Title: Staples v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-2485 
____________ 
 
WARREN STAPLES, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[October 6, 2016] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
Warren Staples seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal in Staples v. State, 161 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), on the ground that 
it expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of the First, Second, and Fourth 
District Courts of Appeal in Bennett v. State, 684 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), 
Bell v. State, 643 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), and Diaz v. State, 629 So. 2d 
261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), on a question of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we approve the Fifth District’s 
holding in the instant case and disapprove the conflict cases to the extent that they 
are inconsistent with our decision. 
 
 
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FACTS 
On August 28, 2012, Petitioner Warren Staples pleaded guilty to one count 
of traveling to meet a minor under section 847.0135(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2011).1  
Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and, as part of a stipulated downward departure 
sentence, was sentenced to six days time served and five years of sex offender 
probation.  Condition 17 of Petitioner’s sex offender probation required Petitioner 
to actively participate in and successfully complete a sex offender treatment 
program.  See § 948.30(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2011).  Neither “active participation” nor 
“successful completion” is defined by statute.  See §§ 948.30(1)(c), 948.001, Fla. 
Stat. (“Definitions”). 
From November 2012 to March 2013, Petitioner attended a sex offender 
treatment program with ITM Group.  However, on March 22, 2013, Petitioner was 
discharged from the program for refusing to admit to any sexual misconduct 
necessitating treatment.2  As a result of being terminated, Petitioner was charged 
with violating Condition 17 of his probation.  Staples, 161 So. 3d at 562-63.  
Petitioner was not alleged to have violated his probation on any other grounds.   
                                          
 
 
1.  Petitioner was also charged with solicitation of a minor via computer, § 
847.0135(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011), and attempted lewd or lascivious battery, §§ 
800.04(4)(a), 777.04.  However, the State entered a nolle prosequi on those counts. 
 
2.  Admitting fault or some form of deviant sexual misconduct is a required 
part of ITM Group’s sex offender treatment program. 
 
 
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At the violation of probation hearing, Petitioner’s therapist, Jack Stultz, 
testified that Petitioner was first admitted into the program on a trial basis to 
determine his amenability for treatment.  This trial period typically lasts for two 
months but was extended in Petitioner’s case to give him an opportunity to admit 
responsibility for any deviant or inappropriate behaviors to be addressed as part of 
the program.3  Dr. Stultz also testified that Petitioner actively participated in the 
program and had not missed any sessions since January, when Petitioner was 
transferred to Dr. Stultz’s sessions.4  Petitioner’s probation officer testified that 
Petitioner was substantially in compliance with the other conditions of his 
probation and that he was found to be in violation solely because of his continued 
denial of any deviant conduct. 
Petitioner testified that he entered his guilty plea because he felt it was in his 
best interest.  Both the transcript and judgment form from Petitioner’s original plea 
hearing indicate that Petitioner pleaded guilty.  The judgment form included 
options for pleading “Guilty-Best interest” and nolo contendere, but neither option 
                                          
 
 
3.  Dr. Stultz opined that a client is not amenable to treatment if that client is 
not willing to admit that he or she has a problem. 
 
4.  Petitioner began treatment with another therapist in the ITM Group, but 
was transferred to Dr. Stultz after a change in employment required that he attend 
night sessions instead.  Petitioner provided the only testimony about his attendance 
while being treated by the first therapist in November and December and stated 
that he could not remember having any absences. 
 
 
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was selected.  Upon entry of his guilty plea, Petitioner was not required to admit in 
court that he had actually committed the charged offense, nor was he advised prior 
to the entry of his plea that the ITM Group treatment program would require him to 
admit some sexually deviant behavior.  Staples, 161 So. 3d at 562.  Before his 
admittance into the treatment program, Petitioner’s probation officer instructed 
Petitioner on the conditions of his probation, including Condition 17.  However, 
those conditions did not expressly include the requirement that Petitioner admit 
any wrongdoing, nor did the probation officer disclose this program requirement 
until later on during Petitioner’s treatment.  Nonetheless, Petitioner and his 
probation officer both acknowledged that before his discharge, Petitioner was 
made aware that continuing to deny sexual misconduct could result in his 
termination from the program, thereby violating his probation.  Petitioner testified 
that he was willing to finish the program, despite its financial strain on him.  
Neither Petitioner nor his probation officer investigated or discussed alternative 
programs Petitioner could attend that would not require an admission of guilt or 
wrongdoing.5     
                                          
 
5.  Notably, this record does not demonstrate that any such programs exist.  
Dr. Stultz only testified that he knew other programs existed but did not know what 
their requirements were.  Petitioner testified that no one indicated to him whether 
other programs not including the admission requirement existed. 
 
 
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At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court initially struggled to 
reconcile Petitioner’s lack of notice of the admission requirement with the 
probation condition that Petitioner successfully complete the sex offender 
treatment program.6  However, upon being presented with case law—specifically, 
Mills v. State, 840 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)—the trial court found that even 
if Petitioner did not have notice that he would be required to admit guilt as a 
condition of his probation, Petitioner’s best recourse upon discovering the 
requirement was to move to set aside his plea on that basis.  Thus, the court 
revoked Petitioner’s probation, finding that the State presented sufficient evidence 
of a violation. 
The Fifth District affirmed the revocation: 
On appeal, Staples argues that his dismissal from the sex offender 
treatment program based on his repeated refusal to admit to engaging 
in deviant sexual behavior cannot constitute a willful and substantial 
violation of probation where he was never advised, prior to the entry 
of his plea, that his admission to such behavior would be required.  
Although Staples may not have been aware of this requirement at the 
time of the entry of his plea, the record reflects that he was made 
aware of the necessity to acknowledge his offending behavior months 
before he was dismissed from the program.  Upon learning of the full 
                                          
 
 
6.  The trial judge’s first impression was that the probation order “leaves out 
any requirement for admitting.  And although [Petitioner’s probation officer] and 
ITM might have said he has to admit[,] I can’t violate somebody for orders created 
by probation or by counseling services.  I can only violate for orders created by, in 
this case, Judge Polodna and this Court.”  He also stated, “Probation doesn’t have 
the authority to create conditions of probation.  I can’t violate him for a condition 
of probation that probation tells the defendant he has to do.” 
 
 
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consequences of his plea, Staples’ remedy was to either file a written 
motion to withdraw his plea, or a motion to vacate his judgment and 
sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  
Because Staples did neither, we conclude that the trial court could 
properly revoke his probation. 
 
Staples, 161 So. 3d at 562 (footnotes omitted).  The district court found that given 
the treatment program’s requirement that an offender admit sexual misconduct in 
order to complete the program, it was Petitioner’s “decision to refuse to take the 
steps necessary to complete the treatment program” and accepting Petitioner’s 
argument “would, in essence, excuse [Petitioner] from performance of a 
legislatively mandated probation condition.”  Id. at 563.  Petitioner appeals this 
decision on the basis of conflict jurisdiction. 
ANALYSIS 
Petitioner argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that 
Petitioner willfully and substantially violated his probation by refusing to admit to 
some type of deviant behavior to be addressed by the sex offender treatment 
program.  Whether a violation of probation is willful and substantial and has been 
demonstrated by the greater weight of the evidence is a question of fact for the trial 
court.  State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 2002).  The decision to revoke 
probation based on a willful and substantial violation is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  Id.  However, where the issue presented is a question of law, the 
standard of review is de novo.  Adams v. State, 979 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla. 2008); 
 
 
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Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222, 229 (Fla. 2007).  While we will need to 
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, the conflict issue here 
presents the legal question of whether a refusal to admit sexual misconduct can 
constitute a violation of probation.  As such, this initial question of law is reviewed 
de novo. 
I.  The Conflict Issue 
The trial court and the Fifth District in the instant case found the refusal to 
admit wrongdoing to be a violation of the probation condition requiring successful 
completion of a sex offender treatment program because such refusal results in the 
offender’s discharge from the program he was required to successfully complete.  
See Mills, 840 So. 2d at 467 (“Mills did not express any interest in successfully 
completing a [sex] offender program in which he would have to admit his guilt.  
Successful completion of the program, however, was dependent on such an 
acknowledgment.  Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding a 
violation.”); Arias v. State, 751 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (finding that 
probationer’s refusal to accept full responsibility for his criminal conduct 
“obviously precludes his successful completion of this program”); Archer v. State, 
604 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“Archer adamantly maintained at the 
hearing that he had no sexual problem and expressed no willingness to . . . comply 
with the condition of probation.”).  Courts following this approach have found the 
 
 
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refusal to admit wrongdoing a willful and substantial violation because upon 
becoming aware of the admission requirement, the offender should have made a 
motion to withdraw the plea or vacate the judgment.  Staples, 161 So. 3d at 562; 
Mills, 840 So. 2d at 466-67; Archer, 604 So. 2d at 563.  Having done neither, the 
offender can have his or her probation revoked by the trial court, regardless of 
whether the offender was made aware of the requirement prior to the entry of the 
plea.  Staples, 161 So. 3d at 562; Mills, 840 So. 2d at 466-67; Archer, 604 So. 2d at 
563. 
On the other hand, the conflict cases consider the program requirement of 
admitting wrongdoing to be a new, additional condition of probation, not imposed 
by the trial court.  Bennett, 684 So. 2d at 243 (recognizing that probation condition 
required probationer to “enter into and successfully complete” a sex offender 
treatment program, but finding that “no condition of probation was imposed that 
required him to admit to a counselor the sexual acts charged”); Bell, 643 So. 2d at 
675 (“The probation order did not require that [probationer] admit to the 
underlying charges.”); Diaz, 629 So. 2d at 262 (“No specific condition of probation 
was imposed requiring [probationer] to admit to a counselor the specific acts 
charged.”).  Accordingly, those courts find that the refusal to admit is not a willful 
and substantial violation because (1) a trial court cannot revoke probation for 
violation of a condition that was imposed by someone other than the trial judge, 
 
 
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i.e., a probation officer or therapist;7 and (2) the probationer had no notice prior to 
the entry of the plea that he or she would be required to admit sexual misconduct.  
Bennett, 684 So. 2d at 243; Bell, 643 So. 2d at 675; Diaz, 629 So. 2d at 262.8  This 
second rationale appears to be based on the idea that “a defendant could not 
                                          
 
 
7.  See Kiess v. State, 642 So. 2d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) 
(“Violation of a condition which is imposed by a probation officer, rather than an 
express condition of the trial court, cannot serve as a basis for revocation of 
probation.”). 
 
8.  Respondent argues that these cases are distinguishable in several ways.  
First, he asserts that they are distinguishable because they each require the 
probationer to accept responsibility for or admit to the crime charged; whereas in 
this case, Petitioner was required only to admit wrongdoing or deviant sexual 
behavior in general.  However, it is not clear from the record in this case whether 
Petitioner was required to admit guilt or simply acknowledge deviant behavior.  
Further, if this factor distinguishes the conflict cases, it also distinguishes the very 
case upon which Respondent himself relies because the offender in Mills was also 
required to “take responsibility for his offending behaviors” and “admit his guilt.”  
Mills, 840 So. 2d at 466; see also Arias, 751 So. 2d at 186-87. 
Respondent also argues that the cases are distinguishable because they 
involve probationers who were not on sex offender probation but instead received, 
as special conditions of their probation, conditions with language similar to the 
successful completion condition of sex offender probation.  However, Respondent 
does not explain why such fact precludes the reasoning from being applied 
similarly to other types of probation cases.  See Adams, 979 So. 2d at 926-27 
(applying principle from drug offender probation case to sex offender probation 
case). 
 
Lastly, Respondent argues that Bell and Diaz are distinguishable because the 
conditions in both cases required something less than “completion” of treatment.  
Bell, 643 So. 2d at 674 (requiring that offender “submit to” counseling); Diaz, 629 
So. 2d at 261 (requiring offender to “receive” treatment or counseling).  However, 
in neither case was that fact relevant to the way the district court decided the 
willful and substantial violation issue.  As such, the conflict cases cited by 
Petitioner are not distinguishable on the bases offered by Respondent. 
 
 
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willfully violate a condition of probation without being on adequate notice of the 
conduct that is prohibited.”  Lawson, 969 So. 2d at 230. 
We reject the rule from Bennett, Bell, and Diaz that requiring an offender to 
admit sexual misconduct is an impermissible third-party condition that cannot 
serve as the basis of a revocation.  Instead, we recognize the admission 
requirement not as a probation condition on its own but as an internal, program-
specific requirement that may or may not cause an offender to violate the 
“successful completion” condition of sex offender probation. 
We also reject the rule from Bennett and Diaz that where a probationer is not 
told prior to the entry of a plea that an admission of wrongdoing is required, the 
probationer does not have sufficient notice of the admission requirement for the 
probationer’s refusal to admit sexual misconduct to be a willful violation.  Sex 
offender treatment programs will always have program-specific requirements not 
embodied by the generic language of the probation condition requiring “successful 
completion” of the program.  Bennett and Diaz rob the trial court of its discretion 
to make fact-specific determinations as to whether a probationer had notice of 
those program-specific requirements.  Without discretion, courts would have to 
specifically delineate, in each probation order, the program to which an offender is 
being sent and that program’s internal requirements—an approach we have 
implicitly rejected.  Lawson, 969 So. 2d at 235 (holding that “[p]robation orders 
 
 
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need not include every possible restriction so long as a reasonable person is put on 
notice of what conduct will subject him or her to revocation” and that “[a]lthough 
the conditions should be clearly set out and must mean what they say, every detail 
need not be spelled out and the language should be interpreted in its common, 
ordinary usage”).  Thus, we disapprove Bennett, Bell, and Diaz.  
II. This Case 
This Court reviews the trial court’s revocation of probation for an abuse of 
discretion and must affirm the revocation unless “the trial court acted in an 
arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable manner.”  Carter, 835 So. 2d at 262.  Here, the 
trial court found that even if Petitioner did not have notice that he would be 
required to admit guilt as a condition of his probation, under Mills, Petitioner’s 
best recourse upon discovering the requirement was to move to set aside his plea 
on that basis.  Thus, the trial court found that the State presented sufficient 
evidence that Petitioner willfully and substantially violated his probation.  The 
Fifth District affirmed, also finding that Petitioner’s proper remedy was to file a 
motion to withdraw his plea or vacate his judgment and sentence.  Staples, 161 So. 
3d at 562.  Both courts are correct that Petitioner could have moved to set aside his 
plea or vacate his judgment and sentence. 
As to whether the violation was substantial, Dr. Stultz testified that a client 
would not be amenable to treatment in the ITM program if that client were not 
 
 
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willing to admit that he or she has a problem.  Arias, 751 So. 2d at 186 (finding 
that probationer’s refusal to accept full responsibility for his criminal conduct 
“obviously precludes his successful completion of this program”).  Therefore, 
Petitioner’s refusal to admit the need for help completely foreclosed his ability to 
successfully complete ITM’s sex offender treatment program.  Further, this Court 
has previously found a violation of sex offender probation to be substantial based 
on the importance of treatment to the sex offender and society.  Adams, 979 So. 2d 
at 928 (“[S]ex offender probation and the treatment programs are essential not only 
to [the offender’s] well-being and rehabilitation, but also to the protection of 
society and any potential future victims.”). 
Regarding willfulness, a probationer cannot willfully violate a condition of 
probation unless that probationer has adequate notice of what conduct is 
prohibited.  Lawson, 969 So. 2d at 230.  Here, Dr. Stultz testified that ITM 
extended Petitioner’s trial period by about three months in order to give Petitioner 
an opportunity to identify any deviant or inappropriate behaviors that needed to be 
addressed as part of the program.  Petitioner rejected this opportunity.  More 
importantly, Petitioner was made aware, before being discharged, that continuing 
to deny sexual misconduct could result in his termination from the program and 
thereby violate his probation.  Yet Petitioner did not file the appropriate motion 
with the trial court to avoid the violation.  The trial court did not abuse its 
 
 
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discretion in revoking Petitioner’s probation for his willful and substantial 
violation of probation.  Accordingly, we approve the Fifth District’s holding in the 
instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
We disapprove Bennett, Bell, and Diaz to the extent that they are 
inconsistent with our decision.  We approve the Fifth District’s decision in Staples 
v. State, 161 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), affirming the trial court’s revocation 
of Petitioner’s probation. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LABARGA, C.J., and PERRY, 
J., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., dissenting. 
 
In this case the defendant entered a best interest plea so that he was not 
required to admit the crime to which he pled guilty—traveling to meet a minor. 
More importantly, he was not required to admit—and did not actually admit in 
court—that he engaged in sexually deviant behavior.  While I agree that the 
defendant need not be put on notice of every program-specific requirement of 
probation, I disagree with the majority’s attempt to characterize the substantial 
requirement, that is admitting to sexually deviant behavior, as merely “an internal, 
 
 
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program-specific requirement” of probation.  Majority op. at 10.  Without notice of 
this substantial probation requirement to admit to sexually deviant behavior he did 
not admit to in court, the defendant could not have willfully and substantially 
violated his probation by later failing to admit to such behavior in a sex offender 
probation treatment program, and his probation should not have been revoked on 
that basis.  See State v. Meeks, 789 So. 2d 982, 987 (Fla. 2001) (A violation of 
probation “must always be willful and substantial to produce a revocation.”) 
(emphasis omitted).   
Additionally, I dissent because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 
the defendant’s proper remedy to avoid violating his probation when the State 
failed to convey this substantial probation requirement was moving to withdraw his 
plea.  Majority op. at 11.  In this case where the defendant lacked notice of the 
probation requirement in the first place, that remedy would have improperly 
shifted the burden of proof in a violation of probation proceeding from the State to 
the defendant.  Accordingly, I dissent.   
Sex offender probation under section 948.30(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2011), 
requires “[a]ctive participation and successful completion of” a sex offender 
treatment program.  However, as the majority acknowledges, the statute does not 
further define the “successful completion” requirement as mandating that the 
defendant admit sexual misconduct.  Majority op. at 2. 
 
 
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We explained in Lawson v. State that an essential part of due process in the 
revocation of probation is that “the probation order must [] adequately place the 
probationer on notice of conduct that is both required and prohibited during the 
probationary period.”  969 So. 2d 222, 230 (Fla. 2007).  As the majority points out, 
in Lawson we recognized that due process considerations do not require that the 
probation order “include every possible restriction so long as a reasonable person 
is put on notice of what conduct will subject him or her to revocation.”  Majority 
op. at 11 (quoting Lawson, 969 So. 2d at 235) (emphasis added).   
I have no quarrel with the majority’s rejection of a bright-line rule that a trial 
court must advise a defendant of every program specific requirement that will 
subject him or her to revocation.  Id. at 10.  I disagree, however, that the 
requirement that one admit to engaging in sexually deviant behavior when one was 
not required to admit such behavior in court can be characterized as an “internal, 
program specific requirement,” not warranting notice prior to the entry of the plea.  
Id. 
The issue we considered in Lawson was whether the State was required to 
put the defendant on notice of the number of attempts the defendant would have to 
successfully complete a drug treatment program, which is precisely the type of 
program specific requirement that does not need to be specified when imposing the 
condition of probation.  969 So. 2d at 228.  Certainly in the present case, it is 
 
 
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reasonable to conclude that the probationer was on notice that to successfully 
complete his probation, he would have to actually attend the sex offender treatment 
program.   
In stark contrast to the issue in Lawson, it is not a reasonable construction of 
the probation condition at issue here that the probationer was on notice that 
“successfully completing” the treatment program would also require admitting to 
sexual misconduct—something the probationer was “not required to admit” in 
court.  See majority op. at 4.  Thus, under this Court’s precedent in Lawson, due 
process considerations do not allow the revocation of Staples’s probation for 
noncompliance of a critical, yet unspecified, aspect of a probation condition that 
Staples—or any reasonable person—did not have notice of and would not have 
been expected to know could “subject him or her to revocation.”  969 So. 2d at 
235. 
In short, if the condition of probation required the defendant to admit that he 
engaged in sexually deviant behavior, then that requirement should have been 
communicated to him before the time of the plea.  This communication is even 
more critical when considering that in this case, although the defendant pled guilty, 
he asserted that it was a best interest plea, and he “was not required to admit in 
court that he had actually committed the charged offense.”  Majority op. at 4.   
Withdrawal of Plea is an Improper Remedy 
 
 
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I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s proper 
remedy in this case for avoiding a violation of his probation “was to file a motion 
to withdraw his plea or vacate his judgement and sentence.”  Majority op. at 11 
(citing Staples v. State, 161 So. 3d 561, 562 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)).  It defies logic 
to require a defendant to withdraw his plea to avoid violating a probation condition 
that was never communicated to him when that remedy is, as the Fifth District 
explained, typically available for a defendant who does “not understand the 
consequences of his plea.”  Staples, 161 So. 3d at 564; see also Mills v. State, 840 
So. 2d 464, 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Archer v. State, 604 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1992).  A defendant cannot plausibly lack an understanding of the 
consequences of his plea when those consequences were never communicated to 
him so that he could form such an understanding in the first place.   
Further, such a remedy inverts the burden of proof in a violation of 
probation proceeding, where the State must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the defendant willfully and substantially violated a condition of 
probation.  See Meeks, 789 So. 2d at 987; see also Walker v. State, 966 So. 2d 
1004, 1006 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“To establish a violation of probation, the State 
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a probationer willfully 
violated a substantial condition of probation.”).  By requiring the defendant to 
move to withdraw his best interest plea to avoid violating his probation, and then 
 
 
- 18 - 
prove the necessary requirements to meet the withdrawal standard, the trial court 
shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that he did not willfully and 
substantially violate a substantial requirement of probation, even when the State 
failed to put the defendant on notice of the substantial probation requirement.  See 
Sheppard v. State, 17 So. 3d 275, 283 (Fla. 2009) (noting that defendant bears the 
burden of proving a manifest injustice in a motion to withdraw a plea after 
sentencing).   
Under the specific facts of this case, I would conclude that the defendant’s 
failure to admit that he engaged in sexually deviant behavior did not constitute a 
willful and substantial violation of probation because he did not have notice before 
he entered his plea that “successful completion” of a sex offender treatment 
program would require admitting to sexual misconduct.  If the requirement of 
admitting that he engaged in sexually deviant behavior was a prerequisite of 
“successful completion” of a “sex offender treatment program,” then that condition 
should have been communicated to the defendant before he entered his plea.  
Accordingly, I would approve the conflict decisions in Bennett v. State, 684 So. 2d 
242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), Bell v. State, 643 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), and 
Diaz v. State, 629 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), and quash the Fifth District’s 
decision in Staples v. State, 161 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). 
LABARGA, C.J., and PERRY, J., concur. 
 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D13-3573 
 
 
(Osceola County) 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Christopher Sinclair Quarles, Assistant 
Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Wesley Harold Heidt, 
Bureau Chief, and Marjorie J. Vincent-Tripp, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent