Title: State v. Scruggs

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2981-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Tabitha A. Scruggs, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 23, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 13, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Allan B. Torhorst 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissent (Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there was a brief 
and oral argument by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             2017 WI 15
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2981-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CF7) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tabitha A. Scruggs, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
FEB 23,2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Petitioner, Tabitha Scruggs 
("Scruggs"), seeks review of a published court of appeals 
decision denying her motion for postconviction relief.1  The 
court of appeals determined that Scruggs failed to demonstrate 
beyond a reasonable doubt that imposing a now mandatory $250 DNA 
surcharge 
for 
a 
single 
felony 
conviction 
constitutes 
a 
punishment, violating the prohibition against ex post facto laws 
set forth in the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. 
                                                 
1 State v. Scruggs, 2015 WI App 88, 365 Wis. 2d 568, 872 
N.W.2d 146 (affirming judgment and order entered by the circuit 
court for Racine County, Allan B. Torhorst, J., presiding). 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
2 
 
¶2 
Specifically, Scruggs contends that the imposition of 
this single $250 DNA surcharge is punitive for ex post facto 
purposes because it was discretionary when she committed the 
felony offense but mandatory when she was sentenced.  She 
asserts that the statutory amendment making mandatory the 
imposition of the $250 DNA surcharge at sentencing constitutes 
an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it retroactively 
imposes punishment on those who committed a crime before the 
amendment's January 1, 2014 effective date. 
¶3 
Like the court of appeals, we conclude that Scruggs 
has not met her burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the amended statute is unconstitutional.  She has failed to 
show that the mandatory imposition of this DNA surcharge, which 
was discretionary at the time she committed the single felony 
offense, is punitive in either intent or effect and thus 
violative of the ex post facto prohibition. 
¶4 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, denying Scruggs’ postconviction motion to vacate the 
$250 DNA surcharge. 
I 
¶5 
The underlying facts in this case are not in dispute.  
On December 30, 2013, Scruggs was charged with one count of 
burglary as a party to a crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 943.10(1m)(a) & 939.05(1) (2011-12).2  She pleaded no contest 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m)(a) provides: 
(continued) 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
3 
 
to the charged offense on April 1, 2014, and was sentenced on 
June 9, 2014. 
¶6 
The circuit court sentenced Scruggs to 18 months of 
initial confinement and 18 months of extended supervision.  
Scruggs' sentence was stayed and she was placed on probation for 
three years.  The judgment of conviction provided that Scruggs 
submit to a DNA sample and pay a $250 DNA analysis surcharge. 
¶7 
At the time Scruggs committed the offense on December 
30, 2013, Wis. Stat. § 973.046 (2011-12) was in effect.  It 
provided that the decision of whether to impose a DNA surcharge 
was within the circuit court's discretion: 
(1g) Except as provided in sub. (1r), if a court 
imposes a sentence or places a person on probation for 
a 
felony 
conviction, 
the 
court 
may 
impose 
a 
deoxyribonucleic acid analysis surcharge of $250. 
¶8 
On January 1, 2014, Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r)(a) (2013-
14) ("2014 Amendment") took effect pursuant to  2013 Wis. Act 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1m) Whoever intentionally enters any of the following 
places without the consent of the person in lawful 
possession and with intent to steal or commit a felony in 
such place is guilty of a Class F Felony: 
(a) 
Any building or dwelling. 
Wis. Stat. § 939.05(1) provides: 
Whoever is concerned in the commission of a crime is a 
principal and may be charged with and convicted of the 
commission of the crime although the person did not 
directly commit it and although the person who directly 
committed it has not been convicted or has been convicted 
of some other degree of the crime or of some other crime 
based on the same act. 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
4 
 
20.  The Act specified that the mandatory DNA surcharge would 
apply to sentences imposed on or after January 1, 2014, 
regardless of when the underlying offense occurred.  2013 Wis. 
Act 20, §§ 9326, 9426.  Thus, when Scruggs was sentenced on June 
9, 2014, the amended statute made the imposition of a DNA 
surcharge mandatory: 
(1r) If a court imposes a sentence or places a person 
on 
probation, 
the 
court 
shall 
impose 
a 
deoxyribonucleic acid analysis surcharge, calculated 
as follows: 
(a) 
For each conviction for a felony, $250. 
(b) 
For each conviction for a misdemeanor, $200. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.046(1r) (2013-14). 
¶9 
Scruggs filed a postconviction motion seeking to 
vacate the $250 DNA surcharge.  She argued that imposing this 
mandatory DNA surcharge violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of 
the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions because imposition 
of the DNA surcharge was discretionary at the time she committed 
the felony offense.  According to Scruggs, the statutory change 
from a discretionary DNA surcharge to a mandatory DNA surcharge 
makes the 2014 Amendment punitive for a defendant sentenced for 
a single felony offense after the effective date of the 2014 
Amendment for an offense committed before it. 
¶10 Scruggs argued that the circuit court instead should 
have applied Wis. Stat. § 973.046 (2011-12) as it existed at the 
time she committed the offense and exercised its discretion in 
determining whether to impose a $250 DNA surcharge.  The circuit 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
5 
 
court concluded that it was required to impose the mandatory 
$250 DNA surcharge and denied Scruggs' postconviction motion.3 
¶11 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
albeit with a different rationale.  State v. Scruggs, 2015 WI 
App 88, ¶19, 365 Wis. 2d 568, 872 N.W.2d 146.  It determined 
that Scruggs "has failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the $250 DNA surcharge that the circuit court imposed 
on her for a single felony conviction constitutes a punishment  
and, thus, [did not] violate[] the prohibitions against ex post 
facto 
laws 
in 
the 
U[nited] 
S[tates] 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions."  Id. 
II 
¶12 Whether a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses 
of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions is a question 
of 
law 
that 
this 
court 
reviews 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  State v. Haines, 2003 WI 39, ¶7, 261 Wis. 2d 139, 661 
N.W.2d 72.  There is a strong presumption that legislative 
enactments are constitutional.  Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage 
Dist., 
2013 
WI 
78, 
¶76, 
350 
Wis. 2d 554, 
835 
                                                 
3 The circuit court incorrectly reasoned that the 2014 
Amendment was in effect when Scruggs committed the offense 
because the amended statute had been published.  The State 
concedes that the circuit court erred in concluding that the 
2014 Amendment was in effect when Scruggs committed the offense.  
However, the State continues to maintain that the retroactive 
application of the 2014 Amendment is not an ex post facto 
violation because it is not punitive. 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
6 
 
N.W.2d 160.  Scruggs has the burden of establishing beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
the 
challenged 
legislation 
is 
unconstitutional.  Chappy v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, Dep't 
of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 136 Wis. 2d 172, 184-85, 401 
N.W.2d 568 (1987). 
¶13 A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute 
"bears a heavy burden."  State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶8, 323 
Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90 (citing State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, 
¶11, 264 Wis.2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328).  "It is insufficient for 
the party challenging the statute to merely establish either 
that the statute's constitutionality is doubtful or that the 
statute is probably unconstitutional."  Id.  "Instead, the party 
challenging a statute's constitutionality must 'prove that the 
statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Id. 
(quoting Cole, 264 Wis. 2d 520, ¶11). 
III 
¶14 At the outset we observe the basic premise that a 
statute "which makes more burdensome the punishment for a 
crime[] after its commission" is prohibited by the Ex Post Facto 
Clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.4  State 
                                                 
4 Scruggs does not argue that she has greater protection 
under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution 
than she has under the United States Constitution.  She 
acknowledges that this court generally looks to United States 
Supreme Court decisions construing the Ex Post Facto Clause of 
the United States Constitution as a guide to construing the Ex 
Post Facto Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution.  See State v. 
Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 699, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994). 
(continued) 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
7 
 
v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 703, 524 N.W.2d 641 (citing Collins 
v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990).  Scruggs contends that 
the imposition of a $250 DNA surcharge is punitive because it 
was discretionary when she committed the crime but mandatory 
when she was sentenced.  She asserts that the statutory 
amendment making mandatory the imposition of a $250 DNA 
surcharge at sentencing constitutes an unconstitutional ex post 
facto law because it retroactively imposes punishment to those 
who committed a crime before the amendment's January 1, 2014 
effective date. 
¶15 The State does not dispute Scruggs' contention that if 
the DNA surcharge is punitive, amending the statute to make 
mandatory what previously was discretionary is an ex post facto 
violation with respect to defendants who committed their offense 
before the effective date of the amendment.  See Lindsey v. 
Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 400 (1937) (concluding it is an ex 
post facto violation to apply a new criminal penalty where 
"[t]he effect of the new statute is to make mandatory what was 
before only the maximum sentence."). 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution 
is found in Article I, Sections 9 and 10.  Section 9 provides:  
"No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed."  
Section 10 provides:  "No state shall . . . pass any . . . ex 
post facto Law . . . ." 
In the Wisconsin Constitution, the Ex Post Facto Clause  is 
found in Article 1, Section 12, which provides:  "No . . . ex 
post facto law . . . shall ever be passed . . . ." 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
8 
 
¶16 In determining whether a statute is punitive for ex 
post facto purposes, we apply the "intent-effects" test set 
forth in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).  See In re 
Commitment of Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶38, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 
N.W.2d 762.  If we determine that the legislative intent of the 
2014 Amendment was to impose punishment, the law is considered 
punitive and our inquiry ends there.  See City of South 
Milwaukee v. Kester, 2013 WI App 50, ¶22, 347 Wis. 2d 334, 830 
N.W.2d 710.  However, if we determine that the legislature's 
intent was to impose a civil and nonpunitive regulatory scheme, 
we must determine next whether the 2014 Amendment is so punitive 
in form and effect as to "transfor[m] what was clearly intended 
as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."  Rachel, 254 
Wis. 2d 215, ¶33 (citing Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99).5 
¶17 Determining 
whether 
the 
legislature 
intended 
the 
statute to be punitive "is primarily a matter of statutory 
construction . . . ."  Id., ¶40.  Statutory interpretation 
begins by examining the plain language of the statute.  State ex 
                                                 
5 The terms "form" and "effect" are used in relevant case 
law applying the second part of the intents-effects test without 
providing an analysis that distinguishes between the two terms. 
See, e.g., In re commitment of Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶¶42-43, 254 
Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762; Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 
93, 104 (1997); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 
(1996).  Likewise, the parties do not argue or differentiate 
between "form" and "effect."  They discuss only the "effect," 
and do not analyze the "form" when discussing the second part of 
the intents-effects test. Consequently, our analysis discusses 
the "effects" of the surcharge imposed. 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
9 
 
rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted). 
¶18 Accordingly, we begin our analysis of Scruggs' claim 
by considering whether the legislature either expressly or 
impliedly indicated a preference that the 2014 Amendment be 
considered a civil remedy or a criminal penalty.  See Rachel, 
254 
Wis. 2d 215, 
¶32 
(citing 
Hudson, 
522 
U.S. 
at 
99).  
"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or 
phrases are given their technical or special definitional 
meaning."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (citations omitted). 
¶19 Sections 973.046(1r)(c)-(d) (2013-14) provide: 
If a court imposes a sentence or places a person on 
probation, the court shall impose a deoxyribonucleic 
acid analysis surcharge, calculated as follows: 
(c) 
For each conviction for a felony, $250. 
(d) 
For each conviction for a misdemeanor, $200. 
¶20 We give "great deference" when the legislature labels 
a statute as a civil remedy.  Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶42.  
Only the "clearest proof" will convince this court that a 
statute the legislature labeled as a civil remedy is in effect a 
criminal penalty.  Kester, 347 Wis. 2d 334, ¶22 (citation 
omitted). 
¶21 The language of the 2014 Amendment, which uses the 
term 
"surcharge" 
rather 
than 
"fine," 
reveals 
that 
the 
legislature intended the statute to be a civil remedy, rather 
than a criminal penalty.  As the Seventh Circuit explained in 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
10 
 
Mueller v. Raemisch, a fine is a punishment for an unlawful act 
that is a "substitute deterrent for prison time" and "a signal 
of social disapproval of unlawful behavior."  740 F.3d 1128, 
1133 (7th Cir. 2014).  In contrast, a fee (or in this case a 
"surcharge") is compensation for a service provided to, or 
alternatively compensation for a cost incurred by, the person 
charged the fee.  See id.6 
¶22 Scruggs contends that placement of the DNA surcharge 
within the criminal sentencing statutes reflects a legislative 
intent to punish.  According to Scruggs, the surcharge is 
situated squarely within the criminal sentencing statutes, which 
address imposition of criminal penalties.  In contrast, Scruggs 
argues, court costs and other non-punitive charges are addressed 
in Chapter 814. 
¶23 Scruggs overlooks that the DNA surcharge is explicitly 
set forth in Wis. Stat. § 814.76(5) (2013-14), which makes a 
distinction between a fine imposed in a criminal action and a 
surcharge imposed in that action.  It provides: 
Surcharges in criminal actions. In addition to any 
fine imposed in a criminal action, a defendant shall 
pay the following surcharges if applicable: 
(5) The deoxyribonucleic acid analysis surcharge 
under s. 973.046(1r). 
                                                 
6 We observe that court costs, fees, and surcharges are all 
set forth in Chapter 814 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  Although 
Mueller uses the term "fee," a "surcharge" is similarly defined 
as an "additional charge, tax, or cost."  Random House 
Unabridged Dictionary 1914 (2d ed. 1993). 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
11 
 
Wis. Stat. § 814.76(5) (2013-14).  Additionally, the United 
States Supreme Court has determined that a forfeiture provision 
may be a civil remedy even though the authorizing statute is 
located in the criminal code.  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 94-95 
(2003) (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 
465 U.S. 354, 364-65 (1984)). 
¶24 Although Scruggs is correct that statutory language is 
interpreted in the context of the statutory scheme, considering 
closely-related statutes, the placement of the DNA surcharge 
within the criminal sentencing statutes is not the only 
statutory context we consider.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  
As the court of appeals explained, the 2014 Amendment is part of 
a larger statutory initiative to expand the state's DNA databank 
and "to offset the increased burden on the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) in collecting, analyzing, and maintaining the additional 
DNA samples . . . ."  Scruggs, 365 Wis. 2d 568, ¶11. 
¶25 Thus, we also interpret the language used in the 2014 
Amendment 
of 
973.046(1r)(a) 
in 
relation 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 973.046(3).  In order to offset the increased burden on the 
DOJ in collecting, analyzing, and maintaining the additional DNA 
samples, the legislature imposed the mandatory surcharge on 
felony convictions to be deposited initially with the secretary 
of administration but to be used by the DOJ to offset the 
increased costs. 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.046(3) (2013-14) states:  "All 
moneys collected from deoxyribonucleic acid analysis surcharges 
shall be deposited by the secretary of administration . . . and 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
12 
 
utilized under s. 165.77."  Section 165.77 sets forth the 
requirements that the DOJ provide for the analysis of the 
collected samples and maintain a state DNA databank.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 165.77(2)(a)(1)&(3) (2013-14).  When viewed in context, 
the 
imposition 
of 
a 
now 
mandatory 
surcharge 
that 
"is 
specifically dedicated to fund the collection and analysis of 
DNA samples and the storage of DNA profiles——all regulatory 
activities——evidences 
a 
nonpunitive 
cost-recovery 
intent."  
Scruggs, 365 Wis. 2d 568, ¶12. 
¶27 Consulting legislative history further informs our 
interpretation.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51 (legislative 
history 
may 
be 
consulted 
to 
confirm 
a 
plain-meaning 
interpretation).  The Legislative Fiscal Bureau memorandum 
regarding the 2014 Amendment recognized that DNA databanks are 
an important tool in criminal investigations and explained that 
the mandatory DNA surcharge would provide funding for the 
collection and analysis of DNA samples together with the 
maintenance of the DNA databank.7  It further explained that 
"deoxyribonucleic acid testing allows a more certain and rapid 
identification of offenders as well as the exoneration of those 
wrongfully suspected or accused . . . ."  Id. at 8. 
¶28 Nonetheless, Scruggs argues that the intent of the 
2014 Amendment is punitive because the surcharge bears no 
                                                 
7 Legis. Fiscal Bureau, DNA Collection at Arrest and the DNA 
Analysis Surcharge, Paper #410 to J. Comm. on Fin. 2-3, 8 (May 
23, 2013). 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
13 
 
relation to the DNA costs created by any particular defendant.  
As the Seventh Circuit explained in Mueller, one basis for 
reclassifying a surcharge as a fine "would be that it bore no 
relation to the cost for which the fee was ostensibly intended 
to compensate."  740 F.3d at 1133. 
¶29 Scruggs has the burden of showing that the amount of 
the surcharge imposed here demonstrates that the $250 surcharge 
is punitive in intent.  Yet, she presents no evidence that the 
surcharge is meaningfully greater than the costs she caused the 
State to incur to collect, analyze, and curate her DNA. 
¶30 The amount of the DNA surcharge for a single felony 
conviction suggests that the fee was not intended to be a 
punishment.  As discussed above, it is instead intended to 
offset the costs associated with the collection and analysis of 
samples together with the maintenance of the state's DNA 
databank.  See, e.g., In re DNA Ex Post Facto Issues, 561 F.3d 
294, 300 (4th Cir. 2009) ("the relatively small size of the 
fee . . . indicate[d] that it was not intended to have a 
significant retributive or deterrent value...").  The $250 DNA 
surcharge is consistent with the DNA fees charged in other 
jurisdictions, which have been considered non-punitive.  See, 
e.g., People v. Higgins, 13 N.E.3d 169, ¶20 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) 
(citing People v. Guadarrama, 955 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2011) ($250)); Commonwealth v. Derk, 895 A.2d 622, 625–30, 630 
n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) ($250); State v. Brewster, 218 P.3d 
249, 251 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) ($100). 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
14 
 
¶31 Scruggs asserts next that tying the surcharge to the 
number and type of conviction indicates that the legislature is 
using the surcharge to impose a penalty on more serious 
offenders.  She reasons that if the surcharge were actually 
intended to offset the costs of DNA testing there would be no 
reason to impose a higher surcharge based on the number and type 
of conviction when these factors do not affect the cost of 
obtaining a DNA sample from a single defendant.  Scruggs further 
argues that a higher surcharge 
based on the number of 
convictions indicates that the legislature had a punitive intent 
in enacting the 2014 Amendment. 
¶32 In State v. Radaj, the court of appeals considered a 
challenge to the 2014 Amendment based upon a $1000 surcharge 
imposed for four felony convictions.  2015 WI App 50, ¶1, 363 
Wis. 2d 633, 
866 
N.W.2d 758. 
 
Unlike 
Scruggs, 
Radaj 
was 
convicted of four felonies and assessed a $250 surcharge for 
each conviction, which totaled $1000.  Id., ¶¶3-5. 
¶33 The Radaj court determined that the 2014 Amendment was 
an ex post facto violation under the facts of that case because 
the multiple surcharges were punitive in effect.  Id., ¶35.  
However, the court left for another day the issue Scruggs raises 
in this case.  It explained that "we do not weigh in on whether 
the result might be different if Radaj had been convicted of a 
single felony carrying with it a mandatory $250 surcharge, 
rather than the prior discretionary $250 surcharge."  Id., ¶36. 
¶34 Radaj assumed without deciding that the legislative 
intent behind the 2014 Amendment was nonpunitive.  Id., ¶16.  
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
15 
 
However, Scruggs relies on a portion of the court's discussion 
of intent, in which it reasoned that "the legislative decision 
to 
tie 
the 
amount 
of 
the 
surcharge 
to 
the 
number 
of 
convictions . . . casts doubt on legislative intent."  Id., ¶21. 
¶35 Scruggs' reliance on Radaj is misplaced.8  We assess 
the merits of this challenge by considering the facts of this 
particular case.  As the court of appeals in this case 
explained, "since this appeal involves only a single felony 
                                                 
8 At oral argument the State reiterated that it was not 
asking this court to overrule Radaj and again emphasized the 
distinctions between the two cases.  It likewise stated that it 
was not challenging the holding in State v. Elward, 2015 WI App 
51, 363 Wis. 2d 628, 866 N.W.2d 756, which it deemed also 
readily distinguishable. 
In Elward, the court of appeals concluded that a mandatory 
$250 surcharge was punitive and violated the ex post facto 
clauses because a multi-phase rollout required circuit courts to 
begin imposing the surcharge on January 1, 2014.  Id., ¶7.  
However, courts had to wait 15 months——until April 1, 2015——
before they could actually order misdemeanants to provide a 
sample for DNA analysis.  Id., ¶2 (citing 2013 Wis. Act 20, 
§ 9426(1)(am) and (bm)).  As a result, Elward never had to 
submit to a test.  Id., ¶7. 
The State emphasized the roll out and the fact that the 
defendant in Elward was never ordered to provide a sample, in 
distinguishing this case: 
Elward was distinguishable because of a lag in 
misdemeanor cases between the collection and the 
imposition of the  surcharge and there was a 15 month 
gap . . . . 
In this case, Ms. Scruggs did have to provide a 
sample.  So, there were [] direct costs attributable 
to Ms. Scruggs by her providing a sample that needs to 
be analyzed, collected and analyzed in the data bank. 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
16 
 
conviction, Radaj does not control our decision."  Scruggs, 365 
Wis. 2d 568, 
¶9. 
 
Unlike 
Radaj, 
which 
involved 
multiple 
surcharges for multiple felony convictions, this case addresses 
whether a single DNA surcharge for a single felony conviction is 
punitive. 
¶36 Scruggs' reliance on the fact that the surcharge is 
set at a flat rate of $200 for every misdemeanor conviction and 
$250 for every felony conviction also fails.  We agree with the 
court of appeals’ determination that "Scruggs has pointed to 
nothing, other than speculation, that the disparity between the 
surcharges on a conviction for a felony as compared to a 
misdemeanor reflects that the legislature was motivated by a 
punitive intent."  Scruggs, 365 Wis. 2d 568, ¶14; see also 
Mueller, 740 F.3d at 1134 ("The burden of proving that it is a 
fine is on the plaintiffs, and since they have presented no 
evidence that it was intended as a fine . . . they cannot get to 
first base without evidence that it is grossly disproportionate 
to the annual cost . . . ."). 
¶37 Further, we observe that the 2014 Amendment did not 
change the amount of the $250 DNA surcharge for felony 
offenders.  The fact that there was no change in the amount of 
the surcharge for offenders convicted of a single felony 
suggests that there was no punitive intent in the mandatory DNA 
surcharge for felony offenders. 
¶38 In sum, Scruggs has failed to produce evidence that a 
$250 DNA surcharge imposed against a defendant for a single 
felony conviction is unrelated to the cost for which it is 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
17 
 
intended to compensate.  There is no evidence that the 
relatively small $250 surcharge is grossly disproportionate to 
the 
cost 
of 
collecting, 
analyzing, 
and 
maintaining 
DNA 
specimens.  We conclude that Scruggs has failed to carry her 
burden of demonstrating that the change from a discretionary to 
a mandatory surcharge for a single felony conviction committed 
before the effective date of the 2014 Amendment was intended as 
a criminal penalty. 
IV 
¶39 Having concluded that Scruggs failed to show that the 
legislature intended the DNA surcharge to be a criminal penalty, 
we nevertheless consider next whether the 2014 Amendment is so 
punitive in effect as to transform the $250 DNA surcharge into a 
criminal penalty.  See Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶42.  In 
applying the second part of the intent-effects test, we 
determine whether the surcharge imposed by the 2014 Amendment is 
"'so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal' 
despite the legislature's intent to the contrary."  Id. (quoting 
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104).  We afford the legislative preference 
for the civil label great deference and only the "clearest 
proof" will convince us that what has been denominated a civil 
remedy is actually a criminal penalty.  Id. 
¶40 As Scruggs acknowledges in her brief, although similar 
facts are considered when discussing punitive intent and 
punitive 
effect, 
each 
requires 
separate 
analysis. 
 
In 
determining whether a statute is punitive in effect, Scruggs 
correctly recognizes at the outset that our analysis is guided 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
18 
 
by the seven factors as set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).  Curiously, however, she 
does not refer to the factors again when she analyzes whether 
the surcharge has a punitive effect here. 
¶41 The seven factors are whether:  (1) the 2014 Amendment 
involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) it has 
historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) it comes into 
play only on a finding of scienter; (4) its operation will 
promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and 
deterrence; (5) the behavior to which the 2014 Amendment applies 
is already a crime; (6) an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.  Id.; 
see also Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶33.  These factors provide 
"useful guideposts."  Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99.  However, they are 
not exhaustive nor is any one factor dispositive.  Smith v. Doe, 
538 U.S. at 97 (citations omitted). 
¶42 We address first the factors that cut in favor of the 
State's argument that the 2014 Amendment is nonpunitive in 
effect under the facts of this case.  Under the first factor, 
the surcharge is nonpunitive because it does not impose an 
affirmative 
disability 
or 
restraint, 
in 
contrast 
to 
imprisonment.  See, e.g., Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104.  Given our 
determination regarding intent, there is also no evidence under 
the second factor that the surcharge has historically been 
considered a punishment.  See id. at 104-105 ("the payment of 
fixed or variable sums of money [is a] sanction which ha[s] been 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
19 
 
recognized as enforceable by civil proceedings since the 
original revenue law of 1789.") (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 
303 U.S. 391, 400 (1938)).  The third factor also supports the 
State because the 2014 Amendment does not have a scienter 
requirement.  See Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶51.  A mandatory 
surcharge is imposed against any person convicted of a felony, 
without regard to the defendant's state of mind.  See Hudson, 
522 U.S. at 104. 
¶43 Conversely, there is only one factor that more clearly 
cuts in favor of Scruggs.  Under the fifth factor, the DNA 
surcharge 
applies 
to 
behavior 
that 
is 
already 
a 
crime, 
suggesting that the surcharge has the effect of punishing 
criminal behavior.  However, this fact is insufficient to render 
a monetary penalty criminally punitive.  Id. at 105 (citing 
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996) ("the fact 
that a forfeiture statute has some connection to a criminal 
violation is far from the 'clearest proof' necessary to show 
that a proceeding is criminal."). 
¶44 We turn next to factors that are disputed by the 
parties.  The remaining factors at issue are whether:  (4) the 
2014 Amendment's operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment-retribution 
and 
deterrence; 
(6) 
an 
alternative 
purpose to which it may be rationally connected is assignable 
for it; and (7) it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned.  See Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶33. 
¶45 This portion of our discussion regarding the effect of 
the 2014 Amendment is closely related to our analysis regarding 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
20 
 
whether the connection between the surcharge and the costs it is 
intended to offset evinces a punitive legislative intent.  As 
set forth more fully in the above discussion regarding intent, 
the relatively small size of a single $250 DNA surcharge 
indicates that it does not serve the traditional aims of 
punishment-retribution and deterrence.  See, e.g., In re DNA, 
561 F.2d at 300; see also ¶29, supra. 
¶46 In considering Scruggs' claim, we observe that a 
surcharge need bear "only an approximate relation to the cost it 
is meant to offset."  See Mueller, 740 F.2d at 1133.  One basis 
for reclassifying a fee as a fine would be that it "bore no 
relation to the cost for which the fee was ostensibly intended 
to compensate."  Id. 
¶47 The purpose to which the surcharge is connected is to 
offset the increased burden on the DOJ in collecting, analyzing, 
and maintaining the additional DNA samples.  An examination of 
cases cited by the parties reflects an emphasis on considering 
the amount of the surcharge or fee in question and asking 
whether there is a rational relationship between that amount and 
the non-punitive activities the surcharge or fee is intended to 
fund.  For example, in Mueller, the Seventh Circuit considered 
the amount of the fee in light of a list of "formidable" ongoing 
tasks associated with the sex offender registry.  740 F.3d at 
1134.  Likewise, in In re DNA, the Fourth Circuit made a point 
of noting that the defendant "offer[ed] nothing to suggest that 
$250 is excessive considering the costs associated with the 
[DNA] database."  561 F.3d at 300. 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
21 
 
¶48 Like these other courts, we focus on the rational 
connection between the amount of a fee and the costs the fee was 
intended to cover.  Scruggs has failed to demonstrate that a 
$250 DNA surcharge for a single felony conviction is excessive 
in relation to the activities it is intended to fund.  See 
Mueller, 740 F.3d at 1134 ("The burden of proving that it is a 
fine is on the plaintiffs . . . ") (internal citations omitted).  
Scruggs has offered nothing to suggest that the single $250 
surcharge is excessive or that it bears no relation to the costs 
it is intended to compensate.  See In re DNA, 561 F.3d at 300; 
see also Mueller, 740 F.3d at 1133.  Thus, we have no reason to 
think that the $250 surcharge is excessive or lacks a reasonable 
relationship to the costs of collecting and analyzing the DNA 
samples together with maintaining DNA profiles in a statewide 
databank. 
¶49 Scruggs has failed to show by the "clearest proof" 
that the $250 surcharge is excessive or that there is no 
rational connection between the amount of the single surcharge 
and the costs it is intended to compensate.  We determine that 
Scruggs has not met her burden of demonstrating that the change 
from a discretionary to a mandatory surcharge for a single 
felony conviction that was committed before the effective date 
of the 2014 Amendment is so punitive in effect as to transform a 
single $250 DNA surcharge into a criminal penalty.  See Rachel, 
254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶33. 
No. 2014AP2981-CR 
 
22 
 
V 
¶50 In sum, like the court of appeals, we conclude that 
Scruggs has not met her burden of establishing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the amended statute is unconstitutional.  
She has failed to show that the mandatory imposition of this DNA 
surcharge, which was discretionary at the time she committed the 
single felony offense, is punitive in either intent or effect 
and thus violative of the ex post facto prohibition. 
¶51 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals, denying Scruggs' postconviction motion to vacate the 
$250 DNA surcharge. 
By the Court.–The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶52 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  An ex post 
facto law is any law which "makes more burdensome the punishment 
for a crime, after its commission . . . ."  State v. Thiel, 188 
Wis. 2d 695, 699, 524 N.W.2d 641 (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 
497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990)). 
¶53 When Scruggs committed the crime, she faced the 
possibility of a $250 DNA surcharge.  Under the amended DNA 
surcharge law, Scruggs now faces the certainty of a $250 DNA 
surcharge.  
¶54 For ex post facto purposes, the critical question is 
whether 
the 
mandatory 
DNA 
surcharge 
statute 
makes 
more 
burdensome the punishment for Scruggs' crime.  
¶55 The law of this state (accepted by the parties and the 
majority opinion) is that the mandatory, per-conviction DNA 
surcharge statute violates the ex post facto clause when applied 
to a defendant convicted in a single case of multiple crimes 
committed prior to the effective date of the mandatory DNA 
surcharge statute.  See State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, ¶¶35-36, 
363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758.1 
¶56 In contrast, the question in the instant case is 
whether the mandatory DNA surcharge law requiring a circuit 
court to impose a single $250 DNA surcharge for the conviction of 
                                                 
1 The majority opinion and the parties do not challenge 
State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758.  
Majority 
op., 
¶35 
n.8. 
 
Instead, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
distinguishes Radaj on its facts:  "Unlike Radaj, which involved 
multiple surcharges for multiple felony convictions, this case 
addresses whether a single DNA surcharge for a single felony 
conviction is punitive."  Majority op., ¶35. 
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
a single crime violates the ex post facto clause when applied to 
a crime committed prior to the effective date of the statute.  
¶57 To me, a statute mandating a DNA surcharge is obviously 
more burdensome on a defendant than a statute granting a circuit 
court discretion to impose a DNA surcharge on a defendant.  
Indeed United States Supreme Court case law supports this 
approach.  See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 400-02 
(1937) (changing penalty from 15-year maximum imprisonment to 
mandatory 15-year imprisonment violated ex post facto clause); 
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32 n.17 (1981) ("a law may be 
retrospective not only if it alters the length of the sentence, 
but also if it changes the maximum sentence from discretionary 
to mandatory"). 
¶58 Thus, to me, the question becomes whether the more 
burdensome mandatory DNA surcharge is punishment for ex post 
facto purposes.   
¶59 Radaj already recognizes that a mandatory surcharge 
can constitute punishment for ex post facto purposes.   
¶60 Although not considered in 
Radaj, the mandatory 
surcharge looks like punishment because the statute explicitly 
makes it part of a defendant's sentence.  Other statutorily 
imposed surcharges, fees, and costs are not explicitly part of 
the sentence.2   
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.046(1r) provides:  
(1r) If a court imposes a sentence or places a person 
on 
probation, 
the 
court 
shall 
impose 
a 
deoxyribonucleic acid analysis surcharge, calculated 
as follows: 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶61 Because the DNA surcharge is part of the sentence and 
because the sentence is the means by which circuit courts impose 
punishment, the DNA surcharge has been considered part of 
punishment.3  See State v. Nickel, 2010 WI App 161, 330 
Wis. 2d 750, 794 N.W.2d 765.  
¶62 In Nickel, the defendant moved to vacate the DNA 
surcharge imposed under the permissive DNA surcharge law.  The 
court of appeals explained that when "a defendant moves to 
vacate 
a 
DNA 
surcharge, 
the 
defendant 
seeks 
sentence 
modification."  Nickel, 330 Wis. 2d 750, ¶5.  The court of 
appeals rejected "the notion that the DNA surcharge is neither a 
sentence 
nor 
a 
component 
of 
a 
sentence. 
 
Nickel, 
330 
Wis. 2d 750, ¶6.4     
¶63 Scruggs' 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
and 
sentence 
explicitly states that she must submit a DNA sample and pay a 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) For each conviction for a felony, $250. 
(b) For each conviction for a misdemeanor, $200. 
3 See State v. Edwards, 2013 WI App 51, ¶7 n.2, 347 
Wis. 2d 526, 830 N.W.2d 109 (quoting State v. Gibbons, 71 
Wis. 2d 94, 97, 237 N.W.2d 33 (1976) ("[A] sentence is the means 
by which the court imposes a punishment or penalty provided by 
statute for the offense upon the person found guilty, as 
distinguished from probation, under which sentence is either 
withheld or its execution stayed.").   
4 At least two circuit courts have vacated the mandatory DNA 
surcharge imposed on defendants who committed crimes before the 
effective date of the statutory mandatory DNA surcharge.  See 
State v. Tharp, Milwaukee County Case Nos. 13-CF-2871 & 13-CF- 
5173 (Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 2014); State v. Vivar, Jefferson County 
Case No. 13-CT-367 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2014). 
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
$250 surcharge.5  Following the reasoning of Nickel, the DNA 
surcharge (statutorily mandated as part of Scruggs' sentence) 
constitutes punishment for purposes of the ex post facto clause.  
¶64 I could end here and conclude that the mandatory DNA 
surcharge statute is punishment and its retroactive application 
runs afoul of the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the 
federal and state constitutions.6  
¶65 Nevertheless, I continue my ex post facto analysis, 
focusing on whether the mandatory DNA surcharge statute has a 
punitive effect.7   
                                                 
5 The majority opinion suggests that a cross-reference to 
the DNA surcharge in Wis. Stat. § 814.76(5), which lists various 
surcharges in criminal actions, negates any inferences that 
could be drawn from the placement of the DNA surcharge in the 
criminal statutes. I disagree.  In any event § 814.76(5) does 
not negate the fact that the DNA surcharge is, unlike other 
surcharges, part of the sentence.    
6 See 
Article 
I, 
Section 
10 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, prohibiting ex post facto laws.     
"The animating principle underlying the ex post facto 
clauses is the concept of fair warning."  State ex rel Singh v. 
Kemper, 2016 WI 67, ¶39, 371 Wis. 2d 127, 883 N.W.2d 86.  See 
also Breck P. McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 15 Cal. L. Rev. 269, 287 (1927) ("At 
the root of the mischief of ex post facto laws is their 
unfairness.  The individual is entitled to a chance to know what 
the law is before he acts.  The law must be accessible.  It must 
not, like Caligula's, be written in small characters and hung 
upon high pillars."). 
7 I conclude that a punitive legislative intent can be 
shown, but it is easier to demonstrate that the mandatory DNA 
surcharge statute's effect is more burdensome punishment than 
the discretionary statute. Similar arguments support both 
punitive intent and punitive effect.  
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶66 In an ex post facto analysis, the text of the 
challenged statute must be scrutinized.  The proper approach is 
to determine whether the mandatory DNA surcharge statute is an 
unconstitutional ex post facto violation on its face.8 
¶67 The text of the statutory mandatory DNA surcharge 
demonstrates that the DNA surcharge is punitive in effect and 
not merely a reasonable civil charge to fund the estimated costs 
of state DNA programs: 
                                                                                                                                                             
Compare People v. Stead, 845 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Colo. 1993) 
(resting its conclusion that a drug offender surcharge had a 
punitive intent in part on the ground that "[t]he surcharge at 
issue is part of Colorado's criminal code" and in part on "[t]he 
amount of the fine imposed is correlated to the degree of felony 
committed.") with In re DNA Ex Post Facto Issues, 561 F.3d 294, 
299-300 (4th Cir. 2009) (resting its conclusion that a $250 DNA 
surcharge applied per defendant did not have a punitive intent 
because the surcharge's express purpose was "not punitive," it 
was not codified in statutory chapter addressing "crime and 
punishment," it offset DNA expenses, and it was "relatively 
small [in] size.").  
8 See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100-01 
(1997) (the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors "must be considered 
in relation to the statute on its face."); Weaver v. Graham, 450 
U.S. 24, 29, 34 (1981) ("the inquiry [whether the criminal 
statute ameliorates or worsens conditions imposed by its 
predecessor] looks to the challenged provision, and not to any 
special circumstances that may mitigate its effect on the 
particular individual"); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 
401 (1937) ("[T]he ex post facto clause looks to the standard of 
punishment prescribed by a statute, rather than to the sentence 
actually imposed. . . . It is for this reason that an increase 
in the possible penalty is ex post facto regardless of the 
length of the sentence actually imposed, since the measure of 
punishment prescribed by the later statute is more severe than 
that of the earlier.") (citations omitted). 
See also 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 
§ 25.1(c) at 765-66 (4th ed. 2015).    
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
• The DNA surcharge is imposed and collected as part of 
the sentence in every criminal conviction, regardless 
of whether a DNA sample is collected or analyzed. 
• The DNA surcharge is imposed and collected as part of 
the sentence in every criminal conviction on the basis 
of the number of convictions, regardless of whether a 
DNA sample is collected or analyzed.9 
• The DNA surcharge is imposed and collected as part of 
the sentence in every criminal conviction, regardless 
of whether the defendant has previously furnished a 
DNA sample. 
¶68 The most significant factor in a court's determination 
that a statute's effects are not punitive is that the statute 
                                                 
9 Two legislative decisions suggest a punitive intent: (1) 
tying the amount of the surcharge to the number of convictions 
(regardless of whether the defendant supplied only one DNA 
sample or several and regardless of whether the State analyzed 
one DNA sample or numerous samples); and (2) imposing a lesser 
DNA surcharge for misdemeanors than felonies.  Cf. State v. 
Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, ¶21, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758 
("Wisconsin's 
DNA 
surcharge 
increases 
with 
each 
conviction . . . . [T]he legislative decision to tie the amount 
of the surcharge to the number of convictions, something 
seemingly unrelated to the cost of the DNA-analysis-related 
activities that the surcharge funds, casts doubt on legislative 
intent."); State v. Elward, 2015 WI App 51, ¶7, 363 Wis. 2d 628, 
866 N.W.2d 756 ("When the circuit court sentenced Elward, the 
law required the surcharge, but did not permit the State to 
actually collect a DNA sample.  As a result, the $200 surcharge 
bore no relation to the cost of a DNA test because he never had 
to 
submit 
to 
a 
test. 
 
The 
State 
received 
money 
for 
nothing. . . . [T]he surcharge . . . violated the Constitution's 
ex post facto clause.") (citation omitted). 
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
has a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose.10  I shall 
therefore examine whether a rational connection exists between 
the terms of the statutory mandatory DNA surcharge and the non-
punitive purpose of the statute to fund state DNA programs.  See 
majority op., ¶¶45-48.  
¶69 Although the State and the majority opinion assert 
that a rational connection exists, their analyses fail.  This 
analysis involves the factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963), especially the sixth and 
seventh factors that "must be considered in relation to the 
statute on its face."  Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 
100-01 (1997).11  
¶70 The sixth Mendoza-Martinez factor addresses whether 
the surcharge is rationally connected to some non-punitive 
purpose.  The seventh Mendoza-Martinez factor addresses whether 
the surcharge "appears excessive in relation to the non-punitive 
purpose" of the statute.  See majority op., ¶¶44-45.   
¶71 The sixth and seventh Mendoza-Martinez factors, taken 
together, require courts to ask a two-part question:  Is there a 
rational connection between the surcharge and the non-punitive 
purpose, and is the amount of the surcharge excessive in 
                                                 
10 "The Act's rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose 
is a '[m]ost significant' factor in our determination that the 
statute's effects are not punitive."  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 
102 (2003) (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 
(1996)). 
11 See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 
(1963) ("[T]hese factors must be considered in relation to the 
statute on its face."). 
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
relation to the non-punitive activities the surcharge funds?12  
"If there is no rational connection and the fee is excessive in 
relation to the activities it is intended to fund, then the fee 
in effect serves as an additional criminal fine, that is, the 
fee is punitive."  Radaj, 363 Wis. 2d 633, ¶25. 
¶72 Looking to the sixth and seventh Mendoza-Martinez 
factors, it is evident that no rational and proportional 
connection exists between the mandatory, per-conviction DNA 
surcharge and its professed non-punitive purpose to fund the 
State's DNA program. 
¶73 Radaj illustrates that there is no rational connection 
between the per-conviction, mandatory DNA surcharge and the 
funding of the State's DNA program.  Radaj was convicted of four 
felonies committed prior to the effective date of the statutory 
mandatory DNA surcharge.  Rather than use its discretion to 
impose a DNA surcharge if necessary, the circuit court was 
required by statute to order Radaj to pay the $250 surcharge for 
each felony, totaling $1,000.  It could have been worse——Radaj 
was initially charged with 21 misdemeanors in addition to the 
four felonies; if Radaj had been convicted and sentenced for all 
25 crimes, Radaj would have been ordered to pay $4,200 as a DNA 
surcharge.  
                                                 
12 Specifically, 
we 
must 
consider 
"whether, 
under 
Wisconsin's statutory scheme, there is some rational connection 
between calculating the DNA surcharge on a per-conviction basis 
and the cost of the DNA-analysis-related activities that the 
surcharge is meant to cover."  Radaj, 363 Wis. 2d 633, ¶29. 
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶74 The court of appeals upheld Radaj's ex post facto 
challenge to the statute and the accompanying surcharges. 
Characterizing the multiple surcharges as punishment, the court 
of appeals concluded that the sentence imposed was more 
burdensome on Radaj than the punishment that would have been 
imposed when Radaj committed the crimes (a single, permissive 
surcharge). 
¶75 After the majority's decision in the instant case, 
Radaj, who was convicted of multiple crimes may not have to pay 
any DNA surcharge at all.  Yet Scruggs, who was convicted of one 
crime, must pay a $250 DNA surcharge. 
¶76 Is there any reason to treat Radaj and Scruggs 
differently?  Both committed crimes before the effective date of 
the statutory mandatory DNA surcharge.  Radaj committed more 
crimes than Scruggs, yet his punishment (the DNA surcharge) may 
be less than hers.  Does their different treatment run afoul of 
due process and equal protection, as well as ex post facto 
protections of the law?   
¶77 I conclude that, on its face, the mandatory DNA 
surcharge statute does not bear a rational connection to funding 
the State's DNA program.  The law calculates the DNA surcharge 
regardless of whether DNA was collected or analyzed, and 
calculates it on a per-conviction and felony/misdemeanor basis 
regardless 
of 
whether 
DNA 
was 
collected 
or 
analyzed.  
Accordingly, the DNA surcharge bears no relationship to the 
actual cost of the DNA-analysis-related activities that the 
surcharge is apparently intended to cover. 
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶78 However rational a connection may be drawn between a 
statute imposing a single mandatory $250 DNA surcharge for a DNA 
sample actually collected and analyzed and funding the State's 
DNA programs, such a statute is not the statute challenged in 
this court on ex post facto grounds.   
¶79 The DNA surcharge challenged in the instant case is 
imposed regardless of whether a DNA sample of the defendant is 
collected 
or 
analyzed; 
is 
calculated 
differently 
for 
misdemeanors and felonies (yet the cost of analysis of DNA 
samples in both types of crimes is the same); and is based on 
the number of convictions in a case.  Consequently, the 
surcharge imposed by the statute challenged is not connected to—
—and is excessive in relation to——the regulatory purpose of 
funding state DNA programs.  
¶80 As in Radaj, the remedy for the ex post facto 
violation in the instant case is to vacate the surcharge, and to 
remand the cause to the circuit court to consider whether to 
impose a discretionary surcharge under the statute applicable at 
the time the crime was committed. 
¶81 Before I conclude, I briefly discuss the obvious:  The 
effect of the mandatory DNA surcharge statute should be 
evaluated in the context of a criminal justice system that 
exacts a serious toll on criminal defendants.  Collateral 
consequences already burden many aspects of a defendant's daily 
life, such as limiting employment and housing options.  Persons 
sentenced for a misdemeanor or felony in Wisconsin face up to 
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
238 collateral consequences.13  And, on top of this, criminal 
justice debt is stacking up for many defendants at a staggering 
rate.  Collateral consequences and criminal justice debt appear 
to be leading criminal offenders into a downward spiral of debt 
and recidivism.14   
¶82 I thus urge the legislature and the Wisconsin Judicial 
Council 
to 
take 
notice 
of 
and 
consider 
the 
unintended 
consequences of the increasing statutory imposition of debt on 
criminal defendants and the increasing statutory collateral 
consequences.  See Wis. Stat. § 13.92(2)(j). 
¶83 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.    
 
 
                                                 
13 See ABA Criminal Justice Section, National Inventory of 
the 
Collateral 
Consequences 
of 
Conviction, 
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/search/?jurisdiction=50 (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2017). 
14 See Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha, & Rebekah Diller, 
Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 
Criminal 
Justice 
Debt: 
A 
Barrier 
to 
Reentry 
(2010), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20a
nd%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf.   
This report discusses the hardships on criminal defendants 
imposed by "'user fees,' financial obligations imposed not for 
any traditional justice purpose . . . but rather to fund tight 
state budgets."  Id. at 1.  User fees, "while often small in 
isolation," are so numerous in many jurisdictions (and becoming 
more numerous) that criminal defendants end up with extensive 
debt.  This criminal justice debt tosses offenders into "an 
endless cycle of debt."  Id.  This debt creates a "significant 
barrier for individuals seeking to rebuild their lives after a 
criminal conviction."  Id. at 2.  The report addresses the 
concern that criminal justice debt leads to recidivism.  Id. at 
5.   
No.  2014AP2981-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1