Title: In re Disqualification of Frost

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Frost, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-4932.] 
 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF FROST. 
WILCOX v. WILCOX. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Frost, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-4932.] 
Judges—Affidavits 
of 
disqualification—R.C. 
2701.03—Affiant 
failed 
to 
demonstrate bias, prejudice, or appearance of impropriety and failed to 
establish that information from judge’s potential testimony is material to 
disposition of pending motion and unavailable from other sources—
Disqualification denied. 
(No. 20-AP-072—Decided September 23, 2020.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Licking County Court of Common Pleas, 
Domestic Relations Division, Case No. 2015 DR 00574. 
____________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Defendant Grant T. Wilcox has filed an affidavit pursuant to R.C. 
2701.03 seeking to disqualify Judge Duke Frost from the above-referenced divorce 
case.  This is the second affidavit of disqualification that Mr. Wilcox has filed 
against Judge Frost in this matter.  His first affidavit was denied in an entry dated 
June 14, 2018.  See Supreme Court case No. 18-AP-063. 
{¶ 2} Mr. Wilcox claims that Judge Frost should be removed for two 
reasons.  First, he asserts that the judge attempted to interfere in Mr. Wilcox’s 
bankruptcy proceeding by issuing a warrant for his arrest in violation of an 
automatic stay.  Second, he claims that the judge or his magistrate will be a witness 
regarding Mr. Wilcox’s pending motion for contempt against his ex-wife. 
{¶ 3} Judge Frost filed a response to the affidavit and does not believe that 
he has taken any action in the underlying case that would create an appearance of 
bias. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 4} In disqualification requests, “[t]he term ‘bias or prejudice’ ‘implies a 
hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of 
the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on 
the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will 
be governed by the law and the facts.’ ”  In re Disqualification of O’Neill, 100 Ohio 
St.3d 1232, 2002-Ohio-7479, 798 N.E.2d 17, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. 
Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 469, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956).  “The proper test for 
determining whether a judge’s participation in a case presents an appearance of 
impropriety is * * * an objective one.  A judge should step aside or be removed if 
a reasonable and objective observer would harbor serious doubts about the judge’s 
impartiality.”  In re Disqualification of Lewis, 117 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2004-Ohio-
7359, 884 N.E.2d 1082, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 5} Mr. Wilcox has not established that Judge Frost has hostile feelings 
toward him or has formed a fixed anticipatory judgment on any issue in the case.  
Nor has Mr. Wilcox set forth a compelling argument for disqualifying Judge Frost 
to avoid an appearance of partiality.  According to the judge, he had a good-faith 
belief that the bankruptcy stay would not prevent enforcement of his orders in the 
underlying divorce case.  But when the bankruptcy court stayed all aspects of the 
divorce case, the judge notes, he took prompt action to comply.  Based on this 
record, Mr. Wilcox has not established that the judge’s actions were the product of 
any bias or that an objective observer would reasonably question the judge’s 
partiality. 
{¶ 6} Judge Frost did not directly address Mr. Wilcox’s allegation that the 
judge or his magistrate will be a witness.  Nevertheless, the chief justice has 
previously “ ‘declined to establish a rule “requiring disqualification of a judge 
based solely on suppositions that the judge may be called as a witness or allegations 
that the judge possesses evidence material to the case.’ ”  In re Disqualification of 
Hedric, 127 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2009-Ohio-7208, 937 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 9, quoting In 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
re Disqualification of Stuard, 113 Ohio St.3d 1236, 2006-Ohio-7233, 863 N.E.2d 
636, ¶ 6, quoting In re Disqualification of Gorman, 74 Ohio St.3d 1251, 657 N.E.2d 
1354 (1993). 
 
“The mere suggestion that [a judge] may be a witness in [the] case 
and an allegation that her testimony may be material to disposition 
of the case are insufficient to establish the existence of bias, 
prejudice, or other disqualifying interest.”  Gorman at 1251, 657 
N.E.2d 1354.  Moreover, when the evidence may be obtained from 
witnesses other than the trial judge, the judge is not such a material 
witness as to require the judge’s disqualification.  Hedric at ¶ 9, 
citing Stuard at ¶ 6.  Indeed, mere familiarity with the circumstances 
surrounding the trial does not render the judge a material witness.  
Stuard at ¶ 6 * * *. 
 
(Brackets sic.)  In re Disqualification of Matia, 135 Ohio St.3d 1246, 2012-Ohio-
6343, 986 N.E.2d 8, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 7} Here, Mr. Wilcox alleges that Judge Frost will be a witness at a 
hearing on Mr. Wilcox’s pending contempt motion against his ex-wife.  But he has 
not established that the information from the judge’s potential testimony is material 
to disposition of the motion and unavailable from other sources. 
{¶ 8} To be sure, if Judge Frost ultimately concludes that he or his 
magistrate is likely to be a material witness, he must disqualify himself, as 
Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(2)(d) directs.  “Every litigant is entitled to have his or her case 
decided by a judge who can approach the case in an objective and impartial manner, 
and a judge who possesses personal knowledge of evidentiary facts that are in 
dispute may not be able to meet this criterion.”  Matia at ¶ 11; see also In re 
Disqualification of Crawford, 81 Ohio St.3d 1204, 688 N.E.2d 510 (1996) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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(disqualifying all judges of a common pleas court from a case that would require 
the court to assess the professional abilities and credibility of a judicial officer of 
that court); In re Disqualification of Rastatter, 113 Ohio St.3d 1218, 2006-Ohio-
7226, 863 N.E.2d 623, ¶ 6 (“The roles of judge and witness are incompatible”). 
{¶ 9} “The statutory right to seek disqualification is an extraordinary 
remedy.  A judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the 
appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these 
presumptions.”  (Citation omitted.)  In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio 
St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.  Mr. Wilcox has not overcome 
those presumptions here. 
{¶ 10} The affidavit of disqualification is denied. 
________________________