Title: State v. Keith A. Davis

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 71 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP1954-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Keith A. Davis, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 12, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Donald R. Zuidmulder   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Chris A. Gramstrup, Superior. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was oral argument by 
Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 71
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP1954-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF141) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Keith A. Davis, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Brown 
County, Donald R. Zuidmulder, Judge.  Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This case is before 
the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06).  Keith A. Davis was 
charged with first-degree sexual assault of a child in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (2003-04).1  Davis sought to suppress 
all oral and written statements he provided to the Green Bay 
Police Department on December 17, 2003.  The Brown County 
circuit court judge, Donald R. Zuidmulder, denied Davis's motion 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
2 
 
to suppress.  Davis proceeded to trial and was convicted of 
first-degree sexual assault of a child.  He now requests that 
his judgment of conviction be vacated and his case be remanded 
to the circuit court for a new trial, which would exclude his 
inculpatory statement.  We decline that request and affirm 
Davis's conviction.   
¶2 
This case requires us to decide whether Davis's 
statement was so closely associated with the voice stress 
analysis that it must be suppressed.  When a statement is so 
closely associated with the voice stress analysis that the 
analysis and statement are one event rather than two events, the 
statement must be suppressed.  State v. Greer, 2003 WI App 112, 
¶¶9-12, 265 Wis. 2d 463, 666 N.W.2d 518.  As is the case with 
any statement, the statement must also survive constitutional 
due process considerations of voluntariness. 
¶3 
We conclude that Davis's statement was not so closely 
associated with the voice stress analysis as to render it one 
event.  Rather, the examination and interview were two totally 
discrete events.  Therefore, because his statement was given 
voluntarily and at a totally discrete interview, we conclude 
that Davis's statement was admissible. 
I 
¶4 
On November 21, 2003, Detective James Swanson of the 
Green Bay Police Department went to the residence of Keith A. 
Davis to speak with him about an alleged sexual assault of a 
juvenile, K.L.D., d.o.b. 12/14/96.  Davis invited the detective 
into the house.  The detective informed Davis that he was not 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
3 
 
under arrest.  Davis gave the detective a "tour" of his 
residence in response to the detective's request to look around 
for evidence.  With consent, the detective collected bedding 
from the alleged victim's room as well as a shaving cream 
container from a bathroom.  It is unclear what else may have 
been said during that visit, but when the detective asked Davis 
if he would be willing to come down to the police department to 
talk about the incident, Davis said that he would drive himself 
to the station later.  The detective left, and on that same 
date, Davis drove to the Green Bay Police Department and talked 
with Detective Swanson in the interview room.  At the police 
station, Davis was informed again that he was not under arrest 
and was free to leave at any time.  At the station, Davis 
answered some questions but denied the allegations.  Several 
times during that interview and before Davis left, he offered to 
take a polygraph examination.  At the conclusion of the 
interview, Detective Swanson told Davis that he may follow up 
with him with respect to Davis taking a polygraph or voice 
stress analysis test. 
¶5 
On December 17, 2003, Detective Swanson returned to 
Davis's residence around 8:00 a.m.  The detective asked Davis if 
he would further discuss the alleged incident regarding K.L.D. 
and whether Davis was still willing to undergo a polygraph or 
voice stress analysis test.  Davis said that he would drive 
himself to the police station, but he wanted to shower first.  
The detective then returned to the police station. 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Around 9:00 a.m., Davis left Detective Swanson a voice 
message that his car would not start, so he would be walking to 
the Green Bay Police Department and would be later than 
expected.  Due to the weather that day and the route Davis would 
need to take in order to get to the police department, Detective 
Swanson decided to get in his car and see if he could find Davis 
walking.  The detective intended to offer Davis a ride.  At 
around 9:15 or 9:20 a.m., as the detective was driving south on 
Broadway, he saw Davis walking on the sidewalk.  Davis waved at 
Detective Swanson.  Detective Swanson made a u-turn, pulled up 
along side Davis, and asked him if he wanted a ride.  Davis got 
in the front seat of Detective Swanson's unmarked squad car, and 
they proceeded to the Green Bay Police Department. 
¶7 
Once at the police station, Detective Swanson and 
Davis went into an interview room.  Detective Swanson explained 
to Davis that he was not under arrest, did not have to talk with 
him, and could leave at any time.  Davis said that he 
understood.  Detective Swanson told Davis that he wanted to talk 
with him and have him take the voice stress analysis, which they 
had discussed before, and Detective Swanson told Davis that 
someone else would conduct the test.  Davis was cooperative and 
wanted to talk.   
¶8 
Detective Swanson left the interview room and returned 
with Detective Buenning, the officer who conducted the test.  
After being introduced to Davis, Detective Buenning took Davis 
to another room, referred to as the "family room," for the voice 
stress analysis test.  Detective Swanson did not accompany Davis 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
5 
 
to the "family room" for testing, nor was he present during the 
test. 
¶9 
Once in the room where Davis was to undergo the voice 
stress analysis, Detective Buenning explained the test and 
obtained Davis's consent.2  Detective Buenning then asked Davis 
nine test questions, which consisted of two relevant questions, 
five irrelevant questions, and two control questions.  Davis 
actually helped formulate the following relevant questions: 
(1) "Did you put your penis into [K.L.D.'s] vagina?"; (2) "Did 
you put your penis in [K.L.D.'s] mouth?"  Davis agreed that 
those were relevant questions.  For the test, Detective Buenning 
used a laptop, and a lapel microphone was clipped onto Davis's 
collar.  After the test, Davis went back to the original 
interview room.  Detective Buenning reviewed the results, and 
then, pursuant to standard procedure, two other officers 
independently evaluated the results.  All three officers 
                                                 
2 Davis signed and dated a form entitled "Green Bay Police 
Consent For Computer Voice Stress Analyst."  Presumably, this 
consent form is pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 942.06, "Use of 
polygraphs and similar tests."  The form reads: 
I . . . Do 
hearby 
voluntarily 
consent 
to 
be 
[] 
examined by a trained computer voice stress analyzer 
of the Green Bay Police Department.  I understand that 
the operation of this device involves the recording of 
my voice to specific questions.  I have had the nature 
of the examination explained to me by Det. Buenning of 
the Green Bay Police Department.  I agree to be 
recorded and tested using the computerize[d] voice 
stress analyst.  I hereby release the results of the 
examination 
to 
the 
investigating 
law 
enforcement 
agency. 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
6 
 
separately concluded that Davis was being deceptive.  Outside 
the presence of Davis, and in a separate room, Detective 
Buenning discussed the results with Detective Swanson.  He told 
Detective Swanson that he believed Davis had been deceptive.  
Both detectives then went to the original interview room and 
then brought Davis back to the "family room." 
¶10 With Detective Swanson in the "family room," Detective 
Buenning told Davis that his answers were deemed deceptive and 
showed Davis the results from the computer charts.  Davis 
repeatedly said that he did not do anything.  Detective Buenning 
then asked Davis, "Well, if you told me yourself that her hymen 
was busted, wouldn't that support the results of the test?"3  
Davis did not verbally respond but nodded his head up and down.  
Detective Buenning asked if he wanted to talk about this and 
Davis said "yes."  Detective Buenning asked Davis if he 
preferred to talk with Detective Swanson.  Davis indicated that 
he did.4  At that point, Detective Buenning stated, "I'm finished 
                                                 
3 The 
record 
does 
not 
indicate——neither 
the 
direct 
examination nor the cross-examination of Detective Buenning——the 
origin of this question.  At the suppression hearing, this 
question is asked, but we are never told the context of the 
first time it was asked.  It appears from the record that 
Detective Buenning and Davis had discussed this topic at some 
time.   
4 While the record does not reflect Davis's exact words, the 
testimony at the suppression hearing confirms that Davis wanted 
to talk with Detective Swanson: 
Q. [Prosecutor] Did he agree to -- did he say he 
wanted to talk to Detective Swanson? 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
7 
 
here" and then he closed up his laptop and left the room with 
all of the voice stress analysis equipment.  Detective Buenning 
told Davis that he was finished with the test.5         
¶11 Detective Swanson and Davis were then alone in the 
"family room."  Detective Swanson stated, "Keith, there's some 
things we need to talk about reference [K.L.D.]."  Davis nodded 
his head yes, and they then went back to the original interview 
room.  Detective Swanson left Davis in the interview room and 
then went to get statement forms.  Approximately five minutes 
later, at about 11:00 a.m., Detective Swanson asked Davis to 
explain what happened with K.L.D.  As Davis gave a statement, 
Detective Swanson wrote it on the statement form.  While Davis 
gave his statement, Detective Swanson did not mention or 
reference the voice stress analysis test or the results.  When 
Davis was finished talking, the detective gave Davis the written 
document to review.  Davis read the statement partly out loud 
and then to himself.  Detective Swanson had him read the 
beginning of the statement out loud in order to make sure that 
Davis could read the officer's writing.  Detective Swanson 
                                                                                                                                                             
A. [Detective Buenning] He wanted to talk to Detective 
Swanson. 
5 While the record does not reflect Detective Buenning's 
exact words, the testimony at the suppression hearing confirms 
that Detective Buenning told Davis the test was over: 
Q. [Prosecutor] Did you actually tell Mr. Davis that you're 
finished with this test? 
A. [Detective Buenning] Yes. 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
8 
 
explained to Davis that if anything was incorrect or needed to 
be changed, Davis should correct it.  However, Davis made no 
corrections.  After reading the statement, Davis signed both 
pages, and the statement was completed at about 11:45 a.m. 
¶12 After Davis signed the statement, he "kind of broke 
down" and was crying.  He stated that he "felt like he wanted to 
die."  Around noon that day, Detective Swanson took Davis to the 
crisis center.  Detective Swanson did not have further contact 
with Davis that day.   
¶13 On February 16, 2004, Davis was charged with one count 
of first-degree sexual assault of a child contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.02(1).  On May 28, 2004, a preliminary hearing occurred, 
and Davis was bound over for trial.  Davis was arraigned on an 
information that charged him with one count of sexual assault.  
The information was amended on the day of trial, September 29, 
2005, to include three counts of first-degree sexual assault of 
a child. 
¶14 On June 11, 2004, Davis moved the circuit court to 
suppress all of his oral and written statements from December 
17, 2003.  On March 29, 2005, the circuit court conducted a 
hearing on the motion.  On April 15, 2005, the circuit court 
issued an oral decision and denied the motion.  The circuit 
court concluded that the statement was voluntarily given under 
Goodchild6 and that Miranda warnings were not required because 
                                                 
6 State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 
N.W.2d 753 (1965). 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
9 
 
Davis was not in custody at the time of the statement.  The 
circuit court also concluded that, under Greer, the statement 
was admissible because it was distinct and separate from the 
polygraph or voice stress analysis.  Relying on Greer, the 
circuit court cited the following four factors: (1) where was 
the statement taken; (2) who took the statement; (3) how soon 
after the polygraph examination was the statement taken; and (4) 
what was the manner in which the statement was taken. 
¶15 The circuit court made a number of findings regarding 
the factors: First, it found that two officers were involved.  
One officer conducted the voice stress analysis and one officer 
secured the statement from Davis.  Second, it found that the 
voice stress analysis had been completed when Davis made his 
statement.  The circuit court stated, "in this case Mr. Davis 
was told that the polygraph or voice stress test had -- had 
ended which is also a condition of Greer, that it was over 
. . . ."  In addition, the circuit court found that Davis made 
his statement in a separate room from where the test was 
conducted.  Third, the circuit court found that while there was 
a nominal period of time between the statement and the voice 
stress analysis, under Greer and Johnson,7 time is the least of 
the factors to be considered.  The circuit court concluded that, 
                                                 
7 State v. Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d 382, 535 N.W.2d 441 (Ct. 
App. 1995). 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
10 
 
under a totality of the circumstances, the statements were 
admissible under Greer.8 
¶16 Davis proceeded to trial on September 29, 2005.  A 
jury convicted him of all three counts of first-degree sexual 
assault of a child.  On January 24, 2006, he was sentenced to 20 
years of initial confinement followed by 10 years of extended 
supervision on each count to be served concurrent with each 
other.   
¶17 Davis appealed his conviction.  The court of appeals 
certified Davis's appeal to this court, and we accepted the 
certification.  Specifically, the court of appeals stated, "we 
believe the law on this topic is in need of re-examination or, 
at 
a 
minimum, 
clarification." 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
"respectfully suggest[ed] that the supreme court either clarify 
the rationale for the current rules or provide a new legal 
framework for analyzing this kind of evidence." 
II 
¶18 We uphold the trial court's factual findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Greer, 265 Wis. 2d 463, ¶9.  
However, 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles 
to 
evidentiary or historical facts is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Id.  Here, we review the voluntariness of the 
statements considering the principles of due process.  State v. 
Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶¶34-36, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 407.  In 
                                                 
8 While it appears that a curative instruction was not given 
in this case, circuit courts may consider giving a curative 
instruction when deemed appropriate.    
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
11 
 
addition, statutory interpretation is also an issue of law, 
which we review de novo.  Megal Dev. Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 
151, ¶8, 286 Wis. 2d 105, 705 N.W.2d 645. 
III 
¶19 Similar to polygraph testing, a voice stress analysis 
is based upon the theory that an individual undergoes certain 
physiological changes when being deceitful.  Thomas R. Malia, 
Admissibility of voice stress evaluation test results or of 
statements made during test, 47 A.L.R.4th 1202 (1986).  As a 
result, when being subjected to voice stress analysis, these 
changes can presumably be monitored and interpreted.  Id.  Voice 
stress analysis and polygraph testing have been used by law 
enforcement for many years. 
¶20 Principles applicable to polygraph testing are equally 
applicable 
to 
voice 
stress 
analysis. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 905.065(1); 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Evidence § 5065.1 
(2d ed. 2001) (concluding that there is little reason to treat 
the forms of honesty testing mentioned in § 905.065 differently, 
"at least under the present state of the scientific art").  We 
see no reason at this time to treat these two methods of 
"honesty testing" differently.   
¶21 Our analysis, as detailed below, primarily requires us 
to determine whether a defendant's statement was given at an 
interview totally discrete from the voice stress analysis.  If 
the defendant's statement was given at an interview that was 
totally discrete from the voice stress analysis test, its 
admission is not automatically precluded.  The statement, 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
12 
 
however, 
is 
also 
subject 
to 
ordinary 
principles 
of 
voluntariness.  Therefore, if the statement is given at an 
interview that is totally discrete from the voice stress 
analysis test and the statement is voluntarily given, the 
statement is admissible. 
¶22 Davis argues that "the administration of a voice 
stress analysis cannot be performed without it being unduly 
coercive."  As a result, Davis argues that "any inculpatory 
statement given post-examination[,] which is determined to be 
closely related to the testing, must also then be excluded as 
being unduly coercive and involuntary."  Davis argues that his 
post-examination statement must be excluded because, under 
Greer, his statement was closely associated with the voice 
stress analysis he took that day.  The State, on the other hand, 
argues that under Greer, the post-examination interview was not 
closely associated with the voice stress analysis so as to 
render it one event.  The State asserts that under the totality 
of the circumstances, the statement was admissible.  The State 
goes further to argue that a voluntary confession should always 
be admissible regardless of whether it was given before, during, 
or after a voice stress analysis.   
A 
¶23 Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude 
that Davis's statement was not so closely associated with the 
voice stress analysis test so as to render it one event; rather, 
the statement and voice stress analysis were two totally 
discrete events.  Whether a statement is considered part of the 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
13 
 
test or a totally discrete event is largely dependent upon 
whether the voice stress analysis is over at the time the 
statement is given and the defendant knows the analysis is over.  
Greer, 265 Wis. 2d 463, ¶12.  To make this determination, the 
following factors should be weighed and considered: (1) whether 
the defendant was told the test was over; (2) whether any time 
passed between the analysis and the defendant's statement; (3) 
whether the officer conducting the analysis differed from the 
officer who took the statement; (4) whether the location where 
the analysis was conducted differed from where the statement was 
given; and (5) whether the voice stress analysis was referred to 
when obtaining a statement from the defendant.  See id., ¶¶12-16 
(articulating and applying these principles). 
¶24 This test has its origins in McAdoo v. State,9 but in 
State v. Schlise10 the factors were more clearly articulated.  
The factors were more recently applied in State v. Johnson, 193 
Wis. 2d 382, 535 N.W.2d 441 (1995) and Greer.  
¶25 In McAdoo, the defendant challenged the admission of 
his statement asserting that it was not given voluntarily 
because it was given immediately after a polygraph examination.  
McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 596, 608-09, 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974).  
This court concluded, "the polygraph can hardly be considered a 
strategy of the police officers since it was administered to the 
defendant upon his request," and the statement was given after 
                                                 
9 McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 596, 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974). 
10 State v. Schlise, 86 Wis. 2d 26, 271 N.W.2d 619 (1978). 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
14 
 
the test was over and the defendant knew the test was over.  Id.  
The defendant underwent the first series of polygraph testing at 
10:45 a.m., a lunch break was taken, and a second round of 
testing began at 2:00 p.m.  Id. at 603.  At 2:25 p.m., the 
defendant decided to discontinue the testing.  Id.  Due to that 
request, the testing equipment was removed from the defendant, 
turned off, and taken away.  Id.  After the examination's 
conclusion, the examiner proceeded to continue with questions.  
Id.  The defendant "freely answered and talked for about forty-
five minutes."  Id.  During the course of this discussion, the 
defendant admitted guilt.  Id.  The court concluded that, under 
Goodchild, the defendant's statement was voluntary and therefore 
admissible.  Id. at 605-08.   
¶26 In Schlise, we excluded statements made during a post-
polygraph interview.  State v. Schlise, 86 Wis. 2d 26, 42, 271 
N.W.2d 619 (1978).  The statements were excluded because no 
Stanislawski11 stipulation had been effected.12  Id.  Immediately 
following that conclusion, however, we stated that "[t]his is 
not intended to suggest that all post-examination interviews 
between a subject and the examiner will be subsumed into the 
                                                 
11 State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 
(1974). 
12 Prior to this court's decision in Stanislawski, no 
polygraph 
evidence 
was 
admissible, 
but 
the 
court, 
in 
Stanislawski, 
eliminated 
the 
unconditional 
rejection 
of 
polygraph evidence so long as certain conditions were satisfied.  
Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d at 736-42.  However, in State v. Dean, 
this 
court 
overruled 
Stanislawski. 
 
State 
v. 
Dean, 
103 
Wis. 2d 228, 278-79, 307 N.W.2d 628 (1981).   
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
15 
 
special 
category 
of 
polygraph 
evidence 
and 
fall 
within 
Stanislawski."  Id.  The court concluded that Schlise was 
distinguishable from McAdoo on its facts.  Id. 
¶27 Specifically, in Schlise, no evidence existed to 
suggest that the defendant was informed or was aware that the 
polygraph examination had ended.  Id.  While the defendant was 
not still connected to the machine, the court determined that 
this was not conclusive because the defendant was not connected 
to the machine during a pre-testing interview and that interview 
was considered part of the polygraph examination.  Id.  The 
officer used and referenced the charts and tracings generated 
from the polygraph examination.  Id. at 43.  The court found 
that even the polygraph examiner thought that the "post-
polygraph" examination was a continuation of the test.  Id.  The 
examiner considered the subsequent interview to be the second 
part of a unified procedure.  Id.  Based on those facts, the 
court concluded that the post-mechanical interview was so 
closely associated with the mechanical testing, "both as to time 
and content," that it must be considered one event.  Id.   
¶28 In Johnson, the police officer conducted the polygraph 
examination, and then, the same police officer escorted the 
defendant to another room for questioning.  Johnson, 193 
Wis. 2d at 386.  The court of appeals concluded that because the 
statements were made voluntarily and separately from the 
polygraph examination, the statements were admissible.  Id. at 
388-89.  The court reasoned that the defendant was no longer 
attached to the equipment, was interviewed in a separate room 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
16 
 
from where the examination took place, and the police officer 
did not refer back to the polygraph examination or tell the 
defendant that he failed the test during post-examination 
questioning in order to elicit an incriminating statement.  Id.  
While the court of appeals acknowledged the short amount of time 
between the examination and interview, it nonetheless concluded 
that a distinct break occurred between the two events.  Id.   
¶29 In Greer, the court of appeals stated that "[t]he 
touchstone of admissibility is whether the interviews eliciting 
the statements are 'found to be totally discrete from the 
examination which precedes them.'"  Greer, 265 Wis. 2d 463, ¶10 
(citation omitted).  Citing to McAdoo, Schlise, and Johnson, it 
identified two "core factors" to be considered when making this 
determination: whether the defendant made the statements after 
the test was over and whether the defendant was told the test 
was over.  Id., ¶12.  In consideration of these "core factors," 
the court of appeals found that prior to his confession, the 
defendant was told orally and in writing13 that the polygraph 
examination 
was 
over, 
and 
he 
was 
disconnected 
from 
the 
equipment, moved to another room, and one hour elapsed between 
the polygraph examination and the start of interrogation.  Id., 
                                                 
13 The defendant signed a polygraph examination form that 
specified the examination was over; it read, "I completely 
reaffirm in its entirety my above agreement. . . . I also 
understand that any questions I may be asked after this point in 
time, and any answers I may give to those questions, are not 
part of the polygraph examination."  State v. Greer, 2003 WI App 
112, ¶4, 265 Wis. 2d 463, 666 N.W.2d 518. 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
17 
 
¶14.  In addition, one police officer conducted the polygraph 
examination 
and 
a 
different 
officer 
conducted 
the 
post-
examination interview.  Id.  Based on these facts, the court of 
appeals concluded that the examination and interview were two 
totally discrete events, and therefore, suppression was not 
required.  Id., ¶¶14-16. 
¶30 In the case at hand, the voice stress analysis and the 
interview were totally discrete events: Two different officers 
were involved——one conducted the examination and the other 
conducted the interview.  Before any statement was made, 
Detective Buenning stated, "I'm finished here," closed up his 
laptop, and left the room with all the voice stress analysis 
equipment.  The interviewing officer did not refer to the 
polygraph examination or its results during the interview, and 
the examination and interview took place in different rooms. 
¶31 While here, very little time passed between the 
examination and interview, time alone is not dispositive.  For 
example, in McAdoo, the examination and interview were virtually 
seamless.  However, in McAdoo, as in the case at hand, the 
interviewer never referred back to the polygraph examination or 
results, and the equipment was removed from the defendant.  Even 
if little time passes between the two events, the statement may 
still be admissible so long as two totally discrete events 
occurred.  See Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d at 389 (concluding that 
neither Barrera v. State14 nor Schlise proscribe a bright-line 
                                                 
14 Barrera v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 269, 298 N.W.2d 820 (1980). 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
18 
 
rule of timing and instead look to the totality of the 
circumstances).  "[W]here there is a distinct break between the 
two 
events 
and 
the 
post-polygraph 
interview 
does 
not 
specifically relate back to the . . . test, the events are 
sufficiently attenuated."  Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d at 389.  Unlike 
the case at hand, in Schlise the interview and examination were 
conducted by the same person, in the same room, and even the 
test examiner considered the procedure one event.  Schlise, 86 
Wis. 2d at 43.   
¶32 Davis argues that the examination was not over when 
Detective Buenning, in the presence of Detective Swanson, told 
Davis that he failed the test and then "convinced" Davis that he 
should give a statement.  However, the facts here reflect that 
the examination was complete when Detective Buenning talked with 
Davis about making a statement even if Davis had not been told 
the examination was over and the equipment had not been put 
away.  That fact, however, does not render Davis's subsequent 
statement to Detective Swanson, at an interview totally discrete 
from the voice stress analysis, inadmissible given our totality 
of the circumstances approach. 
¶33 First, while Detective Swanson was present in the 
"family room" when Davis indicated he wanted to talk, precedent 
clearly holds that the same officer may conduct both the 
examination and the interview so long as the two events are 
separate.  See McAdoo, 65 Wis. 2d at 603, 608-09; Johnson, 193 
Wis. 2d at 386, 388.  Therefore, even though Detective Swanson 
was present in the "family room" when Davis said he wanted to 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
19 
 
talk, this does not preclude the subsequently made statement 
from being admitted.  Second, Davis only agreed to give a 
statement when he was in the "family room" with both detectives, 
he did not begin giving a statement until he returned from the 
"family room" to the original interview room and five minutes 
had passed.  Therefore, there is no concern that Davis began 
giving a statement to both detectives when he was confronted 
with his untruthfulness and as a result locked himself into a 
particular set of facts that he could not change once he began 
giving a statement to Detective Swanson.  Third, so long as the 
examination and interview are two totally discrete events, 
"letting the defendant know that he or she did not pass the 
examination, or letting the defendant so conclude, does not 
negate that the examination and the post-examination interview 
are, as phrased by Schlise, 'totally discrete' events rather 
than 'one event.'"  Greer, 265 Wis. 2d 463, ¶16.  Fourth, at no 
time during the interview did Detective Swanson relate back to 
or rely on the voice stress evaluation or its results. 
¶34 Under the totality of the circumstances and applying 
the Greer test, the voice stress analysis and Davis's statement 
were two totally discrete events.  As a result, the statement is 
admissible under these facts so long as it is voluntary. 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
20 
 
B 
¶35 Even if the examination and interview are totally 
discrete from one another, a statement must still be deemed 
admissible considering ordinary principles of voluntariness and 
constitutional principles of due process.  See Schlise, 86 
Wis. 2d at 44-45 (stating that voluntariness need not be 
considered here because the statement was excluded under 
Stanislawski); Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d at 389 (stating that 
"general rules of admissibility apply to the post-polygraph 
interview"); see also 9 Christine M. Wiseman, Nicholas L. 
Chiarkas & Daniel D. Blinka, Criminal Practice and Procedure 
§ 20.42, 673 n.3 (1996) (discussing post-polygraph confessions). 
¶36 "A defendant's statements are voluntary if they are 
the product of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting 
deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of a 
conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures 
brought to bear on the defendant by representatives of the State 
exceeded the defendant's ability to resist."  Hoppe, 261 
Wis. 2d 294, ¶36; see generally State ex rel. Goodchild v. 
Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965); 9 Wiseman, 
Chiarkas & Blinka, supra, § 20.42.  We must then inquire whether 
the statements were the result of coercion or otherwise improper 
conduct by law enforcement.  Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶37.  If 
neither coercion nor other improper conduct was used to secure 
the statement, it is deemed voluntary.  Id. 
¶37 This court applies a totality of the circumstances 
standard to determine whether a statement was made voluntarily.  
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
21 
 
Id., ¶38.  We must balance the personal characteristics of the 
defendant, such as age, education, intelligence, physical or 
emotional condition, and prior experience with law enforcement, 
with the possible pressures that law enforcement could impose.  
Id., ¶¶38-39.  Possible pressures to consider include the length 
of questioning, general conditions or circumstances in which the 
statement 
was 
taken, 
whether 
any 
excessive 
physical 
or 
psychological pressure was used, and whether any inducements, 
threats, methods, or strategies were utilized in order to elicit 
a statement from the defendant.  Id., ¶39. 
¶38 In the case at hand, we conclude, as did the circuit 
court, that the defendant's statement was voluntary.  The record 
contains no evidence that would give rise to any concerns 
regarding his personal characteristics.  Davis, at the time this 
occurred, was 43 years old.  While the defendant's brief 
indicates that Davis only possesses a middle school level 
education, we must defer to the trial court's judgment that 
Davis was not at such an educational disadvantage to render his 
personal characteristics at issue.   
¶39 We also do not find evidence that law enforcement used 
coercion or other forms of improper conduct in order to elicit 
Davis's incriminating statement.  The duration of questioning 
was not lengthy, no physical or emotional pressures were used, 
and no inducements, threats, methods, or strategies were 
employed to ascertain an incriminating statement from the 
defendant. 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
22 
 
¶40 Davis's participation was voluntary in every way: 
Davis agreed to talk and take the voice stress analysis when he 
was in his own home.  Davis came to the police station on his 
own terms including when and how he intended to get there.  He 
received a ride from law enforcement when his car would not 
start.  Davis waved at the officer and rode in the front 
passenger seat of the police car.  Once at the police station, 
he was told he was not under arrest and he was free to leave at 
any time.  After the voice stress analysis, Davis said he wanted 
to talk, and he chose which officer he was going to talk with 
and give his statement.  In short, Davis set the timing and the 
circumstances of coming to the police station, taking the test, 
and to whom he would ultimately give his statement. 
¶41 Davis argues that Detective Buenning told Davis that 
he failed the voice stress analysis and referred to that 
information to "undermine the defendant's will to resist the 
official accusation."  However, the record does not support that 
conclusion.  In a very brief amount of time, Davis was told that 
the analysis indicated Davis was being deceptive, he was asked a 
question regarding his truthfulness, he was asked if he wanted 
to talk, and Davis said that he wished to speak with Detective 
Swanson. 
 
Compare 
with 
Schlise, 
86 
Wis. 2d 
at 
40-41.  
Separately, he gave a statement to Detective Swanson, which he 
read and approved. 
¶42 Merely because one is administered a voice stress 
analysis or polygraph test does not render a subsequent 
statement per se coercive.  The proper inquiry is not only 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
23 
 
whether a test was taken, but rather, whether a subsequent 
statement was given at a distinct event and whether law 
enforcement used coercive means to obtain the statement.  An 
important inquiry continues to be whether the test result was 
referred to in order to elicit an incriminating statement.  See 
Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d at 389.  Here, Davis did not make a 
statement to Detective Buenning, the tester.  There is no 
question that the test was over.  Davis had gone from one room 
to another room.  In addition, the interviewer, Detective 
Swanson, never referenced the examination or its results during 
the time Davis gave his statement.  No coercive measures were 
used to elicit the statement.  Accordingly, Davis's statement 
was voluntary. 
C 
¶43 In its certification to this court, the court of 
appeals expressed concern that no underlying rationale existed 
for excluding statements during or closely related to a 
polygraph examination or voice stress analysis.  In its brief, 
the State also asserted that no justifiable reason existed for 
excluding statements made during a polygraph examination or 
voice stress analysis.  The State, citing to a number of cases 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
24 
 
from other jurisdictions,15 argues that Wisconsin should adopt a 
voluntariness approach to statements made before, during, or 
after any form of honesty testing. 
¶44 While some prior precedent from this court and the 
court of appeals may not have clearly or perhaps even properly 
articulated the underlying rationale for excluding statements 
                                                 
15 The State cites to other jurisdictions that have rejected 
the approach that voluntary statements made during a polygraph 
must be excluded merely because they were given during a 
polygraph examination.  See Hostzclaw v. State, 351 So. 2d 970, 
971-72 (Fla. 1977), overruling State v. Cunningham, 324 So. 2d 
173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Blosser, 558 P.2d 105, 
107-08 (Kan. 1976); Rogers v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 29, 36 
(Ky. 2002); Commonwealth v. Hall, 14 S.W.3d 30, 31-32 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1999); State v. Blank, 955 So. 2d 90, 109-10 (La. 2007); 
State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me. 1975); State v. 
Erickson, 403 N.W.2d 281, 283-84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Smith, 715 P.2d 1301, 1309-10 (Mont. 1986); People v. Sohn, 539 
N.Y.S.2d 29, 31 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); State v. Green, 531 P.2d 
245, 252 (Or. 1975); Commonwealth v. Schneider, 562 A.2d 868, 
870-71 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).  See also Joel E. Smith, 
Admissibility in evidence of confession made by accused in 
anticipation of, during, or following polygraph examination, 89 
A.L.R.3d 230, § 3 (Westlaw 2007). 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
25 
 
made during honesty testing,16 the underlying rationale is simply 
that our state legislature has generally precluded such a 
                                                 
16 For example, in Schlise, statements were considered part 
of the polygraph examination and not a discrete event, and 
therefore, the statements were excluded because no Stanislawski 
stipulation had been entered and, therefore, no polygraph 
evidence could be utilized.  Schlise, 86 Wis. 2d at 43-44.  
However, Schlise seems to have misinterpreted Stanislawski if it 
interpreted Stanislawski to pertain to anything more than test 
results or testimony about the test results.  This court's 
Stanislawski decision pertained to polygraph results and expert 
testimony based upon the examination; it did not address 
statements 
made 
during 
a 
polygraph 
examination. 
 
See 
Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d at 736, 741-44.  The court stated: 
"Henceforth, in Wisconsin, expert opinion evidence as to 
polygraph tests may be admitted in a criminal case subject to 
the following conditions."  Id. at 741.  Further support for the 
proposition that Stanislawski only considered test results and 
expert opinion on test results is that Stanislawski withdrew the 
"unconditional 
rejection 
of 
polygraph 
evidence" 
that 
was 
established in State v. Bohner.  Id. at 736, 741.  However, 
Bohner and its progeny addressed only polygraph test results and 
expert opinion regarding those results.  See State v. Bohner, 
210 Wis. 651, 658, 246 N.W. 314, 317 (1933) (stating that "the 
systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such 
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and 
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in 
admitting 
expert 
testimony 
deduced 
from 
the 
discovery, 
development, and experiments thus far made"); State v. Baker, 16 
Wis. 2d 364, 368, 114 N.W.2d 426 (1962) (citing to Bohner and 
stating that "[t]he results of such a test are inadmissible, as 
the state concedes").  Cases relying on Schlise only perpetuate 
its misinterpretation and fail to acknowledge the existence of 
Wis. Stat. § 905.065. See, e.g., Greer, 265 Wis. 2d 463, ¶9 
(failing to cite to Wis. Stat. § 905.065 but citing to Schlise 
and stating that "anything that a defendant says during what is 
considered to be part of the polygraph examination is not 
admissible").  Prior to the creation of Wis. Stat. § 905.065, 
admissibility of statement made during a polygraph examination 
seems to have been governed by principles articulated in Turner 
v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 1, 23-26, 250 N.W.2d 706 (1977). 
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
26 
 
scenario under the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 905.065.17  
Wisconsin Stat. § 905.065(2) states, "[a] person has a privilege 
to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing any 
oral or written communications during or any results of an 
examination using an honesty testing device in which the person 
was the test subject."   
¶45 Therefore, the legislature has decided that statements 
made during honesty testing are generally excluded, but if those 
statements are given at an interview that is totally discrete 
from the honesty testing, under the factors articulated in this 
opinion, and the statement was given voluntarily, then the 
statement is admissible.  However, if the statements and 
                                                 
17 In its certification to this court, the court of appeals 
brought our attention to Wis. Stat. § 905.065 stating that "this 
statute was created by the legislature during the Stanislawski 
era, 
at 
a 
time 
when 
polygraph 
examination 
results 
were 
admissible [under certain conditions]. . . . To the extent that 
this statute still has applicability in the post-Stanislawski 
era, 
it 
may 
provide 
defendant's 
with 
a 
method . . . of 
suppressing statements they made during an examination."  We 
agree that this statute generally precludes statements made 
during honesty testing.  We note, however, that the legislative 
history 
of 
the 
statute 
does 
not 
appear 
to 
reference 
Stanislawski.  Moreover, the privilege was not included in the 
original draft, but rather, it was subsequently added by the 
judiciary committee.  The driving force behind the statute 
appears to be employment situations, but this does not limit its 
application in this case.  While test results are no longer 
admissible as a result of our decision in Dean, which prohibited 
the Stanislawski stipulation approach of admitting polygraph 
evidence, Dean, 103 Wis. 2d at 278-79, this does not eliminate 
the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 905.065 to statements made 
during honesty testing.  Our decision in Dean did not address 
Wis. Stat. § 905.065.  "[R]egardless of any stipulation the 
results of 'lie-detector tests' are inadmissible in Wisconsin 
courts because they fail the test of relevance."  7 Daniel D. 
Blinka, Wisconsin Evidence § 5065.1 (2d ed. 2001).   
No. 
2006AP1954-CR   
 
27 
 
examination are not totally discrete events but instead are 
considered one event, then the statements must be excluded by 
virtue of Wis. Stat. § 905.065. 
IV 
¶46 We conclude that Davis's statement was not so closely 
associated with the voice stress analysis as to render it one 
event.  Rather, the examination and interview were two totally 
discrete events.  Therefore, because Davis's statement was given 
voluntarily and at a totally discrete interview, we conclude 
that Davis's statement was admissible.  
By the court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶47 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority that Davis's statements are admissible if the voice 
stress examination and the post-examination interview in which 
Davis made the inculpatory statement are totally discrete 
events. In addition, I agree with the majority that determining 
whether they are totally discrete events requires an examination 
of the totality of circumstances test, as explained in State v. 
Greer, 2003 WI App 112, ¶11, 265 Wis. 2d 463, 666 N.W.2d 518. 
¶48 However, I disagree with the majority's analysis 
because it alters the essential inquiry and misapplies the 
totality of the circumstances test. The proper inquiry and 
application of the totality of the circumstances test require 
the conclusion that the examination and the interview here were 
not totally discrete. A review of our precedent further supports 
that conclusion. I therefore respectfully dissent.  
I 
¶49 This is not a case in which the examination clearly 
took place in one room and the interview clearly took place in 
another room.  Rather it is a case where there was an ongoing 
process with both the examination and the interview occurring in 
two places.   
¶50 A review of the relevant facts here is helpful as a 
preface to the analysis. While at the police station, Detective 
Swanson met with Davis in an interview room. Swanson left and 
returned with Detective Buenning. Davis was escorted by Buenning 
to the family room where the voice stress examination was 
conducted in Swanson's absence.  
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶51 After the test, Davis was returned to the interview 
room. Buenning told Swanson that he believed Davis had been 
deceptive. Both detectives then escorted Davis back to the 
family room.  
¶52 While in the family room, with Swanson present, 
Buenning confronted Davis and told him that his answers had been 
deceptive, showing him charts of the test results. Although 
Davis protested that he had not done anything, Buenning 
continued to press him. Eventually Davis capitulated and 
acknowledged the results. Buenning then asked Davis if he wanted 
to talk. Davis responded "yes." Buenning asked if Davis 
preferred to talk to Swanson, and Davis indicated that he did. 
Then Buenning said "I'm finished here," closed his laptop, and 
left the family room with the examination paraphernalia. 
¶53 Next, Swanson spoke to Davis, indicated that they 
needed to talk, and took Davis back to the interview room. He 
left the room to retrieve forms, returning within five minutes. 
When Swanson returned, Davis made the statements at issue here. 
II 
¶54 The majority states that the issue in the case is 
"whether Davis's statement was so closely associated with the 
voice stress analysis that it must be suppressed." Majority op., 
¶2. It asserts that a statement made during a voice stress 
analysis is generally inadmissible by virtue of Wis. Stat. 
§ 905.065, id., ¶45, but ultimately concludes that the statement 
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
at issue here was made after the analysis was completed and that 
the statement is admissible.1 
¶55 According to the majority, the question of whether 
Davis's statement is admissible depends on whether the statement 
and the voice stress examination were two discrete events. Id., 
¶23. In order to determine whether the examination and the 
statement are totally discrete, the majority applies a totality 
of the circumstances test based on Greer. 
¶56 The 
majority concludes that there were discrete 
events. It bases its conclusion on the facts that there were two 
officers involved, and that Buenning stated that he was 
finished, closed his laptop, and left with the examination 
equipment before Davis made his statement. Id., ¶30. Further, 
the majority explains that Swanson did not refer to the 
examination or results during the time that Davis made the 
statements, and that the examination and Davis's statements 
occurred in different rooms.  
                                                 
1 The majority concludes that the underlying rationale for 
excluding statements made during honesty testing is that "our 
state legislature has generally precluded such a scenario under 
the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 905.065." Majority op., ¶44. 
The majority's conclusion seems problematic for two reasons. 
First, its conclusion implies that the opinion should 
resolve the present case by interpreting and applying § 905.065. 
However, the majority does not purport to do this.  
Second, the majority resolves this case by relying upon a 
line of cases, none of which interprets or applies § 905.065. 
How can the rationale underlying a rule established in these 
cases be a statute that none of the cases ever mentions?  
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
 
A 
¶57 The problems with the majority's analysis begin with 
its statement of the inquiry. In State v. Schlise this court 
determined that the admissibility of statements made after a 
polygraph examination turns on whether the interview in which 
statements are made is totally discrete from the examination. 86 
Wis. 2d 26, 42, 271 N.W.2d 619 (1978). Following Schlise, the 
court of appeals in Greer stated that the admissibility turns on 
"whether the interviews eliciting the statements are found to be 
totally discrete from the examination which precedes them." 265 
Wis. 2d 463, ¶10 (internal quotations omitted).  
¶58 At several points in the opinion, the majority 
correctly states that the inquiry is whether the examination and 
interview were two discrete events. However, in the analysis 
section the majority alters the test set forth in Schlise and 
Greer and instead asks whether the examination and Davis's 
statement are discrete events. Majority op., ¶23.  
¶59 By altering the test, the majority implies that the 
post-examination interview commenced when Davis began making his 
statement. That assumption is untenable. The majority recognizes 
that the voice stress examination was over when Davis was 
unhooked from the voice stress analysis equipment. See id., ¶9. 
What it fails to acknowledge, however, is that when Buenning and 
Swanson escorted Davis to the family room and confronted him 
with the test results, they were initiating the post-examination 
interview. 
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
¶60 Schlise and Greer demand that we analyze whether 
Davis's statements occurred during an interview that was totally 
discrete from the examination. Thus, the proper analysis should 
focus on whether the interview, including the period during 
which Davis was in the family room with both Buenning and 
Swanson, is totally discrete from the examination. Yet the 
majority does not examine the interview as including that 
period. 
B 
¶61 The majority opinion is also problematic in its 
application of the test it sets forth. It sets forth five 
factors from Greer that are relevant in determining whether the 
voice stress examination and the interview are totally discrete:   
(1) whether the defendant was told the test was over; 
(2) whether any time passed between the analysis and 
the defendant's statement; (3) whether the officer 
conducting the analysis differed from the officer who 
took the statement; (4) whether the location where the 
analysis 
was 
conducted 
differed 
from 
where 
the 
statement was given; and (5) whether the voice stress 
analysis was referred to when obtaining a statement 
from the defendant.  
Majority op., ¶23. As noted, in Greer the factors refer to the 
"interview" rather than the "statement." 
¶62 Rather 
than 
examining 
the 
five 
factors 
in 
a 
straightforward way, determining whether each factor indicates 
that the events were totally discrete, the majority lists 
several factors that indicate that the events are discrete. Id., 
¶30. When it reaches the factors that indicate that the events 
are related, it discounts them on the ground that the events are 
totally discrete. 
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶63 A close analysis of factors, however, reveals that the 
examination and the interview here were not discrete events. I 
examine each in turn.  
1.  Was the defendant told the examination was over? 
¶64 Buenning did not give Davis any indication that the 
examination was over until well into the post-examination 
interview, when he stated "I'm finished here." Moreover, 
Buenning's statement that "I'm finished here" is equivocal. Both 
Buenning and Swanson were in the family room at the time, 
Buenning had just asked Davis if he would prefer to talk to 
Swanson, and Davis had responded that he would. Thus, Buenning's 
statement can be interpreted to mean that he was finished, not 
that the examination was finished.  
2.  Did any time pass between the examination and the 
interview? 
¶65 The majority focuses on the five minutes between 
Buenning packing up the voice stress analysis equipment and 
Davis giving his statement to Swanson. Although it concedes that 
the short period of time is an indication that the events are 
not discrete, the majority merely states that "time alone is not 
dispositive." Id., ¶31.  
¶66 The important point, however, is that after Davis 
agreed to give a statement, only enough time passed for him to 
be escorted to a different room and for Swanson to retrieve some 
paperwork. After the break, things picked up precisely where 
they had left off, with Davis agreeing to give the statement 
that had been elicited by Buenning in the family room. It is 
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
incorrect to suggest that there are totally discrete events when 
the break between them was so short and the subject of 
discussion (that Davis had previously not told the truth and 
would now agree to give a truthful statement) was identical 
before and after the break.  
3.  Was the officer conducting the examination different 
from the officer conducting the interview? 
¶67 The 
majority 
maintains 
that 
different 
officers 
conducted the exam and the interview. However, as noted, the 
interview began when both Buenning and Swanson were in the 
family room with Davis. Both were present when Davis capitulated 
and conceded the results of the test, agreeing to give a 
statement.  
¶68 Although only Swanson was present in the room when 
Davis gave his statement, Swanson merely asked Davis to give his 
statement after Davis had already agreed to give it while they 
were in the family room. The interview (that is, all of the 
discussion regarding Davis's actions and the examination) took 
place in the family room with Buenning. Thus, while there were 
two officers involved, both conducted the interview. Because 
Buenning was involved in both the examination and the interview, 
the officer conducting the examination was not different from 
"the" officer conducting the interview. 
4.  Was the location of the examination different from the 
location of the interview?  
¶69 Although the post-examination interview began in the 
same room in which the examination was conducted, Davis was 
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
moved to the interview room to give his statement to Swanson. 
More importantly, though, this is a case in which there was an 
ongoing process.  
¶70 Davis was at the police station for the purpose of the 
examination. He was moved back and forth between the interview 
room and the family room several times. Davis had been in both 
rooms with both officers. As noted above, this is not a case in 
which the examination and the interview each clearly took place 
in a single room. Rather, it is a case in which there was 
ongoing process, including an examination and an interview, 
which occurred in two places. 
5. Were the examination results used in obtaining the 
statement?  
¶71 There 
is 
no 
question 
that 
the 
results 
of 
the 
examination were used to obtain Davis's statement. The majority 
maintains that "so long as the examination and interview are two 
totally discrete events, letting the defendant know that he or 
she did not pass the examination . . . does not negate that the 
examination and post-examination interview are . . . totally 
discrete events." Majority op., ¶33. However, the use of 
examination results is a factor to consider in determining 
whether there are two discrete events. Discounting the factor on 
the ground that there are two discrete events just begs the 
question.  
¶72 The majority also maintains that "at no time during 
the interview did Detective Swanson relate back to or rely on 
the voice stress evaluation or its results." Id. The reason is 
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
that Swanson did nothing but ask Davis to recite the statement 
that Buenning had elicited from Davis a few minutes prior.  
¶73 The factors cited by the majority therefore indicate 
that there were not two totally discrete events. Whether Davis 
was told the exam was over is unclear; there was essentially no 
time breaking up the events involved; both officers were 
involved in the process and Buenning performed most of the 
interviewing; the two rooms were each used for both the 
examination and the interview; and the examination results were 
used during the interview to elicit Davis's statement.  
C 
¶74 Finally, 
a 
review 
of 
prior 
cases 
supports 
the 
conclusion that the examination and the interview were not 
discrete events. This case closely resembles Schlise, where an 
officer conducted a polygraph examination and a post-examination 
interview that were both a part of a longer, seamless process. 
That process included a lengthy pre-examination interview, the 
actual 
polygraph 
examination, 
and 
the 
post-examination 
interview, all conducted by one officer. 86 Wis. 2d at 42-43. 
The post-examination interview involved the officer confronting 
the defendant with the results of the test, thereby eliciting an 
incriminating statement. Id. at 40. This court determined that 
the examination and the interview were so closely associated in 
time and content that they had to be considered one event. Id. 
at 43. 
¶75 The present case is similar. Davis was given the voice 
stress examination, which was over when he was unhooked from the 
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
equipment and escorted to the interview room. Swanson and 
Buenning brought Davis back into the family room and confronted 
him with the results of the test in a post-examination 
interview. During the interview Buenning used the results of the 
test to elicit a statement from Davis. Davis was taken back to a 
room he had been in and out of during the entire process so that 
he could put his statement in writing. 
¶76 Thus, as in Schlise, there was a single, ongoing 
process, the post-examination interview was conducted by the 
officer that conducted the examination, and the results of the 
test were used to elicit an incuplatory statement. The primary 
difference between this case and Schlise is that this case 
involved two officers, both of whom were involved in the entire 
process. Further, while there were two rooms involved, each had 
been used throughout the ongoing process. 
¶77 This case is also different in important ways from 
Greer and State v. Johnson, 193 Wis. 2d 382, 535 N.W.2d 441 (Ct. 
App. 1995), in which the examinations and interview were 
discrete. In Greer, one officer spoke to the defendant the day 
before the defendant was given a polygraph examination. The 
examination was conducted by a different officer. After it was 
completed, the defendant was told orally and in writing that the 
examination was over. 265 Wis. 2d 463, ¶¶3-4. An hour passed and 
the defendant was moved to a different room. There, the first 
officer conducted an interview in which the defendant confessed. 
Id., ¶7. The court of appeals determined that the examination 
and the interview were not totally discrete. Id., ¶16. 
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶78 In Greer the statement that the examination was over 
was clear, whereas here the statement was equivocal. The 
defendant in that case had an hour to differentiate between the 
examination and interview, whereas Davis had only long enough 
for Swanson to retrieve paperwork. The officers in Greer played 
distinct roles, whereas both officers here were involved 
throughout the process. Although this case involves two rooms, 
as did Greer, it is distinct in that both rooms were used 
throughout the process. The Greer court determined that the 
officer's use of the examination results during the interview 
did not alone prevent the examination and interview from being 
discrete. Id., ¶14. Nonetheless, it recognized that using the 
results counts against a determination that the events are 
totally discrete. Id., ¶11. 
¶79 The court of appeals determined in Johnson that there 
were discrete events even though there was only one officer 
conducting the examination and the interview.  193 Wis. 2d 382, 
389. It based the determination on the facts that the defendant 
was moved to a different room, there was a distinct break 
between the two events, and the officer did not refer to the 
test results in order to elicit the inculpatory statement. Id.  
There is no indication that the interview room had been used 
throughout the process, as is the case here. More importantly, 
in this case it was the use of the test results that elicited 
Davis's statement. Further, Davis's statement to Swanson came 
directly after Buenning had induced him to give it, with only 
enough time passing for Swanson to retrieve paperwork.  
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
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¶80 Because this case is similar to Schlise, and distinct 
from Greer and Johnson, the case law favors the conclusion that 
the examination and the interview were not discrete events.  
III 
¶81 In sum, the majority has altered the focus of the 
inquiry set forth in Greer and Schlise. As a result of skewing 
the focus, it incorrectly assumes that the post-examination 
interview commenced when Davis made his statement. Additionally, 
the majority misapplies the totality of the circumstances test. 
I conclude the proper inquiry and application of the totality of 
the circumstances test, together with our prior case law, 
requires the conclusion that the examination and the interview 
here were not discrete events. I therefore respectfully dissent. 
¶82 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2006AP1954-CR.awb 
 
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