Title: MICHELLE MOWERY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MICHELLE MOWERY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 38Case Number: No. S-10-0127Decided: 03/04/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
MICHELLE 
MOWERY,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Washakie County

The 
Honorable Robert E. Skar, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, 
State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, 
Director, UW Defender Aid Program; E. Jeannee Nunn, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Nunn.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jessica Y. Frint, Student Director, 
Jessica G. Van Norman, Student Intern.  
Argument by Ms. Van Norman.

 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Michelle Mowery, appeals a conviction for felony interference with a peace 
officer, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2009).  Ms. Mowery contends the district 
court erred in allowing the State to amend the information to remove the charge 
of attempting to interfere with a peace officer.  She also asserts that the district court 
erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of self-induced 
intoxication.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      
Ms. Mowery presents 
the following issues:

 
 

1.    
Did the district 
court abuse its discretion under Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 3(e) when it 
allowed the last minute amendment of the information which undermined the 
defense strategy?

 
 

2.    
Did the trial court 
err when it declined to give Ms. Mowery's requested jury instruction on the 
voluntary intoxication defense; should both portions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-5-204(b) be classified as specific intent crimes which require proof of 
specific intent to cause bodily injury and thus make the defense of voluntary 
intoxication applicable?

 
 
The State rephrases 
the issues as follows:

 
 

1.    
Did the district 
court properly apply Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 3(e) and properly 
exercise its discretion in allowing the amendment of the criminal 
information?

 
 

2.    
Did the district 
court properly refuse Appellant's proposed instruction which provided that 
self-induced intoxication is a defense to the crime of intentionally and 
knowingly causing bodily injury to a peace officer in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-5-204(b)?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On March 5, 2009, Ms. 
Mowery was admitted to the Washakie Medical Center after taking an overdose of 
two prescription medications, Tramadol and Clonazepam, in an attempt to commit 
suicide.  She was initially treated 
in the emergency room, and was later transferred to the intensive care unit so 
that she could receive individual nursing care.  The following morning, Ms. Mowery's 
attending physician directed that Ms. Mowery not be allowed to leave the 
hospital because she was still suicidal.

 
 

[¶4]        
After meeting with 
her physician on the morning of March 6th 
and discussing participation in a drug rehabilitation program, Ms. Mowery 
attempted to leave the hospital.  
Hospital staff called the police.  
An officer from the Worland Police Department responded to the call, and 
upon arriving at the hospital, confirmed with hospital staff that Ms. Mowery was 
under a hold.  The officer followed 
Ms. Mowery onto a lawn area outside the hospital and attempted to prevent her 
from leaving by catching up to her and stepping in front of her.  Ms. Mowery stated that she was going home 
and that the officer could not make her go back inside the hospital.  When the officer attempted to guide Ms. 
Mowery back to the hospital, Ms. Mowery hit him in the face with a full can of 
soda.  The can of soda exploded on 
impact, cutting the officer's lip, puncturing the inside of his mouth, and 
causing his face to swell.  Later 
that afternoon, Ms. Mowery was discharged from the Washakie Medical Center and 
was taken by ambulance to the Wyoming Behavioral Institute in Casper.  Ms. Mowery testified that she did not 
remember anything after taking the prescription medication on March 5th until she woke up at the Wyoming Behavioral 
Institute. 

 
 

[¶5]        
Ms. Mowery's 
attending physician at the Washakie Medical Center testified that Ms. Mowery 
could still have been confused 24 hours after the overdose due to the amount of 
Tramadol she had ingested.  The 
physician also testified that the effect of the Clonazepam "would be similar to 
someone being intoxicated and not remembering during that course of time."  He testified that the effects of the 
Clonazepam would have been "somewhat similar to intoxication," but that the 
effects "had cleared by the following day," referring to March 6th. 

 
 

[¶6]        
The State originally 
charged Ms. Mowery with a single count of felony interference with a peace 
officer in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b).  The information alleged that Ms. Mowery 
"did intentionally and knowingly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to a 
peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties."  Prior to trial, both the State and Ms. 
Mowery offered proposed jury instructions.  
Ms. Mowery offered an instruction that limited the offense to the 
attempted portion of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b).  She also offered an instruction on the 
defense of self-induced intoxication.1  The State offered an instruction that 
included both the attempted and completed versions of felony interference with a 
peace officer, reflecting the crime as charged in the information. 

 
 

[¶7]        
A one-day jury trial 
was held on December 9, 2009.  
During trial, defense counsel presented evidence relating to the defense 
of self-induced intoxication based on the amount and nature of the medication 
Ms. Mowery had taken.  At the close 
of evidence, the court held a jury instruction conference.  The State moved to amend the information 
to eliminate the attempt crime charged under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b).  The court granted the motion over Ms. 
Mowery's objection and limited the State's jury instruction to the crime of 
"intentionally and knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury to a peace officer . . . in 
the lawful performance of his official duties."  In ruling on the State's motion, the 
district court noted that "[d]ue to the fact that the only evidence before the 
Court is of a battery or an actual injury to the police officer the Court is 
going to grant the Motion to Dismiss the attempt and limit the jury instruction 
to the actual causing of bodily injury."  
The court denied Ms. Mowery's self-induced intoxication instruction and 
instructed the jury that self-induced intoxication is not a defense to a 
completed crime of felony interference with a peace officer.  

 
 

[¶8]        
After receiving the 
instructions, the jury deliberated and returned a guilty verdict.  Ms. Mowery was sentenced to one to two 
years in the Wyoming Women's Center.  
Her sentence was suspended and she was placed on two years supervised 
probation.  She filed a timely 
appeal to this Court.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Amendment of 
Information

 
 

[¶9]        
In Ms. Mowery's first 
issue, she contends the district court erred by allowing the State to amend the 
information after the close of evidence to eliminate the crime of attempting to 
cause bodily injury to a peace officer.  
Ms. Mowery argues that the amendment deprived her of the intoxication 
defense that she had developed and presented during trial.  Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 3(e) 
sets forth the rules for amending an information: 

 
 
(e) Amendment of Information or Citation.  
Without leave of the court, the attorney for the state may amend an information 
or citation until five days before a preliminary examination in a case required 
to be tried in district court or until five days before trial for a case not 
required to be tried in district court. The court may permit an information or 
citation to be amended: 

 
 

(1)   With the defendant's 
consent, at any time before sentencing. 

 
 
(2) Whether or not 
the defendant consents: 

 
 

(A)   At any time before 
trial if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. 

 
 

(B)   At any time before 
verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  We review a district 
court's ruling on whether to allow the State to amend an information for abuse 
of discretion:

 

Wyoming Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3(e) grants discretion to a trial judge in deciding whether 
or not a motion brought by the State to amend the information just prior to 
trial should be granted. Consequently, we review the trial court's decision by 
applying our abuse of discretion standard. In deciding whether or not the trial 
court abused its discretion, this court must "determine whether the trial court 
could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was 
arbitrary or capricious."

 
 

Wilkening 
v. State, 
2005 WY 127, ¶ 23, 120 P.3d 680, 687 (Wyo. 2005) 
(quoting Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 44, 46 P.3d 309, 320 (Wyo. 2002)).  We have stated that "by its very terms 
[W.R.Cr.P. 3(e)] vests the district court with wide discretion in granting or 
denying a motion to amend an information."  
Temen v. State, 2009 WY 25, ¶ 11, 201 P.3d 1139, 1142 (Wyo. 
2009).

 
 

[¶10]     
We addressed the 
issue of prejudice when confronted with an identical amendment to the same 
charge of felony interference with a peace officer in Wilkening, ¶ 23, 120 P.3d  at 687.  In Wilkening, the State originally charged 
the defendant with the attempted and completed versions of felony interference 
with a peace officer under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b).  Id., ¶ 8, 120 P.3d  at 683.  Prior to trial, the State filed a motion 
to amend the information to eliminate the charge of attempt.  Id., ¶ 11, 120 P.3d  at 683.  
A hearing on the motion was held on the morning of trial and the 
court allowed the amendment over the defendant's objection.  Id.  The defendant argued that he was 
prejudiced by the amendment because it prevented him from presenting an 
intoxication defense to negate the specific intent requirement of the attempted 
crime.  Id., ¶ 23, 120 P.3d  at 687.  
In our decision, we repeated an admonishment given in King v. State, 2002 WY 27, 40 P.3d 700 (Wyo. 2002) regarding 
the practice of charging both the attempted and completed versions of felony 
interference with a peace officer: 

 
 
At 
this point, we believe it important, in our supervisory role, to point out what 
appears to be a recurring problem in prosecutions for felony interference. Just 
as in Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 12, fn. 7, 36 P.3d 1151, [1157] fn. 7 (Wyo. 
2001), King was charged using the entire language of § 6-5-204(b), without 
differentiating between the two versions of the offense. Moreover, the 
information was never amended to clarify which version of the offense was being 
pursued.         

 
 

Wilkening, ¶ 25, 120 P.3d  at 687-88 (quoting King, ¶ 24, 40 P.3d at 706).  However, in contrast to King, because the criminal information 
was ultimately amended in Wilkening, 
the State was not required to prove both the attempted and completed crimes of 
felony interference. See King, ¶ 24, 
40 P.3d  at 706.  We held that Mr. Wilkening had not 
established that he was prejudiced by the amendment despite the late filing of 
the motion to amend.  Wilkening, ¶ 25, 120 P.3d  at 
688.

 
 

[¶11]     
Ms. Mowery argues 
that Wilkening is distinguishable 
because, in Wilkening, the amendment was allowed prior to 
trial and afforded the defendant the opportunity to adjust his trial 
strategy.  Here, Ms. Mowery asserts, 
the evidentiary portion of the trial was complete and she had no time to call 
other witnesses or provide evidence to espouse another theory of defense after 
the information was amended.  
However, we find no meaningful distinction between Wilkening and the present case.  

 
 

[¶12]     
As was the case in Wilkening, Ms. Mowery faced conviction 
under the original information for both the attempted and completed versions of 
felony interference with a peace officer.  
However, as further discussed below, self-induced intoxication is a 
defense only to the attempted crime, and not to the completed crime.  When the State amended the information, 
the possibility of conviction for the attempted crime was eliminated.  But Ms. Mowery continued to face, as she 
did from the beginning of the proceedings, the possibility of conviction for the 
completed crime if the State proved its case.  Despite having ample opportunity to 
present a defense to the completed crime, Ms. Mowery presented no other 
defense apart from self-induced intoxication.  The fact that Ms. Mowery's intoxication 
defense was negated by the removal of the attempted crime from the charge 
against her did not prejudice her substantial rights.  As in Wilkening, she was on notice of the 
attempted and completed versions of the crime from the beginning of the case, 
and the attempted version was based in the same statutory provision and arose 
out of identical factual circumstances as the completed crime.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing the State to amend the information.

 
 

Self-Induced 
Intoxication Defense

 
 

[¶13]     
In Ms. Mowery's 
second issue, she contends the district court erred by refusing to instruct the 
jury on the self-induced intoxication defense.  The refusal to give a requested jury 
instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Pina v. Christensen, 2009 WY 64, ¶ 8, 206 P.3d 1298, 1300 (Wyo. 
2009).  "A trial court is 
given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions 
correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant issue, 
reversible error will not be found."          
Iseli v. State, 2007 WY 102, ¶ 9, 160 P.3d 1133, 1135 (Wyo. 
2007).  

 
 

[¶14]     
Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-1-202, self-induced intoxication is a defense only to specific intent 
crimes.  That statute provides as 
follows:

 
 

§ 
6-1-202.  Being under the influence not a defense; effect upon intent; 
"self-induced"         
(a) Self-induced intoxication of 
the defendant is not a defense to a criminal charge except to the extent that in 
any prosecution evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant may be 
offered when it is relevant to negate the existence of a specific intent which 
is an element of the crime.        
(b) Intoxication is self-induced 
if it is caused by substances which the defendant knows or ought to know have 
the tendency to cause intoxication and which he knowingly and voluntarily 
introduced or allowed to be introduced into his body unless they were introduced 
pursuant to medical advice. The fact that the defendant is dependent upon the 
intoxicating substance is not relevant in determining whether his intoxication 
is self-induced.

 
 
Ms. Mowery argues 
that the completed crime of felony interference with a peace officer under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) is a specific intent crime, for which the defense of 
self-induced intoxication is available.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) reads as follows:

 
 
§ 
6-5-204.  Interference with peace officer; disarming peace officer; 
penalties

 
 

. 
. .       
(b) A person who intentionally 
and knowingly causes or attempts to cause bodily injury to a peace officer 
engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties is guilty of a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) 
years.

 
 

[¶15]     
Contrary to Ms. 
Mowery's interpretation of the statute, we have previously held that "[w]ith 
respect to the portion of [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b)] that prohibits anyone 
from intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury to a peace officer, we 
agree that this defines a general intent crime."  King, ¶ 23, 40 P.3d  at 706.  In King, we analogized to the statute at 
issue in Rowe v. State, 974 P.2d 937 (Wyo. 1999), a case in 
which the Court determined that a child abuse statute prohibiting a person from 
"intentionally" inflicting physical or mental injury on a child was a general 
intent crime.  We explained in King that

 
 
Based on Rowe, we conclude that version of the 
felony interference statute that prohibits anyone from intentionally and 
knowingly causing bodily injury to a peace officer is a general intent 
crime.  As with the child abuse 
statute, this offense does not require that the accused intend a further act or 
future consequence.  Instead, it 
merely required that an accused intentionally and knowingly cause bodily injury 
to a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his official 
duties.

 
 

King, ¶ 23, 40 P.3d  at 
706.  Further, our decision in Wilkening also indicated that the 
completed version of felony interference with a peace officer is a general 
intent crime.  Classification of the 
completed crime of felony interference as a general intent crime was implicit in 
our holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of his 
intoxication defense.  See Wilkening, ¶¶ 23-25, 120 P.3d  at 
687-88.  

 
 

[¶16]     
Ms. Mowery concedes 
that classification of the completed crime under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) as 
a general intent crime "is supported by this Court's opinions in King and Wilkening, among others."  She contends, however, that we should 
depart from this line of cases and interpret the "intentionally and knowingly" 
mental state described in the statute as a specific intent element.  She argues that our current 
interpretation of the completed crime of felony interference as a general intent 
crime essentially removes the mental state of "intentionally and knowingly" from 
the elements of the crime.  
Ms. Mowery's argument is based on cases holding that the 
"intentionally and knowingly" mental state requires proof of a "voluntary act." 
 See, e.g., Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1986).  From this proposition, she asserts that 
any crime classified as a general intent crime removes the mental element 
expressly attached to the crime by the legislature.  We disagree.  Consistent with our previous 
interpretations of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b), we find that the completed 
version of felony interference with a peace officer is not a specific intent 
crime and, accordingly, that self-induced intoxication is not available as a 
defense.

 
 

[¶17]     
As Ms. Mowery points 
out, the concepts of general and specific intent are naturally difficult to 
apply and are not always applied with consistency.  The varying distinctions between general 
and specific intent have been described as follows:

 
 
Sometimes "general 
intent" is used in the same way as "criminal intent" to mean the general notion 
of mens rea, while "specific intent" 
is taken to mean the mental state required for a particular crime.  Or, "general intent" may be used to 
encompass all forms of the mental state requirement, while "specific intent" is 
limited to the one mental state of intent.  

 
 
Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, § 5.2(e), p. 
353 (2d. ed. 2003) (footnote omitted).  
However, "specific intent" is most commonly used to refer to a special 
mental element that is required above and beyond any mental state that is 
attached to the physical act of a crime.  LaFave at § 5.2(e), p. 354; see also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 40 (2010).  Under this meaning of specific intent, a 
specific intent crime is often described as one that involves an intent to do 
some further act or achieve a future consequence in addition to the basic 
physical act of the crime.  22 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 40 
(2010).

 
 

[¶18]     
Our jurisprudence has 
followed the most common application of the concepts of general and specific 
intent, as was initially clarified in Dorador v. State:

 
 
Realizing that the 
distinction between a specific intent crime and a general intent crime is 
apparently troublesome, we can perhaps clarify it by stating it in a somewhat 
different way. When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of 
the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or 
achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the 
defendant intended to do the outlawed act. Such intention is general intent. When the statutory definition of the crime 
refers to an intent to do some further act or attain some additional 
consequence, the offense is considered to be a specific intent crime and then 
that question must be asked of the jury.

 
 
 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1978) (emphasis added).  This distinction between specific and 
general intent has been applied in a long line of Wyoming cases.  See, e.g., Bloomfield v. State, 2010 WY 97, ¶ 13, 234 P.3d 366, 371 (Wyo. 
2010); 
Butz 
v. State, 
2007 WY 152, ¶ 13, 167 P.3d 650, 654 (Wyo. 2007); 
Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 
156, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1259, 1262 
(Wyo. 2002); King, ¶ 22 n.1, 40 P.3d  
at 705 n.1; Rowe, 974 P.2d  at 939; Cox v. State, 829 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Wyo. 
1992).

 
 

[¶19]     
Despite the 
consistent application of the concepts of specific and general intent in our 
precedent, Ms. Mowery points to language from Dean v. State, 668 P.2d 639 (Wyo. 1983) and Crozier that she argues provides 
support for her contention that a crime 
is a general intent crime when the relevant statute does not identify a 
particular mental state that is required in order to commit the crime.  Accordingly, she concludes that "intent 
is an element of a crime only in specific intent crimes."  However, both Dean and Crozier, when properly analyzed, clearly 
apply the concept of specific intent as it was explained in Dorador.  In Dean, we noted that "[w]hen the 
definition [of a crime] refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or 
achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of 
specific intent."  Dean, 668 P.2d  at 642 
(citing People v. Love, 111 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 168 Cal. Rptr. 591, 
600 (1980)) (emphasis in original).  
After applying this meaning of specific intent, we held that the words 
"willfully and maliciously" as used in the first-degree arson statute then in 
effect did not create a specific intent crime.  Dean, 668 P.2d  at 642.  Likewise, in Crozier, we cited Dean and Dorador in holding that the words 
"maliciously" and "purposely" as used in the second-degree murder statute did 
not create a specific intent crime. 
Crozier, 723 P.2d  at 53.  These 
cases simply do not support Ms. Mowery's argument that use of the words 
"intentionally and knowingly" transforms the crime of felony interference with a 
peace officer into a specific intent crime.  

 
 

[¶20]     
Pursuant to the 
distinction between general and specific intent applied in Wyoming and the clear 
precedent established by King and Wilkening, the completed offense portion of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) is a general intent crime.  As we noted in King, felony interference with a peace 
officer does not require that the accused intend a further act or future 
consequence.  The language of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) does not require the State to prove injury to a peace 
officer with the additional intent to 
prevent the peace officer from performing his or her duties.  Rather, subsection (b) essentially 
describes a battery of a peace officer who is engaged in his or her official 
duties.  Because the accused does 
not have to intend a further act or future consequence beyond the injury to a 
peace officer, the completed offense described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) 
is a general intent crime.  Consequently, self-induced intoxication 
is not available as a defense pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-202.  See also King, ¶ 22, 40 P.3d  at 705-06.  

 
 

[¶21]     
As a final note, we 
recognize the tenuous logic that is required to conclude that self-induced 
intoxication is a defense to a specific intent crime, but not to a general 
intent crime.  As one respected 
author has explained: 

 
 
It is sometimes 
stated that intoxication can negative a "specific intent" which the crime in 
question may require (meaning some intent in addition to the intent to do the 
physical act which the crime requires), but it cannot negative a crime's 
"general intent" (meaning an intent to do the physical act  or, perhaps, 
recklessly doing the physical act  which the crime requires). . . . But this is 
wrong on principle, for if intoxication does in fact negative an intention which 
is a required element of the crime (whether it be called specific intent or 
general intent), the crime has not been committed.

 
 
LaFave at § 9.5(a), 
pp. 45-46 (footnotes omitted).  We 
also note, however, that many jurisdictions have chosen to abandon the 
self-induced intoxication defense altogether.  Id. at 46 n.25.  Although both approaches to the 
intoxication defense may be questioned, we continue to apply the defense as 
directed by the legislature.  In 
this case, the self-induced intoxication defense was not available and the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the 
instruction.

 
 

[¶22]     
Affirmed. 

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1"Self-induced" 
intoxication is the close equivalent of what has traditionally been referred to 
as "voluntary" intoxication.  Solomon v. State, 227 P.3d 461, 466 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2010).