Title: Commonwealth v. Jones

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11717 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT JONES. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 1, 2014. - April 9, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Indecent Assault and Battery.  Obscenity, Dissemination of 
matter harmful to minor.  Statute, Validity.  
Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and press.  Practice, 
Criminal, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 26, 2012. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Maureen B. Hogan, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the defendant. 
 
Anne M. Paruti, Assistant District Attorney (Jessica L. 
Langsam, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
on two indictments charging indecent assault and battery on a 
2 
 
 
child under fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B, and 
one indictment charging dissemination of matter harmful to 
minors, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 28.1  The defendant 
presents two claims on appeal.  First, he contends that, during 
the time period alleged in the indictment, § 28 was facially 
overbroad because it did not explicitly require the Commonwealth 
to prove that the defendant knew that the person receiving the 
harmful matter was a minor.  Second, he argues that the 
prosecutor's closing argument created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice by suggesting that the defendant would 
have committed further sexual offenses against one of the child 
victims had the child not moved away.  We conclude that, during 
the relevant time period, § 28 was not unconstitutionally 
overbroad because we interpret the statute to have implicitly 
required knowledge that the recipient was a minor as an element 
of the crime.  We also conclude that the prosecutor's suggestion 
that the defendant would have committed further sexual offenses 
against the victim was improper but, in the context of the 
entire closing argument, did not create a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  We therefore affirm the convictions. 
Background.  The two victims were the defendant's nephews, 
sons of two different sisters of the defendant.  In 2006, one 
                                                          
 
1 An additional charge of indecent assault and battery on a 
child under fourteen was nol prossed before trial. 
3 
 
 
victim, C.J., who was approximately eleven years old, moved with 
his mother and younger brother to Woburn, which is also where 
the defendant was living at C.J.'s grandmother's house.  A few 
days during each school week, and nearly every day during the 
summer, C.J. went to his grandmother's house where he and the 
defendant spent time together playing video games, using a 
computer, and playing sports.  Because C.J. looked up to the 
defendant as a father figure, he did not feel uncomfortable when 
the defendant began asking him about his physical development 
through puberty.  The defendant would routinely ask C.J. about 
any physical changes to his body and at one point asked if he 
had started to "play" with his genitals. 
In the summer of 2007, when C.J. was approximately twelve 
years old, the defendant began asking to see his genitals.  With 
no one else in the room, the defendant and C.J. would often be 
sitting on the bed in the defendant's bedroom, playing video 
games or watching television, and the defendant would ask to see 
if any pubescent changes had occurred.   C.J. would then stand 
up or kneel on the bed and pull down his pants and underwear; 
the defendant would look and touch with his hand the pubic 
region immediately above C.J.'s penis, but would not touch the 
penis itself.  The defendant did not show his genitals to C.J. 
or ask C.J. to perform any sexual act with the defendant. 
4 
 
 
This pattern of asking to see C.J's genitals and touching 
his pubic region occurred at least twice a week, and continued 
for about one year before C.J. began to feel uncomfortable.  
C.J. first viewed these interactions as appropriate for a father 
figure to have with a son, but he felt more uncomfortable after 
he recognized that the defendant was asking to see his genitals 
nearly every time he visited.2  These interactions between the 
defendant and the victim stopped after C.J's family moved to 
Tewksbury in the summer of 2008, and shortly thereafter moved to 
New Hampshire. 
The second victim, J.B., also lived in Woburn, with his 
mother, stepfather, and sister.  In 2007, J.B. was approximately 
nine years old and in fourth grade, and often went after school 
to his grandmother's house, where the defendant lived.  The 
defendant and J.B. had a close relationship; they played sports, 
attended sporting events, and went ice-skating together.  For 
three years, when J.B. was in the fourth, fifth, and sixth 
grades, the defendant went to his house to watch almost every 
Boston Bruins hockey game. 
                                                          
 
2 The defendant also routinely kissed C.J. on the lips when 
they parted.  C.J. testified that kissing on the lips was a 
common greeting or farewell gesture in his family, but he 
started to feel uncomfortable when the defendant began kissing 
him multiple times and holding the kiss longer. 
5 
 
 
In the summer before J.B. was starting either fourth or 
fifth grade, the defendant asked him how puberty was going, but 
he did not know what puberty was.  The defendant did not raise 
the topic again until the following winter.  While the defendant 
and J.B. were alone watching television, the defendant asked, 
"How is puberty hitting you?"  The defendant said, "Well, let me 
see then.  I'll tell you how puberty is."  J.B. then pulled down 
his pants and boxer shorts.  From this point forward, about 
every other week, the defendant asked to see J.B.'s penis and 
J.B. showed him.  The defendant did not touch J.B.'s penis 
during these interactions. 
On one occasion, when J.B. was in fifth grade, sometime 
between 2007 and 2008, the defendant asked him to look at 
something on the defendant's computer.  J.B. sat on the 
defendant's lap while the defendant opened a computer program 
used for downloading music and video recordings.  As the 
defendant scrolled through a list of pornographic video 
recordings, J.B. saw images of nude adult men and women 
displaying their genitals and engaging in sexual intercourse.  
The defendant then played a specific video recording, which 
showed a group of nude women using icicles as sexual toys.  The 
defendant asked J.B. if he had ever searched for materials 
similar to what was shown in the video recording, and J.B. said 
6 
 
 
"no."  As they watched the video recording, the defendant 
unbuttoned J.B.'s pants and pulled down his pants and boxer 
shorts.  The defendant grabbed J.B.'s penis and stroked it with 
two of his fingers.  J.B. did not recall any other instance 
where the defendant touched his genitals or showed him 
pornography. 
Discussion.  1.  Dissemination of matter harmful to minors.  
At the time of the charged conduct, G. L. c. 272, § 28, as 
appearing in St. 1982, c. 603, § 2, provided, "Whoever 
disseminates to a minor any matter harmful to minors, as defined 
in [G. L. c. 272, § 31], knowing it to be harmful to minors, or 
has in his possession any such matter with the intent to 
disseminate the same to minors" shall be guilty of a crime.3  
Since then, the scope of the statute has twice been amended.  In 
2010, the Legislature amended § 31 to add to the definition of 
"matter" "any electronic communication including, but not 
limited to, electronic mail, instant messages, text messages, or 
any other communication created by means of use of the Internet 
                                                          
 
 
3 "Harmful to minors" is defined as "matter" that is 
"obscene, or if taken as a whole, . . . (1) describes or 
represents nudity, sexual conduct or sexual excitement, so as to 
appeal predominantly to the prurient interest of minors; (2) is 
patently contrary to prevailing standards of adults in the 
county where the offense was committed as to suitable material 
for such minors; and (3) lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value for minors."  G. L. c. 272, § 31.  
"Minor" is defined as "a person under eighteen years of age."  
Id. 
7 
 
 
or wireless network."  St. 2010, c. 74 § 2.4  In 2011, the 
Legislature amended § 28 explicitly to require that the 
dissemination be purposeful and "to a person [the defendant] 
knows or believes to be a minor."  St. 2011, c. 9, § 19.5,6 
                                                          
 
 
4 This amendment was enacted after we held that the earlier 
definition of "matter" in § 31 did not encompass electronically 
transmitted texts or online conversations.  See Commonwealth v. 
Zubiel, 456 Mass. 27, 33 (2010). 
 
5 The amended G. L. c. 272, § 28, now reads, in relevant 
part, "Whoever purposefully disseminates to a person he knows or 
believes to be a minor any matter harmful to minors . . . 
knowing it to be harmful to minors, or has in his possession any 
such matter with the intent to disseminate the same to a person 
he knows or believes to be a minor, shall be punished . . . . A 
person who disseminates an electronic communication . . . shall 
not be found to have violated this section unless he 
specifically intends to direct the communication to a person he 
knows or believes to be a minor" (emphasis added).  St. 2011, 
c. 9, § 19. 
 
 
6 The 2011 amendment of § 28 followed the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction by a judge of the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts, who declared that the 
2010 amendments to § 31, as incorporated within § 28, violated 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  American 
Booksellers Found. for Free Expression vs. Coakley, U.S. Dist 
Ct., No. 10-11165-RWZ, at 9 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2010).  The 
preliminary injunction arose from a civil suit filed by several 
individuals and organizations that used the Internet to 
disseminate sex-related information.  Id. at 1, 4.  The 
plaintiffs argued that § 28 was unconstitutionally overbroad 
because it did not require that a defendant know that the 
intended recipient of the harmful matter was a minor.  Id. at 4-
5.  The plaintiffs reasoned that those who disseminate "sexually 
frank" information through a generally accessible Web site 
cannot verify the age of every individual who accesses their Web 
site; therefore, they cannot prevent minors from viewing 
information that might be harmful to them but appropriate for 
adults, without significantly limiting adults from accessing 
this information.  Id. at 4, 5 n.3.  The Commonwealth agreed 
8 
 
 
 
The defendant contends that until § 28 was amended to 
require, as an element of the offense, that the defendant 
disseminated the harmful matter to a person "he knows or 
believes to be a minor," the statute was substantially overbroad 
in violation of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 16 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  "The First Amendment doctrine of substantial 
overbreadth . . . is predicated on the danger that an overly 
broad statute, if left in place, may cause persons whose 
expression is constitutionally protected to refrain from 
exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions" 
(citations omitted).  Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 
(1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.).  Although the defendant does 
not contend that he did not know that the victims were minors, 
he need not do so in order to challenge the constitutionality of 
the statute, because the overbreadth doctrine "is an exception 
to the general rule that a person to whom a statute may be 
constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on the 
ground that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others."  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that, if § 28 did not require that the sender know that the 
recipient was a minor, the statute would be unconstitutionally 
overbroad.  Id. at 5.  The judge noted that she could not 
construe the statute to require such knowledge as an element of 
the offense because "in the absence of an explicit state court 
adjudication . . . revision of a state statute by a federal 
court would be inappropriate."  Id. at 7. 
9 
 
 
Id.  See Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership v. Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, 460 Mass. 647, 676 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 2377 (2012) ("The overbreadth doctrine allows an individual 
whose speech may be constitutionally regulated to argue that a 
law is unconstitutional because it infringes on the speech of 
others"). 
 
The premise underlying the defendant's overbreadth claim is 
that § 28 prior to amendment did not require as an element of 
the offense that the defendant knew that the recipient of the 
harmful matter was a minor.  If that premise is correct, the 
statute would be constitutionally suspect because it would chill 
the non-obscene, sex-related speech of those who cannot 
reasonably ensure that the matter they disseminate will be seen 
only by adults.  See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 
U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (governmental interest "in protecting 
children from harmful materials . . . does not justify an 
unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults" 
[citations omitted]).  See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 
147, 153-154 (1959) (punishing bookseller for possession of 
obscene books without knowledge of obscene content would cause 
self-censorship and severely limit public access to 
constitutionally protected matter, because booksellers are 
limited in amount of reading material with which they can 
10 
 
 
familiarize themselves and they would grow timid in face of 
"absolute criminal liability"). 
 
In determining whether to construe the statute prior to 
amendment to require such knowledge, we apply two principles of 
statutory construction.  First, "a statute is to be construed 
where fairly possible so as to avoid constitutional questions."  
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994).  
See Commonwealth v. Disler, 451 Mass. 216, 228 (2008) (it is our 
duty to interpret statutes in manner that avoids constitutional 
difficulties "if reasonable principles of interpretation permit 
it" [citation omitted]).  See also O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 
Mass. 415, 422 (2012) ("we have not hesitated to construe 
statutory language narrowly to avoid constitutional 
overbreadth"); Demetropolos v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 658, 660 
(1961) ("where a statute may be construed as either 
constitutional or unconstitutional, a construction will be 
adopted which avoids an unconstitutional interpretation"). 
 
Second, where First Amendment rights are at issue, we 
presume "that some form of scienter is to be implied in a 
criminal statute even if not expressed."  X-Citement Video, 
Inc., 513 U.S. at 69 (construing statute to require knowledge 
that performer in visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct 
was minor).  See Commonwealth v. Buckley, 354 Mass. 508, 510 
11 
 
 
(1968) ("Statutes, purporting to create criminal offences which 
may impinge upon the public's access to constitutionally 
protected matter . . . , have been construed to require 
knowledge by the accused of the facts giving rise to 
criminality" [quotation and citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. 
Corey, 351 Mass. 331, 332-333 (1966). 
 
In Corey, 351 Mass. at 334, we applied both of these 
principles when interpreting an earlier version of § 28 to 
require scienter.7  The defendant was an employee in a Boston 
book store who sold a book entitled "Candy" to a seventeen year 
old girl who asked for the book by name.  Id. at 332.  The 
defendant argued that he could not be convicted under § 28 
without evidence that he knew of the allegedly obscene content 
of the book; the Commonwealth conceded that it had offered no 
such evidence.  Id.  According to the Commonwealth, the absence 
of any language in the statute requiring scienter suggested that 
the Legislature intended to enact a strict liability criminal 
statute, much like it did when it enacted a strict liability 
                                                          
 
 
7 The relevant portions of the earlier version of § 28 read, 
"Whoever sells . . . to a person under the age of eighteen years 
a book . . . which is obscene, indecent or impure, or manifestly 
tends to corrupt the morals of youth . . . shall be punished 
. . . ."  Commonwealth v. Corey, 351 Mass. 331, 331 (1966), 
quoting G. L. c. 272, § 28, as amended through St. 1959, c. 492, 
§ 1. 
12 
 
 
criminal statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to minors.  Id. 
at 333. 
 
We acknowledged that the Legislature had the authority in 
enacting criminal statutes to define criminal offenses that had 
no element of scienter, but also recognized that "a different 
situation is presented when the legislation is in an area where 
First Amendment rights are involved."  Id.  Where First 
Amendment rights are involved, "[t]he [United States] 
Constitution requires proof of scienter to avoid the hazard of 
self-censorship of constitutionally protected material."  Id. at 
332-333, quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 511 (1966).  
Thus, if § 28 had no scienter requirement, "booksellers, unable 
to familiarize themselves with all the material on their 
shelves, would tend to restrict sales to minors to the 
relatively few books of which they had some knowledge of the 
contents or character.  The result would be an impediment to the 
sale to minors not only of unprotected matter but also of that 
which is constitutionally protected."  Corey, supra at 334.  We 
held that § 28 "must be read as requiring scienter." Id. 
 
For similar reasons, we now construe § 28 prior to 
amendment to require scienter that the recipient was a minor.  
If scienter as to the recipient's age were not required, online 
booksellers and other Web site administrators who could not 
13 
 
 
reasonably identify the age of every person who visits their Web 
sites would be discouraged from disseminating material that is 
appropriate for adults but harmful to minors.  See State v. 
Weidner, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 322 (Wis. 2000) ("By requiring an 
[I]nternet user . . . to prove lack of knowledge regarding the 
age of the person exposed to material deemed harmful to a child, 
the [Wisconsin statute on dissemination of matter harmful to 
minors] effectively chills protected [I]nternet communication to 
adults").  Thus, interpreting the statute to require knowledge 
that the recipient is a minor is necessary to avoid impinging on 
public access to constitutionally protected matter.  See Corey, 
351 Mass. at 334. 
 
We interpret § 28 to include an implied element of 
scienter, not only to preserve the constitutionality of the 
statute, but also to reflect what we understand to be the 
legislative intent.  First, we note that the statute explicitly 
requires that the defendant have knowledge that the matter 
disseminated is harmful to minors.  See G. L. c. 272, § 28, as 
appearing in St. 1982, c. 603, § 2 ("Whoever disseminates to a 
minor any matter harmful to minors . . . knowing it to be 
harmful to minors").  Second, we previously construed § 28 to 
require that the act of dissemination be "purposeful or 
intentional" rather than inadvertent, even though the statute 
14 
 
 
itself did not explicitly state the level of intent necessary to 
prove dissemination.  Commonwealth v. Belcher, 446 Mass. 693, 
696-697 (2006).  Finally, because § 28 also made it a crime to 
possess any matter harmful to minors "with the intent to 
disseminate the same to minors," the Legislature likely intended 
that same intent be required to criminalize the dissemination of 
the same matter.  See X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 72 
("the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should 
apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize 
otherwise innocent conduct"). 
 
Where we adopt a limiting construction of a statute to 
avoid substantial overbreadth, as we have done here by requiring 
scienter that the recipient is a minor, "the statute, as 
construed, 'may be applied to conduct occurring prior to the 
construction, provided such application affords fair warning to 
the defendants.'"  Oakes, 491 U.S. at 584 (opinion of O'Connor, 
J.), quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 n.7 
(1965).  See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 119 (1990) ("Courts 
routinely construe statutes so as to avoid the statutes' 
potentially overbroad reach, apply the statute in that case, and 
leave the statute in place").  Here, where there can be no issue 
of fair warning, we conclude that § 28 included an implied 
scienter requirement before the 2011 amendment made that 
15 
 
 
requirement explicit and was therefore not unconstitutionally 
overbroad.8 
                                                          
 
 
8 On appeal, the Commonwealth also argues that the 
defendant's overbreadth challenge was rendered moot by the 2011 
amendment, even though the amendment was not effective during 
the time period covered by the indictment.  The Commonwealth's 
argument rests on the plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor in 
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 582 (1989), joined by 
three other Justices, which concluded that "overbreadth analysis 
is inappropriate if the statute being challenged has been 
amended or repealed."  Justice O'Connor reasoned: 
 
"Overbreadth is a judicially created doctrine designed to 
prevent the chilling of protected expression.  An overbroad 
statute is not void ab initio, but rather voidable, subject 
to invalidation notwithstanding the defendant's unprotected 
conduct out of solicitude to the First Amendment rights of 
parties not before the court.  Because the special concern 
that animates the overbreadth doctrine is no longer present 
after the amendment or repeal of the challenged statute, we 
need not extend the benefits of the doctrine to a defendant 
whose conduct is not protected." 
 
Id. at 584.  Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion, Part I of 
which was joined by four other Justices, which stated that a 
subsequent legislative amendment of a statute does not 
"eliminate the basis for the overbreadth challenge."  Id. at 
585-586.  Justice Scalia reasoned: 
 
"The overbreadth doctrine serves to protect 
constitutionally legitimate speech not merely ex post, that 
is, after the offending statute is enacted, but also ex 
ante, that is, when the legislature is contemplating what 
sort of statute to enact.  If the promulgation of overbroad 
laws affecting speech was cost free, as Justice O'Connor's 
new doctrine would make it -- that is, if no conviction of 
constitutionally proscribable conduct would be lost, so 
long as the offending statute was narrowed before the final 
appeal -- then legislatures would have significantly 
reduced incentive to stay within constitutional bounds in 
the first place" (emphasis in original). 
 
16 
 
 
 
Having construed § 28 prior to amendment to require 
knowledge that the recipient of the harmful matter was a minor, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Id. at 586.  It was only because Justice Scalia concluded that 
the statute prior to amendment was not impermissibly overbroad 
that Justice O'Connor's opinion had the five votes necessary to 
announce the judgment of the court to vacate the judgment below 
and remand for further proceedings.  Id. at 585, 588, 590. 
 
 
Several circuit courts of the United States Court of 
Appeals have agreed that a subsequent amendment of a statute 
renders moot an overbreadth defense.  See, e.g., National 
Advertising Co. v. Miami, 402 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006); Stephenson v. Davenport 
Community Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1311-1312 (8th Cir. 1997); 
Kentucky Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 644 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 860 (1997).  Yet, as the defendant 
notes, part I of Justice Scalia's opinion was the "only 
proposition to which five Members of the Court [had] 
subscribed."  Oakes, supra at 591 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
The Supreme Court has explained that where "no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds . . . .'"  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977), quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976).  
However, the Court has also acknowledged that this test "is more 
easily stated than applied."  Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 
738, 745 (1994).  See United States v. Robison, 521 F.3d 1319, 
1323-1324 (11th Cir. 2008) ("narrowest grounds" approach does 
not make sense where two opinions "simply set forth different 
criteria" and one opinion does not constitute subset of broader 
opinion).  "Since Marks, several members of the Court have 
indicated that whenever a decision is fragmented such that no 
single opinion has the support of five Justices, lower courts 
should examine the plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions 
to extract the principles that a majority has embraced" 
(emphasis added).  United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 65 
(1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 948 (2007).  Because we 
construe the statute prior to amendment to be constitutional, we 
need not determine the appropriate method of interpreting 
fragmented Supreme Court decisions in order to decide whether, 
under Oakes, the 2011 amendment of § 28 rendered the defendant's 
overbreadth challenge moot. 
17 
 
 
we must address whether the defendant's conviction under § 28 
can stand where the judge's final instructions to the jury did 
not inform them of this element.  See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 118, 
citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1965) 
("where a State Supreme Court narrows an unconstitutionally 
overbroad statute, the State must ensure that defendants are 
convicted under the statute as it is subsequently construed and 
not as it was originally written").  Where, as here, the 
defendant did not object to the judge's jury instructions, we 
determine whether the absence of such an instruction created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Belcher, 446 
Mass. at 696.  We conclude that there was no such risk in this 
case, where the defendant was the uncle of the victim, J.B., and 
knew him very well, and where J.B. was well below eighteen years 
of age when the defendant showed him the pornographic material. 
 
2.  Closing argument.  The defendant also contends that the 
prosecutor's closing argument improperly suggested that the 
defendant would have touched C.J. in the same manner that he 
touched J.B. if C.J. had not moved away.  The prosecutor stated: 
"Was [the defendant] able to progress any further than 
touching [C.J.]'s pubic area?  No.  Why not?  Because 
[C.J.] left, that's why.  Not because he was done learning 
about sex from his uncle, because he physically moved to 
another state.  You heard eighth grade he left.  He was in 
Tewksbury for a short amount of time and then New 
Hampshire.  At that point they saw each other infrequently, 
18 
 
 
not every day.  The access collapsed and his opportunity at 
that point to take it further vanished." 
 
The prosecutor later reemphasized this theory, stating, "Now the 
point that [the defendant] got to with [J.B.] shows you exactly 
what his intent was when he started with [C.J.].  Due to 
circumstances beyond his control, that is a couple of hundred 
miles maybe or a state border, he was unable to reach that point 
with [C.J.]." 
 
The defendant contends that the prosecutor's argument 
regarding the sexual crimes that the defendant would have 
inflicted on C.J. had C.J. not moved was improper because it was 
speculative and played on the jury's fear that, if they found 
the defendant not guilty, he would "take it further" and commit 
more sexual crimes.  See Commonwealth v. Ayoub, 77 Mass. App. 
Ct. 563, 569 (2010) (statements that "invited speculation about 
offenses uncommitted and . . . uncharged" are imprudent).  
Because the defendant failed to object to the closing argument, 
we review whether the prosecutor's argument created a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
v. Renderos, 440 Mass. 422, 425 (2003). 
 
The prosecutor's remarks were improper in that they 
suggested that had C.J. not moved away, the defendant might have 
committed additional sexual offenses against him, which invited 
the risk that the jury would divert their focus from the 
19 
 
 
evaluation of the evidence regarding the defendant's alleged 
crimes, and consider instead what the defendant might have done 
under different circumstances.  A prosecutor may make reasonable 
inferences as to what might have actually happened during the 
commission of the alleged crimes, but may not argue what might 
have happened had the victim not moved away. 
 
The challenged remarks, however, followed the defendant's 
closing argument, and must be evaluated in that context.  See 
Renderos, 440 Mass. at 425 (prosecutor's remarks evaluated in 
context of entire closing argument, judge's instructions of law, 
and evidence at trial); Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 
135, 143 (2001) (prosecutor may fairly respond to defendant's 
closing argument).  In his closing argument, the defendant's 
trial counsel contended that the defendant was "trying to 
introduce these young men to this whole idea of sexual 
development, maturity, puberty and everything that goes along 
with sex education," albeit in a clumsy manner, and therefore 
"[n]one of these events were [sic] indecent."  The prosecutor 
countered that the defendant's touching of the victims was not 
for the purpose of their sex education, but for his own sexual 
gratification and that the defendant took advantage of the trust 
he had built with the victims.  In this context, a reasonable 
jury were more likely to have understood the prosecutor's 
20 
 
 
statements that suggested what the defendant might have done, 
had C.J. not moved away, as commentary on the intent of the 
defendant's earlier touching of C.J., rather than on the 
defendant's future sexual dangerousness.  The prosecutor's 
statement, "[T]he point that [the defendant] got to with [J.B.] 
shows you exactly what his intent was when he started with 
[C.J.]," directed the jury to consider the defendant's conduct 
with J.B. in evaluating the defendant's intent in touching C.J.  
Having considered the prosecutor's improper statements in the 
context of the closing arguments and recognizing the strength of 
the evidence against the defendant, we conclude that there was 
no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
Conclusion.  Because G. L. c. 272, § 28, was constitutional 
at the time of the defendant's charged conduct, and the 
prosecutor's closing argument did not create a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.