Title: Dunn v. Attorney General

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12107 
 
JAMES H. DUNN & another1  vs.  ATTORNEY GENERAL & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     June 8, 2016. - July 6, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Initiative.  Constitutional Law, Initiative petition.  Attorney 
General.  Animal. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on April 25, 2016. 
 
 
The case was reported by Duffly, J. 
 
 
 
Katherine J. Spohn, of Nebraska (Mary Jacobson, of 
Nebraska, with her) for the plaintiffs. 
 
Elizabeth N. Dewar, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendants. 
 
Thomas O. Bean for the interveners. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Diane Sullivan. 
 
 
2 Secretary of the Commonwealth.  Three of the first ten 
signers of the initiative petition at issue (Stephanie J. 
Harris, Joann M. Lindenmayer, and Sharon B. Young) were allowed 
to intervene as defendants.  We acknowledge the brief submitted 
by the interveners. 
2 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In this appeal, we consider whether the 
Attorney General properly certified an initiative petition 
proposing a new law that would prohibit (1) confinement of egg-
laying hens, calves raised for veal, and breeding pigs on a 
commercial farm "in a cruel manner," i.e., under conditions that 
prevent them from lying down, standing up, fully extending their 
limbs, or turning around freely; and (2) the sale by any 
business within the Commonwealth of "shell" eggs, "whole veal 
meat," and "whole pork meat" that the business owner or operator 
"knows or should know" was produced from animals so confined.  
The plaintiffs contend that this initiative petition was not 
properly certified because the animal confinement restriction 
and the prohibition against sale are not related or mutually 
dependent subjects, and because the petition is not in "proper 
form" insofar as it contains a statement of purpose that does 
not constitute a "law" to be voted upon by the people.  See art. 
48, The Initiative, II, §§ 2, 3, of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution, as amended by art. 74 of the 
Amendments.  We conclude that the subjects contained in the 
petition are sufficiently related to meet the requirements of 
art. 48, and that the brief statement of purpose in the proposed 
measure does not render it unfit for submission to the voters.  
We therefore conclude that the initiative petition was properly 
certified by the Attorney General. 
3 
 
 
Background.  In August, 2015, the Attorney General received 
a signed initiative petition entitled "An Act to prevent cruelty 
to farm animals," which she numbered as Initiative Petition 15-
11 (petition 15-11 or petition).  The petition contains two 
principal provisions, which we shall refer to as the "farm 
provision" and the "sales provision." 
 
The farm provision, contained in section 2 of the petition, 
would make it "unlawful for a farm owner or operator within the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to knowingly cause any covered 
animal to be confined in a cruel manner."  "Covered animal" is 
defined in section 5(D) as "any breeding pig, calf raised for 
veal, or egg-laying hen that is kept on a farm."3  "Confined in a 
cruel manner" is defined in section 5(E) as "confined so as to 
prevent a covered animal from lying down, standing up, fully 
extending the animal's limbs, or turning around freely."4 
 
The sales provision, contained in section 3 of the 
petition, would make it "unlawful for a business owner or 
                     
 
3 Section 5(H) of Initiative Petition 15-11 (petition) 
defines a "[f]arm" as "the land, building, support facilities, 
and other equipment that are wholly or partially used for the 
commercial production of animals or animal products used for 
food; and does not include live animal markets or establishments 
at which inspection is provided under the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act." 
 
 
4 Under section 4 of the petition, transportation, 
exhibitions and 4-H programs, slaughter, medical research, 
veterinary examination and treatment, and certain breeding and 
birthing practices are exempted from the definition of "confined 
in a cruel manner." 
4 
 
operator to knowingly engage in the sale within the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts of any: 
"(A) Shell egg that the business owner or operator knows or 
should know is the product of a covered animal that was 
confined in a cruel manner. 
 
"(B) Whole veal meat that the business owner or operator 
knows or should know is the meat of a covered animal that 
was confined in a cruel manner. 
 
"(C) Whole pork meat that the business owner or operator 
knows or should know is the meat of a covered animal that 
was confined in a cruel manner, or is the meat of the 
immediate offspring of a covered animal that was confined 
in a cruel manner."5 
 
"Sale," as defined in the proposed measure, refers only to 
commercial sales by a business.6  The sales provision is not 
limited to the sale of eggs, veal, and pork from Massachusetts 
farms; the sale of such products would be barred regardless of 
the location of the farms that produced the eggs, veal, and 
pork.  Under section 7, the proposed law would provide a defense 
for business owners and operators who rely "in good faith upon a 
                     
 
5 "Whole veal meat" and "[w]hole pork meat" are defined in 
sections 5(T) and 5(S), respectively, as "any uncooked cut . . . 
that is comprised entirely" of those meats, respectively; they 
do not include "combination food products," such as "soups, 
sandwiches, pizzas, hot dogs, or similar processed or prepared 
food products." 
 
 
6 Under section 5(M) of the petition, "[s]ale" means a 
commercial sale by a business that sells any item covered by 
section 3, but does not include any sale undertaken at an 
establishment at which inspection is provided under the Federal 
Meat Inspection Act.  For purposes of this section, a sale is 
deemed to occur at the location where the buyer takes physical 
possession of an item covered by section 3. 
5 
 
written certification or guarantee by the supplier" that the 
eggs, veal, or pork at issue did not come from animals confined 
in a cruel manner. 
 
Section 6 of the proposed law confers sole enforcement 
authority on the Attorney General, who is authorized to seek 
civil fines of up to $1,000 per violation, as well as injunctive 
relief.  Under section 10, the Attorney General would also be 
responsible for promulgating, by January 1, 2020, rules and 
regulations to implement the new law.  The law's operative 
provisions would take effect, pursuant to section 11, on January 
1, 2022. 
 
On September 2, 2015, the Attorney General certified to the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary) that the measure 
proposed in petition 15-11 
"is in proper form for submission to the people; that the 
measure is not, either affirmatively or negatively, 
substantially the same as any measure which has been 
qualified for submission or submitted to the people at 
either of the two preceding biennial state elections; and 
that it contains only subjects that are related or are 
mutually dependent and which are not excluded from the 
initiative process pursuant to Article 48, the Initiative, 
Part 2, Section 2." 
 
 
On April 25, 2016, the plaintiffs commenced an action 
against the Attorney General and the Secretary in the county 
court, seeking relief in the nature of certiorari and mandamus 
under G. L. c. 249, §§ 4 and 5, and requesting declaratory 
relief under G. L. c. 231A.  The plaintiffs sought declarations 
6 
 
that petition 15-11 fails to meet the requirements of art. 48 
and that the Attorney General erred in certifying it, and 
further requested a direction that the Secretary take no further 
steps to advance the petition or submit it to the voters.  A 
single justice of the county court reserved and reported the 
case to this court. 
 
Discussion.  When a new law is proposed by initiative 
petition, it cannot be presented to the Legislature and the 
voters for their consideration unless and until the Attorney 
General reviews it and certifies that it meets the requirements 
of art. 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution. 
See art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  
The plaintiffs contend that the Attorney General's certification 
of petition 15-11 was improper because the petition does not 
meet two of art. 48's requirements:  (1) that a proposed measure 
"contain[] only subjects . . . which are related or which are 
mutually dependent" (related subjects requirement); and (2) that 
the proposed measure be "in proper form for submission to the 
people" (proper form requirement).  Id.  We review the Attorney 
General's certification decision de novo, bearing in mind "the 
firmly established principle that art. 48 is to be construed to 
support the people's prerogative to initiate and adopt laws."  
7 
 
Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 487 (2014), quoting 
Carney v. Attorney Gen., 451 Mass. 803, 814 (2008) (Carney II).7 
 
1.  Related subjects requirement.  The related subjects 
requirement in art. 48 was adopted during the constitutional 
convention of 1917-1918 in response to delegates' concerns about 
voter confusion and the dangers of "log-rolling" in the 
initiative process, i.e., the "practice of including several 
propositions in one measure or proposed constitutional amendment 
so that the . . . voters will pass all of them, even though 
these propositions might not have passed if they had been 
submitted separately."  Carney v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 218, 
219 n.4 (2006) (Carney I), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 960 
(8th ed. 2004).  See Carney I, supra at 227-228; 2 Debates in 
the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention 1917-1918 at 12, 
537, 567, 701-702 (1918) (Constitutional Debates).8  To prevent 
initiative petitions from being exploited in this manner, the 
                     
 
7  The scope of this review is limited solely to whether the 
petition meets art. 48's requirements, and does not extend to 
other potential challenges to the proposed law's validity or to 
its interpretation.  See Hensley v. Attorney Gen., 474 Mass.    
,     n.13 (2016); Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 507-
508 (2014). 
 
 
8 We consider the proceedings of the constitutional 
convention "not for the purpose of controlling the plain meaning 
of words written into the Rearrangement of the Constitution but 
of understanding the conditions under which it came into 
existence and how it appears then to have been received and 
understood by the convention."  Cohen v. Attorney Gen., 357 
Mass. 564, 572 (1970). 
8 
 
delegates considered potential limitations on their subject 
matter.  See Carney I, supra; Constitutional Debates, supra at 
537, 856-857.  One delegate offered an amendment to require that 
"[n]o proposed law shall contain more than one subject," which 
another delegate proposed modifying to state that a proposed law 
"shall not contain unrelated subjects."  See Carney I, supra; 
Constitutional Debates, supra at 856-857.  This modified 
amendment was adopted by the convention, and, after some 
reworking by the committee on form and phraseology, ultimately 
was approved as the provision in art. 48, The Initiative, II, 
§ 3, requiring the Attorney General to certify that a proposed 
measure "contains only subjects . . . which are related or which 
are mutually dependent."  See Carney I, supra; Constitutional 
Debates, supra at 953, 1051. 
 
In light of this history, there is no single "bright-line" 
test for determining whether an initiative meets the related 
subjects requirement.  See Abdow, 468 Mass. at 500, quoting  
Carney I, 447 Mass. at 226.  We do not construe the requirement 
"so narrowly as to frustrate the ability of voters to use the 
popular initiative as 'the people's process' to bring important 
matters of concern directly to the electorate" by effectively 
confining each petition to a single subject; we recognize that 
the delegates to the constitutional convention that approved 
art. 48 permitted more than one subject to be included in a 
9 
 
petition.  Abdow, supra at 499.  Nor do we construe the 
requirement "so broadly that it allows the inclusion in a single 
petition of two or more subjects that have only a marginal 
relationship to one another, which might confuse or mislead 
voters, or . . .  place them in the untenable position of 
casting a single vote on two or more dissimilar subjects."  Id. 
 
Balancing these concerns, the related subjects requirement 
is met where "one can identify a common purpose to which each 
subject of an initiative petition can reasonably be said to be 
germane."  Abdow, 468 Mass. at 499, quoting Massachusetts 
Teachers Ass'n v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 384 Mass. 209, 
219-220 (1981).  "We have not construed this requirement 
narrowly nor demanded that popular initiatives be drafted with 
strict internal consistency."  Abdow, supra at 500, quoting 
Mazzone v. Attorney Gen., 432 Mass. 515, 528-529 (2000).  But we 
have also cautioned that "[a]t some high level of abstraction, 
any two laws may be said to share a 'common purpose.'"  Abdow, 
supra, quoting Carney I, 447 Mass. at 226.  Consequently, we 
have posed two questions to be considered in addressing the 
related subjects requirement:  First, "[d]o the similarities of 
an initiative's provisions dominate what each segment provides 
separately so that the petition is sufficiently coherent to be 
voted on 'yes' or 'no' by the voters?"  Abdow, supra, quoting 
Carney I, supra.  Second, does the initiative petition "express 
10 
 
an operational relatedness among its substantive parts that 
would permit a reasonable voter to affirm or reject the entire 
petition as a unified statement of public policy"?  Abdow, supra 
at 501, quoting Carney I, supra at 230-231.  See Gray v. 
Attorney Gen., 474 Mass.    ,     (2016) (discussing related 
subjects requirement). 
 
In this case, the plaintiffs argue that petition 15-11 does 
not meet the related subjects requirement because the farm 
provision prohibiting confinement of covered animals in a cruel 
manner and the sales provision prohibiting sales of products 
from animals so confined address different public policies.  
They contend that the farm provision aims to prevent animal 
cruelty, whereas the sales provision seeks to mitigate the 
health and safety risks of animal confinement to Massachusetts 
consumers and to regulate the sale of products derived from 
these animals.  They assert that the petition unfairly asks 
voters to decide simultaneously whether to ban certain animal 
farming methods and whether to require retailers to alter their 
purchasing decisions.  The plaintiffs also argue that the 
petition contains unrelated subjects because it concerns three 
different species of animals:  egg-laying hens, calves raised 
for veal, and breeding pigs.  The plaintiffs contend that voters 
may believe that certain confinement practices are beneficial 
for one species but detrimental for another, so that voters 
11 
 
would not be able to affirm or reject the entire petition as a 
unified statement of public policy. 
 
We are not persuaded by these arguments.  Both the farm 
provision and the sales provision share a common purpose of 
preventing farm animals from being caged in overly cramped 
conditions, consistent with the statement of purpose in 
section 1 of the proposed law, "to prevent animal cruelty by 
phasing out extreme methods of farm animal confinement."  The 
two provisions also complement each other in the means of 
accomplishing this common purpose.  The farm provision bars farm 
owners and operators in Massachusetts from confining hens, 
calves, and pigs in a cruel manner, and the sales provision 
prevents businesses in Massachusetts from selling eggs, veal, 
and pork from animals that were confined in a cruel manner.  The 
latter provision protects Massachusetts farmers who comply with 
the law by preventing Massachusetts businesses from selling 
eggs, veal, and pork obtained from out-of-State farmers who 
confine their animals in a cruel manner and who, by doing so, 
may be able to underprice their Massachusetts competitors.  It 
also protects hens, calves, and pigs in other States (and other 
nations) by providing non-Massachusetts farmers with an economic 
incentive not to confine their animals in a cruel manner if they 
wish to sell their eggs, veal, and pork in the Massachusetts 
market.  See Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 384 Mass. at 220-221 
12 
 
(all provisions of Proposition 2½ were germane to common purpose 
where they all related "directly or indirectly to the limitation 
of State and local taxation").  If the confinement of hens, 
calves, and pigs were to pose a health and safety risk to 
consumers, the sales provision would also serve the purpose of 
protecting Massachusetts consumers from that risk, but we do not 
see that as unrelated to the purpose of preventing the cruel 
confinement of farm animals; it would simply be an ancillary 
benefit from the prevention of that cruel confinement.  Because 
the petition's provisions share a common purpose and are related 
in the accomplishment of that purpose, we conclude that a 
reasonable voter may affirm or reject the entire petition as a 
unified statement of public policy. 
 
Finally, although the proposed law covers three different 
species of farm animals, the petition treats all three species 
similarly, applying the same prohibition against confinement in 
a cruel manner to each of them.  It is conceivable, as the 
plaintiffs argue, that a voter might view the law's prohibition 
against confinement in a cruel manner as appropriate for one 
species but not for another.  But that objection pertains to the 
scope of the law, i.e., whether it was appropriate to include 
all three species.  "Provided the subjects are sufficiently 
related," as we believe they are, "the choice as to the scope of 
13 
 
an initiative petition is a matter for the petitioners, not the 
courts."  Abdow, 468 Mass. at 503. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Attorney General properly 
certified that petition 15-11 contains only subjects that are 
related or are mutually dependent. It is therefore fair to ask 
the people of the Commonwealth to vote "yes" or "no" on a single 
petition containing both the farm and the sales provisions. 
 
2.  Proper form requirement.  Under art. 48, only laws and 
constitutional amendments can be presented through the 
initiative process.  See art. 48, The Initiative, I (defining 
"the popular initiative" as "the power of a specified number of 
voters to submit constitutional amendments and laws to the 
people for approval or rejection"); art. 48, The Initiative, II, 
§ 1 ("An initiative petition shall set forth the full text of 
the constitutional amendment or law . . . , which is proposed by 
the petition"); Paisner v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 593, 598 
(1983) ("the popular initiative is confined to laws and 
constitutional amendments").  Accordingly, an initiative 
petition that proposes neither a law nor a constitutional 
amendment is not "in proper form for submission to the people."  
Art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  See 
Paisner, supra ("the Attorney General has . . . the duty, 
pursuant to his review of the 'form' of the initiative petition, 
14 
 
to apply his legal judgment to the issue whether a law is 
proposed"). 
 
"Although we have avoided a precise construction of the 
term 'law' for purposes of art. 48, we have described it as 
including a measure with binding effect . . . ."  Mazzone, 432 
Mass. at 530.  An initiative petition that "merely invites a 
declaration of opinion by voters" does not present a "law" in 
proper form for submission to the voters.  Opinion of the 
Justices, 262 Mass. 603, 605 (1928).  For example, the Justices 
of this court have opined that an initiative petition did not 
present a "law" where it asked Massachusetts voters simply to 
decide whether their senators and representatives in the United 
States Congress should be requested to repeal Prohibition.  See 
id. at 604, 606.  We have also held that an initiative was not a 
"law" that could be submitted to the people for approval or 
rejection where it asked voters whether to call a constitutional 
convention.  See Cohen v. Attorney Gen., 357 Mass. 564, 578 
(1970).  And we have concluded that an initiative did not 
propose a "law" where it sought to prescribe rules for the 
Legislature's internal operations that could not bind the 
Legislature absent a constitutional amendment, and therefore, if 
enacted, "would be no more than a nonbinding expression of 
opinion."  Paisner, 390 Mass. at 601. 
15 
 
 
In the present case, the plaintiffs contend that petition 
15-11 does not properly present a law due to its statement of 
purpose in section 1, which provides: 
"The purpose of this Act is to prevent animal cruelty by 
phasing out extreme methods of farm animal confinement, 
which also threaten the health and safety of Massachusetts 
consumers, increase the risk of foodborne illness, and have 
negative fiscal impacts on the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts." 
 
The plaintiffs assert that inclusion of this "argumentative" 
policy statement is improper, taints the entire petition, and 
results in the petition not being in proper form for submission 
to the people.  The plaintiffs further argue that such policy 
statements are not contemplated under art. 48 and should not be 
permitted in initiative petitions. 
 
We disagree.  As a general matter, there is nothing 
inherently improper about including a statement of purpose in an 
initiative petition.  Laws enacted by the Legislature frequently 
include statements of purpose, which we have in turn used to 
understand the intent of the enacting Legislature when called 
upon to interpret those laws.  See, e.g., Galenski v. Erving, 
471 Mass. 305, 311 (2015) (citing statement of purpose in G. L. 
c. 32B, § 1); R.D. v. A.H., 454 Mass. 706, 714 (2009) (citing 
statement of purpose in G. L. c. 209C, § 1); Beale v. Planning 
Bd. of Rockland, 423 Mass. 690, 695-696 (1996) (citing statement 
of purpose in G. L. c. 41, § 81M).  The people's power to enact 
16 
 
laws through popular initiatives is "coextensive with the 
Legislature's law-making power under Part II, c. 1, § 1," of the 
Massachusetts Constitution.  Paisner, 390 Mass. at 601.  See 
Opinion of Justices, 375 Mass. 795, 817 (1978) ("except as to 
matters expressly excluded, the scope of the power of the people 
to enact laws directly is as extensive as that of the General 
Court").  Statements of purpose are therefore appropriately 
included in laws proposed by initiative petitions, just as they 
are in legislative enactments. 
 
Indeed, where we have been called upon to interpret the 
meaning of laws adopted by initiative petition, we have been 
guided by statements of purpose.  Just last year, in 
Commonwealth v. Canning, 471 Mass. 341 (2015), we cited the 
statement of purpose in the new medical marijuana law, which had 
been adopted by initiative petition, in analyzing whether the 
law affected the requirements for a search warrant where the 
crime alleged was the defendant's cultivation of marijuana 
plants.  See id. at 344, 352.  See also Bates v. Director of the 
Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 436 Mass. 144, 165-166 
(2002). 
 
The plaintiffs cite the Attorney General's Web site warning 
to initiative proponents that it may be safer not to include 
statements of purpose and declarations of public policy, because 
they may result in a conclusion that the proposed law is not in 
17 
 
proper form for submission to the people.  In response, the 
Attorney General states that this warning was prompted by 
concerns that a petition consisting solely of such statements 
would not propose a proper law, or that a petition containing 
wide-ranging policy statements might violate the related 
subjects requirement.  The Attorney General further states that 
the statement of purpose in section 1 of petition 15-11 does not 
raise these kinds of concerns.  We agree. 
 
The plaintiffs also contend that, even if a statement of 
purpose does not always render the form of a petition improper, 
it does here because it is "argumentative."   The plaintiffs 
have not called to our attention any case where we have found 
error in the Attorney General's certification because of the 
"argumentative" nature of the statement of purpose.  Nor need we  
determine whether a statement of purpose may be so argumentative   
that it could make the form of a petition improper, because we 
do not find the statement of purpose in this petition to be 
unduly argumentative. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that an initiative petition 
presenting a proposed law with binding effect may properly 
include a statement of purpose.  We therefore conclude that the 
Attorney General correctly certified that petition 15-11 is in 
proper form for submission to the people. 
18 
 
 
We now address two matters that do not affect our holding 
in this case:  first, the timing of the filing of this action; 
and second, the one-sentence statements describing the effect of 
a "yes" and "no" vote on petition 15-11. 
 
3.  Timing of actions challenging the Attorney General's 
certification decisions.  Article 48 requires that proposed 
initiative petitions be submitted to the Attorney General by the 
first Wednesday in August before the assembly of the Legislature 
in which it is to be introduced.  See art. 48, The Initiative, 
II, § 3, as amended by art. 74.  According to public information 
provided by the Attorney General, this is typically done in an 
odd-numbered year, i.e., in the year before an election year.  
See Initiative Petition Process, 2015-2016:  An Overview for 
Interested Members of the Public, 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/government-resources/initiatives-and-
other-ballot-questions/initiative-petition-process.html 
[https://perma.cc/PR4Y-BZC9].  The Attorney General usually 
determines whether a measure proposed by initiative meets the 
requirements of art. 48 by the first Wednesday in September, 
i.e., about one month later.  Id.  Decisions not to certify are 
usually challenged within days.  Id.  Decisions to certify are 
usually challenged after it is known whether the proponents have 
gathered enough additional signatures by the first Wednesday in 
19 
 
December to move forward with the process.  Id.  See art. 48, 
The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74. 
 
The plaintiffs commenced this action on April 25, 2016.  In 
her order reserving and reporting the case for consideration by 
the full court, the single justice asked the plaintiffs to 
"explain why this action was filed so late," and invited the 
defendants to comment as well on the timing of this action and 
"what they consider to be reasonable and appropriate time 
guidelines for the filing of cases like this in the future."9 
 
We share the single justice's concern with the timing of 
the complaint.  The Secretary is responsible for distributing an 
Information for Voters guide (guide) describing initiative 
petitions in advance of an election.  See art. 48, General 
Provisions, IV, as amended by art. 108 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution; G. L. c. 54, § 53.  This guide 
includes the text of the proposed measures, the Attorney 
General's summaries, the ballot question titles prepared by the 
Attorney General and the Secretary, the one-sentence statements 
describing the effect of a "yes" or "no" vote, statements 
prepared by the Secretary of Administration and Finance 
concerning the fiscal consequences of each measure for State and 
municipal government finances, and arguments for and against 
                     
 
9 In response, the plaintiffs simply stated that they filed 
the action "as expeditiously as possible." 
20 
 
each measure.  See art. 48, General Provisions, IV, as amended 
by art. 108; G. L. c. 54, §§ 53, 54.  The Attorney General and 
the Secretary report that the printing deadline for the guide 
usually falls in early July.  When an initiative petition is 
challenged, this court endeavors to decide the case before the 
July printing deadline to avoid the need for the printing of the 
guide to be postponed or redone.  But, if adequate time is to be 
allowed for the parties to brief the issues and agree on a 
statement of facts, if required, and for the county court or 
this court to review the case, hear argument, and issue a 
decision before the printing deadline, there should be a 
deadline for the filing of a complaint challenging an Attorney 
General's certification decision. 
 
There is presently no such deadline in our Constitution or 
laws, and we have previously held that an action alleging that 
an initiative petition failed to meet art. 48's requirements was 
not barred by laches, even though it "could have been brought at 
earlier stages in the initiative process and before thousands of 
signatures had been obtained and the measure had been submitted 
to the people."  Sears v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 327 Mass. 
310, 326 (1951).  We reasoned that "[f]ailure to comply" with 
art. 48 "will mean that no valid law has been enacted, no matter 
how great the popular majority may have been in its favor," and 
that "[a]n unconstitutional law cannot be made valid by the 
21 
 
laches of anyone or by any lapse of time."  Id. at 321, 326-327.  
See Massachusetts Teachers Ass'n, 384 Mass. at 213, 231 n.19), 
citing Sears, 327 Mass. at 326-327 (laches did not bar actions 
claiming that initiative failed to meet art. 48's requirements, 
even though actions were commenced after initiative was adopted 
by voters; "The doctrine of laches has no significant role in 
prompt, postelection challenges to the process by which an 
initiative measure was adopted"). 
 
The Attorney General and the Secretary propose that actions 
challenging the Attorney General's certification decisions 
should be commenced in the county court by February 1 of an 
election year.  We agree this is a reasonable deadline, and 
therefore strongly urge plaintiffs to file such challenges by 
this date.  As in a marriage ceremony, it is not unfair to ask 
those who object to the Attorney General's certification of an 
initiative petition to "speak now or forever hold your peace."  
Filing a complaint by February 1 should ordinarily permit the 
parties to brief the issues for a May hearing, and enable this 
court to issue a decision by the end of June.10  Plaintiffs who 
delay filing beyond this date should bear in mind that such 
delay may make it impossible for this court to render a decision 
before the guide is distributed, and may risk causing voter 
                     
 
10 We had to convene a special June sitting of the full 
court to hear oral argument in this and two other challenges to 
initiative petitions. 
22 
 
confusion and additional costs for the Commonwealth if the court 
were to conclude that the Attorney General erred in certifying 
an initiative petition. 
 
4.  The one-sentence "yes" and "no" statements.  The 
election ballot will contain only the summary of petition 15-11 
written by the Attorney General and the one-sentence statements 
jointly written by the Attorney General and the Secretary 
describing the effect of a "yes" or "no" vote.  See art. 48, 
General Provisions, III, as amended by art. 74; G. L. c. 54, 
§§ 42A, 53.  The summary describes both the farm and the sales 
provisions.  The one-sentence statements, however, refer only to 
the farm provision; they are silent as to the sales provision.11 
 
General Laws c. 54, § 53, provides in relevant part: 
 
"The secretary shall make available for public examination 
a copy of the ballot question titles, [one]-sentence 
statements describing the effect of a yes or no vote and 
fiscal effect statements and shall publish them in the 
Massachusetts register by the second Wednesday in May.  Any 
[fifty] voters may petition the supreme judicial court for 
Suffolk county to require that a title or statement be 
amended; provided, however, that the petition shall be 
filed within [twenty] days after the publication of the 
title and statement.  The court may issue an order 
requiring amendment by the attorney general and the state 
                     
 
11 The one-sentence statements inform voters as follows: 
 
"A YES VOTE would prohibit any confinement of pigs, calves, 
and hens that prevents them from lying down, standing up, 
fully extending their limbs, or turning around freely. 
 
"A NO VOTE would make no change in current laws relative to 
the keeping of farm animals." 
 
23 
 
secretary only if it is clear that the title, [one]-
sentence statement or fiscal effect statement in question 
is false, misleading or inconsistent with the requirements 
of this section." 
 
Neither the plaintiffs nor any other voters filed a petition 
seeking to amend the one-sentence statements prepared by the 
Attorney General and the Secretary for petition 15-11. 
 
We, however, recognized that the one-sentence statements 
might be clearly misleading to voters because they make no 
reference to the sales provision, even though the initiative 
petition includes only two primary provisions and, in contrast 
with the farm provision, the sales provision will potentially 
affect every Massachusetts consumer of eggs, veal, and pork.12  
We therefore invited the parties and interveners at oral 
argument to provide supplemental briefs as to whether we have 
the legal authority to order the Attorney General and Secretary 
                     
 
12 We also recognize that the one-sentence statements 
cannot, and should not, attempt to describe all the elements of 
a proposed measure.  That would undermine their usefulness as a 
shorthand reference for voters.  We also recognize that 
deference is due the Attorney General's and the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth's reasonable judgments in deciding what to include 
in the one-sentence statements, as evidenced by the statute 
permitting the court to order amendment "only if it is clear" 
that the statement "in question is false, misleading or 
inconsistent with" the statute's requirements (emphasis added).  
G. L. c. 54, § 53. And we acknowledge that the one-sentence 
statements are supplemented by other information provided to 
voters, most importantly the Attorney General's summary, which 
clearly describes the sales provision. 
24 
 
to amend the one-sentence statements where no complaint was 
filed under § 53.13 
 
We conclude that, even if we were to find that the one-
sentence statements are clearly misleading, we have no power to 
order their amendment where no petition has been filed under 
§ 53.  Where a statute requires that a certain claim can only be 
brought by a stated number of specified plaintiffs in a 
particular court, we have treated these requirements as 
jurisdictional, and we have been reluctant to infer jurisdiction 
on some other basis.  See Litton Business Sys., Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 383 Mass. 619, 621-622 (1981) (statute 
that permits "ten taxable inhabitants" to petition court to 
enjoin municipality from unlawfully raising or expending money 
imposes jurisdictional requirements; action did not come within  
general jurisdiction of court of equity, and could be maintained 
only in accordance with statute); Carlton v. Salem, 103 Mass. 
141, 143 (1869) (where statutes expressly confer jurisdiction in 
particular circumstances, they "create a strong implication 
against the existence of . . . general equity jurisdiction").14  
                     
 
13 We also invited the supplemental briefs to address 
whether the one-sentence statements were clearly misleading and, 
if they were and if we had the authority to order amendment, 
what language the parties and interveners would recommend we 
adopt. 
 
 
14 In particular, the requests in the plaintiffs' complaint 
for relief in the nature of certiorari and mandamus, and for 
25 
 
Because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to order amendment 
of the one-sentence statements, we do not reach the question 
whether they are clearly misleading. 
 
Conclusion.  Having determined that the Attorney General 
properly certified petition 15-11 pursuant to art. 48, The 
Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by art. 74, we remand the case 
to the county court for entry of a declaratory judgment to that 
effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                                  
declaratory relief, do not provide an alternative basis for us 
to exercise jurisdiction to order amendment of the one-sentence 
statements.  It is well settled that certiorari and mandamus 
cannot be employed as alternative routes to relief where another 
avenue already exists.  See, e.g., Picciotto v. Superior Court 
Dep't of the Trial Court, 436 Mass. 1001, 1001 (2002), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 820 (2002), quoting G. L. c. 249, § 4 
("Certiorari simply does not provide an additional or 
alternative avenue of appellate review. . . .  [T]he purpose of 
a civil action in the nature of certiorari is to correct errors 
that 'are not otherwise reviewable by motion or by appeal'"); 
Callahan v. Superior Court, 410 Mass. 1001, 1001 (1991) ("It is 
well settled that relief in the nature of mandamus is 
extraordinary and may be granted only to prevent a failure of 
justice in instances where there is no alternative remedy").  
Nor can a declaratory judgment action create jurisdiction where 
none exists.  "General Laws c. 231A, § 1, does not expand the 
jurisdiction of the courts upon which it confers power to render 
declaratory decrees; the statute makes it clear that this power 
is conferred on the courts 'within their respective 
jurisdictions'" (footnote omitted).  Sisters of Holy Cross of 
Mass. v. Brookline, 347 Mass. 486, 491 (1964).