Title: In the Matter of Bertrand

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12849 
 
IN THE MATTER OF BERTRAND.1 
 
 
October 22, 2020. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Child Requiring Assistance. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, a child who was the subject of a child 
requiring assistance (CRA) petition, see G. L. c. 119, § 39E, 
filed by his mother in the Juvenile Court, appeals from the 
judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking review of certain orders 
issued by the Juvenile Court.  We affirm. 
 
 
In addition to seeking review of the Juvenile Court's 
orders in the CRA case, the child also sought an order from the 
single justice directing the Juvenile Court to dismiss the CRA 
petition.  He also requested that a committee be formed to 
promulgate procedural rules concerning CRA cases.  Before filing 
his petition in the county court, however, the child had already 
sought and been denied substantially the same relief from a 
single justice of the Appeals Court by means of an appeal filed 
pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 39I.  See Millis Pub. Schs. v. M.P., 
478 Mass. 767, 775 (2018).  The child had thus already pursued 
the remedy that the Legislature has provided for parties 
aggrieved by orders in CRA cases.  Further, while this matter 
has been pending before this court, the underlying CRA petition 
                     
 
1 A pseudonym.  The parties to this appeal are the child and 
his mother.  The Juvenile Court Department of the Trial Court 
was also named as a party in the child's G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition, but it is a nominal party only.  See S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 
422 Mass. 1302 (1996). 
2 
 
 
 
 
was dismissed in the Juvenile Court, on the mother's motion and 
with the child's agreement.2 
 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion when 
he elected not to exercise the court's extraordinary power of 
general superintendence in these circumstances.  A single 
justice is not required to employ the court's extraordinary 
superintendence power when there is an adequate alternative 
remedy.  Such a remedy existed here, namely, an appeal to a 
single justice of the Appeals Court as provided by G. L. c. 119, 
§ 39I, and indeed the child pursued it.  The fact that he did 
not win the relief he sought in that appeal does not render the 
legislatively prescribed remedy inadequate, nor does it entitle 
him to further review as a matter of right pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  Where the child has failed to demonstrate any 
inadequacy in the statutory appeal framework, the single justice 
was warranted in denying review.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Michael F. Kilkelly for the child. 
 
Rachel Matos for the mother. 
                     
 
2 We need not and therefore do not decide whether a child's 
appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 39I, from a CRA adjudication 
becomes moot when the CRA petition is dismissed in the trial 
court during the pendency of the appeal.  Cf. Matter of F.C., 
479 Mass. 1029, 1029-1030 (2018) (addressing mootness argument 
in context of appeal from civil commitment order).  That is not 
what happened here.  The appeal was decided by the Appeals Court 
single justice before the parties agreed to dismiss the CRA 
petition. 
 
 
3 A single justice of the Appeals Court has the discretion 
to report to a panel of the Appeals Court any appeal that 
presents novel, systemic, or otherwise important issues.  See, 
e.g., Millis Pub. Schs. v. M.P., 478 Mass. 767, 775 (2018).  The 
Appeals Court single justice in this case expressly considered 
but declined to exercise that option; he was well within his 
discretion to do so.