Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-282.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-282 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. KELLOGG-MARTIN. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-282.] 
Criminal procedure — Attorneys at law — Discovery — Prosecutor’s ethical and 
legal duty to disclose exculpatory information — No violations found — 
Disciplinary complaint dismissed. 
(No. 2008-1771 — Submitted December 16, 2008 — Decided February 4, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 07-069. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Kimberly J. Kellogg-Martin of Bellefontaine, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0022083, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1984.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline found that 
respondent had violated the Disciplinary Rules of the former Code of Professional 
Responsibility by failing to disclose, and by making false statements about, 
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potentially exculpatory or mitigating evidence during a criminal prosecution.  The 
board recommends that we suspend respondent from practice for one year, but 
conditionally stay the last six months of the suspension.  Respondent objects to 
the board’s findings and recommendation.  Because we find that several 
objections have merit and that respondent’s acts and omissions did not constitute 
professional misconduct, we dismiss the complaint. 
The Disciplinary Proceedings against Respondent 
{¶ 2} Relator, the Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent in a single-
count complaint with violating DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-
102(A)(5) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), 7-102(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer, in the representation 
of a client, from concealing or knowingly failing to disclose that which she is 
required by law to reveal), and 7-103(B) (requiring a prosecutor to make timely 
disclosure to defense counsel of the existence of evidence known to the 
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigates the degree of the 
offense, or reduces the punishment).  A panel of the board heard the case, 
including the parties’ stipulations, and found the disciplinary violations alleged in 
the complaint.  The panel recommended a six-month suspension with the entire 
six months to be stayed.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but recommended a one-year suspension with six months 
stayed. 
{¶ 3} The following facts were established at the disciplinary hearing: 
{¶ 4} Respondent was the chief assistant prosecuting attorney of Logan 
County.  In 2002, she was assigned to prosecute criminal charges against Joshua 
Giles.  These charges were based upon a young girl’s allegations that Giles had 
forced her to have sex on two separate occasions. 
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{¶ 5} In June 2002, the victim, then 14 years old, was in counseling for 
behavioral problems.  During a counseling session, she told her therapist that 
Giles had twice pressured her into sexual intercourse.  Her therapist reported the 
allegation, as is required by statute. 
{¶ 6} On June 12, 2002, Jo Ann Dorsey, a Logan County Children 
Services (“LCCS”) social worker, interviewed the victim.  Later that day, Dorsey 
wrote a narrative report of the interview (“the Dorsey report”).  According to the 
Dorsey report, with respect to the crucial fact of the victim’s age, the victim stated 
that the first rape had been committed at the home of a friend of the victim in 
August 2001 and that the second rape had been committed at the residence of one 
“Haddy” in September 2001.  The victim’s date of birth was January 21, 1988.  
Thus, Dorsey’s initial account of the victim’s statements implied that the victim 
was 13 years old at the time she was raped.  On July 19, 2002, however, Dorsey 
filled out a form called the “Family Risk Assessment Matrix.”  On this form, 
Dorsey stated that the victim “reported she was raped by a 21 year old man when 
she was 12 years old.” 
{¶ 7} On June 13, 2002, Dorsey faxed a copy of her report to Detective 
Sergeant Jeff Cooper in the Logan County Sheriff’s Office.  Cooper interviewed 
Giles the same day, and Giles admitted to having sex with the victim at her 
friend’s house.  Giles said this had happened a “very long” time ago, around the 
“[e]nd of 2000.” 
{¶ 8} Cooper and another officer interviewed the victim on July 3, 2002.  
According to Cooper’s narrative report (“the Cooper report”), the victim told the 
officers that “she had intercourse with [Giles] on two occasions * * * when she 
was twelve years old.”  The Cooper report also states that the victim “stated that 
she did not tell [Giles] to stop or try to fight him during the incidents of 
intercourse.” 
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{¶ 9} The discrepancy between Dorsey’s June 12 report that the victim 
was 13 and the other information that she was 12 prompted respondent to seek 
further confirmation of the victim’s age before filing criminal charges.  
Respondent therefore interviewed the victim personally.  During the interview, 
the victim stated that before one of the rapes, she had informed Giles that she was 
12.  The victim also told respondent that she had been in a snowmobile accident 
and that the rapes had occurred the summer before that accident.  After the 
interview, respondent checked the victim’s hospital records.  These confirmed 
that the snowmobile accident had taken place in December 2000. 
{¶ 10} Respondent also interviewed the victim’s mother.  From this 
interview, respondent learned that the victim had told her mother about being 
raped.  The victim’s mother told respondent that the victim had been 12 at the 
time of that conversation. 
{¶ 11} On August 28, 2002, the victim told her therapist that one of the 
sexual acts had occurred on a Labor Day weekend “when she was 12.” 
{¶ 12} Giles was ultimately indicted on four counts of raping a person 
under the age of 13, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), and two counts of raping a person 
under the age of 13 by force or threat of force, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and 
2907.02(A)(2).  Each of these charges required the prosecution to prove that the 
victim was younger than 13 at the time of the alleged rapes. 
{¶ 13} After Giles was indicted, his attorney filed a discovery demand 
requesting, inter alia, “all evidence, known or which may become known to the 
Prosecuting Attorney, favorable to defendant, and material either to the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant.”  Respondent did not provide defense counsel with 
copies of either the Dorsey report regarding the age statement or the Cooper 
report concerning consent.  Respondent later testified that she believed she did not 
have a duty under Crim.R. 16 or Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 
S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, to turn these reports over to the defense. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 14} On September 23, 2002, respondent filed a bill of particulars in the 
Giles prosecution.  The bill contained the following statement: “The victim was 
interviewed by Joanie Dorsey of Logan County Children’s Services on June 12, 
2002.  She reported that the Defendant raped her on two occasions over the 
summer of 2000.” 
{¶ 15} On December 18, 2002, Giles entered a plea of guilty to a reduced 
charge of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, R.C. 2907.04(A).  At the 
hearing, respondent delivered a statement of what “[t]he State’s evidence in this 
case would show.”  During this statement, respondent said: “The victim was 
interviewed by Joanie Dorsey of the Logan County Children’s Services on June 
12, 2002.  She reported what had taken place over the year of 2000.” 
{¶ 16} The board found that respondent violated DR 7-103(B) and 7-
102(A)(3) by failing to disclose the Dorsey and Cooper reports to the defense 
before Giles entered his guilty plea.  The board further found that respondent’s 
nondisclosure of the reports was prejudicial to the administration of justice and 
thus violated DR 1-102(A)(5).  Finally, the board found that respondent’s 
statements in the bill of particulars and the plea hearing were false and therefore 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4). 
Respondent’s Objections to the Board’s Report 
{¶ 17} Respondent has filed seven objections to the board’s report and 
recommendations.  Her first five objections challenge the board’s findings that 
she violated DR 7-103(B), 7-102(A)(3), and 1-102(A)(5) by failing to disclose the 
Dorsey and Cooper  reports.  Her sixth challenges the board’s finding that she 
made false statements to the trial court in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4).  Her 
seventh challenges the sanction recommended by the board.  We begin our 
analysis with the issues raised by respondent’s nondisclosure of the reports. 
Nondisclosure of the Dorsey and Cooper Reports 
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{¶ 18} DR 7-103(B) provides: “A public prosecutor or other government 
lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the 
defendant, or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, 
known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt 
of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.” 
{¶ 19} Respondent’s first two objections are related.  In her first 
objection, she argues: “It cannot be the intent of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility * * * that a prosecutor’s ethical duties are broader than her legal 
duties.”  Therefore, she contends, a prosecutor cannot violate DR 7-103(B) by 
failing to disclose evidence unless her failure to disclose also constitutes a 
violation of Crim.R. 16 or of Brady v. Maryland, supra.  In her second objection, 
respondent contends that she had no legal duty to disclose the Dorsey and Cooper 
reports to the defense and hence that she committed no violation of DR 7-103(B) 
by failing to disclose them. 
{¶ 20} Relator, on the other hand, contends that we should read DR 7-
103(B) broadly, to require disclosure of evidence irrespective of whether its 
disclosure is legally required or not.  Relator further contends that even if we 
reject relator’s interpretation of DR 7-103(B), respondent’s failure to disclose the 
reports did in fact violate Brady and Crim.R. 16, and therefore still constituted a 
violation of DR 7-103(B). 
{¶ 21} We decline to construe DR 7-103(B) as requiring a greater scope 
of disclosure than Brady and Crim.R. 16 require.  Relator’s broad interpretation of 
DR 7-103(B) would threaten prosecutors with professional discipline for failing to 
disclose evidence even when the applicable law does not require disclosure.  This 
would in effect expand the scope of discovery currently required of prosecutors in 
criminal cases. 
{¶ 22} For this reason, we hold that DR 7-103(B) imposes no requirement 
on a prosecutor to disclose information that he or she is not required to disclose 
January Term, 2010 
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by applicable law, such as Brady v. Maryland or Crim.R. 16.  Accordingly, we 
sustain respondent’s first objection. 
{¶ 23} In respondent’s second objection, she contends that she had no 
duty to disclose the Dorsey and Cooper reports to the defense.  Therefore, she 
contends, her failure to do so did not violate DR 7-103(B).  In the circumstances 
of this case, we agree with respondent’s contention that she had no duty to 
disclose the reports. 
{¶ 24} In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that 
“the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  373 
U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.  Likewise, Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) 
requires that a prosecutor “disclose to counsel for the defendant all evidence, 
known or which may become known to the prosecuting attorney, favorable to the 
defendant and material either to guilt or punishment.” 
{¶ 25} However, in United States v. Ruiz (2002), 536 U.S. 622, 633, 122 
S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586, the United States Supreme Court held that “the 
Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment 
evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.” 
{¶ 26} The Dorsey and Cooper reports constituted impeachment evidence.  
Had the case against Giles gone to trial, the defense could not have introduced the 
victim’s out-of-court statements to Dorsey and Cooper to prove the truth of the 
matters asserted in those statements (i.e., that the rapes occurred in 2001 or that 
the victim did not offer resistance).  See generally Evid.R. 801(C) and 802.  Thus, 
the defense could have used the victim’s statements only to impeach her 
testimony at trial with respect to these matters.  See generally Evid.R. 613 
(impeachment by self-contradiction). 
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{¶ 27} Relator’s efforts to distinguish Ruiz are unpersuasive.  Relator 
argues that “the focus in this case is not on the validity of Giles’ plea agreement, 
the focus is on evidence withheld by respondent before Giles decided to plead 
guilty.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Relator’s observation is true, but irrelevant.  This case is 
indeed about the “evidence withheld by respondent.”  But the question before us 
is whether respondent had any obligation to disclose that evidence before Giles 
entered his guilty plea.  Ruiz answers that question in the negative. 
{¶ 28} Next, relator points out that Giles, unlike the defendant in Ruiz, 
“was not asked to sign any type of waiver of his right to receive ‘impeachment 
information relating to any informants or other witnesses’ in exchange for 
favorable sentencing.”  It is true that the defendant in Ruiz was asked to 
specifically waive the right to receive impeachment information.  That is, he was 
offered a plea bargain whose terms included a specific waiver of the right to 
receive impeachment information.  But relator omits one critical fact: the 
defendant in Ruiz refused that bargain and later pleaded guilty without making 
any such specific waiver.  536 U.S. at 625-626, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586.  
The only waiver the defendant actually made in Ruiz was the same waiver that 
any criminal defendant – including Giles – necessarily makes by pleading guilty: 
“When a defendant pleads guilty he or she, of course, forgoes not only a fair trial, 
but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees.”  Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 628-
629. 
{¶ 29} Ruiz plainly holds that the state is not required to disclose 
impeachment evidence to a defendant before the defendant pleads guilty.  
Because Giles entered a guilty plea and never went to trial, respondent had no 
obligation to disclose the Dorsey and Cooper reports to him.  We must therefore 
sustain respondent’s second objection. 
{¶ 30} As we find that respondent did not violate DR 7-103(B), we need 
not determine whether, as she contends in her third objection, a finding of 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
willfulness is a prerequisite to a finding of a DR 7-103(B) violation.  
Respondent’s third objection is moot. 
{¶ 31} Respondent’s fourth objection challenges the board’s finding that 
nondisclosure of the reports violated DR 7-102(A)(3).  DR 7-102(A)(3) prohibits 
a lawyer’s failure to disclose information that she is required by law to reveal.  
Under Ruiz, respondent had no obligation to disclose the Dorsey and Cooper 
reports to the defense.  Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s fourth objection. 
{¶ 32} Respondent’s fifth objection challenges the board’s finding that 
respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in 
violation of DR 1-102(A)(5).  In finding that respondent violated DR 1-
102(A)(5), the board relied on the same evidence and analysis that underlay its 
findings that respondent violated DR 7-103(B) and 7-102(A)(3).  Having rejected 
those findings, we must also reject the finding that respondent violated DR 1-
102(A)(5).  We therefore sustain respondent’s fifth objection. 
{¶ 33} Our decision today should not be construed as an endorsement of 
respondent’s nondisclosure of the reports.  “Because we are dealing with an 
inevitably imprecise standard, and because the significance of an item of evidence 
can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete, the prudent 
prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.”  United States 
v. Agurs (1976), 427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342.  Nevertheless, 
we conclude that nondisclosure of the reports at issue here did not violate any 
Disciplinary Rule. 
The Claim that Respondent Made False Statements 
{¶ 34} In her sixth objection, respondent challenges the board’s 
conclusion that she violated DR 1-102(A)(4).  The board’s conclusion was based 
on two statements respondent made in connection with the prosecution of Giles.  
First, the bill of particulars filed by respondent on September 23, 2002 states: 
“The victim was interviewed by Joanie Dorsey of Logan County Children’s 
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Services on June 12, 2002.  She reported that the Defendant raped her on two 
occasions over the summer of 2000.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 35} Second, at the plea hearing on December 18, 2002, respondent 
stated in open court: “The victim was interviewed by Joanie Dorsey of the Logan 
County Children’s Services on June 12, 2002.  She reported what had taken place 
over the year of 2000.” 
{¶ 36} Relator contends that both statements were false, in that they 
misrepresented what the victim actually reported to Dorsey on June 12, 2002.  
Relator further contends that the alleged falsehoods must have been intentional, 
inasmuch as respondent was in possession of Dorsey’s June 12, 2002 report 
stating that the victim had placed the sex acts in 2001. 
{¶ 37} We find that relator has failed to prove that respondent’s 
statements in the bill of particulars and the sentencing hearing were false.  It is 
true that Dorsey’s narrative report of June 12, 2002, is inconsistent with 
respondent’s statements.  The Dorsey report states that the victim, when asked 
whether she had been raped “last year,” i.e., in 2001, said yes and that the victim 
“reports the first rape occurred in August 2001.”  But respondent’s statements 
were not representations about what Dorsey’s report said.  They were 
representations about what the victim said to Dorsey on June 12, 2002.  And the 
June 12 Dorsey report is not the only version of what the victim told Dorsey on 
that date. 
{¶ 38} On June 19, 2002, Dorsey completed a “Family Risk Assessment 
Matrix” form for the victim.  Dorsey wrote on this form that the victim “reported 
she was raped by a 21 year old man when she was 12 years old.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  In the absence of any evidence that Dorsey interviewed the victim at any 
time other than June 12, 2002, we must conclude that the statement on the June 19 
risk-assessment form refers to the victim’s statements to Dorsey on June 12. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 39} Thus, if Dorsey’s statement on the June 19 risk-assessment form is 
correct, then so were respondent’s statements about what the victim reported to 
Dorsey on June 12, 2002.  Relator, who has the burden of persuasion, cites no 
evidence that supports Dorsey’s June 12 version of the victim’s statement as 
opposed to her June 19 version.  Nor does the board’s report cite any such 
evidence. 
{¶ 40} Indeed, the evidence points the other way.  The victim told her 
mother, her therapist, and Sergeant Cooper that she was 12 at the time of the 
alleged rapes.  Respondent determined that further investigation was needed, so 
she interviewed the victim herself.  Yet again, the victim’s account indicated that 
she was 12 when Giles raped her. 
{¶ 41} Given that all the victim’s other statements were consistent as to 
when she was raped, we find it more likely than not that the June 19 risk-
assessment form, and not the earlier Dorsey report, accurately reflected what the 
victim told Dorsey on June 12, 2002. 
{¶ 42} In sum, we find that respondent did not, either in the September 
23, 2002 bill of particulars or during the December 18, 2002 plea hearing, engage 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  We therefore 
conclude that respondent did not violate DR 1-102(A)(4), and we accordingly 
sustain respondent’s sixth objection. 
The Proposed Sanction 
{¶ 43} Respondent’s seventh objection is to the sanction recommended by 
the board.  However, as relator has failed to prove any misconduct, this objection 
is moot. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 44} We find that relator has failed to establish that respondent violated 
the Disciplinary Rules she was charged with violating.  Accordingly, we dismiss 
relator’s complaint. 
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Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 45} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.  I disagree with 
the proposition that DR 7-103(B) is, or should be, limited by Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) 
and the corresponding constitutional analysis.  The majority opinion disregards 
the plain language and purposes of the former Code of Professional 
Responsibility and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Additionally, I disagree with 
the majority’s inclination to reweigh the evidence in order to reject the board’s 
finding of violations of DR 1-102(A)(4).  I would adopt the sanction 
recommended by the board of a 12-month suspension with six months stayed. 
The misconduct 
{¶ 46} Respondent prosecuted a rape case in which the severity of the 
offenses was based upon the age of the victim.  In evaluating the case for trial, 
respondent determined that overwhelming evidence supported her view that the 
crimes occurred in 2000, when the victim was 12 years old.  However, respondent 
possessed two reports—one generated by the county’s children’s services agency 
and one by the sheriff’s office—both of which indicated that the victim had 
reported that the crimes occurred in 2001.  Respondent, in her professional 
judgment and based upon her research, viewed the dates in these reports as 
inaccurate and therefore unreliable and concluded that the crimes had actually 
occurred in 2000, when the victim was 12 years old.  Therefore, respondent 
elected to pursue charges for rape of a person under 13 years of age against the 
defendant. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 47} The defendant was charged with four counts of rape of a person 
under the age of 13, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and two counts of rape 
of a person under the age of 13 by use of force or threat, in violation of R.C. 
2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (A)(2).  All of the offenses were first-degree felonies.  The 
R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) charges for rape of a person under 13 years of age carried 
potential sentences of three to ten years (under former R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)).  The 
R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (A)(2) charges for rape of a person under 13 years of 
age by force or threat carried life sentences (under former R.C. 2907.02(B)).  Had 
the victim been 13 years of age, then the life sentence would not have been an 
available punishment and the longest sentence that the defendant would have 
faced would have been ten-year maximum sentences for the remaining first-
degree rape charges. 
{¶ 48} Thus, the age of the victim was relevant to the potential length of 
incarceration, with a maximum life sentence available if the victim was under 13 
years of age.  Moreover, the timeline of events was important to the state’s case 
because in order to prove the crimes charged, the state needed to show that the 
offenses occurred in 2000, when the victim was 12 years old. 
{¶ 49} In responding to the defendant’s discovery request, respondent 
decided to withhold from the defendant the two reports containing the 2001 dates 
given by the victim.  Later, in the bill of particulars, respondent described the two 
interviews of the victim but stated, without qualification, that the victim reported 
that she had been raped on two occasions in 2000.  By implication, the bill of 
particulars asserted that the defense would not find any exculpatory material in 
the reports themselves. 
{¶ 50} Respondent completed her gloss on the evidence at the defendant’s 
plea hearing.  During that hearing, respondent stated to the court that the victim 
had been interviewed by a therapist and by a children’s services employee and 
that the victim reported that the crimes occurred in 2000. 
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{¶ 51} Thus, the defense did not have these reports to review and could 
not have noted the inconsistency between the dates in the reports and those 
inherent in the charges against him.  Based on respondent’s statements reported in 
the bill of particulars and at the plea hearing, the defendant had no reason to know 
that the reports contained information relating to his guilt on the charges against 
him. 
The effect of the majority decision 
{¶ 52} Respondent was faced with inconsistent evidence, evidence that 
the defense could have used at the least to challenge the credibility of the victim 
and at the most to undermine the theory of the victim’s age in the charges against 
him.1  Yet she was obliged to respond to the defendant’s discovery requests. 
{¶ 53} In doing so, respondent chose to withhold the reports and not 
reveal the inconsistencies contained within them.  Respondent did not provide the 
reports during discovery and misstated the contents of those reports in the bill of 
particulars and to the court during the plea hearing. 
{¶ 54} Respondent admits that she knew of the inconsistencies in the 
reported statements of the victim with the timeline asserted by the state but claims 
that (1) the reports need not have been provided to the defense under the Code of 
Professional Responsibility because they were not subject to disclosure under 
Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) and Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 
10 L.Ed.2d 215, and (2) the statements in the bill of particulars and the statements 
made during the plea hearing did not constitute breaches of respondent’s 
professional responsibilities, because she made the statements in good faith and in 
                                                 
1.  The majority asserts that the statements were hearsay and could therefore be used by the 
defendant only to challenge the credibility of the declarant.  However, that is not an issue before 
us.  Further, the defense was not given the opportunity to explore the veracity of the statements 
and was denied the ability to pursue avenues of defense preparation that could have resulted.  And 
the defense was not aware of the potential weaknesses in the state’s case.  Thus, it is not 
completely accurate to say that the only use for the reports of the victim’s inconsistent statements 
would have been as impeachment evidence.   
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
her professional judgment on the belief that the facts and evidence supported 
them. 
{¶ 55} The effect of the majority opinion is to adopt respondent’s position 
on the obligations of a prosecutor.  Thus, the prosecutor does not violate the Code 
of Professional Responsibility unless she has violated the defendant’s fair-trial 
discovery rights under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution 
and the attendant Rules of Criminal Procedure.  And the prosecutor may 
misrepresent the contents of relevant written reports to the defense and the court, 
so long as the misrepresentation does not rise to the level of a deprivation of 
constitutional rights and she misrepresents them in a way that is consistent with 
her good-faith view of the evidence. 
{¶ 56} The majority goes one step further and holds that so long as the 
case ends with a plea, DR 7-103(B) cannot be violated at all. 
{¶ 57} The board did not, and I too cannot, agree that the rules of 
professional conduct permit such an outcome. 
D.R. 7-103(B) requires more of the prosecutor than the  
related rule of criminal procedure 
{¶ 58} The board found that respondent violated DR 7-103(B), 7-102(A), 
and 1-102(A)(5) by failing to disclose the two reports.  The violations of DR 7-
102(A) and 1-102(A)(5) flow from the finding of the board that respondent 
violated DR 7-103(B).  Therefore, I limit my discussion to DR 7-103(B). 
{¶ 59} The majority holds that the disclosure requirements placed upon a 
prosecutor by DR 7-103(B) are limited in scope to the requirements of Crim.R. 
16(B)(1)(f).  Accordingly, the majority holds that if Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) is not 
violated, then, a fortiori, DR 7-103(B) is not violated. 
{¶ 60} Because the disciplinary rule differs from the related rule of 
criminal procedure in plain language and purpose, I disagree.  I would hold that 
the disciplinary rule requires more of a prosecuting attorney than does the rule of 
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criminal procedure.  Such a holding would not require “open discovery” as the 
majority fears.  Moreover, I find that United States v. Ruiz (2002), 536 U.S. 622, 
122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586, does not control this case.  Ruiz concerned the 
constitutional right to a fair trial and the waiver of that right by a defendant when 
he executed a plea; this case concerns the rules of conduct governing prosecutors 
when they possess evidence favorable to the defense.  The holding of Ruiz has no 
bearing on the question of the professional conduct of a prosecuting attorney. 
The plain language of DR 7-103(B) requires disclosure of the reports in this case 
because the reports are evidence “that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, 
mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.” 
{¶ 61} DR 7-103(B) states: “A public prosecutor or other government 
lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the 
defendant, or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, 
known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt 
of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.” 
{¶ 62} Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) states: “Upon motion of the defendant before 
trial the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to disclose to counsel for the 
defendant all evidence, known or which may become known to the prosecuting 
attorney, favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or punishment.” 
{¶ 63} The chief difference in these two rules is in their descriptions of 
the evidence subject to disclosure.  Under Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f), the prosecuting 
attorney must disclose all evidence “material” to guilt or punishment, whereas 
under DR 7-103(B), the prosecuting attorney must disclose all evidence “that 
tends to” negate guilt or lessen the criminal consequences. 
{¶ 64} Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) is a prophylactic rule, mirroring the rule 
explained in Brady v. Maryland, which describes the role of the Due Process 
Clause in ensuring that a defendant receives a fair trial by receiving all materially 
exculpatory evidence.  (1965) 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
(“the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”). 
{¶ 65} The United States Supreme Court has considered the difference 
between the disclosure rule of Brady, which, like Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f), requires 
disclosure of “material” evidence, and ABA model rules, which, like DR 7-
103(B), require disclosure of evidence that “tends to” negate guilt or lessen the 
offense.  Kyles v. Whitley (1995), 514 U.S. 419, 436-437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 
L.Ed.2d 490.  The court noted that “the rule in [Brady] requires less of the 
prosecution than the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, which call generally for 
prosecutorial disclosures of any evidence tending to exculpate or mitigate.”  Id. at 
437.  The court also referred to ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) 
(1984), which contains language similar to Ohio’s current Prof.Cond.R. 3.8(d), 
the successor to DR 7-103(B).  Thus, the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that in some cases, rules governing the conduct of prosecuting 
attorneys may require greater disclosure of evidence favorable to the defense than 
the defendant would be entitled to under the Constitution alone. 
{¶ 66} By artificially constraining DR 7-103 to the scope of Crim.R. 
16(B)(1)(f), the majority has improperly added words to the rule.  The word 
“material” does not appear in DR 7-103. 
{¶ 67} The question under DR 7-103(B), by its own terms, is whether the 
evidence is of the type “that tends to” negate the defendant’s guilt or lessen his 
offense or punishment.  This finding can be made by relating the undisclosed 
evidence to the offense charged. 
{¶ 68} In this case, the victim’s inconsistent statements amount to 
evidence that “tends to” negate the guilt or lessen the level of the offense and the 
punishment under DR-7-103(B).  The two undisclosed reports add some 
conflicting evidence, albeit very little, on the issue of the victim’s age at the time 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
the acts were committed—an element of the offense charged.  According to these 
reports, the victim stated that the rapes occurred in 2001, which would mean that 
she was 13 years old and that therefore the defendant could not be convicted for 
rape of a 12-year-old.  The defense should have been informed of the existence of 
this evidence in order to decide whether to attack the state’s proffered timeline or 
at least impeach the victim’s credibility.  The evidence tended to negate the 
defendant’s guilt and should have been disclosed under DR 7-103(B). 
A broad reading of DR 1-703(B) will not result in “open discovery.” 
{¶ 69} The respondent claims that the result of a broad reading of DR 7-
103(B) will be “open discovery” in criminal cases.2  A prosecuting attorney must 
disclose all evidence tending to negate the defendant’s guilt or lessen the offense 
or punishment under DR 7-103(B).  This has been the rule since this court 
adopted DR 7-103 almost 40 years ago.  Any evidence that does not have such a 
tendency need not be disclosed.  The premise of the rule is that fair trials in our 
system of criminal justice are more likely to occur when prosecutors do not play 
“hide the ball” with defense counsel. 
{¶ 70} To the extent that policy considerations should play any role in our 
disposition of this case, I prefer the position of the court in Kyles, that disclosure 
is preferable in close cases, because “it will tend to preserve the criminal trial, as 
distinct from the prosecutor's private deliberations, as the chosen forum for 
ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations.”  514 U.S. at 440, 115 S.Ct. 
1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490. 
                                                 
2.  We have proposed changes to Crim.R. 16, subject to the General Assembly’s approval.  The 
Staff Notes to the proposed rule state: “The purpose of the revisions to Criminal Rule 16 is to 
provide for a just determination of criminal proceedings and to secure the fair, impartial, and 
speedy administration of justice through the expanded scope of materials to be exchanged between 
the parties.”  The summary accompanying the public notice of the proposed rule states: “Criminal 
Rule 16 is rewritten to provide a system of more open discovery in criminal cases.”  The proposed 
rule contemplates increasing the amount of materials exchanged in discovery in criminal cases.  
Nothing in the decision of this case should be construed to limit a reasonable, differing 
construction of the new rule, should it be implemented.    
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
DR 7-103(B) and Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) serve different purposes. 
{¶ 71} The purpose of Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) is to ensure that persons 
charged with a crime will receive a fair trial.  State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 
2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 40.  The question for constitutional purposes 
is “not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a 
different verdict with the [undisclosed] evidence, but whether in its absence he 
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.  This fair-trial analysis, centering on the 
rights of the accused, has a different purpose than a rule of conduct describing 
professional responsibilities. 
{¶ 72} The constitutional protection inscribed in Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) 
requires that the defendant is entitled to discovery of any favorable evidence that 
is “material” to guilt or punishment.  Materiality is determined by evaluating 
whether the evidence that was not disclosed before trial now casts a new light on 
the case and undermines the confidence in the jury verdict.  State v. Brown, 115 
Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio- 4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 40.  This analysis requires a 
court to review the case against a defendant to determine whether “ ‘there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 39, quoting United 
States v. Bagley (1985), 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481. 
{¶ 73} Although a materiality requirement may be in keeping with the 
fair-trial rights afforded to criminal defendants, it does not comport with DR 7-
103(B).  The word “material” does not appear in DR 7-103(B); instead, the 
question is whether the undisclosed evidence, standing alone, tends to negate the 
guilt of the accused.  In view of the plain language of DR 7-103(B), the test 
announced by the majority, requiring a weighing of the evidence in an underlying 
criminal trial, is wholly inappropriate. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
{¶ 74} The professional conduct of an attorney should not be based upon 
the quantum of evidence produced at a criminal trial, or whether a defendant 
pleads guilty, regardless of the attorney’s conduct.  Rather, the conduct of an 
attorney should be evaluated on the basis of her own actions.  The true measure of 
whether her conduct comports with her professional obligations as an officer of 
the court is found in Code of Professional Responsibility.  A prosecutor’s 
professional duty can be greater than simply observing the criminal rules.  EC 7-
13 extols the role of a prosecutor in these words: “The responsibility of a public 
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not 
merely to convict.” 
{¶ 75} The majority’s observation that “[o]ur decision today should not be 
construed as an endorsement of respondent’s nondisclosure of the reports” is a 
poor substitute for DR 7-103(B).  Indeed, I fear that attorneys will pay greater 
heed to the majority’s actual approach—“no constitutional violation, no 
misconduct”—and that will become the new measure of professionalism under 
DR 7-103 and its successor, Prof.Cond.R. 3.8. 
Even if we adopt a materiality requirement for DR 7-103(A),  
United States v. Ruiz is inapplicable to this case. 
{¶ 76} Even if we could insert a materiality requirement into DR 7-
103(B), the majority vastly overreaches by applying the evolving standards of 
Brady and Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(f) in the context of attorney discipline.  The criminal 
rules are demonstrably unsuitable for use as rules governing attorney conduct.  
The ill fit is manifest in this case. 
{¶ 77} Under the materiality standard of Crim.R. 16, evidence that goes to 
the credibility of the victim must be disclosed by the prosecutor, when the 
reliability of the victim is likely to be relevant to guilt.  See United States v. Ruiz 
(2002), 536 U.S. 622, 628, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586, citing Giglio v. 
United States (1972), 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104. The 
January Term, 2010 
21 
 
majority seems to concede this point.  Nevertheless, the majority overlooks 
respondent’s failure to disclose this evidence in this case, based upon the 
erroneous notion that Ruiz applies. 
{¶ 78} Ruiz holds that a defendant who enters a guilty plea thereby waives 
the right to complain of certain constitutional errors.  Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630.  This 
waiver includes a waiver of the fair-trial right to obtain material discovery from 
the prosecution.  Id. 
{¶ 79} The court’s reasoning in Ruiz bears absolutely no relation to the 
issue of whether the prosecuting attorney has committed professional misconduct.  
Extending Ruiz into the area of attorney discipline is unwarranted, even if a 
materiality requirement is applied to DR 7-103(B). 
{¶ 80} When a defendant submits a discovery request and the prosecutor 
fails to produce favorable evidence that tends to negate guilt or lessen 
punishment, it is immaterial whether the defendant ultimately enters a plea 
agreement.  If the prosecutor has committed misconduct along the way, a 
defendant’s waiver of certain constitutional errors does not mitigate the 
prosecutor’s professional misconduct. 
Respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
{¶ 81} Respondent, 
in 
communicating 
with 
the 
court, 
twice 
misrepresented the statements of the victim.  In the bill of particulars, the 
respondent stated: “The victim was interviewed by [the Logan County Children’s 
Services employee] on June 12, 2002.  She reported that the Defendant raped her 
on two occasions over the summer of 2000.”  In fact, the victim reported that she 
had been raped in 2001, according to the reports.  During the plea hearing, 
respondent stated, “The victim was interviewed by [the Logan County Children’s 
Services employee] on June 12, 2002.  She reported what had taken place over the 
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22 
 
year of 2000.”  Again, the victim actually reported dates in 2001, according to the 
reports. 
{¶ 82} The majority reweighs the evidence of the DR 1-102(A)(4) 
violations and concludes that the sanctions recommended by the panel and board 
should not be imposed.  The majority determines that the relator has failed to 
prove that respondent’s statements were false, because it is “more likely than not” 
that the interviewer misreported the dates actually communicated by the victim 
and because respondent was representing to the court what the victim said, not 
what the report said.  None of these matters were considered in the board’s report. 
{¶ 83} I would not reweigh the evidence considered by the board on this 
issue.  While it is possible to construe respondent’s comments as good-faith 
interpretations of the evidence in her possession, this does not change the fact that 
her statements appear intended to justify her decision to withhold discoverable 
evidence from the defendant.  Indeed, the board was troubled by this as well.  
Respondent did not qualify her statements to the court; she simply presented her 
view of the evidence in the guise of the victim’s own statements.  Respondent’s 
statements to the court served to ensure that the inconsistencies would remain in 
the prosecutor’s office, and not in the courtroom. 
{¶ 84} I agree with the board that respondent’s statements were false.  I 
further agree that when coupled with the failure to disclose the underlying reports, 
respondent’s misrepresentations “strike at the very heart and soul of a fair trial.”  I 
am mindful of the prosecutor’s high professional responsibilities.  “A prosecutor 
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”  
Prof.Cond.R. 3.8, Official Comment 1.  Therefore, I would adopt the board’s 
findings that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4). 
Sanction 
January Term, 2010 
23 
 
{¶ 85} I would impose the sanction recommended by the board: a 12-
month suspension with six months stayed.  Respondent has commendable 
mitigating circumstances, but the misconduct in this case is severe. 
{¶ 86} For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, First 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, Christopher J. Weber and Geoffrey Stern, 
for respondent. 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. 
Springman and Philip R. Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for amicus 
curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
Robin N. Piper, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel G. Eichel 
and Lina N. Alkamhawi, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for amicus curiae 
Butler County Prosecuting Attorney. 
______________________