Title: Lackey v. Medora Township

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

194 Kan. 794 (1965)
401 P.2d 911
LIZZIE MAY LACKEY, Appellant,
v.
MEDORA TOWNSHIP of Reno County, Kansas; LITTLE VALLEY TOWNSHIP of McPherson County, Kansas, and SUPERIOR TOWNSHIP of McPherson County, Kansas, Appellees.
No. 44,071

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 15, 1965.
Archio T. MacDonald, of McPherson, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellant.
Robert W. Wise, of McPherson, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellee, Little Valley Township.
Michael E. Chalfant, of Hutchinson, was on the briefs for the appellee, Medora Township.
J.R. Rhoades, of McPherson, was an the briefs for the appellee, Superior Township.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This was an action for damages resulting from injuries due to an alleged defective township road. The appeal is from an order of the district court of Reno County refusing to vacate a judgment of dismissal and permit the filing of an amended petition.
On December 31, 1963, the plaintiff filed her petition, which sets out the facts material to the controversy in that part, which reads:
The defendants, and each of them, challenged the petition with motions to dismiss because the petition failed to state a claim against the defendants upon which relief could be granted.
On March 4, 1964, the district court sustained the motions to dismiss, stating in a memorandum opinion that the conditions described in the petition did not constitute a defect within the meaning of K.S.A. 68-301.
Plaintiff then filed a motion for leave to file an amended petition. On April 3, 1964, the district court overruled the motion stating that after there had been a judgment of dismissal a petition could not be amended as a matter of course under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-215 (a).
On April 9, 1964, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the judgment and for leave to file an amended petition. The motion reads in part:
The motion further stated that it was filed under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-260 (b) (1) and prayed that the court vacate and set aside the judgment of March 4, 1964. A copy of the amended petition was attached to the motion.
The district court overruled the motion and in a memorandum opinion stated:
Thereupon the plaintiff perfected the instant appeal.
Appellant contends that her amended petition stated a cause of action and that therefore it was error for the trial court to refuse to vacate a judgment under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-260 (b) (1) which read:
Since the foregoing provision was lifted from rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure we may look to federal cases for its construction and application.
Relief under the provision quoted is not a matter of right, but is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Fischer v. Dover Steamship Co., 218 F.2d 682; Smith v. Kincaid, 249 F.2d 243; and Petition of Pui Lan Yee, 20 F.R.D. 399. Discretion should ordinarily incline towards granting relief in order that judgments reflect the true merits of the case. (Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34.) However, it is desirable that final judgments not be lightly disturbed and the motions and the grounds for that relief should be closely scrutinized.
If mistake or inadvertency forms the basis for a motion to set aside a judgment, the movant should make some showing as to why he was justified in failing to avoid the mistake or inadvertency. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dismang, 106 F.2d 362; Petition of Pui Lan Yee, supra; and Smith v. Kincaid, supra.
Appellant makes no explanation as to why the mistake or inadvertency occurred. She alleged in her original petition: "... that immediately South of said intersection of said North and South road with said East and West road, was a road ditch approximately twenty-one inches in depth; ..."
This was the mistake or inadvertency. Appellant would now allege:
*797 The trial court was justified in concluding that the suggested change in language, in and of itself, did not establish a mistake or inadvertent error justifying the vacation of the judgment.
There is nothing to indicate abuse of discretion. An appellant claiming abuse of discretion has the burden of proving the claim. In the absence of an abuse of discretion this court will not review the trial court's action on appeal. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dismang, supra; Smith v. Kincaid, supra; and Greenspahn v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 186 F.2d 616.
The judgment is affirmed.
FONTRON, J., not participating.