Title: Kieffer v. Icaza

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carolynne M. Kieffer, 
 
 
 
)      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)      
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC92098 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Jennifer Icaza, Ramiro Icaza, and Dianne  
) 
Icaza,  
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondents.  
 
) 
 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of City of St. Louis 
The Honorable Michael Mullen, Judge  
 
Opinion issued July 31, 2012 
 
 
Carolynne Kieffer appeals a judgment in favor of Jennifer Icaza, Ramiro Icaza, 
and Dianne Icaza on Kieffer’s petition for breach of contract and property damage.1  The 
judgment is affirmed. 
                                                 
1 The trial court also entered judgment in favor of Kieffer on the Ocazas’ counterclaim.  
The Icazas have not filed a cross-appeal.  
 
FACTS 
 
In July 1998, Kieffer and the Icazas entered into a lease agreement for a residence 
to be used by Jennifer Icaza.  On September 16, 2005, Kieffer filed a petition for breach 
of contract and property damage against the Icazas claiming that they had breached the 
terms of the lease and had committed waste on the property.  The Icazas filed a 
counterclaim against appellant..  
 
The cause was scheduled for a bench trial on Wednesday, February 13, 2008.  On 
Friday, February 8, 2008, Kieffer filed a motion for jury trial.  On February 13, 2008, the 
trial court overruled Kieffer’s motion for jury trial on the grounds that “the motion was 
improperly filed and that Kieffer did not send a copy of that motion to both of the 
counsels that were listed as counselors for the the Icazas in this case.”    
 
The trial court held a bench trial as scheduled and took the case under submission.  
On May 29, 2008, the trial court entered a judgment and ruled in favor of the Icazas on 
Kieffer’s petition and in favor of Kieffer on the Icazas’ counterclaim.    
 
The court of appeals held that the judgment was void because section 517.111.2 
required the judgment to be entered within 30 days after the case was submitted.  Kieffer 
v. Icaza, 296 S.W.3d 495, 497(Mo. App. 2009).  The court of appeals directed the circuit 
court to set aside the May 29, 2008, judgment and treat the case as finally submitted on 
the day the judgment was set aside. 
 
On February 10, 2010, the circuit court set aside the judgment.  On March 3, 2010, 
the trial court entered a new judgment denying Kieffer’s request for a jury trial and again 
finding in favor of the Icazas on Kieffer’s petition and in favor of Kieffer on the Icazas’ 
counterclaim.  This appeal follows.  
ANALYSIS 
  
This Court will affirm the circuit court’s judgment unless it is not supported by 
substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or 
applies the law.  Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). 
I. Law of the Case 
 
The Icazas assert that the law of the case doctrine bars consideration of Kieffer’s 
first five points on appeal.  They contend that Kieffer could have raised these issues in 
her first appeal and that her failure to do so means that this Court should not consider the 
issues now.   
 
In Williams v. Kimes, 25 S.W.3d 150, 153-54 (Mo. banc 2000), this Court 
explained the law of the case doctrine as follows: 
The law of the case doctrine governs successive appeals involving 
substantially the same issues and facts, and applies appellate decisions 
to later proceedings in that case.  State v. Phillips, 324 S.W.2d 693, 
694 (Mo.1959); State v. Allen, 363 Mo. 467, 251 S.W.2d 659, 660 
(1952).  A previous holding is the law of the case, precluding re-
litigation of issues on remand and subsequent appeal.  State v. 
Graham, 13 S.W.3d 290, 293 (Mo. banc 2000).  The decision of a 
court is the law of the case for all points presented and decided, as 
well as all matters that arose before the first adjudication and might 
have been raised but were not.  Id.; State v. Meyer, 293 Mo. 108, 238 
S.W. 457, 458 (1922).  According to the law of the case doctrine, 
failure to raise points in a prior appeal means that a court later hearing 
the case need not consider them.  United States v. Kress, 58 F.3d 370, 
373 (8th Cir. 1995).  Appellate courts have discretion to consider an 
issue where there is a mistake, a manifest injustice, or an intervening 
change of law.  Graham, at 293; Phillips, at 694. 
 
 
3
 
Although the law of the case doctrine generally applies to issues that could have 
been raised by Kieffer during the first appeal and, in certain other circumstances, the 
doctrine does not apply when the judgment underlying the first appeal is reversed 
because it was void.  For instance, in Century Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. 
CNA/Transportation Ins. Co., 87 S.W.3d 408, 423 (Mo. App. 2002), the court held that 
the law of the case doctrine was inapplicable to the trial court’s legal determination 
regarding insurance coverage because reversal of that judgment in the first appeal 
rendered the trial court’s original judgment void.  When a judgment is reversed 
completely, “the case is put in the same posture in which it was before the judgment was 
entered … [and] the parties’ rights are left wholly unaffected by any previous 
determination that was reversed, so that a judgment that is reversed and remanded stands 
as if no trial has yet been held.”  Id., citing 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 861 (1995).  
Likewise, in this case, the first appeal resulted in a complete reversal of the underlying 
void judgment.  The law of the case doctrine does not apply in this case.  Therefore, this 
Court will consider the merits of Kieffer’s points on appeal.2  
                                                 
2 The Icazas also assert that Kieffer’s brief should be stricken for failure to comply with 
Rule 84.04.  Kieffer’s brief will not be stricken because it sufficiently apprises this Court 
of her points on appeal.     
 
 
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II. Rule 51.05(e) 
 
In Kieffer’s first point, she asserts that the trial court violated Rule 51.05(e) when 
Judge Michael Steltzer assigned the case to Judge Michael Mullen.  Rule 51.05(e) 
provides as follows: 
The judge promptly shall sustain a timely application for change of 
judge upon its presentation.  The disqualified judge shall transfer the 
case to a judge stipulated to by the parties if the new judge agrees to 
take the case.  If the case is not so transferred, the disqualified judge 
shall notify the presiding judge: 
 
(1) If the presiding judge is not disqualified in the case, the presiding 
judge shall assign a judge of the circuit who is not disqualified or 
request this Court to transfer a judge; or 
 
(2) If the presiding judge is disqualified in the case, a judge of the 
circuit shall be assigned in accordance with local court rules, so long 
as the local court rules do not permit the disqualified judge to make 
the assignment, or the presiding judge shall request this Court to 
transfer a judge. 
 
 
Kieffer asserts that Judge Steltzer did not allow the parties to stipulate to a new 
judge, that he failed to consult with Judge Mullen to determine if he consented to taking 
the case, and that the reassignment was approved by Judge David Dowd instead of 
Presiding Judge Thomas Frawley.  Each of these assertions is without merit.   
 
First, there is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that Judge Steltzer 
prevented the parties from stipulating to a new judge.  Second, the fact that Judge Mullen 
took the case indicates that he consented to taking the case.  Finally, the fact that Judge 
Dowd approved the reassignment does not mean that he was not acting as the presiding 
judge.  St. Louis City Circuit Court Local Rule 36.8 provides that the presiding judge can 
be “any judge presiding in Division No. 1 by assignment or request of the Presiding 
 
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Judge of the Circuit Court.”  Kieffer simply asserts that Judge Frawley was the presiding 
judge in 2008, but this does not mean that Judge Dowd was not acting as the presiding 
judge for purposes of reassigning this case.  Kieffer cites no evidence indicating that 
Judge Dowd was not acting as the presiding judge and, therefore, has not demonstrated 
any error in the re-assignment of the case to Judge Mullen.  Point one is denied. 
III. Local Rule 6.1.1.1 
 
In her second point on appeal, Kieffer asserts that Judge Mullen, sitting in 
Division 27 of the St. Louis city circuit court, erred by transferring the case to Division 
28 instead of Division 29.  Kieffer is correct that Local Rule 6.1.1.1 provides that “[a]ny 
case pending in Division 27 in which a jury trial has been requested shall be heard in 
Division 29.”  The flaw in Kieffer’s argument is that there was never a valid request for a 
jury trial.  Section 517.091.1, RSMo 2000, provides that “[i]n any case triable before a 
jury, a trial by jury shall be deemed waived unless written demand be filed not later than 
five days before the return date of summons or the date set for trial, whichever is later.”  
Rule 44.01(a) provides that “[w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 
seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the 
computation.”  Kieffer filed her motion for a jury trial on Friday, February 8, 2008.  The 
trial was scheduled for Wednesday, February 13, 2008.  Excluding Saturday and Sunday 
from the computation period as required by Rule 44.01(a) means that Kieffer did not 
request her jury trial five or more days prior to the scheduled trial.  Kieffer waived her 
right to a jury trial.  Therefore, Local Rule 6.1.1.1 did not require that the case be 
assigned to Division 29.  Point two is denied. 
 
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IV.  Discovery sanctions 
 
In Kieffer’s third point, she asserts that Judge Mullen did not have jurisdiction to 
impose sanctions against her for failure to comply with a discovery order because the 
Icazas’ motion for sanctions did not comply with Local Rule 32.6(1).  Local Rule 32.6(1) 
requires that the party seeking sanctions “separately set out in full each question together 
with any response, objection or other matter material thereto, so that the Court may 
consider and rule on each question without referring to any other matter in the Court 
file.”   
 
Kieffer’s argument is without merit.  Rule 32.6(1) does not determine the trial 
court’s jurisdiction.  It simply requires a party seeking discovery sanctions to identify 
specifically  the discovery request at issue.  Furthermore, even if a party fails to identify 
specifically the discovery request at issue, it does not follow that the trial court must 
overrule a motion for sanctions.  Local Rule 32.6(2) provides that the court “may on its 
own motion … deny any motion which fails to comply with this rule, and on motion of 
any party the Court may similarly deny the motion and make further order authorized by 
Supreme Court Rule.”  Local Rule 32.6(2) gives the trial court discretion to overrule a 
motion for sanctions that does not comply with Local Rule 32.6(1) but does not require 
that the motion be overruled. Point three is denied. 
V.   Lack of jurisdiction to assign the case to Division 27  
 
 
In her fourth point on appeal, Kieffer asserts that Judge Steltzer in Division 28 
exceeded his jurisdiction by transferring the case to Judge Mullen in Division 27.  She 
asserts that Judge Steltzer lacked jurisdiction because she had withdrawn her motion for a 
 
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change of judge.  Even if Kieffer did withdraw her motion for a change of judge, Judge 
Steltzer did not lack jurisdiction to transfer the case to another judge.  A trial judge 
retains discretion to recuse from a case or grant a change of judge for any number of 
reasons.  This is not a jurisdictional issue.  Point four is denied.  
VI. Sufficiency of the evidence 
 
In Kieffer’s fifth point, she asserts that the trial court’s judgment was against the 
weight of the evidence and that she should have been awarded damages for the Icazas 
alleged breach of the lease agreement.  To make a submissible case on a claim of breach 
of contract, Kieffer had to prove:  (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) the rights and 
obligations of each party;  (3) a breach;  and (4) damages.   Howe v. ALD Servs., Inc., 941 
S.W.2d 645, 650 (Mo. App.1997).    
 
Kieffer did not provide an itemized list of damages.  Therefore, she failed to prove 
any damages as a result of the alleged breach. Additionally, the trial transcript 
demonstrates that Kieffer, who litigated the case pro se, failed repeatedly to offer relevant 
evidence or examine the Icazas about issues relevant to the alleged breach.   
 
In contrast, the Icazas offered detailed testimony regarding Kieffer’s repeated, 
unauthorized entry into the condominium.  For instance, Jennifer Icaza testified that on 
one occasion, she returned to the condominium for a lunch break and found Kieffer and 
an unknown man in the condominium going through Ms. Icaza’s personal belongings.  
Ms. Icaza also testified that there were several instances in which she returned to the 
condominium to find her personal belongings had been moved and drawers and cabinets 
had been left opened.  Ms. Icaza testified that Kieffer was the only other person with 
 
8
 
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access to the condominium and that the repeated unauthorized entries left her scared for 
her safety.  There was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that 
Jennifer Icaza did not breach the lease agreement.  Point five is denied.3  
CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Chief Justice 
 
Russell, Breckenridge, Fischer, Stith and 
Price, JJ., and Suter, Sp.J., concur. 
Draper, J., not participating. 
                                                 
3 Kieffer’s sixth and seventh points relied on assert that the court of appeals erred in its 
analysis of certain issues on appeal.  This Court reviews the trial court’s judgment “the 
same as an original appeal” and, therefore, does not review the court of appeals opinion.  
MO. CONST. art. V, sec. 10.