Title: Bernard v. Foley

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 8/21/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
ANGELA ANN BERNARD et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S136070 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B168665 
JAMES FOLEY, as Trustee, etc., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BP072862 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In this case we determine whether close personal friends of a dependent 
elder who at the end of her life provided her with personal care, including health 
care, are “care custodians” for the purposes of statutory provisions that 
presumptively disqualify care custodians as beneficiaries of testamentary transfers 
from dependent adults to whom they provide such services.  (Prob. Code, 
§§ 21350, 21351, subd. (d) (hereafter section 21351(d)); Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§ 15610.17, subd. (y).)1 
We conclude that when an unrelated person renders substantial, ongoing 
health services to a dependent adult, that person may be a care custodian for 
purposes of the statutory scheme at issue, notwithstanding that the service 
relationship between the individuals arose out of a preexisting personal friendship 
                                              
1  
Unlabeled section references are to the Probate Code. 
 
2
rather than a professional or occupational connection.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
Background 
On August 28, 1991, decedent Carmel L. Bosco executed the Carmel L. 
Bosco Revocable Living Trust (Trust).  Over the years, decedent amended the 
Trust seven times.  Plaintiffs, relatives of decedent, brought this action seeking to 
invalidate the seventh, and final, amendment. 
Decedent, a widow with no children, was close to her extended family.  
Plaintiff Angela Ann Bernard is a niece, Ann Cassell is decedent’s sister, 
Arthur G. Erman and Benny Tumminello are nephews, and Cathy Lee Miller is a 
nephew’s successor in interest.  Defendant James Foley is the successor trustee of 
the Trust.  Foley and his girlfriend, Ann Erman (hereafter Erman), were longtime 
personal friends of decedent.  For two months before her death, decedent resided 
at the Riverside home shared by Foley and Erman, who jointly cared for her 
during her final illness. 
Three days before she died, decedent executed the seventh amendment to 
the Trust, pursuant to which Foley and Erman each became a 50 percent residuary 
beneficiary.  Neither had been named as a beneficiary in earlier versions of the 
Trust. 
Plaintiffs petitioned the court to invalidate the seventh amendment to the 
Trust and for a determination of beneficial interests in the Trust estate.  They 
alleged that:  (1) decedent was dependent on Foley and Erman, inter alia, for 
custodial care, from approximately July 15, 2001, until her death; (2) the seventh 
amendment was the product of undue influence by Foley and Erman; (3) decedent 
lacked testamentary capacity when she executed the seventh amendment because 
she was gravely ill and heavily sedated; and (4) Foley and Erman were 
disqualified to receive a testamentary transfer from decedent because they had 
 
3
been her “care custodians” within the meaning of section 21350, subdivision (a)(6) 
and did not fall within any exception to that statute. 
A bench trial was held at which various witnesses testified, including 
Foley, Erman and some of the plaintiffs.  The parties disputed whether Erman or 
Foley had received payment for the room, board and services they provided to 
decedent.  Foley and Erman denied they had; Foley in his brief to this court asserts 
that in any event they “certainly were not under a duty” to take care of decedent.  
“They were simply performing acts of kindness on a purely volunteer basis as 
good friends often do for others.”  The trial court noted that “Ann Erman had a 
personal relationship with decedent founded on a familial bond,”2 ruling that, 
although there was some evidence of compensation to Erman relating to expenses 
for decedent’s care, the evidence was insufficient to establish a “business 
relationship.”  The trial court denied plaintiffs’ petition, concluding neither Erman 
nor Foley were care custodians. 
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Foley and Erman were “care 
custodians” of decedent and they had failed to rebut the statutory presumption that 
decedent’s donative transfer to them was procured by undue influence.  The Court 
of Appeal remanded the cause with directions that the trial court enter a new 
judgment invalidating the seventh amendment to the Trust.  We granted Foley’s 
petition for review. 
                                              
2  
Ann Erman formerly was married to decedent’s nephew, plaintiff Arthur 
Erman. 
 
4
Discussion 
A.   Statutory Disqualification of Care Custodians 
Part 3.5 of division 11 of the Probate Code (hereafter part 3.5), section 
21350 et seq., sets forth certain limitations on donative transfers by testamentary 
instrument.3  Section 21350 lists seven categories of persons who cannot validly 
be recipients of such donative transfers, including, inter alia, “[a] care custodian of 
a dependent adult who is the transferor” (id., subd. (a)(6)).  The statute provides 
that the term “care custodian” for these purposes “has the meaning as set forth in 
Section 15610.17 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.”  (§ 21350, subd. (c).)4  
                                              
3  
“ ‘Instrument’ means a will, trust, deed, or other writing that designates a 
beneficiary or makes a donative transfer of property.”  (§ 45.)  
4  
In its entirety, section 21350 provides that, “(a) Except as provided in 
Section 21351, no provision, or provisions, of any instrument shall be valid to 
make any donative transfer to any of the following:  [¶] (1) The person who 
drafted the instrument.  [¶] (2) A person who is related by blood or marriage to, is 
a domestic partner of, is a cohabitant with, or is an employee of, the person who 
drafted the instrument.  [¶] (3) Any partner or shareholder of any law partnership 
or law corporation in which the person described in paragraph (1) has an 
ownership interest, and any employee of that law partnership or law corporation.  
[¶] (4) Any person who has a fiduciary relationship with the transferor, including, 
but not limited to, a conservator or trustee, who transcribes the instrument or 
causes it to be transcribed.  [¶] (5) A person who is related by blood or marriage 
to, is a domestic partner of, is a cohabitant with, or is an employee of a person who 
is described in paragraph (4).  [¶] (6) A care custodian of a dependent adult who is 
the transferor.  [¶] (7) A person who is related by blood or marriage to, is a 
domestic partner of, is a cohabitant with, or is an employee of, a person who is 
described in paragraph (6). 
 
“(b) For purposes of this section, ‘a person who is related by blood or 
marriage’ to a person means all of the following:  [¶] (1) The person’s spouse or 
predeceased spouse.  [¶] (2) Relatives within the third degree of the person and of 
the person’s spouse.  [¶] (3) The spouse of any person described in paragraph (2).  
[¶] In determining any relationship under this subdivision, Sections 6406 
[Relatives of Halfblood], 6407 [Unborn Relatives of Decedent], and Chapter 2 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
5
That section, in turn, defines “care custodian” by means of a list of described 
agencies and persons, concluding in its final subdivision with “[a]ny other . . . 
agency or person providing health services or social services to elders or 
dependent adults.”5  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17, subd. (y).)  
Section 21351 sets forth several exceptions to section 21350.  Relevant for 
our purposes is subdivision (d) of section 21351, which provides that the 
prohibition of section 21350 does not apply if “[t]he court determines, upon clear 
and convincing evidence, but not based solely upon the testimony of any person 
described in subdivision (a) of Section 21350 [i.e., any prohibited transferee], that 
the transfer was not the product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence.”  
Once it is determined that a person is prohibited under section 21350 from 
receiving a transfer, “section 21351 creates a rebuttable presumption that the 
transfer was the product of fraud, duress, menace, or undue influence.  A person 
who is prohibited from receiving a transfer under section 21350 may still inherit, if 
[he or she] successfully rebuts the section 21351 presumption (§ 21351, subd. (d)).  
In order to rebut the presumption, the transferee must present clear and convincing 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
[Parent and Child Relationship] (commencing with Section 6450) of Part 2 of 
Division 6 shall be applicable. 
 
“(c) For purposes of this section, the term ‘dependent adult’ has the 
meaning as set forth in Section 15610.23 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and 
also includes those persons who (1) are older than age 64 and (2) would be 
dependent adults, within the meaning of Section 15610.23, if they were between 
the ages of 18 and 64.  The term ‘care custodian’ has the meaning as set forth in 
Section 15610.17 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
 
“(d) For purposes of this section, ‘domestic partner’ means a domestic 
partner as defined under Section 297 of the Family Code.” 
5  
Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.17 is quoted in its entirety at 
pages 11-12, post. 
 
6
evidence, which does not include his or her own testimony, that the transfer was 
not the product of fraud, duress, menace, or undue influence.  (§ 21351, subd. 
(d).)”  (Estate of Shinkle (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 990, 993.) 
As we previously have observed, this statutory scheme supplements the 
common law doctrine that “a presumption of undue influence, shifting the burden 
of proof, arises upon the challenger’s showing that (1) the person alleged to have 
exerted undue influence had a confidential relationship with the testator; (2) the 
person actively participated in procuring the instrument’s preparation or 
execution; and (3) the person would benefit unduly by the testamentary 
instrument.”  (Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89, 97; see also Graham v. Lenzi 
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 248, 257; Estate of Swetmann (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 807, 
816-817, and cases cited there.) 
B.   Were Foley and Erman Care Custodians? 
That decedent was a dependent adult is undisputed.6  The question is 
whether Foley and Erman fit the statutory definition of “care custodian.” 
Before the Court of Appeal in this case rendered its decision, two other 
Courts of Appeal had concluded that a person who cares for a dependent adult out 
of a preexisting personal friendship, rather than in an occupational or professional 
                                              
6  
For purposes of Probate Code section 21350, “the term ‘dependent adult’ 
has the meaning as set forth in Section 15610.23 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code and also includes those persons who (1) are older than age 64 and (2) would 
be dependent adults, within the meaning of Section 15610.23, if they were 
between the ages of 18 and 64.”  (§ 21350, subd. (c).)  Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 15610.23 provides, in relevant part, that “ ‘[d]ependent adult’ means 
any person between the ages of 18 and 64 years who resides in this state and who 
has physical or mental limitations that restrict his or her ability to carry out normal 
activities or to protect his or her rights, including, but not limited to, persons who 
have physical or developmental disabilities, or whose physical or mental abilities 
have diminished because of age.”  (Id., subd. (a).) 
 
7
capacity, does not fall within the definition of “care custodian” in Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 15610.17, subdivision (y) and therefore does not face 
disqualification as a beneficiary under Probate Code section 21350, subdivision 
(a)(6).  (See Conservatorship of Davidson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1035 
(Davidson); Conservatorship of McDowell (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 659 
(McDowell).)   
Davidson concerned the estate of an elderly woman, Delores Davidson, 
who late in life changed her will and trust so as to benefit a personal friend and 
neighbor, Steve Gungl, who had cared for her during her declining years.  Four 
years before her death, Davidson executed a will and pour-over trust leaving most 
of her estate to Gungl, thereby revoking her earlier will and trust that had left most 
of her estate to her cousin Elaine Morken.  In the last decade of Davidson’s life, 
Gungl and his life partner visited Davidson often, took her to the doctor, and 
helped her with household chores.  As Davidson declined, Gungl and his partner 
assumed ever greater responsibility for her, doing her shopping, paying her bills 
and taking care of her banking.  For her part, Davidson treated Gungl and his 
partner like family, calling them “her boys.”  (Davidson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1042.) 
Morken and her husband, who had lived out of state, moved at one point to 
California but had infrequent contact with Davidson until they learned she had 
executed an estate plan favoring Gungl.  Thereafter, they made a series of 
complaints to adult protective services, the police and Davidson’s neighbors.  
Ultimately, Davidson was placed in a conservatorship under the charge of the 
public guardian, her house was sold, and she was placed in a nursing home, where 
she declined and died.  After her death, the Morkens sued to invalidate the trust 
and will favoring Gungl, asserting he was a care custodian under section 21350 
and therefore disqualified to receive Davidson’s donative transfer.  The trial court 
 
8
found that, while Gungl was a not a blood relative of Davidson’s, his concern and 
affection for her had been lasting, deep and genuine.  Ruling that Gungl was not a 
“care custodian” for purposes of section 21350 and that Davidson had not been 
subjected to undue influence, the court denied the Morkens’ petition to invalidate 
Davidson’s trust and will.  (Davidson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1040-1046.) 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling.  (Davidson, supra, 
113 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1050-1051.)  The court opined that “the statute bars 
donative transfers to individuals who have assumed the role of ‘care custodian’ to 
a dependent adult incidental to the professional or occupational provision of health 
or social services to that dependent adult, rather than in connection with a personal 
or familial relationship; and whose personal relationship, if any, with the 
dependent adult is entirely incidental, secondary to, and derived from the 
preexisting professional or occupational connection.”  (Id. at p. 1052.)  
Accordingly, the court held, “when an individual becomes what is in effect a care 
custodian of a dependent adult as a direct result of a preexisting genuinely 
personal relationship rather than any professional or occupational connection with 
the provision of health or social services, that individual should not be barred by 
section 21350 from the benefit of donative transfers” (id. at pp. 1052-1053).7 
In McDowell, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 659, Kathryn McDowell, an elderly 
woman living alone, became friends with two men, Reza Fatipoor and another, 
whom she asked to live in her home in exchange for taking care of her.  Two years 
                                              
7  
The Davidson court relied alternatively on “the kind of unsophisticated care 
and attention” that Gungl had provided to Davidson―errands, chores and 
household tasks that “simply cannot be equated with the provision of ‘health 
services and social services’ specified by the subject statutes as constituting 
custodial care.”  (Davidson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 1050.) 
 
9
later, in early 2000, Fatipoor introduced McDowell to Ann Netcharu.  McDowell 
and Netcharu became friends, Netcharu frequently visiting McDowell and 
bringing her food.  In June 2000, McDowell was hospitalized for a broken hip.  
After her discharge, Netcharu visited her often and regularly brought her meals.  
Netcharu eventually started taking care of McDowell’s personal needs, including 
bathing and hygiene.  Netcharu did not receive payment for these services. 
In September 2000, Fatipoor and Netcharu took McDowell to an attorney 
who prepared a will for her, naming Fatipoor and Netcharu executors and sole 
beneficiaries.  McDowell told a doctor friend of the attorney, who interviewed her, 
that she was leaving her money to Fatipoor and Netcharu because they were 
assisting her.  During these months, while McDowell’s physical condition was 
deteriorating, Netcharu tried to get medical aid for her.  She also called the public 
guardian to alert him to McDowell’s deteriorating condition and took McDowell 
to the doctor.   
In January 2001, a permanent conservator appointed for McDowell 
petitioned for authority to revoke her will and to execute a trust and new will 
benefiting Guide Dogs for the Blind.  The conservator asserted that Fatipoor and 
Netcharu had used undue influence over McDowell to gain control of her assets 
and that McDowell lacked testamentary capacity when she signed the will 
benefiting them.  The trial court rejected these claims.  Nevertheless, the court 
ruled that Netcharu was a “care custodian” and, as such, had failed to rebut the 
presumption of undue influence arising under section 21350 when a care custodian 
is named a dependent’s beneficiary.  (McDowell, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at 
pp. 662-663, 667-668.) 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  Quoting Davidson, the court observed that 
“ ‘[t]he controlling question is whether the relationship between the caregiver and 
the dependent adult arose out of the provision of health or social services, or 
 
10
whether instead the provision of care developed naturally from a preexisting 
genuinely personal relationship.’ ”  (McDowell, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 673.)  
Applying that principle, the court concluded the evidence did not support the trial 
court’s finding that Netcharu was a care custodian.  She was neither a professional 
nor an occupational caregiver, nor was there any evidence “she generally offered 
care services to the elderly and dependent adult population as a paid or volunteer 
provider.”  (Ibid.)  Neither was there evidence that Netcharu’s relationship with 
McDowell “grew out of a preexisting professional or occupational connection” 
(id. at p. 673).  Rather, the court found, the evidence showed that Netcharu was a 
well-meaning friend. 
As noted, the Court of Appeal below declined to follow Davidson and 
McDowell in recognizing a preexisting personal friendship exception to statutory 
care custodian status.  The Court of Appeal held, to the contrary, that “the 
definition of care custodian is broad indeed, extending to persons providing health 
services or social services to elderly or dependent adults.”  Reviewing the services 
Foley and Erman had provided to decedent, the court noted they were of the sort 
often rendered by practical nurses.8  The court concluded the evidence established 
that Foley and Erman came within the statutory definition. 
                                              
8  
According to the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Occupational Outlook Handbook, the tasks that licensed practical nurses 
perform include, inter alia, “basic bedside care, taking vital signs such as 
temperature, blood pressure, pulse, and respiration.  They also prepare and give 
injections and enemas, monitor catheters, apply dressings, treat bedsores, and give 
alcohol rubs and massages.  LPNs monitor their patients and report adverse 
reactions to medications or treatments.  They collect samples for testing, perform 
routine laboratory tests, feed patients, and record food and fluid intake and output.  
To help keep patients comfortable, LPNs assist with bathing, dressing, and 
personal hygiene.  In States where the law allows, they may administer prescribed 
medicines or start intravenous fluids.”  (U.S. Dept. Lab., Bur. Lab. Statistics, 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
11
1.   Statutory language 
In resolving the issue before us, we look first to the statutes’ words, as these 
“ ‘generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ ”  (People v. 
Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1007.)  As noted, the Legislature has provided that the 
term “care custodian” for purposes of Probate Code section 21350 has the 
meaning set forth in section 15610.17 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.  
(§ 21350, subd. (c).)  Our task in interpreting these statutes is “to ascertain and 
effectuate legislative intent.”  (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621.)  
In its entirety, Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.17 provides:  
“ ‘Care custodian’ means an administrator or an employee of any of the following 
public or private facilities or agencies, or persons providing care or services for 
elders or dependent adults, including members of the support staff and 
maintenance staff:  [¶] (a) Twenty-four-hour health facilities, as defined in 
Sections 1250, 1250.2, and 1250.3 of the Health and Safety Code.  [¶] (b) Clinics.  
[¶] (c) Home health agencies.  [¶] (d) Agencies providing publicly funded in-home 
supportive services, nutrition services, or other home and community-based 
support services.  [¶] (e) Adult day health care centers and adult day care.  
[¶] (f) Secondary schools that serve 18- to 22-year-old dependent adults and 
postsecondary educational institutions that serve dependent adults or elders.  
[¶] (g) Independent living centers.  [¶] (h) Camps.  [¶] (i) Alzheimer’s Disease day 
care resource centers.  [¶] (j) Community care facilities, as defined in Section 1502 
of the Health and Safety Code, and residential care facilities for the elderly, as 
defined in Section 1569.2 of the Health and Safety Code.  [¶] (k) Respite care 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Occupational Outlook Handbook Bull. No. 2600, p. 1, available online at 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/print/ocos102.htm [as of Aug. 21, 2006].) 
 
12
facilities.  [¶] (l) Foster homes.  [¶] (m) Vocational rehabilitation facilities and 
work activity centers.  [¶] (n) Designated area agencies on aging.  [¶] (o) Regional 
centers for persons with developmental disabilities.  [¶] (p) State Department of 
Social Services and State Department of Health Services licensing divisions.  
[¶] (q) County welfare departments.  [¶] (r) Offices of patients’ rights advocates 
and clients’ rights advocates, including attorneys.  [¶] (s) The office of the long-
term care ombudsman.  [¶] (t) Offices of public conservators, public guardians, 
and court investigators.  [¶] (u) Any protection or advocacy agency or entity that is 
designated by the Governor to fulfill the requirements and assurances of the 
following:  [¶] (1) The federal Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act of 2000, contained in Chapter 144 (commencing with Section 15001) 
of Title 42 of the United States Code, for protection and advocacy of the rights of 
persons with developmental disabilities.  [¶] (2) The Protection and Advocacy for 
the Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986, as amended, contained in Chapter 114 
(commencing with Section 10801) of Title 42 of the United States Code, for the 
protection and advocacy of the rights of persons with mental illness.  
[¶] (v) Humane societies and animal control agencies.  [¶] (w) Fire departments.  
[¶] (x) Offices of environmental health and building code enforcement.  
[¶] (y) Any other protective, public, sectarian, mental health, or private assistance 
or advocacy agency or person providing health services or social services to 
elders or dependent adults.”  (Italics added.) 
Thus, the statutory definition of “care custodian” expressly includes “[a]ny 
other . . . agency or person providing health services or social services to elders or 
dependent adults.”  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17, subd. (y).)   
Here, the uncontroverted evidence shows that Foley and Erman rendered 
various services to decedent during the two-month period she resided with them, 
including health services.  Decedent was incapable of caring for herself, so she 
 
13
was dependent on Foley and Erman for her daily needs.  Foley did decedent’s 
grocery shopping, prepared some meals for her and occasionally attended to her 
personal needs, including helping to change the diapers she wore.  Foley also 
made decedent’s bed and assisted her with bathing.  He applied topical 
medications to decedent’s body, sometimes with Erman’s assistance.  
Additionally, Foley went through decedent’s mail for her and, for the last six 
weeks of decedent’s life, handled all her financial and investment affairs, 
including her bank accounts. 
During the same period, Erman prepared meals for decedent, spent every 
day with her, assisted her in getting to and from the bathroom, helped her into bed, 
fixed her hair, cleaned her bedroom and did her laundry.  Erman washed 
decedent’s face and hands on days when the visiting hospice nurses were not 
present to bathe her.  She administered oral medications to decedent, including 
liquid morphine to assist decedent when she was having difficulty breathing, 
dosages of antidepressant drugs, anxiety medication and codeine cough syrup.  
She helped decedent apply ointments to a rash that had developed in her intimate 
areas.  Erman also cared for decedent’s wounds, applying salves and antibiotics to 
sores on her legs and thereafter bandaging those areas.  Devices for monitoring 
decedent’s breathing were placed in decedent’s and Erman’s bedrooms so that 
Erman could monitor decedent’s breathing. 
In sum, the record reflects that both Foley and Erman provided substantial, 
ongoing health services to decedent while, at the end of her life, she was residing 
in their home and that it was during this period that decedent amended her trust to 
include the donative transfers at issue.  Foley concedes he and Erman engaged in 
activities that could be performed by a nurse, including the administration of 
 
14
medications and application of topical ointments.9  Although Foley challenges the 
Court of Appeal’s analysis of the tasks he and Erman performed as “health 
services” rather than “simple tasks,” the court correctly noted that “Erman 
administered morphine to decedent and provided wound care,” calling such 
services “a far cry from the level of care provided by the longtime friends in 
Davidson,” where the assistance offered consisted of cooking, gardening, driving 
the decedent to the doctor, running errands, grocery shopping, purchasing clothing 
or medications and assisting her with banking (see Davidson, supra, 113 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1050).   
Foley argues that the Court of Appeal in any event erred in focusing on the 
kind of services he and Erman provided.  He urges us to focus instead on whether 
they provided services on an occupational or professional basis, in the manner of 
the “public or private facilities or agencies, or persons providing care or services 
for elders or dependent adults” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17) that are listed in 
subdivisions (a) through (x) of the statutory “care custodian” definition.  These 
definitional categories of care custodian, he argues, reflect public or private 
facilities or agencies that would come into contact with a dependent adult not as 
the result of a personal relationship or friendship, but because they are under a 
duty to provide, or have agreed to provide, services to a dependent adult.  
Acknowledging that the statutory definition ends with a catchall provision that 
encompasses “[a]ny other . . . agency or person providing health services or social 
                                              
9  
As the Court of Appeal noted, notwithstanding Erman was the primary 
caregiver, Foley conceded he and Erman jointly cared for decedent, thus Foley 
qualifies equally as a care custodian.  Foley would in any event be disqualified 
under section 21350, subdivision (a)(7), which disqualifies as a donee a cohabitant 
or domestic partner of a care custodian. 
 
15
services to elders or dependent adults” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17, 
subd. (y)), Foley nevertheless suggests that provision should be interpreted to 
include only similar agencies that serve the same purpose as those specifically 
listed in the preceding subdivisions.  According to Foley, the plain meaning of 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.17, subdivision (y) is to include those 
persons who fulfill the tasks performed by the persons and agencies listed in the 
other 24 categories on an occupational or professional basis. 
In essence, Foley’s argument is that the language of Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 15610.17, subdivision (d) must be understood in light of 
the interpretive canon ejusdem generis—“of the same kind.”  “The principle of 
ejusdem generis instructs that ‘when a statute contains a list or catalogue of items, 
a court should determine the meaning of each by reference to the others, giving 
preference to an interpretation that uniformly treats items similar in nature and 
scope.’ ”  (Kelly v. Methodist Hospital of So. California (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1108, 
1121.) 
The ejusdem generis canon “presumes that if the Legislature intends a 
general word to be used in its unrestricted sense, it does not also offer as examples 
peculiar things or classes of things since those descriptions then would be 
surplusage.”  (Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 
141.)  Here, even if the entities the Legislature has included in subdivisions (a) 
through (x) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.17 are read as 
examples of the public or private facilities, agencies or persons to which the 
Legislature referred in the statute’s introductory paragraph―an uncertain 
premise―they manifestly are not presented as examples of the “other protective, 
public, sectarian, mental health, or private assistance or advocacy agenc[ies] or 
person[s]” (italics added) to which subdivision (y) of the statute refers.  Rather, 
apparently cast as a broad catchall provision, subdivision (y) offers no examples of 
 
16
either peculiar things or peculiar classes.  Therefore, in accordance with our 
established ejusdem generis jurisprudence, we must presume that the Legislature 
intends “any other . . . person providing health services” in Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 15610.17, subdivision (y) to be used in its unrestricted 
sense.   
Seeking further to buttress his ejusdem generis argument, Foley points to 
the requirement in subdivision (y) that the agencies or persons provide dependent 
adults with health or social services.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17, subd. (y).)  
As longtime personal friends of decedent, Foley argues, he and Erman did not 
provide health or social “services” on either a professional or occupational basis.  
Rather, Foley argues, a person who prepares food for, or applies ointment to, a 
friend would not be considered as providing a “service” within the plain meaning 
of the relevant statutes. 
We disagree with Foley that, in ordinary parlance, one who prepares meals 
for or applies ointments to another person does not provide that person a service.10  
When construing statutory language, we are, absent contrary direction, bound to 
give the words the Legislature chose their usual and ordinary meaning.  (DaFonte 
v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601.)  While some of the numerous 
dictionary definitions of the noun “service” may carry commercial connotations, 
others do not.  (See Webster’s New Internat. Dict., supra, at p. 2288 [listing 30 
definitions].)  We discern nothing about the language of Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 15610.17—and in particular the wording of its subdivision (y)—that 
would justify our presuming the Legislature intended a specialized or narrow 
                                              
10  
See, e.g., Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1958) page 2288 
(defining “service,” inter alia, as “[p]erformance of labor for the benefit of 
another” and “[t]he deed of one who serves”). 
 
17
usage rather than a general one.  (See Southern California Edison Co. v. State 
Board of Equalization (1972) 7 Cal.3d 652, 662-663 [finding no statutory 
indication the Legislature intended special meaning of “sales price” in state use tax 
statutes].)  The single potential linguistic clue is to the contrary.  In Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 15610.17’s introductory paragraph, the Legislature 
declares that “ ‘[c]are custodian’ means an administrator or an employee of any of 
the following public or private facilities or agencies, or persons providing care or 
services for elders or dependent adults, including members of the support staff and 
maintenance staff [of the listed entities].”  (Italics added).  For us to construe the 
statute as excluding uncompensated or nonprofessional care on the ground the 
word “services” implies such exclusion would fly in the face of the broad 
introductory phraseology cast thus in the disjunctive. 
In light of the statutory language, we conclude Foley’s claim that he and 
Erman did not serve decedent’s health care needs must fail.  We find no 
professional or occupational limitation on the definitional statute’s pronouncement 
that “care custodian” means, among other things, any person providing care or 
health services to a dependent adult.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17, subd. (y).) 
Finally, Foley argues that he and Erman were not custodians of decedent.  
He cites dictionary definitions of “custodian” that connote a legal or official 
caretaking function.  He argues that because they were not legally bound to 
provide decedent a residence or care, neither he nor Erman can properly be 
considered to have been her custodian. 
Notwithstanding the cited dictionary definitions of custodian, nothing in the 
statutory language suggests the Legislature, when enacting or amending the 
statutory scheme, understood itself to be using the word “custodian” in a sense that 
presumes a contractual or other legal duty.  The statutory definition of “care 
custodian” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.12) includes not only health care 
 
18
institutions, but numerous public and private entities whose employees are in a 
position to exert undue influence on an elderly person facing death.  In its general 
sense, a custodian is simply “[o]ne who has care or custody . . .” (Webster’s New 
Internat. Dict., supra, at p. 650), a definition that clearly applies to Foley and 
Erman.  In any event, irrespective of Foley’s selective dictionary definitions, in 
construing the statutory phrase “care custodian” we are bound to follow the 
definition the Legislature has supplied.  (People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 
870; People v. Pociask (1939) 14 Cal.2d 679, 683.) 
In sum, we conclude that nothing in the statute’s structure, terms or 
language authorizes us to impose a professional or occupational limitation on the 
definition of “care custodian” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17) or to craft a 
preexisting personal friendship exception thereto.  This conclusion is buttressed by 
the legislative history of the statute, to which we now turn. 
2.   Legislative history 
The Legislature added part 3.5 to the Probate Code in 1993 and 
substantially amended it in 1995.  (Stats. 1993, ch. 293, § 8, p. 2021; Stats. 1995, 
ch. 730, §§ 12-17, pp. 5480-5483.)  On the only previous occasion we have had to 
examine this statutory scheme in any depth, we observed that “[t]he 1993 
legislation was introduced in response to reports that an Orange County attorney 
who represented a large number of Leisure World residents had drafted numerous 
wills and trusts under which he was a major or exclusive beneficiary, and had 
abused his position as trustee or conservator in many cases to benefit himself or 
his law partners.”  (Rice v. Clark, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 97-98 (Rice), citing 
Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 21 (1993-1994 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Feb. 4, 1993, p. 1.)  We noted that “[t]he scheme set out in part 
3.5 differs from the preexisting decisional law relating to undue influence (and 
§ 6104) in several respects.  Section 21350 applies to all donative transfers by 
 
19
instrument, not only to wills and other testamentary transfers, but it invalidates 
only gifts to drafters and to fiduciaries (and to persons close to them) who 
transcribe the instrument or cause it to be transcribed.  Unlike the common law, 
section 21350 does not require, as the predicate for a presumption of invalidity, 
that the transferee would receive an ‘undue’ benefit.  The transferee, under part 
3.5, bears an elevated proof burden in rebutting the presumption:  he or she must 
show the absence of undue influence, fraud or duress by clear and convincing 
evidence, and without reliance on the testimony of any presumptively disqualified 
person.  (§ 21351, subd. (d).)”  (Rice, at p. 98.) 
We went on in Rice to discuss certain amendments to the statutory scheme 
that were relevant to the issue before us there (see Rice, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
p. 98), but we have had no occasion specifically to address the legislative history 
of section 21350’s provisions invalidating instrumental transfers to care custodians 
and their relatives, spouses, domestic partners, cohabitants and employees.  
(§ 21350, subd. (a)(6), (7).) 
Other California courts, however, have recognized that the purpose of 
section 21350 was “to prevent unscrupulous persons in fiduciary relationships 
from obtaining gifts from elderly persons through undue influence or other 
overbearing behavior.”  (Bank of America v. Angel View Crippled Children’s 
Foundation (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 451, 456; accord, Osornio v. Weingarten 
(2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 304, 318-319.)  As originally enacted in 1993, section 
21350, subdivision (a) did not include care custodians of dependent adults among 
presumptively disqualified donees.  (See former § 21350, added by Stats. 1993, 
ch. 293, § 8, p. 2021.)  In 1997, the Legislature amended the section to include 
such care custodians.  (See Stats. 1997, ch. 724, § 33; Osornio, at p. 319.)   
In Davidson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 1035, the court stated that a 
legislative committee report indicated that the 1997 amendment to section 21350 
 
20
“was intended to apply to gifts made ‘to practical nurses or other caregivers hired 
to provide in-home care.’ ”  (Davidson, at p. 1050, quoting Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4.)  Partly on 
the basis of that report, the Davidson court concluded that the legislative intent of 
the amendment “was to place limitations on the ability of professional ‘care 
custodians’ to receive donative transfers from elderly testators” (Davidson, at 
p. 1051).  Construing the term “care custodian” so as to exclude preexisting 
personal friends and companions performing “self-sacrificing acts of care and 
companionship,” the court opined, would be congruent with that intent.  (Ibid.) 
Contrary to the Davidson court’s statement, the portion of the committee 
report it cited addressed not what effect the Legislature intended the 1997 
amendment to have, but the state of existing law at the time the amendment was 
being considered.  The relevant sentence in the report reads in full:  “Existing law 
provides a presumption of invalidity that applies to gifts made to lawyers or other 
fiduciaries, but not to practical nurses or other caregivers hired to provide in-home 
care.”  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. 
Sess.) p. 4.)11  The report, in the same section, noted that the general problem the 
amendment was intended to address, one obviously not restricted to paid 
caregivers, was that “care custodians are often working alone and in a position to 
take advantage of the person they are caring for.”  (Id. at p. 4.) 
                                              
11  
The committee report from which the Davidson court obtained its extract 
was the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report on an annual omnibus Probate Law 
bill containing numerous and varied provisions making both technical and 
substantive changes.  (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 1172 
(1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 1.) 
 
21
In sum, neither the statutory scheme presumptively disqualifying care 
custodians from receiving testamentary transfers, nor the definition of “care 
custodian” the Legislature adopted for the purposes of that scheme, contains or 
implies an exception for preexisting personal friends of a dependent adult to whom 
they provide health care services.  Were we, moreover, to create such an 
exception, we would render redundant the express statutory exception for the 
transferor’s relatives and domestic partners.  (See § 21351, subd. (a).)  A 
construction that renders some statutory language surplusage or redundant is to be 
avoided.  (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1023.) 
The Legislature’s failure to include an express friendship exception within 
the statutory scheme is significant, because the Legislature knows how to craft 
such an exception when it wishes to do so.  The Legislature has expressly 
promulgated a friendship exception in another context involving the protection of 
elderly persons, the Residential Care Facilities for the Elderly Act (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 1569 et seq.).  There, the Legislature excluded from certain licensing 
requirements “[a]ny arrangement for the care and supervision of a person or 
persons from only one family by a close friend, whose friendship preexisted the 
contact between the provider and the recipient, and . . . :  [¶] . . . [t]he care and 
supervision is provided in a home or residence chosen by the recipient [and] 
[¶] . . . [t]he arrangement is not of a business nature and occurs only as long as the 
needs of the recipient for care and supervision are adequately met.”  (Health & 
Saf. Code, § 1569.145, subd. (f)(2).) 
Even more tellingly, the Legislature in section 21351 has expressly 
excepted other specified classes of potential beneficiaries from disqualification 
under section 21350.  Section 21351, subdivision (a) nullifies application of 
 
22
section 21350 to transferees who are related to the transferor by blood, marriage or 
domestic partnership, or who are cohabitants with the transferor.12  As the Court 
of Appeal below explained, had the Legislature wished also to exempt preexisting 
personal friends from the definition of care custodian, it could have done so.  “It is 
the role of the courts to interpret and apply the laws as enacted, not to usurp the 
legislative function.” 
“In enacting sections 21350 and 21351, the Legislature was aware that 
certain individuals are uniquely positioned to procure gifts from elderly persons 
through fraud, menace, duress or undue influence.”  (Graham v. Lenzi, supra, 37 
Cal.App.4th at p. 256.)  Regrettably, preexisting personal friendship is no 
guarantee against the exercise of fraud, menace, duress or undue influence over 
dependent adults.   
Our conclusion accords with the overall purpose of section 21350.  The 
public policy underlying that statute “is expressly articulated in Evidence Code 
section 605, which provides that ‘[a] presumption affecting the burden of proof is 
a presumption established to implement some public policy other than to facilitate 
the determination of the particular action in which the presumption is applied, 
such as the policy in favor of . . . the security of those who entrust themselves or 
their property to the administration of others.’ ”  (Graham v. Lenzi, supra, 37 
                                              
12  
Probate Code section 21351, subdivision (a) incorporates the definition of 
“cohabitant” contained in section 13700 of the Penal Code; thus, “ ‘cohabitant’ 
means two unrelated adult persons living together for a substantial period of time, 
resulting in some permanency of relationship.  Factors that may determine whether 
persons are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) sexual relations between 
the parties while sharing the same living quarters, (2) sharing of income or 
expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property, (4) whether the parties hold 
themselves out as husband and wife, (5) the continuity of the relationship, and 
(6) the length of the relationship.”  (Pen. Code, § 13700, subd. (a).)   
 
23
Cal.App.4th at p. 257.)  Nothing in the legislative history suggests the Legislature 
harbored a lesser concern for the security of dependent Californians who entrust 
themselves to personal friends or acquaintances than it did for those whose care 
custodians are paid professionals. 
Section 21350 (set out in full in fn. 4, ante) lists seven categories of persons 
who are presumptively barred from receiving a donative transfer from a dependent 
adult.  These categories cover various relationships between donor and donee that 
might logically offer opportunities for duress or undue influence.  The statutory 
list includes the person who drafted the donative instrument (§ 21350, 
subd. (a)(1)), persons with specified relationships to the drafter (id., subd. (a)(2)-
(3)), a fiduciary who transcribed the instrument (id., subd. (a)(4)), persons with 
specified relationships to the fiduciary transcriber (id., subd. (a)(5)), a care 
custodian (id., subd. (a)(6)), and persons with specified relationships to the care 
custodian (id., subd. (a)(7)).  As to all the categories set forth in section 21350, 
section 21351 expressly exempts cases in which the transferor is related to the 
transferee by blood or marriage, or in other specified ways (§ 21351 , subd. (a)); 
notably it includes no similar exemption for situations where transferor and 
transferee otherwise have a preexisting social relationship.   
Some of the persons described in subsections (1) through (5) of section 
21350, subdivision (a) might be expected to have personal, rather than or in 
addition to, professional relations with the donor/dependent adult.  Yet the statute 
nowhere suggests that, if they otherwise fall within subsections (1) through (5), the 
donor’s preexisting friends, neighbors and social acquaintances are to be excluded 
from those persons presumptively barred from receiving donative transfers from 
the dependent adult.  We discern no reason why the Legislature would want to 
include as prohibited donees preexisting friends of the dependent adult who fall 
within subsections (1) through (5) of section 21350, subdivision (a), but, under 
 
24
subsection (a)(6), exclude preexisting friends who provide care and service, on 
that basis, to the transferor.  The relationship between dependent adult and 
caregiver, however it originates, is at least as rife with opportunity for duress and 
undue influence as the other relationships described in section 21350. 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.17, from which Probate Code 
section 21350, subdivision (c) imports the definition of “care custodian,” is part of 
the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act of 1994 (Elder Abuse 
Act).  (Stats. 1994, ch. 594, § 3, pp. 2934-2935.)  The legislative intent underlying 
the Elder Abuse Act was to create an expansive class of individuals obligated to 
report elder abuse to the proper authorities.  (See id., § 1, pp. 2932-2933.)  The 
Legislature, when defining “care custodian” for purposes of the Elder Abuse Act, 
declared that its intent was very broad, specifically, “to provide that [proper 
authorities] shall receive referrals or complaints from public or private agencies, 
from any mandated reporter submitting reports pursuant to [Welfare and 
Institutions Code] Section 15630, or from any other source having reasonable 
cause to know that the welfare of an elder or dependent adult is endangered . . . .”  
(Id., § 1, subd. (i), p. 2933, italics added.)  Consonant with that intent, the Elder 
Abuse Act itself, as protective legislation, provides no exception from its 
mandatory reporting provisions even for a victim’s blood relatives, let alone for a 
victim’s preexisting personal friends.  (See id., § 3, pp. 2934-2935.) 
In short, neither the statutory language nor the legislative history supports a 
preexisting personal friendship exception to section 21350’s presumptive 
disqualification of care custodian donees.  It is not for us to gainsay the wisdom of 
this legislative choice.  In the event, however, we have mistaken the Legislature’s 
intention, that body may readily correct our error. 
 
25
3.   Public policy 
Citing the principle that where uncertainty exists as to the meaning of 
statutory language, consideration should be given to the consequences that will 
flow from a particular interpretation (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & 
Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387), Foley argues, finally, that 
undesirable public policy consequences will follow our affirming the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal. 
First, Foley notes it is sometimes infeasible for nurses to administer health 
care services to dependent adults, whether because needs arise when a nurse is not 
present or because the family is financially unable to secure professional 
assistance solely to apply an ointment or bandage or to administer medications to 
the dependent adult.  He emphasizes that when he and Erman administered 
medications and applied ointments to decedent, they were proceeding pursuant to 
the instructions of a nurse who attended decedent.  If the Court of Appeal decision 
is affirmed, Foley asserts, one can envision circumstances where a caregiver 
instructed by a nurse to apply a topical ointment refuses to do so for fear of 
invalidating a gift.   
Second, Foley argues that we should exempt preexisting personal friends 
from the operation of section 21350, subdivision (c)(6) in order to vindicate the 
public policy of honoring a decedent’s testamentary disposition.  Absent such an 
exemption, Foley argues, dependent adults may be forced in a difficult period of 
life to expend time, money and energy arranging for a certificate of independent 
review (see § 21350, subd. (b)) in order to ensure their intended transfers are 
honored. 
Finally, Foley urges the interests of potential beneficiaries whose prospects 
may be affected by the statutory scheme.  Lacking a certificate of independent 
review, a potential beneficiary may have difficulty overcoming a section 21350 
 
26
presumption.  In order to do so, a care custodian must present clear and convincing 
evidence, not based solely on his or her own testimony, that the transfer was not 
the product of fraud, duress, menace or undue influence.  (§ 21356, subd. (d).)  
And if the court finds the transfer was the product of fraud, menace, duress or 
undue influence, the disqualified beneficiary must bear all costs of the proceeding, 
including reasonable attorney fees.  (§ 21351(d).)  The Court of Appeal in 
Davidson characterized the application of these provisions to persons who provide 
health care services out of friendship as “effectively punishing . . . individuals for 
the self-sacrificing acts of care and companionship they provide[] to the aging.”  
(Davidson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 1051.)   
We acknowledge that application of the statutory scheme to particular care 
custodians may in some instances result in inequity.  But in light of the statute’s 
language and history, “we need not strain to discern (because we are not free to 
impose) a universally ‘desirable result in terms of public policy’ ” (Samuels v. Mix 
(1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 20).  Moreover, even were we authorized to impose the 
exceptions Foley proposes, we are not persuaded good policy would counsel that 
we do so.  Rather, unless and until the Legislature declares otherwise, we believe 
the result we reach makes practical sense in a society that is experiencing a rise in 
elder abuse cases. 
The statutory scheme neither states nor implies that to qualify as a care 
custodian an individual must receive compensation.  (See Estate of Shinkle, supra, 
97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006 [volunteer ombudsman was care custodian].)  Concern 
about fairness to volunteer health care providers is ultimately unfounded because 
section 21351 provides a clear pathway to avoiding section 21350.  Section 21351, 
subdivision (b) renders section 21350 inapplicable if the donative instrument “is 
reviewed by an independent attorney who (1) counsels the client (transferor) about 
the nature and consequences of the intended transfer, (2) attempts to determine if 
 
27
the intended consequence is the result of fraud, menace, duress, or undue 
influence, and (3) signs and delivers to the transferor . . . [a] ‘CERTIFICATE OF 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW,’ ” in which counsel asserts the transfer is valid 
because it is “not the product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence.” 
Finally, we find Foley’s specter of caregivers refusing to perform services 
for fear of losing a testamentary gift unpersuasive.  Any caregiver who would for 
that reason alone abstain from helping an elderly friend would by hypothesis be a 
caregiver with designs on being included in the elder’s future estate 
plan―precisely the situation the statutory scheme was meant to address.  (See 
Osornio v. Weingarten, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at pp. 318-319; Bank of America 
v. Angel View Crippled Children’s Foundation, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 456.) 
This, we emphasize, is not a case where preexisting friends who were 
testamentary beneficiaries of a testator subsequently became care custodians; 
Foley and Erman became beneficiaries of the Trust only pursuant to changes 
decedent made in her will while she was living with them and they were providing 
her with care services.  Section 21351(d)’s rebuttable presumption is not a ban on 
care custodians’ receiving gifts; it is simply a protection against their seeking or 
obtaining gifts by fraud, menace, duress or undue influence.  Care custodians who 
can meet the proof requirements the Legislature has prescribed in section 21351(d) 
will remain eligible to receive donative transfers.13  And in providing for a 
certificate of independent review (§ 21351, subd. (b)), the Legislature has 
                                              
13  
It bears repeating that the Legislature has exempted from disqualification 
under section 21350 care custodians related by blood or marriage to, who cohabit 
with, or are the registered domestic partners of, a dependent adult from whom they 
receive a testamentary gift (see § 21351, subd. (a)); hence, our resolution of this 
matter cannot effect such persons. 
 
28
provided transferors who so desire with a ready mechanism for making donative 
transfers to care custodians.   
C.   Undue Influence 
Independently examining the record, the Court of Appeal concluded that 
Foley had failed to adduce substantial evidence to rebut the statutory presumption 
that decedent’s transfers to him and Erman were the product of undue influence.  
(See § 21351(d).)  The petition for review raised no question concerning this 
conclusion, and the parties’ briefs on the merits do not address it.  
Disposition 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is 
affirmed.14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
 
                                              
14  
Conservatorship of McDowell, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 659, 
Conservatorship of Davidson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 1035, and Estate of Shinkle, 
supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 990, are disapproved to the extent they interpreted section 
21350 as allowing for a preexisting personal friendship exception. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY GEORGE, C.J. 
I wholly agree that Welfare and Institutions Code, section 15610.17 does 
not include a professional or occupational limitation on, or a preexisting personal 
friendship exception to, the definition of “care custodian” provided by the statute.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 17-18.)  That section and the statutory scheme inclusive of 
Probate Code sections 21350, subdivision (a)(6) and 21351, subdivision (d), 
presumptively disqualifying care custodians as beneficiaries of testamentary 
transfers, do not contain or imply “an exception for preexisting personal friends of 
a dependent adult to whom they provide health care services.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 21.) 
I also observe that the circumstances of the present case illustrate the 
Legislature’s well-founded concern — reflected in its adoption of statutory 
language sufficiently broad to encompass uncompensated caregivers — that 
individuals acting as unpaid care custodians of a dependent adult and not related to 
that adult potentially may exercise undue influence over their charge as readily as 
professional or occupational care custodians.1   
At the same time, it appears to me that in other, fairly common factual 
circumstances involving uncompensated caregivers, application of these statutory 
provisions may disserve the legislative goals implicit in their enactment.  
Accordingly, notwithstanding our customary and proper reticence in encouraging 
                                              
1 
To fairly distinguish the present situation from circumstances that may well 
warrant a different legislative response, I set forth below additional factual 
background supplementing what is provided in the majority opinion. 
2 
legislative action, in the present context I believe the Legislature would do well to 
consider modifying or augmenting the relevant provisions in order to more fully 
protect the interests of dependent adults and society as a whole, by according 
separate treatment to longer term care custodians who undertake that role as a 
consequence of a personal relationship rather than as an occupational assignment. 
I 
The matter before us presents, in the words of plaintiffs’ attorney at oral 
argument, “a classic case of what the Legislature was trying to protect against.”  
As explained in the majority opinion, relatives of the decedent filed suit to 
invalidate the seventh and final amendment to Carmel Bosco’s trust, executed 
three days prior to her death, that for the first time made defendants her sole 
residual beneficiaries.  As is apparent from evidence received at the trial, several 
amendments closely preceding (and apparently anticipating) the final amendment 
to the trust belie the conclusion that Bosco acted merely out of personal 
preference.  Considered in light of the statutory presumption that we have held 
applicable to uncompensated care custodians who become beneficiaries of a 
testamentary instrument, these amendments (including the final amendment) 
together with the other evidence in the record do not constitute substantial 
evidence in support of the trial court’s alternative finding ⎯ premised upon its 
assumed application of the statutory presumption ⎯ that defendants had rebutted 
the presumption. 
Carmel Bosco died childless on September 28, 2001, at 97 years of age, 
leaving an estate valued at approximately $448,000.  Bosco had created the trust in 
1991.  Apparently to ensure the payment of expenses associated with the 
continuing care of Bosco’s youngest sister, Ann Cassell (one of the plaintiffs 
herein), as an Alzheimer’s patient, Bosco designated Ann to receive one-third of 
the trust estate.  Bosco named other relatives as co-equal beneficiaries of the 
residual estate, and named a successor trustee (succeeding Bosco) and an alternate 
trustee.  In the first three amendments, made between 1991 and early 2001, Bosco 
3 
named different successor trustees.  Erman and Foley, longtime personal friends of 
Bosco, were not mentioned in the original trust or in the first three amendments.   
Within several months preceding her death, however, Bosco amended the 
trust four times.  The fourth amendment, dated June 12, 2001, was the final 
amendment executed in the presence of Bosco’s attorney, Marc Eagan, who 
drafted the original trust and all seven amendments.  The fourth amendment for 
the first time named defendant Foley as a successor cotrustee with Patricia Tally (a 
relative of Bosco’s who had assisted her with her daily needs during the preceding 
four years), changed Ann Cassell’s one-third interest in the estate from an outright 
distribution to a life estate, to be held in the trust and used for Cassell’s care in 
amounts deemed reasonable by the trustees in light of other available income and 
resources, and provided that, of the 11 relatives named equal residual 
beneficiaries, Michael Colca (who had become disabled) would receive 
distributions of his share in the trustee’s “absolute discretion.”  
At the repeated urging of defendant Erman, Bosco moved from her own 
residence in Alhambra on July 26, 2001, into a house shared by Foley and Erman 
in Riverside.  Erman and Foley, having learned that Bosco had lung cancer, 
assumed the administration of Bosco’s financial and investment affairs.  The fifth 
trust amendment, dated August 12, 2001, for the first time named defendant Foley 
as the sole successor trustee, declared that Foley was entitled to reimbursement of 
expenses and a reasonable trustee’s fee, and further specified that any third person 
dealing with the successor trustee “shall accept, and shall be absolutely entitled to 
rely upon,” the successor trustee’s statement that he or she is successor in 
accordance with provisions of the trust.  Between August 20 and September 6, 
2001, Foley listed Bosco’s Alhambra residence for sale and sold it for $265,000. 
The sixth amendment to the trust, dated September 11, 2001, deleted the 
names of Michael Colca and two other relatives, so that eight relatives remained as 
beneficiaries of the residual estate.  The seventh amendment, dated September 25, 
2001, deleted the name of an additional residual beneficiary, and eliminated 
4 
entirely Ann Cassell’s one-third life estate interest in the trust estate.  In 
explanation, Foley testified that Bosco had been informed that Cassell would be 
supported by Cassell’s husband, Alvin, although Alvin testified such a 
conversation did not take place.  For the first time, it was provided (in the seventh 
amendment) that the seven remaining relatives, formerly designated equal 
beneficiaries of the residual estate, instead would receive $25,000 each.  For the 
first time, defendants were designated sole residual beneficiaries, giving them, in 
view of the estate’s estimated value of $448,000, the “lion’s share” of the estate.  
In drafting the amendment, Marc Eagan, Bosco’s attorney, did not inform Bosco 
that Foley and Erman would receive the majority of the estate. 
II 
The circumstances underlying the present case illustrate the Legislature’s 
wisdom in including, within the meaning of the statutes presumptively 
disqualifying a care custodian from becoming a testamentary beneficiary of the 
dependent adult, uncompensated friends or acquaintances who provide substantial, 
ongoing health or other services to a dependent adult.  (Prob. Code, §§ 21350, 
subd. (a)(6), 21351, subd. (d).)  In adopting the broad definition of a care 
custodian required to report elder abuse (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17) for 
purposes of defining those persons and entities subject to the presumption of 
undue influence under the Probate Code, the Legislature implicitly recognized that 
an individual acting in a caregiving capacity on behalf of a dependent adult who 
requires substantial, if not total care, assumes a role uniquely susceptible of 
exerting substantial influence over the dependent person, regardless of the 
formality of the arrangement. 
That having being said, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which 
an unrelated individual, motivated by long-standing friendship, moral obligation, 
or other personal incentive, undertakes without compensation to provide 
substantial, ongoing health care services on behalf of a dependent adult — for an 
extended period.  In such a case, the recipient of those services eventually may 
5 
decide to recognize those acts by modifying his or her testamentary disposition of 
property to include the caregiver as a beneficiary.  In the event the dependent adult 
modifies the instrument but thereafter expires prior to obtaining certificated 
independent review pursuant to Probate Code section § 21351, subdivision (b), the 
uncompensated long-term caregiver in that example, no less than the defendants in 
the present circumstances, would be presumptively disqualified from receiving 
that beneficial bequest.   
In my view, it is questionable whether the uncompensated individual who 
in a nonoccupational capacity provides substantial, ongoing health services to a 
dependent adult for an extended period and eventually is made his or her 
beneficiary, should be subject to the identical presumptive disqualification and 
burden of proof imposed upon an individual who assumes the role of an unpaid 
caregiver for a relatively brief period preceding the dependent adult’s favorable 
modification of a testamentary disposition, at a time that is fairly proximate to 
death. 
As a practical matter, the justification for presuming an exercise of undue 
influence is less compelling when an individual having a preexisting personal 
relationship with the dependent adult renders health care and other services over a 
relatively lengthy period of time.  First, the likelihood is less that a personal friend 
gratuitously providing substantial, ongoing health care services over a lengthy 
term is motivated by the prospect of obtaining undue economic benefit by 
coercing a testamentary modification.  Second, an uncompensated but well-
established caregiving relationship affords greater opportunity to the donor’s 
relatives and other interested parties to observe the course of the relationship and 
to resolve any concerns occasioned by the caregiver’s position of trust and 
potential ability to exert undue influence. 
As a matter of policy, it is of doubtful social efficacy to apply the statutory 
presumption and evidentiary burden to an individual who in a nonprofessional 
capacity undertakes the serious responsibilities attending the long-term care of a 
6 
dependent adult.  To do so is counterintuitive to our sense that the uncompensated 
efforts of such an individual, benefiting the dependent adult in question and 
society in general, should be recognized and encouraged. 
Our most basic judicial task in the case before us consists of construing the 
statutory enactment in its present form and not in crafting or recommending its 
modification.  Manifestly, the majority has accomplished the former task, 
interpreting Probate Code section 21350, subdivision (a)(6) to apply equally to 
professional, compensated persons and nonprofessional, uncompensated persons 
who act as care custodians in providing substantial, ongoing health services to a 
dependent adult.  Although I believe our statutory construction is correct and have 
no reservation regarding its application in the present case, applying the statute to 
those persons who have undertaken the long-term care of a dependent adult 
without compensation does not appear to take full measure of the importance to 
the individual or the benefits to society of such efforts born of preexisting personal 
relationships. 
Accordingly, I would suggest legislative modification of the relevant 
statutes to exempt or otherwise limit application of the statutory presumption of 
undue influence in the case of uncompensated care custodians who provide long-
term health care and other services for dependent adults.  Such an exemption or 
limitation might resemble a standard originally applicable in the federal taxation 
of estates.  Formerly, a decedent’s estate was required to include in the gross estate 
all gifts made “in contemplation of death,” a description that presumptively 
included the value of all gifts made by the decedent within three years of his or her 
death.  (See 26 U.S.C. former § 2035 (a); United States v. Hemme (1986) 476 U.S. 
558, 563; Wheeler v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1997) 116 F.3d 749, 760 [the former 
“ ‘contemplation-of-death’ provision” was replaced by the rule set forth in 26 
U.S.C. § 2035 (a) providing that transfers within three years of death are included 
in the gross estate]; Hutchinson v. C.I.R. (7th Cir. 1985) 765 F.2d 665, 669 [to 
forestall litigation seeking to ascertain whether a decedent made a transfer in 
7 
contemplation of death, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 converted the statutory 
presumption into a mandatory rule that the value of all gifts made by the decedent 
within three years of death must be included in the gross estate].) 
In similar fashion, for purposes of testamentary transfers, the language in 
California’s statutes conditionally disqualifying donative transfers to a care 
custodian ⎯ subject to rebuttal of the presumption of undue influence (Prob. 
Code, §§ 21350, 21351) ⎯ could be amended to provide that a change in 
testamentary disposition made by a dependent adult designating the care custodian 
as a beneficiary, within one year following the commencement of a new 
nonprofessional caregiving relationship or within one year preceding the death of 
the dependent adult, will be subject to the presumption of undue influence.  In the 
situation where the donative transfer to an individual precedes his or her 
assumption of responsibilities as a care custodian or is made prior to the time that 
the donor assumes the status of a dependent adult, the statutory presumption 
would not apply.  Similarly,  where the donative transfer to a care custodian who 
provides uncompensated health care and other services to the dependent adult is 
made more than one year following the commencement of those caregiving 
services, the statutory presumption would not apply under such a proposed 
change. 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  If the Legislature wanted Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 15610.171 to apply to anyone who provided care to elderly or 
                                              
1  
Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.17 provides:  “ ‘Care 
custodian’ means an administrator or an employee of any of the following public 
or private facilities or agencies, or persons providing care or services for elders or 
dependent adults, including members of the support staff and maintenance staff:  
[¶] (a) Twenty-four-hour health facilities, as defined in Sections 1250, 1250.2, and 
1250.3 of the Health and Safety Code.  [¶] (b) Clinics.  [¶] (c) Home health 
agencies.  [¶] (d) Agencies providing publicly funded in-home supportive services, 
nutrition services, or other home and community-based support services.  
[¶] (e) Adult day health care centers and adult day care.  [¶] (f) Secondary schools 
that serve 18- to 22-year-old dependent adults and postsecondary educational 
institutions that serve dependent adults or elders.  [¶] (g) Independent living 
centers.  [¶] (h) Camps.  [¶] (i) Alzheimer’s Disease day care resource centers.  
[¶] (j) Community care facilities, as defined in Section 1502 of the Health and 
Safety Code, and residential care facilities for the elderly, as defined in Section 
1569.2 of the Health and Safety Code.  [¶] (k) Respite care facilities.  [¶] (l) Foster 
homes.  [¶] (m) Vocational rehabilitation facilities and work activity centers.  
[¶] (n) Designated area agencies on aging.  [¶] (o) Regional centers for persons 
with developmental disabilities.  [¶] (p) State Department of Social Services and 
State Department of Health Services licensing divisions.  [¶] (q) County welfare 
departments.  [¶] (r) Offices of patients’ rights advocates and clients’ rights 
advocates, including attorneys.  [¶] (s) The office of the long-term care 
ombudsman.  [¶] (t) Offices of public conservators, public guardians, and court 
investigators.  [¶] (u) Any protection or advocacy agency or entity that is 
designated by the Governor to fulfill the requirements and assurances of the 
following:  [¶] (1) The federal Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act of 2000, contained in Chapter 144 (commencing with Section 15001) 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
2 
 
dependent adults, whether professionally or otherwise, they simply would have 
said so.  The impact and the import of the repeated use of such terms as “agency,” 
“office,” “facility,” “school,” “center,” “department,” etc. convey an intention to 
describe people who provide care or assistance through some formal relationship, 
rather than on a private friendship or familial basis.  The use of the term “person” 
twice in the course of this lengthy provision demonstrates an intent to set out the 
broadest scope of those who offer care through the operation of an agency, office, 
facility, etc.  The Legislature included, for example, support and maintenance 
staff, teachers, advocates, lawyers, ombudsmen, and firefighters.  If it had 
intended to include “everybody who treated an elderly person with kindness,” it 
certainly would have been easy to do so.  It painstakingly articulated a large group, 
but one that is more circumscribed than “everyone.”  Read in connection with the 
preceding subdivisions, subdivision (y) is fairly interpreted as a catchall designed 
to include those who give care in some formalized or professional capacity. 
 
The statute does refer to persons who provide care.2    However, this 
reference is immediately followed by the phrase “including members of support 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
of Title 42 of the United States Code, for protection and advocacy of the rights of 
persons with developmental disabilities.  [¶] (2) The Protection and Advocacy for 
the Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986, as amended, contained in Chapter 114 
(commencing with Section 10801) of Title 42 of the United States Code, for the 
protection and advocacy of the rights of persons with mental illness.  
[¶] (v) Humane societies and animal control agencies.  [¶] (w) Fire departments.  
[¶] (x) Offices of environmental health and building code enforcement.  
[¶] (y) Any other protective, public, sectarian, mental health, or private assistance 
or advocacy agency or person providing health services or social services to elders 
or dependent adults.”   
 
All further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code 
unless otherwise indicated. 
2  
“ ‘Care custodian’ means an administrator or an employee of any of the 
following public or private facilities or agencies, or persons providing care or 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
3 
 
staff and maintenance staff.”  Individuals providing care on a personal basis do not 
do so through support or maintenance staffs.  Therefore, the language the 
Legislature chose clearly expresses an intent to encompass only those involved in 
providing services in a professional or formal capacity.   
 
The remainder of the statute confirms this conclusion.  It lists 24 categories 
of care providers, all of whom act in a professional or formal capacity.  The term 
person does not appear again until the 25th category, which is “[a]ny other 
protective, public, sectarian, mental health, or private assistance or advocacy 
agency or person providing health services or social services to elders or 
dependent adults.”  (§ 15610.17, subd. (y), italics added.)  The introductory phrase 
“[a]ny other” links this category to the other 24 on the list.  In other words, the 
principle of ejusdem generis applies here, contrary to the conclusion reached by 
the majority (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 15-16).  The principle presumes that if the 
Legislature intends a general word to be used in its unrestricted sense, it does not 
also offer as examples special things or classes of things since those descriptions 
would then be surplusage.  (Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 116, 141.)  Again, if the Legislature had intended the donative transfer 
restrictions to apply to any person who provides care, it would simply have said 
so, rather than list 24 specific categories of persons to whom the provision applies. 
The legislative history supports this reading.  “As made clear by discussion 
of the legislation in an analysis prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee, the 
enactment of the amendment adding ‘care custodians’ to the list of presumptively 
invalid recipients of donative transfers was intended to apply to gifts made ‘to 
practical nurses or other caregivers hired to provide in-home care.’  (Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) p. 4.)  The 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
services for elders or dependent adults, including members of the support staff and 
maintenance staff . . . .”  (§ 15610.17.) 
 
4 
 
original proponent of the proposal for the amendment was the Estate Planning 
Trust and Probate Law Section of the State Bar of California in its annual omnibus 
bill.  In a document prepared by that section discussing the proposed amendment, 
the ‘Purpose’ of the amendment was described as ‘to prevent the growing “cottage 
industry” of “practical nurses” from successfully taking advantage of dementing 
elders.’  The ‘Application’ of the amendment is similarly described:  ‘This would  
. . . remove the incentives for the growing  “cottage industry” of “practical nurses” 
to attempt to take advantage of dementing elders.’  (Cal. State Bar Estate Planning, 
Trust & Prob. Law Section, Legislative Proposal, Assem. Bill No. 1172, excerpted 
from Senate Com. on Judiciary legislative bill file.)”  (Conservatorship of 
Davidson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1050-1051 (Davidson).) 
The majority opinion discounts the conclusion of Davidson, supra, 113 
Cal.App.4th 1035.  “Contrary to the Davidson court’s statement, the portion of the 
committee report it cited addressed not what effect the Legislature intended the 
1997 amendment to have, but the state of existing law at the time the amendment 
was being considered.  The relevant sentence in the report reads in full:  ‘Existing 
law provides a presumption of invalidity that applies to gifts made to lawyers or 
other fiduciaries, but not to practical nurses or other caregivers hired to provide in-
home care.’  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 
Reg. Sess.) p. 4.)  [Fn.]”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.) 
 
I am not persuaded.  Instead, it appears that the committee was observing 
that the existing state of the law was unsatisfactory and that its reach should be 
extended to “practical nurses or other caregivers hired to provide in-home care.”  
(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, com. on Assem. Bill No. 1172 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) 
p. 4., italics added.) 
 
In terms of public policy, it seems unwise to penalize Good Samaritans by 
making them less eligible to receive the gratitude of those they help, the kinder 
 
5 
 
they have been.3  As the majority opinion points out, Foley and Erman welcomed 
the decedent into their own home and performed a variety of challenging, 
personal, and distasteful tasks to ease the burdens of her final illness.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 12-13.)  The law should not cast a jaundiced eye on those who provide 
such care to family or friends, and there is no reason to believe the Legislature 
intended such an outcome. 
Foley and Erman may have performed these acts in order to unduly 
influence decedent.  They may also have simply been benevolent people willing to 
help another soul in need and to whom the decedent wanted to express her natural 
and well-founded gratitude.  Resolution of this factual question should be left to 
the trial court.  Placing the burden of proof on the challengers, rather than on the 
nonprofessional caregivers, would give deference to the expressed will of the 
decedent, and it would not place those who help the infirm out of the kindness of 
their hearts at a disadvantage with regard to those who may  have ignored them.  
The majority opinion observes, “The Legislature’s failure to include an 
express friendship exception within the statutory scheme is significant, because 
the Legislature knows how to craft such an exception when it wishes to do so.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)   
However, it is also significant that the Legislature did not amend the statute 
to “clarify” its intent after Davidson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 1035, and 
Conservatorship of McDowell (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 659. 
                                              
3  
The majority imports the terms substantial and ongoing care into the statute 
without supporting citation of statutory language or legislative history.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 1-2, 12-14.)  This gives rise to an unfortunate irony.  Those who 
provide only trivial or undependable care may inherit, while those whose care is 
substantial and ongoing are not only to be denied, but also assessed costs and 
attorney fees.  (Prob. Code, § 21351, subd. (d).)  Under this analysis, the caring 
and reliable would be well advised to suppress their kind impulses.  
 
       
 
6 
 
Moreover, the majority misplaces the emphasis here.  This case does not 
require the creation of an exception.  The statute under consideration is itself  an 
exception to the general rule that one may freely dispose of personal assets.  Thus, 
the statute should be interpreted narrowly in terms of the exception it creates. 
While it is certainly true that nonprofessionals may take advantage of the 
infirm, it is also true that the kind and generous may act graciously to ease the 
suffering of those in need.  The motives at play in any given case is the kind of 
factual question the trial court exists to resolve.  Absent a clear legislative 
pronouncement to the contrary, we should allow the court to do so without an 
artificially imposed presumption. 
 
The majority observes, “Concern about fairness to volunteer health care 
providers is ultimately unfounded because section 21351 provides a clear pathway 
to avoiding section 21350.  Section 21351, subdivision (b) renders section 21350 
inapplicable if the donative instrument ‘is reviewed by an independent attorney 
who (1) counsels the client (transferor) about the nature and consequences of the 
intended transfer, (2) attempts to determine if the intended consequence is the 
result of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence, and (3) signs and delivers to 
the transferor . . . [a] “CERTIFICATE OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW,” ’ in which 
counsel asserts the transfer is valid because it is ‘not the product of fraud, menace, 
duress, or undue influence.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 26-27.) 
 
Kind people are hard to come by, sadly, and they may be legally 
unsophisticated.  Further, cooking, cleaning, and tending the infirm may leave 
little time to seek the advice of an attorney.  Indeed, one might wonder about the 
selflessness of their intent if they did.  In light of these realities, one might  
 
7 
 
legitimately question whether section 21351 really provides the “clear pathway” to 
fairness the majority suggests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Bernard v. Foley 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 130 Cal.App.4th 1109 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S136070 
Date Filed: August 21, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Robert H. O’Brien* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Robert M. Neubauer for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Mark T. Eagan and Donna Bader for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Retired judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Robert M. Neubauer 
1061 S. Ogden Drive 
Los Angeles, CA  90019-6502 
(323) 935-1007 
 
Donna Bader 
412 North Coast Highway, Suite 355 
Laguna Beach, CA  92651 
(949) 494-7455