Title: State ex rel. Evenflo Juv. Furniture Co. v. Hinkle

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Evenflo Juv. Furniture Co. v. Hinkle, 91 Ohio St.3d 74, 
2001-Ohio-239.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. EVENFLO JUVENILE FURNITURE COMPANY, INC., 
APPELLEE, v. HINKLE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Evenflo Juv. Furniture Co. v. Hinkle (2001), 91 Ohio 
St.3d 74.] 
Workers’ compensation — Claimant who cannot perform sustained 
remunerative employment is not required to engage in a job search as a 
prerequisite to impaired earning capacity eligibility — Claimant’s 
receipt of Social Security disability compensation does not foreclose 
receipt of impaired earning capacity benefits. 
(No. 98-126 — Submitted November 14, 2000 — Decided February 28, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APD12-1643. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant-claimant Glenn Hinkle injured his back in 1981, 
while in the course of and arising from his employment with appellee, Evenflo 
Juvenile Furniture Company, Inc., and a workers’ compensation claim was 
allowed.  After initially missing time from work because of his injury, claimant 
eventually returned after surgery.  In 1986, however, he reinjured his back and has 
not been able to work since. 
 
In 1992, Dr. Francis F. Paul confirmed that claimant had significant lifting 
restrictions and could never return to his job as an electrician.  Two years later, 
Dr. Donald R. Eck concluded that claimant was permanently and totally disabled.  
A vocational assessment from Dr. Robert A. MacGuffie and Karen J. MacGuffie 
stated that claimant’s nonmedical profile hindered his ability to do even light 
work. 
 
Claimant eventually asked the Industrial Commission of Ohio to 
determine his percentage of permanent partial disability.  The commission 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
assessed a twenty-five percent permanent partial disability.  Given the option of 
receiving his compensation as a lump sum permanent partial disability award 
under former R.C. 4123.57(B) or as biweekly impaired earning capacity (“IEC”) 
benefits under former R.C. 4123.57(A), claimant chose the latter. 
 
Claimant’s selection generated a hearing before a district hearing officer 
(“DHO”).  There, the DHO granted IEC compensation: 
 
“Claimant is awarded an impairment of earning capacity * * *. 
 
“Pre-injury earning capacity is set at the average weekly wage of $755.65. 
 
“Post-injury earning capacity is set at zero. 
 
“Claimant has restrictions of no lifting in excess of fifteen pounds and no 
sitting or standing in one position for more than thirty minutes based on the 
reports of Doctors Paul, MacGuffie and Eck and [compensation is] to continue 
upon submission of [evidence] documenting wage impairment * * *. 
 
“Claimant’s age (67), education thru twelfth grade and work experience as 
a certified electrician only were taken into consideration in reaching this 
decision.” 
 
That order was affirmed. 
 
Evenflo commenced a mandamus action in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
awarding IEC benefits.  The court of appeals agreed, finding that without proof of 
a job search, claimant could not receive IEC. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
A single question is before us: Must a claimant who cannot perform 
sustained remunerative employment nevertheless engage in a job search as a 
prerequisite to IEC eligibility?  For the reasons to follow, we answer in the 
negative. 
 
In advocating a job search requirement, Evenflo relies on the tenet that 
IEC cannot be paid absent a postinjury desire to work.  State ex rel. CPC Group v. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
Indus. Comm. (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 209, 559 N.E.2d 1330.  Evenflo cites four 
cases in support of its position:  CPC; State ex rel. Pauley v. Indus. Comm. 
(1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 263, 559 N.E.2d 1333; State ex rel. McEndree v. 
Consolidation Coal Co. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 325, 626 N.E.2d 674; and State ex 
rel. Mathess v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 205, 625 
N.E.2d 604.  The last two are quickly distinguished because the claimants, unlike 
Hinkle, left their former positions of employment for reasons unrelated to their 
injury.  Equally fatal to Evenflo’s reliance is the fact that neither case said or 
implied that a job search was prerequisite to an affirmative finding of a postinjury 
desire to work.  To the contrary, neither the term “job search” nor any like phrase 
appeared in McEndree or Mathess. 
 
CPC and Pauley established the principle that a postinjury desire to work 
must exist.  Like McEndree and Mathess, neither case referred or alluded to a job 
search.  Unlike those cases, they have been cited as authority in a recent decision 
that does suggest the necessity of such an endeavor. 
 
In State ex rel. Matheney v. Cent. Ohio Coal Co. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 50, 
723 N.E.2d 570, claimant challenged an IEC denial that read: 
 
“ ‘[I]n light of the claimant’s testimony at hearing that it is his belief that 
he cannot physically perform any sustained employment, claimant’s testimony 
that he has not sought other work since his disability retirement in 1993 and the 
fact that the claimant is receiving Social Security Disability Benefits and 
disability retirement benefits, the [DHO] finds claimant has not demonstrated a 
desire to earn since he last worked.’ ” (Emphasis added.)  Id.  at 51, 723 N.E.2d at 
571. 
 
We affirmed, citing CPC and Pauley.  We stressed the necessity of a 
desire to earn and implied that the lack of a job search can indicate the absence of 
that desire.  The question is whether Matheney additionally declared a job search 
to be mandatory. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
In contrast to Matheney is State ex rel. Mt. Carmel Health v. Forte (1992), 
65 Ohio St.3d 335, 603 N.E.2d 1014.  There, claimant’s allowed conditions 
permitted sedentary work.  Because this capability existed, the employer argued 
that earning capacity had not been diminished. 
 
We disagreed, finding that the employer’s position ignored the claimant’s 
nonmedical disability factors, which, when combined with her medical condition, 
removed her from the labor market.  We distinguished CPC and Pauley, stating 
that causal relationship in Forte was not an issue, since, unlike Pauley and CPC, 
there was no evidence that claimant’s postinjury inability to earn was due to 
reasons unrelated to her disability.  As we explained: 
 
“There is no need to speculate on causal relationship in the case at bar.  
Again, medical evidence established that claimant could not return to her former 
job.  Nonmedical evidence established that there were no jobs consistent with 
claimant’s physical restrictions for which she is educationally or vocationally 
prepared.  When claimant lost her ability to return to her old job due to the injury, 
she concomitantly lost her ability to earn wages due to injury.”  Id. at 338, 603 
N.E.2d at 1016. 
 
At first glance, Forte and Matheney appear to take similarly situated 
claimants in opposite directions.  Both seem to involve claimants who cannot 
perform sustained remunerative employment, and while the former did not require 
affirmative proof of a desire to earn, the latter found the lack thereof decisive.  
Closer examination, however, shows that the two cases are distinct. 
 
Matheney is conspicuous for its lack of medical evidence indicating that 
claimant could do no work — evidence that was the cornerstone of the court’s 
decision in Forte.  In Matheney, rather than medical evidence, claimant 
apparently offered only “ ‘his belief that he cannot physically perform any 
sustained employment,’ ” and his testimony that he was not looking for work as a 
January Term, 2001 
5 
result.  There was no medical evidence connecting his postinjury lack of 
employment to his industrial injury.1 
 
Matheney and Forte are not, therefore, irreconcilable, with the latter being 
more analogous to our case.  Consequently, we find that Hinkle’s lack of a job 
search is not fatal, and, from a practical perspective, this makes sense.  It is 
pointless to force a claimant who cannot work to nevertheless go out and look for 
jobs in order to establish that if not for the injury, he or she would indeed be 
working.  See State ex. rel. Baker Material Handling Corp. v. Indus. Comm. 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 202, 212, 631 N.E.2d 138, 147. 
 
Evenflo alternatively argues that claimant’s inability to perform sustained 
remunerative work bars IEC.  It asserts that the declaration alone forecloses 
compensation and is reinforced by claimant’s receipt of Social Security disability 
benefits.  This proposition fails. 
 
The employer relies exclusively on an unreported appeals court decision, 
State ex rel. Packard Elec. Co. v. Smith (Aug. 8, 1989), Franklin App. No. 88AP-
468, unreported, 1989 WL 88886.  Packard involved a claimant who took a 
disability retirement and then later applied for IEC.  That retirement was premised 
on a doctor’s certification that claimant could do no work. 
 
In denying IEC compensation, the court first reasoned that because 
compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A) and permanent total disability (“PTD”) 
compensation are both based on reduced earning capacity, a claimant cannot 
receive both at the same time.  The same is true of PTD and disability retirement, 
i.e., both are based on an inability to perform sustained remunerative work.  Thus, 
                                                          
 
1.  Matheney’s receipt of disability retirement and Social Security disability benefits suggests an 
incapacity for some types of work.  Disability retirement implies an inability to return to the 
former position of employment, while Social Security disability — which is decided under a 
different standard than permanent total disability — is broader.  Even if their receipt, however, 
implied an inability to perform all work, it does not compel the commission to make the same 
finding. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
retirement benefits — like PTD compensation — cannot be paid concurrently 
with IEC benefits. Since the claimant was already getting retirement benefits 
when she applied for IEC, the appellate court reasoned that she was foreclosed 
from the latter. 
 
The flaw in Packard is its failure to recognize that disability retirement 
benefits by statute can be concurrently paid with PTD compensation.  R.C. 
4123.58(B) — both then and now — specifically approved concurrent payment of 
Social Security disability and PTD compensation.  See 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
774.  Therefore, under Packard’s IEC/PTD analogy, IEC and Social Security 
disability benefits would be contemporaneously payable. 
 
We find, therefore, that claimant’s receipt of Social Security disability 
compensation does not foreclose his receipt of IEC. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Coolidge, Wall, Womsley & Lombard Co., L.P.A., and John A. Cumming, 
for appellee. 
 
McCrory & Clark Co., L.P.A., Elizabeth Warren Eddins and Christopher 
S. Clark, for appellant. 
__________________ 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
The claimant must still supply the requisite medical and/or vocational proof and allow the 
commission to make its own determination.  Matheney apparently did not do so.