Title: Allen v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Ronald Robert Allen v. State of Maryland, No. 5, Sept. Term 2007
CRIMINAL LAW - CRIMINAL LAW ARTICLE, § 7-203, UNAUTHORIZED
REMOVAL OF PROPERTY - 2002 RECODIFICATION AND REVISION OF
STATUTE HAD NO EFFECT ON ELEMENTS OF CRIME
STATUTES - REVISIONS DURING RECODIFICATION - SUBSTANTIVE
CHANGES - RECODIFICATION NORMALLY DOES NOT CHANGE THE
MEANING OF THE RECODIFIED STATUTE, UNLESS THE LEGISLATURE SO
INSTRUCTS
STATUTES - CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION - AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION -
THE INTENT OF THE PLAIN MEANING RULE IS TO IMPLEMENT THE
PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATURE AND SHOULD NOT BE INVOKED TO
RENDER PORTIONS OF A STATUTE SUPERFLUOUS AND NUGATORY OR TO
CREATE AN ILLOGICAL RESULT.
Circuit Court for Prince  George ’s County
Case No. CT040270
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 5
September Term, 2007
                                                                             
RONALD ROBERT ALLEN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                            
 
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,
specially assigned)
JJ.
                                                                            
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Bell, C.J., joins judgment only.
                                                                             
Filed:   November 8, 2007
1The relevant statute, as revised in 2002 and extant at all relevant times in the present
case, provides:
CL § 7-203. Unauthorized removal of property.
(a) Prohibited. – Without the permission of the owner, a
person may not enter or be on the premises of another,
and take and carry away from the premises or out of the
custody or use of the other, or the other's agent, or a
governmental unit any property, including:
(1) a vehicle;
(2) a motor vehicle;
(3) a vessel; or
(4) livestock.
(b) Penalty – A person who violates this section is guilty
of a misdemeanor and on conviction:
(1) is subject to imprisonment for not less than 6
months and not exceeding 4 years or a fine not
less than $50 and not exceeding $100 or both; and
(2) shall restore the property taken and carried
away in violation of this section or, if unable to
restore the property, shall pay to the owner the
full value of the property.
(continued...)
This case reaches the Court through our grant of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed
by Ronald Robert Allen (Petitioner) seeking review of a judgment of the Court of Special
Appeals finding no error with the evidentiary sufficiency of his conviction of unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle under Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article § 7-203 (2002).  We also
granted the State’s Cross-Petition to consider whether the Maryland Legislature, in the course
of its 2002 recodification of the substantive statutory criminal law, focusing particularly on
Criminal Law Article (“CL”) § 7-203, added an element to the crime of unauthorized use of
a 
vehicle 
beyond 
that 
previously 
required 
under 
the 
predecessor 
statute.1
1(...continued)
(c) Prohibited defense – It is not a defense to this section
that the person intends to hold or keep the property for
the person's present use and not with the intent of
appropriating or converting the property.
Prior to the 2002 recodification, the relevant statute, codified at Md. Code, Article 27 § 349
(1957), read:
§ 349. Unauthorized use of livestock, boat, or vehicle.
Any person or persons, his or their aiders or abettors who shall
enter, or being upon the premises of any other person, body
corporate or politic in the State, shall, against the will and
consent of said person or persons, body corporate or politic or
their agents, wilfully take and carry away any horse, mare, colt,
gelding, mule, ass, sheep, hog, ox or cow, or any carriage,
wagon, buggy, cart, boat, craft, vessel, or any other vehicle
including motor vehicle as defined in the laws of this State
relating to such, or property whatsoever, or take and carry away
out of the custody or use of any person or persons, body
corporate or politic, or his or their agents, any of the above-
enumerated property at whatsoever place the same may be
found, shall upon conviction thereof in any of the courts of this
State having criminal jurisdiction be adjudged guilty of a
misdemeanor, and shall restore the property so taken and carried
away, or, if unable so to do, shall pay to the owner or owners
the full value thereof, and be fined not less than fifty nor more
than one hundred dollars, or be imprisoned in the county or city
jail, or the house of correction, for not less than six months nor
more than four years, or be both fined and imprisoned as
aforesaid, in the discretion of the court, although it may appear
from the evidence that such person or persons, his or their
aiders and abettors, took and carried away the property or any
portion of the same enumerated in this section, for his or their
present use, and not with the intent of appropriating or
converting the same.  The provisions of Article 52, § 13, shall
(continued...)
-2-
1(...continued)
not apply to this section.
-3-
We shall hold that the Legislature in its 2002 recodification did not add a new requirement
such that a defendant must be shown to have been on the real property from where a vehicle
is taken and to have participated in the taking of the vehicle in order to be convicted of
unauthorized use under CL § 7-203. We further shall hold that the record evidence, and
reasonable inferences drawable therefrom, were legally sufficient to convict Petitioner of
unauthorized use.  As a result, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
I.
Ronald Robert Allen was tried in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on
three counts of theft and one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.  After a two-day
trial, a jury convicted Allen under Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article § 7-203 (2002), of
the crime formally entitled “unauthorized removal of property,” but more commonly referred
to as “unauthorized use” of an automobile.  The parties do not dispute the direct facts.
Early on 28 October 2003, General Motors delivered several new Hummer motor
vehicles to Moore Cadillac’s Virginia dealership.  While normally the delivery driver
dropped the associated paperwork and two sets of keys for each Hummer into a night drop
slot at the dealership, on this occasion he noticed that one of the Hummers, a gray-colored
one, had only one set of keys. On 5 November 2003, when a prospective purchaser inquired
about that Hummer, employees of the dealership could not locate it and reported it stolen.
2The State later moved to amend the charge of “unauthorized use of a motor vehicle”
to a charge of “unauthorized control over property.” Upon Petitioner’s objection, the court
denied the State’s motion on the ground that the proposed amendment was substantive.
-4-
The vehicle was located when Officer Gerald Caver of the Prince George’s County
Police Department noticed a gray Hummer, driven by Petitioner, during his patrol in the
County on 5 December 2003.  While checking on his in-board computer vehicle tag numbers
in search of stolen tags, a “hit” came back for the Hummer, leading him to stop the vehicle.
Officer Caver checked the vehicle identification number with the dispatcher and confirmed
the vehicle was the one reported stolen from Moore Cadillac’s Virginia dealership.  A single
set of manufacturer’s original keys were in the vehicle. 
The grand jury charged Petitioner with felony theft, motor vehicle theft, unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle,2 and misdemeanor theft of the license tags.  The State nol prossed the
misdemeanor theft count at the close of its case-in-chief at trial.  Allen moved for a judgment
of acquittal on the other three charges.  With regard to the count of unauthorized use, he
argued that the State failed to establish the required elements, and specifically that the State
did not offer any evidence that he entered on the property of the Virginia dealership and took
the Hummer off its lot.  His motion for acquittal was denied. 
In his defense, Allen and his mother testified.  His mother testified that Allen was in
Florida when the Hummer disappeared from Moore Cadillac.  Petitioner testified that he did
not take the Hummer from the dealership and did not know that the Hummer was stolen.  He
claimed that the Hummer belonged to an acquaintance, Marcus Robinson, from whom he
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borrowed the vehicle on 5 December 2003 to go to breakfast.  Marcus Robinson did not
testify.  At the close of all the evidence, Allen renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal.
The court denied the motion and the case was sent to the jury.  
The judge’s instructions to the jury included ones consistent with the Maryland Pattern
Instructions on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and the requirement of
impartiality.  The judge also instructed the jury that it
[i]s your duty to decide the facts and apply the law to
those facts. 
. . . .
In evaluating the evidence, you should consider it in the
light of your own experiences.  You may draw any reasonable
inferences or conclusions from the evidence that you believe to
be justified by common sense and your own experiences. 
. . . .
There are two types of evidence, direct and circumstantial.
The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to
either direct or circumstantial evidence.
No greater degree of certainty is required of 
circumstantial
than of direct evidence.  In reaching a verdict, you should weigh
all of the evidence presented whether direct or circumstantial.
You may not convict the defendant unless you find that the
evidence when considered as a whole establishes guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.  
You are the sole judges of whether the witness should be
believed.  In making this decision, you may apply your own
common sense and every day experiences.
. . . .
You have heard testimony about Marcus Robinson who
was not called as a witness in this case.  If a witness could have
given important testimony on an issue in this case and if the
witness was peculiarly within the power of the defendant to
produce but was not called as a witness by the defendant and the
absence of that witness was not sufficiently accounted for or
explained, then you may decide that the testimony of that witness
-6-
would have been unfavorable to the defendant.
After explaining “intent” to the jury, the judge identified the elements needing to be proven
in order to convict as to each of the three charges.  With regard to the charge of
“unauthorized removal of property” (unauthorized use), the judge stated:
Unauthorized removal of property.  Without the permission of
the owner, a person may not enter or be upon the premises of
another and take and carry away from the premises or out of the
custody or use of the other or the other’s agent or a government
unit any property including a motor vehicle.
No exceptions were taken to this instruction. 
The jury found Allen guilty of one count of unauthorized use.  He was sentenced to
four years’ imprisonment, all but 90 days suspended, with three years’ probation upon release
from incarceration.
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Allen argued that the evidence presented
at trial was not sufficient to support a conviction of unauthorized use under CL § 7-203.
Allen v. State, 171 Md. App. 544, 551, 911 A.2d 453, 457 (2006).  Specifically, he pointed
to the language of the statute, last revised in 2002, asserting that the plain language requires
proof both that a person, sans permission, entered or was present on the real property where
the motor vehicle was taken and participated in the taking of such property from the premises
or out of the custody or use of the owner. Id.  In this case, the evidence did not establish
sufficiently either that he was present at the Virginia dealership and removed the Hummer
or, when discovered behind the wheel, that he knew that the Hummer was stolen.  Id.  In
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reply, the State argued that the 2002 revision of CL § 7-203 did not work a substantive
change in the elements of the offense from the predecessor statute and case law interpreting
it and that it only was necessary to prove that Allen participated in the continued use of the
Hummer under circumstances manifesting an intent to deprive the true owner of possession.
Id. 
In its reported opinion, the intermediate appellate court traced the history of the
unauthorized use statute.  Id. at 551-54, 911 A.2d at 457-59.  The court detailed the statute’s
several revisions and the case law interpreting the iterations.  Id.  According to the court, the
case law decided prior to the 2002 revision supported the State’s arguments.  Id. at 554, 911
A.2d at 459.  The court noted, however, that no on-point cases had been decided since the
2002 revision and that the revision worked a substantive change in the statute’s meaning
from that version existing before 2002.  Id.  Specifically, the court held that, under a plain
meaning reading, the statute now requires proof both of entry upon the premises of another
by a defendant and the unlawful taking and carrying away of property.  Id. at 557, 911 A.2d
at 460.  Based on its view of the current statute, the court next considered the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting Allen’s conviction.  Id. at 561, 911 A.2d at 463.  The court noted
Maryland’s recognition that “a jury may infer, from the unexplained possession of recently
stolen goods, that the possessor is the thief.”  Id. at 562, 911 A.2d at 463 (citing Painter v.
State, 157 Md. App. 1, 12, 848 A.2d 692, 698-99 (2004).  Our appellate brethren concluded
that the passage of one month between the discovery that the Hummer was missing from the
3 The Court of Special Appeals, on its initiative, considered whether Maryland had
jurisdiction to prosecute Allen for violating CL § 7-203 in as much as the Hummer was
stolen in Virginia.  Allen v. State, 171 Md. App. 544, 557-61, 911 A.2d 453, 460-63 (2006).
The court concluded that territorial jurisdiction existed because the car obviously was
transported into Maryland. Id. at 560-61, 911 A.2d at 462-63. 
-8-
Virginia dealership and the arrest of Allen behind the wheel of the vehicle in Prince George’s
County did not destroy the probative effect of that permissible inference.  Id. at 562, 911
A.2d at 463-64.  The court noted that the jury was free not to credit Allen’s testimony and
alibi evidence and also to consider that he did not call Robinson to testify in corroboration
of his tendered defense.  Id. at 562-63, 911 A.2d at 463-64.  The intermediate appellate court
had “no difficulty concluding that the State presented evidence from which a jury rationally
could find that Appellant violated CL § 7-203.” 3  Id. at 561, 911 A.2d at 463.
Before us, as before the intermediate appellate court, Allen asserts that the State failed
to produce sufficient evidence to support his conviction of “unauthorized use”of a motor
vehicle.  Agreeing with the intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of CL § 7-203,
Petitioner claims that the evidence presented at trial by the State failed to place him on the
car dealership’s property in Virginia or to show that, when found operating it, he knew that
the Hummer was stolen.  The State, in its cross-petition, asks that we consider whether the
2002 revision to CL § 7-203 affected a substantive change by adding a new element or
elements to the offense of unauthorized use.  Even were we to conclude that such a
substantive change occurred, the State urges that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of
law to support the jury’s verdict. 
-9-
II.
The history and interpretation of the “unauthorized use” statute is of apical importance
to proper analysis of this case.  In 1880, the Legislature created the progenitor of this crime
when it enacted a statute establishing the misdemeanor crime of larceny of the use of any
horse or other animal or any carriage or other vehicle.  Wright v. Sas, 187 Md. 507, 511, 50
A.2d 809, 810 (1947).  Over time, changes were made to the statute, through recodifications
and targeted revisions.  Id. at 511, 50 A.2d at 810.  The controlling text of the statute,
however, was changed very little.   Id.  The penultimate relevant version, prior to the changes
made in the 2002 recodification, was Maryland Code Art. 27, § 349, entitled “unauthorized
use of livestock, boat, or vehicle.” It read in pertinent part: 
Any person or persons, his or their aiders or abettors who shall
enter, or being upon the premises of any other person, body
corporate or politic in the State, shall, against the will and
consent of said person or persons, body corporate or politic or
their agents, wilfully take and carry away any . . . motor vehicle
. . . , or take and carry away out of the custody or use of any
person or persons, body corporate or politic, or his or their
agents, any of the above enumerated property at whatsoever
place the same may be found, shall upon conviction thereof . .
. be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.
As noted by the Court of Special Appeals, this iteration of the crime of unauthorized
use had four elements, “(1) an unlawful taking; (2) an unlawful carrying away; (3) of certain
designated personal property; (4) of another.” Allen v. State, 171 Md. App. 544, 552, 911
A.2d 453, 458 (2006) (citing In re Lakeysha P., 106 Md. App. 401, 411, 665 A.2d 264, 269
(1995)). This Court’s jurisprudence interpreted the unauthorized use statute in the
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disjunctive, holding that it contemplated two ways of satisfying these elements.  Thomas v.
State, 277 Md. 257, 269, 353 A.2d 240, 247-48 (1976).  First, one may enter the premises of
another and take property away.  Id., 665 A.2d at 248.  Second, one may take property from
wherever it is located.  Id.  As to this second means of committing the unauthorized use
offense, this Court and the Court of Special Appeals have affirmed many convictions,
notwithstanding the absence in those records of evidence linking the defendant with the
original taking of the property, because admitted evidence supported a finding that a
defendant had the intent to deprive the owner of possession.  See Lee v. State, 240 Md. 160,
213 A.2d 503 (1965); Spence v. State, 224 Md. 17, 165 A.2d 917 (1960); Anello v. State, 201
Md. 164, 93 A.2d 71 (1952); Banks v. State, 2 Md. App. 373, 234 A.2d 798 (1967); Johnson
v. State, 2 Md. App. 486, 236 A.2d 41 (1967).  
The 2002 (and current) version of the unauthorized use statute, entitled “unauthorized
removal of property,” is codified at Criminal Law Article § 7-203 of the Maryland Code. The
recodification of the substantive criminal laws, of which § 7-203 was a part, came about as
the result of a four year effort to reorganize and simplify the criminal code, consummated by
the adoption of Chapter 26 of the Acts of 2002.  Allen v. State, 171 Md. App. 544, 551-52;
911 A.2d 453, 457 (2006); GENERAL REVISOR’S NOTE TO ARTICLE, MD. CODE CRIM. LAW
ART. (2002).  As the general revisor’s note recognizes: 
[T]he principle function of a Code is to reorganize the statutes
and state them in simpler form. Consequently any changes made
in them by a Code are presumed to be for the purpose of clarity
rather than change of meaning. Therefore, even a change in the
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phraseology of a statute by a codification thereof will not
ordinarily modify the law, unless the change is so radical and
material that the intention of the Legislature to modify the law
appears unmistakably from the language of the Code.     
GENERAL REVISOR’S NOTE TO ARTICLE, MD. CODE CRIM. LAW ART. (2002) (quoting Welch
v. Humphrey, 200 Md. 410, 417, 90 A.2d 686, 689 (1952)).  The revised Criminal Law
Article is organized by Title, setting out various crimes, including “Title 7. Theft and Related
Crimes.”  Title 7 is further broken into Subtitles and Parts.  Notably, “unauthorized use of
property,” or § 7-203 “unauthorized removal of property” as it is called formally, falls within
Part II, “Unlawful Use of Goods.”  It reads in pertinent part:
(a) Prohibited. — Without the permission of the owner, a person
may not enter or be on the premises of another, and take and
carry away from the premises or out of the custody or use of the
other, or the other’s agent, or a governmental unit any property,
including . . . a motor vehicle . . . .
The annotation to this section in the bound volume of the Code also includes a Revisor’s note
stating that “[t]his section is new language derived without substantive change from former
Art. 27, § 349.”  When the Legislature enacted this and the other sections of Chapter 26 of
the Acts of 2002, all of the above language, including the Revisor’s notes appeared in the
legislation.  In addition and of more meaningful import, the session law included Section 13,
which read, “AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That it is the intention of the General
Assembly that, except as expressly provided in this Act, this Act shall be construed as a
nonsubstantive revision, and may not otherwise be construed to render any substantive
change in the criminal law of the State.”
-12-
III.
On the issue of the meaning of CL § 7-203, the Court of Special Appeals’s
interpretation of the statute “enjoys no deferential appellate review.”  Helinski v. Harford
Memorial Hospital, Inc., 376 Md. 606, 614, 831 A.2d 40, 45 (2003).  We review the issue
de novo.  A review of the question regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial
requires us to ask whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Rivers v. State, 393 Md. 569, 580, 903 A.2d 908, 915 (2006).
IV.
A.
The first issue we encounter is whether, when the Legislature enacted Chapter 26 of
the Acts of 2002, it intended to work a substantive change in the elements of the crime of
unauthorized use.  This Court often has had occasion to consider the impact of
recodifications on the meaning of included statutory provisions vis a vis prior iterations of
the relevant statutes.  “When a substantial part of an Article is revised, ‘a change in the
phraseology of a statute as part of a recodification will ordinarily not be deemed to modify
the law unless the change is such that the intention of the Legislature to modify the law is
unmistakable.’”  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Blanton, 390 Md. 528, 538, 890 A.2d 279,
285 (2006) (quoting Rettig v. State, 334 Md. 419, 427, 639 A.2d 670, 674 (1994)); see also
Pye v. State, 397 Md. 626, 634, 919 A.2d 632, 637 (2004).  Furthermore, “[r]ecodification
-13-
of statutes is presumed to be for the purpose of clarity rather than change of meaning and,
thus, even a change in the phraseology of a statute by a codification will not ordinarily
modify the law unless the change is so radical and material that the intention of the
Legislature to modify the law appears unmistakably from the language of the Code.”
Blanton, 390 Md. at 538, 890 A.2d at 285 (quoting Md. Div. of Labor and Indus. v. Triangle
Gen. Contractors, Inc., 366 Md. 407, 422, 784 A.2d 534, 543 (2001)); see also  Tipton v.
Partner's Mgmt. Co., 364 Md. 419, 773 A.2d 488 (2001); Riemer v. Columbia Med. Plan.,
Inc., 358 Md. 222, 747 A.2d 677 (2000); Blevins & Wills v. Baltimore County, Maryland,
352 Md. 620, 724 A.2d 22 (1999); Giant Food, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 356 Md. 180, 738
A.2d 856 (1999); DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 342 Md. 432, 677 A.2d 73 (1996);
Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443, 505 A.2d 113 (1986); Duffy v. Conaway, 295
Md. 242, 455 A.2d 955 (1983); In Re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 458 A.2d
75 (1983); Office & Prof. Employees Int'l Union v. MTA, 295 Md. 88, 453 A.2d 1191 (1982);
Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek, 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 (1974); Welch v. Humphrey,
200 Md. 410, 90 A.2d 686 (1952). 
The Legislature is presumed to be aware of our prior holdings when it enacts new
legislation and, where it does not express a clear intention to abrogate the holdings of those
decisions, to have acquiesced in those holdings. Pye, 397 Md. at 635-36, 919 A.2d at 637
(2007); Plein v. Dep’t of Labor, 369 Md. 421, 437, 800 A.2d 757, 767 (2002); The Pack
Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 257, 808 A.2d 795, 803 (2002); Jones v. State,
-14-
362 Md. 331, 337-38, 765 A.2d 127, 130-31 (2001); Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 210,
438 A.2d 1301, 1305 (1981).  Thus, there is a strong presumption that the Legislature did not
intend, in recodifying the unauthorized use statute as part of its general recodification of the
State’s criminal laws in 2002, to change the elements or judicial interpretation of that statute
from that previously rendered.  
Overcoming that presumption in this case, the Court of Special Appeals held, and
Petitioner embraces, the notion that application of the plain meaning rule to the 2002 version
of CL § 7-203 requires that both “presence on the premises of another and taking and
carrying away property are required elements of the offense.” Allen, 171 Md. App. at 555,
911 A.2d at 459 (2006) (emphasis in original).  The court concluded, therefore, that the
Legislature effectively eliminated the possibility that a defendant could be convicted of
unauthorized use without proof of his or her presence on the premises of the initial theft.  Id.
at 555-56, 911 A.2d at 459-60.  In holding that the 2002 statute contained no ambiguity, the
Court of Special Appeals declined to consider the legislative history as an aid in construing
the statute, and thus took no account of the Revisor’s note to the statute nor even alluded to
the Session law. Id. at 556, 911 A.2d at 460. 
As the Court of Special Appeals aptly stated here, in construing and applying any
statute, a court must “discern the actual intent of the legislature in enacting it.”  Id. at 554,
911 A.2d at 459 (citing Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443-44, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006)).  In
that regard, it is well settled that the purpose of the plain meaning rule is to ascertain and
4See also the Fiscal Note to H.B. 11 and THE 90 DAY REPORT - A REVIEW OF
LEGISLATION IN THE 2002 SESSION, E-1 (2002).  
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carry out the real legislative intent.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397
Md. 399, 419, 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007); Oakland v. Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301,
316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 57, 763 A.2d 136, 139
(2000).  Beyond concurring with this threshold premises, we depart from the reasoning of
the intermediate appellate court in construing the effect of CL § 7-203. 
It is our view that the legislative intent in enacting CL § 7-203 was not to change the
elements of the crime of unauthorized use from those that existed immediately previous to
the recodification.  In fact, the Legislature said just that several times in the course of
enacting the recodification.  In enacting Chapter 26 of the Acts of 2002, the Legislature
stated that “it is the intention of the General Assembly that, except as expressly provided in
this Act, this Act shall be construed as a nonsubstantive revision, and may not otherwise be
construed to render any substantive change in the criminal law of the State.” Section 13,
Chapter 26 of the Acts of 2002.  As adopted, Chapter 26 of the Acts of 2002, included also
the Revisor’s note to CL § 7-203 and the Revisor’s note to the Chapter.4  Conversely,
nowhere in CL § 7-203 or in all of Chapter 26 of the Acts of 2002, did the Legislature
indicate an intent to abrogate the extensive pre-existing case law interpreting the previous
unauthorized use statute. 
In Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628
-16-
(1987) we stated, in response to a plea that we adhere blindly to a plain meaning approach
to a statute:
[D]espite Kaczorowski’s pleas that we examine the trees so
closely that we do not see the forest, the plain-meaning rule does
not force us to read legislative provisions in rote fashion and in
isolation. What we are engaged in is the divination of legislative
purpose or goal. Indeed, as we have explained, the
plain-meaning rule is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for
ascertaining a legislative intention. The meaning of the plainest
language is controlled by the context in which it appears. The
aim or policy of the legislation, against which we measure the
words used, is not drawn out of the air; it is evinced in the
language of the statute as read in the light of other external
manifestations of that purpose. Or as Justice Holmes once put it,
“the general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than
any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down.” . . . 
. . . 
When we pursue the context of statutory language, we are
not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed in the
Annotated Code. We may and often must consider other
“external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence,” including a
bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as
it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and
subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the
fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes
the context within which we read the particular language before
us in a given case.
Sometimes the language in question will be so clearly
consistent with apparent purpose (and not productive of any
absurd result) that further research will be unnecessary. But on
other occasions much more extensive inquiry will be required.
. . . [We] search for legislative purpose or meaning- . . . the
legislative scheme. We identif[y] that scheme or purpose after
an extensive review of the context . . . [including], among other
things, a bill request form . . . , prior legislation . . . , a legislative
committee report . . . , a bill title . . . , related statutes . . . , and
amendments to the bill.
[L]egislative purpose is critical, that purpose must be
-17-
discerned in light of context, and . . . statutes are to be construed
reasonably with reference to the purpose to be accomplished.
The purpose, in short, determined in light of the statute's
context, is the key. And that purpose becomes the context within
which we apply the plain-meaning rule. Thus results that are
unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense
should be avoided with the real legislative intention prevailing
over the intention indicated by the literal meaning.
Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-16; 525 A.2d at 632-34 (internal citations omitted).
The Court of Special Appeals’s reading of CL § 7-203 leaves portions of the statutory
language superfluous and illogical.  The intermediate appellate court’s interpretation would
require that the prosecution prove an entry on the premises and either a taking of certain
property from the premises or a taking of the property out of the custody or use of the person
whose premises was entered.  We are unable to conjure a realistic scenario where a person
would do one, but not the other.  At oral argument before us, Petitioner’s counsel advanced
several hypotheticals in an effort to meet that challenge, but without ultimate persuasive
effect.  Allen’s first hypothetical imagined a defendant moving an owner’s tractor from one
spot on the owner’s land to another.  The second scenario, though no more convincing, wins
points for creativity.  In it, a defendant takes an owner’s sheep across the owner’s property
to the border adjoining defendant’s land to shear it, thus depriving the landowner of the use
of the sheep.  Finally, defense counsel imagined a situation where a defendant took an
owner’s boat and operated it upon the owner’s private lake; thus, while not removing the boat
from the owner’s property, denied the owner of the boat’s use.  We deem illogical the notion
that the Legislature would amend so significantly the prior crime of unauthorized use so as
5Very realistic examples of this kind of action abound.  For example, cars, boats, and
other vehicles are taken from public property, such as streets, or from third party private
property, such as marinas or storage yards, on a daily basis.
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sweep up these hypotheticals, while ignoring any situation where a defendant steals property
not on the owner’s premises,5 thus rendering, under the Court of Special Appeals’s
interpretation of the statute, the second part thereof, superfluous. We shall not hew to a plain
language approach that beggars common sense.  Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d
106, 112 (1994).  Moreover, constructions of statutes should not render any clause or phrase
surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.  Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v.
Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 420, 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007).
We hold that the Legislature in 2002 did not change the elements of the crime of
unauthorized use when it recodified the former statute as CL § 7-203. 
B.
Having resolved the proper interpretation of CL § 7-203, we address whether the
evidence of record, and any reasonable inferences able to be drawn therefrom, were
sufficient to convict Allen of the crime of unauthorized use. We conclude that the evidence
sufficiently supported his conviction.
As noted above, we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial
by determining whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
supported the conviction of Allen, such that any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rivers v. State, 393 Md. 569,
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580, 903 A.2d 908, 914 (2006) (citing State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 533, 823 A.2d 664, 668
(2003)).  It is not the province of an appellate court to retry the case; rather, we review the
evidence and all inferences in a light most favorable to the State.  Id., 903 A.2d at 914-15
(citing Hackley v. State, 389 Md. 387, 389, 885 A.2d 816, 817 (2005); State v. Albrecht, 336
Md. 475, 478, 649 A.2d 336, 337 (1994)).
Petitioner argues that the evidence was legally insufficient for two reasons.  First, he
argues that the State offered no evidence placing him at the Virginia car dealership, and thus
no evidence that he removed the Hummer from the dealership.  Second, he argues that the
State failed to prove that, when found behind the wheel of the stolen vehicle in Maryland,
he knew that the Hummer was stolen.  Allen notes that a month passed between the time of
its disappearance and its reappearance in the possession of Petitioner and the vehicle was
transported into Maryland from Virginia.  He submits that this time and distance separation
makes any inference unsustainable that he removed the Hummer from the Virginia dealership
or knew the vehicle was stolen merely because he was found later driving it in Maryland.
As Allen correctly points out, “[t]he term ‘recent,’ when used in connection with recently
stolen goods, is a relative term, and its meaning as applied to a given case will vary with the
circumstances of the case.”  Butz v. State, 221 Md. 68, 77, 156 A.2d 423, 428 (1959).  We
conclude, without difficulty, however, that a one month gap, as a matter of law, does not
break significantly the permissible inferential chain from the initial disappearance of stolen
goods from the premises to the discovery of Allen in possession of the goods.  Indeed, this
6Part of the Court of Special Appeals’s reasoning regarding the sufficiency question
relied upon the testimony given by Officer Caver that “upon being stopped . . . , [Allen]
stated, without prompting, that the vehicle was not stolen and that it belonged to his
brother.” Allen v. State, 171 Md. App. 544, 562, 911 A.2d 453, 463 (2006). This evidence,
however, was excluded by the trial court. Nonetheless, a reasonable jury could convict Allen
based on the permitted inference from his possession of recently stolen property.
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Court and the Court of Special Appeals have sustained such an inferential chain concerning
far more motile and inconspicuous goods where disappearance and reappearance occurred
in comparable or more lengthy time frames.  See Cason v. State, 230 Md. 356, 358-59; 187
A.2d 103, 104-05 (1963) (transistor radio: four months); Butz, 221 Md. at 76-77; 156 A.2d
at 427-28 (jewelry box: two weeks); Wynn v. State, 117 Md. App. 133, 170, 699 A.2d 512,
530 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 718 A.2d 588
(1998)  (camcorder, antique watch, gym bag: ten months); Jordan v. State, 24 Md. App. 267,
275, 330 A.2d 496, 501-02 (1975) (guns: ten months); Anglin v. State, 1 Md. App. 85, 94,
227 A.2d 364, 368, cert denied, 246 Md. 755 (1967) (jewelry box, earrings, and
miscellaneous jewelry: one month and six months).  We further conclude that a reasonable
jury could draw this inference despite Allen’s testimony that he merely borrowed the car
from Robinson.  As noted in the jury instructions, the jury was free to credit (or not) his
statements in light of his failure to produce Robinson as a witness.6  Petitioner’s possession
of the Hummer and keys, the recent time frame of the salient events, and his inability to
corroborate his testimony with Robinson’s testimony were sufficient for a rational jury
properly to draw the inference that Allen committed unauthorized use of an automobile under
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CL § 7-203.  Indeed, as instructed by the trial court, the jury merely could have considered
the evidence in light of its collective “own experiences” and drawn “reasonable inferences
or conclusions from the evidence [as] justified by common sense and [their] own
experiences.” 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
Chief Judge Bell joins the judgment only.