Title: Tennessee Coal & Iron Div., US Steel Corp. v. Hubbert

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

110 So. 2d 260 (1959)
TENNESSEE COAL & IRON DIVISION, UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION
v.
Margaret HUBBERT.
6 Div. 198.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 19, 1959.
*261 Burr McKamy, Moore & Thomas, Birmingham, for appellant.
Cooper, Mitch & Black, Birmingham, for appellee.
GOODWYN, Justice.
This is a workmen's compensation case tried in the circuit court of Jefferson County and brought here by certiorari.
On October 29, 1954, Richard Hubbert, the husband of plaintiff in this proceeding, entered into a workmen's compensation settlement agreement with his employer, petitioner herein, pursuant to the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Law as it then existed, Code 1940, Tit. 26, §§ 253-325, as amended to said date, particularly §§ 278 (as amended by Act No. 661, § 3, appvd. July 10, 1940, Gen.Acts 1939, p. 1036) and 279 (as amended by Act No. 563, § 1, appvd. Aug. 29, 1951, effective Oct. 28, 1951, Acts 1951, p. 978). The settlement, approved by the circuit court on the same date pursuant to § 278, as amended, supra, provided for payment of compensation of $9.49 per week for 300 weeks, the installments totaling $2,847. Hubbert died on September 13, 1955, from causes other than the work-connected injury (silicosis) made the basis of the compensation award. Up to the time of his death he had received a total of $1,742.87 leaving the balance of the award at $1,104.13. Included in the payments were several advance payments agreed upon and approved by the circuit court.
Hubbert, at the time he received the injury on which the compensation award was based, had dependent on him for support, his wife (the plaintiff) and 6 children under 18 years of age. The plaintiff was still dependent on him when he died.
The parties to the proceeding now before us are in agreement that the question of primary concern is whether or not plaintiff has a right, either for her individual benefit or for the benefit of herself and those of Hubbert's children who may from time to time still be under the age of 18 years, to that part of the compensation award which had not accrued at the time of Hubbert's death.
Bearing on this question is an amendment to § 279(F) which became effective on September 7, 1955 (Act No. 355, appvd. Sept. 7, 1955, Acts 1955, p. 853), after Hubbert's injury and the award of compensation but prior to his death. The amendment added to § 279(F) the following provision:
There is no question that, in the absence of the September 7, 1955, amendment, there would be no right in the widow and dependent children to the installments accruing after Hubbert's death. We have so held. United States Steel Corporation v. Baker, 266 Ala. 538, 97 So. 2d 899; Woodward Iron Co. v. Horton, 267 Ala. 449, 103 So. 2d 717. The precise point at issue, then, is whether the 1955 amendment gives them such right.
Plaintiff insists that the 1955 amendment goes to the remedy; that it is retrospective as well as prospective, covering not only cases where injuries were suffered and awards made after its passage but also cases where injuries were suffered and awards made prior thereto. We are unable to agree. Clearly, it seems to us, the amendment created new substantive rights in favor of the widow and dependent children, on the one hand, by giving them a right to money which they did not theretofore have and, on the other hand, by adding to the employer's obligation a requirement that it pay money which theretofore it was not obligated to pay to anyone.
The employer takes the position that to construe the 1955 amendment so as to require payment of the installments accruing after Hubbert's death would render the amendment unconstitutional for the following reasons: It would (a) impair the obligations of a contract, (b) impair the obligations of a judgment, (c) deprive defendant of property without due process, (d) impute to the legislature the usurpation of judicial power, (e) apply the amendment retrospectively, although the title to the amendatory act did not state that it was to be retrospective, as the Constitution of Alabama requires of such legislation, and (f) disturb an existing defense to a suit after suit has been commenced. We find it necessary to deal only with ground (a).
It is our view that the amendment, if construed so as to give plaintiff the right to the unaccrued installments, would contravene provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions forbidding legislation impairing the obligations of contracts. Section 22, Alabama Constitution 1901 (cf. § 95); § 10, Art. 1, Constitution of the United States; Phillips v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 70 So. 2d 345; Salmon v. Denhart Elevators, 72 S.D. 110, 30 N.W.2d 644; In re Beausoleil's Case, 321 Mass. 344, 73 N.E.2d 461; Warner v. Zaiser, 184 Minn. 598, 239 N.W. 761; Yaeger v. Delano Granite Works, 250 Minn. 303, 84 N.W.2d 363; Preveslin v. Derby & Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151 A. 518, 70 A.L.R. 1426; McClung v. National Carbon Co., 190 Tenn. 202, 228 S.W.2d 488; State ex rel. Conley v. Pennybacker, 131 W.Va. 442, 48 S.E.2d 9; Washabaugh v. Bartlett Collins Glass Co., 177 Okl. 159, 57 P.2d 1162; Swatek Const. Co. v. Williams, 177 Okl. 305, 58 P.2d 585; Thomas v. Crummies Creek Coal Co., 297 Ky. 210, 179 S.W.2d 882; General Refractories Co. v. Henderson, 313 Ky. 613, 232 S.W.2d 846; 12 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 389, p. 18 (Notes 1 and 2); 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 349, p. 19 (Note 10), § 418, p. 108.
The applicable principle is thus stated in 12 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 389, supra:
* * * * * *
In 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 349, p. 19, supra, it is said that
The Florida Supreme Court, in Phillips v. City of West Palm Beach, supra [70 So. 2d 346], had this to say:
The question was thus dealt with by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Salmon v. Denhart Elevators, supra [72 S.D. 110, 30 N.W.2d 648], viz.:
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court discussed the question in Re Beausoleil's Case, supra [321 Mass. 344, 73 N.E.2d 464], as follows:
In Warner v. Zaiser, supra [184 Minn. 589, 239 N.W. 761], the Supreme Court of Minnesota had this to say:
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In the later case of Yaeger v. Delano Granite Works, supra [250 Minn. 303, 84 N.W.2d 366], the Minnesota Court held as follows:
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Preveslin v. Derby & Ansonia Developing Co., supra [112 Conn. 129, 151 A. 522], had this to say:
It follows from what we have said that the judgment under review is due to be reversed. It is so ordered.
Reversed and rendered.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and COLEMAN, JJ., concur.