Title: State v. Goodwin

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

Officers Alvarez and Figueroa stopped defendant s vehicle and arrested the occupants. Officer Alvarez entered the car and observed a cigarette box on the floor in the back. Upon opening the box, Officer Alvarez discovered two vials of cocaine. In addition, the officer observed leather tassels hanging from the underside of the dashboard. Upon pulling on the tassels, Officer Alvarez discovered a black leather pouch containing two .38 caliber bullets. Ultimately, defendant confessed to driving the vehicle but denied that he had anything to do with the shooting, though he did inform police where they could find the gun used in the shooting. In October 1990, defendant was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, and unlawful possession of a handgun. On November 30, 1990, he was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of thirty years imprisonment with a thirty-year parole disqualifier. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant s conviction in March 1993. The Supreme Court denied certification. Subsequently, defendant filed two petitions for post-conviction relief. The first petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, was filed in January 1994. Ultimately, that petition was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court s denial and the Supreme Court denied certification. The second petition was filed on August 4, 1998, again alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. That petition was dismissed on four grounds: (1) defendant had previously litigated the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the petition was time-barred under Rule 3:22-12; (3) defendant failed to demonstrate excusable neglect; and (4) the search of defendant s vehicle was supported by probable cause. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the dismissal of the second petition. The court reasoned that defendant had demonstrated excusable neglect in the form of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the interests of justice required relaxation of the five-year time bar of Rule 3:22-12. The Supreme Court granted the State of New Jersey s petition for certification and granted the motions of the Attorney General and the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey to participate as amicus curiae. HELD: Defendant s petition was filed well beyond the five-year deadline established by Rule 3:22-12 and is thus time-barred. This case does not present excusable neglect under Rule 3:22-12 such that relaxation of the procedural bar is justified, nor do the interests of justice require relaxation. 1. A number of procedural bars to post-conviction relief exist with the purpose of promoting finality in judicial proceedings. One such bar is the five-year time bar set forth in Rule 3:22-12. The five-year period commences from the time of the conviction or the time of the sentencing, whichever the defendant is challenging, and can only be relaxed if the defendant alleges facts demonstrating excusable neglect or if the interests of justice demand it. In determining whether a defendant has asserted grounds sufficient for relaxation of the Rule, a court should consider the following factors: (1) the extent and cause of the delay; (2) the prejudice to the State; and (3) the merits of defendant s claim. Having been filed nearly eight years after the date of defendant s conviction, the petition in this case is time-barred. Further, defendant did not demonstrate excusable neglect, having failed to explain how his attorney s decision not to file a motion to suppress and his subsequent attorney s failure to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel contributed to the extensive delay in the filing of his petition for post-conviction relief. In addition, defendant s claims lack merit and the State would be greatly prejudiced by having to relitigate the case. (Pp. 9-13) 2. In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must (1) show that counsel s performance was deficient; and (2) show that the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 104 S.Ct 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In determining whether there is deficient representation, courts must eliminate the distorting effect of hindsight, reconstruct the circumstances underlying counsel s challenged conduct, and evaluate counsel s conduct from counsel s perspective at the time. Defendant must show that but for the ineffective assistance of counsel, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Under certain circumstances prejudice is presumed, but failure to file a suppression motion is not one of those circumstances. (Pp. 14-17) 3 Probable cause requires more than bare suspicion and rests on the objective and reasonable expectations of a trained police officer. If a search is incident to a lawful arrest, one based on probable cause, the defendant s seizure automatically justifies a warrantless search of the defendant and the area within his or her immediate control. The lawful arrest of a motor vehicle occupant authorizes the warrantless search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, including the search of any containers found within the passenger compartment. (Pp. 17-19) 4 The cumulative information received by the arresting officer within one-half hour of the shooting provided the requisite probable cause and the search of defendant s vehicle was therefore justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest. (Pp. 20-21) 5. Defendant failed to present a prima facie claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the Court concludes that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant, it finds no merit in defendant s claim that trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress. Defendant failed to demonstrate that the allegedly deficient performance of counsel prejudiced his defense so as to deprive defendant of a fair trial and that, but for the failure to file a motion to suppress, the outcome of the trial would have been different. It cannot be said that counsel s assistance was so ineffective as to deny defendant the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. (Pp. 21-23) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI s opinion. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID GOODWIN, Defendant-Respondent. Argued April 30, 2002 Decided August 6, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Susan B. Gyss, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Fred J. Theemling, Jr., Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney). Frank J. Pugliese, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney). Erik W. Daab, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General, attorney). Lawrence S. Lustberg and Shavar D. Jeffries submitted a letter brief on behalf of amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZAZZALI, J. This appeal concerns whether the second petition for post-conviction relief brought by defendant, David Goodwin, is barred by Rule 3:22-12. We also must consider whether the nature of the allegations in his petition for post-conviction relief are sufficient to require relaxation of the five-year time bar. Eight years after he had been sentenced on his convictions of felony murder, armed robbery and unlawful possession of a handgun, defendant filed this second petition for post-conviction relief. His petition was filed well beyond the five-year deadline established by Rule 3:22-12 and is thus time-barred. This case does not present excusable neglect under Rule 3:22-12 such that relaxation of the procedural bar is justified. Nor do the interests of justice require relaxation. [Mitchell, supra, 126 N.J. at 575-76.] However, a court may relax the time bar if the defendant alleges facts demonstrating that the delay was due to the defendant s excusable neglect or if the interests of justice demand it. Id. at 576. If the petitioner does not allege sufficient facts, the Rule bars the claim. Ibid. In other words, a petitioner must offer something more than a bare allegation. Id. at 580. In determining whether a defendant has asserted grounds sufficient for relaxation of the Rule, a court should consider the extent and cause of the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the petitioner s claim in determining whether there has been an injustice sufficient to relax the time limits. Afanador, supra, 151 N.J. at 52 (citing Mitchell, supra, 126 N.J. at 580). In this matter, defendant was convicted in October 1990 and sentenced on November 30, 1990. He filed his first petition for post-conviction relief in January 1994. His second petition for post-conviction relief was filed on August 4, 1998, nearly eight years after the date of his conviction, and almost three years beyond the five-year time bar of Rule 3:22-12. Therefore, defendant s petition is time-barred. Defendant, however, contends that there exists excusable neglect for his failure to file a timely petition. Defendant claims that the delay in the filing of his second petition for post-conviction relief is attributable to his counsel s failure to adequately represent him. Defendant further asserts that the interests of justice require a relaxation of the time bar because his petition raises substantial constitutional questions in respect of ineffective assistance of counsel and the legality of his arrest, the search of his vehicle, and his interrogation. Defendant has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the delay in the filing of his petition was due to excusable neglect. Further, defendant s assertion that his trial counsel and subsequent counsel, a total of three different attorneys, were ineffective is insufficient to demonstrate excusable neglect. See State v. Dugan, 289 N.J. Super. 15, 21 (App. Div. 1996) (refusing to relax five-year time bar because defendant s ineffective assistance of counsel claim rest[ed] on factual allegations outside the trial record that would require an evidentiary hearing relating to the conduct of his trial held more than nine years ago ). Defendant does not explain how his trial counsel s failure to file a motion to suppress, and his subsequent counsel s failure to raise the issue of trial counsel s alleged ineffectiveness, contributed to the extensive delay in the filing of his petition for post-conviction relief. We also conclude that, in any event, the claims set forth in the petition lack merit, and therefore defendant has failed to raise a substantial constitutional question. Moreover, the prejudice to the State in relitigating the case against defendant cannot be understated. Defendant was convicted and sentenced approximately twelve years ago. As indicated by the State at oral argument, two of the officers involved in the case, Investigators Bartucci and Sorrentino, have since retired. Also, one of the State s key witnesses, Ronald Henderson, has been sentenced and is currently serving his term of imprisonment. According to the State, once a co-defendant is sentenced, to convince that co-defendant to testify again is extremely difficult because he or she already has received the benefit of a plea bargain. [ 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984); see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (holding that defendants must satisfy Strickland test to show violation of Article 1, paragraph 10 of New Jersey Constitution).] According to the first prong of the test, counsel s performance must be reviewed with extreme deference . . ., requiring a strong presumption that counsel s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.] Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694). In that respect, courts are required to make every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel s perspective at the time. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694. Under the second prong of the test, prejudice is not presumed and must be proven by the defendant. Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52 (citing Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 2067, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 696-97). Specifically, a defendant alleging [ineffective assistance of counsel] must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Ibid. (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed 2d at 698). In certain contexts, such as the [a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether, prejudice is presumed. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 2067, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 696; see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 667 (1984) (holding that in some ineffective assistance cases, prejudice to defendant may be presumed). Failure to file a suppression motion, however, is not one of those circumstances. State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (1998) (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 2588, 91 L. Ed. 2d 305, 325 (1986)). Additionally, when counsel fails to file a suppression motion, the defendant not only must satisfy both parts of the Strickland test but also must prove that his [or her] Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious. Ibid. (citing Kimmelman, supra, 477 U.S. at 375, 106 S. Ct. at 2583, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 319). In analyzing trial counsel s performance, we examine the law as it stood at the time of counsel s actions, not as it subsequently developed. Ibid. (citing Kimmelman, supra, 477 U.S. at 384, 106 S. Ct. at 2588, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 325 ( The reasonableness of counsel s performance is to be evaluated from counsel s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances. )). Assuming that counsel did not file a suppression motion because he believed that probable cause existed to justify the police officer s search of the container in the vehicle, we must now determine whether counsel s supposition was in error, and if so, whether the error was so serious that counsel was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed 2d at 693. NO. A-58 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID GOODWIN, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED August 6, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY