Title: STATE v GOULD

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 84-135 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1985 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- JAMES DAVID GOULD, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL F R O M : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Lewis & Clark, The Honorable Thomas Olson, Judge p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL O F RECORD: For Appellant: Robert J. Emmons argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Kelena, Montana P a t r i c i a Schaeffer argued, A s s t . Atty. General, Helena Mike McGrath, County Attorney, Helena, Montana Submitted: March 21, 1985 Decided: J u l y 1, 1985 , I 1 s "! F i l e d : f985 M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Following a one-car a c c i d e n t , d e f e n d a n t , James David Gould, was charged w i t h n e g l i g e n t homicide and d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l . Gould's companion, Dawn Clough, was k i l l e d . A Lewis and Clark County District C o u r t j u r y r e t u r n e d g u i l t y v e r d i c t s on b o t h c h a r g e s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t s e n t e n c e d Gould t o 3 y e a r s imprisonment on t h e n e g l i g e n t homicide c h a r g e w i t h a l l b u t 6 months county j a i l t i m e sus- pended and imposed a $1,000 f i n e . H e r e c e i v e d 30 d a y s i m - prisonment and a $300 f i n e on t h e D U I charge. Defendant a p p e a l s . W e a f f i r m . The d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n a d m i t t i n g i n t o e v i - dence t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t s t h a t h e was d r i v i n g t h e v e h i c l e ? 2 . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 39, a s t o whether d e f e n d a n t ' s admis- s i o n s w e r e competently given? 3. Did t h e District Court err i n a d m i t t i n g t h e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e which c o n t a i n e d a s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e deceased was a p a s s e n g e r i n t h e v e h i c l e ? 4. Were t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s admissions c o r r o b o r a t e d by s u f f i c i e n t independent evidence? 5. Did t h e District Court err i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 33 and 41, r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r o o f r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e corpus d e l i c t i ? 6 . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 11, which i n s u b s t a n c e r e q u i r e d t h e j u r y t o f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t d e f e n d a n t was t h e d r i v e r o f t h e v e h i c l e ? 7 . Did t h e District Court err i n r e f u s i n g t o d i s m i s s t h e c h a r g e s a t t h e c l o s e o f t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e on t h e grounds that there was no evidence independent of defendant's admis- sions to show he was the driver? 8 . Did the District Court err in deleting a portion of defendant's proposed instruction no. 14 relating to the use of circumstantial evidence? 9. Did the District Court err in admitting expert testimony regarding defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident? 10. Did the District Court err in allowing evidence of the use of marijuana by the defendant and the decedent on the day of the accident? 11. Are §S 45-5-104 and 45-2-101 (37), MCA, unconstitu- tionally vague? 12. Did the District Court err in refusing defendant's proposed instructions no. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 38, which instruct- ed the jury in substance that a guilty verdict on negligent homicide required a finding of "conscious" disregard of the risk? 13. Did the District Court adequately instruct the jury that the .10 presumption of intoxication applied only to the DUI charge? 14. Did the District Court err in denying defendant's post-trial motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial? Because of the extensive factual arguments, we will set out the facts in some detail. On December 5, 1982, Dawn Marie Clough, 20 years of age, was killed in a single-vehicle accident. The defendant's theory of this case is that Ms. Clough was the driver of the vehicle, which was owned by defendant, and that he was a passenger at the time of the accident. The time and details of various circumstances are c o n t e s t e d . W e have completed a f u l l review of t h e t r a n s c r i p t , d e p o s i t i o n s and d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e . The d e f e n d a n t ' s t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g se- quence o f e v e n t s : h e had worked t h e day b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t . H e a t t e n d e d a p a r t y which l a s t e d u n t i l 2: 30 a.m. on t h e day o f t h e a c c i d e n t . H e picked up M s . Clough a t h e r p a r e n t s ' home i n G r e a t F a l l s around 10:OO a.m. and drove toward H o l t e r Lake, where t h e y planned t o go f i s h i n g . H e drank a b o u t f i v e b e e r s between G r e a t F a l l s and Wolf Creek. They stopped a t t h e O a s i s Bar i n Wolf Creek, where t h e y s t a y e d a b o u t t w o h o u r s d u r i n g which t h e d e f e n d a n t drank two o r t h r e e Black Velvet d i t c h e s . H e t h e n drove h i s p i c k u p t o t h e r e c r e a t i o n a l site a t t h e f a r end o f H o l t e r Lake, where t h e y s t a y e d d u r i n g t h e a f t e r n o o n . That a f t e r n o o n , he drank a b o u t f i v e b e e r s . They l e f t t h e l a k e j u s t b e f o r e d a r k , which would have been between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. H e d r o v e t h e 18-mile winding d i r t road back t o Wolf Creek, where t h e y a g a i n v i s i t e d t h e O a s i s Bar. Defendant may have had t h r e e Black Velvet d i t c h e s a t t h e b a r . (The b a r t e n d e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e served t h e c o u p l e two rounds, b u t M s . Clouqh d i d n o t d r i n k h e r s and t h e defen- d a n t drank a l l f o u r d r i n k s . ) H e d i d n o t e a t any food d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e day. They s t a y e d more t h a n an hour a t t h e O a s i s Bar and, i n d i f f e r e n t t e s t i m o n y , l e f t t h e b a r around 7:00 p.m. Defendant l e f t t h e b a r u p s e t o v e r an argument h e had g o t t e n i n t o a b o u t a pool game. H e drove away from t h e O a s i s Bar, b u t t h e n p u l l e d o v e r and stopped and t u r n e d t h e d r i v i n g o v e r t o M s . Clough w h i l e h e took a nap. H e n e x t remembers waking up i n t h e h n s p i t a l . While d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he remembered v e r y few d e t a i l s o f t h e evening, he s t a t e d t h a t he was " p o s i t i v e " t h a t he t u r n e d t h e d r i v i n g o v e r t o M s . Clough. When he l e f t t h ~ b a r , he was wearing a l a r g e parka and a l a r g e p a i r o f i n s u l a t e d b o o t s which w e r e l a c e d up and tucked under h i s p a n t l e g s . A f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , h e was found w i t h o u t b o o t s or parka. Defendant contends t h i s e v i d e n c e shows t h a t h e was n o t d r i v i n g t h e v e h i c l e and c o r r o b o r a t e s h i s t e s t i m o n y o f s t o p p i n g and t a k i n g o f f h i s c l o t h i n g . S c o t t O'Connell, t h e b a r t e n d e r a t t h e O a s i s Bar i n Wolf Creek, t e s t i f i e d a s f o l l o w s : t h e d e f e n d a n t and M s . Clough a r r i v e d a t t h e b a r between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. The d e f e n d a n t was u n a b l e t o s t a n d w e l l o r t o s h o o t pool v e r y w e l l . OIConnell f e l t t h a t d e f e n d a n t should n o t have any more t o d r i n k . The d e f e n d a n t became a b u s i v e , u s i n g f o u l language and p i c k i n g f i g h t s , and a s a r e s u l t was asked t o l e a v e . S e v e r a l people asked t h e d e f e n d a n t t o l e t t h e g i r l d r i v e . O'Connell himself d i s c u s s e d w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t whether he should d r i v e , and t h e d e f e n d a n t a t one p o i n t a g r e e d t o l e t Clough d r i v e . The c o u p l e went o u t s i d e , b u t t h e n came back i n t o look f o r d e f e n d a n t ' s c a r keys. A b a r p a t r o n found them under defen- d a n t ' s b e l t . The d e f e n d a n t g o t i n t o t h e d r i v e r ' s s e a t and drove away toward t h e e n t r a n c e t o 1-15. The a c c i d e n t oc- c u r r e d 8 m i l e s n o r t h o f Wolf Creek on 1-15. The b a r t e n d e r was n o t a b l e t o s a y s p e c i f i c a l l y what t i m e t h e c o u p l e l e f t t h e b a r . J i m Adams was a t t h e b a r a t t h e same t i m e a s d e f e n d a n t and t e s t i f i e d u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h a t t h e c o u p l e l e f t t h e O a s i s Bar a t 6:45 o r 7:00 p.m. Adams had e a r l i e r o f f e r e d M s . Clough a r i d e home t o G r e a t F a l l s i f t h e d e f e n d a n t r e f u s e d t o l e t h e r d r i v e . Robert Sturm, a c o n s t r u c t i o n worker who was d r i v i n g n o r t h on 1-15 w i t h two co-workers on t h e evening o f December 5 , 1982, w i t n e s s e d t h e a c c i d e n t . I n h i s rear-view m i r r o r , he saw d e f e n d a n t ' s p i c k u p e r r a t i c a l l y approaching from b e h i n d , t r a v e l i n g a t a b o u t 65 t o 70 m i l e s p e r hour. D e f e n d a n t ' s pickup passed s o c l o s e t o S t u r m ' s v e h i c l e t h a t Sturm was a f r a i d t h e y would touch. However, Sturm d i d n o t see who was d r i v i n g because it was d a r k and h e was busy d r i v i n g . A f t e r d e f e n d a n t ' s pickup p a s s e d , Sturm saw t h e v e h i c l e veer t o t h e r i g h t a s i f t o t a k e an o f f ramp a l t h o u g h one was n o t t h e r e . The pickup then veered t o t h e l e f t a c r o s s t h e northbound l a n e i n t o t h e c e n t e r median, d i d a s o m e r s a u l t and landed i n t h e southbound l a n e . Sturm d i d n o t see t h e c o u p l e thrown from t h e v e h i c l e . When he and h i s co-workers r a n t o t h e s c e n e , t h e y found t h e two o c c u p a n t s l y i n g on t h e road. Kevin O'Connell was t h e i n i t i a l p a s s e r b y t o r e n d e r f i r s t a i d . H i s f i r s t a i d t r a i n i n g c o n s i s t e d o f a o n e - q u a r t e r c o u r s e a t Montana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y i n 1 9 7 6 . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was i n shock, b u t came around somewhat a f t e r he became warmer. J a c k Shamley, a deputy s h e r i f f s t a t i o n e d a t Wolf Creek, was the f i r s t law enforcement o f f i c e r t o a r r i v e on t h e scene. H e s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t r a t i o n a l a t f i r s t , b u t was l a t e r a b l e t o answer Shamley's q u e s t i o n s a s t o where h e d i d o r d i d n o t h u r t . Shamley t e s t i f i e d he t h o u g h t d e f e n d a n t was i n shock, b u t found no "overwhelming evidence" o f shock. James T a n n e h i l l was t h e f i r s t highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r t o a r r i v e a t t h e scene. H e r e c e i v e d a c a l l a t a b o u t 7:30 p.m. and a r r i v e d 15 minutes l a t e r . H e determined t h a t M s . Clough was dead and found t h e d e f e n d a n t l y i n g on t h e roadway covered w i t h b l a n k e t s and c o a t s . Defendant was l y i n g w i t h h i s head on M s . Clough's f e e t , b u t f a c i n g away from h e r . T a n n e h i l l asked t h e d e f e n d a n t who owned t h e v e h i c l e . The d e f e n d a n t r e p l i e d it was h i s . T a n n e h i l l t h e n asked t h e d e f e n d a n t i f h e was d r i v i n g t h e v e h i c l e . The d e f e n d a n t answered y e s . T a n n e h i l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e s e a r e r o u t i n e i n v e s t i g a t i v e q u e s t i o n s asked a t t h e scene of an a c c i d e n t . Highway P a t r o l O f f i c e r Gene T i n s l e y a r r i v e d a t t h e scene s h o r t l y a f t e r T a n n e h i l l . H e was d i r e c t e d t o s t a y w i t h t h e victims w h i l e T a n n e h i l l conducted t h e a c c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T i n s l e y was w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n t i n u o u s l y f o r approximately 30 t o 35 minutes. During t h a t t i m e , he conversed c o n s t a n t 3 y w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t i n o r d e r t o keep t h e d e f e n d a n t awake. T i n s l e y asked t h e d e f e n d a n t whose v e h i c l e it was and who was d r i v i n g . The d e f e n d a n t r e p l i e d it was h i s v e h i c l e and he was d r i v i n g . T i n s l e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t seemed a b l e t o understand h i s q u e s t i o n s and t o respond a p p r o p r i a t e l y . T i n s l e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n impaired h i s a b i l i t y t o communicate, a l t h o u g h h e agreed t h a t d e f e n d a n t appeared "a l i t t l e confused." O f f i c e r T i n s l e y t r e a t e d Gould f o r shock a s s u c h a c c i d e n t v i c t i m s a r e r o u t i n e l y t r e a t e d . I n Gould's c a s e , T i n s l e y observed no g r o s s symptoms o f shock and found no i n j u r i e s . T i n s l e y noted t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was f a c i n g away from M s . Clough and d i d n o t change h i s p o s i t i o n b e f o r e b e i n g loaded into t h e ambulance. D e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t because he a r g u e s t h a t h i s l a c k o f competence i s demonstrated by t h e f a c t t h a t he was l y i n g w i t h h i s head on M s . Clough's f e e t , b u t was unaware o f where s h e was. The ambulance a r r i v e d a t t h e s c e n e around 8:15 p.m. Donald Fleming, ambulance a t t e n d a n t and c e r t i f i e d medical t e c h n i c i a n , rode w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e ambulance from t h e scene t o G r e a t F a l l s and checked h i s v i t a l s i g n s . When t h e d e f e n d a n t was i n i t i a l l y p l a c e d i n t h e ambulance, h i s blood p r e s s u r e was 100 and h i s p u l s e was 6 0 , which i s w i t h i n t h e normal range. I n o r d e r t o complete h i s forms, Fleming asked t h e d e f e n d a n t who was d r i v i n g . Fleming phrased t h e q u e s t i o n s i n a c o u p l e o f d i f f e r e n t ways. The d e f e n d a n t responded c o n s i s t e n t l y t h a t he was d r i v i n g . Fleming a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n and n e u r o l o g i c a l r e s p o n s e s w e r e good. The d e f e n d a n t had f a i r l y good r e c a l l . B e was a b l e t o answer simple q u e s t i o n s such a s h i s name, a d d r e s s and t e l e p h o n e number. About 15 m i n u t e s a f t e r defen- d a n t was p l a c e d i n t h e ambulance, h i s blood p r e s s u r e was 120 and h i s p u l s e was 82. These v i t a l s i g n s remained s t a b l e f o r t h e rest o f t h e t r i p , which took a b o u t 4 5 minutes. When t h e y w e r e a b o u t 10 minutes from G r e a t F a l l s , Fleming a g a i n asked t h e d e f e n d a n t who was d r i v i n g . The d e f e n d a n t s a i d t h a t he was d r i v i n g and t h a t h e n e v e r l e t anyone else d r i v e h i s pickup. Fleming t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e i n t e r i o r o f t h e ambulance was h e a t e d and t h a t what appeared t o have been shock symptoms could have been t h e r e s u l t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t l y i n g on c o l d pavement. The d e f e n d a n t ' s competency a t t h e t i m e h e made t h e admissions was d i s p u t e d i n t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g and a t t r i a l . O n a p p e a l , d e f e n d a n t emphasizes a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e o f h i s c o n d i t i o n . T h i s evidence i n c l u d e s d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e - ments t h a t t h e r e w e r e t h r e e r a t h e r t h a n two p e r s o n s i n t h e v e h i c l e . The d e f e n d a n t picked Clough up a t 5:30 p.m. r a t h e r t h a n 10 o ' c l o c k . Defendant wanted t o walk home. The guy who caused t h e a c c i d e n t b e t t e r h i d e o u t . And e v e r y t h i n g would b e okay i f t h e ambulance a t t e n d a n t gave him a b e e r . I n a d d i - t i o n , some o f t h e w i t n e s s e s c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e d e f e n d a n t a s n o t responding t o q u e s t i o n s , u n a b l e t o converse r a t i o n a l l y , mumbling, confused and i n a s t a t e o f shock. The d e f e n d a n t contends h e h a s no r e c o l l e c t i o n o f any o f t h e s e e v e n t s and t h a t he was t o o d i s o r i e n t e d t o l e g i b l y w r i t e h i s name on t h e blood a l c o h o l c o n s e n t form. Defendant t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t h e a c t u a l l y lets o t h e r p e o p l e d r i v e h i s t r u c k . Counsel emphasizes t h a t none o f t h e w i t n e s s e s asked d e f e n d a n t , "Were you d r i v i n g a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . " Counsel c o n t e n d s ----- t h e d e f e n d a n t may n o t have known t h e q u e s t i o n meant a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y through William Newhouse, a f o r e n s i c s c i e n t i s t from t h e Department o f J u s t i c e crime l a b o r a t o r y , on t h e s u b j e c t o f blood a l c o h o l c o n t e n t measurement and t h e symptoms a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v a r i o u s l e v e l s . A blood sample t a k e n from t h e d e f e n d a n t a t 9:30 p.m. on t h e n i g h t o f t h e a c c i d e n t showed a blood a l c o h o l c o n t e n t o f .29 p e r c e n t . A sample t a k e n a t 9:45 p.m. showed a blood a l c o h o l c o n t e n t o f .26 p e r c e n t . Based upon t h i s e v i d e n c e and t h e evidence o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s l e a d i n g up t o t h e a c c i d e n t , Newhouse t e s t i f i e d t h a t a h y p o t h e t i c a l person would have had t o d r i n k approximately 22 d r i n k s t o r e a c h a .26 a t 9:45 p.m., and would have had a blood a l c o h o l c o n t e n t of a p p r o x i m a t e l y .10 t o .11 a t around 7:30 p.m. Newhouse i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e s e l e v e l s w e r e approximations and t h a t t h e r e could b e v a r i a t i o n among i n d i v i d u a l s . D r . P f a f f , a f o r e n s i c p a t h o l o g i s t , was c a l l e d a s a w i t n e s s by t h e d e f e n s e . H e s t a t e d u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h a t it was i m p o s s i b l e t o c a l c u l a t e t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s blood a l c o h o l a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . P f a f f d i d e s t i m a t e t h a t t h e a v e r a g e person would have a l e v e l o f .15 p e r c e n t under s i m i l a r cir- cumstances. During cross-examination, P f a f f s t a t e d t h a t based upon what he knew a b o u t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n , d e f e n d a n t was n o t i n shock when h e e n t e r e d t h e h o s p i t a l . H e s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s symptoms w e r e p r o b a b l y a l c o h o l - r e l a t e d . P f a f f a l s o t e s t i f i e d r e g a r d i n g a n a u t o p s y conducted on M s . Clough's body. No a u t o p s y was performed u n t i l t h e body was exhumed on motion o f d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . P f a f f conducted an autopsy t o determine whether any o f M s . Clough's p h y s i c a l i n j u r i e s tended t o i n d i c a t e whether Clough was t h e d r i v e r or t h e passenger i n t h e v e h i c l e . P f a f f ' s autopsy d i s c l o s e d no i n d i c a t i o n s whether she was t h e d r i v e r o r t h e passenger. P f a f f a l s o examined t h e medical r e c o r d s o f defend3nt and concluded t h e y d i d n o t d i s c l o s e any p h y s i c a l i n j u r y i n d i c a t - i n g whether he was t h e d r i v e r o r t h e passenger. The record c o n t a i n s no o t h e r physical o r d i r e c t evidence i n d i c a t i n g who t h e d r i v e r was. O n December 29, 1982, defendant was charged by informa- t i o n w i t h n e g l i g e n t homicide f o r t h e d e a t h o f Dawn Clough on December 5 , 1982, o p e r a t i n g a motor v e h i c l e under t h e i n f l u - ence o f a l c o h o l o r d r u g s , and f a i l i n g t o have l i a b i l i t y insurance. The drug-related p o r t i o n o f t h e DUI charge was l a t e r dismissed. The charge o f f a i l i n g t o have l i a b i l i t y insurance was severed f o r s e p a r a t e determination. O n January 19, 1983, defendant moved t o suppress a l l evidence o f s t a t e m e n t s made a t t h e scene o f t h e a c c i d e n t on t h e grounds t h a t he was i n shock and n o t mentally competent t o i n t e l l i g e n t l y answer t h e q u e s t i o n s . A suppression h e a r i n g was held on August 18, 1983. The h e a r i n g included testimony by numerous w i t n e s s e s and t h e d e p o s i t i o n o f D r . P f a f f . Post-hearing b r i e f s w e r e submitted by both p a r t i e s . The D i s t r i c t Court found by a preponderance o f t h e evidence t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s statements w e r e voluntary. The c o u r t took i n t o account t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e circumstances, i n c l u d i n g t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e l e n g t h o f t i m e t h a t defendant was observed by highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r s and emergency medical personnel, and t h e f a c t t h a t h i s s t a t e m e n t s t h a t he was t h e d r i v e r w e r e c o n s i s t e n t throughout. The c o u r t denied t h e motion t o suppress. A jury t r i a l was held b e f o r e Judge Thomas Olson on September 6 through September 9 , 1983. The j u r y r e t u r n e d v e r d i c t s of g u i l t y on both t h e n e g l i g e n t homicide and operating an automobile under the influence of alcohol charg- es. Judgment was entered January 26, 1984. Defendant appea 1 s . Did the District Court err in admitting into evidence the defendant's statements that he was driving the vehicle? The defendant contends that his statements that he was driving the vehicle were not competent, and the District Court erred in admitting them into evidence. The defendant argues that he was in shock and so intoxicated both at the scene of the accident and in the ambulance that he was inca- pable of making a voluntary statement. The defendant and the State essentially agree as to legal standards governing the admissibility determination. Section 46-13-301, MCA, in pertinent part provides: " (1) A defendant may move to suppress as evidence any confession or admission given by him on the ground that it was not voluntary. . . . " (4) [T]he prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession or admission was voluntary. " (5) The issue of the admissibility of the confession or admission may not be submitted to the jury. If the confession or admission is determined to be admissi- ble, the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession or admission may be submitted to the jury as bearing upon the credibility or the weight to be given to the confession or admission." The standard to be applied in our review of this issue is whether there is substantial credible evidence to support the District Court's finding. As stated in State v. Grimestad (1-979), 183 Mont. 29, 37, 598 P.2d 198, 203: "Smith and Lenon make it clear that the standard to be applied by the trial judge on a suppression question is 'preponder- ance of the evidence' but when the same q u e s t i o n comes t o u s on a p p e a l t h e c r e d i - b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s and t h e weight t o be given t h e i r t e s t i m o n y i s f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n and o u r review i s l i m i t e d t o d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g t h e District C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s . " A n admission i s competent and a d m i s s i b l e where t h e d e f e n d a n t is found c a p a b l e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g and responding i n a n i n t e l l i g e n t manner. T h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s based upon t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , which i n c l u d e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e " d e f e n d a n t ' s demeanor, coherence, a r t i c u l a t e n e s s , h i s c a p a c i t y t o make f u l l u s e o f h i s f a c u l t i e s , h i s memory and h i s o v e r a l l i n t e l l i g e n c e . " United S t a t e s v . H o l l i s ( D . D e 1 . 1 9 7 5 ) , 387 F.Supp. 21.3, 220; Annotation, 69 A.L.R.2d 361. The d e g r e e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t o x i c a t i o n a t t h e t i m e o f t h e admissions does n o t a l o n e determine t h e competence o r admis- s i b i l i t y o f a n admission. See S t a t e v. Emerson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 285, 546 P.2d 509. Thus, even where t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s blood a l c o h o l a t t h e t i m e o f t h e admission i s e x t r e m e l y h i g h , t h e s t a t e m e n t s a r e a d m i s s i b l e i f t h e e v i d e n c e shows t h e d e f e n d a n t was c a p a b l e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g and responding i n an i n t e l l i g e n t manner. See S t a t e v. Chapman (Wash. 1 9 7 4 ) , 526 P.2d 64 (blood a l c o h o l level . 2 7 ) . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d a s a r e l e v a n t f a c t o r t h e t r u s t w o r - t h i n e s s o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s a s i n d i c a t e d by t h e " c o n t e n t o f t h e [ s t a t e m e n t s ] o r e v i d e n c e o f subsequent e v e n t s which c o n f i r m t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s . " Emerson, 169 Mont. a t 288-89, 546 P.2d a t 511. The s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g t e s t i m o n y a s a whole i n d i c a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t was l y i n g on t h e c o l d pavement and a p p a r e n t l y unconscious when h e l p f i r s t a r r i v e d . Defendant d i d n o t respond t o q u e s t i o n s . Kevin OIConnelI. and o t h e r s a t t h e scene covered t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h b l a n k e t s . By t h e t i m e Deputy S h e r i f f Shamley a r r i v e d , t h e d e f e n d a n t had begun t o warm up and was a b l e t o respond t o a r e q u e s t t o move h i s f e e t . While Shamley was w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e d e f e n d a n t was a b l e t o respond t o i n q u i r i e s a b o u t where h e h u r t . A f t e r Highway P a t r o l O f f i c e r T a n n e h i l l a r r i v e d , T a n n ~ h i l l and o t h e r s p l a c e d b l a n k e t s under t h e d e f e n d a n t t o keep him o f f t h e c o l d ground. OIConnel 1 t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f ~ n d a n t warmed up and began t a l k i n g a f t e r t h e b l a n k e t s w e r e p l a c e d under him. G e n e r a l l y , t h e t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t became more c o h e r e n t and aware a s h e warmed up. The t e s t i m o n y o f t h e o f f i c e r s a t t h e s c e n e and t h e ambulance d r i v e r who t r a n s p o r t e d d e f e n d a n t t o t h e h o s p i t a l was t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was c o h e r e n t and a b l e t o c a r r y on a r a t i o n a l c o n v e r s a t i o n . O f f i c e r T a n n e h i l l d i d n o t o b s e r v e any g r o s s symptoms o f shock. H e b e l i e v e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s re- sponses were l o g i c a l and r a t i o n a l . O f f i c e r T i n s l e y s p e n t 30 t o 4 5 minutes c o n v e r s i n g w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t and observed t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a b l e t o c a r r y on a normal c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h no d e l a y i n r e s p o n s e s . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s re- sponses w e r e c l e a r and u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . Donald Fleming, t h e ambulance a t t e n d a n t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a b l e t o respond t o q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g h i s i n j u r i e s . Fleming a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s blood p r e s s u r e and p u l s e w e r e w i t h i n a normal r a n g e , and t h e d e f e n d a n t responded c o n s i s - t e n t l y when asked whether he was d r i v i n g t h e v e h i c l e . While s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t may have been i n shock, D r . P f a f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t symptoms which could have been p e r c e i v e d a s shock by l a y p e r s o n s w e r e more l i k e l y a l c o h o l - r e l a t e d . William Newhouse, t h e S t a t e ' s f o r e n - sic e x p e r t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t i f a p e r s o n w i t h a . 2 0 blood a l c o h o l l e v e l c o u l d recite h i s name, b i r t h d a t e , r e s i d e n c e and o t h e r simple d a t a , t h e n t h e a l c o h o l l e v e l had p r o b a b l y n o t impaired h i s immediate memory. The ambulance a t t e n d a n t testified that defendant recited his rlame, birth date and residence in a consistent manner. In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the District Court stated that it found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's statements were voluntary. The court took into account the totality of the circumstances, includ- ing the observations of highway patrol officers and emergency medical personnel. The court noted that defendant's state- ments that he was the driver of the vehicle were consistent throughout the period leading up to defendant's hospitaliza- tion. Our review of the suppression hearing transcript indicates that there was conflicting evidence on this issue and that the trial court resolved this conflict in favor of admissibility of the statements. We conclude the transcript contains substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court on this issue. We hold the District Court did not err in admit- ting evidence of defendant's statements that he was driving the vehicle. I1 Did the District Court err in refusing defendant's proposed instruction no. 39 as to whether defendant's admis- sions were competently given? Defendant's refused instruction no. 39 stated: "Evidence has been admitted concerning a statement allegedly made by the Defen- dant. Before you consider such statement for any purpose, you must determine that the statement was given competently. In determining whether the statement was competently given, you should consider if the defendant had the capacity to be conscious of the events which occurred at the time of the alleged negligent homi- cide, whether he could retain those events in his memory, and whether he could recall them with reasonable accuracy . " Under S 46-13-301 ( 5 ) , MCA, t h e j u r y i s a1 lowed t o c o n s i d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s surrounding t h e making o f t h e admission a s b e a r i n g upon t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o r weight t o b e given t o t h e admission. The proposed i n s t r u c t i o n i n c o r r e c t l y a d d r e s s e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t ' s competence r a t h e r t h a n t h e w e i g h t or c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e evidence. T h i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y s h i f t s t h e i s s u e o f a d m i s s i b i l i t y t o t h e j u r y . I n a d d i t i o n , i n - s t r u c t i o n no. 8 i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury a s t o i t s role i n d e t e r - mining t h e weight and c r e d i b i l i t y t o b e accorded d e f e n d a n t ' s admissions. It t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t it was t h e e x c l u s i v e judge whether t h e s t a t e m e n t s w e r e t r u e i n whole o r i n p a r t . It a l s o i n s t r u c t e d them t o view t h e admissions w i t h c a u t i o n . I n S t a t e v. Lapp (Mont. 1 9 8 3 ) , 658 P.2d 400, 40 St.Rep 120, a l m o s t i d e n t i c a l i n s t r u c t i o n s were c o n s i d e r e d . T h i s Court r e j e c t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t an i n s t r u c t i o n s i m i l a r t o no. 39 should have been given t o t h e j u r y . W e hold t h e t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t err i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 39. I11 Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n a d m i t t i n g t h e d e a t h cer- t i f i c a t e which c o n t a i n e d a s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e deceased was a p a s s e n g e r i n t h e v e h i c l e ? The d e f e n d a n t contends t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g p o r t i o n of t h e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e should have been e x c i s e d b e f o r e admission: "Decedent was p a s s e n g e r i n a pick-up t r u c k which l e f t t h e roadway and over- t u r n e d . She was e j e c t e d from t h e v e h i c l e . " The c e r t i f i c a t e was admitted d u r i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e County Coroner who p r e p a r e d it i n t h e c o u r s e o f h i s o f f i c i a l d u t i e s . The d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e was a d m i s s i b l e t o prove t h e d e a t h o f M s . Clough under Rule 8 0 3 ( 9 ) , M.R.Evid. and S 50-15-109 (4), MCA. Admission i n t o evidence f o r t h a t purpose does n o t r e q u i r e t h e admission o f t h e e n t i r e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e . The c o r o n e r was e x t e n s i v e l y cross-examined by d e f e n s e counsel a s t o t h e s o u r c e o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d on t h e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e decedent b e i n g a passen- g e r . The c o r o n e r ' s t e s t i m o n y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t h e based t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t M s . Clough was a p a s s e n g e r upon h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t s a s t o d e f e n d a n t b e i n g t h e d r i v e r of t h e v e h i c l e . No p r o p e r foundation was l a i d f o r t h e admission o f t h a t p a r t o f t h e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e . W e conclude t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t on t h e c e r t i f i c a t e t h a t d e c e d e n t was a p a s s e n g e r should have been e x c i s e d p r i o r t o admission. While t h a t was n o t done, w e conclude t h a t t h e f a i l u r e d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e error. The t e s t i m o n y by t h e b a r t e n d e r and o t h e r w i t n e s s e s e s t a b l i s h e d a s u b s t a n - t i a l b a s i s f o r concluding t h a t d e c e d e n t was a p a s s e n g e r . While t h e s t a t e m e n t i n t h e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e was o b j e c t i o n - a b l e , it confirmed i n an i n s i g n i f i c a n t way o t h e r e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e c o u r t . W e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t commit r e v e r s - i b l e error i n a d m i t t i n g t h e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e . IV Were t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s admissions c o r r o b o r a t e d by s u f f i - c i e n t independent evidence? The d e f e n d a n t contends t h a t t h e S t a t e must e s t a b l i s h t h e corpus d e l i c t i by e v i d e n c e independent of t h e admissions on t h e p a r t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t . The d e f e n d a n t a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e b a r t e n d e r ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t he saw t h e d e f e n d a n t d r i v i n g away from t h e Wolf Creek Bar s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t because it f a i l s t o show t h a t h e was d r i v i n g a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e defen- d a n t l s admissions w e r e s u f f i c i e n t l y c o r r o b o r a t e d and t h a t t h e corpus d e l i c t i was e s t a b l i s h e d by independent e v i d e n c e . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e b a r a t 6:00 t o 6:15 p.m. T h i s l e a v e s s u b s t a n t i a l t i m e unaccounted f o r p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t , which took p l a c e a t approximately 7:00 p.m. While t h e e v i d e n c e i s n o t f r e e o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n on t h e m a t t e r o f t i m e , t h e r e c o r d s u b s t a n t i a t e s f i n d i n g s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e b a r a t 6:45 t o 7:00 p.m. The a c c i d e n t happened s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , and t h e f i r s t law enforcement o f f i c e r was c o n t a c t e d a t a b o u t Defendant a l s o contends t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g placement o f h i s b o o t s and parka is s i g n i f i c a n t t o show t h a t he was n o t d r i v i n g . That evidence does n o t i n f a c t a p p e a r t o be s i g n i f i c a n t . It c e r t a i n l y d o e s n o t prove c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t t u r n e d t h e d r i v i n g o v e r t o M s . Clough. The S t a t e contends t h a t § 45-5-111, MCA, i s a p p l i c a b l e . That s t a t u t e s t a t e s : " I n a homicide t r i a l , b e f o r e an e x t r a j u - d i c i a l c o n f e s s i o n may b e a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e , t h e s t a t e must i n t r o d u c e inde- pendent e v i d e n c e t e n d i n g t o e s t a b l i s h t h e d e a t h and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e a t h was caused by c r i m i n a l agency." (emphasis added) I t i s c l e a r from t h e s t a t u t e t h a t c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f a c o n f e s s i o n . S e c t i o n 45-5-111, MCA, was e n a c t e d i n 1973, w i t h amend- ments t o t h e somewhat stricter p r o v i s i o n s o f § 94-2510, R.C.M. 1947. Even under t h e former s t a t u t o r y s t a n d a r d , t h i s Court h a s h e l d t h a t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e c o r p u s d e l i c t i need n o t b e proven by independent e v i d e n c e o f i t s e l f s u f f i - c i e n t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. T h i s Court s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Ratkovich ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 111 Mont. 1 9 , 25, 105 P.2d 679, 682: "There must b e some independent evidence e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e corpus d e l i c t i , b u t it need n o t o f i t s e l f b e s u f f i c i e n t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a s , once t h e indepen- d e n t e v i d e n c e i s g i v e n , t h e c o n f e s s i o n may b e c o n s i d e r e d w i t h t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n e v i d e n c e i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e c o r p u s d e l i c t i is e s t a b l i s h e d . . . " (emphasis added) The D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a 1 e v i d e n c e beyond t h e admissions o f t h e d e f e n d a n t a l o n e . The D i s t r i c t Court p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s t o b e viewed i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e S t a t e . The judge r e f e r r e d t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f b a r t e n d e r O'Connell, who t e s t i f i e d a s t o h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s o f d e f e n d a n t ' s s e r i o u s l y i n t o x i c a t e d s t a t e , h i s d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t r e g a r d i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s i n a b i l i t y t o d r i v e , and f i n a l l y h i s o b s e r v a t i n n s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t n o n e t h e l e s s d r o v e t h e pickup away from t h e Wolf Creek Bar. With p a r t i c u l a r r e g a r d t o d r i v i n g away from t h e b a r i t s e l f , t h e b a r t e n d e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t f i r s t wanted t o d r i v e and, a f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n , agreed t o l e t M s . Clough d r i v e . L a t e r he changed h i s mind and i n s i s t e d t h a t he would d r i v e even though h e had t o l d t h e b a r t e n d e r h e would n o t d r i v e . The b a r t e n d e r saw t h e d e f e n d a n t d r i v e t h e p i c k u p away from t h e b a r . A n a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s observed t h e defen- d a n t ' s t r u c k b e i n g d r i v e n i n a extremely c a r e l e s s and t h r e a t - e n i n g manner. W e h o l d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a d m i s s i o n s w i t h r e g a r d t o d r i v i n g t h e v e h i c l e w e r e c o r r o b o r a t e d by s u f f i c i e n t indepen- d e n t evidence. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 3 3 and 41, r e l a t i n g t o t h e proof r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e corpus d e l i c t i ? The d i s c u s s i o n r e g a r d i n g c o r p u s d e l i c t i i n t h e p r e c e d i n g i s s u e i s a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . The i n s t r u c t i o n s proposed by t h e d e f e n d a n t w e r e : "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e r e must be independent e v i d e n c e o f t h e corpus d e l i c i t t o c o r r o b o r a t e an admission, and i n a c a s e o f N e g l i g e n t Homicide, a s h e r e , such independent evidence must b e proven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt." Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 3 3 "You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i n a c a s e o f Negligent Homicide, t h e r e must b e inde- pendent e v i d e n c e o f t h e c o r p u s d e l i c t i and such independent e v i d e n c e must b e proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt." Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 41 These i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e n o t c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t s o f t h e law. A s p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, Ratkovich e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t independent evidence need n o t b e s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e corpus d e l i c t i beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. Both i n s t r u c t i o n s r e q u i r e t h a t independent evidence must b e proven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. The District Court r e f u s e d t h e i n s t r u c - t i o n s because it concluded t h a t t h e c o r p u s d e l i c t j . i s n o t a q u e s t i o n t o be decided by t h e j u r y , b u t i s a t h r e s h o l d ques- t i o n f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e c o u r t . That i s e s s e n t i a l l y c o r r e c t a s t h e D i s t r i c t Court must f i r s t d e t e r m i n e i f t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t c o r r o b o r a t i v e e v i d e n c e b e f o r e r u l i n g on t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f t h e c o n f e s s i o n o r admission. W e conclude t h a t t h e District Court d i d n o t err i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s 33 and 41. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 11, which i n s u b s t a n c e r e q u i r e d t h e j u r y t o f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t d e f e n d a n t was t h e d r i v e r o f t h e v e h i c l e ? The i n s t r u c t i o n was r e p e t i t i v e . The j u r y was a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d on r e a s o n a b l e doubt i n o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s . W e hold t h a t no error was committed i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 11. V I I Did t h e District C o u r t err i n r e f u s i n g t o d i s m i s s t h e c h a r g e s a t t h e c l o s e o f t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e on grounds t h a t t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e independent o f d e f e n d a n t ' s admissions t o show he was t h e d r i v e r ? A s d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h i n I V above, t h e r e was s u b s t a n - t i a l evidence independent o f d e f e n d a n t ' s admissions t o show t h a t he was d r i v i n g . No f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n i s r e q u i r e d . There c l e a r l y was n o t a f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e c h a r g e s on t h i s t h e o r y a t t h e c l o s e o f t h e S t a t e ' s ca se-in-chief. V I I I Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n d e l e t i n g a p o r t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 14 r e l a t i n g t o t h e u s e o f c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence? The p o r t i o n o f t h e proposed i n s t r u c t i o n which t h e D i s - t r i c t Court d e l e t e d and t o which t h e d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s i s a s f o l l o w s : "However, you a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t you a r e n o t p e r m i t t e d on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e a l o n e t o f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f any crime charged a g a i n s t him u n l e s s t h e proved c i r c u m s t a n c e s n o t o n l y a r e c o n s i s - t e n t w i t h t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e defen- d a n t i s g u i l t y o f t h e crime, b u t a r e c o n s i s t e n t [ s i c ] w i t h any o t h e r r a t i o n a l c o n c l u s i o n . " I n S t a t e v. Bean ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 135 Mont. 135, 337 P.2d 9 3 0 , t h i s Court determined t h a t t h e s i m i l a r proposed i n s t r u c t i o n was p r o p e r l y r e j e c t e d . Such i n s t r u c t i o n i s a p p r o p r i a t e o n l y where a l l o f t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e i s c i r c u m s t a n t i a l . Here, t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l d i r e c t evidence. W e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t err i n d e l e t i n g a p o r t i o n o f defen- d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 14. IX Did the District Court err in admitting expert testimony regarding defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident? In substance, the defendant contends that because of the conflict in the evidence between Dr. Pfaff and Dr. Newhouse, Dr. Newhouse was not qualified as an expert to express an estimate of the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident. The State points out that Dr. Newhouse's opinions were given in response to hypothetical questions as an aid to the jury. The State argues that Newhouse was qualified as an expert and points out that the court in- structed the jury during the Newhouse testimony that expert witnesses may give opinions, but the jury is not bound to accept those opinions. In addition, there was substantial cross-examination of Newhouse by defendant's counsel. As we review the transcript, it appears that both ex- perts were testifying as to hypothetical averages, which would result from drinking a certain amount of alcohol under certain conditions. The hypothetical questions were within the scope of the evidence presented. The court instructed the jury that they could reject an expert's opinion. The District Court did not err in admitting the expert testimony. X Did the District Court. err in allowing evidence of the use of marijuana by the defendant and the decedent on the day of the accident? That evidence was admissible because the defendant initially was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, even though the drug charge was subsequent- ly dismissed. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e evidence was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d a s a p a r t o f t h e res g e s t a e , a s i n s e p a r a b l y i n t e r t w i n e d i n t h e e v e n t s l e a d i n g t o t h e a c c i d e n t . See S t a t e v. Trombley ( ~ o n t . 1 9 8 0 ) , 620 P.2d 367, 37 St.Rep. 1871. The d e f e n d a n t h a s n o t argued t h e o t h e r crimes r u l e , b u t h a s merely s t a t e d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was p r e j u d i c i a l . W e n o t e t h a t a f t e r t h e e v i d e n c e was a d m i t t e d , t h e D i s t r i c t Court gave an e x c e l l e n t c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n , emphasizing t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was o n l y t o show t h e flow o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h a t t h e j u r y should n o t con- c l u d e d e f e n d a n t was a bad person. W e hold t h a t t h e admission o f t h e evidence r e g a r d i n g t h e u s e o f marijuana was n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . A r e §§ 45-5-104 and 45-2-101(37), MCA, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l - l y vague? Defendant contends t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n of n e g l i g e n c e a s a p p l i e d t o n e g l i g e n t homicide i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a 1 l y vague. I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , t h e code s e c t i o n s p r o v i d e : "Negligent homicide. (1) Crimina 1 homi- c i d e c o n s t i t u t e s n e g l i g e n t homicide when it i s committed n e g l i g e n t l y . " § 45-5-104 ( I ) , MCA. " ' N e g l i g e n t l y ' -- a person a c t s n e g l i - g e n t l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o a r e s u l t or t o a circumstance d e s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g an o f f e n s e when h e c o n s c i o u s 1 d i s r e g a r d s a r i s k t h a t t h r r e s u l t w i l y o c c u r o r t h a t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e e x i s t s o r when he d i s r e q a r d s a - - r i s k o f which should-be aware t h a t t h e r e s u l t w i n - o c c u r or t h a t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e e x i s t s . The risk must b e o f such a n a t u r e and d e g r e e t h a t t o d i s r e g a r d it i n v o l v e s a g r o s s d e v i a t i o n from t h e s t a n d a r d o f conduct t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n would observe i n t h e a c t o r ' s s i t u a t i o n . 'Gross d e v i a t i o n ' means a d e v i a t i o n t h a t i s c o n s i d e r a b l y g r e a t e r t h a n l a c k o f o r d i - n a r y c a r e . R e l e v a n t t e r m s such a s 'neg- l i g e n t ' and ' w i t h n e g l i g e n c e ' have t h e same meaning. " 45-2-101 ( 3 7 ) , M C A (emphasis a d d e d ) . Defendant contends t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n of negligence a s applied t o n e g l i g e n t homicide i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague, r e l y i n g upon a statement by t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. B i e r (1979), 181 Mont. 27, 3 2 , 591 P.2d 1115, 1118. I n B i e r , we s t a t e d t h a t "although somewhat nehul ous i n concept, g r o s s negligence i s g e n e r a l l y considered t o f a l l s h o r t o f a reck- less d i s r e g a r d f o r consequences and i s s a i d t o d i f f e r from o r d i n a r y negligence only i n degree, n o t i n kind." Defendant f u r t h e r argues t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i s vague because, a s a p p l i e d by t h e Court, it d i d n o t r e q u i r e a con- s c i o u s d e v i a t i o n from a known r i s k , and because t h e s t a t u t e f a i l s t o a p p r i s e a person o f t h e standard o f conduct r e q u i r e d by t h e s t a t u t e . Defendant a l s o argues t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d cannot be a standard determined by a j u r y , b u t must be de- f i n e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . F i n a l l y , defendant contends t h a t jury i n s t r u c t i o n no. 1 5 ( a ) would a l l o w t h e jury t o c o n v i c t defendant f o r c r i m i n a l negligence even though t h e blood a l c o h o l l e v e l was less t h a n . l o . The S t a t e contends t h a t t h e holding by t h i s Court t h a t t h e t o r t concept o f g r o s s negligence i s somewhat nebulous does n o t i n any way support t h e claim t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s a r e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague. The S t a t e p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e standard i s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e must be s p e c i f i c enough t o g i v e f a i r n o t i c e of t h e conduct p r o h i b i t e d and t o provide a mean- i n g f u l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between c u l p a b l e and innocent conduct. The S t a t e p o i n t s o u t t h a t it i s n o t unreasonable t o l e a v e t o t h e jury t h e determination of g r o s s d e v i a t i o n from t h e s t a n - dard o f conduct t h a t a reasonable person would observe i n t h e a c t o r ' s s i t u a t i o n . The S t a t e a l s o contends t h a t t h e determination i s t o be made by t h e jury t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e t o t a l i t y o f defendant1 s conduct, i n c l u d i n g t h e speed of t h e v e h i c l e , d i s r e g a r d of warnings t h a t he was t o o drunk t o d r i v e , a s w e l l a s any evidence o f i n t o x i c a t i o n . I n Ketchum v. Ward (W.D.N.Y. 1 9 7 6 ) , 422 F.Supp. 934, a f f ' d , 556 F.2d 557 (2d C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , t h e c o u r t upheld a n e g l i g e n t homicide s t a t u t e s i m i l a r t o S 45-5-104(1), MCA. W e a g r e e w i t h t h e h o l d i n g i n Ketchum t h a t t h e i n a b i l i t y o f an a t t o r n e y t o p r e d i c t t h e outcome o f t h e j u r y d e l i b e r a t i o n s on t h e q u e s t i o n o f n e g l i - gence i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r a f i n d i n g o f u n c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l vagueness. W e a l s o adopt t h e view e x p r e s s e d by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n United S t a t e v . Ragen ( 1 9 4 2 ) , 314 U.S. 513, 523: "The mere f a c t t h a t a p e n a l s t a t u t e i s s o framed a s t o r e q u i r e a j u r y upon o c c a s i o n t o determine a q u e s t i o n o f r e a s o n a b l e n e s s is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o make it t o o vaque t o a f f o r d a p r a c t i c a l g u i d e t o p e r m i s s i b l e conduct. " A s w e c o n s i d e r t h e s t a t u t e s set f o r t h above, w e conclude t h a t t h e r e is no i n d e f i n i t e n e s s on t h e f a c e o f t h e s t a t u t e s s u f f i c i e n t t o r e q u i r e a h o l d i n g o f u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . W e a l s o conclude t h a t t h e r e i s no b a s i s f o r f i n d i n g t h e same u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s a p p l i e d t o p r e s e n t f a c t c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine t h a t conduct, which i n c l u d e d d r i n k i n g b o t h b e e r and whisky o v e r many h o u r s , d i s r e g a r d i n g warnings from s e v e r a l p e o p l e t h a t h e was t o o i n t o x i c a t e d t o d r i v e , and then g e t t i n g behind t h e wheel o f a v e h i c l e and d r i v i n g down t h e highway a t a speed c o n s i d e r a b l y i n e x c e s s o f t h e speed l i m i t , c o u l d n o t b e c l a s s e d a s a g r o s s d e v i a t i o n , meaning a d e v i a t i o n t h a t i s c o n s i d e r a b l y g r e a t e r t h a n t h e l a c k o f o r d i n a r y c a r e . W e conclude t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n a r e n o t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n no. 15 ( a ) allowed t h e j u r y t o c o n v i c t f o r c r i m i n a l n e g l i g e n c e merely on some d e g r e e o f i n t o x i c a t i o n . That i s n o t an a c c u r a t e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . I n s t r u c t i o n no. 15 c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s t h a t any i n t o x i c a t i o n r e l i e d upon must c o n s t i t u t e a g r o s s d e v i a t i o n from t h e s t a n d a r d o f c a r e a s d e f i n e d i n o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s . A s t h i s C o u r t h e l d i n S t a t e v . Cooke (Mont. 1 9 8 2 ) , 645 P.2d 1367, 39 St.Rep. 1026, c r i m i n a l n e g l i g e n c e c a n a r i s e a s a r e s u l t o f d r i v i n g a c a r w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d . W e c o n c l u d e t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n no. 1 5 ( a ) i s n o t improper. W e h o l d t h a t §§ 45-5-104 and 45-2-201(37), MCA, a r e n o t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague. XI1 Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 and 3 8 , which i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y i n s u b s t a n c e t h a t a g u i l t y v e r d i c t on n e g l i g e n t homicide r e q u i r e d a f i n d i n g o f " c o n s c i o u s " d i s r e g a r d o f t h e r i s k ? Defendant s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 5 and 38 r e f e r r e d t o t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h e d e f e n d a n t a c t i n g w i t h a m e n t a l s t a t e a s an e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e . Such i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e improp- er. T h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y d e c i d e d t h a t m e n t a l s t a t e i s n o t a n i s s u e i n n e g l i g e n t homicide c a s e s . S t a t e v. K i r k a l d i e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 283, 587 P.2d 1298. S e e a l s o , S t a t e v. Cook (Mont. 1 9 8 2 ) , 645 P.2d 1367, 1369, 39 St.Rep. 1026, 1029. D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 6 , 7 and 8 r e l a t e d t o t h e t e r m " c o n s c i o u s , " a s u s e d i n t h e f i r s t p a r t o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f n e g l i g e n c e i n S 45-2-101 ( 3 7 ) , MCA. A s t o i n s t r u c t i o n s 6 and 7 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t concluded t h a t t h e word " c o n s c i o u s l y " was a common word i n t h e E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e and r e q u i r e d no d e f i n i t i o n . T h a t f o l l o w s t h e h o l d i n g s o f t h i s C o u r t t h a t words o f common l a n g u a g e need n o t b e ex- p l a i n e d . S t a t e v. Camitsch (Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) , 626 P.2d 1250, 38 St.Rep. 563. The District Court d i d n o t abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n making t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n . With r e s p e c t t o proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 8 , it i n s e r t s t h e word "consciously" where it i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e . W e t h e r e f o r e conclude t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t err i n r e f u s i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 and 38. X I 1 1 Did t h e D i s t r i c t c o u r t a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t h a t t h e .10 presumption o f i n t o x i c a t i o n a p p l i e d on1.y t o t h e D U I charge? The d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n should have i n c l u d e d a c a u t i o n a r y s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e presumption t h a t a person i s under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l i f t h e blood a l c o h o l c o n t e n t i s .10 o r g r e a t e r could n o t b e a p p l i e d t o t h e n e g l i - g e n t homicide charge. I n s t r u c t i o n no. 19 r e f e r r e d t o t h e "blood a l c o h o l l e v e l o f . l o " a s t h e p h r a s e i s used i n Count 11, t h e c h a r g e o f d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l . The r e c o r d e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n d i d n o t a r g u e t o t h e j u r y t h a t t h e presumption a p p l i e d i n any manner t o t h e n e g l i g e n t homicide charge. The District C o u r t s o observed i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e same w i t h counsel o u t s i d e t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e j u r y . There i s n o t h i n g i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t i e t h e .10 presumption t o t h e c h a r g e o f n e g l i g e n t homicide. I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e o f d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t o x i c a t i o n went f a r beyond t h a t p e r t a i n i n g t o h i s blood a l c o h o l l e v e l . There was ample and s i g n i f i c a n t a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t o x i c a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g defen- d a n t ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t he was " p r e t t y much i n t o x i c a t e d " a t t h e b a r i n t h e evening. W e conclude t h a t t h e c o u r t a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e . 1 0 presumption o f i n t o x i c a t i o n . XIV Did the District Court err in denying defendant's post-trial motions for a finding of not guilty or a new trial? Our discussion of previous issues clearly establishes that in light of the evidence presented, there was no basis for a finding by the judge of not guilty or for the granting of a new trial. We affirm. Justic ~ J We concur: Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting in part and concurring in part: I would hold that S 45-1-104(1.), MCA, which describes the crime of negligent homicide, is unconstitutionally vague, when considered with the definition of "negligently" set out in § 45-2-101 ( 3 7 ) , MCA. The statute leaves the determination of criminal conduct to a iury's perception of the standard of conduct that a "reasonable" person would have observed in the actorsr situation, and then the jury's perception of what involves a "gross deviation" from that standard. The statutory scheme is too uncertain to be upheld. We may well disapprove of the defendant's conduct on the day in question, but his conviction for criminal negligent homicide is based on formless and indistinct statutes which inadequately describe what constitutes a crime. On their face, the statutes defy containment. 7: further disagree with the holding of the majority respecting the instruction on circumstantial evidence. If we regard the statements of the defendant that he was driving as direct evidence (I do not since they are at most admissions), the corroboration for those statements exists only in circumstantial evidence. There is no other direct evidence. To be truly corroborative, the circumstantial evidence should be consistent only with the hypothesis that he was guilty of a crime, and not consistent with any other rational conclusion. The jury should have been so instructed, by the court, if the instruction offered by the defendant was not accurately stated. Th.e majority reliance on State v. Bean, supra, is faulty on two bases: such an instruction was not offered in Bean, and, if Bean is interpreted as the majority interprets it, the holding is incorrect. Whether the State undertakes to prove the guilt of the defendant by direct evidence, or indirect (circumstantial) evidence, or by a combination of direct and indirect evidence, the facts and circumstances in evidence produced by the State should be consistent with each other and with the guilt of the defendant, and. inconsistent with any reasonable theory of the defendant's innocence. That is merely another way of saying that the State must prove its case against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. I have other problems with the majority opinion, but these will suffice. 1 would reverse the conviction of criminal homicide against the defendant, and sustain his conviction of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Justice