Title: ESTATE OF SLAVENS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12381 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1973 I N T H E M A T T E R O F T H E ESTATE O F VIOLET SMITH S T A V E N S , Deceased. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C. B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Sandall, Moses and Cavan, Billings, Montana D. Frank Kampfe argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Evalyn B. Carson argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: March 28, 1973 Decided : mfi 8 ? 1973 M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from an order entered i n the d i s t r i c t court of the thirteenth judicial d i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County, denying ~ e t i t i o n e r ' s motion for a new t r i a l . The dispute i n t h i s case concerns a determinatian of the proper h e i r or heirs of the deceased Violet Smith Slavens. Decedent, hereinafter referred t o a s Mrs. Slavens, died intestate i n September 1971, Rose Smith Meyers, Mrs, Slavens' s i s t e r , was appointed administratrix. Lon Marsh, petitioner here, then peti- tioned the court t o determine heirship basing h i s claim on an alleged common law marriage between himself and M r s , Slavens. The t r i a l court found against the petitioner and we affirm. Mrs. Slavens and Marsh were married i n 1960 i n Roundup, Montana. After seven years of marriage, the parties were divorced i n June 1967. A s part of the property settlement Mrs. Slavens received a ranch i n Laurel, Montana and Marsh received an apartment building i n Billings, Montana, Both parties being avid race horse enthusiasts, they continued t o conduct certain business trans- actions jointly. Marsh managed the ranch and the race horses, while Mrs. Slavens collected rents on ~ a r s h ' s property i n Billings for him, Occasionally Marsh and Mrs. Slavens went on horse racing t r i p s together; the parties were, a t different times, seen a t motels together a f t e r t h e i r divorce and petitioner alleges they had resumed marital relations, The major portion of the controversy concerns whether the parties were living together in M r s , Slavens' apartment i n Billings. T h i s i s significant because, i f true, it would add credence t o Marsh's contention that a common law marriage existed a t a t i m e subsequent t o their divorce. Marsh contended that shortly a f t e r t h e i r divorce they resumed a marriage relationship not unlike that which existed prior t o their divorce, H e further contended he and M r s , Slavens agreed t o l i v e a s husband and wife and they consummated the marriage. Petitioner introduced considerable testimony and evidence tending t o show that he lived a t M r s . Slavens' apartment, a t l e a s t some of the time. Marsh received mail a t the apartment, often cooked dinner there, watched television there, and had h i s own key t o the apartment. O n the other hand, there was testimony by the apartment house manager that Marsh did not live there and M r s . Slavens, in fact, lived alone. Further testimony ~f M r s , Slavens' sisters indicated that, t o her family, she was known as a single woman a f t e r her divorce from Marsh and she continued to regard herself a s single u n t i l her death. In addition, respondents, the natural heirs of M r s . Slavens, introduced numerous exhibits showing that M r s . Slavens held herself out as a single woman a f t e r her divorce. These exhibits included income tax returns, retirement claims, doctor and hospital b i l l s , trade b i l l s , and correspondence, While the fact that Marsh a.nd Mrs. Slavens might have lived together i s important, i t i s only one of several factors t o be considered in determining whether a common law marriage existed. The Court i s aware the presumption of a moral and legal relation- ship i s a strong one. W e noted i n Welch v. A l l Persons, 78 Mont. 370, 384, 254 P, 179: 11 The presumption i n favor of matrimony i s one of the strongest known t o the law, I I The Court further noted i n Welch that marriage does not a r i s e by the mere fact of cohabitation alone. Section 48-101, R,C.M, 1947, s t a t e s what constitutes a marriage : I I Marriage i s a personal relation arising out of a c i v i l contract, t o which the consent of parties capable of making it is necessary, Consent alone w i l l nat constitute marriage; it must be followed by a solemnization, or by mutual and public assumption of the marital relation." In Welch and more recently i n Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co., 152 Mont. 210, 448 P.2d 148, the Court carefully considered section 48-101, R.C.M.1947. Applying that section t o the facts here, we find that the d i s t r i c t court had sufficient evidence t o find a common lzw marriage did not exist between Marsh and Mrs. Slavens subsequent t o t h e i r divorce i n 1967. Petitioner r e l i e s on the recent case of In the Matter of the Estate of Swanson, Mont , - , 502 P,2d 33, 29 St.Rep, 819. Marsh contends Swanson i s identical t o h i s own case, W e do not find the similarity between the circumstances of the two cases as does petitioner. In Swanson, Hazel Hzefner Swanson held herself out t o friends and neighbors a s the wife of the deceased George Swanson. Violet Smith Slavens did not hold herself out as the wife of Lon Marsh, Here, the transcript contains testimony that other people assumed o r considered then t o be married but there i s no showing that Mrs. Slavens ever held herself out as the wife of Marsh a f t e r the divorce, On the contrary, the docu- mentary evidence would indicate that quite the opposite was true. In the second appeal of Welch v. A l l Persons, 85 Mont, 114, 133, 278 P. 110, t h i s Court said: "The consent of the parties must be mutual. * * * While the consent need not be expressed i n any particular form * * * it must be given with such an intent on the Dart of each of the parties that marriage cinnot be said t o s t e a l upon them unawares. 'One cannot become married unwittingly or accidentally. The consent required by our statutes, a s well as the statutes of every s t a t e , and by the common law, must be seriously given with the deliberate intention that marriage r e s u l t presently there- from. " (Emphasis added) , Here, there simply was no showing, other than the alleged cohabitation, that Mrs. Slavens desired t o create a new marriage a r consented t o a resumption of a marital relationship. Had the parties, i n f a c t , continually cohabitated a f t e r t h e i r divorce, it is s t i l l only evidence of a marriage, not conclusive of the marriage i t s e l f . W e a r e not persuaded that, on the basis of the alleged cohabitation, there existed a valid common law marriage. The t r i a l court had ample justification and sufficient evidence t o find that no common law marriage existed between the p a r t i e s and t h a t h e i r s of the decedent be determined i n accord- ance with the laws of i n t e s t a t e succession, based on her single s t a t u s , The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s affirmed. i Associate J u s t i c e W e Concur: Associate a u s t i c e s . C Hon. Edward T. Bussault, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f a r Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison.