Title: WAGNER, NUGENT, JOHNSON v. Flanagan

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

629 So. 2d 113 (1993)
WAGNER, NUGENT, JOHNSON, ROTH, ROMANO, ERIKSON & KUPFER, P.A., etc., et al., Petitioners,
v.
John H. FLANAGAN, Jr., Respondent.
No. 79828.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 10, 1993.
Rehearing Denied January 5, 1994.
Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwoody & Cole, West Palm Beach, FL, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, Peterson & Bernard, and Larry Klein and Jane Kreusler-Walsh, *114 Klein & Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for petitioners.
Stuart H. Sobel, Sobel & Sobel, P.A., Miami, FL, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Flanagan v. Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth, Romano, Eriksen & Kupfer, P.A., 594 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), based on conflict with Gallizzi v. Williams, 218 So. 2d 499 (Fla.2d DCA 1969). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash Flanagan.
When JFK Medical Center of West Palm Beach (JFK) was in the process of filing a claim with its insurer under a directors' liability policy for allegedly fraudulent acts committed by JFK's directors, JFK's lawyer sent a letter to the insurer's lawyer commenting on a separate fraud committed by construction contractor Flanagan:
Flanagan did not learn of the letter, which was dated February 1988, until November 1988, and subsequently filed a complaint for defamation in October 1990 against JFK's lawyer, his law firm, and JFK. The trial court ruled the complaint barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1987). The district court reversed, holding that the statute of limitations period for defamation does not begin to run until the libel or slander is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. The court noted conflicting language in Gallizzi, wherein the district court stated that a "[c]ause of action in slander accrues at the time of the alleged publication." 218 So. 2d  at 500.
Flanagan argues that where the defamation is private, not public, the limitations period should run from the time of discovery, not publication. A publication rule for private defamation, he contends, would be unfair because it would deprive a plaintiff of relief when he or she could not have known of the wrong. Flanagan relies on the following broad language from Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1969), for support:
Id. at 334.
We find Creviston, a breach of implied warranty case, inapplicable to the present case by its own terms:
Id. at 334. We find the present case controlled by the plain language of applicable statutes.
The legislature has established unequivocal guidelines governing the statute of limitations for defamation suits and has decided on a two-year period:
*115 Section 95.11, Fla. Stat. (1987). The period begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues:
Section 95.031, Fla. Stat. (1987). A cause of action for defamation accrues on publication:
Section 770.07, Fla. Stat. (1987). Although chapter 770 primarily addresses media defendants, we note the chapter is broadly titled Civil Actions for Libel. We hold the above statute applicable to all civil litigants, both public and private, in defamation actions. To rule otherwise would allow potentially endless liability since Florida Statutes contains no statute of repose for this particular tort. We doubt the legislature would have intended this.
Based on the foregoing, we approve Gallizzi, quash Flanagan, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, McDONALD, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, C.J., and KOGAN, J., concur with opinions.
SHAW, J., dissents with an opinion.
BARKETT, Chief Justice, concurring.
I concur in the result achieved in this case because I do not believe that the letter in question can possibly be actionable.
KOGAN, Justice, concurring.
While I find Justice Shaw's dissent makes good sense, I see no way around the plain language of section 770.07, Florida Statutes (1987), which obviously contradicts the Restatement of Torts. I therefore concur, though with some regret. I would suggest that the legislature revisit this issue. To my mind, a good alternative to the present scheme would be to include a discovery rule in the accrual statute, but limit the discovery period by a longer statute of repose judged from the date of first publication.
SHAW, Justice, dissenting.
To my mind, the statute of limitations in a defamation action begins to run on discovery  not publication  of the defamatory statement. By adopting the publication rule, the majority has erected yet another inequitable barrier between the courthouse door and injured plaintiff.
The Legislature has established a two-year statute of limitations for defamation.[1] The period begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues.[2] A cause of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause occurs.[3] The Restatement of Torts defines the elements of a cause of action:
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977). The last element, special damages, may be summarized as "damages, either presumed or proved," and includes four classes: nominal, *116 general, special, and emotional or bodily harm or injury.[4]
Thus, under the Legislature's scheme the limitations period begins to run not on publication, but when the plaintiff discovers the defamation, since an integral component of the last element is mental or emotional harm to the plaintiff and this generally requires knowledge, direct or indirect, by the plaintiff of the defamatory information. This conclusion is supported by both caselaw and common sense. Applying the discovery rule to a breach of implied warranty claim in Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1969), this Court extrapolated broadly from the facts of that case:
Id. at 333. In concluding, we endorsed the discovery rule as a general principle of law, "regardless of the underlying nature of the cause of action":
Id. at 334. See also City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954) (discovery rule applied to medical malpractice claim).
The discovery rule serves the purpose of the statute of limitations  it bars those who sleep on their rights  and is consistent with principles of basic fairness and common sense, as noted in Creviston. This was further underscored in Caster v. Hennessey, No. 86-5572 (U.S. 11th Cir. Nov. 23, 1987), a federal case decided on state law grounds. There, the plaintiff was discharged from employment and could not obtain another job for years, even though he sent out thousands of applications. He later learned that his former employer had secretly placed a highly unfavorable termination report in his personnel file. The Eleventh Circuit held that *117 Florida's statute of limitations for defamation begins to run on discovery, not publication.
Id., Slip op. at 8 (footnote and citation omitted).
I note that the statutory provision on which the majority hangs its hat, chapter 770, addresses only libel claims against media  not private  defendants.[5] And while it is logical to provide, as does section 770.07, that a cause of action for defamation against a media defendant accrues on first publication in the state, it makes no sense whatsoever to say the same thing about private defendants. For while constructive knowledge may reasonably be imputed when a statement is broadcast on television or radio or printed in a newspaper, no such knowledge may be reasonably ascribed when the statement is secreted in a private letter or transmitted by individual word of mouth. Finally, even though the Legislature has failed to provide a statute of repose for this particular tort, I would leave this matter up to that body  the Legislature has created statutes of repose for numerous claims and may easily do so here, if that is its intent.
Based on the foregoing, I would hold that for other than media defendants the statute of limitations for defamation begins to run on discovery, not publication, of the defamatory statement.
[1]  95.11, Fla. Stat. (1987).
[2]  95.031, Fla. Stat. (1987).
[3]  95.031(1), Fla. Stat. (1987).
[4]  The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) provides:

620 Nominal Damages
One who is liable for a slander actionable per se or for a libel is liable for at least nominal damages.
... .
621 General Damages
One who is liable for a defamatory communication is liable for the proved, actual harm caused to the reputation of the person defamed.
... .
622 Special Harm as Affecting the Measure of Recovery
One who is liable for either a slander actionable per se or a libel is also liable for any special harm legally caused by the defamatory publication.
... .
623 Emotional Distress and Resulting Bodily Harm
One who is liable to another for a libel or slander is liable also for emotional distress and bodily harm that is proved to have been caused by the defamatory publication.
[5]  Virtually every statutory section within the chapter contains a direct or indirect reference to the media, and none to private defendants.