Title: TRABING v. KINKO'S INC.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TRABING v. KINKO'S INC.2002 WY 17157 P.3d 1248Case Number: 02-3Decided: 11/22/2002
October Term, A.D. 2002

 
 

 

 

KATHLEEN 
TRABING,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff) 
,

 

v.

 

KINKO'S, 
INC.,

 

Appellee(Defendant) 
.

 

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
B. "Jack" Speight and Amanda Hunkins of Speight, McCue & Associates, P.C., 
Cheyenne, WY.  Argument by Ms. 
Hunkins.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Gary 
R. Scott of Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Scott.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant 
Kathleen Trabing appeals the district court's order of summary judgment, which 
disposed of her claims for breach of implied-in-fact contract, promissory 
estoppel, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Trabing offers 
the following issues for our analysis:

 

A.  Do 
genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude summary judgment in favor 
of Kinko's on the issue of whether an implied-in-fact contract existed by virtue 
of the Kinko's Co-worker Handbook?

 

1.  Does 
the Employment Agreement executed on the day Trabing began work for Kinko's fail 
for lack of consideration as it pertains to provisions negating its Co-worker 
Handbook's promises of job security?

 

2.  Is 
it bad public policy to allow employers to escape contractual liability for 
handbook provisions by simply distributing employee handbooks prior to date 
employee commences working?

 

B.  Do 
genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Trabing's alleged "actual 
knowledge" of the at-will provisions of the Handbook as it pertains to her 
be[ing] "sufficiently informed" that her employment was 
at-will?

 

C.  Do 
genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Kinko's course of conduct with 
respect to its emphasis on "Positive Discipline" as a mandatory process such 
that it negated its Co-worker Handbook disclaimer and moreover the presumption 
of at-will employment?

 

D.  Do 
genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Kinko's "Positive 
Discipline" process and course of dealing constituted specific promises to 
Trabing upon which she detrimentally relied?

 

E.  Do 
genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether a special relationship 
existed between Trabing and Kinko's and also as to whether Kinko's then breached 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating Trabing's 
employment based on a few disgruntled employees' comments?

 

F.  Do 
genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Trabing suffered severe 
emotional distress when Kinko's terminated her solely on the basis of her 
employees' anonymous and unsubstantiated comments during a time in which she was 
grieving over the recent loss of her mother?

 

Appellee 
Kinko's states its issue as follows:

 

Was 
summary judgment properly granted by the District Court upon Appellant Trabing's 
claims for breach of implied in fact contract; promissory estoppel; breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Trabing began 
working for Kinko's as a branch manager of the Laramie, Wyoming store on 
December 21, 1992.  She signed an 
Employment Agreement on that date, which provided in part:

 

Kinko's 
and the co-worker understand that the co-worker is employed at will, which means 
that the co-worker or Kinko's may terminate the employment at any time, with or 
without cause and with or without advance notice.

 

A 
few days earlier, either on December 18 or 19, 1992, it is unclear what the 
handwritten numeral is, Trabing signed a Co-Worker Agreement, in which she 
acknowledged that she had received the Co-Worker Handbook.  The handbook outlined Kinko's policies 
and procedures, which included the company's positive discipline system.  The handbook also contained an 
employment-at-will provision.  

 

[¶5]      During the nearly 
eight years that Trabing was employed by Kinko's, she received several 
"above-standard" performance evaluations.  
In 1998, however, the store's sales revenues began to decline, and 
Trabing experienced difficulties maintaining good working relationships with her 
subordinates.  Her Management 
Effectiveness Survey (MES) scores, which are anonymous evaluations the manager's 
staff completes regarding the manager's capabilities and management style, got 
consistently worse.  The surveys 
also contained numerous critical comments regarding the way Trabing performed 
her job and treated her employees.  
Trabing admits that she was having difficulties during this time, but 
attributes her problems in part to the fact that her mother was fighting and 
ultimately lost a long battle with cancer.  

 

[¶6]      Concerned about 
Trabing's recent low MES score, Trabing's regional manager and a Kinko's human 
resources specialist traveled to the Laramie store.  They placed Trabing on decision-making 
leave, during which time Trabing was instructed to devise a plan for improving 
her performance.  During those three 
days, Trabing made various attempts to contact her regional manager for 
assistance in drafting her plan.  
When she finally got in touch with him, he advised Trabing that he could 
not discuss the situation with her.  
At the conclusion of the three-day period, the three met again.  Trabing had not drafted a plan for 
improvement, and she was terminated at that time.  

 

[¶7]      Trabing filed 
suit, asserting claims for breach of implied-in-fact contract, promissory 
estoppel, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  
Kinko's moved for summary judgment.  
The district court granted Kinko's motion, and this appeal followed.  

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  Eklund v. PRI Environmental, 
Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶10, 25 P.3d 511, ¶10 (Wyo. 2001); see also 
W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine issue of 
material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the 
effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action 
or defense that has been asserted by the parties.  Williams Gas Processing-Wamsutter Co. 
v. Union Pacific Resources Co., 2001 WY 57, ¶11, 25 P.3d 1064, ¶11 (Wyo. 
2001).  We examine the record from 
the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we 
give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn 
from the record.  Id.  We evaluate the propriety of a summary 
judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were 
employed and used by the lower court.  
Scherer Constr., LLC v. Hedquist Constr., Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶15, 
18 P.3d 645, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001).  We do 
not accord any deference to the district court's decisions on issues of 
law.  
Id.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.  Implied-In-Fact 
Contract

 

[¶9]      Trabing first 
contends that summary judgment was inappropriately granted to Kinko's because 
genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether an implied-in-fact 
contract had been formed by virtue of Kinko's Co-Worker Handbook.  She maintains that the Co-Worker 
Handbook created an implied-in-fact contract whereby termination could occur 
only for cause and only by following the positive discipline process.  Kinko's insists that an implied-in-fact 
contract did not exist because Trabing signed an express, written employment 
agreement when she began her employment on December 21, 1992.  

 

[¶10]   In Wyoming, employment is presumed 
to be at will.  Worley v. Wyoming 
Bottling Co., Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 620 (Wyo. 2000); Bear v. Volunteers of 
America, Wyoming, Inc., 964 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Wyo. 1998).  This presumption may, however, be 
modified by either an express or implied-in-fact contract.  Id.  

 

The 
contract of employment is created by either an express contract or a contract 
implied in fact.  Express contracts 
are ones in which the terms are declared by the parties either in writing or 
orally at the time the contract is formed. . . .

 

            
The implied in fact contract of employment arises from a mutual agreement 
and intent to promise which is found in the acts or conduct of the party sought 
to be bound.  Contracts of 
employment which are found from employee handbooks or policies are implied in 
fact contracts.  Both express and 
implied in fact contracts of employment are enforceable to the same degree.  

 

Wilder 
v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 
868 P.2d 211, 216-17 (Wyo. 1994) (citations omitted). 

 

[¶11]   On December 18 or 19, 1992, two or 
three days before she began work, Trabing received a copy of the employee 
handbook.  The provisions of the 
handbook implied cause was required for termination.  Although the handbook contains 
provisions stating it is not intended to create a contract and employment is at 
will, Kinko's concedes these disclaimers are not sufficiently conspicuous.  Absent any other writings or 
representations prior to beginning employment, a question of fact would exist as 
to whether the handbook creates an implied contract altering the presumption of 
at-will employment and requiring cause for termination.  However, on December 21, 1992, the day 
she began work, Trabing was given a copy of the employment agreement which 
provided as follows:

 

            
Kinko's and the co-worker understand that the co-worker is employed 
at-will, which means that the co-worker or Kinko's may terminate the employment 
at any time, with or without cause and with or without advance notice. 
. . .

 

. . .

 

            
I understand that this agreement constitutes the full and extent of the 
agreement between myself and Kinko's regarding the terms of my employment.  I understand that Kinko's will not be 
bound by any oral statements or promises that are inconsistent with this 
agreement and this agreement can only be modified or amended in writing by an 
authorized representative of the Company.

 

[¶12]   Trabing signed the agreement, 
acknowledging that:

 

            
I have read and understand this Employment Agreement and agree to the 
terms and conditions contained herein.  
I understand that this agreement supercedes all previous agreements and 
that the company may change, rescind or cancel this agreement at any time, in 
its sole and absolute discretion.  I 
further acknowledge that this Agreement has not been executed in reliance upon 
any representation or promise except those contained herein and that Kinko's has 
made no guarantee regarding my employment for a specified period of 
time.

 

[¶13]   Parties to a contract are presumed 
to have knowledge of the terms of the contract and its effects.  First State Bank v. American Nat'l 
Bank, 808 P.2d 804, 806 (Wyo. 1991).  
When parties sign an express contract, the terms within that signed 
writing control.  Generally, an 
implied contract may not be found if there exists an express contract between 
the same parties on the same subject matter.  42 C.J.S., Implied Contracts, § 
34 (1991).  When these principles 
are applied, the express agreement supercedes any implied contract which 
otherwise may have existed by virtue of the employee handbook. 

 

[¶14]   Trabing claims that the Co-Worker 
Handbook that she was given on December 18 or 19, 1992, and asked to review and 
sign supercedes the Employment Agreement that she signed on the day she began 
working for the company on December 21, 1992, and that the Employment Agreement 
fails for lack of consideration.  
She cites Brodie v. General Chemical Corp., 934 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 
1997) in support of her claim.  
Trabing's reliance on Brodie is misplaced.

 

[¶15]   In Brodie, the employee 
began work governed by a handbook containing promises implying job 
security.  Some time later in the 
course of his employment, the employer attempted to revoke the handbook to 
restore at-will status.  The 
question presented was whether additional consideration was required when an 
employer modifies an implied job security provision to restore at-will 
status.  Under the facts presented, 
the court answered the question in the affirmative.  However, in determining whether there 
was sufficient consideration to support the revocation as it occurred in that 
case, the court expressly distinguished representations made after employment 
begins from those made at the time employment begins.  The court said:

 

            
Our analysis today assumes that the representations are made after 
employment has begun and is, therefore, a modification.  A different situation is presented 
when the representation is made at the time that employment begins.  In that case, the 
representation, if enforceable, is a term of the implied 
employment contract along with the other usual terms specifying pay, 
benefits, working hours, and job responsibilities under the rule that a 
single consideration can support several promises.

 

Brodie, 
at 1265 n.1 (citation omitted; emphasis added).

 

[¶16]   In the present case, unlike 
Brodie, the representation made in the express agreement that Trabing's 
employment was at will was not made after employment had begun but rather at the 
time employment began.  Under 
Brodie, therefore, it is not a modification requiring separate 
consideration; rather, it is a term of the employment relationship along with 
all the other terms and is supported by the same consideration.  Contrary to Trabing's argument, 
therefore, the employment agreement does not fail for lack of sufficient 
consideration.

 

[¶17]   In Wyoming, employment is presumed 
to be at will.  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 620; Bear, 964 P.2d  at 1250.  The handbook provided to Trabing two to 
three days before she began her employment stated it was not intended to be a 
contract, the employer reserved the right to change or revise the policies at 
any time, employment was at will, and employment could be terminated at any time 
with or without cause and with or without advance notice.  That these provisions alone may not be 
sufficiently conspicuous under Wyoming law to preserve Trabing's at-will status 
does not end the discussion in this case.  
The day Trabing began her employment, she signed a co-worker agreement 
which further provided that the employer could unilaterally change the policies 
at any time and terminate the employment relationship at any time with or 
without cause or notice.  That same 
day, Trabing received and signed a copy of the employment agreement, 
acknowledging she had read and understood it, which reiterated that her 
employment was at will.

 

[¶18]   These employment documents were 
given to Trabing in the same time frame, separated only by a couple of days, 
before she began work, making them in essence part of one transaction.  Moreover, the express agreement 
accomplished what a conspicuous disclaimer appearing in the handbook itself 
would have accomplishedit informed Trabing she was employed at will, Kinko's 
could terminate her employment at any time with or without notice or cause, it 
constituted the full agreement between herself and Kinko's, Kinko's was not 
bound by any inconsistent agreement or representations, and it superceded any 
previous agreements.  Any ambiguity 
created by the absence of a conspicuous disclaimer in the handbook was resolved 
upon issuance of the employment agreement to Trabing when she began work on 
December 21, 1992.

 

[¶19]   Trabing claims that by emphasizing 
the positive discipline procedures, Kinko's course of conduct negated the 
at-will employment.  We 
disagree.  The express Employment 
Agreement provided that Kinko's would not be bound by any oral statements or 
promises that were inconsistent with the agreement and further that the 
agreement could only be modified in writing by an authorized representative of 
Kinko's.  Given this term, any 
course of conduct that occurred subsequent to the execution of the Employment 
Agreement could not have been reasonably relied upon or interpreted as a 
modification of the contract by Trabing.  

 

[¶20]   We find that Trabing and Kinko's 
entered into an express, written employment contract on December 21, 1992.  When the language in a written contract 
is unambiguous, the intention of the parties shall be ascertained from the plain 
language of the contract.  Busch 
Dev., Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 645 P.2d 65, 71 (Wyo. 1982).  The interpretation of an unambiguous 
contract is a question of law for the court and may properly be disposed of by 
summary judgment.  Sowerwine v. 
Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 1020 (Wyo. 2000).  The unambiguous terms of the Employment 
Agreement provided that Trabing's employment was at will. We hold that the 
district court's decision to enforce that provision by way of summary judgment 
was appropriate. 

 

B.  Promissory Estoppel

 

[¶21] 
  Trabing contends that the positive 
discipline procedure outlined in the Co-Worker Handbook constituted a promise 
that Trabing would be terminated only for cause and only after the positive 
discipline procedures had been complied with.   Kinko's counters that a promissory 
estoppel claim requires that the party invoking the doctrine have acted 
reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise that was allegedly made.  

 

[¶22]   In Worley v. Wyoming Bottling 
Co., Inc.,1 P.3d  at 623, this court explained the remedy of promissory 
estoppel and outlined the required elements of a promissory estoppel 
claim:

 

Promissory 
estoppel provides relief for an "injury arising from actions or declarations 
which have been acted on in good faith and which would be inequitable to permit 
a party to retract."  Davis v. 
Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 347-48 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Jankovsky v. Halladay 
Motors, 482 P.2d 129, 132 (Wyo. 1971)).  In the employment context, promissory 
estoppel works to prevent injustice to employees who in good faith detrimentally 
rely upon an employer's actions, in turn binding the employer to fulfill a 
promise to an employee despite the lack of an employment contract.  Promissory estoppel may be useful when, 
because of lack of consideration, an employee is unable to bring a breach of 
contract claim.  As long as a 
promise is present, promissory estoppel can be used to satisfy the consideration 
element.  Terry v. Pioneer Press, 
Inc., 947 P.2d  at 277 (citing 1 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Employee Dismissal 
Law And Practice § 4.39 (3d ed. 1992)).

 

            
Promissory estoppel is detailed in the Restatement, Second, Contracts § 
90(1) (1981), which we recently quoted:

 

            
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce 
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise.  The 
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.  

 

Bouwens 
v. Centrilift, 
974 P.2d  at 947; Michie v. Board of Trustees of Carbon County School Dist. 
No. 1, 847 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Wyo. 1993).  The required elements of a promissory 
estoppel claim are:  the existence 
of a clear and definite agreement; proof that the party urging the doctrine 
acted to its detriment in reasonable reliance on the agreement; and the equities 
support the enforcement of the agreement.  
Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 710; Michie, 847 P.2d  at 
1009.

 

This 
court has held that a conspicuous disclaimer that indicates at-will employment 
defeats a promissory estoppel claim because such a disclaimer makes it 
unreasonable for an employee to rely on any subsequent understanding that her 
employment would be anything other than at will.  Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo. 1996).  

 

[¶23]   Although Trabing asserts that the 
disclaimer in the Co-Worker Handbook was not conspicuous, we do not address this 
claim because the evidence in this case demonstrates that Trabing routinely read 
the at-will provision to new employees, and she, therefore, had actual knowledge 
of the at-will policy whether it was conspicuous or not.  Furthermore, Trabing is deemed by 
contract law to have knowledge of the terms included in the Employment Agreement 
that she signed.  Her contract 
contained both the at-will provision and the provision that explained that 
Kinko's would not be obligated by any oral statements or promises that were 
inconsistent with the Employment Agreement.  We hold, therefore, that Trabing could 
not have reasonably relied upon any statements or practices that indicated that 
she was anything other than an at-will employee and that Kinko's was entitled to 
a summary judgment on this issue.

 

C.  Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing

 

[¶24]   Trabing next asserts that her eight 
years of dedicated service to Kinko's along with the separate consideration of 
her dedication to outstanding customer service that went above and beyond the 
call of duty created a special relationship of trust and reliance between 
herself and Kinko's and that Kinko's breached its duty to act in good faith and 
fair dealing when it terminated her employment.  Kinko's replies that Trabing has failed 
to establish the requisite special relationship of trust and reliance for her 
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.  

 

[¶25]   Kinko's is correct in its assertion 
that a special relationship of trust and reliance must be demonstrated before an 
employee can recover on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
claim.  VanLente v. University of 
Wyoming Research Corp., 975 P.2d 594, 598 (Wyo. 1999).  Previous Wyoming cases have indicated 
the type of factors that will give rise to a special relationship:  separate consideration, common law, 
statutory rights, or the existence of rights accruing with longevity of 
service.  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 
624.

 

[¶26]   With regard to longevity of 
service, this court has stated that the mere longevity of service is not 
sufficient to create the special relationship leading to tort remedy.  VanLente, 975 P.2d  at 598.  "Usually, the special relationship 
. . . stems from a long term employment relationship coupled with a 
discharge calculated to avoid employer responsibilities to the employee, e.g., 
benefits or commissions."  Garcia 
v. UniWyo Federal Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 646 (Wyo. 1996).  Trabing does not allege, nor does the 
evidence suggest, that Kinko's terminated her employment in order to avoid 
giving her any benefits that she earned during her employment.  We, therefore, are not moved to find 
that Trabing's eight years of service to Kinko's created the special 
relationship necessary to sustain this type of claim.

 

[¶27]   Trabing's assertion that her 
dedication to outstanding customer service constitutes additional consideration 
also fails to establish the special relationship requirement.  Being dedicated to outstanding customer 
service was simply a part of her job as branch manager.  Kinko's company policy states:  "Our primary objective is to take care 
of our customer."  To establish 
separate consideration, Trabing would have to show that she provided something 
other than "merely performing the duties of the job."  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 626.  Indeed, this court has specifically 
stated that "[l]ongevity, coupled with performance of job duties, is not 
sufficient to structure the special relationship required by Wilder." 
 VanLente, 975 P.2d  at 
598.  We hold that the facts of this 
case do not create a special relationship of trust and confidence necessary for 
Trabing to pursue a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing claim.  Kinko's was, 
therefore, entitled to a summary judgment on this issue.

 

D.  Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress

 

[¶28]   Trabing finally alleges that 
Kinko's termination of her employment based solely on the basis of her 
employees' anonymous and unsubstantiated comments during a time in which she was 
grieving over the recent loss of her mother caused her severe emotional 
distress.  Kinko's responds that it 
was simply exercising its legal rights when it terminated Trabing's employment. 

 

[¶29]   Wyoming has acknowledged that 
certain conduct in employment situations may be outrageous enough to provide the 
terminated employee with a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  Worley, 1 P.3d  at 
628.  We have adopted the tort as it 
is defined in the Restatement, Second, Torts § 46(1) 
(1965):

 

One 
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional 
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily 
harm.

 

Worley, 
1 P.3d  at 628.  However, if an 
employee's mental distress is caused solely by a termination that was permitted 
by the contract, then the employer has a complete defense even if the employer 
knows that the termination will cause the employee emotional distress.  Terry v. Pioneer Press, Inc., 947 P.2d 273, 278 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶30]   In light of our holding that 
Trabing's employment with Kinko's was at will, we find that Kinko's did nothing 
more than act within its legal rights when it terminated Trabing's 
employment.  Accordingly, Kinko's 
has a complete defense to this claim, and summary judgment was 
appropriate.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶31]   We hold that there does not exist 
any genuine issues of material fact and that Kinko's was entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law.1  We, therefore, affirm the district 
court's order of summary judgment.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Trabing 
presented many issues for our review in this appeal.  Our decisions on several of her issues 
made others moot; and we, therefore, did not address them.