Title: Harrah v. Washington

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
ROBERT RAYMOND HARRAH,  
ADMINISTRATOR, ETC. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 952312                  November 1, 1996 
 
JAMES E. WASHINGTON, JR., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY 
 
F. W. Harkrader, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this action seeking recovery for a wrongful death 
occurring during a series of motor vehicle accidents on a fog-
shrouded mountain, we consider issues of primary negligence, 
unavoidable accident, sudden emergency, and applicability of the 
statute dealing with stopping vehicles on highways. 
 
Appellant Robert Raymond Harrah, Administrator of the Estate 
of Peggy E. Harrah, Deceased, filed this action against appellees 
James E. Washington, Jr., and Rite Cable Construction, Inc., 
seeking damages for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's 
decedent.  The plaintiff alleged that on April 20, 1992 the 
decedent, his wife, was operating an automobile proceeding in an 
easterly direction ascending the western slope of Afton Mountain 
on Interstate 64 in Augusta County.  The plaintiff further 
alleged that defendant Washington, an employee acting within the 
scope of his employment with the corporate defendant, was 
operating a truck that was stopped in the eastbound lane of I-64. 
 
The plaintiff further alleged that Washington's negligence 
at the time and place caused the decedent's death.  In responsive 
pleadings, the defendants denied Washington was guilty of 
negligence and denied they owed the plaintiff any sum. 
 
In an August 1994 trial, a jury found in favor of the 
 
 
 
 
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defendants.  Overruling the plaintiff's post-verdict motions, the 
trial court entered judgment on the verdict.  We awarded the 
plaintiff this appeal from the September 1995 final order. 
 
Following established appellate procedure, we shall 
summarize the evidence, some of which was conflicting, in the 
light most favorable to the defendants, the prevailing parties 
below. 
 
Interstate 64 crosses Afton Mountain in a generally east-
west direction.  There are two eastbound travel lanes, separated 
by a broken white line, with a "breakdown shoulder" adjacent to 
the right lane.  The accident in question occurred in an 
eastbound lane on a long, gradual, sweeping curve to the left 
near the top of the mountain.  A wide median, with grass and 
bushes, separates the eastbound and the westbound lanes. 
 
Although the weather conditions were constantly changing on 
the slopes of Afton Mountain during the morning of the day in 
question, the evidence showed that visibility near the scene at 
the time of the 11:15 a.m. incident was greatly reduced by fog.  
An investigating police officer testified the "weather was very 
foggy," saying he had not encountered worse fog in the area 
during the 17 years he had been assigned there. 
 
Prior to the incident in question, a series of fog-related 
accidents had occurred in the westbound lanes of I-64 on the 
western slope of the mountain.  A Waynesboro volunteer rescue 
squad crew had been dispatched to render first aid there.  A 
 
 
 
 
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crew-member testified that as he was riding in the rescue 
vehicle, proceeding eastbound up the mountain on I-64 in an 
effort to find the westbound "wreck," "the only way we could see 
the wreck is if you looked out the driver's side.  You couldn't 
see it coming head on."  
 
Eventually, the crew "found the front of the wreck."  The 
rescue vehicle's driver stopped "the crash truck" partly on the 
narrow left shoulder of the eastbound lanes. Part of the vehicle 
rested in the travel portion of the left eastbound lane that was 
11 feet 3 inches wide.  
 
The "crash truck" was a heavy vehicle 30 feet long, 8 feet 
wide, and approximately "11 foot tall."  It was "predominantly 
white with green stripes."  Testimony showed that the lighting on 
the rear of the vehicle included six red emergency lights, three 
on each side, with "four of them going on and off and two of them 
being . . . like a strobe."  A photograph received in evidence of 
the rear of the vehicle appears to show ten red lights (five on 
each side) as well as two large strobe lights near the top (one 
on each side) and two smaller white lights near the bottom (one 
on each side).  
 
Approximately ten minutes before the accident sued upon, 
State Trooper Frank Pyanoe, rushing from Staunton to the scene of 
the westbound accidents, travelled eastbound on I-64 until he 
"came upon" the stopped crash truck.  He said it "extended out to 
the travel area" of the left eastbound lane.  He noticed "a major 
 
 
 
 
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accident over on the westbound side."  The officer stopped his 
police vehicle behind the rescue squad truck because "there were 
no emergency lights flashing at the time" on the truck. 
 
During a conversation between the trooper and a rescue squad 
member over "some type of electronic . . . difficulty with the 
vehicle," the trooper advised the member that "he either had to 
turn the lights on or move to a safer spot, preferably over to 
the right side of the interstate."  Immediately, the lights were 
activated. 
 
The trooper, driving a 1988 Ford Crown Victoria police 
cruiser, then proceeded "entirely in the eastbound lanes on the 
left-hand side" around the crash truck to go to the westbound 
accident scene.  At this time, "the accident had not begun in the 
eastbound lane." 
 
Defendant Washington, age 38 and a Louisa County resident, 
left the corporate defendant's Charlottesville office near 8:00 
a.m. on the day in question to travel to Staunton to pick up two 
rolls of cable.  The defendant drove his employer's white Dodge 
Ram truck that had been modified with a "work cab" for storing 
tools.  He was towing a red two-wheel trailer that was ten feet 
long and about seven feet wide.   
 
Washington testified that, as he crossed Afton Mountain 
travelling westbound on I-64 en route to Staunton, it was raining 
and there was "very dense fog on the mountain itself.  It was 
bad."   
 
 
 
 
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After loading the cable on the trailer in Staunton, 
Washington proceeded to return to Charlottesville, travelling 
eastbound on I-64.  Washington testified that when he reached the 
foot of the mountain on the west near 11:00 a.m., the weather was 
not "bad" although, he said, "I knew it was bad on the mountain 
because I just came across it." 
 
Proceeding up the mountain, defendant had the vehicle's 
lights "on."  As he "went up, it got foggier," so he turned his 
"flashers on."  Driving in the right eastbound lane at a speed of 
30-35 miles per hour, he "got behind a tractor-trailer."  He said 
that because the "weather was real bad and [he] couldn't see very 
far," he decided to pass the truck in order "to see better" and 
to know where he was "headed."  He testified that he activated 
his left-turn signal, looked into his left side mirror, and, 
seeing no vehicle to his left, "proceeded to the left-hand lane." 
 
When Washington reached the left lane, he saw flashing 
lights about 50 yards ahead in the left lane.  Washington said, 
"it looked as if there were two ambulances up there."  He slowed 
his vehicle and stopped in the left lane because he "couldn't go 
any further at that time" due to "traffic in the right-hand 
lane."  Then Washington "looked in the mirror" and saw a white 
automobile "on the left-hand side of the road off onto the 
median."  This was a 1990 Honda Accord operated by the witness 
Deborah F. Branstetter. 
 
Branstetter had been travelling eastbound in the left lane 
 
 
 
 
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of I-64.  She described the weather conditions at the time as 
cool and "very overcast."  The pavement was dry and there was 
"fog on the mountain."  She said the density of the fog would 
change; visibility improved and "then it would become very thick 
suddenly."  As she ascended the mountain, Branstetter gradually 
reduced her speed from 65 to 35 miles per hour. 
 
The witness observed defendant's vehicle ahead in the right 
lane.  As she was in the process of overtaking it, and when her 
vehicle was "even" with defendant's trailer, she could see lights 
burning on the rear of defendant's truck.  At that point, 
Washington "simply changed lanes."  She said that "he did not 
give a signal."  A state trooper testified that a vehicle's "turn 
signals are cancelled out" when four-way emergency "flashers" are 
activated.  
 
According to Branstetter, there was no contact between the 
vehicles because she swerved "out of the way of the trailer into 
the median strip."  She stopped her vehicle with all four wheels 
in the grassy median. 
 
Alighting from his stopped truck, Washington ran back to the 
Honda and asked the operator "what had happened."  She responded, 
"You ran me off the road."  After determining that she was "all 
right," Washington ran back to his vehicle and moved it forward 
in the left lane "a very short distance. A few feet at the most." 
 Washington testified that he desired to move to the right lane 
but could not because of traffic there and that he "couldn't go 
 
 
 
 
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further up because of the crash truck that was in front of me."  
 
"Shortly" after he moved his truck forward, Washington 
looked "into the mirror" and saw a "gray Cadillac coming," which 
struck his trailer and truck from the rear.  This vehicle was 
operated by the witness David L. Gooden, who was travelling 
eastbound on I-64 in the left lane. 
 
Gooden said that as he ascended the western slope of the 
mountain, the weather conditions changed as he left the bottom of 
the mountain; the fog "got thicker at the top."  He testified 
there "were spots that you couldn't hardly see at all and spots I 
could see probably 20 yards."  As Gooden came out of "a real 
dense area of fog," he observed defendant's "pickup with a 
trailer" stopped 20-25 yards ahead in the left lane.  Gooden 
"hit" his brakes but, travelling at a speed of 45 miles per hour, 
struck defendant's vehicle. 
 
After being struck by the Gooden vehicle, Washington "got 
out" of his truck to assist a passenger in the Gooden vehicle who 
was having difficulty extricating herself from the automobile.  
At this moment, another automobile crashed into the Gooden 
vehicle.  This was a 1989 yellow Cadillac Seville operated by the 
plaintiff's decedent. 
 
The collision of the decedent's vehicle with the Gooden 
vehicle caused the Gooden passenger and a rescue squad member to 
be pinned under the Gooden vehicle.  Washington, rescue squad 
personnel, and bystanders joined in lifting the gray Cadillac, 
 
 
 
 
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freeing the trapped persons.  Shortly thereafter a white truck 
"came through" and collided with the decedent's vehicle.  This 
truck was a Ford Ranger pickup operated by the witness Paul W. 
Burch. 
 
As Burch proceeded eastbound on I-64, the weather "was 
pretty sunny at the bottom and increasingly cloudy going up the 
mountain."  According to Burch, "it was very foggy" at "the top 
of the mountain" until "there was no visibility whatsoever."  
Travelling at a speed of 25 to 35 miles per hour in the left 
lane, Burch applied brakes when "the visibility was reduced to 
almost nothing," and struck the decedent's vehicle without seeing 
it.  
 
Riding in the vehicle operated by the plaintiff's decedent, 
age 43, were the Harrahs' two children and their paternal 
grandmother.  The grandmother was seated in the front passenger 
seat as they drove in the left, eastbound lane ascending the 
mountain.  She testified the decedent was driving about 30 miles 
per hour with the headlights burning "because of the fog."  At 
the time of impact with the Gooden vehicle, the grandmother's 
attention was directed to the children riding in the back seat.  
She described the impact as "light because it did not knock any 
of us out of our seat belts."  Following the impact, the decedent 
said, "What have we hit"?   
 
After the collision, the decedent and the grandmother became 
involved in assisting the children from the vehicle, which was on 
 
 
 
 
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the roadway, to the grassy median.  Shortly thereafter, as 
Burch's truck struck the decedent's vehicle, a rescue worker "saw 
what appeared to be a body fly through the air."  This was the 
decedent, who was seriously injured and found "draped across" the 
red trailer. 
 
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court denied the 
plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants' evidence on the 
issue of liability.  Then, the court gave the jury a profusion of 
31 instructions.  Among the issues covered in the jury charge 
were Washington's primary negligence, the decedent's contributory 
negligence, proximate cause, superseding and intervening cause, 
concurrent negligence, unavoidable accident, sudden emergency, 
and duties of drivers of vehicles stopping on highways.   
 
On appeal, the plaintiff first argues the trial court "erred 
by not ruling, as a matter of law, that defendant Washington was 
negligent when he failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to 
give a visible signal before changing lanes and pulling directly 
into the path of an oncoming vehicle."   Focusing solely on 
defendant's alleged involvement with Branstetter, the plaintiff 
contends the evidence establishes that Branstetter was driving 
her Honda in the left lane when Washington suddenly turned into 
her lane to pass a tractor-trailer, and forced her vehicle off 
the highway.  Continuing, plaintiff says that either Branstetter 
was in plain view and Washington failed to see her, or it was so 
foggy that Washington could not see if the left lane was clear to 
 
 
 
 
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make a lane change.  Under either set of circumstances, the 
plaintiff argues, Washington breached his duty to maintain a 
reasonable lookout when he changed lanes. 
 
Furthermore, the plaintiff argues, Washington violated Code 
§ 46.2-848, which requires every driver who intends to turn from 
a direct line to give a plainly visible signal of such intention 
whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by 
such movement.  Recalling the testimony to the effect "that 
flashing hazard lights cancel any attempted turn signal," the 
plaintiff says it is "uncontradicted that no such signal was 
given by Washington."  Plaintiff contends the fact that 
"Washington may have pressed down on his turn signal lever is no 
defense to his failure to give a plainly visible signal."   
 
We do not agree with plaintiff's argument.  We are of 
opinion that the question whether Washington's negligence, if 
any, was a proximate cause of the collision resulting in 
decedent's death was, at the very least, a question for the jury. 
 We say, "at the very least," because we do not have the question 
whether, as a matter of law, Washington's negligence, if any, in 
changing lanes was not a proximate cause of decedent's death.  
Thus, given the issues on appeal, we shall go no further than to 
rule on the question presented by the plaintiff relating to 
Washington's duties owed to the decedent vis-a-vis the 
Branstetter incident. 
 
The evidence establishes that Washington initially stopped, 
 
 
 
 
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not because of any interaction with Branstetter, but due to the 
crash truck's position ahead.  It was for the jury to determine 
whether Washington reasonably believed the truck was blocking his 
passage through the left lane. 
 
Other testimony confirmed Washington's belief that the crash 
truck blocked his way.  For example, the investigating state 
trooper testified "three to four feet" of the truck was "in the 
travel portion of the left-hand lane of 64."  Another witness 
testified he recalled "a substantial portion of the crash truck 
being in the left-hand lane."  Yet another witness testified the 
crash truck "was predominantly in the left-hand lane of travel."  
 
Likewise, it was for the jury to say whether Washington 
reasonably believed that "bumper-to-bumper traffic" proceeding in 
the right lane prevented him from moving into that lane and 
around the truck. 
 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in submitting to the 
jury questions relating to Washington's conduct as it affected 
Branstetter and the ultimate role that conduct played in the 
decedent's death. 
 
Second, the plaintiff argues the trial court erred by giving 
an unavoidable accident instruction.  We agree. 
 
In a mere abstract statement of law, the trial court charged 
the jury:  "An unavoidable accident or incident is one which 
ordinary care and diligence could not have prevented or one which 
occurred in the absence of negligence by any party to this 
 
 
 
 
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action."   
 
The defendants seek to justify the granting of the 
instruction by arguing, in part, that inclusion of the phrase "by 
any party to this action" has significance here.  They say that 
despite all the vehicles involved, "the extreme weather 
conditions and the crash truck blocking the left travel lane, 
plaintiff chose only to sue Mr. Washington and his employer in 
this action, and to file a separate action against the rescue 
squad which is currently pending in Augusta County."  The 
defendants contend that "Washington was entitled to defend on the 
basis that this accident was unavoidable from his standpoint."   
 
As we understand the defendants' argument, they contend that 
if there are nonparties who are negligent in connection with a 
motor vehicle accident, then a party defendant may invoke the 
unavoidable accident doctrine to establish such defendant's 
freedom from fault.  We disagree.  The fact that all potentially 
liable parties are not joined in this action does not remove the 
case from the application of our decisions disapproving use of an 
unavoidable accident instruction. 
 
Few motor vehicle collisions occur without fault.  For this 
reason, we have emphasized that an unavoidable accident 
instruction is rarely appropriate in motor vehicle accident 
cases, although we have not abolished the doctrine or limited it 
to cases involving accidents resulting from unknown causes.  
Chodorov v. Eley, 239 Va. 528, 531, 391 S.E.2d 68, 70 (1990).  
 
 
 
 
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Such an instruction has the tendency to afford a jury "an easy 
way of avoiding instead of deciding the issue made by the 
evidence in the case."  Mawyer v. Thomas, 199 Va. 897, 901, 103 
S.E.2d 217, 220 (1958).  Accord Gardner v. Phipps, 250 Va. 256, 
261, 462 S.E.2d 91, 94 (1995). 
 
In the present case, the decedent's death resulted from the 
negligence of one or more of the several vehicle operators who 
were involved in this bizarre series of events.  Thus, the trial 
court committed reversible error by instructing on unavoidable 
accident. 
 
Because the case must be remanded, we shall discuss the 
other issues raised by the plaintiff, for they may arise upon a 
retrial. 
 
Third, the plaintiff contends the trial court erred by 
giving an instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine.  We 
agree.   
 
The trial court charged the jurors that if they believed 
from the evidence that Washington, "without negligence on his 
part, was confronted with a sudden emergency and acted as a 
reasonable person would have acted under the circumstances of 
this case, he was not negligent."  Further, the instruction 
provided:  "A sudden emergency is an event or a combination of 
circumstances that calls for immediate action without giving time 
for the deliberate exercise of judgment."  Although the 
instruction correctly sets forth the sudden emergency doctrine, 
 
 
 
 
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see Carolina Coach Company v. Starchia, 219 Va. 135, 141, 244 
S.E.2d 788, 792 (1978), Washington is not entitled to its benefit 
under the facts of this case. 
 
For the doctrine to apply, the condition confronting the 
operator must be an "unexpected happening."  Gardner, 250 Va. at 
260, 462 S.E.2d at 94.  In other words, where a set of 
circumstances has existed and the party has been exposed to them 
before, the situation is not "unexpected."  Id. 
 
In the present case, Washington was thoroughly familiar with 
the weather conditions on the mountain at the time, based on both 
his experience earlier in the morning and his observations as he 
ascended the mountain just before he stopped his vehicle.  Given 
those conditions, Washington knew, or should have known, that a 
vehicle might be stopped ahead in his lane of travel.  Such an 
occurrence was foreseeable and not unexpected.  See Chodorov, 239 
Va. at 531, 391 S.E.2d at 70. 
 
Moreover, Washington was not confronted with a sudden 
emergency after he reentered his truck and moved it forward a few 
feet.  Then, he had time for the deliberate exercise of judgment. 
 
Finally, the plaintiff contends the trial court's 
instruction relating to the duties of an operator who stops his 
vehicle on a highway was incomplete and thus erroneous.  We 
agree. 
 
Code § 46.2-888 prohibits a person from stopping a vehicle 
in such a manner as to impede or render dangerous the use of a 
 
 
 
 
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highway, "except in the case of an emergency, an accident, or a 
mechanical breakdown."  The statute further provides that in the 
event of such emergency, accident, or breakdown, the stopped 
vehicle "shall be moved from the roadway to the shoulder as soon 
as possible and removed from the shoulder without unnecessary 
delay." 
 
The trial court charged the jury:  "The driver of a vehicle 
has a duty not to stop his vehicle so as to interfere with 
traffic on the highway or so as to make the highway dangerous to 
others who are using it, unless there was an emergency or an 
accident."   
 
Arguing the instruction was incomplete, the plaintiff 
correctly says the trial court should have instructed the jury on 
"Washington's additional duty to move his vehicle off the roadway 
as soon as possible, even though it was properly stopped for an 
emergency."  The instruction was misleading because it ignored 
Washington's statutory duty to take further action after he 
stopped.  See Armstrong v. Rose, 170 Va. 190, 202, 196 S.E. 613, 
617 (1938).  Parenthetically, we observe that our ruling applying 
the "emergency" provision of this statute, is not inconsistent 
with our previously expressed view that the sudden emergency 
doctrine does not apply to Washington. 
 
Consequently, although the trial court correctly decided the 
first issue, the judgment below will be reversed and vacated 
because of the court's misdirection of the jury, and the case 
 
 
 
 
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will be remanded for a new trial on all issues. 
 
Reversed and remanded.