Title: State v. Hicks

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

245 N.W.2d 319 (1976) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Ira F. HICKS, Jr., Appellant. No. 59259. Supreme Court of Iowa. September 22, 1976. *320 James M. Sullivan, Des Moines, for appellant. Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Jim Robbins, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ray A. Fenton, County Atty. and Richard G. Blane, II, Asst. County Atty., for appellee. Heard by MOORE, C.J., and LeGRAND, REES, UHLENHOPP and REYNOLDSON, JJ. MOORE, Chief Justice. This appeal by defendant, following his conviction for robbery with aggravation, presents one evidentiary question and attacks instruction 16, regarding credibility. We affirm. A detailed statement of facts is not necessary. Mike Fuller, a clerk at Sherman's Super Valu Store in Des Moines testified that about 3:00 A.M., September 8, 1975, defendant approached the check-out counter, drew a 25-caliber automatic and told Fuller to clean out the register "or he would blow my head off." Defendant thereby obtained store money and that of Fuller and another clerk, David Stovall. Defendant's companion flashed a knife during the robbery. Defendant on direct examination admitted having a gun and committing the robbery but denied he had threatened Fuller or Stovall with any harm. Defendant's direct examination continued: I. Of course a general objection to opinion testimony that the question invades the province of the jury is not available. State v. Taylor, Iowa, 201 N.W.2d 724, 727; Bengford v. Carlem Corporation, Iowa, 156 N.W.2d 855, 865; Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 344, 5 N.W.2d 646, 655. However the question propounded to defendant did not go to his opinion but rather to his state of mind his intentat the time of the admitted robbery. His only defense went to the issue of whether he had the intent to maim or possibly kill his robbery victim. The trial court erroneously sustained the State's objection on the ground the question called for a factual opinion. II. It is well established that whenever the belief, intent or motive of a witness is material he may testify directly thereto. In re Estate of Allen, 251 Iowa 177, 180, 100 N.W.2d 10, 11; Williams v. Stroh Plumbing & Electric, Inc., 250 Iowa 599, 603, 94 N.W.2d 750, 753, 754; Halligan v. Lone Tree Fmrs. Exch., 230 Iowa 1277, 1286, 300 N.W. 551, 556; Nelson v. Grimes, 8 Cir., 256 F.2d 816, 819 and citations. *321 The general rule is thus stated in 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, section 364, page 413: See also 1 Jones on Evidence, 6th Ed., Gard, section 4:55, pages 500-501 and 1 Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 6th Ed., Herrick, section 55, page 120 and section 162, page 435, where the respective editors set out the substance of the above quoted legal principles. III. But for the additional testimony of defendant, which details his thoughts and mental state relating to his intent at the time of the robbery, the erroneous ruling of the trial court would require reversal of his conviction. That testimony made the error nonprejudicial. We have repeatedly held that the exclusion of evidence tending to show a certain fact is not reversible error where the claimed fact in question is fully established by other admitted evidence. State v. Johnson, Iowa, 219 N.W.2d 690, 699; State v. Clark, Iowa, 187 N.W.2d 717, 721; Kengorco, Inc. v. Jorgenson, Iowa, 176 N.W.2d 186, 189; State v. Badgett, Iowa, 167 N.W.2d 680, 685, 686 and citations. IV. Defendant-appellant's second assignment asserts the trial court erred in including the following in instruction 16, the general credibility instruction (Uniform Instruction 501.5): This identical contention was made in State v. Ochoa, Iowa, 244 N.W.2d 773, where we rejected it and affirmed the lower court's judgment. Ochoa is dispositive of defendant-appellant's second assigned error. We find no reversible error. AFFIRMED.