Title: State v. Elder

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

70 Wn.2d 414 (1967) 423 P.2d 533 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JOHN WESLEY ELDER et al., Appellants, MARTHA BASEHART et al., Defendants.[*] No. 38738. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. February 2, 1967. Kenneth C. Hawkins, for appellants. The Attorney General and William L. Donais, Assistant, for respondent. OTT, J. This is a condemnation proceeding in which the jury awarded the sum of $7,600 to the property owner. The evidence of damage and value was highly conflicting, ranging from $82,000 upon the part of the owner's witnesses to $7,600 upon the part of the state's witnesses. The appeal is predicated solely upon the trial court's alleged error in refusing to give several of appellants' proposed instructions. None of the instructions which the court gave were excepted to by appellants and they became the law of the case. Pacific Intermountain Express v. Olson, 59 Wn.2d 666, 369 P.2d 856 (1962). On appeal, the appellants admitted that the instructions correctly stated the law, but *415 alleged that they did not contain language which properly presented to the jury the appellants' theory of the case. The instructions given, insofar as they are material to the issues on appeal, are as follows: The appellants assign error to the court's failure to give their proposed instruction No. 9: Appellants assert that potential future uses affect the judgment of willing buyers and willing sellers. They assert that, "Without this instruction the jury was justified in disregarding the testimony as to gravel land." The law with reference to the possible future use of the land was specifically set out in the court's instruction No. 6, supra. The issue of the amount of an award, if any, to be allowed for the value of the gravel was presented to the jury in the court's instruction No. 9, supra. Since both of these theories were presented to the jury, the court did not err in refusing to give appellants' proposed instruction No. 9. Appellants next assign error to the court's refusal to give appellants' proposed instruction No. 7: [1] Several of the experts testified as to comparable sales which they used as an element in determining the value of the land. Each of these witnesses was cross examined relative to the time and place of sale. Appellants' proposed instruction No. 7 states: "You should disregard all comparable sales that are not made sufficiently near in time and place to be such as would not affect the judgment of a well-informed seller or buyer." This is one of the tests upon which the court determines the admissibility of the evidence. *419 It is not the province of the jury to determine admissibility of evidence. Their function is to weigh the evidence after the court has permitted them to consider it. Assuming arguendo that the instruction was proper, the court's instruction No. 14 expressed the law in broad and general terms as it related to opinion evidence. The court did not err in its refusal to give appellants' proposed instruction No. 7. Appellants next assign error to the court's refusal to give appellants' proposed instructions Nos. 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 24, 27, 28 and 30. Similar argument is made that these instructions should have been given because they contained language which specifically identified and emphasized elements of damage upon which appellants relied. [2] In passing upon the sufficiency of instructions, we are governed by the following general rules: (1) Instructions must be considered as a whole. Cunningham v. Town of Tieton, 60 Wn.2d 434, 374 P.2d 375 (1962). (2) Each party is entitled to instructions on his theory of the case which is sustained by substantial evidence. Carraway v. Johnson, 63 Wn.2d 212, 386 P.2d 420 (1963). (3) The court need not give amplified instructions, if the instructions given are broad enough to permit argument. Dole v. Goebel, 67 Wn.2d 337, 407 P.2d 807 (1965). (4) The court's instructions should contain general statements of the applicable law. Vangemert v. McCalmon, 68 Wn.2d 618, 414 P.2d 617 (1966). (5) Instructions are sufficient if each party can argue satisfactorily to the jury his theory of the case. Hartman v. Port of Seattle, 63 Wn.2d 879, 389 P.2d 669 (1964). Applying these rules to the instructions given by the court and to appellants' proposed instructions, we hold that the court did not err in refusing to give the amplified instructions requested and that the instructions given were sufficient to permit the appellants to satisfactorily argue their theory of the case to the jury. The judgment is affirmed. HILL, HUNTER, and HAMILTON, JJ., and JAMES, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 423 P.2d 533.