Title: Ex parte Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and Charlie E. Hardy. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Fred D. Gray v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and Charlie E. Hardy)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 06/01/2007 Ex parte Metropolitan
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1060767
_________________________
Ex parte Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance
Company and Charlie E. Hardy
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Fred D. Gray
v.
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and
Charlie E. Hardy)
(Macon Circuit Court, CV-06-68)
LYONS, Justice.
1060767
2
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and
its agent, Charlie E. Hardy, petition this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the state court to vacate its order denying
their motion to dismiss the complaint of Fred D. Gray or,
alternatively, to stay the state-court proceedings pending
resolution 
of 
a 
declaratory-judgment 
action 
filed 
by
Metropolitan against Gray in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama. We deny the petition.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
Hardy sold Gray a Metropolitan homeowner's insurance
policy that covered Gray's residence in Tuskegee and specified
personal property for the period beginning on December 7,
2003, and ending on December 7, 2004.  On February 10, 2004,
a fire occurred at Gray's law office in Tuskegee, and he filed
a claim with Metropolitan under his homeowner's policy,
seeking the policy limits of $282,520. Gray contended that the
personal-property provision of his homeowner's policy covered
the personal property he lost in the fire at his office.
Metropolitan disputed coverage and on March 16, 2006, filed an
action in federal court seeking a judgment declaring that the
loss was not covered by Gray's homeowner's policy.  On March
1060767
Section 6-5-440, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
1
"No plaintiff is entitled to prosecute two
actions in the courts of this state at the same time
for the same cause and against the same party. In
such a case, the defendant may require the plaintiff
to elect which he will prosecute, if commenced
simultaneously, and the pendency of the former is a
good defense to the latter if commenced at different
times."
3
23, 2006, Gray sued Metropolitan and Hardy (hereinafter "the
insurer and its agent") in the Macon Circuit Court ("the state
court"), alleging breach of contract, bad-faith failure to
pay, negligence and/or wantonness, and fraud.  The insurer and
its agent filed with the Macon Circuit Court a motion to
dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, to stay the
state-court proceedings pending the resolution of the federal-
court action.  The insurer and its agent contended that the
obligations 
imposed 
by 
Rule 
13(a), 
Fed. 
R. 
Civ. 
P.
("Compulsory Counterclaims"), mandated dismissal or stay of
the subsequently filed state-court action.  
Although the insurer and its agent did not cite § 6-5-
440, Ala. Cod 1975,  in the motion to dismiss filed in the
1
state court, they cited Ex parte Canal Insurance Co., 534 So.
2d 582, 583 (Ala. 1988), in which this Court applied § 6-5-440
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4
in tandem with Rule 13(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., to order the
dismissal of a state-court action filed after a federal-court
action.  We treat the motion filed in the state court by the
insurer and its agent as sufficient to invoke the statutory
defense of a prior pending action, despite the absence of any
reference to § 6-5-440 in the motion.  The state court denied
the motion; the insurer and its agent then filed this
petition, relying, among other things, on § 6-5-440, in
seeking a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate
its order denying the motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to
stay the proceedings pending resolution of the federal-court
action.
II. Standard of Review
When the facts underlying a motion filed pursuant to § 6-
5-440 are undisputed, as is the case here, our review of the
application of the law to the facts is de novo.  Greene v.
Town of Cedar Bluff, [Ms. 1050814, February 16, 2007] ___ So.
2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2007).
III. Analysis
1. Applicability of Writ of Mandamus
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5
The insurer and its agent have invoked the writ of
mandamus as the procedural vehicle by which to seek review of
the state court's order denying their motion based upon the
doctrine of prior pending action.  See, e.g., Ex parte Canal
Ins. Co.,  534 So. 2d at 583, and Ex parte Breman Lake View
Resort, L.P., 729 So. 2d 849, 851 (Ala. 1999).  With respect
to the writ of mandamus, we stated in Ex parte Cincinnati
Insurance Cos., 806 So. 2d 376, 379 (Ala. 2001):
"The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ; one
petitioning for it must show (1) a clear legal right
in the petitioner to the order sought, (2) an
imperative duty on the respondent to perform, accompanied by
a refusal to do so, (3) the lack of another adequate remedy,
and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex
parte Breman Lake View Resort, L.P., 729 So. 2d 849, 851 (Ala.
1999)."
2.  The Effect of the Federal-Court Action
The insurer and its agent contend that under Rule 13(a),
Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 13(a), the matters made the basis of the
state-court action are compulsory counterclaims in the
federal-court action.  Rule 13(a) provides:
"(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall
state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time
of (a) serving the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties
1060767
6
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But
the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the
time the action was commenced the claim was the
subject of another pending action, or (2) the
opposing party brought suit upon the claim by
attachment or other process by which the court did
not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not
stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13."
The insurer and its agent rely on Cincinnati Insurance, which
deals with the substantially similar Rule 13(a), Ala. R. Civ.
P., and in which we stated: "The purpose of Rule 13[, Ala. R.
Civ. P.,] 'is to avoid circuity of actions and to enable the
court to settle all related claims in one action and thereby
avoid a wasteful multiplicity of litigation on claims that
arose from a single transaction or occurrence.'" 806 So. 2d at
379 (quoting Grow Group, Inc. v. Industrial Corrosion Control,
Inc., 601 So. 2d 934, 936 (Ala. 1992), and citing 6 Charles
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §
1409 (2d ed. 1990)). 
In Cincinnati Insurance, the plaintiff in the state-court
action asserted claims that arose out of the same nucleus of
operative facts as was involved in a previously filed
declaratory-judgment action in the federal court. After a
judgment had been entered in the federal-court action without
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the state-court plaintiff's having asserted a counterclaim in
the federal court, the defendant in the state court
unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the state-court action.  We
granted the defendant's petition of a writ of mandamus and
issued the writ, holding, independently of § 6-5-440, that the
state-court action was barred by the implicit prohibition
derived from the mandatory terms of Rule 13, Fed. R. Civ. P.,
against the subsequent assertion of claims that should have
been set forth as compulsory counterclaims in a concluded
prior proceeding in the federal court.  Because the federal-
court action here has not been reduced to a judgment, we lay
aside Cincinnati Insurance as not on point. 
The insurer and its agent also rely upon Ex parte Canal
Insurance Co., supra, in which this Court held:
"Since the matter raised in the state court
complaint constitutes a compulsory counterclaim in
the federal court action that was pending at the
time the state court action was commenced, the
statute [§ 6-5-440] compels dismissal of the state
court action."
534 So. 2d at 585.  In Ex parte Breman Lake View Resort, L.P.,
this Court described the interplay between a procedural rule
requiring service of compulsory counterclaims and § 6-5-440,
as follows:
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8
"This Court has held that the obligation imposed
on a defendant under Rule 13(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., to
assert 
compulsory 
counterclaims, when read in
conjunction with § 6-5-440, Ala. Code 1975, which
prohibits a party from prosecuting two actions for
the same cause and against the same party, is
tantamount to making the defendant with a compulsory
counterclaim in the first action a 'plaintiff' in
that action (for purposes of § 6-5-440) as of the
time of its commencement." 
729 So. 2d at 851. 
Gray does not contend that the matters made the basis of
the state-court action are so factually disparate as not to
arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of Metropolitan's federal-court action. Instead, Gray
contends, among other things, that a jurisdictional defect
prevents the assertion of the claim he now asserts in the
state-court action as a compulsory counterclaim in the
federal-court action.  We deal with this potentially
dispositive issue first.  
Gray argues that the prospect for joinder of Hardy as an
additional defendant on any counterclaim he might file in the
federal-court action would destroy diversity of citizenship
necessary for federal-court jurisdiction and that, therefore,
his claim is not a compulsory counterclaim.  Gray cites no
authority for this proposition.  In fact, the settled law is
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9
to the contrary.  See 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure  § 1436 (2d ed. 1990) ("It generally
has been held that persons brought into an action under Rule
13(h) as parties to either a compulsory counterclaim under
Rule 13(a) or a cross-claim under Rule 13(g) will come under
the ancillary subject matter jurisdiction of the court."). 
Gray also contends that the federal court had not assumed
jurisdiction over this action as of the time he filed the
state-court 
action, 
thus 
rendering 
Canal 
Insurance
inapplicable.  Gray points out critical facts omitted from the
insurer and its agent's petition.  Metropolitan's complaint in
the federal court not only failed to allege Metropolitan's
principal place of business, but it also  failed to allege the
citizenship of Gray, alleging only his residence.  Moreover,
attached to Gray's response to the petition is an order
entered sua sponte in the federal-court action on April 6,
2006, stating:
 "The allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are
insufficient to invoke this court's jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. 1332."
The federal court gave Metropolitan the opportunity to amend
its complaint, and the materials before us reflect that
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10
Metropolitan filed a timely amendment correcting the defects
but that that amended complaint was filed several days after
commencement of the state-court action.  
We agree with Gray that a determination that the federal-
court action was pending at the time of the commencement of
the state-court action is essential to the reliance by the
insurer and its agent on Canal Insurance.  The federal court's
finding that the allegations of Metropolitan's original
complaint 
were 
"insufficient 
to 
invoke 
this 
court's
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332" calls into question the
existence of the essential prerequisite of priority of the
federal-court action.  However, the insurer and its agent have
not given us any argument or authority (a) as to whether
Metropolitan's amended complaint relates back to the date of
filing of the initial complaint and, if so, (b) whether the
1060767
Smelser v. Trent, 698 So. 2d 1094, 1095 n. 3 (Ala.
2
1997)("An American Law Reports annotation states: 'The
doctrine of relation [back] ... is a legal fiction invented to
bridge the interval that must necessarily elapse between the
death of the owner of property and the orderly appointment of
a person to care for and distribute it to whosoever may be
entitled to it.'"); Farmer v. Wilson, 33 Ala. 446, 447 (1859)
("This court said, in Pearson v. Darrington, 21 Ala. 169
[(1852)], that 'the doctrine of relation back to a former
period, is a fiction, which is often indulged in advancement
of justice to sustain legal proceedings; but it is never
resorted to, when the result would be to deprive a party of a
clear 
legal 
right, 
or 
when 
it 
would 
work 
manifest
injustice.'").
11
"legal fiction"  of relation back should apply in the context
2
of proceedings in which a party invokes § 6-5-440. 
The burden of establishing a clear legal right to the
relief sought rests with the petitioner.  Cincinnati
Insurance, 806 So. 2d at 379. It is not this Court's function
to do independent research to determine whether a petitioner
for a writ of mandamus has established a clear legal right.
In Ex parte Showers, 812 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. 2001), this
Court stated:
"Rule 21(a), Ala. R. App. P., requires that a
petition to an appellate court for the writ of
mandamus 'shall contain ... a statement of the
reasons why the writ should issue, with citations to
the authorities and the statutes relied on.'
(Emphasis added.) Similarly, Rule 28(a)(5), Ala. R.
App. P., requires that arguments in briefs contain
'citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of
the record relied on.' (Emphasis added.) It is
1060767
12
settled 
that 
a 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
the
requirements of Rule 28(a)(5) requiring citation of
authority for arguments provides the Court with a
basis for disregarding those arguments:
"'When an appellant fails to cite any
authority for an argument on a particular
issue, this Court may affirm the judgment
as to that issue, for it is neither this
Court's duty nor its function to perform an
appellant's legal research. Rule 28(a)(5);
Spradlin v. Birmingham Airport Authority,
613 So. 2d 347 (Ala. 1993).'"
IV. Conclusion
The insurer and its agent have ignored the essential
element of the priority of the federal-court action over the
state-court action, in light of Metropolitan's defective
original complaint. The insurer and its agent have failed to
show a clear legal right to an order dismissing the state-
court action. The petition, therefore, is denied. 
PETITION DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.