Title: Commonwealth v. Waller

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11484 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DERRICK D. WALLER. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     February 10, 2020.  -  October 22, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Evidence, Opinion.  Practice, Criminal, 
Instructions to jury, Assistance of counsel, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 17, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Frank M. Gaziano, J. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the defendant. 
 
Bridget Norton Middleton, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  A jury found the defendant guilty of murder in 
the first degree and of unlawful possession of a firearm.  The 
defendant asserts reversible error because one of the 
Commonwealth's key witnesses provided improper lay testimony on 
                     
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
the ultimate issue of the defendant's guilt.  The defendant also 
argues that a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
occurred because the judge erred by not providing a self-defense 
instruction sua sponte; because trial counsel was ineffective 
for requesting that the judge refrain from issuing that 
instruction in furtherance of an all-or-nothing strategy; and 
because the weight of the evidence did not support either 
verdict.  We affirm and see no reason to exercise our authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
1.  Background.  At around 2 A.M. on August 15, 2009, the 
victim, Delacey Hinton, died from a gunshot wound to the chest.  
The victim's neighbor, who had been with the victim on their 
shared porch, watched the victim descend stairs towards the 
street after a silver, four-door car approached.  The neighbor 
then saw the driver stick a silver handgun out the window and 
heard two shots. 
 
Hours before the murder, the defendant and his roommate  
went to a night club where the defendant's girlfriend  worked 
and where the victim also happened to be.  The defendant pointed 
out the victim to the roommate, explaining that the victim had 
previously slapped the mother of the defendant's child.  As the 
club's closing time approached, an argument ensued between the 
defendant and the roommate, on one side, and the victim and his 
friends on the other.  During the dispute, the victim asked one 
3 
 
 
friend if he had his "thing" on him, which the roommate 
interpreted to mean a gun. 
 
As the victim was leaving the club, the defendant and the 
roommate harassed him in the parking lot.  In response, the 
victim made a shooting gesture with his hands.  As the victim 
drove out of the club's parking lot, the defendant and the 
roommate pursued, but they quickly gave up and returned to the 
parking lot to wait for the girlfriend's shift to end.  The 
defendant, the roommate, and the girlfriend returned to the 
girlfriend's apartment at around 1:30 A.M. 
 
Shortly before 2 A.M., the defendant told the girlfriend 
that he was going to the "dude's crib."  He then took the 
girlfriend's car, a silver, four-door Infinity.  The roommate 
attempted to accompany the defendant, but the defendant refused.  
The roommate and the girlfriend telephoned the defendant 
repeatedly between 1:57 A.M. and 2:05 A.M., when the defendant 
finally answered.  When the defendant returned, at around 2:15 
A.M., he went to the girlfriend's bathroom.  In view of the 
roommate and the girlfriend, the defendant washed his hands, 
took out a chrome revolver with a wooden handle, and dumped two 
shells into the sink.  The girlfriend testified that she 
previously had seen the same gun in the defendant's possession. 
 
A short time later, the defendant exclaimed that he shot 
the victim two times and gestured as if aiming a gun:  "[I] let 
4 
 
 
him have it" and "[I] hit him one time in the chest, he fell 
over and [I] gave him another one to go."  The defendant also 
stated that he believed that the victim had been about to pull 
out a gun.  The next morning, the defendant washed the 
girlfriend's car. 
 
The police began investigating the defendant only hours 
after the murder.  After finding out about the investigation, 
the defendant asked the girlfriend to be his alibi.  He also 
told the roommate not to discuss the shooting, purchased the 
same clothes as the roommate so that they could "be twins," and 
accused the roommate of telling someone what had happened.  
Responding to these developments, the roommate fled to Ohio.  
Soon thereafter, the defendant fled to Indiana, where he lived 
under a false identity and where he was arrested for murder 
about one year later. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Evidentiary issue.  In explaining why 
he left Massachusetts so quickly, the roommate testified that he 
did not "want to be around [shootings]" and that he "didn't want 
to be a part of any of that, shootings and murders and stuff 
like that."  The defendant argues that those statements 
constituted improper lay testimony concerning the ultimate 
issue:  whether the defendant murdered the victim. 
There was no error.  The roommate did not testify to a lay 
opinion.  See Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 541 (2013).  
5 
 
 
He explained why he left Massachusetts, and his testimony 
rebutted the defendant's insinuation that the roommate shot the 
victim.  Moreover, the testimony did not directly implicate the 
defendant as the murderer.  Rather, the roommate explained, in 
general terms, that he did not want to be around "shootings" or 
"murders" or "stuff like that."2   See Commonwealth v. Lennon, 
399 Mass. 443, 444-445 (1987) (no prejudice from improperly 
admitted witness statement, "I know who did it," while 
identifying defendant). 
 
Even if the jury may have considered the testimony as 
evidence that the roommate believed that the defendant had 
committed the murder, the probative value of the evidence was 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.  
See Commonwealth v. Goddard, 476 Mass. 443, 447 (2017); Mass. G. 
Evid. § 403 (2020).  As mentioned, the roommate's explanation of 
why he abruptly left Massachusetts was particularly important 
                     
 
2 "An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces 
an ultimate issue."  Mass. G. Evid. § 704 (2020).  However, 
testimony providing an opinion as to guilt or innocence is not 
permissible because it invades the province of the jury and 
implicitly vouches for the credibility of witnesses.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. 54, 60 (1994) ("jury are 
capable" of assessing ultimate issue); Commonwealth v. 
Richardson, 423 Mass. 180, 185-186 (1996) (opinion on 
credibility of witness inadmissible as improper vouching).  See 
also, Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 541-542 (2013) 
(limitations on expert opinion on ultimate issue also apply to 
lay testimony). 
6 
 
 
considering the defense's insinuation that the roommate might 
have fled because he had committed the crime. 
 
b.  Self-defense instruction.  At trial, the judge 
contemplated whether to provide an instruction on self-defense 
because he anticipated that the defendant might request one.  At 
sidebar, the judge discussed the issue with defense counsel, 
noting that there was sufficient evidence to support the self-
defense instruction.  The judge emphasized that "it's up to 
counsel" whether to pursue the defense. 
At the close of evidence, after consulting with the 
defendant, defense counsel decided against seeking a self-
defense instruction because he thought it would "undercut[] the 
defense" that the defendant did not commit the murder and was 
not present at the scene of the crime.  The judge accordingly 
omitted the instruction. 
The defendant now argues that the judge committed 
reversible error by not providing the instruction and that his 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for strategically 
deciding against requesting such an instruction.  Neither claim 
has merit. 
When requested by either the Commonwealth or the defendant, 
a judge must instruct on self-defense if the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the defendant warrants an instruction.  
See Commonwealth v. Souza, 428 Mass. 478, 486 (1998).  However, 
7 
 
 
a judge has no obligation to instruct when neither party 
requests, because doing so may "interfere[] with the defendants' 
right to present their chosen defenses," especially where 
defendants expressly decide against the instruction in pursuit 
of an all-or-nothing defense.  Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 Mass. 
131, 144 (2012).  See Souza, supra.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 114 (2018) ("It is a well-known and time 
honored approach to avoid emphasizing a defense that would 
undermine a primary defense theory" [quotations and citation 
omitted]); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 407 Mass. 731, 737 (1990) 
("The theory of law on which by assent a case is tried cannot be 
disregarded when the case comes before an appellate court for 
review" [citation omitted]).3  The evidence at trial for a self-
defense instruction was weak, at best, considering the defendant 
affirmatively sought out the "dude's crib" before he shot the 
victim, and the defendant, as determined by the judge's thorough 
colloquies, chose not to pursue the defense.  Therefore, the 
instruction would have "undermine[d the defendant's] central" 
                     
 
3 A judge nonetheless still retains discretion "to instruct 
on a theory of self-defense . . . supported by the evidence even 
where the defendant [or Commonwealth] has not so requested."  
Norris, 462 Mass. at 144 n.12.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Woodward, 
427 Mass. 659, 664-665 (1998) (judicial instructions on lesser 
included offense, even over defendant's objection, allow jury to 
reach verdict supported by evidence); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
419 Mass. 716, 725 n.8 (1995) (judge properly gave instruction 
on lesser included offense, no matter that defendant pursued 
all-or-nothing defense). 
8 
 
 
defense that the defendant was not the shooter and that the 
Commonwealth could not even prove that he was at the scene of 
the crime.  Norris, supra at 143.  The judge did not abuse his 
discretion by deciding to abide by the defendant's request not 
to provide the self-defense instruction. 
As for the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, defense counsel strategically decided against requesting 
the self-defense instruction.  See Norris, 462 Mass. at 142-143.  
The defendant has the right to pursue an all-or-nothing defense, 
and he specifically provided his assent to the judge regarding 
this strategic choice.  See Roberts, 407 Mass. at 737.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 788, 792 (1994) (judge 
has no duty to undercut defendant's all-or-nothing strategy).  
Therefore, defense counsel's strategic decision was not 
"manifestly unreasonable".  See Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 
Mass. 664, 674 (2015).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Goitia, 480 Mass. 
763, 774-775 (2018) (not requesting limiting instruction was 
tactical decision that did not create substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. Wright, 479 Mass. 124, 
139 (2018) (no ineffective assistance of counsel where there was 
clear reason not to pursue lack of criminal responsibility 
defense). 
 
c.  Weight of the evidence.  The defendant asks us to 
exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
9 
 
 
reduce his verdict or to grant him a new trial because the 
weight of the evidence does not support the conviction.  See 
Commonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 770 (2014).  According to 
the defendant, the roommate's and the girlfriend's testimony 
were unreliable because each had an incentive to lie:  the 
roommate had been a suspect in the shooting, and the 
inconsistency between the girlfriend's statements to the police 
during the initial investigation and her testimony at trial 
demonstrated her motivation to assist the Commonwealth upon 
receiving a grant of immunity.  We disagree. 
 
We do not act as a second jury.  Commonwealth v. Franklin, 
465 Mass. 895, 916 (2013).  Section 33E provides us the 
authority to grant a new trial as against the weight of the 
evidence if the verdict, "if allowed to stand, would work a 
miscarriage of justice" (citation omitted).  Id. 
 
Defense counsel vigorously impeached the credibility of the 
roommate and the girlfriend, and the jury are the ultimate 
arbiters of credibility.  See Franklin, 465 Mass. at 916.  The 
Commonwealth also presented compelling and substantial evidence 
that the defendant committed the murder, including that he 
possessed a firearm; that he argued with the victim earlier that 
evening due to an ongoing dispute; that the car the defendant 
drove to the victim's "crib" at the time of the shooting matched 
the description of the car driven by the shooter; that the 
10 
 
 
roommate and the girlfriend repeatedly called the defendant's 
cell phone at around the time of the murder, but their calls 
went unanswered; that when the defendant returned to the 
girlfriend's apartment shortly after the time of the shooting, 
he had a chrome-colored gun, which matched the description of 
the murder weapon, and from which he discharged two shell 
casings; that the defendant told the girlfriend and the roommate 
that he had shot "him" twice, matching the number of the 
victim's gunshot wounds; that the next morning the defendant 
washed the car he had driven; that the defendant asked his 
girlfriend to be his alibi and sought to shift blame for the 
murder to the roommate by subsequently purchasing clothes 
identical to those the roommate had been wearing that evening; 
and that the defendant fled Massachusetts and assumed a false 
identity in Indiana because of consciousness of guilt.  The 
weight of the Commonwealth's evidence amply supported the jury's 
verdict, and that verdict was consonant with justice. 
We have reviewed the entire record and find no basis to set 
aside the verdict of murder in the first degree or to order a 
new trial pursuant to our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.