Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: August 27, 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
CRAIG THOMAS DAWSON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent on Review.
(CA A123488; SC
S055770 (Control))
DENNIS GERHARDT FLETCHER,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent.
(CA A135814; SC
S055789)
(Consolidated for Opinion)
En Banc
On review of orders of the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 3, 2009, at Lewis and
Clark College of Law, Portland, Oregon.
Bronson D. James, Chief Deputy Public Defender,
Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners on review.  With
him on the briefs was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense
Services.  With him on the brief for petitioner on review Dawson was Brandon G.
Williams, Deputy Public Defender.
Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.  With him on
the briefs were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Erika L. Hadlock, Acting
Solicitor General.
DURHAM, J.
The orders of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
*Order of dismissal dated December 27, 2007, and
an order denying motion to reinstate judicial review, dated April 8, 2008.
DURHAM, J.
Petitioners Dawson and Fletcher seek
judicial review under ORS 144.335 of orders in which the Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision (the board) denied their requests to reopen and
reconsider earlier orders.  The board moved to dismiss both petitions for
judicial review on the ground that an order denying reconsideration of an
earlier order is not itself a "final order" and, as such, is not
subject to judicial review under ORS 144.335.  See Esperum v. Board of
Parole, 296 Or 789, 796, 681 P2d 1128 (1984) (so stating); Mastriano v.
Board of Parole, 342 Or 684, 696, 159 P3d 1151 (2007) (reaffirming that
holding of Esperum).  The Court of Appeals agreed and entered orders of
dismissal.  We allowed review and consolidated the cases.  On review,
petitioners argue that the board "constructively reopened" the
earlier final orders and, as such, its orders declining to reopen and
reconsider earlier orders are themselves final orders that are subject to
judicial review.  We conclude that, although it is possible for the board to
constructively reopen or reconsider an earlier final order, no such action
occurred here.  Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the Court of Appeals.
Before turning to the facts of these
cases, it is necessary to discuss the statutes and rules that provide for
administrative and judicial review of board orders.  Oregon Administrative Rule
(OAR) chapter 255, division 80, governs the board's administrative review of
its own orders.  OAR 255-080-0005 provides that an inmate must request administrative
review "within forty-five (45) days after the mailing date on the Board's
final action on the reviewed issue," and that the board will reject as
untimely a request that does not comply with that time limit.(1) 
OAR 255-80-0012(1) authorizes the board to grant a request for review if the
request is consistent with criteria set forth in OAR 255-080-0010 and
limitations set forth in OAR 255-080-0011.(2) 
Aside from that procedure, however, OAR 255-080-0012(2) also provides the board
with discretion to reconsider its own orders at any time:
"The Board may open a case for reconsideration of a
finding without receiving a request, without regard to time limits, and without
opening all findings for review and appeal."
In other words, OAR 255-080-0012(2) authorizes the board to
reopen and reconsider a finding in its own order, after the time limit for an
inmate's or offender's request for administrative review of the order has
expired.(3)
ORS 144.335 governs judicial review
of the board's orders and provides, in part:
"(1) A person over whom the State Board of
Parole and Post-Prison Supervision exercises its jurisdiction may seek judicial
review of a final order of the board as provided in this section if:
"(a) The person is adversely affected or
aggrieved by a final order of the board; and
"(b) The person has exhausted
administrative review as provided by board rule.
"* * * * *
"(4) If a person described in subsection
(1) of this section seeks judicial review of a final order of the board, the
person shall file a petition for judicial review with the Court of Appeals
within 60 days after the date the board mails the order disposing of the person's
request for administrative review. The person shall serve a copy of the
petition for judicial review on the board."
ORS 144.335 thus provides that orders of the board are
subject to judicial review, if the order is a "final order," the
petitioner is "adversely affected or aggrieved" by it, and the
petitioner has "exhausted administrative review."
ORS 144.335 does not explain what a "final
order" is for purposes of judicial review of a board decision.  In Esperum,
this court considered that question.  Several inmates had requested that the
board reopen and reconsider earlier orders setting their parole release dates. 
This court noted that, under the board's existing rules, the board could
respond in one of three ways:
"(1)     Deny the request for
reconsideration;
"(2)     Allow the request and grant some
relief by changing the order; or
"(3)     Allow the request, but deny
relief."
Id.  at 795-96 (emphasis in original).  This court
concluded that the latter two responses would result in a "final
order," subject to judicial review under ORS 144.335(1).  A denial of a
request for reconsideration, however, would not result in a final order.  To
hold otherwise "would effectively eliminate the statutory 60-day petition
requirement [under ORS 144.335(4)] because an inmate could challenge an initial
order, no matter how old, by seeking administrative review and then challenge the
denial."  Id. at 796; see also Mastriano, 342 Or at 696
(reaffirming that holding of Esperum).  Therefore, under Esperum
and Mastriano, a board order denying reopening and reconsideration of an
earlier final order is not subject to judicial review.(4)
With the foregoing in mind, we turn
to the facts of petitioner Dawson's case, which are not in dispute.  In 1985, a
trial court convicted Dawson of murder and imposed a life sentence.  The board
subsequently released Dawson on parole, but later revoked that parole.(5) 
Following a future disposition hearing, the board on December 10, 1996, denied
Dawson re-release on parole, finding that he could not be adequately controlled
in the community.  The board memorialized that ruling in Board Action Form
(BAF) #13:
"PURSUANT TO OAR 255-75-079; OAR 255-75-096 AND CITING
EXHIBIT H, AGGRAVATING FACTOR(S): REPETITION OF TYPE OF CONDUCT ASSOCIATED WITH
COMMITMENT OFFENSE OR PAST CONDITIONS (RETURN TO ASSAULTIVENESS, INVOLVEMENT IN
SAME TYPE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY); REPEATED POSSESSION OF MULTIPLE WEAPONS.  THE
BOARD DENIES RE-RELEASE, FINDING THE INMATE CANNOT BE ADEQUATELY CONTROLLED IN
THE COMMUNITY.  THIS DENIAL OF RE-RELEASE RESULTS IN A TRUE LIFE
SENTENCE."
On January 28, 1997, Dawson sought administrative review of
BAF #13, arguing, in part, that the board had violated the state and federal ex
post facto clauses by failing to apply rules enacted in 1985 to his
review.  The board rejected that argument and denied relief.
In 2003, Dawson filed an
administrative request for the board to reopen and reconsider BAF #13.  Dawson
argued that, in BAF #13, the board had violated the state and federal ex
post facto clauses by applying administrative rules that were not in effect
in 1985, when he had committed the crime that led to his incarceration.  Dawson
based his argument on Himes v. Thompson, 336 F3d 848 (9th Cir 2003), in
which the Ninth Circuit held that the board had violated the federal ex post
facto clause by applying particular administrative rules enacted in 1994 to
a prisoner who had committed his crimes in 1978.  In Himes, the
petitioner, an Oregon inmate, was sentenced to a 70-year prison term for acts
committed in 1978.  In 1994, the board released him on parole and, less than four
months later, revoked the parole.  Applying rules in effect in 1994, but not in
effect in 1978, the board found aggravation, denied re-release, and scheduled
the petitioner's next parole review for 2024.  The Ninth Circuit determined
that the ex post facto inquiry turned on whether the 1994 rules, as
compared to the 1978 rules, "created a substantial -- rather than
attenuated or speculative -- risk of increasing Himes' incarceration * * *." 
Himes, 336 F3d at 856.  After conducting that comparative analysis, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that, in comparison to the rules in effect in 1978, the
1994 regulatory regime "significantly increased the possibility of serving
a lengthy re-incarceration period."  Id. at 859-60.
The board issued Administrative
Review Response (ARR) #7, which stated, in part:
"The board denies your request to reopen and reconsider
its decision in BAF #13 for the following reasons.  In Himes, the court
addressed issues regarding the board's rules that were in effect July 19, 1978
to January 31, 1979.  You committed your crime on May 30, 1985.  Consequently,
the Himes decision does not apply to your case.  As a result, your
request for the board to reopen and reconsider its finding in BAF #13 is
denied."
The board read Himes to require the described
comparative analysis of rule regimes for significant risk of increased
punishment but only if the underlying crime occurred in 1978, like the crime in
Himes, and thus, was subject to the identical rules examined in Himes. 
The board may have read Himes too narrowly -- the Ninth Circuit said
nothing to confine its holding in that manner -- but we need not decide that
question to resolve Dawson's petition in this court.
In 2004, Dawson filed a petition for
judicial review of ARR #7.  The board moved to dismiss the proceeding,
asserting that ARR #7 was not a final order under ORS 144.335.  The Court of
Appeals denied the motion to dismiss and granted Dawson leave to proceed with
judicial review.(6) 
This court vacated the order of the Court of Appeals and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Mastriano.  On remand, the Court of Appeals
determined that, under Mastriano, ARR #7 was not a final order and
therefore was not subject to judicial review.  The court then entered an order dated
December 27, 2007, granting the board's motion to dismiss.  Dawson seeks review
of that order.
The facts of petitioner Fletcher's
case also are not in dispute.  A trial court convicted Fletcher of first-degree
sodomy.(7) 
In 1998, the board released Fletcher on post-prison supervision.  Prior to his
release, however, the board issued an order of supervision conditions,
designating Fletcher as a predatory sex offender (PSO).  In 2006, Fletcher
requested that the board reopen and reconsider that order, claiming, among
other things, that he had not received a hearing on his PSO designation, and
that the board had failed to inform him that he could request administrative
review.  In response, the board issued ARR #2, which stated, in part:
"The board has reviewed and fully evaluated your
request.  The arguments you have provided, however, do not warrant reopening
and reconsidering your case.  Interests of administrative efficiency and
finality of board orders militate against reopening and reconsidering a final
board order based on issues that could have been raised through established
procedures for administrative review.  You could have raised your arguments in
a timely request for administrative review of the June 3, 1998, Order. * * *
Therefore, based on the information that you have provided the board in your
request, the board denies your request to reopen and reconsider its previous
order."(8)
Fletcher filed a petition for
judicial review of ARR #2.  The board moved to dismiss the proceeding, arguing
that, under Mastriano, ARR #2 was not a final order.  Fletcher argued,
in response, that ARR #2 indicated that the board had "evaluat[ed] the
substance of petitioner's legal challenge for reopening," thus
constructively reopening the case and denying relief.  The Court of Appeals
rejected that argument, stating that ARR #2 "merely explains why [the
board] is declining to reopen and reconsider the matter formerly decided,"
and that the board's explanation did not amount to a reconsideration of the
underlying PSO designation.  The court granted the board's motion to dismiss in
an order dated December 27, 2007, and Fletcher seeks review of that order of
dismissal.
On review, the parties do not dispute
whether petitioners were adversely affected or aggrieved by the orders denying
reopening and reconsideration, or whether they exhausted administrative
remedies prior to seeking judicial review.  Instead, both Dawson and Fletcher
(hereafter referred to collectively as "petitioners") argue that the
orders at issue in the instant case are final orders and subject to judicial
review.  Petitioners assert that, when the board explained its reasons for
denying their requests to reopen earlier orders, it made a "ruling on the
merits."  Accordingly, petitioners argue, the board did not merely deny
their requests for reopening and reconsideration.  Instead, the board
"constructively reopened" the earlier orders -- in other words, the
board allowed their requests, reconsidered the earlier orders, and denied
relief, resulting in orders designated as "final" under Esperum
and Mastriano. See Mastriano, 342 Or at 690 (noting that, when
the board "reexamines a prior order, even if it reaffirms the order in
full," that action results in an order that is "final for purposes of
judicial review").
Petitioners advance two primary
sources of legal support for their argument.  First, although petitioners
acknowledge that no Oregon cases recognize a doctrine of "constructive
reopening," they point out several federal cases that do.  As a general
matter, when the Secretary of the former Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare denied a petition to reopen an earlier claim for Social Security
benefits, federal courts lacked jurisdiction to review that denial.  Califano
v. Sanders, 430 US 99, 107-09, 97 S Ct 980, 51 L Ed 2d 192 (1977). 
However, if the Secretary, in the act of denying reopening of the earlier
claim, proceeded to reconsider the claim "on the merits," the court
treated the claim as "having been reopened as a matter of administrative
discretion," making it subject to judicial review.  Jelinek v. Heckler,
764 F2d 507, 508 (8th Cir 1985).
Second, petitioners assert that, as a
general legal principle, "it is the body of a document, not its caption,
that controls" the legal effect of that document.  To support that
proposition, petitioners cite a series of cases that, in the main, discuss the
legal import of motions filed with the court.  E.g., Burden v. Copco
Refrigeration, Inc., 339 Or 388, 393, 121 P3d 1133 (2005) (holding that
when a party incorrectly captioned a document as a motion to dismiss under ORCP
21 A, that fact did not prevent a trial court from treating it as an
application for a preliminary hearing under ORCP 21 C); Welker v. TSPC,
332 Or 306, 312, 27 P3d 1038 (2001) (noting that whether a motion will be
considered as a motion for a new trial "is controlled by [the motion's]
substance, not its caption").  Petitioners also cite cases in which, they
contend, this court stressed the importance of examining the substance, rather
than the form, of legal relations and actions.  See NW Medical Lab. v. Blue
Cross and Blue Shield, 310 Or 72, 83, 794 P2d 428 (1990) (holding that this
court determines whether a joint venture has violated Oregon antitrust law by
looking "at substance, not form"); Baker v. City of Milwaukie,
271 Or 500, 511-12, 533 P2d 772 (1975) (noting that, in order to determine
whether a comprehensive city plan is "legislative and permanent in nature
or administrative and temporary," this court looks "to the substance
of the action rather than the mere title").
On the basis of those legal sources,
petitioners propose that when the Board of Parole "reache[s] the
merits" of a claim that a petitioner advances for reopening an earlier
order, the board constructively reopens that order.  They contend that any
resulting denial of relief is itself a final order, subject to judicial
review.  Petitioners assert that the board reaches the merits of a claim when
it "adds to or alters the factual findings of the original decision, or
adopts a legal position, argument, or conclusion not present in the original
decision or contrary to the original decision."
The board responds that an order
denying a request to reopen and reconsider an earlier order is not a final
order "regardless of any explanation for the denial because the only
legally operative portion of the order is the denial itself."  Under
petitioners' rule, the board insists, "[i]t is hard to imagine what the
board could say in explaining its reasons for denying reopening and
reconsideration" that would not result in constructive reopening.  The
board also asserts that petitioners' proposed rule of law is inconsistent with
the 60-day deadline for seeking appellate review under ORS 144.335(4).  Citing Esperum
and Mastriano, the board insists that a doctrine of constructive
reopening would "nullify the 60-day time limit that the legislature placed
on seeking judicial review."  Mastriano, 342 Or at 696.  Finally,
the board asserts that if the board can implicitly reopen a case by adopting a
"legal conclusion," then a denial of reopening would become a
"final order" under ORS 144.335(1), and "[t]herefore, a
petitioner would not be required to make an administrative review request
within 45 days of the denial of reconsideration."
As this court held in Esperum
and Mastriano, an order denying reopening and reconsideration of an
earlier order is not a final order and is not subject to judicial review.  However,
Esperum also held that, "[W]hen reconsideration of an earlier order
is requested and granted, and the administrative action denies parole release
date relief, such a denial of relief is subject to judicial review in the Court
of Appeals * * *."  Id. at 798.  Neither party challenges those
propositions.  What the parties disagree on is how an appellate court
should determine whether an order of the board is subject to review under those
cases.  Petitioners insist that this court should make that determination by
asking whether the board has "reached the merits" of a request for
reopening.  The board responds that the determination begins and ends with the
tagline of the order in question.(9) 
At oral argument, however, the board acknowledged that this court may examine
the "four corners" of the order for an "intent to undermine the
tagline."
We decline to adopt the position that
the inquiry into whether the board has reopened a prior order begins and ends
with the tagline of the order or with an investigation of the board's intent. 
Instead, we must determine the legal effect or legal substance of an order by
examining it in its entirety, not by focusing solely on one or more of its
parts, such as the order's caption or a statement of disposition.  That brings
us to the question of what characteristics regarding the order will demonstrate
that, in legal effect, the board has reopened or reconsidered a prior order
and, therefore, the order is a final order and is subject to judicial review.
"Determining whether a subsequent action
constitutes a reopening and a new decision requires a court to engage in an
often-difficult process of characterization."
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 2 Administrative Law Treatise
828 (4th ed 2002).
A "reconsideration" of an
earlier order contemplates fresh deliberation over a factual or legal matter
that the board already has considered and decided in the past.  If the board
alters a factual finding or legal conclusion in an earlier order, and the change
is material to a party's legal rights under that order, then we would conclude
that the board had reconsidered the order even if the order purports to deny
reconsideration.  But when the board determines, for example, that the petition
for reconsideration relies on a new factual development or new legal decision
that is irrelevant to the earlier order, and accompanies that
determination with a denial of reopening or reconsideration, there is no basis
for a reviewing court to conclude that the board has reopened or reconsidered
the prior order, see Mastriano, 342 Or at 696 (explaining that no
judicially reviewable final order results when the board's "denial of reconsideration
[leaves] the prior final order undisturbed").
Several federal cases illustrate that
point.  Under the federal court doctrine of constructive reopening, the federal
courts hold, for example, that an administrative law judge (ALJ) has reopened a
claim for benefits if that judge has addressed the merits of the earlier claim. 
Boock v. Shalala, 48 F3d 348, 351 (8th Cir 1995).  However, an ALJ does
not reopen the earlier claim by conducting a threshold inquiry into the
evidence and arguments that accompany a request for reopening.  Byam v.
Barnhart, 336 F3d 172, 181 (2d Cir 2003).  Otherwise, "these threshold
inquiries would lead to frequent unwarranted judicial review," defeating
legislative decisions in favor of the finality of reviewable orders.  Id.
McGowen v. Harris, 666 F2d 60
(4th Cir 1981), provides an extensive discussion of the distinction between
constructive reopening and a mere threshold inquiry into a request for
reopening.  The claimant had applied for surviving child's insurance benefits
as the surviving son of the decedent.  The Social Security Administration
denied benefits to the claimant, holding that he had failed to establish that
he was the "child" of the decedent under the Social Security Act. 
The claimant then sought reconsideration of the denial, presenting further
evidence that the decedent orally had acknowledged the claimant as his son.  An
ALJ stated that the claimant had presented sufficient evidence to establish
that the decedent was his father, but failed to present sufficient "new
and material" evidence of his dependency on the decedent to justify
reopening.  Accordingly, the ALJ denied reconsideration.  The claimant then
sought review in federal court, claiming that the ALJ had constructively
reopened his earlier claim.
The Fourth Circuit responded that no
reconsideration on the merits had occurred, and specifically addressed the
argument that the ALJ had reopened the claim by addressing the claimant's new
evidence and legal theories:
"Of necessity when a social security
claimant presents any claim that is arguably the same one earlier decided on
the merits, the Secretary must in fairness look far enough into the proffered
factual and legal support to determine whether it is the same claim, and if so,
whether it should nevertheless be reopened as a discretionary matter. * * *
"In fairness to the claimant, the results
of this threshold inquiry may be reported as a prelude to reporting the
dispositive administrative action taken.  Thus, an ALJ may state in a formal
decision, as here, that though the claimant had presented sufficient new
evidence to establish biological parentage of the wage earner, his new evidence
of dependency was not sufficiently 'new and material' to warrant reopening and
that it went merely to establish the same claim for res judicata purposes. 
When, as here, this is followed by a specific conclusion that the claim should
be denied on res judicata grounds, the threshold inquiry into the nature of the
evidence should not be read as a reopening of this claim on the merits."
Id. at 67-68 (citation omitted).
McGowen, a case frequently
cited by other courts addressing questions of constructive reopening, and
the logic of which is persuasive to this court, does not support petitioners' somewhat
circular argument that constructive reopening occurs whenever the board addresses
the merits of whether to reconsider an earlier order.  Any petition for
reconsideration necessarily will place in issue the merits of whether to grant
reconsideration.  The board must evaluate a petitioner's evidence and arguments
in favor of reopening in order to determine whether any proffered evidence and
arguments do, in fact, warrant reconsideration of the earlier order.  The
board, if it chooses, may report those findings and conclusions to the inmate. 
But when the board states those findings without a reexamination of the accuracy
of any part of the prior order, there is no basis for a reviewing court to
conclude that anything other than a denial of reconsideration has occurred. 
Indeed, in McGowen, the ALJ made an entirely new, albeit irrelevant,
finding of fact -- that the claimant was, in fact, the biological child of the
decedent -- and the Fourth Circuit still held that such a finding did not
reopen the case.(10)
We reiterate, as we did in Esperum
and Mastriano, the significance of the 60-day time limit that the
legislature has imposed on petitioners seeking judicial review of final orders
under ORS 144.335(4).  We observed in those cases that allowing judicial review
of orders denying reopening and reconsideration would nullify that requirement
by allowing a petitioner to seek reconsideration of an initial order, no matter
how old, and then challenge the denial of reconsideration in court.  Esperum,
296 Or at 796; Mastriano, 342 Or at 696.  Likewise, allowing judicial
review of such orders whenever the board finds any new fact or states any
conclusion of law either would result in judicial review of a vast number of
such orders -- again, eviscerating the 60-day time limit on seeking judicial
review -- or induce the board to stop providing written reasons for its
decision to deny reopening and reconsideration.  The first outcome is contrary
to legislative intent; the second results -- undesirably, in our view -- in the
board cloaking its rationale in secrecy.
Applying the foregoing principles to
the instant case, we hold that both petitioners have failed to demonstrate that
the board constructively reopened its earlier orders.  We consider Dawson's
case first.  Dawson asserts that the board constructively reopened its earlier
order denying re-release when it stated:
"In Himes, the court addressed issues regarding
the board's rules that were in effect July 19, 1978 to January 31, 1979.  You
committed your crime on May 30, 1985.  Consequently, the Himes decision
does not apply to your case."
Dawson argues that the board reached a "wholly
novel" legal ruling about the applicability of Himes, and thereby
reached the substantive merits of his claim for reopening.  We disagree.  The
board made a threshold inquiry into whether the holding in Himes, as the
board construed it, was sufficiently material to Dawson's case to justify
reopening the earlier order, and decided that the holding in Himes was
not material or relevant.  That view informed the board's choice not to reopen. 
It did not amount to a constructive reopening.  Whether the board "reaches
the merits" of the arguments in favor of reopening is beside the
point.
Fletcher argues that the board
constructively reopened the order designating him as a PSO by stating: 
"The board has reviewed and fully evaluated your
request.  The arguments you have provided, however, do not warrant reopening
and reconsidering your case."
Fletcher is mistaken.  The board, in stating that his
arguments did not "warrant reopening," did not reconsider the
original PSO designation.  Instead, the board weighed the arguments that
Fletcher presented in favor of reopening, and found them wanting.  Such a
threshold determination is a necessary part of the board's consideration of a
request to reopen and reconsider an earlier order, and does not itself
constitute a constructive reopening or reconsideration of the prior order.
Petitioners submit one final
argument:  that the board's administrative rules provide guidelines for
reopening and reconsideration of an earlier order and, therefore, this court
and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review an order denying reopening
and reconsideration for consistency with those criteria and abuse of
discretion.  The board responds that, if an order denying reopening and
reconsideration is not a final order under ORS 144.335, then this court may not
review the order for abuse of discretion, because it has no jurisdiction over
the order in the first place.  We agree with the board, and reject petitioner's
argument without further discussion.
In these cases, the board did not
reopen the earlier orders, constructively or otherwise.  The Court of Appeals
correctly held that the board's orders denying reopening and reconsideration
were not final orders for purposes of judicial review, and correctly dismissed
petitioners' appeals on that basis.(11)
The orders of the Court of Appeals
are affirmed.
1. OAR 255-080-0005 provides, in part:
"(1) An inmate/offender may request an
administrative review by sending Exhibit O, Administrative Review Request Form,
to the Board concisely explaining how his or her case fits the criteria for
review listed in rule 255-080-0010. 
"(2) An inmate/offender must request
administrative review within forty-five (45) days after the mailing date on the
Board's final action on the reviewed issue. The Board will reject a request for
administrative review as untimely unless: 
"(a) It is physically received by the Board
on or before the 45th day after the mailing date on the Board's final action on
the reviewed issue; or 
"(b) It is delivered to the Board by mail
in an envelope bearing a United States Postal Service (USPS) cancellation stamp
dated on or before the 45th day after the mailing date on the Board's final
action on the reviewed issue; or 
"(c) In the case of an inmate, and in the
absence of a legible USPS cancellation stamp, the inmate signed and dated the
request and deposited it in the institutional mailing system in compliance with
all applicable Department of Corrections rules on or before the 45th day after
the mailing date on the Board's final action on the reviewed issue.
"* * * * *
"(4) If the Board or its designee
determines that the request is consistent with the criteria as defined in rules
255-080-0010 and 255-080-0011, and meets the deadline requirements, the Board
will resolve the matter using the procedures outlined in OAR
255-080-0012."
2. OAR 255-080-0010 provides:
"The criteria for granting a review are:
"(1) The Board action is not supported by
evidence in the record; or
"(2) Pertinent information was available at
the time of the hearing which, through no fault of the offender, was not
considered; or
"(3) Pertinent information was not
available at the time of the hearing, e.g., information concerning convictions
from other jurisdictions; or
"(4) The action of the Board is
inconsistent with its rules or policies and the inconsistency is not explained;
or
"(5) The action of the Board is in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions or is a misinterpretation
of those provisions.
"(6) The action of the Board is outside its
statutory grant of discretion."
OAR 255-080-0011 provides:
"All administrative review requests will be
screened by a Board member or a Board designee who may deny further review of
the following matters: 
"(1) Findings of aggravation when the Board
has set the prison term within or below the matrix range; 
"(2) Findings of aggravation when the Board
has not overridden a judicial minimum and the prison term has been set equal to
the judicial minimum; 
"(3) Matters which have previously been
appealed and decided on the merits by either the Board or the appellate
court(s); 
"(4) Administrative review requests
considered untimely pursuant to rule 255-080-0005; 
"(5) Subject matter of a hearing or review
and/or Board order other than the Board order being appealed; 
"(6) Matters that will not change the parole
release date or conditions or length of supervision; 
"(7) Board orders that are not final; 
"(8) Errors previously corrected; 
"(9) Order which sustains a minimum term
and the inmate/offender does not contest the crime severity rating and history risk
score; 
"(10) Order which denies, grants or grants
in part an inmate/offender's request for a prison term reduction based upon
outstanding reformation under ORS 144.122; 
"(11) Order which refers an inmate/offender
for psychological evaluation; 
"(12) Order which postpones an
inmate/offender's release date because of: 
"(a) A Board finding of dangerousness under
ORS 144.125(3) and OAR 255-060-0012; 
"(b) An inmate/offender's refusal to submit
to a psychological evaluation; 
"(13) Order which postpones an
inmate/offender's release date because of serious misconduct during
confinement; or 
"(14) Order which denies an
inmate/offender's request under ORS 144.228(1) for an early parole
consideration hearing. 
"(15) Order which sets an initial release
date under ORS 144.120, except if inmate/offender contests the crime severity
rating, the history risk score or aggravating factors found by the Board under
Board rules; 
"(16) Order which sets a date for a parole
consideration hearing under ORS 144.228; 
(17) Order which sets a release date or declines
to set a release date after a parole consideration hearing under ORS
144.228."
3. Several
statutes in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), ORS ch 183, including
those pertaining to orders in contested cases, ORS 183.470, and judicial review
of agency orders, ORS 183.480, have no applicability to the board.  ORS
183.315(1).  As a result, those parts of the APA do not bear on the authority
of the board or the courts in this context.
4. When
this court decided Esperum in 1984, OAR 255-40-020 provided:
"'The Board may reopen any case for
reconsideration upon formal written request of a prisoner to the chairperson or
motion of a Board member * * *.'"
Id. at 795 (quoting the rule).  Like the present OAR
255-080-0012(2), former OAR 255-040-020 did not place a time limitation
on the board's reconsideration of an earlier order. 
There is a difference between the two rules.  Former
OAR 255-040-020 expressly provided that a prisoner could make a formal
written request for reconsideration.  OAR 255-080-0012(2) does not; it merely
states that the board may reopen and reconsider an order at any time.  However,
both petitioners and the board appear to assume that petitioners properly may
request reopening and reconsideration of the orders at issue in the instant
case.  Without deciding the issue, we make the same assumption.
5. The
record before this court does not reveal the dates of Dawson's parole, or the
reasons for its revocation.
6. The
board also had argued that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over ARR #7
because that order, by denying a request to reopen an earlier order, had not
"adversely affected or aggrieved" Dawson.  The Court of Appeals
rejected that argument, citing Richards v. Board of Parole, 339 Or 176,
118 P3d 261 (2005).  The board does not repeat that claim at this stage of the
case, and we do not address it.
7. Again,
the record before this court is limited, and does not reveal the date or the
circumstances of Fletcher's conviction.
8. The
board also noted, and Fletcher acknowledged, that he previously had submitted
another request to reopen and reconsider his PSO designation.  The board denied
that request in 2005, and the Court of Appeals dismissed judicial review of
that proceeding in 2006.
9. The
term "tagline" refers to the final sentence in an order or opinion
that states in summary form the decision or disposition.
10. McGowen
did suggest, however, that the Appeals Council's review of the ALJ's decision not
to reopen the claim might have reopened the claim on the merits, based
on "its stated conclusion that the Michigan intestacy law would control
the question of claimant's legitimacy, hence dependency, and that it would not
support his claim."  The Fourth Circuit was "not prepared to say that
jurisdiction to consider [that claim] would not have existed."  Id.
at 68.
11. Our
holding determines only whether petitioners are entitled to the statutory
remedy of judicial review under ORS 144.335.  Petitioners may have other
potential remedies at their disposal, such as a petition for writ of habeus
corpus or mandamus, but we do not address in this case questions concerning the
availability to petitioners of those other potential remedies.