Title: Tyler v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

250 Ind. 419 (1968)
236 N.E.2d 815
TYLER
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 1067S98.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed May 21, 1968.
*420 Ralph W. Probst, and Probst & Probst, of Kendallville, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Murray West, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
LEWIS, C.J.
This is an appeal from a conviction of the appellant for the crime of Second-Degree Burglary. In the Trial Court the defendant had entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The case was heard by the Trial Court without the intervention of a jury.
On the night of January 5, 1967, the Wolcottville School building was burglarized. Certain portions of the school building had been forcibly entered and several payroll checks to school employees, as well as a money bag, were taken.
At about 2:30 A.M. on January 6, 1967, the appellant had an auto collision near the burglarized school. His car was damaged to such a degree that it was removed to a garage. At about 6:00 A.M., a State Trooper was in the Police Station at Avilla which is also in the vicinity of the school which was burglarized. While there, he saw the appellant and became aware that he had been involved in an auto collision. At 7:30 A.M. on the same morning, the State Trooper received information *421 that the Wolcottville School had been burglarized, and that the burglary had taken place prior to 5:30 A.M. on that same day. At 8:00 A.M., the State Trooper made an examination of the appellant's wrecked automobile, whereupon he observed the money bag lying on the front seat partially hidden by a man's jacket and he observed tools in the back of the car. The Trooper testified that at the time he took the money bag from the car, he believed the bag belonged to the appellant's father. At 1:00 P.M. on the same day he obtained a search warrant and removed the tools from the car, claiming they were possible burglary tools.
The appellant was arrested at approximately 8:30 P.M. on January 6, 1967, by the Town Marshal of Monroeville. The appellant told the Marshal that the stolen checks were in the glove compartment of the car that he was driving at the time of his arrest, and the Marshal removed the checks. The appellant signed a statement admitting that he committed the burglary.
On appeal, appellant raises three (3) assigned errors:
Appellant's assigned errors Nos. 1 and 2 will be dealt with together. The appellant objected to both the money bag and the alleged burglary tools coming into evidence, but, on improper grounds.
The objection to the money bag was raised as follows:
*422 The objection to the alleged burglary tools from being entered into evidence was raised thusly:
It is manifest that the appellant is now raising entirely different questions than those he raised at the time the evidence was admitted at trial.
In the case of Gernhart v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 470, 120 N.E.2d 265, the following statement appears:
We are compelled to hold that since the appellant failed to object at trial for the same reasons now being urged, he is deemed to have waived his alleged errors. One may not raise objections for the first time on appeal in this Court when there was afforded an ample opportunity to raise the objection during the course of the trial. See also: Dull v. State (1962), 242 Ind. 633, 180 N.E.2d 523.
*423 We now turn to appellant's last assigned error concerning the Court's appointment of two physicians to serve as expert witnesses on the issue of the appellant's insanity at the time the crime was committed. It is appellant's argument that since these witnesses were physicians primarily, and not specialists in the fields of mental disorders that they were not competent to render an opinion on the appellant's sanity.
Appellant cites Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., § 9-1702, (1956 Replacement), which reads as follows:
He points out the language "... competent disinterested physicians ...", and interprets this to mean an individual with more training, experience, and qualifications than a general practicing physician without specialized training.
Appellant is correct in his belief that competent experts are necessary in the determination of an individual's sanity; however, we do not believe that the statute envisions the standard to qualify as an expert witness as appellant suggests.
The law is well settled that physicians may testify as experts in situations such as these. In the case of Davis v. State (1871), 35 Ind. 496, the following statement appears:
There was evidence introduced at trial which indicated that Dr. Taylor had taken continuing courses in psychiatry for three and one-half (3 1/2) years in medical school. Also, he had helped to diagnose and treat patients at LaRue Carter, a mental hospital.
Dr. Mellinger stated he had training in psychiatry in medical school as well, and during his internship he had responsibility for determining the mental status of patients in a hospital.
Neither of these witnesses were strangers to mental illness, and we cannot now say that they were incompetent to testify. The question of whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is in the discretion of the Trial Court which may not be set aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. We see none. Dougherty v. State (1934), 206 Ind. 678, 191 N.E. 84.
The appellant has not demonstrated error at law committed by the Trial Court, and we affirm.
*425 Arterburn, Hunter and Jackson, JJ., concur; Mote, J., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 236 N.E.2d 815.