Title: State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment, City Trash Collection v. Westlake

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment, City Trash Collection v. Westlake, 97 
Ohio St.3d 100, 2002-Ohio-5302.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. COMMITTEE FOR THE CHARTER AMENDMENT, CITY TRASH 
COLLECTION, ET AL. v. CITY OF WESTLAKE ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment, City Trash Collection 
v. Westlake, 97 Ohio St.3d 100, 2002-Ohio-5302.] 
Municipal corporations — Ordinance passed privatizing city of Westlake’s trash 
collection services — Elections — Mandamus sought to compel city et al. 
to submit petition proposing amendment to city charter to use only 
public service employees for trash collection services to the Cuyahoga 
County Board of Elections and to have the proposed charter amendment 
placed on the November 5, 2002 general election ballot — Writ granted 
— Request for attorney fees granted. 
(No. 2002-1552 — Submitted September 27, 2002 — Decided October 3, 2002.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
On July 2, 2002, respondent Council of the city of Westlake, Ohio, 
passed Ordinance No. 2002-69, which privatized the city’s trash collection 
services.  The ordinance was passed as emergency legislation and was not subject 
to referendum. 
{¶2} 
Relators, Committee for the Charter Amendment, City Trash 
Collection, and its individual members, circulated a petition proposing an 
amendment to the Westlake Charter.  The amendment would require the Westlake 
Director of Public Service to use only public service employees “for the curbside 
collection of solid wastes, yard wastes, and recyclables from the residential 
household units of the City.” 
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{¶3} 
On August 6, 2002, the committee filed the petition with 
respondent Westlake Clerk of Council Susan J. Prehoda.  The petition consisted 
of 23 part-petitions containing 814 signatures.  On August 9, 2002, Prehoda 
notified the committee members that the petition was insufficient because “a 
minimum number of 1,637 valid signatures of qualified electors of the City are 
required to begin the Charter amendment process.”  Prehoda further advised the 
committee members that they could withdraw the petition, continue circulating it, 
and subsequently refile it. 
{¶4} 
On August 19, 2002, the committee requested that Prehoda explain 
the supposed requirement of 1,637 valid signatures mentioned in her August 9 
letter.  On August 21, 2002, Prehoda informed the committee that the signature 
requirement represented ten percent of the 16,436 total votes1 cast at the 
November 2000 general election, which she claimed was the “last regular 
municipal election at which a Charter amendment was voted upon.”  On that same 
date, Westlake Law Director David R. Harbarger advised the committee that the 
petition did not contain sufficient signatures and that the proposed charter 
amendment, if enacted, would be unconstitutional. 
{¶5} 
Based in part upon Prehoda’s and Harbarger’s responses, the 
committee withdrew the petition on August 28, 2002.  The withdrawal of the 
petition was also based upon the board of elections’ having given the petitioners 
petition forms that contained an outdated election falsification statement. 
{¶6} 
On September 3, 2002, the committee filed a second petition 
concerning the proposed charter amendment.  The petition was composed of 34 
part-petitions containing 840 signatures.  Fifteen of the 34 part-petitions were 
                                                 
1  A minimum of ten percent of 16,436 signatures would actually require 1,644 signatures, not 
1,637. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
unaltered part-petitions that had been withdrawn on August 28.2  Also on 
September 3, 2002, the committee’s attorney filed memoranda with Prehoda and 
Harbarger specifying reasons why the city’s reliance on the number of voters at 
the November 2000 general election was incorrect and why the November 2001 
election was the appropriate election to determine the sufficiency of the petition.  
The committee demanded that Prehoda and the Westlake City Council 
immediately submit the proposed charter amendment to Westlake electors at the 
November 5, 2002 general election and if they failed to do so, that Harbarger take 
the necessary legal action to compel Prehoda and the city council to place the 
issue on the November 5, 2002 election ballot. 
{¶7} 
Upon receiving the petition and after consulting with Harbarger, 
Prehoda submitted the petition to the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections to 
verify the number of valid signatures on the petition.  On September 5, 2002, the 
board informed Prehoda that the petition contained 735 valid signatures. 
{¶8} 
At the time she received the board’s determination on September 
5, Prehoda had already prepared the docket and agenda for that day’s council 
meeting.  Harbarger prepared an ordinance directing the submission of the 
proposed charter amendment to the electorate so that it would be available if the 
city council decided to add it to the agenda at the September 5 meeting. 
{¶9} 
At the September 5, 2002 council meeting, a motion to add the 
ordinance for the proposed charter amendment to the agenda was defeated.  In 
their discussion, council members expressed their desire to “protect” and 
“defend” the charter and disappointment that the petition contained insufficient 
signatures.  The law director had advised council that since the petition required 
                                                 
2  “Neither R.C. 3501.38(I) nor (K) prohibits the withdrawal of previously filed petitions and the 
submission of either new petitions or the resubmission of combined but unaltered petitions before 
the filing deadline.”  State ex rel. Rose v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 229, 
736 N.E.2d 886, syllabus; see, also, State ex rel. Miles v. McSweeney, 96 Ohio St.3d 352, 2002-
Ohio-4455, 775 N.E.2d 468, ¶18-20. 
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ten percent of the votes cast at either the November 2000 election or the 
November 1995 election, i.e., the last elections at which charter amendments were 
on the ballot, the petition contained insufficient signatures.  The ordinance, in 
revised form, was then scheduled to be on the agenda for the September 19, 2002 
council meeting.  Under Sections 8 and 9, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, 
September 6, 2002, was the last day for council to submit the proposed charter 
amendment to Westlake electors at the November 5, 2002 general election.  
According to the relators, placing the charter amendment issue on a special 
election ballot rather than on the November 5 general election ballot would cost 
between $28,000 and $30,000. 
{¶10} On September 6, 2002, relators, the committee and its members, 
filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, the city of 
Westlake, the city council, and Prehoda, to submit the petition to the Cuyahoga 
County Board of Elections and to have the proposed charter amendment placed on 
the November 5, 2002 general election ballot.  Respondents filed an answer and a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the parties filed evidence and briefs 
pursuant to the expedited schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9).  On September 19, 2002, 
the city council did not place the proposed charter amendment on the ballot. 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
{¶11} Respondents request judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 
12(C). 
{¶12} We deny the motion because, like other procedural motions, a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate in expedited election cases 
filed here.  State ex rel. Toledo v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections (2002), 95 Ohio 
St.3d 73, 74, 765 N.E.2d 854.  “Under S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), the presentation of 
evidence and briefs on the merits in expedited election cases is provided in lieu of 
a S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) dismissal determination, making procedural motions 
January Term, 2002 
5 
generally inapplicable.”  Id., citing State ex rel. Ryant Commt. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. 
of Elections (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 111, 712 N.E.2d 696. 
{¶13} Moreover, as discussed later, it does not appear beyond doubt that 
the committee and its members can prove no set of facts warranting the requested 
relief, after construing all material factual allegations in the complaint and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in their favor. 
{¶14} Therefore, we deny respondents’ motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) 
{¶15} Respondents claim that they have no duty to take any action in 
regard to the November 5 election.  They assert therefore that this case is not an 
expedited election case and should not proceed under the schedule in S.Ct.Prac.R. 
X(9).  That rule provides an expedited evidence and briefing schedule if “an 
original action relating to a pending election * * * is filed within 90 days prior to 
the election.”  Relators’ mandamus complaint relates to the November 5, 2002 
election and was filed within 90 days prior to the election.  Therefore, 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9) applies, and respondents’ contention is meritless. 
Laches 
{¶16} Extreme diligence and promptness are required in election-related 
matters, and “ ‘[i]f a party seeking extraordinary relief in an election-related 
matter fails to exercise the requisite diligence, laches may bar the action.’ ”  State 
ex rel. Carberry v. Ashtabula (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 522, 523, 757 N.E.2d 307, 
quoting State ex rel. Hills Communities, Inc. v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 465, 467, 746 N.E.2d 1115. 
{¶17} Respondents assert that relators’ claims are barred by laches 
because they could have or should have instituted expedited election proceedings 
on August 9 or August 21.  But respondents did not divulge the rationale for their 
reliance on a signature requirement of 1,637 valid signatures until August 21, and 
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their advice and improper petition forms given to relators by the board of 
elections caused relators’ subsequent withdrawal of their initial petition.  After 
relators filed a second petition on September 3, respondents had sufficient 
opportunity to have the board of elections verify the number of valid signatures 
on that petition and to place the proposed charter amendment on the November 5, 
2002 election ballot if the petition contained sufficient valid signatures.  When the 
city council failed to do so at its September 5 meeting, relators waited only one 
day to file this expedited election case on September 6.  In addition, briefing and 
evidence in this case were completed before the R.C. 3509.01 deadline to have 
absentee ballots printed and ready for use. 
{¶18} Under these circumstances, relators exercised the diligence 
required in election cases.  The cases cited by respondents are distinguishable.  
Cf. State ex rel. Manos v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 
562, 701 N.E.2d 371; State ex rel. Newell v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 592, 757 N.E.2d 1135. 
{¶19} In Manos, 83 Ohio St.3d at 563-564, 701 N.E.2d 371, the relators 
waited 28 days after a referendum petition was transmitted by the city clerk and 
filed with the board of elections to file their written protest although they knew 
the basis of most of their objections even before the petition was filed, and by the 
time they filed their prohibition action, the date to print and make absentee ballots 
ready for use by electors had already passed.  In Newell, 93 Ohio St.3d at 595-
596, 757 N.E.2d 1135, the relator waited 20 days after a petition was filed to 
protest and another 14 days thereafter to file an action for extraordinary relief, 
which was after statutory deadlines to have absentee ballots printed and ready for 
use.  The delays here were not as lengthy, and the case was fully briefed before 
the statutory deadline for absentee ballots had passed. 
{¶20} Therefore, relators’ claims are not barred by laches, and we 
proceed to consider the merits. 
January Term, 2002 
7 
Mandamus:  Charter Amendment Provisions 
{¶21} In order to be entitled to the writ of mandamus, the committee and 
its members must establish a clear legal right to have respondents submit the 
petition to the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections and have the charter 
amendment issue placed on the November 5, 2002 general election ballot, a 
corresponding clear legal duty on the part of respondents to do so, and the lack of 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Moore v. Malone, 
96 Ohio St.3d 417, 2002-Ohio-4821, 775 N.E.2d 812, ¶20.  Given the proximity 
of the pertinent election, the committee and its members have established that 
they lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Id.; State ex rel. 
Thurn v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 289, 291-292, 649 
N.E.2d 1205. 
{¶22} For the remaining requirements for a writ of mandamus, the 
committee and its members claim that the charter amendment provisions of the 
Ohio Constitution and the Westlake Charter both specify the November 2001 
election as the applicable election to determine the number of valid signatures 
required here and that to the extent they conflict, the Constitution controls.  
Respondents counter that there is no conflict and that the charter controls as a 
supplement to the Constitution, but that even if the constitutional provisions 
control, they have no duty to submit the proposed charter amendment to the 
electorate at the November 5, 2002 general election. 
{¶23} Section 7, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution authorizes 
municipal corporations to adopt and amend a home rule charter, and Sections 8 
and 9 prescribe the procedures for doing so.  “Section 9 of Article XVIII, which 
incorporates the requirements of Section 8, allows, and on petition by ten percent 
of the electors, requires, the legislative authority of any city, e.g., city council, to 
‘forthwith’ authorize by ordinance an election on the charter amendment issue.”  
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(Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Commt. for Charter Amendment Petition v. Avon 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 590, 592, 693 N.E.2d 205. 
{¶24} The number of valid signatures required to warrant placement of a 
proposed charter amendment before the voters is ten percent of the number of 
votes cast at the last preceding general municipal election.  State ex rel. Huebner 
v. W. Jefferson Village Council (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 381, 384, 662 N.E.2d 339; 
Sections 8, 9, and 14, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution; see, also, 1 Gotherman & 
Babbit, Ohio Municipal Law (2d Ed.2002 Supp.) 12, Section 4.02. 
{¶25} Section 2, Article IX of the Westlake Charter establishes the 
following valid-signature threshold: 
{¶26} “The Council may, by affirmative vote of two thirds (2/3) of its 
members, submit any proposed amendment to this Charter or a revised or 
amended Charter to the electors; or, upon receipt of a petition signed by not less 
than ten percent (10%) of the total electors voting at the last regular municipal 
election setting forth any proposed amendment to this Charter or a revised or 
amended Charter, it shall submit such proposed amendment to the electors.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶27} Respondents relied on this charter provision to determine that the 
petition did not contain the requisite signatures from the last regular municipal 
election at which a proposed charter amendment was on the ballot.  In other 
words, respondents interpreted the foregoing charter provision to refer to the last 
regular municipal election at which a charter amendment issue was voted upon. 
{¶28} Respondents’ interpretation is erroneous.  Absent any provision in 
the Westlake Charter regarding the interpretative issues involved, the court may 
apply the general laws regarding statutory interpretation.  State ex rel. 
Youngstown v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 69, 73, 647 
N.E.2d 769.  Therefore, the charter must be construed so as to harmonize its 
provisions with Sections 8, 9, and 14, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, and 
January Term, 2002 
9 
language used in the charter should be construed according to its ordinary and 
common usage.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 123, 
127, 698 N.E.2d 987; cf. R.C. 1.47(A). 
{¶29} In applying the foregoing interpretative rules here, the signature 
requirement of Section 2, Article IX of the Westlake Charter does not conflict 
with the constitutional provisions in this instance.  Reading the phrase “setting 
forth any proposed amendment to this Charter or a revised or amended Charter” 
in the context of Section 2 and according the language its ordinary and common 
usage, it manifestly modifies “petition” and cannot possibly modify “last regular 
municipal election.”  In fact, “such proposed amendment” refers to the phrase 
“petition * * * setting forth any proposed amendment to this Charter” in Section 2 
rather than “last regular municipal election.” 
{¶30} Moreover, to the extent that the charter could be construed to 
conflict with Ohio constitutional provisions, the constitutional provisions would 
prevail. 
{¶31} “By reason of Sections 3 and 7 of Article XVIII of the Ohio 
Constitution, a charter city has all powers of local self-government except to the 
extent that those powers are taken from it or limited by other provisions of the 
Constitution or by statutory limitations on the powers of the municipality which 
the Constitution has authorized the General Assembly to impose.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Bazell v. Cincinnati (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 63, 42 O.O.2d 137, 233 
N.E.2d 864, paragraph one of the syllabus; Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. 
Cuyahoga Falls (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 539, 541-542, 697 N.E.2d 181.  The 
“manifest object” of Section 9 of Article XVIII “is to provide the procedure for 
the submission of a charter amendment to electors” and these “requirements are 
clear and complete, and are not to be added to or subtracted from.”  Billington v. 
Cotner (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 140, 146, 54 O.O.2d 270, 267 N.E.2d 410. 
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{¶32} When the amendment provisions of a charter conflict with 
constitutional charter amendment provisions, the Constitution prevails because 
“[t]he paramount authority must prevail over the subordinate authority.”  State ex 
rel. Hinchliffe v. Gibbons (1927), 116 Ohio St. 390, 395, 156 N.E. 455; State ex 
rel. Semik v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 334, 335-336, 
617 N.E.2d 1120; Huebner, 75 Ohio St.3d at 383-384, 662 N.E.2d 339. 
{¶33} The cases that respondents cite in support of their contention that 
conflicting charter provisions apply are inapposite.  Cf. Toledo, 95 Ohio St.3d 73, 
765 N.E.2d 854; State ex rel. Bedford v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 
62 Ohio St.3d 17, 577 N.E.2d 645; State ex rel. Moore v. Malone, 96 Ohio St.3d 
417, 2002-Ohio-4821, 775 N.E.2d 812.  Neither Toledo nor Moore involved the 
charter amendment procedure, and in Bedford, 62 Ohio St.3d at 22, 577 N.E.2d 
645, we specified that although procedures may be added to the constitutional 
charter amendment provisions, an addition would be permissible only “if the 
additions do not conflict with the Ohio Constitution.” 
{¶34} Therefore, in accordance with Sections 8, 9, and 14 of Article 
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, and consistent in this case with the plain language 
of Section 2, Article IX of the Westlake Charter, the committee’s petition required 
the number of valid signatures equal to ten percent of the number of votes cast at 
the last preceding general municipal election.  Sections 8 and 9 of Article XVIII 
of the Ohio Constitution also prevail over any conflicting provision in Section 2, 
Article IX of the Westlake Charter concerning the timing of the submission of 
charter amendments to the electorate.  See Semik, 67 Ohio St.3d 334, 617 N.E.2d 
1120. 
Validity of Charter Amendment Petition 
{¶35} In assessing the validity of the committee’s charter amendment 
petition, the “last preceding general municipal election” was the November 2001 
election.  See Section 1, Article VII, Westlake Charter (“A general municipal 
January Term, 2002 
11 
election for the purpose of the election of officers provided for in this Charter 
shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in odd-
numbered years”); R.C. 3501.01(A) and (B); Section 1, Article XVII, Ohio 
Constitution.  This was also the “last regular municipal election” for purposes of 
Section 2, Article IX of the Westlake Charter.  The total number of votes cast at 
the November 2001 election was 5,383.  The requisite number of signatures was 
thus ten percent of 5,383, which was 539. 
{¶36} Because the petition contained 735 valid signatures, it had 
sufficient valid signatures to warrant placement on the election ballot. 
November 5, 2002 Election 
{¶37} The committee and its members seek a writ of mandamus to 
compel respondents to submit the petition to the board of elections and to have the 
proposed charter amendment placed on the November 5, 2002 general election 
ballot. 
{¶38} Under Section 8, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, as 
incorporated by Section 9, the Westlake City Council had a duty to “forthwith” 
enact an ordinance to submit the proposed charter amendment to Westlake 
electors.  “Forthwith” means immediately.  State ex rel. Concerned Citizens for 
More Professional Govt. v. Zanesville City Council (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 455, 
457, 639 N.E.2d 421.  “The ordinance providing for the submission of such 
question shall require that it be submitted to the electors at the next regular 
municipal election if one shall occur not less than sixty nor more than one 
hundred and twenty days after its passage; otherwise it shall provide for the 
submission of the question at a special election to be called and held within the 
time aforesaid.”  Section 8, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution; cf. Section 2, 
Article IX, Westlake Charter; see, also, Semik, 67 Ohio St.3d 334, 617 N.E.2d 
1120. 
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{¶39} When a municipal legislative authority erroneously fails to submit 
a charter amendment when it is presented with a legally sufficient petition, 
extraordinary relief in mandamus is available to order placement on the pertinent 
election ballot.  State ex rel. Commt. for the Charter Amendment Petition v. 
Hamilton (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 508, 509, 757 N.E.2d 294. 
{¶40} As regular municipal elections are in odd-numbered years, the next 
one is in November 2003, which is more than 120 days after the Westlake City 
Council had the opportunity on September 5, 2002, to pass the ordinance to place 
the proposed charter amendment on the November 5, 2002 election ballot.  
Section 1, Article XVII, Ohio Constitution; R.C. 3501.01(B); Section 1, Article 
VII, Westlake Charter. 
{¶41} Respondents consequently claim that they have no legal duty to 
place the proposed charter amendment on the November 5, 2002 election ballot 
because they have discretion under Section 8, Article XVIII of the Ohio 
Constitution to order a special election at any time within 60 and 120 days after 
they could have passed an ordinance submitting it to the electorate. 
{¶42} Nevertheless, where a municipal legislative authority has the 
opportunity to adopt an ordinance to place a proposed charter amendment on a 
regularly scheduled election ballot in an even-numbered year but refuses to do so 
for unlawful reasons, a writ of mandamus will issue to compel its submission to 
the electors on that ballot instead of at a later special election.  See Concerned 
Citizens, 70 Ohio St.3d at 459, 639 N.E.2d 421; State ex rel. Citizens for a Better 
Portsmouth v. Sydnor (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 49, 53, 572 N.E.2d 649; State ex rel. 
Jurcisin v. Cotner (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 171, 173, 10 OBR 503, 462 N.E.2d 381. 
{¶43} On September 5, 2002, the city council had the opportunity to add 
the ordinance submitting the proposed amendment to Westlake electors to its 
agenda and enact the ordinance.  The city council, however, refused to do so 
because of its frivolous claim that the petition contained insufficient signatures, its 
January Term, 2002 
13 
irrelevant claims of defending the charter, and the city law director’s concerns 
that the amendment, if approved, would be unconstitutional.3  Although the city 
council now contends that it needed more time to exercise its limited authority to 
review the sufficiency of the petition, this contention is belied by the statements 
made by council members at the September 5 council meeting, the August 21, 
2002 letter from the law director to the committee, and the city’s continued claim 
that the petition contains an insufficient number of valid signatures.  Nowhere in 
the transcript of the September 5 council meeting is there any assertion by council 
or the law director that council needed more time to determine the sufficiency of 
the petition.  The board of elections had already determined that the petition 
contained 735 valid signatures. 
{¶44} In addition, even if the city council were ultimately to place the 
charter amendment issue before the electorate on a subsequent election ballot, 
which council failed to do at its September 19 meeting, it would not render the 
committee’s claims moot.  See, e.g., Morris v. Macedonia City Council (1994), 71 
Ohio St.3d 52, 57-58, 641 N.E.2d 1075. 
{¶45} Therefore, the committee and its members are entitled to a writ of 
mandamus to compel respondents to enact an ordinance to submit the petition to 
the board of elections and to have the proposed charter placed on the November 5, 
2002 general election ballot.  Although this election is not the “next regular 
municipal election,” it constitutes a regularly scheduled “special election to be 
called and held within the time aforesaid.”  Section 8, Article XVIII, Ohio 
Constitution; Concerned Citizens, 70 Ohio St.3d at 460, 639 N.E.2d 421, fn. 1. 
Attorney Fees 
                                                 
3  Challenges to the constitutionality of a proposed charter amendment are premature when the 
amendment has not yet been approved by voters.  Jurcisin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 137, 519 N.E.2d 347, at paragraph four of the syllabus; cf. State ex rel. 
DeBrosse v. Cool (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 7, 716 N.E.2d 1114. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶46} Relators also request attorney fees.  We award attorney fees 
because relators’ action saved Westlake and its residents the expense of a special 
election following the regularly scheduled election on November 5, 2002, 
respondents did not have any reasonable basis for failing to place the charter 
amendment issue on that ballot, and relators gave security for costs, as required 
by R.C. 733.59.  Commt. for Charter Amendment Petition, 81 Ohio St.3d at 595-
596, 693 N.E.2d 205.  Relators are ordered to submit a bill and documentation to 
support their request for attorney fees within ten days of this judgment, in 
accordance with the guidelines in DR 2-106.  Respondents may file a 
memorandum in opposition within ten days thereafter. 
Conclusion 
{¶47} Therefore, we grant a writ of mandamus compelling respondents to 
place the proposed charter amendment on the November 5, 2002 election ballot, 
award attorney fees to relators, and order relators to submit a bill and 
documentation in support of their request for attorney fees. 
Writ granted. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Phillips & Co., L.P.A., and Gerald W. Phillips, for relators. 
 
David R. Harbarger, Westlake Law Director; Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., 
Doug S. Musick and Vincent Squillace III, for respondents. 
__________________