Title: P. v. Hoyos

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 7/23/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S041008 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
JAIME ARMANDO HOYOS, 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 133354 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
During the evening of May 26, 1992, Daniel and Mary Magoon were killed 
in their home and their three-year-old son J. was wounded.  In 1994, a San Diego 
County jury convicted defendant Jaime Armando Hoyos and codefendant Jorge 
Emilio Alvarado of the first degree murders of Daniel and Mary Magoon.  (Pen. 
Code, §§ 187, 189.)1  It acquitted defendant and Alvarado of attempted murder as 
to J. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), but convicted them of the lesser included offense of 
assault with a firearm.  (§ 245, subd. (a)(2).)  The jury further found that defendant 
and Alvarado personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and found true the 
special circumstances that the murders were committed while defendant and 
Alvarado were engaged in the commission or attempted commission of robbery, in 
violation of section 211, and of burglary, in violation of section 459.  (§ 190.2, 
subd. (a)(17).)  It also found true a multiple murder allegation.  (§ 190.2, subd. 
                                              
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
 
2
(a)(3).)2  Before the penalty phase, the trial court granted Alvarado’s motion for 
new trial, but denied defendant’s.3  After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict 
of life without possibility of parole for the murder of Daniel Magoon, and of death 
for the murder of Mary Magoon.  The trial court denied defendant’s motions for 
new trial (§ 1181) and to modify the penalty verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and 
sentenced defendant to death.  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).) 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
 
1.  The Prosecution’s Case 
 
 a.  Evening of May 26, 1992 
On May 26, 1992, Daniel Magoon, his wife Mary, and their children, D. 
(age seven) and J. (age three), were living on Steele Canyon Road in the Jamul 
area of San Diego County.  Daniel Magoon operated a large-scale marijuana 
distribution business out of the garage of their house.  He also kept weapons and 
money in the garage.  A security gate around the house was usually closed. 
Jimmy Johnson was a long-time friend and occasional partner of Daniel 
Magoon in the marijuana trade.  In 1974, both Daniel Magoon and Johnson had 
pleaded guilty to intent to distribute a controlled substance.  Johnson testified that 
he was not involved in dealing marijuana with Daniel Magoon at the time of 
Magoon’s death. 
                                              
2 The jury also found defendant and Alvarado guilty of the following:  conspiracy 
to commit robbery (§§ 211, 182.1), robbery in the first degree (§ 211), burglary 
(§ 459), grand theft of a firearm (§ 487.3), and transporting more than 28.5 grams 
of marijuana (Health and Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)). 
3 We discuss the basis for the new trial motions after the guilt phase but before the 
penalty phase in part IV. F.  Alvarado subsequently pleaded guilty and was 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.   
 
3
Around 8:30 p.m., Daniel Magoon visited Johnson at Johnson’s residence. 
Magoon told Johnson that he was expecting some people to come over to the 
Magoon house that evening, and then left Johnson’s residence.  That day, Johnson 
had seen Magoon with a stack of money, possibly as much as $250,000.  Johnson 
never heard from Daniel Magoon again.   
Around 7:45 p.m., the Magoons’ next-door neighbor, Mary Jane Lange, 
entered her bedroom to read.  Her bedroom windows were open.  About 40 
minutes later, Lange heard Daniel Magoon’s voice and at least one other male 
voice.  She heard Magoon say something like, “Oh, come on.”  Sometime between 
10:30 p.m. and 11:30 p.m., Mrs. Lange heard what sounded like four firecrackers, 
in rapid succession, that came from the direction of the Magoon residence. 
Between five and 15 minutes later, Mrs. Lange heard a series of four to seven 
more firecracker noises in rapid succession, again coming from the direction of the 
Magoon house.  Mrs. Lange’s live-in son-in-law, Kenneth Wall, heard what 
sounded like four gunshots sometime between 1l:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. 
b.  Auto Stop and Arrest of Defendants 
About 12:20 a.m., on May 27, 1992, El Cajon Police Officer William 
Pettus was on patrol when he noticed the rear license plate light was out on a 
passing Toyota Corolla.  Officer Pettus stopped the Corolla, exited his patrol 
vehicle, and approached the car.  He saw Alvarado in the driver’s seat and 
defendant in the front passenger seat.  Alvarado was shaking; he appeared nervous 
and was sweating, although the evening temperature was cool.  Officer Pettus 
asked Alvarado for his driver’s license and vehicle registration.  Alvarado handed 
him a California Identification Card with the name “Ralph Varela.”  Alvarado told 
the officer that defendant had a driver’s license, and the officer asked both 
Alvarado and defendant for defendant’s license, but defendant did not produce 
one.  After returning to his patrol car and determining that there was no record that 
 
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either defendant or “Varela” had a valid driver’s license, the officer began to write 
a citation and called for police back-up. 
El Cajon Police Officer Christopher Pietrzak arrived at the scene shortly 
thereafter.  Officer Pettus ordered defendant and Alvarado out of the car.  Officer 
Pietrzak watched defendant and Alvarado, while Officer Pettus searched the 
Corolla.  Officer Pettus searched the driver’s side and found a nine-millimeter gun 
magazine (containing 12 rounds), and two large caliber rounds.  On the passenger 
side, under the seat, he found a loaded nine-millimeter, semi-automatic, Egyptian-
manufactured Helwan pistol.  It had one round in the chamber and eight rounds in 
its magazine.  The Helwan pistol matched a gun box later found in the victims’ 
house for a gun that Daniel Magoon owned. 
Officer Pettus then searched the back seat of the car, where he found phone 
bills, rental agency forms, and a license plate.  He searched the trunk and found 
approximately 28 pounds of marijuana, some of which was frozen, both in brick 
form and inside plastic baggies contained in boxes.  A latent fingerprint removed 
from a piece of tape used to wrap the marijuana was later identified as Daniel 
Magoon’s. 
Officer Pettus arrested Alvarado and defendant.  The officer conducted a 
pat-down search of Alvarado before placing him in a patrol car.  He found an 
empty nine-millimeter casing in Alvarado’s left front pants pocket.  After placing 
Alvarado in a holding cell, the officer checked the back seat of the patrol car and 
found two nine-millimeter cartridges.  A strip search of Alvarado yielded a rock of 
methamphetamine.   
At the police station, Officer Pietrzak searched defendant and found $1,033 
in various denominations in his right rear pants pocket, and three $1 dollar bills in 
a front pocket.  He also found defendant’s Mexican driver’s license. 
 
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c.  Discovery of the Murders 
On May 27, 1992, about 7:00 a.m., seven-year-old D. woke up in his home.  
He saw his three-year-old brother, J., sleeping on a futon in the living room, woke 
him up, and asked him if he was okay.  J. answered “yeah,” and fell back to sleep.  
D., however, saw some blood on J.  He then found the body of his mother, Mary 
Magoon, in the bathroom.  He found his father’s body in the kitchen by the 
microwave.  D. attempted to use the telephone to call 911 or the police, but was 
unsuccessful.  He left to go to his best friend’s house down the street. 
At approximately 7:30 a.m., Patricia Bagnell was jogging through a field 
behind a 7-Eleven store in Jamul.  She encountered D., barefoot, walking quickly 
down the side of a dirt road.  D. looked pale and was crying.  She said hello, and 
asked him why he was crying.  He said that his parents were dead and there was a 
lot of blood in his house.  She walked with him towards the residence of his best 
friend, where they encountered Richard Brewer.  Brewer asked if they needed 
help.  Bagnell told Brewer that D. had told her that his parents were dead.  Brewer 
asked D. where he lived, and the three of them drove to D.’s house.  When they 
arrived at the Magoon residence, both security gates were open and they pulled 
into the driveway.  
The front door was open, and Brewer entered the residence while the other 
two stayed in his truck.  The house was a shambles; everything was torn up.  
Brewer saw a little boy on the living room floor close to two rifles and a gun with 
a silencer.  Brewer shook the little boy but got no response.  Brewer got nervous 
and left to call for help, leaving the little boy where he was.  Brewer, D., and 
Bagnell went to Bagnell’s house nearby and called 911.  
Firefighters arrived at the Magoon residence about 8:00 a.m.  Brewer told 
Fire Captain Jeffrey Nelson that there was a bleeding child in the living room, and 
that there might be more people down the hallway.  After making sure that police 
 
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deputies were on their way, Captain Nelson entered the house through the front 
door.  He noticed a “Mac-10” style submachine gun on the carpet just beyond the 
entry tile, later identified as an Ingram, semiautomatic .45-caliber pistol with a 
barrel extension.  As he walked into the entryway, he saw J. lying on a futon.  As 
he moved toward the child, he saw two rifles that were lying parallel to each other, 
later identified as a Ruger Mini-14 semi-automatic .223-caliber rifle, and a .177-
caliber air rifle.  
J.’s hair was matted and wet from blood.  The upper part of his T-shirt was 
covered with blood, which had spilled down onto his diaper.  When Captain 
Nelson attempted to feel for a pulse, J. woke up and looked very scared.  Captain 
Nelson then carried him outside to receive medical attention.  J. had a laceration to 
the back of his head, and a six-to-eight-inch-long bruise in the left shoulder blade 
area.  His head laceration was later determined to be a bullet wound.  
Police deputies and other investigators went through the house.  Daniel 
Magoon was found dead, lying on the floor in the kitchen area.  Mary Magoon 
was also found dead, lying on her right side with her shoulder and head at the 
threshold of the hallway bathroom doorway.  There was no evidence of forced 
entry to the Magoon residence.  
d. Crime Scene Evidence 
On-site investigation and later testing showed that multiple weapons had 
been fired in various rooms of the house, and that the house had been ransacked.  
No percipient witnesses testified about what happened in the house when the 
Magoons were shot.  The prosecution relied on detailed crime scene evidence to 
establish its case. 
 
(1) Entryway and Living Room   
Investigators found three guns in the entryway and living room:  a .45-
caliber semiautomatic pistol, a semiautomatic .233-caliber rifle, and a .177-caliber 
 
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air rifle.  The Ingram, Mac 10-style .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol found at the 
entryway had a barrel extension (that resembled a silencer) and a magazine, but 
contained no ammunition.  It had been improperly reassembled, and therefore 
could not fire.  The Ruger Mini-14 semiautomatic .223-caliber rifle did not have a 
magazine, and had no rounds in the chamber.  It had been fired before, but the 
testifying criminologist could not determine how recently.  Blood on the trigger 
guard was tested and found to be consistent with defendant’s blood type.  The 
.177-caliber air rifle was operable and had been fired before, but it could not be 
determined how recently.   Its barrel was bent in a downward direction, and had 
hair and blood on it.  Blood on the trigger guard and forearm stock was tested and 
found to be consistent with defendant’s blood.  Blood on the barrel was consistent 
with Mary Magoon’s blood.   
On the floor was a woman’s checkbook and wallet that had been rifled 
through, but contained a few dollars.  There was also loose marijuana on the floor.  
One unexpended nine-millimeter cartridge was on the living room floor next to the 
fireplace.  
 
(2) Kitchen   
On top of the kitchen island, investigators found a full 7-Eleven “Big Gulp” 
cup with Alvarado’s fingerprints.4  Daniel Magoon’s face and upper body were 
covered with a blanket.  His right hand held a clump of hair, later identified as J.’s.  
There were several nine-millimeter and .22-caliber casings on the floor near 
Daniel Magoon’s body, and scattered across the kitchen counter area.  A wallet 
containing Daniel Magoon’s driver’s license, business and credit cards, but no 
money, was on the floor. 
                                              
4 Marbell Lopez testified that there was a 7-Eleven store near the Magoon 
residence, and that she had driven defendant home from that 7-Eleven store at 
least once two months before the murders. 
 
8
 
(3) Hallway Bathroom 
One expended nine-millimeter bullet was found under Mary Magoon’s 
right forearm.  A second nine-millimeter bullet fell from her body as she was lifted 
onto a gurney.  She held a clump of hair in her right hand, later identified as her 
own.  She also held a clump of hair in her left hand, later identified as J.’s, and a 
baby pacifier.  A baby blanket was lying between her legs.  She was wearing 
pajamas. 
There were three nine-millimeter casings in the hallway bathroom.  The 
hallway bathroom door had two bullet holes at the base.  The door had another 
bullet hole, and a blood spatter about five and one-half feet off the ground, which 
was consistent with either blunt force trauma or a gunshot.  The blood on the 
bathroom door was consistent with that of Mary Magoon’s blood. 
The hallway carpet contained a bullet hole.  A nine-millimeter casing was 
lying on the same carpet.  There was blood on a wall across from the bathroom 
hallway about two and one-half feet off the ground, which was identified as a 
swiped application of blood onto the surface.  This blood was consistent with the 
blood of either Daniel Magoon or J.  There was fresh vomit on the hallway carpet 
located between where Mary Magoon’s body was found and the kitchen. 
 
(4) Master Bedroom 
Investigators found a nine-millimeter casing on the carpet at the end of the 
hallway or entrance to the master bedroom.  The master bedroom door was open.  
The outside of the door had a bullet hole about three feet up from the floor with 
some black soot around it, indicating a close-range shot.  Splinters from the door 
were lying on the floor in that area.  A nine-millimeter casing was on a closet 
floor.  An expended bullet that struck a chair was lying on the floor near a gun 
safe.  The gun safe had a combination lock and keys, both of which had to be 
 
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activated to open the safe door.  Some keys were in the lock, but the safe door was 
closed and locked. 
In the master bedroom bathroom there was a hidden storage compartment 
behind a slip-out shelf.  This storage compartment contained a .30-caliber M-1 
rifle.  It also contained the gun box for the nine-millimeter Helwan pistol that 
Daniel Magoon owned. 
 
(5) Two Bedrooms off the Hallway 
The Magoon residence had two bedrooms off the hallway.  The door to one 
of the bedrooms appeared to have been recently kicked open.  The doorjamb was 
cracked and splintered, and the striker plate and splinters were lying on the 
hallway carpet. 
 
(6) Garage 
The garage contained marijuana debris, heat lamps, a fan, a trash compactor 
with wood blocks to make bricks of marijuana, an electronic scale, a vacuum 
sealer, and packaging material, such as plastic baggies, large garbage and plastic 
bags, and rolls of clear tape.  A federal drug enforcement agent testifying as an 
expert witness stated that the equipment indicated that the persons in control of the 
premises were involved in the sale of marijuana, and that the type of marijuana 
and its packaging indicated Mexican origin.  Also in the garage were two freezers, 
a chest-type and an upright-type.5  Only the upright-type freezer was working, and 
it contained two packages with large quantities of marijuana stems and seeds, as 
well a large amount of marijuana debris at the bottom of the freezer.   A roll-away 
tool chest contained “pay and owe” sheets, which are used to record drug 
transactions. 
                                              
5 The federal drug enforcement agent testified that marijuana dealers believe that 
storing marijuana in a freezer retains its potency.   
 
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e.  Autopsy and Medical Evidence 
 
(1) Daniel Magoon 
Daniel Magoon died from four gunshot wounds.  A bullet hole on his left 
sleeve was surrounded by tiny marks from burning gunpowder, indicating the shot 
came from an “intermediate” range of a few inches to a few feet.  The four shots 
probably were fired in rapid succession.  It was unlikely he would have been able 
to walk after being shot because both of his lungs and his aorta had been 
perforated, and a bullet had penetrated his spinal cord; he probably died within 30 
seconds of being shot.  The toxicology report on Daniel Magoon showed 0.25 
micrograms per milliliter of active cocaine present in his blood. 
 
(2) Mary Magoon 
Mary Magoon’s death was caused by gunshot wounds and blunt force 
injuries.  She suffered four gunshot wounds, including one from a bullet that 
entered the back of her head, went through her brain, and exited her right 
forehead.  In addition, the medical examiner identified at least seven separate blunt 
force injuries to her head.  The severe injuries to her head alone could have caused 
her death.  Her skull was severely fractured underneath the bruises and lacerations.  
The blunt force injuries to her head occurred before she died.  These injuries could 
have been caused by the air rifle found on the living room floor. 
Mary Magoon also had injuries to the rest of her body, including four 
separate injuries to her back.  These injuries had imprints that were consistent with 
the shape of the air rifle.  She had multiple injuries to her arms and hands.  Her left 
ring finger was broken, and there were shallow cuts to her right wrist.  Some of 
these injuries were consistent with “defensive wounds,” which is a natural 
inclination to move the arms up to deflect blows.  A laceration on the top of her 
foot contained embedded wood fragments, which the medical examiner opined 
were from the wood chips the gunshot hole created in the lower part of the 
 
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hallway bathroom door.  The toxicology report on Mary Magoon showed 0.98 
micrograms per milliliter of active cocaine present in her blood. 
 
(3) J.  
J. had two lacerations, an entry wound and an exit wound two inches apart, 
to the back of his head, indicating a bullet caused the penetrating injury.  There 
was discoloration and burning of the skin which, the treating physician opined, 
indicated the gun was close to the entry wound.  A brain scan indicated the brain 
had been injured, but J.’s wound was not life-threatening.  An impact to the brain 
can cause nausea and vomiting. 
f.  Blood and DNA Testing 
Defendant’s and Alvarado’s clothing was taken as evidence the night they 
were arrested and later submitted for DNA testing, which revealed the following.  
Defendant was the possible source of the bloodstains on his T-shirt and for three 
separate bloodstains on his jeans.  However, there was blood consistent with that 
of Mary Magoon on the right thigh of defendant’s jeans.  There was also blood 
consistent with that of either Daniel Magoon or J. on the left front pocket area of 
defendant’s jeans.  No blood was found on Alvarado’s clothing. 
g.  Ballistic Evidence 
A firearms expert testified that his analysis of the recovered bullets and 
casings indicated that two nine-millimeter firearms were used at the crime scene.  
Daniel Magoon’s Helwan pistol, which was found in Alvarado’s car, was the only 
nine-millimeter weapon recovered during the investigation, but none of the 
recovered nine-millimeter bullets or casings was fired by the Helwan.  The 
Helwan had been fired at some point, but it was not possible to determine when. 
Expert testimony also revealed that two expended bullets recovered from 
Daniel Magoon’s body during the autopsy, and the expended bullet found on the 
master bedroom floor, were fired by one nine-millimeter weapon, but the expert 
 
12
could not determine the particular model.   Either of the two nine-millimeter guns 
listed on the Department of Justice’s records as registered to Alvarado (under the 
name “Ralph Varela”) was the type of gun that could have fired the bullets, but 
there were approximately 75 other models of nine-millimeter firearms available on 
the market that could have also fired them. 
The two expended bullets recovered under Mary Magoon’s body were fired 
from the same gun, which was probably an Uzi-manufactured firearm.  The Uzi 
magazine found in Alvarado’s car could have fit into either a pistol or carbine Uzi 
weapon. 
The firearms expert also testified that six of the nine-millimeter casings 
recovered were fired by one gun; five of the casings were found at the crime scene 
(including the three casings found near Daniel Magoon’s body) and one casing 
was found in Alvarado’s pants pocket when he was arrested.  The three nine-
millimeter casings found on the floor in the hallway bathroom (where Mary 
Magoon was killed) were fired from a different gun.  
An unexpended cartridge found on the living room floor, and two 
unexpended cartridges found in the backseat of the patrol car where Alvarado was 
sitting, had been cycled through the same firearm that fired the three nine-millimeter 
casings found on the hallway bathroom floor.  In addition, five .22-caliber casings 
were recovered at the crime scene, all of which were fired from the same gun. 
h.  Defendant’s Dealings With Daniel Magoon  
Several times between February and May of 1992, Johnson was present at 
the Magoon residence, mostly in the garage, where Daniel Magoon, who knew 
some Spanish, spoke with Spanish-speaking men.  Johnson identified defendant at 
trial as someone he had seen with Daniel Magoon at least once in the garage.  
Defendant had been at the garage in the company of one or two other persons.  
Johnson did not recognize Alvarado.  Defendant had also been in the company of 
 
13
a woman named “Maria” Lopez.6   Johnson initially thought Maria Lopez and 
defendant were married, and assumed defendant’s name was “Jaime Lopez.”  
Johnson had identified defendant in a live line-up as “Jamie Lopez.” 
Marbell Lopez met defendant in 1991, and had a close relationship with 
him.  In February 1992, she purchased a Ford Bronco for defendant with money he 
gave her.  She would occasionally drive defendant to the Magoon residence, had 
been there with him four or five times, and had met Daniel Magoon there once or 
twice while with defendant.  She also met Alvarado through defendant. 
i.  Alvarado’s Firearms Use 
Thomas Lamb, who knew Alvarado, testified at trial.  He stated that once, 
before the murders, Alvarado had displayed a nine-millimeter handgun to him. 
Earlier on the day the murders were committed, about 3:00 p.m., defendant, 
Alvarado, Thomas Arroyo, and Jose “Chepe” Sanabia drove to a gun shop in San 
Ysidro, California. 7  Alvarado, using the name “Ralph Varela,” purchased a 
Bersa, a .380-caliber gun manufactured in Argentina, which is smaller than a nine-
millimeter gun and is called a “nine-millimeter short.”  Alvarado did not take the 
gun with him that day, because there was a 15-day waiting period.  Sanabia picked 
up the gun after the waiting period. 
On May 30, 1992, a detective searched Alvarado’s residence in El Cajon.  
Underneath a drawer, the detective found an empty gun box for a semiautomatic 
nine-millimeter pistol.  The serial number on the gun box matched the serial 
number of a weapon listed on the Department of Justice’s records sold to “Ralph 
Varela” (Alvarado’s alias). 
                                              
6 Maria Lopez was apparently a friend of Johnson’s wife.  Lopez appears to be the 
same person as “Marbell” Lopez, who testified at trial. 
7 Sanabia identified defendant in a photographic lineup but could not identify 
defendant in court. 
 
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2. The Defense Case 
Neither codefendant testified. 
 
a.  Defendant’s Driver’s License  
An official from the Mexican consulate testified that defendant had a valid 
Mexican truck driver’s license. 
 
b.  Daniel Magoon’s Cocaine Use 
 As noted, toxicological specimens collected during the autopsy indicated 
that Daniel Magoon had 0.25 micrograms per milliliter of active cocaine in his 
blood.   Stephen Stahl, M.D., a psychiatrist and psychopharmacologist, testified 
that this level of cocaine would be consistent with Daniel Magoon’s “being 
anywhere from mildly stimulated to being overtly crazy.”  Richard Whalley, a 
forensic scientist and toxicologist, testified that, given this cocaine level, Daniel 
Magoon could have exhibited a range of behavior, from being a little more than 
usually alert to paranoia. 
 
c.  Daniel Magoon’s Firearms Use 
Arthur Coleman testified that on April 25, 1982, he was a deputy sheriff in 
Imperial County, and he encountered Daniel Magoon driving a van.  Magoon 
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol, and Deputy Coleman arrested him.  
During an inventory search of the van, Deputy Coleman retrieved three loaded 
firearms, two unloaded firearms, approximately 1,000 rounds of ammunition, and 
two bundles of marijuana. 
 
 
d.  The Shooting of J. 
Pathologist Arthur Koehler, M.D., testified that he had reviewed the 
medical reports, photographs, and other records of J.’s gunshot wounds.  Dr. 
Koehler testified that the bullet entry to J.’s scalp was “tangential,” which meant 
that it was fired somewhat parallel to his scalp rather than at a right angle.  Dr. 
 
15
Koehler stated that J.’s wound was consistent with a bullet passing through Mary 
Magoon’s arm. 
Forensic pathologist, Irving Root, M.D., also testified about J.’s injuries.  
Dr. Root stated that, if J. had been injured in the area of the hallway bathroom, one 
would expect to see a blood trail from that area to the futon where J. was found, 
but there appeared to be no such blood trail.  Because of this, and because of the 
large amount of blood on the futon, it was Dr. Root’s opinion that J. was on the 
futon within a few seconds to one minute after he began to bleed.  Dr. Root 
testified that the vomit found on the hallway floor was consistent with J.’s 
vomiting after he sustained the scalp injury. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
The prosecution gave no opening statement, put on no evidence, and rested 
on the guilt phase evidence. 
 
2. Defense Evidence 
James Park, a correctional consultant and retired administrator for the 
California Department of Corrections, testified about the conditions of defendant’s 
confinement, if he were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 
Carrie Baker, who lived in Jamul, testified that, in the early morning of 
May 27, 1992, she heard approximately five muffled gunshots around 2:45 a.m. 
(which would have been after the time defendants had been arrested).  Three or 
four days later, she read something about the murders, called a number that was 
listed for information about the case, and left her name and telephone number on 
an answering machine. 
Eight members of defendant’s family (his wife, three children, three 
brothers, and a sister) testified that they loved defendant and would be deeply 
saddened if he were put to death. 
 
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II.  PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A.  Denial of Motion to Dismiss the Special Circumstances  
Defendant filed a pretrial motion seeking dismissal of the special 
circumstance allegations on the ground they were an ex post facto application of 
the laws and therefore a violation of his state and federal rights to due process.  
The trial court denied the motion.  On appeal, defendant contends the trial court 
erred in denying the motion and as a consequence violated his right to due process 
of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  For the reasons discussed below, we discern no error and no 
violation of defendant’s due process rights. 8 
Defendant was charged with robbery and burglary special circumstances 
under section 190.2, as amended in 1990 by Proposition 115.   Defendant contends 
that because this court decided the constitutionality of Proposition 115’s 
amendments to section 190.2 after the commission of his crimes, charging the 
special circumstances violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal 
Constitutions.  He also contends the special circumstances charges denied him due 
                                              
8 Regarding this claim and most other claims raised on appeal, defendant contends 
that the asserted error or misconduct violated several constitutional rights.  In 
many instances in which defendant raised issues at trial, however, he failed 
explicitly to make some or all of the constitutional arguments he now asserts on 
appeal.  Unless otherwise indicated, his appellate claims either required no action 
by defendant to preserve them, or involved application of the same facts or legal 
standards defendant asked the trial court to apply, accompanied by a new 
argument that the trial error or misconduct had the additional legal consequence of 
violating the federal Constitution.  To that extent, defendant has not forfeited his 
new constitutional claims on appeal.  (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 
1084, fn. 4.)  On the merits, no separate constitutional discussion is required, or 
provided, where rejection of a claim that the trial court erred on the issue 
presented to that court necessarily leads to rejection of any constitutional theory or 
“gloss” raised for the first time here.  (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, 
fn. 17.) 
 
17
process because he lacked notice that he could be charged with the special 
circumstances.    
Addressing defendant’s claim requires a brief review of the history of 
Proposition 115.  In June 1990, the electorate passed both Propositions 114 and 
115, which contained different versions of section 190.2.  (People v. Superior 
Court (Clark) (1994)  22 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1545 (Clark).)  Under the Proposition 
114 version of section 190.2, the Legislature required a finding of intent to kill 
before the trier of fact could impose the death penalty on one who was not the 
actual killer.  (Clark, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1544-1545.)  Under the 
Proposition 115 version of section 190.2, however, the felony-murder rule applied, 
with no required finding that a defendant had an intent to kill.  (Ibid.)  The passage 
of Propositions 114 and 115 spawned litigation that challenged whether 
Proposition 115’s amendments to section 190.2 were effective.  (Clark, at p. 
1546.)  On June 25, 1992, we settled this issue in Yoshisato v. Superior Court 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 978, 992.  Yoshisato held that Proposition 115’s amendments to 
section 190.2 were operative, and went into effect the day of Proposition 115’s 
passage in June 1990.  The crimes in the present case were committed on May 26-
27, 1992. 
Defendant contends that the law was “unsettled” for the two-year period 
between the passage of Proposition 115 in June 1990, and our decision in 
Yoshisato on June 25, 1992, and that he lacked notice that a death judgment was 
proper in light of the actions constituting the two special circumstances charged.  
Defendant concedes that his argument fails under Clark, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at 
page 1541.  He apparently asks us to disapprove that case.   
We decline to do so.  As Clark observed, both the United States and 
California Constitutions forbid only “ ‘the retroactive application of an 
“unexpected” or “unforeseeable” judicial enlargement of a criminal statute.’ ”  
 
18
(Clark, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1550.)  Our decision in Yoshisato was neither 
“unexpected” nor “unforeseeable”; all that can be said of the state of the law 
during the two-year period was that it was “unsettled.”  (Clark, supra, 22 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1550.)  Defendant therefore was on notice that this court might 
find (as indeed we did) that the provisions of Proposition 115 were controlling.  
Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss 
the special circumstances. 
 
B.  Denial of Motion to Suppress 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his section 1538.5 motion 
to suppress the evidence discovered in the traffic stop of Alvarado’s car, in which 
defendant was a passenger.  Defendant asserts the stop violated his rights under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and that 
the trial court improperly admitted all evidence discovered after the stop.  
Defendant contends the officers based the stop in significant part on his ethnicity, 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  He also contends that even if the 
initial stop was lawful, his detention was unnecessarily prolonged and therefore 
unlawful.   For the reasons discussed below, we reject these contentions. 
 
1.  Factual and Procedural Background 
At the suppression hearing, the two arresting officers testified.  Their 
testimony was substantially identical to their testimony at trial, which is 
summarized in the statement of facts above.  Officer Pettus also testified that he 
impounded the car because neither defendant nor Alvarado had a valid license.  
Once Officer Pietrzak arrived, Officer Pettus asked defendant and Alvarado to step 
out of the car.  Officer Pettus then conducted an inventory search to make sure 
there were no valuables or other items in the car before he impounded it.  Less 
than one minute elapsed from the time Officer Pettus asked defendant and 
 
19
Alvarado to exit the car, until the officer found a gun magazine containing 12 
nine-millimeter rounds underneath the driver’s side seat cover.    
The trial court found that the initial stop was lawful and defendant’s 
detention was not unduly prolonged.  It therefore denied the motion to suppress.  
 
2.  Analysis 
In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical 
facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether 
the law as applied has been violated.  (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 
279.)   We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential 
substantial-evidence standard.  (Ibid.)  The ruling on whether the applicable law 
applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to 
independent review.  (Ibid.)  Applying this standard, we discern no error in the 
trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. 
 
a. Stopping and Impounding the Car 
Defendant asserts that Officer Pettus stopped and impounded the car 
because defendant and Alvarado were two Mexican males, an act that would 
violate the federal Constitution’s prohibition on the selective enforcement of the 
law based on ethnicity.  But defendant did not raise the claim of ethnic bias below, 
and consequently forfeits the issue on appeal.  The claim also lacks merit.  
Defendant did not introduce any evidence at the suppression hearing showing the 
officers’ harbored ethnic bias or animus towards them.  As defendant conceded at 
the suppression hearing, the license plate light on Alvarado’s car was burned out, 
and Officer Pettus had probable cause to stop the car for a violation of Vehicle 
Code section 24601.  As to impounding the car, defendant likewise presents no 
 
20
evidence of any ethnically motivated conduct by the officers.9  Officer Pettus 
testified he decided to impound the car because neither defendant nor Alvarado 
had a valid license.     
Defendant also contends that because a valid Mexican driver’s license was 
later found on him, Officer Pettus’s testimony that defendant did not produce the 
Mexican driver’s license before the car was impounded is facially implausible.   
We disagree.  As the trial court noted, it is quite conceivable that defendant and 
Alvarado did not want to reveal their true identities at the time of the stop.  
Defendant presented no evidence at the suppression hearing to controvert Officer 
Pettus’s testimony that defendant said he did not have a driver’s license and did 
not provide a license to the officer.  Because neither occupant of the car produced 
a valid driver’s license, the officer was authorized to impound the vehicle.  (See 
Veh. Code, § 22651, subd. (p).) 
 
b.  Order to Exit the Car 
Defendant claims he was unlawfully detained either when the officer 
ordered him out of the car or during the period after he was ordered out of the car, 
and that there existed no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to 
justify his detention.  
Defendant’s first contention fails because an officer making a traffic stop 
may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, order the driver and passengers to  
                                              
9 Defendant claims an improper ethnic motive for the impounding occurred 
because the registered owner of the vehicle, Alvarado’s wife, Sylvia Alvarado, 
lived close to where the vehicle was stopped.  Defendant implies the officers had a 
duty to locate her before impounding the car, but he presents no authority to 
support his contention. 
 
21
exit a car. (Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 410, 415 (Wilson).) 10  
Wilson extended to passengers the rule in Pennsylvania v. Mimms that once a 
vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, a police officer may 
order the driver to exit the vehicle without any articulable justification.  (Wilson, 
supra, 519 U.S. at p. 410; Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 111, fn. 6; 
People v. Maxwell (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1004, 1009.)  Defendant relies on 
People v.  Gonzalez (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 381, 386, a case decided before Wilson 
that acknowledged a police officer could order a passenger out of a car lawfully 
detained for a traffic violation in order to protect the officer, or other reasonable 
justification.  (Maxwell, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1009-1010.)  Thus, even 
under the holdings of the pre-Wilson cases, the officers were justified in ordering 
the codefendants to exit the car. 
 
c.  Detention Outside the Car 
Officer Pettus’s discovery of the gun magazine in the car clearly gave rise 
to reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and Alvarado for further investigation.  
The issue is whether defendant was unlawfully detained during the time period 
starting at the point he was standing outside the car being watched by Officer 
Pietrzak and ending at the point that Officer Pettus discovered the gun magazine.  
As discussed below, we conclude that defendant’s detention during this time 
period was lawful as a brief continuation of detention for officer safety.  (Wilson, 
supra, 519 U.S. at p. 410.) 
                                              
10 Wilson was decided after the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress.   
A high court decision construing the Fourth Amendment, however, applies 
retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was 
rendered.  (United States v. Johnson (1982) 457 U.S. 537, 562.)  Defendant’s 
motion to suppress was made after the adoption of Proposition 8 in June 1982, 
which abolished the independent state grounds doctrine for the exclusion of 
evidence under the California Constitution.  (See 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. 
Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Illegally Obtained Evidence, § 30, pp. 644-645.) 
 
22
“A person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment . . . ‘only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the 
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to 
leave.’ ”  (Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567, 573, citation and fn. 
omitted.)  The high court later made clear that this test “states a necessary, but not 
a sufficient, condition for seizure.”  (California v. Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621, 
628.)  In order for there to be a seizure under the Fourth Amendment there must 
also be an arrest, by the application of physical force or by submission to the 
assertion of authority.  (Id. at p. 626.)  As to whether defendant was seized when 
he was ordered out of the car, neither Mimms nor Wilson clarifies whether an 
officer’s ordering the driver or a passenger out of the car is to be considered a 
seizure.   However, the high court has recently concluded that a Mimms/Wilson 
order is a seizure because it is reasonable for both the driver and passenger to 
expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not 
let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety.  (Brendlin v. 
California (2007) 551 U.S. ___ [127 S.Ct. 2400, 2407].)  In the situations in which 
a Mimms/Wilson order is used, there is a social expectation of unquestioned police 
command, which is at odds with any notion that a passenger would feel free to 
leave without advance permission.  (Ibid.) 
But while defendant was seized for the time period between the officer’s 
ordering him out of the car and the officer’s discovery of the gun magazine, his 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.  The initial stopping of the car was 
valid, as was the subsequent Mimms/Wilson order by which the officer ordered the 
codefendants to exit the car.  Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, detention 
following a Mimms/Wilson order may continue at least as long as reasonably 
necessary for the officer to complete the activity the Mimms/Wilson order 
contemplates.  Here, the officers needed the codefendants out of the car and out of 
 
23
the way while the first officer did an inventory search of the car before 
impounding it.  The second officer kept an eye on the codefendants in order to 
ensure the first officer’s safety during his search.  The trial judge found the period 
of detention may have been less than a minute, but at any rate was no more than a 
minute or two.  Under these circumstances, we discern no violation of defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
C.  Denial of Severance Motion 
Defendant asserts that the trial court’s denial of his severance motion 
violated his rights to due process of law, a fair trial, a reliable sentence, and the 
right to testify on his own behalf, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  As discussed below, 
we conclude the trial court did not err in denying the severance motion. 
1.  Statements of the Jailhouse Informants 
Several of defendant’s claims on appeal, including the severance claim, 
relate to jailhouse informants George Jimenez and Jorge Flores and their 
statements.  Neither Jimenez nor Flores testified at trial. 
 
a.  George Jimenez 
Following defendant’s and Alvarado’s arrest after the car stop, Alvarado 
was incarcerated in the county jail.  On May 30, 1992, Alvarado (under the alias 
“Ralph Varela”) was in a holding cell with several other inmates, including 
George Jimenez.   In an interview on June 23, 1992, Jimenez told police the 
inmates were passing around a newspaper that included a story about the Magoon 
murders.  While looking at the newspaper, Alvarado stated, “Hey, we did this.”  
One of the other inmates said, “You’re the ones that capped that little kid?”   
Alvarado laughed and replied, “Yeah.”  Enraged by Alvarado’s admission, some 
of the inmates assaulted Alvarado. 
 
24
 
b.  Jorge Flores 
On the same day as Alvarado’s jailhouse assault, defendant was 
incarcerated in a different jail, where he spoke with an acquaintance, Jorge Flores.  
The next day, June 1, 1992, during an interview with police detectives, Flores 
stated defendant told him he had taken a pistol that belonged to a shooting victim.  
Defendant told Flores that he and an unnamed companion were sent by their boss 
to the victims’ house to either get back the marijuana their boss had sold to the 
victims or get the money the victims owed for it.  Defendant stated that when they 
went to the victims’ house the victims were not there, but when the victims 
arrived, the male victim saw they were waiting for him, and the victims went 
inside the house.  Defendant and his companion knocked on the door; the door 
opened, or was broken down, and the male and female victims were inside holding 
weapons.  The companion pulled his gun and shot one of the victims, and the 
bullet also hit one of the children in the head.  The second victim tried to shoot, 
and defendant shot the second victim. 
 
2.  Aranda/Bruton Issues 
Defendant and Alvarado moved to sever the trial on the ground that the 
prosecution’s proposed admission of the jailhouse informants’ testimony would 
violate People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 
391 U.S. 123.  Bruton and its progeny provide that if the prosecutor in a joint trial 
seeks to admit a nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial statement, either the 
statement must be redacted to avoid implicating the defendant or the court must 
sever the trials.  (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 43.)  As to 
the Flores statement, the prosecution resolved any potential Aranda/Bruton issues 
when it limited its evidence to defendant’s admission that he had taken a gun from 
the victim.  As to the Jimenez statement, the prosecutor offered several possible 
redactions to avoid violating Aranda/Bruton, all of which the court ultimately 
 
25
deemed inadequate.  The prosecutor then elected to proceed with a joint trial at 
which he would not introduce the Jimenez statement in his case-in-chief, although 
the parties understood it might be used for impeachment purposes.  The trial 
court’s final order was that the prosecution would not use the Jimenez statement in 
its case-in-chief at the guilt or penalty phases. 
Section 1098 expresses a legislative preference for joint trials.  (People v. 
Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 40.)  A trial court’s denial of a 
motion for severance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, judged on the facts as 
they appeared at the time of the ruling.  (Id. at p. 41.)  But even if the ruling on a 
severance motion was correct when made, the reviewing court will reverse the 
decision if a defendant shows that joinder actually resulted in “gross unfairness,” 
amounting to a denial of due process.  (People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d at p. 
576, 590.) 
Because the trial court decided the severance motion entirely on Aranda 
and Bruton grounds, and because defendant does not claim the trial court erred in 
that ruling, he appears to concede the trial court’s denial of the severance motion 
was correct.  Defendant contends, however, that the court committed prejudicial 
error when it left open the possibility that if Alvarado testified, Jimenez could be 
called to impeach him.  Defendant claims that because the trial court did not bar 
Jimenez’s testimony altogether, the denial of severance resulted in gross 
unfairness amounting to a violation of due process.   But defendant’s claim that the 
trial court erred in not barring Jimenez’s testimony altogether on Aranda and 
Bruton grounds is not viable.  A codefendant’s extrajudicial statement implicating 
another defendant need not be excluded when the codefendant testifies and is 
 
26
available for cross-examination. 11  (Nelson v. O’Neil (1971) 402 U.S. 622, 629-
30; People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 562-63.) 
 
D.  Denial of Motion to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing or Exclude 
Statements of Jailhouse Informants 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to hold an 
evidentiary hearing concerning the admissibility of the jailhouse informants’ 
statements, or to exclude them.  He asserts the error denied him due process of 
law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.12 As discussed below, we conclude the trial court did not err in 
denying the motion. 
 
 
 
1. Evidentiary Hearing 
Defendant contends that Evidence Code section 402 and the federal due 
process clause required the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the 
admissibility of Jimenez’s testimony.  Evidence Code section 400 et seq., sets 
forth the rules for determining the existence or nonexistence of a preliminary fact 
when the parties dispute its existence.  A  “ ‘preliminary fact’ means a fact based 
upon the existence or nonexistence of which depends the admissibility or 
                                              
11 Defendant bases his claim that he suffered gross unfairness because Jimenez’s 
testimony was not excluded altogether on his argument (discussed and rejected in 
pt. IV. F., post) that he suffered a Brady violation because the prosecutor made a 
late disclosure of evidence that undermined Jimenez’s credibility.  (Brady v. 
Maryland (1975) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady).)  But because defendant’s Brady claim 
fails, so too does his derivative claim that the trial court’s denial of severance later 
resulted in gross unfairness in the form of the alleged Brady violation. 
12   The trial court granted defendant’s request for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether Flores was working as an agent for the police pursuant to 
Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, based on counsel’s representations 
of a long-standing relationship between Flores and a police detective.   The 
evidentiary hearing was held, but Flores failed to appear, and the trial court 
suspended the ruling on the motion to exclude his testimony until he could be 
found.   Flores was not found and did not testify at trial. 
 
27
inadmissibility of evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 400.)  Evidence Code section 402, 
subdivision (b), provides in relevant part:  “[I]n a criminal action, the court shall 
hear and determine the question of the admissibility of a confession or admission 
of the defendant out of the presence and hearing of the jury, if any party so 
requests.”  (Italics added.)  But subdivision (b) of Evidence Code section 402 does 
not mandate, as defendant appears to contend, that a court must hold an 
evidentiary hearing on request.  Subdivision (b) states only that if a court holds an 
evidentiary hearing concerning the admissibility of a confession or admission, 
then it must do so outside the presence of the jury, if any party so requests. 
The pretrial defense motions asserted that jailhouse informants were 
inherently unreliable, but raised no “preliminary fact” concerning the admissibility 
of Jimenez’s testimony beyond the undisputed fact that he was a jailhouse 
informant.  Defendant’s challenges to the reliability of the jailhouse informants 
therefore went to the weight of their testimony rather than its admissibility (Evid. 
Code, § 351), which the trial court correctly concluded in denying the motion by 
stating: “Jailhouse informants may not be the most trustworthy and perhaps 
believable individuals, but if there is competency to testify, they may testify.”  
Therefore, at the time the trial court ruled on the defense’s in limine motions, the 
defense had raised no admissibility issues concerning Jimenez that warranted an 
evidentiary hearing.13 
                                              
13 As recounted in part IV. F., post, after the return of the verdicts, the prosecutor 
disclosed Jimenez’s admissions about his use of drugs that called into question 
Jimenez’s competency to testify.  Defendant argues that had the court granted the 
in limine motion for an evidentiary hearing for Jimenez, this information would 
have been revealed earlier, and defendant could have avoided the  prejudice he 
suffered due to the prosecutor’s late disclosure.  We reject defendant’s claims in 
part IV. F., post. 
 
28
Nor was the trial court required to hold an evidentiary hearing on federal 
due process grounds.  Defendant correctly notes that under Evidence Code 
sections 402 and 405, the voluntariness of a confession is a “preliminary fact” that 
a trial judge must determine before the confession may be submitted to the jury.  
(People v. Rowe (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1029.)  In addition, under the federal 
due process clause, a defendant has a right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue 
of his confession’s voluntariness.  (Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 376-
377; People v. Bennett (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 230, 236.)  Although the Jimenez 
statements reported Alvarado’s admissions, defense counsel never raised the issue 
of the voluntariness of Alvarado’s admissions to Jimenez.  Rather, defense 
counsel claimed Jimenez’s statements were inherently unreliable because Jimenez 
was a jailhouse informant.  Therefore, the due process cases defendant cites are 
inapplicable. 
 
2.  Motion to Exclude the Testimony of the Jailhouse Informants  
Defendant next contends the court should have excluded Jimenez’s 
statements under Evidence Code section 352, and as a matter of federal due 
process.14  Defendant asserts that jailhouse informant testimony is inherently 
unreliable, so that any probative value is outweighed by the testimony’s 
prejudicial impact.  Referring to the observations of state and federal courts 
(People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 617-618; In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 
945, 957; Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie (9th Cir. 2001) 
243 F.3d 1109, 114-1116), defendant seeks to document the unreliability inherent 
                                              
14 Evidence Code section 352 provides: “The court in its discretion may exclude 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that 
its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the 
jury.” 
 
29
in jailhouse informant statements, and relies on many items outside the record on 
appeal. 
Defendant has cited authorities indicating that courts are aware of reliability 
issues concerning jailhouse informants.  But we have consistently rejected claims 
that the testimony of jailhouse informants is inherently unreliable.  (People v. 
Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1165.)  Nothing defendant presents here causes us 
to reconsider this conclusion.  The abuse of discretion standard of review applies 
to any trial court ruling on the admissibility of evidence.  (People v. Guerra (2006) 
37 Cal.4th 1067, 1113 (Guerra).)  We conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion or violate due process in denying defendant’s motion to exclude the 
jailhouse informants’ testimony. 
III.  JURY SELECTION ISSUES 
A.  Denial of Motion for Individual and Sequestered Juror Voir Dire 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for individual 
and sequestered juror voir dire, and thus violated his right to trial by an impartial 
jury and to due process of law under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.  As we explain, we conclude the trial court did not err 
in denying his motion. 
Alvarado filed an in limine motion, in which defendant joined, seeking 
individual and sequestered juror voir dire.  The trial court denied the motion, but 
left open the possibility of individual and sequestered voir dire for particular jurors 
on a showing of good cause.  Subsequently, the court stated it intended to call 12 
prospective jurors at a time for voir dire, followed by discussion of challenges for 
cause outside the jurors’ presence.  Defendant’s trial counsel stated he had no 
objection to the court’s proposed jury selection procedures.   
 
30
As an initial matter, the People contend that counsel’s acquiescence in the 
trial court’s proposed jury selection process bars defendant’s claim concerning 
individual and sequestered voir dire.  But the parties stipulated that when the trial 
court made a ruling on an in limine motion, the losing party was not required to 
restate the objection in order to preserve it for appellate purposes (assuming that 
no evidence later presented changed the basis of the trial court’s ruling).  
Defendant therefore did not forfeit his contention.  
Defendant’s claim fails on the merits, however, because, as defendant 
concedes, Code of Civil Procedure section 223, enacted as part of Proposition 115, 
abrogated the former individual voir dire procedure directed by Hovey v. Superior 
Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80.  (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713, 
citing Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1171.)  
Defendant submits that Covarrubias was wrongly decided, and apparently invites 
us to reconsider the issue.  We decline to do so.  (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 494, 512.)  
 
B.  Prosecutor’s Peremptory Challenges (Alleged Batson/Wheeler Error) 
Defendant contends that the prosecution’s striking of Hispanic prospective 
jurors violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.   For the reasons discussed below, we conclude the 
trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion under Batson v. Kentucky 
(1986) 476 U.S. 79, 84-89 (Batson), and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 
276-277 (Wheeler). 
The prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against three Hispanic 
jurors:  M. A., L. H., and Y. M.   Alvarado made an objection to each excusal 
under Batson/Wheeler, in which defendant joined.  The prosecution argued that 
the codefendants had not made a prima facie showing, given that one Hispanic 
 
31
juror, P. G., was on the panel.  The trial court found no prima facie showing and 
denied the motion, basing its ruling on a review of the jurors’ voir dire transcripts, 
which disclosed neutral grounds for the challenges, and on the presence of at least 
one Hispanic juror on the panel, P. G.  
Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory 
challenges to remove prospective jurors based solely on group bias.  (Batson, 
supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.)  Recently, 
“the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that Batson states the procedure and 
standard to be employed by trial courts when challenges such as defendant’s are 
made.  ‘First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by “showing that the 
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”  
[Citations.]  Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the 
“burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering 
permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, “[i]f a 
race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether 
the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.”  
[Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 66-67 (Cornwell), 
quoting Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted (Johnson ).)    
The high court clarified that “a defendant satisfies the requirements of 
Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to 
draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”  (Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at 
p. 170, revg. in part People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1318 [requiring the 
defendant to “show that it is more likely than not the other party’s peremptory 
challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias”].)  “ ‘When a 
trial court denies a Wheeler motion without finding a prima facie case of group 
bias, the appellate court reviews the record of voir dire for evidence to support the 
trial court’s ruling. [Citations.]  We will affirm the ruling where the record 
 
32
suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged the 
jurors in question.’ ”  (Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1101, quoting People v. 
Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 106, 135.) 
As a preliminary matter, defendant contends that because the trial court did 
not articulate the standard it used to determine whether he established a prima 
facie discrimination case, we must presume it used the then current “strong 
likelihood” standard.  Defendant asserts that this standard sets a higher threshold 
than the Batson standard of an “inference” of group bias.   Defendant also claims 
that because the trial court used the incorrect standard, its ruling is entitled to no 
deference. 15  But as we have held in analyzing Batson/Wheeler claims, 
“[r]egardless of the standard employed by the trial court, and even assuming 
without deciding that the trial court’s decision is not entitled to deference, we have 
reviewed the record and, like the United States Supreme Court in Johnson . . . 
[we] are able to apply the high court’s standard and resolve the legal question 
whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the 
basis of race.”  (Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 73, italics omitted; Guerra, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1101.) 
As to the three challenged jurors, defense trial counsel sought to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination solely on the circumstance that the prosecutor 
struck three individuals of Hispanic ancestry, and that defendant was the same.    
On appeal, defendant contends that a prima facie case is established because the 
                                              
15 Defendant also contends that the trial court’s ruling deserves no deference 
because, in the course of discussing the motion, the trial court mentioned that 
“there were two African-American representatives on the jury.”  Defendant argues 
that this demonstrates a misunderstanding of the purpose of Batson.  We need not 
reach this issue, because as explained below, our conclusion that defendant did not 
make a prima facie showing is based on our review of the record, not on deference 
to the trial court’s ruling or reasoning. 
 
33
prosecutor struck three of the only four Hispanics called to serve on the jury.  In 
the alternative, defendant claims that the fact that all three struck jurors were 
Hispanic women supports a prima facie case of discrimination against Hispanic 
women as a cognizable class.  We will assume, without deciding, that defendant’s 
claim of discrimination as to Hispanic women specifically (as opposed to 
Hispanics generally) is not forfeited on appeal because he failed to present it 
below.  (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1016, fn. 12 
(Lewis and Oliver).)   
We have held that, although a prosecutor’s excusal of all members of a 
particular group may establish a prima facie discrimination case, especially if the 
defendant belongs to the same group, this fact alone is not conclusive.  (Guerra 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1101-1102; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 119 
(Crittenden); but see Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 166, 173 [the removal of all 
three African-American prospective jurors established a prima facie case].)  The 
prosecution did not excuse all Hispanic jurors, and defendant is a Hispanic man 
not a Hispanic woman.  In any event, as discussed below, the record discloses 
race-neutral grounds for the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges.   (Guerra, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 1101.)  
1.  Prospective Juror M. A. 
During voir dire, Prospective Juror M. A. stated that Spanish was her 
primary language, and that she did not speak English well or understand many 
words.  She stated she did not have any strong feelings either for or against capital 
punishment.  Defense counsel moved to excuse M. A. for cause because she 
lacked sufficient skills in both written and spoken English, and because her 
problems with speaking and understanding English could affect her ability to 
interact with the other jurors during deliberations.  The prosecutor agreed and also 
requested that she be excused for cause.  Trial counsel for Alvarado opposed the 
 
34
for-cause challenge.  The trial court denied the challenge, and stated the parties 
would have to deal with excusing M. A as a peremptory challenge. 
Defendant contends that because the trial court denied the challenge for 
cause based on M. A.’s limited English language skills, this ground is not a valid 
basis for a peremptory challenge either.  But the circumstance that a juror is not 
subject to exclusion for cause does not, on its own, support an inference that group 
bias motivated the peremptory challenge.  (Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 70.)  
The record demonstrates both the prosecutor and defendant’s own counsel were 
reasonably concerned about the prospective juror’s English language skills and, on 
this basis, the prosecutor was entitled to excuse her. 
2.  Prospective Juror L .H. 
During voir dire, Prospective Juror L. H. stated she tended to favor life 
imprisonment, rather than the death penalty, as the appropriate punishment.  She 
observed that she could keep an open mind, but would have to be “really 
convinced” before returning a death verdict.  Although the trial court had 
explained at some length that neither side bore a burden of proof in the penalty 
phase, when asked by the prosecutor if she would place a burden of proof on either 
party regarding the appropriate punishment, she responded, “Prosecution.”  
At best, L. H. appeared equivocal about the death penalty, and at worst, she 
appeared biased against it.  Defendant claims that although she stated during voir 
dire that she would lean toward imposing life imprisonment, she also said she 
could keep an open mind.  That a juror is equivocal about his or her ability to 
impose the death penalty is relevant to a challenge for cause, but does not undercut 
the race-neutral basis for a prosecutor’s decision to excuse a prospective juror 
peremptorily.  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th  81, 118.)  The record strongly 
suggests the prosecutor had grounds for concern about her possible bias against 
the death penalty, and on this basis, was entitled to excuse her. 
 
35
3. Prospective Juror Y. M. 
During the court’s voir dire, Prospective Juror Y. M. stated she had strong 
religious beliefs against the death penalty and she could not return a death 
sentence.  During the prosecution’s voir dire, she again expressed religious 
reservations against the death penalty, but asserted she could sit as a juror in this 
case.  The trial court denied the prosecutor’s for cause challenge of Y. M., but 
allowed the prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge on Y. M. after finding 
that Y. M. had strong feelings against the death penalty.  The record suggests the 
prosecutor had reason for concern about Y. M.’s possible bias against the death 
penalty, and on this basis, he was entitled to excuse her. 
4. Group Attitude 
In addition, defendant claims that, even if Prospective Jurors L. H. and Y. 
M. exhibited a bias against the death penalty, most Hispanic women actually feel 
this way, so that any disqualification of a Hispanic woman based on her beliefs 
about the death penalty would constitute improper bias against this group.  We 
note that defendant points to no evidence in the record to support his speculation 
about Hispanic women’s beliefs.  In any event, we have recently rejected a similar 
contention.  (Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1016.)  A prosecutor may 
excuse prospective jurors, including members of cognizable groups, based on 
personal, individual biases those prospective jurors actually express, even if the 
biased view or attitude may be more widely held inside the cognizable group than 
outside of it.  (Ibid.) 
 
C.  Asserted Witt/Witherspoon Error  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in not excusing for cause five 
prospective jurors who were biased in favor of the death penalty, and in excusing 
for cause two prospective jurors he asserts were not biased, in violation of 
 
36
Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 and Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 
U.S. 510.  Defendant claims the trial court’s rulings violated his right to trial by a 
fair and impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial 
court did not err in its rulings concerning the for-cause challenges of prospective 
jurors, and that defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated. 
1.  Denial of Defense’s For-cause Challenges 
The defense unsuccessfully challenged for cause the following five 
prospective jurors: R. L., P. G., S. K., M. N., and D. V.16  The defense later 
removed Prospective Juror R. L. using a peremptory challenge.  Prospective Jurors 
P. G. and S. K. were chosen to sit as jurors. 
Preliminarily, the People contend that defendant has forfeited these claims 
because his trial counsel did not exhaust his peremptory challenges.17  “ ‘To 
preserve a claim of trial court error in failing to remove a juror for bias in favor of 
the death penalty, a defendant must either exhaust all peremptory challenges and 
express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected or justify the failure to do 
so.’ ”  (Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1099, quoting People v. Williams (1997) 16 
Cal.4th 635, 667.)  Defendant does not dispute the fact that his trial counsel 
neither exhausted his peremptory challenges nor expressed dissatisfaction with the 
                                              
16 For R. L, S. K, M. N. and D.V., both defendant’s trial counsel and Alvarado’s 
trial counsel joined in the for-cause challenges.  For P. G., Alvarado’s trial counsel 
made a challenge for cause, but defendant’s trial counsel stated he was not 
challenging P. G. for cause.  We do not consider the claim as to P. G. forfeited, 
however, because failure to object does not forfeit a Witt/Witherspoon claim on 
appeal.  (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 262 (Schmeck); People v. 
Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 443.)  In addition, codefense counsel’s challenge 
for cause alerted the trial judge to the possibility of Witt/Witherspoon error as to P. 
G.  (See People v. Velasquez, supra, 26 Cal.3d at 444.) 
17 The defense exercised five of 20 available joint peremptory challenges only, 
and defendant did not exercise any of his five individual peremptory challenges. 
 
37
jury ultimately selected.  Rather, he asserts that our discussion in People v. 
Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pages 1220-1221, concerning the dynamic nature of 
the process of exercising peremptory challenges, somehow undermines the 
exhaustion requirement.  Defendant is mistaken.  Our discussion in Johnson 
addresses how a party with fewer remaining peremptory challenges might exercise 
them more sparingly, but this does not relieve defendant of the exhaustion 
requirement in order to preserve his claim.  Alternatively, defendant seeks to 
justify trial counsel’s failure to exhaust all peremptory challenges by arguing that 
when counsel accepted the 12 jurors in the box, the venire contained several 
prospective jurors who may well have been worse than those in the box.  Even 
assuming this argument could justify a failure to exhaust his peremptory 
challenges, it is mere speculation on this record.  Defendant’s contentions of 
erroneous jury inclusion are therefore forfeited. 
Even if he did not forfeit his claims, defendant can show no error with 
respect to the three prospective jurors who did not sit on the jury, that is, R. L., M. 
N., and D. V.18  As to the two jurors who did sit on the jury, P.G. and S.K., as 
discussed below, the trial court properly denied each of defendant’s challenges for 
cause.   
                                              
18 “To establish that the erroneous inclusion of a juror violated a defendant’s right 
to a fair and impartial jury, the defendant must show either that a biased juror 
actually sat on the jury that imposed the death sentence, or that the defendant was 
deprived of a peremptory challenge that he or she would have used to excuse a 
juror who in the end participated in deciding the case.”  (People v. Blair (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 686, 742 (Blair), italics omitted.)  The defense removed R. L. with a 
peremptory challenge, but defendant makes no argument that exercising a 
peremptory challenge on R. L. deprived him of one that he would have used to 
excuse a juror who participated in deciding the case (and indeed he cannot make 
such an argument, given the number of his remaining unused peremptory 
challenges).  M. N. and D. V. never even made it into the jury box. 
 
38
The same analysis applies to claims involving erroneous juror exclusion or 
inclusion.  (See People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975.)  “ ‘Applying 
Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424. . . , we have stated that “ ‘[i]n a 
capital case, a prospective juror may be excluded if the juror’s views on capital 
punishment would “prevent or substantially impair” the performance of the juror's 
duties.’ [Citations.]  ‘A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is 
unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the 
death penalty where appropriate.’ [Citation.]”  In addition, “ ‘[o]n appeal, we will 
uphold the trial court's ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as 
binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror’s true state of 
mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or 
ambiguous.’ [Citations.]” ’ ”  (Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 743, quoting People v. 
Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th, 900, 987.) 
a.  Juror P. G. 
During the trial court’s voir dire, P. G. stated he would be able to follow the 
law and procedures in capital cases.  He did not believe his feelings either for or 
against the death penalty would affect his judgment.  P. G. told defense counsel he 
thought the state should reserve the death penalty for the most brutal and severe 
crimes, but he did not have a specific list of such crimes in mind.  P. G. stated that 
if he found the torture allegation in the conspiracy count to be true, he could 
impose the death penalty and he would place the burden on the defense in the 
penalty phase to produce evidence to get him to lean the other way.  But in 
response to the prosecutor’s questions, P. G. said he would consider the factors the 
trial court read when making his determination about the appropriate punishment, 
and he was not predisposed in the death penalty’s favor based on the charges filed 
against the defendants.  The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that P. G. 
 
39
did not hold views that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of 
his duties as a juror.  (Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 743.) 
b.  Juror S. K. 
In his responses to the written questionnaire, S. K. indicated he thought 
there were circumstances, such as a planned murder, where a defendant should 
receive the death penalty automatically.  During voir dire, S. K. confirmed his 
responses to the questionnaire but acknowledged he made them before the court 
instructed him about the two options in the penalty phase.  S. K. noted that he 
could separate his personal beliefs and his ability to consider both sentencing 
options.  He stated he would follow the court’s penalty instructions, and that he 
would consider the alternative penalty of life without the possibility of parole.  S. 
K. responded to defense counsel that he understood the trial court’s instruction 
that the law did not have a preference for the death penalty and that its imposition 
was not automatic.  He also stated he would make his decision on penalty after 
listening to both sides.  
Although the trial court concluded that S. K gave equivocal answers, the 
court was satisfied that S. K. was capable of fulfilling his juror responsibilities.    
The record supports the trial court's conclusion that S. K did not hold views that 
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror. 
(Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 743.) 
2.  Granting of Prosecution’s For-cause Challenges 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in excusing two prospective jurors, 
R. J., and R. A. for their alleged bias against the death penalty.  We discuss each 
claim below. 
a.  Prospective Juror R. J. 
In his written questionnaire, R. J. noted that he was ambivalent about the 
death penalty, but denied having conscientious or other objections to it, and 
 
40
indicated he would not automatically vote for life imprisonment.  In his voir dire 
examination, however, R. J. stated he was biased against the death penalty and 
would not be able to listen to all the evidence in the penalty phase with an open 
mind and return a verdict of death.  The trial court granted the prosecutor’s for-
cause challenge to R. J., concluding his ability to sit as a fair and impartial juror 
was substantially impaired due to his strong beliefs in opposition to the death 
penalty.  The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that R. J. held views that 
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.  
(People v. Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 262.)  Even if his statements are 
considered conflicting or equivocal, the trial court’s determination of each juror’s 
true state of mind is binding on us.  (Ibid.)  
b.  Prospective Juror R. A. 
In his written questionnaire, R. A. expressed equivocal views about the 
death penalty.  During the trial court’s voir dire, R. A. stated that his feelings in 
opposition to capital punishment would not affect his judgment, and that he was 
capable of keeping an open mind in order to impose a just punishment.  But during 
defense counsel’s questioning, R. A. observed that he did not think he was ready 
to pass judgment in a capital case.  In response to the prosecutor’s voir dire, R. A. 
stated he would not impose the death penalty on a first time murderer with special 
circumstances.  He did observe that if a murderer were to kill again after having 
been given a chance to rehabilitate, the death penalty might be appropriate.   
The prosecutor challenged R. A. for cause because he apparently would not 
impose death on first time murderers.  The court granted the prosecutor’s 
challenge.  We find that the record supports the court’s conclusion that R. A.’s 
views would prevent or substantially impair his ability to perform his juror duties.   
(Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 262.)   
 
41
D.  Denial of Motion to Admonish Prospective Jurors 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion in limine 
requesting the court to admonish prospective jurors of their civic duty to serve as 
jurors, and to set aside their personal views to that duty in order to follow the law.  
Defendant claims the trial court’s denial of his motion contributed to the improper 
dismissal of qualified jurors, and violated his right to an impartial jury, due 
process, and equal protection of the laws under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  He further claims the trial court 
erred by excusing prospective jurors for cause without first so admonishing 
them.19   Defendant concedes that we have consistently held “a ‘civic duty’ 
admonition is not necessary,” and apparently asks us to reconsider the issue.  
(People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1261.)  We decline to do so and find no 
error under these facts. 
IV.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Alleged Errors in Admitting Crime Scene and Autopsy Photographs  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted crime scene 
and autopsy photographs, and in so doing violated his constitutional rights to a fair 
trial, due process of law, and a reliable sentence.  Having viewed the photographs, 
and for the reasons discussed below, we conclude the court neither abused its 
                                              
19 Defendant argues a “civic duty” admonition might have “salvaged” six 
prospective jurors excused for cause: R. J., L. S., N. W., P. K., A. U., and R.A.  As 
an initial matter, we note that the goal of voir dire is not to “salvage” problematic 
jurors, but rather to find 12 fair-minded jurors who will impartially evaluate the 
case.  In the previous section, defendant claimed that two of these six prospective 
jurors (R. J. and R. A.) were excused in violation of Witherspoon and Witt.  But 
defendant does not appear to claim that the remaining four jurors (L. S., N. W., P. 
K., and A. U.) were also excused in violation of Witherspoon and Witt.  In any 
event, we have reviewed the voir dire of these other four jurors, and we conclude 
the record supports the trial court’s findings that these jurors held views that 
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties. 
 
42
discretion nor violated defendant’s constitutional rights in admitting the 
photographs. 
Alvarado filed in limine motions, in which defendant joined, to exclude 
crime scene and victim autopsy photographs as irrelevant, cumulative, and more 
prejudicial than probative.  At a pretrial hearing, the trial court examined the 
photographs, and admitted some while excluding others.  Defendant apparently 
challenges all of the photographs admitted over defense objection, and claims they 
were not relevant or, in the alternative, that they were cumulative and 
inflammatory.  (Evid. Code, § 352.) 
In determining whether there was an abuse of discretion, we address two 
factors:  (1) whether the photographs were relevant under Evidence Code section 
210, and (2) if they were relevant, whether the trial court abused its discretion 
under Evidence Code section 352 in finding that the probative value of the 
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice.  (People v. Carter (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 1114, 1166.)  Defendant presents no credible argument that the 
photographs were irrelevant.  The photos were clearly relevant to the 
determination of many disputed facts in this case including how the victims were 
killed and what happened prior to the killings.  (Evid. Code, § 210.)   
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that the probative 
value of each photograph was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect.  “ ‘The admission of photographs of a victim lies within the broad 
discretion of the trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or 
inflammatory.  [Citations.]  The court's exercise of that discretion will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is 
outweighed by their prejudicial effect.  [Citations.]’ ”  (People v. Ramirez (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 398, 453-454, quoting Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83 at pp. 133-134.)  
 
43
We have examined the photographs and conclude they are not of such a nature as 
to overcome the jury’s rationality.  (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 625.)  
The trial court did not err in admitting the challenged photographs of the victims, 
nor did their admission violate defendant’s constitutional rights. 
 
B.  Asserted Error in Admission of Testimony of Prosecution’s Blood 
Spatter Expert Witness 
Defendant contends that prosecution blood spatter expert witness, Deputy 
Sheriff Brian Kennedy, was biased and lacked proper qualification as an expert.  
He claims Kennedy’s testimony (on crime reconstruction using blood spatter 
analysis) violated defendant’s constitutional rights to a fair trial, due process of 
law, and a reliable penalty determination.  The testimony described the blood 
spatter patterns the killings caused, other transfers of blood (including “castoffs,”  
“wipes,” and drip trails), and blood pooling in Daniel Magoon’s body.  Defendant 
further contends the court violated Evidence Code section 402 and his federal due 
process rights when it deferred, until midtrial, any rulings on the admissibility of 
Kennedy’s testimony.  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude no error 
occurred. 
The parties discussed the admissibility of Kennedy’s testimony during in 
limine motions.  Defense counsel made an oral objection to the testimony under 
People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 and Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
293 F. 1013, raising the issue of whether Kennedy had used correct procedures.20  
The court ruled that Kelly was inapplicable to Kennedy’s testimony.  After 
reviewing Kennedy’s resume, the trial court stated that there was no need to have 
an Evidence Code section 402 hearing on Kennedy’s qualifications, because 
                                              
20 Because the United States Supreme Court abrogated the Frye formulation in 
federal trials in 1993, this rule should more accurately be referred to now as the 
Kelly rule.  (See People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 591.) 
 
44
Kennedy appeared qualified.  The trial court noted that the defense would have the 
opportunity to voir dire Kennedy at trial to confirm his qualifications.  At trial, 
defense counsel did not object to Kennedy’s testimony. 
As a preliminary matter, the People assert that defendant forfeited his 
claims because he failed to object to Kennedy’s testimony either on the ground 
that he was biased or that he lacked proper qualifications as an expert.  Defendant 
replies that trial counsel’s objection on Kelly and Frye grounds to the scientific 
validity of the procedures followed by Kennedy is sufficient to preserve the issue 
on appeal.21  But because the objection below neither explicitly nor implicitly 
raised the issues of Kennedy’s bias or lack of qualification, we conclude that 
defendant did forfeit the claims.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1000.) 
Even assuming that defendant’s claims were not forfeited, we find them 
without merit.  A claim that expert opinion evidence has been improperly admitted 
is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.  (People v. Panah 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 478.)  “Error regarding a witness’s qualifications as an 
expert will be found only if the evidence shows the witness ‘ “ ‘clearly lacks 
qualification as an expert.’ ” ’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th 
at p. 162.)  The record does not show that Kennedy lacked expert qualifications.  
Kennedy received a bachelor’s degree in Police Science and Management and 
after becoming a police officer took supplemental courses in crime scene 
reconstruction and bloodstain patterns.  He lectured on blood spatter evidence at 
an in-service school for criminal investigators and prosecutors at San Jose State 
University.  He had testified regarding blood spatter evidence in superior courts 
                                              
21 Defendant appears to refer to the Kelly/Frye objection below to support his 
contention that Kennedy lacked proper expert qualification and was biased in the 
prosecution’s favor.  He does not raise a Kelly rule issue on appeal.   A Kelly rule 
claim would be unavailing in any case, as we have held that Kelly is inapplicable 
to blood spatter testing.  (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1018.) 
 
45
throughout the state on numerous occasions.   He conducted blood spatter analysis 
for the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department and went to homicide scenes.  Kennedy’s 
educational background and work experience fully qualified him to testify as an 
expert on blood spatter evidence.  (See People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 
849.) 
Defendant contends that Kennedy was biased because his report included a 
section called “The Bludgeoning,” in which he opined that the eight cast-off 
bloodstains in the hallway were likely caused by repeated blows to Mary 
Magoon’s head by an instrument consistent with a nine-millimeter handgun.  The 
serology reports, however, showed that the blood at issue was not Mary 
Magoon’s; it was D.’s.22  Defendant implies this discrepancy shows Kennedy’s 
bias against the defendant in the face of scientific evidence to the contrary.  But 
the explanation for the apparent conflict, as Kennedy testified at trial, was that his 
deadline for submitting the findings to the district attorney’s office required him to 
write his report before the serology tests had been completed, and he was asked to 
outline as many possibilities as he could, including the possibility that the blood in 
the hallway was Mary Magoon’s.  After the serology tests were returned, and prior 
to trial, Kennedy sought to redact the pages of the report that dealt with the 
bludgeoning in the hallway, but the trial court ruled that Kennedy’s entire report 
was the fair subject of defense examination.  Nothing in this record suggests 
Kennedy was biased in any regard. 
In addition, we find no merit in defendant’s contention that the trial court 
violated Evidence Code section 402 and defendant’s due process rights when it 
deferred until midtrial any rulings on the admissibility of Kennedy’s testimony.   
The trial court did not defer its Evidence Code section 402 rulings until midtrial; it 
                                              
22 D. was not injured during the murders.  His cast-off bloodstains in the hallway 
apparently predated the murders. 
 
46
made pretrial rulings on the two preliminary facts raised, which were the scientific 
reliability of blood spatter testing (the Kelly rule objection), and Kennedy’s 
qualifications to testify as an expert witness.23   
Defendant contends the court should have held an evidentiary hearing 
before Kennedy was allowed to testify.  The claim has no merit.  Kennedy’s 
resume sufficiently established his qualifications.  In addition, the court correctly 
concluded that blood spatter testing does not require Kelly scrutiny.  (People v. 
Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1018.)  We therefore conclude no error occurred 
when the court admitted Kennedy’s expert testimony. 
 
C.  Asserted Errors in Rulings on Admissibility of Evidence of Mary 
Magoon’s Alleged Propensity for Violence and Use of Firearms 
Defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in excluding 
evidence of Mary Magoon’s alleged propensity for violence and use of firearms.  
Defendant claims the exclusion violated his rights to due process, to present a 
defense, and to a reliable penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  As discussed below, 
defense counsel did not seek to admit this evidence, and, even if he had, it would 
not have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have excluded the 
evidence. 
Before trial commenced, the court denied the prosecution’s motion in 
limine to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence of Daniel Magoon’s propensity for 
violence and prior firearm use.  The court agreed with defense counsel that the 
presence of the Ingram “Mac 10” semiautomatic pistol at the entryway of the 
                                              
23 Evidence Code section 400, et seq. set forth rules for determining the existence 
or nonexistence of a preliminary fact “when the existence of a preliminary fact is 
disputed.”  (Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (a).)  A “ ‘preliminary fact’ means a fact 
upon the existence or nonexistence of which depends the admissibility or 
inadmissibility of evidence.”  (Evid. Code, § 400.) 
 
47
Magoon house supported the defense theory that Daniel Magoon may have 
brandished that weapon in a confrontation with defendants, and that his propensity 
for violence and prior use of firearms was therefore relevant.  But the parties did 
not discuss the relevance of evidence pointing to Mary Magoon’s propensity for 
violence or prior firearm use.   
During the cross-examination of prosecution witness Jimmy Johnson, 
defense counsel asked Johnson about statements Johnson made to the police 
concerning Mary Magoon’s propensity for violence and prior firearm use.  The 
prosecution objected to the question on relevance grounds, but the court overruled 
the objection.  Later, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel told the 
court that Johnson had made a prior statement to police that Johnson believed 
Mary Magoon was heading to the bathroom to get a gun before she was murdered. 
The court did not rule that the statement was inadmissible.  Instead, it observed 
that the evidence presented at trial thus far provided no foundation for questions 
concerning Mary Magoon’s propensity for violence and firearm use.  Continuing 
his cross-examination of Johnson, defense counsel asked about a statement that 
Johnson had made to the police that Mary Magoon “was on a runaway . . . train 
with Dan.”  The court sustained the prosecution’s objection on relevance grounds. 
The issue of Mary Magoon’s propensity for violence resurfaced later in the 
trial, when defense counsel asked the court to rule on defendant’s pending motion 
in limine to admit the testimony of Detective Coleman.  That testimony would 
discuss Daniel Magoon’s 1982 arrest in order to show his propensity for being 
armed during drug transactions.  The court was concerned that because Mary 
Magoon had also been present at the arrest, the testimony could confuse the issues 
under Evidence Code section 352, particularly because there was no evidence 
establishing Mary Magoon’s propensity for violence.  Defense counsel made a 
narrower offer of proof limited to Daniel Magoon’s past gun use, and stated he 
 
48
was willing to sacrifice any testimony about Mary Magoon in order to present the 
jury with the evidence concerning Daniel Magoon.  In light of the narrowed offer 
of proof, the court admitted Detective Cole’s testimony, and defendant’s counsel 
did not object to the ruling. 
Although the record shows that defense counsel failed to seek a ruling on 
the admissibility of evidence concerning Mary Magoon’s propensity for violence 
and prior use of firearms, defendant contends that any further attempts by trial 
counsel to admit such evidence would have been futile after the court appeared to 
indicate that it believed such evidence to be inadmissible.  Even assuming 
defendant’s argument to be true, the trial court would not have abused its 
discretion in excluding such evidence under Evidence Code section 352 on the 
ground that it would have created a substantial danger of confusing the issues at 
trial.  (See People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 587-88 [court may exclude 
under Evidence Code section 352 evidence of the aggressive and violent character 
of the victim.])  During the pretrial discussions of the relevance of admitting 
evidence of Daniel Magoon’s propensity for violence and gun use, the trial court 
pointed out that, in order for a murder victim’s propensity for violence to be 
relevant, there must be some evidentiary support for a self-defense-type theory 
that the defendant perceived the murder victim as presenting an immediate threat.  
As the trial court noted, even if the murder victim were the most violent person in 
the world, that fact would not be relevant if the evidence made it clear that the 
victim was taken by surprise and shot in the back of the head. 
There was no evidence indicating that Mary Magoon could have presented 
a threat to defendant.  Mary Magoon was killed in the hallway bathroom, which 
was a significant distance away from the living room, where investigators found 
the two rifles, or the entryway, where investigators found the Ingram “Mac 10” 
semiautomatic pistol.  The evidence indicated that she had been shot while holding 
 
49
three-year-old J. in her arms, beaten, and then finished off with a bullet to the back 
of her head.  Defendant’s sole basis for arguing that Mary Magoon might have 
been perceived as a threat to defendant is Johnson’s statement to the police that 
Mary Magoon might have been going for a gun in the hallway bathroom, which 
was sheer speculation. 24  Given this record, it would have been within the trial 
court’s discretion to have excluded the admission of evidence pertaining to Mary 
Magoon’s alleged propensity for violence and prior use of firearms. 
 
D.  Asserted Error in Refusal to Instruct on Voluntary Manslaughter as to 
Mary Magoon 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on 
the voluntary manslaughter of Mary Magoon as a lesser included offense of 
murder, on the theory that her killing was committed either in sudden quarrel/heat 
of passion or in unreasonable self-defense.  Defendant claims the court’s failure to 
so instruct deprived him of his due process right to have the jury determine every 
material issue the evidence presented.  Defendant again points to Mary Magoon’s 
alleged propensity for violence and claims that her alleged role in the family 
business may have led defendant to believe she was “going for a weapon in the 
bathroom when killed.”  Defendant asserts that this evidence “supports a voluntary 
manslaughter instruction because it was sufficient to deserve consideration by the 
jury, and a reasonable jury could find it sufficiently persuasive to warrant a verdict 
of voluntary manslaughter.”  
We disagree.  “ ‘Manslaughter is “the unlawful killing of a human being 
without malice” [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 102, 
                                              
24 Defendant asserts that Mary Magoon “was found on the floor near the empty 
box of a weapon just like the one she was known to have carried in the past.”  But 
defendant is mistaken.  The empty gun box of the Helwan pistol was found in a 
hidden compartment in the master bedroom bathroom, not in the hallway 
bathroom where investigators found Mary Magoon’s body. 
 
50
quoting § 192.)  Even though a court must instruct on general principles of law 
relevant to the issues the evidence raises, “[a] court is not obligated to instruct sua 
sponte on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense in the absence of 
substantial evidence that the defendant acted in a ‘sudden quarrel or heat of 
passion’ (§ 192, subd. (a)), or that the defendant killed in ‘ “ ‘unreasonable self-
defense.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Benavides, at p. 102.)  There was no evidence that the 
killing of Mary Magoon involved sudden quarrel/heat of passion or unreasonable 
self-defense, and therefore no support for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. 
 
E.  Asserted Errors Arising Out of Lack of Instruction on the Elements of 
Torture 
Defendant contends the court violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, 
and a reliable sentence under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution because the prosecution misused the law related 
to conspiracy, and effectively charged defendant with murder by torture, when it 
listed the torture of Mary Magoon as one of 10 overt acts in the conspiracy to 
commit robbery count (a noncapital offense for which defendant and Alvarado 
were charged and found guilty).  Defendant further contends that the prosecutor’s 
references to torture during the trial had the effect of trying defendant for murder 
by torture, even though neither codefendant was so charged, and the trial court did 
not instruct the jury in any definition of torture.  Defendant does not specify 
whether the asserted error is based on prosecutorial misconduct in using the word 
“torture” or the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury in the legal elements of 
torture, but we discern no error under either theory.  Defense counsel never 
objected to the prosecution’s use of the word “torture” in the information or at 
trial.  For this reason, we consider any claim based on the prosecution’s use of the 
word forfeited. (Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1000.)  In addition, as we explain, 
even if defendant did not forfeit the issue, he fails to show prejudice. 
 
51
 
1.  Torture as an Overt Act 
Count 1 of the information charged both codefendants with conspiracy to 
commit robbery.  It listed 10 overt acts: (1) arming themselves with nine-
millimeter pistols; (2, 3) driving to Daniel Magoon’s residence and entering it; (4) 
shooting and murdering Daniel Magoon; (5) torturing Mary Magoon; (6) shooting 
and murdering Mary Magoon; (7) shooting and wounding J.; (8-10) stealing 
Daniel Magoon’s marijuana, nine-millimeter Helwan pistol, and money. The 
information charged murder generally, and did not specify first degree murder by 
torture under section 189.  Defendants were not charged with the crime of torture 
under section 206, nor was torture alleged as a special circumstance under section 
190.2, subdivision (a)(18).  The prosecution submitted but, on defense counsel’s 
objection, withdrew a first degree murder by torture instruction.  The court did not 
instruct the jury on any torture definition. 
For the conspiracy count, defendant cites no authority holding the trial 
court was required to instruct the jury on the meaning of the word “torture,” as an 
overt act.  “A court has no sua sponte duty to define terms that are commonly 
understood by those familiar with the English language, but it does have a duty to 
define terms that have a technical meaning peculiar to the law.”  (People v. Bland 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 334.)  In the information, the word “torture” was used in its 
commonly understood sense to describe an overt act, not as part of a legal 
definition of conspiracy.  Overt acts are not required to be crimes.  (People v. 
Marquez (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1325-26.)  Because there is no indication 
the word “torture” was being used in a technical legal sense, the trial court had no 
sua sponte duty to define the term in the conspiracy count.   
Even assuming the trial court erred in not instructing on the meaning of the 
word “torture” as an overt act, any error was harmless under any standard.  
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [federal constitutional error 
 
52
assessed under harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard]; People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [state law error assessed under reasonable 
probability standard]; People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, 502-504 
[instructional error subject to harmless error review].)  Substantial evidence 
supported the other nine overt acts, any one of which also supported the jury’s 
guilty verdict on the conspiracy count.  (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 
1128 [jury need not unanimously agree on the same overt act to convict for 
conspiracy].) 
 
2.  First Degree Murder by Torture 
Defendant contends the court should have instructed the jury on the legal 
elements of torture.  But because defendant was not charged with the separate 
crime of torture under section 206, or torture as a special circumstance under 
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), the trial court had no duty to instruct on either.  
Murder by torture is a specified statutory basis for first degree murder.  (§ 189.)  
The information charging defendant with murder did not specify first degree 
murder by torture, but the accusatory pleading need not specify the theory of first 
degree murder on which the prosecution intends to rely.  (See People v. Diaz 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 556-57 [information need not specify first degree murder by 
poison].)  Of course, even though the prosecutor did not charge first degree 
murder by torture, he still might have presented the elements of murder by torture 
to the jury in the course of presenting his case.  But even assuming the prosecutor 
in effect developed a murder by torture theory at trial and even assuming the trial 
court had a duty to instruct on first degree murder by torture, defendant can show 
no possible prejudice from the absence of the instruction.  The jury was instructed 
on two theories supporting a guilty verdict for first degree murder: premeditation 
and felony murder.  The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder as to 
Mary Magoon based on either or both of those theories.  There was no possible 
 
53
prejudice to defendant by the trial court’s failure to provide the jury with a third 
theory for returning a verdict of first degree murder.  Whether the jury accepted or 
rejected this third theory would not have changed the verdict of first degree 
murder it returned based on the other two theories. 
F.  Asserted Errors Arising From Prosecutor’s Late Disclosure of Report 
on Informant Jimenez 
The jury returned its verdicts in the guilt phase on March 7, 1994.  The next 
day, the prosecutor sent defense counsel a copy of a one-page report dated March 
7, 1994 prepared by the prosecutor’s investigator, David Weil, which described 
statements Jimenez had made to Weil on September 22, 1993, when Weil served a 
subpoena on Jimenez.  Weil’s report appeared to undermine the credibility of 
Jimenez as a potential witness because it noted that Jimenez said his statements to 
the police about Alvarado’s admissions in jail could have been untrue because of 
drugs Jimenez was taking at the time.25 As discussed above in part II.C., the trial 
court had excluded Jimenez’s statements from the prosecution’s case-in-chief on 
Aranda and Bruton grounds, but Jimenez’s statements were held admissible for 
impeachment if Alvarado testified.  Neither Alvarado nor Jimenez testified at trial. 
Both defendant and Alvarado filed written motions seeking a new trial and 
other relief.  They complained that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose information 
affecting Jimenez’s credibility violated Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. at 
page 87.  Defendant’s motion included the declaration of his cocounsel, Arturo 
                                              
25 Weil’s report stated in relevant part: “Jimenez said that he did not want to 
testify in this matter because he was afraid.  He went on to say that he does not 
remember most of what he told the officers and that he (Jimenez) was taking 
strong medication at the time he talked to the authorities.  Jimenez made it known 
to me that his statement that was recorded earlier could be misleading or contain 
falsehoods because of the drugs he was taking at the time.”  Jimenez also said “he 
was concerned for his safety and the safety of his family if he was compelled to 
testify.” 
 
54
Herrera, stating that defendant had consistently expressed a desire to testify in his 
own defense, and that Attorney Herrera had advised defendant against testifying 
because Alvarado was not going to testify. 
The trial court granted Alvarado’s motion for a new trial, reasoning that 
Jimenez’s statements to Weil constituted Brady material that the prosecution was 
obligated to disclose to Alvarado, and that the prosecutor’s failure to provide this 
information at a critical stage in the proceedings prevented Alvarado’s counsel 
from providing effective representation on the question of whether to testify.26  
(Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87.)  The trial court denied defendant’s motion in all 
respects. 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new 
trial because the late disclosure of the Weil report violated his right to due process 
under Brady and his right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Defendant claims 
these constitutional violations rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and require 
the court to set aside his verdicts.  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude 
defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated, and the trial court did not err in 
denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.27 
                                              
26 In granting Alvarado’s motion, the trial judge also mentioned that Alvarado’s 
counsel had subpoenaed the sheriff’s office for Jimenez’s psychiatric and medical 
record, but had not received them even though Alvarado’s counsel had a right to 
receive that information. 
27 Defendant’s motion for a new trial was based on the constitutional grounds of 
an asserted Brady violation or violation of the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.  On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial is reviewed 
under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.  (People v. Coffman and Marlow, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 127.)  Its ruling will not be disturbed unless defendant 
establishes “ ‘a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting 
People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 328.)  Here, the asserted abuse of 
discretion is the asserted failure of the trial court to recognize violations of 
defendant’s constitutional rights.  Our constitutional analysis below therefore also 
addresses the abuse of discretion issue. 
 
55
a. Brady v. Maryland 
(1) The Brady Standard 
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held “that the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  (Brady, supra, 373 
U.S. at p. 87.)  The high court has extended the prosecutor’s duty to encompass 
the disclosure of material evidence, even if the defense made no request 
concerning the evidence.  (United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 107.)  The 
duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence.  
(United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 676.)  Such evidence is material 
“only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  “A 
‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  (Id. at p. 682.)  “ ‘[T]he reviewing court may consider directly any 
adverse effect that the prosecutor’s failure to respond may have had on the 
preparation or presentation of the defendant’s case.’ ” (In re Brown (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 873, 887, quoting Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 683.)  Defendant has the 
burden of showing materiality.  (In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545.) 
(2)  Defendant’s Brady Claim 
Defendant essentially asserts the Brady violation that led the court to grant 
Alvarado’s new trial motion had a spillover effect as to him because he and 
Alvarado had a strategic understanding that if one defendant testified, the other 
defendant would also have to testify.  Defendant contends the timely disclosure of 
the Weil report would have led him to testify due to a change in this joint defense 
strategy.   
 
56
As the trial court acknowledged during the hearing on the new trial 
motions, Brady claims typically require showing the different result of the 
proceeding in terms of the verdict, rather than in terms of an intermediate event 
such as a defendant’s testifying.  Defendant essentially ignores the issue of how 
his testimony would have changed the verdict.  If, however, defendant cannot 
establish the materiality of the Weil report even as to the intermediate event of his 
decision whether to testify, then he has failed to establish the verdict would have 
been different.  As discussed below, we conclude defendant has failed to establish 
materiality even as to his decision whether to testify. 
 (3)  Inadmissibility of the Jimenez Statements  
Assuming defendant’s claim is cognizable under Brady, the People pose a 
further threshold issue in observing that evidence inadmissible at trial is 
immaterial under Brady and, therefore, the failure to disclose such inadmissible 
evidence is not a Brady violation.  Defendant concedes that, at the joint trial, 
Alvarado’s purported admissions would have been admissible against Alvarado 
but inadmissible as hearsay against defendant, and that if defendant’s motion for 
severance had been granted, the Jimenez testimony could not have been admitted 
at his single trial for any purpose.  Defendant claims, however, that even though 
the Jimenez testimony was not admissible against defendant individually, his due 
process claim must survive.     
The United States Supreme Court has never announced a bright line rule 
that only admissible evidence is “material” for purposes of a Brady violation.28  
                                              
28 In Wood v. Bartholomew (1995) 516 U.S. 1, 6-7, the United State Supreme 
Court ultimately found inadmissible polygraph evidence not material under Brady.  
However, Wood was not based on a per se rejection of inadmissible evidence as a 
basis for a Brady claim.  Wood found the evidence not material because, even 
based on the assumption that this inadmissible evidence might have led 
respondent’s counsel to conduct additional discovery leading to admissible 
 
57
Some federal and state courts, however, have held that unless the undisclosed 
evidence would have been admissible at trial, it need not have been disclosed 
under Brady.29  Other courts have rejected admissibility as a prerequisite for 
determining Brady’s applicability, as long as the information would have led to 
admissible evidence or been useful to the defense in structuring its case. 30  This 
court has not directly addressed the issue, although we have implied in dicta that 
admissibility might be a prerequisite to materiality.31  In addition, this case 
presents the additional question of what aspect of admissibility is a prerequisite to 
Brady materiality in a joint trial: admissibility at trial generally, or admissibility as 
to the individual defendant making the Brady claim? 
Because the evidence on which defendant bases his Brady claim was 
admissible at the joint trial, for the reasons that follow, we conclude defendant 
may assert a Brady claim, even though the evidence was not admissible against 
him.32  The Brady standard for materiality states the undisclosed evidence is to be 
                                                                                                                                      
 
evidence, the evidence’s influence on the outcome of the case was speculative.  
(Wood v. Bartholomew, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 6.); see also Paradis v. Arave (9th 
Cir. 2001) 240 F.3d 1169, 1178 [“In Bartholomew, the Court did not categorically 
reject the suggestion that inadmissible evidence can be material under Brady, if it 
could have led to the discovery of admissible evidence.”])  
29  See, e.g., Madsen v. Dormire (8th Cir. 1998) 137 F.3d 602, 604 ([inadmissible 
evidence of forensic chemist’s incompetence not material under Brady]); see also 
Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct (2d ed. 2005) § 5:8, and cases collected 
therein. 
30 See, e.g., Paradis v. Arave, supra, 240 F.3d at page 1179 ([prosecutor's notes, 
although not admissible, could have been used to contradict a key medical witness 
and nondisclosure was Brady violation]); see also Gershman, Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, supra, § 5:8, and cases collected therein. 
31 “Materiality, in turn, requires more than a showing that the suppressed 
evidence would have been admissible.” (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
1031, 1043, cf. Wood v. Bartholomew, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 2.) 
32 Thus, we need not and do not reach the issue of whether a Brady claim is 
precluded when the basis of the Brady claim is evidence not admissible at trial. 
 
58
evaluated in terms of how “the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  (United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 682.)  In addition, the 
evidence’s materiality “ ‘must be evaluated in the context of the entire record.’ ” 
(In re Brown, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 887, quoting United States v. Agurs, supra, 
427 U.S. at p. 112.)  In deciding whether asserted Brady evidence is material to 
defendant’s case, it is therefore appropriate to examine the effect of the evidence 
on the actual joint proceeding in which defendant was tried. 
(4) The Joint Defense Strategy 
Even though defendant’s Brady claim is not per se precluded because the 
undisclosed evidence was inadmissible against him individually, its 
inadmissibility highlights the weaknesses in his Brady contention.  As defendant 
concedes, Jimenez’s statements were admissible only as impeachment evidence 
against Alvarado, if Alvarado testified.  For defendant, unlike Alvarado, there was 
no direct causal connection between Jimenez’s statements and the decision 
whether or not to testify.  If Alvarado testified, Jimenez’s statements could have 
impeached him.  But the prosecution could not have impeached defendant with 
Jimenez’s statements, even if Jimenez testified. 
Defendant contends Jimenez’s statements did affect his decision whether to 
testify because the potential prejudicial impact of the statements on the jury caused 
him to adopt a joint defense strategy with Alvarado, to the effect that either both or 
neither of them would testify.  During the hearings on the motions for a new trial, 
defense counsel extensively discussed the reasoning behind this joint defense 
strategy, which defendant summarizes and adopts on appeal.  If the jury heard 
Jimenez’s statements, their impact would be prejudicial not merely on Alvarado 
but on defendant as well.  Defendant was free to testify without causing Jimenez’s 
statements to be admitted, but if he testified, he presumably would say something 
exculpatory about his participation in the crime.  Then more blame might be 
 
59
placed on Alvarado, so Alvarado would feel compelled to testify.  Defendant’s and 
Alvarado’s defense counsel believed there was no fair way to have only one story 
presented.  Thus, the codefendants had agreed on a both-or-neither approach to 
testifying. 
(5) Impact of the Joint Defense Strategy 
Defendant alternatively refers to his understanding with Alvarado on 
testifying at trial as an agreement and as a trial strategy.  To the extent that the 
defendant implies the existence of a binding agreement, the argument fails.  He 
fails to establish that he formed a binding agreement with Alvarado either by 
contract or detrimental reliance.33  The trial court made no findings establishing 
the existence of a joint defense agreement.  To the extent defendant’s argument for 
materiality depends on the existence of a binding agreement, defendant has 
therefore failed to establish one. 
In the alternative, defendant describes his agreement with Alvarado as a 
trial strategy that each codefendant adopted, based on their shared interest in 
keeping Jimenez’s statements away from the jury.34  Defendant claims that if the 
prosecution had timely disclosed the Weil report, it would have changed the joint 
defense strategy because the information revealed in the report would have 
undercut Jimenez’s credibility.  He reasons, therefore, that neither he nor Alvarado 
                                              
33 The only factual evidence presented during the new trial motions was the 
declaration of defendant’s trial attorney, Arturo Herrera.  His declaration describes 
defendant’s desire to testify and counsel’s advice to defendant that, because 
Alvarado was not going to testify, then neither should he.  But this declaration 
does not assert (let alone establish) the existence of a binding agreement. 
34 Defendant also briefly mentions his trial counsel’s argument that because 
defendant and Alvarado are brothers-in-law, the codefendants adopted the “both or 
neither” testifying strategy, at least in part, out of their sense of familial loyalty. 
Assuming defendant also raises this argument on appeal, he presents no authority 
that familial loyalty can establish materiality under Brady.  
 
60
would have been deterred from testifying because they feared the effect of 
Jimenez’s statements on the jury. 
Defendant implies the above trial considerations necessitated his adoption 
of the agreement with Alvarado and corresponding trial strategy.  But this strategy 
was not compelled by necessity, legal or otherwise.  Even assuming both 
codefendants wished to keep Jimenez’s statements from the jury, defendant’s 
testifying would not necessarily have caused Alvarado to testify.  Alvarado’s 
testifying in response to Jimenez’s statements would have been contingent on the 
nature of defendant’s testimony.  If defendant’s testimony painted Alvarado in a 
particularly bad light, Alvarado might have testified, in order to shift the blame to 
defendant. 
It was also possible, however, that Alvarado would not have testified.  
Before testifying, Alvarado would have considered the consequences of his 
testimony:  leaving defendant’s testimony unrebutted, or taking the stand and risk 
having the jury hear Jimenez’s statements.  Alvarado could not make that 
calculation prior to hearing defendant’s actual testimony.  Neither could defendant 
know with any certainty in advance what Alvarado would do.  There was no 
necessary connection between defendant’s testifying and Alvarado’s testifying.   
In observing that defendant has not shown the legal necessity of the 
purported joint defense strategy, we do not hold defendant is required to show 
legal necessity in order to establish his Brady claim.35  Nor do we deny defendant 
presents reasonable strategic considerations that may possibly have been factors in 
his decision whether or not to testify.  But codefendants in many joint trials face 
difficult tactical choices in deciding how to proceed where multiple considerations 
                                              
35 Alternatively, we need not and do not reach the issue of whether a showing of 
legal necessity would be sufficient to establish a Brady claim under these 
circumstances. 
 
61
are involved.  Defendant has shown only the possibility that his decision not to 
testify was a result of strategic considerations made in connection with Jimenez’s 
statements.  In other words, defendant has shown only the possibility that he 
would have testified had the Weil report been timely produced.  To establish 
materiality under Brady, defendant must do more than establish a possible 
relationship between the Weil report and a different result; he must establish a 
reasonable probability of a different result.  “The mere possibility that an item of 
undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the 
outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.”  
(United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at pp. 109-110.)   Ultimately, defendant’s 
contention that the timely disclosure of the Weil report would have resulted in his 
testifying is based on speculation and fails to establish materiality under Brady.  
(Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 87; Wood v. Bartholomew, supra, 516 at p. 6.)   
The People raise the related point that considerations entirely independent 
of Jimenez’s statements caused defendant not to testify, regardless of whether the 
prosecution had disclosed the Weil report.  The People point out that if defendant 
testified, he could have been subject to impeachment by his own prior statements 
to the police, and his admissions to jailhouse informant Jorge Flores. 
In response, defendant attempts to discredit the possible influence of these 
other impeachment sources.  Defendant claims his statements to the police were 
not preceded by any Miranda warning, were far from a confession, and might 
have been excluded in any case as being involuntary.  It is true that the People 
have not shown conclusively that these other impeachment factors independently 
determined defendant’s decision not to testify.  But neither has defendant 
conclusively shown these factors could not have done so.  The highly speculative 
nature of any analysis here further supports our conclusion that defendant has 
failed to establish materiality under Brady. 
 
62
b.  Asserted Violation of Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
In the alternative, defendant asserts that regardless of whether the timely 
disclosure of the Weil report would have caused him to testify, its late disclosure 
was prejudicial because it violated his right to receive meaningful guidance from 
his counsel on whether or not to testify on his own behalf.  Defendant relies on 
cases based on the deficient performance of counsel, such as Wiggins v. Smith 
(2003) 539 U.S. 510, which appear inapplicable to the facts of this case.  Wiggins 
addressed whether counsel fulfilled his duty to “ ‘make reasonable 
investigations’ ” into defendant’s background so that counsel could make a 
reasonable decision as to what to offer in mitigation at the penalty phase.  (Id. at p. 
522.)  Defendant does not argue that his trial counsel was deficient because he 
failed to uncover the Jimenez impeachment evidence.  Thus, in contrast to 
Wiggins, there is no issue of trial counsel’s not becoming aware of relevant 
evidence through counsel’s failure to conduct a reasonable investigation.  
Defendant also contends he was in the same situation as Alvarado in regard 
to the untimely disclosure of the Weil report and consequently he suffered the 
same interference with his right to receive meaningful guidance from counsel on 
the issue of whether to testify.   But defendant was not in the same situation as 
Alvarado in relation to the Weil report.  As discussed above, Alvarado and 
defendant stood in different relationships to the Jimenez statements.  If Alvarado 
testified, he faced impeachment with Jimenez’s statements.  Defendant, in 
contrast, could testify without being subject to impeachment.  Defendant attempts 
to negate this fundamental difference by claiming that a joint defense strategy 
committed both codefendants to the same course of action in testifying—that is, 
either both would testify, or neither would.  But, as discussed above, defendant has 
failed to establish a material connection between Jimenez’s statements and 
defendant’s decision to testify.  Because there was no material connection, we find 
 
63
no interference with defendant’s right to counsel based on the late disclosure of 
the Weil report. 
 
c.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct  
Defendant contends his convictions and sentence should be set aside 
because the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he deliberately withheld 
Weil’s report, which rendered the trial fundamentally unfair under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  In addition, defendant contends the 
trial court erred in finding the prosecutor did not intentionally keep the Weil report 
secret until after the jury returned the guilty verdict. 
“A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal 
Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the 
conviction a denial of due process.  Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a 
criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law 
only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to 
persuade either the trial court or the jury.”  (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 
34, 44.)   As discussed above, because there was no material connection between 
the Weil report and defendant’s decision whether or not to testify, we rejected his 
claims that the late disclosure of the Weil report violated his constitutional right to 
due process under Brady or his right to the effective assistance of counsel.  This 
same lack of material connection likewise causes us to reject his claim that the late 
disclosure of the Weil report made his trial fundamentally unfair.  As to whether 
the prosecutor violated state law by using deceptive or reprehensible methods, we 
reject that claim based on the trial court’s finding, not contradicted in the record, 
that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose was unintentional.36 
                                              
36 Prosecutorial misconduct does not require a showing of bad faith.  (People v. 
Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 822, 829.)  Thus, in a typical claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct involving a prosecutor’s presentation to the court or jury, there is no 
 
64
In describing the circumstances surrounding the late disclosed Weil report, 
the prosecutor stated that, in September of 1993, after serving the subpoena on 
Jimenez, Weil told him the following:  Jimenez did not want to be a witness; he 
was scared of what might happen to him or his family; and he might forget what 
he said or didn’t really remember what was said.  The prosecutor could not recall 
if he directed Weil to prepare a report in September of 1993, but he believed a 
report would be prepared.  When the prosecutor was reviewing documents in 
preparation for the penalty phase, he became aware that no such report had been 
prepared.  The prosecutor then directed Weil to prepare a report and had it 
delivered to defense counsel.  The court made findings in connection with the 
codefendants’ motions for a new trial.  It concluded the prosecutor clearly had 
been negligent in failing to produce the information in the Weil report in a timely 
manner, but also found the prosecutor had not intentionally kept the Weil report 
secret until after the jury returned the verdicts.   
Defendant contends the court was unreasonable in concluding that the 
untimely disclosure was not intentional because there were several motions filed 
and hearings held regarding Jimenez’s statements after the time in which the 
prosecutor became aware of the statements.  Defendant claims the prosecutor 
could not have believed defense counsel was already aware of Jimenez’s 
statements to Weil.  Defendant contends it was inconceivable that defense counsel 
would not have mentioned a “recantation” by Jimenez because such a recantation 
                                                                                                                                      
 
need to address the prosecutor’s intent.  But in the context of the prosecutorial 
misconduct claimed here, the only way the actions of the prosecutor can be shown 
to be deceptive or reprehensible is if the prosecutor had intentionally withheld the 
Weil report for strategic advantage.  In the absence of claims for intentional 
misconduct, defendant would merely be repeating his Brady claim, since 
nondisclosure under Brady does not require a showing of the moral culpability or 
the willfulness of the prosecutor.  (United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 
110.) 
 
65
would have rendered the Aranda/Bruton hearings on Jimenez’s testimony 
unnecessary.37 
The record does not support defendant’s claim.  It appears the trial court’s 
conclusion was consistent with the prosecutor’s statement that when the 
prosecutor heard Weil’s account of Weil’s conversation with Jimenez in 
September of 1993, he understood Jimenez’s comments to Weil to be an attempt 
to get out of testifying because he was unwilling or scared to testify.  The 
prosecutor stated that it was not until after he read the version of the conversation 
in Weil’s March 1994 report, that he was aware of Jimenez’s comments that his 
prior statement to police might be misleading or contain falsehoods due to the 
drugs he was taking at that time.  The prosecutor’s understanding of Jimenez’s 
comments to Weil as an attempt to get out of testifying, rather than as a 
“recantation,” is consistent with the prosecutor’s apparent lack of surprise that 
Jimenez’s comments to Weil were not mentioned during the Aranda/Bruton 
hearings addressing Jimenez’s statements. 
 
V.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A.  Asserted Violations of International Law 
Defendant contends that his trial and sentence of death are in violation of 
customary international law under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Declaration of 
                                              
37 Defendant also claims that the prosecutor must surely have also been aware of 
the Los Angeles Grand Jury investigation concerning jail house informants, which 
had surfaced with much publicity not long before this trial, and that, consequently, 
the prosecutor should have been on notice that the testimony of a jailhouse 
informant like Jimenez was likely false.  This argument is based on facts not 
contained in the record.  But even assuming the prosecutor was aware of the grand 
jury investigation, this would add little to defendant’s main argument, which is 
that the prosecutor had actual knowledge of the unreliability of Jimenez because 
the prosecutor knew that Jimenez had admitted it to Weil in September of 1993. 
 
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the Rights and Duties of Man, and the International Convention Against All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination.  But as discussed above, defendant has failed to establish 
that any aspect of his trial or penalty determination involved violations of state or 
federal constitutional law.  Therefore, we need not consider whether a violation of 
state or federal constitutional law would also violate international law.  (People v. 
Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 511.)  Had defendant shown prejudicial error 
under domestic law, we would have set aside the judgment on that basis without 
recourse to international law.  (Ibid.)  As to whether California’s death penalty 
generally violates international law, we have previously held, as defendant 
concedes, that international law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in 
accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.  (Ibid; 
People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 533-534.)  
B.  Miscellaneous Constitutional Challenges to the Death Penalty 
Defendant attacks the constitutionality of California’s death penalty statute 
on numerous grounds.  We reaffirm the decisions that have rejected similar claims 
and decline to reconsider such authorities, as follows: 
That certain noncapital sentencing proceedings may require jury unanimity 
or proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean the death penalty statute 
violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  (People v. 
Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 893 (Rogers); Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 754; 
People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 571-572.)  “The death penalty law is not 
unconstitutional for failing to impose a burden of proof—whether beyond a 
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence—as to the existence of 
aggravating circumstances, the greater weight of aggravating circumstances over 
mitigating circumstances, or the appropriateness of a death sentence.”  (Lewis and 
Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1066, citing People v. Brown, (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
382, 401.)  Indeed, the trial court need not and should not instruct the jury as to 
 
67
any burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase.  (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th 
at p. 893; Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753.) 
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require that a jury 
unanimously find the existence of aggravating factors or that it make written 
findings regarding aggravating factors.  (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 893; Blair, 
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753.)  In addition, the United States Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee (United States v. 
Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 961;  Ring v. 
Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584;  Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466) have 
not changed our prior conclusions regarding burden of proof or jury unanimity at 
the penalty phase. (Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1066; Rogers, supra, 
39 Cal.4th at 893.)  
Section 190.2—setting out the special circumstances that, if found true, 
render a defendant eligible for the death penalty—adequately narrows the category 
of death-eligible defendants in conformity with the requirements of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 892; Blair, supra, 36 
Cal.4th at p. 752; 893; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1179.) 
Section 190.3, factor (a)—which permits consideration of the 
“circumstances of the crime” as an aggravating factor—is not impermissibly 
vague and provides adequate guidance to a jury in sentencing. (People v. Prieto 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 276 (Prieto); People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 394.) 
There is no requirement under the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment, the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, 
or the due process or equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment 
that a jury find the existence of unadjudicated criminal activity under section 
190.3, factor (b), unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Rogers, supra, 39 
Cal.4th at 894; Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753.)  
 
68
The use of restrictive adjectives—i.e., “extreme” and “substantial”—in the 
list of mitigating factors in section 190.3 does not act unconstitutionally as a 
barrier to the consideration of mitigation.  (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 
310, 365; Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402; Prieto, supra, 30 Cal. 4th at p. 276.) 
Intercase proportionality review is not required by the due process, equal 
protection, fair trial, or cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the federal 
Constitution.  (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 894; Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 
753.) 
Capital punishment per se does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.  (People v. Moon (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 1, 47; People v. Staten (2000) 24 cal.4th 434, 462.)  We have recently 
rejected the argument that we should reconsider our position in light of the 
abolition of the death penalty by the nations of Western Europe, and the United 
States Supreme Court’s ruling in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304 that the  
execution of mentally retarded persons constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  
(Moon, supra, 37 Cal. 4th at pp. 47-48.)38  
 
VI.  CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Defendant requests that we consider the cumulative effect of any errors in 
the pretrial stage, guilt phase, or penalty phase in deciding whether to reverse 
                                              
38 Without providing further argument, defendant also contends that asserted 
errors in the following guilt phase rulings also had prejudicial impact on the 
penalty phase: denial of severance motion, rulings on the admissibility of evidence 
of Mary Magoon’s alleged propensity for violence and use of firearms, lack of 
instruction on the elements of torture, admission of the testimony of prosecution’s 
blood spatter expert witness, and admission of crime scene and autopsy photos.  
Because we discern no error in any area of the guilt phase, we reject defendant’s 
claims of any prejudicial effect in the penalty phase arising from these or any other 
guilt phase rulings. 
 
69
defendant’s convictions and death sentence.  Because we conclude there were no 
individual errors of any kind, we reject defendant’s claim that any cumulative 
effect warrants reversal. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Hoyos 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S041008 
Date Filed: July 23, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Charles R. Hayes 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael Snedeker and Lisa R. Short, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Meagan J. Beale and Anthony Da Silva, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael Snedeker 
Snedeker, Smith & Short 
4110 SE Hawthorne Boulevard 
Portland, OR  97214-5246 
(503) 232-3584 
 
Anthony Da Silva 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2608