Title: STATE v SOLIS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

NO. 12448 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1973 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs - G E O R G E SOLIS, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Sixteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Hon. A. B . Martin, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Reno and Dolve, B i l l i n g s , Montana James A. Reno argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl , Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. C . Weingartner, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana William J. Krutzfeldt, County Attorney, appeared, Miles City, Montana Keith Haker argued, Miles City, Montana Submitted: September 26, 1973 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant George Solis appeals from h i s conviction of f i r s t degree burglary entered i n the d i s t r i c t court of Custer County. O n September 22, 1972, two young women came t o t h e home of Frank Morrelle i n Miles City, Montana, t o inquire about an apartment he had offered f o r rent. One of the women, Irma Jean Hoops, was l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s the g i r l friend of defendant Solis. Morrelle loaned the women some money f o r food which he obtained from h i s basement s a f e i n t h e i r presence. Some keys and a r i n g belonging t o Morrelle disappeared about the time of the g i r l s ' v i s i t . He reported the missing items t o the police and changed the door locks corresponding t o t h e missing keys. The missing r i n g was found i n defendant's possession when he was apprehended i n connection with the burglary. O n September 24, 1972, Frank Morrelle, returning t o h i s home a t about 9:20 p.m., noticed a l i g h t i n h i s basement. Morrelle became suspicious, went t o the home of David Whitney, h i s next door neighbor, and asked Whitney t o phone the police. After doing so, Whitney went outside and observed defendant on foot leaving ~ o r r e l l e ' s property. h?hitney f i r s t called t o defendant, then pursued him. Whitney t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant stopped and "pulled a p i s t o l o r something out of h i s pocket and pointed it towards me." Defendant was arrested about an hour l a t e r by the Custer County deputy s h e r i f f a t t h e Flaming Arrow Motel i n Miles City. The deputy s h e r i f f and other law enforcement o f f i c e r s present t e s t i f i e d t h a t when arrested defendant appeared sweat-soaked and exhausted a s though he had been running. David Whitney postively identified defendant a s t h e man he had pursued from the Morrelle residence e a r l i e r i n the evening. Witnesses t e s t i f i e d ~ o r r e l l e ' s safe had been overturned and tampered with but the burglar had f a i l e d t o open the s a f e when he l e f t the scene, leaving h i s t o o l s behind. O n appeal defendant presents two issues f o r review: (1) Did the evidence support the jury verdict of f i r s t degree burglary, s p e c i f i c a l l y with regard t o the "nighttime re- quirement "? (2) Did the t r i a l court e r r i n refusing t o give de- fendant's offered instructions numbered 1, 4, 6 and 7? Issue (1). Section 94-901, R.C.M. 1947, provides: 11 Every person who enters any house * * * with i n t e n t t o commit grand o r p e t i t e larceny o r any felony, i s g u i l t y of burglary." The f a c t t h a t the safe opening had not been completed and nothing had been taken from the Morrelle home does not preclude conviction of burglary. Morigeau v. S t a t e , 149 Mont. 85, 423 P.2d 60. Section 94-902, R.C.M. 1947, provides: I I Every burglary committed i n the nighttime i s burglary i n the f i r s t degree and every burglary committed i n the daytime i s burglary i n the second degree. I I This Court i n S t a t e v. Copenhaver, 35 Mont. 342, 89 P. 61, and i n S t a t e v. Fitzpatrick, 125 Mont. 448, 239 P.2d 529, established t h a t f i r s t and second degree burglary a r e separate offenses d i f - ferentiated by the nighttime requirement which e x i s t s a s an essen- t i a l element of f i r s t degree burglary only. Commission of a burglary i s predicated upon the "entry" with the r e q u i s i t e felonious intent. Hence, the burglary occurs a t the time of the entry upon the premises. S t a t e v. Harris, Mont . , 498 P.2d 1222, 29 St.Rep. 498; S t a t e v. Board, 135 Mont. 139, 337 P.2d 924; State v. Moran, 142 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777. The "nighttime entry" issue i n the i n s t a n t case i s analogous t o S t a t e v. Board, supra. I n Board, the defendant was discovered p i l f e r i n g a motel room a t about 4:00 a.m. N o d i r e c t evidence was - ever introduced t o e s t a b l i s h the time of entry. In the cases c i t e d , the r u l e i n Fitzpatrick -- i s followed. I n Fitzpatrick, there was no evidence of the commission of the - - burglary i n the nighttime, much l e s s the entry. In the cases which followed Fitzpatrick, and i n p a r t i c u l a r Board, the burglary was - established a s occurring during the nighttime and entry was of necessity submitted t o the jury on circumstantial evidence. I n the i n s t a n t case, defendant was flushed i n the night- time a t about 9:20 p.m., September 24, some hours a f t e r darkness a t t h a t time of year. Only preliminary work toward opening the safe had been completed and among the tools l e f t behind was a f l a s h l i g h t . It seems reasonable the jury could conclude t h a t a burglar would proceed with diligence t o the task a t hand and would not require a f l a s h l i g h t i n the daylight hours. Examination of the t r i a l record discloses the jury was instructed i n court's instructions number 2 and 8 t h a t commission i n the nighttime i s an element of f i r s t degree burglary. Instruc- t i o n number 2 s t a t e d the requirement t h a t every f a c t o r element necessary t o c o n s t i t u t e the crime charged must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Court's i n s t r u c t i o n number 1 1 stated t h e de- fendant could not be convicted on conjecture, suspicion o r probability, but only upon proof such a s t o logically compel the conviction t h a t the charge was true. Instruction number 12 defined circumstantial evidence a s evidence which proves a f a c t from which the inference of another f a c t may be drawn. The jury was properly instructed a s t o a l l the elements of the crime charged and a s t o the burden of proof. There was, con- sidering a l l of the f a c t s and circumstances, s u f f i c i e n t d i r e c t and circumstantial evidence t o support the jury's verdict. Issue 12). Did the t r i a l court e r r i n refusing defendant's offered instructions numbered 1, 4, 6 and 7? Proposed i n s t r u c t i o n 1 was a directed verdict instruction. This instruction was properly refused, a s was defendant's motion f o r dismissal. Under Montana law i n a criminal case, a directed verdict i s given only where the s t a t e f a i l s t o prove i t s case and there i s no evidence upon which a jury could base a verdict of guilty. S t a t e v. Metcalf, 153 Mont. 369, 457 P,2d 453; S t a t e v. Yoss, 146 Mont, 508, 409 P.2d 452. Defendant's proposed instructions numbered 4, 6 and 7 were repetitive of other instructions given by the trial court relating to the elements of first degree burglary and were properly refused. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. / &. -; 2 ' 'd Justice / I Chief Justice Justices Hon. ~ @ b ~ L. ~ c ~ i n n o h , District Judge, sitting for Justice John Conway Harrison.