Title: Commonwealth v. Reyes

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11590 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSHUA REYES. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     May 6, 2019. - September 9, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Self-Defense.  Evidence, Self-defense, State of mind, 
Photograph.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Argument by 
prosecutor, Instructions to jury. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 24, 2011. 
 
 
The case was tried before C. Jeffrey Kinder, J. 
 
 
 
William S. Smith for the defendant. 
 
Laila Atta, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  On the morning of Monday, August 8, 2011, the 
defendant stabbed Miguel Rodriguez twenty-eight times, killing 
him.  The issue at trial was not whether the defendant committed 
the killing -- the defendant admitted to doing so in his 
testimony -- but whether the killing was triggered by 
2 
 
 
Rodriguez's own attempt to stab the defendant.  Defense counsel 
argued that the killing was mitigated because the defendant used 
excessive force in self-defense and acted in the heat of passion 
on reasonable provocation and in sudden combat, and therefore 
asked a Superior Court jury to return a verdict of voluntary 
manslaughter rather than murder in the first degree.  The jury 
implicitly rejected the defendant's version of the incident and 
found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty. 
 
On appeal, the defendant claims that he is entitled to a 
new trial because the judge erred in various evidentiary 
rulings, because the prosecutor made prejudicial statements in 
closing argument that were not supported by the evidence, and 
because the judge overruled the defendant's objection to 
instructing the jury regarding the third prong of malice.  He 
also claims that that the jury should have been instructed that, 
to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on 
the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, they must find that 
he appreciated the consequences of his choices.  In addition, he 
asks this court to exercise its extraordinary powers under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. 
 
We conclude that the judge made no prejudicial error in his 
evidentiary rulings, that nothing in the prosecutor's closing 
3 
 
 
argument created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice, that the judge's instructions regarding murder in the 
first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty were 
proper, and that the jury's verdict is consonant with justice.  
We therefore affirm the defendant's conviction of murder in the 
first degree, and decline to exercise our authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or to order a new trial. 
 
Background.  Because the defendant claims that he acted in 
self-defense and that the jury's verdict of murder in the first 
degree is not consonant with justice, we provide a detailed 
summary of the evidence at trial, reserving discussion of some 
of the facts to the relevant claims of error. 
 
The defendant was born in Holyoke, and he has moved between 
Massachusetts and Puerto Rico several times.  He most recently 
moved back to Holyoke from Puerto Rico on July 21, 2011, 
approximately three weeks before the killing.  In the weeks 
leading up to the victim's death, the defendant resided with his 
uncle, Joel Montanez; Montanez's longtime girlfriend, Celia 
Rojas; and their children in a fifth-floor apartment in Holyoke. 
 
The victim resided with his sister on the fourth floor of 
the same apartment building.  The defendant and the victim met 
soon after the defendant moved into the building; the defendant 
occasionally sold drugs to the victim, and used drugs with him.  
Montanez testified that he had warned the defendant about the 
4 
 
 
victim, telling the defendant that the victim had a reputation 
for "being trouble," that he carried a gun, and that the 
defendant should "watch himself" when he was with the victim. 
 
On the Thursday before the killing, the defendant was using 
drugs with the victim and "Tutti," a neighbor from the third 
floor of their apartment building, when Tutti pulled out a gun.  
The victim said that that was the weapon he would use "if 
anything happened."  At that time, the defendant did not 
understand the victim's statement to be a threat, because he was 
on friendly terms with the victim.  The relationship between the 
defendant and the victim soured, however, after the victim lent 
the defendant cocaine valued at one hundred dollars on the 
Saturday before the killing.1  Before dawn the next morning, at 
some time after 2 A.M., the victim called the defendant to ask 
for cocaine.  The defendant testified that the victim came to 
his apartment door multiple times in the next several hours, 
repeatedly asking for drugs, which the defendant did not 
provide. 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant testified that he did not owe the victim one 
hundred dollars and that he therefore never intended to repay 
it.  According to the defendant, he had earlier lent the victim 
twenty dollars and cocaine valued at eighty dollars.  From the 
defendant's testimony, it appears that he believed that the 
victim gave him one hundred dollars in cocaine to repay him for 
this earlier loan. 
5 
 
 
 
Later that Sunday morning, the defendant, along with other 
family members, went to the defendant's grandmother's home in 
Holyoke.  The victim came to the home and asked the defendant to 
return his one hundred dollars.  The defendant told the victim 
that he would make some telephone calls to attempt to obtain the 
money.  The victim then left, but he returned ten or fifteen 
minutes later and threatened to do something to the defendant if 
he did not get the money.  The defendant told the victim that he 
would pay the one hundred dollars by 4 P.M. 
 
After the victim left, the defendant returned to Montanez's 
apartment.  Montanez testified that the victim came by the 
apartment four or five times, looking to speak with the 
defendant.  At approximately 1 P.M., according to the defendant, 
the victim asked again for the one hundred dollars and told the 
defendant that he would "blow [the defendant] up" if he did not 
get the money.  The defendant interpreted this to mean that the 
victim was threatening to shoot him.  At approximately 3 P.M., 
the defendant went to his aunt's home.  While the defendant was 
there, the victim telephoned, said he wanted to see the 
defendant, and threatened to kill the defendant if he (the 
victim) did not get his money. 
 
The defendant testified that, after leaving his aunt's home 
at approximately 10 P.M., he went to his cousin's house to get a 
knife to protect himself.  The defendant described the knife as 
6 
 
 
an old, brown, rusty knife with a long black handle.  The 
defendant testified that he then waited downstairs in front of 
his apartment building, hoping to prevent the victim from 
reaching his family.  He said that if he saw the victim, he 
intended to tell the victim that he did not have the money "and 
whatever happened was going to happen."  The defendant testified 
that he eventually grew tired of waiting for the victim and went 
upstairs to Montanez's apartment at approximately 10:30 or 11 
P.M.2 
 
When the defendant came upstairs, where Montanez was 
playing dominoes, Montanez observed the defendant take a chrome-
colored knife from his waistband and place it on his lap.  
Montanez noted that the knife had no guard where the handle met 
the blade. 
 
The next morning, at approximately 8:15 A.M., a witness who 
was driving his vehicle on the street in front of the 
defendant's apartment building saw two men running from the 
further front entrance of the apartment building toward the 
                                                          
 
 
2 Montanez testified that on the night before the killing, 
he was walking to a neighborhood store when he saw the defendant 
walking toward the apartment building.  The defendant asked 
Montanez if he had seen the victim, and Montanez responded that 
he had not.  When Montanez returned from the store, the 
defendant was still outside the apartment building, but he 
returned to the apartment about five or ten minutes later. 
7 
 
 
street.3  One man was attempting to run away from another man, 
who was holding his shirt to prevent his flight.  The witness 
stopped his vehicle to watch the encounter.  He saw the man who 
was holding the victim's shirt spin the victim around and start 
"punching" the victim in the chest.  The victim had his hands in 
the air, screaming and trying to get away; there was nothing in 
the victim's hands.  The witness saw blood and observed the 
"punching" man holding a shiny object; at this time, he realized 
that the man was not punching the victim, but stabbing him with 
a knife.  The victim fell to the ground, and then he got up and 
staggered to lean on another vehicle.4  The man who had stabbed 
the victim ran into the other front entrance of the apartment 
building. 
 
That same morning, Montanez was awakened by knocking on the 
front door of his apartment.  Rojas opened the door, and the 
defendant -- whose hand was bleeding -- entered.  Montanez 
testified that he observed the defendant place a knife on top of 
the bathroom sink, and that this was the same knife he had seen 
                                                          
 
 
3 There are two front entrances to the apartment building 
where the victim and the defendant lived.  The first leads to 
stairs to the apartments on the left side of the building, and 
the second leads to stairs to the apartments on the right side 
of the building.  The defendant and the victim lived on opposite 
sides of the building. 
 
 
4 Another witness, whose truck the victim leaned against, 
heard the victim mumble some unknown words and saw him drop to 
the ground. 
8 
 
 
the defendant with the previous evening.  He heard the defendant 
say only "cut."  Montanez then told the defendant to leave the 
apartment, which the defendant did. 
 
After arriving at the scene, Holyoke police Detective David 
Usher followed a blood trail on the floor, stairs, and walls of 
the apartment building up to the fifth floor.  When he knocked 
on the door to Montanez's apartment, Rojas answered and allowed 
him in.  The detective saw blood on the floor near the front 
bedroom and in the hallway, and noted that the front hallway had 
been recently mopped.  A protective sweep of the apartment did 
not locate the defendant. 
 
The defendant testified that, after he left Montanez's 
apartment following the stabbing, he went to the home of the 
cousin who had lent him the knife and returned it to him.  The 
defendant admitted that the knife Montanez had seen on the 
bathroom sink that morning was the knife used in the stabbing.  
The defendant then went to his grandmother's home in Holyoke, 
where he showered and took medication for the pain arising from 
his wounds.  From there, the defendant went to his aunt's home, 
where he ate and slept.  Eventually, the defendant's cousin's 
boyfriend drove him to a home in Springfield, where the 
defendant went to sleep for the night.  The following day, the 
defendant's cousin's boyfriend asked the defendant if he was 
going to turn himself in to the police.  The defendant responded 
9 
 
 
that he would, and the boyfriend drove him to his grandmother's 
house.  There, the defendant asked his mother to call the 
police, who arrived and arrested him. 
 
Holyoke police Detective James McGillicuddy noted that, 
when he arrested the defendant, the defendant had slice wounds 
to his right thumb, ring finger, pinky finger, and left forearm.  
He also had a "scratch type injury" to his right upper arm. 
 
The medical examiner who examined the victim's body, Dr. 
Katherine Lindstrom, found twenty-eight "sharp-force injuries," 
likely caused by a knife, all of which contributed to the 
victim's death.  She noted that any of three stab wounds that 
penetrated the victim's lungs, as well as a stab wound that 
struck his carotid artery, would have sufficed on its own to 
cause death.  She opined that someone with these stab wounds 
would be able to survive "likely minutes." 
 
The prosecutor and the defendant agreed that the fight 
between the defendant and the victim began in the vestibule of 
the apartment building, but disagreed as to how that fight 
began.  The defendant testified that the victim had called the 
telephone in Montanez's apartment early that morning and said he 
wanted to see the defendant.  Soon thereafter, the victim 
knocked on the apartment door and told the defendant to come 
with him.  The defendant testified that he left the knife he had 
borrowed from his cousin in the apartment, because the victim 
10 
 
 
was watching him as he left.  The victim took the defendant to 
his fourth-floor apartment, handed him a cellular telephone, and 
told him to call someone for the money he owed the victim.  The 
victim then said, "[L]et's go.  Somehow we're going to make some 
money."  The two walked down the stairs to the ground floor, 
with the victim walking behind the defendant.  When they reached 
the ground floor, the defendant opened the door leading to the 
vestibule and let the victim walk ahead of him.  As that door 
was closing behind the defendant, the victim attacked the 
defendant with a knife, attempting to stab him.  The defendant 
grabbed the knife away from the victim, cutting his own hand in 
doing so.  The defendant then started to stab the victim, noting 
that "[e]verything happened so fast, so crazy, so bizarre."  He 
continued to stab the victim in the vestibule until both fell 
through the front door connecting the vestibule to the sidewalk, 
and the defendant fell on top of the victim.  The defendant 
continued to stab the victim while he was on top of the victim 
because he was afraid that the victim might pull out a gun and 
start shooting him.  Both the victim and the defendant 
eventually stood up, but the victim fell back down.  At this 
time, the defendant returned to the apartment building and 
started ringing doorbells until the inside door opened and he 
was able to run upstairs to Montanez's apartment. 
11 
 
 
 
The prosecutor, in contrast, argued that the defendant -- 
unprovoked -- attacked the victim in the vestibule by stabbing 
him in the back, and continued to stab him outside while the 
unarmed victim attempted to run away. 
 
The defendant's version of events suffered from at least 
four flaws that, considered together, made it unbelievable.  
First, the knife that the defendant brought upstairs to the 
bathroom in Montanez's apartment after the stabbing -- which he 
admitted was the knife used in the stabbing -- was identified by 
Montanez as the same knife that he had seen on the defendant's 
lap during the previous night's dominoes game. 
 
Second, the eyewitness's observation of the assault is not 
consistent with the defendant's account.  The eyewitness 
described the victim attempting to run away, with his hands in 
the air, and the defendant attempting to prevent his flight by 
grabbing his shirt, eventually succeeding in spinning the victim 
around so that they faced each other, with the defendant then 
"punching" the victim in the chest.  The defendant, in contrast, 
said that he fell on top of the victim upon leaving the 
vestibule.  In addition, the jury saw and heard evidence that 
the victim had been stabbed multiple times in the back and the 
back of the neck.  Where the eyewitness did not testify to 
seeing the victim get stabbed in the back, it may be inferred 
that these injuries occurred in the vestibule.  This is 
12 
 
 
consistent with the defendant's testimony that he let the victim 
enter the vestibule first, and permits the inference that the 
defendant had the opportunity to strike the first blow from 
behind the victim. 
 
Third, the victim's sister, who lived with him, had given 
the victim her keys to the apartment before she left for work, 
because the victim did not have his own set of keys.  Those keys 
were found in the vestibule, which suggested that the victim was 
carrying them in his hand before the assault commenced.  If the 
victim had intended a "sneak attack," it is unlikely that he 
would do so with a knife in one hand and his keys in another.  
But if the "sneak attack" was perpetrated by the defendant, one 
might expect that the victim would drop his keys after being 
stabbed. 
 
Fourth, the defendant admitted that, the night before the 
killing, he waited for the victim outside the apartment 
building, armed with a knife he had just borrowed from his 
cousin, planning to tell the victim that he did not have the one 
hundred dollars and "whatever happened was going to happen."  
Where the victim had access to Tutti's gun, and told the 
defendant that he would use that gun if anything happened, it is 
likely that the victim -- if he had attempted to attack the 
defendant -- would have done so with a gun and not a knife.  The 
defendant, in contrast, had access to a knife but not a gun, had 
13 
 
 
armed himself with a knife the previous evening because of the 
victim's continued threats regarding his nonpayment of one 
hundred dollars, and had prepared to encounter the victim with 
the knife in his waistband. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Alleged errors in the judge's evidentiary 
rulings.  The defendant argues that the judge erred in three 
evidentiary rulings.  First, he claims that the judge erred in 
sustaining the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel's 
question to the defendant's mother, "[D]id he indicate to you in 
any way that he wanted to turn himself in?"  The defendant 
contends that the defendant's out-of-court statement to his 
mother was admissible for the purpose of demonstrating his 
consciousness of innocence.  We need not decide whether such 
testimony was properly excluded, because any error was cured by 
the fact that the jury heard abundant evidence from three 
separate sources that the defendant turned himself in to the 
police at his grandmother's house. 
 
Before the objection to the question posed to the 
defendant's mother was sustained, she had already testified that 
she called the police "so that [the defendant] could turn 
himself over to the police."5  McGillicuddy, who made the arrest, 
                                                          
 
 
5 Defense counsel then sought clarification as to the timing 
of the defendant's offer to turn himself in, asking, "When [the 
defendant] contacted you to turn himself in, was that the next 
day [after the killing]?"  The defendant's mother did not 
14 
 
 
likewise testified that the defendant's mother called a State 
police trooper and that the defendant turned himself in without 
incident at his grandmother's home.  And the defendant himself 
testified that he "asked [his] mother to call the cops so [he] 
could turn [him]self in."  Because the jury heard ample evidence 
that the defendant surrendered himself to the police 
voluntarily, we conclude that the defendant suffered no 
prejudice from the judge's evidentiary ruling, even if it were 
error. 
 
Second, the defendant claims that the judge erred in 
sustaining objections to three questions that sought to elicit 
the defendant's fearful state of mind at the time of the 
killing, which he contends was relevant to his claim that he 
acted in self-defense.  We recognize that a defendant's state of 
mind at the time of a killing may be relevant where there is an 
issue of self-defense, or the excessive use of force in self-
defense.  See Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 654 
(2005); Commonwealth v. Fontes, 396 Mass. 733, 736-737 (1986) 
("what was in the defendant's mind when he confronted the 
victim" relevant in cases involving self-defense claim).  But 
the defendant was not deprived of the opportunity to present 
                                                          
 
dispute that the defendant wanted to turn himself in, and 
responded only as to the timing of his request. 
15 
 
 
such evidence by the judge's evidentiary ruling regarding these 
three questions. 
 
The defendant contends that the judge erred in sustaining 
an objection where defense counsel asked the defendant whether 
the victim had said, referring to Tutti's gun, "If I had any 
problems, that's what I would use."  Because the defendant had 
previously testified to the victim making this same statement, 
the judge did not abuse his discretion by sustaining the 
objection.6  See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 481 Mass. 189, 193 
(2019) (judges have "discretion to limit repetitive questions"); 
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 186, 190 n.4 (2017), quoting 
Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2016) ("The court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 
danger of . . . needlessly presenting cumulative evidence"). 
The defendant also claims that the judge improperly 
sustained an objection to his answer to a question concerning 
what he had told his cousin about the killing.  The defendant's 
response, "I told him I had a fight, that someone had tried to 
kill me," was struck in its entirety by the judge.  The judge 
did not abuse his discretion in deciding to strike the 
defendant's prior out-of-court statement -- even if it were 
                                                          
 
 
6 The defendant previously testified that on the Thursday 
before the killing, "Tutti took out a weapon and [the victim] 
said that that's what he was going to use if anything happened." 
16 
 
 
offered solely to show the defendant's state of mind and not to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted -- where it was redundant 
of the defendant's earlier testimony regarding the fight that 
resulted in the killing.  See Martinez, 476 Mass. at 190 n.4; 
Commonwealth v. Romero, 464 Mass. 648, 652 n.5 (2013), quoting 
P.J. Liacos, M.S. Brodin, & M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence 
§ 8.2.6 (7th ed. 1999) ("statements may be offered as evidence 
of state of mind without implicating the hearsay rule if the 
statements either do not contain assertions or are offered 
without regard to whether the assertions are true"). 
 
Lastly, the defendant claims that the judge erred in 
sustaining an objection to defense counsel's question, "What was 
your state of mind when you got to your grandmother's house?"  
Where the defendant went to his grandmother's house after the 
stabbing and after first having visited his cousin's house, and 
where the defendant had described his state of mind at the time 
of the stabbing, the judge did not err in the exercise of his 
discretion in excluding evidence of the defendant's state of 
mind when he visited his grandmother.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Garrey, 436 Mass. 422, 438 (2002) ("defendant's relevant state 
of mind . . . was his state of mind at the time of the offense, 
not one and one-half hours later, when he was in police 
custody"). 
17 
 
 
 
Third, the defendant claims that the judge abused his 
discretion by admitting in evidence, over the objection of the 
defendant, graphic photographs of the victim's injuries, which 
he claims posed a risk of unfair prejudice that substantially 
outweighed their probative value.  "Relevant evidence is 
admissible as long as the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."  
Commonwealth v. Wall, 469 Mass. 652, 661 (2014).  "That the 
photographs may be gruesome or have an inflammatory effect on 
the jury does not render them inadmissible so long as they 
possess evidentiary value on a material matter."  Commonwealth 
v. Olsen, 452 Mass. 284, 294 (2008). 
 
Having examined these photographs, we conclude that the 
judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the probative 
value of the photographs with regard to the issues of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty and self-defense was not substantially 
outweighed by their potential for unfair prejudice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Alleyne, 474 Mass. 771, 779 (2016), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983) (where 
photographs are probative of "extent of physical injuries," 
"number of blows," "manner and force" with which blows were 
delivered, and "disproportion between the means needed to cause 
death and those employed," they are probative of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty); Commonwealth v. Benson, 419 Mass. 114, 118 
18 
 
 
(1994) (photographs admissible where relevant to defendant's 
self-defense claim).  See also Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 
Mass. 773, 803 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011), 
quoting Commonwealth v. DeSouza, 428 Mass. 667, 670 (1999) 
("This court has almost never ruled that it was error to admit 
photographs of crime scenes and homicide victims"). 
 
We note that the judge exercised his sound discretion in 
barring from evidence a close-up photograph of the victim's 
lifeless body lying near the wheel of a motor vehicle.  We also 
note that, during jury selection, each prospective juror was 
told individually at sidebar that the evidence in the case might 
include photographs that were graphic in nature, and was asked 
whether seeing those photographs would affect his or her ability 
to be fair.  Any prospective juror who answered this question in 
the affirmative was excused from serving on the jury, so each of 
the sitting jurors had attested that graphic photographs would 
not affect his or her ability to be fair.  See Alleyne, 474 
Mass. at 780 ("A judge may mitigate prejudice" by "alerting the 
venire during jury selection that graphic photographs might be 
admitted in evidence, and asking potential jurors if that might 
cause anyone particular difficulty" [citation and alteration 
omitted]).  Because the judge properly weighed the probative 
value of the photographs against the risk of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant and took appropriate steps to select jurors who 
19 
 
 
would not be unduly influenced by the photographs' graphic 
nature, we discern no error.7 
 
2.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant claims 
that the prosecutor in closing argument made three assertions 
that found no support in the evidence and that were calculated 
to improperly play on the jurors' emotions.  Where none of the 
assertions triggered an objection at trial, we consider whether 
the argument was improper and, if so, whether it created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 643-644 (2017). 
 
First, the defendant argues that it was improper for the 
prosecutor to argue that the defendant's obtaining of a knife on 
the night before the killing was evidence of the defendant's 
premeditation, where the defendant testified that he obtained 
the knife from his cousin's home only for self-defense and did 
not use it during the stabbing.8  There was nothing improper in 
                                                          
 
 
7 We likewise discern no error in the judge's decision to 
admit the crime scene photographs in the absence of expert 
testimony regarding the use of force.  We have not previously 
required expert testimony under the circumstances described 
here, and we decline to do so now. 
 
 
8 The statements made by the prosecutor that the defendant 
claims to be improper were as follows:  "[T]here is evidence 
that the defendant is guilty of premeditation.  And we heard 
some of it from his mouth.  He told you that the night before he 
got a knife.  Coincidence?  I think not.  Of course he wants you 
to believe it was a rusty, old, little knife.  No.  What did he 
tell you he did with the knife?  He stood outside on the corner 
waiting for [the victim] to walk by.  He lay [in] wait.  He was 
20 
 
 
this argument.  The jury were not required to credit the 
defendant's testimony in this regard, and it was fair to argue, 
based on the evidence presented at trial, that the defendant had 
obtained the knife on Sunday evening precisely because he 
intended to preempt the victim's violent threats by killing the 
victim.  It likewise was fair to argue, based on the evidence 
presented at trial, that the knife from the defendant's cousin's 
home was in fact the knife used to stab the victim.  See 
Commonwealth v. Parker, 481 Mass. 69, 74 (2018) ("In closing 
argument, prosecutors are entitled to marshal the evidence and 
suggest inferences that the jury may draw from it" [quotation, 
citation, and alteration omitted]). 
 
Second, the defendant contends that the prosecutor's 
assertion in closing argument that, as a result of the stabbing, 
the victim's abdomen was protruding and "his intestines [were] 
coming out of his stomach" was not supported by the evidence and 
was designed to shock the jurors and elicit their sympathy.  The 
prosecutor's statement was supported by the testimony of the 
medical examiner, who, when making reference to a photograph of 
the victim's abdomen that was in evidence, testified that the 
victim had a wound to his abdomen that was approximately eight 
                                                          
 
going to do it the night before if he saw him.  He was going to 
attack [the victim].  He was sick of being harassed by him.  He 
was sick of him showing up at his house, at the parties, asking 
for money, asking for drugs.  He was sick of it." 
21 
 
 
inches deep, that his small intestine was "herniated," and that 
the herniation was caused by "the force of the intestines 
pushing it out through the wound."  Where the prosecutor's 
assertion was grounded in the evidence, and where the severity 
of the stab wounds was relevant to the issue of extreme atrocity 
or cruelty, the prosecutor's argument was not improper.  See 
Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227 ("extent of physical injuries" 
relevant to whether murder was committed with extreme atrocity 
or cruelty). 
 
Third, the defendant contends that it was improper for the 
prosecutor to argue that the defendant was motivated to kill the 
victim because the defendant, a seller of cocaine, was "a very 
conscientious businessman" who grew sick of the victim, one of 
his customers, getting "antsy and desperate" when the defendant 
could not supply him with more cocaine, and that the defendant 
needed to "establish his turf" as someone new to the Holyoke 
area.9  There was evidence at trial that the defendant sold drugs 
                                                          
 
 
9 The statements made by the prosecutor that the defendant 
claims to be improper were as follows:  "[H]e is a very 
conscientious businessman.  He closes his doors at midnight.  
And [the victim] bothered his business practice.  [The victim] 
was addicted.  He was a user of cocaine.  The defendant told you 
that himself.  And the defendant was his source.  And when the 
source couldn't supply, maybe he got a little antsy and 
desperate.  He was sick of it.  He was being shown up by this 
five, six, 125-pound man and he wasn't going to have it.  He is 
new to the area.  He has to establish his turf.  He planned 
this.  He showed up with the knife and attacked [the victim] 
inside of that lobby." 
22 
 
 
to the victim and others, and it was reasonable to characterize 
the victim's behavior as "antsy and desperate" where there was 
evidence that the victim repeatedly demanded repayment of one 
hundred dollars in cocaine that he purportedly loaned to the 
defendant.  And although it was a stretch to infer from the 
evidence that the defendant was a "conscientious businessman" 
based on his small-scale cocaine operation, or that the killing 
was motivated by the defendant's desire to "establish his turf," 
these statements could not reasonably be understood as an 
attempt to play on the jury's emotions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Young, 461 Mass. 198, 204 (2012) ("it is error for a prosecutor 
to make an argument designed to evoke an emotional, rather than 
intellectual, response from the jury"). 
 
Even if we were to conclude that the prosecutor's 
statements regarding the defendant's business motives were 
improper because they were not supported by the evidence, 
whether this error is reversible depends on our consideration of 
four factors:  "(1) whether the defendant seasonably objected; 
(2) whether the error was limited to collateral issues or went 
to the heart of the case; (3) what specific or general 
instructions the judge gave the jury which may have mitigated 
the mistake; and (4) whether the error, in the circumstances, 
possibly made a difference in the jury's conclusions" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Perez, 444 Mass. 143, 151 (2005).  
23 
 
 
The last of these factors is considered most important.  Id.  
Here, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's 
statements, the judge gave a general instruction informing the 
jurors that closing arguments "are not evidence in and of 
themselves," and any purported "business motive" was discussed 
only in passing, making it unlikely to have influenced the 
jury's decision.  We therefore conclude that even if the 
prosecutor's inference concerning the defendant's motive to 
"establish his turf" was not reasonably drawn from the evidence, 
the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
3.  Third prong of malice.  The Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide state that where the defendant is being charged with 
murder based on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, the 
Commonwealth must prove, as one element of the crime, (1) that 
the defendant intended to kill the victim (the first prong of 
malice); or (2) intended to cause grievous bodily harm to the 
victim (the second prong of malice); or (3) intended to do an 
act that, in the circumstances known to the defendant, a 
reasonable person would have known created a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would result (the third prong of malice).  
See Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 50 (2018).10  The judge 
                                                          
 
10 At the time of the defendant's trial, the 2013 Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide were in effect.  The instruction 
24 
 
 
charged the jury in accordance with these instructions.  The 
defendant contends that the judge erred in instructing the jury 
regarding the third prong of malice, because such an instruction 
was not supported by the evidence and risked confusing the jury.  
Because the defendant objected to the judge's instruction on the 
third prong of malice, we review for prejudicial error.  
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 348 (2016). 
 
There was neither error nor prejudice.  Where there is 
evidence of the first or second prong of malice, as there was 
here, the Commonwealth is entitled to an instruction as to the 
third prong of malice.  The element of malice may be satisfied 
by proving any one of the three prongs, Commonwealth v. 
Townsend, 453 Mass. 413, 428-429 (2009), and evidence sufficient 
to support a finding that the defendant intended to kill or to 
inflict grievous bodily harm will also be sufficient to support 
a finding that the defendant intended to do an act that, in the 
circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable person would 
have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death 
would result.11   
                                                          
 
concerning the three prongs of malice is identical in the 2013 
and the 2018 Model Jury Instructions on Homicide. 
 
11 Although the defendant contends that the instruction on 
third prong malice could only have confused the jury, in view of 
the number and severity of the stab wounds, we note that the 
defendant testified that his "mind just went blank" when he was 
stabbing the victim, that he "came into a panic," and that his 
"mind was not working or thinking right."  He also said that he 
25 
 
 
 
Moreover, where the jury found the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation, and where we affirm the conviction on that 
theory, there can be no possibility of prejudice arising from an 
instruction on third prong malice, which affects only the jury's 
finding on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See 
Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 463 Mass. 116, 135 (2012) (where "jury 
also convicted the defendant based on the theory of deliberate 
premeditation, we need not address" objections based on theory 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty).12 
 
4.  "Appreciated the consequences of his choices."  In 
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 197 (2017), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 686 n.16 (1980), we noted 
that we had "not reformulated our homicide jurisprudence" to 
require that a jury find that the defendant "appreciated the 
consequences of his choices" in order to find a defendant guilty 
of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity 
                                                          
 
ran back to his apartment after the incident because he feared 
that the victim would get up and attempt to kill him.  In light 
of this testimony, we cannot eliminate the possibility that a 
reasonable juror might conclude that the defendant did not 
intend to kill or grievously injure the victim, but that the 
requisite intent was proved under the third prong of malice. 
 
 
12 The defendant further argues that this court should 
eliminate the third prong of malice because it focuses on the 
result of an act as opposed to the specific intent of the actor.  
We declined to do so in Commonwealth v. Lang, 473 Mass. 1, 9-10 
(2015), and we likewise decline to do so here. 
26 
 
 
or cruelty.  The defendant asks us to revisit that issue in this 
case.  We decline to do so where, as earlier noted, the 
defendant was also found guilty of murder in the first degree on 
the theory of deliberate premeditation.13 
 
Conclusion.  This case was ably tried and ably judged, and 
the verdict was supported by the evidence and consonant with 
justice.  We therefore affirm the conviction and decline to 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new 
trial or to reduce the conviction of murder in the first degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                                                          
 
 
13 We also note that the phrase, "appreciated the 
consequences of his choices," derives from Commonwealth v. 
Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 686 n.16 (1980), where we stated, 
"Hereafter, in addition to the traditional instructions on 
extreme atrocity or cruelty the judge may also instruct the 
jurors that if they find from the evidence that the defendant 
had substantially reduced mental capacity at the time the crime 
was committed, they may consider what effect, if any, the 
defendant's impaired capacity had on his ability to appreciate 
the consequences of his choices."  Here, there was no evidence 
that the defendant's mental capacity was impaired in any way.