Title: Commonwealth v. Henry

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13048 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHRISTOPHER HENRY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 5, 2021. - October 1, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Plea, 
Conduct of government agents, Assistance of counsel.  
Practice, Criminal, Plea, Conduct of government agents, 
Assistance of counsel, New trial.  Evidence, Guilty plea, 
Exculpatory. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 21, 2011. 
 
 
A motion to withdraw guilty pleas and for a new trial, 
filed on July 21, 2015, was heard by Jeffrey D. Locke, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Amy Codagnone for the defendant. 
 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In 2012, the defendant entered into a plea 
agreement with the Commonwealth and pleaded guilty to 
2 
 
indictments charging robbery, assault and battery by means of a 
dangerous weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm, and 
possession with intent to distribute a class B controlled 
substance.  After learning of chemist Annie Dookhan's misconduct 
in falsifying drug test results at the William A. Hinton State 
Laboratory Institute (Hinton lab), the defendant moved to 
withdraw his guilty pleas.  While the motion to withdraw was 
pending, the defendant's drug conviction was vacated and 
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to an order by a single 
justice in the county court arising from the court's decision in 
Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 476 Mass. 
298, 332 (2017).  A Superior Court judge subsequently held an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether to allow the defendant 
to withdraw his guilty pleas with respect to the nondrug-related 
charges that had been tendered as part of the over-all plea 
bargain.  The judge then denied the motion; his ruling was 
affirmed by the Appeals Court, see Commonwealth v. Henry, 98 
Mass. App. Ct. 229, 230 (2020), and we allowed the defendant's 
petition for further appellate review.  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We summarize the facts as 
recited by the prosecutor at the plea hearing, supplemented with 
undisputed facts from the record.  On March 24, 2011, at 
3 
 
9:10 P.M., Boston police received a report of an armed robbery 
that had taken place in the Mattapan section of Boston.  Police 
officers met the victim at his parents' home at around 9:30 P.M.  
The victim informed the officers that he had been walking along 
a residential street when he was approached by two young Black 
men who had just come from a nearby apartment building.  One of 
the men, later identified as the defendant, pulled a revolver 
out of his pocket and held it against the victim's head.  The 
other man robbed the victim of his cellular telephone, a ring, 
and a wallet containing more than $500 in cash.  The victim 
described the individual who was brandishing the revolver as 
about five feet, nine inches tall, with a dark complexion, and 
shoulder length braids. 
Based on this information and additional evidence, police 
entered the apartment building later that evening to investigate 
the crime.  Standing at the threshold, the officers spoke to the 
occupants of a second-floor apartment;1 police eventually made 
their way inside the apartment.  Once inside, they saw the 
defendant walk out of a bedroom.  The defendant, who was dressed 
in a white tank top and gym shorts, matched the approximate 
physical description provided by the victim of the armed 
 
 
1 In addition to the defendant, four other occupants of the 
apartment were arrested, one for armed robbery (the defendant's 
codefendant), and the other three for possession of drugs (among 
them, the defendant's girlfriend). 
4 
 
robbery; he had a dark complexion, was close to the described 
height and age, and appeared to have his hair in braids. 
While checking the defendant's pants pockets for weapons, 
police found a small bag of what appeared to be "crack" cocaine.  
The defendant was arrested for possession of a class B 
controlled substance.  During a search incident to that arrest, 
the police located an additional quantity of suspected crack 
cocaine in the defendant's shorts.  Police then secured the 
scene and returned to the apartment with a search warrant.  
During a search of the bedroom from which the defendant had 
emerged, officers found eleven bags of what appeared to be 
cocaine.  In addition to narcotics, the officers found a loaded 
.22 caliber revolver and a box of .22 caliber ammunition in the 
bedroom.  The defendant's fingerprints were recovered from the 
box of ammunition. 
The substances seized from the defendant's person later 
were tested by chemist Annie Dookhan at the Hinton lab, and she 
signed certificates of drug analysis stating that the substances 
tested positive as cocaine.  The bags of powder seized from the 
bedroom also were tested and certified by Dookhan as class B 
controlled substances. 
After the defendant's arrest, the victim of the armed 
robbery identified the defendant as the gunman from a 
photographic array. 
5 
 
b.  Procedural history.  On June 21, 2011, a grand jury 
returned indictments charging the defendant with armed robbery, 
in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 17; assault and battery by means 
of a dangerous weapon, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A; 
illegal possession of a firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a), as an armed career criminal under G. L. c. 269, § 10G, 
and a subsequent offender, under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (d); illegal 
possession of ammunition, in violation of G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (h); illegal possession of a loaded firearm, in violation 
of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n); possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 18B; 
possession of a class B controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c); and 
violation of the controlled substance laws in a school zone, in 
violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. 
 
In February 2012, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the physical evidence and the identification from the 
photographic array.  The motion was denied after a hearing; the 
defendant's motion for reconsideration also was denied, as was 
his petition in the county court seeking the right to pursue an 
interlocutory appeal. 
 
On July 13, 2012, the defendant entered into a plea 
agreement with the Commonwealth under the following terms.  The 
defendant pleaded guilty to (1) so much of the armed robbery 
6 
 
indictment charging robbery, with a sentence of incarceration 
from three years to three years and one day; (2) assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon, with a sentence of two 
years of probation from and after the sentence imposed on the 
charge of robbery; (3) unlawful possession of a firearm, with a 
sentence of from three years to three years and a day in prison, 
concurrent with the sentence on the robbery charge; and 
(4) possession with intent to distribute a class B substance, 
with a sentence of from three years to three years and one day 
of incarceration, concurrent with the sentence on the charge of 
robbery.  The Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi of the 
indictments charging armed career criminal, subsequent firearm 
offense, unlawful possession of ammunition, possession of a 
loaded firearm, carrying a firearm while committing a felony, 
and the school zone violation.  After a detailed colloquy, a 
Superior Court judge accepted the defendant's guilty plea.2 
 
c.  Motion to withdraw guilty plea.  In July 2015, the 
defendant filed a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), 
 
2 That same day, the judge also found the defendant in 
violation of the terms and conditions of his probation on an 
unrelated 2008 conviction of illegal possession of a firearm.  
With the defendant's assent, the probation department 
recommended a sentence of two and one-half years committed to 
the house of correction, concurrent with the sentences imposed 
for the robbery and the evidence seized during the subsequent 
search of the defendant's apartment.  The judge adopted the 
joint recommendation. 
7 
 
as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  He contended that his plea had not been knowingly and 
voluntarily made due to the withholding of exculpatory evidence 
regarding Dookhan's misconduct at the Hinton lab, and that his 
plea counsel failed to inform him of the collateral consequences 
of pleading guilty, including possible future sentencing 
enhancements, thus making it impossible for him to assess 
adequately the "possible risks and advantages" of changing his 
plea.3  Relying on Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Padilla 
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 391 (2010), and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), 
the defendant argued that the risk of the "severe" consequences 
of a sentencing enhancement in the Federal system, or being 
found to be a "career criminal" in that system, with its 
"particularly severe penalty" under Federal sentencing 
guidelines, was "analogous" to the risk of deportation in 
Padilla.  The defendant also argued that, at the plea colloquy, 
when the judge asked the prosecutor whether he was "aware of any 
other collateral consequences" "apart from the [deoxyribonucleic 
acid] sample requirement," and a possible suspension of the 
defendant's driver's license, that would "attend" the guilty 
pleas, the prosecutor said that he was not. 
 
 
3 After pleading guilty, the defendant was charged with a 
new offense in Federal court, and received a sentencing 
enhancement based on the prior robbery conviction. 
8 
 
In an affidavit attached to his motion, the defendant 
averred that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been aware 
of the tainted drug evidence.  The defendant asserted, "I was 
concerned with proceeding to trial on all charges because the 
Commonwealth alleged that there were drugs found on my person 
and in my clothing, and I did not believe that I had a strong 
defense to the drug charges."  At the same time, the defendant 
believed that he had a legitimate basis upon which to challenge 
the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and 
identification.  He also believed that he had a "strong 
misidentification case."  This belief was based on a statement 
by the victim to a private investigator expressing some doubt 
about his identification of the defendant.4  The 
misidentification defense, the defendant explained, was further 
supported by evidence that he did not exactly match the physical 
description provided by the victim (he did not have braids at 
the time of the robbery), and because, when he was arrested, he 
was wearing clothing different from that which had been 
 
4 The victim told a defense investigator that he was "[sixty 
percent] or maybe [seventy percent] sure the guy he picked out 
of the . . . photo array was the guy who robbed him."  The 
victim added that, a couple of days after the robbery, some men 
who were associated with the defendant came to his workplace and 
asked him about the certainty of his identification.  The victim 
then related that this experience made him "pretty nervous." 
9 
 
described by the victim.  The clothing the victim had described 
was not found in the apartment where the defendant was arrested. 
 
The defendant also submitted an affidavit from his plea 
counsel.  Plea counsel stated that prior to the plea agreement, 
neither he nor the defendant were aware of any problems at the 
Hinton lab.  According to counsel, had he known about Dookhan's 
misconduct, his advice to the defendant would have been 
"markedly different."  The Dookhan defense to the drug charges, 
plea counsel asserted, could have been combined with a 
misidentification defense and a third-party culprit or Bowden 
defense, to contest the defendant's guilt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980). 
In April 2017, the defendant's drug conviction was vacated 
and dismissed with prejudice by an order of a single justice 
arising from our decision in Bridgeman, 476 Mass. at 332. 
 
In March 2019, a Superior Court judge who was not the plea 
judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea.  The defendant testified and 
asserted that he had had three solid defenses to the charge of 
robbery and the firearms charges:  misidentification, alibi, and 
third-party culprit.  The misidentification defense was based on 
evidence that the victim was unsure of his identification of the 
defendant, and the defendant did not match the description of 
the gunman the victim had given police on the day of the 
10 
 
robbery.  The defendant also believed that he had had a "strong" 
alibi because, at the time of the robbery, he had been with his 
girlfriend at her apartment.5  In addition, the defendant pointed 
out that there had been another robbery outside that apartment 
building in November of 2010, and the individuals who had been 
charged with that crime had been released from custody shortly 
prior to the defendant's arrest.  The defendant maintained that 
the drug charges drove his decision to plead guilty, and that, 
had he known of Dookhan's misconduct, he "would have pushed to 
go to trial." 
After the hearing, the motion judge issued oral findings of 
fact and rulings of law on the record.  The judge focused on the 
second prong of the two-pronged test this court has established 
to determine whether a defendant is entitled to withdraw a 
guilty plea based on Dookhan's misconduct.  See Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 354-355 (2014).  The motion judge found 
that, had the defendant been aware of Dookhan's misconduct at 
the Hinton lab, he "would not have acted differently with regard 
to the pleas that he entered on the nondrug offenses."  The 
judge specifically rejected the defendant's testimony that the 
 
 
5 The defendant's girlfriend and her mother lived in the 
apartment in which the defendant was arrested; the defendant 
himself lived with his mother in another apartment building on a 
different street but had been an overnight guest in his 
girlfriend's apartment. 
11 
 
drug offenses "drove his decision to plead guilty."  In 
particular, the judge noted that the defendant had been facing 
"substantially greater sentences on [the] violent crimes . . . 
and then a series of firearm offenses," and received a very 
favorable plea deal.  In light of the defendant's fingerprint 
found on the box of ammunition, the judge also found that the 
defendant's contention that he had had a solid defense to the 
firearm offenses "rings hollow."  The judge concluded, "I do not 
find that the drug offense here would have made any difference 
in the defendant's decision to plead guilty to the other 
criminal offenses, both gun-related and armed robbery." 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "A motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea is treated as a motion for a new trial 
pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b)."  Commonwealth v. Resende, 
475 Mass. 1, 12 (2016).  "Under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), a 
judge may grant a motion for a new trial any time it appears 
that justice may not have been done.  A motion for a new trial 
is thus committed to the sound discretion of the judge."  
Commonwealth v. Camacho, 483 Mass. 645, 648 (2019), quoting 
Scott, 467 Mass. at 344.  "We review the allowance or denial of 
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to determine whether the 
judge abused that discretion or committed a significant error of 
law."  Camacho, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Cotto, 471 Mass. 
97, 105 (2015).  A judge's findings of fact after an evidentiary 
12 
 
hearing on such a motion will be accepted if supported by the 
record.  Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 672 (2015), 
S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017). 
 
The defendant's challenge to the denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas requires this court to decide three 
issues.  First, the court must determine whether the defendant 
is entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas to the nondrug offenses 
based on governmental misconduct.  Second, the court must decide 
whether the defendant also was entitled to withdraw his guilty 
pleas to the nondrug offenses on the grounds of newly discovered 
or withheld exculpatory evidence.  Third, the court must 
determine whether plea counsel provided ineffective assistance 
because he failed to inform the defendant that if the defendant 
were convicted of additional crimes in the future, he could be 
subject to State or Federal sentencing enhancements or armed 
career criminal charges as a result of pleading guilty to the 
charges at issue here. 
 
b.  Governmental misconduct.  i.  Ferrara-Scott framework.  
In Scott, 467 Mass. at 347-358, this court used its 
superintendence authority to establish a two-pronged test for 
analyzing a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea on the 
ground that governmental misconduct at the Hinton lab rendered 
that plea involuntary.  Ordinarily, a defendant claiming that a 
guilty plea was induced by government misconduct is required to 
13 
 
demonstrate that (1) "egregiously impermissible conduct . . . by 
government agents . . . antedated the entry of his [or her] 
plea;" and (2) "the misconduct influenced [the defendant's] 
decision to plead guilty or, put another way, that it was 
material to that choice."  Id. at 346, quoting Ferrara v. United 
States, 456 F.3d 278, 290 (1st Cir. 2006).  Given the "breadth 
and duration" of Dookhan's misconduct, however, and the 
difficulties faced by any one defendant in attempting to 
reconstruct the damage done to the integrity of samples 
processed at the Hinton lab, we established a special 
evidentiary rule for cases affected by Dookhan's misconduct.  
Resende, 475 Mass. at 3.  Under this rule, in cases where 
Dookhan signed the certificate of analysis as the primary or 
secondary chemist, a defendant seeking to vacate a guilty plea 
is "entitled to a conclusive presumption that egregious 
government misconduct occurred in the defendant's case."  Scott, 
supra at 352.  Thus, a defendant is relieved of the evidentiary 
burden to establish the first prong of the Ferrara-Scott 
framework.  Id. at 353-354. 
This court has yet to address explicitly whether the 
conclusive presumption of governmental misconduct applies to all 
crimes that were combined in a plea agreement, or whether the 
conclusive presumption of governmental misconduct is limited to 
drug offenses tainted by Dookhan's misconduct.  We take this 
14 
 
opportunity to clarify our holding in Scott.  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 360 (2019) 
(declining to apply conclusive presumption that defendant 
satisfied first prong of Ferrara-Scott framework to drug 
conviction where Dookhan did not sign certificate of drug 
analysis) with Commonwealth v. Williams, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 
388 (2016) (applying first prong of Ferrara-Scott framework to 
nondrug charges where drug charges were predicate sentencing 
enhancements as armed career criminal).  See Commonwealth v. 
Guzman, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 1120 (2017) (applying conclusive 
presumption of first prong of Scott to nondrug charges included 
in "package" plea agreement) 
 
The defendant argues that "[t]he Scott court did not . . . 
parse out charges within a case."  In support of this position, 
he points to the following discussion in Scott, 467 Mass. at 
338:  "[W]here Dookhan signed the certificate of drug analysis 
as either the primary or secondary chemist in the defendant's 
case, the defendant is entitled to a conclusive presumption that 
Dookhan's misconduct occurred in his [or her] case . . ." 
(emphasis added).  The defendant contends that the use of the 
word "case" refers to all of the charges that were before the 
court, and not just the indictments for drug offenses. 
 
The defendant's interpretation, however, is inconsistent 
with this court's subsequent decision in Bridgeman, 476 Mass. at 
15 
 
330-332, with respect specifically to the governmental 
misconduct at issue.  In Bridgeman, the court declined the 
petitioner's request to exercise its powers of superintendence 
to vacate the thousands of drug convictions affected by 
Dookhan's misconduct.  Id. at 300.  Instead, the court adopted a 
three-phase protocol for case-by-case adjudication of all 
relevant "Dookhan defendants."  Id.  One step in the initial 
phase required the district attorney, in the exercise of his or 
her discretion, to reduce the number of Dookhan defendants by 
moving to vacate and dismiss all drug charges the district 
attorney either would not, or could not, reprosecute.  Id. at 
327-328.  Once these convictions were vacated and dismissed with 
prejudice, the defendants were to "be notified of the action 
taken."  Id. at 328. 
As relevant here, Bridgeman limited postconviction relief 
to tainted drug convictions.  Id. at 327-328.  In so holding, 
the court specifically excluded associated nondrug offenses; the 
court explained, "Where a defendant pleaded guilty to multiple 
charges at a plea hearing or was convicted at trial of multiple 
counts, the vacatur of these drug convictions with prejudice 
will not affect any nondrug convictions."  Id. at 328 n.26. 
 
The limitation in Bridgeman is consistent with our holding 
in Resende, 475 Mass. at 14, where we limited the application of 
the conclusive presumption of Scott to tainted drug convictions.  
16 
 
In Resende, supra at 11, 15-16, we considered whether the Scott 
conclusive presumption is available to a defendant in a case 
where Dookhan played a minor role in the testing but did not 
sign the certificate of drug analysis.  We held that a special 
magistrate did not abuse his discretion or commit an error of 
law in determining that such a defendant was not entitled to the 
conclusive presumption of governmental misconduct articulated in 
Scott.  Resende, supra at 14. 
 
In light of the above, we clarify that where a plea 
agreement or trial involved multiple charges, some drug-related 
and others not, the conclusive presumption of governmental 
misconduct set forth in Scott applies only to the tainted drug 
convictions.  A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea to 
nondrug charges that were combined with tainted drug charges in 
a single plea agreement, on the asserted ground of governmental 
misconduct, therefore must establish both prongs of the Ferrara-
Scott test. 
ii.  Application.  Here, without objection from the 
Commonwealth, the judge focused solely on the second prong of 
the Ferrara-Scott framework.  After an evidentiary hearing, the 
judge found that the defendant did not establish a reasonable 
probability that, had he known of Dookhan's misconduct, he would 
not have pleaded guilty to the nondrug offenses.  Although the 
defendant was not entitled to the conclusive presumption of 
17 
 
governmental misconduct, the Commonwealth waived the issue at 
the hearing, see Commonwealth v. Yasin, 483 Mass. 343, 349 
(2019).  We therefore consider the judge's findings with respect 
to the second prong, and we review for abuse of discretion.  See 
L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). 
The judge's finding that the defendant's plea was 
motivated, in part, by the favorable terms of the over-all plea 
arrangement is amply supported by the record.  As the judge 
noted, the defendant faced "substantially greater sentences on 
violent crimes -- an armed robbery, [an] assault and battery [by 
means of] a dangerous weapon, and then a series of firearm[] 
offenses" -- than the three-year sentence he received.  The 
potential sentence on these charges included the possibility of 
life in prison, and a minimum of five years, on the armed 
robbery charge, see G. L. c. 265, § 17; up to ten years' 
incarceration for the charge of assault and battery by means of 
a dangerous weapon, see G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); and up to 
fifteen years of incarceration if the defendant were convicted 
of unlawful possession of a firearm as an armed career criminal 
and as a subsequent offender, see G. L. c. 269, §§ 10G and 
10 (d).  In addition, if he were convicted at trial, the 
defendant could have been sentenced to a minimum of five years 
in prison on the charge of possession of a firearm while in the 
commission of a felony, see G. L. c. 265, § 18B; and an 
18 
 
additional term of up to two and one-half years for unlawful 
possession of a loaded firearm, see G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n).  
Taking into account the time that the defendant had served 
awaiting trial, the plea arrangement assured that he would be 
released from custody less than two years after he entered into 
the agreement. 
The motion judge also observed that the asserted defenses 
to the firearm charges were not as solid as the defendant 
claimed.  As the defendant argued, he did not live in the 
apartment in which the gun and most of the drugs were found; 
rather, it was his girlfriend's apartment.  The defendant 
conceded, however, that he had spent the entire evening there on 
the date of the robbery, and a police officer investigating the 
building for the two suspects immediately after the offense saw 
him leave the bedroom where the contraband ultimately was found 
and then enter the shared living spaces.  In that bedroom, 
police located the .22 caliber firearm and a box of .22 caliber 
ammunition; the defendant's fingerprint was on the box.  Thus, 
the judge observed, the defense that the apartment was not the 
defendant's, and therefore that the firearm and ammunition found 
in the bedroom were not his, was not as persuasive as the 
defendant had posited. 
The defendant also testified at the hearing on his motion 
to withdraw his plea that he "would have pushed to go to trial" 
19 
 
had he been aware of Dookhan's misconduct.  Before us, as he did 
at the motion hearing, the defendant contends that the drug 
charge was "the pivotal indictment" in his decision to plead 
guilty, and "thus Dookhan's misconduct went to the heart of the 
case."  The judge explicitly did not credit this testimony; the 
judge noted, "I do not find that the drug offense here would 
have made any difference in the defendant's decision to plead 
guilty to the other criminal offenses, both gun-related and 
armed robbery." 
In sum, there was adequate evidence to support the judge's 
finding that the defendant failed to establish that there was a 
reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty had he 
known of Dookhan's misconduct.  The motion judge's assessment of 
the defendant's credibility at the hearing on the motion for a 
new trial is entitled to deference, and we discern no reason to 
disturb his findings.  See Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 
307 (1986). 
c.  Exculpatory and newly discovered evidence.  The 
defendant contends, in the alternative, that his convictions 
must be vacated because Dookhan's misconduct constitutes newly 
discovered evidence or withheld exculpatory evidence.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 326 (2008) (new 
trial claim raised based on failure to provide exculpatory 
evidence); Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 408-409 
20 
 
(1992) (argument new trial was required based on failure to 
disclose exculpatory evidence need not be considered only on 
constitutional grounds, and could be addressed under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 30 [b]); Grace, 397 Mass. at 305-306 (where new trial 
sought based on newly discovered evidence, evidence must be 
material and credible).  The defendant argues that the office of 
the Suffolk district attorney was aware of Dookhan's misconduct 
prior to his guilty plea, and that her misconduct "was only 
substantially revealed in September 2012."  This misconduct, and 
the knowledge of the misconduct, was exculpatory because it 
called into question whether the seized items were, in fact, 
controlled substances.  The motion judge did not reach this 
argument. 
 
On appeal, the court may affirm a ruling on an issue on 
grounds different from those relied upon by the motion judge, so 
long as "the correct or preferred basis for the affirmance is 
supported by the record and the findings."  See Commonwealth v. 
Mauricio, 477 Mass. 588, 595 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Va 
Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997).  In Scott, 467 Mass. at 361, 
the defendant also raised the alternative ground that the judge 
could have found that Dookhan's misconduct constituted newly 
discovered evidence or withheld exculpatory evidence.  We noted 
that both claims require a defendant to demonstrate prejudice or 
materiality.  Id. at 360.  In deciding whether the evidence 
21 
 
"casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction," such that a 
new trial is necessary, "[t]he motion judge decides not whether 
the verdict would have been different, but rather whether the 
new evidence would probably have been a real factor in the 
jury's deliberations" (citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Ellis, 475 Mass. 459, 476-477 (2016).  Just as where a defendant 
presents newly discovered evidence that the defendant argues 
would have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations, 
"where the defendant[] argue[s] on the basis of a newly 
available analysis that likely would have rendered inculpatory 
evidence presented at the original trial inadmissible, we ask 
whether that inculpatory evidence 'likely was a "real factor" in 
the jury's deliberations such that its elimination would cast 
real doubt on the justice of the defendant's conviction.'"  
Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 618 (2015), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340, 350 (2014). 
We also have observed that our prior cases concerning newly 
discovered or withheld exculpatory evidence had arisen largely 
in the context of a defendant's motion for a new trial, and that 
in those cases we had examined how likely it would be that the 
evidence would have had a prejudicial effect on the jury's 
deliberations.  Scott, 467 Mass. at 361.  In the context of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we have addressed the issues 
by borrowing from our jurisprudence on claims that the 
22 
 
ineffective assistance of counsel induced a guilty plea.  Id. at 
360-361.  In these claims, the question of prejudice is focused 
on the defendant's decision whether to enter into a plea 
agreement.  Id. at 361, citing Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 
30, 46-48 (2011).  The defendant in such a case has the burden 
of demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's ineffective assistance, he or she would not have 
pleaded guilty and instead would have insisted on going to 
trial.  See Scott, supra, quoting Clarke, supra at 47.  We have 
observed that, "were we to determine the specific formulation of 
the standard for prejudice to be applied to defendants seeking 
to withdraw a guilty plea based on either newly discovered 
evidence or prosecutorial nondisclosure, we may well conclude 
that the most appropriate formulation would be the reasonable 
probability standard that we adopted in Clarke."  See Scott, 
supra at 361.6  Based on the similarities between the Clarke 
standard and the second prong of the Ferrara-Scott framework, we 
have concluded that, where a defendant reformulates a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct as one for newly discovered or 
 
 
6 In Scott, 467 Mass. at 361, we noted that we "may well 
conclude" that this would be the appropriate standard.  Our 
reluctance to set forth a definite conclusion was based on the 
Commonwealth's argument, which we did not reach, that, by 
entering a voluntary and intelligent plea, the defendant waived 
the right to contest the claims of newly discovered evidence or 
prosecutorial nondisclosure.  Id. at 359, 361. 
23 
 
nondisclosed evidence, if the "defendant is unable to establish 
prejudice under the second prong of the Ferrara analysis, it is 
likely that he or she would be unable to make the showing of 
prejudice required by the other two grounds [newly discovered or 
withheld exculpatory evidence] as well."  Scott, supra. 
Here, the motion judge had adequate grounds upon which to 
find that the defendant failed to establish a reasonable 
probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been 
aware of Dookhan's misconduct.  Therefore, having failed to 
establish prejudice under the second prong of the Ferrara-Scott 
test, the defendant's recasting of his claim for relief from 
governmental misconduct to one of newly discovered or withheld 
exculpatory evidence also must fail.  See Commonwealth v. 
Antone, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 810, 821 (2017) (where defendant 
failed to satisfy second prong of Ferrara-Scott test, he had not 
satisfied his burden on his claims of prosecutorial 
nondisclosure and newly discovered evidence "concerning [the] 
same misconduct"). 
d.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues also that his plea counsel was ineffective for not having 
advised him that his plea could subject him to future State or 
Federal sentencing enhancements if he were rearrested.  The 
defendant contends that the requirement that a defense attorney 
advise his or her client of the potential collateral 
24 
 
consequences of a conviction or plea is based on Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), where the United States Supreme 
Court held that a defense attorney has a duty to advise clients 
in criminal matters about certain collateral consequences of a 
guilty plea, such as the risk of deportation, and that the 
failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.  
See Clarke, 460 Mass. at 49 (applying Padilla retroactively on 
collateral review to guilty pleas made after effective date of 
immigration reform legislation).  The defendant maintains that 
the rationale underlying the holding in Padilla regarding 
immigration advice "is equally relevant to counsel's failure to 
provide advice about the collateral criminal consequences of a 
conviction."  These consequences, the defendant argues, include 
being subject to sentencing enhancements for armed career 
criminals or habitual offenders, see G. L. c. 279, § 25 (d), and 
G. L. c. 269, § 10G, or qualifying as a career offender under 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (updated Aug. 
2016). 
In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, we ask whether counsel's performance fell "measurably 
below that which might be expected from an ordinarily fallible 
lawyer," and "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise 
available, substantial ground of defence."  Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  We do not agree with the 
25 
 
defendant's view that, under Padilla, a failure to advise a 
defendant of all possible collateral consequences results in 
constitutionally ineffective assistance.  See Commonwealth v. 
Roberts, 472 Mass. 355, 356, 362-363 (2015) (concluding that 
analogy between consequences of deportation under Padilla and 
potential civil commitment as sexually dangerous person "is 
inapt").  Padilla did not address any distinction between the 
direct and collateral consequences of pleading guilty and 
limited its holding to "the unique nature of deportation."  
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365.  See Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 476 
Mass. 1, 6-7 (2016) (Padilla did not abrogate distinction 
between direct and collateral consequences); Roberts, supra at 
363 n.10 ("it is clear that the [Padilla] Court's holding was 
limited to the context of deportation"). 
Generally, in Massachusetts, a failure to inform a 
defendant of the collateral or contingent consequences of a plea 
does not render the plea involuntary.  See Sylvester, 476 Mass. 
at 6, and cases cited.  It is unlikely, therefore, that 
counsel's purported failure to advise the defendant of the 
collateral consequences of his plea agreement with respect to 
possible future sentencing enhancements should he be convicted 
of another crime deprived him of an otherwise available, 
substantial ground of defense.  See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 73 
Mass. App. Ct. 57, 67-68 (2008) (counsel was not ineffective for 
26 
 
not appealing from denial of motion for new trial where judge 
did not inform defendant that violation of probation would 
result in previously mentioned minimum mandatory sentence); 
Commonwealth v. Shindell, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 503, 505 (2005) 
(counsel was not ineffective for failure to inform defendant 
that she could be subject to then-current sex offender 
registration requirements if she pleaded guilty).  See also 
Sylvester, supra at 2 (concluding that counsel's incomplete 
advice regarding duty to register as sex offender under 2002 
version of registration statute was not ineffective, but 
declining to decide whether that would be the case under current 
registration requirements).  In sum, the defendant has not 
demonstrated that his counsel's failure to inform him of certain 
possible, but contingent, consequences of a guilty plea was 
behavior that was less than would be expected of an ordinary 
fallible attorney. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a new trial affirmed.