Title: Matter of Injury to Potter

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Injury to Potter1986 WY 63715 P.2d 214Case Number: 85-174Decided: 03/06/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN 
THE MATTER OF INJURY TO EUGENE F. POTTER, AN EMPLOYEE OF RMT PROPERTIES, INC. 
EUGENE F. POTTER, APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

 
 
v. 

 
 
RMT PROPERTIES, INC., 
APPELLEE (EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District Court,LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Daniel E. White of Vines, 
Rideout, Gusea & White, Cheyenne.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

E. William Rideout, III, 
Cheyenne.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

 
 
** Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is from the 
district court's denial of a worker's compensation permanent partial disability 
claim. The district court held that the worker failed to carry his burden of 
proving that a worksite injury caused his partial disability. We must decide 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's factual 
determination.1 

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     In January of 1984 
claimant Eugene Potter, a 59-year-old boilermaker, slipped on a patch of ice at 
the Husky Oil Refinery in Cheyenne and fell on his back. He did not miss 
any work, but he did consult his family physician who began a course of physical 
and drug therapy. Claimant's employer, appellee RMT Properties, Inc., consented 
to his worker's compensation claims covering the cost of these treatments, and 
they were paid. Claimant suffered another injury several weeks later when he 
pulled his back while turning a wrench at the plant. This injury, like the 
first, did not cause claimant to miss work, but he did continue to receive 
worker's compensation benefits for back treatments.

 
 

[¶4.]     In May of 1984, the 
upstream assets2 of Husky Oil Company were purchased 
by Marathon Oil Company and the downstream assets, including the Cheyenne refinery, were 
transferred to a Husky subsidiary, RMT Properties, Inc. As part of the 
reorganization, older workers, including claimant, were offered early retirement 
with a special severance package. Claimant accepted the package and retired on 
June 1, 1984.

 
 

[¶5.]     Shortly after retiring, 
claimant visited Dr. Kline who had successfully treated him for back problems 
since 1958. He told Dr. Kline of the incidents in January and February, 1984, 
and complained of continued back pain. After x-rays, Dr. Kline diagnosed 
claimant's condition as degenerative arthritis of the spine and facetteal 
joints.

 
 

[¶6.]     Throughout the summer 
and fall of 1984, claimant continued to visit Dr. Kline for his back pain, and 
he submitted claims for those visits to worker's compensation. Finally, on 
December 21, 1984, claimant filed a claim for permanent partial disability under 
§ 27-12-403, W.S. 1977. The employer contested the claim, and the case was set 
for trial.

 
 

[¶7.]     At trial, Dr. Kline 
testified on claimant's behalf. He repeated to the court his diagnosis of 
claimant's condition as degenerative arthritis, a condition which, according to 
Dr. Kline, takes a long time to develop. He testified that it could have 
developed in claimant through heredity, small repetitive injuries, heavy labor, 
or just sixty years of normal life.

 
 

[¶8.]     While Dr. Kline never 
said that claimant's work injuries in the winter of 1984 caused the arthritis, 
he did testify that the work injuries caused the arthritis to become 
symptomatic; in other words, the arthritis became painful and disabling after 
the injuries. Specifically, Dr. Kline was asked, "[Do] you attach some 
significance to the fact that the arthritic condition became symptomatic after 
the January incident where he slipped and fell at work?" He responded, "I think 
that is the straw that broke the camel's back." On other issues, Dr. Kline 
testified that claimant's condition was incurable, that he would never be able 
to do heavy work, and that he was, therefore, 25 percent permanently 
disabled.

 
 

[¶9.]     The district court 
denied appellant's claim, basing its decision primarily on claimant's failure to 
establish a causal connection between the 1984 worksite accidents and the 25 
percent disability. In its opinion letter, the court 
stated:

 
 
"The problem, as I see 
it, is that the disability is directly attributable to a disease of degenerative 
arthritis, as both doctors testified. There is a suggestion by claimant, and Dr. 
Kline in part sustains this, that the injury of the claimant in January, 1984, 
during and at work, may have been an aggravation of the preexisting arthritic 
disease. The problem with that, however, is that there is no testimony or 
evidence of any kind in the record to show that the 25% disability resulted from 
the aggravation of the January, 1984, injury in whole or in part. The testimony 
is that the disability of 25% impairment of the body as a whole results from the 
arthritic disease itself. If there was, in fact, an aggravation of the 
preexisting arthritic disease, did such aggravation cause the plaintiff to be 
25% disabled? Or, did such aggravation, if any, cause a 20%, or a 15%, or 0% 
disability? There is no evidence from which I can make any finding in this 
regard."

 
 

[¶10.]  Claimant made a timely motion for new 
trial which the district court denied after a hearing. The court's statements at 
the hearing provide an additional insight into the court's reasoning on the 
critical causation issue:

 
 
"I have to repeat what I 
said in my letter opinion, that taking into account, as a factual matter, I 
listened to the claimant and all of the other evidence; I was not overly 
impressed with the weight of the claimant's testimony - and my function is 
sorting out and assigning credibility and weight. In all honesty, I would have 
to say that Mr. Potter came through to me as a man who was somewhat upset at his 
employer and felt that he ought to - I will answer it this way. Unfortunately, I 
watched the witness and listened to him, and I was not convinced that he had 
ever had an injury that was caused by his present 
complaints."

 
 

[¶11.]  The court denied claimant's motion for a 
new trial, and claimant appealed to this court.

 
 

[¶12.]  In a worker's compensation case, the 
burden of proof is on the claimant to prove the essential elements of his claim 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Nuanes v. State ex rel.    Wyoming  Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 694 P.2d 86, 89 
(1985). Claimant's claim arose under § 27-12-403, W.S. 1977, which states in 
part:

 
 
"Permanent partial 
disability means the loss or permanent impairment of a limb or sense, or any 
other injury known to surgery or medicine to constitute permanent impairment of 
a bodily function." The remainder of the statute sets the level of compensation 
for the various types of permanent partial disability. Section 27-12-403, by 
employing the term of art "injury," incorporates additional essential elements 
from the definition of injury found in § 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977. The 
portions of the definition pertinent to this case are as 
follows:

 
 
"`Injury' means any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging * * * arising 
out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶13.]  Under the factual setting of this case 
and the statutes outlined above, claimant had to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he suffered:

 
 
(1) A harmful change in 
the human organism

 
 
(2) which constituted a 
permanent impairment of a bodily function

 
 
(3) which arose out of 
and in the course of employment3

 
 
(4) and which he incurred 
while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the 
employer.

 
 

[¶14.]  In determining whether an unsuccessful 
claimant has met his burden of proof on an essential element, we must assume on 
review that the evidence favoring the employer is true and leave out of 
consideration entirely the evidence presented by the claimant which conflicts 
with the employer's evidence. We must also give the evidence of the successful 
employer every reasonable inference that can be drawn from it. Nuanes v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, supra. Finally, after reviewing the evidence in this 
light we can reverse the trial court only if its findings are "clearly erroneous 
or manifestly wrong and totally against the evidence." Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 
Wyo., 678 P.2d 874, 878 (1984).

 
 

[¶15.]  The element upon which this case turns is 
the causal connection between claimant's employment and his disability. After 
reviewing the facts in this case, we cannot say that the trial court's finding 
on this issue was clearly erroneous. We reach this conclusion even though the 
only medical testimony on causation, Dr. Kline's statements, favored the 
claimant.

 
 

[¶16.]  The district court recognized that Dr. 
Kline's testimony on causation depended upon the accuracy of appellant's account 
of his injury as he related it to the doctor. At the hearing on claimant's 
motion for a new trial, the court stated:

 
 
"Unfortunately, I watched 
the witness and listened to him, and I was not convinced that he had ever had an 
injury that was caused by his present complaints. His present complaints are 
pre-existent, and the doctors have diagnosed them as an arthritic condition, a 
degenerative arthritic condition. The doctor is relying on Mr. Potter saying, 
well, I think I slipped and fell in January and February. Then he says that this 
was a long-standing condition that was actually caused over the years by the 
normal aging process, coupled with his normal activities, whatever they might 
have been; that in his view, if he 
suffered this slip and fall, that was, quote, `the straw that broke the 
camel's back,' unquote. I don't think the 
court can take that as expressing a medical opinion to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, that he suffered a 25 percent permanent partial disability by 
a work-related accident." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶17.]  Dr. Kline did not learn of the alleged 
accidents until the summer of 1984 and, even then, there were never any 
objective tests showing that the incidents took place. The tests revealed only 
that claimant suffered from degenerative arthritis, a condition that had, 
without question, developed over a long period of time. Claimant could have 
given Dr. Kline an inaccurate history which Dr. Kline repeated in testifying at 
the trial.

 
 

[¶18.]  The district court had an ample basis to 
conclude that claimant might have concocted the work-related accidents. First, 
there was claimant's general demeanor as a witness, something we cannot 
reconstruct from a cold record, but something which the district court found 
important. At the hearing on claimant's motion for a new trial, the court 
stated:

 
 
"I was not overly 
impressed with the weight of the claimant's testimony - and my function is 
sorting out and assigning credibility and weight. In all honesty, I would have 
to say that * * * I was not convinced that he had ever had an injury that was 
caused by his present complaints."

 
 

[¶19.]  Second, claimant's credibility was 
damaged when a witness contradicted claimant's own testimony that he was 
restricted to sedentary activities. The witness testified that he saw claimant 
waterskiing on Wheatland Reservoir in the summer of 1984. Finally, when the 
claimant spoke to Dr. Kline in the summer of 1984, claimant had the necessary 
knowledge and motive to create a false claim. He had filed about 25 worker's 
compensation claims in the preceding ten years. And, he was angry with his 
employer as a result of his retirement. We think that the district court could 
have legitimately concluded from the evidence that the worksite accidents did 
not occur or that if they did occur, they did not result in 
injury.

 
 

[¶20.]  Even if the district court had concluded 
that claimant had actually experienced the work-related accidents in 1984, the 
court could still have found that there was no causal connection between the 
accidents and the disability. The court heard Dr. Kline's critical testimony in 
person and apparently felt that the doctor was not very sure of his opinions. 
The weakness of the doctor's opinions is clearly shown by his affidavit which 
accompanied claimant's motion for a new trial. In that affidavit Dr. Kline 
stated: 

 
 
"I cannot say with 
medical certainty the extent to which the pre-existing disease, as opposed to 
employment trauma contributed to Mr. Potter's current disability. * * * If I was 
required to render my best educated guess on this question, I would say that 
employment related traumas probably constituted 25% to 40% of the total cause of 
the permanent partial disability from which Mr. Potter currently 
suffers."

 
 
This kind of speculation, 
especially when based on a questionable history given by the claimant, could not 
satisfy the claimant's burden of proving causation.

 
 

[¶21.]  In summary, we think that the district 
court - which was in a better position to judge the demeanor, truth and veracity 
of the witnesses and which weighed the testimony of Dr. Kline and the other 
witnesses testifying at the trial - could reasonably have found against claimant 
on the causation element. The district court's denial of the claim was not 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

 
 

[¶22.]  Affirmed.

1 Appellant Eugene Potter 
(claimant) maintains in his brief that the district court required him to 
apportion the amount of his disability between the worksite accident and his 
preexisting back problems. He argues that such an apportionment, which reduces a 
worker's award based on a preexisting condition, is improper because the 
employer must take the worker as he finds him and pay for all the disability 
that is caused by a work-related event.

 
 
We do not have to reach 
any conclusions about the so-called apportionment rule because we do not think 
that the district court based its decision on that rule. Instead, the district 
court held that claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
any of his disability was caused by the worksite accident. Without establishing 
some causal connection between the workplace accident and his disability, a 
worker clearly cannot recover under §§ 27-12-102(a)(xii) and 27-12-403, W.S. 
1977. It is the court's determination on the cause issue which we must 
review.

2 In the oil business 
upstream assets are related to the exploration, extraction and transportation of 
crude oil while downstream assets are those which relate to refining and 
marketing of the finished product.

3 This element of the 
claim has also been established in Wyoming case law, e.g., Bocek v. City of Sheridan, Wyo., 432 P.2d 893, 894 (1967).