to him,
at the time Arthur Jr. was born, he and Lorraine lived together in
Milwaukee. However, when Arthur Jr. was approximately six months
old, he and Lorraine separated, and Arthur Jr. had resided with him
since that time. Respondent testified that he told Lorraine he wanted
custody of Arthur Jr. and that he would take care of their son.
According to respondent, he and Lorraine had an arrangement where
he was the primary caretaker of Arthur Jr. with the child visiting with
Lorraine for a total time of about three months of the year.
Respondent admitted that there are no court documents giving him
guardianship and custody of Arthur Jr.; that he and Lorraine had a
voluntary arrangement; and if Lorraine wanted to take Arthur Jr., she
could. Respondent stated that Arthur Jr. was not in Rockford with
Lorraine in August 2000 at the time of the first DCFS investigation
conducted by Angela Harris. Respondent also testified that between
July 2000 and March 2001, Lorraine had no contact with Arthur Jr.
	Upon questioning from the court, respondent testified that he
signed an acknowledgment of parentage of Arthur Jr. in Wisconsin.
Respondent also stated that Lorraine had filed suit in Wisconsin
against him for child support, but that her claim was dismissed
because Arthur Jr. resided with him, and he was taking care of him.
According to respondent, Arthur Jr. lived in Milwaukee with him, his
fiancé Allean Williams, and her two children. Respondent further
testified that he, Allean and his mother Bobby were involved in caring
for Arthur Jr. on a day-to-day basis.
	The circuit court, on its own motion, then recalled Lorraine to
the witness stand. Lorraine stated that Arthur Jr. had lived with
respondent since the child was eight months old. It was around that
time, in March 2000, that she moved from Milwaukee to Illinois.
Lorraine testified that Arthur Jr. goes "back and forth" between her
and respondent, with each parent keeping the child for a few months.
She stated that, in August 2000, when DCFS first came to her home,
Arthur Jr. was present. Lorraine testified that Arthur Jr., "spent most
of his time with his dad" in Milwaukee, but then stated that Arthur Jr.
spent an equal amount of time living with each parent.
 	Respondent then called his mother, Bobby H., as a rebuttal
witness. Bobby H. testified that Arthur Jr. resided primarily with
respondent in Milwaukee, and that the child would generally stay with
Lorraine for approximately one week at a time, and then return to
Milwaukee to live with his father. Bobby H. stated that she saw
Arthur Jr. almost every day and was regularly involved with baby-sitting him.
	The parties then presented closing arguments. The State asserted
that it had "shown all of the elements in count I, that the minor did
have a hernia and that the mother had previously failed to follow
doctor's recommendations as far as administering the medication."
Also, the State argued that it had met its burden of proof with respect
to counts II and III. Counsel for respondent renewed his earlier
contention that the State failed to establish that Arthur Jr. resided in
Illinois; that Arthur Jr. was in any way involved in the injurious
environment to which the other children may have been subjected; and
that the State had no jurisdiction over a child residing in Wisconsin.
Counsel argued that the State had failed to adduce any testimony that
Arthur Jr., was exposed to the conduct alleged in counts I, II or III of
the amended petition, and asserted that the court could not presume
such exposure. At the conclusion of argument, the circuit court took
the case under advisement.
	Following a brief recess, the circuit court announced its ruling.
As an initial matter, the court granted Lorraine's motion for a directed
finding as to count III of the amended petition in each of the cases.
Accordingly, that count is not at issue in the matter before us.
	The circuit court, however, denied the motion to dismiss counts
I and II of the amended petition. The court then made the following
findings of fact. The circuit court found that the evidence showed that
all of Lorraine's five children, with the exception of Arthur Jr., had
lived fulltime with her in Rockford. The court also found that Arthur
Jr. spent "substantial" time living with Lorraine in Rockford, and that
Lorraine and respondent have an "informal shared joint parenting
arrangement." However, the court then made the following
observation: "Frankly, the court is not certain as to exactly how much
time Arthur spends with his mother and/or with his father," noting
conflicts in the testimony between Lorraine and respondent.
Nevertheless, the court then found that "somewhere in between there
lies exactly how much time Arthur H., Jr. spends with each of them."
Because neither parent had any legal documentation setting forth a
custodial arrangement or granting to him or her sole custody of
Arthur Jr. the court "proceeded on the assumption that they have an
agreement worked out between the two of them that they are sharing
jointly the custody of this child." Therefore, the court was "of the
opinion that the contacts that Arthur has with the State of Illinois
extend the jurisdiction of this court over him."
	The court then found that the evidence showed that Earl was
prescribed a sleep apnea monitor and that Lorraine failed to use that
monitor. The court also found that Lorraine failed to follow up with
medical care in relation to the monitor and Earl's sleep apnea, and
held that this failure endangered Earl. Finally, the court held that Earl
was endangered because Lorraine failed to provide him with necessary
immunization shots.
	In addition, the court held that the environment in Lorraine's
home was neither clean nor healthy. The children were dirty and
smelled of urine, and there were used diapers on the floor. The court
determined that this environment placed the children at risk of harm. 	Based upon these findings, the circuit court held that, with
respect to Earl, the State established by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was a neglected minor as alleged in counts I and II
of the amended petition. However, the court also found that
		"there is no neglect in relation to this alleged hernia. There is
no evidence presented to the court that would convince this
court that the hernia, if the child has a hernia, required any
immediate medical care or took attention. So, the argument
that's been made is that count I doesn't cover the failure to
provide other medical care other than for this alleged hernia,
and I am finding that it does, that that count pleads a
sufficient cause of action to cover the failure to get the
treatment for the sleep apnea and also the failure to get the
necessary immunizations."
	With respect to the other four children, the court held that the
State met its burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence
that those children were also neglected minors under counts I and II
of the amended petition.
	On May 31, 2002, the circuit court conducted a dispositional
hearing. The court entered a dispositional order finding that Lorraine
was unfit to care for her children, and that it was in the best interest
of the minors to be removed from her custody. The court made all five
children wards of the court, and granted guardianship and custody of
the children to DCFS with the discretion to place the children with a
responsible relative or in traditional foster care.
	Respondent filed a timely appeal. On appeal, respondent
contended that the circuit court's finding that Arthur Jr. was a
neglected minor was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Respondent requested the appellate court to reverse the circuit court's
finding and dismiss the amended petition alleging that Arthur Jr. is a
neglected minor.
	A majority of the appellate court reversed the judgment of the
circuit court and remanded this cause with directions for a new
dispositional hearing. 338 Ill. App. 3d 1027. The majority first
determined that the evidence of sibling neglect presented by the State
at the adjudicatory hearing was sufficient to support a finding of
neglect under count I against Lorraine with respect to Arthur Jr. The
majority further held, however, that this same evidence was
insufficient to support a finding of neglect against respondent.
According to the majority, "although the [Juvenile Court] Act seems
to treat both parents as a unit, the trial court may make a neglect
finding and adjudicate wardship of a minor as to one parent while not
finding neglect as to the other parent." 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1034. Thus,
according to the majority, both parents must be found to be neglectful
before a child may be adjudicated neglected.
	The majority held, under the facts presented in the instant cause,
that there was no evidence that respondent ever neglected Arthur Jr.;
that Earl is not the child of respondent, and, therefore, he is not
responsible for Earl; and that Arthur Jr., was with respondent and not
present at Lorraine's home during the series of visits by DCFS
beginning in February 2001, which formed the basis of the State's
allegations of neglect. Thus, the majority held that under the facts
here, the State's theory of "anticipatory neglect" under count I of the
amended petition did not apply against respondent because Arthur Jr.
was not present in Lorraine's home during the alleged instances of
neglect.
	In addition, the majority found a second, independent basis for
reversal of the circuit court's judgment with respect to count I of the
amended petition. The court held that the State's proof at adjudication
did not conform to the pleadings, thereby failing to provide
respondent with adequate notice of the theory upon which the State
intended to proceed. The majority noted that count I of the amended
petition alleged that Arthur Jr.'s environment was injurious to his
welfare because his sibling "had a hernia approximately 2½ to 3 inches
in diameter and the mother had previously failed to follow the
doctor's treatment and administer medication." The majority found it
significant that the circuit court refused to find that Earl was neglected
on the basis of the alleged hernia because the State failed to produce
any evidence to support this allegation. The circuit court instead found
that Earl was a neglected minor because Lorraine failed to use the
apnea monitor and failed to have Earl immunized. The majority
observed, however, that the amended petition did not allege that Earl
was neglected because Lorraine failed to use the apnea monitor or
have the children immunized. Because the petition did not mention
these occurrences, the majority refused to read these allegations into
the petition.
	Finally, with respect to count II of the amended petition, the
majority also reversed the judgment of the circuit court. The majority
found that the State had not met its burden of proof to show that
Arthur Jr. was present in Lorraine's home at the time the other four
children were left unsupervised. Although the State tried to save this
count by suggesting that the circuit court's ruling was based upon a
theory of anticipatory neglect, claiming that Arthur Jr. "spent a
substantial amount of time with his mother[,] who was found to have
left four children unsupervised in poor conditions," the majority held
that this argument was insufficient to support a finding of neglect as
to respondent.
	The majority stressed that its ruling did not reverse the trial
court's finding of neglect as to Lorraine, which the majority held was
supported by the evidence. In light of the decision to reverse the
finding of neglect as to respondent, the majority remanded this cause
for a new dispositional hearing, noting that two years had passed since
Arthur Jr. was taken from respondent.
	In dissent, Justice Kapala wrote that the majority erred by
assessing responsibility for neglect between the parents at the
adjudicatory stage. The dissenting justice explained that, at the
adjudicatory stage of the proceedings, parents are not adjudicated
neglectful; rather, minors are adjudicated neglected. Thus, according
to the dissent, the trial court need not determine that both parents
engaged in acts or omissions of neglect in order to find that a minor
is neglected. Rather, proof by a preponderance of the evidence that
Arthur Jr. was neglected by anyone responsible for his welfare is
sufficient to adjudicate him a minor who is neglected under the Act.
Relying upon In re B.C., 262 Ill. App. 3d 906 (1994), the dissenting
justice determined that Arthur Jr. was neglected due to the risk of
harm attendant to Lorraine's ability to remove the child from
respondent at any time, and the possibility of this removal left the child
subject to the neglect suffered by his siblings. Further, the dissenting
justice believed that count I of the amended petition contained the
theory that Lorraine failed to attach the apnea monitor to Earl, and the
allegations in that count could be fairly construed to include the failure
to keep Earl on the apnea monitor.
	We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315. We also granted the office of the Cook County public guardian
leave to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of the State.

ANALYSIS
	The step-by-step process used to decide whether a child should
be removed from his or her parents and made a ward of the court is
set forth in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.
(West 2000)). Upon the filing of a petition for wardship by the State,
the Act provides that a temporary custody hearing shall be held during
which the court shall determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that the child is neglected, whether there is an immediate and
urgent necessity to remove the child from the home and whether
reasonable efforts have been made to prevent the removal of the child
or that no efforts reasonably can be made to prevent or eliminate the
necessity of removal. 705 ILCS 405/2-10 (West 2000).
	Following placement of a child in temporary custody, the circuit
court must make a finding of abuse, neglect or dependence before it
conducts an adjudication of wardship. 705 ILCS 405/2-21 (West
2000); In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 343 (2000). Section 2-3(1)(b) of
the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2000)) defines a "neglected
minor" to include "any minor under 18 years of age whose
environment is injurious to his or her welfare." Section 2-3(1)(d) of
the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(d) (West 2000)) also provides that a
"neglected minor" is "any minor under the age of 14 years whose
parent or other person responsible for the minor's welfare leaves the
minor without supervision for an unreasonable period of time without
regard for the mental or physical health, safety, or welfare of that
minor."
	Generally, "neglect" is defined as the " 'failure to exercise the
care that circumstances justly demand.' " In re N.B, 191 Ill. 2d  at 346,
quoting People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 624 (1952);
see also In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d 18, 25 (1995). However,
this does not mean that the term "neglect" is limited to a narrow
definition; to the contrary, "neglect," by necessity, has a fluid meaning.
As this court has previously explained,
		" '[Neglect] embraces wilful as well as unintentional
disregard of duty. It is not a term of fixed and measured
meaning. It takes its content always from specific
circumstances, and its meaning varies as the context of
surrounding circumstances changes.' " In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 
at 346, quoting Labrenz, 411 Ill.  at 624; see also In re J.M.,
245 Ill. App. 3d 909, 920 (1993).
	Similarly, the term "injurious environment" has been recognized
by our courts as an amorphous concept that cannot be defined with
particularity. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d  at 346; In re J.P., 331 Ill. App. 3d
220, 234 (2002); In re Z.Z., 312 Ill. App. 3d 800, 804 (2000). In
general, however, the term "injurious environment" has been
interpreted to include "the breach of a parent's duty to ensure a 'safe
and nurturing shelter' for his or her children." In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 
at 346, quoting In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d 820, 826 (1995).
	Accordingly, cases involving allegations of neglect and
adjudication of wardship are sui generis, and must be decided on the
basis of their unique circumstances. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d  at 346; In
re Christina M., 333 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1034 (2002). This analytical
principle underscores the "fact-driven nature of neglect and injurious
environment rulings." In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d  at 346.
	A proceeding for adjudication of wardship "represents a
significant intrusion into the sanctity of the family which should not be
undertaken lightly." In re Harpman, 134 Ill. App. 3d 393, 396-97
(1985). It is the burden of the State to prove allegations of neglect by
a preponderance of the evidence. In re Christina M., 333 Ill. App. 3d
at 1034. In other words, the State must establish that the allegations
of neglect are more probably true than not. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d  at
343; In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 365 (2001). On review, a trial
court's ruling of neglect will not be reversed unless it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In re M.Z., 294 Ill. App. 3d 581, 592
(1998). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only
if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. In re Edward T., 343 Ill.
App. 3d 778, 794 (2003).
	If the State fails to prove the allegations of abuse, neglect or
dependence by a preponderance of the evidence, the court must
dismiss the petition. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West 2000); In re N.B.,
191 Ill. 2d  at 343. A finding of abuse, neglect or dependence is
jurisdictional, " 'without [which] the trial court lacks jurisdiction to
proceed to an adjudication of wardship.' " In re M.B., 235 Ill. App.
3d 352, 377 (1992), quoting In re Shawn B., 218 Ill. App. 3d 374,
380 (1991). If, however, the State satisfies its burden of proof, the
circuit court must then proceed to the second adjudicatory stage, in
which the court determines whether "it is consistent with the health,
safety and best interests of the minor and the public that he be made
a ward of the court." 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 2000). "In any
proceeding initiated pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987,
including an adjudication of wardship, the 'paramount consideration'
is the best interest of the child." In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d  at 343, quoting
In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d 728, 734-35 (1997).
	Turning to the matter before us, the State first contends that the
analysis employed by the appellate court majority was fundamentally
flawed. According to the State, the majority incorrectly read an
unwritten requirement into the Act that in order to find a child to be
neglected, the circuit court must assess the blame of each parent. The
State contends that because a finding of neglect concerns only the
status of the minor, and not the status of the parent, the appellate
majority's analytical focus was misdirected.
	In his brief to this court, respondent agrees with the State's
contention that the appellate majority erred in bifurcating the finding
of neglect between the parents. Respondent emphasizes that he did
not advocate this "bifurcation" theory to the appellate court. To the
contrary, respondent stresses that, on appeal, he challenged the circuit
court's finding that Arthur Jr. was a neglected minor, and did not
appeal the finding of neglect only as it pertained to him. Respondent
agrees with the State that, at the adjudicatory stage, the court's focus
is placed solely upon the minor, not upon the parents.
	We agree with both the State and with respondent that the ruling
of the appellate majority on this specific point is in error. We find that
the majority's holding, that in order to find a minor neglected at the
adjudicatory stage both parents, or all persons responsible for the
welfare of the minor, must engage in acts or omissions that constitute
neglect, is contrary to the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act.
	The legislature has stated that the purpose of an adjudicatory
hearing is "to determine whether the allegations of a petition *** that
a minor under 18 years of age is *** neglected *** are supported by
a preponderance of the evidence." 705 ILCS 405/1-3(1) (West 2000).
The plain language of this provision instructs the circuit court to focus
solely upon whether the child has been neglected. The legislature
made no mention in this provision that during the adjudicatory stage
of the proceedings the circuit court is also to determine who may be
responsible for the child's neglect, and to assess the proportion of
blame with respect to such individuals. See In re R.B., 336 Ill. App.
3d 606, 614-15 (2003); In re Christina M., 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1034.
	In addition, in defining a neglected child in section 2-3 of the
Act, the legislature focused exclusively upon the status of the child,
and gave no consideration to an evaluation of the acts and/or
omissions of the child's parents, or any other individual responsible for
the welfare of the child, in arriving at a determination of neglect. 705
ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) through (1)(d) (West 2000).
	Finally, in section 2-21 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West
2000)), the General Assembly set forth the procedure which the
circuit court must follow in conducting an adjudicatory hearing under
the Act:
			"After hearing the evidence the court shall determine
whether or not the minor is *** neglected ***. *** The
court's determination of whether the minor is *** neglected
*** shall be stated in writing with the factual basis supporting
that determination. (Emphases added.)
			If the court finds that the minor is *** neglected ***, the
court shall then determine and put in writing the factual basis
supporting that the determination, and specify, to the extent
possible, the acts or omissions or both of each parent,
guardian, or legal custodian that form the basis of the court's
findings. That finding shall appear in the order of the court."
Thus, pursuant to section 2-21, the circuit court is first to determine
whether the minor is neglected. There is no direction from the
legislature that the court shall consider the actions of the parents in
making this determination. It is only after the circuit court has
adjudicated the child neglected that the statute directs the court to
consider the actions of the parents. Even then, however, section 2-21
provides that the court need consider such actions only "to the extent
possible." The plain language of this provision indicates that the
legislature recognized that there may occur circumstances when a
child is neglected, but it may be impossible to determine the relative
fault with respect to the child's parents or guardians. However, even
if such a determination is not possible, the statute is clear that this
does not alter the finding that a child is "neglected."
 	Our holding that the Act instructs the circuit court during the
adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the child is neglected, and
not whether the parents are neglectful, furthers the purpose and policy
of the Juvenile Court Act, which is to ensure the best interests and
safety of the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-2 (West 2000). A contrary result
would lead to the unacceptable proposition that a child who is
neglected by only one parent would be without the protections of the
Act. Similarly, a child would have no protection under the Act if the
child were neglected, but it could not be determined which parent's
conduct caused the neglect. The General Assembly could not have
intended such absurd results. See In re R.B., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 615-616 (setting forth hypothetical scenarios to show that a determination
of causation is irrelevant at the adjudicatory stage).
	 As the matter at bar involved an adjudicatory hearing, the
appellate majority's analysis of the relative blame of each parent for
the child's neglect was improper. We agree with the dissenting justice
below that "[t]he basic principle overlooked by the majority is that
parents are not adjudicated neglectful at the adjudicatory stage of the
proceedings under the Act; rather, minors are adjudicated neglected."
338 Ill. App. 3d at 1042 (Kapala, J., dissenting); see also In re
Christina M., 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1034.
	Having decided that the only question to be resolved at an
adjudicatory hearing is whether or not a child is neglected, and not
whether every parent is neglectful, we now turn to the next issue
presented by this appeal: whether, under the unique facts of this case,
the circuit court's finding that Arthur Jr. is a "neglected" minor within
the meaning of the Act is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
	In the matter before us, the circuit court's finding that Arthur Jr.
is a neglected minor is premised upon the theory of anticipatory
neglect. Under the anticipatory neglect theory, the State seeks to
protect not only children who are the direct victims of neglect or
abuse, but also those who have a probability to be subject to neglect
or abuse because they reside, or in the future may reside, with an
individual who has been found to have neglected or abused another
child. See In re L.W., 291 Ill. App. 3d 619, 623 (1997). The theory of
anticipatory neglect flows from the concept of an "injurious
environment" which is set forth in the Act. See In re L.W., 291 Ill.
App. 3d at 623.
	Although our appellate court has recognized the theory of
anticipatory neglect for some time (see, e.g., In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App.
3d 328, 339-40 (1978)), our courts have also held that there is no per
se rule that the neglect of one child conclusively establishes the
neglect of another child in the same household. In re S.R., 349 Ill.
App. 3d 1017, 1021 (2004); In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d at 18.
Rather, "such neglect should be measured not only by the
circumstances surrounding the sibling, but also by the care and
condition of the child in question." In re Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d
at 797; see also In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d at 26; In re M.D.H.,
297 Ill. App. 3d 181, 188-89 (1998). Although section 2-18(3) of the
Act (705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2000)) provides that the proof of
neglect of one minor "shall be admissible evidence" on the issue of the
neglect of any other minor for whom the parent is responsible (In S.R.,
349 Ill. App. 3d at 1021), we emphasize that the mere admissibility of
evidence does not constitute conclusive proof of the neglect of
another minor. Each case concerning the adjudication of minors,
including those cases pursued under a theory of anticipatory neglect
based upon the neglect of a child's sibling, must be reviewed
according to its own facts. In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d at 28.
	In the cause before us, the State contends that a finding of
neglect with respect to Arthur Jr. is appropriate, based upon a theory
of anticipatory neglect. According to the State, the facts in this case
lead to the conclusion that Arthur Jr. was placed at a risk of harm,
and, therefore, his environment was injurious. In support of its
argument, the State relies chiefly upon In re B.C., 262 Ill. App. 3d
906 (1994), and asserts that B.C. is factually analogous to the matter
at bar. The State asserts that it met its burden of proof to show that
Lorraine's neglect of Arthur Jr.'s siblings established an injurious
environment with respect to Arthur Jr. despite the fact that the child
principally resided with respondent and was not present during the
occurrences upon which the State's amended petition was based. The
State emphasizes that Lorraine could remove Arthur Jr. from
respondent at any time, and that this subjected the child to a risk of
harm.
	Contrary to the State's position, respondent contends that the
circuit court's finding that Arthur Jr. is a neglected minor was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent asserts that the State
failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that Arthur Jr. was
placed at a risk of harm. Although respondent acknowledges that the
Act provides that proof of the neglect of one minor shall be admissible
evidence with respect to the neglect of any other minor for whom the
parent is responsible, respondent stresses that merely providing that
such evidence is "admissible" does not mean that the evidence is
sufficient to prove the allegation. In addition, respondent notes that
the case of each minor must be examined individually.
	Respondent further observes that the amended petition for
adjudication alleged that Arthur Jr. was a neglected minor because his
siblings were subjected to medical neglect and to a lack of supervision.
According to respondent, the State presented no evidence that Arthur
Jr. lacked medical care or that Arthur Jr. had been unsupervised.
Respondent emphasizes that Arthur Jr. was living with him in
Milwaukee and was not present at any of the five occasions which
form the basis of the State's petition. Respondent further asserts that
the State failed to present any evidence concerning the degree of risk
of harm to Arthur Jr. or any evidence with respect to the care and
conditions he experienced at the time the court directed the State to
file the petition for adjudication of wardship. Accordingly, respondent
concludes, the circuit court's finding that Arthur Jr. is a neglected
minor within the meaning of the Act is against the manifest weight of
the evidence. We agree.
	We hold that, under the specific facts presented in the instant
cause, the circuit court's holding that Arthur Jr. was neglected under
a theory of anticipatory neglect was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. The record reveals that the State failed to meet its burden
of proof to establish that Arthur Jr. was placed at a probable and
substantial risk of harm as a result of the neglect of his siblings. As
stated, each case involving allegations of neglect and adjudication of
wardship is sui generis, and must be decided on its own facts. In re
N.B., 191 Ill. 2d  at 346; In re Christina M., 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1034.
Our review of the record in the matter at bar reveals that the record
does not support the circuit court's determination that Arthur Jr. was
a neglected minor.
	Both the State, in its brief to this court, and the dissenting justice
below, rely upon the decision in In re B.C., 262 Ill. App. 3d 906
(1994) to support the circuit court's finding of neglect in the instant
cause. However, we find that the facts presented in the cause at bar
are distinguishable from those in B.C. In B.C. the State filed a petition
for adjudication of wardship alleging that B.C. and her two brothers
were neglected because their environment was injurious to their
welfare and placed them at a risk of harm. At the temporary custody
hearing, the State presented evidence that the mother, while
intoxicated, bit one of B.C.'s brothers on the arm when he refused her
request to prepare a meal for her. The mother then disappeared.
Approximately one month later, the mother was arrested, and, at that
time, she was intoxicated. In addition, the State presented evidence
that the mother had failed to take B.C.'s brother to his doctor's
appointments. At the time of these occurrences, B.C. was not living
with the mother; rather, B.C.'s mother had previously left the child
with her godmother without providing any instructions for B.C.'s
care. The trial court found that probable cause existed to remove
B.C.'s brothers from their mother's care, but dismissed the petition as
it related to B.C.
	The appellate court reversed the circuit court's dismissal of the
petition for adjudication of wardship as to B.C. The court held that
the fact that B.C. lived with her godmother at the time of the
occurrences was irrelevant. The court emphasized that B.C.'s mother
retained legal custody of the child and, therefore, could retrieve B.C.
from the godmother at any time. The court held that "this possibility
of removal left B.C. subject to the abuse and neglect endured by both
[her brothers]." In re B.C., 262 Ill. App. 3d at 909.
	The facts presented in B.C. are distinguishable for several reasons
from those in the cause at bar. First, the B.C. decision analyzed a
circuit court order rendered in a procedural posture different from that
in the cause at bar. In B.C., the appellate court reviewed the propriety
of a circuit court's ruling at a temporary custody hearing conducted
under section 2-10 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-10 (West 2000)).
During a temporary custody hearing, the State need only establish that
there is probable cause to believe that a child is neglected. This burden
of proof differs from that at the adjudicatory stage, wherein the State
must establish that the child is neglected by a preponderance of the
evidence. Thus, in B.C. the State had a lower evidentiary threshold to
meet than in the matter at bar.
	Second, in B.C. the court determined that the fact that the child
had temporarily resided with her godmother was of no consequence
in determining whether the child was neglected, because the mother
could remove the child from the godmother at any time. Under the
unique facts presented in the cause at bar, the State has not shown, as
was the case in B.C., that Lorraine may take Arthur Jr. away from
respondent at any time.
	The uncontradicted evidence presented at the adjudicatory
hearing is that Arthur Jr.'s primary residence was in Wisconsin with
respondent. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Lorraine
filed an action against respondent for child support for Arthur Jr. and
her action was dismissed because it was found that the child resided
with respondent in Milwaukee. In addition, the uncontradicted
testimony of all DCFS workers during these proceedings was that
Arthur Jr. resided with respondent in Wisconsin. Further, Lorraine
herself testified that Arthur Jr. spent most of his time with respondent
in Milwaukee, but that she did not know where her son and
respondent lived. Indeed, the circuit court held Lorraine in contempt
because she could not provide the addresses of any of the fathers of
her children who resided in Milwaukee, including respondent. In
addition, the record is uncontradicted that Lorraine lacked
transportation. The record reveals that Lorraine had no transportation
to travel to and from neighborhood clinic appointments; it is therefore
likely that she also would lack transportation to travel nearly 100
miles, across state lines, to retrieve Arthur Jr. from respondent.
	Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, what distinguishes In
re B.C. factually from the cause at bar is the legal relationship that
respondent has with Arthur Jr. In B.C. the court found it significant
that the godmother had no legal right to prevent the mother from
removing the child from her care. In contrast, in the matter at bar, it
is uncontradicted that the primary caretaker of Arthur Jr. was
respondent, his father. Whereas a "godmother" has no legal rights
with respect to a child, a parent possesses a fundamental constitutional
right in the care, custody and control of his children. In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 362-63 (2001). Thus, unlike a godmother, a father has the
right to say "no" to the mother if she wishes to remove the child from
his care.(1)
	In the cause at bar, there is nothing of record to show that DCFS
or anyone else informed respondent about the DCFS investigation of
Lorraine conducted by Angela Harris in 2000, which occurred prior
to the events alleged in the amended petition. Thus, because there is
no evidence that respondent had notice of the conditions in Lorraine's
home, it therefore cannot be assumed that he condoned or acquiesced
in Lorraine's treatment of her children. In sum, because of the
significant factual differences between the cause at bar and B.C., we
do not find that B.C. is of guidance in resolving the issue presented.
	We find that the court's opinion in In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App.
3d 18 (1995), however, is instructive. There, the court held that the
State failed to prove neglect as to the two minors involved, Edricka
and Zemaj. The State had filed two petitions for adjudication of
wardship. One petition alleged that Edricka was neglected because
"the minor's parent *** does not provide the proper or necessary ***
medical or other remedial care recognized under state law." The
second petition alleged that Zemaj was abused " 'in that the minor's
parent *** creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such
minor.' " In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d at 20.
	The petitions were based on a report that the mother failed to
take Edricka for treatment for galactosemia, a blood disorder. Thus,
DCFS considered Edricka medically neglected and Zemaj at
substantial risk of physical injury. Subsequent medical testing showed
that Edricka did not have the blood disorder alleged by DCFS in the
petition. Nevertheless, the case proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing.
The State introduced evidence that DCFS had previously come into
contact with the family in connection with the children's older siblings.
A DCFS child welfare specialist testified that, six years earlier, the
children's oldest sibling had been severely beaten by their parents, and
that five years earlier, the siblings had been left unsupervised in their
apartment when a fire broke out in the building. The DCFS specialist
also testified, however, that Edricka and Zemaj had lived with their
mother without incident from their birth until the time the petitions for
adjudication were filed. The circuit court, basing its ruling on a theory
of anticipatory neglect, found that both Edricka and Zemaj were
neglected because their environment was injurious and they were at
substantial risk of serious injury.
	The appellate court reversed. The court noted that the State had
presented no evidence at trial that Edricka and Zemaj had witnessed
abuse or neglect, or that the children were at any risk in their home
prior to the filing of the petition. In addition, the appellate court noted
that the petition concerning Edricka alleged medical neglect, and that
the State pursued a neglect finding on a theory of anticipatory neglect.
The court determined, however, that the evidence was uncontradicted
that Edricka and Zemaj were perfectly healthy.
	With respect to Edricka, the court held that "the record does not
reveal that, by a preponderance of the evidence, Edricka lacks care,
is exposed to an injurious environment, and is at substantial risk of
physical injury." In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d at 30. With respect
to Zemaj, the court observed that the petition alleged that he was
abused because the mother placed him at "substantial risk for physical
injury." Zemaj's petition derived from the petition concerning Edricka,
based upon the theory that because his sister was medically neglected,
Zemaj was at risk. The appellate court held that the circuit court erred
in basing its findings with respect to Zemaj on speculation, and found
that the trial court's findings came "too close to a per se rule of
anticipatory neglect." In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d at 31.
Although the court recognized that, under the Act, evidence of past
sibling abuse is admissible, the court found that such evidence, by
itself, was insufficient to show that the children were subjected to a
risk of harm. The court stressed that each case concerning the
adjudication of minors must be reviewed according to its own facts,
and that the record before it did not support the trial court's
determination.
	Similarly, in the matter at bar, the State failed to meet its burden
of proof to establish that Arthur Jr. is a neglected minor who is at
probable and substantial risk of suffering harm. As in Edricka C., the
State adduced no evidence at the adjudicatory hearing in the cause at
bar that Arthur Jr. had ever witnessed any abuse or neglect. It is
uncontradicted that Arthur Jr. was not present during the five
occasions which form the basis of allegations in the amended petition.
Also, as in Edricka C., there was no testimony adduced by the State
in the matter at bar that Arthur Jr. was at a risk of harm. Indeed, we
find it notable that the State did not initially institute the adjudicatory
petition with respect to Arthur Jr.; rather, it was the court that sua
sponte ordered the State to file the petition as to Arthur Jr. simply on
the basis that he is a child of Lorraine. From the very first court
hearing in this case, the record reveals that it was clear that all parties
were aware that Arthur Jr. was not present in Lorraine's home during
February and March 2001, and that he was residing with respondent
in Milwaukee. In addition, the DCFS service plan prepared on April
24, 2001, contained virtually no mention of Arthur Jr. did not list him
as being a member of Lorraine's household, and directed no tasks or
services for him. In essence, the status of Arthur Jr. had not been a
concern for DCFS or the State.
	We further observe that, with respect to the specific allegations
in the amended petition, count I alleged that Arthur Jr. was neglected
on the basis of the medical neglect of his sibling. At trial, as in Edricka
C., the State pursued a finding of neglect with respect to this child on
the theory of anticipatory neglect. However, also as in Edricka C., the
State introduced no testimony that Arthur Jr. was in ill health, that he
had missed his immunizations, that he had developmental delays, or
that he had not been taken to a doctor. Thus, as in Edricka C., the
evidence of record did not establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Arthur Jr. lacked care, was exposed to an injurious
environment, or that he was at a probable and substantial risk of harm.
	Similarly, with respect to the allegations contained in count II of
the amended petition, we hold that the State failed to satisfy its burden
of proof to establish that Arthur Jr. was a neglected minor on the basis
that Lorraine had left his siblings unsupervised. Once again, the State
failed to present evidence at adjudication that Arthur Jr. had ever been
left unsupervised, and that he was at a probable and substantial risk of
future harm of being left unsupervised. We find that a finding of
neglect on this basis would be speculative and not supported by the
record.
	In sum, we hold that, on this specific record, the circuit court's
finding that Arthur Jr. was a neglected minor was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. As stated, the term "neglect" is " 'not a term
of fixed and measured meaning. It takes its content always from
specific circumstances, and its meaning varies as the context of the
surrounding circumstances changes.' " In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d  at 346,
quoting Labrenz, 411 Ill.  at 624. Similarly, "injurious environment" is
an amorphous concept that cannot be defined with particularity. In re
N.B., 191 Ill. 2d  at 346. Neglect and injurious environment rulings are
driven by their facts (In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 347), and, in the instant
cause, the facts lead us to conclude that the trial court erred in finding
Arthur Jr. to be neglected.
	Our decision today should not be construed as a criticism of the
theory of anticipatory neglect. To the contrary, we agree that, when
faced with evidence of prior neglect by parents, "the juvenile court
should not be forced to refrain from taking action until each particular
child suffers an injury." In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, 339 (1978).
However, we emphasize that the State must be held to its burden of
proof. These cases involve relationships touching upon fundamental
rights, and the natural ties between parents and their children may not
be severed on the basis of mere speculation. Yet, in the cause before
us, this is precisely what happened. In light of the specific facts
presented which establish that Arthur Jr. was not at a probable and
substantial risk of harm, we are deeply troubled by the actions of the
circuit court judge in directing the State to file a petition for
adjudication of wardship with respect to Arthur Jr. and entering a
juvenile custody warrant resulting in a four-year-old child being
forcibly removed from his Wisconsin home and placed in Illinois foster
care. We note that, as a result of the precipitous actions of the circuit
court, Arthur Jr. has spent more than three years in a foster home.
	We stress that although section 2-18(3) of the Act (705 ILCS
405/2-18(3) (West 2000)) provides that the proof of neglect of one
minor "shall be admissible evidence" on the issue of the neglect of any
other minor for whom the parent is responsible, the mere admissibility
of such evidence does not constitute conclusive proof of the neglect
of another minor. Each case concerning the adjudication of minors,
including those cases pursued under a theory of anticipatory neglect
based upon the neglect of a child's sibling, must be reviewed
according to its own facts.
	Accordingly, because we hold that the State failed to prove the
allegations of neglect with respect to Arthur Jr. the amended petition
for adjudication of wardship must be dismissed. 705 ILCS
405/2-21(1) (West 2000); In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d  at 343. The appellate
court erred in remanding this cause to the circuit court for a
dispositional hearing.
	Because of our disposition of this matter, we need not address
the remainder of the parties' arguments on appeal.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
reversing the finding of neglect with respect to Arthur Jr. is affirmed.
The appellate court's judgment remanding this cause to the circuit
court is reversed. Because we hold that the State failed to prove the
allegations of neglect with respect to Arthur Jr. the judgment of the
circuit court is reversed and the amended petition for adjudication of
wardship is dismissed.
Appellate court judgment
affirmed in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment reversed.
	Both the appellate court and the majority would reverse the
circuit court's finding of neglect. Because I conclude that the finding
that Arthur H., Jr., was neglected within the meaning of section
2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS
405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2000)) was not against the manifest weight of
the evidence, I respectfully dissent.
	At the temporary shelter care hearing with respect to Earl H. and
three of his siblings, the circuit court learned that Lorraine had a fifth
child, Arthur Jr., who was believed to be staying with his father in
Milwaukee because his mother lacked transportation that would have
enabled her to " 'get him back.' " Slip op. at 2. The State indicated a
desire to locate Arthur Jr. and to restrict Lorraine's contact with him.
Slip op. at 3. The suggestion was made by the DCFS investigator that
the child's father might be seeking custody in a Wisconsin court (slip
op. at 2-3), but there was no evidence that such a proceeding had been
initiated or that Lorraine's custodial rights were in any way
diminished. Indeed, because it was not known how long this
arrangement had been in effect, it was not altogether clear whether a
Wisconsin court would have had jurisdiction to determine custody of
the child. See 750 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 2000) (Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act-subsequently repealed, effective January 1,
2004, and replaced by the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, 750 ILCS 36/101 et seq. (West Supp. 2003)); see
also Wis. Stat. Ann. §822.01 et seq. (West Supp. 2000).
	Regardless of the wording of the juvenile custody warrant or the
means used to locate Arthur Jr. and to obtain jurisdiction over him,
the circuit court was well within its discretion to direct the State to
locate the child and to file a neglect petition. It was entirely possible,
given Lorraine's statement that she did not know where the child was
or how to contact him, that Arthur Jr. was in an entirely unsuitable
environment or was a victim of abuse.
	Thus, it is not disputed that Arthur Jr. was properly the subject
of an adjudicatory hearing pursuant to section 2-21(1) of the Act (705
ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West 2000)). I also agree with the majority that
the appropriate focus of the neglect inquiry at such a hearing is the
status of the child, not the conduct of either parent. Slip op. at 18-20.
However, the majority then improperly shifts its focus away from the
circumstances of the child and onto the individual parents. The
majority does what it has identified as error on the part of the
appellate court-it concludes that Arthur Jr. should not have been
adjudicated neglected because the only evidence of neglectful conduct
pertained to his mother. In effect, the majority concludes that Arthur
Jr. was not neglected because Arthur Sr. did not neglect him.
	It is at this point in the analysis that, for several reasons, I part
company with the majority. First, focusing on the child, we know that
he is the nonmarital child of Lorraine. We know that Lorraine and
Arthur Sr. agree that he is the child's biological father. We are told
that Arthur Sr. signed an acknowledgment of paternity in Wisconsin,
but the circumstances surrounding the execution of that document are
unknown. We do not know if Lorraine signed it, so the legal effect, if
any, of that document is not established. See, e.g., 750 ILCS
45/5(a)(3), (a)(4) (West 2000) (requiring that an acknowledgment of
paternity by a man purporting to be the father of a child be signed by
both the man and the child's mother in order to create a presumption
of paternity); see also Wis. Stat. Ann. §891.405 (West 1994) (creating
a presumption of paternity if both the mother and the man claiming
paternity have complied with the statute governing acknowledgment
of paternity and no other man is presumed to be the father). Thus, no
presumption of paternity has arisen and, legally, the relationship
between Arthur Sr. and Arthur Jr. is that of putative father and
nonmarital child.
	By the date of the adjudicatory hearing, there had been no
adjudication of paternity, no award of custody, no support obligation
established, and no fixing of visitation rights with regard to Arthur Jr.
As a result, custody of this nonmarital child was presumed to be with
his mother. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/10-5(a)(3) (West 2000) (for
purposes of statute on child abduction, it is "presumed that, when the
parties have never been married to each other, the mother has legal
custody of the child unless a valid court order states otherwise"); see
also 750 ILCS 45/14(a)(2) (West 2000) (even where there has been
a judgment of paternity, in the absence of an order granting custody
to the father or unless he has had physical custody for at least six
months prior to the date that the mother seeks to enforce her custodial
rights, custody shall be presumed to be with the mother). Arthur Sr.
had mere physical custody of the child, not legal custody, and the
duration of his physical custody was a matter of dispute. Lorraine
could have insisted on the child's return at any time. Indeed, Arthur
Sr. admitted that he would have returned the child to Lorraine if she
had asked. In sum, Arthur Jr., had one legal parent, one putative
parent, and four siblings or half-siblings who were neglected while
residing with the mother they shared.
	The State's theory with regard to the alleged neglect of Arthur
Jr. is sometimes referred to as "anticipatory neglect." This court has
not used the term before, but there is ample case law from the
appellate court utilizing and defining the term. See, e.g., In re S.R.,
349 Ill. App. 3d 1017 (2004); In re J.P., 331 Ill. App. 3d 220 (2002);
In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d 18, 28 (1995). The theory arises
from section 2-18(3) of the Act, which states that proof of the abuse
or neglect of one minor "shall be admissible evidence on the issue of
the abuse [or] neglect *** of any other minor for whom the
respondent is responsible." 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2000).
Thus, if Lorraine was "responsible" for Arthur Jr., her neglect of her
other four children may be used as evidence that she is likely to
neglect him in the future. As the sole adult with custodial rights to
Arthur Jr., she was surely responsible for him even though she
voluntarily relinquished her responsibility, for a time, to Arthur Sr.
	My second point of disagreement with the majority is its
resolution of the question of whether Lorraine was likely to neglect
Arthur Jr. in the future. The majority overlooks the significant
similarity between Arthur Sr. and the godmother in In re B.C., 262 Ill.
App. 3d 906 (1994), to whom the respondent mother had temporarily
relinquished physical custody of B.C. Slip op. at 24. Neither Arthur
Sr. nor the godmother had any custodial rights to the children. Both
Lorraine and B.C.'s mother could have removed their children at any
time. The majority opines that "unlike a godmother, a father has the
right to say 'no' to the mother if she wishes to remove the child from
his care." Slip op. at 24. The only authority offered for this blanket
statement of paternal veto power over the rights of a custodial mother
is the fundamental constitutional right of a parent to the care, custody,
and control of his children. However, while a father's interest in
maintaining a relationship with his child is a fundamental liberty
interest, his rights arise from the state and federal constitutions and are
implicated only if the state attempts to interfere with them, not if the
mother of his nonmarital child seeks to enforce her custodial rights. In
re Adoption of K.L.P., 198 Ill. 2d 448, 466-67 (2002).
	Arthur Sr. certainly had standing to seek an adjudication of
paternity and custody of his son. At the time of the adjudicatory
hearing, however, he had not done so. His own testimony reveals that
if Lorraine had demanded the child's return, he intended to abide by
their informal agreement and to return the child to her. I therefore
conclude that this case is quite similar to B.C. and that the same result
should apply-the child's temporary residence with someone other than
his custodial parent should not preclude a finding of neglect under a
theory of anticipatory neglect.
	The case law is clear that when the State seeks an adjudication of
neglect of one child based on evidence of neglect of the child's
siblings, the court should fully consider the child's current care and
condition. See Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d at 28. In the present case,
Arthur Jr. was apparently well cared for in Milwaukee before these
proceedings began, just as B.C. was apparently well cared for by her
godmother. His condition, however, was that he was a nonmarital
child in the physical, but not legal, custody of a man who was his
biological, but not legal, father. His siblings and half-siblings were
being neglected by his only legal parent and he was at risk of the same
neglect if his mother demanded his return.
	The majority focuses on the fact that Lorraine lacked
transportation and was therefore unlikely to be able to travel 100 miles
"across state lines" to Milwaukee to retrieve him. Slip op. at 24. I
cannot imagine that it would have been difficult for Lorraine to prevail
upon a friend or relative to give her a ride to Milwaukee for
something as important as picking up her son. I can, however, imagine
the scene if, as the majority would have it, the petition had been
dismissed and she had gone to Wisconsin to demand the child's return.
Arthur Sr. would either have given up the child, which all agree would
have exposed him to neglect, or else he might have refused. The
police might have been called. They would have learned that Lorraine
and Arthur Sr. had never been married and that Arthur Sr. did not
have a court order giving him custody of the child. They would also
have learned that a neglect petition had been dismissed in Illinois and
that, as a result, Lorraine's custodial rights were still in full effect. It
is likely that the child would have been sent back to Illinois with his
mother.
	My third concern is that the majority uses imprecise language and
undefined terms in a manner that will cause confusion as our circuit
and appellate courts attempt to discern the precedential effect of this
case. For example, the majority states that the "uncontradicted
evidence" shows that Arthur Sr.'s home was the child's "primary
residence." Slip op. at 23. The evidence, however, was in dispute.
Lorraine and Arthur Sr. gave differing accounts of the amount of time
the child spent with each parent. Because Arthur Sr. opposed the
finding of neglect, he and his mother, who supported his version of
events, may have been inclined to exaggerate the amount of time the
child was in Milwaukee. Lorraine may have minimized the amount of
time the child spent at his father's, although her motive to do so is not
clear since she obviously was not going to be able to have Arthur Jr.
returned to her, no matter whom the court believed. This is not
uncontradicted evidence of a child's primary residence. In the end, the
circuit court was not convinced that either parent was presenting an
unbiased view. See In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 (2002) (under
a manifest weight of the evidence standard, a reviewing court gives
deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in a better
position to observe the conduct and demeanor of parties and witnesses
and to assess their credibility). The court reasonably concluded that
the actual amount of time the child spent with his father was
somewhat more than Lorraine described and somewhat less than
Arthur Sr. described.
	Even leaving aside the fact that the evidence was in dispute, the
term "primary residence" is not found anywhere in the Act or in the
case law applying the Act. Indeed, if primary residence were a
determinative factor in neglect cases, any parent could avoid a neglect
finding by placing his or her child in the home of a grandparent or
other caregiver long enough for that home to become the child's
"primary residence."
	Similarly, the majority makes much of the "legal relationship"
between Arthur Jr. and Arthur Sr. and the fact that Arthur Sr. was the
"primary caretaker" of his son. Slip op. at 24. As I noted above, the
legal relationship between Arthur Sr. and Arthur Jr. is not established.
The relationship appears to be that of putative father and nonmarital
child. If and when Arthur Sr. successfully asserts his parental rights in
a parentage action or effectively acknowledges his paternity (see
People ex rel. Department of Public Aid v. Smith, No. 97120
(September 23, 2004)), he will be the child's legal father. Until then,
there is no legal relationship between two, just as there is no legal
relationship between Arthur Sr. and Lorraine's daughter, Jaquane,
whom the parties believe is his daughter. In any event, even if the
acknowledgment of paternity signed by Arthur Sr. in Wisconsin was
effective to create a parent-child relationship, it was not effective to
confer to legal custody upon Arthur Sr.
	"Primary caretaker" is a description often used in the context of
child custody disputes between divorcing parents to argue for the
award of custody to the parent who has provided a greater share of
the day-to-day parenting of the child. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Wycoff, 266 Ill. App. 3d 408 (1994). If, after an adjudication or
effective acknowledgment of paternity, a dispute were to arise
between Arthur Sr. and Lorraine over the custody of their son, his
status as primary caretaker, if proven, would weigh heavily in his
favor. In an adjudicatory proceeding under the Act, however, saying
that a putative father has been the primary caretaker of a child is just
another way of saying what the majority has criticized the appellate
court for saying-that Arthur Jr. was not neglected because only one
of his parents was neglectful.
	Finally, the majority acknowledges that the standard of review in
this case is whether the circuit court's finding of neglect was against
the manifest weight of the evidence, but then engages in its own
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and its own weighing of
the evidence. In effect, the majority engages in de novo review and
concludes that it would have reached a different decision on the
question of whether Arthur Jr. was neglected. This is something we
are not permitted to do, even if the case is a hard one and even if the
respondent parent is a very sympathetic character. A reviewing court
must not reverse a circuit court's determination on the question of
neglect unless the finding is "against the manifest weight of the
evidence if the facts clearly demonstrate that the court should have
reached the opposite result." In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 346 (2000).
	In the present case, the circuit court certainly could have
concluded that Arthur Jr. was not neglected as alleged in any of the
three counts in the petition. However, given Arthur Jr.'s status as a
nonmarital child whose mother had full custodial rights to him, the
substantial risk that she would successfully assert those rights, and the
evidence of neglect of his siblings, I conclude that the circuit court's
findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
	In In re S.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d 121 (2000), the State sought an
adjudication of neglect of a child born 20 months after the death of his
infant sister. The theory was anticipatory neglect. After the older child
died of shaken baby syndrome, the father was charged with first
degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. He was acquitted. The
parents of the child had never been married and they were no longer
together at the time of the adjudicatory hearing. The circuit court
found the child neglected and made him a ward of the court. Both
parents appealed. Like the appellate court in the present case, the
appellate court in S.S. considered the parents separately and
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish the father's
neglect, but not the mother's.
	As a result of the majority opinion in the present case, we now
know that the proper inquiry at the adjudicatory hearing is whether
the child is abused or neglected, not which parent is responsible for
the abuse or neglect. Although the appellate court in S.S. engaged in
unnecessary consideration of the degree of responsibility of each
parent at the adjudicatory stage, it did reach the correct result:
"Because the evidence of past sibling abuse by [the father] was
sufficient to establish a finding of neglect, the trial court properly
determined that it was in the best interest of S.S. that he be made a
ward of the court." S.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 132. The court then went
on to determine that it was error for the circuit court at the
dispositional stage to remove custody of S.S. from his mother, in
whose custody he would not have been at risk, and to place
guardianship with DCFS.
	In my opinion, this would have been the proper procedure in the
present case. Arthur Jr. was properly found to be neglected based on
the fact that siblings were neglected in the home of his mother, whose
custodial rights to him were not limited in any way. If the evidence at
the dispositional stage revealed that he had an "otherwise fit parent"
who was ready, willing, and able to assume custody, the circuit court
should have "exercise[d] extreme prudence before placing [him] under
the guardianship of DCFS." S.S. , 313 Ill. App. 3d at 132-33. At this
point, the circuit court might well have determined that the best
interests of Arthur Jr. would have been served by placing him with his
father. 705 ILCS 405/2-23(1) (West 2000). Lorraine might have been
granted supervised visitation, or a protective order requiring her to
stay away from Arthur Jr. might have been warranted. 705 ILCS
405/2-25(1)(a), (1)(b) (West 2000).
	The majority's resolution, reversing the finding of neglect and
dismissing the State's petition, returns father and son to the status quo
ante. There is still no finding of paternity and no award of custody.
Arthur Sr. will have physical possession of his son, but not legal
custody.
	If Lorraine's parental rights to Arthur Jr. have already been
terminated, a question not answered in the briefs, Arthur Jr. may be
left without a legal parent. On the other hand, if her rights have not
been terminated, the majority has undermined the ability of the State
to seek to terminate her parental rights because if a child is not
abused, neglected, or dependent then he cannot be the subject of a
petition to terminate parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-12(2) (West
2000) (a petition in respect of a minor under the Act "shall allege that
the minor is abused, neglected, or dependent, with citations to the
appropriate provisions of this Act, and set forth *** facts sufficient to
bring the minor under Section 2-3 or 2-4" of the Act). See also In re
J.P.S., 198 Ill. App. 3d 633 (1990) (holding that the State's petition
to terminate parental rights did not state a cause of action because the
child had not been adjudicated an neglected or dependent minor as
required by the Act).
	It is my sincere hope that Arthur Sr. will act promptly to clarify
the status of his son and that their family will quickly overcome the
effects of this long separation.
	JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this dissent.
	 
1.               
  We note that the dissenting justices repeatedly characterize Arthur Sr. as the "putative" father of Arthur Jr. 
"Putative" is defined as "[r]eputed; believed; supposed." Black's Law Dictionary 1250 (7th ed. 1999). However, there is no dispute in the 
record that Arthur Jr. is the biological child of Arthur Sr. Notably, the dissenting justices acknowledge this fact early in their separate 
opinion when they state that "[w]e know that Lorraine and Arthur Sr. agree that he is the child's biological father," and observe that 
"Arthur Sr. signed an acknowledgment of paternity in Wisconsin."