Title: Nollsch v. City of Rock Springs

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Nollsch v. City of Rock Springs1986 WY 167724 P.2d 447Case Number: 86-16Decided: 08/29/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Donald NOLLSCH, Appellant (Appellant/Defendant),

v.

CITY OF ROCK SPRINGS, 
Appellee (Appellee/Plaintiff).

Appeal from The District Court,SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Donald Nollsch, 
pro se.

Jeffrey A. 
Schalow, Rock 
Springs, for 
appellee (appellee/plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this rather unique 
case, presented by Donald Nollsch, acting as his own counsel, we are called to 
address the right to a jury trial in a municipal court. A corollary matter 
raised is whether the concept of jury nullification must be accounted for in 
considering a right to a jury trial. Other issues relating to the jurisdiction 
of the municipal court; the concept of licensing by a municipality; and the 
sufficiency of the evidence are raised. The municipal court found Nollsch guilty 
of violating a local ordinance requiring licenses for dogs, fined him $10.00, 
and also assesssed $10.00 in court costs. He appealed to the district court 
which affirmed the judgment of the municipal court. We affirm the district 
court.

[¶2.]     In his brief Nollsch 
asks this court to resolve, favorably to him, the following issues which he 
charges are present in this case:

"1. The trial court is a 
court of limited jurisdiction and jurisdiction was challenged, and never 
proven.

"2. The appellant, being 
a sovereign, having constitutional rights, exercised his rights and allegedly 
violated a city ordinance. Rights supersede law, and therefore, there could not 
have been a violation.

"3. The essential 
elements of a crime were not present, therefore there was no triable issue at 
law.

"4. The appellant in an 
attempt to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial was interfered with 
by the trial court, denial of a jury trial, resulting in an unlawful seizure of 
property.

"5. By the wording of the 
statute, the denial of a jury trial, and subsequently, the denial of the 
citizen's right to jury nullification, the appellant was denied due process of 
law."

[¶3.]     The underlying facts 
are not complex. Nollsch kept a dog which was owned by his brother within his 
fenced yard in the City of Rock Springs. One day the animal control supervisor for the 
City of Rock 
Springs saw the dog and another dog running at large, and 
followed the dogs until they went into Nollsch's open garage. Upon inquiry 
Nollsch admitted that the dog belonged to him, and the officer then cited 
Nollsch for the offense of a dog at large and a dog not 
licensed.

[¶4.]     Before the municipal 
court for the City of Rock Springs Nollsch conceded that the dog belonging to his brother 
did not have a license and was off of his premises. The trial court then found 
him guilty of a violation of Ordinance 3-521 of the City of Rock Springs which 
provides:

"(a) Any person owning, 
keeping, harboring, or having custody of any dog or cat of more than three 
months of age within the city of Rock Springs, must obtain a license as herein 
provided.

* * * * * 
*

"(g) Dogs and cats must 
wear the city identification tag or collar at all times when off the premises of 
the owners."

[¶5.]     We have no difficulty 
in sustaining the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Article 5, § 1, of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming authorizes the legislature to 
establish subordinate courts. Municipal courts are created pursuant to § 
5-6-101, W.S. 1977. Section 5-6-102, W.S. 1977, then provides that municipal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the ordinances of cities 
and towns which occur within the city limits. As noted, Nollsch concedes that 
the dog did not have the requisite license, agrees that the dog was at large 
within the City of Rock 
Springs, and recognizes that the ordinance prohibited 
this. He argues, however, that the municipal court itself is "an 
unconstitutional court." Unfortunately he cites no pertinent authority for his 
position nor does he offer any cogent argument. Instead he seems to focus upon 
the assumed duty of the trial judge to establish that he had jurisdiction. 
Nollsch's contention with respect to jurisdiction simply is not pukka, and we 
will not address this issue. Freeman v. Town of 
Lusk, Wyo., 717 P.2d 331 
(1986).

[¶6.]     In a second argument 
Nollsch contends that the word "license" is defined as connoting "permission to 
do some act * * * on the land of the licensor". He quotes "Bouvier's Law 
Dictionary, 1974, 1914 Edition," and argues that since the dog did not go upon 
any land of the city but only other private property, the city could not require 
him to obtain a license. Unfortunately, Nollsch is misled by relying only upon a 
definition of the word "license" restricted to granting permission to someone to 
conduct activities on another's land. The word "license," embraces a broader 
concept of granting permission in the context of the licensing of activities by 
municipalities. See, e.g., Littleton v. Burgess, 
14 Wyo. 173, 82 P. 864 (1905) (license to 
operate gambling house is a permit); Hahn v. State, 78 Wyo. 258, 322 P.2d 896 
(1958) (license to practice medicine confers permission). Section 15-1-103(xiv), 
W.S. 1977, grants to municipalities the authority to issue licenses for dogs. 
Such ordinances uniformly have been upheld in the face of constitutional 
challenges. 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 24.284 (3d Ed. 
1978).

[¶7.]     Nollsch's third claim 
of error focuses upon an assertion that because the city ordinance does not 
contain an element of intent it is unconstitutional. In Freeman v. Town of 
Lusk, supra, 717 P.2d  at 334, we disposed of a similar issue by saying:

"* * * It is well 
established that the legislature may adopt statutes defining crimes which are 
malum prohibitum, and which require no showing of any criminal intent beyond 
that encompassed in the conduct which violates the statute. * 
*"

[¶8.]     We then turn to 
Nollsch's claims relating to his right to a jury trial. He was charged in two 
counts. The municipal prohibition against a dog at large provided for a maximum 
penalty of a fine of $200.00 and set the fine at $10.00 for the first offense. 
The maximum penalty for having a dog that was not licensed was $25.00. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that petty offenses may 
be tried without a jury.

"So-called petty offenses 
were tried without juries both in England and in the colonies and have 
always been held to be exempt from the otherwise comprehensive language of the 
Sixth Amendment's jury trial provisions." Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160, 
88 S. Ct. 1444, 1453, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968).

Two years later 
the Supreme Court of the United 
States drew the line between 
petty offenses which do not require trial by jury and non-petty offenses which 
do require a jury trial at a maximum of six months imprisonment. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S. Ct. 1886, 26 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1970).

[¶9.]     In Wyoming, Rule 5(d), 
W.R.Cr.P.J.C., provides that: "There shall be no right to demand a jury trial in 
municipal court unless a jail sentence is provided for by ordinance upon 
conviction * * *." We thus have limited the right to a jury trial in a municipal 
court in a manner which is consistent with the supreme court decisions which 
have been cited, although our rule is less restrictive than the federal 
standard. In Lapp v. City of Worland, Wyo., 612 P.2d 868 (1980), in which the 
provisions in the Worland City Code under which Lapp was prosecuted provided for 
a jail sentence upon conviction (30 days), we held that the predecessor of this 
rule required a jury trial. See Brenner v. City of Casper, 723 P.2d 558 
(1986). In this case Nollsch did not suffer the risk of any imprisonment, and 
consequently he was not entitled to a jury trial under our rule or under any 
constitutional standard.

[¶10.]  Nollsch argues, however, that in denying 
him a jury trial the municipal court abrogated his right to have the jury 
nullify the ordinance as applied to him. The unreviewable power of a jury to 
acquit even in the fact of overwhelming evidence of guilt, sometimes described 
as jury nullification, long has been recognized and accepted as an integral and 
essential aspect of our criminal jury system. Bushell's Case, 6 Howell's State 
Trials 999 (1670); Dunn v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S. Ct. 189, 190, 76 L. Ed. 356 (1932); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 
Lessard v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 227 (1986). In recognizing the 
concept, however, other courts have announced the generally accepted rule that 
jury nullification is not a right enjoyed by a defendant in a criminal case. 
Sparf v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343 
(1895); United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1974); State v. Skuse, 
Alaska.App., 714 P.2d 368 (1986); Medley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 704 S.W.2d 190 
(1985); People v. St. Cyr, 129 Mich. App. 471, 341 N.W.2d 533 (1983); State v. 
Perkins, Minn., 353 N.W.2d 557 (1984); State v. Maloney, 126 N.H. 235, 490 A.2d 772 (1985); State v. Champa, R.I., 494 A.2d 102 (1985). Nollsch had no right to 
jury nullification and that concept does not require that he be afforded a jury 
trial in contravention of the clear provisions of Rule 5(d), 
W.R.Cr.P.J.C..

[¶11.]  We conclude that there was no error with 
respect to any aspect of the proceedings in the municipal court. The order of 
the district court affirming the judgment and sentence of the municipal court of 
the City of Rock 
Springs is affirmed.