Title: Higgins v. Wood

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 88 
Docket: 
Pen-17-170 
Argued: 
October 11, 2017 
Decided: 
July 3, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Majority: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Dissent: 
JABAR, J. 
 
 
SHELLY R. HIGGINS 
 
v. 
 
TODD A. WOOD 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
 
 
[¶1]  In this appeal, and a separate opinion issued today, see Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs. v. Fagone, 2018 ME 89, --- A.3d ---, we clarify the 
circumstances in which a court order that anticipates a change in child support 
upon the occurrence of future events will be self-effectuating.  In the matter 
before us, we conclude that the court’s order requiring Todd A. Wood to pay a 
specific amount of child support to Shelly R. Higgins did not contain a 
self-effectuating provision that immediately reduced Wood’s child support 
payments upon his oldest child reaching age eighteen.  We also conclude that 
neither administrative collateral estoppel nor administrative equitable 
estoppel was properly raised and therefore those doctrines cannot provide a 
 
2 
remedy to Wood.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment on Wood’s post-divorce 
motions in which the District Court (Bangor, Lucy, J.) ordered changes in 
Wood’s child support effective only after Wood’s service of the post-divorce 
motion to modify.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The following facts are drawn from the procedural record and from 
the family law magistrate’s (Chandler, M.) findings of fact, reached upon a 
stipulated documentary record and adopted by the District Court (Lucy, J.).  See 
Dunwoody v. Dunwoody, 2017 ME 21, ¶ 7, 155 A.3d 422.  Higgins and Wood 
were married in May 1997 and have three children who were born in 1991, 
1998, and 2001.   
 
[¶3]  Higgins filed a complaint for divorce on March 20, 2007, and a family 
law magistrate (Langner, M.) entered a divorce judgment on June 14, 2007, that 
provided for Higgins to have primary residence and required Wood to pay child 
support of $297.15 per week for the three children, who were then ages fifteen, 
nine, and five.  The child support worksheet attached to the judgment provided 
as follows with respect to the overall weekly support obligation of the parents: 
Basic weekly support for all children up to 18 years (or up to 19 
years if still in high school) . . . . 
 
a 
Total number of children 3 
 
3 
 
b 
Number of children ages 0-11 2 multiplied by amount from 
table 102 X 2 = 204 
 
c 
Number of children ages 12-17 1 multiplied by amount from 
table 126 
 
The court added in the $35 cost of health insurance for the three children 
without apportioning it per child.  The order made Wood responsible for 
ninety-one percent of the weekly support and credited him for paying the cost 
of health insurance, resulting in the $297 weekly support amount that was 
required by the judgment for support of the three children.  The child support 
order stated: 
The child support obligation shall continue for each child until that 
child reaches the age of 18; provided, however, that if the child has 
not graduated, withdrawn, or been expelled from secondary school 
as defined in Title 20-A, the child support shall continue until the 
child graduates or reaches the age of 19, whichever occurs first[.] 
 
 
[¶4]  In addition, the order stated, “Any party to this action may ask the 
court to review the amount of child support and if appropriate, to modify it in 
accordance with the state’s child support guidelines.  To start this process, a 
party must file with the court a Motion to Modify.”   
 
[¶5]  To assure that Wood met his child support obligations, Higgins 
pursued support enforcement through the Department of Health and Human 
Services Division of Support Enforcement and Recovery, which withheld 
 
4 
Wood’s wages to provide Higgins with the ordered child support beginning in 
the middle of 2008.  In 2009, the oldest child turned eighteen, having already 
graduated from high school.  At about that time, Wood asked the Department 
to reduce his payments, though he did not move to modify the judgment in the 
District Court.1  The Department made no adjustment at that time.   
 
[¶6]  Wood continued to pay child support in the amount ordered and 
took no further action until February 2015 when his telephone calls to the 
Department prompted the Regional Manager of the Department’s Division of 
Support Enforcement and Recovery to send him a notice that the Department 
was adjusting the child support obligation down to $182 per week.  The $182 
amount was apparently intended to reflect a flat reduction of the basic weekly 
support by the $126 amount originally allocated to the oldest child in the 2007 
child support worksheet, with the health insurance provisions remaining the 
same despite the termination of support for one child, and the support amounts 
for the other two children remaining unchanged despite the increases that 
should have occurred when each of the younger children reached age twelve.  
                                               
 
1  The Department’s case notes indicate that Wood first telephoned the Department about his 
oldest child reaching age eighteen in 2009, and Wood was then informed that the “blanket order” 
that was in place did not authorize a change in the amount of child support.  Wood called about the 
issue again in February 2015.   
 
5 
At the time of the February 2015 letter, the two younger children were ages 
seventeen and thirteen.   
 
[¶7]  Several months later, in July 2015, the Director of the Division 
informed Wood that the February decision was in error and that Wood needed 
to file, in court, a motion to modify the child support order to seek any reduction 
in the ordered support.   
 
[¶8]  On July 24, 2015, Wood filed two motions in the District Court—a 
motion to modify and a motion for determination of overpayment.  He argued 
that he had overpaid by more than $35,000 over the course of six years because, 
after the oldest child turned eighteen, his child support obligation should have 
been reduced by $114 per week.  Although the use of the summary judgment 
process in family law matters is not authorized, see M.R. Civ. P. 56(a),2 Wood 
also moved for summary judgment on his post-judgment motions, submitting a 
statement of material facts and supporting evidence.  In the motion for 
summary judgment, he raised issues of administrative collateral estoppel and 
                                               
 
2  The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow for motions for summary judgment on 
post-judgment motions in family matters.  See M.R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party seeking to recover upon a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” 
(emphasis added)).  It was through such an impermissible motion that Wood raised administrative 
collateral estoppel and equitable estoppel issues.   
 
6 
equitable estoppel.  The parties filed opposing and reply memoranda and 
statements of material facts.   
 
[¶9]  On March 21, 2016, the family law magistrate (Chandler, M.) held a 
hearing.3  The parties informed the magistrate that they had agreed to a series 
of three child support orders to apply from the filing of Wood’s motion, in 
July 2015, forward.  The first of these orders imposed an obligation of $280.50 
per week toward the support of the two youngest children through January 
2016 when the middle child turned eighteen.  The order explicitly provided that 
the support would decrease to $207.56 upon the youngest child becoming the 
only child for whom support was owed, and the final order required Wood to 
pay $187 per week beginning in August 2016 based on the Department’s 
revised child support table.  See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23 (2016).   
 
[¶10]  The magistrate then accepted a collection of stipulated exhibits, 
and the parties offered legal arguments regarding the amount of child support 
owed from the oldest child’s eighteenth birthday in 2009 through the 
July 31, 2015, effective date of the first agreed-upon order.  Thus, the court held 
                                               
 
3  Despite his own assertion through his motion for summary judgment that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact, Wood submitted a witness list after receiving a hearing notice and objected to 
proceeding with a nonevidentiary hearing.  Ultimately, the magistrate accepted stipulated exhibits 
and heard legal arguments, as explained further below.   
 
7 
the trial on a stipulated record, and the parties presented argument on the 
applicable law.  See Rose v. Parsons, 2015 ME 73, ¶ 8, 118 A.3d 220. 
 
[¶11]  The magistrate entered the modified child support orders to which 
the parties had agreed.  The magistrate then concluded that Wood could not 
recover any overpayment for child support paid prior to his service of the 
motion to modify because the parties’ 2007 judgment did not provide dollar 
amounts by which the child support order would self-adjust upon each child’s 
emancipation or attainment of the age of twelve.  The court ordered the 
Department to determine any amount of overpayment or underpayment that 
may have arisen while the motion to modify was under consideration by the 
court.   
 
[¶12]  The Department filed an unopposed motion to amend the findings 
of fact to correct minor factual errors, which the magistrate granted.  Wood 
objected to the magistrate’s order on the grounds that the magistrate applied 
the incorrect law and that only a judge—not a magistrate—had the authority 
to rule on the motion for summary judgment.  See M.R. Civ. P. 118(a).   
 
[¶13]  The court (Lucy, J.) reviewed the magistrate’s decision and entered 
a judgment in which it adopted the magistrate’s order on the modification of 
child support, agreed with the magistrate that the Department did not have the 
 
8 
authority to adjust the court-ordered amount of child support, and concluded 
that summary judgment must be denied, in part because a party may not move 
for summary judgment on a post-judgment motion in a family matter.  See id.  
With respect to the alleged overpayment, the court explained that, because the 
divorce judgment did not include explicit prospective calculations of child 
support based on the children reaching age twelve or eighteen, a motion to 
modify the judgment was necessary for the court to find the proper amount of 
child support to be paid.   
 
[¶14]  Wood appealed from the judgment.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1) 
(2017); 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2017); M.R. App. P. 2 (Tower 2016).4  The 
Department filed a brief that included a “supplement” consisting of the child 
support worksheet and order from Lund v. Lund, a District Court case that 
resulted in an opinion from us.  2007 ME 98, 927 A.2d 1185.  Wood objected 
and moved to strike the supplement because it was not in the record available 
to the trial court.5  We ordered that the issue would be considered along with 
                                               
 
4  The appeal was filed before September 1, 2017; hence, the restyled Maine Rules of Appellate 
Procedure do not apply.  See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled).  We cite to the applicable rules throughout this 
opinion, except as indicated. 
 
5  Wood also moved to strike certain arguments made by Higgins, but we denied that part of 
Wood’s motion.   
 
9 
the merits of the appeal, and we now take judicial notice of the documents 
submitted by the Department and address the merits of Wood’s appeal.  See 
M.R. Evid. 201(b)(2), (d); cf. In re Jonas, 2017 ME 115, ¶ 38 n.10, 164 A.3d 120 
(explaining that a court may take judicial notice of the action taken by a court 
in a final judgment).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶15]  Wood argues that the child support order included in the 2007 
divorce judgment provided for a self-effectuating reduction in the amount of 
child support when the parties’ oldest child turned eighteen in 2009 and that 
he is therefore entitled to recoup an overpayment of child support.  Here, we 
use the term “self-effectuating” to describe a provision in a judgment that 
explicitly articulates a change in a support obligation on an identified date or 
upon the occurrence of a specific event, such that the new, explicitly identified 
amount takes immediate effect and is enforceable.  In other words, we have 
substituted the term “self-effectuating” for the longer description used 
previously for a “self-executing provision that automatically amends a court 
order” upon the occurrence of a specific event or the arrival of a specific date.  
Bartlett v. Anderson, 2005 ME 10, ¶ 12, 866 A.2d 829. 
 
10 
 
[¶16]  To review whether the judgment at issue here was 
self-effectuating such that Wood was entitled to reduce his payments without 
further order of the court, we (A) summarize the alternative administrative and 
court processes for establishing and modifying child support, (B) examine the 
law governing self-effectuating adjustments in court-issued child support 
orders, (C) review whether the District Court properly applied the law, and 
(D) address the application of principles of collateral and equitable estoppel. 
A. 
Methods of Establishing and Modifying Child Support Orders in Maine 
 
[¶17]  In Maine, there are different methods for parents to obtain 
enforceable orders of child support.  Most commonly, a parent will seek a child 
support order through (1) the Department in an administrative proceeding, see 
19-A M.R.S. § 2304 (2017); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-36 to -41, ch. 8 (2016), or 
(2) the District Court in an action for divorce or for the determination of 
parental rights and responsibilities, see 19-A M.R.S. §§ 901, 1652, 
1653(2)(D)(3), 1653(8) (2017).6  We summarize the methods for establishing 
and enforcing each of these types of orders. 
                                               
 
6  A court order of child support may be entered in other contexts, as well, and our holding today 
applies equally to any court-ordered support.  See, e.g., 19-A M.R.S. § 1654 (2017) (parents living 
apart); 19-A M.R.S. § 4007(9) (2017) (protection from abuse); 22 M.R.S. § 4038-C(4) (2017) 
(permanency guardianship). 
 
 
11 
 
1. 
Department-Issued Child Support Orders 
 
[¶18]  The Department—acting “on its own behalf or on behalf of another 
state or another state’s instrumentality, an individual or governmental 
applicant for services under section 2103 [support enforcement] or a person 
entitled by federal law to support enforcement services as a former recipient of 
public assistance”—may “establish the responsible parent’s current parental 
support obligation” applying the statutory child support guidelines and the 
statute governing deviation from the guidelines.  19-A M.R.S. § 2304; see 
19-A M.R.S. §§ 2001-2012 (2017) (child support guidelines);7 17 C.M.R. 10 144 
351-37 to -39, ch. 8, § 9. 
 
[¶19]  A party may seek administrative review of a Department decision 
establishing the child support obligation within thirty days after receiving 
notice of the decision.  19-A M.R.S. § 2451 (2017); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-49, 
ch. 12, § 2(B)(2)(a), (3)(i) (2017).  If a party seeks to challenge the final decision 
entered upon administrative review, that party may appeal to the Superior 
Court for judicial review.  19-A M.R.S. § 2453 (2017); M.R. Civ. P. 80C.  A party 
                                               
 
7  Some portions of the guidelines have recently been amended, as discussed further in this opinion 
below.  See P.L. 2017, ch. 30 (effective Nov. 1, 2017) (to be codified at 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653, 2001, 
2006). 
 
12 
has a right of appeal to the Law Court from the Superior Court decision on the 
Rule 80C appeal.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80C(m). 
 
[¶20]  If there is a substantial change in circumstances after the 
Department’s order becomes final, a responsible parent may seek amendment 
of the order by the Department through an administrative hearing.  See 
19-A M.R.S. § 2304(8); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, -50, ch. 8, § 15, ch. 12, § 2(C).  
All rights to administrative review and appeal to the courts are again available 
upon the Department’s decision.  See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 2451, 2453; M.R. 
Civ. P. 80C; 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-49, ch. 12, § 2(B)(2)(a), (3)(i). 
 
[¶21]  If a court enters a child support order after the Department 
establishes a child support order, the court order will supersede the 
Department’s administrative decision ordering the payment of child support.  
See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, ch. 8, §§ 14, 16. 
 
2. 
Court-Issued Child Support Orders 
 
[¶22]  In a court proceeding, whether in a divorce action, in an action to 
determine parental rights and responsibilities, or in any other family 
proceeding, the District Court determines the amount of child support by 
applying the child support guidelines and the statute governing deviation from 
the guidelines.  See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 901, 1652, 1653(2)(D)(3), 1653(8), 
 
13 
2001-2012.  A party has the right to appeal to us from the child support ordered 
in the final judgment.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1901(1); 19-A M.R.S. § 104; M.R. App. P. 2; 
M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B (restyled).   
 
[¶23]  After a judgment ordering the payment of child support becomes 
final following an appeal or the expiration of the appeal period, a party may 
seek to enforce the judgment either in court or through the Department.  See 
19-A M.R.S. § 2103(2) (2017); M.R. Civ. P. 120; 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, ch. 8, 
§ 16.  A judgment’s terms may be enforced by the Department if its terms are 
unambiguous.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2103(2); Curtis v. Medeiros, 2016 ME 180, ¶ 8, 
152 A.3d 605.  If the child support obligations in the court order are ambiguous 
or undefined, only the court that issued the judgment has the “inherent 
authority to construe and clarify the decision.”  Id. 
 
[¶24]  Upon a substantial change in circumstances, a party, including the 
Department, may file a motion in the District Court seeking to modify the 
amount of child support, see 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(1), and include “[a] proposed 
order, incorporating the child support worksheet.”  See 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 2009(4-A)(E).  The Department has no authority to modify the court’s 
judgment.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2009. 
 
14 
 
[¶25]  When the parties reach an agreement to modify the amount of 
child support that has been established by a court order, the process is 
straightforward and inexpensive.  No filing fee is required if a motion seeks only 
to modify child support.  See Revised Court Fees Schedule and Document 
Management Procedures, Me. Admin. Order JB-05-26 (as amended by 
A. 12-17), § I(A)(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2018).8   
 
[¶26]  The entry of a modified order can be addressed promptly if the 
motion is uncontested and the amount of child support in the proposed order 
is at least as much as the amount that would be ordered through the ordinary 
application of the child support guidelines.  19-A M.R.S. § 2009(5), (6).  In such 
circumstances, if neither party requests a hearing within thirty days after the 
service of the motion, “the court may enter an order modifying support without 
hearing using the proposed order.”  Id. 
 
[¶27]  Only if the moving party proposes a downward deviation or one of 
the parties requests a hearing on the pending motion will the parties be 
required to proceed with mediation and, if necessary, a hearing.  See id.  
                                               
 
8  The fee schedule has recently been amended, effective July 1, 2018, but there is no fee for filing 
a motion seeking only the modification of child support.  See Revised Court Fees Schedule and 
Document Management Procedures, Me. Admin. Order JB-05-26 (as amended by A. 7-18), § I(A)(2) 
(effective July 1, 2018). 
 
15 
 
[¶28]  Again, a right of appeal to us is available after the entry of a final 
judgment on the motion to modify.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1901; 19-A M.R.S. § 104; M.R. 
App. P. 2; M.R. App. P. 2A, 2B (restyled).  The final judgment, if unambiguous, 
may be enforced through the court or the Department.  See 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 2103(2); M.R. Civ. P. 120; 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-40, ch. 8, § 16; see also Curtis, 
2016 ME 180, ¶ 8, 152 A.3d 605. 
 
[¶29]  Because the original order entered in Higgins and Wood’s divorce  
was issued by a court, a motion to modify was required to be filed in court to 
change the amount of the child support obligation, unless the original order 
unambiguously specified an enforceable adjustment.  The question, therefore, 
is whether the divorce judgment provided for a quantified change in the 
amount of child support with sufficient specificity that it could be enforced and 
effectuated through the Department without additional court involvement. 
B. 
Self-Effectuating Reductions of Court-Ordered Child Support in Maine 
 
[¶30]  A child  support order entered by a court remains in effect as to a 
child until that child reaches age eighteen or another specified event occurs: 
Termination of order.  A court order requiring the payment of 
child support remains in force as to each child until the order is 
altered by the court or until that child: 
 
 
A.  Attains 18 years of age.  For orders issued after 
January 1, 1990, if the child attains 18 years of age while 
 
16 
attending secondary school as defined in Title 20-A, 
section 1, the order remains in force until the child 
graduates, withdraws or is expelled from secondary school 
or attains 19 years of age, whichever occurs first; 
 
 
B.  Becomes married; or  
 
 
C.  Becomes a member of the armed services. 
 
19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12) (2017).  The statute in effect when the parties’ divorce 
judgment was entered authorized, but did not require, the court to “include 
automatic adjustments to the amount of money paid for the support of a child 
when the child attains 12 or 18 years of age; or when the child graduates, 
withdraws or is expelled from secondary school, attains 19 years of age or is 
otherwise emancipated, whichever occurs first.”  19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(13) 
(Pamph. 2007).9 
 
[¶31]  More than two years before Higgins and Wood were divorced, we 
considered whether the Department had the authority to reduce court-ordered 
child support obligations upon a child reaching the age of eighteen or the 
                                               
 
9  This portion of the statute was repealed, effective November 1, 2017, when the Legislature 
“amend[ed] the laws governing child support guidelines to conform to changes made by the 
Department of Health and Human Services by rule that eliminate the age categories in the child 
support table.”  L.D. 364, Summary (128th Legis. 2017); see P.L. 2017, ch. 30, § 1 (effective 
Nov. 1, 2017) (repealing 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(13)).  The Department’s revised single-tier table was 
adopted with an effective date of July 29, 2016.  See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23 (2016).  We do 
not opine on whether the Department acted within its rulemaking authority to eliminate the age 
categories in July 2016 when the statutory guidelines still described age categories.  See 19-A M.R.S. 
§§ 1653(13), 2001(1), (11), 2006(1), (6), (7), (8) (2016). 
 
17 
occurrence of another triggering event.  See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-20, 
866 A.2d 829.  The children in Bartlett were ages twelve, six, and one at the time 
of their parents’ divorce in 1995.  Id. ¶¶ 2-3.  The judgment required the father 
to pay $111 per week toward the support of the three children, later increased 
to $200 per week upon motions to modify.  Id. ¶¶ 3-4.  After the parties’ oldest 
child graduated from high school in June 2001 at the age of eighteen, the 
Department unilaterally reduced the weekly withholding from the father’s 
salary by one-third.  Id. ¶ 6.  The Department did not, however, unilaterally 
increase the amount of support when the middle child reached age twelve in 
July 2001.  Id.; see generally 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2006 (1998) (providing for differing 
support obligations when a child reaches the age of twelve).10  Upon the 
mother’s March 2003 motion for post-judgment relief, the District Court 
determined that, because the Department had no authority to reduce the 
amount of child support, the father owed the full $200 per week as ordered.  
Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 8, 10, 866 A.2d 829. 
 
[¶32]  We affirmed the judgment, holding that, when a court has entered 
an order of child support containing a termination provision that does not 
                                               
 
10  See P.L. 2017, ch. 30 (effective Nov. 1, 2017) (to be codified at 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653, 2001, 2006) 
(eliminating age categories from the guidelines for determining child support). 
 
18 
specify the dollar amount of the adjustments, that provision is not 
self-effectuating, and a motion to modify, filed by the Department or one of the 
parents, is required so that a court—not the Department or a party—can 
adjudicate the proper amount of child support.  See id. ¶¶ 12-17 (citing 
19-A M.R.S.A. § 2009 (1998)).  We also held that, because child support orders 
may be modified retroactively only back to the date of service of the motion to 
modify on the opposing party, the court could not relieve the father of his 
preexisting obligations incurred before that date.  Id. ¶ 19 (citing 19-A M.R.S.A. 
§ 2009(2)). 
 
[¶33]  In reaction to Bartlett, the Legislature amended the child support 
statute with respect to judgments that were entered before the Bartlett 
decision, requiring, 
With regard to any initial or modified child support order that 
affects more than one child and that was entered before 
January 18, 2005, unless that order states the manner in which the 
order must be modified upon the events listed in subparagraphs 
(1) to (4), that the order be automatically modified pursuant to this 
paragraph to address any of the following events: 
 
 
(1) Any child reaches 18 years of age and has graduated from 
secondary school; 
 
 
(2) Any child reaches 19 years of age without having 
graduated from secondary school; 
 
 
(3) Any child obtains an order of emancipation; or 
 
19 
 
 
(4) Any child dies. 
 
As of the date of an event listed in subparagraphs (1) to (4), the 
total child support amount stated in the order must be decreased 
by the child support amount assigned to that child in the 
worksheets accompanying the child support order or as set forth 
in the order. 
 
P.L. 2005, ch. 352, § 5 (codified as subsequently amended at 19-A M.R.S. 
§ 2006(8)(G) (2017)11) (emphasis added). 
 
[¶34]  The divorce judgment in the matter before us was entered in 
2007—two years after our decision in Bartlett.  Thus, by its plain language, 
section 2006(8)(G) does not apply to the matter on appeal.12 
 
[¶35]  About one month after Higgins and Wood’s divorce judgment was 
entered in 2007, we decided another matter in which a judgment’s provisions 
regarding the reduction of child support were at issue.  See Lund, 2007 ME 98, 
927 A.2d 1185.  There, the 1999 divorce judgment provided certain specific 
                                               
 
11  The subsequent amendment to this paragraph merely altered the ending punctuation and 
added the word “and” to accommodate a new paragraph H.  See P.L. 2009, ch. 290, § 15 (effective 
Sept. 12, 2009). 
 
12  To the extent that the use of the date of the Bartlett decision in the statute is ambiguous, 
testimony regarding the legislation indicates that the statute was designed to “eliminate the 
extremely harsh retroactive application of the decision in Bartlett,” but leave “orders established or 
modified after Bartlett” to be “calculated according to the holding in that case.”  An Act to Improve 
Child Support Services: Hearing on L.D. 1589 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Judiciary, 122d Legis. 3 
(2005) (testimony of Stephen Hussey, Director of Division of Support Enforcement & Recovery, Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs. Bureau of Family Independence). 
 
20 
amounts with respect to the youngest of three children reaching the age of 
twelve: 
Pursuant to the guidelines currently in effect, [the father] shall pay 
to [the mother] the sum of $ 175.00 per week as child support for 
the minor children, in accordance with the Court guidelines.  When 
[the youngest child] turns age 12 on May 11, 1999, [the father]’s 
child support obligation shall increase to $ 187.00 per week 
pursuant to the Court guidelines. 
 
Id. ¶ 2 (bold emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  The attached child support 
worksheets provided for a basic weekly support obligation of $88 per child 
during the ages twelve to seventeen.  Id. ¶ 2 n.1.  The order also included a 
provision that the obligation would continue for each child until the child 
reached age eighteen after graduation, graduated at age eighteen, or reached 
the age of nineteen without graduating, whichever occurred first.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 
[¶36]  The original judgment in Lund did not address the increase in the 
per-child amount of support provided for in the guidelines if only two children 
were subject to a support order.  Although the judgment did not specify the 
calculations that would apply upon the termination of support for the oldest 
child, we held that the judgment did allow for a self-effectuating adjustment 
because it ordered changes in support by a specific amount when the youngest 
child turned twelve and stated the conditions for the termination of the support 
obligation for each child.  Id. ¶ 21. 
 
21 
 
[¶37]  We must acknowledge the confusion that has resulted from the 
legislative language and from the Lund decision regarding self-effectuating 
changes in child support orders.  In Lund, we did not discuss changes in the 
application of the guidelines based on the number of children subject to a child 
support order, 2007 ME 98, ¶¶ 4, 22, 927 A.2d 1185, despite our statement in 
Bartlett that “the payment obligation for two children is not automatically 
two-thirds of the payment obligation for three children,” 2005 ME 10, ¶ 13, 
866 A.2d 829. 
 
[¶38]  Thus, we now specifically hold that guideline-related adjustments 
are part of the reason that a motion to modify child support is required if a 
parent seeks an adjustment that is not explicitly quantified in the existing 
judgment.  A motion to modify is also necessary if the child support worksheet 
includes health insurance costs, extraordinary medical expenses, or child care 
expenses that are not apportioned on a per-child basis.  See 19-A M.R.S 
§ 2006(3).  The new amount of such costs or expenses, and any related health 
insurance adjustment, cannot be calculated without some adjudication of facts 
by a court. 
 
[¶39]  Because our opinion in Lund and other changes in the law have 
made it difficult for parents and the Department to determine whether a 
 
22 
particular judgment ordering child support for multiple children provides for 
self-effectuating adjustments that may be immediately implemented, we 
endeavor to clarify the circumstances in which prospective amendments to the 
amount of child support ordered by a court are self-effectuating.  We now 
clarify that, for any court judgment ordering the payment of child support 
entered after Bartlett, a change in child support is self-effectuating only if the 
judgment includes a specific, quantifiable amount of support ordered to replace 
the original obligation on a specific date or upon the occurrence of a specific 
event.  See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-17, 866 A.2d 829.  If a judgment does 
not provide the necessary specificity, neither a parent nor the Department can 
determine the amount of support upon that change in circumstances, and a 
motion to modify is required so that the court can take appropriate action.  See 
19-A M.R.S. § 2009.13 
 
[¶40]  Because, as we have summarized, court orders entered in different 
timeframes are treated differently under the law, we provide the following 
clarification. 
                                               
 
13  Although the filing of such a motion may seem burdensome, as we indicated above, it is possible 
for a judgment to be entered promptly if no hearing is requested and “the proposed modified support 
obligation is equal to or greater than the obligation resulting from the application of” the applicable 
support guidelines.  19-A M.R.S. § 2009(6) (2017).  In such circumstances, no hearing is required, and 
the parties’ modified order may be entered swiftly.  See id. 
 
23 
1. For judgments containing child support orders entered before 
January 18, 2005, a reduction in support may be self-effectuating when 
a child reaches age eighteen after graduating from secondary school, 
reaches age nineteen without having graduated from secondary school, 
obtains an order of emancipation, or dies, unless the order “states the 
manner in which the order must be modified upon [those identified] 
events.”  19-A M.R.S. § 2006(8)(G).  How that reduction is calculated will 
depend on the language in the child support order. 
 
2. For judgments entered between January 18, 2005, and the recent 
elimination of the age-tiered child support table, a change in the amount 
of court-ordered child support is self-effectuating only if the order 
provides for specifically quantified prospective amounts owed upon 
dates or specific events explicitly addressed in the order.  See Bartlett, 
2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-17, 866 A.2d 829.  The actual amount of the 
anticipated updated child support obligation must be stated in the order. 
 
3. We have yet to opine on whether judgments entered after the 
elimination of the age-tiered system can be self-effectuating without 
specifying an adjusted dollar amount.  See P.L. 2017, ch. 30 (effective 
Nov. 1, 2017) (to be codified at 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1653, 2001, 2006); 
17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23.  However, given that guideline 
adjustments occur when the number of supported children changes, and 
that other components of support, including health insurance and child 
care costs, may change, an order will not be self-effectuating upon the 
aging-out of the oldest child unless the new amounts are expressly stated 
in that order.  See 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23.   
 
[¶41]  To assure clarity, reduce costs to the parties, and avoid 
unnecessary additional process, in those cases where changes should occur 
without any return to court, all who are involved—judges, magistrates, parties, 
and counsel—should focus on developing orders that explicitly specify the 
adjustments to be effectuated when support obligations cease for each child. 
 
24 
 
[¶42]  The judgment at issue here falls into the second category because 
it was entered after Bartlett and before the elimination of the age-tiered system.  
For an adjustment in such a child support order to be self-effectuating, the 
judgment must explicitly identify the amount of child support to be paid when 
each of the youngest children has reached the age of twelve and when support 
terminates as to each child.  See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12, 17, 866 A.2d 829.  
Focusing specifically on the termination of child support for the oldest child, 
judicial decision-making is necessary if the judgment does not specify the 
amount thereafter owed for the younger children.  Cf. Teele v. West-Harper, 
2017 ME 196, ¶¶ 12-20, 170 A.3d 803 (holding that a parent must move to 
modify a judgment to receive a credit for dependent benefits if the credit was 
not ordered in the original judgment). 
C. 
Review of the District Court’s Application of the Law 
 
[¶43]  In the parties’ 2007 divorce judgment, the court ordered Wood to 
pay $297 per week for support of the three children.  The judgment provided 
that the child support obligation would terminate for each child upon the child 
reaching age eighteen or another triggering event, but it did not state the 
amount of the new support obligation upon the termination of support for each 
child and did not indicate specific increases upon each younger child reaching 
 
25 
age twelve.  Also, the accompanying child support worksheet did not allocate 
the cost of health insurance on a per-child basis.   
 
[¶44]  Given the language of the court order in effect on the eighteenth 
birthday of the oldest child, no automatic adjustment was possible.  Although 
the worksheet accompanying the 2007 child support order identified the basic 
weekly support amount for the parties’ oldest child as $126 while Wood was 
responsible for support for three children at younger ages, the order did not 
specify the amount of support owed upon the termination of support for the 
oldest child, an event that occurred only after one of the younger children had 
reached age twelve.  Absent such specificity, the court could not enforce any 
amount other than that specified in the 2007 divorce judgment.  The court 
therefore properly limited Wood to the remedy of moving to modify the child 
support order to determine how much support was owed for the two younger 
children.   
 
[¶45]  Once Wood did move to modify the amount of child support, the 
court, based on the parties’ agreement, ordered a very modest change in the 
amount of support owed for the period beginning when the motion to modify 
was served.  The obligation for that period was reduced from $297 per week to 
$280.50 per week.  The court, again based on the parties’ agreement, also 
 
26 
entered modified child support orders providing for exact modifications on 
specific future dates based on the children’s changes in age and a change in the 
child support table.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2009(2); 17 C.M.R. 10 144 351-15 to -23.  
Because the original judgment lacked this degree of specificity, however, the 
court correctly concluded that, in the absence of a motion to modify, no change 
in the amount of child support took effect upon the oldest child reaching age 
eighteen. 
 
[¶46]  To consider fully Wood’s argument that he has overpaid by more 
than $35,000, we attempt to estimate the amount of support that would have 
resulted from an application of the guidelines if Wood had filed a motion to 
modify immediately when the oldest child reached age eighteen.  Although 
Wood contends that the 2007 child support worksheet establishes the amount 
owed for each child, the amount owed per child increased pursuant to the 
guidelines if there were only two children subject to a child support order, and 
the amount owed for a younger child increased when the child reached age 
twelve.  See Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective 
Dec. 1, 2008), available at 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2011 (Pamph. 2010); see also Child 
Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective Feb. 8, 2014), available at 
19-A M.R.S.A. § 2011 (Supp. 2015). 
 
27 
 
[¶47]  Assuming that the cost of health insurance for two children was 
identical to the cost for coverage for all three children, and assuming that each 
party’s income remained the same, had Wood filed a motion immediately after 
his oldest child’s eighteenth birthday, we estimate that his total child support 
obligation pursuant to the guidelines in 2009 would only have been reduced by 
approximately $51 per week, not the $114 per week that he asserts could be 
subtracted from the original obligation.  See Child Support Guidelines and 
Calculation Tables (effective Dec. 1, 2008).  Moreover, the child support table 
was updated over time, and based on the table in effect from 2013 when the 
youngest child turned twelve through 2015 when Wood moved to modify, 
Wood’s obligation for the two youngest children would have exceeded the 
originally ordered $297 per week in child support for the three children.  See 
id.; Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective Feb. 8, 2014).  
Therefore, even if Wood had filed a motion to modify immediately upon the 
oldest child reaching age eighteen, it is unlikely that his child support obligation 
would have been reduced over the years at issue by the substantial amount that 
Wood claims.14 
                                               
 
14  Recognizing that a retrospective calculation without the benefit of the parties’ input is an 
imperfect vehicle for accuracy, we acknowledge that these numbers are estimates. 
 
28 
 
[¶48]  Although the dissent posits that our holding produces an unfair 
result, any interpretation of the law in this area will produce a result that may 
seem unfair to one party or the other.  Due to the divorce judgment’s language 
and the identified ambiguities in our earlier case law, neither Higgins nor Wood 
could be certain about the amount of support owed after the oldest child 
reached age eighteen.  Interpreting the judgment as we have, Wood has paid 
somewhat more than he would have pursuant to the child support guidelines 
then in effect.  See Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective 
Feb. 8, 2014); Child Support Guidelines and Calculation Tables (effective 
Dec. 1, 2008).  If we were to interpret the change in support as Wood suggests, 
however, Higgins—the parent providing primary residence for the children—
would have received significantly less than the amount of child support that she 
was entitled to pursuant to those guidelines.  See Child Support Guidelines and 
Calculation Tables (effective Feb. 8, 2014); Child Support Guidelines and 
Calculation Tables (effective Dec. 1, 2008).  It is hoped that today’s clarification 
of the law will increase certainty and predictability for families and the 
Department and avoid this shifting sense of unfairness in the future. 
 
29 
D. 
Administrative Collateral Estoppel and Equitable Estoppel 
 
[¶49]  Wood raised issues of administrative collateral estoppel and 
equitable estoppel in his motion for summary judgment, and he now argues 
that the court erred in failing to grant him relief pursuant to those doctrines.   
 
[¶50]  The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow for motions for 
summary judgment on post-judgment motions in family matters.  See M.R. 
Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or 
any part thereof.” (emphasis added)).  Thus, these arguments were not 
properly raised in the District Court, and neither the magistrate nor the District 
Court could adjudicate the issues.  Wood did not seek conclusions of law 
concerning either of these doctrines after the court entered its judgment on the 
post-divorce motions.  See M.R. Civ. P. 52. 
 
[¶51]  Thus, although Wood has argued the doctrines of administrative 
collateral estoppel and equitable estoppel on appeal, these arguments were 
never properly presented to the trial court for consideration.  We cannot, in this 
procedural posture, provide any meaningful appellate review. 
 
30 
 
[¶52]  Moreover, even if the issues had been presented properly, Wood 
could not prevail.  Although Wood contends that Higgins and the Department 
may not relitigate the determination that the Department reached in its 
February 2015 letter, administrative collateral estoppel cannot preclude a 
court from ruling on a legal issue presented through a motion to modify 
court-ordered child support.  See Larrivee v. Timmons, 549 A.2d 744, 747-48 
(Me. 1988); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83(4)(b) (Am. Law Inst. 
1982) (stating that relitigation of an issue decided in an administrative 
proceeding is not precluded “if according preclusive effect to determination of 
the issue would be incompatible with a legislative policy that . . . [t]he tribunal 
in which the issue subsequently arises be free to make an independent 
determination of the issue in question”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”); 19-A M.R.S. § 2009 (authorizing a 
court—not the Department—to modify court-ordered child support).   
 
[¶53]  As to equitable estoppel, there is no indication in the stipulated 
evidence that Wood took action to his detriment in reasonable reliance on 
either Higgins or the Department, to the extent that the Department can be 
 
31 
considered Higgins’s agent.  See Dunwoody, 2017 ME 21, ¶¶ 13-14, 
155 A.3d 422.15   
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
[¶54]  Judgments in family matters should provide certainty that the 
amount of court-ordered child support will remain in place unless and until that 
amount is either (1) superseded by a predictable, prospectively designated 
amount that is explicitly stated in the child support order itself or (2) modified 
by the court upon a proper motion.  We have not authorized, and do not here 
authorize, self-help in changing the amount of child support.  See Lund, 
2007 ME 98, ¶ 21, 927 A.2d 1185; Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶ 17, 866 A.2d 829.  
                                               
 
15  On these facts, even had Wood properly presented the facts and law in support of his equitable 
claim, he would not have prevailed, given the general purpose of equity to provide a remedy only 
where the rigid application of the law results in an injustice.  See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. 
Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ¶ 19, 964 A.2d 630; see generally John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity 
Jurisprudence § 67, at 89 (5th ed. 1941).  After Wood’s oldest child reached age eighteen, Wood 
continued to pay the mother of his three children $297 per week ($15,444 per year) for six years 
while she continued to provide the primary residence for their two younger children.  Wood did not 
move to modify the court order until 2015 despite the notice within the judgment that a change in 
the judgment required the filing of such a motion.  He now seeks to require Higgins to return at least 
one-third of the amount that he paid—approximately $35,000—while Higgins continues to provide 
the primary residence for their youngest child, who will not reach age eighteen until 2019.   
 
In sum, the amount Wood seeks is far in excess of the reductions that the guidelines would likely 
have established upon the pertinent changes in the children’s ages, he was made aware in the 
judgment of the necessity to file a motion to modify if any circumstances changed, and any 
overpayments went toward the support of his own children.  A court would not be likely to provide 
an equitable remedy in such circumstances.  Cf. Pelletier, 2009 ME 11, ¶ 19, 964 A.2d 630 (“Equitable 
estoppel must be evaluated with circumspection and applied judiciously in the context of child 
support actions brought by the Department.”). 
 
32 
Contrary to the concerns expressed by the dissent, this clarification and 
certainty of process will reduce litigation and prevent the stress and surprise 
that happened here when a parent, after paying a specific amount of child 
support for six years, sought to reclaim thousands of those dollars from his 
children’s mother. 
 
[¶55]  When a judgment entered after January 18, 2005, does not include 
an explicit amount for the future obligation, a new court order will be necessary 
to establish the amount owed when circumstances change.  See Bartlett, 
2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 12-17, 866 A.2d 829.  Neither a parent nor the Division of 
Support Enforcement and Recovery may unilaterally reduce the amount of 
court-ordered support owed when the judgment does not specify the amount 
of the reduction.  The parties, however, may quickly and inexpensively obtain 
an updated order of child support when they agree upon a new amount that is 
at or above the amount established by the child support guidelines.  See 19-A 
M.R.S. § 2009(5), (6); Revised Court Fees Schedule and Document Management 
Procedures, Me. Admin. Order JB-05-26 (as amended by A. 7-18), § I(A)(2) 
(effective July 1, 2018). 
 
33 
 
[¶56]  The court did not err in concluding that Wood was not entitled to 
recover a substantial portion of the child support that he paid to Higgins before 
he served his motion to modify on her.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. 
 
The entry is: 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
JABAR, J., dissenting. 
[¶57]  I respectfully dissent because I believe that the Court ignores the 
plain language of the statute and imposes additional burdens on family law 
litigants that the Legislature neither intended nor anticipated.   
A. 
Plain Meaning of the Statute and the Court Order  
 
[¶58]  When we are required to interpret text—in legislation and in 
contracts—we are first and foremost guided by the principle that the plain 
language of the statute or document controls our analysis.  See Griffin v. Griffin, 
2014 ME 70, ¶ 18, 92 A.3d 1144; Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. v. Flynn, 
2015 ME 134, ¶ 17, 129 A.3d 936.  We are similarly guided by this concept when 
tasked with interpreting court orders.  See Burnell v. Burnell, 2012 ME 24, ¶ 15, 
40 A.3d 390.  Led by this bedrock tenet, the analysis in this case must begin with 
 
34 
an examination of the plain language of 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12)(A) (2017), 
which states,  
12. Termination of order.  A court order requiring the payment 
of child support remains in force as to each child until the order is 
altered by the court or until that child: 
 
 
A.  Attains 18 years of age. . . . 
 
 
[¶59]  As written, the language of section 1653(12)(A) is simple, logical, 
and clear.  Keeping in mind that roughly seventy-five percent of the litigants in 
family court navigate the system without an attorney, 2014 Me. Laws 1654 
(State of the Judiciary address of Chief Justice Leigh I. Saufley to 2d Reg. Sess. of 
126th Legis.), the language in section 1653(12)(A) clearly states that when a 
child turns eighteen, the order, as to that child, is no longer in force.  Despite 
this clarity and simplicity, the Court now engrafts two new requirements upon 
section 1653(12)(A): (1) a self-effectuation concept that is not present in the 
plain language of the statute, and (2) an affirmative duty upon litigants to 
initiate litigation that the statute neither anticipates nor requires.  Court’s 
Opinion ¶¶ 1, 15, 54-55. 
 
[¶60]  After today’s Opinion, if an obligor has more than one child, that 
obligor can no longer look to the plain language of section 1653(12)(A) in order 
to know what happens when one of their children turns eighteen.  Section 
 
35 
1653(12)(A) is no longer sufficient on its own.  The Court uses the new term, 
“self-effectuating,” which does not appear in case law, in statute, or in the court 
order at issue in this case.  Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 1, 15.  In Bartlett v. Anderson, the 
Court used the term “undifferentiated” to refer to the child support order, 
which did not provide a different amount when one child, but not the others, 
had reached the age of eighteen.  2005 ME 10, ¶ 13, 866 A.2d 829.  In other 
words, undifferentiated orders do not distinguish between the amount owed 
for each child, but, rather, contain only one figure to represent the amount 
owed for all children.  The Bartlett Court said that “section 1653(12) specifies 
no formula or method to adjust payment obligations when one child, among 
several covered by a single, undifferentiated child support payment obligation, 
reaches age eighteen.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
[¶61]  Here, the Court’s use of the term “self-effectuating” effectively 
amends section 1653(12)(A) to include a provision that the Legislature did not 
provide for in the statute.  However, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, an order 
can differentiate the amount owed for each child without creating a formula for 
calculating the remaining support owed for the children still under age 
eighteen.  By interposing the concept of a “self-effectuating” order, the Court 
today takes the “undifferentiated” language from Bartlett one step further.  
 
36 
Ultimately, the Court should not amend the statute to include a provision that 
it acknowledges the Legislature did not contemplate in the statute.   
[¶62]  The Legislature did not qualify the straightforward plain language 
of the statute by adding that, if there are other children, then the order remains 
in effect beyond the oldest child’s eighteenth birthday, until such time that the 
court makes adjustments to the order.  Despite the absence of this or similar 
language in the statute, the Court today amends the plain language of section 
1653(12)(A) to include this new requirement.  Court’s Opinion ¶ 40.  Such a 
statutory amendment should be left to the Legislature.   
 
[¶63]  Turning to this case, the child support order, which mirrors the 
statute, is clear: “The child support obligation shall continue for each child until 
that child reaches the age of 18 . . . .”  The child support worksheet, which is 
incorporated into the child support order, distinguishes between the amount 
owed for the oldest child and the amount owed for the younger children.  Based 
on the worksheet, it is a simple task to determine how much child support is 
attributed to the eighteen-year-old.  The language in the order is clear and 
unambiguous and should therefore be given its full weight and effect.  The 
overall child support obligation should have been reduced by the amount 
 
37 
specified in the child support worksheet attributed to the oldest child when that 
child turned eighteen.   
B. 
Reliance on Bartlett  
 
[¶64]  As the Court acknowledges, subsequent to Bartlett, the Legislature 
passed legislation to circumvent the harshness of the holding in that case.  
Court’s Opinion ¶ 33; P.L. 2005, ch. 352, § 5 (codified as subsequently amended 
at 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(8)(G) (2017)).16  Because of this legislative action, any 
reliance on Bartlett is misplaced. 
 
[¶65]  The new legislation placed the burden on the courts, not the 
obligor, and put the obligee, in this case, the State, on notice of the need for an 
order that makes an automatic adjustment when there are children who have 
not yet attained the age of eighteen.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(8)(G).  When the 
court fails to include such a “self-effectuating” provision in an order, and the 
obligee fails to secure such an order, then the plain meaning of the order and 
the statute should prevail: the obligor’s obligation for a child ends when the 
child reaches age eighteen.   
                                               
 
16  As the Court intimates, the subsequent amendment has no relevance here.  Court’s Opinion 
¶ 33 n.11.   
 
38 
[¶66]  Furthermore, Bartlett did not turn on the need for a 
“self-effectuating” order; rather, it turned on the distinction between 
differentiated and undifferentiated orders.  See Bartlett, 2005 ME 10, ¶ 17, 
866 A.2d 829.  The Bartlett Court concluded that the order was 
undifferentiated.  See id.  However, based on the incorporated child support 
worksheet in Bartlett, it is arguable that the order there, like the order here, 
was differentiated because the worksheet delineated the different amounts 
owed for the children based upon their ages.  The Bartlett opinion does not 
demonstrate whether that issue—differentiated versus undifferentiated—was 
fully litigated on appeal. 
C. 
Conclusion 
 
[¶67]  With its opinion today, the Court is not only legislating new 
requirements for litigants involved in family matters, it is increasing the volume 
of litigation and making the process exceedingly more complicated for the 
many self-represented litigants in family court.  Given the plain language of 
both section 1653(12)(A) and the order in this case, when the child attained the 
age of eighteen, the child support obligation for that child should have 
terminated without the need for the obligor to return to court.   
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ezra A. R. Willey, Esq. (orally), Willey Law Offices, Bangor, for appellant Todd 
A. Wood 
 
Wayne Doane, Esq., Exeter, for appellee Shelly R. Higgins 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, Thomas A. Knowlton, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), 
and Debby Willis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for 
appellee Department of Health and Human Services 
 
 
Bangor District Court docket number FM-2015-459 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY