Title: Drumgo v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DESHAWN DRUMGO,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 550, 2011 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and  
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0606012315   
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  January 20, 2012 
Decided:  April 17, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
       
O R D E R 
 
This 17th day of April 2012, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Deshawn Drumgo, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s September 27, 2011 denial of his first motion for 
postconviction relief.  We conclude that there is no merit to the appeal and 
affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
(2) 
On June 15, 2006, Larry Larkin was fatally stabbed in the chest 
in the courtyard of a Wilmington apartment complex.  The appellant, 
Deshawn Drumgo, was arrested a week later.  On July 10, 2006, Drumgo 
was charged with Larkin’s murder and three related weapon offenses, i.e., 
2 
 
Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, 
Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon 
by a Person Prohibited. 
(3) 
Drumgo was tried in the Superior Court beginning October 9, 
2007.  Prior to jury selection, Drumgo stipulated that he was a person 
prohibited from possessing a deadly weapon. 
(4) 
On October 12, 2007, the jury convicted Drumgo of Murder in 
the Second Degree and the three weapon offenses.  On December 21, 2007, 
the Superior Court sentenced Drumgo to twenty-three years at Level V 
followed by one year at Level III. 
(5) 
On direct appeal, we affirmed Drumgo’s convictions.  In our 
conclusion we stated that “[t]his was not a close case.  There were numerous 
witnesses, many of whom knew Drumgo and Larkin.  Moreover, Drumgo 
admitted that he intervened in the fight that resulted in Larkin’s death, thus 
placing himself at the scene of the crime.” 1 
(6) 
On June 9, 2010, Drumgo filed a motion for postconviction 
relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  Drumgo alleged 
that numerous errors were made by the Superior Court, this Court (on direct 
                                          
 
1 Drumgo v. State, 976 A.2d 121, 124 (Del. 2009). 
3 
 
appeal), and his trial and appellate counsel.2  Drumgo argued that the 
cumulative effect of all of the errors warranted relief. 
(7) 
The Superior Court referred Drumgo’s postconviction motion 
to a Commissioner for proposed findings and recommendations.3  By report 
dated July 20, 2011, the Commissioner recommended that Drumgo’s 
postconviction motion should be denied.  Drumgo filed objections to the 
Commissioner’s report and recommendation.  Upon de novo review, the 
Superior Court adopted the report and recommendation and denied the 
postconviction motion.  This appeal followed. 
(8) 
On appeal, Drumgo summarizes his postconviction claims in 
three arguments.4  First, he argues that he is entitled to postconviction relief 
on the basis that there was no DNA evidence presented at trial.  Second, he 
argues that he is entitled to relief on the basis that the trial judge failed to 
conduct a balancing test required under Rule 609(a) of the Delaware 
Uniform Rules of Evidence (hereinafter “Rule 609(a)”)5 before permitting 
the prosecutor to question him about a prior felony weapon conviction.6 
                                          
 
2 Drumgo was represented by different counsel at trial and on appeal. 
3 In the proceedings before the Commissioner, Drumgo’s trial counsel and appellate 
counsel filed affidavits, the State filed a response, and Drumgo filed a reply. 
4 To the extent Drumgo raised claims that are not renewed on appeal those claims are 
considered waived and abandoned.  Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997). 
5 Rule 609(a) provides in pertinent part that for the purpose of attacking the credibility of 
a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but 
4 
 
(9) 
Drumgo’s third argument, that he is entitled to postconviction 
relief based on the cumulative effect of the alleged errors, is unavailing.  
Drumgo is correct that the Court has held that the cumulative impact of 
errors at trial may be the basis for reversing a conviction even when one 
error, standing alone, would not be the basis for reversal.7  For the reasons 
that follow, however, the Court has determined that Drumgo’s claims of 
error on appeal are procedurally barred without exception.  Therefore, a 
cumulative error analysis is not warranted. 
(10) When reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction 
relief, this Court must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 
before addressing any substantive issues.8  Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any 
ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the 
judgment of conviction is barred  unless the defendant can establish “cause” 
for relief from the procedural default and “prejudice” from a violation of his 
                                                                                                                             
 
only if the crime is a felony and the court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
6 Also, Drumgo alleges that the prosecutor “misinformed the jury” that he had two prior 
weapon offenses when he had only one.  Drumgo’s assertion of having only one prior 
weapon offense is not supported by the record, however, in view of his dual 2004 
convictions for Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited and Possession of 
a Firearm by a Person Prohibited.  The Court takes judicial notice of Drumgo’s 
convictions in State v. Drumgo, Del. Super., Cr. ID No. 0403022351A (Sept. 27, 2004).  
7 Wright v. State, 405 A.2d 685, 690 (Del. 1979).  
8 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).  
5 
 
rights.9  To gain relief from the procedural bar under Rule 61(i)(3), a movant 
must demonstrate that a barred claim warrants consideration under Rule 
61(i)(5).10 
(11) It does not appear that Drumgo raised either of his claims at 
trial or on direct appeal.  Therefore, under Rule 61(i)(3), the claims are 
barred unless Drumgo can establish cause for failure to raise the claims and 
prejudice arising from the errors.11  Drumgo raises ineffective assistance of 
his trial and/or appellate counsel as cause for failure to raise the claims, and 
he alleges that he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors.  To prevail on his 
ineffectiveness claim, Drumgo must demonstrate that his counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and was 
prejudicial, i.e., that but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.12 
(12) Moreover, when evaluating counsel’s performance, a reviewing 
court must eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight and reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct from counsel’s perspective at 
                                          
 
9 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 
10 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that the procedural bar of R. 61(i)(3) 
shall not apply to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a 
constitutional violation). 
11 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 
12 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
6 
 
the time.13  There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.14 
(13) Drumgo first asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective 
because he did not move for DNA testing of the pants Drumgo was wearing 
when Larkin was stabbed.  According to Drumgo, DNA test results from an 
analysis of the pants would have been negative for Larkin’s blood. 
(14) Under all the circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that 
Drumgo’s trial counsel’s decision to forego DNA testing or his appellate 
counsel’s failure to raise the claim on appeal was either unreasonable or 
prejudicial.  Trial counsel averred in his Rule 61(g)(2) affidavit that 
foregoing DNA testing was a strategic decision to first, protect Drumgo in 
the event the results were incriminating, and second, to provide the defense 
with an argument of insufficient evidence based on the prosecutor’s failure 
to produce the test results.  Moreover, the Court observes that the value of 
any DNA testing was limited when the pants were not seized until a week 
after the murder. 
(15) Next, Drumgo asserts that both his trial and appellate counsel 
overlooked the trial judge’s failure to conduct a required balancing test 
under Rule 609(a) before allowing the prosecutor to question him about a 
                                          
 
13 Id. at 689.  
14 Id. 
7 
 
prior weapon conviction.15  Having carefully reviewed the record, we cannot 
conclude that the trial judge’s failure to conduct the Rule 609(a) balancing 
test or that Drumgo’s counsel’s oversight of that error was prejudicial when 
first, the jury was already aware that Drumgo was a person prohibited from 
possessing a deadly weapon, and second, the trial judge gave an appropriate 
limiting instruction.16 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                          
 
15 See Gregory v. State, 616 A.2d 1198, 1204 (Del. 1992) (concluding that, under Rule 
609(a), the failure to balance the probative value of defendant’s prior convictions against 
their prejudicial effect foreclosed admission of those crimes except those involving 
dishonesty or false statement). 
16 See Johnson v. State, 2004 WL 5579821 (Del. Supr.) (citing United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).