Title: Hunteman v. Ward Transport, Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hunteman v. Ward Transport, Inc.1985 WY 159706 P.2d 1126Case Number: 84-1Decided: 10/10/1985Robert HUNTEMAN, Appellant (Employee-Claimant),



v.



WARD TRANSPORT, INC., Appellee (Employer-Respondent).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
Robert HUNTEMAN, Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

v.

WARD TRANSPORT, INC., Appellee 
(Employer-Respondent).

 
 
 
 
James W. Gusea, Vines, Gusea & White, P.C., 
Cheyenne, for appellant.A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Criminal Division, John 
Renneisen, Senior Asst. Atty. *1127 Gen., and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
for appellee.Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY, 
BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Chief Justice.

 

[¶1.]     The only issue in this 
worker's compensation case is whether the evidence presented by the workman was 
sufficient to justify the modification of an award of temporary total disability 
payments upon the ground of increase in incapacity due solely to the injury or 
upon the ground of mistake. The district court concluded that the injured 
workman had not met his burden of proving either increase in incapacity due 
solely to the injury or mistake. We hold that the district court correctly dealt 
with this issue of fact. We affirm the order of the district court denying 
additional benefits.

 

[¶2.]     The appellant set forth 
the issues in his brief as:

 
"I. Whether the Court erred in finding insufficient 
evidence of mistake to authorize a reopening of the Worker's Compensation Claim 
pursuant to W.S. § 27-12-606.

 
"II. Whether the Court erred in finding insufficient 
evidence of an increase of incapacity due solely to the injury to authorize a 
reopening of the Worker's Compensation claim pursuant to W.S. § 27-12-606."

In the brief on the part of the State of Wyoming, which appeared 
as the appellee in the matter, the issues are restated in this 
way:

 
"I. WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING OF NO MISTAKE OR INCREASE OF INCAPACITY DUE SOLELY TO 
THE INJURY, AS THOSE GROUNDS ARE SET OUT IN SECTION 27-12-606, 
W.S.1977?

 
"II. DO APPELLANT'S ACTIONS IN FAILING TO ASSERT 
CLAIMS FOR TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS UNTIL LONG AFTER THE PERIODS OF 
ALLEGED DISABILITY, AMOUNT TO A WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL CONCERNING SUCH CLAIMS?"

Robert Hunteman suffered an injury to his back while 
working for Ward Transport, Inc. When he bent over to pick up a hose which he 
had used in unloading his truck, he blacked out and fell to the ground. Upon 
regaining consciousness, he found he was suffering severe pain in his back. He 
then was transported to a doctor's office, and that doctor referred him to an 
orthopedic surgeon for further treatment. The orthopedic surgeon diagnosed 
Hunteman's injury as an acute lumbosacral strain. The doctor treated Hunteman's 
injury conservatively with traction, muscle relaxants, exercise, and a 
recommended weight loss program.

 

[¶3.]     By a letter dated March 
19, 1981, the orthopedic surgeon advised the clerk of the district court that he 
had released Hunteman to return to part-time work on November 10, 1980, and to 
full-time work in December 1980. After that, Hunteman filed a claim for 
temporary total disability for the period from August 22, 1980, until November 
10, 1980, in the amount of $2,972.09, which was ordered paid by the district 
court on April 16, 1981. Hunteman continued to have problems, however, and upon 
further complaint to the orthopedic surgeon, some rather extensive diagnostic 
tests were performed in April 1981. These included a lumbar myelogram, a 
computerized tomography scan, and electrical myelographic studies. The product 
of these tests was that the orthopedic surgeon found no disc herniation, and he 
testified the tests confirmed his earlier diagnosis. He did say, however, that 
based upon Hunteman's continuing symptoms, he might have released him for work 
later than the November 10, 1980, date.

 

[¶4.]     Hunteman continued to 
suffer from pain in his back, and he then sought and obtained permission to 
change doctors, and he was treated by a neurosurgeon. Tests performed by the 
neurosurgeon in the late summer and fall of 1981 disclosed a possible herniated 
disc. In February 1982 a laminectomy was performed on this disc by *1128 the 
neurosurgeon, and the surgery apparently substantially alleviated Hunteman's 
symptoms. The neurosurgeon testified that he could not tell when the injury that 
produced the herniated disc occurred. He did testify that it was more probable 
than not that it existed when the orthopedic surgeon was treating Hunteman. 
Thereafter Hunteman filed additional claims for temporary total disability. One 
of these was filed December 22, 1982, and claimed total temporary disability 
from September 27, 1982, until December 26, 1982, in the amount of $4,401.90. On 
June 17, 1983, another claim for temporary total disability for the period from 
November 10, 1980, to September 26, 1982, was filed in the amount of $33,112.07. 
These claims were contested by Hunteman's employer.

 

[¶5.]     After a trial of the 
contested claim in the district court, the district judge sent a rather complete 
opinion letter to counsel. The opinion letter served as the basis for an order 
which was entered denying the claims filed by Hunteman for additional benefits 
in the form of temporary total disability awards for the period from November 
10, 1980, through December 26, 1982. The Order specifically provided that the 
decision letter be incorporated by reference as part of the 
order.

 

[¶6.]     Essentially the 
district court found that the applications were to be considered under § 
27-12-606, W.S.1977, for additional benefits or modification of the amount of 
the award for increase of incapacity due solely to the injury or on grounds of 
mistake. The court further found that the orthopedic surgeon did not find any 
evidence of a ruptured disc in April of 1981 when the extensive medical 
diagnostic tests were performed. According to the court's finding, the 
neurosurgeon was of the opinion that Hunteman had degenerative disc disease 
which was the actual cause that would allow rupture of a disc, that the 
precipitating factor for the rupture would be some movement of the back which 
could be quite innocuous, and that he could not tell when the disc had ruptured 
but based on the history given to him by Hunteman, he was of the opinion that it 
was more probable than not that the herniated disc had been present when 
Hunteman was treated by the orthopedic surgeon. The district court noted that 
the neurosurgeon testified the precipitating factor could as easily have 
occurred off the job as during the course of Hunteman's employment, and that the 
difference in the medical opinions may be explained by the fact that the 
neurosurgeon relied only upon information given to him by 
Hunteman.

 

[¶7.]     The district court 
thereupon concluded that Hunteman had failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that his ruptured disc was an injury which arose out of his employment 
and that there was a causal connection between his injury on August 20, 1980, 
and any change of condition after he had been released by the orthopedic surgeon 
to return to work. The court also concluded that Hunteman's injury came from a 
hazard to which he would have been fully exposed outside of his employment and 
specifically that Hunteman had failed to prove that there was a mistake in the 
original award of compensation for the injury in the form of temporary total 
disability from August 20, 1980, to November 10, 1980, or that he had suffered 
any increase in incapacity due solely to the injury.

 

[¶8.]     The parties are in 
accord that Hunteman's claims for additional benefits are presented under § 
27-12-606, W.S.1977. That statute provides in pertinent part as 
follows:

 

"Where an award of compensation has been made in 
favor of or on behalf of an employee for any benefits under this act [§§ 
27-12-101 through 27-12-804], an application may be made to the clerk of 
district court by any party within four (4) years from the date of the last 
award, or at any time during which monthly payments under an award are being 
made, for additional benefits of any type or nature or for a modification of the 
amount of the award on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due 
solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or fraud."

In Conn v. Ed Wederski Construction Company, 
Wyo., 668 P.2d 649 (1983), we discussed the application of this statute to a somewhat similar 
circumstance. In that case, the theory of the claimant was limited to mistake. 
We there noted that other jurisdictions limited relief under their statutes to 
situations in which a mistake in the determination of a material fact had been 
made by a fact finder. We concluded that Conn could not reopen his claim because he had 
not established that a mistake was made by a fact finder in the determination of 
any material fact. The same situation prevails in this instance. There was not 
mistake made by the district court in relying upon the advice of the orthopedic 
surgeon when the first award for temporary total disability was made. The doctor 
had released Hunteman for work on November 10, 1980. That award is subject to 
the concept of finality, and the burden of establishing the ground to reopen is 
upon the claimant. Matter of Abas, Wyo., 701 P.2d 1153 (1985); Conn v. Ed 
Wederski Construction Company, supra. The same burden must pertain to 
establishing an increase of incapacity due solely to the claimed injury. This 
burden is no different from the usual burden of proof cast upon the injured 
workman in worker's compensation matters. Rose v. Westates Construction, 
Wyo., 703 P.2d 1084 (1985); State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Division v. 
DeForrest, Wyo., 603 P.2d 865 (1979); Hammond v. Hitching Post Inn, 
Wyo., 523 P.2d 482 (1974); Amax Coal Co. v. Haynie, Wyo., 592 P.2d 693 
(1979). The difference with respect to § 27-12-606 is that the workman must meet 
the burden in order to have the claim reopened. If he succeeds in persuading the 
district court to reopen the claim, then he quite likely will have met his 
burden of proof to establish entitlement to additional awards, although that 
might not be true in all instances. Even though the claim were reopened, 
additional testimony at a hearing on the merits might persuade the trial court 
not to grant the additional award.

 

[¶9.]     In this instance, there 
was testimony by the orthopedic surgeon that in April of 1981 his diagnostic 
testing did not disclose a herniated disc. The herniated disc was present later, 
but the medical experts agreed that it could result from mundane activities. The 
treating neurosurgeon testified that it was more probable than not that the 
herniated disc existed when Hunteman was treated by the orthopedic surgeon. This 
information in the record created a question of fact to be resolved by the 
district court. The district court found and concluded that Hunteman had failed 
to meet his burden of proof, and since there is evidence to support that 
conclusion by the district court, we will not adjust it on appeal. Shaw v. 
Lewmont Drilling Associates, Inc., Wyo., 
694 P.2d 117 (1985); Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, Wyo., 678 P.2d 874, 877 (1984); Lindbloom v. Teton 
International, Wyo., 684 P.2d 1388, 1389 (1984). We hold that 
the district court correctly found that Hunteman had failed to meet his burden 
of proof of showing an increase of incapacity due solely to the injury or the 
existence of a mistake.

 

[¶10.]  We note the attempt on the part of the 
State of Wyoming to establish in this case a waiver or 
estoppel arising out of the failure to present the claim until a long time after 
the injury. We need not consider this issue in light of our disposition of the 
case. Furthermore, we should not consider it. The district court in the decision 
letter stated:

 
"Finally, it should be noted that the Court has not 
founded this decision upon doctrines of laches or estoppel as to this claimant 
and the delay incident to his submission of a claim in this case * * *. Neither 
party has raised those issues by pleadings or arguments made to the Court."

Under the circumstances, even if the State had filed 
a cross-appeal, we would be foreclosed from consideration of this issue because 
of the failure to raise it in the court below. Dennis v. Dennis, Wyo., 675 P.2d 265 (1984); Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corporation, Wyo., 665 P.2d 452 
(1983).

[¶11.]  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment 
of the district court is affirmed.