Title: Winkler v. Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc. (Opinion on Application)

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

WINKLER v MARIST FATHERS OF DETROIT, INC 
 
Docket No. 152889.  Argued on application for leave to appeal April 13, 2017.  Decided 
June 27, 2017. 
 
 
Bettina Winkler brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court, alleging that Marist 
Fathers of Detroit, Inc., denied her admission to its high school because of her learning 
disability, in violation of MCL 371.1402 of the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act 
(PWDCRA), MCL 371.1101 et seq.  Plaintiff attended the middle school division of Notre Dame 
Preparatory High School and Marist Academy, but defendant denied her admission to the high 
school division of its school.  Defendant moved for summary disposition under 
MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (10), arguing that under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the circuit 
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the admission decision of a religious school, 
that the PWDCRA does not apply to religious schools, and that even if the act did apply to 
defendant, there was no genuine dispute that defendant’s decision was based on plaintiff’s 
academic record, not her learning disability; plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction.  The court, 
Rudy J. Nichols, J., denied defendant’s (C)(4) motion, concluding that it had subject-matter 
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim.  The court also denied defendant’s (C)(10) motion, 
reasoning that it was premature because discovery had just started and that plaintiff had failed to 
establish that the PWDCRA does not apply to religious schools.  The court also denied plaintiff’s 
request for a preliminary injunction.  Defendant appealed.  In an unpublished per curiam opinion 
issued November 12, 2015 (Docket No. 323511), the Court of Appeals, SAWYER, P.J., and K. F. 
KELLY and FORT HOOD, JJ., reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case to the trial 
court for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(4).  Relying 
on Dlaikan v Roodbeen, 206 Mich App 591 (1994), the Court of Appeals concluded that under 
the First Amendment, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review defendant’s 
admission decision, reasoning that courts may not analyze the decision-making process of a 
religious institution.  The Court of Appeals accordingly declined to address defendant’s 
argument that the PWDCRA does not apply to religious schools and defendant’s remaining 
(C)(10) arguments that were not resolved by the trial court.  Plaintiff sought leave to appeal.  The 
Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant plaintiff’s application for 
leave to appeal or take other action, and it directed the parties to address: (1) whether the 
doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention involves a question of a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction 
over a complaint, (2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that consideration of 
plaintiff’s challenge to defendant’s admission decision would have impermissibly entangled the 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Joan L. Larsen 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
trial court in questions of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity, and (3) whether the Supreme 
Court should overrule Dlaikan, and if so on what basis.  500 Mich 888 (2016). 
 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice MCCORMACK, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the 
Supreme Court held: 
 
 
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine informs how a civil court must adjudicate claims 
within its subject-matter jurisdiction that involve ecclesiastical questions; it does not operate to 
divest courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims.  Dlaikan was overruled to the extent 
it held otherwise. 
 
 
1.  Subject-matter jurisdiction is the right of a court to exercise judicial power over a 
certain class of cases; the court’s jurisdiction is not dependent on the particular facts of a case or 
whether a plaintiff has a cause of action.  MCL 600.605 provides that Michigan circuit courts are 
courts of general jurisdiction, and those courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine 
all civil claims and remedies, with the exception of when exclusive jurisdiction is given in the 
constitution or by statute to some other court or when circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by 
Michigan’s 1963 Constitution or Michigan statutes.  Accordingly, circuit courts have subject-
matter jurisdiction over claims of discrimination under the PWDCRA.   
 
 
2.  The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, which arises from the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, prohibits a civil court from substituting its 
opinion for that of the authorized tribunal of a religious entity in ecclesiastical matters, or from 
otherwise judicially interfering in the purely ecclesiastical affairs of a religious entity.  While the 
doctrine thus ensures that a civil court, when adjudicating a particular case, does not infringe on 
the religious freedoms and protections guaranteed under the First Amendment, it does not 
deprive civil courts of the right to exercise judicial power over any given class of cases.  In other 
words, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not divest courts of jurisdiction over every 
claim or case involving an ecclesiastical question.  Instead, the doctrine requires a case-specific 
inquiry that informs how a court must adjudicate claims within its subject-matter jurisdiction that 
involve such questions; it is not applied to determine whether the court has subject-matter 
jurisdiction over those claims in the first place.  In this case, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine 
did not divest the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim; the 
court has judicial power to consider and dispose of the claim in a manner consistent with First 
Amendment guarantees.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the trial court’s 
order and remanding for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant under 
MCR 2.116(C)(4).  To the extent Dlaikan and other cases hold that the ecclesiastical abstention 
doctrine affects a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a particular case, those decisions are 
overruled.   
 
 
Court of Appeals judgment reversed and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for 
consideration of defendant’s argument that the PWDCRA does not apply to its school.   
 
 
 
©2017 State of Michigan 
 
 
FILED  June 27, 2017 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
BETTINA WINKLER, by her next friends 
HELGA DAHM WINKLER and MARVIN 
WINKLER, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 152889 
 
MARIST FATHERS OF DETROIT, INC., 
d/b/a NOTRE DAME PREPARATORY 
HIGH SCHOOL AND MARIST 
ACADEMY, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
MCCORMACK, J.  
When presented with an ecclesiastical question, civil courts have long recognized 
the need, grounded in the First Amendment, to abstain from answering it themselves.  
This case invites us to consider the nature of this ecclesiastical abstention doctrine: 
namely, whether it is properly understood as a limitation on the subject matter 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Joan L. Larsen 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
jurisdiction of civil courts.  The defendant operates a parochial school to which the 
plaintiff was denied admission.  When the plaintiff sued on the basis of disability 
discrimination, the defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing among other 
things that, under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the circuit court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over her claim.  Central to the defendant’s argument was Dlaikan v 
Roodbeen, 206 Mich App 591; 522 NW2d 719 (1994), which applied the doctrine to 
conclude that a circuit court had no such jurisdiction over a challenge to the admissions 
decisions of a parochial school.  The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion.  The 
Court of Appeals, however, was convinced by the defendant’s jurisdictional argument 
and reversed the circuit court, awarding the defendant summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(4).   
We disagree with this determination.  While Dlaikan and some other decisions 
have characterized the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as depriving civil courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction, it is clear from the doctrine’s origins and operation that this is 
not so.  The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine may affect how a civil court exercises its 
subject matter jurisdiction over a given claim; it does not divest a court of such 
jurisdiction altogether.  To the extent Dlaikan and other decisions are inconsistent with 
this understanding of the doctrine, they are overruled.  We therefore reverse the Court of 
Appeals’ award of summary disposition to the defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(4), and 
we remand to that Court for further proceedings. 
I 
The defendant, Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc., operates Notre Dame Preparatory 
High School and Marist Academy (NDPMA), a private, Catholic school in Oakland 
 
 
 
 
3 
County.  The plaintiff, Bettina Winkler, is a young woman who attended the middle-
school division of NDPMA, but was denied admission to its high school.  Believing this 
decision was based on her learning disability, dyslexia, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging 
that the defendant violated MCL 37.1402 of the Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights 
Act (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.1  Motions ensued, with the plaintiff requesting a 
preliminary injunction and the defendant seeking summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(4) and (C)(10).  As is relevant here, the defendant argued that, under the 
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine—and, more specifically, its application in Dlaikan—the 
circuit court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a challenge, such as the 
plaintiff’s, to the admissions decision of a religious school.  The defendant further argued 
that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim because the PWDCRA does not apply to 
religious schools and, even if it did, the record betrayed no genuine dispute that the 
defendant’s admissions decision was based on the plaintiff’s lack of academic 
qualification, not her disability. 
The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), 
concluding it had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim and 
observing, in support, that the 
[d]efendant cites no canon law or religious doctrine governing its 
admissions conditions; indeed, its reasons appear to be otherwise secular 
ones involving Plaintiff’s grades, high school placement test results and 
teacher evaluations.  No rituals, liturgy of worship or tenets of faith appear 
to have been involved in its decision.  Moreover, [the d]efendant cites 
                                              
1 The plaintiff’s complaint also stated claims for tortious fraud or misrepresentation, and 
for violation of MCL 445.903(1) of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MCL 
445.901 et seq.  The parties subsequently stipulated to the dismissal of these claims. 
 
 
 
 
4 
nothing rooted in Catholic or other religious precepts, beliefs or doctrine 
that governed or dictated its refusal.   
The court declined to rule on the defendant’s motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), 
deeming it “premature” as discovery had just commenced but noting that the defendant 
had “failed to establish that the PWDCRA does not apply to” its school.  The court also 
denied the plaintiff’s bid for a preliminary injunction. 
The defendant sought the review of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the 
circuit court and remanded for entry of summary disposition in the defendant’s favor 
under MCR 2.116(C)(4).  Winkler v Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc, unpublished per 
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 12, 2015 (Docket No. 
323511).  Leaning heavily on Dlaikan, the panel agreed with the defendant that “civil 
courts lack[] subject-matter jurisdiction over [the plaintiff’s PWDCRA] claim pursuant to 
the protections of the First Amendment.”  Civil courts, the panel reasoned, “have no 
place analyzing the decision-making process of a religious institution regarding 
admission,” regardless of what reason there may have been for the decision; indeed, said 
the panel, any such inquiry by a court into the factual basis for the decision would itself 
“invade[] constitutional protections provided to [the] defendant as a religious institution.”  
Accordingly, the panel concluded that the circuit court erred in believing it could exercise 
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim.  In light of this ruling, the panel saw no need to 
reach whether the PWDCRA applied to religious schools, and declined to reach the other 
arguments for summary disposition raised by the defendant but not resolved by the trial 
court in the first instance. 
The plaintiff then sought leave to appeal in this Court.  We ordered oral argument 
on whether to grant the application or take other action, directing the parties to address:  
 
 
 
 
5 
(1) whether the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention involves a question of a 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, compare Lamont 
Community Church v Lamont Christian Reformed Church, 285 Mich App 
602, 616 (2009), with Dlaikan v Roodbeen, 206 Mich App 591, 594 (1994); 
(2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that consideration of 
plaintiff’s challenge to defendant’s admission decision would have 
impermissibly entangled the trial court “in questions of religious doctrine or 
ecclesiastical polity,” Dlaikan, 206 Mich App at 594; and (3) whether this 
Court should overrule Dlaikan, and if so, on what basis.  [Winkler v Marist 
Fathers of Detroit, Inc, 500 Mich 888 (2016).] 
II 
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary 
disposition.  Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).  We 
likewise review de novo questions of subject matter jurisdiction and constitutional law.  
Hillsdale Co Senior Servs, Inc v Hillsdale Co, 494 Mich 46, 51, 832 NW2d 728 (2013); 
People v Ackley, 497 Mich 381, 388; 870 NW2d 858 (2015). 
Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) is warranted when “[t]he court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.”  As this Court has consistently explained, 
[j]urisdiction over the subject-matter is the right of the court to exercise 
judicial power over that class of cases ; not the particular case before it, but 
rather the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one 
pending ; and not whether the particular case is one that presents a cause of 
action, or under the particular facts is triable before the court in which it is 
pending, because of some inherent facts which exist and may be developed 
during the trial.  [Joy v Two-Bit Corp, 287 Mich 244, 253-254; 283 NW 45 
(1938) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]   
See, e.g., Travelers Ins Co v Detroit Edison Co, 465 Mich 185, 204; 631 NW2d 733 
(2001) (emphasizing that subject matter jurisdiction “is not dependent on the particular 
facts of the case”); People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 458; 579 NW2d 868 (1998) 
(explaining that subject matter jurisdiction “is the right of the court to exercise 
jurisdiction over a class of cases, such as criminal cases”); Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 
 
 
 
 
6 
39; 490 NW2d 568 (1992) (rejecting a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
circuit court as “confus[ing] the question whether the court has jurisdiction over a class of 
cases, namely, child custody disputes, with the question whether a particular plaintiff has 
a cause of action”); Campbell v St John Hosp, 434 Mich 608, 613-614; 455 NW2d 695 
(1990) (quoting caselaw citing Joy). 
The circuit courts of this state are courts of general jurisdiction, with “original 
jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive 
jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the 
circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state.”  MCL 
600.605.  See also Const 1963, art 6, § 1; Campbell, 434 Mich at 613.  “In construing 
such statutes or constitutional provisions, retention of jurisdiction is presumed and any 
intent to divest the circuit court of jurisdiction must be clearly and unambiguously 
stated.”  Campbell, 434 Mich at 614. 
III 
There is no dispute that circuit courts possess subject matter jurisdiction over 
claims of discrimination under the PWDCRA.  See MCL 600.605; MCL 37.1606(2).  At 
issue here is whether this general rule holds true for the plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim (as 
the circuit court concluded), or if instead the court lacks such jurisdiction over the claim 
by virtue of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine (as the Court of Appeals panel 
concluded).  As noted, the panel’s determination was premised largely on the prior Court 
of Appeals decision in Dlaikan, which also sought to apply the ecclesiastical abstention 
doctrine to a lawsuit challenging a parochial school’s admissions decisions.  The 
plaintiffs in that case brought their claims in contract and tort, and the circuit court 
 
 
 
 
7 
concluded it had subject matter jurisdiction.  The Court of Appeals, however, reversed in 
a split decision, awarding summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) to the defendant 
school.  Dlaikan, 206 Mich App at 594.  Relying on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, 
the Dlaikan majority concluded that “the pleadings demonstrate that plaintiffs’ claims are 
so entangled in questions of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity that the civil courts 
lack jurisdiction to hear them.”  Id.  The majority reasoned that, under the doctrine, 
“[w]hen the claim involves the provision of the very services (or as here refusal to 
provide these services) for which the organization enjoys First Amendment protection, 
then any claimed contract for such services likely involves its ecclesiastical policies, 
outside the purview of civil law.”  Id. at 593.  Accordingly, the majority continued, “[a] 
civil court should avoid foray into a ‘property dispute’ regarding admission to a church’s 
religious or educational activities, the essence of its constitutionally protected function,” 
as “[t]o do so is to set foot on the proverbial slippery slope toward entanglement in 
matters of doctrine or ecclesiastical polity.”  Id.2  
The instant panel saw no basis for distinguishing Dlaikan, deeming its application 
of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine dispositive of whether the circuit court could 
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim.  And Dlaikan, 
for its part, is not alone in characterizing the doctrine as a limitation on the subject matter 
jurisdiction of civil courts and a proper basis for an award of summary disposition under 
                                              
2 The dissenting judge in Dlaikan, meanwhile, believed the majority had construed the 
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine much too broadly and would have affirmed the trial 
court’s jurisdictional ruling, as “[d]etermination of the validity of the contract rights 
asserted by plaintiffs does not require the trial court to stray into questions of religious 
doctrine or ecclesiastical polity.”  Id. at 603 (TAYLOR, J., dissenting). 
 
 
 
 
8 
MCR 2.116(C)(4).  See, e.g., Hillenbrand v Christ Lutheran Church of Birch Run, 312 
Mich App 273, 275; 877 NW2d 178 (2015); Pilgrim’s Rest Baptist Church v Pearson, 
310 Mich App 318, 323; 872 NW2d 16 (2015).3  The instant panel’s adoption of this 
same jurisdictional characterization is thus certainly understandable.  But the 
characterization is also inapt.  As its origins and operation make clear, the ecclesiastical 
abstention doctrine informs how civil courts must adjudicate claims involving 
ecclesiastical questions; it does not deprive those courts of subject matter jurisdiction 
over such claims. 
                                              
3 Both the Court of Appeals and this Court have also, at times, described the 
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine as pertaining to a civil court’s “jurisdiction.”  See, e.g., 
Berkaw v Mayflower Congregational Church, 378 Mich 239, 266; 144 NW2d 444 
(1966); Davis v Scher, 356 Mich 291, 297; 97 NW2d 137 (1959); Berry v Bruce, 317 
Mich 490, 503; 27 NW2d 67 (1947); Borgman v Bultema, 213 Mich 684, 703; 182 NW 
91 (1921); Attorney General ex rel Ter Vree v Geerlings, 55 Mich 562, 566-567; 22 NW 
89 (1885); Maciejewski v Breitenbeck, 162 Mich App 410, 413-414; 413 NW2d 65 
(1987); Wiethoff v St Veronica Sch, 48 Mich App 163, 166-167; 210 NW2d 208 (1973).  
This Court has previously cautioned against reading too much into such generic 
language, and we find that caution well heeded here.  See, e.g., Bowie, 441 Mich at 39-40 
(in rejecting a challenge to the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction, reiterating this 
Court’s warning against “[t]he loose practice [that] has grown up, even in some opinions, 
of saying that a court had no ‘jurisdiction’ to take certain legal action when what is 
actually meant is that the court had no legal ‘right’ to take the action, that it was in 
error”), quoting Buczkowski v Buczkowski, 351 Mich 216, 222; 88 NW2d 416 (1958) 
(quotation marks omitted).  We do not see, under the jurisdictional gloss sometimes 
applied to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in prior decisions, a binding 
determination by this Court that the doctrine may operate to deprive a court of 
“jurisdiction of the subject matter” such that summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(4) would be warranted. 
 
 
 
 
9 
IV 
The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine arises from the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution4 and reflects this Court’s longstanding 
recognition that it would be “inconsistent with complete and untrammeled religious 
liberty” for civil courts to “enter into a consideration of church doctrine or church 
discipline,” to “inquire into the regularity of the proceedings of church tribunals having 
cognizance of such matters,” or “to determine whether a resolution was passed in 
accordance with the canon law of the church, except insofar as it may be necessary to do 
so, in determining whether or not it was the church that acted therein.”  Van Vliet v 
Vander Naald, 290 Mich 365, 370-371; 287 NW 564 (1939).  See also, e.g., Borgman v 
Bultema, 213 Mich 684, 703; 182 NW 91 (1921).  Accordingly, “[w]e have consistently 
held that the court may not substitute its opinion in lieu of that of the authorized tribunals 
of the church in ecclesiastical matters,” First Protestant Reformed Church v DeWolf, 344 
                                              
4 The First Amendment provides, in part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  US Const, Am I.  
“These provisions apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Smith v 
Calvary Christian Church, 462 Mich 679, 684 n 4; 614 NW2d 590 (2000).  They do not, 
however, “dictate that a State must follow a particular method” when applying the 
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to disputes brought in its civil courts, so long as the 
method does not require from those courts “consideration of doctrinal matters, whether 
the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.”  Jones v Wolf, 443 US 595, 602; 
99 S Ct 3020; 61 L Ed 2d 775 (1979) (quotation marks and citation omitted).   
The Michigan Constitution also contains its own guarantee of religious freedom, 
see Const 1963, art 1, § 4, which “is at least as protective of religious liberty as the 
United States Constitution.”  People v DeJonge (After Remand), 442 Mich 266, 273 n 9; 
501 NW2d 127 (1993).  The parties have not argued, and precedent does not suggest, that 
this guarantee adds to or alters the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine required by the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, or itself affects whether the doctrine is 
properly understood to divest this state’s civil courts of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
10 
Mich 624, 631; 75 NW2d 19 (1956), and that “judicial interference in the purely 
ecclesiastical affairs of religious organizations is improper.”  Berry v Bruce, 317 Mich 
490, 499; 27 NW2d 67 (1947).  See, e.g., Smith v Calvary Christian Church, 462 Mich 
679, 684; 614 NW2d 590 (2000) (“Under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, 
apparently derived from both First Amendment religion clauses, ‘civil courts may not 
redetermine the correctness of an interpretation of canonical text or some decision 
relating to government of the religious polity.’ ”), quoting Paul v Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Society, 819 F2d 875, 878 n 1 (CA 9, 1987).  Accord Jones v Wolf, 443 US 595, 
602; 99 S Ct 3020; 61 L Ed 2d 775 (1979) (“[T]he First Amendment prohibits civil courts 
from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice.  
As a corollary to this commandment, the Amendment requires that civil courts defer to 
the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a 
hierarchical church organization.”) (citations omitted). 
The doctrine thus operates to ensure that, in adjudicating a particular case, a civil 
court does not infringe the religious freedoms and protections guaranteed under the First 
Amendment.  It does not, however, purport to deprive civil courts of “the right . . . to 
exercise judicial power over” any given “class of cases.”  Joy, 287 Mich at 253 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  The doctrine, for instance, has frequently been 
invoked and applied in the adjudication of disputes over church property; it has not, 
however, been understood to categorically preclude a civil court from assuming 
jurisdiction over such disputes.  See, e.g., Presbyterian Church in the United States v 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 US 440, 449; 89 S Ct 601; 
21 L Ed 2d 658 (1969) (“It is obvious . . . that not every civil court decision as to 
 
 
 
 
11 
property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First 
Amendment.  Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their 
doors to disputes involving church property.”); DeWolf, 344 Mich at 633 (“While courts 
do not interfere in matters of church doctrine, church discipline, or the regularity of the 
proceedings of church tribunals, and refuse to interfere with the right of religious groups 
to worship freely as they choose, the question of the property rights of the members is a 
matter within the jurisdiction of the courts and may be determined by the court.”); 
Borgman, 213 Mich at 703 (“Where . . . a church controversy . . . involves rights growing 
out of a contract recognized by the civil law, or the right to the possession of property, 
civil tribunals cannot avoid adjudicating these rights under the law of the land, having in 
view, nevertheless, the implied obligations imputed to those parties to the controversy 
who have voluntarily submitted themselves to the authority of the church by connecting 
themselves with it.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).5  Likewise, while the 
doctrine calls for deference to the decisions of “the authorized tribunals of [a religious 
entity] in ecclesiastical matters,” DeWolf, 344 Mich at 631, that deference simply 
                                              
5 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has confirmed the existence of a 
“ministerial exception” to federal employment-discrimination laws, which is “grounded 
in the First Amendment” and which “precludes application of such legislation to claims 
concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.”  
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch v EEOC, 565 US 171, 188; 132 S 
Ct 694; 181 L Ed 2d 650 (2012).  See id. at 194-195 (explaining that the exception 
“ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a 
matter strictly ecclesiastical—is the church’s alone”) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The Court, however, made clear that this exception does not operate as “a 
jurisdictional bar” to such employment-discrimination suits “because the issue presented 
by the exception is whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief, not 
whether the court has power to hear the case.”  Id. at 195 n 4 (quotation marks, citation, 
and brackets omitted). 
 
 
 
 
12 
requires civil courts to “accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their 
application to the case before them.”  Watson v Jones, 80 US at 679, 727; 20 L Ed 666 
(1871).  It does not divest courts of jurisdiction over every claim or case involving such a 
decision.  See Lamont, 285 Mich App at 616 (explaining that, under the ecclesiastical 
abstention doctrine, a civil court retains subject matter jurisdiction over a given matter 
and, with it, the ability to “enter a judgment” that “resolve[s] the matter consistent with 
any determinations already made by” the religious entity). 
Thus, while some prior decisions such as Dlaikan have affixed the label of subject 
matter jurisdiction to the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, we agree with the Court of 
Appeals in Lamont that “[t]his characterization is a misnomer,” 285 Mich App at 616, 
and we disavow it.  The existence of subject matter jurisdiction turns not on the particular 
facts of the matter before the court, but on its general legal classification.  See Travelers 
Ins Co, 465 Mich at 204; Goecke, 457 Mich at 458; Bowie, 441 Mich at 39-40; Campbell, 
434 Mich at 613-614; Joy, 287 Mich at 253.  By contrast, application of the ecclesiastical 
abstention doctrine is not determined by reference to the category or class of case the 
plaintiff has stated.  Whether a claim sounds in property, tort, or tax, for instance, is not 
dispositive.  Nor is the fact that the claim is brought against a religious entity, or simply 
appears to be the sort that “likely involves its ecclesiastical policies.”  Dlaikan, 206 Mich 
App at 593 (emphasis added).  What matters instead is whether the actual adjudication of 
a particular legal claim would require the resolution of ecclesiastical questions; if so, the 
court must abstain from resolving those questions itself, defer to the religious entity’s 
resolution of such questions, and adjudicate the claim accordingly.  The doctrine, in 
short, requires a case-specific inquiry that informs how a court must adjudicate certain 
 
 
 
 
13 
claims within its subject matter jurisdiction; it does not determine whether the court has 
such jurisdiction in the first place.  The instant panel thus erred, albeit understandably, in 
deeming summary disposition warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(4), and we reverse that 
determination.6 
V 
The defendant, at this point, does not particularly dispute this general 
understanding of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine,7 urging instead that the plaintiff’s 
PWDCRA claim still can’t survive under it.  According to the defendant, even if a civil 
court can exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s challenge to its admissions decision, 
the court cannot disrupt that decision or award the plaintiff relief as to it without 
impermissibly passing judgment on ecclesiastical matters.  In support, the defendant 
                                              
6 Other jurisdictions, it bears noting, have likewise rejected the notion that the 
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine operates to deprive civil courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., St Joseph Catholic Orphan Society v Edwards, 449 SW3d 727, 
736-737 (Ky, 2014); Brazauskas v Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, Inc, 796 NE2d 286, 
290 (Ind, 2003); Bryce v Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F3d 648, 654 
(CA 10, 2002).  A number of these jurisdictions have further clarified that the doctrine 
operates as an affirmative defense, a characterization consistent with that adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court as to the “ministerial exception.”  See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 
US at 195 n 4.  We need not decide here whether we agree with this particular 
characterization of the doctrine—just that we agree the doctrine does not sound in subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
7 Although the defendant argued lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the courts below 
and in its initial response to the instant application, it ultimately conceded in briefing to 
this Court that “the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention does not involve a question of a 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a claim.”  Despite the defendant’s concession, we 
have a duty to examine “the limits of [our] authority,” Fox v Bd of Regents of Univ of 
Mich, 375 Mich 238, 242; 134 NW2d 146 (1965) (quotation marks and citation omitted), 
regardless of whether the parties concede it, see In re Return of Forfeited Goods, 452 
Mich 659, 671; 550 NW2d 782 (1996). 
 
 
 
 
14 
suggests an analogy between the students of its high school and the clergy and 
membership of a church.  The defendant stresses that “the action of the church authorities 
in the deposition of pastors and the expulsion of members is final,” Borgman, 213 Mich 
at 703, and that civil courts “cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor 
whether the excommunicated have been justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly cut off 
from the body of the church,” Watson, 80 US at 730.  See also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 US 
at 184 (recognizing that “[t]he Establishment Clause prevents the Government from 
appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the 
freedom of religious groups to select their own”).  A parochial school’s admission or 
expulsion of a student is no different, the defendant maintains, given the “integral part” 
such a school can play in furthering “the religious mission of the Catholic Church” and in 
“transmitting the Catholic faith to the next generation.”  Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 
609, 616; 91 S Ct 2105; 29 L Ed 2d 745 (1971) (quotation marks omitted).  A similar line 
of thinking, it seems, informed the majority’s ruling in Dlaikan.  See Dlaikan, 206 Mich 
App at 593 (citing Borgman’s statement regarding the “expulsion of clergy or members” 
in support of its conclusion that “[a] civil court should avoid foray into a ‘property 
dispute’ regarding admission to a church’s religious or educational activities, the essence 
of its constitutionally protected function”).   
Whether this analogy is generally sound, and whether it holds up in the instant 
case (or in Dlaikan, for that matter), we see no reason to reach at this time.  It is for the 
circuit court, in the first instance, to determine whether and to what extent the 
adjudication of the legal and factual issues presented by the plaintiff’s claim would 
require the resolution of ecclesiastical questions (and thus deference to any answers the 
 
 
 
 
15 
church has provided to those questions).8  It is enough for our purposes here to clarify 
that, contrary to the suggestion of Dlaikan and other decisions, the circuit court does, in 
fact, have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim, and the judicial power to 
consider it and dispose of it in a manner consistent with the guarantees of the First 
Amendment.  Simply put, to the extent that application of the ecclesiastical abstention 
doctrine might still prove fatal to the plaintiff’s claim for relief under the PWDCRA, it 
will not be for lack of “jurisdiction of the subject matter” under MCR 2.116(C)(4). 
VI 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the defendant 
is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4).  As to the defendant’s 
entitlement to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the Court of Appeals 
previously declined to reach those arguments on which the circuit court had not yet ruled; 
we see no reason to disrupt that decision.  The circuit court did, however, reject the 
defendant’s argument that the PWDCRA does not apply to its school, a ruling which the 
defendant challenged on appeal but which the panel saw no need to review given its 
                                              
8 The defendant did not press the analogy discussed above in its motion for summary 
disposition, and the circuit court did not address it in ruling on that motion.  As noted, 
however, the court did observe that, while discovery had just commenced, the 
defendant’s “reasons [for its admissions decision] appear[ed] to be . . . secular.”  For the 
reasons discussed, this observation was not necessary to the circuit court’s ruling under 
MCR 2.116(C)(4); the court was correct to conclude it had subject matter jurisdiction 
over the plaintiff’s PWDCRA challenge to the defendant’s admissions decision 
regardless of whether that decision was secular in nature.  Should this matter ultimately 
return to the circuit court, the defendant remains free, as the record develops, to challenge 
the accuracy of the court’s initial characterization of its decision and to seek application 
of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine to the plaintiff’s claim. 
 
 
 
 
16 
jurisdictional determination.  Having reversed the jurisdictional determination, we 
remand this matter to the Court of Appeals for consideration of that challenge. 
 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Joan L. Larsen 
 
Kurtis T. Wilder