Title: Maine v. Fundalewicz

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 107 
Docket: 
Aro-11-538 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
May 24, 2012 
Decided: 
August 9, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
MICHELLE E. FUNDALEWICZ 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  Michelle E. Fundalewicz appeals from the judgment of conviction of 
violation of a protection order (Class D), 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1) (2011), entered in 
the District Court (Presque Isle, O’Mara, J.).  Fundalewicz contends that the State 
failed to establish the corpus delicti for the offense charged.  We affirm the 
judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the 
following facts were established at trial.  On May 10, 2011, Paul Clark obtained a 
temporary protection from abuse order on behalf of his thirteen-year-old son 
against Fundalewicz, the child’s mother and Paul’s ex-girlfriend.  At the time, the 
child resided with Paul and Paul’s then-fiancée (now wife), Miranda Clark. 
 
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[¶3]  On June 6, 2011, the child received a phone call on the home’s landline 
while Paul or both Paul and Miranda were not home.  When Paul returned home, 
he noticed that the child was acting strangely and convinced the child to talk with 
him.  The child eventually revealed that Fundalewicz had called him earlier that 
day.  Paul reported the incident to the police.  The child provided a written 
statement to the police stating that Fundalewicz did call and speak with him on that 
date.   
[¶4]  The State charged Fundalewicz with violation of a protection order 
(Class D), 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1).  Fundalewicz pleaded not guilty to the charge, 
and the matter proceeded to a jury-waived trial.   
[¶5]  At trial, the child testified that it was instead his cousin who called him 
that day.  He testified that he said it was Fundalewicz in his written statement to 
police because Paul had told him that if he did not name Fundalewicz, the child 
would have to move back in with Fundalewicz, where he would “get treated like 
crap” as he had been when he lived with his mother in the past.  Paul testified that 
he did not tell the child what to write in the police report. 
 
[¶6]  Miranda testified that a few days after the incident, she spoke with 
Fundalewicz on the phone, and Fundalewicz admitted to having called and spoken 
with the child on June 6. 
 
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[¶7]  At the close of the trial, Fundalewicz orally moved for a judgment of 
acquittal on the grounds that “the State failed to establish a corpus for the offense 
charged” because the State did not provide “evidence independent of any 
potentially incriminating statements that [Fundalewicz] . . . made.”  The court 
denied the motion, found Fundalewicz guilty of violating the protection order, and 
sentenced her to pay a $400 fine.  Fundalewicz timely appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶8]  Fundalewicz contends that there is insufficient evidence to support her 
conviction in light of the corpus delicti rule.  Corpus delicti means “body of the 
crime.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 395 (9th ed. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).  
The rule originated in common law and is intended to prevent the possibility of a 
conviction for a crime that never actually occurred.  Field & Murray, Maine 
Evidence § 801.9 at 447 (6th ed. 2007); see State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 
1367 (Me. 1981).  Pursuant to this doctrine, before a defendant’s self-inculpatory 
out-of-court statement may be admitted in evidence 1 and considered by the 
fact-finder, the State must present sufficient credible evidence to “create a 
                                               
 
1  Miranda Clark was the first witness to testify, and her testimony established Fundalewicz’s 
admission of guilt.  Although we have noted a “strong preference for proof of corpus delicti prior to 
admitting evidence of a defendant’s confession or admission,” we have also noted that a trial court has 
“discretion to control the order of proof pursuant to the corpus delicti rule.”  State v. Knight, 2002 ME 35, 
¶ 12, 791 A.2d 110 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
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substantial belief that the crime charged has been committed by some person.”2  
State v. Anglin, 2000 ME 89, ¶ 9, 751 A.2d 1007 (quotation marks omitted); see 
State v. Chad B., 1998 ME 150, ¶ 5, 715 A.2d 144. 
[¶9]  The “substantial belief” standard of proof is a low one.  See State v. 
Snow, 438 A.2d 485, 487 (Me. 1981) (describing as a “high hurdle” a defendant’s 
ability to persuade an appellate court to vacate his conviction on corpus delicti 
grounds).  The State need not establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable 
doubt; “that standard is required to be met by the total evidence, of which the 
defendant’s own confession is a properly considered part.”  Bleyl, 435 A.2d at 
1367; see State v. Spearin, 477 A.2d 1147, 1151 (Me. 1984).  Rather, we have 
described the burden as “less than a fair preponderance of the evidence and 
resembl[ing] the probable cause standard.”  Spearin, 477 A.2d at 1151 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Thus, a substantial belief “exists where the facts and 
circumstances within the knowledge of the factfinder would warrant a prudent and 
cautious person to believe that the crime was committed by someone.”  State v. 
Knight, 2002 ME 35, ¶ 11, 791 A.2d 110 (alterations omitted) (quotation marks 
omitted).  This test recognizes the “superior opportunity” enjoyed by the trial court 
“to hear the evidence as it was presented through live witnesses and is consistent 
                                               
 
2  Although we have previously described the corpus delicti rule as a two-prong test, we recognize that 
the second prong is essentially the same as the sufficiency of the evidence standard that applies in any 
criminal case.  Knight, 2002 ME 35, ¶ 12 n.4, 791 A.2d 110. 
 
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with the same policy by which deference is accorded to a trial court’s factfindings 
in civil cases.”  Snow, 438 A.2d at 487; see Ma v. Bryan, 2010 ME 55, ¶¶ 7-8, 
997 A.2d 755.   
[¶10]  Here, the trial court determined that the State met its corpus delicti 
burden by establishing that the child received a phone call, that he exhibited a 
change in his demeanor after receiving the phone call, and that he told his father 
and stepmother certain things about the phone call.  We review the court’s factual 
findings for clear error, but we review de novo whether those facts are “sufficient 
to establish probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed by 
someone.”3  State v. Chad B., 1998 ME 150, ¶ 8, 715 A.2d 144 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
[¶11]  Although these facts on which the court relied rest on circumstantial 
evidence and reasonable inferences, that does not diminish the record support for 
corpus delicti.  “The law is well established that circumstantial evidence is no less 
conclusive than direct evidence in supporting a conviction.”  State v. Work, 
603 A.2d 464, 465 (Me. 1991).  The fact-finder also is permitted to draw from the 
evidence any reasonable inference, that is, “a deduction as to existence of a fact 
which human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from 
                                               
 
3  The crime charged in this case is unique because no crime was committed unless it was Fundalewicz 
who made the call to her son in violation of the protection order.  Thus, in this instance, to prove that a 
crime was committed, the State had to prove that it was Fundalewicz who made the phone call. 
 
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proof of other facts.”  Ma, 2010 ME 55, ¶ 7, 997 A.2d 755 (quotation marks 
omitted).  What is true for a verdict is equally true for a corpus delicti 
determination.  See Snow, 438 A.2d at 487. 
 
[¶12]  Here, there was evidence that (1) the child did receive a phone call 
from someone at the day and time in question; (2) at that time, there was a 
protection order in place prohibiting Fundalewicz from contacting the child; (3) the 
child exhibited a distressed reaction to that call; (4) the child’s distress continued 
for some period of hours after the call; and (5) the child’s report of the call to his 
father prompted his father to report the call to the police.  There was also evidence 
that, around this time, the child was also generally upset at the prospect of living 
with his mother.  
[¶13]  From this evidence, the fact-finder could reasonably infer that the 
child’s father called the police because the caller was Fundalewicz.  In Snow, 
438 A.2d at 486, 488, we described as sufficient to satisfy the corpus delicti 
requirement that the victim’s injuries were inconsistent with the description of the 
accident given by the defendant.  Similarly, in State v. Discher, 597 A.2d 1336, 
1340 (Me. 1991), we approved the lack of other reasonable explanations for an 
event as a factor supporting a finding that corpus delicti was established.  
Likewise, because only Fundalewicz was barred from calling the child, Paul’s call 
 
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to the police after the child identified the caller is both consistent with the caller 
having been Fundalewicz and inconsistent with other explanations of the event.   
[¶14]  Although largely circumstantial, this evidence, along with the 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, adequately supports the corpus 
delicti requirement, as well as the court’s finding that Fundalewicz did in fact call 
her son in violation of the protection order.4   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Matthew A. Hunter, Esq., Presque Isle, for appellant Michelle Fundalewicz 
 
Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, and Carrie L. Linthicum, Dep. Dist. Atty., Presque 
Isle, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
 
Presque Isle District Court docket number CR-2011-567 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
 
 
                                               
 
4  Given this conclusion, we need not address the State’s alternative argument, that M.R. Evid. 
801(d)(1)(B) authorized the admission of the child’s statements to Paul for the truth of the matter 
asserted.