Title: Trumble v. Farm Bureau

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 46133 
 
 
BRIAN D. TRUMBLE, 
 
    Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant-    
    Cross Respondent, 
 
v.  
 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO, an Idaho 
corporation; WESTERN COMMUNITY 
INSURANCE CO., an Idaho corporation; 
FARM INSURANCE BROKERAGE CO., 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
 
     Defendants-Counterclaimants- 
     Respondents-Cross Appellants. 
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Boise, May 2019 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: December 17, 2019 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County.  Nancy A. Baskin, District Judge. 
 
The district court’s grant of summary judgment for Farm Bureau is affirmed.  
The district court’s grant of summary judgment for Trumble on Farm  
Bureau’s counterclaims is also affirmed.  
 
Points Law, PLLC, Boise, and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen,  
Chtd, Boise, attorneys for Appellant.  Michelle R. Points argued. 
 
Racine, Olson, Nye & Budge, Pocatello, attorneys for Respondent. Lane V. 
Erickson argued. 
________________________________ 
 
BEVAN, Justice 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
 This case is about whether a career agent for Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 
can collect service bonus commissions that were credited to him during his career, but which 
became forfeitable after the agent’s termination if the agent competed with Farm Bureau within 
one year of his termination. The district court held that the agent forfeited his commissions by 
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competing with Farm Bureau in violation of the one-year non-competition requirement. We 
agree, affirming the district court’s judgment dismissing the agent’s claims.  
In addition, this case is about Farm Bureau’s counterclaims against the agent, alleging the 
agent misappropriated trade secrets and intentionally interfered with Farm Bureau’s prospective 
economic advantage after his termination. The district court held that the agent was blameless for 
his actions after termination and dismissed Farm Bureau’s counterclaims. We likewise agree 
with this determination, and affirm the district court’s dismissal of Farm Bureau’s counterclaims. 
II. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In December 1995, Brian D. Trumble entered into a Career Agent’s Contract (“Agent 
Contract”) with Farm Bureau. Under the Agent Contract, Trumble was an independent contractor 
who procured insurance from interested buyers on Farm Bureau’s behalf. The Agent Contract 
included a non-competition clause which stated: 
Upon termination of this contract, Agent shall not compete in any way 
with [Farm Bureau] for a period of ninety days from the date of termination 
within a radius of fifty miles from Agent’s residence at the time of termination. 
Competition includes but is not limited to the following: 
a. Employment as an insurance agent, independent contractor or employee 
of any other insurance company or agency selling or brokering the 
same or similar type of insurance as [Farm Bureau]; 
b. Soliciting casualty, property, disability, life or health insurance; 
c. Owning or operating any brokerage or independent insurance agency; or 
d. Providing any information to [Farm Bureau’s] competitors about [Farm 
Bureau’s] rates, insurance policies, insureds, or policy forms. 
At about the same time Trumble entered into the Agent Contract with Farm Bureau, Farm 
Bureau provided Trumble with a separate document titled “Career Agent’s Service Bonus 
Commission Memorandum of Understanding” with an effective date of January 1, 1994 (“1994 
Memorandum”). The 1994 Memorandum explained: 
As of January 1, 1994, each qualifying, full-time agent under contract [with Farm 
Bureau] will be eligible to receive a service bonus commission after termination if 
the agent meets the conditions set forth each year and does not compete with 
[Farm Bureau] for a period of one year after he or she has terminated. 
Neither party signed the 1994 Memorandum. 
In 2011, Farm Bureau revised the 1994 Memorandum and issued another version of the 
“Career Agent’s Service Bonus Commission Memorandum of Understanding” (“2011 
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Memorandum”).1 The language quoted above remained substantially unchanged2 but multiple 
sections were added to the 2011 Memorandum that were absent from the 1994 Memorandum. 
Those sections read: 
After completion of each qualifying service year, the service bonus 
commission credit will be placed on deposit. . . . The commission credit made on 
behalf of each agent and interest will not become payable to agent, however, until 
the agent complies with all other requirements of the plan, terminates, and fulfills 
the no competition requirements. Any commission credit which does not become 
payable to agent will revert back to [Farm Bureau]. 
The no competition restriction referred to above means that the agent shall 
not own, operate or be employed as an agent, independent contractor or employee 
of any other insurance company . . . for a period of one year from the date of 
termination within a radius of fifty (50) miles of the agent’s residence at the time 
of termination. A violation of the no competition restriction will result in 
forfeiture of the service bonus commission and interest credited.  
The service bonus commission will be paid one year after the agent 
terminates their contract with [Farm Bureau], provided the no competition 
restriction is observed. . . . No service bonus will be paid to any agent committing 
fraud, dishonesty or other material agent misconduct.  
From December 1995 until Trumble’s termination in May 2016, Trumble was a 
qualifying agent who met the requirements to earn the service bonus commission every year. On 
January 26, 2016, Farm Bureau sent Trumble a letter showing that he had qualified for service 
bonus commissions totaling $251,431.96, if he met “all requirements of the program . . . before 
and after termination of [his] contract.” 
On May 4, 2016, Farm Bureau terminated Trumble’s Agent Contract for alleged 
dishonesty. The next day, Trumble’s counsel sent a letter to Farm Bureau requesting that it 
restore Trumble as an agent and further requesting that if Farm Bureau did not rescind its 
                                                          
 
 
1There is a discrepancy between the parties about when the language was first changed. According to Farm Bureau, 
Trumble was given a similar memorandum in 1996, shortly after he started working at Farm Bureau, with the added 
language. Trumble also received later memorandums dated in 1998, 2004, 2009 and 2010. While Trumble does not 
disagree that the 1996, 1998, 2004, 2009, and 2010 memorandums were provided to him and that they contain 
language more aligned with the 2011 memorandum, Trumble asserts the 2011 Memorandum is controlling because 
it was the only other Memorandum with an effective date listed. For this appeal, the district court found that the 
2011 Memorandum is controlling and neither party contests that holding on appeal. Thus, we will focus on the 2011 
Memorandum.   
2 The language in the 2011 Memorandum changed “one year after he or she terminated” to “one year after they 
terminated.” Additionally, the 2011 Memorandum begins “As of January 1, 2011,” instead of “As of January 1, 
1994.” 
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termination, that Farm Bureau immediately pay Trumble the bonus commission in full. Farm 
Bureau’s counsel responded on May 9, 2016, explaining that “[Trumble’s] [A]gent [C]ontract 
was ending in part, due to his dishonesty in listing a property in which he held a partial 
ownership interest, in which he did not reside, as his primary residence, when he knew full well 
that it was not.” Farm Bureau expressed the view that based on the dishonesty provision in the 
2011 Memorandum, Farm Bureau had no contractual obligation to pay any service bonus 
commissions to Trumble. The letter also noted that “even if Mr. Trumble were entitled to his 
service bonus, the [2011] Memorandum contains a non-competition clause restricting payment 
until after compliance for a 12-month period.”  
Two weeks later Trumble filed his complaint, seeking declaratory relief and requesting 
the district court: (1) find the 90-day covenant not to compete in the Agent Contract 
unenforceable; and (2) order Farm Bureau to immediately pay Trumble the service bonus 
commission. Trumble then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a ruling that (1) the 
non-competition agreement in the Agent Contract was unenforceable and (2) the non-
competition and forfeiture provisions in the 2011 Memorandum were unenforceable.  
The district court denied summary judgment, holding that the issue over the non-
competition clause in the Agent Contract was moot because more than ninety days had passed. 
The district court also relied particularly on Anderson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 
461, 470, 732 P.2d 699, 708 (Ct. App. 1987) (abrogated on other grounds by Metcalf v. 
Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989), in ruling that the one-year non-
competition and forfeiture clauses in the 2011 Memorandum were enforceable as a matter of 
law. The district court explained: 
[Trumble] . . . asserts that the non-competition restriction in the service bonus 
commission memorandum is only applicable if the agent terminates his or her 
contract. . . . In interpreting this provision, [Trumble] focuses only on the phrase 
“after they have terminated” rather than considering the sentence as a whole. The 
plain language of the provision indicates the general terms of eligibility “to 
receive a service bonus commission after termination.” In terms of such 
eligibility, there is no indication that agents who elect to terminate their contracts 
are treated any differently from agents who have their contracts terminated by 
[Farm Bureau]. Under [Trumble’s] interpretation, an agent whose contract is 
terminated by [Farm Bureau] would not be eligible to receive any service bonus 
commission, because the memorandum contains no separate statement defining 
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eligibility under that circumstance. For these reasons, the court cannot conclude 
that the non-competition restriction is inapplicable to [Trumble] simply because 
he did not elect to terminate his contract with [Farm Bureau].  
(Emphasis in original).  
About six months later, Trumble moved for reconsideration. Significantly, for purposes 
of this appeal, Trumble asserted generally that the forfeiture clause in the 2011 Memorandum 
was overbroad and that the forfeiture provision should not be enforced because it was 
unreasonable. Trumble sought to distinguish Anderson, arguing that it was inapplicable to his 
case because he had earned the service bonus commissions, unlike the agent in Anderson. 
Trumble did not argue that the non-competition clause was ambiguous, or that it should be 
construed against Farm Bureau. 
On reconsideration, the district court held that the 2011 Memorandum is not ambiguous. 
The court also upheld the forfeiture provision in the 2011 Memorandum, noting that “[a]lthough 
the law does not favor forfeitures, courts will generally uphold contracts that expressly provide 
for forfeitures.” (quoting Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 779 (2014)). The court also noted that 
forfeitures must strictly follow the contract terms and that “[t]here is no showing . . . that [Farm 
Bureau] did not follow the terms of the 2011 Memorandum in denying [Trumble’s] request for 
payment of his service bonus prior to the satisfaction of all the terms of the 2011 Memorandum.” 
During the litigation, Trumble had generated a list (“Subject List”) containing the names 
and addresses of 578 individuals, some of whom were customers of Farm Bureau. Trumble 
compiled the list from personal contacts in his phone, old commission statements, old calendars 
and his own personal knowledge and experience. After the ninety-day non-compete in the Agent 
Contract had elapsed, Trumble began working for one of Farm Bureau’s competitors, Post 
Insurance, and began soliciting new customers from the Subject List. Farm Bureau learned of the 
solicitation after a customer notified Farm Bureau about receipt of a solicitation letter. 
Additionally, some customers requested to have their policies with Farm Bureau cancelled as a 
result of a solicitation letter.  
Based on this information, Farm Bureau filed its answer and asserted two counterclaims: 
(1) Trumble violated the Idaho Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”); and (2) Trumble intentionally 
interfered with Farm Bureau’s prospective economic advantage. Soon after, Trumble moved for 
summary judgment on both of Farm Bureau’s counterclaims, asserting that Trumble did not 
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violate the ITSA and that Trumble did not interfere with Farm Bureau’s prospective economic 
advantage. The district court ultimately agreed with Trumble, granting summary judgment to 
him on the counterclaims, ruling that Trumble did not misappropriate any trade secrets or 
intentionally interfere with Farm Bureau’s prospective economic advantage.  
During this same period, Farm Bureau also brought a motion for summary judgment 
asserting that Trumble’s admitted competition with Farm Bureau within one year of his 
termination acted as a forfeiture of the service bonus commission under the 2011 Memorandum. 
In response, Trumble argued that summary judgment should be granted to him “on the grounds 
that Farm Bureau’s actions and representations made Trumble’s compliance with the terms of 
the [2011 Memorandum] futile and/or were an anticipatory breach. . . .” Trumble did not argue 
that the terms of the Memorandum were ambiguous or that it should be construed against Farm 
Bureau. Indeed, Trumble agreed with what a plain reading of the 2011 Memorandum required of 
him in his memorandum opposing summary judgment: 
Farm Bureau is correct that the Career Agent’s Service Bonus Commission 
Memorandum of Understanding at issue in this case [the 2011 Memorandum] 
conditioned payment of the service bonus commission upon Trumble not 
competing with Defendants for a period of one year. It is also true that Trumble 
competed with Farm Bureau prior to the expiration of one year. However, Farm 
Bureau ignores the key undisputed fact explaining why Trumble did not honor the 
non-compete condition contained in the [2011 Memorandum]: namely, that Farm 
Bureau made absolutely clear that it would not pay the service bonus 
commissions even if Trumble complied with the non-compete provision. 
Trumble also argued that “Farm Bureau should be estopped from asserting that Trumble 
was required to comply with the one year term of the non-compete based upon Farm Bureau’s 
past inconsistent statements.” He based this argument on doctrines of quasi estoppel, anticipatory 
repudiation and/or futility, which he contended nullified the non-competition condition in the 
2011 Memorandum when Farm Bureau declared it would not pay the service bonus commission 
based on Trumble’s alleged dishonesty. 
The district court granted summary judgment for Farm Bureau, holding: (1) the 2011 
Memorandum was not ambiguous about what would occur if an agent is terminated; and (2) the 
non-competition language amounted to a forfeiture provision, which was enforceable and was 
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not unconscionable. Thus, the court held that Farm Bureau did not breach any contract it had 
with Trumble and that Trumble had no right to the service bonus commission.  
The district court did not award attorneys’ fees or costs to either party. Both parties 
appealed. 
III. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erroneously granted summary judgment for Farm Bureau, 
finding Trumble had no right to the service bonus commission because he did not satisfy 
the eligibility requirements. 
2. Whether the district court erroneously granted summary judgment for Trumble, finding 
no misappropriation of any trade secret or intentional interference with a prospective 
economic advantage.  
3. Whether either party is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal.  
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court employs the same standard as the district court when reviewing rulings on 
summary judgment motions. La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler, 158 Idaho 799, 804–05, 353 P.3d 420, 
425–26 (2015). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
I.R.C.P. 56(a). A moving party must support its assertion by citing particular materials in the 
record or by showing the “materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact[s].” See 
I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(B). Summary judgment is improper “if reasonable persons could reach 
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented.” La Bella Vita, 
158 Idaho at 805, 353 P.3d at 426 (quoting McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 
317, 320 (2003)). Even so, a “mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment.” Id. 
(quoting Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009)).  
V. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The district court correctly granted summary judgment for Farm Bureau. 
1. The district court’s conclusion that the 2011 Memorandum was unambiguous is 
affirmed. 
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The first issue that we must resolve is the proper scope and reviewability of Trumble’s 
first issue on appeal--whether the non-competition clause in the commission contract only 
applies if Trumble terminates the commission contract. Trumble now asserts that the non-
competition requirement in the 2011 Memorandum does not apply to him because Farm Bureau 
terminated his agent’s contract, rather than Trumble terminating the contract himself. The 
problem for Trumble in raising this argument on appeal is that he did not raise the argument in 
opposing Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment. As a result, Trumble is bound “to the 
theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 
Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (citing Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through 
Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799–800, 589 P.2d 540, 546–47 (1979)); see also State v. 
Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721, 404 P.3d 659, 663 (2017) (explaining this Court will not consider 
an alternate theory on appeal when that theory was conceded below). 
As noted above, in response to Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment, Trumble 
argued that summary judgment should be granted to him “on the grounds that Farm Bureau’s 
actions and representations made Trumble’s compliance with the terms of the [2011 
Memorandum] futile and/or were an anticipatory breach. . . .” Trumble also argued that “Farm 
Bureau should be estopped from asserting that Trumble was required to comply with the one 
year term of the non-compete based upon Farm Bureau’s past inconsistent statements.” He based 
this argument on doctrines of quasi estoppel, anticipatory repudiation and/or futility, which he 
contended nullified the non-competition condition in the 2011 Memorandum when Farm Bureau 
declared it would not pay the service bonus commission based on Trumble’s alleged dishonesty. 
Trumble did not argue that the terms of the Memorandum meant something different than 
Farm Bureau argued in its motion for summary judgment. He simply argued on other grounds 
(which will be discussed below) why the non-competition clause should not be enforced against 
him. Beyond that, he explicitly agreed that Farm Bureau was correct in its assertion of what the 
language in the 2011 Memorandum required of him. He stated in his memorandum opposing 
summary judgment:  
Farm Bureau is correct that the Career Agent’s Service Bonus 
Commission Memorandum of Understanding at issue in this case [the 2011 
Memorandum] conditioned payment of the service bonus commission upon 
Trumble not competing with Defendants for a period of one year. It is also true 
that Trumble competed with Farm Bureau prior to the expiration of one year. 
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However, Farm Bureau ignores the key undisputed fact explaining why Trumble 
did not honor the non-compete condition contained in the [2011 Memorandum]: 
namely, that Farm Bureau made absolutely clear that it would not pay the service 
bonus commissions even if Trumble complied with the non-compete provision. 
(Emphasis added). 
Thus, Trumble has admitted that the 2011 Memorandum applied to him, no matter how 
his affiliation with Farm Bureau ended. Trumble is now bound by this concession made in his 
briefing. See Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721, 404 P.3d at 663; see State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 
224-25, 443 P.3d 231, 238–39 (2019) (reiterating that this Court will not consider an alternate 
theory when that theory was conceded below). Trumble abandoned his original theory when he 
opposed Farm Bureau’s summary judgment motion below, and he cannot resurrect the theory 
now, on appeal. Indeed, Trumble acknowledged in his opening brief on appeal that “neither 
Trumble nor Farm Bureau argued that the [2011 Memorandum] was ambiguous below, and a 
review of the [2011 Memorandum] establishes it is not ambiguous.” (Emphasis added).  
The only way for Trumble to argue that the 2011 Memorandum means something 
different from what the district court determined is to claim that the 2011 Memorandum is 
ambiguous. Kunz v. Nield, Inc., 162 Idaho 432, 439, 398 P.3d 165, 172 (2017) (“A contract term 
is ambiguous when there are two different, reasonable interpretations of the language.”). If that 
were his argument, we would be constrained to review the document’s language critically, and 
apply rules of construction that govern when contractual language is ambiguous. See, e.g., Fed. 
Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Hafer, 158 Idaho 694, 702, 351 P.3d 622, 630 (2015) (“Ambiguities in a 
contract of adhesion should be construed against the drafter.”); Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 
928, 936, 318 P.3d 918, 926 (2014) (“The Court construes a stipulation against the drafter.”). But 
since he has never made that argument, and he conceded that Farm Bureau was correct below, 
his claim on appeal that the 2011 Memorandum means something other than the district court 
held fails. As Farm Bureau notes, “[w]hen read as a whole, the 2011 [Memorandum] evidences 
that Farm Bureau is free to terminate an agent who could still qualify to receive a Service Bonus 
Commission so long as they fulfill the 1-year non-competition eligibility requirement.”  We thus 
affirm the district court’s initial conclusion on this basis.  
2. The district court’s holding that Trumble had no right to the service bonus 
commission was proper. 
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Trumble raises additional issues regarding the 2011 Memorandum that are properly 
before us on appeal. He submits that the non-competition and forfeiture provisions in the 2011 
Memorandum are unenforceable on three grounds: (1) the non-competition clause is subject to 
reasonableness standards and, as written, it is not reasonable; (2) the forfeiture clauses are 
impermissible because they are penalties that bear no reasonable relationship to Farm Bureau’s 
damages; and (3) the forfeiture clauses are unconscionable. Each ground will be discussed in 
turn.   
a. The non-competition and forfeiture provisions are reasonable as a matter of law. 
Trumble argues that a “reasonableness standard” should prohibit the reach of the 
forfeiture clause here because the amount at issue is so substantial that it would be unreasonable 
to enforce the non-competition clause against him. He supports this argument by asserting that 
the $251,431.96 service bonus was based on his production and was “earned and vested” over 
his twenty plus years with the company. Thus, he contends, Idaho should adopt and follow the 
law that forfeitures tied to restrictive covenants are invalid and/or not enforceable because they 
are unreasonable.   
The facts here do not support Trumble’s claim. While the service bonus commission is 
credited yearly based on the agent completing a qualifying service year, and the amount of the 
commission is placed on deposit with interest, the 2011 Memorandum clearly states that “[t]he 
commission credit made on behalf of each agent and interest will not become payable to agent     
. .  . until the agent complies with all other requirements of the plan, terminates, and fulfills the 
no competition requirements.” The 2011 Memorandum further states that if these requirements 
are not met, “[a]ny commission credit which does not become payable to agent will revert back 
to” Farm Bureau.  Thus, Trumble’s credit for service bonus commissions was never “earned” or 
“vested,” and it appropriately reverted to Farm Bureau when Trumble joined another insurance 
agency within the one-year period. 
Trumble’s position is juxtaposed against the Court of Appeals’ holding in Anderson 
which weighed heavily in the district court’s analysis in granting summary judgment against 
him. Trumble argues that Anderson does not fit the facts presented here and that its legal 
conclusions are erroneous. Trumble posits that the analysis of courts in other states shows that 
the Anderson court’s conclusion is now incorrect. 
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Trumble’s reasonableness argument fails for two reasons. First, Trumble was not an 
employee of Farm Bureau. Most courts that have applied the reasonableness test have done so in 
the context of an employer-employee relationship not present here. E.g., Morris v. Schroder Cap. 
Mgmt. Int’l, 859 N.E.2d 503, 507 (N.Y. 2006) (applying the reasonableness test to employer-
employee relationship); Gaver v. Schneider’s O.K. Tire Co., 856 N.W.2d 121, 130 (Neb. 2014) 
(applying reasonableness standard to employer-employee non-compete); Lavey v. Edwards, 505 
P.2d 342, 345 (Ore. 1973) (explaining the validity or invalidity of forfeiture clauses in employee 
pension plans should be determined by the test of reasonableness); but see Deming v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 623 (Conn. 2006) (recognizing it was adopting a minority view, the 
appellate court analyzed the forfeiture of deferred compensation as it would an employment 
contract non-compete clause). Indeed, this Court applies reasonableness standards to determine 
whether covenants not to compete in employment contracts are valid. E.g. Freiburger v. J-U-B 
Eng’rs, Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 420, 111 P.3d 100, 105 (2005) (“A covenant not to compete in an 
employment contract must be reasonable as applied to the employer, the employee, and the 
public.”). Trumble’s status as an independent contractor distinguishes the cases holding that 
forfeiture clauses are subject to a reasonableness analysis. The district court appropriately 
recognized that Trumble was not an employee of Farm Bureau and that his right to payment was 
neither earned nor vested. As a result, the reasonableness analysis applicable to employees does 
not apply in Trumble’s case. 
Second, the district court appropriately applied Anderson in reaching this conclusion. 
Anderson involved an insurance agent who, like Trumble, was an independent contractor, as 
opposed to an employee. 112 Idaho at 465, 732 P.2d at 703. The Court of Appeals analyzed two 
separate contracts in making its decision, but one of those contracts was nearly identical to the 
2011 Memorandum, so its reasoning and holding covers the facts of this case. See id. at 470, 732 
P.2d at 708. Like the issue presented here, in Anderson the court was asked to determine whether 
an agreement which “provided for ‘service bonus’ commissions upon termination if ‘the agent . . 
. does not compete with the Companies for a period of one year after he has terminated’” was an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. In holding that this provision was enforceable, the Court of 
Appeals stated:  
Anderson argues that such provisions are anti-competition covenants and, as such, 
are void as restraints of trade. This characterization is overbroad. Agency 
12 
 
 
contracts often do contain non-competition covenants. These covenants usually 
require the agent to refrain from working in the insurance business for certain 
time periods and within certain geographical limitations. They will be upheld if 
they are ancillary to employment and are reasonable in their application to the 
covenantor, the covenantee and the general public. However, the provisions set 
forth in the contracts before us are not restrictive covenants in this sense. They do 
not prohibit competition; they simply impose contractual forfeitures. Provisions of 
this type generally are not considered restraints of trade. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
 
This legal conclusion remains correct and forecloses Trumble’s argument over the 
forfeiture clause here. Since the non-competition clause is a forfeiture provision, it is not subject 
to the same reasonableness analysis that a non-competition covenant applicable to an employee 
would be. As the district court recognized,  
[c]oncededly, these forfeitures impose a cost for engaging in competition. But the 
agent, through his competitive activity, mitigates the cost by soliciting customers 
to buy insurance from the new carriers he represents. The strong weight of 
judicial authority upholds such agreements even when they are unrestricted in 
time or territory. 
(Quoting Anderson, 112 Idaho at 470, 732 P.2d at 708). The strong weight of judicial authority 
continues to support this conclusion. 
b. The forfeiture clause does not amount to a penalty. 
Trumble’s next argument relies on his first. He maintains that the forfeiture clause acts as 
a penalty because he had already earned the service bonus commissions. Trumble again contends 
that words like “will be placed on deposit,” and “termination of the Commission Contract will 
not reduce accrued credits” in the 2011 Memorandum showed that the commissions have already 
been earned—making the forfeiture an unenforceable penalty “designed to deter a breach or to 
punish the breaching party rather than compensate the injured party. . . .” As we have already 
held, the clear mandate of the 2011 Memorandum is that the agent must comply with all the 
requirements before becoming eligible to receive payment of the service bonus commission. 
Trumble never became qualified as he violated the non-competition requirement. 
Trumble equates the forfeiture provision to a liquidated damages clause, noting that 
forfeiture provisions should not be enforced when they are “designed to deter a breach or to 
punish the breaching party rather than compensate the injured party for damages occasioned by 
the breach.” Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 779, 331 P.3d 507, 521 (2014). Trumble also cites 
13 
 
 
Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 117, 982 P.2d 945, 952 (Ct. App. 
1999) in support of his argument. Magic Valley is readily distinguishable. There, the 
employment contract between the plaintiff and the defendant provided that in the event of a 
breach of a non-competition clause by the plaintiff, the defendant would be entitled to liquidated 
damages in the amount of $5,000 for each calendar month of competition by the plaintiff. 133 
Idaho at 113, 982 P.2d at 948. The court held that the clause was unenforceable as exorbitant and 
unconscionable, amounting to an unenforceable penalty. See id. at 117, 982 P.2d at 952. 
Unlike Magic Valley, but like the district court below, we hold that the non-competition 
provision in the 2011 Memorandum is not a liquidated damages clause. We note that the Agent’s 
Contract, like the agreement in Magic Valley, set forth the agent’s promise not to compete for 
ninety days and contained a liquidated damages clause in the event of a breach of that agreement 
by the agent. In contrast, in the 2011 Memorandum, the non-competition provision is a condition 
of eligibility to receive the service bonus commission, rather than a contractual promise that 
would be breached by the agent engaging in competition. As noted, the 2011 Memorandum 
provides that the service bonus commission 
will not become payable to agent . . . until the agent complies with all other 
requirements of the plan, terminates, and fulfills the no competition requirements. 
. . . .  
A violation of the no competition restriction will result in forfeiture of the service 
bonus commission and interest credited.  
 
The service bonus commission will be paid one year after the agent 
terminates their contract with [Farm Bureau], provided the no competition 
restriction is observed. 
Provisions of this type do not prohibit competition and they are not imposed as a penalty for any 
breach. They simply impose a cost as a consequence for choosing to compete with Farm Bureau 
within one year of termination – and that cost is a valid “cost for engaging in competition.” 
Anderson, 112 Idaho at 470, 732 P.2d at 708. 
c. The forfeiture clause is not unconscionable. 
 
Trumble also asserts that the forfeiture provision is unconscionable. For a contract 
provision to be void as unconscionable, it must be both procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable. Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 42, 72 P.3d 877, 882 
(2003). Procedural unconscionability concerns the bargaining process leading up to the 
14 
 
 
formation of a contract. Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 321, 246 
P.3d 961, 974 (2010). Substantive unconscionability focuses on the terms of the contract. Id.  
 
Procedural unconscionability exists when the contract was not the result of 
free bargaining between the parties. Indicators of procedural unconscionability 
generally include a lack of voluntariness and a lack of knowledge. Indicators of 
lack of voluntariness include the use of high-pressure tactics, coercion, oppression 
or threats short of duress. A lack of voluntariness can be shown by an imbalance 
in bargaining power resulting from the non-negotiability of the stronger party’s 
terms and the inability to contract with another party due to time, market 
pressures, or other factors. Indicators of a lack of knowledge include a lack of 
understanding regarding the contract terms arising from the use of inconspicuous 
print, ambiguous wording, or complex legalistic language; the lack of opportunity 
to study the contract and inquire about its terms; or disparity in sophistication, 
knowledge, or experience of the parties.  
The focus of substantive unconscionability is solely on the terms of the 
contractual provision at issue. A provision is substantively unconscionable if it is 
a bargain no reasonable person would make or that no fair and honest person 
would accept. If a contract term is one-sided or oppressive, it may be 
substantively unconscionable. In determining whether a term is unconscionable, a 
court must consider the purpose and effect of the terms at issue, the needs of both 
parties and the commercial setting in which the agreement was executed, and the 
reasonableness of the terms at the time of contracting. 
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). When reviewing an unconscionability 
determination made by a trial court, the appellate court accepts the factual findings made by the 
trial court, as long as they are supported by substantial, competent evidence, and freely reviews 
as a question of law whether under those facts, a contractual provision is unconscionable. Lovey, 
139 Idaho at 41, 72 P.3d at 881.  
The district court here held that “the record is devoid of any facts which the [c]ourt could 
consider in making an unconscionability determination. [Trumble] simply asserts in his briefing 
that the bonus service commission memorandum ‘was not even a bargained for contract.’ ” 
Trumble’s argument on appeal mirrors that made before the district court. He claims that the 
2011 Memorandum was “not even a bargained for or signed contract[,]” and that “including a 
forfeiture based upon ‘dishonest’ conduct is substantively unconscionable because it is 
oppressive.” These allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to establish either procedural or 
substantive unconscionability. We recognize and agree with the general legal premise refusing to 
enforce forfeiture penalties that bear no rational basis to the damages incurred by an employer 
15 
 
 
when an employee competes against it. E.g., Magic Valley, 133 Idaho at 117, 982 P.2d at 952. 
With that said, these principles are of no moment here because: (1) Trumble was not an 
employee of Farm Bureau; and (2) the forfeiture provision in the non-competition clause was 
merely part of a unilateral offer that never materialized. Once again, the non-competition 
provision in the 2011 Memorandum is a condition of eligibility to receive a service bonus 
commission; it is not a contractual promise on the part of the agent that would be breached by the 
agent competing with Farm Bureau. Thus, the 2011 Memorandum is not unconscionable.  
3. Trumble’s quasi-estoppel, futility and anticipatory repudiation arguments are 
unsupported by the record and applicable case law.  
Trumble also argues that statements made by Farm Bureau at and around the time of 
Trumble’s termination relieved Trumble from complying with the non-competition clause based 
on the doctrines of quasi-estoppel, futility, and/or anticipatory repudiation. First, Trumble alleges 
the doctrine of quasi-estoppel bars Farm Bureau from relying on the non-competition clause in 
the 2011 Memorandum because Farm Bureau took inconsistent positions about why Trumble 
had no right to the service bonus commission. Second, Trumble argues that the doctrine of 
futility released Trumble from complying with the non-competition clause. Lastly, Trumble 
argues that Farm Bureau anticipatorily repudiated its “contract” when Farm Bureau informed 
Trumble he would not receive the service bonus commission regardless of his compliance with 
the non-competition clause.  
a. Quasi-estoppel does not apply.  
First, Trumble asserts the doctrine of quasi-estoppel bars Farm Bureau from relying on 
the non-competition clause in the 2011 Memorandum. According to Trumble, Farm Bureau was 
inconsistent by representing at the time of termination that Trumble would never receive a 
service bonus commission even if Trumble complied with the non-competition clause.  
“The doctrine of quasi-estoppel ‘prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment 
of another party, which is inconsistent with a position previously taken.’ ” Keybank Nat’l Ass’n 
v. PAL I, LLC, 155 Idaho 287, 294, 311 P.3d 299, 306 (2013). The doctrine applies when: 
(1) [T]he offending party took a different position than his or her original position 
and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a 
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change 
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to 
16 
 
 
maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit 
or acquiesced in. 
Id. (quoting Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006)). “Quasi-estoppel is 
essentially a last-gasp theory under which a defendant who can point to no specific detrimental 
reliance due to plaintiff’s conduct may still assert that plaintiffs are estopped from asserting 
allegedly contrary positions where it would be unconscionable for them to do so.” Id. (quoting 
Schoonover v. Bonner Cnty., 113 Idaho 916, 919, 750 P.2d 95, 98 (1988)). 
Here, Farm Bureau has consistently maintained one general position—Trumble is not 
entitled to the service bonus commission because he did not satisfy all of the eligibility 
requirements under the 2011 Memorandum. Farm Bureau first informed Trumble he would not 
be entitled to the service bonus commission because he was terminated for dishonest conduct. At 
that time, Farm Bureau also informed Trumble that “even if [Trumble] were entitled to his 
service bonus, the Memorandum contains a non-competition clause restricting payment until 
after compliance for a 12-month period.” During litigation, Farm Bureau discovered Trumble 
was competing and violating the non-competition clause in the 2011 Memorandum. Based on 
this information, Farm Bureau filed for summary judgment arguing Trumble had no right to the 
service bonus commission in spite of the dishonesty allegations because it was undisputed that 
Trumble was competing in direct violation of the one-year non-competition clause. Thus, while 
Farm Bureau’s initial statements and reasons for terminating Trumble were based on allegations 
of dishonesty, those claims were not the sole basis for its asserted defenses, as its counsel 
pointed-out in the May 9, 2016, letter, within days of Trumble’s termination as set forth above. 
Trumble cannot show that Farm Bureau took an inconsistent position and then changed that 
position in an unfair way. Trumble thus fails to satisfy the first factor necessary to establish a 
successful quasi-estoppel claim.  
b. The contract doctrine of anticipatory repudiation does not apply.  
Based on the same statements made by Farm Bureau at the May 4, 2016, meeting and in 
the May 9, 2016, letter, Trumble argues that Farm Bureau anticipatorily repudiated its 
obligations under the 2011 Memorandum when it told Trumble that he would not receive the 
service bonus commission. “An anticipatory breach of a contract has been defined as ‘a 
repudiation [by the promisor] of his contractual duty before the time fixed in the contract for his 
performance has arrived.’ ” Swafford v. Huntsman Springs, Inc., 163 Idaho 209, 213, 409 P.3d 
17 
 
 
789, 793 (2017) (emphasis in original) (quoting Foley v. Munio, 105 Idaho 309, 311, 669 P.2d 
198, 200 (1983)). A repudiation is “a statement by the obligor to the obligee indicating that the 
obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total 
breach[.]” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 (1981). A repudiating party’s language 
“must be sufficiently positive to be reasonably interpreted to mean that the party will not or 
cannot perform.” Id. cmt. b. Further, a statement of repudiation must threaten a breach of 
sufficient gravity that, “if the breach actually occurred, it would of itself give the obligee a claim 
for damages for total breach. . . .” Id. cmt. d. 
Again, the doctrine of anticipatory breach requires the breach of a contractual duty. Farm 
Bureau’s obligation under the 2011 Memorandum to pay the service bonus commission did not 
arise until Trumble satisfied all the stated eligibility conditions.  Without an obligation to make 
such a payment, there can be no anticipatory repudiation because Farm Bureau did not breach 
any contractual duty—Farm Bureau had none. 
Beyond that, the May 9, 2016, letter contemplated the possibility that Farm Bureau 
misjudged Trumble’s behavior and specifically informed Trumble that the non-competition 
provision applied even if the dishonesty provision did not apply, when it stated, “even if Mr. 
Trumble were entitled to his service bonus, the [2011] Memorandum contains a non-competition 
clause restricting payment until after compliance for a 12-month period.” Thus, as the district 
court noted, Farm Bureau did not express that Trumble would never be paid under any 
circumstances, but that Trumble could maintain eligibility for the service bonus commission if he 
successfully challenged Farm Bureau’s allegations about his dishonesty. Farm Bureau issued this 
clarification two weeks before Trumble filed his initial complaint on May 23, 2016, and months 
before Trumble began working for Post Insurance in August 2016. As the district court 
summarized: 
So while [Trumble] has established that he believed [Farm Bureau] would not pay 
the service bonus because they thought he acted dishonestly, there are no facts in 
the record to support a claim that [Trumble] reasonably believed there had been 
an anticipatory repudiation of all eligibility requirements of the [2011 
Memorandum by Farm Bureau] prior to his filing of the Complaint or to 
competing in August of 2016. 
Thus, Trumble’s attempt to show that Farm Bureau repudiated an obligation to pay him before 
he qualified for the same is unsupported by this record.  
18 
 
 
c. The doctrine of futility does not apply.  
Trumble asserts he did not need to comply with the non-competition clause because 
doing so would be futile. He argues that once Farm Bureau declared that it would not pay the 
service bonus commission to Trumble due to his alleged dishonesty, it would have been futile for 
him to comply with the one-year covenant not to compete. This argument fails for the same 
reasons stated regarding his anticipatory repudiation argument.  
The law is well settled that one will not be required to undertake a useless act. Ford v. 
Lord, 99 Idaho 580 (1978). Even so, as has been established, Farm Bureau made clear to 
Trumble well before he filed his complaint that “even if Mr. Trumble were entitled to his service 
bonus, the [2011] Memorandum contains a non-competition clause restricting payment until after 
compliance for a 12-month period.” Given the conclusion that Trumble had to comply with the 
12-month non-competition clause before he was eligible for any bonus commission payments, 
his argument that it would have been useless to adhere to the non-competition clause because 
Farm Bureau had already made up its mind is erroneous. He ultimately filed suit and had every 
right to disprove Farm Bureau’s claims that he was terminated for dishonesty. Had he 
successfully done so, while waiting for the one-year period to run, he would have been eligible to 
receive the service bonus commission. Thus, it would not have been futile for him to make that 
choice and avoid competing with Farm Bureau for one year as required. 
B. The district court properly granted summary judgment for Trumble on the 
misappropriation and intentional interference of a prospective economic advantage 
claims.  
Farm Bureau alleges the district court erroneously granted summary judgment for 
Trumble on its misappropriation and intentional interference of a prospective economic 
advantage claims. Farm Bureau continues to argue on appeal that the Subject List is a trade 
secret and that Trumble’s mere usage constitutes a misappropriation under the ITSA. Farm 
Bureau also argues that by violating the ITSA, Trumble wrongfully interfered with Farm 
Bureau’s prospective economic advantage. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for Trumble. 
1. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Trumble on the 
misappropriation claim because the Subject List is not a trade secret.   
19 
 
 
In its initial counterclaim, Farm Bureau alleged the Subject List constituted a trade secret 
because the list contained “confidential and proprietary internal records, lists and data compiled, 
owned and used by Farm Bureau in its operations, which Farm Bureau ha[d] continue[d] to 
protect as confidential.” Farm Bureau further alleged that “Trumble’s retention, possession 
and/or use of the above confidential information constitute[d] a misappropriation” in violation of 
the ITSA. In reply, Trumble argued he created the Subject List after he was terminated, the list 
was created based on his own personal knowledge and experience, the Subject List derived no 
independent economic value, and Farm Bureau did not reasonably maintain its secrecy. Further, 
even if the Subject List were a trade secret, Trumble argued he did not acquire it by improper 
means and therefore did not misappropriate the Subject List. 
The district court found nothing in the record to refute Trumble’s assertions that he 
created the Subject List after termination based on his phone contacts, commission statements, 
and calendars and that none of these sources “contained the kind of proprietary information that 
could only have been obtained from [Farm Bureau].” The district court also found “no evidence 
that the actual information at issue in this case was subject to any reasonable efforts to maintain 
its secrecy” past the ninety-day non-competition clause in the Agent Contract. The district court 
ultimately ruled the Subject List was not a trade secret. The district court reiterated that even if 
the Subject List were a trade secret, Trumble did not acquire it through improper means. The 
district court thus ruled there was no genuine dispute based on the evidence provided and granted 
summary judgment in Trumble’s favor.  
On cross-appeal, Farm Bureau argues the district court erroneously granted summary 
judgment in Trumble’s favor because Trumble admitted in his affidavit that “a few names on the 
Subject List (approximately 20 or so) came from [his] old commission statements and 
calendars.” Farm Bureau interprets this statement as Trumble admitting use of a customer list, 
which, according to Farm Bureau, by itself constitutes a trade secret. Farm Bureau also alleges 
mere usage of the customer list constitutes misappropriation. Farm Bureau’s argument, with no 
additional evidence, does not create a genuine dispute. 
“To prevail in a claim brought under the ITSA, ‘[a] plaintiff must show that a trade secret 
actually existed.’ ” La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler, 159 Idaho 799, 807, 353 P.3d 420, 428 
20 
 
 
(quoting Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734, 992 P.2d 175, 183 (1999)). Without this 
showing, there can be no misappropriation. Id. The ITSA defines a trade secret as: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, computer 
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:  
(a) 
Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means 
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or 
use; and 
(b) 
Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy. . . . 
I.C. § 48-801(5). This Court has also taken direction from the Restatement of Torts section 757, 
which lists six additional factors that can be used to determine whether information is, or is not a 
trade secret. Shatila, 133 Idaho at 735, 992 P.2d at 184. These factors include  
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside [the plaintiff’s] business; 
(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the 
business; (3) the extent of measures taken by [the business] to guard the secrecy 
of the information; (4) the value of the information to [the business] and [its] 
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by [the business] in 
developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the 
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939)). These factors are not required, but 
“address the issue of whether the information in question is generally known or readily 
ascertainable.” Id.  
When a plaintiff successfully establishes the existence of a trade secret, the plaintiff must 
also show that the defendant misappropriated the trade secret. See I.C. § 48-801. 
Misappropriation is defined as: 
(a) 
Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has 
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or  
(b) 
Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied 
consent by a person who: 
A. Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or 
B. 
At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that 
his knowledge of the trade secret was: 
i. 
Derived from or through a person who had utilized 
improper means to acquire it; 
ii. 
Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or  
21 
 
 
iii. 
Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the 
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; 
or  
C. 
Before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to 
know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it has been 
acquired by accident or mistake. 
I.C. § 48-801(2). Improper means include “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or 
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy. . . .” I.C. § 48-801(1).  
Farm Bureau notes that this Court has held customer lists are trade secrets. See Wesco 
Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 898, 243 P.3d 1069, 1086 (2010) (explaining 
“customer lists . . . are trade secrets.”); see also Northwest Bec-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 
Idaho 835, 839, 41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002) (explaining that it was undisputed the customer list was 
a trade secret). Even so, not every customer list constitutes a trade secret. See La Bella Vita, 158 
Idaho at 810, 353 P.3d at 431.  
In La Bella Vita, a salon sued its former employees who had opened their own salon, 
alleging the former employees misappropriated trade secrets. Id. at 803, 353 P.3d at 424. 
According to the salon, the former employees “wrongfully took and used its confidential client 
lists, calendars, scheduling lists, client contact information, and other information regarding 
products, services, and client preferences in the creation and promotion” for the new salon. Id. at 
802, 353 P.3d at 423. In response, the former employees argued the lists were compiled from 
their own personal efforts including information from “cell phone and email contacts, church 
membership directories, social media connections, suggestions and referrals from family and 
friends, public phone books, online directories, internet searches, word of mouth, and use of 
referral cards.” Id. at 808, 353 P.3d at 429. The district court granted summary judgment against 
the salon, finding no evidence produced to refute the fact the former employees generated the 
client list through “alternative and independent methods and sources.” Id. at 803, 353 P.3d at 
424 (emphasis added). On appeal, the salon argued summary judgment was improper because 
there was a genuine dispute about the lists’ confidentiality, no matter how the lists were 
compiled. Id. at 808, 353 P.3d at 429. In support of these contentions, the salon provided 
evidence including, but not limited to, the confidentiality of its clients. Id. at 810, 353 P.3d at 
431. The salon’s confidentiality and privacy practices were established through the testimony of 
its owner: 
22 
 
 
[La Bella Vita’s] data system included the names, phone numbers, physical 
addresses, email addresses, special dates (birthday, anniversaries), services and 
product profiles used by the client . . . and referral information. This information 
was generated for the specific purpose of keeping the clients as customers and 
maintaining good client relations. I was careful to ensure that all of this 
information was included as part of our confidentiality contract with our 
employees. The importance of keeping this information confidential was 
discussed in the confidentiality contract as well as the employee handbook. 
Id. These customer lists were stored at the salon “in a way that the information did not become 
public.” Id. The former employees argued the lists were not confidential because it was the 
practice of the salon to print portions of the list as a daily schedule and post these schedules 
around the salon, allowing anyone receiving services to view them. Id. at 811, 353 P.3d at 432. 
This Court held summary judgment was improper because “a genuine factual dispute as to the 
confidential nature of [the salon’s] client list and client-related information” was presented. Id. at 
812, 353 P.3d at 433. Although this Court did not identify the parameters for what constitutes 
confidentiality, we noted that “[a] person’s contact information can be ascertained in a variety of 
ways, including through the involuntary sharing or selling of information. It is nearly impossible 
to completely control these other avenues . . . even though [the salon’s] clients considered the 
same to be non-public and confidential.” Id. at 814, 353 P.3d at 435. 
Here, the Subject List does not constitute a trade secret because it was almost wholly 
generated from alternative and independent sources, it contained generally known information 
and Farm Bureau took few efforts to maintain its secrecy. First, the Subject List was generated 
from alternative and independent sources. In La Bella Vita, the district court found the customer 
list may not have been a trade secret because the list could be generated from alternative and 
independent sources such as “cell phone and email contacts, church membership directories, 
social media connections, suggestions and referrals from family and friends, public phone books, 
online directories, internet searches, word of mouth, and use of referral cards.” 159 Idaho at 808, 
353 P.3d at 429. Although this Court ultimately held the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment against the salon owner, this Court’s holding was based on confidentiality concerns 
regarding the customer list itself, not how it was generated. See id. at 810, 353 P.3d at 431. Thus, 
customer lists generated from independent sources such as those identified do not automatically 
constitute trade secrets. See id. Here, the Subject List was mostly generated from Trumble’s 
personal knowledge accumulated while working as an insurance agent as well as through the 
23 
 
 
contacts in his phone. Although around twenty names on the Subject List were compiled from 
old commission statements and calendars accessed when Trumble was working for Farm Bureau, 
most of the names included on the list were from Trumble’s own alternative and independent 
sources. 
Second, the Subject List generally contains only contact information of individuals—
their names and addresses. As briefly noted in La Bella Vita, contact information can be 
determined in many ways, even if involuntarily, making it essentially public information. Id. at 
814, 353 P.3d at 435. Such public information cannot, on its own, constitute a trade secret.  
 
Third, Farm Bureau did not take reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the 
information included on the Subject List. The Subject List includes names and addresses only. 
This information was compiled mostly from Trumble’s phone contacts. Mr. Swore, a Farm 
Bureau employee who maintained the operating systems and network infrastructure, provided 
testimony about Farm Bureau’s protocol after an agent is terminated and explained how an 
agent’s contacts are removed from Farm Bureau’s server and any saved contacts, including 
addresses, are sent directly to the terminated individual. In his deposition, Mr. Swore testified 
that Trumble’s contacts were sent directly to him. After learning Trumble’s contacts had not 
been sent to Trumble, Mr. Swore altered his testimony accordingly. However, Mr. Swore did not 
alter his testimony about Farm Bureau’s protocol. It is hard to maintain an argument that contacts 
generated during employment are intended to remain a secret when Farm Bureau’s practice is to 
provide terminated individuals with a copy of their contacts from the server.   
 
Farm Bureau particularly challenges the portion of the Subject List that Trumble admits 
was generated from past commission statements sent by Farm Bureau. Although this Court did 
hold summary judgment was improper when conflicting testimony was provided about the 
general business practices regarding the confidentiality of the customer list and customer 
information, 158 Idaho at 812, 353 P.3d at 433, here no such dispute is supported by the record. 
Farm Bureau sent unredacted commission statements to Trumble throughout his tenure which 
included the names of customers and customer policy numbers. It is also undisputed that the 
commission statements lacked any language relaying the statements as confidential. There also 
was no business policy or practice in place informing agents that the information in the 
commission statements was confidential. And even if there were some aspect of confidentially 
24 
 
 
implied by Farm Bureau about the commission statements, the statements did not have addresses 
of the customers. Thus, on these facts we conclude that the Subject List could not have divulged 
confidential information when the information Trumble used to mail solicitation letters was not 
included in the commission statements. Based on these reasons, we agree with the district court 
that the Subject List is not a trade secret. 
 
Even if the list were a trade secret, Farm Bureau is also required to prove Trumble 
misappropriated its trade secrets in order to establish a successful ITSA claim. Merely using 
information obtained during his association with Farm Bureau in a new  capacity does not rise to 
the level of misappropriation. Northwest Bec-Corp v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 839, 
41 P.3d 263,267 (2002) (explaining that the legislature did not intend the ITSA to be read so 
broadly that merely hiring a competitor’s employee constitutes acquiring a trade secret because 
employees will naturally take with them the skills, training and knowledge acquired from 
previous employment). Nor is there any evidence in the record that the Subject List was acquired 
through improper means. Farm Bureau made no allegation of theft, bribery or misrepresentation. 
Its argument is founded on Trumble breaching a duty to maintain secrecy. As discussed directly 
above, Farm Bureau did not take reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy. Even so, the district 
court found that the Agent Contract provided a specific list of forbidden activities that a 
terminated agent could not participate in for a period of ninety days. Thus, the district court 
found that this provision signified that after the ninety days had passed, Trumble was free to 
engage in any of the listed activities without breaching the Agent Contract. Trumble adhered to 
the ninety-day term in the Agent Contract and thus there was no evidence of breach to maintain 
secrecy. Farm Bureau had the duty “to present evidence that demonstrated there was a genuine 
issue of material fact in order to survive summary judgment.” Id. at 841, 41 P.3d at 269. It failed 
to do so. Summary judgment in Trumble’s favor was proper on the misappropriation claim. 
2. The district court properly granted summary judgment for Trumble on the intentional 
interference with a prospective economic advantage claim. 
To maintain a successful claim for intentional interference with a prospective economic 
advantage, a plaintiff must show: 
(1) [T]he existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the 
expectancy on the part of the interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing 
termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure 
25 
 
 
beyond the fact of the interference itself, and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff 
whose expectancy has been disrupted.  
Wesco, 149 Idaho at 893, 243 P.3d at 1081 (quoting Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 
138, 191 P.3d 205, 216 (2008)). Interference is wrongful where “(1) the interferer had an 
improper motive to harm the plaintiff; or (2) the means used by the interferer to cause injury to 
the prospective advantage were wrongful by reason of statute, regulation, recognized common 
law rule, or an established standard of a trade or profession.” Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho 
Dep’t. of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 64–5, 305 P.3d 499, 508–09 (2013). “The mere pursuit of one’s 
own business purposes is not sufficient to support an inference of an improper motive to harm 
the plaintiff.” Id.at 65, 305 P.3d at 509. 
Farm Bureau’s argument that Trumble interfered with its economic expectancy is based 
on Trumble’s alleged violation of the ITSA. As noted above, there is no genuine dispute based 
on the record that Trumble violated the ITSA. Without an ITSA violation, there can be no 
intentional interference claim based on Farm Bureau’s arguments. Beyond that, Trumble’s 
actions were taken to pursue his own business purposes. Pursuing one’s own business interest 
cannot support an inference of an improper motive to harm Farm Bureau. See id.  
 
In summary, Farm Bureau provided no additional evidence to create a genuine dispute 
that the Subject List was a trade secret, that Trumble misappropriated the Subject List or that 
Trumble wrongfully interfered with Farm Bureau’s prospective economic advantage. Summary 
judgment for Trumble on Farm Bureau’s counterclaims was proper. We affirm the district court.  
C. 
Neither party is entitled to attorney fees or costs on appeal. 
Both parties request attorney fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-
120(3). Section 12-120(3) states “[i]n any civil action to recover . . . in any commercial 
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.” Commercial transaction 
is “defined to mean all transactions expect transactions for personal or household purposes.” Id. 
In determining which party prevailed where there are claims and counterclaims between 
opposing parties, this Court determines who prevailed in the action from an overall view, not 
through a claim-by-claim analysis. Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 
540, 545, 272 P.3d 512, 517 (2012).  
26 
 
 
Here, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Farm Bureau holding 
Trumble had no right to the service bonus commission. We also affirm the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment for Trumble on the misappropriation and intentional interference with a 
prospective economic advantage claims. Based on our rulings, neither party prevailed. As a 
result, neither party is entitled to attorney fees or costs on appeal.  
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court’s grant of summary judgment for Farm Bureau is affirmed. The district 
court’s grant of summary judgment for Trumble on Farm Bureau’s counterclaims of 
misappropriation of trade secrets and intentional interference with a prospective economic 
advantage is also affirmed. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees or costs on appeal.  
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices BRODY, STEGNER and MOELLER, CONCUR.