Title: WILLIAM HENRY FORBES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WILLIAM HENRY FORBES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 146220 P.3d 510Case Number: S-08-0278Decided: 12/01/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
WILLIAM 
HENRY FORBES,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Alan Johnson, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; Justin A. Daraie, Student Intern; Christopher J. 
King, Student Intern.  Argument by 
Mr. Daraie.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
William 
Henry Forbes pled guilty to two counts of third-degree sexual abuse of a 
minor.  The district court imposed 
concurrent sentences of six to eight years, but suspended those sentences and 
placed Mr. Forbes on supervised probation.  
Subsequently, the State moved to revoke his probation.  The district court, after a hearing, 
revoked probation and imposed the underlying sentence.  Mr. Forbes appeals, claiming that the 
State failed to prove he willfully violated a condition of his probation, and 
that the district court erred when it did not provide him the opportunity to 
allocute at his probation revocation hearing.  We affirm. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. 
Forbes presents the following issues on appeal: 

 
 

1.        
Did 
the trial court err in revoking appellant's probation, as he did not initiate, 
establish or maintain contact with a minor?

 
 

2.        
Was 
the alleged probation violation willful?

 
 

3.        
Did 
the trial court err when it refused to allow appellant to allocute at his 
probation revocation hearing?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Mr. Forbes met the victim in Anchorage, Alaska, when she was fourteen and 
he was thirty-five.  They began a 
sexual relationship and the victim became pregnant with Mr. Forbes's child. 
 They traveled to California and 
Louisiana and eventually landed in Wyoming when their car broke down in 
Cheyenne.  In June of 2007, the 
victim gave birth to a son.  The 
victim contacted law enforcement seeking a welfare check on the child.  She disclosed her sexual relationship 
with Mr. Forbes to the responding officer.  
The State filed criminal charges against Mr. 
Forbes.

 
 

[¶4]        
In 
April of 2008, Mr. Forbes pled guilty to two counts of third-degree sexual abuse 
of a minor in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2007).1  Following entry of that plea, the 
district court sentenced Mr. Forbes to six to eight years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  The court suspended 
execution of that sentence in favor of six years of supervised probation.  The Judgment and Sentence of the district 
court specifically provided:  
"DEFENDANT shall not initiate, maintain, or establish contact with any 
minor child, nor attempt to do so, nor reside in the same residence with minor 
children without the written permission of the probation agent in consultation 
with the treatment provider."

 
 

[¶5]        
During 
a routine home visit, Mr. Forbes's probation officer discovered a woman and her 
14-year-old son in his hotel room.  
Mr. Forbes claimed they were homeless and he had no choice but to give 
them a place to stay for the night.  
Mr. Forbes was taken into custody and the State initiated proceedings to 
revoke his probation.  The district 
court held a revocation hearing, found that Mr. Forbes's actions violated a 
condition of probation, and revoked his probation.  The court heard arguments from counsel 
regarding further disposition, but did not offer Mr. Forbes the opportunity to 
make a statement prior to rendering a decision.  After the court announced its decision 
to impose the underlying sentence, Mr. Forbes requested an opportunity to 
address the court but was not allowed to do so.  This appeal followed. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶6]        
Probation 
revocation proceedings are reviewed under our abuse of discretion standard. 
 Ramsdell v. State, 2006 WY 159, ¶ 11, 
149 P.3d 459, 462 (Wyo. 2006).  A district court's decision to revoke 
probation and impose a sentence is discretionary and will not be disturbed 
unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  Mapp v. State, 929 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Wyo. 
1996).  We review the district 
court's decision to determine whether the court could reasonably conclude as it 
did.  Id.  "Upon review, all that is necessary to 
uphold a district court's decision to revoke probation is evidence that it made 
a conscientious judgment, after hearing the facts, that a condition of probation 
had been violated."  Sweets v. State, 2003 WY 64, ¶ 9, 69 P.3d 404, 406 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶7]        
Probation 
revocation hearings are governed by W.R.Cr.P. 39.  In addressing proceedings under this rule 
we have stated:

 
 
The 
proceedings for probation revocation consist of a two-part process.  The first part, the adjudicatory phase, 
requires the district court to determine by a preponderance of the evidence 
whether a condition of probation was violated.  The second, dispositional phase, is 
triggered only upon a finding that a condition of probation was violated.  In this phase, the district court must 
deliberate not only upon the violation, but also the reasons the conditions were 
originally imposed and the circumstances surrounding the violation. After 
consideration of all these factors, the district court must then determine the 
appropriate consequences of the probationer's violation.  

 
 

Sinning 
v. State, 
2007 WY 193, ¶ 9, 172 P.3d 388, 390 (Wyo. 2007), quoting Mapp, 929 P.2d  at 1226.  

 
 

[¶8]        
A 
probation violation ordinarily will justify revocation only if the violation was 
willful.  E.g., Edrington v. State, 2008 WY 70, ¶ 7, 185 P.3d 1264, 1266 (Wyo. 2008); Sami v. 
State, 2004 WY 23, ¶ 15, 85 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Wyo. 2004); Anderson v. State, 2002 WY 46, ¶ 26, 43 P.3d 108, 118 (Wyo. 2002).  
In 
the context of a probation revocation, the term "willful" is given its ordinary 
and common meaning.  Edrington, ¶ 9, 185 P.3d  at 1267.  "Willfully means intentionally, 
knowingly, purposely, voluntarily, consciously, deliberately, and without 
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from carelessly, inadvertently, 
accidentally, negligently, heedlessly or thoughtlessly."  Id., quoting Butz v. State, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 20, 167 P.3d 650, 655 (Wyo. 2007). 

 
 

[¶9]        
At 
the probation revocation hearing, the district court first considered the 
State's evidence of the violation and Mr. Forbes's contention that his actions 
were justified.  Once it determined 
Mr. Forbes had violated a condition of probation, the court revoked probation 
and then heard arguments regarding disposition.  We will first address the district 
court's finding that Mr. Forbes willfully violated a condition of his probation. 

 
 

[¶10]     
As 
a condition of his probation, Mr. Forbes was ordered not to "initiate, maintain, 
or establish contact with any minor child."  The State contended that Mr. Forbes 
"maintained" contact with a minor.  
The word "maintain" is not defined in the sentencing order identifying 
Mr. Forbes's probation conditions.  The parties agree, however, that the 
common definition of "[t]o continue (something)" applies to this probation 
condition.  Black's Law Dictionary 
1039 (9th ed. 2009).  This common 
meaning of "maintain" is evident when considered in relation to the words 
"establish" and "initiate."  The 
prohibition on "maintaining" contact with a minor supplements the prohibitions 
of "initiating" and "establishing" by forbidding Mr. Forbes from continuing 
contact with a minor that may have been initiated or established by him, or 
someone else.

 
 

[¶11]     
While 
it may have been unclear how contact with the minor was initiated, the district 
court found that Mr. Forbes did not terminate contact as required.  The State presented the testimony of Mr. 
Forbes's probation officer who described going to Mr. Forbes's hotel room 
for a routine home visit.  She then 
testified:

 
 
[Probation 
Officer]: I collected a breathal[y]zer, went into his hotel room.  At that point, I noticed that his closet 
door was shut.  That was noticeable 
to me because it's a small hotel room, and normally, he has that door open, 
previously had a chair in it, sort of treated it as a separate room because his 
room was so small.

 
 
So 
he set it up as best he could to make it an apartment.  On that day the door was shut, so I 
asked him if he would open the door.  
He told me I wouldn't like it, and he was very nervous.  I told him, "That's okay.  I still need you to open the door."  He opened the door and a lady . . . was 
in there with her minor son.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
Did you ask them to leave?

 
 
[Probation 
Officer]: They did. They lefther and her son.  They had a suitcase with them on wheels, 
and they pulled their suitcase behind them, and they left.  I watched them walk down the 
hallway.

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
Did you have any further conversation with 
Mr. Forbes?

 
 
[Probation 
Officer]: I continued to talk with Mr. Forbes because at that point I was doing 
two things: I was trying to get a supervisor on the phone to figure out what to 
do, and I was talking with Mr. Forbes about why he was in this situation.  He told me he felt like he had to give 
them a place to stay.  I told him he 
of all people know we have homeless people and different things available to 
people, that he needs to follow the conditions of his probation, and also that 
he needs to protect himself.  Why 
would he put himself in that position if he knew he was a sex offender, and have 
a minor around?

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
Did he express any concern about violating the terms of his 
probation?

 
 
[Probation 
Officer]: He was.  He was very 
nervous what was going to happen from here, did this affect his probation.  He was very 
nervous.

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
Well, was he aware this was a condition of his probation that he was not to have 
any contact with minors?

 
 
[Probation 
Officer]: Yes, he was.  I went over 
court orders with him.  I [had] gone 
over a second-offense Probation and Parole agreement that we have.  He was very aware of the contact.  He opened the hotel room and knew they 
were hiding in his closet.  He was 
aware from the beginning this would be a problem.

 
 
The 
probation officer then testified that she left the hotel room and contacted a 
supervisor about what to do next.  
Her testimony continued: 

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
Did you go back to his hotel room?

 
 
[Probation 
Officer]: I went back to his room with law enforcement.  Law enforcement knocked on the door, and 
[the woman] was there with her son back in the hotel room.

 
 

[¶12]     
Mr. 
Forbes contends that the probation officer's testimony was not sufficient to 
prove he "maintained" contact with a minor.  He also argues that, even if he did 
"maintain" contact, the violation was not willful.  Mr. Forbes attempts to support this 
claim by asserting that the district court made remarks at the original 
sentencing which led him to believe that his conduct did not violate the terms 
of his probation.

 
 

[¶13]     
At 
the sentencing hearing, the district court explained that Mr. Forbes was to have 
no contact with minors as a condition of his probation.  The following exchange then 
occurred:

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]: . . . [A]s the [c]ourt mentioned, it's a discretion of the Probation 
and Parole supervising agent regarding contact with minors.  Of course, Mr. Forbes also has relatives 
that may be under age at family gatherings.  I'm sure that will be something he can 
qualify with his agent.

 
 
[The 
Court]:  Yes.  You're talking about the prohibition 
against contact with minors, and the details of that prohibition will be worked 
out between Mr. Forbes and the supervising agent.  [The m]ain point, obviously, is that he 
have no contact that's not supervised or in the company of others with persons 
that are minors.  If he goes to 
family events where there are people under 18 years of age, that's not a 
violation.

 
 
Mr. 
Forbes asserts that these comments led him to believe that allowing the woman 
and her child to stay in his hotel room would not be a violation because the boy 
was accompanied by his mother. 

 
 

[¶14]     
The 
district court found the State's evidence plainly established a willful 
violation, stating: "There [was] a woman and her minor son, [a] 14-year-old boy 
hiding in Mr. Forbes' room.  I 
think reasonable inference from the fact they were hiding is that he knew very 
well he wasshe was not to be there.  It was a violation."  The district court also found evidence 
that Mr. Forbes was not a passive player in the violation, but had actively 
maintained contact with the minor, stating:

 
 
On 
neither occasionthe original entry into the room, [or the] return to the 
roomcould it have occurred without Mr. Forbes' acting permission.  He was [the] sole occupant of the room, 
[the] one who was renting it.  He 
had control over who came in and who didn't.  There's no question he knew it was a 
violation.  

 
 
The 
court reflected that it was also reasonable to infer from the State's evidence 
that the mother and son did not randomly select Mr. Forbes's room and that he 
must have had some contact with them prior to the incident. 

 
 

[¶15]     
The 
evidence also does not support Mr. Forbes's claim that the remarks of the 
district court led him to believe his actions were not a violation.  According to the probation officer's 
testimony, Mr. Forbes was clearly instructed that having the child in his room 
was a violation.  Despite that 
advice, the mother and child were again in the room when the probation officer 
returned with law enforcement.  We 
find no error in the district court's determination that Mr. Forbes willfully 
violated one of the conditions of his probation. 

 
 

[¶16]     
In 
this appeal, Mr. Forbes also contends that his actions were justified because 
they were necessary to prevent the woman and her son from spending the night on 
the street.  It is unclear whether 
the defense of necessity is available to defend a violation of probation.  Compare State v. Pease, 758 P.2d 764, 768 (Mont. 
1988) (not allowing the defense of necessity to justify defendant's probation 
violation) with People v. Planer, 515 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (contemplating the applicability of 
necessity as a defense to a probation violation but not applying it to 
defendant's case for lack of evidence).  In this case, there is insufficient 
evidence to establish the defense.  To the extent that any evidence supported 
the defense, the district court carefully considered that evidence in arriving 
at its conclusion that the violation was willful.

 
 

[¶17]     
The 
district court also considered the circumstances of the incident in determining 
the consequences for the violation.  
The 
district court noted, 
"this violation is not the crime of the century, but Mr. Forbes knows very well 
that he got in serious trouble by having contact with minors."  The court remarked on the broader danger 
of permitting sex offenders to invoke charitable motives for probation 
violations:

 
 
[This 
case b]rings to mind a case we had where the child sex offender would 
deliberately order more pizza than he and his mother could eat.  He would go across the street to the 
park and offer it to the kids who would come around, and he was caught doing 
that, and the argument was now we're sending people to prison for giving pizza 
to kids.

 
 
If 
you take a very, very short view of the situation, it may so appear, but . . . 
that's not what it's about.

 
 

The 
district court also drew a connection from the probation violation to the 
underlying crime, noting that the victim in the original case was a homeless 
runaway when Mr. Forbes sexually abused her.  As these remarks demonstrate, the 
district court thoughtfully considered the relevant circumstancesincluding the 
claimed necessity created by the fact that the woman and her son were 
homelessin finding that this was a willful violation of a probation condition 
and in determining the appropriate consequence for the violation.    

 
 

[¶18]     
Next, 
we turn to Mr. Forbes's contention that the trial court committed reversible 
error when it did not permit him to allocute at the probation revocation 
hearing.  After the district court 
determined Mr. Forbes had violated a condition of his probation, it heard 
arguments from both counsel regarding further disposition.  The State sought imposition of the 
underlying sentence.  Defense 
counsel requested continued probation.  
After arguments had concluded, the district court announced its decision. 
 It did so without asking Mr. Forbes 
if he wished to make a statement.  
The following exchange then occurred:

 
 
[Defendant]: 
Excuse me, may I say something?

 
 
[The 
Court]: Yes.  Oh, I'm sorry . . . 
no, I don't need to hear from you, Mr. Forbes.  Your attorney spoke very eloquently on 
your behalf.

 
 
[Defendant]: 
So I just got six to eight years for performing Christian 
duties.

 
 
Mr. 
Forbes asserts that the district court erred when it failed to provide him the 
opportunity to allocute.  

 
 

[¶19]     
This 
Court has not yet faced the question of whether a probationer has the right to 
allocute at a probation revocation proceeding.  Wyoming has long recognized the right of 
a defendant to speak in mitigation at sentencing.  Keffer v. State, 73 P. 556, 560 (Wyo. 
1903); White v. State, 147 P. 171, 174 (Wyo. 1915); see also Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 
(Wyo. 1987); Wilson v. State, 2007 WY 
55, ¶ 14, 155 P.3d 1009, 1012 (Wyo. 2007).  
The right has been codified by procedural rule.  W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1)(C) requires the 
district court to "[a]ddress the defendant personally and determine if the 
defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of the sentence," before the court imposes a sentence.  The issue at hand, however, requires us 
to decide the specific question of whether a defendant must be afforded the 
right to allocute at a probation revocation proceeding. 

 
 

[¶20]     
W.R.Cr.P. 
39 governs probation revocation proceedings.  It states, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
(5) 
Hearing. At the hearing upon the petition for revocation of probation, the 
state must establish the violation of the conditions of probation alleged in the 
petition by a preponderance of the evidence.

 
 
(A) 
The probationer shall have the right to appear in person and by counsel, and to 
confront and examine adverse witnesses.

 
 
W.R.Cr.P. 
39(a)(5)(A).  The rule is silent 
regarding a defendant's right to allocute.  
Mr. Forbes contends that the allocution provision of W.R.Cr.P. 
32(c)(1)(C) should apply in probation revocation proceedings.  He cites to this Court's decision in Anderson, 43 P.3d 108 to support this 
claim.

 
 

[¶21]     
In 
Anderson, the defendant pled guilty 
to aggravated assault and battery.  
The court accepted, but did not enter, the plea and placed the defendant 
on probation in accordance with Wyoming's "first-offender" statute.2  The State later filed a petition to 
revoke the defendant's probation.  
Finding a violation, the district court entered the plea, revoked the 
defendant's probation, and imposed a sentence of 12-18 months at the Wyoming 
Women's Center.  Although the issue 
of allocution was not presented, we felt compelled to 
comment:

 
 
Our 
review of the record reveals that, although Anderson was given an opportunity to 
allocute at the time she was placed on probation, she was not afforded such an 
opportunity at the time she was sentenced to a term of 12-18 months in the 
Wyoming Women's Center.  No issue is 
raised in this regard, but we call this to the attention of the district courts 
in an effort to ensure that the requirement for allocution is met.  W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1)(C); Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 
(Wyo. 1987); and see Michael A. 
DiSabatino, J.D., Annotation, Right and 
Sufficiency of Allocution in Probation Revocation Proceeding, 70 A.L.R. 5th 
533 (1999).

 
 
It 
may be that allocution is not an absolute requirement at the time probation is 
granted, as technically a sentence is not imposed.  However, better practice is probably to 
allow the defendant an opportunity to allocute at that time, as well as at 
sentencing in such circumstances as those which arise under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-301.  See McCarty v. State, 883 P.2d 367, 371-72 
(Wyo. 1994).

 
 

Anderson, 
¶ 20 n.10, 43 P.3d  at 116 n.10.  

 
 

[¶22]     
Mr. 
Forbes asserts that this passage from Anderson supports his claim that the 
district court erred when it did not allow him the opportunity to address the 
court at his probation revocation proceeding.  Anderson, however, is distinguishable. 
 The defendant in Anderson was not sentenced until her 
probation was revoked.  At the 
probation revocation proceeding, the district court, after determining that 
probation should be revoked, sentenced the defendant without providing the 
opportunity to allocute.  The right 
of a defendant to allocute in mitigation at sentencing is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 
32(c)(1)(C).  Mr. Forbes's situation 
is different.  He pled guilty and 
was sentenced on August 8, 2008, at a sentencing hearing governed by W.R.Cr.P. 
32.  Prior to imposing that sentence 
he was provided the opportunity to allocute.  The proceeding Mr. Forbes now challenges 
was a probation revocation proceeding governed by W.R.Cr.P. 
39.

 
 

[¶23]     
We 
must decide whether the allocution provision of W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1)(C) applies to 
probation revocation proceedings.  
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in United States v. Frazier, 283 F.3d 1242 
(11th Cir. 2002).  In Frazier, the defendant claimed the 
district court erred when, after conducting a hearing, it sentenced him for 
violating the terms of his supervised release without providing an opportunity 
to allocute before imposing the sentence.3  Id. at 1243.  In considering this claim, the Frazier court grappled with the 
relationship between Fed.R.Cr.P. 32, which governed sentencing proceedings and 
provided the right of allocution at sentencing, and the then-current version of 
Fed.R.Cr.P. 32.1, which governed probation and supervised release revocation 
hearings, but did not specifically provide the right to allocute during such 
proceedings.  The court noted a 
split of authority on the issue.  
Several courts held that the right of allocution provided in Fed.R.Cr.P. 
32 extended to revocation proceedings.  
See United States v. Patterson, 128 F.3d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 919, 921 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Carper, 24 F.3d 1157, 
1162 (9th Cir. 1994).  The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, determined that a defendant did not have a 
right to allocute at a revocation proceeding.  United States v. Waters, 158 F.3d 933 
(6th Cir. 1998). 

 
 

[¶24]     
Ultimately, 
the Frazier court determined that the 
right did not extend to revocation proceedings. The court noted that Fed.R.Cr.P. 
32 provided a party with the right to allocute "before the court imposes a sentence," 
and made no mention of revocation proceedings.  Frazier, 283 F.3d  at 1244 (emphasis 
added); Waters, 158 F.3d  at 
942-43.  The defendant in Frazier had already received a sentence 
but had violated a term of his supervised release.  The proceeding at issue was a revocation 
proceeding, governed by Fed.R.Cr.P. 32.1.  That rule was "silent with respect to 
whether a defendant has a right to allocute before sentence is imposed at a 
revocation hearing."  Frazier, 283 F.3d  at 1245, quoting Waters, 158 F.3d  at 943.  Because the revocation proceeding in Frazier was governed by Fed.R.Cr.P. 
32.1, and that rule was silent with respect to the right to allocute, the court 
held "there exists no legal requirement to grant a defendant the right to 
allocution at a revocation hearing." Frazier, 283 F.3d  at 
1245.

 
 

[¶25]     
The 
Frazier court did suggest that an 
amendment to the Federal Rules be considered:

 
 
It 
does appear to us . . . that this question is one that should be addressed by 
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The right of allocution seems both 
important and firmly embedded in our jurisprudence. We suspect that its omission 
from [the rule governing revocation proceedings] could be the result of a simple 
oversight.  

 
 

Id.  In response to Frazier and the disparate treatment of 
the issue in federal circuit courts, the Advisory Committee amended the Federal 
Rules in 2005.  Fed.R.Cr.P. 
32.1(b)(2) now reads as follows:

 
 
(2) 
Revocation Hearing. Unless waived by the person, the court must hold the 
revocation hearing within a reasonable time in the district having jurisdiction. 
The person is entitled to:

 
 
(A) 
written notice of the alleged violation;

 
 
(B) 
disclosure of the evidence against the person;

 
 
(C) 
an opportunity to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness 
unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the 
witness to appear;

 
 
(D) 
notice of the person's right to retain counsel or to request that counsel be 
appointed if the person cannot obtain counsel; and

 
 
(E) 
an opportunity to make a statement and present any information in 
mitigation.

 
 
The 
Advisory Committee also amended Fed.R.Cr.P. 32.1(c)(1), to read as 
follows:

 
 
(c) 
Modification.

 
 
(1) 
In General. Before modifying the conditions of probation or supervised release, 
the court must hold a hearing, at which the person has the right to counsel and 
an opportunity to make a statement and present any information in 
mitigation.

 
 

[¶26]     
We 
agree with the approach of the Frazier court.  W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1)(C) applies to 
sentencing, not to probation revocation proceedings.  Revocation proceedings are governed by 
W.R.Cr.P. 39.  That rule is silent 
regarding the court's obligation to provide a defendant with the opportunity to 
allocute.  We would urge the 
Advisory Committee for the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure to address this 
issue.  As we did in Anderson, we again comment that allowing 
the probationer the opportunity to allocute is the better practice.  In light of W.R.Cr.P. 39's silence on 
the issue, however, we do not find that the district court erred in failing to 
offer allocution to Mr. Forbes.

 
 

[¶27]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316(a)(iv) provides:

(a)           
Except 
under circumstance[s] constituting sexual abuse of a minor in the first or 
second degree . . . , an actor commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in 
the third degree if:

. 
. . .

(iv)        Being 
seventeen (17) years of age or older, the actor knowingly takes immodest, 
immoral or indecent liberties with a victim who is less than seventeen (17) 
years of age and the victim is at least four (4) years younger than the 
actor.

2The 
"first-offender" statute allows the district court to defer further proceedings 
and, without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, place certain offenders 
on probation for a term not exceeding five years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-301.

3Although 
there may be minor differences between probation and parole, where sentencing 
has been imposed previously, there is little discernable difference between 
parole revocations and probation revocations.  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 
n.3, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759 n.3, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973).