Title: PAGEL v. FRANSCELL

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PAGEL v. FRANSCELL2002 WY 16957 P.3d 1266Case Number: 01-201Decided: 11/19/2002
October Term, A.D. 2002

TOM 
PAGEL, as Director of the

WYOMING 
DIVISION OF

CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION,

and 
as Official Custodian of Certain

Concealed 
Firearm Permit Records,

Appellant(Petitioner) ,

 
 

v.

                                                                        

ANN 
FRANSCELL, and the

GILLETTE 
NEWS RECORD,

upon 
their request for Certain

Concealed 
Firearm Permit Records,

Appellees(Respondents) .

 
 

The Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
    

Representing 
Appellant:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; Hugh 
Kenny, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Bryan A. Skoric, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and T. Alan Elrod, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Messrs. Skoric and Elrod.

 
     

Representing 
Appellees:

Michael 
J. Krampner of Krampner, Fuller, and Hambrick, Casper, WY.  Argument by Mr. Krampner.

 
   

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

LEHMAN, 
Justice, delivered the opinion of the court.  GOLDEN, Justice, filed a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
    
  

*Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
     

LEHMAN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      This 
is an appeal from an order of the district court requiring appellant Tom Pagel, 
as director of appellant Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation 
(collectively DCI), to provide a list of all people living within Campbell 
County possessing a permit or license to carry a concealed weapon under Wyoming 
law to appellee Ann Franscell, as editor-in-chief of appellee Gillette 
News-Record (collectively Newspaper).   We reverse 
and remand.

 
   

ISSUES

[¶2]      DCI sets forth the 
following issues on appeal:

 
   
    

I.  Did the district court err as a matter of law 
in denying appellant's Rule 59 motion, where the intervening change in the 
controlling law, with its clear retroactivity clause, necessitated either a new 
trial or an amendment of the district court's order of March 21, 
2001?

 
 
               
           
            
      

II.  Did the district court err as a matter of 
law in holding that the names of concealed firearm permit holders were subject 
to release under the concealed firearm permit statute, Wyo. Stat. 
§ 6-8-104?

 
 
                
           
    

III.  Did the district court err as a matter of 
law by failing to apply the Public Records Act in determining whether appellant 
was entitled to refuse to disclose the records that appellees 
requested?

 
 
                
            
   

IV.  Did the district court err as a matter of 
law by ordering appellant to disclose the names of concealed firearm permit 
holders, where those orders mandate appellant to violate both state and federal 
law?

 
 
               
           
      

Newspaper phrases the issues on appeal as:

 

I.  Did the district court err in deciding that the Wyoming 
Public Records Act required access to the list of persons to whom concealed 
weapons permits had been issued, by applying the law which was in effect both on 
the day the records were requested and on the day the case was decided? 

 

II.  After a case between two parties has been decided, can 
the Legislature alter the decision in that case by changing the law 
"retroactively," consistent with the "separation of powers" doctrine and W.S. 
§ 8-1-107, when the words of the statutory amendment itself require a 
different result? 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On September 19, 
2000, Newspaper requested that DCI provide a list of all people living within 
Campbell County who had a valid permit or license to carry a concealed weapon 
under Wyoming state law.  On October 
3, 2000, DCI denied Newspaper's request indicating the language within Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104(n) (Lexis 1999) allowed release of the requested 
information solely to Wyoming law enforcement agencies and, notwithstanding that 
language, release of the information would do substantial injury to the public 
interest.  DCI also indicated 
release of the information would be contrary to the very purpose of the 
concealed firearm statute since it would directly subvert an individual's right 
to conceal from the public at large whether that individual was armed.  

 

[¶4]      On the same date 
of DCI's denial, DCI filed an action in the district court pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(g) (Lexis 1999), which allows a custodian to petition the 
court for an order restricting disclosure of a requested record, even if the 
record may be otherwise available to the public.  DCI asserted the requested records were 
not public records but, even in the event they were considered public records, 
release would do substantial injury to the public interest.  Immediately after a February 1, 2001 
hearing, the district court orally ordered DCI to release the names of concealed 
permit holders in Campbell County to Newspaper but offered to stay the 
enforcement pending appeal since the court recognized the potential for 
irreparable harm.  Shortly after the 
hearing, Newspaper submitted a proposed order to DCI for approval.  DCI refused to approve this proposed order and requested that a 
transcript of the hearing be prepared for review. Upon review of the transcript, 
DCI objected to the proposed order pursuant to W.R.C.P. 58 on February 21, 2001.

 
      
             
             
      

[¶5]      During this time 
frame, § 6-8-104 was amended to mandate that no lists or other records 
maintained by DCI or other law enforcement agencies, which identified an 
individual who concealed a firearm through permit, were to be considered a 
public record.  This amendment also 
specified that it was to have retroactive effect concerning all records 
regarding the application and issuance of concealed firearm permits and became 
effective on February 20, 2001.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-8-104 (LexisNexis 2001).

 
       

[¶6]      On March 21, 
2001, the district court entered its order in the form presented by Newspaper 
requiring DCI to disclose the requested information but staying enforcement of 
the order pending appeal.  On April 
2, 2001, DCI filed a motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, to alter or 
amend the district court's previously entered order.  On June 15, 2001, the district court 
held a hearing concerning this motion and requested additional briefing.  After considering this additional 
briefing, the district court entered an order denying DCI's motion.  This appeal followed.   

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      A hearing was 
held with the district court issuing specific findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.  In its recently published 
case of Hutchings v. Krachun, 2002 WY 98,  ¶10, 49 P.3d 176, ¶10 (Wyo. 2002), 
this court reiterated our standard of review:  

 

The 
purpose of specific findings of fact is to inform the appellate court of the 
underlying facts supporting the trial court's conclusions of law and disposition 
of the issues.  Hopper v. All Pet 
Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 1993).  While the findings of fact made by a 
trial court are presumptively correct, we examine all of the properly admissible 
evidence in the record.  Because 
this court does not weigh the evidence de novo, findings may not be set aside 
because we would have reached a different result.  Rather, the appellant has the burden of 
persuading the appellate court that the finding is erroneous.  Id.  See also Maycock v. Maycock, 2001 
WY 103, ¶11; 33 P.3d 1114, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001).  Findings of fact are not set aside 
unless inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary to the 
great weight of the evidence.  The 
definitive test of when a finding of fact is clearly erroneous is when, although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is 
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  A determination that a 
finding is against the great weight of the evidence means that a finding will be 
set aside even if supported by substantial evidence. Id.  See also Mathis v. Wendling, 962 P.2d 160, 163 (Wyo. 1998).  
Conclusions of law made by the trial court are not binding on this 
court and are reviewed de novo.  Maycock, ¶12.

(Emphasis added.)

 
 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      In its second 
issue raised on appeal, DCI asserts that the district court erred as a matter of 
law by failing to correctly interpret the Public Records Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-4-201 et seq.) in conjunction with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104 in determining 
that the records requested by Newspaper were public records.  Specifically, DCI 
contends that the correct interpretation of Wyoming law is that these records 
are not public records and public inspection is thereby prohibited.

 
     
            
       

[¶9]      In the case of 
Wyoming Cmty. College Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. College Dist., 2001 WY 86, 
¶¶16-18, 31 P.3d 1242, ¶¶16-18 
(Wyo. 2001), we set forth:
      

In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  Fontaine 
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo. 2000); State ex rel. 
Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983).  Legislative intent must be ascertained 
initially and primarily from the words used in the statute.  Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991); Phillips v. Duro-Last 
Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 837 (Wyo. 1991).  When the words are clear and 
unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible substitution of its own views, or 
those of others, for the intent of the legislature if any effort is made to 
interpret or construe statutes on any basis other than the language invoked by 
the legislature. Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d  at 219.  Moreover, "[a]ll statutes must be 
construed in pari materia; and in ascertaining the meaning of a given 
law, all statutes relating to the same subject or hav[ing] the same general 
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony."  Fontaine, 4 P.3d  at 894 
(citing State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d at 
735).

Therefore, 
in performing our review, we look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words to determine if the statute is ambiguous.  Olheiser v. State ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Parker Land 
& Cattle Company v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 
1993)).  A statute is clear and 
unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on 
its meaning with consistency and predictability.  Parker Land & Cattle, at 
1043. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain 
and subject to varying interpretations.  
Id.  We have said that 
divergent opinions among parties as to the meaning of a statute may be evidence 
of ambiguity.  Basin Electric 
Power Co-op. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo. 1978).  However, the fact that opinions may 
differ as to a statute's meaning is not conclusive of ambiguity.  Ultimately, whether a statute is 
ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court. 
Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d  at 219.

            
If we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general 
principles of statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent.  Petroleum Inc. v. State ex rel. State 
Bd. of Equalization, 983 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Parker Land 
& Cattle, 845 P.2d at 1044).

[I]n 
ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a statute . . . the court . . . 
must look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting 
surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the 
law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances that would 
enable the court intelligently to determine the intention of the lawmaking 
body.

Parker Land 
& Cattle Co. at 1044 
(quoting Carter v. Thompson Realty Co., 58 Wyo. 279, 131 P.2d 297, 299 (1942)).

 
  
 

We have also 
recognized that if a statute is deemed to be ambiguous, we must under the 
guidelines of statutory construction allow specific statutory language to 
control over prior generally stated statutory language.  In re Pohl, 980 P.2d 816, 820 (Wyo. 1999) and those cases cited therein.

 
  
      

[¶10]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-201(a)(v) (Lexis 
1999) states:
     
  

(v)  "Public 
records" when not otherwise specified includes the original and copies of any 
paper, correspondence, form, book, photograph, photostat, film, microfilm, sound 
recording, map drawing or other document, regardless of physical form or 
characteristics that have been made by the state of Wyoming and any counties, 
municipalities and political subdivisions thereof and by any agencies of the 
state, counties, municipalities and political subdivisions thereof, or received 
by them in connection with the transaction of public business, except 
those privileged or confidential by law[.]

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  While Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104 (Lexis 1999) 
does not particularly provide that concealed weapon license records are 
privileged or confidential by law, that statute does enunciate, in part, the 
following:

 
     
           
            
  

(g)  The 
sheriff of the applicant's county of residence shall submit a written report to 
the division containing any information that he feels may be pertinent to the 
issuance of a permit to any applicant.  
The written report shall state facts known to the sheriff which establish 
reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant has been or is reasonably 
likely to be a danger to himself or others, or to the community at large as a 
result of the applicant's mental or psychological state, as demonstrated by a 
past pattern or practice of behavior, or participation in incidents involving a 
controlled substance, alcohol abuse, violence or threats of violence as these 
incidents relate to criteria listed in this section.  . . .  The sheriff of the applicant's county of 
residence shall notify the chief of police, if any, of the applicant's place of 
residence of the application for a concealed firearm permit by the 
applicant.  The chief of police 
shall submit written comments to the division under the guidelines prescribed in 
this section.  Submitted comments 
shall not be considered a public record.  

. . .

(n)  The 
division shall maintain an automated listing of permit holders and pertinent 
information, and the information shall be available on-line, upon request, at 
all times to all Wyoming law enforcement agencies.

. . .

(z)  By March 1 of each year, the division shall 
submit a statistical report to the governor and to the joint judiciary interim 
committee indicating the number of permits issued, revoked, suspended and 
denied.

 
 
              
            
     

[¶11]   Looking first at § 6-8-104(n), 
since it is specifically focused upon the dissemination of lists of those 
holding permits to carry a concealed weapon and other information related to 
that topic, the very subject matter at issue here, this subsection allows only 
the dissemination of this information to Wyoming law enforcement agencies.  Stated conversely, therefore, this 
information is precluded from being released to the public, along with even law 
enforcement agencies outside of Wyoming.  
Clearly, the 
language utilized by the legislature in this subsection infers the legislature's 
intent to limit access to any lists of those holding permits to carry a 
concealed weapon and other related information.

 
          
             
         

[¶12]   Such intent of the legislature is 
also gleaned from review of § 6-8-104(z).  
This subsection plainly allows solely the dissemination of very limited 
types and amounts of statistical information concerning the area of concealed 
weapons to the governor and the joint judiciary interim committee.  Therefore, we must conclude that the legislature intended that specific 
information in this area other than statistical information regarding the number 
of permits issued, revoked, suspended, and denied should be protected and kept 
confidential.

 
      
          
         
        

[¶13]   Finally, review of § 6-8-104(g) 
explicitly states that written reports made by the local sheriff and chief of 
police located in the area of residence of a person applying for a concealed 
weapon permit shall not be considered public records.  Newspaper argues that this statement 
within subsection (g) makes it evident that the legislature intended that only 
these written reports should not be deemed public records and it follows that 
any other records in the concealed weapon arena must be considered a public 
record that may be disclosed.  
Indeed, the district court explicitly agreed and adopted this argument as 
a basis for its ultimate ruling.  
However, we do not 
agree.

 
    

[¶14]   Our analysis of this subsection 
leads us to the conclusion that the legislature was merely being exceedingly 
careful in its decree that any written reports of the applicable law enforcement 
officials be kept confidential and no other inference may be drawn from this 
expression.  The allowed written 
reports of these officials and the required background information that must be 
used as a basis for such comments are exceedingly private.   Indeed, as stated within this 
subsection, these statements must be based upon facts known to the law 
enforcement officials which establish reasonable grounds to believe that the 
applicant has been or is reasonably likely to be a danger to himself or others, 
or to the community at large as a result of the applicant's mental or 
psychological state, as demonstrated by a past pattern or practice of behavior, 
or participation in incidents involving a controlled substance, alcohol abuse, 
violence or threats of violence as these incidents relate to the issuance of a 
concealed weapon permit.   

 

[¶15]   Prohibiting dissemination of this 
information ensures the protection of the applicant, personally, along with his 
or her reputation within the community and surrounding area of residence.  Further, precluding the publication of 
these statements also provides a protection for the law enforcement officials 
involved since dissemination may result in retaliatory acts being taken against 
them for simply supplying their respective honest and verifiable comments 
concerning the issuance of a concealed weapon permit to any particular 
applicant. Accordingly, we hold that the language used within subsection (g) by 
the legislature was meant solely as a carefully thought out prophylactic measure 
to ensure that the written reports submitted by law enforcement officials called 
for under the statute be kept confidential.  

 

[¶16]   Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, a simple reading of § 6-8-104 in pari materia leaves little 
question that release of a list of concealed weapon permit holders is contrary 
to the very nature of the statute.  
Simply put, what good is a concealed weapon permit if the identity of 
those who are issued such a permit is of general public knowledge?  If we were to hold that lists of those 
issued concealed weapon permits may be released to the general public, such 
would defeat the very purpose of the concealed weapons law itself.  We cannot infer that the legislature would 
have purposefully intended such a result.

 
      
      

[¶17]   We do not find the language used 
within § 6-8-104 to be ambiguous.  
Review of the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the words used therein 
makes it evident that the legislature only intended to provide limited access to 
any lists of those holding permits to carry a concealed weapon and other related 
information and that this information should therefore not be considered a 
public record which may be released to the general public.  Alternatively, even if we were to conclude that this statute might be 
construed as being ambiguous, application of the proper rules of interpretation 
lead us to the same conclusion.

 
      
            
          

[¶18]   Our determination is based on 
interpretation of the Public Records Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-201 et seq.) in 
conjunction with § 6-8-104 prior to its modification during the 2001 legislative 
session.  The 2001 amendment is 
telling and is supportive of our ultimate decision; the legislature explicitly 
includes a statement that the information sought to be disclosed by Newspaper is 
not to be considered a public record.  
Specifically, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104 (bb) (LexisNexis 2001) provides:

 
         

(bb)  No list or other record maintained by the 
division or other law enforcement agency pursuant to this section, which 
identifies an individual applicant or permittee shall be considered a public 
record.

 
 
             
           
      

The 
legislature went further to explicitly provide that the provisions of § 
6-8-104(bb) shall apply retroactively to all records regarding the application 
and issuance of permits regarding concealed firearms under this section.  2001 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 63, § 2.  Hence, the legislature could not have been 
any more clear in its desire to limit the access to any lists of those holding 
permits to carry a concealed weapon and other related information and that such 
information should not be considered a public record which may be released to 
the general public.

 
      
                
            
             
    

[¶19]   Further, while we suppose that one 
could assert that the amendments to § 6-8-104 clarify that the legislature did 
not previously intend to limit access to the records sought by Newspaper, we do 
not believe that such is the case.  
To the contrary, the modifications made by the Wyoming legislature in 
2001 must be seen as merely a clarification of the legislature's original 
intentions concerning the limited dissemination of the names and identities of 
those issued a concealed weapons permit.  
Thus, these 
modifications may only be interpreted as an act by the legislature to leave no 
doubt as to this matter.

 
            
         

[¶20]   We also note that the legislature 
further amended § 6-8-104 at subsection (bb) in 2001 to provide that 
applications, listings, and other records maintained pursuant to this section 
which identify an individual shall be made available to other law enforcement 
agencies for purposes of conducting official business.  In addition, the legislature decreed 
that the statistical report provided pursuant to subsection (z) of this section 
shall be a public record.  These 
additional modifications by the legislature do not lessen our resolve that the 
legislature, from the inception of enactment of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104, 
desired to limit access to any lists of those holding permits to carry a 
concealed weapon and other related information.  Rather, these modifications simply clarify the legislature's intention to 
be cooperative with other law enforcement agencies outside of Wyoming in this 
area and to provide the general public with at least some information concerning 
the issuance of concealed weapons permits through the release of general 
statistics without obliterating the very purpose of the concealed weapons 
law.

 
    
           
              
           
           
    

[¶21]   Finally, as our holding concerning the 
second issue raised on appeal by DCI is dispositive of this case, we find no 
necessity to address any other issues brought before this court by the parties 
upon appeal as they are rendered moot.

 
     
                
             
      

CONCLUSION

 

[¶22]   Given those reasons set forth 
above, we reverse the order entered by the district court requiring DCI to 
provide a list of all people living within Campbell County, Wyoming who 
currently had a permit or license to carry a concealed weapon under Wyoming law 
to Newspaper and further remand this matter back to the district court for entry 
of an order consistent with this opinion. 

GOLDEN, 
J., 
specially concurring.

[¶23]      The 
Court holds that in three subsections of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104 (Lexis 1999), 
the concealed weapons law, as well as from "the very purpose" of that law, the 
Wyoming legislature inferentially designated that the list of citizens given 
concealed weapon permits is privileged or confidential and, therefore, not a 
public record which must be disclosed to the public.  Further, the Court concludes that the 
Wyoming legislature's 2001 amendment, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-104(bb) (LexisNexis 
2001), which expressly declares that the list of concealed weapon permit holders 
is not a public record, "must be seen as merely a clarification of the 
legislature's original intentions . . . ."  
Because I disagree with the Court's analysis, but think that the 2001 
amendment applies to Franscell's request, I concur in the result of the Court's 
opinion.

 
            
             

[¶24]      In 
the Wyoming Public Records Act, the legislature has declared that the term 
"public records" does not include documents made or received by any agencies of 
the state in connection with the transaction of public business if the documents 
are made  "privileged or 
confidential by law."  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-4-201(a)(v) (Lexis 1999).  
Over the years this Court has consistently maintained that it liberally 
construes the Act in favor of disclosure and narrowly construes exceptions.  Houghton v. Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Wyo. 1994).   I am 
inclined to think that exceptions to disclosure, like exceptions to liability 
(immunity), must be expressed, not implied.  The legislature has shown over the years 
in different areas that it knows how to word express exceptions.  In fact, within § 6-8-104(g), in which 
the Court claims to find an implication of confidentiality for the requested 
list, the legislature used obvious language to except from disclosure the 
written comments of a chief of police:  
"Submitted comments shall not be considered a public record."  It would have been easy for the 
legislature to use like language in subsection (g) or subsections (n) and (z) of 
§ 6-8-104 had the legislature intended to except the requested list from 
disclosure.  That it did not is 
dispositive for me.

 
     
  

[¶25]      Let 
me say a few words about "the very purpose" of the concealed weapons law.  The Court identifies that purpose to be 
concealing the identity of concealed weapon permit holders from general public 
knowledge.  I am not so sure.  As I shall explain, I am more inclined 
to think that the law's purpose is to protect the law-abiding citizen and the 
public from the violent crimes which have become all too prevalent in today's 
society.  Once upon a less 
crime-ridden time, many states, including Wyoming,1 had laws that prohibited an 
individual from carrying a concealed weapon.  Clayton E. Cramer and David B. Kopel, 
"Shall Issue": The New Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 679, 681 (1995).  Such laws 
were "designed to prevent a person with a weapon from taking some undue 
advantage over an unsuspecting adversary who is not aware that the person is 
carrying a weapon."  Dorelus v. 
State, 747 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Stated in a slightly 
different way, secondary authority informs us that the object of the prohibition 
was "clearly that of protecting the public by preventing an individual from 
having on hand a weapon of which the public is unaware, and which might be used 
by that individual in a fit of passion."  
79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons and Firearms § 8 
(1975).

 
   

[¶26]      In 
Wyoming, in 1957, the legislature established a "discretionary issue" procedure 
under which county sheriffs in their discretion could issue permits to carry 
weapons to "travelers, merchant police, private detectives, or other persons who 
may be required by their work, vocation or profession to carry a weapon or 
weapons."  1957 Wyo. Sess. Law ch. 
201, § 1; Wyo. Stat. § 6-239 (Michie 1957).  Factors bearing on the sheriff's 
exercise of discretion were the applicant's general reputation and previous 
criminal record; the sheriff could revoke an issued permit at any time if the 
sheriff believed that the permitee's conduct was contrary to the best interests 
of the state or its subdivisions.  
Id.  In 1994, the 
Wyoming legislature dramatically changed the law.  1994 Wyo. Sess. Law ch. 41, § 1.  The legislature abolished the 
"discretionary issue" system and replaced it with the "shall issue" system we 
have today which vests in the state attorney general the authority to issue 
concealed weapon permits.  
Id.  Thus, Wyoming 
joined the growing number of states that have facilitated more liberal issuance 
of permits.  John C. Lenzen, 
Liberalizing the Concealed Carry of Handguns by Qualified Civilians:  The Case For "Carry Reform," 47 
Rutgers L. Rev. 1503, 1504 n.4, 1506-07 (1995).  According to some, "[c]arry reform is a 
legislative movement in which the states are unequivocally rejecting the 
assumption that civilians are incompetent to carry handguns in preparation for 
the lawful resistance of criminal aggression."  Id. at 1507.  It has been reported that 

empirical 
evidence from those states with liberal concealed carry laws strongly suggests 
that carry reform . . . [does] not threaten public safety.  Other data indicate that more prevalent 
concealed carry may be a powerful weapon in the fight against violent crime in 
two ways:  (1) 
empowering individuals to defend against violent crime; and (2) deterring the 
commission of violent crimes in general.

 
  
            
   

Id. 
at 1513.  And, it has been said that 
"[t]aken as a whole, [the] evidence suggests that more widespread and 
well-publicized concealed carry may reduce the rates of violent crime by 
deterring criminal behavior."  
Id. at 1514.  
Moreover, it has been said that "the available evidence suggests that gun 
ownership among potential crime victims has as much, if not more, of an effect 
on violent crime than the activities of the entire criminal justice 
system."  Id. at 
1536.

 
 

[¶27]      In 
the final analysis, whether the validity of these reports, evidence, data, and 
statements is borne out in the long run remains to be seen.  But it cannot be doubted that the 
pendulum of public policy, as declared by the legislatures of the carry reform 
states, has swung over the century from protecting the public by preventing an 
individual from carrying a weapon to protecting the law-abiding individual and 
the public from violent crimes by permitting the law-abiding individual to carry 
a weapon.  And, given that 
dramatic swing of the pendulum, I am more inclined to think that the true 
purpose of the current concealed weapon law is one of protecting the law-abiding 
citizen and the public from violent crimes which have become all too commonplace 
in our contemporary times.

 
    
                
            
             
 

[¶28]      Let 
me say a few words now about the applicability of the 2001 amendment to 
Franscell's request.  Because the 
Court decided this case on a different ground, it did not address the issue 
whether the 2001 amendment, by which the legislature expressly designated the 
requested list not to be a public record, applied so as to preclude 
disclosure.  The parties did address 
that issue, and I shall, albeit briefly, because I think that that amendment 
applies in this case.  Pagel, the 
custodian of the requested list, relied on the 2001 amendment as an alternative 
ground for non-disclosure.  The 
amendment, which was expressly retroactively applicable to concealed weapon 
permit records, became effective February 20, 2001, before the entry of the 
district court's order of March 21, 2001, requiring Pagel's disclosure of the 
requested list to Franscell.  In 
their respective legal briefs on this point and related points, Pagel and 
Franscell thrust and parry concerning whether the district court decided the 
case on February 1, 2001, the date of the hearing, or on March 21, 2001, the 
date of the court's order, and whether the legislature can alter the outcome of 
a case by changing the law retroactively.  
I shall not go into the details of the respective arguments on these 
several points; it is, I think, a close call.  I am more inclined to conclude, however, 
that Pagel has the better legal position.  
Therefore, I would hold that the legislature's 2001 amendment, with its 
express designation that the requested list is not a public record, is 
dispositive.  Because the 
legislature designated that the requested list is not a public record, Pagel 
need not have disclosed it.

 
  
            
    

FOOTNOTES

1Before 
statehood in 1890, a Wyoming Territorial law prohibited carrying concealed 
weapons.  1890 Wyo. Terr. Sess. Laws 
ch. 73, § 96.  Upon statehood, this 
became state law.  1890 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 35, § 1.  It remained law 
until amendment in 1957.  1957 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 201, § 1; Wyo. Stat. § 6-239 (Michie 1957).