Title: Politi v. Tyler

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Politi v. Tyler (98-245); 170 Vt. 428; 751 A.2d 788

[Filed 07-Apr-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of 
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-245

Francis Politi	                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Chittenden Superior Court	

Janet L. Tyler, PhD	                         May Term, 1999

Linda Levitt, J.

Thomas C. Nuovo of Bauer, Anderson & Gravel, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Patricia S. Orr of Wilson Powell & Lang, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Defendant Dr. Janet Tyler appeals a Chittenden
  Superior Court  decision denying her motion for dismissal and for judgment
  on the pleadings, as well as her  summary judgment motion against plaintiff
  Francis Politi in this suit for malpractice and  intentional infliction of
  emotional distress.  Defendant argues that it was error for the court to 
  reject her motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings because she
  had judicial  immunity or, in the alternative, witness immunity.  Defendant
  also argues that she is entitled to  summary judgment against plaintiff's
  malpractice claims because the statute of limitations has  expired, or in
  the alternative, because she owed plaintiff no duty of care.  Plaintiff
  cross-appeals,  arguing that the court erred in dismissing her
  intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims  because it incorrectly
  measured the discovery date of her injury.  We affirm.  

 

       Plaintiff and her husband, David Alexander, were divorced in 1990
  pursuant to an order  Chittenden Family Court order.  In early 1993,
  plaintiff was involved in a custody and visitation  dispute with her
  ex-husband regarding their minor child.  On March 18, 1993, the Chittenden
  Family  Court issued an order that read: "Forensic evaluation will be done.
  . . .  Counsel to let us know  [within] a week who to engage for a forensic
  evaluation."  The evaluation was intended to assist the  court in
  determining the best interests of the child pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 667(b).

       Defendant, a licensed psychologist, contracted with plaintiff and Mr.
  Alexander to conduct  the evaluation, with all fees to be paid equally by
  the parties.  During May and June 1993, defendant  met with plaintiff, the
  child, the ex-husband, and others whom the parties identified as having 
  information relevant to the custody proceeding.  In June 1993, defendant
  prepared a report detailing  her psychological evaluation, which she
  distributed to the parties in September 1993.  Defendant  testified about
  her evaluation and recommendation before the family court on March 22,
  1994.  On  May 5, 1994, plaintiff and her ex-husband stipulated to a
  modified custody agreement.

       On May 5, 1997, plaintiff brought suit against defendant for slander,
  malpractice, and  intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Plaintiff
  alleged that as a result of defendant's breach of  her duty to
  professionally perform the forensic evaluation and defendant's subsequent
  testimony  based on that evaluation, plaintiff was forced to stipulate to
  joint custody with David Alexander of  her youngest son and forced to
  continue to fight for the custody of her son.  

       Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings
  or, in the alternative, a  motion for summary judgment.  Defendant claimed
  she had absolute judicial immunity as a court  appointed expert.  In the
  alternative, defendant contended that she had immunity as a witness in a 
  judicial proceeding; that all of plaintiff's claims were barred by the
  statute of limitations; that her 

 

  testimonial privilege precluded plaintiff's claim for slander; and that she
  did not owe any duty to  plaintiff that would support a malpractice claim. 
  The court rejected defendant's judicial immunity  defense.  The court
  declined to dismiss the malpractice claim, concluding that defendant owed a
  duty  of care to plaintiff and that the claim included economic damages
  governed by a six-year statute of  limitations.  The court dismissed
  plaintiff's intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because  the
  statute of limitations had expired.  Plaintiff agreed to dismissal of her
  slander claim.  

       Defendant now appeals, arguing that the superior court erred in
  rejecting her claim of judicial  immunity.  Defendant further contends that
  the court failed to consider her argument that witness  immunity precludes
  plaintiff's claims even if the court correctly concluded that defendant was
  not  entitled to judicial immunity.  Defendant also asserts that the court
  erred in holding that she owed a  duty of care to plaintiff.  Finally,
  defendant argues that the court erred in determining that the  applicable
  statute of limitations for plaintiff's claim is six years.  Plaintiff
  cross-appeals, arguing that  her
  intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim was filed within the
  applicable three-year  statute of limitations.(FN1)

       For defendant's claims that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of
  law on the pleadings, we  consider all the factual allegations in the
  pleadings of the nonmoving party and all reasonable  inferences that can be
  drawn from them to be true and allegations to the contrary by the moving
  party  to be false.  See In re Estate of Gorton, 167 Vt. 357, 358,