Title: Nichol v. Stass

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 86065-Agenda 15-May 1999.
GREGORY NICHOL et al., Appellants, v. JOHN STASS et al., 								Appellees.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
	The plaintiffs, Gregory Nichol and Ruby Nichol, brought this
action in the circuit court of Cook County individually and as
cospecial administrators of the estate of the decedent, Jonathan
Nichol, against the defendants, John Stass and Bonnie Stass, and
the Human Enrichment and Developmental Association (HEDA),
an independent child welfare agency. The plaintiffs alleged that
Jonathan, their son, died while in the care of the Stasses, who were
acting as Jonathan's foster parents at the time of his death and who
were allegedly under the supervision of HEDA. The plaintiffs
sought recovery from the defendants under several different
theories. The trial judge dismissed the plaintiffs' action against the
Stasses on the ground that it was barred by sovereign immunity.
The appellate court affirmed. 297 Ill. App. 3d 557. We allowed the
plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and
we now reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts
and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	According to the allegations in the complaint, Jonathan died
on June 16, 1995, while at the Stasses' home and in their care, by
drowning in a toilet. He was two years old. The plaintiffs sought
recovery from each of the defendants under the Wrongful Death
Act (740 ILCS 180/1 (West 1996)), the Rights of Married Persons
Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 1996)), and the Survival Act (755
ILCS 5/27-6 (West 1996)), alleging that the defendants negligently
violated various duties imposed by the common law and by
administrative regulations, and, further, that liability was
established under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The complaint
alleged that the Stasses failed to supervise Jonathan, failed to
protect him from hazards within the home, failed to provide him
with sufficient food and water, and failed to provide him with
immediate medical care after the occurrence. The amended
complaint described HEDA as an independent licensed child
welfare agency that has contracted with the Department of Children
and Family Services "to provide supervision, inspections,
management, guidance and discipline" to foster parents and foster
children. The amended complaint further asserted that HEDA "was
in charge of, supervisor of, manager of, and director of" the
Stasses. The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that HEDA
negligently failed to supervise the Stasses, failed to ensure that the
child was provided with adequate food and water, failed to
complete background checks on the Stasses, and failed to place the
child in a home "free from observable hazards."
	Pursuant to sections 2-619(a)(1) and (a)(9) of the Code of
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1), (a)(9) (West 1996)), the
Stasses moved to dismiss the counts of the amended complaint that
were directed against them, arguing that the claims were barred by
the doctrines of sovereign immunity and public officials'
immunity. Following a hearing, the trial judge stated that he would
deny the Stasses' motion. Counsel for the Stasses then advised the
trial judge that a pending case in the appellate court raised a similar
issue, and the judge said that he would postpone his ruling on the
motion until the outcome of the appeal was known. The appellate
court soon filed its opinion in the other case, Griffin v. Fluellen,
283 Ill. App. 3d 1078 (1996), holding that the foster parent named
as a defendant in that action was a state employee and could invoke
the protection of the sovereign immunity doctrine. In a later
proceeding in the case at bar, the trial judge concluded that he was
required to follow Griffin and granted the Stasses' motion to
dismiss. The trial judge also entered a finding pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) permitting the plaintiffs
to appeal immediately from that ruling; the plaintiffs' separate
claims against HEDA remained pending in the circuit court of
Cook County, and they are not at issue in this appeal.
	The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal
order. 297 Ill. App. 3d 557. The appellate court believed that the
Stasses should be considered agents of the state and therefore could
assert the protection of the sovereign immunity doctrine. The court
theorized that the state owed the foster child a nondelegable duty
of care and that the state would therefore be vicariously liable for
the foster parents' conduct. The court rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that the Stasses, even as agents of the state, could still
be liable for the Jonathan's death because they owed the child a
duty of care that was entirely independent of their status as foster
parents. We allowed the plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal. 177
Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
	Before this court, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants are
neither employees nor agents of the state and therefore cannot
avoid suit through the sovereign immunity doctrine. The Stasses,
in response, maintain that the lower courts correctly concluded that
they are state employees or agents and that the plaintiffs' action
against them is one in substance against the State of Illinois,
triggering the sovereign immunity doctrine. The Stasses also argue,
as an alternative ground in support of the judgments below, that
even if they are not protected from suit by sovereign immunity,
they may still assert parental immunity as an affirmative defense to
the plaintiffs' action. We will consider these contentions in turn.
	Article XIII, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution provides,
"Except as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign
immunity in this State is abolished." Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, §4.
The legislature has reinstated sovereign immunity. Section 1 of the
State Lawsuit Immunity Act reads:
			"Except as provided in the 'Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act', enacted by the 83rd General Assembly, or
except as provided in 'AN ACT to create the Court of
Claims, to prescribe its powers and duties, and to repeal
AN ACT herein named', filed July 17, 1945, as amended,
the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party
in any court." 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 1996).
Section 8(d) of the Court of Claims Act grants the court of claims
exclusive jurisdiction over, among other matters, "[a]ll claims
against the State for damages in cases sounding in tort, if a like
cause of action would lie against a private person or corporation in
a civil suit." 705 ILCS 505/8(d) (West 1996).
	In Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 308 (1990), this court
summarized the scope and effect of the preceding provisions:
			"Whether an action is in fact one against the State, and
hence one that must be brought in the Court of Claims,
depends not on the formal identification of the parties but
rather on the issues involved and the relief sought. (Herget
National Bank v. Kenney (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 405, 408;
Hudgens v. Dean (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 353, 355-56; Moline
Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue (1951), 410 Ill. 35,
37.) Thus, the prohibition 'against making the State of
Illinois a party to a suit cannot be evaded by making an
action nominally one against the servants or agents of the
State when the real claim is against the State of Illinois
itself and when the State of Illinois is the party vitally
interested.' (Sass v. Kramer (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 485, 491.)
Sovereign immunity affords no protection, however, when
it is alleged that the State's agent acted in violation of
statutory or constitutional law or in excess of his authority,
and in those instances an action may be brought in circuit
court. Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 169, 188-89; Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor
(1977), 68 Ill. 2d 540, 548; Moline Tool Co., 410 Ill.  at 37;
Schwing v. Miles (1937), 367 Ill. 436, 441-42."
	A threshold question in the present appeal is whether the
defendants are in fact state employees or agents. If they are neither,
then the doctrine of sovereign immunity can have no application
here. The appellate court has reached conflicting results on the
question whether foster parents are either agents or employees of
the state. In the present case and in Griffin v. Fluellen, 283 Ill. App.
3d 1078 (1996), cited by the trial judge below, the appellate court
concluded that foster parents are state agents or employees and
therefore are protected from suit by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The appellate court reached the opposite result in
Commerce Bank v. Augsburger, 288 Ill. App. 3d 510 (1997), and
in Swanigan v. Smith, 294 Ill. App. 3d 263 (1998), holding in those
cases that foster parents are not state agents or employees and
therefore cannot assert immunity from suit under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. We conclude in the present case that the
defendants have failed to establish that they are state employees or
agents.
	The Foster Parent Law does not describe foster parents as
either employees or agents. 20 ILCS 520/1-10, 1-15, 1-20 (West
1996). Nor are foster parents deemed state employees in any of a
variety of statutes relating to state employment. See, e.g., 5 ILCS
375/3 (West 1996) (State Employees Group Insurance Act of
1971); 5 ILCS 340/3 (West 1996) (Voluntary Payroll Deductions
Act of 1983); 5 ILCS 410/10 (West 1996) (State Employment
Records Act); 5 ILCS 365/2 (West 1996) (State Salary and Annuity
Withholding Act); 40 ILCS 5/14-103.05 (West 1996) (State
Employees Retirement System of Illinois). The record in the
present case is not entirely clear concerning the relationship among
the Stasses, HEDA, and the Department of Children and Family
Services. According to the allegations in the complaint, HEDA, an
independent child welfare organization, was "in charge of,
supervisor of, manager of, and director of" the Stasses as foster
parents. Neither side appended to any of their pleadings copies of
the contracts between the Department and HEDA and between
HEDA and the Stasses. To be sure, it was the defendants' motion
to dismiss, and therefore it was their duty to supply a record in
support of their motion. In the absence of those documents, and in
light of the relevant statutes and the allegations in the plaintiffs'
amended complaint, we must conclude that the Stasses were
independent contractors rather than employees or agents of the
state.
	The Stasses argue, however, that, as foster parents, they were
subject to a diverse and comprehensive set of requirements
concerning their care for foster children. For example, the
Department regulates the cleanliness, temperature, and lighting of
a foster home. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.8(a) (1996). Pets in the
home must be inoculated against rabies. 89 Ill. Adm. Code
§402.8(e) (1996). Foster parents must develop and rehearse fire
evacuation plans. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.8(g) (1996). Foster
parents must provide a child with closet and dresser space (89 Ill.
Adm. Code §402.8(h) (1996)) and adequate bedding (89 Ill. Adm.
Code §402.9 (1996)). Meals and discipline are also subject to
extensive regulation. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §§402.11, 402.21 (1996).
	We do not believe that the preceding measures are anything
more than licensing requirements or that they serve to establish the
defendants' role as state employees or agents. The state licenses a
broad range of activities and professions, often in regulations as
detailed and encyclopedic as those involved here. See, e.g., Pre-School Owners Ass'n of Illinois, Inc. v. Department of Children &
Family Services, 119 Ill. 2d 268 (1988) (licensing requirements for
day-care centers). The existence of those administrative
requirements, however, does not mean that the persons subject to
them are state employees or agents.
	Nor is state employment established, for purposes of sovereign
immunity, through the State Employee Indemnification Act.
Section 1(b) of the Indemnification Act provides, "For the purpose
of this Act," in pertinent part:
			"The term 'employee' means *** individuals who serve
as foster parents for the Department of Children and
Family Services when caring for a Department ward, ***
but does not mean an independent contractor except as
provided in this Section." 5 ILCS 350/1(b) (West 1996).
"Employees" under the Indemnification Act are entitled to
representation by the Attorney General in civil proceedings
stemming from "any act or omission occurring within the scope of
the employee's State employment." 5 ILCS 350/2(a) (West 1996).
"Employees" also are entitled to indemnification under the Act for
any adverse judgment unless "the conduct or inaction which gave
rise to the claim or cause of action was intentional, wilful or
wanton misconduct and was not intended to serve or benefit
interests of the State." 5 ILCS 350/2(d) (West 1996). We note that
the Attorney General's office has represented the Stasses
throughout these proceedings.
	Even though the Indemnification Act terms foster parents
"employees," we do not believe that the provision must be
construed as establishing foster parents' position as state
employees for purposes of sovereign immunity. Rather, the
preceding definition simply affirms the entitlement of foster
parents to indemnification, without also establishing, for other
purposes, their status as government employees or agents. As
noted, the provision in the Indemnification Act begins with the
restrictive phrase "For the purposes of this Act," limiting the scope
of the ensuing definition. Moreover, section 1 of the Act expressly
recognizes that some independent contractors might be considered
"state employees" for purposes of indemnification, but the
provision does not purport to alter their status as independent
contractors for all other purposes.
	The appellate court also believed that sovereign immunity
could be invoked in the present case because, whether or not the
defendants are deemed state agents or employees, the state owed
Jonathan, a ward of the court, a continuing, nondelegable duty of
care. The appellate court further believed that the state would be
vicariously liable for conduct of the foster parents in violation of
that duty.
	We do not disagree with the broad proposition that the state
owes certain duties to persons whom it places in state-run
institutions (see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982)) or even in private care (K.H. ex rel.
Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); Doe v. New York
City Department of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Those cases are not applicable here, however. In general, they
involve actions under section 1983 (42 U.S.C. §1983 (1994))
against the state or state officers, and they concern what degree of
misconduct must be shown to give rise to public liability for
injuries occurring to a state ward while in private custody. Notably,
state liability in those circumstances does not extend to state
misconduct that is "merely negligent [citation] or even grossly
negligent." K.H., 914 F.2d  at 852. The court in K.H. thus framed
the issue before it as follows:
			"We emphasize that the issue is not whether the state's
duty follows the child into the private home in which he is
placed. We may assume, without having to decide, that it
does not, that the foster parents, even if paid by the state,
are not state agents for constitutional purposes. *** The
only right in question in this case is the right of a child in
state custody not to be handed over by state officers to a
foster parent or other custodian, private or public, whom
the state knows or suspects to be a child abuser." K.H.,
914 F.2d  at 852.
	The issues raised in the present case are far different from
those involved in the cases cited previously. The plaintiffs in this
action are not attempting to recover from the state for its decision
to place Jonathan with the Stasses, and we do not believe that the
state must be considered the real party in interest in this
proceeding.
	The appellate court below cited section 424 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in support of its nondelegable duty analysis.
Section 424 provides:
			"One who by statute or by administrative regulation is
under a duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions
for the safety of others is subject to liability to the others
for whose protection the duty is imposed for harm caused
by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide
such safeguards or precautions." Restatement (Second) of
Torts §424, at 411 (1965).
We do not believe that section 424 is applicable here. Under the
circumstances envisioned by section 424, it is the principal in the
first instance, and not the independent contractor, who must be
required by statute or regulation to provide specified safeguards. In
the present case, however, it is the principal-the state-who has
imposed these duties on the independent contractor; the
administrative regulations pertinent to this case are imposed by the
state on foster parents.
	The appellate court also cited sections 214 and 251 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency in support of its discussion of this
question. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§214, 251 (1958).
Section 214 provides:
			"A master or other principal who is under a duty to
provide protection for or to have care used to protect
others or their property and who confides the performance
of such duty to a servant or other person is subject to such
others for harm caused to them by the failure of such agent
to perform the duty." Restatement (Second) of Agency
§214 (1958).
Under section 251, a principal may be liable for physical harm
caused by the negligence of a "servant or a non-servant agent: (a)
in the performance of an act which the principal is under a duty to
have performed with care." Restatement (Second) of Agency §251
(1958). Again, although foster parents are required to comply with
numerous administrative regulations, we do not find anything that
imposes on the state an independent duty to guarantee compliance
by foster parents with those provisions. In addition, the hallmark
of a nondelegable duty is the right of the principal "to control
physical details as to the manner of performance" by the actor.
Restatement (Second) of Agency §250, Comment a (1958). The
administrative regulations cited in this case, however, do not go so
far.
	We agree with the plaintiffs that whatever duty there is to
provide placement, to institute procedures, or even to exercise
general authority over foster children is not the same as a
continuing, nondelegable duty to provide for the care of children
placed in foster homes. Moreover, even if a continuing duty can be
said to exist, we agree with the plaintiffs' observations that it
would pertain to the relationship between the state and the foster
children and not to the relationship between the state and foster
parents, and that it would not operate to confer sovereign immunity
on foster parents.
	The Stasses do not renew before this court their contention,
raised in the circuit court, that they are protected from liability
under the doctrine of public officials' immunity. As a separate
ground in support of the judgment below, however, the defendants
now contend, for the first time in these proceedings, that they are
shielded from liability by the doctrine of parental immunity. They
argue that they stand in loco parentis in relation to the foster child
and that they must therefore enjoy the same protection from
liability that a child's biological parents could assert, if the latter
had retained custody of the child.
	In Cates v. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76 (1993), this court reevaluated
the doctrine of parental immunity, abrogating its application in a
limited number of circumstances. The child in that case was injured
in an automobile collision that occurred as she was riding in a car
being driven by her father, and the court concluded that the father
was not immune from suit. The court distinguished the child's
action in that case from conduct inherent to the parent-child
relationship, with respect to which the doctrine of parental
immunity survived. The court explained:
		"Thus, under our standard, parental discretion in the
provision of care includes maintenance of the family
home, medical treatment, and supervision of the child. A
child may attempt to sue a parent alleging that the child
fell on a wet, freshly mopped floor in the home, but the
immunity would bar such an action because the parent was
exercising his discretion in providing and maintaining
housing for the child." Cates, 156 Ill. 2d  at 105.
	Courts in other states are divided on this question, with some
jurisdictions allowing the assertion of parental immunity by foster
parents (Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992); Brown v.
Phillips, 178 Ga. App. 316, 342 S.E.2d 786 (1986)), and other
jurisdictions denying it (Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 Mich. 579, 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985)). We conclude that a limited form of parental
immunity should be available in negligence actions against foster
parents. It should be noted that one of the decisions cited favorably
by Cates, Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193
(1963), recognized a limited form of parental immunity in an
action against a foster parent. Moreover, although the relationship
between foster parents and foster children is not identical with the
relationship between biological parents and their children, we
believe that it would be anomalous to reject some form of the
defense in these circumstances. The rationale identified by the
Cates court as justifying the retention of some portion of the
doctrine-the preservation of parental authority and discipline
(Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 103-04)-is also applicable in the foster parent
setting. Although foster parents receive compensation for their role,
they exercise a substantial amount of discretion in discipline,
supervision, and care, areas in which Cates found immunity to be
appropriate. As the appellate court observed in Commerce Bank v.
Augsburger, 288 Ill. App. 3d 510, 517 (1997), in allowing foster
parents to assert parental immunity:
			"Unquestionably, foster parents under the circumstances
of the Augsburgers have responsibility in regard to the
supervision and discipline of those children under their
care. Negligence in that regard is what is charged here.
Foster parents are nearly as much in need of leeway in this
regard as are natural parents. Often animosity can exist
between natural parents and foster parents. Exposure to
suit for negligence in supervising and disciplining the
children in their custody would be a deterrent to the best
performance by the foster parents in this regard. We find
no precedent for denying parental immunity here and deem
the granting of it consistent with the theory of Cates."
	An analogous situation arises in the educational context. In
Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education, 63 Ill. 2d 165 (1976),
this court determined that sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School
Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, pars. 24-24, 34-84a), which
conferred upon teachers the status of parents or guardians, entitled
teachers to a qualified immunity for their actions in supervising and
disciplining students. In a later case, Gerrity v. Beatty, 71 Ill. 2d 47
(1978), this court examined the considerations of public policy
underlying the earlier decision in Kobylanski. Referring to sections
24-24 and 34-84a of the School Code, the court explained:
			"The statutory provisions in question reflect a legislative
determination that the orderly conduct of the schools and
the maintenance of a sound learning atmosphere require
that there be a personal relationship between teacher and
student in which the teacher has disciplinary and
supervisory authority similar to that which exists between
parent and child. It is evident that this relationship would
be seriously jeopardized if teachers and school districts
were amenable to ordinary negligence actions for
accidents occurring in the course of the exercise of such
authority." Gerrity, 71 Ill. 2d  at 51.
	We believe that a similar rationale provides further support for
our decision to extend a qualified form of parental immunity to
foster parents. Like teachers, foster parents receive compensation
for their work. Moreover, the relationship between a foster parent
and a foster child, like the relationship between a teacher and a
student, is not permanent and may even be relatively brief. Yet
foster parents, like teachers and biological parents, are responsible
for a broad range of decisions affecting the vital interests of the
children involved. It would be anomalous to grant a qualified
immunity to educators and biological parents but to deny immunity
entirely to foster parents, who, in their relationships with their
foster children, share many important similarities with the others.
Thus, it can be seen that our result in this case does not represent
an undue expansion of the immunity doctrine; rather, our holding
is entirely consistent with this court's previous decisions
recognizing immunity for persons who stand in loco parentis to
children.
	To be sure, the defendants correctly suggest that the scope of
parental immunity in this context must be tempered by the
circumstances peculiar to the foster-child relationship. Thus, the
defendants acknowledge that parental immunity should not be
available when, for example, the underlying conduct resulted in the
revocation of a foster parent's license or a finding of neglect, or
when it is the subject of a criminal charge. The defendants also
suggest that any recognized immunity should not override
Department regulations to the contrary. We believe that these are
appropriate restrictions on the scope of the immunity in these
circumstances.
	As we have noted, the Stasses moved to dismiss the present
action under sections 2-619(a)(1) and (a)(9) of the Code of Civil
Procedure. They did not, however, raise the defense of parental
immunity in the circuit court, choosing at that time to assert only
the defenses of sovereign immunity and public officials' immunity.
Nonetheless,"[i]mmunity from suit is an 'affirmative matter'
properly raised under section 2-619(a)(9)" (Epstein v. Chicago
Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 383 (1997)), and thus parental
immunity could similarly be pleaded as a defense to the present
action in a motion for dismissal under section 2-619.
	The affirmative subject matter asserted by a defendant
pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) must appear on the face of the
plaintiff's complaint or be supported by affidavit or other
evidentiary material. Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 383; Kedzie & 103rd
Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116 (1993).
"Once a defendant satisfies this initial burden of going forward on
the section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss, the burden then shifts
to the plaintiff, who must establish that the affirmative defense
asserted either is 'unfounded or requires the resolution of an
essential element of material fact before it is proven.' Kedzie &
103rd Currency Exchange, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d  at 116." Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d  at 383.
	The Stasses did not submit any affidavits or other material in
support of their dismissal motion, even under the two theories they
pursued in the circuit court, so in considering the defense of
parental immunity we are necessarily limited to an examination of
the amended complaint, and an assessment of whether the
allegations in the amended complaint on their face disclose that the
action is barred by parental immunity. In light of the procedural
posture of this case, we are not prepared at this time to determine
whether the plaintiffs' action is completely barred by the doctrine
of parental immunity. Some of the allegations in the amended
complaint arguably fall within the scope of the immunity
recognized by Cates and further limited by the special
circumstances like those in which the state acknowledges the
defense would not be available, as noted above. Other allegations,
however, perhaps fall outside those boundaries. The plaintiffs
should have an opportunity to amend their complaint further to
allege additional matters that, if true, could defeat a claim of
parental immunity in the foster family context.
	"If a cause of action is dismissed during hearing on a section
2-619 motion on the pleadings and affidavits, the question on
appeal is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and
whether defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[Citations.]" Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 494
(1994). On the present record, we believe that there remains a
genuine issue of material fact concerning the Stasses' parental
immunity defense. The defendants did not raise this particular
theory in the circuit court. Although that omission does not
preclude them from now arguing the theory as an alternative
ground in support of the ruling below (Wright v. City of Danville,
174 Ill. 2d 391, 399 (1996)), it does mean that the issues on this
point were not shaped as they ordinarily would have been through
the adversary process. We therefore believe that the plaintiff should
be entitled to plead anew.
	For the reasons stated, the judgments of the appellate and
circuit courts are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit
court for further proceedings.
 
Judgments reversed;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
	Two-year-old Jonathan Nichol drowned in a bathroom toilet
while in the care of his foster parents, John and Bonnie Stass.
Jonathan's biological parents filed a complaint against the Stasses
alleging negligent supervision, monitoring and care of Jonathan.
The majority correctly holds that foster parents are not employees
or agents of the state and therefore the Stasses cannot invoke
sovereign immunity as a defense to plaintiffs' claims. Regrettably,
however, the majority also holds that foster parents enjoy a limited
but undefined form of parental immunity which apparently bars
some but not all of plaintiffs' claims against the Stasses. I disagree.
There are fundamental differences in the relationship between
foster parents and foster children and the relationship between a
child and his actual parents which preclude extending parental
immunity to foster parents. Additionally, the majority provides
virtually no guidance to lower courts regarding the extent and
scope of such immunity because the majority declines to hold
whether or not parental immunity bars plaintiffs' claims against the
Stasses. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
	The majority's holding that foster parents enjoy a limited form
of parental immunity is based on the assumption that foster parents
perform essentially the same functions as actual parents and
therefore it would be anomalous to extend immunity to actual
parents but not to foster parents. Slip op. at 8. Again, I disagree.
Fundamental differences between a foster parent and an actual
parent's relationship with a child militate against extending
parental immunity to foster parents. A foster parent is not related
to a foster child by blood or adoption. The relationship between a
foster parent and a foster child is created exclusively by contract.
Slip op. at 5 (referring to foster parents as "independent
contractors"). Foster parents, unlike biological or adoptive parents,
receive reimbursement for expenses related to the care of the foster
child. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §§353.5, 359.4 (1996); 20 ILCS
520/1-15(4) (West 1996) (foster parents have "right to receive
timely financial reimbursement commensurate with the care needs
of the [foster] child"). Moreover, a foster parent's relationship with
a foster child is purposely designed to be temporary. When a child
is placed in foster care, the state's paramount goal remains to
reunite the child with his biological parents. 89 Ill. Adm. Code
§§305.40(b)(2)(a), 315.45(b) (1996). See Johnson v. Burnett, 182
Ill. App. 3d 574, 582 (1989) (foster parents serve as "a temporary
way station on the road of a child's life until the difficulties at
home can be straightened out"). A foster parent is a "professional
member of the child welfare team" (20 ILCS 520/1-15(1) (West
1996)), not a foster child's permanent family member and
caregiver. The licensing of foster parents, the placement of foster
children and the relationship between foster parents and foster
children are all extensively regulated by the state. Since foster
parents voluntarily assume a contractual duty to provide care and
supervision for foster children, they should not be immunized for
failure to use reasonable care in the performance of their duties.
Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 Mich. 579, 586-87, 374 N.W.2d 683, 686
(1985) (holding parental immunity does not bar negligent
supervision claim against foster parents); Andrews v. Otsego
County, 112 Misc. 2d 37, ___, 446 N.Y.S.2d 169, 172-74 (1982)
(same); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963)
(same).
	The majority states that the primary policy justification for
parental immunity-preservation of parental authority and
discipline-also applies to foster parents. The extensive regulations
governing foster parents' ability to discipline foster children,
however, demonstrate that this justification is not viable when
applied to foster parents. Foster parents cannot decide for
themselves how to discipline foster children; their authority to
discipline foster children is strictly circumscribed by regulation.
Commerce Bank v. Augsburger, 288 Ill. App. 3d 510, 518 (1997)
(Cook, J., dissenting). Foster parents, for example, cannot subject
foster children to corporal punishment (89 Ill. Adm. Code
§402.21(c) (1996)), but they are permitted to assign special or
additional chores as a disciplinary measure (89 Ill. Adm. Code
§402.21(j) (1996)). Foster parents cannot deprive a foster child of
a meal or part of a meal as punishment. 89 Ill. Adm. Code
§402.21(d) (1996). Foster parents are permitted to restrict a foster
child to his bedroom as punishment, but the bedroom must be
unlocked, the foster child can only be confined for a "reasonable"
amount of time, and he must be given full access to the bathroom.
89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.21(g) (1996). Foster parents are permitted
to withhold a foster child's monthly personal spending money for
breaking family rules, but only if the child has been given an oral
warning. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.21(i)(1)(b) (1996). The State
even regulates how much of the foster child's spending money
(50%) that the foster parent can withhold for disciplinary reasons.
89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.21(i) (1996). The state places no such
restrictions on the authority of biological or adoptive parents to
discipline their children.
	The majority asserts that " '[e]xposure to suit for negligence
in supervising and disciplining the children in their custody would
be a deterrent to the best performance by the foster parents in this
regard.' " Slip op. at 9, quoting Commerce Bank v. Augsburger,
288 Ill. App. 3d 510, 517 (1997). I have no idea what this means.
In any event, the majority has it exactly backwards. Immunizing
foster parents from liability eliminates a powerful incentive for
ensuring that foster parents adequately perform the duties for which
they were hired. The majority's rationale,whatever it means, has
little relevance to this case. The Stasses have no more duties to
perform as foster parents; they no longer care for Jonathan Nichol.
He is dead.
	The majority gives great weight to the interest of preserving
foster parents' authority to discipline foster children, but the
majority fails to consider the foster child's interest in receiving
proper care and, if so indicated, compensation for his injuries.
Granting parental immunity to the foster parents in this case has the
perverse effect of protecting conduct which plaintiffs allege is
responsible for severing the only permanent family relationship
Jonathan Nichol had, his relationship with his biological parents.
	Finally, the majority's failure to hold whether plaintiffs'
claims are barred is inexcusable. The majority states:
		"Some of the allegations in the amended complaint
arguably fall within the scope of the immunity recognized
by Cates and further limited by the special circumstances
like those in which the state acknowledges the defense
would not be available, as noted above. Other allegations,
however, perhaps fall outside those boundaries. The
plaintiffs should have an opportunity to amend their
complaint further to allege additional matters that, if true,
could defeat a claim of parental immunity in the foster
family context." 192 Ill. 2d  at 248.
The majority justifies its bizarre refusal to determine whether
plaintiffs' claims are barred under the doctrine of parental
immunity by stating that "there remains a genuine issue of material
fact concerning the Stasses' parental immunity defense." Slip op.
at 11. Yet, inexplicably, the majority never identifies what this
genuine issue of material fact is. This, however, is not the only
thing missing from the majority opinion. There is no resolution or
conclusion in the majority opinion. It winds down to nothing more
than an advisory opinion that foster parents should have a limited
form of parental immunity. A cryptic statement that some of
plaintiffs' claims are barred and some are not is useless to the
parties in this case and provides no guidance to either litigants,
lawyers or judges who may be faced with this same issue. The
majority remands to the circuit court so that plaintiffs can replead,
but this disposition is absolutely useless if this court fails to
identify with any certainty which claims are barred by the
undefined form of parental immunity which the court now extends
to foster parents.
	Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
	The court today resolves the critical question of subject matter
jurisdiction on the basis of an incomplete record on appeal. The
court today also concludes that the state does not have a
nondelegable duty to provide for the care of children placed in
foster homes. Rather, the state's duty is merely to "provide
placement, to institute procedures, *** [and] to exercise general
authority over foster children." Slip op. at 9. Lastly, the court today
holds that foster parents stand in loco parentis to their foster
children and, with certain exceptions, are entitled to the same
protection from lawsuits enjoyed by biological parents and
teachers. I respectfully dissent.
	Jonathan Nichol died in the care of his foster parents, John and
Bonnie Stass. Jonathan's biological parents, Gregory and Ruby
Nichol, individually and as administrators of Jonathan's estate,
brought an action in the circuit court of Cook County against the
Stasses and the Human Enrichment and Developmental
Association (HEDA), a child welfare agency supervising the
Stasses. In the complaint, the Nichols alleged, inter alia, that the
Stasses failed to supervise Jonathan, to protect him from hazards
in the foster home, and to provide him with immediate medical
care. The Nichols alleged, inter alia, that HEDA negligently failed
to supervise the Stasses, and failed to place Jonathan in a home
"free from observable hazards."
	The Stasses filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant
to sections 2-619(a)(1) and (a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1), (a)(9) (West 1998)). They maintained
that an action against a foster parent is an action against the state,
and, as such, must be filed in the Illinois Court of Claims. See 705
ILCS 505/8 (West 1998). The circuit court agreed. The court
followed Griffin v. Fluellen, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1078 (1996), which
held that a claim against a foster parent appointed by the
Department of Children and Family Services is in actuality a claim
against the state, and must be filed in the court of claims. The
circuit court concluded that the court of claims had exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction over the Nichols' claim. The Nichols
appealed.
	The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's order of
dismissal. The appellate court held that foster parents are agents of
the state because they are appointed by the Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS), a state agency, and they are
performing duties statutorily mandated as government duties.
Furthermore, whether foster parents are agents of the state or
independent contractors, they perform the state's nondelegable
duties toward its foster wards. Thus, the conduct of the foster
parent is the conduct of the state, and the foster parent is
considered an agent of the state whether or not he is in fact an
independent contractor. The appellate court ruled that, in the
performance of their duties as foster parents, the Stasses were
agents of the state, and, as such, could be sued only in the court of
claims. The Nichols sought and received leave to appeal to this
court.
	In this court, the Nichols maintain that the Stasses are neither
agents nor employees of the state and, therefore, the circuit court
erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Contrarily, the Stasses contend that the court of claims
has exclusive jurisdiction over the Nichols' claim, as it does over
all claims brought against the state. Thus, the question on appeal
is whether the Stasses are agents or employees of the state,
protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. If a foster parent
is neither an agent nor an employee of the state, the circuit court
erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. If a foster parent is an agent or employee of the state,
and the claim against the Stasses is in fact a claim against the state,
the circuit court did not err in dismissing the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295
(1990) (discussing when an action nominally against a servant or
agent of the state is actually an action against the state). The subject
matter jurisdiction of the circuit court, and consequently of this
court, turns on the question of state agency or employment.
	To begin its analysis, the majority notes that the Foster Parent
Law (20 ILCS 520/1-10, 1-15, 1-20 (West 1998)) "does not
describe foster parents as either employees or agents" of the state.
Slip op. at 4. The majority then examines "a variety of statutes
relating to state employment," and concludes that foster parents are
not "deemed state employees" in these statutes. Slip op. at  5.
	It would seem that the next logical step for the majority would
be to determine that foster parents are not agents or employees of
the state. Instead, the majority looks to the contents of the record
on appeal to determine subject matter jurisdiction. The majority
notes:
		"The record in the present case is not entirely clear
concerning the relationship among the Stasses, HEDA,
and the Department of Children and Family Services.
According to the allegations in the complaint, HEDA, an
independent child welfare organization, was 'in charge of,
supervisor of, manager of, and director of' the Stasses as
foster parents. Neither side appended to any of their
pleadings copies of the contracts between the Department
and HEDA and between HEDA and the Stasses. To be
sure, it was the [Stasses'] motion to dismiss, and therefore
it was their duty to supply a record in support of their
motion." Slip op. at 5.
Because the record on appeal is incomplete, the majority assumes
that the Stasses are not agents or employees of the state. From this
assumption flows another: the circuit court had subject matter
jurisdiction because the claim against the Stasses is not a claim
against the state. Thus, the contents of the record on appeal
determine subject matter jurisdiction.
	Given the importance of subject matter jurisdiction, I question
the propriety of deciding the issue in such a speculative manner. If
the majority believes that state agency or employment is to be
determined on the basis of the record on appeal, why not defer the
question until the record is complete? Why not remand to the
circuit court so the Stasses can supplement the record? Once the
record is complete, this court could give full consideration to the
issue of state agency or employment. The majority identifies
correctly the threshold question on appeal: "whether the [Stasses]
are in fact state employees or agents." Slip op. at 10. However, the
majority never answers the "threshold question" so identified.
	I believe it was neither necessary nor proper to refer to the
record on appeal to determine the question of state agency or
employment. Whether foster parents are agents or employees of the
state depends on the statutory framework under which they operate,
the administrative regulations with which they must comply, and
the duties they are required to perform. Do foster parents perform
services for the state? Are foster parents reimbursed by the state for
expenses related to the care of the foster child? Does the state
dictate the manner in which foster parents perform their work? Are
their actions controlled by the state or subject to the state's right of
control? Based upon my review of the statutory framework created
by our General Assembly and the regulations promulgated by
DCFS these questions must be answered in the affirmative.
Consequently, I am of the opinion that foster parents are agents of
the state.
	In the case at bar, the Stasses were under the supervision of
HEDA, a child welfare agency. Nonetheless, they were subject to
control by the state, as I will demonstrate below. All foster parents,
whether supervised directly by DCFS or supervised by a child
welfare agency, are subject to DCFS licensing requirements, must
participate in DCFS training programs, must maintain records
required by DCFS, must provide access to DCFS, and must comply
with DCFS standards relating to the appearance, cleanliness and
safety of the facility; the discipline of children at the facility; and
the provision of care to children at the facility.
	There can be no doubt that foster parents perform services for
the state. DCFS "is a legislatively created agency charged with the
duty to protect and promote the welfare of the children of Illinois."
In re C.J., 166 Ill. 2d 264, 269-70 (1995). DCFS is empowered to
provide child welfare services aimed at protecting and promoting
the health, safety and welfare of children; assuring safe and
adequate care of children away from their homes, in cases where
the child cannot be returned home or cannot be placed for
adoption; and restoring to their families children who have been
removed, by providing services to the child and the families when
the child can be cared for at home without endangering the child's
health and safety. 20 ILCS 505/5(a)(3) (West 1998). DCFS relies
upon foster homes and child welfare agencies(1) to provide substitute
care for children away from home. Our legislature best describes
the role of foster parents:
		"Family foster care is an essential service for children and
their families who have been separated due to the tragedy of
child abuse, neglect, or dependency. When children have been
separated from their families, it is the responsibility of the
child welfare team to respond to the needs of the children and
their families ***.
			Foster parents are an essential part of and fulfill an
integral role on the child welfare team ***. By providing
care for children and supporting the attachment of children
to their families in a manner sensitive to each child's and
family's unique needs, the foster parent serves the child,
the family, and the community." 20 ILCS 520/1-5 (West
1998).
	There can be no doubt foster parents are entitled to
reimbursement from the state for the services they provide to foster
children. A foster parent's rights include "[t]he right to receive
timely financial reimbursement commensurate with the care needs
of the child." 20 ILCS 520/1-15(4) (West 1998). DCFS is required
to disburse monies to the foster parent for the child's care (89 Ill.
Adm. Code §353.5(a) (1996)), including payments for room,
board, clothing, and a personal allowance to the child (89 Ill. Adm.
Code §353.2 (1996)). DCFS also provides payment for goods and
services necessary to ensure the personal and physical maintenance
of placed children, including payments for cultural enrichment,
education expenses, camp fees, clothing, and supplies. 89 Ill. Adm.
Code §359.7 (1996).
	Lastly, there can be no doubt that foster parents' actions are
controlled by the state or subject to the state's right of control.
Virtually all aspects of foster care are dictated by the state.
Facilities for child care or child care facilities(2) are licensed by the
state. Application for a license to operate a child care facility must
be made to DCFS in the manner and on forms prescribed by it. 225
ILCS 10/4 (West 1996). The application must include written
authorization by the applicant and all adult members of the
applicant's household to conduct a criminal background
investigation; medical evidence in the form of a medical report that
the applicant and all members of the household are free from
communicable diseases or physical and mental conditions that
affect their ability to provide care for the child or children; the
names and addresses of at least three persons who can attest to the
applicant's moral character; and fingerprints submitted by the
applicant and all adult members of the applicant's household. 225
ILCS 10/4(b) (West 1998). DCFS issues a license to a child care
facility if, upon examination of the facility and investigation of
persons responsible for care of the children, DCFS is satisfied that
the facility and responsible persons meet standards prescribed for
the facility. 225 ILCS 10/4(d) (West 1998). The license remains
valid for four years, unless revoked by DCFS. 225 ILCS 10/5(d)
(West 1998).
	DCFS is required to prescribe and publish minimum standards
for licensing child care facilities, which include foster family
homes. 225 ILCS 10/7 (West 1998). The standards must touch
upon the character, suitability and qualifications of an applicant
and other persons directly responsible for the care and welfare of
the children served; the number of individuals or staff required to
insure adequate supervision and care of the children; the operation
and conduct of the facility and responsibility it assumes for child
care; the appropriateness, safety, cleanliness and general adequacy
of the premises, including maintenance of adequate fire prevention
and health standards conforming to state laws and municipal codes;
the maintenance of records pertaining to the admission, progress,
health and discharge of children; the filing of reports with DCFS;
the discipline of children; and the provisions for food, clothing,
educational opportunities, program, equipment and individual
supplies to assure the healthy physical, mental and spiritual
development of the children served. 225 ILCS 10/7(a) (West
1998). Each licensee is required to post a complete and current set
of the licensing standards in a common area so that all employees
of the facility may have unrestricted access to the standards, and
maintain documentation of the current review of licensing
standards by all employees. 225 ILCS 10/7(a) (West 1998). Lastly,
foster parents are also required to undergo training with DCFS.
DCFS standards provide that "[f]oster parents shall complete, as a
condition of initial licensure, at least six clock hours of training on
content approved by [DCFS]." 89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.12(i)
(1996).
	DCFS's control over the child care facility extends beyond the
initial licensing of the facility. DCFS may revoke a child care
facility's license, and issue a conditional license to the facility. 225
ILCS 10/8.2 (West 1998). The conditional license, issued for no
more than six months, affords the child care facility time to correct
deficiencies or meet licensing standards. 225 ILCS 10/8.2 (West
1998). A complete listing of deficiencies and a corrective plan
approved by DCFS must exist at the time a conditional license is
issued. 225 ILCS 10/8.2 (West 1998).
	DCFS may revoke or refuse to renew the license of a child
care facility if the licensee fails or refuses to admit authorized
representatives of DCFS at any reasonable time for the purpose of
investigation; fails to maintain the standards prescribed and
published by DCFS; fails to provide, maintain, equip and keep in
safe and sanitary conditions premises established or used for child
care as required under standards prescribed by DCFS, or as
required by any law, regulation or ordinance applicable to the
facility; fails to correct any condition which jeopardizes the health,
safety, morals, or welfare of children served by the facility; fails to
exercise reasonable care in the hiring, training and supervision of
facility personnel; or fails to discharge or sever affiliation with the
child care facility of an employee or volunteer at the facility with
direct contact with children who is the subject of an indicated
report under section 3 of the Abused and Neglected Child
Reporting Act (325 ILCS 5/3 (West 1998)). 225 ILCS 10/8, 8.1
(West 1998).
	DCFS also controls the placement of children in child care
facilities (20 ILCS 505/7 (West 1998)), family-child visitation (89
Ill. Adm. Code §301.210 (1996)), and sibling visitation (89 Ill.
Adm. Code §301.220 (1996)). In making a placement, DCFS must
ensure that the child's health, safety, and best interests are met. 20
ILCS 505/7(c) (West 1998). DCFS is required to develop a case
plan designed to reunify the child with his family when safe and
appropriate, or to move the child toward the most permanent living
arrangement possible. 20 ILCS 505/6a (West 1998). The foster
parent is a member of the child welfare team, and champions the
efforts of the team by providing care to the child and supporting the
attachment of the child to his family in a manner sensitive to the
child's and family's unique needs. 20 ILCS 520/1-5 (West 1998).
	Beyond the development of an overall case plan for each child,
DCFS delves into the everyday aspects of care provided to the
child. DCFS publishes standards relating to sleeping arrangements
for the foster child (89 Ill. Adm. Code §§402.9(a), (b), (c) (1996));
sharing a bedroom (89 Ill. Adm. Code §§402.9(c), (d), (e) (1996));
the size of the bedroom and ventilation (89 Ill. Adm. Code
§§402.9(g), (h) (1996)); the springs and mattresses on the bed, and
mattress covers (89 Ill. Adm. Code §§402.9(i), (k) (1996)); linen
changes (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.9(j) (1996)); the bedroom
furnishings (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.9(l) (1996)); the number of
meals and time span between meals (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.10(a)
(1996)); special diets (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.10(c) (1996)); the
nutritional needs of the child (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.10(d)
(1996)); the manner in which meals are served and sanitary
conditions (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.10(f) (1996)); coerced feeding
(89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.10(g) (1996)); child assistance in meal
preparation (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.10(h) (1996)); the use of food
products from home-raised animals (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.10(b)
(1996)); medical and dental checkups (89 Ill. Adm. Code
§402.17(a) (1996)); immunizations and tests (89 Ill. Adm. Code
§402.17(c) (1996)); the use of prescription drugs or medicines (89
Ill. Adm. Code §402.17(e) (1996)); contagious diseases (89 Ill.
Adm. Code §402.17(g) (1996)); recreation and leisure time (89 Ill.
Adm. Code §402.19 (1996)); development of social relationships
through participation in schools, and other community and group
activities (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.16(c) (1996)); participation in
extra-curricular activities including sports, art and music (89 Ill.
Adm. Code §402.20(b) (1996)); cooperation in the child's
educational plan (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.20(a) (1996)); contact
with educators (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.20(c) (1996)); corporal
punishment, verbal abuse, threats or derogatory remarks (89 Ill.
Adm. Code §402.21(c) (1996)); meal deprivation (89 Ill. Adm.
Code §402.21(d) (1996)); deprivation of visits with family or other
persons (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.21(e) (1996)); clothing or sleep
deprivation (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.21(f) (1996)); restriction to a
room (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.21(g) (1996)); use of physical
restraints (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.21(h) (1996)); withholding
child's spending money for disciplinary purposes (89 Ill. Adm.
Code §402.21(i) (1996)); special or additional chores as
disciplinary measure (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.21(j) (1996));
removal of privileges as disciplinary measure (89 Ill. Adm. Code
§402.21(k) (1996)); inviting friends to the foster home or visiting
in the homes of friends (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.16(c) (1996));
overnight stays with friends or relatives of the child or foster
parents (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.16(d) (1996)); personal allowance
money and earning additional spending money (89 Ill. Adm. Code
§402.16(e) (1996)); opportunity for the child to assume some
responsibility for himself and for household duties (89 Ill. Adm.
Code §402.16(g) (1996)); equitable treatment of all children in the
foster family (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.16(a) (1996)); and
supervision of the child (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.16(b) (1996)).
	DCFS also publishes standards relating to the number and ages
of children served in a child care facility (89 Ill. Adm. Code
§402.15 (1996)); the health of the foster parents and members of
the household (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.14 (1996)); qualifications
of the foster family, including financial resources which must be
available to the foster family (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.12 (1996));
the operation of other business enterprises in the child care facility
(89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.11(c) (1996)); employment of foster
parents outside the home (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.11(d) (1996));
the operation of a rooming or boarding house on the premises (89
Ill. Adm. Code §402.11(a) (1996)); and general requirements for
the child care facility (89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.8 (1996)). The
general requirements for the foster home concern such matters as
the water supply of the foster home; the use of portable space
heaters; fire and emergency evacuation plans; closet and dresser
space for the foster child; the availability of a telephone; storage of
drugs, household supplies, dangerous tools, weapons, guns and
ammunition; household pets; the child's right to privacy while
sleeping, washing and dressing; and ventilation, lighting and
cleanliness of the home. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.8 (1996). Lastly,
foster parents are required to maintain certain records for each
child, including a record of immunizations, a daily log of
medication prescribed and given, and a record of arrangements for
the child's education. 89 Ill. Adm. Code §402.26 (1996).
	DCFS exercises pervasive control over foster parents, such as
the Stasses. The right to control the actions of another is a hallmark
of agency. Restatement (Second) of Agency §1, at 7 (1958); see
also Taylor v. Kohli, 162 Ill. 2d 91, 95-96 (1994) (the principal
factor to consider in determining whether a relationship is that of
principal/agent, employer/employee or owner/independent
contractor is the right to control the manner in which the work is
done); Hansen v. Caring Professionals, Inc., 286 Ill. App. 3d 797,
801 (1997). In light of the fact that foster parents perform services
for the state, receive reimbursement from the state, and are subject
to the state's control in all aspects of the provision of care to
children at the facility, foster parents must be considered agents of
the state.
	An equally important reason to hold that foster parents are
agents of the state is that foster parents perform the state's
nondelegable duty to provide for the care of its wards. By statute,
DCFS is required to provide child welfare services aimed at
protecting and promoting the health, safety and welfare of children;
assuring safe and adequate care of children away from their homes,
in cases where the child cannot be returned home or cannot be
placed for adoption; and restoring to their families children who
have been removed, by providing services to the child and the
family when the child can be cared for at home without
endangering the child's health and safety. 20 ILCS 505/5(a)(3)
(West 1998). Further, DCFS is required to "establish rules and
regulations concerning its operation of programs designed to meet
the goals of child safety and protection, family preservation, family
reunification." 20 ILCS 505/5(g) (West 1998). A decision to place
a child in foster care is to be made "with considerations of the
child's health, safety, and best interests." 20 ILCS 505/5(l-1)
(West 1996).
	As noted in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[o]ne who by
statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide
specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is
subject to liability to the others for whose protection the duty is
imposed for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed
by him to provide such safeguards or precautions." Restatement
(Second) of Torts §424, at 411 (1965). This is so because the
statutory duty is nondelegable, and the principal is not relieved of
liability by hiring an independent contractor to perform his duty.
The independent contractor is deemed the agent of the principal.
Stated in other words,"[a] master or other principal who is under
a duty to provide protection for or to have care used to protect
others or their property and who confides the performance of such
duty to a servant or other person is subject to liability to such
others for harm caused to them by the failure of such agent to
perform the duty." Restatement (Second) of Agency §214, at 463
(1958). The Restatement elaborates:
		"[O]ne may have a duty to see that due care is used in the
protection of another, a duty which is not satisfied by
using care to delegate its performance to another but is
satisfied if, and only if, the person to whom the work of
protection is delegated is careful in giving the protection.
In this *** class, the duty of care is non-delegable."
Restatement (Second) of Agency §214, Comment a, at 464
(1958).
In the case at bar, the state had a duty to provide care to Jonathan
Nichol. The state attempted to fulfill this duty by placing Jonathan
in the home of the Stasses, where he died. The Stasses should be
deemed agents of the state, and the state should be vicariously
liable for the actions of the Stasses. The state could not relieve
itself of liability by entrusting the performance of its duty to the
Stasses.
	The majority here states:
		"[W]hatever duty there is to provide placement, to institute
procedures, or even to exercise general authority over
foster children is not the same as a continuing,
nondelegable duty to provide for the care of children
placed in foster homes." Slip op. at 9.
I disagree. The majority's analysis of this issue trivializes the duty
imposed upon the state. In his dissent in Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., dissenting),
Judge Kozinski summarized the relationship between the foster
child and the state:
		"In removing children from the custody of parents who are
unable, unwilling or unfit to take care of them, the state
performs a very significant-and very
delicate-governmental function. Because children
normally have no resources of their own, and very young
children lack the wherewithal to provide for their own
upkeep, they depend on adults for the necessities of life
and for the other resources they need to become healthy,
productive and well-adjusted adults. [Citations.] Normally
these resources are provided by their parents; every child
has a legitimate expectation, if not entitlement, to be
supported by the adults who brought him into the world.
But when, because of death or disability, criminality or
drug abuse, the child's parents fail to provide these
resources, the state normally steps in to make sure the
child receives the necessary care. Indeed, every state in the
union has undertaken to care for its abandoned, neglected
and mistreated children. In so doing, states take on very
significant responsibilities.
			The process starts with removing the child from the
custody and control of those to whom he is entitled to look
for support and nurture. 'When the minor must be
removed from the custody of his parents for his own
welfare ... the state assum[es] the parents' role... .'
[Citations.] The weighty and sensitive responsibilities of
parenthood-with its focus on the well-being of the
child-devolve upon the state."
 The state does not merely have a "duty to provide placement, to
institute procedures, or even to provide general authority over
foster children." The state has a duty to care for its wards.
	Far from trivial, the state's duty to its wards is of constitutional
proportions. Several courts have held, by analogy to Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976), and
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982), that a state may be liable under the due process clause
for failing to protect children in foster homes from mistreatment by
foster parents. See Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895
(7th Cir. 1997); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th
Cir. 1990); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th
Cir. 1987); Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services,
649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981); Taahira W. ex rel. McCord-Salley v.
Travis, 908 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Ill. 1995); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1989). See also Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir. 1995).
	I do not wish to imply that foster parents, in general, are bad
persons. The vast majority of foster parents are persons of good
nature, who undertake a difficult task and do so to the best of their
abilities. I approach this issue from the point of view that the state
has a nondelegable duty to care for its wards. Foster parents are
agents of the state. To the extent that certain foster parents, like
persons in the general population, are unqualified to provide care
to foster children, or do not possess the temperament or qualities
needed to serve as foster parents, the state must be held liable for
harm suffered by the state's wards while in the care of these foster
parents.
	The state had a nondelegable duty to care for Jonathan,
whether the duty is said to be statutory or constitutional. The state
could not avoid liability by delegating this duty to the Stasses. As
a consequence, I believe that the Nichols' action should have been
brought against the state in the Court of Claims. I also believe this
court does not have jurisdiction over this action, as subject matter
jurisdiction lies in the Court of Claims.
	Having assumed that the Stasses are not state agents or
employees, the majority next considers whether the doctrine of
parental immunity bars an action against a foster parent for
negligence. To begin its analysis, the majority explains the
rationale justifying the doctrine of parental immunity-preservation
of parental authority and discipline. Slip op. at 10. The majority
then compares the roles of biological parents, foster parents and
teachers. The majority acknowledges that "the relationship between
foster parents and foster children is not identical with the
relationship between biological parents and their children." Slip op.
at 10. The relationship between a foster parent and foster child "is
not permanent and may even be relatively brief." Slip op. at 11.
Also, foster parents "receive compensation for their work." Slip op.
at 11. However, the majority concludes that foster parents stand in
loco parentis to their foster children and, with certain exceptions,
are entitled to the same protection from lawsuits enjoyed by
biological parents and teachers.(3) The majority explains:
		"[F]oster parents, like teachers and biological parents, are
responsible for a broad range of decisions affecting the
vital interests of the children involved. It would be
anomalous to grant a qualified immunity to educators and
biological parents but to deny immunity entirely to foster
parents, who, in their relationship with their foster
children, share many important similarities with the others.
Thus, it can be seen that our result in this case does not
represent an undue expansion of the immunity doctrine;
rather, our holding is entirely consistent with this court's
previous decisions recognizing immunity for persons who
stand in loco parentis to children." Slip op. at 11-12.
Again, I disagree.
	Like Justice Heiple, I believe that there are fundamental
differences in the relationship between a foster parent and foster
child and the relationship between a biological parent and child
which militate against extension of parental immunity to foster
parents. Foster parents do not stand in loco parentis to foster
children. Thus, I join in Justice Heiple's dissent on this issue.
However, I write separately to sound a cautionary note: the
majority has redefined the term in loco parentis, and its opinion
may have unintended consequences.
	Prior case law established that one who stands in loco parentis
is one who "take[s] upon himself the obligations of a parent."
Busillo v. Hetzel, 58 Ill. App. 3d 682, 684 (1978); accord People
ex rel. Smilga v. Hoyer, 345 Ill. App. 365, 368 (1952). As
explained in Smilga,
		" ' "a person in loco parentis, means a person taking upon
himself the duty of a father to make provision for the
child." [Citation].' The cases dealing with this subject
emphasize the fact that one standing in loco parentis
assumes the financial burdens arising out of the
relationship of parent and child." Smilga, 345 Ill. App. at
369, quoting Capek v. Kropik, 129 Ill. 509, 515 (1889).
Thus, in Mid-American Lines, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Ill. 2d 47, 52 (1980), this court stated,"[a] showing of in loco parentis ***
has come to require that the putative parent (1) intended to assume
parental functions and (2) discharged parental duties." "Mere
affection, generosity, and exercise of care without assuming the
usual financial burdens of parenthood are insufficient to place one
in loco parentis to a child." Busillo, 58 Ill. App. 3d at 684, citing
Hawkey v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Ill. 1952).
	In Wallace v. Smyth, 301 Ill. App. 3d 75 (1998), our appellate
court considered whether a not-for-profit academy, the director of
the academy, and counselors employed by the academy
(collectively defendants) stood in loco parentis to a child. DCFS
had placed the child with the academy for a 90-day diagnostic
assessment. The child lived in the home of the director of the
academy, and died while being restrained by the director and two
counselors. The child's biological parent filed an action alleging
that defendants acted negligently, willfully, and wantonly in the
death of the child. The trial court granted defendants' motion to
dismiss the negligence claim on the basis of parental immunity. On
appeal, the court observed that "parties must assume the usual
financial burdens of parenthood before they can be considered in
loco parentis, and such status is granted sparingly." Wallace, 301
Ill. App. 3d at 79. The court observed further:
	"The relevant legislation here is the Illinois Administrative
Code, which states DCFS has legal and financial responsibility
for children of whom it is guardian, regardless of their
momentary location. That obligation entails providing for such
children's clothing, mental health care, camp fees and
supplies, cultural enrichment, educational expenses, and
medical care." Wallace, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 80-81.
The court found that DCFS, and not defendants, bore ultimate
responsibility for traditional parental functions with regard to the
child. Thus, the action against defendants was not barred by the
doctrine of parental immunity. See also Bland v. Department of
Children & Family Services, 141 Ill. App. 3d 818, 822 (1986)
(DCFS was the party in loco parentis to the child; the grandparents
did not enjoy the right, nor were they burdened by the obligations
of parents.)
	As noted in Justice Heiple's dissent, foster parents receive
reimbursement for expenses related to the care of the foster child.
Slip op. at 14 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Although foster parents
provide housing and care to the foster child, foster parents have the
"right to receive timely financial reimbursement commensurate
with the care needs of the [foster] child." 20 ILCS 520/1-15(4)
(West 1998). Under established law, a person who exercises "the
parental attributes of affection, generosity, and care without
assuming the usual financial burdens of parenthood does not stand
in loco parentis to a child." Lawber v. Doil, 191 Ill. App. 3d 323,
325 (1989). Consequently, a foster parent does not stand in loco
parentis to the foster child.
	The majority concedes that foster parents do not assume the
financial burdens of parenthood. See slip op. at 10, 11. However,
citing Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education, 63 Ill. 2d 165
(1976), the majority notes this court has held that teachers stand in
loco parentis to a student, although teachers are compensated for
their work. Slip op. at 11. Sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the
School Code (105 ILCS 5/24-24, 34-84a (West 1998)), which
were in effect at the time this court decided Kobylanski (see Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 122, pars. 24-24, 34-84a), provide that "[i]n
all matters relating to the discipline in and conduct of the schools
and the school children, [teachers] stand in the relation of parents
and guardians to the pupils." Thus, it is by legislative enactment
that a teacher stands in loco parentis to a student. The legislature
has not seen fit to include a similar provision in the statutes relating
to foster parents.
	By its holding today, the majority has eliminated the
requirement that one who stands in loco parentis must assume
financial responsibility for the child. The majority has redefined the
term in loco parentis. The implication in the present case is that the
Stasses may invoke the doctrine of parental immunity to bar an
action for negligent supervision of Jonathan Nichol. The majority
opinion, however, may have unintended consequences. As noted
by the appellate court in Wallace, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 80, housing,
care and education are also provided by summer camps, day-care
centers, medical and psychological treatment facilities,
grandparents and other relatives of a child. Do these persons or
entities also stand in loco parentis to a child? Should the Wallace
court have held that the academy and counselors stood in loco
parentis to the child placed in their care? Moreover, use of the term
in loco parentis is not restricted to the area of foster care or
education. Under the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS
305/1 et seq. (West 1998)) death benefits are payable to a child to
whom the deceased employee stood in loco parentis. A parent, or
one who stands in loco parentis to a child may be guilty of the
offense of contributing to the dependency or neglect of the child.
720 ILCS 130/2 (West 1998). By redefining the term in loco
parentis, the majority opinion may have an impact on diverse areas
of the law.
	In this case, we must, as a threshold matter, determine whether
a foster parent is an agent or employee of the state. The subject
matter jurisdiction of the circuit court, and of this court, turns upon
the answer to that question. The majority failed to answer this
question, choosing instead to assume subject matter jurisdiction
based on an insufficient record. To be sure, the majority might
have concluded that foster parents are not agents or employees of
the state. It would thus follow that the action against the Stasses is
not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, the
majority chose not to determine whether foster parents are agents
or employees of the state, relying instead on the insufficiency of the
record on appeal. I suggest this court cannot assume subject matter
jurisdiction in the absence of a complete record. I also believe that
a foster parent is an agent of the state. The state's control over
various aspects of the care foster parents provide to foster children
is pervasive. Further, the state has a nondelegable duty to care for
its wards. In electing to place foster children with foster parents,
the state does not relieve itself of its obligation to care for its wards
or of its liability when its duty to its wards is breached. Lastly, I
believe that a foster parent does not stand in loco parentis to the
foster child because the foster parent does not assume financial
responsibility for the foster child. Consequently, the doctrine of
parental immunity should not be extended to protect foster parents
from negligence actions. The majority asserts that the "result in this
case does not represent an undue expansion of the immunity
doctrine." Slip op. at 11-12. I disagree. For these reasons, I
respectfully dissent.
1.      1A child welfare agency is a "public or private child care facility,
receiving any child or children for the purpose of placing or arranging
for the placement of the child or children in foster family homes or
other facilities for child care, apart from the custody of the child's or
children's parents. The term 'child welfare agency' includes all agencies
established and maintained by a municipality or other political
subdivision of the State of Illinois to protect, guard, train or care for
children outside their own homes." 225 ILCS 10/2.08 (West 1998).

2.      2Facility for child care or child care facility means "any person,
group of persons, agency, association or organization, whether
established for gain or otherwise, who or which receives or arranges for
care or placement of one or more children, unrelated to the operator of
the facility, apart from the parents, with or without the transfer of the
right of custody in any facility *** established and maintained for the
care of children." 225 ILCS 10/2.05 (West 1998).
	A foster family home is "a facility for child care in residences of
families who receive no more than 8 children unrelated to them, unless
all the children are of common parentage, or residences of relatives who
receive no more than 8 related children placed by [DCFS], unless the
children are of common parentage, for the purpose of providing family
care and training for the children on a full-time basis." 225 ILCS
10/2.17 (West 1998).

3.      3The majority imposes certain restrictions on the immunity afforded
foster parents. Thus, parental immunity is not available when "the
underlying conduct result[s] in the revocation of a foster parent's
license or a finding of neglect, or when it is the subject of a criminal
charge." Slip op. at 12. Further, the immunity does not override DCFS
regulations to the contrary. Slip op. at 12.