Title: City of Cheyenne v. Reiman Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

City of Cheyenne v. Reiman Corp.1994 WY 17869 P.2d 125Case Number: 93-20Decided: 02/11/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
CITY OF CHEYENNE,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

REIMAN 
CORP.,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant,

Jack 
Gage, and S. Gregory Thomas, City Attorney's Office, City of 
Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellee,

E. 
James Burke, Burke, Woodard & Bishop, P.C., Cheyenne.

 

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The issue as 
posed by the parties is whether a construction company that has submitted a bid 
to a city for the construction of a fire station should be entitled to rescind 
its bid without penalty because of a mistake in computing the amount of the bid. 
The trial court, by applying Colorado law, ruled the construction company would 
be entitled to rescind without incurring any penalty under the circumstances of 
this case. We hold the trial court erred in failing to strictly apply WYO. STAT. 
§ 15-1-113 (1992). We affirm the summary judgment entered in favor of the 
contractor, however, because these parties are bound by the settlement 
agreement, which affords finality to the judgment of the district court without 
regard to whether it is legally correct. The contractor is entitled to the 
additional amount awarded by the trial court.

[¶2]      The appellant, 
City of Cheyenne (City), states the issue to be:

Whether 
the district court erred as a matter of law by granting summary judgment to 
Reiman.

 

The 
appellee, Reiman Corporation (Reiman), articulates the question with five 
sub-issues:

I. 
Is the low bidder on a municipal construction project entitled to rescind its 
mistaken bid after bid opening without penalty if:

A. 
The error was of a clerical nature, made without gross negligence;

B. 
The contractor promptly notified the city of the error;

C. 
The error is significant;

D. 
The city has taken no action in reliance upon the bid prior to being notified of 
the error;

E. 
The allowance of rescission will work no substantial hardship on the 
city.

[¶3]      This case is 
before the court for the second time, and the material facts may be gleaned from 
the earlier opinion in Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182 
(Wyo. 1992). Reiman mistakenly failed to include five items in computing the bid 
it submitted to the City for construction of a fire station. These items 
aggregated $71,000. Upon discovering the mistake, Reiman asked to withdraw its 
bid, which had been opened, without forfeiture of its bid bond, and requested 
the contract be awarded to the next lowest bidder. The City decided to accept 
Reiman's bid and issued a notice of award to Reiman because its bid was the 
lowest one submitted. Subsequently, the City amended the notice of award to 
extend Reiman's time for execution of the contract to December 26, 1990. Reiman 
was told, if it failed to execute the contract by that date, its bid bond would 
be forfeited.

[¶4]      Reiman then filed 
a declaratory judgment action in which it requested it either be allowed to 
rescind the bid or to reform the bid to include the $71,000 omitted by mistake. 
In addition, Reiman requested injunctive relief to prevent the City from 
forfeiting the bid bond or, alternatively, to excuse Reiman from the execution 
of the contract. Reiman's motion for injunctive relief was set for hearing on 
December 20, 1990 but, on that day, Reiman entered into an agreement with the 
City relating to the litigation. The agreement provided Reiman would withdraw 
its motion for a preliminary injunction; Reiman would sign the contract; and 
Reiman would proceed with construction of the fire station. With respect to the 
issue in this particular case, the agreement provided:

c. 
Reiman will execute the contract presented by the City and will perform the work 
specified in the contract. The price Reiman Corp. will be paid for the work will 
be either the original bid price of $1,910,000.00 or the amended bid price of 
$1,981,000.00 or such other price as the parties agree upon in 
writing.

d. 
If the parties cannot agree in writing as to a contract price, the price 
shall be determined as set forth in this Agreement based upon the decision of 
the District Court in the action currently pending in Laramie County District 
Court.

e. 
Although this Agreement will be binding between the parties, such litigation 
shall be determined without reference to this Agreement, i.e., the parties agree 
that this Agreement shall not be relevant evidence in determining whether Reiman 
was entitled to rescind its bid.

f. 
If Reiman prevails, and the District Court finds that Reiman is entitled to 
rescind its bid, Reiman shall be entitled to a contract price of 
$1,981,000.00.

g. 
If the City of Cheyenne prevails in such litigation, and the District Court 
finds that Reiman is not entitled to rescind its bid, the City shall be entitled 
to a contract price as stated in Reiman's original bid, $1,910,000.00. (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶5]      On October 7, 
1991, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. Ten days later, Reiman filed 
its cross-motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court 
dismissed Reiman's request to rescind its bid asserting an absence of 
jurisdiction, and the court granted the summary judgment motion of the City with 
respect to the reformation claim. The trial court found the December 20, 1990 
agreement entered into by Reiman and the City rendered the rescission issue 
moot, and reformation was available only upon a mutual mistake by the 
parties.

[¶6]      Reiman appealed 
the dismissal of its rescission claim by the district court. This court reversed 
and remanded the case to the district court "for a declaration as to whether a 
public bid may be withdrawn/rescinded, under the circumstances of this case, 
without forfeiture of the bid bond." Reiman, 838 P.2d  at 1188.

[¶7]      When the district 
court considered the case on remand, it granted summary judgment to Reiman on 
its claim for rescission and awarded the disputed $71,000 to Reiman for a total 
contract price of $1,981,000. The district court adopted the criteria 
articulated in Powder Horn Constructors, Inc. v. City of Florence, 754 P.2d 356 (Colo. 1988). It ruled:

In 
Wyoming, a bidder is entitled to rescission of its mistaken bid if: (1) the 
mistake is of a clerical or mathematical nature, (2) the mistake was made in 
good faith, (3) the mistake was made without gross negligence, (4) the mistake 
relates to a material aspect of the bid, and (5) the public authority did not 
rely to its detriment on the mistaken bid prior to the letting of the 
contract.

The 
district court found that, in accordance with the criteria, Reiman had made a 
clerical error, in good faith, without gross negligence, with respect to a 
material aspect of its bid, and the City did not rely to its detriment on the 
mistaken bid prior to the letting of the contract. The City then took this 
appeal.

[¶8]      We hold the 
determination of the trial court with respect to the right to rescind the bid is 
clearly erroneous. The resolution is controlled by WYO. STAT. § 15-1-113 (1992). 
The pertinent provisions of that statute state:

(c) 
The contract shall be let to the lowest bidder who shall be determined 
qualified and responsible in the sole discretion of the governing body. The 
governing body may reject all bids submitted if it finds that none of them would 
serve the public interest.

* 
* * * * *

(f) 
In advertising for any bid, the forms of guarantee required under this section 
and approved by the city or town shall be specified. In addition, bidders shall 
be required to accompany each bid with a bid bond or if the bid is one hundred 
thousand dollars ($100,000.00) or less, any other form of bid guarantee approved 
by the city or town, equal to at least five percent (5%) of the total bid 
amount, with sufficient surety and payable to the city or town. The bid 
guarantee shall be forfeited as liquidated damages if the bidder, upon the 
letting of the contract to him, fails to enter into the contract within thirty 
(30) days after it is presented to him for that purpose or fails to proceed with 
the performance of the contract. * * * All bids shall be numbered 
consecutively before they are opened and no further bids may be received after 
the advertised time of opening bids and any bid is publicly opened. * * * No bid 
may be considered unless accompanied by a bid guarantee in the required 
amount.

* 
* * * * *

(o) 
Any contract made in violation of the provisions of this section is void, 
and any money paid on account of the contract by the city or town may be 
recovered without restitution of the property or benefits received or retained. 
(Emphasis added.)

[¶9]      For some forty 
years, this court has espoused and followed, frequently, the rule that we do not 
resort to rules of statutory construction and interpretation when the language 
of a statute is plain and unambiguous. E.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. 
Study, No. 93-45, 1994 WL 2811 (Wyo. Jan. 7, 1994); Wyoming State Tax 
Comm'n v. BHP Petroleum Co., Inc., 856 P.2d 428 (Wyo. 1993); Jackson 
State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093 (Wyo. 1993); Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94 (Wyo. 1992); Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834 
(Wyo. 1991); Vandehei Developers v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wyoming, 790 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1990); Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux & Assoc., 773 P.2d 153 (Wyo. 1989); NL Industries, Inc. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920 (Wyo. 
1989); Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. State of Wyoming, Envtl. Quality 
Council, 766 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1988); Wyoming Ins. Dept. v. Avemco Ins. 
Co., 726 P.2d 507 (Wyo. 1986); Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow 
Comm., 651 P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982); State, ex rel. Fawcett v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs of Albany County, 73 Wyo. 69, 273 P.2d 188 (1954). An unequivocal 
corollary of that rule is, if the statute is determined to be plain and 
unambiguous, the words used are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. 
BHP Petroleum Co., Inc.; Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n v. Thornock, 851 P.2d 1300 (Wyo. 1993); Vandehei. Our reading of WYO. STAT. § 15-1-113 
leads to the ineluctable conclusion that the statute is plain and unambiguous, 
and the words used should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.

[¶10]   We agree with the City that this 
statute proscribes the relief Reiman sought in the declaratory judgment action. 
Reiman submitted its bid, accompanied by the required bid bond in the amount of 
5% of the total bid, in conformity with subsection (f). The City let the 
contract for construction of the fire station to Reiman, the lowest bidder it 
considered qualified, in accordance with the clear mandate of subsection (c) of 
the statute, providing that the "contract shall be let to the lowest 
bidder." The statute, also in subsection (f), clearly mandates the "bid 
guarantee shall be forfeited as liquidated damages if the bidder, upon 
the letting of the contract to him, fails to enter into the contract within 
thirty (30) days after it is presented to him for that purpose or fails to 
proceed with the performance of the contract."1

[¶11]   This statute, by its language, 
forecloses any opportunity for Reiman to withdraw its bid without forfeiture of 
its bid bond. The thrust of the statute is that the bid is irrevocable, and the 
City is without authority to relieve Reiman from its mistaken bid. According to 
the plain meaning of this statute, the contractor, in this instance Reiman, must 
either perform the contract for the original bid price or forfeit the bid bond. 
The plain, definitive language of WYO. STAT. § 15-1-113 categorically 
establishes a rule of law in Wyoming that is contrary to the rule invoked by the 
trial court.

[¶12]   The district court erred in its 
reliance upon Powder Horn to interpret the Wyoming statute. Under the rules we 
have noted previously, the law of Wyoming is found within the language of the 
statute itself, and no interpretation is appropriate. Furthermore, the Colorado 
statute is different and, therefore, distinguishable from the Wyoming statute. 
Since the court in Powder Horn was ruling based upon a Colorado statute, that 
evidences a clear legislative intent to allow withdrawal of the mistaken bid 
prior to the letting of the contract without forfeiture of the bid bond, the 
case can have no viability in Wyoming. We note, for example, that 10 C.R.S. § 
24-105-201 (1988) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Bid 
security. 
(1) Bid security shall be required for all competitive sealed bidding for 
construction contracts when the price is estimated by the procurement officer to 
exceed fifty thousand dollars. * * * Nothing in this subsection (1) prevents the 
requirement of such bonds on construction contracts under fifty thousand 
dollars.

(2) 
Bid security shall be in an amount equal to at least five percent of the amount 
of the bid.

* 
* * * * *

(4) 
After the bids are opened, they shall be irrevocable for the period specified in 
the invitation for bids, except as provided in section 24-103-202(6). If a 
bidder is permitted to withdraw his bid before award, no action shall be had 
against the bidder or the bid security. (Emphasis added.)

In 
10 C.R.S. § 24-103-202(6) (1988), the exception is articulated in this 
way:

Withdrawal 
of inadvertently erroneous bids before the award may be 
permitted 
pursuant to rules if the bidder submits proof of evidentiary value which clearly 
and convincingly demonstrates that an error was made. Except as otherwise 
provided by rules, all decisions to permit the withdrawal of bids based on such 
bid mistakes shall be supported by a written determination made by the state 
purchasing director or the head of a purchasing agency. (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶13]   There, indeed, are very apparent 
differences between the Wyoming statutes and the Colorado statutes relating to 
bidding for public construction projects. The Colorado legislature has expressly 
authorized a permissive procedure for withdrawal of an inadvertently erroneous 
bid. On the contrary, the Wyoming legislature has mandated forfeiture of the bid 
bond, as liquidated damages, if the low bidder fails to execute the contract or 
proceed with construction. There is nothing included in the Wyoming statutes 
that approaches a procedure for withdrawal or rescission such as found in 
Colorado.

[¶14]   From the plain and unambiguous 
language of our Wyoming statute, we must presume this result is what the 
legislature intended, and this court is "not at liberty to depart from that 
meaning which is plainly declared." Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming 
Game and Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen 
v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We hold that the district 
court erroneously ruled Reiman had a right to rescind its bid, contrary to the 
provisions of WYO. STAT. § 15-1-113.

[¶15]   When Reiman filed its declaratory 
judgment action, it interrupted the orderly application of the public bidding 
statutes and, in the course of that litigation, it entered into an agreement 
with the City, on December 20, 1990, to resolve the dispute over the $71,000 
mistake in its bid. As we have noted previously, the contract provided that the 
decision of the district court in the declaratory judgment action then pending 
would be dispositive with respect to whether or not Reiman would be paid the 
additional $71,000. Certainly, this contract was formed peripherally and outside 
the parameters of WYO. STAT. § 15-1-113. Had this agreement not been made to 
resolve an issue in litigation, we would be compelled to invoke subsection (o), 
WYO. STAT. § 15-1-113, and hold the City was without authority to make such a 
supplemental agreement with respect to a mistake in bidding.

[¶16]   We recently observed that we 
acknowledge a strong public policy in favor of settlement of litigation. 
Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Hursh Agency, 
Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d 27 (Wyo. 1983); Coulter, Inc. v. 
Allen, 624 P.2d 1199 (Wyo. 1981)). We have previously pointed out that, 
under the pertinent provision of WYO. STAT. § 15-1-113, Reiman would be entitled 
to neither reformation nor rescission of its bid. Neither the City nor Reiman is 
asserting the supplemental agreement is void as a matter of law, however, and, 
in view of the policy favoring settlements, the court will not of its own motion 
conclude it is. While a strict application of the statute might require that 
result, we do not reach it in this instance.

[¶17]   We conclude, and hold, the 
agreement made in the course of the declaratory judgment was an express contract 
binding on both parties. The parties in that agreement stated they would abide 
by the decision of the district court with respect to Reiman's right to rescind. 
The district court ruled Reiman was entitled to rescind its bid. The district 
court also ruled Reiman is entitled to receive a total of $1,981,000 for 
construction of the fire station. That is what the settlement agreement 
provided. Even though the district court's ruling was erroneous, still the 
district court decided Reiman could rescind, and the amount of the contract 
price was established. That amount is $1,981,000, which is the tenor of the 
judgment in the district court. Reiman is entitled to receive, as the amount 
payable under the contract, the sum of $1,981,000.

[¶18]   We do note Reiman did agree to the 
construction of the fire station in accordance with the contract specifications. 
Reiman accomplished this. The additional amount of $71,000 represents work 
awarded to, and subsequently completed by, subcontractors of Reiman. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate this does not establish the appropriate value 
of the work. The City received what it had bargained for, and that work was 
accomplished by Reiman. Under these circumstances, we cannot discern any unjust 
enrichment to Reiman.

[¶19]   Consequently, although we 
specifically reject the interpretation of the public construction bidding 
statute arrived at by the district court, the judgment in favor of Reiman is 
affirmed. 

MACY, 
C.J., files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which 
TAYLOR, J., joins.

MACY, 
Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom 
TAYLOR, Justice, joins.

[¶20]   Reiman submitted the lowest of 
several sealed bids to perform a construction contract for the City of Cheyenne. 
After the bids were unsealed, Reiman asked to withdraw its bid without having to 
forfeit its bid guarantee because it had accidentally omitted $71,000 in costs 
from the original bid. The City let the contract to Reiman and informed Reiman 
that, unless it performed the construction according to the original bid, it 
would forfeit its bid guarantee.

[¶21]   Reiman filed a petition for a 
declaratory judgment and a motion for a preliminary injunction in the district 
court. Before Reiman's claims were heard, however, the parties executed an 
addendum to the construction contract designed to settle part of their dispute. 
Reiman agreed to withdraw its motion for a preliminary injunction, to sign the 
construction contract as amended, and to perform the construction. The City 
agreed to pay the additional $71,000 and, implicitly, to return Reiman's bid 
guarantee if the district court ruled that Reiman was entitled to rescind its 
original bid. Both parties reserved the right to appeal from the district 
court's ruling.

[¶22]   After the first trial court 
proceeding and the first appeal to this Court, the district court ruled that 
Reiman was entitled to rescind its bid and, pursuant to the compromise 
agreement, to receive the higher contract price. The City brought this second 
appeal.

[¶23]   The majority holds that the 
district court erred because in Wyoming a city construction contract bidder is 
prohibited by an unambiguous statute from withdrawing an erroneous bid without 
having to forfeit its bid guarantee and because, once a city awards a contract, 
the city has no authority to modify that contract. Nonetheless, the majority 
holds that, because of our public policy favoring litigation settlement, the 
parties' settlement agreement must be enforced. I disagree.

[¶24]   Because we must give effect to the 
public policy expressed in an unambiguous statute, I would reverse and remand 
with directions that the original construction contract be enforced.

[¶25]   "Our rule in Wyoming is 
unequivocal. Municipalities, being creatures of the state, have no inherent 
powers but possess only the authority conferred by the legislature." K N 
Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207, 210 (Wyo. 1988); but 
cf. WYO. CONST. ART. 13, § 1 (home-rule amendment authorizing cities and 
towns to elect out of certain statutes which are not uniformly applicable). 
"When the statutory delegation of power to a local governmental entity specifies 
a procedure to be followed in the exercise of that power, the procedure becomes 
a condition of and restriction upon the grant." Schoeller v. Board of County 
Commissioners of County of Park, 568 P.2d 869, 877 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶26]   A city's authority to contract for 
public improvements is circumscribed by statute. WYO. STAT. § 15-1-113 (1992). 
Any contract made in violation of § 15-1-113 is void. Section 15-1-113(o). 
"Where a municipal contract is void because it is opposed to a mandatory 
statute, no contract or benefit can be implied." Robert W. Anderson 
Housewrecking and Excavating, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, School District No. 25, 
Fremont County, Wyoming, 681 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Wyo. 1984). A bid to perform a 
public construction contract is an irrevocable offer, and, once the public body 
makes the award, it loses its discretion to rescind the contract. Id. at 
1332.

[¶27]   Only two remedies are available 
under § 15-1-113 for a mistake which has been made in the lowest qualified and 
responsible bid. First, with an appropriate finding, the City may reject all 
bids and rebid the project. Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Construction, 
Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 237 (Wyo. 1991) (citing § 15-1-113(c)). Second, the 
bidder may decline either to execute the contract or to perform the construction 
and thereby forfeit its bid guarantee. Section 15-1-113(f).

[¶28]   Nowhere in § 15-1-113, or in any of 
our statutes, is the City granted authority to negotiate away a low bidder's 
obligation to either "enter into" or "proceed with the performance of" the 
construction contract as bid. Section 15-1-113(f); compare § 15-1-113 
with WYO. STAT. § 16-6-117 (1990) (authorizing settlement of disputed 
cost claims at the time the final payment is made) and WYO. STAT. § 
16-6-701(a)(iv) (1990) (recognizing modifications in contract performance terms 
by "change orders agreed to by the parties"). The City's agreement compromising 
the terms of its public improvement contract is not only unauthorized but also 
expressly prohibited by § 15-1-113(o).

[¶29]   Section 15-1-113 "`is by no means a 
general grant of power, but is narrowly tailored to set procedural standards.'" 
City of Green River v. Debernardi Construction Co., Inc., 816 P.2d 1287, 
1292 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting the trial court opinion letter with approval). "In the 
absence of any suggestion that the legislature so intended, this court will not 
extend through judicial fiat what the legislature has not chosen to express in 
statute." K N Energy, Inc., 755 P.2d  at 216.

[¶30]   "When we find the terms of a 
statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete except in rare and exceptional 
circumstances." Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190, 111 S. Ct. 599, 
604, 112 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1991) (reversing 495 U.S. 903, 110 S. Ct. 1921, 109 L. Ed. 2d 285 (1990)), on remand, 930 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1991). "The remedy for any 
dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with Congress and not 
with this Court. Congress may amend the statute; we may not." Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576, 102 S. Ct. 3245, 3253, 73 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1982) (reversing 454 U.S. 1052, 102 S. Ct. 595, 70 L. Ed. 2d 587 
(1981)), on remand, 685 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1982).

[¶31]   Similarly, our Legislature may 
amend § 15-1-113 to permit settlement negotiations between a city and its 
contract bidders. We may not. For this reason alone, we must reverse the trial 
court's ruling.

[¶32]   Even if our statutes did not 
require reversal, an analysis of the competing public policies would result in 
requiring reversal. The public policy expressed by § 15-1-113 is "[t]o safeguard 
public funds by preventing extravagance in their expenditure." Centric 
Corporation v. Barbarossa & Sons, Inc., 521 P.2d 874, 875 (Wyo. 1974). 
That policy was circumvented when the City relinquished $71,000 in public money 
in violation of the competitive bidding statute.

[¶33]   To measure against this loss of 
public money, the majority offers the public's interest in litigation 
settlement. The majority's justification is baffling. The settlement agreement 
in this case expressly anticipated future litigation. It has, in fact, produced 
over three years of litigation. Agreements designed to produce protracted 
litigation should not be encouraged. See Reiman Corporation v. City of 
Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1190 (Wyo. 1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(dispositive public policy concern should be preservation of the competitive 
bidding process by enforcing clear language of § 15-1-113).

[¶34]   The majority contends that, because 
neither party challenged the validity of the compromise agreement, we should not 
address that issue. Again, I disagree.

[¶35]   It is a court's duty, on its own 
motion, to refuse to entertain an action from an agreement expressly made 
illegal by statute. Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Company, Inc., 
572 P.2d 412, 414-15 (Wyo. 1977). Contracts cannot be used to hoodwink the law 
and cannot rise above constitutional and statutory law. Tri-County Electric 
Association, Inc. v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d 995, 1004 (Wyo. 
1978).

[¶36]   Nor should we encourage the making 
of agreements designed to compromise an unequivocal statutory duty. See 
Ballangee v. Board of County Com'rs of Fremont County, 66 Wyo. 390, 212 P.2d 71, 76 (1949) (agreement to compromise a mandatory statutory duty is void 
because it is unsupported by consideration). The people gain nothing when their 
city agrees to relax the statutory obligations of a public contract bidder. Cf. 
WYO. CONST. Art. 3, § 40 (prohibiting a municipal corporation from diminishing 
obligations owed to it, except as prescribed by the Legislature).

[¶37]   The taxpayers in this case have 
needlessly paid not only the $71,000 forsaken by the City's unlawful agreement 
but also the costs of the City's attorneys and the court personnel involved in 
this litigation. Sadly, I repeat: "Everyone involved in this controversy can 
take credit for making a simple matter complex and excessively litigious." 
Cook v. Zoning Board of Adjustment for the City of Laramie, 776 P.2d 181, 
187 (Wyo. 1989) (Macy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).

[¶38]   I concur with the majority's 
conclusion that the statute is unambiguous. I would, however, reverse the trial 
court's ruling and remand the case with directions that the original contract be 
enforced. I, therefore, dissent from the majority's disposition of the 
case.

Footnotes

 

 1 BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 903 (6th ed. 1979) defines "let" as follows:

To 
award to one of several persons, who have submitted proposals (bids) therefor, 
the contract for erecting public works or doing some part of the work connected 
therewith, or rendering some other service to government for a stipulated 
compensation.