Title: Touchette v. Ganal

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

922 P.2d 347 (1996) 82 Hawai`i 293 Wendy TOUCHETTE, Individually and as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Robert Touchette, deceased, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Kalah Kim Touchette, deceased minor, and as Special Administratrix of Joshua Michael Touchette, deceased minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mabel GANAL; Enivel, Inc. dba Young Laundry & Dry Cleaning;[1] Island Insurance Company, Limited,[2] Defendants-Appellees, and Orlando T. Ganal, Sr.; Dr. B.J. Williams; Dr. Corazon C. Hobbs, and Doe Defendants 1-100, Defendants. No. 19020. Supreme Court of Hawai`i. July 10, 1996. *348 Joseph P. H. Ahuna, Jr., Lionel M. Riley and John H. W. Yuen of the Law Offices of Joseph P. H. Ahuna, Jr., on the briefs, Kaneohe, for plaintiff-appellant Wendy Touchette, Individually, and as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Robert Touchette, deceased, and Special Administratrix of the Estate of Kalah Kim Touchette, deceased minor, and as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Joshua Michael Touchette, deceased minor. Ralph R. LaFountaine and Michael N. Tanoue of Matsumoto, LaFountaine & Chow, on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee Mabel Ganal. Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ. MOON, Chief Justice. In this civil action concerning deaths and injuries stemming from an intentionally-started fire, plaintiffs-appellants Wendy Touchette, individually (Wendy) and as special administratrix [hereinafter, collectively, appellant] of the estates of Michael Robert Touchette (Michael), Kalah Kim Touchette (Kalah) and Joshua Michael Touchette (Joshua) [hereinafter, collectively, the Touchettes], appeal from the First Circuit Court's order granting defendant-appellee Mabel Ganal's (Mabel) motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we vacate the circuit court's order and remand for further proceedings. The facts that form the basis of the present case are exhaustively set forth in this court's opinion in State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai`i 358, 362-65, 917 P.2d 370, 374-77 (1996). We therefore briefly recount only the pertinent facts. In early 1991, allegedly due to a workrelated injury, Orlando T. Ganal, Sr. (Ganal) became unable to work at his job at Young Laundry and was having difficulty obtaining workers' compensation. At roughly the same time, Mabel, Ganal's wife, began having an extra-marital affair with Michael's brother, David Touchette (David), a co-worker at her part-time job. Mabel and Ganal's marriage steadily deteriorated, and Mabel moved out of the house she shared with Ganal and moved into her parents' home in Waipahu. During the late evening of August 25, 1991, Ganal broke into Mabel's parents' Waipahu home, shot and killed Mabel's parents, and shot and injured Mabel and Orlando T. Ganal, Jr., Mabel and Ganal's son. Immediately thereafter, Ganal drove to the Touchettes' Kailua residence, where Ganal knew David to have stayed, blocked the outer doors shut, broke several windows, doused the interior rooms with gasoline, and set the house on fire. Although Wendy managed to escape the burning house alive, Michael, Wendy's husband, and Kalah and Joshua, Michael and Wendy's infant children, all eventually died as a result of thermal burns and smoke inhalation. Wendy was severely burned over approximately forty percent of her body and suffered scarring over much of her face. David was not in the house. Immediately after starting the fire at the Touchettes' home, Ganal drove to the Young Laundry premises near the airport, poured gasoline in a second-floor office and started another fire. Although Young Laundry employees *349 were present on the premises at the time of the fire, no one was injured. On July 7, 1993, appellant filed a civil complaint against, among others,[3] Ganal and Mabel, alleging the following facts and claims for relief: On January 26, 1994, Mabel filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 12(b)(6),[4] asserting that appellant had failed to state a claim against her upon which relief could be granted. By order filed April 15, 1994, the circuit court granted Mabel's motion to dismiss, stating that "pursuant to § 315 Restatement of Torts (Second) and Hawaii case law[,] Defendant MABEL GANAL had no duty to control the conduct of ORLANDO T. GANAL, SR.[,] as no required `special relationship' was alleged or shown at hearing." Appellant then filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order, which was denied by order filed March 14, 1994. Mabel then moved for certification, pursuant to HRCP Rule 54(b),[5] of the circuit court's order granting her motion to dismiss, which the circuit court granted by order filed November 1, 1994. This timely appeal followed. It is well settled that: Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 545, 852 P.2d 44, 52, reconsideration granted in part and denied in part, 74 Haw. 650, 875 P.2d 225 (1993). As previously noted, the circuit court concluded that Mabel did not owe appellant a duty pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 315 and 314A (1965), because Mabel lacked a requisite "special relationship" with both appellant and Ganal. We agree. Sections 314 through 325 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts address a person's duty to act for the protection of others. The general rule governing this duty is set out in section 314, which provides: Sections 314A through 325 address special applications of the general principle set forth in section 314. Comment a to section 314 provides: Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 314 comment a. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 315, comment a ("The rule stated in this Section is a special application of the general rule stated in § 314."). In Cuba v. Fernandez, 71 Haw. 627, 801 P.2d 1208 (1990), this court discussed the general principles governing when a person would have a duty to control the conduct of others pursuant to sections 315 and 314A and noted: See Wolsk v. State, 68 Haw. 299, 301, 711 P.2d 1300, 1302 (1986). The "special relations" referred to in § 315 are defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965) to include the following four situations: 71 Haw. at 631-32, 801 P.2d at 1211. See also Wolsk, 68 Haw. at 302, 711 P.2d at 1302. Thus, applied to the present case, Mabel would owe a duty to appellant under sections 315 and 314A only if Mabel bore a "special relation" to either appellant or Ganal. Section 314A contains a caveat stating that "[t]he Institute expresses no opinion as to whether there may not be other relations which impose a similar duty[,]" and this court has also recognized that the list of relationships delineated in section 314A is not exclusive or exhaustive. See, e.g., Doe v. Grosvenor Properties (Hawaii) Ltd., 73 Haw. 158, 163, 829 P.2d 512, 515 (1992) ("Section 314A of the Restatement sets forth a non-exclusive list of special relationships upon which a court may find a duty to protect." (Emphasis added.)); Cuba, 71 Haw. at 632, 801 P.2d at 1211 ("The `special relations' referred to in § 315 are defined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965) to include the following four situations[.]" (Emphasis added.)). Moreover, comment (b) to section 314A provides: Appellant does not argue on appeal, nor did she argue in opposition to Mabel's motion to dismiss in the circuit court, that she had a "special relation" with Mabel justifying application of the principles of section 315. The dispositive issue, therefore, is whether Mabel's relationship with Ganal constitutes a "special relation" contemplated by section 315, or more specifically, whether Mabel's marriage relationship with Ganal alone justifies the imposition of a duty to control Ganal for the protection of others pursuant to section 315. Although this issue is one of first impression in Hawai`i, the few other jurisdictions that have had occasion to consider the issue *354 to date have held that a marriage relationship does not fall within the scope of the "special relations" contemplated by section 315. For example, in Rozycki v. Peley, 199 N.J.Super. 571, 489 A.2d 1272 (1984), the parents of a group of young boys who were victims of sexual and physical assault by the defendant brought an action against the defendant and the defendant's wife, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant's wife had a duty to warn the boys of her husband's pedophilia because her marriage to her husband constituted a "special relation" within the scope of section 315. The Superior Court of New Jersey declined to impose a duty on the defendant's wife, holding in pertinent part that: 489 A.2d at 1276 (some citations omitted). Similarly, in Wise v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1008, 272 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1990), the defendant's husband mounted a sniper attack from the roof of his home, severely injuring a number of passing motorists, including the plaintiffs, before taking his own life. The plaintiffs brought suit against the defendant, asserting that the defendant had a duty, pursuant to section 315, to warn the the plaintiffs of her husband's conduct. The defendant moved for a demurrer and the superior court denied her motion. In reversing the superior court, the California Court of Appeal held that: 272 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25 (citations and some brackets omitted) (emphases in original). See also T.A. v. Allen, 447 Pa.Super. 302, 669 A.2d 360 (1995) (wife's co-ownership of property in tenancy by entireties insufficient to merit imposition of section 315 duty to warn or protect husband's grandchildren from sexual abuse by husband). We agree with the reasoning of the Rozycki and Wise courts and likewise hold that, without more, a marital relationship does not alone constitute a "special relation" under section 315 so as to merit the imposition of a duty to warn others or control the actions of a spouse. We therefore hold that the circuit court's order granting Mabel's motion to dismiss was correct insofar as it held that Mabel did not owe a duty to appellant under sections 315 and 314A because Mabel did not bear a "special relation" to either appellant or Ganal as contemplated by the language of section 315. Appellant next argues that the circuit court erred in granting Mabel's motion to dismiss because the circuit court failed to consider whether, pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 302, 302A, and 302B, Mabel had a duty to refrain from conduct that would create an unreasonable risk of harm to another through Ganal's conduct. We agree. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 302 (1965) sets out the general rule regarding a risk of direct or indirect harm. Section 302 provides: Sections 302A and 302B are "special application[s] of Clause (b) of [section 302]," Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 302 comment bsection 302A addressing "the risk of harm through the negligent or reckless conduct of others[,]" id., and section 302B addressing "the risk of the intentional or criminal conduct of others[.]" Id. Section 302A provides: Section 302B provides: The duty described under sections 302, 302A, and 302B differs from the duty described under sections 315 and 314A in that sections 302, 302A, and 302B posit a duty based on negligent acts or omissions, whereas sections 315 and 314A address only negligent omissions, or failures to act. Comment a to section 302 provides: Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 302 comment a (1965). This distinction has also been phrased in terms of "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance." Comment c to section 314 provides: Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 314 comment c (1965). Although we have had occasion to discuss the duty set out in sections 302, 302A, and 302B in the past, see, e.g., Haworth v. State, 60 Haw. 557, 592 P.2d 820 (1979) (reversing a judgment in favor of the state after a bench trial on a claim that, inter alia, the state breached its duty, pursuant to section 302A, to exercise reasonable care to avoid the danger of Haworth injuring himself while on a prison work assignment); see also Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 62 Haw. 530, 540, 618 P.2d 267, 274 (1980) (recognizing section 302A, although trial court's refusal to give jury instruction reciting section 302A was proper because instruction was ultimately unnecessary), the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction central to the dispositive issue in the present case is perhaps most exhaustively discussed in the California Court of Appeal's decision in Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980). In Pamela L., the three minor plaintiffs, who were allegedly sexually molested, brought suit against the alleged molester and his wife. The Superior Court of California sustained the wife's demurrer, and the children appealed. Rejecting the wife's argument that she owed no duty to the minors, the California Court of Appeal held: 169 Cal. Rptr. at 284 (emphases added and footnote omitted). We agree with the reasoning of Pamela L. and adopt it. Although, as previously noted, we have recognized the duty described in sections 302, 302A and 302B in the past, for purposes of clarity, we expressly hold that: (1) a negligent act or omission may be one which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through either (a) the continuous operation of a force started or continued by the act or omission, or (b) the foreseeable action of the other, a third person, an animal or a force of nature; (2) an act or an omission may also be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the negligent or reckless conduct of the other or a third person; and (3) an act or an omission also may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal. As previously discussed, the circuit court's role on a HRCP Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and, likewise, this court's role on appellate review, is to "view a plaintiff's complaint in a light most favorable to him or her in order to determine whether the allegations contained therein could warrant relief under any alternative theory." Baehr, 74 Haw. at 545, 852 P.2d at 52 (emphasis added). See Makanui v. Department of Educ., 6 Haw.App. 397, 403, 721 P.2d 165, 170 (1986) ("A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that can be proved in support of its allegations." (Citations omitted.)); 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1357 (2d. ed.1990) at 344-45 ("As a practical matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief. In other words, dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the complaint itself clearly demonstrate that plaintiff does not have a claim." (Footnotes omitted.)). In the present case, a review of the complaint, the memoranda in support of, and in opposition to, Mabel's motion to dismiss, the transcripts of the hearing, and the circuit court's order granting the motion, indicates that the circuit court granted Mabel's motion to dismiss solely on the ground that Mabel lacked a "special relation" with appellant and/or Ganal and, therefore, concluded that Mabel did not owe a duty to appellant. Although the circuit court's holding, as previously discussed, was correct regarding the question of Mabel's duty to appellant to affirmatively warn or to control Ganal pursuant to sections 315 and 314A, the circuit court failed to determine if Mabel owed a duty to appellant pursuant to other authority, especially in view of appellant's counsel's many attempts to direct the circuit court's attention to the potential viability of appellant's claims against Mabel based on the breach of the duty set out in sections 302, 302A and/or 302B. *358 Similar to Pamela L., appellant's complaint against Mabel in the present case alleges affirmative conduct, or alleged "misfeasance" on the part of Mabel, in that "DEFENDANT MABEL GANAL initiated and maintained a course of conduct which involved taunting and humiliating DEFENDANT ORLANDO T. GANAL, SR. by flaunting her extra marital love affair with David Touchette," (emphasis added), and that "DEFENDANT MABEL GANAL's extra marital love affair with David Touchette, and her conduct of taunting and humiliating DEFENDANT ORLANDO T. GANAL, SR. with respect to that affair, caused DEFENDANT ORLANDO T. GANAL, SR. to suffer severe and extreme emotional and mental distress and depression," (emphasis added), thereby implicating the duty described by sections 302, 302A and 302B. Mabel retorts by asserting that sections 302, 302A and 302B do not apply to the situation at hand and essentially argues that the circuit court's failure to consider the issue was harmless. We disagree. As previously noted, section 302 deems an act or omission negligent if it involves "an unreasonable risk of harm to another through ... the foreseeable action of the other, [or] a third person[.]" Similarly, sections 302A and 302B deem an act or omission negligent "if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another." Appellant's complaint provides in pertinent part: (Emphasis added.) Considering these allegations as true, as this court must on appellate review of a dismissal pursuant to HRCP Rule 12(b)(6), see Baehr, 74 Haw. at 545, 852 P.2d at 52, it is clear, and we so hold, that the allegations state a claim that potentially could warrant relief under a theory based on the duty stated in sections 302, 302A and/or 302B. Based on the foregoing, we vacate the circuit court's order granting Mabel's motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [1] The appeal against defendant-appellee Enivel, Inc. dba Young Laundry & Dry Cleaning was dismissed by stipulation filed September 18, 1995. [2] The appeal against defendant-appellee Island Insurance Company, Limited was dismissed by stipulation filed on September 21, 1995. [3] The other named defendants were Enivel, Inc. dba Young Laundry & Dry Cleaning, Island Insurance Co., Ltd., Dr. B.J. Williams, and Dr. Corazon C. Hobbs. [4] HRCP Rule 12(b) provides in pertinent part: DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONSWHEN AND HOW PRESENTEDBY PLEADING OR MOTIONMOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. (b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading ... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: ... (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.] (Bold emphasis in original.) [5] HRCP Rule 54(b) provides: Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. (Bold emphasis in original.)