Title: State v. Peter A. Fonte

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 77 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2097-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Peter A. Fonte,  
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  276 Wis. 2d 570, 687 N.W.2d 548 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 15, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 10, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert J. Kennedy   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: CROOKS, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by William L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Martha K. Askins, assistant state public defender. 
 
2005 WI 77
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2003AP2097-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2001CF306) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Peter A. Fonte, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 15, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded with directions.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   The State seeks review 
of a court of appeals decision reversing the conviction of Peter 
Fonte for homicide by intoxicated operation of a vehicle under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.09 (2001-02),1 after a boating accident that 
resulted in the death of one of Fonte's friends.  The five 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
2 
 
issues presented on appeal2 are:  (1) whether the jury 
instruction that was given for chemical tests of intoxication 
denied Fonte of a fair trial; (2) whether there was sufficient 
evidence in the record that Fonte was operating the boat at the 
time of the accident to support the conviction; (3) whether 
Fonte was denied effective assistance of counsel; (4) whether 
Fonte's motion for change of venue due to pretrial publicity 
should 
have 
been 
granted; 
and 
(5) 
whether 
§ 940.09 
is 
constitutional.  Because we rule against Fonte on each issue, we 
reverse the court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit 
court with directions to reinstate Fonte's conviction. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
This case arose from a boating accident on Geneva Lake 
on July 16, 2001.  Several days before, Fonte and a group of 
friends had gathered for a concert at Alpine Valley.  The group 
stayed in the area, and on the day of the accident, they rented 
a motorboat to spend a day on the lake.  The group included 
Fonte, Traci Paladino, Chad Mattingly, Lee Bovarnick, Kelly 
Pleffner and Christopher Gibbs.   
¶3 
While they were out on the lake, at least four people 
jumped into the water to swim, including Paladino, Pleffner and 
Gibbs.  Pleffner testified that the motor was idling and the 
                                                 
2 The court of appeals ruled on the jury instruction issue 
and did not consider the other issues.  Both parties have 
briefed all the issues, and rather than remand to the court of 
appeals for consideration of the issues it did not discuss, we 
address them.  See State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 124-26, 
449 N.W.2d 845 (1990). 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
3 
 
boat was drifting while they swam.  Pleffner saw the boat coming 
toward her when it was approximately five feet away.  She 
attempted to dive below the surface of the water to avoid the 
boat, but felt the bottom of the boat scrape her side.  When 
Pleffner resurfaced, she saw Gibbs and heard someone ask, 
"Where's Traci?"  Pleffner then noticed there was blood in the 
water.  Several members of the group jumped in the water to 
search for Paladino.  Shortly thereafter the Water Safety Patrol 
arrived and a dive team took up the search. 
¶4 
Walworth County sheriff's deputies took the group to 
the City of Lake Geneva Police Department where officers 
separated them for individual questioning.  Walworth County 
Deputy 
Sheriff 
Jeffery 
Patek 
interviewed 
Fonte. 
 
Fonte 
identified 
himself 
as 
Anthony 
Michaels. 
 
Patek 
smelled 
intoxicants coming from Fonte and noticed that his eyes were 
bloodshot and his speech was impaired.  Patek asked Fonte if he 
had been drinking and Fonte stated that he had not.  Patek 
performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test on Fonte, and based 
on the results of this test, Patek concluded that Fonte was 
"under the influence of intoxicants."  Fonte was given a 
breathalyzer test that registered an alcohol content of .06% at 
approximately 9:00 p.m. 
¶5 
Patek asked Fonte if there was anything Fonte needed 
to tell him.  Fonte told Patek that when the swimmers jumped 
into the water he believed he had put the boat into neutral. 
Fonte then stated that he stood up from the controls and walked 
away.  Patek placed Fonte under arrest and Fonte submitted to a 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
4 
 
blood draw at approximately 10:42 p.m.  Analysis of his blood 
showed his blood alcohol content was then .052%. 
¶6 
Fonte was charged with homicide by the operation of a 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.09(1)(a) 
and 
(b).3 
 
Paladino's 
body 
was 
recovered 
approximately five months after the accident and the parties 
stipulated that the boat propeller caused her death. 
¶7 
Fonte moved to change venue due to extensive pretrial 
publicity that he argued would prejudice the jury if selected in 
Walworth County.  The court denied the motion for a change of 
venue, and stated that a fair trial could be achieved through 
careful screening of the jury. 
¶8 
The trial began March 11, 2002 and resulted in Fonte's 
conviction.  The circuit court4 imposed a 25-year bifurcated 
sentence, consisting of seven years of confinement and 18 years 
of extended supervision.  Fonte moved for post-conviction 
relief, alleging several errors at trial.  The court denied the 
motion.  On appeal, the court of appeals reversed Fonte's 
conviction based on its conclusion that the jury instruction 
regarding chemical tests for intoxication was misleading, and 
                                                 
3 The information added a count of obstruction, to which 
Fonte pled guilty, and counts of injury to another person by 
operation of a motorboat while under the influence and with a 
prohibited 
blood 
alcohol 
content 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 30.681(2)(a) and (b) and 30.80(6)(a) and (b). 
4 At the trial held in Walworth County Circuit Court, Judge 
Robert J. Kennedy presiding. 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
5 
 
remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.  The State 
appealed the reversal, and both sides briefed the remaining 
issues that the court of appeals did not decide. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶9 
Fonte raises five issues, each of which has its own 
standard of review.  Regarding the jury instruction issue, a 
circuit court has broad discretion in deciding whether to give a 
particular jury instruction.  A court must exercise its 
discretion to "fully and fairly inform the jury of the rules of 
law applicable to the case and to assist the jury in making a 
reasonable analysis of the evidence."  State v. Coleman, 206 
Wis. 2d 199, 212, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996) (citation omitted).  
However, we independently review whether a jury instruction is 
an accurate statement of the law applicable to the facts of a 
given case.  State v. Groth, 2002 WI App 299, ¶8, 258 Wis. 2d 
889, 655 N.W.2d 163. 
¶10 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a conviction, we do not overturn a jury's verdict 
"unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the 
conviction, is so lacking in probative value and force that no 
trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt."  See State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 
507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). 
¶11 The standard of review for ineffective assistance of 
counsel's components of deficient performance and prejudice 
present mixed questions of law and fact.  State v. Johnson, 153 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
6 
 
Wis. 2d 121, 127, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984)).  A circuit court's 
findings of historic fact, "the underlying findings of what 
happened," will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.  
State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 634, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).  
Questions of whether counsel's performance was deficient and 
prejudicial are questions of law we review de novo.  Id. 
¶12 "We review [a circuit] court's denial of [a] change of 
venue 
motion 
under 
the 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
standard."  State v. Albrecht, 184 Wis. 2d 287, 306, 516 N.W.2d 
776 (Ct. App. 1994).  However, we independently evaluate the 
circumstances "'to determine whether there was a reasonable 
likelihood of community prejudice prior to, and at the time of, 
trial and whether the procedures for drawing the jury evidenced 
any prejudice on the part of the prospective or empaneled 
jurors.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Messelt, 178 Wis. 2d 320, 327-
28, 504 N.W.2d 362 (Ct. App. 1993)). 
¶13 And finally, the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.09 is a question of law that we review de novo.  See 
Maurin v. Hall 2004 WI 100, ¶93, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866. 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
7 
 
B. 
Jury Instruction 
¶14 The State argues that the jury instruction properly 
explained the law regarding chemical tests for intoxication 
under Wis. Stat. § 885.235.5  We agree and therefore conclude 
that the instruction did not deprive Fonte of his right to due 
process of law. 
¶15 "The validity of [a] jury's verdict [is affected by] 
the correctness of the jury instructions."  State v. Dodson, 219 
Wis. 2d 65, 87, 580 N.W.2d 181 (1998).  "A challenge to [a 
conviction based on] an allegedly erroneous jury instruction 
warrants reversal and a new trial only if the error [is] 
prejudicial."  Fischer v. Ganju, 168 Wis. 2d 834, 849, 485 
N.W.2d 10 (1992).  "An error is prejudicial if it probably and 
not merely possibly misled the jury."  Id. at 850.  We will not 
reverse a conviction if the overall meaning communicated by the 
jury instructions was a correct statement of the law.  See State 
v. Paulson, 106 Wis. 2d 96, 108, 315 N.W.2d 350 (1982). 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 885.235 states in relevant part: 
Chemical tests for intoxication. 
. . . 
(3) If the sample of breath, blood or urine was 
not taken within 3 hours after the event to be proved, 
evidence of the amount of alcohol in the person's 
blood or breath as shown by the chemical analysis is 
admissible only if expert testimony establishes its 
probative value and may be given prima facie effect 
only if the effect is established by expert testimony. 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
8 
 
¶16 At trial, the State submitted a proposed instruction 
that allowed the jury to find that Fonte had a PAC of 0.1 or 
higher at the time of his operation of the boat as prima facie 
evidence that he was under the influence of an intoxicant at 
that 
time. 
 
Fonte 
objected, 
arguing 
that 
the 
proposed 
instruction should not be given because his blood draw was taken 
more than three hours after the alleged operation.  The court 
concluded that Wis. Stat. § 885.235(3) allows a jury to find 
that a PAC of 0.1 or higher is prima facie evidence of the 
defendant being under the influence when expert testimony 
establishes that the results of the delayed blood draw and the 
test have the effect of showing the defendant's blood alcohol 
level would have been 0.1 or higher at the time of the operation 
of the motor vehicle.  Accordingly, because it found that the 
necessary nexus of expert opinion evidence was presented, it 
gave the following instruction: 
Evidence has been received that a sample of the 
defendant's breath and blood were taken——was taken. An 
analysis of the samples has also been received. If you 
are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there was 
.10% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's 
blood, or .10 grams or more of alcohol in 210 liters 
of the defendant's breath at the time of operation, 
you may find from that fact alone that the defendant 
was under the influence of an intoxicant at the time 
of the alleged operating, but you are not required to 
do so. 
¶17 Fonte 
argues 
that 
the 
jury 
instruction 
is 
not 
appropriate in Wis. Stat. § 885.235(3) cases because those tests 
do 
not 
come 
within 
the 
requirements 
of 
§ 885.235(1g).  
Subsections 885.235(1g) and (3) do differ in that under 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
9 
 
subsection (1g), chemical test analysis is admissible without 
requiring expert testimony, while under subsection (3), chemical 
test 
analysis 
is 
admissible 
"only 
if 
expert 
testimony 
establishes its probative value."  Also, under § 885.235(1g)(c), 
analysis showing that a person's PAC was 0.1 or higher is prima 
facie evidence that he or she was under the influence of an 
intoxicant or had an alcohol concentration of 0.1 or higher.  
Under subsection (3), the alcohol concentration analysis "may be 
given prima facie effect only if the effect is established by 
expert testimony." 
¶18 At trial, the State's expert, Casey Collins,6 testified 
in regard to the effect that the delayed blood draw and test 
results had upon Fonte's alcohol concentration at the time of 
the alleged operation, as follows: 
Q: 
Mr. Collins, the last substance on the report is 
an alcohol——ethanol level, and what was that 
ethanol level? 
A: 
0.052 grams per hundred milliliters, or grams 
percent. 
Q: 
And was that in his blood? 
A: 
Yes, that was the whole blood sample. 
Q: 
If you were to assume that this incident happened 
at approximately 3:55 in the afternoon, and that 
the blood sample was taken at 10:42 in the 
evening, is it possible for you to state to a 
                                                 
6 Casey Collins testified that he is employed by the State 
of Wisconsin as the technical unit leader of the toxicology 
section of the Madison Crime Laboratory.  Collins has a degree 
in forensic toxicology and has tested tens of thousands of 
samples for the presence of alcohol.  
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
10 
 
reasonable degree of professional certainty what 
Mr. [Fonte's] blood alcohol level was at 3:45, 
assuming no consumption of alcohol after 3:45? 
A: 
I would——I could make an estimate, and I would 
give you a range with that estimate.  . . . 
Q: 
And 
how 
would 
you 
go 
about 
doing 
that 
calculation? 
A: 
I would use the average elimination rate of a 
male human, multiply that elimination rate times 
the number of hours between the blood draw and 
the incident, and add that on to the blood 
alcohol level that we measured at 10:42. 
Q: 
And is it possible for you to do that calculation 
now? 
A: 
Yeah, sure.  . . . 
. . . 
Now, there is a——there are ranges of elimination 
rates, so we must try to——we must compensate for 
that.  So the low end of the range would be an 
elimination rate of .010, so that would . . . 
[result in a concentration of] 0.122 as the low 
end of the range. 
. . . 
 
All right, now the higher elimination rate . . . 
would . . . [result in a concentration of] 0.227, 
so we have a range of .1 to .22, with the average 
or the middle ground being [a concentration of] 
.157 . . . . 
. . . 
Q: 
And can you state to a reasonable degree of 
professional 
certitude——or 
certainty, 
rather, 
using the breath test result in this case, what 
his alcohol would have been as it relates to the 
legal standards of .10 at 3:45 in the afternoon, 
assuming no consumption of alcohol after 3:45? 
A: 
I would stick with my blood back extrapolation.  
I would just use that breath to see that he was 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
11 
 
in the elimination phase.  I wouldn't——um, I, I 
mean I can do that, mathematically.  So we have 
.074 at what time?  This is at 9:02, right? 
Q: 
Yes. 
A: 
And the incident——so that's five, five hours and 
15 minutes since the accident?  Somebody help me 
here. 
Q: 
Yes. 
A: 
Okay, so .015 times 5.25, plus .074.  I come up 
with a .152. 
We conclude that this testimony is sufficient to satisfy Wis. 
Stat. § 885.235(3) because the expert testified to a reasonable 
degree of certainty what Fonte's blood alcohol level was at the 
time of the accident.  Therefore, the circuit court did not err 
in giving the objected-to instruction. 
C. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
¶19 Fonte also argues that there was insufficient evidence 
at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the 
operator of the boat at the time of the accident.  In evaluating 
the evidence, we give all reasonable inferences to it that will 
support the verdict.  See State v. DeLain, 2005 WI 52, ¶11, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 695 N.W.2d 484. 
¶20 Both Fonte and the State point to the same evidence, 
but come to different conclusions.  Three of the four people on 
the boat (not including Fonte) who testified stated that they 
did not see who was operating the boat at the time of the 
accident.  The fourth, Chad Mattingly, at first testified that 
he did not see who was driving, but was impeached with evidence 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
12 
 
of a prior statement he gave to police.  He testified as 
follows: 
Q. 
On the night of July the 16th, do you recall 
. . . indicating to the officer who was operating 
the boat at the time of the accident? 
A. 
After some time, um, yes, I did.  Um, it was——he 
kind of, I mean, helped me through my statement.  
I was kind of having a tough time getting some 
words out, and he was helping me along and kind 
of like, you know, feeding me some stuff and 
trying to help me get, you know, my words out, 
and I——we both kind of like sort of came to the 
conclusion that it had been Pete, and I kind of 
just went along with it, and I should have been a 
hundred percent sure; and I didn’t know it was 
going to escalate like this. 
Q. 
Well, you understand we're only interested in 
what you observed and——and the truth? 
A. 
Right. 
Q. 
Okay.  Now did you——do you know who you told the 
officer was driving the boat at the time of the 
accident? 
A. 
He or——If I remember correctly, I think he might 
of said, well——then it was something like, well, 
it might have been Rabbit?7  And then I was like, 
I don't know.  And then, um, I can't really 
recall what he said next, and then I guess I 
agreed with him . . . . 
The other evidence implicating Fonte as the operator was the 
testimony of Officer Patek, who interviewed Fonte at the police 
station the night of the accident.  Patek testified that he 
asked Fonte "if there was anything he needed to tell [him]," and 
Fonte became "emotionally upset" and "started to cry."  Fonte 
                                                 
7 There was testimony that Fonte was also known by his 
nickname, "Rabbit." 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
13 
 
then stated "I thought the boat was out of gear.  Oh, my God, I 
thought the boat was out of gear."  Patek further testified as 
follows: 
Q. 
And what next did [Fonte] say to you? 
A. 
Um, he stated that they were going down the lake, 
um, that some subjects jumped off the back of the 
boat to go swimming.  He stated that he pulled 
back on the controls. 
Q. 
Did he indicate then what direction the boat 
began to move at that point in time? 
A. 
I believe he said the boat was still going 
forward at that time. 
Q. 
Did you ask him what happened next? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
What did he say? 
A. 
Um, that once the boat was back where he thought 
it was in neutral, he had gotten up from the 
controls and walked away. 
Q. 
And did you ask him then what happened? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
What was his response? 
A. 
The boat at that time, um, continued in a sharp 
or tight turn and came back through the swimmers 
that were in the water. 
Fonte argues that this evidence is not sufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Fonte was the operator of the 
boat.  He argues the evidence shows only that Fonte had been 
driving the boat at some time prior to the accident, but that 
the jury had no way of knowing whether someone else had touched 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
14 
 
the controls before the accident or if it was Fonte's actions 
that caused the accident. 
¶21 Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdict, we conclude the jury could have found beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
Fonte 
was 
the 
operator. 
 
Fonte's 
statements to Officer Patek could be understood as an admission 
that his operation of the boat was responsible for the accident.  
Patek's testimony that Fonte began to get emotional and cry as 
he stated, "I thought the boat was out of gear.  Oh, my God, I 
thought the boat was out of gear," could lead a reasonable jury 
to find that Fonte believed he was operating the boat at the 
time of the accident and that it was his failure to put the boat 
in neutral that caused the accident.  Additionally, Mattingly's 
grudging admission that he had agreed that Fonte was operating 
the boat corroborates this inference.  Therefore, we conclude 
that the jury had sufficient evidence before it to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Fonte was operating the boat at the time 
of the accident. 
D. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶22 Fonte 
next 
argues 
that 
he 
was 
denied 
his 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel when 
his trial counsel failed to object to evidence revealing Fonte's 
alias and failed to object to evidence relating to his 
lifestyle. 
¶23 Strickland sets out the test for determining whether 
effective assistance of counsel was denied: 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
15 
 
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's 
assistance was so defective as to require reversal of 
a conviction . . . has two components.  First, the 
defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious 
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes 
both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction 
. . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary 
process that renders the result unreliable. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  We have adopted the Strickland 
test.  See Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 127.  We have also explained, 
"Review of counsel's performance gives great deference to the 
attorney and every effort is made to avoid determinations of 
ineffectiveness based on hindsight."  Id.  "Rather, the case is 
reviewed from counsel's perspective at the time of trial, and 
the burden is placed on the defendant to overcome a strong 
presumption that counsel acted reasonably within professional 
norms."  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  In addition 
to deficient performance, a defendant must prove that the 
defense was prejudiced, so that the defendant was denied a fair 
trial with a reliable result.  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687).   
1. 
Use of an alias 
¶24 Fonte claims his counsel's performance was deficient 
because she failed to object to repeated references to Fonte's 
use of the alias, "Anthony Michaels," which Fonte employed upon 
his arrest and at his first court appearance.  The use of this 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
16 
 
alias led to an obstruction charge, to which Fonte pled guilty 
on the first day of trial.  Fonte points us to numerous places 
in the record where the prosecutor, in the course of examining 
Fonte's friends, referred to Fonte as Michaels and asked them if 
they knew Fonte's real name before the accident.  They responded 
that they did not, but rather, knew him as Anthony Michaels or 
"Rabbit."  Law enforcement witnesses also testified that Fonte 
identified himself as Michaels on the day of the accident. 
¶25 Fonte argues that "[p]rudent defense counsel would 
have objected to the state's use of Fonte's alias," that the use 
of an alias was irrelevant to the charges, and that it was 
prejudicial because "[c]riminals, not innocent people, use 
aliases.  People who have an alias are hiding something."  The 
State argues that Fonte was known to many of the witnesses as 
Michaels, and calling him Michaels at trial was the natural 
result of communicating with witnesses who knew Fonte as 
Michaels.  In addition, at the post-conviction motion hearing 
regarding ineffective assistance, Fonte's trial counsel stated 
that she was concerned that the use of the alias might confuse 
or prejudice the jury, but "believed that it was a better 
decision to have the State bring it out and us explain later 
that this was a name who all of his friends knew him as."  She 
also said that she and Fonte had agreed to proceed this way 
because it would have been difficult to examine witnesses who 
knew Fonte as Michaels without using the name they knew.   
¶26 In denying the post-conviction motion, the circuit 
court stated "it would have been a tactical nightmare . . . to 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
17 
 
try to avoid the use of the [alias]" and that efforts to avoid 
all mention of the name by counsel and in exhibits would have 
been confusing to the jury to the point of possibly being a 
ground for post-conviction relief had they proceeded that way. 
¶27 We are not persuaded by Fonte's arguments, but rather 
agree with the circuit court.  Trial counsel's explanation of 
her reasons for permitting the use of the alias, which was 
reached after consultation with Fonte, is reasonable.  Given 
that Fonte was known by different names to different witnesses, 
having the alias known avoided confusion for the jury.  We also 
note that the nature of this crime, which arose from an accident 
rather than a premeditated desire to injure someone, makes the 
argument that "only criminals use aliases" less persuasive, 
because intent was not an element of this crime.   
2. 
Evidence of lifestyle 
¶28 The testimony the State presented of Fonte's lifestyle 
forms an additional basis for Fonte's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Fonte argues that testimony painted an 
unflattering view of him by showing that:  (1) he and his 
friends were in town to hear a concert by Phil Lesh, bass player 
for the Grateful Dead, a band whose followers are widely known 
as "Dead Heads;" (2) he had attended more than fifty concerts 
over the previous one to two years; (3) his group of friends 
knew each other only by first names or nicknames; and (4) the 
group had all slept together in one hotel room the night before 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
18 
 
the accident.8  Fonte argues this evidence paints him as a person 
who either does not have a job or has little responsibility and 
is more likely to abuse drugs or alcohol. 
¶29 We conclude that Fonte's arguments regarding testimony 
about his lifestyle are unpersuasive.  We agree with the circuit 
court and Fonte's trial counsel that testimony concerning the 
group 
of 
friends 
frequently 
attending 
concerts 
is 
not 
prejudicial to Fonte.  We agree that the jury, after hearing 
this evidence, would not necessarily interpret it as Fonte 
argues.  There is little reason to think Fonte was unemployed 
based on the fact that he traveled to fifty concerts.  While we 
agree that drug abuse and alcohol abuse have been reported as 
having occurred at rock concerts, Fonte fails to show how this 
point, given other evidence9 raised against him in the circuit 
court, is sufficient to undermine our confidence that Fonte 
received a fair trial with a reliable verdict.  Accordingly, we 
reject Fonte's argument that he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel. 
                                                 
8 Fonte also cites to a comment made by the prosecution that 
Fonte created a criminal record as he followed bands around the 
country.  This comment was made at Fonte's initial appearance 
regarding bail, not in front of the jury.  Therefore, it is not 
relevant to our discussion. 
9 The jury heard unrefuted testimony that Fonte had a blood 
alcohol level at the time of the accident of at least 0.122. 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
19 
 
E. 
Change of Venue 
¶30 Fonte argues the circuit court erred in denying a 
change of venue.  He contends he submitted enough evidence to 
show the pretrial publicity would prevent a fair trial in 
Walworth County. 
¶31 In making our evaluation of the publicity, we consider 
the following factors: 
(1) the inflammatory nature of the publicity; (2) the 
timing and specificity of the publicity; (3) the 
degree of care exercised, and the amount of difficulty 
encountered, in selecting the jury; (4) the extent to 
which the jurors were familiar with the publicity; (5) 
the defendant's utilization of peremptory and for 
cause 
challenges 
of 
jurors; 
(6) 
the 
State's 
participation 
in the 
adverse 
publicity; 
(7) the 
severity of the offense charged; and (8) the nature of 
the verdict returned.  
Albrecht, 184 Wis. 2d at 306.  Fonte supplied the circuit court 
with 44 newspaper articles10 from area newspapers dated July 17, 
2001 to January 10, 2002, focusing on the first, second and 
fourth Albrecht factors.  He argues that the voir dire process 
did not cure the jury of the prejudicial effect of that 
publicity. 
                                                 
10 Shortly 
before 
the 
trial, 
newspaper 
articles 
were 
published stating that syringes, one of which had Fonte's DNA on 
it, were found in the hotel room Fonte had occupied.  The trial 
court ruled that this evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial 
and thus ruled it inadmissible at trial.  This is the kind of 
evidence that could be considered inflammatory, but as we 
explain in our discussion of the voir dire process below, ¶37, 
the court dismissed all potential jurors who said they had read 
about the case in the time immediately preceding the trial, and 
therefore might have seen these articles. 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
20 
 
¶32 With regard to the first factor, the inflammatory 
nature of the publicity, we note that objective, factual, non-
editorial reporting is not prejudicial.  Briggs v. State, 76 
Wis. 2d 313, 327, 251 N.W.2d 12 (1977).  
A court looking to the inflammatory nature of the 
publicity should be primarily concerned with the 
manner 
in 
which 
the 
information 
was 
presented. 
Uneditorialized news of an informational nature may 
inform possible members of a jury, but this does not 
necessarily make the information objectionable.  News 
reports become objectionable when they editorialize, 
amount to "rabble rousing" or attempt to influence 
public opinion against a defendant. 
Id.  At the motion hearing, Judge Kennedy stated: 
I don't see the publicity as being unduly prejudicial 
. . . nor do I find it even inflammatory.  It's mostly 
factual about what happened.  It is not . . . written 
with the intent to pillory and convict Mr. Fonte 
before he's ever . . . before trial.  It factually 
reports what's happening in the courts, what evidence 
has been produced at the preliminary hearings and has 
come out in public documents that the press has access 
to and which, by the way, any member of the public can 
come in and read too. 
¶33 We agree with the circuit court's characterization of 
the publicity.  The articles contained factual, non-editorial 
reporting about the accident and the criminal proceedings 
against Fonte.  Some of the articles focused not on Fonte, but 
on the search for Paladino's body, which took several months to 
recover.  To the extent the coverage contained possibly 
inflammatory elements, such as a headline stating he had a 
"history of run-ins with authorities," a statement calling his 
record "a laundry list of criminal activity" or a story 
containing statements about Fonte's operation of the boat, that 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
21 
 
coverage was offset by other factors we explain below, ¶¶34, 36-
37, such as the long time period between the coverage and the 
trial and the circuit court's effective use of voir dire.  In 
any case, we cannot characterize the publicity as "rabble 
rousing" or an attempt to influence public opinion against 
Fonte.   
¶34 The second factor, the timing and specificity of the 
publicity, works against the jury pool being prejudiced.  More 
than half of the articles were published in July and August 
immediately after the accident.  Those published between 
September and January generally focused on either the search for 
Paladino's body or summaries of the proceedings against Fonte.  
The articles Fonte believes are inflammatory due to statements 
about his prior record or disputed events being asserted as fact 
were published on July 25 and 26, more than seven months before 
the trial.  The gap between these articles and the trial is such 
that "the memories and passions of readers had time to fade."  
Messelt, 178 Wis. 2d at 330. 
¶35 Fonte also cites the fourth Albrecht factor, the 
extent to which the jurors were familiar with the publicity.  He 
argues that the court's findings that the circulation of the 
newspapers was about 20,000, while there were approximately 
79,000 potential jurors in the area, show that a "significant 
percentage" 
of 
potential 
jurors 
were 
influenced 
by 
the 
publicity.  We do not rely on specific percentages to determine 
whether there was prejudice; however, a significant number of 
potential jurors could have been exposed to the publicity.  This 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
22 
 
extensiveness factor does not weigh heavily in our determination 
because of the circuit court's use of voir dire, which we 
describe below. 
¶36 Finally, Fonte argues that voir dire, which is 
mentioned in the third and fifth Albrecht factors, did not 
successfully solve the problems raised by the publicity.  He 
argues that the effects of the publicity were not eliminated 
because five of the twelve jurors said either that they had read 
about the case or thought they had read something about the 
case.  Fonte also states that four of his five peremptory 
challenges were used on potential jurors who had read about the 
case. 
¶37 After examining the transcript of voir dire, we are 
satisfied that it ensured an impartial jury.  The circuit court 
individually questioned potential jurors about whether they had 
seen coverage of the case and whether it tainted their ability 
to be impartial.  The court excused eleven potential jurors who 
said they had formed an opinion about the case, ten of whom had 
been exposed to pretrial publicity.  The court stated it must 
"err on the side of caution" and "be on the safe side" in 
excusing potential jurors who were uncertain whether they could 
be impartial.  In addition, as we mentioned in our discussion on 
the inflammatory nature of the publicity, supra ¶¶32-33, the 
court dismissed four jurors who had read articles published 
shortly before the trial mentioning syringes found in the room 
Fonte originally occupied because the court decided such 
evidence would be prejudicial.  Therefore, we conclude that voir 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
23 
 
dire was properly employed by the circuit court to produce an 
impartial jury. 
F. 
Constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 940.09 
¶38 Finally, Fonte challenges11 the constitutionality of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.09, "Homicide by intoxicated use of vehicle or 
firearm,"12 arguing that the statute unconstitutionally relieves 
the State of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt a 
causal connection between a defendant's intoxication and the 
death by requiring the State to prove only that operation by an 
intoxicated driver caused the death.  He asks that we overrule 
our decision in State v. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d 587, 363 N.W.2d 
                                                 
11 The court of appeals stated that Fonte abandoned this 
issue in his reply brief.  State v. Fonte, No. 2003AP2097-CR, 
unpublished slip op. at 2 n.1 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2004).  In 
his reply brief below, Fonte stated "[b]oth parties agree that 
this court is bound by State v. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d 587, 363 
N.W.2d 574 (1985), which upheld the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. § 940.09.  Only the supreme court has the authority to 
overrule Caibaiosai, and thus, no reply to the state's brief is 
warranted here."  On appeal here, both parties agree that Fonte 
abandoned his argument only with respect to the court of appeals 
and properly raised the issue here. 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.09 states in relevant part: 
Homicide 
by 
intoxicated 
use 
of 
vehicle 
or 
firearm.  (1) Any person who does any of the following 
is guilty of a Class B felony: 
(a) Causes the death of another by the operation 
or handling of a vehicle while under the influence of 
an intoxicant. 
(b) Causes the death of another by the operation 
or handling of a vehicle while the person has a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 340.01(46m). 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
24 
 
574 (1985), where we rejected this precise argument.  We decline 
to do so.  While the doctrine of stare decisis "contemplates 
that under limited circumstances a court may overrule outdated 
or erroneous holdings," Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 186, 560 
N.W.2d 246 (1997), our reasoning in Caibaiosai is sound.  In 
Caibaiosai we stated: 
The legislature has determined that combining the 
operation of a motor vehicle with being in an 
intoxicated state is conduct which is malum prohibitum 
and is pervasively antisocial. Since the conduct is 
considered inherently evil, it conceptually cannot be 
divided into portions which are bad and portions which 
are 
not 
bad. 
Section 
346.63, 
Stats., 
entitled 
"Operating under the influence of intoxicants" is 
violated by a person who, one, operates a motor 
vehicle, and two, is at the time under the influence 
of an intoxicant. The commission of the offense does 
not require any erratic or negligent driving. Because 
driving under the influence of an intoxicant is malum 
prohibitum 
it 
is 
impossible 
to 
separate 
the 
intoxication from the driving or the driving from the 
intoxication. The result is the potentially lethal and 
illegal combination of driving while intoxicated. 
Section 
940.09, 
Stats., 
requires 
that 
the 
prosecution 
prove 
and 
the 
jury 
find 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt a causal connection between the 
defendant's unlawful conduct, operation of a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated, and the victim's death. The 
statute does not include as an element of the crime a 
direct 
causal 
connection 
between 
the 
fact 
of 
defendant's 
intoxication, 
conceptualized 
as 
an 
isolated act, and the victim's death. Under this 
statute there is an inherently dangerous activity in 
which it is reasonably foreseeable that driving while 
intoxicated may result in the death of an individual. 
The 
legislature has 
determined this activity so 
inherently dangerous that proof of it need not require 
causal connection between the defendant's intoxication 
and the death. 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
25 
 
Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d at 593-94.  We affirm Caibaiosai and 
reject Fonte's argument that § 940.09 is unconstitutional. 
III. CONCLUSION 
¶39 We conclude the following:  (1) the jury instruction 
that was given for chemical tests of intoxication did not deny 
Fonte of a fair trial; (2) there was sufficient evidence in the 
record that Fonte was operating the boat at the time of the 
accident to support the conviction; (3) Fonte was not denied 
effective assistance of counsel; (4) the decision to deny 
Fonte's motion for change for venue due to pretrial publicity 
was appropriate; and (5) Wis. Stat. § 940.09 is constitutional.  
Because we have ruled against Fonte on each issue, we reverse 
the court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court 
with directions to reinstate Fonte's conviction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded with directions. 
¶40 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
2003AP2097-CR   
 
 
 
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