Title: JEFFREY JAMES FULLER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JEFFREY JAMES FULLER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 55230 P.3d 309Case Number: S-09-0169Decided: 04/28/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
JEFFREY 
JAMES FULLER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable Scott W. Skavdahl, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. Daraie, Student 
Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Daraie.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Jeffrey 
James Fuller appeals his conviction on a charge of felony property destruction 
in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) (LexisNexis 2007).  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]      
Mr. 
Fuller states his single issue as follows:

 
 
Where 
a tenant damages rented property and subsequently pays for its repair, can that 
tenant be held criminally liable under W.S. § 6-3-201 for the damage to the 
property he was legally possessing under the rental 
agreement?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Mr. 
Fuller and his wife leased a house and garage in Casper, Wyoming.  After an argument with his wife, 
Mr. Fuller drove his pickup through the closed garage door, striking his 
wife's car inside.1  He backed up his pickup and then rammed 
the car again, this time pushing it through the rear wall of the garage.  Both the garage and the car were 
damaged.  Mr. Fuller submitted 
claims to his automobile insurance company.  It issued a check to the landlords in 
the amount of $8,265.39 as reimbursement for damages to the garage.  

 
 

[¶4]        
Mr. 
Fuller was charged with the crime of property destruction and defacement for 
damaging the car and the garage.  At 
the close of the prosecution's case, Mr. Fuller moved for acquittal, asserting 
that he could not be convicted for damaging the car he owned or the garage he 
leased.  The district court granted 
the motion as it related to his wife's car because the State failed to prove who 
owned it.  The district court denied 
the motion as it related to the garage on the basis that, despite 
Mr. Fuller's lease of the property, the State had offered sufficient 
evidence that the landlords owned the garage.  The jury convicted Mr. Fuller, and 
after sentencing, he filed this appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶5]        
To 
resolve this case, we must interpret Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-3-201(a).

 
 
Statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law which we review de novo.  Qwest Corp. v. State ex rel. Dept. of 
Rev., 2006 WY 35, ¶ 8, 130 P.3d 507, 511 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 
When 
interpreting statutes, we follow an established set of guidelines.  First, we determine if the statute is 
ambiguous or unambiguous.  A statute 
is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree 
as to its meaning with consistency and predictability.  Unless another meaning is clearly 
intended, words and phrases shall be taken in their ordinary and usual sense. 
 Conversely, a statute is ambiguous 
only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations.  

 
 

BP 
America Prod. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 
2006 WY 27, ¶ 20, 130 P.3d 438, 464 (Wyo. 2006), quoting State Dept. of Revenue v. Powder River Coal 
Co., 2004 WY 54, ¶ 5, 90 P.3d 1158, 1160 (Wyo. 2004).  If a statute is clear and unambiguous, 
we give effect to the plain language of the statute.  State ex rel. Wyo. Dept. of Revenue v. Union 
Pacific R.R. Co., 2003 WY 54, ¶ 12, 67 P.3d 1176, 1182 (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 

Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 
2009 WY 139, ¶ 11, 219 P.3d 128, 134 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶6]        
Mr. 
Fuller was convicted of violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a), which 
provides that "A person is guilty of property destruction and defacement if he 
knowingly defaces, injures or destroys property of another without the owner's 
consent."  Mr. Fuller focuses on the 
phrase "property of another," contending that it is ambiguous when applied to 
property in which a defendant has an ownership interest.  Because the lease entitled him to sole 
possession of the garage at the time it was damaged, Mr. Fuller asserts that the 
garage could be considered his property as well as "property of another."  On this basis, he claims that the 
statutory language is subject to varying interpretations, and is therefore 
ambiguous.  

 
 

[¶7]        
Mr. 
Fuller supports his argument that the statute is ambiguous by citing our 
decision in Horn v. State, 556 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1976).  In that case, Mr. 
Horn had "resorted to self-help" when the telephone company was slow to respond 
to a request to disconnect and remove the telephone from his home.  He cut the telephone line between his 
home and a pole in the alley, and "then bundled up the wire and left the 
telephone with the wire attached at the front door of the telephone 
company."  Id. at 926.  He was convicted under Wyo. Stat. 
§ 37-258.1 (now codified as Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-12-121), which reads 
as follows:

 
 
Any 
person who wilfully displaces, removes, injures or destroys any public telephone 
instrument or any part thereof or any equipment or facilities associated 
therewith or who enters or breaks into any coin box associated therewith or who 
wilfully displaces, removes, injures or destroys any telegraph or telephone 
line, wire, cable, pole or conduit belonging to another or the material 
or property appurtenant thereto is guilty of a felony.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  At that time, telephones 
were generally "owned" by telephone companies and "consigned" to customers.  Customers had the right "to possess the 
property as against everyone except" the company, but still had "less than 
ownership" of the telephones.  Horn, 556 P.2d  at 927.  "[T]he theory of the State in 
prosecuting [Mr.] Horn was that the telephone company was the owner of the 
property involved, and it was because of that ownership that the State, under 
its theory, satisfied the element of the offense that the property involved must 
be property belonging to another.'"  
Id. at 
926.

 
 

[¶8]        
We 
found the phrase "belonging to another" ambiguous because the "word belong' is 
said to have two general meanings:  
(1) ownership; and (2) less than ownership, i.e., less than an unqualified and 
absolute title, such as the absolute right of user.  Black's Law Dictionary, p. 198 (4th Ed. 1968)."  Horn, 556 P.2d  at 927.  Mr. Horn had "less than ownership" 
of the telephone, but the Court concluded that his interest was enough to 
"permit this telephone to be described as belonging to [Mr.] Horn."  Id.  Under this statutory language, we 
concluded, a defendant could not be convicted unless the State proved that he 
"had no interest whatsoever in the telephone equipment which would permit it to 
be described as belonging to' the defendant."  Id. at 928.

 
 

[¶9]        
Based 
on the decision in Horn, Mr. Fuller 
asserts that he cannot be convicted of property destruction unless the State 
proves that he "had no interest whatsoever" in the garage.  But the statute under which 
Mr. Fuller was convicted does not use the ambiguous phrase "belonging to 
another."  It uses the phrase 
"property of another," and we conclude that this language has only one 
reasonable interpretation.  As the 
State points out, the word "property" means "anything of value whether tangible 
or intangible, real or personal, public or private."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-1-104(a)(viii).  The word 
"another" is commonly understood to mean "being one more in addition 
. . . one that is different from the first or present one."  Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 88 (1991).  The 
garage was "property," the landlords were "another," and they had a property 
interest in the garage.  When Mr. 
Fuller damaged the leased garage, he destroyed or defaced "property of 
another."  Because the words have a 
clear and unambiguous meaning, we will give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.  Exxon, ¶ 11, 219 P.3d  at 
134.

 
 

[¶10]     
Mr. 
Fuller lists other situations involving jointly owned property in which, he 
suggests, it would be absurd to impose criminal sanctions.  He asks, for example, "What about 
tenants by the entireties, can either the husband or the wife chop down the 
cherry tree without the express consent of the other?"  In contrast, the State contends that 
"property of another" should be broadly interpreted to include jointly owned 
property of all kinds, and marital property in particular because property 
destruction is commonly associated with domestic violence.  We do not need to decide such questions 
in this case, and we are not doing so in this opinion.  Our narrow holding here is that, under 
the plain language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201, a tenant may be found 
guilty of property destruction or defacement if he knowingly defaces, injures, 
or destroys rented or leased property without the landlord's consent.  

 
 

[¶11]     
As 
a final matter, we reject Mr. Fuller's suggestion that his conviction was 
improper because his insurance company reimbursed the landlord for the damage he 
caused to the garage.  He has not 
provided any legal authority in support of that assertion, and nothing in the 
language of this statute indicates that paying for the damages is a defense to 
the charged crime.  

 
 

[¶12]     
Mr. 
Fuller's conviction is affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1As Mr. Fuller 
did at trial, we will refer to "his pickup" and "her car" because he drove the 
pickup more often and she usually drove the car.  The record does not show whether the 
vehicles were owned individually or jointly.