Title: Riffle v. Physicians & Surgeons Ambulance Serv., Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Riffle v. Physicians & Surgeons Ambulance Serv., Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-989.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-989 
RIFFLE ET AL., APPELLEES, v. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS AMBULANCE 
SERVICE, INC., D.B.A. AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE, ET AL.;  
THE CITY OF AKRON, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Riffle v. Physicians & Surgeons Ambulance Serv., Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-989.] 
Political-subdivision immunity—R.C. 4765.49(B) expressly imposes civil liability 
on a political subdivision for purposes of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5). 
(No. 2012-0205—Submitted January 9, 2013—Decided March 21, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 25829, 2011-Ohio-6595. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The city of Akron appeals from a judgment of the Ninth District 
Court of Appeals that affirmed the denial of its motion for judgment on the 
pleadings in connection with Andrea and Dan Riffle’s wrongful-death and 
medical claims alleging that the city and its medical-emergency personnel 
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negligently, recklessly, and wantonly caused the death of their infant daughter.  
At issue in this case is whether a political subdivision is immune from liability for 
the willful or wanton misconduct of its first responders when providing 
emergency medical services.  The parties here ask us to determine whether R.C. 
4765.49(B) is an additional immunity defense or is an express imposition of 
liability for purposes of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5). 
{¶ 2} R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) states that except as provided in division (B), a 
political subdivision is not liable in damages for injury allegedly caused by an act 
of an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or 
proprietary function.  Providing emergency medical services is a governmental 
function.  See R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(a).  Division (B)(5) establishes an exception to 
immunity when civil liability is expressly imposed upon a political subdivision by 
the Revised Code, and relevant to this case, R.C. 4765.49(B) provides that a 
political subdivision is liable for injury arising out of any actions taken by a first 
responder, EMT-basic, EMT-I, or paramedic when emergency medical services 
are provided in a manner that constitutes willful or wanton misconduct. 
{¶ 3} The complaint filed in this case alleges that the city of Akron and 
its employees provided emergency medical services negligently, recklessly, and 
wantonly; wanton misconduct, pursuant to R.C. 4765.49(B), is an exception to 
political-subdivision immunity, and the complaint therefore states a claim upon 
which relief may be granted.  For this reason, the judgment of the court of appeals 
is affirmed. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} In the early morning hours of December 26, 2008, the city of 
Akron Fire Department EMS received an emergency call advising that Andrea 
Riffle, then in her third trimester of pregnancy, had begun experiencing serious 
vaginal bleeding. Company Officer Todd Kelly, Paramedic Stacie Frabotta, and 
Medics Peter Mattucci and Thomas Whatley all responded to the call.  They took 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
Riffle’s vital signs but did not assess the unborn child or transport Riffle to the 
hospital; instead, they contacted a private ambulance service, Physicians and 
Surgeons Ambulance Service, Inc., doing business as American Medical 
Response, which arrived a few minutes later and transported Riffle to the labor 
and delivery unit at Akron City Hospital. 
{¶ 5} Doctors there diagnosed the unborn child with fetal bradycardia—a 
fetal heart rate of less than 100 beats per minute, Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 
230 (26th Ed.1995)—and as a result, performed an emergency cesarean section. 
After the child’s birth, doctors determined that a placental abruption precipitated 
the fetal bradycardia.  The baby survived for only three days. 
{¶ 6} The Riffles sued the city of Akron and several of its medical-
emergency personnel and Physicians and Surgeons Ambulance Service, alleging 
that each had negligently, recklessly, and wantonly caused the death of their 
daughter. The city moved for judgment on the pleadings, claiming immunity.  The 
trial court denied the city’s motion, concluding that R.C. 4765.49(B) provides for 
an exception to political-subdivision immunity when emergency medical services 
are provided in a manner constituting willful or wanton misconduct. 
{¶ 7} The city appealed. The Ninth District Court of Appeals rejected the 
trial court’s analysis construing R.C. 4765.49(B) as an exception to political-
subdivision immunity as expressed in R.C. 2744.02.  Riffle v. Physicians & 
Surgeons Ambulance Serv., 9th Dist. No. 25829, 2011-Ohio-6595, 969 N.E.2d 
297, ¶ 7-8. Rather, the appellate court determined that because both R.C. 
2744.02(A)(1) and R.C. 4765.49(B) afford immunity to a political subdivision for 
providing emergency medical services but only R.C. 4765.49(B) contains an 
exception, the two statutes conflict.  Id. at ¶ 11.  It therefore held that “R.C. 
4765.49(B) more specifically addresses governmental entities that provide 
emergency medical services than does R.C. 2744.02, and, therefore, it, rather than 
the more general provisions of R.C. 2744.02, applies to the alleged facts of this 
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case.”  Id. at ¶ 2.  Thus, the court concluded that the city is not immune from 
liability for any willful or wanton misconduct of its medical-emergency 
personnel, and it affirmed the trial court on that basis. 
Arguments on Appeal 
{¶ 8} The city of Akron now appeals to this court and presents one 
proposition of law: R.C. 4765.49 does not conflict with R.C. 2744.02 under an 
R.C. 1.51 analysis, but serves as an additional immunity defense under R.C. 
2744.03(A)(7). 
{¶ 9} Even though the parties agree that providing emergency medical 
services is a governmental function for which the city is immune, the city asserts 
that none of the exceptions to immunity set forth in R.C. 2744.02(B) imposes 
liability in this case for performing that governmental function.  It claims that 
R.C. 4765.49(B) does not create an exception to immunity but instead provides an 
additional defense to liability that becomes relevant only if one of the exceptions 
to liability set forth in R.C. 2744.02(B) applies.  It further maintains that no 
conflict exists between R.C. 2744.02 and R.C. 4765.49(B), because they can be 
read in harmony. 
{¶ 10} The Riffles contend that R.C. 4765.49(B) expressly imposes 
liability on political subdivisions for injuries caused by the willful or wanton 
misconduct of first responders and note that the city’s argument renders R.C. 
4765.49(B) meaningless with regard to political-subdivision liability, because if 
the city is correct, a political subdivision will never be liable for injuries caused 
by those who provide emergency medical services, regardless of the degree of 
fault.  But, they argue, if the court determines that R.C. 4765.49(B) does not 
provide an express exception to immunity, then the court should hold that it 
irreconcilably conflicts with R.C. 2744.02 and that R.C. 4765.49(B) controls 
because it is the more specific immunity statute. 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
{¶ 11} Because R.C. 4765.49(B) expressly imposes liability on a political 
subdivision when emergency medical services are provided in a manner that 
constitutes willful or wanton misconduct, the exception to immunity contained in 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) applies, and therefore a political subdivision is not immune 
from liability under the circumstances alleged in the complaint. 
Law and Analysis 
Immunity for Providing Emergency Medical Services 
{¶ 12} At common law, political subdivisions enjoyed immunity for the 
performance of governmental functions, which included providing emergency 
services.  See Frederick v. Columbus, 58 Ohio St. 538, 51 N.E. 35 (1898), 
syllabus; Hall v. Youngstown, 15 Ohio St.2d 160, 164, 239 N.E.2d 57 (1968); 
King v. Williams, 5 Ohio St.3d 137, 140, 449 N.E.2d 452 (1983) (“emergency 
medical services fit within the classic definition of governmental functions”).  We 
recognized, however, that the General Assembly had the authority to abrogate 
common law immunity of political subdivisions.  See Frederick at the syllabus 
(“A municipal corporation is not, in the absence of any statutory provision, liable 
in damages to one injured by the negligent acts of its fire department or any of its 
members” [emphasis added]); see also Broughton v. Cleveland, 167 Ohio St. 29, 
30, 146 N.E.2d 301 (1957) (“Ohio has consistently followed and applied the rule 
that, except as otherwise provided by statute, municipal corporations are exempt 
from liability for negligence in the performance or nonperformance of their 
governmental functions” [emphasis added]). 
{¶ 13} In 1976, the General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.H.B. 832 to, 
among other things, “specify liability for emergency medical service,” 136 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 3042, and in R.C. 4731.90(B), which was in that act and is a 
predecessor of R.C.4765.49, it imposed liability on political subdivisions for 
emergency medical services provided in a manner constituting willful or wanton 
misconduct: 
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No political subdivision * * * nor any officer or employee 
of a public agency * * * that provides emergency medical services 
* * * shall be liable in civil damages for damages arising out of 
any actions taken by an EMT-A or paramedic working under the 
officer’s or employee’s jurisdiction * * * unless the care, 
treatment, or assistance is provided in a manner constituting willful 
or wanton misconduct. 
 
136 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3052-3053. 
{¶ 14} In 1982, this court abolished the common law immunity of 
political subdivisions in Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 26, 30, 
442 N.E.2d 749 (1982), holding that the defense of sovereign immunity is not 
available in the absence of a statute providing immunity. 
R.C. Chapter 2744 
{¶ 15} In R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), the legislature, in 1985, reinstated political-
subdivision immunity for governmental functions, which includes providing 
emergency medical services, R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(a).  As we explained in Colbert 
v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215, 2003-Ohio-3319, 790 N.E.2d 781: 
 
Determining whether a political subdivision is immune 
from tort liability pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744 involves a three-
tiered analysis.  Greene Cty. Agricultural Soc. v. Liming (2000), 89 
Ohio St.3d 551, 556–557, 733 N.E.2d 1141.  The first tier is the 
general rule that a political subdivision is immune from liability 
incurred in performing either a governmental function or 
proprietary function.  Id. at 556–557, 733 N.E.2d 1141; R.C. 
2744.02(A)(1).  However, that immunity is not absolute. R.C. 
January Term, 2013 
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2744.02(B); Cater v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 697 
N.E.2d 610. 
The second tier of the analysis requires a court to determine 
whether any of the five exceptions to immunity listed in R.C. 
2744.02(B) apply to expose the political subdivision to liability.  
Id. at 28, 697 N.E.2d 610. At this tier, the court may also need to 
determine whether specific defenses to liability for negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle listed in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) 
through (c) apply. 
If any of the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) do 
apply and no defense in that section protects the political 
subdivision from liability, then the third tier of the analysis 
requires a court to determine whether any of the defenses in R.C. 
2744.03 apply, thereby providing the political subdivision a 
defense against liability. 
 
Id. at ¶ 7-9. 
The R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) Exception 
{¶ 16} Among other exceptions to immunity contained in R.C. 
2744.02(B), R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) states that “a political subdivision is liable for 
injury, death, or loss to person or property when civil liability is expressly 
imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code.”  The 
General Assembly, however, stated that  
 
[c]ivil liability shall not be construed to exist under another section 
of the Revised Code merely because that section imposes a 
responsibility or mandatory duty upon a political subdivision, 
because that section provides for a criminal penalty, because of a 
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general authorization in that section that a political subdivision 
may sue and be sued, or because that section uses the term “shall” 
in a provision pertaining to a political subdivision. 
 
Id. 
R.C. 4765.49(B) 
{¶ 17} The year after the General Assembly enacted R.C. Chapter 2744, 
reinstating political-subdivision immunity, it recodified R.C. 4731.90 as R.C. 
3303.21, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 222, 141 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2704, 2725-2727, and in 
1992, it amended and recodified it as R.C. 4765.49, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 98, 144 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 343, 500-502.  The current version of R.C. 4765.49 is the 
result of an April 2007 amendment: 
 
A political subdivision * * *, and any officer or employee 
of a public agency * * *, that provides emergency medical services 
* * * is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or 
loss to person or property arising out of any actions taken by a first 
responder, EMT-basic, EMT-I, or paramedic working under the 
officer's or employee's jurisdiction, or for injury, death, or loss to 
person or property arising out of any actions of licensed medical 
personnel advising or assisting the first responder, EMT-basic, 
EMT-I, or paramedic, unless the services are provided in a manner 
that constitutes willful or wanton misconduct. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 18} Notably, appellate districts around the state have concluded that 
R.C. 4765.49 (or one of its predecessor statutes—R.C. 3303.21 or R.C. 4731.90) 
denies immunity when emergency medical services are provided in a manner 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
constituting willful or wanton misconduct.  See, e.g., Fuson v. Cincinnati, 91 
Ohio App.3d 734, 633 N.E.2d 612 (1st Dist.1993); Denham v. New Carlisle, 138 
Ohio App.3d 439, 443, 741 N.E.2d 587 (2d Dist.2000); Dickman v. Elida 
Community Fire Co., 141 Ohio App.3d 589, 591, 752 N.E.2d 339 (3d Dist.2001); 
Campbell v. Colley, 113 Ohio App.3d 14, 20, 680 N.E.2d 201 (4th Dist.1996) 
(applying former R.C. 3303.21(D); case involved no political subdivision, so R.C. 
2744.02 not involved); Gordon v. Strasburg, 5th Dist. No. 88AP050038, 1988 
WL 119945 (Oct. 21, 1988); Mitchell v. Norwalk Area Health Servs., 6th Dist. 
No. H-05-002, 2005-Ohio-5261, 2005 WL 2415995, ¶ 55; Sopkovich v. Gold 
Cross Ambulance, 7th Dist. No. 90 C.A. 37, 1992 WL 19834 (Feb. 6, 1992); 
Johnson v. Cleveland, 194 Ohio App.3d 355, 2011-Ohio-2152, 956 N.E.2d 355, 
¶ 21 & fn. 2 (8th Dist.); Blair v. Columbus Div. of Fire, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-575, 
2011-Ohio-3648, 2011 WL 3073870, ¶ 28-29; Bush v. Community Care 
Ambulance Network, 11th Dist. No. 2011-A-0072, 2012-Ohio-4458, 2012 WL 
4481299, ¶ 26 (applying R.C. 4765.49(A); case involved no political subdivision, 
so R.C. 2744.02 not involved); Wright v. Hamilton, 141 Ohio App.3d 296, 301, 
750 N.E.2d 1190 (12th Dist.2001). 
{¶ 19} As we explained in Clark v. Scarpelli, 91 Ohio St.3d 271, 278, 744 
N.E.2d 719 (2001), “[i]t is presumed that the General Assembly is fully aware of 
any prior judicial interpretation of an existing statute when enacting an 
amendment.”  And we have observed that “ ‘the General Assembly has shown no 
hesitation in acting promptly when it disagrees with appellate rulings involving 
statutory construction and interpretation.’ ”  In re Bruce S., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
2012-Ohio-5696, 983 N.E.2d 350, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 20} Furthermore, while the General Assembly has amended R.C. 
4765.49 on multiple occasions subsequent to enacting R.C. Chapter 2744—most 
recently in legislation passed on December 13, 2012, 2012 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 284, 
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effective March 22, 2013—it has not attempted to abrogate these appellate court 
holdings. 
{¶ 21} We reject the conclusion of the court of appeals here that R.C. 
4765.49(B) conflicts with R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).  As explained in Summerville v. 
Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, “ ‘[i]t is a 
well-settled rule of statutory interpretation that statutory provisions be construed 
together and the Revised Code be read as an interrelated body of law.’ ”  Id. at 
¶ 24, quoting State v. Moaning, 76 Ohio St.3d 126, 128, 666 N.E.2d 1115 (1996).  
R.C. 1.51 provides that when statutory provisions are in conflict, “they shall be 
construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both.”  And when construing a 
statute, our paramount concern is “the legislative intent in the statute’s enactment, 
and to discern this intent, we read words and phrases in context according to the 
rules of grammar and common usage.”  Wilson v. Kasich, 134 Ohio St.3d 221, 
2012-Ohio-5367, 981 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 22} There is no conflict between R.C. 2744.02(A) and R.C. 
4765.49(B).  R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) establishes a general grant of immunity to 
political subdivisions, but R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) creates an exception to that 
immunity “when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision 
by a section of the Revised Code.”  R.C. 4765.49(B) in turn provides that a 
political subdivision is not liable in damages for emergency medical services 
provided by its first responders “unless the services are provided in a manner that 
constitutes willful or wanton misconduct.” 
{¶ 23} After considering the plain meaning and reviewing the history of 
these statutes, it is manifest that the legislature intended R.C. 4765.49(B) to 
expressly impose liability on political subdivisions within the meaning of R.C. 
2744.02(B)(5) by providing an exception to the immunity of political subdivisions 
when emergency medical services are provided in a manner that constitutes 
willful or wanton misconduct. 
January Term, 2013 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 24} A political subdivision is not liable for injury arising out of actions 
taken by first responders in the course of providing emergency medical services, 
unless those services are provided in a manner that constitutes willful or wanton 
misconduct.  Here, the complaint alleges that city of Akron medical-emergency 
personnel wantonly caused injuries to the Riffles and their unborn child, and it 
therefore states a claim for which relief may be granted.  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Kohnen & Patton, L.L.P., Ann Ruley Combs, and Rebecca Cull, for 
appellees. 
 
Cheri B. Cunningham, Akron Director of Law, and John Christopher 
Reece and Michael J. Defibaugh, Assistant Directors of Law, for appellant. 
 
Steven M. Goldberg Co., L.P.A., and J. Michael Goldberg, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
 
Ice Miller, L.L.P., and Stephen L. Byron, Stephen J. Smith, and Chris W. 
Michael; and John Gotherman, urging reversal for amicus curiae the Ohio 
Municipal League. 
______________________