Title: Florida Board. Of Bar Examiners Re: R.L.W.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC00-2111
____________
FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR 
EXAMINERS RE:  R.L.W.
[August 30, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner asks this Court to review the recommendation of the Florida Board
of Bar Examiners that his admission to The Florida Bar be denied.  We have
jurisdiction.   See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we
approve the Board’s recommendation that R.L.W. not be admitted at this time. 
Further, we approve the Board's recommendation that R.L.W. be disqualified from
reapplying for admission for a period of five years.
FACTS
On April 5, 1996, while a student at Saint Louis University School of Law,
R.L.W. executed a student registration with the Florida Board of Bar Examiners. 
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On June 2, 1998, R.L.W. converted the registration to an application for admission
to The Florida Bar.  During the course of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners'
character and fitness investigation, certain items of information reflecting adversely
on R.L.W.'s character and fitness were discovered.  After an investigative hearing,
the Board filed Specifications against R.L.W.  
Specification 1(a) alleged that R.L.W. failed to disclose in his Florida Bar
application that he had attended Western State University College of Law 
("Western State") during spring 1994.  Specification 1(b) alleged that R.L.W. failed
to disclose his delinquent and outstanding account at Western State in the amount
of $1,700.50.
Specification 2 alleged that in his 1998 supplement to his application to The
Florida Bar, R.L.W. continued with the failure to disclose his attendance at and
past indebtedness to Western State.  The Board noted that R.L.W. failed to
disclose this information even though a collection agency was handling R.L.W.'s
delinquent account during the nine months prior to the execution of the supplement,
and the fact that R.L.W. settled his delinquent account by payment of $1400 to
Western State University just two months prior to executing the supplement.
Specification 3 alleged that at the investigative hearing before the Board,
R.L.W. falsely testified that his reason for not disclosing his attendance at Western
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State was that he had no recollection of such attendance at the time he completed
the application and supplement, notwithstanding the recurrent and recent contact
with the collection agency.  
Specification 4 addressed R.L.W.'s 1995 application to Saint Louis
University School of Law.  Specification 4(a) alleged that R.L.W. falsely stated that
he had not attended any other colleges or universities.  Specification 4(b) alleged
that R.L.W. falsely stated that he had not enrolled for classes previously at any
other law school.  Specification 4(c) addressed a 1999 letter R.L.W. wrote to Saint
Louis University pursuant to a request by the Board, wherein R.L.W. informed the
university of his prior admission to Western State.  The Board alleged that R.L.W.
falsely stated in the letter that (i) he had "quickly" decided to withdraw from the
school, when he had actually withdrawn six weeks after commencing classes, and
(ii) he failed to recall his prior attendance at Western State.  In support of the latter
allegation, the Board noted that R.L.W. signed his application to Saint Louis
University only thirteen months after withdrawing from Western State.  
Specification 5(a) alleged that R.L.W. falsely stated on his 1995 "Application
for Registration as a Law Student" with the Committee on Character & Fitness of
the Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar that he was single when in
fact he was married.  In 5(b), the Board alleged that R.L.W. left blank that portion
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of the application which required the applicant to state the date of marriage and the
spouse's name.  
Specification 6 alleged that R.L.W. in his 1995 "Application and
Questionnaire for Registration as a Law Student" with the Committee of Bar
Examiners of the State Bar of California failed to disclose his prior attendance at
Western State by leaving blank that portion of the application requiring disclosure
of "Other "
Specification 7  addressed R.L.W.'s 1997 "Application for Certification of
Fitness to Practice Law" with the Supreme Court of Georgia.  Specification 7(a)
alleged that R.L.W. falsely stated that he had never been divorced, when in fact he
was divorced in 1996.  Specification 7(b) alleged that R.L.W. failed to disclose that
he had submitted an application to The Florida Bar.  Specification 7(c) alleged that
R.L.W. failed to disclose that he had attended Western State.  Specification 7(d)
alleged that R.L.W. falsely stated that he had never had an account turned over to a
collection agency.  Specification 7(e) alleged that R.L.W. further failed to disclose
his divorce by falsely stating that he had never been a party to litigation. 
Specification 7(f) alleged that R.L.W. falsely stated that he had never been charged
with a traffic violation, when he had received a speeding ticket in Pomona,
California, in 1994.  Specification 7(g) alleged that in response to an inquiry from
1.  The Board found that these Specifications were proven.
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the Georgia Office of Bar Admission, R.L.W. stated that he failed to disclose his
attendance at Western State because he "attempted to cancel the enrollment within
the first few days," when in fact he had attended classes at Western State prior to
withdrawing.  
Specification 8 alleged that in his 1998 Graduate Application for Admission
to Suffolk University's MBA program, R.L.W. failed to disclose his attendance at
Western State.    
R.L.W. executed a sworn Answer to Specifications in which he admitted the
allegations in Specifications 1, 2, 4(a), 4(b), 6,  7(c), 7(d), 7(f), and 8.1  As to
Specifications 3, 4(c)(i) and 7(g) (all relating to R.L.W.'s attendance at Western
State), R.L.W. admitted to giving the alleged testimony and statements, but denied
that they were lacking in candor.  R.L.W. admitted Specification 5 (failing to inform
the Alabama Bar that he was married), but stated that he inadvertently checked the
"Single" box and then failed to fill in the date of marriage and his spouse's name. 
R.L.W. admitted 7(e) (falsely stating to the Georgia Bar that he has never been a
party to litigation), but denied that he "continued to conceal" his divorce
proceedings.  R.L.W. denied Specifications 4(c)(ii) (that he falsely stated he failed
to recollect his attendance at Western State in his 1999 letter to Saint Louis
2.  Given the time frame, it appears that R.L.W. applied for this loan for
purposes of funding his legal education at the Saint Louis University College of
Law.
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University), 7(a) (that in his application to the Georgia Bar he denied ever being
divorced), and 7(b) (that he failed to disclose to the Georgia Bar his application for
admission to The Florida Bar).  Finally, R.L.W. asserted the affirmative defense of
rehabilitation.
At the formal hearing, R.L.W. continued to claim that he had forgotten about
his attendance at Western State and this was why he failed to disclose his
attendance in his application and supplement to the Florida Board of Bar
Examiners, to the state bars of Georgia and California, and to Suffolk University
and Saint Louis University.  The Board rejected R.L.W.'s explanations.  In support
of its conclusion, the Board noted that the formal hearing record included (1) a
statement of account from Western State showing R.L.W. to be indebted
$1,700.50 to the university; (2) a "Notice of Action Taken" dated September 13,
1995, informing R.L.W. that he had been rejected for a loan due to "delinquent
credit"2 (R.L.W. testified that he had never received this notice); (3) a record of
activity by the collection agency which demonstrated that R.L.W. had phone
conversations with the collections agents in October and December, 1997.  In these
conversations, R.L.W. advised the agents that he disputed the indebtedness and
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had no intention of paying; (4) R.L.W.'s application to Saint Louis University
College of Law which contained the following personal statement:  "While the law
has always been my passion, apathy and complacency settled in and I deferred
actual matriculation until now.";  and (5) R.L.W.'s testimony.  The Board ultimately
found that R.L.W.'s testimony was unworthy of belief and concluded that
Specification 3 (falsely testifying at the investigative hearing that he failed to recall
his attendance at Western State) had been proven.  In finding this Specification to
be proven, the Board concluded that Specification 4(c)(ii) (falsely writing to St.
Louis University that he failed to recall his prior attendance at Western State) was
proven as well.
In finding Specification 4(c)(i) to be proven (falsely telling Saint Louis
University that  he had "quickly" decided to withdraw from Western State), the
Board noted that at the hearing R.L.W. admitted he attended classes at Western
State University for "[t]wo to three weeks."  The Board concluded that R.L.W.'s
letter to Saint Louis University stating that he "quickly decided to withdraw" from
Western State lacked candor.  The Board referenced its findings in Specification 4
when finding that Specification 7(g) (falsely informing the Georgia Bar that he
attempted to cancel his enrollment with Western State "within the first few days,")
had been proven.  In reaching this finding, the Board further noted that R.L.W.
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"has repeatedly been untruthful in his prior dealings with others including the
Board."  The Board found Specification 5 to be proven, noting that even if R.L.W.
was separated at the time of his application to the Alabama Bar, he should have
checked either the "Married" or "Separated" box.
In finding Specifications 7(a) and 7(b) to be proven (failing to inform the
Georgia Bar that he had been divorced and that he had applied for admission to
The Florida Bar), the Board noted that there were discrepancies between the Office
of General Counsel's ("OGC's") copy of R.L.W.'s application to the Georgia Bar
and the copy of the same application upon which R.L.W. relied.  In the OGC copy
of the Georgia Bar application, R.L.W. stated that he had never been divorced, and
failed to disclose that he had applied for admission to The Florida Bar.  On the
other hand, the copy of the same application produced by R.L.W. stated that he
had been divorced and also listed that he had applied for admission to The Florida
Bar.  At the hearing, R.L.W. testified that the copy of the Georgia Bar application
in his possession was a true copy of the original as filed with the Georgia
authorities and that he had not revised his copy of the Georgia application.  The
Board inspected the applications and noted that in the copy of the Georgia Bar
application obtained by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners it appeared that the
original responses of "Florida 04/96" had been deleted and replaced with "Georgia
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11/97" and that an "x" had been deleted from the "yes" response to the question of
whether R.L.W. had ever been divorced.  The Board concluded that one of two
things had happened; either the Georgia Bar itself had altered R.L.W.'s application,
or R.L.W. (or someone on his behalf) changed the original application after it had
been copied by R.L.W. but prior to it having been forwarded to the Georgia Bar
admissions office.  The Board concluded that it was "unwilling to assume that
someone associated with the Georgia Office of Bar Admission made deletions and
additions for no apparent reason to [R.L.W.'s] sworn bar application."  As such,
the Board concluded that R.L.W. knowingly offered an altered copy of the true
Georgia Bar application in an attempt to deceive the Board, and that he testified
untruthfully at his formal hearing when he denied any knowledge that the copy of
the Georgia Bar application he presented had been altered.
The Board concluded that R.L.W.’s formal hearing presentation was
insufficient to establish the defense of rehabilitation by clear and convincing
evidence.  R.L.W. presented no witnesses other than himself and no exhibits other
than his copy of the application to the Georgia Bar.  R.L.W.'s only testimony was
that he (1) currently works for General Motors; (2) supports the Christian
Children's Fund; and (3) provides discarded newpapers to a homeless shelter.
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In recommending that R.L.W. not be admitted to The Florida Bar, the Board
found that the proven allegations of the Specifications were collectively
disqualifying.  The Board noted that Specifications 4-8 demonstrated R.L.W.'s
inability to be truthful during the period of April 1995 through July 1998 and that
Specifications 1-3 and R.L.W.'s formal hearing presentation demonstrate his
continuing inability to be truthful in his dealings with the Board.  Given R.L.W.'s
repeated misrepresentations and the egregious conduct of entering a fraudulent
exhibit into evidence at his formal hearing, the Board recommended that R.L.W. be
disqualified from reapplying for admission for a period of five years as authorized
by Florida Bar Admission Rule 3-23.6(d).
R.L.W. seeks review of the Board's recommendation, challenging the
Board’s findings that the proven Specifications are collectively disqualifying and
that R.L.W. knowingly entered an inaccurate document in an attempt to deceive the
Board.  R.L.W. further challenges the Board's recommendation that he not be
allowed to apply for a period of five years.
ANALYSIS
Challenges to Specifications:  Although R.L.W. phrased this issue as
whether the Specifications found by the Board are collectively disqualifying, the
challenge actually centers upon whether the Board properly found that R.L.W.
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intentionally failed to disclose information on bar and university applications. 
R.L.W. testified that his failure to provide this information was due to oversight or
inadvertence.  However, the Board did not find his testimony to be credible.  
This Court has held that the Board’s findings of fact should be approved if
they are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record.  See, e.g.,
Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re G.J.G., 709 So. 2d 1377, 1379 (Fla. 1998);  Florida
Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re M.C.A., 650 So. 2d 34, 35 (Fla. 1995).  The Court usually
defers to the Board’s findings on a witness’s credibility because the Board has had
the opportunity to observe the witness during testimony.  See Florida Bd. of Bar
Exam’rs re C.W.G., 617 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 1993) (adopting Board’s finding
that applicant lacked candor where the “Board observed that [the applicant’s]
credibility, during his testimony, was lessened by his demeanor, including the
manner in which he answered questions and the time he took to answer them”). 
The Board correctly asserts that it does not "have to believe [a] petitioner’s version
of events.”  Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re R.D.I., 581 So. 2d 27, 30 (Fla. 1991). 
Further, the Board may find that facts are proven by circumstantial evidence where
“the inference of the fact preponderates over other inferences.”  Id. at 29. 
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In the instant case, the Board found a great deal of circumstantial evidence
existed to belie R.L.W.'s assertion that his failures to disclose were merely
"oversights" or due to inadvertence:
(1)  R.L.W. testified that he never received the notice rejecting his loan
application for delinquent credit; rather, he learned of the rejection when he called
the agency that offered the loan.  At the formal hearing, when counsel for the Bar
asked R.L.W. if he had ever inquired as to why he had been rejected for the loan,
he claimed that he did not.  Arguably, anyone curious enough about his or her
educational loan application to call the agency for a status update would want to
know why it had been rejected.
(2)  The Bar submitted documentation that the credit agency representing
Western State spoke with R.L.W. on October 28, 1997.  Ten days later R.L.W.
had his application to the Georgia Bar notarized.  This application failed to disclose
his attendance at Western State.  It is difficult to believe that R.L.W. "forgot" about
his attendance at Western State in those ten days.  Even if R.L.W. filled out the
application before the phone call, he should have filed a supplement to his
application.  When asked why he waited for a letter from the Georgia Bar
requesting specific information regarding Western State before providing this
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information, R.L.W. testified, "I couldn't answer that question.  I guess I was--I
don't know."
(3)  R.L.W. paid his delinquent debt during the period of March and April,
1998.  Approximately three months later, R.L.W. applied to Suffolk University. 
Yet, he again failed to disclose his attendance at Western State in his graduate
application.  His only explanation was, "Well, consistent with all of the applications
in question here, it just did not register in my mind to list it." 
(4) R.L.W. admitted that his personal statement in his application to Saint
Louis University College of Law was totally inaccurate.  When a Board member
stated, "That message was not true when you wrote it to St. Louis. You had
matriculated and started your law school application some time before[,]"  R.L.W.
responded, "Right. That certainly would be inaccurate."
(5) R.L.W. testified that he fully intended to mark the "married" box on his
application for admission to the Alabama Bar.  When asked whether leaving that
portion of the application blank which required him to list the date of marriage and
name of spouse was consistent with checking the "single" box or the "married"
box, R.L.W. testified, "It is I guess consistent with single, but it was just an
oversight."
3.  We do not discuss Specifications 4(c)(1) and 7(g) in this opinion because
we conclude that the remainder of the Specifications are sufficient to disqualify
R.L.W. from admission to the Bar.
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The above list of inconsistencies between R.L.W.'s actions and his
testimony supports the Board's finding that R.L.W. was not a credible witness and
was not testifying truthfully.  Therefore, we defer to the Board's rejection of
R.L.W.'s explanations and conclude that R.L.W. on multiple occasions
intentionally failed to disclose information to various state bars and universities.3  
The Georgia Bar Application:  R.L.W. next challenges the Board's finding
that he knowingly entered an inaccurate document in an attempt to deceive the
Board.  The Board's determination that it was R.L.W., and not the Georgia Bar,
who changed the application is similarly an issue of witness credibility and
circumstantial evidence.  The Board could accept or reject R.L.W.'s version of
events and elected to reject it.  See R.D.I., 581 So. 2d at 30.  There was no direct
evidence as to who altered which document.  As such, the Board permissibly relied
on the logical and reasonable inference in concluding that R.L.W. made the
changes. See generally id. at 29.  There is no conceivable reason why the Georgia
Bar itself would alter R.L.W.'s sworn application (or why someone would forge a
Bar application in R.L.W.'s name).  As such, we approve the Board's conclusion
that R.L.W. had made alterations on the application prior to submitting it to the
4.  Under the Florida Bar Admission Rules, "[a]ll applicants seeking
admission to The Florida Bar shall produce satisfactory evidence of good moral
character . . . and proof that the applicant is otherwise fit to take the oath and
perform the obligations and responsibilities of an attorney."  Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 2-
12.  
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Georgia Bar and then testified falsely as to this fact based upon a false copy
presented at the hearing.  
The Five-Year Disqualification:  This Court has charged the Board of Bar
Examiners with "ensur[ing] that each applicant has met the requirements of the
Rules with regard to character and fitness, education and technical competence
prior to recommending an applicant for admission."  Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 1-14.2.4 
The rules inform Board members that they should "be just and impartial in
recommending the admission of applicants and should exhibit courage, judgment
and moral stamina in refusing to recommend applicants who lack adequate general
and professional preparation or who lack good moral character."   Fla. Bar
Admiss. R. 1-33.  In 1993, this Court approved a rule affording the Board the
specific discretion to recommend an extended disqualification period where the
case involves "material omissions or misrepresentations in the application process." 
Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 3-23.6(d).
Under the rules, the Board serves as the body to make the initial
determination of an applicant's fitness for admission to the Bar.  This Court has
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extended discretion to the Board to recommend enhanced restrictions where
material omissions or misrepresentations are determined to exist. Such
recommendations are rare and we accord respect to the Board when the Board
determines that the misrepresentations are so egregious that the circumstances
warrant a recommendation of an enhanced disqualification period.   
This Court, along with the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, is committed to
the proposition that issues of honesty, integrity and character will be fully and fairly
analyzed and properly addressed in connection with those who seek to assume a
position of trust and confidence through admission to The Florida Bar.  Those
serving on the Florida Board of Bar Examiners work long hours and provide an
essential public service as they strive to ascertain the presence or absence of
essential character traits before approving applicants for the privilege of serving
Florida citizens as members of The Florida Bar.  The task is not easy, but it is
essential and fundamental to support a system in which the people of Florida can
have trust and confidence.  If the Board were to sanction the admission of those
who demonstrate a continuing pattern of conduct reflecting a total absence of truth
and candor, or merely delay admission for an insignificant time period, the integrity
of the entire process itself would be properly subject to question.  The Board of
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Bar Examiners has been and must remain ever vigilant in its activities to serve and
protect the people of Florida. 
In the past this Court has held that “no qualification for membership in The
Florida Bar is more important than truthfulness and candor,”  Florida Bd. of Bar
Exam’rs re E.R.M., 630 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 1994), and that “[a] lack of
candor on the part of an applicant is intolerable and disqualifying for membership in
the Bar.”  Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re C.A.M., 639 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 1994); 
see also Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re R.B.R., 609 So. 2d 1302, 1304 (Fla. 1992)
("This Court will not tolerate a lack of candor from Bar applicants.  The ample
evidence of R.B.R.'s past misconduct and lack of veracity establish that R.B.R.
fails to meet the standards of conduct and fitness required of Bar applicants.").  
The Board has had the firsthand opportunity to hear the evidence and
evaluate the suitability of an applicant for entry into the practice of law.  Past
justices have frequently cautioned against the rejection of Board recommendations
of whether to admit an applicant to the practice of law.  See generally Florida Bd.
of Bar Exam'rs re J.A.S., 658 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1995) (Wells, J., Dissenting)
("It is the Board that has had J.A.S. before it in person and has that valuable basis
upon which to judge his credibility and his rehabilitation.  Since the Board, based
upon a thorough investigation and an in-the-flesh hearing, has not found that J.A.S.
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has overcome the substantial obstacle which he created for himself through past
misconduct, I do not believe we have a sound basis to substitute our judgment for
the Board's judgment that J.A.S. has failed to demonstrate at this time that he is
worthy of the trust of the public as a lawyer in our state."); see also Florida Bd. of
Bar Exam'rs re P.T.R., 662 So. 2d 334, 338 (Fla. 1995) (Wells, J., dissenting);
Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re S.M.D., 609 So. 2d 1309, 1313 (Fla. 1992) (Grimes,
J., dissenting);  Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'rs re D.M.J., 586 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla.
1991) (Grimes, J., dissenting).  We conclude that this Court needs to be equally
cautious when rejecting the Board's recommendation as to an enhanced period of
disqualification when presented with the facts established here.   The Board has not
abused this provision in the past and, as such, caution is particularly important
since the Board does not lightly invoke this provision.
The minority view voiced today focuses on what R.L.W. initially failed to
disclose and would conclude that this Court has approved less lengthy periods of
disqualification.  However, this Court should focus not solely on the initial
underlying conduct which R.L.W. failed to disclose or misrepresented (domestic
litigation, collection agency action, the withdrawal from Western State, a traffic
violation, and others), but on R.L.W.'s repeated and multiple failures to disclose
that conduct to multiple Bar associations, and his engagement in conduct designed
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to further hide the truth.  See generally Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re J.H.K., 581
So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. 1991) ("It is not the fact that petitioner was accused of eight
juvenile offenses which disqualifies him for admission to the bar.  Not only did he
leave them off his application, but also he subsequently gave conflicting accounts
concerning the manner in which he responded . . . .").  A review of the record
below more than demonstrates why the Board determined that an enhanced period
of disqualification is required and why it is appropriate.  When one of R.L.W.'s
misrepresentations surfaced, he did not simply clarify or correct matters.  Rather,
he attempted to bury it under further falsehoods.  This conduct continued into the
final hearing and further involved the submission of a false document during the
final hearing.    
The final defining act in R.L.W.'s lack of candor, and the factor that we feel
substantially distinguishes this case from those upon which the minority relies, is
R.L.W.'s presentation of an altered document at the disciplinary hearing.  R.L.W.
could have addressed the misrepresentations on his Georgia Bar application, or he
could have denied or explained apparent discrepancies.  Instead, he arrived at the
hearing with what the finder of fact has determined to be a false copy of the
application, which was different from the copy that the Office of General Counsel 
obtained from the Georgia Bar itself, and R.L.W. continued to assert that the
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document he presented at the final hearing was the true copy of the application. 
The Board observed R.L.W.'s deceit firsthand, and even though the Board
provided R.L.W. with multiple opportunities to "set the record straight," R.L.W.
continued in the attempt to cover up his misrepresentations with further falsehoods
and incredible explanations.  There is no credible evidence that the Georgia Bar
altered or had any reason to alter the application as R.L.W. would ask us to
conclude.
 
The Court has respectfully considered and analyzed each and every decision
upon which the minority relies to reject the recommendation of the Board. 
However, we conclude that not one of the cases cited in support of rejecting the
discretion exercised by the Board here addresses the present facts.  None of the
cases involves a Board recommendation for the enhanced disqualification, or even
any discussion of the applicable rule.  None of the cases involves the aggravating
factor of the submission of false documents during a final hearing before the
Board.  Finally, none of the cases involves misrepresentations to the Bar
associations of four states. 
The conduct demonstrated by R.L.W. here is a perfect example of what one
should not do if one wishes to be admitted into the practice of law in Florida.  This
is a classic example of what should not be done by a future lawyer.  Given this
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Court's continuing emphasis on the importance of candor and professionalism, and
the egregiousness of R.L.W.'s misrepresentations in this case, the record below is
more than sufficient to justify the Board's recommendation of an enhanced period
of disqualification.  Our words requiring integrity, honesty, fairness, respect, and
professionalism would ring hollow if we were to close our eyes to the submission
of false and altered documents during a formal hearing after an applicant has made
multiple misrepresentations in multiple Bar applications.  This case must be
regarded as more than simply one of the other more mundane circumstances that
pass through the application process from time to time supporting basic
disqualification for a shorter period of time.  As such, we conclude that the a five-
year period of disqualification as assessed in the Board's discretion is justified in
the instant case.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we approve the Board’s recommendation that R.L.W. be
denied admission to the Bar at this time.  In light of R.L.W.’s egregious and
repeated misrepresentations, we further approve the Board's recommendation that
R.L.W. not be permitted reapply for admission for a period of five years.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
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ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur in the Court’s opinion approving the Board’s recommendation
that R.L.W. not be admitted to the Florida Bar.  Simple honesty and integrity are
qualities absolutely essential and fundamental for those who seek to become
officers of this Court and to serve the citizens of Florida.  The Florida Board of
Bar Examiners has worked tirelessly to protect the citizens of Florida by
consistently emphasizing the fundamental nature of these qualities of honesty and
integrity for those who seek the privilege of practicing law in Florida.  All Florida
citizens, and especially members of the justice system, owe a debt of gratitude to
the Board for maintaining a sharp focus on these essential qualities.  Further, the
record before us fully supports the Board’s findings here and the recommendation
that R.L.W. not be admitted at this time.
While I would sustain the Board’s recommendation of denial, I would allow
reapplication in two years.  Whether petitioner will be able to prove his
rehabilitation in that time remains to be determined.  My concern, and my
disagreement with my colleagues in deviating from the standard two-year period
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before a new application may be filed, is that this deviation sharply conflicts with
our own prior decisions, which in many instances involve much more egregious
conduct but permit reapplication in two years.  I fear we are also embarking on a
course where we, and the Board, will be faced in every case of denial of admission
with the additional burden of determining when to allow reapplication, using
R.L.W.’s circumstances as a benchmark.  And, of course, our decisions will
largely be based upon speculation that rehabilitation cannot occur sooner.  
Not even one instance has been cited by the Board where the Board has
recommended and this Court has approved a ban on reapplication for five years. 
Perhaps more important, there are a host of instances in our case law where much
more serious misconduct, including criminal conduct or dishonesty, has been
involved, but reapplication has been permitted within the standard two years.  See,
e.g., Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re J.E.G.R., 725 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1999); Florida
Bd. of Bar Exam’rs re R.L.B., 660 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1995); Florida Bd. of Bar
Exam’rs re C.W.G., 617 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1993).  Indeed, we frequently discipline
practicing lawyers for much more serious misconduct with suspensions for terms
less than five years. 
Principled decision making requires that we act reasonably and consistently
in evaluating the circumstances of the cases before us.  With today’s decision, we
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must now be careful that our standards are both applied consistently and that they
appear to be applied consistently.  I fear we have deviated from that rule here. 
When all is said and done, what the Board has really decided is that R.L.W. cannot
possibly be rehabilitated in less than five years.  Traditionally, we have put off
speculating about that issue and left it to the applicant to shoulder the heavy burden
of demonstrating rehabilitation, and the Board’s good judgment in evaluating that
issue upon reapplication based upon the actual facts of the case.  Actual facts will
always trump speculation.  And, again, based upon today’s decision, even those
with criminal records will have the opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation while
R.L.W. waits more than twice the time to attempt to make his case. 
PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Original Proceeding - Florida Board of Bar Examiners
Richard A. Greenberg, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Kathryn E. Ressel, Executive Director, and Thomas A. Pobjecky, General Counsel,
Florida Board of Bar Examiners, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent