Title: BURNHAM v. COFFINBERRY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BURNHAM v. COFFINBERRY2003 WY 10976 P.3d 296Case Number: 02-209Decided: 09/08/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

MARGOT 
BURNHAM,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

RICHARD 
A. COFFINBERRY, as Trustee

of 
the Richard A. Coffinberry Living

Trust, 
dated June 8, 1995,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Hot Springs County

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Edward 
G. Luhm of Scott, Shelledy and Luhm, P.C., Worland, 
Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Jerry 
D. Williams of Williams Law Office, Thermopolis, Wyoming

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Margot 
Burnham (Burnham), asserts that the district court erred in failing to grant her 
motion to dismiss this action, or to have stayed these proceedings pending 
resolution of related litigation between the parties in California.  It is also her contention that the 
district court erred in applying the law of Wyoming to this matter rather than 
the law of California as it relates to the dissolution of a relationship between 
unmarried persons who cohabit and commingle their assets.  Appellee, Richard A. Coffinberry as 
Trustee of the Richard A. Coffinberry Living Trust (Coffinberry), counters that 
the district court's orders were proper in all respects.  We will affirm.

 

 

[¶2]      Burnham advances 
these issues:

 

1.  Whether 
the district court erred by failing to grant [Burnham's] motion to dismiss or 
stay this litigation in light of the existence of a previously commenced foreign 
action which placed into controversy properties owned by the parties and 
proceeds realized from the sale and refinancing secured therefrom, including 
real property located in Hot Springs County, Wyoming, which are also the subject 
matter of [Coffinberry's] quiet title action herein?

 

2.  Whether 
the district court erroneously applied the law of this State as it pertains to 
actions between unmarried persons who cohabit and commingle assets in granting 
[Coffinberry's] motions for summary judgment?

 

Coffinberry 
approaches the issues somewhat differently:

 

1.  Did 
the District Court properly apply Wyoming statutes and case law in denying 
[Burnham's] Motions to Dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(3)?

 

2.  Did 
the trial court properly grant summary judgment?

 

3.  Does 
the Minute Order and Statement of Decision, dated September 25, 2002, of the 
Superior Court of the State of California, County of Orange, in Burnham v. 
Coffinberry, Case No. 00 CC 10796 render [Burnham's] appeal 
moot?

 

 

[¶3]      The controversy 
at hand arose out of a close personal and business relationship between Burnham 
and Coffinberry which endured from 1979 until 1993.  Burnham contended that she and 
Coffinberry jointly acquired real property both in California and in Wyoming (as 
well as other states) and that they cohabited in their principal residence 
during the duration of their relationship.  
They never married.  Burnham 
contended that the Wyoming properties were acquired for their mutual benefit and 
were purchased, in part, with funds obtained through a series of refinances of 
their principal residence.

 

[¶4]      On September 8, 
2000, Burnham filed an action in California, seeking to divide property jointly 
owned by her and Coffinberry, including the Wyoming property at issue here.  On September 21, 2000, Coffinberry filed 
a complaint in the Wyoming district court, seeking to quiet title to all of the 
properties located in Hot Springs County in the name of his living trust.  Burnham answered that complaint and 
included in her answer a motion to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(3).  Burnham contended that it was necessary 
for the California court to have jurisdiction over the Wyoming property so that 
it could "balance accounts" between the parties.  Eventually, the district court denied 
Burnham's motion to dismiss and entered summary judgment in Coffinberry's favor 
with respect to all of the Wyoming properties.  With respect to California property, 
those matters were decided by the California courts, largely in favor of 
Burnham.

 

 

 

[¶5]      We have 
recognized that a district court's ruling on a matter related to venue is 
measured by the abuse of discretion standard.  Rivermeadows, Inc. v. Zwaanshoek 
Holding, 761 P.2d 662, 668 (Wyo. 1988); and see SPS v. Thunder Basin Coal 
Company, 978 P.2d 1138, 1141, 1144-46 (Wyo. 1999).  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Pasenelli v. Pasenelli, 2002 WY 
159, ¶11, 57 P.3d 324, 329, ¶11 (citing Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 
151 (Wyo.1998)).  We will enlarge 
our analysis somewhat by quoting this discussion from Professors Wright and 
Miller:

 

            
On a motion under Rule 12(b)(3), facts must be shown that will defeat 
plaintiff's assertion of venue.  A 
number of courts have concluded that the burden of doing so is on defendant, 
since venue is a "personal privilege" and a lack of venue should be established 
by the party asserting it.  On the other hand, several courts 
have imposed the burden on plaintiff in keeping with the rule applied in the 
context of jurisdiction defenses.  
The latter view seems correct inasmuch as it is plaintiff's obligation to 
institute his action in a permissible forum, both in terms of jurisdiction and 
venue.  There seems to be little 
justification for distinguishing between the two in determining the placing of 
the burden.  If a defect in venue is 
not demonstrated, the court will deny the motion to dismiss.  However, motions under 12(b)(3) may also 
be denied or held in abeyance whenever the court determines that further 
information is needed in order to establish clearly whether venue is 
proper.

 

5A 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 
§ 1352, at 263-65 (1990).

 

[¶6]      Burnham first 
contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion to 
dismiss premised on W.R.C.P. 12(b)(3).  
That rule provides:

 

(b)  How 
Presented. -- Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion:  (1) lack of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter;  (2) lack 
of jurisdiction over the person;  
(3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; (5) insufficiency 
of service of process;  (6) failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;  (7) failure to join a party under Rule 
19.  A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.  No defense or objection is waived by 
being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion.  If a pleading 
sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to 
serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the trial any 
defense in law or fact to that claim for relief.  If, on a motion asserting the defense 

numbered 
(6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 
56.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶7]      Burnham contends 
that the Wyoming district court should have dismissed the Wyoming action, or in 
the alternative stayed it, pending an unraveling of the parties' personal and 
business relationship in California.  
The argument championed by Burnham tends to confuse the concepts of 
jurisdiction, venue, and forum non conveniens in this regard, as well as 
the concepts of civil actions generally and matters related to the dissolution 
of marriage more specifically.  
Burnham, who is a resident of California, filed a civil action in 
California purporting to be in the nature of dissolution and winding up of a 
business relationship, as well as a personal relationship.  It is her contention that the Wyoming 
properties at issue here are a part of both the business and personal 
relationship.  Of course, California 
appears to be the proper forum for that action both in terms of jurisdiction as 
well as venue.  Coffinberry is a 
resident of Wyoming and he has substantial real estate holdings in Hot Springs 
County.  He filed a complaint in 
Wyoming to quiet title to that property, at least in part because Burnham 
claimed that the Wyoming property should be divided between them in the 
California action.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-32-201 (LexisNexis 2003) provides:

 

An 
action may be brought by a person in possession of real property against any 
person who claims an estate or interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose 
of determining the adverse estate or interest.  The person bringing the action may hold 
possession himself or by his tenant.

 

Although 
Coffinberry's action does not fit squarely into the provisions of Wyoming quiet 
title statutes, Burnham does not question their applicability and Coffinberry 
did, in essence, contend that Burnham's California litigation amounted to a 
denial of clear title in Coffinberry.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-204 (LexisNexis 2003).  As to one of the properties at issue, 
Burnham and Coffinberry were cotenants and Burnham had deeded several other 
properties at issue to Coffinberry.  
Coffinberry purchased the remainder from third parties.  Within the chapter of Wyoming statutes 
concerned with venue, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-5-101 (LexisNexis 2003) 
provides:

 

(a)  Actions 
for the following causes shall be brought in the county in which the subject of 
the action is situate, except as provided in W.S. 1-5-102 and 
1-5-103:

(i)  For 
the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest 
therein;

                        
(ii)  For the partition of real property;

            
(iii)  For the sale of real property under a mortgage, lien or 
other encumbrance or charge.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Also see Rivermeadows, 
Inc. v. Zwaanshoek Holding and Financiering, B.V., 761 P.2d 662, 667-68 
(Wyo. 1988); Hronek v. St. Joseph's Children's Home, 866 P.2d 1305, 
1309-10 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶8]      Burnham more or 
less concedes that the district court had jurisdiction and that venue was proper 
in Hot Springs County.  The real 
thrust of her argument is that the district court should have declined to 
exercise jurisdiction or venue or both, or that the district court should have 
stayed the proceedings until the California courts could act on Burnham's suit 
there.  To the extent Burnham's 
argument is based in the concept of forum non conveniens, we note that 
West Texas Utilities Company v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 807 P.2d 932, 935 (Wyo. 1991), holds that such a question is also addressed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  The 
underlying basis for Burnham's contentions is that what California was 
undertaking to do is what amounts to a divorce in Wyoming, and that Wyoming 
recognizes that personal relationships can have business aspects that may be 
resolved in the courts.  See 
Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595-96 (Wyo. 1981) (and cases cited 
therein) (contract to settle dispute between unmarried man and woman who 
cohabited enforced; case did not involve quantum meruit and/or unjust 
enrichment); Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1158-60 (Wyo. 1982) 
(distinguishing Kinnison).  
However, Burnham fails to cite pertinent authority or to provide a cogent 
argument that the exercise of discretion by the district court in these 
circumstances was an abuse of discretion or that permitting the properly venued 
quiet title action to go forward operated as an injustice to Burnham.  For these reasons we need not consider 
her contentions in that regard further.  
See Shumway v. Worthey, 2001 WY 130, ¶9, 37 P.3d 361, ¶9 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

 

[¶9]      When we review a 
summary judgment, we have before us the same materials as did the district 
court, and we follow the same standards which applied to the proceedings 
below.  The propriety of granting a 
motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual findings 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the prevailing 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Reed v. Miles Land and Livestock 
Company, 2001 WY 16, ¶9, 18 P.3d 1161, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001).  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or defense.   We, of course, examine the record 
from a vantage point most favorable to that party who opposed the motion, 
affording to that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that fairly may 
be drawn from the record.  
Scherer Construction, LLC v. Hedquist Construction, Inc., 2001 WY 
23, ¶15, 18 P.3d 645, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001); Central Wyoming Medical Laboratory, 
LLC v. Medical Testing Lab, Inc., 2002 WY 47, ¶15, 43 P.3d 121, ¶15 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

[¶10]   Our disposition of this issue can 
be quite brief.  Burnham contends 
that the trial court "erroneously ruled as a matter of law that there exists no 
remedy at law or equity for an unmarried cohabitant who commingled her assets 
with the other cohabitant's even when the other cohabitant unjustly enriched 
himself through the use of those assets."  
No such proposition was offered to the district court for its resolution, 
nor did the district court make a decision to that effect.  The district court did decide that the 
properties at issue in this case were titled in Coffinberry's name and, as 
between him and Burnham, the title to those properties should be quieted in 
him.  Summary judgment is governed 
by W.R.C.P. 56, which provides:

 

(a)  For 
claimant. -- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or 
any part thereof.

(b)  For 
defending party. -- A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's 
favor as to all or any part thereof.

(c)  Motion 
and proceedings thereon. -- Unless the court otherwise orders, the motion 
and any response and other papers relating thereto shall be served pursuant to 
Rule 6(c).  The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

(d)  Case 
not fully adjudicated on motion.  
If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at 

  
the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts 
exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted.  It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in 
the action as are just.  Upon the 
trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly.

(e)  Form 
of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. -- Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as 

would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein.  Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith.  The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits.  
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.  
If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.

(f)  When 
affidavits are unavailable. -- Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may 
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or 
may make such other order as is just.

(g)  Affidavits 
made in bad faith. -- Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at 
any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay the other 

  
party 
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
the other party to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of 
contempt.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶11]   Coffinberry brought forward 
documentary evidence that proved he was the owner of the disputed property.  Burnham did not come forward with any 
specific facts to dispute the recorded deeds that proved Coffinberry's 
case.  Burnham's conclusory 
statements went to an entirely different case, a matter which was being pursued 
in California and which she had not pleaded before the courts of Wyoming.  She "concluded" that the parties had a 
"relationship," but did not bring forward the requisite facts underlying that 
assertion so as to overcome Coffinberry's motion for summary judgment.  The same is true with respect to unjust 
enrichment, quantum meruit, and her other claims -- she used the magic words, 
but neglected to specify in an affidavit, or deposition, or otherwise, the 
underlying facts which might have given life to those 
claims.

 

 

[¶12]   Coffinberry contends that this 
appeal is moot because the California courts have now ruled on his claims there 
and they reached virtually the same result as did the Wyoming courts.  Coffinberry does not present pertinent 
authority or cogent argument to convince us that this appeal is moot.  Therefore, we decline to address that 
issue further.

 

 

[¶13]   The district court's order denying 
Burnham's motion to dismiss is affirmed, as are the district court's orders 
granting summary judgment in favor of Coffinberry.