Title: Hero v. Macomber

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 4 
Docket: 
Han-15-215 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
December 17, 2015 
Decided: 
January 12, 2016 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
BARBARA A. (MACOMBER) HERO 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH O. MACOMBER 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
 
[¶1]  Joseph O. Macomber appeals from a judgment entered by the 
District Court (Ellsworth, Mallonee, J.) granting Barbara A. (Macomber) Hero’s 
motion to enforce a provision of the parties’ divorce judgment requiring the sale of 
certain real property in a commercially reasonable manner.  On appeal, Joseph 
contends that (1) the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue; 
(2) the court erred in failing to grant or make findings on a motion for an expedited 
hearing; and (3) the court’s finding that the sale of real property was commercially 
reasonable was not supported by sufficient evidence in the record.  We affirm the 
judgment. 
 
 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s 
judgment, the record supports the following facts.  Pearson v. Wendell, 
2015 ME 136, ¶ 2, --- A.3d ---.  Joseph and Barbara were married in 1995, and 
Barbara filed for divorce in 2012.  The court entered a divorce judgment on 
October 17, 2014, that incorporated the terms of a mutual agreement between the 
parties.  Among the marital property subject to the divorce judgment is certain real 
property on Water Street in Castine.  In 2012, the Water Street property was 
appraised to have a fair market value of $515,000.  The terms of the divorce 
judgment provided that “[a]s soon as practicable, Water Street shall be sold in a 
commercially reasonable manner and the parties are ordered and required to take 
all steps reasonably required to effect such a sale.”  Pending the sale, the parties 
shared the Water Street property as tenants in common; Joseph held a 27.5% 
undivided interest and Barbara held a 72.5% undivided interest.  Once the sale of 
the Water Street property was consummated, each party would receive proceeds 
consistent with their respective interest in the property. 
[¶3]  In addition to his interest in the Water Street property, Joseph was also 
awarded exclusive ownership of real property situated at The Shore Road 
(Shore Road) in Castine, which was encumbered by a mortgage in the amount of 
 
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$129,000.  The judgment required Joseph to use his proceeds from the sale of the 
Water Street property to pay any indebtedness on the Shore Road property. 
[¶4]  On February 3, 2015, Barbara filed a motion to enforce the judgment 
with regard to the sale of the Water Street property and a motion for an expedited 
hearing on the matter.  In her motion to enforce, Barbara indicated that she sought 
to sell the property for $300,000 and had secured a buyer for that amount, but that 
Joseph refused to consent because, he contended, the sale was commercially 
unreasonable given that the property had been appraised at $515,000 three years 
earlier.  On March 19, 2015, the motion for an expedited hearing was granted, and 
the court issued a notice of hearing for all pending motions to be held on 
April 7, 2015. 
[¶5]  Joseph failed to attend the hearing on April 7, 2015, because notice was 
sent to an incorrect address.  Two days later, the court issued a notice of hearing to 
the correct address indicating that the hearing on the motion to enforce would be 
held on April 15, 2015.  On the day before the hearing, Joseph filed a motion to 
continue citing the death of his father and his need to obtain a lawyer.  In response 
to his motion, Barbara’s counsel posited that “[f]ailure to sell to this buyer now is 
not going to guarant[ee] a higher price in the future.  And in fact, what is likely to 
occur is we have a very real potential of the town of Castine for[e]closing its 
municipal real estate mortgage.” 
 
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[¶6]  On April 15, 2015, the court denied the motion to continue based on 
the time-sensitive situation and Joseph’s adequate opportunity to secure an 
attorney.  The court proceeded to hold the hearing that day after offering Joseph a 
brief opportunity to prepare; it received six exhibits and heard testimony from two 
witnesses—the prospective buyer and Barbara.  Joseph did not object, offer any 
evidence, or conduct any cross-examination during the hearing.  At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the court granted Barbara’s motion to enforce.  Joseph appealed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Motion for Continuance 
[¶7]  “In reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a 
continuance, we look first at the reasons contemporaneously presented in support 
of the request for the continuance because the party seeking a continuance has the 
burden of establishing a substantial reason why granting the continuance would 
further justice.” Daud v. Abdullahi, 2015 ME 48, ¶ 5, 115 A.3d 77 (citations 
omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  “We review a court’s denial of a motion to 
continue for an abuse of discretion examining whether the denial had any adverse 
prejudicial effect on the movant’s substantial rights and viewing each case largely 
upon its own facts and circumstances.”  State v. Dube, 2014 ME 43, 
¶ 13, 87 A.3d 1219 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
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[¶8]  Joseph contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to continue because he presented substantial grounds for the motion, 
including the death of his father and his need to obtain a lawyer.  Although he 
referred to it in his written motion, Joseph did not mention the death of his father at 
the hearing; rather, he argued only that he did not have adequate time to find a 
lawyer. 
[¶9]  Contrary to Joseph’s contention, the court did not exceed the bounds of 
its discretion in denying Joseph’s motion to continue.  The court appropriately 
considered the time-sensitive nature of the motion such that the property was 
subject to a possible foreclosure and a sale was ready to be consummated but for 
Joseph’s delay.  In addition, Joseph had sufficient time to secure an attorney.  In 
the two months that followed the filing of the motion to enforce, Joseph utilized, at 
least to a limited extent, the services of an attorney to address issues relating to the 
sale of the Water Street property.  Six days’ notice of the hearing date, in this 
context, is sufficient time to secure an attorney.  See Daud, 2015 ME 48, ¶¶ 6-8, 
115 A.3d 77 (holding that eight days’ notice before a hearing on a protection order 
was sufficient time to secure counsel). 
B. 
Motion for Expedited Hearing 
[¶10]  Joseph argues that the court erred in failing “to make any ruling 
whatsoever” on the motion for an expedited hearing.  Contrary to Joseph’s 
 
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assertion, the court indeed granted the motion for an expedited hearing as 
evidenced by the docket entry granting the motion and the notice of hearing issued 
on the same day.  In addition, Joseph contends that the court erred in failing to 
make findings on the motion for an expedited hearing because Maine Rule of Civil 
Procedure 107(b) states that “[n]o ruling granting substantive relief shall be made 
without notice and opportunity to be heard.”  In granting the motion, however, the 
court did not grant substantive relief; rather, it simply set the date of a future 
hearing for which Joseph was timely notified and afforded an opportunity to be 
heard. 
C. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[¶11]  Joseph alleges that (1) the trial court did not have sufficient evidence 
before it to find that the property would be sold in a commercially reasonable 
manner; and (2) allowing the sale for $300,000 constituted a “de facto modification 
of the original property distribution” because, in reaching their agreement, the 
parties contemplated a sale price of $515,000.  Because Joseph presented no 
evidence and never objected to any testimony or exhibit, the entirety of the 
evidence in the record is uncontroverted.  Both Barbara and the prospective buyer 
presented evidence showing that the fair market value of the property was around 
$300,000.  To that end, Barbara was competent to testify as to the value of her 
property as informed by brokers’ opinions.  See Peters v. Peters, 1997 ME 134, 
 
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¶ 14, 697 A.2d 1254.  Thus, because the record supports the court’s finding that the 
property was to be sold for its fair market value, Joseph has not demonstrated that 
any insufficiency in the sale process worked to his economic disadvantage. 
[¶12]  Joseph’s modification argument is also unpersuasive.  Joseph 
contends that the terms of the divorce judgment “allow him to live without a 
mortgage” on the Shore Road property following the sale of the Water Street 
property.  The terms of the agreement, however, do not provide a minimum sale 
price or any guarantee that the sale proceeds would satisfy the mortgage in its 
entirety.  Although this may have been the ultimate goal contemplated by Joseph in 
agreeing to the divorce settlement, the plain terms of the divorce judgment show 
that the sale is guided by commercial reasonableness only. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Ronald P. Lebel, Esq., and Sarah C. Mitchell, Esq., Skelton 
Taintor & Abbott, Auburn, for appellant Joseph O. Macomber 
 
Elizabeth A. Boepple, Esq., Lambert Coffin, Portland, for 
appellee Barbara A. (Macomber) Hero 
 
 
Ellsworth District Court docket number FM-2012-195 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY