Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Armengau

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Armengau, 99 Ohio St.3d 55, 2003-Ohio-2465.] 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. ARMENGAU. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Armengau, 99 Ohio St.3d 55, 2003-Ohio-
2465.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Public reprimand — Asserting lawyer’s 
personal knowledge of the facts in issue — Engaging in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice — Disregarding a ruling of a 
tribunal made in the course of the proceedings. 
(No. 2003-0382 — Submitted April 16, 2003 — Decided May 16, 2003.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 01-101. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
On December 10, 2001, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a 
complaint charging respondent, Javier H. Armengau of Marion, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0069776, with three counts of misconduct in violation of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility.  Respondent answered, and a panel of the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“board”) heard the cause. 
{¶2} 
Prior to the hearing, the parties stipulated to certain facts and to 
three violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility:  DR 7-106(C)(3) 
(asserting a lawyer’s personal knowledge of the facts in issue); DR 1-102(A)(5) 
(engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice); and DR 
7-106(A) (disregarding a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of the 
proceedings).  After a hearing, the panel adopted the facts as stipulated. 
{¶3} 
Respondent represented a defendant in a criminal trial in June 
1999.  The state had charged respondent’s client with two counts of unauthorized 
use of a motor vehicle, alleging that while employed at an automobile dealership, 
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the client had unlawfully provided vehicles to a co-defendant.  The night before 
trial began, respondent, accompanied by his wife, went to the dealership, claiming 
interest in purchasing a vehicle.  The dealership, in fact, permitted respondent and 
his wife to keep a vehicle overnight. 
{¶4} 
In defending his client, respondent challenged the dealership’s 
claim that his client had not complied with a policy requiring that all potential 
buyers sign a demonstration agreement before a test drive.  When respondent 
cross-examined two employees of the dealership, respondent repeatedly 
questioned the witnesses about the dealership’s purported failure to require him to 
sign a demonstration agreement.  Respondent also suggested that the dealership 
had lost his demonstration agreement and continually injected facts into his cross-
examination relating to his personal experience at the dealership the night before. 
{¶5} 
On the second day of trial, respondent cross-examined the 
salesperson who had assisted him at the dealership.  Respondent’s cross-
examination centered in large part on respondent’s personal experience with this 
witness.  He implied during questioning that the witness had lost two 
demonstration agreements during respondent’s visit when, in reality, respondent 
had had these agreements in his possession when he left the dealership. 
{¶6} 
In a February 2001 jury trial, respondent defended another client 
who had been charged with two felony counts of drug trafficking.  Prior to trial, 
the court granted the state’s motion limiting respondent’s cross-examination of a 
confidential police informant.  The ruling prohibited respondent from inquiring 
into the facts underlying any of the informant’s prior felony convictions, and also 
limited cross-examination to misdemeanor convictions involving dishonesty and 
moral turpitude. 
{¶7} 
Despite the judge’s pretrial ruling, respondent made several 
inquiries on cross-examination regarding the underlying facts of the informant’s 
previous felony convictions and also improperly inquired into his prior 
January Term, 2003 
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misdemeanor convictions.  Respondent continued to improperly examine this 
witness despite admonitions from the trial court.  As a result of respondent’s 
improper questioning, the trial court sustained several objections from the 
prosecutor, had to excuse the jury from the courtroom twice, and had to issue 
corrective instructions to the jury.  After respondent made another prohibited 
remark during his closing argument, the trial judge found respondent in contempt 
of court. 
{¶8} 
The panel found that respondent had committed the stipulated 
violations.  In mitigation, the panel considered that respondent had cooperated in 
the disciplinary investigation, had not been the subject of any prior discipline, and 
was remorseful.  The panel recommended, based on the parties’ suggestion, that 
respondent receive a public reprimand.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. 
{¶9} 
On review, we agree that respondent committed the misconduct 
found by the board and that a public reprimand is appropriate.  Respondent is 
hereby publicly reprimanded for his violations of DR 7-106(C)(3), 1-102(A)(5), 
and 7-106(A).  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK, LUNDBERG 
STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lori J. Brown, First 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Javier H. Armengau, pro se. 
__________________