Title: State v. Ronald G. Sorenson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2000 WI 43 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-3107 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In re the Commitment of Ronald G.  
Sorenson: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Ronald G. Sorenson,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Reported at:  (No Cite) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 26, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 3, 1999 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Juneau 
 
JUDGE: 
John W. Brady 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there 
were briefs by T. Christopher Kelly and Thomas, Kelly, Habermehl 
& Mays, S.C., Madison and oral argument by T. Christopher Kelly. 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was 
argued by Warren D. Weinstein, attorney general with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 43 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No.  98-3107 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Ronald G.  
Sorenson: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronald G. Sorenson,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.   Reversed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals that dismissed the 
appeal of Ronald G. Sorenson (Sorenson).1  The court of appeals 
found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because 
Sorenson did not file a notice of appeal in a timely manner. 
¶2 
Sorenson attempted to appeal an order by the Circuit 
Court for Juneau County, John W. Brady, Judge, that committed 
Sorenson as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. § 980.05. 
                     
1 State v. Sorenson, No. 98-3107, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1999). 
FILED 
 
MAY 26, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
2 
 Sorenson's attorney transmitted the notice of appeal via 
facsimile machine to the office of the clerk of the circuit 
court on the last calendar date permitted for filing the notice. 
 He concurrently mailed the original copy of the notice to the 
clerk's office, and the clerk received that mailed document one 
day after the filing deadline. 
¶3 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
it 
lacked 
jurisdiction because Sorenson's notice of appeal was not timely 
filed.  The court found that the facsimiled transmission did not 
constitute a filing of a notice of appeal under Pratsch v. 
Pratsch, 201 Wis. 2d 491, 548 N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1996).  
Pratsch held that Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2) prohibits the filing of 
a notice of appeal by facsimile because a notice of appeal is a 
paper that requires a filing fee.  Id. at 494-95.  Under the 
rule, only papers that do not require a filing fee may be filed 
by facsimile.2  Id. 
                     
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.16(2) provides: 
(2) For papers that do not require a filing fee: 
 
(a) A court may adopt a local rule, if it is approved 
by the chief judge, that requires the use of a plain-
paper facsimile machine and permits the filing of 
those papers by facsimile transmission to the clerk  
of circuit court. 
 
(b) If no rule has been adopted under par. (a), a 
judge may permit a party or attorney in a specific 
matter to file those papers with the clerk  of circuit 
court by facsimile transmission to a plain-paper 
facsimile machine. 
 
(c) The party or attorney, by filing papers by 
facsimile transmission, certifies that permission of 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
3 
¶4 
Sorenson 
contends, 
however, 
that 
as 
an indigent 
person, he was exempted from fee payments by Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.29(1)(d)2.3  Therefore, he was not required to submit a 
filing fee to initiate his appeal.  Because he was not required 
to submit a filing fee for his papers, he was allowed under Wis. 
Stat. § 801.16(2) to transmit the notice of appeal by facsimile 
transmission.  Sorenson consequently maintains that he satisfied 
the statutory requirements for the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal. 
¶5 
This court granted Sorenson's petition for review to 
decide 
one 
discrete 
issue, 
namely 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.16(2), under which "papers that do not require a filing 
fee" may be filed by facsimile transmission, permits indigent 
parties to file a notice of appeal by facsimile.  We hold that a 
notice of appeal may be filed by facsimile transmission because 
a notice of appeal is not a paper that requires a filing fee to 
                                                                  
the 
judge 
or 
court 
for 
filing 
by 
facsimile 
transmission has been granted.  Papers filed by 
facsimile 
transmission 
are 
considered 
filed 
when 
transmitted except that papers filed by facsimile 
transmission completed after regular business hours of 
the clerk of court's office are considered filed the 
next business day. 
 
All statutory references are to the 1997-98 volume of the 
Wisconsin Statutes unless indicated otherwise. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.29(1)(d)2 states costs and fees are 
not required upon a showing:  "That the person is represented by 
an attorney through a legal services program for indigent 
persons, including, without limitation, those funded by the 
federal legal services corporation, the state public defender or 
volunteer attorney programs based on indigency." 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
4 
confer jurisdiction.  The court of appeals obtained jurisdiction 
over this appeal when the clerk of the circuit court received 
Sorenson's facsimiled notice of appeal within the statutorily 
prescribed time frame.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
For purposes of this review, the pertinent facts are 
not in dispute.  On April 2, 1998, a jury found Sorenson a 
sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.05.  At a 
July 29, 1998, disposition hearing, the Juneau County Circuit 
Court entered the judgment of the jury and issued a commitment 
order.  The order required that Sorenson be committed to 
institutional care in a secure mental health unit or other 
facility.   
¶7 
Sorenson, who is indigent, sought to appeal the order 
of commitment.  On August 7, 1998, the office of the State 
Public Defender appointed a Madison-based attorney to represent 
Sorenson in the appeal.  
¶8 
The parties agree that the notice of appeal was due no 
later than October 27, 1998.  On the morning of October 27, 
1998, Sorenson's attorney transmitted the notice of appeal via 
facsimile to the office of the Clerk of Circuit Court for Juneau 
County.  In the cover letter accompanying the facsimiled notice 
of appeal, Sorenson's attorney stated that he made the filing by 
way of facsimile "[p]ursuant to my discussion with a clerk in 
your office today."  The cover letter also indicated that the 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
5 
attorney transmitted the same document via facsimile to opposing 
counsel:  The letter noted that the attorney sent it "via 
facsimile & U.S. Mail" and copied both the office of the 
District Attorney and the office of the Attorney General.  
¶9 
The notice of appeal addressed Sorenson's intent to 
appeal the final judgment entered by the Juneau County Circuit 
Court.  It specified that the judgment order committed Sorenson 
as a sexually violent person to the custody of the Department of 
Health and Social Services.4  The notice also stated that Wis. 
Stat. § 752.31(2) did not apply to this appeal,5 and it declared 
that this was not an appeal entitled to preference by statute.  
¶10 The time stamp on the facsimile transmission reveals 
that the facsimile arrived at the clerk's office at 11:18 a.m. 
on October 27, 1998.  The clerk of court stamped the facsimiled 
notice of appeal with the October 27, 1998, date, and the Juneau 
County Criminal Court Record notes that a "Notice of AppealFax 
Copy" reached the office on that day.  That same day, the clerk 
of court transmitted a copy of the notice of appeal to the Clerk 
of the Court of Appeals, indicating that the notice of appeal 
was "filed herein on October 27, 1998."   
¶11 Sorenson's attorney also mailed the notice of appeal 
on the same day he transmitted the filing by facsimile machine, 
                     
4 The Department of Health and Social Services was renamed 
the Department of Health and Family Services, effective July 1, 
1996.  1997-98 Wisconsin Blue Book, at 419.  
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.31(2) specifies which cases shall be 
heard by one court of appeals judge, not a three-judge panel of 
the court of appeals.  
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
6 
and the clerk of court received the mailed document on October 
28, 1998, one day after the filing deadline.  The clerk's office 
stamped the mailed copy with the October 28, 1998, date, and the 
Juneau County Criminal Court Record marked the arrival of the 
notice of appeal on its log for October 28.   
 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶12 The court of appeals directed the parties to prepare 
briefs addressing whether the filing of a notice of appeal by 
facsimile transmission is permitted in light of Pratsch.  
Sorenson, unpublished slip op. at 1.  Pratsch held that Wis. 
Stat. § 801.16(2) "plainly means that only those papers that do 
not 
require 
a 
filing 
fee 
may 
be 
filed 
by 
facsimile 
transmission."  Pratsch, 201 Wis. 2d at 494.  The Pratsch court 
reasoned that § 801.16(2) precludes the filing of a notice of 
appeal 
via 
facsimile 
because 
another 
procedural 
statute, 
§ (Rule) 809.25(2)(a)1, requires the payment of a filing fee for 
a notice of appeal.6  Id. at 494-95. 
¶13 Finding that Sorenson's appeal was not timely filed, 
the court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal.  Sorenson, unpublished slip op. 2.  The court 
observed that Pratsch allows filing by facsimile transmission 
only of those types of papers that generically do not require a 
                     
6  Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(2)(a)1 provides: "(2) 
FEES. (a) The clerk of the court shall charge the following 
fees: 1. For filing an appeal, cross-appeal, petition for 
review, petition to bypass, or other proceeding, $150." 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
7 
filing fee.  Id.  The court emphasized that its rule precluding 
the filing of notices of appeal by facsimile transmission 
applied uniformly to all notices of appeal and did not turn on 
whether an individual appellant is required to pay the filing 
fee.  Id.  Because a notice of appeal may be filed before the 
court determines that an indigent appellant can proceed without 
the payment of filing fees, the court declined to endorse an 
"unworkable situation" in which the assessment of a particular 
appellant's eligibility to file a notice of appeal by facsimile 
transmission might not be made until after the notice of appeal 
actually is filed.  Id. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 This 
court 
has 
established 
the 
rules 
of 
civil 
procedure that govern the manner in which parties must initiate 
appeals.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.84;7 Jadair Inc. v. United 
States Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d 187, 194, 200, 562 N.W.2d 401 
(1997).  The issue in this case, whether Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2) 
allows indigent parties to file a notice of appeal by facsimile 
transmission, requires us to interpret a court rule. 
¶15 When we interpret court rules, this court turns to the 
rules of statutory construction for guidance.  Jadair, 209 
                     
7 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.84, Applicability of rules of 
civil procedure, states:  "An appeal to the court is governed by 
the rules of civil procedure as to all matters not covered by 
these rules unless the circumstances of the appeal or the 
context of the rule of civil procedure requires a contrary 
result." 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
8 
Wis. 2d at 194.  The interpretation of a court rule, like 
statutory interpretation, is a question of law that we review 
independently without deference to the lower courts.  Id.  The 
goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect 
to the intent of the legislature.  Lake City Corp. v. City of 
Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 558 N.W.2d 100 (1997).  Similarly, 
in interpreting court rules, we seek to reach a result 
consistent with the manifest intent of this court.  County of 
Door v. Hayes-Brook, 153 Wis. 2d 1, 21-22, 449 N.W.2d 601 (1990) 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring).  If the manifest intent of this 
court is clear from the plain language of a rule, we give effect 
to that intent and look no further.  Jungbluth v. Hometown, 
Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996); see also 
State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). 
On the other hand, if a procedural rule is ambiguous, we are 
likely to construe it liberally so as to encourage a resolution 
of the controversy on the merits.  See DOT v. Peterson, 226 
Wis. 2d 623, 633, 594 N.W.2d 765 (1999) (citing Kyncl v. Kenosha 
County, 37 Wis. 2d 547, 555-56, 155 N.W.2d 583 (1968); State v. 
Rosen, 72 Wis. 2d 200, 204-05, 240 N.W.2d 168 (1976)). 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶16 We begin our analysis by considering how an appellate 
court secures jurisdiction over an appeal.  A party must file a 
notice of appeal to initiate an effective appeal.  Wis. Stat. 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
9 
§ (Rule) 809.10(1)(a).8  A notice of appeal is a signed paper 
that contains certain required pieces of information and alerts 
the opposing party, the circuit court, and the court of appeals 
of a party's intention to seek recourse from a court judgment or 
                     
8 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.10, Initiating the appeal, 
provides:   
(1) NOTICE OF APPEAL.  (a) Filing.  A person shall 
initiate an appeal by filing a notice of appeal with 
the clerk of the trial court in which the judgment or 
order appealed from was entered and shall specify in 
the notice of appeal the judgment or order appealed 
from, whether the appeal is in one of the types of 
cases specified in s. 752.31(2), and whether the 
appeal is one of those to be given preference in the 
circuit court or court of appeals pursuant to statute. 
 The person at the same time shall notify the court of 
appeals of the filing of the appeal by sending a copy 
of the notice of appeal to the clerk of the court.  
The person shall also send the court of appeals an 
original and one copy of a completed docketing 
statement on a form prescribed by the court of 
appeals.  The statement shall accompany the court of 
appeals' copy of the notice of appeal.  The person 
shall also send a copy of the completed docketing 
statement to opposing counsel.  Docketing statements 
need not be filed in criminal cases or in cases in 
which a party appears pro se. 
 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
10
order.9  Jadair 209 Wis. 2d at 201; 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate 
Review § 325 (1995).  The timely filing of a notice of appeal is 
necessary 
to 
give 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
subject 
matter 
jurisdiction over an appeal.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.10(1)(b).10 
 If a party fails to comply with the statutory requirements for 
filing a timely notice of appeal, the court of appeals lacks 
jurisdiction, 
and 
the 
court 
must 
dismiss 
the 
appeal 
as 
defective.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.10(1)(b); see also Michael 
S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin 
§ 5.2 (David L. Walther et al., eds., 1986 ed.). 
¶17 Our rules do not define what constitutes a "filing."  
Usually, a clerk stamps a notice of appeal "filed" on the date 
the paper comes into the clerk of circuit court's office, and 
the date stamped on the notice serves as the date of filing.  
                     
9 The parties in this case do not dispute that Sorenson's 
notice of appeal fulfilled the requirements for the necessary 
content of a notice of appeal.  The facsimiled notice of appeal, 
and its subsequent transmittal to the court of appeals by the 
clerk of the circuit court, fulfilled its statutory goal of 
alerting the opposing party, the circuit court, and the court of 
appeals of Sorenson's intention to appeal the final decision of 
the commitment order.  Sorenson's notice of appeal complied with 
the content requirements set forth by this court:  (1) It 
specified the order or judgment from which Sorenson sought to 
appeal; (2) it addressed whether the appeal fell within Wis. 
Stat. § 752.31(2); and (3) it indicated whether the appeal 
should be given preference by statute.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.10(1)(a); see also Michael S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice 
and Procedure in Wisconsin § 5.3 (David L. Walther et al., eds., 
1986 ed.). 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.10(1)(b), Time for filing, 
provides that:  "The notice of appeal must be filed within the 
time specified by law.  The filing of a timely notice of appeal 
is necessary to give the court jurisdiction over the appeal." 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
11
Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. International Rectifier Corp., 91 
Wis. 2d 813, 822, 284 N.W.2d 93 (1979).  Despite this common 
practice, the date stamped on the notice of appeal does not 
speak conclusively to the date of filing.  Id. at 824.  Rather, 
this court has determined that a notice of appeal is "filed as 
of the date that the notice of appeal is actually received by 
the clerk [of the circuit court]."  Douglas v. Dewey, 147 
Wis. 2d 328, 335, 433 N.W.2d 243 (1989) (quoting Boston Old 
Colony Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d at 822).   
¶18 We have also determined that payment of a filing fee 
for an appeal is not a jurisdictional requirement.  Id. at 336. 
 Hence, failure to make payment at the time of filing the notice 
of appeal is not fatal to an appeal.  Id. at 336-37.  The only 
document that the clerk of the circuit court must receive within 
the statutorily prescribed time frame is the notice of appeal 
itself.  Id. 
¶19 There is no dispute that the office of the clerk 
actually received the facsimile transmission on October 27, 
1998, the statutory deadline for the filing of Sorenson's notice 
of appeal.  Moreover, under our holding in Douglas, 147 Wis. 2d 
at 336-37, the fact that a filing fee did not accompany the 
facsimiled notice of appeal had no impact on the timeliness of 
the filing.  As a result, the court of appeals obtained 
jurisdiction over the appeal in this case if the applicable 
rules permitted a notice of appeal to be filed by facsimile 
transmission. 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
12
¶20 The State contends, however, and the court of appeals 
held, that Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2) and Pratsch prohibit the 
filing by facsimile transmission of papers that require a filing 
fee.  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.16(2) states that:  
 
(2) For papers that do not require a filing fee: 
 
(a) A court may adopt a local rule, if it is approved 
by the chief judge, that requires the use of a plain-
paper facsimile machine and permits the filing of 
those papers by facsimile transmission to the clerk  
of circuit court. 
 
(b) If no rule has been adopted under par. (a), a 
judge may permit a party or attorney in a specific 
matter to file those papers with the clerk  of circuit 
court by facsimile transmission to a plain-paper 
facsimile machine. 
 
(c) The party or attorney, by filing papers by 
facsimile transmission, certifies that permission of 
the 
judge 
or 
court 
for 
filing 
by 
facsimile 
transmission has been granted.  Papers filed by 
facsimile 
transmission 
are 
considered 
filed 
when 
transmitted except that papers filed by facsimile 
transmission completed after regular business hours of 
the clerk of court's office are considered filed the 
next business day.  (emphasis added) 
The court of appeals applied this rule in Pratsch, holding that 
"[a] notice of appeal is a paper that requires the payment of a 
filing fee.  RULE 809.25(2)(a)1.  Therefore, § 801.16(2), does 
not permit the filing of a notice of appeal by facsimile 
transmission."  201 Wis. 2d at 494-95.  The Pratsch court 
reached this conclusion after observing that the Judicial 
Council Committee Note, 1991, Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2), remarks 
that the rule "clarifies that papers (other than those requiring 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
13
a filing fee) may be filed by facsimile transmission."  Id. at 
494. 
¶21 The issue, then, is whether a notice of appeal is 
among the "papers that do not require a filing fee."  To decide 
this issue, we must interpret the word "require," keeping in 
mind that "[t]he goal of rule interpretation, like that of 
statutory interpretation[,] is to give effect to the intent of 
the enacting body."  City of West Allis v. Sheedy, 211 Wis. 2d 
92, 96, 564 N.W.2d 708 (1997).  Thus, we must interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 801.16(2) in a manner that is consistent with the 
manifest intent of this court.  See County of Door, 153 Wis. 2d 
at 22 n.2 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
¶22 The process of rule interpretation begins with the 
plain language of the rule.  Jadair, 209 Wis. 2d at 195.  If 
that language clearly and unambiguously sets forth the intent of 
this court, it is our duty to apply that intent and not look 
behind the language to discern its meaning.  Id.  If the 
language does not express our intent clearly and unambiguously, 
however, we will construe the rule expansively to harmonize with 
our intent of encouraging a climate in which parties can resolve 
their controversies on the merits.  See Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 
633.  "The upshot of these maxims" is that when a procedural 
rule is ambiguous, we resolve the ambiguity in a manner that 
favors a determination upon the merits.  Id. 
¶23 Having set forth the general guidelines of rule 
interpretation, we proceed to our analysis of Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.16(2).  Usually, this court first looks at the definitions 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
14
of words and phrases before it will find that a statute or rule 
is ambiguous.  State v. Circuit Court for Jackson County, 155 
Wis. 2d 148, 156-57, 454 N.W.2d 792 (1990).  In this case, Wis. 
Stat. § 801.16(2) does not define what it means to "require" a 
filing fee.  When a statute or rule does not provide a 
definition, we construe the words according to their ordinary 
and plain meaning.  Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 
61, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995).  Courts give nontechnical words their 
common and accepted meaning, and that meaning can be determined 
from the definition provided by a recognized dictionary.  See 
State v. Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d 664, 670, 350 N.W.2d 647 (1984). 
¶24 An accepted definition of "require" is:  "1. To have 
as a requisite; need.  2. To call for as obligatory or 
appropriate; demand.  3. To impose an obligation on; compel."  
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed. 
1992).  Thus, a notice of appeal would be a paper that 
"requires" a filing fee if the fee were requisite or obligatory 
to the appeal, or if the clerk of court could demand or compel 
payment of the fee as part of the process of filing the notice 
of appeal.   
¶25 This dictionary definition suggests that a notice of 
appeal is not a paper that "requires" a filing fee for three 
reasons.  First, in Douglas, 147 Wis. 2d at 336, we held that 
the payment of filing fees does not speak to the jurisdictional 
foundations of an appeal.  Thus, the payment of a filing fee is 
not "required" for a notice of appeal because the filing fee is 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
15
not an obligatory prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the court 
of appeals.   
¶26 Second, an indigent person, like Sorenson, is not 
obligated to pay a filing fee at any stage during the appeal 
process.  Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(2)(a)1, the rule upon 
which the Pratsch court relied to find that a notice of appeal 
requires a filing fee, does provide that "[t]he clerk of court 
shall charge the following fees:  1. For filing an appeal, 
cross-appeal, petition for review, petition to bypass, or other 
proceeding, $150."  For the indigent appellant, however, that 
fee may be waived.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.29(1)(d)2.  
Thus, as Sorenson argues, for indigent parties a notice of 
appeal is a "paper that does not require a filing fee."  If we 
were to find the meaning of "require" ambiguous under these 
circumstances, 
our 
policy 
of 
reading 
procedural 
statutes 
expansively would lead us to conclude that Sorenson's notice of 
appeal was not defective.  A reading of Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2) 
that allows parties to transmit notices of appeal by facsimile 
transmission is consistent with our intent to interpret the 
right to appeal liberally. 
¶27 Third, although Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.25(2)(a)1 
instructs clerks of court to charge a fee for the filing of an 
appeal, the rule does not state that the notice of appeal must 
be accompanied by a filing fee.  Even though parties who are not 
indigent must pay a fee for filing an appeal, in practice many 
prospective appellants do not submit the fee simultaneously with 
their notices of appeal.  Instead, clerks routinely accept 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
16
mailed or personally delivered notices of appeal without filing 
fees, and those appeals are considered properly initiated.  See 
Douglas, 147 Wis. 2d at 340.  It is counterintuitive to allow 
parties to mail or deliver notices of appeal for filing without 
the simultaneous payment of fees but to prohibit parties from 
conveying notices of appeal by facsimile transmission for filing 
because the filing, although timely, is not accompanied by a 
fee.  One might argue that Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2) precludes the 
filing of any paper that requires a filing fee because filing 
fees simply cannot be transmitted by facsimile machine.  In 
practice, however, the payment of the mandatory filing fee would 
be no different for a notice of appeal submitted by facsimile 
transmission than for a notice of appeal mailed or delivered to 
the court without payment.   
¶28 We can identify no public policy argument that 
countervails our decision to allow filing via facsimile machine. 
The State argues that a rule that permits the filing of notices 
of appeal by facsimile transmission for indigent parties would 
undermine the uniformity of appellate procedure by treating 
indigent appellants more favorably than solvent ones.  We agree. 
An interpretation of court rules that grants one category of 
prospective appellants additional time to file an appeal would 
create two ambiguous standards and generate imbalance.  Our 
policy of resolving ambiguities in favor of promoting the 
resolution of disputes on the merits cautions against this 
result.  We hold that all appellants, irrespective of financial 
status, should be permitted to file notices of appeal by 
No. 
98-3107  
 
 
17
facsimile 
transmission.  
Our 
decision 
therefore 
overrules 
Pratsch, 201 Wis. 2d 491. 
¶29 This decision to apply the rule uniformly to all 
appellants reflects the manner in which clerks of court 
presently treat mailed or personally delivered notices of appeal 
for both indigent and non-indigent parties.  Following the 
delivery of a notice of appeal, a clerk of court usually bills 
the prospective appellant's lawyer for the filing fee.  Douglas, 
147 Wis. 2d at 340-41.  If the prospective appellant is 
indigent, he or she then seeks waiver of the fee pursuant to the 
indigency provisions of Wis. Stat. § 814.29(1)(d)2.  Payment of 
the filing fee is not necessary to begin the appeal process.  If 
a non-indigent appellant subsequently fails to pay the filing 
fee, the already initiated appeal may be dismissed.  Id. at 341 
n.5 (citing Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.83(2)).  Similarly, the 
appeal of an indigent party is considered filed without a fee 
payment, even though it remains contingent on the court's 
granting of the motion to waive fees.  See Heffernan, Appellate 
Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin § 5.4. 
¶30 In this case, the office of the clerk for the circuit 
court received the notice of appeal within the appropriate 
statutory time frame.  The clerk date-stamped the facsimiled 
notice upon its actual receipt, and Juneau County Criminal Court 
Record acknowledged the delivery of the notice of appeal on the 
date on which Sorenson's attorney transmitted the facsimile.  
The clerk of court transmitted the notice of appeal to the clerk 
of the court of appeals, stating that the notice was filed on 
No. 
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October 27, 1998.  The record does not reveal that the filing by 
facsimile caused any harm to the opposing party.  The notice of 
appeal served its purpose of alerting both the courts and the 
State to Sorenson's intention to seek redress from the court's 
final order. 
¶31 Finally, the State contends that Sorenson cannot 
invoke Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2) because he failed to demonstrate 
that a local court rule or a judge approved the facsimile 
transmission.  This construction of the rule is too restrictive. 
 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.16(2)(c) provides that "[t]he party or 
attorney, by filing papers by facsimile transmission, certifies 
that permission of the judge or court for filing by facsimile 
transmission has been granted."  The rule does not place the 
burden on Sorenson to show that he secured the permission of the 
local court.  Rather, Sorenson's attorney, by filing the notice 
of appeal via facsimile transmission, certified that the Juneau 
County Court had granted the permission.  Moreover, the cover 
letter Sorenson's attorney submitted with the notice of appeal 
buttressed the certification by the attorney.  The letter states 
that the attorney transmitted the notice "[p]ursuant to [the 
attorney's] 
discussion 
with 
a 
clerk 
in 
[the] 
office."  
Construing 
the 
procedural 
rule 
in 
a 
manner 
that 
favors 
Sorenson's appeal, we find that the filing of the notice of 
appeal by facsimile transmission certified that the attorney had 
been granted the permission of the judge or the court under Wis. 
Stat. § 801.16(2)(c), and the declaration in the cover letter 
supported that certification.  The State, of course, could have 
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challenged that certification, but it then would have had to 
meet its burden by showing that Sorenson's attorney did not, in 
fact, receive permission to file by facsimile transmission from 
the judge or pursuant to a local rule. 
¶32 By now, facsimile machines are a commonly accepted 
tool for the transmission of papers between offices in both 
private and public businesses.  Like other sectors, the legal 
community 
increasingly 
relies 
on 
facsimile 
machines 
to 
effectuate the timely conveyance of documents.  Facsimile 
technology enables lawyers to file documents expeditiously when 
the hasty approach of deadlines renders timely delivery by mail 
uncertain, or delivery in person impossible.  The opportunity to 
make use of this technology is particularly convenient for 
lawyers who, like Sorenson's attorney, must file documents in 
courts some distance from their office. 
¶33 Despite our expansive reading of procedural statutes, 
we nonetheless emphasize that the statutory right to appeal 
hinges 
upon 
the 
timely 
filing 
of 
a 
notice 
of 
appeal.  
Prospective appellants should be acutely aware that failure to 
submit a notice of appeal in a timely manner renders the appeal 
fatally defective.  The timely filing of a notice of appeal is 
necessary to secure the jurisdiction of the court of appeals.  
Given the irrevocability of this requirement, it is good 
practice for attorneys to file notices of appeal within a time 
frame that does not jeopardize their clients' right to appeal.  
We therefore urge attorneys to avoid last-minute mishaps by 
filing such notices before the deadline. 
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¶34 We also caution that our decision today does not alter 
the rules governing the filing fees non-indigent parties must 
pay for appeals.  The perfection of an appeal remains contingent 
upon payment of the fee or a waiver of that fee by the court.  
Although failure to pay the fee at filing does not affect the 
jurisdiction of the court, failure to pay the filing fee 
promptly prevents the appeal from going forward and is grounds 
for dismissal of the appeal.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.83(2). 
¶35 Similarly, our rule to allow parties to file notices 
of appeal by facsimile transmission does not mean that all 
documents can be transmitted by facsimile to the offices of the 
clerks of court.  Papers that still require the payment of a fee 
at the time of filing cannot be filed by facsimile pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2).  In addition, under § 801.16(2)(a)-(c), 
parties seeking to file papers by facsimile transmission must 
secure permission to do so under either a local court rule or 
from the circuit court judge. 
¶36 In conclusion, we hold that a notice of appeal is not 
a paper that "requires" a filing fee.  A notice of appeal is a 
paper that may be filed by facsimile transmission under Wis. 
Stat. § 801.16(2).  Sorenson's notice of appeal was filed on 
October 27, 1998, the date on which the clerk of the circuit 
court actually received the facsimile transmission.  The court 
of appeals therefore obtained jurisdiction over this appeal.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
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