Title: Herrington v. Central Soya Co., Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

420 So. 2d 1 (1982)
Bonnie HERRINGTON and Edgar Burt
v.
CENTRAL SOYA COMPANY, INC.
No. 80-740.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 16, 1982.
Rehearing Denied September 17, 1982.
Charles S. Doster of Merrill, Porch, Doster & Dillon, Anniston, for appellants.
C. E. Isom of Wilson, Bolt, Isom, Jackson & Bailey, Anniston, for appellee.
JONES, Justice.
The trial of this cause resulted in a jury verdict for Defendants Herrington and Burt on their counterclaim alleging a contract *2 between Defendants and another, the obligations of which Plaintiff Central Soya allegedly agreed to fulfill. Central Soya's motion for a new trial was granted; Defendants' motion for reconsideration of the order granting a new trial was denied; and Defendants filed this appeal.
In denying Defendants' motion for reconsideration, the trial judge set out a summary of the facts of the case and the grounds for his decision to grant a new trial:
*3 The applicable portion of the Alabama Statute of Frauds (Code 1975, § 8-9-2) reads:
The cases pointed out in Central Soya's motion for new trial, and referred to by the trial judge, reflect this Court's interpretation of subsection (3) of the Statute of Frauds. Those cases, and countless others, distinguish between a "collateral" agreement and an agreement that is "original" in nature:
See, also, Gregory v. Hardy, 53 Ala.App. 705, 304 So. 2d 209 (1974); Westmoreland v. Porter, 75 Ala. 452 (1883); Puckett v. Bates, 4 Ala. 390 (1842).
This distinction between "original" and "collateral," focuses on the nature of the promise made.
The sole issue presented on this appeal, then, is the propriety of the trial judge's granting the motion for new trial on the grounds that his oral charge to the jury with regard to the Statute of Frauds aspect was erroneous and thus caused "severe detriment" to Central Soya.
Walker v. Henderson, 275 Ala. 541, 544, 156 So. 2d 633 (1963). When it is apparent, then, that there has been a serious miscarriage or a total failure of justice, the trial judge is "under a duty to set aside [the verdict] and grant a new trial." State v. Oliver, 288 Ala. 32, 256 So. 2d 866 (1972). Further, once that power has been exercised by the trial judge, its consequences are attended by a presumption of correctness, and the trial judge's decision will not be overturned by the appellate court unless the evidence of record plainly and palpably shows that the trial court was in error. Hill v. Cherry, 379 So. 2d 590 (Ala.1980).
We recognize the long-standing rule as stated by the Court of Civil Appeals in American Service Mutual Insurance Company v. Grizzard, 356 So. 2d 191 (Ala.Civ. App.1978):
356 So. 2d  at 193.
Furthermore, as stated in Montgomery City Lines, Inc. v. Scott, supra:
248 Ala. at 31.
The discretionary power of the trial court, however, is not so broad as to obviate the basic principle expresed in A.R.C.P. 51:
While this language from Rule 51 is stated in the context of an appellate review of a trial court's refusal of a requested, written instruction, nonetheless, it is a correct statement of the polestar that guides the trial judge's review of a refused, written instruction challenged by a ground of a motion for new trial. That is to say, where the trial court's oral charge is a full, complete, and accurate statement of the applicable law, the trial judge's refusal of a requested, written instruction, although a correct statement of the law, serves as no legal basis for the granting of a new trial. For an analogous situation, in which the trial judge was reversed for granting a new trial to one of several defendants, see Harnischfeger Corporation v. Harris, 280 Ala. 93, 190 So. 2d 286 (1966).
When considering a motion for new trial raising the refusal of a requested, written instruction as a ground, the trial judge, of course, may compare the refused instruction with his oral charge in determining whether the same rule of law was substantially and fairly given to the jury. But when such comparison does not disclose that the oral charge was either incorrect or, in some material aspect, incomplete or misleading, the trial judge is not authorized to grant a new trial on such ground.
*5 We have reviewed the trial court's oral charge and have extracted those portions dealing with the Statute of Frauds aspect of Defendants' counterclaim against Central Soya:
We find no error in the charges quoted from. While the terms "original" and "collateral" do not appear in the trial judge's charges, the distinction between the two are clearly set out by the judge. The nature of both a "collateral" and an "original" promise or agreement are sufficiently defined by the trial judge so as to give the jury an adequate legal foundation upon which to base their deliberations and ultimate verdict in the case. The court's use of the emphasized portion of the charge, when taken in full context with the entire instruction, can hardly be said to be either incomplete or misleading. Indeed, these definitive terms are even more explanatory of the applicable legal principles than are the words "collateral" and "original"the terms used in the requested, written instruction.
The trial judge's failure to use "collateral/original" language in his charge did not diminish the sufficiency of his interpretation of § 8-9-2(3) and, therefore, did not cause "severe detriment" to Central Soya, nor did it result in the serious miscarriage or total failure of justice which ordinarily warrants the granting of a motion for new trial.
We hold, then, that the oral charge of the trial judge was proper in its definition of the legal distinction between an "original" and "collateral" promise or agreement as contemplated by § 8-9-2(3), and that the motion for new trial was improperly granted. This cause, therefore, is reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the judgment appealed from, in accordance with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
*6 TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, FAULKNER and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
ALMON, SHORES, EMBRY and BEATTY, JJ., dissent.
SHORES, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Because the trial judge specifically found that the charge "was to the severe detriment of the Plaintiff," I would affirm his decision granting a new trial.
ALMON and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
EMBRY, Justice (dissenting):
Because I interpret the trial court's recitations respecting a summary of the facts in this case, and the grounds for its decision to grant a new trial, differently from the majority, I am compelled to dissent. I read those recitations to mean nothing more than a statement to the effect that the trial court deemed his actions to have caused the jury to return an unjust verdict substantially prejudicial to plaintiff's rights. For this reason, I would affirm the trial court's order granting a new trial. See Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala. 630, 9 So. 738 (1891), and its progeny.
[1]  Defendants claim that an "agreement" was not reached between Defendants and Central Soya as to this aspect of the process. Rather, say Defendants, they were told by an agent of Central Soya, on January 16, 1980, that Defendants would care for the birds, under the terms of the court's TRO, and that Defendants would be compensated by Central Soya for such care from the time when the TRO went into effect (January 10, 1980).