Title: State of New Jersey v. Michael Arthur

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). A jury found Michael Arthur guilty of various offenses involving cocaine, among them the distribution of cocaine within 500 feet of a public park and possession of cocaine within 500 feet of a public park with the intent to distribute. The trial court sentenced Arthur to concurrent fifteen-year terms of imprisonment, with five years of parole ineligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence. This Court denied Arthur s petition for certification. Arthur filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on the alleged ineffective assistance provided by his trial counsel, which was supported by affidavits of a Robert Jackson and three other potential witnesses whom counsel did not call at Arthur s trial. Judge Barisonek, who also was the trial judge, conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing in which Jackson, Arthur, Arthur s brother, Arthur s fiancée Crystal Ross and defense counsel all testified. At the hearing on Arthur s petition for post-conviction relief, Robert Jackson testified that Arthur brought him to the courthouse on the first day of the trial and that he told Arthur s lawyer that he was the one who sold drugs to a woman named Crittenden. According to Jackson, he also told an investigator from the prosecutor s office that he was the one who sold drugs to Crittenden. On cross-examination, Jackson was confronted by the investigator s notes, signed by Jackson, which did not include any statement that Jackson had sold drugs to Crittenden. Jackson also testified that on the second day of trial, defense counsel pulled him into the staircase and told him to take off, and that he then left the courthouse. Arthur s brother also testified that defense counsel came outside to the hall next to the courtroom in a rush and told him to get Jackson out of here. Defense counsel gave the following account of his interview of Jackson. Originally, Jackson looked like an excellent witness because he was able to give the defense what it needed to establish that he was the seller. However, he changed his story. When he learned that he was going to be a suspect, he said he wasn t the seller but that he was there and knew that Michael Arthur didn t sell. Defense counsel further explained that he didn t know what Jackson was going to say and that was something he didn t want to risk. Defense counsel testified that he was pleased with Crittenden s testimony and thought they were going to get a not guilty verdict based on her testimony. In addition, he testified that Crittenden told him that Arthur had been selling drugs that day, but Jackson was the one who make the sale to her. On cross-examination, defense counsel indicated that he suggested Jackson leave the courthouse during the trial because he was concerned Jackson would be arrested and not because he had made a strategic decision not to call Jackson as a defense witness and wanted to prevent the State from calling him as a rebuttal witness. Defense counsel also testified that he made a tactical decision not to call Arthur s brother as a trial witness and that he was unable to call Arthur s two other proposed witnesses, Crystal Ross and Danielle Tomlison, because Arthur did not bring them to the courthouse. Judge Barisonek denied the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial. This Court granted Arthur s petition for certification, limited to the issue of whether he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. HELD: Defense counsel s representation of his client fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance to which an accused is entitled and the accused received a fair trial; the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief is sustained. To be entitled to a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make a two-part showing. First, the defendant must show that counsel s performance was deficient. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. In determining whether defense counsel s alleged deficient performance prejudiced the defense, it is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceedings. Defendant bears the burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. (pp. 10-12) Judged by these standards, there is no basis for concluding that defense counsel provided Arthur ineffective assistance in failing to call Jackson as a defense witness. Initially, we reject Arthur s contention that counsel failed to make a strategic decision not to call Jackson. Judge Barisonek concluded that defense counsel s testimony that he did not tell Jackson to leave the courthouse was incredible and found that counsel told Jackson to leave and get out of here because he was going to hurt Robin Crittenden s testimony. An appellate court must accept a trial court s factual finding if it is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Judge Barisonek s finding is supported not only by the testimony of Arthur s brother and Jackson, but also the inherent improbability that an experienced criminal defense attorney such as defense counsel would think his duty of loyalty to his client was outweighed by an obligation to warn a potential defense witness that he could be arrested. Judge Barisonek also correctly concluded that Arthur failed to overcome the presumption that defense counsel s strategic decision not to call Jackson as a defense witness might be considered sound trial strategy. There was a reasonable basis for defense counsel s strategic decision not to call Jackson as a defense witness because his testimony was more likely to harm than to help Arthur s case. This perception of the probable impact of Jackson s testimony on the trial was obviously shared by the prosecutor, who made her own strategic decision to call Jackson as a rebuttal witness and strenuously urged the trial court to delay the trial to afford her the opportunity to locate him. There also is no basis for concluding that this strategic decision was affected by defense counsel s failure to conduct additional pretrial investigation. (pp. 12-18) We reject Arthur s argument that defense counsel s representation was deficient in failing to call Arthur s brother to testify that Arthur did not sell the drugs to Crittenden and that Jackson said he was the one who sold the drugs. Defense counsel testified that he decided, with Arthur s concurrence, not to call Arthur s brother because he believe Crittenden had been an effective witness and that Arthur s brother would not be a credible witness. Defense counsel also stated that he considered calling Arthur s brother to testify that Jackson had initially admitted selling drugs to Crittenden but ultimately decided not to call him for that purpose. Such testimony would have posed obvious strategic risks to the defense. (pp. 18-19) Arthur also argues that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to visit the area where he was alleged to have sold drugs to Crittenden, failing to interview potential defense witnesses before trial and failing to call any defense witnesses in addition to Crittenden at trial. There is no basis for concluding that there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different if defense counsel s pretrial preparation had included a visit. In the absence of evidence that defense counsel s failure to interview Jackson and Arthur s brother before trial affected those decisions, there is no basis for concluding that this failure constituted ineffective assistance. It is reasonable to infer that defense counsel made a strategic decision not to call Crystal Ross as a witness. In view of Ross s close personal relationship to Arthur and the risk that her version of the drug sale would conflict with Crittenden s, there is no basis for concluding that this decision was objectively unreasonable or that there is a likelihood Ross s testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial. Tomlinson was not produced as a witness at the hearing on the petition for post-conviction relief. Consequently, there is no evidence that she was even available to testify at the time of Arthur s trial and thus no foundation for concluding that the failure to call her constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (pp. 20-23) In addition to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims asserted by Arthur, the dissent contends that defense counsel was ineffective in other ways, none of which were raised by Arthur in his petition for post-conviction relief, his arguments at the hearing on the petition or his appellate brief. An appellate court ordinarily will not consider issues that were not presented to the trial court and an appellate court should be even more hesitant to raise an issue sua sponte that the parties have not had an opportunity to address. (pp. 23-24) We consider it necessary to comment upon the dissent s assertion that it is highly unusual that three individuals would be willing to come forward and offer testimony not only exonerating a defendant, but also implicating another person in the neighborhood and still more unusual that the person implicated would actually admit his guilt to clear a wrongfully charged defendant. What may appear highly unusual to appellate judges may not be so unusual in the culture of street-level drug dealers. (pp. 25-26) The complete trial transcript shows that defense counsel made an objectively reasonable decision regarding his overall strategy in defending the charges against Arthur by relying primarily upon Crittenden s identification of Jackson as the actual seller and that he conducted this defense in a reasonably effective manner. Defense counsel s effort to create reasonable doubt concerning Crawford s identification of Arthur as the person who sold drugs to Crittenden through Crittenden s testimony that Jackson was the actual seller would have been seriously undermined if Jackson had taken the stand and denied he was the seller. Defense counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to avoid this risk by not calling Jackson. (pp. 27-32) This opinion should not be read to condone a defense attorney s failure to interview prospective defense witnesses until the day of trial. But even though defense counsel s pretrial preparation fell short of the professional standards to which the Public Defender should require adherence, the purpose of the constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel is not to improve the quality of legal representation. The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. Our review of the trial record shows that defense counsel made an objectively reasonable decision not to call Jackson as a defense witness based on his assessment of the effectiveness of Crittenden s trial testimony and his justifiable concern that Jackson could undermine Crittenden s testimony by denying he was the one who sold her drugs. We are satisfied that defense counsel s representation of Arthur fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance to which an accused is entitled and that Arthur received a fair trial. (pp. 32-34) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED . JUSTICE ALBIN filing a separate, DISSENTING opinion, in which JUSTICES ZAZZALI and WALLACE join, is of the view that counsel s defaults amounted to errors so serious that he was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Arthur s trial would have been different had his counsel engaged in reasonable preparation. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUDGE SKILLMAN S opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICES ZAZZALI and WALLACE join. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MICHAEL ARTHUR, Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 15, 2005 Decided July 19, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Roger L. Camacho, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Sara B. Liebman, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Theodore J. Romankow, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Steven J. Kaflowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, on the letter in lieu of brief). JUDGE SKILLMAN (temporarily assigned) delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief based on the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the defense of a prosecution for a sale of drugs. Defendant's primary claim is that his counsel was ineffective in failing to call as a defense witness Robert Jackson, who initially told defense counsel that he was the one who sold the drugs but then retracted this admission when informed he could be subject to prosecution. We conclude that defense counsel's decision not to call Jackson was a reasonable strategic decision because the buyer of the drugs, Robin Crittenden, testified that Jackson was the one who sold her the drugs and defense counsel could reasonably have believed Jackson would harm the defense case by denying Crittenden's allegation that he was the seller. We also reject defendant's arguments that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to visit the scene of the drug transaction or to interview potential defense witnesses before trial and by failing to call other witnesses who could have testified defendant did not sell drugs to Crittenden. However, he changed his story. When he learned that he was going to be a suspect in this, he said, oh, no, no, I wasn't the seller. I was there. I know that Michael Arthur didn't sell and it was at that point that he was interviewed by the Prosecutor's Office and my understanding of what he told them, although I never saw the notes that you just discussed, was that he basically told them that he didn't indicate he was the seller. Defense counsel further explained: "I didn't know what [Jackson] was going to say and that was something I didn't want to risk." Defense counsel also testified that he was "pleased" with Crittenden's testimony and "thought we were going to get a not guilty based on her testimony." In addition, he testified that Crittenden told him that defendant had been selling drugs that day, but Jackson was the one who made the sale to her. Defense counsel gave the following account of Jackson's departure from the courthouse: I went out in the hallway and out of fairness to Mr. Jackson I said you are going to be arrested. Are you going to adhere to what you told me before that you were the seller? Otherwise, you better take off because you are about to be arrested but it's your call. I can't tell you what to do and at that point he literally got out in the nick of time because the entire building was scoured and the doors were shut downstairs and they didn't find him. On cross-examination, defense counsel indicated that he suggested Jackson leave the courthouse because he was concerned Jackson would be arrested rather than because he made a strategic decision not to call Jackson as a defense witness and wanted to prevent the State from calling him as a rebuttal witness: I wanted to be fair to him. I felt like he was going to stick his neck out for [defendant]. I wanted to make sure he knew what he was getting into. Defense counsel also testified that he made a tactical decision, in which defendant concurred, not to call his brother, James Arthur, as a witness and that he was unable to call defendant's two other proposed witnesses, Crystal Ross and Danielle Tomlinson, because defendant did not bring them to the courthouse. Judge Barisonek delivered a comprehensive oral opinion denying defendant's petition. The judge found defense counsel's testimony that he did not tell Jackson to leave the courthouse but instead told him to decide for himself whether to stay to be incredible: I don't believe [defense counsel], in terms of his testimony, and I don't like to say this about a lawyer, but I have to be up front. That he never told him to leave, there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that he told this guy to leave and get out of here because he was going to hurt Robin Crittenden's testimony. In making this credibility finding, Judge Barisonek relied partly on James Arthur's testimony that defense counsel told him to get Jackson out of the courthouse and partly on defense counsel's own testimony that he made a strategic decision after Crittenden testified to rely solely on her testimony in defending the case. Judge Barisonek also found that defendant concurred with defense counsel's decision not to call Jackson as a defense witness. [Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693).] In determining whether defense counsel's representation was deficient, "'[j]udicial scrutiny . . . must be highly deferential,' and must avoid viewing the performance under the 'distorting effects of hindsight.'" State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 37 (1997) (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694). Because of the inherent difficulties in evaluating a defense counsel's tactical decisions from his or her perspective during trial, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed. at 694-95 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164, 100 L. Ed. 83, 93 (1955)). In determining whether defense counsel's alleged deficient performance prejudiced the defense, "[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceedings." Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 697. Rather, defendant bears the burden of showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698; see also State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 432 (2004). A. No sir. . . . . Q. Is it possible that she told your partner that and you weren't at the location when she said that? A. It's possible. . . . . Q. And if she had told you that, of course, the seller wasn't Mr. Arthur you would have been interested to hear that. Right? A. Not really. Q. I thought so. In cross-examining Carrier, defense counsel also brought out that the police had not retained either the KFC box or brown bag in which the drugs were located. In his summation, defense counsel reminded the jury that the State's case essentially turned on Detective Crawford's credibility and that Crawford's testimony should not be accepted simply because he is a police officer: [W]e don't put the police officer on a pedestal, we put him at ground zero and either the barometer goes up or down based on your determination of his credibility. And based on this particular case I'm asking you, as I've asked you at the beginning of the case, to assume that all witnesses are equal, okay, and judge them according to what the testimony reflects . . . . Defense counsel then argued that the jury should find Crittenden credible because she had no motive to lie about Jackson's identity as the seller, and she repeatedly told the police from the time of her arrest that Jackson, not defendant, was the seller: You have to analyze her motives and one of the bases to assess whether she is credible and Detective Crawford lied to you is whether or not she tried to announce that truth before. Did she ever do it before. We know she did. She did it at the scene and I think one of the officers indicated she was trying to say something, she was doing a lot of talking and no doubt she indicated that Mr. Arthur was not the person who sold her drugs, no doubt about it . . . . Plainfield police don't want to hear this. They have their own agenda. It's not for me to say why a particular police officer has an agenda or an axe to grind over a particular suspect and why he would pin a rap on someone rather than the person who actually did it. I don't know, but I do know that Miss Crittenden made it clear over, and over again that, "You have the wrong guy." Defense counsel also pointed out that Crittenden initially indicated Jackson was the seller when she pled guilty to purchasing the drugs and that she identified defendant as the seller only after the prosecutor and trial judge told her she had to name him to get the benefit of her plea bargain: She indicated, "It's Robert Jackson," at the beginning. Whoops? "What do you mean those aren't the rules? I can't say the truth"? No. The Court takes a break, comes back, she confers with her attorney and the Prosecutor says, "Well, let's try this again, Miss Crittenden. Remember the deal here? Okay"? And suddenly she has a recollection that it's Michael Arthur who now is the seller. It's a game, that is all it is, it's not a very good game, it's not something which I would ascribe much integrity to because I'm not sure it has much to do with the truth. She was trying to say, "I got the wrong guy, but if you need me to say Arthur is the guy to get the deal I'll say it," but isn't this ridiculous, it's literally out of the mouths of babes in a way. Here is this innocent person to the system, okay, she has prior convictions and she's been through the system to some degree, but she does not - she is not a lawyer, she is not a Judge, she is someone of limited education and she is telling everyone, "There is something not cool here. You know, this is the guy who did it," but you know he didn t do this. "Can't I just admit my guilt? Isn't that good enough for the State"? But it's not. Why did they take a break? They took a break to get the story straight so she could do the dance, and she does the dance. It's all this case is about and you will have to make the call. In addition, defense counsel argued that if the jury had any doubt about defendant's guilt based on Crittenden's testimony, they should acquit him because the State had the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: [Y]ou have a reasonable certainty that you are comfortable and confident that this man was the person that sold the drugs. You have to feel that, you have to believe that, otherwise if you don't have it you cannot convict him . . . . Based upon what Miss Crittenden said, who is what I would submit is a whistle blower, that is what she is, she is basically unleashing the truth about a dirty system, she is telling you that and you have an obligation in this case only, I'm not talking about the large picture of what happens in society, I'm talking about how it affects this man's life to acquit him based upon her testimony, which is the truth. Thus, defense counsel provided defendant with an aggressive and reasonably competent defense of the charges against him. His effort to create reasonable doubt concerning Crawford's identification of defendant as the person who sold drugs to Crittenden through Crittenden's testimony that Jackson was the actual seller would have been seriously undermined if Jackson had taken the stand and denied he was the seller. Consequently, defense counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to avoid this risk by not calling Jackson. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MICHAEL ARTHUR, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. The most seasoned trial attorney cannot do justice to his client s cause if he does not prepare for trial. If he fails to conduct an investigation, or interview and take statements from critical witnesses, or get those witnesses on the stand, then the attorney s courtroom performance, however skillfully displayed, is but an illusion of adequate representation. Courtroom tactical decisions made by an attorney who has not engaged in minimal trial preparation often are distorted, rushed, wrongheaded -- and at the expense of the client. Defendant Michael Arthur likely sits in prison convicted of drug distribution charges, not because of the strength of the State s case against him, but rather because of the ineffectiveness of his State-appointed attorneys. Arthur pled not guilty to the indictment, which alleged that he had distributed drugs on June 23, 1998. He had a formidable wrongful identification defense, but the jury never heard from the witnesses who would have corroborated that defense due to his attorneys failure to conduct an investigation or prepare for trial. The Public Defender s Office and pool counsel had represented Arthur for fifteen months, and yet Arthur did not meet his assigned attorney until the pretrial conference, just two weeks before trial. Although he supplied his attorney with the names of four witnesses to support that defense, his attorney did not interview a single one before trial. His attorney did not subpoena key exculpatory witnesses for trial. Moreover, when his attorney met in the courthouse with the person who admitted to having committed the crime -- the person who came to testify to Arthur s innocence -- the attorney took no statement from him, did not call him as a witness, and allowed him to leave. As a result of his defective trial preparation, the attorney called only one witness to challenge the credibility of the State s case. Arthur did not have the financial means to retain his own attorney. He had to rely on the State to appoint competent counsel for him. The State provided him with an attorney who, however experienced, failed to take the most basic preparatory steps to assure his client a fair trial. Because I cannot agree with the majority that Arthur received the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by our federal and state constitutions, I must dissent. Based on those remarks, Jackson fled the courthouse. See footnote 7 Although defense counsel was not present at Jackson s proffer with the detective and did not review the State s notes from that meeting, he testified that Jackson, in speaking with the detective, changed his story. See footnote 8 It was counsel s understanding that Jackson, upon learning that he was a suspect, denied having committed the crime to the detective. Of course, had defense counsel looked at the detective s notes, he would have learned that Jackson only denied possessing the drugs found in the bushes. The jury never got to hear Jackson s confession because defense counsel did not get a signed statement from Jackson or move to disqualify himself from the case so that he could testify to Jackson s confession. Accordingly, the jury never heard the piece of evidence most damaging to the State s case -- that Jackson incriminated himself and cleared Arthur. In addition to Jackson, defense counsel had available three other witnesses to corroborate Crittenden s testimony that Arthur did not sell the drugs. In an affidavit, Danielle Tomlinson stated that [i]n the summer of 1998 Michael [Arthur] had gotten locked up for something he did not do. I know because I was outside and present on that date. Shortly before Arthur s arrest on West Third Street, Tomlinson notice[d] a female and Robert Jackson engaged in a conversation and some sort of exchange. While that was occurring, Arthur was seated on top of a van eating food. He later was arrested. Similarly, at the PCR hearing, Crystal Ross, defendant s girlfriend, confirmed that if called as a witness at Arthur s trial, she would have testified to the information that she provided in her affidavit. Ross stated in her affidavit that she saw Crittenden walk up to Robert Jackson who was next to Arthur. At that point, [Crittenden] and [Jackson] began to exchange something by hand. Immediately following that transaction, the narcs jumped out and grabbed Michael [Arthur] and Robin [Crittenden]. While Robert [Jackson] walked off to the corner store, Ross witnessed Crittenden crying and yelling, why are you[] locking [Arthur] up, he didn t give me anything. Ross was 100% sure that it was Robert Jackson who made the transaction. James Arthur, defendant s brother, also testified at the PCR hearing. He recalled telling defense counsel in the courthouse that he had witnessed Jackson making the drug sale to Crittenden. James also witnessed Jackson s hallway confession to his brother s attorney. However, defense counsel chose not to put James Arthur on the stand in his brother s trial. Jackson, Tomlinson, Ross, and James Arthur were witnesses whose names were known by counsel and who would have corroborated the account of the sole defense witness -- Robin Crittenden. Because defense counsel did not call any of the four witnesses who would have corroborated Crittenden s account, the jury was left to ponder the prosecutor s assertion in summation that Robert Jackson was someone Crittenden had made up. Not surprisingly, Arthur was convicted. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MICHAEL ARTHUR, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 19, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Judge Skillman (temporarily assigned) CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Albin [i]mmediately prior to trial the defendant on his own contacted the witnesses and made them available to defense counsel. Among the witnesses was Robert Jackson who admits that he served Robin Crittenden the drugs that were found in her possession. Mr. Jackson was present in court for two days waiting to testify at the request of the defendant. No statement was taken from this witness nor was he interviewed prior to showing up in court on the day of trial. [(Emphasis added).] The brief then proceeds to argue that counsel s assistance was ineffective under Strickland, supra. Furthermore, defense counsel s delegating to his client the responsibility for taking witness statements was discussed at the PCR hearing. The State knew that defense counsel s overall failure to investigate and prepare for trial was at the heart of the PCR claim and is not disadvantaged by this Court s addressing the obvious. However, even if Arthur had not raised this precise sub-issue, we would not be required to put on appellate blinders. Defense counsel s ineffective assistance generally -- and his inadequate preparation in particular -- are unquestionably before this Court. We also are entitled to notice plain error not brought to the attention of the trial or appellate court. R. 2:10-2. This court should not ignore counsel s conduct that manifestly fell below acceptable standards of performance and that denied Arthur a fair trial.