Title: Comer v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LAMAR COMER,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
          Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 619, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0410023811 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                      Submitted: April 22, 2011 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: June 13, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 13th day of June 2011, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Lamar Comer, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s August 31, 2010 order denying his first motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.1  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
                                                 
1 Because this was Comer’s first postconviction motion and because Comer raised claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Superior Court requested Comer’s attorneys to 
file affidavits.  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g)(1) and (2); Horne v. State, 887 A.2d 973, 975 
(Del. 2005). 
 
2
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in May 2006, Comer was found guilty 
by a Superior Court jury of Murder in the First Degree, Attempted Assault in 
the First Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Reckless Endangering in 
the First Degree and three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony.  Comer’s convictions stemmed from an incident 
that occurred at 7:00 p.m. on October 25, 2004, in which Baheem Mitchell, 
an innocent bystander, was shot and killed when Comer and two co-
conspirators opened fire on a car driven by Frank Johnson at the corner of 
Fifth and Monroe in Wilmington, Delaware.  Comer was sentenced to life in 
prison on the murder conviction and to a total of thirty-one years at Level V, 
to be followed by probation, on his remaining convictions.   
 
(3) 
On direct appeal, this Court reversed Comer’s murder 
conviction due to a faulty jury instruction on the murder charge.  We 
remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new trial or, in the alternative, 
imposition of a conviction of manslaughter as a lesser-included offense.  The 
State chose the latter alternative.  Judgment was entered accordingly and 
Comer was re-sentenced. 
 
(4) 
In his appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his first 
motion for postconviction relief, Comer claims that his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to a) challenge the original charge of first 
 
3
degree murder; b) raise as an issue on appeal the alleged delayed disclosure 
of certain ballistics evidence; c) challenge the State’s withholding of the 
statements of two alleged witnesses to the crime; d) request an instruction on 
reckless endangering as a lesser-included offense of first degree murder; e) 
raise his conspiracy conviction as an issue on appeal; f) raise his 
manslaughter conviction as an issue on appeal; and g) raise his assault 
conviction as an issue on appeal.  To the extent Comer does not assert claims 
in this appeal that previously were raised in the Superior Court, any such 
claims are deemed to be waived and will not be addressed by this Court.2   
 
(5) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.3  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.4  The 
                                                 
2 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  In his postconviction motion filed 
in the Superior Court, Comer also claimed that his counsel failed to object to certain jury 
instructions, failed to conduct a direct examination of a witness and failed to challenge 
the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal.     
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
4 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
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defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.5      
 
(6) 
Comer’s first claim is that his counsel failed to challenge the 
charge of first degree murder.  The record reflects that Comer’s counsel 
vigorously challenged the murder conviction in a motion for judgment of 
acquittal as well as on direct appeal, which resulted in this Court’s reversal 
of the conviction.  Moreover, there was no basis for challenging the original 
charge of first degree murder.  The charge was proper and the evidence 
presented at trial supported Comer’s conviction of that charge.  The 
conviction was reversed not because there was insufficient evidence to 
support it, but because the jury instruction on that charge was deficient.6  In 
the absence of any evidence of error on the part of his counsel that resulted 
in prejudice to him, we conclude that Comer’s first claim of ineffective 
assistance is without merit. 
 
(7) 
Comer’s second claim is that his counsel failed to raise as an 
issue on appeal the State’s allegedly delayed disclosure of ballistics 
evidence.7  The record reflects that the State’s ballistics expert testified that 
the fatal bullet ricocheted off a surface such as concrete, asphalt or brick 
                                                 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
6 Comer v. State, 977 A.2d 334 (Del. 2009). 
7 We will address the merits of this claim even though it appears that Comer did not 
squarely present it to the Superior Court in the first instance. 
 
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before it hit the victim.  The record further reflects that Mitchell, the victim 
of the shooting, was an innocent bystander killed when multiple gunshots 
were fired at a car driven by Johnson, the intended target, on a busy city 
street.  Whether information concerning the substance of the expert’s 
testimony was delayed or not, the testimony that the fatal bullet ricocheted 
before it struck Mitchell was immaterial to the evidence presented by the 
State at trial that resulted in Comer’s conviction.  In the absence of any 
evidence of error on the part of his counsel resulting in prejudice to him, we 
conclude that Comer’s second claim also is without merit. 
 
(8) 
Comer’s third ineffectiveness claim is that his counsel failed to 
challenge the State’s withholding of the statements of two alleged witnesses 
to the crime.  The record reflects that the testimony of one of the defense 
witnesses raised the possibility that the fatal shot was fired by someone other 
than Comer and that two witnesses had knowledge of that.  While the street 
names of the two alleged witnesses to the crime were given to police, the 
witnesses themselves were never identified or located.  While Comer faults 
his counsel for failing to locate the witnesses, he does not indicate what 
more his counsel could have done to locate them.  Nor does the record 
reflect that any statements as described by Comer ever existed.  As such, the 
State may not be faulted for failing to produce them.  In the absence of any 
 
6
evidence of error that resulted in prejudice to him, we conclude that Comer’s 
third claim also is without merit.  
 
(9) 
Comer next claims that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to request an instruction on reckless endangering as a 
lesser-included offense of first degree murder.8  The record reflects that the 
charge of first degree murder9 addressed Comer’s intent regarding Johnson, 
the target of the shooting, while the charge of reckless endangering10 
addressed the fact that innocent bystanders were placed in danger by the 
firing of multiple gunshots on a busy city street.  Because the evidence at 
trial demonstrated that Comer acted with intent to kill Johnson, there was no 
rational basis for instructing the jury on reckless endangering.  Defense 
counsel, therefore, may not be faulted for not requesting such an instruction.  
We, therefore, conclude that Comer’s fourth claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel is without merit. 
 
(10) Comer’s last three claims may fairly be summarized as a claim 
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence that supported his convictions of conspiracy, 
manslaughter and assault.  In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the 
                                                 
8 We will address the merits of this claim even though it appears that Comer did not 
squarely present it to the Superior Court in the first instance. 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 636(a)(1). 
10 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 604 
 
7
evidence, the Court will uphold a conviction as long as any rational trier of 
fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.11   
 
(11) As to the first of Comer’s claims regarding insufficiency of the 
evidence, the record reflects that Comer and his two companions fired their 
pistols simultaneously at Johnson’s car, providing a rational basis for a jury 
to conclude that they had conspired with each other prior to the attack.12  As 
to the second claim, this Court previously ruled on direct appeal that there 
was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the charge of 
manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder in the first degree13 and 
Comer has offered no reason why that ruling should be revisited in the 
interest of justice.14  As to the third claim, Comer argues that his conviction 
of attempted first degree assault15 is invalid because it conflicts with his 
conviction of the charge of manslaughter16 by requiring proof of intent.  The 
record reflects that Comer acted with intent to kill Johnson and recklessly 
caused the death of Mitchell.  There was, therefore, no conflict between the 
two charges and no basis for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
                                                 
11 Word v. State, 801 A.2d 927, 929 n.7 (Del. 2002). 
12 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1979); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §512. 
13 Comer v. State, 977 A.2d at 343-44.   
14 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
15 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 613(a)(1). 
16 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 632. 
 
8
on the assault charge.  In the absence of any support for Comer’s claim of 
insufficient evidence to support his convictions of conspiracy, manslaughter 
and assault, his counsel may not be faulted for failing to challenge those 
convictions on that ground.  We conclude, therefore, that Comer’s last three 
claims also are without merit.     
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice