Title: McLellan v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

413 So. 2d 705 (1982) William E. McLELLAN, III v. MISSISSIPPI STATE BAR ASSOCIATION. Conf. Misc. No. 61. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 21, 1982. Watkins & Eager, Hassell H. Whitworth, John L. Low, IV, Jackson, for appellant. Jimmy Miller, Jackson, for appellee. EN BANC. ROY NOBLE LEE, Justice, for the Court: The Committee on Complaints of the Mississippi State Bar filed a formal complaint against William E. McLellan, III, for violation of the Mississippi Code of Professional Responsibility. The matter was heard by a Complaint Tribunal on stipulated facts and disciplinary action[1] was adjudged against him. McLellan has appealed to this Court as provided by law. The complaint stated the following charges against appellant: Appellant answered the complaint and admitted the fact of publishing the advertisement in the "Yellow Pages" of the Jackson telephone directory. He set up as affirmative defenses that, if he was found to have violated any of the sections of the Code of Professional Responsibility set forth in the formal complaint, such sections were violative of his constitutional rights. The Complaint Tribunal found that appellant's advertisement violated three (3) sections of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The pertinent parts of those sections are: The sections from the Code of Professional Responsibility set out above are the only restrictions on an attorney's use of the classified section of the telephone directory for advertisement purposes. They clearly prohibit all "Yellow Page" advertisements except those which contain no information beyond the attorney's name, firm's name, address and telephone number. The findings of fact and ruling of the Tribunal amounted to total suppression of any other form of telephone directory advertising. Appellant contends that DR 2-102[A] is unconstitutional in its restriction and limitation of an advertisement to a statement of an attorney's name, firm's name, address and telephone number. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1977), which involved advertising in a newspaper by a member of the Arizona State Bar, the Court, in holding that the newspaper advertisement involved [See Appendix II] could *707 not be prohibited by the Bar Association, said: The Bates decision involved a newspaper advertisement, but its scope was narrow. The only advertising media singled out for special treatment or different consideration was "the electronic broadcast media." However, the Court shed light upon any distinction which it considered to exist between newspapers and telephone directories with the following footnote in the opinion: Princeton Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706 (3d Cir.1978) discussed the possibility of the existence of any distinction between various classes of printed media and extended full protection of the First Amendment to telephone directory advertisement. The case of Kentucky Bar Assn. v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978), involved a form of "print media" where the accused attorney prepared a direct mail campaign relating to legal services to be performed regarding real estate transactions. He was found in violation of the Kentucky disciplinary rules and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky the judgment was reversed. The Court made the following observation: In its finding the Complaint Tribunal, sub judice, specifically found: It is clear that the advertisement under consideration in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, was larger in size, and more aggressive than that of appellant here. Since the Bates decision, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of In Re R.M.J., ___ U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 929, 71 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1982), on appeal from the Missouri Supreme Court. The advertisement involved there set out the name and address of the attorney, together with various branches of law he practiced, and stated he had been admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court and was licensed in Missouri and Illinois. [See Appendix III]. After discussing the Bates v. State Bar of Arizona decisions, supra, and its implications, the Court said: While we recognize, as was held in Bates and In Re R.M.J., supra, that the Bar may regulate advertising and impose discipline where the particular advertising is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that a particular form or method of advertising has proved to be deceptive in the past, we are of the opinion that the complete elimination and blanket prohibition of advertising in the "Yellow Pages" of a telephone directory are constitutionally impermissible, and the sections of the Code of Professional Responsibility so prohibiting same here are held to be so.[2] The appellee contends that Section DR 2-101 was violated because appellant's ad was "self-laudatory." We think the advertisements in Bates and In Re R.M.J. are far more susceptible of being self-laudatory than the advertisement published by *709 appellant here. Even though the appellant may have attempted to draw attention to himself through the advertisement (which is the purpose of all advertisements), a general condemnation of it and all advertisements may not be had under Bates. Each case has to be examined, and must stand, on its own facts. We do not consider the advertisement to be self-laudatory of appellant, and we hold there is no merit in that finding. For the reasons stated, the order of the Complaint Tribunal is reversed, judgment is rendered here in favor of the appellant, and the complaint filed against him is dismissed. This case was considered by a conference of the justices en banc. REVERSED AND RENDERED. PATTERSON, C.J., SUGG and WALKER, P. JJ., and BROOM, BOWLING and DAN M. LEE, JJ., concur. HAWKINS and DARDEN, JJ., took no part. *710 [1] Public reprimand in accordance with Mississippi Code Annotated Section 73-3-319 (Supp. 1981). [2] We recognize that advertising of any kind was/is repulsive to attorneys of the so-called "Old School."