Title: THOMAS D KURTZ V FAYGO BEVERAGES

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 29, 2002  
THOMAS KURTZ,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 118723  
FAYGO BEVERAGES, INCORPORATED,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
In this worker’s compensation case, the Worker’s  
Compensation 
Appellate 
Commission 
dismissed 
plaintiff’s 
appeal  
because the transcript was not timely filed.  The Court of  
Appeals thereafter reversed, relying on Brooks v Engine Power  
Components, Inc, 241 Mich App 56; 613 NW2d 733 (2000).  
We conclude that in the circumstances of this case, in  
which plaintiff did not timely file a request for an extension  
of time, the WCAC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing  
the appeal.  We thus reverse the Court of Appeals decision and  
reinstate the WCAC’s dismissal of plaintiff’s appeal.  
 
 
I  
Plaintiff 
sought 
worker’s 
compensation 
benefits, 
claiming  
that he injured his back in the course of his employment with  
defendant. The magistrate granted an open award of benefits  
on December 19, 1995, following trial.  On December 28, 1998,  
defendant filed a petition to stop benefits.1
 After a  
hearing, the magistrate granted the motion in an order mailed  
June 14, 2000, finding that plaintiff’s disability had ended  
by December 2, 1998. He also ordered recoupment of benefits  
from that date.  
On July 10, 2000, plaintiff filed a timely claim for  
review.  Under MCL 418.861a,2 the transcript was due within  
sixty days thereafter, or on or before September 8, 2000.  
After receiving the claim for review, the WCAC sent the  
parties a form letter regarding the appeal procedure, which  
included the following about transcripts and extensions:  
TRANSCRIPTS  
The appellant is responsible for filing the 
complete, original hearing transcript with the  
1 The magistrate denied an earlier petition to stop 
benefits on July 25, 1997.  
2  
(5)  A party filing a claim for review under 
section 859a shall file a copy of the transcript of 
the hearing within 60 days of filing the claim for 
review and shall file its brief with the commission  
and provide any opposing party with a copy of the 
transcript and its brief not more than 30 days 
after filing the transcript. For sufficient cause  
shown, the commission may grant further time in 
which to file a transcript.  
2  
 
Commission not later than 60 days after filing the 
Claim for Review.  Copies of the transcript must be  
served 
on 
all 
opposing 
parties. 
Ref:  
Section 861a(5).  Beginning January 1, 1999, the  
court reporting service will file the ordered 
original and all copies upon the appellant for  
distribution. The court reporting service will no 
longer 
file 
transcripts 
directly 
with 
the  
Commission.  
EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FILING TRANSCRIPTS  
Extensions of time will be considered if  
requested prior to the expiration of the above due 
dates, and will normally be granted on good cause 
shown.  The first extension shall be granted 
automatically for 60 days.  If extension requests 
are not timely, they will only be granted in 
extraordinary circumstances.  
Plaintiff failed to file the transcript by September 8,  
2000, and did not request an extension of time.  Therefore, on  
September 26, 2000, the WCAC issued an order dismissing the  
appeal.  In its letter, the commission stated that it would  
“consider a timely motion for reconsideration, supported by  
affidavit or other evidence, showing that the reason for the  
tardy filing was beyond plaintiff’s control.”  
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration explaining  
that he could not file the transcript on or before September 8  
because the reporter did not complete the transcript until  
September 14, 2000.3  On October 18, 2000, the WCAC issued an  
order denying reconsideration, “because plaintiff failed to  
3 The reporter’s certificate attached to the motion was 
dated September 16, 2000, but the plaintiff did not file it 
with the WCAC until September 29, 2000, after entry of the 
dismissal 
order. 
 
An 
additional transcript volume was prepared 
later as the result of an oversight on behalf of the reporting 
firm.  
3  
show good cause that the untimely filing of the transcript was  
the result of circumstances beyond his control.”  
Plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal with  
the Court of Appeals.  The Court issued a peremptory order  
reversing and remanding to the WCAC for consideration of  
plaintiff’s appeal, stating that it was bound by Brooks and a  
series of peremptory orders of this Court.4  The Court further  
stated that, but for those authorities, it would affirm the  
WCAC on the basis that it did not abuse its discretion in  
dismissing the appeal for failure to timely file  the  
transcript.  
Defendant has filed an application for leave to appeal to  
this Court.  
II  
As we explained in Marshall v D J Jacobetti Veterans  
Facility (After Remand), 447 Mich 544, 548-550; 526 NW2d 585  
(1994), the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission’s  
practices regarding deadlines and extensions have previously  
been characterized as “chaotic.”  We noted, however, that  
effective January 1, 1993, the WCAC provided adequate notice  
of a change of practice regarding enforcement of its  
administrative rules and the statutory time limits.  That  
policy stated:  
4  Unpublished order, entered February 20, 2001 (Docket 
No. 230773).  
4  
 
 
 
 
 
“The 
Workers' 
Compensation 
Appellate 
Commission has unanimously adopted a formal policy 
concerning filing requirements when requesting 
review of a workers' compensation claim.  
“The Commission's policy will apply to all 
appeals filed on or after January 1, 1993.  
The  
new policy is as follows:  
“1. 
Per 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
of  
section 861a(5), the transcript is due within 60  
days of the filing of the appeal. 
Any motion for  
an extension of time in which to file the  
transcript must be filed within that 60-day period.  
In the event a motion for extension is timely 
filed, an automatic 60-day extension shall be 
granted from the date of the extension letter. 
Warning letters, advising that a transcript has not 
been timely received, shall no longer be sent for 
any appeals filed on or after January 1, 1993.   If  
the transcript or request for extension is not  
filed in a timely manner, the appeal shall be  
dismissed.  
“2. 
Per 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
of  
section 861a(5), the appellant's brief is due 
within 30 days of the filing of the transcript. 
Any motion for an extension of time in which to 
file the brief must be filed within that 30-day 
period.
 In the event a motion for extension is  
timely filed, an automatic 60-day extension shall 
be granted from the date of the extension letter. 
If the brief or request for extension is not filed 
in a timely manner, the appeal shall be dismissed 
or the decision of the magistrate shall be  
summarily affirmed.  
“For appeals filed prior to January 1, 1993,  
each assigned panel of the Commission shall  
continue to exercise its discretion concerning 
extensions and dismissals.  
Because no party is 
guaranteed a particular panel, parties would be 
well advised to assume that their panel is composed 
of commissioners adhering to the strictest possible 
policy 
concerning 
the 
statutory 
filing 
requirements.”
 
[447 
Mich 
549-550 
(emphasis 
added).]  
Marshall involved a dismissal of an appeal because of the  
plaintiff’s failure to timely file a brief on appeal.  We  
5  
 
 
reversed the dismissal because it occurred before the WCAC  
gave clear notice of its changed policy.  We announced,  
however, that dismissals of appeals filed after January 1,  
1993, would be evaluated in light of the new policy.  
Our Marshall decision included a footnote regarding  
untimely filing of transcripts, a subject that we expressly  
declined to rule upon:  
We are aware that the WCAC has dismissed some  
appeals for failure to file the transcript timely, 
and we observe that the WCAC's notice also states  
that transcript deadlines are to be strictly 
enforced.  While the policy reasons for enforcing a 
deadline on the filing of transcripts may be at 
least as strong as those for enforcing a briefing 
deadline, there are circumstances in which an  
attorney cannot prevent the tardy filing of a 
timely ordered transcript.  We express no opinion  
regarding 
the 
proper 
outcome 
in 
such 
a  
circumstance. [447 Mich 550, n 9.]  
The Court of Appeals opinion on which the decision in the  
present case was based, Brooks, dealt at length with the  
matter of late transcripts.  The Brooks Court reviewed several  
peremptory orders of this Court setting aside dismissals that  
had been entered on the basis of the failure to timely file  
transcripts.5  The Court viewed these orders as answering the  
question left open in Marshall—“the ‘proper outcome’ when the  
WCAC dismisses an appeal for failure to timely file a  
transcript, even though the appellant’s attorney could not  
5  Tomblin v MNP Corp, 456 Mich 871 (1997); Horvath v  
Pegasus Tavern, 454 Mich 912 (1997); 
Bright v Voss Steel  
Corp, 454 Mich 855 (1997); Alshubi v Chrysler Corp, 454 Mich  
854 (1997); Wimbush v Noecker Vinyl & Plastics, 453 Mich 963  
(1996).  
6  
prevent the tardy filing.”  241 Mich App 61.  The Court  
concluded that our orders  
constitute binding precedent for the proposition 
that the WCAC abuses its discretion when it  
dismisses an appellant's appeal for failing to 
timely prepare transcripts when the appellant can 
show that the failure occurred "for reasons beyond 
the control of appellant's counsel.”  [241 Mich App  
62.]  
Brooks established a rule that the WCAC abuses its  
discretion by dismissing an appeal for failure to timely file  
a transcript when such failure is the fault of the court  
reporter and not of the party or counsel.  The court  
reporter’s failure to timely prepare the transcript, however,  
does not, in itself, excuse a tardy filing.  The WCAC’s  
written policies provide clear notice of the obligation to  
request extensions of time before the due date.  As stated in  
the form letter sent in this case, as of January 1, 1999,  
court reporters no longer file transcripts directly with the  
WCAC, but instead provide them to counsel.  Thus, attorneys  
representing appellants can and should know if a transcript  
will not be timely filed and are in a position to request an  
extension within the allotted time.  
Of course, unusual situations may arise in which an  
appellant’s failure to timely request an extension might be  
excused.
 Where such a claim is made, evaluation of the  
circumstances 
is 
entrusted 
to 
the 
WCAC’s 
discretion.  
Appellate courts review such decisions regarding failure to  
comply with procedural deadlines for an abuse of discretion.  
7  
 
 
 
Zielke v A J Marshall Co, 306 Mich 474, 477-478; 11 NW2d 209  
(1943); Meyers v Iron Co, 297 Mich 629, 634-636; 298 NW 308  
(1941).
 As we stated in Alken-Ziegler, Inc v Waterbury  
Headers Corp, 461 Mich 219, 227-228; 600 NW2d 638 (1999):  
An abuse of discretion involves far more than  
a difference in judicial opinion. 
Williams v  
Hofley Mfg Co, 430 Mich 603, 619; 424 NW2d 278  
(1988).  It has been said that such abuse occurs  
only when the result is "'so palpably and grossly 
violative of fact and logic that it evidences not 
the exercise of will but perversity of will, not 
the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not 
the exercise of reason but rather of passion or 
bias.'"  Marrs v Bd of Medicine, 422 Mich 688, 694; 
375 NW2d 321 (1985), quoting Spalding v Spalding,  
355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959), and 
noting that, although the Spalding standard has  
been often discussed and frequently paraphrased, it 
has remained essentially intact.  
III  
In this case, the transcript was due on September 8,  
2000. Plaintiff did not request an extension and presented  
an explanation for the delay only in his motion for  
reconsideration of the dismissal order. There, he explained  
that the reporter failed to prepare the transcript by the due  
date. This explanation, however, did not excuse the failure  
to timely request an extension.  In view of the WCAC’s efforts  
to remove the perceived “chaos” in prior practice and to  
enforce timely filing requirements, we find no abuse of  
discretion in this case.  
As the Court of Appeals decision in Brooks noted, on a  
number of occasions we have set aside dismissals that were  
8  
 
 
 
 
based on the failure to timely file a transcript.  Each of  
those cases involved its own set of circumstances, and we do  
not reconsider at this point whether, under the principles  
enunciated here, we would reach the same decision in those  
cases.  In any event, our peremptory orders in those cases  
provide little guidance because of the limited discussion of  
the facts in the orders.  
Accordingly, we hold that a court reporter’s delay in  
preparing a transcript does not necessarily excuse a late  
filing where the appellant fails to request an extension of  
time under procedures established by the WCAC.6
 In the  
circumstances of this case, the WCAC did not abuse its  
discretion in dismissing the appeal.  We therefore reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the dismissal  
order.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
6 
 To the extent that the reasoning in Brooks is  
inconsistent with our decision here, it is overruled.  
9  
 
 
________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
THOMAS KURTZ,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 118723  
FAYGO BEVERAGES, INCORPORATED,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
A per curiam opinion is not an appropriate vehicle for  
resolving the issue in this case. Despite the WCAC's policy  
regarding filing requirements, this Court has found that the  
WCAC abused its discretion by dismissing cases due to late  
filing of transcripts. These were cases where the delay was  
not caused by the appealing party. See, e.g., Tomblin v MNP  
Corp, 456 Mich 871 (1997); Bright v Voss Steel Corp, 454 Mich  
855 (1997).  The Court of Appeals in Brooks v Engine Power  
Components, Inc,1 was in accord with the orders in those  
cases. Brooks held that the WCAC abused its discretion when  
it dismissed an appeal because a court reporter filed a  
transcript untimely.  
1 241 Mich App 56; 613 NW2d 733 (2000).  
 
In light of this precedent, it is unclear that the  
circumstances of the current untimely filing are insufficient  
to excuse the delay or the failure to request an extension.  
I would deny leave, allowing the matter to be resolved under  
Brooks, or I would grant leave to fully consider the continued  
viability of that decision.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
2