Title: Houston v. Town of Waitsfield

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

HOUSTON_V_TOWN_OF_WAITSFIELD.93-154; 162 Vt. 476; 648 A.2d 864


Filed:  26-Aug-1994

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as
 well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are
 requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State
 Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that corrections
 may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                   No. 93-154


 Virginia Houston                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Washington Superior Court

 Town of Waitsfield, et al.                   March Term, 1994


 Stephen B. Martin, J.

 Stephen R. Crampton and Lucy T. Brown of Gravel and Shea, Burlington, and
   David P. Brauer of Brauer & Brauer, Medfield, Massachusetts, for
   plaintiff-appellant

 Steven F. Stitzel and Dianne L. Kenney of Stitzel & Page, P.C., Burlington,
   for defendant-appellee

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Eileen I. Elliott, Assistant
   Attorney General, Montpelier, for amicus curiae


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff Virginia Houston appeals from a decision of the
 Washington Superior Court affirming a denial of her zoning application by
 the Town of Waitsfield Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA).(FN1)  We affirm.
      Plaintiff (landowner) owns a 1,631-acre parcel in the Town of
 Waitsfield and applied for a permit to extract water from an aquifer lying

 

 under her property for transportation and eventual sale as bottled water.
 Her property is zoned agricultural-residential.  Under the Waitsfield zoning
 ordinance, the agricultural-residential zone allows eight uses by right,(FN2)
 including agricultural uses, and a similar number of conditional uses.(FN3)
 Agricultural uses are further defined as:  "The growing or harvesting of
 crops; raising of livestock; operation of orchards, including maple sugar
 orchards; the sale of farm produce on the premises where raised; processing
 or storage of products raised on the property."  Town of Waitsfield Zoning
 Ordinance, art. V, { 13.  The ordinance also contains the following
 restriction:  "[A]ny use not expressly permitted in any district is
 prohibited in that district."  Id. at art. II, { 4.
      On the recommendation of the town zoning administrator, landowner
 applied to the Town for a conditional use permit for her planned extraction
 and storage of water.(FN4)  In October 1991, landowner was given preliminary

 

 site plan approval by the Town Planning Commission based on its assessment
 that her activities fit within the conditional use category of "small-scale
 processing of raw agriculture or forestry products."  Shortly thereafter,
 the Waitsfield town attorney submitted an opinion letter to the ZBA in
 which he opined that landowner's proposed use was an agricultural one
 permitted as of right in her district.  As a result of the conflict of
 opinions, the ZBA considered landowner's application under both permitted
 and conditional use standards during its January 1992 public hearing on the
 proposed project.  After discussion, the ZBA rejected both theories, and
 denied landowner's application.
      On appeal to the superior court, the parties agreed to limit the issue
 for decision solely to whether plaintiff's proposed use was an agricultural
 one.  The Superior Court agreed with the ZBA's conclusion that the
 extraction of water was not a permitted agricultural use, and therefore,
 granted summary judgment in favor of the Town.  The court did not address
 whether the landowner's proposal fit within the conditional use category.
      Before this Court, plaintiff focuses her arguments on bringing the
 extraction of natural spring water within the definition of an agricultural
 use.  For example, plaintiff argues that the extraction of water is similar
 to a traditional agricultural use because water is a renewable food product
 that is cultivated and harvested like any other agricultural product, and
 water is "raised" quite literally from the ground as one would raise any
 other crop.
      Although plaintiff makes a number of creative arguments, we do not find
 them persuasive.  Zoning ordinances are construed according to the general
 rules of statutory construction.  See Blundon v. Town of Stamford, 154 Vt.

 

 227, 229, 576 A.2d 437, 439 (1990).  Therefore, if the meaning of the
 ordinance is plain, it will be enforced according to its terms, without need
 to resort to subordinate rules of construction.  See In re Vermont Nat'l
 Bank, 157 Vt. 306, 312, 597 A.2d 317, 320 (1991).  Our standard of review of
 the trial court construction is whether it is clearly erroneous, arbitrary
 or capricious.  See id.
      We cannot conclude that the bottling of natural spring water falls
 within the plain meaning of the zoning provision allowing an "agricultural"
 use.  The ordinance definition of "agriculture" is traditional and does not
 specifically include water as an agricultural product.  Although the term
 "agricultural" is given a broader meaning than "farming," see Jackson v.
 Building Inspector of Brockton,