Title: James Belcher v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC01-1414
____________
JAMES BELCHER,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 10, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a
sentence of death.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), of
the Florida Constitution.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm Belcher's
convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and sexual battery.
FACTS
The evidence presented at trial indicated that some time after 10:30 p.m. on
January 8, 1996, but before 9 p.m. on January 9, 1996, James Belcher (Belcher)
1.  No signs of forced entry were found at Embry's home.  Embry's
neighbor, Anna Alford, testified that she saw Embry come home alone at 10:30
p.m. on January 8, 1996.  Ricky Embry, the victim's brother, testified that after
Embry missed school and work on January 9, 1996, he went to her home around 9
p.m. to check on her.  As he placed his key into the lock, the door "just came
open."  Ricky found Embry's body in the bathtub.
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gained access to the victim's townhouse, where she lived alone.1  Belcher sexually
battered victim Jennifer Embry (Embry) and then killed her by placing his hands
around her neck and holding her head under water in the bathtub until she could no
longer breathe.  At 2 a.m. on January 9, 1996, Maxine Phillips, Embry's next door
neighbor, was awakened by loud noises, which came from the common wall she
shared with Embry.  Phillips described the noises as three hard knocks, as if
someone was knocking against the wall.
Medical Examiner Bonifacio Floro testified that the cause of Embry's death
was both manual strangulation and drowning.  White foam, a product of the
mixture of air, water, and mucous in the trachea and bronchial tree, was discovered
coming out of Embry's nose and mouth, which indicated to the medical examiner
that she was alive and breathing when her head was submerged in the water.  Linear
bruising on Embry's neck and small internal hemorrhaging on her larynx and hyoid
bone were consistent with her being manually strangled while she was still alive.  Dr.
Floro testified that Embry suffered from the following nonfatal injuries before her
2.  Dr. Floro explained that sperm can survive longer in a dead body than a
living body.  He performed Embry's autopsy on January 10, 1996. 
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death: vaginal injuries consistent with forcible entry by a penis or object; a bruise
above the right eyebrow; and a laceration to the right shoulder.  He stated that the
injuries were "fresh," indicating that they had been inflicted within twenty-four hours
of Embry's death.  Dr. Floro found spermatozoa in Embry's vagina and opined that
they were "fresh" due to the fact that they still had both heads and tails at the time
of the autopsy.  Dr. Floro stated that although he could not pinpoint the time of the
placement of the sperm, he opined that the condition of the sperm indicated that
they had been placed there probably during a sexual act some time between three
and six days before the autopsy.2 
Detective Robert Hinson, the lead detective assigned to the case, testified
that in the bathroom where Embry's body was found, there were some things
apparently out of place.  He related the following observations of the bathroom:
one of the two parallel shower curtain rods was askew and had been propped up
against the wall with a towel; one of the two shower curtains was pulled over to one
side of the rod; the plastic hook that held up the decorative shower curtain was
missing from the wall and found in the bathroom trash can with a piece of wall
board still attached; and a strip from the plastic shower curtain liner was found in
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the bottom of the bathtub. 
At the time of the murder, Belcher lived with his sister in a house that was
close to the Florida Technical College, where Embry had attended classes until her
death.  Belcher had twice been observed at Florida Technical College in connection
with Embry.  Elaine Rowe, an employee at Florida Technical College, testified that
in the winter of 1995, a man came into Rowe’s office and asked for Embry by
name, requesting that Embry be retrieved from her class.  Rowe had someone
retrieve Embry from her class and testified that to her knowledge, the man and
Embry interacted that day.  From a police photo-lineup, Rowe identified Belcher as
the man who came to her office, and she identified Belcher in court.  Derrick Scott,
a classmate of Embry’s with whom she had a five-month affair, testified that one
day before October of 1995, he walked out of class at Florida Technical College,
and observed a man standing by Embry’s car, talking with her.  Scott identified
Belcher from a side-shot photo, displaying a facial scar, as the man he saw talking
with Embry by her car.  Scott also identified Belcher in court. 
On August 4, 1998, Detective Hinson questioned Belcher about Embry's
murder.  During that interview, Belcher denied (1) ever being at Embry's home, (2)
ever having sex with Embry, and (3) ever meeting Embry.  After Derrick Scott
identified Belcher from a photo, Detective Hinson obtained a search warrant for a
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sample of Belcher's blood.  At the time of the blood draw, Hinson observed that
Belcher was nervous and holding a Bible, and that he had urinated on himself. 
James Pollack, lab analyst for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
(FDLE), testified that the semen discovered in Embry’s vagina and on a bedroom 
slipper found in the bathroom near her body contained DNA matching Belcher’s
DNA profile. 
The jury found Belcher guilty of first-degree murder on the theory of both
premeditation and felony murder, and guilty of sexual battery.  After a penalty
phase hearing, the jury voted nine to three, in favor of a death sentence.  The trial
court followed the jury’s recommendation and imposed a death sentence for first-
degree murder and sentenced Belcher to twenty-five years imprisonment for sexual
battery.  The trial court found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
following aggravators in support of Belcher’s death sentence: (1) the defendant has
been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to
some person (great weight); (2) the capital felony was committed while the
defendant was engaged in the commission of the crime of sexual battery (great
weight); and (3) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
(HAC) (great weight).  The trial court found that all of the mitigating factors that
were presented were proven sufficiently for the Court to give them consideration. 
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The mitigating factors in this case, all of which were nonstatutory, were: (1) in his
relationship with family members, Belcher is considerate, generous and concerned;
(2) Belcher loves his parents, brother, sisters, cousins, aunts, and uncles, and they
love him; (3) Belcher has not lured anyone else in his family into trouble with the
law, he has actually discouraged family members from engaging in criminal
behavior and used himself as an example as to why they should not get involved in
criminal activity; (4) Belcher has done many kind things for his family; (5) in spite
of personal problems, Belcher has encouraged his cousins to do well; (6) Belcher
has often been a mentor and a role model of integrity to his relatives; (7) Belcher
has maintained contact with relatives even while in prison and continues to provide
them advice and counsel, sometimes over the phone; (8) Belcher was raised in a
high crime area in New York and was evidently unable to resist the temptations of
crime; (9) Belcher was sent to adult prison at an early age and it affected his
development; (10) Belcher has never abused alcohol or drugs; (11) Belcher has
shown concern for younger inmates at Appalachee Correctional Institute (ACI) and
has had a positive effect on their lives by being a tutor, basketball coach, a good
listener, a counselor to young inmates, and a peacemaker; (12) Belcher can
continue to help other inmates in the future, as evidenced by those who testified at
the penalty phase; (13) Belcher has not been a discipline problem either in prison or
3.  See Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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in the pretrial detention facility for the period of his recent incarceration; (14)
Belcher displayed proper behavior during trial; and (15)  Belcher displayed
appropriate remorse and genuine concern for the distress caused to his family and
the victim's family during the Spencer3 hearing.  The sentencing order indicates that
the trial court assigned "some weight" to all of the mitigators, except for (11) and
(12), to which it assigned "greater weight."
ANALYSIS
Although Belcher does not challenge his first-degree murder conviction, this
Court has examined the record and has determined that there was sufficient
competent and substantial evidence presented to support the conviction for first-
degree murder.  See Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998); see also Fla.
R. App. P. 9.140(h) (requiring this Court to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence, regardless of whether or not it is presented for review).  As discussed in
this opinion, eyewitness testimony connected Belcher to Embry and incriminating
physical evidence linked Belcher to Embry's home where her body was found.  We
have referred to that evidence in some detail above.
PROSECUTION CLOSING ARGUMENT
Belcher claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial,
4.  The argument and objection during closing was as follows in pertinent
part:
[Prosecutor:]
Don't those violent crimes show his true character? 
Doesn't it show that he is a person who refuses to learn from prior
experience?  You might restate that.  You might say he actually learned
from one of those experiences.  What did he learn regarding
Ms.White?  She was able to identify him.  Ms. Embry wasn't able to
come into this court and identify him.
[Defense:]
Your honor, I think that is objectionable.  It's a thinly
veiled argument about elimination of a witness.  Elimination of a
witness is not an aggravator that the State has proved, nor can they do
it, but that is what the argument is all about.  It's not an argument about
anything but that.  Has nothing to do with any of the aggravators.
[Prosecutor:]
With all due respect, I'm not arguing that as an
aggravator.  That's not one of the enumerated ones.  I haven't said
anything about the elimination of a witness.  I'm talking about the prior
violent crime, which I'm allowed to do that.  That is a prior aggravator.
. . . . 
[Prosecutor:]
What does this aggravator prove?  That the
defendant is willing to kill to cover his tracks.  That he chose to kill, in
addition to committing a dangerous violent felony, sexual battery.
[Defense:] Your Honor, excuse me.  I renew the objection.  I have to
renew the objection I just made at the bench.
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which was made upon objection to the prosecutor's penalty phase closing
argument, contemporaneous with the prosecutor's statements that the defendant's
actions were to eliminate Embry as a witness.4  Belcher states that because the State
was not pursuing the avoid arrest aggravator, and because the evidence did not
support that aggravator, the prosecutor's argument of an improper aggravating
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circumstance tainted the penalty phase and caused the death sentence to be
unconstitutionally imposed.
We agree with the trial court's denial of a mistrial in this situation because
although the prosecutor arguably crossed the line into discussion of matters that
could also support the avoid arrest aggravator, which was not a relevant aggravator
to this case, we find that any resulting error was harmless.  The prosecutor's
comments did not constitute a wholly improper and prejudicial attempt to introduce
the avoid arrest aggravator into this case.  As the State points out, the jury was not
subsequently instructed on the avoid arrest aggravator.  Before instructing the jury
on the aggravators of prior violent felony, murder in the course of a sexual battery,
and HAC, the trial court instructed the jury that it was limited to consideration of
only those three aggravators.  In accordance with the standard jury instruction, the
trial court stated: "The aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited
to any of the following that are established by the evidence . . . ."  Fla. Std. Jury
Instr. (Crim.) 7.11.  Thus, we find that the prosecutor's argument, because it was
made within the context of this case regarding the prior violent felony aggravator,
did not rise to the level that would require the trial court to declare a mistrial and
order a new trial.  See Teffeteller v. State, 439 So. 2d 840, 845 (Fla. 1983)
("Comments of counsel during the course of a trial are controllable in the discretion
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of the trial court, and an appellate court will not overturn the exercise of such
discretion unless a clear abuse has been made to appear.").
HAC AGGRAVATOR
Belcher argues that the evidence in this case was insufficient to establish the
heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravator (HAC) because the medical examiner
testified that Embry could have lost consciousness within thirty seconds to one
minute of her strangulation, rendering her unable to feel pain.  However, we find
that there was competent, substantial evidence to support the HAC aggravator. 
This Court considers whether or not there was evidence of a struggle for further
support of the victim's consciousness before death.  See Bowles v. State, 804 So.
2d 1173, 1178 (Fla. 2001) ("Strangulation of a conscious murder victim evinces
that the victim suffered through the extreme anxiety of impending death as well as
the perpetrator's utter indifference to such torture.  Accordingly, this Court has
consistently upheld the HAC aggravator in cases where a conscious victim was
strangled.").  Evidence was presented at trial that Embry struggled with her attacker
while she was still conscious, indicating that she was aware of her impending death. 
As the trial court noted in the sentencing order, there was evidence that the injuries
to Embry's head, shoulder, and neck were inflicted while she was alive, supporting
evidence of a struggle.  We further note that the medical examiner's testimony that
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Embry was forcibly raped while she was alive supported evidence of a struggle
while she was conscious.  Other evidence at trial also pointed to signs of a struggle
in the bathroom where her body was found: the shower curtain rod had apparently
been knocked down and propped up with a towel; a piece of shower liner had been
removed and was found in the tub with Embry's body; and a hook supporting the
curtain rod had been torn out of wall and was found with a piece of the wall still
attached.  This Court has considered the HAC aggravator in a case of strangulation
death, wherein the evidence was "unclear" exactly how long the victim remained
conscious before death.  See Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2002), cert.
denied, 71 U.S.L.W. 3758 (U.S. June 9, 2003).  In Barnhill, this Court held that a
strangulation death can, indeed support a finding of HAC, stating:
The HAC aggravating factor applies in physically and mentally
torturous murders which can be exemplified by the desire to inflict a
high degree of pain or utter indifference to or enjoyment of the
suffering of another.  See Williams v. State, 574 So. 2d 136 (Fla.
1991).  HAC focuses on the means and manner in which the death is
inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death,
rather than the intent and motivation of a defendant, where a victim
experiences the torturous anxiety and fear of impending death.  See
Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998).  Thus, if a victim is
killed in a torturous manner, a defendant need not have the intent or
desire to inflict torture, because the very torturous manner of the
victim's death is evidence of a defendant's indifference.  See id. 
Because strangulation of a conscious victim involves foreknowledge
and the extreme anxiety of impending death, death by strangulation
constitutes prima facie evidence of HAC.  See Mansfield v. State, 758
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So. 2d 636, 645 (Fla. 2000); Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 263 (Fla.
1996).
Id. at 849-50.  Although Embry was probably only conscious for sometime
between thirty seconds and a minute before her strangulation and drowning death,
the evidence of a struggle between Embry and her attacker (located on her body
and in the bathroom) establishes that she was likely conscious at the outset of the
strangling and was aware of her impending death.  See Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d
300, 315 (Fla. 1997) (holding that HAC was appropriately found in drowning death
independent of whether the victim was conscious when she was thrown in canal
because there was other evidence of a struggle); Rutherford v. State, 545 So. 2d
853, 856 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the evidence supported HAC where the victim
was found in bathtub, cause of death was by drowning or asphyxiation, and
physical signs of struggle were evident).  Thus, we find that the trial court correctly
instructed the jury about and properly found that Embry's strangulation and
drowning death was especially HAC. 
SPECIAL JURY INSTRUCTION
Belcher maintains that the trial court erred when it denied his request to read
a special instruction to the jury, listing the nonstatutory mitigators presented.  The
record reflects that Belcher filed a list of mitigating circumstances with the trial
5.  The Florida standard "catch-all" jury instruction states: "Any of the
following circumstances that would mitigate against the imposition of the death
penalty: (a.) Any [other] aspect of the defendant's character, record, or
background.  (b.) Any other circumstance of the offense."  Fla. Std. Jury Instr.
(Crim.) 7.11.
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court in statement form, enumerating the nonstatutory mitigators in the case.
In denying the defense's request to have the mitigation list read to the jury,
the trial court stated:
I guess I have both concerns.  One that it emphasizes the details of the
defendant's mitigation over details of the State's aggravation and,
secondly, it does run the risk of leaving out something that the jury
might have heard that they would lump into the category of
defendant's character, record and background because I didn't
mention it in the instruction, which is my instruction to them, they
would feel they shouldn't consider it, so I think we'll leave the
instruction in the language that has been approved by the Supreme
Court. . . . I'm not going to specifically provide details of that
particular mitigator, but the defense can certainly provide those details
in the argument.
The trial court instead recited a "catch-all" type of jury instruction stating:
Among the mitigating circumstances you may consider, if
established by the evidence, are any aspects of the defendant's
character or record or background, any other circumstances of the
offense that would mitigate against the imposition of the death
penalty.5
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving a "catch-all"
jury instruction about mitigation instead of giving Belcher's list of nonstatutory
mitigators.  See Card v. State, 803 So. 2d 613, 624 (Fla. 2001) (finding that the trial
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court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant's request to give an
alternative jury instruction on CCP).  Out of fairness to Belcher, the trial court gave
serious consideration to Belcher's special instruction, but found that it was not
superior to the "catch-all" instruction.  See James v. State, 695 So. 2d 1229, 1236
(Fla. 1997) ("The trial court is required to give only the 'catch-all' instruction on
mitigating evidence and nothing more.").  Thus, we affirm the trial court's denial of
Belcher's request to read the special jury instruction.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FLORIDA'S DEATH PENALTY SCHEME
Belcher challenges the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to declare
sections 782.04 and 921.141, Florida Statutes (2002), unconstitutional under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  Belcher claims that his death
sentence should be vacated because (1) the indictment did not give notice of the
aggravating circumstances on which the State would rely to attempt to establish
eligibility for the death penalty; (2) the jury in this case was not told that the
existence of any aggravating circumstance had to be agreed upon by all jurors; and
(3) the jury's nonbinding recommendation was not unanimous.  However, as the
State points out, two of the three aggravators found in this case are exempted from
an Apprendi analysis: prior violent felony and murder committed in the course of a
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sexual battery.  Regarding the prior violent felony aggravator, in Apprendi, the U.S.
Supreme Court exempted prior convictions from facts that must be submitted to a
jury because they increase the penalty for a crime.  Id. at 490.  The recent decision
of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), did not disturb that particular holding. 
See id. at 597 n.4 (noting that Ring did not challenge Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and that none of the aggravators in his case related to
past convictions).  Regarding the murder being committed in the course of a sexual
battery aggravator, the fact remains that a unanimous jury found Belcher guilty of
both murder and sexual battery, and therefore the guilt phase verdicts reflect that
the jury independently found the aggravator of the murder being committed in the
course of a sexual battery.
As for Belcher's challenge to Florida's death penalty scheme and how it
relates to the remaining aggravator of HAC, we find that Belcher is not entitled to
relief under the holding of Ring.  This Court addressed a similar contention in
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 662 (2002), and
King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 657 (2002), and
denied relief.  We find that Belcher is likewise not entitled to relief on this claim.
PROPORTIONALITY
Although Belcher does not challenge the proportionality of his death
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sentence on appeal, due to the uniqueness and finality of death, this Court
addresses the propriety of all death sentences in a proportionality review.  See
Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990).  This Court reviews and
considers all the circumstances in a case relative to other capital cases when
deciding whether death is a proportionate penalty and to ensure uniformity.  See
Johnson v. State, 720 So. 2d 232, 238 (Fla. 1998); Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411,
416-17 (Fla. 1998).  The death penalty is reserved only for those cases where the
most aggravating and least mitigating circumstances exist.  See Kramer v. State, 619
So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla. 1993).
We find that the death penalty was not a disproportionate sentence in this
extremely aggravated case, as compared to other similar cases that this Court has
decided.  In Branch v. State, 685 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1996), this Court affirmed the
death sentence in a case where the aggravators were: (1) murder committed during
the course of a sexual battery; (2) prior violent felony; and (3) HAC.  Id. at 1252
n.1.  The trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigating factors: (1)
remorse; (2) unstable childhood; (3) positive personality traits; and (4) acceptable
conduct at trial.  Id. at 1252 n.2.
In Kimbrough v. State, 700 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1997), this Court upheld the
death sentence in a similar case where the aggravators were: (1) prior violent felony;
6.  The trial court in Banks rejected the defendant's religious activities as a
mitigator and found that Banks did not establish that he was under the influence of
alcohol when the murder occurred.  Banks, 700 So. 2d at 365.
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(2) murder committed during the course of a sexual battery; and (3) HAC.  Id. at
636.  The trial court rejected the defendant's age as a statutory mitigator, but
considered the following statutory mitigation: (1) unstable childhood; (2) maternal
deprivation; (3) an alcoholic father; (4) a dysfunctional family; and (5) a talent for
singing.  Id.
In Banks v. State, 700 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1997), this Court considered another
case which bears resemblance to the aggravators and mitigators involved in the
instant case.  The aggravators found by the trial court in support of the death
sentence were: (1) prior violent felony; (2) murder committed during the course of a
sexual battery; and (3) HAC.  Id. at 365.  The trial court found the statutory
mitigator of age (little weight), and the following nonstatutory aggravators (little
weight): (1) service in the military; (2) employment history; (3) good character; and
(4) contribution to community and family.  Id.  In Banks, the trial court also found
the following additional mitigation, but did not assign it "great weight": (1)
appellant's potential for rehabilitation; (2) cooperation with the police; and (3) his
love and support for his family.  Id.6
Based on the totality of the circumstances in this case considered in light of
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this Court's prior decisions in other capital cases involving similar circumstances,
we find that death is a proportionate penalty in this case.
Accordingly, we affirm Belcher's convictions and sentences.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., and SHAW,
Senior Justice, concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
PARIENTE, J., specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion in this case, and write separately to expand
briefly on the discussion of Belcher's request for a jury instruction detailing the
nonstatutory mitigating factors, and also to explain my view of the grounds on
which we are denying relief pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
In a specially concurring opinion in Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 918-
22 (Fla. 2001), Justice Anstead discussed the denial of special instructions on
nonstatutory mitigation in the context of United States Supreme Court precedent
holding that a capital sentencer must receive an opportunity to consider and give
effect to relevant mitigating evidence.  Justice Anstead concluded:
The bottom line of these Supreme Court decisions is that juries must
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be given explicit and adequate instructions as to the factors they must
consider in deciding whether to impose a sentence of death.
Consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's repeated concerns,
juries should be provided with specific guidance as to the type of
nonstatutory mitigating factors that they may consider. Because the
overly brief "catch-all" jury instruction neither mentions nor defines the
various categories of nonspecific mitigation a Florida jury may
consider, it may well be inadequate to provide for the type of
individualized assessment of mitigation that the Supreme Court has
mandated. 
Id. at 921.  
I concurred in that opinion, and continue to believe that in a proper case, in
which the evidence is insufficient to warrant an instruction on the statutory
mitigating circumstances contained in section 921.141(6), Florida Statutes (2002), 
an instruction that the jury may consider a specific circumstance in mitigation may
nonetheless be warranted.  Whereas each of the "statutory" aggravators is
specifically enumerated for the jury, the standard catch-all instruction on mitigation
provides no guidance on how to determine what factors are mitigating.  In
particular, facts indicating emotional disturbance, extreme duress, or impaired
capacity which fall short of the threshold for statutory mitigation remain potentially
significant considerations in a jury's advisory sentencing decision. 
In my view, the trial court's actions in Duest v. State, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S501
(Fla. June 26, 2003), should serve as a model for trial courts to follow in the
7.  The trial court in Duest instructed the jury:
Amongst the mitigating circumstances you may consider if established
by the evidence are any aspect of the defendant's character,
background or record and any other circumstances of the offense
including but not limited to, . . . [t]wo, the defendant was under the
influence of drugs or alcohol at the time the offense was committed. 
Three, the defendant was under mental or emotional disturbance at the
time the offense was committed.
28 Fla. L. Weekly at S504.  
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exercise of their discretion to instruct on nonstatutory mitigation.  In Duest, we
rejected a claim that the trial court erred in declining to give the standard
instructions on the two statutory mental mitigators, and pointed with approval to
special instructions given by the trial court on the mitigators in terms comporting
with the evidence.7  We noted in Duest that the trial court did not suggest that the
jury should give the mitigating factors any less weight than if it had received the
standard instructions on the corresponding statutory mitigators.  See id. at S503-
04.  I encourage trial judges to follow this example where appropriate.  
Nonetheless, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the expanded instruction in this case.  The specific instruction submitted
by Belcher did nothing more than recite a virtual laundry list of his proposed
nonstatutory mitigation and, therefore, would not have provided greater assistance
to the jury than the catch-all instruction alone.  Accordingly, I agree with the
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majority's resolution of this issue in this case.
Regarding the effect of Ring, I concur in the affirmance of Belcher's death
sentence because this case involves the aggravating circumstance of prior violent
felony convictions:  armed burglary and aggravated assault in 1989, attempted
robbery in 1981, and robbery in 1976.  See Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 380, 409
(Fla. 2003) (Pariente, J., concurring as to conviction and concurring in result only
as to sentence) (defendant in direct capital appeal not entitled to relief under Ring
where trial court found prior violent felony aggravator).  In Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the United States Supreme Court exempted "the
fact of a prior conviction" from its requirement of a jury finding of any fact that
increases the penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.  Although the
Supreme Court extended Apprendi to capital sentencing schemes in Ring, none of
the aggravating circumstances in Ring involved prior convictions, and therefore the
Court was not called upon to address the Apprendi exception.  See Ring, 536 U.S.
at 597 n.4.  
Because the trial court's finding of fact on the prior violent felonies rendered
Belcher eligible for the death penalty, it is unnecessary for us to address any effect
Apprendi and Ring may have on the validity of the remaining aggravating
circumstances, including HAC, as a foundation for the death sentence in this case. 
8.  As to the trial court's rejection of a special instruction on nonstatutory
mitigation, I would point to the concerns I listed in my separate opinion in Downs
v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 918-22 (Fla. 2001) (Anstead, J., specially concurring). 
In the instant case, the brevity and general nature of the "catch-all" instruction given
by the trial judge provided no real guidance to the jury as to what it might properly
consider during its deliberations and, in fact, may have served to diminish the
mitigation Belcher introduced.  The effect of this diminishment may be viewed as
even more problematic given the import of Sixth Amendment jury protections
announced in Ring.
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Additionally, because both Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002), and
King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002), involved successive postconviction
motions, in my view neither case is dispositive in a direct appeal in which the issue
is properly raised.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority analysis except for its discussion of Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and
the discussion of the rejection of Belcher's request for a special instruction on
nonstatutory mitigation.8
For the reasons I expressed in my opinion in Duest v. State, No. SC00-2366
(Fla. June 26, 2003), I cannot agree that the presence of an aggravating
circumstance that is arguably "exempt" from Sixth Amendment requirements allows
the Court to ignore the express mandate of Ring that aggravating circumstances
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used to justify a death sentence must be found by a jury and not by a judge alone.
Implicit in the majority's proposition that certain aggravating circumstances
are exempt from Ring and Apprendi analysis is the mirror proposition that other
aggravating circumstances are not exempt.  Notably, in the instant case, the
aggravating circumstance that the majority does not conclude to be exempt is that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  See § 921.141(5)(h),
Fla. Stat. (2001).  The trial court not only independently found this "non-exempt"
aggravator, but also assigned it "great weight" in its decision to impose the death
penalty.  I find it inconsistent to uphold a death sentence based upon a trial judge's
finding of HAC, and the judge's assignment of "great weight" to that finding, while
at the same time ignoring the fact that this aggravating circumstance was found and
utilized in violation of Ring.
In effect, the Court has apparently determined that the judge's finding of
HAC is harmless error because other "exempt" aggravating factors exist.  However,
the seriousness of this aggravating factor and the weight assigned to it by the trial
judge in his sentencing decision obviously preclude us from finding that this error
caused no harm.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 
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Peter L. Dearing, Judge - Case No. 99-1156 CFA
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and W. C. McLain, Assistant Public Defender,
Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee