Title: State Ex Rel. Brant v. Beermann

State: nebraska

Issuer: Nebraska Supreme Court

Document:

350 N.W.2d 18 (1984) 217 Neb. 632 STATE of Nebraska ex rel. Clayton BRANT et al., Relators, v. Allen J. BEERMANN, Secretary of State of the State of Nebraska, Respondent. No. 83-834. Supreme Court of Nebraska. June 15, 1984. *19 Thomas J. Walsh of Walsh, Walentine, Miles, Fullenkamp & O'Toole, Omaha, and Stephen E. Gehring of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, Lincoln, for relators, and, on brief, Timothy F. Shaw, (Lincoln). Paul L. Douglas, Atty. Gen., and Terry R. Schaaf, Lincoln, for respondent. KRIVOSHA, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, and GRANT, JJ., and COLWELL, D.J., Retired. PER CURIAM. Relators, by leave of this court, filed an original action seeking a writ of mandamus requiring that the Secretary of State of the State of Nebraska file relators' initiative petition and that the subject of the initiative petition, as a proposed law, be placed on the ballot for the general election in November 1984. Anticipating relators' filing their proposed initiative petition, and equipped with a copy of the proposed petition, the Secretary of State sought advice from the Attorney General of the State of Nebraska, that is, whether the Secretary of State was required to file the copy of the relators' petition sought to be circulated for signatures of registered voters. In a written opinion dated June 3, 1983, the Attorney General advised the Secretary of State that the initiative process could not be used for the creation of a resolution or for conducting advisory votes on questions of public policy. In an additional written opinion on August 25, 1983, the Attorney General informed the Secretary of State that there existed "no statutory authority for utilizing the initiative process to obtain an advisory vote on [the] question" contained in relators' petition. On August 31, 1983, relators presented to the Secretary of State a copy of the initiative petition pursuant to Neb.Rev. Stat. § 32-704 (Reissue 1978). The copy and form of the proposed initiative petition are as follows: BILATERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE INCLUDING DEPLOYING OF MX MISSILES IN NEBRASKA On September 1, 1983, the Secretary of State found that relators' petition was without statutory authority and should not be filed because the measure contained in the proposed initiative petition was "advisory in nature." By his "order" issued on September 1, 1983, the Secretary of State refused to file a copy of relators' proposed initiative petition, although the Secretary of State did stamp "RECEIVED" on the copy of the petition for identification of that document. The Secretary of State admits that relators' proposed initiative petition satisfies statutory prescriptions regarding the form of an initiative petition. See Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 32-703 (Cum.Supp.1982), 32-703.01, and 32-704 (Reissue 1978). Neb. Const. art. III, § 1, provides in part: Further, Neb. Const. art. III, § 2, provides in part: "The first power reserved by the people is the initiative whereby laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments adopted by the people independently of the Legislature." By the foregoing constitutional provisions the people of the State of Nebraska have reserved the power to propose and enact laws independent of the Legislature. Consequently, the Legislature and the electorate are concurrently equal in rank as sources of legislation. Provisions authorizing the initiative should be construed in such a manner that the legislative power reserved in the people is effectual. See, Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 143 N.W.2d 744 (1966); State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, 183 Neb. 521, 162 N.W.2d 262 (1968); Adams v. Bolin, 74 Ariz. 269, 247 P.2d 617 (1952). Such right reserved in the people of Nebraska is so precious and jealously guarded that the Governor cannot veto measures initiated by the people. See Neb. Const. art. III, § 4. "The right of initiative is precious to the people and is one which the courts are zealous to preserve to the fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter." McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 332, 196 P.2d 787, 788 (1948). "To preserve the full spirit of the initiative the submission of issues to the voters should not become bogged down by lengthy litigation in the courts ...." Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 91, 207 P.2d 47, 49 (1949). Provisions concerning the initiative, the legislative power reserved to the people, should receive liberal construction to effectuate the policy proposed and adopted by the initiative as a part of the democratic process. See State v. Davis, 418 S.W.2d 163 (Mo.1967); cf. State ex rel. Boyer v. Grady, 201 Neb. 360, 269 N.W.2d 73 (1978) (powers of the initiative and referendum regarding municipalities are to be liberally construed to permit, rather than restrict, the power and to attain, rather than prevent, its object). This case presents two questions: (1) Whether the Secretary of State was required to file the copy of relators' initiative petition as directed in § 32-704; and (2) Whether the measure contained in the proposed initiative petition was a law within the meaning of Neb. Const. art. III, § 2, and § 32-703. Concerning the relators' proposed initiative petition, the following principles are applicable: (1) Unless the subject of the proposed petition on its face is invalid or unconstitutional, the Secretary of State cannot pass upon the validity or construction of any proposed law, when the proposed petition is presented for filing pursuant to § 32-704. An example of the Secretary of State's determining the validity of an initiative measure would be found in an initiative petition proposing a statutory abolition of a constitutional office. (2) The Secretary of State cannot pass upon the merit, wisdom, or policy of the law to be initiated. (3) The Secretary of State is required to perform promptly all the ministerial duties imposed by law, except the Secretary of State may determine whether the subject of the petition has the semblance of a law or whether the subject is legally appropriate for the initiative. For example, the Secretary of State may exercise discretion and refuse to file a petition for something which would merely be an advisory vote on an issue or which would not have the characteristics of a law. See White et al. v. Welling, Secretary of State, 89 Utah 335, 57 P.2d 703 (1936). Generally, a measure seeking an advisory vote of the electorate or a nonbinding expression of public opinion on a question is not a proper subject for the initiative. See, City of Litchfield v. Hart, 306 Ill.App. 621, 29 N.E.2d 678 (1940); Kimble v. Swackhamer, 94 Neb. 600, 584 P.2d 161 (1978); State ex rel. Cleveland City Council v. Bd. of Elections, 40 Ohio App.2d 299, *22 318 N.E.2d 889 (1974); Paisner v. Attorney General, 390 Mass. 593, 458 N.E.2d 734 (1983). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered a similar question in Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 262 Mass. 603, 160 N.E. 439 (1928). The Massachusetts House of Representatives had inquired of the justices whether a "proposed law" introduced by an initiative petition, providing for a vote to determine the will of the people with reference to a repeal of the eighteenth amendment, was a law within the meaning of the initiative provisions of the Constitution. In holding that it was not a law, the opinion stated at 605-06, 160 N.E. at 440: (Emphasis supplied.) Government should be spared the burdensome cost of election machinery as a straw vote on the electorate's opinions, sentiments, or attitudes on public issues. This includes lawmaking through the Legislature or the initiative. We hold that the initiative petition proposed by the relators is nothing more than a nonbinding expression of public *23 opinion and not a proper subject for the initiative in Nebraska. WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED. SHANAHAN, Justice, dissenting. The majority concludes that the measure in relators' petition is not a law. A law is a rule of civil conduct (see Leymel v. Johnson, 105 Cal. App. 694, 288 P. 858 (1930)), a rule of action prescribed by authority (see Insurance Co. v. Industrial Com., 71 Colo. 495, 208 P. 465 (1922)), and a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the lawmaking power in a state (see Public Service Commission v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 193 A.D. 615, 185 N.Y.S. 267 (1920)). Regarding the issues before the court in this case, a law is a rule of conduct prescribed by the lawmaking power of a sovereign. Although relators' proposed initiative petition does reflect approval of a bilateral nuclear freeze and disapproval of locating MX missiles in Nebraska, the subject of the petition includes more than expressions of public opinion about nuclear weapons. Within 10 days of the operative date of the proposed law, the Governor of Nebraska must take action, that is, send a written communication to certain officials of the U.S. Government and to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The communication from Nebraska's Governor shall contain the "Statement of Policy" set forth in § 1 of relators' proposed measure. If relators' initiative petition receives a favorable vote, then Nebraska's Governor is required to take definite actionthe obligatory written communication transmitted to the designated governmental officials. The duty imposed and the specific action dictated as consequences of the proposed initiative petition, if approved, provide the subject of the petition with the attributes of a law and distinguish the relators' initiative petition from mere expressions of nonbinding public opinion. The initiative is an integral and vital part of Nebraska's democratic process. Courts should not weigh the wisdom or social propriety of a measure sought in an initiative petition, for such matters are public policy and politicsarenas or thickets in which courts should be conspicuously absent. The writ of mandamus should have been granted. WHITE and GRANT, JJ., join in this dissent.